Dvoretsky / Yusupov · Secrets of Opening Preparation
Mark Dvoretsky and Artur Yusupov

Secrets of Opening Preparation

School of Future Champions 2

Edited and translated by Ken Neat

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Mark Dvoretsky

Introduction

When embarking on some serious enterprise, one always endeavours to plan it as well and as accurately as possible. And if the project proves to be a good one, things usually develop successfully.

Grandmaster Yusupov and I discussed in detail the directions and principles of the working of the school for gifted young chess players, which we were intending to organise. And now it is pleasant to report that our main ideas have withstood the test of time. An indication of this is provided by the successes of pupils from the school. Many of them have already become quite strong players, victors and medal-winners in the junior championships of the country, Europe and the world. In 1992 alone, four of our pupils became champions of the world or Europe – Ilakha Kadymova, Inna Gaponenko, Alexey Alexandrov and Vadim Zviagintsev.

Our main principle was a reliable one, since earlier it had been verified on our own experience. We realised perfectly well that we should not simply convey specific chess knowledge to the pupils – over two ten-day sessions in a year you can’t show much, and besides, this is by no means the most important thing when teaching chess. It is far more important: a) to familiarise pupils with the general ideas, methods and procedures of play – they have universal importance; b) to reveal rational ways of working on chess and means of mastering general ideas, as well as obtaining necessary specific information; c) to analyse deficiencies in the pupils’ play and help to eliminate them.

Another idea which justified itself was the conducting of thematic sessions. Each of our meetings was devoted to some direction of work on chess. The ‘massed’ attack in this direction – lectures, practical exercises, and additional material which we provided for the pupils – gave a strong impetus for improvement in the given field.

We would like to be able to help any player who wishes to play more strongly than before, and who for this aim is prepared to work seriously on self-improvement. But the number of pupils at the school is limited. Therefore right from the start we planned to prepare instructional books, combining lectures read at the sessions with the most interesting articles on the given topic.

The first such book, based on the materials of the first session of our school, was published in 1991. Secrets of Chess Training (Olms 2006) was a new and greatly expanded edition. In it the most general questions of studying chess are analysed – the disclosure and elimination of a player’s weaknesses, the technique of analysing your own and other players’ games and the extraction of useful information from them, the role of the classical heritage, and so on.

Now you have before you our second book. It is devoted to the opening. What new ideas can we offer here to the reader? It is worth speaking about this in more detail.

It is probable that a good 50% of all chess books are monographs, analysing a specific opening variation or a collection of them. Essentially these are reference books, and sometimes you have to consult them, but to master opening theory with them alone is
not easy. They offer too much information, the greater part of which is completely superfluous, and there is too little explanation of the general ideas typical of the variations in question. In addition, opening monographs very quickly become outdated.

For chess amateurs who want to learn quickly how to play a particular opening, there are appropriate books, which analyse only the necessary minimum number of variations. They are indeed very useful. But to achieve genuine mastery in playing the opening stage of the game, using only ready-made prescriptions, is impossible. You need to study the methods of opening preparation in general, reflect on the typical problems which other players encounter, and independently analyse opening systems that appeal to you.

Our book will help you in this work. It is intended for players (in particular, young players) wishing to deepen their understanding of chess in general and the opening stage in particular, and to learn to work independently on the opening.

The first part of the book describes the problems you will encounter in playing the opening, and what is needed to successfully solve them at the board. Here the central place is given over to lectures by World Championship Candidates Artur Yusupov and Sergey Dolmatov (Sergey is an active collaborator at our school). In my view, it is exceptionally interesting to follow the thought train of these outstanding grandmasters, who openly describe what they think about during a game, how they find the best moves, and why they sometimes go wrong.

But in order to learn to take correct decisions, an acquaintance with ‘theory’ alone is insufficient. Practical training is also needed. At each session of the school we invariably arrange various events, competitions, and so on. One such training session is described in the first part of the book.

The second part is devoted to the development of an opening repertoire, and preparation for an event or for a specific opponent. This topic is continued in the third part, which talks about the independent analysis of opening positions and the technology of devising novelties.

The fourth part traces the connection of the opening with other stages of the game, and demonstrates the continuity of chess ideas. In it the central idea, permeating the entire book, is especially emphasised: the key to your success lies not in the mechanical memorising of opening information, but in assimilating the wealth of chess ideas and improving your chess culture.

However, although it was not our main objective, the reader will also find a considerable amount of useful specific information—opening novelties (some of which have not yet been employed in practice), recommendations on the playing of the most diverse positions, and reviews of a number of opening systems (King’s Indian Attack, Closed Variation of the Ruy Lopez, Queen’s Gambit Accepted, and others).

Finally, by tradition we conclude the book with extracts from the games of pupils at the school, annotated by grandmaster Yusupov. Here there are models of high-level, full-blooded opening struggles, as well as examples of instructive opening mistakes.

In his comments on the pupils’ games, Yusupov focuses on those general problems of opening play, which he described in the lecture which begins our book. When studying his lecture, it probably makes sense to immediately refer to the concluding chapter, and examine them in parallel.

This book has been created by a team of authors. Apart from the author of these lines and grandmasters Yusupov and Dolmatov, it also includes articles by grandmaster Yuri Razuvaev and national masters Boris Zlotnik,
Alexey Kosikov and Vladimir Vulfson. I am sincerely grateful to all of them. I hope that the compiled views of different experts on one and the same problems will prove interesting to the readers, and impart a certain diversity to the book.

If our work should force the reader to think about the difficult but fascinating problems of opening preparation, and suggest new ideas to him in this field, the authors will consider their objective fulfilled.

For this new edition the text has been checked anew, many analytical corrections have been included, and the chapter on the King's Indian Attack has been considerably expanded.
PART I

Artur Yusupov

General Principles of Opening Play

Let us ask ourselves the question: what does the strategy of opening play comprise? If you look at the games of strong masters, you will see that the players aim above all for the rapid mobilisation of their forces. And this is understandable: the greater the number of pieces in play, the greater the attacking possibilities. **Rapid development is the basis of opening play.**

There is a second important factor: from the very first moves a struggle for the centre develops. The centre is a kind of dominant height in a chess battle: whoever seizes it will subsequently have the better prospects. Naturally, from the very start both sides focus on the central squares e4, e5, d4 and d5. **As a rule, players aim either to occupy the centre with pawns, or to develop piece pressure on it.**

Along with this, the two sides try to forestall each other’s intentions. **It makes sense with some move to delay the opponent’s development or hinder his actions – it is probable that the ‘loss of a tempo’ will subsequently be justified. You should not begrudge a tempo spent on preventing him from castling** – with this you will consolidate your lead in development. Thus the third principle of opening play is to fight against the opponent’s ideas, with the aim of hindering his development and preventing him from gaining control of the centre.

You ask, which is more important: to develop your own pieces or hinder the opponent’s development? Of course, the ideal is if you can combine the one with the other. But if there is a choice, in every specific case you must act in accordance with the situation – here there is no universal prescription. But even so, it is better not to forget about your own development.

What else concerns a player in the opening? Of course, the forming of the pawn structure. It is possible that at an early stage you will be able to provoke a weakening in the opponent’s pawn formation, or, as they say, spoil his pawns. **Remember: much depends on what sort of pawn structure you obtain – favourable or unfavourable.**

And, finally, **from the very first moves a struggle for the initiative develops, and this is perhaps the chief essence of opening play.** Can you imagine a game nowadays, where for some time the two players simply bring out their pieces, and then begin looking to see what has happened and what do to next? Of course not. It is natural that White, who has the right of the first move, should usually aim in the opening to gain a lead in development, occupy the centre and be the first to create threats.

Before turning to specific examples, I should draw your attention to another important factor. **The modern handling of the opening is inseparably linked with a plan of play in the middlegame (and sometimes even the contours of a future endgame have to be taken into account!).** And today it is hard to draw a clear line between the
opening and the middlegame, especially since, although in somewhat different form, all the listed principles of opening strategy are also applicable to the middlegame.

And so, let us examine in more detail the first opening principle (rapid mobilisation of the forces). We should remember several simple rules:

1) do not move one and the same piece twice (there should be a serious motivation for such moves);
2) don’t waste time on prophylactic moves with the rooks’ pawns – it is more important to develop the pieces quickly;
3) don’t bring out the queen prematurely: the choice of a place for it is an exceptionally important problem, since the character of the subsequent play can largely depend on the position of the queen;
4) don’t launch a premature, unprepared attack;
5) don’t go pawn-grabbing, especially in open positions, where a lead in development has enormous significance; remember that a tempo in the opening is sometimes more important than a pawn.

We will now analyse a game of mine with grandmaster Boris Gulko. I think that from its example the principles of mobilising the forces and opening play in general will become more understandable.

Yusupov – Gulko
Reykjavik 1990
King’s Indian Defence

1 d4  e6
2 c4  g6
3 f3  g7
4 g3  0-0
5 g2  d6
6 d2

We see how with each move new forces come into play. White occupies the centre with pawns, while Black prepares to exert piece pressure on it.

7 c3  f5

Not a frequently-occurring move, but a perfectly possible one. Black develops his bishop and establishes control over the central e4-square, with the intention of playing 8...e4.

8 d5

Here there are also other continuations – e1, b2–b3 and e1. The move made is also quite logical: with gain of tempo White increases his spatial gains in the centre.

8...

a5

For the second time in the opening Black moves the same piece, but in the given instance this is justified: firstly, he was forced to do this, and secondly, 8...a5 creates a counter-threat to the c4-pawn.

Now the question arises: what should White play?

9 d2?!  

The move made in the game has certain drawbacks. At d2 the knight blocks the path of the bishop on c1. I was hoping that the threat of 10 b4 would force the opponent to block the position on the queenside by
...c7–c5. Then White gains a tempo by advancing his pawn to e4, and later completes his development by \( \text{wc2} \), b2–b3, \( \text{\#b2} \) and so on. Alas, events took a different turn.

9 \( \text{\#d4} \) looks more natural and logical. The bishop at f5 is attacked, and the c4-pawn is indirectly defended: if 9...\( \text{\#xc4} \) there follows 10 \( \text{\#xf5} \) gxf5 11 \( \text{wd3} \), and White regains his pawn, obtaining the better pawn structure. After 9...\( \text{\#d7} \) 10 \( \text{wd3} \) White has a promising position.

9...c6!

After gaining some lead in development, my opponent resolutely opens the position. Now I was faced with a new problem: how to extinguish Black's intended initiative? I was unable to solve this task and I got into difficulties.

The logical follow-up to 9 \( \text{\#d2} \) was the energetic 10 b4!? The main idea, which I did not see during the game, is after 10...\( \text{\#xd5} \) 11 cxd5 \( \text{\#xc3} \) to play 12 e4! (I only considered 12 \( \text{\#a3} \)? \( \text{\#xd2} \)). It is probable that White will gain two pieces for a rook, but in return Black will have several pawns. It is not easy to evaluate such a situation; it is quite possible that we have here a position of dynamic equilibrium.

In the game White played routinely.

10 e4?! \( \text{\#g4}! \)

With this cunning move Black provokes new weaknesses: either the advance f2–f3, which allows Black tactical possibilities involving ...\( \text{\#b6} \), or the move of the queen to c2, where after the opening of the c-file it will come under the unpleasant pressure of the rook on c8.

11 \( \text{\#c2} \) cxd5

12 cxd5

Capturing with the e-pawn would have been even worse: in this case the black bishop would have gained the excellent f5-square.

Note how consistently Gulko brings new forces into play, gradually building up the pressure. Exploiting White's routine play, which has hampered his development, Black has already seized the initiative. Now he is obliged to follow a very important principle, which was formulated long ago by Steinitz: the player with an advantage is obliged to attack, as otherwise he risks losing his advantage!

13 \( \text{\#e1} \)

White tries somehow to establish coordination between his pieces. He prepares to continue his development with 14 \( \text{\#f1} \) and at the same time he prevents the manoeuvre of the black bishop via e2 to a6, where it would exert dangerous pressure.

13...b5

Here there were also other possibilities, 13...\( \text{\#b6} \), for example. 13...\( \text{\#d7} \) also came into consideration, vacating the g4-square for the manoeuvre of the knight to e5 and planning to meet 14 \( \text{\#f1} \) with 14...\( \text{\#c4} \).

14 a3

Here too it was possible to play 14...\( \text{\#d7} \)? 15 \( \text{\#f1} \) \( \text{\#c4} \) 16 \( \text{\#e3} \) \( \text{\#g4} \). But Gulko found a much more interesting continuation, based on the same general evaluation of the position: Black has a lead in development, and therefore it is advantageous for him to open up the game.
14 ... e6!
After the exchange of pawns on d5 the bishop will obtain the f5-square, which is extremely unpleasant for White. If he replies 15 h3?!; there follows 15...exd5 16 hgx4 d4, and my pawn structure will be hopelessly spoiled, i.e. Black transforms one form of advantage into another: a lead in development into a superior pawn structure.

I had to try another method of defence, which can be expressed roughly as follows: when everything is bad, it is already too late to fear anything!

15 wd3
What to do? I was already resigned to the fact that I would be unable to complete my development by normal means, and I try everything possible to complicate the play. Such tactics can sometimes give quite good practical results, although with correct play on the part of the opponent they should probably be punished. Objectively the quiet 15 df1 (15...exd5 16 exd5) was nevertheless the lesser evil.

15 ... exd5
16 dxb5
Whereas for White the opening has not yet ended, Black, of course, is already deep in the middlegame. Now he could have played 16...wb6!?, securing a retreat for his bishop to d7. The advanced position of the bishop at g4 is perhaps the only defect of his game (there is a possibility that the bishop may be cut off from the main forces).

But from the standpoint of fighting for the initiative, Gulkov found perhaps an even better move.

16 ... e8!?
Yet another black piece comes into play...
From this moment on, balancing on the edge of the abyss, I time after time found resources for continuing the struggle. I was simply fortunate that the position proved quite complicated and for the moment it is not yet possible to predict how it will all end.

17 h3 Qf5
A tempting reply. Also possible was 17...e6, in reply to which there would have followed 18 exd5 Qf5 19 Qxe8+ Qxe8 20 Qf1. White is a pawn up, although Black, of course, has strong counterplay.

18 g4
The only move. White, albeit at the cost of a pawn, nevertheless manages to complete his development.

18 ... Qxe4
19 Qxe4
The knight has finally left the d2-square!

19 ... Qxe4
In view of White’s retarded development, regaining the pawn by 20 Qxe4?! would have been equivalent to capitulation: 20...dxe4 21 Qxd6 Wh4!. 20 Qxd5? is also bad on account of the very strong reply 20...Qe5!.

20 Qxa7!? In this game White acts against all the rules, and with accurate play by the opponent he should have been punished. But I was aware that after the ‘normal’ development of events I had nothing to hope for.

20 ... Qb8
In the event of 21 Qxd5?! the tactical stroke 21...Qxf2!? suggests itself, for example: 22 Qxe8+ Qxe8 23 Qxf2 Qb3 24 Qc6 with an unclear game. But the inclusion of 21...Qe5! would appear to set White altogether insoluble problems: his pieces are uncoordinated, and the same terrible blow on f2 is threatened (22 Qd3 Qxf2 23 Qxf2 Wh4+!).

Naturally, he must exploit the opportunity to bring his hitherto inactive bishop into play.

21 Qe3 Qxb2
22 Qab1
If 22 Qad1 the reply 22...Qc3 is unpleasant, for example: 23 Qd2 d4 24 Qxb2 Qxb2 25 Qxd4 Qe2+ 26 Qxe2 Qxe2, and if 27 Qh6, then simply 27...Qxe5, blocking the danger-
ous diagonal and remaining with a great material advantage.

\[ 22 \ldots \ \text{b}b3 \]

Gulko conducts the game purposefully and finds a concrete way of increasing his advantage.

\[ 23 \text{wx}d5 \]

White would have lost quickly after 23 c2 b8 24 c6 c6 25 xc6 xc8.

\[ 23 \ldots \ \text{c}c3 \]

The correct reaction was 24...d7!. But Gulko did not notice that in the variation 25 xa5 xb1 26 xb1 there is the deadly 26...c3!. White would have had to continue trying to stir up trouble with 26 c6 (26 xe8+ xe8 27 c6 wb8 is no better), but not for long: 26...xe1+ 27 xe1 xa7 28 e8+ g7 29 e7 b8, and Black wins.

Fortunately for me, however, Gulko was tempted by a queen sacrifice.

\[ 24 \ldots \ \text{xb}1? \]

\[ 25 \text{d}8 \]

\[ 26 \text{f}1 \]

A completely unclear position has arisen, in which the threats of the two sides would appear to be mutually compensating.

\[ 26 \ldots \ \text{c}3 \]

\[ 27 \text{d}2! \]

27 xa5? was bad: 27...e2+ 28 g2 f4+ 29 g1 xh3+ 30 g2 f4+ 31 g1 c3, and therefore White takes control of the f4-square. However, 27 a8!? was also possible. If 27...e2+? there follows not 28 g2? f4+, but 28 h2! g7 29 e7 e5+ 30 f4!, in the event of 27...e8 there is the pretty reply 28 c8!, while 27...g7 28 g2! (but not 28 xa5? e2+) enables White to escape in good time from the unpleasant pin on the back rank.

Here there is an interesting calculating problem – find the continuation which promises White the best practical chances. In essence, there are three possibilities:

1) 24 xb3 xb3 25 xb2 c5. In my view, Black has the advantage (although it can happen that such a surrender of material will help to repair the position);
2) 24 c6 – objectively, perhaps, this counter-stroke is the strongest. However, after 24...xd5 25 xd8 xe3 Black, of course, has an obvious advantage (for example, 26 xe3 bxe3 27 xe3 xa3);
3) The move which I made in the game, and on which I was pinning my hopes.

\[ 24 \text{g}5!? \]

Here Black needed to solve the last difficult problem, after which he would most probably have gained a deserved win.
27...\(\mathcal{D}e2+\)

Dvoretsky suggested the interesting variation 27...\(\mathcal{A}d1?!\) 28 \(\mathcal{W}e3\) \(\mathcal{D}c4\) 29 \(\mathcal{W}e8+\) \(\mathcal{G}g7\), and now either 30 \(\mathcal{A}e7\) \(\mathcal{D}e2+\) 31 \(\mathcal{G}g2\) \(\mathcal{D}f4+\) 32 \(\mathcal{G}h2\) \(\mathcal{D}e6\) 33 \(\mathcal{F}f8+\)! (33 \(\mathcal{A}xc4?\) \(\mathcal{D}e5+\) leads to mate) 33...\(\mathcal{D}xf8\) 34 \(\mathcal{A}xc4\) \(\mathcal{A}b7\), or 30 \(\mathcal{G}h2?!\) \(\mathcal{A}xf1\) 31 \(\mathcal{A}e7\) \(\mathcal{A}xf2+\) 32 \(\mathcal{G}g1\) \(\mathcal{A}h6\) 33 \(\mathcal{F}f8+\)! (not immediately 33 \(\mathcal{A}xf2?\) \(\mathcal{D}e4+\)) 33...\(\mathcal{A}h7\) 34 \(\mathcal{A}xf2\) – in each case with chances for both sides.

28 \(\mathcal{G}g2\)
29 \(\mathcal{W}h6\)

29 \(\mathcal{W}xd6\) is also possible.

29...\(\mathcal{G}g7\) 30 \(\mathcal{W}d2\) \(\mathcal{C}c3\) would have led to a draw.

30 \(\mathcal{D}c6\)
31 \(\mathcal{D}e7+\)
\(\mathcal{F}f8?!\)

A mistake. Correct was 31...\(\mathcal{A}h8!\) 32 \(\mathcal{D}xg6+!\) \(\mathcal{F}xg6\) 33 \(\mathcal{A}f6!\) \(\mathcal{A}b7\) 34 \(\mathcal{A}xe2\) \(\mathcal{A}xe2\) 35 \(\mathcal{A}xg7+\) \(\mathcal{A}xg7\) 36 \(\mathcal{W}f4!\) with equal chances.

32 \(\mathcal{W}xh7\)
33 \(\mathcal{G}h2\)
\(\mathcal{D}f4+\)

In the opinion of grandmaster Igor Zaitsev, Black would still have retained excellent drawing chances by continuing 33...\(\mathcal{A}xe7!\) 34 \(\mathcal{A}xe7+\) \(\mathcal{A}xe7\) 35 \(\mathcal{W}xg7\) \(\mathcal{D}e5\) (or 35...\(\mathcal{A}d2\)) 36 \(\mathcal{G}g2\) \(\mathcal{A}xa3\).

34 \(\mathcal{D}g8+!\)

Not 34 \(\mathcal{W}xg7?\) \(\mathcal{A}xf1\) and then 35...\(\mathcal{A}xh3\) mate.

34...\(\mathcal{D}f8\)

Black would also not have saved the game with 34...\(\mathcal{A}d7\) 35 \(\mathcal{W}xf7\) \(\mathcal{A}xf1\) 36 \(\mathcal{D}c6+!\) \(\mathcal{A}xc6\) 37 \(\mathcal{W}xc4+\) \(\mathcal{A}d7\) 38 \(\mathcal{W}xb3\).

(see diagram)

35 \(\mathcal{D}xg6!\)

The distance between a win and a loss proved to be very short. After this blow Black’s position is no longer defensible (if 35...\(\mathcal{D}xg6\) there simply follows 36 \(\mathcal{A}xc4\)).
45 $\text{hxh1}$  $\text{f7}$  
46 $\text{g2}$  $\text{f6}$  
46...$\text{e6}$ was better.  
47 $\text{f4}$  $\text{d5}$  
48 $\text{f2}$  $\text{d6}$  
49 $\text{f3}$  $\text{e6}$  
50 $\text{d4}$  $\text{e7!}$  
51 $\text{g3}$  $\text{b4!}$  
52 $\text{h4}$  $\text{e1+}$  
53 $\text{h3}$  $\text{d2}$  
54 $\text{g3}$  $\text{e1+}$  
55 $\text{f2}$  $\text{c3}$  
56 $\text{f3}$  $\text{g7}$  

More tenacious was 56...$\text{f6!}$? 57 $\text{h5}$ $\text{gxh5}$  
58 $\text{f5+}$  $\text{f7}$  59 $\text{gxh5}$, but even then it is probable that the position cannot be held – 
White plays $\text{e3}$, $\text{g4}$, $\text{g5}$, then $\text{f3}$–$\text{e2}$–$\text{d3}$–$\text{c2}$–$\text{b3}$–$\text{a4}$, and the d5-pawn is lost.  
57 $\text{e1!}$?  
57 $\text{b6!}$?, preparing $\text{e3}$ and $\text{d4}$, was also good.  
57 ...  $\text{f8}?!$  
58 $\text{c3}$  $\text{h6}?!$  
59 $\text{f5+}$  $\text{gxf5}$  
60 $\text{g5}$  

Black resigned in view of 60...$\text{f8}$ 61 $\text{h5}$ $\text{f7}$  
62 $\text{f4}$.

I should like once again to draw your attention to Gulko’s exceptionally consistent 
play in this game, right up to his fatal mistake on the 24th move. Already in the 
opening he began fighting for the initiative, and after gaining a lead in development he 
continued purposefully building on it, bringing more and more new pieces into the 
battle, not shunning temporary sacrifices. In this connection one can single out his 
moves 14...$\text{e6}!$ and 16...$\text{e8}!$.

As for White, after violating one of the main 
opening principles (the rapid mobilisation of 
the forces) and conceding the initiative, he 
should have lost. But this game is also 
noteworthy in that it demonstrates the 
importance of continuing to fight in any 
circumstances. Yes, White ended up in an 
inferior position. But he did not lose heart, 
and tried to initiate counterplay and seize 
the initiative. In the end he was able to set 
his opponent difficult practical problems, 
and the latter deviated from the correct 
course...

The following is a somewhat simpler exam­ple. In contrast to the game with Gulko, for 
my meeting with Boris Spassky I was well 
prepared.

**Spassky – Yusupov**  
Linares 1990  
*Ruy Lopez*  
1 $\text{e4}$  $\text{e5}$  
2 $\text{c3}$  $\text{c6}$  
3 $\text{b5}$  $\text{a6}$  
4 $\text{a4}$  $\text{f6}$  
5 $\text{c3}$

Spassky often employs this ancient continu­ation, which at one time was considered 
virtually the main variation in the Ruy Lopez, 
but then almost went out of use.

From the common sense point of view, there 
is nothing wrong with the move 5 $\text{c3}$: 
White brings out a piece towards the centre. 
However, those who have studied the Ruy 
Lopez will know that it is nevertheless better 
to play 5 0–0, in order subsequently to create 
a pawn centre with c2–c3 and d2–d4 (which 
the knight on c3 hinders).

5 ...  $\text{b5}$  
5...$\text{c5}!$? is also possible.  
6 $\text{b3}$  $\text{e7}$  
7 $\text{d3}$  $\text{d6}$  
8 $\text{d5}$  

It is tempting, of course, to strengthen the 
control of an important diagonal and in 
particular of the central d5-square. But 8
d5 leads to simplification and effectively to an equal game.

8 ... Qa5
9 Qxe7 Qxe7
10 0-0 0-0

Strangely enough, a novelty. 10...c5 is usually played.

11 Qd2

This rather inactive move was also employed earlier by Spassky.

11 ... Qxb3
12 axb3

Let's think a little about the resulting position. How would you go about solving Black's opening problems?

12 ... c5? Well, a perfectly possible move, strengthening Black's control over the centre. Have you any other suggestions?

12 ... Qd7, preparing ...f7–f5? A good idea. Develop the bishop at b7? Yes, this comes into Black's plans. But I did not want to play this immediately on account of the strong reply 13 Qh4. The pieces should be brought out in the most accurate way, taking account of the opponent's resources.

Let us sum up what has been said. Indeed, here the undermining of the central e4-pawn by ...f7–f5 suggests itself. It simply stems from the structure of the position. If Black were able to make the moves ...Qb7, ...Qd7 and ...f7–f5, the play would be to his advantage. But he must act so as not to allow the unpleasant sortie of the white knight to h4. Therefore in my preparations for the game I intended beginning with the retreat of the knight.

12 ... Qd7!

Black has successfully solved his opening problems, without spending time on ...c7–c5 – a move which, generally speaking, is useful, but not immediately necessary. Here White should have displayed caution and prepared for the opponent's operations in the centre. But Spassky did not sense in time the danger of his position. Indeed, at this moment it is not easy to imagine that the situation may radically change literally within a few moves.

13 Qe1?!
13 Qa5 c5 14 Qd2, as suggested later by the ex-world champion, would have led to equality.

13 ... Qb7

Everything is ready for ...f7–f5. It was high time for White to think about defence, but to his misfortune he decided to pour further fuel onto the fire.

14 d4?

14 Qg5 f6 15 Qh4 with the idea of 16 Qd2 was better, when Black has only a slight advantage.

14 ... f5!

Here White could have captured on e5, but the variations would have developed in my favour, for example: 15 dxe5 fxe4 16 exd6 Wf7! 17 Qc3 zag8 18 Qg5 Wxf2+ 19 Qh1 e3 20 Wg4 h5 21 Wg3 cxd6 with advantage.

After lengthy reflection Spassky played differently.

15 exf5 Qxf5
16 dxe5
This sacrifice suggests itself. Of course, for the sake of activating the bishop at b7 Black does not begrudge giving up the exchange. The consequences of the primitive 16...\textit{xf}3 were less clear: 17 gxf3 2xe5 (not 17...\textit{xe}5? 18 f4 \textit{wh}4 19 fxe5 2xf2 20 \textit{f}4!) 18 2xe5 \textit{xe}5 19 \textit{we}1.

17 gxf3 18 \textit{f}4

18 f4 would have lost quickly to 18...\textit{f}7 or 18...\textit{wh}4.

18... 19 \textit{xf}3+?! Here I was rather faint-hearted and decided to take play into an endgame with an extra pawn, which I might not have won. Of course, I should have continued the attack, but as bad luck would have it I made a mistake in my calculations. I thought that after 18...\textit{f}8 19 2xe5 dxe5 20 \textit{d}4 a not altogether clear position would arise. However, it was sufficient to continue this variation slightly, to realise that the opposite was true: 20...\textit{f}6 21 \textit{g}4 \textit{xf}3, and Black has a powerful attack. [After 22 \textit{g}3 e4 23 \textit{xc}7 its strength would still have had to be demonstrated – Dvoretsky.]

In the game, alas, it all turned out far more prosaically.

19 2xf3 \textit{xe}1+

At the cost of enormous efforts I nevertheless managed to win this endgame, but only thanks to a serious mistake by my opponent. This game shows that aiming for control of the centre and paying careful attention to similar actions by the opponent enables many opening problems to be solved. There is another important factor: the specific plans of the two sides are determined by the pawn structure at a fairly early stage of the game.

The next point. When developing the pieces, tried to think what you will be doing a few moves later, what direction the play will take. Only, this should not be taken literally, that supposedly already in the opening you must firmly devise and develop a plan, which will lead directly to a win somewhere in the endgame. No, of course not. I have in mind fairly short operations, of three or four moves, aimed at improving your position and worsening the position of the opponent. In essence, an entire game is a sum of mini-operations, united by a general strategic idea, incorporated in the opening chosen by you.

How such short operations are planned will be seen in the following game.

Yusupov – Ljubojevic
Tilburg 1987
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 \textit{f}6
2 c4 e6
3 \textit{f}3 d5
4 \textit{c}3 \textit{e}7
5 \textit{f}4 0-0
6 e3

A well-known theoretical position. Ljubomir Ljubojevic chooses a continuation which is
less well-studied, compared with the usual 6...c5.

6... b6
A normal move, aiding Black’s development and conforming to the idea of fighting for the centre. The entire character of the subsequent play will largely depend on White’s next decision.

Let’s list them in order: what candidate moves are there? 7 cxd5, 7 e2 and 7 c1.

7 c1
I didn’t want to capture on d5, as long as the opponent can recapture with his knight. When you hold the initiative, it is better to avoid simplification. Any exchange should be motivated, i.e. bring some positional or tactical dividends. Thus after 7...b7 8 cxd5 the capture with the knight is now dubious – the c7-pawn is lost. The combination of the moves 7 c1 and 8 cxd5 is in fact the first mini-operation, planned in this game by White.

7... c5
Pawn tension, typical of many modern openings, has arisen. In such cases it is important to decide for yourself what pawn structure you want to obtain.

8 dxc5!
Of course, this move is not a revelation in chess theory, although according to Informator it was a novelty by White (the usual continuation was 8 cxd5). The capture on c5 soon leads to Black acquiring hanging pawns. If he recaptures on c5 with his bishop, he obtains a position with an isolated pawn, to which White also does not object (then the move ...b7–b6 may prove not the most advisable).

8... bxc5
9 e2 b7
10 0-0 bd7
In principle, the opening can be considered complete. It is here, according to the rules given in certain old books, that the two players should start forming plans. In fact, I made my choice much earlier, when I gave a direction to the play with the move 7 c1. It is clear that the main factor in the battle will soon become the attack and defence of the hanging pawns.

11 cxd5 exd5
11...xd5!? came into consideration, when White has only a slight advantage.
How to intensify the pressure on the opponent’s pawn centre? For a start it would not be bad to attack the d5-pawn, by carrying out a small concrete operation: e5 and f3.

12 e5
In the given instance I did not avoid a possible exchange, since there was a definite point to it. Firstly, the knight has vacated the f3-square, from which the bishop will be able to attack the d5-pawn, and secondly, in the event of 12...xe5 13 xe5 the other bishop will be attacking the f6-knight, one of the defenders of the d5-pawn – and in a certain sense there is also a gain of a tempo. Black then has to retreat his knight to d7 and, possibly, even play it to b6. The initiative remains on White’s side.

12... b6
What would you have played here?
13 ... c2 and then d2? Well, this manoeuvre is not bad, but I have something else in mind: how would you react to the opponent's last move? Remember an old procedure in such positions: by advancing your a-pawn, you emphasise the instability of the knight on b6.

13 a4!

Now Black faces a difficult dilemma: on the one hand, he does not want to allow his knight to be driven away, but on the other hand, after a7–a5 White gains the b5-square. What then should he do?

You suggest playing 13...d4? Let's see: 14 exd4 cxd4 15 b5 d5 16 g3 and it is hard to defend the d4-pawn. But in itself the idea is interesting. With this pawn structure White must constantly reckon with the possible breakthrough ...d5-d4. In some cases it may prove rather unpleasant.

13 ... a5

White's first big achievement. Now it was possible to immediately invade with the knight on b5, aiming to use the b5 + f4 construction for operations on the d6- and c7-squares. But after some thought I decided for the moment not to deviate from my plan and to retain the pressure on the d5-pawn.

14 f3 e8

If Black had replied 14...c8, I would indeed have considered the manoeuvre 15 c2 and 16 d2, in order to strengthen the pressure on the d5-pawn. But after the move made I could no longer resist the temptation to exploit the b5-square.

15 b5!

The play takes on a tactical character. The unpleasant threat of 16 xf7 and 17 c7 is created, and to parry it Black is forced to put his rook in a rather awkward position.

At the same time b5 is not only an attacking move, but also a prophylactic one: Black was now intending to play 15...d6 and drive my pieces away from the centre.

15 ... a6

If 15...c8 there could have followed 16 a7! with the idea of exploiting the weakness of the c6-square – incidentally, a fairly typical operation with a knight on e5.

Think now: what would you have played here? Should White immediately play actively, or should he delay this and for the moment strengthen his position, denying the opponent counterplay? This problem is one of the most difficult when trying to convert a positional advantage.

In this game I solved it incorrectly, by hurrying to begin concrete action. White had available the excellent move 16.b3!, securely fixing the opponent's pawn structure and allowing the pressure to be built up unhindered.

16 d3?!

White's choice involved an oversight in one of the variations. It is quite obvious that in reply Black will advance his c-pawn, which 16 b3! would have prevented.

16 ... c4

17 c7

In the event of 17 c7 cxd3 18 a6 xax6 19 c7 xd7 20 xb6 b4! Black would have gained good compensation for the exchange.
The white pieces – the knight on b5 and the bishop on c7 – are unexpectedly hanging. Thus if 18 \( \text{Qf4} \) there follows the tactical stroke 18...\( \text{Qxa4}! \).

18 \( \text{Qe5} \) \( \text{Wc8} \)
19 \( \text{b3?!} \)

19 \( \text{Qxb6} \) \( \text{Qxb6} \) 20 \( \text{Qg4} \) would have given an equal game.

19 ... \( \text{Lc8} \)

20 ... \( \text{d4?!} \) was dubious on account of 21 \( \text{Qd5}! \) \( \text{Qf8} \) 22 \( \text{Qf3} \).

21 \( \text{cxd5} \)

22 \( \text{Qc4!} \)

Black would have gained an obvious advantage after 22 \( \text{Qc6} \) \( \text{Wd7}! \) (with the idea of 23...\( \text{Qxd5} \)) 23 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{Qxe4} \) 24 \( \text{Qxe4} \) \( \text{Qxe4} \) 25 \( \text{Qb8} \) \( \text{We7} \) 26 \( \text{Qxa6} \) \( \text{Qxa6} \).

Here Black had various possibilities. One of them was an attempt to simplify the position by the counter-sacrifice of a piece: 22...\( \text{Qxh2+?!} \) 23 \( \text{Qxh2} \) \( \text{Qxd5} \). However, after 24 \( \text{Qg1} \) with the idea of 25 \( \text{Qcd6} \) or 25 \( \text{Wd4} \) White has the advantage. It was probably best to play 22...\( \text{Qb4!} \), placing the bishop on a defended square. In reply there could have followed 23 \( \text{d6?!} \) or 23 \( \text{e4?!} \) (23...\( \text{Qxe4} \) 24 \( \text{d6} \) with the threat of 25 \( \text{d7} \)).

In the game Ljubojevic committed a tactical oversight, leading to defeat.

22 ... \( \text{Qc5!?} \)

23 \( \text{Qxa5!} \) \( \text{Qxa5} \)

24 \( \text{Qxc5} \) \( \text{Wd8} \)

Here 24...\( \text{Wb8} \) 25 \( \text{Wd2} \) \( \text{Qa6} \) 26 \( \text{Qc4} \) would not have saved Black. Ljubojevic was hoping to disentangle himself with the move in the game, but he overlooked a simple rejoinder.

(see diagram)

25 \( \text{Qd6!!} \) \( \text{Wxd6} \)

If 25...\( \text{Qxc5} \), then 26 \( \text{Qxb7} \).

26 \( \text{Qxa5} \) \( \text{Qxd5} \)

[Neither player noticed the clever reply 26...\( \text{Qa6!} \) with the idea of arresting the white rook on a5. If 27 \( \text{Qe1} \) there follows 27...\( \text{Wb4}! \), while if 27 \( \text{Qe2} \) – 27...\( \text{Wb6}! \). White is obliged to play 27 \( \text{Qxa6} \) \( \text{Qxa6} \) 28 \( \text{Wd4} \) with roughly equal chances. But this means that the move 22...\( \text{Qc5}! \) should not be condemned – Dvoretsky.]

27 \( \text{Wd4!} \)

The decisive move. Now the game is decided.

27 ... \( \text{We6} \)

27...\( \text{Qe6?!} \) 28 \( \text{Qxd5} \)

28 \( \text{Qxd5} \) \( \text{Qxd5} \)

29 \( \text{Qd1} \) \( \text{Qc8} \)

30 \( \text{Qc5!} \) \( \text{Qxc5} \)

31 \( \text{Qxc5} \) \( \text{h5} \)

32 \( \text{a5} \) \( \text{We4} \)

33 \( \text{h3} \) \( \text{g6} \)

34 \( \text{Qc6} \) \( \text{Wb4} \)

35 \( \text{a6} \) \( \text{Wb5} \)

36 \( \text{Qb7} \) \( \text{Wxa4} \)

37 \( \text{Qb1} \)

Black resigned.

Let us now single out for what reason this game is of interest to us. In particular we see
that the struggle for the centre led to the creation of a specific pawn structure (hanging pawns), which influenced to a significant degree the subsequent plans of the two sides. Such pawn structures are a separate theme, which should be studied seriously. Here there are rules and exceptions to the rules, there are features which are common to all structures of the given type and those which are typical only of some specific positions; also known are the standard plans, one of which White tried to follow.

The second thing, to which I consider it important to draw your attention, is this: it would seem that, by exchanging his central pawns, already in the opening White voluntarily conceded the centre. But in return he set up strong piece pressure on the opponent's central pawns and transformed them into real weaknesses. Thus the game forces us to think about the problem of the transformation of a pawn centre: it may be replaced by pieces, but sometimes it even makes sense to give it up altogether. Generally speaking, a pawn centre is good not in itself, but for how it can be used for concrete aims. Say, for driving back the opponent's pieces (remember how we carefully looked out for the move ...d5–d4), to delay his development, or to obtain convenient squares for our own pieces under the cover of the pawns. But if, as in the game just examined, the centre does not fulfil these objectives, it can easily become vulnerable and be transformed into a target for the opponent to attack.

Of course, all that has been said by no means exhausts the problem of the pawn centre. Very important, for example, is the difficult problem of pawn tensions (between pawns on c4 and d5, d4 and c5, and so on). Here a whole array of questions arises. Which tension should be retained, and which not? How should these dynamic tensions be maintained? At what moments should they be transformed into more static structures? To some extent the game also gives answers to some of these questions.

The following example will certainly gladden supporters of the Dutch Defence. This is a game of mine with grandmaster Alexander Beliavsky, in which the plans of the two sides were determined by a complex pawn structure, so typical of the 'Dutch'.

**Beliavsky – Yusupov**

54th USSR Championship, Minsk 1987

*Dutch Defence*

1 *d4* f5
2 *c4* ½f6
3 g3 e6
4 ½g2 d5

Black is aiming for a 'stonewall' set-up. His aim is clear: to establish as close control as possible over the e4-square – probably it is simply hard to imagine closer control. However, this is achieved at the cost of a substantial weakening of a whole complex of dark squares. The e5-square is deprived of pawn protection, and the fate of the game will largely be determined by how Black can counter the opponent’s intention to occupy this point.

5 ½f3 c6
6 0-0 ½d6

Earlier Black more often played the 'stonewall' with his bishop on e7. It seems to me that at d6 the bishop is more logically placed. Since the dark squares have been weakened, it is desirable that the pieces should defend them as far as possible.

Why were they afraid to play 6...½d6? They thought that after 7 ½f4, by exchanging bishops, White would strengthen his control of e5 and gain an appreciable advantage. However, it transpired that in this case too Black can put up a perfectly good fight. In reply to 7 ½f4 I recommend the immediate exchange of bishops – 7...½xf4, somewhat
weakening the opponent's kingside. Otherwise e2–e3 will be played, after which the exchange on f4 will become extremely dangerous for Black: White will reply exf4 and develop pressure on the e-file. This procedure is worth bearing in mind.

7 b3

Transparently hinting at the possible exchange of the dark-square bishops on a3 – an operation that is rather advantageous for White.

7... We7

I am agreeable to the exchange, but only with the inclusion of the move a2–a4. Why? Because in this case the unequal value of the two sides' last moves will tell: the developing move with the queen is more useful than the advance of the rook's pawn. During the time that White spends on playing his knight from a3 to a more active position, Black has time to prepare ...e6–e5.

8 a3 0-0

A natural developing move. However, I don't like it. The set-up introduced in his time by Tigran Petrosian is much better: develop the knight on d2 and subsequently aim for control of the e5-square with both knights (f3–e5–d3 and d2–f3).

Incidentally, in the Dutch Defence White should be very cautious about occupying the e5-square. If, after an exchange of pieces, a pawn ends up on this square, Black will no longer have a weakness on e5 and usually he escapes from his opening difficulties.

Now I have to try and solve the problem of my queenside development, and above all the question of my light-square bishop’s ‘employment’ – virtually the main cause of headaches in the Dutch Defence. Two fundamentally different plans are possible. The first is to fianchetto the bishop on b7, hoping subsequently to play ...c6–c5. However, with his knight on c3 White is well prepared for this. Therefore I chose the other plan, involving the manoeuvre of the bishop to h5, where it will also be taking part in the play.

9... We7!? 10 a5 We8 11 d3

Not having any great experience in playing the Dutch Defence, Beliavsky fails to find an effective plan. The time spent on playing the knight from f3 to d3 could probably have been used more suitably. Instead of the move in the game White should have strengthened his position in the centre by 11 e3 and subsequently perhaps even played f2–f4.

11... Bd7 12 e3

Not a very good decision. It would appear that White is operating without a definite plan. He should have accepted the fact that he has no advantage and played 12 f4!?, securing himself an equal game.

What can be said about this position? Black is very solidly placed in the centre and his pawn structure is sound. Therefore he already has the right to consider active play.

12... g5!

If you do not control the situation in the
centre, it is better to refrain from such actions. Because in reply you risk receiving a blow in the centre, dashing your hopes. But in the given instance there is no danger of this, since Black is closely controlling a whole complex of central squares. And the fact that he has set his sights on the kingside is quite understandable – nearly all of his pieces are aimed there. It follows that Black’s plan stems intrinsically both from his pawn structure, and the arrangement of his pieces. I think that my position is already somewhat more pleasant.

Apparently Beliavsky’s evaluation of the situation was the same, otherwise he would not have aimed for simplification.

13 a4

White reverts to the idea of exchanging the dark-square bishops, hoping in this way to extinguish the opponent’s initiative.

13 ... g6

13...h5 14 c1 e4 also came into consideration, with somewhat the better chances. The point of the move in the game is to forestall White’s obvious plan: c1 and a3. Now if 14 c1 there follows, of course, 14...f4.

14 f4

Beliavsky insists on carrying out his plan.

14 ... h5

There was no longer anything for the bishop to do on g6.

15 c1

Evidently White should have decided on 15 f3!?. This looks a little strange, but, on the other hand, it is already time for him to think about defence. Besides, it may well turn out that soon the bishop on g2 will be a worse piece that its opposite number on h5 – after all, it is running up against the securely defended d5-pawn.

15 ... e4

16 fxg5

Played in the hope of establishing the knight on f4 (after the natural 16...xg5), but...

![Diagram]

16 ... xc3!

17 xc3 e2

The knight on f4 could indeed have become a defensive bulwark, and therefore I happily give up my bishop for it. But for the sake of retaining this knight, it perhaps made sense for my opponent to part with the exchange: 18 f4!?xf1 19 xf1.

18 fe1 xd3

19 xd3 xg5

Black has achieved a marked advantage.

What does it consist of? In particular, the structure of the position. He is threatening the extremely unpleasant plan of attacking the h2–g3 pawn chain with his h-pawn, after which appreciable weaknesses will arise in White’s position.

In order to neutralise this plan, Beliavsky carried out the following exchanging operation:

20 a3 xa3

21 xa3 f6

22 f1 h5!

23 f4 xf4

24 gxf4

Despite the simplification, the resulting endgame is still difficult for White. I was the first to occupy the g-file and in addition the
white bishop proved to be much weaker than my knight. This is a fairly standard 'stonewall' situation: the bishop runs up against a solid rock of black pawns, whereas the agile knight creates threats without hindrance.

Later Black was able to win in instructive fashion, by taking play into a rook endgame. Moreover, again a position with a structural advantage was created: after the exchange of minor pieces on the e4-square, the black pawn which moved there seriously cramped the opponent.

Of the instructive features in this game I would single out Black's attitude to the centre: he paid constant attention to it and endeavoured to control the important e5-square with his pieces. And only after creating a secure position in the centre did Black risk beginning active play on the kingside.

I will show you two more games from that same 54th USSR Championship in Minsk. The first, with grandmaster Vitaly Tseshkovsky, is interesting for the way that White made use of his pawn centre. In principle, this is already a middlegame problem, but studying the opening in isolation from the middlegame is not a very advisable occupation. The typical pawn structure arising in the opening largely determines the entire subsequent play. The modern approach to the opening consists precisely in studying such typical structures, and in a deeper penetration into their characteristic regularities and typical playing methods.

Yusupov – Tseshkovsky
54th USSR Championship, Minsk 1987
Grünefeld Defence

```
1 d4 d5
2 c4 g6
3 Qc3 dxc4
4 cxd5 Qxd5
5 e4 Qxc3
6 bxc3
```

A fashionable variation of the Grünfeld Defence. White has a pawn centre, which Black tries to undermine and attack with his pieces.

```
6 ... Qg7
7 Qc4 0-0
8 Qe2 c5
9 0-0 Qc6
10 Qe3
```

Here my opponent chose not the most critical plan.

```
10 ... Da5
```

The usual continuation is 10...Qg4. By removing the attack on the central d4-pawn, he grants me greater scope for manoeuvring.

```
11 Qd3 b6
12 Qc1 Qc7
```

The immediate capture on d4 came into consideration, since one of the problems of such positions is the d4–d5 advance. In many cases it can be advantageous for White to advance his d-pawn, although in reply Black usually initiates counterplay involving ...c5–c4 and the undermining move ...e7–e6.

For the moment I decided simply to strengthen my position.

```
13 Qd2 Qb7
```

Strictly speaking, the opening is at an end – both sides have developed their pieces. But for a better understanding of this type of position it is useful to see how White uses his advantage in the centre to develop an initiative.

```
14 Qh6
```

One of the advantages of controlling the centre is that it is easier to switch play to the flanks. White considers that under the cover of his strong centre he already has the right to begin active play against the
opponent’s king. The exchange of the dark-square bishops comes into his strategic plan, since the g7-bishop is very active and in addition it is virtually the only defender of the king.

14 ... ad8
15 h4!? 
A theoretical novelty. 15 d5 also came into consideration. After 15...c4 16 �c2 e6 17 �xg7 �xg7 White plays 18 f4!, and if 18...exd5 – 19 e5 with an attack. In the game I was able to carry out this idea, and in an even more favourable version.

15 ... d6?! 
A rather abstract move. The centre could have been attacked more effectively by 15...�c6, and if 16 d5, then 16...�e5, aiming to use the central squares in order to disrupt the coordination of the white pieces.

16 d5
The start of an instructive operation, with which White strengthens still further his position in the centre. Black’s reply is forced, since 16...e6? is bad because of 17 c4.

16 ... c4
17 �c2
If Black could have anticipated the development of events, he would now have preferred ...e7–e5. But Tseshkovsky evaluated the position incorrectly and advanced his pawn only one square.

17 ... e6?!
18 �xg7 �xg7
And here White finally carried out his plan, involving a positional pawn sacrifice.

(see diagram)

19 f4!
The idea is understandable: after 19...exd5 20 e5! White will occupy the excellent central square d4 with his knight, after which there will follow f4–f5 and so on. That is, the

- position after 18...�xg7 –

pawn centre is effectively replaced by a pawn-piece centre, under the cover of which White conducts an attack on the king with great effect.

Tseshkovsky is an experienced player, of course he fully appreciated the danger of capturing the d5-pawn, and he pinned his hopes on attacking the centre.

19 ... f5
However, here too the drawbacks of Black’s position are patently obvious: his king is open, his knight at a5 is shut out of the game, and in the centre White has more pawns – all these factors are very significant. It is not surprising that a concrete decision is found.

20 �d4!
The knight will help the pawns to advance further.

20 ... fxe4
21 dxe6
Of course, not 21 �xe6+?? on account of 21...�xe6. After making a pawn breakthrough in the centre, White has gained a powerful passed pawn at e6 and created a mass of problems for his opponent.

21 ... c6
22 f5!
22 �xe4?! would have been significantly
weaker in view of 22...\(\text{\textit{xd4}}\) 23 \(\text{\textit{xd4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd4+}}\) 24 cxd4 \(\text{\textit{xe4}}\) 25 e7 \(\text{\textit{xd4}}\) 26 exf8\(\text{\textit{w+}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf8}}\), and Black has sufficient compensation for the exchange.

22... \(\text{\textit{xd4}}\)

23 cxd4

The queens must be retained. Now Black loses by force after 23...\(\text{\textit{xd4+}}\)? 24 \(\text{\textit{xd4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd4}}\) 25 e7 \(\text{\textit{e8}}\) 26 \(\text{\textit{a4}}\). It is easy to see that the capture on f5 is also hopeless (23...\(\text{\textit{xf5}}\)? 24 \(\text{\textit{xf5}}\) gxf5 25 \(\text{\textit{g5+}}\)). As Boris Gelfand commented, he could have defended by 23...\(\text{\textit{de8}}!\), after which White would have continued the offensive with 24 \(\text{\textit{a4}}!\) \(\text{\textit{e7}}\) 25 \(\text{\textit{d7}}\).

23... \(\text{\textit{e7}}\)

24 \(\text{\textit{a4}}!\)

The triumph of White's central strategy! In the centre he effectively has three connected passed pawns, and the e6-pawn is especially dangerous. What can Black do against this? If 24...gxf5, then White simply goes into an endgame by 25 \(\text{\textit{g5+}}\), after which the e-pawn can be stopped only by giving up the exchange. And in the event of 24...\(\text{\textit{d5}}\) the goal is achieved by 25 fxf6 hxg6 26 \(\text{\textit{xf8}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf8}}\) 27 \(\text{\textit{f1}}\) \(\text{\textit{f5}}\) 28 \(\text{\textit{xf5}}\!), and again the e-pawn forces its way through to the queening square. Therefore Black has little choice.

[After 24...\(\text{\textit{d5}}\)? 25 fxf6 Black should play 25...\(\text{\textit{df5}}!\) 26 \(\text{\textit{xf5}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf5}}\), and it is not easy for White to demonstrate his advantage. In view of this, 25 \(\text{\textit{xc4}}!\) \(\text{\textit{dx5}}\) 26 \(\text{\textit{xf5}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf5}}\) 27 \(\text{\textit{d5}}!\) comes into consideration, for example: 27...\(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) 28 \(\text{\textit{c3+}}\) \(\text{\textit{h6}}\) 29 \(\text{\textit{c7}}\) \(\text{\textit{h4}}\) 30 \(\text{\textit{e3+}}\) \(\text{\textit{g5}}\) 31 \(\text{\textit{h3+}}\) \(\text{\textit{h5}}\) 32 \(\text{\textit{hxh5+}}\) \(\text{\textit{dxh5}}\) 33 \(\text{\textit{e7}}\) \(\text{\textit{f7}}\) 34 \(\text{\textit{e8}}\) \(\text{\textit{xe8}}\) 35 \(\text{\textit{xe8}}\) with quite good winning chances in the endgame - Dvoretsky.]

24... \(\text{\textit{xf5}}\)

25 \(\text{\textit{xf5}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf5}}\)

26 \(\text{\textit{f4}}!\)

Now the e6-pawn is indirectly defended (26...\(\text{\textit{xe6}}\) 27 \(\text{\textit{c7+}}\)), and impending over Black is 27 \(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) with the terrible threat of \(\text{\textit{c7}}\).

26... \(\text{\textit{d5}}\)

26...\(\text{\textit{f8}}\) would also not have saved Black in view of 27 \(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xe6}}\) 28 \(\text{\textit{c7+}}\) \(\text{\textit{f7}}\) 29 \(\text{\textit{b3}}\) \(\text{\textit{d5}}\) 30 \(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) 31 \(\text{\textit{g5+}}\), and White wins by a direct attack.

27 \(\text{\textit{e5+}}\) \(\text{\textit{g6}}\)

27...\(\text{\textit{g8}}\) 28 \(\text{\textit{c3}}\); 27...\(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 28 e7.

28 \(\text{\textit{c3}}\) \(\text{\textit{f4}}\)

29 h5+

Black resigned.

The result of the game was justified. The play went badly for Black. First he missed a moment when he should have initiated a fight in the centre, then he delayed slightly, and White got in first with his active offensive play. What else can be said? Note how White combined the threat of a breakthrough in the centre with threats to the king. This is also one of the advantages of a strong centre – at any moment under its cover one can begin an attack on the king!

In the following game a popular variation of the Modern Benoni was played.
General Principles of Opening Play

Yusupov – Dolmatov
54th USSR Championship, Minsk 1987

Modern Benoni

1 d4 e6
2 c4 c5
3 d5
4 exd5
5 cxd5
6 e4
7 a6
8 b5

If one approaches things formally, such a flank attack by Black should be refuted by play in the centre by White, and in general such pawn moves are incorrect, premature and so on. But in the Modern Benoni the advance of the pawn to b5 has a serious point: it is not so much a matter of play directly on the queenside, but rather a fight against the enemy centre! Subsequently Black will normally drive away the strong knight from c3, and in many cases, if he should succeed in advancing ...c5–c4, his knight will aim for c5 and threaten the e4-pawn. It can be said that the main idea of the Modern Benoni is an attempt to by-pass the enemy centre from the flank and exert pressure on it.

White, of course, should play in accordance with the rules, i.e. prepare a breakthrough in the centre. This is the aim of his next move.

9 c7 f6
Black is already forced to defend against e4–e5.

10 g5 e7
11 h6

The third move in the opening by one and the same piece! This would appear to be a gross violation of the laws of development. But, after all, during this time Black too has not made any useful moves: he has wasted time on moving his knight away from the centre with ...h5, and although he has developed his bishop, e7 is by no means its best square, and this has given me an opportunity to prevent Black’s castling, which is so necessary for him.

11 f8
The best proof that the moves g5 and h6 were not a pointless waste of time.

12 e3 xh6
13 xh6

Now Black should have made use of the respite to develop his pieces. The theoretical continuation is 13...d7. But Sergey Dolmatov employed a new move.

13 b4?!
This decision would appear to be well-motivated: the knight is driven away from the centre to a less active position. But in so doing Black creates a not very favourable pawn structure on the queenside, and the c4-square is transformed into a desirable target for a white knight. From here it will not only exert pressure on the d6-pawn, but also support the e4–e5 breakthrough.

14 d1 f6
Black unequivocally demonstrates that he is also thinking about active play. For example, White has to reckon with the invasion of a piece on f4 (say, if 15 e2 there follows 15...f4).

What should White do? No way of quickly completing the development of the pieces is apparent. He is obliged to show a little cunning.

15 d2!
Again seemingly a move against the rules, but in fact it is made in the interests of development – g2–g3 is prepared. In this way White simultaneously solves several problems: he shuts the enemy knight at h5 out of the game, the bishop will support the centre from g2, and the knight may subsequently go from d2 to c4.

Black stands significantly worse. Now he should have continued his development by
playing 15...\textit{d}d7. True, in this case too after 16 \textit{g}3 \textit{e}5 17 \textit{e}2! (it is important to control the d3-square!) I have an appreciable advantage. Thus if 17...\textit{g}4, then White simply exchanges on g4, after which he can play both f2–f3, and \textit{e}3.

At one stroke Dolmatov tries to solve the problem of his queenside and the c4-square, but it is probable that the move made by him is already the decisive mistake.

15 ... \textit{d}d7?! 

What should I do now? It is possible, of course, to continue the intended plan with 16 \textit{g}3, but then Black replies 16...\textit{b}5, after which White’s main trump – the c4-square – will be knocked out: in the event of the exchange of bishops on b5, a black pawn will end up on this square.

But there is another way: realise what the opponent wants, and try to prevent him. Fortunately there is such a possibility.

16 \textit{a}4!

Now the bishop can no longer go to b5. It transpires that with 15...\textit{d}d7 Black has merely deprived his b8-knight of its lawful square, and now it is not apparent how he can complete his development.

16 ... \textit{d}8

My opponent could not find anything better than this king move, but, naturally, this does not lead to anything good.

17 \textit{g}3 \textit{g}4

18 \textit{e}3 \textit{f}3

Here it was possible to play simply 19 \textit{xf}3 \textit{xf}3 20 \textit{g}2 \textit{f}6 21 \textit{c}4 with an obvious advantage. But this is no longer enough for White. He acts more energetically, remembering that, when you have a lead in development (although for the moment it is not so obvious) you must attack!

19 \textit{e}5!

The decisive opening of the position!

19 ... dx e5

20 \textit{xf}3 \textit{xf}3

21 \textit{g}2 \textit{f}6

22 \textit{d}6 \textit{c}7

Black can still put up a resistance. Thus if 23 \textit{d}5 he would reply 23...\textit{e}6! and then 24...\textit{d}7, attacking the d6-pawn. Therefore White does not hurry.

23 0-0 \textit{g}7

Black would have lost quickly after 23...\textit{d}7 24 \textit{d}5!? \textit{g}7 25 \textit{e}3 followed by 26 \textit{e}7, when it transpires that the rook at a7 is extremely badly placed and loss of material is unavoidable.

Now I need to bring my heavy pieces into play, as otherwise the enemy defences cannot be breached. How to place the rooks is always a difficult problem. I think that here White coped with it successfully.

24 \textit{ac}1! \textit{d}7

25 \textit{fd}1 \textit{f}5

If 25...\textit{e}6, then after 26 \textit{d}5 \textit{g}5 27 \textit{x}g5 \textit{g}5 the white knight again invades at e7.

26 \textit{xf}5 \textit{xf}5

27 \textit{e}3!

This is why the rook went to c1! The opponent has no satisfactory defence against the exchange sacrifice on c5. He did not in fact manage to complete his development and connect his rooks.
27... 
28 \( \text{x} \text{xe}4 \)
29 \( \text{d} \text{d}5 \)
Or 29...\( \text{w} \text{xb}2 \) 30 \( \text{d} \text{xc}5 \).
30 \( \text{d} \text{xc}5 \)
31 \( \text{w} \text{xc}5 \)
Black resigned.

Both these games, with Tseshkovsky and Dolmatov, can be called opening games, since in both cases the opponents essentially did not manage to get past the opening. This is why it is useful to examine them as a whole. Black seemingly did not make any obvious mistakes, but from these examples we have seen that sometimes it is sufficient to take one or two inexact decisions – say, incorrectly evaluate the situation, fail to understand the pawn structure, not begin a fight for the centre at the right time, or commit an inaccuracy in defence – in order to suffer a rapid defeat.
How does opening theory develop? What helps a player, at the board or in home analysis, to find the correct solution to an opening problem facing him? There is no doubt that here one cannot get by without an ability for improvisation, sharp combinative vision, and accurate calculation of variations. But in our opening investigations another component is nearly always present and plays a very important role – logic!

I should like to draw your attention to several examples of the logical solving of opening problems.

It is clear that logic does not operate in an empty space. It is based on specific opening knowledge, and also on the typical methods and evaluations which we have mastered, and it helps to link all this with the given position and as a result to work out the correct decision. The more ideas that we know, the wider the scope for logic, and the deeper and more accurate our reasoning becomes.

I will remind you of one of the standard methods which occurs in the Sicilian Defence, in ‘Scheveningen-type’ positions.

(see diagram)

It is clear that White’s last move was 13 g4. A widely-known strategic principle states: against a flank attack it is desirable to reply with a counter-blow in the centre.

13 . . .  

fixing the e4-pawn, and only then strikes with ...d6–d5. Any player who plays the Scheveningen Variation or the Najdorf Variation must be well familiar with this idea: ...e6–e5! followed by ...d6–d5!

In the following examples we will see the influence of this idea on the taking of decisions both by White, and by Black.

Dolmatov – Lerner
47th USSR Championship, Minsk 1979
**Logic in the Opening**

What should White play? He is intending to complete his development by $\text{d}2$, $\text{ae}1$ and $\text{h}1$, obtaining an active position. But for choosing the best move these considerations are not enough – it is also necessary to employ the idea of 'prophylactic thinking', which we have already encountered many times.

Let us ask ourselves: 'What does Black want; what ways does he have of continuing?' The answer is now clear to us: $13...\text{e}5$ and then $\ldots\text{d}6-\text{d}5$. Is this the only possibility? Hardly – it is probable that $13...\text{d}5$ 14 $\text{e}5$ $\text{e}4$ also has to be taken into account.

If Sergey Dolmatov had reasoned in this way, he would surely have made the move which he himself recommends in his notes, namely $13\text{g}3$!. Then after $13...\text{d}5$ 14 $\text{e}5$ the black knight can no longer invade on $\text{e}4$, while if $13...\text{e}5$ there would be the excellent reply 14 $\text{f}5$.

Unfortunately, in the game Dolmatov did not think about his opponent's intentions.

13 $\text{h}1$?

In such positions this move in itself is quite good and useful, but here it is untimely and it leaves Black with freedom to act.

13 . . .
14 $\text{g}3$
14 $\text{d}5$!

Black has succeeded in striking at the centre and he has seized the initiative.

**Smyslov – Hort**

Interzonal Tournament, Petropolis 1973

*Sicilian Defence*

1 $\text{e}4$ $\text{c}5$
2 $\text{f}3$ $\text{e}6$
3 $\text{d}4$ $\text{cxd}4$
4 $\text{c}4$ $\text{d}4$
5 $\text{e}2$ $\text{e}7$
6 0-0 $\text{a}6$
7 0-0 $\text{a}6$
8 $\text{f}4$ 0-0
9 $\text{e}3$ $\text{c}7$
10 $\text{a}4$ $\text{b}6$
11 $\text{f}3$ $\text{b}7$
12 $\text{e}1$ $\text{bd}7$

What do you think should be White's main plan over the next few moves? Most probably $\text{g}2-\text{g}4-\text{g}5$ (nothing is given by 13 $\text{g}3$ $\text{c}5$ 14 $\text{e}5$ $\text{dxe}5$ 15 $\text{f}xe5$ $\text{dxe}4$! 16 $\text{xe}4$ $\text{xe}4$).

After the immediate 13 $\text{g}4$?! it is not good to reply $13...\text{e}5$? in view of 14 $\text{f}5$ (with gain of tempo) and then 15 $\text{g}5$ – there is no time for the counter-blow $\ldots\text{d}6-\text{d}5$. It is tempting first to attack with $\text{e}4$-pawn with 13...$\text{c}5$, and only after 14 $\text{f}2$ to continue 14...$\text{d}5$ or 14...$\text{e}5$ with an excellent game. However, White has an unexpected tactical resource: 14 $\text{g}5$! $\text{f}xe4$ 15 $\text{b}4$!, winning a piece, the compensation for which after 15...$\text{d}5$ 16 $\text{bxc}5$ $\text{bxc}5$ 17 $\text{b}3$ is insufficient. However, Black can simply play 13...$\text{d}5$ 14 $\text{e}5$ $\text{e}4$ with chances for both sides.

Vasily Vasilievich – an experienced, cautious player – preferred to avoid unnecessary complications.

13 $\text{f}2$?!

Now, when the $\text{e}4$-pawn (and the $\text{e}4$-square) are safely guarded, $\text{g}2-\text{g}4-\text{g}5$ is threatened.
However, the opponent has various ways of combating this threat.

For example, the non-routine move 13...g6!? is strong. By depriving the knight of the f5-square, Black prepares 14...e5.

13...c5 also comes into consideration, again parrying g2–g4. The aggressive 14 b4?! cd7 15 g4? seriously weakens the queenside – as was shown by Sergey Shipov, Black exploits this factor with the central counter 14...d5!.

In 1979 I was analysing this position with grandmaster Igor Platonov, and he suggested the thematic, typically Sicilian move 13...d6!, which is now recommended in opening books. If 14 g4, then 14...e5! is very strong, and after 15 f5 – either 15...d5! (the bishop on e7 is defended), or 15...exf4 16 g5 c5! (Abramov–Akopov, corr. 1981).

Initially I liked the central advance 14 e5, exploiting the fact that the rook is occupying the e8-square, to which the knight might retreat. For example, 14...dxe5 15 fxe5 c5 16 a2xd5 17 a2xd5 exd5 18 e6 c6 19 exf7+ xf7 20 wd1, and Black has a weak d5-pawn. Alas, after 14...dxe5 15 fxe5 cxe5! 16 xxb7 I overlooked the strong intermediate move 16...d6!, which gives Black the advantage.

You see that a logical analysis, in which the calculation of concrete variations based on taking account of typical motifs, has enabled us to penetrate more deeply into the essence of the position and even find some new ideas (naturally, they require additional checking).

Vlastimil Hort played superficially and soon came under a strong attack.

13... d5?

14 g4!

Now the knight is driven back from f6. Hort vacates the d7-square for it, but as a result he needlessly merely loses time. He should have resigned himself to retreating it to e8.

14...

15 g5

16 d1

Threatening 17 b4 d6 (17...c3 18 xd3) 18 de2. The best chances of a defence were still given by the modest move 16...d6!, with the idea of meeting 17 b4 with the central counter 17...e5! (in the event of 18 f5 the bishop on e7 is defended).

16...

b8?!

Black has lost the thread of the game. Just a few moves ago he had normal Sicilian knights – now where have they ended up? Using the solidity of his centre, Smyslov calmly strengthens his position and prepares his pieces for an attack.

17 e3

18 d3

19 g2

20 f2

Also a typical Sicilian move – the c2-pawn is supported.

20...

16

It was essential to exchange knights. However, White would also have stood better after 20...cxd4 21 xd4 e5 22 e3.

21 f3!

Black is in a cramped position, and so Smyslov avoids the exchange. Besides, he
has a concrete idea: h2–h4 and then the manoeuvre of the knight to g4 via h2. High class play!

21 . . . \( \text{b}4 \)

After this the knight immediately goes to g4.

22 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{c}7 \)

23 \( \text{g}4 \) \( \text{d}7 \)

Threatening 25 \( \text{h}6+. \)

24 . . . \( \text{e}5 \)

25 fxe5 \( \text{e}5 \)

If 25...dxe5 26 \( \text{e}3 \) with an obvious advantage.

26 \( \text{d}f1 \)

It was essential to exchange the terrible knight on g4. There now follows the concluding combination.

27 \( \text{x}e5 \) \( \text{d}xe5 \)

28 \( \text{f}6+ \) \( \text{h}8 \)

29 \( \text{x}h7! \)

If 29...\( \text{x}h7 \), then 30 \( \text{g}6+ \) is decisive

30 \( \text{x}f7 \)

31 \( \text{h}1 \)

32 \( \text{f}8+ \)

Black resigned.

An excellent win by Vasily Vasilievich. Its basis was laid in the opening, when Black did not manage to meet White’s flank attack g2–g4 with the standard counter-blow in the centre.

To come to the correct decision in the above examples it was necessary to make skilful use of a well-known opening idea. But often far more subtle, less obvious details of the position have to be taken into account. New games played in a particular variation add their arguments to the unceasing opening debate, and it is hard to get by without studying them.

At one time the following quiet variation of the English Opening was very popular.

1 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{e}5 \)

2 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{f}6 \)

3 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \)

4 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{b}4 \)

5 \( \text{g}2 \) 0-0

6 0-0 \( \text{e}4 \)

7 \( \text{e}1 \)

For a long time it was thought that the sharper move 7 \( \text{g}5 \) did not promise White anything. However, the opinion changed after the world champion Garry Kasparov, in his match with Anatoly Karpov (Seville 1987) and then against Vasily Ivanchuk in the 1988 USSR Championship, played his knight to g5.

7 . . . \( \text{x}c3 \)

8 \( \text{d}c3 \) \( \text{h}6 \)

Black usually prevents the exchange of the c1-bishop for his knight, which is advantageous to the opponent.

9 \( \text{c}2 \) \( \text{e}8 \)

10 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{d}6 \)

11 \( \text{c}2 \) \( \text{a}5 \)

Black’s last move is not essential (theory recommends 11...b6), but it is quite popular. It was chosen by Victor Korchnoi against Karpov in the 6th game of their world championship match (Baguio 1978). From
the opening Karpov did not achieve anything: 12 a4 \( \text{We7} \) 13 \( \text{Dd5} \) \( \text{Dxd5} \) 14 \( \text{Cxd5} \) \( \text{Db8} \) 15 \( \text{Cf5} \) 16 h3 \( \text{Dd7} \) 17 c4 b6 18 \( \text{Cc3} \) c5 19 b3 \( \text{Dd7} \) 20 \( \text{Cf2} \) We7 21 \( \text{Dd4} \) f6 22 \( \text{Cc1} \) We8 23 \( \text{De3} \) Draw.

Games from world championship matches, even those as colourless as the one just examined, usually provide an impetus for the further development of opening theory. Grandmaster Wolfgang Uhlmann developed a promising plan of play for White and successfully employed it. Let us first try to decide for ourselves what should be aimed for here.

White has two bishops. But for the moment this is not yet the 'advantage of the two bishops', since their mobility is restricted. To open the position and give the bishops freedom is White's main objective. If an exchange of knights takes place on d5, it will then be possible to advance the pawn to c4 and occupy the long diagonal with the dark-square bishop. But what about the light-square bishop? The e4-pawn, which it is running up against, must be removed.

Karpov did not even try to solve the problem of his light-square bishop. Uhlmann acted far more energetically.

**Uhlmann – Osmanovic**

**Decin 1979**

12 \( \text{Dd2} \)

13 f4!

In such positions it is dangerous not to capture on f3 – White plays f4–f5, cramps the opponent's light-square bishop, and prepares a pawn offensive on the kingside. In Informator the following variation is given: 13...d7 14 Dd5 \( \text{Dxd5} \) 15 \( \text{Cxd5} \) Db8, and now, when the knight is a long way from the e5-square – 16 f5!. If 16...f6, then 17 Ce3 followed by Df4 (or immediately 17 Df4) is strong, while if Black plays 16...e3, then 17 Cc1 and Df3, when the pawn will almost certainly be lost. White has an obvious advantage.

14 ef3 \( \text{Dd7} \)

15 Cae1 \( \text{Df8} \)

16 f4

This is the set-up for which Uhlmann was aiming.

The bishop is pressing strongly along the h1–a8 diagonal. Sooner or later the knight will go to d5, and after the exchange on d5 the second bishop will come into play. In the future White will advance his kingside pawns. The opponent has no counterplay, as the black knights lack strong points in the centre, and so White can play for a win without any risk.

16...

17 Dd3 \( \text{Cc7} \)

18 h3

In such cases Aaron Nimzowitsch used to say that White had a 'qualitative pawn majority' on the kingside. It resides in the fact that White's pawns can advance, whereas Black's cannot.

18...

19 Cc5

Of course, White is not agreeable to the exchange of his light-square bishop.
A slight deviation from the plan which we have been discussing. In passing White also harasses the queenside. He wants to create active possibilities there: after the exchange on b4 to create a passed pawn and press on the backward c7-pawn.

22 ... 
23 cxb4  

Now a passed pawn does not result, but chronic weaknesses have been created on the c-file.

24 â€¢ c3  
25 â€¢ d4  
26 â€¢ c3  
27 a3  
28 â€¢ h2

There is nothing Black can move, and in the meantime Uhlmann consistently strengthens his position.

28 ...  
29 â€¢ e3  
30 â€¢ f3  
31 â€¢ g2  
32 â€¢ e1

The battery on the e-file has been correctly set up - rook in front, queen behind.

32 ...  
33 g4  
34 â€¢ b2  
35 â€¢ c3  
36 â€¢ xf6  
37 g5  
38 fxg5  
39 â€¢ e7

White has an overwhelming advantage. He can simply play 40 h4!, not fearing 40...â€¢ g6? (40...c6 or 40...c5 is more tenacious) 41 â€¢ xd7 â€¢ xh4+ 42 â€¢ g3 â€¢ xf3 43 â€¢ xf3 â€¢ f8 on account of 44 g6!. Also very strong was 40 â€¢ h5!? g6 41 â€¢ f3 â€¢ e8 42 â€¢ f6 (or 42 â€¢ xe8 â€¢ xe8 43 â€¢ f6).

Uhlmann preferred a spectacular, combinative way to the goal.

40 g6!  
40...f6 41 h4 or 40...â€¢ e8 41 gx7+ â€¢ f8 42 â€¢ xh5! g6 43 â€¢ g4 (43 â€¢ f3) was hopeless.

41 â€¢ xd7  
42 â€¢ g3  
43 â€¢ xf3  
44 h4!!

Has White miscalculated? His rook is trapped.

44 h4!!

No, he has not. This modest move is the idea of the combination: the h-pawn becomes a queen.

44 ...  
45 â€¢ xg7  
46 h5

And without waiting for his opponent's reply, Black resigned.

Now let us suppose that you have to play this variation with Black. You already know
Uhlmann’s game, and you appreciate the threat of White’s two bishops. Of course, you have no intention of losing ignominiously, like Osmanovic. What to do? Change variation? Well, if you approach things this way, you will never have any decent openings – in each one problems will arise. No, let’s devise something here – it is unlikely that White has a forced way to gain an advantage.

Only by clearly appreciating the danger will you be able to accustom yourself to the position, be imbued with its spirit, and as a result find an idea which will help you. This is what Black did in the following game.

**Uhlmann – Popov**

*Berlin 1979*

12 d2  
13 f4  
14 exf3

It appears that nothing can prevent White from carrying out his plan. It develops very naturally: ae1, f3–f4, and at some point d5.

14 . . .  
15 ae1

I don’t know whether Luben Popov found this idea at the board, or prepared it at home. In any case this unusual manoeuvre solves his defensive problems – the active position of the queen ensures Black counterplay. He gains time: in order to prepare d5, White has to remove his king to h1 and play b2–b3. But what is more important is the fact that the queen controls the d5-square, and it is no longer easy for the white knight simply to be placed there. If White plays f3–f4, there is a possibility of exchanging knights by ...g4, and d5 will not be possible because of ...f2+.

16 h1  
17 b3  
18 d3

In order to prepare d5, White has had to place his queen on d3, where it comes under attack by ...e5. Black has succeeded in doubling his rooks. If 19 f4 there can follow either 19 ...g4, or 19 ...e4.

19 d5  
20 cxd5  
21 w4!

The only move. 21 w2? wxd5 22 f4 wd3 is bad for White.

21 . . .  
22 cxd4  
23 xe7

Here White already has to display accuracy: the invasion on e2 is threatened. Thus in the event of 24 xa5? b6 and 25 e2 Black has active play. How can Black be prevented from activating his rook? White must be able to meet ...e2 with d1, but without allowing a check on f2.

24 g1!

If now 24 ...e2, then 25 d1, when the threat of f1 is very unpleasant, and in addition the a5-pawn is still hanging.

24 . . .  
25 d1

Two pawns are attacked – White is forced to exchange.
Logic in the Opening

26 axb4 axb4
27 c1 c8

A roughly equal ending has been reached.
28 f4 a6 29 f3 f8 30 e2 e8 31 a3 bxa3 32 a1 d8 33 xa3 b7 34 h4 f5 35 h5 e8 36 g2 e7 37 b4 e8 38 a7 c8 39 f3 e7 40 a1 d8 Draw

Now let us think for Uhlmann. 'I worked out such a good plan, I'm not going to give it up now. I have to find an improvement.' When you know the ideas, it is easier to devise a novelty. Here it is conceived in a purely logical way.

The pattern of the position is appealing, but it would be good to prevent Black from playing his queen to c5. How? He can be deprived of the e5-square, by placing the pawn on f4. This means that instead of 12 d2 we should look at 12 f4. It looks rather dangerous for White to play this, with his development incomplete and his rooks unconnected. But it should be checked...

Uhlmann – Plachetka
Trencianske Teplice 1979

12 f4 exf3
13 exf3 e7
14 f4!

Now White only needs to play d2 and a1, and he reaches the very position for which he is aiming. Of course, he has to reckon with ...e4, but on the other hand he has the reply d5.

I will take this opportunity to once again emphasise an idea which we have already encountered many times. The deepest moves, the best positional decisions, are those which combine the implementation of your own plan with prophylaxis against the opponent's ideas. This is the strength of the move order chosen by Uhlmann: the grandmaster does not deviate from his main course of play, and at the same time he prevents the queen manoeuvre to c5.

14 . . .
15 d2

If now 15...f8, then after 16 a1 the same position is reached as in the Uhlmann–Osmanovic game, where White was able to gain a clear advantage.

15 . . .
16 d8

Black nevertheless wants to switch his queen to the g1–a7 diagonal via the b8-square.

16 h3

If now 17 a1, then 17...a7 18 h2 c5. White has a couple of extra tempi compared with the Uhlmann–Popov game, but nevertheless Black retains counter-chances.

17 d5!
18 cxd5
19 h2!

What would you advise White to do now?

20 f5! was very strong. It cramps the enemy pieces and gives White the advantage. Unfortunately, Uhlmann played slightly routinely.

20 a1?!

If 20...f5, then 21 e4 g6 22 g4 h4 23
g3 is strong.

21 a4 f8
22 g4 d3
23 e3!

An important intermediate move. Incorrect was 23 f3? b5! 24 d1 c4, and two pawns at d5 and a2 are under attack.

23 . . .
24 f2

Here Black should probably have played 24...g6, because White wants to squeeze him with f4–f5, and this way the knight can at least occupy the e5-square.

24 . . .
25 c4?
26 c1 g6

Otherwise 26 f5 is very strong. But now the black bishop ends up in a dangerous position.

26 d2!

Preparing to push back the black pieces: b2–b3, c3–c4 and so on.

26 . . .
26...a4! was more tenacious.

27 b3 a6
28 c4! xg2
29 xg2 e4
30 ge2 f5

31 f5 was threatened. But now Uhlmann assails the opponent’s kingside on the dark squares (there his g7-point is hopelessly weak). As always occurs in such cases, the presence of opposite-colour bishops sharply strengthens the attack.

31 d4 c6
32 gxf5 cxd5
33 c3! e7
34 cxd5 a8
35 f6 e8
36 xf6

Black resigned.

After this game the entire variation was judged to favour White, and Black stopped playing this way. But wrongly so! After all, the next improvement is not so difficult to find. Let us look once more at the position after 12 f4 exf3 13 exf3.

The Uhlmann–Popov game demonstrated a promising idea for Black – the switching of his queen via e5 to the g1–a7 diagonal. In the Uhlmann–Plachetka game Black showed that it was also possible to go there via b8. But for some reason he first moved his queen in the opposite direction: 13...e7?. Illogical! Why not play 13...d7 and in reply to 14 f4 (or 14 d2) – 14...b8!, then ...a7 and ...c5. Compared with the last game, Black saves two tempi. Here I do not see any advantage for White.

Imagine now that you have quickly looked at one of these games in Informator, with comments relating mainly to the middlegame. It is possible that you would simply trust its book evaluation. If you happened to see Uhlmann’s game with Popov, you would decide that the variation does not give White anything, and if it was the one with Plachetka, you would evaluate it in favour of White. You would take into account the evaluation, but you would not in fact acquire a true understanding of the position. Unfortu-
nately, this is how many players work on the opening. And this is why 'novelties' such as 13...\texttt{d}d7 followed by 14...\texttt{w}b8 sometimes remain unnoticed, although they can be arrived at almost automatically, if you delve into the position and follow the development of ideas in the given variation.

But do you know in which wonderful classic game such a queen manoeuvre first occurred?

\textbf{Janowski – Rubinstein}

\textit{Karlsbad 1907}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c}
29 \ldots \\
\texttt{w}d8! \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Apparently with the idea of 30...\texttt{w}g5.

30 \texttt{w}g4 \\
31 \texttt{g}g2 \\
32 \texttt{fe}1 \\

And Black gained the possibility of active play on the queenside.

See how an idea from a quite different opening can sometimes come in useful! Incidentally, from which opening? The position has an 'Old Indian' character, but in those times that opening was not yet employed. And indeed, the game began as a Four Knights.

\textit{Enrich your chess culture, and collect ideas – later you will be able to use them in the most varied situations.}

In one of the team tournaments I happened to play the following game.

\textbf{Dvoretsky – Shmit}

\textit{Tbilisi 1979}

\textit{Alekhine Defence}

\begin{center}
1 \texttt{e}4 \\
2 \texttt{c}c3 \\
3 \texttt{e}5 \\
\end{center}

Other possible replies are 3...\texttt{fd}7 and 3...d4.

4 \texttt{ce}2!

Black's knight is in danger. Nimzowitsch called such pieces 'tempo-devourers'. The knight has already made two moves, and it will have to move again. Now White gains a tempo by attacking it with d2–d3, and then, perhaps, also another one: d3–d4.

In the 1972 Moscow Championship the national master Vladimir Baikov played 4...d4 against me. Unfortunately, I did not notice that the reply 5 \texttt{c}3! would have been unpleasant for my opponent. 5...d3? is bad in view of 6 \texttt{a}4+, while if 5...\texttt{xc}3 there follows not 6 \texttt{a}4+?! \texttt{d}7 7 \texttt{x}e4? \texttt{c}5, but simply 6 \texttt{b}xc3 with an obvious advantage. True, as was shown later, the reply 5...\texttt{c}6! promises Black some compensation for the lost (or sacrificed?) pawn.

4 \ldots \\
5 \texttt{d}3 \\
\texttt{f}6 \\

5 \texttt{d}3 \\
\texttt{g}5
This is also an interesting opening problem. White has a way to secure a marked advantage.

You suggest playing 6 f4? The knight retreats to f7, from where it attacks White’s centre.

6  \( \text{c4} \) (with the threat of 7 \( \text{h5} \) +) 6...fxe5 7 \( \text{dxc5} \) is an interesting idea. But Black replies 6...g6, and if 7 h4 – 7...\( \text{e6} \).

Correct is 6 \( \text{xg5!} \) fxg5 7 h4! gxe4 8 \( \text{f4} \) (threatening 9 \( \text{h5} \) +) 8...g6 9 \( \text{h4} \) g7 10 d4 and 11 \( \text{d3} \) with terrible pressure on Black’s kingside. This occurred in a game Polovodin—Palatnik in the same year, 1979, but not, unfortunately, in my game against Anatoly Shmit.

Two games in this variation, and in neither of them did I see the strongest continuation. Such episodes should give cause for reflection, since this does not happen by accident. I never had any particular taste for playing the opening. I would aim not to obtain an advantage, but my own position, to avoid opening preparations by my opponent, and to then somehow outplay him. With such an approach you often do not notice the strongest continuations in the opening, since you are simply not in the habit of looking for them. Garry Kasparov, for example, has a fundamentally different approach. Since childhood he has been aiming for the maximum in the opening, to the seizure of the initiative, and he has an excellent feeling for where it is concealed. Of course, for him to find the strongest continuations such as 5 \( \text{c3} \) or 6 \( \text{xg5} \) would not be difficult, since he is accustomed to this and is trained to look for them. But when a player has no such habit, he misses certain important possibilities. You see, a couple of examples from my games, and it is immediately possible to give a diagnosis. It is clear what to work on, in order to improve, in the opening at any event.

I played in my style – I found a quiet set-up, which in general also has some point.

\begin{align*}
6  \ & \text{g3} \quad \text{f7} \\
7  \ & \text{exf6} \quad \text{exf6} \\
8  \ & \text{d4}
\end{align*}

We have reached the position which I would like to discuss with you.

Does this remind you of any other opening? That’s right, the Exchange Variation of the French Defence. The pawn structure is almost exactly the same. The only difference is the pawn on f7 and the placing of the pieces. White’s knight has ended up on g3, and Black’s on f7.

Let us find out to whose advantage are these deviations from the Exchange Variation. For this, let us at least remember the initial moves of the game Winter—Alekhine (Nottingham 1936): 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 exd5 exd5 4 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 5 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{d6} \) 6 c3 \( \text{h4} \) ?. Why is this queen sortie needed? In order to prevent the important move \( \text{f4} \) with the exchange of White’s passive bishop. In turn Black plans to carry out a similar operation – ...\( \text{ge7} \) and ...\( \text{f5} \).

Yes, in such positions control of the f4- and f5-squares is very important. Returning to my game with Shmit, I should mention that White can play \( \text{d3} \), \( \text{e2} \) and \( \text{f4} \), whereas Black does not and will not have the possibility of ...\( \text{f5} \).
What else can be mentioned? Black's kingside is weakened. White will press on h7 by \( \textsf{\texttt{d}}d3, \textsf{\texttt{c}}2-c3 \) and \( \textsf{\texttt{w}}c2 \) – the opponent will evidently have to reply \( \ldots g7-g6 \). I will play \( h2-h4 \), and at some time point \( h4-h5 \). Kingside castling will be dangerous for Black.

It can be concluded that we have an improved version for White of the Exchange Variation of the French Defence. With a quite development of events his position is preferable, and the further course of the game confirmed this.

\[ 8 \ldots \textsf{\texttt{c}}c6 \]
\[ 9 \textsf{\texttt{c}}3 \]
White has a completely clear plan of action: \( \textsf{\texttt{d}}d3, \textsf{\texttt{w}}c2, \textsf{\texttt{g}}ge2, \textsf{\texttt{f}}f4, h2-h4, 0-0-0 \ldots \) A whole series of moves can be made easily, without reflection. The opponent needs to think how to combat this.

\[ 9 \ldots \textsf{\texttt{e}}e6 \]
Black prepares queenside castling, so as not to come under an attack on the kingside.

\[ 10 \textsf{\texttt{d}}d3 \textsf{\texttt{w}}d7 \]
\[ 11 \textsf{\texttt{e}}e2 \]
Here Black also has another problem. Do you remember the article “The 'superfluous' piece”, which was offered for study in the first book of this series (cf. Secrets of Chess Training)? Here too there is a 'superfluous' piece: the d6-square is needed both for the knight, and for the bishop, but together they cannot be accommodated on one square. If the bishop goes to d6, the knight will be doing nothing on f7. And if the knight goes to d6, how can the bishop be developed?

\[ 11 \ldots \textsf{\texttt{d}}d6 \]
\[ 12 \textsf{\texttt{c}}c2 \textsf{\texttt{g}}6 \]
\[ 13 h4 \textsf{\texttt{0}}-\textsf{\texttt{0}}-\textsf{\texttt{0}} \]
\[ 14 \textsf{\texttt{f}}f4 \textsf{\texttt{b}}b8 \]
\[ 15 0-0-0 \textsf{\texttt{a}}a5 \]
\[ 16 \textsf{\texttt{b}}b1 \textsf{\texttt{b}}6 \]
White’s opening strategy has been justified – he has a slight, but enduring advantage. He can gradually cramp his opponent by 17 \( \textsf{\texttt{c}}c1 \) (vacating the f4-square for his knight), then b2-b3, depriving the black knights of the c4-square, and so on. (Unfortunately, here I hastened to seize control of the f5-point, and played 17 h5?! g5 18 \( \textsf{\texttt{x}}xd6 \textsf{\texttt{x}}xd6 \) 19 \( \textsf{\texttt{f}}f5 \), but did not achieve a lot.)

Let us return to the moment when the 'Exchange Variation' arose after White's 8th move. Incidentally, here Shmit had a serious think, but even so he did not sense the strategic danger threatening him.

During the game I was concerned about the reply \( 8 \ldots c5! \), changing the pawn structure. After this it is no longer an Exchange Variation of the French Defence. But what does occur? Most probably a position with an isolated d5-pawn for Black, and this means the Tarrasch Variation of the French Defence.

In whose favour are the changes in the position compared with the Tarrasch Variation? Anatoly Karpov, who at one time won a number of games in this variation, wrote: ‘The main idea of White’s play is control of the d4-point. He must constantly keep an eye on it.’ If White does not have secure control of this point, he cannot count on any advantage.
Usually in the Tarrasch Variation the knights stand on f3 and d2, and then, after an exchange of pawns on c5, the knight goes with gain of tempo to b3, from where it controls the d4-point. But here the white knight has moved to the side and is not taking part in the battle for the centre. This factor improves Black’s chances in comparison with the normal Tarrasch Variation. It is more difficult to evaluate the f6, d7 construction. Does it not weaken Black’s position? The answer to this question is not obvious. It is easier to figure out if you know one of the strategic ideas which Black sometimes employs in the Tarrasch Variation. It was demonstrated in the following game.

Gipslis – Korchnoi
Amsterdam 1976
French Defence
1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 c4 e5 4 d5 c6 5
exd5 exd5 6 b5 d6 7 dx5 xc5 8 0-0
b6 9 b3 d6 10 g5 0-0 11 e1

13 e2 e6
14 g3

It is advantageous for White to exchange the dark-square bishops. But Black is ready to counter this attempt.

14 ... e5!
The defence is based on the strong point at e5.

15 fd4 d7

I would have preferred the retreat to f7, to securely defend the d5-pawn.

16 a4 a6 17 a5 c7 18 c3 d8 19 c1
b4 20 d3 g6 21 f4 xf4 22 xf4
fe8 23 g3 c5! 24 f1 f7 25 a4
g6 26 e3 g4 27 d3 f7 28 xe8+
xe8 29 c2 g6 30 b4 a7 31 b5 e5 32
f1 axb5 33 xb5 c5 34 d1 g4 35
a1 a8 Draw.

Let us return to the Alekhine Defence. Knowing Korchnoi’s game, we can conclude that the knight at f7 and pawn at f6 are not so stupidly placed, and they may well come in useful for Black in his set-up. This factor merely strengthens our impression that Black has a good version of the Tarrasch Variation.

Chess is not like study composition, where there is always just one solution. I have shown one of the sensible approaches to the position, but a completely different logic is also possible. When I invited Nana Alexandria to consider the position, she found her own solution, and also a good one – the interesting queen check 8 ... e7+!

How should White respond to it? The exchange of queens is not dangerous for Black. If 9 e3?, then 9 ... b4+ is unpleasant. 9 e2 hampers White’s development. 9 e2 looks natural, but then 9 ... g4! The exchange on e2 favours Black, but after 10 f3 d7 (followed by ... c6 and ... 0-0-0) the knight has been deprived of the f3-square and it is not easy for White to complete his development.
How does one arrive at the move $8...\text{w}e7+$? After all, it is not usual to play with the queen, when there is only one knight developed. You can arrive at this check only after experiencing a certain alarm, after realising that if the game develops naturally it will take a favourable course for White. Not wishing to allow this, you look for drastic measures and sometimes find them.

Absolutely original ideas occur extremely rarely in chess. All this had already occurred, including the queen check. It is much easier to find it, if you know the following game, or more correctly Larsen's comments to it on the position arising in the opening.

**Larsen – Portisch**

*Interzonal Tournament, Amsterdam 1964*

*French Defence*

\[
\begin{align*}
1 & \text{e}4 & \text{e}6 \\
2 & \text{d}4 & \text{d}5 \\
3 & \text{c}3 & \text{b}4 \\
4 & \text{exd}5 & \text{exd}5 \\
5 & \text{w}f3!?
\end{align*}
\]

Let us hand over to Bent Larsen:

'This set Portisch thinking! The exchange variation has had a reputation as a dull drawish line for many years; for instance, $5 \text{\textit{d}}3 \text{\textit{c}}6 6 \text{\textit{ge}}2 \text{\textit{ge}}7$ followed by $...\text{f}5$, and there are no problems for Black. The text move, which I had played in some blitz games against Palle Ravn, is directed against the very manoeuvre $...\text{\textit{ge}}7$ and $...\text{f}5$; after $5\text{\textit{d}}7 6 \text{\textit{d}}3 \text{\textit{bc}}6 7 \text{\textit{e}}2$ White's position is quite attractive.

'Because of this game $5 \text{\textit{w}}f3$ became almost popular for a short while, but it disappeared again because of the reply $5...\text{w}e7+$, for instance $6 \text{\textit{e}}2 \text{\textit{c}}6 7 \text{\textit{xd}}5 \text{\textit{f}}6$ with more than enough for the pawn.

'During the game I thought of the possibility $5...\text{w}e7+$ and toyed with the idea $6 \text{\textit{e}}3 \text{\textit{xc}}3+ 7 \text{\textit{bc}}3 \text{\textit{a}}3 8 \text{\textit{d}}2$, which may look strange, but is very good for White. However, a Yugoslav game Mestrovic–Maric, Kraljevo 1967, seems to prove that $6 \text{\textit{e}}3$ is of dubious value because of $6...\text{\textit{f}}6 7 \text{\textit{d}}3 \text{\textit{c}}5!$. After this I tend to believe that $5...\text{w}e7+$ is Black's strongest move.

'Immediately after the game O'Kelly stated that the easiest solution for Black was $5...\text{e}6$, but I don't agree; after $6 \text{\textit{d}}3 \text{\textit{w}}f6$ White ought to play $7 \text{\textit{f}}4$!.

'Also $5...\text{c}5$ has been recommended, but $6 \text{\textit{dxc}}5 \text{\textit{d}}4 7 \text{\textit{a}}3 \text{\textit{wa}}5 8 \text{\textit{b}}1$ looks very good for White.

'Portisch had enough to think about!'

It remains to add that in the game there followed $5...\text{\textit{c}}6 6 \text{\textit{b}}5 \text{\textit{e}}7 7 \text{\textit{f}}4 0-0 8 0-0-0 \text{\textit{a}}5$? (8...\text{\textit{e}}6 was better) 9 \text{\textit{ge}}2 \text{\textit{c}}6 10 \text{\textit{d}}3 \text{\textit{b}}5 11 \text{\textit{h}}4! \text{\textit{c}}4 12 \text{\textit{h}}5 \text{\textit{f}}6 13 \text{\textit{g}}4 \text{\textit{wa}}5?! 14 \text{\textit{xc}}4 \text{\textit{dxc}}4 15 \text{\textit{a}}3! \text{\textit{xc}}3 (15...\text{\textit{xa}}3 16 \text{\textit{bx}}a3 \text{\textit{wx}}a3+ 17 \text{\textit{d}}2 \text{\textit{b}}4 18 \text{\textit{a}}1!! \text{\textit{bxc}}3+ 19 \text{\textit{dx}}c3 \text{\textit{wb}}4 20 \text{\textit{h}}b1) 16 \text{\textit{xc}}3 \text{\textit{wd}}8 17 \text{\textit{he}}1 (17 \text{\textit{xb}}5?! \text{\textit{wd}}5!) 17...\text{\textit{a}}5 18 \text{\textit{g}}3 \text{\textit{a}}7 (18...\text{\textit{b}}4 19 \text{\textit{d}}6!) 19 \text{\textit{h}}6! \text{\textit{g}}6 20 \text{\textit{d}}6 \text{\textit{we}}8 21 \text{\textit{w}}f4! \text{\textit{ff}}7 22 \text{\textit{e}}5 \text{f}5 23 \text{\textit{bb}}8 \text{\textit{eb}}7 24 \text{\textit{we}}5! \text{\textit{gb}}8 25 \text{\textit{g}}5 \text{\textit{b}}4 26 \text{\textit{w}}f6+ \text{\textit{ee}}8 27 \text{\textit{w}}x\text{c}6+ \text{\textit{ff}}7 28 \text{\textit{w}}f6+ \text{\textit{ee}}8 29 \text{\textit{d}}5 \text{\textit{f}}8 30 \text{\textit{c}}6+ \text{\textit{dd}}7 31 \text{\textit{d}}6 \text{\textit{f}}7 32 \text{\textit{xe}}7 \text{\textit{bc}}3 33 \text{\textit{b}}4+ Black resigned.

The conclusion from what has been said is
obvious. Chess erudition, a knowledge of typical ideas, serves as a reliable basis in the logical perception of opening problems, and helps correct solutions in the opening to be found. However, not only in the opening. The boundary between the opening and the middlegame is very arbitrary. Many of the positions in question, although they are considered by opening theory, can well be assigned to the middlegame. At one time I wrote an article about the study of typical middlegame positions and in it I recommended roughly the same approach. You can find it in the fourth part of this book.
Artur Yusupov

Surprises in the Opening

What chess player has not stumbled into a cunning opening trap, been caught in a variation that appeared to be condemned by theory but in reality proved fully viable, or fallen victim to his own opening preparation, which turned out on verification to have a ‘hole’? In other words, all of us have had occasion to encounter surprises in the opening and, of course, we are well familiar with the unpleasant feelings associated with this.

The search for unexpected (for this read – new for the opponent!) ideas serves as the main source of opening theory development. And if you think about it, all our efforts in preparing for a game are aimed precisely at finding a way to perplex, surprise, stun the opponent, to upset his normal routine. To surprise means to win! But, after all, our opponents also aim for the same thing.

Of course, thorough opening preparation significantly reduces the probability of some opening move or variation proving unexpected for you. However, it is not possible to exclude unpleasant surprises completely, and you should be inwardly prepared for them.

There are different sorts of surprises. In other words, a new move by the opponent may be objectively strong, but it may be aimed at you in particular, at your reaction, since any surprise is in the first instance an attack on your nerves. And very much depends on how quickly you are able to take yourself in hand and tune up for a full-blooded struggle. If you become flustered, this is likely to lead to a rapid collapse.

Incidentally, meeting something unexpected or unexplored is not bound to demoralise; on the contrary, it may awake our imagination and force the brain to work at full power. It often happens that the player who wins is not the one who prepares the variation, but the one for whom it was prepared! Relying entirely on the strength of his home preparation, a player is sometimes unable to force himself to play with full intensity. In this case, any surprise in the opponent’s actions, even the most trivial, may prove fatal for him – he simply does not manage to retune for a fierce and genuine struggle.

I should like to disclose the theme of today’s lesson using examples from my own games. I will begin with one played in the World Cup with the Hungarian grandmaster Gyula Sax. Of course, for such important encounters the players make especially thorough preparations. I was hoping to catch Sax in one of the variations of the Queen’s Indian Defence, of which I had made a fairly detailed analysis.

Yusupov – Sax
World Cup, Rotterdam 1989
Queen’s Indian Defence
1 d4 ♙f6
2 c4 e6
3 ♙f3 b6
4 g3 ♙a6
5 b3
Apart from this, the most popular continuation, I have also employed 5 ♙bd2 several times.

5 . . . ♙b4+
6 ♙d2 ♙e7

What is the idea of this loss of a tempo,
which Black goes in for? The point is that after b2–b3 the natural place for the bishop is on b2. White may still want later to switch his bishop to the long diagonal, but at c3 it is less securely placed than at b2, and in addition it takes away the natural square for the development of the knight. If White does develop his knight on c3, all the same he will subsequently have to move his bishop from d2. Therefore with his manoeuvre Black effectively does not lose a tempo.

7 \( \text{g}2 \) \( \text{c}6 \)
Preventing \( \text{d}7-\text{d}5 \).

8 0-0 \( \text{d}5 \)

9 \( \text{e}5 \)
Exploiting the fact that for the moment it is not possible to capture on c4 because of the vulnerability of the c6-point, White tries to occupy the centre. The knight on e5 is very unpleasant for Black, and he must exchange it.

9 . . . \( \text{fd}7 \)
Again supposedly against the rules (the second move in the opening by the same piece), but in closed positions this is sometimes admissible. In the given case the battle for the centre is more important than the rapid development of the pieces. And in view of the fact that the knight at b8 is literally crippled by the knight on e5, the move made is in some sense also a developing one.

10 \( \text{xd}7 \) \( \text{xd}7 \)
11 \( \text{c}3 \)
Here we have that instance about which I told you: White is forced to waste a tempo, in order to bring his bishop onto the long diagonal. In passing I should mention that the capture on c4 is dangerous for Black, since after 11...dx\( \text{c}4 \) 12 \( \text{d}5! \) exd\( \text{5} \) 13 \( \text{x}g7 \) White prevents his opponent from castling, obtaining an enduring initiative for the pawn.

12 \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{c}8 \)

When the game was played, this move was considered almost obligatory, but at the present time theoreticians are increasingly considering other continuations. One of the new and good alternatives is 12...\( \text{f}6 \). This was first played by Lajos Portisch against Anatoly Karpov (Rotterdam 1989), and later the same idea was used by Karpov himself in his match with me. The position is quite intricate, despite its apparent simplicity. But we will not now go into its subtleties – for this there are reference books.

13 e4
Play in the centre! In reply, if you remember, in the matches between Kasparov and Karpov (1984-85 and 1986) the advance ...b6–b5 was tested, after which White played \( \text{e}1 \). But the plan with ...c6–c5 is more usual.

13 . . . \( \text{c}5 \)
14 exd5 \( \text{exd}5 \)
15 dxc5
White is not able to win a pawn: if 15 \( \text{x}d5 \) there is the reply 15...\( \text{f}6 \).

15 . . . \( \text{dxc}4 \)
After 13...c5 the given position arises more or less by force. If it is unfamiliar to you, it is not so easy to work out its nuances at the board. In principle, such positions, critical for the opening variation, should be very thoroughly studied in home preparations and subjected to detailed analysis.

16 c6
Now in particular White has to reckon with the reply 16...\( \text{xb}3 \), since the capture on d7 does not work, as the bishop at c3 is hanging. There now begins a sharp tactical skirmish, which seemed to me to be not unfavourable for White.

16 . . . \( \text{xb}3! \)
17 \( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{b}5 \)
Perhaps the most critical reply (although later 17...b2!? 18 \( \text{xb}2 \) \( \text{c}5 \) came into fashion). Sax attacks the c6-pawn and is still
not afraid of the capture on d7. If White wants to sell his bishop more dearly – 18 \( \text{axg7} \text{axg7} \) 19 cxd7, then simply 19...\( \text{xd7} \). Black has the two bishops, and it is not apparent how the weakening of his position can be exploited.

Now try to look ahead a little, to find out how the game may develop, and what resources are available to White.

18 \( \text{c1} \)? A new move, which is worth considering...

Capture on b3 with the pawn? Yes, this is not a bad reply, perhaps the best. I advise you to look carefully at 18 axb3 at home – the resulting variations are very interesting.

Is that all? In fact it is also possible to capture on b3 with the knight, in connection with an interesting tactical idea: the sacrifice \( \text{ixg7} \). It is this possibility that I analysed in my home preparation – it is a pity if you did not notice it.

18 \( \text{xb3} \)? \( \text{xc6} \)

At this moment the situation suddenly ceased to appeal to me: Sax all too willingly went in for the complications, which according to all my preliminary estimations should have been in my favour. He was not so naive as to go in for such play, without having something specific in mind! I realised that there might be a flaw in my calculations. Sax, I repeat, had replied too confidently and quickly.

In such a situation the main thing is not to become flustered, not to panic. You should try to delve more deeply into the position and try to find out what exactly the opponent has in mind. In addition, it is important to brace yourself psychologically for the fact that something unexpected awaits you, some unpleasant surprise...

Realising all this, I nevertheless did not see any possibility of deviating from the planned capture on g7. Although, I have to admit, I made the move without my former optimism.

\[
19 \text{\textit{xg7}} \quad \text{\textit{xd7}} \\
20 \text{\textit{d4}}!
\]

Here Black does not have much choice. Thus 20...\( \text{f6} \) is bad – White gains the advantage after 21 \( \text{xc6} \text{xc6} \) 22 \( \text{xc6} \text{xa1} \) 23 \( \text{wa1+} \). The main continuation, which I examined in my home analysis, was, naturally 20...\( \text{xg2} \). Let us together try and figure out what was Sax's defensive idea.

Let's immediately look at the critical line – 21 \( \text{f5+} \) (other moves hardly deserve serious consideration). The reply 21...\( \text{f6} \) does not have to be feared, while after 21...\( \text{h8} \) 22 \( \text{xe7} \) the impression is that White's attack is irresistible.

Indeed, how can Black defend? 22...\( \text{h3} \) is
then you have not played so badly. The move made is more accurate than 25 \( \text{We}1 \), to which Black could have replied 25...\( \text{Cc}7 \)! (now after this there follows 26 \( \text{Ad}1 \)). In addition, 25 \( \text{We}2 \) creates the threat of 26 \( \text{Axh}7 \).

25...\( \text{xf}5 \)

26 \( \text{Ad}1 \)

Unexpectedly the black queen is trapped. However, I did not manage to catch Sax unawares – he had foreseen the only defence, which this time saves Black.

26...\( \text{gg}4 \)!

Here peace was concluded. The draw can result in several ways. It is possible, for example, to play brilliantly: 27 \( \text{Ah}7 \)+ \( \text{Ah}7 \) 28 \( \text{Axg}4 \) \( \text{We}8 \) 29 \( \text{Dd}7 \)+ \( \text{Af}7 \) 30 \( \text{xf}7 \)+ \( \text{Wxf}7 \) 31 \( \text{Wxc}8 \) \( \text{Wxa}2 \), and the queen endgame is most probably drawn. However, there is no need for such brilliancy, and in the game White would probably have played more simply: 27 \( \text{Ax}d8 \) \( \text{Ax}e2 \) 28 \( \text{Wxf}8 \)+ \( \text{Wxf}8 \) 29 \( \text{Ax}e2 \) \( \text{Af}7 \) with complete equality.

Great was my surprise when I learned that Sax had not devised this idea himself, but had noticed it in a game Cher nin–Browne, played a couple of weeks before the World Cup at a tournament in Lugano! Alexander Cher nin, after analysing this variation for White, followed the same path as I did and encountered the same unpleasant novelty (possibly found by Walter Browne directly at the board), but in contrast to me he played 24 \( \text{Ax}e5 \) and later had to endure a lengthy battle for a draw. That is, on encountering the surprise, he did not manage to find the correct solution. Or perhaps he simply became flustered.

Here, naturally, there are no prescriptions for all eventualities. **The main thing is not to lose your composure, but to calmly try to find a vulnerable point in your opponent’s idea. And, of course, you should always be psychologically prepared for surprises** such as 23...\( \text{Ce}5 \). I was greatly
helped by the fact that I sensed in good time: Sax is trying to trap me! And when you realise what is awaiting you, it is easier to find an antidote.

Of course, this game can also induce sad thoughts. It once again shows that, given the mass of information saturating the modern chess world, it is sometimes simply impossible to keep up with all that is new in opening theory! However, if you are aiming for good results and at the same time you like sharp and critical variations, you cannot get by without a knowledge of the latest achievements of theoretical thinking.

The next game that we will discuss is of a quite different type. In it the opening knowledge of the two players concluded not at the transition stage into the endgame, as in the previous game, but somewhere in the region of... the fifth move!

Yusupov – Timman
Linares 1989
Slav Defence

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
1 & d4 & d5 \\
2 & c4 & c6 \\
3 & cxd5 & cxd5 \\
4 & \text{\textit{d}c3} & \text{\textit{d}c6} \\
5 & \text{\textit{f}4} & \\
\end{array}
\]

I occasionally employ the Exchange Variation. In this tournament my attention was drawn to the game Gulkov–Timman, played in one of the earlier rounds, where, as it seemed to me, White managed to gain an advantage. Boris Gulkov continued 4 \text{\textit{f}4} \text{\textit{c}6} 5 \text{\textit{e}3} \text{\textit{e}6} 6 \text{\textit{c}3} \text{\textit{d}6} 7 \text{\textit{x}d6} \text{\textit{w}xd6} 8 \text{\textit{d}3} \text{\textit{f}6} 9 \text{\textit{f}4}! Now it is clear why White did not hurry with the development of his g1-knight – he was waiting to see where the opponent would develop his dark-square bishop, in order in the event of ...\text{\textit{f}8–d6} to obtain secure control of the e5-point.

I decided to try the same idea, but I slightly changed the move order.

\[
5 \ldots \\
6 \text{\textit{xe}5} \\
7 \text{\textit{d}xe5} \\
\]

A novelty! Having played Jan Timman many times, I realised that from the very first moves he would fight for the initiative, and that it was extremely dangerous to concede this. The move made by Timman is an obvious attempt to seize the initiative. Now White must capture on e5, of course, but with what – pawn or bishop?

I judged the c6-knight to be a more active piece than the f4-bishop. The situation after 6 \text{\textit{d}xe5} \text{\textit{d}4} seemed to me to be more promising for Black.

\[
6 \ldots \\
7 \text{\textit{d}xe5} \\
\]

I was of the impression that it was around here that Timman’s analysis concluded. His position clearly appealed to him.

Let’s consider what possibilities White has. Yes, of course, 8 \text{\textit{a}4+} suggests itself. But doesn’t it concern you that the move is, in general, a very obvious one? This would have put me on my guard... So, is the check possible, or not? That’s right, it’s not worth giving: after 8 \text{\textit{a}4+} Black replies 8...b5!, and what can White do? Capturing with the queen is bad on account of 9...\text{\textit{d}7}, while after the capture with the knight there also follows 9...\text{\textit{d}7} with the threat of ...a7–a6. Here Black probably wins.
There is nothing to be done – the knight has to be moved into the centre.

8 \( \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}4}} \) For the moment the bishop check at b4 is not to be feared – White simply blocks with his knight. Timman continues to increase the pressure.

8... \( \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{b}6}} \)

Now consider: what should White do? What 'course of behaviour' should he choose, after encountering such an unusual development of events in the opening, when Black somehow over-sharply wants to seize the initiative and win?

The value of each move is now very high. The b2-pawn is ‘hanging’, but to defend it with the rook?!... The faint-hearted 9 \( \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}6}}+ \), trying somehow to subdue the opponent's attacking mood, also does not look good: after 9...\( \texttt{\texttt{x}d6} 10 \texttt{\texttt{ex}d6} \texttt{\texttt{xb}2} \) I think that Black has a minimal advantage.

9 \( \texttt{\texttt{f}3}! \) The critical decision. Of course, White cannot know for sure how the complications will end, but he acts in accordance with the rules of opening strategy and brings new pieces into the battle, not bothering about the defence of the b2-pawn.

9... \( \texttt{\texttt{xb}2} \)

10 \( \texttt{\texttt{b}1} \)

Are there any other suggestions? Capture the d4-pawn with the queen? Let's take a look: 10 \( \texttt{\texttt{x}d4} \texttt{\texttt{b}4}+ 11 \texttt{\texttt{d}1} \) (not 11 \( \texttt{\texttt{d}2}?? \texttt{\texttt{c}3} \) or 11...\( \texttt{\texttt{x}d}2+ \)), and now Black is not obliged to exchange queens, but can play 11...\( \texttt{\texttt{a}3} \). Shall we look any further? To be honest, with his king on d1 White's position does not inspire confidence.

If it appears to you that White can defend himself here, try checking this position at home. In general, try to support all your feelings with concrete analysis.

But remember: in a practical game you are not able to calculate everything to the end, and the main thing is to evaluate correctly the consequences of this or that continuation, and decide for yourself whether it is worth going in for the variation, or at least seriously examining it. In the given instance, I repeat, I considered the move 10 \( \texttt{\texttt{x}d4} \) to be very dangerous for White, even on psychological grounds, since it hands the initiative to the opponent. But I wanted to be the attacking side, I myself wanted to fight for the initiative with every move!

10... \( \texttt{\texttt{b}4}+! \) The strongest reply – Black drives back one of the opponent's already developed pieces. The capture on a2 would be extremely risky for him, since it would give White the opportunity to begin an attack with 11 \( \texttt{\texttt{e}3} \), as well as with the simple capture 11 \( \texttt{\texttt{d}4} \).

11 \( \texttt{\texttt{d}2} \) A purely practical decision: by blocking with this knight, White reduces the opponent's choice of replies. After all, in both cases Black can capture on d2, but the move 11 \( \texttt{\texttt{d}2} \) forces this exchange, since in the event of 11...\( \texttt{\texttt{a}3} \) White is now free to capture on d4.

11... \( \texttt{\texttt{x}d}2+ \)

12 \( \texttt{\texttt{d}2} \) \( \texttt{\texttt{x}a}2 \) It is possible to make an initial assessment of the operation begun with 10 \( \texttt{\texttt{b}1} \). White
has lost a pawn, but in return he has gained the opportunity to quickly complete the development of his pieces. Incidentally, which move best conforms with the given aim?

13 e3
Correct! Incidentally, if I had not foreseen this resource, I possibly would not have played 10 \text{\textipa{b1}}, but would have looked for some alternative. It seemed to me that White was firmly seizing the initiative.

13 \ldots dxe3
What to do now? There are two candidate moves: 14 \text{\textipa{b5+}} and 14 fxe3, and the question is which of them is more accurate. You think 14 fxe3? But why, can you explain? Because of the possibility of placing the bishop on c4? Yes, this is the first thing that strikes one. If White plays 14 \text{\textipa{b5+}}, Black would manage to take control of the c4-point: 14 \ldots f8 15 fxe3 e6. But this is not the only aim of the capture with the pawn.

14 fxe3
Now Black also faces a choice: either to develop his bishop – 14 \ldots e6, or bring out his knight to \text{e7}. In the event of 14 \ldots \text{\textipa{e7}} 15 \text{\textipa{c4}} there was a cunning trap awaiting him. The natural reply 15 \ldots a5? is prettily refuted: 16 \text{\textipa{f7+}}! \text{\textipa{xf7}} 17 \text{\textipa{h5+}} g6 18 e6+!, winning the queen, or 17 \ldots e6 18 0-0! with irresistible threats to the king.

Of course, Black is not obliged to fall into the trap and he can defend differently, but there is no point in calculating the variations further – a simple assessment is sufficient, that after 15 \text{\textipa{c4}} White has a strong attack. Evidently Timman came to the same conclusion and he avoided this continuation.

14 \ldots e6!
As you see, from the practical point of view 14 fxe3 was indeed more accurate than 14 \text{\textipa{b5+}}. White has retained the possibility of the check on b5, but he also has available another, stronger continuation.

15 \text{\textipa{xb7}}
The rook is included in the attack.

15 \ldots d8
The alternative was 15\ldots g6!?, preparing in advance a shelter for the king, which, and this is already clear, will be unable to castle. Then 16 \text{\textipa{e4}} is tempting, with the idea of invading with the knight. White's initiative seemed dangerous to me even in the event of the exchange of queens: 16\ldots \text{\textipa{a5+}} 17 \text{\textipa{d2}} \text{\textipa{xd2+}} (17\ldots \text{\textipa{xe5?}} 18 \text{\textipa{b4}}) 18 \text{\textipa{xd2}}, but here, unfortunately, I overlooked the unexpected reply 18\ldots 0-0-0+!

However, the aggressive continuation chosen by Timman is also not bad.

In such situations it is important not to get hooked on some single variation, but to see all the various possibilities. Here White has two ways: one is obvious – 16 \text{\textipa{b5+}}, but the other is less so – 16 \text{\textipa{c1}}. I rejected the bishop check for the reason that it assists the implementation of Black's plan, involving the evacuation of his king: ...\text{\textipa{f8}}, ...\text{\textipa{g7–g6}} and ...\text{\textipa{g7}} followed by the development of his knight.

16 \text{\textipa{c1!}} g6!
A prophylactic move, preparing the flight of the king to g7. Here I considered various possibilities, including 17 \text{\textipa{c4}}. But after the simple 17\ldots \text{\textipa{xc4}} 18 \text{\textipa{xc4}} \text{\textipa{wg2}} I was
surprised in the Opening

unable to find any attacking continuation.

17  \textit{c3}!

While improving the position of his queen, at the same time White delays the development of the opponent's knight. If 17...\textit{h6} there follows the unpleasant 18 \textit{b4}. It is also not good to bring out the knight to e7: 18 \textit{b5}+ \textit{f8} 19 \textit{x}e7! (weaker is 19 \textit{b4 \textit{g7}}!) 19...\textit{xd}2 20 \textit{e}8+! \textit{g7} 21 \textit{xd}2 \textit{b}1+ 22 \textit{d}1 \textit{xb}5 23 \textit{h}8, and White remains the exchange up.

17 ... \textit{f8}

18 \textit{d}3

White continues the attack and simultaneously completes his development. As you see, even in the course of such concrete tactical play the actions of the two players are in accordance with the basic principles of chess strategy. Indeed, both sides (despite the fact that one is attacking, and the other is obliged to parry immediate threats) make moves which are either developing, or hinder the opponent's development!

18 ... \textit{c8}!

A subtle move. With the queen on the long diagonal, the black king at g7 will feel uncomfortable. After 18...\textit{g7}? 19 0-0 White is already threatening \textit{xf}7+!.

19 \textit{b}4+

Had Timman delayed ...\textit{c}8 for an instant, the white queen could have occupied the central d4-point, whereas now it has to be satisfied with the side square b4.

19 ... \textit{g7}

20 0-0 \textit{h}6

Black has managed after all to develop his knight.

21 \textit{e}4

Threatening 22 \textit{g}5. But at just the right time Timman is able to bring his last piece into play!

21 ... \textit{hd}8!

22 \textit{d}6

White is obliged to reject the planned knight sortie to g5.

22 ... \textit{d}5!

By now both sides had little time left. In time-trouble it is not very pleasant to encounter such a threat, but White was able to find the correct solution to the problem.

23 \textit{e}4!

The exchange sacrifice is, of course, temporary.

23 ... \textit{xb}7

24 \textit{xb}7 \textit{b}8

25 \textit{e}7

Generally speaking, the position is equal. Now Black is forced to play 25...\textit{f}8, since 25...\textit{e}6? would be bad on account of the obvious 26 \textit{xf}7+!.

25 ... \textit{f}8

26 \textit{f}6+ \textit{g}8

27 \textit{g}5 \textit{g}7

28 \textit{f}6+

White forces a draw by repetition.

28 ... \textit{g}8

29 \textit{g}5 \textit{g}7

30 \textit{f}6+

And here a draw was agreed.

Of course, had there been a little more time, I could have played on, say, by setting an
attractive trap: 30 h3, hoping for the reply 30...\(\text{h}6?\). Then there follows 31 \(\text{f}6 \text{w}d7\) 32 \(\text{c}6! \text{w}c7 33 \text{w}h6+! \text{x}h6 34 \text{f}5+\) and White gives mate. But in a serious game I do not recommend you to be tempted by similar traps – it is not without its dangers. After the correct 30...\(\text{g}8!\) (taking control of the f6-point) White would still have had to overcome certain difficulties. As it was, the game immediately ended in a draw.

This game illustrates an important principle, which I usually endeavour to follow: **On encountering a surprise in the opening, endeavour on no account to concede the psychological advantage to the opponent, but seek active possibilities and do everything possible to fight for the initiative.** Only then can you hope for a successful solution to your opening problems.

The following example shows how it is possible to fight for a win in an opening setup with which the opponent is more familiar than you.

**Shirazi – Yusupov**

Saint John 1988

*French Defence*

1 e4 \(e6\)

2 d4 \(d5\)

3 \(\text{c}3 \text{b}4\)

4 \(\text{ge}2\)

An unpleasant surprise, seeing as this variation has great drawing tendencies, and I, despite the black pieces, was intending to play for a win.

4 ... \(\text{d}xe4\)

5 a3 \(\text{e}7\)

6 \(\text{x}e4 \text{f}6\)

7 \(\text{d}3 \text{c}6\)

8 \(\text{f}4\)

What moves would you now suggest for Black? Let’s give them in order: 7...\(\text{c}6\), 7...\(\text{b}6\), 7...\(\text{bd}7\), 7...\(\text{d}7\) – four in all. You don’t have any other ideas? Then look and see what happened in the game.

8 ... \(\text{d}5!\)?

It is a well-known principle that in the opening you should not move the same piece twice. However, in the given instance Black was pursuing a perfectly concrete aim. I would not assert that my decision here was the best. No, but it is challenging, since it forces the opponent to solve concrete and not very simple problems! Besides, strictly speaking, I do not really lose much time. After all, now White has to move his bishop, as otherwise after its exchange Black will gain the advantage of the two bishops.

9 \(\text{d}2\)

In playing 8...\(\text{d}5\), Black had to have some plan of action, since it is clear that the opponent will want to push away the knight by \(c2-c4\). Then the loss of time will be quite unjustified. But what specifically should be done? The pawn sacrifice 9...\(\text{b}5\) seems dubious to me. There is, of course, this positional idea – to try and take control of the light squares, but for the moment it is too early for this. What then should be done?

9 ... \(\text{b}6\)

10 \(\text{c}4 \text{a}6\)
In effect, Black is simply pulling his opponent’s leg: I do not think that much can be achieved with an operation such as ...\(\mathcal{d}_d5\) and ...\(\mathcal{a}_a6\). White had several normal reactions. One was 11 \(b_4\), another – 11 \(\mathcal{g}_2g3\) followed by \(\mathcal{w}_c2\). It is probable that soon the knight would have had to retreat to \(f_6\), after which White would have a pleasant game. Nevertheless, since Black has not done anything particularly reprehensible, in principle his handling of the opening is also possible.

Kamran Shirazi approached the position differently. He decided that his knight was already developed – at \(e2\), and that it was time he developed his \(f1\)-bishop.

11 \(g3\)
A move provoked by the position of the bishop on \(a6\).

11 . . . \(\mathcal{d}_d7\)
12 \(\mathcal{g}_2g2\)
Here I again chose a problematic decision. Can anyone suggest what it was? Generally speaking, it is not so easy to find.

Let us consider together the resources of the two sides. First of all an anxious thought occurs: what if the white queen should now retreat to \(c2\)? The knight will have to move from \(d5\), and then I may lose the exchange on \(a8\). This looks dangerous. I was about to move my rook to \(b8\), but then I thought: suppose he captures my rook – perhaps after ...\(\mathcal{w}_xa8\) I will gain counterplay on the long diagonal?

On the other hand, if it were not for the knight on \(d5\), Black would be able to play ...\(\mathcal{d}_d7-e5\) – after all, the white queen is not defended! How can Black nevertheless land this attractive tactical blow ...\(\mathcal{d}_d7-e5\) ?

The move made by me may objectively be questionable, but in the end it was thanks to it that I won the game.

12 . . . \(\mathcal{f}_5f6!\)?
Can you explain what is the point of Black’s combination? After all, after the seemingly forced 13 \(\mathcal{d}_xf6+\) \(\mathcal{xf}_6\) 14 \(\mathcal{xa}_8\) \(\mathcal{w}_xa8\) 15 0-0 White does not face any threats...

Well, of course, the point is that this variation is not at all forced! The intermediate stroke 14...\(\mathcal{e}_e5!\) is in fact the idea of the combination.

13 \(\mathcal{d}_xf6+\) \(\mathcal{xf}_6\)
14 \(\mathcal{xa}_8\)

Of course, this operation is not obligatory, but, as I was hoping, Shirazi could not resist the temptation to capture the rook.

14 . . . \(\mathcal{e}_5e5!\)
15 \(\mathcal{w}_e4\) \(\mathcal{w}_xa8\)
16 \(\mathcal{w}_xa8\) \(\mathcal{d}_3+\)

It was extremely difficult for me to decide on this variation: after all, the exchange is the exchange! But after a careful study I realised that Black has compensation: the character of the play has changed sharply, and the initiative is on his side.

In certain situations such risky play can be justified. Shirazi is a player of active style, who likes to attack. Players of this type often underestimate the opponent’s threats, and they do not defend too confidently.

17 \(\mathcal{f}_1f1\) \(\mathcal{xa}_8\)
18 \(b3\) \(\mathcal{b}_7\)
The immediate 18...c5 also came into consideration.

19 \( \text{g1} \)  

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\begin{scope}[scale=0.5]
\foreach \x in {0,...,7} {
\foreach \y in {0,...,7} {
\pgfmathparse{\x + \y}
\edef\value{\pgfmathresult}
\ifnum\value=2\node at (\x,\y) {\textcolor{white}{\textbullet}};
\else\ifnum\value=3\node at (\x,\y) {\textbullet};
\fi\fi
\}}
\end{scope}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

20 \( \text{\textit{e3}}? \)  

\( \text{d8} \)

The weakness of the light squares in the opponent's position and the fact that he is somewhat behind in development provide definite compensation for the exchange. I am not talking about anything more, but I think that the compensation is nevertheless sufficient: Black's pieces are active, he has the two bishops, and in addition he has chances of winning another pawn. All this inspired me!

However, the position is far from clear, and how all this should turn out is hard to say. Had White now played, say, 20 \( \text{c3} \), it is doubtful whether Black would have had anything better than 20...\( \text{d8} \), allowing the following variation: 21 dxc5 \( \text{\textit{xc5}} \) 22 \( \text{xf6} \) gxf6 23 \( \text{e1}?! \) (but not 23 b4? \( \text{b3} \)), and if 23...\( \text{xb3} \), then 24 \( \text{d1} \).

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\begin{scope}[scale=0.5]
\foreach \x in {0,...,7} {
\foreach \y in {0,...,7} {
\pgfmathparse{\x + \y}
\edef\value{\pgfmathresult}
\ifnum\value=2\node at (\x,\y) {\textcolor{white}{\textbullet}};
\else\ifnum\value=3\node at (\x,\y) {\textbullet};
\fi\fi
\}}
\end{scope}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

As a result Black is simply a healthy pawn to the good with the better position.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\begin{scope}[scale=0.5]
\foreach \x in {0,...,7} {
\foreach \y in {0,...,7} {
\pgfmathparse{\x + \y}
\edef\value{\pgfmathresult}
\ifnum\value=2\node at (\x,\y) {\textcolor{white}{\textbullet}};
\else\ifnum\value=3\node at (\x,\y) {\textbullet};
\fi\fi
\}}
\end{scope}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

The conversion of the advantage is simple. Black gradually advances his kingside pawns.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\begin{scope}[scale=0.5]
\foreach \x in {0,...,7} {
\foreach \y in {0,...,7} {
\pgfmathparse{\x + \y}
\edef\value{\pgfmathresult}
\ifnum\value=2\node at (\x,\y) {\textcolor{white}{\textbullet}};
\else\ifnum\value=3\node at (\x,\y) {\textbullet};
\fi\fi
\}}
\end{scope}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

There is no need to calculate any variations – two connected passed pawns in combination with a powerful bishop are quite sufficient for a win.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\begin{scope}[scale=0.5]
\foreach \x in {0,...,7} {
\foreach \y in {0,...,7} {
\pgfmathparse{\x + \y}
\edef\value{\pgfmathresult}
\ifnum\value=2\node at (\x,\y) {\textcolor{white}{\textbullet}};
\else\ifnum\value=3\node at (\x,\y) {\textbullet};
\fi\fi
\}}
\end{scope}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

White resigned.

Let us ask ourselves: how was Black able to win so easily? After all, he encountered an unfamiliar system of development, which usually does not bode well. In my view, the secret of Black's success was largely associated with the fact that he responded in the psychologically correct way to his opponent's unexpected choice of opening. He did not allow himself to be drawn into any well-studied, forcing variations, which were possible, for example, after 4 \( \text{ge2} \) dxe4 5 a3 \( \text{xc3}+ \), but preferred an original scheme of development with a definite positional...
Surprises in the Opening

basis. Such tactics – to divert the opponent from the well-trodden paths, especially if he is inferior to you in class – often bear fruit.

The following example develops the theme of the French Defence. The game with Andrey Sokolov, which I want to show you, was played in our Candidates Match and, I remember, it afforded me great creative satisfaction.

A. Sokolov – Yusupov
Final Candidates Match, 3rd game
Riga 1986
French Defence

1 e4 e6
2 d4 d5
3 ∇c3 ∇b4
4 e5 ∇e7
5 a3 ∇xc3+
6 bxc3 c5
7 ∇f3 b6

Match play has its specific features, and in it a particular place is given over to opening duels. The aim of the last move is obvious: Black wants to exchange his bad ‘French’ bishop. In the 1st game Sokolov preferred to avoid the exchange, by playing 8 ∇b5+ ∇d7 9 ∇d3. He obtained a reasonable position, but later he lost in a complicated struggle. It was clear that for the 3rd game Sokolov would think up something new. But what? In my preparations with my trainer, to be honest, I did not guess right, and the opening of this game came as something of a surprise to me.

8 a4
A typical move in such positions.

8 . . . ∇a6
9 ∇xa6
9 ∇b5+ is more often played.

9 . . . ∇xa6
10 0-0 ∇b8

11 dxc5
In practice 11 ∇g5 and 11 ∇a3 have also been tried.

11 . . . bxc5
12 c4!
White undermines the centre.

Here I had to think seriously. I had only some vague memories of the games from the Geller–Spassky Candidates quarterfinal match (Sukhumi 1968), where this variation occurred several times.

In such situations you have to be guided by common sense, and if the position allows it, avoid the familiar paths as far as possible, choosing positionally justified but less well-studied continuations.

I sensed that the further course of the struggle would largely depend on what squares the black knights would occupy, and in particular where the b8-knight would be developed.

12 . . . 0-0
This move did not cause any great doubts.

13 cxd5
But here it was time to avoid the familiar paths, and not wait for Sokolov to spring some surprise. As far as I remembered, Boris Spassky captured on d5 with his queen.
13 ...  \( \boxtimes xd5!? \)

Not a bad square for the knight. For the moment Black is not particularly afraid of c2–c4, since his knight can occupy the b4-square.

14 \( \boxtimes d3 \)

What would you suggest now for Black? To answer this question correctly, you must see the aim of White’s last move.

Well, of course, he wants to play 14 \( \boxtimes g5 \), forcing the reply ...g7–g6, which seriously weakens the dark squares. This weakening is very significant, in view of the absence of an opponent to White’s dark-square bishop.

14 ... h6

The position is very complicated. To 15 \( \boxtimes d1 \)

I was intending to reply 15... \( \boxtimes c6 \), and if 16 \( \boxtimes a3 \), then 16... \( \boxtimes cb4 \), with unclear play. Sokolov played more positively and... less successfully.

15 c4

17...\( \boxtimes e7 \) White strengthens his position by 18 \( \boxtimes ad1 \) (it has to be this rook) 18...\( \boxtimes fd8 \) 19 \( \boxtimes d6 \), and if 19...\( \boxtimes xd6 \), then 20 \( \boxtimes xc5 \), winning a pawn.

After some thought, I decided that the place for the knight was at e7. Here it may come in useful for the defence of the kingside and in general it has good prospects: it can possibly move to f5 and then d4, or else go to g6, attacking the e5-pawn. Of course, when choosing the move I also had to analyse concrete variations. For example, the following one, which looks rather dangerous for Black: 15...\( \boxtimes e7 \) 16 \( \boxtimes d1 \) \( \boxtimes xd3 \) 17 \( \boxtimes bc6 \) 18 \( \boxtimes e3 \), and it appears that the c5-pawn cannot be defended. But... it only appears to be so! I had prepared the reply 18...\( \boxtimes fc8 \)! and if 19 \( \boxtimes xc5 \) – 19...\( \boxtimes xe5 \)!. This, so to speak, is the tactical justification of 15...\( \boxtimes e7 \).

In the given instance the general evaluation of the position is combined with concrete calculation, which is usually a necessary condition for taking the correct decision. You can give as many general considerations as you like in defence of a move, but if it then turns out that in one of the variations a pawn is simply lost – all your arguments will lose their point. Your evaluations must without fail be supported by accurate calculation!

15 ... \( \boxtimes e7 \)!

16 \( \boxtimes e4 \)

The next important question is where to develop the b8-knight: at c6 or d7? After some thought, I chose 16...\( \boxtimes d7 \), since after 16...\( \boxtimes bc6 \) it would have been much more difficult to defend the c5-pawn. General speaking, when you encounter an unfamiliar system, you should pay extra attention to your opponent’s threats.

16 ... \( \boxtimes d7 \)

17 \( \boxtimes b1 \)!

The best continuation was 17 \( \boxtimes d1 \). But I saw that after 17...\( \boxtimes c7 \) I did not have to fear 18 \( \boxtimes d6 \)?! in view of 18...\( \boxtimes f5 \)!, when it is bad to
play 19 c6? b7 20 b1 b6 with the deadly threat of 21...ac8.

However, Sokolov played superficially. He realised that I would answer 17 d1 with 17...c7, and he decided to prevent this, by preparing 18 b7 in reply. However, 17...c7 is by no means obligatory. Black can easily equalise by 17...b8. But at this moment I sensed that my position was already preferable and that it was possible to play for a win.

17 ... a5!

If there is a possibility of making an active move, it should be made! Black seizes the initiative. For the moment the a4-pawn is hanging. White should probably have admitted his mistake and returned his rook to a1.

18 d1

Why not simply capture the pawn now? After all, at first sight Black is not threatened with anything.

It turns out that if 18...xa4? there is the idea 19 xh6! gxh6 20 a1 c6 21 xc6 xc6 22 xd7, and White is alright. But Black is hoping for more.

18 ... ad8!

18...b6 was also not bad, but 18...ad8 (only not 18...fd8? 19 xd7!) nevertheless seemed to me to be the most energetic. As long as White’s bishop lingers on the back rank, his king may not feel safe: it has no escape square, and the opponent is already creating tactical threats.

19 c2

Sokolov decided to defend the a4-pawn, overlooking the spectacular reply. It is amusing that, as in the preceding game, it is a knight sortie from d7 to e5 that proves fatal for White!

(see diagram)

19 ... xe5!!

20 xe5
cxd8 xf3+.

20 ... c3!

It goes without saying that it is pleasant to make such moves.

21 e2 xe5

As a result of his combination Black has won a pawn and is close to winning the game. However, he still has to overcome some technical difficulties.

22 e3 f5

The immediate 23...d4 was possibly preferable, but I decided to play more simply.

23 xf3 xd1+

Here Sokolov committed a serious mistake. He should have chosen 25 xb7. Then Black would probably have had nothing better than 25...c2 26 f3 xe3, and in the resulting endgame White would retain drawing chances.

25 xd4?

26 d3 d8

27 g3 c5

The queen makes way for the e-pawn.

28 f4?!

This merely leads to a weakening of White’s king position. But all the same things are bad for him, and so this move should not be strongly criticised. The rest is easy.

28 ... b4

29 a1 a5
A move that suggests itself, wouldn’t you agree? The enemy pawn is fixed and Black’s own pawn advances closer to the queening square. While it is possible, you should aim to strengthen your position to the maximum, and only then seek a concrete plan for converting the advantage. In the given instance, since White has no counterplay at all, Black has no reason to hurry.

30 h4
31 Kb1
32 Kb5
33 f2
34 f3
35 Kb6

With the idea of 36 Kxe6. Here Black repeated moves to gain time on the clock.

35 . .
36 Kb1
37 Kb6

Turning to resolute action. If 38 Kxe6 I was intending 38...Kb8! 39 Kg6+ Kf8, and Black himself launches an attack.

38 Ke2
39 Kc6
40 Kb2

On seeing that the opponent had managed to make the time control, Sokolov resigned.

In what way is this game instructive? It shows how important it is to pay attention to the opponent’s threats – both to those that are obvious – tactical, and to the more camouflaged – positional. In this respect I would single out the move 15...Qe7, which in some way provided the basis for Black’s success. At any event, it helped him to solve his opening problems.

Don’t forget about another very cunning opening weapon – move transposition! Sometimes it can be sufficient for the opponent simply to change the places of two moves, for all your preparatory analytical work to come to nothing. If, contrary to expectation, such a thing happens, the main thing is not to engage in self-reproach (this won’t help matters!), but to remember an ancient truth: to regret a mistake that has been made is to make a second mistake! Let us analyse a game of mine with the English grandmaster Tony Miles. It was played at the start of the Interzonal Tournament in Tunis and was of great importance for me. At that time Miles was considered to be one of the strongest players in the West, and he had achieved good tournament results. I had Black, and therefore I decided to choose a safe opening. But here is what came of this...

Miles – Yusupov
Interzonal Tournament, Tunis 1985
Caro-Kann Defence

1 c4 c6

At that time the Slav Defence was part of my opening repertoire, and it was this that I had planned for my meeting with Miles. And suddenly – to my horror! – Miles replied with something quite unexpected.

2 e4!

Of course, the exclamation mark is not for the strength of the move, but for the correct psychological choice. The point is that after 1 e4 I do not play the Caro-Kann Defence, and in my preparations for the game I had absent-mindedly overlooked this simple transition into it. Yes, such a transposition of moves can be more unsettling than any prepared variation!

2 . .
3 exd5
4 d4
5 Qc3

When you encounter a little-known system, you naturally want to reduce it to something that is more or less familiar to you. I had some idea about the variations arising after 6 Qf3 Qg4, but, alas, Miles played differently.
Surprises in the Opening

6 g5
At this my opening knowledge came to an end. What to do? Now 6...e6 would have led to well-known theoretical set-ups — well-known, but not to me. Therefore I decided to look for some other sensible path.

6... e6!? It was only after the game that I learned that 6...e6 had been introduced by Sergey Belavenets, and later taken up by Salo Flohr. At first sight Black’s decision may seem eccentric, but in essence it is not without point, since it does not greatly violate the principles of opening play. Indeed, I develop a piece, establish control over the centre, strengthen the d5-point, and create the possible threat of capturing on c4. It is hard to demand more of one move!

7 xf6
This exchange could have been delayed, by playing, for example, 7 f3. But, as it turned out, Miles was following the recommendations of theory, based on a game Botvinnik–Flohr (Moscow 1965). In it after 7 xf6 exf6 8 c5 White gained a positional advantage, defined by his superior pawn structure.

7... gxf6! This move also has certain drawbacks, but on the whole, in my view, it is more logical than 7...exf6. The pawn captures towards the centre, thereby strengthening Black’s control of it. But, more important, it does not lead to a strategically unpromising situation, where on the queenside White effectively creates an extra pawn.

8 wd2
Miles delays the development of his knight at f3, in order later to have the possibility of f2–f4, inhibiting the advance of the black e-pawn. Naturally, such a decision also has its drawbacks — since neglecting the rules of development may tell.

8... wa5
Now it is rather more difficult for Black to bring his dark-square bishop into play (he does not have ...f8–h6), and so he completes his queenside development, aiming for castling on that side of the board. The queen will be more actively placed at a5 than at d7. The concrete justification of the move is that if 9 xxd5?! there follows 9...xd2+ 10 xd2 0-0-0, and then Black regains the pawn on d5.

9 c5 0-0-0
10 b5
In my view, it would have been better for White to complete his development by 10 g2 and then g2–g3.

What move would you now suggest for
Black? 10...h5 and then ...h6? There is such an idea. But I decided to play more directly.

10...\[\text{g8}\]!

Black aims to create a weakening in the opponent's position. In the event of 11 g3 he could now have continued 11...h5, but he could also have considered 11...\[\text{g4}\], hindering the development of the knight at e2 and preparing the thematic advance ...e7–e5.

11 f4

Miles prepares in advance to combat ...e7–e5. But, by making many pawn moves, he delays the development of his pieces, which I try to exploit.

11...\[\text{h6}\]

Black's play is simple and natural. It somehow happens of its own accord, that all his moves aid the implementation of his plan. From h6 the bishop helps ...e7–e5 to be carried out, but it is quite possible that it will also come in useful for the landing of some tactical blow.

Here it was already essential for Miles to remember about development. True, if 12 \[\text{f3}\], then 12...\[\text{g4}\] 13 0-0 e5 is unpleasant. And yet, if he was thinking about counterplay, White should have sought it somewhere along these lines.

12 \[\text{w2}\]

What is happening is something that we have already encountered many times in our analysis of games: one superficial decision leads to another, with the result that already developed pieces have to move more than once. White's difficulties are in a certain sense 'pre-programmed': they are the consequence of 8 \[\text{d2}\], or perhaps even 7 \[\text{x6}\].

12...\[\text{b4}\]!

Creating the highly unpleasant threat of 13...\[\text{xb5}\]!.

13 \[\text{d1}\] \[\text{f5}\]

14...\[\text{c2}\] is threatened. Just 13 moves have been made, and already Black has launched a decisive attack. This is the retribution for neglecting the development of the pieces.

14 a3

It was nevertheless better to play 14 \[\text{ge2}\], but after 14...\[\text{c2}\] 15 \[\text{f1}\] e5 16 \[\text{g3}\] \[\text{g4}\]! the complications favour Black. You suggest 14...a6? A strong move – this is probably simpler.

14...\[\text{c2}\]

15 \[\text{d2}\] \[\text{e4}\]!

After 15...e5 White could still have somehow resisted with 16 \[\text{e2}\]. But now the game concludes quickly.

16 \[\text{ge2}\] \[\text{xg2}\]

17 \[\text{h4}\] \[\text{xd4}\]

18 \[\text{h3}\] \[\text{f5}\]

19 \[\text{d3}\] \[\text{xe2}\]

20 \[\text{xe2}\] \[\text{xf4}\]!

It is time to resign, but through inertia Miles makes a few more moves.

21 \[\text{e1}\] \[\text{d4}\]

22 \[\text{f3}\] \[\text{dx3}\]

23 \[\text{xd8}\] \[\text{xd8}\]

24 \[\text{g2}\] \[\text{g2}+\]

And only here did White finally stop the clocks.

It is time to draw some conclusions. In this game the role of psychological mood is shown especially clearly. Indeed, if you are ready for fierce, uncompromising play, you can begin fighting for the initiative from virtually the very first moves. In such instances even the encountering of a surprise may not be so dangerous, since your inner composure and readiness for a struggle can immediately help you to grasp the situation and find the correct solution.
The creative Solving of irrational Problems in the Opening

What does a player’s opening preparation normally comprise? The study of specific variations from books, Informators, and articles devoted to particular openings. There you will find key positions and you will think about them, analyse, look for novelties, select useful games, and so on. This is the most common and undoubtedly the most legitimate way of processing opening information – research within some specific opening.

But it is also possible to work in another way – by the method of generalisation, selecting general situations which arise in completely different openings. For example, it is useful to study typical pawn structures – some of them are simultaneously typical of several openings. Interesting conclusions can be drawn by observing how different players react to novelties: successfully, unsuccess-fully, whether they spend a lot of time, whether they try to immediately refute them or seek the most reliable continuations – here there are many interesting aspects.

If you observe in yourself an ability to make generalisations on some chosen feature, you can confidently exploit this ability. Such an approach to the processing of opening information may prove for you to be the most productive. I should once again emphasise: you can improve in chess in all sorts of ways, in accordance with your individual inclinations.

At present I am working on the middlegame, and I have become interested in a theme which no one yet has seriously analysed – the art of manoeuvring. Anatoly Karpov has a good mastery of it, as did Lev Psakhis in his best years, but in the games of, say, Garry Kasparov, such examples are very rare. He is accustomed to always carrying out specific plans, whereas manoeuvring does not pursue any clear aim. Apart, perhaps, from one: the opponent faces an examination in his understanding of absolutely all the subtleties of the position. If neither of the sides has a positional advantage (or it is insufficient to achieve any real gains), it is often necessary to manoeuvre, to move to and fro apparently aimlessly, without worsening the placing of the pieces. When the opponent is unable to withstand such manoeuvring and he commits an inaccuracy, by tactical means one can sharply change the character of the play and seize the initiative.

I am studying this theme, but each of us can choose his own. Having chosen a theme, look for examples in the games of top-class players and analyse how they solve the problem interesting you. Endeavour from all the examples to pick out those in which there is something common, which unites them. The solving of such creative problems brings great benefit.

I will dwell in more detail on the following problem, as it is one to which no one has yet given serious consideration. Perhaps because it requires a high chess standard.

Eminent grandmasters sometimes make strong moves which they themselves find hard to explain. Moreover, it is almost impossible to demonstrate even in analysis that these moves are objectively the strongest. Nevertheless, in a given specific game they help problems to be successfully
The creative Solving of irrational Problems in the Opening

solved, they make their mark on the entire subsequent play, and impart to it the required character. If you can observe such moments in the games of top-class players, you may be able to sharply increase your understanding of chess.

Here is a specific example:

**Kasparov – Karpov**  
2nd match game, Seville 1987

After the well-known opening moves 1 c4 \( \text{\textit{c6}} \) 2 \( \text{\textit{c3}} \) e5 3 \( \text{\textit{f3}} \) c6 4 g3 b4 5 g2 0-0 6 0-0 e4 7 g5 xc3 8 bxc3 e8 9 f3 Karpov employed a novelty – 9...e3!? How should White best respond to it? The problem facing White is an exceptionally difficult one. Kasparov found an outstanding solution, apparently the best solution to an opening problem in the match – 10 d3! d5 11 wb3!!. Such moves are often found not in home analysis, but at the chess board, when the player is under strong emotional pressure. Many reviewers did not understand why Karpov, after employing the novelty and winning the game, never played this again. The explanation is simple: at the board Kasparov refuted the novelty; the move wb3 is very strong. I was one of Kasparov's seconds at the match and I can state this with complete certainty. An excellent example of a creative solution to an irrational problem!

I will show you some examples on the same theme, taken from my own games. I will not try to demonstrate rigorously that the solutions found in critical positions were the strongest. But these moves will be semantically important and will exert a decisive influence on the further course of the play. Incidentally, you will see examples of my reactions to surprises in the opening. The opponent employed a novelty and all the problems had to solved at the board, not in home analysis. I repeat: if you work on such situations, which few players notice, you may achieve serious progress.

At a tournament in Iceland I met Lev Polugayevsky. The opening was a Dutch Defence. I often employ it with Black and it was not hard to guess that Polugayevsky would be fully armed. Usually he used to prepare very thoroughly for the opening. Indeed, a surprise awaited me. I realised this beforehand, from the manner in which my opponent conducted the game. He made his moves very slowly, obviously luring me, and not wanting me to avoid the main variation. But I believed in my opening set-ups, I wanted to uphold my views, and therefore I had no intention of deviating.

**Polugayevsky – Dolmatov**  
Reykjavik 1990  
*Dutch Defence*

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This is the so-called Leningrad Variation of the Dutch Defence, not its most fashionable branch, which would appear to have been introduced into modern tournament practice.
by Artur Yusupov. But now, I think, I play it more than anyone else. It was also known earlier, but it had a bad reputation. The usual continuation in this position is 7...\(\mathbb{W}e8\).

8 b3

This is what White played in the well-known game Karpov–Yusupov (Linares 1989), which ended dismally for Artur–Karpov scored a good win. But to me this plan seems unconvincing.

8...\(\mathbb{W}a5\)

The idea of this move is simple. I attack the knight on c3 and simultaneously prepare 9...e5. When I devised this novelty (Yusupov played 8...\(\mathbb{W}c7\) followed by ...a7–a5 and ...\(\mathbb{Q}a6\), I assumed that by advancing ...e7–e5 Black would obtain a comfortable position. I thought that White's best reply was 9 \(\mathbb{Q}d2\), but then I retreat 9...\(\mathbb{W}c7\), when the white bishop is less well placed than in the Karpov–Yusupov game. This occurred in several of my games, and they all ended in a draw. But Polugayevsky played differently.

9 \(\mathbb{Q}b2\)  e5

I first reached this position in a qualifying tournament for the World Cup (Moscow 1989) against Helgi Olafsson. He continued 10 dxe5 dxe5 11 e4. I failed to grasp the essence of the position, played 11...fxe4?! , and ended up worse. 11...f4! is stronger – this was how I won with Black in a tense struggle against Dmitry Gurevich (Palma de Mallorca 1989) and Walter Browne at that same tournament in Reykjavik.

10 \(\mathbb{W}d2!\)

A novelty, which was undoubtedly prepared at home. Polugayevsky was very pleased with this move; indeed, it is unexpected and unpleasant, and in my opening preparations I overlooked it. The idea is simple: White defends against the opponent's main positional threat ...e5–e4 (10...e4? is not possible because of 11 \(\mathbb{Q}xe4\)). You will realise that if Black can advance his pawn to e4, he will obtain an excellent position. Only White will have problems – his king's bishop is shut in, and the undermining move f2–f3 is ineffective. This is why I mainly looked at 11 e4 (after the preliminary exchange on e5) and overlooked the possibility of 10 \(\mathbb{W}d2\). And since Black cannot play ...e5–e4, it is very awkward for him to make his reply. I reasoned as follows: 'I should be satisfied that at least I have played ...e7–e5 – that is good!'

10...\(\mathbb{W}c7\)

11 dxe5 dxe5

12 e4

Of course, White does not allow ...e5–e4. But what should I do now? In roughly this position I had replied either ...fxe4, or ...f5–f4. By analogy with the games against Gurevich and Browne, I wanted to play 12...f4. But, alas, here this will not do, since after 13 gxf4 exf4 White breaks through in the centre with 14 e5, while the usual response 13...\(\mathbb{Q}h5\) loses its strength: 14 fxe5, and White has no real compensation for the pawn. ([I think that 14...\(\mathbb{Q}g4\) gives quite good counterplay – Dvoretzky.)

In the event of 12...fxe4 13 \(\mathbb{Q}g5\) the knight, after reaching e4, secures White a positional advantage. Incidentally, for your information: the structure in the Dutch Defence with an isolated e5-pawn and a white knight on
e4 is sometimes not so easy to evaluate, but under one condition – if Black’s pawn is still on c7, and his knight can go via c6 to d4. Then Black usually has good counterplay. But if the pawn is on c6, then normally the position is significantly worse for Black. Therefore 12...fxe4 is bad.

After some thought I realised that Polugayevsky could not have thoroughly checked all the variations (he had prepared at the tournament, immediately before the game), and I hit on a move which he had probably overlooked. The move is quite natural, and probably the strongest, but for some reason it had escaped his attention. As a result the situation became equal – subsequently we were both obliged to solve independently the problems at the board.

12 ...

\[ \text{a6!} \]

It transpires that the natural 13 \[ \text{ad1} \] is unfavourable for White in view of 13...fxe4 14 \[ \text{g5} \] \[ \text{g4} \] with an attack on the rook. Polugayevsky did not want to capture immediately on f5, developing Black’s pieces, but he had to.

13 \[ \text{exf5} \]

14 \[ \text{ad1} \]

I should like to draw your particular attention to this position, since it is associated with the main theme of our discussion. Up to here the play has developed logically. Polugayevsky employed a novelty, and Black responded in probably the strongest way. But here I sensed that the position was still rather dangerous for Black. Although I have achieved much (brought out my bishop to f5 in one move, and developed my knight), some problems, and very serious ones, remain. My pieces do not stand badly, but in time they may be pushed back by h2–h3 and g3–g4. The e5-pawn is isolated, and the knight cannot get to d4. Exchanges merely make my defence more difficult, since the isolated pawn is retained and the possibilities for counterplay will be fewer and fewer. It was in such conditions that I had to find a plan of subsequent action.

The move which I made is, I think, the strongest. If such decisions interest you, look for them, for example, in the games of Kasparov. Although this is not easily done – outwardly such moves are not prominent, the commentators do not usually understand them, and they are not seriously explained. This is why it is best to study the notes to games, written by the players themselves.

14 ...

\[ \text{xe8!!} \]

An imperceptible, unprepossessing move, but I am proud of it. All the subsequent play will be governed by the ideas embodied in this move. What is the point of it?

The e5-pawn is weak, and it is useful to defend it. The rook is badly placed at f8, since Black cannot play his knight to c5 in view of \[ \text{a3} \]. These are some of the motives for my decision. But this is not the only point, of course – there are also deeper reasons for placing the rook on e8. It is clear that White wants to play h2–h3, depriving the black pieces of the g4-point and securing the e3-square for the queen. Then he will play g3–g4. It is against this plan that Black has prepared a tactical antidote, involving the invasion of his knight on d3.
The creative Solving of irrational Problems in the Opening

15 h3
d5
c5
16 We3
d3!

This is the whole point – the knight is invulnerable in view of the fork: 17 $\text{xd3?}$ $\text{xd3}!$ 18 $\text{xd3 e4}$. If you are in a good frame of mind and can find such decisions, it means that you do not have to fear inferior positions and that you are capable of saving a game where you are dubiously placed. I am convinced that if I had not found this idea, and instead of ...

\[ \text{fe8 I had made some 'normal' move,} \]

14...

\[ \text{ad8 for example, then I would have} \]

imperceptibly ended up in a difficult position and gradually lost, without even understanding why this happened. And I would probably have reckoned that I had ended up in a bad position from the opening and that the entire variation was unsuitable. That is how many games end, when a player fails to find the only creative decision contained in the position. Of course, I did not know for sure how it would all end, but I realised that after 14...

\[ \text{fe8 I would gain counter-chances. If I was going to lose the game, it would be in a struggle. When my opponent replied 15 h3, I became finally convinced that I had made the correct choice. This, if you like, is complex prophylaxis: Black had to realise that White wanted to play h2–h3, and to find how to combat this.} \]

After interesting adventures the game ended in a draw. I don’t see where White could have improved on what he played and gained an advantage.

17 $\text{a1}$

18 g4 is threatened. The knight on d3 is insecure, and I did not want to place my pawn on e4.

17 ...

b4

I continue to harass the opponent with little threats: on this occasion the fork ...c2. In the event of 18 g4 White has to reckon with 18...
d3. First the knight went to this square, now the bishop can be placed there, followed by ...e5–e4 and ...c2. You can see that it is not so easy to drive back the black pieces. Polugayevsky hopes to do this after first covering the weak c2- and d3-squares.

18 $\text{e1}$

h5!

Black prevents g3–g4 and at the same time prepares ...h7 and ...h6. Note that with the knight on f3 I would not have played this. Apart from virtues, moves also have drawbacks: the opponent has parried my threats, but in so doing he has disconnected his rooks and allowed me to play ...h7–h5. White now has to hurry, since the plan with ...
h7 and ...h6 is unpleasant for him.

19 a3

c2

The knight has done a great deal of work and it can now be sent off on holiday.

20 $\text{xc2}$

$\text{xc2}$

Here Polugayevsky faced an interesting problem, and he coped with it successfully. There is a choice between d2 and c1. It looks safer to play 21 c1, since Black cannot reply 21...

\[ \text{xb3?} \]

22 e4. He is forced to retreat 21...

f5. After 22 e4 $\text{xe4} 23 \text{xe4} \text{Black can choose between} \]

23...

h3 and 23...

h7. We looked at this after the game – here Black is alright.
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21 \text{d}2!

Polugayevsky made the more forceful move. Here the rook is much more active than on c1, since it remains on the open file. True, the b3-pawn is sacrificed. Retreating the bishop with 21...\text{f}5 would be a psychological concession, which is undesirable. If you are offered a pawn and there is no forced refutation, the sacrifice should be accepted, in my view.

21... \text{x}b3!

22 \text{b}5!

If 22 \text{d}3 there is the reply 22...\text{f}7, defending the g6-pawn and threatening the c4-pawn. White does not have time to attack the bishop on b3.

22... \text{c}xb5
23 \text{x}b3 \text{b}xc4
24 \text{x}b7 \text{ac}8

White, of course, has full compensation for the pawn. In this position I offered a draw, and it was accepted. Both players were already short of time. Polugayevsky thought that it was risky to play on a pawn down, while I sensed that I would be unable to convert my pawn advantage. Subsequent analysis confirmed that the agreement to a draw was justified.

Polugayevsky was intending to play 25 \text{a}6. I would have replied 25...\text{b}6, planning 26...\text{e}4. White prevents this by 26 \text{d}6 \text{xa}6 27 \text{xa}6. If Black defends his a7-pawn with an ‘accurate’ move such as 27...\text{e}7, then after 28 \text{c}1 his position is very difficult, and perhaps lost, despite the extra pawn. 27...c3 is necessary, when the subsequent play is forced: 28 \text{c}1 c2 29 \text{c}6 \text{ed}8 30 \text{xc}2 \text{d}1+ 31 \text{g}2 \text{xa}1 32 \text{d}5+ \text{xd}5 33 \text{xc}8+ \text{h}7 34 \text{xa}7 \text{a}2. Some danger for Black would still appear to exist, but objectively this is a draw.

I think it will have become more clear to you what I had in mind, when I talked about moves in an irrational position which have a decisive influence on the further course of the play. 14...\text{fe}8 is such a move. It is not a question of whether it is possible to demonstrate in analysis that it is the strongest. This move contains a certain set of ideas, which were later carried out in the game – this is the main thing.

Here is another example on the same theme, rather more complicated. Also to a certain extent prophylaxis, but not at all obvious. The following game against Kirill Georgiev was played in a European champions cup match.

\textbf{Dolmatov – Georgiev}

Moscow 1989

\textit{Sicilian Defence}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
1 e4 & c5 \\
2 \text{f}3 & d6 \\
3 d4 & \text{cxd}4 \\
4 \text{xd}4 & \text{f}6 \\
5 \text{c}3 & g6 \\
6 \text{e}3 & \text{g}7 \\
7 f3 & 0-0 \\
8 \text{d}2 & \text{c}6 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

The Dragon Variation. The attitude of strong players to this opening is fairly unanimous: it
is rather dangerous for Black. But in top-level games White normally avoids the sharpest and most critical lines, and does not try directly to refute Black's set-up. The point is that the theory of the Dragon Variation is very extensive and is constantly growing thanks to games by medium-strength players. But among the leading grandmasters there are few who employ it with Black. Therefore those who play 1 e4 are reluctant to constantly engage in complicated searchings, when it is not clear whether they will ever come in useful.

In the Dragon Variation I, for example, always face the problem: how to obtain not even an advantage with White, but simply a comfortable position. I never play 9 \( \mathcal{c}4 \): there is too much theory there, and very little scope for independent play. I want to play chess, and not compete in accuracy of opening analysis. Therefore I am interested in 9 0-0-0 and 9 g4; both continuations are possible. Now the popularity of castling has grown, because after 9...d5 they have found the new resource 10 \( \mathcal{w}e1\)!

**9 g4**

I have been employing this move for a long time. I once lost a game where I castled queenside, and I decided to try 9 g4, not a new idea, but a forgotten one. However, I was forestalled by Anatoly Karpov, who employed it in 1982 against Jonathan Mestel and Tony Miles. The variation became popular. But in the end Black found a strong antidote, and today this continuation is not highly rated for White. I know several ways for Black to equalise. The most reliable is a plan, which according to theory results in an unclear endgame: 9...\( \mathcal{e}6 \) followed by \( ...\mathcal{x}d4 \) and \( ...\mathcal{a}5 \). On this theme I recommend you to look at the notes to my game with Alexey Shirov (Klaipeda 1988) in Mark Dvoretsky's book *School of Chess Excellence 4 - Opening Developments* (p.163). Incidentally, it is far worse to begin with 9...\( \mathcal{x}d4 \).

I think that after the present game this move will go out of use. It was once played against me several years earlier by Vitaly Tseshkovsky (at the international tournament in Frunze in 1983). I remembered only that, although I won, I did not obtain anything in particular out of the opening. I again had to ponder over the position.

Black's idea is clear – he wants to play ...d6–d5. Before White exchanges on d5, it is desirable to drive away the knight by g4–g5. I looked at the natural variation 10 0-0-0 d5 11 g5 \( \mathcal{h}5 \) and noticed that if now 12 exd5, then Black exchanges twice on d4 and captures the g5-pawn with check.

Perhaps White should defend the g5-pawn beforehand? 10 h4 looks natural, but after 10...d5 11 g5 \( \mathcal{h}5 \) Black has the possibility of exchanging his knight for my bishop by ...\( \mathcal{g}3 \). Incidentally, that is what happened in my game with Tseshkovsky – after 10 0-0-0 d5 11 g5 \( \mathcal{h}5 \) 12 h4 Black played 12...\( \mathcal{g}3 \) 13 \( \mathcal{g}1 \) \( \mathcal{x}f1 \) 14 \( \mathcal{g}x f1 \) \( \mathcal{e}5 \) and an unclear position was reached.

Now the point of the move made by me will become clear.

**10 \( \mathcal{g}1 \)!**

Seemingly a logical decision, but it was not easy to play this. Here the problem was
purely psychological – I had to overcome a certain routine. It appears that we should be mounting a traditional attack with h2–h4–h5, and the move \( \text{g1} \) does not fit in with this plan. In fact it is far more important to carry out the prophylactic idea embodied in the modern rook move. After Black has played ...e7–e6, he can no longer avoid the advance in the centre.

\[ \text{10 \ldots d5} \]
\[ \text{11 g5} \]

Now if 11...\( \text{h5} \) there follows 12 exd5, and the knight on the edge of the board stands very badly – it has altogether no moves. Sometimes in such cases White plays his knight to g3, forcing the exchange and opening the h-file for his attack.

Georgiev decided to play his knight to a normal position.

\[ \text{11 \ldots \text{d7}} \]

[Many seemingly buried opening set-ups prove on closer inspection to be very much alive. That is the case here: Black ended up in a difficult position not as a consequence of a bad opening variation, but as a result of this unfortunate knight retreat to a square where it has few prospects. Later the correct plan was found: 11...\( \text{e8} \) (Wolff–Fedorowicz, USA Championship 1992). After the exchange of pawns on d5 the knight goes via c7 to e6.

On the other hand, in the game Zapata–Armas, Havana 1986, after 10 0-0-0 d5 11 \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{h5} \) White demonstrated an important improvement: 12 f4! (instead of 12 h4), which would appear to promise him an advantage – Dvoretzky.]

\[ \text{12 exd5 \hspace{0.5cm} exd5} \]

I did not even consider 13 \( \text{xd5} \), because White’s retarded development is bound to tell.

\[ \text{13 0-0-0} \]

Similar positions sometimes arise in the Scheveningen Variation, in the Keres At-

\[ \text{tack. But there Black’s king’s bishop is on e7. He plays ...\( \text{b6} \), after which it is not easy for White to parry the threatened knight invasion on c4. But here, with the bishop on g7, the knight can be restricted by the typical idea b2–b3. White should not be afraid to make this move. But with the bishop on e7 Black in reply would have the dangerous pin ...\( \text{b4} \).} \]

\[ \text{13 \ldots \text{b6}} \]
\[ \text{14 f4} \]

It is useful to deprive the knight of the e5-point.

\[ \text{14 \ldots \text{e8}} \]
\[ \text{15 \text{g3}} \]

15 \( \text{f2} \) was perhaps more accurate, not allowing the exchange sacrifice.

\[ \text{15 \ldots \text{d7}} \]
\[ \text{16 \text{f2} \text{c8}} \]

One senses that Black has serious problems with his d5-pawn, and he is unable to initiate counterplay. If ...\( \text{c6}–\text{a5} \) there is always the reply b2–b3!.

\[ \text{17 \text{b1}} \]

For the moment White simply improves his position. He need not be in a hurry to try and win, but should first consolidate in the centre.

\[ \text{17 \ldots \text{e7}} \]

Perhaps somewhere Kirill could have played more cunningly, and also at some point found an interesting idea like 10 \( \text{g1} \), or 14...\( \text{fe8} \) in the previous game. But he has played routinely and now his position becomes strategically hopeless.

(see diagram)

\[ \text{18 b3!} \]
\[ \text{\text{f5}} \]

Exchanges merely hasten the end for Black. If 18...\( \text{xd4} \), then 19 \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{f5} \) 20 \( \text{xb6} \) axb6 21 \( \text{xd5} \).

\[ \text{19 \text{xf5} \hspace{0.5cm} \text{xf5}} \]
\[ \text{20 \text{h3}} \]
I only need to exchange a pair of bishops, and it becomes apparent just how much weaker the knight on b6 is than the one on c3. It would appear that nothing difficult remains: exchange pieces and win the game.

20 ...  
21 ♂xe7  
22 dxe7

How well my rook has come into play! And after all, this is the consequence of the modest move 10 ♕g1!

22 ...  
23 ♕d4

In such a position it is no longer possible to devise anything. The only variation that I had to calculate was ...♕g4 after the double exchange on c3. Let us check: 22...♗xc3 23 ♕xc3 ♕xc3 24 ♕xc3 ♕g4 25 ♕e1! ♕xe1+ 26 ♘xe1, and after 26...♕xf4 27 ♘e8+ ♕g7 28 ♘c5 there is no satisfactory defence against the mate.

23 ♗d4

White has completely implemented his idea. I have not even needed to advance my kingside pawns – the game should be decided by active play in the centre. But from this moment my opponent began to defend resourcefully. Georgiev played unexpectedly, trying to change the pattern of the play.

23 ...  
24 ♖xg7  
25 a4

A completely standard move with an enemy knight on b6. 26 a5 is threatened, and if the opponent replies 25...a5, my knight obtains the b5-point, the support of the black knight is removed, and I can attack it, for example, with 26 ♕f2.

25 ...  
26 ♕f2

I saw that I could transfer my queen to the central square d4, and this satisfied me perfectly well. After the game Kirill suggested an interesting possibility: 26 ♕g3 ♕c8 27 ♕d4+ ♕g8 28 ♕f5 with an attack. I was aiming for play in the centre and did not even think about moving my rook to the side. I find it hard to condemn myself for this move, since it leads to a further improvement in the placing of the pieces and retains a winning position.

26 ...  
27 ♕d4+  
28 ♕e1

Black is forced to concede the open e-file.
Here I made what was probably a serious mistake. White's forces are fully mobilised and it was now time for him to begin a concrete exploitation of his advantage and to calculate 29 \( \cong b5! \). But, to be honest, I did not look at this move at all, because the c2-pawn is hanging. But after 29...\( \cong xc2 \) I should have seen the simple 30 \( \cong xa7 \), winning. And if 29...a6, then all the same there follows 30 \( \cong a7! \) \( \cong 8c7 \) 31 \( \cong de3 \), when there is no defence against the check on e8. The game would have come to its logical conclusion. But I was evidently not destined to win it. I continued playing in the same unhurried manner as before.

Incidentally, players often have to resolve the following problem: whether to play positionally or switch to concrete action. In the given instance I think that up till now I had done everything correctly, although other solutions may have been possible. But this moment is a very important one – here I delayed, violating the famous rule of Wilhelm Steinitz: 'The player with an advantage is obliged to attack, as otherwise he risks losing this advantage'. True, the move made by me does not throw away the win, but merely complicates it. The trouble is that, as Siegbert Tarrasch said, 'mistakes never happen singly', and one mistake often gives rise to another one.

29 \( \cong b2? \) \( \cong c6 \)

And here something inexplicable happened. White's position is, of course, totally won. The simplest was 30 f5! gxf5 31 g6, when 31...fxg6 fails to 32 \( \cong e7 \). But 30 \( \cong e7 \) followed by \( \cong de3 \) is also not bad. At this point I clearly saw that the only danger for me was the tactical stroke \( \cong c4+ \).

30 \( \cong de3?? \)

I thought that I was continuing to strengthen my position and, above all, defending against \( \cong c4+ \), but I overlooked that in fact I was simply provoking this move...

30 ... \( \cong c4+! \)

I thought that after 31 bxc4 \( \cong xc4 \) 32 \( \cong f6 \) d4 33 \( \cong xc6 \) I would remain a piece up, forgetting that the knight is captured with check. After committing something irreparable, fortunately I did not lose my head, and I realised that it was now dangerous to play for a win.

31 bxc4 \( \cong xc4 \)
32 \( \cong xd5 \) \( \cong xc3 \)
33 \( \cong xc6 \) \( \cong 3xc6 \)
34 \( \cong e8+ \) \( \cong xe8 \)
35 \( \cong xe8+ \) \( \cong g7 \)
36 \( \cong b3 \)

And within a few moves we agreed a draw.

Thus in this game too one move – 10 \( \cong g1 \) – exerted a very serious influence on the entire course of the play, and simply predetermined it. The opponent's possibilities were restricted and the rook successfully, without loss of time, came into play.

The following example is a game with Alexander Beliaevsky. It concluded successfully for me.

**Dolmatov – Beliaevsky**

56th USSR Championship, Odessa 1989

Ruy Lopez

1 e4 \( \cong e5 \)
2 \( \cong f3 \) \( \cong c6 \)
3 \( \cong b5 \) \( a6 \)
4 \( \cong a4 \) \( \cong f6 \)
5 0-0 \( \cong e7 \)
6 \( \cong e1 \) \( b5 \)
7 \( \cong b3 \) \( d6 \)
8 c3 \( 0-0 \)
9 h3 \( \cong b8 \)
10 d4 \( \cong bd7 \)
11 \( \cong bd2 \) \( \cong b7 \)
12 \( \cong c2 \) \( \cong e8 \)

Black has played the Breyer Variation. I only
had a slight knowledge of it – after all, one can't remember everything. Theory considers the main continuation to be 13 \( \text{Qf1} \ \text{Qf8} \) 14 \( \text{Qg3} \ g6 \), after which it examines variations as far as the 20th or even 30th move. This leads to complicated positions, over which it is easy to lose control. I don't like playing this way, especially with White.

But there is also another system, which is less popular, but quite dangerous. In my preparations I came across the game Sokolov–Beliavsky, played in the previous USSR Championship. Andrey Sokolov gained an advantage and I decided to act in the same way.

13 a4 \( \text{Qf8} \)

14 \( \text{Qd3} \)

My impressions of this position change from game to game. I thought that Beliaevsky's reply 14...c6 was obligatory. But then at the tournament in Reykjavik in 1990 Helgi Olafsson played 14...exd4 15 cxd4 c5 against me, and Yefim Geller explained after the game that all this was known long ago. As they say, well known, but in narrow circles... Although the plan employed by Olafsson was new to me, this did not prevent me from gaining an opening advantage by 16 axb5 axb5 17 \( \text{Qxa8} \ \text{Qxa8} \) 18 dxc5! (this last move, as it turned out, was a novelty by me) 18...\( \text{Qxc5} \) 19 \( \text{Qxb5} \).

14 ... \( \text{c6} \)

15 b3 \( \text{g6} \)

Beliavsky played differently against Sokolov: 15...\( \text{Qb8} \) 16 \( \text{Qa3} \ \text{Qh5} \).

16 \( \text{Qa3} \) \( \text{Qc7} \)

17 \( \text{Qc2} \) \( \text{Qad8} \)

(see diagram)

Here I stopped to think and I realised that on this occasion Beliaevsky was not intending to play his knight to f4, as in the game with Sokolov, but was planning ...d6–d5. And, as it initially seemed to me, if he were to make this advance in the centre he would exchange many pieces and equalise. And so I thought and thought, seeing as there was ample time. On all of the preceding moves I had spent about five minutes, but here I thought for 40 or 50. I found the correct move earlier, but it was hard for me to decide on it. For purely psychological reasons – I liked the idea, but it was contradictory to the normal routine, and I could not bring myself to make it.

18 \( \text{ab1} \!! \)

Prophylaxis! On one occasion Tarrasch called such a move by Aaron Nimzowitsch 'mysterious', and in revenge Nimzowitsch gave the heading "'Mysterious' rook moves" to a whole section of his book. He wrote: 'We have here therefore to do with a preventive action. Hence it is only the outer form of the move which is mysterious (a rook to seize a file which is still closed), its strategic end is not... The prevention of freeing moves by the opponent is far more important than considerations about whether the rook is effective at the given moment or is occupying a passive position.' But even so, why does this move make it difficult for Black to carry out his planned ...d6–d5?

It turns out that the immediate ...d6–d5 is not threatened at all. Say, after the natural...
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18...d5? there follows 19 xf8 xf8 20 b4! exd4 21 cxd4, and Black is left with a bad light-square bishop and an unfavourable pawn structure. Correct is 18...bxa4! 19 bxa4, and only now 19...d5 with equality.

After 18...ab1!! Beliaovsky can no longer reply 18...bxa4 19 bxa4 d5, since the rook on the newly-opened file is attacking the bishop on b7, tying the queen to its defence. There follows 19 xf8 xf8 20 exd5, and then White captures on e5, winning a pawn. And the reply to the immediate 18...d5 we already know.

The reader is justified in asking: what happens if Black avoids ...d6–d5, and plays, for example, 18...g7. The d6-point is weakened, but is this so important? Without going into details, I will merely comment that if White carries out his thematic move c3–c4, an exchange of pawns, opening the b-file, is quite probable, and the rook at b1 may also come in useful.

Sasha Beliaovsky is a rather straightforward player. He usually coping excellently in tactical variations, but he is significantly weaker in positional subtleties. Thus here he does not want to give up his plan. He sees that the exchange of pawns on a4 is unfavourable for him, but that the immediate ...d6–d5 cannot be directly refuted. And the fact that it leads to a strategically difficult position for Black is something that he does not notice.

18... d5?
19 xf8 xf8
20 b4!

Of course, Black's position is not yet lost, but at the least White has gained a stable opening advantage.

20... dxe4
21 xe4!

I did not want to complicate the play unnecessarily, and after 21 xe4 xe4 22 xe4 f5 I would have had to sacrifice my bishop on f5.

I think that now Black should have played the restrained 21...wd6. Beliaovsky incorrectly opens lines.

21... exd4?!
22 cxd4 wd6

White's positional advantage is obvious, but here, unfortunately, I made a serious mistake. I should have played 23 a5! e7 24 wb2 – then I would have had an extra tempo compared with the game. Without thinking about what Black now wants (and he wants to double rooks on the open e-file), White hurriedly, without any particular hesitation, made his next move.

23 wb3?

I was intending to attack the f7-point – 24 g5.

23... e7!

Black hopes to seize the initiative, since my pawns have suddenly become vulnerable. 24...de8 is threatened, and then, after the exchange of rooks, ...d5.

Here I had to compose myself and find what appears to be the only way of maintaining White's entire construction.

24 c2!

The bishop retreats here, in order to defend
the a4-pawn. When making my move, it was essential for me to calculate the variation 24...\texttt{h}\texttt{h}1+ 25 \texttt{h}x\texttt{e}1 \texttt{d}d5 26 \texttt{b}b1 bxa4 27 \texttt{w}xa4 \texttt{c}c3, and now 28 \texttt{e}e4!. Without this nuance White's position would be unpleasant, but, fortunately, it is there.

\begin{align*}
24 & \text{...} \quad \texttt{d}d8 \\
25 & \texttt{b}b2! \\
26 & \texttt{h}x\texttt{e}1 \\
27 & \texttt{h}x\texttt{e}1
\end{align*}

A serious mistake. Black had a choice: to allow the blocking of the position by a4–a5, or himself exchange on a4. Beliaevsky incorrectly evaluated the position. He should have chosen 27...bxa4! 28 \texttt{h}x\texttt{a}4 \texttt{b}b6 with an acceptable game.

I should mention that if 27...\texttt{w}e7 I would have replied not 28 \texttt{d}d3?! \texttt{w}e2 and not 28 \texttt{f}f1?! bxa4 29 \texttt{h}x\texttt{a}4 a5, but 28 \texttt{f}f3! \texttt{w}e2 29 a5! \texttt{e}e4 30 \texttt{d}d3 followed by \texttt{w}c1.

\begin{align*}
28 & a5 \\
29 & \texttt{d}d3
\end{align*}

Again White has the advantage, since the opponent has been left with a bad bishop.

\begin{align*}
29 & \ldots \\
30 & \texttt{c}c8
\end{align*}

An attempt to bring out the bishop to f5; I, of course, prevent this.

\begin{align*}
30 & \texttt{c}c5 \\
31 & \texttt{d}d1!
\end{align*}

Typical Beliaevsky play. If there is a possibility, he immediately goes onto the attack; now he is threatening both a check on e2, and 31...\texttt{w}d5.

\begin{align*}
31 & \ldots \quad \texttt{w}d5 \\
32 & \texttt{f}f3 \\
33 & \texttt{f}f1!
\end{align*}

Perhaps my opponent did not notice this bishop manoeuvre? White defends against everything (31...\texttt{w}d5 32 \texttt{f}f3). If 31...\texttt{w}e7, then 32 \texttt{f}f3 is strong. Here 31...h5!? should probably have been played, but Beliaevsky, as on the 18th move, does not wish to abandon his plan, and he continues acting in the same manner, merely worsening his position.

\begin{align*}
31 & \ldots \\
32 & \texttt{f}f3 \\
33 & \texttt{f}f1!
\end{align*}

Black’s hopes were pinned on 33 \texttt{h}h2? \texttt{w}h4, but now he has to sound the retreat. In addition, Beliaevsky was in time-trouble.

\begin{align*}
33 & \ldots \\
34 & \texttt{d}d5 \\
35 & \texttt{c}c3
\end{align*}

For a player in time-trouble, an unhurried manner of play is very unpleasant. I strengthen my position, I exchange the opponent's active pieces, and he does not know at what moment to expect decisive action.
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35...  \( \text{d}6 \)
The correct reply. After it I initially thought that Black was intending to capture on d5 with a piece, and I was all ready to play 36 \( \text{xd}5 \). But suddenly it occurred to me that he would most probably capture with the pawn. *When trying to convert an advantage there are usually more winning chances when there are not identical, but different pieces remaining on the board.* It is better to have a bishop against a knight, than a bishop ending. I sensed that in the event of the capture on d5 with the pawn it would be more advantageous for me to retain my knight on c3, rather than the bishop.

36 \( \text{xd}5! \)  \( \text{cxd}5 \)
I was happy to have guessed my opponent’s plans in time.

37 \( \text{d}2 \)

---

Here is a little positional problem. How, do you think, should Black conduct the defence? In time-trouble Beliavsky did not find the correct solution.

In Black’s position the weakness of the dark squares is felt. Nothing can be done about the queenside, but the weaknesses on the kingside could have been covered, by arranging the pawns on dark squares: f6–g5–h6, as you are supposed to do when you have a light-square bishop. The correct move, retaining chances of a successful defence for Black, was 37...g5!

37...  \( \text{h}5? \)
Now I think that Black’s position is hopeless.

38 \( \text{h}4 \)  \( \text{g}7 \)
39 \( \text{We}3 \)  \( \text{e}6 \)
Unfortunately, here it was my turn to make a mistake.

40 \( \text{g}3 \)

In principle, I do not recommend taking radical decisions on the 40th move. But in the given instance there was a win: two precise moves, after which the opponent could have resigned. 40 \( \text{xe}6+! \) \( \text{xe}6 \) 41 \( \text{we}5+! \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 42 dxe5. The invasion of the white king is threatened, and if 42...f6 there follows 43 f4. I saw that the immediate 40 \( \text{we}5+ \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 41 dxe5 \( \text{xc}5 \) was unclear, but I simply did not have time to think about the preliminary exchange on e6.

Such mistakes usually prove costly. Black’s position is bad, but he is hoping to construct and hold some kind of fortress. The process of trying to breach the opponent’s defences may prove long and difficult (indeed, the game dragged out for more than another 40 moves). If a possibility presents itself of immediately and advantageously changing...
the course of the play, it should be checked and exploited. Subsequently such a convenient way may no longer occur.

*I think, nevertheless, that Dolmatov correctly avoided forcing events. After 40 \( \text{dxex6+ xe6 41 we5+ xe5 42 dxe5 f6 43 f4} \) Black would have succeeded in creating counterplay by 43...fxe5 (43...g5!? 44 exf6+ \( \text{xf6} \) also comes into consideration) 44 fxe5 g5! 45 \( \text{e2} \) (45 g3? gxh4 46 gxh4 \( \text{g6} \) will not do, and 45 hgx5 \( \text{g6} \) is also dubious) 45...gxh4 (but not 45...\( \text{g6} \)? 46 \( \text{d4} \) 46 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{f7} \), and the vulnerability of the g2-pawn seriously restricts White's possibilities – Dvoretsky.]

40... \( \text{f6} \)

Here the game was adjourned. Unfortunately, in my analysis I was unable to find the strongest plan for converting my advantage, which was later demonstrated by Beliavsky.

41 \( \text{e1} \)

The sealed move. When I adjourned the game I had in mind a sensible plan. The black knight will soon retreat to c7. White can play his knight to f4, but no direct win is apparent. And since this is so, I decided, I need to play f2-f3, g3-g4, and then advance the pawn to g5 to wrest control of the dark squares. But before advancing the pawns, the king must be moved away from this wing.

Instead of 41 \( \text{e1} \) Beliavsky suggested playing 41 \( \text{e2} \) c7 42 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{f7} \) 43 \( \text{c1} \)!. I did not see the retreat to c1, and only looked at 43 \( \text{c3} \). The main threat is \( \text{cd3} \) and then \( \text{c5} \). With the queen on c3 there is the defence 43...\( \text{c6} \) (the king stands at f7, so that \( \text{ce6+} \) is not possible). With the queen on c1 in reply to 43...\( \text{c6} \) he did not like 44 \( \text{d3} \) (with the threat of 45 \( \text{h6} \)) 44...\( \text{g7} \) 45 \( \text{f4} \). Sasha admitted that because of this plan he even did not want to resume the game.

In fact, his idea is unconvincing. And the point is not even that if 45 \( \text{f4} \) there is the reasonable defence 45...\( \text{f5} \) (White's last move is not the strongest – 45 \( \text{e6+! xe6} \) 46 \( \text{xc7+} \) wins). It is more important that the bishop can be played to f5 a move earlier – instead of moving the king. After 44...\( \text{f5} \) 45 \( \text{h6} \) \( \text{d3} \) 46 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{e6} \) White's advantage is reduced.

41... \( \text{c7} \)
42 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{g4} \)

Well, I thought, he is merely helping me to advance my pawns. But my opponent, as it transpired, was trying to prevent the manoeuvre \( \text{c3–e2–f4} \). It is amusing how differently we approached the position.

43 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{e6} \)
44 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{f7} \)
45 \( \text{g4} \) hgx4
46 fxg4 \( \text{e6} \)
47 g5 \( \text{f5} \)
48 gxf6+ \( \text{xf6} \)

If 48...\( \text{xf6} \), then 49 \( \text{e5} \) is decisive. But after the move in the game White could have won by 49 \( \text{h6!} \) with the same idea – \( \text{h8+} \) and \( \text{e5} \).

49 \( \text{g5+?!} \) \( \text{f7} \)
50 \( \text{e3} \)

I had already noticed my mistake and I tried to correct it. I retreated my queen in the hope that Beliavsky, not wishing to allow 51 \( \text{e5} \), would return with his king to f6. But he was on the alert, despite mutual time-trouble, and he found the only correct defence.

50... \( \text{e6!} \)

(see diagram)

Suddenly it has become altogether unclear how to proceed further. The open position of White's king ties his hands. I had very little time left on the clock. I realised that only a tiny bit more, and I would have to give up
any dreams of winning. And here I managed to find a solution, perhaps one of the best in the game.

51 \( \text{Wg3!} \)

A committing move, since several pawns are immediately exchanged, and White remains with only two. I saw that I would obtain a superior knight endgame, but I didn't know whether it was won. On the other hand, even such a possibility might subsequently not have presented itself.

51 ... \( \text{Wxg3} \)

If 51 ... \( \text{Wxc5} \) 52 dxc5 with a great positional advantage, since after 52 ... \( \text{Wf6} \) there follows 52 \( \text{If4} \), controlling the very important d4-point.

52 \( \text{Oxg3} \) \( \text{Oxd4} \)
53 \( \text{Of5!} \) \( \text{gxf5} \)

If 53 ... \( \text{Oxf5} \) 54 \( \text{Oxa6} \), then 54 ... \( \text{Oxh4} \) 55 \( \text{Oc7} \) is bad for Black, while if 54 ... \( \text{Oe7} \) White decides matters with 55 \( \text{Oc5} \) \( \text{Od4} \) 56 a6 \( \text{Oc6} \) 57 \( \text{Oe3} \), intending \( \text{Ob3–d4} \) or \( \text{Of4–g5} \).

54 \( \text{Oxa6} \) \( \text{Oc6} \)
55 \( \text{Oc7} \) \( \text{Oxb4} \)
56 \( \text{Oxb5} \) \( \text{Og6} \)
57 \( \text{Od4} \)

(see diagram)

White had aimed for this position, rightly assuming that his wing pawns would be stronger than the opponent's central pawns. Interesting play commences. I reckoned that Black had two moves: ... \( \text{Oh5} \) or ...f5–f4. If 57 ...f4 I was intending 58 \( \text{Oe2} \) \( \text{Oh5} \) 59 \( \text{Oe3} \) \( \text{Oxh4} \) 60 \( \text{Oxf4} \). Each side has only one pawn left, but Black cannot save the game. The white king crosses to the queenside, driving away the knight. The d5-pawn merely hinders Black.

The second variation was 57 ... \( \text{Oh5} \) 58 \( \text{Oc3} \) \( \text{Oa6} \) 59 \( \text{Oxf5} \) \( \text{Og4} \) 60 \( \text{Oe3} \) \( \text{Oxh4} \) 61 \( \text{Oxd5} \) \( \text{Og5} \) 62 \( \text{Oc4} \) \( \text{Of5} \) 63 \( \text{Ob5} \) \( \text{Ob8} \) 64 \( \text{Ob4} \) \( \text{Oe6} \) 65 \( \text{Oc6} \) \( \text{Od7} \) 66 a6 and wins.

Belavsky found a third possibility – he made a cunning waiting move. But he was no longer able to save the game.

57 ... \( \text{Oa6} \)
58 \( \text{Oe3} \) \( \text{Oc5} \)
59 \( \text{Oe4} \) \( \text{Od3}+ \)
60 \( \text{Oe3} \) \( \text{Ob4} \)
61 \( \text{Oe4} \) \( \text{Od3}+ \)
62 \( \text{Oe3} \) \( \text{Ob4} \)
63 \( \text{Oe2} \) \( \text{Oe6} \)
64 \( \text{Oe4} \) \( \text{d4} \)

This is something of an achievement – White has forced this pawn to advance, to where it will be more easily attacked. But 62 ... \( \text{Oe5} \) would have lost immediately to 63 \( \text{Oe3} \) !.
65 e2    f7
66 d1!    f6
67 d2

It is always pleasant to put the opponent in zugzwang.

67 ...    f7

There are various ways of winning. I decided to capture the pawn.

68 e2    g6
69 xd4    f4
70 e2    h5
71 f3    xh4
72 xf4

The win here is very simple, because *it is always hard for a knight to combat a rook's pawn.*

72 ...    h5
73 e5    g6
74 d6    f7
75 c5    a6+
76 b6    b4
77 c6    d5+
78 b7    e6
79 a6    d7
80 a7    c7
81 e5+    d8
82 c4    a8
83 b6    c7
84 c6

Black resigned.

The game could have concluded sooner, if I had played more accurately. As it was, we saw an interesting and, unfortunately, rather typical picture. White solved the problems of the position and gained an advantage. Then he relaxed, committed some inaccuracies and squandered all his advantage or a significant part of it. Then he again composed himself, again outplayed his opponent, and again began acting carelessly... True, it is hard to play the best moves all the time, if the opponent is resisting with all his might – in such cases mistakes are probable.

Here is an example from another opening: the Caro-Kann Defence. The game is from the tournament in Hastings, one of my few wins there. I scored only three, but this was good enough to give me first place, and even on my own.

**Dolmatov – Speelman**

**Hastings 1989/90**

**Caro-Kann Defence**

| 1 e4 | c6 |
| 2 d4 | d5 |
| 3 exd5 | cxd5 |
| 4 c4 | f6 |
| 5 c3 | e6 |
| 6 f3 | b4 |

I nearly always employ the Panov Attack, from where, as in the given instance, play frequently transposes into the Nimzo-Indian Defence.

| 7 d3 | dxc4 |
| 8 xc4 | 0-0 |
| 9 0-0 | bd7 |

A theoretical position. Here there hasn’t
been anything new for a long time. I know the moves 10 \( \text{Re}1 \) and 10 \( \text{Re}d3 \). Black replies 10...\( \text{Rx}c3 \) 11 \( \text{bxc}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \) followed by 12...\( \text{b}7 \), and White develops his bishop at \( \text{g}5 \) with a complicated battle. In the opinion of theory White does not have any particular advantage.

That day I was in the mood to play something unusual. Especially against Jonathan Speelman, an out-of-the-ordinary player, who himself seeks complications. He is a very active player, and it is pleasant to play against him – the games turn out to be interesting. I decided to make a committing move – to sacrifice the \( \text{c}3 \)-pawn by 10 \( \text{g}5!\). A similar sacrifice had already occurred in my game with Janos Flesch (Bucharest 1981). However, in it my opponent did not play 9...\( \text{Rbd}7 \), but immediately 9...\( \text{Rx}c3 ?! \) 10 \( \text{bxc}3 \) \( \text{Rc}7 \). There followed 11 \( \text{d}3!? \) \( \text{Rbd}7 \) (if 11...\( \text{Rxc}3 \), then 12 \( \text{f}4 \) is strong) 12 \( \text{a}3! \) \( \text{R}e8 \) 13 \( \text{d}2! \) \( \text{Rd}8 \) (totally bad is 13...\( \text{Rxc}3 \) 14 \( \text{c}4 \) and wins) 14 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 15 \( \text{e}4 \) with an obvious advantage for White.

As you see, in not one of the lines did the bishop come out to \( \text{g}5 \) – at the time I thought that there was nothing for it to do there. But now I decided to try it. The idea occurred to me at the board – I hadn’t analysed it at home.

Speelman is a bold player and, of course, he accepts the sacrifice.

\[ \begin{align*}
10 & \text{g}5!\? \\
11 & \text{bxc}3 \\
12 & \text{d}3!
\end{align*} \]

I made this last move quickly, since the pawn sacrifice is the idea behind the move 10 \( \text{g}5 \). It is already too late to avoid the critical variations – the cautious 12 \( \text{Rd}3 \) would allow Black easy equality after 12...\( \text{b}6 \) 13 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 14 \( \text{fe}1 \) \( \text{ac}8 \).

In general, this is a creative, problematic decision, involving a considerable risk. During the game I tried to convince myself as follows: ‘Simply physically I have not managed to make a mistake, since as yet the only independent move I have made is the sensible \( \text{g}5 \). What could be more natural than this move? The opponent may win a pawn, but he gives me several tempi, which must compensate for his small material advantage.’

\[ \begin{align*}
12 & \ldots \\
13 & \text{c}1 \\
14 & \text{xc}3
\end{align*} \]

When I sacrificed the pawn, I needed to see this position and without fail find the following move. If White plays something neutral, let us suppose 14 \( \text{e}1 \), preparing \( \text{e}5 \), then after 14...\( \text{b}6 \) 15 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{b}7 \) he remains without any real compensation. Black successfully completes his development, and in addition I have an isolated pawn in the centre. Here even with material equality (give White back his pawn on \( \text{b}2 \) Black retains an excellent position. Therefore, I repeat, it was essential to see beforehand the following move.

\[ \begin{align*}
14 & \text{e}5!
\end{align*} \]

If now Black plays 14...\( \text{b}6 \), then 15 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 16 \( \text{h}3 \) is strong, threatening 17 \( \text{xd}7 \). White develops a dangerous initiative. Such a turn of events did not satisfy Speelman.

\[ \begin{align*}
14 & \ldots \\
15 & \text{c}5
\end{align*} \]
16 dxe5!
It is unfavourable to capture on e5 with the rook in view of 16...\(\text{Q}d5\) and then \(\text{f}7-\text{f}5\) – it is not clear how White can develop his initiative.

16...\(\text{Wxc5}\)

After the game Speelman suggested 16...\(\text{Q}e4\). A quite unexpected possibility, which would not occur to everyone. It is a thematic move, which is justified in the event of 17 \(\text{Q}xe4\) \(\text{Wxc5}\). But after 17 \(\text{Qxc8}\) Black ends up in a bad position: 17...\(\text{Q}xg5\) 18 \(\text{Qxa8}\) \(\text{Qxa8}\) 19 h4. Now 19...\(\text{Qd8}\) is not possible because of 20 \(\text{Q}xh7+\), while the cunning 19...g6 is calmly answered by 20 \(\text{Q}b1\), and the knight is nevertheless lost.

17 \(\text{Q}xf6\)

During the game I reckoned that this position was a draw. That is what I still think. I played well, the opponent also played worthily – what could be done, the game should end in a draw.

I thought that 17...gxf6 would automatically be played. The plausible attacking attempt 18 \(\text{Wg4+}\) \(\text{Q}h8\) 19 exf6? is refuted by 19...\(\text{Qg8}\) 20 \(\text{Wh4}\) h5, and White loses.

A draw occurs in the variation 18 \(\text{Q}xh7+\) \(\text{Q}xh7\) 19 \(\text{Wh5+}\) \(\text{Q}g8\) (of course, not 19...\(\text{Q}g7??\) 20 exf6+ and wins) 20 \(\text{Wg4+}\) \(\text{Q}h7\) (but not 20...\(\text{Q}h8?\) 21 exf6) 21 \(\text{Wh4+}\) (now 21 exf6 \(\text{Qg8}\) 22 \(\text{Wh4+}\) \(\text{Qg6}\) no longer works). White can also give perpetual check by 18 \(\text{Wg4+}\) \(\text{Q}h8\) 19 \(\text{Wh4}\) f5 20 \(\text{Wf6+}\) \(\text{Qg8}\) 21 \(\text{Wh5+}\).

I sat while my opponent was analysing variations, and suddenly Speelman made a different move. After the game I asked him: ‘Were you playing for a win?’ It transpired that he had not been playing for a win. He was afraid of capturing 17...\(\text{Q}xf6\) on account of 18 \(\text{Wg4+}\) \(\text{Q}h8\) 19 \(\text{Wh4}\) f5 20 \(\text{Wf6+}\) \(\text{Qg8}\) 21 \(\text{Qe1?!}\) \(\text{Q}d7\) 22 \(\text{Qe3}\). The only defence is 22...\(\text{Wc1+}\) 23 \(\text{Qf1}\) \(\text{Qxe3}\). Fortunately for me, Speelman reckoned that White still had winning chances. Alas, after the game we did not find a win here. In addition, Reiner Knaak found another defence: 21...\(\text{Qc7?!}\) 22 \(\text{Qe3}\) \(\text{Qd8}\), when White is obliged to give perpetual check by 23 \(\text{Qg3+}\) \(\text{Qf8}\) 24 \(\text{Wh8+}\) \(\text{Qe7}\) 25 \(\text{Wf6+}\) \(\text{Qf8}\).

17...\(\text{Qe8?!}\)

When Jonathan played this, in my surprise I became slightly flustered. I had been expecting a draw, and now I looked and couldn’t see a perpetual check. And I was the exchange and a pawn down. ‘Well, I’ve been unlucky!’, I thought. For some five minutes I couldn’t see anything sensible. I was diverted by all sorts of attacks like 18 \(\text{Q}b5\), and I was very surprised that I couldn’t find a draw. And suddenly I realised that it was in vain that I was seeking a draw – I should be playing for mate!

18 \(\text{Q}xh7+!!\) \(\text{Q}xh7\)

18...\(\text{Q}f8?\) 19 \(\text{Wg4}\) gxf6 20 exf6 was bad for Black.

19 \(\text{Wh5+}\) \(\text{Qg8}\)
20 \(\text{Wg5}\) \(\text{Qf8}\)
21 \(\text{Qd1!}\)

I think that Speelman missed the sacrifice on h7 with the subsequent inclusion of the white rook in the attack (although the idea is roughly the same as in the variation he calculated after 17...\(\text{Q}xg6\)). Otherwise he
would not have gone in for this position. How can he now defend against the switching of the rook to the g- or h-file?

However, my opponent again surprised me – he found a way of prolonging the resistance for nearly a further fifty moves.

[As was later established, the game would not have been prolonged if White had carried out more accurately the idea of switching the rook to the g-file: 19 \( \text{Wh}3 \pm \) (instead of 19 \( \text{Wh}5 \pm \)) 19...\( \text{g}8 \) 20 \( \text{Wg}3 \) \( \text{Wf}8 \) 21 \( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{b}6 \) (little is changed by 21...\( \text{d}7 \) 22 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{ec}8 \) 23 \( \text{h}3 \)) 22 \( \text{d}4 \) and 23 \( \text{g}4 \) – Dvoretsky.]

21...

\( \text{b}6 \)

White has two moves: \( \text{d}3 \) and \( \text{d}4 \). I experienced an unpleasant feeling – I was afraid of guessing wrong.

22 \( \text{d}4 \)!

\( \text{a}6 \)

23 \( \text{g}4 \)

If 23 \( \text{h}4 \), then 23...\( \text{e}2 \) (23...\( \text{ec}8 \)!) 24 \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{c}5 \) (!) 24...\( \text{ed}8 \), and if 25 \( \text{f}3 \) Black has 25...\( \text{xf}3 \) 26 \( \text{xf}3 \) \( \text{c}5 \), launching a counterattack on the white king.

23...

\( \text{e}2 \)

24 \( \text{xg}7 \)!

Nothing was achieved by 24 \( \text{Wxg}7+ \text{Wxg}7 \) 25 \( \text{g}7+ \) in view of 25...\( \text{h}8 \) (but not 25...\( \text{f}8 \) 26 \( \text{h}7 \) with unavoidable mate), with a draw by perpetual check after 26 \( \text{h}3 \), 27 \( \text{g}4 \) and 28 \( \text{g}5+ \). After the game grandmaster Sergey Smagin, who was following our game, reckoned that I could have won by 24 \( \text{g}3 \). But it is precisely in this variation that Black has a defence: 24...\( \text{ed}8 \) 25 \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{d}3 \) 26 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{d}1+ \) 27 \( \text{h}2 \) \( \text{d}3 \) 28 \( \text{e}7 \) (!) 28...\( \text{xg}7 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 28...\( \text{f}6 \) 29 \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{c}5 \)!, or 30 29 \( \text{xf}7 \) 30 \( \text{h}6 \) (30 \( \text{xf}7+ \)?) \( \text{xg}7 \) 31 \( \text{g}7+ \) \( \text{h}8 \) 32 \( \text{g}5 \), and the most probable outcome is a draw) 30...\( \text{g}6 \) 31 \( \text{g}4 \) \( \text{h}7 \).

Now you will understand why I preferred to go into a won ending, and, incidentally, why I rejected 22 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 23 \( \text{g}3 \).

24...

\( \text{xg}4 \)

25 \( \text{xf}8+ \)

There was also the intermediate check 25 \( \text{xh}6+ \). Such 'trifles' can have a decisive influence on the outcome of a game. You should always see such alternatives and choose the position that appeals to you more. In the given instance I think that it is better to capture immediately on \( f8 \). I was intending to push my h-pawn, and I didn’t want the black king to forestall it by standing on \( h7 \).

25...

\( \text{xf}8 \)

26 \( \text{xc}8 \)

27 \( \text{h}4 \)

The natural move, but nevertheless an inaccuracy. 27 \( \text{g}5+ \) was stronger, restricting the mobility of the enemy king. I was not afraid of the move made by Black, as I saw that it would lead to the loss of another pawn, but that is precisely what my opponent played.

27...

\( \text{e}7 \)

28 \( \text{g}5+ \)

29 \( \text{f}4 \) a5!

I should remark that Speelman defends very well. In general he does not play badly, and he is especially strong in defence, as I sensed in this game. Such problems arise,
that at one moment I was doubtful whether I would win.

30 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}x\texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{f}}}}7+ \text{c6}

The h-pawn cannot promote on its own – it needs the support of the g-pawn. But Black is endeavouring to obtain a passed pawn on the queenside. To participate in a race, to see who is quicker, is unpleasant. Therefore I decided first to halt the opponent’s counterplay, even if only for a time, and then to advance my pawns.

31 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}f3+ \text{c5}
32 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}e3+ \text{c6}
33 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}f3+ \text{c5}
34 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}a3+ \text{c4}
35 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}b3+ \text{c5}
36 a4! \text{b8}

37 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}b5+ was threatened. Speelman defends his pawn and prepares \ldots b6–b5.

37 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}c3+ \text{d5}
38 f4 \text{e4}
39 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}f3+

Also strong was 39 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}c4+!? \text{e3} 40 g3 with a winning position.

39 . . . \text{d4}
40 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}c6 \text{e3}
41 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}c1+

41 g3! was simpler.

41 . . . \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{E}}}}e2
42 h5 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{E}}}}ec8
43 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}f1+ \text{d2}
44 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}b5 \text{e3}
45 g3 \text{d4}
46 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{G}}}}g2

Everything seems to be alright: White has not allowed \ldots b6–b5, he has strengthened his position, and he has begun advancing his pawns. And I almost stopped paying any attention to Speelman’s moves.

46 . . . \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{C}}}}c3
47 h6?!?

47 g4! was far more accurate.

47 . . . \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{H}}}}h8

There is no longer a simple win. Here I decided to complicate matters, by finally allowing the opponent to play \ldots b6–b5.

48 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}d7 b5
49 axb5 a4
50 b6 a3
51 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}a4 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{B}}}}b2
52 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}b4+ \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{A}}}}a2
53 h7!

By driving the king in front of the pawn, so that it cannot advance, White has indirectly defended his h-pawn. It cannot be taken, since the rook is lost. But even so, the position is not easy – I have allowed Black to advance his passed pawn too far. The win is achieved by just one tempo.

53 . . . \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{E}}}}bc8
54 b7 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{E}}}}c2+
55 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}f3 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{B}}}}b2
56 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}c4+ \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{B}}}}b3+
57 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{G}}}}g4 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{B}}}}b2
58 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}c8 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{X}}}}h7

After 58...a2 59 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}xh8 a1\texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}} (59...\texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}xb7 60 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}g8 a1\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{W}}} 61 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}h8\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{W}}}) 60 b8\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{W}}} \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{W}}}}d1+ 61 \texttt{\textbf{\textsf{\textbf{G}}}}g5, White avoids the checks, since the rook on b3 is pinned.

59 b8\texttt{\textbf{\textbf{W}}} \texttt{\textbf{\textbf{G}}}g7+
The creative Solving of irrational Problems in the Opening

60 ♘h5  ♗xg3
61 ♘d6  ♘h3+
62 ♘g6  ♘bg3+
63 ♘f7  ♘h7+
64 ♘xe6  ♘h6+
65 ♘f5  ♘xd6
66 exd6  a2
67 d7  a1♕
68 ♘b7+

The next move will be 69 d8♕, and there is not a single check. Black resigned.

So, I have acquainted you with one of my approaches to working on chess. In each of the games examined we encountered – most often, immediately after the opening – the problem of a key move, a move which gives the game a definite direction and exerts an enormous influence on the further course of the play. For me this is a deeply creative problem, associated not only with purely chess laws, but also with intuition, emotion, and psychological condition. The discoveries which I have shown could be conceived only directly at the board, in the course of a tense battle. Therefore I advise you: don’t forget to strengthen your mind, develop your intuition, and learn to control your emotions. Don’t restrict yourself only to the acquisition of knowledge, but try to improve in the most varied fields.
invite you to test your strength by independently seeking the replies to questions which the players faced in the opening stage of one quite old game.

I found this game in a splendid book published in 1979 Het groot analyseboek Jan Timman, which in translation from the Dutch means 'Jan Timman's Big Book of Analyses'. I studied Timman’s analyses with great interest and benefit to myself, and, of course, I found many mistakes in them. 

When a commentator does not restrict himself to general remarks, but tries to analyse a game in real depth, mistakes are inevitable in view of the complexity of the problems facing the analyst. Many of the mistakes pointed out by readers of the book were corrected in its English edition The Art of Chess Analysis. And in 1989 Timman presented me with a new, French edition – L'art de L’analyse.

Timman’s book comprises commentaries to games, written by him in various years and published in the Dutch chess magazine. The game which you will see is one of the first in the book, and is perhaps annotated less well than the others. This is a vivid illustration of the fact that in his youth Timman was an indifferent analyst – subsequently, after gaining experience, he began analysing much better.

The time you have for the solving of the problems (with some of which even the commentator did not cope) will not be long: from 5 to 15 minutes. But don’t be afraid – you will be helped by leading questions, outlining the problem more specifically.

Exercises offered in competitions usually have completely clear-cut solutions – for example, a forcing combination or an end-game that can be accurately calculated. Our competition is a not altogether standard one. Many of the problems are open to discussion. Sometimes it will be hard to demonstrate this 'this' is better than 'that'. You will have to trust in your general perception of the position, your intuition. Calculation of variations is also required, of course, but it will be more important to see all the resources both for yourself, and for the opponent, and to evaluate correctly the resulting situations.

The questions will be purely practical and they should be answered from the position not of an analyst, but of a practical player. Your objective is to find in a restricted time the most important, most significant variations for the taking of a decision, and to guess the optimal way of combining calculation of variations with evaluation of position.

Polugayevsky – Mecking
Mar del Plata 1971
Semi-Slav Defence

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1 c4 c6
2 d4 d5
3 e3 dxc4
4 d4 e6
5 b3 bd7
6 a3 bd7
7 d4 0-0
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Had White now played 8 wxc2, this would have transposed into a well-known position from the Meran Variation (1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 d3 f6 4 c3 c5 5 e3 d6 6 wxc2 d6 7 b3 0-0 8 a2), in which the light-square
A Practical Exercise

bishop is usually developed on e2. But Lev Polugayevsky deviates slightly from the usual set-up.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
8 \text{d3} \\
\text{e8} \\
9 \text{c2}
\end{array}
\]

And now – the first question.

1) Suggest for Black the main candidate moves (10 minutes).

So, nearly all of you correctly determined the main ideas for Black. You even suggested some which I did not have in mind, but also deserve consideration. I thought that here there are three main possibilities:

1) \(9...\text{dxc4} 10\ \text{bxc4} \text{e5}\) – the standard plan in such positions, although when the bishop is on e2 – with the bishop on d3 it looks weaker;

2) the immediate \(9...\text{e5}\) – each time in such cases you must consider whether you should allow the exchange on d5;

3) the preparatory move \(9...\text{we7}\); the idea of it will be explained a little later.

Vadim Zviagintsev suggests a completely different plan: the completion of Black’s development by \(...\text{b7–b6}\) and \(...\text{b7}\). I am not prepared to comment on this suggestion, since I have not analysed it. But it looks sensible, sometimes Black plays this way in similar positions, and therefore it receives an extra point.

Now regarding preference. \(9...\text{we7}\) is the move that I like most. Here, of course, I cannot demonstrate anything – I can only explain. What is the idea? Let’s investigate. Why didn’t White castle just now? Because of the reply \(9...\text{e5}\). He does not have time to capture on d5 in view of the fork \(10...\text{e4}\), and so he has to exchange on e5 in a situation advantageous to Black. \(9 \text{c2}\) was played in order to take control of the e4-square, and in the event of \(9...\text{e5}\) to be able to exchange on d5. And now comes a rather refined reply – \(9...\text{we7}\). In itself it is useful in such positions, but in addition Black renews the threat of a fork after \(...\text{e6–e5}\).

Only Vasya Emelin chose this move, for which I have also given him an extra point.

\(9...\text{we7}\) was not made in the game or indicated in the notes. In effect this is an opening novelty, and not a bad one. This is how they are devised: one only needs to carefully analyse a game or opening variation, to delve into its latent ideas...

As candidates, Yan Teplitsky suggested nearly all possible moves up to an including \(9...\text{c5}\) – this is rather excessive. With such an abundance of possibilities it is hard to hit the target, and it demands too much time. Endeavour with the help of evaluation to somehow restrict the list of candidate moves.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
9 \ldots \\
\text{e5} \\
10 \text{cxd5} \\
\text{cx}d\text{5}
\end{array}
\]

In such positions there is sometimes the typical move \(\text{b5}\), but, of course, not here – because of the check on b4.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
11 \text{dxe5} \\
\text{xe5} \\
12 \text{xe5} \\
\text{xe5}
\end{array}
\]

12...\(\text{xe5}\)! is more active.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
13 \text{e2}
\end{array}
\]

Polugayevsky aims to simplify the position, to exchange the dark-square bishops. Black again faces a committing decision.
2) How should Black continue?  
(10 minutes)

With quiet play White gains a slight but enduring positional advantage. Therefore in the first instance one should look at moves which disrupt the 'normal' course of play.

The first try is 13...\texttt{\texttt{a}5+ 14 \texttt{c}3 \texttt{xc}3+ 15 \texttt{xc}3 \texttt{xc}3+ 16 \texttt{xc}3, and now 16...d4, because otherwise White has the more pleasant endgame. After 17 \texttt{b}5! Black has to sacrifice the exchange: 17...dxe3 18 \texttt{c}7 exf2+.

Nearly all of you reached this position in your calculations, but not everyone was able to accurately calculate the variation to the end. However, in the first edition of his book Timman also went wrong, attaching an exclamation mark to 19 \texttt{d}2?, which is in fact refuted by 19...\texttt{d}8 20 \texttt{xa}8 \texttt{f}5. Of course, 19 \texttt{xf}2 \texttt{g}4+ 20 \texttt{g}1 \texttt{d}8 21 \texttt{xa}8 \texttt{xd}3 22 \texttt{h}3 is correct. This position could have been unclear in view of the bad placing of the white king (imagine if the black rook were on d2!), but here White is alright: 22...\texttt{f}6 23 \texttt{h}2 or 22...\texttt{e}3 23 \texttt{f}2. For the exchange there is no real compensation.

This entire variation subsequently occurred in the game Makarychev–Chekhov (Moscow 1981).

Since the exchange sacrifice is incorrect, the check on a5 also has no particular point. Another active try is more interesting – 13...d4?.

If 14 f4? or 14 \texttt{d}1?, then 14...\texttt{a}5+ is strong. In reply to 14 exd4 one of you suggested 14...\texttt{d}6!? with the idea after 15 \texttt{h}3 \texttt{a}5+ 16 \texttt{c}3 \texttt{g}5 of developing pressure on White's kingside. Clever! But White can simply castle, and the bishop sacrifice, unfortunately, does not work: 15 0-0? \texttt{x}h2+ 16 \texttt{x}h2 \texttt{g}4+ 17 \texttt{g}1 \texttt{d}6 (17...\texttt{h}4 18 \texttt{c}7!) 18 \texttt{g}3 \texttt{h}6 19 \texttt{fe}1 \texttt{h}2+ 20 \texttt{f}1. However, the simple 14...\texttt{xd}4 is quite sufficient for equality.

The critical reply is 14 e4!, and it is on this that the evaluation of 13...d4 depends.

3) What does 14...\texttt{xe}4 lead to?  
(5 minutes)

Absolutely all of you gave the correct evaluation. After 15 \texttt{xe}4 d3 16 \texttt{xd}3 \texttt{xb}2 White should play not as suggested by Timman – 17 \texttt{d}1? \texttt{a}5+, but simply 17 \texttt{x}h7+! \texttt{h}8 18 \texttt{xb}2 \texttt{xh}7 19 0-0, and Black has no compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

What then should Black do? White's pawn structure is better, and he is threatening to play f2–f4. The endgame after 14...\texttt{a}5+ 15 \texttt{d}2 is clearly in White's favour. Black must play as energetically as he can, and I think
that the only serious option is 14...\( \square \)g4!. But how to reply to 15 h3? It is possible to prevent the opponent from castling, but after 15...\( \mathbb{w} \)a5+ 16 \( \mathcal{f} \)f1 the advantage is with White. 15...\( \mathbb{w} \)h4 is stronger. Now if 16 0-0 there is the guerrilla raid 16...\( \mathcal{h} \)h2!, when all kinds of sacrifices are in the air: ...\( \mathcal{h} \)xh3 or ...\( \mathcal{h} \)f3+. However, by playing 16 g3, White suddenly reminds Black that for a long time his d4-pawn has been en prise. But Black too does not lose heart, since after 16...\( \mathbb{w} \)h6 17 \( \mathcal{d} \)xd4 \( \mathbb{w} \)b6 or 17...\( \mathcal{d} \)d8 the turmoil on the board does not end. You don't know, by chance, how this final position should be evaluated? In analysis I found this entire series of moves, by looking at and rejecting other continuations. It is clear that Black has the right to play this way. It is risky for him, for he remains a pawn down, but for White too there is a risk, since his kingside is weakened and his king is stuck in the centre.

Thus we have established that Black had a not very successful queen check at a5 and a tempting attempt to initiate complications by 13...d4?!. But Mecking chose another move.

\[ 13 \ldots \ \mathcal{w} \text{d6} \]

In order to give it an objective evaluation, another question must first be answered.

4) Comment on the series of moves made in the game (15 minutes)

\[ 14 \ \mathcal{h} \text{xe5} \ \mathcal{w} \text{xe5} \]
\[ 15 0-0 \ \mathcal{d} \text{d7} \]
\[ 16 \ \mathcal{g} \text{d4} \]

(see diagram)

First let's evaluate the resulting position. After the exchange of the dark-square bishops White has retained a slight positional advantage, that is obvious. It is determined by the isolated d5-pawn and the opponent's passive light-square bishop. It is not clear whether White can win, but at any event he will be able to press for the entire game. Could Black have avoided such a fate?

Some of you suggested capturing on e5 not with the queen, but the rook. I will not give any points for this move, because I don't see any particular virtues in it. White replies 15 \( \mathcal{d} \)d4, not fearing 15...\( \mathbb{w} \)b4+ 16 \( \mathcal{d} \)d2 \( \mathbb{w} \)xd4?? 17 \( \mathcal{h} \)xh7+, and planning \( \mathcal{c} \)c1 and then possibly \( \mathbb{c} \)c7. He can also consider 15 \( \mathcal{c} \)c1 d4 16 e4.

After 14...\( \mathbb{w} \)xe5 15 0-0 the recommendation 15...\( \mathcal{g} \)e4 is unconvincing. White places his rook on c1 and his knight on d4, and at an appropriate moment he can even exchange on e4, leaving himself with a strong knight against a passive bishop. Black's position retains the same drawbacks as in the game.

On the other hand, 15...\( \mathcal{g} \)g4! gives Black reasonable counter-chances, and enables him to sharpen the position. Of course, during the short time available you would have been unable to calculate the variations exactly, but your positional feeling correctly suggested to many of you that Black should have decided on this move. Logic, typical of such situations, operates: before accepting the need to spend the entire game defending passively, you should first seek active resources, which may change the unfavourable course of the play. And if a move such as 15...\( \mathcal{g} \)g4 is not refuted directly, and it leads to unclear situations, it should be made.
However, White in turn could have played more strongly, and not allowed an unnecessary sharpening of the play. 15 \textit{Wc}3! was a good prescription, instead of 15 0-0?! Many of you pointed this out. It is important to dislodge the black queen from its excellent central square. The position after 15...\textit{Wxc}3+ 16 \textit{Qxc}3 is already known to us from the 13...\textit{Wa}5+ variation – it was not in vain that we calculated it. As you will remember, 16...d4 17 \textit{Qb}5 gives White the advantage. And if the queen moves, White can castle or first play 16 \textit{Qd}4.

You suggest that 15 \textit{Wc}3 should be answered by 15...\textit{Wg}5? Well, I can castle, since 16...\textit{Qh}3 is not dangerous in view of 17 \textit{Qf}4. And meanwhile White is planning \textit{Wd}4 followed by \textit{Wf}4, or, even more active – \textit{Qc}7. At any event, the counterplay which flared up after 15 0-0?! \textit{Qg}4! is not obtained here.

Volodya Balkan suggested the variation 15 \textit{Wc}3 \textit{Wh}5 16 0-0 \textit{Qg}4 17 h3 \textit{Qe}5. You know, after 18 \textit{Qf}4 White is still a little better, since the d5-pawn is weak. Also I am not obliged to castle, but can play 16 \textit{Wd}4 or 16 \textit{Qc}7. But in general, this is the correct approach – Black must somehow try to sharpen the position. I have given him an extra point for his attempt to analyse 15 \textit{Wc}3.

Now we can give an objective evaluation to the move 13...\textit{Wd}6. It leads to a rather inferior, passive position. The more dynamic 13...d4?! should have been preferred.

I have given the maximum score – 10 points – to those who indicated the idea of 15...\textit{Qg}4!, giving Black counterplay, and 15 \textit{Wc}3! for White instead of casting. In two cases I gave a score between five and ten, when the reply was based on the correct premise, that White needs to devise something, since after 15 0-0 there is the strong rejoinder 15...\textit{Qg}4!, but 15 \textit{Wc}3 was not suggested. I gave the fewest marks to Yan Teplitsky (I warned him!), since, as in the first exercise, he again suggested a mass of possibilities, including some that were correct, but he did not indicate any clear preference. You should not be afraid to express your opinion. Of course, it may be mistaken, but you learn from your mistakes. After all, the aim is not to score the most points in the competition. We are training your approach to the taking of decisions, which you will be able to use in practical games. There, in the end, you will be obliged to draw a clear conclusion, as to which you move you like less, and which you like more.

But now we will carefully analyse the variation 15 0-0 \textit{Qg}4!. How to defend against the mate? The first try is 16 g3 \textit{Wh}5 17 h4.

5) What should Black play? (5 minutes)

Here Black has the powerful move 17...g5!, which gives him an excellent position with a strong attack. The threats are ...\textit{gxh}4 and in some cases ...\textit{Qe}5. You analysed 18 \textit{Qg}2. I had in mind 18...\textit{gxh}4 19 \textit{Qh}1 h3+. In one of the replies it is written that 18...\textit{gxh}4 is bad because of 19 \textit{Qf}4. I don't think so – after 19...h3+ 20 \textit{Qh}1 \textit{Wf}6 Black is well placed. However, it is possible that 18...\textit{Qxe}3 is even stronger. The one who suggested this receives an additional point.

The only difficulty of the exercise is that there is another tempting move 17...\textit{Qe}5, which is not so easy to refute. This was the
one recommended by Timman. But if the variation is continued: 18 f4 f3+ 19 g2 g4 (the piece sacrifice 19...xh4+ is also insufficient: 20 gxh4 g4+ 21 h2 xh4+ 22 g1 g5+ 23 g2 h3 24 f4 xg2+ 25 xg2 xe3 26 f3 or 27 ad1 with a difficult endgame for Black) 20 h1 with the extremely unpleasant threat of 21 e2 (or even 20 e2 xh4+ 21 h1), it becomes clear that the position should be evaluated in favour of White.

Let us continue looking at the defences against the mate threat after 15 0-0 g4. The second try is 16 f4. Here, there is really not even anything to ask – it is clear that Black plays 16...h5!. And then, say, 17 e1 h4 (there is also 17...xh2!?) 18 f1 h3 19 g3 f6 followed by ...e5. Black begins an attack on the light squares; his position is better.

Timman recommends 16 f4 and comes to an amusing conclusion: after 16...f6 (intending 17...d4) 17 e2 g4 18 f4 the result is a draw. But does the knight have to retrace its steps? Black has two active moves: 16...g5 and 16...d4.

In the first, Dutch edition of his book, Timman considered both moves to be bad, in the English edition – only one of them, and only in the French edition (taking account of an article of mine in the magazine New in Chess, pointing out the mistakes in his book) was the correct evaluation given – both moves secure Black an excellent game.

I will give one variation now, and you can try to find the second yourselves.

16...g5 17 h3 gxh4! 18 exf4 xf4 19 hxg4 xg4 with advantage to Black. If White regains the pawn by capturing on h7, Black will attack along the h-file. Where could Timman have gone wrong here? He was carried away by an attempt to win a pawn: 17...xe3? 18 fxe3 xe3+ 19 h2 gx4 20 f3, after which it is White who builds up a powerful attack.

The second variation is 16...d4 17 xh7+ h8 18 h3.

6) What position should Black go in for? (10 minutes)

Black has numerous tempting continuations. There are variations that are rather sharp and complicated, and in 10 minutes, of course, you will not calculate them all. The aim is not so much to calculate, as to assess and sense where you will stand better, where your position will be more secure. Let's try.

Timman examines three variations.

The first: 18...xf2 19 xf2 dxe3 20 h4 g5 21 h6 g7 22 xg7+ xg7 23 h5+ xh7 24 f6+, and White wins.

The second: 18...f6 19 g6!! (the f7-pawn is awkward to defend) 19...dxe3 20 xf7 xf4 21 xe8 xe8. Black has won two pieces for a rook, but with such a king he cannot survive: after 22 fxe3! xe3+ 23 h1 White's threats are irresistible. Incidentally, instead of 21...xe8? it is far stronger to play 21...f5! 22 c5 e2 23 f8+ g8 24 f6+. And, finally, the third: 18...dxe3 19 hxg4 exf2+ 20 xf2! xh7 21 ae1.

But why does Black commit hara-kiri, by himself opening lines for the white rooks? In
this last variation he has the simple 19...\textit{xf}4!
(instead of 19...exf2+?) with brilliant prospects.
Thus we see that in the event of 16 \textit{f}4
Black is by no means bound to agree a draw – he straight away has two tempting possibilities.
What then should White do? Did the inaccuracy 15 0-0?! really lead to an inferior position for him? I don’t think so. We must consider one other continuation: 16 \textit{xh}7+ \textit{h}8, and only now 17 \textit{g}3. Evidently Black should win the bishop for three pawns:
17...g6 18 \textit{xg}6 fxg6 19 \textit{xf}6, and then, most probably, 19...\textit{g}8 20 \textit{h}5+ \textit{x}h5 21 \textit{g}h5.

When solving studies, if you are fortunate enough to find a series of best moves, the evaluation of the final position usually does not present any difficulty – it is either a win, a draw, or a loss. A practical game is far more complicated. Here forcing variations very often end in completely unclear positions. I don’t know how to evaluate this position; if anyone knows, please tell me! But at any event I think this is the best that White has after 15...\textit{g}4!.
Imagine how difficult his task would have been! He would have to examine the variations 16 \textit{g}3, 16 \textit{f}4 and 16 g3. Then, by the method of elimination, choose the piece sacrifice 16 \textit{xh}7+, after sensing (it is not possible to calculate to the end), that everything else is dangerous for White, whereas here an unclear endgame is reached.

We are now finished with the opening stage. Play has gone into a quiet middlegame. It would be wrong to think that White has a big advantage, and certainly not a winning position. In such situations experienced and cool defenders are usually able to save the game.

But what told subsequently was the difference in class between the two players. Polugayevsky was a mature, positional competitor. As for Henrique Mecking... A year after this game Tigran Petrosian wrote about him: ‘He is indeed not a bad player. He will possibly play better, but I am sure that he will never become world champion. And mainly because of the narrowness of his chess thinking. Mecking does not understand, for example, the significance of weak and strong squares. I have played him three times. In 1968 he lost to me because of the weakness of the light squares. A year later he readily conceded all the dark squares to me, and again suffered a defeat. And at the tournament in San Antonio (1972) grandmaster Mecking again gave me control of the dark squares, and with them also victory. Mecking is distinguished by his active piece play, but he does not have a proper understanding of the deep features of a position, and this forces me to have doubts about his chess future.’ A severe but instructive ‘diagnosis’.
I should mention that a weakness on squares of a particular colour usually arises when pawns are arranged on squares of the same colour as a bishop. As we will now see, it is this elementary positional mistake that is committed by Mecking.
Let us see how the game developed.
18 ... a6?!  

Petrosian is right – Mecking does not know on which squares he should keep his pawns.

19 \texttt{hac1} \texttt{g4}  

Too late! Now this no longer has any great point.

20 \texttt{d3} \texttt{b6}  

21 \texttt{xc8} \texttt{xc8}  

22 \texttt{c1}  

Polugayevsky operates in accordance with a well-known principle: 'Against youth – go into the endgame!' It is easy to see that 22...\texttt{xe3}? does not work: 23 \texttt{xc8}+ \texttt{xc8} 23 \texttt{c1} or 23 \texttt{e5}.

22 ... \texttt{f6}  

23 \texttt{xc8}+ \texttt{xc8}  

24 \texttt{c3} \texttt{d7}  

25 \texttt{d4} \texttt{e8}  

26 a4!  

An old Russian proverb states: 'When two do one and the same – it is not the same.' Polugayevsky, like Mecking before him, has placed a pawn on a square of the same colour as his bishop. But he wants to advance it further, fixing the queenside. And if the opponent forestalls White's plan by 26...a5, then, as shown by Timman, there follows 27 \texttt{b5}! \texttt{xb5} 28 \texttt{xb5}.

This device, a rather difficult one, incidentally, demanding a subtle evaluation of the position, is called 'transformation of an advantage'. White gives up one of his pluses: he exchanges the opponent's 'bad' bishop, but in return he hopes to gain another one: superiority in the placing of his pieces. It is hard for Black defend the invasion squares. For example, he loses a pawn after 28...\texttt{c6} 29 \texttt{xc6} bxc6 30 \texttt{c4} c5 31 \texttt{c6}. But in the event of 28...\texttt{f6}! chasing after the pawn by 29 \texttt{xf6} \texttt{xf6} 30 \texttt{c6} b6 31 \texttt{c8} is not justified, since in return Black activates his king: 31...\texttt{f8}! 32 \texttt{xb6} \texttt{f7} 33 \texttt{c8}+ (33 \texttt{f3} \texttt{d6}) 33...\texttt{d7} 34 \texttt{a7} \texttt{d6} 35 \texttt{b5+ c5}. White should simply reply 29 \texttt{d4}!, retaining an appreciable advantage.

26 ... \texttt{d7}  

27 \texttt{xc7} \texttt{xc7}  

28 a5  

In Timman's opinion, here Black was obliged to try 28...\texttt{e6}?. If 29 \texttt{xe6}, then 29...\texttt{f6} 30 \texttt{f4} \texttt{f7}, followed by ...h7–h6, ...\texttt{f6} and ...e6–e5. This was his best chance, promising real hopes of a draw. Instead there follows a superficial move.

28 ... \texttt{f8}?!  

29 \texttt{f1}  

Now this idea does not work – after 29...\texttt{e6} 30 \texttt{xe6} fxe6? the h7-pawn is hanging. But Black could have played 29...h6 and then ...\texttt{e6}.

29 ... \texttt{e7}  

30 \texttt{e2}
It is laughable that a grandmaster should play this! He sees that if 30...g6 there is 31 f5+, and without hesitation he places another pawn on a square of the colour of his bishop.

31 d2
32 fxe6?!

I find this move hard to understand. 32 c3 suggests itself.

32...
fxe6
33 f4
e5
34 g3
d6

Here Timman demonstrates with a serious piece of analysis that Black could have held the position by 34...b5!. It is probable that this was indeed his best chance. At any event, White could not have gone into the pawn endgame, since after 35 xb5 axb5 36 c3 e6! if 37 b4? there is the reply 37...d4!.

35 c3

Now 35...b5 is no longer possible – in the variation 36 xb5 axb5 37 b4 d4 White captures on e5 with check.

35...
e6
36 b4?!

In the later editions of his book Timman rightly points out that, before embarking on resolute action, White should have played his bishop to f3: 36 e2 d7 (36...d4+ 37 exd4 exd4+ 38 xd4 xb3 39 f3 c7 40 c5 is hopeless for Black) 37 f3 c6 38 b4 (with the threat of 39 fxe5+ xe5 40 c5), and the pawn endgame arising after 38...d4 39 xc6 bxc6 40 exd4 exd4 41 c4 c5 42 b4 cxb4 43 xd4 is won.

And now the last exercise.

7) What would you have played?

(5 minutes)

Mecking has already spoiled his position so much, that it is unclear whether he can now save it. But one should fight in any situation. The threat is 37 fxe5+ xe5 38 c5, breaking through on the dark squares. In the event of the exchange on f4, the white king goes to d4. It is improbable that White would fail to convert such an enormous positional advantage – as Black's pawns are on squares of the same colour as his bishop. 36...d4! is the most natural move (at least one pawn moves onto a dark square), and for this reason I gave you only five minutes. There is no need to calculate it exactly; it is sufficient merely to slightly weigh up the resources of both sides. It may also lose, but it may not, and in any case it will be not so simple. White must decide: whether to capture on d4, or on e5, or perhaps to play 37 e4. And who knows which reply is correct?
Initially Timman did not consider this defence at all. And when I mentioned it in my article, in the French edition of his book he wrote that White wins with 37 e4 followed by 38 fxe5+ ²xe5 39 ²c5 ²xb3 40 ²b6. But after 40... ²d1 41 ²xb7 ²f3 Black has nothing to fear. In addition, if desired White's 'threat' can easily be parried by 37 ... ²d7.

The strongest continuation is 37 exd4! exd4 38 h4 followed by h4–h5. It is hopeless to go into the pawn endgame: 38... ²f5 39 ²xf5 gxf5 40 ²c4 d3 41 ²xd3 ²c5(d5) 42 h5!. In a new English edition of his book, published in 1997, Timman tried to show that Black could save the game by 38... ²c6!. At the end of the variation suggested by him, 39 h5 gxh5 40 ²e4+! ²d5 41 ²xh7 b5 White has the winning manoeuvre 42 ²f5! followed by 43 ²c8, but Black’s last unfortunate move can be replaced by 41...b6!.

36 ... exf4?

Yet another confirmation of Petrosian’s opinion, that Mecking has an indifferent understanding of position. The conclusion of the game shows how such endings are won.

37 gxf4 ²g4
38 ²c3 ²f3
38... ²c5 39 b4+.

39 ²d4 ²g2

If White’s bishop were to end up on the h1–a8 diagonal, then, by playing e3–e4, he would attack the b7-pawn.

40 h4 ²f3
41 b4

Before embarking on decisive action, in accordance with the well-known endgame principle ‘do not hurry!’, White strengthens his position to the maximum, making all the useful moves.

However, the evaluation expressed in this last sentence is not in fact as obvious as it appears. Are White’s pawn moves really useful? After all, a zugzwang situation might arise, in which a reserve pawn move (b3–b4 or h2–h4) would prove most opportune. Polugayevsky had probably already seen how he would break through, and he knew that he would not require any reserve tempo to give his opponent the move.

41 ... ²h1
42 ²e2 ²g2
43 ²g4 ²e4
44 ²c8 ²c7
45 ²e6 ²d6
46 ²g8 h6
47 ²f7 h5

Forced.

48 ²e8 ²c2
49 ²f7 ²e4

50 f5!

This breakthrough cracks Black’s defences. If 50...gxf5 51 ²xh5, and the passed h-pawn decides matters.

50 ... ²xf5
51 ²xd5 ²c8
52 e4 ²e7
53 ²e5 g5
54 hxg5 h4
55 g6 h3
56 g7 h2
57 g8 f1
Let us think about the causes of Black’s failure. As regards the middlegame and the endgame – here everything is clear. We have already said enough about Mecking’s lack of understanding of a simple positional problem – on which squares he should keep his pawns.

But, after all, the roots of Black’s defeat were laid back in the opening or immediately on emerging from it, when he ended up in an inferior position. Why did this happen?

Mecking played timidly, and conceded the initiative to his opponent. He did not exploit the active possibilities that were available to him in the opening: 13...d4!, 15...g4! (and, incidentally, also in the endgame – 36...d4!). Possibly because he did not sense the strategic danger of his position. Perhaps Mecking thought that in a quiet situation it would be easier to defend against an experienced grandmaster. But this is radically incorrect. For an experienced grandmaster there is nothing better – give him a position in which he is not risking anything, and the only question is: will he win or not. Double-edged play, when there is a risk of losing, is far more unpleasant for him.

It cannot be said that White played the opening ideally. By not finding 15 c3!, he thereby allowed 15...g4!, sharply changing the character of the play. But otherwise Polugayevsky acted very sensibly. Passive tactics when playing the opening are unpromising. On the contrary, here the maximum accuracy and the maximum energy are required. After all, the outcome of the opening battle often determines the entire future pattern of the game. The main theme of our exercise was in fact the struggle for the initiative in the opening. You have had some training in the concrete solving of opening problems.

And now for the results of our competition. There was quite a compact group of leaders. The difference of one point between first place and those who shared 2nd-4th is not very significant. All the leaders performed excellently, and successfully coped with most of the exercises. But nevertheless the competition had a winner, and he was Maxim Boguslavsky, with 38 points.* Congratulations!

Second to fourth places were shared by Dragiev, Emelin and Georgiev, who each scored 37 points. On 35 points were Makariev and Zviagintsev. Makariev had a serious setback at the start, in the calculation of the 13...e5+ variation. And Vadim did not cope, when asked to comment on a series of moves, and he did not suggest 15...g4! – a very serious omission. This was his main loss, as he solved all the remaining exercises well. Volodya Baklan scored 33 points. Well, and the one who performed least successfully was Yan Teplitsky. See how dangerous it is to arrive at a competition at the last moment. After his journey he obviously did not have time to acclimatise.

* The author does not consider it necessary to give exact details of how the points were awarded. The main thing to note is that several pupils performed almost equally successfully (translator’s note).
PART II

Mark Dvoretsky

The Development of an Opening Repertoire

There are many different approaches to working on your opening repertoire. This is an individual matter, and every player has his own principles. But I hope that what I have to say will prove useful.

Which openings to include in your repertoire

Your choice of openings should be made primarily in accordance with your own tastes and style of play. This is a seemingly obvious principle, but nevertheless it is quite often violated.

When I was teaching in the Institute of Physical Culture, one of my students, a candidate master, who wasn’t having much success in tournaments, showed me his games. What surprised me was that, although he was a quiet and sensible lad, he played sharp openings: the Sicilian, King’s Indian... Why was this? It all turned out to be very simple. He had been studying in a group at the Moscow Pioneers Palace, the trainer of which was fascinated by the theory of fashionable opening variations. That is, the player’s choice of openings depended not on his own tastes, but on those of his trainer. I advised him to change his repertoire, and in particular to switch to 1 d4 with White. Soon the student’s results improved, since he began playing his own sort of chess.

This was an example involving a candidate master. But it seems to me that a quite similar mistake was made by grandmaster Mikhail Tal in his preparations for the World Championship Return Match with Mikhail Botvinnik. In the first match Tal had problems with White in the Caro-Kann Defence, although the score in this opening was nevertheless in his favour. In the Return Match he decided to ‘dumbfound’ Botvinnik with the then rare 3 e5 system. From the purely chess point of view it was perhaps not badly prepared, and Tal did indeed have some interesting ideas there. But he ended up with a minus score in this system: he won one game, but lost two, with several draws. The explanation was simple: Tal had a very good understanding of and a feeling for open positions with active piece play, whereas e4–e5 leads to strategic, closed positions. Botvinnik easily found his bearings in such play, whereas for Tal it was by no means his strongest side. He went in advance onto Botvinnik’s territory, where the latter felt more confident. And it was no longer so important how the opening had been prepared. One can obtain promising positions, but if you have a poor feeling for such play, mistakes are quite probable. And that is what happened: Tal often failed to exploit the advantages of his position.

This is a banal consideration, that the opening should be studied in accordance with your own tastes. There is another, slightly less banal consideration – your opening repertoire should be constructed in relation to your own memory. For players
with a brilliant memory (such as, for example, Victor Gavrikov or Yuri Balashov) it makes sense to include in their opening repertoire complicated modern opening systems, where there is a great deal of theory, you have to know an enormous number of games, and remember various subtleties. There are numerous such variations: for example, the ultra-sharp Najdorf Variation in the Sicilian Defence. In openings such as the Grünfeld Defence or the King's Indian Defence White has an enormous choice, and it is he who determines the opening set-up – whereas Black has to be prepared for everything. Only if you have a good memory can you play them with Black.

There is another factor, which it is useful for players with a good memory to exploit. They can permit themselves to vary their opening repertoire and employ different openings, since they are capable of mastering, remembering and subsequently choosing those openings which are the most uncomfortable for their opponent.

For players with a less good memory it is dangerous to embark on such a course. I know for myself what agonizing work it is to repeat ‘theory’ before a game. Everything is recorded in your notebooks, you have already looked through it ten times, and all the same you don’t remember it. It is better to aim for ‘opening schemes’ – logical systems with less theory, in which what is more important is an understanding of position and a knowledge of typical ideas and methods, rather than specific details or precise move orders.

Openings in general can be arbitrarily divided into ‘opening variations’ and ‘opening schemes’. Of course, this is a comparative division, since in the theory of any opening there are both exact, specific variations, and logical, systematic elements – it is merely a question of their correlation. Thus, with a good memory you can boldly adopt ‘opening variations’, but with an indifferent one you should aim for ‘opening schemes’.

An example of an ‘opening scheme’

In my time, when I was still a first category player, I became interested in the question of how to play with Black against the Closed Variation of the Sicilian Defence. We are sometimes troubled by strange problems! How to play against the normal Sicilian was something that, apparently, I knew.

At that time my trainer was Alexander Roshal, and it has to be said that he was a good trainer. At one training session he showed me a system of play against the Closed Variation of the Sicilian Defence, which appealed to me – it seemed logical. I saw that it was suitable not only in this opening, but also against a number of similar set-ups by White, such as the King’s Indian Attack; i.e. the given scheme was fairly flexible and universal. I also recommend it to you – you will not regret it.

I immediately began employing the new plan.

Gorodilov – Dvoretsky
Leningrad 1964
French Defence

\[
\begin{align*}
1 & \text{e}4 & \text{e}6 \\
2 & \text{\textbf{\textit{\#e2}}} & \text{c}5 \\
3 & \text{g}3 & \text{c}6 \\
4 & \text{f}3 & \text{g}6 \\
5 & \text{g}2 & \text{g}7 \\
6 & 0-0 & \text{ge7} \\
7 & \text{d}3 & 0-0
\end{align*}
\]

Black's plan is suitable for many eventualities, including against the Chigorin Variation of the French Defence.

After the game I learned that in such situations one has to reckon with the
The Development of an Opening Repertoire

position threat of e4–e5. A fine game played on this theme was Petrosian–Pachman (Bled 1961)*. Well, when you are only just beginning to employ a new system, there are many subtleties that you do not yet know. A deep understanding is developed by practice.

8 c3
d6
9 d1?

At that time I myself played this in similar positions: I retreated my knight, advanced my pawns by f2–f4 and g3–g4, and thought that I would soon give mate. Strictly speaking, I was also interested in how to parry such attacks as Black.

9 ... b8

The advance of the b-pawn is Black’s main plan. He creates counterplay on the queenside.

10 f4
b5
11 f3
b4
12 e3
bxc3
13 bxc3

I think that strategically the position is almost won. Not long ago the g7-bishop was running up against a securely defended white pawn, but after ...b7–b5–b4xc3 it is pressing on a weak, vulnerable pawn on c3. The other bishop has also occupied an excellent diagonal and is attacking the d3-pawn. Black controls the open b-file and he will intensify the pressure on the queenside by ...wa5. His well-devised scheme of development has allowed him quickly to develop an initiative on the queenside.

And what can White do? See how flexibly the black knights are placed. They are defending each other, and at the same time the knight on e7 is controlling the f5-square. Black must keep a careful look-out for f4–f5. If this breakthrough becomes a threat (for example, after g3–g4), he forestalls it by playing ...f7–f5. In so doing he retains control of all the central squares, and his position remains solid and flexible.

14 c2?

My opponent wants to develop his queen’s knight, but he runs into a tactical stroke typical of this set-up.

14 ... d4!
15 cxb4 xa1

There is no need to show any more of the game – Black is a sound exchange to the good and he won easily.

My first experience of employing this set-up proved successful. Things went equally well in this next game.

Turovsky – Dvoretsky
Moscow 1964
French Defence

1 e4
e6
2 d2
c5
3 f3
f6
4 g3
g6
5 g2
g7

*This game, as well as some others which will be mentioned, will be found in the appendix to the lecture.
You will see that on this occasion I already understand the position better and I do not allow e4–e5. Cicero once said ‘Everyone can make a mistake, but to persist in your delusions is merely senseless.’

Now the position is similar to a Closed Variation of the Sicilian Defence (the knight has come out to c3). But it is more comfortable for Black than in the Closed Variation, since there White does not usually block the f-pawn with his knight, and it is also not clear why he has played 1.d2 – he does not need this move.

Black’s plan is the same – to advance his b-pawn, lengthening the diagonal of his bishop on g7.

10.d2

Here there is an interesting problem, an important one for the entire variation. White probably wants to play h6. Black can preserve his strong bishop from exchange by 10...e8, and if 11.h6, then 11...h8. But another reaction is also possible: allow the exchange, rearrange the pawns on dark squares (...e6–e5, ...f7–f6), and play for the restriction of the opponent’s light-square bishop, which becomes ‘bad’. Both strategies are possible, and each time a concrete decision must be made as to which of them to follow.

Why is this move dubious? At that time I did not yet realise that Black has to reckon not only with 11.h6, but also 11.d4. After the opening of the d-file the d6-pawn becomes vulnerable. *Usually in such cases d3-d4 should be prevented by ...d4.*

11.d1?

White wants to occupy the centre by c2–c3 and d3-d4. This plan is too slow – it would make sense only if Black were unable to ‘latch on’ to the c3-pawn with his b-pawn.

Black’s pieces are far more harmoniously placed than the opponent’s. His bishops, as in the previous game, are raking the entire board, his rooks control the open b- and c-files, and the d4-pawn is weak. In the event of 17.xa5 xa5 the black knight goes to c4.

17.c3

18.c1

When you know a plan, you don’t even have to think long, as all the moves are natural. The play proceeds of its own accord: Black could have acted like this even in a blitz game.

20.xb8

21.b1

22.d1?

22.b5 really was better.
The gathering of the harvest begins. However, 22...\( \text{cxd3} \) was even stronger.

23 \( \text{wb4} \)
24 \( \text{wc3} \)
25 \( \text{xc1?!} \)
26 \( \text{xb4} \)
27 \( \text{d2} \)

White resigned, since he loses a second pawn.

In demonstrating these games, I have not delved into variations. Firstly, because my opponents were only first category players. Nuances and specific details are better studied in games by stronger players. And secondly, because we are examining not an 'opening variation', but an 'opening scheme'. In such cases what is more important to you is not a detailed variational analysis, but the pattern of the play, the plans of the two sides, and typical methods.

Such comparatively easy play succeeded not only in junior events. I also successfully employed this set-up later, against strong opponents.

**Bronstein – Dvoretsky**

Moscow 1976

_Sicilian Defence_

1 e4  
2 \( \text{c3} \)  
3 g3  
4 \( \text{g2} \)  
5 d3  
6 \( \text{e3} \)

But why not 6...\( \text{d4?!} \) This is what Arnold Denker played against Vasily Smyslov in the 1946 USSR-USA match. **Remember**: the d4-square should be occupied by the knight only after the white knight has appeared on f3 or e2. If 6...\( \text{d4?!} \) there follows 7 \( \text{ce2!} \) followed by c2–c3 and d3-d4. The variation 7...\( \text{xe2} \) 8 \( \text{xe2} \) \( \text{xb2} \) 9 \( \text{b1} \) is advantageous to White, since 9...\( \text{wa5+?} \) 10 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{xa2} \) 11 \( \text{xb2!} \) \( \text{xb2} \) 12 \( \text{c3} \) is bad for Black.

7 f4  
8 \( \text{f3} \)

Which do you think is more accurate, 8...0-0 or 8...\( \text{d4?!} \)? We have already mentioned that Black has to reckon with d3-d4. It is not always dangerous, but it seemed to me that it was better to prevent it. Now I am not so sure: after 8...0-0 9 d4 there is 9...\( \text{b6} \) or 9...cxd4 10 \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{b6} \). The same reaction follows after 9 0-0 \( \text{b8} \) 10 d4. On the other hand, when the knight is on c6, the pawn sacrifice 10 e5!? (which is not bad with the knight on d4) loses its strength.

8 ...  
9 0-0

One of the basic positions of the Closed Sicilian has been reached. White has several continuations: 10 \( \text{d2} \), 10 \( \text{f2} \), 10 \( \text{b1} \) and the afore-mentioned pawn sacrifice 10 e5. It is precisely here that general considerations are insufficient – one cannot get by without a familiarity with the specific theory of the variation. But if you desire you can carry out this work yourself, whereas here we have other objectives.

10 g4

What should Black play? It is very dangerous to allow White to break up the black king's pawn screen with the pawn sacrifice f4–f5. As we have already said, the standard reaction to this threat is the counter ...f7–f5.

10 ...  
11 f5!

_(see diagram)_

But with what should Black recapture on f5? For such positions there is a 'rule of thumb': capture with the opposite pawn to the opponent. If g4xf5 reply ...e6xf5, and if e4xf5, then ...g6xf5. I don't know how to
The Development of an Opening Repertoire

- position after 10...f5 -

explain this logically, but my experience of playing this set-up suggests that usually that is the way things are.

11 gxf5  
12 wD2

The standard ...Db8 and ...b7–b5–b4 is now rather slow. Black must complete his development and actively fight for the centre. Where is his light-square bishop best placed? Often in such cases it is developed at e6 (after first playing ...dh8, so as not to have to fear dg5). But I decided to place my bishop on c6, in order to oppose the white bishop on the long diagonal.

12... Dd7  
13 Wf2
White finally dislodges the knight from d4.

13... Dxf3+  
14 Dxf3  
Dc6
I want to prepare (by playing ...b7–b6, and perhaps ...Wd7) the advance ...d6–d5, after which Black wins the battle for the centre.

15 g2  
16 Dd1  
WC7
Black intends ...Wb7, ...Dd8 and ...d6–d5.

17 De2
Of course, the b2-pawn cannot be taken – White replies c2–c3 and then begins trapping the bishop. Now, after defending the b2-pawn, he wants to play c2–c4. I guessed that this was his plan and I prepared an antidote.

17... Dae8
17...Dad8, preparing ...d6–d5, was also good.

18 Da1  
Wb7
Black's position is preferable: his pieces are exerting unpleasant pressure on the opponent's centre.

19 c4?!  
Positionally this move is justified: it prevents ...d6–d5 and prepares the manoeuvre of the knight via c3 to d5. However, in carrying out his plan, Bronstein underestimated the flank diversion I had prepared. Evidently he should have chosen 19 Dg3, when Black would have replied 19...d5 20 e5 d4 with somewhat the better chances.

19... Wd6!
I have a special term for such moves: 'strategic double attack'. The capture on a2 is threatened, but in addition Black wants to exchange pawns in the centre. If the opponent recaptures on e4 with a piece, my knight will obtain the colossal f5-point. And if he recaptures with the pawn, I will pick up the c4-pawn.

20 De3  
fxe4
21 dxe4

21 dxe4 was nevertheless better. In my opponent’s place I would have begrudged giving up the pawn.

\[ 21 \ldots \text{d}4^+ \]
\[ 22 \text{h}1 \text{xc}4 \]
\[ 23 \text{fe}1?! \text{h}8 \]
\[ 24 \text{e}2 \text{g}7 \]
\[ 25 \text{b}3 \text{a}6 \]
\[ 26 \text{g}3 \text{b}7 \]

Black has again set up a battery along the long diagonal, which he had a few moves ago. After the natural move 27 \text{xd}6 he had prepared the counter 27...\text{f}5! (28 \text{xc}6 \text{h}4!).

27 \text{g}1?

White should have supported his bishop: 27 \text{f}1. Now I am able to force events to my advantage.

\[ 27 \ldots \text{f}5! \]
\[ 28 \text{xf}5 \text{xf}5 \]

28...gxf5 29 \text{b}2 \text{f}7 was also good.

\[ 29 \text{xd}6 \text{xe}4 \]
\[ 30 \text{xe}4 \text{xe}4 \]
\[ 31 \text{xe}4 \text{d}8^+ \]
\[ 32 \text{xf}8 \text{xf}8 \]
\[ 33 \text{f}5 \text{g}7! \]
\[ 34 \text{fxg}6 \text{d}4 \]
\[ 35 \text{g}7^+ \text{g}8 \]
\[ 37 \text{f}1 \text{e}1^+ \]

Black has a decisive advantage.

We will return again to this type of position, but for the moment we will continue our discussion about the development of an opening repertoire.

Some remarks on the technique of working on the opening

The most unsuccessful method, which I know that many of you employ, is to copy opening information into a notebook. One can’t think of anything worse! You fill up the pages of the notebook with games and variations, then new games, fresh ideas and additional variations appear, and it is not clear where you should put them. Some pages turn out to be unsuccessful, and have to be altered or even discarded, and in a notebook you can’t insert new pages. Gradually you develop almost an aversion to your opening notebook, as you sense how out of date it is, and how awkward it is to record novelties in it.

\textbf{All information, and opening information in particular, should be recorded in a card index.} These can be either small cards, or large sheets. If necessary, you write a new sheet, add it to any other, or discard a sheet that is no longer appropriate; i.e. you can do what you want with them. Yusupov, Dolmatov – all the players who have worked with me, have a set of folders with opening analyses, devoted to different openings and even individual variations.

And another piece of advice: leave large margins – there will almost certainly be things to add. Where you feel that something new will appear, leave space. Write only on one side of a sheet.

Of course, today such a method of working has become out of date. It is clearly far more convenient to maintain your card index on a computer. There it is always as though brand-new: you can easily adjust, amplify or correct things, and there is a system of opening keys, with the help of which everything can be neatly arranged. The computer processing of opening information is a topic demanding a special discussion; here we will not dwell on this question.
‘Your own theory’
Let us suppose that you have successfully chosen your openings, and your index is maintained irreproachably: in it are both the latest games, and extracts from opening articles. You understand everything perfectly well and you remember it. ‘An opening advantage is guaranteed’, you think and... you will be wrong. Because to achieve great successes it is not enough to know ‘official’ theory. It is essential (as Botvinnik commented in this time) to have ‘your own theory of the openings’.

It is very important to introduce into your repertoire some opening schemes or variations where your views differ from the theoretical ones, even if only very slightly. This may be a novelty, as a result of which an entire variation is reassessed or a scheme, which was considered bad, is rehabilitated. Or it may be the non-traditional assessment of a known position. Let us suppose that the position is considered not too favourable, but it appeals to you. You work out a plan and reckon that this position, which has a dubious reputation, is one that you can go in for.

In general, you should have something special of your own, your own systems, for which you have a feeling and have analysed. For a player who knows only that which has already been played, it is hard to count on success. Against an experienced opponent he will never gain an advantage: the latter also knows everything. But thanks to ‘your own theory’ you may be able to outplay the opponent in the opening, put him in an uncomfortable position, or lure him onto ground where he will not understand around what the struggle revolves.

How to expand your opening repertoire
It rarely happens that a player scratches his head, and then decides: ‘Shouldn’t I be studying, say, the Nimzo-Indian Defence?’ He picks up the Encyclopaedia and studies it. This happens, but not often. Usually the introduction into the repertoire of a new scheme or variation is preceded by some impulse. For many young players this is the help of a trainer. He says: ‘I have some good analysis of a certain opening system; I will show it to you and you will beat everyone.’ This often proves useful. Only, don’t become accustomed to working in this way. After all, sooner or later the trainer’s supply of ideas will dry up, and you yourself will reach a level where no trainer can help you any more. Then you yourself have to devise things. But for the time being a trainer’s help is indeed your ‘magic wand’.

After Valery Chekhov won the qualifying tournament for the 1975 Junior World Championship, it transpired that those openings which he had employed earlier were not suitable for the world championship. There was no active opening for Black, and with White he played all kinds of rubbish, although before coming to me he had studied in the Pioneers Palace with an openings trainer.

Realising where our weak points were, and what problems needed to be solved, I invited grandmaster Evgeny Sveshnikov to a training session. The range of openings which he was able to show is well known — he has been playing them all his life. For Black — the Chelyabinsk Variation, and for White — the Sicilian with 2 c3. This was just what we needed: to obtain a system with White in the Sicilian and an active system with Black against 1 e4. At that time the theory of the Chelyabinsk Variation was not yet developed, and it was constantly employed only by Sveshnikov and Gennady Timoshchenko. Sveshnikov helped us to master these two openings and at the world championship Chekhov successfully employed them. They became part of his repertoire.
Moreover, I also used the notes made at the training session for myself, and I expanded my repertoire. Later I showed the Chelyabinsk Variation to Artur Yusupov and Sergey Dolmatov, and for a time they also played it. So that a few hours of study with Sveshnikov helped for a time to form the opening repertoire of a whole group of players.

Another example was Dolmatov's preparation for the 1978 World Junior Championship. At that time a similar situation arose: Sergey did not have a serious variation with White against the Sicilian. I myself could not help him, since I did not play anything worthwhile, and at the first convenient opportunity I used to play h5. To a training session before the world championship we invited grandmaster Vladimir Tukmakov, an expert on the Sicilian Defence for Black. For such a specialist, showing the main ideas for White was not such a difficult task. The consultation with Tukmakov proved exceptionally useful for Dolmatov. At the world championship he played normal lines against the Sicilian, successfully combating the Scheveningen Variation, and since then throughout his career he has successfully played the main variations of the Sicilian Defence with White.

Information often reaches us by accident. Once, when I was still a university student, I called in at a lecture by grandmaster Yuri Razuvaev about the Exchange Variation of the Ruy Lopez. He showed some recent games by Robert Fischer, and explained the main ideas. I so liked this 90-minute lecture that, after also looking at the Exchange Variation myself, I later won several good games with it.

Thus a suggestion by a trainer or expert may prove very useful, and provide the impetus for including an opening in your repertoire. And it is understandable why: when you begin studying an opening, you are faced with an enormous body of material, a large number of games, and several pages of minute text in the Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings. You don’t know what you especially need, which systems are the main ones, and which are secondary. You see the variations, but you don’t understand what stands behind them. But if a trainer explains the main ideas and assists you in making a choice, this, of course, is a serious help.

Generally speaking, you can also expect help not only from a trainer. It is very productive to work as a pair, with one of your friends. Each of you has his ideas and his opening researches, and it is useful to exchange them and analyse them together. The drawbacks in such cases are always less than the benefits. Of course, you will no longer be able to play an opening variation against a colleague, which whom you have studied it together; and if he is the first to employ a novelty, you will no longer be able to make use of its surprise effect – these are the minuses. But at the same time, firstly, you will obtain information which previously you did not have; secondly, your opening variations will be better developed. In the end you are competing not with your colleague, but with the remaining players in the world. You will be disarmed against your friend, but better armed against all remaining players, and this is more important. Here the many years' work of Yusupov and Dolmatov is a very notable example. Many variations were developed in their joint analyses. Yusupov borrowed some ideas from Dolmatov, and vice versa; as a result they both improved their opening repertoires.

Thus a second way of expanding your opening repertoire is to exchange information with a colleague.

A third source is the analysis of games. It is in this way that strong players find for
themselves the most important ideas. At the first session of our school, Yusupov showed a game of his with Anatoly Karpov, and described how the Open Variation of the Ruy Lopez appeared in his repertoire. I should remind you: he analysed the Karpov–Savon game (1971) and found an improvement for Black. The novelty provided the impetus for a study of the Open Variation in general.

There is another way of improving: choose for yourself a chess leader, whose ideas and style of play you like. The opening repertoire of this player can be copied, by studying the systems employed by your idol.

**Working with literature**

Chess literature is a very important source of new information. You should be constantly looking through magazines, chess books and *Informator*. You never know where you will run across an idea which will later come in useful. Even in old publications.

Here is an example: many years ago I studied a games collection of Rashid Nezhmetdinov. This was a remarkable book: very vivid games, and wonderful combinative play. There I noticed a combination which Nezhmetdinov had carried out in a simultaneous display against an amateur. It appealed to me, and I included it in my card index of exercises.

A few years passed. Something interested me in the Grünfeld Defence, and I opened the *Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings*. And suddenly I discovered that the opening variation from Nezhmetdinov’s game, in which he found a forced win with White, had a diametrically opposite evaluation in the *Encyclopaedia* — in favour of Black. I immediately realised that this was a trap, in which it would be possible to catch some zealous reader of opening books.

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**Nezhmetdinov – N.N.**

*Kazan 1951*

**Grünfeld Defence**

1 d4 d6
2 c4 g6
3 d3 c3 d5
4 cxd5 xd5
5 e4 c5
6 bxc3 c5
7 b5+ c6?!

This move was recommended in the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia* (in the second edition the mistake was corrected, and the main move for Black became 7...d7).

8 d5 a5

Apart from this stroke, 8...a6 must also be considered. Now a forcing exchange of blows begins.

9 a4!

What should Black do? Nezhmetdinov has defended his bishop, and after the exchange on a4 Black loses a piece.

9 ... x3+
10 e2 d7

10...xa1 11 dxc6 is completely bad for Black. In the event of 10...g7 11 dxc6 0-0 12 b1, in my view, he gains insufficient compensation for the sacrificed (or lost?) piece.

11 dxc6 bxc6
12 xxc6 d8
In the *Encyclopaedia* this position is evaluated in favour of Black. The white rook is hanging. Do you see what happens after the natural move 13 $\texttt{b}1$? Quite correct: 13...$\texttt{wd}3++! 14 $\texttt{x}d3 \texttt{xc}6+$, and Black wins a pawn. This happened in a game Isakov–Nikitin (1947).

You suggest 13 $\texttt{f}3$. An interesting move. It is not considered in the *Encyclopaedia*, so let’s have a look at it. What happens after the capture of the rook? 13...$\texttt{xa}1$ 14 $\texttt{d}1$, or more accurately 14 $\texttt{xd}7+ \texttt{xd}7$ 15 $\texttt{d}1$. Excellent – White develops and prevents the capture of the rook. What can Black play? Probably again 13...$\texttt{d}3+$. But now the capture of the queen is not obligatory. After 14 $\texttt{e}1$ $\texttt{c}3+$ White can repeat moves – already not bad – but he can also play for a win: 15 $\texttt{d}2$ $\texttt{xa}1+$ 16 $\texttt{e}2$. It is probable that the rook cannot be taken, since there follows 17 $\texttt{e}5$. This means 16...$\texttt{b}2$, guarding the e5-square. And White, we assume, will play 17 $\texttt{d}1$ or 17 $\texttt{c}1$. Does he have sufficient attack for the sacrificed exchange? It is interesting to give some thought to this position.

But before delving into a complicated analysis, you should always ask yourself: “Did I not miss something earlier, at the very start of my calculations?” It is stupid to study lengthy variations, which in fact are not obligatory. And thus here after 13...$\texttt{wd}3+$ 14 $\texttt{e}1$ Black has the excellent reply 14...$\texttt{g}7+$, which simply refutes 13 $\texttt{f}3$.

I suggest that you try to find for yourself the solution to the problem: **how did Nezhmetdinov win the game?**

I showed this opening variation to Yusupov and Dolmatov. It was of more interest to Yusupov, since he constantly plays 1 d4, whereas Dolmatov plays it only occasionally. Thus we have an opening trap. Can it be used? First two questions must be answered.

The first: what if Black chooses a different move order, and plays not 6...c5, but 6...$\texttt{g}7$? Then one either has to prepare for the main variations of the Grunfeld Defence, or find a way of avoiding them. We began analysing 7 $\texttt{a}3$. Theory considers this move, and later Dolmatov won an excellent game against Vladimir Bagirov. Nevertheless, there is something ‘non-Grunfeld’ about the bishop on a3. In the end we realised that in this way it is hard to count on an opening advantage. This means that one cannot get by without a mastery of the ‘normal’ Grunfeld.

The second question: what happens if after 6...c5 7 $\texttt{b}5+$ Black avoids 7...$\texttt{c}6$?

According to theory, 7...$\texttt{d}7$ promises White the better chances after 8 $\texttt{f}3$. After all, what is one of the problems for White in this variation? Black attacks the central d4-pawn with his c5-pawn, his bishop and his knight on c6. White defends it with his bishop and knight. In principle it is advantageous for him to develop his knight on f3, but he has to reckon with the pin $\texttt{g}4$. Therefore White usually places his knight on e2, or if on f3, then after first making the not very necessary move $\texttt{b}1$, in order to remove the rook from the a1–h8 diagonal. But after 7 $\texttt{b}5+$ $\texttt{d}7$ 8 $\texttt{f}3$ White does not have to worry about his centre – the opponent has neither the pin $\texttt{g}4$, nor the development of his knight on c6.

The most natural move is 7...$\texttt{d}7$. After 8 $\texttt{xd}7+ \texttt{xd}7$ 9 $\texttt{f}3$ White has achieved something: he does not have to fear the pin on his knight and he succeeds in securely defending his centre. But does he have anything real? On the basis of some old game, theory gave equality. We began studying the resulting positions and found some ideas for White, and it even appeared that he could hope for an advantage. Then we came across an article in a foreign magazine, where it was shown that with accurate play Black could nevertheless
equalise. We were unable to refute this conclusion, and so in the end we lost interest in the idea of the trap.

Even so, at the 1981 Student Team Championship in Graz, Yusupov managed to lure one opponent into the prepared variation, and he won against Robert Morenz exactly as in the Nezhmetdinov game. So that the study of this old book brought some fruit, even if only slight.

More often, of course, novelties are to be found in more recent games and articles. I will tell the story of one successful discovery.

For the 1984 World Junior Championship Alyosha Dreev and I prepared in Estonia at a joint training session with another participant in the tournament, Lembit Oll. International master Ivo Nei, Oll’s trainer, brought to the session a whole suitcase-full of chess literature, including many foreign magazines. I had not seen them before and in my spare time I began looking through them. In a Bulgarian magazine I came across an article devoted to one of the lines of the Carlsbad Variation in the Queen’s Gambit. (It is probably more correct to call this the Exchange Variation, as prescribed in official theory, but the resulting pawn structure is usually called the ‘Carlsbad’, and I am accustomed to using this name for the entire system).

One of the possible continuations (nowadays 11 h3 is more popular), and a very old one. It was first played by Frank Marshall against Akiba Rubinstein at the Moscow International Tournament of 1925. Theory considers that this variation leads to equality.

11 ...  
12 axb7 e4  
13 axb7 dxe4  
14 d2 f5  
15 f3 exf3  
16 axf3 e6  
17 e4 fxe4  
18 axb7

This move is stronger than 18 axb7 f5.

18 ...  
19 ef1

In the afore-mentioned game Marshall won quickly by 19 ef5 h6 20 ef4 wb4?! 21 a3! wc4 22 ef2 axf7? (22...b6!) 23 b3! xxb3 24 axf2 wa2 25 ef3. However, Black could have defended better: 20...wc7!? (with the threat of 21...xd4) or 20...ed5.

19 ...  

In the afore-mentioned game Marshall won quickly by 19 axf5 h6 20 axf4 wb4?! 21 a3! wc4 22 ef2 axf7? (22...b6!) 23 b3! xxb3 24 axf2 wa2 25 ef3. However, Black could have defended better: 20...wc7!? (with the threat of 21...xd4) or 20...ed5.

19 ...  

The game Tal-Vaganian (Moscow 1975) subsequently developed as follows: 20 ed5 ef7 21 ef4 ed6? 22 ef3 ef7 23 ef5, and Black has no time to defend his a7-pawn in view of the terrible threat of 24 ed5 axd5.
25 \( \text{nxe5}\). But this game too does not demonstrate any advantage for White – by playing for simplification by 21...\( \text{d7}! \) Black could have hoped to equalise.

The author of the article suggested an interesting set-up for White:

\[ 20 \text{h1e3!?} \text{ wff7} \]
\[ 21 \text{we2} \]

White concentrates his forces closer to the kingside. If necessary, he can avoid exchanges on the e-file by occupying the e5-point with his knight and can then switch his rooks to the neighbouring files on the kingside.

This idea seemed promising to me, from the purely chess and from the practical point of view. After all, it is not possible to keep track of every periodical; an article in a Bulgarian magazine would be known in Bulgaria, but in other countries it might not be noticed. This meant we would have ideas with which our opponents were unfamiliar.

However, this variation was of little use to Dreev, since at that time he only played 1 \( e4 \). I simply transcribed the analysis, realising that sooner or later it would come in useful.

When Yusupov and I were preparing for the 1985 Candidates Tournament I suggested to Artur that we should investigate this system. I showed him the variations given in the article, and it appealed to him. First we analysed the resulting positions, and then we played a training match with a time control of 15 minutes each per game.

Incidentally, to consolidate opening information which is being studied, I strongly recommend you to play games with a shortened time control (of course, after preparatory analysis and with additional analysis after the games). They do not take much time, but in the opening, even if a player has done preparatory work on it, new problems are usually discovered. In the opinion of Yusupov, you should play in turn for both sides, which aids a more objective view of the position.

In our series of games a mass of novelties was generated, and we gained a far better feeling for the opening than before the training. Yusupov included the Carlsbad Variation for White in his opening repertoire. At the Candidates Tournament he won a fighting game against Boris Spassky and crushed Jesus Nogueiras, and later too he successfully employed this system.

It stands to reason that Yusupov's successes were not a result of some particular strength of the given variation. On the contrary, we came to the conclusion (which was not hard to predict beforehand) that, as in any sound opening, with accurate play Black can equalise. Simply we were somewhat ahead of our opponents, we understood the positions more deeply, and we had in reserve some ideas which were unfamiliar to them.

Since Artur plays the Queen's Gambit not only with White, our analyses also came in useful for reinforcing his defence with Black. In particular, in the 8th game of his Candidates Match against Jan Timman, when the opponent, playing White, desperately needed to win, Yusupov employed the novelty 18...\( h6!? \) (instead 18...\( \text{ad8} \)) prepared at our training session, and easily equalised.

\[ \text{With White, as with Black} \]

We have spoken briefly about the basic principles of building up your opening repertoire. Now I will dwell in more detail on one specific method. It is appropriate for those who in the opening do not aim with White for the maximum, for a definite advantage, but seek their 'own game', their type of position.

Sometimes with White is makes sense to employ a system which you like for Black; i.e. with White you play like Black with an extra tempo.
Soon after I included in my repertoire a successful method of play against the Closed Variation of the Sicilian Defence, with which I won the majority of my games, the idea naturally occurred to me of employing the same set-up with White. What was needed for this? Obviously to begin playing the English Opening. Of course, in this Black has many different systems, for which one has to be prepared. But if he aims for a King’s Indian set-up, there is a chance of catching the opponent in the favourite scheme.

Grandmaster Razuvaev once told me about a specific method, which he employs in his (very productive) work on opening theory. He looks for the most important, representative examples of the opening in question. A game in which both players (or at least one of them) acts logically and consistently; where valuable ideas and typical methods occur. Such games help one to understand the opening set-up more deeply and to remember it more easily.

The game which I will now show you may serve as a key example for the system which we are currently discussing.

**Dvoretsky – Timoshchenko**

USSR Team Championship, Moscow 1966

*English Opening*

1 e4 e5
2 Nc3 c6
3 g3 g6
4 Bg2 Bg7

Black is playing the Closed Variation of the Sicilian with reversed colours.

5 e3 Bb4

An interesting moment. I consider this move to be rather weak: in this variation the knight is best placed at f6 or even h6. The basis of this evaluation is purely tactical and not at all obvious. You will see it within a few moves.

6 Bge2 0-0

7 0-0 d6
8 d3 Be6

How to reply, do you remember?

9 Bd5!

Of course, ...d6–d5 must be prevented.

9 ... Bd7
10 Bb1

I can now explain why the knight is worse placed at e7 than at f6 or h6. Here Black cannot play 10... Bh3, because after the exchange I will capture the c7-pawn. With the knight on f6 or h6, 10... Bh3 is possible, since after the exchange on h3 White cannot capture the c7-pawn because of ... Bg4 with mate. A little tactical detail, which is very significant. If Black were free to exchange the light-square bishops, he would not stand badly. Incidentally, the position with the knight on f6 is examined in my article ‘The superfluous piece’ in the book Secrets of Chess Training.

10 ... Bd8

The game Dvoretsky–Veselovsky (Moscow 1967) went 10... a5 11 a3 Ba8? (the queenside should not have been abandoned to its fate) 12 b4 axb4 13 axb4 Bd8 14 b5 c6 15 bxc6 Bxc6 16 Bxe7+ Bxe7.

A little exercise for you to solve yourself: what is White’s most exact course of action?
11 b4 \(\text{\textit{\&}xd5\textit{\&}}\)

If 11...c6 there follows 12 \(\text{\textit{\&}xe7+\textit{\&}}xe7\) 13 b5. After the exchange of pawns on c6 the bishop comes out to a3, the queen to a4, and so on – White has an easy, pleasant game. The move made by Black leads to a closed type of game.

12 cxd5 \(\textit{\&}h3\)

What should White play in such cases?

13 e4!

The standard plan: after the light-square bishops have been exchanged, the pawns are moved onto light squares.

13 ... \(\textit{\&}xg2\)

14 \(\textit{\&}xg2\) f5

15 f3

I think that White’s position is preferable. He has more space, and the black bishop is running up against its own pawns. If Black undermines the centre with ...c7–c6, there follows \(\textit{\&}c3\). At some point subsequently White exchanges on c6, and in the event of ...b7xc6 he advances b4–b5, obtaining the central d5-point for his knight. Black in turn will acquire the possibility of placing his knight on d4, but these points are not equivalent. The knight at d4 is attacked by the white bishop, whereas Black is unable to exchange his bishop for the white knight. Here it is, the advantage of a ‘good’ bishop over a ‘bad’ one.

My next move is one that, to be honest, I am proud of. At that time I had only just become a master, but the move, in my opinion, is one worthy of a grandmaster. It was found in a purely logical way, and we will now follow this logic.

What does Black want? It is always useful to ask yourself this question. Most probably, to exchange his bad bishop: 16...\(\textit{\&}h6\).

Should I agree to the exchange? If the bishop is moved to b2 or g1, the black bishop will take control of the c1-square and it will be hard for me to put into effect my natural plan – pressure on the backward c-pawn with the heavy pieces along the c-file. In addition, the black knight will obtain the excellent square g5 in the vicinity of my king.

It is very dangerous to ‘stick to your principles’ and reason routinely: since the opponent’s bishop is ‘bad’, it means that it should not be exchanged. But for any rule there are numerous exceptions. After some thought I decided: there was nothing to be done, I would have to exchange.

But on which square? I can allow him to capture on c1, when I occupy the c-file with gain of tempo. I can capture on h6 – there the black knight will be badly placed. The second option seemed more reliable.

But how should I arrange my pieces on the c-file? The most natural set-up is the queen on c2, the rook from f1 to c1, and the b1-rook can go to c3. This means we have a choice between 16 \(\textit{\&}c2\) and 16 \(\textit{\&}b3\). The rook move is apparently more accurate. After the exchange on h6, the fork \(\textit{\&}c1\) may be a possibility – with a simultaneous attack on c7 and h6.

This last consideration fully justified itself (true, in a slightly different form) in a game which I played two years later against national master Anatoly Kremenetsky (35th USSR Championship, Kharkov 1968). After 16 \(\textit{\&}b3\) he did not reply 16...\(\textit{\&}h6\), but 16...h6. I acted in accordance with my plan:
The Development of an Opening Repertoire

17...c3, and after 17...g5? 18 xg5 hxg5 19 c1!! two black pawns – c7 and g5 – were under attack.

What should I play?

The natural plan is c2 and c1. Black defends his pawn with ...c8. What to do next? Obviously, advance the queenside pawns. However, in this case a well-known positional principle applies: **before attacking, you should create a target to `latch on' to.**

19 c1!

Forced – Black has to free his rook. But now the a6-pawn makes it easier for White to open lines on the queenside. He plays a2–a4, b4–b5 and after ...a6xb5 he recaptures on b5 with his queen.

21 fc1

22 c3

The more aggressive move 22 a5 came into consideration.

What should Black do now? He has a terrible knight on h6. His natural strategy is to switch it to better squares: ...g8–f6, and if the c7-pawn requires more reliable defence, then ...e8.

There is also another tempting idea: to play 22...b5 and then 23...b6, from where the queen can embarrass White with the threat of an invasion on e3 or f2.

With correct defence I think that Black would have had an inferior but tenable position. However, my opponent chose a faulty plan.

22...

Timoshchenko mounts an attack on the king, or more correctly, he thinks that he does. The standard reaction to flank activity by the opponent is a counterblow in the centre. But if 23 d4? there follows 23...fxe4, then ...g4 or ...g4 and ...c8 – and all the black pieces join the attack. This means that for the moment the routine recommendation is inapplicable.

What does the opponent want? Does he intend to play 23...g4? But then White has the excellent reply 24 f4!. On g4 the pawn takes away this square from the queen and the knight.

Now let us consider 23...f4. The reply 24 g4? is not possible in view of 24...xg4. What is the drawback to Black’s move? It removes the attack on the e4-pawn and I can finally strike at the enemy centre: 24 d4!, simultaneously including my rook and queen in the defence of the kingside.

It follows that at the moment I have nothing to fear – replies are prepared against each of the opponent’s attacking moves. This means that I can coolly make a useful move on the queenside. A good example of clear, logical reasoning, based on `prophylactic thinking'.

23 a4!

24 d4!

All according to the rules: against a flank attack – a counterblow in the centre, and a timely one. Black has two attacking possibilities: he can play ...g5–g4 either immediately, or first exchange on g3. But after
24...fxg3 25 hxg3 g4 there is the very strong reply 26 f4!.

24 ... g4
25 dxe5 dxe5

How should White proceed further? I saw that there was an excellent square at e6 for the white knight.

26 gxf4!
27 h2d4 h8
28 h2e6
29 h2b2!

A methodical move. Try more often to pay attention to such 'trifles'. I force the opponent to place his king on g8, after which I don't have to fear any counterplay on the g-file. Probably I would also have won without this, but it is always useful first to restrict the opponent's possibilities.

29 ... h8
30 b5!

The triumph of White's opening plan – his offensive on the queenside.

30 ... axb5
31 axb5 gx3+ 32 xf3 f5

In desperate situations a player often resorts to 'kamikaze' tactics. Such final bursts of activity by the opponent should be treated very seriously, so as not to allow him any counter-chances. The knight can be taken, of course, but why allow even the slightest sharpening of the play?

33 g1+ g7
34 bxc6 bxc6
35 c2!

The game is won with quiet moves. Black cannot take on d5, and 36 cg2 is threatened.

35 ... e8
36 xg7+
36 ... xc6 was also strong.

36 ... xg7
37 xg7+ xg7
38 xg7 cxd5?

Of course, 38 ... xg7 was also completely hopeless.

39 xe8

Black resigned.

Take note: I showed some of the previous games from my notebook, but I remember the game with Timoshchenko without a crib, even though it was played a quarter of a century ago! Why? Because at one time I did some serious work on it, I thought about the meaning of every move, and this game became for me a defining, fundamental one in the given variation.

From the King's Indian Defence to the King's Indian Attack

Inveterate King's Indian players sometimes try to obtain their customary positions with reversed colours and an extra tempo. One would imagine that it is not so difficult, knowing the ideas of an opening, to make advantageous use of the extra tempo. In fact, easy problems do not exist in chess and an extra tempo does not always prove to be a blessing. Why? Engraved on my
memory are the comments by Mikhail Tal on an absolutely symmetric position in the English Opening, which he reached in the first game of his 1965 Candidates Match with Lajos Portisch:

Of course, in this symmetric position it is ridiculous to talk about any advantage for Black, but the fact that it is easier for him to play is the hundred per cent truth. In fact, as long as the opponent’s moves seem to him to be the strongest, without a twinge of conscience he repeats them, awaiting a convenient moment to ‘deviate’, whereas White is forced to act independently.

It is similar with the exploitation of an extra tempo in positions with reversed colours – the whole problem is the need to act independently. I will now show you a dismal example on this theme from my own experience. To make it easier to understand, first I will briefly acquaint you with a variation of the King’s Indian Defence, which I used to employ with Black and the ideas of which I unsuccessfully tried to use, when I obtained the same position with White.

1 d4 lL’lf6 2 c4 g6 3 lL’lc3 3i.g7 4 e4 d6 5 lL’lf3 0-0 6 i.e2 e5 7 d5 lL’bd7 8 0-0 lbcs 9 ‘iic2 aS. The main continuation here is 1 0 i.g5 h6 11 3i.e3. The move 10 lL’ld2 went out of use because of Yefim Geller’s reply 10 ... i.h 6!, the aim of which is to exchange Black’s ‘bad’ bishop.

After 11 ®b3 ®xc1 12 ®axc1 ®fd7 or 12 ®xc5 ®h6 followed by ...®d7 and ...f7–f5 Black stands quite well. Mikhail Mukhin played 11 b3 against me; I replied 11...®e8, advanced ...f7–f5, and won in good style.

Having received a little bit of information about the King’s Indian Defence, now take a look at the following game.

Dvoretsky – Alburt
USSR Championship, First League, Odessa 1974
King’s Indian Attack
1 ®f3 ®f6
2 g3 c5
3 ®g2 ®c6
4 0-0 d5
5 d3 e5
6 ®bd2 ®e7
7 e4 d4
8 ®c4 ®d7
9 a4 0-0
10 ®h3

It stands to reason that I make use of Geller’s idea. When you play an opening with reversed colours, you have to know the ideas of the source opening.

10 ... ®c7

As you can see, the position is exactly the
same. I have an extra tempo. For what should I use it? I decided to prepare f2–f4 by 11  e1. But, although it may seem paradoxical, this move did not improve, but worsened my position. I was probably let down by an analogy with the game against Mukhin, but to a greater extent by my unwillingness to think, to delve into the specific details of the position.

But what should I have done? 11  fd2 is tempting. If the opponent replies 11...  b6, then White's move is certainly justified. He has to reckon with 11...  g5 (with the same idea as the move 10  h3 - the exchange of the ‘bad’ bishop). What then should White play, do you see? I think that the only correct reply is the gambit 12 f4! exf4 13  f3  h6 14  h4!. I would not recommend you to go in for such a position with Black. See what fascinating possibilities are revealed in a situation, which just now appeared perfectly understood and uninteresting!

The positional threat of f2–f4 should most probably be met by a typical blockading operation: 11...g6!? 12 f4 exf4 13  f3  h6 14  h4!. I would not recommend you to go in for such a position with Black. See what fascinating possibilities are revealed in a situation, which just now appeared perfectly understood and uninteresting!

But what should I have done? 11  fd2? 12  xc8  xc8!

11  e1?  b6
12  xc8  xc8!

This would not have been possible with the knight on f3. When Black played this, I became anxious. There is now the positional threat of ...f7–f5. For example, 13 b3  xc4 14 bxc4 f5 15 exf5  xf5. White's pieces are ridiculously placed, and his knight will never get from e1 to e4. At some point Black intends to play ...e5–e4, perhaps after first bringing up his pieces and placing his knight on b4.

13  xb6  axb6

Threatening 14xb5.

14  d2  f5
15 exf5  xf5
16 f3

Now Black would have gained the advantage by 16...  h3!, when 17  e2 b5 is unfavourable for White, while if 17  g2, then 17...  f5, intending 18...  h5, is strong. White's position is falling apart, both on the queenside, and on the kingside.

But here I was lucky – my opponent quite unnecessarily went in for complications.

16... c4?!
17  e2  c5
18  g2  c3!
19  ae8 19 dxc4 e4 is not dangerous in view of 20 fxe4  xe4 21  d3.
19 bxc3  b5
20 a5

Here Lev Alburt offered a draw, and I, displaying optimism unwarranted by the position, declined. But after a tense struggle the game nevertheless came to a peaceful end.

In the following example White used his extra tempo more successfully.

Dvoretsky – Tataev
Beltsy 1972

King's Indian Attack

1 e4  c5
2  f3  g6
3 d3  0–0
4 g3  g7
5  g2  c6
6 0–0  f6
The Development of an Opening Repertoire

I reached this position several times with Black after 1 d4 f5 2 c4 g6 3 d3 g7 4 g3 0-0 5 g2 d6 6 0-0 d6 7 c3 e5 (sometimes 7...f5 or 7...g4 is played here, but the most usual move is 7...a6).

White has a choice between 8 dxe5 and 8 d5. The pawn exchange is not as harmless as it appears. Initially I replied to 8 dxe5 with 8...dxe5. However, in the variation 9 wxc8 8xc8 10 g5 e6 11 d2 it is not so easy to equalise, for example 11...h6 12 xf6 8xd2 13 xg7 xg7 14 xc6 bxc6 15 b3, and White's chances are somewhat better thanks to his superior pawn structure (Koyfman–Dvoretsky, Moscow Championship 1966).

The game Vaganian–Dvoretsky (USSR Championship First League, Tbilisi 1973) went 8 dxe5 dxe5 9 dxe5 dxe5 10 wxc8 8xc8 11 g5 d4! 12 e3? 8xc4 13 ac1 c6! 14 xf6 xf6 15 e4 xc1 16 xg6+ g7 17 e8+ f8 18 xc1 xe8 19 xc6 e6! 20 cc5 cc8 ½-½. White also achieves nothing with 12 b3 c6, but he retains pressure by 12 d5! dxd5 13 cxd5 e4 14 ff1 – here the theory books give inaccurate information.

After 8 d5 e7 in the 1966 Moscow Championship Vladimir Yurkov chose 9 c5 against me. I had only just become a master, I had no serious knowledge of the theory of this variation, and I had never seen the move 9 c5. Since Aaron Nimzowitsch's book *My System*, which I had previously read with great pleasure, was still fresh in my mind, at the board I was able to find an idea in the spirit of Nimzowitsch, with a blockading knight on d6: 9...e8 10 cxd6 xxd6. The continuation was 11 e4 c5?! 12 a4?! d7 13 e1 h6 14 b3 f5 with a good game for Black. White could have seized the initiative by 12 dxc6 xc6 13 g5! f6 14 e3 followed by 15 c5 (Ivkov–Uitumen, Palma de Mallorca 1970). Therefore Black does better not to hurry with 11...c5, but to first play 11...h6!, and then, according to circumstances, 12...c5, 12...c6 or 12...f5.

The main continuation is 9 e4 d7. The game Doda–Dvoretsky (Polanica Zdroj 1973) went 10 e1 f5 11 d3 f6 12 f3?! (12 f4 is better, as Etruk played against me a year earlier; 12 exf5, 12 d2 and 12 g5?! have also occurred) 12...h6! 13 d2 g5 (threatening 14...f4) 14 exf5 xf5. The initiative is with Black, whose subsequent plan is ...e8–g6, ...d4, ...f5, ...af8, ...h6–h5 and ...g5–g4.

The manoeuvre of the knight to d3 is a little slow. White has some worthy alternatives: 10 e3, 10 d2 and 10 b4. He can also consider the non-routine 10 g5?! h6 11 d3 followed by 12 f4.

After this excursion into the theory of the King's Indian Defence, let us return to the Dvoretsky–Tataev game.

(see diagram)

So, I have an extra tempo. Which moves for White are useful, and which are not? What would you say, for example, about 8 e1? Yes, this would be a move in the style of my game with Alburt, a move which does not improve, but worsens the position. Black replies 8...d4 9 e2 e5. Now White needs to
play f2–f4, and in this case his rook is clearly worse placed at f1 than at e1.

8 h3!

In every eventuality it is useful to defend the g4-square – both in an endgame arising after 8...dxe4, and in a blocked position after 8...d4. Knowing the ideas of the corresponding variation of the King’s Indian Defence, about which we have only just spoken, it was not difficult to find the correct solution with White.

My opponent did not want to play a theoretical position a tempo down, and he tried to devise something new.

8...

9 d2!?

If now 9...d4, then it is clear that I have made a useful move. After 9...e5 or 9...e6 the planned advance f2–f4 gains in strength. Black should probably have played 9...dxe4 10 dxe4 (nothing is given by 10 cxe4 dxe4 11 cxe4 b6! 12 xc5 bxc5 13 xc6 xb3) 10...c7 11 f4 d8 12 e5 e8.

9...

10 f4

Now it is unfavourable for the opponent to open the centre: after 10...dxe4 11 dxe4 and 12 e5 'holes' appear in his position at d6 and f6, and the white knight will occupy a powerful position on e4.

An interesting positional problem: to where should the knight retreat, d7 or e8? (We will not even consider the h7-square – there the knight is out of play.)

What is Black intending to do next? Of course, he won’t want to weaken his pawn chain with ...f7–f6. He intends to seize space on the queenside by ...b6–b5–b4. How should White react? He will probably try to prevent this plan by 13 a4. At the same time the knight thrust to b5 becomes a possibility. After 12...e8 Black retreats his bishop to b7, and then plays ...a7–a6,...c7 and ...b6–b5. Now c5 is no longer dangerous, since the knight on e8 is defending the d6-square. But with the knight on d7 none of this is possible, and White gains the better prospects, since the opponent does not have any normal plan.

12...

13 a4!

14 f3

15 b5

16 axb5

17 c4!

A good positional move: the diagonal of the
The Development of an Opening Repertoire

The g2-bishop is lengthened, and the mobility of the opponent’s pieces is restricted.

17 ... dxc4
18 dxc4 \(\text{\textit{W}}b8\)
19 \(\text{\textit{W}}a4\) was threatened.
19 \(\text{\textit{A}}e3\)
19 \(\text{\textit{G}}xd4?\) cxd4 20 b3 also came into consideration.
19 ... \(\text{\textit{G}}xf3+?!\)

After this exchange Black remains without any counterplay at all. He should have sacrificed a pawn: 19 ... \(\text{\textit{A}}fd8\).

20 \(\text{\textit{W}}xf3\) \(\text{\textit{A}}fd8\)
21 \(\text{\textit{A}}fd1\)

There is now the unpleasant threat of 22 \(\text{\textit{W}}b7\), winning a pawn.

21 ... \(\text{\textit{A}}c7\)
22 \(\text{\textit{A}}d6!\) \(\text{\textit{G}}f8\)
23 \(\text{\textit{A}}c6\) \(\text{\textit{A}}dc8\)

How should White proceed further?

24 h4!

Threatening 25 h5.

24 ... \(\text{\textit{H}}5\)
25 g4 \(\text{\textit{H}}xg4\)
26 \(\text{\textit{W}}xg4\) \(\text{\textit{A}}g7\)
27 h5 \(\text{\textit{G}}f8\)

White must play \(\text{\textit{A}}e4\) and \(\text{\textit{A}}g1\). But with which move should he begin? When trying to convert an advantage, one should carefully watch for the opponent’s counterchances. The natural move 28 \(\text{\textit{A}}e4?\) is refuted tactically: 28 ... \(\text{\textit{A}}xc6\) 29 bxc6 \(\text{\textit{H}}xe5!\) 30 fxe5 \(\text{\textit{W}}xe5+\) with the threats of 31 ... \(\text{\textit{W}}xb2+\) and 31 ... f5.

28 \(\text{\textit{G}}g1!\)

White has a decisive advantage, which he converted into a win.

When playing with reversed colours those set-ups which we like for Black, it is hardly ever possible to directly transfer from there any specific variations. On other hand, as I hope you have seen, a wide use can be made of the typical plans, methods and evaluations of the corresponding source openings. And in general, for a deep understanding of any opening, a study of general ideas is work that is no less and possibly more important that the memorising of specific variations.

To solve opening problems, one sometimes has to use ideas typical of quite different schemes. This means that the practical player should not restrict himself to a study of games played only with ‘his’ openings. Study well-annotated games, even if ‘other’ openings are employed in them. You will not expand your opening repertoire straight
away, but it is possible that some game will provide the impetus for this. But more important, you will expand your arsenal of positional ideas, methods and evaluations, which, as I have already said, may possibly be used in the most varied openings. Record ideas that appeal to you in the form of 'positional sketches', as described in the first book of this series (Secrets of Chess Training).

Solutions

**Nezhmetdinov – N.N.** (Kazan 1951).

13 \( \text{b3!!} \quad \text{xa1} \)

Bad is 13...\( \text{xb3} \) 14 \( \text{xd7} \) and 15 axb3, when White wins a piece.

14 \( \text{b2} \)

15 \( \text{f3!} \)

16 \( \text{e5} \)

Threatening mate in one move.

16... \( \text{e6} \)

17 \( \text{xd7}+ \) \( \text{xd7} \)

18 \( \text{b8+} \) \( \text{d8} \)

18... \( \text{e7} \) 19 \( \text{c6} \) mate.

19 \( \text{b5+} \)

White has built up a decisive attack. The game concluded 19... \( \text{e7} \) 20 \( \text{b7+} \) \( \text{f6} \) 21 \( \text{xf7+} \) \( \text{g5} \) 22 \( \text{f3+} \) \( \text{h5} \) 23 \( \text{g4+!} \) \( \text{xg4} \) 24 \( \text{xe6+} \) \( \text{f4} \) 25 \( \text{e5+} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 26 \( \text{g5} \) mate.

**Dvoretsky – Veselovsky** (Moscow 1967).

White’s plan is clear: play on the queenside. In one order or another he intends \( \text{a4}, \) \( \text{a3}, \) \( \text{b6(b8)} \) and so on.

When carrying out your plan, you are obliged to reckon with your opponent’s intentions. What does Black want here? Obviously it would be advantageous for him to weaken the pressure on his queenside, by exchanging the light-square bishops: 17... \( \text{h3} \). For this reason the natural move 17 \( \text{a4?} \) would be a serious inaccuracy.

It is easy to forestall the exchange of bishops by 17 \( \text{e1} \). But in itself this move is not needed by White, and it does not come into his plan.

17 \( \text{a3!} \)

The strongest continuation. While intensifying the pressure on the queenside, at the same time White preserves his light-square bishop from exchange. In Nimzowitsch’s opinion, it is such moves, combining the implementation of your own plan and prophylaxis against the opponent’s ideas, that comprise the essence of genuine positional play.

Black managed to hold out for only a few more moves: 17... \( \text{fe8} \) 18 \( \text{a4} \) \( \text{c7} \) 19 \( \text{a8 f5?!} \) (19... \( \text{d7} \) with the idea of 20... \( \text{d5} \) was more consistent, against which I would probably have played 20 \( \text{b8} \) d5 21 \( \text{fb1} \) dxc4 22 dxc4) 20 \( \text{b8 f8} \) (20... \( \text{e4?!} \)?) 21 \( \text{b4} \) \( \text{a7} \?) 22 \( \text{a1} \) (22 \( \text{xd6} \) 22... \( \text{d7} \) 23 \( \text{a6} \) \( \text{f7?!} \) 24 \( \text{a5} \) Black resigned. In the final position the domination of the white pieces on the queenside is striking.
Appendix

(games, mentioned in the lecture, which will supplement your impressions of the opening variations analysed)

**Petrosian – Pachman**

Bled 1961

*King's Indian Attack*

1 e4  c5
2 g3  c6
3 g2  g6
4 0-0  g7
5 d3  e6
6 e4  ge7
7 ef1  0-0?!

7 ... d6 is safer.

8 e5!  d6
9 exd6  xd6
10 ef2 d2

Either here or on the following move ...b7–b6 should have been played.

11 ed3!  d4?
12 df4  b6
13 ed5  xb3

14 axb3  d5  15 ed4  c6 was less accurate.

15 . . .  b5

In the event of 14...d8 15 axb3 the threats of 16 ed6 and 16 ea5 are unpleasant.

15 axb3  a5

Black is forced to defend against 16 ea5.

16 ed6  f6
17 ef3  g7
18 ed4?!

The combination which White carried out on his next move was already possible here.

18 . . .  d8

19 ef6+!  xf6
20 eg5+  g6
21 eg7!

Black resigned.

**Smyslov – Denker**

USSR-USA Match, Moscow 1946

*Sicilian Defence*

1 e4  c5
2 ed3  c6
3 g3  g6
4 eg2  g7
5 d3  e6
6 eg3  ed4?!
7 ed2!  d6
8 c3  ed6

8...ed2 looks more natural.

9 d4  cxd4
10 ed4!

White must capture on d4 with a piece, in order to subsequently exploit the weakness of the d6-pawn.
10 ...  
11  \( \text{Qxd4} \)  
11...\( \text{Qf6} \) was better.

12  \( \text{Qe3} \)  
13  \( \text{Qe2} \)  
14 0-0  
15  \( \text{Qd2} \)  

Not 15...d5 in view of 16  \( \text{Qc5} \).

16  \( \text{Qf1} \)!

In order to gain control of the d5-point, White must prepare c3-c4. 16 b3, with the same aim, is weaker in view of 16...b5 (17  \( \text{a4} \) \( \text{bxa4} \) \( \text{Qxa4} \) \( \text{xe3} \)-xe3). But now if 16...b5 there follows 17  \( \text{a}4! \) a6 (17...\( \text{bxa4} \) 18  \( \text{Qxa4} \) a5 19  \( \text{Qc1} \) with the threat of 20 b4) 18  \( \text{Qd1} \), for example: 18...\( \text{Qd8} \) 19  \( \text{a}xb5 \) axb5 20  \( \text{Qa7} \), or 18...\( \text{Qfd8} \) 19  \( \text{a}xb5 \) axb5 20  \( \text{Qxa8} \) \( \text{xa8} \) 21  \( \text{Qxd6} \), or 18...\( \text{b}3 \) 19  \( \text{Qxd6} \)  \( \text{Qxd6} \) 20  \( \text{Qxd6} \)  \( \text{Qxa4} \) 21  \( \text{Qc1} \), preparing 22 b3.

16 ...  
17  \( \text{c4} \)  
18  \( \text{Qc3} \)

In the event of 18...\( \text{Qxc4} \) White has a pleasant choice of 19  \( \text{Qd1} \), 19  \( \text{Qxe4} \) or 19.b3.

19  \( \text{Qxe4} \)  
19...\( \text{Qd4} \) 20 c5! d5 21  \( \text{g5} \)  \( \text{f7} \) 22  \( \text{f4} \) with an attack for White.

20  \( \text{Qxe3} \)  

21  \( \text{Qd1} \)  
21...\( \text{Qxc4} \) 22  \( \text{Qac1} \).

22  \( \text{Qac1} \)  
23  b3  
24  \( \text{Qc3} \)!

White is planning the advantageous exchange of the light-square bishops. And if 24...\( \text{Qh7} \) there follows 25  \( \text{We4}! \), intending 26  \( \text{h4} \), or 26  \( \text{Qb5} \) and 27  \( \text{Qd3} \).

24 ...  
25  \( \text{Qd5} \)  
26  \( \text{Qxe6} \)  
27  \( \text{Qd3} \)  
28  \( \text{Qcd1} \)  
29  \( \text{Qe4} \)  
30  \( \text{Qd5} \)  
31  \( \text{Qd3} \)  

The loss of the pawn is now unavoidable. 31  \( \text{Qxd6}?! \)  \( \text{Qxd6} \) 32  \( \text{Qxd6} \) would have been premature: 32...\( \text{Qd1}+! \).

31 ...  
32  \( \text{Qxe4} \)  
33  \( \text{Qxd6} \)  
34  \( \text{Qxe5} \)

At first sight, a rather risky decision. By giving up his f2-pawn, White exposes his king. But Smyslov has accurately calculated that he will be the first to begin an attack.

34 ...  
35  \( \text{Qd7}+ \)  
36  \( \text{Qxf7}+ \)  
37  \( \text{Qd8}! \)  
38  \( \text{We8} \)  
39  \( \text{Qh8}+ \)  
40  \( \text{Qd6}+ \)  
41  \( \text{Qh6} \)

It has all become clear. Black has no counterplay – his rook is passive, his king is vulnerable, and in addition, being two pawns down, he cannot agree to the exchange of queens.
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41 ... \( \texttt{w}f5 \)
42 \( \texttt{d}d1! \) \( \texttt{c}5+ \)
43 \( \texttt{g}2 \) \( \texttt{e}7 \)
44 \( \texttt{f}1+ \) \( \texttt{g}8 \)
45 \( \texttt{f}6 \) \( \texttt{e}8 \)
46 \( \texttt{f}5 \) \( \texttt{g}4 \)
47 \( \texttt{f}2 \) \( \texttt{e}7 \)
48 \( \texttt{d}3 \) \( \texttt{g}5 \)
49 \( \texttt{e}2 \) \( \texttt{f}8 \)
50 \( \texttt{e}4 \) \( \texttt{g}7 \)
51 \( \texttt{d}5+ \) \( \texttt{f}7 \)
52 \( \texttt{e}6! \)

Black resigned.

Dolmatov – Bagirov
Frunze 1983
Grüenfeld Defence

1 \( \texttt{c}4 \) \( \texttt{f}6 \)
2 \( \texttt{c}3 \) \( \texttt{d}5 \)
3 \( \texttt{c}xd5 \) \( \texttt{xd}5 \)
4 \( \texttt{d}4 \) \( \texttt{g}6 \)
5 \( \texttt{e}4 \) \( \texttt{xc}3 \)
6 \( \texttt{b}xc3 \) \( \texttt{g}7 \)
7 \( \texttt{a}3 \)

Black can get by without this move, by playing 7...\( \texttt{b}6! ? \) followed by ...\( \texttt{b}7 \), ...0-0 and ...\( \texttt{c}7-c5 \), after which his knight will be able to occupy the more active \( \texttt{c}6 \)-square.

8 \( \texttt{f}3 \) \( \texttt{c}5 \)
9 \( \texttt{b}3 \) \( \texttt{0-0} \)
10 \( \texttt{d}3 \)

Obviously weaker is 10 \( \texttt{e}2 \) \( \texttt{c}xd4 \) 11 \( \texttt{c}xd4 \) \( \texttt{f}6 \). If 10 \( \texttt{d}1 \) the Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings recommends 10...\( \texttt{c}xd4 \) 11 \( \texttt{c}xd4 \) \( \texttt{f}6 \) 12 \( \texttt{d}3 \) \( \texttt{g}4 \) 13 \( \texttt{xb}7 \) \( \texttt{xf}3 \) 14 \( \texttt{gxf}3 \) \( \texttt{xd}4 \), evaluating the resulting position as roughly equal.

10 ... \( \texttt{b}6?! \)

Black played more actively in the game Evans-Korchnoi (Buenos Aires 1960): 10...\( \texttt{c}7 \) 11 0-0 \( \texttt{b}8 \) (intending ...\( \texttt{b}7-b5 \)), and after 12 \( \texttt{b}5 \) \( \texttt{b}6 \) 13 \( \texttt{ad}1 \) \( \texttt{a}6 \) 14 \( \texttt{d}3 \) \( \texttt{b}5 \) 15 \( \texttt{b}1 \) \( \texttt{b}7 \) he obtained an excellent position.

11 \( \texttt{d}1 \)

11 0-0?! was inaccurate in view of 11...\( \texttt{e}5! \) with equality.

11 ... \( \texttt{e}6 \)
12 0-0 \( \texttt{c}7 \)

The start of a sharp plan of attack on the kingside, typical of such positions.

13 \( \texttt{e}5! \)

14...\( \texttt{h}6? \) loses to 15 \( \texttt{xe}6! \) \( \texttt{c}6 \) 16 \( \texttt{d}5 \).

15 \( \texttt{b}1 \)

15 \( \texttt{e}4 \) came into consideration, with the aim of occupying the central \( \texttt{e}4 \)-point with the knight (if 15...\( \texttt{h}6 \), then 16 \( \texttt{xe}6 \) is still strong). But Dolmatov avoids the exchange, hoping to use his bishop to break up the enemy king’s defences.

15 ... \( \texttt{ab}8 \)
16 \( \texttt{h}4 \) \( \texttt{b}5 \)

This pawn offensive on the queenside is too late. 16...\( \texttt{c}6! \) was better, threatening mate and intending ...\( \texttt{a}4 \).

17 \( \texttt{h}5 \) \( \texttt{b}4 \)
18 \( \texttt{hxg}6! \) \( \texttt{bxa}3 \)

If 18...\( \texttt{hxg}6 \), then 19 \( \texttt{g}6 \) \( \texttt{fxg}6 \) 20 \( \texttt{xe}6 \) \( \texttt{c}6 \) 21 \( \texttt{d}5 \) is decisive.
19 gxf7+ ♕h8
20 ♛xh7
Threatening ♕b1–g6–h5.

20 . . . ♔f8
21 ♕d3 ♔h6
If 21...cxd4, then 22 ♕h3 ♔x5 23 ♕g8+ ♔g7 24 ♕g4! ♔h6 25 f4.
22 ♕h3! ♕xg5
23 ♕g8+ ♔g7
24 ♕d3

And Black resigned.

Timman – Yusupov
Candidates Match, 8th Game, Tilburg 1986

Queen's Gambit

1 d4 d5
2 c4 e6
3 ♕c3 ♕f6
4 cxd5 exd5
5 ♕g5 ♕e7
6 e3 ♕bd7
7 ♕c2 0-0
8 ♕d3 ♕e8
9 ♕f3 ♕f8
10 0-0 c6
11 ♕ae1 ♕e4
12 ♕x7 ♕xe7
13 ♕xe4 dxe4
14 ♕d2 f5

In the World Team Championship (Luzern 1985) against Zoltan Ribli, Yusupov employed a riskier plan: 14...b6!? 15 ♕a4 b5! and gained a quick draw. (Incidentally, in that same event in the very same variation he beat Li Zunian with White). Timman was evidently hoping for a repetition of this variation and had certainly found a way of improving on Ribli’s play. But Yusupov had made a deep study of this variation, which in case of necessity gave him the possibility of varying his plans, thus avoiding prepared lines by the opponent.
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18 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{a}}x\texttt{e}4} \quad h6!? \\
19 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}e2}?! \\

An unsuccessful reaction to the novelty. 19 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f1} was preferable, or 19 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e5}, as Yusupov had played against me a year earlier in some training games with a 15-minute time control.

\[ \text{Diagram} \]

Taking account of the situation in the match, with an exchange sacrifice Yusupov forces a draw. 28...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f8} 29 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f5} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}e6} or 29...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}}h7} was also not bad.

\[ 29 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}f7}+ \quad \texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}}h7} \]
\[ 30 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}xe8} \quad \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}xb2}! \]
\[ 31 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f2} \quad \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}a1}+ \]
\[ 32 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f1} \quad \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}a2} \]

Natural tactics in such a situation – without changing the position, to reach the adjournment and to check at home whether or not there are any winning chances.

\[ 33 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f2} \quad \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}a1}+ \]
\[ 34 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f1} \quad \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}a2} \]
\[ 35 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f2} \quad \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}b1}+ \]
\[ 36 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f1} \quad \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}b2} \]
\[ 37 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f2} \quad \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}b1}+ \]
\[ 38 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f1} \quad \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}c2} \]
\[ 39 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f2} \quad \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}c1}+ \]
\[ 40 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f1} \quad \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}d2} \]
\[ 41 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f2} \quad \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}d1}+ \]

Draw.

\textbf{Mukhin – Dvoretsky} \\
Moscow 1969

\textit{King’s Indian Defence}

\begin{align*}
1 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c}}c4} & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f6} \\
2 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}f3} & \texttt{g6} \\
3 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}c3} & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{g}}g7} \\
4 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e4} & \texttt{d6} \\
5 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}d4} & \texttt{0-0} \\
6 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e2} & \texttt{e5} \\
7 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}d5} & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{a}}a6} \\
8 & 0-0 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c}}c5} \\
9 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}d2}?! & \texttt{a5} \\
10 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{b}}b3} & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}}h6}! \\
11 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}c2} & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e8} \\
12 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f3} & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}xc1} \\
13 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}xc1} & \texttt{f5} \\
14 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}xf5} & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}xf5} \\
15 & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}e3} & \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f6}
\end{align*}
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15...b6!? is also good.

16 \( \triangle d2 \) \( \triangle g7 \)

17 a3?

17 f3 is correct, with roughly equal chances.

24...

24 \( \triangle x e2+ \)

25 \( \text{Wxe}2 \) \( \triangle d3 \)

But not immediately 25...\( \text{Wb}2 \)? 26 \( \triangle x e4 \).

26 \( \text{We}1 \) \( \text{Wb}2! \)

26...\( \text{Wd}4!? \) was also tempting, creating the terrible threat of 27...\( \text{Wxf}2! \) 28 \( \text{Wxf}2 \) e3. Then 27 \( \triangle c3 \) \( \triangle x b4 \)? (but not 27...\( \text{Wxf}2? \) 28 \( \text{Wxd}3! \)) 28 \( \triangle b3 \) \( \text{Wb}6 \) is hopeless for White. The only defence is 27 g3!, when the immediate 27...\( \text{Wxf}2! \) 28 \( \text{Wxf}2 \) e3 allows White to save himself by 29 \( \text{Wf}4! \). Therefore the following combination suggests itself: 27...\( \triangle x b4! \)? (27...\( \text{Wb}2 \) is stronger) 28 \( \triangle x b4 \) (28 \( \triangle b3 \) \( \text{Wb}2 \) 29 \( \triangle x b4 \) \( \text{Wxb}3 \) with advantage to Black) 28...\( \text{Wxf}2 \) 29 \( \text{Wxf}2 \) e3.

17...

17 \( \text{c}2! \)

18 b4

After 18 \( \text{b}5 \) White was concerned about 18...c6, although perhaps he should have played this and followed up with 19 b4!?.

18...

18 axb4

19 \( \text{Wxa}1 \)

20 \( \text{Wxa}1 \) \( \text{Wf}5 \)

21 \( \text{W}h3 \)

21 \( \text{Wf}3? \) e4 or 21 \( \triangle d e4? \) \( \text{x}e4 \) 22 \( \triangle x e4 \) \( \text{W}h4 \) was bad for White.

21...

21 \( \text{d}4! \)

22 \( \text{W}e3 \) \( \text{a}6 \)

23 \( \triangle a2 \)

Hardly any better was 23 b5, after which I had in mind the following variation: 23...\( \triangle c5 \) 24 \( \text{f}1 \) e4 25 \( \text{a}2 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 26 \( \text{W}h3 \) e3 27 \( \text{xc}2 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 28 \( \triangle d e4 \) \( \text{x}e4 \) 29 \( \text{x}e4 \) \( \text{Wf}4 \) 30 \( \text{a}2 \) e4.

23...

23 \( \text{e}4! \)

24 \( \text{c}1 \)

In the event of 24 \( \text{e}1! \)? Black would have replied as in the game: 24...\( \triangle x e2+ \) 25 \( \text{x}e2 \) \( \triangle d3 \) 26 \( \text{We}3 \) \( \text{Wb}2 \).

Now 30 \( \text{Wf}4 \) exd2! no longer helps White, since his rook is not defended by the knight. However, he finds the fantastic reply 30 \( \text{Wf}7!! \) (it has to be this square!) 30...\( \text{xf}7 \) 31 \( \triangle f3 \), when the queen cannot go to e4 because of the knight fork, and otherwise White plays 32 \( \text{xd}x3 \) and 33 \( \triangle f6 \), consolidating his forces.

27 \( \triangle c3 \)

28 \( \triangle x e4 \)

29 \( \triangle x e4 \)

30 \( \text{b}1 \)

30 \( \text{b}1 \)

This move, winning a pawn, was prepared beforehand and therefore it was made
quickly. But meanwhile, here Black should have stopped and carefully calculated the variations.

During the game both I and my opponent thought that 30...\texttt{\textdaggerdbl}d4?! was refuted by 31 \texttt{\textlhd\textlhd}e2 \texttt{\textlhd}xc4 32 \texttt{\textlhd}g5 \texttt{\textlhd}xd5 33 \texttt{\textlhd}e7. We did not notice the only, but sufficient defence against the mate: 33...\texttt{\textlhd}xf2! 34 \texttt{\textlhd}xh7+ \texttt{\textlhd}f8. However, after 34 \texttt{\textlhd}f3 or 34 \texttt{\textlhd}h6+ \texttt{\textlhd}e7 35 \texttt{\textlhd}f3 the outcome remains unclear.

Instead of 31...\texttt{\textlhd}xc4? Black has the decisive 31...\texttt{\textlhd}f4! 32 \texttt{\textlhd}g5 \texttt{\textlhd}xf2. However, White's play can also be improved: 31 \texttt{\textlhd}e3!, and Black is nevertheless obliged to go in for the complicated variation given above (31...\texttt{\textlhd}xc4 32 \texttt{\textlhd}g5 etc.).

After 30...\texttt{\textlhd}c2! 31 \texttt{\textlhd}d1 nothing is given by 31...\texttt{\textlhd}xf2? 32 \texttt{\textlhd}xf2 \texttt{\textlhd}xf2+ 33 \texttt{\textlhd}h1 \texttt{\textlhd}e3 34 \texttt{\textlhd}f3(f1), but the simple 31...\texttt{\textlhd}xc4 is adequate. Here the white queen is less active than after 30...\texttt{\textlhd}d4.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
31 & \texttt{\textlhd}e2 & & & & & & & \\
32 & \texttt{\textlhd}e1 & & & & & & & \\
33 & \texttt{\textlhd}xe4 & & & & & & & \\
34 & \texttt{\textlhd}xe5 & & & & & & & \\
35 & \texttt{\textlhd}xe5?! & & & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

It is probable that the rook endgame is also lost.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
35 & & & & & dx\texttt{\textlhd}e5 & & & \\
36 & & \texttt{\textlhd}f2 & & & & & & \\
37 & & \texttt{\textlhd}e3 & & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

White resigned, since after 38 c5 b6 39 \texttt{\textlhd}e4 bxc5 40 \texttt{\textlhd}xe5 he soon ends up in zugzwang.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
& & & & & & & & & \\
& & & & & & & & & \\
& & & & & & & & & \\
& & & & & & & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

An important position for the evaluation of the variation. If 16 \texttt{\textlhd}d3 Black replies 16...\texttt{\textlhd}f6 followed by ...\texttt{\textlhd}d7 and ...\texttt{\textlhd}ae8, when he is excellently placed. White should play 16 \texttt{\textlhd}e6 \texttt{\textlhd}xe6 17 dx\texttt{\textlhd}e6. In this case his chances are evidently preferable, although a draw is still the most probable outcome.

16 g4?

A nervy move, handing the initiative to the opponent.

16... \texttt{\textlhd}d4

17 h3
If 17 e3 there follows 17... h4! 18 xd4 xg4+ 19 xg4 xd4+ 20 g2 xg4 or 19 g2 xf4 with advantage to Black.

17 ... h4

18 xe1

Comparatively best. 18 d3? is bad because of 18... xg4! 19 hxg4 xg4+ 20 h1 e5 21 d2 xf4 22 xf4 xf4 23 xf4 xf4 24 xd4 e8 25 e1 h4+. In the event of 18 e3 g3+ 19 g2 xf1+ 20 xf1 the simplest is 20... xh3, but 20... e5 is also decisive, or even 20... xg4 21 hxg4 xg4 22 d3 e2+ 23 f2 f8+ 24 e1 g3.

18 ... xe1

19 xe1 d7?

Indecisive! I wrongly avoided the previously intended 19... e5 20 e2 f3+ 21 xf3 xf3 22 g2 f7 (22... d3!?). Now if 23 h6 it is possible to capture the b2-pawn, and otherwise ...h7–h5 is unpleasant, opening up the game with the two bishops.

20 g2! xe8

21 d2 e5

22 e2 xe2

23 xe2 xb2

24 b1 d4

25 xb7 b6

Black loses after 25... xe4? 26 xe4 f2+ 27 g3 xd2 28 e7.

26 g3! a8

In the variation 26... c8 27 b8 xg4 28 xe8 xe2 29 e7 xc4 30 h6 the activity of the white pieces compensates for the two lost pawns.

27 c5! c8

28 cxb6 xb7

29 bxc7 ac8

30 b4??

The decisive mistake! After 30 a5 White should be able to gain a draw, although 30... xe8 would still have set him some problems.

30 ... xc7

31 xd6 c3+

32 h4 e8

33 b2 xe4

34 xb7 h6!

35 b4 d3

36 c5 f4

37 xa7 f3

38 a8+ g7

39 a7+ f6

40 a6+ e5

White resigned.
A player who opens 1 e4 can, if he wishes, include in his opening repertoire the system 1 e4 e6 2 d3!? or 1 e4 c5 2 d3 e6 3 d3!? Avoiding the French or Sicilian Defence, White develops his pieces in the same way as Black does in the King's Indian Defence. In so doing White is counting not only on the extra tempo compared with the King's Indian Defence, which he has because of the reversed colours, but mainly on Black's not very favourable move ...e7–e6 (in the King's Indian Defence it is extremely rare for White to play e2–e3).

The same positions can also be reached from the Réti Opening – 1 d4 f3 d5 2 g3 c5 3 g2 d6 4 0-0 – if now or a move later Black plays ...e7–e6. (However, the King's Indian Attack also includes various other set-ups by Black – provided only that White has developed his pieces in King's Indian fashion.) But since the given review is based on personal experience in the King's Indian Attack and largely contains my own games, and I usually played 1 e4, it is to this move order that the main attention will be paid.

Some of the games given below are not of theoretical importance, since at least one of the players did not act in the best way. However, they may prove useful for becoming familiar with the pattern of play characteristic of the given opening, and the typical strategic and tactical ideas and methods employed in it.

I. Black develops his bishop on e7

1 e4 e6
2 d3 d5

3 d2
c5
4 gf3
c6
5 g3
f6
6 g2
e7
7 0-0

1) Basic ideas for White
(examples with poor play by the opponent)

Knight sacrifice on g5

Dvoretsky – Damsky
Moscow 1969

7 . . .
0-0
8 e1 b6?!
9 e5 d7
10 f1 b7
11 h4 c7?

If Black had attacked the pawn a little earlier, White would have had to defend it with the not very useful move we2. But now the attack on the pawn is pointless, since it can be defended by the bishop.
12 .gf4  

b5

Compared with the normal handling of the variation (8...b5 etc.) Black has wasted several tempi.

13 .gf1  
d5-d4?

This makes it easier for White to launch a decisive attack.

14 .ge5!  
h6

15 .ge5!  
hxg5

16 hxg5  

fb8

If 16...fd8 17 .gf4  gf8, then 18 e4 followed by  gf2 and g1 is strong.

17 .gf4  

f8

18 .gf6+!

Stronger then 18 e4 gf6.

18 ...  
xf6

If 18...gx6 19 exf6 e5 20  ed5 (or 20  wh6  e6 21 e4) 20...d6 21  wh6  e6 22 g6 with mate.

19 exf6  
e5

20  ed5!  
e8

20...exf4 21  e7; 20...d8 21  g2; 20...wh7 21 fg7  g6 22  xg6  xd5 23  wh6.

21 g6  

d8

22 gxg7+  

Black resigned in view of 22...xf7 23  g5 g6 24  wh6.

Knight sacrifice on d5

Dvoretsky – Yusupov
Blitz game, Moscow 1987

7 ...  
w7

8  ge1  
0-0

9 e5  
d7

10  we2  
b5

11 h4  
a5

12  gf1  
a4

13 a3  
b4

14  gf4  
xb3

15  xb3  
a6

16  ge3  

If the black queen on c7, it is advantageous for White to play his knight to g4 via the e3-square (rather than h2), with the strong threat of xf6d5!.

16 ...  

fe8?

17  xd5!  
exd5

18 e6  
w8

19 exf7+!  
xf7

20  we6+  
f8

21  g5  
xg5

22  d6+  
e7

23  xd5  

Black resigned.
Undermining of the centre by c2–c4

Dvoretsky – Gorchakov
Moscow 1973

7 ... 0-0
8 ... e1 b5
9 e5 d7
10 f1 f5?!
11 exf6 xf6

If 11 ... xf6, then 12 f4, aiming to occupy the e5-point.

12 h4

12 ... b6

12 ... h6!? 13 e3 or 13 f1h2.

13 g5!

If 13 ... e5, then 14 c4! is strong, demolishing Black's centre.

But here too 14 c4? came into consideration: 14 ... bxc4 15 dxc4 xg5 (15 ... xc4? 16 xe6! 16 xg5 (or 16 hxg5) 16 ... xc4, although the correctness of the positional pawn sacrifice would still have had to be demonstrated.

Another interesting possibility is 14 h5!? h6 15 e3 (the same idea as in the Dvoretsky–Damsky game) with the idea of g4 and xh6+. If 15 ... e5, then 16 f4! hxg5 17 hxg5 g6 18 xe5 gxh5 19 exd6 g7 (19 ... xg5 20 xd5!), and now either 20 h3 followed by e3-g2-f4, or the same strike at the centre 20 c4!?

Dolmatov – Meyer
Philadelphia 1991

7 ... 0-0
8 ... e1 b5
9 e5 d8
10 f1 f6?!
11 exf6 xf6

If 12 ... xf6, then 12 f4, aiming to occupy the e5-point.

12 h4

12 ... b6

12 ... b6

13 g5!

13 ... f5 14 c4!...

14 g4

15 xf6+

In the event of 15 ... xf6 White has a pleasant choice between 16 cxd5 and 16 g5?.

16 cxd5

17 d2!

17 ... f5 18 c4!.

18 e4

18 ... e4

19 xg5

20 c4

21 f4

22 e3

23 f5

24 g4

25 f4

26 g5

27 f4

28 g6

29 f5

30 g6

31 f5

32 g6

33 f5

34 g6

35 f5

36 g6

37 f5

38 g6

39 f5

40 g6

41 f5

42 g6

43 f5

44 g6

45 f5

46 g6

47 f5

48 g6

49 f5

50 g6

51 f5

52 g6

53 f5

54 g6

55 f5

56 g6

57 f5

58 g6

59 f5

60 g6

61 f5

62 g6

63 f5

64 g6

65 f5

66 g6

67 f5

68 g6

69 f5

70 g6

71 f5

72 g6

73 f5

74 g6

75 f5

76 g6

77 f5

78 g6

79 f5

80 g6

81 f5

82 g6

83 f5

84 g6

85 f5

86 g6

87 f5

88 g6

89 f5

90 g6

91 f5

92 g6

93 f5

94 g6

95 f5

96 g6

97 f5

98 g6

99 f5

100 g6

101 f5

102 g6

103 f5

104 g6

105 f5

106 g6

107 f5

108 g6

109 f5

110 g6

111 f5

112 g6

113 f5

114 g6

115 f5

116 g6

117 f5

118 g6

119 f5

120 g6

121 f5
King's Indian Attack (from White's Point of View)

19  \textit{h}6  \textit{fd8}
20  \textit{c}1  \textit{c4}
21  \textit{h}5  \textit{ac8}
22  \textit{dxc}4  \textit{bxc}4
23  \textit{f}4!

White has an undisputed advantage.

Some players aim to play c2–c4 as early as possible, and therefore after 1 \textit{e}4 \textit{c}5 2 \textit{\textit{f}3} \textit{e}6 3 \textit{d}3 \textit{d}5 they refrain from 4 \textit{\textit{d}bd}2 in favour of 4 \textit{we}2. After completing their kingside development, they plan to play c2–c4 and \textit{c}3.

\textit{An exchange of knights on d4 is normally advantageous to White}

\textit{Fischer – U.Geller}
Netanya 1968

7 . . . 0–0
8 \textit{e}1 \textit{wc}7
9 \textit{e}5 \textit{d}7
10 \textit{we}2 \textit{b}5
11 \textit{h}4 \textit{a}5
12 \textit{\textit{f}1} \textit{d}4?!
13 \textit{\textit{d}xd}4 \textit{cxd}4
14 \textit{\textit{f}4}

15 \textit{\textit{h}2}!

The standard sacrifice 15 \textit{\textit{d}xd}?! would

have proved premature because of the counter 15...\textit{b}4!. The following variations are possible:

a) 16 \textit{\textit{d}d}2?! \textit{exd}5 17 \textit{e}6 \textit{wxf}4? 18 \textit{gxf}4 \textit{exe}6 19 \textit{wd}1 \textit{g}6+ and 20...\textit{\textit{f}6} with a dangerous attack for Black;

b) 16 \textit{ac}1? \textit{exd}5 17 \textit{e}6 \textit{exe}6! 18 \textit{exe}6 \textit{wxf}4! 19 \textit{xd}7 \textit{f}3! 20 \textit{\textit{h}2} \textit{xd}1+!

c) 16 \textit{ed}1? \textit{exd}5 17 \textit{e}6 \textit{exe}6! 18 \textit{exe}6 \textit{wxf}4! 19 \textit{xd}7 \textit{f}3! 20 \textit{\textit{h}2} \textit{xd}1+!

d) 16 \textit{eb}1!! The only move, which can be found by the method of elimination. Now after 16...\textit{exd}5 17 \textit{e}6 the move 17...\textit{exe}6?! no longer works: 18 \textit{exe}6 \textit{wxf}4 19 \textit{xd}7 \textit{f}3 20 \textit{\textit{h}2}!

The move in the game is stronger than 15 \textit{\textit{g}4}?! \textit{\textit{h}8} 16 \textit{ac}2 (intending \textit{\textit{h}2–f}3) in view of 16...\textit{c}6 17 \textit{c}1 \textit{b}4 18 \textit{\textit{h}2} \textit{a}6 with the unpleasant threat of 19...\textit{xd}3.

15 . . . \textit{c}6
16 \textit{ac}1 \textit{a}6?

Now the thematic stroke on d5 secures White the advantage. Black should have chosen between 16...\textit{wb}6 and 16...\textit{b}4.

17 \textit{\textit{xd}5}! \textit{exd}5
18 \textit{e}6 \textit{d}8
19 \textit{exd}7 \textit{e}6
20 \textit{\textit{g}4}! \textit{f}5

If 20...\textit{\textit{xd}7}, then 21 \textit{\textit{e}5} is decisive.

21 \textit{\textit{h}5} \textit{\textit{xd}7}
22 \textit{\textit{f}3} \textit{g}6
23 \textit{\textit{h}6} \textit{f}6
24 \textit{\textit{b}6} \textit{\textit{xe}6}
25 \textit{\textit{e}5}!!

An elegant stroke, after which White's positional advantage becomes decisive. The obvious 25 \textit{\textit{e}1}? would have unexpectedly led to a draw after 25...\textit{\textit{xe}1}+!! 26 \textit{\textit{\textit{xe}1} \textit{\textit{g}7} 27 \textit{\textit{g}5} \textit{\textit{f}6}.

25 . . . \textit{\textit{xe}5}
26 \textit{\textit{e}1} \textit{f}4?!
27 \textit{\textit{xe}5} \textit{d}7
28 h5!  fxg3
29 hxg6!  gxf2+
If 29...xf3, then 30 xe8+! xe8 31 xh7+ e8 32 g7+.
30 xf2  hxg6
31 xg6+  g7
32 g5!
Black resigned.

2) The main line

Fischer – Miagmasuren
Interzonal Tournament, Sousse 1967

7 ...  0-0
8 e5  d7
9 xe1  b5
10 d1  b4
11 h4  a5
12 f4  a4
13 a3!
White should not allow 13...a3 14 b3 a7 with the manoeuvre of the knight to c3.

13 ...  bxa3
14 bxa3
Now Black has to reckon with c2–c4, striking at the centre.

14 ...  a5?!
14...d4?!
15 e3  a6

16 h3
Fischer is apparently preparing g5. The other standard plan is 16 h5, intending 17 h6 g6 18 g4 followed by play against the weakened dark squares on the kingside (wd2, g5 and so on).

16 ...  d4
17 b1  b6
18 g5  d5
19 d2  xg5
20 xg5  d7
21 h5  c8
22 d2  c3
23 f6!  e8
Black would have lost after 23...gxf6 24 exf6 h5 25 c3 d5 26 h5 g8 26 c5 c7 27 g2! followed by 28 e4.

24 e4  g6
25 g5!  e4
26 e4  c4
This thematic move should have been made a little earlier.

27 h5!  cxd3
28 h4  a7
If 28...dxc2, then 29 hxg6 fxg6 30 xh7.

29 g2!!  dxc2?!
29...f8  30 e4 dxc2 31 hxg6 fxg6 32 xg6 would not have helped.

30 h6  f8
31 g7+!
Black resigned.

Dvoretsky – Tseshkovsky
USSR Championship, First League, Odessa 1974

7 ...  0-0
8 e1  b5
9 e5  d7
10 d1  b4
11 h4  a5
12 f4  e8!?
An interesting prophylactic move.

13  \( \text{c}3 \)  \( \text{a}6 \)

14  a4!?

The start of a dubious plan. The standard course would be 14 h5 followed by \( \text{g}4 \) and h5–h6.

14 . . .  bxa3

15 bxa3

White prepares c2–c4. Compared with the immediate 14 c4 bxc3 15 bxc3 and 16 c4, here the b4-square is unavailable to the black knight.

15 . . .  \( \text{c}8 \)

17 . . .  \( \text{h}6 \)

Only here did I begin to check the variations, and I came to the conclusion that all White's combinative attempts are refuted: 18  \( \text{h}5 \) (18  \( \text{xf}7 \)?  \( \text{xf}7 \) 19  \( \text{h}5+ \text{g}6! \)) 18 . . . hxg5 19 hxg5 g6 20  \( \text{h}4 \) (20  \( \text{h}3 \)?  \( \text{xd}5 \) 20 . . . d4 21  \( \text{h}2 \) (21  \( \text{g}4 \)  \( \text{f}5 \) 22  \( \text{h}3 \)  \( \text{g}7! \)) 21 . . . f5 22  \( \text{x}f5 \) exf5 (22 . . . gxf5 23  \( \text{h}1 \)  \( \text{f}8 \) 24  \( \text{g}1 \)  \( \text{g}7 \) 25  \( \text{h}7+ \)  \( \text{f}8 \) 26 g6 and 27  \( \text{h}6 \)) 23  \( \text{h}1 \)  \( \text{f}8 \) 24  \( \text{g}1 \)  \( \text{g}7 \). Alas, I overlooked the powerful stroke 23  \( \text{e}6 \)!

18  \( \text{h}3 \)?  \( \text{f}8 \)

White's play has come to a standstill. Black, who has the possibilities . . . d5–d4 or . . .  \( \text{d}4 \) available, stands clearly better.

3) Black delays castling

Dvoretsky – Cook
Saint John 1988

7 . . .  b6

8  \( \text{e}1 \)  \( \text{b}7 \)

9 c3  \( \text{c}7 \)

9 . . . 0–0.

16  \( \text{a}2 \)

After the immediate 16 c4 I did not like 16 . . . dxc4 17 dxc4  \( \text{b}6 \) 18  \( \text{d}2 \)  \( \text{d}4 \)?! – and I was wrong: 19  \( \text{b}1 \) or 19  \( \text{e}4 \)  \( \text{ed}8 \) 20  \( \text{b}1 \) would have promised White an advantage.

I decided to advance c2–c4 in a more favourable situation. For example, 16 . . . a4 17 c4  \( \text{b}6 \) 18  \( \text{d}2 \)!  \( \text{c}7 \) 19  \( \text{c}2 \). And in the event of 16 . . .  \( \text{b}6 \), as it seemed to me, the attack 17  \( \text{g}5 \) gains in strength.

16 . . .  \( \text{b}6 \)

17  \( \text{g}5 \)

Quickly played, without proper calculation. However, Black was already threatening 17 . . . d4.

10  \( \text{e}2 \)

In such situations White should not be in a hurry to advance e4–e5. After 10 . . .  \( \text{d}7 \) it is bad to play 11 d4?  \( \text{cxd}4 \) 12  \( \text{cxd}4 \)  \( \text{b}4 \)
13 \( \text{Re3} \) \( \text{wc2}! \) 14 \( \text{We1} \) \( \text{Gg6} \) (Hort), while if 12 \( \text{Gf1?!} \) there follows 12...0-0-0 with chances for both sides (but not 12...\( \text{Gcxe5?} \) 13 \( \text{Gxe5} \) \( \text{Gcxe5} \) 14 \( \text{Gf4} \) \( \text{Gd6} \) 15 \( \text{Gxe5} \) \( \text{Gxe5} \) 16 \( \text{Wh5} \) with advantage to White, as in the game Nadyrkhanov–Saltaev, Tashkent 1993).

10 . . . 0-0-0
11 a3
Logical: White prepares an offensive on the queenside, where the enemy king has just taken shelter. In reply 11...h6!? came into consideration, and if 12 b4, then either 12...g5 or 12...\( \text{Gcxe5?} \).

11 ... \( \text{g6} \)
12 e5 \( \text{Gd7} \)
13 h4!
It is important to hinder the thematic advance ...g7–g5.

13 . . . h6
14 h5 \( \text{Gf8} \)
If 14...g5 White was intending 15 hxg6 fxg6 16 \( \text{Gh3} \) \( \text{Gf8} \) 17 \( \text{Gf1} \) or 17.b4!?

15 b4 \( \text{Gd6} \)
15...f6 16 exf6 \( \text{Gxf6} \) 17 \( \text{Gb1} \).
16 \( \text{Gb1} \) \( \text{Gb7} \)
17 bxc5 \( \text{bxc5} \)
18 \( \text{Gb3?!} \)

18 hxg6 \( \text{Gxg6} \) 19 \( \text{Gb3} \) was probably stronger, and if 19...h5 20 \( \text{Gg5} \), aiming at the c5-pawn. After the move in the game Black should have replied 18...gxh5 19 \( \text{Ge3} \) \( \text{Gd7} \).

18 . . . \( \text{Gd6}? \)
19 \( \text{Gc3}! \) \( \text{Gxe5} \)

19...c4 20 \( \text{Gc5?!} \) \( \text{Gxc5} \) 21 \( \text{Gxc5} \) with an attack.

20 \( \text{Gxe5} \)
Also possible was 20 \( \text{Gf4} \) \( \text{Gxf3+} \) 21 \( \text{Gxf3} \) \( \text{Gd6} \) 22 \( \text{Gxd6} \) \( \text{Gxd6} \) 23 c4 or 23 d4.

20 . . . \( \text{Gxe5} \)
21 \( \text{wc2} \) \( \text{wc7} \)
22 c4 \( \text{d4?!} \)

23 \( \text{Gd2} \)
White has a decisive advantage.

23...\( \text{g7} \) 24 hxg6 \( \text{eg6} \) 25 \( \text{Gc5} \) \( \text{b6} \) 26 \( \text{Gc6} \) \( \text{fxc6} \) 27 \( \text{Gxe5} \) \( \text{Gd6} \) 28 \( \text{Gc6} \) \( \text{Gd7} \) 29 \( \text{Gc5} \) \( \text{b7} \) 30 \( \text{Gxe7+} \) \( \text{Gxe7} \) 31 \( \text{Gxb6+} \) \( \text{Gxb6} \) 32 \( \text{Gxb6} \) \( \text{Gxb6} \) 33 \( \text{wc4} \) \( \text{Ghd8} \) 34 \( \text{Gc6+} \) \( \text{Gc7} \) 35 \( \text{Gxd6} \) Black resigned.

If the black king has remained in the centre, the plan involving the exchange on d5 also makes sense.

Dvoretsky – Bogomolov
Moscow 1967

7 . . . \( \text{b5?!} \)
8 \( \text{Gh1} \)
Even stronger was 8 \( \text{exc5} \) \( \text{exc5} \) 9 d4! (9 \( \text{c4?!} \)?) 9...c4 10 a4! b4 11 \( \text{Gc5} \) with the threat of 12 \( \text{Gxc4} \) (suggested by Viorel Bologan).

8 . . . \( \text{Gb7} \)
9 \( \text{exc5} \) \( \text{exc5} \)
10 \( \text{c4}! \)
A typical blow at the centre.

10 . . . \( \text{bxc4} \)
11 \( \text{dxc4} \) 0-0
12 \( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{Gd5} \)
13 \( \text{Gc4} \)

White’s position is somewhat preferable. In
the subsequent battle, which was not without its mistakes, he managed to outplay his opponent.

13...f6 14 g5! ? xg5 15 xg5 d4 16 w2 h6 17 e4 b4 18 ad1 bc2 19 f1 f5 20 f6+ xf6 21 xb7 ad8 22 h1 w7 23 a5 b8 (23...b4!?) 24 g2 xb2 25 wc3 b5? (25...xa2 26 xc5 xe6) 26 a4 bb8 27 xc5 (27 c6!) 27...bc8 (27...f6) 28 c6 xc6 29 xc6 ac8 30 xc2 xc6 31 wd3 ad6 32 f3 wd5 33 ec1 h7 34 g4 w7 35 ec4 Black lost on time.

If White plays e4–e5, Black should aim for ...g7-g5 – it is on this advance that the evaluation of the position depends.

### Chekhov – A.Ivanov

Qualifying Tournament for the World Junior Championship, Sochi 1975

1 g3  f6
2 g2  d5
3 f3  e6
4 0-0  e7
5 d3  b6
6 bd2  b7
7 e4  c5
8 e5  fd7
9 xe1  c6
10 f1  wc7

Already here 10...g5!? came into consideration.

11 f4  h6
12 h4  d4?

(see diagram)

12...g5! or 12...0-0-0 13 e3 g5 (13...f8) was better.

13 c3  dxc3
14 bxc3  0-0-0

It was still not too late to play 14...g5 15 hxg5

hgx5 16 xg5 xg5 17 xg5 cxe5.

15 d4  f8
16 d2  g6
17 e3

White has an advantage in space and good prospects of mounting an attack on the queenside, whereas the opponent has no real counterplay.

17...cxd4 18 cxd4 b4 19 a4 g7 20 a3 xd2 21 xd2 b8 22 ac1 d5 23 e4 d7 24 c2 c8 25 ec1 dd8 26 f1 we7 27 d2 wf8 28 xc6 xc6 29 xc6 we8 30 b5 a6 31 c8+ Black resigned.

### II. Black develops his bishop on g7

1 e4  e6
2 d3  d5
3 d2  c5
4 gf3  c6
5 g3  g6
6 g2  g7
7 0-0  ge7

7...f6 is evidently weaker in view of 8 exd5 xd5 (8...exd5 9 e1+) 9 b3 b6 10 c4 c7 11 d4.

- position after 12...d4 -
1) It is unfavourable for Black to castle – White’s attack is very dangerous

Dvoretsky – Ubilava
Tbilisi 1979

8 ... 0-0
9 e5
9 h4?! h6 10 e5 has also been tried.

9 ... \textbf{wc7}
10 \textbf{we2}

White carries out a standard plan of attack: \textbf{e}f1, h2–h4, \textbf{f}4, h2–g4 and so on. Compared with the variation with the bishop on e7, it is harder for the opponent to defend, since the dark squares on his kingside have been weakened by the move ...g7–g6. In this connection, serious consideration should be given to the attempt to sharply change the character of the play by 10...g5!? (a recommendation of Viktor Ciocaltea).

10 ... \textbf{a5}
11 h4 \textbf{h6}
12 \textbf{gf1}

It is usually advantageous for White to block the play on the queenside – therefore it made sense to play 12 a4!?, then c2–c3 and \textbf{f}1. I decided not to deviate from my plan.

12 ... \textbf{a4}
13 a3 \textbf{b5}

It was possible to exchange a pair of knights by 13...\textbf{d}d4!? , but after 14 \textbf{x}d4 \textbf{c}xd4 15 \textbf{h}2 White would have retained the better chances.

14 \textbf{h}2 \textbf{b}4
15 \textbf{f}4 \textbf{h}7
16 \textbf{g}4 \textbf{g}8

17 \textbf{c}4!

After 17 h5 g5 the sacrifice on g5 does not work. In order to strengthen it, White wants to win control of the e4-square by attacking the d5-pawn with his c-pawn.

17 ... \textbf{bxc3}
18 \textbf{bxc3} \textbf{a}6
19 \textbf{c}4! \textbf{dxc4}
20 \textbf{dxc4}

Now 21 h5 (and if 21...g5 22 \textbf{x}g5) cannot be prevented.

20 ... \textbf{ab}8
21 \textbf{h}5!
21 \textbf{f}6+? was less good: 21...\textbf{h}8 22 h5 g5, or 22 \textbf{e}3 \textbf{d}4! 23 \textbf{x}d4 \textbf{c}xd4 24 \textbf{xd}4 \textbf{fd}8.

21 ... \textbf{h}8
21...g5 22 \textbf{x}g5! was hopeless.
King’s Indian Attack (from White’s Point of View)

22 h×g6  fxg6
23 ♘f6!  ♘ge7

23...♘d4! was a tougher defence.

24 ♘ad1

24 ♘h4!? was also strong.

24 ...
25 ♘d6!  ♘b7
26 ♘xe6  ♘d4

26...♘f5 27 ♘d5 ♗f7 28 ♘xc6 ♘xc6 29 e6 and wins.

27 ♘xd4  cxd4
28 ♗d3  ♘xg2
29 ♘xg2  ♗f7
30 ♘h1!  ♘f5
31 ♗g4  ♗b7+
32 ♘g1  ♗e3
33 ♘xe3  ♗f3
34 ♗xg6  ♘xf6
35 ♘xh6+

Black resigned.

Dvoretsky – Khalifman
Sverdlovsk 1987

8 ...
9 e5  ♗c7
10 ♗e2  b6
11 h4  ♘a6
12 ♘f1

12 c3!? also does not look bad, but then White has to reckon with 12...f6 13 exf6 ♘xf6 14 ♘f1 e5.

12 ...
13 ♘xd4  cxd4
14 ♗f4  ♘c6?!

14...♘ac8 15 ♘ac1 ♗c5 was better, with the intention of attacking the queenside pawns with the queen. However, 16 ♘h2 followed by ♗g4 or h4–h5 would have given White a dangerous attack.

15 a3

15...

15...

If 15...♗ac8!? I would have simply replied 16 ♘ac1!, since 16 ♘h2 would allow Black to complicate matters by 16...♗xe5!? 17 ♘xe5 ♘xe5 18 ♘xe5 ♗xe5 19 ♘xe5 ♘xc2.

16 ♘h2  ♘ae8
17 ♘g4  ♗f6

After 17...h5 18 ♘f6+ ♗xf6 19 exf6 (threatening 20 ♘h6) 19...♗h7 20 ♘e5 and 21 f4 White would have gained an overwhelming advantage.

18 exf6  ♘xf6
19 ♘xf6+  ♘xf6
20 ♘h3  ♘xf4

20...♘c8 21 ♘e5 was also hopeless.

21 gxf4  ♘c8
22 ♗f3

22 f5 was premature in view of 22...e5.

22 ...
23 ♗g3  ♗h8

If 23...♗f8 there follows 24 f5.

24 ♘e2  ♗f8
25 ♘ae1  ♘d8
26 f5!  ♗xf5
27 ♗e5+  ♗g7+
28 ♗xg7+  ♗xg7
29 f4

And White won the endgame.
2) The pawn should not be advanced to e5 before Black castles kingside – because of counterplay by ...h7–h6 and ...g6–g5

Dvoretsky – Anikaev
USSR Championship Semi-Final, Odessa 1972

8 . . . b6
9 e5?! wc7
10 wе2 h6!
11 h4 g5!
12 hxg5 hxg5
13 ᵉxe5 ᵉxe5!
14 ᵇxe5?! After 14... authTokenxe5! Black would have stood better.

15 ᵇc4!?

He should have decided on the positional exchange sacrifice 15...dxc4! 16 ᵇxa8 cxd3.

16 dxc4 ᵇb7
17 c3
17 a4!?.

17 . . . 0-0
18 cxd5?!
18 a4! was stronger, with somewhat the better chances for White. In the event of 18... authToken c6 he has the promising piece sacrifice 19 ᵃxe6! fxe6 20 ᵇxe6, although it does not lead to a direct win: 20... authToken f7 21 ᵇg5 authToken e8 22 ᵃxe7? ᵇd7.

18 . . . authToken xd5
19 authToken xd5 authToken xd5
20 ᵇe4 ᵇd8
21 authToken g5 f6
22 authToken d2 d7
23 ᵇe2

Draw.

3) The tension in the centre is retained

Dvoretsky – Averkin
USSR Championship, First League, Odessa 1974

8 . . . b6
9 c3 authToken b7
If 9... authToken a6?! White has 10 exd5 authToken d5 11 ᵇa4.

10 ᵇf1 h6
11 h4 d4!?
The endgame after 11... dxe4 12 dxe4 authToken d1 13 authToken d1 is evidently more pleasant for White.

12 c4 e5
13 h5

White obviously needs to advance f2–f4. With this aim he could have played 13 ᵇh2 immediately.

13 . . . authToken c8
13... authToken d7!? looks more natural.

14 ᵇh4

White is consistent, although it is unclear where the knight stands better: here or on h2.

14 . . . authToken f6
15 hxg6 fxg6
16 f4
16...h5!
Not 16...exf4? because of 17 dxe4! dxe4 18 e5.

17 f5?
A strategic mistake. It was necessary to maintain the tension: 17 h2.

17...g5
Black's position is better, since White has no active possibilities.

Dolmatov – A. Sokolov
Interzonal Tournament, Manila 1990

8...b6
9 c3
In the opinion of Sergey Dolmatov, 9 f1 is more accurate, with the intention of playing 10 e5, for example, in reply to 9...d4. And 9.dxe4 10 dxe4 wxd1 11 xd1 leads to roughly the same favourable endgame for White that occurred in the game.

9...a5!? 10 f1
White intends e4–e5. In the game Ljubojevic-Kasparov, Niksic 1983 (where the moves 9 h4 h6 were included) White played 11 a4, to which Kasparov replied 11...a7!? . But after 10 a4 Dolmatov was concerned about the reply 10...d4.

10...dxe4 or 10...a4 came into consideration.

11 dxe4
12 xd1

13 b1!
0-0
If 13...a3, then 14 bxa3, attacking the b6-pawn.

14 f4 e5?!
For the sake of a few active moves it was hardly worthwhile Black shutting in his own bishop on g7 and weakening the light squares. However, in the variation 14...a3!? 15 d1! axb2 16 xb2 the b6-pawn is vulnerable, and at the board it was not easy to judge how the complications would conclude after 16...b4 17 d2! xa2 18 a1 e5!.

15 e3 e6
16 b3 axb3
17 axb3
White's position is preferable.

17...fd8
18 d2 f6
18...d3 19 d1 and 20 f1.

19 f1 f8
19...d4?! came into consideration, after which Dolmatov was intending 20 cxd4 cxd4 21 xd4 exd4 22 c4.

20 b4!
20...c4 was premature on account of 20...f7.

20...a3?

It was essential to exchange on b4, in order to open the diagonal for the dark-square bishop and possibly make use of the d4-point.

21 bxc5 bxc5
22 xc1 c8
23 xc4 xc4

23...f7? is not possible in view of 24 b7+.

24 xc4 a4
25 fd2 d6?!
26 b6 a2
27 a1 xa1
28 xa1 f5
29 d5 fxe4?

29...f7 was a tougher defence.
30 f6+ f7
31 fxe4

White now has a decisive positional advantage, which Dolmatov accurately converted into a win.

31...f5 32 a6 xe3 33 xe3 (33 xc6!?)
33...b6 34 f6+ e7 35 b6 d7 36 c6 a8 37 f2 a2 38 e2 d8 39 d3 e7
40 h4 b8?! 41 e6! d7 (41...d7 42 xe5 c6 43 xc5+) 42 c4 g2 43 a5 f8 44 c6+ c7 45 xe5 xe5+ 46 xe5 d8 47 h5 e7 48 hxg6 hxg6 49 e6 g5 50 e5 d7 51 c4 g1 52 xe5 xe5 53 e4 h3 54 xc5+ d8 55 e6+ d7 56 d4 f6 57 f5 e7 58 d3 h1 59 c4 a1 60 b5 a3+ 61 e4 d7 62 b7+ c8 63 b3 a1 64 d5 d1 65 c5

White now has a decisive positional advantage.

4) Exchange of pawns on d5

Yurtsev – Dvoretsky

Frunze 1983

8...b6

9 exd5! exd5

If 10...xd5, then 11 d4! cxd4 12 xd4 xd4 13 xd5 is strong.

11 f1 0-0
12 f4 d7
13 d4

13.h4?! was also good.

13...cxd4

14 cxd4 b7?

14...f5 was better, not fearing 15 e5 xe5 16 dxe5 b7 followed by 17...d4. But now after 15 c1 (as in the game) or 15 h4 White has a significant advantage.
King's Indian Attack (from White's Point of View)

...\(d4\) 14 ...\(xd4\) \(\text{b7}\) 15 \(\text{d2}\) \(\text{c8}\), and 16 \(c4\) does not work in view of 16...\(a6\) 17 \(b3\) \(\text{c7}\) (a recommendation by Ilya Odessky).

...\(d4\) 0-0

If 10...\(xd4\), then 11 ...\(xd4\) \(\text{bxc5}\) 12 \(\text{b3}\) with advantage to White. And if 10...\(c4\) he has the strong reply 11 \(\text{e5}\) \(\text{xd4}\) 12 \(\text{dxc4}\).

10 d4 0-0

If 10...\(xd4\), then 11 ...\(xd4\) \(\text{bxc5}\) 12 \(\text{b3}\) with advantage to White. And if 10...\(c4\) he has the strong reply 11 ...\(e5\) ...\(d4\) 12 ...\(dxc4\).

10 d4

0-0

10...\(b6\)

...\(b6\) is preferable, although after 11 \(h3\) \(\text{xf3}\) 12 ...\(xf3\) 0-0 13 ...\(f4\), intending ...\(e1\) and ...\(ad1\), White retains positional compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

Now he could have simply played 11 ...\(f4\)! 0-0 12 ...\(d6\) and 13 ...\(c5\) with the better chances. I preferred 11 ...\(g5\), and after 11...\(f5\) (11...0-0? 12 ...\(fxd4\) \(\text{f5}\!) 12 ...\(e1\) ...\(e6\) I went in for a double-edged combination: 13 \(g4\) ...\(d6\) 14 ...\(fxd4\)! (14 c3 ...\(e4\!) 14...\(xd4\) 15 ...\(xd4\) ...\(xd4\) 16 ...\(xd5\)!. After fascinating complications the game ended in a draw.

III. Black plays ...\(d6\) and ...\(ge7\)

...\(e4\) 1 \(e6\)

2 \(d3\) 2 \(d5\)

3 ...\(d2\) 3 \(c5\)

4 ...\(gf3\) 4 ...\(c6\)

5 \(g3\) 5 \(d6\)

6 ...\(g2\) 6 ...\(ge7\)

7 0-0 7 0-0

8 ...\(h4\)!?
1) **Black meets the opponent’s pawns with ...f7–f5**

Ciocaltea – Libezon
Netanya 1983

8 ... 
9 f4 
10 c3 
11 exf5 
12 ddf3

This arrangement of the white knights is typical of the given variation.

12 ... e6

Another development scheme is 13 d3!?, followed by d2, d2, e1 and a possible d3-d4.

13 ... d8
14 d2 
15 a3 
16 a4 
17 b5 
18 ... d8
19 c4!

Black intends 17...b5 18 axb5 xb5 with pressure on b2.

17 cc1!

An excellent prophylactic move. If 17...b5 White replies 18 axb5 xb5 19 cc2 followed by c1 and ce2, harmoniously deploying his pieces and fully neutralising the pressure on the b-file.

17 ... e8?

This knight retreat allows White to carry out a typical diversion on the kingside. 17...e8 was better, and if 18 cc2, then 18...d8.

18 g5

Threatening 19 wh5.

18 ... g6?!

18...d6 was preferable.

19 c4!

Not 19...dxc3? 20 xc6 followed by 21 cc3+. By blocking the queenside White has freed his hands for action on the kingside, where he is stronger.

20 w2 
21 b3 
22 w2 
23 d3 
24 e1 
25 e8 
26 g4!

In the event of 26...fxg4 27 xc4 White would have followed up with f4–f5.

27 gxf5 
27...gxf5 came into consideration, intending 28 w2 b4! 29 wh3 xd3 30 xf5 xf5 31 wxf5 wg6 32 wg4 wf6 with chances for both sides.
28 \(\text{\textit{e4}}\) \(\text{\textit{e3}}\)?

28...\(\text{\textit{ce7}}\) was better.

29 \(\text{\textit{xc6!}}\) \(\text{\textit{bxc6}}\)

29...\(\text{\textit{wxc6}}\) 30 \(\text{\textit{wx e3}}\) dxe3 31 \(\text{\textit{c3+}}\) or 30 \(\text{\textit{axe3 dxe3}}\) 31 \(\text{\textit{wb2+}}\).

30 \(\text{\textit{xe4}}\) \(\text{\textit{g4?!}}\)

31 \(\text{\textit{g2}}\) \(\text{\textit{h6}}\)

32 \(\text{\textit{g5}}\) \(\text{\textit{f8}}\)

33 \(\text{\textit{xc5}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc5}}\)

34 \(\text{\textit{xc5}}\)

Black resigned.

**Dvoretsky – Chekhov**

Sverdlovsk 1987

8 ... b6

9 f4 f5

10 exf5 exf5

11 \(\text{\textit{df3}}\) \(\text{\textit{c7?!}}\)

12 c3

It is also possible to place the bishop on e3 immediately, in order after 12...d4 13 \(\text{\textit{f2}}\) to undermine Black's centre by c2–c3.

12 ... \(\text{\textit{a6}}\)

13 \(\text{\textit{e1}}\) \(\text{\textit{ae8}}\)

14 \(\text{\textit{e3!}}\)

14 \(\text{\textit{g5}}\) suggests itself, but after 14...\(\text{\textit{wd7}}!\) there does not appear to be any favourable combination.

14 ... h6

15 d4 \(\text{\textit{d8}}\)

16 \(\text{\textit{f2}}\) cxd4?!?

17 \(\text{\textit{xd4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd4}}\)

18 \(\text{\textit{xd4}}\)

White has an overwhelming positional advantage.

2) Black does not play ...f7–f5

**Dvoretsky – Dieks**

Wijk aan Zee 1975

8 ... b6

9 f4 \(\text{\textit{c7?!}}\)

10 f5 exf5

If 10...dxe4?! there is the strong positional pawn sacrifice 11 f6! gxf6 12 \(\text{\textit{xe4}}\).

11 exf5

A quieter alternative is 11 \(\text{\textit{xf5}}\) dxe4 12 \(\text{\textit{xe7+}}\) with roughly equal chances.

11 ... f6

12 c3 \(\text{\textit{a6}}\)

12...\(\text{\textit{e5?!}}\) 13 d4 cxd4 14 cxd4 \(\text{\textit{c5}}\) looks tempting, but White has the strong manoeuvre 15 \(\text{\textit{b1}}\) and 16 \(\text{\textit{c3}}\).

13 \(\text{\textit{df3}}\) \(\text{\textit{d7}}\)

14 g4 \(\text{\textit{d6?!}}\)

15 \(\text{\textit{f2}}\) \(\text{\textit{ae8}}\)
16 $\text{h3}$!
Now Black has to reckon with g4–g5, but my main idea was to gain control of the f4-point after $\text{g2}$.

16 ... $\text{h6}$
17 $\text{g2}$ $\text{d4}$
18 $\text{c4}$ $\text{b7}$
19 $\text{f4}$

White's position is preferable. However, his opening strategy was rather risky and it probably requires refinement.

Fischer–Ivkov
Santa Monica 1966

8 ... $\text{b6}$
9 $\text{f4}$ $\text{dxe4}$
10 $\text{dxe4}$$\text{a6}$
11 $\text{e1}$

11 ... $\text{c4}$
11...$\text{e5}$ comes into consideration.

12 $\text{c3}$$\text{a5}$?!

White also stands better in the event of 12...$\text{c5}$+ 13 $\text{h1}$ e5 14 f5 $\text{c8}$ (Dvoretsky-Mikhalevishin, Tbilisi 1980). Possibly he should play 15 $\text{h5}$, intending g3–g4–g5 (but, of course, not immediately – because of the reply ...$\text{f2}$).

13 e5 $\text{c5}$+
14 $\text{h1}$$\text{d5}$

If 14...$\text{c8}$ White has the strong reply 15 b4! $\text{xb3}$ 16 $\text{xb3}$.

15 $\text{e4}$$\text{b7}$
16 $\text{h5}$$\text{e7}$
17 $\text{g4}$$\text{xe4}$?!
18 $\text{xe4}$$\text{g6}$
19 $\text{h6}$$\text{d5}$

Black also has a bad position after 19...$\text{h8}$ 20 $\text{f3}$.

20 f5 $\text{e8}$
21 fxg6 $\text{fxg6}$
22 $\text{xg6}$! $\text{d7}$
23 $\text{f4}$$\text{ad8}$
24 $\text{h5}$$\text{h8}$
25 $\text{f6}$$\text{xf6}$
26 $\text{exf6}$$\text{g8}$
27 $\text{f4}$$\text{g4}$
28 $\text{ad1}$$\text{dg8}$
29 f7!

Black resigned.

IV. Black leaves his pawn on c7

1 $\text{e4}$$\text{e6}$
2 $\text{d3}$$\text{d5}$
3 $\text{d2}$$\text{f6}$
4 $\text{gf3}$$\text{c6}$
King’s Indian Attack (from White’s Point of View)

Dvoretsky – Ek
Wijk aan Zee 1975

5 c3
Black intends to play ...e6–e5 and it is quite probable that at some point he will exchange pawns on e4. In this case the bishop will be not too well placed on g2. Therefore it makes sense to develop it on the f1–a6 diagonal. What essentially results is a Philidor Defence with reversed colours and two extra tempi for White.

5 ... e5
5...a5 is more accurate.

6 ♗e2
In such positions it is worth making the useful move b2–b4!.

6 ... a5
7 0-0 ♗e7
8 ♗e1 0-0
9 ♗c2 h6
10 ♗f1 ♗e8

(see diagram)

11 b3
One of the typical plans in such positions is b2–b3, a2–a3, ♗b2 and b3–b4, as a result of which White gains space on the queenside and creates potential threats to the e5-pawn. In reply Black did not manage to find a good arrangement of his forces.

Dvoretsky – Orlov
Moscow 1984 (time control: 30 minutes for the game)

5 c3 dx e4
6 dxe4 ♗c5

– position after 10...♗e8 –
7 ♗b5!  ♦d7
8 0-0 0-0
9 ♘e2
9 b4!? ♘b6 10 ♘e2.
9 . . . a6
10 ♘d3 e5
11 b4 ♘a7
12 ♗c4 ♘e8
13 ♘g5 h6
14 ♘h4 ♘g4
15 ♘ad1 ♘e7
16 h3 ♘h5
17 a4 ♘e6
18 ♗e3 g5
19 ♘g3 g4
19...♘xe3 was preferable.
20 hxg4 ♘xg4
21 ♗d5 ♘ac8
22 ♘c4 ♘g6
23 ♘d3
Not 23 ♗h4? ♘xf2.
23 . . . ♘e7
24 ♗h4 ♘xf2?
The decisive error. But the advantage is also with White after 24...♘g5 25 ♘xe7+ ♘xe7
26 ♘c2.
25 ♘xe7+ ♘xe7
26 ♘xf2 ♘xe2
27 ♗xf2
Black resigned.

V. Exploiting the weakness of the light squares

Dvoretsky – Rogozhnikov
USSR Schoolboys Championship, Moscow
1965
1 g3 ♘f6
2 ♗g2 d5
3 ♗f3 c5
4 0-0 ♘c6
5 d3 e5
6 ♗bd2 ♘e7
7 e4 0-0
8 c3 dxe4?
An unfortunate exchange. Now White acquires a clear plan of play against the weaknesses at c4, d5 and f5.
9 dxe4 ♘c7
10 ♘c2 ♘e8
11 ♘e1
I did not play 11 ♗c4, to avoid suggesting to the opponent the correct arrangement of his forces: 11...♘e6 12 ♗e3 h6.
11 . . . ♘f8
12 ♗f1 g6?
White's next move should have been prevented by 12...h6.
13 ♘g5! ♘g7
14 ♘xf6
White wants to seize control of the d5-point and so he exchanges one of its defenders – the knight on f6. Of course, he could have first played his knight to e3.
14 . . . ♘xf6
15 ♗e3 ♘e6
16 ♗f1!
And now he exchanges another defender of the d5-point – Black’s light-square bishop.

16 ... a6
17  
18  
19  
20  
Transformation of an advantage: White gives up his central point, but spoils the opponent’s pawn structure. With the intermediate move 19  he lured the enemy knight to the unfortunate square e7, from where it will have to return with loss of tempo to c6.

Weaker was 20 c4?!  21  22 exd5  g7 followed by ...f7–f5 and ...e5–e4, or 22 cxd5 c4, intending ...f6–e7–c5(d6).

20 ... fxe6
21  
22  
The exchange of rooks makes it harder for Black to defend the doubled pawns and widens the scope of the white queen.

22 ... c6
23 a4!

Now the queenside pawns also become vulnerable.

23 ...  
24  
25  
26  
Another transformation of advantage. White exchanges the opponent’s bad bishop, but in return he further weakens Black’s central pawns and also the dark squares on the kingside, where an invasion will be threatened.

26 ... xf6
27 axb5 axb5
28  
29 h4  
30  b4
If 30...c4 there follows 31  and 32  .

31  
32 bxc3  
33  
Carried away by his plan of  and , White overlooked the possibility of  !.

33 ...  f7
34  
35  c7!

And soon Black resigned.

Dvoretsky – Kupreichik
USSR Championship, First League, Odessa 1974

1 e4  c5
2  f3  e6
3 d3  d5
4  
5 g3  dxe4?!
6 dxe4  b6
If 7  there is the strong reply 7...a6, and therefore I develop my bishop on the f1–a6 diagonal.

7  
8  e2!

It is important to prevent ...a7–a6. Now if 8...a6? there follows 9  b4 10  11  with advantage to White, only not 11  in view of 11...c3!.

8 ...  f6
9 c3  e7
10  0-0
11 a4  c7
12 \( \text{Re}1 \)

12 \( \text{c}4 \)? \text{a}6 13 \( \text{f}4 \) \text{w}b7 is weaker, but 12 \text{e}5 \( \text{d}5 \) 13 \( \text{d}3 \) came into consideration.

12 . . .  \text{e}5

Black is afraid of \text{e}4–\text{e}5, and so he weakens his \text{d}5-point. White’s subsequent plan is roughly the same as in the previous game.

13 \( \text{f}1 \) \text{a}6!?

14 \( \text{d}3 \)

14 \( \text{xa}6 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) is unclear.

14 . . . \( \text{a}5 \)

If 14 . . . \text{h}6, then 15 \( \text{e}3 \) followed by 16 \( \text{f}5 \).

15 \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{b}3 \)??

16 \( \text{xf}6! \) \( \text{xf}6 \)

17 \( \text{a}3 \) \( \text{e}6 \)

After 17 . . . \( \text{a}5 \) 18 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 19 \( \text{xa}6 \) \text{c}4 20 \( \text{b}5 \) Black has no compensation for the lost pawn.

18 \( \text{e}3 \)

18 \( \text{xa}6 \)?! \text{c}4 19 \( \text{b}5 \) \( \text{e}7 \) was less clear.

18 . . . \( \text{e}7 \)

19 \( \text{c}4! \)

Stronger than 19 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{a}5 \).

19 . . . \( \text{xc}4 \)

20 \( \text{xc}4 \) \( \text{a}5 \)

21 \( \text{a}1 \) \( \text{b}5 \)??

An unsuccessful attempt to confuse matters. Black should have patiently defended by 21 . . . \( \text{xc}4 \) 22 \( \text{w}4 \) \( \text{fd}8 \) 23 \( \text{ed}1 \) \( \text{f}6 \), intending . . . \( \text{c}6 \).

22 \text{axb}5 \text{axb}5

23 \( \text{xb}5 \) \( \text{c}4 \)!!

24 \( \text{a}4! \)

Black loses material, without gaining any compensation.

24 . . . \( \text{fb}8 \) 25 \( \text{xc}4 \) \( \text{xc}4 \) 26 \( \text{xc}4 \) \( \text{b}6 \)!!

27 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{b}7 \) (27 . . . \text{xb}2 28 \( \text{c}8 \)!!) 28 \text{b}4 \( \text{f}8 \) 29 \( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{wd}8 \) 28 \text{b}4 \( \text{f}8 \) 29 \( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{wd}8 \) 30 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{wd}2 \) 31 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{wc}2 \) 32 \text{e}5 \( \text{a}2 \) 33 \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{b}2 \) 34 \( \text{c}8 \)

Black resigned.

VI. Black chooses a Sicilian set-up – he does not play . . . \text{d}7–\text{d}5

1 \text{e}4 \text{c}5

2 \( \text{f}3 \) \text{e}6

3 \text{d}3 \( \text{c}6 \)

4 \text{g}3 \text{g}6

Black intends . . . \( \text{g}7 \), . . . \( \text{ge}7 \), . . . \text{0–0}, . . . \text{d}7–\text{d}6, . . . \text{b}8 and . . . \text{b}7–\text{b}5. In my view, this is one of the best systems of defence. If now White develops his knight on \text{c}3, it transposes into the Closed Variation of the Sicilian Defence. Here we will examine other plans for White.
1) 5 d4 variation

Dvoretsky – Filipowicz
Varna 1980

5 d4!?

6 Qxd4
cxd4

The loss of a tempo (d2–d3–d4) is not as pointless as it may appear at first sight. Black has to reckon with Qb5, and, in addition, after the development of his bishop at g7 the d6-square will come weak. Here the d-file is not blocked for White by his bishop on d3, as in a line of the Paulsen Variation, in which a similar situation arises (1 e4 c5 2 Qf3 e6 3 d4 cxd4 4 Qxd4 a6 5 Qd3 g6!?).

6 . .

a6
7 Qg2

7 c4!? Qg7 8 Qe3 also comes into consideration.

7 . .

Qg7
8 Qxc6
Qxc6

The endgame after 8...Qxc6 9 Wxd8+ Qxd8 10 Qd2 is obviously in favour of White, since the opponent’s dark squares on the queenside are weak.

9 0-0

Qe7

If 9...d5, then 10 exd5 cxd5 11 c4 and 12 Qc3.

10 Wd6!

Wxa5

After 10...0-0 White consolidates his advantage by 11 Qc3! (less accurate is 11 c4?! a5 followed by ...Qa6). The best chances of a successful defence are promised by Mikhail Tal’s recommendation of 10...Qb7, intending ...Qc8.

11 Qd2?!

Nothing is given by 11 Qd2?! Qe5 12 Wd3 d5 13 Qb3 Wb5, but it was possible to play either 11 Qa3?! Qe5 12 Wd1?! (12 Wd3?! d5 13 Qd2 Wc7 is weaker) 12...d5 13 exd5 exd5 (13...cxd5? 14 Qc4!) 14 Wb1, or 12 Qd2! Qxd5 13 Qxa5 with advantage in the endgame.

11 . .

Wxe5
12 Wxe5
Qxe5
13 Qc3
Qxc3

If 13...f6, then 14 f4 is not bad, but 14 Wxe5 fxe5 15 Qd2, with the extremely unpleasant threat of 16 Qc4, is even better.

14 Qxc3

d5
15 Qa4
Qb8
16 b3
0-0
17 f4

17 Qfd1, intending 18 Qac1 and 19 c4 with an advantage, was evidently even stronger.

17 . .

Qd8?

This makes it easier for White to play c2–c4.

18 Qfd1

h6
19 c4

g5

19...d4 20 Qd3 f6 21 e5 or 20...g5 21 Qad1 gxf4 22 gxf4 Qg6 23 Qxd4 Qxd4 24 Qxd4 Qxf4 25 Qd8+ was bad for Black.

20 Qd4!

Qxf4
21 gxf4
Qg6
22 exd5
Qxd5
23 cxd5
Qxd5
24 Qc3!
Qe6
25 Qad1
Qg7
26 Qxd5
Qxd5
27 Qxd5

White is a healthy pawn to the good.
Dvoretsky – Chubinsky
Philadelphia 1990

5 d4 cxd4
6 cxd4 a6
7 g2 c7!? 8 0-0 g7

Now if 9 c6 Black replies 9 ... dxc6!. This means that White must aim to set up a strong pawn-piece centre.

9 e3 g7
10 c4!
11 c3

11 ... d6

In the event of 11 ... cxd4 12 dx4 wxc4 13 xg7 xg7 14 c1 (or 14 d6) White has more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

12 c1 g7?!
13 cxd4 e5?!

13 ... cxd4 14 xd4 e5 really was better.

14 e3 e6
15 d5 xd5
16 cxd5

White has gained a great positional advantage. If 16 ... wa5 he was intending 17 wd2! wxa2 18 wb4 or 17 xd2 18 xd2 followed by 19 b4.

16 ... w7
17 wb3 f5?!

Black’s position is strategically hopeless.

Dvoretsky – Filipowicz
Polanica Zdroj 1973

5 d4 g7?!
6 dxc5 b6

An interesting idea. After 6 ... a5+ 7 c3 wxc5 8 c3 Black would stand worse.

7 cxb6 xb6
8 cxb6 d5
9 d3 g7
10 c3 0-0
11 a4 a5
12 a4

The opponent has gained definite although hardly sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

12 ... b8
12 ... e5 came into consideration.
13 a3! b7
14 b3 a7
15 e2 fd8

It made sense to place this rook on e8, in order to prepare ...e6-e5.

16 e1 a8
17 h4!

The active possibilities for both sides are restricted, and so White makes a semi-waiting pawn move, which in some cases may nevertheless come in useful.

17 ... d4?! 18 c4! a6
19 xb8 b8
20 c2 b7
21 f1! dxc3
22 bxc3 xc4

22...b3?? is unsuitable because of 23 xb3 xb3 24 xa5 (or 24 cd2).

23 xc4 c8
24 d2 e5!
25 xe5 xe5
26 b5 c7?!
27 e3

27 g2!? is also strong.

27 ... c6
28 a2

White has retained the advantage.

I think that quite a good reaction to d3-d4 is a positional pawn sacrifice.

5 d4 cxd4
6 xd4 g7!
7 b5 d5
8 exd5 exd5
9 xd5 xe7+!
10 e2 g4!

The right way – it is important to prevent the simplification of the position by 11 d6.

2) Bishop sortie to g5

Veselovsky – Dvoretsky
Moscow Championship 1973

5 g5!? c7
6 g2 g7
7 c3 ge7
8 d2 h6

Black avoids the exchange of bishops: 8...0-0 9 h6.

9 e3 d4
10 0-0 d6
11 e1 d7
3) Plan with c2–c3 and d3-d4

Fischer – Panno
Buenos Aires 1970

5  \( \texttt{g2} \)  \( \texttt{g7} \)
6 0-0  \( \texttt{dxe7} \)
7  \( \texttt{c3} \)  \( \texttt{d6} \)

If 7...0-0, then 8 e5 is unpleasant.

8  \( \texttt{c3} \) 0-0

8...e5? is a sound continuation – see the following game.

9 d4  cxd4
10 cxd4

10 ... d5?!

10...\( \texttt{b6} \) 11 d5  \( \texttt{xb2} \) 12  \( \texttt{xb2} \)  \( \texttt{xb2} \) is stronger, leading to rather sharp variations, not unfavourable for Black. For example: 13 dxc6  \( \texttt{xa1} \) 14  \( \texttt{b3} \) (14 cxb7  \( \texttt{xb7} \) 15  \( \texttt{b3} \)  \( \texttt{d5} \) 16 exd5  \( \texttt{ab8} \) 17  \( \texttt{d3} \)  \( \texttt{xd5} \) 14...  \( \texttt{xc6} \) 15  \( \texttt{c3} \)  \( \texttt{d4} \) 16  \( \texttt{xa1} \)  \( \texttt{xb3} \) 17 axb3  \( \texttt{d7} \) (Ljubojevic-Hüburn, Buenos Aires 1998), or 13  \( \texttt{bd2} \)  \( \texttt{a5} \) 14  \( \texttt{a4} \)  \( \texttt{b6} \) 15 e5  \( \texttt{xd5} \) 16 exd6  \( \texttt{w8} \) 17  \( \texttt{e5} \) b6 18 d7  \( \texttt{b7} \).

11 e5

Now White’s chances are preferable. It is not easy to attack his centre: 11...\( \texttt{f5} \) 12  \( \texttt{c3} \)  \( \texttt{wb6} \) 13  \( \texttt{a4} \), or 11...f6 12 exf6  \( \texttt{xf6} \) 13  \( \texttt{h6} \).

11 ...  \( \texttt{d7} \)

12  \( \texttt{c3} \)  \( \texttt{c8} \)
13  \( \texttt{f4} \)  \( \texttt{a5} \)
14  \( \texttt{c1} \)  b5
15 b3!  b4
16  \( \texttt{e2} \)  \( \texttt{b5} \)

16...\( \texttt{xc1} \) was more accurate.

17  \( \texttt{wd2} \)  \( \texttt{ac6} \)
18 g4  \( \texttt{a5} \)?

In a cramped position one should aim for exchanges. 18...\( \texttt{xe2} \) was essential. However, after 19  \( \texttt{xe2} \)  \( \texttt{b6} \) 20  \( \texttt{e3} \)  \( \texttt{b8} \) 21  \( \texttt{f1} \) White would have stood better.

19  \( \texttt{g3} \)  \( \texttt{b6} \)
20 h4!  \( \texttt{b8} \)
21  \( \texttt{h6} \)  \( \texttt{d7} \)
22  \( \texttt{g5} \)!

Threatening 22  \( \texttt{xe7} \)  \( \texttt{xg7} \) 23  \( \texttt{xe7} \) or 23  \( \texttt{h5} \).

22 ...  \( \texttt{xc1} \)
23  \( \texttt{xc1} \)  \( \texttt{xe6} \)

Black also has a difficult position after 23...f6!? 24 exf6  \( \texttt{hxh6} \) 25  \( \texttt{xe6} \)  \( \texttt{xf6} \) 26  \( \texttt{hxh6} \).

24  \( \texttt{xe6} \)  \( \texttt{c8} \)
25  \( \texttt{xc8} \)  \( \texttt{xc8} \)
26 h5!  \( \texttt{d8} \)?

It was necessary to play 26...\( \texttt{f8} \) 27  \( \texttt{f4} \) (27  \( \texttt{c1} \)?) 27...\( \texttt{c7} \) (28 h6 or 28  \( \texttt{g5} \) was threatened), although after 28  \( \texttt{f1} \)!?  \( \texttt{xf1} \) 29  \( \texttt{xf1} \) White would have retained an obvious advantage.

27  \( \texttt{g5} \)  \( \texttt{f8} \)
28  \( \texttt{e4} \)!!

A spectacular breakthrough of the enemy defences. However, 28  \( \texttt{xe4} \)!?  \( \texttt{xe4} \) 29  \( \texttt{xe4} \) is totally bad, while if 28...\( \texttt{e8} \), then 29 hxg6  \( \texttt{hxg6} \) 30  \( \texttt{h5} \) is decisive.

28 ...  \( \texttt{e7} \)
28...dxe4 29  \( \texttt{xe4} \) is totally bad, while if 28...\( \texttt{e8} \), then 29 hxg6  \( \texttt{hxg6} \) 30  \( \texttt{h5} \) is decisive.
King's Indian Attack (from White's Point of View)

29 \(\texttt{Qxh7!}\) \(\texttt{Qxh7}\)  
30 h\texttt{xg6} \(\texttt{fxg6}\)  
30...\(\texttt{Qf8}\) 31 g7 leads to a quick mate.  
31 \(\texttt{Qxg6}\) \(\texttt{Qg5}\)  
31...\(\texttt{Wg7}\) 32 \(\texttt{Qxh7+ Wxh7}\) 33 \(\texttt{Wxe6+}\) is also completely hopeless.  
32 \(\texttt{Qh5}\) \(\texttt{Qf3+}\)  
33 \(\texttt{Qg2}\) \(\texttt{Qh4+}\)  
34 \(\texttt{Qg3}\) \(\texttt{Qxg6}\)  
35 \(\texttt{Qf6+!}\) \(\texttt{Qf7}\)  
36 \(\texttt{Wh7+}\)  
Black resigned.

Fang – Dvoretsky

Philadelphia 1991 (time control: 45 minutes for the game)  
5 \(\texttt{Qg2}\) \(\texttt{Qg7}\)  
6 \(\texttt{0-0}\) \(\texttt{Qge7}\)  
7 \(\texttt{Qe1}\) \(\texttt{d6}\)  
8 \(\texttt{c3}\) \(\texttt{e5?!}\)  
9 \(\texttt{Qbd2}\)  
The attempt to break through immediately in the centre by 9 \(\texttt{Qe3}\) 0-0 10 d4 is unsuccessful. Black replies 10...exd4 11 cxd4, and now either 11...\(\texttt{Qg4}\) (although then he has to reckon with the exchange sacrifice 12 dxc5), or 11...\(\texttt{d5?!}\).  
After 9 a3 0-0 10 b4 h6 it is wrong to play 11 bxc5? dxc5 12 c4 in view of 12...\(\texttt{f5!}\) 13 \(\texttt{Qc3}\) (13 \(\texttt{exf5? e4}\) 14...\(\texttt{f4}\) 14 \(\texttt{Qd5}\) \texttt{g5} with advantage to Black (Djindjihashvili–Dvoretsky, Philadelphia 1991), while 11 \(\texttt{Qbd2}\) transposes into the game which we are now examining.  
9 ... 0-0  
10 a3 h6  
In the event of 10...\(\texttt{a5?!}\) 11 a4 White's position is preferable.  
11 \(\texttt{b4}\) \(\texttt{Qe6}\)  
A different development scheme was tried in the game Lau–Hübner, Munich 1988: 11...\(\texttt{b6}\) 12 \(\texttt{Qb2}\) \(\texttt{b7}\) 13 \(\texttt{Wb3}\) \(\texttt{Wd7}\).

12 \(\texttt{b2}\) \(\texttt{Wd7}\)  
13 d4?!  
A clever, but dubious pawn sacrifice. However, also after other continuations Black would not have stood badly. For example: 13 \(\texttt{We2}\) \(\texttt{Aae8}\) 14 \(\texttt{Wf1}\) f5 (14...\(\texttt{a6?!}\)?) 15 b5 \(\texttt{Qd8}\) 16 d4 exd4 17 cxd4 fxe4 18 \(\texttt{Qxe4}\) \(\texttt{Qg4!}\) 19 \(\texttt{Qed2}\) \(\texttt{Qf5}\) (Dominguez–Dvoretsky, Tarrassa 1996). 13 \(\texttt{Qb3}\) b6 14 d4 comes into consideration.  
13 ... \texttt{exd4}  
14 cxd4 \texttt{cxb4}  
15 \(\texttt{Wb1}\)  
After 15 axb4 \(\texttt{Qxb4}\) White would not have time to prevent ...\(\texttt{d6-d5}\) in view of the threat of 16...\(\texttt{Qd3}\).  
15 ... \texttt{bxa3}  
16 \(\texttt{Qxa3}\) \texttt{d5}  
17 \(\texttt{Qe5!}\) \(\texttt{Qxe5}\)  
18 \(\texttt{dxe5}\) \texttt{d4}  
19 \(\texttt{f4}\) \(\texttt{Qc6}\)  
This and the following moves were made with the aim of safeguarding the d4-pawn. Probably it should have been disregarded for the sake of rapidly advancing the queenside pawns: 19...\(\texttt{b5?!}\) 20 \(\texttt{Qf3}\) (not 20 \(\texttt{f5? gxf5}\) 21 \(\texttt{exf5}\) \(\texttt{Qxf5}\)) 20...\(\texttt{a5}\) 21 \(\texttt{Qxd4}\) b4.  
20 \(\texttt{Qf3}\)  
20 \(\texttt{Wf1}\) (trying to frighten the opponent with
the advance f4–f5) 20...\texttt{c}h3 21 \texttt{c}4 did not work in view of 21...\texttt{x}g2 22 \texttt{x}g2 b5! 23 \texttt{d}d6 \texttt{x}e5! 24 fxe5 \texttt{x}e5, and the white knight is trapped.

\begin{align*}
20 & \ldots & \texttt{c}4 \\
21 & \texttt{d}1 & \texttt{e}2 \\
22 & \texttt{d}2 & \texttt{x}f3
\end{align*}

Of course, not 22...d3?! 23 \texttt{e}1 \texttt{d}4? 24 \texttt{f}xd3.

\begin{align*}
23 & \texttt{x}f3 & \texttt{f}d8 \\
24 & \texttt{e}2 & b5?!
\end{align*}

Playing on the opponent’s time-trouble. After 24...\texttt{ac}8 25 \texttt{d}1 White would have retained compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

\begin{align*}
25 & \texttt{x}b5 & \texttt{ab}8 \\
26 & \texttt{xd}4?
\end{align*}

Now Black’s trappy tactics prove justified. But meanwhile, after 26 \texttt{f}1! the advantage would have passed to his opponent.

\begin{align*}
26 & \ldots & \texttt{e}7?!
\end{align*}

Obviously White was hoping for 26...\texttt{xd}4+? 27 \texttt{xd}4 \texttt{xd}4 28 \texttt{d}3!. I quickly made a move planned beforehand, not noticing the winning continuation 26...\texttt{c}7! 27 \texttt{xd}8+ \texttt{xd}8.

\begin{align*}
27 & \texttt{xd}8+ & \texttt{xd}8 \\
28 & \texttt{d}3 & \texttt{b}4 \\
29 & \texttt{a}2 & \texttt{c}6
\end{align*}

Threatening 30...\texttt{b}6+ followed by ...\texttt{b}4. After 30 \texttt{h}1 \texttt{b}3 Black would have retained the initiative, which in time-trouble would be not easy to extinguish. But now came a final oversight.

\begin{align*}
30 & \texttt{c}2?? & \texttt{b}6+ \\
31 & \texttt{g}2 & \texttt{b}4 \\
32 & \texttt{c}4 & \texttt{xa}2 \\
33 & \texttt{d}4 & \texttt{b}4 \\
34 & \texttt{ax}a7 & \texttt{d}2+ \\
35 & \texttt{h}3 & \texttt{b}2
\end{align*}

White resigned.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\texttt{a} & \texttt{b} & \texttt{c} & \texttt{d} & \texttt{e} & \texttt{f} \\
\hline
\texttt{g} & \texttt{h} & \texttt{i} & \texttt{j} & \texttt{k} & \texttt{l} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}
After 8...cxd4 9 cxd4 it is unfavourable for Black to play 9...\(\text{b}6\)? (which, I should remind you, worked with the inclusion of the moves \(\text{e}1\) and \(\text{d}7\)–\(\text{d}6\)) 10 d5 \(\text{xb}2\) 11 \(\text{xb}2\) \(\text{xb}2\) 12 dxc6 \(\text{xa}1\) 13 cxd7 \(\text{d}8\) 14 \(\text{b}3\) (Bologan). He continues 9...d5 10 e5, and a position from the previously analysed game Fischer–Panno is reached with an extra tempo for Black (there the rook already stood at e1), resulting from the fact that the pawn has advanced to d5 in one move – from d7.

Now 10...\(\text{b}5\)? is incorrect in view of the weakening of the c5-square: 11 \(\text{bd}2\) a5 12 \(\text{b}3\) a4 13 \(\text{c}5\) \(\text{b}6\) 14 \(\text{f}4\) f6 15 \(\text{e}1\) with advantage to White (Bologan–Kurz, Biel 1995).

Black’s best counter-plan involves pressure on the enemy centre. But if it is implemented inaccurately White still retains the better chances, as shown by two games by Ljubomir Ljubojevic.

10...f6 11 \(\text{e}1\) fxe5 12 dxe5 \(\text{d}7\) 13 \(\text{c}3\) \(\text{c}8\) 14 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 15 \(\text{d}2\) \(\text{a}5\) 16 b3 \(\text{b}5\)? (16...h6 was essential) 17 \(\text{g}5\) \(\text{b}6\) 18 g4 and the knight has no move (Ljubojevic–Tatai, Manila 1973).

10...\(\text{f}5\) 11 \(\text{c}3\) f6 12 \(\text{e}1\) (12 \(\text{f}4\)?! fxe5 13 dxe5 allows counterplay that is thematic for this variation: 13...h6 14 h4 \(\text{x}4\)! 15 \(\text{x}4\) \(\text{x}4\)! 16 gxf4 \(\text{x}4\)! 16 gxf4 \(\text{x}4\) with excellent compensation for the sacrificed exchange) 12...\(\text{x}5\) (if 12...\(\text{d}7\) there is the unpleasant reply 13 g4) 13 dxe5 \(\text{d}7\) 14 \(\text{f}4\) h6 15 h4 \(\text{e}8\) (here the same idea 15...\(\text{c}4\) 16 \(\text{x}4\) \(\text{x}4\) – if 16...g5 White has both \(\text{g}6\), and 17 \(\text{d}5\)? – 17 gxf4 \(\text{x}4\) does not work on account of 18 \(\text{d}5\)! \(\text{d}8\) 19 \(\text{f}6+\) \(\text{x}6\) 20 e6 with a great advantage for White) 16 \(\text{d}2\) \(\text{b}6\)! 17 f1 \(\text{b}4\) 18 \(\text{x}4\) 22 \(\text{c}5\) \(\text{f}7\) 23 a3!, and White won (Ljubojevic–Timman, Hilversum 1973).

Now you will be able to properly appreciate the subtle prophylactic move 12...\(\text{h}8\)!, made in the game Dvoretsky–Kalinin, Wijk aan Zee 1999. In the tactical variations involving ...\(\text{x}4\) White will not have the counter-stroke \(\text{x}5\)! If 13 \(\text{f}4\) there follows 13...g5 14 e6 \(\text{x}6\) 15 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{e}5\) (15...\(\text{e}5\)?) 16 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{b}6\).

13 h4 \(\text{d}7\) 14 \(\text{f}4\) (in reply to 14 g4 Black can sacrifice a piece: 14...\(\text{x}4\)! 15 \(\text{x}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 14...\(\text{x}5\) 15 dxe5? \(\text{x}4\)! 16 \(\text{x}4\) g5, and the advantage is already with Black. White should have played 15 \(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) (or 15...\(\text{xe}5\) 16 \(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{b}6\)) 16 \(\text{xe}5\) with chances for both sides.

After this lengthy theoretical excursion, let us return to the Fischer–Duraao game.

8...d6?!

Black hopes to exchange on d4 a little later, at a more appropriate moment, but his hopes are not destined to be realised.

9 dxc5! \(\text{xc}5\)

10 \(\text{e}2\) \(\text{b}6\)

11 e5

11 \(\text{d}1\)? is inaccurate in view of 11...\(\text{a}6\).

11...

12 \(\text{e}1\) \(\text{a}6\)

13 \(\text{e}4\) \(\text{a}7\)

14 \(\text{bd}2\) \(\text{d}3\)

15 \(\text{h}4\)

16 \(\text{xd}8\) \(\text{xd}8\)

17 a4! \(\text{a}6\)
Black's pieces are actively placed, and therefore it may seem that he stands quite well. But in fact in his position there are rather many weak squares, and this factor gives White a great positional advantage. Fischer begins the processing of these weaknesses with the exchange of the light-square bishops.

18 \(\text{\texttt{\#}f1!}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}xf1}\)
19 \(\text{\texttt{\#}xf1}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}de7}\)
20 \(\text{\texttt{\#}c4}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}c8}\)
21 \(\text{\texttt{\#}g5}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}6e7}\)
22 \(\text{\texttt{\#}fd2}\) \(\text{h6}\)
23 \(\text{\texttt{\#}xe7}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}xe7}\)
24 \(\text{\texttt{\#}a3!}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}c7}\)
25 \(\text{\texttt{\#}b3}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}c6}\)
26 \(\text{\texttt{\#}e4}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}f8}\)
27 \(\text{\texttt{\#}e2}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}e7}\)
28 \(\text{f4}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}f8}\)
29 \(\text{g4}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}e8}\)
30 \(\text{\texttt{\#}f1}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}d5}\)
31 \(\text{\texttt{\#}f3}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}d8}\)
32 \(\text{\texttt{\#}h3}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}f8}\)
33 \(\text{\texttt{\#}xa5!}\)

Fischer's play creates a highly artistic impression. It is instructive to follow how he exchanged the pieces that he did not need, strengthened to the maximum the placing of his remaining pieces, and finally landed a decisive blow. 33...\texttt{\#xa5} loses to 34 \(\text{\texttt{\#}f6+}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}e7}\) 35 \(\text{\texttt{\#}b7+}\).

33...\(\text{\texttt{\#}c7}\) 34 \(\text{\texttt{\#}c4}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}a7}\) 35 \(\text{\texttt{\#}xb6}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}xb6}\) 36 \(\text{\texttt{\#}xb6}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}d8}\) 37 \(\text{\texttt{\#}f6+}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}d8}\) 38 \(\text{\texttt{\#}c6}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}c7}\) 39 \(\text{\texttt{\#}d3+}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}c8}\) 40 \(\text{\texttt{\#}xc7+}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}xc7}\) 41 \(\text{\texttt{\#}d7+}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}c6}\) 42 \(\text{\texttt{\#}xf7}\) Black resigned.

\textbf{Bukhtin – Dvoretsky}
Moscow Championship 1972

5 \(\text{\texttt{\#}g2}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}g7}\)
6 \(c3!\)?

An attempt to begin active play in the centre, by saving another tempo: on castling.

6... \(\text{\texttt{\#}ge7}\)

It is possible, of course, to give the play a quite different character, by choosing 6... \(d5!\), but this is sometimes not to the taste of those who aim with Black for Sicilian positions.

7 \(\text{\texttt{\#}e3}\)
7 \(d4?!\) is premature: 7...\(\text{\texttt{\#}xd4}\) 8 \(\text{\texttt{\#}xd4}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}b6}\).

7... \(d6\)
7...\(b6!?\) was worth trying, and if 8 \(d4\), then not 8...\(d5?!\) 9 \(\text{\texttt{\#}xc5}\), but either 8...\(d6\) or 8...\(\text{\texttt{\#}xd4!}\). After 8 0-0 0-0 9 \(d4\) in the game Radulov–Taimanov, Interzonal Tournament, Leningrad 1973, White gained a promising position after 9...\(\text{\texttt{\#}xd4}\) 10 \(\text{\texttt{\#}xd4}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}b7}\) 11 \(\text{\texttt{\#}xc6}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}xc6}\) 12 \(\text{\texttt{\#}d6}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}c8}\) 13 \(\text{\texttt{\#}d2}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}c7}\) 14 \(\text{\texttt{\#}a3}\), but 9...\(\text{\texttt{\#}a6}\) 10 \(\text{\texttt{\#}e1}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}xd4}\) 11 \(\text{\texttt{\#}xd4}\) \(\text{\texttt{\#}e5}\) came into consideration.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

8 0-0

The logical consequence of the move order chosen by White was the immediate 8 \(d4\). If 8...\(\text{\texttt{\#}xd4}\) there follows 9 \(\text{\texttt{\#}xd4}\) 0-0 10 0-0, while if 8...\(\text{\texttt{\#}b6}\) – simply 9 \(\text{\texttt{\#}d2}\). Possibly Black should maintain the tension in the centre by 8...\(b6!?!\), but this is already something of a concession compared with the variations analysed earlier.

8... \(0-0\)
9 \(\text{\texttt{\#}bd2}\)
The consequences of 9 d4 have been seen in our analysis of the previous game. White employed a different arrangement of his forces in the game Udov-Dvoretsky, Moscow Championship 1967: 9 \( \text{W}c1 \text{E}a8 \) (avoiding the exchange of the dark-square bishops after 10 \( \text{h}6 \)) 10 a3 b8 11 d1?! (11 \( \text{h}6 \text{h}8 \) 12 c2; 11 d4?) 11...b5 12 c2 b4 13 d4 bxc3 14 bxc3 \( \text{a}5 \) (14...cxd4 15 \( \text{c}x \)d4) 15 \( \text{a}3 \) \( \text{x}a3 \) 16 \( \text{c}x \)a3, and now Black should have played 16...d5!.

9...b6

The pawn does not manage to advance to b4, since the variation 9...b5?! 10 d4 b4 11 dxc5 bxc3 12 bxc3 is advantageous to White. However, it made sense to take control of the d4-square by 9...e5?!. The arrangement of Black’s forces is the optimal one both with his pawn on e6, and on e5.

10 d4 a5?!
11 a4

Changing the character of the play by 11 dxc5 bxc5 12 e5? came into consideration.

11...\( \text{a}6 \)
12 Exe1 cxd4

This exchange could have been delayed, by choosing 12...\( \text{c}8 \)?, and if 13 dxc5, then not 13...dxc5?! 14 \( \text{b}3 \) followed by \( \text{f}1 \) or \( \text{c}4 \), but 13...bxc5.

13 \( \text{x}d4 \) \( \text{x}d4 \)

In the event of 13...\( \text{e}5 \) White would have neutralised the bishop at a6 by 14 \( \text{b}5 \).

14 cxd4

14 \( \text{x}d4 \) was preferable, when White’s position would have remained more pleasant.

14...\( \text{c}6 \)

Another possibility was 14...\( \text{c}8 \), and if 15 \( \text{b}3 \) – either 15...d5, or 15...\( \text{c}6 \) 16 d5 \( \text{d}4 \) 17 \( \text{x}d4 \) \( \text{x}d4 \) 18 dxe6 \( \text{f}6 \)?.

15 \( \text{b}1 \)! \( \text{b}4 \)
16 \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{x}f1 \)
17 \( \text{x}f1 \) d5
18 e5 \( \text{c}8 \)
19 \( \text{a}3 \)

19 \( \text{c}3 \)?, intending 20 h4, looks more natural. Black would have replied 19...f6.

19...\( \text{d}7 \)
20 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{f}6 \)

Draw. The two sides’ chances are roughly equal.
Difficult in study, easy in battle', Suvorov liked to repeat, tirelessly urging his generals to make practice attacks. This ageless precept of the great commander is also fully applicable to chess. The more difficult and painstaking your preparatory work, the easier and more inspired the game itself will be!

Preparation for a game is a highly individual process. And here much depends on what kind of opening arsenal you have at your disposal. Some players solve this problem fairly simply: they do not prepare for every specific opponent, but make preparations for an entire tournament, deciding beforehand the range of openings that they are intending to employ. They hope that, if they encounter any surprise in the opening, they will be able to deal with the situation directly at the board. Usually these are players with a narrow, well-developed opening repertoire.

An example is provided by grandmaster Andrey Sokolov. To predict what opening you will have in a game with him is not at all difficult: with White he exclusively chooses e2–e4, and with Black, say, the Queen's Indian Defence. And that's all! Andrey sticks accurately to his opening repertoire, but he knows it thoroughly, of course, since he has great experience of playing his systems. Sokolov reckons that if an opponent succeeds in casting doubts on some variation of his, he will quickly be able to repair it; for his next opponent it will be significantly more difficult to find a defect in this variation, and in the end he will have a completely 'fireproof' repertoire, which is especially important when playing Black. In general, such logic, such an approach to the solving of opening problems, has a right to exist.

As a rule, players nevertheless do not stick too rigidly to such tactics, preferring occasionally to vary their opening set-ups. Because otherwise it becomes just too easy for their opponents to prepare.

As an example I will show a preparation which I made with Mark Dvoretsky at the Candidates Tournament in Montpellier before my game with the Cuban player Jesus Nogueiras. At that time he had a rather narrow repertoire, and we noticed that in the Queen's Gambit he often employed one and same variation, a very risky one, in my view. Delving into the position, we found a new plan, which I in fact employed in the game. The novelty proved uncommonly effective! It need hardly be said how much our task was eased by the narrowness of the opponent's opening repertoire.

Yusupov – Nogueiras
Candidates Tournament, Montpellier 1985
Queen's Gambit

1 d4 d5
2 c4 e6
3 c3 c6
4 f3 f6
5 g5 bd7
6 cxd5 exd5
7 e3 d6
8 d3 f8

It was this set-up that Nogueiras used to employ.
Black wants to play \( \ldots \Box g6, \ldots h7-h6 \) and force the exchange on \( f6 \). An obvious drawback to his plan is the fact that he has already moved the same piece twice in the opening, and he intends to move it a third time, which clearly violates the principles of development. In addition, \( 8 \ldots \Box f8 \) delays castling. All this encourages White to play actively.

\[ \text{9 } \Box e5 \]

This move suggests itself. Black has lifted his control of \( e5 \), and the white knight promptly heads there. In reply to \( 9 \ldots \Box g6 \) there follows \( 10 \text{ f4} \). The plan involving the occupation of the central \( e5 \)-point was introduced back in the 19th century by the great American player Harry Nelson Pillsbury. Here is a more recent example: the game Chernin–Cvetkovic (Belgrade 1988) went 10...0-0 11 \( \Box c2 \) (11 0-0!? ) 11...\( \Box e8 \) 12 0-0 \( \Box b4?! \) 13 \( \Box h1 \), and soon White launched a decisive offensive.

\[ \text{9 } \ldots \ \Box b6 \]

Black wants to exchange the powerful knight on \( e5 \) before it is supported by the \( f \)-pawn. With this aim he violates yet another opening principle, by bringing his queen out too early. If in addition he decides to capture with his queen on \( b2 \), his pawn-grabbing may cost him dearly: after \( 10\ 0-0 \Boxxb2\ 11\ \Box c1 \) White gains a significant lead in development.

\[ 10 \text{ 0-0 } \]

\[ 11 \text{ dxe5 } \]

In our preparations we considered \( 11...\Box b6d7 \), after which we were intending \( 12 \Box f4 \), and if \( 12...\Boxxb2?! \) 13 \( \Box c1 \) \( \Box g6 \), then \( 14 \Box xg6 \) \( h_xg6\ 15 \text{ e4!} \), opening lines in the centre. Instead of capturing the pawn, Black does better to complete his development with \( 12...\Box c5 \). This is what happened in the game Gulko-Smagin (Moscow Championship 1984).

\[ 11 \ldots \]

\[ 12 \Box g4?! \]

An unsuccessful reply. An attempt to play actively while insufficiently well-developed cannot be recommended. Nevertheless, in our preparations we considered this move, although, of course, our analysis was rather cursory. At home it had seemed to me that by playing \( 12 \Box f4 \Box g6 13 \Box xg6 \) \( h_xg6\ 14 \text{ h3 } \Box h6\ 15 \text{ e4} \) White would gain an advantage. But at the board I realised that Black can defend by \( 15...\Boxxb2\ 16 \Box c1 0-0 \), returning the extra pawn.

Delving into the position, I found a stronger continuation. Can you see what is was? No? What if I make the leading suggestion that the position of the knight on \( g4 \) must be indirectly exploited?

\[ 12 \Box a4! \]

The extremely unpleasant threat of \( 13 \Box xd5 \) has been created. If \( 12...\Box d7 \), then White can choose between \( 13 \Box a3!? f6 14 \text{ exf6 } \Boxxf6\ 15 \Box h4 \) and the more camouflaged idea of \( 13 \text{ e6!} ? \Box xe6 14 \Box xd5 \Box xd5\ 15 \Box xg4 \). In both cases, with a lead in development and the two bishops, his position is strategically won.

\[ 12 \ldots \]

\[ 13 \Box xb2 \]

Black, as they say, throws caution to the winds.

\[ 13 \Box ac1 \]

Of course, not \( 13 \Box xd5? \Box xe5 \). But now it is not possible to capture with the knight on \( e5 \), if only because of \( 13...\Box xe5 14 \Box c2 \Box b6\ 15 \)]
Preparation for a Game

Here I thought for a long time, realising that in such a position there was simply bound to be a forced win. 14 c2 wb6 15 b1 c7 16 xd5 seems to suggest itself, but after 16...wx5 nothing definite is apparent, while if 16 xf4 Black can continue the fight with 16...xe6.

And here it suddenly dawned on me!

14 wd4!!

A move of murderous strength. With the simple centralisation of his queen White simultaneously creates five (!) threats: 15 xd5, 15 b5, 15 e4, 15 b1 and 15 e6 (15...xe6 16 wg7). It is not possible to defend simultaneously against all of these. For example, 14...wb6 parries four of the threats, but the fifth proves decisive – 15 e6!

14... f6
15 exf6 gxf6
16 xf6 g8

If Nogueiras had played 16...xf6 17 xf6 g8, the opposition of the queens could have been exploited by 18 xd5.

17 db5 wb5
17...xd4 18 d6 mate.

18 xb5 e6
19 wb2 cxb5
20 h4

Black resigned. It goes without saying that this was a severe punishment for his violation of opening principles!

I thought that I had convincingly refuted the ‘Nogueiras variation’. Imagine my surprise when a few years later I suddenly saw the match game Timman–Ljubojevic (Hilversum 1987), played with the same variation. True, in it Black lasted only a little longer. Instead of 10...xe5 he played 10...xb2 (Ljubomir Ljubojevic very much likes to have extra pawns) 11 c1 g6 12 f4 (12 xf6?! gxf6 13 g4) 12...0-0 13 c2 wb6? (13...a3 was better) 14 xf6 gxf6 15 g4 xg4 16 xg4 h8 17 b1 c7 18 xd5 wd8 19 c3 xf4 20 e2! e8 21 e4. Jan Timman gained a marked advantage, and the incorrect combination made by the opponent merely hastened his demise: 21...xe3+?! 22 xe3 xd4 23 e1 e5 24 f5, and Black resigned in view of 24...xd3 25 xf6.

Let us return once again to my game with Nogueiras. The question may be asked: if I had prepared the entire variation beforehand, why in the course of the game did I have to look for a stronger continuation? Well, this is a valid question and one which is worth dwelling on in more detail.

Here it all depends on the time spent on the preparation. It is one thing to study some variation at home, in the quiet of your study, so to speak, and quite another when you have to do this during the course of a tournament. It is clear that during immediate preparations for a game (usually lasting a couple of hours) it is hard to take all nuances into account. That was also the case here. We did not study in detail how to play against 11...g4, as our objective was a different one: simply to convince ourselves that after this continuation too the position
was favourable for White and rather dangerous for Black. The move planned at home, 12 \( \text{f4} \), was sufficient to confirm this evaluation. This by no means signifies that it is the strongest.

You should not blindly trust your opening preparations. And not only because a mistake may creep in to your preliminary analysis. The main thing is something else: the tension of the struggle, the stressful competitive situation itself sharply accentuates your intuition, strengthens your imagination, and also raises your calculating ability. This is why, however meticulous your analysis has been, during a game you should check the variations you have found, and seek stronger alternatives. At the board you may hit on some new and unexpected idea! Of course, on moves such as 9 \( \text{dxe5} \) and 10 \( \text{f4} \) (in reply to 9...\( \text{dxe5} \)) it is not worth spending time, but when there arises a position which has not been analysed, but merely estimated, here a serious verification is simply essential.

Thus, success in the opening largely depends on your ability to guess what variation the opponent will choose, and successfully prepare for it. This is especially important (but also difficult!) when meeting a player such as Timman, for example, who has a very broad opening repertoire.

But there is no guarantee that, during the couple of hours spent at a tournament preparing for a specific opponent, you will definitely devise the optimal way of combating the opening set-ups employed by him. Therefore a second significant factor of success is the quality of your preparation before the competition, the depth of your opening erudition, and the breadth of your own opening repertoire.

Any experienced player will no doubt easily remember instances when his old preparations came into action. For example, as in my game with the Hungarian grandmaster Zoltan Ribli, which we will now examine.

Preparing for a game with Ribli is difficult, since he is one of those players who varies his opening systems. He has quite a wide repertoire and he has a thorough knowledge of the variations he employs. However, at that tournament in Montpellier I somehow managed to guess what he would play, and, in addition, in the variation in question I had an important improvement stored up. So that my entire preparation essentially reduced to me simply looking through my notebook and refreshing the lines in my memory!

I should mention that in making immediate preparations for a game during the course of an event you should observe a sense of measure – what is the point of spending five hours studying, if after this you arrive for a game with a headache and unable to understand anything? The optimal variation is when all your main analytical work is done beforehand, and during an event you merely remember your analyses, refresh them in your memory.

Yusupov – Ribli
Candidates Tournament, Montpellier 1985
Queen’s Gambit

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
1 & d4 & \text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textsf{f6}}}} \\
2 & c4 & \text{e6} \\
3 & \text{\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\text{d}}}}f3 & d5 \\
4 & \text{\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\text{c}}}}3 & c5 \\
5 & \text{cxd5} & \text{\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\text{d}}}}xd5 \\
6 & e4 & \text{\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\text{c}}}}xc3 \\
7 & \text{bxc3} & \text{\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\text{d}}}}xd4 \\
8 & \text{cxd4} & \text{\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\text{c}}}}6 \\
9 & \text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textsf{\text{c}}}}4} & \text{b5} \\
\end{array}
\]

All this is well known in theory.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
10 & \text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textsf{\text{e}}}}e2} & \text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textsf{\text{b}}}}4+} \\
11 & \text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textsf{\text{d}}}}2} & \text{\textcolor{red}{\text{\textsf{\text{a}}}}5} \\
12 & \text{d5} & \text{exd5} \\
\end{array}
\]
13 exd5

Why did Ribli choose this variation? I think because he was hoping to catch me unawares – after all, this was not his main opening weapon. In addition, I had never played this as White, and this position had not occurred in any of my games. But here he was simply unlucky: how could he have known that three or four years earlier I had made a serious study of the Tarrasch Defence Deferred and had found an improvement for White?

14 0-0
15 hxg5
16 hxg6

An interesting pawn structure has arisen. White has a strong passed pawn in the centre, which Black is intending to blockade and possibly attack.

17 f3

17 hxg5 has also been tried. In the game Kir. Georgiev–Ribli (Sarajevo 1985) there followed 17...hxg5 18 c5 (in the event of 18 d6 c5 Black has counter-threats) 18...b6! 19 cxb6 axb6 20 xf5 21 xf5 22 c6 23 xd5 24 xe6 25 xe6, and the players agreed a draw.

17...f5

Here 18 d3 is analysed in the theoretical guides, but after 18...d6! Black would appear to equalise. However, from the very start it appeared to me that the position is rather more pleasant for White. And the analytical work that I did merely reinforced this opinion.

18 c1!

The fruit of my efforts at home. White develops his rook and simultaneously prevents the reply 18...d6 (in view of 19 c6).

18 d6

It is well known that the knight is a good blockader, so that Ribli's decision is positionally justified. He was probably hoping that after the obvious 19 c4 d7 20 c6 his queen would come out to f6 and the position would become equal: indeed, the knight at d6 is excellently placed and the black rooks will now occupy the e-file.

But it turns out that White can prevent the queen from coming out to f6.

19 d4!

An unpleasant continuation for Black. Now 19...f6 leads to the spoiling of his pawn structure. Even so, this was probably the lesser evil. What Ribli played was less good.

19...b6?!

Here the queen stands worse than at f6. It is remote from the kingside and White can develop his initiative there unhindered. It is clear that now he should no longer exchange queens.

20 f4!

A significant inaccuracy; the rook should have been kept at f8 for the defence of the royal residence.

21 d4

(see diagram)

White has an appreciable advantage, largely the result of successful opening preparation. The position reached was not only familiar to me, but also close to me in style.
Can one expect more from the opening? Perhaps the only instance closer to the ‘ideal’ is when you know all the moves right to the end – as Lev Polugayevsky sometimes achieved. But in my view such an approach is irrational: it demands an enormous expenditure of energy, and for what – in order to win, as a rule, only one single game?!

Of course, here we have a different case. But for a ‘normal’ player, say what you like, this is ideal preparation. Generally speaking, if you find a move such as 18...c1, you see that the resulting position is slightly better for you and also that it is to your taste – then confidently go in for it!

I remember that Ribli was upset by this turn of events. Perhaps it was for this reason that subsequently he did not defend in the most tenacious way.

22...c4
23 ffe1
White probes the weakness of the e7-square.

23...b2
24 e4
The threat of the knight fork on d3 has been parried, and Ribli has nothing better than to return his knight to its starting point.

[Already here it was possible to begin the ‘gathering of the harvest’, by playing 24 exe8+!, when 24...exe8 is not possible because of 25 e5. And if 24...exe8 White decides matters with 25 e7+ f8 26 b4 xf2+!? 27 h1! or 25...h8 26 c8! d8 27 c7! (27 b4? d7 28 d6) 27...xc7 28 xc7 – Dvoretsky.]

24...c4
25 h3 h6
26 d3!
White has strengthened his position to the maximum, and now it is time to switch to concrete play. I exploit the fact that the double capture on c6 leads to loss of material: 26...xc6 27 dxc6 e1+ 28 xe1 xc6 29 e4 e8 30 h7+.

26...b2
What else?

27 b1
The bishop has no intention of leaving the active diagonal. Black’s position is practically hopeless.

27...xc6
28 dxc6 exe1+
29 exe1 ecx6
rook on e1. But I was attracted by another idea.

30 \textit{\textbf{c4}}

Now 30...\textbf{\textit{c4}} was the most tenacious, but after 31 \textbf{\textit{d2}} \textbf{\textit{e8}} 32 \textbf{\textit{h7+}} \textbf{\textit{xh7}} 33 \textbf{\textit{xe8}} White is the exchange up with a winning position. Ribli played differently and... fell into a prepared trap.

30...

31 \textbf{\textit{c1}}

Ribli was pinning his hopes on this counter-stroke. Now 32 \textbf{\textit{xc3}?} is incorrect: 32...\textbf{\textit{xf4}} 33 \textbf{\textit{f3}} \textbf{\textit{e2+}} (the same check would have followed after 33 \textbf{\textit{xa8}}) 34 \textbf{\textit{f1}} \textbf{\textit{e8}} 35 \textbf{\textit{e3}} \textbf{\textit{d4}} 36 \textbf{\textit{h7+}} \textbf{\textit{f8}}, and Black remains a pawn up.

32 \textbf{\textit{xf7+}}

Loss of material becomes inevitable. Black resigned.

The following example is practically on the same theme, with the significance difference that, even with the best will in the world, I simply could not have guessed my opponent's choice of opening: Kevin Spraggett employed the Tarrasch Defence for the first time in his life! The Canadian grandmaster prepared very thoroughly for our Candidates match, and the Tarrasch Defence was in fact one of his opening surprises. But he guessed wrongly! And in two respects: firstly, the prepared variation was one that I had analysed well, and secondly, it corresponded more with my style of play that with his own.

After suffering a disaster, Spraggett did not persist and in the match he didn't employ the Tarrasch Defence again.

\begin{align*}
Yusupov &- Spraggett \\
3rd match game, Quebec 1989 & \\
Queen's Gambit & \\
1 \textbf{\textit{d4}} & \textbf{\textit{d5}} \\
2 \textbf{\textit{f3}} & \textbf{\textit{c5}} \\
3 \textbf{\textit{c4}} & \textbf{\textit{e6}} \\
4 \textbf{\textit{xd5}} & \textbf{\textit{exd5}} \\
5 \textbf{\textit{c3}} & \textbf{\textit{c6}} \\
6 \textbf{\textit{g3}} & \textbf{\textit{f6}} \\
7 \textbf{\textit{g2}} & \textbf{\textit{e7}} \\
8 \textbf{\textit{0-0}} & \textbf{\textit{0-0}} \\
9 \textbf{\textit{g5}} & \textbf{\textit{e6}} \\
10 \textbf{\textit{dxc5}} & \textbf{\textit{dxc5}} \\
11 \textbf{\textit{xf6}} & \textbf{\textit{xf6}} \\
12 \textbf{\textit{xd5}} & \textbf{\textit{xb2}} \\
13 \textbf{\textit{c7}} & \textbf{\textit{ad8}} \\
14 \textbf{\textit{c1}} & \textbf{\textit{xc1}} \\
15 \textbf{\textit{xc1}} & \textbf{\textit{c1}} \\
\end{align*}

The usual 9...\textbf{\textit{cxd4}} 10 \textbf{\textit{xd4}} \textbf{\textit{h6}} leads to more complicated play.

What oversight, you may ask, did he make in his choice of opening? Spraggett did not take account of the fact that I had also participated in that tournament and, naturally, I had also paid attention to the aforementioned game, since two rounds later I was due to play White against Illescas. These are the subtleties which sometimes have to be taken into account during preparations! What is important is not even whether a particular variation occurred in the opponent's games, but whether he was there, where this variation was employed!

Spraggett effectively fell victim to my preparation for the game with Illescas (in which, incidentally, another variety of the Tarrasch Defence occurred). However, it so happened that I had first studied the given
Preparation for a Game

At this point 18 e3! was usually played. Here are a few examples, showing that Spraggett had serious grounds for thinking that he would be able to make an accurate draw:

18...\textit{d}7 19 h4 \textit{d}4!?, and Black advantageously simplifies the position (Ftacnik-Minev, Bucharest 1978);

18...\textit{d}6 (the b7-pawn is indirectly defended) 19 h4 \textit{d}6 20 \textit{e}4 b6 21 \textit{h}3 \textit{f}7 22 \textit{c}1 (22 e3 \textit{c}8 23 g4 g5! also leads to equality, as in the afore-mentioned Beliaovsky-Illescas game) 22...\textit{e}8 23 e3 \textit{e}7 24 \textit{f}1 \textit{a}5!, and Black does not experience any difficulties (Ornstein-Schneider, Copenhagen 1981).

Incidentally, in the \textit{Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings}, none other than Garry Kasparov judged the given opening variation to be sufficient for equality.

18 e3!

Realising that an exchange of rooks is unfavourable for him, White does not hurry with the move \textit{b}1. Besides, it is not yet clear whether it will subsequently be required (the rook may prove useful on c1). The move made by me, which I had prepared for the game with Illescas, proved to be a theoretical novelty, although what, it would appear, could be more logical? – White takes control of the d4-square, on which exchanges undesirable for him could have occurred.

18...\textit{d}6

19 h4 \textit{h}6

20 \textit{e}4 \textit{f}d8

21 \textit{h}3

I prevent the exchange of a pair of rooks. The attempt to insist on this by 21...e5 would have had serious consequences for Black: 22 \textit{g}2 \textit{d}1 23 \textit{xd}1 \textit{xd}1, and the white bishop gains the opportunity to attack the b7-pawn from c8 (then the knight on c6 will also be attacked), whereas the black bishop on f6 is bad. Naturally, such a prospect did not appeal to Spraggett, and he prefers to defend without making any unnecessary weakening.

21...\textit{f}7

22 \textit{g}2 \textit{e}8

Here the fact that White did not hurry with \textit{b}1 again came in useful. Delving into the position, I realised that there was altogether nothing for the rook to do on b1. Moreover, I came to the conclusion that White’s main objective now was the activation of his knight, for which I made a concrete plan. Let’s ponder over this together and try to decide – what plan?

(see diagram)

It is clear that the only square via which the knight can come into play, without fear of being exchanged, is d2. But how can I take control of it? That’s right, by defending it with
Preparation for a Game

- position after 22...\(\text{He}8\) -

a rook. So that the first stage of the plan is clear – the manoeuvre of the rook from f1 to c2. And when the knight arrives on c4, not only do concrete threats appear, but it also becomes possible to advance the kingside pawns, f2–f4 for example – a good way of improving the position.

I think that already here one can draw conclusions about Spraggett’s preparations for the game with me, and my preparations for the game... with Illescas. Black has no prospects, whereas White has obtained the sort of position that he wanted – he has a slight but enduring advantage, and a plan for strengthening his game.

I have to admit that during the game I rather forgot my previous analysis. But unexpectedly this proved opportune: at the board the need arose to think seriously about the position, as though to evaluate with a fresh glance, and calculate the variations anew. So that even the opponent’s somewhat unexpected choice of opening proved to be a factor in my favour.

23 \(\text{Cc}1\)  
24 \(\text{Cc}2\)  

An imperceptible, but significant mistake – Spraggett weakens the position of his knight. White immediately exploits this factor.

25 \(\text{Ef}4\)!
Creating the tactical threat of 26 \(\text{Xc}6\) \(\text{Xc}6\) 27 \(\text{Oe}5\)+, while if 25...\(\text{Gg}8\), then 26 \(\text{Od}2\)! followed by \(\text{Oe}4\) is very strong.

25 ...  
\(\text{Gg}6\)

26 g4!
It transpires that if 26...\(\text{Oe}5\) there is the unpleasant reply 27 g5, for example: 27...hxg5 (it is better to play immediately 27...\(\text{O}d3\) 28 h5+! \(\text{Gf}7\) 29 gxf6 \(\text{Oxf}4+\) 30 exf4 gxf6) 28 hxg5 \(\text{O}d3\) 29 gxf6 \(\text{Oxf}4+\) 30 exf4, and if 30...gxf6 31 f5+! with an overwhelming advantage. The simple 27 \(\text{Oxe}5+\) \(\text{Xxe}5\) 28 \(\text{Ef}8\) is also strong – the black king is in an anxious position.

26 ...  
\(\text{Aa}1\)

The only move.

27 \(\text{Cc}1\)  
28 \(\text{Cc}2\)  

The repetition of moves has allowed me to gain time for thought. For the moment I could not see any decisive strengthening of the position: to 29 h5+ \(\text{Gh}7\) 30 g5 Black replies 30...g6, and if 29 \(\text{Fc}4?!\), then simply 29...\(\text{Oe}5\). Therefore I decided to make a neutral move (at the same time slightly strengthening my position), inviting the opponent to guess what in fact White was contemplating.

29 a4!
It is not easy for Black to defend, especially when short of time, as Spraggett was.

29 ...  
\(\text{Oe}5?!\)

30 \(\text{Oxe}5\)  
\(\text{Xxe}5\)
31 \(\text{Ef}8!\)

In this version, a position with opposite-colour bishops suited me fine. Here it is obvious that the black king will come under a mating attack.

31 ...  
\(\text{Gd}7\)
31...\(\text{Gh}7\) was more tenacious.

32 f4
A strong reply. Now 32...c7? is bad on account of the decisive breakthrough 33 f5+ exf5 34 gxf5+ h7 35 f6!.

32...c7
33 d2 c3
34 d6 h7
35 g5 hxg5
36 hxg5 b4

Unfortunately, I did not notice a spectacular blow, which would have concluded the game immediately: 37 g6+ h6 (37...xg6 38 f5+) 38 f5!.

37...g6

If 37...g6 the most energetic is 38 h8+ g7 39 h6 with the terrible threat of 40 dh8.

38 f3 f7
39 h8 e5
40 g4

Of course, 40 e6 would have won the exchange, but White wants to weave a mating net. And he succeeds in doing this.

40...exf4
41 d5! fxe3+
42 g3

Black resigned.

This is how, in a rather strange way – thanks to preparation for an altogether different game – I managed to win this important encounter. An instance which once again reminds us that serious analytical work is never wasted – of course, if the results are recorded, comprehended, and lodged in your memory. As a rule, in chess, work done for future use sooner or later (it may even be many years after) justifies itself.

I must once again emphasise that, in my view, the main preparatory work should be carried out beforehand. Not at competitions, but between them! I remember a conversation with Korchnoi at the Tilburg tournament of 1987. Complaining about his not very successful play, Victor Lvovich said that, unfortunately, he had not had time to prepare properly for the tournament and had arrived at it without any fresh ideas. This had upset him. Indeed, before an important event it is very important to have something in mind, to produce a definite reserve of new ideas – without this it is hard to count on success.

Young, not too skilful players, sometimes try to build their preparations on the study of less explored, so to speak, side variations. In principle, this is normal for a player who has not yet acquired a broad opening repertoire, who on account of his youth has simply not had time to assimilate the avalanche of theory which currently engulfs the professional player. However, there is no point in transforming the avoidance of theoretical continuations into an end in itself, by deliberately choosing not the best lines, and basing your play on various types of 'crooked', trappy moves – such strategy is incorrect.

What course, then, is the most advisable? My position is simple: in the opening you should aim to make objectively the best moves, even if in your preparations this demands a significantly greater volume of work and a more detailed analysis. And in any case, that which you play must be
thoroughly studied, and you should sense all the nuances.

Summing up what has been said, let us formulate the two main principles for the choice of opening when preparing for a specific opponent.

The first. **You should proceed from your own possibilities, i.e. aim to obtain a position which you yourself know well and which corresponds to your chess tastes and style of play.** Since, if you have a leaning towards positional actions, and as a result of your preparation you obtain gambit play with wild complications, you risk seeing your hopes dashed, despite the most conscientious preparatory work. Therefore experienced grandmasters sometimes reject even promising continuations, if they do not correspond with their style. It is hard, you will agree, to expect from Garry Kasparov that, even playing Black, he will go in for a passive position. It is simply not in his nature! See how he played in his matches against Anatoly Karpov: deliberately avoiding passive positions, he preferred to give up a pawn and make a draw in a complicated struggle, rather that, without sacrificing anything, make the same draw by accurate, defensive play. And by contrast, see how Karpov prepared. You will see that in the opening he did everything possible to avoid unnecessary complications, and went in for them only when he was sure that he had prepared a genuinely powerful, promising continuation, when such an evaluation was supported by deep analysis.

Thus, the main objective of your preparation is to obtain a game which is comfortable for you.

The second objective is perhaps more subtle – **try to lure the opponent into positions which are least in keeping with his style, and do not correspond to his chess tastes. In this case the probability of mistakes by him is sharply increased.** Remember, for example, Gata Kamsky’s failure at the Linares tournament of 1991. It is largely explained by the fact that his opponents quickly discovered defects in his opening repertoire, and they easily dragged Kamsky into positions which were unfamiliar to him (simply on account of his youth and lack of experience). Right through the tournament he suffered terribly, especially as Black, with which he lost all his games!

As a ‘positive’ example I will describe my game with the English grandmaster Jonathan Speelman from the same tournament. I will not show it on the board, but will simply inform you of the problems which I encountered in my preparations.

This was the game from the first round, and it can happen that your mood for the entire event will depend on its result! I had White, and the opponent’s opening repertoire was not a secret to me. I wasn’t worried about the Queen’s Gambit, although, of course, just in case I had a specific variation prepared. Looking at Speelman’s recent games, I came to the conclusion that the probability of him employing the Slav Defence was also not very great. Therefore for it too I did not particularly prepare, especially as I had something in reserve.

But I had to reckon with the fact that Speelman, a player with a fighting and original style, might well answer 1 d4 with 1...d6 – it has to be said that he has a good feeling for Pirc Defence-type positions and he quite often plays them. Even so, I will not hide the fact that initially I was tempted to play this. But then I rejected this idea, since here I had nothing prepared. I decided not to embark on a critical theoretical dispute, preferring to save effort on preparation.

And suddenly an idea occurred to me, how even in this case I might drag Speelman into ‘my’ type of position. After 1 d4 d6 I should play 2 g3! You will ask, what is the
advantage of this move order, compared, say with 2 \( \text{d}f3 \)? The subtle point is that in reply to 2 \( \text{d}f3 \) the English grandmaster often employs the system 2...\( \text{d}f6\) 3 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{g}4\). But by playing 2 \( \text{g}3\), I sharply weaken the strength of the bishop move to \( \text{g}4\), since I succeed in supporting the knight with the bishop from \( \text{g}2\), which would hardly appeal to Speelman. Of course, this move order might lead to a normal King’s Indian with the move \( \text{g}2\)–\( \text{g}3\), but this did not bother me – this variation was part of my opening repertoire.

As you see, I was helped in my manoeuvrings by the fact that I had a choice of different systems against the King’s Indian Defence. If I had employed, for example, only the Sämisch Variation, it would have been far harder to avoid Speelman’s intricate preparations. Thus after 1 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}6\) 2 \( \text{c}4\) he could have replied 2...\( \text{g}6\), managing without ...\( \text{d}f6\). I would also have had to analyse this... As it was, with the one move 2 \( \text{g}3\) all the preparation was practically completed!

In the game after 1 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}6\) 2 \( \text{g}3\) we transposed into a King’s Indian Defence, a position which was well familiar to me was reached, and as a result I was able to achieve the more pleasant game. I was quite satisfied with the outcome of the opening.

It goes without saying that such preparation is very economical. But, in my view, immediate preparations should as far as possible be economical and rational, because excessive expenditure of energy immediately before a game may, as I have already said, boomerang during play. This is why you should be able to vary your play in the opening. Firstly, this increases your chances of luring the opponent into a position that is uncomfortable for him, and secondly, it becomes more difficult to prepare for a game with you.

Another example of successful preparation may be provided by my game with Kasparov from the same tournament in Linares. Here what told was mainly the factor of surprise. Kasparov did not expect that I would choose the Dutch Defence (Leningrad Variation). And when I replied to 1 \( \text{c}4\) with 1...\( \text{f}5\), for a moment he became flustered. I saw that my reply was unpleasant for him, and that he had obviously not anticipated it in his preparations. As a result, Kasparov spent more time than me on the opening, but even this was not the main thing: speaking in tennis language, his well-developed first serve did not go in, and he had to use his second, less powerful one. I soon managed to seize the initiative. And yet a win in this last round game would have been so important for him!

Of course, it is no bad thing to spring a surprise in the opening. However, I don’t recommend that for this you employ a variation that you are playing for the first time in your life. It is extremely dangerous to bluff, especially against a skilled opponent.

In principle, it is possible to give numerous pieces of advice about preparation. There are as many opinions as there are people! Every top player has his own prescriptions, often an entire system of preparation. For example, I can mention the so-called ‘Capablanca rule’. It is very sensible and useful. Capablanca said that for a tournament he usually prepared one opening each for White and for Black (in the latter case, apparently, one each against 1 \( \text{d}4\) and 1 \( \text{e}4\)). How did he justify such an approach? By the fact that if in his set-up there were some defects, the opponent, who in a tournament did not have a great deal of spare time, would be unlikely to discover them. And indeed, if you have been struggling with a variation, say, for a week and have not found a refutation, why, you may ask, should the opponent be able to find one in the two hours before a game?
Thus preparation for a tournament begins long before it starts. This enables you to save strength during the event, and eases the choice of opening for a specific opponent. As I have already said, the ideal version is when you don’t need to analyse anything at all, but merely to refresh your home preparations in your memory. Of course, like any ideal, it is unattainable, but you should aim for it!

If you are nevertheless obliged to work immediately before a game, approach the preparation rationally. Don’t endeavour to refute without fail the opponent’s set-up – sometimes it makes sense to avoid it. Don’t get involved in a theoretical discussion in a line where you feel that the opponent is well prepared. Only if you sense some serious defect in a variation chosen by him (remember the ‘Nogueiras variation’), can you not spare any effort in search of a concrete refutation.

It is very important to be able to guess the opponent’s actions: how he will prepare, what he will chose, what he will expect from you. Without this it is hardly possible to arrange your preparation correctly. Endeavour to understand who you are dealing with: whether it is a player who is combinative or positional, bold or cautious, dogmatic or experimental... For example, if you know that the opponent handles endings badly, is it worth trying to devise something in the opening? Isn’t it simpler to find a variation which leads directly to the endgame?

However, if your own opening arsenal is limited, even the most correct compiling of the opponent’s creative portrait will not enable you to exploit his weak points. In this case you effectively have no choice. Play that which you know well, i.e. not against a specific opponent, but as though against his pieces (remember the title of the collection of best games by the Yugoslav grandmaster Svetozar Gligoric: I play against Pieces?).

The most striking representative of this tendency, which, incidentally, to some extent resembles the afore-mentioned ‘Capablanca rule’, was, as is well known, the great Akiba Rubinstein.

Such an approach is not flexible, but it is economical. And, of course, in this case you have to know your openings thoroughly! Otherwise the opponent, after easily reckoning what opening will occur, will confuse you with some prepared surprise. The creation of a brilliantly-developed, practically irrefutable opening repertoire is, naturally, something that is within the capabilities of only a very experienced player. But even for young players such a course is not at all appropriate: you can expand your arsenal gradually, analysing one variation after another, instead of aiming straight away to employ all the openings.

I should like to mention one more ‘opening device’, although it relates more to the field of chess psychology. I have in mind the camouflaging of your intentions. Imagine that you have guessed right with the choice of opening variation and the opponent has fallen into your trap. Nevertheless you don’t let on that you have caught him in your variation, but, on the contrary, you do everything possible to conceal this from him, so that he does not sense the danger in time. Incidentally, this is how Kasparov and Karpov act. And often, despite the fact that both the position and the entire subsequent play are well known to them, they continue to think for a long time over their moves.

I should like to warn against becoming carried away by such devices. In principle they are possible, but in very moderate, so to speak, medicinal doses. In other words, camouflaging is one thing, but don’t waste too much time – this is not without its dangers. Firstly, during the course of the game unforeseen problems may arise; secondly, time may be needed for the
conversion of an advantage. Therefore I would advise you to act differently: if you know how to play in the resulting position, and it has been thoroughly studied by you at home, then make the moves quickly! In this way you will create additional psychological pressure on your opponent. After all, he will realise that he has been caught in a variation, he will no longer be so certain in his actions, and this will give you a serious psychological initiative. And it is for the seizure of the initiative – both purely chess, and psychological – that we should aim when playing the opening.

At first sight some of my pieces of advice may seem to contradict one another. For example, as you will remember, in my game with Nogueiras I did not follow my last recommendation of quickly making the previously prepared moves. In fact here there is no contradiction. Chess is not an arithmetic game, it is by no means unambiguous, and the employment of a particular rule sometimes depends on the most minute nuances in the situation. Don't try to work out for yourself a strict set of instructions for all eventualities in life – it is more important simply to know various approaches to the solving of the problems arising. And the choice of a particular approach will often be purely subjective, depending on the style and tastes of the player.
You were right, Monsieur La Bourdonnais!

Everything returns to its own circles.
It is only these circles that turn.

Andrey Voznesensky

Even so, the chess childhood of our generation (to say nothing of those who are a little older) was a happy one. The era of Informator and ECO (in this form the Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings sounds more frightening) came later. We didn't know about opening indexes, we didn't waste hours recording games, our hands weren’t covered in dried glue, and our scissors did not cut up the innumerable bulletins of transient tournaments. The front of the so-called information boom had not yet arrived, and the language of essential symbols was pleasantly sparse and understandable to anyone. Nowadays, on opening a copy of Informator, even an experienced professional initially has to anxiously skim through the incomplete (for the moment!), but furiously increasing page of the new Esperanto. At that time chess books could simply be read (hardly any reference books on the openings were published). True, far fewer books were published, but I agree with the opinion that in childhood it is more important to have only one book, but a good one and a favourite one. Therefore it was not difficult for us to satisfy our needs. And to obtain a book, you could simply go into a shop and buy it.

But everything changes, including chess. The avalanche of information engulfing us today is accompanied by an intensive, total study of the opening. During the past twenty years the investigative surge has acquired the character of an epidemic; we have laboured mightily, digging over masses of chess earth. The initial position, so frightening a hundred years ago, has lost its innocent mystery, and in all the openings (classical, or those which were once irregular) reliable paths have been not only laid, but also thoroughly trampled down. What is meant by opening theory? It seemed that this was the method of play in the initial position. But how everything has changed now. Now we choose some position after, say, eighteen moves – and start from there!

For the uninitiated, I will describe how this tabiya arises.

1 e4 c5 2 d3 f3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 xd4 f6 5 c3 a6 d4 d5 a5 6 g5 e6 7 f4 b6 8 d2 bx2 9 b1 a3 10 f5 c6 11 fxe6 fxe6 12 xc6 bxc6 13 e5 dxe5 14 xf6 gx6 15 e4 e7
16 \texttt{\texttt{h}e2} h5 17 \texttt{\texttt{b}b}3 \texttt{\texttt{a}a}4 18 \texttt{\texttt{x}f6+} \texttt{\texttt{x}f6} 19 c4

But surely this isn’t all forced? – the reader will exclaim, trying to suppress a mixed feeling of surprise and mild panic.

Calm down, of course it isn’t. But chess also has its fashions – this is one thing. Secondly, it is easier to analyse this position than the initial one. However, it has to be admitted that in some places we have delved so deeply, that we no longer remember the initial aims and directions. But we remember that ‘there is no striving more natural than the striving for knowledge’.

Sergey Makarychev once told me about a visit to Tunis. Shortly before his departure he dropped in at a chess club, and in one of the rooms he came across a group of juniors, absorbed in an analysis of intricate branches of the Chelyabinsk Variation (this was at the time when this paradoxical system was beginning to ‘blossom’). Calling in two days later at a chess club in Tunis, Sergey was considerably staggered to see an equally enchanting picture, moreover – who would have thought it! – the positions on the boards were remarkably similar. Yes, when in the not too distant future powerful computers finally become involved, we will become witnesses to (and participants in) events far more vivid than those brilliantly depicted in the prophetic speech by Ostap Bender in Vasyuki.

Moreover, one cannot help noticing that the further you go into the forest, the less generalisations there are. Of course, chess ideas (like any others) have a great magical attraction, but sometimes it is useful to stop and look around. Enormous experience has helped mankind to accurately establish that ‘a thousand ways lead to fallacy, but only one to the truth’. And the history of chess ideas eloquently speaks of the dialectics of chess theory.

In literature a customary scheme has long been established: 1) the old Italian School (a glorious time: pawns were sacrificed as though they were of no consequence); 2) François-André Philidor (affirmation of the basics of the positional school, the first attempt at a harmonious view on chess etc.).

There’s no denying that these books were diligently and well written, but, as a rule, unfeeling paper has turned everything into an assertion of dogmas, and for ever excluded us from active searching. I, for example, am still tormented by the origin of the Steinitz Gambit (1 e4 e5 2 \texttt{\texttt{c}c}3 \texttt{\texttt{c}c}6 3 f4 exf4 4 d4). From certain authors I read with astonishment that the creator of this staggeringly bold and imaginative idea is regarded as a dogmatist. However, if the experiments of Wilhelm Steinitz so stagger us today, how they must have shocked the contemporaries of the first world champion. A worthy response to the birth of the new gambit was made by the Homer of chess – Sam Loyd. See what a problem he created in connection with this.

The solution is amazingly beautiful: 1 \texttt{\texttt{e}e2}!! (if it were possible, I would add another couple of exclamation marks from myself) 1...f1\texttt{\texttt{w}}+ 2 \texttt{\texttt{e}e}3.

Or the birth of the Alekhine Defence. How
You were right, Monsieur La Bourdonnais!

was it that the great maestro, who so valued time in chess and for a couple of tempi was capable of any sacrifice, could believe in the paradoxical 1 e4 d\textsubscript{f}6? 

In general, it is time to say that the development of chess ideas more resembles a wild vine than a conifer. Before our eyes openings are born, sink into oblivion, and then are revived anew.

This position is as old as chess itself (1 d4 d5 2 c4). At any event, it features in the Göttingen manuscript (late 15th century) and in Damiano’s book (1512). The first books give the variation 2...dxc4 3 e4 b5 4 a4 c6 5 axb5 cxb5 6 b3. Ruy López (according to tradition – the first major opening theoretician) in 1561 in his treatise Libro de la invención liberal y arte del juego del Axedrez refined the move order: 5 b3 and if 5...cxb3 6 axb3 with advantage to White. More than forty years later, Salvio, who glorified Leonardo da Cutri in his romance Il Puttino, altramente detto il cavaliere errante, pointed out an attractive trap which is familiar to us all: 2...dxc4 3 e3 b5 4 a4 c6 5 axb5 cxb5 6 \textsubscript{f}3.

In fact the gambit proved to be hypothetical, and Black set about seeking counterplay. The Syrian player Phillip Stamma, the inventor of algebraic notation, in the second edition of his famous treatise The Noble Game of Chess (1745) pointed out the possibility of 3...e5!?.

Highly important in the history of the 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5 variation were the La Bourdonnais-McDonnell matches. Sadly, all that most of us remember of this wonderful duel is the final position from the 16th game of the fourth match.

In their matches the afore-mentioned variation occurred frequently, always with La Bourdonnais playing White, and McDonnell correspondingly playing Black. Unfortunately, the author of these lines does not possess any works by the participants in the matches, but he has read with great interest the comments of Mikhail Ivanovich Chigorin, who called the games between La Bourdonnais and McDonnell ‘brilliant inspirations of the past’. We will pick out the most interesting of them.

La Bourdonnais – McDonnell

6th game of the second match

Queen’s Gambit

\begin{align*}
1 & d4 & d5 \\
2 & c4 & dxc4 \\
3 & e3 & e5 \\
4 & \texttt{xc}4 & exd4
\end{align*}
You were right, Monsieur La Bourdonnais!

Here Chigorin makes an interesting comment: ‘La Bourdonnais acknowledges 6... \( \text{d6} \) to be better than the move in the present game.’ Since the theory of the \( 3...e5 \) variation was poorly developed, La Bourdonnais’ evaluation, speaking in editorial language, deserves consideration.

7 \( \text{f3} \)

8 0-0

In the first match 8 \( \text{e3} \) occurred, but the move played here looks more natural.

8 ... c6

Here again there is an interesting comment by Chigorin: ‘This method was suggested by Philidor, but La Bourdonnais considers it bad.’ But what does modern theory say? Unfortunately, during the intervening 150 years it has not proved possible to give an exact reply. It can only be mentioned that until recently they believed Philidor. Now they have doubts.

9 h3

10 \( \text{b6} \)

11 \( \text{b5} \)

Modern-day players more often play as Steinitz did – 11...\( \text{bd5} \).

12 \( \text{we2} \)

The 17th game of the first match went 12 a4 a5 13 \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{e6} \) 14 \( \text{c2} \) f5? 15 \( \text{we2} \) f4 16 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{we8} \) 17 \( \text{ae1} \) \( \text{f7} \) 18 \( \text{we4} \) g6 19 \( \text{xf4!} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 20 \( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{c4} \) 21 \( \text{wh6} \) \( \text{xf1} \) 22 \( \text{gx6!} \) \( \text{hxg6} \) 23 \( \text{gx6} \) \( \text{c8} \) 24 \( \text{wh8+} \) \( \text{f7} \) 25 \( \text{wh7+} \) \( \text{f6} \) 26 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{d3} \) 27 \( \text{e6+} \) \( \text{g5} \) 28 \( \text{wh6+} \) \( \text{f5} \) 29 g4 mate.

12 ... \( \text{h8} \)

13 \( \text{ae1} \)

14 \( \text{c2} \) f5?

Constancy in delusions is customarily called obstinacy.

15 \( \text{e5} \)

16 \( \text{wh5} \)

17 \( \text{g6+} \)

18 \( \text{b3+} \)

19 \( \text{xd5} \)

Very pretty – if 19...\( \text{xh5} \) 20 \( \text{de7} \) mate.

19 ... cxd5

20 \( \text{xd5+} \)

21 \( \text{xd5+} \)

22 \( \text{e5} \)

23 \( \text{f7} \)

24 \( \text{xh6} \)

25 \( \text{xe5} \)

26 \( \text{fxe5} \)

27 \( \text{f3} \)

28 \( \text{f6} \)

and White won.

The following game gives food for thought – its authentic uniqueness makes a modern and genuinely brilliant impression.

La Bourdonnais – McDonnell

15th game of the first match

Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 d5

2 c4 dxc4

3 e3 e5

4 \( \text{xc4} \)

5 exd4 \( \text{f6} \)

6 \( \text{c3} \)

7 \( \text{f3} \)

8 h3 c6
You were right, Monsieur La Bourdonnais!

9 (Qt\textsubscript{e}3) \textit{f5}

10 4g4!? 

Such play demands not only accuracy, but also inspiration: the centre is open, Black is guaranteed counterplay, and therefore the outcome will be decided in a direct battle.

10 ... \textit{tg6}
11 \textit{lb}e5! \textit{lb}bd7
12 \textit{hxg6} h\textit{g6}
13 h4! \textit{b}6
14 \textit{b}3 \textit{fd5}
15 h5 \textit{xe3}
16 fxe3 \textit{h}4+
17 \textit{d}2 g\textit{xh5}
18 \textit{f}3 \textit{g}5

19 \textit{af1}!!

The reader wishing to read detailed comments on the game can find them in Yakov Neishtadt’s splendid book \textit{Nekoronovannye chempiony} (The uncrowned champions). I should add that every move of La Bourdonnais is imbued with energy and strength.

19 ... \textit{xf}d4+
20 \textit{c}2 \textit{f}6
21 \textit{xh}5 \textit{g}6+

Even the exchange of queens would not have saved Black – 21...\textit{xf}3 22 \textit{xf}3 \textit{e}7 23 \textit{h}5 \textit{f}6 24 g5 \textit{xc}3 25 bxc3 \textit{d}5 26 e4 etc. After 21...g6 Chigorin gives the following variation: 22 \textit{h}3 \textit{g}xh5 (if 22...\textit{we}5 23 \textit{f}5) 23 \textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}6 24 \textit{wh}5, and Black has no defence against g5–g6.

22 e4 \textit{d}5
23 \textit{fh}1 \textit{h}6
24 g5! 
25 \textit{xd}5 c\textit{xd}5
26 \textit{xd}5+ \textit{h}7
27 \textit{xh}6+ \textit{xh}6
28 g\textit{xh}6

Black resigned.

La Bourdonnais – McDonnell

7th game of the third match

\textit{Queen’s Gambit}

1 d4 d5
2 c4 dxc4
3 e3 e5
4 \textit{xc}4 exd4
5 exd4 \textit{f}6
6 \textit{c}3

The reader wishing to read detailed comments on the game can find them in Yakov Neishtadt’s splendid book \textit{Nekoronovannye chempiony} (The uncrowned champions). I should add that every move of La Bourdonnais is imbued with energy and strength.

6 ... \textit{d}6

As has already been mentioned earlier, it was this move that La Bourdonnais considered best.

7 \textit{f}3 0-0
8 h3 \textit{e}8+
9 \textit{e}3 \textit{f}4

A rash move. ‘Don’t cut everything that grows’, Kozma Prutkov severely warns.

10 \textit{d}2 \textit{e}7
11 0-0 \textit{xe}3
12 fxe3 \textit{xe}3+
13 \textit{xe}3
14 \textit{e}5!

And here is the retribution. We see that even 150 years ago one could be caught in home preparation.

14 ... \textit{e}6
You were right, Monsieur La Bourdonnais!

15 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}}xe6} \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}}e6

16 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{f}}}}}f2} \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}}xe5

17 dxe5 etc.

The La Bourdonnais–McDonnell matches demonstrated the attacking possibilities for White after 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5. The position arising after the emergence from the opening was characterised by Chigorin as follows: 'At the given moment the position of Black's game is very similar to the position which occurred in Zukertort's and Lasker's games with Steinitz. The only different is that in the present game Black has a pawn on c6, and not one on e6. But the plan of defence is the same, both with McDonnell, and with Steinitz.'

After the La Bourdonnais–McDonnell matches the variation sank into oblivion and practically went out of use. Somewhere in the first quarter of the 20th century they came to the conclusion that it is better for White to play against a pawn on e6, rather than on c6. Why did they decide this? The author has to frankly admit that he has not dug as deeply as this; moreover, it seems to me that they simply decided, and that was it. Later, as often happens, virtually only 3 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{f}}}}}f3 was played (in extreme cases 3 e4), and in notes for the ill-informed it was stated that 3 e3 was weaker because of the counter-stroke 3...e5. Of course, there were a few doubters, but no one paid any attention to them. In 1965 a book by Neishtadt on the Queen's Gambit Accepted was published. The venerable theoretician wrote: '3 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{f}}}}}f3 is correct, not allowing ...e7–e5 – book authors unanimously assert. However, the strength of the ...e7–e5 counter-stroke should not be overestimated.'

As often happens, help arrived from another side. In the mid-1970s there began a surge in the popularity of the Petroff Defence. A serious analysis was made of the following variation: 1 e4 e5 2 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{f}}}}}f3 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{f}}}}}f6 3 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}}xe5 d6 4 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{f}}}}}f3 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}}}}}xe4 5 d4 d5 6 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}}}}}d3 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}}}}}e7 7 0-0 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{c}}}}}c6 8 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}}}}}e1 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{g}}}}}g4 9 c4 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{f}}}}}f6 10 cxd5 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}}xd5 11 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{c}}}}}c3 0-0 12 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}}}}}e4 \text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}}}}}e6.

Several years of tests, and the evaluation arrow moved from (=) to (±). It transpired that, with the e-file open, it was not easy for Black to defend. An echo of these changes was provided by games, played in the Queen's Gambit Accepted.

\textbf{Timman – Panno}

Mar del Plata 1982

\textit{Queen's Gambit}

1 d4 \texttt{d5}

2 c4 \texttt{dxc4}

3 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{c}}}}}c3 \texttt{e5}

4 e3 \texttt{exd4}

5 exd4 \texttt{\texttt{f}6}

6 \texttt{\texttt{x}xc4} \texttt{\texttt{e}7}

7 \texttt{\texttt{f}3} \texttt{0-0}

8 h3 \texttt{\texttt{b}7}

9 0-0 \texttt{b6}

10 \texttt{b3} \texttt{c6}

11 \texttt{e1} \texttt{\texttt{f}5}

A familiar position. Note Jan Timman's next move: Black has moved his knight away from the kingside, and White immediately...
You were right, Monsieur La Bourdonnais!

directs his second knight closer to the black monarch.

12  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_4  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_8  \\
13  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}}_2  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}}_5  \\
14  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{g}}}_3  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_6  \\
15  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}}_2  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}}_7  \\
16  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{a}}}_3  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}}_8  \\
17  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}}_3  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{g}}}_6  \\

In Timman’s opinion, 17...f6 followed by ...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}}_7 was better, but even in this case the initiative is with White.

18  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}}_6  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}}_6  \\
19  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_d2  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}}_5  \\
20  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_5  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_6  \\
21  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}}_2  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}}_7  \\
22  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{g}}}_4  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{g}}}_5  \\
23  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}}_g5  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_xg5  \\
24  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_b4  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}}_6!  \\
25  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_e5  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}}_4  \\
26  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}}_f6+  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_xf6  \\
27  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_4  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}}_8  \\

Typical of this type of position: Black defends well, but he is unable to completely extinguish White’s initiative. With his last move Oscar Panno missed an opportunity to simplify the position by 27...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}}_e4 28 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}}_e4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_7.

28 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}}_3!  \\
29 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_c3  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}}_b3  \\
30 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_x_b3  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_d4  \\
31 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}}_6+  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}}_8  \\
32 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{a}}}_e1  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_b8?!  \\
33 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_1e4  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_d8  \\
34 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}}_e6!  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}}_8  \\
35 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_c3  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_7  \\

If 35...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_f8 Timman gives the spectacular finish 36 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{g}}}_h5+! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}}_h7 37 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}}_4+ \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_h6 38 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_f6!.

36 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}}_5+  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{g}}}_8  \\
37 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}}_e6  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_f7  \\
38 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}}_6+  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}}_8  \\
39 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_c5+  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{g}}}_7  \\
40 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_e7  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}}_f6  \\
41 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}}_e5 mate

The conclusion to this excellent game is steeped in the traditions of the 19th century.

In the following example White was not able to exploit the advantages of his position, but his method of play in the opening is undoubtedly of interest.

\textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{Browne – Petrosian}}}  \\
Las Palmas 1982

\textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{Queen’s Gambit}}}  \\
1 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}}_4  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}}_5  \\
2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}}_4  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}}_xc4  \\
3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}}_3  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_5  \\
4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_3  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_xd4  \\
5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}}_d4  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}}_6  \\
6 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}}_c4  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_7  \\
7 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}}_3  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}}_6  \\
8 0-0  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}}_7  \\

An interesting moment. The American grandmaster does not waste time on prophylaxis (8 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}}_3), and Tigran Petrosian does not play 8...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{g}}}_4 – apparently, both are right.

9 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}}_3  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}}_6  \\
10 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_1  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}}_6  \\
11 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{g}}}_5  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}}_d5  \\

Petrosian judges this position to favour White.

12 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}}_5  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}}_xd5  \\
13 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_5  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_6  \\
14 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}}_3!  \\

(see diagram)

A subtle manoeuvre. White rapidly expands his possibilities, whereas Black is left with an unpleasant choice of technically difficult endings.

14 ...  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}}_4  \\
15 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}}_e7  \textit{\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}}_e7
You were right, Monsieur La Bourdannais!

Here Walter Browne began his usual 'time-trouble race', and on the 41st move the game ended in a draw. As was shown by Petrosian, instead of the move in the game, 25 g4 followed by g2, h2–h4 and g4–g5 was very strong, with advantage to White.

Dear reader, have you ever seen an article without a brilliant example by the author? 'A ridiculous question', you will say. I agree.

Razuvaev – Bagirov
Yaroslavl 1982
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 d5
2 c4 dxc4
3 e3 e5
4 ♕xc4 exd4

5 exd4 ♖f6
6 ♖f3 ♕e7
7 0-0 0-0
8 h3 ♖bd7
9 ♕c3 ♖b6
10 ♕b3 ♖bd5

Following Philidor and Steinitz!

11 ♕e1 c6
12 ♕g5 ♕e6
13 ♕e5 ♕c7

The precarious placing of the black pieces on the e-file begins to tell. For example, 13...♛a5 14 ♖xf7! ♖xf7 15 ♕xd5 ♕xd5 16 ♕xe7 or 14...♖xf7 15 ♖e2! (pointed out by Lev Psakhis, but 15 ♖xf6 is also good), and ‘it is hard to offer Black any good advice’, which in the language of symbols looks like this: (+–).

[The accurate reply 14...♕xc3! casts doubts on the combination: 15 bxc3 (15 ♖h6+ ♕h8 16 bxc3 ♖xb3 17 ♕xb3 ♕xg5 18 ♕f7+ ♕xf7 19 ♕xf7 ♕d5) 15...♕xf7 16 ♕xe7 ♕xg5 – Dvoretsky.]

14 ♕c2 ♕e8
15 ♖wd3 g6
16 ♕f3 ♖fd5
17 ♕xe7 ♕xe7
18 ♕g3 ♕ad8
19 ♕ad1 ♕f6
20 f4!
21 ♕f2 f5

There is no other defence against f4–f5.

22 g4 ♕g7
23 gxf5 ♕xf5

If 23...♕xf5 White has the good reply 24 ♕xf5 gxf5 25 ♕h2 ♕h8 26 d5 ♕xd5 27 ♔xd5 ♕xd5 28 ♕xd5 cxd5 29 ♕d4 ♕g7 30 ♕g1 (+–).

24 ♕h2 ♕h8
25 ♕g1 ♕d5
26 ♕g5 and ♕h4 was threatened.
You were right, Monsieur La Bourdonnais!

26 \( \text{Qxd5} \) \( \text{cxd5} \)

After 27...\( \text{Qg8} \) White has many good alternatives, one of them being 28 \( \text{Qxg7+} \) \( \text{Qxg7} \) 29 \( \text{Qg1+} \) \( \text{Qh8} \) 30 \( \text{Wh4} \) (30...\( \text{Wh4} \) 31 \( \text{Qf7} \) mate).

28 \( \text{Qdg1} \) \( \text{Qf8} \)
29 \( \text{Qh6!} \) \( \text{Qg8} \)
30 \( \text{Qb3} \) \( \text{Qd6} \)

If 30...\( \text{Qf6} \), then 31 \( \text{Wh4} \) is decisive.

31 \( \text{Qg2} \) \( \text{Qfd8} \)
32 \( \text{Qxd5} \) \( \text{Qxd5} \)
33 \( \text{Qxe6} \) \( \text{Wf8} \)

33...\( \text{Wc7} \) would allow an amusing finish: 34 \( \text{Wxd5} \) \( \text{Qxd5} \) 35 \( \text{Qe8} \) mate.

Such moves are easy to find and pleasant to make.

34... \( \text{Qxe8} \)
35 \( \text{Wxd5+} \)

Black resigned.

Our excursion has come to an end, and the unpleasant, responsible moment for summing up has arrived. We often argue about the strongest move in various positions but, thank God, at present we all play differently. It seems to me that in the opening you can fantasise a little, and endeavour to find yourself (or someone else's position which is the most comfortable for you). In this question I am all for subjectivity.

So, you were right, Monsieur La Bourdonnais!

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Postscript

Several years have passed since the publication of this article. At the request of Mark Dvoretsky I read it through anew, but decided to refrain from correcting it. The article contains not only reference material, but also the thoughts and feelings which excited me seven years earlier. It seems to me that ideas put down on paper are as though separate from us and cease to belong only to the author. Therefore I did not want to touch material which had already partly become the property of others.

I must frankly admit that I reread the article with a feeling of anxiety. The point is that since childhood one of my favourite chess books has been the primer by the legendary José Raúl Capablanca. The extreme clarity, when the words acquire an almost mathematical meaning, the innate sense of harmony – and all this filled with genuinely Mozart-like charm. One does not want to part with such a book for long, and I often return to it.

But on one occasion, when I was already a grandmaster, I came across some lines which took me aback.
You were right, Monsieur La Bourdonnaise!

Under the diagram I read: ‘White has the two bishops and a solid position. Black in compensation has a strongly posted knight at c5. All things considered, the position seems to be slightly favourable to White, though probably not favourable enough to win. This variation is taken from a game Stahlberg–Nimzowitsch, won by White. Since Nimzowitsch has specialised in this kind of defence, it must be assumed that there is nothing better for Black in this variation…’

How unfortunate! After all, we are talking about one of the most correct of modern openings – the Nimzo-Indian Defence. It has to be admitted that in the evaluation of opening ideas even geniuses can be mistaken. And since that time, when I write opening articles and books, I invariably have a feeling of impending doom. But on this occasion I was lucky, and during the intervening seven years the evaluations made in the article have remained in force.

In conclusion I have pleasure in offering to the reader another interesting example. The easy, elegant style of Rafael Vaganian, who is skilled in subtle piece play, is highly suited to positions from our theme.

Vaganian – Hübner
Tilburg 1983
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 d5
2 c4 cxc4
3 Øc3 e5
4 e3 exd4
5 exd4 Øf6
6 Øxc4 Øe7
7 Øf3 0-0
8 0-0 Øbd7

The attempt to simplify by 8...Øg4 gave White the advantage after 9 h3 Øxf3 10 Øxf3 Øc6 11 Øe3 Øxd4 12 Øxb7 c5 13 Øxd4 cxd4 14 Øad1 Øc8 15 b3 Øc7 16 Øf3 Ød7 17 Øe2 in the game Zaichik-Karpeshov (Volgodonsk 1983).

9 Øe1 Øb6
10 Øb3 c6
11 Øg5 Øg4

Carelessness, bordering on frivolousness. Without his light-square bishop it will be very difficult for Black to ‘suppress’ the bishop on b3.

12 Ød3 Øxf3

After 12...Øh5, as recommended by certain commentators, 13 Øe5 is very unpleasant.

13 Øxf3 Øfd5
14 Øxe7

The position is full of temptations and mirages. 14 Øxe7 Øxe7 15 Øe1 looks very appealing, but Vaganian gives a brilliant refutation: 15...Øbc8 16 Øe2 Øe8 17 Øxf7+ Øxf7 18 Øe6+ Øf8 19 Øe3 Ød6 20 Øf3+ Øxf5! 21 Øxf5+ Øxf5 22 Øxf5+ Øf6+, and White loses because of the lack of an escape square for his king.

14... Øxe7
15 Øe5!
A subtle technique: White does not allow the black knight to go to d5, and this significantly strengthens the pressure of the bishop on b3.

15 ...  
16 ♗e4  
17 ♗d1  

Black stops half-way. The place for the black knight is at f6. Although even in this case after the preparatory 18 ♗e3 White plays d4–d5, and the superiority of the bishop over the knight will be appreciable.

18 ♗e3  
19 ♗g6  

Black misses the last opportunity to play ...♗f6. Now White succeeds in including his knight in the attack, after which Black will be unable to hold the position.

19 ♗e4  
20 ♗d6 was threatened. From this moment White begins to dictate matters.

20 h4!  

The h-pawn was taboo: 20...♗xh4 21 ♖h5 ♗g6 22 ♖h3 h6 23 ♕xg6! (indicated by Vaganian).

21 ♖g4  
22 ♖f4  

22...♗f4 23 ♖xf4 ♖xf4 24 ♖d6! was no better.

23 ♖g3  
24 hxg6  

25 ♖e1  

The movements of the white pieces are uncommonly harmonious and natural. In such situations one has to sense the melody, and then the moves suggest themselves.

25 ...  
26 ♖e8  
27 ♖c5  

An oversight, which hastens the end.

28 ♖xf4!  

Black resigned.
How do Opening Novelties originate?

A striving for the new is the first demand of human imagination.

Stendhal

Defining in aphoristic form the specific nature of the three stages of the chess game, Rudolf Spielmann once wrote: ‘In the opening a chess player is a book, in the middlegame a creator, and in the endgame a machine.’

There is no doubt that in chess, as in life, the commonplace and the prosaic predominate over the unusual and the artistic. However, even in the opening, and especially in the endgame, there is, of course, scope for creativity. The search for opening discoveries against the background of a chess player’s everyday work in mastering new systems and variations, and perfecting those that he already employs, is one of the most attractive aspects of chess, in which the investigative and artistic components of the game intersect.

Since the finding of opening novelties is to a certain extent an intimate process, with the aim of giving greater clarity to the explanation, most of the given examples have been taken from the author’s games.

It is customary to separate opening innovations into two groups. The first contains those which were generated directly during a tournament game; in the second are those found at home, in the quiet of one’s study.

We will begin with novelties from the first group, which even today, despite the general information boom, still occur quite often.

Zlotnik – Gik
Dubna 1968
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5
2 d4 d6
3 c4 cxd4
4 xd4 f6
5 c3 e3
6 f3
7 e4

As Alexander Alekhine liked to say in such cases: ‘lapsus manus’. The reason why the natural 7 f3 was not played was a banal one – before the game the young, newly-fledged master had been bathing in the Volga and sunning himself, and on sitting down at the board in a mellow, relaxed state, he automatically brought out his bishop to c4, thinking that 7 f3 0-0 had already been played.

7 . . .
8 b5+
9 0-0?
How do Opening Novelties originate?

In the game Skold–Botvinnik (Stockholm 1962), which I knew at that time, White played 9 \( \text{d2} \), avoiding the deformation of his pawn structure after the exchange on e3. However, as the subsequent course of events showed, Black’s two bishops are a more weighty factor than the loss of the right to castle.

Annoyed by my absentmindedness on the one hand, and feeling the need to reassure myself on the other, I took a purely emotional (my emphasis – B. Zlotnik) decision to sharply change the course of events. After the move in the game and the exchange on e3 White is saddled with doubled and isolated e-pawns, but on the other hand the f-file is opened and his lead in development becomes threatening.

For about 20 years I did not return in my thoughts to the diagram position, thinking that the accidentally devised novelty was a one-off, and was suitable only for surprising the opponent in a single game. Therefore, when I saw my game with Evgeny Gik in a book by Eduard Gufeld, devoted to the Dragon Variation (1982), I was genuinely surprised to see a question mark attached to 7...\( \text{g4} \). In his book *Botvinnik’s Best Games, Volume 3: 1957–1970* (Moravian Chess 2001) Mikhail Botvinnik regards 7 \( \text{c4} \) as an opening slip, but he makes no mention of 9 0-0. This idea also does not occur in modern tournaments. Such a conspiracy of silence is usually explained not only by ignorance. The answer came only in 1987 at the USSR Junior Championship, when one of the participants, Sergey Tiviakov – then one of the most promising young players in the country – showed me a counter-novelty for Black. I think that, if only in the moral sense, copyright exists in chess; therefore I cannot give Black’s idea here, and I would like to suggest to the readers that they try to find it themselves.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
9 & \ldots & \text{dxe3} \\
10 & \text{fxe3} & \text{e6} \\
11 & \text{c4} & \text{e7} \\
12 & \text{cb5!} & \text{g8?}
\end{array}
\]

12...\( \text{e5} \) was necessary. Now Black’s position is hit by a tornado of sacrifices. It is interesting that the subsequent events made such a strong impression on my opponent, that after the game he not only congratulated me on my win, but also thanked me for my beautiful play. A rare instance of gentlemanly behaviour in the ultra-competitive world of chess.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
13 & \text{xd6!!} & \text{xd6} \\
14 & \text{xe6!} & \text{xe6}
\end{array}
\]

Hoping to obtain three pieces for the queen.
Mate would have resulted from 14...\(\text{wx}d1\) 15 \(\text{ax}d1\) \(\text{c}c6\) 16 \(\text{c}c7\) \(\text{bb}8\) 17 \(\text{xf}7+\) \(\text{f}8\) 18 \(\text{b}3+\) \(\text{e}7\) 19 \(\text{f}7\) mate.

[14...\(\text{e}5!\) was more tenacious. However, even then White would have retained an obvious advantage, by continuing 15 \(\text{wx}d6\) \(\text{ax}d6\) 16 \(\text{d}8\) \(\text{e}6\) 17 \(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{fx}e6\) 18 \(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{e}7\) 19 \(\text{f}7\) – Dvoretzky.]

15 \(\text{wd}8+\) \(\text{f}8\)
16 \(\text{xf}7!\)

Or 16...\(\text{wx}f7\) 17 \(\text{f}1\).

17 \(\text{xc}8\) 
18 \(\text{xc}4+\) \(\text{g}7\)
19 \(\text{d}4+\)

Black resigned.

Rather than as the result of an emotional fit, improvised novelties, i.e. those not prepared beforehand, occur far more often as the result of studying a position and grasping its essence in a state of maximum concentration, directly against the ticking of the clock in the tournament hall.

Kuzovkin – Zlotnik
Moscow 1981

Queen's Indian Defence

1 \(d4\) \(\text{f}6\)
2 \(c4\) \(e6\)
3 \(\text{f}3\) \(b6\)
4 \(g3\) \(\text{b}7\)
5 \(\text{g}2\) \(e7\)
6 0-0 \(0-0\)
7 \(d5!?\) \(\text{ex}d5\)
8 \(\text{h}4\) \(c6\)
9 \(\text{cx}d5\) \(\text{xd}5\)
10 \(\text{f}5\) \(\text{c}7\)
11 \(\text{c}3\) \(d5\)
12 \(e4\) \(\text{f}6\)
13 \(\text{ex}d5\) \(\text{xd}5\)
14 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{ba}6\)
15 \(e1\)

At the time when this game was played, the chess world was under the influence of Garry Kasparov's brilliant win over Slavoljub Marjanovic (Olympiad, Malta 1980), which went: 15...\(\text{wd}7\)? 16 \(\text{h}3\) \(\text{h}8\)? (16...\(\text{wd}8!\) ) 17 \(\text{c}4!\) \(\text{xb}2\) 18 \(\text{g}5!\) with a decisive attack for White.

While I was thinking about my next move, I recalled rather vaguely that Kasparov had gained a spectacular win, but I had no thoughts of my own regarding this position. Delving into the situation, I came to the conclusion that the most unpleasant piece for Black was the knight on f5. Therefore I began studying 15...\(\text{wd}7\) and 15...\(\text{c}8\). I didn't like the first of these because of 16 \(\text{h}3\). My basis for choosing the second was the variation 15...\(\text{c}8\) 16 \(\text{d}6\) \(\text{xc}3!\) 17 \(\text{bxc}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 18 \(c4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 19 \(\text{xa}8\) \(\text{wa}8\) with excellent prospects for Black.

After the game I acquainted myself with Kasparov's notes to his game with Marjanovic, and in particular, with his evaluation of 15...\(\text{c}8\) as being promising for White in view of the variation 16 \(\text{d}6\) \(\text{e}6\) 17 \(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 18 \(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 19 \(\text{wd}5\) \(\text{xb}2\) 20 \(\text{ad}1\).

Apparently, after my present game with Kuzovkin (Informator 31/618) Kasparov changed his opinion about 15...\(\text{c}8\), and in his book The Test of Time he commented
How do Opening Novelties originate?

that it was acceptable. It would appear that 15...c8 is not only a possible move, but also the strongest. At any event, this idea was employed against Kasparov by Anatoly Karpov in the second game of their first match (1984/85) after a slightly different move order: 13 f4 c8; there followed 14 g4 b6 15 c1 d7 16 d2 c5, and Black's position proved very sound. After this the entire gambit with 7 d5 went out of fashion.

Returning to the source game, I should mention that the comparatively best move for White was nevertheless 16 d6.

15 ... c8!
16 d4?! d7
17 c1 b7
18 e5 xe5
19 xe5 fe8

Black has managed to consolidate his position, retaining his extra pawn.

20 h5 g6
21 d2 f6
22 h4 c5
23 b3 ad8?

23...e6 was better. Now White could have reduced Black's advantage to the minimum by 24 xc5 bxc5 25 a4 e6 26 xc5 xc5 27 xc5, although after 27...d4 it would not have been easy for him to defend.

24 d1? e5
25 xc5 bxc5
26 a4

26 a4 was also no better on account of 26...e7 27 a5 e6.

26 ... a6
27 a5 e7
28 f4 e3
29 b4 cxb4
30 xd5 xd5
31 xd5+

32 f2 a3

White resigned.

The main form of novelty is, of course, the one prepared at home in the quiet of one's study. One can distinguish three types of such novelties: accidental, on the basis of analogy, and the creation of new positions. I will give some examples of each type.

One of the most impressive novelties of 1988 came in the following position.

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 b4 4 e5 c5 5 a3 xc3+ 6 bxc3 e7 7 g4 0-0 8 b3 bc6 9 d3 f5 10 exf6 xf6 11 g5 e5!

Black's last move had been known for a long time and the verdict of theory was unanimous: it was bad to play this in view of 12 xh7+ xh7 13 h5+ g8 14 xf6 gx6 15 dxe5.

Citing the generally-accepted opinion, the author of these lines also gave this variation in his book on the French Defence, published in 1982. However, during the process of working on the book I realised that many existing evaluations were based on old games, and games that were not always played by players of high standard. Both these factors, the age of the evaluations and the low standard of the players, necessarily suggests that the conclusions of theory in
such cases may be dubious.
The history of the move 11...e5! – the novelty here is mainly the change of assessment from question mark to exclamation mark – is as follows.

In the summer of the previous year, Yuri Dokhoian (who was then still a master and a student at the chess faculty) and his trainer, the teacher Sergey Kishnev, asked me how to ease Black’s difficulties in the variation 11...g5...f7 12...xe7...exe7 13...h4. I knew well from my own practical experience what a thankless task it was to defend as Black in this variation. As the author of an opening book, in which, taking account of the considerations only just expressed, a number of assessments were dubious, I suggested, or more precisely expressed my certainty, that the move 11...e5 was perfectly possible.

As the result of a brief joint analysis, to general surprise, including that of the person what had suggested investigating this continuation, it was established that 11...e5 was a promising move, and it became clear that a new branch on the tree of opening theory had been generated. The opportunity to be the first to test 11...e5 in practice, and to reap the harvest of the novelty, fell to Dokhoian. Here is the game which appeared first in the annals of opening theory (Informator 46/383).

Psakhis – Dokhoian
USSR Championship, First League, Klaipeda 1988

French Defence

1 e4 e6
2 d4 d5
3...c3...b4
4 e5 c5
5 a3...xc3+
6 bxc3...e7
7...g4...f3
8...f3

9...d3 f5
10 exf6...xf6
11 g5 e5!
12...h4

According to Dokhoian, 11...e5 left Lev Psakhis in a state of shock. He thought over his reply for more than 40 minutes, and he still did not risk going in for the main continuation: 12...xh7+...xh7 13...h5+...g8 14...xf6 gxf6 15 dxe5, given in all the books on the French Defence.

Despite the irrational nature of the position, defined in particular by the exposed position of the black king, the situation is one not only of approximate material equality, but also positional equality. The secret of the position is that Black should aim for the exchange of queens by 15...f8 with the idea of 16...f7. Analysis has shown that it is not so simple to advance White’s three (!) connected passed pawn on the kingside.

The game Abramovic–Dokhoian (Belgrade 1988) went 12...g3...xf3 13 gxf3 c4! 14...xe7? (14...e2 was better) 14...exe7 15...e2 exd4 16...f1...f5 with a clear advantage for Black.

12... e4
13...xf6 gxf6
14...xf6 exd3
14...exf3 was weaker on account of 15 gxf3 
\( \text{g6} \) 16 \( \text{Wxd8} + \text{hxd8} \) 17 dxc5! \( \text{e6} \) 18 \( \text{xg6} \) hxg5 19 0-0 0-0 20 \( \text{xd5} \) with advantage to White (indicated by Dokhoian).

\[ \begin{align*}
15 & \text{cxd3} & \text{cx} & \text{d4} \\
16 & \text{xd4} & \text{xd4} \\
17 & \text{Wxd4} & \text{f5} \\
18 & 0-0 \\
19 & \text{We3} & \text{d4} \\
20 & \text{cxd4} & \text{Wxd4} \\
21 & \text{fd} & \text{d8} \\
22 & \text{ab} & \text{d7} \\
23 & \text{Wg} & \text{g5+} \\
\end{align*} \]

Draw.

We will now consider an example of an opening novelty, devised by analogy. This type is the one that occurs most often. The degree of analogy with known examples can differ, of course, from being obvious to hard to establish. We will consider an example which is roughly equidistant from the two extreme points.

**Makarychev – Zlotnik**

*Moscow 1978*

**Sicilian Defence**

\[ \begin{align*}
1 & \text{e} & \text{c5} \\
2 & \text{f} & \text{c6} \\
3 & \text{c} & \text{g6} \\
4 & \text{d} & \text{cxd4} \\
5 & \text{xd} & \text{g7} \\
6 & \text{e} & \text{f6} \\
7 & \text{c} & \text{a5} \\
8 & 0-0 \\
9 & \text{b} & \text{c7} \\
10 & \text{e} & \text{d6} \\
11 & \text{f} & \text{a5} \\
12 & \text{a} & \text{b4} \\
13 & \text{f} & \text{g4!} \\
\end{align*} \]

A very unusual type of move, especially for the opening stage – a piece is simply placed *en prise*. How did the idea of this move arise?

The prototype was provided by the game **Fischer–Korchnoi** (Candidates Tournament, Curaçao 1962), in which after the moves 1 \( \text{e} \) 2 \( \text{d} \) 3 \( \text{f} \) 4 \( \text{g} \) 5 \( \text{f} \) 6 \( \text{e} \) 7 \( \text{c} \) 8 0-0 0-0 9 \( \text{h} \) 10 \( \text{c} \) 11 \( \text{d} \) 12 \( \text{a} \) 13 \( \text{g} \) the following position arose.

There followed 13...\( \text{xg4!} \) (an idea of Evgeny Vasyukov) 14 \( \text{xg4} \) 15 \( \text{xg4} \) 16 \( \text{b} \) 17 \( \text{a} \) \( \text{c6} \), and Black had an obvious advantage.

If the two diagrams are compared, it is easy
How do Opening Novelties originate?

to establish their similarity. The next step in the search for the idea was my own dismal experience, in a game with the Kharkov master Alexander Vaisman (Moscow 1964), when, playing White in the last but one diagram, instead of 13  
\textit{f}3 I played 13 g4?, after which, of course, there followed 13...  
\textit{x}g4! Reflecting on the results of these two games, I came to the following conclusion: since after the capture of the g4-pawn with the bishop Black gains an advantage, it can be assumed that in the similar position, but without the win of the white g-pawn, the bishop move to g4 is sufficient for equality.

Returning to the game with Sergey Makarychev, I should mention that the grandmaster very quickly grasped the essence of the novelty and after literally a few minutes' thought he offered a draw. But I was loathe to part with the game...

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c}
14 \textit{x}g4 \\
15 \textit{w}xg4 \\
16 bxc3 \\
17 \textit{d}4 \\
18 \textit{x}a1 \\
18...b5 19 axb5 \textit{w}c4 20 \textit{d}2 \textit{x}b5, creating a passed pawn on the a-file, also came into consideration.
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

19 fxe5 \textit{d}xe5

20 \textit{w}g3

The critical position, reached practically by force after the acceptance of the sacrifice. Now 20...\textit{fe}8 was essential, and in view of the threat of 21...\textit{w}c4 it would seem that Black's chances are even preferable.

However, I was so pleased that I had finally managed to employ the novelty which I had been nurturing for two years, that I was unable to force myself to play with full intensity, and I made a series of second-rate moves.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
20 ... \\
21 \textit{c}5 \\
22 \textit{w}e3! \\
22...\textit{a}6 was better, followed by ...\textit{a}6-c6 and ...\textit{b}7-b6.
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

23 \textit{b}6 \\
Blundering a pawn. It was still not too late to maintain equality by 23...\textit{a}6! 24 \textit{xa}5 b6 25 \textit{b}4 \textit{xa}4.

[After 26 \textit{xa}4 \textit{xa}4 27 \textit{xb}6! Black's position is difficult. The knight is taboo (27...\textit{xb}3? 28 \textit{b}8+ \textit{g}7 29 \textit{f}8+), and White, after playing h2–h3 and \textit{c}5, will create threats to the enemy king – Dvoretsky.]

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
24 \textit{xa}5 \\
25 c4! \\
26 c5 \\
27 \textit{b}3 \\
28 \textit{xb}3 \\
29 \textit{f}1 \\
30 gxf3 \\
31 \textit{a}5 \\
32 \textit{g}1 \\
33 \textit{c}4
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

And White won.
We will now examine two games by well-known grandmasters. In the first of these the novelty was apparently devised by making use of the classical heritage, while in the second a new position was created.

Romanishin – Geller
43rd USSR Championship, Yerevan 1975

Ruy Lopez

1 e4 e5 2 d3 c6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 f6 5 0-0 e7 6 e1 b5 7 b3 d6

Before the present game this position had occurred many times in various tournaments. Repeated attempts had been made to demonstrate White’s superiority thanks to his pair of bishops, but the weakness of the d5-pawn nullified all these attempts. Thus, for example, the game Bronstein–Geller (Teesside 1975) went 15 a4, and after 15...b4 16 d1 c7 17 axb5 axb5 18 a3 b4!? 19 cxb4 axa3 Black obtained good play.

15 d2
16 f1!

An interesting gambit idea. It is noteworthy that a number of participants in this tournament – the 42nd USSR Championship – were ‘green with envy’ on seeing White’s last move, stating that their attempts to find some new idea in the given position had been unsuccessful.

Now 16...fxd5 is unfavourable because of 17 e4, but at first sight it is unclear what compensation White will have after the capture on d5 with the other knight.

16...

So, the position, for which Oleg Romanishin was aiming when he played 15 d2, has been reached. What does White have for the sacrificed pawn? And how, finally, did Romanishin devise his idea?

I would venture to suggest that a prototype was provided by the famous game Bronstein–Keres (Candidates Tournament, Budapest 1950): 1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 f6 5 0-0 e7 6 e1 b5 7 b3 d6 8
Despite the formal difference of the two last diagrams, one cannot help but notice their similarity in content - in both cases in return for the sacrificed pawn White has the bishop pair and prospects of an attack on the king.

17 \( \text{g}3 \)  \( \text{c}7 \)

After 17...\( \text{e}8 \) 18 \( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 19 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 20 \( \text{g}5 \)! with the threat of 21 \( \text{h}6+ \) White has an obvious advantage.

18 \( \text{a}4 \)  \( \text{bxa}4 \)

18...\( b4 \) came into consideration. White can play 19 \( \text{c}xb4 \), regaining the pawn, but after 19...\( \text{e}6 \) 20 \( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 21 \( \text{e}7+ \) \( \text{xe}7 \) or 19...\( \text{g}6 \) 20 \( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 21 \( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{f}8 \) Black has a good game. In the event of 19 \( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{bxc}3 \) 20 \( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{e}6! \) (20...\( \text{xb}2? \) 21 \( \text{g}7 \) \( \text{bxa}1\text{w} \) 22 \( \text{xa}1 \) \( \text{fe}8 \) 23 \( \text{h}5 \) or 22...\( \text{ce}8 \) 23 \( \text{g}3 \), with a win for White in both cases) 21 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{h}5 \) 24 \( \text{g}4 \) Black has a pleasant choice between 24...\( \text{f}6 \) with a repetition of moves, and the tempting 24...\( \text{xb}2 \). [As was pointed out by Vlado Kovacevic, after 19...\( \text{bxc}3 \)!
there is the simple reply 20 \( \text{bxc}3! \) \( \text{e}6 \) 21 \( \text{a}3 \) with the dangerous threats of 22 \( \text{xe}5 \) and 22 \( \text{ad}1 \). In the game Kurajica–Smejkal, Titovo Uzice 1978, Black preferred 19...\( \text{e}6!? \) 20 \( \text{b}7 \) \( \text{e}8 \) – Dvoretsky.]

19 \( \text{xa}4 \)  \( \text{b}8 \)

This move allows White to regain his pawn, while keeping the initiative. The variation 25...\( \text{xc}2 \) 26 \( \text{xb}5 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 27 \( \text{e}a1 \) was also to his advantage.

The best move was 25...\( \text{d}4! \), for example: 26 \( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 27 \( \text{xf}8+ \) \( \text{xf}8 \) 28 \( \text{h}7+ \) \( \text{h}7 \) 29 \( \text{a}8 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 30 \( \text{xc}8 \) \( \text{xc}8 \), and Black's chances are by no means worse.

26 \( \text{xf}8+ \)  \( \text{xf}8 \)

26...\( \text{xf}8 \) was dangerous because of 27 \( \text{xb}5 \) \( \text{xc}2 \) 28 \( \text{a}1 \).

27 \( \text{h}7+ \)  \( \text{h}7 \)

28 \( \text{xb}5 \)

Thus, material equality has been restored, and the passed b-pawn and the possibility of sharply activating his rook mean that White's position is to be preferred. Without doubt, the psychological initiative was also now on his side – after all, White has managed to demonstrate the correctness (in practice!) of his idea. Also of significance was the fact that, in search of a refutation, Yefim Geller had expended a great deal of time.

Therefore it is not surprising that, although White's positional advantage is not so great, Black lost rather quickly.

28 ...  \( \text{g}8 \)

29 \( \text{a}1 \)  \( \text{d}5 \)

30 \( \text{a}7 \)  \( \text{c}4 \)

31 \( \text{b}8 \)  \( \text{d}4 \)

31...\( \text{xb}4 \) was more accurate, and after 32 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{c}8 \) Black would have had better chances of a successful defence.

32 \( \text{g}5 \)  \( \text{h}7? \)

[Here too 31...\( \text{xb}4 \) was necessary – Dvoretsky.]
How do Opening Novelties originate?

33 \( \text{xe}7 \)  \( \text{d3} \)

33...\( \text{xc}8 \) was no better, for example: 34 \( \text{wxe}5 \)  \( \text{xc}1+ \)  35 \( \text{wh}2 \)  \( \text{d3} \)  36 \( \text{xf}8 \)  \( \text{xf}8 \) (or 36...\( \text{xf}8 \)  37  \( \text{xf}5 \))  37 \( \text{we}3 \)  \( \text{c}8 \)  38 \( \text{xd}3 \)  \( \text{xb}4 \)  39 \( \text{xf}7 \).

\( \text{xf}8 \)
\( \text{a}8 \)
\( \text{xf}8+ \)
\( \text{h}8+ \)
\( \text{h}5+ \)
\( \text{f}5+ \)

Black resigned.

We will now consider an example showing the creation of an original position with a pawn sacrifice that had no analogue, and which occurred, incidentally, in the same tournament against the same opponent.

**Guilko – Geller**

43rd USSR Championship, Yerevan 1975

**Grünfeld Defence**

1 \( \text{d}4 \)  \( \text{d}5 \)
2 \( \text{gf}3 \)  \( \text{f}6 \)
3 \( \text{e}3! \)?

A very rare move for a game at grandmaster level, but it is this that begins the construction of the intended position.

3...
4 \( \text{c}4 \)  \( \text{g}7 \)
5 \( \text{cxd}5 \)  \( \text{xd}5 \)
6 \( \text{e}2 \)

Another unusual move. 6 \( \text{c}3 \) would have led to familiar lines of the Grünfeld Defence. White's outwardly unpretentious play naturally provokes an active reaction by his opponent...

6...
7 \( \text{e}4 \)  \( \text{b}6 \)
8 \( \text{d}5 \)  0-0

Thus, an unusual position has been created, one that only formally resembles known positions. However, White has lost a tempo on the advance of his e-pawn, as a result of which he is behind in development, and in addition his pawn centre is in danger, in view of the undermining moves ...\( \text{f}7-\text{f}5 \) and ...\( \text{e}7-\text{e}6 \). He is now required to play resourcefully and he must be prepared to take risks.

9 \( \text{a}4! \)

The prelude to an interesting pawn sacrifice. The natural 9 0-0 was less good because of 9...\( \text{e}6 \) 10 \( \text{d}6 \) (after 10 \( \text{dx}e6 \) \( \text{xe}6 \) Black has an excellent game) 10...\( \text{c}6 \) with the idea of ...\( \text{c}6-\text{d}4 \), and it becomes difficult to defend the queen's pawn. In view of the threat of 10 \( \text{a}5 \), Black's next move is forced.

9...
10 \( \text{bd}2 \)

10 \( \text{a}5 \) did not work on account of 10...\( \text{f}xe4 \) 11 \( \text{ax}b6 \) \( \text{ex}f3 \) 12 \( \text{xa}7 \) \( \text{fxe}2 \) 13 \( \text{wa}4 \) \( \text{d}7 \) and 14...\( \text{a}6 \).

10...
11 \( \text{xe}4 \)  \( \text{xd}5 \)
12 0-0  \( \text{b}6 \)
13 \( \text{c}4 \)  \( \text{e}6 \)
14 \( \text{a}5! \)

(see diagram)
How do Opening Novelties originate?

White has reached the position for which he was aiming, when he sacrificed the pawn. 14...h6! was less good on account of 14...h6!, when it is not easy for White to develop his initiative.

14...\textcolor{red}{a6}

Apparently the strongest reply. 14...\textcolor{red}{c6}, for example, was weaker on account of 15 axb6 \textcolor{red}{cxb6} 16...\textcolor{red}{b5} \textcolor{red}{d4} 17...\textcolor{red}{d4} \textcolor{red}{x}d4 18...\textcolor{red}{c6} \textcolor{red}{b}8 19...\textcolor{red}{e}3! with the better game for White.

15 axb6

axb6?

This natural move is a poor one. By no means always, especially in such an unusual position, is the natural the best. 15...\textcolor{red}{b}6 was stronger. Then nothing is given by 16...\textcolor{red}{c}5 on account of 16...\textcolor{red}{x}d5 17...\textcolor{red}{x}d5+...e6, while after 16...\textcolor{red}{e}1...\textcolor{red}{a}7 Black would have retained adequate defensive resources.

16...\textcolor{red}{e}5\textcolor{red}{d}7

17...\textcolor{red}{e}2?!

17...\textcolor{red}{b}3 was stronger, when 17...b5 is insufficient in view of the simple 18...\textcolor{red}{x}e6+, while if 17...\textcolor{red}{d}6, then 18...\textcolor{red}{e}1 is good. [18...\textcolor{red}{e}1 is a poor move in view of 18...b5! -- preferable is 18...\textcolor{red}{d}1 \textcolor{red}{c}6 19...\textcolor{red}{h}4! b5 20...\textcolor{red}{h}3! \textcolor{red}{e}8! 21...\textcolor{red}{d}3 e5 22...\textcolor{red}{g}3 ...f5 with chances for both sides -- Dvoretsky.]

17...\textcolor{red}{e}8

18...\textcolor{red}{b}5

19...\textcolor{red}{d}3

After 19...\textcolor{red}{x}e6+ and mass exchanges on e6, White would have regained his pawn, but ended up in an inferior position.

19...\textcolor{red}{b}7

20...\textcolor{red}{e}5\textcolor{red}{d}8?

Again a natural move proves to be a mistake, and this time, apparently, a decisive one. After 20...\textcolor{red}{b}4! 21...\textcolor{red}{a}8 \textcolor{red}{a}8 (21...\textcolor{red}{x}a8? 22...\textcolor{red}{h}5!) 22...\textcolor{red}{b}1...\textcolor{red}{c}6 there would still have been all to play for.

21...\textcolor{red}{b}1\textcolor{red}{d}4

21...\textcolor{red}{d}5 was comparatively better, after which there would have followed 22...f4.

22...\textcolor{red}{f}3

Here 22...\textcolor{red}{x}h7 would have been more quickly decisive. After 22...\textcolor{red}{x}e5 23...\textcolor{red}{xf}8 \textcolor{red}{c}6 24...f3 Black would have lost the exchange. [In fact, the capture on h7 is incorrect in view of the counter 22...\textcolor{red}{f}5! -- Dvoretsky.] bpk

22...\textcolor{red}{d}7

23...\textcolor{red}{e}5\textcolor{red}{d}4

24...\textcolor{red}{a}3

All White’s pieces have joined the attack and the threatened sacrifice on h7 cannot be prevented. After Black’s reply in the game, White ‘prosaically’ restricts himself to the win of the exchange.

24...\textcolor{red}{d}5

25...\textcolor{red}{f}3\textcolor{red}{f}4

26...\textcolor{red}{f}4\textcolor{red}{d}4

27...\textcolor{red}{e}6\textcolor{red}{b}4

28...\textcolor{red}{d}1!\textcolor{red}{f}3

29...\textcolor{red}{f}3\textcolor{red}{c}6

30...\textcolor{red}{f}8\textcolor{red}{f}8

31...\textcolor{red}{e}4\textcolor{red}{f}6

32...\textcolor{red}{d}5+\textcolor{red}{h}8

33...\textcolor{red}{a}6!

Black lost on time, but his position is, of course, hopeless.
The Move ...g7–g5 in the French Defence

Chess has been in existence for a millennium and a half. But despite such a venerable age, it is currently experiencing a second youth. The popularity of the game is growing and the number of tournaments is increasing. Views on chess strategy in general, and on opening theory in particular, are rapidly changing.

In recent years systems which previously were considered unpromising, such as the Dutch Defence or the Italian Game, have become fashionable. New trends in opening theory have appeared. Fifty years ago the Chelyabinsk Variation was simply considered an anathema – it was thought that Black’s position consisted entirely of weaknesses. And the Volga Gambit? Already in the opening Black sacrifices a pawn, and then dreams about the endgame. Meanwhile, both of these systems are now very popular. Moreover, White sometimes seeks ways of avoiding them, not allowing them.

Great changes are also occurring within opening systems; approaches to them, ways of playing them, and evaluations are changing.

The French Defence is an old love of mine; I have been employing it for more than quarter of a century. Using its example I would like to show what changes are currently occurring in the interpretation of various opening lines.

What are the classical concepts of standard French positions, arising after the advance of the white pawn to e5? Black’s plans have always been associated with pressure on the d4-pawn and the development of his initiative on the queenside. Sometimes Black also plays ...f7–f6, after which a struggle begins for the e5-point; White reinforces his centre and tries to organise an attack (with pawns or pieces) on the kingside.

Modern chess has become ‘total’; the struggle in it is conducted by all the pieces and on any part of the board. And for Black in the French Defence, nowadays a counter-attack on the kingside is an equally customary weapon as play on the queenside.

I first encountered the move ...g7–g5 some thirty years ago, when analysing the game Sakharov–Petrosian (USSR Championship Semi-Final, Kiev 1957).

```
1 e4 e6
2 d4 d5
3 c3 c5
4 e5 cxd4
5 d2 cxb4
6 a3 exd2
7 c3 c6
8 xd4 f5
9 w4?! f4
9... c3!!
10 w4 (see diagram)
```

10... g5!
11 b5+ c6
12 d4! d5!
13 b4 w5
14 w2 xg2
The Move \ldots g7–g5 in the French Defence

Black has gained an advantage and he went on to win.

For those times the move \ldots g7–g5 looked remarkable and appeared merely to be an exception, in no way disproving the general rule. But I remembered this idea, and I began employing it frequently and not unsuccessfully.

Tumenok – Kosikov
Kiev 1977
French Defence

1 e4 e6
2 d4 d5
3 \protect\texttt{c}c3 \protect\texttt{b}4
4 e5 \protect\texttt{e}7
5 a3 \protect\texttt{x}c3+ c5
6 bxc3 a4 \protect\texttt{b}c6

Nowadays in this position I prefer 7...\protect\texttt{wc}7.

8 \protect\texttt{f}3 \protect\texttt{d}7
9 \protect\texttt{d}3 \protect\texttt{c}7
10 0-0 c4!
11 \protect\texttt{e}2 f6

What possible plan does Black have? In the event of the pawn exchange on f6 he will endeavour to play \ldots e6-e5. But if the pawn tension in the centre is maintained, it makes sense to play \ldots f6-f5 at some point and then attack on the kingside.

I planned the following piece set-up: switch the rook from d8 to f7, where it will not only assist the attack, but also help in the defence along the 7th rank; place the knight on f5 and support it with \ldots h7–h5; play the king to a8 and retreat the bishop to c8, supporting the b7-point and vacating the 7th rank for the rook. But in some cases \ldots \protect\texttt{d}7–e8–g6(h5) is also possible.

With what should Black begin?

13 \ldots \protect\texttt{df}8!

The correct move. Now nothing is given by 14 \protect\texttt{d}6?! \protect\texttt{d}8, when after \ldots \protect\texttt{f}7 and \ldots \protect\texttt{f}5 the bishop comes under attack. Apparently White does best to play 14 \protect\texttt{f}1 \protect\texttt{f}7 15 g3!, intending after the exchange of pawns to bring out the bishop to h3 (Dueball-Fichtl, Bamberg 1972).

14 a5 \protect\texttt{f}7
15 a6?

A serious strategic mistake – the blocking of
the queenside is to Black’s advantage. In addition, the a6-pawn may subsequently become weak.

15 ... b6
16 ♖d6 ♗d8
17 ♗h4
White prevents 17...♗f5 and prepares f2−f4.

17 ... f5!
Black’s flank attack may be successful only if the centre is stable. The hasty 17...g5? is a mistake in view of 18 exf6.

18 f4

A typical pawn sacrifice for the sake of opening lines – a kind of ‘Volga Gambit’ in the French Defence.

19 fxg5 ♕g8
20 ♕d2 ♗g7
21 ♗f3 h6
22 gxh6 ♗g6!
22...♗xg2+ would have been a blunder, since after 23 ♗h1 followed by 24 ♗g1 the initiative on the kingside is seized by White – he simply has more pieces there.

23 ♗f1 ♖hxh6
24 ♖eb1
Now Black has to reckon with the rook sacrifice on b6, say, in reply to 24...♗e8?.

24 ... ♗d8!
Before the start of a decisive assault it is useful to safeguard one’s own king. Now 25 ♙xb6 axb6 26 a7 ♖xa7 27 ♖xa7 ♗c8 is no longer dangerous. White should probably have set up a defensive line by ♕f2, ♖e1, ♖ad1 and ♖d2.

25 ♕c1?
White has practically no chance of creating an attack, and nevertheless he aims for one. This is the difference between obstinacy and tenacity!

Let’s outline a plan of action for Black. It is important for him to advance his pawn to f4 (after first playing ...♖g4). In this case the pressure on g2 is intensified, and the f5-square is vacated for the knight and the b1−h7 diagonal for the bishop or queen. But first he must eliminate White’s hopes associated with the rook sacrifice on b6.

When the plan is clear, the subsequent moves are easy to make.

25 ... ♕c8!
26 ♖a3 ♖e8
27 ♖e3 ♖h8
28 ♖c1 ♗ce7
29 ♖f2 ♖g4
30 ♖e2 ♖h5
30...f4 31 ♖e1 was premature.

31 ♖d2

When defending it is in general recommended to exchange pieces. However, the exchange of the light-square bishops does not bring White any relief.

31 ... ♖g7
32 ♖h5 ♖hx5
33 ♖f3 ♖g4!
34 ♖d2 f4
35 ♖e1 ♖h7
Threatening 36...♗xc2.

36 ♖ac1 ♖f5
37 ♖f1?!
The Move \( \ldots g7-g5 \) in the French Defence

Note the great activity of the black pieces. The accumulation of positional advantages usually prepares the ground for a decisive combinative breakthrough. And here such an appropriate moment has in fact arrived!

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
5 & \text{d}3 & c5 \\
6 & c3 & \text{c}6 \\
7 & \text{e}2 & \text{cxd}4 \\
8 & \text{cxd}4 & f6 \\
9 & \text{exf}6 & \text{xf}6 \\
10 & \text{f}3 & \text{d}6 \\
11 & 0-0 & \text{c}7 \\
12 & \text{c}3 & a6 \\
13 & \text{g}5 & 0-0 \\
14 & \text{h}4 & \text{h}5!
\end{array}
\]

There is a struggle in progress for the central d4- and e5-points. White wanted to exchange the dark-square bishops, whereas for Black it is advantageous to give up his knight for the enemy bishop.

15 \( \text{g}3 \) ?!

White should not have fallen in with his opponent's plans. 15 \( \text{e}1 \) was stronger, and subsequently even \( \text{h}4-g5-e3 \), in order to support the weak d4-pawn.

15 \( \ldots \) \( \text{xg}3 \)

16 \( \text{hxg}3 \) \( \text{g}6! \)

The g7-square must be vacated for the queen; from there it intensifies the attack on the key d4- and e5-squares. Black's position is already preferable.

17 \( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{g}7 \)

18 \( \text{b}1 \)

5 \( \text{d}3 \)

6 \( \text{c}3 \)

7 \( \text{e}2 \)

8 \( \text{cxd}4 \)

9 \( \text{exf}6 \)

10 \( \text{f}3 \)

11 \( 0-0 \)

12 \( \text{c}3 \)

13 \( \text{g}5 \)

14 \( \text{h}4 \)

After 44 \( \text{e}3 \) the knight, which all the game has been standing in ambush, lands the concluding blow: 44...\( \text{e}7! \) 45 \( \text{xg}1 \) \( \text{f}5 \) mate. White resigned.

Today in the French Defence Black advances his pawn to g5 in the most varied situations. Here is one more example.

Smagin – Vaiser

Barnaul 1984

French Defence

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
1 & \text{e}4 & \text{e}6 \\
2 & \text{d}4 & \text{d}5 \\
3 & \text{d}2 & \text{f}6 \\
4 & \text{e}5 & \text{fd}7 \\
18 & \ldots & \text{g}5!
\end{array}
\]
This is not an attack on the king. By threatening the f3-knight, Black further intensifies the pressure on the enemy centre.

19 \( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{d}7 \)

There is no need to hurry: the complications after 19...g4 20 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{xe}5?! \) 21 dxe5 \( \text{xe}5 \) 22 \( \text{xd}5! \) exd5 23 \( \text{xd}5+ \) \( \text{f}7 \) 24 \( \text{c}7 \) favour White.

20 \( \text{d}2? \)

20 \( \text{d}3 \) was better. There now follows an exchange sacrifice, typical in such positions.

20 ... \( \text{xf}3! \)

21 gxf3 \( \text{xd}4 \)

22 \( \text{g}2 \)

If 22 \( \text{e}3 \), then 22...\( \text{f}4! \) is strong.

22 ... \( \text{f}8 \)

23 \( \text{h}1 \) \( \text{h}6 \)

24 \( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{xf}3 \)

25 \( \text{xd}5!? \)

26 \( \text{gxh}4 \)

If 26 \( \text{g}1 \), then 26...\( \text{f}7! \) is strong, attacking the f2-point and intending 27...\( \text{f}3+ \) and 28...\( \text{xd}5 \).

26 ... \( \text{h}4+ \)

27 \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{b}5+ \)

28 \( \text{e}1 \)

Here 28...\( \text{g}2! \) would have won immediately. Black played less accurately (28...\( \text{b}4+ \)), but all the same he soon won.

And now I would like to reveal to you the story of how I conceived a new opening idea, which in the mid-1980s became very popular. You will see from within the mechanism of how an opening novelty emerges.

When studying the Tarrasch Variation of the French Defence, on one occasion I was considering how Black should play after the following moves:

1 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{e}6 \)

2 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}5 \)

3 \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{f}6 \)

4 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{fd}7 \)

5 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{c}5 \)

6 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \)

7 \( \text{df}3 \)

Who has outwitted whom? 25...\( \text{xd}5? \) 26 \( \text{xd}5+ \) \( \text{f}7 \) is incorrect in view of 27 \( \text{e}4! \), when it is now Black who has problems. And if 25...\( \text{c}6? \) there follows simply 26 \( \text{xc}6! \) bxc6 27 \( \text{e}3 \).

25 ... \( \text{h}4+!! \)

Nevertheless the move ...g6-g5 also comes in useful for the attack.
A 'prompt' was found in a game which made an enormous impression on me.

**Reshevsky – Vaganian**

Skopje 1976

7 ... \textit{b5}
8 \textit{f2}
9 \textit{d3} \textit{b6}
10 \textit{e2} \textit{f6}
11 \textit{exf6}

In an earlier game Adorjan–Vaganian (Tees-side 1974) White chose 11 \textit{g3} (intending \textit{h2–h3} and \textit{h2}). But this did not lead to a quiet life: Rafael Vaganian replied 11...\textit{g5}!

12 \textit{e1} \textit{xd4} 13 \textit{exd4} (13 \textit{cxd4} \textit{gxh4}+ 14 \textit{xf4} \textit{exe5} 15 \textit{dxe5} \textit{h6} 13...\textit{gxh4}+ 14 \textit{xf4} \textit{exe5} 15 \textit{dxe5} \textit{dxe5} 16 \textit{exe5} (Black also has an excellent position after 16 \textit{dxe5} \textit{dxe5} 17 \textit{exe5} \textit{b7} 18 \textit{h5}+ \textit{d7} 16...\textit{dxe5} 17 \textit{dxe5} \textit{d8}+ 18 \textit{h3} \textit{d8}, and in a sharp skirmish he finally won.

11 ... \textit{xf6}
12 \textit{g3} \textit{cxd4}
13 \textit{cxd4} \textit{0-0}
14 \textit{e1}?

The decisive mistake. 14 \textit{h3} followed by \textit{h2} was essential.

In order to emphasise the vulnerability of the white king, Vaganian blows up the central fortifications with the aid of material sacrifices.

15 fxe5 \textit{dxe5}
16 dxe5 \textit{h4}+!!
17 \textit{xh4} \textit{xf3}!!

Now 18 \textit{gxf3} \textit{f2}+ leads to a quick mate.

18 \textit{f1} \textit{f4+}
19 \textit{f4} \textit{e7+}
20 \textit{g5} \textit{e6}!
21 \textit{f5} \textit{xf5}
22 \textit{f4} \textit{xe5}
23 \textit{g4} \textit{d7}
24 \textit{h5} \textit{e7}
25 \textit{g6}+ \textit{d7}
26 \textit{g3} \textit{d6}
27 \textit{ae1} \textit{h6}
28 \textit{h6} \textit{f8}

White resigned.

This brilliant rout suggested to me the main idea by which Black should be guided, in order to exploit his lead in development: he must detain the enemy king in the centre, and then blow up the centre at any cost.

But in the game Panchenko–Kosikov (Dnepropetrovsk 1978) my opponent replied to 7...\textit{b5} with 8 \textit{a5}! \textit{xc5} (of course, 8...\textit{xc5}? 9 \textit{b4} is bad) 9 \textit{h3} followed by \textit{f2–d3}. White gained an advantage and he went on to win.

White also has another excellent set-up: 8 \textit{e3}! \textit{cxd4} (8...\textit{b5} 9 \textit{xc5}! \textit{b4} does not work because of 10 \textit{d4} \textit{b7} 11 \textit{a3}! \textit{xc3} 12 \textit{b4}: Tseshkovsky–Vaganian, Vilnius 1975) 9 \textit{xd4} \textit{xd4} 10 \textit{xd4}.

In the search for an improvement in Black's play, a logical thought occurred: why place the queen on \textit{a5}, if all the same it later returns to \textit{b6}?

7 ... \textit{b6}!?  

I began studying this move, rummaging...
through opening books. The theory of that time stated that White gains an advantage.

8 g3       cxd4
9 cxd4

After 9 \( \text{cxd4} \) \( \text{c5} \) followed by \( \text{e4} \) and \( \text{f7-f6} \) Black gains counterplay.

9 . . .       \( \text{b4}+ \)
10 \( \text{f2} \)       \( \text{f6} \)
11 \( \text{g2} \)

If now 11...0-0, then 12 \( \text{d3} \) followed by \( \text{e2} \) and \( \text{h2-h4} \).

I focussed on this position for a long time. Black has a strange clump of pieces on the queenside (\( \text{b6, d7, c8, a8} \)) – they seriously hinder their mutual development. Of course, it is possible to play 11...\( \text{c7} \), intending \( \text{b6, d7} \) and \( ...0-0-0 \), but during this time White will also complete his development, and his spatial superiority will leave its mark on the entire subsequent play.

But let's approach the situation from the other side. At least Black has developed four pieces, whereas the opponent has developed only one knight, which in addition is depriving the other knight of its best square \( \text{f3} \). It is also Black to move. He has a significant lead in development. As is well known, in closed positions this is not too important a factor. Hence Black must open up the game, by removing the barrier of pawns.

It was this that gave birth to an idea, which at first sight seemed crazy: 11...\( \text{g5}?! \). Nearly all Black's forces are grouped together on the queenside, and yet he launches tactical operations on the kingside, where the opponent has more pieces. Anti-positional? Not altogether since, as we have already mentioned, Black is better developed and it is very important for him to open lines. In addition, the white king is sheltering on the kingside.

In February 1980 the Premier League of the USSR Championship was held in Vilnius. I was there for several days and one evening I showed my idea to Gennady Kuzmin, a grandmaster with a very unusual way of thinking. Nevertheless, his verdict was unambiguous: ‘This cannot be, because it can never be.’ True, he was not able to demonstrate anything with variations.

In the summer of 1981, also in Vilnius, the All-Union Schoolchildren's Spartakiad was held. Appearing for the Ukraine team was one of my pupils, 13-year-old Lena Sedina. In an important match against the Moscow team, with the agreement of the trainers the novelty was put into action for the first time. The experiment proved successful. Without going into details, I will show the opening stage.

\[ \text{Saburova – Sedina} \]
\[ \text{Vilnius 1981} \]

11 . . .       \( \text{g5}?! \)
12 \( \text{exf6} \)       \( \text{g4} \)
13 \( \text{f7+!} \)       \( \text{f8}! \)
14 \( \text{d5} \)

If 14 \( \text{g5} \) Black was intending 14...\( \text{f6} \) with the threat of 15...\( \text{h6} \).

14 . . .       \( \text{xd4} \)
15 \( \text{xd4} \)       \( \text{xd4} \)
The Move \( \ldots g7-g5 \) in the French Defence

Black has achieved a good position, and in the end she went on to win the game.

Of course, one does not have to be a grandmaster to realize that at some point Black's position was rather dangerous. Thus, for example, instead of 14 \( \text{dx}e5 \) White should nevertheless have considered 14 \( \text{f}5 \text{g}5 \) \( \text{f}6 \), and now 15 \( \text{h}3 \).

I did not want to expose the king too much, and so new searches for an improvement to Black's play were sought. In the end I was able to find another way of implementing the same idea. It turns out that the g-pawn can also be advanced a move earlier: 11 \( \ldots g5 \).

16 \( \text{fx}g4 \) \( \text{xf}7 \)
17 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{xf}3 \)
18 \( \text{xf}3 \) \( b6 \)
19 \( \text{b}5 \) \( \text{b}7 \)
20 \( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{e}7 \)
21 \( \text{d}7 \) \( \text{d}7 \)
22 \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{d}6 \)

Black has achieved a good position, and in the end she went on to win the game.

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I did not want to expose the king too much, and so new searches for an improvement to Black's play were sought. In the end I was able to find another way of implementing the same idea. It turns out that the g-pawn can also be advanced a move earlier: 11 \( \ldots g5 \).

Polyantsev – Kaplun
Ukrainian Spartakiad 1983

10 \( \ldots \) \( g5! \)
11 \( \text{fx}g5 \) \( \text{dxe}5 \)
12 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{xe}5 \)
13 \( \text{g}2 \) \( \text{c}6 \)
14 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{f}8! \)
15 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{g}7 \)
16 \( \text{b}2 \) \( \text{d}7 \)
17 \( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{h}6! \)
18 \( \text{gx}h6 \) \( \text{xh}6 \)
19 \( \text{e}2? \)

19 \( \text{f}5 \) was better

19 \( \ldots \) \( 0-0 \)

[19\( \ldots \text{e}5! \) with the threat of 20\( \ldots \text{h}3+ \) was very strong – Dvoretsky.]

20 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \)
21 \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{b}8 \)
22 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{f}6 \)
23 \( \text{xc}6+ \) \( \text{xc}6 \)

Black has achieved a positional advantage and later he successfully converted it.

But it was not in this game that my novelty was first tested in practice. A few months earlier it had been employed by Lena Sedina.

Voronova – Sedina
Women's USSR Championship Semi-Final 1983

10 \( \ldots \) \( g5! \)
11 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{f}6 \)

With this move order the undermining move gains in strength, although 11\( \ldots \text{g}4 \) also came into consideration.

12 \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{h}5! \)
13 \( \text{xe}6 \)

[It is curious that the Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings recommends 13\( \text{ex}f6 \text{g}4 \) 14\( \text{f}7+ \text{f}8 \) 15\( \text{f}h4 \) with the evaluation 'advantage for White'. Although in fact after 15\( \ldots \text{gx}h3 \) ]
16 \( \textbf{\Delta}g6+ \textbf{\Delta}g7 \) 17 \( \textbf{\Delta}xh8 \textbf{\Delta}f6! \) 18 \( \textbf{\Delta}xh3 \textbf{\Delta}g4+ \) 19 \( \textbf{\Delta}g1 \textbf{\Delta}d7 \) the evaluation changes to diametrically opposite – Dvoretsky.]

13 ... \textit{gxf4}
14 \( \textbf{\Delta}xd7+ \textbf{\Delta}xd7 \)
15 \textit{gxf4}
16 \( \textbf{\Delta}xe5 \) \( \textbf{\Delta}c5 \)
17 \( \textbf{\Delta}b3 \) \( \textbf{\Delta}d4! \)

A sharp position has been reached, in which Black has more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn. She went on to win.

Since then numerous games have been played with my variation, and improvements have been found both for White, and for Black, but as far as I know a refutation has not in fact been discovered. This is not surprising: the move 10...g5 is positionally justified and is fully in accordance with the modern ‘total’ approach to the struggle.

While the variation was not yet widely known and was still in the development stage, I naturally took a lively interest in its fate. But when it finally began to be constantly employed in tournaments of the most varied standard, my interest in it gradually cooled. It is a tedious business processing numerous recently-played games, taking opening refinements virtually as far as the 40th move.

A search for new paths began. Generally speaking, the key to success in the opening is largely associated with the ability to be ahead of opening fashion, even if only by half a step. However, new ideas do not appear as a result of the mechanical analysis of variations – one must endeavour to penetrate into the essence of the events occurring on the board.

Remember the Polyanstev–Kaplun game. Black had to retreat his bishop from b4 to a better post. And in the Sedina–Voronova game White managed to develop her bishop on e3 – because of the bishop on b4, the queen could not capture the b2-pawn. Of course, it is tempting to force \( \textbf{\Delta}f2 \), but is it not possible to get by without this check?

**Serebro – Kosikov**
Kiev 1984

9 ... \( \textbf{\Delta}e7! \)?
10 \( \textbf{\Delta}h3 \)

Bad, of course, is 10 \( \textbf{\Delta}d3? \textbf{\Delta}xd4 \).

10 ... \( \textbf{\Delta}f6!? \)
11 \( \textbf{\Delta}f1 \)

A complicated position, most probably favourable for Black, results from 11 \( \textbf{\Delta}e2 \) 0-0! 12 \( \textbf{\Delta}xe6+ \) (12 0-0 \( \textbf{\Delta}xe5 \) 13 \( \textbf{\Delta}xe5 \textbf{\Delta}dxe5 \)) 12...\( \textbf{\Delta}h8 \) 13 \( \textbf{\Delta}xd7?! \textbf{\Delta}xd7 \) 14 0-0 \( \textbf{\Delta}g4 \). But the continuation in the game also suited me – I have managed to force the king to move without giving a check on b4.

11 ... 0-0
12 \( \textbf{\Delta}g2 \) \( \textbf{\Delta}g5!? \)

13 \( \textbf{\Delta}b3? \)

Fearing an attack, White seeks the exchange of queens, but in so doing he takes his queen away from the kingside, where the main events are bound to occur. The fate of Black’s idea depends on the evaluation of the sharper moves 13 exf6!? and 13 fxg5!?.

13 ... \( \textbf{\Delta}a6 \)
The position may still seem unclear. In fact, Black wins by force. How?

The sacrifice on e5 suggests itself. But in the variation 20...h4xe5 21 fxe5 xf3 22 xf3 g4+ 23 xg4 xe2+ 24 h3 the king escapes from the pursuit. No, the sacrifice must be associated with another idea.

20 ... h4xe5!
21 fxe5 xf3!
22 xf3 e6!!

The third sacrifice in a row! It is important to include the rook in the attack with gain of tempo.

23 xe6 f8+

But not 23...d4+?? 24 xd4, and the queen is defended.

24 f4

24 f4 d4+ would have led to the loss of the queen, but even so this was White’s best chance.

24 ... d3+
25 f2 c5+
26 e1 e4!
27 g5

White also loses after 27 f1 d4 28 g4 c2+ 29 d2 d8+.

27 ... b4+
28 d1 xh1+
29 c2 e4+
30 b3 d3+
31 a4 b5 mate

Thus, in the French Defence, along with the classical methods of play, Black can and should make use of plans involving sharp attempts to seize the initiative. And the signal for the start of active play on the territory of the opponent is often provided by the counter-blow ...g7–g5!
How does the study of forcing opening variations proceed? I will share my own experience of working on the Dragon Variation of the Sicilian Defence.

Robert Fischer stated that in this variation a grandmaster can lose to a first category player, since White’s strategy is so very simple and logical. Yes, indeed, here serious difficulties lie in wait for Black, but players who employ the Dragon Variation try to compensate for this with a better knowledge of opening theory and typical ideas. You can’t play this variation by blindly copying the games of other players. Many ideas, which are employed at the board, are first thoroughly checked at home. Success is achieved not by the player who has learned the variation better from the books, but by the one who has carried out more research work. I will describe a few episodes from battles in the Dragon Variation.

In 1974 Anatoly Karpov’s win over Victor Korchnoi in the second game of Candidates Final Match made a great impression on everyone.

Karpov – Korchnoi
Moscow 1974
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5
2 ²f3 d6
3 d4 cxd4
4 ²xd4 ²f6
5 ²c3 g6
6 ²e3 ²g7
7 f3 ²c6
8 ²d2 0-0
9 ²c4 ²d7
10 h4 ²c8
11 ²b3 ²e5
12 0-0-0 ²c4
13 ²xc4 ²xc4
14 h5 ²xh5
15 g4 ²f6
16 ²de2 ²a5
17 ²h6 ²xh6
18 ²xh6 ²fc8
19 ²d3

This move came as a great surprise to Korchnoi. He thought for a long time, but was unable to find a sensible plan of defence, and after 19... ²d4? 20 g5 ²xg5
21 ²d5 ²xd5 22 ²xd5 ²e8 23 ²ef4 ²c6
24 e5 ²xd5 25 exf6 exf6 26 ²xh7+ ²f8 27 ²h8+ he suffered a crushing defeat.

Immediately after the game Mikhail Botvinnik suggested that Black should have defended by 19... ²d8, with the idea of switching the queen to the defence of the kingside. It was
with an analysis of this continuation that I began a fight to restore the reputation of the Dragon Variation.

First I convinced myself that the direct play for the win of a piece – 20 e5 does not achieve anything. Black defends with 20... dxe5 21 ♂hd1 ♠8c7 22 ♦d2 e6 23 g5 ♦d5, or, if White continues playing for mate: 21 ♦g3 ♠d4 22 g5 ♦h5 23 ♦xh5 gxh5 24 ♦xh5 ♦f5.

But can Black gain equality in the endgame after 20 g5 ♦h5 21 ♦g3 ♦f8? I was unable to find an advantage for White in the variation 22 ♦xf8+ ♦xf8 (but not 22... ♦xf8 23 ♦xh5 gxh5 24 ♦d5) 23 ♦xh5 gxh5 24 ♦xh5 ♦8c5, since in the event of 25 f4 b5 the weakness of the e4-pawn is felt. However, things are far from brilliant for Black if the white pawn reaches h6: 22 ♦xh5 ♦xh6 (22...gxh5 23 ♦xh5) 23 gxh6 gxh5 24 ♦d2 and he does not have full equality. Is he really obliged to defend this inferior endgame?

19... ♦e6!? This move became the next stage of the search. The idea of it is to switch the queen to the defence of the kingside via the central square e5.

20 g5 ♦h5 21 ♦g3 ♦e5

It would appear that White wins by 22 ♦xh5 gxh5 23 ♦xh5, when the threat of f3–f4 followed by ♦h5–f6+ looks irresistible. But Black nevertheless has the possibility of gaining a draw, by sacrificing first the exchange: 23... ♦xc3 24 bxc3 ♦xc3, and after 25 f4 also a rook.

(see diagram)

25... ♦xc2+! 26 ♦xc2 ♦c5+. It is not hard to see that the king cannot hide from the perpetual check. Incidentally, this idea was found by the very young Leonid Yurtayev.

Things are more difficult for Black, if White captures on h5 with his knight.

In this way Black succeeds in neutralising the opponent’s main threat of f4–f5 followed by ♦d3–h3 and in winning the ideal square f5 for his bishop. It is easy to see that variations such as 25 f5 dxe4 are in his favour.

25 ♦hd1

White appears to retain all the pluses of his
position in view of the weakness of the 8th rank.

So, is the entire variation really bad for Black, and does Karpov's move 19 d3 set him insoluble problems? I had almost despaired of finding anything, when I suddenly discovered a paradoxical defence.

25 ... \textit{\textbf{Wf8!}}

If White does not go in for the repetition of moves 26 h1 w7, he is forced to concede the f5-square. Of course, he remains a pawn up, but the pressure on c2 ties down his pieces.

It only remained to wait for one of my opponents to go in for the position after 19 d3. But time passed, and the theory of the Dragon Variation proceeded along other main lines. It was established that after 16 de2 Black obtains good play by 16 ... e8. Then his plans began increasingly often to be associated with the impeding h7–h5. So that, unfortunately, the analysis which I have showed you is now no longer topical.

For many years I awaited an opportunity to employ an interesting preparation in another branch of the Dragon Variation. Let us return to the 'tabiya' arising after 1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cxd4 4 dxd4 f6 5 c3 g6 6 e3 \textit{\textbf{e7}} 7 f3 0-0 8 w2 d6 9 c4 d7 10 h4 d5 11 b3 c8 12 0-0 c4 13 x c4 x c4 14 h5 x h5 15 g4 f6.

Along with Karpov's move – 16 de2, White also has these possibilities: 16 h6, 16 e5 and 16 b3. I will not dwell on all these continuations, but will just describe one theoretical duel.

Back in 1976, when I discussed the move 16 e5 with Yurtaev, we came to the conclusion that along with the book move 16 ... xg4 Black could also consider 16 ... dxe5. After later working out all the details, I began waiting for someone to employ 16 e5 against me. And then, 10 years later, the national master Arkhipkin went in for this position.

\textbf{Arkhipkin – Vulfson}

\textit{\textbf{Moscow 1986}}

16 e5 \textbf{dxe5?!}
17 b3 \textit{\textbf{e7}}
18 g5 f5
19 gxf6 exf6
20 h6

This natural move is wrong – playing for mate does not give White anything.

20 ... \textit{\textbf{g5!}}

Now the main defensive functions are handed over to the light-square bishop.

21 e4 \textbf{x e4!}

The only way! In the event of 21 ... x e4 22 fxe4 x e4 White would have gained a very strong attack by 23 h2! h4 24 x h4.

22 fxe4 \textit{\textbf{x e4}}
23 x g7 \textit{\textbf{x g7}}
24 h3 \textit{\textbf{g6}}

Black wants to advance as quickly as possible his pawn mass on the kingside. Now White should on no account exchange the queens; his play must be based on the creation of tactical threats to the black king. Possibly I should have preferred 24 ... b6, in order to restrict the knight and prevent the following manoeuvre of the white rook.

25 c3 \textit{\textbf{e7}}
26 \textit{$\text{c}5$}

White is counting only on 26...f5, which is not good because of 27 \textit{$\text{c}3$}. He should have thought about activating his knight: 26 \textit{$\text{c}5$}.

\begin{align*}
26 & \ldots & h5 \\
27 & a4 & h4 \\
28 & a5 & a6 \\
29 & \textit{$\text{d}5$} & \\
\end{align*}

The seemingly logical 29 \textit{$\text{d}5$} runs into an unexpected activation of Black's forces: 29..\textit{$\text{c}8$} 30 \textit{$\text{c}3$} \textit{$\text{b}4$}!. But now I prepare the advance of my f-pawn.

\begin{align*}
29 & \ldots & \textit{$\text{e}8$} \\
30 & \textit{$\text{c}3$} & g4 \\
31 & \textit{$\text{c}5$} & f5 \\
32 & \textit{$\text{xb}7$} & g3 \\
33 & \textit{$\text{d}6$} & \textit{$\text{g}5$}+ \\
34 & \textit{$\text{b}1$} & \textit{$\text{e}7$} \\
35 & \textit{$\text{c}7$} & f4 \\
36 & \textit{$\text{xe}7$} & \textit{$\text{xe}7$} \\
37 & \textit{$\text{wc}6$} & h3 \\
38 & \textit{$\text{e}8$}+ \\
\end{align*}

Since White no longer has time to capture on a6, he tries at least to create some threats to the king.

\begin{align*}
38 & \ldots & \textit{$\text{h}6$} \\
39 & \textit{$\text{f}6$} & \textit{$\text{g}5$} \\
40 & \textit{$\text{e}4$}+ & \textit{$\text{h}4$} \\
41 & \textit{$\text{a}8$} & h2 \\
42 & \textit{$\text{h}8$}+ & \textit{$\text{g}4$} \\
43 & \textit{$\text{f}6$}+ & \textit{$\text{g}5$} \\
44 & \textit{$\text{g}8$} & \textit{$\text{c}5$} \\
\end{align*}

(see diagram)

White resigned, since my king easily hides from the checks in the opponent's position.

After the game Arkhipkin suggested that after 21...\textit{$\text{xe}4$} White's position was hopeless. Nevertheless, exactly a year later this position again occurred in one of my games.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
& a & b & c & d & e & f & g & h \\
\hline
8 & & & & & & & & \textit{$\text{h}2$} \\
7 & & & & & & & & \textit{$\text{h}4$} \\
6 & & & & & & & & \textit{$\text{h}5$} \\
5 & & & & & & & & \textit{$\text{h}6$} \\
4 & & & & & & & & \textit{$\text{h}7$} \\
3 & & & & & & & & \textit{$\text{h}8$} \\
2 & & & & & & & & \textit{$\text{h}2$} \\
1 & & & & & & & & \textit{$\text{h}1$} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

- position after 44...\textit{$\text{c}5$} -

\textbf{Malyutin – Vulfson}

Moscow 1987

24 \textit{$\text{h}2$} (instead of 24 \textit{$\text{h}3$}). This novelty did not pose Black any problems. After 24...\textit{$\text{c}8$} 25 \textit{$\text{a}1$} \textit{$\text{g}6$} 26 \textit{$\text{c}3$} \textit{$\text{wc}4$} 27 \textit{$\text{a}3$} \textit{$\text{h}5$} 28 \textit{$\text{c}2$} \textit{$\text{g}4$} 29 \textit{$\text{b}1$} \textit{$\text{g}3$} 30 \textit{$\text{g}2$} \textit{$\text{h}4$} 31 \textit{$\text{a}1$} \textit{$\text{f}5$} 32 \textit{$\text{g}5$} \textit{$\text{g}4$} 33 \textit{$\text{wxg}4$} \textit{fxg}4 it proved impossible to stop the armada of black pawns.

Two years later the idea with 16...dxe5 faced a new test. On this occasion the role of examiner was performed by the national master Ilya Koifman.

\textbf{Koifman – Vulfson}

Moscow Correspondence Championship 1989-90

After 17 \textit{$\text{b}3$} \textit{$\text{c}7$} 18 \textit{$\text{g}5$} \textit{$\text{f}5$} 19 \textit{gx}f6 \textit{ex}f6 White succeeded at last in finding the key to this position. It turns out that it is very important to activate the knight on c3, and for this the king must be moved into the corner.

(see diagram)

\begin{align*}
20 & \textit{$\text{b}1$}! & \textit{$\text{c}8$} \\
21 & \textit{$\text{a}1$}! & \\
\end{align*}

Here I had to sacrifice the exchange, but in less favourable circumstances.
Opening Research

- position after 19...exf6 -

21 ...  hxc3
22  hxc3

In the event of 22 bxc3  f8 Black could have hoped for counterplay on the queenside.

22 ...  hxc3
23 bxc3  b6
24  b2

In contrast to the positions examined earlier, the white f3-pawn significantly hinders the advance of the kingside pawns. At this point I judged Black's position to be very difficult.

24 ...  h5
25  h4?

But these intricacies are unnecessary. The advance of the a-pawn looks far more natural and strong, leading in the end to the creation of a passed pawn for White on the queenside.

25 ...  h7
26  c7
27  d7
28  b4  f5

This is the result of White's planless play!
The pawns begin their advance, against which it is now very hard to defend.

29  d2  f6
30  b8  g5

31  c4  xc4
32  xc4  f4
33  g1  c6
34  d2  g4

White's whole problem is that his rook has no way of returning to base.

35 fxg4  hxg4
36  c8  d5
37 c4  e6
38  c7  e4+
39  c1  e3

Here Black was awarded a win on adjudication, since after 40  e4  h4 his pawns cannot be stopped.

Thus the last opening round was won by White, but I think that it is still too early to close the entire opening variation. It is Black's turn to come up with something.

Another direction of research work on the opening is the search for new continuations in old, already forgotten variations. After all, many opening schemes cease to develop not because they are condemned by theory, but on account of attention switching to other, more fashionable lines.

Until recently, one such forgotten scheme was the 4 f3 variation in the Nimzo-Indian Defence. At one time in the 1960s it was often employed by grandmasters Lajos Portisch and Florian Gheorghiu. One can recall Gheorghiu's win over none other than Fischer at the World Chess Olympiad.

Gheorghiu – Fischer
Olympiad, Havana 1966
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4  f6
2 c4  e6
3  c3  b4
4 f3  d5
5 a3  xc3+
6 bxc3 0-0?!
6...c5 is preferable, leading to one of the key positions of the Sämisc Variation. However, not all those who play the Nimzo-Indian Defence like this way of countering the Sämisc Variation.

7 cxd5 exd5
8 e3 d h5
This early activity does not give Black an equal game. Fischer avoids 8...c5, wishing to preclude the well-known set-up where White, after completing his development, carries out the central advance e3–e4. I should remind you that a classic example of this plan is the famous game Botvinnik–Capablanca (AVRO Tournament 1938). But 8...d5 also occurs.

9 w c2 d8
10 g4! d f4
11 h4 c5
12 d f2 d g6
13 d d3 d c6
14 d e2 d e6
15 g5!

15 ... d c8
16 h5 d f8
17 g6 f x g6
18 h x g6 h6
19 w b1 d a5
20 d f4 c4

The exchange on d4 looks more logical, to use the c4-square for the knight.

21 d c2 d c6
22 d a2 d d7
23 a4 d f6
24 d a3 w d7
25 d b2 b6
26 d b5 d b7
27 e4 d x e4
28 d x e4
gheorghiu avoids the unnecessary risk after 28 fxe4, since in this case Black could have gained chances against the white king.

28 ... d cc8
29 d e5 d g4
30 d d5 d x e5
31 d x f6+ g x f6
32 d x e5 d c5
33 d c5 w d2+
34 d g3 d x f3
35 d x f3 d x c5
36 w c1!

Subsequently White converted his material advantage.
Gradually Akiba Rubinstein’s solid continuation 4 e3 supplanted for a long time all other systems of play against the Nimzo-Indian Defence.

For me a stimulus in the search for new ideas in the 4 f3 variation was provided by the following episode. In 1978 the Moscow player Sergey Kishnev showed me an interesting idea in the variation 1 d4 d f6 2 c4 e6 3 d c3 d b4 4 f3 c5 5 d5 d x c3+ 6 b x c3 w a5.
Sergey was facing a decisive game, which in the event of a win would bring him the master title. His opponent was an experienced master and great expert on the Nimzo-Indian Defence, Boris Zlotnik. To arrive empty-handed for such a game was simply dangerous.

And here instead of the theoretical 7 d2 Kishnev suggested the pawn sacrifice 7 e4.

We established that the acceptance of the pawn sacrifice brings Black nothing but problems. But in that game Black avoided 4...c5 and chose 4...d5. A fluctuating struggle nevertheless ended in a win for White. The 7 e4 idea was first tested in practice two weeks later.

**Vulfson – Veselovsky**

*Moscow 1978*

**Nimzo-Indian Defence**

1. d4 f6
2. c4 e6
3. Qc3 b4
4. f3 c5
5. d5 xc3+
6. bxc3 a5
7. e4 d6

On encountering a novelty, Black sensibly decided to decline the gift.

8. Ee2 e5

9. e3 bd7
10. Wd2 f8
11. g4?

At that time I still had a poor understanding of the positional nuances in blocked structures of this type. It is not surprising that in the subsequent battle my experienced opponent completely outplayed me. This game served as a good lesson.

11. . . .
12. h4
g6
13. g5
g8
14. g3 e7
d7
15. d3 f5
16. f5 xf5
17. exf5 e7
18. c2 0-0-0
19. 0-0-0 f6
20. f4

And now try to find the strongest continuation for Black.

If you have a good positional feeling, you would be bound to choose the pawn sacrifice.

20 . . .
e4!

The white bishops become altogether cramped.

21. xe4 a4
22 \( \text{Wd3} \)

Another little problem: what is Black’s best way of converting his positional advantage?

On this occasion the more patient among you are right, those who suggested 22...\( \text{b8} \) followed by the manoeuvre of the queen to c8 (or, after ...\( \text{bxc8} \) – to d7) and the regaining of the f5-pawn at a convenient moment. Those who preferred the energetic 22...b5 fell into the same trap as my opponent in the game.

22 ... b5?

23 \( \text{Axc5!} \)

Now the character of the position changes sharply and Black loses practically without a fight.

23 ... dxc5

24 d6 \( \text{Wxc4?} \)

The decisive mistake! I will not give all the complicated variations, but will merely say that the best chances of a defence were given by the counter-sacrifice of a piece: 24...\( \text{dxc6} \) 25 cxb5 \( \text{he8} \) 26 bxc6 \( \text{Axc6} \) 27 \( \text{Axc6} \) \( \text{Wxc6} \) 28 \( \text{fd1} \) \( \text{e4} \).

25 \( \text{Wf3} \)

The simple 25 dxe7 \( \text{Bde8} \) 26 \( \text{ae1} \) was also possible.

25 ... \( \text{xf5?} \)

And White soon converted his material advantage.

When I began studying the 4 f3 variation, I discovered that many of the positions arising in it had hardly been analysed. There was very little practical material. It was thought that Black obtained a good game, both in the variation 4...c5 5 d5 \( \text{h5} \), and after 4...d5 5 a3 \( \text{e7} \) 6 e4 dxe4 7 fxe4 e5 8 d5 \( \text{c5} \). The third possibility, which occurred in my game with Sergey Veselovsky, was also considered reliable.

If he wishes, Black can switch to the Sämisch Variation: 4...d5 5 a3 \( \text{xc3+} \) 6 bxc3 c5 7 cxd5 \( \text{xc5} \). In this variation too, theory was based on games played in the 1950s and 1960s.

I devoted particular attention to the study of typical positions with a completely closed centre, which mainly demand not a knowledge of specific variations, but positional understanding. The fact that I achieved some success in this field is illustrated by the following game.

**Vulfsen – Loktev**  
Moscow 1985

**Nimzo-Indian Defence**

1 d4 \( \text{f6} \)

2 c4 \( \text{e6} \)

3 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{b4} \)

4 f3 \( \text{c5} \)

5 d5 \( \text{d6} \)

6 e4 \( \text{xc3+} \)

7 bxc3 \( \text{e5} \)

8 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{bd7} \)

(see diagram)

The idea of inhibiting the manoeuvre ...\( \text{d7–f8–g6} \) had been found in home preparation.
Opening Research

After Black has castled kingside, the pawn storm looks more justified than in the game with Veselovsky.

11 h4
After Black has castled kingside, the pawn storm looks more justified than in the game with Veselovsky.

11 . . .
12 wb2
13 a4
14 cl
15 a5
Now Black will suffer from a chronic lack of space.

15 . . .
16 g5
gf8
17 h5
cd7
18 ge3
g6
19 ed3
bxc4
20 ed2
b7
21 wb2
b8
22 wd1
After a slight regrouping of his bishops, White completely neutralises the pressure on the b-file, after which all Black can do is defend passively.

22 . . .
23 c4
Possession of the b-file does not bring Black any significant benefits, although for a time it can divert White from his activity on the kingside. The following bishop manoeuvre by Black is clearly unsuccessful. Apparently, to gain at least some counterplay he should have decided on ...c5–c4.

23 . . .
24 cl
wb5
25 w3
d8
26 ed2
c8
27 ed2
cb8
29 ed2
eb7
30 wb3
e7
31 ed2
g7
32 eg1
f4
33 f4
exf4
34 wb4
wb8
35 ed7!
36 f5
37 e5
gxf5
38 g6
hxg6
39 hgx6
40 gxf7+
xf7
41 ed7+
42 wb4
Black resigned.

Thus, research work helps one to improve in over-the-board play.
PART IV

Mark Dvoretsky

Middlegame Problems

The middlegame is the most complicated and least studied stage of the chess game. One of the methods of working in this field is the study of typical positions.

Unfortunately, as yet there is no classification of such positions. It is not easy to create one – after all, the selection of typical positions can be carried out on the basis of various features. The most important feature is the pawn structure (for example, positions with an isolated pawn, with a closed centre, and so on). One can also take account of material (the battle of heavy pieces, knight against a ‘bad’ bishop), and also the placing of the pieces, in particular the kings (king in the centre, castling on opposite sides, and so on). The development of such a classification could significantly ease the selection and processing of information on the middlegame.

The aim of the present article is to express certain thoughts about the methods of working on typical positions.

Nowadays it is not enough to know general conclusions. For example, that an isolated pawn in the centre is not only a strength, but also a weakness, and that, if you have an isolated pawn, you should play for an attack, whereas when playing against one you should aim to simplify and to exploit the weak square in front of it, etc. All this is correct, but to achieve success you must have a mastery of more subtle evaluations.

And then it is no longer a matter of indifference, whether the isolated pawn is obtained from the Tarrasch Defence to the Queen’s Gambit or the Tarrasch Variation of the French Defence, because there are differences in both the placing of the other pawns, and in the arrangement of the pieces, and therefore the methods used in these systems are somewhat different to each other.

The following conclusion suggests itself: **as a rule, typical middlegame positions are closely linked with a particular opening variation, and therefore work on them is at the same time work on the opening.** Often it is very hard to decide where the opening ends and the middlegame begins – nowadays the very concept of the ‘opening’ differs strongly from that which existed earlier.

On one occasion I was present at a lecture about the Exchange Variation of the Ruy Lopez, read by Yuri Razuvaev to students in the chess section of the Physical Culture Institute. During the lecture the grandmaster hardly demonstrated any ‘book’ variations – he showed some games by Robert Fischer, model examples of how to play the typical positions resulting in the opening system in question.

In particular, he showed the following game.
Fischer – Portisch
Olympiad, Havana 1966
*Ruy Lopez*

1 e4 e5 2 d3 d6 3 b5 a6 4 xc6 dxc6 5 0-0 f6 6 d4 exd4 7 xd4 c5 8 b3 xd1 9 xd1 d6? 10 a5!

White has created the threat of 11 c4. The tactical attempt to solve Black’s development problems: 10...g4 11 f3 0-0-0 does not work on account of 12 e5!, when he loses a piece (Hort-Zhelyandinov, Havana 1967). But the natural move in the game leads to a weakening of the c5-pawn, which Fischer splendidly exploits.

10...b5 11 c4! (fixing the c5-pawn) 11...e7 12 e3 f5 13 d3 e6 14 e5! xex5 15 xc6 xc3 16 bxc3 d5 17 c6 e6 18 cxb5 axb5 19 a7! b8 20 d1 f7 21 xb5 h8 22 b4 xxa2 23 xc7 bxc8 24 h4! d2 25 b6 f3 26 e3!

14 e5! xex5 15 xc6 xc3 16 bxc3 d5 17 c6 e6 18 cxb5 axb5 19 a7! e6 20 xb5 a5 21 a4 c8 22 d4 e5 23 f4 c6 24 d2 ca8? 25 xc7 xa4 26 xa4 xa4 27 xe6 Black resigned.

In this game White copied not only Fischer’s strong play in the opening, but also his middlegame ideas: the same e4–e5! breakthrough, and the manoeuvre c6–a7! for the win of a pawn.

Such a complete transfer of all the ideas from one game to another is a rather rare phenomenon, but constant use should be made of general plans or specific ideas, taken from examples that have been studied. It may be remembered that, in his game against Wolfgang Unzicker (Siegen 1970) Fischer himself used a strategic discovery
of Emanuel Lasker (f4–f5!!) from a famous game of his against José Raúl Capablanca.

**Lasker – Capablanca**  
St. Petersburg 1914

*Ruy Lopez*

1 e4 e5 2 d4 f3 c6 3 b5 a6 4 xc6 dxc6 5 d4 exd4 6 cxd4 cxd4 7 xd4 d6 8 c3 e7 9 0-0 0-0 10 f4 e8 11 b3 f6

12 f5!

Lasker restricts the mobility of the opponent's light-square bishop, ensures the exchange of the dark-square bishops, and fixes the f6-pawn, which he intends to attack with g2–g4–g5 and possibly e4–e5.

12...b6 13 f4 b7?!

13...xf4! 14 xf4 c5 was simpler, with chances for both sides.

14 xd6 cxd6 15 d4 xd8 (15...c8!) 16 e6 d7 17 ad1 c8 18 f2 b5 19 ffd2 ed7 20 b4 f7 21 a3 a8? (21...xe6! was better) 22 f2 a7 23 g4 h6 24 e3 a5? 25 h4 axb4 26 axb4 ed7 27 f3 g8 28 f4 g6 29 g3 g5+ 30 f3 b6 31 hxg5 hgx5 32 h3 d7 33 g3 e8 34 dh1 b7 35 e5! dxe5 36 d4 d5 37 d6 c5 c8 38 dx7 edx7 39 h7 xf8 40 a1 e8 41 db8 42 c5 Black resigned.

**Fischer – Unzicker**  
Olympiad, Siegen 1970

*Ruy Lopez*

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 b5 a6 4 xc6 dxc6 5 0-0 f6 6 d4 exd4 7 xd4 e7 8 e3 g6 9 d2 d6 10 c4 0-0 11 d3 e5 12 xe5 xe5 13 f4 d6

14 f5! e7 15 f4! xf4 16 xf4 d7 17 e1 c5 18 c3 xe8 19 g4 d6 20 g3 e7 21 f3 c5 22 e5! fxe5 23 fxe4 c6 24 xe5 fe8 25 xe7 xe7 26 e5! h6 27 h4 d7 28 f4 fe6 29 he2! c8 30 c4+ h7 31 g6 xe2 32 xe2 d7?! (32...d6!) 33 e7 xe7 34 xe7 g5 35 hgx5 hxg5 36 d5 c6 37 xc7 f3 38 e8 h6 39 f6 g7 40 f2 d1 41 d7 c4 42 g3 Black resigned.

The following conclusion can be drawn: the **best method of studying typical middlegame positions is to make a selection of games and then analyse the plans and tactical and strategic methods used in them.**

It is clear that you should select games conducted in exemplary fashion by both sides, or by at least one of the players. You are recommended to select games, and not just fragments, since it is useful to
visualise the complete picture, beginning with the opening subtleties and concluding with the endgame, in which there may also be features typical of the system in question. The examples chosen should normally be by players, in the games of whom positions of this type constantly occur. Thus when studying the middlegame arising from the Exchange Variation of the Ruy Lopez, one should devote particular attention to the games of Lasker and Fischer. But, of course, other games may also be valuable. For example, the great Capablanca, employing the Exchange Variation as White for virtually the only time in his career, gave a classic example of attack in this opening after castling on opposite sides.

Capablanca – Janowski
St. Petersburg 1914

\[ \textit{Ruy Lopez} \]

\[
1 \text{ e}4 \text{ e}5 2 \text{ \text{\textdia}f}3 \text{ c}6 3 \text{ \text{\textdia}b}5 \text{ a}6 4 \text{ \text{\textdia}xc}6 \text{ dxc}6 5 \text{ \text{\textdia}c}3 \text{ \text{\textdia}c}5 6 \text{ d}3 \text{ \text{\textdia}g}4 7 \text{ \text{\textdia}e}3 \text{ \text{\textdia}xe}3 8 \text{ fxe}3 \text{ \text{\textdia}e}7 9 \text{ }0-0 0-0-0? 10 \text{ \text{\textdia}e}1 \text{ \text{\textdia}h}6 \\
\]

11 \text{ \text{\textdia}b}1!

The pawns at a6 and c6 provide a good target for White’s queenside pawn storm.

11...\text{f}6 12 \text{ b}4 \text{ \text{\textdia}f}7 13 \text{ a}4 \text{ \text{\textdia}xf}3 14 \text{ \text{\textdia}xf}3 \text{ b}6 15 \text{ b}5! \text{ cxb}5 16 \text{ axb}5 \text{ a}5 17 \text{ \text{\textdia}d}5 \text{ \text{\textdia}c}5 18 \text{ c}4

For the moment David Janowski has managed to prevent the opening of lines on the queenside, but at a high price – the enemy knight has established itself at d5. Now it only remains for White to prepare d3–d4 and c4–c5. Black has no defence.

\[
18...\text{\textdia}g5 19 \text{ \text{\textdia}f}2 \text{ \text{\textdia}e}6 20 \text{ \text{\textdia}c}3 \text{ \text{\textdia}d}7 21 \text{ \text{\textdia}d}1 \text{ \text{\textdia}b}7 22 \text{ d}4 \text{ \text{\textdia}d}6 23 \text{ \text{\textdia}c}2 \text{ \text{\textdia}exd}4 24 \text{ \text{\textdia}exd}4 \text{ \text{\textdia}f}4 25 \text{ c}5 \text{ \text{\textdia}xd}5 26 \text{ \text{\textdia}xd}5 \text{ \text{\textdia}xd}5 27 \text{ c}6+ \text{ \text{\textdia}b}8 28 \text{ \text{\textdia}xd}7 \text{ \text{\textdia}xd}7 29 \text{ d}5 \text{ \text{\textdia}e}8 30 \text{ d}6 \text{ \text{\textdia}xd}6 31 \text{ \text{\textdia}c}6 \\
\]

Black resigned.

In the following game White followed the plan demonstrated by Capablanca.

Dvoretsky – Koryakin
Moscow 1971

\[ \textit{Ruy Lopez} \]

\[
1 \text{ e}4 \quad e5 \\
2 \text{ \text{\textdia}f}3 \quad \text{\textdia}c6 \\
3 \text{ \text{\textdia}b}5 \quad \text{a}6 \\
4 \text{ \text{\textdia}a}4 \quad \text{\textdia}f6 \\
5 \text{ }0-0 \quad \text{\textdia}e7 \\
6 \text{ \text{\textdia}xc}6 \quad \text{dxc}6 \\
7 \text{ d}3 \quad \text{\textdia}g4 \\
8 \text{ h}3 \quad \text{\textdia}xf3 \\
9 \text{ \text{\textdia}xf}3 \quad \text{d}6 \\
\]

It is evidently better to fight for equality by 9...0-0 10 \text{ \text{\textdia}d}2 \text{ \text{\textdia}d}7 11 \text{ \text{\textdia}c}4 \text{ \text{\textdia}g}5.

10 \text{ \text{\textdia}d}2 \text{ \text{\textdia}e}6 \\
11 \text{ \text{\textdia}c}4 \text{ 0-0-0} \\

(see diagram)

In opening books you will find the recommendation of Paul Keres 12 \text{ \text{\textdia}g}3 (with the idea of f2–f4), but then Black can immediately equalise by 12...\text{\textdia}xe4! 13 \text{ \text{\textdia}xe}5 \text{ \text{\textdia}xe}5 14 \text{ \text{\textdia}xe}5 \text{ \text{\textdia}d}6. It is better to chose the plan demonstrated by Capablanca in the previous example:

12 \text{ \text{\textdia}d}2!

\textit{Classical examples should be used, but}
not copied. The ‘routine’ 12 \( \text{b1} \) is less accurate – after all, in the event of the opening of lines on the queenside, the rook will be needed on the a-file. Capablanca was able to prepare b2–b4 only by \( \text{b1} \), whereas here White has another way, with which he also connects his rooks and completes his development.

12 \ldots \text{d7}

The sharper 12...\( \text{dg8} \) was preferable.

13 b4

Also a motif from the analysis of the previous game – the advance should be begun with the b-pawn. 13 a4? is incorrect because of 13...c5!. With the pawn on a2 the move ...c6–c5 is not to be feared, since White replies a2–a3 and then b2–b4, achieving the opening of lines on the queenside.

13 \ldots \text{h5}

14 a4

15 \( \text{wg3!} \)

Prophylaxis – White prevents the opening of lines on the kingside. 15...g4 is now pointless in view of 16 h4!.

15 \ldots \text{b6}

16 \( \text{e3} \)

First 16...\( \text{b7} \) is better.

17 b5!

18 axb5 \text{a5}

If 18...axb5, then 19 \( \text{a7!} \) is good, for example: 19...f6 20 \( \text{b1} \) (20 \( \text{d5?!} \) \( \text{xd5!} \)), or 19...\( \text{g6} \) 20 \( \text{d5} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 21 \( \text{a8+!} \) \( \text{b7} \) 22 exd5 \( \text{xd5} \) 23 \( \text{h8} \) \( \text{h8} \) 24\( \text{g5} \).

19 \( \text{d5} \)

21 ...\( \text{d7} \) is more tenacious, for example: 22 d4 h4 23 \( \text{h2} \) \( \text{d6} \) 24 c5 exd4 25 cxd6 dxe3 26 dxc7 exf2+ 27 \( \text{xf2} \) \( \text{e8} \).

22 fxe3 \( \text{d7} \)

The structure of the position is the same as in the Capablanca–Janowski game. By exploiting the weakness of the f6-pawn, White need not prepare the c4–c5 breakthrough, but can carry it out straight away.

23 c5!

24 \( \text{e1} \)

25 \( \text{xf6} \)

26 \( \text{c6} \)

27 \( \text{xc5} \)

Black resigned.

Mecking – Korchnoi
Candidates Match, 12th game
Augusta 1974

Ruy Lopez

1 e4 e5 2 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 3 \( \text{b5} \) a6 4 \( \text{xc6} \) dxc6 5 0-0 \( \text{d6} \) 6 d3 f6 7 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{g4} \) 8 \( \text{bd2} \) 0-0-0

(see diagram)
Middle game Problems

9 b1! e7 10 b4 g5 11 a4 g6 12 b5 (in the given instance the advance of the white pawns leads to the opening of lines)
12...cxb5 13 axb5 axb5 14 bx5 c6 15 b2 c5 16 b3 b4 17 f4! exd4 18 xg4+ d7 19 xd7+ xd7 20 xd4!
c3 21 a2 xd4 22 a3! By his elegant combination Henrique Mecking has obtained a winning position.

22...b4 23 xc3 e8 24 f3 d7 25 a1 b5 26 f2 d6 27 a3 h5 28 a4 c6 29 ca3 g4 30 a5 e5 31 xb5 xb5 32 fxg4 hxg4 33 g3 b1 34 d4 c1 35 c3 b5 36 xf6 b4 37 b3 f1 38 g5 c5 39 c3 bxc3 40 xc3 d1 41 e3 c4 Black resigned.

Now let us see how one might attempt a systematic study of a typical middlegame position. As an example I propose to investigate the old plan with d4–d5 in the Chigorin Variation of the Ruy Lopez.

Let us select and analyse some games. But first of all I should mention one principle in this type of work. It is useful to study methods of playing typical positions in an historic sense, in their development.

This enables the ideas of the position to be more deeply understood.

The move d4–d5 in the Chigorin Variation of the Ruy Lopez was popular in the 1920s, then it was almost forgotten, and only many years later did it again attract attention.

1 e4 e5
2 ff3 ff6
3 b5 a6
4 a4 c5
5 0-0 xe7
6 e1 b5
7 b3 d6
8 c3 0-0
9 h3 a5
10 c2 c5
11 d4 c7
12 bd2 c6
13 d5

White's plans after other knight moves are illustrated by two games of Yefim Geller.

Geller – Mecking
Interzonal Tournament, Palma de Mallorca 1970
13...a5 14 b3! d7 15 f1 b7 16 g3 c4?! (16...fb8) 17 b4 fc8 18 f5 f8

(see diagram)
19 \( \text{h2!?} \) a5 20 \( \text{e3!} \) axb4 21 cxb4 \( \text{xf5?!} \)

22 exf5 c3 23 \( \text{g4!} \) \( \text{e7} \) 24 \( \text{xf6+} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 25 \( \text{e4!} \) \( \text{d7} \) 26 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c7} \) 27 h4 \( \text{we7} \) 28 g3 \( \text{d8} \) 29 a3 \( \text{cc8} \) 30 \( \text{b1} \) \( \text{e7} \) 31 \( \text{we2} \) \( \text{b8} \) 32 \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{d7} \) 33 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{e7} \) 34 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{f6} \) 35 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{e7} \) 36 g4! f6 37 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{f7} \) 38 \( \text{bxc3} \) \( \text{bc8} \) 39 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{d8} \) 40 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{c4} \) 41 \( \text{xc4} \) \( \text{xc4} \) 42 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{b6} \) 43 \( \text{xc4} \) \( \text{bxc4} \) 44 g5 \( \text{fxg5} \) 45 hxg5 \( \text{d8} \) 46 \( \text{wh5} \) c3 47 \( \text{e3} \) h6 48 f6 Black resigned.

14 a4 \( \text{b8} \)

As the following game shows, it is dangerous to weaken the queenside by playing 14...b4 (or 14...d7 15 axb5 \( \text{xb5} \) 16 \( \text{a4} \)).

Capablanca – Vidmar
New York 1924
14...b4 15 \( \text{c4} \) a5 (otherwise 16 a5!)

16 \( \text{fxe5!?} \) (in the opinion of Alexander Alekhine, 16 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{d7} \) 17 \( \text{fd2} \) came into consideration) 16...\( \text{e6} \) 17 \( \text{b3!} \) dxe5 18 d6 \( \text{xd6} \) 19 \( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{xd6} \) 20 \( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{b7}?! \) (20...\( \text{b8} \) was better) 21 \( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{xb7} \) 22 cxb4! cxb4? (too passive – 22...axb4 23 f3 \( \text{a6} \) was necessary, followed by a possible ...c5–c4) 23 f3 \( \text{fd8} \) 24 \( \text{e3} \) h6 25 \( \text{ed1} \) \( \text{c6} \) 26 \( \text{ac1} \) \( \text{e8} \) 27 \( \text{f2} \) \( \text{xd1} \) 28 \( \text{xd1} \) on the kingside is also strong: 15 g4 \( \text{c8} \) 16 \( \text{g3} \) g6 17 \( \text{h2} \) \( \text{e8} \) 18 \( \text{h6} \) \( \text{g7} \) 19 \( \text{g1} \), as in the game Klovans-Schneider, Jurmala 1978) 15...\( \text{fb8} \) 16 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{c8} \) 17 a5! c4 18 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{f8} \) 19 \( \text{h2} \) \( \text{e7} \) 20 \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{e8} \) 21 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{b7} \) 22 b4! \( \text{xb3} \) 23 \( \text{xb3} \) \( \text{c8} \) 24 \( \text{ec1} \) h6 25 \( \text{e3} \) f5 26 \text{xf5} \( \text{xf5} \) 27 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 28 \( \text{xf1} \) \( \text{f6} \) 29 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{g6} \) 30 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{bc4} \) 31 \( \text{xc4} \) \( \text{e7} \) 32 \( \text{a2} \) \( \text{xc1} \) 33 \( \text{xc1} \) \( \text{b5} \) 34 \( \text{c6} \) \( \text{d3} \) 35 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{xd2} \) 36 \( \text{xd2} \) \( \text{f7} \) 37 \( \text{f5} \) \( \text{d8} \) 38 \( \text{xd8} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 39 \( \text{xa6} \) \( \text{xa6} \) 40 \( \text{xa6} \) Black resigned.
Ic8 29 g4 d7? (29...f8 was more tenacious) 30 b6 e6 31 xe6 fxe6 32 d8+! xd8 33 xd8 d7 34 xa5 c5 35 b3! xb3 36 xb4 d4 37 a5 Black resigned.

Incidentally, in his annotations to this game Saviely Tartakower mentioned a recommendation by Richard Teichmann – 14...a7!? , a move which has not occurred in practice. Thus by reading old books and studying old games and the notes to them, one can unexpectedly hit upon interesting ‘novelties’ and ‘improvements’.

We have finally reached the main position of the variation. The following game is regarded as a classic example of play for Black.

Thomas – Rubinstein
Baden-Baden 1925

15 axb5 axb5
16 f1 e8!
17 g4 g6
18 g3 g7
19 h1 f6
20 g1 f7

White has adopted a typical attacking set-up on the kingside, while Black has demonstrated the best regrouping of his forces for defence and for a possible counterattack on the kingside. Now his objective is to exchange the rooks, in order to eliminate the threats to his king.

21 w1 d7
22 e3 a8
23 w2 g1 a1!
24 xa1 b7
25 h2 a8
26 w1 a6
27 d2 a8
28 xa6 xa6

Black’s position is preferable, mainly because White has no active possibilities, whereas Black can prepare ...h7–h5 and ...f6–f5.

29 b3?! g5
30 g2 h5!
31 h4 f7
32 gxh5 gxh5
33 h2 c8
34 w2 f8
35 d2
Middlegame Problems

39 \( \triangleleft xh5 \) or 39 \( \triangleleft h6 \) is bad because of 39...\( g4 \).

\[
39 \ldots \quad \triangleleft xg3+
\]
\[
40 \text{fxg3} \quad \triangleleft f5!
\]

41 \( \triangleleft xf7? \)

It was nevertheless better to take the pawn:
41 \( \triangleleft xh5 \) \( \triangleleft xh5 \) 42 \( \text{wh5} \). However, after 42...\( g4 \) followed by ...\( f5 \) Black retains the advantage in the endgame in view of the weakness of the d5-pawn.

\[
41 \ldots \quad \triangleleft xf7
\]
\[
42 \triangleleft e4 \quad \text{wd7}
\]
\[
43 \triangleleft h6 \quad \text{kg6}!
\]
\[
44 \triangleleft xg7 \quad \text{xe4}
\]
\[
45 b4? \quad c4
\]

45...\( \text{cx} b4 \) 46 \( \text{cx} b4 \) \( \text{xe} 4 \) 47 \( \text{xe} 4 \) \( \text{g} 4 \) was also strong.

\[
46 \triangleleft d2 \quad \text{sf7}
\]

Black is not only a pawn up, but he also has good prospects of winning a second one – the d5-pawn. His position is won.

47 \( \text{we} 3 \) \( \text{xd} 5 \) 48 \( \text{g} 5+ \) \( \text{g} 6 \) 49 \( \text{we} 7+ \) \( \text{g} 8 \)
50 \( \text{wd} 8+ \) \( \text{f} 7 \) 51 \( \text{d} 7+ \) \( \text{f} 6 \) 52 \( \text{wd} 8+ \) \( \text{f} 5 \)
53 \( \text{d} 7+ \) \( \text{f} 6 \) 54 \( \text{d} 8+ \) \( \text{g} 7 \) 55 \( \text{e} 7+ \) \( \text{f} 7 \)
56 \( \text{xd} 6 \) \( \text{f} 2+ \) 57 \( \text{h} 3 \) \( \text{h} 6! \) (zugzwang)
58 \( \text{b} 1 \) \( \text{w} f5+ \) 59 \( \text{g} 2 \) \( \text{xb} 1 \) 60 \( \text{w} 8+ \) \( \text{g} 5 \)
61 \( \text{d} 8+ \) \( \text{g} 4 \) 62 \( \text{d} 7+ \) \( \text{f} 5 \) 63 \( \text{d} 1+ \) \( \text{g} 5 \)

White resigned.

Rubinstein’s game is very useful for an understanding of Black’s methods of play, but his opponent manoeuvred unconvincingly. If he was intending an attack on the kingside, why then open the a-file? – Black promptly began exchanging rooks on this file. It was more logical to block the queenside, in order to free his hands for the attack on the other side of the board, or else not touch the queenside pawns at all, since it is not so easy for Black to obtain counterplay there. Let us consider some examples.

Bogoljubow – Rubinstein
Baden-Baden 1925

15 c4!?

(Instead of 15 axb5). Now in the event of an exchange of pawns White will exert pres-
sure on the queenside. Rubinstein coolly replied:

15 . . .

b4

The game continued:

16 b3 d8 17 g4 g6 18 h1 g7 19 g1 h5! 20 f1 hxg4 21 hxg4 f6 (Black has a defensible position) 22 e3 f7 23 h4 h8.

Here Yefim Bogoljubow demonstrated two typical attacking ideas: the opening of lines by f2–f4 and the knight sacrifice on f5.

24 f4! exf4 25 e5! f5 (Black did not risk accepting the piece sacrifice, preferring a quiet and roughly equal position) 26 gxf5 g5 27 xf4 f7 28 h2 h7 29 g2 f7 30 e3 d7 31 g2 g7 32 h1 bh8 33 e2 c8 34 g3 g8 35 g4 h1 36 xh1 xh1 37 xh1 h7+ 38 g2 h5 39 d1 h6 40 e1 xg4 41 f3 a5 42 e2 e8 43 xg4 h6 44 g1 f7 Draw.

However, White's attack is not as harmless as it might appear from the games we have examined. Here is a typical example.

**Dubinin – Suetin**

Russian Federation Team Championship 1950

*Ruy Lopez*

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 f6 5 0–0 e7 6 e2 b5 7 b3 d6 8 c3 0–0 9 h3

22 f5! Again a typical knight sacrifice. It is important to note that on the kingside White has such a great advantage in force, that even after the sacrifice he can develop his attack gradually, with quiet moves. If 22...gx5 Dubinin wanted to continue 23 gx5 f8 24 h4! e8! (24...f7? 25 h5!) 25 d2 f7 26 f3! a7 27 g4!, threatening 28 g6+! hxg6 29 fxg6 with a win.

22...f8 23 xg7+ xg7 24 g5 h8 25 h4! gx5 26 gx6 xf6 27 exf5 e8?! 28 g5! xg5 29 xg5? (29 h5! was stronger) 29...f7 30 h5 g8? (strangely enough, Black could have defended by playing 30...h6! 31 xh6 f5 31 xh7+! xh7 32 h5+ h6 33 g6 f8 34 xh6+ h6 35 f6+ e4 36 xxe4+ Black resigned.

Here the plan of attack under consideration proved of use to White in a different opening variation – with 6 e2 (instead of 6 e1). When choosing this system, White must be
prepared after 6...b5 7 b3 0-0 8 c3 for the gambit 8...d5!? and if 9 exd5 g4!, but his opponent did not go in for this variation.

Later too Black played passively (13...c4 came into consideration, or a move earlier - 12...c4 followed by ...a5-b7-c5, ...a6-a5 and ...a6, as in the game Marjanovic-Lengyel, Sarajevo 1980), did not create any counterplay on the queenside, and merely carried out Rubinstein’s defensive set-up on the kingside. White effectively had an extra tempo, which he saved on the move 6 tl:e1 (the rook went to g1 in one go) and, exploiting his opponent’s subsequent inaccuracies, he carried out a brilliant combinative attack.

But even this fine game did not cast doubts on Rubinstein’s plan of defence, which successfully withstood many tests. Things reached the point that the d4-d5 system disappeared for a long time from tournament play, although several attempts were made to revive it.

And, finally, supporters of White found ideas which breathed new life into this old system. Let us return to the main position of the variation after 14 a4 tl:b8.

Karpov – Unzicker
Olympiad, Nice 1974

15 axb5 axb5
16 b4! b7
Black can also switch directly to Rubinstein’s defensive set-up by 16...c4 17 tl:f1 a6. The plan chosen by his opponents – g2-g4, g3, h2 and g1 – is evidently not too effective here. But White found another plan: 18 tl:h2! f6 19 f4 tl:f7 20 tl:f3 g6 21 f5 tl:g7 22 g4 with pressure on the kingside, as in the game Karpov-Spassky (41st USSR Championship, Moscow 1973), which, however, ended in a draw.

17 tl:f1 d7
18 tl:e3

In the 1st game of the Final Candidates Match Spassky-Korchnoi (Kiev 1968) White developed his bishop on d2, but he did not achieve much: 18 tl:d2 tl:a8 19 g3 tl:c8 20 tl:h2 tl:a1 21 tl:x1 tl:d8 22 tl:a7 tl:a8! 23 tl:x7 tl:b8, and the players agreed a draw.

18...
19 td2 tc8
19...tb8 and 20...tc8 is better.

20 tl:d3 g6
21 g3 tf8
22 tl:a2 c4
23 tl:b1 td8?!

24 tl:a7!

From a7 the bishop completely paralyses the opponent’s counterplay on the queenside. Under its cover White gains the opportunity to calmly prepare a storm on the other side of the board.

24...tl:e8 25 tl:c2 tl:c7 26 tl:a1 te7 27 tl:b1 tl:e8 28 tl:e2 tl:d8 29 tl:h2 tl:g7 30 f4 f6 31 f5 g5?! (31...gx5 32 ex5 tl:f7) 32 tl:c2! tl:f7 33 tl:g3 tl:b7 34 tl:d1 h6?! 35 tl:h5 te8 36 td1 tl:d8 37 tl:a3 tf8 38 tl:a2 tl:g8 39 tl:g4! tl:f8 40 tl:e3 tg8 41 tlxf7+ tlxf7 42 tl:h5 td8 43 td8 g6! tf8 44 tl:h5 Black resigned.

However, in my view the most accurate plan
for White was demonstrated in the following little-known game, which was judged the best at the international tournament in Polanica Zdroj in 1972. In it White did not exchange pawns on b5.

**Zuckerman – Kostro**

Polanica Zdroj 1972

15 b4! b7
16 f1 d7
17 d2 fc8
18 d3

It appears that White is preparing play on the queenside, but in fact he has a quite different intention. By pressure on the b5-pawn he forces the opponent to move ...c5–c4, after which he blocks the queenside by a4–a5 and then begins play on the kingside. But what is the difference with the Bogoljubow–Rubinstein game, where White, by playing 15 c4, forced the immediate blocking of the queenside? Let us follow how events developed.

18 ... a8
19 e2 c4

It perhaps made sense to change the character of the play, by sacrificing the exchange: 19...bxa4 20 xxa6 xe4!? 21 xxb7 xd2.

20 c2 e8

And here 20...a5 should have been considered, although after 21 axb5 xb5 22 e3 the advantage would have remained with White.

21 a5! d8
22 g4 g6
23 g3 f6
24 h2 f7
25 g1 g7
26 g2 h8
27 ag1 g8

How to further intensify the pressure? The answer is already known from the previous games: White must carry out f2–f4.

28 e1 af8
29 f4 exf4
30 xf4 e5
31 f3 c8

In the event of 31...xf3+ 32 xf3 Black would have been deprived of his only trump – his centrally-placed knight.

32 d4 e8

A proper evaluation can now be made of White’s strategic idea. The arrangement of the queenside pawns is ideal for him, and he has gained possession of the very important d4-square. It should be mentioned that, even if Black were able to evacuate his king to the queenside, White could have disturbed it with a foray along the g1–a7 diagonal.

33 gf5! gxf5
34 gxf5 f7

It would appear that Black has no satisfactory defence. White is intending, depending on the circumstances, to place his bishop on h6, triple heavy pieces on the g-file, advance his h-pawn, and invade with his knight on e6.

35 g4 e5
36 h4 ef8
37 ♂g6!  
38 ♂xh7+!  
39 ♭g4  
Black resigned.

I should like to add one more feature, in favour of the pawn set-up on the queenside chosen by Bernard Zuckerman – the idea of a positional piece sacrifice on c4.

Bronstein – Winiwarter  
Krems 1967

36 ♝dxc4! bxc4 37 ♝xc4 ♣b5 38 ♣b6 ♦xe2 39 ♪xe2 ♦e7 40 ♝xc8 ♪xc8 41 ♣a7 ♣d7 42 ♪xa6 Black resigned.

Thus, in this interesting variation the scales have tipped in favour of White. It is now Black’s turn to come up with something...
Alexey Kosikov

The Connection of the Opening with the Endgame

Do you remember the science fiction novel by the Strugatsky brothers Monday begins on Saturday? Its title conceals a deep philosophical thought: our tomorrow’s problems are generated today (if not yesterday!). This is also the case in a chess game: the endgame sometimes begins back in the opening!

When studying the opening it is not enough to mechanically learn variations by heart – you must have a deep understanding of the events taking place on the board, and for this you need to grasp the ideas of the forthcoming middlegame, and even the endgame. Besides, given the enormous flood of information which overwhelms chess players today, theory has developed so much that opening analyses sometimes conclude deep in the endgame. I remember a game played in the Premier League of the 1984 USSR Championship between Igor Novikov and Vladimir Tukmakov. White employed an improvement on the 36th (!) move, after which an ending with bishop against pawns arose and, by gaining a win, he changed the evaluation of one of the then fashionable variations of the Grünfeld Defence.

I should like to share with you my impressions of how the opening struggle proceeds, and to show a game in which from the very start the forthcoming endgame had to be reckoned with. During the lesson you will be invited to carry out a few assignments for analysis at home.

Palatnik – Kosikov
Odessa 1979
Slav Defence

1 d4 d5
2 c4 c6
3 f3 f6
4 c3 dxc4
5 a4 f5
6 e5

The continuation of Alexander Alekhine, which even today remains topical. The alternative is 6 e3.

6 . . .
7 f3 b4
8 xc4 0-0
9 g5 h6
10 h4 c5
11 dxc5 wxd1+
12 xd1 c2
13 c1 h7?!

Black embarks on an unpromising path. To those interested in this variation, I recommend that they study the move 13...xa4!, made by Jan Ehvest against Evgeny Bareev (Tallinn 1986, Informator No.41, Game 435).

14 e4 c6

(see diagram)

Let us weigh up the pluses and minuses of the resulting position and make an evaluation of it.

1. White is somewhat behind in development. In addition he has a complex of weak squares on the queenside.
The Connection of the Opening with the Endgame

2. Black’s bishop on h7 is extremely badly placed. In order to bring it into play, he must either advance ...f7–f5 – but then the e6-point is weakened, or else clear the a2–g8 diagonal (for example: ...\(\text{c}7\text{d7}\), ...f7–f6, ...e6–e5 and ...\(\text{g}6\text{f7}\)) – but this demands a lot of time.

Whose pluses are more significant? Practice has shown that White’s chances are better.

15 \(\text{f2}\) \(\text{d7}\)
16 \(\text{e2}\) \(\text{xc5}\)
17 0-0

Black, naturally, tries to exploit the weakness of the d4-square.

18 \(\text{cd1}\) \(\text{fd8}\)
19 \(\text{xd8+}\)!

Rook exchanges should extinguish Black’s initiative, after which the main strategic defect of his position – his out-of-play bishop on h7 – will be especially perceptible.

19 ... \(\text{xd8}\)
20 \(\text{d1}\) \(\text{bd4}\)
21 \(\text{f1}\)

Of course, not 21 \(\text{f1??}\) \(\text{xc3}\) 22 bxc3 \(\text{xf3+}\).

21 ... \(\text{xe2}\)
22 \(\text{xd8+}\)

23 \(\text{xe2}\)

Black has the ‘advantage of the two bishops’. But this is a purely dogmatic evaluation: what advantage can one speak of, given the position of the bishop at h7?

23 ... \(\text{xc3}\)

This exchange would appear to be forced. There was no way that I could be satisfied with 23...\(\text{c6}\) 24 \(\text{b5}\) a6 25 \(\text{bd6}\), when, exploiting the absence of my king and light-square bishop, the opponent launches an attack on the queenside.

24 bxc3 \(\text{c6}\)
25 \(\text{d6}\) b6

26 \(\text{d3}\)

The centralisation of the king suggests itself. How can Black now parry the threat of it invading his position?

26...\(\text{e5+}\)?
27 \(\text{d4}\) f6 is useless in view of 28 \(\text{c8}\). His king must be urgently brought up to the defence.

26 ... \(\text{f8}\)
27 \(\text{c4}\) \(\text{e7}\)
28 \(\text{g3}\)

But what to do now?

28 ... \(\text{e5!}\)

After 29 \(\text{d5}\) \(\text{d7}\)! the pawn cannot be taken: 30 \(\text{xe5}\) f6 (or 30...\(\text{g8}\)), and the
The position has changed markedly. Let's try and evaluate it: who stands better, and by how much?

Some of you gave preference to White, and you consider his advantage to be significant. Why? A 'good' bishop in an open position and the more active king.

No, such an evaluation is dogmatic and superficial, and I categorically disagree with it. In fact the advantage is now with Black, and it is a considerable advantage.

I will express my views regarding the relationship of knight and bishop in endings. Even in an open position a knight may prove stronger than a bishop if both sides have weaknesses. Here is a somewhat abstract example. Imagine an endgame without kings: White has a knight and pawns on a2, c2, e2 and g2; Black has a dark-square bishop and pawns on b7, d7, f7 and h7. It is quite probable that, by attacking the enemy pawns, the knight will force them to advance onto squares of the colour of the bishop and the latter will be transformed into a 'bad' bishop.

Let us return to our position. The bishop is not so strong, and there are more pawn weaknesses in White's position. His only active possibility is 31 \( \texttt{b5} \), and this is the one which must be examined in the first instance. Black replies 31...\( \texttt{e7} \), not fearing 32 \( \texttt{f6} \) xf6 33 \( \texttt{a6} \) d5, when he retains his extra pawn. The variation 32 \( \texttt{f2} \) d5 occurred by transposition in the game – we will see it in due course. It remains to check 32 \( \texttt{a6} \) xf5. Now 33 \( \texttt{xa7} \) is hopeless for White: 33...\( \texttt{xg3} \) 34 h\( \texttt{xg3} \) (34 \( \texttt{xb6} \) e2 35 c4 d4) 34...\( \texttt{c6} \) 35 g4 g6 followed by...f7–f5 and e5–e4. He is forced to play 33 \( \texttt{f2} \), but then there follows 33...\( \texttt{c6} \) 34 \( \texttt{xa7} \) d6 35 g4 (35 \( \texttt{xb6} \) c8+) 35...g6, and it is hard for White to defend against his opponent's clear plan: ...\( \texttt{c4} \), ...f7–f5 and ...e5–e4–e3.

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c}
\hline
a & b & c & d & e & f & g & h \\
\hline
\text{a} & \text{a} & \text{a} & \text{a} & \text{a} & \text{a} & \text{a} & \text{a} \\
\hline
\text{b} & \text{b} & \text{b} & \text{b} & \text{b} & \text{b} & \text{b} & \text{b} \\
\hline
\text{c} & \text{c} & \text{c} & \text{c} & \text{c} & \text{c} & \text{c} & \text{c} \\
\hline
\text{d} & \text{d} & \text{d} & \text{d} & \text{d} & \text{d} & \text{d} & \text{d} \\
\hline
\text{e} & \text{e} & \text{e} & \text{e} & \text{e} & \text{e} & \text{e} & \text{e} \\
\hline
\text{f} & \text{f} & \text{f} & \text{f} & \text{f} & \text{f} & \text{f} & \text{f} \\
\hline
\text{g} & \text{g} & \text{g} & \text{g} & \text{g} & \text{g} & \text{g} & \text{g} \\
\hline
\text{h} & \text{h} & \text{h} & \text{h} & \text{h} & \text{h} & \text{h} & \text{h} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

The position is now one that few of you will want to try and uphold with White. The move in the game loses by force, but 35 g4 \( \texttt{a6}+ \) 36 \( \texttt{a3} \) c5 also looks completely hopeless.

\[
\begin{array}{c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c}
\hline
35 & \ldots & \texttt{a6}+ \\
36 & \texttt{c3} & \texttt{bxa5} \\
37 & \texttt{xa7} & \texttt{c5} \\
38 & \texttt{g4} & \texttt{g4} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

(see diagram)
Black has not only an outside passed pawn (and, as a result, a win in almost any pawn endgame); also important is the fact that the white bishop is shut out of play. How can this factor be exploited?

That's right – it is already time to begin pursuing the bishop.

38 ... \texttt{a4+!} \\
39 \texttt{b3} \\
\texttt{b6}

Threatening 40...\texttt{b7}.

40 \texttt{b8} \\
41 \texttt{h4} \\
\texttt{c8!!}

Complete domination of knight over bishop. The rest is elementary.

42 \texttt{a4} \\
43 \texttt{xe5} \\
44 \texttt{xa5} \\
45 \texttt{b4} \\
46 \texttt{c3} \\
47 \texttt{d3} \\
48 \texttt{e4} \\
49 g5 \\
50 f4 \\
51 \texttt{xf4} \\
52 \texttt{e4} \\
53 \texttt{d4}

An elegant concluding stroke. White resigned.

And now, your first assignment.
From the opening White apparently gained an advantage. Where did he squander it, and how can his play be improved?

The Slav Defence is an old, well-tested opening weapon of mine. Associated with it are memories, both joyful and sad, successful discoveries and vexing losses. I should now like to describe to you the history of one of these discoveries.

Magerramov – Kosikov
All-Union Qualifying Tournament, Daugavpils 1978
\textit{Slav Defence}

1 \texttt{f3} \\
2 c4 \\
3 cxd5 \\
4 d4 \\
5 \texttt{c3} \\
6 \texttt{f4} \\
7 e3 \\
8 \texttt{b5} \\
9 \texttt{a4}

9...\texttt{c8} is also played.

10 \texttt{h4}

There was a time when it was thought that this move virtually refuted 9...\texttt{b6}. The point is that the primitive 10...\texttt{g6} allows White, by breaking through in the centre, to gain a serious advantage: 11 \texttt{xg6} h\texttt{xg6} 12 e4! dxe4? 13 d5!.

10 ... \texttt{e4!}

(see diagram)

When I began studying the position after 10 \texttt{h4}, I sensed that the only defect of White's plan was the unfortunate position of his knight on the edge of the board. This was how the move 10...\texttt{e4}! originated.
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It was first made two months earlier, in the game Buturin–Kosikov from the 1978 Ukrainian Championship.

11 0-0 â7 (11...a6 or 11...âc8 came into consideration) 12 âxe4!? dxe4 13 d5! âc5! 14 dxc6 0-0! 15 âc4 bxc6! 16 âa4 âxa4 (less good was 16...âh4 17 âd6 âxa4 18 âxf8 âxb2 19 âe4) 17 âxa4 âh4 18 âxe4 âf6 (18...âxb2 was extremely dangerous) 19 âe5 âxe5 20 âxe5 âad8 21 âd1 âb5! 22 âxb5 (22 âc3 âd5 23 e4 âc5 with counterplay) 22...âxb5 23 âf1 âd1+ 24 âxd1 âc8, and the players agreed a draw.

This game apparently did me a bad service. At the qualifying tournament in Daugavpils (a few rounds before the meeting with Elmar Magerramov), playing against Naum Rashkovsky, I underestimated a similar breakthrough in the centre and ended up in a difficult position.

11 âc1!? âc8

[Some opening information: quite possible is 11...âe7 12 âxe4 dxe4 13 d5, and now Black has a choice:

a) 13...âc5 14 dxc6 0-0 15 âxc5 âxc5 16 0-0 bxc6 17 âxc6 âd8! 18 âg3 g5 19 âxe4 (19 âxe4 gxh4 20 âf4 âd2!) 19...gxh4 with equality (Azmaiparashvili–Dvoretsky, Tbilisi 1980);

b) 13...exd5!? 14 âf5 âc5 15 âxc6+ bxc6 16 âxc5 âxc5 17 0-0 0-0 (17...g6) 18 âe5 âf6 19 âxf6 gxf6 20 âd1 âh8 21 âh5 d4! (the game Ehlvest–Sergeev, Leningrad 1979, went 21...âg8? 22 âxf7 âf8 23 âe6 with chances for both sides) 22 exd4 âd5, and Black gains the advantage – Dvoretsky.]

12 0-0 a6 13 âxc6

With what should Black recapture on c6?

13...âxc6? (hoping for 14 âxe4? âxc1) is clearly bad because of 14 âd1!. How can he defend against the threats of 15 âxe4 and 15 âe2? If 14...âb6, then 15 âxe4 âxc1 16 âxc1 âxc1 17 âf6+! gxf6 18 âxc1.

The game went 13...âxc6? 14 âxe4 dxe4 15 d5! exd5 16 âf5. White’s great lead in development decides the outcome. There followed 16...g6 17 âd4 âxc1 18 âxc1 âxb2 19 âc8+ âe7 20 âb3! (the simplest way to the goal) 20...g5 21 âxg5+ f6 22 âb4+ âf7 23 âxb7 âe7 24 âxd5+ âg7 25 âxd7 âxc8 26 âxe7+, and Black resigned in view of 26...âg6 27 âxe4+ âxg5 28 âf4+ âg6 29 âg4+ and 30 âxc8.

And now – your second home assignment.

Evaluate the consequences of 13...bxc6.

Let us return to the game with Magerramov.
In reply to 10...\texttt{xe}4! he made a natural, but poor move.

11 \texttt{f}3\texttt{?!} \texttt{d}3\texttt{!!}

It is this that constitutes the tactical justification of Black’s plan. It was also possible to play this a move earlier, but then White would have gained an advantage by 11 \texttt{xd}5! \texttt{ex}d5 12 \texttt{xd}3. It is important to provoke \texttt{f}2–\texttt{f}3, to deprive the white knight of the \texttt{f}3-square.

12 \texttt{xd}5!

Practically forced. In the event of 12 \texttt{xd}3 \texttt{xb}2 13 0–0 \texttt{xc}3 14 \texttt{b}5 \texttt{b}6 Black’s position is close to winning.

12 . . . \texttt{xb}5

Of course, not 13 \texttt{xb}5? \texttt{ex}d5, when Black is a piece up.

13 . . . \texttt{xa}4

14 \texttt{xa}8

14 \texttt{xa}4 is bad: 14...\texttt{e}7 15 \texttt{g}3 \texttt{g}5 (here it is, the price of the move \texttt{f}2–\texttt{f}3).}

Initially I had been planning 14...\texttt{e}7, which leads to unclear positions. For example, 15 \texttt{b}3?! \texttt{hx}4+ 16 \texttt{d}2 0–0 17 \texttt{c}7. The following move, found literally a few hours before the game, is far stronger.

14 . . . \texttt{b}4!

Black not so much threatens to regain the exchange, as vacates the \texttt{c}6-square for his ‘errant’ bishop. Now an amusing situation arises: White is the exchange and a pawn up, but both his knights are trapped.

15 \texttt{d}2

If 15 \texttt{c}1 I was planning to reply 15...\texttt{c}6. [Here it should be examined what happens after 16 \texttt{e}2 \texttt{e}7 (16...\texttt{d}5 17 \texttt{g}3 \texttt{g}5 18 \texttt{e}4) 17 \texttt{c}7\texttt{+} \texttt{d}8 18 \texttt{a}3, and if 18...\texttt{a}2, then 19 \texttt{d}5?!?. It is possible that the position is still in favour of White.

In the game Glyanets-Dvoretsky (Tbilisi 1979) 15 \texttt{g}4?! (vacating the \texttt{g}2-square for the knight) 15...\texttt{d}3\texttt{+}! 16 \texttt{e}2 \texttt{xf}4+ 17 \texttt{exf}4 was played.}
The ultra-sharp opening skirmish has concluded to Black's obvious advantage.

18 g6

18 g3 g4 19 f4 b6 was no better for White.

18 ... hgx6
19 g3 d5
20 xd5 exd5
21 c7+ e8
22 e4

The rooks need scope, so White tries to open lines.

22 ... c6
23 exd5 cxd5
24 d6 b6
25 xe7 xe7
26 h3 c4+
27 c3

Not 27 c2 c3+ and 28 xg2.

27 ... d6
28 e1 c8
29 e2 a3+
30 d2 c2+
31 e1 xe2+
32 xe2 c2
33 c1

After 33 d1 xa2 the win for Black is not in question.

33 ... xd4+
34 f2 a5
35 a3 a4
36 e3 e6
37 c2 b5

White's position is hopeless – only elementary accuracy is required. But, as is well known, the hardest thing is to win a won position.

38 d2 e5

Now 43 ... c4+ suggests itself, and, whichever way the white king moves, Black's king breaks through on the opposite wing. Instead of this I commit an oversight, which makes things much harder for Black.

43 ... f5?
44 f4+! gxf4+
45 xf3+ d4
46 xf4

White has managed to reduce the number of pawns on the board, which improves his survival chances.

46 ... c4
47 g4 d3
48 h2 f5

This move is forced – the threat of creating a passed h-pawn was too serious.

49 gxf5 xf5
50 h4 e3
51 d2+ d3
52 g5 f5

After 52 ... c4 Black would have to reckon with 53 d3+ xd3 54 xg6.
53 \( \text{xg6!} \)
Weaker was 53 \( \text{h2} \) \( \text{e3} \) 54 \( \text{f6} \) \( \text{d4} \) 55 \( \text{h3+ f3} \) 56 \( \text{h1 d2} \), and Black wins.
53 ... \( \text{hxh4+} \)
54 \( \text{f6 c4} \)

Here the game was adjourned. Analysis showed that it was not easy to convert the advantage, but that to make a draw was even more difficult.

55 \( \text{f2} \)
The sealed move.
55 ... \( \text{f5!} \)
56 \( \text{e5} \)
57 \( \text{d2} \)
White would have lost after both 57 \( \text{d6 b3} \) 58 \( \text{c6} \) (58 \( \text{f3 c4+} \) and 59...\( \text{x} \)xb2) 58...\( \text{d1} \), and 57 \( \text{f4+ c5} \) 58 \( \text{f2 c4+} \) 59 \( \text{e6 b4} \) 60 \( \text{axb4+ x} \)xb4 61 \( \text{d5 b3} \) 62 \( \text{f3 x} \)xb2.
57 ... \( \text{g6!} \)
58 \( \text{f4} \)
58 \( \text{d6!} \)\( \text{b3} \) 59 \( \text{c5 c4} \) 60 \( \text{d4 x} \)xb2 61 \( \text{b4+ x} \)xa3 62 \( \text{x} \)xb5 was probably more tenacious.
58 ... \( \text{c2} \)
59 \( \text{g2} \)
60 \( \text{d2} \)
Before embarking on decisive action, the black king must help in driving the enemy king as far away as possible.

61 \( \text{h2} \) \( \text{e3} \)
62 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c4} \)
63 \( \text{h4+} \) \( \text{e5!} \)
64 \( \text{h5+} \) \( \text{f5} \)
65 \( \text{h2} \) \( \text{e4+} \)
66 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{d4} \)
67 \( \text{f4} \)
68 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{d3+} \)
69 \( \text{g4} \)

The goal has been achieved – now it is time to attack the white pawns.
69 ... \( \text{d5} \)
70 \( \text{g3} \)
If 70 \( \text{f5} \), then 70...\( \text{f3!} \) 71 \( \text{c2 e3} \) 72 \( \text{e6 d1} \) 73 \( \text{h2 e2!} \) proves decisive. Amazingly precise coordination by the black pieces!
70 ... \( \text{b3!} \)
71 \( \text{h2} \) \( \text{e3!} \)
The threat is ...\( \text{b3-d1-e2} \). And if 72 \( \text{h5} \), then 72...\( \text{c4} \) 73 \( \text{h2 e1!} \) followed by 74...\( \text{e2} \) and 75...\( \text{d3} \). Therefore White resigned.

Naturally, after this game White began looking for new possibilities.
11 0-0-0!?
This was played by Artur Yusupov against Alexander Beliaevsky in the 1979 USSR Championship. Now 11...\( \text{e7} \) does not work because of 12 \( f3 \).

\[
\begin{array}{l}
11 \ldots \text{c8} \\
12 \text{f3} \text{g6} \\
13 \text{hxg6} \text{hgx6} \\
14 \text{b1} \text{a6}
\end{array}
\]

Events developed as follows: 15 \( \text{d3} \) (it stands to reason that after the exchange on c6 White cannot hope for an opening advantage) 15...\( \text{b4} \) 16 \( \text{c1} \) 0-0 17 a3 \( \text{x} \text{xc3} \) 18 \( \text{xc3} \) \( \text{e5} \)! 19 dxe5 \( \text{cxe5} \) 20 \( \text{c2} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 21 \( \text{xc3} \) \( \text{xd3} \) 22 \( \text{xd3} \) \( \text{c5} \) 23 \( \text{d4} \) (of course, not 23 \( \text{xd5?} \) in view of 23...\( \text{d8} \) and 24...\( \text{d2} \) 23...\( g5! \) 24 \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{d8} \). Black managed to equalise, and the game ended in a draw.

A new attempt to improve White's play was made in the game Mordasov–Vekshenkov (Alma Ata 1980).

15 \( \text{e2} \)

Events later developed in similar fashion to the previous game: 15...\( \text{b4} \) 16 \( \text{c1} \) 0-0 17 a3 \( \text{x} \text{xc3} \) 18 \( \text{xc3} \) \( \text{e5} \) 19 dxe5 \( \text{cxe5} \), but after 20 \( \text{hc1} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 21 \( \text{xc3} \) White gained the advantage.

And now a third home assignment.

In reply to 15 \( \text{e2} \) find the best plan of defence for Black, one which does not involve a weakening of his pawn structure.

**Discussion of home assignments**

I have to say that no one was able to give accurate replies to all three assignments. Of course, they were quite difficult, and besides, as in general in the majority of opening positions, the solutions offered may seem ambiguous and questionable. Even so, such training is very important and useful. If you wish to feel confident in the opening stage of the game, you need to learn to solve independently the problems facing you, not relying on the opinion of a trainer or recognised experts.

**Assignment 1** (Palatnik–Kosikov).

Up to the 23rd move White’s actions did not cause either you or me any doubts. The first questionable moment arose in the following position.

![Chess board](image)

Apparently not wishing to allow a weakening of White’s queenside pawns, a group of you (Zviagintsev, Boguslavsky, Kiryakov and Makariev) suggested the variation 23 \( \text{a} \text{a2} \) \( \text{e} \text{e7} \) 24 \( \text{xe} \text{e2} \) \( \text{c} \text{c6} \) 25 \( \text{c} \text{c3} \) \( \text{a} \text{6} \) (25...\( \text{f5}!) \) 26 a5, giving preference to White in the final position. But why? After the thematic break-through 26...\( \text{f5}! \) (which, unfortunately, was not even considered) 27 e5 (27 exf5 \( \text{xf5} \)\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{a6} \) (25...\( \text{f5}!) \) 27...\( f4! \) the problem of the light-square bishop is solved. There can follow 28 \( \text{a} \text{a4} \) \( \text{c2} \) 29 \( \text{c} \text{c5} \) \( \text{x} \text{c5} \) 30 \( \text{x} \text{c5} \) \( \text{b} \text{3} \) with equality.

No, this recommendation is unconvincing. I think that the moves made in the game 23 \( \text{xe} \text{e2} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 24 \( \text{bxc3} \) \( \text{c6} \) are correct.

We have already mentioned that Black’s main problems are his bishop, which is shut out of the game, and his less centralised king. White’s success largely depends on whether he can quickly ‘engage’ the opponent, by initiating concrete play before the approach of his main forces.
In this connection, I liked the idea of Svidler, Baklan and Emelin, who suggested 25 a5!, and then 26 d6xa5 27 xa7 followed by 28 b6. White does indeed have an obvious advantage.

But the move in the game 25 d6! is no worse. Only, in reply to 25...b6 instead of the routine 26 d3? White should have played more concretely: 26 c4!. For example, 26...f5 27 c5 bxc5 28 xc5 xe4 29 xe4, and only then 30 d3 with excellent winning chances.

And White's decisive mistake after 26 d3? f8 27 c4 e7 28 g3 e5 was the move 29 f5+?.

Assignment 2 (Rashkovsky–Kosikov).
Most of you expressed the opinion, with which I agree, that by choosing 13...bxc6! Black would have gained a satisfactory position.

Emelin and Baklan found the interesting variation 14 fd1 e7 15 f3 g5 16 xe4 gxf4 17 f3 dxe4 18 xe4 fxe3 with an unclear game. This is probably so, but in the first instance one should consider the sharp attempt by White to break through immediately in the centre.

14 xe4 dxe4 15 d5 exd5 16 fd1 In the event of 16 f5 g6 17 d6+ xd6 18 xd6 c5! 19 e5 f6 and 20...wc6 he has insufficient compensation for the pawn. [The balance can be retained by 19 wd4! (instead of 19 e5) 19...xd4 20 xc8+ wd8 21 xd8+ xd8 22 exd4 – Dvoretsky.] 16...c5!? An alternative, apparently also quite possible, was suggested: 16...c5 17 wd4 wd8 18 f5 e6.

17 b4!? xb4 18 xb4 d6 19 xd5 g6! with chances for both sides.

Assignment 3 (Mordasov–Vekshenkov)

Makariev, Zviagintsev and Kiryakov recommend 15...wa7 followed by 16...b5. An interesting plan, but, as Yusupov mentioned, not without its dangers. There can follow 16 c1 b5?! 17 xb5! axb5 18 xb5 xa4 19 xa4 a7 20 xc8+ xc8 21 c1 b6 22 b5, and the threat of a2–a4–a5 is very serious.

All the other students chose 15...a5 16 c1 c4 with a not altogether clear position, in which after 17 b3 I would nevertheless prefer to play White.

My suggestion is 15...e7 16 e4 (otherwise Black has no problems) 16...wd8!! With this unpretentious move, vacating the b6-square for his knight, Black succeeds in maintaining his centre. For example: 17 exd5 b6 18 b3? (18 c2 b4 19 b3 is better) 18...a5! 19 wc2 xd5, and Black has the advantage.
Mark Dvoretsky

In the Footsteps of one Game

(some non-theoretical reflections)

All theory, dear friend, is grey,
But the golden tree of life springs ever green.

J. W. von Goethe

A game of chess only begins with the opening, but it by no means ends there. It sometimes happens that the treatment of the opening determines the final result, but far more often the outcome depends on the skill of the two contestants in the subsequent stages of the game. And nevertheless many young players spend all their free time only on strengthening their opening repertoire, by a brief examination of countless recent games, published in magazines, bulletins or Informators, or recorded on computer discs. As a result, imperceptibly to themselves they merely become narrow specialists. Without purposeful work on the middlegame and the endgame, knowledge in these fields remains patchy, and the general understanding of chess suffers. I am convinced that a highly cultured, harmoniously prepared player is bound to do better than an ‘openings-expert’.

On a brief examination of a game, behid its bare score it is very hard to see the problems faced by the opponents, the ideas behind the moves made, and pretty variations which remained off-stage. I prefer to study games by strong players, furnished with detailed comments, desirably written by one of the two contestants. Such comments not only draw the readers into the creative laboratory of a grandmaster, but often provoke a desire to argue with the conclusions suggested, and stimulate your own analytical searches.

Chess games hardly ever repeat themselves. But situations arising in them, ideas and typical methods – these are often repeated. Sometimes one insignificant episode provokes a long chain of associations, and similar instances in your own games or those of others are remembered. Such associations are very useful – they help the studied material to be repeated and consolidated.

Many of the tales from the cycle A Thousand and One Nights are linked by common heroes or develop from one and the same initial situation. Without claiming to be a Scheherazade, I will acquaint the readers with several chess stories, in the remembering of which I was helped by one not especially interesting game (or more precisely, its first half). I hope that these stories will provide a reasonable illustration of the ideas expressed in the preambule to the lecture.

Introduction

Gavrikov – Dolmatov
Tallinn 1985
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 f6
2 c4 e6
3 ∆c3 d5
4 d4 ∆e7
What can be said about the system of development chosen by White? It seems to me that its strategic idea is based on the uncomfortable opposition for the opponent of the white rook and the black queen, which has no suitable square to go to, such as e2 in the white position. A similar motif also occurs in other openings (for example, in the Tarrasch Defence to the Queen’s Gambit), but here we will not develop this topic, remembering that at our disposal we do not have a thousand and one nights.

12 ... lxg3
13 hxg3

Here or on the previous move it was better to play ...cxd4. We will return to this moment, although some time later.

14 hxg3

What else? Black has to reckon with both 15 dxc5 and 15 d5. Bad is 14 ...cxd4 15 gxh4, when the terrible 16 gxg6 is threatened.

15 gxf3!

In the event of 16 hxg6 fxe6 followed by 17 ...h5 White would have time to safeguard his queen against the action of the enemy rook. But now it is hard to defend against the thematic central breakthrough d4–d5!

16 ... d6

Only here did the play deviate from the source game played thirty (!) years earlier. Gligoric–Unzicker (Olympiad, Dubrovnik 1950) developed as follows: 17 ...e8 18 b5! c8 (18 ...e7 19 e4 and 20 d5!) 19 e4 e7 20 d5! e5 21 g4 ed8 22 xxd7 xxd7 23 xxd6 xd6 24 fxe5 c7 25 d6, and White won.

18 ac1
19 a6
20 f3
21 a3
22 d3
g6
23 e2

Sergey Dolmatov has successfully deployed his forces and has completely equalised. The game continued for a long time yet (and was far from faultless), and in the end it finished in a draw.

But one gains the impression that White stood better and did not exploit all this chances, wouldn’t you agree? At some point he delayed. But where?

First story: bishop or knight?

White did not in fact put into effect his main positional threat, d4–d5. Let us return to the position after Black’s 17th move. Why not break through in the centre at this moment?
The answer is simple: both players saw the variation 18 d5 exd5 19 \( \texttt{xd5} \) \( \texttt{xd5} \) 20 \( \texttt{xd5} \) (20 \( \texttt{xd5} \) \( \texttt{xf6} \)) 20...\( \texttt{xc8} \). On the next move the black queen goes to f6 and White’s pressure on the d-file evaporates.

If this is so, why not try capturing on d5 not with the knight, but the bishop?

18 d5! exd5
19 \( \texttt{xd5} \)!!

If 19...\( \texttt{xd5} \), then both 20 \( \texttt{xd5} \) (the black queen has no convenient square) and 20 \( \texttt{xd5} \) are strong. 19...\( \texttt{c8} \) is better, but here too White retains some initiative, by continuing (if there is nothing better) 20 \( \texttt{xd5} \) with the threat of 21 \( \texttt{b5} \) (the immediate 20 \( \texttt{b5} \) is weaker in view of 20...\( \texttt{e7} \) 21 \( \texttt{xe7} \)!! \( \texttt{xe7} \) 22 \( \texttt{xa7} \) \( \texttt{c2} \) and 23...\( \texttt{c5} \)).

Grandmaster lossif Dorfman once half-jokingly, half-seriously formulated the principle: ‘The worst bishop is always better than the best knight’. Apparently, somewhere in our consciousness we agree with him, because we frequently overlook moves such as 19 \( \texttt{xd5} \)!! – it is a pity to allow the exchange of a bishop.

Overcoming this psychological barrier could be helped by familiarity with situations in which similar non-routine decisions were taken. (‘Similar’ and ‘non-routine’ – at first sight, what incompatible words! But, as IsaaL Lipnitsky wrote in his remarkable book *Voprosy sovremennoy shakhmatnoy teorii* (Problems of modern chess theory): ‘Creatively concrete decisions are by no means some negation of chess generalisations, since the negation of one set of often obvious rules and laws occurs when other, perhaps more latent rules and laws, are established.’

Here are two examples on the given topic from my own games.

**Dvoretsky – Romanov**

*Moscow 1963*

**Nimzo-Indian Defence**

1 d4 \( \texttt{f6} \) 2 c4 \( \texttt{e6} \) 3 \( \texttt{c3} \) \( \texttt{b4} \) 4 e3 \( \texttt{c5} \) 5 \( \texttt{f3} \) \( \texttt{d5} \) 6 \( \texttt{d3} \) 0-0 7 0-0 \( \texttt{xd4} \) 8 \( \texttt{exd4} \) \( \texttt{xc4} \) 9 \( \texttt{bxc4} \) \( \texttt{b6} \) 10 \( \texttt{g5} \) \( \texttt{b7} \) 11 \( \texttt{e2} \) \( \texttt{e7} \) 12 \( \texttt{fd1} \) \( \texttt{wc7} \) 13 \( \texttt{b3} \) \( \texttt{c6} \) 14 \( \texttt{ac1} \) \( \texttt{ac8} \)

```

    8
    7
    6
    5
    4
    3
    2
    1

    a b c d e f g h

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Please don’t judge the preceding play too severely – after all, at that time the two players had only second category rating! But even today I have no reason to criticise my subsequent actions. However, at a young age non-routine decisions are sometimes found more quickly than when one is more mature: due to lack of experience and knowledge, stereotypes have not yet had time to form.

15 d5! exd5
16 \( \texttt{xd5} \) \( \texttt{fe8} \)
17 \( \texttt{c4} \) \( \texttt{xd5} \)?
18 \( \texttt{xd5} \) \( \texttt{wb8} \)
19 \( \texttt{f4} \) \( \texttt{a5} \)
20 \( \texttt{xe7} \) 21 \( \texttt{xc8} \)!

Black resigned.

The following example, played in an event of far higher standard, will be analysed in more detail.
In the Footsteps of one Game

Gulko – Dvoretsky
43rd USSR Championship, Yerevan 1975

Ragozin Defence

1 d4
2 c4
3 e3
f6
4 f3
5 e3
6 d3
c6
7 0-0

A purely prophylactic move, provoked by the need, when carrying out the main plan 7...dxc4 8 xc4 d6 (intending 9...e5), to reckon with 9 b5 and 9 b5!?.

However, according to theory the first of these is not dangerous. In the aforementioned book Lipnitsky gives the interesting game Bannik–Cherepkov (1952), which is of immediate relevance to our theme. In it after 9 b5 e7! 10 d2 (also nothing is given by 10 xd6 cxd6 followed by 11...e5) 10...e4 11 e1 e5 12 dxe5

Black did not play 12...xe5? (on account of 13 xd6 with the better chances for White), but 12...xe5!. The subsequent events took a tense course: 13 xe5 xe5 14 e2 d8 15 a4 d2 16 xc7 d7 17 a5 xf1 18 x8 xe3 19 fxe3 xa8 20 b4 xb4 21 xb4, and the game ended in a draw.

This variation of the Ragozin Defence was handled somewhat differently by Mikhail Botvinnik. The first game of his Return Match in 1961 with Mikhail Tal went 4 e3 0-0 5 d3 d5 6 a3 dxc4 7 xc4 d6 8 f3 c6 9 b5?! e5 (9...e7!?).

10 xd6 xd6! 11 dxe5 xd1+ 12 xd1 g4 13 e2 cxe5 with an active position for Black. Why didn’t Botvinnik play 10 dxe5 xe5 11 xd6 with an advantage? We already know the answer – because of 10...xe5!.

Later Botvinnik improved White’s play: 9 b4! e5 10 b2 g4 11 dxe5 (11 d5 e7, as in the third game of the Return Match, leads to an unclear game).
I think you will agree that now the move 11...\textit{$\text{hxg}5$} very much suggests itself (and then, according to Konstantinopolsky – 12 \textit{\text{hxg}5} \textit{\text{fxf}3} 14 gxf3 \textit{\text{xg}5} with equality). We are surprised to learn that Tal chose 11...\textit{$\text{exh}5$}?! After 12 \textit{\text{xe}5} \textit{\text{xd}1} 13 \textit{\text{fxe}6} \textit{\text{cxd}6} 14 \textit{\text{dxd}6} 16 \textit{\text{dxd}6} the position was markedly worse for him.

8 h3!

An important prophylactic move, the point of which becomes clear on an examination of the variation 8 a3 dxc4 9 \textit{\text{xc4}} (9 \textit{\text{xh}7}+?) 9...\textit{\text{d6}} 10 e4 e5. Now it would be advantageous for White to retain the tension in the centre, but after 11 \textit{\text{e}3} both 11...\textit{\text{g}4} and 11...\textit{\text{g}4} are strong.

If he wishes, Black can continue ‘jockeying for position’ by 8...h6? (it is useful to deprive the white pieces of the g5-square), but he decides to clarify the situation.

8... dxc4
9 \textit{\text{xc4}} \textit{\text{d6}}
10 e4 e5
11 \textit{\text{e}3}

At the moment when this game was played, I trusted Lipnitsky’s evaluation, which assumed that Black gained good counterplay by activity on the queenside: 11...h6 12 \textit{\text{e}1} b5 13 \textit{\text{b}3} \textit{\text{b}7} (now theory regards this differently – the \textit{Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings} evaluates the variation in favour of White). Nevertheless, I made another move.

11... \textit{\text{exd}4}?!

Why? Behind this there is a rather curious story.

In those years I was helping Botvinnik to conduct lessons with talented young players at the school directed by him. Not long before the championship of the country I showed the juniors the game Taimanov–Fischer (Buenos Aires 1960), which was full of fascinating events in all its stages. In his youth Robert Fischer used to employ the Ragozin Defence. On reaching this same position, he chose 11...\textit{\text{exd}4}?! 12 \textit{\text{xg}5} \textit{\text{d7}} 13 \textit{\text{e}7} \textit{\text{e}7}? (13...\textit{\text{e}5} 14 \textit{\text{f}1} \textit{\text{g}6} was preferable, although, as shown by the game Keres-Lipnitsky, played in the 19th USSR Championship, 1951, the plan of g2–g3, \textit{\text{g}2} and f2–f4 ensures White an enduring initiative) 14 \textit{\text{g}5} \textit{\text{xg}5} 15 \textit{\text{d}5}! \textit{\text{e}5} 16 f4, and Mark Taimanov gained a decisive advantage.

One of the juniors asked why Fischer did not simplify the position by 12...\textit{\text{xg}5} 13 \textit{\text{xg}5} (if 13 \textit{\text{xg}5}?? c5 14 \textit{\text{d}2} there follows not 14...b5? 15 \textit{\text{f}1} \textit{\text{e}7} 16 \textit{\text{xd}8} \textit{\text{xg}5} 17 \textit{\text{d}5} \textit{\text{xg}5} 18 \textit{\text{xg}5} \textit{\text{a}7} 19 b4, but 14...\textit{\text{e}5}?, threatening the exchange on c3 followed by the capture of the e4-pawn) 13...c5 or 13...b5.
I was ready for this question (since I had analysed the position beforehand), and I explained that if $13...c5$ White does not play $14 \text{ } \text{\underline {c3}}?! \text{ } b5$, but $14 \text{ } \text{\underline{x}f6}! \text{ } \text{\underline {w}xf6} \text{ } 15 \text{ } f4$, intending $e4$–$e5$, when he stands better. Stronger is $13...\text{b5!} \text{ } 14 \text{ } \text{\underline{b3}}?! \text{ } c5 \text{ } 15 \text{ } \text{\underline{x}f6} \text{ } \text{\underline {w}xf6} \text{ } 16 \text{ } f4 \text{ } (or \text{ } 16 \text{ } \text{\underline d}d5 \text{ } \text{\underline {w}e}5 \text{ } 17 \text{ } \text{\underline f}f4 \text{ } \text{\underline x}xe4) \text{ } 16...c4 \text{ } 17 \text{ } e5 \text{ } \text{\underline c}5+, \text{ } and \text{ } Black \text{ } solves \text{ } all \text{ } his \text{ } problems. \text{ } But \text{ } instead \text{ } of \text{ } 14 \text{ } \text{\underline b3}?! \text{ } he \text{ } has \text{ } to \text{ } reckon \text{ } with \text{ } 14 \text{ } \text{\underline e}5!.

And here the twelve-year-old Garik Kasparov suggested the brilliant counter-stroke $14...c5!!$. The main variation was quickly found: $15 \text{ } \text{\underline{x}f6} \text{ } \text{\underline{cxd4}} \text{ } 16 \text{ } \text{\underline{fxg7}} \text{ } \text{\underline e}8 \text{ } 17 \text{ } \text{\underline d}d5 \text{ } \text{\underline {dxc3}} \text{ } 18 \text{ } \text{\underline{x}xa8} \text{ } \text{\underline {cxb2}} \text{ } 19 \text{ } \text{\underline b1} \text{ } \text{\underline{w}f6}$, and Black has excellent compensation for the sacrificed exchange.

Against Boris Gulko I decided to use this novelty, found in a joint analysis at the Botvinnik School. Alas, my opponent forestalled me. He captured on $d4$ not with the knight, like Taimanov, but with the bishop.

$12 \text{ } \text{\underline x}d4!!$

(see diagram)

After pondering over the position, I realised that I was unable to combat successfully the threat of $e4$–$e5$.

$12... \text{ } \text{\underline{xd4}}$

$13 \text{ } \text{\underline {w}xd4} \text{ } \text{b5}$

Here, fortunately for me, Boris was too hasty.

**14 \text{ } e5? \text{ } \text{bxc4}**

Again, so not to deviate too much from the main theme, I won’t mention the subsequent difficult struggle and the very clever trap in which Gulko finally caught me. However, this game, like the Taimanov–Fischer game, can be found in the appendix to the lecture.

White could have retained the advantage by $14 \text{ } \text{\underline b3}! \text{ } \text{c5} \text{ } 15 \text{ } \text{\underline {w}e3} \text{ } \text{c4} \text{ } 16 \text{ } \text{\underline c2}!$, and only if $16...\text{b4} - 17 \text{ } \text{e5!} \text{ } \text{bxc3} \text{ } (17...\text{\underline x}xe5 \text{ } 18 \text{ } \text{\underline x}xe5 \text{ } \text{bxc3} \text{ } 19 \text{ } \text{\underline x}c3 \text{ } \text{\underline e}6 \text{ } 20 \text{ } \text{\underline x}xc4) \text{ } 18 \text{ } \text{\underline ad1}$. The mistake made by my opponent can be interpreted, if we remember a well-known psychological chess principle: ‘A threat (in this case $e4$–$e5$) is often stronger than its immediate execution’. But this is a topic for a quite different conversation...

**Second story: study the comments of grandmasters!**

Let us again return to the place where we began – to the divergence between the games Gligoric–Unzicker and Gavrikov–Dolmatov. Let us open Svetozar Gligoric’s book *I Play Against Pieces*. In a note to Black’s 17th move in his game against Wolfgang Unzicker he gives the variation $17...\text{\underline f6} \text{ } 18 \text{ } \text{d}5 \text{ } \text{exd5} \text{ } 19 \text{ } \text{\underline x}d5! \text{ } \text{\underline c}8 \text{ } 20 \text{ } \text{\underline b}5$. Why did Viktor Gavrikov not make use of this ‘prompt’?
He didn’t know the source game? Unlikely, since he had already employed this variation of the Queen’s Gambit many times, and Gavrikov works assiduously on opening theory.

He had forgotten? Altogether improbable – Viktor has a phenomenal memory, and he appears to remember absolutely everything. I think the point is that players who are fascinated by opening theory try to quickly digest as much fresh information as possible and are often not inclined to spend time on a thorough study of the games they examine, on an analysis of the commentaries on them. Apparently Gavrikov either did not notice Giligoric’s comment, or he had not read his book at all and had only seen the Giligoric–Unzicker game (or more precisely, its opening stage) in an opening book.

Many years ago a similar story occurred with Yuri Balashov – a player with the same kind of absolute memory as Gavrikov, and with the same approach to the study of the opening.

Balashov – Dvoretsky
USSR Spartakiad, Moscow 1967
King’s Indian Defence
1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 Qc3 g6 4 e4 d6 5 f4
A clever and, for me, extremely unpleasant choice of opening variation.

At a training session before the Spartakiad, Yuri and I were sharing a room. It was assumed that he would be playing on the junior board for the Moscow team, and I was his ‘understudy’. However, the directors of the Russian team managed to get Balashov to play for them and they withdrew him from the Moscow team’s training session. Our brief contact was sufficient for Yuri to come to the certain conclusion that I was not very familiar with opening theory.

In the Four Pawns Variation it is not possible to act on general grounds – one is obliged to play ‘move-by-move’ and in sharp positions find the only correct continuations. To conduct such a struggle without an accurate knowledge of the extensive theory of the variation is very difficult.

Balashov was highly skilled in the art of opening preparation for a specific opponent. I remember how in the USSR Championship First League in 1974 he defeated Yuri Razuvaev with Black in the main variation of the Grünfeld Defence, in which his opponent was a major expert. After the game Balashov stated that the plan chosen by Black had already been employed not long before by Vasily Smyslov. ‘How did I miss this game, seeing as I carefully follow the theory of this variation?!’ Razuvaev lamented. In reply Balashov smiled cunningly: ‘You see, it was only published in the magazine The Chess Player, and you don’t receive it.’

5 ... e6
6 Qf3 c5
7 d5 e6
8 Qe2 exd5
9 cxd5 He8
10 Qd2

I didn’t know anything about this move (however, I also didn’t remember the sharp variations arising after 10 e5). I began looking how to deviate from theory, and I made an unexpected move.

10 ... c4!?
‘Bravo, excellently devised, booser nose!’ said Buratino to the joiner Giuseppe. (Buratino – a hugely popular Russian puppet character, loosely based on Pinocchio and created by Alexey Tolstoy – translator). But, unfortunately, I was a little late: a year earlier, at the Olympiad in Havana, this had already been played by Robert Fischer. His
opponent, Arturo Pomar, made a poor response: 11 \text{f3} \text{bd7} 12 0-0? b5! 13 \text{h1} a6 14 a4 \text{b8}, and Black gained the advantage.

11 a4 \text{a6}
12 0-0 \text{c5}
13 e5!? The quiet 13 \text{f3} was probably preferable. Incidentally, on this topic a fairly extensive theory has now accumulated.

13 ... dxe5
14 \text{xc4} e4!? Afraid of coming under an attack, I decided on a positional pawn sacrifice. 14...exf4 15 \text{xf4} \text{ce4}! was also possible.

15 \text{e3} \text{d3}
16 \text{xd3} \text{exd3}
17 \text{xd3} \text{f5}
18 \text{d2} \text{c8}
19 b3

When he sacrificed the pawn Black calculated as far as here and he was hoping that in the resulting position he would find sufficient tactical resources.

19 ... \text{e4}

Here I calculated a variation which leads almost by force to an acceptable ending for Black.

20 \text{xe4} \text{xa1}
21 \text{ed6} \text{c3}!
22 \text{xc3} I breathed a sigh of relief, since I had not seen a clear reply to 22 \text{c1}, although I was hoping that I would find one in case of necessity. After the game I asked Balashov why he didn’t play this. ‘Risky’, he shrugged his shoulders.

22 ... \text{xd6}
23 \text{xd6} \text{xc3}
24 \text{d4} \text{d3}
25 \text{xe8} \text{f8}
26 \text{e1} \text{d5}
27 \text{d6} \text{xd5}
28 \text{e8+} \text{g7}
29 \text{xb7} \text{e6}

It is clear that the game should end in a draw. That in fact happened, although only after many adventures. One of the instructive episodes in the rook endgame that soon arose is analysed in my book School of Chess Excellence 1 – Endgame Analysis in the chapter ‘Rook against pawns’.

After the game Balashov took me aback, by saying that ‘all this had already happened’, and referring to an article by Mikhail Tal about the international tournament in Mallorca in issue No.5 of the magazine Shakhmaty in 1967. Of course, I found the magazine and saw there the game Pomar–Toran (Palma de Mallorca 1966), which up to the 19th move took exactly the same course.

But what staggered me most of all was Tal’s comment on Black’s 19th move (\text{g4}). ‘During the game I thought that 19...\text{e4} 20 \text{xe4} \text{xa1} 21 \text{ed6} \text{c3} was stronger. But analysis showed that by continuing 22 \text{c1}! White retains an advantage, both material and positional.’

It was not without reason that I feared this move. But why did Balashov, who remembered the game, the issue of the magazine
where it was published (and, it would seem, even the page number), not make use of the resource suggested by Tal? The answer is already known: it is probable that he had merely seen the game, but had not studied it, and had not taken an interest in the commentary.

Meanwhile, objectively the capture on c3 is not a mistake, and White lost his advantage only on the next move. After 22 \( \text{\textit{W}}x3 \text{\textit{W}}xd6 \) he had the brilliant possibility 23 \( \text{\textit{W}}h8+!! \) \( \text{\textit{Q}}xh8 \) 24 \( \text{\textit{Q}}d4+ \text{\textit{Q}}g8 \), and only now 25 \( \text{\textit{Q}}xd6 \), when he remains a healthy pawn to the good. White's spectacular \emph{zwischenzug} was overlooked by both players — it was discovered more than 30 years later by grandmaster Viorel Bologan, when checking my analyses on a computer.

I should mention in passing that nowadays nearly all players – from ordinary amateurs to leading grandmasters – make active use of computers in the study of sharp opening variations. Playing programs or analytical modules help to avoid tactical errors and suggest latent resources in a position — as a result, the quality of opening analyses and the speed with which they are carried out have increased markedly. Alas, there is also the other side of the coin, which is often forgotten. Your tactical vision needs constant training, as otherwise it will let you down at the board. By trusting the 'electronic nanny', we get out of the habit of checking for ourselves the correctness of ideas found. As a result of the lack of training, the corresponding skills, so important for any player, are also weakened.

As regards the evaluation of the position, it can be concluded that 19...\( \text{\textit{Q}}e4 \) is insufficient for equality. Black should go in for the brilliant combination, found by Roman Toran after an hour and a half's thought in the afore-mentioned game.

\( 19 \ldots \text{\textit{Q}}g4! \)
\( 20 \text{\textit{Q}}d4 \text{\textit{Q}}xd4+ \)

\( 21 \text{\textit{W}}xd4 \text{\textit{Q}}xc4!! \)

Black's idea is illustrated by the variation 21...\( \text{\textit{W}}h4 \) 22 \( h3 \text{\textit{Q}}xc4 \) 23 \( \text{\textit{Q}}xc4 \text{\textit{Q}}e3 \) 24 \( \text{\textit{Q}}xg4 \text{\textit{Q}}h3 \) 25 \( \text{\textit{Q}}xh3 \text{\textit{Q}}g3+ \) with perpetual check. But it is not enough to find an idea — it must be implemented in the most accurate way. By playing 24 \( \text{\textit{Q}}d2! \) (instead of 24 \( \text{\textit{Q}}xg4? \) 24...\( \text{\textit{Q}}d3 \) 25 \( \text{\textit{Q}}e1 \) White would have parried the attack. Therefore Toran changes the move order.

\( 22 \text{\textit{Q}}xc4 \text{\textit{Q}}e3! \)

Threatening both 23...\( \text{\textit{W}}h4 \), and 23...\( \text{\textit{Q}}d3 \).

\( 23 \text{\textit{Q}}h3 \text{\textit{Q}}d3! \)
\( 24 \text{\textit{W}}xa7 \text{\textit{W}}h4 \)
\( 25 \text{\textit{Q}}a2! \)

The only possibility of continuing to play for a win. We already know that 25 \( \text{\textit{Q}}xh4 \text{\textit{Q}}h3! \) leads to perpetual check, while if 25 \( \text{\textit{Q}}e2? \) there follows 25...\( \text{\textit{Q}}xh3! \) 26 \( \text{\textit{Q}}xh3 \text{\textit{Q}}xh3 \) 27 \( \text{\textit{Q}}f2 \text{\textit{Q}}e4. \)

\( 25 \ldots \text{\textit{Q}}e3 \)
\( 26 \text{\textit{W}}b8+ \text{\textit{Q}}g7 \)
\( 27 \text{\textit{W}}e5+ \)

\( 27 \ldots \text{\textit{Q}}f6? \)

The losing move (Black was most probably in severe time-trouble). 27...\( \text{\textit{Q}}g8? \) was also wrong, if only because of 28 \( \text{\textit{Q}}b2! \text{\textit{Q}}xf1 \) 29 \( \text{\textit{Q}}xb7 \). But after 27...\( \text{\textit{Q}}h6 \) the game would apparently have ended in a draw: 28 \( \text{\textit{Q}}e4 \)
28 \textit{f7}+ \textit{h6} \\
29 \textit{e4}!

From this point onwards it is only White who is attacking. The threat is 30 \textit{f8}+ \textit{h5} 31 \textit{xf6}+.

29 \ldots \textit{xe4} \\
30 \textit{xe4} \textit{b3} \\
31 \textit{b2}!? \textit{f5} \\
32 \textit{xb3}! \textit{fxe4} \\
33 \textit{xe3}

White has a decisive material advantage.

33...\textit{e7} 34 \textit{h2} g5 35 \textit{fxg5}+ \textit{g5} 36 \textit{f1}+ \textit{c7}+ 37 \textit{h1} \textit{xc4} 38 \textit{xe4} \textit{wxc4} 39 \textit{d1} \textit{we7} 40 \textit{fe1}

Third story: what has my opponent devised?

Let us again return to that with which we began. Remember that Dolmatov did not manage to gain equality against Gavrikov. A sound plan of action for Black was demonstrated in the game which we will now examine.

\textbf{Gavrikov – Yusupov} \\
Interzonal Tournament, Tunis 1985

\textit{Queen's Gambit}

\begin{itemize}
\item 1 \textit{d4} \textit{f6} \\
\item 2 \textit{f3} \textit{d5} \\
\item 3 \textit{c4} \textit{e6} \\
\item 4 \textit{c3} \textit{e7} \\
\item 5 \textit{g5} 0-0 \\
\item 6 \textit{e3} \textit{h6} \\
\item 7 \textit{h4} \textit{b6} \\
\item 8 \textit{d3} \textit{b7} \\
\item 9 0-0 \textit{bd7} \\
\item 10 \textit{e2} \textit{c5} \\
\item 11 \textit{g3} \textit{e4} \\
\item 12 \textit{fd1} \textit{cxd4}!
\end{itemize}

13 \textit{exd4}

If 13 \textit{xd4} Artur Yusupov was intending 13...\textit{g3}, in order to weaken the opponent's pressure on d5 and to obtain a shelter for the queen on the c-file. 13...\textit{g3} 14 \textit{hxg3} \textit{f6} is also possible, for example: 15 \textit{a1} \textit{b4}! 16 \textit{cxd5} \textit{xc3} 17 \textit{xc3} \textit{xd5} 18 \textit{c1} \textit{c8} 19 \textit{a6}, and here in the game Novikov–Lputian (51st USSR Championship, Lvov 1984) the players agreed a draw.

13 \ldots \textit{g3} \\
14 \textit{hgx3} \textit{f6}

In contrast to the Gligoric–Unzicker and Gavrikov–Dolmatov games, here Black securely controls the important d5-point.

Not long before the Interzonal Tournament, Yusupov headed the Moscow Pioneers Palace team in the competition sponsored by the newspaper \textit{Komsomolskaya Pravda} (grandmaster captains give simultaneous displays with clocks against the juniors from the other teams). Artur later told me that in the match against Baku in one of the games he employed this opening variation with White, but he did not gain any advantage – his young opponent played the opening stage extremely accurately. As it transpired, the juniors of the Baku team had been helped in their preparations by their captain – Garry Kasparov. When he met Gavrikov,
In the Footsteps of one Game

Artur tried to remember this game...

15 će5 ćc8
16 ćac1

16 ćb5? is clearly premature: 16...dxc4 (the immediate 16...a6 17 ća7 ćc7 is also possible) 17 ćxc4 a6 18 ća7 ćc7 with the threats of 19...b5 or 19...wa8. But now Black has to reckon with ćb5.

16 . . .
17 ćxc4
dxc4
18 ćb3
dxc3
19 bxc3

Among the numerous deep conceptions expounded by Aaron Nimzowitsch in his book My System, one of the most important seems to me to be the idea of prophylaxis. Nimzowitsch wrote: ‘Neither attack nor defence is, in my opinion, a matter properly pertaining to position play, which is rather an energetic and systematic application of prophylactic measures.’ This idea seems paradoxical and incomprehensible, but I hope that an analysis of the present game will help it to be understood.

This is what Nimzowitsch understands by prophylaxis: ‘What it is concerned with above all else is to blunt the edge of certain possibilities which in a positional sense would be undesirable.’ He considers two forms of prophylaxis: the over-protection of strategically important points and the prevention of freeing pawn moves. But prophylaxis can be understood more widely, as the prevention not only of pawn moves by the opponent, but also other ideas of his. Therefore from the standpoint of the practical player it is more useful to talk not even about prophylaxis, but about ‘prophylactic thinking’ – an inner resolve to identify the opponent’s ideas. I will disclose one my professional secrets, confirmed by my entire experience of training work: a player who masters the skill of prophylactic thinking will significantly raise his standard, and sharply improve in positional play, the technique of converting an advantage, and various other fields.

Of course, grandmaster Yusupov developed the skill of prophylactic thinking long ago, from the time when he was not yet a grandmaster. Let us see this skill in action.

![Chess Diagram]

Artur asked himself: ‘What does the opponent want, and what would he play if it were him to move?’ Perhaps he was intending to sacrifice his knight on f7? (However, it is not clear whether the sacrifice is correct.) Black certainly has to reckon with activity in the centre by c3-c4 and d4–d5. Is that all? No, there is also another threat: ćd3 and then ćc2. The move ...f7–f5 weakens the position too much, while in reply to ...g7–g6 there follows the knight sacrifice on g6.

Now, knowing the opponent’s ideas, it is easier to choose your move. For example, 19...ća3 comes into consideration – after 20 ćc2 it is not easy for White to set up the battery on the b1–h7 diagonal. But does this move help against c3-c4 and d4–d5, and with what plan can it be linked? (Remember, Nimzowitsch demands ‘an energetic and systematic application of prophylactic measures.’)

19 . . .
ćc7!!

A grandmaster move! Black improves his
position and prepares ...\( \texttt{c8} \) (or ...\( \texttt{a8} \)), which is a good antidote to White’s offensive in the centre. Now almost certainly the knight sacrifice on f7 will be incorrect.

\[ \texttt{20 w_d3 f6} \]

It transpires that after 21 \( \texttt{c2 g6} \) White cannot play 22 \( \texttt{dxe5?} \) – the black rook participates in the defence along the 7th rank.

\[ \texttt{21 \textit{g4} h5!} \]

Parrying the obvious threat of 22 \( \texttt{c2 g6} \) 23 \( \texttt{dxe5} \).

\[ \texttt{22 \textit{e3}} \]

\( \texttt{22 dxe5} \) would have led to equality, but for the moment Gavrikov is hoping for more.

But now what does White want? Either, as before, c3-c4 and d4-d5, or 23 d5 immediately, in order to then support the d5-point by c3-c4.

\[ \texttt{22 . . . d7!} \]

Now 23 c4? \( \texttt{xh4} \) is not possible, while if 23 d5 Yusupov was intending 23...\( \texttt{g5} \) 24 f4 \( \texttt{e5} \) followed by ...\( \texttt{c5} \). 23 \( \texttt{a4 d6} \) 24 \( \texttt{c4?} \) \( \texttt{a6} \) is also pointless.

\[ \texttt{23 g4 hxg4} \]

\[ \texttt{24 \textit{xg4}} \]

Now what is threatened? Probably nothing. After strengthening his position with a series of prophylactic moves, Black can also think about his own active possibilities.

\[ \texttt{24 . . . g6} \]

\[ \texttt{25 \textit{e1}?!} \]

White decided to improve the placing of his rooks, by playing \( \texttt{e1} \) and \( \texttt{cd1} \). A sensible operation? Undoubtedly. However, absolutely ill-timed. Now it was his turn to employ ‘prophylactic thinking’ and forestall Black’s prosaic idea of activating his forces: ...\( \texttt{g7} \) and ...\( \texttt{h8} \). This problem would have been most simply solved by 25 \( \texttt{w3} \) (but not 25 \( \texttt{h3} \) ? \( \texttt{g5} \) and 26...\( \texttt{g7} \), for example, 25...\( \texttt{g7} \) (25...\( \texttt{g7} \) 26 \( \texttt{h6} \)+; 25...\( \texttt{g5} \) 26 f4) 26 \( \texttt{e5} \) with roughly equal chances.

\[ \texttt{25 . . . g7} \]

\[ \texttt{26 \textit{cd1}?} \]

Consistent, but bad! White should have forestalled the threatened attack on his king with a series of exchanges: 26 \( \texttt{w3} \) (or 26 \( \texttt{xf6} \) immediately) 26...\( \texttt{h8} \) 27 \( \texttt{xf6} \) \( \texttt{xf6} \) 28 \( \texttt{w5} \) with somewhat the better endgame for Black.

\[ \texttt{26 . . . h8} \]

\[ \texttt{27 \textit{g3}} \]

What does White want? Obviously, to simplify the position by 28 \( \texttt{xf6} \) \( \texttt{xf6} \) 29 \( \texttt{w5} \). But it is not hard to parry this threat with a move which at the same time comes into Black’s plan of attack.

\[ \texttt{27 . . . h5}! \]
Appendix

How quickly White’s position has become difficult!

28 \texttt{Wf4}?

28 \texttt{Qxf6} was nevertheless better.

28 ... \texttt{Ae7}!

The bishop switches to a powerful attacking position – d6. A possible variation is 29 \texttt{Qe5 Ad6} 30 \texttt{We3 Wh4} 31 f3 \texttt{Xxe5}! 32 dxe5 \texttt{Ac5} 33 \texttt{Xxd7 We1+}.

29 \texttt{Cc1} \texttt{d6}

30 \texttt{Qe5 Wh4}

31 f3 \texttt{Wg3}

32 \texttt{Xe3}

32 \texttt{Qxd7 Wh1+}!

32 ... \texttt{Ad8}!

The last black piece joins the attack (33 ... \texttt{Adh8} is threatened). White resigned.

White lost quickly, without making any obvious positional mistakes. There was a simple reason: Gavrikov had not developed the skill of prophylactic thinking, which Yusupov possessed. For this reason, in this game they proved, in boxing terminology, to be ‘in different weight categories’.

Prophylaxis is one of my favourite themes. I could expand on it at length, but it is time to stop. In conclusion I should like to dispel the impression, which you may have acquired, that I am altogether against the serious study of opening theory. Remember the examples we have examined, and the difficulties which one of the sides sometimes encountered due to being insufficiently well-prepared in the opening, and you will realise that I am by no means appealing you to give up studying the opening. And in general, every player has the right to study that aspect of chess which most attracts him. I wanted only to warn against concentrating on opening theory alone, and to show what fascinating and useful discoveries can be made, by immersing yourself in the amazing world of chess.

‘Here morning stole up on Scheherazade, and she ceased her permitted discourse.’

The Taimanov–Fischer and Gulkov-Dvoretsky games, the opening stages of which we have already examined, contained many other interesting and instructive events – you can now make their acquaintance.

Taimanov – Fischer

Buenos Aires 1960

Ragozin Defence

1 c4 \texttt{Qf6} 2 \texttt{Qc3} e6 3 d4 \texttt{Qb4} 4 e3 0-0 5 \texttt{Qd3} d5 6 \texttt{Qf3} \texttt{Qc6} 7 0-0 dxc4 8 \texttt{Qxc4} \texttt{Qd6} 9 \texttt{Qb5}?! \texttt{Qe7}?! (9 ... e5!?; 9 ... \texttt{Qe7}!?) 10 h3 (10 \texttt{Qc2}!, preparing \texttt{Qd1}) 10 ... \texttt{a6} 11 \texttt{Qc3} \texttt{Qd6} 12 e4 e5 13 \texttt{Qe3} exd4?! 14 \texttt{Qxd4}? (14 ... \texttt{Qxd4}!!) 14 ... \texttt{Qd7}?! (14 ... \texttt{Qxd4} 15 \texttt{Qxd4} b5! 16 e5 c5!!)

15 \texttt{Qe1} \texttt{Qe7}?

16 \texttt{Qg5}!

16 ... \texttt{Qe5} was better, although after 17 \texttt{Qf3} White would still have retained the advantage.

17 \texttt{Qd5}!

The only way! The primitive 17 \texttt{Qxd4}? would have allowed Black to simplify the position by 17 ... \texttt{Qe5}.

17 ... \texttt{Qe5}

18 f4 \texttt{Qf3+}

The only move.
Taimanov makes the natural move, retaining an advantage, taking into account the variation 19...\textit{d}d4+ 20 \textit{h}1 \textit{x}c4 21 \textit{xf}6 (it is probable that 21 \textit{xf}6+ \textit{g}xf6 22 \textit{xf}6 also works). The capture with the pawn also came seriously into consideration, so as not to allow the black queen to go to d4.

In good positions one usually does not want to take unnecessary risks, especially since no elementary win is apparent after 19 gxf3 \textit{xb}2. For example, 20 \textit{b}1 \textit{a}3 21 \textit{xf}6?! \textit{c}5+ or 20 \textit{e}2 \textit{a}3 21 \textit{xf}6?! \textit{g}xf6 22 \textit{xf}6+ \textit{h}8 23 \textit{xd}7 \textit{g}8+.

In the conversion of an advantage, at some point you have to exert yourself, calculate variations accurately, and find a concrete way to the goal. White would have won by 19 gxf3! \textit{xb}2 20 \textit{e}2 (20 \textit{b}1 \textit{a}3 21 \textit{xf}6+ is also not bad) 20...\textit{a}3 (if 20...\textit{c}5+ 21 \textit{h}1 \textit{d}4, then at the least 22 \textit{xf}6 \textit{g}xf6 23 \textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 24 \textit{d}1 \textit{c}5 25 \textit{xd}4 \textit{cxd}4 26 \textit{xf}6+ and 27 \textit{xd}7 is possible) 21 \textit{xf}6+ \textit{g}xf6 22 \textit{xf}6. After 22...\textit{h}3, the reply which concerned Taimanov, there follows either 23 \textit{h}2! \textit{e}3+ 24 \textit{h}1 \textit{xf}4 25 e5!, or 23 \textit{d}5! h6 (23...\textit{c}5+ 24 \textit{h}2; 23...\textit{xf}4 24 \textit{h}5) 24 \textit{h}5 \textit{w}c5+ 25 \textit{xc}5 \textit{xc}5+ 26 \textit{h}2 \textit{e}6 27 \textit{g}2+ \textit{h}7 28 \textit{g}7+ \textit{h}8 29 \textit{g}5+ or 29 \textit{xf}7+ \textit{g}8 30 \textit{xf}8+ \textit{xf}8 31 \textit{xe}6.

Excessive laziness or caution can in fact turn out merely to be new obstructions on the way to the winning of a game.

19... \textit{d}4+

20 \textit{h}1 \textit{g}4!?\text{Fischer was hoping that the weakening of the enemy king provoked by this move would subsequently come in useful for him.} 20...\textit{xd}5 21 \textit{xd}5 was unpromising.

21 \textit{hxg}4 \textit{xc}4

22 \textit{b}3 \textit{b}5

The queen has no secure shelter: if 22...\textit{d}4, then 23 \textit{ad}1 is strong.

23 \textit{a}4 \textit{a}5

24 \textit{ed}1! Threatening 25 b4!.

24... \textit{c}6

25 e5 Nothing is given by 25 \textit{e}7+ \textit{xe}7 26 \textit{xe}7 \textit{fe}8 27 b4 \textit{b}6 28 \textit{c}5 on account of 28...\textit{xe}4.

25... \textit{b}4

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

26 \textit{we}4\text{White could have won a pawn by 26 \textit{e}7 \textit{xe}7 27 \textit{xe}7+ \textit{h}8 28 \textit{xc}6 \textit{bxc}6 29 \textit{wc}6. But with all the heavy pieces on the board it would not have been easy to convert it, in view of the insecure position of his king (this is where the effect of 20...\textit{g}4 is felt).}

Taimanov wisely avoids the temptation. Having a stable positional advantage, it is important not to 'sell too cheaply'.

26... \textit{xd}5

27 \textit{xd}5 \textit{b}6

28 f5! An accurate move order. While attacking on the kingside, White at the same time creates a threat on the queenside: 29 a5 \textit{wc}6 30 \textit{c}1. Weaker was 28 a5 \textit{wc}6 29 f5, after which apart from 29...b5!? 30 \textit{c}1 \textit{b}7 there is also the clever stroke 29...\textit{d}2!, suggested by the eleven-year-old candidate
In the Footsteps of one Game

master Sasha Ryazantsev (30 $\text{b}x\text{d}2$ $\text{ad}8$, and Black regains the piece).

28 . . . $\text{c}3$
29 $\text{c}1$ $\text{b}2$

By threatening the b3-pawn, Fischer tries to divert the opponent from his attack.

30 $\text{b}1$ $\text{c}3$

31 $\text{c}1$?

31 b4! would have won, for example 31...$\text{ae}8$ 32 $\text{c}5$! f6 33 $\text{e}3$ $\text{xe}5$ 34 $\text{xe}5$.

31 . . . $\text{b}2$

32 $\text{c}4$?!

By playing 32 $\text{c}2$!, White would have forced 32...$\text{xb}3$, after which there would follow 33 $\text{xc}7$, retaining an attack. The move in the game allows Black an important tempo to bring up his reserves.

32 . . . $\text{ae}8$!

There begins a tactical skirmish, in which an important role is assigned to the bishop on b2, attacking the e5-pawn. Both 33...c6 and 33...f6 are threatened.

33 f6?

33 $\text{e}3$ $\text{xb}3$ 34 $\text{xc}7$ was objectively stronger, since now Black could have seized the initiative, by playing 33...$\text{e}6$! with the idea of 34 $\text{xg}7$ $\text{fe}8$.

33 . . . c6

34 $\text{fg}7$ $\text{xd}5$
35 $\text{gxf}8$ $\text{xf}8$

Also possible was 35...$\text{xf}8$ 36 $\text{xd}5$ $\text{xb}3$ 37 $\text{f}6$ (37 $\text{h}6$? $\text{g}3$, and 38 $\text{xf}8$? $\text{e}1+$ 39 $\text{h}2$ $\text{xe}5+$ is bad for White) 37...$\text{e}3$! with an unclear position (but, of course, not 37...$\text{g}3$? 38 $\text{d}2$!).

36 $\text{wh}7$

If 36 $\text{xd}5$ there follows 36...$\text{xe}5$ 37 $\text{d}2$ $\text{e}6$.

36 . . . $\text{xe}5$
37 $\text{f}4$!
38 $\text{f}1$

Black has successfully conducted a difficult defence and only a little more was required in order to completely neutralise the opponent's initiative. He should have moved his bishop along the a1–h8 diagonal; only not to g7, in view of 39 $\text{c}1$! (39 $\text{d}2$? $\text{xf}4$) 39...$\text{e}7$ 40 g5 $\text{b}4$ (intending 41...$\text{e}1$) 41 $\text{xb}2$! d4 42 $\text{xf}5$ $\text{xb}3$ 43 g6 f6 44 $\text{xd}4$, but to c3 or d4, when in the event of 39 $\text{c}1$ there is the reply 39...$\text{e}7$!.

Fatigued by such a gruelling game, Fischer makes a mistake, which could have proved decisive.

38 . . . b5?
39 $\text{xb}5$?
Strangely enough, this natural exchange (especially in time-trouble – just before the fortieth move!) prevents White from concluding his attack victoriously.

He could have won by 39 \texttt{Be}1!, creating the irresistible threat of 40 \texttt{h}6+ \texttt{e}7 41 \texttt{g}7.

39 ... \texttt{axb}5

40 \texttt{d}2

Now if 40 \texttt{e}1 there is the suitable reply 40...\texttt{a}8!! – the threat of the exchange 41...\texttt{a}1 neutralises the white rook. For example, 41 \texttt{h}6+ \texttt{e}7 42 \texttt{g}7 \texttt{a}1! 43 \texttt{x}a1 (better is 43 \texttt{h}4+ \texttt{f}6 44 \texttt{x}a1 \texttt{x}a1 45 \texttt{g}5 with equality) 43...\texttt{x}a1 44 \texttt{x}a1 \texttt{e}1+ 45 \texttt{h}2 \texttt{x}a1, and the queen ending is in Black's favour.

40 ... \texttt{e}7!

41 \texttt{b}4+

42 \texttt{xf}7 \texttt{e}8!

42 \texttt{a}5+ \texttt{c}8 43 \texttt{xf}7 \texttt{h}8 44 \texttt{c}7+ \texttt{b}8 45 \texttt{b}7+ etc. would also have led to a draw.

42 ... \texttt{h}8

43 \texttt{f}8+ \texttt{xf}8

44 \texttt{xf}8 \texttt{f}6!

White's extra pawn does not play any significant role. The game should end in a draw.

45 \texttt{c}5

45...\texttt{f}1+ 46 \texttt{g}1 \texttt{d}4 suggests itself, forcing 47 \texttt{h}2 with roughly equal chances. Fischer was probably trying for more, but he overlooked his opponent's simple reply.

46 \texttt{g}1! \texttt{f}4

Black is forced to allow the exchange of queens and go into an unpleasant bishop ending. True, the draw has not yet been thrown away.

47 \texttt{e}7+ \texttt{c}8

48 \texttt{f}8+ \texttt{xf}8

49 \texttt{xf}8 \texttt{g}3!

50 \texttt{f}1 \texttt{d}3!

51 \texttt{b}4 \texttt{d}7

52 \texttt{e}1 \texttt{f}4

53 \texttt{c}3 \texttt{g}3

54 \texttt{g}5 \texttt{e}6?!

An inaccuracy. 54...\texttt{e}7 55 \texttt{g}6 \texttt{f}8 was simpler.

55 \texttt{g}6 \texttt{e}7

The position of the king on e7 gives White a tempo, necessary to free his king from imprisonment.

56 \texttt{e}1 \texttt{f}4

57 \texttt{h}4+ \texttt{f}8

58 \texttt{g}3! \texttt{d}6!

The natural move 58...\texttt{e}3? would have lost in view of 59 \texttt{f}6 followed by \texttt{e}1 and \texttt{f}6–e5–f4.
If we now make the moves 81...f5 82.d5, we obtain the position in which David Janowski resigned to José Raúl Capablanca (at the New York Tournament of 1916).

The black bishop is controlling a square which the pawn must cross. White will try to evict the enemy bishop, by using interception - a highly important method in such situations. Only the black king can prevent the interception.

An analysis of this type of ending was made in the mid-19th century by the Italian player Luigi Centurini. He established the main idea of the defence - the black king should be positioned to the rear of the white king. Here is one of his positions, showing how Black should construct the defence:

(see diagram)

1.c7 is not possible, while after 1.e3 a5 2.b6 d2 3.c7 e3 interception is not feasible, since the c5-square is controlled by the black king.

Yuri Averbakh showed that Janowski was wrong to resign against Capablanca - he could have reached Centurini's position: 1...f4!! 2.d4 (2.e5+ e3 3.b5 d3 4.c6 c4) 2...f3! 3.b5 e2 4.c6 d3 5.b6 g5 6.c7 (after 6.b7 c4 7.a6 Black again takes his king to the rear of White's - 7...b3! 8.f2 d8 9.e1 a4! with a draw) 7.e3 8.d5! (8.d6 c4) 8...d2!! (bad is 8...c3 9.d6 b6 10.c6 or 9.b3 10.c5 a4 11.c6) 9.d8 (9.b6 a5) 9...e3 10.e7 b6! 12.c6 a5 13.d6 c4.

Even in his youth (at the time he was just seventeen) Robert Fischer seriously studied chess as a whole, and not only opening theory. He was familiar with Averbakh's analysis and therefore he gained a draw without difficulty.

81...f4!
82.b5
e4
83.d4
c7
84.c5
d3!
85.c6
c4
86.b6
g3
87.a7
c7

Draw.
In the Footsteps of one Game

Gulko – Dvoretsky
43rd USSR Championship, Yerevan 1975

Ragozin Defence
1 d4 ∆f6 2 c4 e6 3 ∆c3 ∆b4 4 ∆f3 d5 5 e3 0-0 6 ∆d3 ∆c6 7 0-0 a6 8 h3 dxc4 9 ∆xc4 ∆d6 10 e4 e5 11 ∆e3 exd4?! 12 ∆xd4!! ∆xd4 13 ∆xd4 b5 14 e5? (14 ..ib3! c5 15 ∆e3 c4 16 ∆c2! b4 17 e5!) 14...bxc4 15 exd6

What should Black play now?

Having got away with a slight fright in the opening, in my joy I immediately committed a significant inaccuracy. Since in any case the queenside pawns will remain broken, I should at least have retained the more active c4-pawn, which fixes White’s weakness on b2. After 15...∆e6! the two sides’ chances are roughly equal.

Unfortunately, I conducted the subsequent stage of the game superficially and my opponent gradually outplayed me.

15 ... ∆xd6?! 16 ∆xc4 ∆e6 17 ∆e2 ∆fe8 17...∆d5 came into consideration.

18 ∆fd1 ∆c5

White would also have stood better after 18...∆b6 19 ∆c2.

19 ∆d2 ∆h5

20 ∆f4 c5

Black’s position is clearly worse; the white pieces are more active (he has to reckon with ∆e5 and ∆d6) and his queenside pawns are weak. In such cases it is important to find an idea which may divert the opponent from the natural idea of further strengthening his position, and to pose him some problems.

23 ... ∆f5!

I thought that, in an ending with rooks on the board, the bishop might prove stronger than the white knight and that to some extent this would compensate for the weakness of my pawns. In the middlegame, by contrast, knights usually coordinate better with the queen.

In addition Black sets his opponent a positional trap – he tempts him into playing 24 ∆d6?! (with the threat of 25 ∆e5), against which he had prepared 24...∆ad8! 25 ∆xd8 ∆xd8 26 ∆xd8+ ∆h7. In the resulting position I have real counter-chances, associated with ...∆h5 and ...g7–g5–g4. Incidentally, it was in connection with this plan that on the previous move Black lured the king to h2.
Here I had to think for a long time. The position is very hard to defend. For example, if 27...\textit{xe6} the simple 28 \textit{xe3} followed by 29 \textit{d6} is strong. It is unfavourable to play 27...\textit{e6} 28 \textit{d6} \textit{e6} 29 \textit{xe4} or 28...\textit{e4} 29 \textit{xe4} \textit{xe4} 30 \textit{f3} \textit{b7} (30...\textit{b1} 31 \textit{a6}) 31 \textit{a5} \textit{e7} 32 \textit{b3}.

27...\textit{e4}!? looks better. White has a choice:

a) 28 \textit{xe4} \textit{xe4} (28...\textit{xe4}? 29 \textit{d6}), and now none of the following continuations is convincing: 29 \textit{d6} \textit{e6}, or 29 \textit{e2} \textit{e6} with the idea of ...\textit{d5}, or, finally, 29 \textit{d6} \textit{b1}! 30 \textit{xa6} \textit{d3}.

b) 28 \textit{e2}!? \textit{f8} (weaker is 28...\textit{f6} 29 \textit{xe8}+ \textit{xe8} 30 \textit{a4} \textit{e6} 31 \textit{b3}!? \textit{xc4} 32 \textit{bxc4} \textit{d6} 33 \textit{xc5} a5 34 \textit{g3} \textit{xc4} 35 \textit{f4}) 29 \textit{a4} \textit{d7}! 30 \textit{cb6} (the simple 30 \textit{ab6} leaves White with somewhat the better position) 30...\textit{b5} 31 \textit{c2} \textit{d3} 32 \textit{c1} \textit{xf2} 33 \textit{xc5}. The endgame looks dangerous for Black, but 33...\textit{e2} would appear to maintain the balance.

I decided to employ my favourite defensive method – to tempt the opponent into the win of a pawn, in order in return to activate my pieces to the maximum.

\texttt{27 \ldots} \textit{f8}!?

Black had aimed for this position. His rook is now active (the threat is 32...\textit{d2}, winning a pawn), and his bishop is stronger than the knight, restricting its mobility (it was for such a situation that I was hoping, when I exchanged the queens). The chances of a draw are quite real.

I was expecting the natural move 32 \textit{b3}, parrying the threat of 32...\textit{d2}. After 32...\textit{e7} White has to reckon with ...f7–f5–f4 (especially in the event of \textit{g3}). If 33 \textit{c6} there is 33...\textit{d2} (the a2- and b3-pawns are vulnerable), while if 33 \textit{a5} – 33...\textit{d6}.

In such cases another well-known psychological effect often operates in Black's favour. The opponent does not realise that the pawn was sacrificed for definite positional compensation; he thinks that he simply won it. Reckoning that the goal is already close, and that the remainder is a matter of technique, he frequently relaxes and begins playing carelessly, which it is usually possible to exploit.
But I was unlucky – Gulko did not make this psychological mistake. He thought for a long time (leaving himself with just 10 minutes for 8 moves) and found an excellent practical chance.

32 \[ \text{b6} \]

White does not want to place his pawns on light squares and he plans a2–a3, retaining the possibility of also advancing this pawn further. In addition, the move in the game involves a cunning trap, which I, alas, failed to spot.

Of course, 32...\[ \text{xa2??} \] 33 \[ \text{b8+} \] \[ \text{e7} \] 34 \[ \text{f5+} \] is not possible, but why not simultaneously attack two pawns with 32...\[ \text{d2} \]? The opponent will obviously reply 33 a4. After quickly calculating some variations, I decided that this was not dangerous.

32...\[ \text{d2}?! \]

It was safer to act according to plan: 32...\[ \text{e7} \]. White would probably have replied 33 g4! (33 \[ \text{g3} \] f5 34 f4 g5 was weaker), but after 33...\[ \text{h5} \] (33...\[ \text{d2} \] 34 \[ \text{g3} \] \[ \text{xa2} \] 35 \[ \text{f5+} \] \[ \text{d7} \] 36 \[ \text{xg7} \] \[ \text{c7} \] 37 \[ \text{hxh6} \] \[ \text{xb2} \] is also interesting) 34 \[ \text{g3} \] hxg4 35 hgx4 \[ \text{d7} \] or 35...g6 the chances of a draw are quite real.

33 a4 \[ \text{xf2} \]

34 a5

After once again checking the variation planned beforehand: 34...\[ \text{e2} \] 35 a6 \[ \text{xe3} \] 36 a7 \[ \text{d5} \], without hesitation I made the losing move.

34...\[ \text{xe2??} \]

35 a6 \[ \text{xe3} \]

36 \[ \text{b8+} \] \[ \text{e7} \]

37 \[ \text{b7+} \]!

Now White's idea becomes clear – the rook has physically intercepted the a8–h1 diagonal, after which the pawn cannot be halted. Black resigned.

Meanwhile, it was not yet too late to turn aside. It appears that 34...\[ \text{f4!} \] would have saved the game.

Now neither 35 b3 \[ \text{f2} \] nor 35 b4 \[ \text{xb4} \]! is dangerous for Black. White must play 35 \[ \text{b5!} \]. If now 35...\[ \text{e4?!} \], then 36 \[ \text{d1} \] \[ \text{e1} \] 37 \[ \text{c3} \] c4 38 \[ \text{b4!} \] \[ \text{a1} \] 39 \[ \text{a4} \] \[ \text{xa4} \] 40 \[ \text{xa4} \] \[ \text{e7} \] 41 a6 (or 41 \[ \text{b6} \] \[ \text{f5} \] 42 a6) 41...\[ \text{d6} \] 42 a7 \[ \text{d5} \] 43 \[ \text{b6} \] \[ \text{b7} \] 44 a8\[ \text{w} \] (44 \[ \text{xc4??} \]?) 44...\[ \text{xa8} \] 45 \[ \text{xa8} \] \[ \text{c6} \] 46 \[ \text{g3} \] \[ \text{b7} \] 47 \[ \text{f4} \] \[ \text{xa8} \] 48 \[ \text{e5} \] \[ \text{b7} \] 49 \[ \text{d4} \], and the outside passed pawn would appear to ensure him a win in the pawn ending. 40...\[ \text{d7!} \] (instead of 40...\[ \text{e7} \]) is more tenacious, but after 41 \[ \text{b6!} \] (41 \[ \text{c5} \] \[ \text{c6} \]) 41...\[ \text{b5} \] 42 \[ \text{d5f} \] \[ \text{c6} \] 43 \[ \text{e3} \] \[ \text{b5} \] 44 \[ \text{g3} \] \[ \text{e7} \] 45 \[ \text{f4} \] White retains the advantage.

However, Black can improve the defence: 35...\[ \text{e7!!} \] 36 \[ \text{xc5} \] \[ \text{b4} \] 37 \[ \text{d1} \] \[ \text{d6} \] 38 \[ \text{c3} \] \[ \text{a4} \] 39 \[ \text{a3} \] \[ \text{xa3} \] 40 \[ \text{bxa3} \] \[ \text{c5} \] 41 \[ \text{c3} \] f5. He follows up with ...g7–g5, ...\[ \text{c8} \] and ...\[ \text{c4} \] and almost certainly gains a draw. In this variation the main idea of Black's defence is again seen – his hope that his bishop will prove superior to the knight in the endgame, and also the more active position of his king.

It is curious that, six months earlier in a game between the same players, a similar situation arose. And again Gulko rose to the occasion.
Black’s position is strategically hopeless. If 50...\texttt{g}8, then 51 \texttt{e}f4 is strong.

I decided to provoke my opponent into a combination with the win of a pawn, since I saw that the resulting bishop ending might prove difficult to win.

50 \ldots \texttt{f}5!?
51 \texttt{xf}8+!
52 \texttt{xf}6
53 \texttt{xf}6+

\texttt{g}8

Which moves for White suggest themselves in the first instance? Probably 54 b3, fixing the black pawn on a square of the colour of its bishop, or 54 g4, to open a direct route for the king into the centre. It was they that I was counting on!

After 54 b3? the black king becomes too active: 54...\texttt{f}7 55 \texttt{c}3 \texttt{e}6 56 \texttt{g}1 \texttt{d}5 57 \texttt{f}2 \texttt{c}4! (it is probable that 57...\texttt{e}4 58 \texttt{e}2 \texttt{h}5 also does not lose) 58 b4 \texttt{c}6 followed by \ldots \texttt{b}5 and \ldots \texttt{xb}4.

In the event of 54 g4? Black succeeds in advantageously exchanging a pair of pawns on the kingside: 54...\texttt{f}7 55 \texttt{c}3 \texttt{c}4! 56 \texttt{g}2 \texttt{g}6 57 \texttt{f}3 \texttt{h}5. Then the worst that Black is threatened with is the loss of his c-pawn, after which there arises a drawn ending, already familiar to us from the Taimanov–Fischer game. But it is not apparent how White can achieve even this, for example, 58 gxh5+ \texttt{hx}5 59 \texttt{e}4 \texttt{h}6! 60 d4 \texttt{c}1 61 \texttt{xc}4 \texttt{xb}2 62 \texttt{xb}2 \texttt{h}4.

Gulko assessed the position excellently and made the winning move.

54 \texttt{g}1!
55 \texttt{c}3
56 \texttt{f}2

If 56...\texttt{c}4, then 57 \texttt{e}3 \texttt{d}5 58 \texttt{f}4 is decisive.

57 \texttt{e}3!

Again White is careful. If 57 \texttt{f}3? there would have followed 57...\texttt{c}4! 58 g4+ \texttt{g}6 (or 59...\texttt{g}5) and \ldots \texttt{h}7–\texttt{h}5.

57 \ldots \texttt{h}5
57...c4 58 \texttt{d}4 \texttt{f}4 59 \texttt{xc}4.

58 b3

Only now has the time come to fix the black pawn.

58 \ldots \texttt{e}7
59 \texttt{d}3 \texttt{e}5
60 \texttt{e}1! \texttt{d}6
61 \texttt{c}4

62 b4!

Black resigned.
PART V

Artur Yusupov

Games by Pupils of the School

In this chapter we will once again return to the problems which players face when preparing for a game and during the playing of its initial stage, by analysing the typical mistakes revealed in the analysis of games by our pupils. The number in brackets indicates the age of the pupil.

Sitnik (8) – Stepanavichus
Tallinn 1989

How should White continue? He is actively placed, but the development of his pieces is not yet complete. Of course, he should bring his knight into play by 14 c3! Subsequently the knight will go to d5 or e4.

Instead of this, the young player decided to attack the opponent’s king immediately.

14 f5? c5?

Now White achieves his aim. Unprepared wing attacks should be met by energetic action in the centre. A just retribution for violating the principles of development would have been the variation given by Dvoretsky: 14...xe5! 15 e4 c5! 16 xa8 h7. The queen is trapped and the advantage passes to Black.

15 fxe6
16 gxf7+ h8
17 g8+! xg8
18 fxg8 mate

Gaponenko (14) – Repkova
European Girls Championship 1991

French Defence

1 e4 e6
2 d4 d5
3 c3 f6
4 g5 e7
5 e5 fd7
6 h4

The Chatard-Alekhine Attack. White sacrifices a pawn for the sake of gaining time and opening the h-file. Black usually declines the gambit and aims to carry out the standard central counter c7–c5. If 6...c5 is played immediately, Black has to reckon with the knight sortie to b5 after the exchange of the dark-square bishops, and so the simplest is to first play 6...a6.

6 ... h6?!
The same mistake as in the previous game — you should not launch an attack without completing your development. Correct was 9  \textit{\&f3} \textit{\&c6} 10 0-0-0 with the better chances for White.

9 ... \textit{\&c6}  
10 \textit{\&g3} \textit{g6}  
11 \textit{\&f3}?  
11 \textit{\&f3} was better.

11 ... \textit{\&dxe5}?

Black senses that a counterblow in the centre should refute her opponent’s unprepared attack, but the concrete method she chooses is unfortunate. In her annotations Inna Gaponenko gave the correct way: 11...\textit{\&xd4!} 12 \textit{\&xg6} \textit{\&dxe5} 13 \textit{\&h6+ \&e8} 14 \textit{\&g7} \textit{\&xf3+} 15 \textit{\&xf3} \textit{\&f6}, and Black wins.

12 dxe5 \textit{\&xe5}  
13 \textit{\&f4} \textit{\&xf3+}?!  

It is well known that ‘mistakes do not come singly’. 13...\textit{\&d6!} was essential. In the event of 14 \textit{\&a4} the simplest is 14...\textit{\&d7} 15 \textit{\&a3} \textit{\&xf3+} 16 \textit{\&xf3} \textit{\&e7} with advantage to Black.

Far stronger is 14 0-0-0! (development first and foremost!), not fearing 14...\textit{\&d3+?} 15 \textit{\&xd3} \textit{\&xf4} 16 \textit{\&xf4}, when the minor pieces are clearly superior to the enemy queen. 14...\textit{\&xf3} has to be played. White is forced to capture on f3 with the queen, and for the moment the knight cannot be developed on the best square f3. However, the position arising after 15 \textit{\&xf3} \textit{\&xh4} looks anxious for Black (Dvoretsky).

14 \textit{\&xf3}

It is amazing how quickly the situation has changed. Black has exchanged both of her already developed knights, and now the superiority in the placing of the white pieces is very obvious.

14 ... \textit{d4}?  
14...\textit{\&g7} was better. After the move in the game Gaponenko builds up a decisive attack on the king.

15 \textit{\&e5} \textit{\&f6}  
16 \textit{\&e4!} \textit{\&dxe3}  
17 \textit{\&d1} \textit{exf2+}  
18 \textit{\&e2!}

18 \textit{\&xf2} \textit{\&xd1} 19 \textit{\&xf6} \textit{\&d4+} 20 \textit{\&g3} \textit{\&h7}  
21 \textit{\&xg6+} \textit{\&g8} 22 \textit{\&e7+} \textit{\&f8} leads to a draw.

18 ... \textit{\&e7}  
19 \textit{\&xf6} \textit{\&g7}  
20 \textit{\&e4} \textit{f6}  
21 \textit{\&g3!} \textit{g5}

If 21...\textit{\&xe5} 22 \textit{\&xe5+} \textit{\&g8} White was intending 23 \textit{\&d3!} followed by 24 \textit{\&d6+ \&f7} 25 \textit{\&f3}. 
Games by Pupils of the School

22 \( \texttt{\text{g4}} \) \( \text{f8} \)
23 \( \text{hxg5} \) \( \text{f5} \)
24 \( \text{gxh6+} \) \( \text{h7} \)
25 \( \text{\texttt{f6+}} \) \( \text{xf6} \)
26 \( \text{\texttt{xf6+}} \) \( \text{xf6} \)
27 \( \text{\texttt{d8!}} \) \( \text{xf6} \)
28 \( \text{\texttt{c7+!}} \) \( \text{xb2} \)
If 27...f4 (hoping for 28 \( \text{g8}+ \text{h6} \) 29 \( \text{xc8?? e5+} \)), the simplest is 28 \( \text{d3+} \) \( \text{f5} (28...\text{h6} 29 \text{h3+}) \) 29 \( \text{xf5+} \text{xf5} \) 30 \( \text{xf2} \text{b6} \) 31 \( \text{e2} (31 \text{a6} \) 31...\text{h6} \) (31...\text{b7} 32 \text{d7+}) 32 \( \text{f3} \text{b8} \) 33 \( \text{c6} \) (Gaponenko).
28 \( \text{c7+!} \) \( \text{h6} \)
29 \( \text{h2+} \) \( \text{g5} \)
30 \( \text{g8+} \)
Black resigned.

Mugerman – Makariev (14)
Moscow 1989
Trompowsky Attack

1 \( \text{d4} \)
2 \( \text{g5} \)
3 \( \text{d2} \)
4 \( \text{e4?!} \)

The main objectives at the start of a game are the rapid development of the pieces and the struggle for the centre. Therefore you should refrain from making repeated moves with one and the same piece (unless, of course, such a manoeuvre brings some substantial gain or is forced). The danger of violating this rule is illustrated by the following short variation: 4 \( \text{dxc5?! xc5} \) 5 \( \text{e4?? xe4} \) 6 \( \text{xd8 xf2 mate} \).

It was better to reinforce the centre by 4 e3.

4...\( \text{d5} \)
4...\text{cxd4}?! 5 \( \text{xd4} \text{e7} \) 6 \( \text{d6+} \) favours White, since he is able to hinder the opponent’s development.

5 \( \text{xc5} \) \( \text{xc5} \)
As a result of his dubious operation White has spent two tempi on the exchange of the f8-bishop, and in addition he has exchanged his more central d-pawn. As a consequence the initiative passes to his opponent.

6 \( \text{dxc5} \) \( \text{a5+} \)
6...\( \text{a67?! is weaker on account of 7 \text{d4}, while if 6...\text{bd7 there is 7 b4.} \)

7 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{xc5} \)
Threatening 8...\( \text{e4} \).

8 \( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \)
9 \( \text{g3} \)

A normal developing move. Its only drawback is that after the natural reply 10 \( \text{g2} \) the thematic advance ...e6-e5 is hindered. Black should have fought more actively for the centre. Concrete analysis shows that the immediate 9...e5! 10 \( \text{g2} \text{e6} \) was possible:

a) 11 \( \text{c4? xc4} \) 12 \( \text{c1 xa2} \) 13 \( \text{xd5} \text{xd5} \) 14 \( \text{c8+ d7} \) 15 \( \text{h8 b1+} \), and White remains a piece down;

b) 11 0-0-0?! \( \text{c6} \) 12 \( \text{xd5? 0-0-0} \) 13 \( \text{xe6+ (e4 b4)} \) 13...\text{xe6} 14 \( \text{e1 xd1+ 15 xd1 d8 (15...\text{xf2 is also good)} 16 \text{e1 d5 (16...\text{b4? 17 c3 xa2+ 18 b1 b5! with the threat of 19...d1+ 20 xd1 xc3+, while the knight is invulnerable in view of the fork 19...\text{d5}) 17 f3 xa2 18 d2 (18 c3 a5! 18...a5!?) with a dangerous initiative on the queenside} \)

\[ \text{Diagram} \]
(the threat is ...a5–a4–a3);
c) 11 a3 2c6 12 a3xd5 a3xd5! (12...0-0-0 13 c4 2b4 14 e4 a3xa2 is unconvincing) 13 a3xd5 a3b4+ 14 c3 (White is also worse after 14 a3d2 a3xb2) 14...a3xb2 15 a3d7+ a3f8 16 a3d2?! (16 a3f5! a3xc3+ 17 a3f1 maintains the balance) 16...a3xd2+ 17 a3xd2 a3e7. Even in the endgame Black's better development gives him the advantage.

10 a3g2 a3d7
11 a3f3
11 e3?! followed by a3e2 came into consideration.

11 . . .

Ilya Makariev repeats his opponent's mistake: he wastes time in the opening. He should have continued his development: 11...e5! 12 a3d1 a3e6 13 0-0 0-0-0 would have given him control of the centre and led to a promising position.

12 0-0 a3xf3+
The outcome is that Black has wasted two tempi on the unnecessary exchange of knights. However, if 12...a3c4 there is the unpleasant reply 13 a3h6!?, suggested by Dvoretsky.

13 a3xf3!?
If 13 a3xf3 Makariev was planning 13...a3e7!? – the obvious 13...0-0-0 did not appeal to him because of 14 c3 followed by b2–b4, a2–a4 and so on.

13 . . .

It is dangerous to reply 15...e5? 16 a3xe1 a3he8 (16...a3d6? 17 fxe5 fxe5 18 a3e3; 16...d4? 17 a3xc6 bxc6 18 fxe5 fxe5 19 a3e2 or 19 cxd4 with advantage to White) 17 fxe5 fxe5 18 a3g5 f6 (if 18...a3d6 or 18...a3e7 there follows 19 a3f5+) 19 a3xf6 a3f8 in view of 20 a3xe5 a3xf2+ 21 a3h1, and the constant threat of a bishop check on h3 severely restricts Black's possibilities.

If instead 15...d4?!, then after 16 a3xc6 bxc6 17 cxd4 White has the advantage. More tenacious is 16...dxc3 17 a3xb7+ a3xb7 with good drawing chances.

Black should probably prefer the prophylactic 15...a3b8!?, preparing both ...d5–d4 and ...e6–e5.

15 a3fe1!?
Returning the favour. White fights against ...e6–e5, but allows a more dangerous advance. 15 c3!, hindering the thematic ...d5–d4, was correct.

15 . . .

It is dangerous to reply 15...e5? 16 a3fe1 a3he8 (16...a3d6? 17 fxe5 fxe5 18 a3e3; 16...d4? 17 a3xc6 bxc6 18 fxe5 fxe5 19 a3e2 or 19 cxd4 with advantage to White) 17 fxe5 fxe5 18 a3g5 f6 (if 18...a3d6 or 18...a3e7 there follows 19 a3f5+) 19 a3xf6 a3f8 in view of 20 a3xe5 a3xf2+ 21 a3h1, and the constant threat of a bishop check on h3 severely restricts Black's possibilities.

If instead 15...d4?!, then after 16 a3xc6 bxc6 17 cxd4 White has the advantage. More tenacious is 16...dxc3 17 a3xb7+ a3xb7 with good drawing chances.

Black should probably prefer the prophylactic 15...a3b8!?, preparing both ...d5–d4 and ...e6–e5.

Gasymov – Zviagintsev (13)

Leningrad 1990

Queen's Pawn Opening

1 d4
2 a3f3
3 g3

Gasymov – Zviagintsev (13)

Leningrad 1990

Queen's Pawn Opening

1 d4
2 a3f3
3 g3
4 c4  
5 \( wb3 \)

The queen is a very important piece and its placing has a great influence on the character of the subsequent play. \textit{The queen's position should not be determined too early.} Very often, as happened in the present game, by attacking the queen the opponent gains time for the development of his forces.

In chess there are no rules which apply in every case. The correctness of ‘absolute’ truths must each time be checked with the concrete features of the position. Thus the early queen move to b3 is a fairly standard reaction to the development of Black’s light-square bishop in the Queen’s Gambit. Even so, it is better for young players first to master general rules and only then seek exceptions to them.

5 . . .  \( dc6! \)
6 \( ad2?! \)

6 c5 is preferable. Now Black gains an opportunity to exploit the advanced position of the queen.

6 . . .  \( dxc4! \)
7 \( wxc4 \)

If 7 \( wb7 \), then 7 . . . \( e4! \) 8 \( wb5 \) \( bb8. \)

By attacking the queen Vadim Zviagintsev hopes to disrupt the coordination of the opponent’s forces. However, this is achieved at the cost of a loss of time: Black manoeuvres in the opening with his already developed pieces, committing the same fundamental mistake as in the previous example. His lead in development (White has lost time on queen moves, and his bishop on d2 is not too well placed) should have been transformed into a more stable advantage – superior pawn structure. The correct course was suggested by Peter Svidler: 7 . . . \( e4! \) (here this repeat move with the bishop is justified by the fact that White in turn is forced to spend time on the defence of the d4-pawn) 8 \( ac3 \) \( xf3 \). There can follow 9 \( exf3 \) \( wd5 \) 10 \( wxd5 \) \( xd5 \) 11 \( ab5 \) \( ad7 \) 12 \( dd2 \) \( a6 \) 13 \( xc6+ \) \( xc6 \) 14 \( cc4 \) \( dd6 \) with the better endgame for Black.

8 \( gb2 \)  \( bb6 \)
9 \( wc3?! \)

Here the queen deprives its minor pieces of the convenient c3-square. 9 \( wb3 \) was better, not fearing 9 . . . \( e4 \) 10 0-0! \( xf3?! \) 11 \( xf3 \) \( xd4 \) 12 \( cc3 \) with excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

9 . . .  \( e4?! \)

I would have preferred to complete my development with 9 . . . \( b4 \) 10 \( b3 \) a5 or 9 . . . \( e7 \) 10 0-0-0-0 followed by . . . \( f6. \)

10 0-0!  \( e7 \)
10 . . . \( xf3?! \) 11 \( xf3 \) \( xd4 \) 12 \( cc3. \)
11 \( w e3! \)  \( f5 \)
11 . . . \( g6?! \).

12 \( cc3 \) 0-0
13 \( wc1 \)

White prepares 14 \( bd2. \)

13 . . .  \( cc4 \)

By endlessly regrouping with his already developed pieces, Black gradually loses the initiative. 13 . . . a5 or 13 . . . \( f6 \) came into consideration.

14 \( b3 \)  \( dd6 \)
15 \( \text{b2} \) \( \text{f6} \)  
16 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{e7}?! \)  
16...\( \text{e8} \) 17 \( \text{bd2} \) (17 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{xf3} \) and 18...\( \text{xd4} \) 17...\( \text{h5} \) was more interesting. The move in the game allows the knight to come out to the more active c3-square.  
17 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{c6}?! \)  
In his commentary Zviagintsev recommends 17...\( \text{d5}?! \), and if 18 \( \text{xe4} \) (18 \( \text{a4}?! \) 18...\( \text{xe4} \) 19 \( \text{e5} \), then 19...\( \text{g5} \) with chances for both sides.  
18 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{c8} \)  
19 \( \text{h3}?! \) \( \text{e4} \)  
Black is also worse after 19...\( \text{d5} \) 20 \( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 21 \( \text{ac1} \).  
20 \( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xe4} \)  
21 \( \text{g5} \)  
The advantage has passed to White – just retribution for Black’s slow and aimless manoeuvring.

**Nikonovich – Baklan (12)**  
Alushta 1990  
*Queen’s Pawn Opening*  
1 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{f6} \)  
2 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c5} \)  
3 \( \text{dxc5}?! \)  
The exchange of the more central d-pawn for the c-pawn is normally unfavourable. White made a similar mistake in the Mugerman–Makariyev game, examined earlier. 3 \( \text{d5} \) or 3 \( \text{e3} \) is better  
3... \( \text{e6} \)  
4 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{xc5} \)  
5 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{c6} \)  
6 0-0  
6 c4?! \( \text{a5}+! \).  
6... \( \text{0-0} \)  
7 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{b6} \)  
8 \( \text{e5} \)?  

A serious mistake, which we have already encountered in the earlier games. By wasting time in the opening, White quickly ends up in a difficult position.  
8... \( \text{xe5}!! \)  
Far weaker is the restrained 8...\( \text{b7} \)? 9 \( \text{f4} \) with equality. After sacrificing the exchange, Volodya Baklan begins an attack on the opponent’s king. White’s light-square bishop is cut off from the kingside and from its main forces.  
9 \( \text{xa8} \) \( \text{d5}! \)  
Of course, not 9...\( \text{a6} \) 10 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{xc4} \) 11 \( \text{c3} \). Black aims not to regain the material, but for rapid development and an attack.  
10 \( \text{cxd5} \)  
Often the best, and sometimes the only defence against a gambit is the timely returning of the extra material, with the aim of consolidating one’s forces or simplifying the position. Thus here White could have tried to buy off his opponent with two pawns by 10 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{xc4} \) 11 \( \text{c6} \) \( \text{xb2} \) 12 \( \text{b3} \), although even in this case Black has the advantage. Besides, instead of 11...\( \text{xb2} \) there is 11...\( \text{e5}! \) 12 \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{h3} \).  
10... \( \text{a6}! \)?  
The simple 10...\( \text{exd5}?! \) is also not bad, including the bishop in the attack along the c8–h3 diagonal. For example: 11 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{g6} \) (11...\( \text{h3} \)? is not in the spirit of the position:}
12 \(\text{\textit{f}}e5 \text{\textit{x}}f1 13 \text{\textit{w}}xf1 \text{\textit{w}}xa8 14 \text{\textit{f}}xf6 \text{\textit{g}}xf6 15 \text{\textit{d}}d2\), and the chances are only with White; however, Black's play can be improved with 13...\text{\textit{g}}g4! 12 \text{\textit{g}}g5 \text{\textit{h}}3 13 \text{\textit{c}}c6 \text{\textit{xf}}f1 14 \text{\textit{w}}xf1 \text{\textit{d}}d6 15 \text{\textit{b}}b5 (15 \text{\textit{xf}}6 \text{\textit{xf}}6 16 \text{\textit{x}}xd5 \text{\textit{xb}}2) 15...\text{\textit{e}}e4 and wins. Or 12 \text{\textit{c}}c6 \text{\textit{xf}}4 13 \text{\textit{x}}f4 \text{\textit{w}}d6, and White's position is unenviable.

The only way of establishing some kind of defence was by 11 \text{\textit{c}}c3! \text{\textit{h}}h3 12 \text{\textit{x}}xd5 \text{\textit{xf}}1 13 \text{\textit{g}}g1.

11 \text{\textit{c}}c6
11 \text{\textit{f}}4 \text{\textit{g}}g6!? 12 \text{\textit{c}}c6 \text{\textit{xf}}4 13 \text{\textit{g}}xf4 \text{\textit{d}}d6 with an attack.

11...exd5
12 \text{\textit{a}}a4 b5!?

A thematic move, but objectively not the strongest. Black should probably have preferred 12...\text{\textit{c}}c8! 13 \text{\textit{g}}g2 (if 13 \text{\textit{xf}}4, then 13...\text{\textit{h}}h3! is decisive) 13...\text{\textit{f}}f5.

13 \text{\textit{c}}c2?

The queen penetrates to h3, from where it creates irresistible threats.

14 \text{\textit{g}}g2
14 \text{\textit{d}}d2 \text{\textit{h}}h3 15 \text{\textit{f}}f3 \text{\textit{fg}}4 with unavoidable mate.

14...\text{\textit{c}}c8!

The point of Black's idea.

15 \text{\textit{h}}h1 \text{\textit{w}}h3+
16 \text{\textit{g}}g1 \text{\textit{fg}}4
17 e3 d4!

White resigned. He was severely punished for neglecting the development of his pieces.

Zviagintsev (15) – Feigin
CIS Junior Championship, Jurmala 1992

\textit{Benoni Defence}

1 d4 e6
2 c4 c5
3 d5 exd5
4 cxd5 d6
5 \text{\textit{c}}c3 \text{\textit{g}}g7
6 e4 \text{\textit{g}}g7
7 \text{\textit{d}}ge2 \text{\textit{e}}e7

A rare continuation, the point of which is to make an early attack on the centre by ...\text{\textit{f}}7–\text{\textit{f}}5. The inclusion of the moves 7...a6?! 8 a4 weakens this idea: 8...\text{\textit{e}}e7 9 \text{\textit{g}}g3! 0-0 10 \text{\textit{e}}e2 \text{\textit{f}}5 11 \text{\textit{ex}}f5 \text{\textit{xf}}5 12 \text{\textit{xf}}5 \text{\textit{xf}}5 13 0-0, and Black has problems with the development of his knight – 13...\text{\textit{d}}d7? is not possible in view of 14 \text{\textit{g}}4! \text{\textit{xc}}3 15 \text{\textit{b}}xc3 \text{\textit{e}}e4 16 \text{\textit{f}}3 (analysis by Zviagintsev).

But now after 8 \text{\textit{g}}g3 0-0 9 \text{\textit{e}}e2 \text{\textit{f}}5 10 \text{\textit{ex}}f5 \text{\textit{xf}}5 11 \text{\textit{xf}}5 \text{\textit{xf}}5 12 0-0 Black can play 12...\text{\textit{a}}a6!.

8 \text{\textit{g}}g5!?

White provokes a weakening of the kingside pawns.

8...h6
9 \text{\textit{e}}e3 f5!?

If 9...0-0?! there would have followed 10 \text{\textit{w}}d2 with gain of tempo. Black plans to exchange on e4 and then harass the bishop on e3 with ...\text{\textit{f}}f5.
10 g4!!
An excellent decision! In the King’s Indian Defence White sometimes advances his g-pawn in order to gain control of the f5-square and restrict the mobility of a knight on e7, but usually this does not involve giving up a pawn. In the event of the acceptance of the pawn sacrifice, White gains compensation in the form of his strong and mobile pawn centre.

10 ... fxg4
Weaker is 10...fxe4?! 11 d3 with advantage.

11 h3
By inviting the exchange of the g-pawn, Zviagintsev wants also to exchange the light-square bishops. Then he will endeavour to invade on the weakened e6-square with a knight.

11 ... d7!?
Black would play into his opponent’s hands by 11...gxh3 12 hxh3 or 11...a6 12 hxg4 hxg4 13 h3, with excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

12 f4
12 hxg4? e5 13 f4 came into consideration.

12 ... h6?
The start of a faulty manoeuvre. If 12...e5 Black was probably concerned about 13 b5+, but after 13...f7!? things are not so clear. 13...f8 is weaker on account of 14 hxg4 xg4 15 e6+! or 14...xg4 15 e2 with a dangerous initiative for White.

12...a5! was also possible: 13 b3! (13 c2 xc3+! 14 bxc3 e5) 13...xc3+! (13...e5 14 b5+ with an attack for White) 14 bxc3 e5 15 b5+ d8! with double-edged play (Zviagintsev). If 13 e6!, then 13...xc3+ 14 bxc3 e5.

13 e6
If 13...e5? Zviagintsev was planning 14 b5 f7 15 a4!. Black should have played 13...xc3+ 14 bxc3 e5.

The move in the game is a poor one. Black violates one of the simplest rules: *don’t go ‘pawn-grabbing’ in the opening.* Now White wins by force, by exploiting the poor position of the enemy queen.

14 xg7+ f7
15 d2!
xg7
16 b1 a3
17 b3 a5
18 b5 d8
19 c3+ e5
White has included his pieces in the attack with gain of tempo and prepared a concluding combinative stroke in the centre.

20 xg6!
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Black resigned.

Kramnik – Zviagintsev (14)
Leningrad 1990
Philidor Defence

1 e4 d6
2 d4 f6
3 ∆c3 e5
4 ∆f3

White can also consider transposing into a superior endgame by 4 dxe5 dxe5 5 wxd8+ ∆xd8 6 ∆f3 ∆d6 7 ∆c4. The move in the game leads to a variation of the Philidor Defence.

4 ... bd7
5 ∆c4 e7
6 0-0 0-0
7 ∆e1

7 wxe2.

7 ... c6
8 a4 wc7

The standard reaction 8...a5!? , recommended by modern theory, restricts the opponent’s possibilities on the queenside. After this White has tried 9 h3 exd4 10 cxd4 (10 wxd4 ∆c5 11 ∆g5 ∆e6 12 ∆xe6 ∆xe6 13 wad1 wе8 14 ∆xf6 wxf6 15 wxd6 wб6! with an unclear game, Timoshchenko-Planinc, Polanica Zdroj 1979) 10...∆c5 11 ∆f4 wб6 12 ∆b3 ∆e6 13 ∆xe6 wxe6 14 ∆e3 wc7 15 ∆d4 wxd4 16 wxd4 wad8, and the chances are equal (lvkov–Planinc, Amsterdam 1974).

9 h3

Preparing the development of the bishop at e3. An alternative is 9 a5!?.

9 ... h6

Zviagintsev did not play 9...b6?! , because he was afraid of 10 d5. For example, 10...б7 11 dxc6 ∆xc6 12 wб5! (in the event of the immediate 12 wg5 Black has the equalising 12...∆xe4!) 12...б7 13 wg5 with advantage to White.

In the game Kuchukhidze–Zviagintsev, played earlier in the same tournament, in reply to 9...h6 White chose 10 a5!?. After 10...wб8 nothing is given by 11 d5 b5 12 axb6 wxb6, but serious consideration should have been given to the prophylactic 11 ∆a2!, and if 11...b5 12 axb6 axb6 13 d5. Instead of this there followed 11 wе3, and Black successfully solved the problem of his queenside by 11...b5! 12 axb6 axb6 13 d5 b5 14 wа7?! wб7 15 wxb7 wxb7 16 wб3 b4!? 17 wа2 cxd5 18 exd5 wа5.

Naturally, Volodya Kramnik had prepared for the game and he tried to improve White’s play.

10 wе3!??
Games by Pupils of the School

10...\(\Box e4\) 11 \(\Box xe4\) d5 did not work account of 12 \(\Box xd5\) cxd5 13 \(\Box c3\). Black should have **fought against his opponent’s plans**, by choosing either 10...a5!? or 10...b6!? (with the idea of ...a7–a6, ...\(\Box b7\) and ...b6–b5). If after 10...b6 White replies 11 \(\Box h4\), then 11...\(\Box xe4\)? does not work because of 12 \(\Box g6\)! or 12 \(\Box xe4\) \(\Box xh4\) 13 \(\Box g4\), but 11...exd4 and 12...\(\Box e5\) is possible. And if 11 d5, then 11...\(\Box b7\) 12 dxc6 \(\Box xc6\) 13 \(\Box d2\) a6!? 14 \(\Box e2\) \(\Box b7\) with chances for both sides.

11 a5!

White is planning 12 d5.

11...

\(\Box f8?!\)

11...\(\Box f8\) 12 d5 \(\Box g6\) is more natural.

12 d5!

\(\Box c5\)

12...cxd5 13 \(\Box xd5\) \(\Box c5\) is also unattractive.

13 \(\Box d2\)

If desired, it is also possible to spoil the opponent’s pawn structure by 13 \(\Box xc5\) dxc5 14 dxc6 bxc6.

13...

\(\Box d7\)

14 b4!

cxd5

The only defence.

15 \(\Box xd5\)

16 \(\Box xd5\)

16...\(\Box a4\)? 17 \(\Box f3\)! and 16...\(\Box a6\)? 17 \(\Box b1\)! were both bad for Black.

17 c4

\(\Box f4?!\)

18 \(\Box xf4\)

exf4

19 a6

White’s initiative on the queenside and in the centre has led to the creation of pawn weaknesses in the opponent’s position. However, if the game is opened up, Black will acquire certain counter-chances. In the event of 19 h4 (with the threat of 20 \(\Box f3\)) there is the reply 19...\(\Box e7\), activating the ‘bad’ bishop, but 19 \(\Box f3\)!? or 19 \(\Box f3\)!? came into consideration.

19...

\(\Box c6\)

20 axb7

\(\Box xb7\)

21 \(\Box xb7\)

If 21 \(\Box a4\) there again follows 21...\(\Box e7\)!

21...

\(\Box xb7\)

22 \(\Box b1\)

22...

\(g5?\)

Siegbert Tarrasch rightly commented that if one piece stands badly, the game also stands badly. The principles of development apply not only in the opening. Black should have activated his bishop, but without weakening his castled position in the process. The logical move was 22...\(\Box e7\). Zviagintsev’s suggestion 22...a5!? 23 bxa5 \(\Box c7\) 24 \(\Box g4\) \(\Box xa5\) 25 \(\Box xf4\) \(\Box a2\) was also interesting.

23 h4!

In this way White gains an obvious advantage.

23...

\(\Box e6\)

24 \(\Box h5\)

Weaker was 24 hxg5 hxg5 25 \(\Box f3\) \(\Box xe4\) 26 \(\Box xg5\) \(\Box xe1+\) 27 \(\Box xe1\) \(\Box e7\) with counter-chances (Zviagintsev).

24...

\(\Box g6\)

25 hxg5

\(hxg5\)

26 e5!

In the event of 26 \(\Box f3\) Black would have
gained counterplay by 26...\textit{e}e8! 27 \textit{d}xg5 \textit{h}h6.

\begin{itemize}
  \item 26 ... \textit{e}e8
  \item 27 exd6 \textit{x}xe1+
  \item 28 \textit{xe}1 \textit{xb}4?
\end{itemize}

This loses immediately. Black should have eliminated the more dangerous d-pawn: 28...\textit{xd}6. However, even in this case White would have retained a great advantage by continuing 29 b5! (weaker is 29 \textit{f}3 \textit{xb}4 30 \textit{w}xg5+ \textit{g}6 31 \textit{w}f4 a5). For example: 29...\textit{xd}2?! 30 \textit{g}xg5+ \textit{h}7 31 \textit{x}e8 \textit{b}6! 32 \textit{xf}8 \textit{w}f2+ 33 \textit{h}2 \textit{g}3+ (otherwise things end in mate) 34 \textit{w}g3 \textit{fxg}3+ 35 \textit{x}g3 \textit{g}7 36 \textit{c}8 with a won rook endgame (variation suggested by Mark Dvoretsky).

8 ... \textit{d}xb4

9 0-0

For a long time the move 9 a3 suffered a crisis because of the game Ivanchuk-Korchnoi (Tilburg 1989), in which after 9...b5 10 \textit{w}xb5 \textit{c}2+ 11 \textit{d}2 \textit{xa}1 12 \textit{w}x\textit{c}6+ \textit{d}7 13 \textit{w}xc4 Victor Korchnoi employed the novelty 13...\textit{c}5! and gained a spectacular win: 14 \textit{w}a2 \textit{w}a5+ 15 b4 \textit{c}xb4 16 \textit{w}xa1 \textit{c}8 17 \textit{e}5 \textit{b}5 18 \textit{e}3? \textit{c}2 (Black has an obvious advantage) 19 \textit{f}3 0-0 20 a4 \textit{f}6 21 \textit{d}3 \textit{c}4 22 \textit{d}2? \textit{w}g5+ (22...\textit{xd}3!) 23 \textit{f}4 e5 24 \textit{d}xc4 \textit{exf}4+ 25 \textit{g}f4 \textit{w}f5 26 \textit{d}6 \textit{w}e6+ White resigned.

The attempt by White to improve with 18 \textit{d}3 in the game Polovodin–S.Ivanov (St. Petersburg 1992) led to the same inauspicious result: 18...\textit{xd}3 19 \textit{b}x\textit{d}3 0-0 20 \textit{w}b2 \textit{bxa}3 21 \textit{w}xa3?! (21 \textit{d}xa3 was better, and if 21...\textit{b}b5 22 \textit{c}4!) 21...\textit{b}5+ 22 \textit{d}2 \textit{w}f5 23 \textit{e}3?! \textit{w}f5! 24 \textit{e}2 \textit{b}2+ 25 \textit{d}2 \textit{xd}2+ 26 \textit{xd}2 \textit{w}f2+ 27 \textit{d}3 \textit{w}g3 28 \textit{b}1 \textit{e}5 29 \textit{b}2 \textit{xd}4+ White resigned.

Subsequently it transpired that White does better to defend with 18 d5 or 18 a4. In addition, instead of 15 b4 it makes sense to play 15 \textit{c}3?! \textit{c}xd4 16 \textit{xd}4, as in the game Bareev–Adams, Dortmund 2000, which ended in a draw.

9 ... \textit{b}8

10 \textit{c}3

11 \textit{d}7?!
For the moment Black is a pawn up, but he is behind in development and his pieces are uncoordinated. 10...a6 11 cxe5 0-0 (11...\texttt{Wxd4} 12 \texttt{Qxc6} favours White) 12 \texttt{Qxc6} \texttt{Qxc6} 13 \texttt{Qxc6} bxc6 14 \texttt{Wxc4} \texttt{Qxb2} has occurred several times, but after 15 \texttt{Qab1} \texttt{Qb6} 16 \texttt{Wc5} White retains some initiative. In the game Krasenkow–Mednis (Palma de Mallorca 1987) there followed 16...f6 17 a4 \texttt{Qe8} 18 a5 \texttt{Qxb1} 19 \texttt{Qxb1} \texttt{Qd6} 20 \texttt{Wxd6} cxd6 21 \texttt{Qb6}, and now Black should have continued 21...\texttt{e7}! 22 \texttt{Qxc6} \texttt{Qe7} with equalising chances. Later Uwe Bönsch managed to neutralise Oleg Romanishin’s initiative (Berlin 1990) by 16...h6 17 a4 a5 18 \texttt{Qfd1} \texttt{Qa6} 19 e3 \texttt{Qg5} 20 \texttt{Qxb6} \texttt{Qxc5} 21 dxc5 cxb6 22 cxb6 \texttt{Qb8} 23 \texttt{Qb1} \texttt{Qd3} 24 \texttt{Qb2} \texttt{Qf8}}. Instead of 17 a4 Alexander Khalifman tried 17 \texttt{Qfd1} against Sergey Ivanov (St. Petersburg 1996), and also failed to gain an advantage: 17...\texttt{Qa6} 18 \texttt{Qxb1} \texttt{Qd6}! 19 \texttt{Qe4} \texttt{Wd5} 20 \texttt{Wxd5} cxd5 21 \texttt{Qc5} \texttt{Qe8} 22 \texttt{Qb8} \texttt{Qf8}.

The move in the game is an interesting novelty. Alexey Alexandrov is prepared to return the pawn for the sake of very promising counterplay.

\begin{itemize}
  \item 11 a3
  \item b5!
  \item 12 \texttt{Qxb5}
  \item \texttt{Qd5}!
\end{itemize}

As shown by Romanishin, 12...a6 13 \texttt{Qc3} \texttt{Qxd4} was weaker because of 14 \texttt{Wa5}! \texttt{Qb3} 15 \texttt{Wc5} f6 16 \texttt{We4} (16 \texttt{Wh5}+!? g6 17 \texttt{Wh6}) 16...\texttt{Qxa1} 17 axb4 \texttt{Qb3} 18 \texttt{Wxc4}, and White has a won position.

\begin{itemize}
  \item 13 \texttt{Qc3}!
\end{itemize}

After 13 e4!? \texttt{Qce7} 14 exd5 \texttt{Qxb5} 15 \texttt{Wxa7} \texttt{exd5} White’s position is preferable. Black’s play can be improved by 14...\texttt{Wxd5}! (instead of 14...\texttt{Qxb5}) 15 \texttt{Wxa7} \texttt{Qxb5} 16 \texttt{Qe5} 0-0 with approximate equality. Incidentally, instead of the knight retreat Alexandrov had prepared 13...a6!? , when the following variations are possible:

\begin{itemize}
  \item 14 \texttt{Wxa6}? \texttt{Qb6}! with the threat of 15...\texttt{Qc8} (Dvoretsky), and the queen is trapped. The direct 14...\texttt{Qa8} (hoping for 15 \texttt{Wxb7} \texttt{Qa5}) is less good on account of 15 \texttt{Wxa8}! \texttt{Qxa8} 16 \texttt{exd5} \texttt{Wb7} 17 \texttt{Qc3};
  \item 14 \texttt{Qc3} \texttt{Qxc3} 15 bxc3 \texttt{Qxd4} 16 \texttt{Wxa6} (bad is 16 \texttt{Wxc4} \texttt{Qxf3}+ 17 \texttt{Qxf3} \texttt{Qb5}) 16...\texttt{Qb5} 17 \texttt{Wc7} \texttt{Qe2}+ 18 \texttt{Qh1} \texttt{Qxc3} with chances for both sides (Dvoretsky).
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item 13...\texttt{Qxb2}
\end{itemize}

13...\texttt{Qxc3} 14 bxc3 \texttt{Qxd4} 15 \texttt{Wxc4} \texttt{Qxf3}+ 16 \texttt{Qxf3} \texttt{Qb5} 17 \texttt{Wc5} leads to an advantage for White.

\begin{itemize}
  \item 14 \texttt{Wxc4}
  \item \texttt{Qa5}
  \item 15 \texttt{Wd3}
  \item \texttt{Qb3}
  \item 16 \texttt{Qfc1}
\end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
  \item 16...\texttt{c5}!
\end{itemize}

Usually one should not delay castling, but situations sometimes occur when other factors prove more important than simple development. In Black’s position there is a serious defect – the backward c-pawn, which may prove weak. For the moment the activity of the pieces compensates for this drawback, but if White should succeed in disentangling himself, he will gain an obvious advantage. Therefore Alexandrov hurries to create counterplay in the centre and on the queenside.
Let us see what would have happened after the routine 16...0-0. In reply 17 \( \mathbb{h}d2 \)?! is a mistake in view of 17...\( \mathbb{h}b5 \) 18 \( \mathbb{w}f3 \) \( \mathbb{a}xh3 \) 19 \( \mathbb{a}xh3 \) \( \mathbb{h}xe2 \) 20 \( \mathbb{w}xe2 \) \( \mathbb{g}xc3 \) 21 \( \mathbb{a}a6 \) c5 or 21...\( \mathbb{w}xd4 \).

17 \( \mathbb{h}d2 \) is far more dangerous. After quiet continuations Black's position is clearly worse: 17...c6 18 e4 \( \mathbb{f}6 \) 19 \( \mathbb{d}d1 \) \( \mathbb{a}b8 \) 20 \( \mathbb{a}b1 \) or 17...f6 18 \( \mathbb{d}xc7 \) \( \mathbb{w}xd7 \) 19 \( \mathbb{g}xd5 \) exd5 20 \( \mathbb{a}a6 \) (Romanishin).

Black is also not saved by 17...\( \mathbb{h}b5 \) 18 \( \mathbb{w}d2 \) \( \mathbb{g}xc3 \) 19 \( \mathbb{g}xc3 \) f6 - now both 20 \( \mathbb{a}c6 \) \( \mathbb{g}xc6 \) (20...\( \mathbb{h}xe6 \)!? 21 \( \mathbb{a}xb3 \) \( \mathbb{g}xd4 \) 22 \( \mathbb{b}1 \) \( \mathbb{h}xe2 \) 23 \( \mathbb{g}b4 \) \( \mathbb{f}3 \)+ 24 \( \mathbb{a}xf3 \) \( \mathbb{w}xd2 \) 25 \( \mathbb{a}xh3 \) \( \mathbb{a}f3 \) 26 \( \mathbb{e}d7 \) 27 \( \mathbb{a}xc6 \) \( \mathbb{a}xh3 \) 22 \( \mathbb{w}xc3 \) \( \mathbb{g}xc6 \) 23 \( \mathbb{w}xe4 \) \( \mathbb{w}xd2 \) 24 \( \mathbb{g}xf3 \) \( \mathbb{h}8 \) 25 \( \mathbb{a}c1 \) c5 26 \( \mathbb{a}c6 \) and 20 \( \mathbb{h}f3 \)! \( \mathbb{h}xe2 \)! 21 \( \mathbb{a}b3 \) \( \mathbb{b}3 \) 22 \( \mathbb{w}e2 \) \( \mathbb{b}xa1 \) 23 \( \mathbb{w}e6 \)+! \( \mathbb{h}8 \) 24 \( \mathbb{a}a2 \) are inauspicious for Black, according to analysis by Dvoretsky and Alexandrov.

17 \( \mathbb{w}d2 \)

After 17 dxc5 \( \mathbb{h}b5 \) bad is 18 \( \mathbb{w}d4 \) \( \mathbb{g}xc3 \) 19 \( \mathbb{w}xg7 \) \( \mathbb{h}xe2 \)+ 20 \( \mathbb{h}1 \) \( \mathbb{f}8 \), and Black remains a piece up. White would have to sacrifice his queen: 18 \( \mathbb{w}xb5 \) (or 18 \( \mathbb{g}xb5 \) \( \mathbb{a}xh3 \) 19 \( \mathbb{d}d6 \)+ \( \mathbb{h}7 \) 20 exd3) 18...\( \mathbb{a}xb5 \) 19 \( \mathbb{a}xb5 \) \( \mathbb{b}3 \) 20 \( \mathbb{d}d6 \)+ \( \mathbb{h}7 \) 21 \( \mathbb{e}e5 \) - with unclear consequences.

The most accurate continuation was probably 17 \( \mathbb{h}d2 \)! \( \mathbb{h}b5 \) (17...\( \mathbb{a}xc3 \) 18 \( \mathbb{g}xc3 \) \( \mathbb{a}b5 \)? does not work because of 19 \( \mathbb{w}f3 \)) 18 \( \mathbb{w}d2 \) \( \mathbb{g}xc3 \) 19 \( \mathbb{g}xc3 \), when there appears to be nothing better than 19...c4, transposing into a favourable position for White, which occurred in the game.

17...c4
18 \( \mathbb{h}e5 \) \( \mathbb{a}xc3 \)
19 \( \mathbb{g}xc3 \)

(see diagram)

19...\( \mathbb{h}b5 \)

Up to this point both contestants had played splendidly and the young player had successfully stood up to his experienced opponent. But here Black's play began to be affected by lack of time for thought. The move in the game makes things easier for White.

19...\( \mathbb{h}b8 \)? was incorrect: 20 \( \mathbb{g}xc4 \) \( \mathbb{a}b3 \) 21 \( \mathbb{d}d6 \)+ \( \mathbb{h}7 \) (21...\( \mathbb{f}8 \) 22 \( \mathbb{w}f4 \)) 22 \( \mathbb{g}xb3 \) \( \mathbb{g}xb3 \) 23 \( \mathbb{g}g5 \)+ \( \mathbb{f}6 \) 24 \( \mathbb{c}c5 \) \( \mathbb{f}8 \) 25 \( \mathbb{a}a7 \) with advantage to White (Romanishin).

That which is good as an exception should not be made into a rule! It was now time to castle 19...0-0?!, when 20 \( \mathbb{g}xc4 \) \( \mathbb{a}c7 \) 21 \( \mathbb{a}c1 \) is bad because of 21...\( \mathbb{g}xc3 \) 22 \( \mathbb{g}xc3 \) \( \mathbb{a}c8 \). Alas, as Dvoretsky later established, White would nevertheless have retained his extra pawn, by continuing 21 \( \mathbb{b}b1 \) (instead of 21 \( \mathbb{a}c1 \)?) 21...\( \mathbb{g}xc4 \) 22 \( \mathbb{w}c2 \).

In view of the fact that a careful analysis of all Black's alternative possibilities, beginning from the 12th move, has not enabled an improvement in his play to be found, one is forced to conclude that Alexandrov's clever opening idea is objectively not altogether correct.

20 a4! f6

Both players saw that in the event of 20...\( \mathbb{a}a6 \) 21 \( \mathbb{a}b3 \) White would gain a powerful attack:

a) 21...\( \mathbb{a}b3 \) 22 \( \mathbb{g}c6 \) \( \mathbb{a}xc6 \) 23 \( \mathbb{g}xc6+ \) \( \mathbb{a}e7 \) (23...\( \mathbb{f}8 \) 24 \( \mathbb{w}b4 \)+) 24 \( \mathbb{g}g5 \)+ \( \mathbb{f}6 \) 25 \( \mathbb{c}c5 \)+;

b) 21...\( \mathbb{d}xb3 \) 22 \( \mathbb{a}c6+ \)! (weaker is 22 \( \mathbb{b}b4 \) \( \mathbb{a}xd4 \)) 22...\( \mathbb{f}8 \) 23 \( \mathbb{b}4 \)+ \( \mathbb{g}8 \) 24 \( \mathbb{d}1 \) h5
Games by Pupils of the School

(24...\texttt{Wf8} 25 \texttt{Wc3}) 25 d5! (threatening 26 \texttt{Qxf7}).

\textbf{21 axb5} \texttt{fxe5}

\textbf{22 \texttt{Qc6}+!}

A subtle decision. If 22 \texttt{Qxb3} \texttt{Qxb3} 23 \texttt{Qc6}+, then Black obtains some counterplay in the endgame: 23...\texttt{Wf8} 24 \texttt{Wb4+} \texttt{We7} 25 \texttt{Wxe7}+ \texttt{Wxe7} 26 \texttt{Wxa7}+ \texttt{Wf6} 27 dxe5+ \texttt{Wxe5}, and 28 \texttt{Wxg7??} c3! is bad for White (Dvoretsky).

\textbf{22 ... \texttt{Qxc6}}

Forced.

\textbf{23 bxc6} \texttt{Qxc3}

23...\texttt{Wxd4} would have led to a hopeless ending: 24 \texttt{Wxd4} exd4 25 \texttt{Wxc4}.

\textbf{24 \texttt{Wxc3}} \texttt{Wxd4}

\textbf{25 \texttt{Wa3}!} \texttt{Wf7}

25...\texttt{Wf8} would not have helped: 26 c7 \texttt{Wxf2+} 27 \texttt{Wf1} \texttt{Wd7} 28 \texttt{Qd1}+ (Romanishin).

If 25...c3 there follows 26 c7! (less good is 26 \texttt{Qc1} c2 27 \texttt{Wb3} 0-0 28 e3 \texttt{Qd2} 29 \texttt{Wxc2} \texttt{Wxc2} 30 \texttt{Wxc2} \texttt{Wc8}, and Black retains saving chances) 26...\texttt{Wf7} (26...\texttt{Wc4} 27 \texttt{Wad4+}! \texttt{Wxa4} 28 c8\texttt{W+}) 27 \texttt{Qc1} \texttt{Wc8} 28 \texttt{Wxc3} and wins.

\textbf{26 e3} \texttt{Wd3}

In the event of 26...\texttt{Wxe4} the simple 27 \texttt{Wxa7}+ \texttt{Wf6} 28 c7 is good. If 26...\texttt{Wb6} (hoping for 27 \texttt{Wd6?} \texttt{Wf6}!), then, as shown by Romanishin, White wins the endgame: 27 \texttt{Wxa7}+ \texttt{Wxa7} 28 \texttt{Wxa7}+ \texttt{Wf6} 29 \texttt{Qa4} e4 30 \texttt{Qxc4} \texttt{Wc8} (30...\texttt{Wf5} 31 \texttt{Wd4} and 32 \texttt{Wd7}) 31 \texttt{Wg2} \texttt{h5} 32 \texttt{Wf3} (or 32 c7) 32...\texttt{Qd5} 33 \texttt{Wd4}+.\texttt{Wxa7+} \texttt{Wf6}

\textbf{28 \texttt{Wb7} c3}

28...\texttt{Wb3} was more tenacious.

\textbf{29 \texttt{Wb7} \texttt{Qg8}}

\textbf{30 \texttt{Wf7}+ \texttt{Wg5}}

\textbf{31 h4+ \texttt{Qg4}}

\textbf{32 \texttt{Qg2} \texttt{We2}}

\textbf{33 \texttt{Qa4}+}

Black resigned.

\textbf{Boguslavsky (15) – Bazhin}

USSR Junior Team Championship 1990

\textit{Modern Benoni}

\begin{align*}
1 & \texttt{d4} & \texttt{f6} \\
2 & \texttt{c4} & \texttt{e6} \\
3 & \texttt{Qc3} & \texttt{c5} \\
4 & \texttt{d5} & \texttt{exd5} \\
5 & \texttt{cxd5} & \texttt{d6} \\
6 & \texttt{e4} & \texttt{g6} \\
7 & \texttt{f4} & \texttt{g7} \\
8 & \texttt{e5} & \texttt{dx}d5 \\
9 & \texttt{fxe5} & \texttt{Wd7} \\
10 & \texttt{e6} & \texttt{fxe6} \\
11 & \texttt{dx}d6 & \texttt{We7} \\
12 & \texttt{Qd5}! & \texttt{We6+} \\
13 & \texttt{Qe2} & \texttt{We2+} \\
14 & \texttt{Qxe2} & \texttt{Qe5}?! \\
\end{align*}

Such very sharp opening variations demand an accurate knowledge of theory. It is extremely difficult to play them, simply on the basis of common sense – the very first inaccuracy may prove fatal.

To avoid conceding the initiative to his opponent, Black should have sacrificed a whole rook: 14...0-0!! 15 \texttt{Qc7} \texttt{Qc6} 16 \texttt{Qxa8} \texttt{Qb4}. But is it conceivable to take such a decision at the board, without preparatory analysis at home?

\begin{align*}
15 & \texttt{Qf3} & \texttt{Qf6} \\
15...\texttt{Qd6??} & 16 \texttt{Qh6}! \\
16 & \texttt{Qc4} & \texttt{Qxd5} \\
17 & \texttt{Qxd5} & \texttt{Qf6} \\
18 & 0-0 & \texttt{Qc6} \\
\end{align*}

(see diagram)

\textbf{19 \texttt{Qg5}!}

The strategy chosen by Maxim Boguslavsky, typical of such positions, is rather instructive. \textit{Exchange the opponent's already developed pieces – then your lead in development will become especially appreciable.}
Games by Pupils of the School

This 'pawn-grabbing' when behind in development is severely punished. 19...\( \text{g}x5 \) 20 \( \text{g}x5 \) \( \text{f}5 \) was essential.

20 \( \text{g}x6 \) \( \text{bxc6} \)

21 \( \text{a}e1+ \)

22 \( \text{e}+! \)?

The same idea! However, the enemy bishop would also have been exchanged in the variation 22 \( \text{e}7+! \) \( \text{d}6 \) 23 \( \text{d}1+ \) \( \text{d}4+ \) 24 \( \text{g}x4 \) cxd4 25 \( \text{x}d4 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 26 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{b}5 \) 27 \( \text{e}5+ \) c5 28 \( \text{d}3! \) with a quick win (indicated by Dvoretsky).

22 ... \( \text{e}5 \)

23 \( \text{x}e5 \)

Black resigned.

Svidler (15) – Arkhipov
Gausdal 1991
French Defence

- position after 18...\( \text{c}6 \) -

19 ... \( \text{x}b2? \)

In the endgame Black is two pawns up. But when there are opposite-colour bishops a material advantage has no particular significance – it is far more important to have an attack. The black king is in deadly danger. If 23...c4!? Boguslavsky was intending 24 \( \text{f}7+ \) \( \text{d}6 \) 25 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{a}6 \) (25...\( \text{g}4 \) 26 h3 \( \text{g}5 \) 27 \( \text{x}g5+ \) \( \text{e}6 \) 28 \( \text{c}7 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 29 \( \text{x}c6+ \) \( \text{d}5 \) 30 \( \text{f}6 \) ) 26 \( \text{a}5+ \) \( \text{e}6 \) 27 \( \text{c}7 \) \( \text{b}5 \) (27...\( \text{c}8 \) 28 \( \text{e}5+ \) \( \text{f}6 \) 29 \( \text{x}c6+ \) \( \text{f}7 \) 30 \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 31 \( \text{c}7+ \) \( \text{g}8 \) 32 \( \text{h}6 \), and White wins) 28 a4, overlooking the reply 28...a6! Instead of 26 \( \text{a}5+ \) stronger is 26 \( \text{g}5+ \) \( \text{e}6 \) 27 \( \text{c}7 \) \( \text{h}f8 \) (27...\( \text{h}c8 \) 28 \( \text{g}5+ \) \( \text{d}6 \) 29 \( \text{a}5+ \) ) 28 \( \text{x}c6+ \) \( \text{d}7 \) 29 \( \text{c}7+ \) \( \text{e}6 \) 30 g3 or 30 \( \text{g}3 \), retaining the advantage, but even so, with 22 \( \text{e}7+! \) White would have achieved more.

23 ... \( \text{c}7 \)

24 \( \text{e}7+ \)

24...\( \text{b}6 \) would have led to mate: 25 \( \text{b}1+ \) \( \text{a}5 \) 26 \( \text{d}2+ \) \( \text{a}4 \) 27 \( \text{e}4+ \) \( \text{a}3 \) 28 \( \text{c}1+ \) \( \text{x}a2 \) 29 \( \text{b}2+ \).

25 \( \text{d}1 \)

25...\( \text{h}d8 \) 26 \( \text{x}h7 \).

26 \( \text{f}4+ \)

26...\( \text{c}8 \) 27 \( \text{b}1 \).

27 \( \text{b}1+ \)

28 \( \text{d}2+ \)

29 \( \text{e}4+ \)

30 \( \text{c}4+ \)

31 \( \text{c}1+ \)

32 \( \text{b}2+ \)

33 \( \text{b}7+ \)

Black resigned.
5 c3
c5
6 â g 3
dc6
7 ë e 2
cxd4
8 cxd4
b6
9 0-0

A problematic pawn sacrifice. As compensation White gains an enduring initiative, thanks to his lead in development.

9 . . .
10 ë xd 4
11 ë f 3
12 â a 4

The manoeuvre of the white queen to g4 should be prevented.

13 â c 2
c5
14 â e 2

The theoretical 14 â xh 7 b6 leads to equality.

14 . . .
h6?!

It is more logical for Black to continue his development: 14 . . . e 7 15 Ê e 3 â a 5, although after 16 â c 2! White retains quite good compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

15 Ê e 3
â a 5
16 ë d 4!

The direct consequence of the loss of time on the move of the rook's pawn. White prepares f2–f4. 16 . . . â x e 5? is bad because of 17 ë d 2! â c 7 18 Ë b 5 â b 8 19 ë f 4 f 6 20 â c 1 ! ë d 6 21 ë x c 8 + !.

16 . . .
17 â g 4
g6!
18 f 4!

Not 18 â xg 6? Ë e 5.

18 . . .
â c 5?!

In Svidler's opinion, 18 . . . h 5 !? 19 â g 3 Ë c 5 came into consideration, but not 19 . . . Ë c 5?!
20 â x g 6! f x g 6 (20 . . . Ë g 8 21 â x f 7 + ! Ë x f 7 22
â h 3) 21 â x g 6 + ë d 8 22 f 5! e x f 5 23 Æ g 5!
â e 8 24 b 4! (or 24 . . . d 6 + Æ d 7 25 b 4!), when 24 . . . b 4 25 d 6 + d 7 26 Ë e 6 + Æ e 6 27
â e 7 + Æ e 7 28 â x b 4 is bad for Black.

19 Æ g 6 !

Destroying the pawn screen; in full accordance with the demands of the position, White begins an attack on the king.

19 . . .
fxg 6
19 . . . Ë g 8 20 Æ x f 7 + Æ x f 7 21 â h 5 + is hopeless.

20 â x g 6 +
d8
21 f 5
e x f 5

If 21 . . . c 7, then 22 Ë b 5 !.

22 e 6
â a 6
23 Ë a d 1

Here White had a serious alternative: 23 Æ c 1 !? Ë e 6 24 Ë x f 5 (but not 24 Æ c 8 + ?
Æ c 8 25 Ë e 6 + Æ d 7, and it is Black who wins) 24 . . . Ë e 8 25 Æ x h 6 !? with a strong attack.

23 . . .
â x e 6
23 . . . Ë e 6 24 Ë x f 5 was worse.

24 Ë x f 5 !
â g 8 !

According to analysis by Svidler, other continuations lose:

a) 24 . . . Ë c 8 25 Ë x e 7 Æ x e 7 26 Æ c 5 + Æ x c 5
27 â g 7 + ;

b) 24 . . . Ë e 4 25 Ë x e 7 Æ x e 7 26 â g 7 + Æ d 6
27 Æ f 4 + ;

c) 24 . . . Ë x f 5 25 â x f 5 ! Ë e 6 26 Æ d 5 + .

25 â h 7
â f 8 !
Bad is 25...\textit{\texttt{e}}8 26 \textit{\texttt{d}}xe7 \textit{\texttt{x}}xe7 27 \textit{\texttt{f}}h8+ \textit{\texttt{e}}8 28 \textit{\texttt{f}}6+ \textit{\texttt{d}}7 29 \textit{\texttt{x}}c5, while if 25...\textit{\texttt{x}}g2+ White decides matters with 26 \textit{\texttt{x}}g2 \textit{\texttt{e}}2+ 27 \textit{\texttt{h}}1 \textit{\texttt{xf}}5 28 \textit{\texttt{xf}}5 \textit{\texttt{xe}}3 29 \textit{\texttt{xd}}5+ \textit{\texttt{c}}7 30 \textit{\texttt{de}}1 \textit{\texttt{g}}5 31 \textit{\texttt{xe}}7+ \textit{\texttt{xe}}7 32 \textit{\texttt{f}}7 (Svidler). However, 25...\textit{\texttt{d}}6!? came into consideration.

26 \textit{\texttt{d}}xe8  \textit{\texttt{xe}}8 27 \textit{\texttt{f}}h6  \textit{\texttt{e}}4?

The middlegame is in progress, but Black has not yet completed his development. He would like to include his rook in the play, and therefore 27...\textit{\texttt{c}}8 looks logical. But then there follows 28 \textit{\texttt{x}}c5! \textit{\texttt{x}}c5 29 \textit{\texttt{f}}8+, for example, 29...\textit{\texttt{c}}7 30 \textit{\texttt{x}}g8 \textit{\texttt{xe}}8 31 \textit{\texttt{g}}7+ \textit{\texttt{b}}6 32 \textit{\texttt{x}}g8 \textit{\texttt{e}}2 (hoping for 33 \textit{\texttt{f}}1 \textit{\texttt{e}}3+ 34 \textit{\texttt{h}}1 \textit{\texttt{c}}1) 33 \textit{\texttt{g}}6+ and 34 \textit{\texttt{d}}3, and White retains an advantage sufficient for a win.

Svidler suggests 27...\textit{\texttt{e}}2! 28 g3 \textit{\texttt{e}}4 29 \textit{\texttt{w}}xe6 \textit{\texttt{xe}}3+ 30 \textit{\texttt{g}}2 \textit{\texttt{e}}2+ 31 \textit{\texttt{g}}1 \textit{\texttt{e}}3+ with perpetual check. If White does not want a draw, he can try 29 \textit{\texttt{f}}4!?.

After Black's mistake the attack becomes irresistible.

28 \textit{\texttt{f}}8+  \textit{\texttt{e}}7 28...\textit{\texttt{x}}f8? 29 \textit{\texttt{xf}}8+ \textit{\texttt{d}}7 30 \textit{\texttt{xa}}8 \textit{\texttt{e}}2 does not work in view of 31 \textit{\texttt{xb}}7+ \textit{\texttt{e}}8 32 \textit{\texttt{a}}8+ \textit{\texttt{d}}7 33 \textit{\texttt{xa}}7 followed by 34 \textit{\texttt{f}}1. If 28...\textit{\texttt{d}}7, then 29 \textit{\texttt{h}}7+ \textit{\texttt{c}}6 30 \textit{\texttt{c}}1+ \textit{\texttt{b}}5 31 \textit{\texttt{xa}}8 \textit{\texttt{xa}}8 32 a4+ is decisive.

29 \textit{\texttt{xa}}8  \textit{\texttt{xa}}8 29...\textit{\texttt{x}}g2+? 30 \textit{\texttt{h}}1! is pointless.

29...\textit{\texttt{e}}2!? would have posed more problems. Then only a draw results from 30 \textit{\texttt{h}}7+ \textit{\texttt{f}}7 31 \textit{\texttt{h}}4+ \textit{\texttt{d}}7 32 \textit{\texttt{h}}3+ \textit{\texttt{e}}7 33 \textit{\texttt{c}}1!? (33 \textit{\texttt{f}}1 \textit{\texttt{xa}}8 34 \textit{\texttt{h}}4+ \textit{\texttt{e}}6) 33...\textit{\texttt{xa}}8! (33...\textit{\texttt{x}}g2+? 34 \textit{\texttt{h}}1!) 34 \textit{\texttt{c}}7+ \textit{\texttt{f}}6 35 \textit{\texttt{h}}6+ \textit{\texttt{g}}6 36 \textit{\texttt{g}}7+ \textit{\texttt{f}}5 37 \textit{\texttt{d}}7+ \textit{\texttt{e}}5 38 \textit{\texttt{e}}7+ (Svidler).

However, stronger is 30 \textit{\texttt{h}}4+! \textit{\texttt{f}}6 (30...\textit{\texttt{d}}7 31 \textit{\texttt{h}}7+) 31 \textit{\texttt{c}}5+ \textit{\texttt{f}}7 (31...\textit{\texttt{d}}7 32 \textit{\texttt{a}}4+ \textit{\texttt{c}}7 33 \textit{\texttt{f}}4+ \textit{\texttt{c}}6 34 \textit{\texttt{d}}6+ \textit{\texttt{b}}5 35 \textit{\texttt{a}}4+ \textit{\texttt{c}}4 36 \textit{\texttt{c}}1+ \textit{\texttt{b}}3 37 \textit{\texttt{x}}g8) 32 \textit{\texttt{f}}8+!! \textit{\texttt{x}}f8 33 \textit{\texttt{f}}1, and White wins.

30 \textit{\texttt{h}}4+!  \textit{\texttt{d}}7

If 30...\textit{\texttt{d}}6, then 31 \textit{\texttt{xe}}4!. Now the capture of the knight is less convincing in view of 31...\textit{\texttt{e}}2, and so White plays for mate.

31 \textit{\texttt{h}}7+  \textit{\texttt{c}}6 32 \textit{\texttt{c}}1+  \textit{\texttt{b}}5 33 \textit{\texttt{a}}4+  \textit{\texttt{a}}5 34 \textit{\texttt{c}}7+  \textit{\texttt{b}}6 35 \textit{\texttt{b}}4+  \textit{\texttt{xb}}4 36 \textit{\texttt{b}}1+  \textit{\texttt{a}}5

37 \textit{\texttt{d}}2+!

Black resigned.

\textbf{Makariev (15) – Rasulov}

CIS Junior Championship, Jurmala 1992

\textit{King's Indian Defence}

This example is something of a curiosity: White lost the game without making a single move of his own! Unfortunately, in his preparations Makariev committed a very common mistake: he decided to play a long theoretical variation without thoroughly checking its correctness. See what this led to.

1 \textit{\texttt{d}}4  \textit{\texttt{f}}6
2 c4  \textit{\texttt{g}}6
3 \textit{d}c3  \textit{g}7
4 e4  0-0
5 \textit{f}f3  \textit{d}6
6 \textit{e}2  \textit{c}6
7 0-0  \textit{e}5
8 d5  \textit{e}7
9 \textit{e}1  \textit{d}7
10 \textit{d}3  \textit{f}5
11 \textit{d}2  \textit{f}6
12 f3  \textit{f}4
13 c5  g5
14 cxd6  cxd6
15 \textit{f}f2  \textit{g}6
16 \textit{c}2  \textit{f}7
17 \textit{f}c1  h5

For the moment the game is following a familiar course.

18 h3  a6!? Consideration should be given to the thematic 18...g4!? 19 fxg4 hxg4 20 hxg4 \textit{e}8 (20...h7 21 \textit{b}5 \textit{g}5 22 a4 with an unclear game, Sosonko-Kavalek, Tilburg 1980) 21 a4 \textit{f}6 22 \textit{a}3 \textit{h}4 23 \textit{cd}1 \textit{g}3 24 \textit{h}3 \textit{wh}4 25 \textit{df}2 \textit{f}6 26 \textit{wd}1 \textit{d}7 27 a5 \textit{af}8 28 \textit{e}1, and in the game Sosonko-Hellers (Wijk aan Zee 1986) the players agreed a draw.

19 a4  \textit{f}8
20 a5  \textit{g}4!

Less good was 20...b5?! 21 axb6 \textit{xb}6 22 \textit{a}4 \textit{a}7 23 \textit{a}5.

21 fxg4  hxg4
22 hxg4  b5
23 axb6  \textit{xb}6
24 \textit{a}4  \textit{a}7
25 \textit{a}5  \textit{b}8

If 25...\textit{b}7 there follows 26 \textit{a}3 with the better chances for White.

26 g5!

The players are following the game Rogers-Sznapik (Olympiad, Thessaloniki 1988), which continued 26...\textit{h}7 27 \textit{b}6 f3!? (27...\textit{d}7 28 \textit{xd}7 \textit{xd}7 29 \textit{g}4 or 27...\textit{xb}6 28 \textit{xb}6 \textit{xb}6 29 \textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}5 30 \textit{g}4, and White gains the advantage – V.Spasov) 28 \textit{xf}3 \textit{xb}6! 29 \textit{xb}6 \textit{xb}6 30 \textit{xc}8 \textit{g}5 31 \textit{xa}6 \textit{e}3? (31...\textit{xb}2 was essential, hoping for 32 \textit{xd}6?! \textit{f}4 with counterplay; however, in the opinion of Ian Rogers, even then White would retain the better chances by 32 \textit{c}2! \textit{d}4 33 \textit{a}3) 32 \textit{a}3 \textit{b}6 (32...\textit{f}4 33 \textit{c}7!) 33 \textit{g}4 \textit{h}6 34 \textit{c}2 \textit{h}7 35 g3!, and White won. Rogers annotated this game in the 46th issue of Informator.

26 ...  \textit{a}1
27 \textit{g}4

\begin{center}
\textit{g}4!
\end{center}

28 \textit{c}6?

Rogers attached an exclamation mark to this move and in reply considered only 28...\textit{d}7 29 \textit{b}6! or 28...\textit{fb}7 29 \textit{c}5!. Makariiev knew Rogers’ analysis, but he did not look critically at it, for which he was punished.

In the light of the present game, Spasov’s recommendation 28 \textit{a}3!? comes into consideration.

28 ...  \textit{e}2!

This resource, which had not been taken into account, gives Black a very strong attack. For example, 29 \textit{b}6 \textit{e}7 30 \textit{c}7
Games by Pupils of the School

(30  xb6  b5  31  c7  e8, attacking the knight on a4) 30...xg5 31 xb8  h4. The most tenacious was 29 b6 b5 30 c8 (if the queen moves, then simply 30...xb6) 30...e3 31 c3 d7! (31...xc8 is unconvincing: 32 xc8 f3 33 g3) 32 b6 xb6 33 xe3 fxe3 34 xb6 exf2+ 35 xf2 b5 (S.Shipov), but here too Black has a big advantage.

29 c2 f3
30 g3
Otherwise 30...f4.

30...h7!
Threatening 31...h1+! 32 xh1 xf2.

31 e1 h3
White resigned.

Sometimes even very strong players become victims of trustfulness. In the 44th issue of Informator the game Miles–Christiansen from the 1987 San Francisco tournament was published.

1 e4 e5
2 f3 f6
3 xe5 d6
4 f3 xe4
5 c3 f5

6 xe4 xe4 7 d3 g6 8 g5 e7 9 xe7 xe7+ 10 e2 c6 11 0-0 0-0 12 e1 ae8 13 wd2 e5 14 d4 xf3+ 15 xf3 wd7 16 c3 b6 17 xe8 xe8 18 e1 xe1+ 19 xe1 f8 20 g3, and the players agreed a draw.

The young Indian player Vishwanathan Anand decided to make use of such a simple way of equalising. However, at the tournament in Biel in 1988 after 5...f5?? his opponent Alonso Zapata replied:

6 e2!

Black had to resign in view of the inevitable loss of a piece (6...e7 7 d5).
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Mark Dvoretsky / Artur Yusupov

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The main theme of volume 4 is “prophylaxis”, a concept first expounded by Nimzowitsch and one which has been brilliantly developed by Mark Dvoretsky and his pupils. The art of positional play is explained in terms of planning, manoeuvring, the study of typical positions, and deep strategy in grandmaster games.

“The series of books is addressed to those who do not regard chess simply as an amusement, but want to understand its secrets more deeply and substantially raise their standard of play. How can this be achieved? What are the ways and methods of working independently on chess? That is what we teach in our school, and that is what is described in these books. We hope that you will derive benefit from them.”

Mark Dvoretsky, Artur Yusupov
Mark Dvoretsky
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Mark Dvoretsky
Endgame Analysis
School of Chess Excellence 1.
Edited and translated by Ken Neat.
ISBN 978-3-283-00416-3

This first title is devoted to the endgame and examines a wide range of positions, taken mainly from games of the author’s pupils. The comments are packed with practical advice and special test positions and frequent questions ensure that the reader’s participation in the book is an active one.

Mark Dvoretsky
Strategic Play
School of Chess Excellence 3.
Edited and translated by Ken Neat.
ISBN 978-3-283-00418-7

This third volume in Mark Dvoretsky’s course is devoted to questions of strategy, and is aimed at improving the reader’s positional understanding. The author also examines a number of positions that lie on the boundary between the middlegame and endgame.

Mark Dvoretsky
Tactical Play
School of Chess Excellence 2.
Edited and translated by Ken Neat.
ISBN 978-3-283-00417-0

The initial part of this book deals with combinations and tactical techniques, and suggests methods for developing a player’s calculating ability.
In the second part the author analyses a number of fascinating examples, in which he examines a wide variety of attacking and defensive means.

Mark Dvoretsky
Opening Developments
School of Chess Excellence 4.
Edited and translated by Ken Neat.
ISBN 978-3-283-00419-4

Compared with the other books, substantially more space is given to the analysis of the opening problems that confront a player in a particular game. The first half of the book is altogether devoted to opening preparation, and also in the second half nearly every game is accompanied by detailed opening information.

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