Dvoretsky / Yusupov • Secrets of Chess Training
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From the Authors

This book, like our whole series of books, is addressed to those who do not regard chess simply as an amusement, but want to understand its secrets more deeply and substantially raise their standard of play. How can this be achieved? What are the ways and methods of working independently on chess? That is what we teach in our school, and that is what is described in this book. We hope that you will derive benefit from it.

*Mark Dvoretsky*
*Artur Yusupov*
By what is success in chess determined? Usually, in answer to this question, two necessary factors are singled out: talent and work. However, ability and a desire to work, on their own, are insufficient. Of great significance are physical condition, competitive character and the ability to concentrate during a game. It is no less important to choose correctly the direction of the work and to be able to carry it out qualitatively. Of course, this is by no means a simple problem. At the first session of our school we try to help our pupils to master the skills of working independently on chess.

It stands to reason that, in order to choose the required direction for self-improvement, a critical appreciation of your play is needed. It is the authors’ deep conviction that a necessary condition for the development of a player is a serious study of his own games. Therefore a central place in the book is occupied by the topic ‘The analysis of your own games’. The reader will find numerous specific methodological recommendations on how to carry out this work.

Without a broad chess culture, a knowledge of the creative heritage of the great masters from the past, it is hard to expect to achieve good results. This is why we try to show the reader various ways of using the rich heritage of chess.

Naturally, topics such as ‘The analysis of your own games’ and ‘Studying the classics’ are practically inexhaustible. The first topic is examined from various points of view in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 9th parts of the book, and the second topic is covered in the 3rd and 4th parts. Part 6 is devoted to original king manoeuvres, but the more general topic ‘Non-standard manoeuvres’ is studied in the 5th part, as well as the 9th and certain other parts of the book. Part 7 is a compilation of advice by outstanding grandmasters about how to improve at chess. Finally, specially for this second edition, the large 8th part has been written, inviting the reader to test his strength by independently solving exercises on a variety of themes.

A few words about the structure of the book. Each of the first six parts opens with a lecture, read at a session of the school. Then follow exercises (for this new edition many new exercises have been added, and some old ones replaced) and additional material. These supplements, linked thematically with the lectures, have been taken from publications by the authors in the magazines Shakhmaty v SSSR and 64 – often they have been augmented and revised specially for this book. In this second edition two new articles have been included.

Of course, the work in our school is not restricted merely to the reading of lectures. Great attention is given to a joint analysis of games, individual consultations, the development of specific homework and its checking. From part 9 the reader can gain some impression of the form that these lessons take.

It has been the aim of the authors that every reader should be able to find something interesting and useful in this book. The suggested procedures and methods will, I hope, become the key to your chess improvement.
Of course, even a very good methodology will not be effective, if it is applied mechanically, without independent interpretation. But for the serious, thoughtful player this book can become a good stimulus to creative and competitive development. Our work has continued. A second session of the school was held, where the main topic was the opening — the general principles of playing it, the methods of studying opening theory, the approach to the formation of your own opening repertoire, the link between the opening and middlegame, and so on (cf. *Secrets of Opening Preparation*). Plans for subsequent sessions include endgame technique, middlegame strategy, and practical playing procedures. The readers can become acquainted with this work from the later books in the series *School of Future Champions*. 
PART I

Mark Dvoretsky

A Chess Player’s Virtues and Deficiencies, and their Influence on the Course of a Game

Long, long ago, before the time of Steinitz, it was thought that whether a chess player won or lost depended only on his degree of genius. Morphy was a genius, and so he defeated everyone; his opponents were less talented, and so they lost to him. Steinitz realised and demonstrated that chess has an objective basis. Events occurring on the board are subject to definite rules and positional principles. If a player is guided by them, he is successful.

It has now become evident that the truth lies not even in the middle, as is customarily thought, but in a combination of both these factors, subjective and objective. (Those of you with a serious interest in philosophy will possibly remember the ‘synthesis’ of Hegel’s famous triad.) Yes, of course, the struggle is based on objective positional rules. But its result is decisively influenced by the personal qualities of a player – his talent, character and state of health, and his preparedness, ability to use his knowledge, to act competently and professionally at the board, and to take the optimal decisions in a variety of situations.

Mastery is made up of a number of very different components, in some of which a player may be very strong, but in others frankly weak. Behind the moves that he makes stand his virtues and deficiencies, his strong and weak points. It is they that decisively influence the outcome of a game, an entire event and often even his chess fate. Many players have been unable to reveal their talent fully on account of obvious gaps in certain fields.

Take, for example, grandmaster Viktor Kupreichik. He is exceptionally dangerous in attack, when he acts boldly and resourcefully, but in technique and in the endgame he is frankly weak. As a result, he has not managed to rise to a level corresponding to his talent. On one occasion, when playing Kupreichik in the USSR Championship First League, I went into an endgame a pawn down, but within some ten moves it was already I who was a pawn up. In a World Cup qualifying tournament in 1989 against the young Gata Kamsky he was two pawns up with a completely won position, but gradually – not on account of any blunder – he lost that game.

Many players are ‘geared’ towards the study of openings, engaging only in the processing of information and the acquisition of new opening knowledge. I am convinced that this is not the way for any player, certainly not a young player, to develop. Training work on self-improvement is far more important.

The main objective of the trainers of our school is to give a ‘diagnosis’ to each of the pupils, help them to investigate their own style, determine their virtues and deficien-
cies, and suggest how to eliminate their deficiencies and to develop their strong points. In order to try and convince you of the correctness of the direction in which our school will be working, of the importance of what we will be doing, I am going to devote my entire lecture to examples of the decisive influence and the results of deficiencies, which players did not want to eliminate or were unable to do so at the proper time.

Some players, who spend all their time studying the opening, believe that their games will not reach an endgame, and if they do, then they will somehow cope at the board with the resulting problems. The example with Kupreichik demonstrates the naiveté of such hopes. Of course, the opening is a very important stage of the game, but the endgame is no less important and it too must be seriously studied.

Weakness in the endgame may show itself in two main forms: in ignorance of endgame theory and in weakness of endgame technique. We will initially consider the first of these.

A glaring example of ignorance of theory once struck me, when I was listing through the Dutch magazine *New in Chess*.

**Coull – Stanciu**

Women’s Olympiad, Thessaloniki 1988

The player from Scotland, who had White on board one, found the only way (not counting overstepping the time limit) of losing the game immediately – she simply resigned!! Incredible ignorance! Such endings are probably taught in the first class of any chess school. But, as you can see, the education of the leader of the Scottish team was at the kindergarten level.

Alas, similar mistakes in endgames (including pawn endgames, though, of course, not so elementary) are made even by grandmasters.

**Ljubojevic – Browne**

Amsterdam 1972

1...f5?? 2 b4 draw.

Reposition the black king at d6, and you obtain (with reversed colours) a well-known study by Nikolai Grigoriev, composed back in 1928. Its solution is as follows:

1...d5!

2 b4

The white king is unable to prevent the enemy pawn from queening: 2 b4 d4! 3 a3 f5 4 b2 f4 5 c2 e3 6 d1 f2! 7 b4 f3 b5 g2 and wins.

2...

3 b5

4 b6

5 a6

f5

f4

c6!

f3
6 b7   f2
7 b8#   f1+  
White loses his queen or is mated.  
I can remember numerous similar examples of endgame ‘creativity’. A blunder in a well-known and theoretically drawn ending led to Alexander Kochiev losing to Vasily Smyslov in their game from the 1978 Zonal Tournament, dashing his hopes of qualifying for the Interzonal Tournament. The comedy of errors in an elementary rook ending, which occurred in a game Capablanca–Menchik, became famous. And 45 years later exactly the same endgame arose is a game that decided the fate of the USSR Junior Team Championship.

Pekker – Ermolinsky
Alma Ata 1974

The Moscow player with White needed to draw for his team to become the champions. The position is absolutely drawn. The simplest is to wait: 1 a2 or 1 h3. But 1 a8 is quite possible, as, however, is any move by the rook along the a-file... apart from one, which was in fact chosen by Seryozha Pekker.

1 a3??   f1+
2 g3   f2
After 3 f3 g1! there is no saving check from the rear.

White lost and the Moscow team finished only second. The reason for what happened was a defect in Pekker’s chess education. His trainer, a well-known theoretician, devoted all his lessons to studying only opening theory. In the endgame his pupils would lose their way.

Now let us turn to endgame technique. You need not only to remember theory, but also to have a mastery of typical endgame techniques, to learn to attune yourself appropriately for playing endings, and to have a feeling for their specific features. I recommend that you should study Mikhail Shereshevsky’s excellent book Endgame Strategy, which is devoted to this topic.

I will now show you what happens when a player does not understand the spirit of the endgame and is unable to think in endgame terms.

Dvoretsky – Sukhanov
Moscow 1968

Ruy Lopez

1 e4   e5
2 d4   c6
3 c4  d5
4 d3  e6
Here there is the interesting gambit possibility 5 b4!? , but at the time of the present game it was not yet known.
5 cxd4  cxd4
6 c3  b6
7 d4  c6
8 c4  d6
The tournament situation obliged me to play for a win. I didn’t know the theory of the variation, and I was pondering over the plan of further action, when I suddenly remembered who I was playing. Vladimir Sukhanov was a talented master, a brilliant tactician who liked to attack, but he could not bear tedious positions and he had no concept of the endgame. (This was not surprising – he studied chess with the same trainer as Pekker.)
The decision that I took can hardly be approved from the purely chess viewpoint, but it was justified psychologically, as the further course of the game confirmed.

9 dxe5 dxe5
10 w xd8+ $xd8
11 $e3

The endgame is equal, of course, but see how Sukhanov plays it.

What do you think is the most accurate reply for Black?

The bishop at e3 is more active than the one at d8, and therefore Black should have offered an exchange: 11...$b6!. But in what way is the developing move 11...$f6, made in the game, inferior?

11...
12 f3

Now if 12...$b6 there follows 13 $f2 and the exchange takes place in a version that it slightly more favourable for White. First, he does not have to take on b6, opening the a-file for the black rook, and second, the white king approaches closer to the centre. These trifles may not influence the overall evaluation of the position, but nevertheless in the endgame every such trifle should be taken care of, and you should seek the most accurate way of carrying out your plans. If Black had decided to exchange bishops, he should have thought about the most accurate way of doing this.

However, it transpired that my opponent had quite different intentions.

12...

Black has decided to launch an attack! What is his idea? Probably ...h5–h4, ...$h5 and $f4. In the middlegame such plans may be alright, but for the endgame this is very strange strategy. Very well, for the moment I will complete my development.

13 $d1 h4
14 $d2 h3?

But what next? After all, in the future the h3-pawn will almost certainly turn out to be weak.

15 g3 b5?

My opponent appears to have forgotten that pawns do not move backwards. Now I also acquire a target on the queenside – the b5-pawn, which I will immediately attack by a2–a4.

16 $f1

From here the bishop keeps both of the vulnerable black pawns under fire.

16...
17 $f2 g5

I finally understood the idea (albeit crazy) of my opponent's preceding actions. He wants after 18...g4 either to weaken the e4-pawn, or, after playing his knight to g4, to attack the h2-pawn, which he has 'fixed' by the advance ...h5–h4–h3. And if 18 g4, he was probably intending the bishop sacrifice on g4.

Resourceful and clever, but completely unrealisable. This is no way to play the endgame!

18 a4!
19 $xb6 axb6
20 axb5 $a1
21 $xa1 gxf3
22 $f3! $xe4+
23 $e3 $d6
24 bxc6
I calculated this entire variation when I played 19 \( \mathcal{Q}xb6 \). It is clear that White’s position is won, and subsequently he easily converted his advantage.

What can be said here – everything is clear. The outcome of the game was predetermined, and the play was all in one direction. You probably gained the impression that the player with Black was very weak, not even of club standard – club players would be offended and would say that we don’t play the endgame like that. No, I repeat, this was a talented master, who in other stages of the game acted quite differently. I happened to catch him right on his weak point. Now think: is it conceivable to become a strong player, while giving your opponents such great odds in some aspect of the game?

It is very important to get rid not only of your purely chess weaknesses, but also of psychological and personality deficiencies. A person who is uncertain in himself often loses on account of his own indecisiveness, whereas with a self-confident person it may be because of underestimating the opponent’s possibilities. A slow-witted player with poorly developed intuition will constantly suffer from time-trouble. The list can be extended to include the most diverse human and individual deficiencies, and they all influence the results no less than purely chess weaknesses.

Let us consider an example of the manifestation and diagnosis of one such deficiency.

(see diagram)

It is White to move. How do you evaluate the position, and what move would you suggest?

On a static evaluation, you may be satisfied with White’s position. But let’s try looking at it dynamically, taking account of future prospects. I would prefer Black’s position. Why? He has a clear plan: to play \( \ldots \text{d}5-\text{d}4, \) place his king at \( \text{d}5 \) and then advance \( \ldots \text{c}5-\text{c}4 \). White appears to stand well, he is pressing on \( \text{g}7 \), but what he should do next is not clear.

Since this is so, while it is not yet too late he should play 1 \( \mathcal{Q}e3 \), agreeing to an equal pawn endgame.

Candidate master Vladislav Fedorov, playing White, thought that he stood better and he made an amazingly pointless move.

1 \( \mathcal{Q}g6 \)?

Sometimes in such cases they use the banal phrase: ‘White intensifies the pressure’. However, it is not clear what pressure and why it is intensified. Perhaps Fedorov had in mind \( g2-\text{g}4-\text{g}5 \).

1 \ldots \( \mathcal{Q}e6 \)

Threatening 2...\( \mathcal{Q}f5 \), winning the f4-pawn. In the event of 2 \( g4 \) \( \mathcal{Q}f7 \) 3 \( f5 \) \( d4 \) the white rook is trapped. We see that Black’s reply emphasised the absurdity of the move 1 \( \mathcal{Q}g6 ? \) – 1...\( d4 \) was less accurate in view of 2 \( g4 \) \( \mathcal{Q}e6 \) 3 \( g5 \).

2 \( \mathcal{Q}g3 \) \( d4 \)

3 \( \mathcal{Q}e2? \)

A thematic move. White takes his king to where the battle is developing – the queenside. The drawback of 3 \( \mathcal{Q}e2 \) is the
loss of the f4-pawn after 3...<w>g5+. But from the positional point of view the sacrifice is justified – in return the white king is activated: it penetrates to c4, attacking the c5-pawn.

I could have rightly complimented the player with White, had it not transpired after the game that he had not sacrificed the pawn, but simply blundered it. Here, you will understand, a quite different picture emerges. Incidentally, this episode shows why we ask for thoroughly analysed games to be sent. Sometimes a good move can be made with a completely incorrect idea. It is important for us not only to see the moves that you have made, but also to know the ideas behind them, what you were thinking about, how you evaluated the position. Only then can a trainer make an objective assessment of a pupil’s play.

So, White blundered a pawn, but he blundered it successfully.

3 ... <w>f5+
4 <w>d3 <w>xg4
5 <w>c4 <w>e5

Can the c5-pawn be taken? Black replies 6...<w>c7+. Should White go in for such sharp play, or is it dangerous? There is no need to calculate the variations to the end; you can simply limit yourself to a general impression.

Of course, without any calculation it is obvious: taking on c5, giving the opponent a passed d4-pawn, is terribly dangerous, and most probably simply impossible. But what should be played? 6 <w>d3, I think. The intention is 7 <w>d2 with the threat of 8 <w>xg5. It is useful to drive the black rook to c7. Then it makes sense to exchange the most active black pawn on d4 by c2–c3. In some cases b3–b4 may also be possible. If 6...<w>e4, then 7 <w>d2 <w>e3 8 <w>d3+ and 8...<w>e2? is not possible on account of 9 <w>xg5.

Black probably does best to reply 6...f5 7 <w>d2 <w>c7, intending 8...g5, activating his game on the kingside, where he has an extra pawn. But White’s pieces are active, and his chances of a draw remain quite good.

6 <w>xg5??
7 <w>b5

7 <w>b4 is more cautious, keeping the king closer to the d-pawn. If Black had played as in the game, this could have helped White. But all the same his decision to take on c5 was fundamentally incorrect. This would be best demonstrated by a move that neither player noticed. Which move? That’s right, 7...g5! Now that the g-pawn is no longer under attack, Black can calmly take on c2. Of course, with the king on b4 it would not help to play 8 c3 on account of 8...dxc3 9 <w>xh3 a5+.

7 ... <w>c2
8 <w>xg7 d3
9 <w>xh7?

9 <w>d7 was more tenacious, trying even for a short time to halt the passed pawn. But Fedorov is confident that ‘all is quiet on the Western front’, that he will have time to stop the pawn, and while Black is winning the rook for it he will advance his queenside pawns.

9 ... <w>e6!

Now the rook will not get onto the d-file.

10 <w>a6+ <w>d7
White resigned in view of 11 a7+ c7. With the king at b4 Black would not have had this variation – after the exchange of rooks the king would have been able to stop the pawn. What would you say about the player with White? Are you still unsure? Then I will show you another example of his play.

Fedorov – Dvoretsky
Moscow 1972

What do you think White should do? Black’s plans are clear. If he should succeed in playing ... h8, ... g8 and then doubling (or even tripling) heavy pieces on the g-file, he will develop a powerful attack on the kingside. White is obliged to divert his opponent, to start his own play as soon as possible. He must play c4–c5. Immediately, or after preparation? Of course, immediately – why postpone it? If Black replies ... dxc5, then after xc5 his rook has nowhere to go (if ... f7 there is the fork d6). If Black has time to play ... h8, his rook will gain the excellent square g8.

But Fedorov was not at all afraid of the attack on the kingside, and therefore he decided that he had no need to hurry.

29 b4?

White most probably wants to recapture on c5 with his pawn, obtaining fine pawns in the centre. But first he will have to defend his d5-pawn. Such a plan would be good in a quiet situation, but with White threatened by an attack it is too slow.

29 ... h8
30 h1 g8
31 d2?

Consistent: by defending his d5-pawn, White prepares c4–c5. But he is paying not the slightest attention to his opponent’s possibilities; he is simply not thinking about them. The punishment follows immediately.

31 ... gxf3
32 gxf3 xe4
33 fxe4 h3

Mate is inevitable – White resigned.

Ridiculous, wouldn’t you agree? Within the space of three moves an excellent position collapsed. Is it still unclear what to say about the player with White? Is he simply a weak player? I can show you how he defeated Alexander Belyavsky in excellent positional style, and he has also played some other good games. No, I am not showing you the games of a weak player, but simply demonstrating his most vulnerable point. What is it?

Fedorov played badly in the ending against Shamrai, but the point is not that he is weak in the endgame – this is not so. Remember: with 1 g6 he tried to play for a win, not realising that at the least he did not stand better, not noticing the opponent’s plan for strengthening his position. Then he blundered the f4-pawn. Then he fearlessly and recklessly grabbed the c5-pawn and, finally, he allowed the opponent’s passed pawn to queen. All these mistakes, as well as those that he made in the game with me, have the same root cause.

It is quite obvious that Fedorov has absolute confidence in himself, and in his own ideas. He doesn’t give a damn about his opponent – for Fedorov he simply does not exist. Thus the diagnosis is over-confidence, an overes-
timation of himself and his resources, and an underestimation of the opponent’s possibilities.

In those years Fedorov was studying in the chess department of the Institute of Physical Culture, and I was a teacher there. He was indeed a sturdy, athletic lad, very determined, with a pose at the board like that of a world champion. With such youngsters, self-confidence (an excellent quality!) often grows into over-confidence. He was quite a strong candidate master, but he was simply unable to achieve the master norm. His main deficiency constantly hindered him.

I explained to Fedorov the main cause of his failures. I recommended that he should work in this direction: study the games of players who always forestall in advance their opponent’s counterplay, in particular Tigran Petrosian and Anatoly Karpov. I selected a series of exercises on this topic. The work done by Fedorov soon helped him to become a master.

In the first half of the lecture we looked at examples of the destructive effect on various players of some very prominent deficiencies. Now let us see how all the deficiencies of a player, together with their virtues, operate in combination and determine their individual chess style.

In 1980 I helped Nana Alexandria in her quarter-final women’s candidates match against Lena Akhmylovskaya. As usual, I prepared a creative portrait of her opponent, with information about her strong and weak sides. Naturally, I also saw Alexandria’s virtues and deficiencies, and at the time we worked actively on eliminating her deficiencies.

After an exceptionally difficult and tough struggle, Nana won. On the conclusion of the match the thought occurred to me to show Nana (and also myself) to what extent her virtues and deficiencies, as well as the virtues and deficiencies of her opponent, determined the entire course of the play and the result. I wrote down the main chess qualities of both players and gave them arbitrary codes.

The symbol ‘L1’ signifies Akhmylovskaya’s main virtue – good positional understanding. Lena has a subtle feeling for the coordination of the pieces, she is able to find good posts for them, to manoeuvre and to strengthen her position.

‘L2’ is Akhmylovskaya’s main deficiency. She is weak in tactics and is afraid of them, she avoids any sharpening of the play, and she feels unsure in obscure, complicated positions.

‘L3’ is Akhmylovskaya’s uncertainty in converting an advantage. For you it will probably not be so obvious that this deficiency is closely linked with the previous one, and to some extent stems from it. During the conversion of an advantage there invariably comes a moment when you have to switch from the gradual strengthening of the position to concrete action. You must not miss such a moment, but should strain yourself, accurately calculate variations and find the strongest, and sometimes the only correct continuation. For players who prefer to act on general grounds, who do not like calculating variations, this moment often proves to be a stumbling-block. They continue playing ‘at sight’ when concrete problems need to be solved; as a result their advantage diminishes. Of course, such a deficiency is typical not only of Akhmylovskaya. Later I noticed it in Andrey Sokolov. At some point during the course of the final Candidates match of 1986, Artur Yusupov, seeing that the diagnosis of his opponent was fully confirmed, gestured in surprise: ‘How is he intending to win even one game, if I don’t leave something en prise? After all, he’s unable to solve any problem that is in the least bit complicated.’ Unfortunately, to-
wards the end of the match Yusupov began leaving pieces en prise...

Nana Alexandria’s main virtue, which I have signified ‘N1’, is her vivid imagination and creative resourcefulness.

‘N2’—inadequate positional understanding, as a consequence of low level of chess culture at that time. We did much work on this problem and by the time of her match against Maya Chiburdanidze Nana had succeeded in raising her standard of positional play. But at that time this deficiency was still felt. Hence — frequent mistakes in the evaluation of a position, and bad positional errors.

‘N3’—irrational expenditure of time, and time-trouble. Earlier Alexandria had been an inveterate time-trouble sufferer. After special training, her time-troubles became less severe, but they had not been completely cured.

‘N4’—excessive emotionality at the board. Alexandria is a person of moods, and during a game she copes badly with her emotions. It is hard for her to change things when they are going badly. Mistakes often follow one after another, and as a result an excellent position may quickly be transformed into a hopeless one.

‘N5’—lack of sense of danger.

As you see, Alexandria’s list of deficiencies turned out to be longer than that of her opponent. This is not surprising — I wanted to clearly demonstrate to Nana all her weak points, and to induce her to work seriously on eliminating them.

I annotated all the games of the match, in the process recording how the traits of both players singled out by me showed up in the play. Where I saw the manifestation of some trait, I placed the appropriate code. The picture proved rather interesting, and on Nana at least it made a great impression. Now, from this point of view, we will analyse two of the games, chosen almost at random.

Akhmylovskaya – Alexandria
6th match game, Kislovodsk 1980

Slav Defence

1 d4 d5
2 c4 c6
3 ♜f3 ♜f6
4 ♜c3 e6
5 ♜b3

At this point the match score was level: 2½–2½. We managed to guess that Akhmylovskaya would choose precisely 5 ♜b3. She is a positional player, critical openings, in which a sharp battle develops (the Meran Variation or the Botvinnik Variation), are not to her taste (L2), and this meant it was probable that she would choose a quiet plan of development.

In reply Black has quite a good plan in the spirit of the Meran Variation: 5...dxc4 6 ♦xc4 b5, then ...♖d7, ...♗b7 and at some point ...c6–c5, perhaps after the completion of development – ...♕e7 and ...0–0. But during our preparations I found in Informator Volume 27 the recent game F.Portisch–Nogueiras (Kecskemet 1979). It went 5...dxc4 6 ♦xc4 b6. Black wants to answer 7 e4 with 7...♖a6 and, by exchanging on f1, to prevent the opponent from castling kingside.

There followed 7 g3 ♖e7 8 ♖g2 0–0 9 0–0 b5! 10 ♖b3 (10 ♖d3 is better) 10...b4. After the retreat of the knight Black plays 11...♖a6,
attacking e2, then ...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{b}}b5}\) and, perhaps, ...
\(a7-a5-a4\) with a very active position.

The plan of Jesus Nogueiras appealed to me. But the idea occurred to me that it could be carried out more accurately, by playing ...
\(b7-b5\) in one move. Let us play 5...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}e7}\)
(generally speaking, this is the main theoretical
move). If 6 g3, then 6...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}xc4}\) 7 \(\text{\textit{\textsc{w}}xc4}\) 0-0
8 \(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}g2}\) \(b5\) and Black has saved a whole
tempo. 6 \(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}g5}\) is probably stronger. We didn’t
want to continue following the book with 6...
0-0 7 e3 – it leads to a rather passive
position that is not in Alexandria’s style. But
one can play like Nogueiras.

\[
\begin{align*}
5 & \ldots & \text{\textit{\textsc{e}}e7} \\
6 & \text{\textit{\textsc{g}}g5} & \text{\textit{\textsc{d}}xc4} \\
7 & \text{\textit{\textsc{w}}xc4} & \text{\textit{\textsc{b}}6}
\end{align*}
\]

In the event of 8 g3 it transpires that, compared with the F.Portisch–Nogueiras
game, Black has played ...
\(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}e7}\), a far more
useful move than White’s \(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}g5}\). Generally
speaking, the fianchetto in conjunction with
the bishop at g5 looks somehow ridiculous.
And since this is so, White is practically
forced to play 8 e4, when Black carries out
the idea of exchanging on f1.

It is another question just how good it is.
Later Yusupov and I analysed this variation
and came to the conclusion that White
nevertheless gains the better chances.

\[
\begin{align*}
8 & \text{\textit{\textsc{e}}e4} & \text{\textit{\textsc{a}}a6} \\
9 & \text{\textit{\textsc{w}}b3} & \text{\textit{\textsc{xf}}1} \\
10 & \text{\textit{\textsc{xf}}1} \\
10 & \text{\textit{\textsc{xf}}1} & \text{\textit{\textsc{g}}2-g3} & \text{\textit{\textsc{g}}2} & \text{\textit{\textsc{b}}6} & \text{\textit{\textsc{d}}7}
\end{align*}
\]

10 \(\text{\textit{\textsc{xf}}1}\) followed by \(g2-g3\) and \(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}2}\) was a
good alternative.

\[
\begin{align*}
10 & \ldots & 0-0 \\
11 & 0-0-0 & \text{\textit{\textsc{bd}}7}
\end{align*}
\]

White has harmoniously developed her
pieces and she controls more space. Her
position is probably preferable. But, in view
of the castling on opposite sides, a sharpening
of the play can be expected. It was for
just such a turn of events – favourable for
herself and uncomfortable for the opponent
– that Alexandria had aimed. Therefore we
were quite satisfied with the result of the
opening. Here, if you like, is a typical
example of taking into account the virtues
and deficiencies of an opponent when
choosing an opening variation. In the end
our reckoning was justified, although we had
to experience many anxious moments.

Despite the fact that the resulting position
had been reached in our home preparations,
Alexandria spent 35 minutes on the preceding
moves that had been planned in advance.
Not such a small amount – this time
could have been missed later. As you see,
from the very start of the game deficiency
\(N3\) displayed itself – irrational expenditure
of time.

\[
\begin{align*}
12 & \text{\textit{\textsc{e}}e5} \\
12 & \ldots & \text{\textit{\textsc{d}}xe5} \\
13 & \text{\textit{\textsc{x}}xf6}!
\end{align*}
\]

At home, superficially checking the varia-
tions, we had satisfied ourselves that after 13
\(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}xe5} \text{\textit{\textsc{d}}d7}\) Black is excellently placed.
Akhmylovskaya evaluated the position cor-
rectly (\(L1\)) and played more strongly.
Of course, 13...\textit{xf6}? 14 dxe5 \textit{g5}+ 15 f4 is bad. If 13...\textit{d3}+ 14 \textit{xd3} \textit{xf6}, then roughly the same position is reached as in the game, expect that instead of a knight Black is left with a bishop. It is doubtful whether this factor is to her advantage. After defending the d4-pawn, White will then continue f2–f4, e4–e5 and \textit{e4} with the better chances.

Without extreme necessity, we are not accustomed to sharply changing the pattern of play, and therefore certain moves sometimes simply fall out of our field of view. The idea 13...\textit{gx}f6!? did not occur to anyone. It looks strange, but let's nevertheless check what happens after 14 dxe5 \textit{c7}.

15 exf6 \textit{xf6} 16 f4 suggests itself, intending e4–e5 and \textit{e4}. It is not clear what Black has achieved, and why the kingside has been weakened. Yes, this is so, but we have not taken into consideration an intermediate check, which changes the evaluation of the position: 15...\textit{f4}+! 16 \textit{b1} \textit{xf6}. Look – Black has a strong bishop at f6, and the queen at f4 is also playing on White's nerves: either it wants to take on h2, or on e4 (after the exchange on c3). But most probably Black will simply play in the centre with ...\textit{ad8}. I would prefer her position.

White in turn can try to improve on the variation with 16 \textit{d2} (instead of 16 \textit{b1}) 16...\textit{xf6} 17 \textit{g3} \textit{f3} (otherwise 18 f4) 18 \textit{d5} (after 16 \textit{b1} this move would not have been possible) 18...\textit{xb3} 19 \textit{xf6}+ \textit{g7} 20 \textit{h5}+ \textit{h6} 21 axb3 with the better endgame. But in this case Black has another intermediate move in reserve: 16...\textit{fd8}! 17 \textit{fd1} (17 \textit{d5} \textit{xd5}!? 18 exd5 \textit{b4}) 17...\textit{xf6} (f2–f4 is no longer possible) or even 17...\textit{xd2}!? 18 \textit{xd2} \textit{ad8}.

In playing 13...\textit{gx}f6, Black must also reckon (after 14 dxe5 \textit{c7}) with the positional pawn sacrifice 15 f4 fxe5 16 f5!. But here too she has sufficient counter-chances. For example, she can play 16...\textit{exf5}. If 17 \textit{xf5}, then 17...\textit{h8} or 17...\textit{g7} followed by 18...\textit{f6}. White's knight and queen are too distant from the kingside, to that she is unable to quickly create an attack there, and Black will immediately begin play in the centre: ...\textit{ad8}. She is, after all, a pawn up.

If instead 17 \textit{exf5}, then 17...\textit{fd8} 18 \textit{e4} \textit{d5}!. Again White does not obtain a positional bind – in return for the fine knight at e4 Black has not only an extra pawn, but also strong points in the centre.

The conclusion: 13...\textit{gx}f6! was an excellent move, which would have ensured good counterplay. (This was why White should have preferred 12 \textit{b1}, retaining \textit{xe5} as a threat). But should Nana be reproached? I am sure that such a decision would have been beyond the powers of many male grandmasters.

\begin{center}
\textbf{14 \textit{xe7} \textit{xe7}}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\textbf{15 f4}
\end{center}

Let's think about what Black should do.

It seems to me that there are two possible plans. The first is the attempt to gain some squares in the centre for her pieces, by playing ...f7–f5. This move is probably best prepared, by first moving the king off the a2–g8 diagonal: 15...\textit{h8}.

The other course is play on the queenside: ...\textit{b6–b5} and ...\textit{b6}, followed by \textit{c4} or
...a7–a5–a4. In the event of e4–e5 the black knight will be able to occupy the d5-square. I don’t know which of these plans is stronger, but one of them should have been chosen. Alas, Nana played routinely and not very successfully (N2).

15 ... Had8?! What for? If Black wants to attack on the queenside, the rook will be needed there. And if she wants to play ...f7–f5, it may be necessary to defend the e6-pawn with a rook.

16 e5
Akhmylovskaya acts logically and consistently. She wants to play Qe4 and occupy the strong d6-square with her knight. In addition, Black has to reckon with the threat of an attack on the kingside by f4–f5. Therefore her reply is practically forced.

16 ... f5 What should White play? You have not forgotten that the players have castled on opposite sides? Then 17 g4! should be the first move that comes into your head. If 17...fxg4 18 f5 – the e6-pawn is attacked and the knight gains the e4-square. The reply 17...g6 may not even be considered – it is clear that the inclusion of the moves 17 g4 g6 is advantageous to White.

Both players overlooked 17 g4!. Alexandria – because of her lack of sense of danger (N5). Akhmylovskaya – since she is a purely positional player, and sharp attacking moves are not her style (L2).

17 a4
This looks rather risky, since it weakens the flank where the white king is placed. Nevertheless, if one forgets about the possibility 17 g4!, Akhmylovskaya’s decision is positional justified. She inhibits the development of Black’s initiative on the queenside by ...b6–b5 and ...Qb6.

17 ... Hh8
18 Qb1

What would you now play as Black? One of the sensible plans is 18...a6, preparing 19...b5.

Another possible line of play is 18...Qb8, intending to take the knight via a6 to the weakened b4-square. If the knight is prevented from going to b4, it will head via c7 to d5. After 18...Qb8 19 WC4 it is possible, by defending the e6-pawn, to prepare ...WB7, but Black can also remember her first plan and play 19...a6 followed by 20...b5 with gain of tempo.

18 ... Hb8?
But this move is bad. The knight is stuck on the poor square d7. Again, strategically Alexandria is not up to the mark (N2).

19 WC1 a5

After the immediate 19...b5 Black obviously did not like the reply 20 a5.

Akhmylovskaya has outplayed her opponent, which is not surprising – we have already mentioned her superiority over Alexandria in positional play. But now Akhmylovskaya begins to have difficulties. Her advantage needs to be exploited in the most accurate way, and usually she does not manage this (L3). Now White should have played 20 Qd1. The knight heads via c4 to the d6-square. In passing, and this is very important, White attacks the c6-pawn, diverting the opponent from playing ...b6–
b5. After 20...\texttt{b}c8 21 \texttt{c}e3 she is threatening 22 \texttt{c}c4, and 21...b5 is hardly possible in view of 22 axb5, when the rook at c8 is hanging. 20...c5 is also bad on account of 21 d5.

20 \texttt{c}c2? \texttt{b}7
21 \texttt{d}d1

Now this is no longer so strong – Black has a convenient way of defending her c6-pawn.

21 ... \texttt{b}8
22 \texttt{e}3 \texttt{b}5
23 axb5

There was the interesting move 23 \texttt{c}5!? Exploiting the fact that it is hard for the knight to tear itself away from the defence of the c6-pawn, White attacks b5 and cuts off the black queen's path to b4.

23 ... \texttt{xb}5

Although Black has acquired some weak pawns on the queenside, her pieces are gradually coming into play and the position is becoming sharper.

24 \texttt{w}c3 \texttt{a}7
25 \texttt{d}d1

25 \texttt{c}c4 was stronger.

What does White want? Probably, to play her knight to d6. The rook at b5 will have to retreat somewhere, but all the same it will remain on an open file, whereas the second black rook will be passive. Therefore 25...\texttt{d}8! 26 \texttt{c}c4 \texttt{dd}5 suggests itself. Now 27 \texttt{d}6 is no longer so dangerous – the king's rook has forced its way into the centre, where it attacks the d4-pawn and supports the undermining move ...c6–c5. Unfortunately, Alexandria missed this opportunity (\texttt{N}2).

25 ... \texttt{a}4?!
26 \texttt{c}c4 \texttt{a}6
27 \texttt{d}d6

If 27 \texttt{a}5?! there follows 27...c5. Akhmylovskaya is usually not attracted by flank diversions, but plays towards the centre.

27 ... \texttt{b}6

This is probably correct. In the event of the sharper 27...\texttt{b}3 the following variation was possible: 28 \texttt{xc}6 \texttt{b}4? (28...a3 29 \texttt{wa}4) 29 \texttt{w}c8 \texttt{wb}8 30 \texttt{f}7+! \texttt{g}8 31 \texttt{xe}6, threatening the famous smothered mate (31...\texttt{xc}2 32 \texttt{h}6+ \texttt{h}8 33 \texttt{g}8+! \texttt{gx}g8 34 \texttt{f}7 mate).

28 \texttt{wa}5 \texttt{h}6

Black could have taken her last piece across to the queenside: 28...\texttt{a}8, but she prefers to play more cunningly. As we have just seen, Black needs an escape square for her king, and at the same time she invites her opponent to take the a4-pawn, after which lines are opened on the queenside for an attack.

29 \texttt{w}a4?!

Akhmylovskaya is greedy. 29 \texttt{d}d3 followed by \texttt{a}3 was preferable.

29 ... \texttt{a}8

How sharply the situation has changed! For the pawn Black has a dangerous attack along the opened a- and b-files (imagine to yourself a Benko Gambit with the white king on the queenside). 30...\texttt{b}8 is threatened, and then the black knight will go to b4...

We see that, as soon as tense calculating play has begun instead of quiet manoeuvring, Alexandria has outplayed Akhmylovskaya. There is nothing surprising in this, in view of \texttt{N}1 and \texttt{L}2.
30 3c3 31 d4 3b5 31...3b4 also came into consideration.
32 3a3 3c7 33 3c2 3d5

White has successfully included her rook in the defence, and the position is now rather unclear. She should have simply defended her pawn by 34 g3. The preparatory exchange of rooks, carried out by Akhmylovskaya, is incorrect.

34 3xa8? 3xa8 35 g3

What told here was the 35 minutes spent to no purpose in the opening by Nana. In time-trouble (N3) she missed a comparatively simple way to win. Can you see what she should have played?

Black would have won by 35...c5! 36 dxc5 3b4 37 3b3?! (37 3c3 is more tenacious) 37...3e4+. The geometry is attractive: the attack along the file is strengthened by the inclusion of the queen along the seemingly firmly blocked h1—a8 diagonal.

35...
36 3d3

Now 36...3b4 37 3a3 3xc2 38 3xa6 3xd4 would have led to a roughly equal endgame. But in a severe time scramble Alexandria plays for a win.

36...
37 3a3 3b6 38 3c4 3b5 39 3a3??

A serious oversight. After 39 b3 the position would have remained unclear.

39...
40 3xb2 3xd3+

Black has regained the pawn and now has a big positional advantage. Alexandria’s superiority in sharp play told in the end.

Here Akhmylovskaya sealed her move. On the resumption Nana converted her advantage in highly instructive fashion. The ending of the game is quite a good illustration of an idea examined in the 6th part of the book in a lecture by grandmaster Grigory Kaidanov.

41 3a1

Now the obvious 41...3c3 would have led to the win of the d4-pawn. The best defensive possibility for White was 42 3b3! 3xd4 43 3c2. Strangely enough, here even a detailed analysis did not enable a convincing winning path to be found (cf. the chapter ‘How hard it is to win a won position!’ from the first book of my series *School of Chess Excellence*).

Tearing myself away at some point from the tiring analysis of variations, I suddenly realised that all Black’s difficulties with the conversion of her obvious advantage stem-
A Chess Player's Virtues and Deficiencies

med from the non-participation of her king. Was it worth spending tempi on the winning of the not too important d4-pawn, allowing White during this time to consolidate?

41 ... h7!!
42 b1 g6!
Threatening ...g6–h5–g4–h3. If 43 b8 there follows 43...xd4+ 44 a2 b4+ with a decisive attack.

43 d2 xd2
44 c4

Everything else is equally hopeless. The main variation of the analysis looked like this: 45 h3 g5 46 fxg5 hxg5 47 b2 g4 (47... f4? 48 gxf4 gxf4 49 f3) 48 hxg4+ (48 h4 f4) 48...xg4 49 c2! (bad is 49 f1 f13 with the threat of 50...f2 or 50...e2 51 h2 h2, while 49...b3 leads to the main variation) 49...xg3 50 d3 g2! (but not 50...f4? 51 e4; 50...f2 51 b3 f4 52 e4 is also inaccurate) 51 c4 (if 51 b3 or 51 e2, then 51...f4 is decisive) 51...f2! (51... f4 is less methodical: 52 c5 f3 53 xc6 f2 54 d6 and 54...f4? 55 d5! is bad for Black) 52 c5 (52 d3 f4+ 53 c4 e2) 52...e2 with an easy win, since White is not able even to sacrifice the knight for the f-pawn.

45 ... g4
46 a5 e7
47 b2

If 47 b7 both 47...g5 and 47...h3 48 d8 h2 49 xe6 xg3 50 xg7 g4 are possible.

47 ... h3
48 c3 xh2
49 c4 xg3
50 c5 h5
51 d6

If 51 xc6 the simplest is 51...xc6 52 xc6 h4 53 d5 h3, and the black pawn queens with check.

51 ... d5

51...h4 would also have won easily.

52 xe6 h4
53 xc6 xf4+
54 xf5 h3

White resigned.

Now let us analyse the ninth game, which proved to be the last in the match. Alexandria was leading her opponent by two points and had the white pieces. Akhmylovskaya needed to win two games in a row.

Alexandria – Akhmylovskaya
9th match game, Kislovodsk 1980

Trompowsky Opening

1 d4 d6
2 g5 e6

Even in a situation when a draw is equivalent to defeat, Akhmylovskaya chooses the quietest system of development. On the one hand, this is correct – you should play ‘your’ positions, and employ variations that correspond to your own chess tastes and style of play. On the other hand, one can only regret that her style is insufficiently universal and even at such an important moment it does not allow (on account of L2) the employment of sharper development plans.

3 xf6 exf6
4 e3 e4
5 d2 c6
6 d3 f5
7 f3

This move is usually useful in such positions, but here, I think, White should not have been in a hurry to play it. 7 e2 was sounder, followed by c2–c4 and c3 (or f4). And only then, if it was required, f3 could be played.

7 ... g6
8 e2 d7

Now if 9 c4 there is the unpleasant reply 9...b4, and so first Alexandria castles.

9 0-0 d6

9...f6 and 10...e4 was stronger. It was here that the drawbacks to the queen’s early development would have told.
PART I

10 c4  \text{ \textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{f6}}}}

11 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\text{f4}}}}  \text{0-0}

12 cxd5  cxd5?! \\

I would have preferred to recapture on d5 with a piece, probably the bishop. Akhmylovs-

dkaya wants to invade with her knight at e4, but in itself this square is not so important.

Far more significant is the fact that the light-
square bishop remains shut in by its own

pawns.

Now let us remember White’s last five

moves: \textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\text{e2}}}}, 0-0, c4, \textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\text{f4}}}} and cxd5. All of

them, with the exception of the last one, are obvious, almost self-evident, and they could

have been made even in a blitz game. How much time should be spent on them? Probably about ten minutes, slightly less, slightly more. But how much time had Alexandria spent, do you think? 30 minutes? No, go higher – more than an hour! This is, of course, completely impractical, and it seriously reduces the chances of success in the game. Ahead lie problems that are rather more difficult than those that have been solved over the past five moves, and there will almost certainly be insufficient time for them. What told here was not only Nana’s ‘time-trouble sickness’ (\textit{\textbf{\text{N3}}}), but also her excessive emotionality (\textit{\textbf{\text{N4}}}). The atmosphere of the decisive game affects her, forces her to become nervous and to re-

check her decisions, as a result of which the quality of her play suffers.

13 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\text{b3}}}}?!

\text{(see diagram)}

There is nothing for the knight to do at b3. Unfortunately, Alexandria sometimes places

her pieces badly (\textit{\textbf{\text{N2}}}). 13 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\text{e2}}}} was better, vacating the f3-square for the knight or the

pawn, and if necessary the black knight could have been driven away from e4.

However, all the same White’s position remains very solid. Black does not stand

dead, but don’t forget that she needs to win

without fail. Akhmylovs-kaya begins playing

actively. But sharp play is not her natural

element and therefore each of her next few

moves proves not very successful.

13 \ldots  \text{g5}?!

14 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\text{h5}}}  \text{\textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\text{e4}}}}}?!

14...g4 15 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\text{xf6+}}}  \textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\text{xf6}}}} and then \ldots f5–f4

was better.

15 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\text{e2}}}  \text{g4}?!

Why concede the f4-square?

16 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\text{f4}}}  \textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\text{g5}}}}

Let’s now consider how White should

proceed further.

I have an unexpected suggestion: let’s

check 17 \textit{\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{\text{x}}}}xe4 and, say, 17...fxe4 18 g3.
White has an excellent knight at f4; the exchange on f4 will leave Black with a hopelessly bad bishop. (You will realise that, if the black pawn had still been at g7, I would not have suggested this.)

White has some useful moves, for example \( \text{c5, d1} \) and \( \text{b5} \). But what play does Black have? Perhaps only ...h7–h5–h4, preparing an attack along the h-file. But firstly, this is not too dangerous, since ...hxg3 can always be answered by fxg3, maintaining a defence along the 2nd rank. In addition, it is clear that White’s activity will develop much more quickly.

I think that after the exchange on e4 any play for a win by Black would have ended, without seriously beginning, and her position would have become completely unpromising. Moreover, it is not essential to hurry with the exchange – the preparatory 17 g3 is in no way inferior.

20 \text{h1}?! An excellent prophylactic move. Now in the event of \( \text{x} \)xe4 White will be unable to also exchange rooks by \( \text{g3} \). But all the same White’s position remains solid; nothing terrible has yet occurred. Obviously it is time that her badly placed knight at b3 was moved somewhere.

21 \text{c1} \text{g4}

22 \text{c2}?

It is tempting to place the knight at d3, but Black has a strong reply which was underestimated by Alexandria. What told was her poor sense of danger \( (N5) \). 22 \text{d1} and 23 \text{e2} was sounder. From e2 the knight would have supported its colleague at f4 and controlled the g3-square, and in some cases it could have gone to c3.

22 ... \text{ag8}
An excellent move – the bishop unexpectedly threatens to come into play via b5. If 24 a4, then 24...b5!.

Alexandria decided against taking on d5 on account of a wild variation which does credit to her imagination (N1). (I suspect, however, that it did not even occur to Akhmylovskaya.) 24 ��xd5 ��h4 (threatening ...��g3+) 25 ��h3 ��c6!! 26 ��xh4 ��xh4. For the queen Black has only a rook, but all her pieces are participating in the attack, and it is difficult for White to parry the numerous threats.

After finding such a spectacular idea for her opponent, with the move made Nana overlooked another, simpler one. However, the position has become much sharper and it is not easy to give White good advice.

24 ��f2 ��xf4!
25 ��xf4 ��xf4

Question: with what should White take on e4?

During the last few moves the situation has changed abruptly, and has become unpleasant for White, although as yet by no means hopeless. Here it is very important to maintain your composure, and calmly tackle the resulting problems. But, as I have already mentioned, Alexandria is excessively emotional, and a change in the character of the play strongly influences her mood. She is not able to stop, take herself in hand and calmly calculate variations, and so she usually commits one mistake after another (N4).

We are faced with a problem, the solving of which demands a combination of accurate calculation and correct positional evaluation. I think that ��xe4 is correct. After 26...��xe3 there is 27 ��c5 or 27 ��f6, if there is nothing better, so that only the reply 26...��xh2 needs to be feared. But then 27 ��xh2 fxe4 28 ��h5, attacking the f7- and d5-pawns, or 27...��h4+ 28 ��g 1 fxe4 29 ��xf7. In both cases White retains counterplay.

The capture on e4 with the bishop is much weaker.

26 ��xe4? ��b8?

As soon as things come to specific calculation, Akhmylovskaya makes a mistake (L2, L3). In reply to 26 ��xe4 she had probably planned to retreat her bishop, trying to exploit the 'advantage of the two bishops', and now she does not want to deviate from her plan. However, the capture on e4 with either pawn would have secured her a big advantage:

a) 26...f6xe4 27 exf4 e3! (a blockade of the pawns on the dark squares must not be allowed). The bishop immediately acquires excellent prospects, for example, ...��g4, ...��f5–e4 or ...a7–a6 and ...��b5. The passed pawn is also very dangerous.

b) 26...dxe4 27 exf4 ��b4!. Now ...��b5 is threatened, the d4-pawn is attacked, defending it is rather inconvenient, and the white knight is badly placed.

I don't know which of these captures is the stronger, but in any event both are better than the move made by Akhmylovskaya.

27 ��f3 ��h4?

Another mistake – Lena simply overlooks her opponent's only reply. 27...��e8 should
have been played, setting White the problem of defending the e3-pawn.

\[ 28 \text{Qh3} \quad \text{He8} \\
29 \text{Fd2} \quad \text{Fe7} \\
30 \text{fxd5?}\]

Now the white knight is stuck for some time at h3. Of course, 30 \text{Qf4} \text{xe3} 31 \text{xe3} \text{xe3} 32 \text{xd5} was stronger, with somewhat the better endgame for White. Again Alexandria displays her inadequate positional understanding (N2) together with her tendency to make several mistakes in a row (N4).

Nana rejected 30 \text{Qf4} because of the reply 30...\text{c6}, after which it is not possible to capture on d5. A trivial reason! The simplest was to play as solidly as possible: 31 g3! \text{xe3} 32 \text{xe3} \text{xe3} and now either 33 \text{xd5}, or the cool-headed 33 \text{g2}. There is no need to hurry with the regaining of the pawn – everything is safely blockaded, the mobility of the bishops is restricted and White is at any rate no worse.

\[ 30 \ldots \text{xe3} \\
31 \text{xe3} \quad \text{xe3}\]

Threatening 32...\text{e2}.

\[ 32 \text{f3} \]

Black’s position is preferable – she has the two bishops and for the moment the white knight is out of play. If only the kingside pawns weren’t broken...

White will obviously want to bring her king to the centre. Before this happens, some kind of activity must be undertaken. I suggest 32...a5!? with the idea of ...\text{a7}. It is advantageous for Black to lure the pawn to d5 and to post her bishop in the centre at d4.

\[ 32 \ldots \text{b6}?! \]

What for? After all, White will not want to take on b7, since she has only just played \text{f3}. Now it will not be easy to attack the d4-pawn. Again the habit of making moves ‘on general grounds’ prevented Lena from exploiting the advantages of her position (L3).

\[ 33 \text{g1} \quad \text{g7}\]

Had Alexandria now played 34 \text{f2}, she would have obtained an excellent position. It would only remain for her to play g2–g3 and place her knight on f4. However, Nana was already in time-trouble (N3) and in such cases logic and calculation tend to be replaced by emotions and feelings – which are frequently erroneous. Alexandria saw that in the event of 34 \text{f2} \text{d3} she would simultaneously have two pawns en prise, but the fact that after 35 \text{xd1} \text{xd1} 36 \text{xd1} it is not possible to capture on h2 was something she did not have time to realise.

\[ 34 \text{d1}?! \quad \text{e8} \\
35 \text{g3}?\]

Why is this move planned by White incorrect? She should have asked herself what Black wanted, why she retreated her rook. Only to avoid the tempo-gaining \text{f2}, or with some other idea? Of course, it is heading for c8. It should not have been allowed onto the open c-file, and so 35 \text{c1} should have been played.

\[ 35 \ldots \quad \text{c8} \\
36 \text{d2} \quad \text{d6} \\
37 \text{a3} \quad \text{e7} \\
38 \text{f4} \quad \text{g5}\]

I have to admit that I don’t understand the point of the bishop manoeuvre to g5.

\[ 39 \text{f2} \quad \text{f8}\]
Here the game was adjourned. White has a solid but nevertheless rather passive position. Despite her broken pawns on the kingside, Black retains the initiative thanks to her two bishops and control of the open c-file.

What is White’s best play? Her bishop is now firing into space, and it would be not a bad thing to switch it to b3, covering the light squares on the queenside and preparing the exchange of rooks on c2. After d1! the game would have soon ended in a draw. Unfortunately, Alexandria sealed a less accurate move (N2, N5).

41 d5? a4!
The bishop can no longer go to b3, and Black wants to activate her pieces by ...c1 and ...c2–e4.

42 b3
In analysis we decided that this move was necessary. But now Black acquires the excellent square c3 for the invasion of her rook.

42 . . . e8
We mainly reckoned on 42...d7 43 a4 xf4 44 gxf4 c3. Here White’s defence is not so easy as it may appear at first sight. The best is probably 45 e2! c8! (45...h3 46 c2; 45...b5 46 axb5 xb5+ 47 c4) 46 c4 h3 47 d5 xh4 48 e3 d7! 49 e2!, but not 49 d6? h6! and not 49 d4? e7!.

43 a4 g7
44 e2 c7!
An excellent prophylactic move. Akhmylovskaya takes away the important c4-square from the enemy bishop. Now 45 c4 is bad in view of 45...xa4 (with the rook at c8 the capture on a4 would not have been possible on account of the intermediate move a6). Black wants, after placing her king on d6, to drive the white bishop from the centre and then play her own bishop to e6.

45 d3 c2?
Akhmylovskaya wrongly deviates from her plan. 45...e7! would have retained an advantage for Black, whereas the invasion of the rook is easily parried.

46 e3
Having defended the d4-pawn, White wants to offer the exchange of rooks by 47 c3. The minor piece endgame is drawn, and if Black avoids the exchange the invasion of the white rook at c8 or c7 is unpleasant.

46 . . . h6+
47 f3
Again threatening c3.

47 . . . g7
Now White could have returned with her king to e3, but the exchange of rooks also works immediately.

48 c3 xc3
49 xc3
If 49...xd4 there follows 50 b5 with a draw. The position has become completely equal, and Black no longer has any winning chances.

49 . . . d7
50 e2 e6
51 e4 e7
52 e3 d6
53 f4 h6
54 f3 g7
55 e3 h6
56  \textit{\textbf{\textit{\\f3}}}

Draw agreed.

As you see, the game turned out to be rather difficult and dreary, with numerous mistakes. What can be done – such far from exemplary games occur with each one of us, and far more often than we would like. I think you will agree that the mistakes made by both contestants were not accidental, but were the consequence of their inherent chess and psychological deficiencies. I hope that this discussion will induce you to look at yourself and your play, think about what is hindering you, and about what deficiencies you urgently need to eradicate.

\section*{Exercises}

As a piece of homework I am offering you three exercises. They are taken from the games of one and the same famous grandmaster. After you have found the solutions, think about what may be the vulnerable point of this grandmaster, if in all three he cases he did not choose the strongest continuation.

1. Black to move

2. White to move

3. White to move
Solutions

1. Smyslov–Botvinnik (world championship match, Moscow 1958, 7th game).

At this point Mikhail Botvinnik accepted his opponent’s offer of a draw. However, he could have gained an advantage by sacrificing the exchange.

\[
\begin{align*}
16 & \ldots \quad \text{xf3!} \\
17 & \text{gxf3} \quad \text{c6} \\
18 & \text{xd1} \quad \text{d5} \\
19 & \text{h3} \\
19 & \text{c1 e6} \ 20 \ b3 \text{f8}. \\
19 & \ldots \quad \text{we6}
\end{align*}
\]

With a double attack on h3 and a2.

Why didn’t Botvinnik play this? Here is his own explanation: ‘During the game I considered the exchange sacrifice only after the preparatory exchange of queens on b3, overlooking after 16...\text{xf3} 17 \text{xc4} the intermediate move 17...\text{xe3+}.’

2. Botvinnik–Smyslov (world championship match, Moscow 1958, 18th game)

The game went 23 \text{h3}? \text{e5} 24 \text{xe5 fxe5} 25 14? (25 \text{e6+ h8} 26 \text{f3! is equal}) 25...\text{c6} 26 \text{g5?!}, and here Vasily Smyslov played 26...\text{de8}?, missing a forced win by 26...\text{d2! 27 e6+ f7! 28 xf7+ xf7.}

But earlier a win was missed by White.

\[
\begin{align*}
23 & \text{d4!!} \quad \text{xd4} \\
23 & \text{cxd4 24 d5+! xd5 25 e8! or} \\
24 & \text{h8 25 e7.} \\
24 & \text{e7!}
\end{align*}
\]

Botvinnik made a mistake not only in the game, but also in his analysis. He gave 24 \text{d5+!} (Botvinnik’s exclamation mark) 24...\text{xd5 25 e7, but in this case Black saves} himself by 25...\text{e2+!} 26 \text{f1} (not 26 \text{xe2? d1! or 26 \text{xe2? d1+ 27 \text{g2 c6+} 28 f3 xf3}) 26...\text{h7 27 \text{xf7 xf7}} 28 \text{wh7+} \text{f8} (found when solving home-work by students at the Dvoretsky–Yusupov school).

\[
\begin{align*}
24 & \ldots \quad \text{xf7} \\
25 & \text{d5!} \\
25 & \text{xf7 e2+ 26 \text{xe2 d1+} 27 \text{f1 xf1+} 28 \text{xf1 d1+ 29 e1 b5+ 30 g2 d5+} 31 \text{g1 f7 32 f4 also wins, but 25 d5! is simpler and more convincing.} \\
25 & \ldots \quad \text{f3+} \\
26 & \text{h1} \quad \text{xf2} \\
27 & \text{xf7+} \quad \text{h8} \\
28 & \text{e8+!}
\end{align*}
\]


The tempting 25 f5? is incorrect in view of 25...\text{xe4!}. The game went 25 \text{f3?! \text{c4 26 d3, and now instead of} 26...\text{b4?! 27 b3 xd2 28 xd2 e7 29 de2 Black could have equalised by} 26...\text{f5! 27 xf5+ gxf5 28 b3 c7.}

An unexpected combination was found by grandmaster Georgy Tringov.

\[
\begin{align*}
25 & \text{b3!!} \quad \text{xf1} \\
26 & \text{b2} \quad \text{f8} \\
27 & \text{e6+} \quad \text{xe6} \\
28 & \text{dxe6}
\end{align*}
\]

(As was pointed out many years later by X. Fernandes, White’s combination was nevertheless insufficient for a win. In the variation suggested by Botvinnik 25...\text{xe4!} 26 \text{xe4 xf1 27 e6+ g8 28 wb2 e5 29 xe5 dxe5 30 xe5 c7? 31 xc7 it} is not essential to give up the rook – after 30...\text{f7! White has only a perpetual check.})

In his comments on these three examples, Botvinnik himself gave the diagnosis: ‘what told was my old “illness” – weakness of combinative vision.’ It is best treated by doing exercises on the solving of studies and practical positions with an unusual and pretty content.
In chess, as in any type of sport, the guarantee of a competitor’s future successes is a clearly organised training process. There are many playing skills, such as the ability to calculate variations deeply, to evaluate a position correctly, to convert an advantage accurately, and to find the psychologically correct solution. These skills can and should be developed by special training. The constant focusing of a player’s attention on any ‘retarded’ components of his play and the repeating of special exercises helps a particular deficiency to be eliminated or reduced to the minimum.

Of course, skills can also be developed without systematic study, as a result of tournament practice alone. However, this process is uncontrolled and haphazard. As a result, many strong players have deficiencies that are amazing for their class. But we have been able to achieve success in developing reliability and stability in play, precisely by the systematic elimination of deficiencies.

Valery Chekhov, for example, had a poor mastery of endgame technique, and in working with him the main focus had to be on a study of typical methods of conducting endings. As a result the standard of his play improved literally before our eyes.

For a long time Sergey Dolmatov lacked physical stamina, but constant participation in sports (running, football, swimming etc.) combined with hydrotherapy, strengthened his nervous system. Now he has enough strength both for five hours’ play, and for the entire length of a tournament.

There are always many problems, and when you solve one, others arise. For example, the improvement in Dolmatov’s technique led to him starting to avoid positions involving calculation, and aiming to decide the outcome of a game by purely technical means.

This position was reached in one of Dolmatov’s games (he had Black) after the following opening moves: 1 e4 c5 2 d4 c6 3 d4 cxd4 4 dxe4 f6 5 e5 e6 6 c6 bxc6 7 g5 h8 8 c4.

Here, faithful to his ‘technical’ credo, he chose 8...h6?!, and although he subsequently won, in a post-mortem he was criticised for having rejected 8...xh2!!.
Indeed, it is not hard to demonstrate that after 9 \( \texttt{b3} \texttt{b4} 10 \texttt{d2} \texttt{a5} 11 \texttt{a4} \) (11 \texttt{f3} \texttt{a6}?!?) 11...\( \texttt{xe4} \) in return for the exchange Black has a very strong attack.

Having observed this tendency in good time, we took appropriate measures. Our efforts were aimed at developing in Dolmatov a taste for sharp, calculating, dynamic play, which in general is typical of his natural talent. This work soon told and helped Sergey to victory in the world championship.

In the course of their work my pupils make active use of their own games and analyses. Here is an example. Once, when studying the position that arises from the Chelyabinsk Variation after 1 \texttt{e4} \texttt{c5} 2 \texttt{f3} \texttt{c6} 3 \texttt{d4} \texttt{cxd4} 4 \texttt{xd4} \texttt{f6} 5 \texttt{c3} \texttt{e5} 6 \texttt{db5} \texttt{d6} 7 \texttt{a4} \texttt{h6} 8 \texttt{c4} \texttt{a6} 9 \texttt{a3} \texttt{e6} 10 0-0 \texttt{c8}, Yusupov discovered a reply that at first sight seemed unpleasant – 11 \texttt{xe6} \texttt{fxe6} 12 \texttt{w3}.

\[ \text{Diagram 1} \]

Now if 12...\( \texttt{e7} \), then 13 \texttt{g3} is strong, and Black cannot castle on account of 14 \texttt{xh6}, while if 13...\( \texttt{f7} \), then the reply 14 \texttt{f4} is unpleasant. After some searching Yusupov suggested 12...\texttt{wd7} followed by ...\texttt{f7}, ...\texttt{e7} and ...0-0. However, such a slow plan allows White quite good chances of developing an initiative by f2–f4.

A joint analysis enabled us after 12...\( \texttt{e7} \) 13 \texttt{g3} to find the strong move 13...\( \texttt{g5} \), radically preventing the undermining move f2–f4. Black achieves a more than comfortable game.

While analysing this position, at the same time we studied the plans for the two sides when there is such a pawn structure in the middlegame. The typical advance f2–f4 proves highly effective, for example, in the variation 1 \texttt{e4} \texttt{c5} 2 \texttt{f3} \texttt{c6} 3 \texttt{d4} \texttt{cxd4} 4 \texttt{xd4} \texttt{f6} 5 \texttt{c3} \texttt{a6} 6 \texttt{e3} \texttt{e5} 7 \texttt{f3} \texttt{h6} 8 \texttt{c4} \texttt{e6} 9 \texttt{xe6} \texttt{fxe6} 10 \texttt{h4}.

\[ \text{Diagram 2} \]

After 10...\texttt{f7} White replies 11 \texttt{f4}!, and if 11...\texttt{exf4}, then 12 \texttt{e5}! with a strong attack, and otherwise 12 \texttt{f5} is unpleasant.

The plan with ...\texttt{g7}–\texttt{g5} in similar positions also occurred earlier, for example in the game Drimer–Bronstein (Budapest 1961).

\[ \text{Diagram 3} \]
With 16 h4 White initiated action on the kingside, but after 16...f7 17 g3 d4 18 d1 g5! he was obliged to return with his knight: 19 f3xf3+ 20 xf3 b5 21 a3 c6 etc.

Thus opening analyses are closely interwoven with the study of typical positions, sometimes not directly linked with the variation in question. In other cases too, when in any details we discover something general, we try to focus attention on this general aspect.

A trainer is, of course, also obliged to think about how to reveal the strongest aspects of his pupils' chess talent. The quality of his work is characterised, in particular, by the diversity of his pupils' styles of play. A convincing example is provided by Viktor Kart, who has produced such diverse players as Alexander Belyavsky, Oleg Romanishin, Adrian Mikhalechishin and Marta Litinskaya. Each of my pupils also has their own distinctive style, which does not depend on my tastes. Thus Yusupov is especially strong in a complicated strategic struggle, which for me was always a stumbling-block.

Generally speaking, the role of the trainer in modern big-time sport has increased greatly. This also applies to chess. A top-class player has to be excellently prepared psychologically, physically and in the purely chess sense, and achieving this without the help of an experienced mentor is far from easy.

Correct psychological orientation is important. Anton Makarenko (a prominent Soviet pedagogue and writer in the 1920s and 1930s – translator) advised teachers to help their pupils arrange for themselves a definite system of goals: immediate, distant (major) and middle (intermediate).

In our work the main aim was to become a genuine, top-class chess player. The immediate aims were the solving of current improvement objectives and successful play in regular events. And the implementation of a preparation program for the junior championships of the world and of Europe, aimed at 1½–2 years from the start of our joint work, was that intermediate goal, successfully linking the current and future objectives into a united whole...
PART I

Mark Dvoretsky

American Observations

An analysis of playing style, virtues and deficiencies is usually applied to a specific player. One has to be very cautious about talking simultaneously in this way about many people: after all, we are all different, and each has his attachments, his principles, his destiny. This is why I always related with suspicion to discussions about the Soviet Chess School – too much in such discussions was ideology that was advantageous to the authorities, and there was too little real, chess content. Of course, if you desire you can declare Tigran Petrosian and Mikhail Tal as being followers of the same chess school, but is there any point in this and by whom is it needed?

Even so, it can happen that in the play of a whole group of players, to a greater or lesser extent, one can observe some general features. This sometimes happens with the pupils of one and the same trainer – when the mentor’s personality has too strong an influence on his pupils. There can also be other causes.

In the summer of 1991 I gave lessons to some young American players. To my surprise I observed that many of them, when playing important games or meeting more eminent opponents, did not want to play actively and thought only about a draw. Clearly, the result would often turn out directly the opposite – ultra-cautious, passive play usually leads to a worsening of the position.

Here are a few examples that stuck in my memory.

Michael Granne–Dvoretsky
Blitz Game 1991

1 e4 g6 2 d4 g7 3 c3 c6 4 f4 d6 5 f3 g4 6 e3 w6 7 w2 d7?

I forgot to exchange first on f3 and Black’s entire set-up is immediately made senseless.

8 w2 a5 9 0-0 b5

Black does not develop his knight at f6, fearing e4–e5. But with the white king having castled short, the pawn attack on the queenside is also unpromising. 10 h3 would have been the simplest way for my opponent to emphasise his enormous lead in development. Instead of this Michael carried out a completely absurd exchanging operation.

10 g5?! x2 11 x2? xd2 (thank you!) 12 xd2 h6 13 f3 gf6 (now the knight can be developed) 14 e5 d5

Black has an acceptable position, and subsequently he won the ending.

‘Why did you exchange the queens?’ I asked my opponent.
'I didn’t know what to play.’
‘Anything you like, only with the queens on! After all, White has excellent attacking chances.’

Generally speaking, Michael is a player with a fighting, active style, but what probably operated here was a very common (and fundamentally incorrect) reflex – the aim to play quietly and as ‘safely’ as possible against a strong opponent. In fact, such an approach merely plays into the opponent’s hands and usually makes things easier for him.

Dvoretsky – Chris Talbert
Simultaneous Display 1991

1 e4 c6 2 c3 d5 3 e5 d4 4 exf6 dxc3 5 fxg7 cxd2+ 6 lxd2 ‘txd2+ 7 ..txd2 ..txg7 8 0-0-0 ..f5 (8 ... ..c6) 9 ..e2

The only sensible plan for White is the exchange of the strong bishop at g7 (which is why he develops his knight at e2), followed by an attempt to exploit the opponent’s rather loose pawn structure. A little earlier I gave a few lessons to Josh Waitzkin, then one of the leading American juniors. He showed me a game of his in which he had played this variation with White, but developed his knight at f3 and soon ended up in an inferior position. I explained the above strategic idea to him and soon he successfully employed it in a strong ‘World Open’ tournament. Typical plans, ideas and procedures are often far more important than specific opening variations, and in addition they do not overload the memory.

9 ... ..c6 10 ..c3 ..h6+!? 11 ..b1 ..g8

Here, to my surprise, my opponent offered a draw! What for? Was it really in order to then boast to his friends that he had not lost to an international master? Is there any great merit in such a draw in 11 moves, and for the sake of this is it worth sitting down to play? And yet peace offers in unresolved positions were also made by other participants in this display.

12 ..g3 ..g6 13 ..b5 a6?! 14 ..xc6+ ..xc6 15 ..e1 ..d8 16 ..e5 ..d7 17 b3

Black’s two bishops compensate to some extent for his pawn weaknesses. After 17...f6! followed by ...e7–e5 there would have been a complicated struggle in prospect. But Chris was let down by his excessive caution, stemming from his desire to make a draw.

17 ... ..g7?? (a serious positional mistake)

Now Black no longer has the bishop pair, the white rook has taken control of the entire fifth rank, and it is intending to attack the weak a6-pawn. Black subsequently defended very passively and I converted my positional advantage without difficulty.

Caution at the board is often the consequence of character traits such as timidity and lack of confidence in one’s own powers. But it was evident to me that such an
explanation did not fit either Michael or Chris – both were sturdy, energetic, outgoing lads. So what was the reason?

I was invited to the closing ceremony of the American under-16 championship and shown several games that had been put forward for the best game prize. Alas, there too I saw the same picture.

Mark Berman – Stanislav Garber
1991

1 d4 ☐f6 2 c4 g6 3 ☐c3 ☐g7 4 e4 d6 5 f3 0-0 6 ☐e3 ☐c6 7 ☐ge2 a6 8 ☐b1!? A rare, but perfectly possible move. If 8...☐b8 there follows 9 b4 b5 10 cxb5 axb5 11 d5 ☐e5 12 ☐d4 with advantage to White. But the plan chosen in the game would appear to be only a little better. Evidently here more subtle methods of play for Black must be sought.

8...e5 9 d5 ☐e7 (here the knight is badly placed, but what can be done if it cannot go to the usual d4-square?) 10 b4 10 ☐d2 is more accurate, not allowing 10...☐h5? 11 g4 with advantage to White: Damjanovic–Bobotsov (Zagreb 1964).

10...☐h5 11 g4

![Chess diagram]

11...☐f6??
Incredible! How could Black not play his knight to f4? Often in such cases he is even prepared to sacrifice a pawn, whereas here he retains material equality. Berman, playing White, judged the position after 11...☐f4 12 ☐xf4 exf4 13 ☐d4 ☐xd4 14 ☐xd4 to be in his favour. In fact Black achieves a good game with 14...g5! followed by ...☐e7–g6–e5 (15 h4? gxh4 16 ☐xh4 ☐f5!).

After the passive knight retreat Garber's position is altogether hopeless – he stands worse on both flanks.

12 ☐c1 (12 ☐g3!) 12...d7 13 g5!? f5 14 ☐d2?!
White had several useful moves available: ☐b3, ☐d2 and h4, which he should have made in one order or another. Instead, without having completed his development, he determines the position of his king, which allows the opponent to create counterplay.

Now the opening of the centre by 14...c6 suggests itself. Probably even stronger is 14...a5!? 15 a3 (after 15 b5 White's queenside pawns are immobilised) 15...axb4 16 axb4 c6 – the a-file may prove useful to Black.

14...☐h8? 15 h4 ☐f7? 16 ☐e2 ☐f8?
Garber failed to exploit his chance opportunity. The series of passive moves has allowed his opponent to completely seize the initiative and subsequently he successfully broke through on the queenside.

Alex Sidelnikov – Josh Waitzkin
1991

(The player with Black was the future winner of the championship, and the player with White finished second).

1 ☐f3 ☐f6 2 g3 g6 3 ☐g2 ☐g7 4 0-0 0-0 5 c3 d6 6 d4 ☐bd7 7 ☐e1 e5 8 e4 ☐e8?! 9 ☐bd2 ☐h6
An interesting idea, based on what is in principle a sound positional idea. Black hopes, after exchanging bishops, to leave his opponent with a passive light-square bishop. White should probably have avoided
the exchange with 10 b3!? followed by \( \text{b2} \) or \( \text{a3} \).

10 dxe5 dxe5 11 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{xc1} \) 12 \( \text{xc1} \) \( \text{e7} \)
13 \( \text{d2} \) c6 14 \( \text{ad1} \) f6

White's position is preferable, although it is probable that he has nothing real – he has played too timidly. Natural moves are 15 h4, 15 \( \text{h3} \) or 15 \( \text{e3} \).

15 \( \text{d6?} \)

The knight at c4 is clearly stronger than the one at e8 – so why does White himself offer such an exchange? Besides, the disappearance of the queens is to Black's advantage – his king gains the opportunity to move into the centre.

15...\( \text{xd6} \) 16 \( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{xd6} \) 17 \( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{b6} \)
18 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{f7} \) 19 b3?

Black has a clear program of action: ...\( \text{e7} \), ...\( \text{e6} \) and ...a7–a5, seizing the initiative on the queenside. White should have created his own play by 19 f4! \( \text{e7} \) 20 \( \text{d3} \) (or 20 fxe5 fxe5 21 \( \text{d3} \)), preparing to attack the e5-pawn by \( \text{f3} \). But for some reason he submissively goes totally onto the defensive.

19...\( \text{e7} \) 20 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{e6} \) 21 \( \text{b1?} \) a5 22 c4 a4
23 \( \text{ed1} \) \( \text{d7} \) 24 \( \text{c3?!} \) axb3 25 axb3 \( \text{a1} \)
26 \( \text{dc1} \) \( \text{fa8} \) 27 b4 \( \text{ba2} \) 28 \( \text{b3?} \) b5 29
\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{b6} \) 30 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{xc4} \) 31 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{b2} \)
32 \( \text{ee1} \) \( \text{xb4} \) 33 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{a2} \) 34 \( \text{b1} \) \( \text{a1} \) 35
\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{xc1} \) 36 \( \text{xc1} \) \( \text{d6} \) 37 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c5} \) and
White soon resigned.

Waitzkin showed good technique in the ending – it was even deemed to be the best game of the tournament. (The lessons which I gave Josh before the championship were in fact largely devoted to the technique of converting an advantage.) But, of course, Black's success became possible only as a consequence of his opponent's extremely passive play.

Now I will express my version of events. In America parents begin closely following the competitive achievements of their children from their very first steps in chess. Too much emphasis, even in junior competitions, is given to ratings, prizes, isolated successes in games with strong opponents, and so on. Such an approach is of course passed on to the children, and they try to give their parents joy and boast to the contemporaries about any current success. For the sake of momentary successes they became cautious. Alas, the result sometimes turns out just the opposite and, more important, it sharply slows the creative growth of the children.

An improvement process is only effective when the work is done with a future aim. This means that trainers should teach young players to sensibly combine fighting for successes in competitions and experimenting and taking creative risks. The fostering of a depressing pragmatism from early childhood cannot be good.
PART II

Artur Yusupov

The Analysis of one’s own Games

Why have I chosen this particular topic? Possibly I developed quite successfully as a chess player for the reason that I devoted much time to the analysis of my games. I think that the analysis of one's own games is the main means of self-improvement. I am convinced that, without a critical understanding of his own play, it is impossible for a player to develop. Of course, this does not mean that other forms of chess work should not be carried out. You must study the opening, the endgame and the middlegame, and it is exceptionally useful to study the games of strong players. But in general we learn best from our own examples.

Our own games are closer to us than any others. We have played them and have tried to solve the problems that were facing us. In analysis it is possible to check and clarify the evaluations by which we were guided during the play, and determine where they were incorrect, where we played inaccurately. Sometimes the opponent punishes us for our mistakes, but often they remain unnoticed and can be revealed only in analysis.

What do I think it is important to focus on when you are analysing your own games? First of all you should find the turning-points — decide where mistakes were made, where the evaluation of the position changed or an opportunity for sharply changing the situation on the board was not exploited. The ability itself to find in analysis the critical moments of a game is exceptionally important, since it will help you also to guess such moments during an actual game. This is perhaps the most difficult thing in chess — to sense the critical, turning-point in a game, when you must seriously consider the position and solve a problem, when the outcome of the entire struggle may depend on one move.

I have to say that even among top-class players there are few who possess this quality in full. I once had a discussion with Boris Spassky about the play of Robert Fischer, whom all of us, without exception, rate very highly. Spassky said that he saw only one slight weakness in Fischer — he did not always sense the critical, turning-point in a game. Of course, this was a relative weakness, only as applied to his general very high standard of play, but even so, in the opinion of Spassky, it sometimes hindered Fischer. One can get rid of such a deficiency only by a critical study of one’s play.

The second factor, to which you should pay attention in the analysis of your games, is to seek the reasons for your own mistakes. By disclosing the mistakes, you gradually begin to understand with what they could be associated, and you see the deficiencies in your play. Of course, it is simpler when you are helped by a trainer, when everything is explained in detail. But there will be an impetus only if you yourself sense the causes of the mistakes and do not want to put up with them any more. An objective
realisation of your own weaknesses is a necessary first step in the serious work of correcting them.

The third factor. It is very important to seek new possibilities, which you did not notice during the game due to being carried away by other ideas of your own. After analysis you begin to have a better feeling for the type of position in question, and you have a deeper familiarity with its typical strategic and tactical ideas. Moreover, the conclusions that you yourself have drawn will be more firmly engraved in your memory than those obtained from other sources.

And one last thing. When analysing a game you have played, you should ponder over the opening stage. Try to improve your play, especially if you were not altogether satisfied with the outcome of the opening. By critically approaching the problems that you faced in the opening, you can enrich your knowledge, outline new plans, and devise important novelties.

I should like to illustrate what has been said with a game that I played as Black against Anatoly Karpov in Moscow in the 1983 USSR Championship. Why have I chosen it? My opponent's play made a strong impression on me. It is not so often that I feel that I have been outplayed, but in the given instance I felt this, and the most annoying thing was that I did not altogether understand how this happened and why. I had to do a lot of work on this game.

In this championship I played badly and later in my spare time I decided to analyse the reasons for my failure. The work I did was not in vain, and I am sure that it assisted my future victories in the Interzonal Tournament and the Candidates matches. Generally speaking, I have noticed that, if after a failure I have managed to genuinely work on my games, this has invariably proved highly beneficial, and later I have experienced a creative growth. This happened, for example, in 1979, when after a failure in the Junior World Championship I spent roughly a month analysing my games, and even filled a special notebook. And in my very next tournament – the USSR Championship First League – I played respectfully, and a way out of the crisis began to emerge. And later in the same year I achieved my best result in USSR Championships – a share of 2nd place in the Premier League.

Karpov – Yusupov
50th USSR Championship, Moscow 1983

Ruy Lopez

1 e4 e5
2 Qf3 Qc6
3 Bb5 a6
4 Ba4 f6
5 0-0 lxe4

The Open Variation of the Ruy Lopez is one of the mainstays of my repertoire.

6 d4 b5
7 Bb3 d5
8 dxe5 Qe6

Every player chooses a repertoire that suits him. I like positions with an element of blockade. I am happy to fight against the strong e5-pawn; I blockade it and try somehow to 'by-pass' it. Sometimes it is possible to radically solve the problem of the centre, by playing ...f7–f6.

9 c3 Qc5

Here 9...Qe7 is also often played.

10 Qbd2

White, naturally, harasses the knight at e4, which occupies a strong central position.

10... 0-0

As long as the exchange on e4 is not dangerous for Black, he ignores the threat.

11 Qc2 Qf5

In this game I decided to defend my knight on e4. But there is another interesting continuation – 11...Qxf2, which I play quite regularly.
PART II

White completes his development and clears the way for his dark-square bishop.

12 ... \texttt{g6}

The bishop has to stand on a protected square, since 13 \texttt{xc5} was threatened. If 13 \texttt{xe4}, then Black takes with his pawn, attacking the knight at f3 – here he is alright.

13 \texttt{fd4 \xd4} 14 \texttt{cxd4}

It so happened that I began playing the Open Variation as Black precisely on account of one of Karpov’s games. Studying his collection of selected games, I hit upon the game Karpov–Savon (Moscow 1971), which was splendidly won by White, and found an improvement for Black. When you find an idea of your own in some variation, it can be tempting to work seriously on this variation and study it in depth, which is what I did. Having prepared the Open Variation of the ‘Spanish’, I began successfully employing it. A similar pattern of mastering a new opening system has occurred several times with me: you study a game between two strong players, you find an improvement for one of the sides, after which you begin analysing seriously and become acquainted with other games on the same topic... I never played opening variations without some idea of my own. Using only other players’ ideas is not something that I find interesting.

14 ... \texttt{a5}

This was how Vladimir Savon played in the afore-mentioned game. The knight at e4 is insecurely placed, and White can drive it away by f2–f3. The move 14...a5 temporarily solves this problem: in reply to 15 f3 there follows 15...a4, forcing the exchange of knights.

Generally speaking, the present pawn structure infers an offensive by White’s pawn majority on the kingside, while for Black play on the queenside with ...c7–c5 is the most natural. Of course, events may also turn out quite differently. For White, for example, it is tempting to create pressure on the half-open c-file, while Black has the undermining move ...f7–f6, enabling him to hope for counterplay on the kingside.

15 \texttt{xe3 a4}

Savon chose 15...\texttt{b4} 16 \texttt{b1 a4} 17 \texttt{d2 a3}, but after 18 \texttt{c1!!} his opening strategy was refuted. Of course, in his comments Karpov also considers 15...a4, which, in my view, is more natural.

16 \texttt{d2}

In modern practice 16 \texttt{c1} also occurs, leading to very complicated, interesting play.

16 ... \texttt{a3}

Black consistently works for his knight at e4, trying to secure a post for it at c3. As 17 bxa3 is not possible on account of 17...\texttt{c3}, White is practically forced to exchange knights.

17 \texttt{xe4 axb2}

An important intermediate move.

18 \texttt{b1}

In his commentary Karpov considered only 18...dxe4 19 \texttt{xb2 e7}, which after 20 \texttt{xb5 xa2 21 b1 a8 22 c1} leads to a difficult position for Black.
When I analysed that game, to me it seemed illogical to take on e4 with the pawn, leaving myself with a passive bishop at g6. I began studying the capture on e4 with the bishop, which subsequently became the main line of the given opening variation.

Now White has little choice. After 19 \textit{\textbf{\textit{x}}e4} I considered an interesting, although hardly forced variation with a sacrifice of the exchange: 19...\textsc{dxe4} 20 \textsc{w}g4 \textsc{cxd4} 21 \textsc{f}d1 \textsc{c}5 22 \textsc{h}h6 \textsc{g}6 23 \textsc{xf}8 \textsc{xf}8. For the exchange Black has a strong position and many pawns. It is not good to take on b2 in view of 24...\textsc{f}3+, while if 24 \textsc{w}xe4, then 24...\textsc{xa}2, and the b2-pawn is very unpleasant for White. Apparently, all that remains for him is to try to play for perpetual check: 25 e6 \textsc{fxe6} 26 \textsc{w}e5.

\begin{center}
\textbf{19} \textsc{xb}2 \textsc{d}7
\end{center}
Black indirectly defends the b5-pawn (20 \textsc{xb}5 \textsc{c}xe5).

\begin{center}
\textbf{20} \textsc{d}3
\end{center}
This move is an invention of Robert Hübner. Nothing is given by 20 \textsc{xe}4 \textsc{dxe}4 21 \textsc{xb}5 \textsc{c}xd4 22 \textsc{c}5 \textsc{f}d8 23 \textsc{xd}4 \textsc{xd}4 24 \textsc{xd}4 \textsc{xd}4 25 \textsc{xc}7 \textsc{h}5 with equality, as in A.Ivanov–Yusupov (USSR Championship First League, 1979). It was in this game that I tested in practice my analyses in the Open Variation.

\begin{center}
\textbf{20...} \textsc{xd}3
\end{center}
20...b4 is a mistake on account of 21 \textsc{b}5, when if 21...\textsc{fb}8 White has 22 \textsc{xb}4.

\begin{center}
\textbf{21} \textsc{xb}3 \textsc{fb}8
\end{center}
In the event of 21...b4 22 \textsc{c}1 White would have won a tempo compared with that which happened in the game. 21...\textsc{a}5 22 \textsc{xb}5 \textsc{c}6 23 \textsc{e}2 \textsc{c}4 is worth studying. Black sacrifices a pawn, but transfers his knight to c4 and gains definite counterplay, for example 24 \textsc{fb}3 \textsc{h}6 25 \textsc{fb}1 \textsc{f}5.

Now I suggest that you have a think about the position that was reached in the game, about the ideas that can be carried out here by White and Black.

\begin{center}
\textbf{The most natural plan for White is the aggressive 22 f4! followed by f4–f5–f6. Let us see how the play might develop then. Black can transfer his knight to c4 – 22...\textsc{c}a5. But White has a very interesting regrouping of his forces; it begins with the prophylactic move 23 \textsc{c}1!, moving the bishop away from a possible attack and, what is also important, taking control of the a3-square. If 23...\textsc{c}4 there follows 24 \textsc{e}2, intensifying the threat of a breakthrough by f4–f5 and e5–e6. White has excellent attacking prospects.}
\end{center}

Let us go back slightly. It is not possible to halt the white pawns by 22...f5 in view of 23 \textsc{xf}6 \textsc{gxf}6 24 \textsc{f}5. The position of the black king is weakened, and White wants to play \textsc{h}h6 with an attack. For example, 24...b4 25 \textsc{h}6 \textsc{a}3 26 \textsc{d}1. This position seems very dangerous for Black.

Black should probably seek counterplay by 22...b4, with the idea of gaining the a3-square for his rook. Let's suppose 23 f5 \textsc{a}3 24 \textsc{e}2. White's position is still threatening, but perhaps it is worth Black trying by 24...b3 to activate his pieces along the 3rd rank. The main thing here, I think, is that Black does not restrict himself to passive defence, but harasses his opponent and tries to counterattack. After, say, 25 axb3 \textsc{xb}3 26 \textsc{xb}3 \textsc{xb}3 27 f6 he gains the opportunity to play his knight via \textsc{d}8 to \textsc{e}6.
Let us return to the game. It is interesting that Karpov approaches the problem in a completely different way. He is primarily a prophylactic player. It is probable that he immediately asked himself: what does the opponent want, what is Black’s plan? And what do you think Black would like to play now? Of course, ...\text{c}a5–c4!. Now watch how with every move of his Karpov tries to prevent this knight manoeuvre.

22 \text{Ef}b1 \text{b}4

22...\text{c}a5 is not possible because of 23 \text{xb}5.

23 h3

This is also a prophylactic move. The game Hübner–Korchnoi (Luzern 1982) went 23 \text{d}d2, after which there followed the active reply 23...\text{g}4. Karpov not only makes his king an escape square – an exceptionally useful measure – but also takes control of the g4-square.

Instead of 23 h3 little is promised by 23 a3, hoping for the incorrect 23...\text{xa}3? 24 \text{xa}3 \text{bxa}3 25 \text{xb}8+ \text{d}8 26 \text{a}8 and White wins. After 23...\text{xa}3 24 \text{xb}8+ \text{xb}8 25 \text{xb}8+ \text{xb}8 26 \text{xa}3 \text{c}6 (but not 26...\text{c}6 27 \text{a}8+ \text{d}8 28 \text{g}5) 27 \text{e}7 \text{d}7 Black has an acceptable position. However, the immediate 23 \text{c}1 was quite possible.

I will show the following section of the game roughly how I saw it at the board, deliberately omitting one or two points which were found later, in analysis. Afterwards we will then return to these.

23... \text{h}6

Black decided that for him too an escape square would come in useful. I had some doubts about this, of course, but they were not so strong.

24 \text{c}1

(see diagram)

What happens after 24...\text{c}a5, do you see? 25 \text{d}2 \text{c}4 suits Black, but there is the move 25 \text{b}1!. Now if 25...\text{c}4 there follows 26 \text{xb}4 \text{xb}4 27 \text{xb}4, and 27...\text{xa}2 is not possible in view of 28 \text{b}8+ \text{h}7 29 \text{b}1+ winning the rook. To be honest, I did not immediately notice this variation. See how Karpov acts: he has activated his rook and at the same time not allowed ...\text{c}a5 to be played.

24... \text{b}6

I have moved the rook to a protected square, defended the knight at c6, and am once more planning ...\text{c}a5. Karpov again prevents the knight manoeuvre, by attacking the b4-pawn.

25 \text{b}1

It is amazing that the entire strategic battle revolves around this one idea. If Black should succeed in playing his knight to c4, he will gain an excellent position. I in principle realised this, but, evidently, insufficiently deeply.

25... \text{ab}8

Again pursuing the same aim – the transfer of the knight to c4, and again Karpov finds a way of preventing this.

26 \text{c}5 \text{d}8

I did not like the rook at c5 and I decided to evict it. Karpov makes yet another prophylactic move.
27 \textit{Ec}2

Black was hoping to play \ldots \textit{Ec}b7 and then \ldots \textit{Ed}a5, penetrating to c4. But my opponent removes in advance his rook from a square where it could have come under attack.

27 \ldots \textit{Ec}6

There is nothing for the knight to do at d8, and so I brought it back. I again want to play \ldots \textit{Ed}a5, and again Karpov prevents me.

28 \textit{Wc}1

The imperceptible transference of the rook from c1 to c2 enables White to set up a battery in the optimal way: with the rook in front of the queen.

28 \ldots \textit{Ed}b7

29 \textit{Ed}c5

Again there is no possibility of playing \ldots \textit{Ed}a5. By now I was completely rattled. When you are not allowed to carry out your main idea, it is very hard to fight.

29 \ldots \textit{Ed}e7

And here Karpov played cunningly. I was expecting activity, I was afraid of g2–g4, and the position did not appeal to me. But there followed a modest waiting move, which is useful for the subsequent pawn offensive.

30 \textit{Wf}2

It is clear that sooner or later White will begin a pawn storm on the kingside. This threat was psychologically hanging over me, and I wanted to gain counterplay as soon as possible. And I made a mistake, which is also explained by the fact that, unfortunately, it is sometimes typical of me not to notice my opponent's possibilities.

30 \ldots \textit{Ed}f5?

Simply a blunder. I should have stuck to defensive tactics, by playing 30\ldots \textit{Ed}c6, retaining a slightly inferior but solid position. While waiting for some active move on the part of White, let's say g2–g4, I could have tried to create some counterplay by \ldots b4–b3.

31 \textit{Ec}bc2

I am losing a pawn and I realise that after this, against the then world champion, there are no longer any real chances of saving the game. Nevertheless I decided to go down fighting.

31 \ldots \textit{Eg}6

You know how it often happens: you lose material, but in return you suddenly gain counterplay which was not there before. Pieces, which were previously tied to the defence of weaknesses, become active. Unfortunately, in the given instance it does not compensate for the lost pawn. 31\ldots b3 32 a\textit{xb}3 \textit{Ed}xb3 33 \textit{Ec}xc7 \textit{Ed}c7 34 \textit{Ec}c7 \textit{Ed}b5 was no better – White is the first to create threats: 35 \textit{Ec}8+ \textit{Ed}h7 36 \textit{Ec}7.

32 \textit{Ec}xc7 \textit{Ed}c7

33 \textit{Ec}c7 \textit{Ed}b5

Black does his utmost to make things difficult for the opponent. Of course, having the advantage, Karpov does not want to have to calculate variations after 34 \textit{Ed}c5 (incidentally, here Black can force a draw by a rook sacrifice: 34\ldots \textit{Ed}xg2+! 35 \textit{Ed}xg2 \textit{Ed}xe3+ 36 \textit{Eh}f3 \textit{Ed}d3).

34 g4!

A good move. It is bad to exchange on e3 – White is a healthy pawn to the good.

34 \ldots \textit{Ed}h4

Now 35 \textit{Ed}c5 would have given White a forced win: if 35\ldots \textit{Ed}f1 there is the simple 36 \textit{Ed}xd5. Here Karpov made what was perhaps his only inaccuracy in the game. Although, he played safely enough.

35 \textit{Ec}c8+ \textit{Ed}h7

36 \textit{Ed}d1

For the moment Karpov simply tries to keep his extra pawn. He hopes that in the future the advance of his kingside pawns will lead to a win.

36 \ldots \textit{Eb}a6

37 \textit{Ec}2 f5

Here Black could still have put up a
tenacious resistance by, say, 37...\texttt{w}a3, but his position would have remained unpromising. I realised that after 37...f5 I was losing, but seeing as the opponent had little time left, I decided to take a risk, try a practical chance, and set him some tactical problems. You will know that sometimes such a method proves successful. I did not criticise myself for this decision, although objectively it is not the strongest and it merely hastens my defeat.

Alas, here too Karpov was accurate. Try putting yourself in his place. What would you have played? I think that it would be easier for you to find the correct solution if you had read the sixth chapter of the book.

The idea is after 40 fxg3 to play 40...\texttt{w}a3, with the latent geometrical threat of 41...b3 and 42...\texttt{w}e7+. Alas, 41 \texttt{w}c1 refutes this idea. Deciding that the refutation was too simple, I rejected 39...g3. But in principle it is very important to find similar resources – sometimes such an accidental chance may change the course of the play.

The idea of 39...gxh3 is seen in the variation 40 \texttt{w}xh3 \texttt{w}e6+ 41 \texttt{w}h2 \texttt{w}f5, and quite unexpectedly Black’s small army creates dangerous threats. Karpov plays more strongly.

40 f4 \texttt{w}e6
41 \texttt{w}h5

Again a good move. White prevents the activation of the enemy pieces.

41 ... \texttt{w}e7+
42 \texttt{w}xh3 \texttt{w}f7

I try my last chance. One last little problem: what should White play?

43 \texttt{w}h2!

The threat of 43...\texttt{w}g3+ 44 \texttt{w}h4 \texttt{w}h3+ is parried. There is nothing more to hope for.

43 ... \texttt{w}d7+
44 f5

Black resigns. An excellent positional performance by White. The spirit of prophylaxis, permeating the entire game, is very typical of Karpov’s play.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\caption{Chess Board}
\end{figure}

\texttt{38 \texttt{w}g3!}

There are not so many pieces on the board. Karpov logically decides that his king should take part in the fight and it attacks the knight at h4. This is the only winning continuation. I saw it, but I took a risk, assuming that only in complications could I gain any practical chances.

38 ... fxg4
39 \texttt{w}xh4

Now it is necessary to think up at least some idea for Black.

39 ... gxh3

I was still pinning some hopes on 39...g3.
The Analysis of one's own Games

It is clear that I lost the game with 30...\(\Box f5\)!. But the strategic battle was apparently lost somewhere earlier, when Karpov frustrated the manoeuvre of my knight to c4. In order to understand what happened, a serious analysis is required.

Initially Black played logically, and all his actions were dictated by specific considerations. But after 23 h3 my reply 23...h6 was clearly not essential.

I looked more carefully at this position and discovered that, firstly, 23...\(\Box b6\)! comes into consideration. It is not clear whether ...h7-h6 will be needed, whereas ...\(\Box b6\) will certainly be useful, neutralising White's active reply 24 \(\Box c1\). I should remind you: the game went 23...h6 24 \(\Box c1\), and it transpired that if 24...\(\Box a5\) there is the tactical idea 25 \(\Box b1\). But after 23...\(\Box b6\)! 24 \(\Box c1\) it is possible to play 24...\(\Box a5\), and 25 \(\Box b1\) is now not dangerous. Black has as though carried out prophylaxis against the opponent's prophylaxis.

In addition, I found another interesting possibility: 23...\(\Box a4\)!?. Of course, Black has to reckon with 24 a3. There is the idea of sacrificing a pawn: 24...\(\Box a5\) 25 \(\Box x b4\) \(\Box x b4\) 26 \(\Box x b4\) \(\Box x b4\) 27 \(\Box x b4\) \(\Box x c4\). The knight is stronger than the passive bishop, which may give some compensation, although it seems to me that White nevertheless retains the advantage. For example, 28 \(\Box h2\) \(\Box a4\) 29 \(\Box f5\). I don't like this.

However, Black does not have to sacrifice a pawn. He can retain the balance, simply by opening an escape square for his king – 24...h6!.

But what if White plays 24 \(\Box c2\)!? (instead of 24 a3)? Then there is 24...\(\Box a6\). How to reply to 25 \(\Box c1\), do you see? That's right, 25...\(\Box x a2\)!. After 26 \(\Box x a2\) b3 27 \(\Box b2\) \(\Box x a2\) 28 \(\Box x a2\) White still retains pressure on the c-file, so that for the moment Black still has some problems. I thought of this plan: 28...\(\Box d8\) 29 \(\Box a7\) \(\Box c8\), then ...\(\Box e6\) and even ...g7-g6. The resulting position is acceptable for Black.

But that is not all. I still had doubts: after all, 23...h6 does not look a bad move, and I did not believe that because of it my position should have become difficult. So let's look more closely at what happened after this.

After 23...h6 24 \(\Box c1\)! \(\Box b6\) 25 \(\Box b1\) I played 25...\(\Box x b8\). In general this is a thematic move, preparing ...\(\Box a5\), but even so it is a pity to move the rook off the open file. What other possibilities does Black have?

The b4-pawn could also have been defended from the other side – 25...\(\Box a4\)!?. If now 26 \(\Box c5\) (as in the game), then 26...\(\Box a5\) is now possible, and this is a colossal
achievement for Black, which solves all his problems. If instead 26 \( \text{Bc}2 \), again preventing ...\( \text{d}a5 \), then Black renews the threat by 26...\( \text{B}a7 \). This means that the move \( \text{Bc}2 \) also does not give anything.

It remains to check 26 \( \text{Bc}2 \), but then too there is 26...\( \text{B}a7 \) 27 \( \text{Bc}5 \) \( \text{B}a5 \) 28 \( \text{Bc}2 \) \( \text{B}a7 \). White must either reconcile himself to a draw, or allow the knight to go to c4.

When I discovered this, somehow I immediately felt easier. My evaluation during the game had after all been more or less correct (I thought that the position was roughly equal). But my perception of the position had been insufficiently accurate. Although I had the desire to place my knight on c4, it was not strong enough to force me simply to burn with this idea, and try to carry it out at any cost. After understanding the essence of a position, grasping the thread of the play, you can unravel any situation – such an understanding greatly helps a player to find the only correct solutions at the board.

Let us sum up. What of use can be gained from the game we have just examined? Well, of course, valuable opening information. Subsequently, using my analysis, I made a draw in this variation with Black, whenever it suited me – so to speak, I defended my variation.

It is very useful also to think about Karpov’s actions. His play creates a strong impression. First of all, his approach to the taking of decisions, his prophylactic frame of mind. With every move, with every action he takes account of his opponent’s ideas and fights against them.

The quite accurate conversion of the advantage was also instructive. Perhaps at some point Karpov could have played somewhat more concretely. But when the need arose, he was not afraid to play 38 \( \text{g}3! \) and 39 \( \text{h}xh4 \), he did not avoid the calculation of concrete variations, because this was dictated by the demands of the position.

Situations occur when you have to calculate variations, when you have to go in for a sharpening of the play – this is the only way to the goal.

Let us once again return to the guiding thread. The entire game was essentially a game of one idea, the struggle revolved around one manoeuvre. This sometimes happens. For example, you realise that the main objective is to exchange the light-square bishops, and you endeavour to carry out this exchange, while the opponent tries to prevent it. Annotating the 9th match of the match for the world championship (1960), Mikhail Tal remembers his conversation with Mikhail Botvinnik regarding the complicated middlegame position that arose in it. Botvinnik said that for a long time he had doubts about the evaluation, but then he understood the essence of the position: the rooks had to be exchanged, but the queens retained. To Tal such an evaluation seemed too abstract, but later, sifting through the complicated variations that he had had to calculate during the game, he realised that Botvinnik was absolutely right and that the idea he had expressed was correct in many variations.

I should like to look at another game – from my Candidates match with Jan Timman. It was played with the score standing at 2½–2½ and, generally speaking, it decided the fate of the match. We will focus on those factors about which I spoke before the analysis of the game with Karpov.

**Timman – Yusupov**
Candidates Match, Tilburg 1986, 6th Game

*Queen’s Gambit*

| 1 d4 | d5 |
| 2 c4 | e6 |
| 3 g3 | f6 |
| 4 f3 | e7 |
| 5 g5 | h6 |
The Analysis of one's own Games

6 \text{\texttt{xf6}}  \quad 7 \text{\texttt{wb3}}

I hadn't expected this move, which occurred earlier in Kasparov's match with Karpov, and I chose the same reply as Karpov.

7 \ldots  \quad 8 \text{\texttt{c6}}  

Kasparov acted more quietly – 8 e3. Timman's choice is an indication of his fighting mood. Here I considered various continuations, even the most risky. For example, 8...b5, and also 8...b6 9 \text{\texttt{c2}} dxc4 10 \text{\texttt{e4}} – none of this appealed to me. So I played quite logically and in accordance with my tastes.

8 \ldots  \quad 9 \text{\texttt{dxc4}}  

White has a choice of where to retreat his queen: to b3 or d3. Each move has its drawbacks. After 10 \text{\texttt{wd3}} Black can reply, say, 10...d7 11 e4 \text{\texttt{a5}} with the threat of 12...b4 (the a2-pawn is hanging somewhat).

10 \text{\texttt{wb3}}

The resulting structure is typical of many variations of the Queen's Gambit or the Slav Defence. Black's standard plan is to prepare ...c6–c5 by ...d7,d7, ...b7 and ...a7–a6. There is also a more risky plan, which I in fact chose.

There is one thing which, I think, I sensed correctly during the game. Black should not be in a hurry to castle, since after the move ...h7–h6 the position of his king is vulnerable. White begins a pawn storm with h2–h4 and g2–g4–g5, and in the given situation his attack may get there first.

10 \ldots  \quad 11 \text{\texttt{a5}}

Of course, this is an impudent plan, but I did not choose it accidentally. A match has its specific nature – there is a struggle for the initiative, for a psychological advantage. Often the winner is not the stronger player, but the one who is more in a mood for a fight, who displays the greater will to win. Psychologically 10...a5 is a very good move – Black demonstrates that he is not afraid of his opponent and that he is aiming for as complicated a game as possible. I think that objectively too it is not bad.

11 e4

All in accordance with science: in reply to a flank operation, White plays in the centre.

11 \ldots  \quad 12 \text{\texttt{wc2}}

I also considered 12...d6!? If 13 e5 e7 14 \text{\texttt{e4}}, attacking the c6- and b5-pawns, Black has the defence 14...\text{\texttt{wc7}}! But nevertheless I decided to develop my knight towards the centre.

Here Timman had a choice. To me 13 e5 d7 14 \text{\texttt{e4}} \text{\texttt{b7}} 15 \text{\texttt{b1}} seems a logical
continuation. Such play is positionally the most justified. Of course, in this case too Black would have retained counter-chances after 15...b4. He has the prospect, say, of a pawn sacrifice on b3 to open lines.

Timman played more sharply. He apparently thought that Black’s flank development should be refuted by an immediate breakthrough in the centre.

13 d5

The drawback to this move is that it opens the diagonal for the bishop at f6, which now begins operating at full power.

13 ... cxd5
14 exd5 a3

Black’s idea looks logical – to open up the queenside, where the enemy king is situated. But in such a sharp situation you cannot trust your initial feeling, but must support it by calculation. The correct move was 14...0-0! (this is important for the theory of the given variation). After the position has opened up on the queenside and in the centre, Black must nevertheless concern himself about the safety of his king and only then continue his offensive.

If, say, 15 dxe6 fxe6 16 ♖xb5 (this is what concerned me during the game), there is the promising reply 16...a3. After 17 ♖xa3 it is possible to sacrifice the exchange: 17...♕xa3 18 bxa3 ♖a5. By then playing ...♖c5 and ...♗b7, Black will develop a terribly strong attack. It would appear that such a turn of events is advantageous to Black.

In the event of 16 ♖e4 there is a choice between 16...♖a5 and 16...♗xc3.

16 ♖xb5 is probably stronger. Then there can follow 16...a3 17 ♖c4 (a seemingly logical move) 17...axb2+ 18 ♕b1 (a typical defensive idea – hiding the king behind an enemy pawn; of course it is dangerous to take on b2). The position is very complicated, and it is practically impossible to analyse it exhaustively. I will show you a sample variation from my analysis, which is largely illustrative in character: 18...♖b6 (18...♖a5!? 19 ♕e4 ♕e7 20 ♕d4 ♕c5 21 ♕xc5 (21 ♕he1 is more accurate) 21...♗xc5 22 ♕e4 ♕xd4 23 ♕xa8 ♖b7 24 ♖a3 ♕e4+ 25 ♕d3 ♕a8 26 ♕e7 ♕a6 and Black wins.

On the analysis of this position (however, also those that occur later in the game) one could probably spend the entire lesson, and not just one. But the conclusion is clear: 14...0-0! would have led to very complicated play with chances for both sides. Whereas after the move in the game White could have gained an advantage.

15 dxe6 axb2+
16 ♕b1 ♖xe6

I considered the piece sacrifice 16...0-0 17 exd7 ♖a5 in the hope of 18 dxc8♕? ♕xc8, but, unfortunately, it is refuted by 18 ♖b3!, for example: 18...♗xc3 19 dxc8♕ or 18...♗b7 19 ♕d4 b4 20 ♕cb5; it is also not possible to trust the enticing 18...♗xd7 19 ♕xd7 ♕f8 (or 19...♕c8).

17 ♕e4!

Of the many tempting continuations, Timman managed to chose the strongest. 17 ♖xb5 would have led to an already familiar position, reached after 14...0-0. In the event of 17 ♖xb5 0-0 18 ♕c7 the move 18...♗b7? does not work on account of 19 ♕xa8 ♖xa8
20 \( Axd7 \) \( A_c6 \) (20...\( A_c8 \) 21 \( A_c4 \) \( A_e4 \) 22 \( A_d3 \)) 21 \( A_a7! \) (not 21 \( A_d6? \) \( Wxa2+! \)). But I saw a worthy reply – 18...\( Aa7! \) 19 \( A_xe6? \) \( Axa2! \).

17 \( Wg6+ \) looks attractive, when 17...\( A_e7? \) 18 \( A_d4 \) \( Wb6 \) 19 \( A_f5+! \) is bad for Black. 17...\( A_g8 \) is essential, no longer fearing 18 \( A_d4 \) \( Wb6 \) 19 \( A_e4 \) \( A_b7 \). Compared with the game, 18 \( W_e4 \) is less strong in view of 18...\( A_a5 \), when it is no longer possible to take the e6-pawn with check. Grandmaster Adrian Mikhalchishin recommended 18 \( A_xb5 \), when 18...\( A_a5 \) 19 \( A_c4 \) \( A_b6 \) 20 \( A_d6 \) is bad for Black. However, here too he finds defensive resources: 18...\( A_b7 \) 19 \( A_d6 \) (19 \( A_c4!?) \) 19...\( W_e7! \) 20 \( Axb7 \) \( A_b6 \) with very unclear consequences (21 \( A_d6 \) \( W_a7 \); 21 \( A_d4 \) \( A_a3 \); 21 \( A_a6!? \) \( Aa4 \)).

17... \( Axc3! \)

I have already mentioned the psychological mood of the two players in this game, which is what provoked this exchange sacrifice. I realised that it was risky, and perhaps even incorrect. But the prospect of a depressing defence in an endgame a pawn down after 17...\( Axb8 \) 18 \( Wxe6+ \) \( W_e7 \) 19 \( Wxe7+ \) \( Axe7 \) 20 \( A_d5+ \) did not appeal to me at all.

As a result of the sacrifice, an exceptionally sharp and complicated situation arises. In principle, Black's problems are associated not with a deficit of material, but with the fact that he is somewhat behind in development. If he can succeed in 'unravelling', the b2-pawn, supported by the dark-square bishop, will secure him very dangerous counterplay. Which way the scales will tip depends on the resourcefulness of the two players over the next few moves. Objectively White's prospects are better. But a practical game is not home analysis, and with restricted time for thought it is practically impossible to find one's way faultlessly through the resulting wild complications.

18 \( Wxa8 \) 0-0

In the match press centre this natural move was judged to be a mistake on account of Timman's reply, and 18...\( Wc7 \) was recommended. I think that the two continuations are roughly equivalent.

Now 19 \( Axb5 \) suggests itself. After 19...\( Wf6? \) 20 \( Wc6 \) Black's pieces are completely tied up – there is no sensible move that be can make. But the defensive resources are not exhausted.

Ulf Andersson suggested 19...\( Wc7 \) 20 \( Wc6 \) \( Wxc6 \) 21 \( Axc6 \) \( Axc5 \). The two dangerous bishops and the powerful b2-pawn give Black some compensation for the sacrificed exchange. Even so, according to analysis by Timman, White retains the better chances in the endgame. And it is not essential for White to go into an ending – he has 20 \( Wxe4!? \).

Perhaps the modest move 19...\( W_e7!? \) should be preferred.

19 \( Wc6 \)

This seems very strong. By simultaneously attacking the bishop and the e6-pawn, White denies his opponent the possibilities 19...\( W_e7 \) and 19...\( Wc7 \) and apparently forces the reply 19...\( Wf6 \), which after 20 \( Axb5 \), as we already know, leads to extremely difficult consequences for Black. But here too there is a defence.

Generally speaking, the defensive resources in chess are very great. It can happen that a
game is going not altogether well for you. But if you do not lose heart, continue resisting with all your might, stubbornly seek practical chances and continually set your opponent new problems, in the end he may not withstand the tension of the struggle and begin to make mistakes. That is what happened in this game.

Thus the main things in defence are composure, presence of mind, and tenacity. These qualities were possessed in full by players who were famed for their skill in defence – for example, Emanuel Lasker and Anatoly Karpov. If you make a study of their games, you will sense this, and at the same time you will assimilate the specific methods of defending difficult positions – both purely chess methods, and psychological.

19 ... b4!

Think about how to reply to 20 b5. Black has 20 ... f6!, and if 21 x7 d7 d7 22 x7, then 22 ... d8.

Now let us consider 20 x6+ h8 21 b5. Here Black has to find something, as otherwise he will simply have to resign the game.

Let us check 21 ... f6. Clearly, 22 x7 d7 x6 23 x6 x6 will not do for White. This means 22 x6 f6 23 h4 h7, and 24 d3+ g8 is not too dangerous for Black; he is threatening both ... g7–g5, and ... g4. It makes sense for White to give up part of his extra material, and play for a positional advantage: 24 h1!

This idea can also be considered in its mirror reflection – 21 ... b6. After the exchange of queens, the knight ends up at b6 instead of f6. This has its pluses (the f-file is open), but also its minuses.

It is clear that the appearance of the black bishop or queen on the b1–h7 diagonal may immediately decide the game, leading to fearful loss of material. Black’s entire counterplay is based on this. He also has a quite fantastic idea, and I will not be surprised if it proves correct. I saw it during the game, and my trainer Mark Dvoretsky found it in the press centre.

Let us try sacrificing the queen: 21 ... c5!! 22 x8 x8. White must guard the critical diagonal, and therefore the only move is 23 g6. In reply Black coolly completes his development: 23 ... e6!

For the sacrificed queen Black has only a bishop. But it is not so easy for White to parry the threats of 24 ... a8 and 24 ... g8 followed by ... h7; he also has to reckon with 24 ... xa2+ 25 xa2 a8+.

Incidentally, a game on this theme was later played in India – you can find it in the 42nd
volume of *Informator*, game No.566. (However, I am not sure whether it was actually played, or made up, since we have seen that the preceding moves are not at all obligatory for both sides.)

If you want to amuse yourself, analyse the position after the queen sacrifice. In the comments on the 'Indian' game it is shown that White retains the advantage, but I found a way of improving Black’s play and I think that the objective outcome is a draw.

The queen sacrifice is merely a small, although very interesting little island in the boundless sea of variations, contained in my game with Timman. Analysing such conflicts is difficult, but very useful and interesting.

Let us return to the game. Timman decided not to take the e6-pawn.

20 \textit{c4} \textit{h8}

A normal prophylactic move in such situations (here it is practically forced). If you look at Kasparov’s games, you will notice that before a decisive assault he often prophylactically improves the position of his king. Remember the 16th game of his return match with Karpov (London/Leningrad 1986), which he won with a brilliant attack in the Ruy Lopez. It was a very complicated position, he had sacrificed something, but at some point he made a prophylactic move, safeguarding his king, and later this proved to be simply a winning continuation.

21 \textit{e4}?

Here Timman deviated from the correct path. What would have happened after 21 \textit{xe6} ? During the game I saw the variation 21...\textit{f6}! 22 \textit{xd7} \textit{f5+} and did not look any further, since for the time being this satisfied me. Especially since all the same there was no choice. I don’t know how dangerous 22 \textit{d5} is, but I think that here Black has many tempting possibilities.

Timman and I later came to the conclusion that he should have chosen 21 \textit{d6}. I would have replied 21...\textit{f6}. Now 22 \textit{xd7} is bad on account of 22...\textit{xd7} 23 \textit{xd7} \textit{g6+} and ...\textit{xg2}. After 22 \textit{hd1} there would have followed 22...\textit{e5} 23 \textit{xe5} \textit{xe5}! 24 \textit{d3} \textit{e7}! and then ...\textit{b7}. The best is 22 \textit{d3}, covering the most vulnerable diagonal. Black may be forced to play 22...\textit{e5} 23 \textit{xe5} \textit{xe5} 24 \textit{e4} \textit{f5}. Here there is some compensation (a pawn for the exchange).

The path that Timman could have chosen, although logical, is not very obvious: before taking control of the b1–h7 diagonal, he should activate his rook by letting it go forward, i.e. aim to play with all his pieces. With 21 \textit{e4} Timman probably wanted to seize the diagonal immediately and exploit the position of the king at h8. But this is a mistake.

21...\textit{c7}

The correct reply, which simultaneously pursues several aims. Black prepares ...\textit{f6} and creates the threat of ...\textit{f4}. Here I sensed that the initiative was turning my way.

Have a look at another fantastic queen sacrifice for just a minor piece: 21...\textit{c5}!? 22 \textit{xd8} \textit{xd8}. After 23 \textit{we3} there follows 23...\textit{b7}, while if 23 \textit{wc2} – again 23...\textit{b7} 24 \textit{e1} \textit{xf3}. White has to choose between 23 \textit{g6} \textit{b7} 24 \textit{g5}!? \textit{hxg5} 25 \textit{f3} and 23 \textit{h4} \textit{f6} 24 \textit{h5} \textit{b7} 25 \textit{e5}. I think that the modest move made in the game is objectively stronger.

22 \textit{h4} \textit{e5}

Black has to defend against the threat of 23 \textit{g6+}.

23 \textit{d3}

(see diagram)
How would you have played now, what candidate moves do you see? 23...g5 is one way of defending against mate, 23...f5 is a second, and 23...xd3 a third.

I didn't want to play 23...g5, exposing my king. 23...xd3, the move I liked best, involved a straightforward variation – I calculated it accurately.

23...xd3!
24 g6+
It would have been better not to hurry with this check.

24...g8
25 lxf2
In the event of 25 lxf8 it is not possible, of course, to take on f2 because of 26 wh7+ and 27 h1 – the pin on the f-file is decisive. But I had seen the reply 25...c5! Now the f-file is not open, and so 26 wh7+ does not give anything, while if 26 f3 there follows 26...b7, winning.

If 25 xd3, then 25...e8 followed by 26...b7 and then ...d5 or possibly ...e6–e5. I judged this position to be in my favour. An approximate variation goes 26 b5 f7 27 e5 f5+ 28 d3, and here, perhaps, simply 28...f8 – the white pieces are completely tied up.

25...xf2
26 f3
White exchanges the active rook. If 26...d1, then the simple 26...f6 is possible, but there are also tricks such as 26...d2.

How many possibilities are concealed in this position!

26...

27 gxf3
This material balance – two bishops and a pawn against rook and knight – occasionally occurs in practice, and very often the two bishops prove stronger. And in the given instance, with the terrible pawn at b2, it ensures a decisive advantage. Thus if 27 xf3 the simplest is 27...f7, and the exchange of queens leads to a won ending.

What would you have played as Black in this position?

My reasoning was simple: the situation is exceptionally favourable for me, only I must not allow Timman to become active. One must realise what the opponent is intending to do on his next move. Obviously he wants to develop his rook on an open file – 28 d1. Then it is also easy to find my reply.

27...

28 b6
I forestall my opponent, and at the same time I create the threats of 28...a6 and 28...b7. If 28...c2, then 28...d7, threatening a check at a4. The best defence was 28...f4, but all the same after 28...d7 and a possible ...c6 Black has a splendid position.
The Analysis of one's own Games

28 \textit{wc}2
Again White plans \textit{ad}1. Being a player of very high class, Timman aims to play with all his pieces.

28 ... \textit{e}5!
And again Black forestalls his opponent's plans. What follows after 29 \textit{ad}1, is it clear? Black transposes into a won ending: 29...\textit{xd}1+ 30 \textit{xd}1 \textit{f}5+.

29 \textit{h}4
By now I was in time-trouble (5 minutes for 12 moves), but I managed to take the game to its logical end.

29 ... \textit{e}6
Possibly there were also other ways to the goal, for example, 29...\textit{f}6. But I thought that 29...\textit{e}6 was simpler.

30 \textit{d}1 \textit{d}4
Here I made a slight oversight. But, since my position was very powerful, it turned out that everything was alright. White could have played 31 \textit{xb}2, but this would have run into the refutation 31...\textit{d}8! 32 \textit{f}12 \textit{f}6 33 \textit{g}3 \textit{xa}2+. If instead 31 \textit{f}5, then 31...\textit{a}6 32 a4 b3.

31 \textit{a}4
A last attempt to become active. The threat is clear – 32 \textit{e}8+. If, with the same aim, 31 \textit{g}6, then the simplest is 31...\textit{d}7 with the tactical threat of 32...\textit{xa}2+ and 33...\textit{a}4+.

31 ... \textit{d}8
The knight is guarding the f5-square, and I attack it. White's position is difficult, and in addition he makes a poor move.

32 \textit{c}6 \textit{d}5
Now things are totally bad for White: his knight is hanging, and after any move such as 33 \textit{b}5 there is the extremely unpleasant reply 33...\textit{a}8. Black's pieces are well coordinated, and he has a decisive advantage.

33 \textit{xd}4 exd4
34 \textit{b}5 \textit{a}8
35 \textit{xb}2 \textit{xa}2+
36 \textit{c}1 \textit{a}1+
37 \textit{d}2 \textit{c}3+
38 \textit{d}1 \textit{b}3+

Here Timman resigned.

So, a mind-boggling game. This is what I should like to draw your attention to (this thought is also interesting to me myself): this game, like the previous one, is in some sense a game of one idea. Black was seized by one, perhaps even abstract positional thought, or, more precisely, one construction: bishop at c3, pawns at b2 and b4. I realised that it was my only hope, and that I had to exploit it: aim somewhere to bring my bishop to f5 or sacrifice something on a2. Thanks to this frame of mind it was easier for me to play, easier to seek a solution to the problems facing Black.
Exercises

In conclusion I invite you to try and solve three examples from modern practice. Since these are not studies, there may not be strictly only one solution, and it is possible that you will also find other good continuations. I should like to you to regard these tests as a kind of challenge to yourself. The point is that the positions are rich in content, and will demand of you imagination, resourcefulness and accurate calculation. In two of these positions, very strong grandmasters made mistakes. Therefore you have the chance to show that you can cope better with the problems posed. I hope that in the analysis of your own games you will also constantly seek (and sometimes find) similar omissions.

1. White to move

2. White to move

3. White to move
Solutions


White has a forced way to win.

38 e6! \( \text{xd6} \)
39 e7 \( \text{c6} \)
40 \( \text{f8} \+ \)
41 \( \text{f5} +! \)
42 \( \text{d8} \)
43 \( \text{d7} \)
44 \( \text{xd7} \)

I did not notice the intermediate check 41 \( \text{f5} +! \) and so I chose 38 g3? \( \text{h7} \) 39 \( \text{g2} \)
\( \text{xg2} \) 40 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{g6} \) 41 \( \text{f8} \). But Timman found the defence 41...\( \text{b2} \)!, after which it proved impossible to convert the extra pawn.


White has a clear positional advantage, and the question is how best to exploit it. Gurevich found a brilliant solution, concluding the struggle in just two moves.

30 h5! \( \text{g5} \)
31 \( \text{d5} \)!

Black resigned in view of 31...exd5 32 \( \text{xe7} \)
\( \text{xe7} \) 33 \( \text{xf5} + \) and 34 \( \text{xc8} \). Paradoxically, in the twinkling of an eye Black’s most fortified point at f5 became his main weakness.


31 \( \text{d5} \)!

Otherwise Black loses a pawn without any compensation.

32 \( \text{c6} \)
33 \( \text{b6} \)
34 \( \text{c5} \)!

Threatening 35 \( \text{d7} \) and 35 \( \text{c8} \).

34 \ldots \( \text{xd6} \)
35 \( \text{cx}d6 \)
36 \( \text{c7} \)!!

It was this elegant move that Dolmatov overlooked.

36 \ldots \( \text{xc7} \)
37 \( \text{xc7} \)
38 \( \text{d7} \)
39 \( \text{d8} \)
40 \( \text{xd8} \)
41 \( \text{a5} \)
42 \( \text{c3} \)

The game continued 34 \( \text{c8} \)?
35 \( \text{xa6} \)
36 \( \text{xa5} \)
37 \( \text{xc4} \) 38 \( \text{h2} \)
39 \( \text{c6} \). It is extremely difficult to convert such an extra pawn, and Black subsequently gained a draw.

White missed a forced win:

34 \( \text{c5} \)!

All three examples show that the conversion of an advantage is not just a matter of technique alone. Nearly always there comes a moment when you have to exert yourself, calculate variations accurately and find the shortest way to the goal. Otherwise the achievement of the win may prove difficult, or altogether impossible.
The comments on the following game were written immediately after it was played. At that time the opening variation chosen by White had not yet become fashionable – its interpretation corresponds to my perception of the opening problems at that time.

**Dvoretsky – Agzamov**

Alma Ata 1976

*English Opening*

1 c4 d5
2 c3 e6
3 e4 d5
4 e5

As is well known, in the event of 4 cxd5 exd5 5 e5 Black sacrifices a pawn by 5...dxe4! and gains excellent counterplay. For example, 6 dxe4 dx e4 7 w a4+ c6 8 w e4 w d4! 9 w xd4 w xd4 10 c d1 c f5 11 d3 0-0-0.

But here the similar sacrifice is less effective: 4...dxe4 5 dxe4 dx e4 6 g4 c6 7 w e4 w d4 8 w xd4 w xd4 9 d1, and compared with the previous variation it is harder to Black to activate his light-square bishop. The game Dvoretsky–Petrosian (43rd USSR Championship, Yerevan 1975) continued as follows: 9...c5 (or 9...d7 10 d3 0-0-0 11 c e3) 10 d3 c6 (if 10...c5, then 11 g4 h6 12 h3 x f2 13 g2 followed by f3, e2 and d3–d4 with advantage) 11 f6 12 f3 fxe5 13 fxe5 0-0 14 e2 d7 15 d2 e8 16 g5 d7 17 g4 e5 18 c3 with advantage to White.

4... d4
5 exf6 cxd3
6 bxc3

6 fxg7 cxd2+ 7 xxd2 or 7 w xd2 is also possible.

6... w xf6
7 d4 c5
8 f3 h6

After 8...cxd4 9 g5! w f5 10 cxd4 b4+ 11 d2 Black can apparently equalise, but he has to defend accurately, and, above all, there is no chance at all of anything more. It is not surprising that Georgy Agzamov chooses a more complicated continuation.

9 d3!

This involves a pawn sacrifice. The quiet 9 e2 does not create any problems for Black, for example: 9...cxd4 10 cxd4 b4+ 11 d2 x d2 12 w x d2 c6 13 0-0 0-0, or 9...d6 10 0-0 0-0 11 e3 c6 12 w b3 e5 with equal chances (Mikenas–Cherepkov, Leningrad 1954).

9... c6

Now 9...cxd4 10 cxd4 b4+ 11 d2 x d2 12 w x d2 c6 13 w e3 0-0 14 0-0 no longer equalises in view of the possibilities of e4 and a b1 (14...b6?? is totally bad on account of 15 w e4).

The game Dvoretsky–Langeweg (Wijk aan Zee, 1976)...

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**Mark Dvoretsky**

*A Commentator’s Doubts*
A Commentator's Doubts

Zee 1976) went 9...d6 10 0-0 0-0 11 e2 d8? (11...c6 is better) 12 e4 f5 13 h4! and White won.

10 0-0 cxd4

Black decides to accept the pawn sacrifice, although, from the speed with which I made the opening moves, my opponent could have guessed that the sacrifice had been prepared beforehand.

Black's decision is dubious: for the pawn White has too great a lead in development. Of course, it was safer to play 10...d6 11 e2 0-0 (11...cxd4 12 cxd4 xd4 13 xd4 b2 14 g3), but here too White's chances are preferable: for example, he can obtain the better endgame by 12 e4 f5 13 xf5 or 13 xc6.

11 cxd4 xd4
12 xd4 b1 13 d8

If 13...e7 there would have followed 14 b2.

14 f13

14 b2 would remove the attack on the b7-pawn, allowing Black to develop his bishop on c8. White chooses a different plan.

14... e7

If 14...c5, then 15 b5! is very strong, for example, 15...e7 16 g3 d4 17 e4 with the threat of 18 a3. And after 14...d6 I was seriously thinking of carrying out the same idea at the cost of another pawn – 15 c5!? xc5 16 b5.

15 d1

Of course, it was not my intention to exploit such a tempting attacking position, merely in order to regain the pawn by 15 e4 0-0 16 xb7.

15... c7
16 b5

In this way White does not allow his opponent to castle (16...0-0 17 xh6! gxh6 18 g4+ g5 19 xg5+ or 18...h8 19 h5 and wins). But Black forces the rook to go to h5, where it is not altogether well placed.

16... a6!
17 h5

There is no point in White simplifying by 17 f4 d6!.

17... d7
18 f4 c8

A cool-headed and correct move. In the event of 18...d6 19 xd6 xd6 White would have gained a great advantage, by playing simply 20 xb7 c6 21 b6. The tempting 20 g6? is much weaker. After 20...e7 21 xf7+ xf7 22 xf7+ xf7 23 xd7+ g6 24 h3 xd8 25 g3+ f6 26 gxf7 xd7 27 xd7 xc8 28 xb7 xc4 29 b1 cc2 30 a1 the win in the rook endgame still has to be demonstrated, while the variation 20...xd1+ 21 xd1 fxg6 22 c5 c6! is even less clear.

19 e5

19 g3 deserved serious consideration. Then 19...g5 20 e5 f6 leads to a position from the game, advantageous to White. If 19...f6, then 20 d6 is strong, while if 19...f8, then, if there is nothing better, 20 d6 xd6 (20...e8 21 e4 c6 22 xc6 bxc6 23 c5 with advantage to White) 21 xd6+ g8 22 c5 c6 23 e4. However, after 23 xe4 24 xc8+ xc8 it would be not at all simple for White to convert his
material advantage.

19 ... f6
20 \textit{Wg3}

After 20 \textit{Ag6+ \textit{f8} Black would have been threatening to simplify the position by 21...\textit{Ae8}. In this case it is not apparent how White can strengthen his attack, and so he decided to sacrifice a piece.

20 ... g5?

In the event of 20...fxe5 21 \textit{Xg7 \textit{f8} the black king is in danger, but there is no clear win. If 22 \textit{Axe6?}, then 22...\textit{Xc5}! is possible. White would probably have played the simple 22 \textit{Xxe5, retaining dangerous threats. For example, if 22...\textit{Xc7 23 \textit{Ag6+ \textit{d8 there follows not 24 \textit{Xxe6 \textit{Xc5}! with counter- chances, but 24 \textit{f5}! Then 24...\textit{Xxf5} 25 \textit{Xxf5 \textit{g8+ is not possible, while if 24...\textit{Xc8 White has the decisive 25 \textit{Xxd7 \textit{xd7 26 \textit{Xxe6+ \textit{c6 (26...\textit{d8 27 \textit{d5+.; 26...\textit{e8 27 \textit{g6+ \textit{d8 28 \textit{d5+ \textit{d6 29 c5; 26...\textit{d6 27 \textit{g4!) 27 \textit{d5+ \textit{b6 28 \textit{xe7 with irresistible threats. However, after 22...\textit{d8}! (instead of 22...\textit{c7} White has a draw: 23 \textit{f5}! \textit{Xxf5} 24 \textit{Xxf5 \textit{g8 25 \textit{h}+ \textit{c7 26 \textit{e5+}, but it is unclear whether he can hope for more after, say, 23 \textit{e2}!?.

I think that the best possibility of a defence was offered by the cool-headed 20...\textit{f8}! After the move in the game White had prepared a decisive combination.

21 \textit{Ag6+ \textit{f8}

If 21...\textit{d8 the most energetic is 22 \textit{Xh3!}, preparing to switch the rook to the d-file.

\textit{(see diagram)}

22 h4! \textit{Ae8

Of course, not 22...fxe5 23 \textit{f3+.

23 h\textit{xg5} fx\textit{e5

Or 23...\textit{Xg6 24 gxf6!, and Black has no defence.

24 \textit{Xxh6!}

Naturally, not 24 \textit{Xxe5? \textit{Xg6! 25 \textit{Xh8+ \textit{f7}. Also weaker is 24 g\textit{h6 \textit{Xg6 25 \textit{Xg6

\textit{Ag8, and after the queen moves – 26...\textit{c6 or 26...\textit{f6.

24 ... \textit{Ag8

If 24...\textit{Xh6 25 g\textit{xh6 \textit{f6 there follows 26 \textit{f3 \textit{e7 27 \textit{w3+! with mate.

25 \textit{f3+ \textit{g7

26 \textit{\textit{e4

The simplest, although, of course, 26 \textit{h7+ \textit{Xg6 27 \textit{e4+ \textit{Xg5 28 \textit{d3 would also have led to mate.

26 ... \textit{f8

Or 26...\textit{h8 27 \textit{Xh8 \textit{Xh8 28 \textit{h3+ with mate in 4 moves.

27 \textit{h7+ \textit{g8

28 \textit{h3

Black resigns.

The analysis of the game would appear to be complete, but now I should like to give some thought to the question of game annotations in general. After all, thousands, tens of thousands of games are annotated on the pages of chess publications, and they are all annotated in different ways.

I have always thought that the annotations to a player's own games are the most interesting. As a rule, they contain fewer analytical mistakes (after all, the author of the notes solves the same problems first at the board, then in a joint analysis with his opponent, and finally, when preparing the game for publication). Also important is the
fact that such notes are rarely restricted to a simple statement of events – the annotator talks about his thoughts during the game, the reasons for the mistakes committed, and so on...

But apart from the obvious virtues, normally such notes are also typified by certain fundamental deficiencies. These deficiencies are not at all obvious, but they frequently prevent a full and accurate picture of the play from being obtained. So as not to have to go looking for examples, let us return to the game we have just examined.

Let us begin with the opening. It appears to have been covered in sufficient detail. But take a closer look. A comparatively rare variation was played. But why does it hardly ever occur in practice? Perhaps because reliable ways for Black to equalise have been found? But where are they, these ways? – the author of the notes does not say anything about them. And here it is not just a lack of recommendations. For example, the evaluation of the position arising after Black's 8th move could also have been expressed differently by me, for example: 'After 8...cxd4 9 gxg5 h5 10 cxd4 b4+ Black would have gained good chances of equalising.'

Perhaps the author of the notes does not know what to recommend for Black? Of course he knows! There are continuations which to him personally seem unpleasant, but consciously or sub-consciously he prefers not to share them; he also does not want to talk about the methods he has developed against various plans for Black. And this is natural: after all, in tournament play he himself may need these opening preparations. (Already then I had found the pawn sacrifice 7...e5!? 8 e2 e7!, and I had decided that White does best not to accept it, but to play 8 f3. Subsequently this became the main continuation in the given opening variation.)

It is clear that an 'evasive' coverage of the opening is a characteristic feature of the annotating of one's own games. There is also another feature. We are all inclined to consider our defeats to be accidental, whereas we prefer to see our wins as being genuine examples of chess art. And, succumbing (as a rule – sub-consciously!) to this desire, we begin paying exaggerated attention to our own decisions, and of the opponent's actions we pick out only those against which we had prepared a pretty rejoinder.

Everything that does not fit into this pattern, is not even discarded – conscientiousness does not allow this (here we are talking about conscientious annotators), but is simply mentioned after some featureless introduction such as 'consideration should also be given to...' or 'possibly X should have thought about...'. And as a result it often happens that the reader often rushes past the most important, turning-points of the play, almost without stopping.

What, for example, can be said for the moment about the game in question? Already in the opening White made a positional pawn sacrifice, and then, exploiting tactical factors, he confidently developed his initiative and concluded the battle with a pretty combination.

A complete game, wouldn't you agree? But let us take a closer look. In the notes to Black's 20th move it is the consequences of him accepting the piece sacrifice that are mainly analysed, and the best defence is mentioned only in passing: 20...f8!. What would happen in this case?
21 \texttt{g6} will not do in view of 21...\texttt{f}xe5! (there is also the more cautious 21...\texttt{e}8). If 21 \texttt{d}6, then 21...\texttt{x}d6 22 \texttt{xd}6+ \texttt{f}7, and it is not apparent how White can strengthen his attack (after 23 \texttt{c}5 \texttt{c}6 there is no time for 24 \texttt{e}4 on account of 24...\texttt{d}8).

If this variation is compared with the note to White's 19th move, which shows that after 19 \texttt{g}3 White would have retained the better chances, it can be concluded that 19 \texttt{e}5 is a mistake, after which, at the least, White no longer has any advantage.

Yet even after 19 \texttt{g}3 White does not achieve a great deal, whereas the position promised more. Were not some mistakes made earlier?

Here White played 16 \texttt{b}5 and after 16...\texttt{a}6 he switched his rook to \texttt{h}5. Perhaps this manoeuvre is not the best?

Analysis shows that it was stronger to play 16 \texttt{f}4 \texttt{e}5 (16...\texttt{c}6 17 \texttt{xc}+ \texttt{b}xc6 18 \texttt{e}4 \texttt{d}7 19 \texttt{b}7 is completely bad for Black) 17 \texttt{g}3, and after 13...0-0 18 \texttt{e}4 \texttt{f}5 19 \texttt{d}5+ White regains the pawn, maintaining pressure.

In the note to Black's 13th move I mentioned the move 14 \texttt{b}2 and explained why I did not play this. But what if the position is studied more concretely?

And so, 14 \texttt{b}2 \texttt{d}7 15 \texttt{e}4. Now 15...\texttt{c}6 leads after 16 \texttt{xc}+ \texttt{b}xc6 17 \texttt{f}3 or 17 \texttt{g}4 to an overwhelming advantage for White. 15...\texttt{c}8 16 \texttt{g}7! \texttt{g}7 17 \texttt{b}7 \texttt{d}8 18 \texttt{x}a8 \texttt{xa}8 19 \texttt{d}6 \texttt{d}8 20 \texttt{b}8 \texttt{c}8 21 \texttt{c}5 is also hopeless for Black.

And if 15...\texttt{c}7, then 16 \texttt{e}1! is very strong, for example: 16...\texttt{c}6 17 \texttt{e}5! \texttt{c}8 18 \texttt{f}3 with the threat of 19 \texttt{xb}7!.

It is now possible to evaluate more objectively the play of the two contestants. After successfully sacrificing a pawn in the opening, White pursued the wrong attacking strategy, and several times did not choose the best way of developing his initiative, risking losing all his advantage. But at times Black played too boldly. As a result he first
put himself in a dangerous position, by accepting the pawn sacrifice, and then, after almost parrying the attack, he nevertheless suffered a defeat after incautiously weakening his position with 20...g5.

Why then did the game initially receive a different evaluation? Mistakes in the notes? No, after all, we have not refuted a single variation. It was all a question of incorrect accentuations. They are wonderful things, these accentuations! With their help, without changing anything in variations, one can demonstrate that a game was interesting, that a game was uninteresting, that there were many mistakes, that there were hardly any mistakes...

Therefore, if you want to gain a complete impression of a game being studied, check and re-check the arguments of the commentators. Be especially attentive to imperceptible recommendations, made 'in passing', such as those that we were able to decipher in the given instance.
PART II

Artur Yusupov

How to play with Black

A player’s success in a competition often depends on his tournament strategy (in the choice of which account should definitely be taken of his own condition, state of preparedness and competitive form) and the tactics chosen in each specific game, which may change depending on the strength and style of his opponent.

To my surprise, the result I achieved in the World Chess Olympiad (Dubai 1986) was much better than I expected. I think that my successful performance was assisted by two factors.

The first: I soberly assessed my own condition, which was not ideal, and chose the optimal tournament strategy. Realising that to engage in a complicated struggle would not be easy and that the probability of failure would be great, I endeavoured to play as simply as possible, exploiting my superiority in class – in the team I was playing on boards three and four. Several times I was able to win simple positions – while maintaining a minimal tension, I tried to force my opponent into making mistakes.

And the second: it was easier for me playing Black, since here I have a better developed opening repertoire, and the lack of excessive opening ambitions corresponded with the strategy that I had planned.

Of course, luck also played its part. Otherwise it is hard to explain my result – 10 out of 12, with nine of my games being played with Black and against quite strong opponents.

The following game was played in the USSR–Bulgaria match.

\[
\begin{align*}
1 & d4 & d5 \\
2 & c4 & e6 \\
3 & \text{c2} & c6 \\
4 & \text{c} & f3 & f6 \\
5 & cxd5 & exd5 \\
6 & \text{c} & c2 & e7 \\
7 & \text{d} & g5 & g6 \\
8 & \text{xf6} & \text{xf6} \\
9 & e3 & f5 \\
10 & d3 & x d3 \\
11 & \text{xd3} & d7
\end{align*}
\]

**Inkiov – Yusupov**

Olympiad, Dubai 1986

*Queen’s Gambit*

The situation of our team obliged me to play for a win in every game, irrespective of the strength of my opponent and the colour of the pieces. But how to achieve success, playing Black against an experienced opponent? It looks natural to try and initiate as complicated a struggle as possible. In this connection my choice of opening may seem open to criticism: in the Queen’s Gambit it is easy for White to simplify the position. But after weighing up everything ‘for’ and ‘against’ with team captain Yefim Geller, we came to the conclusion that in a simple situation I would be more likely to exploit my strong points and force the opponent to go wrong. It was important to play calmly, not agree to a draw, and seek winning chances in any position.

Serious consideration should be given to the plan that Garry Kasparov likes to carry out in similar positions: ...0-0, ...\text{d6}, ...\text{d}7 and ...\text{d}ad8, in order to counter the standard
b2–b4–b5 with ...c6–c5.

12 0-0
The immediate 12 b4 was possibly more accurate.

12 ... e7!?
13 a5
14 a3
15 wc2

White tries to play as safely as possible. After 15 b4 he was concerned about 15...axb4 16 axb4 a3.

15 ... d6

One of the possible reactions to the minority pawn attack is the counter-advance ...b7–b5. But after both 15...e8 16 b4 axb4 17 axb4 b5, and the game continuation (in the event of 17...b5), 18 e4 promises White the better game. 15...f5 was possible, but I didn’t want to weaken my castled position.

16 b4
axb4

After 16...b6 I would have had to reckon with 17 bxa5.

17 axb4 d6
18 b5?!

White should have exercised more caution and played 18 d2. After 18...wc7 19 g3 a3 20 b3 a roughly equal position would have arisen. How, however, Black obtains the more pleasant game.

18 ... c4
19 a1

19 bxc6 a3 20 wd3 xb1 21 cxb7 is dangerous for White on account of 21...a3 22 xb1 wa5 23 wc1 wb8.

19 ... wc7

The aim of this move is to prevent d2 and to prepare the recapture with the queen on c6.

20 bxc6
Ventsislav Inkiov falls in with his opponent’s wishes. The other possibilities here are 20 g3 and 20 wd3.

20 ... wc6!?

Now the advance of the b-pawn is threatened.

21 e4?

21 wb3 f8 22 xa8 (defending against 22...xa1 23 xa1 xe3) 22...xa8 23 b5! was correct, when it is very hard for Black to develop his initiative. For the Bulgarian player the move 20...wc6 came as a surprise, and he was unable to react calmly to the changed situation.

21 ... xa1
22 xa1 a6!
23 wb3 c8
24 e2?!

If 24 xd5 xd5 25 exd5, then 25...c1+! 26 wd1 wc4 27 b1 wd5 28 wd3 b5!, and Black achieves a distinct advantage. With an interesting pawn sacrifice Inkiov tries to complicate the play.

24 ... dxe4
25 g5 c7

25...c4? was weaker in view of 26 h3! h5 27 d5! and 28 e4.

26 h4?

Better chances of a successful defence were offered by 26 xf7! xf7 27 c1, although in this case too after 27...xh2+ 28 xh2 wd6+ Black has an obvious advantage.

26 ... c4
Having parried the threat of 27 \( \text{xf}7 \), Black has fully coordinated his forces. Inkiov's desperate attempt to confuse matters is easily refuted.

27 \( \text{Wh}3 \)  h6
28 h5  \( \text{Wd}5 \)

The safest continuation. If 28...hxg5 29 \( \text{xa}8+ \text{f}8 \) 30 h6 f5 31 h7+ \( \text{xe}7 \) 32 \( \text{xf}8+ \text{xf}8 \) 33 \( \text{xe}7 \), with possible counter-chances for White.

29 \( \text{xa}8+ \)

29 f4 was more tenacious.

29 . . .  \( \text{g}7 \)
30 hxg6  \( \text{xe}5 \)
31 gxf7  \( \text{xf}7! \)

If 31...\( \text{xf}7 \) White had the reply 32 \( \text{wc}8 \).

32 d5  \( \text{xd}5 \)
33 \( \text{d}4 \)  \( \text{b}6 \)

The simplest. Further loss of material is unavoidable.

34 \( \text{wh}6 \)  \( \text{xa}8 \)
35 \( \text{wh}7+ \)  \( \text{e}8 \)

White resigned.
PART III

Artur Yusupov and Mark Dvoretsky

The Technique of Working on your own and other Players’ Games

Artur Yusupov

We will be talking about how to study games – classic games or your own, and about certain procedures, enabling the maximum benefit to be gained from such work.

You cannot become a real chess player without a serious study of the chess classics, just as it is impossible to imagine, say, a writer or a poet who has not read Shakespeare, or an artist who has not seen the pictures of Rembrandt.

Even a cursory examination of classic games can contribute much to the improvement of positional understanding. After all, the great players had a complete mastery of the general principles of strategy, and skilfully arranged their pieces. From their games one can study typical chess positions, standard plans, and model procedures. That is, the classics are a serious aid in mastering the skill of playing the middlegame.

You will remember that we analysed my game with Anatoly Karpov, and I drew your attention to his approach to the taking of decisions, to his prophylactic perception of a position. By studying the games of outstanding players, you will see how they think, how they solve complicated problems, and what psychological methods they use. This information is also very important for your self-improvement.

Try to focus your attention on the strongest aspects of the play of that outstanding player, whose games you have chosen to study. For example, when becoming acquainted with the games of Tigran Petrosian, your main attention should be on how Petrosian prophylactically perceived a position, and how he combated his opponent’s ideas. Such work is especially useful to players for whom this aspect of play is their most vulnerable point. When studying the games and commentaries of Alexander Alekhine, a quite different approach is needed. It is very interesting to follow how logically and concretely Alekhine evaluates a position and chooses a plan, and with what inexorable consistency and colossal energy he carries out his plans.

A few words about the methods that it is useful to use when studying games. You can play at ‘guessing’. After playing through the opening, cover the subsequent text in the book with a sheet of paper and try to guess the moves made by the grandmaster. By comparing your intuitive perception of the position with the decisions of the great player, you will develop your intuition, your feeling for position. This method was used, for example, by Aaron Nimzowitsch.

Another method. You see a diagram or a lengthy comment. It is clear that here is
concealed a serious, interesting problem, or that an unexpected and difficult move was made (or missed). You can, by delving into the position, try to solve this problem independently, and then check your conclusions with the game commentary.

There is a third method of working, which I think is very useful. You have looked through a game and some feature made an impression on you, it seemed interesting and instructive. Make a ‘positional sketch’ on this topic. On a separate sheet of paper draw a diagram and describe briefly why the position seemed interesting to you, what was curious about it. Leave space for possible future additions or refinements. Add new examples to this sheet only when they closely resemble those already there.

The game which we will now examine was played quite recently – just over a hundred years ago. Why have I chosen this encounter between Zukortort and Blackburne? This is one of the most brilliant games in the history of chess, and in it a wonderful combination was carried out. Johann Zukortort – the opponent of Wilhelm Steinitz in the first match for the world championship – was a versatile player. He attacked especially inventively, but he was also able to act positionally.

**Zukortort – Blackburne**

London 1883

Queen’s Pawn Opening

1 c4 e6
2 e3 d5
3 d3 b6
4 d2 b7
5 0-0

In 1883 they played the opening without any great pretensions – they simply developed their pieces sensibly. But I would like to draw your attention to the next few moves of Joseph Blackburne. He found a good arrangement of his pieces.

5 ... d5
6 d4 d6

The placing of the pieces is, of course, a matter of taste. It is also possible to play differently, for example, 6...dxc4, 6...e7, 6...bd7, or 6...c5. But I personally prefer the plan chosen by Blackburne. Later, in similar situations, both Alexander Alekhine and Akiba Rubinstein acted in the same way.

7 c3 0-0
8 b3

Zukortort completes his development by playing his bishop to b2.

8 ... bd7

This is the arrangement about which I was speaking. The active bishops at b7 and d6 are trained on the kingside. They used to be called ‘Horwitz bishops’ (the 19th century German master Bernhard Horwitz liked to deploy his bishops in this way). Black subsequently dreams of playing ...e4, ...f7–f5, and then switching his queen or rook via f6 for an attack on the king.

9 b2

Now Black can choose 9...c5 or 9...e4, but I would have preferred 9...a6, to prevent b5. The bishop at d6 is a very strong piece and White would very much like to exchange his knight at c3 for it. Of course, b5 is not always an effective move. The
bishop may retreat to e7, then there follows ...a7–a6, and the result is the same. But if White’s rook or queen has already occupied the c-file, the bishop can no longer retreat in view of the weakness of the c7-pawn. Therefore in this type of position the move ...a7–a6 is a good prophylactic procedure. However, Blackburne underestimated the threat of \( \text{b}5 \).

\[9 \ldots \text{We}7?!\]
\[10 \text{b}5 \text{e}4\]
\[11 \text{xd}6 \text{cxd}6\]

Do you see how the position has changed? Black’s pawn structure has been slightly spoiled and White has gained the advantage of the two bishops. He will exchange the knight at e4 or drive it away by f2–f3. White’s position is preferable.

Let us go back slightly. It seems to me that the situation before Black’s 9th move is rather interesting. Here one could draw a positional sketch on the theme of prophylactic moves, of attention to the opponent’s threats. Take a sheet of paper, entitle it, say, ‘Attention to the opponent’s possibilities’. Draw a diagram. Above it write ‘Zukertort–Blackburne (London 1883)’ and under it – ‘Black to move’ (or ‘after 9 \( \text{b}2 \)’). On the right side of the page leave space for possible future comments. Then it can be remarked that in the game Black inaccurately played 9...\( \text{We}7 \), allowing the exchange of his d6 bishop for the knight at c3. He should first have defended the b5-square by 9...a6, a typical move in such positions.

In principle, you can write any comments of your own, any discussions on the given topic. If later you come across a new and similar example, add it to the same list. As a result you will compile a collection of instructive positions on the most varied topics. In the process they will be firmly engraved in your memory, expanding and reinforcing your positional arsenal.

Let us now return to the game. So, as a result of Blackburne’s inaccuracy, White has gained a slight advantage.

\[12 \text{d}2 \text{df}6\]

If 12...f5, then after 13 cxd5 \( \text{xd}5 \) 14 f3 White would have gradually prepared e3–e4. But I think that the exchange 12...\( \text{b}2 \text{d}2 \) was better than the move in the game.

Now I suggest that you spend some time considering the position.

Recently I was discussing this game with Dvoretzky and he drew attention to the move 13 \( \text{b}1 \)!. A hundred years ago, of course, they didn’t play that sort of chess. This positional procedure – non-standard avoidance of an exchange – appeared much later. Mark Israilevich easily found the strongest move, because he had already studied such situations and even written an article on this topic ‘The “superfluous” piece’.

Here too I would make a positional sketch. And comment on the given situation roughly as follows:

‘The unexpected 13 \( \text{b}1 \) comes into consideration. In avoiding the exchange, White intends by 14 f3 to drive the knight away from e4, and then play \( \text{c}3 \), preparing e3–e4. In this case he retains more pieces on the board, which is advantageous to the side with a spatial advantage.’
A similar situation sometimes occurs in the English Opening or in the Stonewall Variation of the Dutch Defence.

There is an additional nuance – in some cases \( \texttt{\texttt{A}}a3 \) becomes possible, which is important, say, in the variation 13 \( \texttt{\texttt{A}}b1 \) e5 14 f3 \( \texttt{\texttt{A}}g5 \) 15 dxe5 dxe5 16 \( \texttt{\texttt{A}}a3 \), winning the exchange.

In the game White played more simply, allowing the exchange of knights and thereby lessening his positional advantage.

\[
\begin{align*}
13 & \texttt{f3} & \texttt{\texttt{A}}xd2 \\
14 & \texttt{\texttt{W}}xd2 & \texttt{dxc4}
\end{align*}
\]

A possible decision, although some criticised Blackburne for this move. But with what would you recapture on c4?

The pawn at c4 would be rather weak, and therefore the capture with the bishop looks more natural. We thereby ascertain that, instead of 14...dxc4, serious attention should have been given to 14...\( \texttt{\texttt{A}}a6 \).

\[
\begin{align*}
15 & \texttt{\texttt{A}}xc4 & \texttt{d5} \\
16 & \texttt{\texttt{A}}d3
\end{align*}
\]

Now the open file must be occupied by a rook. The question is, which rook?

If White plays 16...\( \texttt{\texttt{A}}ac8 \), he has to reckon with the reply a2–a4!. The threat of \( \texttt{\texttt{A}}a3 \) appears, as well as the serious plan of an offensive on the queenside with a4–a5.

\[
\begin{align*}
16 & \ldots & \texttt{\texttt{A}}fc8 \\
17 & \texttt{\texttt{A}}ae1
\end{align*}
\]

White had a choice. He could also have considered the plan of playing on the queenside, with 17 a4. But 17 \( \texttt{\texttt{A}}ae1 \) looks more natural, and in the positional sense Zukerkert was a natural player who made sound moves of this sort.

Now I invite you to reflect a little on the position and take a decision for Black.

\[
(\text{see diagram})
\]

Yes, you hit the mark if you suggested 17...a5!. The situation is not without its dangers for Black. His bishop at b7 is passive, while White has the advantage of the two bishops and the real prospect of an offensive in the centre with e3–e4. If Black plays thoughtlessly and without a plan, he may be left without counterplay and end up in a difficult position.

With the move ...a7–a5 (which was not in fact made in the game) Black simultaneously pursues several aims. He acquires three promising possibilities: counterplay on the queenside with ...a5–a4, the exchange of the light-square bishops by ...\( \texttt{\texttt{A}}a6 \), and in some cases ...\( \texttt{\texttt{W}}b4 \).

White would probably have combated the threat of ...a5–a4 by 18 a4. Then Black would have exchanged the light-square bishops, gained quite adequate counterplay, and would have been unlikely to lose the game. A very active white piece would have disappeared from the board and also the c2-square would have been weakened, intensifying the threat of Black doubling rooks on the c-file.

After we have found the move 17...a5!, it becomes clear that, once White had chosen the plan of play in the centre, he should have implemented it by 17 \( \texttt{\texttt{W}}e2! \) (instead of 17 \( \texttt{\texttt{A}}ae1 \)). From e2 the queen not only assists
e3–e4, but also prevents Black from exchanging the light-square bishops.

On this topic too you can prepare a positional sketch (you already know how this is done). The heading – 'exchange of pieces'. *It is often very important to realise which pieces should be exchanged, or, on the contrary, which should not be exchanged.* Such a conclusion may prove to be the key to a position, and help the correct plan to be determined.

Blackburne played routinely. He saw that there was an open file and he began doubling rooks on it.

17 ... \( \text{c7} \)
18 \( e4 \) \( \text{ac8} \)

Many players would probably also have acted in this way – doubled rooks, and only then begun thinking what to do next. But in general there is nothing that Black can do – the invasion squares on the c-file are securely controlled by the white bishops. Nevertheless, Black does still have some tactical possibilities, associated with the invasion on c2. Thus there is the possible idea of ...\( \text{a6} \), although it is not apparent how it can be prepared.

21 \( \text{f3} \)

If now 21...\( \text{g7} \), then White would have continued the offensive with 22 \( g4 \).

21 ... \( \text{f5} \)

Somewhat inconsistent, but this often happens: first you make one move, and then you realise that you should have played differently. Now try thinking for some time, delving into the position, and guessing the further course of the play.

On what grounds did you choose 22 \( \text{xf6} \)?

Yes, of course, this is the most obvious move. With the two bishops it is natural to open the position, and the hope appears that the bishop at b2 may somehow also be included in the attack. However, account must be taken of the counterplay that may flare up after ...\( \text{e4} \), so that 22 \( \text{xf6} \) must be accurately calculated.

It was also possible to play more quietly: h2–h3 and g2–g4. But then it is very difficult, if at all possible, to breach Black's position.

22 \( \text{xf6}! \)
The start of a very fine combination.

22 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{xf6}}} \)

If Black had foreseen Zukertort's idea, he would have preferred 22 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{xf6}}} \) in the hope of somehow digging in, say, after 23 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{e1}}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{g7}}} \). White would have developed his initiative with \( g2-g4 \) and continued his attack, but Black's position would have remained fairly solid. But Blackburne wanted to play more actively, especially since he was obviously already planning the counterplay with 25 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{xc2}}} \).

What should White do now? Here you can't get away with general reasoning. You must calculate variations, and find the idea that Zukertort carried out.

23 \( f5 \)

This move made a strong impression on one of the annotators of this game, the first world champion Steinitz, who called it 'the start of a remarkable conception on a grand scale.'

23 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{e4}}} \)

What else?

24 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{xe4}}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{dxe4}}} \)

The thematic move 25 \( d5 \) strongly suggests itself. In positions with opposite-colour bishops a material advantage is not of great importance; what is important is the activity of the bishop. With \( d4-d5 \) White opens the long diagonal for his bishop, he threatens \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{d4}}} \), and in general this is a very interesting continuation. But let us check it concretely: 25 \( d5 \) \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{c2}}} \) 26 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{d4}}} \) \( e5 \), and after the exchange on \( e5 \) – ... \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{xd5}}} \), when Black has every chance of a draw. This means that other possibilities in the position must be sought.

It is very probable that Zukertort had already foreseen them when he played 22 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{exf6}}} \). He was an uncommonly inventive player and had almost certainly found the idea of the combination beforehand.

25 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{fxg6}}}! \)

Clearly, 25 \( f6 \) is weaker, because it allows Black a respite: he plays 25 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{w7}}} \) 26 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{c3}}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{d5}}} \), gaining real chances of a draw. The move in the game, opening the position, is the most energetic. Now 25 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{hxg6}}} \) is bad, because White has the very unpleasant 26 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{g3}}} \) (26 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{g7}}} \) 27 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{d5}}} \), and if 27 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{xc2}}} \), then 28 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{xc2}}} \).

25 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{xc2}}} \)

26 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{gxh7+}}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{h8}}} \)

A typical defensive procedure — the king hides behind the pawn. 26 ... \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{hxh7}}} \) 27 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{h3+}}} \) and 28 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{h6}}} \) was clearly bad.

27 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{d5+}}} \) \( e5 \)

28 \( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{wb4}}}!! \)

Here the calculation can probably be cut short – one senses that White has a very
dangerous attack, sufficient at least for a draw. But even so, let's try and calculate the variation \(28... \text{Nxb4} 29 \text{Axex5+ Dxh7} \) to the end. White plays \(30 \text{Ahh3+ Dg6 31 Dg3+ Dh6 32 Afx6+, then Afx5(f7)+ and Af4+} \). Do you see the mating construction? This is the idea of the combination. The three white pieces give mate with continuous checks. If \(28... \text{g7} \) or \(28... \text{g5}, then 29 Afxg3 is decisive.

\[28... \text{A8c5}\]

It is now evident that White's position is won, and probably not just in one way. Apart from the spectacular manner chosen by Zukertort, I also see another win.

\[29 \text{Af8+!}\]

A very pretty diversion. If \(29... \text{Af8} \) there follows \(30 \text{Axex5+ Dxh7 31 Aexe4+ Dh6 32 Afxh3+ and mate in a few moves. Here Steinitz gives the following comment: 'In conjunction with White's previous play, this forms one of the most notable combinations conceived over the chessboard. Words cannot suffice to express our admiration of the great skill with which Zukertort played this game.' Steinitz was constantly in rivalry with Zukertort, but he genuinely loved chess, admired pretty ideas, and gave his opponent his due. An example worthy of imitation!\]

However, the less aesthetic \(29 \text{Axe4} \) is also decisive, although the variations are slightly more complicated. If \(29... \text{xb2, then 30 Afxb2, then 30 Afxb2+ Dxf8 31 Aexe4+ Dh7 (31...Dg7 32 Aexe8+ Axh7 33 Afxh3+ Dg6 34 Df7+), and here the quickest way to mate is 32 Afxh5+ Dh7 33 Afxg5+ f7 34 Df5+ Dg8 35 Afxg6+. \)

\[\text{In such instances you should choose the one move which most appeals to you and calculate it to the end.}\]

\[29... \text{Af7} \]

\[30 \text{Dxe4+} \]

\[31 \text{Axex5+} \]

White is now finishing off, but in style. Zukertort's aesthetic feeling must be given its due.

\[31... \text{Bxf8} \]

\[32 \text{Afg7+!}\]

An attractive blow.

\[32... \text{Af8} \]

\[33 \text{dxe7} \]

Black resigned.

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You have just looked at a wonderful classic game and picked out from it several strategically interesting situations. The positional sketches which you may have made are, so to speak, of a purely chess character (they are all associated with the problem of exchanging pieces). It is very important to master the typical methods of positional play. The arsenal of any strong play contains an enormous store of such methods, both widely-known, and subtle ones which rarely occur.

But positional sketches can be made not only on purely chess topics. Chess is played by a person, who thinks, seeks and fights. At times he is successful, at times he finds something interesting, but sometimes he makes mistakes and does not succeed. Moreover, he does not succeed not only because of a lack of purely chess knowledge, but frequently on account of deficiencies of character, on account of mistakes in considering moves, in the approach to a position, or in the taking of decisions. The ability to analyse your thinking, develop rational methods of planning, determine what lies behind mistakes committed and, by contrast, identify your creative
successes – it is clear that all this is no less important than the mastery of purely chess subtleties.

The examples that I wish to show you are linked with the analysis of a player’s own actions, an analysis that is not purely chess, but, so to speak, chess psychology. They are all taken from the games of Sergey Dolmatov, who carried out this work in the period 1977–1980. At that time he needed to become stronger in positional play, and he used to draw positional sketches, in which he would comment not only on purely chess factors, but also the psychological aspect of decision taking and methods of considering moves.

Recently I looked anew at Sergey Dolmatov’s notebook (generally speaking, it would have been better to use not a notebook, but separate sheets – a ‘card index’). It was very interesting for me to remember how he then worked on his chess. It should be said that Sergey was already quite a strong player. In 1978 he became world junior champion, and a year later he won the USSR Championship First League. But even for a player of the standard reached by Dolmatov, work with positional sketches proved productive, and assisted his development. There were things to comment on, since he found defects in his play, which he wanted to eradicate. I will now show you examples of the analysis of his own games.

At the end of 1977 Dolmatov did not manage to win the European Junior Championship. He shared 1st–3rd places, but was placed second on the tie-break. This tournament revealed certain deficiencies, in particular a lack of self-confidence and a certain passivity in his play. Earlier we had worked a lot on strategy and technique. Sergey was fascinated by positional play and he began avoiding risks, giving preference to purely technical methods of play. After the European Championship he and I set about activating his play and strengthening his fighting qualities. As a result, Sergey began playing much more aggressively and inventively, which helped him to a confident victory in the World Junior Championship. But, when analysing his play even in this successful tournament, he found traces of his old illness.

The game with which we will begin was played at the start of the world championship. The first sketch that Sergey drew involved a position that was reached immediately after the opening.

Khakpur – Dolmatov
Graz 1978
Sicilian Defence
1 e4 c5 2 d3 e6 3 c3 d5 4 cxd5 cxd5 5 d4
f6 6 d3 e7 7 0-0 0-0 8 We2 cxd4
9 cxd4 c6 10 d1 b4 11 c3 Wd6 12 b1

A normal developing move. But wouldn’t 12...b6 have been stronger, trying to deploy the bishop more actively by occupying the long diagonal? What might Black be bothered about here? Of course, 13 e4 – when he might accidentally end up losing a rook. Should we be afraid of this move or not? We find the counter 13...a6!. Any exchanges
are to Black’s advantage, so there is no reason to be afraid.

Dolmatov drew a diagram and wrote that instead of 12...\textit{d}d7 it would have been better to develop the bishop on the long diagonal (for the moment this is a purely chess evaluation). He made the following comment on what had happened:

‘I knew that 12...b6 was stronger, but during the game I suddenly became afraid of 13 \textit{e}e4, although I also found the reply 13...\textit{a}a6!; i.e. I was afraid of a ghost.’

It is curious: if Sergey had not found the intermediate move ...\textit{a}a6 and had decided that 12...b6 was refuted, this episode could have been regarded as a tactical error. Yet he saw everything and nevertheless he was afraid – this results in a quite different picture. You should be afraid of things that are more real. If you see a good idea and it works – why then be afraid!

Mistakes in the consideration of moves are rarely accidental; they give grounds for reflection, as usually something stands behind them. For example, lack of confidence in one’s powers – where you are afraid not of concrete threats, but are simply excessively cautious just in case. This is a serious defect, and in chess it is a terrible hindrance. Successes come more often to aggressive, self-confident players.

Cautious play is sometimes the consequence of a corresponding approach to a game. For example, it is important for you not to lose, from your tournament position a draw suits you perfectly well, and you decide to act as safely as possible. Such a frame of mind influences your behaviour throughout the game. At some point you need to play actively, but because of your striving for solidity and safety, you restrict yourself.

If from your tournament position you need a draw without fail, then playing directly for a draw is a serious mistake. In such cases a player nearly always loses, if, of course, he has a clever and experienced opponent. There is nothing worse than aiming for a draw from the very first moves. \textit{If it is important for you not lose, don’t think at all about a draw, but play normally and actively. You have the right to remember about the required outcome only at certain rare moments – for example, if the opponent himself offers a draw, or if the possibility appears of forcing a dead-drawn position – in other words, only once or twice during the course of the game.}

Of course, a cautious frame of mind does not necessarily lower the standard of your play. Thanks to it you can sometimes neutralise the opponent’s latent ideas, which in other circumstances you could have overlooked. That is, a cautious mood may help and may also let you down, with both one and the other sometimes occurring during the course of the same game. We will now see such an instance.

At the start of the world championship, when his game with the Iranian player Khakpur occurred, Sergey was not yet warmed up, was not fully confident in himself, and was excessively constrained and cautious. Let us examine a position that arose in the middlegame of the same game.
It is Black to move. How does he stand? Well, of course. In our country we do after all play chess better than in Iran, so it is not surprising that Dolmatov had outplayed his opponent. Here he again drew a diagram, attached an exclamation mark to his move 22...d7! and gave the following commentary:

'Here I guessed my opponent's idea and made the strongest move. 22...b6 suggests itself, but it is weaker on account of 23 e5! xb2? 24 g4! and White wins. Earlier I would have overlooked a move like 24 g4, since I was always afraid of sharply advancing the pawns in front of the king.'

We see that in the given instance Sergey's cautious frame of mind forced him to look carefully at his opponent's possibilities, and helped him to discover a veiled trap.

Note the last phrase in Dolmatov's comment – it reflects the satisfaction of seeing the results of training work he had carried out. Previously moves such as 24 g4 were not part of his chess repertoire, and did not come easily to him. After training in active play, dynamics and the search for unusual solutions, Sergey sensed that he was now capable of finding such ideas without difficulty.

Let us examine a third episode from the same game.

Dolmatov's comment on the move he made, 25...b5?:

'Again I saw the strongest continuation: 25...e4 26 e3 xb2 27 xe6 xf2+ 28 xf2 xf2, but I did not notice that at the end of the variation I would be a pawn up – for some reason I felt that the pawns would be equal.'

At first sight this is a purely concrete mistake, but I think that it was not accidental. When a player is in a cautious mood, he does not want to take sudden decisions, sharpen the situation, or play combinations. When an idea occurs to him, subconsciously he seeks not a confirmation of it, but a refutation, in order to maintain the desired course of quiet manoeuvring. And therefore it is easy to persuade yourself with real, but sometimes, as in the given instance, illusory arguments. The illusions normally occur only in one direction.

By contrast, a player with an ultra-aggressive mood usually has illusions of the directly opposite nature.

I think that the positional sketches (in the given instance it would be more correct to say – psychological sketches), associated with these three episodes from one game, should be placed on one sheet, since they have something in common with one another, and show us the different consequences of one and the same psychological condition of a player. On the same list I would add a description of another instance that occurred with Sergey in the same junior world championship.

(see diagram)
It is White to move. The game was played in the middle of the tournament, at a moment when Yusupov was half a point behind Sergey. In the first half of the game White had a big advantage. Dolmatov defended tenaciously and managed to beat off the attack. Again I give his commentary.

'In this position I took my most unfortunate decision of the tournament: I offered a draw, although Black has good winning chances. In view of my opponent’s shortage of time, these chances could well have been transformed into a point. After conducting a gruelling defence in the first half of the game, I was unable to retune and begin playing for a win. I realised that my position was not worse, but it somehow did not occur to me that it was better.'

First about the purely chess evaluation of the situation. Dolmatov is quite right. **When there are opposite-colour bishops in the middlegame it is very important who has the initiative, who is attacking.** It is clear that Black is more actively placed. His bishop is pressing on the f2-point, whereas the white bishop is running up against its own d5-pawn. **A blockaded pawn on the colour of its own bishop sharply restricts the bishop’s activity – this is a very serious positional deficiency in a middlegame with opposite-colour bishops.**

Now about the psychological aspect. The transition from an inferior position to a superior one frequently proves difficult for both players. The one who held an advantage sometimes does not fully realise that the situation has changed, and he does not sense the danger. Instead, while it is not too late, of being satisfied with equality and somewhere agreeing a draw, through inertia he continues playing for a win and worsens his position. By contrast, a player who for a long time has been conducting a difficult defence often continues defending, even when he acquires real chances of a win. This is a typical psychological mistake, and it is very good if you can learn to observe similar mistakes in your own games. If you will analyse your play as honestly and sincerely as Dolmatov did, in all probability you will avoid repeating the same mistakes in the future.

On the whole Dolmatov played splendidly in the 1978 world championship, he won with the very high score of 10½ points out of 13, and he gained several fine wins. But, as you can see, even in his best tournaments a player is bound to have difficult moments, attacks of uncertainty and oversights; it is very important to get through them with minimal losses.

Chess is played by completely different people, with different ways of thinking, and different characters and temperaments. Dolmatov is highly emotional, and an excess of emotions frequently overwhelms him and prevents an objective evaluation of the situation. He experiences significant mood swings. I have shown you examples when he lacked confidence in himself, when he needlessly doubted something, was afraid of something. But now I will show you some directly opposite instances.

Immediately after the 1978 world champion-
ship, Sergey and I took part in a tournament dedicated to the memory of the splendid trainer Vakhtang Ilyich Karseladze, in which we shared first place.

Estrin – Dolmatov
Kutaisi 1978

White has just captured a black bishop: 17  \texttt{\textbackslash \textit{xg6}. With what would you recapture on g6? Dolmatov chose 17 ...\texttt{\textit{fxg6?!}.}

'The natural 17...hxg6 was stronger, for example, 18 0-0-0 \texttt{\textit{f5 19 wd8 fx d8 with advantage to Black in the endgame.' (Indeed, the position favours Black thanks to the bad knight at a3; if the knight were normally placed, this evaluation would hardly be valid – Dvoretsky.) 'But I wanted to play a more complicated game and so I persuaded myself that in the middlegame my advantage would be no less. In fact in the middlegame Black has nothing. Moreover, he has to play accurately not to end up worse. Earlier, practically without thinking, I would have played 17...hxg6, since I would have gained a better endgame, and this always used to suit me. But now I was trying to play for the maximum. In principle this is the correct approach, but in the given specific instance I incorrectly decided where the maximum was.'
developing pressure on the weak black pawns. He wanted to win, but he did not see how.

Probably he should have accurately played 25 \textit{\texttt{d}e4}, aiming for a roughly equal endgame, but here there were no real chances of success.

\textbf{25 \textit{\texttt{d}f1}?}

This is how Sergey commented on his actions:

'A completely senseless move. I wanted to win without fail, but in this way it is only possible to lose the game. You can't force the position! I once again realised this.'

The underlying motive of the king move is purely emotional. Since all the same White has to move his rook and go into an ending, the king should be brought closer to the centre – with his king at e2 in the endgame he will be able to play for a win. But this is only a feeling, and if White had only given it some thought, it would have disappeared.

Try moving the rook – there immediately follows ...\textit{\texttt{d}d1+} or ...\textit{\texttt{d}d2}. The idea of going into an endgame with the king on f1 is unrealisable. And otherwise White’s move cannot be justified.

Margeir Petursson is a good positional player, but he defends better than he attacks. Had his offensive standard been slightly higher, he would surely have found 25...a4!. Then 26 \textit{\texttt{c}c1} \textit{\texttt{d}d2} leads to a difficult endgame for White. The relatively best way out of the situation would be the admission of his mistake: 26 \textit{\texttt{g}g1}?! But, firstly, it is not easy to decide on this, and secondly, then too after 26...a3 the white a2-pawn becomes vulnerable, and could give Black something to latch on to.

\textbf{25 \ldots \textit{\texttt{f}f8}}

A less energetic move, after which White gains a respite.

\textbf{26 \textit{\texttt{f}f4}}

Dolmatov defends the e5-pawn and wants to include his bishop in the play. Now in the event of 26...a4 he can calmly take the pawn, and if 27...\textit{\texttt{d}d1+} there is 28 \textit{\texttt{e}e1}.

\textbf{26 \ldots \textit{\texttt{b}b4}}

\textbf{27 \textit{\texttt{e}e1}?}

The simple move 27 \textit{\texttt{f}f3}! would have led to equality. But White makes another serious positional mistake, again along the same lines: he wants to simplify the position and then begin working on the weak pawns. In so doing, Sergey again underestimates the dangers threatening his king.

\textbf{27 \ldots \textit{\texttt{xe}e1}}

\textbf{28 \textit{\texttt{xe}e1} a4!}

What to do now? The b3-pawn is attacked, and it is not possible to take on a4 with the rook in view of 29...\textit{\texttt{c}c5}! with the deadly threats of 30...\textit{\texttt{c}c1+} and 30...\textit{\texttt{g}g1+}. The position would have been quite normal, if the king had been somewhere like h2, but it is stuck in the centre.

\textbf{29 \textit{\texttt{b}b4} a3?!}

Again Petursson commits an inaccuracy in attack. In the positional sense the move made is quite competent – it is useful to obtain a dangerous pawn at a3, separate the opponent’s pawns and fix the weakness at a2. But at the same time White gains an opportunity to escape with his king from the danger zone.

Had Black played a little more concretely: 29...\textit{\texttt{b}b6}!, and only if 30 \textit{\texttt{f}f1} – 30...a3, the white king would have remained in the centre, and things would have been far more difficult for Dolmatov than in the game.

\textbf{30 \textit{\texttt{f}f2}}

The initiative is still with Black. However, after tenacious defence and an agonising analysis of the adjourned position (described in \textit{\texttt{School of Chess Excellence 1: Endgame Analysis}} p.14) Dolmatov managed to save the game.

We have talked about lack of confidence in
one's own powers and, by contrast, over-evaluation of one's own possibilities and underestimation of the opponent's resources. But, of course, a player can be hindered by deficiencies of a quite different sort.

In those years Dolmatov was not satisfied with his ability to calculate variations. After the Premier League of the 1979 USSR Championship he made 'sketches' on this topic from five games that he played. I will now show you one of them.

Belyavsky – Dolmatov
Minsk 1979

It is Black to move. It stands to reason that the position is in his favour. He is excellently placed in the centre and he controls the dark squares. Which move looks the most natural?

Advance the pawn to h3? A possible continuation, and the one in fact chosen by Dolmatov. But in the positional sense it is questionable, since it weakens Black's control of the dark squares.

Play ... Nh5 and then ... Nh4? Not bad – f4 is a quite appropriate square for the knight.

However, the most attractive move is 22...Nd5!. The knight heads for f4, but at the same time it also eyes other squares, and who knows which one it will in fact occupy.

Perhaps, c3. And if White replies 23 ff3, the knight will go to b4. What can White then do with his bishop at c2? He would probably have had to play 23 fd2, but the position after 23...c3 24 xd8 xd8 25 xd8+ h7 is advantageous to Black. It is clear that the multi-purpose move 22...Nd5! would have best emphasised his advantage.

Dolmatov writes: 'Black became carried away by the calculation of a complicated combination, beginning with 22...h3?! 23 g3 Nf4, and did not notice the simple move 22...Nd5, giving him an obvious advantage. I was again let down by undisciplined calculation.'

What did Sergey have in mind by 'undisciplined calculation'? What principle of calculating variations was violated? Of course, the principle of 'candidate moves', which demands that first you should determine all the promising possibilities, and only then delve into a calculation of any one of them. By following this principle, Dolmatov would surely have found the move ...Nd5!.

Then he would possibly have rejected the combination, especially since its consequences were unclear, and preferred a simple and sound way of retaining his advantage.

22... h3?!
23 g3 Ng4
24 f3

Try now to find the idea of Black's combination. It is not at all obvious.

24 ... wc5+
25 wc2

In the event of 25 de3 Black has the strong reply 25...Nd5!.

25 ... wc3

(see next diagram)

Now let's calculate variations, try to understand what Dolmatov had in mind, and guess what he might have overlooked here. This is a rather difficult problem.
It is obvious that the capture of the bishop loses immediately to 26...\(\text{e}x\text{g}4\) 27 \(\text{e}2\) \(\text{e}5\). What other candidate moves for White do you see?

Sergey worked out the following main variation: 26 \(\text{e}3\) \(\text{xf}3\) 27 \(\text{xf}3\) \(\text{d}5\) 28 \(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{e}3\) 29 \(\text{f}2\) \(\text{f}3\) 30 \(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}5\) and 31...\(\text{f}2\), winning. A pretty idea!

When Dolmatov showed me the game, I immediately asked him: but what if White plays 29 \(\text{xc}6\) (instead of 29 \(\text{f}2\)), or, even better, captures on \(c6\) a move earlier? There was no reply – Sergey had simply overlooked the opponent's counter-blow. I don't know what should happen here – you can check the variations yourself. But later a far more convincing refutation of Black's combination was found: 28 \(\text{d}3!\) (instead of 28 \(\text{ex}d5\)).

Alas, this is not all. Dolmatov writes: 'Black overlooked 26 \(\text{e}5\), which, fortunately, nevertheless does not lead to a loss for him. In sharp positions of this sort an oversight can cost the game.'

Belyavsky made his move after a long think.

26 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{xf}3\)

If now 27 \(\text{ex}f6\), then simply 27...\(\text{xd}1\). However, serious consideration should also have been given to 26...\(\text{xd}1\) 27 \(\text{xd}1\) \(\text{xf}3\) 28 \(\text{xf}3\) (bad is 28 \(\text{ex}f6\)? \(\text{xf}2+\) 29 \(\text{xf}2\) \(\text{e}2+!\) 30 \(\text{g}1\) \(\text{g}2+\) 28...\(\text{xf}3\) 29 \(\text{ex}f6\) 30 \(\text{xe}1\).

Well, let's assume 29...\(\text{xf}6\). How should the endgame after the exchange on \(f6\) be evaluated? Black is worse, agreed? If the rook were active, it could prove stronger than the two minor pieces, but here the rook has no invasion squares. The white king quickly comes to the centre, after which the rook definitely has nowhere to break in. And White, of course, will soon surround and win the \(h3\)-pawn.

There is 29...\(\text{d}2\). What does it lead to? Do you see the counter 30 \(\text{h}7+\) ? It leads to perpetual check. But this is better than the unpleasant ending after 29...\(\text{xf}6\)?.

Are there no other continuations? I will again hand over to Dolmatov:

'What simultaneously told here were poor calculation and weak evaluation of the position. Black has three possibilities:

a) 29...\(\text{xf}6\)?. The most unfortunate move – and the one made in the game. The endgame is in favour of White.

b) 29...\(\text{d}2\)?!. I simply did not see this move.
It leads to a draw after $30 \text{h7+} \text{xh7} 31 \text{f5+} - \text{perpetual check.}

c) $29...\text{gxf6!}$. In the middlegame Black has the advantage, since his king can safely hide at f8 and e7, whereas the white king is less well placed. In the event of the exchange of the a2-pawn for the h3-pawn (for example, after $30 \text{g4+ f8} 31 \text{xh3} \text{xha2}$) Black soon exchanges queens and obtains a won endgame. It is interesting that $29...\text{gxf6!}$ did not even occur to either me or my opponent.’

Dolmatov and I discovered the possibility of $29...\text{gxf6}$ when we analysed the game. I am afraid that Sergey exaggerates its strength: after $30 \text{g4+ f8}$ White has the unpleasant check $31 \text{b4+}$, and also $31 \text{xh3} \text{xa2}$ leads only to a draw after $32 \text{h6+! e7} 33 \text{e3+}$. But in principle everything he says is correct. It is unseemly to overlook resources such as $29...\text{d2}$ and $29...\text{gxf6}$.

Every cloud has a silver lining. After reaching a difficult endgame, Sergey began defending stubbornly and, when at one point his opponent blundered, he carried out a fantastic combination and created a genuine masterpiece. The ending of the game is analysed in School of Chess Excellence 1 – Endgame Analysis.

We have seen that in those years Dolmatov felt uncomfortable in a sharp struggle, and he calculated variations inaccurately, making oversights both for himself, and for his opponent. But those of you who are familiar with the afore-mentioned book will have seen in it numerous examples that are directly opposite in character, in which Sergey demonstrated great mastery in the calculation of complicated variations.

The explanation is simple: Dolmatov realised that with poor calculating technique he would not achieve any great successes. He began serious training, and solved numerous studies and practical positions from my card index of exercises. We also used other training methods, such as the playing of specially selected positions. Now I think that in certain situations he is capable of out-calculating Kasparov himself.

Don’t think that at that time Sergey was simply a pupil, and that he was still merely assimilating chess knowledge. No, he was already a strong player, who carried out interesting, deep ideas and won some wonderful games. However well a player performs, he always has deficiencies on which he has to work. And, as you see, the starting point of Dolmatov’s work on self-improvement was an analysis of mistakes he had made, carried out with the help of a method which we arbitrarily called ‘positional sketches’.

Up till now I have mainly showed you negative examples, Sergey’s failures. Now I wish to demonstrate one of his best games of that time, which any top player would be pleased to have to his credit. It was played in the 1978/79 European Junior Championship, an event in which Dolmatov played many good games. I annotated some of them for the tournament bulletin, but not the encounter with the Englishman Jim Plaskett. I remembered that at one moment Dolmatov made a very deep, very subtle positional move, which determined his advantage. But the game was given in the tournament bulletin without any notes and to figure out what this idea was, why it was precisely this move and not another, was not so easy. Of course, Sergey no longer remembers what he calculated at the time. But recently I opened Dolmatov’s notebook with his positional sketches and I found there a description of this episode. Thanks to the notebook a wonderful example was preserved and I can now show it to you.
Working on your own and other Players' Games

Dolmatov – Plaskett
Groningen 1978/79
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5
2 d3 d6
3 d4 cxd4
4 e4 e6
5 f4 f5
6 e3 e7
7 e3 e8
8 0-0 0-0
9 a4 a6
10 f7 f6
11 h1 h6

One of the 'tabiyas' of the Scheveningen Variation has been reached. Here 11...e8 is usually played. The continuation chosen by Plaskett is less good.

11...
12 xd4
13 e5
14 d3

The *Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings* mainly considers 12...e5. Instead of this Black allows a cramping of his position, hoping later to launch a counterattack against White's centre.

15 f2!
15 e4 suggested itself, but Black would have replied 15...d8!, and if 16 c3 – 16...c8!. The opposition of White's queen and the enemy rook causes him serious discomfort. I once analysed this position with Nana Alexandria and Igor Platonov, the grandmaster from Kiev, and we established that White has nothing.

Dolmatov plays more strongly – he vacates in advance a convenient retreat square for his queen.

15...
16 a3

White has slightly more space, and therefore his position is preferable. In the subsequent play he strives to maintain and further increase his spatial advantage.

16...
17 a5

A standard bind on the queenside.

17...
18 w2

A good regrouping: the bishop must operate on the g1–a7 diagonal, and the queen supports it from behind.

18...
19 b6
20 w3
21 a7
22 b6

To avoid tactical tricks such as 22...xg2+ 23 xg2 b6+, or the immediate 22...b6 (22...b5), Dolmatov decides to bring his bishop back.

22...
23 wxb6
24 e4

Black has a strong bishop at c6, cementing together his queenside and pressing on g2; White prepares to exchange it.

24...
25 ad1

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Here is the position, for the sake of which I am showing you this game. White appears to stand well, but how is he to maintain his initiative? Although Sergey was not then a grandmaster, he made a genuine grandmasterly move. I will now attempt to reproduce the logic of his reasoning.

First let us check whether it isn't possible to break through immediately, for example, with 26 f5. Alas, we have nothing concrete, the opponent stands alright, and his position cannot be taken by storm.

What question is it useful to ask ourselves in such a situation, do you know? 'What does the opponent want?' This is a key question, which always helps a position to be approached correctly. We must mentally give the opponent the turn to move and ascertain how he would use it.

Does Black want to capture on e5? Let us check: 26...dxe5 27 axd7 bxc2? 28 axc2! with the irresistible threat of 29 wb3. Where should the knight move? At c3 it stands badly, and Black successfully disentangles himself, obtaining play on the c-file; ...dc7, ...c6 or ...c4 is possible. 28 ...c5 is also not without its dangers. There is the restrained reply 28 ...e7 followed by ...c6, but 28 ...dc7 29 b4 c6 30 wb7 xb7 31 xb7 is also not bad.

Useful information has been obtained: we now know what to expect from Black. Most probably 26 ...xe4 and 27 ...d5, but perhaps also 26 ...wb7. Now we have to find a way of combating these plans. What can be devised, so as not to allow the opponent to escape from the bind? Dolmatov found a brilliant solution.

26 wb4!!

A mysterious queen retreat, the point of which is not immediately apparent. I very much like such moves. Let's investigate.

What was White intending in reply to the opponent's main idea? It transpires that after 26 ...xe4 27 ...xe4 d5 Dolmatov had prepared the terribly strong 28 c4!! By then capturing on d5, White gains an obvious advantage, while if 28 ...xc4, then 29 wc4 dxc4 30 xd7 with a completely won position – the black pieces have no useful moves.

Thus, the point of Dolmatov's discovery is now clear – he has succeeded in forestalling the opponent's plan involving the exchange on e4. As often happens with deep moves, 26 wb4 proves multi-purpose, new virtues are discovered in it, and it proves appropriate not only in those variations, for the sake of which it was made. To convince ourselves of this, let us examine the situation on the board.

Now 26 ...wc7 does not create the positional threat of exchanging queens, and therefore
White has time to do something. And he makes splendid use of this opportunity, as you can see by analysing the further course of the game.

If 26...d5, then 27 d3 (intending c3−e2−d4) – here the situation has not changed in comparison with our preliminary estimations.

After 26...dxe5 27 x7d7 x7d7, however, the situation has changed. We were intending to capture on b7 with the bishop, but here this is not possible because of the pin. And the capture with the queen is not so clear. But this is no problem – for the moment we can simply play 28 fxe5, since if 28...x7e5 there is the decisive stroke 29 e7!.

Is it possible that 26 b4 wins the game? Hardly, since it is not even easy to suggest what Black is threatened with. He surely should be able to find a defence.

Let’s try 26...cd8, threatening to capture on e5. Dolmatov considered this move, and he wrote that he was intending to reply 27 xc6 bxc6 28 b6!. A good idea. In the event of the exchange on b6, the passed pawn will be supported by the knight from a4. The black pawn cannot remain for ever at d6: it will either go to d5, or will be exchanged on e5 – in both cases the white knight will obtain the excellent c5-point.

But I am not sure about the evaluation of the position after 28...b7 29 xa6 (or 29 xc6) 29...xb2. It seems to me that Black can hope to equalise.

It cannot be ruled out that other acceptable possibilities for Black may also be found. But this does not change the essence of the matter. In practice, moves such as 26 b4!! often turn the course of the play, and sometimes also decide its outcome. If you are able to penetrate deeply into the essence of the position, disrupt the opponent's plans and set him serious problems, it is quite probable that he will be unable to figure out your idea in time, retune, find new ideas and make new plans. Psychologically this is a very difficult task.

Plaskett too failed to cope with it. He must have realised what awaited him in the event of the exchange on e4, but he overlooked another powerful idea associated with 26 b4.

26...wc7?!

This looks very natural – Black activates his queen and defends his rook at d7. But here too Dolmatov had prepared an excellent positional rejoinder.

27 xc6 wxc6

After 27...bxc6 the same reply would have followed.

28 a4!

This, it turns out, is the point: by retreating his queen, White vacated the b6-square for his knight.

It is time, finally, to say something about the piece whose fate is the leitmotif of White's entire strategy – this is the black knight, which is now restricted by the white e5-pawn. What prospects does it have? To come out via g7 to f5? But if the queens are not on the board, White will meet it with g2–g4. The other route for the knight is via c7 to d5. If White succeeds in placing his pawn on c4, this route will also be ruled out, and the knight at e8 will be shut out of the game. And then it is the right time to remember Tarrasch's aphorism: 'One piece stands badly – the entire game stands badly'.

Now it is clear what Dolmatov was aiming for. It is not a question of threatening Black with a fork, nor of playing the knight to b6 (this is not the best square on the board). The main thing is that White secures himself with c2–c4!, restricting the mobility of the enemy knight, and at the same time of the heavy pieces on the c-file.

The conclusion of the game demonstrates the complete triumph of White's plan.
A primitive trap: 29 b6? d5, and the exchange of knights immediately eases Black's position. Of course, Dolmatov is not going to make a mistake here – he knows very well that his main aim is the restriction of the enemy knight.

29 c4
dxe5
30 b6
31 xd1
32 fxe5

The opponent's pieces have nothing to breath. At the same time White seizes control of the open d-file. Here we see that domination, so liked by Petrosian and Karpov. The rest is no longer a fight, but finishing off.

32 ... g7
33 wd6!

The simplest, clearest solution. The black queen is defending the queenside, and after its exchange the white rook invades the 7th rank.

33 ... b8
34 xc6 bxc6
35 ed7 de8

If 35 ... a8, then, of course, 36 c5, and the rook endgame is completely hopeless for Black.

36 g4!

A precise positional solution. White creates an escape square for his king and a direct route for it to the centre, and also seizes space on the kingside.

36 ... g5

Now the final subtlety. White's position can probably be won 'as he pleases', but this is not the way to think when converting an advantage. You should find the most accurate, the 'cleanest' way to win.

Of course, it is possible to bring the king to the centre or attack the enemy pawns on the queenside. But Dolmatov again asked himself: what is Black intending to do? What do you think he wants? Probably to try and free his knight, by playing ... g6 and ... f7–f6. It would be not a bad thing to prevent this.

37 b4! g6
38 ec7

The f-pawn can no longer advance, and White wants to bring his king to the centre. But should he have conceded the d-file to the black rook?

38 ... ed8
39 b5!

Now the point of 37 b4! becomes clear.

39 ... cb5
40 cb5 axb5
41 a6 b4
42 a7

Black resigns. An excellent strategic win!

I hope you will have realised how useful it is to draw positional sketches, both purely chess, and psychological, when analysing your own games or studying those of other players.
When studying games you have played, it is not enough to restrict yourself to a purely chess analysis. It is important to understand the causes of the mistakes committed, and to seek ways of eradicating them in the future. Acting in this way, a player will subsequently be able to follow the great Alexander Alekhine in saying: 'By means of chess I trained my character'.

Kotov – Dolmatov
Moscow 1977

Black has an acceptable position. For example, 1...a5 is possible. Dolmatov picked up his rook, intending to play 1...\( \text{b8} \), and promptly noticed 2 \( a6 \).

The best way out of the position was the cool-headed 1...\( a7 \) followed by 2...\( a8 \), but Sergey simply could not bring himself to make such a move. Not wishing to admit his mistake so openly, he chose 1...\( b8 \), although he saw that after 2 \( a6 \) \( a6 \) 3 \( x6 \) \( x2 \) 4 \( d7 \) it was not possible to play 4...\( x3 \) on account of 5 \( a8+ \) 6 \( e4+ \). He had to choose 4...\( f8 \) 5 \( x7 \) \( b8 \), and subsequently White converted his advantage.

The reasons for rejecting the sensible move 1...\( a7 \) in favour of 1...\( b8 \) were not to do with chess, but were purely emotional. Sergey and I carefully discussed this incident. We remembered Tarrasch's famous aphorism: 'Mistakes never happen singly'. We pondered over why this happens. After making an error, a player often continues following his intended incorrect plan, even if there is still time to change his mind. Or, on the other hand, after recognising his error he loses his composure and proves incapable of finding his way correctly in the new situation.

This means that it is very important, on the one hand, to learn to acknowledge a mistake in good time, and on the other hand – to develop composure and self-control, an ability not to weaken after making an error, but to continue playing as though nothing has happened.

Focusing attention on some problem, a thorough analysis of it, the search for new aspects, the constant returning to it – all this is a reliable prescription for the successful resolving of the given problem in the future.

(see next diagram)

Black is excellently placed and he could, for example, play 16...\( a8 \). Instead of this Dolmatov chose 16...\( g4 \), intending the exchange of knights at e5 or h2. While the opponent was considering his reply, Sergey observed that after 17 h3 \( g5 \) 18 \( d4 \)! there is no satisfactory defence against two threats: 19 \( x6 \) and 19 \( x5 \). After 17...\( h2 \) the reply 18 \( d4 \) is again strong.
It was here, as he later admitted, that Sergey remembered our conversations. He did not torment himself with doubts, and when the opponent played 17 h3, without hesitation he brought his knight back: 17...\texttt{Qg6}. Now 18 \texttt{Qd4} \texttt{Qae8} 19 \texttt{Qxb5} axb5 20 \texttt{Qxb5} is no longer dangerous on account of 20...\texttt{Qh2+}.

The game continued 18 \texttt{Qd1} \texttt{e5} 19 a3 (if 19 e5, then 19...\texttt{xf3} 20 \texttt{xf3} \texttt{Qxe5} 21 \texttt{Qg3} \texttt{Qf4!} 22 \texttt{Qe4} \texttt{Qf3!!}) 19...\texttt{Qae8} 20 \texttt{Qe3} \texttt{Qxe3} 21 \texttt{Qxe3} \texttt{Qh5}

Despite the loss of two tempi, Dolmatov retained a good position and, above all, did not lose his presence of mind. Subsequently he outplayed his opponent and won the game.

\texttt{(see next diagram)}

White thought he would transfer his bishop to c3 and then play \texttt{Qb2}, developing pressure on the e5-pawn. But with which move should he begin, 16 \texttt{Qd2} or 16 \texttt{Qb2}?

Dolmatov decided that 16 \texttt{Qd2} was more accurate, preventing 16...a5 17 bxa5 \texttt{Qxa5}. But when Black nevertheless replied 16...a5!, he realised that after 17 bxa5 bxa5 Black controls the c5-square and achieves an excellent game.

Dolmatov promptly readjusted, avoided the exchange on a5, and nevertheless began – albeit with a loss of time – the transfer of his bishop to b2, to neutralise Black’s pressure on the a-file.

17 a3! axb4 18 axb4 \texttt{Qa2} 19 \texttt{Wd3} \texttt{Qbd7} 20 \texttt{Qc3} \texttt{h5} 21 \texttt{Qb2!} \texttt{Qf6} 22 \texttt{Wc2!} (threatening 23 \texttt{Qxe5!}) 22...\texttt{Qa8} (22...\texttt{Qg4}?) 23 \texttt{c5}.

White’s position is better, and he won the game.

This was how one of the numerous playing skills needed by a player was developed. I make no secret of the fact that such results afford a trainer enormous creative satisfaction. Far more than even, say, the successful employment of an opening novelty worked out at home, or the difficult and accurate analysis of an adjourned position. After all, the main aim in the instruction of a player (at least, of a young one) should be not so much the processing and assimilation of specific information, but rather the development and mastering of necessary skills, and the hardening of character. This is far more difficult than the simple acquisition of knowledge, but it is also far more important, and therefore any success in the given field is especially pleasing.
From the books of Aaron Nimzowitsch it is well known that pieces that are in contact with a strategically important point and assist its occupation are usually well placed. To dispute possession of the given square, we usually aim for the exchange of these pieces. But sometimes it makes sense to choose the directly opposite strategy: if by exchanges it is not possible to gain control of the square, one can altogether give up the fight for it, and avoid exchanges. After all, the ‘important height’ can only be occupied by one of the opponent’s pieces, and the rest will as though prove superfluous. Here are a few examples on this topic.

The following variation of the English Opening has occurred several times in my games:

1 c4 e5
2 ∇c3 ∇c6
3 g3 g6
4 g2 g7
5 e3 f6
6 ∇ge2 0-0
7 0-0 d6
8 d3 ∇e6
9 ∇d5

Black wants to weaken the pressure on his queenside by exchanging the light-square bishops: 10... ∇h3. Here account must be taken of the fact that 11 ∇xh3 ∇xh3 12 ∇xc7? is not possible because of 12... ∇g4.

The game Ubilava–Dvoretsky (Batumi 1969) went 10 b1 h3 11 ec3 xg2 12 xg2 (12 xf6+ is better) 12...h5, and it transpired that the two white knights, both competing for the one square d5, were too many. After 13 b4 f5 14 b5 d8 my opponent had to reckon with both 15...c6, and 15...f4. Ubilava decided to retreat: 15 e2 c6 16 bxc6 bxc6 17 w4 h8 18 f3 d6 19 d3 f7, but as a result Black gained a marked advantage.

10 ec3

This was played five years later against the author of these lines in the First League of the USSR Championship (Odessa) by grandmaster Vladimir Savon. Black faces a problem: which of two sensible positional ideas (already known to us from the previous game) to carry out first: the exchange of light-square bishops or the retreat of the knights followed by ...c7–c6. I made the incorrect choice: 10...h3?! 11 xf6! xf6 12 d5 d8. White has exchanged his ‘superfluous’ knight, at the same time driving the black bishop to a poor position. There followed 13 d2 xg2 14 xg2 f5 15 wb3, and Black encountered serious difficulties.

Analysis showed that Black should have avoided the exchange of knights.

10...

Black plans ...e6–h3 or ...c6–d8 followed by ...c7–c6, after which he has no problems. This evaluation was confirmed in
the game Gufeld–Dvoretsky (Borzhomi 1975).

11 f4 h3 12 h3 e3 e3 13 f5 (a harmless venture) 13...gxf5 14 b4 f4 (the simple 14...h8 was probably even stronger) 15 gxf4 f5 16 b5 h8! 17 h1 d8 with excellent prospects for Black.

Later I played the same position as White and I once more realised that he can hardly hope for an advantage.

Dvoretsky – Vadasz
Wijk aan Zee 1975

11 a4 h3
11...d8!?

12 d2 xg2
13 xg2 f5
14 a1

14 b4? is incorrect in view of 14...f4!, when the unfortunate position of the white knight at c3 is felt. Even so, 14 f4 was more accurate, since after the move in the game Black could have replied 14...g5.

14...
15 f4

A careless move, which costs Black dearly. He should have exchanged queens immediately by 15...d8!. For example, 16 x7 17 e4 c6 18 e3 exf4 19 xg4 fxg4 20 xg4 e6 21 f5 c5, or 16 a3 e6 17 d4 g5.

16 gxf4
d8
17 x7
d7
18 e4
c6

Or 18...fxe4 19 xex4!.

19 exf5!

Now it is clear why the exchange of pawns on f4 was incorrect – White now has the opportunity to open the e-file with gain of tempo.

19...
20 xex8+
f7
21 xfe1

Subsequently I was able to convert the advantage gained.

On the basis of the examples considered it can be concluded that in the given variation the knight at c3 (when the second knight is at d5) is badly placed. By avoiding the exchange of knights, Black achieves an excellent game.

Dolmatov – Romanishin
47th USSR Championship, Minsk 1979

White has a spatial advantage, but Black has at his disposal the strong point e5, for which both his knights and the dark-square bishop are contending. White cannot and should not fight for the e5-square – one of the opponent’s pieces will occupy it, but the other two will prove ‘superfluous’.

He should begin his own play, for example, 27 a5! (provoking a weakening of the c6-square) 27...b6 28 c3 e5 29 d4!, intending a2–a4–a5 with the better chances for White. As was shown bylossif Dorfman, Black can avoid the weakening of his queenside by choosing 27...d8!?, since if 28 a4 he has the reply 28...d8!. But I think that even in this case White’s position is preferable: 29 c3 b6+ 30 d4 e7 31 h3 e5 32 h2.

Alas, in the game Sergey Dolmatov acted far less logically.
The 'superfluous' Piece

27 c3 4e5
28 d4 b6
29 a4?

29 c3 f6 30 d4 was better.

29...

ThREATENING 30...xf3+.

30 xe5 xxe5
31 xe5 xxe5
32 a5 g6

As a result Black has exchanged his 'superfluous' pieces for the opponent's active pieces. The remaining white bishop and knight are passive, and the initiative is now with Black.

A similar positional mistake was made in the following game.

Karpov – Dolmatov
Amsterdam 1980

34...

An unfortunate idea: why exchange the 'superfluous' white knight at b4? After 34...e4!? the opponent would have had to reckon with the manoeuvre ...f5–e5–d4, creating a threat to his only real weakness – the c4–pawn. There could have followed 35 e3 we5 36 bd5 (intending 37 g4 and 38 wb2+) 36...h5! with a defensible position for Black. For example: 37 f4 exf3 38 xf3 xe5 39 we5 g5 40 b8 e7!? 41 b7 (41 f8+ h7) 41...a5.

Many years later Yuri Yakovich pointed out after 34...e4 a very strong reply: 35 xa3! (threatening 36 xe3), and if 35...g5, then 36 f4! (not 36 f3 we5) 36...f6 37 g4 we6 38 h1 followed by 39 xe3. Therefore Black does better to restrict himself to the waiting move 34...g5!, and if 35 fa1, then either continue waiting tactics (35...h5; 35...h4), or nevertheless play 35...e4!?, not fearing 36 xe1 h4 37 wb2+ we5 38 xe5+ dx e5 39 g3 f6 40 xf6 xf6 41 xe4 d6 with a probable draw.

35 a6 w7
36 w4 xe7
37 xd5 e7
38 fa1 f8
39 we2 c6
40 a3! c5
41 f3! xf3
42 xf3

The remaining black pieces are passive and scattered. Anatoly Karpov soon developed a decisive attack on the king.

Up till now we have been examining cases where two knights were contending for one square. But other pieces can also prove 'superfluous'.

Nei – Dvoretsky
Kharkov 1967
White is a healthy pawn to the good. Black has some hopes associated with the fact that the enemy d-pawn is on a square of the colour of its bishop. This means that counterplay on the dark squares is possible. And in the event of all the heavy pieces being exchanged, the bishop endgame may be drawn.

Now a choice has to be made between 20...\texttt{lab8} and 20...\texttt{ae8}. With all four rooks on the board, the bishop, by standing at c6, would restrict the mobility of the black rooks. They would have only the b-file, on which only one rook is needed. The second black rook would remain passive. And White, after doubling on the e-file, would be able to invade the 7th rank. This means that one pair of rooks must definitely be exchanged.

\begin{verbatim}
20 . . . \texttt{ae8!} \\
21 \texttt{c6} \texttt{xe1}+ \\
22 \texttt{xe1} \texttt{b8} \\
23 \texttt{c3}+ \texttt{f6} \\
24 \texttt{xf6}+ \texttt{xf6} \\
25 b3 \texttt{b4} \\
\end{verbatim}

I have retained definite counterchances and subsequently I achieved a draw.

\textbf{Exercises}

\begin{itemize}
\item 1. White to move
\item 2. White to move
\item 3. Black to move
\end{itemize}
Solutions

1. **Geller – Ciocaltea** (Olympiad, Malta 1980).
   13 $\text{d}3$!

   'In this way White not only avoids exchanges, but also keeps the knight at c7.' (Ye.Geller). There followed 13...f5 14 exf6 exf6 15 a4 a5 16 b3 $\text{e}8$ 17 $\text{a}3$ with advantage to White.

   13 $\text{b}3$!

   Here the knight is excellently placed. In addition, Black has two pieces contending for the e4-square and the knight at f6 simply proves to be 'superfluous'. White intends 14 $\text{d}4$. After 13...c8 14 $\text{d}4$ $\text{b}6$ 15 $\text{fc}1$


   Black must not allow the enemy knight to go to c4 (after the exchange of the light-square bishops). The move in the game parries this positional threat.

   19... $\text{b}5$!

   Now the knight at d2 has no good prospects, whereas the black knight is ready to go via a6 to c5. If 20 $\text{h}1$ (with the idea of 21 f4), then 20...$\text{f}4$!. The game went 20 h4 h5 21 $\text{g}5$?! (21 $\text{h}1$!) 21...$\text{xg}5$ 22 hxg5 $\text{a}6$ with an excellent endgame for Black.
PART IV

Mikhail Shereshevsky

Studying the Chess Classics

Not long ago I asked a gifted player for her opinion about Alekhine’s games. She replied: ‘Why should I study Alekhine’s games, when I’m never going to have to play him?’ It follows that she only studies the games of her opponents. I am convinced that, with such an approach, the prospects of this player are very limited.

Why do we need the classics? Today I will try to explain this to you.

Modern chess begins with the theory of Steinitz. Before him there were also some very strong players — such as Philidor, La Bourdonnais and Morphy, but it was Steinitz who laid the basis of modern positional play.

As a trainer I am concerned primarily with the practical results of my pupils. Therefore a study of the classics is of interest primarily from the standpoint of the practical player. I have a definite, possibly subjective program of work on the classics, which is what I suggest to my pupils.

I am not too interested in chess before Steinitz. And although, of course, Morphy was a wonderful player, a study of his games does not come into my program. It begins with the theory of Steinitz. I think that it is best described in two books: Emanuel Lasker’s Chess Manual (the chapter ‘Position Play’) and Max Euwe’s Kurs shakhmatnykh lektsii (Course of chess lectures).

In addition, there is a very interesting booklet by Eugene Znosko-Borovsky The Middle Game in Chess, which analyses the methods of evaluating a position that were typical at that time. Nowadays they have been largely forgotten.

Before Steinitz, players thought that the course of events on the board depended only on themselves. It was sufficient to feel well and to be in a creative mood, and enlightenment would come without fail, a brilliant combination would be found. At that time the ‘immortal’ game Anderssen–Kieseritzky was played (alas, it was far from faultless, and from the present-day viewpoint it does not stand up to criticism). Steinitz was the first to wonder whether this really was the state of affairs, and he became interested in this problem.

He came to the conclusion that combinations are possible in far from every position, and that their implementation depends not only on the talent of the player, but also on the properties of the position itself. There are situations in which the most brilliant player is unable to carry out any combination. This induced Steinitz to begin analysing the most varied positions, and he began seeking the general laws of positional play. However, his main achievement — I must emphasise this! — was the conclusion that a game of chess should be played in accordance with a plan, and that one can plan one’s actions. The plan, in turn, depends on the evaluation of the position. Steinitz developed many interesting principles of positional play; the majority of these have
withstood the test of time, although a few have not proved justified. But his main idea, that one should play in accordance with a plan, and the plan stems from the evaluation of the position – this idea is certainly correct and it proved very important for the development of chess theory.

The approach to the evaluation of a position, which was typical at that time, is very clearly described in the afore-mentioned booklet by Znosko-Borovsky. There are three main factors which influence this evaluation: advantage in force (that is, material superiority), advantage in time (we would say – in development) and advantage in space. In those days, when talking about an advantage in time, players would begin counting tempi, starting from the initial position. It could happen that one side had made, let us say, six moves, whereas the other had made ten (this happens not only due to the direct loss of tempi, but in view of the exchange of a piece that has made several moves for a piece that has hardly moved at all). Now, of course, no one counts tempi – a player simply looks at the position and determines by eye that one side has an advantage in development.

It is these three factors that were mainly used in evaluating a position and deciding on a plan. Today too such an approach may be appropriate. Let us consider some examples.

### Nimzowitsch – Capablanca
St Petersburg 1914

![Chessboard](image)

White is a pawn up, but Black has a lead in development. Let us count tempi: White has played e4 – one move, ²c3 – a second, castling – a third, and the queen has gone to a6 in two moves, making a total of five. Black has several tempi more: the pawn moves g6, d6 and bxc6 – three tempi; ³c8, ³e8, ²d7, ³g7, ³f6 and castling – a further six (of course, not all of them are of equal value; for example, ³c8 is of little use).

I repeat – it is not essential for you to make such calculations. You can also determine at sight that Black has a lead in development, but White is a pawn up.

The e4-pawn is attacked, and White faces the question of how to defend it. He can do this by ²d3, at the same time removing the queen from its rather dangerous position, or he can play ³e1 or f2–f3.

Nimzowitsch chose 15 ²d3 and later lost the game in highly instructive fashion. Capablanca replied 15...²e6, again attacking the e4-pawn and forcing White to make another defensive move. The play developed in accordance with the motifs of the modern Benko Gambit: the knight went from d7 to c4, and the rooks occupied the open a- and b-files. White was unable to neutralise this pressure.
This is how the game continued: 16 f3 \&d7 
17 \&d2 \&e5 18 \&e2 \&c4 19 \&ab1 \&a8 20 
a4 \&xd2 21 \&xd2 \&c4 22 \&fd1 \&eb8 23 
\&e3 \&b4 24 \&g5 \&d4+ 25 \&h1 \&ab8 26 
\&xd4 \&xd4, and Black easily converted his 
exchange advantage.

Only from Znosko-Borovsky did I find the 
correct explanation of what happened. He 
writes that if the opponent has an advantage 
in time (in development) and you have extra 
material, on no account should you remove 
to the defence those pieces which are 
putting pressure on the opponent’s position.

They may stand dangerously, they may be 
subject to risk, but they prevent the oppo­
nent from freely manoeuvring.

From a6 the queen is attacking the c6-pawn 
and preventing the regrouping ...\&e6, 
...\&d7, ...\&b6(e5) and ...\&c4. Therefore 
the correct move was 15 f3!. Of course, 
White has to reckon with the reply ...\&a8, 
but then he can play \&c4. The point is not to 
remove the queen’s attack on the c6-pawn.

Here one cannot help remembering the 
Najdorf Variation in the Sicilian Defence, 
where Black captures the b2-pawn with his 
queen and then withdraws it to a3. This 
queen diverts the opponent’s attention. It is 
in a dangerous situation, but it prevents the 
ponent from manoeuvring freely.

Now I will show you a position that arises in 
one of the variations of the Ragozin De­

1 d4 \&f6
2 c4 e6
3 \&f3 d5
4 \&c3 \&b4
5 cxd5 exd5
6 \&g5

The exchange of pawns followed by the pin 
on the knight is one of the most unpleasant 
plans for Black. He normally replies by 
counterattacking with ...c7–c5, after first 
playing 6...h6. But he can also play differ­
ently.

Now in the event of the queen retreating (for 
example, via a3 to e7) Black will almost 
certainly come under an unpleasant attack. 
He needs to try and restrain the opponent 
with those forces that are already in play. 
After studying the position, we arrive at the
following rook move.

12 ... \texttt{g8}

The queen must remain on \texttt{c3}. It may be in a rather advanced, eccentric position, but from here it hinders the opponent. For example, in the event of 13 \texttt{wh5} Black acquires good chances of a counterattack: 13...\texttt{g4} 14 \texttt{wh6} \texttt{f5}, and if 15 \texttt{xb7} – 15...\texttt{c1}+ 16 \texttt{e2} \texttt{g4+} (or 16...\texttt{c2?!}). All this is very dangerous for White.

Unfortunately, White has a way of setting the opponent difficult problems.

13 \texttt{g3!} \texttt{g4}
14 \texttt{e2}

Black's position is worse. His chronic weaknesses are bound to tell. But this is the way he should fight: not retreat, but try with the forces available to offer resistance to the opponent. Keep in mind that it is not so easy for White to decide on \texttt{g2–g3}: after the exchange of bishops, forced by ...\texttt{g4}, the light squares are weakened and the number of pieces on the board is reduced, which is unpleasant when you are a pawn down.

Now let us analyse one of the variations of the Grünfeld Defence.

1 \texttt{d4} \texttt{f6}
2 \texttt{c4} \texttt{g6}
3 \texttt{c3} \texttt{d5}
4 \texttt{f4} \texttt{g7}
5 \texttt{e3} \texttt{c5}
6 \texttt{dxc5} \texttt{a5}
7 \texttt{wb3}

The last move is little-explored (apparently, it is not good enough to obtain an advantage). White's idea is a possible exchange of queens by \texttt{b5}.

7 ... \texttt{d7}

This interesting reply was discovered when I was studying the position with some of my pupils. Black radically forestalls his opponent's idea. White cannot take on \texttt{b7}, as after 8 \texttt{xb7} \texttt{e4} 9 \texttt{xa8} 0-0 he comes under a crushing attack. On the other hand, Black wants to develop his initiative by ...\texttt{a6} and ...\texttt{xc5}.

8 \texttt{e5}

It is hard to suggest anything better. With this move White gains control of the \texttt{a1–h8} diagonal and creates the threat of capturing the \texttt{d5}-pawn.

8 ... \texttt{a6}
9 \texttt{cxd5} \texttt{xc5}
10 \texttt{wc4} \texttt{a6}

Only in this way is it possible to parry the terrible threat of 11 \texttt{b4}.

We initially thought that White's position was unsatisfactory. If he now develops a piece – 11 \texttt{f3} or 11 \texttt{e2}, Black replies 11...\texttt{c8} and gains strong counterplay.

But let's remember the idea expressed by Znosko-Borovsky. White is a pawn up, but behind in development. One more developed piece will not save him. Let's try playing actively, using those forces which are already in play.

11 \texttt{a3} \texttt{c8}
12 \texttt{b4}

If White succeeds in driving back the enemy queen, after 13 \texttt{d4} he will have every chance of completing his development while retaining a material advantage. And in the event of 12...\texttt{xc4} 13 \texttt{bxa5} he gains the
better endgame. For the moment he is a pawn up, and even if should lose the a5-pawn, his advantage in the centre will allow him quickly to complete his development.

Thus very long ago an idea originated that is also useful for present-day play: 'when you have a material advantage and are behind in development, don't withdraw your advanced pieces which are creating some difficulties for the opponent.' In other words, don't go totally onto the defensive. Nowadays this conception has been forgotten.

Znosko-Borovsky also has some interesting ideas about positions with a spatial advantage. He expresses the general thought that it is not at all essential to increase a spatial advantage; the main thing is to maintain it. Sooner or later a critical moment will arise: the opponent will try to free himself. It is for this critical moment that you should be prepared as well as possible.

He also has recommendations about what to do when you are short of space. Znosko-Borovsky suggests deciding which of your pieces stands worst, and also trying to understand the plan that the opponent is intending to carry out. After which you should improve the position of this piece, while simultaneously hindering the opponent's plan. All this is demonstrated in specific examples.

The theory of Steinitz contains many different postulates – some that are undisputable, others that are very disputable. He writes about the advantage of the two bishops, and about the queenside pawn majority (although practice has shown that a pawn majority on a flank does not in itself give any advantage – it must be specifically linked with other elements of the position). Some of his principles are, so to speak, of a philosophical nature. If you have the advantage, you are bound to attack, to play actively, as otherwise this advantage will inevitably evaporate – this is no longer a purely chess principle, but a philosophical one. On the whole, the approach to the evaluation of a position, suggested by Steinitz, deserves serious study. This is a very interesting chapter in chess history. It should desirably be studied from old books, to make a direct acquaintance with the thoughts of those people who discovered all this.

The drawback to Steinitz's theory is that it is static. Theoretical mechanics, as taught in technical institutes, consists of three main sections: statics, kinematics and dynamics. Roughly speaking, statics is when everything is at rest, kinematics is if there is some form of motion, and dynamics is when everything is in motion. Thus the theory of Steinitz is merely one of the sections in the 'theoretical mechanics' of chess. Steinitz, unfortunately, did not take account of the dynamics of the struggle, but took everything in its static state. His evaluations are suitable for many positions, but by no means for all. But how much can be expected from one person? As it was, he made an enormous contribution to the development of chess.

It is very interesting to play through Steinitz's games, but it has to be acknowledged that the Steinitz theory is better illustrated by the games of his followers, than by his own. At times he adhered too strictly to his theory, failing to take account of the dynamics of the struggle. And this sometimes led to dismal results.

The teachings of Steinitz were splendidly employed in practice by Akiba Rubinstein. In his Chess Manual Lasker expressed the opinion that Rubinstein's games are model examples from the viewpoint of Steinitz's theory. In addition, Rubinstein possessed a wonderful endgame technique. An excellent book Akiba Rubinstein was written by Razuvaev and Murakhveri, and all the
Studying the Chess Classics

I would suggest that you study Rubinstein’s games in the following way. After playing through the opening, cover up his moves and try to guess them. That is, try to play like Rubinstein. Spend at least 45 minutes on such an analysis of one game, and your mind will retain much more that if you simply play it through.

An excellent book *Die Moderne Schachpartie* was written by Ziegbert Tarrasch. Garry Kasparov has spoken very highly about it. When Tarrasch is called dogmatic, this is, of course, incorrect. It is simply that in his time he had a dispute with Chigorin, who is regarded as the founder of the Russian chess school. And in our country such people are not liked from then on, and they have all kinds of labels pinned on them.

We will now examine an example demonstrating the advantages of a dynamic, concrete approach to a position over a static one. You have here an example taken from Isak Lipnitsky’s excellent book *Voprosy sovremennoy shakhmatnoy teorii* (Questions of modern chess theory).

It is White’s turn to move. He has the advantage of the two bishops, but his pawn structure on the queenside has been spoiled. If Black should succeed in carrying out the standard plan in such positions — ...\(\text{a}6\), \(\text{c}6\), \(\text{a}4\) and \(\text{a}5\), he will win the c4-pawn and most probably also the game.

If you follow the general principles of play in the opening — develop the pieces and castle, then 11 \(e3\) should be played. I am afraid, however, that in this case the specific plan will prevail over abstract principles and White will gradually lose.

But there are also other, less obvious principles operating in the position. It is not always easy to express them in words; often a player senses them intuitively.

On a careful study of the position it may be noticed that Black has not a single piece on the kingside. In this way one may arrive at the move 11 \(g4!!\), which radically changes the evaluation of the position. This move is in accordance with the principle: ‘attack the opponent where he is most vulnerable’.

White creates the very unpleasant threat of 12 \(\text{g}2\). For example, if 11...\( fxg4\) there follows 12 \(\text{g}2\) \(\text{c}6\) 13 \(d5\), and Black’s position crumbles. If he plays 11...\( \text{b}7\), then after 12 \(\text{g}1\) White has a powerful attack on the kingside. Perhaps the best solution is 11...\(\text{c}xd4\), taking play into an ending that is difficult for Black.

If the pawn were at \(f7\), and not at \(f5\) — such a trifle! — and this entire play, beginning with \(g2\)–\(g4\), was simply not there, the advantage would be with Black. Although there is still no black piece defending the kingside, there is nothing for White to grasp, there is no \(f5\)-pawn — that ‘hook’ which he can latch on to. It is very important to take such specific details into account when evaluating a position.

Next after Steinitz came the hypermodernists (an amusing word!). Steinitz thought that it was good to have a strong pawn centre and that a player who has an advantage in the
centre has an advantage in general. But players such as Réti, Nimzowitsch and Breyer – the main representatives of hypermodernism – asserted that it is by no means obligatory to have a strong pawn centre, but that you can concede the centre to your opponent and then attack it with pieces. New openings appeared, for example, the Réti Opening, the Nimzo-Indian Defence and the Alekhine Defence; the understanding of old openings, for example, the English Opening, was broadened. Nimzowitsch discovered principles such as prophylaxis and over-protection. That is, as a result of the dispute between the hypermodernists and the ‘classics’, chess moved forward.

Nimzowitsch was an implacable opponent of Tarrasch and his views. Unfortunately, they are players of different generations. For Nimzowitsch and Tarrasch the peaks of their practical strength came at different times. In games between them Nimzowitsch was more often successful, but this does not indicate the superiority of hypermodernism – it was simply that Tarrasch was much older, and played more weakly than in his youth.

From Nimzowitsch’s books My System and Chess Praxis one can certainly derive a great deal. But you should not unconditionally believe everything that is written there. Nimzowitsch was often dealing with opponents who were significantly inferior to him in playing strength, and in such cases it is not hard to prove any theory.

In an issue of the magazine Shakhmaty v SSSR a very interesting article by the Moldavian master V.Chebanenko was published. In it the author cast doubts on Nimzowitsch’s principle, which states that a pawn chain should be attacked at its base. Imagine a white pawn wedge in the King’s Indian Defence: d5, e4, f3, g2 (black pawns at c7, d6, e5). Nimzowitsch writes that Black should play ...f7–f5 and then, perhaps, push his pawn to f4 and advance his g-pawn. The base of White’s pawn chain is the f3-pawn, or even the g2-pawn. But time and again we see examples where Black begins not with ...f7–f5, but with ...c7–c6. That is, he undermines the centre not at the base of the pawn chain, but at its head, and this sometimes turns out quite well. Nimzowitsch largely based his conclusions on the French Defence, but there too Black sometimes has to attack not the base, but the head of the pawn chain, i.e. play ...f7–f6.

There are some other classic books which deserve attention. I recommend that you read Masters of the Chess Board by Richard Réti. I also like very much his small book New Ideas in Chess, demonstrating the approach to chess in the period of hypermodernism.

In some aspects the approach of the hypermodernists was also dogmatic. Annotating his game against te Kolsté (Baden-Baden 1925), Réti judged the position arising after 1 e4 cf6 2 e5 cf5 3 c3 c3 c3 4 dxc3 to be in favour of Black, thanks to the prospect of obtaining a pawn majority on the kingside. He writes that ‘by modern technique a minute but clear positional advantage incurred in the opening can be easily converted into a win.’ Lasker severely criticised this approach in his Chess Manual. He showed specifically where White could have defended better and commented: ‘On a motif such as was indicated by Réti, one cannot build the plan of a whole well-contested game; it is too meagre, too thin, too puny for such an end. Réti’s explanations, wherever they are concerned with an analysis which covers a few moves are correct and praiseworthy. As yet nobody has been able to do much more than that except to conceive plans as the game proceeded. The reader of Réti’s remarks is led to think than an altogether new and profound strat-
egy has recently arisen and is probably tempted to cast very deep strategical plans of the same order. He is in danger of losing his sound judgement, and neither he nor chess is well served thereby.’

Finally, two players stand apart. They are Capablanca and Alekhine. They were not subject to any influences, and they played completely differently, but their games serve as model examples even to this day.

Think about how modern chess looks. Let us suppose that there are two opponents of equal strength – for example, Andersson and Hübner. One of them draws up a plan, but the other sees this plan and tries to prevent it. As a result of the clash of plans, White gains a small advantage. He makes a new plan, and in reply there follows a new counter-plan. Finally, both players end up in time-trouble, in which the logical course of the struggle is disrupted. For an inexperienced player it is not easy to understand such a game, and even for a master it can be difficult. But if, say, Alekhine is playing Tartakower, here the difference in class is felt. Alekhine makes a plan which proceeds smoothly. Tartakower does not understand it, and does not prevent it from being carried out. In this way the entire plan is presented to us in pure form. Against modern players – such as Salov, Hübner, Andersson, such a clear picture would not have resulted, since their opposing strength is much higher. So that the first lessons of strategy, lessons of making plans, should be taken from the classics.

Let us suppose that you have become acquainted with the great players from Steinitz to Alekhine, that you have looked at their games and studied the books that I have mentioned. Then it can be said that you have basically assimilated the chess classics. Of course, there are also Botvinnik, Smyslov, and other top players of our time. But for a deep understanding of modern chess, it is important to have a good chess culture, and to initially go through a course on the classics.
The modern attitude to the classics (including the chess classics) is mainly creative, and sometimes even critical. And at the same time careful and thoughtful. Every player at certain stages of his development turns (it would be more accurate to say, should turn) to a study of our valuable heritage. And, of course, a close familiarity with the classics is essential for trainers working with youngsters.

When preparing games by the leading grandmasters of the past for use in lessons, you constantly have to ask yourself: what provoked particular decisions by the two players, and was it not possible to play more strongly? After all, you may certainly be asked this by your pupils. Commentaries in books answer by no means all such questions, and sometimes the answers seem not altogether satisfactory. You must get down to checking variations yourself. Often an analysis, confirming the correctness of the contestants, enables their decisions to be understood and sensed more deeply, but sometimes roughly equivalent alternatives are discovered. It can also happen that in the moves or notes you encounter direct mistakes. But however carefully and seriously a trainer prepares, all the same in lessons he will have new and interesting ideas proposed to him, and many variations will be improved. As a result, the picture of the struggle in the game in question will often begin to look completely different from how it appeared before the work.

Emanuel Lasker’s first appearance after losing the title of world champion was the strong international tournament in Moravská Ostrava in 1923. The outcome of the event was largely determined by the 9th round encounter between the two leaders – Lasker and the Czech grandmaster Richard Réti, which ended in a win for the ex-world champion.

Commentaries on this game (in particular, in B. Vainstein’s interesting and vivid book Myslitel (The Thinker), devoted to Lasker’s career) are, in my view, inadequate, and in places they incorrectly reflect its content. Meanwhile, the game is interesting from not only the historic, but also the purely chess point of view, and for this reason I wish once again to draw it to the attention of the readers.

Réti – Lasker
Moravská Ostrava 1923
Slav Defence

1 d4 d5
2 c4 c6
3 e3 dxc4
4 f3 f6
5 b4

Nowadays this is rarely played: current opening fashion is more for 5 a4.

6 a4 b5
7 a2 b4
8 xc4 e7
9 0-0 0-0
10 e2 bd7

Perhaps the most typical and instructive game for the given variation is deemed to be Reshevsky–Smyslov (USSR–USA Radio Match 1945), which went 10...b7 11 d1 a5 12 d2 bd7 13 c1 wb6 14 b3 c5 15 e1 fd8 with complicated and roughly equal play. It is interesting to try and
evaluate those deviations from the classical example (created 22 years later), which Lasker and Réti permitted themselves. The drawback to 10...,Qbd7, compared with 10...Qb7, is that now White could have tried 11 e4. However, it is unclear how advantageous it would be to him.

11 b3!?  
Réti develops his bishop at b2, where it is more actively placed than d2 – as with Reshevsky. But at the same time the c3-square is weakened, which may prove (and indeed proved in the present game) highly significant.

11 ... a5  
12 b5 c5  
13 Qfd1 Wb6  
14 Qc1 Qa6?!  
It was quite possible to follow the future classical example: 14...Qb7. By exchanging the light-square bishops, Lasker hopes to exploit the weakening of the b3-pawn. However, in the process the enemy knight gains the excellent square c4. In the future a favourable situation for White may arise, with a strong knight at c4 against a passive dark-square bishop.

We see, firstly, that even such seemingly modest moves as 11 b3 or 14...Qa6 may be double-edged and risky in the strategic sense, and secondly, that both players are inclined to take a principled stance, being prepared to make weaknesses in their own position in the fight for the initiative.

15 ... Qxc5?!  
In the event of 15 Qxa6!? Wxa6! 16 Wxa6 Qxa6 17 Qd3 White has slightly the better endgame. 15 Qd2 also came into consideration.

15 ... Qxc5  
16 Qe5 Qxc4  
It was also worth thinking about 16...Qd5!? , intending 17...Qf6.

17 Qxc4 Wxa6

Now White needs to take measures against the threat of 18...Qf6 followed by 19...Qxb3, and also to think about the development of his knight at c1.

18 Qd4 Qfc8?  
In my view, a significant inaccuracy. White wants to solve his problems by exchanging on c5. Black could have retained a knight there by playing 18...Qf6! (there is also 18...Qfd7), after which 19 f3 Qc3 20 Qxc3 bxc3 followed by 21...Qfc8 is unfavourable for White. Réti would probably have replied 19 Qa2!, but after 19...Qc3 20 Qxc3 bxc3 21 Qc2 Qab8 (21...Qf6!? 22 e4 Qfd8, and 23 Qxd8 Qxd8 24 e5? fails to 24...Qxe5!) 22 Qxc3 Qf6 the game is completely equal.

19 Qxc5! Qxc5  
In the event of 19...Qxc5 White can deprive the enemy pieces of the d5-square by 20 e4!. Weaker is 20 Qd3?! Qd5 21 e4 Qd4 with an unclear game. But if now 20 e4, then 20...Wb7 is unpleasant; 20 Qd3 is also bad in view of 20...Qe4(d5) followed by 21...Qc3.

20 Wf3!
roughly the same situation would have arisen in the game, had Réti chosen the modest 21 \( \text{c}e2 \). In this case he would have retained the better chances, which, however, does not signify that Black’s plan, beginning with his 14th move, was wrong, but is merely a consequence of his inaccuracy on the 18th move.

Lasker provokes his opponent into the more active manoeuvre \( \text{c}c1-d3-e5 \), as a result of which White seizes control of all the central squares. But in return the black knight gains the opportunity to go to c3. It is probable that Lasker’s enormous experience of defence in strategically difficult situations suggested to him that the good placing of just one piece might prove to be that sheet anchor, with the help of which White’s seemingly powerful offensive could be neutralised.

21 \( \text{d}d3?! \)

We have already mentioned the striving of both players to act critically, but in the given instance White would have done better to play more cautiously, especially with serious time-trouble approaching.

21 ... \( \text{d}5! \)
22 \( \text{de}5 \) \( \text{f}6! \)

Of course, not 22...\( \text{f}6? \) 23 \( \text{xe}5 \), while if 22...\( \text{f}8? \) the following variation was possible: 23 \( e4 \) \( \text{c}3 \) 24 \( \text{d}7 \) \( \text{a}7 \) (24 ... \( \text{f}6 \) 25 \( \text{e}1 \) 25 \( \text{xa}7 \) \( \text{xa}7 \) 26 \( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 27 \( \text{xe}7+ \) \( \text{xe}7 \) 28 \( \text{c}5 \) 29 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 30 \( \text{c}1 \) (but not 30 \( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{a}4 \) 30...\( \text{xe}4 \) (not 30...\( \text{xe}4? \) in view of 31 \( \text{d}1 \) 31 \( \text{xe}4 \) with advantage to White in the endgame.

23 \( e4 \)

Subsequently an escape square for the king would have come in very useful, and so 23 \( g4 \) may seem tempting. But then there would have followed 23...\( \text{xc}4! \) 24 \( \text{xc}4 \) \( \text{xa}1 \) 25 \( \text{xa}1 \) \( \text{c}3 \), and for the moment the white rook is shut out of the game. After the move in the game 23...\( \text{xc}4? \) 24 \( \text{xc}4 \) \( \text{xa}1 \) is now unfavourable on account of 25 \( \text{exd}5! \).

23 ... \( \text{c}3 \)
24 \( \text{d}6?! \)

A natural and logical move, but, as was shown by the young candidate master Maxim Boguslavsky, it was stronger to play 24 \( \text{d}7! \) \( \text{a}7 \) and only now 25 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 26 \( \text{e}1 \). The rook is less well placed at a7 than at a8. However, here too after 26...\( \text{xe}5 \) (26...\( \text{a}6?! \) 27 \( \text{d}3! \) 27 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{e}7 \) the outcome would have remained completely unclear.

24 ... \( \text{b}7 \)
25 \( \text{e}1 \)

Now Black has to reckon with 26 \( \text{d}7 \). If 25...\( \text{d}8 \), then 26 \( \text{xd}8+ \) \( \text{xd}8 \) 27 \( \text{xa}5 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 28 \( \text{e}6 \) and thanks to the threat of \( \text{e}4-e5 \) White has time to consolidate. Lasker finds a stronger alternative.

25 ... \( \text{xe}5! \)
26 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{c}7! \)

26...\( \text{xe}4? \) did not work, of course, because of 27 \( \text{d}7! \). In the event of 26...\( \text{d}8 \) 27 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 28 \( \text{ad}6 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 29 \( \text{e}5 \) the advantage is with White: after making an escape square for his king, he then plays his rook via e3–d3–d4–c4. In this case the knight at c3 is no longer dangerous: it does not create any threats and it is very far from those squares from which it could attack the b3-pawn – the only weakness in the opponent’s position. Lasker forces the white knight to return to c4, where it proves vulnerable.

27 \( \text{c}4 \)

There is nothing else. After 27 \( \text{d}7 \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 28 \( \text{xf7+} \) \( \text{h}8 \) the g7-point is defended, while if 27 \( \text{d}3 \) there would have followed 27...\( \text{xe}4! \) (weaker is 27...\( \text{d}5? \) 28 \( \text{c}4 \) 28 \( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{xd}6! \).

(see next diagram)

Now White wants to strengthen his position by 28 \( \text{e}5 \) with the threat of 29 \( \text{b}6 \). The logical continuation of Black’s strategy was the obvious 27...\( \text{xa}4! \). For example, if 28
In all the commentaries on the game it is stated that in this case White would have won by 28 e5 \( \mathcal{L}c3(\mathcal{c}5) \) 29 \( \mathcal{L}b6 \). Saviely Tartakower gave a strange variation: 28 e5 \( \mathcal{L}d8 \) 29 \( \mathcal{L}ed1 \) (why not simply 29 \( \mathcal{L}c6! \), winning a piece?) 29...\( \mathcal{L}c3 \) (29...\( \mathcal{L}c5 \)) 30 \( \mathcal{L}d7! \) f5 31 exf6!.

For sixty years (!) this conclusion, significantly influencing the evaluation of both sides’ strategy, remained unshaken, until Artur Yusupov pointed out the possibility of a simple defence: 28...\( \mathcal{L}ab8! \), and if 29 \( \mathcal{L}ed1 \), then 29...\( \mathcal{L}c5 \). The threats are parried, and Black’s extra pawn remains. It is now White who would have had to fight for a draw, and this could have proved no easy matter, especially in severe time-trouble.

Why didn’t the ex-world champion take the pawn? It is possible that Lasker – an excellent tactician – instantly saw another, completely unexpected and very pretty defensive possibility and, unable to refrain from it, did not bother to check the variations carefully. Or perhaps both sides were in time-trouble? It is a pity that information on the times is not available (with the exception of White’s severe time trouble, mentioned in Vainstein’s book) – it could have given much additional information, important for a better understanding of the events on the board.

The move in the game, creating the threats of 29 \( \mathcal{L}d7 \) and 29 \( \mathcal{L}xe5 \), is very strong. Its only drawback is that it was here that Lasker had prepared a very clever counterblow.

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The knight could have been taken, but after 29 \( \mathcal{L}xe2?! \) \( \mathcal{L}xd6! \) 30 \( \mathcal{L}xf7+! \) \( \mathcal{L}h8 \) (30...\( \mathcal{L}xf7 \) 31 \( \mathcal{L}xd6+ \) \( \mathcal{L}e6 \) 32 \( \mathcal{L}xc8 \) \( \mathcal{L}xc8 \) 33 \( \mathcal{L}f1 \) \( \mathcal{L}c3 \) 34 \( \mathcal{L}e3 \) \( \mathcal{L}xe3 \) leads to an immediate draw) 31 \( \mathcal{L}d5 \) Black’s chances are somewhat better, although a draw is highly probable. In time-trouble it is almost impossible to prefer the move of the king into the corner, but 29 \( \mathcal{L}h1! \) would have retained a significant advantage for White. Siegbert Tarrasch gave this variation: 29...\( \mathcal{L}d4 \) 30 \( \mathcal{L}xe5 \) \( \mathcal{L}xb3 \) 31 \( \mathcal{L}b6 \) \( \mathcal{L}c3 \) (31...\( \mathcal{L}c1 \) 32 \( \mathcal{L}ed1 \) 32 \( \mathcal{L}xc3 \) \( \mathcal{bxc3} \) 33 \( \mathcal{a}8 \) (33 \( \mathcal{a}c8 \) \( \mathcal{xc8} \) 34 \( \mathcal{L}e1! \) is also strong – this was found by Ilya Makariyev who, like his friend Maxim Boguslavsky, studied in our school) 33...\( \mathcal{L}c2 \) 34 \( \mathcal{h}3 \) (34 \( \mathcal{h}4 \) or 34 \( \mathcal{g}3 \) is more logical) 34...\( \mathcal{c}1 \) (the rook endgame after 34...\( \mathcal{a}8 \) 35 \( \mathcal{c}6 \) \( \mathcal{c}1\) is hopeless) 35 \( \mathcal{xc1} \) \( \mathcal{xc1} \) 36 \( \mathcal{b}6 \) \( \mathcal{e}8 \) – it is clear that the extra pawn ensures White excellent winning chances (the improvements in brackets are mine – Dvoretsky).
It is possible to defend more tenaciously: 29...\texttt{d}8 (instead of 29...\texttt{d}4) 30 \texttt{xe}5 (30 \texttt{xd}8 \texttt{xd}8 followed by ...\texttt{d}4) 30...\texttt{xd}6 31 \texttt{xd}6 \texttt{xd}6 32 \texttt{d}4. If now 33 \texttt{e}3, then 33...\texttt{d}8 (33...\texttt{a}6 34 \texttt{c}4 \texttt{c}6 is weaker on account of 35 \texttt{d}3) 34 e5 f6 35 f4 fxe5 36 fxe5 \texttt{d}8 with equality, or 34 \texttt{b}7 \texttt{d}7 35 \texttt{d}3 (35 \texttt{xa}5? \texttt{xb}3; 35 \texttt{c}7? \texttt{c}7) 35...\texttt{xb}7 36 \texttt{xd}4 \texttt{f}8 37 g3 \texttt{c}7 38 \texttt{d}5 \texttt{c}3 39 \texttt{xa}5 \texttt{xb}3, and soon a drawn ending is reached with four pawns against three on one wing.

However, instead of 33 \texttt{e}3?, 33 \texttt{b}1 is stronger. The rook maintains control of the 1st rank, and if 33...\texttt{d}8, then 34 \texttt{b}7 is now very strong. With careful play White can hope to gradually convert his extra pawn.

29 ... \texttt{d}4
30 \texttt{xe}5 \texttt{xb}3
31 \texttt{b}6 \texttt{d}2+

This check is the whole point!

32 \texttt{g}1 \texttt{c}4
33 \texttt{xc}4

If 33 \texttt{xa}8 there follows 33...\texttt{xd}6 34 \texttt{xd}6 \texttt{xd}6 35 \texttt{b}6 (35 e5 \texttt{c}4) 35...\texttt{c}2 (of course, not Vainstein's 35...\texttt{c}6?! 36 \texttt{d}5 \texttt{xe}4?? on account of 37 \texttt{e}7+, and in view of the threats of 36...\texttt{b}3 and 36...\texttt{xe}4 Black must win.

33 ... \texttt{xc}4

34 \texttt{f}5?

After such a sharp change of scene, and in severe time-trouble, it is not easy to switch to defence and find the best moves. Meanwhile, I think that as yet things were by no means hopeless for White. He should have chosen between 34 \texttt{b}6, placing the rook behind the dangerous passed pawn, and 34 h4, intending 35 \texttt{b}6 or 35 h5 h6 36 \texttt{e}3 and 37 \texttt{g}3.

34 ... \texttt{ab}8!
35 e5 \texttt{b}3
36 e6 \texttt{f}xe6
37 \texttt{d}xe6 \texttt{xf}8

There was a quicker win by 37...\texttt{b}2 38 \texttt{e}7 \texttt{b}1!! 39 \texttt{x}b1 \texttt{g}6!, when the queen has nowhere to go.

38 \texttt{e}5 \texttt{c}2
39 f4

39 \texttt{g}3 b2 40 \texttt{e}7 \texttt{g}6 41 \texttt{x}g6 hxg6 42 \texttt{b}1 \texttt{f}4! followed by 43...\texttt{xa}4 would not have helped.

39 ... \texttt{b}2
40 \texttt{e}7 \texttt{g}6
41 f5 \texttt{f}6
42 \texttt{d}5+ \texttt{h}8
43 \texttt{b}7 \texttt{c}3

White resigned. If 44 \texttt{f}1 the most accurate is 44...\texttt{e}3+ 45 \texttt{h}1 \texttt{f}4! 46 \texttt{d}1 (46 \texttt{g}1 \texttt{xb}7 47 \texttt{xb}7 \texttt{b}8) 46...\texttt{c}1!.

Analysis has shown that, alas, the game was far from faultless. But in it one is attracted by the active and at times risky struggle by both players for a win, and by the principled way in which they carried out their plans. Here strategy and tactics were very closely interwoven. The value of each move was extremely high, and the slightest error (such as 27...e5? or 29 \texttt{f}1??) radically changed the evaluation of the position. A thorough study of similar interesting games is not only useful, but also fascinating, helping one to gain a better feeling for the depth and beauty of chess.
Exercises

You have here three impressive episodes from the play of Rudolf Spielmann, analysed by him in his famous book *The Art of Sacrifice in Chess*. You have to refine or even refute certain conclusions drawn by the grandmaster. The problems are very difficult, and are intended not so much for solving, as for independent analysis (moving the pieces on the board).

1. Black is actively placed, but he has to reckon with $\text{Rx}d6$. If $23...\text{Wc}2$ there is the good reply $24 \text{Ad}2$, and so Spielmann played $23...\text{a}5!$, diverting the queen from the b4-square. If $24 \text{Ad}2$, then $24...\text{Wc}5$, intending the invasion of the rook at f2. White has to choose between $24 \text{Wxa}5$ and $24 \text{Wc}3 \text{Wc}5$ (after defending the d6-pawn, Black wants to block the queenside by $25...\text{a}4$) $25 \text{b}4$. Which would you prefer?

2. **It is Black to move.** Assess the consequences of the spectacular breakthrough in the centre $17...\text{d}5$.

3. **Black to move.** As in the previous game, Spielmann decided on a breakthrough in the centre: $12...\text{e}5$. What do you think about this?
1. Rubinstein – Spielmann (San Sebastian 1912).

The correct solution is the cool-headed capture of the pawn.

24 \( \text{W}x\text{a}5! \)  \( \text{W}c2 \)

It was this move that Spielmann had in mind, since 24...\( \text{W}x\text{b}2 \) would have allowed White to exchange queens in a convenient way: 25 \( \text{Z}d2 \) \( \text{Z}b3 \) (25...\( \text{Z}e5?!\) 26 \( \text{W}x\text{e}5 \) \( \text{d}x\text{e}5 \) with approximate equality) 26 \( \text{W}b4 \).

25 \( \text{Z}d2! \)

Not 25 \( \text{W}c3? \) (or 25 \( \text{Z}x\text{d}6? \)) on account of 25...\( \text{Z}x\text{e}4! \). After 25 \( \text{W}d2 \) \( \text{W}x\text{c}4 \) the threat of 26...\( \text{Z}f2 \) is unpleasant.

25 ...  \( \text{W}x\text{c}4 \)

26 \( \text{Z}x\text{d}6! \)

The only way! White would have lost after 26 \( \text{W}c3? \) \( \text{Z}f1+! \) 27 \( \text{Z}x\text{f}1 \) \( \text{Z}x\text{f}1+ \) 28 \( \text{Z}g2 \) \( \text{W}x\text{c}3 \) 29 \( \text{b}x\text{c}3 \) \( \text{Z}x\text{e}1 \). But now 26...\( \text{Z}f1+? \) 27 \( \text{Z}x\text{f}1 \) \( \text{Z}x\text{f}1+ \) 28 \( \text{Z}g2 \) does not work, and nor does 26...\( \text{Z}x\text{e}4? \) 27 \( \text{Z}x\text{e}4 \) \( \text{Z}f1+ \) 28 \( \text{Z}g2 \). White is a pawn up and he is ready to simplify the position by 27 \( \text{Z}d8 \). After 28...\( \text{Z}f2 \) 29 \( \text{Z}d8 \) \( \text{W}c2 \) 30 \( \text{Z}x\text{f}8+ \) \( \text{Z}x\text{f}8 \) the result is a draw.

In the game Akiba Rubinstein made an unfortunate choice, allowing his opponent to carry out a brilliant combination.

24 \( \text{W}c3?! \) \( \text{W}c5 \) 25 \( \text{b}4 \) \( \text{Z}x\text{e}4!! \)

The queen is, of course, immune in view of 26...\( \text{Z}f1+ \) with mate. After 26 \( \text{Z}x\text{e}4?! \) Spielmann was intending 26...\( \text{Z}f1+ \) 27 \( \text{Z}x\text{f}1 \) \( \text{x}f1+ \) 28 \( \text{Z}g2 \) \( \text{Z}g1+ \) 29 \( \text{Z}f3 \) \( \text{Z}h5+ \) 30 \( \text{Z}e3 \) \( \text{Z}x\text{h}2 \). 'It would be a problem in itself to examine the position more closely. But from the practical standpoint, which, in our sense, should alone hold the scales in judging real sacrifices, only an estimate is possible, which, in my opinion, should prove favourable to the second player. He who would not boldly undertake to win such a position with Black will never go far in the domain of the sacrifice.' (Spielmann)

The young player Sasha Ryazantsev showed that by playing 30 \( \text{Z}f4! \) (instead of 30 \( \text{Z}e3 \)), White could have saved himself. In reply 30...\( \text{Z}h6+ \) 31 \( \text{Z}g4 \) is pointless, while in the variations 30...\( \text{g}5+ \) 31 \( \text{Z}e3 \) \( \text{Z}x\text{h}2 \) 32 \( \text{W}f6! \) \( \text{Z}e1+ \) 33 \( \text{Z}d4 \) \( \text{W}b2+ \) 34 \( \text{Z}c3 \) \( \text{W}d2+ \) 35 \( \text{Z}d3, \) 30...\( \text{e}5+ \) 31 \( \text{Z}e3 \) \( \text{W}h6+ \) 32 \( \text{Z}f3 \) \( \text{W}x\text{h}2 \) 33 \( \text{Z}d5+ \) \( \text{Z}f8 \) 34 \( \text{Z}e4 \) \( \text{W}e2+ \) 35 \( \text{Z}e3 \) (35 \( \text{Z}f5? \) \( \text{W}h5+\) ) 35...\( \text{W}g4+ \) 36 \( \text{Z}d3 \) \( \text{W}d1+ \) 37 \( \text{Z}e4!, \) or 30...\( \text{Z}c1 \) 31 \( \text{Z}d2! \) (31 \( \text{W}xc1 \) \( \text{W}h6+; \) 31 \( \text{W}b3 \) \( \text{Z}e1\) ) 31...\( \text{Z}x\text{c}4 \) 32 \( \text{Z}e3! \) \( \text{W}e5 \) 33 \( \text{Z}d4 \) \( \text{W}g5+ \) 34 \( \text{Z}f3 \) \( \text{W}f6+ \) 35 \( \text{Z}e3 \) Black has to be satisfied with perpetual check.

White also had available the clever defence 26 \( \text{Z}f3? \) (with the idea of answering 26...\( \text{Z}x\text{f}3 \) with 27 \( \text{W}x\text{f}3! \)). Then, according to Spielmann's analysis, the play would have developed as follows: 26...\( \text{a}x\text{b}4 \) 27 \( \text{a}x\text{b}4 \) \( \text{W}c6 \) 28 \( \text{b}5 \) 28...\( \text{W}x\text{e}4? \) \( \text{W}x\text{e}4 \) 29 \( \text{Z}x\text{f}7 \) \( \text{W}b1+\) 28...\( \text{Z}x\text{f}3 \) 29 \( \text{W}x\text{f}3! \) \( \text{Z}x\text{f}3 \) 30 \( \text{b}x\text{c}6 \) \( \text{Z}x\text{g}2+ \) 31 \( \text{Z}x\text{g}2 \) \( \text{b}x\text{c}6 \) 32 \( \text{Z}x\text{e}6 \) \( \text{Z}f6 \) 33 \( \text{Z}e7 \). Black is a pawn up in a rook endgame but the opponent retains saving chances. I should mention that Black is not obliged to exchange queens – he also retains an extra pawn after 27...\( \text{W}h5!? \) 28 \( \text{W}x\text{e}4 \) \( \text{Z}x\text{f}3 \) 29 \( \text{Z}x\text{f}3 \) \( \text{Z}x\text{f}3 \) 30 \( \text{W}e5 \), or 28 \( \text{W}x\text{f}7 \) \( \text{Z}x\text{g}2+ \) 29 \( \text{Z}x\text{g}2 \) \( \text{W}x\text{f}7 \).
We have seen that, although objectively Black's combination did not lead to a win, it set the opponent very difficult problems.  

26 \texttt{exf4?} 27 \texttt{xf1} \texttt{xf1+} 28 \texttt{g2} \texttt{xf2+} 29 \texttt{h3} \texttt{h1!}  

29...\texttt{xf5+} 30 \texttt{g2} was pointless, but now this check is threatened, since the king cannot retreat to \texttt{g2} on account of mate by the queen on \texttt{f1}. White's position is lost, despite his extra rook.  

30 \texttt{xf3} \texttt{h2+} 31 \texttt{g4} \texttt{h5+} 32 \texttt{f4} \texttt{h6+} 33 \texttt{g4} \texttt{g5!} 34 \texttt{xe6} (otherwise there is no defence against 34...\texttt{h5 mate}) 34...\texttt{xe6} 35 \texttt{h5} (35 \texttt{g5} \texttt{h6+} 36 \texttt{f4} \texttt{e1!} also does not help) 35...\texttt{h6} (intending ...\texttt{h7–g6}; 35...\texttt{e4+} 36 \texttt{g5} \texttt{h6+} 37 \texttt{f6} \texttt{e1!} would also have won) 36 \texttt{g3} 37 \texttt{f3} (37 \texttt{d5} \texttt{h5+} 38 \texttt{f3} \texttt{f1+}) 37...\texttt{e1+} 38 \texttt{xf1} \texttt{xf5+} 39 \texttt{g2} \texttt{xf1+} 40 \texttt{xf1} axb4 41 axb4 \texttt{f6} 42 \texttt{f2} \texttt{h5} White resigns.  


In the game after 17...d5 White decided to grab all the material sacrificed by his opponent: 18 \texttt{exd5} \texttt{xd5!!} 19 \texttt{cxd5} \texttt{xd5}. Commenting on the resulting situation, Rudolf Spielmann writes:  

'The sacrifice is now clear; Black has a piece less (the doubled pawn hardly counts as a compensation), but his advantage in development has increased enormously through the opening up of the two centre files; as both the bishop and the g2-pawn are attacked, White cannot castle and must waste another tempo – unless he plays for equalisation, with 20 \texttt{h7+} and castles. It is, however, hardly to be expected that White should make no attempt at refutation, and so Black can count on the chances of a violent central attack on the hostile king.  

'These were the considerations which led to the sacrifice. Only unbounded faith in the position and in the undeviating principles of development gave birth to the idea, for a previous instance of such a break-through is unknown to me even today.  

'I told myself that White, in spite of his extra piece, would be compelled to defend himself for a long time against a local supremacy and that, in these circumstances, the gain of at least some pawns could be counted on. The course of the game speaks for the correctness – certainly from a practical standpoint – of this assumption.'  

20 \texttt{g3} \texttt{e8} 21 \texttt{e2} \texttt{bd8}  

21...\texttt{h5} 22 \texttt{g4} \texttt{xf4!} 23 \texttt{xf4} \texttt{g2} was tempting. However, after 24 \texttt{f1} \texttt{e2+} 25 \texttt{xe2} \texttt{h1+} 26 \texttt{c2} a roughly equal position would have arisen.  

22 \texttt{c3}  

If 22 \texttt{f1} Spielmann gives 22...\texttt{xe2} 23 \texttt{xe2} \texttt{c4+!} 24 \texttt{e1} \texttt{e8+}, overlooking the intermediate move 23 \texttt{c3!}. Therefore the attack should be continued with 22...\texttt{e4!}.  

22...\texttt{d2+} 23 \texttt{f1} \texttt{d5}  

'Far more powerful than 23...\texttt{xb2}; in such positions pawns should not be captured until they fall in your lap, so to speak. Nothing counts but the attack.' (Spielmann)  

24 \texttt{e1} \texttt{xf4} 25 \texttt{f2} \texttt{d4} 26 \texttt{g3} \texttt{h3} 27 \texttt{f5} \texttt{xb2} 28 \texttt{h3}?  

The main variation, according to Spielmann, was 28 \texttt{d1!} \texttt{d2!} 29 \texttt{h3} \texttt{d4} 30 \texttt{f2!} \texttt{xe2} 31 \texttt{e2} \texttt{xe2}+ 32 \texttt{g2} \texttt{h5!} with chances for both sides.  

28...\texttt{xc3} 29 \texttt{f5} \texttt{d4!} 30 \texttt{f2} \texttt{d2} 31 \texttt{g1} \texttt{e6} 32 \texttt{g2} \texttt{f6} 33 \texttt{f3} \texttt{xe1+} White resigns.  

We have seen that, objectively, the queen sacrifice did not promise Black any advantage. Moreover, it is not hard to demonstrate that it should have led to an inferior position.  

17 ... \texttt{d5?!}  

18 \texttt{e5!}  

18...\texttt{xc4} 19 \texttt{c2} \texttt{e8} 20 0-0 is bad for Black.  

19 \texttt{xd8} \texttt{fxd8}
Spielmann thinks that this position is in his favour because of the opponent's inferior development. This is not so – the evaluation is determined mainly by the defects in Black's pawn structure.

20 b3 f5
Otherwise 21 \textit{x}xe4 dxe4 22 \textit{c}c3 followed by 0-0 or \textit{a}a4 is unpleasant.

21 cxd5 \textit{xd}5
22 \textit{e}3 \textit{e}6
23 \textit{x}xe4 fxe4
24 \textit{c}1

It is clear that Black faces a difficult struggle for a draw.

Instead of the spectacular, but objectively not altogether correct breakthrough, Spielmann could have begun systematic pressure on the enemy centre by 17...\textit{e}8! 18 0-0 \textit{d}7, for example: 19 \textit{c}3 (19 \textit{e}5 dxe5 20 fxe5 \textit{xe}5 21 \textit{x}f6 \textit{xf}6 22 \textit{x}h7+ \textit{f}8 does not work) 19...\textit{xb}2 20 \textit{e}5 \textit{c}6! 21 \textit{d}5 \textit{xd}5 22 cxd5 dxe5 23 fxe5 \textit{xd}5, and Black wins.

White defends by 19 \textit{e}1 \textit{c}6 20 \textit{f}2 (when 20...\textit{xb}2? fails to 21 \textit{e}5), but in this case too it is evident that Black retains an excellent position.

Black has a lead in development, and therefore his desire to open up the position as soon as possible, to mount an attack on the enemy king stuck in the centre, is strategically fully justified. But it should have been put into effect in a slightly different way. The undermining move 12...\textit{g}5!, which is not mentioned in any of the commentaries, was very strong. What can White do now? After 13 g3 gxf4 14 gxf4 compared with the game the sacrifice 14...\textit{e}5! gains greatly in strength. If 13 fxg5 there again follows 13...\textit{e}5!. Finally, in the event of 13 \textit{d}3 gxf4 14 0-0 Black does best not to accept the pawn sacrifice, but to answer with the same universal move 14...\textit{e}5!. In all these fairly simple variations the destruction of the enemy pawn centre, in contrast to the game, is achieved for free, without a piece sacrifice.

Now let us see what the immediate central breakthrough leads to.

12 ... \textit{e}5!?
13 \textit{fxe}5 \textit{xe}5!
14 dxe5

The piece has to be taken, since after 14 \textit{e}2 \textit{c}4 Black has an obvious advantage.

14 ... \textit{d}4!

The opening-up of lines must be carried out ruthlessly. In working out this game for a chess periodical I wrote the following note at this stage: "The sacrifice of the knight cannot be vindicated by analysis, and it..."
would possibly have been refuted in a game by correspondence. But in a contest over the board and with a time limit of eighteen moves an hour, it would nearly always win through."

'That is the practical standpoint frequently upheld in this book.

'If each and every sacrifice had to be of that cast-iron soundness which can be verified by analysis, it would be necessary to banish from the game of chess enterprise, that proud and indispensable prerogative of the fighter. All real sacrifices would have to disappear; only those of the temporary type, which are in effect not sacrifices at all, would be allowed to remain.' (Spielmann)

The grandmaster's thoughts on the theme of acceptable risk in a practical game are instructive and interesting. However, we should not unconditionally accept them as the truth. Firstly, times have changed, and defensive technique has improved greatly. Many decisions, which a few decades ago could be considered correct from the practical standpoint, would be called into question by present-day grandmasters. Secondly, sometimes it does indeed make sense to go in for irrational complications, when there is no good and sound alternative, but in the given instance, as we have seen, there was such an alternative.

15 exd4!

It is strange that this natural move was not made in the game. Ernő Grünfeld was afraid of the intermediate check 15...\textit{Wh}h4+. 'As matters stand this check would not be the best continuation, because White would play \textit{Q}d1–c2, and the king would escape.' (Spielmann)

\begin{verbatim}
15 ...  \textit{Wh}xd4
16 \textit{Q}e2!
\end{verbatim}

If 16...\textit{Wxe}5 there follows 17 \textit{Cc}3. 16...\textit{Wh}4+ 17 \textit{Wg}3 is also useless. In my view, Black has insufficient compensation for the sacrificed piece and his attack is bound to be parried.

Now let us see how events developed in the game.

16 \textit{Q}d1? \textit{Qxe}5 16 e4 \textit{Qxe}4

White has avoided the opening of the d-file, but at a high price. All the same the attack continues, with the opponent now having two pawns for the piece, and therefore the risk that he undertook has been significantly reduced.

17 \textit{Qf}2 \textit{Qd}5 18 \textit{Wh}3 \textit{We}7 (for the moment there is no point in wasting time on the capture of the a2-pawn) 19 \textit{Qe}2?

Apparently, the decisive error. White is hoping to castle, but things do not come to that. 19 \textit{Qd}1 was better, and if 19...\textit{Qxa}2 20 \textit{Qc}4.

19...d3!! 20 \textit{Qxd}3 \textit{Qfe}8 21 \textit{f}f1 (21 0-0 \textit{Qd}4+) 21...\textit{Qxb}2!

Spielmann thinks that he could have regained the piece by 21...\textit{Qc}3 22 \textit{Qxc}3 \textit{Wh}xe2+ 23 \textit{Qg}1 \textit{Qe}3 (he did not want to go in for the position arising after 24 \textit{Qe}1 \textit{Qxh}3 25 \textit{Qxe}2 \textit{Qxd}3 26 a3), but this is a mistake in view of 24 \textit{Qf}4!.

22 \textit{Qe}1 \textit{Wf}6+ 23 \textit{Qf}2 (not 23 \textit{Qf}3 \textit{Qc}4!) 23...\textit{Qd}4 24 \textit{Qg}3 \textit{Qe}4!

More accurate than 24...\textit{Qe}5 25 \textit{Qd}3 (or 25 \textit{Qf}4?). Now if 25 \textit{Qd}3 Black wins by 25...\textit{Qg}4!. After 25 \textit{Qf}3 there is the adequate reply 25...\textit{Qxe}2!, and if 26 \textit{Qxe}2, then 26...\textit{Qc}4!. Finally, after 25 \textit{Qf}3 \textit{Qc}4+ 26 \textit{Qg}1 \textit{Qxe}1+ 27 \textit{Qxe}1 \textit{Qe}8 any move of the bishop from e1 is answered by 28...\textit{Qxf}2+.

25 h4 \textit{Qae}8 (threatening 26...\textit{Qxe}2) 26 \textit{Qb}5 \textit{Qxe}1+ 27 \textit{Qxe}1 \textit{Qe}3! (27...\textit{Qxe}1+ 28 \textit{Qxe}1 \textit{Qxf}2+ 29 \textit{Qxf}2 \textit{Qa}1+ also wins) 28 \textit{Qg}5 (28 \textit{Qb}8+ \textit{Qg}7 29 \textit{Qb}4 \textit{Qc}5! 30 \textit{Qxc}5 \textit{Qa}1+) 28...\textit{Qxe}1+ 29 \textit{Qxe}1 \textit{Qxf}2+ 30 \textit{Qd}1 \textit{Qxg}2 31 \textit{Qe}1 \textit{Qf}3+ 32 \textit{Qe}2 \textit{Qc}3! 33 \textit{Qxf}3 \textit{Qxf}3+ 34 \textit{Qc}2 \textit{Qxe}1 White resigns.
PART V

Alexey Kosikov

Positional Evaluation and the Choice of Plan in the Middlegame

First of all, a few words about the middlegame. In my view, and not only mine, this is the most complicated part of the game. If a chess game is taken as a unit, then the endgame is somewhere around thirty per cent, the opening is twenty per cent, and one half of all the events develop in the middle of the game. The complexity of the middlegame is not only that there are many pieces operating – its study is also a complex matter. It is to this that I should like to draw your attention.

You probably have a picture of how to study an opening. You open an appropriate manual, compile a card index, study the games, prepare ‘mines’ in a number of variations, and everything is alright – the opening can be employed. Of course, this demands a lot of time, but if you spend this time, you can consider that everything is alright.

It is also comparatively easy to study the endgame, on the theory of which many books have been written. Comprehensive Chess Endings by Yuri Averbakh, the Yugoslav Encyclopaedia of Chess Endings, and other books – I will not list them all. Suppose that you are deficient in rook endings. This is nothing terrible: pick up Averbakh, pick up the Encyclopaedia – and study the thousand or two thousand positions that are collected there, and master the tactical and strategic methods.

But studying the middlegame is significantly more difficult. Why? Because there is no clear, accurate method, there is no book that you could take and read, and thereby raise your standard, say, from strong club player to master. If you could learn how to play in the middlegame, everything would become easy and simple. But there is no such book and, I don’t think there will be one in the near future. Fortunately or unfortunately, but more probably the former, because a chess player is primarily a creator, and chess is creativity. Each must make his own way, and it would be uninteresting if everyone followed a well-trodden path. But creativity always involves difficulties, so that it is better, of course, to know something.

I cannot say that nothing is known about working on the middlegame. Certain ways of studying it can be described in general terms.

What are these ways? In particular – a study of the classics, the games of the great masters. Of course, on average, players in the past were weaker than today’s. But nevertheless, one cannot get by without becoming familiar with their games. After all, the difference in class between the leading masters and other players was then very great. And perhaps the most instructive games were created by top players against weaker opponents. Against them it was easier to carry out clear, precise plans, from the study of which you and I can learn a
great deal. Thus the first way is a study of classic games.

The second way is a study of tactical and strategic methods. We assimilate them by analysing games or game fragments, or by solving combinations and studies.

A third way of working is the study of typical positions. What is meant by a typical position is something you can probably imagine. For example, a position with an isolated pawn, the Carlsbad structure, positions with a pawn majority on the flank or in the centre... If you know the typical plans in them, it is easier to take a decision at the board in similar situations.

And, finally, a fourth way, which I want to recommend to you – this is the study of positions with a definite balance of material. Positions occur in which a bishop is stronger than a knight, or, for example, where one side has a good bishop and the other has a bad one. You should know the evaluations of various combinations of pieces. For example, in the majority of cases a rook and bishop are a little stronger than a rook and knight. Whereas a queen, by contrast, coordinates better with a knight than with a bishop.

A player should be universal, able to play the most varied positions, and this means with various arrangements of pieces. At the same time it is hard to name a player who did not have his favourite piece. Morphy, Fischer and probably most of us prefer a bishop to a knight, but Chigorin or Petrosian very much liked playing with the cunning, crafty piece – the knight.

Let us analyse a few games which are united by three components. Firstly, in all of them the French Defence was played.

Secondly, in each of them I was one of the players. I am showing you my own games not in order to boast – after all, they weren’t all won by me. It is simply that by playing, and then analysing these games, I gained a deeper feeling for them and I can better explain to you what happened in them.

And thirdly, the main role in all the games was played by a bishop.

The game with which I begin was played in the Ukrainian Championship, and my opponent was the Lvov (at that time) master Boris Kogan.

Kosikov – Kogan
Lvov 1974
French Defence

1 e4 e6
2 d4 d5
3 e5 dxe4
4 Nf3 Nf6
5 exd4 Nxd5

Nowadays Black usually recaptures on d5 with his pawn or queen.

6 Nf3 cxd4
7 Nxd4 Ke7

It is impossible to imagine play in the middlegame, where individual moves are accidental, not connected with one another, not bound by the cement that in chess is provided by a strategic plan. By acting planlessly, a player does not create an integral impression, and he also fails to achieve the desired competitive results.

From what moment does the drawing up of a plan begin? That’s correct, in the opening; of course, not from the first move, but also not when the opening has already ended.

The plan in the middlegame depends on the situation on the board, on how the pieces are arranged. But where should the pieces be developed? In accordance with the plan that you have chosen. In chess, as in life, everything is interconnected: the arrangement of the pieces should be in accordance with the intended plan, and vice versa.

Let us try deciding on the arrangement of the pieces and the plan of subsequent
actions for White and for Black in the resulting position (the fact that the opponent's actions have to be taken into account is, I think, understandable).

Thus the further development of the white pieces depends on where you are intending to play. You can try to exploit your pawn majority on the queenside. Then the arrangement of the pieces should aid the advance of the queenside pawns: bishops at e3 and f3 (g2), rooks at d1 and c1, and queen at e2.

But in chess there is always a choice. It is also possible to imagine a quite different plan – an attack on the kingside (it is quite obvious that Black will castle short). Then one bishop should stand at d3 and the other on the a1–h8 diagonal. Of course, we will not tolerate the knight at d5 – we will ask it to move by c2–c4. It is clear that, if we are preparing an attack on the kingside, it is desirable to keep the rooks on d1 and e1, and the queen on e2, intending a possible \( \text{We}4 \).

This was the piece set-up that I intended. It is more interesting to attack that to engage in some kind of abstract play.

When choosing a plan, it is necessary to reckon with the opponent's actions. Where will Black play? He has, of course, a plan involving the advance of his e- and f-pawns. But it is not at all easy to carry out, bearing in mind that White will put pressure on e6 and control the e5-square.

Another possible line of play for Black is the preparation of the undermining move \( \ldots b7-b5 \) (seeing as White will play c2–c4). In this case Black's queen will go to c7. So that it should not be harassed, the move \( \ldots a7-a6 \) must be included. The king's rook will obviously go d8, and it makes sense to develop the light-square bishop at b7, the knight at d7 and the queen's rook at c8. This leads to an arrangement of the pieces that is quite natural for such positions.

After we have determined the plans of the two sides, the next few moves become understandable and hardly require any commentary.

\[
\begin{align*}
8 & \text{d}3 & 0-0 \\
9 & 0-0 & a6 \\
10 & c4 & \text{f}6 \\
11 & b3 & \text{c}7 \\
12 & \text{e}1 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Of course, 9...\( \text{b}4 \) did not concern me: the bishop withdraws to e2, and the knight at b4 is badly placed. The Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings recommends 9...\( \text{f}6 \), vacating the e7-square for queen or knight.

The knight is detailed to the defence of the king.

\[
\begin{align*}
10 & c4 & \text{f}6 \\
11 & b3 & \text{c}7 \\
12 & \text{e}1 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Both White and Black are engaged in their own affairs, but the opponent's actions must also be followed. Now the 'normal' developing move 12 \( \text{b}2 \) would simply be a blunder in view of 12...e5 and 13...e4. [This is not so: 12 \( \text{b}2 \) e5?! 13 \( \text{f}5 \) e4? 14 \( \text{xe}7+ \text{xe}7 \) 15 \( \text{e}1 \) with advantage to White – Dvoretsky.] However, 12 \( \text{e}2 \) was not a bad alternative.

\[
\begin{align*}
12 & \ldots & \text{b}6 \\
13 & \text{b}2 & \text{b}7 \\
14 & \text{e}2 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Both sides carry out the intended strategic arrangement of their pieces. But, of course,
one cannot mechanically make the planned moves. Here 14...\texttt{d}d7 would appear to lose after 15 \texttt{xe}6 \texttt{fxe}6 16 \texttt{we}6+ \texttt{f}7 17 \texttt{g}5.

What then should Black do? 14...\texttt{c}6 is not in accordance with his plan – the knight at c6 blocks the bishop’s diagonal. In order to play ...\texttt{d}d7, he must forestall the sacrifice \texttt{xe}6.

14 ... \texttt{b}4

Perhaps here Black had no particular choice, but in principle such moves should be made with great caution. Firstly, it is desirable to keep the bishop close to the king, and secondly, at b4 the bishop is awkwardly placed: it is out of play, and it does not fit in with the piece arrangement planned by Black. Of course, he hopes that the bishop has gone there only for a time, but it must be remembered that the bishop stands badly.

15 \texttt{ed}1 \texttt{bd}7

Play 16 a3? The bishop will evidently retreat to d6.

You suggest a piece sacrifice? 16 \texttt{xe}6 \texttt{fxe}6 17 \texttt{we}6+ \texttt{h}8, and what next? 18...\texttt{xf}3 is threatened. I simply don’t like this position.

16 \texttt{g}5 does not look dangerous. What is the threat? Black can reply 16...\texttt{d}6 or 16...\texttt{fe}8.

Play 16 \texttt{b}1? There is such a move, but what will you say about it to the rook at a1? Have patience? But it isn’t necessary for the pieces to be patient.

Retreat the knight to c2? Yes, this is the simplest solution to the problem: \texttt{c}2, \texttt{ac}1 and \texttt{b}1. But it is a pity to waste a tempo. Black prepares for defence: 16...\texttt{fe}8 17 \texttt{ac}1 \texttt{ad}8 18 \texttt{b}1 \texttt{f}8 19 \texttt{wc}2 g6.

16 \texttt{ac}1!

Seemingly a very simple move, which comes into White’s plan. I didn’t think over it for long – some seven minutes. But my opponent thought for about twenty minutes over his reply. He was trying to decide whether this was a blunder or a sacrifice.

After checking some variations I saw that if the opponent were to accept the piece sacrifice, I had a guaranteed draw. Intuition suggested to me that I could and should be able to find something else. So that the lottery – the move \texttt{ac}1 – was one that I couldn’t lose.

16 ... \texttt{e}5

Black, as they say, picks up the gauntlet. But it would have been better to refrain from this move, which proved to be the decisive mistake. He should definitely have played 16...\texttt{fe}8 and brought his bishop to the defence of his king. In the subsequent events Black will very much feel the lack of the b4 bishop.

17 \texttt{f}5 \texttt{e}4

Having started, there is no turning back.

18 \texttt{we}3
White’s strongest piece joins the attack. Here there is not even any particular need to delve into the variations, to realise how dangerous it is to take on f3 or d3. Let’s, for example, follow the variation 18...exd3 19 \( \text{Wg5} \). The reply 19...g6 is forced. Now the outcome is most simply decided by the calm move 20 \( \text{Exd3} \). Black’s downfall is caused by the weakness of the a1–h8 diagonal. \( \text{Exd7} \) and \( \text{gh6+} \) is threatened. No better is 18...exf3 19 \( \text{Wg5} \) g6, and here it only remains to clear the d-file by playing, for example, 20 \( \text{Sb1} \) with the threat of \( \text{Exd7} \).

18...\( \text{Af8} \)

Evidently the only move. Now the next task is: continue White’s attack.

Yes, 19 \( \text{Wg5} \) \( \text{Af8} \) 20 \( \text{Ah6}+ \) \( \text{Ah8} \) 21 \( \text{Exf7+} \) \( \text{Ag8} \) suggests itself. Although White is a pawn up, he probably has no more than draw, because he simultaneously has three pieces en prise. But a draw is guaranteed: that draw which I had foreseen.

You suggest 19 \( \text{Ab1} \)? I reply 19...exf3 20 \( \text{Wg5} \) \( \text{Af8} \). Now 21 \( \text{Exd7} \) is not at all dangerous.

19 c5!!

It is very good, if you found this solution. It is not easy to see – after all, the attack is taking place on the kingside, to where all White’s aspirations, all his thoughts are directed.

But as soon as you discover this possibility, it becomes clear that all other moves are pushed into the background. It is quite understandable that Black can hold the position only if his g7 will be defended by his bishop. By cutting off the bishop from the defence of the king, you sharply strengthen the attack.

Black faces a very difficult, I would frankly say, insoluble problem. 20 \( \text{Wg5} \) is threatened. Do you sense how Black lacks his bishop for the defence, how it is needed on f8? Here, I think, Black already realised everything and regretted that he had made the over-active move 16...e5.

You suggest playing 19...h6? This is hardly likely to save the position. In some cases even c5–c6 is possible. I will always regain the piece in some favourable version. We won’t linger here – I will simply show you how events developed further. Only, remember once more: Black loses because of the bad position of just one piece – his bishop at b4. Place it on f8 and the evaluation of the position changes sharply.

19...\( \text{Exf3} \)

If I am going to be subjected to an attack, let it at least be for a piece – the typical reasoning of a practical player.

20 \( \text{Wg5} \) g6

In such positions the main difficulty is the mass of tempting continuations. It is very important not to become entangled in them, not to follow a false trail.

Play 21 c6? This is possible, but in this way you vacate the a3–f8 diagonal, whereas your plan is an attack on g7. In the future this resource may come in useful, but for the moment it is too early.

21 \( \text{Wh6} \)

This sacrifice of a second piece conclusively destroys the opponent’s position. If he declines it, by playing 21...\( \text{Ah5} \), then after 22 g4 \( \text{Wf4} \) 23 gxh5 \( \text{Wxh6} \) 24 \( \text{Ah6+} \) \( \text{f8} \) 25
Position Evaluation and the Choice of Plan in the Middlegame

21 . . .
gxf5
22 \text{xf5}

There are very many threats: \text{xh7+, xd7, \text{xd7}... They are all based on the terrible power of the bishop at b2 – White’s main attacking piece. Why is this the main piece? Because it has no opponent. Black’s bishop should be at g7, but it is stuck on b4.

22 . . .
\text{e5}
23 \text{xf6}
The gathering of the harvest begins.

A question: if 23...fxg2, what should White do?
24 f4 ? No, this move is very bad on account of 24...\text{xg2}. You suggest 24 \text{d7} ? The reply 24...\text{f3}+ is unpleasant.

Remember about the bishop at b2, and then you will easily find the solution. Of course, 24 \text{d3}!. The threat of 24...\text{f3}+ is repulsed, and Black is no longer able to parry the deadly 25 \text{g3+}.

23 . . .
\text{xc5}
If 23...\text{wc7} the simplest is 24 \text{wh6} f6 25 \text{xe5 fxe5} 26 \text{d7}.

24 \text{d7}
\text{d7}

My opponent, who was in time-trouble, was about to play 24...\text{c6}, but at the last moment he removed his hand. A pity! I had prepared 25 \text{xh7+! \text{xh7} 26 \text{xf7+}. Again the variations are based on the strength of the bishop. I very much wanted the game to end in this way, but alas, in life not everything turns out as we would like. The opponent also has a head on his shoulders and he endeavours to thwart our plans.

25 \text{xd7}

It is not possible to recapture on d7, the material advantage is now with White, and within a few moves he won without difficulty. The game is a good illustration of Tarrasch’s famous aphorism: ‘One piece stands badly – the entire game stands badly.’ The bishop is a long-range piece, and it would not seem difficult to deploy it successfully. But, as you see, it is not always possible to do this.

The following game was played in 1972 in the semi-final of the USSR Trades Union Championship. This time I had Black.

Agzamov – Kosikov
Orenburg 1972
French Defence

1 e4
e6
2 d4
d5
3 0-0
c6

Usually 3...\text{f6} or 3...c5 occurs, but I also consider 3...\text{c6} to be a perfectly acceptable move. I think that the time will come when it is played increasingly often, because the variations with 3...\text{f6} have been very deeply studied, and here it is becoming hard to find new opening ideas.

4 \text{gf3}
f6
5 e5
d7
6 \text{b5}

The main continuations are 6 \text{b3} and 6 \text{e2}, but this move is also possible.

6 . . .
a6

A questionable decision. 6...\text{e7} or 6...a5 comes into consideration.

7 \text{xc6} bxc6
8 c4

This move is one that I cannot recommend. 8 \text{b3} is stronger, with the idea of \text{a5}, and if Black replies 8...c5, then 9 \text{g5 \text{e7} 10 \text{a5} is possible, forcing 10...\text{b8}. White’s position is preferable. Two years later Konstantin Lerner played this against me. Although the game ended in a draw, Black experienced definite difficulties.

[Opening information: in the event of 10 \text{a5} White also has to reckon with 10...\text{xex5}. Therefore 10 \text{xe7 \text{xe7} 11 0-0 a5 12 \text{d2 a4 13 \text{xc5 \text{xc5} 14 dxc5 \text{xc5} 15 b4! is simpler, with advantage to White (Popovic–Kovacevic, Novi Sad 1984). Black in turn]
can improve his defence with 9...f6 (instead of 9...ėe7) 10 ėf4 a5, although after 11 c3 a4 12 ćc1 he still stands slightly worse – Dvoretsky.]

The first question: how should Black respond to 8 c4?

You suggest 8...f6, beginning active play in the centre? But such activity is usually advantageous to the side who is better developed. In the given instance this can hardly be said to be Black.

8...c5 can be evaluated in the same way. Moves such as ...f7–f6 or ...c6–c5 should be made with great caution. Look more closely at the position and you will see that White is ahead in development and is ready to castle. Therefore a sharpening of the position in the centre is very dangerous for Black.

What can be said about 8...a5 with the idea of ...ėa6? I will share with you an observation which holds true in such positions. The bishop stands well at a6 only as long as White has not castled. If castling has been carried out and the rook stands at e1, the bishop at a6 proves to be out of play.

You should not try and solve the position by a mechanical analysis of variations. Let’s try to understand its essence – this will help the correct strategic course to be determined.

What is the distinguishing feature of the position? White has given up a bishop and now Black has two bishops against a bishop and knight. What do you know about the strategy of playing with two bishops? You must open diagonals for them – this is clear, this is elementary. But there is also another very important consideration in such positions. When playing with two bishops against bishop and knight, you should strive to demonstrate the strength of the bishop that does not have an opponent. If you are able to demonstrate that the light-square bishop is a piece and not just an observer, then you will exploit the strength of the two bishops.

8 ... dxc4

This move had already been suggested, but with the aim of then playing ...a6–a5. But Black is planning to develop his bishop at b7 and if possible play ...c6–c5, seizing control of the long diagonal.

White should probably have simply played 9 ćxc4. I don’t know how I should have replied. Most probably 9 ...a5, but perhaps nevertheless 9...a5, so as not to allow the knight to go to a5.

My opponent chose a less successful move, underestimating my strong reply.

9 ća4?!

By giving up his c6-pawn, Black opens the diagonal for his light-square bishop, while the c4-pawn may still come in useful.

10 ćxc6+

11 će4

The bishop already becomes active. 12 0-0 is not possible on account of 12...c3. But White needs to castle, and therefore his next move is forced.

12 ćb1

Now the exchange of queens – 13 ćxd5 ćxd5 14 ćc3 – gives Black an excellent position after both 14...ćxc3 15 bxc3, and 14...ćb4.

13 će3
The queen at d5 is very strongly placed. Imagine what a powerful battery will be set up when the bishop also appears on c6. Of course, it is desirable to maintain the queen on its central square, which means that measures have to be taken against c3.

Do you suggest exchanging the dark-square bishop for the knight at c3? You know, this idea is not so good, because the white bishop will come out at a3. Of course, I will be strong on the light squares, but my opponent will gain counterplay on the dark squares.

Moves to the edge of the board can be good, if they involve some sensible idea: in this case to exchange this knight for the one at c3. 14 0-0 still does not work in view of 14...c3.

In chess, as in life, there are things which must be done first, and those which can be deferred. Let us try and decide with what move now Black does best to begin.

The evaluation of the position is clear: Black has the advantage. When his light-square bishop moves to c6, the opponent will have nothing with which to oppose it. The bishop is very strong, it is much stronger than the knight. What other typical features of the position can be mentioned?

Two bishops? I don't really understand what is the advantage of the two bishops, if there is not domination by the bishop that has no opponent. If in this position the light-square bishop is strong, then yes – I see the advantage of the two bishops. If the bishop is passive, then there is no advantage.

Let us remove the dark-square bishops from the board. Of course, this is to the advantage of White, since his c1 bishop is bad. But nevertheless Black's position remains superior, because his bishop is very dangerous. Therefore I would assert that here we have not the advantage of two bishops, but the superiority of one – the light-square bishop – over the knight. Although of course, the existence of Black's second bishop emphasises the strength of his position.

I should mention another important feature of the position: the open b-file. The question of who is able to control it will certainly be of significance.

When taking a decision, it is useful first to select the candidate moves. You suggest 15...c5? But what is the point of it? You want to get rid of your doubled pawn. But in what way is my c7-pawn worse than the pawn at c3? It is not clear. Whereas White will gain a chance to occupy the d4-square with his knight or even his bishop.

I seriously considered three candidate moves: developing – 15...e7, seizing the diagonal – 15...c6 and finally, 15...b8 – placing the rook on the open file. Which of these is the most accurate?

If 15...e7 White can reply 16 b1. It does not look bad to play 15...b8 16 b1 b6, and when the bishop moves, the exchange on b6 will improve Black's pawn structure. But the third possibility is even better.

If now 16 b1, then 16...e4 is extremely
unpleasant, as the rook has no satisfactory move along the b-file (if 17 \( \text{b}2 \), then 17...\( \text{a}3 \)).

16 0-0 \( \text{b}8 \)
But not 16...\( \text{e}7 \) 17 \( \text{b}1 \) \( \text{e}4 \) 18 \( \text{d}2 \).
In passing, Black has gained control of the open file. You may say that this is a trivial matter, a trifle. But such ‘trifles’ influence the evaluation of a position, ease your further play, hinder the opponent’s actions and in the end often tell on the outcome of the game.

17 \( \text{e}1 \)
Just in case, White defends against ...\( \text{e}4 \). You know, the difficulty of his position is that it is hard to suggest anything for him, since no active plan is apparent. If 17 a4 (intending \( \text{a}3 \)), then 17...\( \text{b}3 \) (an illustration of how timely Black’s last two moves were). However, even after the exchange of the dark-square bishops Black’s control of the b-file together with the weakness of the b2- and b3-squares would have become a decisive factor.

[Apparently, here White missed his last chance of putting up a tough defence. He should have played 17\( \text{g}5 \!), to create some pressure on the opponent’s kingside and, by defending the g2-pawn, unpin the knight at f3 – Dolmatov.]

17 ... \( \text{e}7 \)
A useful developing move. Such play is very unpleasant for the opponent – after all, it is not clear what specifically is threatened and what to do in reply.

18 h4
In the event of Black castling, this pawn is ready to advance further, in the illusory hope of creating some kind of attack. Now answer the next question: how would you have continued to build up Black’s initiative?

Does 18...\( \text{d}7 \) appeal to you? But what to do next – double rooks and altogether abandon the kingside to its fate? This somehow doesn’t look right, wouldn’t you agree? The move ...\( \text{d}7 \) is a very committing one. You acknowledge that you are unlikely ever to open up the position. With the king on d7 you will not especially be able to be aggressive.

You can, of course, simply castle, and then try to invade on the b-file. Although, for the moment it is not clear in what way. And what do you do after 19 h5: allow the pawn to go to h6 or meet it with 19...h6? In the latter case you have reckon with the switching of White’s pieces to the kingside: \( \text{f}4 \), \( \text{g}4 \), \( \text{e}3 \), \( \text{e}1 \) and \( \text{g}3 \). You don’t want to allow the opponent counterplay.

18...g5 is a very interesting idea, one which shouldn’t immediately be given a hostile reception. But, of course, it is a very committing move. After 19 hxg5 you want by 19...\( \text{g}8 \) to create the threat of capturing on g5? White replies 20 \( \text{f}1 \), in order in the event of the piece sacrifice to escape with his king via e2. [Black can nevertheless play 20...\( \text{g}5 \)! 21 \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{g}2+ \) 22 \( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{g}5 \!), since 23 \( \text{g}5 \)? \( \text{f}3+ \) 24 \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{h}3+ \) leads to mate. White would have had either to defend the unpleasant position arising after 23 \( \text{a}3 \), or choose 20 \( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{g}5 \) 21 \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{g}5 \) 22 \( \text{f}1 \) – Dvoretzky.]
Position Evaluation and the Choice of Plan in the Middlegame

Prepare ...g7–g5 by 18...g8? But if I again reply 19 f1, what then?

After the other preparatory move – 18...h6, White will probably try to block the kingside with 19 h5.

You suggest 18...a8? What for? Again to play ...c7–c5? Let's suppose 19 e2 c5 20 e3, then ...e1 – White somehow disentangles himself. I don't understand the point of such play for Black.

You want to play 18...a5 with the idea of ...a3? Illogical. You liked the advantage of the two bishops and we decided that White's bishop is bad, so why exchange it? And also, it is a great pity to break up the powerful d5–c6 battery. I think that Black's strategy should involve exploiting the power of this battery.

18... h5!
This is the correct solution. Although it is also very committing – it weakens the g5-square. It is important that White has not managed to play f4, g3 and g5. But we want to intensify the pressure on the g2-point. If it were our move we would decide the fate of the game by including the rook in the attack: ...h6!, then ...g6 and at some point ...g4.

19 e2
The only defence. What to do next? Let us continue our strategy – try to clear the long diagonal, even if it means sacrificing a pawn.

19... g5!
20 xg5 xg5
21 hxg5 h4
If now Black manages to play ...h4–h3, the game will be decided. But White still has a defensive resource.

22 eb1 b6
It is a pity to concede the open file by 22...d8. But if Black does allow the exchange, the most advantageous square for this is b6 (incidentally, if we had already played ...c7–c5, the move ...b6 wouldn't have been possible; this means that the pawn at c7 has its advantages). Any exchange in a game of chess is like a trading transaction. You offer your goods, you are offered something different, and in the process each side tries to gain some benefit. Here, for example: you want to exchange rooks? – then take on b6, at the same time undoubling our pawns. But what else can White do? – he is forced to take, since his queen's rook can't stay for ever in the corner.

23 xb6 cb6
24 e1 h3
25 f3
Black is attacking, but this does not mean that he should automatically avoid the exchange of queens. Now moving the queen to d7 or b5 would be a blunder. White would reply 26 f6 and then 27 g6, after which it is not clear who is attacking whom.

25... hxc2
26 xd5 xd5
27 xg2
It all seems to have gone well, we have done everything correctly, and yet here we are in an endgame a pawn down. Was something wrong? No, we weren't mistaken in our evaluation, and the next move convincingly demonstrates this.
27 \ldots \textit{H}h3!
Everything is alright! White's position is bad, in fact it is completely hopeless.

28 \textit{c}c1 \textit{b}5
White resigned. Why? The knight can't move, the king can't move, and if 29 f4 Black wins by 29...\textit{g}3 30 \textit{c}c2 \textit{b}4 followed by a general exchange on g2. There only remains \textit{c}c2–c1–c2, but then comes \ldots\textit{e}8–d7–c6, \ldotsa6–a5, \ldotsb5–b4 and so on.

Why did Black win? Who was the main hero of the battle? Clearly, the light-square bishop, which did not have an opponent.

I played this game when I was still a candidate master, but even so I am proud of it to this day. After all, in the French Defence the c8 bishop is usually bad, and causes Black nothing but torment. But here it played the leading role. Such instances are remembered for a long time.

The following game took place at an international chess festival in Kiev. Looking ahead, I should say that although, unfortunately, I did not manage to win, in the creative sense I was happy with my play.

\textbf{Kosikov – Khoperia}
Kiev 1989
\textit{French Defence}

1 e4 c5
A Sicilian Defence sometimes transposes into a French.

2 \textit{f}f3 e6
3 c3 d5
4 e5 \textit{c}c6

If Black wants to avoid the French Defence, he can play 4...d4 here, which leads to very complicated play.

5 d4 \textit{g}e7
6 a3 c4
7 \textit{f}f4 \textit{b}6

I will not discuss the opening, since here we are interested in the subsequent part of the game. I will mention only that Black's last move is usually made when the bishop is at c1. But here it is hardly good, since the bishop has already come out to f4 and White does not shut it in by developing his knight at d2. 7...\textit{c}c7 is preferable.

8 \textit{c}c2 \textit{d}7
9 \textit{b}d2
The sacrifice 10 \textit{x}c4 is not yet threatened, since Black interposes 10...\textit{g}6, but in principle he has to reckon with this idea.

9 \ldots \textit{a}5
10 \textit{e}2 f5?

In my view this last move is a positional blunder. The e5-pawn is cramping Black, and he should have retained the possibility of undermining the opponent's centre by \ldotsf7–f6. In the French Defence there are variations in which Black plays \ldotsf7–f5 and then puts pressure on the d4-pawn. But here, after he has deprived himself of counterplay in the centre by playing \ldotsc5–c4 and \ldotsf7–f5, his position becomes strategically difficult.

And so, a typical 'French' position has arisen, in which White is clearly stronger on the kingside, while Black tries to develop an initiative on the queenside.

11 h4
A natural move in such positions, and much
stronger than 11 0-0. In any case the h-pawn will have to advance, to ram the opponent's fortifications on the kingside. But whether castling will be needed is still an open question. The following plan is quite possible: the rook comes into play via h3, and the king is evacuated from the centre by \( \text{e1-f1-g1} \).

11... \( \text{c8} \)
12\ h5 \( \text{h6} \)

I don't like this move, but Black feared, and not without reason, 13 h6 g6 14 \( \text{g5} \), then \( \text{f6} \) and \( \text{g5} \).

13 \( \text{h4} \)

For the time being White's actions are very natural, and do not demand any effort. Apart from the fact that control is taken of the g6-square, the main idea of this last move is to play g2-g4. Black hurries to divert the opponent from his attack, by initiating activity on the other side of the board.

13... \( \text{b3} \)
14 \( \text{xb3} \) \( \text{xb3} \)

Question: should White exchange queens or not? Are there any wishing to play 15 \( \text{xb3} \) or 15 \( \text{d1} \)? You all want to move the queen away? You are right. Why exchange, when White has excellent prospects of an attack on the kingside! Although, it should be mentioned, even after the exchange on b3 White would have stood slightly better.

15 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{a4} \)

Pointless now is 16 \( \text{d1 b5} \), when the exchange of bishops is clearly to Black's advantage. 16 \( \text{c1} \) also should not be played. What sort of work is that for a rook – to guard the empty square c2? In reply Black immediately attacks the b2-pawn: 16...\( \text{c6} \) and ...\( \text{b6} \).

16 \( \text{g4} \)

Now the exchange of queens by 16...\( \text{c2} \) is possible, but it leads to an extremely difficult endgame: 17 \( \text{xc2 xc2} \) 18 \( \text{d2 a4} \) 19 gx\( f5 \). White acquires too many positional pluses: protected passed pawn, weak g6-square in the opponent's position, and open g-file.

16... \( \text{c6}! \)

A good reply. The rook goes to b6, while after the exchange on f5 it will restrain the advance of the e-pawn and, very important, defend the g6-square.

17 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{exf5} \)

Here I spent quite a long time in thought – some 25 minutes. But the position deserved this – it is a very difficult one. White has to reckon seriously with ...\( \text{b6} \), as well as ...\( \text{c2} \). How would you have played in his place?

The evaluation of the bishop exchange after 18 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{b5} \) has not changed – it is more likely to favour Black.

If 18 \( \text{f3} \), then 18...\( \text{b6} \) 19 \( \text{g6 xg6} \) 20 hx\( g6 \), and now 20...\( \text{c6} \), if there is nothing better. White doesn't want to block the g6-square and the g-file with his pawn. The immediate 18 \( \text{g6} \) has the same drawback. You suggest 18 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{b5} \) 19 \( \text{f3 b6} \) 20 \( \text{b1} \)? Let's suppose that the queen returns to b3. What can White do next?

Let's approach the position philosophically, and decide what we can do, what we want, and what we don't want. We would like to attack – for this the queens must be
retained. In addition, we must hold the b2-point. If it were to fall, the opponent would develop a serious initiative on the queenside and our attack on the kingside might be too late. But we don't want to allow the exchange of the light-square bishops. Therefore we are not satisfied with defending the b2-point by $\text{d1}$, $\text{xa4}$, $\text{c1}$ and $\text{c2}$. No, the bishop at a4 must remain alive. Its fate will influence the outcome of the game: this bishop may be powerful, but it may also be very bad.

Thus, we see that Black's pieces – queen, rook and bishop at a4 – are pressing on our position. But they are stuck on the queenside, and if a battle should flare up on other parts of the board, they may be out of play and unable to reach the centre of the conflict in time.

18 0-0!

An at first sight inconspicuous, but in fact very effective move. Now after 18...$\text{f6}$ 19 $\text{ab1}$ it is no longer possible to play 19...$\text{wc2}$ in view of 20 $\text{d1}$!

18...$\text{wc2}$

19 $\text{we1}$!

Threatening 20 $\text{d1}$. 19...$\text{xb2}$ is bad because of 20 $\text{b1}$ and 21 $\text{xb7}$. After 19...$\text{e4}$ 20 $\text{g2}$ the queen finds itself trapped (21 $\text{c1}$ and 22 $\text{f3}$). Here my opponent rather surprised me, by offering a draw. I asked him to make a move, and he couldn't find anything better than to move his queen back.

19...$\text{wb3}$

20 $\text{d1}$

By playing his rook to d2, White securely defends his b2-point and frees his hands for an attack, in which, incidentally, the rook may take an active part. It becomes absolutely clear that on the queenside Black has not achieved anything and has merely got his pieces stuck there.

20...$\text{d8}$

Black doesn't want to lose without any counterplay. He is intending ...$\text{g7-g5}$.

21 $\text{d2}$

22 $\text{hgx6}$

23 $\text{g6}$

24 $\text{h1}$

Black has occupied the g-file, but he is unable to create any real threats along it, since White has far more pieces on the kingside. White's great positional advantage is obvious.

24...

$\text{b6}$

25 $\text{h5}$

26 $\text{f7}$

It is not worth paying any attention to the rook. 26 $\text{e2}$ was also possible, but the move in the game is stronger. The d5-pawn is attacked, and 27 $\text{e6}$ is threatened.

26...

$\text{g4}$

Black goes in for a forcing variation, which I had foreseen and evaluated in my favour.

27 $\text{f3}$

28 $\text{g3}$

29 $\text{xf4}$

30 $\text{h2}$

31 $\text{xd2}$

Let us take stock: material is equal, but Black's pieces are scattered, his d5-, f5- and h6-pawns are weak, and the bishop at a4 has been transformed into the usual bad
Position Evaluation and the Choice of Plan in the Middlegame

‘French’ bishop. White is bound to win. Sometimes the most difficult thing in a game is to win a won position. You see various promising possibilities, but by no means always do all of them lead to the goal.

I considered two tempting continuations: 32 \&xd5 \&b5 33 \&g2 and 32 \&g2 \&xf7 33 \&g1 (32 \&g1 merely transposes). Which of these should be preferred?

I see that opinions are divided. The correct reply was 32 \&g2!. The main variation is not hard to calculate: 32...\&xf7 33 \&g1 \&e8 34 \&g7 \&f8 35 \&g6 \&f7 (if the queen moves, 36 \&e6+ is decisive) 36 \&h8+ \&f8 37 \&xh6 and 38 \&e6+.

But, unfortunately, I spoiled things: I was tempted by another idea and overlooked the refutation.

32 \&xd5? \&b5!
33 \&g2 \&xd5
34 \&g7+
35 \&xh8 \&h5+
36 \&g1

I was obliged to agree a draw.

Let us again set up the initial position. The French Defence is a very interesting opening; I have been playing it for a long time and I do not regret this. I have had my joys and disappointments, and there have been theoretical duels which did not always end as I would have liked. I will now describe the history of one such duel.

1 e4 e6
2 d4 d5
3 \&c3 \&b4
4 e5 \&e7
5 a3 \&xc3+
6 bxc3 c5
7 \&f3 \&c7

Black’s last move seems to me to be the most promising (although 7...\&a5 is more often played). In reply to 8 \&e2 or 8 \&d3 Black exploits the delay in developing his b8 knight by 8...b6, after which 9...\&a6 gains sharply in strength – the opponent has already spent a tempo on an unnecessary move with his light-square bishop.

8 a4

Now 8...b6 is not so good (although it is quite possible) in view of 9 \&b5+.

At one time, when I was pondering over this position, I wanted to find some drawback to 8 a4, a move which is useful in all respects. And I began analysing 8...\&bc6.

White has several possible continuations. 9 \&a3 is possible, but it does not present any serious danger. Black replies 9...cxd4 10 cxd4 \&a5+ 11 \&d2 \&xd2+ 12 \&xd2, which, in my view, leads to a roughly equal endgame.

9 \&d3 encounters a combinative refutation. Perhaps I am missing something, but it would appear that this move loses by force. Let us check this: 9...cxd4 10 cxd4 \&a5+ 11 \&d2 \&xd2+ 12 \&xd2, which, in my view, leads to a roughly equal endgame.

9 \&d3 encounters a combinative refutation. Perhaps I am missing something, but it would appear that this move loses by force. Let us check this: 9...cxd4 10 cxd4 \&a5+ 11 \&d2 \&xd2+ 12 \&xd2, which, in my view, leads to a roughly equal endgame.

12 \&d2 \&xa1 13 \&b5+ \&d7 14 \&xd7+ \&xd7 15 \&b4?. A very cunning move. Castling is threatened (after the immediate 15 0-0 there would have followed 15...\&xa4).

15...\&xc1+ 16 \&e2 \&f4!. The only move! Excessive greed is punished: 16...\&xh1? loses to 17 \&xb7+ \&d8 18 \&xa8+ \&c8
PART V

\[12 \text{ b7 with the terrible threat of } 20 \text{ c6+}.\]  
[Instead of 18...c8? necessary is 18...d7  
19 xa7+ d8 20 d8+ d7 21 xh8 xg2 with a roughly equal game – Dvoretsky.]

17 x b7+ d8 18 xa8+ (Black also has an obvious advantage after 18 c6+ xc6 19 xa8+ c7 20 xh8) 18...c8. Although material is equal, White’s position is simply bad. His knight is hanging and his e5-pawn is attacked. After 19 c6+ c7 he also has problems with his queen.

We have analysed 9 a3 and 9 d3, and now we will turn to the most natural (since 9 d3 is not possible) move 9 e2. For a long time I did not know what to play here as Black. And then one day the thought occurred to me: the position is closed, the time factor is not of decisive importance, so isn’t it possible for Black to be a bit ‘naughty’ and play not according to the rules?

\[8 \ldots \text{ bc6} \]  
9 e2  
10 cxd4  
11 0-0  
12 xxc2  
13 d3  
14 a3

Klovans – Kosikov  
Moscow 1974

Here I had a long think. And the more I looked at the position, the less it appealed to me. I have a pawn – that’s good. But the fact that there are opposite-colour bishops – that is bad. If I survive to the endgame, this factor may make it hard for me to convert my extra pawn. In the middlegame, on the other hand, with opposite-colour bishops the attack is greatly strengthened, and it is very difficult to defend. I simply have nothing with which to oppose White’s dark-square bishop.

14 c6  
15 c1!

It is terribly dangerous to play 15...d7 and castle queenside: all the white pieces
quickly join the attack on the king. Kingside castling is impossible. Only one thing remains – to try and hide the king at f7.

15 ... f6
16 exf6 gxf6
17 £e1

If now 17 ... £xd4, then 18 £xd4 £xd4 19 £c7.

The remaining moves are even unpleasant to demonstrate – White’s pieces simply tore my position apart.

17 ... £f7
18 £f4 h6

Black had to reckon with 19 £g5+.

19 £e3 £h7

An awkward move, but I do not see anything better.

20 £e5+ £xe5
21 dxe5 f5
22 £h4 £e8
23 £f6 £g8
24 £g3

Black resigned.

You will have noticed that in his attack White effectively had an extra piece – his terrible dark-square bishop, which did not have (and with opposite-colour bishops, could not have) an opponent.

Of course, when the game ended I had reproaches hurled at me: you good-for-nothing, they said, why did you lose without a fight in such an important match? The team’s trainer and captain did not remember, of course, that they had given me the ok to employ this dangerous opening variation. But what could be done – I myself was largely to blame.

When the bitterness of defeat had passed slightly, I was faced with the question: did the variation really have to be shelved, was it really not possible to capture the c2-pawn? If an opponent has refuted your opening idea, don’t be in a hurry to give it up, but try first to find an improvement. Here you should not act by making an exhaustive search; you need, as we have already said, to approach the position philosophically.

Why did Black lose the game? Because he had no way of opposing the bishop at a3. The bishop began to dominate the a3–f8 diagonal after the exchange of minor pieces on d3. Apparently 12 ... £d3 was the decisive mistake.

How to fight against the formidable dark-square bishop? Let us consider 12 ... £ec6. But then 13 a5! is strong, and if 13 ... 0-0, then 14 £a3 winning the exchange.

The retreat 12 ... £bc6 is possible. White replies 13 £a3 0-0 14 £b5. Now 15 £c1 is threatened, and 14 ... £d7 is not possible on account of 15 £xe7.

There only remains 12 ... a5!. But what to do after 13 £b5+? If 13 ... £ec6, then 14 £a3 0-0 15 £xc6 bxc6 16 £xb4 axb4 17 £xb4. Material is equal, but Black has a bad light-square bishop and a weak pawn at c6. A difficult position.

But perhaps we don’t have to fear the loss of castling, and can play 13 ... £d7? After 14 £xd7+ £xd7 15 £a3 £ec6 Black is alright: the light-square bishops have been exchanged, and the opponent’s dark-square bishop has been neutralised. Later Black can, for example, aim for artificial castling:
...\texttt{hc8, ...\texttt{e8, ...\texttt{f8} and so on.} 

True, I had some doubts about 14 \texttt{a3} (instead of 14 \texttt{xd7+}). Let's see what happens after 14...\texttt{xb5} 15 axb5 \texttt{d3}. 

If White does not want to exchange his queen, he has to allow an attack on it with gain of tempo: 16 \texttt{we3}. After 16...\texttt{f5} 17 \texttt{g5} h6 18 \texttt{g4} \texttt{e2} White's pieces are completely paralysed, and his position would be bad even if Black did not have an extra pawn. 

16 \texttt{d1} is better, but then 16...\texttt{xd1} 17 \texttt{fxd1} \texttt{f4}, and 18 \texttt{ac1} is not possible because of the fork 18...\texttt{e2+}. Black has time to consolidate and join in the battle for the c-file. 

After studying these and certain other variations, I decided that 10...\texttt{b4} nevertheless has the right to exist. 

Two years later in Beltsy the all-union qualifying tournament for the USSR Championship took place. When the pairings were announced, I was very happy to learn that in the very first round I would have Black against Klovans. Of course, there was no guarantee of success, since it cannot be asserted that in this variation Black wins. I could again have missed something. But in chess, apart from the result, there is also the creative aspect. In this game the fate of the plan developed by me would be decided. Can Black play this or not? No analysis can replace a practical verification. 

Knowing Klovans to be a player who sticks to his principles, I was sure that he would not avoid a theoretical duel. I once again checked the prepared variations, and made some slight refinements... 

\textbf{Klovans – Kosikov} 

\textit{Beltsy 1976} 

12... \texttt{a5!} 

13 \texttt{a3} 

Of course, I had also examined this move, and so I replied quickly. 

\begin{figure}[h] 
\centering 
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{chess_board.png} 
\caption{Position after 13... \texttt{a5!} and 14 \texttt{a3}} 
\end{figure} 

13... \texttt{d7} 

Now it is not possible to take twice on \texttt{c4} – the bishop at \texttt{c2} is hanging. And the consequences of 14 \texttt{b5} \texttt{xb5} 15 axb5 \texttt{d3} are already known to us. 

14 \texttt{d1} \texttt{c7} 

15 \texttt{xb4} \texttt{axb4} 

16 \texttt{xb4} 

I reached this position at home and I saw for Black a clear way to equalise: 16...\texttt{b5} 17 \texttt{b3} bxa4 18 \texttt{xa4} \texttt{xa4} 19 \texttt{xa4} 0-0. For the rehabilitation of the variation this would have been quite sufficient. But after such a terrible rout had been inflicted on me in the previous game, a draw no longer satisfied me; I very much wanted to gain revenge. Besides, on the preceding moves I had spent only 5 minutes, whereas Klovans had used nearly two hours, and he had only 45 minutes left for 24 moves! 

It was a pity not to try and use such a big time advantage, and besides, the position seemed interesting. So I chose a different, somewhat risky line. 

16... \texttt{c6} 

17 \texttt{a3} \texttt{b5} 

If Black should succeed in playing ...\texttt{b5–b4} and then castling, his position will be excellent. White tries to prevent castling. 

18 \texttt{c2} \texttt{b4}
19 \( \text{wd3} \)

What would you suggest now for Black?

\[ \text{19 } \text{c8!} \]

Out of his remaining seven minutes, here my opponent spent roughly five. It was obvious that he very much disliked his position, despite the extra pawn. The white c5-pawn is bound to fall, whereas the black c4-pawn is a powerful force. The black pieces are more active, and even the knight at a5 is better than the 'centralised' knight at f3. It is simultaneously blocking the passed a-pawn, defending the c4-pawn and threatening a fork at b3.

\[ \text{27 } \text{d2} \]

White should have tried 28 \text{e4}, although then 28...\text{xb4} with the threat of ...\text{b3} is unpleasant. I think that in this case too Black would have retained excellent winning chances.

\[ \text{23 } \text{xc4} \]
\[ \text{dxc4} \]
\[ \text{24 } \text{xb4} \]
\[ \text{b8} \]
\[ \text{25 } \text{wc5} \]
\[ \text{xc5} \]
\[ \text{26 } \text{dxc5} \]
\[ \text{e7!} \]

20 \( \text{fc1} \)
\[ \text{a6} \]
\[ \text{21 } \text{wd2} \]
\[ \text{c4} \]

Forced: 21...0-0? 22 \text{wh7+}.

\[ \text{22 } \text{d3} \]

Black is all the time required to find accurate moves. What should he do now? The capture on c4 is threatened, and the knight would appear to be tied to the b4-pawn. 22...\text{xd3} 23 \text{xd3} \text{b6} 24 \text{b5} clearly favours White.

\[ \text{22 } \text{a5!} \]

If now 23 \text{xb4}, then 23...\text{b8} and 24...\text{b3}, winning the exchange.

\[ \text{27 } \text{d2} \]
\[ \text{b4} \]

\[ \text{23 } \text{xc4} \]
\[ \text{dxc4} \]
\[ \text{24 } \text{xb4} \]
\[ \text{b8} \]
\[ \text{25 } \text{wc5} \]
\[ \text{xc5} \]
\[ \text{26 } \text{dxc5} \]
\[ \text{e7!} \]

20 \[ \text{fc1} \]
\[ \text{a6} \]
\[ \text{21 } \text{wd2} \]
\[ \text{c4} \]

Forced: 21...0-0? 22 \text{wh7+}.

\[ \text{22 } \text{d3} \]

White should have tried 28 \text{e4}, although then 28...\text{xb4} with the threat of ...\text{b3} is unpleasant. I think that in this case too Black would have retained excellent winning chances.

\[ \text{28 } \text{cb1} \]
\[ \text{xb1} \]
\[ \text{29 } \text{xb1} \]
\[ \text{c3} \]
\[ \text{30 } \text{e4} \]

30 \text{f1} was perhaps more tenacious.

\[ \text{30 } \text{c2} \]
\[ \text{31 } \text{c1} \]
\[ \text{b8} \]
\[ \text{32 } \text{d2} \]

If 32 \text{c3}, then 32...\text{b2} and 33...\text{b3}.

\[ \text{32 } \text{b3} \]

In the event of the exchange on b3 there is no defence against ...\text{b1}.

\[ \text{33 } \text{xc2} \]
\[ \text{xd2} \]
\[ \text{34 } \text{f3} \]
\[ \text{b3} \]

Through inertia White made a further 5–6 moves and then resigned.
You are to test your powers by trying to solve some positional problems, selected by Mark Dvoretsky. After your acquaintance with the lecture you should certainly find it much easier to cope with them.

1. White to move

2. White to move

3. White to move

4. White to move
5. White to move

6. White to move
Solutions


23 h4!  \[f8\]
24 a3

By bringing his light-square bishop into play, White has significantly intensified the pressure on the opponent’s position and gained a great advantage.

24...\[wb8\] 25 h5+ \[f8\] 26 a4 35 e5! (the most accurate way for White to convert his advantage) 33...\[xa5\]!

The exchange of queens leads to the destruction of Black’s queenside, but in any case things were bad for him. After 33...\[wb8\] the simplest is 34 \[xe6\] and 35 \[b4\], while if 33...\[c3\], then 34 \[b4\], after which White can double rooks on the d-file or play 35 axb5 axb5 36 \[a7\].

34 \[xa5\] a8 35 \[xe6\]! \[xe6\] 36 \[b4\] \[g7\] 37 \[xa6\] Black resigns.

2. Simagin – Bondarevsky (Szczawno Zdroj 1950).

But here the place for the light-square bishop is c4, from where it will create dangerous threats to the enemy king.

29 \[f1\]!

The game continued 29...\[wa7\] 30 \[c4\] \[xc4\] 31 bxc4 \[wc5\] 32 \[f6\]! \[c8\] 33 \[xh7+\] \[e7\] 34 e5!, and White soon won.


15 0-0?! is inaccurate in view of 15...g5! 16 hxg5 h4 with counterplay.

15 \[c1\]!

At a3 the bishop was firing into empty space; the place for it is g5. Then the h5-pawn will become vulnerable.

There followed: 15...\[g4\] 16 f3! (16 \[b1\] f5?)! 16...\[xd4\] 17 \[xd4\] \[xd4\] 18 \[b1\] (18 \[b2\]? \[b4+]! 18...\[e5\] 19 \[e3\] \[d3+\] 20 \[f1\] \[e5\] 21 \[h3\] \[d7\] (21...\[f5\] 22 \[g5\] intending 23 exf5) 22 \[g1\] \[hd8\] 23 \[f1\], and Black had insufficient compensation for the sacrificed piece.


The win is elementary, if you find the following bishop manoeuvre.

1 \[g2\]! \[b3\]
2 \[d5\]!

The black pawns are halted. (Equally good is \[f1\]–h3–e6).

The only difficulty of the problem is not to be tempted into playing for mate, beginning with 1 \[c6\]!?. Indeed, if 1...b3? White wins by 2 \[c5\] a3 3 \[e5\] (b4) a2 4 \[b4\] or 2...b2 3 \[b4\] (3 \[xb2\] a3 4 \[c4+\] \[a4\] 5 \[e2\]! is also good) 3...b1\\(w\) (3...a3 4 \[b5\] 4 \[c6\] mate. But Black has a stronger defence: 1...a3!.

a) 2 \[c1\] (or 2 \[c5\]) 2...b3! 3 \[xb3+\] (3 \[c5\] b2) 3...\[b4\] 4 \[c4\] \[c3\] 5 \[b5\] (5 \[a2+\] \[b3\])! 5...\[b2\] 6 \[d3+\] \[b1\]! 7 \[b4\] a2 8 \[d3+\] \[b2\] with a draw.

b) 2 \[c5\] a2! 3 \[c1\] a1\\(w\) (3...b3? 4 \[xb3+\] \[a4\] 5 \[c4\] \[a3\] 6 \[c3\]; 3...a1\\(w\)? 4 \[b3+\] \[a4\] 5 \[xa1\] b3 6 \[b5+\] \[a3\] 7 \[c4\] b2 8 \[c2+\] \[a4\] 9 \[a2\]! 4 \[b5\] \[b3\] 5 \[e2\] (threatening 6 \[d4\]) 5...\[c2\]!, and Black saves himself.

5. Geller – Larsen (Copenhagen 1966).

22 \[h5+\]?! \[d8\] is unjustified, since playing his king to the queenside comes into Black’s plans.

If 22 \[h5?\]! there also follows 22...\[d8\] (less good is 22...\[f6\] 23 \[g6+\] \[e7\] 24 \[xf6\] \[xf6\] 25 \[g7+\]), for example, 23 b3 \[c8\] 24
Position Evaluation and the Choice of Plan in the Middlegame

For the development of White's initiative it is important to attack the e6-pawn immediately with his bishop.

22 b3!!

White prepares 23 \( \text{c4} \) and 24 \( \text{g6+} \). It is now too late for 22...\( \text{d8} \) 23 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{g8} \) 24 \( \text{xe5}?! \) (24 \( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{xd7} \) 25 \( \text{d1}+ \) \( \text{c6} \) 26 \( \text{xe6} \) is weaker in view of 26...\( \text{d8} \) 27 \( \text{xd8} \) \( \text{g1+} \) 28 \( \text{b2} \) \( \text{xd8} \) 29 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{d4+} \) with perpetual check) 24...\( \text{xe5} \) 25 \( \text{xe7} \) \( \text{h8} \) 26 \( \text{xb4} \) with an obvious advantage.

22...\( \text{e4} \)

After 22...\( \text{c3} \) Yefim Geller gives the variation 23 \( \text{h5} \) \( \text{e4} \) 24 \( \text{xe4} \) (weaker is 24 \( \text{c4}?! \) \( \text{f6} \) 25 \( \text{xf6+} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 24...\( \text{xe4} \) 25 \( \text{g7}+ \) \( \text{d8} \) 26 \( \text{xe6+} \) \( \text{e8} \) 27 \( \text{g6+} \) \( \text{f7} \) 28 \( \text{g8}+ \) and wins.

23 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{e5} \)

24 \( \text{g6+} \) was threatened. If 23...\( \text{f6} \), then not 24 \( \text{h5}?! \) \( \text{e5} \), but 24 \( \text{h5}+! \) followed by 25 \( \text{xe4} \).

24 \( \text{h5}+ \) \( \text{d8} \)

25 \( \text{xe4} \)

White has won an important pawn, while retaining a strong attack. Subsequently he confidently converted his advantage.

25...\( \text{c3} \) 26 \( \text{e2}! \) (26 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{fxe4} \) 26...\( \text{h8} \) 27 \( \text{hxh8} \) \( \text{h8} \) 28 \( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{hxh2} \) 29 \( \text{g6!} \) \( \text{h4} \) 30 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{c7} \) 31 \( \text{g7} \) \( \text{f6} \) 32 \( \text{e6+} \) (32 \( \text{xd7+}! \) \( \text{xd7} \) 33 \( \text{b5}+\) ) 32...\( \text{b6} \) 33 \( \text{g6} \) \( \text{c3} \) (33...\( \text{h8}?! \) 34 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{h2} \) 35 \( \text{c5+} \) \( \text{c6} \) 36 \( \text{xaxa6} \) 34 \( \text{c5+} \) \( \text{c6} \) 35 \( \text{a4+} \) \( \text{c7} \) 36 \( \text{xc3} \) \( \text{bxc3} \) 37 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{b6} \) 38 \( \text{xc3} \) \( \text{c2} \) 39 \( \text{d6+} \) \( \text{c5} \) 40 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{b4} \) 41 \( \text{b2} \) \( \text{e4} \) 42 \( \text{a3+} \) \( \text{a5} \) 43 \( \text{d6} \) Black resigns.


In the event of the primitive 28 \( \text{c6}+? \) \( \text{xc6} \) 29 \( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{xc6} \) the chances are equal.

It is more difficult to refute 28 \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{exd4} \) 29 \( \text{e1} \). Black replies 29...\( \text{xd8}! \), for example:

30 \( \text{b8}+ \) \( \text{xb8} \) (not 30...\( \text{xb8} \) 31 \( \text{b1}+\) ) 31 \( \text{e7}+ \) \( \text{d8} \) 32 \( \text{xa7} \) \( \text{b1}+\) ! 33 \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{d5} \) ! 34 \( \text{xf7} \) \( \text{xf1}+ \) 35 \( \text{xf1} \) \( \text{h1}+ \) 36 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{e4+} \) with perpetual check. White can play more strongly: 30 \( \text{e7}+! \) \( \text{b8} \) 31 \( \text{c6} \) \( \text{xc6} \) ! 32 \( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{d3} \) 33 \( \text{f3}! \) \( \text{c3} \) 34 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{c2} \) (34...\( \text{d2} \) 35 \( \text{xb7} \) 36 \( \text{e7+} \) and 37 \( \text{xf7} \) ) 35 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{d2} \) (35...\( \text{a5} \) 36 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{a4} \) 37 \( \text{xa4} \) ) 36 \( \text{xc2} \) \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{d7} \) \( \text{h1}+ \) \( \text{g2} \). However, after 38...\( \text{d6}! \) (intending 39...\( \text{xf6} \) or 39...\( \text{a5} \) ) Black retains saving chances.

White achieves his goal with a spectacular bishop manoeuvre.

28 \( \text{c1}!! \)

After the appearance of the bishop at a3, all the white pieces assail the defenceless black king.

28...\( \text{c3} \) 29 \( \text{a3} \) \( \text{c4} \)

In the 61st volume of Informator, Vladimir Kramnik gives a detailed analysis of 29...\( \text{xf2}+ \) and 29...\( \text{c2} \), demonstrating that nowhere did Black have a draw.

30 \( \text{d6}+ \) \( \text{d7} \) 31 \( \text{c6}+! \) \( \text{e6} \) (31...\( \text{xd6} \) 32 \( \text{b5}+ \) \( \text{d5} \) 33 \( \text{xc4}+ \) \( \text{xc4} \) 34 \( \text{c6}+ \) \( \text{d3} \) 35 \( \text{c8} \) \( \text{c2} \) 36 \( \text{c1} \) ) 32 \( \text{b5} \) \( \text{xf2}+ \) 33 \( \text{xf2} \) \( \text{d4}+ \) 34 \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{e4} \) 35 \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{h1}+ \) 36 \( \text{f2} \) \( \text{hxh2}+ \) 37 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{xb7} \) (37...\( \text{h5}+ \) 38 \( \text{g2} \) ) 38 \( \text{xe5}+ \) \( \text{b6} \) 39 \( \text{c4+} \) \( \text{d7} \) 40 \( \text{xa7}+ \) \( \text{c8} \) 41 \( \text{c7}+ \) Black resigns.
Chess is by nature democratic. We all have the right, when playing through games by the stars of the past and the present, to doubt their moves or comments and to seek our own solutions. Such searchings are useful for improvement; sometimes they lead to a refinement, deepening, or even radical revision of existing opinions and evaluations. There have been many examples when excellent analytical finds by ordinary enthusiasts have become an integral part of our perception of games by famous grandmasters.

However, it should be remembered that the classical heritage demands a careful and solicitous attitude. In your searchings it is dangerous to proceed from the desire alone to 'refute', which usually leads to a loss of objectivity – you must aim to establish the truth. In order to discard a generally accepted opinion, it is not enough simply to have doubts about it – it must be thoroughly analysed, and the refutation must be conclusive and convincing.

One should be especially cautious as regards positional evaluations, where there is no reliable support of concrete and precise variations. The reason for my talking about this is that in the magazine *Shakhmaty v SSSR* (1984, No.12) an article was published by the master Vladimir Goldin entitled 'Overture to an historic encounter', devoted to the first game of the world championship match between Capablanca and Alekhine. The author of the article casts doubts on many decisions by both players and tries to paint his own picture of the game. Unfortunately, in my view, most of his evaluations are unjustified and incorrect.

Our opinion about the extent of a player's advantage is most often expressed in words. These words are sometimes not altogether clear, but are vague, and can be understood in different ways. In order to achieve definiteness and accuracy in opinions, grandmaster Igor Bondarevsky proposed a ten-point scale of evaluations, which I will use. On Bondarevsky's system a 5:5 rating signifies that the position is equal. Better chances for White receives a 6:4 evaluation (which is equivalent to $\pm$ in the *Informator* system), while if Black is better, then it is 4:6 ($\mp$). A significant advantage for White is 7:3 ($\pm$). If we evaluate a position as 8:2, we are stating that White should win ($\mp$), and 9:1 means that this win is a matter of simple technique. Finally, 10:0 simply signifies a point in the tournament table. More subtle, intermediate evaluations are also possible. For example, $2\frac{1}{2}:7\frac{1}{2}$ implies that White is on the verge of defeat.

After this protracted introduction it is finally time to turn to the game.

### Capablanca – Alekhine

**Buenos Aires 1927**

*French Defence*

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<td>11 ce3</td>
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Mark Dvoretsky

**Regarding a certain Article**

*PART V*
Now, in the opinion of Goldin, White should have captured on d5. He writes: ‘The question arises, if after 14 Qxd5 White was equal, then what happened to Black’s advantage which he had four moves ago after the indifferent move 10 Qd1? Arguing logically, we must criticise Alekhine’s play in the interval between the 10th and 13th moves.’ And this is what the master does, condemning the 10th, 11th and 12th moves of the challenger for the title of world champion.

This logic would be irreproachable, if the given evaluations were confirmed at both ends of the section of play in question. But it is hard to agree with these evaluations. It is clear that from the opening Black gained an excellent position, and his chances were even slightly preferable. But not more. For the moment there can be no question of an advantage. A fair evaluation would be 4.5:5.5, at the maximum 4:6.

On the other hand, after 14 Qxd5 Qxh2+ 15 Qxh2 Qxd5 both Capablanca (who did not go in for this variation) and Alekhine evaluated the position in favour of Black. To explain this Alekhine added a further two moves: 16 c4 Wh5+ 17 Qg1 Qad8.

Goldin thinks that the plan of defence found by him – 16 Qh1 Qad8 17 Qg1 h6 18 Qh4! – gives equal chances. This is not so. White’s rooks are disconnected and Black’s pieces are more active than those of the opponent. Let us play 18...b5 and look at the position with an unprejudiced view – surely we must prefer Black here? And what about 16...Qe4 (instead of 16...Qad8), pursuing the aim of not allowing the white rook to go to h4? After 17 c4 White has to reckon with 17...Qe5 18 cxd5 Qxd3.

No, the conclusion that 14 Qxd5 would have equalised is insufficiently well proven. At the least Black has lost nothing here compared with what he had four moves earlier, and the evaluation is no less than 4:6.

And since this is so, the entire criticism of Black’s play in the given period of the game is unsubstantiated.

Let us now examine Goldin’s specific recommendations. He thinks that Black should have castled not on the kingside, but on the queenside. He explains his opinion with the variation 10...0-0-0 11 c3 Qf8! 12 b4 f6 13 a4 g5 14 a5 Qe7 15 b5 h5 and with the evaluation: ‘White’s threats are not worth anything, whereas Black’s pressure increases.’

I think that in this last phrase the words ‘White’ and ‘Black’ could calmly change places – the new assertion would be... equally as unjustified as the the previous one. In fact a complicated position arises here, with chances for both sides. There is, for example, 16 Qe3, when the exchange on e3 is unfavourable for Black (16...Qxe3 17 fxe3!). After 16...h4 17 Qa3 White can think about Qe2–c1–b3, and there are also other possibilities. Instead of 14 a5 it is probably more accurate to play the immediate 14 Qe3 Qce7 15 b5 h5 16 Qa3 (now Black has to reckon with 17 Qxe7 Qxe7 18 Qg3 and 19 Qg5) 16...h4 17 Qc1 or 17 Qae1, intending a possible f2–f4 (perhaps after the preparatory h2–h3 and Qg4).
Castling on the queenside is much sharper than on the kingside, but on the basis of a short and provisional variation it is impossible to claim that it is stronger. I personally think that Alekhine played not only more safely, but also better; however I would not venture to insist on this assertion—to demonstrate it a very serious analysis would have to be carried out. After all, a position can often be treated in several roughly equivalent ways, the choice depending on the style and tastes of the player. We do not even know with which move it is best to begin a game: 1 d4 or 1 e4, or perhaps altogether something different! It is clear that problems of similar complexity constantly confront us during a game.

Goldin’s next recommendation—11...c7 can be deemed worthy of consideration, but there is no justification for asserting that this move is stronger than 11...e3 as chosen by Alekhine—we again have a case of roughly equivalent possibilities. And the doubts about the advisability of 12...e8! are altogether groundless. Instead 12...e7 is suggested, but after 13 f4 or 13 c3 d6 14 f4 the position becomes equal. By contrast, in the game the development of the bishop at f4 proved rather more difficult: 13 c3 d6 14 f4 was not possible on account of 14...xe2, while after 13 f4 White would have to reckon, say, with 13...g4 14 f3 g6 15 xg6 hxg6. If now 16 f2, then 16...xe2! 17 xe2 b4 16 xd4 18 f2 c5 19 e3 e8 or 19 f1 e6.

Equality would have been maintained by 16 f2!, but, understandably, to Capablanca the placing of the white pieces in the variation could have seemed shaky.

In the opening game of the match it was unpleasant for the world champion to have to play accurately for equality. It is psychologically easily understandable that he decided to make use of the very first opportunity to play actively and chose 13 f4?! (with the threats of 14 b5 and 14 b3, against which it is seemingly not very comfortable to defend), underestimating the excellent reply 13...d6!.

‘Mistakes never occur singly’—within a few moves Black was already a healthy pawn to the good.

14 fe1 b4
15 b3 f5
16 ac1? xc2!
17 xc2 f4!
18 g3 f5
19 ce2 b6
20 b5 h5
21 h4

Surely Black’s play in this part of the game was strong? No, the author of the article thinks differently. He criticises 14...f4 and instead of 16 ac1? recommends 16 d3. His reasoning is worth giving in full, merely adding, for the sake of clarification, the numerical evaluations which obviously follow from the verbal formulations:

‘After 16...xd3 17 xd3 xd3 18 cxd3 Black’s advantage would have been purely academic (4:5.5 or 4:6 – Dvoretsky). In reply to 18...b4, as given by Alekhine, with 19 e2 White could have constructed a fortress, and the possibility of taking it, in my view, is impossible to demonstrate analytically (but can the possibility of holding this ‘fortress’ be demonstrated analytically? – Dvoretsky).

‘It is noteworthy that Alekhine himself, after initially evaluating this endgame as lost for White (2:8 – Dvoretsky), several years later was inclined to the opinion that it was only significantly worse (3:7 – Dvoretsky). Was it worth then making the outwardly energetic moves with knight and queen, when the correct reply by White would have led to a position that was unhopeful as regards playing for a win? Didn’t Alekhine have a more promising continuation?’
'I think that he did. After 14...\textit{e}4! the white knight would be forced to retreat, since in this version the capture on d5 is no longer acceptable: 15\textit{xd}5 \textit{xe}2+ 16 \textit{xe}2 \textit{xd}5 17 \textit{c}3 \textit{h}5+ 18 \textit{g}1 \textit{h}4 19 f3 \textit{e}7 with a strong attack. And after 15 \textit{e}2 \textit{e}7 Black's position looks at any rate more promising than after the exchange of queens. Carried away by his idea, Alekhine apparently did not consider 14...\textit{e}4 at all.'

Here, in my view, everything is incorrect. What, for example, is the basis of the supposition that the challenger for the world championship 'did not consider 14...\textit{e}4 at all'? After all, in the event of 14 c3!? (instead of 14 \textit{fe}1??) he was almost certainly intending to play this. Levenfish and Romanovskiy give the following approximate variation: 14 c3 \textit{e}4 15 \textit{e}2 \textit{ae}8 16 \textit{g}3 \textit{xg}3 17 \textit{hxg}3 \textit{e}7 18 \textit{fe}1 \textit{f}5 19 \textit{d}2 \textit{d}6 – 'Black has enduring pressure, but not yet anything perceptible’. An accurate evaluation! (Numerically it would probably be expressed as 3.5:6.5.) But after 14 \textit{fe}1 \textit{e}4 15 \textit{e}2 \textit{e}7 16 \textit{g}3 or 16 \textit{d}2 roughly the same position is reached with roughly the same evaluation.

Can it be asserted that here Black can hope for more than in the variation 14...\textit{b}4 15 \textit{b}3 \textit{f}5 16 \textit{d}3 \textit{x}d3 17 \textit{xd}3 \textit{xd}3 18 cxd3 \textit{b}4?

Black's advantage is significant and, above all, enduring; White is condemned to a difficult defence. From the citation given above it follows that the evaluation of White's position, given by Alekhine, varied from 'significantly worse' to 'lost'. How, without even trying to support your arguments analytically, can you call the position 'a dead draw' and Black's advantage 'purely academic'?

It is hard to say with any certainty whether White is bound to lose this endgame or with correct play he can hold the draw. From the standpoint of the practical chess player this is probably not so important – between 'draw' and 'win' there are also a number of intermediate states.

In the given instance the problem is not whether Black has a win in the endgame; it is more important to decide where the practical winning chances are greater – in this ending or in the 14...\textit{e}4 variation, and in which branch White faces the more difficult problems. I think that Alekhine made the correct choice. In disagreeing with Alekhine's opinion, Goldin was obliged to justify his doubts analytically. Unfortunately, he did not even attempt to do this.

Now let us examine the further course of the game.

21 ... \textit{e}4
22 \textit{d}2! \textit{xd}4
23 \textit{c}3 \textit{d}3
24 \textit{e}5 \textit{d}8
25 \textit{d}6 \textit{xd}6
26 \textit{e}5 \textit{f}3
27 \textit{hx}h5 \textit{hx}h5
28 \textit{e}8+ \textit{h}7
29 \textit{xd}3+ \textit{g}6
30 \textit{d}1 \textit{e}6
31 \textit{ea}8 \textit{e}5
32 \textit{xa}7 c5

(see diagram)
PART V

33 \( \text{d}7 \)  \( \text{e}6 \)
34 \( \text{w}3+ \)  \( g6 \)
35 \( \text{d}8 \)  \( d4 \)
36 a4  \( \text{e}1+ \)
37 g2  \( \text{c}6+ \)
38 f3  \( \text{e}3 \)
39 w1d1  \( \text{e}6 \)
40 g4  \( \text{e}2+ \)
41 h3  \( \text{e}3 \)
42 h1  \( \text{f}4 \)
43 h5  \( \text{f}2 \)

White resigns.

Capablanca defended with uncommon inventiveness. To exchange the bishops and activate his rooks, he sacrificed a second pawn. Soon one of the pawns was regained, and at the same time the black king was slightly exposed. But Alekhine, after giving back his extra pawn, himself assailed the white king. Was the success of Black's strategy logical?

33 \( \text{d}7 \) was a mistake, allowing Alekhine to set up with gain of tempo a battery of heavy pieces on the e-file: queen behind the rook. Instead of this move Capablanca suggested 33 g2, but, in Alekhine's opinion, here too after 33...d4 Black has a decisive advantage, for example: 34 a3 \( \text{e}6! \) 35 c4. Goldin points out a better defence – 33 f3!.

By attacking the f7-pawn, White does not allow the build up of heavy pieces on the e-file. He thinks that in this case 'White's chances would have been by no means worse'.

True, Black can continue 33...\( \text{b}1+ \) 34 g2 \( \text{f}5 \) 35 e2 d4, and White still has to defend accurately (for example, incorrect is 36 d7 \( \text{x}a2 \) followed by 37...\( \text{e}6 \)). However, after 36 b3! White parries the immediate threats. Essentially the master is correct here. Black was a healthy pawn to the good, and his position was, apparently, won (2:8). Whereas now material is equal, and Black's attack is highly problematic. It can be concluded that Alekhine did not choose the best plan for converting his advantage.

Let us now go back, to discover where, in the opinion of the commentator, Alekhine went wrong.

Black chose 21...\( \text{e}4 \). Goldin writes: 'Can such a move be a mistake? Ask any master. The reply will almost certainly be unanimous: no, it cannot. And yet, strangely enough, it apparently loses Black nearly all his advantage.'

Indeed, any experienced player would hardly consider 21...\( \text{e}4 \) to be a mistake, and would certainly doubt that it 'loses Black nearly all his advantage'. In such positions the advantage can be lost either by a positional or tactical blunder, or by a series
of errors such as 21...\textit{f}4 (if it is in fact not the strongest move). Usually one inaccuracy is insufficient — it may only complicate (sometimes significantly) the conversion of the advantage.

But how strong is the move 21...\textit{f}3, suggested instead? Goldin considers only 22 \textit{g}4 \textit{xe}2 23 \textit{wxe}2 \textit{wxe}2 24 \textit{wxe}2 \textit{x}4 with a won rook endgame, and 22 \textit{d}2 \textit{xe}2 23 \textit{xe}2 \textit{a}6! (when if 24 \textit{c}6 there evidently follows 24...\textit{wxe}2 25 \textit{xa}8+ \textit{h}7 26 \textit{c}3 \textit{c}4). However, White can choose 22 \textit{g}5! \textit{xe}2 23 \textit{xe}2 \textit{a}6 24 \textit{w}6. Now after 24...\textit{wxe}2 25 \textit{xa}8+ \textit{h}7 White’s bishop is not hanging and he has the simple 26 \textit{w}d5. Also 25...\textit{f}8 26 \textit{w}d5 \textit{xb}2 is not altogether convincing: White can choose between 27 \textit{g}2, 27 \textit{f}4 and 27 \textit{d}8, retaining definite counter-chances. Finally, in the event of 24...\textit{w}e8 25 \textit{e}1 Black has to reckon with the positional threat of 26 \textit{e}7.

In principle, it is useful to mention and check alternative possibilities, such as 21...\textit{f}3. But you should not attach more importance to them than they deserve and immediately draw far-reaching conclusions.

After 21...\textit{e}4 22 \textit{d}2 Black could also have avoided taking the second pawn. Regarding the exchange of rooks – 22...\textit{xe}2 – Goldin says that ‘it would probably have retained some winning chances’. Why so modestly — ‘some winning chances?’ Of course, it is a pity that the e-file is now in White’s possession, but Black’s extra pawn and other positional pluses still remain. I think that Black retains excellent winning chances (2.5 : 7.5).

Let us now examine the position arising after Capablanca’s recommendation 22...\textit{ae}8 23 \textit{wxe}8+ \textit{xe}8 24 \textit{xe}8+ \textit{h}7.

(see diagram)
vincing, as he quite reasonably comments: 'It is hardly possible to exhaust this position with variations, but does one need to?'

After 25 ♗g2 he examines only 25...c5 and 25...♗d3 26 ♖c3 c5. But ...c7–c5 is a questionable move – it relieves the opponent of his bad d4-pawn and, above all, removes the support of the excellently placed bishop at d6, which is neutralising both white rooks. Instead of this the plan of advancing the queenside pawns comes into consideration, for example, 25...♗d3 26 ♖c3 ♗c4! (26...b5 27 a3 a5 also looks good, as well as 26...a5 followed by ...♗a6, ...b6–b5 and ...♗d6) 27 a3 a5. Another promising idea is 25...♗g4 26 ♖c3 f5 and 27...f4.

Perhaps, then, the capture of the d4-pawn should be deemed incorrect? I don’t think so – also after 22...♗xd4 Black undoubtedly retained the advantage. I will merely point out a few instances where Alekhine could have played differently (without a thorough analysis I would not risk saying ‘more strongly’) than in the game.

Alekhine avoided 23...♖c4 (instead of 23...♗d3) because of the counterblow 24 ♗e5!. However, after 24...♗xe5! 25 ♖xd5 ♖xc3! 26 ♖xf5 (26 ♖xa8+ ♖h7 27 bxc3 ♖xc3) 26...♗xe1 27 ♖d5 ♖xf2+ 28 ♖g2 (28 ♖xf2 ♖c2+ and 29...♖e8, winning) 28...♖e8 29 ♖xc4 ♖c5 (intending ....♖d6 and ....♖e3 or ....♖e6–g6) Black has the advantage.

Incidentally, as Yu.Nikonov (Shakhmaty v SSSR 1986 No.6) discovered, 23...♖g4! 24 ♖e5 ♖b4! was very strong, when 25 ♖xd5 c6! 26 ♖xc6 ♖c8 is bad for White, as is 25 ♖d1 ♖c5! 26 ♖c6 (26 ♖xd5 ♖xg3+; 26 ♖xc7 ♖c8 27 ♖e5 ♖xf2+) 26...♖d8! 27 ♖xc7 (27 ♖xc7 ♖f3! 28 ♖e1 ♖xg3+) 27...♖e8! 28 ♖xd5 ♖e4!. Nikonov also showed that after 23...♖d3 24 ♖e5 Black had the very strong reply 24...♖c5!.

White would also have been a long way from equalising after 25...cxd6 (instead of 25...♗xd6), and two moves later it was possible not to take the rook on h5, but play 27...♖h6!?.

Finally, as N.Volgin pointed out in the same issue of the magazine, instead of 31...♖e5 Black could have immediately advanced his passed pawn: 31...d4! 32 ♖xa7 (32 ♖xd4? ♖e1+ 33 ♖h2 ♖c6) 32...d3 33 ♖xc7 ♖e2.

Previously there was no need to check all these possibilities, since the plan chosen by Alekhine in the game also seemed good enough for a win. But now they have to be regarded much more seriously, since the defensive resource 33 ♖f3!, pointed out by Goldin, casts doubts on the correctness of Black’s attack (this is the only rational point of his publication).

At the conclusion of his article Goldin writes: ‘...Despite the corrections made to the evaluation of events by the present analysis, made nearly 60 years later, this was a gripping struggle, in the course of which impressively deep and brilliant decisions were taken by both players. ’I am afraid that, if one agrees with the ‘corrections made’, this little eulogy will look more like a mockery. After all, between the 10th and 14th moves alone, Goldin suggests that there were two mistakes by White and four by Black! Fortunately, the great players from the past did not play so badly – in the majority of cases it was not they, but their critics, who were wrong. Although, in general, of course, the game in question cannot be called a masterpiece.
PART VI

Grigory Kaidanov

A Feeling for the King

The arsenal of a strong player contains many very diverse methods and evaluations – from generally accepted to non-standard. In the material you are studying it is very important to be able to find that which can enrich your play. Even grandmasters and masters sometimes encounter ideas that are new to them.

I remember how in 1981 grandmaster Razuvaev and I were chatting about the new wave of Soviet players – in the USSR Championship that had just ended, Psakhis, Yusupov and Dolmatov had played brilliantly. Talking about Psakhis, Yuri Sergeevich remarked that 'he has a subtle feeling for the king'. To be honest, at the time this remark seemed to me to be too abstract, but soon I saw the following game:

Psakhis – Hebden
Chicago 1983

White is a pawn up, but its conversion does not look easy.

35 d1
With the idea of d3–f3.

35 ... a7
36 b4 c7
37 d3 g6

If 37 ... a6, then 38 h5 f8 39 f3, intending g6! and g3–g4–g5 with a winning attack.

38 g4 g7
39 f3 f8
40 h5 g5
41 f5 e7

Now Black is completely tied up. He cannot move either his queen, or his rook, or his king, because of the weakness of his f7 and f6 squares. All that remain are moves with his bishop. It appears that for White too it is hard to strengthen his position, however...

42 g2 b6
43 f1 a7
44 e2 b6
45 d3 a7
46 c4 c7+
47 b3 a7
48 g4! b6
49 c4 a7

(see diagram)
50 \( \text{b5} \)!!

The white king moves directly into the fire of the opponent's heavy pieces. But what does it want?

50 ... \( \text{e8+} \)

50 ... \( \text{e8+} \) 51 \( \text{a6} \)!! \( \text{b6+} \) 52 \( \text{a5} \) and wins.

51 ... \( \text{c6} \) \( \text{d8} \)

52 \( \text{c4!} \) \( \text{e7} \)

53 \( \text{d7} \)

Only now does White's idea become clear. His king advanced so far, not merely in order to simply frighten the opponent, but with the aim, after the exchange of queens, of ensuring the advance of his pawns.

53 ... \( \text{e6+} \)

54 \( \text{x} \text{xe6} \) \( \text{fxe6} \)

55 \( \text{x} \text{f8} \) \( \text{xf8} \)

56 \( \text{b5} \) \( \text{e7} \)

57 \( \text{a6} \) \( \text{xf2} \)

58 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{d8} \)

59 \( \text{b7} \) \( \text{e1} \)

60 \( \text{b5} \) \( \text{f2} \)

61 \( \text{b6} \) \( \text{d4} \)

62 \( \text{a4} \) \( \text{d5} \)

62 ... \( \text{e3} \) 63 \( \text{c6} \) \( \text{c5} \) 64 \( \text{b7} \).

63 \( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{exd5} \)

64 \( \text{exd5} \) \( \text{e4} \)

65 \( \text{c6!} \) \( \text{c8} \)

66 \( \text{d6} \) \( \text{e3} \)

67 \( \text{b5} \) \( \text{f6} \)

White launched a 'combination'.

14 \( \text{xf7?} \) \( \text{xf7} \)

15 \( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6!} \)

The refutation! After 16 \( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{d8} \) the white queen is trapped.

16 \( \text{f3+} \) \( \text{e7} \)

17 \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{xb5} \)

18 \( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{xe6!} \)

19 \( \text{d5+} \) \( \text{e7} \)

20 \( \text{f3+} \) \( \text{d7} \)

21 \( \text{d5} \) \( \text{d7} \)

22 \( \text{e4+} \) \( \text{e6} \)

23 \( \text{cd1} \) \( \text{f7} \)

24 \( \text{d7+} \) \( \text{e7} \)

25 \( \text{f3+} \) \( \text{e8} \)

26 \( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{c5} \)

27 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{d8} \)

White resigns.
'Why was the move 15...\textit{xf6} overlooked by my opponent?', I began thinking, and I came to a simple conclusion: while acknowledging the role of the king in the endgame, we often do not even consider active moves by the king in the middle of the game. Remember chess history: long ago Steinitz tried to demonstrate that even in the middlegame the king is a strong piece. But in the gambit he devised (1 e4 e5 2 f4 exf4 3 \textit{c}c3 \textit{h}4+ 4 \textit{e}e2) the 'activity' of the king is hardly justified – often Black simply mates it.

An understanding of when the king should be activated, and when this is inopportune, is most probably that 'feeling for the king' that Razuvaev mentioned. Although, this concept can also be interpreted more widely: it can include an ability to sense an appropriate moment for an attack on the enemy king or, having guessed the opponent's intentions, to safeguard your own king in good time, and so on.

Now let us examine the following game.

\textbf{Andersson – Tempone}

\textit{Buenos Aires 1979}

\textit{English Opening}

1 c4
2 \textit{f}f3
3 \textit{c}c3
4 cxd5
5 e4
6 dxc3

After the exchange of queens, White no longer has to fear the loss of castling.

6 \ldots \textit{wx}d1+
7 \textit{x}xd1 c5?

A poor move, leading to an inferior position for Black.

8 \textit{e}e3
9 a4
10 \textit{b}b5
11 \textit{c}c2
12 \textit{hd}1 a6?!
13 \textit{c}c4 \textit{g}4
14 h3 \textit{xf}3
15 gxf3 0-0
16 f4 \textit{a}7
17 e5 a5
18 \textit{ad}2 e6
19 \textit{ad}1 \textit{c}8
20 \textit{b}b3! \textit{f}8
21 \textit{b}b5! \textit{cc}7
22 \textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6
23 \textit{c}4 \textit{e}7
24 \textit{ad}7 \textit{cc}7
25 \textit{xc}7 \textit{xc}7
26 \textit{b}b5 \textit{ac}8
27 \textit{ad}7 \textit{f}8
28 \textit{xb}6 \textit{e}8
29 \textit{b}7 \textit{d}8+
30 \textit{b}5 \textit{c}4
31 \textit{ac}5

Black resigns.

This game, in which the white king, as though 'swaying from the hips', proceeded via b3–c4–b5 into the opponent's position, is one that I very much like. For myself I called this technical procedure 'the king march' and I collected several more examples on the same theme. Here is one of them.
The position on the board is a typical Caro-Kann endgame.

27 \texttt{\texttt{d}f4!} \texttt{\texttt{d}7}
28 \texttt{\texttt{b}3!}

With the idea of \texttt{\texttt{c}c2}.

28 \ldots \texttt{\texttt{d}8}
29 \texttt{\texttt{c}c2} \texttt{\texttt{e}8}
30 \texttt{\texttt{e}e4} \texttt{\texttt{c}7}

Black is seriously cramped, and White begins a pawn offensive on the kingside.

31 \texttt{f4} \texttt{\texttt{e}7}
32 \texttt{\texttt{g}4} \texttt{\texttt{h}4}
33 \texttt{\texttt{f}5} \texttt{\texttt{g}3}
34 fxe6 fxe6
35 \texttt{\texttt{g}6+} \texttt{\texttt{f}8}
36 \texttt{\texttt{w}xe6} \texttt{\texttt{xe}5}

After our acquaintance with the previous example it is not hard to find the following manoeuvre.

37 \texttt{\texttt{d}d3!} \texttt{\texttt{g}3}
38 \texttt{\texttt{e}4} \texttt{\texttt{h}2}
39 \texttt{\texttt{f}5} \texttt{\texttt{g}3}
40 \texttt{\texttt{d}2} \texttt{\texttt{h}2}
41 \texttt{\texttt{c}3} \texttt{\texttt{f}7+}

And Black resigned: after 42 \texttt{\texttt{w}xf7+} \texttt{\texttt{w}xf7} 43 \texttt{\texttt{e}4} and 44 \texttt{\texttt{d}5} White wins the bishop endgame.

Remember the Psaskhis–Hebden game. Here you have the same scenario: a king march with heavy pieces on the board, then the exchange of queens, and the resulting endgame proves won thanks to the superior position of the king.

After the study of all these examples if was pleasant for me to play the following game.

21 \ldots \texttt{\texttt{e}7}
22 \texttt{\texttt{a}a4} \texttt{\texttt{h}b8}
23 \texttt{\texttt{c}c4} \texttt{\texttt{f}6!}
24 \texttt{\texttt{f}1} \texttt{\texttt{a}7}
25 \texttt{\texttt{e}1} \texttt{\texttt{h}6}
26 \texttt{\texttt{e}2} \texttt{\texttt{e}5}
27 \texttt{\texttt{f}1} \texttt{\texttt{f}4}
White's next move loses quickly, but his position is already difficult: 29 \( axa6 \) is not possible on account of 29...\( d5 \) followed by 30...\( a7 \), and meanwhile 29...\( d5 \) and 30...\( f5 \) is threatened.

29 \( f1? \)
30 \( xa6 \)
31 \( exd5 \)
32 \( xe1 \)
33 \( f1 \)
34 \( a1 \)
35 \( g1 \)
36 \( h1 \)

White resigned: there is no defence against 37...\( g3 \) and 38...\( h2 \) mate.

This episode demonstrates once again that conscientious work is never in vain!

Supplement to Grigory Kaidanov's Lecture

Artur Yusupov

Korchnoi – Yusupov
Lone Pine 1981

With my last move 32...\( c8–a8?! \) I wanted to force White to remove the unpleasant pressure on the b5-pawn and by the threat of 33...\( a1 \) compel him to play 33...\( d1 \). But Korchnoi's brilliant reply dispelled my illusions.

33 \( f1!! \)
34 \( e2!! \)

It transpires that at e2 the king is perfectly safe. White wants to activate all his forces after \( b4 \). The hasty 34 \( e8+ g7 35 d7 \) would have allowed me to save the game by 34...\( xe3+! 35 xe3 x1+ 36 xe1 c3+ and 37...\( xb3 \).

34...\( g7 \)

If 34...\( b6 \), then simply 35 \( xb5 c1 36 e8+ g7 37 xf7+ h6 38 f8+ g7 39 f4+, while after 34...\( e5?! \) there is the satisfactory reply 35 \( d2 \).

35 \( b4 \)

Of course, not 35 \( xb5? \) because of 35...\( d6 \). But now both 36 \( e8 \) and 36 \( xb5 \) are threatened. I was unable to find a defence against these threats.

36...\( b6 \)
36 \( d6 \)

36 \( xb5 \) was also good.

36...\( c1 \)
37 \( xf6! \)

This exchange sacrifice wins by force.

37...\( d4+ \)
38 \( d6+ \)
39 \( e7+! \)

Or 39...\( h6 40 h4 g7 41 f6+ h6 42 f8+ h5 43 g4 mate. \)

40 \( f4+ \)

Black resigned in view of mate in two moves. The game was effectively decided by the unexpected king manoeuvre.
Teichmann – Allies
Glasgow 1902

The white rook is tied to the g2-point. Rudolf Teichmann finds an unusual solution: he brings his king out to h4 in order, after freeing the rook, to then switch it to the g-file. And in some cases the king can break through to g6.

28 ♕h2  
29 ♕g3!  
30 ♕h4

Threatening both 31 ♕h5, and 31 ♕e3.

30 ...  
31 ♕e3!  
32 ♕g3

The variation 32...g5+ 33 ♕h5! ♕xg3 34 ♕g6 is instructive.

33 fxg6  
34 ♕g4  
35 ♕h5

Black resigns.

This game was played at the start of the last century. But not long before the end of it a similar plan was successfully employed in two games by the leading English grandmaster.

Kasparov – Short
London 1987 (rapid)

44 ...  
45 ♕e7!

It is important to ensure the safety of the e6-pawn.

46 ...  
46 ♕c1?

46 ♕e8! was essential.

46 ...  
47 ♕h5!

The king heads for g3, and White has no way of opposing this threat. 47 ♕e8 is now pointless in view of 47...♕f7.

47 ♕a8  
48 ♕c8  
49 g4+  
50 ♕xc4

White resigns.
Black is tied down, but at first sight it is unclear how to intensify the pressure. However, for us this is no longer a problem. A familiar device – the inclusion of the king in the attack – leads immediately to the goal.

32 ♖g3!!  
33 ♕f4  
34 ♕g5!

Black resigns, since he is unable to parry the deadly threat of 35 ♖h6.

Exercises

1. White to move

2. Black to move
3. White to move

5. White to move
   How should the game conclude?

4. Black to move

6. Black to move
A Feeling for the King

Solutions

1. Mortensen – Tisdall (Gausdal 1982).

43  ¿g3!

The king goes to h4 in order, firstly, to shelter from the enemy attack, and secondly, to help its own pieces create a decisive attack against the opponent's king.

43...¿h1 44 ¿e4! (not immediately 44 ¿h4? in view of 44...¿e1+ 45 g3 ¿xh3+!) 44...¿g6 (44...¿e1 45 ¿h4+! ¿g6 46 ¿d3 ¿e3+ 47 ¿f3+ ¿xd3 48 ¿g4+! and 49 ¿xd3--) 45 ¿f5 ¿c3+ 46 ¿h4 ¿g1 47 ¿e6+ ¿h7 48 ¿g4 (48 ¿e7+ ¿g6 49 ¿e6+ ¿f5 50 ¿f7+ or 48...¿h8 49 ¿h5! would have won slightly more quickly) 48...¿h1 49 ¿e7+ ¿h8 50 ¿e8+ ¿h7 51 ¿e4+ ¿g6 52 ¿g8+ ¿f6 53 ¿e6+ ¿f7 54 ¿ee8+ Black resigns.


29 ... g4!

After this accurate move the position is drawn, despite White's extra piece – his king is unable to hide from perpetual check.

In the game Black played 29...¿b8?, which allowed the king to escape from the danger zone by 30 ¿f3! ¿b2 (30...¿d1+ 31 ¿e2) 31 ¿g4!. If now 31...¿xf2, then 32 ¿xh6 ¿d1+ 33 ¿e2! ¿xe2+ 34 ¿h3++. There followed: 31...¿g6 32 ¿d3! ¿g7 (32...¿xd3 33 ¿xh6; 32...f5+ 33 ¿xf5) 33 ¿xg7+ ¿xg7 34 ¿f3 Black resigns.


The game quickly ended peacefully: 38 ¿c3?! ¿xf3 39 ¿xf3+ ¿b8 40 ¿c3 (40 ¿e3 ¿d4 41 ¿d5 ¿xe3 with equality) 40...¿e6. Draw. But White could have won, by attacking the enemy rook with his king.

38 ¿f1!!

It is true that 39 ¿xe2 is not yet a threat in view of 39...¿d5(c2)+, but after White's intended 39 ¿g5 the rook really will be 'hanging', with nowhere to go. If 38...¿d6 (intending 39 ¿g5 ¿xf3 40 ¿xf3+ ¿e4), then 39 ¿xe2! becomes possible: 39...¿xf3+ (39...¿d5+ 40 ¿e3) 40 ¿f1! and wins (but not 40 ¿xf3? ¿e4+ 41 ¿g3 ¿f5+ 42 ¿h2 ¿f4+ 43 g3 ¿xc1).

38 ... ¿b8

By moving his king off the h1–a8 diagonal, Black has prepared 39...¿xf3. But now misfortune strikes from another side – White has gained an important tempo for the creation of decisive threats against the opponent's king.

39 ¿g8+! ¿b7 40 ¿a1


23 ... ¿g6!!

Here one cannot help but recall the words of the first world champion Wilhelm Steinitz: 'If necessary precautionary measures are taken, the king can defend itself.' The pin on the h4–d8 diagonal is annoying to Black, and his king personally takes measures to eliminate it. The natural 24 h4 loses immediately to 24...¿g4! 25 ¿xf6 ¿d7!, trapping the queen. White is a piece down and therefore the exchange on f6 is equivalent to capitulation. He has to leave his bishop en prise, but the king boldly captures it, after which White's attacking resources prove insufficient.

24 ¿f5 ¿xg5 25 ¿g3+ (25 h4+ ¿xh4 26 ¿hx4 ¿xh4! 27 ¿g3+ ¿h5 28 ¿d1+ ¿g4 29 ¿h3+ ¿g5 is no better) 25...¿g4 26 h4+ ¿f6!. With the king in the front line, extreme care has to be taken. The incautious 26...¿h5? would have led to mate: 27 ¿xg4+! ¿xg4 28 ¿d1+ ¿f4 29 g3#.
27 \text{wpg}4 \text{wg}8 28 \text{wxf}3 \text{xf}5 29 \text{xf}5+ \text{we}7 30 \text{wh}3 \text{wg}6 31 \text{g}3 \text{c}5 32 \text{f}1 1 \text{wf}6 \text{White resigns.}


White has a great material advantage, but his king is in danger.

1 \text{e}3!

The only defence against the threat of mate. It is clear that in the event of 1... \text{exd}3 2 \text{xe}h5 \text{xe}h5 3 \text{cx}d3 White wins easily. But where can his king hide from the checks along the 5th rank?

1... \text{f}5+ 2 \text{xe}4 \text{e}5+ 3 \text{d}4 \text{d}5+ 4 \text{c}4

4... \text{wd}1 5 \text{xd}1 \text{xd}1 is completely hopeless.

5 \text{b}3! \text{gf}7+!

After 5... \text{b}5+? 6 \text{a}2 the king would have hidden from the checks at b1. But now it has to remain in front of its troops.

6 \text{a}3! \text{a}7+

6... \text{a}5+? 7 \text{b}4, and Black has no convenient check.

7 \text{b}4! \text{a}5+ 8 \text{b}3 \text{b}5+

8... \text{b}5+ 9 \text{a}2.

9 \text{c}4 \text{c}5+

9... \text{a}4+ 10 \text{b}4.

10 \text{d}4

An amusing picture: earlier the rook drove the king from the kingside to the queenside, but now, after the black pieces have shifted to the queenside, it moves in the opposite direction. But where is the final goal of its wanderings around the board?

10... \text{d}5+ 11 \text{e}4 \text{e}5+ 12 \text{f}4 \text{f}5+ 13 \text{g}4 \text{g}5+ 14 \text{h}4

The king has finally acquired a safe shelter (the h5-square is controlled by the white queen) and the outcome has become obvious.


Who is attacking whom? In the event of 32... \text{w}h3?? Black is the first to get mated: 33 \text{e}8+ \text{h}6 34 \text{g}8+ \text{h}5 35 \text{ef}6+ \text{xf}6 36 \text{xf}6+ \text{h}6 37 \text{w}f8 mate. And after 32... \text{f}1+ 33 \text{g}2 \text{xf}4 34 \text{gf} \text{g}4+ 35 \text{f}1 it is not apparent how Black can achieve more than perpetual check.

32... \text{h}6!!

33 \text{g}8+

After 33 \text{f}8+ \text{h}5 34 \text{xf}7 \text{g}4! White has no defence against 35... \text{f}1+ 36 \text{g}2 \text{g}1 mate. And after 33 \text{c}8 \text{xc}8 34 \text{xc}8 \text{d}2 the endgame is won for Black.

33... \text{h}5

34 \text{d}5+ \text{g}4!

In the game Alvis Vitolins went wrong and missed a win: 34... \text{f}5? 35 \text{h}3! (but not 35 \text{xf}5+? \text{gf}5 36 \text{d}7 \text{g}4 37 \text{d}8\text{w} \text{f}1+ 38 \text{g}2 \text{g}1 mate, or 36 \text{h}3 \text{d}2) 35... \text{f}1+ 36 \text{g}2 \text{f}2+ (to avoid the worst, Black has to be satisfied with perpetual check) 37 \text{h}1 \text{f}1+ 38 \text{g}2 \text{f}2+ Draw.

35 \text{xd}4 \text{cx}d4 36 \text{f}6+ \text{h}3
PART VII

Ideas and Advice of great Players

(about working on chess, studying your own and other players’ games, and overcoming deficiencies in your play)

Wilhelm Steinitz

The advice which we offer on the subject is, in the first place, that a learner should seek as much as possible to play on even terms with superior players. One thing that we would especially urge upon the chess student is that regularity of study and practice very much facilitates making rapid progress. The player by fits and starts will scarcely ever improve, and it is much better to devote to chess one hour per day for six consecutive days than six hours one day in the week. In order to strengthen the powers of chess perception and memory, a good habit to cultivate is that of playing over from recollection one’s own games, or more especially selected and well-annotated published games played by masters.

The Modern Chess Instructor

Siegbert Tarrasch

Only I know that my defeats were explained not by a lack of playing strength, but by a lack of ability to use it. The reason for my failure was an underestimation of my opponents and an overestimation of my own possibilities. I assumed that to win it was sufficient to sit down at the board and move the pieces; my opponents would lose merely as a consequence of the irresistible feeling that they were opposed by none other than Dr Tarrasch. Moving the pieces carelessly, without delving deeply into the play, I firmly believed that the just cause (namely – mine) would in the end prevail... I suffered a deserved punishment, which, however, proved very useful to me. I finally realised that it is not enough to be a good player; one also has to play well.

...I cannot help emphasising particularly that I have never played, as they say, ‘for a draw’, except, of course, in positions which were unfavourable for me and in which best play on my part could lead at most to a draw. I consider the expressions ‘playing for a win’ or ‘playing for a draw’ to be complete misnomers. I regard every position as a problem, in which the best move has to be found, and I endeavour to solve it. If I see the strongest move, giving winning chances, then I would be simply betraying myself if I were to choose another move, leading only to a draw. The depressing chopping of chess wood, leading to a quick draw, is something I find repulsive and absurd.

Three Hundred Chess Games

Emanuel Lasker

One may err, but one must not deceive oneself. He who bravely follows his judgement may lose but even his loss profits him, provided he seeks to discover the reasons for it; and he grows to be a master, an artist. But he who no longer ventures to back his opinion loses the quality of a fighter and approaches his fall.
...Education in chess has to be an education in independent thinking and judging. Chess must not be memorised, simply because it is not important enough... Memory is too valuable to be stocked with trifles. Of my fifty-seven years I have applied at least thirty to forgetting most of what I had learned or read, and since I succeeded in this I have acquired a certain ease and cheer...

You should keep in mind no names, nor numbers, not isolated incidents, not even results, but only methods. The method is plastic. It is applicable to every situation...

He who wants to educate himself in chess must evade what is dead in chess – artificial theories, supported by few instances and upheld by an excess of human wit; the habit of playing with inferior opponents; the custom of avoiding difficult tasks; the weakness of uncritically taking over variations or rules discovered by others; the vanity which is self-sufficient; the incapacity for admitting mistakes; in brief, everything that leads to a standstill or to anarchy.'

Lasker’s Manual of Chess

José Raúl Capablanca

It would be a grave mistake to study the opening without keeping in mind the subsequent middlegame and ending. In the same way it would be wrong to study the middlegame without considering the endgame. This reasoning clearly proves that in order to improve your game you must study the endgame before anything else; for, whereas the endings can be studied and mastered by themselves, the middlegame and the opening must be studied in relation to the endgame.

Capablanca’s Last Chess Lectures

Alexander Alekhine

There were two things that made me a master: a search for the truth and a striving for a struggle. When I was still a little boy I sensed that I had a talent for chess. And already then I sensed an inner striving, an overwhelming attraction to chess. By means of chess I trained my character. Chess primarily teaches you to be objective. In chess you can become a great master, only by recognising your mistakes and deficiencies. Exactly as in life.

...There is one trait, along with others, which determines chess strength: unshakable concentration, which should isolate the player absolutely from the outside world.

from an article

Aaron Nimzowitsch

The simultaneous analysis of different types of positions merely generates confusion in your thoughts, whereas a thorough study of one type cannot fail to raise the level of your positional understanding.

If you, dear reader, with maximum available intensity sit down to study positions, say, with a central file against a flank storm, it would not surprise me at all if as a result you observe a clearer judgement in the field of the endgame. The process of studying one typical position has the aim not only of analysing this typical position, but also of improving your positional feeling as a whole.

I believe in the radioactive strength of this method: the entire chess organism is as though awakened and, joyful, awaits renewal. It is not only positional feeling that is strengthened – perhaps the most typical improvement is that the player, who previously pursued spectres (for example, eternally dreaming of mating attacks) suddenly begins very seriously to reckon with chess reality.

...Combinative talent plus thorough work can make the impossible possible, and therefore we once more advise: ‘Combinative players, endeavour step by step to
improve your understanding of the most important positional motifs and strategies! And you, players who do not like combinations, endeavour to like them, learn them, since only a linking of combinative play with positional can provide those successes, joys and thrills, of which chess has such a wealth!'

*How I became a grandmaster*

**Mikhail Botvinnik**

I long ago suggested to our masters, who systematically end up in time-trouble, a way of tackling this deficiency. Unfortunately, it would appear that they have not made use of my advice, and meanwhile it is very simple. You should play training games in which you pay the main attention to the clock, not the quality of play or the result, and continue these exercises until you develop the skill of using your time sensibly, while succeeding in calculating all the necessary variations. I think that in this way 90% of those suffering from the 'time-trouble disease' would be completely cured, with the exception, of course, of the 'hopelessly ill'.

Other deficiencies should be cured by the same method. During special training games you should focus your main attention on a particular deficiency – until it disappears...

If a master is weak in the endgame, he only has to follow the example of Chekhover, who in recent times has worked much in the field of the endgame and especially studies, and has achieved considerable success. In this case in training games you should aim for the endgame, which will also help you to acquire the appropriate experience. By the same method gaps in the middlegame can be filled, although here things are more complicated.

...Analysis at home has its own specific features: the player is not restricted by time and he can move the pieces. Despite these differences, there is also much in common between analysis and over-the-board play. It is well known that nearly all the outstanding players have also been excellent analysts. From this the conclusion suggests itself: anyone who wants to become an outstanding player must also improve in the field of chess analysis...

Of course, notes to games written 'in a rush', in 1–2 hours, cannot be called analysis. Such 'analysis' plays only a negative role, since it may be transformed into a bad habit.

*On my methods of preparing for competitions*

**Garry Kasparov**

I am an adherent of the investigative tendency, to which Botvinnik belongs. It was from him that I learned to study chess properly, find new ideas, and constantly work on improving. This is a scientific approach, based on a deep analysis of the heritage of the past, on the search for new opening variations and methods of play in the middlegame, and on the development of fundamentally new strategic plans. All chess players study old games – rather as they learn the words of a foreign language. But after acquiring some vocabulary, you have to learn to use it, in order to realise your creative potential. Especially if you are dreaming of becoming world champion.

...For me, brought up on the scientific methods of Botvinnik, the most important thing is the ability to concentrate. Seemingly a simple matter. But in an extreme, crisis situation? Few recognise that the ability to compose himself at the decisive moments of play is virtually the most important quality for a chess player.

...To play creatively, not fear risky adventures, possess a keen chess taste – all this does not free you of the need to work hard.
On the contrary, you must constantly improve your play, deepen and expand your opening repertoire, sharpen your techniques and analyse complicated endgames. After all, chess is not the once and for all mastery of a sum of knowledge. Chess is dynamic, and any conclusive result may prove on verification to be only intermediate. Each time the truth must be demonstrated. Even my own game commentaries are not unshakable for me. I like to refine them: in the course of time many ideas are subject to re-evaluation, including, of course, my own ideas. I happily return to my mistakes and analyse them. 'When a player annotates a game, he often endeavours to discover his inaccuracies and omissions,' wrote Botvinnik in 1980. 'This is the way Kasparov acts. He aims for the truth, and endeavours to be objective.'

Bezlimitny poedinok
A significant place in the improvement of a player involves (or more accurately – should involve) training – the independent solving of exercises. With their help it is possible to repeat and consolidate material that has just been studied, practise before important events, develop various skills and abilities, and make an objective diagnosis of your playing virtues and deficiencies.

You have already had an opportunity to test your strength on the simple and rather difficult exercises at the end of certain sections of the book. The present chapter is wholly devoted to practical tests.

All the exercises are divided into 12 themes, such as attack, defence, conversion of an advantage, traps, play with pawns, counter-chances for the opponent, manoeuvres and so on. The number of the theme is signified by a Roman numeral.

Each theme is represented by eight exercises, their numbers being signified by Arabic numerals. The first two exercises of each theme are elementary, the next two are rather more difficult, the third pair of exercises is not at all easy, and finally the fourth pair is very difficult.

It is not at all necessary to move consistently from one theme to the next. If the reader knows his weak points, he can choose the appropriate themes (from the list given at the end of the chapter) and try to solve the exercises relating to them, operating on the principle ‘from the simple to the difficult’. Of course, eight exercises on one theme may proved insufficient. But the thematic index indicates the numbers of exercises from other sections, which are also suitable for training on the given theme.

Another approach: you can begin with the simplest exercises on the various themes, and then gradually increase their difficulty. That is, first try to solve the first exercises from each theme, then the second, the third, and so on. If you operate in this way, you do not receive any prompts, and you do not even know whether the exercise in front of you is a positional or a tactical one. After solving many exercises, it is useful to note which themes caused you difficulty, and that means on which aspects of your chess mastery you have to tighten up.

Exercises

I/1 White to move
I/8 Black to move

II/3 White to move

II/1 Black to move

II/4 White to move

II/2 White to move

II/5 White to move
PART VIII

II/6  Black to move

III/1  White to move

II/7  White to move

III/2  White to move

II/8  Black to move

III/3  White to move
V/6 Black to move

VI/1 White to move

V/7 White to move

VI/2 Black to move

V/8 Black to move

VI/3 White to move

PART VIII
Solutions to Exercises

I


23 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{xf5}}}}
\text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{xf5}}}}
23...\text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{xf5}}}} 24 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{g3+}}}}.

24 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{xb7}}}}--

In the game Anatoly Karpov did not notice the winning sacrifice; he played 23 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{tf3}}}}? \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{d7}}}} 24 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{g5}}}} \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{f8}}}}, and the game dragged out for a further 30 moves.


1 ... \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{c3!}}}}
2 bxc3 a4
3 cxd4
After 4 c3 a3 White resigned.

1/3. Schiffer – Chigorin (13th match game, St Petersburg 1897).

Mikhail Ivanovich Chigorin chose 22...b6?, overlooking a spectacular mating combination:

22 ... \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{h1+!}}}}
23 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{hxh1}}}} \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{h2+!}}}}
24 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{hxh2}}}} \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{h8+}}}}
25 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{g3}}}}
25 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{g1}}}} \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{hxh1 mate.}}}}
25 ... \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{f5+}}}}
26 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{f4(g4)}}}} \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{h4 mate}}}}

1/4. À. Wotawa (1952).

1 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{e5}}}} \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{d2+}}}}
2 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{e3}}}} \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{e2+}}}}
3 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{d4!}}}}
3 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{f4? \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{xe5-+}}}}}}}}
3 ... \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{xe5}}}

1 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{e1!!}}}} \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{xe1}}}}

4 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{f6!!}}}}
\text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{gxf6}}}}
Stalemate! Or if 4...\text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{a5}}}}, then 5 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{g6}}}} with a draw.

1/5. Lucarelli – Carra (Bologna 1932).

White is a rook up, but the threats along the 2nd rank are extremely dangerous. He loses immediately after 1 d4? \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{e2}}}}, and 1 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{xc7+? \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{xc7}}}}}}}} 2 h7 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{e5}}}} does not help.

1 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{d2!!}}}} \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{xd2}}}}
2 d4 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{e2}}}}
After 2...\text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{d6}}}} there follows 3 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{f5}}}}, while if 2...\text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{g2?}}}}, then 3 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{a1 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{e2}}}}}}}} 4 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{b1 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{d6}}}}}}}} 5 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{f5}}}}.

3 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{c1}}}}

Black resigns. By sacrificing the rook, White has changed the places of the opponent’s heavy pieces on the 2nd rank – in the new order they are no longer dangerous.

1/6. R. Liberzon – Belov (Moscow 1957)*.

Both kings are in terrible danger. White gets there first, thanks to a diverting queen sacrifice.

1 \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{e1!!}}}} \text{\textbf{\textsf{\textit{xe1}}}}
If 1...\texttt{axa}2, then 2 \texttt{xbxb}+! is decisive.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
2 \texttt{xfxf} & \texttt{xfxf} \\
2...h6 & 3 \texttt{bxb}6+.
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

3 \texttt{g}b7

Threatening 4 \texttt{bxb}7+ \texttt{g}8 5 \texttt{h}h8+ \texttt{g}7 6 \texttt{h}1h7 mate.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
3 & \ldots & \texttt{g}8 \\
4 & \texttt{xbxb} & \texttt{f}8 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Nothing is changed by 4...\texttt{h}4 5 \texttt{h}7h4+.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
5 & \texttt{h}8+ & \texttt{e}7 \\
6 & \texttt{xe}1+ & \texttt{d}7 \\
7 & \texttt{he}8 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Mate by \texttt{b}1e7 is unavoidable.

\section*{I/7. Dreev – Yudasin (Interzonal Tournament, Manila 1990)}

It may seem that the f7-pawn is doomed. In fact White has at his disposal a spectacular combination, exploiting the strength of this pawn.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
37 & \texttt{d}5! & \texttt{a}6 \\
38 & \texttt{ff}5 & \texttt{h}7 \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

38...\texttt{g}6? 39 \texttt{xbxb}6 loses immediately, while if 38...\texttt{d}7? White wins by 39 \texttt{e}5! \texttt{b}5 (39...\texttt{xfxf} 40 \texttt{xcxc} 40 \texttt{xcxc}! \texttt{xcxc} 41 \texttt{xe}8. By playing his king to h7, Black prepares 39...\texttt{g}6 or 39...\texttt{g}6 40 \texttt{f}6 \texttt{g}7. 39 e5!

For the sake of connecting his f- and e-pawns, White is prepared to sacrifice his rook, for example: 39...\texttt{g}6 40 e6! gx5 41 \texttt{xcxc}! f4!? 42 \texttt{b}6+!--- 39...\texttt{d}7 40 \texttt{xcxc}! \texttt{xfxf} 41 \texttt{xbxb}3 is also bad for Black.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
39 & \ldots & \texttt{g}6 \\
40 & e6!! & \texttt{xfxf} \\
41 & \texttt{xcxc}!! & \texttt{xcxc} \\
42 & e7 & \texttt{xfxf} \\
43 & e8\texttt{h}6 &
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Alexey Dreev did not notice the combination, or else he was unable to calculate it, and he parted with his f7-pawn. White retained the advantage, but he was unable to convert it – his opponent defended tenaciously and resourcefully.

37 f4?! \texttt{xfxf} 38 \texttt{d}8+ \texttt{h}7 39 f5! g6! 40 \texttt{d}6 gx5 41 \texttt{h}h5 \texttt{d}d7! (41...\texttt{cxc} 42 \texttt{g}6+ and 43 \texttt{xfxf}) 42 \texttt{xbxb}6+ \texttt{g}8 43 \texttt{xfxf} c3 44 \texttt{f}6 \texttt{c}4! 45 \texttt{g}6+ \texttt{h}8 46 \texttt{h}h6+ \texttt{g}7 47 \texttt{g}6+ \texttt{h}8 48 \texttt{g}4! \texttt{e}6! 49 \texttt{b}4 \texttt{h}7 50 \texttt{e}8 \texttt{c}7 51 \texttt{h}4+ \texttt{g}8 52 \texttt{e}4!. We have reached the position of exercise I/8.

\section*{I/8. Dreev – Yudasin (Interzonal Tournament, Manila 1990)}

Black’s position is anxious. His bishop is attacked, but it is extremely undesirable for him to move it – from e6 it prevents the f6-pawn from advancing and simultaneously deprives the rook of the important g4-square. For example, after the plausible 52...\texttt{f}7? White wins by 53 \texttt{g}4+ \texttt{h}8 (53...\texttt{f}8 54 \texttt{g}4 \texttt{e}6 55 \texttt{h}6+ \texttt{f}7 56 \texttt{g}7+ \texttt{xfxf} 57 \texttt{xcxc} 54 \texttt{g}7 c2 55 \texttt{xfxf} \texttt{xfxf} 56 \texttt{xfxf} c1\texttt{w} 57 \texttt{xcxc} \texttt{xcxc} 58 \texttt{c}4 a5 59 h4 a4 60 h5 followed by 61 h6 or 61 f7 \texttt{g}7 62 h6+.

Leonid Yudasin found a pretty saving combination.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
52 & \ldots & \texttt{c}5!! \\
53 & \texttt{xcxc} \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

53 \texttt{d}4? c2 54 \texttt{d}8 does not work on account of 54...\texttt{e}4+ and 55...\texttt{xfxf}.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
53 & \ldots & \texttt{xcxc} \\
54 & \texttt{xe}6 & \texttt{c}2 \\
55 & \texttt{g}6! \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Of course, Black is not afraid of 55 f7+? \texttt{f}8 56 \texttt{g}6 \texttt{f}5+ or 55 \texttt{e}1? c1\texttt{w}, but what can he do now?

(see diagram)

\* (p. 170, No. I/6) This indicates that the position did not in fact occur in the game, but could have been reached in a possible variation.
Mate is threatened, and the obvious 55... \texttt{Hc8}\texttt{+} loses after 56 \texttt{He8+} \texttt{Hxe8} 57 \texttt{f7+} \texttt{He7} 58 \texttt{fxe8} \texttt{Hc1} 59 \texttt{He7+} \texttt{Hh6} 60 \texttt{Hh7+} \texttt{Hg5} 61 \texttt{h4+} \texttt{He6} 62 \texttt{He7+} \texttt{He5} 63 \texttt{He7+} \texttt{Id5} 64 \texttt{He5+}.

\begin{itemize}
  \item 55 \ldots \texttt{Hf5+}!!
  \item 56 \texttt{He2}
  \item 56 \texttt{Hxf5}? \texttt{Hc1}++; 56 \texttt{Hg3} \texttt{Hg5+}.
  \item 56 \ldots \texttt{Hxf6}!
  \item 57 \texttt{He8+} \texttt{He8}
  \item 58 \texttt{Hxf8+} \texttt{Hxf8}
  \item 59 \texttt{Hxc2}
\end{itemize}

White has remained a bishop up, but this is of little use – it is of the ‘wrong’ colour. Draw.

\section{II/2. Tal – Polugayevsky (45th USSR Championship, Leningrad 1977)}

Incautiously playing 30 \texttt{He6}?, Mikhail Tal overlooked the very strong reply 30...\texttt{b5}!. There followed 31 \texttt{a5} (31 \texttt{axb5} \texttt{He5}; 31 \texttt{He4} \texttt{bxa4} or 31...\texttt{He4}!) 31...\texttt{b3} 32 \texttt{He2} \texttt{He5} 33 \texttt{He2} \texttt{He4} 34 \texttt{Hd1} \texttt{He4}, and Black won.

White should have first attacked the b4-pawn.

\begin{itemize}
  \item 30 \texttt{He4}!
  \item 30...\texttt{b3} 31 \texttt{He4}=
  \item 31 \texttt{He6}
  \item 32 \texttt{Heb6} \texttt{He4}
  \item 33 \texttt{He7+}\texttt{f}?
\end{itemize}

\section{II/3. Smyslov – Szabo (Hastings 1954/55)}

White stands better. He has several tempting continuations, and the only question is which of these is the most accurate.

25 \texttt{f4}? \texttt{He4}!!?

25 \texttt{He7} \texttt{b3}! 26 \texttt{Hea8} \texttt{Hxd1}=

Vasily Smyslov chose the optimal way.

25 \texttt{b4}!

The continuation was 25...\texttt{He6} (25...\texttt{He7} 26 \texttt{He4}! \texttt{Hxd2} 27 \texttt{Hexe6+} \texttt{fxe6} 28 \texttt{Hxd2} 26 \texttt{He2} \texttt{He7} 27 \texttt{He3} \texttt{Hxd2+} 28 \texttt{Hxd2} \texttt{He8} (28...\texttt{e5} 29 \texttt{b5} \texttt{He5} 30 \texttt{f4} \texttt{He4} 31 \texttt{He4} 29 \texttt{Hxd8} \texttt{Hxd8} 30 \texttt{f4} and White won.

\section{II/4. Semenova – Levitina (Women’s Final Candidates Match, 5th game, Sochi 1984)}

There followed 22 \texttt{He8}? \texttt{He8} 23 \texttt{He1} \texttt{He8} 24 \texttt{He3} \texttt{He7} 25 \texttt{He3} \texttt{b6=} with a rapid draw.

Was it possible to take on b7? It turns out that it was!

\begin{itemize}
  \item 22 \texttt{Hxb7}!
  \item 23 \texttt{He7}
  \item 24 \texttt{Hxb7} \texttt{He6}
\end{itemize}

(see diagram)
It was apparently because of this double attack that Lidia Semenova avoided taking the pawn. And wrongly so!

25...\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}	exttt{e}1! \textbf{\texttt{x}}\texttt{e}1
26...\textbf{\texttt{c}}\texttt{7}!+-

\textbf{\textit{Il/5. R.Rétí}} (1922).
At first sight it is all very simple: 1...\textbf{\texttt{c}}\texttt{4} b3 2...\texttt{d}5 b2 3...\texttt{c}3. But here there is an extremely unpleasant surprise lying in wait for White: 3...b1\textbf{\texttt{w}}!! 4...\texttt{xb}1+ \texttt{a}4, and moving the bishop leads to stalemate.
If he plays 1...\texttt{e}4 b3 2...\texttt{c}3, hoping for 2...b2? 3...\texttt{e}4!+-, Black has 2...b2! followed by 3...\texttt{c}2=.

1...\texttt{e}4!! b3
2...\texttt{d}5 b2
3...\texttt{c}3 \texttt{b}3
4...\texttt{d}3+-

Nothing concrete is apparent for Black after 48...\textbf{\texttt{d}}1+?! 49...\texttt{f}5!. He has the tempting 48...\texttt{h}5+? 49...\texttt{x}g5 (49...\texttt{x}h5? \texttt{h}3+ 50...\texttt{g}x5 \texttt{f}6 mate) 49...\texttt{f}6+ (49...\texttt{f}6+ 50...\texttt{h}4!) 50...\texttt{x}h5...\texttt{e}5 with the terrible threat of 51...\texttt{h}6 mate. But Paul Keres did not play this, since he noticed a spectacular defense for his opponent: 51...\texttt{d}6!! \textbf{\texttt{x}}\texttt{d}6 52...\texttt{f}5+.

Not finding any way to give mate, the grandmaster correctly decided to restrict himself to winning the a3-pawn with gain of tempo.

48...\textbf{\texttt{f}}2+!
49...\texttt{f}5 \textbf{\texttt{d}}3+!
49...\texttt{d}1+?! 50...\texttt{f}3! was pointless. Also unconvincing was 49...\texttt{a}6?! 50...\texttt{c}6!, or 49...\texttt{b}1+?! 50...\texttt{e}5...\texttt{d}3+ (50...\texttt{g}4+ 51...\texttt{d}6 \texttt{b}8+ 52...\texttt{c}5) 51...\texttt{d}6 \texttt{b}8+ 52...\texttt{e}7!.

50...\texttt{e}5 \textbf{\texttt{g}}4+
51...\texttt{d}6 \textbf{\texttt{a}}3+

Black has a decisive advantage, which subsequently he methodically converted.

White could have gained an advantage in the following way:

20...\textbf{\texttt{c}}3! \texttt{cxb}3
21...\texttt{xd}5 \textbf{\texttt{x}}\texttt{d}5!
22...\texttt{xd}5 \textbf{\texttt{x}}\texttt{c}1
23...\texttt{xc}1 \texttt{b}2!?

23...\texttt{bx}a2 24...\texttt{x}e6 \texttt{fx}e6 25...\texttt{g}2 (threatening 26...\texttt{c}7) 25...\texttt{h}7+ 26...\texttt{d}1 \texttt{a}3 27...\texttt{d}1 with a dangerous attack;

23...\texttt{b}5 24...\texttt{e}4 \texttt{bx}a2 25...\texttt{g}2! (weaker is 25...\texttt{a}1? \texttt{xd}5 26...\texttt{xd}5 \texttt{b}1+ 27...\texttt{d}1 \texttt{b}2 28...\texttt{c}1 \texttt{b}3 29...\texttt{g}2 \texttt{a}3=) 25...\texttt{d}1 (25...\texttt{b}2 26...\texttt{xe}6; 25...\texttt{xd}5 26...\texttt{xd}5 \texttt{b}2 27...\texttt{c}7) 26...\texttt{d}1, and Black’s position is difficult.

24...\texttt{b}1 \textbf{\texttt{c}}5!
25...\texttt{e}4 \textbf{\texttt{c}}1+
26...\texttt{d}1 \textbf{\texttt{a}}3!

Serious consideration should be given to 26...\texttt{xd}1+ 27...\texttt{xd}1 \texttt{g}4 28...\texttt{b}1 \texttt{a}3, and if 29...\texttt{f}1, then 29...\texttt{f}3 followed by 30...\texttt{f}5. Even so, White can play for a win by 29...\texttt{f}3! \texttt{x}f3 30...\texttt{f}2 \texttt{g}4 31...\texttt{e}3.

27...\texttt{xe}6 \textbf{\texttt{f}}xe6
28...\texttt{g}2\texttt{±/±}

White plans to strengthen his position with
moves such as $\text{d}3$, $f2$–$f4$ and $\text{h}3$. But whether he can achieve anything real nevertheless remains unclear. In addition he has to reckon with $28...\text{wc}4!$?

Lev Polugayevsky decided to eliminate the d5-pawn immediately, but he underestimated the counterattack that his opponent launched in reply.

20 $\text{Nd}5? \text{Nxd}5$!

20...$\text{Nd}5?$ was much weaker in view of $21 \text{Nxd}5 \text{cx}b3 22 \text{Bxc}8 \text{bxa}2 (22...\text{Bxc}8 23 \text{axb}3 \text{Nxb}3? 24 \text{Bxg}4+) 23 \text{Bc}1!$ (but not $23 \text{Nxd}8? \text{a1+} 24 \text{Bx}b1 \text{a}2$ $24\text{Bb}1+$). Also possible is $21 \text{Bxg}4+ \text{h}8 22 \text{Nxd}5 \text{cx}b3$, and now either $23 \text{Bxb}4 \text{Bc}1+ 24 \text{Bg}2 \text{Bxb}4 25 \text{Bd}8+ \text{Bf}7 26 \text{axb}3$, or $23 \text{Bc}8 \text{Bxc}4 24 \text{Bxd}8 \text{Bxa}4 25 \text{Bx}f8+ \text{Bf}7 26 \text{axb}3$ – in both cases White can hope for a win.

21 $\text{Nxd}5 \text{cx}b3 22 \text{Bxc}8 \text{Bc}8 (22...\text{bxa}2? 23 \text{Bc}1) 23 \text{axb}3$?

23 $\text{Bd}1 \text{Bxa}4 24 \text{axb}3$ really was better, although after $24...\text{Bc}6$ the advantage remains with Black.

23...$\text{Bg}4$!

This is the whole point! With a small army Helmut Pfleger creates a decisive attack against the enemy king.

24 $\text{Bh}4$ ($24 \text{Bg}5+ \text{fxg}5 25 \text{Bxg}5+ \text{Bg}7 26 \text{Bd}8+ \text{Bf}8) 24...\text{Be}1+ 25 \text{Bf}2 \text{Be}2 26 \text{g}4 \text{Bf}1+ 27 \text{Bf}3 \text{Bf}1+ 28 \text{Bc}4 \text{Bc}4 29 \text{Bxf}6 \text{Bxf}2+ 30 \text{Be}5 \text{Be}3+ 31 \text{Bf}5 \text{Bf}3+ 32 \text{Be}5 \text{Be}3+ 33 \text{Bd}5 \text{Bd}3+ 34 \text{Bxd}3 \text{Bxd}3+ 35 \text{Bg}5 \text{Bf}3+ 36 \text{Bh}5 \text{Be}7$ White resigns.


Black’s position is not easy. But if he can manage to block the g-pawn and defend his d5-pawn, the opponent will have to overcome great technical difficulties.

The bishop cannot be allowed to go to g8: $66...\text{Bg}5$? $67 \text{Bg}8$, or $66...\text{Bg}5$? $67 \text{Bg}8 \text{Bf}4 68 \text{Bf}3+-$. The natural move $66...\text{Bg}7$? made in the game also loses quickly, on account of a pretty bishop manoeuvre: $67 \text{Bd}3! \text{Bf}6 (67...\text{Bg}5 68 \text{Bf}1!) 68 \text{Bf}1! \text{Bg}5 69 \text{Bg}2 \text{Be}6 70 \text{Bf}4$ and the blockade is broken. There followed $70...\text{Bf}7 71 \text{g}5 \text{Bd}6 72 \text{h}3+ \text{Bh}7 73 \text{Bg}4 \text{Bc}4 74 \text{Bc}3 \text{Be}6 75 \text{g}6$ Black resigns.

There remains only one defence.

$66...\text{Bf}6$ $67 \text{Bf}1!+-$

If $69 \text{Bg}2$, then $69...\text{Bd}6 70 \text{Bf}4 \text{Be}6+.$

$69... \text{Bf}6$ $70 \text{Bg}2 \text{Be}6+ 71 \text{Be}3 \text{Bc}7$

Black has parried the immediate threats and the win for White still remains in question.

III


29 $\text{Bf}1!++$

Nothing would be achieved by $29 \text{h}4?! \text{Bb}2$. By interposing this king move, White prepares $\text{f}2$–$\text{f}4$!. For example: $29...\text{Bb}2 30 \text{f}4 \text{Bf}5 31 \text{h}3$ with unavoidable mate by the rook on $\text{f}7$. 
29...\textit{x}x f 2 + 30 \textit{x}x f 2 \textit{x}x g 5 31 \textit{e}3 \textit{g}4 32 b 5 \textit{h}3 33 \textit{c}4 \textit{b}2 (33...\textit{c}5 34 \textit{xc}5) 34 \textit{c}2 Black resigns.

\textbf{III/2. Keres – Botvinnik} (22nd USSR Championship, Moscow 1955).

7 \textit{c}4! \textit{xf}3

Now 8 \textit{xf}3 \textit{xf}3 9 \textit{xf}3 exd 4 or 8 \textit{xd}5 \textit{x}d 1 9 \textit{xd}1 exd 4 leads only to equality. But, of course, when he made his developing move Paul Keres had reckoned with the capture on f3 (for the sake of which Black had just developed his bishop at g4) and had prepared an excellent rejoinder.

8 \textit{wb}3! \textit{a}5?

It was better to play 8...\textit{d}7 9 \textit{xf}3 exd 4 (9...\textit{a}5 10 \textit{xf}7+! \textit{xf}7 11 \textit{b}5+), although after 10 0-0! followed by 11 \textit{e}1+ Black's position would have remained difficult.

9 \textit{a}4+ \textit{d}7
10 \textit{xf}7+! \textit{d}8
11 \textit{xd}7+ \textit{xd}7
12 \textit{xf}3+-

And White won.


It would be a mistake to play 15 \textit{xd}4? \textit{h}2+, while in the event of 15 exd 4?! \textit{f}6 the position is roughly equal. 15 \textit{xd}4 \textit{f}6! 16 c 5 ! \textit{xe}4 17 cxd 6 is more interesting, but after 17...\textit{t}f 5 18 d 7 \textit{e}7 19 \textit{fd}1 \textit{g}3 20 \textit{wd}2 \textit{e}4 it would appear that White has to agree to a repetition of moves: 21 \textit{c}2(\textit{d}3) \textit{g}3 22 \textit{wd}2.

The problem is solved by the unexpected interposition of a check, which removes the bishop from the vulnerable e4-square and vacates the 4th rank for the rook.

15 \textit{h}7+! \textit{h}8
16 \textit{xd}4+!

The game continued 16...\textit{c}5? (16...\textit{f}6? 17 \textit{fd}1 \textit{h}7 18 \textit{xd}6 and 19 \textit{xd}6 was bad for Black, but 16...\textit{f}8 was more tenacious) 17 \textit{f}4 \textit{e}7 18 \textit{e}4 \textit{f}8 19 \textit{h}4! f 6 20 \textit{g}6 \textit{e}7 21 \textit{h}5! \textit{d}6 22 \textit{d}1 \textit{e}5 23 \textit{a}3 c 5 24 \textit{h}4 Black resigns.


Of course, 1 c8? \textit{x}c8+ 2 \textit{xc}8 a2+ is incorrect, and therefore 1 \textit{a}5 suggests itself. In the variation 1...b3? 2 \textit{xa}3 \textit{d}3+ 3 \textit{e}7 b 2 4 cxd 3 b1\textit{w} 5 \textit{h}3+ \textit{g}6 6 \textit{g}3+ \textit{h}7 7 c 8\textit{w} White wins, but the defence can be improved: 1...\textit{d}3+! 2 \textit{e}7 \textit{c}3 3 \textit{d}7 \textit{d}3+ 4 \textit{c}6 \textit{c}3+ 5 \textit{c}5 (5 \textit{b}7 b 3) 5...a 2 6 c 8\textit{w} a 1\textit{w} with a draw.

1 \textit{h}5+!!

This intermediate check is decisive. Wherever the king moves, it will stand worse than at h7.

1 ... \textit{g}6

In the event of 1...\textit{g}8 2 \textit{a}5 \textit{d}3+ 3 \textit{e}7 \textit{c}3 4 \textit{d}7 \textit{d}3+ 5 \textit{c}6 \textit{c}3+ White plays 6 \textit{c}5, since his pawn queens with check.

2 \textit{a}5 \textit{d}3+
3 \textit{e}7 \textit{c}3
4 \textit{d}7 \textit{d}3+
5 \textit{c}6 \textit{c}3+
6 \textit{b}7! b 3
7 \textit{c}3 a 3

\textbf{8 a}6+!
PART VIII

Now it is clear why the enemy king had to be lured to g6.

8...\f7 9 \b6 \c2 10 \c8\nBlack resigns.

III/5. Bologan – Nunn (Germany 1993).

If the knight moves from g4, the c2-pawn is lost. The tempting 30...\f1+ 31 \xf1 e1\nunfavourable in view of 32 \xd7d7 (with the threats of 33 \xe1 and 33 \xe7+ \xe7 34 \hxg4) 32...\xf1+ 33 \xf1 \h2+ 34 \g1 \xd7d7 35 \xh2+.

30 ... \b6!!
31 \ed2\nAfter 31 \xb6 the idea 31...\f1+! 32 \xf1 e1\ngains significantly in strength, thanks to the diverting of the knight from c4.

33...\xd2 and 33...\e3+ are threatened, and after 33 \c4 \e6 or 33 \d3 \a5 34 \d5 \e1! Black has excellent winning chances.

31 ... \e2
32 \xe2 \xc4
33 \hxg4 \xb2\n34 \d6 (34 \e7+ \f7 35 \xf7+ \xf7 36 \d6+ \e6 37 \xb7 \d5 38 \f2 \c4+ (+) 34...b6

35 \e7+?
The decisive mistake! The white pieces are well placed and for the moment they should not have been moved. As was shown by Robert Hübner, 35 g3\f was correct, depriving the black rook of the f4-square.

35...\f6 36 \b7 \a4 37 \c4 \g5! 38 \xb6 \xb6 39 \xb6 \f4!+ 40 \d6 \c4
41 \d2 \xg4 42 \f2 \c3 43 \g1 \h5 44 \h2 \g5 45 \e2 \h4 46 \e4+ \g4 47 \e2 \g3+ 48 \g1 \g4 49 \f1 \c4 White resigns.


First of all White must get rid of the pin on the c-file (24 \xe5? \b6 is bad for him). 24 \ce2? does not work on account of 24...\a5!

25 \b6 (25 \a3 \c4–+) 25...\xb6 26 \xb6 \c4.

If 24 \ee2?, then 24...\b6 25 \xb6 \xc2 26 \xc2 \xd6 27 \c6 \f8=. Also nothing is promised by 24 \d1?! \b6 25 \xd6 \xc2 26 \xc2 \xd6 27 \b3 \g7 or 27...\f6 with equality.

24 \g4!
Before defending the rook, it is important to force ...f7–f5, weakening the a2–g8 diagonal.

24 ... \f5
25 \d1\n
Now if 25...\b6 there follows 26 \xd6 \xc2 27 \xc2 \xd6 28 \xe5, and the d5-pawn is invulnerable. Black also loses a pawn after 25...\a5 26 \b3 \e4 27 \b6 \f6 28 \xc8+ \xc8 29 \xa5+.

After 25...\e4 White has two strong replies:

26 \e7! and 26 \xe4! \xe4 (26...\xd5 27 \b3! \h8 28 \e7! \xd1+ 29 \g2 \g1+ 30 \h3! \d7 31 \f6+ \g7 32 \xc+ \xc 32 \c4 \d7 33 \b5! \e6 34 \xg7+ \g7 35 \xb7+ 27 \g4 \xd5 28 \e7 \xc2 29 \xd8 \c1+ 30 \g2 \xd8 31 \e7 \f8 32 \xe5 \g7 33 \xex4+.

The game continued 25...\f8 26 \xa7 (26 \xe5? \xc5! 27 \xc5 \f7) 26...\c4 (26...\xc2 27 \xc2 \c8 28 \c5 \xc5 29 \xc5 \c7 30 \a5b 31 \d2) 27 \d6! (27
Solutions: Tests 12 x 8

\[ \text{b3 b5 or 27...\text{a}5 28 \text{a}ee2 b5) 27...\text{a}xd6} \]
\[ (27...\text{a}xd6 28 \text{a}xc4 \text{a}xd1 29 \text{a}xc8 \text{axe}1+ 30 \text{w}xe1 \text{w}xc8 31 \text{w}xe5--; 27...\text{a}xd6 28 \text{b}5+) 28 \text{a}xc8 \text{a}xc8 29 \text{b}3+ (29 \text{c}5!? \text{a}h8 (29...\text{g}7 30 \text{c}5 \text{xc}5 31 \text{w}xc5 e4 was better) 30 \text{c}5 \text{g}7 (30...\text{xc}5 31 \text{w}xc5 e4 32 \text{w}e5+ \text{g}7 33 \text{d}d1++) 31 \text{a}4 \text{d}d5 32 \text{b}3 \text{d}d7 33 \text{a}4 \text{d}5 34 \text{e}3+. \]


1...\text{e}7!!

A deep intermediate move. 1...\text{b}6?? is incorrect: 1...\text{b}7 2 \text{xe}2 (2...\text{g}3 \text{c}6 3 \text{a}4 \text{b}5 followed by 4...\text{e}1) 2...\text{h}5 3 \text{d}7 \text{c}6=. 1...\text{xe}2? \text{b}7 is premature – this position must be reached, but with the rook on e1.

1...e1\text{w}+

Forced, in view of the threat of 2 \text{b}6+. It is altogether hopeless to play 1...\text{f}4+ 2 \text{g}3 \text{c}4 3 \text{b}6+ \text{d}8 4 \text{xc}4 or 1...\text{d}8 2 \text{xe}2.

2 \text{xe}1 \text{b}7

3 \text{b}6!

But not 3 \text{a}1? \text{c}6 4 \text{a}5 \text{f}5=. 3...\text{e}5+.

4...\text{d}7 \text{c}6

4...\text{d}5 5 \text{e}6! \text{c}7 6 \text{c}6 \text{d}6 7 \text{xd}6 \text{xd}6 8 \text{e}5+.

5 \text{xe}5+!

5 \text{d}1? \text{d}5! 6 \text{xd}5 \text{xd}5 7 \text{g}5 \text{c}6=.

5...\text{xc}5

6 \text{g}4+!!

(see diagram)

Black loses his rook. After 1...\text{xe}2? the f1-square would have been available to the rook.


The immediate 21 \text{xc}5? \text{xc}5 22 \text{xf}6+ \text{xf}6 23 \text{xf}6 \text{hxg}5 24 \text{b}3 does not work in view of 24...\text{h}7! 25 \text{xf}7+ (25 \text{xf}7+ \text{h}6) 25...\text{d}6.

Mikhail Tal finds a way of decisively strengthening this idea. He wins a very important tempo, thanks to which his rook occupies the d-file.

21 \text{xf}6+!

If 21...\text{xf}6 22 \text{xf}6 \text{xf}6 23 \text{d}3, and there are two black pawns en prise: at c5 and h6.

22 \text{ad}1 \text{e}7

22...\text{d}4 23 \text{xd}4 \text{cxd}4 24 \text{xd}4! \text{hxg}5 25 \text{a}7+.

23 \text{xc}5!

24 \text{xd}1

Of course, not 24...\text{xe}7? \text{xe}1+ 25 \text{h}2 \text{gx}5.

24...\text{xc}5

25 \text{xf}6 \text{hxg}5

26 \text{b}3+!!

White's attack is irresistible. Here 26...\text{h}7 no longer helps in view of 27 \text{xf}7 \text{e}7 28 \text{d}8.

26...\text{b}7 27 \text{gx}6+ \text{f}8 28 \text{h}6+ \text{e}8 (28...\text{g}8 29 \text{hg}5+ or 29 \text{d}6; 28...\text{e}7 29 \text{hx}5+ \text{f}8 30 \text{h}6+ \text{e}7 31 \text{d}5) 29 \text{d}5 \text{b}6 30 \text{h}8+ \text{e}7 31 \text{xc}8 Black resigns.
PART VIII

IV


43 . . .

Black improves the position of his knight and at the same time sets a trap, into which his opponent falls.

44 $\text{dx}c7$?

44 $\text{e}e3$ $\text{f}e4$ 45 $\text{g}4=?$

44 . . .

$\text{g}4+!$

White resigns.


David Janowski resigned the game. His position is lost, of course, but before capitulating it made sense to try a last trap.

63 . . . $\text{c}5$? 64 $\text{d}d5$?

This desire to give mate as soon as possible (65 $\text{e}e7$) could have cost White dearly.

64 . . . $\text{x}f3+!$

65 $\text{x}f3$

66 $\text{x}e4$

Stalemate!


11 $\text{c}3$!

A positionally necessary move for White (he is planning $\text{c}c2$ and $\text{e}3$) and at the same time a trap.

11 . . . $\text{xc}3+?$

12 $\text{bxc}3$

13 $\text{wd}2$

14 $\text{xb}1$!

Black resigned in view of the inevitable 15 $\text{b}2$.


White stands better. He could, say, have played 15 $\text{d}5$?, for example; 15...$\text{xb}5$ 16 $\text{wb}4\pm$ or 15...$\text{d}3$ 16 $\text{xd}3\pm$. The best defence is 15...$\text{a}5\pm$.

Vladimir Savon chose a more cunning alternative. He offered the advantageous exchange of light-square bishops and at the same time set his opponent a trap.

15 $\text{b}5$!

15...$\text{xb}5$ 16 $\text{xb}5$ $\text{a}5\pm$.

16 $\text{xa}2$

17 $\text{b}3$!

18 $\text{xa}1$

Black resigns.


32 $\text{d}5$!

An excellent trap!

32 . . . $\text{c}3$?

The advantage also remains with White after 32...exd5 33 $\text{wd}5$, for example: 33...$\text{xa}3$ 34 $\text{d}8+$ $\text{f}8$ 35 $\text{xc}7$, or 33...$\text{c}6$ 34 $\text{d}6$ $\text{d}7$ 35 $\text{b}5$, or 33...$\text{e}8$ 34 $\text{b}5$ $\text{c}8$ 35 $\text{d}6$.

33 dxe6!! $\text{xc}3$

33...$\text{xa}3$ 34 $\text{d}7$!.

34 $\text{e}7+$

35 $\text{b}2$!

Black resigns.


36 $\text{b}8+$

37 $\text{e}8$?

This is what White was hoping for, but all the same Black’s position is difficult. If 37...$\text{xb}2$?!, then 38 $\text{h}8+$ $\text{g}6$ 39 $\text{e}5$ $\text{c}2$ 40 $\text{h}5+$ $\text{f}6$ 41 $\text{f}5+$ $\text{e}7$ 42 $\text{e}5+$ with a decisive attack.

38 $\text{h}8+$

$\text{g}6$
Solutions: Tests 12 x 8

Now nothing is given by 39 \( \text{W}e8+ \) \( \text{W}f1? \) 40 \( \text{W}e4+ \) \( \text{g}5 \) 41 \( \text{W}e5+ \) \( \text{x}g4\infty \). David Bronstein decides matters with a spectacular tactical blow, envisaged beforehand.

39 \( \text{W}xh6+!! \)

Black resigned in view of 39...\( \text{gxh6} \) 40 \( \text{W}g8+ \) \( \text{x}f6 \) 41 \( \text{W}f8+ \) or 39...\( \text{W}xh6 \) 40 \( \text{W}h8+ \) \( \text{g}6 \) 41 \( \text{W}h5+ \) \( \text{x}f6 \) 42 \( g5+. \)

IV/7. Portisch – Saidy (San Antonio 1972).

White has a significant positional advantage. He plans to play \( \text{e}5 \) and \( \text{d}6 \), and then to advance his kingside pawns. In the game he was able to increase his advantage unhindered.

25...\( \text{d}8?! \) 26 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{x}d2 \) 27 \( \text{x}d2 \) \( c5 \) 28 \( g4! \) \( g5 \) (otherwise \( h2-h4 \) and \( g4-g5 \)) 29 \( f5 \) \( c4 \) 30 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 31 \( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 32 \( \text{x}d7 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 33 \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{x}d7+ \) 34 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 35 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 36 \( a4! \) \( \text{bx}a4 \) 37 \( \text{x}c4 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 38 \( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{ex}f5 \) 39 \( \text{gf}5 \) \( a3 \) 40 \( \text{e}6+ \) \( \text{f}7 \) 41 \( \text{bx}a3 \) \( \text{xa}3+ \) 42 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{h}3 \) 43 \( \text{xb}6 \) Black resigns.

The attempt by 25...\( \text{d}7?! \) to prevent the invasion of the knight at \( e5 \) does not bring any relief – White replies 26 \( \text{b}4 \) with the threat of 27 \( \text{xc}6+ \) or 27 \( \text{x}d7+. \) If 26...\( \text{c}5 \) there follows 27 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{ec}8 \) 28 \( e5! \) (preparing \( g2-g4 \) or \( \text{c}2-d4 \)), and 28...\( \text{b}7?! \) is not possible on account of 29 \( \text{a}6! \). And in the event of the more tenacious 26...\( \text{f}6 \) the play, according to Lajos Portisch, can develop as follows: 27 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{d}5+ \) (27...\( \text{ec}8 \) 28 \( e5 \) \( \text{d}5+ \) 29 \( \text{xd}5+ \) \( \text{ex}d5 \) 30 \( \text{c}1! \) and 31 \( f5+. \) 28 \( \text{xd}5+ \) \( \text{ex}d5 \) (28...\( \text{xd}6 \) 29 \( e5+. \) \( \text{d}7 \) 30 \( \text{f}6+ \) \( \text{e}8 \) 31 \( \text{xe}8 \) \( \text{xe}8 \) 32 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 33 \( g4+\) ) 29 \( e5 \) \( d8 \) 30 \( \text{xd}8 \) \( \text{xd}8 \) 31 \( f5 \) \( \text{e}7 \) (31...\( \text{d}7 \) 32 \( e6 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 33 \( \text{d}4 \) and 34 \( \text{e}5+) 32 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 33 \( h4! \) (but not 33 \( g4! \) \( g5+) ) 33...\( \text{d}8 \) 34 \( g4 \) \( d4 \) 35 \( \text{e}4 \) \( c5 \) 36 \( g5 \) 37 \( \text{d}2? \) (zugzwang!) 37...\( \text{d}7 \) 38 \( e6 \) and 39 \( \text{e}5, \) winning.

The best chance of a successful defence is a trap!

25...\( \text{g}4+!! \)

26 \( \text{f}3? \)

This natural move throws away the win. 26 \( \text{e}2! \) is correct. The h2-pawn is invulnerable: 26...\( \text{x}h2? \) 27 \( \text{e}5 \) (threatening 28 \( \text{h}1 \) 27...\( h5 \) 28 \( \text{d}7+. \) If 26...\( c5 \) there follows 27 \( h3 \) \( f6 \) 28 \( e5? \) (28 \( e3 \) \( d7 \) 28...\( \text{xe}4 \) 29 \( \text{d}7+. \) Black is forced to play 26...\( \text{d}8 \) 28 \( h3 \) \( f6 \) 28 \( \text{e}3\) \( \text{f}3 \), leading to roughly the same difficult position as in the game (but at any event – not worse!). Unfortunately, in the knight endgame arising after 28...\( \text{cd}7?! \) 29 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{xd}2 \) 30 \( \text{xc}6+ \) \( \text{e}8 \) 31 \( \text{xd}2 \) \( \text{xd}2 \) 32 \( \text{xd}2 \) \( \text{xe}4+ \) 33 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{d}6 \) (33...\( \text{c}5+ \) 34 \( \text{d}4 \) \( d7 \) 35 \( \text{a}7 \) 34 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 35 \( \text{e}5+ \) White retains a significant advantage.

26...\( \text{g}4+!! \)

27 \( \text{g}3 \)

28 \( \text{h}2 \)

Of course, not 28 \( \text{e}5?? \) \( \text{xd}2 \) 29 \( \text{xd}2 \) \( \text{f}1+. \)

28...\( \text{f}3 \)

30 \( \text{c}4 \)

31 \( \text{c}4 \)

32 \( \text{cd}3 \)

33 \( \text{cd}3 \)

33...\( \text{xd}3+! \) also does not lose.

After 36...bxc2?! 37 âxc2 Black’s position is difficult. For example: 37...âh7 (37...âd7 38 âxg6; 37...a4 38 âb4 âd7 38 âxg6) 38 âe5 âd7 39 âxh5+ âg8 40 âxa5, and White should gradually win.

The best practical chance is to play for a trap.

36 ... a4!

Threatening 37...âxd3 38 cxd3 a3.

37 âb4?!

White fails to see through his opponent’s idea. After the restrained 37 âb2! bxc2 (37...âxd3+ 38 cxd3 g5 39 âe5) 38 âxc2 he would have retained a great, and probably decisive advantage.

37 ... âxd3+

37...b2? 38 âa3 or 38 âb1.

38 cxd3

White would win easily if he had time to play f3–f4. But after the move in the game Black releases his king from imprisonment and, by threatening to create a passed pawn on the kingside, gains counterplay sufficient to save the draw.

39 âa3! (39 âg1 g4 or 39...âh7; 39 hxg5 âh7! 40 âxa4 h4 41 âh1 h3 42 âb4 âg6 43 f4?! âd5!) 39...gxh4 40 âe5 âh7 41 âxh5+ âg6 42 âxh4 âf5 43 d4 âxf6 44 d5 âd7 45 âe4 âb5 46 âb2 âd7 47 âc3 âb5 48 âb4 âd7 49 âd4 âf5! 50 f4 (50 âb6+ âg7 51 âe5 âc2 52 d6 a3 53 d7 a2 54 âa6 b2 55 d8 âa1=) 50...âc2 51 âc3 a3 52 âa4 Draw.

V

V/1. Pein – Plaskett (British Championship, Swansea 1987).

18 ... âxe3!

19 fxe3

19 âxf5 âb6 20 âh3 âc7++. 19 ... âxf3++

White has a difficult position, since his pawns are weak and his pieces are passive. The game continued 20 âg2 âf3? (20... âxe3! 21 f2 âxe5 22 g4 âg6–+) 21 âh5 âf5 22 âe2 âxe5 23 g4 âf3+ 24 âh1 âf6 25 âg3 e5 26 e4 âc6 27 âxe5?! âe6! 28 âxf3 âxe5 29 âg2 âg6 30 âf1 âxf1+ 31 âxf1 dxe4 32 âxc4+ âh8 33 âg1 e3 34 âf1 âe4 White resigns.

V/2. Stein – Petrosian (Moscow 1961).

19 a4!

This pawn sacrifice enables the bishop to occupy the important a3–f8 diagonal. Had it been Black to move, he would have prevented this by 19...âa4!.

19 ... âxa4

20 âa1 b5

21 âa3–

White has a decisive attack.

20...b5 21 âa3 âd7 22 âf2 âb7 23 âa1 âd8
24 \textit{\texttt{Wd1}} (threatening 25 \textit{\texttt{h5} or 25 \textit{\texttt{xe6}} fxe6 26 \textit{\texttt{g4}}, but 24 \textit{\texttt{e2}! was more accurate}) 24...\textit{\texttt{h6}}?

Black would have lost after 24...a5? 25 \textit{\texttt{xe6}}! fxe6 26 \textit{\texttt{g4}}. As Valery Beim pointed out, he should have sacrificed a pawn, to divert the bishop away from the c1-square: 24...b4!! 25 \textit{\texttt{xb4}} (24 \textit{\texttt{cxb4}} \textit{\texttt{b5}) 25...\textit{\texttt{g5}} 26 \textit{\texttt{a3}} (26 \textit{\texttt{e2}} \textit{\texttt{h6}} 27 \textit{\texttt{h3}} \textit{\texttt{f1}}! with the idea of ...\textit{\texttt{h7}}–g5) 26...\textit{\texttt{h6}} 27 \textit{\texttt{h3}} \textit{\texttt{e3}}. After 24 \textit{\texttt{e2}! the e3-square would have been covered and Black would not have managed to gain counter-chances.

25 \textit{\texttt{c1}} \textit{\texttt{h7}} 26 \textit{\texttt{xe6}}! Black resigns.


15 . . .  \textit{\texttt{h8}}!

After the exchange of the dark-square bishops White's attack would have become irresistible. In such situations the g7 bishop is more valuable than a rook. After the acceptance of the exchange sacrifice the position remains unclear.

16 g5 \textit{\texttt{d7}} 17 \textit{\texttt{xf8}} \textit{\texttt{xf8}} 18 f4 \textit{\texttt{c5}} 19 \textit{\texttt{h4}} (19 \textit{\texttt{h6}} \textit{\texttt{g4}) 19...h5! 20 gxh6 \textit{\texttt{h7}}–21 \textit{\texttt{g1}} \textit{\texttt{f6}} 22 \textit{\texttt{h2}} a5 23 \textit{\texttt{we3}} a4 24 \textit{\texttt{c4}} \textit{\texttt{b8}} 25 e5 \textit{\texttt{h8}} 26 \textit{\texttt{d3}} (26 a3!) 26...\textit{\texttt{d8}} 27 \textit{\texttt{g3}} \textit{\texttt{xd3+}} 28 \textit{\texttt{xd3}} dxe5 29 fxe5 a3! 30 \textit{\texttt{we3?}} (30 \textit{\texttt{e1}}) 30...\textit{\texttt{f5}}! 31 d4 c5 32 d5?! (32 dxc5) 32...axb2+ 33 \textit{\texttt{xb2}} \textit{\texttt{xb2}} 34 \textit{\texttt{xb2}} \textit{\texttt{wb8+}} 35 \textit{\texttt{a1}} \textit{\texttt{xe5}} 36 \textit{\texttt{xc5}?

36...\textit{\texttt{a7}!! White resigns.


If Black had time to play 23...\textit{\texttt{c6}}, he would equalise. This can be only be prevented by the sacrifice of two pieces for a rook and pawn, after which White's central pawns begin advancing.

23 \textit{\texttt{xe5}}! \textit{\texttt{xe5}}

24 \textit{\texttt{xe5}} \textit{\texttt{we5}}

25 f4 \textit{\texttt{we6}}

After 25...\textit{\texttt{c3}} 26 \textit{\texttt{f2}} the black queen would have been trapped. For example: 26...\textit{\texttt{c6}} 27 e5 \textit{\texttt{e8}} 28 \textit{\texttt{e3}} \textit{\texttt{b2}} 29 \textit{\texttt{h6}}+ gvh6 30 \textit{\texttt{h7}}+ and 31 \textit{\texttt{xb2}+-.

26 e5±

There followed: 26...\textit{\texttt{e8}} (26...\textit{\texttt{e4}} 27 \textit{\texttt{xe4}}! \textit{\texttt{xf5}} 28 \textit{\texttt{ee1}} \textit{\texttt{e6}} 29 f5 or 28...\textit{\texttt{h5}} 29 \textit{\texttt{d3}) 27 \textit{\texttt{h4!}} (weaker is 27 \textit{\texttt{d6}} \textit{\texttt{xd6}} 28 exd6 \textit{\texttt{f6}} 29 d7 \textit{\texttt{c6}} 30 \textit{\texttt{e8}} \textit{\texttt{d4}) 27...\textit{\texttt{c6}} 28 \textit{\texttt{d3}} g6 29 f5 \textit{\texttt{xf5}} 30 \textit{\texttt{xf5}} (threatening 31 \textit{\texttt{e7+}) 30...\textit{\texttt{g6}} (30...\textit{\texttt{a7}} 31 \textit{\texttt{xg7}} \textit{\texttt{xg7}} 32 \textit{\texttt{h7+}} \textit{\texttt{f8}} 33 \textit{\texttt{f5+-}) 31 \textit{\texttt{e2!}} (31 \textit{\texttt{d7}?) 31...\textit{\texttt{g5}?! (31...\textit{\texttt{e6}} 32 \textit{\texttt{e4}} \textit{\texttt{g6}} 33 \textit{\texttt{ee3}} or 33 \textit{\texttt{e7}} with a winning position for White) 32 h4 \textit{\texttt{f4}} 33 g3 \textit{\texttt{xe5}} 34 \textit{\texttt{g4}} \textit{\texttt{g7}} 35 \textit{\texttt{xg7}} \textit{\texttt{f6}} 36 \textit{\texttt{f4}} \textit{\texttt{g7}} 37 \textit{\texttt{c7}} \textit{\texttt{b8}} 38 \textit{\texttt{d6}} \textit{\texttt{g4}} 39 \textit{\texttt{xc6}} \textit{\texttt{d4+}} 40 \textit{\texttt{f1}} Black resigns.

22 ♘hx5! gxh5
23 ♘xg8+ ♗xg8
24 ♜xh5

White intends to include his rook in the attack and then advance his h-pawn. It is hard for Black to counter this plan, since his pieces are badly placed.

24...a7 25 ♗f5! ♗xf5 26 ♗g3+ ♘f8 27 ♘xf5 ♗d7 28 h5+ ♗e7 29 ♗g7 ♘f8 30 h6 ♘b7 31 h7 ♘xh7 32 ♘f7+! Black resigns.


14...♘xd1+ 15 ♘xd1 ♗e8 leads to equality, but Black is rightly hoping for more.

14 ... ♗d7!!

15 ... ♘xf8

White’s position is also not eased by 15 ♖f2 ♘g5 16 0-0 ♗e5 with an attack.

15 ... ♗h4+
16 ♖d2

If 16 g3, then 16...fxg3 with the threat of 17...g2+. After 16 ♖f1 ♗xf8 White’s rooks are separated. Therefore he removes his king to the queenside, but there too it does not find peace.

16 ... ♗xf8

After sacrificing the exchange, Leonid Stein has gained complete control of the dark squares. The initiative is now completely on his side.

17 ♖e1 ♖e7 18 ♗c2 ♗e5 19 ♗c1 ♗g7 20 ♗d5 ♖c5 21 ♗g1 ♗xc4+ 22 ♗b1 ♖d3+ 23 ♗c2 (23 ♗a1 ♗c4) 23...♗e6 24 ♗e2? (24 ♘d1 ♗a6!) 24...♗xe4 25 ♗c3 ♖f5 26 ♗c1 ♗c6+, and Black won.

Black (subsequently the weakness of the white pawns will tell). Boris Spassky found the only way, and a far from routine one, of fighting for the initiative: he sacrificed a rook for four pawns.

20 ♘h5!! ♗xh5
21 gxh5 ♗f8

Weaker is 21...♗e5 22 ♗xe4.

22 ♗xe4!

The logical continuation of White’s planned operation.

22 ... ♖xe4
23 ♖xe4 ♗xe4
24 ♖d6 ♗e8

24...♖c8 25 ♖xg5+ ♖h8 26 ♖e5+.

25 ♖xg5+ ♖h8

26 ♖xc5 f6

26...b6? 27 ♖d4+ ♖h7 28 ♖g7+ ♖h6 29 ♖xf7.

27 ♖g3


27 ... ♖d4

28 ♖d4

An unusual position has arisen, hard to evaluate.

28...♖h7 29 ♖d2 ♖g8 30 ♖g6 ♖e8 31 ♖d3! ♖xg6 32 hxg6 ♖xd4! 33 cxd4 ♖f8 34 ♖c5 ♖xc5 35 dxc5 ♖d7! (35...♖xg6? 36 ♖xg6 ♖xg6 37 c6+-) 36 c6 ♖b6 37 e4 ♖g7
38 a6!? fxg6 39 a4! f7 40 a5 a8 41 c4 d8 Draw. There could have followed 42 f4! e7 43 e5 fx5 44 fx5 c7 45 d6+ xd6+ 46 exd6+ xd6=.

V/8. Korchnoi – Geller (USSR Team Championship, Moscow 1963)

19 ... wc4!
When Black made this energetic move, it was essential to prepare a convincing rejoinder to the opponent's reply.

20 g4 dxg4!
20...d7? 21 g5 followed by 22 e4, and the queen sortie ends in failure.

21 e4
21 fxg4 hxg4+ 22 h1 xc3 and 23...e4+) 22...hxg4+ 23 e2 gxh1 24 xh1, and White won easily.

VI/2. Groszpeter – Kupreichik (Minsk 1982).
Little is promised by 21...f4 22 exf4 xf4 23 g3 f6 (23...f3 24 wg4) 24 ef2 ef8 25 g2 followed by ead1.

21 ... a6!
Black concentrates all his forces for an attack on the king. He intends ...g6, ...d6 and ...e5. As usually happens in the middlegame, the presence of opposite-colour bishops strengthens the attack.

22 cxd1 g6 23 ef2 d6 24 c4 ef5 25 g3

25...f4 (now is the time!) 26 exf4 xf4 (threatening ...c5 and ...e4–e3) 27 xd6 x6 28 xe4 xc5 29 wg2 gf6 30 a2 f3 31 ef2 h6 and Black won.


12 a4!!
White finds the most energetic way of
exploiting his lead in development - he includes his queen's rook in the play along the 4th rank. There is the terrible threat of 13 b5 axb5 14 Qh4.

12...Qc7 13 b5 Qg6 14 Qg4 Qh3 15 Be1 (threatening 16 f1) 15...Qh4 16 Qxh4 Whxh4 17 b6 cxb6 18 g5 Wh3 19 e6 dxe6 20 Qxe3 Black resigns.

VI/4. P.Heuacker (1929)
The obvious 1 Qf5? Qb2 is incorrect, since 2 Qb7+ Qa2 3 Qd4 leads to stalemate after 3...c1Q 4 Qb3+ Qa1 5 Qc2+ Qxc2 6 Qxc2.
The knight has to head for d3!

1 Qh5!! Qb1
2 Qb7+ Qa2
3 Qh1 Qb2
4 Qf4 c1Q
5 Qd3+.

Black must include his queen in the attack. With this aim 30...c6?! is unconvincing: 31 bxc6 Qb6+ 32 d4 exd4 33 Qb5!.

30 ... a6!!— Threatening ...Qb8–a7+. If 31 bxa6, then 31...Qb8 32 axb7 Qxb7 and 33...Qa7+.
31 Qh2 Qxh2 32 Qxh2 Qg5! 33 Qxh3 Qh7+ 34 Qg2 Qh6 and White resigned in view of 35 Qg2 Qh6.

White has a strong passed c-pawn, which to some extent compensates for the insecure position of his king. If he should manage to transfer his king to the queenside, away from the black knight, it will be safe there, and the c-pawn will ensure White the advantage.

However, Black is able to detain the king on the kingside.

28 ... Qb6+!

29 Qg2 29 Qe1?? Qf3+; 29 Qe3?? Qxe3 30 Qxe3 Qg4+.

29 ... Qg4
After 30 c7 Qb7+ 31 Qh3 h5 the position is unclear.
In the game Black played much more weakly.
28...Qxe2+? (28...Qg4+? 29 Qf3 was completely bad) 29 Qxe2 Qe8+ (Black could have considered 29...Qe7+ 30 Qd2, and now not 30...Qd8+? 31 Qc1 Qxd1+ 32 Qxd1 Qc5+ 33 Qb1=, but 30...Qc8 31 c7 Qf3+ 32 Qc1 Qg5) 30 Qd2 Qc8 31 Qc1 Qg4 32 c7 h6 33 Qc6 Qh7 (33...Qf6 34 Qxe8+) 34 Qd7 Black resigns.

VI/7. Pchiolkin – Pokrovsky (Russian Federation Correspondence Championship 1980/83).

30 Qe3!!
This unexpected bishop manoeuvre to h6 places the opponent in a difficult position.

30 ... Qc4 30...Qxe3 31 Qf8+! Qxf8 32 Qxf8 Q+ Qxf8 33 Qg4+ Qg7 34 Qc8+ with mate; 30...Qb2 31 Qf12+–.

31 Qh6! Qe4+
32 Qf3! 32 Qf3? Qcc2.

32 ... Qe1+ 32...Qf2 33 Qg1; 32...Qb2 33 Qd3!.
33 Qxe1 Qxe1+
34 Qg2 Qe4
35 Qh3– (see diagram)
By exchanging all the pieces on f8, White obtains a won pawn ending.

35...\(\text{ wb4} 36 \text{ af2} \text{ e7} 37 \text{ xf8}+ \text{ xf8} 38 \text{ xf8+} \text{ xf8} 39 \text{ gxf8w+} \text{ xf8} 40 \text{ xf8} \text{ xf8} 41 \text{ g4} \text{ e7} 42 \text{ f5} \text{ d6} 43 \text{ e4} 45 44 \text{ axb6 a5 45 b7} \text{ c7} 46 \text{ exe5 a4 47 e6 a3 48 d6+} \text{ xb7} 49 \text{ d7} \text{ and White won.}


19 \text{ d2}!!

A subtle manoeuvre, creating the threats of 20 \text{ b5} and 20 \text{ b4 \wedge c7} 21 \text{ c1}.

The obvious 18 \text{ b5}?! is weaker: 19...\text{ wa3} 20 \text{ wb1 d7} 21 \text{ b4 ac8} 22 \text{ c1 xc1+} 23 \text{ xc1}. And 20 \text{ c2} (instead of 20 \text{ wb1}) 20...\text{ ac8} (20...\text{ d8}?) 21 \text{ c1 w d6} 22 \text{ wb1} does not work in view of 22...\text{ d7}! 23 \text{ xa5 \wedge c7+}.

19 ... \text{ b6}

19...\text{ ad7} 20 \text{ b4 \wedge e3} 21 \text{ d1 \a4} 22 \text{ xa5 \x d1} 23 \text{ xd1}. 20 \text{ b4} \text{ wc7}

20...\text{ e3} 21 \text{ d4! \wedge x d4} 22 \text{ xd4 \wedge x d5} 23 \text{ exd5 \x d5} 24 \text{ e4+-}.

21 \text{ c1} \text{ wb7}

21...\text{ d7} 22 \text{ d4 \a7} 23 \text{ b5 \w b7} 24 \text{ xa5 (24 \text{ c6})} 24...\text{ bxa5} 25 \text{ c6}. 22 \text{ wb1!}

A decisive double attack: both 23 \text{ dxe6} and 23 \text{ xa5} are threatened. If 22...\text{ c8}, then 23 \text{ f4}, preparing to destroy the black king’s defences by 24 \text{ e5} (23...\text{ wb8} 24 \text{ xe7 is bad for Black}).

22...\text{ ab8} 23 \text{ dxe6 \c6} 24 \text{ c3 \e5} 25 \text{ b5 \bc8} 26 \text{ xe5 \xc1+} 27 \text{ xc1 fxe5} 28 \text{ d7 \a6} 29 \text{ g3 \xa2} 30 \text{ h4 \f8} 31 \text{ g5 \f6} 32 \text{ xf6}! Black resigns.

VII

VII/1. Simagin – Kotov (Moscow 1944).

36 \text{ h5}!±

Before going into the endgame it is useful to cramp the opponent's kingside as much as possible. Otherwise Black himself would have played ...\text{ h6–h5} and ...\text{ g7–g6}.

36...\text{ e6} 37 \text{ d7 \e7} 38 \text{ xe6 fxe6} 39 \text{ f3 \c7} 40 \text{ e4 \f7} 41 \text{ d6 \e7} 42 \text{ f5 exf5+} 43 \text{ xf5+}, and White won.


13 \text{ g4}!±

This energetic move emphasises the weakness of the e4-pawn. Black’s position is difficult: 14 \text{ g5} is threatened, and if 13...\text{ h6}?! there follows 14 \text{ h4}. The best chances of creating counterplay were promised by 13...\text{ a5}! 14 \text{ b5 \d8} 15 \text{ g5 \c5d5} 16 \text{ cxe4 \c5}.

13...\text{ bd5}? 14 \text{ g5 \xe3} (14...\text{ xc3} 15 \text{ gxf6} \text{ xd1} 16 \text{ fxe7+}) 15 \text{ fxe3} (15 \text{ gxf6 \xf6}) 15...\text{ d5} (15...\text{ e8} 16 \text{ dxe4}) 16 \text{ xd5 \x g5} 17 \text{ xe4 \x d5} 18 \text{ \f3}, and White won.


21... \text{ g4}!!

The opening of the \text{ h2–b8} diagonal would
have given White a very dangerous attack. By sacrificing a pawn, Wolfgang Uhlmann shuts the opponent's powerful dark-square bishop out of the game.

22 hgx4
If 26 hgx4, then 26...e4 followed by 27...f5. 26 f5 gxf3 27 hxd6 fxg2 is no good for White.

22...f5!∞
23 g5 e7 24 g3 e8 25 We3 e4! 26 fxg4 dxe4 dxg4 27 f2 (27 d5?) 27...e5h7 (27...Wd5) 28 fxb1 (28 d5?) 28...Wd5
Black has sufficient positional compensation for the sacrificed pawn. Subsequently he outplayed his opponent and won.


45 h4! –
The enemy pawn must be fixed on the vulnerable h5-square, in order to tie one of the black pieces to its defence or to have the possibility of creating a dangerous passed h-pawn.

In the game White went wrong by playing 45 d5?, and after 45...h4! the position became drawn. If White takes his king to the a7-pawn, Black will shut it in the corner by 46...c7, while in the event of g2–g3 Black, after exchanging pawns, can easily block the passed g-pawn. In addition, for a draw it is sufficient for him to give up his knight for it, and then return with his king to b8 (with pawns at a6 and a7, the extra bishop does not give a win). The continuation was 46 dxe5 h5 47 Wf3 fxe5 48 f5 Wg6, and the game ended in a draw.

VII/5. Portisch – Smyslov (3rd match game, Portorož 1971).
White has prepared e2–e4. The question is whether to play this immediately, or after the preparatory exchange of pawns on d5. Only the second way is correct.

14 cxd5!
If now 14...cxd5?!, then 15 e4 e5 16 e5 h7 (16...e5 17 a3) 17 b5. 14...dxd5 is better, but even then after 15 e4 White’s position is preferable: 15...xc3 16 bxc3 ad8 17 ad1= or 15...bd4 16 wd2 ad8 17 ad4=.
14 e4? (hoping for 14...e6? 15 e5 h5 16 f4=) was significantly weaker because of 14...xc4! 15 bxc4 b6!.

White’s centre has become vulnerable. For example, 16 exf5 Wxc4 or 16 c5?! c4. The best defence was 16 d5 f7d7 17 d1?! (17 f4 exf4 18 xe4 c5; 17 e2 d4+ 18 h1 e5 19 ad1 c5) 17 a4! 18 xg7 Wxd7 19 c3 ac5 20 Wd2 fxe4 21 fxe4 Wxf1+ 22 Wxf1 Wd8=.

The game continued: 16 c5? c4 17 c1 (17 ab1?) 17...ad8 18 b1 (18 exf5 gx5 19 Wxf5 xd4=) 18...d7 19 d5 (19 xb7 xc5; 19 e2 xc5 20 wc2 xd4 21 xd4 xd4+ 22 h1 h7=) 19...b5! 20 dx6 (20 xb6 db6 21 fxe4 22 xe4 xc3 23 xc3 cxd5) 20...xc5 21 wc2 a6=, and Black won.


27 g4! g8
Black loses after 27...fxe4? 28 g5 Wxe5 29
Solutions: Tests 12 x 8

\[ \text{\#x6+} \text{\#g8} 30 \text{\#h7+}. \] The best defence is offered by 27...\text{\#d8!} 28 g5 \text{\#g7}.

28 g5 \text{hxg5}
29 \text{\#h7+} \text{\#f8}
30 fxg5 \text{\#g7}
31 g6\pm

Black's position is difficult. For example, 31...\text{\#d7?} is bad in view of 32 \text{\#e8+!} and 33 \text{\#c5+}.

In the game Zurab Azmaiparashvili did not find the correct plan and he conceded the initiative to the opponent: 27 f5? \text{\#d7!} (27...\text{\#xe5?} 28 \text{\#h6+} \text{\#g8} 29 f6+-) 28 \text{\#e7} \text{\#e8\uparrow} 29 \text{\#xb7} \text{\#c6+} 30 \text{\#xc6} \text{\#xc6+} 31 \text{\#e4} \text{\#b8} 32 \text{\#xf7??} (32 \text{\#f3; 32 \#g1}) 32...\text{\#xe4+!} White resigns.


White has to reckon with 15...d4 (16 exd4 cxd4 17 \text{\#xd4?} \text{\#d5--}) and with 15...\text{\#e4.}

For example, 15 \text{\#c1?!} \text{\#e4} 16 \text{\#g4} \text{\#xc3} 17 \text{\#xc3} c4=.

Nothing is given by the tempting 15 \text{\#xf6?!} \text{\#xf6} 16 \text{\#c2} on account of 16...c4! 17 \text{\#xh7+} \text{\#h8} 18 f5 \text{\#ab8=}.

15 b4! d4!
15...c4 16 \text{\#c2\pm}.
16 exd4 cxd4
17 \text{\#b2!}
17 \text{\#xd4? \#d5--+}.
17 ... \text{\#d5}
18 f3
18 ...\text{\#e6} 19 \text{\#xc1} axb4 20 axb4 \text{\#ab8} 21 \text{\#c4} \text{\#e6} 22 \text{\#xd4} \text{\#e3+} 23 \text{\#h1} \text{\#b5} 24 \text{\#c3\pm,}

and White converted his extra pawn (Gligoric–Bukic, Doni Milanovac 1979).

19 \text{\#d2}
19 \text{\#e4? \#e5.}
19 ...\text{\#e3}
20 \text{\#fc1\pm} (see diagram)

Despite Black's apparent activity, his position is difficult. His d4-pawn is vulnerable, while White has two strong bishops, control of the c-file and the prospect of creating a dangerous passed pawn on the queenside.

20...\text{\#ad8} 21 \text{\#c5} \text{\#d6} (21...\text{\#e6}) 22 \text{\#ac1} \text{\#b7} 23 \text{\#c7} (23 \text{\#b5!} \text{\#e5?!} 24 \text{\#xd4+--}) 23...\text{\#e7} 24 \text{\#xe7} \text{\#xe7} 25 \text{\#e1} \text{\#d7} 26 \text{\#b1?} (26 b5! and 27 a4\pm; 26 \text{\#f2!} and 27 \text{\#h4\pm}) 26...\text{\#c6!} 27 \text{\#c1} \text{\#g6} 28 \text{\#xd4} \text{\#xd4} 29 \text{\#xd4} \text{\#xd4} 30 \text{\#xc6} \text{\#d2!}, and the game ended in a draw.


If Black manages to play 27...\text{\#b5}, White will have to exchange on b5, which is undesirable. If 27 a4?! there follows 27...\text{\#xc3} 28 \text{\#xc3} \text{\#b4} 29 \text{\#c4} \text{\#h6} 30 \text{\#g3} g5 with counterplay. In the event of 27 c4 a4?!\pm it is not easy for White to breach the opponent's defences.

27 a3!!\pm

Threatening 28 axb4 axb4 29 \text{\#a7}. If 27...\text{\#xc3} 28 \text{\#xc3} the black rook (in contrast to the 27 a4?! variation) does not have the important b4-square. After 27...b3 28 a4 followed by 29 \text{\#ab1} the b3-pawn is most probably doomed.

27...f5 (this attempt to sharpen the play does not bring Black any relief) 28 axb4
axb4 29 cxb4 axb4 30 e5! dxe5 31 edh6 32 edb1 ede8 33 edb7 edxb7 34 edc4 edb2 35 wfe3 edc2, and now the most reliable way to win was 36 edb1! edd2 37 wce1 edb1 38 wxb1++.  

**PART VIII**

**VIII/1. Estrin – Kletsel** (World Correspondence Championship 1975/78).

Black intends to take on f4 and then play ...d6–d5 with a good game. Yakov Estrin frustrates this plan by a timely exchange on b6, thanks to which he seizes control of the light squares and gains the advantage.

16 edxb6! wxb6 17 edc4±

The d5 and f7 points are weak. It is interesting to follow how subsequently White exploited the benefits of his position.

16...exf4 18 edxf7 wdf8 19 wxe6+ edb8 20 wdd3 wa5 21 whd1 we5 22 a3 d5 (otherwise edb1 and then wdd5) 23 wdd5 wdd5 24 wdd5! (White is playing for an attack and therefore he avoids the exchange of rooks) 24...wdf6 (24...wxf5 25 wff3 wdd7 26 wdd4 edx3 27 edx3 wfc8 28 edx7!++) 25 c3 wdd6 26 wdf3 edx8 27 g4 fxd3 28 hxg3 whg8 29 edb1 we8 30 wa2 ed7 31 edf4+ wxe5 32 wa4 edx8 33 c4 wxe7 34 wdb3 wdb8

White has arranged his pieces in the best way possible. Everything is ready for the decisive breakthrough.

35 wcf5 wxc5 (35...wxd5 36 edx8; 35...bxc5 36 wdd6!) 36 edb7! edx8 37 edx8 edf6 38 edxh8 Black resigns.

**VIII/2. Timman – Diez del Corral** (Olympiad, Luzern 1982).

19 wg4!

Weaker was 19 g4?! wtae8.

19...wxf4 20 hxg4±

By exchanging queens White has attacked the e4-pawn, deprived the knight of the f5-square, and opened the h-file.

20...wxe4 21 wdd2! wdf6?! (21...wa8) 22 wxe4 wdd5 23 edx1 wad8 24 edf3 wxe3+ 25 edxe3 wdf7 26 edf3 wdd8 27 hxg3 whg8, and Black resigned.


42 dxe4! wxe4 43 edx5 wxa1

After the exchange of rooks the d6-pawn has become far less dangerous, since the black king gains the opportunity to attack it, without fearing the enemy rook.

44 wdd2 wde8 45 dxe4 wxe6, and the game ended in a draw.


White could have saved the game, by exchanging all the pieces.

42 wde4! wxe4 42...dxe4 43 edx4 43 dexe4 44 edx4 45 edx4 wde4 46 edx4 edx5 47 edx5 edx7 48 b3 a6
49 a3!
Black is the first to run out of reserve pawn moves and he is obliged to agree to the exchange of the kingside pawns, leading to a draw.
Alexander Alekhine avoided going into the pawn ending, but the rook endgame proved difficult.

\[ 42 \text{xc1?} \text{d5+} 43 \text{hxg5} \text{e6+} 44 \text{g4} \text{d7} 45 \text{c3} a5 46 \text{f3} \text{g6} 47 \text{a3} \text{h5} 48 \text{xa5} \text{f5} 49 a4 g5 50 \text{a8} \text{e4} 51 \text{f8+} \text{e5} 52 \text{e8+} \text{d4} 53 \text{b8}! c5 54 b4? (54 a5!?) 54...c4 55 a5 \text{e3+} 56 \text{f2} \text{a3} 57 \text{g8} c3 58 \text{h5} \text{a2+} 59 \text{f3} c2 60 \text{g1}, and White resigned.

VIII/5. Oll – Ubilava (Moscow 1983).
Black's objective is to consolidate and coordinate his forces. To resolve this successfully it is important to retain the rook that is defending his rear.

\[ \text{21} \ldots \text{e8!} \]
Intending 22...\text{f6} followed by ...e6–e5.
\[ \text{22} \text{b8} \text{d8!} \]
But not 22...\text{f6}? 23 \text{xc8}!.
\[ \text{23} \text{c7} \text{f6?} \]
For the moment the c6-pawn is invulnerable: 24 \text{xc6}? \text{d7}–+

In the game Black exchanged rooks, which led to great difficulties. White broke through with his queen into the opponent's rear and won the a6-pawn, obtaining a dangerous passed a-pawn. It should be mentioned that, when there is an unusual material balance like this, exchanges are normally advantageous to the side with the queen – which finds it easier to display its power on a more empty board.

\[ \text{21}\ldots \text{x}f1+? \text{22} \text{xf1} \text{d8} \]
(22...\text{e7} 23 \text{d6} \text{d7} 24 g3 and 25 h4–+) 23 \text{c7} \text{d7} 24 \text{d1} \text{d8} 25 \text{a5} \text{f6} 26 \text{xa6+} \text{e5} 27 \text{a7} (27 a4!? e4 28 \text{w}c4+ \text{e}e6 29 \text{w}e2) 27...e4 28 \text{g1} \text{g5} 29 \text{w}c5 \text{h6} (29...\text{e}e6 30 \text{w}c4) 30 \text{g4 (30 \text{w}e7 came into consideration: 30...\text{e}e8 31 \text{xd7} \text{xe7} 32 \text{xe7}, or 30...\text{e}e3+ 31 \text{h}1 \text{b6} 32 \text{xe4}) 30...\text{f4 (30...e3! 31 \text{g5} e2 32 \text{f1} \text{e6}) 31 \text{f1} \text{g5 (31...\text{e}e6?! 32 \text{w}c4 \text{e}e3+ 33 \text{h}1 \text{b6} 34 \text{xe4}) 32 \text{xf4}! \text{e}6 33 \text{w}e7! \text{xf4} 34 \text{g5} \text{c8} 35 \text{g6} \text{d1}+ 36 \text{f2} (36 \text{g}2? \text{f3+} 37 \text{f2} \text{d2}+ 38 \text{xe1} f2+) 36...\text{e}3+ 37 \text{f}1?! (after 37 \text{w}e2 \text{d2}+ 38 \text{f}1 \text{f}2+ 39 \text{e}4 \text{g}5+ 40 \text{xe5} e2 41 \text{f}1 \text{White wins; it appears that Black can nevertheless save himself with 38...\text{eh}2!) 37...\text{d4}+? (37...\text{f}1+! 38 \text{g}2 \text{f}2+ 39 \text{g}1 \text{g}5! 40 \text{w}xg5 \text{h}3=, or 38 \text{e}4 \text{g}5+ 39 \text{e}5 e2 40 \text{f}6 \text{e}4+ 41 \text{g}5=) 38 \text{xf4} \text{f1}+ 39 \text{e}4 \text{e}6 40 \text{w}e3 \text{c5} 41 \text{w}h7+ \text{f}8 42 \text{w}h8+ Black resigns.

White wants to simplify the position by 37 \text{w}e2 and 38 \text{d}3. The attempt to prevent this plan by 36...\text{d}4? (with the idea of 37 \text{w}e2? \text{a}1), made by Jan Timman in the game, did not succeed. White replied 37 \text{e}3! (renewing the positional threat of 38 \text{w}e2 and 39 \text{d}3=). There followed: 37...\text{a}5 38 \text{w}e2 \text{a}4 39 \text{b}xa4 \text{a}8 40 \text{a}3 \text{b}8 41 \text{b}3 (41 \text{a}2? \text{b}4–+) 41...\text{a}8 42 \text{a}3 Draw.

Black could have won by the immediate advance of his a-pawn, with the idea of preparing the transition into a pawn ending.

\[ \text{36} \ldots \text{a}5! \]
37 \text{w}e2 \text{a}4
38 \text{d}3
Otherwise the white king comes under a mating attack.

\[ \text{38} \ldots \text{axb}3+ \]
39 \text{c}3
39 \text{xb3} \text{w}a4 (or 39...\text{a}8) is hopeless for White.

\[ \text{39} \ldots \text{w}x\text{d}3+! \]
40 \text{w}x\text{d}3 \text{d}3+
It is not possible to prevent the invasion of the black king: after 42 f4 g6 43 g4 either 43...f6 or first 43...h5 is decisive.

The most accurate, although 44...g5 45 a4 gx4 46 gx4 xf4 47 b5 xe5 48 xc5 f5 is also possible.

54 exf6 gxf6
55 a4
56 a5=e

Carl Schlechter probably avoided the knight exchange because of the tactical stroke 17 b5, but he had to reason to fear it.

15...
16 xe5!
17 xe5!

The tempting 17...xg2?! is worse in view of 18 xg1 (but not 18 xg2 xg2) 18...xf1 19 wc2±.

18 c7
19 e8!

Weaker is 18...wd8? 19 xb7±.

(see diagram)
immediate 20 \( \texttt{g5!} \) is not at all obvious. But from the logical point of view, since the possibility of the check will not run away, it should have been preserved, which subsequently would have expanded White’s resources.

20...\( \texttt{h8} \) 21 \( \texttt{g5!} \) (threatening 22 \( \texttt{h5} \) or 22 \( \texttt{f7+} \)) 21...\( \texttt{wxg5?} \)

Now Black’s position is strategically hopeless. It is probable that Schlechter rejected 21...\( \texttt{xh2+!} \) 22 \( \texttt{xh2 \texttt{xg5} \) because of 23 \( \texttt{xd7} \), but here he could have initiated great complications by playing 23...\( \texttt{e5!} \). Let us analyse Black’s resources after 24 \( \texttt{xb7} \) \( \texttt{xc1} \) 25 \( \texttt{xc1} \).

White gains the advantage after 25...\( \texttt{h6} \) 26 \( \texttt{g1} \) \( \texttt{c6?!} \) (as we will see later, 26...\( \texttt{g4!} \) is correct) 27 \( \texttt{b2} \) \( \texttt{xb7} \) (27...\( \texttt{f3+} \) 28 \( \texttt{xf3!} \) 28 \( \texttt{xe5} \)). Therefore let us check 25...\( \texttt{g4+} \) 26 \( \texttt{g1} \).

A) 26...\( \texttt{h6?!} \) 27 \( \texttt{b2} \) (if 27 \( \texttt{e1} \) there is both 27...\( \texttt{h2+} \) 28 \( \texttt{f1 \texttt{e5!}} \) – cf. the 26...\( \texttt{h4} \) variation, and 27...\( \texttt{f4!} \) 28 \( \texttt{b2} \) \( \texttt{xe3} \) 29 \( \texttt{g7+} \) \( \texttt{g7} \) 30 \( \texttt{xf2} \ cx2+ 31 \( \texttt{xf2} \) \( \texttt{xf2} \) or 28 \( \texttt{xf4} \) \( \texttt{h2+} \) 29 \( \texttt{f1} \) \( \texttt{h1+} \) 30 \( \texttt{e2} \) \( \texttt{hxg2=} \) 27...\( \texttt{wh2+} \) 28 \( \texttt{f1 \texttt{f6}} \) (or 28...\( \texttt{e5} \)) followed by 29...\( \texttt{wh1+} \) 30 \( \texttt{e2} \) \( \texttt{hxg2} \)).

B) 26...\( \texttt{wh4} \) 27 \( \texttt{e1} \) (27 \( \texttt{b2} \) \( \texttt{h2+} \) transposes into the previous variation) 27...\( \texttt{wh2+} \) (with the queen on \( \texttt{h4} \) it is no longer possible to play 27...\( \texttt{f4!} \) 28 \( \texttt{f2} \) – in view of the threat of mate) 28 \( \texttt{f1 \texttt{e5!} 29 \texttt{b2?!} \) (29 \( \texttt{c3} \) \( \texttt{d8} \) 30 \( \texttt{d5} \) \( \texttt{h1+} \) 31 \( \texttt{e2 \texttt{h5+}} \) with a draw) 29...\( \texttt{h1+} \) 30 \( \texttt{e2 \texttt{xe1+} 31 \texttt{xe1 \texttt{d3+} 32 \texttt{e2 \texttt{xb2} \) . Despite being a pawn down, White has a good endgame, but he has to reckon with 33...\( \texttt{c8} \). The outcome remains unclear.

Now let us see what would have happened if White had refrained from the bishop check (20 \( \texttt{g5!} \) \( \texttt{xe2+!} \) 21 \( \texttt{xe2} \) \( \texttt{xg5} \) 22 \( \texttt{d7} \) \( \texttt{e5!} \) 23 \( \texttt{xb7} \) \( \texttt{xc1} \) 24 \( \texttt{xc1} \) \( \texttt{g4+} \) 25 \( \texttt{g1} \)).

In the 26...\( \texttt{h6} \) variation there is a new resource: 27 \( \texttt{a2+!} \) \( \texttt{h8} \) 28 \( \texttt{xb2} \) \( \texttt{h2+} \) 28...\( \texttt{d8} \) 29 \( \texttt{d4} \) 29 \( \texttt{f1} \), and after 29...\( \texttt{d6} \), if there is nothing better, 30 \( \texttt{xf6} \) \( \texttt{xf6} \) 31 \( \texttt{c2} \) \( \texttt{h1+} \) 32 \( \texttt{e2 \texttt{g2} 33 \texttt{w6+} \). In reply to 26...\( \texttt{h4} \) the same arrangement of the forces is no longer possible (the queen has to defend the \( \texttt{f2} \)-square), but after 27 \( \texttt{e1} \) \( \texttt{h2+} \) 28 \( \texttt{f1} \) Black cannot choose 28...\( \texttt{e5} \) 29 \( \texttt{b2} \), and in the event of the exchange of queens the \( \texttt{d3} \)-square is under control. Things are also bad for him after 28...\( \texttt{h1+} \) 29 \( \texttt{e2} \) \( \texttt{g2} 30 \( \texttt{b2} \).

22 \( \texttt{xd6} \) 23 \( \texttt{h4} \) \( \texttt{g4} \) 23...\( \texttt{wh4} \) 24 \( \texttt{g7+!} \) 23...\( \texttt{e7 \texttt{e6!} \) 24 \( \texttt{xd6} \) \( \texttt{c6} \) (25 \( \texttt{xc6} \) was threatened) 25 \( \texttt{xd6} \) \( \texttt{d8} \) 25...\( \texttt{f4} \) 26 \( \texttt{e6} \) \( \texttt{g6} \) 27 \( \texttt{d7=} \) 26 \( \texttt{c7} \) \( \texttt{a8} \) 27 \( \texttt{b3} \) \( \texttt{f4} \) 28 \( \texttt{xc6} \) \( \texttt{f8} \) 29 \( \texttt{e7} \) Black resigns.


White’s rook cannot break into the opponent’s position, and his king is cut off from the queenside. Therefore 23 \( \texttt{e1} \) suggests itself. However, after 23...\( \texttt{xe1+} \) 24 \( \texttt{xe1} \) \( \texttt{c5} \) 25 \( \texttt{d2 \texttt{d4} \) (25...\( \texttt{d4} \) 26 \( \texttt{c2} \) also has to be reckoned with) Black, having placed his king in the centre, then plays...
...a7–a5, ...c6–c5 and at the appropriate moment ...c5–c4. With the opponent’s king being so active, it is doubtful whether White could win, and at any event this is a rather difficult task.

Vladimir Tukmakov found a strong intermediate move, enabling him subsequently to prevent the activation of the black king.

23 h3!

The plan suggested by Sofia Polgar also deserved consideration: 23 b4!? with the idea of a1, f3–e2, a6+ and b4–b5. If 23...e6 (intending 24...b5), then 24 c5.

23 ... e7

23...c5 24 g2 d4 (24...e5 25 f4; 24...d8 25 e2) 25 d5, and the advance of the pawns has merely weakened Black’s position.

24 e1! xe1+

24...b7 is more tenacious, but even then after 25 e2 c5(c7) 26 d2 (26 a1) 26...xb3 27 e7 White should win.

25 xe1 c5

26 d7!+

This is the whole point! By not allowing the king forward, White wins easily.

26...a5 27 d2 c6 28 e8 f6 29 h4 c5 30 f7 e5 31 e3 h6 32 f4+ d6 33 h5 c4 (otherwise the white king heads for the a-pawn) 34 bxc4 a4 35 d4 dxc4 36 c4 Black resigns.

IX


Black is intending to begin an attack by ...f7–f5, but first he must deny the opponent counterplay (b2–b4) on the opposite side of the board. Incorrect is 19...f5? 20 b4± or 19...c6? 20 d5 w.d8 21 b4±.

19 ... a5!

If 20 d5 there follows 20...xd5 21 cxd5 f5 22 d2 xd2+++. White should have chosen 20 d4! (preparing f1–e3), for example: 20...xd2 (20...f5 21 exf5) 21 xd2 f5 22 f4!? with equality. Lev Aronin did not play this, evidently not wishing to allow the exchange of the ‘bad’ bishop. But in the given instance this consideration is far less significant that the fact that now Black has the clear plan of an offensive on the kingside, whereas there is practically nothing that White can do.

20 b3? f5 21 b5 c6 22 d5 g7 23 b6 f7 24 a1 a8 25 a3 g5 26 e3 g4 27 h4 xe3! 28 fxe3 f4 29 f5 g5

22 d2 xd2++. White should have chosen 20 d4! (preparing f1–e3), for example: 20...xd2 (20...f5 21 exf5) 21 xd2 f5 22 f4!? with equality. Lev Aronin did not play this, evidently not wishing to allow the exchange of the ‘bad’ bishop. But in the given instance this consideration is far less significant that the fact that now Black has the clear plan of an offensive on the kingside, whereas there is practically nothing that White can do.

20 b3? f5 21 b5 c6 22 d5 g7 23 b6 f7 24 a1 a8 25 a3 g5 26 e3 g4 27 h4 xe3! 28 fxe3 f4 29 f5 g5

22 d2 xd2++. White should have chosen 20 d4! (preparing f1–e3), for example: 20...xd2 (20...f5 21 exf5) 21 xd2 f5 22 f4!? with equality. Lev Aronin did not play this, evidently not wishing to allow the exchange of the ‘bad’ bishop. But in the given instance this consideration is far less significant that the fact that now Black has the clear plan of an offensive on the kingside, whereas there is practically nothing that White can do.

20 b3? f5 21 b5 c6 22 d5 g7 23 b6 f7 24 a1 a8 25 a3 g5 26 e3 g4 27 h4 xe3! 28 fxe3 f4 29 f5 g5

If now 30 xd6, then 30...fxe3! 31 xf7 xf7 32 a1 d4 33 f1 f3+ 34 h1 e2+ (34...h4+), or 31 f5 d4 32 xc5 (32 xe3 xe3+!) 32...e2 (32...fx5) 33 xe5 xe3+! 34 xe3 f1+!

30 exf4 xf4 (threatening 31...f3) 31 f1 f3 32 g3 xf5! (32...d2 33 h4 d4? 34 xd6 was weaker, but 32...d4 33 xd4 34 f1+ 34 h1 d2! 35 g1 g1? would also have won) 33 xf5 d2

White resigned in view of 34 f2 d1+ 35 f1 f2+ 36 xf2 xf5+.


Black wants to initiate play in the centre:
8...e6 followed by ...exd5, ...e8 and ...
...e4. White also has to reckon with ...
b7–b5. To reduce the strength of either of these
plans, it is important to immediately drive the
knight back from f6.

8 h4!±

8...e6 (8...b5 9 g5!) 9 g5 hxg5 10 hxg5
e8? (10...h7) 11 w3 exd5 12...xd5
c6 13 wg3 xe6 14 wh4 f5 15 wh7+ ef7
16 xg6+!! (16 h6!) 16...xg6 17...h5+
...h7 18...f7+...h6 19 g6+...g7 20...h6+
Black resigns.

IX/3. Timoshchenko – Klovans (USSR
1979).

White intends...b1 followed by...xc5. If
Black is forced to take back on c5 with his
pawn, he will stand worse.

27...h6? 28...b1wb6 29...xc5 dxc5 30
...d3±.

27...wb6? 28...b1wc7 29...xb8 wxb8 30
...xc5 dxc5 31 wxa5± (31...d3±).

Jan Klovans found an accurate solution to
the problem facing him.

27...c8!  28...b1  wb6!=  29...d1...h6 30...e1 Draw.


If Black were to manage to play 19...d6 and
20...ec7, he would stand well.

19 c5?! is tempting, but then the opponent is
able to simplify the position, after which it is
hard for White to achieve anything real.
Here is a possible variation: 19...bxc5 20
bxc5 d5 21 cxd6...xc1 22...xc1...xd6 23
wxd6...xd6 24...c6...d7 25...a6...f8±.

Anatoly Karpov found an excellent bishop
manoeuvre, enabling him to restrict the
opponent's forces and to retain an appreci-
able advantage in the middlegame.

19...b7!  ec7

19...b8 20...c6.

20...a6!±

Now 20...d6 is unfavourable on account of
21...b5. Black constantly has to reckon with
the move...b5. But White's basic plan is to
play his queen to a4, followed by the
doubling of rooks on the d-file or...b5 and
a3–a4–a5.

20...c6 21 wb3 (21...b5...d6) 21...wb8 22
wa4 (threatening 23...xd7) 22...c7 23
wb5...f6 (23...d5 24...xd5...xc1 25...xc1
c7 26...d6!) 24 f3 d5 (24...xe8 25...d6) 25
c5 h5 26 a4 xe8 27 cxb6 axb6 28 a5...xc1
29...xc1...e5 (29...bxa5 30...xb8...xb8 31
bxa5++) 30...xb6 d4 31...h1...e3 32...f1
e5 33...d3 h4 34...xh4...f4 35...g1...xh4
36...a6...g6 37...a7...g7 38...xg6! Black resigns.

IX/5. Larsen – Spassky (Interzonal Tourn-
ament, Amsterdam 1964).

White's main threat is 56...d5. Bad is
55...b8? 56...d5...b3 57...xh4...d3 58
xe7...e3 59...g8+ (or 59...d1...e6 60
xd6++) 59...h7 60...f6+...h6 61...e7!...e6
62...d1 (A.O'Kelly).

That which happened in the game was no
better: 55...e4?! 56...xe4...xe4 57...xh4
...a8 (57...e8 58...g5...f6 59...f5 and 60
...g4++) 58 f5...a2 59...g8...f2 60...f8 Black
resigns.

It is harder to refute 55...e4?! 56...d5
...d2! (Bent Larsen considered only 56...d8?
57...xe7...xe3 58...g8+). In the variation 57
...g2...e4 58...xh4...f6!, by evicting the
enemy knight from d5, Black frees his rook
and gains a draw, for example: 59...b4...c8
60...g5...c3 61...xf5...xe3=. Even so, White
has a subtle way to win, pointed out by
Garry Kasparov: 57...g5!...f3 58...g2! (of
course, not 58...xf5??...g8, and it is Black
who wins) 58...h5 (58...e1 59...e2!) 59
...f2!...e1 60...e2...f3 (60...d3 is met by
the same reply) 61...g2! (unexpectedly
Black finds himself in zugzwang) 61...h6
62...f2!...e1 63...e2 (63...xh4) 63...d3
(63... \text{c}f3 64 \text{g}2) 64 \text{c}2! \text{h}5 65 \text{g}2 and 66 \text{g}5+.

55 . . . \text{d}8!!
In this way Black parries the dangerous attack by the white knight (56 \text{d}5 \text{c}8! 57 \text{e}4 \text{fxe}4 58 \text{g}5 \text{e}3! 59 \text{xe}3 \text{d}3 60 \text{e}5 \text{d}6 and at the same time prepares counterplay with 56...\text{c}4, which follows, for example, in reply to 56 \text{h}xh4.

56 \text{d}1 \text{g}7
By going to f6, the king wants to attack the e6-pawn.

57 \text{d}5
Or 57 \text{d}5 \text{c}8 58 \text{d}4 \text{h}8 59 \text{c}4 \text{d}8 60 \text{c}5 \text{d}6 61 \text{xe}7 \text{e}8 62 \text{c}6 \text{xe}7 63 \text{xd}6 \text{f}6 64 \text{hxh}4 \text{g}7! with a draw (Kasparov).

57 . . . \text{c}8=
57...\text{f}6 58 \text{e}5 \text{e}8! followed by ...\text{c}4 is also possible.

IX/6. Petrosian – Spassky (World Championship Match, 12th game, Moscow 1969).
Black's position is more promising; he is threatening to play his king to d6 followed by ...c6–c5. For example: 48 \text{h}3?! \text{h}6 49 \text{g}4 \text{h}4! 50 \text{f}2+ \text{e}7 51 \text{c}2 (51 \text{g}5 \text{a}8?; 51 \text{f}5+ \text{xf}5 52 \text{xf}5 \text{b}6?) 51...\text{b}6! (51...\text{d}6 52 \text{f}2) 52 \text{c}5 (52 \text{c}1 \text{d}6 53 \text{f}1 \text{c}5 54 \text{f}6+ \text{c}7) 52...\text{d}6 53 \text{xa}5 \text{c}5 54 \text{b}5+ \text{e}5.
Tigran Petrosian forestalls Black's plan with a clever pawn sacrifice.

48 \text{g}4!! \text{hxg}4
48...\text{gxg}4? 49 \text{xc}6; 48...h4?! 49 \text{h}3.

49 \text{g}3
The players agreed a draw, in view of 49...\text{f}6 50 \text{f}4 \text{b}6 (50...\text{e}7? 51 \text{e}5 is dangerous) 51 \text{c}5 \text{a}6=.

If White waits, Black will place his pawns on g5 and f4, and play his king to h4 and his knight to f5, after which White will end up in zugzwang. That is in fact how the game concluded.

41 \text{b}2? \text{g}5 42 \text{g}3 \text{f}4+ 43 \text{g}2 \text{h}4 44 \text{h}2 (44 \text{d}3 \text{xb}3--; 44...\text{g}5 45 \text{g}2 \text{h}5 46 \text{h}2 \text{c}6 47 \text{e}2 \text{e}7 48 \text{g}2 \text{f}5 49 \text{h}2 \text{h}4 50 \text{g}2 \text{e}3+ 51 \text{h}2 \text{c}2
Zugzwang (if 52 \text{g}2, then 52...\text{e}1+ wins). White resigns.

White also loses after 41 \text{g}3? \text{h}5! 42 \text{h}4 (otherwise 42...\text{g}5 and 43...\text{f}4+) 42...\text{d}8 43 \text{d}3 \text{hxh}4+ 44 \text{h}3 \text{xb}3 (not 44...\text{g}5 45 \text{c}5) 45 \text{f}4+ (45 \text{b}2 \text{g}5--+) 45...\text{h}6 46 \text{b}2 \text{e}1! 47 \text{xe}6 \text{c}3 48 \text{c}7! \text{xd}4! (48...\text{xb}2? 49 \text{e}6) 49 \text{e}6 \text{xe}6 50 \text{c}1+ (50 \text{xe}6 \text{xb}2++) 50...\text{g}5+ 51 \text{h}4?! \text{e}1 mate.
Black's plan must be prevented.

41 \text{h}4!=
'I was unable to find a realistic plan for strengthening my position after 41 \text{h}4.' (Petrosian)

41...\text{h}5 42 \text{h}3! (42 \text{g}3? \text{d}8) 42...\text{d}8 43 \text{d}3! \text{xb}3 44 \text{f}4+ \text{h}6 45 \text{b}2 \text{hxh}4 46 \text{xe}6 \text{e}1? 47 \text{c}7 \text{c}3 48 \text{e}6=–.

White is threatening to win a pawn by 42 \text{g}7+ \text{h}8 43 \text{hxh}7+ \text{hxh}7 44 \text{g}5+ and 45 \text{xc}6. But the threat of developing an attack on the kingside by 42 \text{h}5! is even more dangerous – and it was against this threat that Black should have defended in the first instance. The correct defensive plan involves a pawn sacrifice, with the aim of simplifying the position and safeguarding the king against attack.

41 . . . \text{b}3!
42 \text{g}7+ \text{h}8
43 \text{hxh}7+ \text{hxh}7
44 \text{g}5+ \text{h}6
45 \text{xc}6 \text{a}4!
In view of the minimal amount of material remaining on the board and the fact that the opponent's king is cut off on the back rank, Black has excellent drawing chances.

In the game Zoltan Ribli chose 41...\(\texttt{a8}?!\), retaining material equality, but subjecting himself after 42 h5± to a very dangerous attack. There is a direct mating threat: 43 \(\texttt{g7}+\ \texttt{h8}\) 44 \(\texttt{ff7}\) \(\texttt{xex6}\) 45 \(\texttt{hxh7}+\ \texttt{g8}\) 46 \(\texttt{fg7}+\ \texttt{f8}\) 47 h6. If 42...gxh5, then 43 f4!, intending 44 \(\texttt{g7}+\ \texttt{h8}\) 45 \(\texttt{h6}\).

102...f5!+-
The most clear-cut way to win. The threat is 103...\(\texttt{g7}+\). White has no useful moves.

X/1. Shmirin – Novikov (USSR 1982).

102 ... f5!+-
The most clear-cut way to win. The threat is 103...\(\texttt{g7}+\). White has no useful moves.

103 a5 \(\texttt{g7}+\) White resigns.

X/2. Yap – Pinter (Szirak 1985).

51 \(\texttt{d2}\) Creating the threat of 52 \(\texttt{f4}+\) followed by 53 \(\texttt{xd4}\). If 51...\(\texttt{e7}\), then 52 \(\texttt{xe5}\) is decisive.

51 ... \(\texttt{f6}\)
52 \(\texttt{f2}+\)
53 \(\texttt{f4}+\)

Now, after the rook has been switched to f2 with gain of tempo, this check is decisive.

53...\(\texttt{f7}\) 54 \(\texttt{e2}+\) Black resigns.


After 47 \(\texttt{e4}?!\) \(\texttt{f6}\) it is not good to play 48 \(\texttt{e5}\) ? a4! 49 \(\texttt{d3}\) \(\texttt{axb3}\) 50 \(\texttt{xb3}\) \(\texttt{b8}\) (50...\(\texttt{d8}+) 51 \(\texttt{c3}\) \(\texttt{b4}=-\).

The strongest plan is to play the king to g3 followed by \(\texttt{c3}–\texttt{e3}–\texttt{e5}+\).

47 \(\texttt{e2}!+-\)

47...\(\texttt{c7}\) 48 \(\texttt{f1}\) \(\texttt{d7}\) 49 \(\texttt{xc5}+\ \texttt{xf4}\) 50 \(\texttt{g2}\) \(\texttt{d2}\) 51 \(\texttt{xa5}\) \(\texttt{c2}\) 52 \(\texttt{a4}+\ \texttt{g5}\) 53 \(\texttt{c4}\) \(\texttt{xa2}\) 54 \(\texttt{g3}\) Black resigns.


45 h4!
It is essential to tie the black king to the kingside, by fixing one of the pawns there on
a dark square, where it can be attacked by the bishop. The incorrect 45 \( \texttt{f2?} \) throws away the win: 45...\( \texttt{g6!} \) 46 \( \texttt{b6} \) (46 \( \texttt{e2} \) \( \texttt{e6} \) 47 \( \texttt{d3} \) \( \texttt{d5=} \) 46...\( \texttt{e6} \) 47 \( \texttt{f8} \) h5 48 \( \texttt{gxh5} \) \( \texttt{gxh5} \) 49 \( \texttt{g2} \) \( \texttt{d7}! \) 50 \( \texttt{h3} \) \( \texttt{c4=} \) .

\[
\begin{align*}
45 & \ldots \texttt{g6} \\
46 & \texttt{h5!} \quad \texttt{gxh5} \\
47 & \texttt{gxh5}+--
\end{align*}
\]

The march of the king to the queenside is threatened. The black king cannot head there because of the weakness of the h6-pawn, and the attempt to win the h5-pawn leads to the loss of the e5-pawn.

\[
\begin{align*}
47 & \ldots \texttt{f6} \quad 48 \texttt{b6} \quad \texttt{b7} \quad 49 \texttt{f8} \quad \texttt{g5} \quad 50 \texttt{g7} \\
& \quad \texttt{hx5} \quad 51 \texttt{xe5} (\text{now the f4-pawn is vulnerable}) \quad 51 & \ldots \texttt{g5} \quad 52 & \texttt{f2} \quad (52 & \texttt{h3} \quad \texttt{a5} \quad 53 \quad \texttt{d6} \quad \texttt{b7} \quad 54 & \texttt{e7+} \quad \texttt{h5}) \quad 52 & \ldots \texttt{f5} \quad 53 & \texttt{g7} \quad \texttt{h5} \quad (53 & \ldots & \texttt{g5} \quad 54 & \texttt{e2}) \quad 54 & \texttt{g2}! \quad (\text{after advancing to h5, the pawn has become weaker, and it will soon be lost}) \quad 54 & \ldots \texttt{c5} \\
& 55 & \texttt{f8} \quad \texttt{b7} \quad 56 & \texttt{h3} \quad \texttt{g5} \quad 57 & \texttt{e7+} \quad 58 & \texttt{f5} \quad 58 & \texttt{h4} \quad \text{Black resigns.}
\end{align*}
\]

\[X/5. \quad \text{Botvinnik - Levenfish (8th match game, Moscow 1937).} \]

It is important for White to do something before the enemy king goes to e7.

\[
\begin{align*}
41 & \texttt{d7!} \quad \texttt{c7} \\
\text{Black loses after 41...f6?} \quad 42 & \texttt{hx7} \quad \text{or} \quad 41 & \ldots \texttt{c7}?! \quad 42 & \texttt{d8+} \quad \texttt{g7} \quad (42...\texttt{e8} \quad 43 \quad \texttt{d6}; \quad 42...\texttt{e7} \quad 43 \quad \texttt{d6}) \quad 43 & \texttt{c8}. \quad \text{Perhaps the most tenacious move was 41...h5?!, but after 42 \texttt{f2} \quad f6 \quad 43 \quad \texttt{f3!} \quad \text{all the same the advantage would have remained with White, for example: 43...\texttt{c5} \quad 44 \quad \texttt{d8} \texttt{fxe5} \quad 45 \quad \texttt{a8}.} \quad 42 \quad \texttt{d8} \quad \texttt{e7} \\
& 43 & \texttt{d6}! & \texttt{=} & \texttt{+}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{(see diagram)}
\]

This is the point of White's idea. The enemy rook is forced to take up a passive position at a7, since it is bad to play 43...\( \texttt{d7} \) 44 \( \texttt{xa6} \) \( \texttt{d4} \) 45 \( \texttt{b6} \) \( \texttt{c7} \) (45...c4 46 \( \texttt{a8} \) \( \texttt{c7} \) 47 \( \texttt{xc8} \) \( \texttt{a6} \) 48 \( \texttt{xc4=} \) 46 \( \texttt{a7} \) \( \texttt{d8} \) 47 \( \texttt{e6} \) 48 \( \texttt{xc7} \) \( \texttt{xc7} \) 49 \( \texttt{a7} \) \( \texttt{d8} \) 50 \( \texttt{a8} \) \( \texttt{xa8} \) 51 \( \texttt{xa8+} \) \( \texttt{b7} \) 52 \( \texttt{f2}+\). \]

\[
\begin{align*}
43 & \ldots \texttt{a7} \quad 44 & \texttt{c6} \quad \texttt{d7} \quad 45 & \texttt{b6}! \quad (45 \texttt{xe5?} \quad \texttt{c7}) \quad 45 & \ldots \texttt{e7} \quad 46 & \texttt{f2} \quad f6 \quad 47 & \texttt{e2} \quad \texttt{a8} \quad 48 \quad \texttt{c6} \quad \texttt{fxe5} \quad 49 \quad \texttt{xc5} \quad \texttt{d6} \quad 50 \quad \texttt{c7=} \quad \texttt{e6} \quad 51 \quad \texttt{xd6} \quad \texttt{xd6} \quad 52 \quad \texttt{xc7} \quad \texttt{xb8} \quad (52...\texttt{e6} \quad 53 \texttt{g4}) \quad 53 & \texttt{g7} \quad \texttt{b2}+ \quad 54 & \texttt{f1} \quad \texttt{e4} \quad 55 & \texttt{xe6} \quad 56 \quad \texttt{xa6} \quad \texttt{a2} \quad 57 & \texttt{e8} \quad 58 & \texttt{f1} \quad \texttt{a6} \quad 59 & \texttt{e2} \quad \texttt{a2}+ \quad 60 & \texttt{d1} \quad \texttt{xa3} \quad 61 & \texttt{a7} \quad 62 & \texttt{h4} \quad \texttt{d3} \quad 63 & \texttt{c2} \quad \texttt{d7} \quad 64 & \texttt{g4} \quad \texttt{c7}+ \quad 65 & \texttt{b3} \quad \texttt{d7} \quad 66 & \texttt{c3} \quad \texttt{c7}+ \quad 67 & \texttt{b4} \quad \texttt{d7} \quad 68 & \texttt{c5} \quad \text{Black resigns.}
\end{align*}
\]

\[X/6. \quad \text{Nimzowitsch – Stahlberg (4th match game, Gothenburg 1934).} \]

What position should White aim for?

25 \( \texttt{a3?} \) \( \texttt{xb2} \) 26 \( \texttt{xb5} \) \( \texttt{xa3} \) 27 \( \texttt{xb7} \) \( \texttt{d8=} \), and the endgame is drawn.

25 \( \texttt{xb5?!} \) \( \texttt{xa2} \) 26 \( \texttt{b3} \) (26 \( \texttt{xb7} \) \( \texttt{xb2=} \) 26...\( \texttt{h4}! \)), and Black gains counterplay.

25 \( \texttt{d7?!} \) \( \texttt{xa2} \) 26 \( \texttt{xb7} \) (26 \( \texttt{d5} \) \( \texttt{xb2=} \)) 26...\( \texttt{f8} \) 27 \( \texttt{d5} \) \( \texttt{xb2} \) 28 \( \texttt{xf7+} \) \( \texttt{e8=} \), and the outcome remains unclear.

Aaron Nimzowitsch found the strongest continuation.

\[
25 & \texttt{c5}!!
\]
Threatening 26 \( \text{d}5 \) followed by 27 \( \text{xb}5 \) or 27 \( \text{c}7 \). The a2-pawn is invulnerable on account of mate.

25 ... b4!

The best defence. Black loses after 25...\( \text{xb}2? \) 26 \( \text{xb}5 \) \( \text{xa}2 \) 27 \( \text{c}1 \) (or 27 \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{a}1+ \) 28 \( \text{g}2 \) and 29 \( \text{xb}7 \)). The game continuation was also unsuccessful: 25...\( \text{f}5+? \) 26 \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{b}4 \) 27 \( \text{c}7 \) \( \text{xb}2 \) 28 \( \text{xf}7+ \) \( \text{e}8 \) 29 \( \text{xb}7 \) \( \text{c}3 \) 30 \( \text{g}7 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 31 \( \text{xa}8 \) Black resigns.

25...b6!? comes into consideration, but after 26 \( \text{c}6! \) (more accurate than 26 \( \text{c}7 \) \( \text{e}8 \)) 26...\( \text{b}8 \) 27 \( \text{b}4 \) Black's position is difficult.

\begin{align*}
26 & \text{d}5 & \text{xb}2 \\
27 & \text{c}7 & \text{f}8 \\
28 & \text{xb}7 & \text{c}3+
\end{align*}

White has extracted the maximum possible from the position and gained a big advantage. However, he is not yet guaranteed a win. If 29 f4 Black should reply 29...g5!, retaining hopes of saving the game.

\[ \text{X/7. Faibisovich - Frolov (Leningrad 1986).} \]

In this position White apparently does not have a win, for example: 6 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{f}5+ \) 7 \( \text{d}7 \) \( \text{d}4! \) (but not 7...\( \text{g}7 \) 8 \( \text{e}5+ \) \( \text{f}8 \) 9 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{h}5 \) 10 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{f}7 \) 11 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 12 \( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 13 \( \text{g}6 \), and Black is in zugzwang) 8 \( \text{e}5+ \) (8 \( \text{c}5 \) ? \( \text{e}2 \) ! 9 \( \text{xe}6 \) \( \text{g}6 \) and 10...\( \text{xf}4= \) 8...\( \text{g}7 \) 9 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{e}2 \) 10 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{f}7 \) 11 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{g}1= \).

\begin{align*}
1 & \text{e}4+! & \text{d}5 \\
1 & \text{e}7 & 2 \text{c}2 \text{f}7 3 \text{f}6+\ldots \\
2 & \text{c}3+ & \text{d}6 \\
2 & \text{c}5 & 3 \text{a}4+ \text{d}6 4 \text{xb}2 \text{e}7 5 \text{c}4! \ (5 \text{e}4!? \text{f}7 6 \text{e}5 \text{e}7 7 \text{d}3+- \ldots) 5 \text{f}7 6 \text{e}5+ \text{g}7 7 \text{c}6+\ldots.
\end{align*}

The game concluded: 5...\( \text{g}7 \) (5...\( \text{e}7 \) 6 \( \text{g}8 \)\(+ \)) 6 \( \text{g}8 \) \( \text{g}8 \) 7 \( \text{xb}2 \) \( \text{f}7 \) 8 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 9 \( \text{c}4 \) (9 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 10 \( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{g}6 \) is also good) 9...\( \text{f}5 \) 10 \( \text{d}4 \) (zugzwang) 10...\( \text{xf}4 \) 11 \( \text{g}6 \) Black resigns.

\[ \text{X/8. Uhlmann - Adorjan (Sarajevo 1982).} \]

It is not easy for Black to convert his piece advantage.

38...\( \text{h}5?? \) 39 \( \text{g}7+! \) \( \text{g}7 \) 40 \( \text{xf}8 \) mate. 38...\( \text{h}6!!? \) 39 \( \text{g}3 \).

38...\( \text{b}5+?? \) 39 \( \text{g}1 \) \( \text{b}4 \) (39...\( \text{xf}2 \) with the threats of 41 \( \text{g}7+! \) and 41 \( \text{xf}5! \)) 40 \( \text{hx}6 \) (40 \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{h}5 \) 41 \( \text{g}5! \) (but not 41 \( \text{f}6 \) \( \text{g}8 \) 42 \( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{a}1+ \) 43 \( \text{h}2 \) \( \text{e}5+ \) 41...\( \text{e}7 \) 42 \( \text{xf}5 \) was threatened) 42 \( \text{xe}7 \) \( \text{xf}2 \) 43 \( \text{h}2 \) \( \text{h}4+ \) 44 \( \text{g}1= \) Or 40...\( \text{e}1 \) 41 \( \text{h}2 \) \( \text{d}2 \) (41...\( \text{xf}2 \) 42 \( \text{g}7+! \) \( \text{g}7 \) 43 \( \text{h}5+ \) \( \text{g}8 \) 44 \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{h}6 \) 45 \( \text{f}3+ \) \( \text{f}1 \) 46 \( \text{xf}6 \)-; 41...\( \text{e}4 \) 42 \( \text{g}1!?) 42 \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{b}6+ \) 43 \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 44 \( \text{g}7+ \) \( \text{g}7 \) 44...\( \text{xe}8 \) 49 \( \text{xe}8 \) \( \text{xb}2 \) 50 \( \text{a}8 \) \( \text{b}4 \) 51 \( \text{a}6= \). 38...\( \text{f}7?? \) 39 \( \text{b}6! \) (49 \( \text{c}4 \) is weaker in
view of 49...\texttt{Wd8}! 50 \texttt{Wd3} \texttt{Ad7}--+, or 50 \texttt{Ad3} \texttt{Qe3}+! 51 \texttt{Qe2} \texttt{Af2}+ 52 \texttt{Qxe3} \texttt{Wg5}+!
39...\texttt{Wf8}?! (39...gxg2?! 40 \texttt{e6} \texttt{Qxh6} 41 \texttt{Qxf7} \texttt{Qxf7} 42 \texttt{Wd4}+) 40 \texttt{e6} \texttt{f6} 41 \texttt{Wc7} \texttt{Wxh6} 42 fxg3\texttt{xf3}.
In the game there followed 38...\texttt{Wg6}? 39 \texttt{Axg5}! \texttt{Axg5} 40 \texttt{Wc8}+ \texttt{Wg8} 41 \texttt{Wxg5} \texttt{Wc4}+ 42 \texttt{Qe1} \texttt{Wc1}+ 43 \texttt{Qe2} \texttt{Wxb2}+ 44 \texttt{Qd1}! (44 \texttt{Qe3}? \texttt{Wxf2}+) 44...\texttt{Wd4}+ 45 \texttt{Qc1}! Draw.
Only one continuation leads to a convincing win.

38 ... gxf2!!
Now Black wants to take the h6-pawn with his knight. 39 \texttt{Wxg5} is not possible in view of 39...\texttt{Wb5}+ 40 \texttt{Qxf2} \texttt{Wxf5}. 39 \texttt{Wc5} \texttt{Wd8} is also hopeless.

39 e6!? \texttt{Wb5}+!
But, of course, not 39...\texttt{Qxh6}?? 40 \texttt{Wxe5}+ (or 40 \texttt{Wxf8}+ \texttt{Wxf8} 41 \texttt{e7}), and not 39...\texttt{Wxe6}?
40 \texttt{Wg7}+! \texttt{Qxg7} 41 \texttt{Wxf8}+ \texttt{Wg8} 42 \texttt{hxg7}+ \texttt{Qxg7} 43 \texttt{Qxg8}+ \texttt{Wxg8} 44 \texttt{Qxf2}+.

40 \texttt{Qxf2} \texttt{Wxb2}+
41 \texttt{Qg1}
41 \texttt{Qe1} \texttt{Wa1}+ 42 \texttt{Qf2} \texttt{Wd4}+ (not 42...\texttt{Wxa2}+ 43 \texttt{Qg1} \texttt{Wxe6} 44 \texttt{Wc3}+).

41 ... \texttt{Wd4}+
42 \texttt{Qh2}
42 \texttt{Qf1} \texttt{Wd1}+ 43 \texttt{Qf2} \texttt{Wd2}+ 44 \texttt{Qg1} \texttt{Wc1}+.

42 ... \texttt{Wd4}+
43 \texttt{Qg1}
44 \texttt{Qh2} \texttt{Wxe6}--

\textbf{XI}


25 ... b4!++
The inclusion of the black bishop via b5 decisively strengthens the attack. For example, 26 \texttt{Wxe3} \texttt{Ab5}-- or 26 \texttt{Wxd6} \texttt{Wg2}+ 27 \texttt{Qe3} (27 \texttt{Qe1} \texttt{Ab5}) 27...\texttt{Wxd6}--.

26 a4 bxa3 27 b3! \texttt{Qe7} 28 c4 \texttt{dxc4} 29 \texttt{bxc4} \texttt{Ab6}! 30 \texttt{Qa2} \texttt{Wf5}! 31 \texttt{Wxf5} \texttt{Qxf5} 32 \texttt{c5} \texttt{Qb2}+ 33 \texttt{Qxb2} axb2 34 \texttt{Qd2} a5 35 \texttt{c6} \texttt{Qb4} White resigns.


13 \texttt{Qg5}! \texttt{h6}
14 \texttt{Qh4}!
Threatening 15 e5. Black loses after 14...g5 15 \texttt{Qxg5} hxg5 16 \texttt{Qxg5}.

14 ... \texttt{Wf8}
15 \texttt{Qxf6}±
14...gxg6 16 \texttt{Qd2} \texttt{Qh7} 17 \texttt{Qf1} b5 (17...\texttt{Qa6} was better) 18 \texttt{Wf3}! f5 19 \texttt{Wf4} \texttt{Qb3} 20 \texttt{Qxb3} cxb3 21 \texttt{d3} fxe4 22 \texttt{Qxe4}+ \texttt{Qxe4} 23 \texttt{Qxe4} \texttt{Qe7} 24 \texttt{Qd5} \texttt{Qg8} 25 \texttt{Qc5} c6 26 \texttt{Qxb3} \texttt{Qac8} 27 \texttt{Qe4}+ \texttt{Qg6} 28 \texttt{Qxc6} \texttt{Qxc6}, and Black resigned.

\textbf{XI/3. Ragozin – Noskov} (Moscow 1930).

12 e5!
Sacrificing a pawn, White opens diagonals for his bishops and gains a very strong attack.

12 ... \texttt{dxe5}
13 \texttt{Qe4}!
13 fxe5? \texttt{Qxe5} 14 \texttt{Qxe5} \texttt{Qxe5} 15 \texttt{Qxh7}+? \texttt{Qxh7} 16 \texttt{Wh5}+ \texttt{Qg8} 17 \texttt{Qxe5} \texttt{Wxd2}+.

13 ... \texttt{Qxe4}+
14 \texttt{Qxf6}+ \texttt{Qxf6}
15 \texttt{Qxf4}+--
Black has no satisfactory defence, for example:

15...\texttt{Wb6}+ 16 \texttt{Qd4} c5 17 \texttt{Qxf6} gxf6 18 \texttt{Qxh7}+.
15...\texttt{Qd5} 16 \texttt{Qxh7}+! \texttt{Qxh7} 17 \texttt{Wh5}+ \texttt{Qg8} 18 \texttt{Qxg7}! f5 (18...\texttt{Qxg7} 19 \texttt{Qg4}+) 19 \texttt{Qg4}!.
15...\texttt{Wd5} 16 \texttt{Qxf6}! gxf6 17 \texttt{Qxf6} e5 18 \texttt{Qxh7}+!
15...e5?! 16 \texttt{Qxe5} \texttt{Qd5} 17 \texttt{Wh5} h6 18 \texttt{Qf3}--.
15...\texttt{Qe8} 16 \texttt{Qxf6}! gxf6 17 \texttt{Qg4}+ \texttt{Qf8} (17...\texttt{Qh8} 18 \texttt{Qh4}) 18 \texttt{Qa3}+ \texttt{Qe7} 19 \texttt{Qxh7} \texttt{Wb6}+ 20 \texttt{Qh1} \texttt{Qe8} 21 \texttt{Qd1} Black resigns.

27 ...  
28  
29  
30  

If 30 , then 30... is unconvincing in view of 31 ! followed by 32 . 30... is stronger, and Black has too many threats (31 ... ; 31 ... ; 31 ... f6).

30 ... 

The queen goes to g5 or h4. There was also another unexpected way to the goal: 30...! with the irresistible threat of 31 ... c2 (the exchange of rooks on c1 does not work on account of the knight fork at d3).

31  

By sacrificing the knight, Black has developed a decisive attack. If 32 , then 32... wins, while if 32 -- 32... .

32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  

White must open up the play on the queenside, where the king is intending to hide.

21 b4!!

Now Black could have tried 21... , on which there follows either 22 bxc5+ c6 23 d4, and his position remains dangerous, or 22 ? c3? (22...d8 is better) 23 d7+ e5 24 dc3!+.

In the game there followed: 21...c7 22 a1 c8 (22...e8?).

23  
24  25 26 27 28 29 30 31  


The obvious 21 xf6? xf6 22 xf6+ allows the black king to escape from the pursuit: 22...c7 23 e6 (23 f7+ e7) 23...d5 24 f1 d8! 25 f7+ d7+.

White must open up the play on the queenside, where the king is intending to hide.

21 b4!!

Now Black could have tried 21...d5?!, on which there follows either 22 bxc5+ c6 23 d4, and his position remains dangerous, or 22 ? c3? (22...d8 is better) 23 d7+ e5 24 dc3!+.

In the game there followed: 21...c7 22 a1 c8 (22...e8?).

23  
24  25 26 27 28 29 30 31  

XI/6. Rizzitano – Miles (USA 1980).

Black’s exchange advantage does not play any role. The most important thing is to be ahead of the opponent, and be the first to begin an attack on the king.

White is intending 26 g3 or 26 xa6. If 25...h5?! there follows 26 xa6.

25 ...  

What else could White have done? It is useless to play 26 a5 b5, or 26 xe6 g6 followed by ...h6. If 26 xa6 Black wins by 26...xg2!! 27 xe2 g8+ 28 h3 f14 (or 28...g7) 29 h5 g1.

26 ...  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  

28 g2 hxg3 29 fxg3 c6+ 30 f3 h2+.

28 ...  
29 fxg3  
30  
31  

28...hxg3

Black resigns.
Black wins back the sacrificed material, retaining a decisive attack.

32 \( \text{xf1} \) \( \text{Wxd3} + \) 33 \( \text{xf2} \) \( \text{Wd2} + \) 34 \( \text{xf1} \) \( \text{Wf4} + \)
35 \( \text{xe1} \) \( \text{Wc7} \) 36 \( \text{Ac1} \) \( \text{Ah2} \) White resigns.

**XIV. Norwood – Mestel** (British Championship, Blackpool 1988).
The most energetic way of conducting the attack is a bold piece sacrifice.

9 \( \text{h5!} \) \( \text{g5} \)
10 \( \text{xe5!} \) \( \text{hxg5} \)
11 \( \text{h6} \) \( \text{Ah8} \)

Black would perhaps have done better to return the piece immediately, by playing 11...\( \text{Ah6}! \)? 12 \( \text{Ah6} \) \( \text{Ah7} \). But after 13 \( \text{Ah3}! \)
(13 \( \text{Ah1} \) \( \text{Ah8} \) 14 \( \text{Ad2} + \)) 13...\( \text{Ah8} \) 14 \( \text{Ag3}!? \) or 14 \( \text{Ad2} + \)? his position still remains unpleasant in view of the weakness of the
g5-pawn.

12 \( \text{h7} + \) \( \text{Ah7} \)

After 12...\( \text{Ah7} \) the simplest way to win is 13 \( \text{Ad6}! \) (preparing 14 \( \text{Wf5} \)). Also possible is
13 \( \text{Ah7}! \) \( \text{Ah7} \) (13...\( \text{Ad5} \) 14 \( \text{Ad3}! \) \( \text{Ah7} \) 15 
\( \text{Wf5} \) 15 \( \text{Wg6} \) \( \text{Ah7} \) 17 \( \text{Ah5} \) with the
decisive threats of 18 \( \text{Ah8} + \) and 18 \( \text{Ad6} \) 14 
\( \text{Ad3} + \) 15 (14...\( \text{Ah6} \) 15 \( \text{Ah6} \) \( \text{Ah5} \) 16 \( \text{Wf1} + \)) 
15 \( \text{Wf5} + \) \( \text{Ah8} \) 16 \( \text{Wg6} + \) \( \text{Ah7} \) 17 \( \text{Wf6} + \).

The position is exceptionally tense, and it is not easy for White to maintain his attack.

21 \( \text{xf7} \)? \( \text{Wd5} -- \).
21 \( \text{dxc5} \) \( \text{Wxc5} + \) 22 \( \text{Ah1} \) \( \text{Adxe1} \) 23 \( \text{Adxe1} \) \( \text{Wf2} \)
24 \( \text{Ah1} \) \( \text{Ah8} -- \).
21 \( \text{Ah2} + ? \) \( \text{Ad5} \) 22 \( \text{xf7} \) \( \text{xf7} \) 23 \( \text{xf7} + \)
\( \text{xf7} \) 24 \( \text{Wc4} + \) \( \text{Ah6} -- \).
21 e5!!
Threatening 22 a2, for example: 21...fxe5 22 a2±. Bad is 21...d5 there follows 22 e5 22...g6 23 g5±.

21 ... g6
This defence was recommended by Mikhail Botvinnik, with the variation 22 xf7 xd4+ 23 xd4 cxd4 23 a2±. Bad is 23...e5 22 fxe5±, while if 21...d5 there follows 22 e5 (22 fxe5 22...g6 23 g6±.

21 ... g6

22 a2!
Black loses immediately after 22...fxe5 23 a2±. Bad is 22 e5 22...g6 23 e5 22...g6 23 fxe5 22...g6 23...g6 23...g6 23...g6 23...g6 23...g6 23...g6 23...g6 23...g6 23...g6 23...g6 23...g6.

22 ... e5
This defence was recommended by Mikhail Botvinnik, with the variation 22 xf7 xd4+ 23 xd4 cxd4 24 a2! xe5 25 fxe5 a6! 26 h6! 27 d6+ h7 28 e8 e8 29 e6 d3=. In fact, 24 a2 deserves not an exclamation mark, but a question mark: White can gain a decisive advantage by 24 xe5! (24 xe5 24...h7 25 h6! 26...e5 27 d1 is also good) 24...h6 25 d6 e5 26 fxe5 a6 27 d1 d3 28 b4.

White can play even more energetically.

22 a2!
Now 24 f5 xe4 is pointless. There followed 24 g1 f4! (24...e7!?) 25 xd6 c8 (25...h4! is more energetic, and if 26 fxe5, then 26...e5 and 27...gxh3++) 26 xf4 (26...h6!?) 26...exf4 27 f1 hxg4 28 xf4 f5 29 xb4 f6 30 d6 g3 31 hxg4 e3 32 h1 g7! 33 f3 fxg4 34 x54 x54 White resigns.

XII/2. Short – Bagirov (Baku 1983).

48 ... a7!!
The only way of parrying the threat of 49 g7+. 49 g7+ (49 d6 b4) 49...e6 50 g8+ (50 h4 f7 or 50...xd4) 50...f7 51 c8+ d7 52 g8+ f7 53 a8 c7, and the game ended in a draw.
PART VIII


Black intends 36...\textit{e}6 followed by 37...\textit{w}g7 or 37...\textit{h}3. In the game there followed 36 \textit{w}d3? \textit{e}6 37 \textit{f}5 \textit{g}7! 38 \textit{g}4 \textit{x}g4 39 \textit{fxg4} \textit{w}xg4 40 \textit{we}4 \textit{f}2+-.

36 \textit{w}xb5! \textit{e}8

If 36...\textit{e}6 there is 37 \textit{w}b6!? \textit{h}3 38 \textit{g}1, but 37 \textit{xf}4! is even stronger.

37 \textit{w}b6 \textit{g}7

38 \textit{g}1±


White is threatening to play 20 \textit{h}3 \textit{h}6 21 \textit{x}h6. It was along these lines that events in the game developed:

19...\textit{f}c8? 20 \textit{w}h3 \textit{h}6
21 \textit{xf}xh6 \textit{we}5 (21...\textit{g}xh6 22 \textit{x}g6±
22 \textit{g}5! (but not 22 \textit{g}x6? \textit{w}xh5 23 \textit{xf}h5 \textit{g}xh5). Black resigns, since he is unable to defend against 23 \textit{h}7+ \textit{f}8 24 \textit{h}8+!.

The best defence involves a counter-sacrifice of the queen.

19 ... \textit{f}c6!
20 \textit{e}4 \textit{xe}4!
21 \textit{xe}4 \textit{xe}4

Black retains a defensible position.


Black’s king is in terrible danger. He loses after 16...\textit{e}7? 17 \textit{w}g4+ \textit{h}8 18 \textit{xf}6+ \textit{xf}6 19 \textit{w}e4, or 16...\textit{f}4? 17 \textit{g}3 \textit{wh}6 18 \textit{w}g4+ \textit{h}8 19 \textit{we}4 with the threats of 20 \textit{xf}6+ and 20 \textit{xa}8.

16 ... \textit{g}8!!

Now after 17 \textit{w}g4+ \textit{f}8 White’s queen is en prise. He also achieves nothing with 17 \textit{w}f3 \textit{e}7 18 \textit{w}g3+ \textit{fg}3 19 \textit{fxg}3 \textit{h}5! 20 \textit{f}4 \textit{h}8 21 \textit{af}1 \textit{h}6, while 18 \textit{xa}8 loses by force:

18...\textit{b}7 19 \textit{xe}6+ \textit{xe}6 20 \textit{w}a7 \textit{h}8! 21 \textit{e}4 (21 \textit{g}3 \textit{we}6 22 \textit{f}3 \textit{d}7--+) 21...\textit{xe}4!

22 \textit{xc}7 \textit{gg}2+ 23 \textit{h}1 \textit{xf}2+ 24 \textit{g}1 \textit{g}2+ 25 \textit{h}1 \textit{g}3+ with mate.

17 \textit{e}4 \textit{a}7 18 \textit{wh}5 \textit{h}6 19 \textit{ad}1 \textit{e}7

(19...\textit{b}7? 20 \textit{xb}7 \textit{bx}7 21 \textit{dd}3) 20 \textit{f}e5 \textit{b}7 21 \textit{dd}4?

The attack also gets bogged down in the variation 21 \textit{xb}7 \textit{xb}7 (threatening 22...\textit{ww}g2+!) 22 \textit{f}3 \textit{c}8 23 \textit{d}4 \textit{h}7 24 \textit{xf}7+ \textit{g}7. White should have tried 21 \textit{f}3!?, considering that 21...\textit{xe}4 22 \textit{fxe}4 \textit{wc}2 enables him to regain the sacrificed material after 23 \textit{wc}1!

21...\textit{xe}4 22 \textit{xe}4 \textit{wc}2! 23 \textit{gg}4+ (23 \textit{f}4 \textit{w}g6 24 \textit{g}4 \textit{h}7) 23...\textit{f}8 24 \textit{xc}h6+ \textit{e}8
25 \textit{gg}8+ \textit{xc}8 26 \textit{wh}8 \textit{gg}6 27 \textit{ec}1 (27 \textit{g}g7 \textit{f}8!) 27...\textit{f}6, and Black won.


White is threatening not only the capture of the knight, but also 24 \textit{d}5! In the game Black underestimated the latter threat and he quickly lost:

23...\textit{xe}5? 24 \textit{d}5! \textit{ef}5 25 \textit{gg}8+ \textit{e}7 26 \textit{xc}e5+ \textit{f}6 27 \textit{xf}5+ \textit{e}6
28 \textit{ee}1+ \textit{d}7 29 \textit{xe}8 Black resigns.

The correct plan of defence involves the immediate flight of the king away from the danger zone.

23 ... \textit{e}7!!
24 \textit{d}5+ \textit{exf}5
25 \textit{c}6+ \textit{d}7
26 \textit{xd}8

\hspace{1cm} 26 ... \textit{g}6!!

This is the whole point – the white queen is
unexpectedly trapped.

27 \( \text{W}xg8 \)

White loses after 27 \( \text{Exe8? } \text{A}h8 \) 28 \( \text{Xg8} \) cxb2!.

27 ... \( \text{A}xg8 \)

28 \( \text{Exg8} \) c2!?

28...\( \text{Xxd8} \) 29 bxc3 \( \text{A}d5! \) also comes into consideration, with an unusual position that is hard to evaluate.

29 \( \text{Q}xb7 \) cxd1 \( \text{W} \)
30 \( \text{A}xd1 \) \( \text{c6}!\) ?=

30...\( \text{Xxb7} \) 31 \( \text{Xf7}^+ \) is unfavourable for Black, but 30...\( \text{Ee7} \) is also possible: 31 \( \text{Ee1+} \) (31 \( \text{Xf7} \) \( \text{Xf7} \) 32 \( \text{Q}d6+ \) \( \text{Ee7} \) 33 \( \text{Q}b5 \) \( \text{Ec2} \) 31...\( \text{E}f8 \) 32 \( \text{Q}d6 \) \( \text{Cc6}! \).

XII/7. Tal – Olafsson (Bled 1961).

Black's position looks dangerous, but with accurate play he can parry the opponent’s attack.

20 ... \( \text{W}d8!! \)
21 \( \text{exd6}+ \)

21 \( \text{Kh6?} \) dxe5 22 \( \text{Xxe5+} \) \( \text{f6} \) 23 \( \text{Ee3} \) does not work – Black does not reply 23...\( \text{Xxe5?} \) 24 \( \text{Xh3} \) –, but 23...\( \text{Xg8}! \) or 23...\( \text{Xg2}! \).

It looks tempting to play 21 \( \text{e6+} \) \( \text{f6} \) 22 \( \text{Wh4?!} \) (22 \( \text{e7?} \) \( \text{Xxd4+} \) 23 \( \text{Kh1} \) \( \text{Wc7} \) or 23...\( \text{Wb6} \) 22...\( \text{fxe6} \) (23 \( \text{e7} \) was threatened) 23 \( \text{Xxe6} \). It appears that the variations are in favour of White: 23...\( \text{g7?} \) 24 \( \text{Xg7+} \) \( \text{Xg7} \) 25 \( \text{Ee7}+ \) 23...\( \text{g7?} \) 24 \( \text{Xxf6} \) \( \text{Xxf6} \) 25 \( \text{e4}!\) –, or 23...\( \text{Xxd4+?!} \) 24 \( \text{Wxd4+} \) \( \text{A}g8 \) 25 \( \text{Xxd6} \) \( \text{gx}f5! \) 26 \( \text{Xxd8} \). However, there is the brilliant reply 23...\( \text{e5}!! \), eliminating the danger (for example, 24 \( \text{Xxe5?!} \) \( \text{Wxh4} \) 25 \( \text{Ee4+} \) \( \text{Wf6} \)).

21 ... \( \text{xf6} \)
22 \( \text{Wh4} \)

(see diagram)

22 ... \( \text{Ag7}! \)

The soundest continuation. After 22...\( \text{Ag7}? \) Mikhail Tal had foreseen the spectacular stroke 23 \( \text{Ad7}!! \), enabling him to create decisive threats to the opponent's king: 23...\( \text{Xxd7} \) 24 \( \text{Q}d5 \) \( \text{Xxd4+} \) 25 \( \text{W}xh8 \) \( \text{A}h6 \) (25...\( \text{f6} \) 26 \( \text{Ee7+} \) \( \text{g8} \) 27 \( \text{Wh4}+ \) +) 26 \( \text{Exe4} \) \( \text{g5}?! \) (26...\( \text{f6} \) 27 \( \text{Ee7}+ \) 27 \( \text{h4}! \) (but not 27 \( \text{Ee7} \) \( \text{Ag8} \) 28 \( \text{W}f6?? \) \( \text{Ag6} \) 29 \( \text{Wxh7} \) \( \text{Wh8}+ \) +) 27...\( \text{Ag8} \) (27...\( \text{f6} \) 28 \( \text{Ee7}+ \) – followed by 29 \( \text{xg5} \) ) 28 \( \text{hxg5}+ \) \( \text{Exg5} \) 29 \( \text{Eh4}+ \) \( \text{Hh5} \) 30 \( \text{Exh5}+ \) \( \text{Xh5} \) 31 \( \text{Ag7}!\) +.

After 22...\( \text{Xxd4+}?! \) 23 \( \text{W}xh4 \) \( \text{Ag8} \) 24 \( \text{A}e4 \) \( \text{Ee8} \) 25 \( \text{Q}d1 \) White has more than sufficient compensation for the exchange. However, instead of 23...\( \text{Ag8} \) Black can try 23...\( \text{f6} \). In the fascinating complications that follow it would appear that White does not have more than a draw:

24 \( \text{Ae4} \) \( \text{Cc8} \) 25 \( \text{Xxc6} \) \( \text{Xxc6} \) 26 \( \text{Ee6} \) \( \text{Wb6} \) 27 \( \text{Wxb6} \) \( \text{Wxb6} \) 28 \( \text{Wd5} \) \( \text{Cc6} \) 29 \( \text{Q}d4 \) \( \text{b6} \); 24 \( \text{Ee7} \) \( \text{gx}f5 \) 25 \( \text{W}h4 \) \( \text{Wb6}+ \) 26 \( \text{Q}f1 \) \( \text{Xg2}!! \)
27 \( \text{Qe2} \) \( \text{f7}!! \) 28 \( \text{Wxf7} \) \( \text{Ee8} \) 29 \( \text{Ee7} \) \( \text{Xe7}+ \) 30 \( \text{dx}e7 \) \( \text{W}e6+ \) 31 \( \text{Qf2} \) \( \text{Cc6}+ \); 24 \( \text{Xg6}?! \) \( \text{hxg6} \) (24...\( \text{Ag8} \) 25 \( \text{Ee4} \)) 25 \( \text{Ee7} \) \( \text{Ag8} \) 26 \( \text{Q}e4! \) \( \text{f7}!! \) 27 \( \text{Wxf6+} \) \( \text{f8} \) 28 \( \text{Ee6} \) (28 \( \text{Q}d7+ \) \( \text{Ag8} \) 29 \( \text{Xxf7} \) \( \text{Xxf7} \) 30 \( \text{Q}e5+ \) \( \text{Ag6} \) 31 \( \text{Xc6} \) \( \text{Ax}d6 \) ) 28...\( \text{b7}! \) (intending 29...\( \text{Wb6} \); bad is 28...\( \text{Ag7} \) 29 \( \text{d7}+\) –) 29 \( \text{Q}d7+ \) 28...\( \text{Xd7}!! \) (29...\( \text{Xe}d7 \) 30 \( \text{Xg6}+ \) ) 30 \( \text{Wf6}+ \) (30 \( \text{W}h8+ \) \( \text{f7} \) 31 \( \text{Ee7} \) \( \text{W}e7 \) 32
PART VIII

23... hxg7+
23... hxg7
23... hxg7+
23... hxg7...

The position after 24... hxg7 25... e4 xe8 26... d1 has already been mentioned in the notes to Black’s 22nd move – we evaluated it in favour of White.

25... e7+
26... f7+
27... e4
28... xe4

All the remaining ways of defending (apart from 20... dh8!!) lead to difficulties for Black.

The game went 20... g8? 21... e6 (threatening 22... h6) 21... g5 (21... f6 22... hxg6 hxg6 23... h6... 24... c4 25... h3... d4+ 26... h1) 22... exf7+! (stronger than 23... e7+!... 24... e7 24... h6 f6 25... hxg6... d8, or 25... e6+... h8 26... d5... b7?) 22... hxg7 23... hxg6... g7 (23... d7 24... f1 or 24... e6 with the threat of 25... dxh7+) 24... e6+... h8 25... e8! h6 26... xc6... xc6 27... e4

White has an undisputed advantage (27... g6! was probably even more energetic).

There followed 27... e8 28... g6 (28... f7+!... e5 29... f8+ 28... f7 29... h4 (29... dxg5?... xe1+ 30... f2 is refuted in two ways: 30... e2+! 31... xe2... g2+ with a draw, or 30... e5+! 31... xe5... c5+) 29... d5 (29... f4+! 30... f6!... xc2 31... f8+... h7 32... hx7+) 30... dxg7+... xg7 31... xd6... xd6 32... dx6... xh4 33... e8+... g8 34... f7+... g7 35... e8+... g8 36... xh6+... h7 37... f5... g5 38... b3 Black resigns.


White’s attack is rather dangerous. He is threatening g4–g5, opening lines on the kingside. 18... h5? 19... hxh5 is bad for Black. As usual, the correct reaction to a flank attack is a counterblow in the centre.

18... b4!
18... bxc4!? was probably also not bad. Black was afraid of the reply 19... b1!, renewing the threat of g4–g5. But after 19... g6! (with the idea after 20... g5 of replying 20... d5!) the position is unclear.

19... b1... d5!!
19... b7?! suggests itself, intending 20... d2+! d5! 21... cxd5... d5 22... e5... e4 23... g5 h5! followed by 24... b5. But White acts more sharply: 20... g5!... xe4 21... xh6 g6 22... h1, and the position of the black king gives cause for alarm. Therefore Sergey Makarychev immediately breaks through in the centre, even at the cost of a piece sacrifice.

20... exd5
20... g5?!... xe4.

20... e4 21... cxd5
21... e4 f5 22... xf5... f5 23... f3?... c8 (23... b3??).

21... d5

Makarychev had aimed for this position.
White now has no time to continue his pawn storm. He cannot play 22 \( \texttt{h7+?} \texttt{xh7} 23 \texttt{xd5} \) because of 23...\( \texttt{c7+} \). In the event of 22 \( \texttt{hf1} \texttt{xa2} \) Black has two pawns for the piece, and the white king feels uncomfortable.

22 \( \texttt{d2} \texttt{xa1} 23 \texttt{xfh1} \)

Material is roughly equal and Black’s chances in the forthcoming struggle are not worse. He only needs to avoid the temptation to win a pawn: 23...\( \texttt{c7+?!} \) 24 \( \texttt{b1} \texttt{xf4} \) – after 25 \( \texttt{f1} \texttt{d4} 26 \texttt{b3} \) (intending \( g4-g5 \) and \( \texttt{e4} \)) White again goes onto the attack.

23...\( \texttt{fd8} \) 24 \( \texttt{c4} \) (24 \( \texttt{e4}?! \texttt{d6} \); 24 \( \texttt{e4}?! \)) 24...\( \texttt{d4} 25 \texttt{f5} \texttt{ad8} 26 \texttt{c2} \texttt{c7} 27 \texttt{e3} \) (27 \( \texttt{b3} \texttt{f4} \)) 27...\( \texttt{e5} \) 28 \( \texttt{fxe6} \texttt{xe6} 29 \texttt{b1} \texttt{e8} \) (an immediate draw would have been achieved by 29...\( \texttt{e4} \)? 30 \( \texttt{e1} \texttt{e5} 31 \texttt{b3} \texttt{g6}+ 32 \texttt{c2} \texttt{e6} \) 30 \( \texttt{e1} \) with chances for both sides.

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In the first chapter of this book Mark Dvoretsky has already shown how the strong and weak sides of a contestant’s play influence the result of a game. For successful improvement it is important to determine these qualities correctly — that is, to supply a ‘diagnosis’. In our school prime importance is attached to this aspect of the work.

First the pupils comment on their own games. Then a joint analysis with the teachers of the most interesting games enables their evaluations to be checked and often corrected, and the virtues and deficiencies of the youngsters to be more accurately disclosed. In combination with the solving of a variety of tests, thematic training games and the observance of our pupils’ work during studies and lectures, this enables a fairly complete creative portrait of the young players to be compiled.

In this chapter we would like to give some impression of how such work is conducted, and to show several examples both of striking creative discoveries, and of instructive mistakes, taken from the youngsters’ games.

**Pessimists and optimists**

In order to become more closely acquainted with the play of our pupils, we organised a thematic match between two teams: ‘optimists’ and ‘pessimists’. In the optimists we included those youngsters who were confident in their powers, and liked to play sharply and to attack; playing for the pessimists were those who were more inclined towards positional methods of play. The following game is taken from this match, and I think it will be easy to guess in which of the teams these lads were playing (here and subsequently the ages of our pupils are given in brackets).

**Zviagintsev (13) – Alexandrov (16)**

Daugavpils 1990

*Nimzo-Indian Defence*

1 d4  \( \text{Qf6} \)
2 c4  \( \text{e6} \)
3 \( \text{Qc3} \)  \( \text{b4} \)
4 f3  \( \text{d5} \)
5 a3  \( \text{e7} \)
6 \( \text{cxd5?!} \)

6 e4 is more critical.

6 . . .  \( \text{exd5!} \)

6...\( \text{Qxd5?!} \) is weaker on account of 7 e4 \( \text{Qxc3} 8 \text{bxc3} \) with a strong centre for White.

7 e4  \( \text{dx e4?!} \)

In the game Gelfand–Spassky (Linares 1990) Black sacrificed a pawn – 7...c5 8 dxc5  \( \text{Qxc5} 9 \text{e5} \), but he was unable to demonstrate the correctness of his idea.

8 fxe4  \( \text{Qc6?!} \)

In his commentary Vadim Zviagintsev examines some more promising possibilities: 8...c5 9 d5 (after 9 \( \text{b5+} \)  \( \text{d7} \) 10 e5 \( \text{d5} \)
Black's position is more pleasant) 9...d6
10 f3 g4 (I think that 10...bd7 is also
good – Yusupov), and 8...0-0 9 f3 c5 10 d5
g4 11 e5! xe5!? 12 xe5 h4+ 13 g3
e8 with complications not unfavourable for
Black.

9 f3
10 e3

Black launches an attack, without having
completed his development. 10...0-0 is
stronger and more solid. After the reckless
10...xf3? 11 gxf3 h5 Zviagintsev had
foreseen 12 f4! (12 d2 a5!) 12...h4+ 13
d2!!, and if 13...xd4?, then 14 c1 and
wins.

11 c4
g4?!

In the same risky manner; 11...0-0 is better.

12 f4
h4+
13 xh4

c4+?

A serious mistake. White wants to play as
safely as possible, but as a result he hands
the initiative to his opponent. Correct was 14
g3! d8 (14...h3?? 15 f1) 15 d5! with a
great advantage to White.

14 g3?

A serious mistake. White wants to play as
safely as possible, but as a result he hands
the initiative to his opponent. Correct was 14
g3! d8 (14...h3?? 15 f1) 15 d5! with a
great advantage to White.

14 ...
g5
15 d5

After the game it transpired that Alexandrov
had not considered the obvious 15...f2.
True, 16 d2 d2+ 17 xd2 xh1 18
c7+ d7 19 xh1 ac8 20 d5 would
have led to an intricate position. The move
made by him is not bad, but, unfortunately,
the opponent's reply came as a complete
surprise to Black. It is clear that the finding
of 'candidate moves', the noticing of differ­
ent possibilities (especially for the oppo­
ponent) is a weak point with this young player,
and, incidentally, the main cause of his
failure in the present game. He faces some
serious work in this direction.

16 c1! e6?

A poor move, allowing White to complete his
development. Black should have exchanged
queens.

17 f4
d7
18 0-0?

19 ac1

After sacrificing a pawn, White has concen­
trated all his forces for an attack. But Black's
defensive resources are not yet exhausted.
He should have brought his rook into play –
19...e8!. There could follow 20 b5!xb5
21 xc7! b6+ 22 f2 xc7 23 xc7+ xc7 24 xa7 with double-edged play.

19 ...

In such positions every mistake may prove
to be the last. White confidently concludes
the game.

20 e7+!

xe7
21 \textit{\textsc{c}xe6+} \textit{\textsc{b}8}

Black is also not saved by 21...\textit{\textsc{w}xe6} 22 \textit{\textsc{xc}7+} \textit{\textsc{xd}8} 23 \textit{\textsc{d}1+} \textit{\textsc{e}8} 24 \textit{\textsc{xe}7+} (24 \textit{\textsc{xc}6} is also possible) 24...	extit{\textsc{xe}7} 25 \textit{\textsc{c}7+} \textit{\textsc{e}6} 26 \textit{\textsc{d}6}.

22 \textit{\textsc{xc}7} \textit{\textsc{xc}7}  
23 \textit{\textsc{xc}7+} \textit{\textsc{a}8}  
24 \textit{\textsc{d}1} \textit{\textsc{g}5}  
25 \textit{\textsc{d}7}

25 \textit{\textsc{c}8} was simpler.

25...	extit{\textsc{w}e}3+

26 \textit{\textsc{h}1!}

It was not yet too late to lose the game by 26 \textit{\textsc{f}1??} \textit{\textsc{xh}2+}!.

26...	extit{\textsc{w}b}6  
27 \textit{\textsc{d}5} \textit{\textsc{xc}7}  
28 \textit{\textsc{xc}7} \textit{\textsc{b}8}  
29 \textit{\textsc{xb}7+}!

Black resigns.

\textbf{Play on different flanks}

This element of chess strategy is one of the most difficult. But see how skilfully it is used by a young player.

Baklan (11) – Zilberstein
Kiev 1989

The correct plan in this position is the advance \textit{\textsc{b}2–\textsc{b}3} and play on the queenside. But before carrying it out, with an operation on the opposite flank White disrupts the coordination of the opponent’s pieces.

20 \textit{\textsc{g}5!} \textit{\textsc{g}6}  
21 \textit{\textsc{h}4} \textit{\textsc{hg}8}  
22 \textit{\textsc{h}5} \textit{\textsc{h}6}  
23 \textit{\textsc{g}3} \textit{\textsc{f}8}

If 23...	extit{\textsc{e}7}, then 24 \textit{\textsc{h}7} \textit{\textsc{h}8} 25 \textit{\textsc{w}xg7}.

24 \textit{\textsc{b}3!} \textit{\textsc{c}6}  
25 \textit{\textsc{xc}4} \textit{\textsc{d}xc4}?

25...\textit{\textsc{w}xc4} was better, but even then after 26 \textit{\textsc{b}4} \textit{\textsc{c}7} 27 \textit{\textsc{fb}1} the advantage is with White.

26 \textit{\textsc{w}e}3 \textit{\textsc{d}7}  
27 \textit{\textsc{b}4} \textit{\textsc{c}7}  
28 \textit{\textsc{fb}1} \textit{\textsc{a}6}  
29 \textit{\textsc{a}4}

29 \textit{\textsc{e}4} \textit{\textsc{b}6} 30 \textit{\textsc{d}5} was also good.

29...	extit{\textsc{w}c}6  
30 \textit{\textsc{e}5}

Preparing \textit{\textsc{d}4–\textsc{d}5}. But it was also possible to play this immediately: 30 \textit{\textsc{d}5??} \textit{\textsc{c}5} 31 \textit{\textsc{d}6} \textit{\textsc{c}6} 32 \textit{\textsc{xc}5} \textit{\textsc{xc}5} 33 \textit{\textsc{e}4} \textit{\textsc{b}5} 34 \textit{\textsc{a}5}.

30...	extit{\textsc{w}d}7  
31 \textit{\textsc{d}5} \textit{\textsc{b}6}  
32 \textit{\textsc{d}6} \textit{\textsc{c}6}  
33 \textit{\textsc{e}4} \textit{\textsc{w}c}8

Now comes a pretty finish.

34 \textit{\textsc{xb}6+!} \textit{\textsc{axb}6}  
35 \textit{\textsc{wb}6+} \textit{\textsc{b}7}  
36 \textit{\textsc{a}8+}

36 \textit{\textsc{xc}6} was simpler.

36...	extit{\textsc{xa}8}  
37 \textit{\textsc{xc}6} \textit{\textsc{xc}6}  
38 \textit{\textsc{xc}6+} \textit{\textsc{b}8}  
39 \textit{\textsc{d}7}

Black resigns.

\textbf{The Steinitz Principle}

The development of the initiative is a topic that is very difficult not only for young players. At individual lessons in our school we try to focus the pupils’ attention on missed possibilities, and investigate the reasons for the mistakes made.
White has an obvious lead in development, but here he played sluggishly, allowing his opponent to initiate counterplay.

In his comments on the game, Petya Kiryakov indicated the following possibilities: 11 e4, 11 dxe4!? and 11 g4!? However, after 11 g4 dxe4 he considered only 12 d4! xg4 13 e4 dxe4 14 b5. 'This attack is probably incorrect, and I am not a fan of such attacks,' wrote Petya in his notes.

In fact White has some tempting ways of developing his initiative. Thus after 11 g4 dxe4 he has the strong 12 b5! and 13 c3 with dangerous threats. 11 b5 d8 12 c3 e6 13 xf6 xf6 14 b6 is also interesting. Remember Steinitz’s famous principle: ‘The player with an advantage must attack, as otherwise he risks losing this advantage.’

Exploiting his opponent’s indecisiveness, Black, as predicted by Steinitz, has seized the initiative (although the game ended in a draw).

We advised the young player to pay attention to the slight passivity of his style, and recommended that he should study the games of Jan Timman and other dynamic players.

**A spectacular attack**

Maxim Boguslavsky loves to attack. In the following example with accurate and inventive play he mated the enemy king, after the opponent failed to exploit all his defensive resources.

---

**Kiryakov (15) – Sakaev**

Simferopol 1990

1 d4 f6
2 c4 e6
3 c3 b4
4 w2 c5
5 dxc5 xc5
6 f3 d6
7 e3 c7
8 d2!? 0-0
9 d3 h8?!
10 0-0-0 e7

---

**Boguslavsky (14) – Matsionis**

Tallinn 1990

11 h3? a6
12 b5 b6
13 g4 c5
14 g5 xd3+ e8
15 wxd3 e6
16 e4 e4
17 e3 a5
18 c3 b5!
24 \( \text{f1} \! \)  

Little is promised by 24 \( \text{wb7+ wb7} \) 25 \( \text{xb7 h1+} \) with an unclear endgame. With the subtle move in the game the young Muscovite parries the threatened rook exchange and maintains all his own possibilities.

24 . . . \( \text{xa5?} \)  

Black cracks under the tension. He should have answered in the same manner: 24...\( \text{d8!} \) 25 \( \text{xb7 xa5!} \) (25...\( \text{c8!} \) also comes into consideration) 26 \( \text{b5!? h1+} \) (but not 26...\( \text{xc3? 27 xxd7+!!} \) 27 \( \text{f2 wa2+ 28 b5b2 xf1+ 29 xf1 xc4 with chances for both sides.} \)

25 \( \text{a2!} \)  

Black was probably expecting only 25 \( \text{xb7+}, \) which would have transposed into the variation just examined.

25 . . . \( \text{b6} \)  

26 \( \text{d1!} \)  

Boguslavsky conducts the attack in excellent style. 26 \( \text{c2?!} \) was weaker on account of 26...\( \text{h1+ 27 f2 xf1+! 28 xf1 b8.} \)

26 . . . \( \text{c7} \)  

27 \( \text{xa7} \) \( \text{h1+} \)  

28 \( \text{f2} \) \( \text{h3?!} \)  

28...\( \text{b8} \) was better, when White would probably have replied 29 \( \text{a6!} \) followed by 30 \( \text{b3.} \)

29 \( \text{a4} \) \( \text{xg2} \)  

30 \( \text{a8+} \) \( \text{b8} \)  

31 \( \text{c6+!} \) \( \text{xc6} \)  

32 \( \text{axb8+} \)  

And mate next move.

Play without a plan

Unfortunately, Boguslavsky does not solve positional problems so confidently. In the following example he was unable to find good squares for his pieces.

Boguslavsky (14) – Shakhbaz  
Moscow 1989

22 \( \text{e1?} \! \)  

After achieving the better position, White loses the thread of the game. He could have strengthened his position by 22 \( \text{f7+! h7 23 g3, obtaining excellent attacking prospects.} \)

22 . . . \( \text{f8!} \)  

Black defends the vulnerable f8-square and prepares to occupy the important f4-point with his knight.

23 \( \text{ad1} \) \( \text{d5} \)  

24 \( \text{d3?} \)  

A bad move, leading to the loss of the initiative. 24 \( \text{g3 ad8 25 d4! f6 26 h4 was correct, when 26...\( \text{f4?} \) is not good in view of 27 \( \text{f7+}. \)

24 . . . \( \text{f4} \)  

25 \( \text{h7+} \)  

25 \( \text{d7} \) was stronger.

25 . . . \( \text{h8} \)  

26 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{xh7} \)  

27 \( \text{d7} \) \( \text{xd7!?} \)  

28 \( \text{f5} \)  

And it was now Black, after sacrificing his queen, who began an attack.
Comparison: which move is more accurate

Ovseevich (12) – Emelin (13)
Belsy 1989

White has a pronounced positional advantage. It is determined mainly by his superior pawn structure and more active pieces. The different prospects of the bishops should be especially mentioned: in contrast to its cramped opposite number, White's bishop can come out to h3 and intensify the pressure on the opponent's position.

Now an attack on the b6-pawn suggests itself. It can be carried out in two ways: 21 \( \texttt{d4} \) and 21 \( \texttt{e3} \). In such situations the procedure of comparison comes to a player's aid. In both cases it is bad to defend the pawn with the queen on account of 22 \( \texttt{h3} \).

The virtue of 21 \( \texttt{e3} \)! is that after the straightforward defence 21...\( \texttt{b7} \) there is a tactical rejoinder: 22 \( \texttt{g6} \) \( \texttt{x} \texttt{d6} \) 23 \( \texttt{xd6} \) (but not 23 \( \texttt{xb7} \)? in view of 23...\( \texttt{c5} \)!)

23...\( \texttt{xd6} \) 24 \( \texttt{xe4} \) \( \texttt{xb7} \) \( \texttt{x} \texttt{b7} \) 25 \( \texttt{x} \texttt{xe5} \) with an extra pawn for White, or 24...\( \texttt{xc4} \) 25 \( \texttt{f1} \) with the advantage. But the obvious drawback to this move is that it allows ...d6–d5.

Of course, at such moments a player should delve into a position and calculate variations. After 21 \( \texttt{e3} \)! d5 22 \( \texttt{f4} \) Black has several continuations:

1) 22...\( \texttt{dxe4} \) 23 \( \texttt{xd8} \+) \( \texttt{xd8} \) 24 \( \texttt{xe5} \) with advantage to White;
2) 22...\( \texttt{g6} \) 23 \( \texttt{f1} \+) \( \texttt{h7} \) 24 \( \texttt{f6} \+) \( \texttt{xf6} \) 25 \( \texttt{xa7} \) winning the exchange;
3) 22...\( \texttt{c6} \) 23 \( \texttt{cxd5} \) \( \texttt{exd5} \) 24 \( \texttt{xd5} \) \( \texttt{xd5} \) 25 \( \texttt{f7} \+) \( \texttt{h8} \) 26 \( \texttt{xd5} \), and Black has a difficult position;
4) 22...\( \texttt{xc4} \)? 23 \( \texttt{bxc4} \) dxe4. This position must be evaluated in favour of White. He has real chances of an attack, and the presence of opposite-colour bishops merely strengthens the attacking possibilities. The simplest is 24 \( \texttt{xe4} \) followed by 25 \( \texttt{g6} \) and 26 \( \texttt{xe4} \), but 24 \( \texttt{xd8} \+) \( \texttt{xd8} \) 25 \( \texttt{f7} \+) ? \( \texttt{h8} \) 26 \( \texttt{g6} \) with the threat of 27 \( \texttt{xe4} \) can also be checked.

In the game White played less subtly and allowed his opponent to organise a defence.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
21 \texttt{d4} \\
22 \texttt{h1} \\
23 \texttt{xb5} \\
24 \texttt{c1} \\
\end{array}
\]

The start of active counterplay. 24...\( \texttt{d7} \) 25 \( \texttt{h3} \) \( \texttt{h8} \) was also possible.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
25 \texttt{h3} \\
26 \texttt{xe6}+ \\
27 \texttt{c3} \\
28 \texttt{f2} \\
\end{array}
\]

As often happens, in return for the lost
material Black’s initiative has flared up. Now it was important for him not to allow the enemy knight to go to d5. This problem would have been solved by 28...\[\text{b6}!!\], when 29 \[\text{xd5} is dangerous on account of 29...\[\text{g5} followed by \ldots \text{f}g4.

\[\text{28... d4?} \]
A natural but poor continuation.

\[\text{29 \[\text{d5} \text{f8}} \]
\[\text{30 \[\text{g2} \text{b7}} \]
\[\text{31 \[\text{xe7} \text{xe7}} \]
\[\text{32 \[\text{xf8+} \text{xf8}} \]
\[\text{33 \[\text{c8}} \]

The resulting endgame is lost for Black.

**A queen sacrifice in defence**

Gasymov – Kiryakov (15)
Simferopol 1990

White has conducted the game inventively and built up a dangerous attack. However, he has already sacrificed two pawns. In such cases it is often possible to return the extra material for the sake of achieving some positional gains.

White is intending, by playing f2–f4, to include his dark-square bishop in the attack. This could have been forestalled by 29...\[\text{a4}!!. After 30 \[\text{g8}+ \text{xg8} 31 \text{xe8} \text{xe8} Black has the advantage.

In the game he played differently.

\[\text{29... f7?} \]
\[\text{30 \[\text{g3} \text{e7!}} \]
Bad is 30...\[\text{h6+? } 31 \text{xf6} \text{g6} 32 \text{f4} \text{a4} 33 \text{xe5} \text{xb2} 34 \text{xe2} \text{xe5} 35 \text{d4} with a decisive advantage for White.

\[\text{31 f4} \text{e8} \]
\[\text{32 \[\text{eg2} \text{xe6}} \]
\[\text{33 \[\text{de6} \text{xe6}} \]
\[\text{34 \[\text{xe5} \text{e5}!}} \]
\[\text{35 \[\text{f4} \text{e5?!}} \]

Here White was tempted by the ‘win’ of the queen – 36 \[\text{g8+??}, leading to a difficult ending, which in the end he lost. Meanwhile, after 36 \[\text{h4!}, with the veiled idea of \[\text{c1–h6, he would have retained a powerful attack. Even stronger was the direct 36 \text{f5! d6} (36...\[\text{e8 is met by the same reply) 37 \text{xe5! e5} 38 \text{g7} and wins.}}

**Forestalling the opponent’s possibilities**

Paying attention to the opponent’s threats is a necessary quality for a chess player. It helps in many situations, and in particular when defending.

Makariev (14) – Khristov
Kishinyov 1990
White is threatening 44 \( \text{c4+} \), after which the black king will feel extremely uncomfortable. This threat should have been parried by 43...\( \text{c5!} \) with good drawing chances (pointed out by Ilya Makariev).

43 ...  \( \text{fxe5?} \)

44 \( \text{c4+} \)  \( \text{f6} \)

45 \( \text{b6+} \)  \( \text{g7} \)

46 \( \text{g6+} \)  \( \text{h8} \)

47 f5

And Black encountered insuperable difficulties.

\text{Pashanov – Sitnik (8)}

Sochi 1989

A passed pawn in the endgame

\text{Khoroshavina – Gaponenko (13)}

Kherson 1989

31 \( \text{xb7?} \)

White incorrectly hurries to change the structure of the position. She could have retained a serious advantage with the simple move 31 \( \text{ab3} \).

31 ...  \( \text{xb7} \)

32 c6  \( \text{c5?} \)

An instructive mistake. The c-pawn is closer to the king and to Black’s main forces, and therefore it is far easier to combat than a passed pawn on the b-file. \textit{Whereas in the opening and the middlegame central pawns are stronger than flank pawns, in the endgame it is normally the other way round.} After 32...\( \text{xc6!} \) 33 bxc6 \( \text{b6} \) Black would have gained a draw without difficulty.

33 cxb7  \( \text{xb7} \)

34 b6  \( \text{c5} \)

35 \( \text{b5} \)  \( \text{c8} \)

36 \( \text{b3!} \)  \( \text{b7} \)

37 \( \text{c6} \)  \( \text{cd6} \)

38 \( \text{xd5} \)

And White converted her pawn advantage.

This example shows how important it is to remain vigilant. Black has a great advantage, but after just one incautious move the game concluded not in his favour.

22 ...  \( \text{f8??} \)

23 \( \text{xf8+!} \)

Mate in inevitable.

In analysis after the game Maxim Sitnik found the correct solution. Black should divert the opponent’s pieces from the attack and then complete his development: therefore 22...\( \text{c2!} \), and only after 23 \( \text{xc2} \) – 23...\( \text{f8} \).
It hardly needs to be explained how much benefit may be gained by a young player having a creative contact with leading grandmasters and trainers, and how necessary it is for the young to have help and advice. Many years ago ex-world champion Mikhail Botvinnik headed the first all-union junior school. Many pupils of that school subsequently become outstanding players. Later other similar schools also appeared, although not all of them operated successfully.

In his time Artur Yusupov studied in the Botvinnik school, while Mark Dvoretzky worked in it, helping Botvinnik and simultaneously training Artur. Years passed. Yusupov became one of the strongest grandmasters in the world, and he several times participated in the Candidates events for the world crown. Dvoretzky is now a famous trainer, who has taught many world junior champions, and prepared several Candidates for the world championship: Artur Yusupov, Sergey Dolmatov, Nana Alexandria and Alexey Dreev.

At the end of 1989 the Dvoretzky-Yusupov school was set up. The combination of a top-class grandmaster and a trainer of enormous experience immediately raised the lessons to a new, qualitatively higher level than previously. This immediately began telling on the youngsters’ results.

Three pupils from our school earned the right to participate in the world girls and boys under-14 championships, which took place in 1990 in the USA. Twelve-year-old Diana Darchia from Batumi won the top title, while Inna Gaponenko from Kherson and Vasya Emelin from Leningrad became silver medal winners.

Alexey Alexandrov (from Bobruysk), twice the adult champion of Belarus, won the USSR Junior Championship in 1991. Elakha Kadymova from Gyandzhi won the all-union girls championship, and then also became champion of Europe.

At the age of 14 the Muscovite Vadim Zviagintsev achieved the master norm – previously only Alexey Dreev had done this at an earlier age, and he, incidentally, also studied under the direction of Mark Dvoretzky. I will briefly describe who taught in the school, and how our work was arranged.

The sessions were held twice a year, each for a period of 10 days. We worked with rated young players (not lower than candidate master). 10–15 pupils were invited to each session, and Yusupov and Dvoretzky consulted not only with the youngsters, but also their trainers. And the most highly-qualified experts gave lessons together with them. The masters Mikhail Shereshevsky, Alexey Kosikov and Vladimir Vufson were effectively fully-fledged teachers at our school.

Dvoretzky and Yusupov invited the author of these lines, a chess master, to become the director of the school, and to take on all the associated organisational problems.

Each day began with physical exercises, in which not only the youngsters, but also the teachers participated. An excellent example for the pupils, and far more effective than any talks about the benefits of physical preparation. Incidentally, we also played sports during the day.
After breakfast the pupils would gather for a general lecture. The lectures were recorded on tape, and then transcribed onto a computer. In the second half of the day the lessons were more individual in character. Usually the youngsters were divided into small groups, taking account of age and practical strength, or sometimes similarity of opening repertoire or inherent deficiencies (for example, for improvement in endgame technique or the development of combinative vision).

We attached great importance to the analysis of the pupils’ own games. The youngsters would annotate them carefully, and then the notes would be checked by the teachers. These games, along with the results of competitions held at the sessions for the solving of specially selected exercises and individual observations by the teachers, allowed the pupils to be given a ‘diagnosis’ – revealing the virtues and deficiencies of their play. On the basis of the ‘diagnosis’, homework was suggested – a program of further work on chess.

Apart from that which was assimilated at the lectures and seminars, for individual study each pupil was also given a given a substantial ‘pack’ of additional material – previously published articles, linked with the content of the session.

Of course, when working so intensively you need to be able to relax well. We provided the teachers and pupils with comfortable rooms in a hotel, and with tasty and varied meals. Time was also found for relaxation, watching videos etc.

Collected in this book are the lectures and the most interesting additional materials from the first session, at which the most general problems of independent work on chess were discussed. After studying the book, you will gain an impression of how we worked and, I hope, you will find much that is interesting and useful for yourself.
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