Mark Dvoretsky

Tactical Play

School of Chess Excellence 2

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Foreword

My friends tried many times to convince me of the need to put down on paper at least part of the quite substantial material that I have accumulated during the course of my training work. In principle I agreed with them, but I did not have a very clear impression of the appropriate way of doing this. To give a consistent account of my entire concept of training, preparing something akin to a new version of Nimzowitsch's famous 'My System', was something that I simply could not bring myself to do. But I also did not want to restrict myself to describing some small province of the extensive and fertile kingdom of chess.

Finally, some kind of writing plan occurred to me. When I sat down at my desk, I quickly realised that this plan could not be accommodated within the framework of one book. In the end I have written four, united under the general title 'School of Chess Excellence'.

In 1991 the publisher Batsford brought out my first work 'Secrets of Chess Training'. It was a success with the readers, and was even judged 'best book of the year' by the British Chess Federation.

The book which you now have before you continues the previous, Volume 1 in the series, and in it there are numerous references to general rules, techniques or even specific examples, that have already been examined. But before talking about it, I should like to explain the overall idea of this series. Strictly speaking, there is not just one, but several ideas.

1) Fresh material. I mainly use the games of my pupils (in particular, Artur Yusupov and Sergey Dolmatov: at one time participants in junior tournaments, and subsequently grandmasters, and candidates for the world championship), or my own games. Examples from the games of other players are given only in those cases when we (I or one of my pupils) were able to look at them with new eyes, and correct and add to other analyses. I invite the reader into our creative and analytical laboratory, and offer original chess material, which will not be found in other books.

2) The art of analysis. It is clear that, with such an approach to the selection of material, considerable attention must be devoted to the process of chess analysis, to the technique of its implementation, to typical mistakes in analysis, and so on. I do not want to expand here in detail about the importance of analytical mastery for any player. I will merely cite the opinion of Garry Kasparov: 'I consider that, other things being equal, the analytical approach, the analytical method of studying chess, must give a colossal advantage over the practical player, and that self-improvement in chess is impossible without analysis.'

3) Familiarisation with the experience of others. 'It is hard to comprehend yourself, if you do not have an impression of others. All roads have their branches', wrote the famous Japanese warrior and martial arts theoretician of the 17th century, Miyamoto Musasi, in his 'Book of the five rings', which distils the entire experience of his long life. Although, as already mentioned, my book is very personal in nature, I nevertheless wanted to expand its bounds and to bring onto its pages as many interesting people as possible. I am fundamentally opposed to
concentrating only on the technical, narrowly-professional aspects of the game. It is my conviction that a good chess culture is a necessary condition for good and stable achievements. And not only in chess: our game is a model of life, and ideas acquired from other everyday spheres, and general human factors cannot help but influence a chess player's successes. This is why on the pages of the book you will find the aphorisms, opinions and thoughts of famous writers, teachers, thinkers and politicians, as well as numerous views and pieces of advice from the great masters of the past and the present about specific chess problems.

4) Training exercises. It is not enough simply to study chess — you must be constantly training, developing the qualities and skills which will help you to take a decision at the board. For this it is useful to tackle exercises — easy and difficult, positional and tactical. Training can be done in various ways: by solving exercises in your mind, or by analysing, moving the pieces on the board, by playing specially selected positions, and so on. All these forms of training are described in the book, and in addition a variety of examples are offered for independent work. They are divided into 'exercises' (signified by a letter 'E'), the solutions to which are given at the end of the book, and 'questions' (letter 'Q'), with replies in the following text.

5) Purely chess and chess-psychological approaches to the taking of decisions in the most varied situations. It is perhaps this that constitutes the main idea. My impressions, which have confirmed their viability in the games of my pupils, sometimes do not fully coincide with the traditional point of view. It is with them that I should like to acquaint the reader. By analysing some specific position, you will see hidden springs, directing the process of the play, ways of searching for the correct move, the reasons for mistakes and ways of avoiding them in the future.

In a review of the previous edition of the first book in this series, it was pleasant for me to read the following words by grandmaster Murray Chandler: '...Reading the text, and just attempting the analysis, will start you thinking in a new way'. It was for this that I was aiming.

In order to achieve this objective with sufficient completeness, the widest possible range of situations must be examined. However, the afore-mentioned first book gives only positions with a small amount of material — practical endings and studies. This new book continues the theme using the example of middlegame positions, associated with attack and defence, combinations, and sacrifices.

The first half of it is devoted to the 'technique' (if such a word is appropriate here) of combination — the ability to find tactical ideas and to calculate them exactly. Various types of combinations, techniques aiding the calculation of variations, and methods of developing the calculating ability of a player are all investigated.

The examples analysed in the second half of the book are mainly of a problematic and irrational nature. They involve sacrifices that do not lend themselves to precise calculation, with creative risk in attack and defence.

At the end of the book you will find a thematic index of exercises on the skills which you are called on to develop. Generally speaking, the book should be read chapter by chapter, but if you cannot wait to start independent training, with the help of the index you will be able to find and try solving exercises on the topic that interests you.
'Chess is nothing more than a manual board game', a trainer acquaintance of mine used to say half-jokingly, half-seriously. With this 'aphorism' be wanted to emphasise the role of tactics in chess, and express the thought that no science, and no deep positional considerations or strategic subtleties, would help a player, if he was not capable of finding strong moves, and seeing and accurately calculating concrete possibilities for himself and for his opponent.

Some are of the opinion that tactical ability is inborn: you either have it, or you don't, and if you don't, then there is nothing you can do about it. My experience as a trainer convinces me that this is not so. With purposeful training you can significantly develop your ability in the field of tactics (as, however, in any other field). Remember the lecture, which grandmaster Ostap Bender, the hero of Ilf and Petrov's immortal novel 'The Twelve Chairs', gave to chess fans in the town of Vasyuka. 'We see that the fair-haired man plays well, and the dark-haired man plays badly. And no lectures can change these relative strengths, if each individual in isolation will not constantly train at draugh... I mean, chess...' Bender, it is true, did not explain precisely how to train. I endeavoured to make up for this omission of his in the third part of Volume1 of this series, devoted to studies, and here we will continue our discussion on this topic.

The tactical skill of a player is made up of two components – combinative vision and the technique of calculating variations. They in turn are also divided into elements – various procedures for seeking and planning moves, and typical patterns and situations. Even if in general you are an excellent tactician, you will certainly be able to pick out some components of tactical mastery in which it would do no harm to improve further.
Combinative Vision

A consistently conducted game, concluding with a pretty combination—this is my chess ideal.

Vladimir Simagin

What we understand by combinative vision is the ability to quickly discover latent tactical ideas—far from obvious strong moves, usually involving sacrifices.

For the development of chess imagination—combinative vision—you should solve exercises (studies, and examples from practical games), the main difficulty in which is to find the correct tactical idea. I must stress the word find, rather than calculate or evaluate. You can make use of any of the numerous ‘puzzle books’ that are published, it would seem, in all the countries in the world. They largely contain comparatively simple combinations, which a skilled player will spot very quickly. Even playing blitz. Here are a couple of examples from five-minute games of mine.

Dvoretsky – Zilberstein
Moscow 1966

Q 4-1. What should White play?

White has an overwhelming lead in development, and all his pieces are highly active. There must be a combination.

20 \( \text{\textit{Qxd7!}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qxd7}} \)
21 \( \text{\textit{Wa7!!}} \)
(There was also another way to win – 21 \( \text{\textit{Qd2!!}} \)). Black resigns.

Dvoretsky – Bogomolov
Moscow 1967

1 e4 c5 2 d4 cxd4 3 c3 dxc3 4 \( \text{\textit{Qxc3}} \) e6
5 \( \text{\textit{Qc4}} \) d6 6 f3 a6 7 0–0 b5?! 8 \( \text{\textit{Qb3}} \) dxe7
9 \( \text{\textit{Qg5!}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qg6}} \) 10 f4 \( \text{\textit{Qxe7}} \) 11 15 \( \text{\textit{Qxg5}} \) 12 fxg6
hxg6 13 \( \text{\textit{Qxg5}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qxg5}} \) 14 \( \text{\textit{Qxd6}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qe7}} \).

Q 4-2. What should White play?

Being a pawn down, he can agree to the exchange of queens only in connection with a specific combinative idea.
15. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{ex}}e7+} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xe}}7} \)
16. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}5+!} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}6} \)
16...exd5 17 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}5} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}7} \) 18 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xf}}7+} \) and 19 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xa}}7} \).
17. e5+!
Not 17 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xf}}7} \)? on account of 17...exd5 18 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xd}}5} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{e}}6}! \); 17 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}6}?! \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}7} \) is also unconvincing.
17...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{xe}}5} \)
18. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}7} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}7} \)
19. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xf}}7} \)
White has gained a clear advantage, and he soon converted it.

Even if such examples do not cause you the slightest difficulty, all the same it makes sense to try solving them from time to time. They are like scales, practised by musicians. They are very useful for improving your form directly before a competition. By quickly finding the replies in a series of combinative exercises, you not only sharpen your perception of the position, but also experience a growing confidence in your own powers.

Since we are talking about five-minute games, I will take the opportunity to boast about another two pretty wins of mine, against very strong opponents. Both were played at a training session for the Moscow team before the USSR Spartakiad. I arrived at this session immediately after another one, in which I had been preparing Valery Chekhov for the World Junior Championship. Our joint work proved highly productive: Chekhov became World Champion, and I performed quite well in the Spartakiad (but perhaps even better at the training session before it).

\textbf{Petrosian – Dvoretsky}

Liejapa 1975

1. c4 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}4} \)
2. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}3} \) g6

3. g3 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{g}}7} \)
4. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{g}}2} \) 0–0
5. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{f}}3} \) d6
6. 0–0 e5
7. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}3} \) c6
8. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}1} \) a5
9. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}3} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{f}}5} \)
10. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}2}?! \)

10. b4 is stronger. True to his prophylactic style, Tigran Petrosian parries the threat of 10...e4, but in fact it is not a threat, as after 10 b4 axb4 11 axb4 e4?! 12 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{h}}4} \) exd3 13 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xf}}5} \) dxe2 14 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xe}}2} \) gx\( \text{\textit{\textbf{f}}5} \) 15 b5 White gains the advantage.

10...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}7} \)
11. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{e}}1} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{h}}3} \)
12. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{h}}1} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{g}}4}! \)

Had the knight been at f3, Black would have had to spend a tempo on ...h7–h6, but now he immediately begins a typical and very dangerous attack. The knight at g4 occupies a menacing position, which will become evident after the thematic ...f7–f5–f4. Much weaker is 12...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{h}}5}?! \) 13 b4, as was played in an analogous situation (without the inclusion of ...a7–a5 and a2–a3) in a game Chernin–Levitt (Rome 1989).

13. b4 axb4
14. axb4 f5
15. b5 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}8} \)
16. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}5} \) f7
17. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}2} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{e}}6} \)
18. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}1} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}8} \)
19. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}7} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}5} \)
20. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}3} \) f4
21. \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xc}}5} \) fxg3
22. hxg3 dxc5
23. f3

(see next diagram)
The two players have consistently carried out their offensives, each on his own side of the board, but Black would appear to have made more progress. The position of the white king gives cause for alarm, combinations are in the air, and it is only a matter of choosing the best one. I found a pretty idea, but, of course, in a blitz game I simply did not have time to check it.

23 e4
d6
25 f4 "xf4
26 gxf4
The ex-World Champion resigned the game, not finding any defence against the threat of 27...h1+ 28 xf1 h2 mate.

E 4-1. Was Petrosian’s decision justified?

Dvoretsky – Gulko
Lipeaja 1975

1 e4
c5
2 tf3
e6
3 c3
d5
4 exd5 exd5
5 d4 d6
6 txe3 wb6?!
6...cxd4 is better.
7 txa3!
A very strong reply. 7 dxc5 wb2 or 7 wb3 c4 is much worse. Now if 7...wb2 there follows 8 txb5, or if 7...a6 8 wb3!, forcibly transposing into a favourable ending. And if 7...c4, then 8 txc4! dxc4 9 d5 wb2 10 dxc6 with advantage to White. Therefore the opponent's reply is practically forced.

7 ... cxd4
8 txd4 txa3
9 txc6?!
The simple 9 bxa3 is also possible, of course, but White wants to achieve more. If 9...txc6 he intends 10 wb3! (with the threat of 11 txb5) 10...d6 11 txb5+ d7 12 txd7+ xd7 13 ta3.

9 ... wb2!
10 txa4! bxc6
10...t6 11 txb1 ta2 12 tbb5 0-0 13 ta1 wb2 14 t4 tga4! was probably preferable. At any event, it was this line that we regarded as the main one, when Chekhov and I analysed this opening variation at our training session.

11 .xb1!
But not immediately 11 .xg7? in view of
11...f6.

11 ... $\textit{wx}a2$

12 $\textit{gx}g7$ $\textit{gx}g4$

Here our preparatory analysis concluded — we had considered only 12...c5 13 $\textit{e}2+$.  

13 $\textit{f}3$ $\textit{d}7$

Threatening 14...$\textit{e}8+$.  

14 $\textit{b}7+$ $\textit{d}6$

If 14...c8 there follows 15.a6. Here I noticed a spectacular combination, and I could not resist the temptation.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

15 $\textit{e}5+?!$ $\textit{xe}5$

16 $\textit{d}4+$ $\textit{d}6$?

It was this that White was counting on.

17 $\textit{f}4+$ $\textit{c}5$

17...$\textit{e}6$ 18 $\textit{xf}7+$ with a very dangerous attack.

18 $\textit{b}5+$! $\textit{xb}5$

19 $\textit{c}7$ mate

A so-called 'epaulette mate'.

Instead of 16...d6? Black should have replied 16...$\textit{e}6!$, and after 17 $\textit{wx}g4+$ $\textit{f}5$ or 17 fxg4 $\textit{c}1!$ the attack comes to a standstill. 17...$\textit{d}3!$ is more dangerous, threatening both the capture of the bishop, and 18 0–0. But White hardly has more than perpetual check after 17...$\textit{f}5$ or 17...$\textit{wx}g2$

18 $\textit{e}3+$ $\textit{f}6$ 19 $\textit{fx}4+$ $\textit{e}6$ 20 $\textit{xf}7+$ $\textit{d}6$.

Of course, these complications were not necessary — the crude 15 fxg4! $\textit{e}8+16$ $\textit{e}2$ would have won without difficulty.

It would be ridiculous to reproach myself for taking this decision — after all, it was only a blitz game. But in a serious tournament, such playing for brilliancy is completely unacceptable. The simplest way to the goal should always be preferred.

Many years ago I once showed a similar combination to grandmaster Simagin, who was giving lessons to juniors in the Moscow Pioneers' Palace. Knowing Vladimir Simagin to be a player with a sharp, original style, I hoped that he would approve of my 'creative searchings', but I was wrong. 'A combination for the sake of a combination' — this was his conclusion, 'is not justified from either the competitive, or the creative standpoint'. Later I myself realised that such games looks attractive only until you delve into the position, and begin a critical investigation of the accompanying variations.

A much better impression is made by combinations, even comparatively simple ones, if they are correct and are the shortest or even the only way to the goal. Especially when they logically crown the preceding strategy. I will now show two attractive examples from the games of Sergey Dolmatov.

I will begin with a training game with a shortened time control (15 minutes for the entire game), played by him when preparing for the 1980 World Junior Team Championship.

\textbf{Dolmatov – Belyavsky}

\textit{Otepya 1980}

1 e4 c5

2 $\textit{df}3$ d6
The plan chosen by Black was at one time very popular, but now it would appear to have gone out of fashion. 10...e5 is more often played, or else 10...cxd4 11 wxd4 a5 (true, the exchange on d4 is usually carried out without the inclusion of 9...h6 10 d4).

11 f3 a5
12 b1 d8

A year later, in a serious game between the same opponents, played in the 49th USSR Championship (Frunze 1981), Alexander Belyavsky preferred 12...xc8. There followed 13 g4!? b5 14 d3 c4? (a mistake, apparently planned in Black’s home preparation; 14...b4 was better) 15 a3 d3. After the recapture on d3 Black opens lines on the queenside with 16...b4, but he clearly underestimated the following riposte by his opponent.

16 d5! xd2 17 xe7+ f8 18 d2 (obviously, White was able to play this only thanks to the position of the rook at e8) 18...e7 19 e5 e5 (forced). Now White could have gained a big advantage with 20 xe5! xxe5 21 xe5 with the idea of 22 exf6+ xf6 23 e5. Unfortunately, Dolmatov went wrong: 20 xe5? xe5 21 xe5, and after 21...e6 22 f1 g5 23 e1 a5 Black equalised.

13 d3 b5

14 g4!

14 xxb5?! is illogical: 14...b6 15 he1 ab8 16 b3 e8, and Black seized the initiative (Byrne–Ivanovic, Reykjavik 1982). In positions with castling on opposite sides one should strive not for gain of material, but to begin an attack as soon as possible.

The game Gufeld–Utası (Havana 1985) went 14 h1! b4 15 e2 e5 16 g4! e6 17 b3 d5 18 xf6! xf6 19 g5 hxg5 20 fxg5 e7 21 g6!, and White created very dangerous threats to the opponent’s king. As we will now see, the thematic move g2–g4 can also be made immediately, without preparation.

14 ... b4

With the rook at d8, 14...b4 no longer involves a threat of 15 xc3, and White simply ignores it.

15 e2 xg4

To judge by his comments in Informator, it was because of this pawn capture that Eduard Gufeld avoided 14 g4. This evaluation is questionable: the attack along the opened g-file promises White excellent chances of success. However, Black had no choice – g4–g5 was threatened, all the
same opening lines on the kingside. The question arises, where then did he go wrong? It seems to me that his entire opening plan is dubious: it is risky to go in for a position with castling on opposite sides, if the opponent has something to latch onto, such as the h6 pawn.

16 lhg1 lhx4
17 lhx4 lfe6

If 17...lff2 White should simply reply 18 lfd1, since 18 f5?! is parried by 18...b3!

18 f5 lfl8

Q 4-3. How should White continue?

Everything is ready for the decisive storm. Dolmatov carries out a spectacular combination with the sacrifice of both rooks.

19 lxf7!! lxf7
20 lgl+ lfl7

If 20...lfl8 there follows 21 lwh6+ lfe7 22 lge6+ lfxg6 23 lgg7 lfe8 24 lwxg6 lge7 25 lgg7 lfe8 26 lwh8+ (or 26 lwxf6).

21 lxe6

There was no point in making this move earlier, since after ...lxe6 Black would have gained a tempo for the defence thanks to the attack on a2. But now 21...lxe6 is bad because of 22 e5+.

21...
22 lge7!! lxe7
23 lfd5 lge8
24 lwh6

Black resigned, not finding any defence against the mate. As in my game against Petrosian, the resignation was premature, since in fact there was a defence: 24...lwa2+! 25 lwa2 (25 lcd1? lwa1+ 26 ldd2 lff3+ 27 lfe3 lgg4+) 25...lxe6+. However, after 26 lce4? lxf5 27 exf5 lxc4 28 lxf6 Black's position is hopeless.

Mukhin – Dolmatov
Pushkinskie Gory 1977

1 e4 e5
2 lff3 lfd6
3 lxe5 lxe5
4 lff3 lxe4
5 d4 d6
6 ldd3 lce7
7 0-0 lcc6
8 lcc1

Later the main move for White became 8 c4.

8...
9 c3 f5
10 lbd2

At the tournament in Wijk aan Zee 1975 Bert Enklaar tried 10 h3 against me. I sacrificed a pawn: 10...lxf3 (10...lbc5 is quieter) 11 gxh3? lxf6 (11...lbd6? 12 lwb3) 12 lxf5 lce7 13 ldd3 ldc6 14 lgg5 lxe7. Now 15 lxf6? is clearly wrong: 15...lxf6 16 lxe7+lxe7 trapping the bishop (or 16...lxd8 with a strong attack). After 15 lxf6 lxf6 16 lxe7+ lxd7 a roughly equal ending would have been reached. With the incautious check 15 lce6+? Enklaar conceded g6 to my knight, and hence lost control of the very important f4 square. The retribution
followed swiftly: 15...\textit{\textbullet}h8 16 \textit{\textbullet}d2 \textit{\textbullet}g6 17 \textit{\textbullet}f5 (17 \textit{\textbullet}xd5 \textit{\textbullet}f4!; 17 \textit{\textbullet}f5 c6) 17...\textit{\textbullet}f4 18 \textit{\textbullet}xf6 \textit{\textbullet}xf6 19 \textit{\textbullet}xg6 \textit{\textbullet}xd2 20 \textit{\textbullet}e2? \textit{\textbullet}f4 21 \textit{\textbullet}xh7 \textit{\textbullet}g5+ 22 \textit{\textbullet}h1 \textit{\textbullet}h5. White resigns.

The old move 10 c4?! has also been played, but according to theory the strongest is 10 \textit{\textbullet}b3.

10...\textit{\textbullet}d6!? Dolmatov prepares to castle queenside. After 10 \textit{\textbullet}b3, as is well known, White can answer 10...\textit{\textbullet}d6?! with the unpleasant 11 \textit{\textbullet}xd2!

11 \textit{\textbullet}b3

11 c4 \textit{\textbullet}xd4 12 \textit{\textbullet}a4+ \textit{\textbullet}c6 with an unclear game.

11...\textit{\textbullet}xd2!?

12...\textit{\textbullet}xd2!?

13 \textit{\textbullet}a4 \textit{\textbullet}xd2

14 \textit{\textbullet}x d2

The game Mestel-Wolff (London 1985) went 14 \textit{\textbullet}xd2 \textit{\textbullet}he8 15 \textit{\textbullet}f1 \textit{\textbullet}e2 16 \textit{\textbullet}xe2 \textit{\textbullet}xe2 17 b4 \textit{\textbullet}xd4! with complications not unfavourable to Black.

14...\textit{\textbullet}xf3

15 gxf3

15...\textit{\textbullet}b8 is sounder, not giving the opponent a 'hook' for his pawn offensive on the queenside. But Dolmatov wants to have a more favourable situation in the endgame – after the double exchange on c6 he will immediately place his king on d7 – and therefore he takes a risk in the middlegame.

16 \textit{\textbullet}d3!?

If 16 \textit{\textbullet}xc6 is not played, then it is better to withdraw the bishop to f1.

16...\textit{\textbullet}b8

17 \textit{\textbullet}xf5?

Consistent, but bad. From the Enklaar-Dvoretsky game we know that the f5 pawn in such positions is of no particular importance. White should have urgently begun his play on the queenside: 17 b4.

17...\textit{\textbullet}h4!

18 \textit{\textbullet}h3 \textit{\textbullet}f6

19 \textit{\textbullet}g2 \textit{\textbullet}e7

The same knight manoeuvre as in my game with Enklaar.

20 \textit{\textbullet}e2 \textit{\textbullet}g6

21 f4

21 \textit{\textbullet}ae1!?

21...\textit{\textbullet}xf4

22 \textit{\textbullet}xf4 \textit{\textbullet}xf4

23 \textit{\textbullet}h1 \textit{\textbullet}f8

24 \textit{\textbullet}f1 \textit{\textbullet}f6

25 \textit{\textbullet}e8 \textit{\textbullet}h6

26 \textit{\textbullet}d7

(see next diagram)
Q 4-4. What should Black play?

White was hoping for 26...\textit{\texttt{x}}e8 27 \textit{\texttt{w}}e8+ \textit{\texttt{a}}7 28 \textit{\texttt{w}}e5(e3) with approximate equality, or 26...\textit{\texttt{a}}7 27 \textit{\texttt{x}}d8 \textit{\texttt{x}}d8 28 h3, attacking both the bishop and the d5 pawn with the queen.

\begin{eqnarray*}
26 & \ldots & \textit{\texttt{a}}7! \\
27 & \textit{\texttt{x}}d8 & \textit{\texttt{e}}7!! \\
28 & \textit{\texttt{h}}3 & \textit{\texttt{d}}6 \\
29 & \textit{\texttt{w}}d6 & \textit{\texttt{x}}d6
\end{eqnarray*}

Dolmatov has transformed his positional advantage into a material one, and in the subsequent play he confidently converts it into a win.

\begin{eqnarray*}
30 & \textit{\texttt{x}}d6 & \textit{\texttt{w}}d6 \\
31 & \textit{\texttt{e}}1 & \\
32 & \ldots & \textit{\texttt{c}}6 \\
33 & \textit{\texttt{e}}2 & \textit{\texttt{f}}4 \\
34 & \textit{\texttt{f}}1 & \textit{\texttt{c}}1 \\
35 & \textit{\texttt{g}}2 & \textit{\texttt{g}}5 \\
36 & \textit{\texttt{g}}1 & \textit{\texttt{b}}1! \\
37 & \textit{\texttt{a}}3 & \textit{\texttt{c}}1 \\
38 & \textit{\texttt{f}}2 & \textit{\texttt{f}}4 \\
39 & \textit{\texttt{g}}2 & \textit{\texttt{h}}4 \\
40 & \textit{\texttt{f}}2 & \textit{\texttt{g}}3+ \\
41 & \textit{\texttt{e}}3 & \textit{\texttt{f}}4+ \\
42 & \textit{\texttt{f}}2 & \textit{\texttt{c}}1 \\
43 & \textit{\texttt{g}}2 & \textit{\texttt{b}}6
\end{eqnarray*}

Now the point of Black's 35th move becomes clear – his king has obtained invasion squares on the queenside.

\begin{eqnarray*}
44 & \textit{\texttt{f}}1 & \textit{\texttt{a}}5 \\
45 & \textit{\texttt{g}}1 & \textit{\texttt{a}}4 \\
46 & \textit{\texttt{f}}2 & \textit{\texttt{b}}3
\end{eqnarray*}

Black's plan is obvious: after first bringing up his queenside pawns, he will sacrifice his queen on b2. White resigns.

To conclude the chapter, I invite you to solve a few simple exercises.
White to move
'Spots occur even on the sun' runs the proverb. Even in events at the highest level — matches for the world championship — the players sometimes overlook favourable tactical possibilities. This is not surprising: to find a veiled combination in a nervous match atmosphere with the clock ticking is not easy, even for a world champion or the challenger to that title.

Chiburdanidze – Levitina
4th match game, Volgograd 1984

Q 4-5. Evaluate 26 \( \text{b4} \).

White is a healthy pawn to the good. The lady world champion played simply: 26 \( \text{dxe2} \text{xe2} \) (26...\text{exe2} 27 \( \text{d}3 \)) 27 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{e5} \) (27...\( \text{d}6 \)?) 28 \( \text{c1} \) \( \text{g5} \)? 29 \( \text{c8} \) \( \text{g7} \) 30 \( \text{f8} \). Black resigns. Even after the normal development of events: 28...\( \text{g4} \) 29 \( \text{c2} \) White would have had every justification in hoping for a win, although the conversion of the extra pawn could have been a protracted process.

26 \( \text{b4} \)!

26...\( \text{xe1}+ \) 27 \( \text{xe1} \text{xa2} \) does not change anything, but 26...\( \text{d4} \) is more tenacious. However, after 27 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{xe1}+ \) 28 \( \text{xe1} \) Black's position is lost.

27 \( \text{xa2} \)

28 \( \text{f5} \)!

The theme of the combination is the weakness of the eighth rank. 28 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{e6} \) or 28 \( \text{b1} ? \) \( \text{e2} \) does not work.

28 ... \( \text{e2}! \)

29 \( \text{b1}!! \)

An essential interposition. 29 \( \text{g4} \) \( \text{b5} \) is incorrect, while to the immediate 29 \( \text{d3} \) Black replies 29...\( \text{a5} \) with the spectacular idea of 30 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{e5} \)!! After 30 \( \text{g3} \) there again follows 30...\( \text{e5} \), while if 30 \( \text{c5} \), then 30...\( \text{d2} \)! There only remains 30 \( \text{xa5} \) \( \text{xa5} \) 31 \( \text{xe2} \), but for the sake of such an extra pawn with opposite-colour bishops there was obviously no point in initiating the combination.

29 ... \( \text{b2} \)

29...\( \text{a1} \) 30 \( \text{xh7+} \) or 30 \( \text{c3} \).

30 \( \text{d3} \)

Now 30...\( \text{a5} \) 31 \( \text{xa5} \) is pointless, and Black also loses after 30...\( \text{xb3} \) 31 \( \text{xe2} \) \( \text{g5} \) 32 \( \text{e8} \) \( \text{g7} \) 33 \( \text{f8} \). Thus we have seen that 26 \( \text{b4} \) was objectively the strongest move, and yet from the practical standpoint the continuation chosen by Maya Chiburdanidze should not be criticised. After all, in calculating the
combination it would have been easy to make a mistake, whereas the quiet course retained an advantage without any problems.

Kasparov – Karpov
1st game of the second match,
Moscow 1985

17

Q 4-6. What should Black play?
Observing the game from the auditorium, I, of course, first thought about 18...bxc5. But it would appear that this cannot be played, since White has two ways of refuting it:

1) 19 Qxc8+ Rdxc8 20 b7;

2) 19 Qxb8 Qxb8 20 dxc5 (intending 21 Nb1) 20...Qa6 21 Qxc8+ Qxc8 22 b7.

'If it is impossible, but you very much want to, then... you can!', runs one of the famous aphorisms from the back page of the Russian Literary Gazette. It is obvious that, if events develop quietly, it will be hard for Black to save the game - he is just too cramped. If the problems of a position cannot be solved by normal means, drastic ones must be considered, and therefore I continued checking 18...bxc5. I immediately noticed that after 19 Qxc8+ Rdxc8 20 b7 Qxb7 21 Qxb7 cxd4 22 Qxa7 Qc5 23 Qb1 e5 Black gains excellent compensation for the sacrificed exchange. If White advances his a-pawn, his rook will never be able to escape from a7.

In the second variation Black has to part with a piece.

18...bxc5!! 19 Qxb8 Qxb8 20 dxc5 Qa6! 21 Qxc8+ Qxc8 22 Qb7 Qxc5! (22...Qc6? 23 Qxc6 dxc6 24 Qb1 is hopeless) 23 Qxa6 Qa5 24 Qc8! (more accurate than 24 Qb7) 24...Qxa2+ 25 Qe3 Qd8 (25...Qc2? 26 Qd1) 26 Qb7 Qc2 27 Qa1 (27 Qa6 Qa2 28 Qb5? a6) 27...Qxc4 28 Qxa7. After 24 Qb7? the black king would have been at e7 and the a7 pawn would have been invulnerable in view of the pin ...Qc7. But now too the ending is drawish.

A good example of a saving combination. I have no doubt that in his best years Anatoly Karpov would have discovered it without difficulty, since he was rightly famed for his skill in defending difficult positions. But as age increases, with almost every player there is a reduction in his reserves of energy, there is a tendency to avoid calculating complicated variations, and the sharpness of his combinative vision is blunted. Apparently these sad changes already applied to Karpov, for he made the passive move 18...Qc7? with the idea of exchanging the dangerous knight at d6. I remember that this seemed to me to be a bad omen for the World Champion, and indeed, at the end of the match the supreme title passed to Garry Kasparov.

18 ... Qc7?
19 Qb4 Qe8
20 Qxe8?

As was shown by Kasparov, White could have gained a decisive superiority by 20 Qxc8+ Qxc8 (20...Qdxc8 21 Nb1 and 22 Qd3) 21 cxb6 axb6 22 Qd3 Qd6 23 Qc1 Qb8 24 Qcb1 Qbc8 25 Qa4! Qb8 26 Qa6 Qdc8 27 Qb4. After the move in the game,
Karpov could again have obtained quite good drawing chances, by playing 20...\textit{xe8!} 21 \textit{hb1 \textit{b7} 22 d5 exd5 23\textit{cx}d5 \textit{f8+} (this check is the whole point) 24 \textit{d2 \textit{a8}!} 20 \textit{xe8?} 21 \textit{hb1 \textit{a6} 22 \textit{e3 \textit{d5} 23 \textit{cx}d6 \textit{bc8} 23...\textit{xd}6 24 c5 \textit{dd8} 25 \textit{c6 \textit{bc8} 26 \textit{a4.}}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
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Q 4-7. Evaluate 24 \textit{a4}. For the second time from the auditorium I was able to find a combination that was not noticed by the participants on the stage. Obviously, the attempt to force events by 24 \textit{a4 \textit{xc4} 25 \textit{b7} will be met by 25...b5! However, the counter-stroke 26 d7+!! leads to an immediate win.

Kasparov played less energetically and the game dragged out somewhat.

White to move
Twin Combinations

Men play better than women, because they know many more chess combinations, which can be repeated endlessly in this or that game, whereas naive women always want to play independently, relying only on their beauty, imagination and temperament, i.e. not guided by the real life of the chess pieces.

David Bronstein

Since the time that Bronstein wrote these lines, many years have passed, and in the chess world much has changed. The impressive successes of the young Polgar sisters have to a considerable extent been the result of their fully professional work on chess. But the basic idea contained in Bronstein’s words, has, of course, not aged at all. Ideas, techniques, and combinations repeat themselves, they can and should be studied, and your future successes depend on the amount of work done, and on the extent of your knowledge.

A chess player depends on his own discoveries, to no less a degree than those of others. They are closer to him, and they are better remembered, since at some point they have already been deeply considered and sensed by him. Your own games should be carefully preserved, and sometimes again examined. On returning home after the conclusion of a round, I would usually write out the game I had just played in a special notebook, recording the variations that I had calculated at the board, and the ideas that I had considered in the course of the play. Leaving space for future additions and corrections. The information retained in this way was subsequently used many times both when preparing for new games, and as training material for lessons with young players. I also recommend the same system to my pupils (with the only difference that, instead of a notebook, it now makes sense to use a computer). The games we play, together with the ideas we invest in them, are the main creative result of our chess activity, and they are deserving of a caring attitude.

Here are two integral games by Sergey Dolmatov, in which he carried out very similar combinations. The second combination undoubtedly came to him without any difficulty, aided by the experience that he already had.

Dolmatov – Botto
European Junior Championship, Groningen 1977/78

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In the second half of the 1970s this position was an opening ‘tabiya’, which occurred in numerous games. Black tried various systems of defence, but in the Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings I did not find the move made by Paul Botto.

11 . . . e8
Black wants to defend by occupying the strong point e5 with his knight. An interesting idea, probably evoked by the game Gipslis–Korchnoi (Amsterdam 1976). In it Black began carrying out the same plan two moves earlier, in the ‘tabiya’ position: 11...f6 12 h4 wb6! 13 e2 e6 14 g3 e5! with an acceptable game.

14 h4 wc7
15 g3 e5!

Of course, the young player from Wales avoids the unfavourable exchange of dark-square bishops.

16 fd4

It is useful to prevent the manoeuvre of the bishop to f7, supporting the weak d5 pawn.

16 ...
20

17 f3!

A good plan: White places his bishop at f3 and plays his knight to e3. By piling up on the d5 pawn, Dolmatov hopes to provoke favourable exchanges. I should mention that the strength of playing a knight to e3 in such positions was already known to Sergey. Our opening preparation did not merely reduce to the memorising of specific variations; we analysed typical games, aimed to delve more deeply into the ideas of the opening, and to pick out typical techniques, i.e. to act precisely in the direction recommended by Bronstein.

17 ...
18 c2 c6?

A positional mistake – here the bishop is badly placed. It was better to play 18...e6, e.g. 19 bd4 f7 20 e3 g6.

19 bd4 wc8

If 19...g6, then 20 h5, intending f5 or f2–f4–f5.

20 e3 c5
20...xf3+ 21 xf3 c5 22 ad1 with advantage to White.

21

21 h5! g6
22 g4! xg4

Forced.

23 xg4 d7

Or 23...f5 24 f3 with an obvious positional superiority. Dolmatov has successfully achieved his main objective – the exchange of the knight on e5.

Q 4-8. What should White do next?

There followed another ‘little combination’ (as Capablanca liked to say).
24 $e6! f5
25 $xd8 fxg4
26 $xe7! $xe7
26...$xe7 27 $xd5+ with a quick mate.
27 $xd5+ $e6
27...$f8 28 $h4 or 28 $f4.
28 $xe6 $xe6
29 $xe6+ $xe6
The combination has won White a pawn, which he converts quickly and accurately.
30 $f1 $f7
31 $d1 h6
32 $d5 $b6
33 c4 $f6
34 b3 $e4
35 a4 $e6
36 a5 $a7
37 b4 $e4
38 b5
Black resigns.

The following game was played six months later.

Dolmatov – Mokry
World Junior Championship, Graz 1978

1 e4 c5
2 $f3 d6
3 d4 $xd4
4 $xd4 $f6
5 $c3 a6
6 f4 e6
7 $e2 $e7
8 0–0 0–0
9 a4 $c6
10 $e3 $c7
11 $h1 $d7
12 $b3
Before the world championship Dolmatov studied the main variations of the Sicilian Defence at a training session with the assistance of a great expert on this opening, grandmaster Vladimir Tukmakov. The present game was the first test of strength in an opening variation that was new for him. Despite his lack of practical experience, Dolmatov confidently coped with the subtleties of the position. Here, for example, he retreated his knight to b3 only after the bishop had moved to d7 – otherwise Black would have developed his bishop much more actively: ...b7–b6 and ...$b7.
Instead of 11...$d7, nowadays 11...$e8 is more often played.

12...
If 12...$a5, then 13 e5! is unpleasant.
13 a5 $c6
14 $f3 d5
15 e5 $d7
16 $e2 b6
White has the advantage on the kingside and in the centre; his opponent should have sought counterplay on the queenside with 16...b6.
17 $d1 $b7
18 c3 $c6
Black acts too passively. 18...$c4 really was better, when Dolmatov was intending 19 $d4!

19 $f2 $c8
20 $d3 $b8
21 $f1 $f6
22 exf6 $xf6
23 $f3 $f6
24 $b6 $d7
25 $d4 $d6
26 g3 $b7
27 \textit{e1} \textit{c8} \\
28 \textit{g4} \textit{e8} \\
29 \textit{xc6} \textit{xc6} \\
30 \textit{d4} \textit{f7}

Of course, 33 \textit{xf7} is also good enough, but the move played is more accurate.

33 \ldots \textit{d7} \\
34 \textit{h6+} \textit{f8} \\
35 \textit{xf7} \textit{xf7}

It is not hard to convert the exchange advantage. Dolmatov first strengthens his position to the maximum, and then... adjourns the game. In home analysis we chose an appropriate way to break through the opponent's defences.

36 \textit{g4} \textit{f8} \\
37 \textit{b4} \textit{e7} \\
38 \textit{a2} \textit{d7} \\
39 \textit{g2} \textit{f8} \\
40 \textit{ae2} \textit{d7} \\
41 \textit{h3} \textit{g8} \\
42 \textit{h6} \textit{f7} \\
43 \textit{g5} \textit{e7} \\
44 \textit{h6}

The sealed move.

44 \ldots \textit{f7} \\
45 \textit{f5!} \textit{exf5} \\
46 \textit{xe8} \textit{xe8} \\
47 \textit{xf5!} \textit{d7} \\
48 \textit{xd7} \textit{xd7}

Black resigns.

Q 4-9. What should White play?

Up till now Dolmatov has been consistently strengthening his position. Now the moment has come to transform positional superiority into material gains. If the previous game is remembered, it is easy to find the solution.

31 \textit{h5!} \textit{g6} \\
32 \textit{e5!} \textit{c7} \\
33 \textit{g4!}
A Prompt

Our happiness or unhappiness depends only on ourselves.
Michel Montaigne

One candidate master decided that in his next tournament he would definitely, at any price, achieve the master norm. He persuaded a friend, a strong master, to help him not only in his preparations for the games, but also during play. Together they worked out a system of signs, with the help of which at decisive moments the master could suggest strong moves.

In one of the first rounds the master ‘recommended’ an apparently very strange continuation. The candidate could not understand the point of it, and he played differently. And this was a mistake – the suggested move was very strong. After this incident, at a ‘council of war’ it was decided that all suggestions should be carried out unconditionally. In the next round the master suggested giving up a pawn. The candidate did not understand why, but he sacrificed the pawn and did not gain any compensation for it. After losing the game, he indignantly asked the master what the point of it was. ‘I am capable of making a mistake’, replied the latter, shrugging his shoulders.

I have always regarded such unsporting tricks as pitiful attempts to make up for lack of skill, and at the least a sure sign of weakness of spirit. The high moral esteem in which Artur Yusupov, Sergey Dolmatov and Nana Alexandria are held in chess circles is a logical consequence of how their trainer too has always tried to adhere to the rules of honest competition.

I remember, however, how once they tried to prompt me. But, as in the story just related, this did not succeed.

In a game played towards the end of a junior team tournament, I exchanged all the pieces and transposed into a favourable pawn ending. I was sitting, calculating some rather complicated variations, and trying to find a way to win. Alexander Roshal, the team’s trainer (and simultaneously my own trainer) came up and whispered: ‘Agree a draw! Agree a draw!’. I was surprised, but, thinking that such a result was in the interests of the team, I waited for a couple of minutes and then offered a draw. My opponent, of course, agreed.

I went off to one side, and Roshal promptly asked me:
– Why did you stop playing? You stood better.
– But you yourself said to me ‘Agree a draw’, I answered in surprise.
– Nothing of the sort. I whispered to you ‘g4’.

Eighteen months passed. For the first time in my life I entered a tournament with the master norm, and I immediately exceeded it by one and a half points. The following game, in which I suffered some unpleasant experiences, proved decisive. But in the end I was helped by a prompt, although an indirect one.

Bobolovich – Dvoretsky
Moscow Championship Semi-Final 1966

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</table>
5 0–0
d4
c3
dx5
e3
Wa4

c5
d6
c6
dx5
e6
Wa5?

A mistake, which immediately puts Black in a difficult position. According to theory, 10...c4 is correct.

11 d2!
Threatening 12 x6.

11 ...

11...b4?  
12 x4  
13 xc5!  
14 e3 xc4

A pawn down, I desperately try to change the unfavourable course of the game.

15 xc4 b5

Q 4-10. What should White play?

A very important moment has been reached. White has an undisputed advantage, and he has several tempting continuations. He needs to choose the most clear-cut, the most convincing course, since if it is missed, it may subsequently be far more difficult to win.

16 ad1?

Much stronger was 16 fd1! cb8 17 ac1! bxc4 18 xa7, when White is a healthy pawn to the good.

16 ...

17 cb8!

It was not yet too late for White to admit his mistake, by nevertheless placing his rook on c1.

17 ...

18 x3  
19 xa7

Now White is not a pawn up, and he has 'only' the advantage of the two bishops, which, however, is overwhelming, since the position is an open one.

20 d2 fc8

21 b2?

Serious consideration should have been given to 21 x8! (a well-known truth: 'the main advantage of the two bishops is that one of them can always be exchanged') 21...x8 22 b7! c2! 23 ld1 xd2 24 xd2 xc1 + 25 g2 xc6 26 d7, although it is doubtful whether White’s advantage is sufficient for a win. 21 ld1! was simpler.

21 ...

22 fb1  
23 xb2  
24 f1  
25 e3

If 25 xb5 Black would not have replied 25...xa7! 26 b7, but 25...a1! 26 b7 x7.

25 ...

26 f4?  
27 g2  
28 d2 e4
Q 4-11. What should Black play?

At this point a colleague of mine from school and the Pioneers Palace, Sasha Karasyov, came into the tournament room. We greeted one another, and I continued thinking about my move.

It is clear that the worst for Black is now over, and he should not lose. I was looking for the safest way to gain a draw. If, say, 29...\(\text{c}3\), then 30 \(\text{c}4\), and 30...\(\text{a}5\)? is not possible due to 31 \(\text{xb}4\). It is possible simply to exchange on \(d2\), but will not the \(b4\) pawn become weak when the white king crosses to the queenside, especially in the event of the exchange of rooks?

Here I sensed some kind of agitation, so I raised my head, and noticed that my friend was very excited. His face had changed, and he began circling round the board. I immediately realised that Sasha had seen something. This forced me to look at the position with different eyes, to stop looking for a draw, and to consider what he could have discovered. And, of course, the solution was instantly found.

- 29 \(\ldots\) \(b3!!\)
- 30 \(\text{xb}3\) \(\text{d}1\)

The bishop is trapped. If 31 \(\text{b}5\), then 31...\(\text{a}7\).

- 31 \(\text{c}3\) \(\text{xc}3\)
- 32 \(\text{c}2\) \(\text{d}5\)

And now the awkward position of the other bishop tells.

- 33 \(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xe}3+\)
- 34 \(\text{f}2\) \(\text{xf}1\)
- 35 \(\text{e}2\) \(\text{b}1\)
- 36 \(\text{b}4\) \(\text{h}2\)

White resigns.

Why did I relate this story? After it I realised how important it can sometimes be to look at a position with a fresh glance. This is that ‘prompt’, which you can always arrange for yourself.

Tigran Petrosian suggested that usually a player either notices immediately an unexpected combinative blow, or else he does not find it at all. This is explained by the fact that, carried away by the checking and clarification of variations, under their influence he forms a definite impression of the position and he can no longer move off the established track, forgetting about the search for new ideas. You can and must fight against this psychological effect.

On encountering a difficult problem during the course of a game, stop your calculations for a time and turn to a search, asking yourself: ‘what else may be hidden in the position, what may I have overlooked?’ Not always, but quite often, such a ‘distraction’ will give good results.
Candidate Moves

Candidate moves should be determined immediately and listed accurately. This work cannot be done piecemeal, considering one move, and then looking for another.

Alexander Kotov

It is not enough to find a combination; its consequences must also be accurately calculated. For the purpose of training in the calculation of variations, you should try to solve exercises, the main difficulty of which lies not in the search for pretty, camouflaged ideas, but in the need to examine a large number of different branches, which sometimes require analysing many moves ahead.

Alexander Kotov, who in his time was only a first category player, significantly developed his calculating ability thanks to systematic training. As a result, he sharply improved his standard of play, and became a grandmaster. In the books that he wrote, Kotov shared the experience of his work, picked out procedures for improving the quality of calculating variations, and gave a number of useful pieces of advice. One such piece has been taken as the epigraph to the present chapter.

In Volume 1 of this series we saw on several occasions how valuable this advice was when applied to the analysis of adjourned games. It stands to reason that it is no less important when playing at the board. I should now like to show you a memorable occurrence for me on this theme.

Dvoretsky – Schussler
Tbilisi 1980

1 e4 e5
2 Qf3 Qf6
3 Qxe5 d6
4 Qf3 Qxe4

5 d4 d5
6 Qd3 Qe7
7 0–0 Qd6?!

Black defends against c2–c4, but for this he makes already a third move with his knight. In the opening one is not supposed to waste tempi, and so it is not surprising that White can obtain the better position in various ways. For example, 8 Qc3 c6 9 Qe2 Qf5 10 Qg3 is not bad.

8 Qf4

Now 8...Qf5 is not possible in view of 9 Qxd6.

8 ... Qg4

9 Qbd2

An interesting plan was developed by Sergey Makarychev: 9 Qe1 0–0 10 h3 Qh5 11 Qc3! c6 12 We2.

Q 4–12. What happens in reply to 12...Qe8?
12...\textit{He}8 is bad on account of 13 \textit{xh}7+! \textit{Hxh}7 14 \textit{Qg}5+ \textit{Aq}g5 15 \textit{Wh}xh5+ \textit{Ah}6
16 \textit{Hx}e8 (16 \textit{Hx}d6 \textit{Hxe}1+ 17 \textit{Hxe}1 \textit{Hxd}6
18 \textit{Wf}5+ \textit{Wg}6 19 \textit{Wc}8, suggested by Joël Lautier, is also strong, although here White has to reckon with 19 ...\textit{Ae}2
16 \textit{Ax}h6 g\textit{gxh}6 18 \textit{Wf}x7+ \textit{Ag}7 19 \textit{Wxb}7 (or 19 \textit{Ae}1).

\textbf{Q 4-13. And how can 12...\textit{Qc}8 be refuted?}
This also does not work: 12...\textit{Qc}8 13 \textit{Ab}8 \textit{Ax}f3 (13...\textit{Ax}b8 14 \textit{We}5) 14 \textit{We}5!! \textit{Ah}6
15 \textit{Wf}4 \textit{Ag}5 (15...\textit{Ah}5 16 \textit{Ac}7 \textit{Wd}7 17 \textit{Af}5) 16 \textit{Wf}5! \textit{g}6 17 \textit{We}5 \textit{Af}6 18 \textit{Wc}7!, and the bishop at f3 can move only to e4.
Finally, if 12...\textit{Af}6 Makarychev gives the following variation: 13 \textit{We}3! \textit{Ze}8 (13. \textit{Ax}f3
14 \textit{Wf}3 \textit{Ad}4 15 \textit{Qd}5!!) 14 \textit{Ae}5 \textit{Ad}7
15 \textit{g}4 \textit{Ag}6 16 \textit{Wf}4 with advantage to White.

9 0-0
10 \textit{Hf}1 \textit{Af}6

I had already reached this position seven years earlier, in a game against Andrey Khachaturov (Moscow 1973). Then I played superficially: 11 c3, and Black was able to equalise by 11...\textit{Be}8 12 \textit{Wb}3 \textit{Db}6 13 \textit{Wc}2
\textit{g}6 14 \textit{De}5 \textit{Df}5 15 \textit{He}2 \textit{Ag}5! 16 \textit{Xg}5 \textit{Xg}5
17 \textit{Aa}e1 \textit{f}6.

On this occasion I chose a more logical plan. For the moment 11 h3 \textit{Ah}5 is pointless, since Black gains the opportunity to exchange the light-square bishops by ...\textit{Ag}6.
But if I first transfer my knight to g3 and only then play h2-h3, the opponent will have to exchange on f3, after which my pieces will exert unpleasant pressure on Black's kingside.

11 \textit{Af}1 \textit{Af}6

All is clear: if 12 \textit{Ag}3 the reply 12...\textit{Ah}5 is intended. But there is a serious flaw in the opponent's plan.

\textbf{Q 4-14. What is it?}
12 \textit{Ag}3 \textit{Ah}5

13 \textit{Qxh}5 \textit{Xh}5
14 \textit{Ee}5!

An extremely unpleasant double attack. If Black exchanges on f3 and then plays ...\textit{c}7-\textit{c}6 (and there appears to be no other way of avoiding the loss of a pawn), then White can sacrifice his bishop on h7. After the game my opponent pointed out a move which he had been studying 'in desperation': 14...\textit{g}5?!; but, of course, it cannot be taken seriously.

Harry Schussler sank into thought. His reply followed only one and a half hours (!) later. At this point I felt sorry for him: what can you do when all moves are bad, and however much you think the position can no longer be repaired.

14 ... \textit{Af}3
15 \textit{Wf}3 c6

26

\textbf{Q 4-15. What should White play?}
I was in no doubt that the bishop sacrifice was correct. Therefore my first desire was to take on h7 without thinking, see what defence the opponent would chose after 16 \textit{Xh}7+ \textit{Xh}7 17 \textit{Hh}5+ \textit{Ag}8 18 \textit{Wh}3 -
18...\textit{f}6 or 18...\textit{f}5 – and only then calculate variations. But fortunately, I did not do anything so stupid, but began checking the sacrifice, and saw that things were not as
The threat is 17 cxe7. After 16...f6 17 cxe7+ cxe7 18 h5+ c8 19 xd6 c8 20 e5 Black has no compensation for the lost pawn.

It is noteworthy, however, that I did not see the best defence - 16 c8! If the opponent had played this, I am not sure if I would have had the strength to find the correct continuation of the attack: 17 a1 16 h5 g6 19 h3! cxd4 20 h7. Objectively the resulting position is advantageous to White. e.g. 20 f6 21 h6 (threatening 22 c3) 21...xb2 (22...g5 22 xg5+ 23 xg5 24 b1 25 h6 25 h6) 22 g5 c3 23 e3, or even 23 e6?!

I was lucky: Schellusser was as tired as I was, and he made things easy for White.

16 ... h4?
17 c6+ c7
18 h5+ c8
19 h3!

Of course, not 19 h4? cf5 or 19 h4? h4 20 h4 c6.

19 ... g5
20 g3

20 e5 is also strong, but the move in the game is simpler.

20 ... c8
21 xg8 c8
22 d2 c7
23 gh4 gh4
24 h1!

Black resigns, since 24...g6 is met by 25 g1 e8 26 f4.

I do not reproach myself for immediately being carried away by calculating the bishop sacrifice - it was just too tempting. But as soon as it became clear that the sacrifice did not lead to a forced win, it was essential to stop and compile a complete list of available candidate moves. By concentrating on this objective, I would probably have quickly found 16 c8, and after a brief verification would have realised that this is what I should play. As a result, I would have saved myself much time and effort.

Grandmaster Yusupov attaches great importance to determining all the candidate moves. This habit has often helped him to find and make use of latent resources in the position. A good illustration is provided by the following game.
Yusupov – Nogueiras
Candidates Tournament, Montpellier 1985

1 d4 d5
2 c4 e6
3 ∇c3 c6
4 ∇f3 ∇f6
5 ∇g5 lbd7
6 cxd5 exd5
7 e3 lbd6
8 lbd3

Black wants to carry out the same procedure that I made use of in the previous game: ...lbd6 followed by ...h7–h6. For the sake of this aim, like Schussler, in the opening he makes several moves with one piece. This dubious plan was one that Jesus Nogueiras had also employed earlier, and so Artur and I had the opportunity to prepare and to guess how events would develop.

9 ∇e5!? lbd7

In the event of 9...lbd6 White reinforces his knight in the centre by 10 f4, e.g. 10...0–0 11 0–0 (in the game Chernin–Cvetkovic, Belgrade 1988, 11 wc2!? wc8 12 0–0 was played) 11...h6 12 ∇xf6 wxf6 13 wh5 lbd7 14 g4 or 14 e4.

10 0–0 lxe5

10...wxb2 11 lc1 was extremely dangerous for Black.

11 dxe5 lbd7?

11...lbd6 was stronger, when Yusupov had in mind 12 ∇f4 wxb2 13 lc1 lbd6 14 ∇xe6 lhxg6 15 e4, securing him an advantage. Instead of taking the pawn, it is better for Black to play 12...lc5, as in the game Gulko–Smagin (Moscow Championship 1984).

Q 4–16. What should White play?

We briefly looked at this position in our preparations, and decided that it was advantageous to White in view of the variation 12 ∇f4 lbd6 13 ∇xe6 hxg6 14 h3 lbd6 15 e4! However, at the board Yusupov usually checks preliminary analyses, especially if they have been done hastily. He wondered whether there were any other possibilities apart from 12 ∇f4, and found a very tempting idea. After coming to the conclusion that in the variation planned at home Black can still defend by 15...wxb2 16 lc1 0–0!, Artur preferred a continuation that he found during the game.

12 wa4! lxb2?!

Now White’s lead in development becomes overwhelming, but it is hard to offer Black any good advice. After 12...lxd7 there was a choice between 13 wa3!? f6 14 exf6 gxf6 15 lh4 and 13 e6!? lxe6 14 lxd5 lxd5 15 wxb7 – in both variations White’s advantage is obvious.

13 lc1 lbd7

If 13...lxe5 White wins by either 14 lc2 wb6 15 lxd5, or 14 lxd5 lxd3 15 lxc6!

see next diagram
Q 4-17. How can White most quickly exploit his advantage?

The first desire is bring all the pieces into play by 14 \( \text{c}2 \) \( \text{w}b6 \) 15 \( \text{b}1 \). However, after 15...\( \text{c}7 \) 16 \( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{xe}5 \) or 16 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{e}6 \) Black somehow holds on.

Again Yusupov asked himself about the candidate moves available. As a result he found a deadly solution.

14 \( \text{d}4!! \)

White has created five(!) threats: 15 \( \text{xd}5 \), 15 \( \text{b}5 \), 15 \( \text{e}4 \), 15 \( \text{b}1 \) and 15 \( \text{e}6 \) \( \text{xe}6 \) 16 \( \text{wxg}7 \). It goes without saying that it is not possible to defend simultaneously against all of them. If, for example, 14...\( \text{b}6 \), then 15 \( \text{e}6 \), winning a piece.

14 ... f6
15 \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{gx}f6 \)
16 \( \text{x}f6 \) \( \text{g}8 \)
16...\( \text{xf}6 \) 17 \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{g}8 \) 18 \( \text{xd}5 \)
17 \( \text{b}5! \) \( \text{xb}5 \)
18 \( \text{xb}5 \) \( \text{e}6 \)
19 \( \text{b}2 \) \( \text{cxb}5 \)
20 \( \text{h}4 \)

Black resigns.

Q 4-18. How should White continue his offensive?

In the book by John Nunn and Peter Griffiths *Secrets of Grandmaster Play* they suggest
15 e5! (the authors' exclamation mark)
15...\textit{ex}e5 16 \textit{\textit{a}2} \textit{\textit{g}4} (16...\textit{c}4? 17 \textit{\textit{x}xb2} \textit{\textit{x}xb2} 18 \textit{wd}4) 17 \textit{\textit{d}d}4 \textit{\textit{x}h6} 18 \textit{\textit{c}6} \textit{\textit{w}c7} 
19 \textit{\textit{x}xb8} \textit{\textit{g}7} 20 \textit{\textit{c}c6}, and the resulting position is judged to favour White.

Dolmatov did not agree with this evaluation, and suggested continuing the variation: 20...d5! (weak is 20...\textit{\textit{c}1}5 21 \textit{\textit{a}7} \textit{\textit{w}b6} 
22 \textit{\textit{g}4} \textit{\textit{d}d}4 23 \textit{\textit{a}8} \textit{\textit{x}c6} 24 \textit{\textit{w}d}6, or 
22...d5 23 \textit{\textit{a}xd5}! \textit{\textit{ex}d5} 24 \textit{\textit{e}1}+ \textit{\textit{f}8} 
25 \textit{\textit{w}d}5) 21 \textit{\textit{a}xd5} \textit{\textit{ex}d5} 22 \textit{\textit{e}1}+ \textit{\textit{f}8} 
23 \textit{\textit{w}d}5 \textit{\textit{f}6}, and it is not apparent how White can strengthen his attack.

Sergey would seem to be right, although Yusupov found a more convincing reply to Nunn's recommendation (here and subsequently I give the name of only one of the co-authors, since in the preface to the book it is mentioned: 'In general, the moves are mine and the words Peter's'). The habit of deciding on all the candidate moves helped Artur after 15 e5? (on this occasion the question mark is mine) to find the excellent reply 15...d5!, which makes any further complicated calculations superfluous.

In Yusupov's opinion, White should play simply 15 \textit{\textit{d}b}1! \textit{\textit{f}6} 16 \textit{\textit{d}b}3! (less good is 16 \textit{\textit{f}4} \textit{\textit{e}7}! with the threat of 17...\textit{\textit{x}g}8) 
16...e5 (16...\textit{\textit{w}e}7 17 \textit{\textit{f}4}; 16...\textit{\textit{d}e}5 17 \textit{\textit{h}3} or 
17 \textit{\textit{d}d}4) 17 \textit{\textit{x}d}3 \textit{\textit{w}e}7 18 \textit{\textit{c}c}3! \textit{\textit{e}6} 19 \textit{\textit{d}d}5 
\textit{\textit{a}xd5} 20 \textit{\textit{a}xd5}, and White retains unpleasant pressure on the opponent's position.

13 \textit{\textit{g}5} \textit{\textit{d}7} 
14 \textit{\textit{w}c}1 \textit{\textit{c}5} 
15 \textit{\textit{b}4}?!

The simple 15 \textit{\textit{d}d}1 would have secured White the better chances. Instead of this John Nunn decided on an exchange sacrifice, the consequences of which were very hard to evaluate. Tony Miles did not risk taking the rook, and preferred to win a pawn by 15...\textit{\textit{e}6} 16 \textit{\textit{h}6} \textit{\textit{d}d}4 17 \textit{\textit{x}d}4 \textit{\textit{x}d}4 
18 \textit{\textit{w}h}1 \textit{\textit{x}h}6 19 \textit{\textit{w}x}h6 \textit{\textit{x}c}2, but after 
20 \textit{\textit{a}c}1 \textit{\textit{d}d}4 21 \textit{\textit{\textit{x}c}7} White gained more

than sufficient positional compensation for it. The game ended in a win for him.

Let's analyse what could have happened if Miles had chosen the most critical continuation.

15 ... \textit{\textit{\textit{x}a}1}! 
16 \textit{\textit{x}a}1 \textit{\textit{d}e}6 
17 \textit{\textit{h}6} 
Not 17 \textit{\textit{x}e}7? \textit{\textit{\textit{c}x}e}7 18 \textit{\textit{f}6}+ \textit{\textit{h}8} 19 \textit{\textit{d}7}+ 
\textit{f6} 20 \textit{\textit{x}b}8 \textit{\textit{w}b}6.

17 ... \textit{\textit{e}8} 
18 \textit{\textit{f}4} \textit{\textit{f}6} 
19 \textit{\textit{f}5} 

\textbf{Q 4-19. To where is it better to retreat the knight, c7 or g7?}

Try first guessing the reply, and only then delve into the variations. It is very hard to make the correct choice, since there are serious arguments in favour of each of the possibilities.

A) In the event of 19...\textit{\textit{g}7} White can continue his pawn storm on the kingside with 20 \textit{\textit{g}4} followed by \textit{\textit{g}4}-\textit{g}5, whereas after 
19...\textit{\textit{c}7} there is no time for this, since Black immediately exchanges the strong knight at d5.

B) After 19...\textit{\textit{g}7} 20 \textit{\textit{w}a}2 Black parries the
opponent's threats with the simple 20...\(\text{\textesel{h}8}\), not fearing 21 fxg6 hxg6 22 \(\text{\textesel{d}f}4\) in view of 22...\(\text{\textesel{e}5}\) 23 \(\text{\textesel{g}6+}\) \(\text{\textesel{h}7!}\) (23...\(\text{\textesel{g}6}\) 24 \(\text{\textesel{f}7}\) \(\text{\textesel{g}8}\) 25 \(\text{\textesel{x}g}6\) \(\text{\textesel{d}7}\) 26 \(\text{\textesel{e}3}\)) 24 \(\text{\textesel{x}e}5\) \(\text{\textesel{e}6!}\), when the attack is repulsed, but the exchange advantage remains.

In the event of 19...\(\text{\textesel{c}7}\) 20 \(\text{\textesel{a}2}\) the move 20...\(\text{\textesel{h}8}\) now loses: 21 \(\text{\textesel{x}c}7\) \(\text{\textesel{x}c}7\) 22 fxg6 hxg6 23 \(\text{\textesel{f}7}\) \(\text{\textesel{g}8}\) 24 \(\text{\textesel{f}4!}\) g5 25 \(\text{\textesel{x}g}5\) fxg5 26 \(\text{\textesel{h}5+}\).

Is this factor sufficient to give preference to the knight retreat to g7? No, it is not: after 19...\(\text{\textesel{c}7}\) 20 \(\text{\textesel{a}2}\), apart from 20...\(\text{\textesel{h}8}\)? Black also has the seemingly risky move 20...\(\text{\textesel{e}6}\)!, suggested by Nunn. In the variation 21 \(\text{\textesel{x}c}7\) \(\text{\textesel{x}c}7\) 22 fxg6 hxg6 23 \(\text{\textesel{x}f}6\) \(\text{\textesel{h}7}\) followed by ...\(\text{\textesel{e}5}\) the knight's strong position in the centre of the board safeguards Black against an attack. Neither 21 fx6 \(\text{\textesel{x}e}6\) 22 \(\text{\textesel{f}e}4\) \(\text{\textesel{f}7}\), nor 21 \(\text{\textesel{d}f}4\) \(\text{\textesel{h}8!}\) (weaker is 21...\(\text{\textesel{e}5}\) 22 \(\text{\textesel{d}d}4\)) 22 fxg6 hxg6 23 \(\text{\textesel{x}g}6+\) \(\text{\textesel{h}7}\) is dangerous, while if 21 e5 the simplest is 21...\(\text{\textesel{x}e}5\)!

C) It only remains to analyse another attempt to sacrifice the rook on f6. Nunn considers this idea to be incorrect and gives the variation 19...\(\text{\textesel{c}7}\) (he does not examine 19...\(\text{\textesel{g}7}\) at all) 20 fxg6 hxg6 21 \(\text{\textesel{x}f}6\) exf6 22 \(\text{\textesel{x}f}6+\) \(\text{\textesel{f}7}\) 23 \(\text{\textesel{x}e}8\) \(\text{\textesel{x}e}8\), 'and Black wins'.

This position can be reached after both knight retreats on the 19th move, but it is not Black who wins. After 24 \(\text{\textesel{h}8}\), despite his extra rook, he has no reliable way of parrying the threats of 25 \(\text{\textesel{b}8}\) and 25 \(\text{\textesel{h}7+}\). 24...\(\text{\textesel{f}6}\) 25 \(\text{\textesel{g}7+}\) is completely bad for him. If 24...\(\text{\textesel{g}4}\) there follows 25 \(\text{\textesel{h}7+}\) \(\text{\textesel{e}6}\) (25...\(\text{\textesel{f}6}\) 26 \(\text{\textesel{g}5+}\)) 26 \(\text{\textesel{f}4+}\) \(\text{\textesel{e}5}\) 27 \(\text{\textesel{f}7}\)!, while in reply to 24...\(\text{\textesel{f}6}\) 25 \(\text{\textesel{g}7+}\) \(\text{\textesel{e}8}\) White does not play 26 \(\text{\textesel{g}5}\) \(\text{\textesel{b}7}\)!, but 26 \(\text{\textesel{x}g}6+\) \(\text{\textesel{d}7}\) 27 \(\text{\textesel{g}5}\), remaining with two or three pawns for the exchange and maintaining his attack. More tenacious is 26...\(\text{\textesel{e}7}\) (instead of 26...\(\text{\textesel{d}7}\)) 27 \(\text{\textesel{g}7+}\) \(\text{\textesel{e}8}\) 28 \(\text{\textesel{g}5}\) \(\text{\textesel{b}7}\) 29 \(\text{\textesel{x}f}6\) \(\text{\textesel{x}f}6\) 30 \(\text{\textesel{x}f}6\) \(\text{\textesel{x}b}4\), but 31 \(\text{\textesel{d}4}\) retains the advantage for White.

Let us now try and find where Black can avoid this unfavourable variation. After 19...\(\text{\textesel{g}7}\) 20 fxg6 hxg6 (20...\(\text{\textesel{e}5}\)!) 21 gxh7+ \(\text{\textesel{x}h}7\) 22 \(\text{\textesel{c}1}\), and White has good positional compensation for the sacrificed exchange) 21 \(\text{\textesel{x}f}6\) exf6 22 \(\text{\textesel{x}f}6+\) \(\text{\textesel{f}7}\) 23 \(\text{\textesel{x}e}8\) (23 \(\text{\textesel{x}g}7?\) \(\text{\textesel{e}5}\)) we must check 23...\(\text{\textesel{h}5}\)!? (23...\(\text{\textesel{e}6}\) is worse on account of the same reply 24 \(\text{\textesel{h}8}\)!) But then there follows 24 \(\text{\textesel{g}7}\)! \(\text{\textesel{e}5}\) (24...\(\text{\textesel{w}6}\) 25 \(\text{\textesel{e}5}\)?) 25 \(\text{\textesel{a}2+}\) with the better chances for White. Also possible is 24 \(\text{\textesel{h}8}\) \(\text{\textesel{x}e}8\) 25 \(\text{\textesel{h}7+}\) \(\text{\textesel{e}6}\) (25...\(\text{\textesel{f}6}\) 26 \(\text{\textesel{f}4}\)) 26 \(\text{\textesel{f}4+}\) \(\text{\textesel{x}f}4\) 27 \(\text{\textesel{x}f}4\) (27 gxh4 \(\text{\textesel{w}7}\) 27...\(\text{\textesel{w}7}\) (27...\(\text{\textesel{b}7}\)?) 28 \(\text{\textesel{h}3+}\) \(\text{\textesel{f}6}\) 29 \(\text{\textesel{e}5}\) \(\text{\textesel{e}5}\) 30 \(\text{\textesel{g}5+}\)) 28 \(\text{\textesel{h}3+}\) \(\text{\textesel{e}7}\) 29 \(\text{\textesel{x}d}6+\) \(\text{\textesel{x}d}6\) 30 \(\text{\textesel{x}f}7\) \(\text{\textesel{x}h}3\) 31 \(\text{\textesel{x}g}6+\) \(\text{\textesel{e}6}\) with a position that is difficult to evaluate: after 32...\(\text{\textesel{e}5}\) Black's pieces are exceptionally active, but on the other hand White has several extra pawns.

Let us return to the knight retreat to c7. It is here that the defence can be improved.

19 ...\(\text{\textesel{c}7}\)!

20 fxg6 \(\text{\textesel{h}x}g6\)

21 \(\text{\textesel{x}f}6\) exf6

22 \(\text{\textesel{x}f}6+\) \(\text{\textesel{f}7}\)

23 \(\text{\textesel{x}e}8\) \(\text{\textesel{x}e}8!\)
After the capture on e8 with the king the attack quickly peters out, e.g. 24 Wh8+ Qd7 25 Nh3+ Qe6.

Thus we finally have the right to draw a conclusion: 19...Qc7! is stronger than 19...Qg7, which tells in particular in the event of the rook sacrifice on f6. To foresee this, being guided only by 'general considerations', is practically impossible. You need to deeply and accurately calculate variations, each time without fail deciding on all the candidate moves for yourself and for the opponent. Remember, if only, how easy it was to come to an incorrect conclusion when checking the 20 g4 variation – we only needed to overlook a latent defence for Black.

The only purely positional argument, which could have helped us to choose 19...Qc7!, was the fact that it threatens the exchange of knights, compelling White to force events and ruling out quiet moves such as 20 g4. But here this is merely a slight prompt – in such cases one cannot get by without a thorough specific checking of the variations.

In the new edition of his book (1997) Nunn analysed another attempt to create an attack. After 19...Qc7! 20 fxg6 hxg6 White can sacrifice another, less valuable piece – his knight: 21 Qxf6+! exf6 22 Qxf6.

22...Qe5. If 22...Qe5, then 23 Qxg6+ Qh7 24 Qg5 We8 25 Qf4 (with the threat of 26 Qd1), and Black has to give up his queen on g6, after which he will at the least not stand better.

23 Qxg6+ Qh7 (23...Qh8 24 Qg5 Qd7 25 Qf6+ Qh7 26 Qg7+ Qxg7 27 Qxg7 Qxg7 28 Qd4 with equal chances) 24 Qg5 Qxg6. Bad is 24...Qd7 25 Qh6+ Qg7 (25...Qg8 26 Qf6 Qg4 27 Qf4 Qf8 28 Qh4 with a crushing attack) 26 Qf4 Qg8 27 Qd4! Qe8 28 Qh3 Qf8 29 Qf2 Qf7 30 Qxc8 Qxg5 31 Qe6. In the event of 24...Qxg6 25 Qxd8 Qxd8 the white queen dangerously invades the opponent's position: 26 Qf6.

25 Qxd8 Qxd8. The position reached is a difficult one to evaluate, with an unusual (and roughly equal) material balance. In Nunn's opinion, it is quite probable that the activation of the white queen will at some point lead to perpetual check.

Ivanchuk – Dolmatov

Interzonal Tournament, Manila 1990

1   e4   e6
2   d4   d5
3   Qd2   c5
4   exd5   exd5
5   Qb5+   Qc6
6   Qf3   cxd4
7   We2+   We7

This was played three times by Victor Korchnoi against Robert Hübner in their Candidates Match (Merano 1980/81). In each case after 8 Qxd4 Wxe2+ an endgame slightly more pleasant for White was reached. Vasily Ivanchuk had prepared a sharper continuation.

8   Qe5!?   Qd7
E 4-9. How should Black defend?
Paying Attention
to the Opponent’s Possibilities

The opponent also has the right to exist.
Saviely Tartakower

Yusupov – Fries-Nielsen
World Junior Championship, Skien 1979

1. d4 e6
2. ©f3 ©f6
3. g5 c5
4. e3 b6?

An opening inaccuracy, which has been known since the game Petrosian-Kozma (13th Olympiad, Munich 1958). In it White gained a clear advantage by 5 d5! exd5 6 ©c3 ©b7 7 ©xd5 ©xd5 8 ©xf6 ©xf6 9 ©xd5 ©c6 (9... ©xb2 10 ©d1 ©b4+ 11 ©c3! ©xc3+ 12 ©d2 ©c1+ 13 ©e2 and wins) 10 ©c4.

The same mistake, surprisingly enough, was made by Karpov against Yusupov in the 5th game of their Candidates semi-final match (London 1989). Instead of 6...©b7 Anatoly Karpov played 6...©e7, but after 7 ©xd5 ©b7 8 ©xf6 ©xf6 9 c3 0-0 10 ©c4 he also ended up in an inferior position. Yusupov gained a spectacular win, and the game was judged to be the best in the Candidates semi-final matches and one of the best in the 48th volume of Chess Informator.

5. d5! d6
6. dxe6 ©xe6

6...fxe6 7 e4!

7. ©b5+ ©bd7
8. ©c3 a6

Artur thought for a long time, and then forced a series of exchanges: 9 ©xd7+ ©xd7 10 ©d5 ©e7 11 ©xf6 ©xf6 12 ©xf6+ ©xf6 13 ©d5 ©e7 (obligatory: after 13...0-0 14 0-0-0 the d6 pawn is lost) 14 0-0-0. By keeping the black king in the centre, White gained a slight (not too great) advantage. The opponent soon committed an inaccuracy, and Yusupov went on to win.

‘Why did you spend so much time on your ninth move?’ I asked Artur after the game.

‘I was looking to see if I could achieve more than with 9 ©xd7+; I was checking 9 ©c6’, he explained, and he showed me the following pretty variation.

9. ©c6 ©a7
9...©c8? 10 ©b7.
10. ©e4

see next diagram
Q 4-20. What should Black play?

The d6 pawn is attacked. The passive 10...\textit{\texttt{We7}} 11 0–0 leads to a completely hopeless position. Black has to give up a pawn.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{cccccccc}
 & a & b & c & d & e & f & g \\
\hline
a & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
b & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
c & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
d & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
e & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
f & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
g & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
h & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

\begin{itemize}
\item 10 \ldots \textit{\texttt{Wc7!}}
\item 11 \textit{\texttt{Dxf6+}} \textit{\texttt{gxf6}}
\item 12 \textit{\texttt{Dxf6}} \textit{\texttt{Dg8}}
\end{itemize}

The exchange sacrifice 12...\textit{\texttt{Wxc6}} 13 \textit{\texttt{Dxh8}} f6 (or 13...\textit{\texttt{c4}} 14 b3) 14 \textit{\texttt{Dd3}} is incorrect.

\begin{itemize}
\item 13 \textit{\texttt{Dxd7+}} \textit{\texttt{Dxd7}}
\item 14 0–0
\end{itemize}

Not 14 \textit{\texttt{Dh4}} \textit{\texttt{Dxg2}} 15 \textit{\texttt{Dg3 Wc6}}, when White cannot get at the enemy rook. 14 \textit{\texttt{Dh4}} comes into consideration, but it is clear that, with the knight on the edge of the board, Black has definite compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

But after castling White is intending to secure his position by playing his bishop to g3. 14...\textit{\texttt{Dh3}} 15 \textit{\texttt{De1}} \textit{\texttt{Dxg2}} 16 \textit{\texttt{Dxg2 Wh3}} does not work because of 17 \textit{\texttt{Dd5}}!

\begin{itemize}
\item 14 \ldots \textit{\texttt{Dxg2+!!}}
\item 15 \textit{\texttt{Dxg2}} \textit{\texttt{Dh3+}}
\item 16 \textit{\texttt{Dh1}} \textit{\texttt{Dxf1}}
\item 17 \textit{\texttt{Wxf1}} \textit{\texttt{Wf5}}
\end{itemize}

Black regains the piece and a roughly equal position is reached.

A splendid calculation! In order to find such subtleties at the board, \textit{\textit{it is important not to confine yourself only to your own plans, and to check them thoroughly; you must seek latent resources for the opponent, no less carefully than for yourself. Candidate moves must be determined not only for yourself, but also for the opponent.}}

Dolmatov – Lugovoi
Russian Championship, Elista 1996

Q 4-21. Evaluate 28 \textit{\texttt{Df6}}.

The knight thrust to f6 is very tempting, in view of the variations 28...\textit{\texttt{gx}f6} 29 \textit{\texttt{Dx}d6} \textit{\texttt{Dx}d6} 30 \textit{\texttt{Dx}d6} \textit{\texttt{Dx}d6} 31 \textit{\texttt{Wx}f6+}, winning, or 28...\textit{\texttt{Wxd}1} 29 \textit{\texttt{Dxd}1} \textit{\texttt{Dxd}1} 30 \textit{\texttt{Dg}4} with a very strong attack for White. However, Dolmatov was concerned about the counter-blow 28...\textit{\texttt{Dxb}4+!!} 29 axb4 \textit{\texttt{Dxa}6+} 30 \textit{\texttt{Dh}4} (not 30 \textit{\texttt{Db}1??} because of 30...\textit{\texttt{Wxd}1+!!}) 30...\textit{\texttt{Dxd}3} 31 \textit{\texttt{Dxd}3} \textit{\texttt{gx}f6} – the resulting position seemed to him to be unclear. The grandmaster chose a sound continuation, guaranteeing him a serious advantage.

28 \textit{\texttt{De}3!!}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{cccccccc}
 & a & b & c & d & e & f & g \\
\hline
a & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
b & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
c & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
d & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
e & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
f & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
g & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
h & - & - & - & - & - & - & - \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
From here the knight defends the rook at d1, which deprives Black of any tactical opportunities.

28 ... ♜xd3
29 ♜xd3 ♜xd3
30 cxd3

The zwischenzug 30 ♜xf7? is refuted by the simple reply 30...♝d2! But now, despite the great simplification, the position of the black king becomes uneasy. The presence of opposite-colour bishops, as usual, strengthens the attack – the pressure of the powerful b3 bishop against the kingside is hard to counter.

30 ... ♞g6?!

Against 30...♝d4 Dolmatov had prepared 31 ♜xf7! ♜xe3 32 ♜f5 ♞e7 33 ♜e6, winning, but 30...f6!? 31 ♜f5 ♜e8 would have been more tenacious.

31 ♜xf7 ♜xd3
32 ♜c4?! 

As was pointed out by Ken Neat, 32 ♜d5! would have won much more quickly.

32 ... ♜d8
33 ♜f7 ♜d4
34 gxh6 gxh6

The simple 35 ♜e6?! was quite good. Sergey realised that after 35...♜xe3 36 ♜xe3 he would have a big advantage, since in an open position a bishop is much stronger than a knight. But even so, he did not want to allow the exchange.

35 ♜f5?! ♜xb2!

Grandmasters rarely overlook such obvious blows (36 ♜xb2? ♜d2+ leads to perpetual check). Dolmatov was hoping to refute it with his next move – it was here that he made an oversight.

36 ♜g6??

White should have chosen the slightly more complicated, but genuinely correct path: 36 ♜e6! ♜f6 (if 36...♜c1 or 36...♜g7 the same reply is decisive) 37 ♜d6 ♜e5 (37...♜f8 38 ♜f7+ ♜g7 39 ♜g4+) 38 ♜xe5!

Thus 35 ♜f5 would have led to a win. However, from the practical standpoint, 35 ♜e6 should probably have been preferred. Dolmatov was in time trouble, and in such situations it is better to aim for more simple positions, not involving the need for the precise calculation of variations.

36 ... ♜f8!
37 ♜xb2

With the queen at e6 Black would have had to resign, but here he unexpectedly regains the piece.

37 ... ♜e5

This is what Dolmatov had not seen. He has to reconcile himself to a draw.

38 ♜xh6+ ♜xh6 39 ♜xh6 ♜xc4+ 40 ♜b3 ♜e5 41 ♜f5 ♜h7 42 ♜b4 a6 43 ♜d6 b5. Draw.

The following example, in which the evaluation of the position changed several times, once again illustrates the fatal consequences of disregarding the opponent's counter-chances.
Q 4-23. Where should the rook move to?
The white pawns are weak. Black should have simply played 32...\texttt{b}1!!, intending 33...\texttt{x}c5, with a big advantage.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \texttt{Ab4}?! \texttt{A tempting move, which contains a little trap: 33 \texttt{hx}c6? is bad in view of 33 ...\texttt{h}h4+! 34 \texttt{g}g3 \texttt{g}g4+ 35 \texttt{h}h3 \texttt{bxc6}. However, Vlado Kovacevic overlooked his opponent's clever counter, leading to a sharpening of the play.}

  \item \texttt{g4}! \texttt{\texttt{c}6!}
\end{itemize}

If 33...\texttt{fxg4}, then 34 \texttt{x}c6.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \texttt{gx}f5 \texttt{\texttt{x}c}5
\end{itemize}

Sounder, as pointed out by Kovacevic, was 34...\texttt{\texttt{a}4} 35 \texttt{\texttt{b}3} \texttt{\texttt{b}4} 36 \texttt{\texttt{f}x}6 \texttt{\texttt{x}e}6 37 \texttt{\texttt{e}3} \texttt{\texttt{d}xc}5 38 \texttt{\texttt{xc}5} \texttt{\texttt{xc}5} 39 \texttt{\texttt{g}3} \texttt{h}6 with advantage to Black.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \texttt{c}2!
\end{itemize}

Q 4-24. How should Black continue?
In Kovacevic's opinion, he should have been satisfied with an equal position after 35...\texttt{b}6 36 \texttt{\texttt{c}xc}6 \texttt{\texttt{a}4}. Indeed, 35...\texttt{\texttt{a}4}?, as chosen in the game, allowed Gyula Sax a tactical opportunity to seize the initiative. Also incorrect was 35...\texttt{\texttt{f}d}7? 36 \texttt{\texttt{c}xc}6!? (36 \texttt{\texttt{f}xe}6 \texttt{\texttt{g}xe}6 37 \texttt{\texttt{g}xc}6 is also possible, but not 37 \texttt{\texttt{c}xc}6? \texttt{\texttt{d}d}4) 36...\texttt{bxc}6 37 \texttt{\texttt{f}x}6 \texttt{\texttt{a}a}4? 38 e7?

However, Kovacevic did not consider all his candidate moves. There was also another possibility: 35...\texttt{\texttt{e}4}! By blocking the opponent's dangerous bishop, Black defends against the tactical blows on \texttt{b}7 and \texttt{c}6. Apparently White does best to play 36 \texttt{h}6! \texttt{\texttt{g}x}6 37 f6 \texttt{\texttt{a}a}4 38 \texttt{\texttt{c}4}, but then there follows 38...\texttt{\texttt{c}5}! (weaker is 38. \texttt{\texttt{g}5 39 \texttt{\texttt{g}2} and 40 \texttt{f}4) 39 \texttt{\texttt{g}3} \texttt{\texttt{g}6} with the threat of 40...\texttt{b}5, or 39 \texttt{\texttt{g}2} \texttt{\texttt{d}3} 40 \texttt{\texttt{f}1} \texttt{\texttt{c}4}! 41 \texttt{\texttt{g}c}4 \texttt{\texttt{e}5}, and Black retains the advantage.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \texttt{\texttt{x}a}4?
  \item \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{b}b}7}!\texttt{?}
\end{itemize}

In the 33rd volume of Chess Informator, Kovacevic incorrectly awarded this move two exclamation marks. After 36...\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{b}b}7}! 37 \texttt{\texttt{c}6 (37 \texttt{\texttt{f}x}6 \texttt{\texttt{d}8} 38 \texttt{\texttt{c}xc}6 \texttt{\texttt{b}4}) it is not good for Black to play 37...\texttt{\texttt{b}b}6? 38 \texttt{\texttt{f}x}6!
\( \text{Qxe6} \) 39 \( \text{xd5+} \), but the simple reply 37...\( \text{exf5!} \) secures him equality.

Another combination: 36 \( \text{xc6!} \) bxc6 37 fxe6 \( \text{xe6} \) (37...c5 38 e7 \( \text{b8} \) 39 \( \text{c4!} \) 38 \( \text{xc6+} \) d7 39 d6+ \( \text{c8} \) 40 \( \text{xe6} \) h4+ 41 \( \text{g3} \) h5 42 e7 would have retained some winning chances for White.

\[
\begin{align*}
36 & \text{...} & \text{xb7?} \\
37 & \text{xc6} & \text{f4} \\
38 & \text{fxe6!} & \text{xe6} \\
39 & \text{g2} & \text{xf2} \\
39...\text{h4+} & 40 \text{g3} & \text{h5} 41 \text{xe6+} \text{c7} 42 f4, and Black's position is lost.
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
40 & \text{xe6+} & \text{c8} \\
41 & \text{g3} & \text{c2} \\
\text{Bad is} & 41...\text{f7?!} & 42 \text{a6}. \\
42 & \text{d6} & \text{c5} \\
43 & \text{e6} & \text{c7} \\
44 & \text{e7} & \text{f2} \\
45 & \text{c6+} & \text{d7} \\
46 & \text{xc5} & \text{xe7}
\end{align*}
\]

Thus, White has won a piece and now can expect to win. But the adventures in this game are not yet at an end.

\[
\begin{align*}
47 & \text{h3} & \text{e1} \\
48 & \text{f4} & \text{f1} \\
49 & \text{c8} & \text{f7} \\
50 & \text{h8} & \text{f2} \\
51 & \text{g3} & \text{b2} \\
52 & \text{f4}
\end{align*}
\]

52 \( \text{d5+} \) f6 53 \( \text{h7?} \) b8! with a draw.

\[
\begin{align*}
52 & \text{...} & \text{f2} \\
53 & \text{g4} & \text{d2} \\
54 & \text{e4} & \text{d4} \\
55 & \text{f4} & \text{d1}
\end{align*}
\]

Q 4-25. Is it time to pick up the h7 pawn?

White's position is won. The simplest is 56 \( \text{g3} \) followed by \( \text{h7} \); also strong is 56 \( \text{e5} \) e1 57 \( \text{c8} \) e2 58 \( \text{c7+} \) f6 59 \( \text{d5} \).

Of course, 56 \( \text{h7?} \) g8 would be a mistake, but why not take the pawn with the bishop? This is what Sax played, clearly overlooking his opponent's clever defence.

\[
\begin{align*}
56 & \text{hxh7?} & \text{g5+!!} \\
57 & \text{hxg6+} \\
57 & \text{xg5} & \text{g7}. \\
57 & \text{...} & \text{g7} \\
58 & \text{g8+} & \text{h6}
\end{align*}
\]

The game soon ended in a draw. Due to the extremely unfortunate position of his bishop, White is not able to convert his enormous material advantage. If the rooks are exchanged, this leads to an elementary theoretical fortress (such a position has already been mentioned in the second section of Volume 1, devoted to the construction of fortresses).
Black to move

White to move

Black to move

Evaluate 26...\textcolor{red}{\text{d6}}
The Method of Elimination

It is an old maxim of mine that when you have excluded the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.

Arthur Conan Doyle

In the third section of Volume 1, in the chapter devoted to the playing of studies, I have already emphasized the exceptional importance of the method of elimination for saving time and effort when taking decisions. Very often we find it rather difficult to calculate the consequences of the strongest move; it is simpler to convince ourselves that all the remaining moves are bad, or at least, much weaker. As a result of such a verification, a firm conviction is gained about which move should be made.

It is clear that for the faultless use of the method of elimination it is necessary to have a mastery of the skills mentioned in the preceding chapters. First we determine all the candidate moves that make sense, then we carefully look for the opponent’s strongest replies, forcing the majority of the candidate moves to be rejected, and if as a result there remains only one unrefuted possibility, this is the one we choose. Therefore training exercises on the theme of ‘the method of elimination’ simultaneously also assist development in the two skills mentioned above.

Arkhipkin – Dvoretsky
USSR Cup, Ordzhonikidze 1978

45

Fearing an attack on my king, I did not want to allow the exchange of my dark-square bishop, which is defending the kingside. Therefore I began considering 21...d4, and in the end that is what I played. After 22 g3 d8! 23 xa6?! bxa6 24 e2 h6 25 e4?! (White should have gone into the roughly equal double rook ending) 25...f6 26 c7 g8! 27 b4 d2 Black seized the initiative, and in the end won the game.

When choosing my 21st move, I was obliged to consider the opponent’s most active replies, involving attacks on the bishop at d4. It is easy to check that neither 22 c4 d8! nor 22 d1 d8 is dangerous.

21 ... d4!
22 c6d1!?
Q 4-26. What should Black play?

White has two threats: 23 \( \text{c}5 \) and 23 \( \text{a}6 \). First of all I convinced myself that attempts to defend the bishop with one of the rooks are easily refuted:

22... \( \text{a}8 \) winning the exchange; 22... \( \text{d}8 \) winning the exchange; 22... \( \text{d}8 \) bxa6 bxa6 24 \( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 25 \( \text{c}8 \) 26 \( \text{a}8 \) \( \text{e}4 \) 27 \( \text{a}7 \)\( + \) and White is a pawn up.

Then I checked moves with the knight. After 22... \( \text{c}5 \)? 23 \( \text{a}6 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 24 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 25 \( \text{e}7 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 26 \( \text{a}8 \) \( \text{e}4 \) 27 \( \text{a}7 \) White remains a pawn up. 22... \( \text{c}5 \)? 23 \( \text{b}5 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 24 \( \text{d}4 \) is even worse.

22... \( \text{c}7! \)

But this move I was unable to refute, which enabled me to decide on 21... \( \text{d}4! \).

The list of candidate moves that I examined was not exhaustive. However, at the stage of preliminary calculation I did not need to study all the available possibilities - it was sufficient to find one sound defence.

A somewhat different situation, incidentally, very typical and instructive, could have arisen in the following game.

---

Yusupov – Timman

Candidates semi-final match, 3rd game,
Tilburg 1986

1 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{f}6 \)
2 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{e}6 \)
3 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \)
4 \( \text{a}3 \) \( \text{c}5 \)
5 \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{a}6 \)
6 \( \text{c}2 \) \( \text{xe}5 \)
7 \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{g}6 \)
8 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{g}7 \)
9 \( \text{g}3 \) 0-0
10 \( \text{g}2 \) \( \text{d}6 \)
11 0-0 \( \text{e}8 \)
12 \( \text{f}4 \)

In the 5th game of the match Yusupov strengthened White's play: 12 \( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 13 \( \text{h}3! \) (but not 13 \( \text{e}4 \) in view of 13... \( \text{g}4! \)

13... \( \text{e}5 \) 14 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 15 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 16 \( \text{e}3 \)

\( \text{d}7 \) 17 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{c}4 \), and the standard positional pawn sacrifice 18 \( \text{e}5! \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 19 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 20 \( \text{f}5 \) gave him a persistent initiative.

12 ... \( \text{e}7 \)
13 \( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{b}7 \)
14 \( \text{e}4! \) \( \text{d}5 \)

Incorrect now is 14 \( \text{e}4? \) \( \text{g}4! \) – after going to e5, the knight will have its eyes on the weak d3 square. There followed 14 \( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{e}4! \)

15 \( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{xc}3 \) (better, apparently, than 15... \( \text{xc}3 \) 16 \( \text{bxc}3 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 17 \( \text{d}3 \) 16 \( \text{bxc}3 \)

\( \text{b}7 \) 17 \( \text{d}3 \) 15 18 \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{xd}2! \) 19 \( \text{xd}2 \)

\( \text{e}5 \) with roughly equal chances.

Yusupov could have played differently:

14 \( \text{a}4! \) \( \text{b}7 \)
15 \( \text{b}5 \)

In this case, employing the method of elimination, Jan Timman would have been faced with solving a very difficult problem.
Q 4-27. How should Black continue?

The d6 pawn is attacked, and 16 $\text{Q}c7$ is also threatened. Both threats can be parried by 15...$\text{Q}e5$, but this is not a move that one wants to make – after the exchange on e5 the position looks unpleasant for Black.

What other possibilities are there? The capture of the d5 pawn by the knight and the exchange sacrifice 15...$\text{Q}a4$.

Let us first check 15...$\text{Q}xd5$. The variation 16 $\text{Q}xd6$ $\text{Q}xf4$ 17 $\text{Q}xf4$ $\text{Q}xf3$ appears quite safe for Black (18 $\text{Q}e4$ $\text{Q}xe4$ 19 $\text{Q}xe4$ $\text{Q}xe4$ 20 $\text{Q}xd6$) 17 $\text{Q}xd6$!

Thus, there only remains the modest move, which we so much did not want to make. At least it does not lose by force. Here the method of elimination operates in pure form.

15 ... $\text{Q}e5$!

Incidentally, on closer inspection it transpires that the first impression of the positional defects of this move is rather exaggerated. There is no way for White to gain a clear advantage. Here is a possible variation: 16 $\text{Q}xe5$ $\text{dxe5}$ 17 $\text{d}6$ $\text{Q}d7$ 18 $\text{Q}xe5$ $\text{Qxd7}$ 19 $\text{Q}c5$ $\text{Q}c6$ 20 $\text{Q}xc7$ $\text{Q}xa4$ 21 $\text{Q}xa4$ $\text{Q}d7$ 20...$\text{Q}ed8$! 21 $\text{Q}ad1$ $\text{a}6$ 22 $\text{Q}c7$ $\text{a}7$, and White’s attack would appear to come to a standstill.

Yusupov rejected 14 $\text{Q}a4$ precisely because of 15...$\text{Q}e5$! One can admire the depth and accuracy of his evaluation of the position, but I think that from the practical viewpoint he was nevertheless wrong. Black would have faced a difficult choice, and Timman might well have been deflected from the correct course. After 14 $\text{Q}ad1$ the way to equalise was more obvious.

The following example shows how difficult it can sometimes be to employ in practice the method of elimination.
**Furman – Dvoretsky**  
**USSR Championship First League, Tbilisi 1973**

### Q 4-28. How should Black defend?

Playing on a pawn down, and with a bad bishop at g7, is a completely hopeless exercise. Only the idea of exchanging bishops by ...\(i.f6-g5\) promises hopes of saving the game.

28 ... \(\text{\(i.f6!\)}\)

### Q 4-29. And how should White reply?

At this point Semion Furman thought for a long time. In the event of 29 \(\text{\(h.xh6\)}\) \(\text{\(w.xe2\)}\) 30 \(\text{\(e.xe2\)}\) \(\text{\(b.xb4\)}\) the black pieces are activated, and White has to reckon with the bishop manoeuvre ...\(d.b8-b6\) and ...f7–f5. Understandably, he wanted to find something more convincing.

The grandmaster’s attention was drawn to a tactical idea: 29 \(\text{\(d.e3\)}\) \(\text{\(w.xe4\)}\) 30 \(\text{\(a.a6\)}\) (30 \(\text{\(g.g4\)}\) \(\text{\(w.xe2\)}\) 31 \(\text{\(xf6+\)}\) \(\text{\(g7\)}\) is pointless). Both the knight and the d6 pawn are attacked, and 30...\(b.b6?\) 31 \(\text{\(a.a7\)}\) is bad for Black. However, he is saved by interposing 30...\(d.d4!\). When 31 \(\text{\(w.xd6?\)}\) is not possible on account of 31...\(b.b6!\)

If White defends the e4 pawn by 29 f3, Black replies 29 ...\(g.g5\) 30 \(\text{\(e.xe3\)}\) (30 \(\text{\(x.g5\)}\) \(\text{\(w.xe2\)}\) 31 \(\text{\(x.e2\)}\) \(\text{\(h.xg5\)}\) and 32...\(x.b4\)) 30...\(b.b2\), retaining counterplay.

In the end Furman played 29 g3 (apparently, intending to reply to 29...\(g.g5\) with 30 f4). He probably did not seriously think about this move, but chose it by the 'method of elimination'. After first discarding other possibilities: 29 \(\text{\(x.h6\)}\), 29 \(\text{\(e.xe3\)}\) and 29 f3. But in fact the move made by him is by no means better. After 29...\(g.g5\) Furman realised that the opening of the position by 30 f4? \(\text{\(c.xf4\)}\) 31 \(\text{\(h.h4\)}\) was too dangerous for him. There followed 30 \(\text{\(x.g5\)}\) \(\text{\(w.xe2\)}\) 31 \(\text{\(e.xe2\)}\) \(\text{\(h.xg5\)}\) 32 f3 \(\text{\(x.b4\)}\), and the players agreed a draw.

After convincing himself that none of the other continuations promise him anything, White should have gone into the ending with an extra pawn.

29 \(\text{\(x.h6!\)}\) \(\text{\(w.xe2\)}\)

30 \(\text{\(x.e2\)}\) \(\text{\(x.b4\)}\)

31 \(\text{\(d.d2\)}\)

It is not easy for Black to gain a draw, e.g. 31...\(a.b1\) 32 \(\text{\(e.e1\)}\) \(\text{\(d.d8\)}\) (32...\(c.c5\) 33 \(\text{\(x.c3\)}\) 33 \(\text{\(e.e3\)}\) \(\text{\(b.b2\)}\) 34 \(\text{\(c.c1\)}\) etc.

**E 4-14**

49
White to move

Black to move
Double Attack

If you chase after two hares, you will not catch either of them.
Clearly a non-chess saying

The double attack, or the 'fork', as it is sometimes called, is one of the most powerful tactical measures. This is understandable: it is easier for the opponent to parry one threat, than two simultaneously, and besides, they often arise on different sectors of the front.

Dvoretsky - I. Zaitsev
USSR Championship Semi-Final, Odessa 1972

\[
\begin{array}{c}
1. e4 \quad e6 \\
2. d4 \quad d5 \\
3. \text{c3} \quad \text{b4} \\
4. \text{d3} \quad \text{dxe4} \\
5. \text{xe4} \quad \text{c5} \\
6. \text{d3} \quad \text{c6} \\
7. \text{xc5} \quad \text{xb4} \\
8. \text{d2} \quad \text{f6}
\end{array}
\]

Q 4-30. Evaluate 47 \text{xc7}.

Excessive greed would have been a serious mistake. If 47 \text{xc7} Black replies 47...\text{a1}+ 48 \text{f1} \text{d8}! with two threats: 49...\text{xc7} and 49...\text{f1}+ 50 \text{xf1} \text{d1}+. After the forced 49 \text{b3} \text{xc7} 50 \text{xb4} \text{c1} Black has quite good winning chances.

\[
47 \text{wd3}!
\]

Threatening the double attack 48 \text{d5}+.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
47 \ldots \quad \text{c6} \\
48 \quad \text{c5}!
\end{array}
\]

Again a double attack is threatened: 49 \text{b3(c4)+. Black resigned.}

Kirpichnikov – Dvoretsky
USSR Team Championship, Moscow 1966

\[
\begin{array}{c}
1. e4 \quad e6 \\
2. d4 \quad d5 \\
3. \text{c3} \quad \text{b4} \\
4. \text{d3} \quad \text{dxe4} \\
5. \text{xe4} \quad \text{c5} \\
6. \text{d3} \quad \text{c5} \\
7. \text{xc5} \quad \text{bd7} \\
8. \text{d2}
\end{array}
\]

The game Shekhtman–Dvoretsky (tournament with a time control of 30 minutes each per game, Moscow 1984) took an interesting course: 8 \text{c6} \text{c5}!? 9 \text{xb7} \text{xb7} 10 \text{b5}+ \text{e7} 11 \text{xd8}+ \text{xd8} 12 \text{f3} \text{xe4} 13 0–0 \text{xc3} 14 \text{xc3} \text{c5} 15 \text{e5} \text{ac8} 16 \text{b1} \text{e4} 17 \text{d3} \text{a8} 18 \text{c4} f6 with an excellent game for Black.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
8 \ldots \quad \text{xe4} \\
9 \text{c4}
\end{array}
\]

9 \text{b5}+ \text{cd7} 10 \text{f3} \text{a6} 11 \text{d3} 0–0 12 0–0 \text{b6} 13 \text{e4} \text{e7} 14 \text{e2} \text{b7} leads to equality (Averbakh–Botvinnik, 22nd USSR Championship, 1955).

\[
\begin{array}{c}
9 \ldots \quad 0–0 \\
10 \text{f3}
\end{array}
\]
Q 4-31. How can Black simplify the game?

I was afraid that after the natural 10...\textit{c7} 11 \textit{e2}, followed by castling on either side and a2-a3, the two bishops would give White the better chances. After noticing a little combination on the theme of the double attack, enabling me to exchange several pieces, I carried it out without hesitation.

\begin{verbatim}
10 ... \textit{ce4!}
11 \textit{xe4} \textit{xe4}
12 \textit{xb4} \textit{b6}
13 0-0

Attempts to refute the combination are unsuccessful: 13 \textit{d4} \textit{xb4+ 14 c3 \textit{xb2}, or 13 we2 \textit{xb4+ 14 c3 \textit{xc3!}

13 ... \textit{xb4
14 \textit{d4} \textit{d6!}

Play passes into a roughly equal ending.

15 \textit{b3} \textit{xd4}
16 \textit{xd4} \textit{d8}
17 \textit{d1} \textit{f8}
18 \textit{f4} \textit{d7}
19 \textit{f3} \textit{e8}
20 \textit{e5}
\end{verbatim}

Draw.

The following example demonstrates once again that double attacks are significantly more dangerous than single ones.

\textbf{Yusupov – Agzamov}

USSR Young Masters Championship, Baku 1979

Q 4-32. What should White play?

First let us see how the game developed.

\begin{verbatim}
23 \textit{xe5?!} \textit{xe5}
24 \textit{g4}

White has created the threat of 25 \textit{xc8. It is not so easy to parry it: Black loses after 24...\textit{h8? 25 \textit{xe6 or 24...\textit{f17? 25 \textit{e1 \textit{f6 26 \textit{xe6! \textit{xe6 27 f4. Only a counterblow can save him.

24 ... \textit{h5!}
25 \textit{h3}

Nothing is achieved by 25 \textit{xc8 hgx4.

25 ... \textit{h7}

Now 26 \textit{xe6 \textit{xe6 27 \textit{xf8 \textit{xb2 leads to a non-standard position, in which Black's two bishops and passed pawns are hardly any weaker than the white rooks.

26 \textit{d2}

By defending the b2 pawn, Yusupov renews the threat of 27 \textit{xe6. It should have been
parried by the awkward 26...g8! (or 26...h8!), after which White would apparently not have had any advantage. But Georgy Agzamov was unable to withstand the tension of the struggle.

26  
27  
28  
29  
30  

Two exchanges to the good, White is happy to part with one of them in order to simplify the position: 30...b4 31  

30  
31  

31...b4 32  b3 33  

32  
33  
34  

And White converted his material advantage.

Let us return to the position before the exchange of queens and try 23 c6, which was pointed out by Yusupov immediately after the game. It simultaneously creates two 'long' threats: a) 24 g4 followed by 3h8, b) 24 b8, and then b5 or a8. The opponent has no satisfactory defence (if 23...e7 White wins by both 24 g4, and 24 c8 c8 25 d7).

Apart from purely tactical double attacks, also highly effective are moves with a double aim, each of which may be strategic in character and may not involve a direct threat to the enemy pieces.

Dvoretsky – Shamkovich
USSR Championship Semi-Final, Voronezh 1973

Q 4-33. What should White play?

Black wants to seize control of the centre by ...e7–e5, ...c6 etc. To avoid ending up in a positional bind, I need to find 'my play'. I should like to carry out d3–d4, but how can this be achieved? If 17 d2 there follows 17...e5 18 c4 c6, while in the event of 17 b4 the opponent has the excellent reply 17...f6!

17 b1!

With this modest move White simultaneously creates two positional threats: 18 d4 (the knight at e4 is now defended) and 18 b4.

17  
If 17...c6, then 18 d4. Black could have considered 17...xe4?!

18  
19  
20  
21  

21...b5 is strongly met by 22 d4! But now too, by continuing 22 d4! exd4 23 xb7 xb7 24 xd4, White would have gained a
positional advantage in view of his attacking chances on the kingside (24...\textit{w}f6 25 \textit{f}4; 24...\textit{w}e7 25 \textit{e}3). Unfortunately, I played less strongly and the game ended in a draw.

I remembered for a long time an instance when, after gaining an overwhelming position, I played carelessly and allowed my opponent, literally out of nothing, to create simultaneously two serious threats.

\textbf{Dvoretsky – Anikaev}

USSR Young Masters Championship, Batumi 1969

![Chessboard diagram]

27 \textit{a}xg6! \textit{a}xd4

If 27...\textit{a}xh3 White has a pleasant choice between 28 \textit{e}xc8 \textit{e}xc8 29 \textit{w}xd5 and 28 gxh3 fxg6 29 \textit{w}xd5+.

28 \textit{a}xd4 \textit{w}xd4

29 \textit{b}1 b6?!

30 \textit{c}2 \textit{f}8

Only here did Yuri Anikaev notice that 30...\textit{w}g7 loses immediately to 31 \textit{e}xc8 \textit{e}xc8 32 \textit{a}xe6!

31 \textit{h}7+ \textit{f}8

32 \textit{e}xc8 \textit{e}xc8

33 \textit{w}xh6+ \textit{g}7

\textbf{34 \textit{w}f14?}

Of course, White must play for an attack. In the event of the exchange of queens, the passed d-pawn and the open file for the rook would give the opponent definite counter-chances, despite being a pawn down. However, preference should have been given to the simple 34 \textit{h}4!, intending \textit{h}2 and \textit{e}3. I assumed that the exchange of the h3 and d5 pawns would deprive my opponent of any hopes of counterplay, but in the process the defences of my own king are weakened.

34 ... \textit{x}h3

35 \textit{w}d6+ \textit{g}8

36 \textit{w}xd5 \textit{e}6

37 \textit{w}d6?!

\textbf{Q 4-34. What should Black play?}

Black’s position looks completely hopeless, but Anikaev did not lose his composure and he found a brilliant reply.

37 ... \textit{g}5!!

Two dangerous threats are simultaneously created: 38...\textit{c}1 and 38...\textit{a}d5, and it is not at all easy to parry them. It would probably have been best to reply passively: 38 \textit{d}1 \textit{a}d5 39 \textit{f}3, but even then the weakening of
the dark squares around my king would have given the opponent reasonable counter-chances.

38  
39  

Q 4-35. What did Anikaev play now?

There followed a spectacular blow on the theme of interference:

39  
I was lucky that I was still able to find a draw.

40  
41  
42  

The bishop is immune: 42...\texttt{xe4}? 43 \texttt{e5+}. There followed 43 \texttt{g1} \texttt{c1+} 44 \texttt{h2} \texttt{h6+} 45 \texttt{g1} \texttt{c1+}, and the players concluded peace.

$\text{Gutman - Razuvaev}$

\text{USSR Cup, Tbilisi 1976}

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  

Black does not play ...c7–c6, waiting to see where the white king will castle. After queenside castling his usual plan is ...\texttt{e8}, ...\texttt{e6} and ...c7–c5 (perhaps after the preparatory ...a7–a6 and ...\texttt{c8}). In this case ...c7–c6 would be a waste of a tempo.

9  

White has castled on the kingside, so that it was now time to place the pawn on c6.

10  

$\text{E: 4-17. Is it worthwhile taking the b4 pawn?}$
One of the important sources of opening information for a player is the fresh games played with 'his' openings. In publications such as Chess Informator and New in Chess they are provided with comments, sometimes brief, but at times also very detailed. The notes can significantly facilitate work on the opening, by explaining various important details. But they can, on the contrary, be misleading, since the games are normally annotated hastily, and almost unavoidably contain mistakes. You should act in accordance with the ancient principle: 'Trust, but verify!', by independently checking the soundness of book recommendations.

On one occasion grandmaster Yusupov played through the following game from Informator.

Taimanov – Borkowski
Wroclaw 1979

1 e4 d5
2 b3 g4
3 e3 e5
4 h3 xf3
5 gxf3 e5
6 c4
7 c6

Black chose 7...e4, and after 8 d1 c5?! (8...dxc4 was stronger) 9 b4! d3+ 10 xd3 exd3 11 cxd5 xd5 12 a3 he ended up in a somewhat inferior position.

Was it not possible, by playing 7...c6, to reinforce the centre? In his notes Mark Taimanov answers this question in the negative, and gives the following variation:

7 ... c6?
8 cxd5 cxd5
9 b5! d6
10 c3 e4
11 f5

White has the advantage. (All evaluations by Taimanov).

Q 4-36. Find the mistake in the grandmaster's analysis.

Yusupov saw that the concluding position of the variation, in which in Taimanov's opinion White has the advantage, should in fact
have directly the opposite evaluation.

11  ...    g6!!
12  \( \text{xd7} + \)
12  \( \text{xd5} \text{gx5} \) 13  \( \text{xf6} + \text{e7} \) or 13  \( \text{xf6} \text{wa5} \) also does not help.

12  ...    \( \text{f8} ! \)
13  \( \text{g5} \)    \( h6 \)
14  \( \text{h4} \)    \( g5 \)

An excellent combination on the theme of trapping the queen!

It is very important not to be hypnotised by your discoveries. After soberly considering the position, Artur concluded that after 7...c6 8 cxd5 cxd5 White nevertheless has the right to claim some advantage, by playing the restrained 9  \( \text{c3} \) instead of 9  \( \text{b5} ?! \)

It stands to reason that you should have a critical approach not only to other players’ analyses, but also to your own.

**Alterman – Dvoretsky**

**USSR Championship Semi-Final,**

**Voronezh 1973**

61

The positional pawn sacrifice 25  \( g4 \) suggests itself, as a result of which Black gains the excellent square e5 for his knight. All the same I do not have anything better, and therefore I could have played this without any calculation. Nevertheless, I looked deeper and saw a possibility of transposing into what seemed to me to be a won minor piece ending.

25  ...    \( \text{f4} !? \)
26  \( \text{xf4} \text{exf4} \)
27  \( \text{xf4} \text{xf4} \)
28  \( \text{xf4} \text{e5} \)
29  \( \text{g3} \text{xf4} \)
30  \( \text{xf4} \)

**Q 4-37. What should Black play?**

Now would have been an appropriate moment to stop and calmly check my preliminary calculations. It is clear that after 30  \( \text{f8} ?! \) Black does not stand worse. But also not better: he has full compensation for the sacrificed pawn, but not more. Realising this, I was unable to overcome my excitement, and almost without a halt I continued my planned forcing variation.

I was not the first, and, I fear, I will not be the last to commit such a mistake. Here is how Mikhail Botvinnik commented on an episode from his game against Vasily Smyslov in the 1946 Groningen tournament:
'After working out the following exchanging variation, I came to the conclusion that it would lead to a won ending with an extra pawn, and without checking this continuation any further (after each of Black's replies) – unpardonable carelessness! – I quickly made the planned moves.'

30 ... $\text{fxh4}$?
31 $\text{gxh4}$ $\text{xfh4}$
32 $\text{hxh4}$ $\text{h6}$
33 $\text{g2}$ $\text{f3+}$
34 $\text{g3}$ $\text{g5}$
35 $\text{e5}$ $\text{dx5}$
36 $\text{d6}$ $\text{xf6}$

Here I only expected 37 $\text{g4}$ $\text{g2}$. The following move, which, incidentally, with a knight on the edge of the board is a very standard one, for some reason I overlooked.

37 $\text{e4}$!

It is all over! Now the knight cannot escape from the trap.

37 ... $\text{e6}$
38 $\text{g4}$ $\text{xd6}$
39 $\text{xe5}$

And Black soon resigned.

Q 4-38. How should Black continue?

The threat of h4–h5–h6 looks extremely dangerous. In order to parry it, Dolmatov moved his knight from g6 in advance, but in so doing he conceded the important e5 square to the enemy knight. After 27... $\text{c8}$?

28 $\text{e5}$ $\text{c7}$ 29 $\text{d2}$ $\text{g6}$ 30 $\text{b4}$ $\text{d8}$
(30...a5 31 $\text{d6}$) 31 $\text{a4}$ a5 32 $\text{b4}$ f4! 33 $\text{g4}$!
$\text{axb4}$ 34 $\text{xb4}$ $\text{hxh4}$ 35 $\text{h3}$! $\text{g5}$ 36 $\text{e7}$

Vladimir Tukmakov gained a great advantage (true, subsequently he was unable to convert it).

Black's defence can be improved, if a tactical idea, involving the trapping of the queen, is found.

27 ... $\text{h6}$!!

28 $\text{wxg6}$? is not possible in view of 28... $\text{c6}$ followed by 29... $\text{e8}$, when White loses his queen for just two minor pieces. If 28 $\text{we3}$ there follows 28... $\text{f7}$ (or 28... $\text{c8}$! and 29... $\text{d7}$), intending 29... $\text{c7}$, and in some cases ... $\text{h5}$. Evidently in this way Black would have retained an acceptable position.

On seeing the resource ... $\text{h7}$–$\text{h6}$!! it is natural to consider in which situation it is best to use it – after all, it is possible to wait
for White's move h4–h5. But, I think, there is no point in deferring it, as is apparent from the following variations:

27...±c6? 28 h5 h6 29 ±e3, and White wins (but not 29 ±c1? ±xh5 30 ±xc6 ±xg3+ 31 ±f1 ±h4);

27...±c8?! (hoping for 28 h5? h6!) 28 ±e5!, with advantage to White;

27...±c8?! 28 ±e3 (28 h5? h6) 28...±c7? (here 28...h6! is now obligatory) 29 ±e5 ±xe5 30 dxe5 ±d7 31 ±d6 ±c2 32 ±g5.

Unfortunately, this was not the only instance when Dolmatov overlooked that he could trap an enemy piece. You will find two such examples among the exercises to the present chapter.
The Strength of a Passed Pawn

*Even a pawn which has reached the penultimate rank may be given up for the sake of the initiative.*

Vlastimil Hort, Vlastimil Jansa

When play goes into an ending with a small number of pieces, there is hardly any chance of giving mate. **The basic theme of the endgame is the promoting of a pawn to a queen.** The strength of pawns in the endgame grows markedly, especially if they are passed.

Dvoretsky – Rusakov
Moscow 1964

Q 4-39. **What should White play?**

Is the c7 pawn strong, or weak? This depends on whether the black king succeeds in approaching it. For example, in the variation 31 g3? .Move 32...h3 a6 the pawn will certainly be lost. It has to be supported by tactical means.

31 a4!  a6

If 31...xa4, then 32 d4 (with the threat of 33 a6) 32...b5 33 g3, intending h3 or g2–b7. After 31...d7 White wins by

32 d4 a8 (32...e8 33 b5) 33 a6 c8 34 b5 a6 35 c6 a7 36 e1!

32 g3 e8

In the event of 32 f5 33 h3 g6 34 g4 e8 35 xf5 c8 36 f1! there is nowhere for Black to move his king (36 g8 37 f6!).

33 d4! c8
34 b5

Now it is obvious that the initiative is completely in White’s possession.

34 ... e4
35 d3 f5
36 c6 e7

37 d5!!

‘Why on earth did you give up such a pawn?’, grandmaster Simagin exclaimed in surprise, when I showed him this ending. Of course, within a moment he understood everything. The place of the lost pawn is
taken by a new passed pawn at d6, which together with the bishop takes away all the squares from the enemy pieces. Perhaps two exclamation marks for White's move are rather a lot, especially since there are certainly also other ways to win. But the author of these lines was then only a first category player, and with such a classification it is not easy to decide to sacrifice, on purely positional grounds, the 'pride and glory' of your position – the c7 pawn.

37 ... \textit{\( \text{\textsc{xc7}} \)}
38 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{d6}} \)} \textit{\( \text{\textsc{f7}} \)}
39 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{d4}} \)}

39 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{d5}} \)} is also strong.

39 ... \textit{\( \text{\textsc{d7}} \)}
40 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{d5}} \)} \textit{\( \text{\textsc{e8}} \)}
41 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{xd7}} + \text{\textsc{xd7}} \)}
42 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{c8}} + \text{\textsc{d8}} \)}
43 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{c7}} \)}

This position is an excellent illustration of the assertion of Aron Nimzowitsch (whose book I had not yet then read – it was a bibliographic rarity): 'Absolute control of the 7th rank in combination with far-advanced passed pawns normally leads to a win'.

43 ... \textit{\( \text{\textsc{a6}} \)}
43...\textit{\( \text{\textsc{d7}} \)} 44 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{e6}} \)}
44 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{e6}} \)} \textit{\( \text{\textsc{b8}} \)}
45 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{g7}} \)} \textit{\( \text{\textsc{f8}} \)}
46 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{hxh7}} \)}

Black resigns.

Combinations based on the strength of passed pawns occur not only in the endgame.

\textbf{Panczyk – Yusupov}

\textit{Warsaw 1985}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\textbf{Q 4-40. What should Black play?}

White has launched a desperate attack on the king. If 17...\textit{\( \text{\textsc{g4}} \)}? he was intending 18 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{xf7}} + \)} \textit{\( \text{\textsc{xf7}} \)} (or 18...\textit{\( \text{\textsc{h8}} \)} 19 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{h5}} \)} \textit{\( \text{\textsc{e5}} \)} 20 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{xd4}} \)} \textit{\( \text{\textsc{xd4}} \)} 21 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{b2}} \)} 19 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{hx5}} + \text{\textsc{g8}} \)} (19...\textit{\( \text{\textsc{f8}} \)} 20 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{hx6}} \)} 20 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{g7}} + ! \)} \textit{\( \text{\textsc{g7}} \)} 21 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{hx6}} + \text{\textsc{f6}} \)} 22 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{g5}} + \)} and wins. 17...\textit{\( \text{\textsc{g4}} \)}? also does not work because of the simple 18 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{h3}} \)}!

Yusupov parries the opponent's onslaught by sacrificing a piece for two pawns, one of which will be a very dangerous passed pawn.

17 ... \textit{\( \text{\textsc{g4}} \)}
18 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{xf6}} \)}
18 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{g4}} \)} \textit{\( \text{\textsc{g4}} \)}, and the weakness of the back rank tells.

18 ... \textit{\( \text{\textsc{xf6}} \)}
19 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{g4}} \)} \textit{\( \text{\textsc{dxc3}} \)}
20 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{e3}} \)}
20 \textit{\( \text{\textsc{f4}} \)} c2.
20 ... \textit{\( \text{\textsc{c2}} \)}
Q 4-41. How should Black reply to 21 \( \text{Wf1} \) and to the move in the game?

In the event of 21 \( \text{Wf1} \) the obvious 21...\( \text{Qe5?!} \) is unconvincing. White has two possible replies: 22 \( \text{Bf4} \) \( \text{Qxf4} \) 23 \( \text{Bxf4} \) \( \text{Qd3} \), 24 \( \text{Wxe8+} \) \( \text{Qxe8} \) 25 \( \text{g3!} \), and 22 \( \text{Bd4} \) \( \text{Qf3+} \) (22...\( \text{Qxd3} \) 23 \( \text{Bxd3} \) \( \text{Wxa1} \) 24 \( \text{Wxa1} \) \( \text{c1+} \) 25 \( \text{Bd1} \) 23 \( \text{gx1f} \) \( \text{Wd4} \) 24 \( \text{Bxd4} \) \( \text{Qxe1+} \) 25 \( \text{Qxe1} \) \( \text{c1+} \) 26 \( \text{Bxc1} \) \( \text{Bxc1+} \) 27 \( \text{gh2} \) – the consequences of these variations are completely unclear.

As was pointed out by Joël Lautier, 21...\( \text{b4?!} \) also does not succeed in view of 22 \( \text{Bc4!} \) (bad is 22 \( \text{AXB4?} \) \( \text{Wxa1} \) 23 \( \text{Wxa1} \) \( \text{c1+} \) or 22 \( \text{Bc4?} \) \( \text{Qxa2} \) 23 \( \text{Bxc8} \) \( \text{Bxc8} \) 24 \( \text{Bxa2} \) \( \text{c1+} \) 25 \( \text{Bxc1} \) \( \text{Bxe6} \) 26 \( \text{Be2} \) \( \text{Bxe2} \) 22...\( \text{h5} \) 23 \( \text{Bc1} \) ! \( \text{hxg4} \) 24 \( \text{Wxb4} \) ! Instead of 22...\( \text{h5} \) Black can play 22...\( \text{Bc8d8!} \) 23 \( \text{Bc1} \) \( \text{Bxc1} \) ! \( \text{Bxc1+} \) 24 \( \text{Qxc4!} \) 24 \( \text{Qxc4} \) \( \text{Qd3} \) – he remains a pawn up, but White retains quite good chances of saving the game.

Black wins by 21...\( \text{Bcd8!} \) (threatening 22...\( \text{Bxa1!} \) 23 \( \text{Wxa1} \) \( \text{d1+} \) 22 \( \text{Bb3} \) (22 \( \text{Bc1} \) \( \text{Bb2} \) 22...\( \text{Bb2} \) 23 \( \text{Bc4} \) \( \text{Bb5} \) 24 \( \text{Bxc2} \) \( \text{Wxc2} \) 25 \( \text{Bc1} \) \( \text{Bb3} \) or 25...\( \text{Wf5} \).

The spectacular reply to the move in the game was foreseen by Artur when he began his combination.

21 ... \( \text{Wxe3!!} \)
22 \( \text{fxe3} \) \( \text{Wxf1+} \)
23 \( \text{Bxf1} \) \( \text{Qe5} \)

Threatening both 24...\( \text{c1} \) and 24...\( \text{Qxg4} \).

Despite White's extra rook, his position looks desperate. Even so, he could have saved the game, by carrying out a countercombination: 24 \( \text{Bxf7+} \) \( \text{Qh8} \) 25 \( \text{Bc1} \) (25 \( \text{Bgf4?} \) \( \text{c1} \) 26 \( \text{Bxc1} \) \( \text{Bxc1+} \) 27 \( \text{Bd2} \) \( \text{Qd3} \) 25...\( \text{Qd3} \) ! (not 25...\( \text{Qxg4?} \) because of 26 \( \text{Bd6} \) 26 \( \text{Bxc2} \) \( \text{Bxc2} \) 27 \( \text{Bc4} \).

24 \( \text{Bgf4?} \) \( \text{c1} \)
25 \( \text{Bxc1} \) \( \text{Bxc1+} \)
26 \( \text{Bf1} \) \( \text{Qxf1+} \)
27 \( \text{Bxf1} \) \( \text{Qg4} \)

White resigns, since he loses a second pawn.

The following classic combination is to be found in many books.

\textbf{Teichmann – N.N.}

Zurich 1921

Q 4-42. What should White play?

1 \( \text{Wf5?} \) (with the threat of 2 \( \text{Wxf7+} \) is useless because of 1...\( \text{a6(b7)} \) ! Being two pieces down, Richard Teichmann is obliged to try and break through.
1 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash Axh6!}} \texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash xh6}

Not 1...\texttt{\textbackslash Axh6?} 2 \texttt{\textbackslash Axf7+ or} 1...\texttt{\textbackslash bxc4? 2 \textbackslash Axh8+!}

2 \texttt{\textbackslash wg5} \texttt{\textbackslash f7}

3 \texttt{\textbackslash wd8+!} \texttt{\textbackslash xd8}

4 \texttt{\textbackslash h6}

In view of the threat of 5 \texttt{\textbackslash h7+}, it would seem that Black must resign (and according to
certain sources, he in fact did so).

\textbf{Q 4-43. Is Black's position really lost?}

It is as yet too early to resign! True, 4...\texttt{\textbackslash w8} is
unsatisfactory because of 5 \texttt{\textbackslash h7+ \textbackslash f7}
(5...\texttt{\textbackslash xh7 6 \textbackslash gfx8\textbackslash w+ 7 \textbackslash h8\textbackslash w+ \textbackslash e7 8 \textbackslash xe6 \textbackslash dxe6 9 \textbackslash wxe5}. As Joël Lautier
pointed out, no better is 4...\texttt{\textbackslash g6 5 \textbackslash xg6 \textbackslash w8}
6 \texttt{\textbackslash xxe6+! (6 \textbackslash h7+? \textbackslash xh7 7 \textbackslash gfx8\textbackslash w \textbackslash xg6) 6...\textbackslash xxe6 (6...\textbackslash dxe6 7 \textbackslash h7+) 7 \textbackslash gfx8\textbackslash w+ \textbackslash xf8}
8 \texttt{\textbackslash h7}.

But even so there is a hidden defence.

4 ... \texttt{\textbackslash wd4!!}

It is important to vacate the d6 square for the
king.

5 \texttt{\textbackslash h7+} \texttt{\textbackslash f7}

6 \texttt{\textbackslash g8\textbackslash w+} \texttt{\textbackslash e7}

7 \texttt{\textbackslash h8\textbackslash w} \texttt{\textbackslash d6!}

How should this position be evaluated?

After 8 \texttt{\textbackslash xxe6 \textbackslash dxe6 or} 8 \texttt{\textbackslash w8+ \textbackslash c7}
9 \texttt{\textbackslash xd8+ \textbackslash b7} the advantage would appear
to pass to Black. After I had published my
analysis in an article, candidate master Yuri
Nikonov, a chess trainer from Barnaul, wrote
to me saying that objectively the sharp
skirmish should end in a draw.

8 \texttt{\textbackslash g7!} \texttt{\textbackslash xd2!}

All other moves lose: 8...\texttt{\textbackslash d7? 9 \textbackslash xxe6}
\texttt{\textbackslash dxe6 10 \textbackslash xxe6+!!; 8...\textbackslash b7? 9 \textbackslash xd8! \textbackslash xd8}
10 \texttt{\textbackslash xd8; 8...\textbackslash bxc4? 9 \textbackslash xd8.}

9 \texttt{\textbackslash f8+} \texttt{\textbackslash c7}

10 \texttt{\textbackslash xd8+} \texttt{\textbackslash b7}

White cannot avoid perpetual check.
Don’t Let the King Interfere!

Don’t leave a stone unturned. It’s always something, to know you have done the most you could.
Charles Dickens

At one of the sessions of our chess school for talented young players, grandmaster Yusupov remarked that, when studying Kasparov’s games, he had noticed a specific procedure that was often employed by the world champion. With an offensive in full swing, there would suddenly follow a quiet king move, and later it would transpire that this move decisively strengthened the attack. On its previous square the king interfered, by being open to a check in certain variations. An excellent illustration of this is provided by the 16th game of the third Kasparov–Karpov match (Leningrad 1986).

But examples of this theme could also have been selected by Artur from his own games.

Yusupov – Magerramov
Qualifying Tournament for the World Junior Championship, Leningrad 1977

White’s passed pawns in the centre are securely blockaded, whereas Black’s queenside pawns may be free to advance. Objectively, White should probably have taken the opportunity to force a draw by 30...dxe3! dxe3 (30...b4 is dubious, if only because of 31...h5) 31...f7+ g8 32...h6+. But Yusupov was aiming for a win, and he decided to try his luck with an attack on the kingside.

30 h4!? b4
31...h2!

Q 4-44. Why were these moves made?
The piece sacrifice 30...xf6 gxf6 31...g4 suggests itself. Black replies 31...d7. Now how can the attack be continued? 32...e1 would set the opponent insoluble problems, were it not for the fact that the rook can be taken with check. Incidentally, with the king at h2 Black also has to reckon with the immediate...e1 (without the sacrifice on f6) – the rook is immune in view of mate in two moves.

31...a5?

Amazing carelessness! Elmar Magerramov does not even try to guess White’s intentions, and calmly advances his pawns. On the basis of this episode it can be assumed with a sufficient degree of certainty that the player with Black suffers from a very serious illness – the under-estimation of the opponent’s resources. He should have parried the threats by 31...h6 (vacating the h7 square for the knight) or 31...d7.

32...xf6! gxf6
A typical mistake in such situations (correct was 36 \texttt{c}f5!, with very dangerous threats). 

When the attack on the king becomes threatening, the opponent usually tries to parry it by giving up material. And here it is important not to sell yourself too cheaply. Often winning material is the logical outcome of your offensive, but it can happen that, if you are too greedy, you concede the initiative to your opponent. The attack comes to an end and your pieces, which were occupying excellent attacking positions, prove to be misplaced for the resulting positional battle.

36 ... \texttt{xf7} 
37 \texttt{gxf7} \texttt{xf7} 
38 \texttt{h5}

White is forced to continue his offensive -- otherwise he will be unable to counter the powerful passed pawns on the queenside. But after the disappearance of his powerful knight, the success of his attack is problematic.

38 ... \texttt{b3} 
38...a4!? 
39 \texttt{h6} \texttt{a4}?

Another confirmation of the 'diagnosis', which was mentioned in the note to Black's 31st move -- Magerramov again does not pay the slightest attention to his opponent's threats. He should have chosen between 39...\texttt{we6} 40 \texttt{g7} f5 and the immediate 39...f5.

40 \texttt{g7} \texttt{we6} 
41 \texttt{g3} 

Threatening 42 \texttt{h7+}; if 41...\texttt{g8}, then 42 \texttt{e1} \texttt{c8} 43 \texttt{g8+} \texttt{g8} 44 \texttt{e8} is decisive. Black resigns.

This position could have occurred in the game Khalifman-Oll (Kiev 1984). White has an obvious positional advantage, but it may evaporate after the quiet 1 \texttt{f4}?! \texttt{d1}. If 2 \texttt{c5} the simplest is 2...\texttt{h6} followed by ...g7-g6.

Q 4-45. What happens in the event of 1 \texttt{c3}?

The answer to this question demands a deep and careful calculation of variations.

1 \texttt{c3}!? \texttt{xf3}+ 
2 \texttt{h3} 
2 \texttt{xf3} \texttt{d1} is unconvincing.

2 ... \texttt{f5}+ 
3 g4 \texttt{g1}! 
3...\texttt{xg4+} 4 \texttt{xg4} \texttt{g1}+ 5 \texttt{xf3} is hopeless for Black, as is 3...\texttt{xc3} 4 \texttt{xf5+} \texttt{xf5} 5 \texttt{bxc3} \texttt{e4} 6 \texttt{b3} or 6 \texttt{e6} followed by 7 \texttt{g3} (6 \texttt{g3}?! \texttt{c8} is less accurate).

4 \texttt{gf5}+ \texttt{h5}!? 

A double attack -- both 5...\texttt{xf2} and 5...\texttt{g4} mate are threatened. 4...\texttt{h6} 5 \texttt{xf3} is totally bad, while if 4...\texttt{g5} White wins by
5 \( \text{d}4! \) \( \text{x}f2 \) 6 \( \text{f}4+ \) \( \text{h}5 \) 7 \( \text{f}7+ \) \( g6 \) 8 \( \text{x}g6+! \) \( h\times g6 \) 9 \( \text{g}4+ \) \( \text{h}6 \) 10 \( \text{x}g6 \) mate.

5 \( \text{f}7+! \)

Not 5 \( \text{d}4? \) \( \text{x}f2 \) 6 \( \text{f}7+ \) (6 \( \text{g}4+ \) \( \text{h}6 \)
7 \( \text{f}4+ \) \( g5!) \) 6...\( \text{h}6! \) 7 \( \text{f}4+ \) \( g5 \) 8 \( \text{x}g6+ \) \( \text{g}7 \).

5 ... \( \text{g}6 \)

6 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{x}f2 \)

7 \( \text{x}g6+! \) \( \text{h}6 \)

8 \( \text{f}4+ \) \( \text{g}7 \)

9 \( \text{c}7+! \)

Mate is inevitable.

Thus, 1 \( \text{c}3 \) leads by force to a win. Why then is it adorned not with two exclamation marks, but much more modestly -- with an exclamation mark together with a question mark, expressing some doubt? The point is that there is a much simpler solution. By moving his king away in advance from possible checks: 1 \( \text{h}3! \), White immediately places his opponent in a hopeless position.

1...\text{x}f3 is bad because of 2 \( \text{x}c2!, \) 1...\( \text{h}6 \) is met by 2 \( \text{c}3, \) and 1...\text{d}1 by 2 \( \text{c}5! \)
Learn from Your Mistakes!

Why with the time do I not glance aside
To new-found methods and to compounds strange?
William Shakespeare

Alterman – Dvoretsky
USSR Championship Semi-Final,
Voronezh 1973

When this position was reached on the board, I thought for a long time. Black obviously stands well, but there do not appear to be any simple ways of seizing the initiative.

Q 4-46. How should White play in reply to 21...h4?

Initially the pawn sacrifice appeared tempting to me in view of the variation 22 xf4 exf4 23 xf4 xf4! 24 xf4 g5+ 25 g4 g4 26 xg4 f3+ and 27...e5. But I rejected it because of the counter exchange sacrifice: 22 xf4! exf4 23 xf4.

From the positional standpoint it would have been useful to play the knight from d7 to h5, in order to strengthen the threat of invading on f4. But in the event of 21...g6 Black has to reckon with 22 h4. Is it not possible to solve the problem combinatorively?

21...g6 22 h4 h5 23 hxg5 (I also considered 23 xf8 xf3 24 xf8 xf8 25 xf8 xf3 26 h3 – Black does not stand badly, although for the moment no particular achievements are evident. However, it makes sense to delve into this branch only if an advantage for Black is found in the main variation 23 hxg5).

23...xg3. Now 24 gxh6+? loses to 24...xh6, but 24 f3! is very strong. Both knights are attacked, and 24...xf1 25 gxh6+ xh6 26 xf1 gives Black only a rook and pawn for two minor pieces.

I very much wanted to play 21...e6, and so I spent a long time studying the position after 24 f3, but I failed to find anything. I had to make the passive move 21...f7 (vacating the h6 square for the bishop), which led only to an equal game. After 22 h4 h6 23 f2 (23 h5?) 23...f6 24 f1 h5 25 g4! a position which we have analysed in the chapter 'The trapped piece' was reached.

One of the most inventive analysts, Igor Zaitsev, who was playing in the same tournament, suggested a surprising way of preparing the knight manoeuvre to h5.

21...c4!!

22 xg4 f6

23 h4 h5

24 hxg5 xg3

25 e3 h5f5!

26 exf5 h1+
With the bishop at d3, here there would have been the simple reply 28...xf5.

28...e3+!
29...xe3
30...d3
31...c3
32...d3

And White loses his queen.

Zaitsev’s discovery made a strong impression on me. The linking of a combination on the kingside with a zwischenzug on the queenside is not at all obvious. The reason for the pawn sacrifice is very subtle – the diversion of the bishop from the f5 square, which is already controlled by a white pawn.

Subsequent analysis of the position enabled another useful conclusion to be drawn: good moves have an effect, not only in those variations for the sake of which they are made.

21...c4!! 22...xc4...f6 23...h5 24...xf8...xg3 25...e1...f8 26...xg3...f4 27...h3.

Here we have already seen such a position (but with the pawn at c5), and we had doubts about its evaluation. It turns out that the pawn sacrifice also helps here: after 27...xc7! the queen breaks into the opponent’s position along the dark squares.

White does best to avoid 23...h4, but even after 23...h2!...h5 24...xf8...xf8 25...f1...f4! Black has excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

The main conclusion, drawn after the game, was this: many tempting but incomplete ideas may be realised, if a way of preparing them can be found. You should constantly seek intermediate moves, which would strengthen the planned idea.

I very much wanted to rehabilitate myself for my failure in the game with Alterman, by carrying out something similar to the missed opportunity. For a long time a convenient instance did not present itself, but in the end fortune nevertheless smiled, and, moreover, twice over a short period of time.

Dorfman – Dvoretsky
Vilnius 1978

16...b4 17 a3 exd4 18 axb4 (18...xd4 is bad because of 18...c2) 18...dxc3 19...xc3 axb4 20...xb4...e7! Black simultaneously prepares two regroupings of his forces: 21...e8 followed by ...a8, or 21...c8 and ...de8.

21...e5 dxe5 22...xd8+...xd8 23...xe5...c7 24...e8 25...h6 26...d4...c8 27...d8! 28...b5...b8! (28...d7?! 29...a7! 28...a5?! 29 b4...a2 30...d6) 29...c3 (29...b6?...e6 30...d4...d7) 29...e6 30...e3. Draw.

Outwardly, everything that occurred in the game appears simple and of little interest. But beauty in chess is determined not so much by moves, as by ideas. Moves that are apparently quiet may contain deep and subtle ideas. Let us investigate why lossif Dorfman, annotating this game in Chess
Informator, attached two exclamation marks to 16...\(\text{d}b4\).

The diagram position is promising for White. His main positional threat is 17\(f4\)! Searching for an antidote, I noticed the interesting move 16...\(\text{d}h5\)?!, with idea of meeting 17\(f4\) with a blow in the centre: 17...\(\text{ex}f4\) 18 \(\text{gx}f4\) \(\text{d}5\). Black is not afraid of 17 \(\text{d}f3\) \(\text{d}f6\), since the bishop at \(f3\) is badly placed. And after other continuations it will be possible to strengthen the position, for example by ...\(g7\)-\(g6\) and ...\(f7\)-\(f6\).

Reasoning in this way, I decided that it was necessary to once again check the critical variation 16...\(\text{d}h5\) 17 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{ex}f4\) 18 \(\text{gx}f4\) \(\text{d}5\) 19 \(\text{e}5\)! White threatens 20 \(\text{d}f3\), and if 19...\(\text{w}e7\) there follows 20 \(\text{w}f2\), intending \(f4\)-\(f5\)-\(f6\). White has an obvious advantage.

It was a pity to give up such a tempting idea, and in the end I found a way of strengthening it by interposing a move on the other wing (as in the preceding example).

\[16 \ldots \text{d}b4!!\]

Threatening 17...\(\text{ex}d4\) 18 \(\text{w}x\text{d}4\) \(\text{c}c2\). I sensed that Dorfman did not want to block the centre with 19 \(\text{d}5\). The move in the game, 17 \(\text{a}3\), led to simplification, which in principle is advantageous to Black, who has a cramped position. I mainly considered the replies 17 \(\text{w}f1\) and 17 \(\text{w}e2\). In the event of 17 \(\text{w}f1\) Black achieves an excellent game, by breaking through in the centre: 17...\(\text{ex}d4\) 18 \(\text{w}x\text{d}4\) \(\text{d}5\)! But after 17 \(\text{w}e2\) this cannot be played, since after the series of exchanges on \(d5\) the rook at \(e8\) is 'hanging'. But then Black was intending to carry out his main idea.

\[17 \text{w}e2 \text{h}5!!\]

\[18 f4?! \text{ex}f4\]

\[19 \text{gx}f4 \text{d}5\]

\[20 \text{e}5 \text{w}e7!!\]

Now it is clear why the intermediate move was necessary. The rook is blocking the second rank, and White no longer has the important move 21 \(\text{w}f2\).

**Glyanets – Dvoretsky**

Tbilisi 1979

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<td>9</td>
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9...\(c8\)?!

\[10 \text{h}4\]

After the 'normal' retreat of the bishop, White seizes the initiative by breaking through in the centre: 10...\(\text{g}6\) 11 \(\text{xg}6\) \(\text{hxg}6\) 12 \(\text{e}4\) (and if 12...\(\text{dx}e4\), then 13 \(\text{d}5\) \(\text{xc}5\) 14 \(\text{dx}c6\) \(\text{bxc}6\) 15 \(\text{xc}6\)+ \(\text{e}e7\) 16 0–0–0! \(\text{xa}4\) 17 \(\text{d}7\)+ \(\text{e}e8\) 18 \(\text{xa}4\) with a decisive attack, as in the game Andrianov–Imanalieva, Sochi 1980). Or 10...\(\text{g}4\) 11 \(\text{h}3\) \(\text{h}5\) 12 \(\text{e}4\).

The tactical stroke 10...\(\text{d}3\)? does not work in view of 11 \(\text{xd}5!\) (11 \(\text{xd}3?\) \(\text{xb}2\)
11...exd5 (11...exb5 12 axb6 axa4 13 axa8, and Black does not have compensation for the lost exchange) 12 axd3 with an obvious advantage to White.

10 ... h4!

11 f3?

If 11 0-0 or 11 c1 Black replies 11 ... e7. According to theory, the strongest continuation is 11 0-0-0 c8 (11...e7 12 f3) 12 f3 g6 13 xg6 hxg6 14 b1, which first occurred in the game Yusupov–Belyavsky (47th USSR Championship, Minsk 1979).

11 d3!

12 xd5 axb5

13 xb6 xa4

14 xa8

Compared with the immediate 10...d3?, the situation has changed radically. By interposing 10...e4! I provoked the opponent into placing his pawn on f3, and as a result the knight at h4 now has no retreat square.

14 b4!

15 g4

After 15 d2 e7 16 c7+ d8 17 c1 g5! in the game Magerramov–Kosikov (Daugavpils 1978) Black gained a decisive advantage.

15 ... d3+!

16 e2 xf4+

17 exf4

Q 4-47. Explain the point of the move made in the game.

Of course, I began my calculation of variations with the obvious 17...d6, depriving the enemy knight of the c7 square. White replies 18 ac1. Let us consider various attempts to trap the piece.

18...e7? is bad in view of 19 c7 c6 20 d5+ or 19...c6 20 d5 exd5 21 f5+.

If 18...0-0 there follows 19 c7 c6 (or 19...c8 20 b3 c6 21 d5 exd5 22 xd5 or 22 f5?) 20 xc6 bxc6 21 d6 xf4 22 g2, and Black does not have anything in particular.

After 18...c6 19 d5! exd5 20 f5 the play becomes sharper.

Now we can judge the true worth of the intermediate move in the game. White has two replies: 18 g2 and 18 g5 (bad is 18 ac1 0-0). If 18 g5 I was intending 18...d6 19 ac1 0-0! 20 c7 c6 21 xc6 (21 a6 b5+; 21 d5 exd5) 21...xc6 22 d6 xf4, and the pawn, which with Black's 17th move was lured to g5, is lost (23 g1 xh2).

18 e2 d6

19 ac1 c6!
has been driven away from the f5 square.

20 \text{e}3 \hspace{1cm} 0-0

Black has retained a material advantage, which he later successfully converted.

- **E 4-23**
  
  **82**

- **E 4-24**
  
  **83**

White to move

Black to move
By the definition of Mikhail Botvinnik, a combination is a forcing variation with a sacrifice. As a result of a combination we obtain without fail (if, of course, there is no mistake in our calculations) that position for which we were aiming from the very start.

It is a different matter when we set our opponent a trap. He is by no means bound to fall into it. In order to lure him into it, a bait is necessary. We must tempt our opponent with a seemingly easy opportunity to achieve a material or positional gain, in reply to which we have prepared a concealed refutation.

How is a trap thought up? We consider some move of our own, and find an unpleasant reply by the opponent. However, not frightened by this reply, we continue considering the variation, and suddenly we notice that it can be refuted. In order to think up a refutation, sometimes exceptional imagination is required. It is in such instances that the trap has real chances of success – after all, if the refutation is obvious, the opponent too will most probably see it.

In the first book of this series we have already met several traps, which I would call 'grasping at the last chance'. Let us examine another example of a miraculous escape, thanks to a trap.

**A.Ivanov – Dolmatov**

Novosibirsk 1976

85

![Chessboard Diagram]

Black, of course, should lose, since the e4 pawn must inevitably fall. Dolmatov tries his last chance.

38 . . . h5!
39 d4 e3!
40 xb4??

The 'bait' operates. The simple 40 fxe3 would have won, but Alexander Ivanov was in severe time trouble, and he simply did not have time to grasp what was happening.

40 . . . e2

Here the time scramble ended, and the players agreed a draw, since after 41 c4 xf5 42 gxf5 h4! a fortress arises: the white rook is tied to the e-file, and the king cannot escape from the corner.

*In a desperate situation you should not be afraid to risk any trap, even if*
objectively it may hasten your defeat, provided only that it promises some practical chances of success. But in normal positions playing for a trap at the cost of worsening your own position is unjustified. It is best if the trap involves a move which comes into a plan that you are carrying out.

Yusupov – Agzamov
USSR Young Masters Championship, Baku 1979

Q 4-48. What should White play?
Artur chose 14 d1! The opponent could have replied 14...b4?! when after 15 xe4 xb4 White's advantage is insignificant. However, there followed 14...b5?! 15 axb5 axb5 16 fd1 c5 17 e4 b4 18 xe4 xb4 19 e5! (now White has a serious advantage) 19...f6 20 a8 c5 (20...fxe5 21 e4) 21 xf6 xf6 22 e4 e5, and the position reached is one that we have examined in the chapter about double attacks.

Why didn’t Yusupov play 14 d1! – surely it must be advantageous to drive the enemy queen away from the centre? He was probably afraid of the counter 14 b4, but there was no need – it could have resulted in an excellent trap:

14 d1! b4?
15 xh7+!! xh7
16 xd4

White has won a pawn (16...c2? is not possible in view of 17 e4+).

It can happen that a trap is generated of its own accord, simply as the consequence of a thorough calculation of variations. After weighing up all the possibilities, we choose the continuation that gives us the best chances of a mistake by the opponent.

Dvoretsky – Khachaturov
Moscow 1973

Q 4-49. How should White play?
Realising that the position was drawn, I began seeking a way of setting the opponent some problems.

36 d7+ e7
36...e6? 37 f8+.
37 b6! e6
38 a8!

Black’s task is simpler after 38 h4 h6 39 a8 (otherwise 39 f7 and 40 g5+) 39...e8!
38...

The knight in the corner of the board has
successfully played the role of a bait – Andrey Khachaturov was unable to resist the temptation of trying to trap it. It is this that I was hoping for. 38...\texttt{c7!!} was essential. I still had the hope that after 39 \texttt{c7+} (weaker is 39 \texttt{h4 d6} 40 \texttt{b5+ e6} 41 \texttt{h4} the opponent would hurry to drive the white king from the centre and play 41...\texttt{h6} – then I could have broken through with 42 \texttt{c7+ d6} 43 \texttt{h5}! \texttt{g5+} (43...\texttt{gxh5} 44 \texttt{e8+} and 45 \texttt{g7}) 44 \texttt{xf5 xc7} 45 \texttt{g6 d6} 46 \texttt{xh6 f5+} 47 \texttt{g6 xd4} 48 \texttt{h6 e6} 49 \texttt{f17}. However, the waiting move 41...\texttt{d7(e7)} or 41...\texttt{d8} would have led to a draw. Well, in this case I would have had the right to say to myself with a clear conscience, that I had done everything possible!

39 \texttt{e5} \texttt{c6}
40 \texttt{b6}!

Now things are bad for Black. If 40...\texttt{f7+}, then 41 \texttt{f6} \texttt{d6} (41...\texttt{d8} 42 \texttt{e7}) 42 \texttt{e6}.
40 ... \texttt{f4}
41 \texttt{h4}

But not 41 \texttt{xd5}? \texttt{f7+} 42 \texttt{d6} \texttt{xd5} or 41 \texttt{e6}? \texttt{f5}.

41 ... \texttt{h5}
41...\texttt{d5} 42 \texttt{xd5} \texttt{xd4} was more tenacious.

42 \texttt{xd5} \texttt{f5}
43 \texttt{xf4} \texttt{xbh4}
44 \texttt{e6} \texttt{g5}
45 \texttt{d5+} \texttt{c7}
46 \texttt{xh5}

And Black soon resigned.

In the following game I was able to set what was perhaps the best trap in my life.

**Lukin – Dvoretsky**

Qualifying Tournament for the World Junior Championship,
Moscow 1967

Q 4-50. Evaluate 14...\texttt{e4}.

White has the freer position and therefore it was useful for me to exchange knights, at the same time opening the diagonal for my dark-square bishop. But by playing his knight to e4, Black allows the enemy knight to go to d5, and at first sight this factor seems quite sufficient to immediately reject any ideas about 14...\texttt{e4}. I can take pride in the fact that I did not succumb to the obvious, but looked more deeply into the position.

14 ... \texttt{e4}!!
15 \texttt{d5?!} \texttt{xd5}
16 \texttt{cxd5} \texttt{exe4}
17 \texttt{xd4}

Not 17 \texttt{xc7} dxe3 18 \texttt{xe3} \texttt{d8} (a double attack: the rook is threatened, as well as 19...\texttt{g3} or 19...\texttt{c3}) 19 \texttt{wc1?!} \texttt{ec5}.

After 17 \texttt{exd4} \texttt{xf2}?! 18 \texttt{e1} \texttt{e4} 19 \texttt{d3} \texttt{f5} (19...\texttt{df6} 20 \texttt{f1} and 21 \texttt{ec2}) 20 \texttt{xe7} White gains the advantage. Black should choose between 17...\texttt{ef6}?! 18 \texttt{e1} \texttt{d8} 19 \texttt{wb3} b5 and 17...\texttt{df6}?! (intending
18...\textit{\texttt{Qxd}}5 or 18...\textit{\texttt{h}}6).

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\t\node (a) at (0,0) {\textit{\texttt{f}}1};
\t\node (b) at (1,0) {\textit{\texttt{xd}}4};
\t\node (c) at (2,0) {\textit{\texttt{exd}}4};
\t\node (d) at (3,0) {\textit{\texttt{d}}2};
\t\node (e) at (4,0) {\textit{\texttt{fe}}1};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

17\ldots \textit{\texttt{h}}4!

The idea of the trap finally becomes apparent: it is hard for White to defend his f2 square.

18 \textit{\texttt{f1}} \textit{\texttt{xd}}4
19 \textit{\texttt{exd}}4 \textit{\texttt{d2}}
20 \textit{\texttt{fe}}1

Now the simple 20...\textit{\texttt{Wxd}}4 would have ensured me an excellent game. In reply to this 21 \textit{\texttt{cd}}1? is bad: 21...\textit{\texttt{xe}}2! 22 \textit{\texttt{xe}}2 \textit{\texttt{f3+}}. After 21 \textit{\texttt{xc}}7 \textit{\texttt{c5}} (with the threat of 22...\textit{\texttt{d3}}) 22 \textit{\texttt{xd6}} Black has a choice between 22...\textit{\texttt{ce4}} 23 \textit{\texttt{g3}} \textit{\texttt{xg3}} 24 \textit{\texttt{wg3}} \textit{\texttt{Wxd5}} (the pin on the e-file ties White down) and a forced draw in the variation 22...\textit{\texttt{d3}} 23 \textit{\texttt{Whx}}3 \textit{\texttt{Whx}}3 24 \textit{\texttt{xd3}} \textit{\texttt{xe1+}} 25 \textit{\texttt{h2}} \textit{\texttt{ed}}8 26 \textit{\texttt{db4}} \textit{\texttt{f1+}} 27 \textit{\texttt{g1}} \textit{\texttt{d2+}}.

Unfortunately, I played 20...\textit{\texttt{lf6}}? almost instantly, and after 21 \textit{\texttt{xc7}} White retained somewhat the better chances.
Logic or Intuition?

Youth is typically proud of its deep, accurate and rapid calculation of variations. At that time Tai was already famous for this quality, and I had no wish to be left behind.

Lev Polugayevsky

It is extremely rare to come across players with a universal style, operating equally successfully in any type of position. Such were Bobby Fischer and — in his best years — Boris Spassky. Normally all players, including top grandmasters, have playing defects of some sort, and in certain situations they do not feel too confident. I have always aimed to help the players, whom I have been training, to develop their backward aspects, and to eliminate their own weaknesses (without, of course, rejecting their natural way of playing).

Traditionally players are divided into combinative and positional. At one time it was comparatively easy to distinguish players by this criterion, but now things are different — hardly any purely positional or purely combinative players remain. Besides, such a division talks only about the manner of playing, and not about the way of thinking. It gives little information from the viewpoint of choosing the direction and content of training required by the player. The skills that you need to develop, if, for example, you need to make progress in the field of tactics, are too varied and different from one another (you, I hope, will already have realised this). Things are just the same if you want to improve your positional mastery.

To me it seems more productive to distinguish between the type of thinking of a player, that which dominates in his creative approach to the taking of decisions: intuitive or logical.

Grandmasters of the intuitive tendency — José Raúl Capablanca, Mikhail Tal, Tigran Petrosian, Anatoly Karpov — have a subtle feeling for the finest nuances of the position, and possess keen combinative vision. They are weaker in the formulation of the game, in strategy, they are not too fond of calculating variations, and they commit errors in their calculations.

At the opposite pole are, for example, Akiba Rubinstein, Mikhail Botvinnik, and Garry Kasparov. They carry out deep plans in the opening and in the following stages, they think in a disciplined way, and calculate variations accurately. But sometimes they miss unexpected tactical ideas, sometimes they are excessively direct, and they sense insufficiently keenly the turning points of the battle.

It stands to reason that all this is a crude plan. Usually my 'diagnosis' of a player, with whom I am working (all the same, whether it is a young candidate master or a grandmaster), includes a significantly greater number of different parameters. Nevertheless, the classification indicated seems methodologically very important and useful.

It is clear, for example, that it is advisable for a player of the intuitive type of thinking to work on exercises involving the complicated calculation of variations, demanding perseverance and concentration (training in this direction helped Alexander Chernin to achieve significant progress, rapidly progressing from a run-of-the-mill master to a grandmaster, and a participant in the Candidates event for the world championship). But for logical players such as, for example, Artur Yusupov, one can recommend the
solving of examples which demand the rapid ‘grasping’ of the tactical or positional features of a position.

I am not convinced that you, dear reader, will immediately agree with all the views and evaluations expressed above. And at any event you should be surprised to see Mikhail Tal being assigned to the grandmasters who have problems with the calculation of variations. We only have to remember the epithet, which in his youth often accompanied the player from Riga: ‘the electronic calculating Tal’. Here, indeed, some explanation is required.

Tal was a genius of a chess player, superior in my view to all others in his completely unbounded imagination, inventiveness, and also his colossal boldness, his complete lack of restraint, and his inner freedom in the decisions he took. It stands to reason that he was capable of noticing instantly not only latent possibilities, but also the variations underlying them. Rapidly calculating them many moves ahead, he however did not always do this accurately. Trusting his intuitive impression, Tal usually avoided a thorough checking of the combinative complications that he launched. Knowing this, players such as, say, Victor Korchnoi and Lev Polugayevsky, who did not trust Tal’s calculations, looked for vulnerable points in them, and often successfully refuted them.

A good illustration of this is provided by the following game.

**Polugayevsky – Tal**

USSR Championship Semi-Final, Tbilisi 1956

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 c3 c5 4 e3 e6 5 d3 c6 6 a3 cxd4 (6...a6!??) 7 exd4 b5 8 d5 (according to theory, 8 c5 e4 9 d5 is stronger) 8...dxc4 9 e3 0-0 10 0-0 b6?! (10...a6?? and 11...b5) 11 d3 d5 12 d1 c6 13 a2 w7 14 e5 d8 15 w2.

Ten years later Tal reached this position, but this time with White, against Brink-Claussen in the 17th Olympiad (Havana 1966). His opponent replied passively: 15...cxd5?! and after 16 cxd5 w3 17 f3! w6 18 x7 e7 e7 19 f1 e6 20 g7 e8 21 h4! White gained an appreciable positional advantage.

15 ... g4!

True to his style, Tal makes use of the very first opportunity to launch into combinative complications. He creates the concrete threat of 16...e6 17 x7 e7 f3, which will be carried out in reply to 16 h3? or 16 c5? In the event of 16 c5 Black has a pleasant choice between 16...g4 and 16...h7.

Q 4-51. What promising continuations does White have?

From the commentaries of Tal and Polugayevsky, one would imagine that 16 b5!, as played in the game, was the only move. In fact there is also another interesting idea: 16 d5? cxd5 17 h3! In reply to this neither 17 c5? 18 x5 nor 17...xe2? 18 x2 is possible. The only correct move is the cold-blooded 17...d1 18 c5 f3 18...f1 (18...e4? 19 d4 d5 20 d5 d5 21 d5) 19 h4 e8. White is unable to
extract any concrete gains from the active placing of his pieces, and the initiative passes to his opponent (for example, 20 \( \text{W}d3 \text{\&e}5\)).

\[ \text{16 \&b}5! \]

Now 16...\( \text{W}b8 \) 17 \&xe6 is bad for Black. There are two tactical possibilities available to him: 16...\&a6 and 16...\&xd4.

Q 4-52. Try to calculate or analyse both continuations.

First let us see how the game proceeded.

\[ \text{16...\&a6?}! \text{17 \&xe6! \&xb5 (forced)} \text{18 \&xd4 \&e7 19 \&xe7 \&xe7 20 \&e1.} \]

\( \text{20 \&d2?!} \) is weaker, since after 20...\&xf3 White has to recapture on f3 with his pawn (21 \&xf3? \&xd4 22 \&d1 \&f3+!).

\[ \text{20...\&xf3 (20...\&xd4? 21 \&xd4!) 21 \&xf3 \&d7 22 d5! \&d4 23 \&d3 \&c2 24 \&b1!} \]

\( \&xe1 25 \&xh7+ \&f8 26 \&xe2 \&xd5. \) Up to here events have developed by force. Tal writes that when he went in for this entire variation, he was hoping to parry the opponent’s attack by 26...\&e8 27 \&h8+ \&e7 28 \&xe1+ \&d6, when White loses due to the weakness of his back rank. A clever idea, which, however, is easily refuted by the prosaic 27 \&xc8!.

Studying Tal’s games, I noticed that such a picture occurs in them very often. He calculates a long variation, finds in it a brilliant ‘point’, is inspired by it, and makes the move without hesitation. Alas, the insufficiently tested variation usually contains a ‘hole’, and moreover, sometimes a rather primitive one.

\[ \text{27 \&xe1 f6 28 \&xc8 \&xc8 29 h4.} \]

As a result of pretty complications White has won a pawn, and has excellent winning chances. However, in his joy Polugayevsky makes a mistake on the very next move, and misses a deserved victory.

\[ \text{29...\&d8 30 h5?} \text{(30 \&e3!) 30...\&d3.} \]

Black forces the exchange of queens. And according to Tarrasch’s apt comment ‘all rook endings are drawn’.

\[ \text{31 \&xd3 \&xd3 32 \&c1 \&g8 33 \&c2 \&g4 34 \&h7 35 \&g2 \&h6 36 f3 a5 37 \&g3 \&a4 38 \&c4 \&xh2 39 \&a4 \&b3 40 \&a8 \&h7 41 \&f4 b5 42 \&e4 \&c3 43 \&a5 b4 44 axb4 \&c4+ 45 \&f5 \&xb4 46 \&a7 \&b3 47 f4 \&b5+ 48 \&e6 \&b4.} \]

Draw.

Now let us see what could have happened if Tal had played differently on the 16th move. First, here is what he himself had to say:

‘Here there was the interesting variation 16...\&a6! 17 \&xe6! \&xf3 18 \&xd4! \&xf3 19 \&xc7 \&xe2 20 \&xc6 \&xg5 21 \&xg5 \&xe5 22 h6 23 fxe5 \&xh5 24 e6 \&c4 25 e7 \&xa2 26 \&d1 (in our youth we calculated quite well, and this variation was seen by both of us).’

Certainly, a deep and pretty calculation. But I suggest checking it move by move, to see how correct it is.

Only initially does the play develop by force.

\[ \text{16... \&xd4!} \]

\[ \text{17 \&xd4!} \]

\( \text{17 \&bxd4? \&xd4 (or 17...\&xg5 18 \&xe6 \&e8).} \)

\[ \text{17... \&xf3} \]

\[ \text{18 \&xd8+} \]
Not 18 \(\text{Wxf3? \text{Wxh2+}}\) 19 \(\text{Qxf1 \text{Qc2.}}\) The variation 18 \(\text{Qxc7 xe2} 19 \text{Qxd6+ (Qxe6? \text{Qxg5!?) 20 Qxd8 Qxd8!} 21 Qxd8+ Qxd8 22 \text{e1 eb5}) leads to a transposition of moves.

From this point let us consider rather more carefully all the candidate moves. This is the first opportunity to deviate from the variation given by Tal: 18...Qxd8!? 19 Qxc7 xe2 20 Qxe7 (20 Qxe6 d7) 20...d7, and Black regains the piece.

18 ... Qxd8
19 Qxc7 Qxe2
20 Qxe6!

Of course, 20...fxe6? 21 Qxe6+ Qf6 22 Qxc8 Qxg5 23 Qe1 is bad for Black. However, apart from 20...Qxg5, he can also play 20...Qf6! Then 21 Qxf6 Qxf6 22 Qg5 Qh5 or 21 Qe1 Qc4 is not dangerous for him. At first sight 21 h3 seems strong, intending 21...Qe5? 22 Qxf6 Qxf6 23 Qd4 with advantage to White. But 21...h6! can be interposed, after which White has nothing. 21...Qc4! is also good.

The defence found is quite sufficient to conclude that Black's position is defensible after 16...Qxd4! Even so, it is interesting to continue our analysis, and see whether things are indeed bad for Black after 20...Qxg5.

20 ... Qxg5
21 Qxg5 Qe5

In the event of the passive 21...Qh6? 22 Qe1 White's advantage is obvious. However, Black can consider 21...Qc4!? 22 Qc1 b5 23 b3! Qe6 24 Qxc8+ Qxc8 25 b4 Qe5 (but not 25...Qh6? 26 f3 and 27 Qf2) 26 f4 Qc4 (26...h6? 27 Qe4, intending Qd6) 27 Qxc4 (weaker is 27 a4 Qd6!) 27...bxc4. White's position is preferable, but I think that Black can hope to save the game.

But does the f7 pawn have to be defended?

22 f4 h6
22...Qc4? 23 Qe1.
23 fxe5 hxg5
24 e6

Even here not all is clear. Only, Black must not fall into the combination given by Tal: 24...Qc4? 25 e7 Qxa2 26 Qd1. Also wrong is 24...f6? 25 e7+ Qh7 26 Qe6! Qe8 27 Qe1 or 26...Qb8 27 Qf7 Qb5 28 Qd1 and 29 Qd8.

24 ... Qf8!
25 exf7
25 e7+ Qe8.
25 ... Qc2

Black intends 26...Qxb2 or 26...Qc4. The ending is drawish. 25...Qh5 26 Qf1 Qc7 is also possible.

Now remember the question about how Tal calculated variations. Was it badly? No. Of course not, there is no way that one can say this. Do you know many players who are capable of seeing so many moves ahead? But you also can't say that he calculated well -- on verification, his long and pretty variations turned out to be just too unreliable.
However, we will not hurry to draw conclusions. In order to make an objective judgement about the play of the great player, who Mikhail Tal certainly was, one example is clearly insufficient. I will return again to an analysis of examples of his play in the following part of the book, devoted to attack, to risk and to problematic sacrifices of material.
The Checking of Exercises

If a player is shown a move that looks heroic, but in reality turns out to be a bluff, and if, after yielding to the first impression, he will seriously believe this move, but after the bluff is revealed he will feel deeply insulted, it will take a long time for this feeling to be erased.

Emanuel Lasker

For many years now I have been compiling a card index of exercises, aimed at developing thinking skills and a mastery of the techniques needed by the practical chess player. The examples included in the card index must meet definite, quite high methodological and aesthetic standards.

Looking through chess literature: magazines, books, *Informator* (in particular, well annotated games and extracts), I stop at interesting and instructive episodes that occur in games or are mentioned in the notes. I think for what aim a particular episode could come in useful to me, and in which section of the card index it should be included. Then I begin a thorough checking, which in at least half of the cases forces the discovery to be discarded. But if everything is alright, the example goes into the card index, and is soon used in training sessions. There it undergoes another check, a much more strict one. Many times my pupils, in solving exercises, have discovered in them new facets, about which I did not even suspect. As a result the example had either to be removed from the card index, or be substantially redesigned.

**Bartrina – Ghitescu**

Olot 1974

Q 4-53. How should the game end?

1...\(\text{d}8\) is incorrect in view of 1...\(\text{f}2\)!

2\(\text{xf}\)\(a\)\(x\)\(b\)\(2\) with mate. White carried out a combination, which found its way into many books on tactics.

\[
\begin{array}{cccccccc}
\text{a} & \text{b} & \text{c} & \text{d} & \text{e} & \text{f} & \text{g} & \text{h} \\
8 &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
7 &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
6 &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
5 &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
4 &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
3 &  &  & \text{\textcolor{white}{\textbullet}} &  &  &  &  \\
2 &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
1 &  &  &  &  &  &  &  \\
\end{array}
\]

1 \(\text{g}7\)! \(\text{f}2\)+

2 \(\text{f}1\)!

2\(\text{x}1\)\(2\)\(b\)\(2\) is not possible, nor is 2\(\text{h}1\)\(?\)\(x\)\(g\)\(2\)+! 3\(\text{x}\)\(g\)\(2\) \(\text{g}3\)+ 4\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{g}1\)+ 5\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{x}b\)\(2\)+.

2\(\ldots\) \(\text{b}5\)+

2...\(\text{x}g\)\(2\)+ 3\(\text{x}1\)\(2\)\(b\)\(2\)+ 4\(\text{g}1\).

3 \(\text{x}f\)\(2\) \(\text{e}2\)+

4 \(\text{g}3\) \(\text{x}d\)\(1\)

5 \(\text{h}8\)! \(\text{d}6\)+
6...\textit{d}d12

Black resigns.

Teodor Ghitescu could have avoided defeat, if he had found the cool defence 1...f6! Now 2...h8 leads to perpetual check after 2...f12+ 3...f11 b5+ 4...xf2 e2+ 5...g3 e5+, but even so White has nothing better. Incidentally, a transposition of moves is also possible: 1...f2+ 2...f11 f6!

A refutation does not necessarily have to be of a concrete, tactical nature – sometimes it is sufficient simply to look soberly at the position and make a more precise evaluation.

\textbf{Stein – Bronstein}

Moscow 1971

Q 4-54. How should White continue?

Leonid Stein carried out a combination, based on the weakness of the 8th rank.

22...\textit{c}xc5

In his book about Stein, grandmaster Raymond Keene attaches two exclamation marks to this move. I would replace the first of these with a question mark.

22...\textit{x}xc5 23...e8.

23...\textit{x}xe8 \textit{g}g4

23...\textit{x}xe8? 24...e8+...t8 25...h6 would have led to mate. Things are hopeless for Black after 23...g5? 24...xg5 (24...e4? 15) 24...e8 25...e8+...f8 26...xc8...g7 27...e1.

The intermediate move, moving the bishop away from the attack, changes the situation. If the rook moves, there follows 24...g5 25...xg5...e8. If 24 f3, then 24...d4+ 25...h1...e8 26...e8+...g7 27...xg4 h6 or 27...a4. Therefore Stein is forced to go into a complicated ending.

24...b5!

25...xb5

26...xd1

Threatening 27...b6.

26...\textit{b}7!

Although White has only a pawn for the exchange, the initiative is on his side, in no small degree thanks to his two strong bishops. The enemy rooks are tied down by the need to keep the white passed pawns under observation.

In the subsequent play Stein went on to win. Our evaluations are often influenced by the final result of a game, and therefore it is not surprising that on a brief examination the
ending appears won for White. But this is a serious exaggeration. Grandmaster Dolmatov made a more accurate evaluation of the position: in fact the combination did not bring Stein any advantage. Black lost only because of his subsequent mistakes.

27 \textit{\texttt{e1}} \textit{\texttt{d8}} 28 \textit{\texttt{c4}} \textit{\texttt{f8}} 29 \textit{\texttt{g7}} 30 \textit{\texttt{a3}} \textit{\texttt{bxa3}}. A debatable, although possible decision. 30...\textit{\texttt{d6}} was simpler.

31 \textit{\texttt{a1}} \textit{\texttt{d6}} 32 \textit{\texttt{d2}} \textit{\texttt{c7}} (32...\textit{\texttt{db8}} 33 \textit{\texttt{xa3}} \textit{\texttt{xb5}} came into consideration) 33 \textit{\texttt{xa3}} \textit{\texttt{e7}} 34 \textit{\texttt{e3}} \textit{\texttt{b6}}?! 34...\textit{\texttt{d6}} was stronger, not fearing 35 \textit{\texttt{b4}}?, of course, in view of 35...\textit{\texttt{cxb4}}.

Don't think that, when I see someone else’s analysis, I am immediately seized with the desire to refute it at all costs. It is just that, so that the exercise should be ‘clean’, and should make a strong impression on the solver, its soundness should be tested beforehand. And I am only too happy if the example withstands the test.

Keres – Benko
Candidates Tournament, Yugoslavia 1959

20 \textit{\texttt{c2}}!!

Q 4-55. What should White play?

Paul Keres found a quiet move of fearful strength.

20 ... \textit{\texttt{g6}}?

How can Black defend against the threat of 21 \textit{\texttt{f5}}? In all variations he loses at least a pawn, e.g. 20...\textit{\texttt{h5}} 21 \textit{\texttt{f5}} (21 \textit{\texttt{xf6}}+ \textit{\texttt{xf6}} 22 \textit{\texttt{xf5}} is weaker in view of 22...\textit{\texttt{e8}}) 21...\textit{\texttt{hxg4}} 22 \textit{\texttt{xd7}} \textit{\texttt{d8}} 23 \textit{\texttt{xe4}}, or 20...\textit{\texttt{d5}} 21 \textit{\texttt{f5}} \textit{\texttt{e6}} 22 \textit{\texttt{xe6}}! The game lasted only one more move.

21 \textit{\texttt{d1}}

Black resigns.

A very convincing finish, wouldn’t you agree? However, it had to be checked whether or not White had another, equally effective way to gain a decisive advantage.
The existence of a second solution would, of course, have significantly reduced the aesthetic impression of the exercise.

After 20 \( \text{Qxf6} + ? \) \( \text{tbxf6} \) 21 \( \text{He7} \) \( \text{Qd5} \) the game becomes equal, since the combination 22 \( \text{Hd7} \) \( \text{Qxf4} \) 23 \( \text{Hxf7} \) leads only to a draw: 23...\( \text{He2} + \) 24 \( \text{Wf1} \) \( \text{He1} \) 25 \( \text{He6} \) \( \text{He8} \) 26 \( \text{He7} + \) \( \text{Qf8} \).

20 \( \text{Qd1} \) looks stronger. If 20...\( \text{Qc6} \), then 21 \( \text{Qc2} \) \( \text{h5} \) 22 \( \text{Qxf6} + \) \( \text{Qxf6} \) 23 \( \text{Qf5} \) is possible, if there is nothing better. Black replies 20...\( \text{Qc5} \) 21 \( \text{Qc2} \) \( \text{e4} \) 22 \( \text{Qxf6} + \) \( \text{gx6} \) 23 \( \text{Qxe4} \) \( \text{Qxe4} \). The position favours White, of course, but it is not easy for him to achieve concrete gains, e.g. 24 \( \text{Hd7} \) \( \text{Qc5} \) 25 \( \text{Qxc7} \) \( \text{Qxc7} \) 26 \( \text{Qxe4} \) \( \text{Qd4} \), or 24 \( \text{Qh6} \) \( \text{Qd6} \) 25 \( \text{g4} \) (preventing 25...\( \text{Qf5} \)) 25...\( \text{f5} \) followed by...\( \text{f7-f6} \),...\( \text{Qd4} \), etc.

This analysis shows that the move made by Keres was the strongest, which means that the exercise is fully correct.

**Browne – Ljubojevic**

Tilburg 1978

Q 4-56. Find and calculate the strongest continuation for White.

14 \( \text{d5} \) suggests itself, but Ljubomir Ljubojevic had prepared the strong reply 14...\( \text{Qc5} \)! After 15 \( \text{dx6} \) (15 \( \text{Qa4} \) \( \text{Wc5} \) 16 \( \text{de6} \) \( \text{Qxe1} \) 17 \( \text{Qxd7} \) \( \text{Qd7} \), and White’s pieces are 'hanging') 15...\( \text{Wxc4} \) 16 \( \text{Qxd7} \) \( \text{Qxd7} \) Black’s position is preferable.

In the event of the other standard move 14 \( \text{Qe5} \), 14...\( \text{Qxe5} \) 15 \( \text{Qxe5} \) \( \text{Qc5} \) looks dubious, but the simple 14...\( \text{Qxc3} \) 15 \( \text{Qxc3} \) \( \text{Wd6} \) is possible, not fearing 16 \( \text{Qxf7} \) \( \text{Qxf7} \) 17 \( \text{Qxe6} \) (17 \( \text{Qxe6} \) \( \text{Qf8} \)) 17...\( \text{Qd8} \) with an unclear game.

Walter Browne found a splendid solution.

14 \( \text{Qd5} \)!! \( \text{c6} \)

14...\( \text{Qxd5} \) 15 \( \text{Qxd5} \) is completely bad, and as for 14...\( \text{Qxc3} ?, \) we will return to it later.

15 \( \text{Wc4} \) \( \text{Qc3} \)

15...\( \text{Qa5} \) 16 \( \text{Qc3} \) \( \text{Qd6} \) 17...\( \text{gxd6} \) \( \text{Qd6} \) 19 \( \text{Whd7} \) \( \text{Qc8} \) \( \text{Wh7} ? \) 19...\( \text{Whd8} \) \( \text{Qb8} \) \( \text{Qd2} \) would have come to roughly the same thing.

16 \( \text{Qxc3} \) \( \text{Qb8} \)

17 \( \text{Qb3} \)

White has gained a clear advantage. His pieces are significantly more active, and it is not easy for the bishop at \( \text{a6} \) to come back into play, in view of the weakness of the \( \text{a7} \) pawn.

17...\( \text{Wd7} \) 16 \( \text{Wc3} \).

18 \( \text{Wc5} \) \( \text{Wb7} \)?

18...\( \text{Whd7} \) was better.

19 \( \text{Qxf6} \) \( \text{gx6} \)

20 \( \text{d5} \)!

The time has come for this thematic breakthrough in the centre.

20...\( \text{exd5} \)

21 \( \text{Qb4} \) \( \text{Wd7} \)

22 \( \text{Qh4} \) \( \text{Qg7} \)

23 \( \text{Qd4} \)

Threatening 24 \( \text{Qd2} \). Black resigns.

Judging by the comments in *Chess Informator*, Ljubojevic rejected 14...\( \text{Qxc3} \) (in reply to 14 \( \text{Qd5} \)!!) because of 15 \( \text{Qxb7} \)
\text{\text{\text{x}e}1 \text{\text{x}c}8, and if 16...\text{\text{a}5}, then 17 \text{\text{x}d}7 \text{\text{x}d}7 18 \text{\text{x}f}6 with advantage to White (even stronger is Ken Neat’s suggestion of 17 \text{\text{a}4}!, with the idea of a2–a3 and b2–b4). However, he had available a curious tactical possibility: 16...\text{\text{x}f}2+!? 17 \text{\text{f}1}! (17 \text{\text{x}f}2? \text{\text{e}4+}) 17...\text{\text{x}d}4! 18 \text{\text{x}d}4 \text{\text{c}5}. Black regains his piece, but promptly again loses it: 19 \text{\text{f}13 \text{x}c}8 20 \text{\text{b}4 \text{\text{d}7 21 \text{x}f}6 \text{g}x\text{f}6 22 \text{\text{g}4+ \text{\text{h}8} (or 22...\text{\text{f}8}) 23 \text{\text{b}c}5}.}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

This position would appear to be reached by force. After 23...\text{\text{x}c}5 White has a choice between 24 \text{\text{x}c}5 \text{\text{x}c}5 25 \text{\text{b}3 and 24 \text{\text{d}1 \text{\text{d}5 25 \text{\text{d}3. Although nominally material is equal (three pawns for a knight), White’s chances, as it seems to me, are better. This means that we have not succeeded in refuting Browne’s idea. If it is taken into account that in the initial position ‘normal’ ways do not promise White any advantage, the operation undertaken by him can be deemed justified.}

A very unusual and pretty exchange of blows occurred in the following game.

\text{Novikov – Nikolaev}
\text{Kharkov 1968}

1 \text{d}4 \text{d}5 2 \text{c}4 \text{dxc}4 3 \text{\text{f}3 \text{\text{f}6 4 e}3 \text{\text{g}4 5 \text{\text{x}c}4 \text{e}6 6 \text{\text{c}3 a}6 7 a4? \text{\text{c}6 8 h}3 \text{\text{h}5 9 g}4?! \text{\text{g}6 10 \text{\text{h}4 \text{\text{b}4 11 \text{\text{g}6 \text{hx}g6 12 \text{\text{w}13}.}
}

\text{Q 4-57. Calculate the consequences of 12...e5.}

White has played the opening inaccurately, and his position is rather loose. This factor could have been emphasised by playing simply 12...\text{\text{a}5 13 \text{\text{a}2 c}5. However, Black’s attention was attracted by a more energetic, although double-edged plan.

12 ... \text{e}5!?

While immediately attacking the enemy centre Black at the same time increases the scope of the bishop at c4 and weakens his f7 square. Accurate calculation is required.

The cautious 13 \text{\text{d}5? leads after 13...e4! 14 \text{\text{w}e}2 \text{\text{e}5 to a clear advantage for Black. In the event of 13 \text{\text{d}xe}5?! \text{\text{c}xe}5 14 \text{\text{b}7 \text{\text{b}8 (of course, not 14...\text{\text{c}3+ 15 \text{\text{c}3 \text{\text{c}4? 16 \text{\text{c}6+ and 17 \text{\text{w}xc}4) White cannot play 15 \text{\text{w}xa}6? \text{\text{b}6 16 \text{\text{b}5+ c}6, while after 15 \text{\text{w}g}2 Black’s compensation for the sacrificed pawn is more than sufficient. For example: 15...\text{\text{b}6 (15...0–0 is also}}

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strong) 16 \( \texttt{e}2 \) \( \texttt{d}3+ \) 17 \( \texttt{f}1 \) (17 \( \texttt{x}d3 \) \( \texttt{e}x\texttt{d}3 \) 18 \( \texttt{a}8+ \) \( \texttt{e}7 \) 19 \( \texttt{x}h8 \) \( \texttt{d}6 \) 17 \( \texttt{e}6 \) 18 \( \texttt{g}5 \) \( \texttt{x}c3 \) 19 \( \texttt{bxc3} \) \( \texttt{e}4 \) with advantage to Black.

13 \( \texttt{g}5! \) \( \texttt{ex}d4! \)

If 14 \( \texttt{ex}d4 \), then both 14...\( \texttt{x}d4 \) and 14...\( \texttt{xd}4 \) are good.

14 \( \ldots \) \( \texttt{dxc3} \)
15 \( \texttt{fxg7} \) \( \texttt{cxb2}+ \)

The situation has become irrational: Black is threatened with mate in one move, and the pawns of both sides are on the threshold of queening.

16 \( \texttt{e}2 \)

Things seem to be bad for Black: how can he simultaneously parry the two threats of 17 \( \texttt{x}f7 \) mate and 17 \( \texttt{gxh8} \)? 16...\( \texttt{x}d4+ \) 17 \( \texttt{exd4} \) \( \texttt{e}7+ \) does not help in view of 18 \( \texttt{e}3 \).

16 \( \ldots \) \( \texttt{d}3+!! \)

Black was obliged to foresee this splendid resource in advance – when he made his 12th move.

When checking Black's idea, I noticed that in the event of 16 \( \texttt{f}1 \) (instead of 16 \( \texttt{e}2 \)) the counter-blow 16...\( \texttt{d}3+ \) loses its strength:

17 \( \texttt{g}2! \) \( \texttt{bxa1} \) 18 \( \texttt{xf7+} \) \( \texttt{d}8 \) 19 \( \texttt{g}8+ \) \( \texttt{xg8} \) 20 \( \texttt{xe6}+ \) \( \texttt{d}7 \) 21 \( \texttt{e}6+ \) \( \texttt{d}8 \) 22 \( \texttt{xd3} \) with advantage to White. However, another diverting queen sacrifice was found: 16...\( \texttt{d}1+!! \) 17 \( \texttt{xd1} \) \( \texttt{bxa1} \) 18 \( \texttt{gxh8}+ \) \( \texttt{h}8 \) and Black remains a pawn up. A unique instance: two queen sacrifices on different squares, immediately after emerging from the opening.

17 \( \texttt{x}d3 \)

Weaker is 17 \( \texttt{xd3} \) 0–0–0+ and 18...\( \texttt{bxa1} \).

17 \( \ldots \) \( \texttt{bxa1} \)
18 \( \texttt{gxh8}+ \) \( \texttt{h}8 \)

Black has emerged from the complications with an extra pawn. However, the opponent retains some positional compensation for it.

19 \( \texttt{e}4 \) \( \texttt{c}3 \)
20 \( \texttt{xc6}+ \) \( \texttt{xc6} \)
21 \( \texttt{xc6}+ \) \( \texttt{bxc6} \)

Now, by continuing 22 \( \texttt{h}4! \), in order to exchange his isolated h-pawn, White would have gained real drawing chances.

Black's brilliant combination was completely correct, but I am not convinced that it was objectively the strongest continuation. Therefore, when offering the position as an exercise for training imagination and skill in calculating variations, it is advisable to use a clarifying question, the one that you were given before the start of the combination.

see next diagram
White to move. What would you play?

Black to move. Evaluate 44...\textit{xf3}.

Black to move. Calculate the variations, and give an evaluation of the position.
Is there a Solution to the Problem?

_Fear of the possibility of a mistake should not avert us from seeking the truth._

Claude Helvétius

The following ending to an old game is given in many chess guides.

_Kunneman – N.N._

_Berlin 1934_

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The storm clouds have gathered over the position of Black's king. The move made by him looks like a gesture of despair.

1  ...  \( \text{\#xb2}! \)

Well, what significance in this situation does the b2 pawn have? However, things are by no means as simple as they appear. From b2 the queen coordinates quite well with the other pieces, and helps to parry the immediate threats on the back rank and on the weakened dark squares on the kingside. For example, the direct 2 \( \text{\#xe5} \)? \( \text{\#xe5} \) 3 \( \text{\#f6} \) does not achieve its aim in view of 3...\( \text{\#b1} + 4 \text{\#g2 \#e4} + \) with perpetual check (after the forced 5 \( \text{\#g1} \)). In the event of 2 \( \text{c4} \) the bishop at e5 is defended by the queen, and so Black can reply 2...\( \text{\#d8} \) (threatening 3...\( \text{\#g7} \)) 3 \( \text{\#e4} \text{(e3)} \) 3...f6, when he is alright. Q 4-58. Does 2 \( \text{\#f6} \) win?

It was this tempting continuation that White chose in the game, in which he was able to announce mate: 2 \( \text{\#f6} \) \( \text{\#xc3} \)? 3 \( \text{\#g7} +! \) \( \text{\#g7} \) 4 \( \text{\#e8} +! \). However, later a brilliant defence was found.

2  \( \text{\#f6} \) \( \text{\#c1} +! \)

3  \( \text{\#xe5} \) \( \text{\#xh6}! \)

The two sides' chances are roughly equal. After making the acquaintance of this ending, I began wondering what exercises could be made out of it. One of them, involving the development of imagination and attention to the opponent's counter-chances, you have only just solved. The leading question in the formulation of the exercise, pointing towards a search for defensive resources by Black, makes things easier for the solver. But what if it should prove possible after
1...\(\text{\textit{W}}\)xb2 to find for White a clear-cut (and single!) way to win – then it would be possible to manage without the leading question, and simply invite White to make a decision. In this case we would obtain a very difficult problem on the theme of taking account of the opponent's resources. To discover the spectacular refutation of 2 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)f6?! without a special prompt that it exists, to refute this move and choose another, stronger one, is something that not every grandmaster is capable of doing.

**Q 4-59. Find the strongest continuation.**

This is an exercise not for solving in the mind, but for a serious analysis – therefore I recommend that you move the pieces on the board. Focus your attention on determining the candidate moves for both sides.

Remembering the chapter ‘Don't let the king interfere!’, we begin by checking 2 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)g2, renewing the threats of \(\text{\textit{W}}\)f6 and \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xe5. Then 2...f6? 3 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xe5 is bad for Black. The only defence is 2...f5!, when the following variations are possible:

a) 3 c4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)a5! (3...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d7 or 3...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d8 is weaker because of 4 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)e3) 4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d1 (4 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)d3 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d4; 4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)f4 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)d4, but not 4...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)f7? 5 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)e3 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d6 6 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)c5 and wins) 4...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)c2! with the threat of 5...\(\text{\textit{W}}\)e4. The greedy 4...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xa2?! would have subjected Black to serious danger after 5 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)d2 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)b1 6 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xa2 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xa2 7 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d3.

b) 3 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)f4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xf4! (3...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xc3? 4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xe5; if 3...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xe3 or 3...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)f6 White wins by 4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)e8+ \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)f7 5 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)e3) 4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xf4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d2! 5 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)e8+ (5 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)e3 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d8 followed by ...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d7) 5...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)f7 6 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xb8 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d7!, and if 7 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)h8, then 7...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)f6 or 7...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d5+ 8 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)h3 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)f6.

To be honest, the conclusion that 2 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)g2?! was insufficient for a win merely gladdened me, since I had seen another, apparently very strong possibility – 2 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)e3.

Simultaneously three threats have been created: 3 f4, 3 c4 and 3 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xa7. After 2...f6 incorrect is 3 f4? \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d2! 4 fxe5 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xe2 5 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)f3 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xh6, but the simple 3 \(\text{\textit{W}}\)xa7! retains the initiative for White, e.g. 3...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d8 4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)a5 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)e8 5 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)g2?!

For at least a year I thought that the solution had been found, and I constantly used this exercise at teaching and training sessions. But on one occasion a student in the chess section of the Institute of Physical Culture (where I was then teaching) drew attention to the subtle defence 2...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)a3!!, parrying all White's immediate threats: 3 f4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)g7 4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)e8+ \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)f8, or 3 c4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xe3 4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xe3 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)a5 5 f4? \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d4.

More dangerous is the preparatory move 3 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)g2!, intending 3...b5? 4 c4! \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xe3 5 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xe3 bxc4 6 f4 and wins, or 3...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)g7? 4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xa7! \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)f8 5 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xg7 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xg7 6 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xb7 when White is a pawn up. However, after 3...f6! Black, by sacrificing a piece, can defend: 4 f4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)f7 (the immediate 4...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xa2+ also comes into consideration) 5 fxe5 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xe5 6 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)d2 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xe1 7 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xe1 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\)xa2+.

The situation began to resemble certain old mathematical problems, when after agonising over the solution and finally looking up the answer, the schoolboy would sometimes with surprise and indignation read: 'There is
no solution to the problem'.

Even so, before giving up, let us think whether we have missed any further candidate moves. Thus, for example, there is 2 h4 with the threat of 3 \( \texttt{Exe}5 \). However, 2...f5! leads to roughly the same variations as after 2 g2.

There remains one other possibility, which, in my opinion, is in fact the strongest.

\begin{equation}
2 \texttt{g4!!}
\end{equation}

While trying to prevent the important defensive move ...f7–f5, at the same time White creates the threat of 3 \( \texttt{Exe}5 \) \( \texttt{Exe}5 \) 4 \( \texttt{Wf6} \) \( \texttt{Wb}1+ \) 5 \( \texttt{g2} \) \( \texttt{We4}+ \) 6 \( \texttt{g3} \) \( \texttt{Wd}3+ \) 7 f3. If 2...\( \texttt{wc2} \), then 3 \( \texttt{We3}! \) is an unpleasant reply.

\begin{equation}
2 \ldots f5!
\end{equation}

Nevertheless, here too the best defence involves the advance of the f-pawn. The direct 3 \( \texttt{gx}5 \) does not give White anything in view of 2...\( \texttt{Wxc3} \) 4 \( \texttt{Exe}3 \) \( \texttt{Wc2}! \). However, there is a strong intermediate move, which puts Black in a difficult position.

\begin{equation}
3 \texttt{c4!}
\end{equation}

Thus, a solution to the problem exists. But a move such as 2 g4 is practically impossible to make during a game – it may emerge only as a result of a lengthy analysis of the position (as in fact occurred). But problems, which it is advisable to set for the training of practical players, should be similar to those that are likely to be encountered at the board (perhaps, only a little more difficult and, if possible, prettier). So that we have not really obtained a good exercise.

However, for an exercise the position with which we began is quite suitable. Black should not be afraid of ghosts and, finding replies to the opponent’s main attacking moves (including 2 \( \texttt{Wf6} \)), he should boldly capture the b2 pawn.

In the 4th issue of the German magazine \textit{Schach} in 1997 a big article devoted to this ending was published. Its author, Klaus Dieter Mayer, made a number of significant corrections and additions to the analysis. However, all my main conclusions were confirmed, all... except one, the most important. It turned out that even after 2 g4 Black should not lose.

Firstly, in the variation 2...\( \texttt{wc2}! \) 3 \( \texttt{We3} \) there is the successful reply 3...\( \texttt{Wxa2}! \). After the immediate 2 \( \texttt{We3} \) (instead of 2 g4) it was bad to take on a2 in view of 3 c4! \( \texttt{Wxc4} \) 4 \( \texttt{Wxa7} \), but now 4 c4? \( \texttt{Wxc4} \) is pointless, since the g4 pawn comes under attack. White has to play 4 f4 f6 5 g5!? \( \texttt{d}2! \) with great complications.

Secondly, after 2...f5! 3 c4 there is the excellent defence 3...\( \texttt{d}7! \) 4 gx5 \( \texttt{h7} \), leading by force to a drawn queen ending: 5 \( \texttt{d}1(\texttt{d}3) \) \( \texttt{g}7! \) 6 \( \texttt{e}8+ \texttt{f}8 \) 7 \( \texttt{xf8}+ \texttt{xf8} \) 8 \( \texttt{x}8 \texttt{xf}8 \).

It turns out that nevertheless there is no solution to the problem!
How Many Roads Lead to Rome?

Of several combinations simultaneously existent you have to choose, in the position, the one yielding the greatest advantage: of several mates you have to select the simplest one because that mate is least open to error, because unfortunately humanum est errare.

Emanuel Lasker

Dvoretsky – Mochalov
Minsk 1962

White gained a decisive advantage, by carrying out an attractive combination.

20 dxe5! l:txe5

Black loses after 20 ... lxe5? 21 lxe4 or 20 ... łąxc5 21 exf6.

21 lxe4 lxe4

22 lxe4 łąxc5

23 l:tg4!

Only this move leads to the goal. Now Black cannot play either 23...dxe4 24 łąe6+, or 23...łxb2 24 łąe6+ łąh8 25 l:te8+. If 23...łg7, then 24 łąe6+ łąh8 25 łąe8+ łąf8 26 łąxg7+ łąxg7 27 łąe7+ łąg8 28 łąxc6.

In the game there followed 23...łd6 24 łąe6 łąd8 25 łąxc6 łąxb2 26 łąe6+ łąh8 27 łąxa6 łąxa6 28 łąxa6 łąg7 (28...d4 29 łąb5!)

29 l:tg5! łąe8 30 łąa5! d4 31 łąd8 łąxd8 32 łąxd8 d3 33 łąf1 l:tg8 34 a4 łąf8 35 a5 łąe8 36 a6 łąd4 37 l:tg5 d2 38 łąxd2. Black resigns.

Remembering this example one day, I wondered whether it could be used as an exercise. The combination is evidently correct, but couldn’t White have achieved success in some other, simpler way?

During the game I saw that 20 l:txe4? does not work because of 20...łxg5, while to me the variation 20 l:txe4 dxe4 21 l:tc2 exd4 22 łąxc6 łąe7! did not seem convincing. However, on checking it transpired that after 20 l:txe4 dxe4 21 l:tb3+! łąh8 22 dxe5 l:txe5 (22... łąxc5 23 exf6; 22...łxg5 23 łąb7) 23 łąc2 with the threats of 24 łąxc6 and 24 łąc4 it is doubtful whether Black can hold the position. 20 łąc1!? is also quite unpleasant for him.

It stands to reason that I did not include this position in my ‘card index of exercises’. Why calculate a combination, if there is a simpler way to the goal? Lasker wrote: ‘One should not demand serious efforts where they are not demanded... The result should be achieved with one move – it cannot have any rivals.’
Polugayevsky – Torre
Interzonal Tournament, Toluca 1982

Q 4-60. What should Black play?

Torre is a pawn up, but his knight is attacked, and if it moves, then 38 a4 is very unpleasant. For example, 37...f3? 38 a4 We3 39 d8+ and White wins. Does Black have anything better than to give up the exchange by 37...c4!!

37 ... c4!!
38 a4 We6?

Not 38...e3? 39 d8+ f8 40 x8+ xf8 41 b8+ f7 42 c7+ and 43 xc4.

39 xf2 xe4+
40 g2

40 g1 wg4+ and 41...xd1+.

40 ... xg2+
41 xg2 e3+
42 f3 d1

If now 43 e2, then 43...b5. The combination has led to a won knight ending, and subsequently Eugenio Torre successfully converted his material advantage.

This entire variation will surely surprise some of the readers – those who found another, simpler solution to the exercise:

37...c5! 38 b4 (38 a4 c2 39 d8+ f17) 38...f8! with a winning position for Black. I suspect that Torre did not play this, because he did not notice the possibility of 38...f8! It is well known that long backwards moves by pieces are often overlooked.

Although I avoid tests which have more than one solution, even so several such examples are retained in my card index of exercises. In all of them the secondary solution is just as clear-cut and interesting as the main one. By observing the path chosen by the solver, one can sometimes make a judgement about his chess inclinations, especially his way of thinking.

Tal – N.N.
Simultaneous display with clocks, Riga 1958

Q 4-61. Calculate the consequences of 18 xf7.

Of course, the sacrifice on f7 suggests itself, but how should the offensive then be continued?

18 xf7! xf7
19 xe6+ f8

Now 20 f3+? does not work: 20...f6 21 xf6+ (21 xf6 gxf6) 21...xf6!
A few chapters earlier it was mentioned that Mikhail Tal’s amazing imagination enabled him, when calculating variations, to instantly discover completely unexpected attacking resources. That was also the case here: even the fact that Tal was playing several games simultaneously did not prevent the grandmaster from seeing in advance a brilliant quiet move.

20  \textit{\texttt{c1!!}}

Creating the irresistible threat of 21 \texttt{f3+ \texttt{f6} 22 \texttt{a3+}. The game concluded 20...\texttt{f6} 21 \texttt{a3+ \texttt{e7} 22 \texttt{e4 \texttt{e8} 23 \texttt{x} \texttt{e7} \texttt{xe7} 24 \texttt{d5 \texttt{b5} 25 \texttt{d6 \texttt{x} \texttt{d3} 26 \texttt{d7+}, and mate next move.}

When Artur Yusupov used to solve exercises, he would first consider forcing continuations with checks (a quite sensible approach in such positions). One of them, as it turns out, leads to a quick mate.

20  \texttt{xe7+! \texttt{xe7} 21 \texttt{f3+ \texttt{e8} 22 \texttt{f7+! \texttt{d7} 23 \texttt{xe7+ \texttt{xe7} 23...\texttt{xe7 24 \texttt{xd5.} 24 \texttt{e6+} 24 \texttt{d5 is also strong.} 24...\texttt{c7 25 \texttt{f7.} 25 \texttt{f8+! \texttt{xf8} 26 \texttt{f7 mate

In each of the following exercises there are two roughly equivalent solutions. Try to find them!
White to move

Black to move
‘Difficult in Training – Easy in Battle!’

Life is just a moment’s pulse,  
Just a swift dissolving  
Of ourselves in everyone,  
Like a wedding gift.  
Boris Pasternak

In the third part of the first volume of this series, devoted to studies, I have already talked about an effective training method – the playing of studies and positions, taken from practical games. I should remind you that for this aim one uses examples in which one of the sides (and in exercises for reciprocal playing – both players) in a limited time for thought has to make on the board a chain of best moves. Moreover, in contrast to usual exercises, requiring the taking of one decision, even though it may be a very difficult one, exercises for playing presuppose the solving of a series of successive problems. When making your initial moves it is usually not possible, and in any case not necessary, to foresee how the game will end, and what problems you will still have to solve in the future.

Exercises using examples from practical games, although sometimes not as striking as studies, are on the other hand more interesting and varied. In studies everything is based only on a search for combinative possibilities and the calculation of variations. When playing a study, a player must accurately calculate to the end either the continuation chosen, or, if the solution is taken by the method of elimination, then all the remaining possibilities that he rejects. Things are different when playing practical positions – here many decisions can be taken on the basis of positional evaluation (usually nevertheless supported by calculation).

The playing of practical positions is a form of training which imitates most closely the atmosphere of a tournament game. When preparing my pupils for competitions I frequently use the playing of positions instead of traditional training games. After all, during one session it is sometimes possible to play two or three positions, whereas training games require a significantly greater amount of time. The character of the play in them is unpredictable, and an interesting game may not result, whereas in the playing of positions one definitely has to solve difficult problems. Moreover, the trainer may choose exercises on a theme that is especially useful to the pupil at the given moment. Since the positions played have been thoroughly analysed earlier, it is easier for the trainer to determine mistakes made by the pupils.

I am by no means urging for training games to be avoided – they have their virtues. It is simply that each time one should choose concretely the most appropriate form of training, in accordance with those problems of a chess player’s preparation that have to be solved.

In this and the following chapters I will show several examples, played in training sessions by my pupils, and will describe some interesting finds that were made in the process.

The following position was one that I first ‘played’ myself – in a tournament game.
25 ... \texttt{\textcolor{red}{D}d8}  
White was threatening 26 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{Q}e3} or 26 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{b}b6}, winning a pawn.  
26 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{a}a4} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{b}}b8}}  
26...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{c}c5}? 27 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}cxf6}} gxf6 28 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{e}e5}.  
27 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}c6}}  
The next move will be 28 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e}}e4}}, after which the d6 pawn cannot be defended. How can Black create counterplay?  
27 ... \texttt{\textcolor{red}{w}c7}  
28 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}c4}} d5!  
28...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{d}d4}? was risky: 29 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}}dx5}} (29 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}cxd4}}!?) \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{w}}xc4}} 30 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}}dx5}}  
29 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}c5}}  
30 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}c5}} dxe5 31 f6! 29...dxe5 30 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}}dx4}}.  
30 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}c5}}  
30 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}c5}} dxe5 31 f6! 29...dxe5 30 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}}dx4}}.  
31 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}c5}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{w}}d7}}  
It is now clear what Black’s idea was. The white pawns at a4 and f5 are attacked: if 32 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{a}}xa5}}, then 32...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}cxf5}} (intending 33...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{w}}d3}}) with sufficient counter-chances. Frankly speaking, during the game I did not calculate any further, since I knew definitely that queen and knight become a formidable tandem, if they approach close to the enemy king. The following drawing variation is interesting (although not obligatory): 33 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{w}}f3}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}}xh4}}} 34 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{w}}e4}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{w}}d1+}} 35 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}}f2}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{h}h5}}} 36 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{g}}g4}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f3+}}} 37 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{g}}g3}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{h2+}}} 38 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}}xf3}}} 39 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}}f3}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e}e1+}} with perpetual check.  
Yuri Balashov quite reasonably decided to return the extra pawn.  
32 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e}}e3?}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{w}}x4}}  
33 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}c7}}  
Now Black faces a problem on the theme of exchanging pieces. The obvious 33...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}}d5}?! leads after 34 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}cxd5}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{w}}d1+}}} 35 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{h}h2}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}}xd5}} 36 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{g}}g3}} to a better position for White. One of the black pieces has to defend g7, and in the meantime the c-pawn advances.  
The most active white piece is the rook, which has broken through onto the 7th rank. It must be driven away or exchanged.  
33 ... \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{w}}e8}?!}  
It later transpired that it was also possible to defend in a different, tactical way: 33...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}}d5}?! leads after 34 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}cxd5}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{w}}d1+}}} 35 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{h}h2}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}}xd5}} 36 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{g}}g3}} to a better position for White. One of the black pieces has to defend g7, and in the meantime the c-pawn advances.  
34 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{w}}d2}}  
White prevents 34...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}}d8}}; if 34 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}c4}}, then 34...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}}d6} 35 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{a}}a7} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}}f5}}}.  
34 ... \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}}d8}}  
35 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{w}}e2}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d7}?!}}  
Here too the knight exchange 35...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}}d5} is dubious: 36 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}cxd5}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}}xd5}} 37 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{g}}g4} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d7}}} 38 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{a}}a4}}.  
36 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}}c4} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}}d8}!}}  
37 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}}xd7}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}}xd7}}
Black has achieved his aim and has equalised. Now 38 \texttt{We}6 \texttt{W}d3 39 \texttt{Cd2} e4 40 \texttt{W}xe7 \texttt{W}d2+ 41 \texttt{C}f1 \texttt{W}xe3 would have led to a draw. Batashov played the weaker 38 \texttt{We}4?!., and after 38...\texttt{W}d2! he himself encountered some difficulties.

Events in this game developed quite forcibly. Black had to solve several problems—both tactical, and, in the main, positional. Therefore the extract given seemed to me to be appropriate for training purposes.

When preparing Artur Yusupov for the 1977 World Junior Championship we played this position (Artur, naturally, took the black pieces). To my surprise, only two moves from the Balashov-Dvoretsky game were made.

25...\texttt{A}d8 26 a4 \texttt{Ab}b8 27 \texttt{Cb}6.

27...\texttt{W}b7!? I thought that Black could maintain equality, only by playing as in the game: 27...\texttt{W}c7 28 \texttt{Cc}4 d5! However, Yusupov found another satisfactory solution. And a few years later Alyosha Dreev chose 27...\texttt{W}f1!? 28 \texttt{X}d6 \texttt{X}d6 29 \texttt{X}d6 \texttt{W}c7 30 \texttt{Cc}4 \texttt{Ce}7.

In a study, any deviation from the main variation is usually immediately punished. It is sufficient for the trainer simply to point out on the board the refutation anticipated beforehand by the composer of the study. But with the playing of practical positions, things are much more complicated. Here deviations from the path that the trainer had in mind, unforeseen or not analysed in detail, are quite probable. And then he is forced to join genuinely in the play and fight with all his might, in order to demonstrate to the pupil the drawbacks to his unexpected decision (if, of course, they exist), or to set his opponent new problems, or finally, simply so as not to undermine his prestige with weak play. Therefore it is clear that, if the trainer is not of a sufficiently high playing standard, he does better not to engage in training with the playing of practical positions.

28 \texttt{Cc}4 d5! 29 \texttt{X}d5 \texttt{X}d5 30 \texttt{X}d5 \texttt{Wb}3 31 \texttt{X}c5 \texttt{W}xa4 32 \texttt{W}f3 e4!? A clever counterblow. However, 32...\texttt{Cc}7 33 \texttt{Cc}7 \texttt{Cc}8 was also possible.

33 \texttt{W}xe4 (33 \texttt{W}e2?!) 33...\texttt{Cc}5 34 \texttt{X}a5! \texttt{W}d1+! In the event of 34...\texttt{W}xc4 35 \texttt{X}e5 \texttt{W}xe4 36 \texttt{X}e4 \texttt{X}xb2 White would have retained excellent winning chances in the rook ending. Yusupov decided to remain two pawns down, but to create threats to the king.

35 \texttt{Ch}2 \texttt{g}4+ 36 \texttt{g}3 h5 37 \texttt{DA}8 \texttt{X}a8 38 \texttt{X}a8+ \texttt{h}7 39 \texttt{W}e4 (39 \texttt{W}f3 \texttt{We}1+ 40 \texttt{Af}4 \texttt{X}h4 41 g3 was stronger) 39...\texttt{W}g1 (39...\texttt{W}f1!) 40 \texttt{W}e2.
Here, unfortunately, Artur went wrong. He played 40...\texttt{Wc5?!}, underestimating the strong reply 41 \texttt{f4!}, which allowed White to gradually convert his material advantage. Analysis showed that, by continuing 40...\texttt{h2+! 41 f3 xh4}, Black would have retained sufficient counterplay.

And now look at the ending to a game which Artur played just a month later.

\textbf{Popovic – Yusupov}  
World Junior Championship, Innsbruck 1977

The chances are roughly equal, but both players were aggressively inclined. The Yugoslav player – under the influence of the memory that a few moves ago he stood better, and Yusupov – because the resulting position appealed to him.

\begin{verbatim}
30 ... \texttt{Wa3!}
31 \texttt{f2} \texttt{c1}
32 \texttt{d2} \texttt{b1}
33 \texttt{d7} \texttt{f5}
34 \texttt{d2}
\end{verbatim}

34 \texttt{xf5 xf5 35 xb7?} is bad on account of 35...\texttt{g4! 36 f2 d8} with decisive threats.

\begin{verbatim}
34 ... \texttt{b5!}
35 \texttt{g2?!} \texttt{h6!}
36 \texttt{g3?}
\end{verbatim}

Black not only removes his pawn from attack and advances on the queenside, but also tempts the opponent into attacking the weak c6 pawn with his bishop.

\begin{verbatim}
35 \texttt{g2?!} \texttt{h6!}
36 \texttt{g3?}
\end{verbatim}

The bait has worked (it was essential to return the bishop to h3). Now Black carries out a decisive counter-attack following the same pattern, as a month ago, in the training session.

\begin{verbatim}
36 ... \texttt{g4}
37 \texttt{d2} \texttt{g1}
38 \texttt{d8} \texttt{xd8}
39 \texttt{xd8+} \texttt{h7}
40 \texttt{d4}
\end{verbatim}

see next diagram
On this occasion Artur corrects the mistake, made by him at the training session, and picks up the h4 pawn. 40...h2+! was weaker in view of 41 e3!

40 ... h2+

White resigns.

This victory over a dangerous rival inspired Yusupov, he won several more games, and a round before the finish he secured himself the title of world champion. One of the important components of his success was the serious study and training work that he had done before the tournament, including the playing of positions. Of course, such a fortunate instance of using ideas from a training game in a tournament encounter might not have occurred, but this is not the only point. The purposeful training helped Artur to improve his technique of calculating variations, and to arrive for this important competition in excellent form.
A Combination Which is Impossible to Find

It is always easier to discover treasure in a place
where someone has already found a handful of coins.

Igor Zaitsev

In 1988 Sergey Dolmatov and I decided to carry out a training cycle on the playing of very complicated, almost irrational positions, for improving his technique in calculating variations and his ability to guess intuitively the most promising continuations. I had to select a series of deeply analysed games or extracts with great combinative complications. This was not easy, taking account of the specific demands that the example proposed for playing had to meet, and also the fact that all the best exercises in my card index had already been solved or played by Dolmatov earlier.

Fortunately, not long before this the book by John Nunn and Peter Griffiths Secrets of Grandmaster Play had been published. Nunn’s very interesting games, splendidly analysed by him, gave me the very material that was required.

Nunn rightly remarked in his Preface: ‘with such a large quantity of analysis some mistakes are inevitable’. (I am afraid that I have also been unable to avoid them in my book). When Dolmatov – a top-class grandmaster – with maximum intensity played (and then analysed) a game, which before that had been played by another player, it was clear that he was bound to solve some problems differently, and to find subtleties not envisaged by the English grandmaster not only at the board, but also in analysis. Of course, the same would have happened if Nunn had played one of Dolmatov’s games.

Borkowski – Nunn
European Junior Championship,
Groningen 1974/75

1 e4 g6
2 d4 Kg7
3 c3 d6
4 f4 f6
5 O3 0–0
6 Od3 Od6
7 e5 Od7
8 h4?!

From this point we began our training. Up to the 15th move Dolmatov with Black played exactly the same as Nunn.

8 ... c5

Undoubtedly the most natural move, although 8...dxe5 9 fxe5 c5 is also possible, as played in the game Borkowski–Balce-
rowski (Poland 1979). Dolmatov hardly considered 8...dxe5, and explained later that in principle he does not like the type of position arising after 9 dxe5, since the bishop at g7 remains shut out of play. This evaluation is not indisputable (after 9...Qd5 Black would appear to stand well), but quite interesting. And at least it is very informative for the trainer -- from such episodes he can make judgements about his pupil's way of thinking and style of play.

9 h5 cxd4

10 hxg6 hxg6

Weaker is 10...fxg6? 11 c4+ h8 12 g5 h6 13 d3! or 10...dxc3? 11 g5! hxg6 12 xg6!

11 g5! dxe5

We already knew that 11...dxc3? 12 xg6! is not good for Black.

Q 4-62. How would you continue the attack in the event of 11...Qd5?

He should play 12 Qf2! (creating the terrible threat of 13 h8+! xh8 14 Wh1) 12...Qd3+ 13 cxd3. After the forced reply 13...Ze8 White has no need of a combination: 14 h8+ xh8 15 Wh1 g7 16 Wh7+ Wh8 17 f5, which apparently leads to a draw (17...xf5 18 Qe6+ xe6 19 Wh6). The simple 14 Qe4 is more dangerous for Black.

Thus 11...Qd5 is not too good a move. But apart from 11...dxe5, as chosen by Nunn (and Dolmatov), Black also had available another strong possibility: 11...dxc3!? 12 fxe5 dxe5, which was tested in the game De Firmian–Van der Wiel (Wijk aan Zee 1986).

12 f5! Qf6!

Here is the first divergence from the variations and evaluations given by Nunn. He awards the move he made not an exclamation mark, but a question mark. In his opinion, in the game Black could have encountered difficulties, whereas 12...gxf5 would have led to his advantage (other possibilities are bad: in the event of 12...dxc3? or 12...Qd5? White gains a decisive attack after 13 fxg6). Dolmatov showed that, on the contrary, the move in the game was correct, whereas the capture on f5 (which we will consider later) would have lost.

13 fxg6 Qg4!

Nunn sacrifices the exchange, counting on the strength of his central pawns. He would have lost after 13...fxg6? 14 c4+ or 13...dxc3 14 gxf7+ xf7 15 Wh7+.

14 gxf7+ Qxf7

15 Qe2

15 xf7+ xe7 16 xe2 f5 or 16...xe2 17 xe2 Wh5.
Q 4-63. How should Black continue?

After 15...\( \text{b8} \) 16 \( \text{c4+ d5} \) the following spectacular line does not work, unfortunately: 17 \( \text{c3 xd1} \) 18 \( \text{xd5+ xd5} \) 19 \( \text{xd5 fe8} \) 20 \( \text{xd1 ad8} \), and Black's chances are better. However, White retains a strong attack by 17 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{f5} \) 18 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{c2} \) 20 \( \text{g4} \) 19 \( \text{g3} \).

And if he wishes, he can force a draw with 17 \( \text{d3 f6} \) (17...\( \text{f5} \) 18 \( \text{g3} \) is dangerous) 18 \( \text{c4+} \).

Nunn decided to prevent \( \text{c4} \), and played 15...\( \text{c5} \). A critical position arose after 16 \( \text{g6 ff8} \) 17 \( \text{d3 e4} \). Bad now was 18 \( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{b4} \) or 18 \( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 19 \( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 20 \( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{b4} \), but the pretty 18 \( \text{d4} \)!! would have enabled White to maintain the balance. The main variation is 18...\( \text{xa2} \)!! (18...\( \text{xc3} \) 19 \( \text{h7+} \); 18...\( \text{xd3} \) 19 \( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xd8} \) 20 \( \text{f1} \) 18 \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{f5} \) 22 \( \text{e6} \); 18...\( \text{a5} \) 19 \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{d8} \) 20 \( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{e6} \) 21 \( \text{e3} \) 18...\( \text{e5} \) 19 \( \text{xe4} \) 19 \( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{a1} \) 20 \( \text{h7+} \) \( \text{h8} \), and things ends in perpetual check.

18 \( \text{xd4} \)!! \( \text{xd4} \) 19 \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{ad8} \) 20 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{b4} \) 21 \( \text{c1} \)? (the balance could still have been maintained by 21 \( \text{ge6} \)!) 21...\( \text{bd5} \) 22 \( \text{xf4} \) 23 \( \text{f5} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 24 \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 25 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{e6} \) 26 \( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{xe6} \) 27 \( \text{xa7} \) \( \text{g4} \)

28 \( \text{c5 xb2} \). White resigns.

In our training game Dolmatov played much more strongly than Nunn.

15 ... \( \text{c5} \)!

By bringing his knight to the centre and not allowing White to include his queen in the attack, Black obtains more than sufficient compensation for the exchange.

16 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{e6} \)
17 \( \text{xf7} \) \( \text{xf7} \)
18 0-0?

Better chances of a successful defence would have been given by 18 \( \text{g5} \)!! I was concerned about the replies 18...\( \text{e4} \) and 18...\( \text{b5} \), but, as was shown later by Nunn, they were not fatally dangerous: 18...\( \text{e4} \) 19 \( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 20 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{a5} \) 21 \( \text{c3} \), or 18...\( \text{b5} \) 19 \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{d3} \) 20 \( \text{cxd3} \) \( \text{xd3} \) 21 \( \text{f1} \). The grandmaster also examined 18...\( \text{b6} \)?? 19 \( \text{b3} \) (weaker is 19 \( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{b4} \)!) 20 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{xc4} \) 19...\( \text{e4} \) 20 \( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{d3} \)!, although here too White can hold on: 21 \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{d2} \) 22 \( \text{xd2} \) \( \text{xd2} \) 23 \( \text{d8} \) \( \text{xf1} \) 24 \( \text{xb6} \) \( \text{e4} \) 25 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{ab6} \) 26 \( \text{d7} \) \( \text{f8} \) 27 \( \text{xf1} \) \( \text{a2} \) 28 \( \text{f4} \).

18 ... \( \text{h8} \)

It transpires that it is hard for White to defend against the attack on the h-file. 18...\( \text{b5} \) was also not bad (19 \( \text{xb5} \) \( \text{b6} \)).

19 \( \text{e1} \)
19 ... \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{h5} \) 20 \( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \) followed by \( \text{h8} \).

19 ... \( \text{h7} \)
20 \( \text{g5} \)

20 \( \text{g3} \) was better, although even this would not have saved White.

20 ... \( \text{h8} \)
21 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{h2} \)
22 \( \text{f2} \) \( \text{e4} \)!

I had to capitulate in view of the variation 23 \( \text{h1} \) \( e3 \) 24 \( \text{xe3} \) \( \text{e4} \).
As will be seen, Dolmatov conducted the game confidently and strongly (incidentally, spending only 63 minutes on it). The only thing that I could reproach him for was the fact that he did not consider at all some promising possibilities that were available to him, such as 11...\text{c}xe5 or 12...\text{g}xf5.

While he agreed that 11...\text{c}xe5 certainly came into consideration, Dolmatov expressed serious doubts regarding 12...\text{g}xf5. This factor forced him to turn to Nunn’s analysis, in which Sergey quickly discovered a weak link.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image.png}
\end{center}

Q 4-64. Decide on White’s candidate moves.

Two possibilities are obvious: 13 \text{\textlxf}5 and 13 \text{\textwh}5. There is also a third, one that is much more camouflaged: 13 \text{\textce}4.

It is easiest to reject the primitive capture of the pawn. After 13 \text{\textlxf}5? \text{\textg}f6 14 \text{\texth}7+ (14 \text{\textxc}8 \text{\textxc}8 15 \text{\textce}4 \text{\textxe}4 16 \text{\textxe}4 \text{\textwf}5) 14...\text{\textxh}7 15 \text{\textxh}7 \text{\textl}5 16 \text{\textw}5 \text{\textwd}6 (followed by ...\text{\textwg}6) Black wins.

It is far more difficult to analyse (to say nothing of to calculate, without moving the pieces) the most natural move 13 \text{\textwh}5. Nunn regards it as the strongest, but he convincingly demonstrates that after 13...

\text{\textl}f6 the defence nevertheless proves stronger than the attack.

1) 14 \text{\textwh}2? \text{\textdxc}3 15 \text{\textde}4 (15 \text{\textdh}7 \text{\textg}4) 15...\text{\textxe}4 16 \text{\textxe}4 \text{\texte}8 17 \text{\texth}7+ \text{\textf}8 18 \text{\texth}6 \text{\textg}4;

2) 14 \text{\textwh}3 \text{\textdxc}3 15 \text{\textdh}7 \text{\textg}4 16 \text{\textg}5 (16 \text{\textl}f6+ \text{\textxf}6 17 \text{\texth}6 \text{\textf}4 18 \text{\textwh}4 \text{\textcb}2 19 \text{\textxe}7 \text{\textbx}a1+ and 20...\text{\textwh}1, or 19 \text{\texted}1 \text{\textwa}5+ 20 \text{\textf}1 \text{\texte}4! 21 \text{\textxe}7 \text{\textwh}5 22 \text{\textwh}5 \text{\textwh}5 with a material advantage for Black) 16 \text{\textdh}6 17 \text{\textde}6 \text{\textcb}2! (17...\text{\textxe}6 18 \text{\textxh}6 is dangerous) 18 \text{\textxe}7 \text{\textbx}a1 19 \text{\textwh}6 \text{\textxc}1+ 20 \text{\textwh}1 \text{\textwa}5+ 22 \text{\textf}1 \text{\texte}4 23 \text{\textxe}4 \text{\textde}7, and Black wins;

3) 14 \text{\textwh}4 \text{\textdxc}3, and now:

15 \text{\textdh}7 \text{\textg}4 16 \text{\textg}5 (16 \text{\textl}f6+ \text{\textxf}6 17 \text{\texth}6 \text{\textd}4!) 16...\text{\textde}6 17 \text{\textdh}7 (17 \text{\textde}4 \text{\textwb}6; 17 \text{\textde}6 \text{\textxe}6 18 \text{\textxh}6 \text{\textwd}4, 17 \text{\textxf}7 \text{\textxe}7 18 \text{\textc}4 \text{\textwd}6) 17...\text{\textwd}4 18 \text{\textxd}4 19 \text{\textwh}8 \text{\textxf}8 (19...\text{\textcb}2!) 20 \text{\textwh}6 \text{\textd}h6 21 \text{\textxc}6 \text{\textg}7, and Black has an overwhelming advantage;

15 \text{\textde}4 \text{\textxe}4 16 \text{\texth}6 (16 \text{\textxe}4 \text{\texte}8! 17 \text{\texth}6? \text{\textwd}4, or 17 \text{\texth}7+ \text{\textf}8 18 \text{\texth}6 \text{\textd}2! 19 \text{\textxd}2 \text{\textd}x\text{\textd}2+ 20 \text{\textxd}2 \text{\textd}h8+) 16...\text{\textxd}2 17 \text{\textd}1 (17 \text{\textxe}7 \text{\textbx}a1+ and 18...\text{\textwh}1; 17 \text{\textg}5 \text{\textbx}a1+ 18 \text{\textd}2 \text{\textwa}5+ 17...\text{\textf}5! 18 \text{\textg}5 (18 \text{\textxe}7 \text{\texth}7 19 \text{\textxe}5 \text{\textwa}5+, or 19 \text{\textg}3 \text{\textwb}6 20 \text{\textf}6+ \text{\textg}6) 18...\text{\textg}6 19 \text{\textxe}7 \text{\texth}7 20 \text{\textxe}7 \text{\textex}d3 (not 20...\text{\textwa}5+?) 21 \text{\textd}1 \text{\texth}7 22 \text{\textc}4! 23 \text{\textf}6+ \text{\textg}6 24 \text{\textwh}6, but quite possible is 20...\text{\texth}7 21 \text{\textf}6+ \text{\textg}6 22 \text{\textc}4 \text{\textxd}1+ 23 \text{\textd}x\text{\textd}1 \text{\textw}b1+, and the king has nowhere to go) 21 \text{\textxe}5 (21 \text{\texth}8+ \text{\textxe}7 22 \text{\texth}6+ \text{\textf}6) 21...\text{\textwa}5+ 22 \text{\textd}1 \text{\textxe}5 23 \text{\textxe}5 \text{\textxh}7 and Black wins. If on the 17th move White had placed his rook on b1, then on the 20th move 20...\text{\textex}d3 would have been decisive (the alternative 20...\text{\texth}7 21 \text{\textc}4 \text{\texte}6 22 \text{\textf}6+ \text{\textg}6 23 \text{\textxe}6 \text{\textxf}6 seems less reliable).

Now let us consider the brilliant stroke 13 \text{\textce}4!!, found but underestimated by Nunn.
After 13...fxe4 14 Qxe4 (with the threat of 15 Wh5) it is hard for Black to defend. For example:

14...Qf6 15 Qxf6+ exf6 16 Qh7+ Qh8 17 Wh5 and White mates;
14...e6 15 Wh5 Qg6 (15...Qd8 16 Wh7+ Qf8 17 Qh6) 16 Qxg6 fxg6 17 Qc4+ Qf7 18 Qg5 with advantage to White;
14...e5 (14...f6 or 14...f5- 15 Qc4+) 15 Wh5 f5 (15...Qe8 16 Qh6! or 16 Wh7+ Qf8 17 Qh6) 16 Wh7+ Qf7 17 Qg5! (stronger than 17 Qg5+ Qe7 18 Qxg7+ Qd6) 17...Qf8 (17...Qa5+ 18 Qe2; 17...fxe4 18 0-0+ Qf6 19 Qxf6) 18 Wh5+ Qg8 19 Qg6 (threatening in particular 20 Qh7 Qf7 21 Qh6) 19...Qf7 (19...Qxh2 20 Wh7+ Qf7 21 Qd6 mate; 19...fxe4 20 Wh7+ Qf7 21 Qf1+ Qe8 22 Qg6+ 20 Qh8+ Qxh8 21 Qxf7 Qxb2 22 Qd1 with decisive threats.
14...Qb4 15 Wh5 Qxd3+ 16 Qxd3 f6 17 Qh7+ Qf7 18 0-0 with a very dangerous attack.

Apart from these variations, found by Nunn, one further defence, pointed out by Artur Yusupov, must be considered - 14...Qe8!?

Alas, after 17...Qf6 the attack is parried: 18 Qh7+ (18 Qxf7+ Qh8 19 Qg6 Qf8) 18...Qxh7 19 Qxf7+ (19 Qxh7+ Qf8 20 Qe6+ Qxe6) 21 Qh6 Qa5+ followed by 22...Qd8, and the black king escapes to d7) 19...Qh8 20 Wh5 Qf5 21 Qf7+ Qg8 22 Qxd8 Qf8, and Black has too many pieces for the queen.

White gains a menacing position after 15 Wh5 Qf6 16 Qxf6+ exf6 17 Qh6! Qf8 (forced) 18 Qxg7+ Qe7. But possibly even stronger is 15 Qh6! Wh6 (15...Qf6 16 Qxg7 Qa5+ 17 Qf1 Qxg7 18 Qc1; 15...Qh6 16 Qxh6 Qf6 17 Qd2 Qxe4 18 Qxe4 e6 19 Qh8+!) 16 Qxg7 Qxg7 17 Qh7+! Qg8 (17...Qxh7 18 Qf6+ Qg7 19 Qg4+) 18 Wh5 Qg6 19 Qh8+ Qg7 20 Qxg6+ and 21 Qxe8.

We have seen that Black should not accept the piece sacrifice. Nunn considers that the attack can be repulsed by 13...Qb6.

Q 4-65. How should White continue?

If 14 Wh5 there follows 14...Qh6! (but not 14...Qg6? 15 Qxg6 fxg6 16 Qc4+) 15 Qh6 Qh6 16 Qxh6 fxe4 17 Qxe4 Qf6, and the black king is out of danger.

14 Qc4!! This move, found by Dolmatov, decisively strengthens the attack:
14...Qb4+ 15 Qd2 Qxc4 16 Qh4+ (but not 16 Wh5? Qd8) 16...Qxh8 17 Wh5, and mate
is inevitable;
14...fxe4 15 \( \text{Nh5} \) with an irresistible double attack on h7 and f7;
14...\( \text{g6} \) 15 \( \text{hxg7} \) \( \text{hxg7} \) 16 \( \text{h5} \) with advantage to White.

The conclusion that can be drawn from all the variations we have examined can be summarised briefly: 12...\( \text{gxh5}?! \) does not solve the problems of the defence in view of 13 \( \text{h4} \) \( \text{h6} \)? 14 \( \text{g5} \)!! Stronger is 12...\( \text{g5} \).

Comparing this combination with many others known to me, I cannot but acknowledge that it is one of the most difficult. The complexity consists in both the unusual nature of White's combinative blows, and in the enormous number of accompanying variations (the accurate calculation of which is totally impossible), luring us into various 'false trails'. It stands to reason that Dolmatov and I would have been unable to reach the truth, had not the greater part of the road to it been laid earlier by John Nunn, to whom we are sincerely grateful.
A Game Played Several Times

In such threatened positions, mistakes are made by psychological necessity: 'where no good moves can be found, a bad one will always turn up.'

Siegbert Tarrasch

Polugayevsky - Nunn
European Team Championship, Skara 1980

1  d4    f6
2  f3    c5
3  d5    e6
4  c4    exd5
5  cxd5  d6
6  c3    g6
7  e4    g7
8  e2    0-0
9  0-0    d7
10  d2    e5
11  c2    h5?
12  b3    ?

This move leads to a difficult position for Black. Much more promising, according to theory, is any of three other possibilities: 12...g5, 12...a6 or 12...fg4.

13  xh5  gxh5
14  b2    d7

If 14...wh4, then 15 db5 bd8 16 f4 dg4 17 cf3.

15  ae1

15 f4 is premature in view of 15...dg4 16 dd1 cd4+! 17 xd4 (17 h1 cxh2!) 17...cx4, when Black succeeds in confusing matters. But now 16 f4 dg4 17 df3 is threatened. There is no sure way of preventing the advance of the white pawns in the centre - it can only be halted for a certain time by tactical means.

Bad now was 16 e3?! dg4 17 h3 wh5 (threatening 18 xf2) 18 f4 dd4+ 19 h1 wh6 with a dangerous initiative for Black. However, the prophylactic move 16 h1! was very strong, renewing the threat of 17 f4 dg4 18 f3.Neither 16...wh4 17 e2, nor 16...dg4 17 cd3 we7 18 h3 promises Black any counterplay.

Another excellent possibility available to White was 16 cd1! Nunn was intending to prevent 17 f4 by 16...wh4, intending 17 g3! wxd2 or 17 h1?! h4 18 g3 wh6. However, the queen is a poor blockader! and, as shown by Igor Zaitsev, White gains the advantage with the simple 17 cc4 or 17 ec1 eh6 18 cb2.

16  f4?

A mistake that is hard to explain for a grandmaster of such class as Lev Polugayevsky.
He was probably intending to trap the black queen after 16...\( \text{Qg4} \) 17 \( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qd4+} \) 18 \( \text{Kh1} \) \( \text{Qf2+} \) 19 \( \text{Qxf2} \) \( \text{Qxf2} \) 20 \( \text{Wc1} \), and did not notice the simple rejoinder 20...\( \text{Qh3!} \), after which the advantage is now with Black.

Now the game enters a phase of highly interesting tactical complications, and therefore it is fully appropriate as an exercise for playing, both 'normal' (for Black), and also 'reciprocal'. Several training games were played, helping to substantially clarify the evaluation of many variations analysed by Nunn.

Incidentally, why was the playing begun from this particular position? It is clear that it could not have been begun earlier, since up till now events have not been at all forced. But why invite the player with Black to make several obvious moves (from 16th to 19th)?

Firstly, so as to camouflage the decisive moment of the battle, when he will have to invest every effort in the calculation and evaluation of highly complicated variations. It is better if this does not happen on the first move, otherwise you essentially end up with an exercise not for playing, but for solving.

Secondly, in order to provoke (and then seriously discuss) a typical mistake, which in such cases is made by many players. They immediately try to investigate the position 'to the end', spend much time and effort on calculation, then make some obligatory moves and again begin checking variations which they have already calculated earlier. As a result – fatigue, mistakes in calculation, and inevitable time trouble.

It is much more sensible to quickly make obligatory moves (after first convincing yourself that they are indeed obligatory). And it will only be necessary to take a committing decision when the position, demanding detailed calculation, arises on the board – it is then that you can delve into complicated variations. That, incidentally, is how Dolmatov acted when playing the position – his first four moves took him all of two minutes.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
16 & \ldots & \text{Qg4} \\
17 & \text{Qf3} & \text{Qd4+} \\
18 & \text{Qh1} & \text{Qf2+} \\
19 & \text{Qxf2} & \\
\end{array}
\]

19 \( \text{Qg1?} \) \( \text{Qd3+} \) is bad, of course. Zaitsev gives the following continuation: 20 \( \text{Qxd4} \) \( \text{Qxe1} \) 21 \( \text{Qd2} \) \( \text{Qxd4} \) 22 \( \text{Qxe1} \) \( \text{Qxc3} \) 23 \( \text{Wxc3} \) \( \text{f6!} \) (but not 23...\( \text{Wf8?} \) 24 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{Qg4} \) 25 \( \text{Wd8+} \) \( \text{Qg8} \) 26 \( \text{Qg7+} \) with perpetual check) 24 \( \text{Qg4} \) 25 \( \text{Qxf6} \) \( \text{Qg6} \), and White’s attack is repulsed. Instead of 22...\( \text{Qxc3} \), also strong is 22...\( \text{Qac8} \) 23 \( \text{Qd1} \) (23 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{Qxc3} \)) 23...\( \text{Qc2} \) 24 \( \text{Qb4} \) \( \text{Qg4} \) (Nunn).

\[
\begin{array}{c}
19 & \ldots & \text{Wxf2} \\
20 & \text{Qc1?!} & \\
\end{array}
\]

It was this move, made by Polugayevsky, that I chose in training games against Dolmatov and Yusupov, although I in fact knew that 20 \( \text{Wb1!} \) is objectively stronger.

The simplest reply is 20...\( \text{Qxc3} \) 21 \( \text{Qxc3} \) \( \text{Qh3} \) 22 \( \text{Qg1} \) \( \text{Qg4} \). White cannot immediately create anything real, but he retains fair positional compensation for the lost exchange in view of his strong dark-square
bishop and the weakening of the opponent's king position.

From b1 the queen defends the e4 pawn. This factor tells, for example, in the variation 20...\( \text{h}3! \) 21 \( \text{e}g1 \) \( \text{f}8? \) 22 \( \text{e}xd4 \) \( \text{cxd4} \) 23 \( \text{b}5.

Instead of the king move, 21...\( \text{g}4 \) 22 \( \text{i}1 \) \( \text{e}3 \) is necessary. Now 23 \( \text{e}xd4 \) \( \text{cxd4} \) 24 \( \text{b}5 \) no longer works in view of 24...\( \text{e}x4 \) 25 \( \text{c}7 \) \( \text{x}b1 \) 26 \( \text{xb1} \) \( \text{e}2! \) 27 \( \text{x}a8 \) \( \text{i}5 \), or 25 \( \text{e}xd6 \) \( \text{xb1} \) 26 \( \text{xb1} \) \( \text{x}e2 \) 27 \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{d}8! \) 28 \( \text{b}7 \) \( \text{x}d5 \) 29 \( \text{hxg4} \) \( \text{hxg4} \) with advantage to Black.

Dolmatov pointed out an interesting way of complicating the play: 23 \( e5!? \) Black cannot reply 23...\( \text{x}c3? \) on account of 24 \( \text{f}g5! \) In the event of 23...\( f5 \) White has a choice between 24 \( \text{b}5!? \) \( \text{x}b2 \) 25 \( \text{d}6 \) (25 \( \text{xb2?} \) \( \text{d}3 \) 25...\( \text{c}3 \) 26 \( \text{h}3 \), and 24 \( \text{e}4 \)? \( \text{cxd4} \) 25 \( \text{b}5 \).

Finally, if 23...\( \text{dxe5} \) there follows 24 \( \text{e}4 \). However, here, in Nunn's opinion, Black can hope for success by continuing 24...\( \text{e}4! \) 25 \( \text{e}1 \) (25 \( \text{eg}5 \) or 25 \( \text{fg5} - 25...f5 \); 25 \( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 25...\( \text{xb2} \) 26 \( \text{xe}3 \) (26 \( \text{xb2} \) \( \text{xe}1+ \) 27 \( \text{xe}1 \) \( \text{xe}4) \) 26...\( \text{x}e3 \), and if 27 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{xf3} \) 28 \( \text{xf3} \) \( \text{e}2 \) 29 \( \text{xe}8 \) \( \text{xe}8 \) and wins.

During the game the English grandmaster noticed the clever move 20...\( \text{h}5 \) (with the threat of 21...\( \text{xe}4 \) 22 \( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{xe}4 \)).

Q 4-66. What could you reply to this?

Nunn considered the following variations:
21 \( \text{xf}5 \) \( \text{xe}1+ \) 22 \( \text{xe}1 \) \( \text{xb2} \); 21 \( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 22 \( \text{x}12 \) (22 \( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 23 \( \text{x}12 \) \( \text{xe}1+ \) 24 \( \text{xe}1 \) \( \text{x}2 \) 22...\( \text{xb1} \); 21 \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 22 \( \text{x}2 \) \( \text{xb1} \; 21 \( \text{xe}2 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 22 \( \text{c}1 \) (22 \( \text{x}2 \) \( \text{xb1} \); 22 \( \text{e}d4 \) \( \text{d}2 \) mate; 22 \( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 22...\( \text{x}3 \) (weaker is 22...\( \text{x}3 \) 23 \( \text{x}3 \) \( \text{x}3+ \) 24 \( \text{g}2+ \) \( \text{h}8 \) 25 \( \text{f}1 \) 23 \( \text{x}2 \) \( \text{x}2 \) and Black wins.

However, later in analysis he found the successful defence 21 \( \text{a}1 \)!, parrying Black's threats. He now has either to exchange on c3, which he would like to avoid, or play 21...\( \text{h}3! \) 22 \( \text{g}1 \) \( \text{g}4 \), transposing into positions examined earlier, but with the bishop at a1 instead of b2.

Another, possibly even stronger reply was suggested by Zaitsev: 21 \( \text{f}1 \) ! \( \text{xe}4 \) 22 \( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{xb2} \), and now not 23 \( \text{c}d4? \) \( \text{xe}1 \) 24 \( \text{f}6+ \) \( \text{g}7 \) 25 \( \text{xe}8+ \) \( \text{xe}8 \) 26 \( \text{xb1} \) \( \text{cxd4} \) with a difficult rook ending for White, but 23 \( \text{d}3! \) According to Nunn, it was this move that he overlooked during the game. In view of the threats of 24 \( \text{eg}5 \) and 24 \( \text{e}d6 \) White retains reasonable compensation for the sacrificed exchange. For example: 23...\( \text{ad}8 \) 24 \( \text{eg}5 \) (bad is 24 \( \text{b}1 \) \( \text{xa2} \) 25 \( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 26 \( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{xb1}+ \) 27 \( \text{xb1} \) \( \text{e}8 \) 24...\( \text{e}7 \) ? (24...\( \text{g}7 \) is better) 25 \( \text{e}7+ \) \( \text{f}8 \) 26 \( \text{e}5! \), or 23...\( \text{g}7 \) 24 \( \text{e}d6 \) \( \text{e}2 \) (24...\( \text{e}2 \) 25 \( \text{b}1 \) 25 \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{c}2 \) 26 \( \text{f}3 \), or 23...\( \text{e}7 \) 24 \( \text{e}d6 \) \( \text{e}2 \) 25 \( \text{b}1 \).

But now let us return to the game. Since 20...\( \text{xc3?} \) 21 \( \text{xc3} \) will not do, there remains only one way for Black to save his queen.

\begin{align*}
20 & \ldots \quad \text{h}3! \\
21 & \text{g}1
\end{align*}
Q 4-67. What do you think, which is the strongest move here?

Nunn made the tempting move 21... ¿f8, preventing 22 gxh3+ and creating the threat of 22... ¿xg2+ 23 ¿xg2 ¿xf3. Dolmatov played exactly the same. He also seriously considered 21... ¿h8 with the idea after 22 ¿xd4 of replying 22... ¿g8 23 ¿c2 (23 gxh3 ¿xd4) 23... ¿xg2+ 24 ¿xg2 ¿xf3, but rightly rejected this thought on account of 22 ¿g5! ¿xg1+ 23 ¿xg1 ¿xg1 24 ¿xg1.

In Nunn’s opinion the quiet 21... ¿g4 does not promise Black any advantage. That is what I too thought – until I played the position against Yusupov. But about that – later.

21 ... ¿g4?! 
22 ¿xd4 ¿xd4

Q 4-68. What should White do?

Completely bad is 23 gxh3? ¿f3+ 24 ¿g2 ¿xc3 25 ¿xc3 ¿xe4. No better is 23 ¿d1? ¿xg2+! 24 ¿xg2 ¿e1+ 25 ¿g1 ¿xe4+ 26 ¿g2 ¿e1+ 27 ¿g1 ¿e2! with the decisive threat of 28... ¿f3+. If 23 ¿b5? the simplest is 23... ¿xe4, threatening 24... ¿xg2+.

Polugayevsky's desperate attempt to create counter-threats by 23 f5? proved unsuccessful. There followed 23... ¿xc3 24 ¿xc3 ¿xc3 25 ¿xc3 ¿xe4. But better is 23 ¿e5! ¿xg2+ 24 ¿xg2 ¿e1+ 25 ¿g1 ¿xe4+ 26 ¿g2 ¿xe4 25 fxh3 (25 ¿xc3 ¿e1! 25 ¿xc3 ¿xg8 or 25... ¿xg2+ 26 ¿xg2 ¿e1+ 27 ¿g1 ¿f3+ 28 ¿g2 ¿xc3) 24... ¿xe4 25 fxh3 (25 ¿xc3 ¿e1: 25 ¿xc3 ¿xe4 26 ¿f6+ ¿e8 27 ¿h8+ ¿d7 28 ¿xa8 ¿xg2+ 25... ¿e8! (of course, Black parries the opponent's transparent threat of 26 ¿g8+) 26 ¿xd3 ¿e1 27 ¿xe1+ (27 ¿b5+ ¿e8 28 ¿g7+ ¿g8) 27... ¿xe1+ 28 ¿g2 ¿c8 29 ¿f6 ¿d7 30 ¿xh7 ¿wd2+ 31 ¿g3 ¿xd5 32 ¿h4 ¿e8. White resigns.

Even so, White’s position was by no means hopeless.

23 ¿a3!!
24 f5 or 24 \textit{\text{\text{x}d}6+} \textit{\text{\text{e}}8 25 f5. Later Yusupov showed that 24 \textit{\text{\text{x}d}6+?} \textit{\text{\text{e}}8 25 f5 is wrong in view of 25 \textit{\text{x}c}3 26 \textit{\text{\text{g}5 \text{x}g}2+ 27 \textit{\text{\text{x}g}2 \textit{\text{e}1+ 28 \textit{\text{g}1 \textit{\text{x}e}4+. The only correct move is 24 f5! with the terrible threat of 25 \textit{\text{\text{h}6+. Let us continue the variation: 24...\textit{\text{\text{c}3 25 \textit{\text{\text{f}1+ \textit{\text{d}7 26 \textit{\text{d}6+ \textit{\text{e}8 27 \textit{\text{e}5+ \textit{\text{d}7 28 \textit{\text{\text{e}4!}}. It appears that Black must agree to a draw, since the attempt to play for a win by 29...\textit{\text{c}8 looks risky in view of 30 \textit{\text{\text{f}8+ \textit{\text{d}7 31 \textit{\text{\text{x}f}7+ \textit{\text{c}8 32 \textit{\text{e}6! \textit{\text{\text{x}e}6 33 \textit{\text{c}2+ (34 \textit{\text{c}8 35 e7, e.g. 35...\textit{\text{e}8 36 \textit{\text{\text{d}6+ \textit{\text{e}8 37 \textit{\text{c}7 with the threat of 38 \textit{\text{\text{d}7. Alas, as Nunn showed in a new edition of his book (1997), this variation is unconvincing. Firstly, in its concluding position Black can defend by 37...\textit{\text{\text{x}f}5 38 \textit{\text{c}7 39 \textit{\text{\text{f}1+ 39 \textit{\text{g}2 \textit{\text{c}1. Now 40 \textit{\text{d}8+ does not work: 40...\textit{\text{c}8 41 \textit{\text{\text{c}7 d3! 42 \textit{\text{\text{x}c}8+ \textit{\text{\text{x}c}8 43 \textit{\text{d}8 \textit{\text{c}2+ and 44...\textit{\text{e}2; a draw results from 40 \textit{\text{\text{c}7 \textit{\text{c}7 41 \textit{\text{\text{x}c}7 \textit{\text{\text{x}b}8 42 \textit{\text{\text{x}d}7 \textit{\text{c}8, while 40 \textit{\text{\text{f}3!? requires additional analysis. It is something else that is much more important: by playing 35...\textit{\text{g}8! (instead of 35...\textit{\text{\text{e}8?) Black wins a highly important tempo thanks to the threat of mate. After 36 \textit{\text{\text{d}6+ \textit{\text{c}8 37 h4 \textit{\text{f}5 he retains good chances of success in the resulting ending. Nunn considers these further variations: 38 \textit{\text{d}2 b6 39 \textit{\text{d}4 \textit{\text{\text{f}1+ 40 \textit{\text{f}2 41 \textit{\text{g}1 \textit{\text{b}7 42 \textit{\text{a}3 \textit{\text{c}8! 43 \textit{\text{d}7+ \textit{\text{f}6 44 \textit{\text{d}8 \textit{\text{c}5+ 45 \textit{\text{g}1 \textit{\text{g}2+ 46 \textit{\text{h}1 (46 \textit{\text{f}1 \textit{\text{h}2 47 \textit{\text{g}1 comes to the same thing) 46...\textit{\text{h}2+ 47 \textit{\text{g}1 \textit{\text{c}2+ 48 \textit{\text{f}1 \textit{\text{a}2 49 \textit{\text{g}1 \textit{\text{a}3 40. or 41 \textit{\text{h}3 \textit{\text{b}7 42 \textit{\text{a}3 \textit{\text{g}2 43 \textit{\text{d}3 \textit{\text{g}1 44 \textit{\text{h}2 45 \textit{\text{g}2+ 46 \textit{\text{h}3 \textit{\text{e}2 46 \textit{\text{d}7+ \textit{\text{a}6 47 \textit{\text{d}8 \textit{\text{e}3+ 48 \textit{\text{f}1 \textit{\text{g}1 followed by an offensive on the queenside. In our game Dolmatov made a move which up till then had not been considered by anyone in analysis.}

Q 4-69. What would you advise White to do? In principle, the idea of including the rook in the attack from g8 looks sound, but it could have been forcibly refuted by 24 \textit{\text{b}5! \textit{\text{c}8 25 \textit{\text{\text{f}1!, when White remains with a material advantage.

I did not notice 25 \textit{\text{\text{f}1!, because I was immediately attracted by a combination, in the calculation of which, unfortunately, I made a mistake. When I used to participate actively in tournaments, I would cope with such problems without difficulty, but in later years. moving away from practical play, I became, alas, not such a strong opponent for this type of training. In this connection I should like to repeat my advice to those who engage in training work: it should without fail be combined with tournament play. 24 \textit{\text{\text{x}d}6+ \textit{\text{\text{e}7 25 \textit{\text{a}4 \textit{\text{c}8 26 \textit{\text{\text{x}d}6 e5+ \textit{\text{d}7 27 \textit{\text{c}5+ \textit{\text{e}7 28 \textit{\text{e}4! 26 \textit{\text{c}5+ \textit{\text{c}5!}

I had reckoned only on 26...\textit{\text{\text{x}d}6? 27 e5 \textit{\text{e}7 28 d6+ \textit{\text{f}8 29 \textit{\text{x}h}3 or 28...\textit{\text{d}8 29 d7! with a probable draw.
White resigns.

Thus 21...\texttt{Wf8}!?, although objectively sufficient to retain the advantage, would nevertheless have allowed White to gain dangerous counterplay. As will soon become clear, the bishop move to g4, chosen against me by Yusupov, is simpler and stronger. Of course, at the board it is impossible to calculate the variations accurately — here you have to guess, trusting to your intuition.

\texttt{21 \texttt{Bg4}!}

Threatening 22...\texttt{Bxf3}+ 23 gxh3+ \texttt{Wxg1}++; if 22...\texttt{Bf1} there follows 22...\texttt{Wf3} with gain of tempo. Therefore the exchange on d4 is forced.

\texttt{22 \texttt{Qxd4} cxd4}

\texttt{23 f5? dxc3?} (23...\texttt{f6}! was essential, with a winning position for Black) 24 \texttt{Wg5+ \texttt{Bf8} 25 Bxc3 \texttt{Be5} 26 \texttt{Wf6}? (26 h3! would have won) 26...\texttt{Bh3}! 27 \texttt{Wxd6+ Be7} 28 f6 \texttt{Bxg2+}. Draw

\texttt{23 \texttt{Bf1} \texttt{Bh4}!}

Much weaker is 23...\texttt{We3}? 24 \texttt{Wxe3} dxe3 25 h3 \texttt{Bd7} 26 \texttt{Be1}, when in the endgame White retains excellent compensation for the exchange.

\texttt{24 \texttt{Bb5} \texttt{Bxe4}}

Black can also consider 24...\texttt{Be2}!? 25 \texttt{Qxd6 \texttt{Bxf1} 26 \texttt{Wxf1}. Nunn continues the variation as follows: 26...\texttt{Bd8} 27 \texttt{Bf5} 28 \texttt{Bxd4 \texttt{Wa6} 29 \texttt{Wf1}, and the black king is in danger. Instead of 26...\texttt{Bd8}, stronger is 26...\texttt{Wf6}. 27 \texttt{Bxe6} \texttt{Bxe6} 28 e5 (28 \texttt{Bf5}; 28 \texttt{Bd3}? \texttt{Wxf4}). Now after 28...\texttt{Wf5} the position looks unclear, but, as Nunn later pointed out, Black can play 28...\texttt{Bxe5} 29 \texttt{Bxd4 \texttt{Wa6} 30 \texttt{Bc1 \texttt{Be8, intending \ldots f7–f6. Black stands better, although after 31 h3 with the idea of \texttt{Wc7} the outcome nevertheless remains completely unclear.}

\texttt{25 \texttt{Qxd4} \texttt{Be2}}

\texttt{26 \texttt{Bxe4}}
Q 4-70. What should Black play?
Bad now is 26...xa2? 27 wc7 f8 28 de4 f6 29 we7 (29 d6; 29 f2!). In Nunn's opinion, Black should force a draw by 26...f3 27 xf5! wh3! (but not 27...xg2+?
28 xg1 wh3 29 xh6+ f8 30 wc5+ de8 31 wb5+ and 32 xe2) 28 xh6+ f8 29 wc5+ de8 30 wb5+ f8 31 wc5+ (31 xe2? xxe2 32 gxh3 xf1) with perpetual check.
Nunn considered 26...d8 to be a poor move in view of 27 wc7. This is not so – as he later pointed out, by continuing 27...d7 28 wc8+ d8 Black retains the advantage without any risk.
Another strong continuation, changing the evaluation of the 21...g4! variation, was found by Yusupov.

26 ... we7!!

27 xc5

The knight has no right to move, as this would allow the black queen to go to e4. If 27 f5, then 27...f6 is possible, as well as 27...xd6.

27 ... xed8?!?

28 f5 f6!

Of course, not 28...xd6? 29 f6 we4 30

wg5+ wg6 31 xg6+ hxg6 32 xd6 with a probable draw.

29 wf4

I also examined 29 h3, but rejected this move in view of 29...we5! 30 hxg4 wg3 31 f2 xf2 32 xf2 wf2 33 de4 (33 wc7? we1+ 34 xf2 we5+) 33...wd4 34 wc4 (34 wc7 de8) 34...wa1+ (the endgame after 34...wc4 also favours Black) 35 h2 we5+ 36 xe1 b5 and wins.

29 ... we5?

The variation 29...b6 30 xa3 xa2 31 xc4 we2 (31...xa3 32 d6) 32 xe1 seemed to Yusupov to be insufficiently convincing.

30 we5

30 h3 xxd5.

30 ... we5

31 h3 de2

32 xe1

32 ... xxd5

33 xb7 xdl

Stronger than 33...bd7 34 xe2 xxb7 35 b4, which, however, was also good enough to win.

34 xxd8 xxe1+

35 xe2 xd3

35...a6 is also good. In this position the game was stopped. Black has a decisive advantage – he intends to attack the g2 square by ...xe2 and ...xe4.
Playing Exercises

It seems as if it were a feature of the modern combinational play to be studiously unassuming: combinations flit in ghostly fashion, so to speak, between the lines, too shy to appear in the text, and even when, on the crest of a wave, they emerge from obscurity into the turmoil of practical play, they still are full of restraint (entirely devoid of thunder and lightning), and their modest appearance is often in – one might almost say deliberate – contrast with the intellectual depth of their conception.

Aron Nimzowitsch

Here I offer three more positions that can be used as playing exercises. They are somewhat simpler than the examples from Nunn’s games, but even so they are quite complicated. In the first and third you are playing White, and in the second – Black.

Mestel – D. Gurevich
Hastings 1982/83

White is two pawns up, but the pin on his rook at e5 is extremely unpleasant. It is clear that he cannot get by without tactics.

43...\texttt{xe5} 44 \texttt{xe5+} \texttt{xe5} 45 \texttt{xe5} \texttt{xf2} 46 b3 is hopeless for Black, since White retains both of his extra pawns.

44 \texttt{wd1}!!

Pointed out by Rafael Vaganian. In the game there followed 44 \texttt{wc4+} \texttt{xf7}! (bad is 44...\texttt{xf8}? 45 \texttt{wb4} \texttt{wb4} 46 \texttt{xf5+} \texttt{wg8} 47 \texttt{xe8+}, but, as will become clear from what follows, 44...\texttt{h7}! 45 \texttt{wc5} \texttt{xc5}! also would not have lost) 45 \texttt{wb5} \texttt{fe7}, and the players agreed a draw in view of 46 \texttt{wc4+} \texttt{h7} 47 \texttt{wh4+} \texttt{g8} 48 \texttt{wc4+}.

But now 44...\texttt{xe5}? 45 \texttt{wd6} \texttt{xe1} 46 \texttt{wb4} or 44...\texttt{xd1}? 45 \texttt{xe8+} and 46 \texttt{xd1} is bad for Black. If 44...\texttt{db8} White wins by 45 \texttt{wd5+} \texttt{h7} (45...\texttt{f8} does not change anything) 46 \texttt{wb5}! \texttt{xb5} (46...\texttt{wd6} 47 \texttt{xe8}; 46...\texttt{f5e5} 47 \texttt{wb8}) 47 \texttt{xb5} \texttt{xe1} (47...\texttt{xb5} 48 \texttt{xe8} 48 \texttt{xf5} \texttt{xe2} 49 b3 \texttt{xe3} 50 \texttt{xf3}. 44...\texttt{wc7}!

The best defence.
Annotating the game in the 36th volume of *Chess Informator*, Dmitry Gurevich recommended 45 \( \text{d}5 \). In fact this tempting check throws away the win. Black plays 45...\( \text{h7} \)! (if 45...\( \text{a8} \)?, then 46 \( \text{c5} + \) \( \text{xc5} \) 47 \( \text{xc5} \) \( \text{xc5} \) is not possible – the rook at e8 is defended, but on the other hand White wins by 46 \( \text{b7} \)! \( \text{xb7} \) 47 \( \text{xf5} \) or 46...\( \text{d6} \) 47 \( \text{xb4} \)!) 46 \( \text{a5} \)? \( \text{d6} \)! (46...\( \text{b8} \)? 47 \( \text{b5} \)! 46...\( \text{xa5} \)? 47 \( \text{xa5} \) \( \text{xa5} \) 48 \( \text{xe8} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 49 \( \text{b6} \) and 50 \( \text{b3} \), winning) 47 \( \text{c5} \) \( \text{xc5} \) (but not 47...\( \text{b8} \)? 48 \( \text{b5} \)! 48 \( \text{xc5} \) \( \text{xc5} \) 49 \( \text{xe8} \) \( \text{xc2} \) 50 \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{c3} \). White loses one of his extra pawns, and after the inevitable exchange of the queenside pawns a drawn rook ending arises.

45 \( \text{c1} \)!! \( \text{d6} \)

45...\( \text{b8} \) 46 \( \text{c4} \) and 47 \( \text{b5} \).
46 \( \text{c5} \)!

46...\( \text{b8} \) 47 \( \text{b5} \)!
47 \( \text{xc5} \) \( \text{xe1} \)

In contrast to the analogous position in the 45 \( \text{d5} \)? variation, here 47 \( \text{xc5} \) is not possible, since the rook at e8 is captured with check.

48 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{e2} \)
49 \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{e3} \)
50 \( \text{f3} \)
White retains his two extra pawns.

Mikh. Tseitlin – N. Popov
USSR 1982

7 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{df6} \)
8 \( \text{c1} \) \( \text{e6} \)
9 \( \text{cxd5} \)

Black has played the opening badly and it is hard now to offer him any good advice. 9...\( \text{xd5} \) 10 \( \text{b5} \) or 9...\( \text{d5} \) 10 \( \text{a4} + \) \( \text{c6} \) 11 \( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{d7} \) 12 \( \text{b5} \) \( \text{a6} \) 13 \( \text{e6} \) is bad for him, while if 9...\( \text{xd2} \) the intermediate check 10 \( \text{a4} + \) is very strong.

9...

\( \text{xd5} \)

The pawn sacrifice that occurred in the game seemed to me to be the only acceptable continuation, and therefore initially I wanted to suggest for playing purposes the position after White’s 9th move. But then I established that the capture with the queen also does not solve the defensive problems in view of 10 \( \text{xf6} \)! \( \text{gxf6} \) 11 \( \text{c7} \) \( \text{xd2} \) 12 \( \text{xd2} \) with a significant advantage to White.

10 \( \text{xc7} \) \( \text{xd2} \)

Not immediately 10...\( \text{d6} \)? because of 11 \( \text{c4} \).
11 \( \text{xd2} \)!

White avoided 11 \( \text{xd2} \), apparently because of 11...\( \text{e4} \). But he was wrong to do so: as was pointed out by Ken Neat, after 12 \( \text{c2} \) \( \text{b4} \) 13 \( \text{d1} \) he would have retained the advantage in view of the dangerous threats of 14 \( \text{a4} + \) and 14 \( \text{c4} \).
Let us begin from this point. Remember: you are playing Black. You have to try and refute the opinion of Mikhail Tseitlin, who in his comments considered that Black's position was difficult.

11 ... \textbf{\textit{d6}}

12 \textbf{\textit{e4+}} \textbf{\textit{f8}}

If now 13 \textit{c3}, then after 13...\textit{e4} or 13...\textit{g5} 14 \textit{g3} \textit{g7} Black obtains good compensation for the pawn, thanks to his lead in development. So as not to concede the initiative, Tseitlin begins a combination, which does indeed set his opponent serious problems.

13 \textit{e4}!?

13...\textit{h5}? will not do: 14 \textit{xb7} \textit{h4} (14...\textit{c8} 15 \textit{d3} 15 \textit{e5} \textit{xe5} 16 \textit{a3}+).

14 \textbf{\textit{c4}}

Imperceptibly we have reached the turning point of the game.

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\textbf{Q 4-72. What should Black play?}

Nikolai Popov made the poor reply 14...\textit{xd4}? There followed 15 \textit{xf7}+! (weaker is 15 \textit{f3}? \textit{xb2} 15...\textit{g8} (15...\textit{f7} 16 \textit{xe6}+ and 17 \textit{xd4}) 16 \textit{f3}! (if 16 0-0, then 16...\textit{c5}!, but not 16...\textit{xd2}? 17 \textit{xe6}) 16...\textit{xb2} 17 0-0! (17 \textit{xb7}? \textit{b4}+

18 \textit{f1} \textit{c1}+! 17...\textit{c5} (17...\textit{xf7} 18 \textit{d7}+ with a quick mate) 18 \textit{xe6}! \textit{xe6} 19 \textit{xb7}, and White soon converted his overwhelming positional advantage.

The consequences would have been equally dismal for Black after 14...\textit{h5}? 15 \textit{xb7} \textit{xh4} (15...\textit{xd2} 16 \textit{xe6}! \textit{xe6} 17 \textit{d7} or 16...\textit{e8} 17 \textit{xe8}+ \textit{xe8} 18 \textit{xf7}+) 16 \textit{g3}! \textit{g3} (16...\textit{g4} 17 \textit{d7} or 16...\textit{xd3} 17 \textit{fg3} \textit{g3}+ 18 \textit{d1}) 17 \textit{fg3} \textit{g3} 18 \textit{a3}+ and 19 \textit{wg3}.

14 ... \textbf{\textit{f5}!!}

The only defence, but an adequate one.

15 \textit{xb7} \textbf{\textit{d2}}

16 \textbf{\textit{xd2}}

If 16 \textit{e2}, then 16...\textit{c8}! is strong.

16 ... \textbf{\textit{f4}+}

17 \textbf{\textit{d3}} \textbf{\textit{h4}}

18 \textbf{\textit{xa7}}

18 \textit{d7} \textit{e7} is pointless.

18 ... \textbf{\textit{d8}}

19 \textbf{\textit{d7}}

The reply to 19 \textit{a8} would be the same.

19 ... \textbf{\textit{g6}}

Black’s king hides at g7, after which he will have excellent compensation for the pawn.

The following example may be used both for the usual playing (with White), and also for reciprocal playing. At the 6th session of the Dvoretsky–Yusupov school (1992) the students played it after an hour’s preparatory analysis.
White's pieces are active, while the pawns around the black king are loose and do not provide it with a secure defence. In such cases it is important to find a concrete way of exploiting the benefits of your position - otherwise the opponent will consolidate and the advantage will evaporate.

In the game there followed 24 h3?! Bc8 25 Bb3 Bb4! (in the event of the exchange of rooks on c1, the white queen would have invaded on the c-file) 26 Bg4 Bxc1+ 27 Bxc1 Bxc1+ 28 Bxc1 h5 29 Bc5 Bc7 30 Bc8 Bc8 31 Bc4 Bd7 32 Bc6 Bc6 33 Bc6 Bc6 Bc6 34 Bc5, and the players agreed a draw. Instead of 26 Bg4 White could have considered 26 Bxc7 Bxc7 27 d5! exd5 (27...Bc3 28 Bc3+ Bc5! is also possible, but not 28...Bc5? 29 d6! Bxa3 30 Bxc7) 28 Bg4, but here too he would not have especially achieved anything.

24 d5!? suggests itself. After 24...exd5 the combination 25 Bxg6+? is incorrect: 25...Bxg6 26 Bxh6+ Bf7 27 Bxe5+ Bxe5 28 Bxd5 Bxc1+ 29 Bxc1 Bc7. However, there is another, less obvious, but more dangerous blow, found by the young players of our school: 25 Ba6!? If after 25...Bxc1+ 26 Bxc1 Black covers the c7 square with 26...Bc6, then White successfully develops his offensive with 27 Bc8! Bc8 (27...Bxc8 28 Bxg6+! 29 Bc7! (threatening 29 Bc6) 28 Bg6 (28...Bxd7 29 Bc6!) 29 Bc6! (29 Bxe8 Bxe8 30 Bg4 Bxg4 31 Bxf6+ Bxf6 leads to a draw) 29...Bd3 30 Bc6! Bb2 31 Bc7+ Bb8 32 Bc6 and wins.

The capture of the bishop 26...Bxa6 also looks dubious in view of 27 Bc7!, e.g. 27...Bb5 (defending against the threat of 28 Bxg6+) 28 Bc4 with an irresistible attack. However, there is nevertheless a defence: 27...Bc8! 28 Bxe6 Bg7, and White has to reconcile himself to a draw: 29 Bc7 Bg8 30 Bc6 Bc6.

From the practical standpoint, perhaps the most successful continuation was chosen by Petya Svidler. He decided to place his pawn on d5 and played 24 e4! There followed 24...Bac8 25 d5 Bc5 26 Bg4, and Black soon had to terminate his resistance. He could have tried 24...Bc8 25 d5 Bc5 26 Bg4, but after 25 d5! Bxc4 26 Bxc4 Bxc4 27 Bc8+ Bc8 28 Bc4 (and if 28...exd5? 29 Bc6+) his position is unenviable.

In his commentary, grandmaster Jan Plachetka examined another direction of the attack and analysed it excellently, but, unfortunately, he did not quite complete his analysis, as a result of which his idea received an inaccurate evaluation.

24 Bg4!?

Threatening 25 d5. 24...h5? is bad on account of 25 d5! hxg4 26 d6.

24 ... Bc8!

Taking account of the fact that on the previous move White, as we have established, had available the strong possibility 24 e4!?, it is better to begin the playing of the position from this point.

25 d5! exd5!

25...Bxc4? loses after 26 Bxc4 Bxc4 27
Q 4-73. How should the offensive be continued?

White can prepare the capture of the h6 pawn with check.

27 \textsterling f6+ \textdaggerdbl f8
28 \textsterling d6+! \textdagger f7
28...\textwedge g8? 29 \textf6+; 28...\textwedge e7 29 \textxc4 or 29 \textf1 with a decisive advantage for White.

29 \textwedge f4!

Threatening 30 \textsterling h6+ \textwedge g8 31 \textf6 mate.

29 ... \textf8

A training game Chernin–M.Gurevich (1984) took an interesting course: 29...\textxc6?! 30 \textf1! \textxc7 31 \textwxd6+ \textwedge g8 32 \textxc6 \textxc6 33 \textwedge e5 \textxc6 34 \textwedge f1 \textb5 35 \textxe4! \texta4 (35...\textxf1 36 \textxf7! \textxf7 37 \textxc7) 36 \textxb5

\textwedge x5 37 \texth4 \texte8 38 \textxc4. Black resigns.

30 \textsterling xh6+ \texte7
31 \textwedge h4+ \textf8

31...\textwedge d6!? is also not so easy to refute. White continues his attack with 32 \textf6 \textxc4 33 \textxe8+ \textd7 34 \textf6+ \texte6 35 \textxc4 \textxc4 36 e4!

32 \textwedge h8+ \texte7

The same position as after Black’s 26th move has been reached, but without the h6 pawn.

33 \textwedge f6+
33 \textwedge e5+? \texte6.

33 ... \textf8

34 \textwedge d6+

34 \texte5 (with the threat of 35 \textxc6+) does not work because of 34...\textg8! 35 \textd1 \textxc4 36 \textd4 (36 \textxc8 \textxc8 37 \textwxd8 \textwxe5) 36...\texte6! 37 \texth4 \textg7.

34 ... \textg7

This position (with the black pawn at h6) is also one that we have already seen. Plachetka thought that White did not have a win in view of the variation 35 \textf6 \textb5!! (35...\texta4? 36 \textxd5 \textxc4 37 \textxc4 \textxc4 38 \textwxd8) 36 \textxd5 (36 \textxb5 \textxc4) 36...\textxc4 37 \textwxe5 \texth7! (37...\textg8? 38 \texte7+ \texth7
39 \( \text{Qxc8} \) 38 \( \text{Qf6+ Kh6} \) 39 \( \text{Qg8+} \) with perpetual check. However, the attack can be conducted more accurately.

35 \( \text{We5+!} \) \( \text{Qf8} \)
36 \( \text{Qf6!} \)

Threatening 37 \( \text{Wxe8+} \), and 36...\( \text{b5} \) is met by the decisive 37 \( \text{Qxd5} \).

36 ... \( \text{Qc6!} \)
37 \( \text{Qxd5} \)

Weaker is 37 \( \text{Wd6+ Ke7} \) 38 \( \text{Qxd5 Qd7} \).

37 ... \( \text{Qe7!} \)
38 \( \text{Wxa5} \)

There does not appear to be anything better.

38 ... \( \text{bxa5} \)
39 \( \text{Qxe8} \) \( \text{Qxc4} \)
40 \( \text{Qxc4} \) \( \text{Qxc4} \)
41 \( \text{Qd6} \) \( \text{Qc2} \)

42 \( \text{g4!} \)
42 a3!?  
42 ... \( \text{Qxa2} \)
43 \( \text{Qb8+} \) \( \text{Qg7} \)
44 \( \text{g5} \)

The attack on the king continues even after the mass exchanges. Black faces a difficult battle for a draw.

'A little fish is also a fish... You should take pawns, if they deserve to be taken' (Hort, Jansa). When the pursuit of the h6 pawn began, it was hardly possible to foresee that this factor would tell deep into the endgame. Simply you should exploit any opportunity to improve your own position, even if just a little, or to worsen your opponent's position, without asking yourself in what concrete variations this may later come in useful.
Exercises for Analysis

You must learn to decide which moves should be calculated, and examine just as many continuations as are necessary – no less, and no more.

With a superficial calculation it is impossible to take account of all the nuances in the position, but getting carried away by the number of possibilities usually leads to difficulties.

Alexander Kotov

Black to move

Evaluate 29...h4
Calculate the consequences of 20 \( \text{Nxd7} \).
In the preceding part of the book we have already seen a number of examples, both of spectacular combintive breakthroughs of the opponent's defences, and of tenacious, resourceful defence. When examining these examples we were primarily interested in how to FIND the strongest continuation (the development of combintive vision) and accurately CALCULATE the resulting variations (training in the technique of calculation). That is, we were talking mainly about forcing (even though extremely complicated) combinations.

If we find a strong move and accurately check the variations involved, then we of course make this move. But what if the position cannot be exhausted by accurate calculation? If we choose a committing continuation, in the process sharply upsetting the balance, we may be successful, but we may possibly end up worse than we began. Well, if you don't take any risks, you won’t win! The outcome of a game, and even an entire competition, often depends on the ability at the required moment to DECIDE to change the course of events, to set the opponent, and of course yourself, new and complicated problems. The element of risk is inherent in chess, and without it a significant part of the charm of the 'royal game' would be lost.

Risks have to be taken in equal measure, both in attack, and in defence. This is what Mikhail Tal, a great expert on the problem of risk, wrote:

'A player has given up a piece for an attack, although he did not need to give it up. Is he taking a risk? Certainly, since the attack may be repulsed, and the opponent's extra piece will tell with its negative (with regard to the risk-taker) strength.

Very well, let us proceed further. A player accepts a piece sacrifice (although he need not have accepted it), hoping to repulse the attack. Is he taking a risk? Undoubtedly! After all, the attack may prove to be irresistible.

Whose risk is 'more risky'? The scales on which this might be determined do not exist.'

Thus, the topic of our discussion will be the choice between different plans of action, quiet or risky, in defence and attack, how a player's individuality displays itself in the making of such a choice, problematic sacrifices of material, and so on.
Sacrifice or Oversight?

A player is more likely to stick his head in a lion's mouth, than to place his queen en prise.

Aron Nimzowitsch

The word 'sacrifice' is employed in chess literature with two different meanings.

Firstly, this is a move that gives up material. A sacrifice in this sense, in the opinion of Mikhail Botvinnik, is an essential element of any combination ('A combination is a forcing variation with a sacrifice').

The second meaning of the word 'sacrifice' is the giving up of material, without there being a combination, i.e. not involving a chain of accurately calculated variations, leading by force to the success of the sacrificer. Rudolf Spielmann called such sacrifices 'real' (in contrast to 'temporary' or 'sham' in the first case). When making the sacrifice, the player relies on the effect of positional factors to compensate for the material given up. But his hopes may not be justified, and therefore real sacrifices always involve some risk.

The first serious book, devoted to real sacrifices, was written by Rudolf Spielmann: The Art of Sacrifice in Chess. Then this topic was continued by Leonid Shamkovich in his The Modern Chess Sacrifice. Both books deserve the most careful study.

Nearly all the examples analysed in this part of the book will involve real sacrifices. We will begin with a game, in which the piece given up was the strongest one – the queen!

**Kapengut – Dvoretsky**

USSR Cup, Ordzhonikidze 1978

1  e4  c5
2  f3  e6
3  d4  cxd4
4  xd4  e6
5  c3  c6
6  xc6  bxc6
7  e5  d5
8  e4  c7
9  f4  b6
10  d3

At the time when this game was played, Black usually chose 8...f5, whereas the variation had not yet come into fashion. Later the main continuation for White became 10 c4!? b4+ 11 e2!

6  ...  a6
7  a3

In the event of 11 c4 White loses a pawn: 11...b4+! 12 d2 x b2.

8  ...  f5?

A mistake, leading to a difficult position for Black. He should have played 11...e7, preparing to counter 12 c4 with 12...f5!

9  exf6  xf6
10  gxf6  b5
11  h5+  d8
Q 5-1. How should White continue?

Black has to reckon with \( \text{Wf7} \), but before the completion of White's development this sortie is premature. If \( 15 \text{Wf7?} \) there follows \( 15...\text{exd3!} 16 \text{Wxf6+ (16 cxd3 f5 or 16...\text{Wd4})} 16...\text{Wc7} 17 \text{cxd3 \text{Wc5} or 17...\text{Wg8}, and Black has excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn.} \)

An advantage could have been secured by a simple exchange: \( 15 \text{Wxa6!} \text{Wxa6 16 \text{Wd2}.} \) The d7 square is very weak; White intends 0-0-0, \( \text{Wc3} \) (or \( \text{Wc5} \)) and \( \text{Wf7} \), in this or some other order. I do not even know what I would then have done. If \( 16...\text{Wb5} \) there follows not 17 \( \text{Wc5} \text{? \text{Wc7} 18 \text{Wb4+ \text{Wd8} with equality, but 17 \text{Wf7 \text{Wc7} 17...\text{Wxb2} 18 \text{Wd1 or 18 \text{Wc5} + 18 0-0-0.} \)

Fortunately, my opponent was attracted by another tempting possibility.

\( 15 \text{Wd2?} \)

White hopes to gain a tempo thanks to the threat of \( 16 \text{Wc5}. \)

\( 15...\text{exd3!!} \)

It should be said that I began this event completely out of training, which showed itself particularly in the opening. In the first round by the tenth move I was absolutely lost, although subsequently I outplayed my opponent and went on to win. In the second round with White I emerged from the opening with a clearly inferior position, but in the end I almost won in the endgame. And now the third round...

After quickly making my move and standing up from the board, I heard my colleague on the 'Burevestnik' team Yuri Razuvaev saying in distress to our trainer: 'Oh dear, Mark just isn’t up to it, he has just blundered away his queen'. I had to go up and reassure him: 'Perhaps I’m indeed not up to it, but I didn’t blunder away my queen. I sacrificed it!'

Apart from the obvious minuses, a lengthy break from tournament play also give certain pluses. You acquire a thirst for the game, a freshness of perceiving positions, and a desire to take risks and to sacrifice. Despite the opening difficulties, which I experienced in almost every round, in the end, by winning four games and drawing three, I was able to achieve the best result not only on my own board, but also overall on the men's boards.

\( 16 \text{Wc5} \)

After \( 16 \text{cxd3} \) the terrible d-file is blocked, and White has nothing.

\( 16...\text{Wxc2} \)

The position has become unclear. For the queen Black has only two bishops and a pawn, but his pieces will soon become coordinated and will take control of many important squares. White's heavy pieces have nowhere to expand.

\( 17 \text{Wf1} \)

\( 17 \text{Wxb6+ axb6 18 \text{Wh4 suggests itself, attacking the f6 pawn and threatening the double attack 19 \text{Wf2}}. \) But with one bishop alone Black solves all his problems: \( 18...\text{Wf8} 19 \text{Wf2 \text{c4}! 20 \text{Wc2 \text{c5}}.} \)

\( 17...\text{c7?!} \)

\( 18 \text{Wxb6+ axb6} \)

\( 19 \text{Wc3} \)

\( 19 \text{d2 followed by \text{ae1} would seem to be stronger.} \)

\( 19...\text{c7} \)

\( 20 \text{g3} \text{a4} \)

\( 20...\text{d6 was sounder, not fearing 21 \text{g7 \text{xh4 22 \text{Wf7 \text{d8}.}}} \)

\( 21 \text{Wf3?!} \)

\( 21 \text{Wf7: 21 \text{c1.}} \)

\( 21...\text{c4!} \)

The best defence against the threat of \( 22 \text{c3}. \) \( 21...\text{b4+} \) was much worse in view of \( 22 \text{axb4! \text{xa1+ 23 \text{d2}}.} \)
22 $c1$?
After this the initiative completely passes to Black. Stronger was 22 $we2$ $he4$ 23 $he3$ with an unclear game; if desired the moves 22 $b3$ $hc5$ 23 $b4$ $hc4$ could first be included.

22 $...$ $ad6$
23 $we2$ $he4$
23...$ad3$ also looked quite good, since after 24 $xc4$ $xe2$ 25 $xe2$ $b5$ the f4 pawn would be lost.

24 $xc2$
Albert Kapengut decides to return the queen. 24 $lie3$ $xf4$ 25 $xe4$ $be4$ 26 $tc3$ $g1$ was even less attractive.

24 $...$ $xf4$
25 $g7$ $xh2$
Weaker is 25...$xe2+$ 26 $xe2$, when the e6 pawn is attacked.

26 $we4$ $xe4$
27 $d2$ $d6$
28 $d4$ $c5$!
29 $xe4$ $c6$

Black has two pawns for the exchange. Clearly, it is my opponent who has to fight for a draw.

30 $b3$ $h5$
31 $h4$ $b5$
32 $e2$ $e5$
Black could also have considered 32...$a8$? 33 $a4$ $e5$! (less good is 33...$bxa4$ 34 $xa4$)
34 $xb5+$ $d6$ 35 $h7$ $a2+$.

33 $g5$ $d4$
34 $hxh5$
34 $b4$ $a8$ 35 $g3$ was preferable.

34 $...$
35 $h3$ $xa3$
36 $g8$ $e5$
37 $g4$ $a2+$
37...e4?!

38 $f3$ $f2+$
39 $g3$ $b2$
40 $g5$
40 $h4$ was more tenacious.

40 $...$
41 $g4$ $xh3$
42 $xh3$ $d5$
43 $g6$ $e4$
44 $b8$ $b4$
45 $g4$ $c4$

White resigns.

After the game they began pulling my opponent's leg: 'I tell them that the position was unclear, but they don't believe me', Kapengut complained to me over dinner. I could only sympathise with him. Indeed, observing from the side, it is not easy to grasp the essence of the play, and to see and evaluate the problems that the two players had to solve.

When that evening I went into the room where our team was gathered, the grandmasters and masters greeted me with applause. Evidently, the sacrifice of the strongest chess piece gladdens the hearts
of not only amateurs, but also seasoned professionals.
And meanwhile, the entire difficulty in carrying out Black's operation was merely that he had to take such a possibility into account. What interferes is the psychological prejudice mentioned by Nimzowitsch, and given as the epigraph to this chapter. As soon as the queen sacrifice is noticed, it immediately becomes clear: that is what should be played. Here one does not even have to talk about risk. After all, with the 'normal' course of the game Black's position is difficult, whereas after the sacrifice the situation moves out of the control of both sides, and any outcome becomes possible.
‘All That Glitters is not Gold’

A sacrifice for the obtaining and maintaining of an attack is necessary only in those cases, when with the natural continuation of the attack a mistake has been made.

Siegbert Tarrasch

If the idea of the great German player, that sacrifices are not needed if the game is conducted correctly, is taken literally, he can immediately be put down as a dogmatist (which has already happened many times), and accused of not understanding the place and significance of combinative play in chess. Fortunately, the number of those who thoughtlessly pin labels would appear to have begun to diminish, both among writers, and among readers. Indeed, Tarrasch himself was not averse to sacrificing, and certainly did not prohibit others from doing so.

If you have excellent attacking prospects and there are every grounds for counting on an advantage, but then you are forced to sacrifice material and the game enters a phase of unclear complications, it can be assumed that you have done something wrong, and that somewhere earlier you have made a mistake. You should carefully check the preceding moves, and, possibly, you will find the point when you could have played more strongly. It is this, in my view, that constitutes Tarrasch’s idea. He warns against a blind delight at your own ‘brilliant’ play, and demands that all the directions of the play should be critically evaluated.

Dvoretsky – Tretyakov

Moscow 1968

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<td>e5</td>
<td>d5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ac3</td>
<td>Cc7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 8 | Axc6 | bxc6?!

8...dxc6 is sounder.

9 d3

When I later became acquainted with the variation of the English Opening 1 c4 e5 2 Bc3 Cf6 3 g3 Bb4, where a similar position with reversed colours may arise, I realised that White should have played 9 d4! cxd4 10 Bxd4.

9 ... Bb8?!

Black wrongly delays the completion of his development. While it was not too late, he should have castled.

10 Bb4 Aa6

Q 5-2. What would you advise for White?
The developing move 11 \texttt{\textit{a}}e3 suggests itself. If 11... \texttt{\textit{d}}xb2 White has a pleasant choice between 12 \texttt{\textit{d}}xc5 \texttt{\textit{d}}xc5 13 \texttt{\textit{d}}xc5 \texttt{\textit{w}}a5 14 d4, and 12 \texttt{\textit{w}}c1 \texttt{\textit{b}}7(b8) 13 \texttt{\textit{d}}xc5, intending 14 \texttt{\textit{w}}a3.

After 11...d6 12 exd6 exd6, 13 \texttt{\textit{f}}14? \texttt{\textit{f}}14 does not work, but 13 \texttt{\textit{g}}5?! looks tempting. For example: 13... \texttt{\textit{d}}xg5 14 \texttt{\textit{f}}16+ (14 \texttt{\textit{d}}xd6+ \texttt{\textit{f}}d7 15 \texttt{\textit{d}}xg5 \texttt{\textit{w}}xg5 16 \texttt{\textit{f}}xg7 \texttt{\textit{w}}f6(15) 17 \texttt{\textit{w}}xh8 \texttt{\textit{w}}xh8 is unconvincing) 14...\texttt{\textit{f}}8 15 \texttt{\textit{d}}e5+ \texttt{\textit{w}}xe5 16 \texttt{\textit{w}}xe5 \texttt{\textit{f}}3+ 17 \texttt{\textit{w}}xf3 \texttt{\textit{w}}xe5 18 \texttt{\textit{w}}xc6+ \texttt{\textit{d}}7 19 \texttt{\textit{d}}e1+ \texttt{\textit{d}}d8 20 \texttt{\textit{w}}xd6 \texttt{\textit{d}}xb2 21 \texttt{\textit{w}}xe7+ \texttt{\textit{c}}7 22 \texttt{\textit{w}}xc5+ with advantage to White.

I was concerned about the reply 13...f6. The consequences of the variation 14 \texttt{\textit{d}}h4 0–0 15 \texttt{\textit{g}}3 h5! 16 \texttt{\textit{d}}xd6 \texttt{\textit{f}}xe6 17 \texttt{\textit{d}}xc8 \texttt{\textit{d}}xe6 18 \texttt{\textit{w}}xc6+ \texttt{\textit{f}}d7 19 \texttt{\textit{d}}e1+ \texttt{\textit{d}}d8 20 \texttt{\textit{w}}xd6 \texttt{\textit{d}}xb2 21 \texttt{\textit{w}}xe7+ \texttt{\textit{c}}7 22 \texttt{\textit{w}}xc5+ with advantage to White. I was concerned about the reply 13...f6. The consequences of the variation 14 \texttt{\textit{d}}h4 0–0 15 \texttt{\textit{g}}3 h5! 16 \texttt{\textit{d}}xd6 \texttt{\textit{f}}xe6 17 \texttt{\textit{d}}xc8 \texttt{\textit{d}}xe6 18 \texttt{\textit{w}}xc6+ \texttt{\textit{f}}d7 19 \texttt{\textit{d}}e1+ \texttt{\textit{d}}d8 20 \texttt{\textit{w}}xd6 \texttt{\textit{d}}xb2 21 \texttt{\textit{w}}xe7+ \texttt{\textit{c}}7 22 \texttt{\textit{w}}xc5+ with advantage to White.

According to Tarrasch's conception, if you have a strategically very favourable position there is no need at all to launch into irrational complications. Carried away by complicated calculations, I, unfortunately, overlooked the typical move 13 d4! Exchanges in the centre underline the vulnerability of the black pawns, and in the event of the exchange of bishops the weakness of the dark squares will tell.

After failing to find a simple way (11 \texttt{\textit{e}}e3! d6 12 exd6 exd6 13 d4!), White chose a continuation which creates an extremely complicated situation, both strategically and tactically.

11 \texttt{\textit{d}}f5!?

Of course, 11...\texttt{\textit{d}}xg5 12 \texttt{\textit{x}}g5 \texttt{\textit{x}}xe5 is bad, since there follows a combinative rejoinder: 13 \texttt{\textit{d}}f6+! exf6 14 \texttt{\textit{x}}xe5+! And 11...\texttt{\textit{w}}c7 is strongly met by 12 \texttt{\textit{d}}xe6 fxe6 13 f4 d6 (the pawn sacrifice 13...0–0 14 \texttt{\textit{d}}xc5 is hardly correct) 14 exd6 exd6 15 f5!

12 \texttt{\textit{d}}xc5!

Nothing would have been given by either 12 \texttt{\textit{x}}xe6 fxe6, or 12 \texttt{\textit{w}}f3 0–0 13 \texttt{\textit{h}}3 h5. After the move in the game Black has a wide choice of continuations.
White finds an elegant solution after 12...\textbf{c}xc5 13 \textbf{d}xe5 d6 14 \textbf{e}e1 0-0?! 15 d4 \textbf{c}c6? 16 \textbf{c}xe6 \textbf{x}xe6 (Black also stands clearly worse after 16...\textbf{f}xe6).

\begin{position}153\end{position}

Q 5-3. What should White play?

There follows a little combination on the theme of double attack: 17 \textbf{h}6 \textbf{e}8 18 d5! \textbf{x}d5 19 c4!

A very sharp situation arises after 12...\textbf{c}c7 13 \textbf{f}f3! 0-0 (13...\textbf{c}xc5? 14 \textbf{f}f7+ \textbf{g}8 15 \textbf{f}4! d6 16 \textbf{d}xe5 \textbf{d}xe5 17 \textbf{g}7 \textbf{e}8 18 \textbf{f}f7+ \textbf{d}7 19 \textbf{c}xe5+ \textbf{d}8 20 \textbf{f}f7+ \textbf{d}7 21 \textbf{d}d4+) 14 \textbf{x}xe6 \textbf{d}xe6 15 \textbf{h}h3 h5. White should apparently sacrifice a piece: 16 g4 f6 (16...\textbf{h}xh2!? 17 gxh5 e5 18 \textbf{h}4 \textbf{f}5) 17 gxh5 f5 18 hXg6 \textbf{h}f5 19 \textbf{h}h7+ \textbf{f}8 20 h4!

This analysis clearly indicates the dangers lying in wait for Black. It is obvious that my idea is not a bluff, and that it sets the opponent serious problems. At the same time it is hard to believe that, after conceding the centre, White nevertheless retains the advantage. In fact, the outcome of this last variation is unclear. But Black also has a quiet way to gain equal chances: after 12...\textbf{c}xc5 13 \textbf{x}xe5 d6 14 \textbf{e}e1 he can play 14...\textbf{f}6! 15 d4 \textbf{a}a6, and if 16 \textbf{c}e6 \textbf{c}xe6 17 \textbf{a}a6 \textbf{c}c7.

But let us return to the game.

\begin{position}153\end{position}

13 \textbf{g}xh2 \textbf{c}xc5

Little would have been changed by interposing a check: 13...\textbf{w}c7+ 14 \textbf{g}1 \textbf{c}xc5 15 \textbf{f}f3 f5 (15...0-0 16 \textbf{g}e7) 16 \textbf{f}f4 d6 17 \textbf{w}g3 (or 17 d4) with dangerous threats. For an experienced player it is not hard to evaluate the concluding position of this variation -- he knows well that the presence on the board of opposite-colour bishops markedly strengthens the attack.

14 \textbf{f}f3 0-0

\begin{position}154\end{position}

Q 5-4. How should White continue the attack?

The following blow had to be anticipated beforehand -- without it, the pawn sacrifice on the 12th move would have been incorrect.

15 \textbf{d}xh7!! \textbf{c}c7

Now White has a strong attack with material equal. But my opponent did not see any satisfactory defence after 15...\textbf{c}xh7 16 \textbf{h}h3+ (16 \textbf{h}f4! d6 17 \textbf{h}h6+ \textbf{g}8 18 \textbf{h}h1 is even more accurate) 16...\textbf{g}8 17 \textbf{h}h1! with the threat of 18 \textbf{g}1. And indeed, there is a forced mate after 17...\textbf{d}6 (or 17...\textbf{d}5) 18 \textbf{h}h6 \textbf{f}4 19 \textbf{g}3! \textbf{h}5 20 \textbf{h}xh5 gxh5 21 \textbf{g}5+ \textbf{h}7 22 \textbf{h}xh5+ \textbf{g}7 23 \textbf{g}5+ \textbf{h}7
24. Also bad is 17...g7 18 h6+ f6
19 h4+ (or 19 g5+), while if 17...f6 White
wins by 18 g3! (again the rook at b8 comes
under a double attack).
There is also the less obvious defence
17...a5, but then White wins prettily by
18 b4! (weaker is 18 g3 e4+ 19 dxe4
h5) 18...xb4 (18...xb4 19 g1) 19
b1! xb1 (otherwise White picks up the ill-
fated rook at b8) 20 g3.

16 e3 e6
17 h6 b5

The following variation is interesting: 17...
c7+ 18 g1 b5 19 g5 xg5 20 xg5
(threatening both 21 f6, and 21 e4)
20...e5 21 f4 xe1+ 22 xe1 d6 23 g5,
renewing the same threats. How easy and
pleasant it is to conduct an attack with
opposite-colour bishops!

18 g4 c7+
19 g2 b7
20 h1 e5
21 f6+ f6
22 h7+ f8
23 h6+ h8

Black resigns.

A good illustration of Tarrasch's thought,
wouldn't you agree? White's idea, begun
with his eleventh move, is bold and original,
and for a long time I was proud of this game.
But subsequently, after examining it more
objectively, I realised that if I had evaluated
the position more deeply, I could have well
managed without any extraordinary and
drastic measures.
Ten Years Later

_Sacrifices are a brilliant indication that the game has been conducted incorrectly._

Saviely Tartakower

In the following encounter events developed in similar fashion. The only difference was that I did not later have to seek in analysis the correct way to develop White's initiative. I saw it at the board, but played differently, which I regretted within just a few moves. This mistake had to be corrected; as a result the game lost its completeness, but on the other hand it gained as a spectacle.

_Dvoretsky – Simic_

_Match USSR-Yugoslavia, Tallinn 1977_

1. e4
2. d4
3. Qb5
4. We2

The plan beginning with this move is one that I developed in my preparations for this game. Despite the fact that in it White won the opening duel, later another continuation came into fashion: 4 Qc3 Qbd4 5 e5 dxe5 6 Qxe5 Qd5 7 Qf3?! (I. Zaitsev).

4. ... g6
5. Qc3 Qg7

5...Qxd4 6 cxd4 cxd4 7 e5 dxe5 8 exf6 favours White.

6. e5 Qg4

The knight could not go to d5, but if Black can manage to transfer it via h6 to f5, he will be alright.

7. Qxc6 dxc6
8. h3 Qh6
9. g4!

He did not manage!

9. ... 0–0
10. d3 f5

Or 10...f6 11 Qf4 Qf7 12 0–0–0 with advantage to White.

11. g5 Qg7
12. Qf4

It was for this position that White had aimed. His lead in development, the bishop at g7 being shut out of play, the possibility of an attack on the kingside by h3–h4–h5 – all this ensures that he has the better chances in the coming battle.

12. ... Qa5
13. We3!

A good positional move. By defending my bishop in advance, I parry the threat of 13...Qb4, at the same time vacating the e2 square for my knight, and, by attacking the c5 pawn, I prevent 13...b5.

13. ... Qd8?!

_In cramped positions one should aim for exchanges._ Therefore correct was 13...Qe6 14 h4! Qd8 15 Qh3 Qxf3, and only then ...Qd8–e6.
Q 5-5. What would you recommend for White?

In good positions many moves seem strong, but this factor sometimes dulls one's vigilance.

14 h4?! 

A superficial decision. 14 f5! e6 15 e2 followed by g2 and h3–h4–h5 etc. was preferable.

'But why these subtleties?', I thought. 'Why not begin the attack on the kingside immediately, and castle on the queenside? The counterattack on the queenside will surely be too late.'

After rapidly considering the variation 14 h4 e6 15 0–0–0 b5 16 h5 b4 17 e2 xa2 18 hxg6 hxg6 19 h4 f7 20 xg6 f6 21 f3, I decided that this combination would worthily crown White's opening strategy. Alas, it all proved to be not so simple.

14 ... e5 

15 0–0–0 b5 

16 h5 

If 16 b1 Black has the unpleasant 16 ... xf4 17 xf4 e6. The threat of 18 ... b4 can be parried by 18 d2 (18 ... b4 19 c4!), but then White has to forget about his attack and concern himself with the safety of his e5 pawn (18 ... b4?!) In order to defend the queenside securely, in such positions the knight should be kept not at c3, but at c1, but White does not have time to play it there. He is forced to abandon the a2 pawn to its fate.

16 ... d8! 

Why drive the knight to e2, if it is itself aiming to go there? Instead of wasting a tempo with 16 ... b4?, Black vacates the f8 square for his king and prepares ... d4.

17 hxg6 hxg6 

18 h4 f7 

Q 5-6. How should White continue?

It is not possible to breach Black's defences directly. If 19 xg6 xg6 20 f3 there follows 20 ... xf4, while after 19 xf5 gxf5 20 g6+ e8 the black king escapes from the danger zone via d7. After prolonged thought I realised that to continue the attack I needed my knight on e2.

19 e2!! 

I very much wanted to avoid moving the knight without special invitation, but I had to. Now Black must seriously reckon with the knight sacrifice on g6. And if he parries the threat with the passive 19 ... f8, White, by transferring his knight to c1 (20 b1 e6 21 c1), neutralises the opponent's counterattack and retains a positional advantage.

I did not even try to calculate the sacrifice exactly, but restricted myself to three short variations:

a) 19 ... xa2 20 xg6 xg6 21 f3 f7 22 h7! 

b) 19 ... h8 20 xg6 xh1 21 xh1 xg6 22 h3; 

c) 19 ... d4 20 xg6 xg6 21 xd4 and 22 f3

It is obvious that in each case White retains a dangerous attack, although, of course, it
cannot be ruled out that somewhere Black will be able to defend himself. Regarding this, Rudolf Spielmann commented: 'How difficult is it not at times to see correctly a few moves ahead with their variations, and how often has such a useless waste of energy led to nervous exhaustion, time difficulties and entirely unnecessary losses! ... The attempt to calculate every sacrifice with the utmost exactitude is fundamentally wrong. Faith in the position is required and faith in oneself. A game of chess is not an exercise in mathematics, but a contest full of life, and in a contest, the attacker has, in practice, always the advantage.' In principle, Spielmann is quite right, although it is doubtful whether many modern players would agree with his last thought. 'Demolish — don't build!' it is normally easier to destroy than to create.

19 ... 
20 $\text{Qe}2$

20 ... $\text{Qxg6}$

Otherwise 21 $\text{Wh5}$ or 21 $\text{Wh3}$ with the threat of 22 $\text{Wh5}$.

21 $\text{Whf3}$

22 $\text{Wh7}$!

While my opponent was trying to find an acceptable defence, I considered the critical continuation 23 ... $\text{Wxb2}$. After 24 $\text{Wh5}$ + $\text{Qg8}$ (24 ... $\text{Wh8}$ 25 $\text{Whh8}$ + $\text{Qxh8}$ 26 $\text{Whh8}$ + $\text{Qf7}$ 27 $\text{g6}$) 25 $\text{g6}$ (25 $\text{Wh1}$ is probably simpler) White is threatening 26 $\text{Qxg7}$ or 26 $\text{Whh8}$. Black has the clever resource 25 ... $\text{Qxd3}$ + 1 with the idea of 26 $\text{Qxd3}$ $\text{Wd4}$ + ! 27 $\text{Qxd4}$ $\text{Qxf4}$ + 28 $\text{We3}$ $\text{Qxh5}$ 29 $\text{Qxc6}$ f4 + , and the battle flares up with renewed strength.

However, White declines the rook sacrifice: 26 $\text{We1}$ $\text{Qxd1}$ + 27 $\text{Qxd1}$ $\text{We1}$ + 28 $\text{Qd2}$! (but not 28 ... $\text{Qc1}$? $\text{Wh8}$ and not 28 ... $\text{Qe1}$? $\text{Wh8}$ + 29 $\text{Qxg7}$ $\text{Qxg7}$ 30 $\text{Whh6}$ $\text{Qg8}$ 31 $\text{Qxf8}$ $\text{Wd4}$ + ! 32 $\text{Qe1}$ $\text{Qxe5}$ + or 32 $\text{Qd3}$ $\text{Qg4}$ + ) 28 ... $\text{Qf8}$ 29 $\text{Qxg7}$ + $\text{Qxg7}$ 30 $\text{Whh6}$ + $\text{Qg8}$ 31 $\text{Qxf8}$.

The move in the game leaves Black with no chances at all.

24 $\text{Qc3}$ $\text{We8}$ 25 $\text{Wxc6}$ + $\text{Qd7}$ 26 $\text{Wh1}$ $\text{Qdc8}$ 27 $\text{Qxg7}$ $\text{Qxg7}$ 28 $\text{Wh8}$ + $\text{Qf7}$ 29 $\text{g6}$ + $\text{Qe6}$ 30 $\text{Qxg7}$ $\text{Le8}$ 31 $\text{Qg8}$ + $\text{Qd7}$ 32 $\text{g7}$ $\text{Qc7}$ 33 $\text{Qd5}$ $\text{Ac6}$ 34 $\text{Wxc5}$ $\text{Qb7}$ 35 $\text{a6}$ $\text{Wa2}$ 36 $\text{Qxe7}$ + $\text{Qa6}$ 37 $\text{Qd4}$ $\text{Wxb2}$ + 38 $\text{Qc2}$ $\text{Qd5}$ 39 $\text{Qa1}$ + $\text{Qa2}$ 40 $\text{Qb4}$. Black resigns.
Twenty Years Later

I have come to the conclusion that combinative play, although it sometimes gives good results, is not able to ensure reliable success... The chess strategist should not go chasing the possibility of brilliant combinations, but on the contrary, he should fight against them and forestall them by simple and imperceptible means.

Wilhelm Steinitz

A further decade passed. A game played by Artur Yusupov, which I annotated for the magazine Shakhmaty v SSSR, vividly reminded me of the two games given above. Again the words of Tarrasch came to mind: 'If you always make the strongest moves, the need to sacrifice rarely arises'.

Yusupov – Ljubojevic
Tilburg 1987

1 d4 ♘f6
2 c4 e6
3 ♘f3 d5
4 ♘c3 ♗e7
5 ♘f4 0–0
6 e3 b6

The normal continuation is 6...c5, but Ljubomir Ljubojevic apparently wanted to deviate as soon as possible from 'official' theory.

7 ♗c1

In the event of 7 cxd5 Black can reply 7...♕xd5 8 ♙xd5 ♗xd5!? Yusupov waits for 7...♗b7 to be played – then after 8 cxd5 the double recapture with pieces on d5 will be unfavourable for Black.

7 ... c5
8 dxc5!

A theoretical novelty! Yusupov is planning to besiege the opponent's hanging pawns, which prove to be surprisingly vulnerable. Previously White exchanged pawns on d5, but did not especially achieve anything.

Such new ideas in the opening are usually the fruit of painstaking analytical work by a player, or even by a training brigade. But in this case there was no preceding preparation – White's improvement was devised during the game itself. Yusupov's great strategic mastery enabled him at the board to choose the most effective plan of action.

8 ... bxc5
9 ♗e2 ♘b7
10 0–0 ♘bd7
11 cxd5 exd5

Knowing the further course of events, recapturing on d5 with the knight can be recommended for Black as the lesser evil. But is it easy, already in the opening, to produce, as Alekhine expressed it, 'testimonium paupertatis' (evidence of poverty)!

12 ♗e5

On the next move the bishop will go to f3, and how then will Black be able to hold his d5 pawn? He would like to ease his defence by exchanges, but after 12...♕xe5 13 ♗xe5 ♗d7 14 ♗g3 followed by 15 ♗f3 things are difficult for him.

12 ... ♗b6
13 a4!

A good positional idea, and, incidentally, quite typical with a knight at b6. The pawn wants to attack the knight, and then also the bishop. Even if in reply to 13...♗c8 or 13...a6 the move 14 a5 is not yet very dangerous (14...♗bd7, and the a5 pawn is attacked), it
will become dangerous after the preparatory 14 f3. And after the mechanical blocking of the a-pawn, the important b5 square is weakened.

13 ... a5
14 f3 e8

Black is intending to drive the tiresome knight from e5 by 15 ... d6 (after the immediate 14 ... d6 White has the strong reply 15 b5), but White finds a serious rejoinder. 14 ... c8 was more circumspect, when Yusupov was planning 15 c2 and 16 d2, intensifying the pressure.

15 b5!

Black’s threat is parried, and instead White creates one of his own: 16 xf7! xf7 17 c7 and 18 xb6. If 15 ... c8, then 16 a7! is very strong. The following artificial reply by Ljubojevic (although, perhaps, the only move) is a clear indication of how unhealthy his position is.

15 ... a6

Q 5-7. How should White continue?

The strengthening of the position by 16 b3! a8 17 c2! suggests itself, with an overwhelming advantage. Of course, Yusupov saw this. Why then didn’t he play it?

The point is that the grandmaster noticed the possibility of carrying out a complicated combination, which, as it seemed to him, should have given a forced win. In principle, looking for combinations in such situations is impractical – you may miscalculate (which, strictly speaking, is what happened: Artur overlooked or underestimated his opponent’s 21st move) and lose the advantage that you have, or even hand the initiative to your opponent. On the other hand, if your calculations are correct, the game is won more forcibly, more quickly and more prettily. Yusupov is a player who aims for the maximum, who often chooses critical courses, even though they may be risky. Often the choice of a particular plan of action is a matter of the style and character of a player, but here, where White had in reserve a simple and sound solution, it was clearly inexpedient to engage in complicated calculations.

16 d3?! c4
17 c7

In the event of 17 c7 cxd3 18 xa6 xa6 19 d7 20 xb6 b4! Black has sufficient compensation for the exchange, which, however, will soon be regained.

17 ... d7!

By threatening 18 ... xa4! 19 xa4 c6 (which would have followed, say, in reply to 18 f4), Black lures the knight to e5, in order to cut off the white bishop’s retreat.

18 e5 c8
19 b3

This undermining move and the associated piece sacrifice are the logical continuation of White’s plan, begun with his 16th move. The more cautious 19 xb6 xb6 20 g4 was sufficient only for equality.

19 ... a8!
20 bxc4 xc7

The attempt, by playing 20 ... d4, not to allow
the opening of the c-file, is refuted by 21 
\( \text{d}x\text{d5!} \), and if 21...\( \text{d}x\text{d5} \), then 22 \( \text{w}x\text{d3!} \).

21 \text{cxd5} \text{d6!}

Q 5-8. How should White continue his attack?

Now the value of every move is exceptionally high – any inaccuracy may decide the outcome in favour of one side or the other. Black gains the advantage after both 22 \( \text{cxd6} \) \( \text{d}x\text{d6} \) 23 \( \text{d}x\text{c4} \) \( \text{d}x\text{d8} \), and 22 \( \text{c}x\text{c6} \) \( \text{w}d7! \) (with the threat of 23...\( \text{c}x\text{xd5} \)) 23 e4 \( \text{c}x\text{e4} \) 24 \( \text{c}x\text{e4} \) \( \text{d}x\text{e4} \) 25 \( \text{d}b\text{b8} \) \( \text{w}e7 \) 26 \( \text{d}x\text{a}6 \) \( \text{d}x\text{a6} \).

22 \( \text{c}c4! \)
The only worthy possibility. Now extreme accuracy is required of Black.

22 ... \( \text{c}c5? \)

In a complicated situation Ljubojevic fails to rise to the occasion, overlooking his opponent's pretty 25th move. Black is also clearly worse after 22...\( \text{d}x\text{h}2+?! \) 23 \text{g}x\text{h2} \( \text{c}x\text{xd5} \) 24 \( \text{w}d4 \) or 24 \( \text{d}g1 \) \( \text{b}b8 \) 25 \( \text{w}d4 \). Essential was 22...\( \text{b}b4 \), when White would have had to choose between 23 d6 and 23 e4 (23...\( \text{d}x\text{e4} \) 24 d6). In both cases White's two pawns and active pieces would fully compensate for the sacrificed piece, but, probably, no more than that. A double-edged battle with an unclear outcome would have been in prospect.

23 \( \text{d}x\text{a}5! \) \( \text{w}x\text{a}5 \)
24 \( \text{w}x\text{c5} \) \( \text{w}d8 \)

No better is 24...\( \text{w}b8 \) 25 \( \text{d}d2 \) \( \text{a}a6 \) 26 \( \text{c}c4 \) \( \text{w}d8 \) 27 \( \text{d}c7! \).

25 \( \text{d}d6!! \) \( \text{w}x\text{d6} \)

Bad is 25...\( \text{c}x\text{c5} \) 26 \( \text{d}x\text{b7} \) \( \text{w}e7 \) 27 d6.

26 \( \text{a}a5 \) \( \text{x}d5 \)
27 \( \text{w}d4! \) \( \text{w}e6 \)

27...\( \text{d}e6 \) 28 \( \text{d}x\text{d5} \).

28 \( \text{x}d5 \) \( \text{c}x\text{xd5} \)
29 \( \text{d}d1 \) \( \text{c}c8 \)
30 \( \text{c}c5! \) \( \text{c}c5 \)
31 \( \text{w}x\text{c5} \)

Nominally two knights are considered to be almost equal in strength to a rook and two pawns. But not in this ending, especially with the strong passed a-pawn, which the unwieldy knights are simply unable to combat. And Black's rook and bishop, which might yet have somehow blocked the advance of the pawn, were exchanged in good time by Yusupov. Black's position is now completely hopeless.

31 ... \( \text{h}5 \)
32 \( \text{a}5 \) \( \text{w}e4 \)
33 \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{g}6 \)
34 \( \text{w}c6 \) \( \text{w}b4 \)
35 \( \text{a}6 \) \( \text{w}a5 \)
36 \( \text{w}b7 \) \( \text{w}a4 \)
37 \( \text{b}1 \)

Black resigns.

We have examined some quite convincing examples, illustrating Tarrasch's thought about sacrifices arising as a consequence of mistakes made earlier in an attack, and have explained the positive aspect of his assertion. To counter this, I should now like
to mention that, firstly, the fact that the preceding play is not completely impeccable by no means devalues a sacrifice, and does not reduce the interest in it. Mistakes in chess are, unfortunately, inevitable. It is very important to retain your presence of mind after a mistake, to be able to neutralise its consequences, and to be ready, if required, to sacrifice. Secondly, even after the impeccable conduct of a game, a sacrifice of material is often either objectively the best way of developing the initiative, or, at the least, one of several roughly equivalent possibilities. We will subsequently see numerous examples of this.
A Pawn in Return for Castling

If only I am ahead in development, favourable attacking chances will inevitably arise.

Rudolf Spielmann

In the opening it almost always make sense to go in for a slight loss of material, in order to keep the enemy king in the centre and firmly seize the initiative. Many opening variations, both classical and modern, are based on this strategic idea.

Dvoretsky – Schmidt
Wijk aan Zee 1975

1  e4  c5
2  d3  e6
3  c3  d6
4  c5  d5
5  d4  cxd4
6  cxd4  d6
7  a3

If White wants to develop his bishop at d3, he must either first cover the b4 square, or exchange the knight at d5 by 7 d3.

7  . .  c6
8  d3  dxes
9  dxes  g7

A rare instance: the game has only just begun, and already White cannot avoid the loss of a pawn. However, he is very willing to give up this pawn, since in return the opponent loses the right to castle.

The game was played in the penultimate round. I was leading, having scored eight wins and five draws. Wlodzimierz Schmidt was just half a point behind. In principle I was satisfied with a draw, but before the game I endeavoured to forget about this. In such situations straightforward play for a draw is a grave mistake. Siegbert Tarrasch wrote: 'If I see the best move, giving winning chances, then I simply go against my own reason by wanting to choose another move, leading only to a draw'. Such 'second-rate' moves, chosen only because they are quieter, more cautious, often in fact lead not to a draw, but to the conceding of the initiative to the opponent, and in the end to a fully merited defeat.
In my preparations I reckoned with the fact that in this opening variation I might have to sacrifice a pawn, but this factor did not concern me.

I think that Schmidt too was happy with the outcome of the opening. After all, it is very difficult to play for a win with Black, and here he immediately gains a material advantage, and the situation becomes sharp. Even so, I think that the risk incurred by Black is too great. *When playing for a win, you should not try immediately to take the bull by the horns*. It is better to aim for a protracted battle, and constantly maintain the tension – then at some point the opponent may falter.

**Diagram 160**

By this time Schmidt had already become aware of the danger threatening him, and he himself offered a draw. I declined without hesitation. Since I had a chance, without waiting for the last round, to conclude the tournament successfully and to secure a place in the main, grandmaster tournament the following year, it would have been stupid to give up such a chance.

**Diagram 160**

*I* 10 0–0  \( \text{Qxe}5 \\
11 \text{Qxe5}  \text{Wxe5} \\
12 \text{Bb5+}  \text{d7}

12...\( \text{Qe}7 \) is preferable, but even then after 13 \( \text{Qe}1 \) \( \text{Wd6} \) 14 \( \text{Qf3} \) f6 15 \( \text{Qc3} \) (it is important to exchange the strong knight at d5) 15...\( \text{Qxc3} \) 16 bxc3 White has excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

**Diagram 160**

13 \( \text{Qxd7+} \) \( \text{Qxd7} \\
14 \( \text{Qe}1 \)

Not immediately 14 \( \text{Qc3?} \) in view of 14...\( \text{Qd6} \).

**Diagram 160**

14 ... \( \text{Wd6} \\
15 \( \text{Qf3} \)

White's plan is clear: he needs to exchange knights and then include his rook in the attack. In the event of 15...\( \text{Qe7} \) there is no point in him being diverted from this plan for the sake of a pawn: 16 \( \text{Wx}77?! \) \( \text{Qaf}8 \) gives Black counterplay. 16 \( \text{Qc3} \) is much stronger.

**Diagram 160**

15 ... \( \text{Qe8} \\
16 \( \text{Qc3} \) \( \text{Qd}8 \\

16...\( \text{Qe7} \) was slightly better, when I would have chosen between 17 \( \text{Qxd5} \) \( \text{Qxd5} \) 18 \( \text{Wg3} \) and 17 \( \text{Qd2} \) \( \text{Qd8} \) 18 \( \text{Qad1} \).

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The primitive 21 $\Box x d 5 ? $ $\Box c 5$ would have allowed Black, finally, to complete his development. Why regain a pawn if, instead of this, you can, by intensifying the threats, invade the opponent’s position?

21 $\Box c 1 !$ $\Box d 7$
22 $\Box c 8$ $g 6$
23 $\Box w e 2$ $g 7$
23...$\Box e 7$ 24 $\Box x f 8 + .$
24 $\Box w e 8$

Great loss of material for Black is now unavoidable.

24 $\ldots$ $\Box l 7$
25 $\Box h 6 + $ $\Box x h 6$
26 $\Box w x f 7$ $\Box c 5$
27 $\Box x h 8$ $\Box x f 2 +$
28 $\Box h 1$ $\Box x e 1$
29 $h 4$ $\Box h 5$
30 $\Box w x d 5 +$

Black resigns.
Was the Attack Irresistible?

The problem for a commentator is that a game ending in a brilliant rout of one of the sides can be hard to annotate objectively.

Bent Larsen

The following widely known game is usually given as an illustration of the development of an initiative, seized by White in the opening thanks to a positional pawn sacrifice, into a powerful attack on the king. In fact the pattern of the play in it, as we will see, was far from clear-cut, and in the resulting skirmish each of the two sides had his chances.

Alekhine – Junge

Prague 1942

1 d4 d5
2 c4 e6
3 ♛f3 ♛f6
4 g3 dxc4
5 ♛a4+ ♛bd7
6 ♛g2 a6
7 ♛xc4 b5
8 ♛c6 ♛b8
9 0–0

According to the modern theory of the opening variation chosen by White, he is not promised any advantage by either the move in the game, or 9 ♛f4 ♛d5 10 ♛g5 ♛e7 11 ♛xe7 ♛xe7 12 0–0 ♛b7 13 ♛c2 c5.

9 . . . ♛b7
10 ♛c2 c5
11 a4!?

Alexander Alekhine sacrifices his d4 pawn.

Black now has a considerable choice of sound continuations – he can play 11...♕c8, 11...♖b6 or 11...b4. However, the young and talented German player (incidentally, in this tournament he shared first place with his great opponent) decided to take a risk and accept the sacrifice. It stands to reason that White gains excellent positional compensation for the pawn. He has the pair of bishops, which with the opening of the game may become extremely dangerous. On the other hand, White has no lead in development and therefore Claus Junge was right to rely on the defensive resources of the position. Aron Nimzowitsch advised: 'A centre pawn should always be taken if this can be done without too great danger'.

11 . . . ♛xg1?  
12 ♛xg1 cxd4  
13 axb5 axb5  
14 ♛d1 ♛b6
Black must exercise caution. 14...e5?! is dubious in view of 15 e3! exd4 16...c6 wxc7 17 wxe6, and White's desired opening of lines is ensured. Joel Lautier continued the variation: 17...wxe7 18 exd4 0-0 (intending 19...wb8) 19 dxe5, after which 19...wb8? is prettily refuted by 20 exf6 exf6 21 wxe8!! wxc2 22 wxc1+ 24 wxc1+ 25 wxf7+, but the simple 19...wxe6 equalises the game. However, White is not obliged to hurry with the exchange of pawns on e5 – stronger is 19 wb3 wb8 20 wxb5 wxb8 (20...wxd7?! 21 wxe5 wxe6 22 wxc6 wxc6 23 wxc6 wxc6 24 exf6 wxf6 - in the endgame Black is a pawn down) 21 dxe5 wb5 (21...wxd7?! 22 wxe5! wxe6, or 22...wxe6 23 exd7) 22 wc3? wxc6 23...exd5 – with two pawns for the exchange, White retains the better chances.

14...wc5? is also poor: 15 wb4 wc8 (15...e5 16 wxe5) 16 wb7 d3 17 wxc8+ wfx2+ 18 wb1.

15 wb2 e5
15...wc5 is unattractive, when both 16 wb2 followed by wb3 and the immediate 16 wb3 wc3+ 17 exf3 are strong. However, 15...wc5? was quite possible: 16 wb3 0-0 17 wc5 wc5! (less good is 17...wxc5 18 wxc5 wc5 19 wb4 wc8 20 wb6), and 18 wxc4? is bad because of 18...wb3! The move in the game is more risky.

16 wb3 wc5!
This was the idea of Black’s preceding move. In the event of the cautious 16...wc7? White would have firmly seized the initiative by 17 e3! dxe3 (17...0-0 18 exd4) 18...wxe3 we6 19 wb5 or 19 wb7.

17 wc5 wc5
Illogical was 17...wxc5 18 wc6+ (18 wb5) 18...wd7 19 we4 (19 wb5 wc5 20 wb5 is also possible) with advantage to White.

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Q 5-10. How would you continue the offensive?

In this part of the book questions will sometimes be asked, to which there are no clear answers (at least, I do not know them). What can be done here? First determine all the promising possibilities, then calculate the variations as far as it seems reasonable to you (all the same it will not be possible to take them all ‘to the end’), and finally, make a choice. By examining the following analysis, you yourself will be able to judge how correctly you evaluated the situation, whether you saw enough, and how successfully (from the practical standpoint!) you took a decision.

So, what candidate moves are there? Black obviously wants to castle. The modest 18 wd2? does not prevent his intention: 18...0-0 19 wb6. It is possible to prevent castling by sacrificing a second pawn: 18 b4?! wb4 19 wc6+. However, after 19...wc7 followed by ...wc8 Black successfully completes his development and White will not have any real compensation for the material he has given up.

18 wg5?, with the positional threat of 19 wxc6+. is tempting. 18...wc8? 19 b4 leads to the loss of a piece. In the event of 18...wc7 19 wc6+ or 18...wd7 19 wg4
White’s initiative becomes very dangerous. This means that Black has to reply 18...0-0 19 ∆xf6 gxf6. White certainly has compensation for the pawn, but whether he has any advantage is unclear.

Significantly sharper and more interesting is the positional exchange sacrifice made by the world champion.

18 a6?! xa6
19 xc5

The black king is prevented from castling and comes under a very dangerous attack. However, the outcome of the attack is problematic. Whereas in the example from the previous chapter, for the sake of keeping the opponent’s king in the centre White gave up just a pawn, here the price he has paid is significantly higher. In addition, his dark-square bishop has not yet come into play. To calculate accurately at the board the consequences of the sacrifice is completely impossible, so that Alekhine’s decision involves a considerable risk.

I think that both 18 g5?! and 18 a6?! are good answers to the question you were asked, and the choice between them is a matter of taste and style. But at least, you should see both possibilities and clearly appreciate the difference between them: in choosing the first, White risks not winning; with the second he has more chances of success, but there is also the risk of defeat, since the attack may peter out.

19 e6!
19...d7?? will not do: 20 c6 d8 (20...f6 21 Wd6; 20...c8 21 xe5+ d8 22 xd7) 21 d5 a7 22 xd7.
20 c6+ d7!
Again Junge makes the correct choice. If 20...d8 White would not have replied 21 f4? (as recommended by Reuben Fine) in view of 21...c8 22 h6+ c7, but simply 21...d2! b4 22 a5+.

21 xd7+
A forced exchange, which signifies a definite achievement by Black—the opponent will have one attacking piece less.

21...xd7
21...xd7? 22 xe5+.
22 a7+

Q 5-11. How should Black defend?

Alekhine had been aiming for this position when he sacrificed the exchange. Now 22...c8? is bad in view of 23 d2 (or 23 g5) followed by c1+. However, after 22...d8, it is not easy to decide how White should develop his attack.

To the natural 23 d2 Black replies 23...d7 24 b4+ (24 a6+ c6) 24...e6 25 a6+ f5. The positional threat of 26...f6 forces White to continue in ultra-aggressive style: 26 e4+ xe4! Now after 27 f3+ xf3! the king, which has penetrated deep into enemy territory, has nothing to fear—the central pawns restrict the attacking possibilities of the white pieces. 27 f4? is stronger, but even so the success of such a 'psychic' attack is very doubtful.

In Reuben Fine’s interesting book Chess marches on!, published in 1945, he recommends 23 f4 in connection with a variation
which was then reproduced in all the publications devoted to this game: 23...f6 24 fxe5+ fxe5 25 a4! exf4 26 a6+ or 26...a6 27 xg7+ or 26...a6(c7) 27 c1+ Black has to give up queen for rook. However, 23...f6? is not obligatory. It is better to hurry with the evacuation of the king from the danger zone: 23...a6 24 fxe5+ a6 25 a6+ a7 26 g5+ h8 (intending...e8, ...h7-h6, ...g8 etc.). Also possible is 26...a8!? (to answer 27 a3? with 27...b7!) 27 c1 a8. Again the outcome remains completely unclear.

The only variation which can be calculated to the end was pointed out by Junge himself: 23 a3! a6 24 c1+ a5 25 xs+ a8 (intending...e8, ...h7-h6, ...g8 etc.). Also possible is 26...a8!? (to answer 27 a3? with 27...b7!) 27 c1 a8. Again the outcome remains completely unclear.

Unfortunately, the highly interesting battle that had developed in this game did not receive its logical development. Junge faltered, played inaccurately, and allowed his opponent to conclude the offensive successfully.

22...a6?

An illogical move, allowing the white rook to join the attack with gain of tempo on the c-file.

23 a2 a8

23...h8 24 c1+ d5 25 c5+.

24 e4!

24 c1+ d5 would have been premature. First the d5 square must be taken away from the king.

24...b3

The only defence against the threat of 25 c1+ d6 26 a4+. Of course, 24...dxe3 25 xe3 was hopeless.

25 a1!

Annotating this game in his book 300 selected games of Alekhine, here Vasily Panov makes the following comment: 'All these last, far from obvious moves by White, show how accurately and subtly Alekhine's combination, beginning on the 18th move, was calculated.'

'Fiction' of this sort, which, unfortunately, fills many chess books, distorts the truth, preventing the reader from sensing how great players think at the board, and how they solve the problems facing them. It is clear that Alekhine did not look so far ahead - when he sacrificed the exchange, he trusted his intuition. To calculate the combination to the end was impossible, and indeed unnecessary, and such an attempt would have led merely to a useless expenditure of time and effort. Human capabilities are restricted, and one has to reconcile oneself to this!

25...b4

25...b6 26 c1+.

26 a6+ b5

27 a5+ c6

27...c4 28 a6+.

28 c5+ d7

29 a7+

Black resigns.
Does the ‘Ideal’ Style Exist?

It is better to be healthy, but rich, than poor, but ill.
Proverb

What manner of playing promises the greatest chances of success? What is more important, to have a subtle positional understanding, or to be skilled at making combinations? Questions such as these seem futile to me. It is sufficient to remember the play of world champions, to realise that the road to the top is not prohibited to the supporters of any style. Emanuel Lasker, Mikhail Botvinnik, Mikhail Tal, Tigran Petrosian... – can you imagine players who differ more from one another?

Often a position arising on the board permits only one correct decision, positional or tactical, and you are obliged to find it, irrespective of the style in which you play. But sometimes there are various ways of handling a position. It can be very interesting to follow how in such cases the individuality of a player manifests itself. We have already encountered this situation in our analysis of the previous game, but the following very tense and difficult encounter seems to me to be even more demonstrative.

Karpov – Timman
Amsterdam 1981

1 4f3 4f6
2 c4 b6
3 g3 b7
4 h2 g2
g6
5 d4 c5
6 0–0 g7
7 4c3
d5 b5!

7...cxd4 is more often played.

8 4xe4

8 4g5?! is another promising possibility.

8... 4xe4

9 d5 0–0

A game between the same players five years later (Brussels 1986) went 9...e5 10 4b3 0–0 11 4h3! 4xf3 12 4xf3 f5 13 e4 f4 (13...4f6 was better) 14 4d1, and White gained the advantage.

10 4h3!?

A typical procedure in such positions. By removing the bishop from g2, Karpov threatens to attack with his knight the bishop that is stuck in enemy territory at e4, and he forces the exchange on f3, which is advantageous to White.

11... 4xf3

11 exf3 e5

Preferable is 11...e6? As played in the 11th game of the Women’s Candidates Match Levitina–Alexandria (Dubna 1983), and later in the fascinating encounter Korchnoi–Panno (World Team Championship, Luzem 1985).
Q 5-12. What should White play?

Both 12 dxe6? dxe6 and 12 d6? Qc6 would be a serious positional concession – in each case the black knight heads for d4. Obviously, White must play f3–f4, in order to open lines for his bishops. However, the immediate 12 f4 leads to the loss of the b2 pawn. Therefore 12 ¿c2 followed by 13 f4 suggests itself, and that is probably what many players would have done.

A distinguishing feature of Anatoly Karpov's style is a constant striving, after guessing the opponent's intentions, to restrict his possibilities as much as possible. This skill, a very important one for a chess player, is something that I call 'prophylactic thinking'. Thus here the world champion realised that if 12 ¿c2?! the opponent would reply 12... f5! 13 f4 e4, blocking the diagonals for the white bishops and retaining an acceptable position. So as not to allow this, Karpov decides to sacrifice a pawn, despite the fact that, in principle, giving up material is not in his style.

12 f4! exf4
12...e4 13 f5!
13 ¿xf4 ¿xb2
14 ¿b1 ¿f6

If 15 ¿d6 Black would have replied 15... ¿e7 16 ¿xe7 ¿xe7 17 d6 ¿f6 18 ¿d5 ¿c6 19 ¿xd7 ¿b4 followed by ... ¿ad8. Of course, Karpov does not part so easily with the advantages of his position.

15 ¿a4!

The start of a plan, the aim of which is to paralyse the opponent's queenside.

15 ... d6

16 ¿b3!

Q 5-13. What is the point of Karpov's move? How should Black reply?

Why didn't the world champion simply place his rook on the open file? He no doubt asked himself how the opponent wanted to develop his pieces. He saw the plan of 16...a6 (not fearing 17 ¿b3 b5), then ... ¿a7–b7, and decided to prevent it. Now 16...a6? 17 ¿fb1 is bad for Black, and meanwhile White wants to play 17 ¿e1 followed by ¿be3, so that his prophylactic move also comes in useful for doubling rooks on the open file. White's plan cannot be prevented by 16... ¿e8 on account of 17 ¿xd6. If 16... ¿g5 there follows 17 ¿xg5 ¿xg5 18 ¿e3! with an overwhelming advantage (18 ¿e1 ¿d2! 19 ¿be3 ¿b4 is less accurate). As we see, Karpov's modest rook move has enabled
him to set up his favourite domination of his own pieces over the entire board.

Even so, Black's defensive resources are not yet exhausted. Jan Timman found the only way of maintaining the tension.

16  ...  h5!

Now the opponent has to reckon with the positional threat of 17...g5 18 .\d2 g4 and 19...\xd7.

Taking account of the fact that Black was subsequently able to save the game, in his annotations the Dutch grandmaster was sceptical about his opponent's prophylactic move 16 \b3. 'Tai or Spassky would have acted more energetically: 16 \f1!', he writes. Very well, let us analyse the variations given by Timman.

A) 16 \f1 h5 17 \h6 \g7 18 \xg7 \xg7 19 \e3 f5 (otherwise the knight cannot be developed; 19...a6 20 \e6 is bad for Black) 20 \e6 \c7 21 \b1 (weaker is 21 \a3 \d7 22 \c3+ \f6 23 \b1 \f7 - Van der Sterren) 21...\d7 22 \d1! \f7 23 \xh5!! \xh5 24 \a1+ \h6 (24...\e5 25 f4 \a1 26 \x5 27 \d6 \d8 28 \xd1 25 \e7 \g8 (25...\e5 26 \c1+) 26 \e6 with the deadly threat of 27 \c1+.

B) 16 \f1 a6 (it was this move that Karpov wanted to prevent) 17 \b3 \e7 18 \b3 (18 \e6 \b7 is pointless, also nothing is achieved by 18 \h6 \g7 19 \xg7 \xg7 20 \e3 \d7 21 \e7 b5!) 18...\e7 (19 \e8 was threatened) 19 \xe7 \xe7 20 \h6 \e8 21 \e3! The only way! Not 21 \g5? in view of 21...b5, while if 21 \b3 there follows 21...\d7 22 \xd7 \x7 23 \x6 \a8 24 \xe8 (24 \a3 \a4) 24...\xe8 25 \xf8 \e1+ 26 \g2 \e4+ 27 f3 \c2+ 28 \f3 \f1+ with perpetual check.

21...f5 (there seems to be no other move) 22 \g4 \d7 23 \xd7 \xd7 24 \xf5 \f6 (24...\e5 25 f6 \x6 26 f4) 25 fxg6 hxg6 26 a4!, and White's two strong bishops ensure him the advantage in the endgame.

A deep and, apparently, completely correct analysis!

But now let us return to the game and think together with Karpov how best to meet the opponent's obvious positional threat. It is hard to believe that White's subtle prophylactic strategy should collapse, just because of one 'peripheral' idea like ...g6-g5. However, to find the solution proves to be not at all easy.

If 17 \h6 Black can reply 17...\e8 (18 \xd6 is no longer possible). 17 f3 weakens the dark squares – after 17...g5 18 \xg5 \xg5 White can no longer play 19 \e3, and in the event of 19 \x6 \e3+ 20 \h1 \x6 21 \xa8 \d7 or 19 \e1 \d2! 20 \e3 \b4 21 \c2 b5 Black gains real counterplay.

There is the tempting piece sacrifice 17 \e1 g5 18 \e3!? \xf4 19 \e8. That is in fact what Karpov played, but White's attack proved insufficient for a win.

17 \e3!? deserves serious consideration. If 17...g5 there follows 18 \d1! \d4 (18...\xf4 19 \xf4 with the threats of 20 \x5h5 and 20 \g3+) 19 \x5h5 \xf4 20 \xf4 (20 \f5 \e8) 20...\e3 21 \h1!! and Black has no defence. However, he can immediately reply 17...\d4! 18 \h6 (18 \d3 g5) 18...\xe3 19 \xe3 a6! 20 \e6 \a7.
Up till now I have been giving variations found by other players, but now the moment has finally come to suggest something of my own.

In reply to 17...g5 let us consider the piece sacrifice 18 \textit{h}5! gx\textit{f}4 19 gx\textit{f}4. The opponent's queenside is still frozen, and 20 \textit{g}3+ \textit{h}8 21 \textit{d}1 is threatened. If 19...\textit{g}7, then 20 \textit{g}3 \textit{f}6 21 \textit{g}5. Black probably plays 19...\textit{h}4 or 19...\textit{h}4, but then the attack can be continued by \textit{h}1 and \textit{g}1.

The idea looks promising, but with which move is it best prepared? The natural 17 \textit{e}1 would turn out to be a waste of a tempo – after all, the rook will have to operate from \textit{g}1. 17 \textit{f}5 looks quite good, but, as we already know, there is the reply 17...\textit{d}4.

I suggest playing 17 \textit{h}1!! After 17...g5 18 \textit{f}5! gx\textit{f}4 19 gx\textit{f}4 White has gained an important tempo for including his rook in the attack along the g-file. This attack becomes irresistible, e.g. 19...\textit{h}4 20 \textit{g}1+ \textit{h}8 21 \textit{h}3 \textit{f}6 22 \textit{d}1 \textit{x}f5 23 \textit{x}h4, or 19...\textit{h}4 20 \textit{g}1+ \textit{h}8 (20...\textit{g}7 21 \textit{h}3 with the threats of 22 \textit{d}1 or 22 \textit{g}5) 21 \textit{h}3(e3) followed by \textit{d}1 (incidentally, given the opportunity it is also possible to set up a dangerous battery: \textit{b}1 and \textit{c}2). Little is changed by the inclusion of 17...a6 18 \textit{f}1 – after 18...g5 all the same there follows 19 \textit{f}5! gx\textit{f}4 20 gx\textit{f}4.

It would appear that the seemingly mysterious king move is the strongest continuation of the attack. However, I am by no means asserting that after it White wins. He is simply ready now to meet ...g6–g5 in a worthy way. But Black does better to avoid this advance, and to play 17...\textit{d}4 or 17...\textit{g}7, as recommended by Boris Gulko. Thus, the position after Black's 15th move permits two diametrically opposed approaches, which are objectively roughly equivalent. The direct plan of attack suggested by Timman is very strong, but against the opponent's best defence White nevertheless cannot get by without prophylactic moves such as 21 \textit{e}3! and 26 a4! Also quite possible is play aimed at suppressing the opponent's possibilities in the spirit of Karpov – 16 \textit{b}3! (and 17 \textit{h}1!!), but he is not able to restrict himself to purely prophylactic actions – sharp variations have to be calculated, and a piece sacrificed.

The conclusion is clear: \textit{there is no good or bad style – there is only good or bad play.}

\textbf{A player has the right to act in any manner, but at the same time his arsenal should be sufficiently universal. During the course of a game all kinds of events are possible, we may encounter the most varied problems, and all-round preparation is needed in order to solve them successfully.}

Let us now see what happened in the game.

\begin{verbatim}
17 \textit{e}1 g5
18 \textit{be}3
\end{verbatim}

Even now, with the loss of a tempo, the idea of 18 \textit{f}5!? gx\textit{f}4 19 gx\textit{f}4 deserved the most serious consideration. After analysing the resulting position, I came to the conclusion that here too it is not easy for Black to parry the opponent's attack.

\begin{verbatim}
18 ... gx\textit{f}4
19 \textit{e}8
\end{verbatim}

If 19 gx\textit{f}4 Timman was intending to reply 19...\textit{h}4! 20 \textit{d}1 \textit{f}6.

\hspace{1cm} (see next diagram)
This counter-blow, diverting the white queen from the kingside and vacating the b6 square for the black queen, was certainly envisaged by Timman beforehand. He would have lost after 19 ... \textit{Wc7?} 20 \textit{xf8+} \textit{xf8} 21 \textit{e8+} \textit{g7} 22 \textit{d1} \textit{h6} 23 \textit{f3}.

\textbf{20} \textit{xb5} \textbf{b6} \\
\textbf{21} \textit{xf8+} \textbf{xf8} \\
\textbf{22} \textit{e8+}

Karpov decides to transpose into an endgame. The pinning of the enemy pieces along the 8th rank compensates for White’s sacrificed piece, but not more.

A draw would also have resulted from 22 \textit{e8+} \textit{g7} 23 \textit{xf4} \textit{d6} 24 \textit{b5} (24 \textit{a4} \textit{f8}; 24 \textit{h1} \textit{xe8} 25 \textit{xe8} a5 26 a4 \textit{a7!} 27 \textit{xb8} \textit{e7}) 24...\textit{b6} (25 \textit{b7} was threatened) 25 \textit{e8} \textit{d8}.

\textbf{22} \ldots \textit{g7} \\
\textbf{23} \textit{xf4} \textit{xb5}

In Timman’s opinion, 23...\textit{d8} was weaker in view of 24 \textit{xb6} \textit{xb6} 25 \textit{g2} a6 26 \textit{c8}.

\textbf{24} \textit{cxb5} \textit{c3!}

The bishop must join the defence of the queenside. Not 24...\textit{c4} 25 \textit{a4} (or 25 \textit{c8} c3 26 \textit{f1}) 25...\textit{c3?} 26 \textit{f1} followed by a4–a5–a6.

\textbf{25} \textit{f1}

\textbf{25} \textit{c8} is not dangerous in view of 25...\textit{a6!} (or 25...\textit{d7?!}). If 25 \textit{d7} there follows 25...\textit{c6} 26 \textit{xc6} \textit{xa6} 27 \textit{xa8} \textit{b4} 28 \textit{xa7} \textit{d5}.

\textbf{25} \ldots \textit{a5} \\
\textbf{26} \textit{c8}

Black wanted to play 26...\textit{a6} 27 \textit{bxa6} \textit{c7} followed by 28...\textit{a7}. Karpov, who, as always, carefully observes his opponent’s ideas, prevents this plan, but he is forced to allow the approach of the enemy king.

\textbf{26} \ldots \textit{f6} \\
\textbf{27} \textit{g2} \textit{e7} \\
\textbf{28} \textit{f3} \textit{d8} \\
\textbf{29} a4

Not 29 \textit{e4?} \textit{f5+!} 30 \textit{xf5} \textit{d7}.

\textbf{29} \ldots \textit{a6} \\
\textbf{30} \textit{bxa6} \textit{d7}

After 30...\textit{xa6} 31 \textit{xb8} \textit{xa4} 32 \textit{h7+} \textit{f6} 33 \textit{d7} \textit{e7} 34 \textit{g2} Black would have had no real advantage, and he would also have had to reckon with 31 \textit{xa6} \textit{xc6} 32 \textit{a5!} \textit{d7} 33 \textit{a8} \textit{c7} 34 \textit{b8}. Therefore Timman forces a draw.

\textbf{31} \textit{h3+} \textit{e7} \\
\textbf{32} \textit{f1}

Otherwise 32...\textit{xa6}.

\textbf{32} \ldots \textit{d7}

Draw. A fascinating encounter!

One always wants to share finds such as 17 \textit{h1!!}, and I included an extract from this game in an article, devoted to analyses by Timman, which was published in the magazine \textit{New in Chess} 1986 No.4. Given in parallel in the same magazine were objections by the grandmaster against some of my variations, sometimes justified, but not always.
After $17 \textit{h1 g5 18 f5}$ Timman suggested the interesting defence $18...\textit{g7}$ (with the threat of $19...\textit{f6}$) $19 \textit{c1 we8}$, but he annotated it in a very strange way.

Trading queens would play into Black’s hands as $20 \textit{exe8 exe8 21 xg5?}$ is impossible because of $21...\textit{e5}$’, writes Timman. In the very next issue of the magazine he had to correct his mistake: White does not lose a piece at all. He can continue $22 \textit{f13 d7! 23 c1 f8 24 d3}$ with somewhat the better endgame. Apparently even stronger is $22 \textit{c8!}$ (with the threat of $23 \textit{b7} 22...\textit{e6! 23 xa6 xg5}$ $24 \textit{f4 e6 25 e1}$ (weaker is $25 h4 \textit{e8}$) $25...\textit{h4 26 g2}$, and Black is faced with defending an unpleasant ending.

If this is not enough for White, he can also move his queen. Timman’s opinion: ‘$20 \textit{a3 e5}$, too, is good for Black, since White cannot maintain his bishop on $f5$. But why cannot he maintain it; doesn’t $21 f3$ solve this problem? After $21...\textit{g4 22 f4}$ it is hard for Black to parry the positional threats of $h2-h3$, f2-f3, or $\textit{g2(g1)}$ followed by $\textit{d2}$ and $e1$ ($22...\textit{h6? 23 b2 e2 24 d3}$ is bad for Black). And if $21...\textit{we2}$, then $22 \textit{g1(g2) xc4 23 we3!}$ $g4$, $24 \textit{f4}$, and soon all the white pieces will fall upon the enemy king.

It is an interesting question why Timman, an excellent analyst, should sometimes make such simple mistakes. In order to understand this better, let us turn to another example from the afore-mentioned article.

**Portisch – Timman**

6th match game, Hilversum 1984

Trading queens would play into Black’s hands as $20 \textit{exe8 exe8 21 xg5?}$ is impossible because of $21...\textit{e5}$’, writes Timman. In the very next issue of the magazine he had to correct his mistake: White does not lose a piece at all. He can continue $22 \textit{f13 d7! 23 c1 f8 24 d3}$ with somewhat the better endgame. Apparently even stronger is $22 \textit{c8!}$ (with the threat of $23 \textit{b7} 22...\textit{e6! 23 xa6 xg5}$ $24 \textit{f4 e6 25 e1}$ (weaker is $25 h4 \textit{e8}$) $25...\textit{h4 26 g2}$, and Black is faced with defending an unpleasant ending.

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**Q 5-14. What should White play?**

Timman’s position is dangerous; his queenside, as in the previous game, is underdeveloped. But White must act energetically; the passive $21 f3?! \textit{a6}$ does not promise him anything. Also not too successful was Lajos Portisch’s choice of $21 \textit{wh5}?!$ Black replied $21...\textit{we6 22 c1 c6 23 a3 a5}$, preparing the knight sacrifice on $b4$. The continuation was $24 g3 \textit{b4! 25 axb4 axb4 26 h3 \textit{a2} 27 c2 c4 28 d2 d4+ 29 c2 c4+ 30 \textit{g2} d4+$. Draw.

How can White’s play be improved? Obviously, it is advantageous for him to develop his bishop at $h3$. In an analysis of the game Yusupov suggested the following variation: $21 g3! \textit{xf2}?!$

Safer is $21...\textit{c6! 22 h3 c7}$, and with the rook at $f8$ White has to reckon with $...d7-d5$. 

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The pretty move 22 $\text{h}3$? is tempting. The capture of the bishop leads to a difficult position for Black: 22...$\text{hxg}2$? 23 $\text{wg}8+!$ (but not 23 $\text{w}f3$? $\text{wc}5+$ 24 $\text{b}1$ $\text{w}f2!$ 25 $\text{wx}a8$ $\text{wx}e2$, threatening mate) 23...$\text{w}e8$ 24 $\text{wd}5$ $\text{hxg}3$ (24...$\text{exe}2$ 25 $\text{wx}a8$ $\text{wc}8$ 26 $\text{w}f3$, and the rook is trapped) 25 $\text{wx}a8$ $\text{wc}8$ 26 $\text{wx}a7$ or 26 $\text{dh}g1$. However, the defence can be improved by interposing a check, vacating the e7 square for the king: 22...$\text{wc}5+$! 23 $\text{b}1$ $\text{hxg}2$ 24 $\text{wg}8+\text{e}7$. Also unclear is 22...$\text{c}6$?! 23 $\text{f}3$ $\text{a}6$.

22 ...

23 $\text{d}d2$

In his comments, Timman considered 23 $\text{h}h1$ $\text{xf}1$ 24 $\text{xf}1$ $\text{c}7$ with a good position for Black.

23 ...

24 $\text{hd}1$

25 e4

White intends to attack the pawn by $\text{wh}5$, then place his bishop on $f5$ and play $g3$-$g4$-$g5$. Black has no real counterplay.

The Dutch grandmaster replied that instead of 24...$\text{f}7$ Black can play 24...$\text{d}5$.

He considered the variation 25 $\text{c}c2$ $\text{wd}7$ 26 $\text{xd}7+$ (26 $\text{xd}5$? $\text{tf}1+!$) 26...$\text{cx}d7$ 27 $\text{xd}5$ $\text{c}5$! (27...$\text{exe}8$ 28 $\text{b}4!$) 28 $\text{xe}5$ $\text{g}8$ followed by 29...a5, and the activity of Black’s pieces provides quite good compensation for the lost pawn.

"It is clear that he need not fear the check on c8", writes Timman. How can that be? After all, 25 $\text{w}c8+!\text{d}6$ leads to a mortal pin along the 8th rank (it will be remembered that in the previous game a similar pin fully compensated for Black’s extra piece). The threat of 26...$\text{f}8$ can be parried by 26 e4 $\text{xd}2$ (26...$\text{f}8$? 27 $\text{xd}5+$) 27 $\text{xd}2$ with an obvious advantage, e.g. 27...d4 28 $\text{f}2$ (28 $\text{b}8!?\text{b}5$ 29 $\text{g}8$. Also strong is 26 $\text{f}5$ (intending 27 $g4$) 26...$h5$ 27 e4 $\text{xd}2$ 28 $\text{xd}2$ d4 29 g4 hxg4 30 h5.

As can be seen, all the errors in the analysis are of the same type – an overestimation of his own position, and insufficient regard for the opponent’s resources. It was against this weakness, which in my view is inherent in Timman’s play, that Yusupov built his strategy in the candidates semi-final match in 1986. He played extremely actively, aiming for an attack on the opponent’s king. At some point Timman would underestimate the danger threatening him, and... The final score was 6:3 in Artur’s favour.
Fantastic!

The harm or benefit of an action depends on a combination of circumstances.

Kozma Prutkov

Analysing the Karpov–Timman game, we have once again seen that even strict adherents to the positional style of play are sometimes simply obliged to act in an unusual manner for them, by making combinations and sacrificing. But there are players who themselves happily aim for this, constantly take risks, and readily decide to disturb the material balance. The most striking representative of this trend was undoubtedly Mikhail Tai. The term ‘Tai sacrifice’ became generally accepted, implying a sacrifice that was totally unexpected, recklessly bold, and... objectively not completely correct.

The small collection of ‘Tai sacrifices’, offered for your attention in this part of the book, includes games by various players. It stands to reason that it would have been much impoverished, had it not included examples from the play of Tal himself.

In its time a very strong impression was created on me by a rook sacrifice, which he made at the start of a candidates quarter-final match.

Tal – Portisch

Candidates match, 2nd game, Bled 1965

1 e4 c6
2  d4 c5
3  d5 e6
4  g4 g6
5  h3
12 d4 is also good) 10...e6 11  f3 with the threat of 12  xf7!

6  xf3  d7
It is quite possible that the former world champion would have replied to 6...e6 with a gambit: 7 d4!? xd4 8 d3  d7 9  e3.

7  d4
Tal does not want to win a pawn by 7  g5  g6 8  b3  e6 9  b7, whereas Robert Fischer, who was always happy to take material offered by his opponent, played this against Cardoso (Portoroz 1958), but after 9...d5! he encountered serious difficulties.

7...  g6
8  d3  e4
9  e4  e6
Lajos Portisch has emerged from the opening with a somewhat passive, but very solid position.

10 0–0
10 c3  f6 11  e2 was slightly more accurate. Now Black could have replied 10...f6 11  h4  d5.

10...  e7
11  c3  f6
12  h4
12  e2 was simpler, with the more pleasant position for White. But from this point Tal deliberately aims to create complications, and to confuse his opponent. At the cost of one or two tempi he entices the black knight away from f6, where it was defending the kingside, and from where it could if necessary have been transferred to an even safer post – f8.
12 ...  \( \text{d}5 \\
13 \text{\textit{g}4} \text{\textit{f}6} \\
13...0-0? 14 \text{\textit{h}6} \text{\textit{f}6} 15 \text{\textit{e}4}.

14 \text{\textit{e}1} \\
14 \text{\textit{e}4} \) (trying to prevent castling) was weaker in view of 14...\text{\textit{e}7}! followed by ...\text{\textit{d}5}. Now in the event of 14...0-0 White conveniently deploys his pieces by 15 \text{\textit{h}6} (threatening 16 \text{\textit{e}4}) 15...\text{\textit{e}8} 16 \text{\textit{b}d}1 \text{\textit{b}6} 17 \text{\textit{c}1}. Portisch does not want to allow this, and he tries to hinder the development of his opponent's forces.

14 ... \text{\textit{b}6} \\

White has a good position. He can choose between 15 \text{\textit{e}2}, 15 \text{\textit{a}3} (preparing c3-c4) and 15 \text{\textit{h}5} \text{\textit{g}6} 16 \text{\textit{e}2} 0-0 17 \text{\textit{h}6}. Tell me, would it occur here to any 'normal' player to consider seriously the rook sacrifice 15 \text{c}4 \text{\textit{b}4} 16 \text{\textit{xe}6}? For this one needs the brilliant imagination and the reckless boldness of Tal.

'But for 14 moves the black king has remained with impunity in the centre of the board! Is there no way of exploiting this and at the same time abruptly changing the course of the game? This was how the idea arose of the rook sacrifice on e6. An amusing variation flashed through my mind — one that was by no means forced, but highly camouflaged — which afforded a certain aesthetic pleasure. And I concluded that, even if the sacrifice might only lead to a draw, it was correct: the change in the character of the play was bound to be unpleasant for Portisch.' (Tal).

15 \text{c}4!? \text{\textit{b}4} \\
The most natural reply, but other possibilities also have to be considered.

15...\text{\textit{xd}4}? 16 \text{\textit{cxd}5} \text{\textit{xf}2+} does not work, of course, the simplest being 17 \text{\textit{h}1}! \text{\textit{xe}1} 18 \text{\textit{dxe}6} with a powerful attack for the sacrificed exchange.

In the event of 15...\text{\textit{d}7} White would have sacrificed 'only' a pawn: 16 \text{\textit{d}5} \text{\textit{cxd}5} 17 \text{\textit{cxd}5} \text{\textit{b}6}, and after 18 \text{\textit{a}4} Black is prevented from castling. How Tal conducts the attack in such situations will be seen by analysing his game from the next chapter.

15...\text{\textit{h}5} came into consideration, e.g. 16 \text{\textit{e}4} \text{\textit{b}4} 17 \text{\textit{d}5} 0-0-0, or 16 \text{\textit{e}2} \text{\textit{d}7} 17 \text{\textit{d}5} \text{\textit{cxd}5} 18 \text{\textit{cxd}5} \text{\textit{d}5} 19 \text{\textit{b}5}+ (19 \text{\textit{e}4} 0-0-0) 19...\text{\textit{b}8} followed by 20...\text{\textit{g}6}. White would probably have replied 16 \text{\textit{f}3}! \text{\textit{b}4} 17 \text{\textit{d}5} 0-0-0 18 \text{\textit{e}3}, retaining a highly promising position.

16 \text{\textit{xe}6}+! \text{\textit{fxe}6} \\
17 \text{\textit{xe}6}+ \\
Black now faces a very difficult choice — all three moves are perfectly possible. Perhaps the most interesting variations arise after 17...\text{\textit{d}7}.  

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Q 5-15. How should White continue the attack?

The direct $18.\text{g}5?\text{c}7 19.\text{e}1$ is incorrect in view of $19...\text{cxd}3! 20.\text{x}e7 \text{g}7!$ It looks tempting to play $18.\text{xh}7$; however, Black does not take the bishop, but plays $18...\text{c}5!$, parrying the opponent's threats. Tal foresaw the remarkable blow $18.\text{g}6+!!$

The bishop cannot be taken: $18...\text{xh}7 19.\text{e}1\text{c}7 20.\text{e}1$ with the threats of $21.\text{e}7$ and $21.\text{xg}6+$. Black has to reply $18...\text{d}8! 19.\text{f}5 \text{xd}4$ (but not $19...\text{c}7? 20.\text{f}4 \text{c}8 21.\text{w}4$). After $20.\text{f}4$ (not allowing $20...\text{d}6$) the position appealed to Tal, and not without reason.

In his notes he reproduces that pretty variation which flashed through his mind during the game, and which helped him to decide on the rook sacrifice: $20...\text{e}8 21.\text{e}1\text{g}6$ (Tal attaches a question mark to this move, but incorrectly: $21...\text{d}3$, for $22.\text{d}1?\text{f}6$, is refuted by $22.\text{e}4$) $22.\text{e}3 \text{w}6 23.\text{a}7 \text{w}e6 24.\text{b}6+ \text{c}8$ (not $24...\text{d}7?$ because of mate in two moves) $25.\text{xe}6+\text{b}8 26.\text{d}7$, and White has an obvious advantage.

In the previous part of the book, in the analysis of the Polugayevsky–Tal game, I mentioned that these types of long and spectacular variations, which inspired the Riga grandmaster's exploits, were not calculated by him exactly, and were only estimated hurriedly; almost invariably they failed to stand up to examination. That is also the case here: after $23...\text{c}7!$ (instead of $23...\text{w}e6?$), Black parries the opponent's threats, remaining a rook up.

But White's play can also be improved. Let us abandon the pretty manoeuvre $22.\text{e}3 \text{w}6 23.\text{a}7$ in favour of the simple $22.\text{g}4!$ Now $22...\text{h}5? 23.\text{d}1 \text{d}3 24.\text{e}5!$ is bad for Black, so he has to play $22...\text{d}3$ immediately. Events then develop by force: $23.\text{e}4 \text{xf}2+ 24.\text{h}2 \text{f}1+!!$ (but not $24...\text{c}5? 25.\text{e}5 25.\text{x}g1 \text{c}5+ 26.\text{e}3! \text{xe}6 27.\text{xe}6$.

The resulting ending seemed to me to be difficult for Black in view of the variation $27...\text{e}3+ 28.\text{xe}3 \text{xb}2 29.\text{b}3 \text{xc}4 30.\text{xb}7 \text{e}5 31.\text{h}7 \text{b}8 32.\text{e}6$, when the bishop is significantly stronger than the knight. However, Alexander Chemin found the correct plan of defence: $27...\text{a}5!$ The knight obtains the excellent square c5, and this is sufficient to maintain the balance.

Thus, after $17...\text{e}7?!$ Black is subjected to serious dangers, but his position nevertheless remains defensible.

$17...\text{d}8?!$ is sounder. In this case White would have had to be satisfied with perpetual check: $18.\text{w}d6+ \text{e}8 19.\text{w}e6+$.

'After the game Portisch admitted that he had seen the rook sacrifice, but had not considered it dangerous. When it in fact took place, he became ill at ease. Only this nervousness can explain why he instantly, without thinking, replied $17...\text{d}8$' (Tal).

However, this move too is not bad.

$17...\text{d}8$!  
$18.\text{f}4 \text{d}8!$

Black has defended against the threat of $19.\text{d}6+$, and wants now to take the bishop.
or play 19...\textsf{W}xd4. He would have lost after both 18...\textsf{\textbf{c}}e8? 19 \textsf{\textbf{d}}6+ \textsf{\textbf{f}}e7 20 \textsf{\textbf{d}}8 21 \textsf{\textbf{d}}3!, and 18...\textsf{\textbf{d}}8? 19 \textsf{\textbf{d}}1 \textsf{\textbf{e}}7 (19...\textsf{g}5 20 \textsf{\textbf{d}}6+ \textsf{g}7 21 \textsf{\textbf{x}}b4) 20 \textsf{\textbf{b}}1 followed by \textsf{\textbf{e}}3 or \textsf{\textbf{e}}5.

\begin{center}
\textsf{\textbf{c}}5 \textsf{\textbf{x}}d3!
\end{center}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chessboard}
\caption{Q 5-16. How should White continue?}
\end{figure}

At first sight the question may seem ridiculous. It is clear that 20 \textsf{\textbf{d}}6+ \textsf{\textbf{x}}d6 21 \textsf{\textbf{x}}d6+ \textsf{\textbf{e}}7 does not work; this means that White has to take the queen, for which, however, Black will have more than sufficient material — a rook and two minor pieces.

In fact things are far more complicated. From afar Tal foresaw the unexpected 20 \textsf{\textbf{h}}6!? when bad is 20...\textsf{\textbf{g}}7? 21 \textsf{x}f6+ \textsf{e}8 22 \textsf{x}g7 \textsf{g}8 23 \textsf{e}6+. However, after 20...\textsf{x}b2! 21 \textsf{x}f6+ \textsf{e}8 White is forced to give perpetual check: 22 \textsf{e}6+ \textsf{f}8 23 \textsf{f}6+.

I think that few would have resisted the temptation to conclude a pretty game with a spectacular draw. After all, playing on involves a considerable risk. But Tal, as already mentioned, usually discounts danger. As long as the resources for continuing the battle are not completely exhausted, he does not want to part with the game.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
20 & \textsf{cxb6}!?
21 & \textsf{w}g4
22 & \textsf{bxa7}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Portisch chooses a dubious plan. He wants to take his king to the queenside and, if possible, even use it to pick up the a7 pawn. But the king's journey is too long - during this time White succeeds in opening lines and creating dangerous threats.

The simple solution: 22...\textsf{g}6 followed by \textsf{\textbf{g}}7, was at the same time also correct. 'How the game would have developed in this case, I honestly do not know. But at the board it seemed to me that to a considerable extent the a7 pawn insures White against defeat. In a number of variations he is able, by giving it up with a7-a8\textsf{W}, to pick up both of Black's queenside pawns in compensation' (Tal).

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
23 & \textsf{b}4!
24 & \textsf{e}1+
25 & \textsf{b}5
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

As was pointed out by Lev Aronin, 23...\textsf{c}7! was stronger.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
24 & \textsf{d}6
24...\textsf{d}8 25 \textsf{e}6 \textsf{xe}7 26 \textsf{d}6+ \textsf{c}7 27 \textsf{x}f6!
25 & \textsf{b}7
26 & \textsf{x}a7
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

This move loses immediately, but Black's position was already difficult. White was threatening both 26 bxc6 bxc6 27 \textsf{e}6+ \textsf{c}7 28 \textsf{b}1, and 26 b6 \textsf{c}6 27 \textsf{b}1. If 25...\textsf{e}8, then 26 \textsf{e}8 \textsf{e}8 27 \textsf{g}3+ \textsf{d}7 28 \textsf{b}8, while if 25...\textsf{c}7 there follows 26 \textsf{g}3+ \textsf{d}7 27 b6 \textsf{c}6 28 \textsf{b}1.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
26 & \textsf{e}6+
27 & \textsf{f}6!
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Black resigns.

Such games significantly widen our impression of the bounds of what is possible in chess. However, White's actions can hardly be judged unequivocally. Imagine a debate between an ardent fan of Tal's play and a sceptic.
'Brilliant play! What boldness and imagination!'

'But, with an excellent position, was it worth taking a risk?'

'Well, as it transpired, White was nowhere losing.'

'Yes, but he was also not winning anywhere. All three possible defences on the 17th move were sufficient for a draw.'

'But was there any guarantee of success given a quiet development of events? After all, White stood only a little better.'

'At any event, he could have played on a long time for a win, whereas in the game 17 ... ♘d8 would have immediately led to a draw.'

'In the end, Tal won. And the winner is always right!'

'Although the last argument does not appear to me to be irrefutable, it nevertheless has to be reckoned with. But even more significant are the thoughts expressed about this by the first serious researcher of real sacrifices, Rudolf Spielmann.

'The expectation of success is not necessarily based on positional judgement alone but can lean upon various extraneous circumstances. It is possible, for instance, to allow for an opponent's individual failings, in other words to play psychologically: one can speculate on his time-difficulties, in other words take a sporting chance. Considered in this light, many combinations could be termed correct in a broader sense, which could not stand the test of subsequent analysis. It is necessary to make a distinction between practical and theoretical soundness.'

Pondering over this game, it is impossible to disregard the fact that the deep strategist Lajos Portisch feels much less confident in double-edged positions, full of tactics. By sacrificing the rook, Tal deliberately directed the play along lines that were psychologically favourable for him and unpleasant for his opponent (remember: in his comments he emphasised this factor). Such 'psychological play' is an inseparable element of the chess struggle.

Many years later, Artur Yusupov, knowing where the Hungarian grandmaster was vulnerable, in all games with him constantly sharpened the situation, and created complications. As a result he won game after game against Portisch. Here is one of his 'psychological' wins.

Yusupov – Portisch

Interzonal Tournament, Tunis 1985

1 d4 d5
2 c4 dxc4
3 e4 ♗f6
4 e5 ♕d5
5 ♘xc4 ♗b6
6 ♘b3
6 d3.

7 ♕f3
7 ♕e2 and 7 ♕e3 are also played.

8 ♘xf7+
If White wishes, he can immediately force a spectacular draw: 8 ♕g5 ♘xd1 9 ♘xf7+ ♘d7 10 ♘e6+ with perpetual check.

8 ... ♕xf7
9 ♕g5+ ♕e8
10 ♖xg4 ♖xd4

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Six months before the Interzonal Tournament the game Ftacnik-Spraggett (Wijk aan Zee 1985) was played. In it White transposed into an equal ending: 11 \textit{lt'}xd4 lbxd4 12 \textit{lt'}a3 e6 13 .ie3 .ib4+ 14 .ie7! Yusupov preferred a different course – he sacrificed a pawn, aiming to obtain against Portisch a position that was as tense as possible.

\textit{lt'}xe2!

Later this was played many times by other players. But it is hardest of all to be the pioneer.

11 ... \textit{lt'}xe5
12 \textit{lt'}e3 \textit{d}d5
13 \textit{lt'}f1 \textit{lt'}e7
14 0–0 e6
15 \textit{lt'}c3! \textit{lt'}d8

Exchanging on c3 is risky: White gains one tempo, by attacking the b7 pawn with \textit{lt'}ab1, and then, by attacking the queen with the rook from b5, he gains another...

The later game M.Gurevich–Drasko (Vrsac 1985) went 15...\textit{lt'}d6 16 \textit{lt'}xd5 \textit{lt'}xd5 17 \textit{lt'}f1 \textit{lt'}f5 18 \textit{lt'}d4 \textit{lt'}xd4 19 \textit{lt'}xd4 \textit{lt'}e7 20 \textit{lt'}d3 \textit{lt'}d8 21 \textit{lt'}ad1 \textit{lt'}hg8 22 g3, and White had excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

16 \textit{lt'}fe1

In Yusupov’s opinion, 16 \textit{lt'}ac1 or 16 \textit{lt'}b5 is more promising. These continuations, it would appear, have not yet been tested in practice.

16 ... \textit{lt'}e7
17 \textit{lt'}b5

White is preparing not only to occupy d4, but also in some cases to play \textit{lt'}ac1 followed by \textit{lt'}xc6. Another plan was employed in the game Alburt–Gulko (Somerset 1986): 17 \textit{lt'}d2!? \textit{lt'}xc3 (17...\textit{lt'}f7 18 \textit{lt'}e4) 18 \textit{lt'}xc3 \textit{lt'}f7 19 \textit{lt'}c4 \textit{lt'}f6 20 \textit{lt'}e3.

17 ... \textit{lt'}xe3

A logical reply. White is forced to take on e3 with his pawn, after which the position of the rook at e1 is devalued. Even so, the exchange of the strong d5 knight is questionable – 17...\textit{lt'}f6 came into consideration.

18 fxe3

Looking at the diagram position gives rise to an optical illusion – Black’s advantage appears undisputed. But don’t forget: he has lost the right to castle, so that Yusupov retains quite good compensation for the sacrificed pawn. Even so, after 18...\textit{lt'}d6 Black’s position would have remained sound enough. However, here Portisch deviates
from the correct path and embarks on a faulty combination.

18 ... a6?
19 ♗xc7+ ♗d7
19...♗f7 is strongly met by 20 ♗d4! ♗xd4
21 exd4 ♗f6 22 ♗f1, and on his next move
White will capture on e6.

20 ♗xa6!

Now after 20...bxa6 21 ♘xa6 White's attack
is irresistible. For example: 21...♗c8 22
♗b7+ ♗c7 23 ♗d1+ ♗d6 24 ♗xd6+ ♗xd6
25 ♗d1+, or 21...♗b8 22 ♘ac1 ♘b5 23
♘xc6!

20 ... ♗a8
21 ♗ed1+ ♗c8

Portisch was counting on trapping the errant
knight, but the following unforeseen move
refutes his idea.

22 b4! ♘xa6
22...bxa6 23 ♘ac1 ♘b7 24 ♘xc6 or 23...♗e4
24 ♘c4.

23 ♗b5 ♘a3
24 ♘xc6

White's attack is now irresistible.

24 ... ♗b6
25 ♘ab1 ♘c5
26 ♗b3 ♘a5
27 ♘c4! ♘xa2
28 ♘xb6 ♘xe3+
29 ♗h1 ♘xb6

29...♘d5 does not help in view of 30 ♘b8+!
♗xb8 31 ♘b4+ ♘c7 32 ♘b7+ ♘d6 33 ♘d7+
♘c5 34 ♘xd5+ exd5 35 ♗e7+ ♘xc6 36
♗xe3, and White must be able to convert his
extra knight.

30 ♘xa2 ♘c7
31 ♗d7+ ♘xc6
32 ♗a4+ ♘c5
33 ♗d2!

Black resigns.
Victory in the Romantic Style

How does Tal win? Very simply: he places his pieces in the centre and then sacrifices them somewhere.

David Bronstein

Tal – Larsen
Candidates match, 6th game, Bled 1965

1 e4 e6
2 e5 d5
3 d4 d6
4 f3 dxe5
5 xf3 e6
6 f4!

The most energetic rejoinder against the opening variation chosen by Larsen. While Black has not yet offered to exchange the knight at e5 by ...dxe7, White hastens to make use of its services. In the event of 6...dxe5 he quickly completes his development by e3, c3 and 0–0–0.

6 ... Wf6

'When two do one and the same thing, it is not the same thing', runs the proverb. White's queen has moved out to an active position, but Black's is in a vulnerable one, where it comes under attack by the opponent's minor pieces.

7 Wg3 h6
8 g5 was threatened.
9 c3!

And now 9...e4 has to be reckoned with.

9 ... b4?!

I think that 8...xc3 was nevertheless better.

9 b5+ c6
10 a4 d7

Q 5-17. Determine all the candidate moves and evaluate how promising they are.

White has numerous tempting continuations. Which of them did Tal check first? Well, of course, the combinatoric one: 11 a3 d5 12 xc6. Black loses after 12...bxc6? 13 xc6 bxc6 14 b5, but White's idea is, unfortunately, refuted by 12...xc3! 13 bxc3 (13 xc3 c6 14 b8+ d8 13...c6 14 b5 a6! (but not 14...d7? 15 xa7 Wd8 16 xd7+ Wd7 17 b1)).

11 b4! looks good. Tal did not like the reply 11...d5, although after 12 xd5 exd5 13 0–0 Black is in serious difficulties. If 13...d6, then 14 a1 xe5 (14...d4 15 xd7) 15 xe5 (15 dxe5 is also strong) 15...xe5 16 xe5+ e6 17 f4. Or 13...xe5 14 xe5 Wg6 15 f3! (threatening 16 xd5) 15...e6 16 c4 (16 b3 b5 17 xb5 is also possible).

I should also mention the modest 11 d2,
and if 11... Qxe5 12 dxe5 Wg6 13 Wxg6 with the advantage in the ending.

Tal examined the tempting plan 11 De4!? Wf5 12 f3, and then 12... Qxe5 13 dxe5 A.d7 14 a3 Qd5 15 c4 Qb6 16 Qc2 Wh5. White's position is markedly better. (For my part I should add that if 12... A.f6, then 13 0-0 is strong. In the event of 12... b5 White does not play 13 A.b3 Qxe5 14 dxe5 c5 15 a3 Ac6!, but 13 a3! Qd5 14 A.b3 Qxe5 15 dxe5, intending 16 c3 and 17 Ac2, or 13... bxa4 14 axb4 with advantage to White).

'I was intending to continue my analysis of this variation, when suddenly my attention was drawn to the possibility of the piece sacrifice that occurred in the game within a few moves. This idea seemed very tempting.' (Tal). Here it is, the thinking of a romantic: a pretty idea instantly diverts him from quiet and sound paths.

11 0-0
12 dxe5
13 Wf3

I suspect that the former world champion moved his queen without the slightest hesitation, whereas his opponent Bent Larsen later remarked: 'I think that Tal acted too much in Tal style. 13 Wxg6 would have given not a big, but a definite advantage — I would certainly have played this.' This is another vivid illustration of the extent to which differences of players in their way of thinking, temperament and style influence the decisions taken by them at the board!

13... Wf5
13... Qxc2? 14 Axc6+; 13... A.d7?! 14 We2, intending We4 and c2-c3.
14 We2

It is here that lies hidden the idea that tempted Tal, when he was considering his 11th move. If 14... Qd5 there follows the pretty blow 15 Qb5!

14... Ae7

Q 5-18. How would you have continued?

The knight sacrifice seemed so tempting to the player from Riga, that here too he carried it out by 15 a3 Qd5 16 Qb5. But this decision is by no means indisputable.

First of all let us ask the question, whether it is possible to gain an advantage in a simpler and sounder way. After all, if White is able to play f2-f4, We4, c2-c3 and Ac2, the enemy queen will feel extremely uncomfortable. I have no doubt that during the game Tal subconsciously wanted to answer this question in the negative (most players would have had the opposite desire), and he quickly convinced himself with the variation 15 f4 0-0 16 We4 b5! 17 A.b3 c5 18 c3 c4!, in which Black is alright. But White's play can be improved.

There is an interesting idea: 15 g4!? Wg6 16 We4. Most of the variations lead to difficult positions for Black, e.g. 16... f5 17 exf6 gxf6 18 Qg3 A.g8 19 c3 Qd5 20 f3 and 21 Ac2, or 16... h5 17 g5 f6 (17... Wf5 18 c3 Qd5 19 f4) 18 exf6 gxf6 19 f4.

However, 15 g4 is almost as drastic a measure as a piece sacrifice. White weakens the position of his own king, and the opponent is simply bound to find some counterplay. He should probably aim for a
pawn sacrifice: 15...\texttt{g}6 16 \texttt{e}4 b5 (or the same thing after the inclusion of 16...\texttt{h}5 17 g5) 17 \texttt{b}3 c5!? 18 \texttt{xb}5+ \texttt{d}7 19 \texttt{e}2 \texttt{c}6!, intending 20...\texttt{xe}5 or 20...\texttt{d}4.

The course suggested by Sergey Dolmatov is much sounder: 15 f4 0–0 16 a3! \texttt{a}6 17 \texttt{d}5 (threatening 18 c4) 17...\texttt{b}5 18 \texttt{b}3, and 18...\texttt{c}5 19 c3 followed by \texttt{c}2 is hopeless for Black. If instead 16...\texttt{a}6, then 17 b4!, and it is not apparent how Black can oppose the plan of \texttt{e}4, c2–c4 and \texttt{c}2. For example, 17...\texttt{b}5 18 \texttt{b}3 c5 19 \texttt{xb}5 \texttt{xb}4 20 c3!, or 18...\texttt{b}7 19 \texttt{e}4 c5 20 \texttt{g}3 \texttt{g}6 21 c3, and the threat of 22 \texttt{c}2 is extremely unpleasant.

We have come to the conclusion that the sacrifice was not essential, and that White could have retained the advantage by comparatively simple means.

15 a3!? \texttt{d}5
15...\texttt{a}6 16 \texttt{b}5! \texttt{xb}5 17 \texttt{xb}5+ and 18 \texttt{d}3.

16 \texttt{b}5!! \texttt{xb}5
The knight has to be taken – otherwise there follows \texttt{d}4, c2–c4 and \texttt{c}2.

17 \texttt{f}xb5+
Of course, not 17 \texttt{xb}5+? \texttt{f}8 18 \texttt{d}3 \texttt{f}4.

17 ... \texttt{f}8
18 c4

The knight can move to b6 or f4. This is what Mikhail Tal had to say:

'The main variation of the combination devised by White was 18...\texttt{f}4 19 \texttt{d}1+ \texttt{c}7 20 \texttt{d}7+ \texttt{xd}7 21 \texttt{xd}7+ \texttt{f}8 22 \texttt{xf}7 \texttt{xe}5 23 \texttt{e}3 \texttt{g}6 (24 \texttt{d}1 was threatened) 24 \texttt{xf}7 \texttt{e}6 25 \texttt{e}8! (this is the point!) 25...\texttt{f}7 (25...\texttt{e}5 26 \texttt{f}4) 26 \texttt{g}6 \texttt{xe}8 27 \texttt{c}5! \texttt{d}7 28 \texttt{f}6+ \texttt{f}8 29 c5. and the bishop at d6 is much stronger than a nook.'

Again we see a long main variation, containing a spectacular 'point'. And again it is completely unconvincing. It is not just that, instead of 25...\texttt{e}7, more tenacious is 25...\texttt{xf}7 26 \texttt{xf}7 \texttt{e}8 – this is in fact an insignificant quibble. More important is the fact that the entire variation is unnecessary: by playing simply 19 \texttt{a}5+! b6 20 \texttt{d}2+ White regains the piece and remains a healthy pawn to the good.

After 18...\texttt{b}6! 19 \texttt{a}5! White also regains the piece, since 19...\texttt{d}7 20 \texttt{e}3 \texttt{c}7 21 \texttt{xd}7 \texttt{xd}7 22 \texttt{d}1+ is bad for Black. The variation given by Tal: 19...\texttt{c}7! 20 c5 \texttt{b}8 21 \texttt{xb}6 axb6 22 \texttt{b}5 \texttt{a}5 23 \texttt{b}3 leads to a position, on the evaluation of which the evaluation of the piece sacrifice as a whole is to a considerable degree dependent. In
the grandmaster's opinion, White retains quite good attacking chances. I think that the chances of a successful defence are not worse. After 23...\textit{\texttt{wx}}e5 (23...\textit{\texttt{ex}}e5 24 \textit{\texttt{wg}}3 is less good) Black is threatening 24...b5; in the event of 24 \textit{\texttt{ad}}2?! \textit{\texttt{ad}}5 for the moment he is a pawn up and has control of the central squares.

Instead of 23 \textit{\texttt{wb}}3, it is probable that 23 \textit{\texttt{wc}}4 is stronger, not giving up the e5 pawn (23. \textit{\texttt{ac}}5 24 \textit{\texttt{wb}}4). In turn, a little earlier Black could have considered 22...\textit{\texttt{ad}}8?! All this is very unclear.

\textit{\texttt{18 \ldots \textit{\texttt{wx}}e5?}}

'Larsen follows the path of least resistance. He gives back the piece, but the position of his king in the centre allows White easily to mount a decisive attack without any significant material sacrifice.' (Tal).

The psychological effect of the sacrifice is curious: the Danish player so lost faith in his position, that even later he did not see that he could have successfully defended. He wrote: 'After 14...\textit{\texttt{ad}}7 my position would have been satisfactory. 14...\textit{\texttt{ae}}7? allowed White to make the brilliant move 16 \textit{\texttt{ab}}5!, and after this it was hard to Black to save the game.'

\textit{\texttt{19 cxd5 \textit{\texttt{ad}}6}}

\textit{\texttt{20 g3 \textit{\texttt{xd}}5}}

\textit{\texttt{21 \textit{\texttt{we}}2}}

For complete happiness, it only remains for White to connect his rooks. The concluding part of the game is a convincing example of an attack on a king that is caught in the centre of the board.

\textit{\texttt{21 \ldots \textit{\texttt{we}}7}}

\textit{\texttt{22 \textit{\texttt{ad}}1 \textit{\texttt{a}}5}}

\textit{\texttt{23 \textit{\texttt{wg}}4 \textit{\texttt{f}}5}}

In the event of 23...e5 Tal wanted to sacrifice a piece by 24 \textit{\texttt{wx}}g7! \textit{\texttt{ae}}6 (or 24...\textit{\texttt{xa}}4)

\textit{\texttt{25 \textit{\texttt{ax}}h6}. And after 23...\textit{\texttt{ad}}8 White would have attacked in the same way: 24 \textit{\texttt{xg}}7! \textit{\texttt{xa}}4 25 \textit{\texttt{ax}}h6.}

\textit{\texttt{24 \textit{\texttt{cc}}4 \textit{\texttt{cc}}5}}

\textit{\texttt{25 \textit{\texttt{dc}}3 \textit{\texttt{dd}}5}}

\textit{\texttt{26 \textit{\texttt{cc}}3! \textit{\texttt{ee}}5}}

\textit{\texttt{26...\textit{\texttt{we}}5 27 \textit{\texttt{ff}}4.}}

\textit{\texttt{27 \textit{\texttt{we}}1 \textit{\texttt{ce}}5}}

\textit{\texttt{28 \textit{\texttt{dd}}2 \textit{\texttt{ff}}8}}

\textit{\texttt{29 \textit{\texttt{ac}}1}}

White has finally brought all his pieces into play. Now Black’s defences quickly collapse.

\textit{\texttt{29 \ldots \textit{\texttt{wb}}6}}

\textit{\texttt{30 \textit{\texttt{ee}}3 \textit{\texttt{aa}}6}}

\textit{\texttt{31 \textit{\texttt{wb}}4}}

Threatening 32 \textit{\texttt{bb}}5.

\textit{\texttt{31 \ldots \textit{\texttt{ba}}5}}

\textit{\texttt{32 \textit{\texttt{xb}}5 \textit{\texttt{wb}}7}}

\textit{\texttt{33 \textit{\texttt{f}}4 \textit{\texttt{bb}}8}}

\textit{\texttt{34 \textit{\texttt{ac}}6}}

Black resigns.

Thus, objectively the piece sacrifice was not the best continuation. However, what is meant by the best continuation? Tal played in full accordance with his style, which brought him outstanding competitive and creative successes. Incidentally, all his wins in his match against Larsen were gained as a result of irrational decisions of this type. The outcome was decided by the final, 10th game, where Tal also carried out a problematic knight sacrifice. Evaluating his actions, he wrote: 'In my opinion, in this situation everything is clear. While does not need any justification, but even so, for the thousandth time I should like to comment: years of analysis and minutes of play are by no means the same thing.'
Two Attacks by Reiner Knaak

When attacking your opponent, aim not to convince him, but to surprise him.
Saviely Tartakower

The game which will now examine developed quietly for a long time. White held the initiative, while Black accurately defended.

Knaak – A.Petrosian
Leipzig 1977

1  d4  d5
2  c4  e6
3  c3  e7
4  cxd5  exd5
5  f4  c6
6  e3  d6
7  xxd6
7  g3!?  

8  d3  e7
9  c2  d7
10  f3  f6
11  e5

Another possible plan involves the minority pawn attack on the queenside, which is standard in such positions: 11 0–0 0–0 12 ab1 g6 13 b4, as occurred (with a slight transposition of moves) in the game Gligoric–Portisch, Palma de Mallorca 1967:

11  ...  g4
12  xg4  xg4
13  0–0  h5

Black wants to simplify the position even further by 14...g6.

14  e4!  dxe4
15  x e4  xd4
16  g3  g4

After 16...g6? 17 xg6 hxg6 18 fe1 Black’s position is unenviable. He must block the e-file, by placing his bishop on e6.

17  fe1  e6
18  f5  0–0–0

In the event of 18...0–0 White would have gained the advantage by 19 ad1 if6 20 xe6 fxe6 21 d7.

19  xe6+  xe6
20  xe6  d5
21  f5  f4
22  g3  c7
23  e1  g6
23...b8.

24  d4  b8
25  fe5  b6
26  e6  b4
27  e2  d3

Q5–19. Can White continue playing for a win?
First let us check the ‘normal’ continuations.

a) 28 $\text{Q}x\text{d}8 \text{Qx}d8! 29 \text{Q}d1 (29 \text{Q}e8 \text{Qxe}1) 29...\text{Q}xe5 30 \text{W}xe5+ \text{c}8 31 \text{W}e6+ \text{b}8;

b) 28 \text{Q}d1 \text{Q}xe5 29 \text{W}xe5+ \text{c}8.

Obviously, in both cases the position is roughly equal, and the game should end in a draw. If such an outcome does not satisfy White, he must now delve into the position, in order to find a way of sharpening the play, and of setting his opponent new problems.

There is a highly unusual idea: to allow the capture on e5, then play a2–a4! with the threat of a4–a5. If Black replies ...a7–a5, then b2–b4!

28 \text{Q}a1!?

Q 5-20. What do you think, is this idea correct? What is Black’s best way of defending?

28 ... \text{Q}xe5

28...\text{Q}d7? or 28...\text{Q}d6? is bad because of 29 \text{Q}d1!, but 28...\text{Q}he8!! came seriously into consideration. However, the capture on e5 is also perfectly possible.

29 \text{W}xe5+ \text{c}8

30 a4

After 30 \text{Q}xd8 the position would have remained equal, but it was not for this that the rook moved to a1.

In the game Arshak Petrosian became rattled, played 30...\text{c}5?, and after 31 \text{Q}c1 \text{W}d6 32 \text{Qxc}5+ \text{b}8 33 \text{Q}xd8 he lost a pawn and also the game.

As confirmation that his idea was correct. Knaak gave the variations 30...\text{Q}he8 31 a5 \text{Q}d5 32 \text{W}d5! \text{W}xb2 (32...\text{c}xd5 33 axb6 \text{Q}xe6 34 bxa7) 33 \text{W}d4!, and 30...a5 31 b4! \text{Q}he8 32 bxa5 \text{Q}d5 33 \text{W}xd5! \text{c}xd5 34 axb6 \text{Q}xe6 35 a5 when White is a pawn up. Unfortunately, he did not consider the best defence.

30 ... \text{Q}de8!

31 a5 \text{W}d8

White can regain the exchange by 32 \text{Q}xd8 \text{Q}xe5 33 \text{Q}d7, or, more precisely, 32 \text{W}h8 \text{Q}xh8 33 \text{Q}xd8 \text{Q}xd8 34 \text{Q}e1. But here he still has to strive for a draw – in the rook ending he nevertheless stands worse.

Knaak would probably have played 32 a6!? (this is where the rook at a1 comes in useful!). After 32...\text{W}e7 33 axb7+ \text{W}xb7 34 \text{W}d4? \text{a}8 35 \text{Q}a6, or 33...\text{W}xb7 34 \text{W}d4? \text{b}6 (or 34...\text{W}d7) 35 \text{Q}xa7 the position remains quite complicated. In the event of 32...b6 White could have considered 33 \text{Q}xd8 \text{Q}xe5 34 \text{Q}xc6 \text{Q}c5 35 \text{Q}xa7+ \text{b}8 36 b4. And if 32...b5 it looks quite good to play 33 \text{Q}c1 \text{W}d7 34 \text{W}f6! (with the threat of 35 \text{Q}d4) 34...\text{W}d6 35 \text{W}g7, forcing the black queen to return to d7.

Let us sum up. The risk that White went in for, in playing for a win, seems quite justified. It was not excessive: although we found a sound defence for Black, it cannot be said
that it refutes Knaak's clever idea. It was not easy for the opponent to find his way at the board in the resulting complications, especially if one makes the highly probable (knowing Arshak Petrosian) assumption that by this point he was already in time trouble.

However, most probably Knaak was not thinking at all about risk. After all, according to his calculations White should have gained the advantage in all variations. Mikhail Tal was quite right, when he remarked in one of his articles: 'A player only genuinely takes a risk, when he knows what he is risking'.

In the following game we again see how Reiner Knaak attacks. It would be interesting to know whether you agree with the choice, made by him at the decisive moment.

Knaak – Reeh
Balatonbereny 1987

1 d4 
2 c4 
3 \( \text{\textit{c3}} \) 
4 e3 
5 \( \text{\textit{ge2}} \) 
6 \( \text{\textit{g3}} \) 
7 e4 
8 \( \text{\textit{d3}} \)!
9 \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 
8...\( \text{\textit{xd4}} \) 9 \( \text{\textit{wa4!}} \), winning a piece.

Weaker is 9...\( \text{\textit{a5}} \) 10 \( \text{\textit{we2}} \) \( \text{\textit{xc3+}} \) 11 bxc3 d6 12 \( \text{\textit{g5}} \).

10 bxc3 

11 \( \text{\textit{g5}} \)!
White does not give his opponent time for 11...d6 followed by 12...\( \text{\textit{xd7}} \).

11 ... 
12 h4! 
13 \( \text{\textit{e3}} \) 
14 h5 
15 \( \text{\textit{we2}} \) 

Black wants to create counterplay as quickly as possible. If 15...\( \text{\textit{we8}} \) Knaak gives the variation 16 0–0–0 f5 17 exf5 \( \text{\textit{xf5}} \) 18 \( \text{\textit{xf5}} \) \( \text{\textit{xf5}} \) 19 \( \text{\textit{wc2}} \) e4 20 \( \text{\textit{xe4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe3}} \) 21 fxe3 h6 22 d6! with advantage to White.

16 \( \text{\textit{g5}} \)!
16...\( \text{\textit{we8}} \) 17 h6 g6 18 0–0–0.

Now White can simply exchange on e7 and then take the f5 pawn. But there is also another, latent possibility: the piece sacrifice 17 exf5 hgx5 18 h6.

E 5-1. After carefully calculating the variations, decide which way is the more promising.
Djin Attacks!

Petty and watchful prudence is the deadly enemy of great deeds.

Michel Montaigne

Before the end of the penultimate, sixteenth round, there were just a few minutes remaining. I had already finished my game, and with enormous interest I followed the battle being conducted by one of the tournament leaders, Roman Djindjihashvili.

Djindjihashvili – Tseshkovsky
USSR Championship First League,
Tbilisi 1973

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Q 5-21. What would you do as White?
Black’s chances appear to be better. His g7 is securely defended by the knight, whereas the pin on the f3 rook on the long diagonal is extremely unpleasant, and it is not apparent how to get rid of it. If 31 hxg7 there is the possible reply 31...xf6! However, Djin did not lose his head, and he found a stunning way of disentangling himself – at the cost of the other rook. (Roman’s surname is too long, and, understandably, to all his friends he was simply Djin, or more correctly Djinn, especially since this nickname combined well with his outward appearance, as in the character from the Arabian A Thousand and One Nights.)

31 hxg7!! hxg7
32 g4!!

The queen cannot be taken because of mate in two moves: 33 f7+ and 34 h6 mate, and 33 g6+! is now threatened. Vitaly Tseshkovsky captured on g7 with his knight almost automatically. If he had had a little more time, he would undoubtedly have chosen the safer 31...xg7! (but not, of course, 31...xg7? 32 g6+ hxg6 33 h3+). Black is threatening to block the terrible bishop by 32...d4, and so Djin would have had to force a draw by 32 d7+! d4 33 xd4+ cxd4 34 e5+ g8 35 wg5+ f7 36 wf6+, when 36...e8?? is not possible in view of 37 w6 mate.

32 ... d4!

The only defence
Q 5-22. And what would you now play with White?

Observing the game, I noticed that White could obtain a rook ending with an extra pawn, although it is completely drawn: 33 \( \text{g6+ hgx6} \) 34 \( \text{h3+ h5} \) 35 \( \text{gxg6 g7} \) 36 \( \text{hxh5+ g8} \) 37 \( \text{xg7+ xg7} \) 38 \( \text{xxc5} \) \( \text{txf4} \) 39 \( \text{c7+ (39 d5? c6) 39...g6} \) 40 \( \text{xhxd4} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 41 \( \text{xa7} \) \( \text{xd3} \). I have no doubt that Djin also saw this variation – experienced players make such calculations instantly, since all the moves for both sides are forced.

The temptation to conclude a dramatic encounter with a pretty drawing variation must certainly have been very strong. But Djin is by nature a gambler (not only in chess!). He decided to take a risk and fight for a win in the time scramble, despite being behind in material. It will be remembered that an analogous decision in a similar situation was taken by Tal on the 20th move of his game with Portisch, which we analysed earlier. Both there and here fortune favoured the bold.

33 \( \text{xh4!!} \) The exclamation marks, as it soon transpires, are not only for boldness and will to win, but also for a correct evaluation of the position.

33 ... cxd4
34 \( \text{wh6} \)

35 \( \text{h3} \) is threatened. Despite Black's extra piece, it is not easy for him to defend – his knight at a7 is too far from the field of battle.

34 ... \( g8? \)
35 \( h3 \) \( f5 \)
36 \( \text{we6+ g7} \)

Not 36...\( \text{h8} \) 37 \( g6+. 36...\text{f7 is strongly met by 37 } \text{xh7+ \text{f7 38 } \text{xh7+ } \text{xh7 39 } \text{gxh7+ g7 40 } \text{h6 with a clear advantage to White in the endgame. However, 37 } \text{xh7!! is more quickly decisive.} \)

37 \( \text{d7}! \) \( \text{c8} \)

Bad is 37...\( \text{f7 38 } \text{xh7+}, \) while after 37...\( \text{c8}, \) if there is nothing better, White can take the knight and his king can escape from the checks at h4.

38 \( \text{xh8} \) \( \text{c1+} \)

Black loses immediately after 38...\( \text{xf8} \) 39 \( \text{d7+ or 39 } \text{h5, but 38...\text{xf8 was preferable. However, it is doubtful whether he would be able to hold the endgame after 39 \( \text{xc8+ xxc8 40 } \text{h7.} \)

39 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{d2+} \)

No better was 39...\( \text{e3+ 40 } \text{xe3! dxe3 41 } \text{e7+ g8 42 } \text{e6 with inevitable mate, or 40...\text{xe3 41 } \text{xe3 dxe3 42 } \text{e6+ f6 43 } \text{d4 with a won knight ending.} \)

40 \( \text{g1} \) \( \text{d1+} \)
41 \( \text{f2} \)

The time control was reached and the game adjourned. Black resigned without resuming.

When he avoided the draw on the 33rd move, Djin did not have time to calculate the variations seriously, and he was merely guided by his intuition and belief in his lucky star. Later I wanted to analyse what it was in fact: a subtle evaluation of the situation, or simply a gamble that accidentally succeeded. A thorough analysis confirmed the soundness of the decision taken by White: it turned out that he had not been losing anywhere, whereas his opponent was still faced with finding a reliable defence.

This conclusion is not at all obvious. A few years later I suggested playing this game fragment with Sergey Dolmatov. With considerable difficulty he found the rook sacrifice on the 31st move, but then almost without thinking he played 33 \( \text{g6+}, \) forcing the transition into a drawn rook ending.

I asked Dolmatov why he had not tried to play for a win. 'But Black is a piece up', Sergey replied in surprise.
'Then defend yourself, sir!', I said, turning the board round.

Q 5.23. What should Black play?
See how our 'game' developed.

34 ... \( \text{Bc8?}! \)
A natural move, parrying the threat of 35 \( \text{Qg6} \) and preparing a counterattack. In fact in all variations White regains the piece and obtains real chances of success.

35 \( \text{f5!} \)
The pawn threatens to advance further, and the queen makes control of the c1 square.

35 ... \( \text{Wc7} \)

Let us also consider the other possibilities.

a) 35 ... \( \text{Dc6?} \) 36 \( \text{Ah3} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 37 \( \text{Wf6} + \text{g8} \) (37 ... \( \text{Dg7} \) 38 \( \text{Wg6!} \); 37 ... \( \text{Wg7} + \) 38 \( \text{Qg6} +! \) \( \text{g8} \) 39 \( \text{we6} +! \) 38 \( \text{we6} +! \) (38 \( \text{xf5? Qxe5} \) 38 ... \( \text{h8} \) (38 ... \( \text{g7} \) 39 \( \text{xf5} \) 39 \( \text{f7} +! \) and 40 \( \text{xf5} \), winning.

b) 35 ... \( \text{xf5} \) 36 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{g8} + \) (36 ... \( \text{Wg7} +? \) 37 \( \text{Wxg7} + \text{g7} \) 38 \( \text{f7} +! \) 37 \( \text{f2}! \) \( \text{g2} + \) 38 \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{g1} + \) 39 \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{e3} + \) 40 \( \text{xe3} \) dxe3, and the resulting ending is clearly better for White. For example, 41 a3?! is possible, preparing 42 \( \text{e2} \).

c) 35 ... \( \text{e8?} \) 36 \( \text{h3} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 37 \( \text{Wf6} + \text{g7} \) 38 \( \text{Qg6} + \text{g8} \) 39 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{f7} +! \) (39 ... \( \text{f6} ? \) 40 \( \text{d5} + \text{f8} \) 41 \( \text{f4} + \) 40 \( \text{xf7} + \text{xf7} \) 41 \( \text{f4} + \) \( \text{f4} + \), and again White's position is preferable.

36 \( \text{f6} \) \( \text{c1} + \)
37 \( \text{f1!} \) \( \text{xh6} \)
38 \( \text{f7} + \) \( \text{g8} \)
39 \( \text{g6} + \) \( \text{f8} \)
40 \( \text{f5} + \) \( \text{g6} \)
42 \( \text{xd4} \)

White has won a pawn. His advantage is undisputed.
Thus, 34 ... \( \text{c8?} \) leads to an inferior ending for Black, and 34 ... \( \text{g8} ? \), as chosen by Tseshkovsky, is also bad. How then should he defend?

Black should have prevented the advance of the f-pawn. I do not see how to refute the seemingly strange move 34 ... \( \text{f5} \). After 35 \( \text{h3} \) \( \text{e8} \) both 36 \( \text{Wf6} \) \( \text{c8} \) and 36 \( \text{Qg6} + \text{g8} \) 37 \( \text{Qg3} \) \( \text{g7} \) are useless; there only remains 36 \( \text{Qg3} \) \( \text{Qg7} \) 37 \( \text{h3} \).

The modest move 34 ... \( \text{e8} ?! \) is even stronger.
In this case it is White who has to strive for a draw by 35 \( \text{h3} \) \( \text{f5} \) (bad is 35 ... \( \text{e6} ? \) 36 \( \text{Qg3} \) \( \text{g7} \) 37 \( \text{f6} \) \( \text{g8} \) 38 \( \text{Qg4} \) 36 \( \text{Wf6} + \text{g7} + \text{Qg6} + \text{g8} \) 38 \( \text{xf5} \) hxg6 (we saw almost the same position after 34 ... \( \text{c8} \) 35 \( \text{f5} \) \( \text{e8} \), but there the pawn was not at f4 and the knight could not be taken) 39 \( \text{d5} + \text{f8} \) (39 ... \( \text{f7} ? \) 40 \( \text{a8} +!) \) 40 \( \text{d6} + \) and, as it is not hard to see, things end in perpetual check.
In the end, chess is not only knowledge and logic!
Alexander Alekhine

Many experts considered the favourite in the candidates event for the world chess crown in 1991/92 to be the highly talented young grandmaster from Lvov, Vasily Ivanchuk. And they had serious grounds for this. Early in 1991 Vasily had confidently won the super-tournament in Linares, ahead of world champion Garry Kasparov and his historic opponent, ex-world champion Anatoly Karpov, and in the FIDE rating list he had risen to second position. In his first candidates match Ivanchuk crushed Leonid Yudasin 4½-½.

However, his next, quarter-final clash with Artur Yusupov turned out to be much more tense. By winning the second game, Yusupov took the lead, but then he lost the third and the fifth. Ivanchuk retained the lead until the last game, in which, consequently, Artur was obliged to play only for a win.

How should a player act, if his tournament position demands that he wins without fail (or, on the contrary, gains a draw)? We have already touched on this problem in the chapter ‘A pawn in return for castling’. The events that developed at the finish of the candidates match in Brussels give excellent grounds for returning again to this same topic (as it is said: ‘repetition is the mother of learning!’). This is what Yusupov himself writes about this:

In such situations two strategies are possible: immediately create the maximum tension, or maintain the tension throughout the game. I think that the second strategy normally promises the best chances of success. A convincing example is provided by the 24th game of the world championship match in Seville. And I initially was intending to follow this sensible aim: not to force events, keep on the board as many dangerous pieces as possible, and await an appropriate moment to switch to resolute action.

Yusupov – Ivanchuk
8th match game, Brussels 1991
1  d4  e6
2  c4  e6
3  c3  b4
4  e3  b6
5  d3  b7
6  f3  0–0
7  0–0  c5
8  d2

8  a4 is more often played, but Yusupov does not like to put his knights on the edge of the board.

8 . . .  cxd4
9  exd4  d5
10  cxd5  xd5
11  c1?!

A new and, apparently, not very successful move. Other possibilities are more promising: 11  e2, 11  c2, or even 11  e5!?, intending to meet the atless 11 . . .  c6? with the typical tactical blow 12  a6!!

11 . . .  c6
12  e1  c8
Black can be satisfied with the outcome of the opening. His pieces are excellently placed, securely controlling the central squares. Realising this, and wanting to change the not altogether favourable course of the game, Yusupov rejects his initial aim and launches a desperate attack on the opponent’s king.

13 $\text{e}4!$

An original manoeuvre – the rook is heading for h4. If 13... $\text{e}7$, then 14 $\text{g}4$ (with the threat of 15 $\text{h}6$) 14... $\text{f}6$ 15 $\text{h}4$.

What do you think, what are the chances of White’s planned attack succeeding? Objectively speaking, they are not very great. There is an important and well-known strategic principle: **flank attacks are effective only when the centre is blocked.** But here the centre is open, and the black pieces have open lines for exchanges or for counter-attacking.

However, things are by no means so simple – the risky decision taken by Yusupov had a serious psychological basis. His opponent was an exceptionally strong player, but at the same time highly emotional, and easily excited. In his preparations for the match, Yusupov noticed that, when he came under attack, Ivanchuk would sometimes begin to grow nervous, become flustered and play lower than his real strength.

Finally, the unusual and bold plan, chosen by White, largely stemmed from the emotional state of Yusupov himself. Switching on the television on 19th August, we learned about the attempted coup d'état in our country by the communist leaders. President Mikhail Gorbachov was removed from power, and on the streets of Moscow tanks appeared. Naturally, the events of the match immediately receded into the background, and Yusupov and I were now discussing not opening subtleties, but the latest news from Moscow. On 20th August in the 7th game Yusupov missed a straightforward win, but he was not even particularly upset – his thoughts were elsewhere.

By the evening of 21st August we sensed an enormous relief – it became clear that the putsch had failed. And on the following day the decisive 8th game of the match took place. Yusupov’s frame of mind was ideal: a feeling of complete inner liberation, the desire to play a deep and interesting game, and the absence of any fear about possible failure. The powerful emotional impulse, received as a result of the happy turn of events in Moscow, helped Yusupov to conduct the finish of the match brilliantly, and to gain a deserved victory over his formidable opponent.

13 ... $\text{c}e7$

14 $\text{c}xd5!$

The immediate 14 $\text{h}4$ is weaker because of 14... $\text{g}6$, when 15 $\text{h}3$? does not work in view of 15... $\text{f}4$! 16 $\text{xf}4$ $\text{xf}4$ 17 $\text{xh}7+ \text{h}8$ 18 $\text{h}4$ $\text{xf}3$.

14 ... $\text{xd}5$

15 $\text{h}4$ $\text{g}6$

With the rook at h4, 15... $\text{f}5$? looks a good reply, but the move made by Ivanchuk is also quite possible.
From the positional viewpoint it made sense to play 16...hxg8 (the black queen keeps the rook at h4 in its 'sights'). But in this case White could have immediately begun a combinative attack: 17 hxg8! hxg8 18 wd2 xd3 19 wh6! xe8 20 xh7+ f8 21 wh6+ ef7 22 g5+ ed6 23 db5 xc7 (23...g5 24 xg5) 24 h3?!

For a time during the game Yusupov was afraid of the counterattack on the c-file: 17...xd2 18 xd2 xc6 19 xh7 xc8, e.g. 20 h3 wc1+ 21 xc1 xc1+ 22 ch2 ed1 followed by 23...ed2. But then he saw that he could maintain the tension by 20 fc1! wc1 21 ef4 (if 21...c2, then 22 wb5 c6 23 wa6 eg7 24 wa3) 22 we3 (but not 22 li6+ eg7 23 we5 xf1+! 24 xf1 fc1+). Artur calculated the following variations: 22...xg2 (22...a6 does not change anything) 23 li6+ eg7 (23...eg8 24 xe8+ eg7 25 xe8+ or 24...eg7 25 xe8+) 24 xe8+ eg8 (24...eg8 25 xe8+ 25 xe8+ eg7 26 wa3+ fc5 27 xa7+ and wins.

Thus, in the middlegame White's attack triumphs over the opponent's counter actions. However, by exchanging queens, Black can nevertheless gain equality: 22...xe3! 23 fxe3 eh5 (the knight is hanging, and 24...ec1 or 24...lc2 is threatened) 24 g4 xh7 25 gh5 g5, or 23 li6+ eg7 24 fxe3 xg2 25 xg2 ec1+ 26 ef1 ef6.

In this position Ivanchuk thought for a long time (roughly an hour) and fell significantly behind on the clock. What was he thinking about?

White's attack does not look especially dangerous. There are several ways of parrying the threats to the king. 18...hxg5 19 xg5 f5, or 18...f5 19 fe2 (19 lih3 xg5 20 xh7? does not work — 20...xd2) 19...hxg5 is quite good. Another plan of defence is 18...fc6 19 wh3 h5 (the immediate 18...h5 is also possible, not fearing 19 xh5? fc6). In each case Black would have retained a good game.

However, Vasily's attention was attracted by a possibility of forcing events, and he began calculating them.

18...a6?!

19 wh3

19 xg5 20 xg5 xh7 21 xg6+ fxg6 22 wh6+ gh8 23 xg6+ gh8 would have only led to perpetual check.

19...h5

The only move. Of course, Black cannot play 19...xd3?? 20 xh7 xg5 (20...xf6 21 gh4; 20...wc2 21 wh8+ gh7 22 xg8+)! 21 xg5 f6 22 xn6. And 19...xg5?! 20 xg5 h5 is also dubious in view of 21 xa6 xa6
22 g4! (the immediate 21 g4 is also possible).

20 \( \Box \text{xh5!} \)

It was not hard for Artur to decide on the rook sacrifice – all the remaining continuations were clearly weaker. 20 \( \Delta e4? \text{w}c4 \) or 20 \( \Delta \text{xa6? w}x\text{a6} \) 21 g4 \( \text{we2!} \) would not do, while after the immediate 20 g4 there would have followed 20...\( \Box \text{xd3} \) 21 \( \text{wx}d3 \) \( \circ \text{b4!} \) (but not 21...\( \text{wd8?} \) 22 \( \Box \text{xh5} \)), and then, according to circumstances, 22...\( \text{wc2} \) or 22...\( \text{wd8} \).

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\text{c} & \text{c} & \text{c} & \text{c} & \text{c} & \text{c} & \text{c} & \text{c} \\
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\]

20 \( \ldots \) \( g \text{hx}5 \)

21 \( \Delta \text{h7+1} \) \( \text{g}7 \)

22 \( \text{wx}h5 \)

Apparantly it was this position that Ivanchuk had spent a long time studying. And to no purpose! The variations are too complicated, to be able to analyse them faultlessly at the board, and that means he should not even have tried – the cost of an oversight is too great. In difficult situations one sometimes has to dive into such play and try to save the game by balancing on a knife edge. But here things were different, since Black stood not at all badly.

Why then did Ivanchuk spend so long trying to 'convince' himself to go in for complications, and in the end convinced himself? Was this a consequence of his boldness, his self-confidence? I think that it was the opposite – the manifestation of a psychological weakness. Normal continuations would have led to a normal game, but a game where he would still have had to fight and fight. But he did not want to fight – he wanted to gain the desired draw as soon as possible. He was hoping to establish in his calculations that after the rook sacrifice White did not have a mate, only perpetual check – and this would have signified the immediate end of both the game, and the match. This was why he embarked on a very complicated analysis of variations, and why, finally, he also convinced himself that everything was alright. Alas, as Tal wrote: 'The combining of sharp play with everyday caution is far from the best combination in chess'.

From the purely analytical viewpoint the decision taken by Black was correct, as for the moment his position is by no means lost. But from the practical viewpoint it was erroneous – the task that he set himself was just too difficult. A convincing example of how an excessive striving for the required competitive result distorts a player's thinking, and interferes with the normal working of his intuition.

Q 5-24. How should Black defend?

First let us see what happened in the game.

\[
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Ivanchuk assumed that White, who is a rook and knight down, would be forced to give perpetual check. But in this match Yusupov calculated variations better than his young opponent – here he had long before found a way to win, back at the time when Black was considering his move 18...\( \Delta \text{a}6 \).
It makes sense, by repeating moves several times, to gain time on the clock, so as to avoid any chance mistakes in time trouble.

28...h8
29.h4+ g8
30.g3+ h8
31.h3+ g7
32.g3+ h8
33.h3+ g7
34.xe6 "xg8
Forced.

35."xe6 d8
Confusion! 35...e8 36.g5 b5 was more tenacious.

36.g4! e8
37."f5 e4
38.g5

Black resigns.

Let us return to the position after White's 22nd move. During the game Yusupov was afraid of 22...xg5. The draw after 23.xg5+ xh7 obviously did not satisfy him, while after 23.xg5 f6 he did not see how to develop his attack (for example, 24.g6+ h8 25.h6 wc7!, or 25.h6 ef7! 26.g6+ g8 27.xf7+ xf7 28.h7+ g8, and the king escapes from the checks).

However, the following day John Nunn demonstrated an amazing possibility.

24.e4! h8 (24...f5 25.h6+ f6 26.g5+ f7 27.g7+! 25.g6+ f8 26.xd5 exd5 (26...xg5? 27.wf6+! 27.wf6+ g8 28.g6+ h8.

29.d2!!
29.h4 is hopeless because of 29...we8, while if 29.f4 there follows 29...we7.

29...c4 (29...e7 30.b4+ d8 31.wd6+) 30.h3. White is threatening 31.a3 or 31.f4. Despite his extra rook, Black has no defence. Staggering!

Let us again go back and examine the counter 22...e2. The direct 23.xe2? xg5 24.xg5 xh7 25.wh5+ g8 26.h6 leads to defeat – Black parries the mate threat by 26...c2!

Much stronger is 23.f3! f6 (the only move) 24.wh6+ h8 25.b1+! (weaker is 25.d3+ g8 26.xe2 wc2) 25...g8 26.g5 e4 (after 26...d8 there is a standard mating mechanism: 27.xf6 xf6 28.h7+ h8 29.g6+ g8 30.wh7+ and 31.xf7 mate) 27.xe4 f5 28.xe7 e7 (28...xe4 29.xf8) 29.b7! wb7 30.g6+ g7 31.wxe6+ and 32.wxe2. With three pawns for the exchange White retains a decisive advantage.

The only way of repelling the attack is a difficult move found by Nunn – 22...b4!!, when White should play 23.xf7! xf7 24.wh6+ h8 25.f5+! g8 26.xe6 xc2! 27.xf7+! (27.g5+? f8 28.wd8+ g7 29.wg5+ wg6) 27...xf7 28.wh5+ with
a probable draw. Possibly White should follow the recommendation of Joël Lautier: 26 \text{Whg6}! (instead of 26 \text{Whxe6}) 26...\text{Whh8}! (but not 26...\text{Whg7} 27 \text{Whxe6+ Whh8} 28 \text{Whh5+ Whh7} 29 \text{Whh5+}, 26...\text{Whh7} 27 \text{Whxe6 is also bad}) 27 \text{Whxe6 Whg8} 28 \text{Whxf7 Whxf7} 29 \text{Whxf7 Whxd2} 30 \text{Whxd5, but after 30...Whc1 31 b3 \text{Whb2} the ending is most probably drawn. Was it really possible to accurately calculate and evaluate such complications, when Black was considering his 18th move? And why try?
The Spectators were Delighted

What we create in the future is in the power of the Lord,
But what we have created is with us today.

Nikolai Gumiliov

So, at the last moment the score in the candidates quarter-final match became equal. According to the regulations, the players now had to contest two additional games with a shortened time control: 45 minutes for 60 moves, and then 15 minutes for each succeeding 20 moves.

In our day 'rapid chess' is very popular. Yusupov is not averse to playing it occasionally - for relaxation or for training purposes. However, he is in principle opposed to its use for determining the winner in events of such high standing as competitions for the world championship.

Nevertheless, Artur had twice already had to decide the fate of a candidates match, expressing it in tennis language, in the 'tie-break' - against Kevin Spraggett (1989) and Sergey Dolmatov (1991). In both cases he was successful. And now here was a new test.

Yusupov considered that the match had already ended in a draw, and that neither of the players had been able to demonstrate his superiority. Rapid chess is nothing more than a form of drawing lots, to decide who will play in the next stage. It has no principle significance, and it does not determine who is stronger, since it has little in common with serious play, the result depending too much on chance. Therefore Artur (in contrast to his opponent) did not experience any excessive nervous tension, but was relaxed and comparatively calm, aiming to fight roughly in the same style as in the previous game - to attack sharply and determinedly!

Ivanchuk - Yusupov
9th match game, Brussels 1991

1  c4  e5
2  g3  d6
3  g2  g6
4  d4  d7
5  c3  g7
6  f3  gf6
7  0-0  0-0
8  c2  e8
9  d1  c6
10  b3  e7

There is no point in discussing the initial moves of the game - they can be found in the Encyclopaedia of Chess Openings. Mention should only be made of the bold choice of opening - I do not remember Artur previously employing the King's Indian Defence with Black.

11  a3
11  e3  f8, as analysed in the books, is too passive, but Yasser Seirawan's recommendation of 11 e4?? comes into consideration.

11  ...  e4
12  g5  e3
13  f4?
13 f3 is more circumspect.

13  ...  f8
14  b4  f5
15  b3  h6
16  f3  g4
Black is preparing to open lines on the kingside by 17...g5.

17 b5 g5!

White's counterplay on the queenside is not hard to stop, by playing the queen to d7 or c7. But then Black's offensive is also held up. Yusupov evaluated correctly the strength of his attack, and decided not to delay.

18 bxc6 bxc6
19 Qe5

Ivanchuk accepts the challenge. 19 fxg5 hxg5 20 Qe5! was more circumspect.

19 ... gxf4
20 Qxc6 Wg5
21 Axd6 Qg6

In Yusupov's opinion, 21 Qxh2 (hoping for 22 Qxh2 Wxg3+ 23 Qh1 Qg6) was weaker in view of 22 Qxh4 Wh5 23 Qd5, with the threats of 24 Qe7+ and 24 Qxe3.

22 Qd5

A picturesque position! The white pieces are dominant in the centre, whereas Black's forces are concentrated on the kingside. Whose trumps are more important? As they say, 'mate is superior!' The white king is clearly short of defenders, and bringing up reserves is hindered by the pawn wedge at e3.

22 ... Wh5
22...fxg3 23 hxg3 (23 hxg3? Wh5) 23...h5 is incorrect in view of 24 h4! Qxh4 25 f4, trapping the black queen. However, according to analysis by Larry Christiansen, very strong was 22 Qxh2! 23 Qxh2 Wxg3+ 24 Qh1 Qh4+ 25 Qg1 Qd1+ 26 Qh1 Wxg2, or 23 f4!? Wh5 24 Wb7 Qg4.

23 h4 Qxh4!

Yusupov avoided 23...fxg3 24 Qxg3 Qxh4, not wishing to repeat moves after 25 f4 Wg5 26 Qh3 Wh5 (26...Wf6 27 Qd5 is unclear – Christiansen) 27 Qf4.

Artur saw the possibility of exposing the opponent's king by a sacrifice of two pieces. He hardly hesitated – it was precisely such ultra-risky play that corresponded with his mood. I should mention that at that time a powerful group of grandmasters had gathered in the press centre, including Anatoly Karpov, Victor Korchnoi, Nigel Short and Mikhail Gurevich... They all considered the sacrifice made by Artur to be absolutely incorrect.

24 gxh4 Wh4
25 Qe7+?

A choice that is hard to explain. It was clearly more logical to give a check with the knight from c6, retaining the other knight at d5, from where it attacks the f4 and e3 pawns.

25 ... Qh8
26 Qxf5 Wh2+
27 Qf1

How now can Black strengthen his attack? The only chance is to place his rook on the g-file, but the routine 27...Qg8? is refuted by 28 Qxe3! Qxd4 (28...Qxe3+ 29 Wxe3) 29 Qxd4 Qxe3+ 30 Qe1 Qxg2 31 Qe5+ Qg8 32 Qd3.

Yusupov found a remarkable combination, enabling him nevertheless to reach the enemy king.
The rook wants to go to g6, clearing the way for the other rook to g8. However, 27 ... e6!? also came seriously into consideration, intending not only ... g8, but also ... h4–f2.

If 28 d3 there can follow 28 ... g8!! 29 xex3 xex3+ 30 xex3 eae8 31 e5 xex5 32 xex5+ xex5 33 dxe5 fxe3 34 wb7, and now 34 ... h5 creates the unpleasant threat of 35 ... g4 (of course, the immediate 34 ... g4?? will not do because of 35 ... c8+). Also strong is 28 ... h4! 29 xex3 f2 30 xxe8+ xex8 31 e4 g1+ 32 e2 xg2.

28 wb7

Q 5-25. How should Black continue?

Artur thought for some time, checking the variations, and only then did the grandmasters in the press centre finally see what was now going to happen.

28 ... g6!!
29 wxa8+ h7

Black is a rook and two minor pieces down, but he is intending also a spectacular sacrifice of his queen: 30 ... h1+!! 31 h1 h2+ 32 e1 g1 mate. As regards this, Yasser Seirawan later recalled the wise advice of his first chess teacher Geoffrey Parsons: ‘Think about what remains on the board, and not about what has left it?’. 

30 wg8+!

The only possibility of prolonging the resistance. In the event of 30 xex3 xex3+ 31 e1 Black wins easily by both 31 ... xg2, and 31 ... xc4.

30 ... xg8
31 xe7+ h7
32 xg6 fxg6
33 xg7

Q 5-26. What should Black play?

Even after the capture of the knight on g7, White will still retain a material advantage, but this is not so important: it is clear that the decisive factor is the desperate position of the white king. Black has a wide choice: after 33 ... xg7 34 db1 he can play 34 ... h5 (preparing ... h4–h3) or 34 ... g5 (intending to hide the king at h5, and if possible to advance it to g3). The immediate 33 ... h5 also comes into consideration, as well the interposition of 33 ... xg3(h4) 34 g1. All these possibilities were actively discussed in the press centre, but Yusupov played quite differently.

33 ... f2!!

It all becomes clear: White has no satisfac-
tory defence against 34...\textit{\&}h3 (or 34...\textit{\&}e4). An excellent example, showing how important it is to concentrate immediately on determining all the candidate moves!

34 \textit{\&}xf4 \textit{\&}xf4
35 \textit{\&}e6
35 \textit{\&}db1 \textit{\&}h3+ 36 \textit{\&}e1 \textit{\&}h4+ 37 \textit{\&}d1 \textit{\&}xd4+ 38 \textit{\&}c2 \textit{\&}xc4+ 39 \textit{\&}b2 \textit{\&}xe2+ is equally hopeless.

35 \ldots \textit{\&}h2
36 \textit{\&}db1 \textit{\&}h3
37 \textit{\&}b7+
37 \textit{\&}e1 \textit{\&}xg2 38 \textit{\&}d1 is more tenacious.

37 \ldots \textit{\&}h8
38 \textit{\&}b8+ \textit{\&}xb8
39 \textit{\&}xh3 \textit{\&}g3

White resigns.

'I amused the audience', Artur calmly commented in reply to my congratulations after the game. Yes, the spectators were indeed delighted, and not only ordinary chess enthusiasts, but also worldly-wise grandmasters. At decisive moments of high level encounters, is it often that we see such uninhibited, bold and, finally, simply brilliant play? 'A Close Look at a Great Game' – this was how Yasser Seirawan entitled his commentary to it in the magazine \textit{Inside Chess}. John Nunn in the \textit{British Chess Magazine} even compared it with a masterpiece of the 19th century, the 'immortal' game Anderssen–Kiezeritsky. Almost unanimously the experts acknowledged this game to be the best in the 52nd volume of \textit{Informator} (putting the previous, 8th game of the match, in second place). \textit{We simply cannot resist the magic of the sacrifice, because enthusiasm for sacrifice lies in the nature of man!} (Rudolf Spielmann).

What was the reason for Yusupov's rather ironic attitude to what happened? The point is that what he values in chess is not so much outward effects, but rather the deep and objective correctness of decisions taken. These qualities are in principle not compatible with accelerated time controls, with which it is not possible to calculate variations accurately.

Black's attack set his opponent, at a point when he was short of time, quite difficult problems. But what significance does it have, whether or not the sacrifice was correct, and how necessary it was to go in for such a risky undertaking? However, for a serious game such an approach is no longer legitimate – the probability that the opponent will find a refutation increases significantly.

Making a deep analysis of rapid games is a rather pointless exercise, but in this case an exception should perhaps be made. Let us return again to certain key moments.

The poor move 13 f4? opened the floodgates for Black's attack, based on the formidable strength of the e3 pawn. ('The next time that you invite the opponent to advance a pawn to e3, you should be sure that you will be able to eliminate it!' – Seirawan).

Many experts thought that, by playing 13 \textit{\&}f3! followed by \textit{\&}ge4, White would have gained the advantage. Yusupov does not agree
with this evaluation. Here is his variation:

13...\textit{Qf8} 14 \textit{Qe4} (14 \textit{Qce4} \textit{Qf5} 15 \textit{Wc3 \textit{Qxe4} c5}) 14...

15 \textit{Wc1 \textit{Qxe4} 16 \textit{Qxe4 \textit{Qxe4} 17 fxe4} c5 18 e5 \textit{Qe6!} 19

\textit{exd6 \textit{Wxd6} 20 \textit{Qxb7} (20 dxc5!? \textit{Wc7}) 20...

\textit{Qxd4!} with excellent counterplay. Instead of 16 \textit{Qxe4} White can consider 16

\textit{fxe4!} \textit{Qg4} 17 e5. The game Schulz-

Jackelen (Porz 1990) went 17...

\textit{Qg5} 18 \textit{Qxd6 \textit{Wh6} 19 h3 \textit{Qf2} 20 \textit{Qe4! \textit{Qxd1} 21

\textit{Qxd1 \textit{Qd7} 22 \textit{Wf1 \textit{Qf8} 23 c5, and White

gained an obvious advantage. But all of this

is hardly forced. Black can try, for example,

17...f5!? 18 \textit{Qxd6 \textit{Wg5}. So long as the e3

pawn is alive, there remains hope of

developing a counterattack.

We already know that the sacrifice of two

pieces was objectively not the strongest

continuation. But the question is, could

White have refuted it and won? Let us

examine the position which would have

arisen after 25 \textit{Qe7+}! (instead of 25

\textit{Qde7+?}) 25...\textit{Qh8} 26 \textit{Qxf5 \textit{Wh2+} 27 \textit{Qf1}.

\begin{center}

![Chess Diagram]

\end{center}

The f4 pawn is attacked, and therefore Black

has no time for moves such as 27...

\textit{Qxe6 or 27...Qg8. However, his resources are by no

means exhausted. There is the brilliant

stroke 27...\textit{Qe5!!}, covering the f4 pawn and

vacating the g-file. (With the knight at c6,

this would not have been possible – is it this

that explains Ivanchuk's choice?)

Q 5-27. How should White continue?

A convincing analysis is given in his comments by Seirawan. He considers three

main moves:

28 \textit{Qxe5+}, 28 \textit{dxe5} and 28 \textit{Wb7}.

A) 28 \textit{Qxe5+ \textit{Qxe5} 29 dxe5 \textit{Qg8} A threat

that is already familiar to us has been

created: 30...\textit{Qh1+!! After 30 \textit{Qdxe3 \textit{fxe3}

31 \textit{Qxe3 \textit{Wf4+} 32 \textit{Qe1 \textit{Qxe3} Black, as it is

not hard to see, retains a decisive attack.

Only the clever defence, suggested by

Christiansen, promises to rescue White: 30

\textit{Qg7!! and if 30...\textit{Qxg7, then 31 \textit{Wb8+ \textit{Qg8}

32 \textit{Qxg8+ \textit{Qxg8} 33 \textit{Wf6+ (33 \textit{Qd4!? K.Neat) 33...

\textit{Qxf6 34 \textit{Qxf6.}

B) 28 \textit{Wb7 \textit{Qxd6} (but not 28...\textit{Qg8? in view

of 29 \textit{Qxe5+ \textit{Qxe5} 30 \textit{Qdxe3} 29 \textit{Qxd6}

(risky is 29 \textit{Qf6 \textit{Qxf6} 30 \textit{Qxd6 \textit{Wh4} 31 \textit{Wh3

\textit{Qg4 or 31 \textit{Qxf7+ \textit{Qg8} 32 \textit{Qxh6+ \textit{Qxh6})

29...\textit{Qh4 30 \textit{Qxf7+ \textit{Qg8, and a draw after

31 \textit{Qg1 \textit{Qf2+ is perhaps the logical result.

C) 28 dxe5! It transpires that after 28...\textit{Qg8

White parries the threatened queen sacri-

fice by 29 \textit{Qdxe3! \textit{fxe3 (29...\textit{Qxe3+ 30

\textit{Qxe3 \textit{fxe3} 31 \textit{Wb7) 30 e6! No better is

28...\textit{f3 29 \textit{exf3 \textit{e2+ 30 \textit{Qxe2 \textit{Wxg2+ 31 \textit{Qd3.}

Thus Black's attack can indeed be refuted,

but the correct defence is not easy to find

even in analysis.

And now let us see what would have

happened in the game after 25 \textit{Qde7+?

\textit{Wh8} 26 \textit{Qxf5 \textit{Wh2+ 27 \textit{Qf1 \textit{Qe6! Instead of

28 \textit{Wb7 White could have tried 28 \textit{Qe7?!,

trying not to allow the rook onto the g-file.

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\textit{Qe6! Instead of

28 \textit{Wb7 White could have tried 28 \textit{Qe7?!,

trying not to allow the rook onto the g-file.}
Q 6-28. How should the attack be continued?

28...\textit{xd6}? 29 \textit{xd6} does not work in view of the resulting threat of mate to the black king: 30 \textit{xxt7+ \textit{h7} 31 \textit{d3} mate. 28...\textit{f6}? 29 \textit{b7} is also bad.

The following line leads to a draw: 28...\textit{xe7} 29 \textit{xe7} \textit{f3} 30 exf3\textit{ e2+ 31 \textit{xe2 \textit{xg2+ 32 \textit{d3 \textit{xf3+ is dangerous, but White can try 31 \textit{e1! as suggested by Graham Burgess) 29...\textit{g3} 30 \textit{g1}. However, as Seirawan pointed out, Black can play much more strongly.

28...\textit{g8!! What can White do now? If 29 \textit{xg8, then 29...\textit{g6 (threatening 30...\textit{h1+!!) 30 \textit{xe3 \textit{xe3+ 31 \textit{e1 (31 \textit{xe3 \textit{g2+ 32 \textit{e1 \textit{xe3) 31...\textit{xe2 32 \textit{d3 \textit{f1! with the deadly threats of 33...\textit{f4+ and 33...\textit{g3. 29 \textit{d3} is strongly met by 29...\textit{f8 (of course, not 29...\textit{f6? 30 \textit{xg8} 30 \textit{g8 \textit{g6} 31 \textit{xe3 \textit{xe3+ 32 \textit{e1 \textit{xd6. After 29 \textit{b7, apart from 29...\textit{f8, Black can also play 29...\textit{xd4. Finally, in the event of 29 \textit{b2 Black should not go in for the variation suggested by Seirawan, 29...\textit{f8 30 \textit{d5+ \textit{h7 31 \textit{xg8 \textit{g6} 32 \textit{f6+ \textit{xf6 33 \textit{xe3 \textit{xd6} in view of 34 \textit{xf6! \textit{xf6 35 \textit{g4, but instead play the thematic 29...\textit{e5!! 30 \textit{xe5+ \textit{xe5 31 \textit{g8 \textit{g6} 32 \textit{b7 f3 with inevitable mate (Burgess).

In the 10th game the roles were reversed. Now it was Ivanchuk who had to try and win at any cost, whereas Artur was satisfied with a draw. See how he gained this draw.

\textbf{Yusupov – Ivanchuk}

10th match game, Brussels 1991

\begin{tabular}{ll}
1 & d4 \textit{f6} \\
2 & c4 e6 \\
3 & \textit{c3!}
\end{tabular}

Usually Yusupov plays 3 \textit{f3}, aiming for the Queen’s Indian Defence. But for the candidates match he prepared the Nimzo-Indian Defence and was successful against it with White, scoring two wins with two draws.

The Nimzo-Indian Defence usually leads to complicated, double-edged play. 3 \textit{f3} is a rather quieter move, and so there was a strong temptation to play that. Of course, this would not have been a ‘mistake’. But if also subsequently you once or twice choose accurate moves instead of the most critical, the initiative may imperceptibly pass to the opponent. A cautious mood normally leads to passivity and as a result it does not reduce, but on the contrary it increases the danger of defeat. Realising this, Yusupov decided to fight to the utmost, without regard for the competitive significance of the game.

\begin{tabular}{ll}
3 & ... \textit{b4} \\
4 & e3 c5 \\
5 & \textit{d3 c6} \\
6 & \textit{f3 \textit{xc3}+} \\
7 & \textit{bxc3 d6}
\end{tabular}

This opening set-up (very much in the spirit of Nimzowitsch) was introduced into modern tournament play by grandmaster Robert Hübner at the 1970 Interzonal Tournament in Palma de Mallorca. Ivanchuk’s choice is psychologically fully justified – non-standard
positions arise here, and the slightest inaccuracy by his opponent usually allows Black to block the white bishops and to set about exploiting the pawn weaknesses.

8 0–0 e5
9 w.e2?!

Here it is, an inaccuracy! If White wanted to carry out the manoeuvre g5–e4, he should have done this immediately.

9 ... 0–0
10 g5 h6
11 g4 b6
12 xfx6 wxf6
13 e4 b7
14 dxc5 dxc5
15 d5 a5
16 e4

The plan of occupying the d5 square with the bishop was found in the 1930s by Botvinnik, but in the given situation it does not give White anything.

16 ... wg6
17 f4 xxd5?

An unfortunate exchange. 17...exf4 18 xfx4 xad8 was much stronger, intending 19... xdx5 20 cxd5 xdx5 or 19...a6. This position was reached (by a transposition of moves) in the game Sande–Csom, played in the 1980 Olympiad in Malta.

18 cxd5 exf4
19 xf4 bae8
20 xae1 x4
21 wg2 x4
22 g3

Now White is intending 23 f5, and if 23...f6, then the exchange on e5 leads to a pawn formation that is favourable, and, more importantly, absolutely safe for White: the protected passed pawn at d5 insures him against any surprises.

22 ... wd6!

Livanchuk skilfully impedes his opponent's plans. If 23 f5 there follows not 23...f6? 24 wh5! (24...g6? 25 xxe5), but 23...g6! and only then 24...f6.

23 wh5 we7!

Black is preparing 24...c3 followed by 25...c4, when the powerful knight at d3 hinders White's manoeuvring, and prepares the ground for a counterattack or the transition into a favourable ending. Black's plan can be countered simply by retreating the queen to e2. But once again, this is not in Artur's style. He chooses the most critical continuation, sharply complicating the position.

24 xf5!? x4
25 x3 c4
26 d6 we6
27 ad5

Q 5-29. What do you think about 27...f5?
By playing this, Black would have fallen into the trap set by his opponent: 28 $\text{fxf5!}$ $\text{xf5}$
29 $\text{wxh5}$ $\text{xf5}$ 30 $\text{exf5}$ $\text{xe3}$ 31 $\text{d7}$, and the pawn promotes.

27 ... $\text{ed8!}$
28 $\text{h3!}$

We are already familiar with this procedure from the chapter 'Don't let the king interfere!' Since White cannot undertake anything specific, it makes sense for him to improve in good time the position of his king.

28 $\text{.ed7}$
29 $\text{h2}$
30 $\text{a4}$
31 $\text{a6}$
32 $\text{e8?}$

The rook should have been placed on c8. Now Yusupov had available a simple combination: 31 $\text{exd3!}$ cxd3 32 $\text{e5}$ $\text{xe5}$ 33 $\text{xe5}$ g6 (33...d2 34 $\text{f4}$) 34 $\text{g4}$ and wins. Perhaps Ivanchuk had been counting on interposing 31...g6!? (instead of 31...cxd3) 32 $\text{wxh6}$ cxd3 – now 33 $\text{e5?}$ $\text{wxh5}$ 34 $\text{hxg6}$ $\text{exh6}$ hands the advantage to Black. However, after 33 $\text{d4!}$ White achieves a clear advantage: the opponent has to reckon both with the threat of a mating attack by 34 e5 and 35 $\text{h4}$, and with the return of the queen to d2 with the aim of taking on d3, obtaining two pawns for the exchange.

31 $\text{d4}$

After defending his e4 pawn, White is ready to play 32 $\text{f3}$.

31 ... $\text{f5!}$

Ivanchuk’s desire to complicate the play is psychologically quite understandable, but the complications prove not to be in his favour.

Q 5-50. What should White do?

As was shown by John Nunn, White could have decided the outcome by 32 $\text{xc4!}$ g6 (32...$\text{xc4}$ 33 $\text{xe8+}$) 33 $\text{hxh6}$ $\text{xc4}$ 34 $\text{hg6+}$ $\text{f8}$. Now, from the standpoint of concluding the match, the simplest was 35 $\text{xd3}$ $\text{xd3}$ 36 $\text{f6+}$ (but not 36 $\text{f4}$ $\text{g7}$
37 $\text{hxh6}$ $\text{xc3}$ with the threat of 38...$\text{e5+}$) 36...$\text{g8}$ 37 $\text{g6+}$, forcing perpetual check. But objectively stronger was 35 $\text{f3!}$ $\text{f7}$ (35...f4 36 $\text{xf4}$ $\text{xf4}$ 37 $\text{xf4+}$ $\text{f7}$ 38 $\text{g4}$) 36 $\text{exf5}$ (threatening 37 $\text{h6+}$ $\text{g8}$ 38 $\text{e5}$) 36...$\text{g7}$ 37 $\text{h6}$ $\text{g8}$ 38 $\text{f6}$ and Black is helpless.

32 $\text{exd3?!}$

Yusupov admitted after the game that he had been carefully watching for ...$\text{f7-f5}$, and he had in mind quite a good reply. When the opponent in fact played this, Artur quickly, without additionally checking (time was short), made the previously planned move.

We see how the specific nature of rapid chess, as one would expect, affected adversely the play of both players. They made several mistakes, and so up till now the game was of interest only from the psychological point of view. But now, when the play has become much sharper, the players begin acting accurately and inventively.
In the event of 33...f7? 34 e3 White has an obvious advantage.

Now White loses after 35 dxe4? xe4 36 xe6+ xe6 37 fxe6 dxe6 38 dxe6 d2. The grandmasters gathered in the press centre were expecting 35 d5 d2 36 f6, when there follows 36...e6, and the position probably favours Black. Yusupov found another possibility.

The bishop joins the battle against the passed pawn. However, at the same time White has to reckon with 35...xf4? 36 xf4 d2.

Q 5-31. What should White do?

Of course, 37 f6? does not work in view of 37...e5! (but not 37...d1? 38 f7+ e8 39 h7 or 39 g7+ with a draw). The following line suggests itself: 37 d4 e5+ 38 h1 (bad is 38 g3 xd4 39 cxd4 d1? 40 e5 h5) 38...f7 (38...xd4 39 e8+ 39 g4, gaining a draw, since 39...xf5? is refuted by 40 xf5! xd4 41 d7 f1+ 42 h2 f4+ 43 e4 d1? 44 d4. However, by choosing 38...e8! (instead of 38...f7)

39 e6 (39 g4 xd6) 39...xd4 40 cxd4 d1+ 41 h2 xd4. Black wins.

The only way to draw is 37 e6+! xe6 38 fxe6 d1? (38...xd6 39 e7 e6 40 d4) 39 e7!!

After spending almost all his time on the calculation of the combination, Ivanchuk chooses another way, but here too the opponent has a surprise in store for him.

35...f7?

36...xf4 is now threatened, and if 36 d7? there follows simply 36...xd4 37 xd4 d7.

36 e5!

By blocking the e-file, White prepares the advance of his passed pawn. If 36...e5 there also follows 37 d7. As we will now see, the stroke found by Yusupov involves a temporary rook sacrifice, but in the last few games that had already become habitual for him.

The advance of the d-pawn can also be prepared by 36 d5. After 36...f1 (but not 36...e8? 37 d7 d8 38 e6) 37 d7! (as was pointed out by Ken Neat, 37 e5 is bad because of 37...e1! 38 d7 g1+ 39 g3 e3+ 40 h4 f2+ 41 g3 e4+) 37...xf4+ 38 g3 xg3+ 39 xg3 xd7 40 xd7 xa4 a drawn rook ending would have resulted.

36...f4

37 cxd4 d2

38 d7 xe5!

39 dxe5 d1?

40 e6 xd6+

If 40...f8, then 41 e7 xd7 or 41 f6 xf6! would have led to a draw, but Black would have had to reckon with 41 g3!? xd4 42 e7 xd7 43 f6! However, after 43...g5 44 b3+ f7 45 xb6 xxe7 46 fx7 xe7 47 g6+ g7 48 xa6 e5+ things would most probably have ended in perpetual check.
41 \( \text{Wg3!} \)
Simpler than 41 \( \text{Wh1} \) \( \text{xf8} \) 42 \( \text{We8!} \) (bad is 42 f6 \( \text{xf6} \) 43 \( \text{We8+} \) \( \text{Wh7} \), when 44...\( \text{xf1} \) mate is threatened).

41 ... \( \text{xd7!} \)
42 \( \text{exd7} \) \( \text{Wd7} \)
43 f6 \( b5 \)
44 axb5 \( axb5 \)
45 f\( xg7 \) \( \text{Wxg7} \)
46 \( \text{Wb3+} \)

The queen ending is of course drawn, but just a couple of seconds remained on Ivanchuk's clock (and he still had fifteen moves to make before the control). Artur offered a draw, and in reply his opponent... resigned, and promptly left the playing hall. The controllers were perplexed.

'How did the game end?', the arbiter asked Yusupov.

'Draw'.

'But I heard him resign!'

'That's not important, since I offered a draw, and in any case the position is drawn', replied the grandmaster.

As a result, a peaceful end to this very tense encounter was recorded, and for the third time in succession Yusupov reached the semi-finals of the candidates competition for the world championship.

'Of course, I could have made my opponent's flag fall, but why spoil an interesting game with pointless time trouble moves?', Artur explained to me later.
Diamond Cut Diamond

The main resource of defence – composure – was fully utilised by my opponent. At one point I was forced to interrupt the calculation of variations and ask myself:
just who is attacking whom?

David Bronstein

Almost all the attacks that we have analysed in this part of the book, although extremely dangerous, nevertheless did not lead to a forced win – they could have been parried. And the fact that in the end they were successful does not indicate a superiority of the sword over the shield in general, but merely in these specific games. It is also not hard to select examples with a directly opposite outcome.

What advice can be given to defenders? In particular, do not lose your composure in a dangerous situation, but maintain your presence of mind, and believe in the latent resources of your position. Carefully watch for your opponent’s attacking possibilities, and calculate variations accurately. Exploit typical defensive procedures, such as returning additional material at an appropriate moment, simplifying the position, and diverting the enemy pieces from the attack by counter threats.

Dorfman – Dolmatov
Rostov on Don 1980

10 c4 c5
10 d2? 
. . .
10 . . .

Later games revealed sounder ways of handling this position.

a) Seirawan–Yusupov (Interzonal Tournament, Toluca 1982): 10... a5+ 11 d2 c7 12 c3 (in the event of 12 g4 Artur was planning a positional exchange sacrifice: 12...0–0!? 13 h6 g6 14 xf8 a5+ 15 d2 x(f8) 12...f6 13 h4 cxd4 14 xd4 (or 14 xd4 a6 with chances for both sides) 14...0–0 15 d1 d8 16 d3 e5? 17 h4 (17 xe5? e8) 17...h6 18 0–0 g4, and Black equalised.

b) Gorelov–Kishnev (Moscow 1984): 10... e7 11 xe7 a5+! (after 11...xe7 12 0–0–0 White has the freer position) 12 d2 xe7 13 0–0–0 d8! 14 xh7 f6 15 xg7 cxd4 16 g5 d7! with excellent prospects for Black.

10 h4 cxd4
12 0–0–0!

After 12 xd4 b4+ the position would have simplified. Not wishing to allow this, Iossif Dorfman sacrifices a pawn. His opponent accepts the challenge.

12 . . .
13 . . .

Harmless is 13 xe5 xe5 14 e1 a5 (the rook is attacked) 15 f4 g4.

Black prepares casting, but now his position
does indeed become dangerous. In Dolmatov's opinion, he should have urgently created counterplay by 13... \textit{\textLambda }e6 14 \textit{\textLambda }he1 \textit{\textLambda }b5?, or even 13...\textit{\textLambda }b5? immediately. In case of necessity, the king could have hidden at f8.

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How can White now exploit his clear lead in development? The Leningrad master Pavel Kondratiev recommends 14 \textit{\textLambda }xe5! and gives two variations:

a) 14...\textit{\textLambda }xe5 15 \textit{\textLambda }he1 0-0 16 \textit{\textLambda }xe5 \textit{\textLambda }xg5 17 \textit{\textLambda }xg5 with irresistible threats;

b) 14...0-0 15 \textit{\textLambda }xh6! (for myself I should mention that the simple 15 \textit{\textLambda }xh6 \textit{\textLambda }xh6 16 \textit{\textLambda }xg6 \textit{\textLambda }xg6 17 \textit{\textLambda }c3 also retains the advantage for White) 15...\textit{\textLambda }xh6 (15...\textit{\textLambda }xe5 16 \textit{\textLambda }xg7 \textit{\textLambda }xg7 17 \textit{\textLambda }g5+ \textit{\textLambda }h8 18 \textit{\textLambda }xe5 \textit{\textLambda }e8 19 \textit{\textLambda }f4) 16 \textit{\textLambda }xh6 \textit{\textLambda }e8 (16...\textit{\textLambda }e6 17 \textit{\textLambda }c2! 17 \textit{\textLambda }g5+ \textit{\textLambda }f8 18 \textit{\textLambda }xf7 \textit{\textLambda }xf7 19 \textit{\textLambda }g6+ \textit{\textLambda }g8 20 \textit{\textLambda }xe8 \textit{\textLambda }e8 21 \textit{\textLambda }xd4, and White has the advantage.

The comparatively best defence is offered by 14...\textit{\textLambda }xe5 15 \textit{\textLambda }he1 \textit{\textLambda }e7 (bad is 15...\textit{\textLambda }d7? 16 \textit{\textLambda }xe5 \textit{\textLambda }xg5 17 \textit{\textLambda }xd4+ \textit{\textLambda }c7 18 \textit{\textLambda }c5+) 16 \textit{\textLambda }f4 (16 \textit{\textLambda }b1!! comes into consideration) 16...\textit{\textLambda }xf4+ 17 \textit{\textLambda }xf4 (17 \textit{\textLambda }xf4 \textit{\textLambda }e6 18 \textit{\textLambda }xf6 \textit{\textLambda }xg6 19 \textit{\textLambda }xf6 \textit{\textLambda }g6 with an acceptable position for Black) 17...\textit{\textLambda }e6. For example, 18 \textit{\textLambda }e5 \textit{\textLambda }g4 19 \textit{\textLambda }xe7+ \textit{\textLambda }xe7 20 \textit{\textLambda }xd4 \textit{\textLambda }xh2?! The initiative is with White, of course, but for the moment the outcome remains unclear.

However, the piece sacrifice made by Dorfman also looks very tempting. The following stage of the game constitutes an excellent exercise for playing – Black has to find a series of strictly forced moves.

14 \textit{\textLambda }he1 0-0

15 \textit{\textLambda }xh6 gxh6

16 \textit{\textLambda }xh6 \textit{\textLambda }f6!

Black defends the e5 pawn and vacates the f8 square for his king or bishop. The incorrect 16...\textit{\textLambda }g4? would have been refuted by 17 \textit{\textLambda }g5! \textit{\textLambda }xh1 18 \textit{\textLambda }h7+ \textit{\textLambda }g8 19 \textit{\textLambda }f5+ \textit{\textLambda }g8 20 \textit{\textLambda }e4 (or 20 \textit{\textLambda }xf1 with the irresistible threat of 21 \textit{\textLambda }e4).

17 \textit{\textLambda }g5 \textit{\textLambda }e6!

Everything else loses, e.g. 17...\textit{\textLambda }e4? (17...\textit{\textLambda }f6? 18 \textit{\textLambda }h7+) 18 \textit{\textLambda }xe4 (also strong is 18 \textit{\textLambda }xe4 \textit{\textLambda }xe4 19 \textit{\textLambda }xe4 or 18...\textit{\textLambda }xe4 19 \textit{\textLambda }g5+! \textit{\textLambda }h8 20 \textit{\textLambda }xe4 with irresistible threats) 18...\textit{\textLambda }xe4 19 \textit{\textLambda }xe4 \textit{\textLambda }xe4 20 \textit{\textLambda }xe4. The game Hauchard–Schlosser, Herzeliya 1998, in which all these moves were made, concluded as follows: 20...\textit{\textLambda }c7 21 \textit{\textLambda }h7+ \textit{\textLambda }g8 22 \textit{\textLambda }xd4 \textit{\textLambda }e5 23 \textit{\textLambda }g6+ \textit{\textLambda }g8 24 \textit{\textLambda }xd8+ Black resigns. This means that he must simply defend his f7 and patiently wait to see what his opponent will do.

18 \textit{\textLambda }h7+ \textit{\textLambda }xh7

19 \textit{\textLambda }xh7+

White could also have considered 19 \textit{\textLambda }xh7 \textit{\textLambda }e7 (19...\textit{\textLambda }f5?? 20 \textit{\textLambda }g6+ \textit{\textLambda }h8 21 \textit{\textLambda }xf6) 20 \textit{\textLambda }d3 (weaker is 20 \textit{\textLambda }xe5 \textit{\textLambda }c7!, when Black acquires counter-threats). But after 20...\textit{\textLambda }f5 21 \textit{\textLambda }g3+ \textit{\textLambda }g6 22 \textit{\textLambda }xf6+ \textit{\textLambda }xf6 23 \textit{\textLambda }xg6+ \textit{\textLambda }h8 24 \textit{\textLambda }h6 \textit{\textLambda }g8 White has only a draw, since the attempt to continue the attack by 25 \textit{\textLambda }e4?! encounters the strong reply 25...\textit{\textLambda }c8! 26 b3 \textit{\textLambda }f5.
Q 5-32. To where should the king move?

Let us first consider 20...\( \text{g}8 \). 21 \( \text{xd4?} \) exd4 22 \( \text{xe6??} \) is not possible because of 22...\( \text{f}4+ \), and also bad is 21 \( \text{e}4? \) \( \text{c}8 \) 22 b3 \( \text{xc4} \) or 22 \( \text{b}1 \) \( \text{f}5 \). However, White has two ways to win:

a) 21 \( \text{d}3! \), and the obvious reply 21...\( \text{c}8 \) (with the clever idea of 22 \( \text{g}3? \) \( \text{c}4+ \) 23 \( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{g}4+!! \)) does not achieve its aim in view of 22 \( \text{e}4! \) \( \text{c}4+ \) 23 \( \text{c}3 \). No better is 21...\( \text{a}5 \) 22 \( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 23 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{c}4+ \) 24 \( \text{d}1 \).

b) 21 \( \text{e}4! \) \( \text{e}7 \) (21...\( \text{f}5 \) 22 \( \text{d}3! \) 22 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 23 \( \text{h}3! \) 16 (23...\( \text{xh3} \) 24 \( \text{g}xh3 \) 24 \( \text{g}3+ \) \( \text{f}7 \) 25 \( \text{g}7+ \) \( \text{e}6 \) 26 \( \text{g}5+ \) \( \text{d}7 \) 27 \( \text{xf6} \), and White's attack is irresistible.

It stands to reason that Dolmatov did not calculate all these variations in detail, but he correctly sensed that clinging on to the material advantage was too dangerous. He made use of an appropriate opportunity to return the material and force the transition into an ending.

20 ... \( \text{e}7! \)

21 \( \text{x}6 \) \( \text{h}8! \)

Of course, not 21...\( \text{f}6 ?? \) 22 \( \text{g}7 \) mate.

Now White is forced to exchange queens.

22 \( \text{x}8 \) \( \text{x}6 \)

23 \( \text{x}7 \) \( \text{d}7! \)

The only defence against the threat of 24 \( \text{d}4 \). Now Black wants to take the \( \text{h}2 \) pawn, and if 24 \( \text{h}3 \) there follows 24...\( \text{g}8 \) 25 \( \text{g}1 \) \( \text{b}4 \) 26 a3 \( \text{b}6 \) 27 \( \text{xb4} \) \( \text{xb7} \) 28 b5 \( \text{c}8 \).

24 \( \text{x}6 \)

A highly instructive situation has arisen. White is two pawns up, but all Black's pieces are very active, and his central pawns may become dangerous. If now 25 \( \text{h}3 \), then 25...\( \text{xg}8 \) 26 14 (26 \( \text{g}1 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 27 b3 e4) 26...f6 27 \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{c}3! \), and the material advantage is not felt at all. Therefore Dorfman sensibly decides to force a draw.

25 \( \text{f}6 \)

26 \( \text{g}4 \) \( \text{xh}2 \)

27 \( \text{d}2 \)

27 g5 \( \text{b}8! \)

27 ... \( \text{h}4! \)

In the event of the exchange of rooks, White would have been able to advance g4-g5.

28 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{g}8 \)

29 \( \text{e}2 \)

29 g5 \( \text{x}4 \).

29 ... \( \text{g}xg4 \)

30 \( \text{f}xg5+ \) \( \text{xe}5 \)

31 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{d}3! \)

32 \( \text{c}5+ \) \( \text{c}6 \)

Draw. A well-played game by both players, and an excellent example of calm and accurate defence.

Subsequently we will not any more dwell specially on defence against mating attacks, and will turn to an examination of the problems of defence as a whole, and, more precisely, to the psychological aspects of defending.
The Psychology of Defence

I have included in this book many of my own games. Some authors explain away such a procedure by claiming they understand their own games best and therefore they can best serve as didactic examples. My reason is more simple — vanity.

Raymond Keene

Defence is an equally inseparable and important element of chess, as attack. If one of the players has an advantage, it means that the other has to defend an inferior position. You will not always be the stronger side, so that there is no way of getting by without an ability to defend.

The basic principle of defence is to make the opponent’s task as hard as possible, and to keep erecting barriers in his way. But this is too general a formulation. Let’s think by what means we can make life hard for the opponent.

Primarily, of course, by purely chess means. By soberly assessing the position and carefully calculating variations, we will find the objectively best, most tenacious moves. With their help we will most probably save an inferior position, if it can be saved, or at least we will prolong the battle, forcing the opponent to overcome fierce resistance.

But sometimes an even greater effect is given by playing for psychology. If you are able suddenly to change sharply the situation on the board (perhaps even by choosing a continuation which is objectively not the strongest, but involves considerable risk), your opponent, already tuned to a certain pattern of play, will often be unable to retune and will begin making mistakes.

The pattern of the play may be changed in various ways. For example, when defending against an attack on the king, it often makes sense to force the transition into an endgame, even if this endgame is not too good for you. Or you may sacrifice material, to force the opponent to switch from attack to defence.

In strategically difficult situations it can be useful to sharply complicate the play, forcing the opponent, who is tuned to the calm exploitation of his advantage, to engage in the calculation of concrete variations, and a search for the only correct moves. With this aim you sometimes again have to go in for material sacrifices, or, on the contrary, grab something, even if in return you risk coming under a fierce attack. Finally, the pattern of the play can also be changed by moves that are committing in the strategic sense, involving certain positional concessions.

Sometimes it is practically impossible to draw the line between psychological and purely chess decisions. When aiming for a sharp change in the character of the play, we sometimes find a continuation that turns out to be correct not only from the psychological point of view, but also objectively. However, this distinction is not so significant. In all the examples that we will consider, the main thing is the psychological resoluteness to break the unfavourable course of the play, and whether or not the method found is completely correct is a secondary matter, although, of course, it is also important. With the accumulation of practical experience you will learn to determine the measure of acceptable risk, which, incidentally, strongly depends on how bad the initial position is.

The majority of the episodes given below are taken from my games. In the opening stage
I very often acted in far from the best manner and quickly encountered difficulties. Like it or not, I had to learn to extricate myself from dubious situations, and to develop, so to speak, my 'escapology' technique.

I will begin with an ending which vividly shows the motives that force a player to change sharply the character of the play, and also the difference between an 'objective' and 'psychological' solution to a position.

Dvoretsky – Khachaturov
Moscow 1972

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![Chessboard](image)

**Q5-33. How would you evaluate the position (it is Black to move)?**

I thought that the game would end with a repetition of moves: 23...c2 24 c2+ 25 f1 c2. However, Andrey Khachaturov played differently.

23 d5!

To successfully organise a defence, it is very important to recognise in good time the impending danger, and to realise that your position is inferior and demands well thought-out defensive action. Carelessness and unjustified optimism have ruined many a game, when there was no reason at all to lose.

After the move made by my opponent I, fortunately, immediately sensed that I stood worse. Black is intending 24...d6 (tying the rook to the defence of the f4 pawn) and only then 25...c2. The activity of his rook will enable him either to win a pawn, or, after attacking the bishop at d4, to begin advancing his passed d-pawn. For the moment the white knight has no right to leave the g3 square, since it is unfavourable to allow the enemy knight to go to f5. And the latter, on the other hand, may in some cases also go to g4, as for example in the variations 24 b1 c2 25 b2 c1+ 26 f2 g4+, or 24 d1 c2 25 e3? g4.

At the board I did not find a reliable plan of defence, and, realising that 'approximate' play move by move might lead White to disaster, after twenty minutes’ thought I decided on a rather risky pawn sacrifice.

Meanwhile, there was also a 'normal' plan (also, however, quite concrete). 24 d1!? was possible, not fearing 24...d6 25 e3 with the threats of 26 xd5 and 26 c1. I was concerned about 24...c2, but then there follows 25 f1!! f5 (25...xa2 26 e3) 26 e3 xd4 27 xc2 (but not 27 xd4? c3!) 27...xc2 28 xd5, and the rook is no weaker than the opponent’s two minor pieces. After 24 d1 the quiet move 24...d7!? is probably more unpleasant for White.

24 h3!? d6
25 e3!

In the event of the passive 25 f2 c1+ 26 h2 d1 or 25 f3 c2 26 a4 d2 Black can either immediately advance his d-pawn, or first bring his king towards the centre. It was such an unfavourable turn of events that I firmly decided to avoid.

25...
c3

White was threatening 26 c1 with full equality; if 25...c2 there would have fol-
lowed 26 \textit{B}c1 \textit{B}xa2 27 \textit{B}c6.

26 \textit{B}f2! \textit{B}c2+

26...d4 27 \textit{B}xd4 \textit{B}xg3 28 \textit{B}xg3 \textit{B}f5+ 29 \textit{B}f3 \textit{B}xd4+ 30 \textit{B}e4 is not dangerous for White.

27 \textit{B}f3 \textit{B}xa2

28 \textit{B}c1

White had aimed for this position. His king has come out towards the centre and supported his weak f4 pawn, while his rook has occupied the open file and wants to invade the opponent's position.

Was my plan of defence (or more precisely—counterattack) correct? I am not sure. A pawn is a pawn, and in addition Black may obtain a dangerous passed a-pawn, after winning the b3 pawn. But at any event White is no longer condemned to passivity; he has gained real counterplay.

The psychological effect of White's operation must also be taken into account. The opponent does not know that the pawn was sacrificed; he thinks that he won it logically, and that the remainder now is a matter of simple technique. As a result, instead of the full mobilisation of his powers that is required at that moment, the opposite picture is seen. His attention weakens, his vigilance is dulled, and mistakes, as experience shows, become almost inevitable.

28 ... \textit{B}b2?

Black should have battled for a win by 28...\textit{B}a3! 29 \textit{B}c6 \textit{B}b4 30 \textit{B}f2 a5! White has numerous active resources: \textit{B}h5, \textit{B}c7, \textit{B}c8+ followed by \textit{B}c7+, and f4-f5, but it is not clear whether they are sufficient to save the game.

29 \textit{B}c6 \textit{B}b4

30 \textit{B}xa6 \textit{B}xb3

31 \textit{B}f2 \textit{B}e1+?!

After this the draw becomes inevitable. But also after 31...d4!? 32 \textit{B}xd4 \textit{B}xg3 33 \textit{B}xg3 \textit{B}f5+ 34 \textit{B}f3 \textit{B}xd4+ 35 \textit{B}e4 it seems to me that White should not lose. On one occasion I saved a similar ending against Oleg Romanishin (it is analysed in the second part of Volume 1 of this series in the chapter 'The strongest piece is the rook!).

32 \textit{B}xe1 \textit{B}xe3+

33 \textit{B}f2 \textit{B}b3

34 \textit{B}d6 \textit{B}b5

34...\textit{B}xg3? 35 \textit{B}d8+.

35 \textit{B}d7 \textit{B}f3

35...\textit{B}f8 36 \textit{B}f3, and Black cannot strengthen his position.

36 \textit{B}f5

Threatening at least 37 \textit{B}xd5. Black cannot play 36...\textit{B}f8? 37 \textit{B}xf7+, and so he reconciles himself to a draw.

36 ... \textit{B}b2+

37 \textit{B}f3 \textit{B}b3+

38 \textit{B}f2

Draw.

A striving to force events, to change and if possible clarify advantageously the situation, often helps the correct decision to be found in a dubious position, but by no means always.
Marshall – Rubinstein
Lodz 1908

1  d4  d5
2  c4  e6
3  c3  c5
4  cxd5  exd5
5  f3  f6

5... c6 is more accurate, so as not to allow White's next move.

6  g5!?  e7

According to modern theory, 6... e6 7 e4 dxe4 8 xe4 cxd4 9 b5+ d7 10 0–0 e7
11 xf6 xb5 12 xe7 xe7 13 e1 0–0 is preferable, as in the game D.Gurevich–I.Ivanov (New York 1983), although here too Black stands worse.

7  dxc5  e6
8  c1  0–0
9  xf6  xf6
10  e3  a5
11  a3?!

White would have retained the advantage by playing 11 d2 c6 12 d4, when if 12... xc5 there follows 13 e4.

11  ...  c6
11... xc5? 12 b5 and 13 c7.

12  d3  xc5
13  h4!?

True to his aggressive style, Frank Marshall launches an attack on the king. White's plan is questionable – when the centre is open, flank attacks do not usually have chances of success. However, after the quiet 13 0–0 e7 Black would have retained a good position, while the pawn sacrifice 13 e4 a5+ 14 b4 xa3 15 xf6+ gxf6 is hardly correct.

13  ...  e7
14  g5

14 h7+? h7 15 g5+ does not work in view of 15... g8 16 h5 f5.

Q 5-34. How should Black continue?

The threat of 16 d3(c2) is highly unpleasant. In a middlegame with opposite colour bishops it is very important to seize the initiative at any price, and to force the opponent to defend, and therefore Rubinstein is quite right to launch a counterattack, involving a piece sacrifice.

16  ...  xh4!
17  g3

Marshall has to accept the challenge. He would have not achieved anything with 17 0–0 f6 18 d3 g5.

17  ...  xg3!
18  fxg3  g5
19  d3

White also has his threats. The great strategist Akiba Rubinstein did not feel too confident in such double-edged situations. It is not surprising that he diverges from the correct path and quickly loses a game in which he was standing well.
19...\textit{W}xg3+? 20 \textit{G}d2 \textit{Hf2}+? 21 \textit{G}e2 \textit{Ge5}
22 \textit{Wh7}+ \textit{Gf7} 23 \textit{Ec7}+ \textit{Gf6} 24 \textit{Gxh6}+
Black resigns.

Instead of the faulty 19...\textit{W}xg3+? Marshall recommends 19...\textit{G}e5 20 \textit{Wh7}+ \textit{Gf7} 21 \textit{Gf1}+ \textit{Gf7}. However, Yusupov rightly pointed out that there is no point in checking with the rook – stronger is 21 \textit{G}e2! (with the threat of 22 \textit{Ec7}+) 21...\textit{Eac8} 22 \textit{Exc8} \textit{Exc8} 23 0-0+ \textit{Gf7} 24 \textit{E}f4, and the compensation for the piece may prove insufficient.

At one of our sessions Artur and I played the position arising after White's 16th move. He, like Rubinstein, sacrificed the bishop, but on the 19th move he chose a far stronger continuation.

\begin{itemize}
  \item 19 \textit{...} \textit{Gf5}!
  \item 20 \textit{G}e2 \textit{Ge5}
  \item 21 \textit{Wb3} \textit{Gf3}
\end{itemize}

\textbf{Q 5-35. Calculate the consequences of 22 \textit{Wxb7}.}

I saw the objectively correct move 22 \textit{Ec3}!, but I did not want to make it, since after 22...\textit{Gaf8} the tension is retained, and White again has to calculate variations and choose the best defence. As in the previous example, I tried to find a more concrete and forcing way, changing the situation on the board, and I very soon persuaded myself that I had found it.

\begin{align*}
22 & \textit{Wxb7} ? \textit{Gf8} \\
23 & \textit{Ee8} \textit{Wxe3} \\
24 & \textit{Exf8}+ \textit{Gxf8} \\
25 & \textit{Gf1} \\
\end{align*}

I was hoping to obtain a good game after 25...\textit{E}f3+ 26 \textit{Gxf3} \textit{Gxf3} 27 \textit{Gxd2}! In principle, not a bad 'escapology' ploy; by returning the extra material, White would have sharply changed the character of the play – simplified the position and eliminated the opponent's attack (in such situations a knight securely covers the king), and would himself have been able to hope to exploit the vulnerability of the a7 and e6 pawns. Alas, Yusupov's reply came as an unpleasant surprise to me.

\begin{align*}
25 & \textit{...} \textit{E}f1+! \\
26 & \textit{Gxf1} \textit{Wf3}+ \\
27 & \textit{Gg1} \\
27 & \textit{Ee1} \textit{Wh1}+ 28 \textit{Gd2} \textit{Gc4}+ 29 \textit{Gc2} \textit{Ge4}+ is equally hopeless.
27 & \textit{...} \textit{Wxe2} \\
28 & \textit{Wb8}+ \textit{Gf7} \\
29 & \textit{Wxa7}+ \\
29 & \textit{Ec7}+ \textit{Ge8} 30 \textit{Wb8}+ \textit{Gf7} 31 \textit{Ee7}+ \textit{E}d7.
29 & \textit{...} \textit{Gf6} \\
30 & \textit{Wf2}+ \textit{Wxf2}+ \\
31 & \textit{Gxf2} \textit{Gc4}!
\end{align*}

The concluding stroke – Black picks up one of the queenside pawns, and with two extra pawns he wins without particular difficulty.

The conclusion suggests itself: when venturing a forcing operation aimed at saving an inferior position, you should carefully check the variations. A strategic risk in such cases is quite admissible, but it is important to avoid tactical 'holes'. The opponent should not be able to find an easy way of refuting your idea.
The same opening variation as in the Dvoretsky–Schmidt game, which we analysed in the chapter 'A pawn in return for castling'.

White has a good position. He should choose one of two equally attractive plans:
1) 11 $\text{d}2$ and 12 $\text{c}3$; 2) 11 $\text{e}1$ 0-0 12 $\text{d}4$, intending 13 $\text{e}4$ g6 14 $\text{h}6$ $\text{e}8$ 15 $\text{g}4$. Instead of this he makes a careless move, overlooking his opponent's simple reply.

$\text{e}2$, intending 13 $\text{e}4$ g6 14 $\text{h}6$ $\text{e}8$ 15 $\text{g}4$. Instead of this he makes a careless move, overlooking his opponent's simple reply.

11 $\text{e}2$? $\text{d}5$!

5-2. What would you do against the obvious threat of 12...$\text{b}3$?
Into the Storm!

Alas, he does not seek happiness
And from happiness he does not run away!

Mikhail Lermontov

One of the manifestations of intuition in chess, along, say, with combinative vision or positional feeling, is the sense of danger. Unfortunately, the authors of books and articles devote little attention to such general problems and prefer to study more accessible and tangible things—opening or endgame theory, notes to games with concrete variations, and so on. In the present book I try to some extent to fill this gap.

So, let’s imagine a few standard situations, when a sense of danger may rescue a player.

The opponent makes an outwardly harmless move, but you, suspecting something bad, see through the prepared trick and successfully neutralise it.

There is a very tempting idea, but there is something in it that you do not like, and, on closer inspection, you find a latent refutation. Or perhaps, to save time, you do not even look for a refutation, but immediately reject it only on the basis of your inauspicious feeling.

You have calculated some complicated variations, but your sense of danger forces you to re-check your calculations, and suggests where precisely a mistake may be hidden.

It would be useful to use specific examples to investigate each of these cases, as well as certain others on the same theme, but within one book it is not possible to ‘embrace the unbounded’. Therefore we will restrict ourselves merely to a more careful examination of the situation about which we have already begun talking: when the unhealthy state of his position forces a player, not fearing risk, to take determined measures. And the sooner that you sense the danger, the greater the various possibilities of changing the course of the play that are available to you.

Dvoretsky – Taimanov
42nd USSR Championship, Leningrad 1974

The position seems roughly equal. But let’s think what each of the players is able to undertake.

Black’s plan is clear: he is intending to play ..., \( \text{c7} \), place a rook at \( d8 \), and then drive away the knight from \( c4 \) by ..., \( a7-a6 \) and ..., \( b6-b5 \), gaining a spatial advantage. White, on the other hand, does not appear to have any counterplay. If he does not think up something, his position will gradually deteriorate.
Sensing the danger in time, I readily made use of the very first opportunity to complicate the play.

13 a5! b5

There is no point in Black breaking up his pawn chain: 13... bxa5?! 14 Qxe5 or 13... Qxa5?! 14 Qxa5 bxa5 15 Wa4 (15 Qe5 is also possible).

14 a6 c8

If 14... bxc4, then 15 dxc4! After 14... a8 15 Qce5 the play would have developed more quietly than in the game, but Mark Taimanov prefers to begin chasing the breakaway pawn at a6. However, I assumed that if I were to lose it, in return I would gain adequate tactical counter-chances.

15 Qfes! 15 Qce5?! is weaker because of 15... Bb6!

15 ... Qxe5
16 Qxe5 Bb6
17 Qd2!

It is clear that White cannot manage without c2-c4, but for the present this move is premature:17 c4 bxc4 18 dxc4 Qb4! with advantage to Black. He must first take control of the important b4 square.

17 ... Qf6!

Black loses after 17... Bxa6? 18 Bxa6 Bxa6 19 Qc6 and 20 Bxd5. An unclear position arises after both 17... Qxa6 18 c4 Qb4 (18... bxc4? 19 Aa5) 19 Bxb4 cxb4 20 cxb4 20 Qc6 (We8) 20... Qxb5 21 Bxa7, and 17... Bc7 18 c4 Qb4 19 Bxb4 cxb4 20 cxb4. And if 17... d6 I was intending 18 c4 Qxe5 19 Bxe5 Wd6 20 Bg5!, with an exchange sacrifice in mind: 20... f6 21 Bxg7+! Bxg7 22 cxd5 exd5 23 Bh5, or 20... h6 21 Bxg7+! fxg7 22 Wh5!

18 Qg4!

Weaker is 18 c4 Qb4 19 Bxb4 cxb4, when the pressure exerted by the powerful f6 bishop along the a1-h8 diagonal secures Black the advantage.

18 ... Bxa6
19 Bxa6 Bxa6
20 Wa1 Wb6
21 Qxf6+ Qxf6
22 B4? 22 Bxe3 was bad in view of 22... Qg4, but 22 Bxa3!? was quite possible. I avoided this because of 22... b4 23 cxb4 cxb4 24 Bxb4 Ac8 with the positional threats of 25... Qg4 and 25... Bb7, but then 25 d4! is very strong. Black does better to return the pawn immediately: 22... Bb7.

22 ... cxb4
23 Bae3 Bb6
24 Qf4

24 cxb4 did not work: 24... Wxb4! 25 Ac1 Wb4!

24 ... Bb6
25 Bae3

Neither player can avoid the repetition of moves. If 25 cxb4?!, then 25... Qg4! followed by ... Bb7 is unpleasant.

25 ... Bb6
26 Bf4 Bb6
27 Bae3 Bb6
28 Bf4 Bb6

Draw.
Shamkovich – Dvoretsky
Vilyandi 1972
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Here the strategic danger facing me is both more obvious, and far more serious, than in the previous example. By advancing his f-pawn to f5, and if possible, also to f6, White will develop a fierce attack on the king. By any means Black must prevent his opponent from carrying out this plan.

15 ... \( \text{Wd7} \)
16 \( \text{Qf5!} \)

Leonid Shamkovich easily solves the first little problem: the hasty 16 f4? would have allowed the white pawns to be blocked by 16...f5! He physically prevents ...f7–f5 and intends 17 f4 followed by 18 \( Qxe7+ \text{Wxe7} \) 19 f5. In search of a way out of his difficult position, Black decides to weaken his kingside.

16 ... \( g6!? \)
17 \( \text{Qh6+} \)

The grandmaster is playing for an attack, and so he does not want to exchange pieces. But 17 \( Qxe7+ \text{Wxe7} \) 18 \( \text{Qh6 Qf8} \) 19 g4! also came into consideration, preparing the advance of the f-pawn and not allowing ...f7–f5.

17 ... \( \text{Qh8} \)
17...\( g7? \) 18 \( \text{Qg4!} \)

18 \( \text{Qe1} \)

Q 5-36. What should Black do?

This last, seemingly not altogether logical move by White (from f1 the rook would have supported the advance of the f-pawn) was made on purely concrete grounds. Now 19 \( Qxf7+ \text{Kxf7} \) 20 e6 is threatened, and 18...f5? 19 e6 is bad for Black.

18 ... \( \text{Kae8}! \)

A drowning man will clutch at a straw! In a difficult situation one must seek and make use of all latent possibilities, capable of somehow easing the position. Black wants to move his bishop and nevertheless play ...f7–f5. If 19 \( Qxf7+ \text{Kxf7} \) 20 e6 he had prepared 20...\( \text{Qh4!} \), when the position after 21 \( Qg5! \text{Qxe6} \) 22 \( \text{Qxh4} \) is quite acceptable for him.

19 \( \text{Qf4} \) \( \text{Qh4?!} \)
20 g3 \( \text{Qd8} \)
21 \( \text{Qg4} \)
21 g4!?
22 ... \( \text{h5} \)
22 \( \text{Qf6?} \)

Carried away by his attack, White makes a serious positional concession. After the modest 22 \( \text{Qf2} \) he would still have retained the better chances.

22 ... \( \text{Qxf6} \)
23 exf6 \( \text{Qc4} \)
24 \( \text{Qe5} \) \( \text{c6} \)
25 \( \text{Qg2} \) \( \text{Wf5!} \)
26 \( \text{We2} \) \( \text{Qe6} \)
27 \( \text{g4} \) \( \text{Qg5} \)
28 h4?! \( \text{Wxh4} \)
29 f4 \( \text{Qf8} \)
30 \( \text{Qh1?!} \)

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This move, prepared in advance, involves a simple oversight. But equally after 30 \textit{f3} hxg4 31 \textit{g3} Wh3+! 32 \textit{f2} (32 \textit{fxh3+} gxh3 33 \textit{xh3} Wh7 followed by ...\textit{h8}) 32...\textit{d2} 33 \textit{Wh3+} gxh3 34 \textit{h1} \textit{e4+} and 35...\textit{xf6} Black would have parried the attack.

30 ... \textit{xg4+}
31 \textit{fxg4} \textit{e3+}

When calculating variations, such intermediate checks are often overlooked.

32 \textit{g3}
32 \textit{g3} \textit{gxg4} 33 f5 \textit{fxe5} 34 dxe5 \textit{xe5} 35 fxg6 fxg6.
32 ... \textit{gxg4}

And Black went on to convert his material advantage.

Let us return to the position after Black’s 17th move. 18 \textit{e1}, as chosen by Shakhovich, did not achieve its aim because of the strong reply 18...\textit{ae8!}, and therefore it can hardly be called the strongest. The simple 18 f4 f5 19 exf6 \textit{xf6} 20 f5 was preferable. The developing move 18 \textit{f4!?}, which involves a pretty combinative idea, also looks very tempting.

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\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
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a & b & c & d & e & f & g & h & i & j & k & l \\
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Q 5-37. How should Black defend?

White is planning \textit{ae1} (creating the already familiar threat of \textit{xf7+}), then g2-g4, \textit{g3} (or \textit{c1}) and, finally, f3-f4-f5. Black would very much like to make use of the opportunity to play 18...f5 (this move, as can be seen, is the leitmotif of the entire game), but then comes an explosion: 19 e6! \textit{xe6} 20 \textit{ae1} \textit{d7} 21 \textit{hxe6!} \textit{xe6} 22 \textit{e5+}.

Terrible? Yes, of course. But the consequences awaiting Black are also difficult if events develop quietly. In such cases it is already too late to be afraid. You should check the opponent’s planned combination as carefully as possible, to search for the slightest thing that you can ‘latch’ onto. And if only you are able to discover one, head boldly into the storm.

18...f5! 19 e6! \textit{xe6} 20 \textit{ae1} \textit{d7} 21 \textit{hxe6!} \textit{xe6} 22 \textit{e5+} \textit{f6} 23 \textit{g4} 23 \textit{g4}?! \textit{c4} 24 g5 \textit{xe5} is not dangerous for Black.

23...\textit{fxg4} 24 \textit{fxg4} \textit{g8}!? Also possible is 24...\textit{xf8} 25 \textit{xf6} (25 \textit{g5}!? \textit{xf8}) 25...\textit{fxg6} 26 \textit{g5} \textit{g8} 27 \textit{xf6} \textit{xe6} with a somewhat inferior, but apparently quite defensible position.

25 \textit{xf6}. Now 25...\textit{c4} suggests itself, but unfortunately it is refuted by 26 \textit{g6+}! hxg6 27 \textit{g6+} \textit{h8} 28 \textit{h6}, when White soon regains his rook, retaining his extra pawns.

He has to restrict himself to the modest 25...\textit{d8}. It is not apparent how White can convert the activity of his pieces into something real, which means that the consequences of his combination are not so clear, and that Black can fearlessly play 18...f5!

\textbf{Rashkovsky – Dvoretsky}

USSR Championship First League, Odessa 1974

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10...exd4 11 cxd4 e8 followed by ...c5 is stronger. Usually in such cases White defends his e4 pawn with f2-f3, but then the position of the pawn at h3 will prove completely inappropriate.

Instead of thinking with my head, I, unfortunately, began repeating the moves from a game played a year earlier, Rashkovsky-Tukmakov (Moscow 1973), in which Black equalised without difficulty.

11 dxe5 dxe5
12 a4 f8
12...e7.
13 g5 h6
14 e3?!

And here is the improvement, prepared by Naum Rashkovsky. The afore-mentioned game went 14 h4 c7 15 xf6 (15 c5 h5) 15...xf6 16 c5 e6 with equal play.

To be honest, I hardly considered the capture of the pawn, since firstly, I was afraid of b6 or b6, but mainly because I did not want to go in for the forcing variations that had undoubtedly been studied by my opponent in his home analysis.

Later I recalled a similar episode – from the 4th game of the Tal-Larsen candidates match (Bled 1965). After 1 e4 f6 2 e5 d5 3 d4 d6 4 f3 dxe5 5 xe5 the Dane quickly played 5...d7?! And Tal (imagine – the great Tall) did not risk sacrificing his knight for the same reason – he was afraid of home preparations by his opponent. Meanwhile, 6 xf7! xf7 7 h5+ e6 8 c4 or 8 g3 would have secured White a promising attack.

14 ... c7?

I did not yet sense the strategic danger of my position and I was hoping by simple means to neutralise White’s obvious threat – 15 c2 followed by 16 c5.

15 c2 b6
16 c5! b5
17 b6 b8
18 xc8! Black was expecting only 18 a4, after which he had a choice between 18...a6 and 18...xc5 19 xc8 fx e4.

18 ... exc8
19 a4 h5
20 ec1!

Black’s knight does not have time now to go to e6, since he has to defend against 21 axb5 axb5 22 c6. Here 20 g3 would have been much weaker in view of 20...g7!

20 ... bxa4?!

20...b4 was better, but even then White’s advantage is obvious.

21 xa4 f4
22 ca1

And Black remained a pawn down, since 22...b7 (or 22...a8) 23 b4 was bad for him.
If on the 14th move I had foreseen what was awaiting me after the quiet 14...\textit{Wc7}, I possibly would have nevertheless examined the capture of the e4 pawn. In dubious positions it makes sense to go in for complications.

14...\textit{Qxe4}!? 15 \textit{Ab6} (15 \textit{Qb6 Axb8 or 15...Aa6 16 c5 Aa7) 15...Qxb6 16 \textit{Wxd8 Axd8 17 Axb6 Aa6 18 c5! Only equality results from 18 Axc8 Axc5!
18...Axc5! After 18...Axc5 19 Axa6 Axa6 Black's compensation for the exchange is clearly insufficient. He also loses after 18...Af5 19 Axa6 Axc5 20 Aexe4 Aexe4 21 Aa4.

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It was quite possible to calculate up to this point, since the play has been forcing. The resulting wild position, in which several pieces are simultaneously en prise, does not lend itself to either evaluation, or calculation – only to scrupulous analysis. White must choose between 19 Axa6 and 19 Axc8.

A) 19 Axa6 Axf2+ 20 Aa1. After 20 Ah2 Axb6 Black might be able to exploit the position of the white king on the h2–b8 diagonal. And if 20 Ah1, then 20...Ag3+ 21 Ah2 Aa8 16 Aa3.

20...Axb6! 21 Aexe4 bxa6 22 Aexe5. Black's strong bishops give him good compensation for the exchange. True, the c6 pawn is attacked and he has some problems with the completion of his development (22...\textit{Wd2} 23 Axc4; 22...Ae6? 23 Axb6). But he has the perfectly sound continuations 22...Af5 or 22...Ag7.

B) 19 Axc8 Axf2+ 20 Aa2. If 20 Ah1, then 20...Ag3+ 21 Ah2 Axf1+ 22 Axf1 Aa5, and Black regains the piece.

20...Ag3+. 20...Axe1 21 Aexe1 b5 is most likely also possible, e.g. 22 Ae7+ Aa8 23 Axg6+ 1xg6 24 Aexe4 Aa1 25 Ae2 Aa1.

21 Aa1 (21 Aa1 Aa2+ with a repetition of moves) 21...Axe1. 21...Aa2+ 22 Aa1 b5 looks tempting, but White plays 23 Ae7+ Aa8 24 Aexe5, and it is not possible to regain the piece.

22 Aexe5 (22 Aexe1 Ag3+ and 23...Axf1) 22...bxa6? Black can also consider 22...Ae3! 23 Axb7 Ac5 (weaker is 23...Ad7 24 Aa6) 24 Ae7+ Aa8 25 Axc6 Ad7 26 Aa8 e4, with good compensation for the piece, since the white pieces are scattered, and the e-pawn is dangerous.

23 Aexe1 Aa2+ 24 Aa1 Ad3 25 Aa7+ Aa8 26 Axc6 Aa6 27 Aexe5 (27 Aa3? Aa6 28 Axb6 e4) 27...Axe1 28 Aexe1 Aa2(d1). The endgame is most probably drawn.

Thus, the pawn could have been taken. For a long time I thought that only in this desperate way could Black maintain the balance. But a few years later one of my pupils suggested a much simpler solution: 14...Aa8! Now 15 c5? Aexe4 is not possible, and if 15 Ac2 there follows 15...b5. I suspect that in this case Rashkovsky would simply have forced a draw by 15 Aa7 Aa8 16 Ae3.
How should Black defend (it is him to move)?

Calculate and evaluate $23...\Box d7$. 
Bluff!

He, who ventures, should lose.
He, who does not venture, loses.
Tartakower

In desperate situations any measures are good. You have the right even to deliberately go in for a continuation that you know to be incorrect, if only it promises some practical chances.

Dvoretsky – S. Sokolov
Moscow Championship 1973

Black's advantage is obvious. His bishop wants to go to g4, and the threat of an invasion at d4 has constantly to be reckoned with. The knight at a5 has nowhere to go, and behind it the white rooks are languishing inactive.

Perhaps the only possibility of complicating the play is the tactical operation 26 \textit{x}e5 \textit{x}e5 27 \textit{Q}xe5 \textit{W}xe5 28 \textit{O}xc4 \textit{O}xc4 29 \textit{A}xa8.

Q 5-39. What do you think about this?
Of course. an abrupt change in the position is to White's advantage, but I immediately noticed a tactical refutation: 28...\textit{x}f2+!! (instead of 28...\textit{O}xc4). If 29 \textit{W}xf2, then 29..\textit{W}xa1+! 30 \textit{A}xa1 31 \textit{L}f1 \textit{O}xc4 32 \textit{G}g2 \textit{A}e6 – the rook and two pieces are clearly stronger than the queen. And after 29 \textit{xf} Black has a pleasant choice between 29...\textit{f}6+ followed by 30...\textit{xa}2, and 29...\textit{O}xc4 30 \textit{A}xa8 \textit{W}d4+.

Nevertheless, I had to take the risk. What was there to lose? In the end, the check on f2 was not an obvious one, and the opponent might possibly not notice it, especially as he was already in quite severe time trouble.

26 \textit{L}xe5!? \textit{L}xe5
27 \textit{Q}xe5 \textit{W}xe5
28 \textit{O}xc4 \textit{O}xc4?

White's reckoning proves justified. Now the battle flares up with renewed strength.

29 \textit{A}xa8 \textit{G}b6

In tense situations a player sometimes begins to 'perceive' his opponent. to sense the mood he is in, what he is seeing, and what will be his reaction. I quickly calculated a tactical variation that was advantageous to me, and for some reason I was in no doubt that in fearful time trouble my opponent would not notice a strong reply that was available to him, and would definitely fall into the trap set for him.

30 \textit{h}3!? 15?
An impulsive reply. 30...\textit{O}d4! was essential.

31 \textit{ex}f5!
Now Black’s position instantly disintegrates.
White has taken control of the b5 square, not fearing 29...\( \text{axa3} \) 30 \( \text{xb6} \) \( \text{xd3} \) 31 \( \text{xd3} \) \( \text{xb6} \), since after 32 \( \text{a3} \) or 32 \( \text{d2} \) his pieces come alive somewhat. My opponent preferred not to deviate from his planned course.

29 ... \( \text{g7} \)

It is all clear: now Black will play 30...\( \text{h8} \), forcing the advantageous exchange of knights. I had to decide on a desperate measure – a piece sacrifice, which, as I was perfectly well aware, was incorrect. But chances of saving the game were possible only if I were able to lure Orest Averkin – a player of strict positional style – into a chasm of tactical complications, in which he did not feel too confident. Besides, to the time control he only had 20 minutes left, and after an abrupt sharpening of the play he would probably have to make his last few moves in time trouble.

30 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{h8} \)
31 \( \text{f4?!} \) \( \text{xf4} \)
32 \( \text{gx4} \) \( \text{h4!} \)

Weaker was 32...\( \text{e7} \) 33 \( \text{f6!} \) (33 \( \text{e5?} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 33...\( \text{xf6} \) 34 \( \text{e5} \) and 35 \( \text{e6} \). In sacrificing the knight, I thought that if I were able to separate Black’s forces by advancing my pawn to e6, the extrapiece would not be felt.

33 \( \text{f6} \) \( \text{xf6?} \)

Time trouble begins to tell! Correct, of course, was 33...\( \text{xf6} \) 34 \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{e7} \) when the pawns are stopped.

34 \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{h4} \)
35 \( \text{e6} \) \( \text{a4} \)
36 \( \text{f5} \)

see next diagram
White had aimed for this position. Now it is no longer easy for the opponent to choose the correct plan of defence, especially with his flag hanging. If, for example, 36...\(\text{g}5\), then 37 \(\text{x}\text{g}5\) \(\text{w}\text{g}5\) 38 \(\text{w}e5\). The best would seem to be 36...\(\text{d}6\) 37 \(\text{w}e5\) \(\text{f}6\).

After 37...\(\text{d}6\) 38 \(\text{d}5\) \(\text{x}\text{f}5\) it is wrong to play 39 \(\text{xb}6?\) in view of 39...\(\text{xb}6\) 40 \(\text{xb}6\) \(\text{f}2+!\) 41 \(\text{xf}2\) \(\text{e}3+\) (K.Neat), but the piece can be regained by 39 \(\text{e}4\).

38 \(\text{x}\text{g}5\) \(\text{w}\text{g}5\)
39 \(\text{w}e5\)

Without thinking I made this move, which I had planned beforehand in the event of the bishop exchange. But in the given situation 39 \(\text{f}6\) was also not at all bad.

39 ... \(\text{h}6?\)
The final time trouble mistake.

40 \(\text{b}7\) \(\text{a}7\)
41 \(\text{xc}8\)
Black resigns.
On the Edge of the Abyss

Victory awaits the one who has everything in order, and this is called luck.
Roald Amundsen

Every player dreams of arriving for an important event in good form. How to achieve this is something that each decides for himself; it is a highly individual matter. But even so I should like to share one prescription of a general nature, which has many times proved justified both for my pupils, and for me myself. Success in a tournament or match demands, on the one hand, a good state of health, reserves of strength and stamina, and on the other hand, a sufficient supply of nervous energy, freshness of perception, and so on. Therefore when preparing for competitions it is important to ensure a solid degree of fitness and emotional stability. Or, putting it in simple terms, you should carry out an interesting and intensive training session, at which purely chess study is constantly mixed with competitive sports games.

This was the prescription that I used when preparing for a rather strong tournament in the Estonian town of Vilyandi, in which – though still then an ordinary master – I managed to take first prize, winning nine games with four draws. Behind me were three grandmasters, including the great Mikhail Tal.

Good form is not a guarantee against mistakes, but even so it helps in reducing their number. But, more important, it helps you to constantly maintain your energy and clarity of thought, and to calmly continue playing whatever the turn of events. An example is provided by the following game. In it, immediately on emerging from the opening, I ended up in a desperate position, and did not escape from it almost to the very end, which nevertheless turned out to be a happy one.

Heuer – Dvoretsky
Vilyandi 1972

1. e4 e6
2. d4 d5
3. ¤c3 ¤b4
4. e5 c5
5. a3 ¤xc3+
6. bxc3 ¤e7

In the opening I nearly always tried to avoid lengthy forcing variations, and therefore in reply to 7 ¤g4 I did not go in for the critical 7...exd4 8 ¤xg7 ¤g8, but restricted myself to the modest 7...0-0 8 ¤f3 ¤bc6 9 ¤d3 f5.

In a game against Karlson (Moscow 1969) after 10 exf6 ¤xf6 11 ¤g5 f7 12 ¤h4 (12 ¤xe7 is more accurate, forcing the capture with the rook) 12...h6 13 0–0 I was able to catch my opponent in a trap, thought up at the board: 13...c4 14 ¤g6? ¤xf3! 15 gxf3 (15 ¤xe7 ¤xe7 16 ¤xe7 ¤xe7, and the white bishop is attacked) 15...hxg5 16 ¤h7+ ¤f8 17 ¤h8+ ¤g8. Black parried the attack and converted his material advantage. Glancing after the game in some opening guides, I saw to my surprise that their authors had fallen into the same trap – not noticing 14... ¤xf3!, in reply to 14 ¤g6? they considered only 14...¤xg6 15 ¤xd8 ¤xh4 16 ¤xh4.

For a better understanding of subsequent events, it is useful to note that in the event of 10 ¤g3 (instead of 10 exf6) Black initiates counterplay by 10...¤b6 or 10...wa5 11 ¤d2 b6, intending 12...¤a8 or 12...wa4.
In the second half of the 1980s the opening theory of this variation made a significant step forward. First it was established that after 10 exf6 gxf6 11 c5 Black is not obliged to move his rook – the complications arising after 11...e5!? are favourable to him. Soon White found a move order that was far more dangerous for his opponent: 8 d3! (instead of 8 c3) 8...bc6 9 h5!?

7 c3!? An original move, which, in my view, deserves consideration. White retains the option of c3 to c4, and in some cases he can even play f2-f4 and only then develop his knight. I decided to transpose into familiar set-ups.

7 ... bc6
8 g4 c4
If 8...0-0 I was concerned about 9 h5. And not without reason – as will be evident from the above opening information.

9 e2 0-0
10 h4

Q 5-40. What should Black do?
'The play of a beginner', I thought. 'We will now meet the flank attack with a blow in the centre', and I instantly replied:

10 ... f5??

After making this move, I immediately noticed to my horror that after 11 g3! Black's position becomes critical. With the pawn at c5 Black would have had counterplay on the queenside or in the centre, but now, when the centre has been blocked by ...c5-c4 and ...f7-f5, there is no way of opposing the opponent's offensive on the kingside. White's delay in developing his knight also turns out to his advantage – now it can follow the optimal route g1-h3-f4, and in some cases to h5.

Of course, 10...f6! was necessary, with a good position for Black (this would indeed be a blow in the centre!). Why then didn't he play this?

In principle, one and the same mistake can be made for various reasons, so that it is hard to give a reliable diagnosis from one episode alone – a series of observations are needed. The reason for 10...f5?? could have been a poor understanding of the position. In the given instance this was not so – after all, I immediately realised what a serious mistake I had committed. Incidentally, from this it is clear how important it is for a trainer, when diagnosing the deficiencies of his pupils, not to restrict himself only to the texts of games and their analysis. He should discuss what happened with the participant in the game, find out how he evaluated the position, and listen to his opinion about the reasons for the mistakes he made. A record of the time spent on moves can be very useful – it would have showed that Black made his last move without thinking. Then other versions arise – routine play (after all, in this variation Black almost always has to play ...f7-f5), and, the most probable – impulsiveness, and a tendency towards hasty, ill-considered decisions, for which one then has to pay very dearly.

11 g3! a5
12 d2 a4
I do everything possible to try and divert the opponent from the development of his initiative on the kingside, but the counter-attacking resources are extremely insignificant, and after the cool 13 $\text{d}f1!$ Black's position would be unenviable.

13 $\text{g}h3$?

An unprofessional decision. Although, after taking the c2 pawn, Black comes under a dangerous attack, he acquires counter-chances, and the situation is no longer strategically hopeless.

13 . . .  $\text{w}xc2$

There is no reason to hesitate – the pawn must be taken, and what will be will be!

14 $\text{h}6$

Q 5-41. How should Black defend?

If 14...$\text{g}6$ Black has to reckon with 15 $\text{h}5$. The only possibility is 15...$\text{f}4!$ 16 $\text{x}f4$ $\text{xf}4$ 17 $\text{hxg}6$ (17 $\text{xf}4$ $\text{xf}4$, and 18 $\text{xf}4$? $\text{w}xc3+$ is not possible) 17...$\text{g}xh6$. Black's king is in a hostile position, but he is a piece up and there is no forced mate.

After 14...$\text{f}7$ 15 $\text{h}5$ one must consider 15...$\text{g}6$ and 15...$\text{f}6$.

After 15...$\text{g}6$ strong is 16 $\text{f}4!$ (16 0–0 $\text{f}4$ is less good) followed by the retreat of the bishop, or even in some cases the sacrifice of a piece on $g6$. And if 15...$\text{g}6$ there can follow 16 $\text{nx}g6$ $\text{hxg}6$ 17 $\text{xc}1$ $\text{w}e4+$ 18 $\text{e}3$ (threatening 19 $\text{xf}4$ or 19 $\text{g}5$) 18...$\text{g}4$ 19 $\text{nx}g4$ $\text{fxg}4$ 20 $\text{xf}4$ or 20 $\text{g}5$, intending $\text{e}2$ and $h4–h5$. The situation arising is less sharp than after 14...$\text{g}6$, but on the other hand Black also has no material advantage (the extra pawn is not felt at all).

I should mention that this last variation is by no means forced. If going into the endgame does not satisfy White, he can begin with 15 $\text{c}1$! (instead of 15 $\text{h}5$). After 15...$\text{b}2$ the thrust 16 $\text{h}5$ gains in strength, if 15...$\text{we}4$, then 16 $\text{g}5$ $\text{f}4$ 17 $\text{g}4$ is decisive, and after 15...14, apart from the simple 16 $\text{xf}4$, also very strong is 16 $\text{w}xg7+$! $\text{w}xg7$ 17 $\text{xc}2$, when 17...$\text{w}xg2$ is not possible because of 18 $\text{xf}4$.

Thus, in the event of 14...$\text{f}7$ White retains the advantage 'for free'. But in the 14...$\text{g}6$ variation he is forced to act extremely accurately and energetically, since, being a piece down, any error in the handling of the attack may prove fatal. It means that this is how Black should play.

14 . . . $\text{g}6$!

15 $\text{h}5$

The most unpleasant for Black was 15 $\text{f}4+$? $\text{f}7$ (15...$\text{xh}6$ 16 $\text{h}5$!) 16 $\text{x}g6$ $\text{xh}6$! 17 $\text{f}4+$ $\text{g}7$ 18 $\text{we}3$. Even so, after 18...$\text{h}8$ his position is by no means hopeless. The straightforward 19 $\text{h}5$ $\text{xg}2$? (19...$\text{g}6$) 20 $\text{xh}6$ (20 $\text{xc}1$? $\text{b}2$) leads to perpetual check: 20...$\text{g}1+$! 21 $\text{xg}1$ $\text{xc}3+$ 22 $\text{f}1$ $\text{h}3+$, while after 19 $\text{xc}1$ $\text{wb}3$ the queen could return home, picking up the a3 pawn on the way.

15 . . . $\text{f}4$!

16 $\text{xf}4$ $\text{xf}4$

17 $\text{hxg}6$ $\text{gxh}6$

If now 18 $\text{xh}7+$ $\text{xb}7$ 19 $\text{xf}4$ $\text{xc}3+$
20 \( \text{wd2} \), then not 20...\( \text{wa1}+ \)? 21 \( \text{d1} \), when White's attack is irresistible, but simply 20...\( \text{xd2}+ \) 21 \( \text{xd2} \) \( \text{xd4} \) with two pawns for the exchange.

\[ \text{18 } \text{hxh6} \]

**Q 5-42.** What should Black play?

*In sharp situations of this sort the decision is often taken by the method of elimination -- it is simpler not to calculate the best move in detail, but to convince yourself that all the others are bad.* White is threatening 19 \( \text{gxf7}+ \) \( \text{h8} \) 20 \( \text{g8} \) mate. Clearly bad are both 18 ...\( \text{f8} \)? 19 \( \text{xh7} \), and 18...\( \text{hxg6} \)? 19 \( \text{xd6}+ \) \( \text{f7} \) 20 \( \text{g7}+ \) \( \text{e8} \) 21 \( \text{g8}+ \) \( \text{e7} \) 22 \( \text{g5}+ \) \( \text{d7} \) 23 \( \text{g7}+ \). If 18...\( \text{d7} \), then 19 \( \text{gxh7}+ \) \( \text{h8} \) 20 \( \text{g7}+!! \) \( \text{xd7} \) 21 \( \text{h8}+ \) is spectacularly decisive. Strictly only one possibility remains.

\[ \text{18... } \text{d7}! \]

\[ \text{19 } \text{f1} \]

While Walther Heuer was considering his move, I calculated the variation 19 \( \text{xe7} \) 20 \( \text{f3} \) (20 \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{g7} \) 21 \( \text{h7}+ \) \( \text{g8} \) leads to a draw) 20...\( \text{xe2}+ \) 21 \( \text{f1} \) (21 \( \text{xe2} \) \( \text{xe2} \) 22 \( \text{xf2} \) \( \text{xf2}+? \) (bad is 22...\( \text{f8} \) 23 \( \text{g8}+ \), but I completely overlooked the winning move 22...\( \text{xg6}! \) -- a player often overlooks long backwards moves by pieces) 23 \( \text{xf2} \) \( \text{i8} \).

**Q 5-43. Where should the king move to?**

A typical exercise, training the ability to see resources for the opponent. Obviously Black wants to play 24...\( \text{e8} \) 25 \( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{xg6} \). We find the idea 24...\( \text{e8} \) 25 \( \text{g7} \), which may lead to the win of a piece. But after 24 \( \text{g3}(e3) \) \( \text{e8} \) 25 \( \text{g7} \) there is the counterblow 25...\( \text{xf3}+! \) and after 24 \( \text{xe2} \) 25...\( \text{xf3}+! \) This means that only 24 \( \text{g1}+ \) is correct, when 24...\( \text{e8} \) 25 \( \text{g7} \) \( \text{f1}+ \) 26 \( \text{xf1} \) \( \text{xh7} \) 27 \( \text{h8} \) is now bad for Black.

\[ \text{19... } \text{f8} \]

\[ \text{20 } \text{gxf7}+!! \]

White is carried away by his attack. He should have forced a draw: 20 \( \text{xf7} \) \( \text{xf2}+ \) 21 \( \text{g1} \) \( \text{xe2} \) 22 \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{xh8} \) 23 \( \text{h7}+ \) \( \text{g8} \) 24 \( \text{g7}+, \) but not 24 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) ! (it would appear that 24...\( \text{xf5} \)! 25 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xh8} \) 26 \( \text{h6}+ \) \( \text{g8} \) 27 \( \text{h6}+ \) \( \text{f8} \) 28 \( \text{g7}+ \) \( \text{e8} \) 29 \( \text{g8}+ \) \( \text{e8} \) 29...\( \text{e8} \) 23...\( \text{xf3}+!! \) 25 \( \text{xf3}+!! \) 26 \( \text{xf3} \) \( \text{e8} \) 27 \( \text{g7}?! \) \( \text{f1}+! \) 20...\( \text{xf7} \) \( \text{g8} \)

\[ \text{21 } \text{f6} \]

\[ \text{22 } \text{g1} \]

**Q 5-44. What should Black play?**

Now was the time to eliminate conclusively the opponent's attack and gain an advan-
'trifle', but a trainer can and should correct such things in his pupils, by drawing attention to them in good time and suggesting specially chosen exercises. 'Even when following the true Path, eliminate small errors, since in the future they can be transformed into big deviations' (Mimamoto Musasi). Black's omission costs him very dearly. Soon he slides to the very edge of the abyss.

22... e7?
23 g8+ xg8
24 hxg8+W+
25 Wxf2

It was stronger to interpose the check 25 Wh4+!, and only then play 26 Wxf2.

Next diagram

Q 5-45. Should Black 'treat himself' to the c3 pawn?
The material balance has been restored. My king has absolutely no pawns covering it, and so White's advantage is obvious. Again Black has a choice: he can make a normal, 'consolidating' move (for example, 25... Wg6), or he can take the 'poisoned' c3 pawn, subjecting his king to a terrible attack after 26 Wh4+.

I again (as on the 14th move) preferred to take a risk. The logic of this decision is the same: first you evaluate the position after quiet continuations (it is unfavourable!), then you try to find a forced refutation of 25... Wxc3, and if you do not find one, then you must pluck up courage and go for it!

25... Wxc3? 26 Wh4+
26 Wh1 is inaccurate: 26... Wg3.
26... Wg7
27 Wh1 We3+

This check is of course necessary. Which of White's three replies (28 Wh2, 28 Wh1 and 28 Wh2) is best? We will shortly return to this question. For a long time I thought that I knew the answer, but now I can no longer say.

28 Wh1 We8!

Another example of a move that was easily found by the method of elimination. All other attempts are quickly refuted: 28... Wxe2? 29 Wh5+; 28... Wh6? 29 Wh7+; 28... Wh8? 29 Wh5 We8 30 Wh7+! (30 We7+ Wh6 31 We8) 30... Wh7 31 Wh6+.
A serious mistake, which loses the game. But was it possible for White to win? During the game I saw the variation 29 $\text{h}6+ \text{h}7 30 \text{f}3 \text{xe}2 31 \text{h}3+ \text{h}5 32 \text{f}7+ \text{h}6 33 \text{xg}8 \text{f}1+ 34 \text{h}2 \text{f}4+ 35 \text{g}3 \text{xg}3+ (but not 35...\text{xd}4? 36 \text{h}4) with an endgame that is hard to evaluate. Incidentally, it is for this reason that pawns such as the c3 pawn are taken, so that such variations, leading to material gains for the opponent, nevertheless end in unclear positions.

Let us go back slightly and examine other possibilities for White apart from 28 $\text{h}1$. 28 $\text{f}2$ is unlikely to be deadly -- with the rook pinned it is not so easy to attack. But 28 $\text{h}2$ may seem to be an important improvement. After 28...$\text{e}8 29 \text{f}6+ \text{h}7 30 \text{f}3 \text{xe}2 31 \text{h}3+ \text{h}5 32 \text{f}7+ \text{h}6 33 \text{xg}8 Black no longer has a check on f1 and he loses. However, grandmasters Maxim Dlugy and Boris Gulko found a saving counterblow: 30...\text{xn}2!! (instead of 30...\text{xe}2?) 31 \text{xe}2.

We arrive at the conclusion that Black’s bold winning of material both on the 14th move, and on the 25th, was justified not only on psychological grounds, but also objectively.

Remember the episode in the opening: 10...$\text{f}5??$ It would appear that the hypothesis, about the player with Black being inclined towards impulsive and hasty decisions, is justified. It is also confirmed by the fact that on such a sharp and intricate game Black spent little more than an hour on his clock. Unfortunately, it was only on becoming a trainer that I learned to focus attention on such deficiencies. But in those times, although I saw my weaknesses, I did not make any serious attempt to eradicate them. And therefore as a player I was unable to realise my full potential.

Incidentally, in making a diagnosis, a player or trainer should be guided not so much by objective mistakes, as by mistakes in the planning of moves and in the approach to taking decisions. Thus in the given case I made a move that was not bad. It was accurately calculated and it led to a forced win.

30 $\text{g}3+$ $\text{g}6$
31 $\text{h}5$ $\text{h}7$
32 $\text{g}5$ c3!

The passed pawn decides the outcome. White resigned in view of 33 $\text{xe}6+ (33 \text{g}1 \text{c}2) 33...\text{xe}6 34 \text{h}5 \text{hx}5 35 \text{hx}5+$ $\text{h}6$.

This was by no means an exemplary game, but it was a fighting one and, I think, highly instructive. A careful analysis enabled many important methodological features to be revealed, both purely chess, and psychological. I recommended that my pupils should study their most interesting games in such a way, and this work invariably produced excellent results.
The Positional Exchange Sacrifice

If you sit for a while, and think, and play this type of position, you will sense that the exchange advantage does not make itself felt at all.

Tigran Petrosian

Martin Gonzales – Dolmatov

Barcelona 1983

1 e4 e6
2 d4 d5
3 €c3 €b4
4 €ge2 f6!? Sensible opening tactics. When meeting an opponent who is inferior in strength, it makes sense to avoid a theoretical discussion in highly analysed variations (4...dxe4), in order as soon as possible to begin an independent debate at the board.

5 e5 Another possibility is 5 g5 dxe4 6 a3 e7 7 xf6 gxf6 8 €xe4.

5... e4
6 a3 €xc3
7 €xc3 €xc3
8 bxc3 0–0
9 f5
9 f5 f5 10 exf6 xf6 11 0–0 would have led to a roughly equal game.

9... f5
10 g4

Q 5-46. How should Black continue?

At first sight White’s aggressive lunge looks just as unconvincing as 10 h4 in the previous game. But, incidentally, that game also showed how dangerous is a flippant attitude to the opponent’s attacking possibilities.

Dolmatov did not repeat my mistake, delved subtly into the position and found a solution to the problem facing him, which involved a deep, purely positional sacrifice.

White is intending 11 f3 followed by 12 gxf5. Clearly unfavourable is 10...fxg4? 11 f3. If Black neutralises the d3 bishop by playing ...g7–g6, this seriously weakens the dark squares and White’s dark-square bishop becomes very strong.

10...b6 (with the idea of 11 f3 a6!) may seem tempting. But then there follows 11 b5! b8 (11...b7 12 gxf5 xf5 13 f3)
12 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}xe8 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{X}}xe8 13 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{g}}xf5 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{e}}xt5 14 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{A}}g2, and White has the advantage in the endgame.

The central counter 10...c5 also does not solve all Black's problems. White continues either 11 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{d}}d3 c4 12 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{e}}e2 (again there are grounds for remembering the previous game), or more sharply – 11 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{g}}xf5 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{X}}xf5 12 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{h}}h3 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{c}}xd4 13 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{c}}xd4 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{C}}c6 14 c3 (but not 14 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{d}}d3 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{X}}xd4! with excellent compensation for the exchange).

10 ... \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{A}}d7!

11 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{g}}xf5

11 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{d}}d3 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{e}}e8 and 12...\text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{g}}6.

11 ... \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{X}}xf5

12 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{h}}h3 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{e}}e8

13 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{d}}d3 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{g}}6!

Black sacrifices the exchange, obtaining excellent positional compensation. His bishop will have complete domination of the light squares. Also important was the psychological factor: Martin Gonzales was in an attacking mood, but now White's attack is at an end, the initiative is seized by his opponent, and he is forced to defend. For most players such a transition is psychologically unpleasant and difficult.

14 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{g}}g1 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}f8

Q 5-47. How should Black reply to 15 c4?

After 15 c4 it is unfavourable to play 15...\text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{d}}xc4? 16 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{X}}xc4 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}f7 (16...\text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{A}}f7 17 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{h}}h6) 17 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{b}}b3. But there is the excellent counter 15...

15 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{X}}xf5 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{x}}xf5

16 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}f3

16 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}h4 came into consideration, with a cunning trap: 16...\text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}h8? 17 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{X}}g7!! \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{X}}g7 18 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{h}}h6, and White wins. Black would have simply played 16...

16 ... \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{C}}c6!

17 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}e2

It was possible to trade queens: 17 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{h}}h6 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{g}}6 18 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}xh8+ \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}xh8. But after 19 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{e}}e3 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{X}}c2 Black has a pawn for the exchange, and the white rooks have nowhere to expand their activity.

17 ... \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{A}}h8

18 a4

224

Q 5-48. What should Black play?

It is clear that the knight needs to be transferred to c4. 18...\text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{A}}a5 suggests itself, but then the white queen unexpectedly breaks through into the enemy position: 19 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{b}}b5! b6 20 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{d}}d7. If instead 18...b6, then after 19 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{a}}a3 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}f7 20 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{b}}b4! the knight cannot go to a5.

18 ... \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}f7!

A subtle positional move. Now ...\text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{a}}a5 is threatened, e.g. 19 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{a}}a3 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{a}}a5 20 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{b}}b5 b6, and the d7 square is covered. If 19 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{b}}b5 Black replies 19...\text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{b}}b8, planning 20...\text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{X}}c2 or 20...\text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}h5. The following curious variation is possible: 20 a5 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{X}}c2! 21 a6 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}f3 22 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{A}}e3 bxa6! 23 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{W}}xc6? \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{A}}d3 with inevitable mate.

19 a5?!

19 f3 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{a}}a5 20 \text{\textbackslash}textit{\texttt{f}}f2 was comparatively best.

19 ... b6

All the same the knight goes to a5, and, in
addition, after the exchange on b6 Black obtains a passed a-pawn and the c-file for his rook.

20 axb6 cxb6
21 a3 a5
22 f3

In Dolmatov's opinion, White should have returned the exchange by 22 bxa5 bxa5 23 c4 dxc4 24 wxc4. However, after 24...wb7 (preparing ...e8c, ...wh1+, ...wb1) his position would have remained anxious. An attack with opposite-colour bishops is no joke!

22 ... c4
23 a12 a5

A pleasant situation for Black – he can gradually strengthen his position, whereas the opponent is deprived of any counterplay.

24 ag1 a4
25 a3 ag6
26 a2 uf5
27 a2 ag7
28 a1c1 h6
29 ag1 a3
30 a3

notes to the game, 'that to achieve complete success was not so easy. Black needs to play on two flanks, to stretch the enemy defences'. As you see, the principle of two weaknesses, which we met in the second part of Volume 1, applies not only in the endgame.

30 ... ah5
31 a3 f8h

Threatening ...h7–f5.

32 h3

White has managed to forestall his opponent's plan. Now Black begins to prepare a breakthrough on the queenside.

32 ... ag6
33 a3 ag3 af5
34 ag2 b5
35 af2 b4!
36 we1 axc2!
37 cxb4

37 bxc2 b3 is completely bad for White.

37 ... ab1
38 a1a?

Now White is left with no chances at all. 38 a3 a3 39 axa3 was much more tenacious. However, after 39...a3! (weaker is 39... axa3?! 40 wb1, e.g. 40...af4 41 af1 axd4+ 42 gh2 axe5 43 we8+ wh7 44 wg6+ with perpetual check) 40 wc3 ac4 his position is difficult, despite his extra pawn. Again this is thanks to the powerful influence of the opposite-colour bishops, which markedly strengthen the attack.

38 ... a2
39 t4 we8!
40 we2 a4
41 we1 b7
42 ad2 xd2
43 wxd2 xb4
44 ed3 xd3
45 \( \text{\texttt{N}} \text{xd3} \) \( \text{\texttt{B}} \text{b3} \)

If now 46 \( \text{\texttt{N}} \text{d1} \), then 46...\( \text{\texttt{N}} \text{b4} \). White resigns.

**E 5-5**

226

Black to move

**E 5-6**

227

Black to move

**E 5-7**

228

Black to move
Two ‘French’ Endgames

Necessity is the mother of invention.
Jonathan Swift

Bakulin – Dvoretsky
Moscow 1974
1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ♘d2 c5 4 exd5 exd5 5 ♘b5+ ♙d7 6 ♙e2+ ♙e7 7 ♙xd7+ ♙xd7 8 dxe5 ♙e2+ 9 ♙xe2 ♘xc5. Usually Black takes on c5 with his knight, but I was aiming to deviate as soon as possible from the well-trodden theoretical paths.
10 ♙b3 ♙b6 11 0–0 ♙e7. This would appear to be a new move – previously the knight was developed at f6.
12 ♙f4 ♙b6 13 0–0 ♙f6 14 ♙c3 (14 ♙d6 ♙e8 15 ♙xe7 ♙xe7 16 ♙f4 ♙f6 is not dangerous for Black) 14...♗c5 (14...♕f6? 15 ♙g5) 15 ♙xc5 (15 ♙e1 ♙e6) 15...♗xc5 16 ♙e4 (16 ♙fe1 ♙b4!) 16...♗d6 17 ♙xd6 ♙xd6 18 ♙fe1.

18...♗c6. But my sense of danger operated, and I had doubts about the position arising after 19 c4 ♗d4 20 ♙c5 ♗b6 21 ♙d3. White creates a pawn majority on the queenside, securely blockades the ♗d4 pawn and controls the e-file. The advantage is on his side, perhaps not very big, but enduring.

It was the realisation of how strategically unpromising my position was that helped me quickly to find an exchanging combination.

18...♕e6!
19 ♙c5 ♙xe1+
20 ♙xe1 ♙c8!
21 ♙xe7 ♙f8!
22 ♙xb7 ♙xc5
23 ♗c3 ♗d4
24 ♙f1
24 ♙b3?? ♗d3 25 ♙d1 ♙e5!
25 ♙xe7 ♙d3
26 ♙xc3 ♙c2

Q 5-49. Evaluate the consequences of 18...♕e6.
Since if 18...♕e6 White has the unpleasant reply 19 ♙c5, I was wanting to play
When I showed this game to my friend Boris Gulko, he smiled ironically: 'This is the first time I've seen a combination for the sake of transposing from a position with equal material to a position a pawn down'.

But if Black had not gone in for the combination, he would have had to defend patiently, move after move seeking the correct continuations, and it would have been easy to go wrong at some point. But in the resulting rook endgame a mistake was practically ruled out, since I was familiar with the theory of this type of ending, and knew for sure that with correct defence a draw could be achieved without particular difficulty. By avoiding 'play' and turning to 'theory', Black made his defence easier (incidentally, this is quite a good illustration of the importance of theoretical knowledge). I think that from the practical standpoint Black's decision was fully justified.

27 g3 g6 28 @g2 @g7 29 @f1 h5 30 h4 @f6
31 @e3 @e3+ 32 @e4 @e2 33 f3 @e2+ 34 @f2 @g7 35 @a6+ @g7 36 @a3 @f6
37 @a6+ @g7 38 @a4 @f6 (38...@f2?)
39 g4 hxg4 40 fxg4 @f1+ 41 @g3 @c2
42 @f1+ (42 g5+ @e5 is also not dangerous)
42...@e6 43 @a4 (43 @f2 @c3+ 44 @f4 @e6)
43...f5 44 @xf5 @xf5 45 @c2 @c4 46 @a2
47 @f1 @f2 48 @e3 (48 @g5 @g4+ 49 @h5 @f6 50 a5?? @g6) 48...@c3+
49 @g2 @c4 50 h5 @h4. Draw.

Paul Keres recommended 12...@d7 13 @f1 @c6, when if 14 @b5 there is the sound reply 14...@d6. Stronger is 14 0–0, e.g. 14...b6 (White's position is also preferable after 14...a6 15 g3) 15 @b5 f6? (15...@d6 is essential) 16 @h6 @e7 17 @xd5! with advantage to White (Atyashev–Abroshin, 1954).

13 0–0–0 @d7
14 @e1!

I was intending to play 14...@c6 and 15...0–0–0. By attacking the d5 pawn, the opponent wants to prevent this plan.

Q 5–50. How can Black complete his development?

If 14...@c6 (with the idea of ...@d7 and 0–0–0) there obviously follows f2–f4–f5.
Black can, of course, play 14...c6, but then
he has problems over the development of his knight, and his light-square bishop remains passive. I did not want to make concessions, condemning Black to passive defence in a somewhat inferior position. But what then was to be done?

My calculations began with the variation 14...c6 15 e5 0-0-0 16 c4. It is easy to see that the pawn cannot be taken: 16...xd4? 17 xg7 c6 18 xd4. But also 16...g6 (recommended by Suetin) can in no way satisfy him in view of 17 xxd7 xd7 18 h7, when White attacks the f7 pawn and intends to defend his own pawn by c2-c3.

Then I turned to 14...c6, and saw that, after sacrificing the e6 pawn, I could then make a counterattack on the enemy d4 pawn. This plan seemed more attractive to me than the passive 14...c6.

14 ... c6!
15 f4 d7
16 f5 0-0-0!

Weaker is 16...e7 17 h3! with the threat of fxe6 fxe6 19 f4. If 17...g4 White has the unpleasant reply 18 fxe6 fxe6 19 g3!

17 fxe6 fxe6
18 xe6 g4!

This position has been reached by force. If now 19 f3 g7, and the pawn will be regained. 19 b5 and 19 b5 also do not promise White anything.

During the game the only move I feared was 19 h5? After 19...g7 there follows 20 xd5, while if 19...xd4, then 20 f3 g4 21 xd5 c5 22 e7+ xe7 (otherwise 23 x6 23 xe7, and White retains his extra pawn (23...f3 24 gxf3 g1 25 e1). As can be seen, the decision that Black took on the 14th move was not a forcing combination, but a real sacrifice, the consequences of which I was unable to calculate accurately.

Later Artur Yusupov suggested that after 19 h5 Black should reply 19...b6! 20 f3 (20 e2 d7 followed by 21...g7 or 21...g6) 20...g7 21 e2? (21 e5 xe5 22 dxe5 d4 or 22 xe5 xd4 with equality) 21...f8!, when he has more than sufficient positional compensation for the sacrificed pawn, since the opponent’s pieces are tied down.

19 f3 g7
20 xd8+
20 h5 d8 and 21...xd4.

20 ... xd8
21 d1

Not 21 e2? f8 22 e3 h6. After 21 b5 xb5 Black’s position is preferable, while if 21 b5 xb5 22 xb5, then both 22...a6 23 c3 c6 and 22...xg2 are possible.

21 ... xd4
22 xd4 xd4

We have reached a completely level ending, which, however, White lost surprisingly quickly. Walther Heuer, a player of active style, likes to attack, but feels much less confident in ‘boring’ endgame positions, and this soon told. He was simply unable to retune himself to a dry technical battle.
23  \\_e2  \\_c5
Black wants to consolidate by ...\_d7 and ...
...c7-c6.
24  \_h6  \_d7
25  c3??!
25 \_f3 c6 26 \_e3 was much more accurate, not allowing 26...
\_f4? in view of 27 \_h8+ \_c7(e7) 28 \_xd5.
25 ...  \_f4
Less good is 25...
\_a4 26 \_h8+ \_e7 27
\_h7+, when 27...
\_d6? is not possible in view of 28 b4! \_e4 29 \_xd7+.

26  g3?
A faulty plan. White is in a hurry to advance
his passed pawn, but in so doing he
weakens his rear and deprives his bishop of
a strongpoint at f3.

26  ...  \_f8
27  g4  c6
28  \_d2  \_e4+
29  \_d3?
The decisive mistake! 29 \_e3 was necessary. Black would probably have simply
replied 29...
\_c7, retaining the better chances, since 29...
\_g3 30 \_f3 \_f1+ 31 \_e2
would not have achieved anything.
29  ...  \_g3
30  \_e3?!
Il really would have been better for White to
reconcile himself to the loss of the g4 pawn.
30  ...  \_f2
31  \_h8+?!
Why drive the black king forward?
31  ...  \_c7
32  \_d1  \_e4?!
A probing move.
33  \_d4
If 33 \_e2 I would have evidently returned
the knight to g3 and then taken the b2 pawn.
33  ...  \_xb2
34  \_c2  \_g5!
35  \_g8  \_f1+
36  \_d3  \_a2
37  \_e2  \_e5
38  g5  \_g4!
39  g6  \_xe3
White resigns.
It Really is Better to Give up a Pawn...

In the majority of cases the sacrifice of a pawn is deeper than the sacrifice of a piece.
Siegbert Tarrasch

Here are two more examples of successful 'escapology operations' in bad positions – perhaps the most difficult that I have ever carried out.

Romanishin – Dvoretsky
42nd USSR Championship, Leningrad 1974

1  c4  g6
2  d4  g7
3  c3  d6
4  e4  e5
5  dxe5  dxe5
6  ?xd8+  ?xd8
7  f3  f6
8  ?f7

Black has chosen a rather dubious opening set-up, and here in addition he mixes up his move order and immediately ends up in a difficult position. More accurate was 8...c6 9 ?e2 ?e8 10 0–0, and only now 10...f6, intending ...?h6–f7.

9  fxe5!  ?xe5
10  ?xe5  fxe5
11  ?g5+  ?f6
12  0–0–0+  ?d7
13  ?e3  c6
14  g4!

Oleg Romanishin seizes space on the kingside and restricts the mobility of the black pieces.

14  ...  h6

Another plan of defence came into consideration: 14...?h4?! 15 g5 ?e8, planning ...?e6, and then either ...h7–h6, or ...?e7 and ...?f8.

15  h4  ?e8
The king does not go to c7, since it has to prevent the invasion of a white rook on the f- or h-file.

16  ?e2  ?e7
The retreat of the bishop to g7 would have given White an excellent post at d6.

17  g5

Black stands badly, since his rooks are disconnected, and his knight and dark-square bishop have no prospects at all. Now he has to take a decision, and choose a definite plan of defence. I wanted to play 17...h5, planning ...?e6 and ...?h7–f7, but how can the e5 pawn be defended after 18 ?f2! (with the idea of 19 ?g3)? Therefore 17...hxg5 seems forced, but I was not in a hurry to make it and I thought for a long time.
Already several moves earlier I began studying the position arising after 18 hxg5 hxh1 19 l:txh1 ...tts 20 %lh7 (otherwise 20 ... �g7) 20...il.e6 21 ll:id1, and simply could not find a convincing way of defending against the opponent’s obvious plan: 21f2, and then, according to circumstances, ilg4, 2fg4 or 2fd3. For example, 21...zd8 22 2fl f7 23 2:c2! (but not 23 2g4? 2xg5!) 23...2d8 (23...2xg5 24 ilxd7 2xe3 25 ild3 or 25 id1 leads to the loss of the exchange, but perhaps this is comparatively the best chance) 24 ilxd7 ilxd7 25 id3! 2c7 26 2xa7. Black loses a pawn, and all the defects of his position remain.

In search of a way out, I considered 17 ... ilg4. Generally speaking, it is useful to Black in any plan of defence. But it was a frightening move to make, since the opponent could assail my kingside by 18 gxh6 2xh6 19 ldg1, and how after 19...2f7 20 h5 could I avoid the loss of the ill-fated knight at h6?

It has been stated several times that in desperate positions it is already too late to be afraid – strangely enough, it is sometimes the most risky continuations that promise the best practical saving chances. That is also the case here – I continued my calculation of the variation, and discovered a tactical subtlety, enabling me to avoid an immediate rout...

17 ... ilg4!!
18 gxh6 2xh6
19 ldg1 2f7
19...2g8 20 2xg6 2f7 21 2g4 2e6 did not work because of 22 2g7! 2f8 23 2g6 2f7 24 2g4 2e6 25 2f1+ 2e8 26 2g6 2f7 27 2g7, and White retains his extra h-pawn. Now the prophylactic move 20 2c2! would have been highly unpleasant for me, but Romanishin went in for the main variation.

21 2h5

Q 5-51. How should Black defend?

Of course, 20...g5? 21 2xg5 is hopeless – it is not possible here to set up any sort of blockade.

20 ... gxh5
21 2h5

Threatening 22 2xh6 or 22 2xf7+, winning a piece. If 21...2f8 there follows 22 2xf7+ 2xh7 (22...2xh7 23 2xh8 2xh8 24 2g8 2f7 25 2c5) 23 2g5 2g7 24 2f1+ 2g8 25 2g1 2h7 26 2xe5, intending 27 2e7. Black has lost a pawn, without in fact disentangling his kingside pieces.

21 ... 2h5
22 2hx5 2g8!

Here is the tactical subtlety, prepared back on the 17th move. The knight is immune: 23 2xh6? 2xg1 24 2xg1 2g5+. Also, 23 2hh1 2g4! is not dangerous for Black.

23 2xg8+ 2xg8
24 2xe5 2d7

Black had aimed for this position. Despite the loss of a pawn, he retains good saving chances, certainly no worse than in the initial position, before 17...2e6. He has been able to exchange several pawns, which is usually to the advantage of the weaker side, the
black pieces can quickly come into play, and White's rear is somewhat weakened.

Here I was expecting 25 \textit{f}5 \textit{f}6 26 \textit{d}d4, in the hope of 26...\textit{e}6? 27 \textit{e}2, and I was intending to reply 27...\textit{e}8! with the threat of 28...\textit{d}d6.

25 \textit{c}2 \textit{f}6
26 \textit{g}5?! It is not easy for White to strengthen his position. If 26 \textit{g}5 Black easily parries the threat of 27 \textit{x}e7+ \textit{x}e7 28 \textit{e}5 by 26...\textit{g}8, and if 27 \textit{f}5 \textit{e}6. But the move made by Romanishin makes things easier for Black, allowing him the possibility of a favourable exchanging operation.

26 \ldots \textit{xe}4
27 \textit{xe}4 \textit{xg}5
28 \textit{xd}5

The resulting ending would appear to be drawn.

28...\textit{b}6 29 \textit{d}3 \textit{h}8 30 \textit{f}4 \textit{c}5 31 \textit{a}3 \textit{h}3+ 32 \textit{e}3 \textit{h}1 (32...\textit{a}5 is more accurate) 33 \textit{c}3 \textit{a}5 34 \textit{d}5. A draw would result from 34 \textit{b}4 \textit{ab}4 35 \textit{ab}4 \textit{cx}b4 36 \textit{xd}5 \textit{d}1+ 37 \textit{e}4 (37 \textit{c}2 \textit{xd}5) 37...\textit{b}5 (weaker is 37...\textit{b}3 38 \textit{xb}6+ \textit{c}6 39 \textit{a}4) 38 \textit{xb}5 \textit{b}3 39 \textit{d}4 (39 \textit{c}3 \textit{b}2) 39...\textit{b}2 40 \textit{xb}2 \textit{b}1 41 \textit{ab}6+ \textit{c}7 42 \textit{xc}4 \textit{xb}2 43 \textit{xb}2 \textit{b}6.

34...\textit{c}6 35 \textit{e}7+. But here 35 \textit{b}4 came seriously into consideration. Before the adjournment White decided not to take any crucial action.

35...\textit{b}7 36 \textit{g}6 \textit{b}1 37 \textit{c}2 \textit{f}1 38 \textit{e}5 \textit{f}5 39 \textit{g}4 \textit{f}3 40 \textit{d}3 \textit{h}3 41 \textit{e}4 \textit{g}3 42 \textit{f}4 (the sealed move). The resumption of this game after the adjournment is described in the second part of Volume 1, in the chapter 'The strongest piece is the rook!'.
In the positional sense this exchange is undesirable, but it involves a specific calculation. Now Black has to make a difficult choice.

24...\(\text{W}x\text{d5}?!\) is the most easily rejected, since 25 \(\text{W}x\text{d5}\) \(\text{A}x\text{d5}\) 26 f4! (it is important to remove the opponent's strong central pawn) 26...exf4 27 \(\text{A}x\text{f4}\) leads to a roughly equal endgame.

If 24...\(\text{A}x\text{d5}\) White replies 25 \(\text{c}1\) \(\text{W}d7\) 26 \(\text{c}7!\) (this is the point of the exchange on d5) 26...\(\text{W}x\text{c7}\) 27 \(\text{W}x\text{d5}\) followed by 28 \(\text{c}1\). 25...\(\text{W}d6\) 26 \(\text{c}7!\) comes to the same thing. Even after the better 25...\(\text{W}e6!\) 26 \(\text{c}7\) the active position of the rook secures White counterplay.

24  
25  
26  
26...\(\text{W}x\text{a4}\) 27 \(\text{c}7\) \(\text{d}7\) 28 \(\text{d}6\) does not promise Black any advantage, e.g. 28...\(\text{A}x\text{d6}\) 29 \(\text{A}x\text{d6}\) \(\text{A}x\text{d6}\) 30 \(\text{A}x\text{b7}\), or 28...\(\text{W}x\text{c6}\) 29 \(\text{W}x\text{c6}\) \(\text{bxc6}\) 30 \(\text{f}1\) \(\text{A}x\text{d6}\) 31 \(\text{A}x\text{a5}\).

27  
28  
29  
30  
By sacrificing a pawn White has simplified the position, activated his forces and retained real chances of a draw. If now 30...\(\text{A}c4\), then 31 \(\text{A}d7\), threatening to play 32 \(\text{A}x\text{a5}\) \(\text{A}x\text{a5}\) 33 \(\text{A}x\text{xb7}\). In the event of 30...\(\text{A}d4!!\) he can choose between 31 \(\text{A}x\text{d6}\) and 31 \(\text{A}d7\) \(\text{A}e7\) 32 \(\text{A}b1\).

30  
31  
32  
Here it was time to agree a draw. But, as often happens, Viktor Kupreichik, discouraged by the loss of his advantage, begins playing carelessly and is soon experiencing serious difficulties.

32...\(\text{A}e6\) 33 \(\text{b}5\) \(\text{A}b8?!\) 34 \(\text{g}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 35 \(\text{A}x\text{b7}\) \(\text{A}c6\) 36 \(\text{A}a7\) \(\text{A}c5\) 37 \(\text{A}x\text{a5}\) \(\text{A}c8?!\) 37...\(\text{A}x\text{f2}\) 38 \(\text{A}x\text{f2}\) \(\text{A}x\text{c7}\) 39 \(\text{A}a7\) \(\text{A}d6!\) 40 \(\text{A}x\text{g7}\) \(\text{g}5\) 41 \(\text{g}3\) \(\text{A}a8\) would have led to a draw.

38 \(\text{A}g3\) \(\text{A}b6\) 39 \(\text{b}5\) \(\text{A}a8\) 40 \(\text{b}4\) \(\text{A}c5\) 41 \(\text{e}4\) \(\text{A}a7?\) (41...\(\text{d}5\) 42 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{d}4\) was correct) 42 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{d}5\) 43 \(\text{A}f2\) \(\text{A}f2\) 44 \(\text{A}x\text{f2}\) \(\text{g}5\) 45 \(\text{g}3\). It is now extremely hard to gain a draw. Unfortunately, on the resumption I fell into a cunning trap (cf. one of the exercises in the chapter 'A great master of the endgame' in the second part of Volume 1) and allowed my opponent to escape.
White to move
Form Your Own Opinion

The simple believeth every word:
but the prudent man looketh well to his going.
Proverbs, 14-15.

A study of the classical heritage is an essential and very important stage in the development of a chess player. When studying the games of the greatest masters from the past, particular attention should be paid to the strongest aspects of their play, to those qualities which distinguished them from their contemporaries.

The second world champion Emanuel Lasker was renowned in particular for his psychological approach to chess, and also for his defensive skill in difficult positions. Perhaps the most typical example of his play is considered to be his win in the 4th game of the world championship match against Siegbert Tarrasch. I will invite you first to play it over on the board without any commentary. Then analyse it a little. It would be interesting to know: what sort of picture does it present to you?

**Tarrasch – Lasker**

4th match game, Dusseldorf 1908

1 e4 e5 2 \( \text{c2} \) f3 c6 3 \( \text{b5} \) f6 4 0-0 d6 5 d4 \( \text{d7} \) 6 c3 \( \text{e7} \) 7 \( \text{e1} \) exd4 8 \( \text{xd4} \) d4 9 \( \text{xd} \) d4 \( \text{xb} \) 5 10 \( \text{xb} \) 5 0-0 11 \( \text{g5} \) h6 12 \( \text{h4} \) \( \text{e8} \) 13 \( \text{ad} \) 1 \( \text{d7} \) 14 \( \text{xe} \) 7 \( \text{xe} \) 7 15 \( \text{wc} \) 3 \( \text{e5} \) 16 \( \text{cd} \) 4 \( \text{c5} \) 17 \( \text{wb} \) 3 \( \text{b6} \) 18 f4 \( \text{w} \) 6 19 \( \text{w} \) 3 \( \text{e} \) 8 20 c3 a5 21 b3 a4 22 b4 \( \text{cc} \) 4 23 g3 \( \text{dd} \) 8 24 \( \text{e} \) 3 c5 25 \( \text{bb} \) cxb4 26 \( \text{xd} \) 6 \( \text{xd} \) 6 27 e5 \( \text{xf} \) 4 28 gxf4 \( \text{w} \) g6+ 29 \( \text{wh} \) 1 \( \text{wb} \) 1+ 30 \( \text{g} \) 2 \( \text{d} \) 2+ 31 \( \text{e} \) 2 \( \text{wa} \) 2 32 \( \text{xd} \) 2 \( \text{xd} \) 2+ 33 \( \text{g} \) 3 a3 34 e6 \( \text{we} \) 1+ 35 \( \text{g} \) 4 \( \text{xe} \) 6+ 36 f5 \( \text{c4} \) 37 \( \text{d} \) 4 a2 38 \( \text{wa} \) 1 d5 39 \( \text{wa} \) 4 \( \text{xc} \) 3 40 \( \text{we} \) 8+ \( \text{h} \) 7 41 \( \text{h} \) 5 a1 w. White resigns.

Of course, this text, as though taken from an express bulletin, is only of any use as a starting point for a subsequent understanding of the events that occurred in the game, and the problems raised by it. Before drawing any definite conclusions, the game must be subjected to a thorough and impartial analysis. Otherwise the perception of it will be strongly influenced by the outward pattern of the play and the final outcome. As a result the overall picture will prove superficial, or even simply incorrect. If such a picture, drawn by a great player, appears in print, incorrect conclusions are subsequently bound to be uncritically reproduced in new publications and become generally accepted. Unfortunately, this has already occurred many times with the great players of the past, and many of their games have entered the gold treasury of chess with an incorrect interpretation.

When playing through a classic game, you should use the commentaries available, but do not restrict yourself to them, and analyse independently the points that interest you. The results of your analysis may sometimes disagree with the book evaluations. In such cases don’t be afraid to review the existing judgements, and form your own opinion. But, of course, don’t hurry to draw conclusions, but re-check your analyses, and don’t throw the baby out with the bath-water, thereby denying yourself, on the basis of inaccuracies and mistakes discovered, the positive benefit that the study of the classical material can give you.
And now let us turn to a specific study of the encounter between the two leading grandmasters from the early part of the century and the comments on it.

‘Réti's commentary on the 4th game of the Lasker–Tarrasch match (1908), published in his book ‘New Ideas in Chess’, even today serves as an unsurpassed example of this genre of chess literature, an object of noble envy by other commentators’.

This is the opinion of Boris Vainstein, the author of an interesting book about Lasker. It is this opinion, or more precisely, the interpretation of the game that Richard Réti offers us, that I wish to dispute.

This is how Réti summarises his impressions of the encounter between Lasker and Tarrasch:

‘What is it, we may well ask, in this game that pleases us so much. The layman who plays it through without any enlightenment will at most derive some interest from the surprise move 27...\texttt{xf4}. But the expert will with very great tension follow Lasker’s equally original and deep idea of placing his rook upon seemingly perilous ground in order to extricate himself from his congested position. And we experience a desire that this bold stroke of genius, and not the sober prosaic method will snatch a victory.

We see how Tarrasch, the man of method, closes in the rook that has been forced through. We were just on the point of giving up Black’s game as lost. It was Black who had our sympathy. But then comes a surprising move 23...\texttt{d8}, with the threat of liberating the rook and breaking up White’s position, and then again White’s counter combination. The drama approaches its climax. And then when the solution comes 27...\texttt{xf4}; great is our delight that the miraculous has really come to pass and that the idea of a genius, for which every pedagogue would have foretold a bad end, has triumphed over all that was systematic and according to rule.’

‘Plato is dear to me, but dearer still is truth’, Aristotle once said. Although it is a pity to dispel such an impressive picture, it has to be done.

In order to experience the delight that Réti talks about, one has to be sure that the outcome was indeed determined by the triumph of Black’s original and bold conception over White’s ‘ordinary’ play. That it was not a blunder by Tarrasch that led to his defeat, but that Lasker did indeed outplay his opponent. Alas, it turns out that this is by no means how things stand.

We will begin from the very start, but we will skip through the opening stage almost without stopping.

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E 5–9. Can Black play 7...0–0?
In the game Capablanca-Thomas (Hastings 1919) there followed 10...a6 11 c3 0-0 12 g5 d7 13 xe7 xe7 14 d5, and White gained the freer position.

11 g5

Capablanca recommended 11 c3 c6 (11...a6!??) 12 d4.

11...

12 h4 e8

13 a3 Threatening e4-e5.

13...

14 xe7 xe7

15 c3

How can the c7 pawn be defended? Of course, 15...f6? or 15...c5? does not work because of 16 e5. But 15...f8 is quite possible, not fearing 16 e5?! a6! White would have replied 16 d4!, provoking a weakening of the kingside by 16...g6. Thanks to his advantage in space, he would have retained an enduring initiative, although, of course, Black could have perfectly well defended himself.

Lasker – a brilliant tactician – finds a clever way of indirectly defending the c7 pawn.

15...

Now 16 xc7?? c5 is not possible, while 16 xc7? xb5 17 xd6 xb2 18 xd7 xd7 19 xd7 c8! leads to the better endgame for Black.

16 d4!

White is threatening to play 17 f5 followed by 18 f4. Black can, of course, reconcile himself to a somewhat inferior position after 16 xc5 17 f3 (17 f5? xe4) 17...g6 (weaker is 17...d7 18 f5). Lasker, however, finds an original way of diverting the opponent from his pressure on the kingside and avoids a weakening of his pawns.

16...

17 b3

If 17 g3, then 17...g5 is possible, if there is nothing better.

17...

17...a5 also came into consideration.

Now Black need have no concerns about his g7 square, but for the sake of this he has had to deploy his rook rather awkwardly. According to Lasker's philosophy, that is how a genuine struggle should proceed: achieve success in one place, at the cost of concessions in another. A player's mastery is revealed in his ability to evaluate, to sense, which of the opponents gains from such an 'exchange', and whose trumps are more important. It is especially important, as we have already mentioned several times, to be able to change sharply the situation on the board, when defending an inferior position. In most of the examples considered earlier, for the sake of this the weaker side went in for material sacrifices, but in the present game the great master of defence Emanuel Lasker 'sacrificed' a positional
factor – the placing of his rook.

18 f4

'Tarrasch's execution in this game is not on the same level as that of his opponent. He does not carry out any counter action but does the most obvious thing. He cuts off the rook, which he considers badly positioned, from the squares available in the event of its having to retire, and above all from e5. But Lasker has no intention of bringing back the rook to the e-file so soon. he having just moved it to c5.' (Réti).

I don't like this comment. While criticising Tarrasch's move (condemning it not even on positional grounds, but only because it is 'the most obvious thing'), Réti does not suggest anything instead.

By advancing his pawn to f4, White takes control of the e5 and g5 squares, and prepares to cramp the opponent by \( \text{fif}3, \text{b2-b3} \) and \( \text{c2-c4} \). From the fact that Tarrasch lost the game, it by no means follows that all his decisions were incorrect.

18 ... \( \text{w}f6 \)

19 \( \text{w}f3 \)

How can one explain the mistake made by Black? I think that, to some extent, by the features of Lasker's style. Although a brilliant tactician, in strategy he was markedly weaker (this told especially when playing the opening stage of the game). Lasker believed that he would always find a tactical way of repairing certain strategic defects in his position, and usually he did indeed succeed in doing this.

In the given instance, realising that his opponent was intending \( \text{b2-b3} \) and \( \text{c2-c4} \), the world champion was probably tempted by the opportunity to set a trap: 20 f3? d5! And for the sake of it he made a move, which was not the optimum one from the standpoint of the plan carried out by Black.
20 c3! a5
21 b3
20 c3! a5
21 b3
21 d3 b5 22 w e2 was tempting, intending 22...c6 23 d4 c5 24 w f2 with an obvious advantage. However, Black would have replied 22...f5! 23 g3 a4. He could also have considered 21...c4 (instead of 21...b5) 22 x a5 a4.

21...

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22 b4?!
Réti does not even consider the natural move 22 c4, with which White would have retained a marked advantage in space. In reply Vainstein recommends 22...axb3 23 axb3 c6 24 d f5 d5, but after 25 w f2! d7 26 g3 Black's forces are completely paralysed and White's advantage becomes overwhelming. 25 w e3! d7 26 h3 x e4 27 x e4 dxe4 28 d6 is also strong (Makarijev).

Lasker would probably have replied 22...axb3 23 axb3 a5, but then 24 b5!, and if 24...w e7, not 25 e5? d5, but 25 w f2. White threatens 26 x d6, and in some cases e4–e5 or c3–d5 is also possible.

It is clear that Black would have faced a difficult defence, with no risk at all for White. These considerations are enough to completely remove any criticism of Tarrasch's preceding actions.

Does it follow that it was here that Tarrasch went wrong?! Instead of the natural seizure of space, he 'dogmatically' continued playing to trap the rook, for which he was punished.

A very tempting conclusion, but, alas, too hasty – it is refuted by the following analysis. It turns out that by playing 22 b4?! Tarrasch retained an advantage that was certainly no less than after 22 c4. So why then do I consider the move made by him to be dubious (as indicated by the '?' sign)?

Today we already understand well (largely, thanks to Lasker) that, when evaluating a particular decision, account must be taken of not only its objective strength, but also the psychological aspect, and various accompanying factors.

After 22 c4 the position is clear and established, and White's subsequent play is simpler. After 22 b4 the position is more complicated, more unusual. Lasker was superior to his opponent in tactics, and was better at finding his way in dynamic positions. In addition, he was significantly younger than Tarrasch, more robust and with greater stamina. It is clear who was favoured by the further complication of the play.

22...

24 c4
23 g3

After White's planned b5 he has to reckon with ...d6–d5. In this case it is important that the f4 pawn should be defended.

23...

24 d8
Lasker prepares ...c7–c5, the only real resource (if you don’t count ...a4–a3 followed by ...c5) available to him. The immediate 23...c5 would have been refuted by 24 b5.

24 \( \text{Be3?} \)

Réti makes the following comment on this move:

White is now positionally outplayed. He has, as against the threat 24...c5 no defence from a positional point of view. Therefore he attempts to create one by means of a combination, which, as is usual with all combinations resorted to in a state of mere desperation, does not get home.'

Again a typical 'adjustment to fit the answer'. What grounds does White have for desperation? If, for example, he were to play 24 a3 c5 25 b5, would he really be taking anything of a risk? Most probably the opposite: it is Black who would still have to show that he has a way to equalise. 24 e5 dxe5 25 bxe5 was also quite possible.

In fact the question is a different one: how does White gain an advantage. For this he needs to find 'a defence against the threat ...c7–c5 from the positional point of view'. Contrary to Réti’s opinion, there is such a defence, and not just one.

An interesting and subtle prophylactic move was suggested by Ludwig Rellstab: 24 \( \text{We3!} \)

Now 24...c5 is unfavourable in view of 25 \( \text{b5}, \) when the c5 pawn is pinned. And White is intending to continue his operation aimed at trapping the rook, making (in this or some other order) the moves \( \text{b5, } \text{d3} \) and \( \text{a3}. \) If 24...e5 there follows 25 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{d8} \) 26 \( \text{b5}, \) threatening 27 e5 or 27 e3. In the event of 24...a3 25 b5 a4 (25...c6 26 \( \text{b6} \) \( \text{cxb5} \) 27 e5) there is no point in playing 26 \( \text{d4?} \) on account of the exchange sacrifice 26...c3! 27 c4 \( \text{xb5} \) with a solid position for Black. Stronger is 26 e5! dxe5 27 fxe5 \( \text{d8} \) 28 \( \text{d8+} \) \( \text{d8} \) 29 e6 \( \text{e7} \) 30 \( \text{d3} \) with a decisive advantage (Black's rook and knight are out of play).

Another possibility of preventing ...c7–c5 was the modest move 24 \( \text{b1}! \) suggested by Alexander Chemin, after which 24...c5 25 bxc5 dxc5 26 e5 can in no way satisfy Black. Meanwhile, White is planning \( \text{e3} \) (or perhaps first \( \text{d3}, \) and only then \( \text{e3} \)) followed by \( \text{b5}–\text{a3}. \) It is not easy to find anything convincing against this plan. If 24...a3, of course there follows 25 \( \text{b3} \).

Finally, I should also mention a suggestion by Makariiev: 24 \( \text{d3!} \) If 24...c5, then 25 bxc5 c5 25...dxc5 26 \( \text{b5} \) 26 \( \text{d1} \) winning the b7 pawn.

Thus we have seen that by the culminating point of the game Lasker had not only not outplayed his opponent, but, on the contrary, had ended up in a very difficult position. Tarrasch, meanwhile, had played excellently up till now, but here, unfortunately, two mistakes by him completely changed the logical course of the game.

24 ... c5

25 \( \text{b5}? \)

Tarrasch continues with the faulty combination, begun with his previous move. Meanwhile, as was rightly pointed out by Richard Teichmann, by playing 25 bxc5! \( \text{c5} \) (bad is
25...dxc5? 26 e5 or 26 Qb5) 26 Qb1 Qc4 27 Qd3 followed by Qc2-e3 White would, at the least, not have stood worse.

25 ... cxb4
26 Qxd6 Qxd6
27 e5 Qxf4!

Of course, Tarrasch overlooked this counterblow. But his combination would have been incorrect, even if this rejoinder had not been found: 27...Qd1+!? 28 Qxd1 Qc6 was also very strong.

At this we will conclude our examination of the game and wonder why the picture, painted by such a subtle expert as Richard Réti, proved false.

In the material being studied it is natural for any player to see that which he is looking for. When he was playing, Réti aimed to create complete, consistent games, permeated by a single plan. Usually he annotated in the same style the games of other grandmasters. While not denying the pedagogical significance of such a way of annotating, one cannot help also seeing its obvious drawbacks, which, incidentally, were pointed out by Lasker himself in his famous Chess Manual: ‘On a motif such as was indicated by Réti, one cannot build the plan of a whole well-contested game; it is too meagre, too thin, too puny for such an end. Réti’s explanations, wherever they are concerned with an analysis which covers a few moves are correct and praiseworthy. But when he abandons the foundation of analysis, in order to draw conclusions that are too bold and too general, then his arguments prove faulty’.

What interests me most of all in chess is the problem of finding the best move and taking decisions. The Tarrasch–Lasker game contains numerous instructive episodes of this sort, for example:

1. The bold and unusual manoeuvre of the black rook on the 5th rank, with the aim of changing the situation on the board, and diverting White from his attack on the king.
2. The link between the mistake made by Lasker on the 19th move and his style of play. The logical comparison of the various possibilities in calculating the variations, which could have helped Black to prefer 19...a5!? to the move made in the game.
3. The problem of the choice for White on the 22nd move. Taking account of psychological factors when choosing a plan. Take note: here it is impossible to say definitely what is better, and what is worse. In chess we constantly encounter such problems, that do not have an exact solution. It is they that frequently prove to be the most interesting and instructive.
4. The practice of ‘prophylactic thinking’, which could have suggested to White the correct decision on the 24th move.
5. The final blow, struck by the ‘desperado’ rook. The concept of ‘desperado’ (signifying, in translation from the Spanish: desperate, frantic) was suggested by Lasker. During the course of a game some pieces or pawns may become a weakness in your position, prove vulnerable or interfere with the coordination of their own forces. These pieces acquire an inner striving for self-sacrifice; they become ‘desperados’. A player must watch most carefully for possible suicidal manifestations of activity by such pieces or pawns. Tarrasch did not do this...

After studying this game and selecting the ideas that interest us, it is useful to find or remember other examples on the same theme. The Tarrasch–Lasker encounter will be interesting to compare, for example, with the finish to the following game.
Levitina – Alexandria
11th game, Women’s Candidates Match, Dubna 1983

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The c4 pawn is attacked. White (who, incidentally, was already short of time on the clock) also has to reckon with the manoeuvre ...\( \text{c7}\rightarrow \text{a6} \rightarrow \text{b4} \rightarrow \text{b8} \), which, if carried out, would give Black the advantage.

22 \( ne4?! \)

After this move Nana Alexandria immediately forgot about any knight manoeuvres – she was unable to refrain from the plan of playing against the white rook hemmed in on the edge of the board.

22 \ldots \text{f5}? 

22...\( \text{a6}?! \)

23 \( \text{h4} \)

The knight should have been brought up. The exchange of bishops follows from the standard logic in this type of situation: as many as possible of the opponent’s good pieces should be exchanged, so that she is left only with bad pieces. But with the disappearance of the bishops, the black king becomes vulnerable, and this proves to be a more important factor.

However, it was not only Alexandria who made a mistake in the evaluation of the position. At that moment, thinking in exactly the same way as her were her trainers, sitting in the auditorium and discussing the course of the game – the author of these lines, and grandmasters Vyacheslav Eingorn and Semion Palatnik. It would appear that the rook at h4 hypnotised us all. After this game I began to understand better how it had been for Tarrasch.

24 \( \text{g5} \)

Both players overlooked a tactical possibility: 24...\( \text{xa2}?! \) 25 \( \text{xa2} \) \( \text{g5} \). To be fair, I should mention that by continuing 25 \( \text{d7}?! \) (instead of 25 \( \text{xa2}?! \) 25...\( \text{xd}7 \) 26 \( \text{d7} \) \( \text{g5} \) 27 \( \text{h7} \) \( \text{f6} \) 28 \( \text{xc7} \) \( \text{d4} \) 29 \( \text{h6} \) White would have gained a draw.

25 \( \text{yg5} \)

If Black plays ...\( \text{a6} \) and ...\( \text{d7} \), her position will become strategically won. But...

26 \( \text{d6}?! \)

A basically incorrect move: who needs the b6 pawn? 26...\( \text{a6} \) was more logical. But, as it turns out, this is of no particular significance – Black has been ‘playing about’ for long enough, and should now pay the price.

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Q 5-53. How should White continue?
White has two ‘desperado’ pieces – the rook at h4 and the bishop at h3. Their self-sacrificing tendency should have been carefully taken into account by both players. Alas, neither Levitina nor Alexandria was sufficiently familiar with Lasker’s ideas, and therefore they did not notice a pretty combination resulting from these ideas. However, it was also not noticed in the auditorium – I discovered the solution only after the conclusion of the game.

White could have achieved a winning position with 27 $\textit{xf5}!! \textit{exf5} 28 \textit{xh7}!! \textit{xa4} (28...\textit{xf7} with inevitable mate) 29 \textit{xg6+ \textit{h8} 30 \textit{g8+ \textit{f7} 31 \textit{g6+ \textit{e7} 32 \textit{xh7+}. It is clear that the same combination would also have worked with the knight at a6.

27 $\textit{wd2}?$

In the positional sense this is a sensible move, preventing the exchange of rooks, but, of course, not what was required!...

27 ... $\textit{wc7}$

Threatening 28...\textit{xa2}.

28 a4 $\textit{wg7}$

Despite the exposed position of the rook at h4, after 29 $\textit{f1}$! (defending against 29...\textit{a1+ and 30...\textit{xa4}) Black would appear to have no advantage. It is not possible to simplify the game or to quickly transfer the knight to a better position (whereas with the knight at a6, after playing 28...\textit{b4 or 28...\textit{b8 instead of the last move, Black would have been close to a win). Meanwhile, White has available a useful (although also very lengthy) plan of action: g3–g4–g5, and then either $\textit{h6 and h2–h4–h5, or f3–f4 and $\textit{h3.}$

In a time scramble there followed:

29 $\textit{g2}? \textit{xa4!}$ 30 $\textit{e7}$ 31 $\textit{d8+ \textit{f7}$ 32 $\textit{e4}$

Although she might have done, White has not exploited the psychological benefits of her ‘Lasker rook’, and now she makes use of an opportunity to bring it back home.

32 ... $\textit{c7!}$ 33 $\textit{e1?!}$ $\textit{xc4}$

Black has a decisive advantage. However, the adventures did not end there, and subsequently a time trouble blunder cost Alexandria a whole point.

This ending convincingly demonstrates the need to be familiar with the classical heritage. Situations that occurred in games by masters from the past repeat themselves, as can be seen, also in our day.
Exercises for Analysis

The secrets of certain positions are sometimes revealed many years after they were played. But there are also those in which the search for the truth is continuing...

Mikhail Botvinnik

The black knight is attacked. It can, of course, simply be retreated to g5, but other possibilities also come into consideration.

E 5-10. What would you recommend for Black?

White is clearly intending to sacrifice his bishop on f7.

E 5-11. Should Black hurry with his counterattack on the queenside with 18...b4, or does he do better to restrict himself to the defensive move 18...\text{a}8?

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Black faces a difficult choice. He can play quietly, but the spectacular breakthrough on the kingside with 20...g5 looks very tempting.

E 5-12. What decision would you take? And how in the event of 20...g5 should White defend?
Solutions to Exercises

E 4-1. Petrosian–Dvoretsky (Blitz game, Liepaja 1975).

Initially I thought that White could defend by 27 a8+ xg7 28 a1+ h6 29 c1! e3 30 xe3, but then I noticed the winning move 28...f6!

Even so, the former world champion should not have resigned – he had a veiled way of parrying the mate threat.

27 e5!! wxe5

28 a8+

What can Black do now? After 28...g7 29 a1 or 28...f7 29 xf4 xf4 30 f6! the queens are exchanged.

28...d8 29 xg8

30...g7 31 a1.

31 f4

Black's attack is repulsed – in the event of 31...c6 32 bxc6 bxc6 White launches a decisive counterattack by 33 a4! g7 34 a8!

It is a pity, but it has to be admitted that Black's combination could have been refuted.

E 4-2. Dvoretsky–Volovich (35th USSR Championship, Kharkov 1967)*.

1...g7+ 2 xf7 3 xe4

Black remains a piece down.

E 4-3. Dvoretsky–Rafalsky (Blitz game, Moscow 1967).

1 wxf6! xd1+

2 xd1
gxf6

3 d8+ g7

4 f5+ g6

5 g8+ h5

6 g4 mate


21 c6!!

Much weaker was 21 xf6 wxf6 22 e6 g6 23 xg6 hxg6 (23...fxg6) 24 f4 xg8 25 b4 e8 26 xd6 e2.

21...

22 xf6!

If 22...gxf6, then 23 g3+ h8 24 g5 or 24 f4(h4) is decisive. After 22...xd5 23 xd6 Black resigned.

E 4-5. Kupreichik–Yusupov (Zonal Tournament, Yerevan 1982).

12...

13 d5!!

The knight is aiming for e3, and it cannot be taken because of mate: 13 exd5 wxd5 14 f2 e8+ 15 e4 xe4+ 16 dxe4 wxe4+.

In the game there followed: 13 f5 d3 14 e2 (equally hopeless is 14 f5 h6 15 e6 w6! 16 xf8 xf8 17 w2 e5) 14...g6! 15 w6 w7 16 w4 xg2 17 xd2 xe5 18 g5 f2+ 19 c1 xd3+ 20 b1 xb2. White resigns.

* An asterisk signifies that the position was reached in analysis, but not in the game itself.

If Black does not take on c3, his pawn formation in the centre will collapse. But if he takes, how is he to reply to 27 \( \text{Bxd5?} \) He is rescued by a combination.

26 \( \ldots \) \( \text{dxc3!} \)
27 \( \text{Bxd5} \)
27 \( \text{Bxc3 \&e6} \) with an excellent position for Black.

27 \( \ldots \) \( \text{\&e6} \)
Otherwise 28 \( \text{Bxc3} \).

28 \( \text{\&ed1} \) \( \text{c2!} \)
29 \( \text{\&d6+ \&e7!} \)

The idea of the combination! 29...\( \text{\&f5?} \) 30 \( \text{\&c1} \) is bad for Black.

30 \( \text{\&xd7+ \&e8} \)
Black regains the rook and obtains a roughly equal rook endgame. The game ended in a draw.


22 \( \text{\&xd7+!! \&xd7} \)
Or 22...\( \text{\&xd7} \) 23 \( \text{\&c8+ \text{xc8} 24 \text{\&xc8+ \&d8} 25 \text{\&c6+ \&f8 26 \&xd8 mate.} \)

23 \( \text{\&c7+ \&e8} \)
24 \( \text{\&d7+! \&xd7} \)
25 \( \text{\&c8+ \text{xc8} 26 \text{\&c8+ \&d8} 27 \text{\&c6 mate} \)


The game went 23 \( \text{\&h3? \&e5 24 \text{\&xe5 fxe5 25 f4? (25 f3! \&d7 26 \&e1 with equality) 25...\&c6 26 \&g5?!, and here, by playing 26...\&d8?, Vasily Smyslov missed an opportunity to win by force with 26...\&d2! 27 \&e6+ \&f1! 28 \&xh7+ \&xh7. But earlier a win was missed by White.} \)

23 \( \text{\&d4!! \&xd4} \)
23...\( \text{\&xd4} 24 \text{\&d5+! \&xd5 25 \&e8! or 24...\&h8 25 \&e7.} \)

24 \( \text{\&e7!} \)
Mikhail Botvinnik made a mistake not only in the game, but also in his analysis. He suggested 24 \( \text{\&d5+! (Botvinnik's exclamation mark) 24...\&xd5 25 \&e7, but in this case Black saves himself with 25...\&e2+! 26 \&f1 (not 26 \&xe2\&d1! or 26 \&xe2\&d1+ 27 \&g2 \&c6+ 28 f3 \&xf3+) 26...\&f7 27 \&xf7 \&xf7 28 \&xh7+ \&f8 (found by pupils of the Dvoretsky–Yusupov school, when solving a homework exercise).} \)

24 \( \ldots \) \( \text{\&f7} \)
25 \( \text{\&d5!} \)
White also wins by 25 \( \text{\&xf7 \&e2+ 26 \&xe2 \&d1+ 27 \&f1 \&xh1+ 28 \&xf1 \&d1+ 29 \&e1 \&b5+ 30 \&g2 \&d5+ 31 \&g1, but 25 \&d5! is simpler and more convincing.} \)

25 \( \ldots \) \( \text{\&f3+} \)
26 \( \text{\&h1 \&xf2} \)
27 \( \text{\&xf7+ \&h8} \)
28 \( \text{\&e8+!} \)

'What told was my old 'illness' – weakness of combinative vision', was how Botvinnik summed things up.


Black's position is uneasy. 10...f6? 11 \&h5+ g6 12 \&xg6 is bad for him. If he prepares...f7-f6 by playing 10...g6, then 11 \&e1 f6 (11...\&g7 is met by the same reply) 12 \&xc6! \&xc6 13 \&f1. Finally, in the event of 10...\&e6 11 \&e1 \&e7 White plays 12 \&b3 (the immediate 12 \&f1 is also possible) 12...c5 13 \&f1 with dangerous threats.

Have we taken into account all Black's candidate moves? No. there is one more, not noticed by Vasily Ivanchuk in his analysis. Dolmatov found it at the board.
Black has created the threat of 11...f6. Since the ending arising after 11...e1 f6 is unpromising for White (the extra pawn will be defended by ...c6-c5), Ivanchuk had to decide on a questionable piece sacrifice.

11 b3 f6

A recommendation by Viswanathan Anand came into consideration: 12 f4!?

12 fxg5

13 a5

13...xd4 c7.

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Another subtle defensive move. 13...c7? was premature in view of 14 a6, but now Black is ready to play 14...c7 15 a6 c8! Unfortunately, at this point the game concluded - the players agreed a draw. I doubt whether White has sufficient compensation for the sacrificed piece.

The evaluation of the concluding position was confirmed five years later, when it was reached in the game Svidler-Dolmatov (Haifa 1995). The young and highly talented grandmaster from St Petersburg was apparently familiar with the Ivanchuk-Dolmatov game, but he had not analysed it and he did not know to whose advantage were the complications initiated by White. The game did not last long.

14 fxe1 c7 15. In the variation 15 a6 c8! 16 xc8+ xc8 17 f7 h6! 18 xh8 b4 Black retains his extra piece.

15...b4!? 16 g3 d6 17 c4 f6 18 axc6. 18 c5 is slightly better, but after 18...xe5 19 xe5 h5! 20 exf6+ (20 xg5 h6! 21 xh5 xh5 22 xh5 g5 and the rook is trapped) 20...xg3 21 xh8 xh8 22 hgxg8b8 Black has a won endgame.

18...xe4 19 xe4 dxe4 20 c5 xe5 21 xe5 c8 22 c4 e7 23 d6+ b8 24 b3 c6 25 c4 f6, White resigns.


I incautiously played 22...g8?, underestimating 23 xf6! gxf6 24 wd7. If now 24...e8, then 25 ef8 d8 26 bxg6, picking up a rich harvest of black pawns. But also after 24...f8 25 xd6 (25 f3 is no less strong) 25...xe3 26 xf6 White gained a winning position.

Of course, the exchange sacrifice should have been prevented.

22...h6!

Black's position is preferable.


The moves ...d7, ...h5 and ...g4 suggest themselves. With which should Black begin?

21...d7? is incorrect because of 22 e4! But also in the event of 21...g4? White complicates matters with 22 f3 d7 23 e4 or 22...e7 23 b4! Taking account of these variations, I chose the most accurate move order.

21...h5!
Black plans ...\text{d}d7, ...g4 and ...\text{bg}8 with advantage.

**E 4-12. Kuzmin-Dolmatov** (Minsk 1982).
Victory and defeat are separated by an insignificant distance – just one move. The direct play for mate 25 ...\text{xd}8? ...\text{xd}8 26 ...\text{h}6 leads to the opposite result: 26...\text{xb}1+! 27 ...\text{xc}1 ...\text{a}2#! But the move chosen by Gennady Kuzmin 25 ...\text{d}3? was no better in view of 25... ...\text{a}2! After calculating the variation 26 ...\text{h}6 ...\text{xb}1+ 27 ...\text{d}2 ...\text{xd}3+ 28 ...\text{xd}3 ...\text{xb}2+ followed by 29... ...\text{e}6, White resigned.

25 ...\text{d}3!!

In this case it is Black who would have had to capitulate – the threat of 26 ...\text{h}6 is irresistible.

Black stands better. If after 26... ...\text{d}6 the opponent were forced to reply 27 ...\text{e}2, then by playing 27... ...\text{c}6 I would increase my positional gains. But the critical reply 27 e4! must be checked.

It looks tempting to play 27... ...\text{xe}4 28 ...\text{xe}4 \text{f}6 29 ... ...\text{d}5 30 ... ...\text{d}3+ ...\text{e}4+ with an obvious advantage to Black. However, instead of 29 ... ...\text{e}5? White plays 29 ...\text{d}3!, and if 29... ...\text{c}6 30 ...\text{d}5. After the immediate 27... ...\text{f}6 there again follows 28 ...\text{d}3!, e.g. 28... ...\text{xh}2 29 ef5 with an unclear position.

Thus after 26... ...\text{d}6?! 27 e4! Black is unable to block securely the enemy pawns and the play becomes sharper, which means that this is not what he should do.

26 ... ...\text{f}6!
27 ... ...\text{d}6!
28 ... ...\text{e}2 ...\text{c}6

And Black gained an appreciable positional advantage.

It is tempting to retain the connected pawns in the centre, but a straightforward verification forces this idea to be rejected.

24 d6? ...f5 25 b4 ...a5, and White's pawn chain is destroyed.

24 e4? ...\text{xd}5 25 ...\text{xd}5 (25 ...\text{xd}5 ...\text{f}7 and 26... ...\text{e}8) 25... ...\text{f}4! followed by ... ...\text{c}4 or ... ...\text{d}4.

Since 24 ...\text{e}4 ...\text{f}5 also has no particular point, only one thing remains for White – to eliminate the ...\text{d}3 pawn with his rook as quickly as possible.

24 ... ...\text{d}11 exd5
25 ...\text{xd}5 ...\text{f}7
26 ...\text{d}3

A complicated ending with chances for both sides has arisen. Lev Alburt chose a faulty plan, and I was able to win.

26... ...\text{e}8? (26... ...\text{a}8 was correct) 27 ...\text{d}4! (not allowing 27... ...\text{e}4) 27... ...\text{g}7 28 ... ...\text{f}5 29 ... ...\text{e}5? (29... ...\text{e}6) 30 ... ...\text{c}6 ...\text{c}6 31 ... ...\text{c}8 (31... ...\text{e}4 32 ... ...\text{c}7!) 32 ... ...\text{f}7 33 ... ...\text{e}4 ...\text{e}8 34 ... ...\text{e}4 35 ... ...\text{a}6! ...\text{e}6 36 ... ...\text{a}7 ...\text{c}8 37 ... ...\text{f}2 ...\text{e}8 38 ... ...\text{d}7 39 ... ...\text{d}6 40 ... ...\text{a}6+ ...\text{e}5 41 ... ...\text{e}6+ ...\text{e}6 42 ... ...\text{a}6 ...\text{d}6 43 ... ...\text{f}8+ 44 ... ...\text{e}3 ... ...\text{c}6 45 ... ...\text{w}4. Black resigns.


23 ... ...\text{c}3!

This simple move was at the same time also the best. White gains a serious advantage. To 23... ...\text{e}5 he has the strong reply 24 e4, intending ... ...\text{d}5, as well as 24 ... ...\text{e}2?! (with the threat of 25 ... ...\text{g}4) followed by 25 ... ...\text{c}4.

Yusupov wanted to achieve more and he played 23 ... ...\text{e}4?, simultaneously attacking the bishop and both rooks. He had reckoned only with 23... ...\text{d}8 and, unfortunately, he
underestimated his opponent’s counterattack: 23...\textit{cd8!} 24 \textit{wx}e7 (24 \textit{xc}xc 3 \textit{xc}3 25 \textit{wx}e7 is sufficient only for equality) 24...c2 25 \textit{cb}b2 \textit{wc}3. There followed 26 \textit{wb}7 \textit{d}5d7 27 \textit{wb}5 a6 28 \textit{wb}6 (if 28 \textit{wc}4?, then not 28...\textit{xb}2? 29 \textit{xa}2 with advantage to White, but 28...\textit{wxc}4! 29 \textit{xc}xc4 \textit{xd}3 30 \textit{d}b2 \textit{xa}1 31 \textit{xa}1 \textit{xb}8) 28...\textit{ed}6. Draw agreed in view of the perpetual pursuit of the queen: 29 \textit{wb}7 \textit{d}6d7 30 \textit{wb}6 \textit{ed}6.


If the queen moves off the h3-c8 diagonal (for example, 22...\textit{we}7), White acquires the tactical blow 23 \textit{xf}6! gxf6 (23...\textit{xc}1 24 \textit{xb}h7) 24 \textit{xf}4 with the threat of 25 \textit{d}d7. This means that Black must choose between the squares \textit{e}6 and \textit{f}5.

In the game there followed 22...\textit{f}5? 23 \textit{gx}h6 \textit{wg}6 (23...\textit{g}xh6 24 \textit{xf}4 \textit{xf}4 25 \textit{w}e3) 24 \textit{d}d7! \textit{ce}6 25 \textit{hx}g7+ \textit{xg}7 26 \textit{d}3? \textit{xd}2 27 \textit{xd}2 \textit{xf}3 28 \textit{fh}2 with an unclear position.

22 ... \textit{we}6!

It is important to leave the f-file free for the rook. In this case Black gains the advantage, for example:

\begin{align*}
23 & \text{ gx}h6 & \text{ gx}h6 \\
24 & \text{ d}d2 & \text{ xd}2 \\
25 & \textit{wx}d2 & \textit{f}3!
\end{align*}

E 4-17. Gutman-Razuvaev (USSR Cup, Tbilisi 1976).

Black should not take on b4.

10 ... \textit{xb}4?

11 \textit{xf}6 \textit{gx}f6

Unfavourable is 11...\textit{xf}6 12 \textit{xd}5 with an obvious advantage to White. But now too he regains his pawn with a little combination, based on a double attack.

12 \textit{xd}5!!

Lev Gutman did not notice the combination, played the weaker 12 \textit{wb}3?, and after 12...\textit{xc}3 13 \textit{xc}3 \textit{c}6 14 \textit{d}1 \textit{f}5 15 \textit{wh}5 \textit{wf}6 he did not gain any real compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

12 ... \textit{xd}5

13 \textit{wa}4

For example, 13...\textit{h}3 (or 13...\textit{e}7 14 \textit{xe}8 \textit{h}3 15 \textit{x}4! 14 \textit{f}4 \textit{wa}5 15 \textit{xa}5 \textit{xa}5 16 \textit{h}3, and Black has a difficult ending. This variation occurred many years later in the game Bareev-Lputian, Montecatini Terme 2000.

Meanwhile, Garry Kasparov was apparently familiar with my analysis, and in the 15th game of his match against Nigel Short (London 1993) he made the same opening moves, including 10 b4! His opponent did not fall into the trap and replied 10...a6, reconciling himself to a somewhat inferior position.


The game went 25...\textit{a}8? 26 f3 \textit{xe}5 27 \textit{c}7, and subsequently White converted his positional advantage.

A temporary bishop sacrifice would have led to a draw:

25 ... \textit{xe}5!

For example: 26 ...\textit{xb}7 \textit{d}5 27 g3 \textit{d}7, or 26 f3 \textit{d}5! 27 \textit{xf}7 \textit{xf}7 28 \textit{c}7+ \textit{f}6 29 \textit{xb}7 \textit{d}1 + 30 \textit{d}2 \textit{d}2 + 31 \textit{g}3 \textit{xb}2.


\begin{align*}
31 & \textit{e}6! & \textit{xe}6 \\
32 & \textit{ae}1 & \textit{d}7 \\
33 & \textit{xe}8+ & \textit{xe}8 \\
34 & \textit{e}1 & \textit{c}6
\end{align*}
35 d4
Since 35...d7?? 36 e8 mate is not possible, White wins the exchange, for which the opponent will not have any real compensation.

Unfortunately, Dolmatov played more weakly and was successful only thanks to a mistake in reply by his opponent.

31 c4? dxc4 32 bxc4 d5 33 e2 f7? (33...g4! and the outcome would have remained unclear) 34 g4! xg5 35 gx5 e4 36 f6! xd7 37 f2 d2 38 e1 f6 39 f3 h5 (39...f7 was more tenacious) 40 xh5 gxh5 41 f5 xc4, and Black resigned.


The black pieces' mouths are watering at the sight of the enemy queen, that has lost its way in their territory. However, trapping it is not so simple. In the game there followed 26...a8? 27 wb7 c6 (27...cb8? 28 d5!, 27...g6? 28 xb5) 28 wb6 xa2 29 a1 with an unclear position.

In order to shut in the queen with the rooks, the white knight must first be deprived of the f5 square. Dolmatov considered 26...d4?, and rejected it in view of 27 e4! a8 28 wb7 cb8 29 e5! we6 30 wc7. But there was a second possibility, which would have led to a win.

26...g6!!
Now after 27 e4 a8 28 e5 or 28 wb7 cb8 29 e5 the black queen can retreat to d8, whereas the white queen has nowhere to go. 27 wa5 c6 28 wa6 c7! 29 e4 a7 30 e5 we6(d7) is equally hopeless.

White needs to do something, since the opponent wants to play 36...d3. 36 w5 xc7 37 b1 looks tempting, but Black has the pretty defence 37...d7!! 38 xd7 (38 b8+ d8) 38...xa2+ 39 h3 xb1 with a won queen ending.

After this variation has been found, the solution becomes clear: the king must be moved away from a possible check.

36 h3!
If now 36...d3?, then 37 w5! xc7 38 b1 g6 39 b8+ g7 40 we5+ f6 41 we8 with a mating attack. 37...wa6?!, hoping for 38 xd5 we6+ or 38 b1 g6 39 xd5 (39 d7 d2 40 b8 d1w) 39...g7 40 b8 d2! also does not save Black. White continues 38 c6! wb7, and now not 39 xd5? d2!, but 39 d6! (Ken Neat) 39...f8 (39...xc7 40 e7) 40 e7 d2 (40...wc8 41 xd5) 41 xf7!!

If 36...g6? there would have followed 37 xc6 with the threat of 38 xb6+. Lev Alburt found the only defence.

36 wb6! 37 xd5 we6+ 38 xc7 xe6 fx6 39 fe f7. Draw agreed. I did not risk playing 40 h4 on account of 40...e5! 41 fe5 xe6 42 c5 f5.

It should be mentioned that in the initial position it was also possible to play 36...c6? d3 37 we7! (if 37 xh5 there follows 37...xc7, but not 37...d2? in view of 38 h6! gxh6 39 g4+ 37...d2 38 wd7 xc7 39 xc7 xc7 40 xc7 d1w, and the queen ending is drawn. But the move in the game is obviously stronger, since it sets the opponent a difficult problem.

White is a pawn up, but the black pieces are active, and the threat of ...wb2 is unpleasant. Dolmatov found a way of relieving the situation to his advantage.

25 d4! wb2

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26 \( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{xd}4 \)
27 \( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{xd}4 \)

Bad is 27...\( \text{Wxc}2 \) 28 \( \text{Wxc}4+ \) \( \text{dxc}4 \) 29 \( \text{c}1 \).

28 \( \text{Wxd}4 \) \( \text{Wxc}2 \)

29 \( \text{Wh}2!! \)

The essential point of the operation planned by Dolmatov. The hasty 29 \( \text{e}3? \) would have led to an unclear position after 29...\( \text{Wh}1+ \) 30 \( \text{h}2 \) c2 31 \( \text{c}3+ \) \( \text{b}7 \), and if 32 \( \text{Wd}2 \) \( \text{a}4 \).

But now 30 \( \text{e}3 \) is threatened, winning the important c3 pawn. For example, 29...\( \text{b}7 \) 30 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{xf}2 \) (30...\( \text{Wd}2 \) 31 \( \text{ad}3 \) 31 \( \text{xf}2 \) \( \text{xf}2 \) 32 \( \text{Wxc}3 \) \( \text{Wxh}4+ \) 32...d4 33 \( \text{Wxd}4 \) \( \text{c}6 \) does not work on account of 34 \( \text{e}4! \) 33 \( \text{h}3 \), and White has excellent winning chances.

29 ... \( \text{Wd}2 \)
30 \( \text{Wxd}2 \) \( \text{cxd}2 \)
31 \( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{b}7 \)
32 \( \text{xd}2 \)

And Dolmatov successfully converted his pawn advantage.

As you see, the king can be hidden from enemy checks not only before the start of a combination, but sometimes even at the very height of it.


Black would like to exchange rooks, in order then to direct his king into the centre of the board. However, the immediate exchange promises little – first he needs to lure forward the white b-pawn.

24 ... \( \text{a}4! \)
25 \( \text{b}5 \)

If 25 fxe4, then Black does not play 25...\( \text{xb}4? \) in view of 26 \( \text{f}5+ \), but he first interposes the check 25...\( \text{g}4! \), and only after 26 \( \text{f}3 \) – 26...\( \text{xb}4 \), with advantage.

25 ... \( \text{a}2+ \)
26 \( \text{d}2 \)

Also bad is 26 \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{xf}3 \).

26 ... \( \text{xf}3 \)
27 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{xd}2+ \)
28 \( \text{Wxd}2 \) \( \text{d}6 \)

With the white pawn at b5 the minor piece ending is an elementary win.

29 b6 \( \text{c}5 \) 30 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{xb}6 \) 31 e4 (31 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{e}6+ \); 31 \( \text{b}4 \) g5; 31 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 31...g5 (more accurate than 31...\( \text{c}5 \) 32 \( \text{b}3+ \) and 33 \( \text{d}4 \) 32 \( \text{b}4 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 33 \( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 34 f4 \( \text{d}6 \) 35 \( \text{f}xg5 \) \( \text{hxg}5 \) 36 \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 37 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 38 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{f}4 \) 39 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{f}3 \) 40 \( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 41 e5 \( \text{g}4 \). White resigns.


It is advantageous for Black to play ...g5–g4, so as then to pick up the h5 pawn. However, if immediately 31...g4?, then 32 \( \text{g}xg4! \) fxg4 33 \( \text{g}4 \) and the white pawns are dangerous, since 33...\( \text{g}7 \) 34 \( \text{c}5 \) is not possible.

31 ... \( \text{a}2! \)
32 \( \text{f}3 \)

Other moves are no better.

32 ... \( \text{g}4 \)
Now after 33 \texttt{Qxg4 fxg4} 34 \texttt{Qxg4 Qg7!} Black does not have to fear 35 \texttt{Qc5}, and the white pawns will be successfully blocked.

33 \texttt{Qg2 Qxh5} 34 \texttt{Qf1 Qe8} 35 \texttt{Qf2 Qc6} 36 \texttt{Qe3 Qa3}! 37 \texttt{Qe1 Qc5} 38 \texttt{Qf1 Qf7} 39 \texttt{Qc2 Qa8} 40 \texttt{Qd4 Qb3} 41 \texttt{Qxb3?} (41 \texttt{Qb1 Qxd4} 42 \texttt{Qxd4} was more tenacious) 41...\texttt{cx}b3 42 \texttt{Qb1 Qa4!} 43 \texttt{Qc4 Qc8} 44 \texttt{Qa1 b2} 45 \texttt{Qb1 dxc4} 46 \texttt{Qxb2 c3} 47 \texttt{Qb4 c2} 48 \texttt{Qd2 Qd8!} 49 \texttt{Qe3 Qd1}! 50 \texttt{Qxa4 Qd5!} 51 \texttt{Qa7+ Qg6} 52 \texttt{Qa6+ Qh5} 53 \texttt{Qf2} (the last hope:

53...\texttt{Qxe3?} 54 \texttt{Qxb5 Qd8} 55 \texttt{Qc6}) 53...\texttt{Qxf1+}. White resigns.

\texttt{E 4-25. Dolmatov–Kuzmin} (Kislovodsk 1982).

27 \texttt{Qe4} suggests itself, but Black defends his weak d6 point by 27...\texttt{Qf5}, not fearing 28 \texttt{Qexg5 Qxd4} 29 \texttt{Qxd4 hxg5} with an acceptable position.

Dolmatov found a cunning intermediate check.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c}
27 \texttt{Qh7+!} \texttt{Qh8} \\
28 \texttt{Qe4}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Now if 28...\texttt{Qf5} White wins by 29 \texttt{d5}, and both 28...\texttt{Qxh7} 29 \texttt{Qf6+} and 28...\texttt{f5} 29 \texttt{Qxd4} are bad.

28 ... \texttt{dxc5} 29 \texttt{dxc5}

If now 29...\texttt{Qf5}, then 30 \texttt{Qexg5} (the white d4 pawn, which the black knight was not averse to capturing, has moved).

29...\texttt{Qd5} 30 \texttt{Qd6 Qxd6} 31 \texttt{cxd6 Qxc2} 32 \texttt{Qxc2 Qb2} 33 \texttt{Qcd1}, and White easily converted his exchange advantage.


The critical feature of the position is the far-advanced passed e3 pawn. White is threatening to attack it by moving his knight from c3. There is also another way of hitting the pawn: 25 \texttt{Qe6 Qxe6} 26 \texttt{Qxe3}. It was almost certainly this that the opponent was mainly hoping for. But here grandmaster Dolmatov, after penetrating more deeply into the position, saw the opportunity for a clever trap.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c}
24 ... \texttt{g5!!} \\
25 \texttt{Qxe6?!}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

It was better to move the knight to another square, but even then the advantage would have remained with Black. If 25 \texttt{Qh3} he would have had the possibility of opening lines on the kingside by ...\texttt{g5–g4}, while after 25 \texttt{Qf2} or 25 \texttt{Qd3} it would have been more difficult for White to attack the e3 pawn.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c}
25 ... \texttt{Qg4!} \\
26 \texttt{Qxe3}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

26 dxe6 \texttt{Qxe6} was hopeless, but now the game concludes immediately.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c}
252
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
playful thought helped him to find a quite serious idea: Sergey realised that the bishop could move away with an attack not only on the king, but also on the queen.

Black made a move that was useful in the positional sense.

14 ... 
\( \text{b6!} \)

He wants to drive the bishop off the a2–g8 diagonal: 15 \( \text{b3} \) a4. Otherwise the opponent could have prepared a retreat for it by 15 a4, or played 15 \( \text{d4} \). The exchange of bishop for knight

\( 15 \ldots \text{x}b6 \text{xb6} \)

16 \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{f8} \) is advantageous to Black.

At the same time Alexander Chernin provokes his opponent into a bishop sacrifice, which looks very tempting.

15 \( \text{x}f7+? \) \( \text{xf7} \)

The accurate move order! 17 \( \ldots \text{c8?} \) (or 17 \( \ldots \text{d7} \)) 18 \( \text{xg7} \) \( \text{c4} \) (18 \( \ldots \text{g7} \) 19 \( \text{d4+} \), but not 19 \( \text{xb6?} \) \( \text{c5} \)) is incorrect in view of 19 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{xe}3 \) 20 \( \text{xe}8 \) (threatening mate with the queen on g7) 20 \( \ldots \text{xe}8 \) 21 \( \text{xe}3 \), when White is the exchange and a pawn up.

18 \( \text{e2} \)

After 18 \( \text{xd8} \) \( \text{xd2} \) 19 \( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{c4} \) (or 19 \( \text{xe4} \)) the white knight cannot escape from the trap. If 18 \( \text{d3} \), both 18 \( \text{e5} \) and 18 \( \ldots \text{g7} \) 19 \( \text{xg7} \) \( \text{e5} \) 20 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{c5} \) (or 20 \( \ldots \text{g7} \) 21 \( \text{f4 c5} \) are strong.

18 ... \( \text{c8} \)

19 \( \text{xg7} \)

19 \( \text{xc4} \) \( \text{a6} \) 20 \( \text{b3} \) a4.

19 ... \( \text{xe3} \)

20 \( \text{xe8} \) \( \text{xd1} \)

21 \( \text{xd1} \)

The game went 21 \( \text{d6} \) \( \text{exd6} \) 22 \( \text{xd1} \) \( \text{e6} \). and White resigned.

21 ... \( \text{d7}! \)

Of course, not 21 \( \ldots \text{xe8?} \) 22 \( \text{b3}+ \) and 23 \( \text{xb7} \). Unconvincing is 21 \( \ldots \text{f7?!} \) 22 \( \text{xd6+} \) \( \text{exd6} \) 23 \( \text{xd6} \).

22 \( \text{b3+} \) \( \text{f8(h8)} \)

White remains a piece down, obtaining only two pawns for it.

The game went 37 \( \text{e5?!} \) \( \text{c7?!} \) (after 37 \( \ldots \text{c5} \)! Black could have successfully defended) 38 \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{a5} \) 39 \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{g6} \) 40 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{c5} \) 41 \( \text{f4}! \) \( \text{xd5} \) (41 \( \ldots \text{xe5} \) 42 \( \text{f6!} \) \( \text{d5} \) 43 \( \text{xe6} \) 42 \( \text{c4} \), and White won.

A combination, which would have led to a forced win for White, was found by Dolmatov.

37 \( \text{xe6}! \) \( \text{f6} \)

38 \( \text{h4!} \)

39 \( \text{f7+} \) \( \text{h8} \)

40 \( \text{e5} \)

Threatening 41 \( \text{f8+} \).

40 ... \( \text{c5} \)

41 \( \text{g6} \) \( \text{xe5}+ \)

42 \( \text{h1} \)


For the pawn Black does not have sufficient compensation. He can dispute this evaluation, only by landing a clever tactical blow.

23 ... \( \text{d2+?!} \)

His opponent became completely rattled and even lost the game after 24 \( \text{b1?} \) \( \text{xd6} \) 25 \( \text{xd2} \) \( \text{xd2} \). Of course, also bad is 24 \( \text{xd2?} \) (or 24 \( \text{d2?!} \)) 24 \( \ldots \text{xd6} \), as well as 24 \( \text{xd2?} \) \( \text{xa2} \) with the threats of 25 \( \ldots \text{xb2} \) mate and 25 \( \ldots \text{a1} \) mate.

24 \( \text{xd2} \) \( \text{xa2} \)
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In the books and articles where this ending is given, only the natural move 25 \( \text{b4?!} \) is considered, leading to a forced draw:

\[
25 \ldots \text{d8! (25 \ldots \text{e3? 26 \text{e1}) 26 \text{b1} (not 26 \text{xd8+? \text{xd8 27 \text{b1 \text{a8}}) 26 \text{da8! 27 c1 \text{d8!} Black cannot play for a win: 27 \ldots \text{f13? 28 \text{e1; 27\text{c5? 28 \text{b6!} (but not 28 \text{xc5? \text{f13 29 \text{e1 a1}+ 30 \text{d2 \text{xe1 31 \text{xe1 a1}+ 32 \text{d2 d1 mate, and not 28 \text{xc5?! \text{d8! 29 \text{xd8+ \text{xd8}.}})}}}}}}}}}}}
\]

Alas, White finds a cool defence, enabling him to eliminate all the opponent's threats, while retaining his extra piece.

\[
25 \ldots \text{d3!}
\]

Since the combination is incorrect, the initial position is also unfavourable for Black.

E 4-30. Polugayevsky–Hulak (Budapest 1975)*.

Lev Polugayevsky thought that Black could save himself only with 44...\( \text{hx5!} \), and that all other moves (for example, 44...\( \text{xd5? 45 \text{e6+!} \)) would lose. In fact the capture on f3 is quite possible.

\[
44 \ldots \text{xf3!}
\]

Bad now is 45 \( \text{e6+? \text{h5, while after 45 \text{h6+ \text{h7 White would have to repeat moves.}}}
\]

45 \( \text{g4?} \)

The grandmaster considered only 45...\( \text{d3(h3) 46 \text{e6+! or 45 \text{b3 46 d6, and White wins. He overlooked a counterblow, which completely reverses the evaluation of the position.}}}
\]

45 \(... \text{e7!}
\]


Nothing is achieved by either 31 \( \text{c7? \text{xe4+ or 31 \text{e7? \text{h7.}}}
\]

31 \( \text{d8!}
\]

Black is unable to parry simultaneously the two threats: 32 \( \text{h6+} \) and 32 \( \text{c7. In the game there followed 31...\( \text{g7 (31...\text{xd5 32 \text{xd5 xc1+ 33 \text{xc1 \text{d7 34 \text{h6+ with mate) 32 \text{c7 \text{h3 33 \text{xc6 bxa6 34 \text{d6, and Black resigned.}}}}}}}}}}
\]

31 \( \text{e3! \text{xd5 32 \text{xc5 was equally strong, e.g. 32...\text{xc4 33 \text{xd6 or 32...\text{xe4+ 33 \text{xe4 dxc5 34 \text{h6+ \text{g8 35 \text{d8 \text{e7 36 \text{cd1 and 37 \text{d1d7.}}}}}}}}}}}}
\]


White has an overwhelming positional advantage, and the only question is how to break through the opponent's defences. In my opinion, the tempting 43 \( \text{e5?! is not completely convincing in view of 43...\( \text{e5! 44 \text{xf7+ \text{xf7 45 \text{xf7+ \text{h6! 46 \text{d2+ (46 \text{xd7 \text{xd7 47 \text{f18+ \text{g7) 46...g5 47 hxg5+ \text{g6.}}}}}}}}}}}
\]

Yefim Geller found a clear and pretty solution.

\[
43 \text{b2! \text{h7 44 \text{f5! \text{xf5 44...\text{b7 45 \text{h5+! \text{g5 46 \text{c1(d2).}}}}}}}}
\]

45 \( \text{h6+! \text{h6 46 \text{h8+ \text{g6 47 \text{xf5+}}}}}
\]

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Black resigned in view of inevitable mate: 47...\text{gx}f5 48 \text{wx}h5+ \text{xf}6 49 \text{wg}5 mate.
A win (true, more difficult to calculate) was also given by the immediate rook sacrifice on f5.

43 \text{xf}5! \text{gx}f5 44 \text{wx}f5 \text{xe}8 (44...\text{xe}5 45 \text{wh}4 and 46 \text{wh}6+\text{g}7 47 \text{xf}7! \text{xd}3 48 \text{xe}8 \text{xd}3 49 \text{wg}5) 48 \text{xe}6+! \text{xe}6 49 \text{wx}e6+ \text{f}8 50 \text{wx}e8+ \text{g}7 51 \text{wg}8+ \text{h}6 52 \text{e}5+! \text{xe}5 (52...\text{xe}5 53 \text{wh}8+ \text{e}5 54 \text{g}6+) 53 \text{wg}7+ \text{d}6 (otherwise the queen is lost) 54 \text{wf}6+ \text{d}7 55 \text{we}6+ \text{d}8 56 \text{we}8 mate.

E 4-33. Kavalek–Martinovic (Sarajevo 1968).
Unconvincing is 24 \text{wh}2?! \text{xf}7 25 \text{xf}4 \text{xf}4+ 26 \text{xf}4+ \text{ex}f4 (intending 27...\text{gh}8).
Lubos Kavalek broke through his opponent’s defences with a spectacular rook sacrifice.

24 \text{gx}g6!! \text{ه}xg6
25 \text{g}5

The main variation of White’s combination was as follows:

25 ... \text{wh}7
26 \text{wh}2 \text{gh}8

After 26...\text{le}8 27 \text{wh}7+ \text{f}8 28 \text{gx}g6 \text{xf}3 the simplest is 29 \text{d}3, preparing 30 \text{fl}1.

27 \text{lx}g6 \text{wx}g6
27...\text{wg}7 28 \text{gh}7+ \text{f}7 29 \text{wh}5+.

28 \text{wh}8+ \text{fl}7
29 \text{gh}7+ \text{le}8
30 \text{le}7+

Slobodan Martinovic parted with his queen immediately, but this too did not help:
25...\text{xf}3 26 \text{xf}3 \text{xf}3 27 \text{wh}2 \text{a}8
28 \text{wh}7+ \text{f}7 29 \text{wh}6 \text{fl}4 30 \text{a}6+ \text{le}8 31 \text{wh}7. Black resigns.

White had available a completely different plan of attack, also, however, involving sacrifice of material.

24 \text{ge}4! \text{g}5 25 \text{eh}1 \text{h}6 26 \text{xf}4! \text{ex}f4
27 \text{e}d4 \text{wd}7 28 \text{wh}2 \text{e}6 29 \text{e}1 \text{af}8 (29...\text{g}7 30 \text{wh}7+ \text{f}7 31 \text{h}5).

30 \text{wh}6! \text{d}xh6 31 \text{d}xh6 with decisive threats. The splendid coordination of White’s rook and two bishops creates a strong impression.

E 4-34. Cvitan–Short (Mexico 1981).
Black has an enormous material advantage, but his king feels extremely uncomfortable. 22 \text{xf}7 \text{d}x7 23 \text{f}6+ and 24 \text{xf}7 mate is threatened. In the game there followed
21...\text{d}8? 22 \text{xf}7! (less good is 22 \text{wh}6+ \text{g}8) 22...\text{xf}7 23 \text{f}6!, and Black resigned.

Ognjen Cvitan considers the best defence to be a move vacating d8 for the king.

21 ... \text{wb}8!

He gives the following pretty variation:

22 \text{xf}7 \text{d}x7
23 \text{xe}7!

But not 23 \text{f}6+? \text{d}8.

23 ... \text{d}8?

Or 23...\text{xe}7 24 \text{xf}7+ with a draw.
24 \( \text{\texttt{exf7}} \)

24 \( \text{\texttt{exf7}} \) \( \text{\texttt{xe5}} \) did not work. But now 25 \( \text{\texttt{h4}} \) is threatened.

24 \ldots \quad \text{\texttt{xe7}}

25 \( \text{\texttt{h4}} \!+! \) \quad \text{\texttt{xf7}}

26 \( \text{\texttt{f6}} \!+! \)

The king cannot hide from perpetual check.

Another attempt is 21 ... \( \text{\texttt{xd5}} \!\! \) 22 \( \text{\texttt{xd5}} \!\! \). In Cvitan's opinion, White gains the advantage: 22 ... \( \text{\texttt{wb8}} \!\! \) 23 \( \text{\texttt{xf7?! \texttt{xf7}} \!\! \). 24 \( \text{\texttt{xf7}} \!+! \) \( \text{\texttt{d8}} \!\! \), and now not 25 \( \text{\texttt{xa8?! \texttt{xe5}} \!\! \), but 25 \( \text{\texttt{g7?!}} \!\! \), and only then 26 \( \text{\texttt{xa8}} \!\! \), regaining the rook. However, Yusupov rightly pointed out that after 22 ... \( \text{\texttt{c7}} \!\! \) 23 \( \text{\texttt{xf7 0–0–0!}} \!\! \) 24 \( \text{\texttt{xe7 c4!}} \!\! \) 25 \( \text{\texttt{e8 \texttt{c5+}} \!\! \) Black's position is not worse.


Aiming to hide from the checks as quickly as possible, I incautiously played 60 ... \( \text{\texttt{c2?!}} \!\! \), and after the unanticipated reply 61 \( \text{\texttt{f3!}} \!\! \) it transpired that the e3 pawn was lost. The game concluded 61 ... \( \text{\texttt{d1+}} \!\! \) 62 \( \text{\texttt{e4 \texttt{e2}}} \!\! \) 63 \( \text{\texttt{xe3 \texttt{xc4+}} \!\! \) 64 \( \text{\texttt{f5}} \!\! \). Draw.

In ancient times they used to say: 'More haste, less speed!'

60 \ldots \quad \text{\texttt{e2?!}}

61 \( \text{\texttt{g4}} \!\! \) \( \text{\texttt{d3}} \!\! \)

62 \( \text{\texttt{f5}} \!\! \)

62 \( \text{\texttt{g6}} \!\! \) \( \text{\texttt{c3}} \!\! \)

62 \ldots \quad \text{\texttt{d2}}

63 \( \text{\texttt{a5}} \!\! \)

63 \( \text{\texttt{d5}} \!\! \) \( \text{\texttt{c1}} \!\! \)

63 \ldots \quad \text{\texttt{d1}}

64 \( \text{\texttt{a4}} \!\! \) \( \text{\texttt{e2}} \!\! \)

65 \( \text{\texttt{c2}} \!\! \) \( \text{\texttt{d2}} \!\! \)

The king has successfully hidden from the checks. and after 66 \( \text{\texttt{b1?! \texttt{c3!}}} \) Black wins.

E 4-36. Gaprindashvili–Alexandria (Kislovodsk 1982).

Black has a definite advantage, but after the hasty move made in the game it could have evaporated.

29 \ldots \quad \text{\texttt{h4?!}}

Fortunately for Nana Alexandria, in the time scramble White made the poor reply 30 \( \text{\texttt{f3?!}} \!\! \), which led to her defeat: 30 ... \( \text{\texttt{d1+}} \!\! \) 31 \( \text{\texttt{xd1 \texttt{xd1+}} \!\! \) 32 \( \text{\texttt{f2}} \!\! \) 32 ... \( \text{\texttt{g2 \texttt{e2+}} \!\! \) 33 \( \text{\texttt{f1 \texttt{h3+}} \!\! \) 34 \( \text{\texttt{h3 \texttt{xc3}} \!\! \) 35 \( \text{\texttt{g1 \texttt{g5}} \!\! \) 36 \( \text{\texttt{c8+ \texttt{g7}} \!\! \) 37 \( \text{\texttt{g4 \texttt{c2+}} \!\! \) 38 \( \text{\texttt{f1 \texttt{d1+}} \!\! \) 39 \( \text{\texttt{f2 \texttt{f6}} \!\! \). White lost on time.

30 \( \text{\texttt{xb5}} \!\! \) \( \text{\texttt{d1+}} \!\! \)

31 \( \text{\texttt{g2}} \!\! \) \( \text{\texttt{f4+}} \!\! \)

31 ... \( \text{\texttt{g4?!}} \!\! \) 32 \( \text{\texttt{f3}} \!\! \) 33 ... \( \text{\texttt{h3+}} \!\! \) 32 ... \( \text{\texttt{f3 \texttt{wd3}} \!\! \) 33 \( \text{\texttt{e8+ \texttt{h7}} \!\! \) 34 \( \text{\texttt{b8}} \!\! \)

32 \( \text{\texttt{xf4}} \!\! \)

Of course, not 32 \( \text{\texttt{gx4?? \texttt{g4}} \!\! \) mate; however, as pointed out by Ken Neat, 32 ... \( \text{\texttt{f3 \texttt{wd3}} \!\! \) 33 \( \text{\texttt{b2!}} \) is stronger.

32 \ldots \quad \text{\texttt{h3+}}

33 \( \text{\texttt{f3}} \!\! \) \( \text{\texttt{d3+}} \!\! \)

34 \( \text{\texttt{g4}} \!\! \) \( \text{\texttt{xb1}} \!\! \)

35 \( \text{\texttt{e8+ \texttt{h7}} \!\! \)

36 \( \text{\texttt{xf7}} \!\! \)

The position is drawn.

In view of the fact that in the initial position White cannot play 30 \( \text{\texttt{xb5?!}} \) because of 30 ... \( \text{\texttt{d1+}} \!\! \) 31 \( \text{\texttt{g2 \texttt{h4+!!}}} \!\! \), Black should have chosen the preparatory move 29 ... \( \text{\texttt{h7}} \!\! \) or, even better, 29 ... \( \text{\texttt{d3!}} \) freeing the queen from having to defend the rook and intending ... \( \text{\texttt{g4}} \!\! \). For example: 30 \( \text{\texttt{g2 \texttt{g4}} \!\! \) (with the threats of 31 ... \( \text{\texttt{h4+}} \!\! \) and 31 ... \( \text{\texttt{xe4+}} \!\! \), or 30 \( \text{\texttt{h4 \texttt{g4 \texttt{xb5 \texttt{e3!}}}}} \!\! \) if 30 \( \text{\texttt{f3}} \!\! \), then 30 ... \( \text{\texttt{h4}} \) gains greatly in strength, and 31 \( \text{\texttt{xb5?!}} \) is bad in view of 31 ... \( \text{\texttt{d1+}} \!\! \).

20 \( \Box xd7 \) \( \Box xd4 \)
21 \( \Box xc8 \) \( \Box xb3 \)
22 \( \Box xf8+! \) \( \Box xf8! \)

22...\( \Box xf8? \) 23 \( \Box a3 \).
23 \( \Box a6! \)
23 \( \Box a3 \) is now pointless in view of 23...\( \Box d8 \).
23 ...
24 \( \Box b6! \)
24 \( \Box a7 \) would seem to be weaker: 24...\( \Box xb2 \)
25 \( \Box xh6 \) \( \Box d4 \) 26 \( \Box b7 \) (26 \( \Box c7 \) \( \Box a8 \))
26...\( \Box c5 \) 27 \( \Box xc5 \) \( \Box xc5 \) 28 \( \Box b1 \) f6?!, and
Black has excellent drawing chances.
24 ...
24 \( \Box xd7 \)

After 24...\( \Box d4 \) 25 \( \Box b8 \) or 24...\( \Box a5 \) 25 \( \Box b4 \)
\( \Box c4 \) 26 \( \Box b8 \) White should win the minor
piece ending.
25 \( \Box xb3 \) \( \Box d1+ \)
26 \( \Box h2 \) \( \Box b1 \)
27 \( \Box b8+ \) \( \Box h7 \)
28 \( \Box b7 \)
28 \( b4?? \) \( \Box e5+ \).
28 ...
29 \( \Box xe7 \) \( \Box g8 \)

This position has been reached more or less
by force. Can White convert his pawn
advantage? I am not sure – I think that
Black's chances of drawing are no less than
White's chances of winning. But in the
position from which we began, all the same I
had nothing better than the exchanging
operation carried out in the game.

Exact recommendations for playing such
positions do not exist – there are only
approximate guides, based on the experi­
ence of play in similar positions. Usually it is
advisable for Black to 'straighten' his
pawns by playing ...h6–h5, and for White
to try and prevent this with g2–g4.

30 g3. I avoided 30 g4 because of 30...\( \Box b5! \)
followed by 31...h5, after which White has to
either exchange a pair of pawns, or advance
his pawn to g5. Both the one and the other
are undesirable. Now (or on one of the next
few moves) it made sense for Black to play
...h6–h5!, but he apparently was not familiar
with the rule mentioned above.

30...\( \Box a2 \) 31 \( \Box g2 \) \( \Box a6 \) 32 \( \Box d7 \) \( \Box a4 \) 33 \( \Box f3 \)
\( \Box b4? \) (33...h5!) 34 \( \Box g4! \) \( g5 \) (34...\( \Box b5 \) 35 \( \Box d5 \))
35 \( \Box d5 \) (threatening 36 \( h4 \) gxh4 37 \( \Box h5 \))
35...\( \Box b3 \) 36 \( e5! \) (36 \( h4? \) gxh4 37 \( \Box h5 \) \( \Box d4 \)
38 \( \Box xh6 \) \( \Box xe3 \) with a probable draw)
36...\( \Box b4 \) 37 \( \Box d4 \) \( \Box h7 \) (37...\( \Box b3+ \) 38 \( \Box e4 \)
\( \Box xh3 \) 39 \( e6! \)) 38 \( \Box e4 \) \( \Box f8 \) 39 \( \Box d7 \) (not 39
\( \Box f5? \) because of 39...\( \Box c5! \), but 39 \( \Box d6? \)
came seriously into consideration) 39...\( \Box g6 \)
40 \( \Box c7 \) \( \Box a4 \) 41 \( \Box c8 \) \( \Box a3? \) (Yusupov
pointed out that after 41...\( \Box g7! \) it would have
been not at all easy for White to break
through his opponent's defences)
42 \( \Box c6+ \) \( \Box h7 \) 43 \( \Box c7 \) \( \Box g8 \) (43...\( \Box g6 \) 44 \( e6! \) \( \Box b2 \)
45 \( e7 \) 44 \( \Box a7! \) \( \Box a7 \) 45 \( \Box a7 \) \( \Box b4 \)
(45...\( \Box h7 \) 46 \( \Box f5 \) \( \Box e7 \) was more tenacious,
but even then, as shown by analysis,
White's position is won) 46 \( \Box f5 \) \( \Box e7 \) 47 \( e6! \)
Black resigns. If 47...fxe6+, then 48 \( \Box g6! \) is
decisive.
22 ... \( \texttt{ab}8! \)
23 \( \texttt{a}1 \)
23 \( \texttt{c}1 \) 24 \( \texttt{xf}4 \) \( \texttt{xe}4 \) is hopeless.
23 ... \( \texttt{b}4 \)
24 \( \texttt{g}5 \)
The game went 24 \( \texttt{c}3 \) \( \texttt{e}4 \) (24...\( \texttt{xf}3 \) would also have won easily) 25 \( \texttt{d}2 \) (25 \( \texttt{xe}4 \) \( \texttt{we}4! \) 26 \( \texttt{a}3 \) \( \texttt{c}2+ \) 27 \( \texttt{a}2 \) \( \texttt{wc}6 \) 25...\( \texttt{gx}6 \) 26 \( \texttt{g}x6 \) \( \texttt{xf}2! \) 27 \( \texttt{xf}2 \) \( \texttt{we}3 \) 28 \( \texttt{g}8+ \) \( \texttt{g}x8 \) 29 \( \texttt{f}3 \) \( \texttt{g}1+ \) 30 \( \texttt{b}2 \) \( \texttt{wf}2+ \).
White resigns.
24 ... \( \texttt{e}4! \)
25 \( \texttt{xe}4 \) \( \texttt{we}4! \)
White has no defence.
If you immediately began your calculations with 22...\( \texttt{ab}8! \), you will have probably also have found without difficulty the entire winning variation. Much more time would have had to be spent on attempts to analyse Black's other attacking possibilities, if it was they that drew your attention.
22...\( \texttt{e}4? \) 23 \( \texttt{xf}4 \) \( \texttt{xe}4 \) 24 \( \texttt{xe}4 \) \( \texttt{we}4 \) 25 \( \texttt{g}5 \) \( \texttt{f}7 \) 26 \( \texttt{d}2 \) \( \texttt{b}8+ \) 27 \( \texttt{a}1 \), and Black has to transpose into an ending that is only slightly better for him by 27...\( \texttt{xf}4 \) 28 \( \texttt{wx}4 \) \( \texttt{xf}4 \).
22...\( \texttt{xe}3? \) 23 \( \texttt{fx}3 \) \( \texttt{xe}4 \) 24 \( \texttt{xe}4 \) \( \texttt{we}4 \).

Here is an additional exercise (for those who did not analyse this position when solving the main exercise): establish what is the difference between 25 \( \texttt{wh}6 \) and 25 \( \texttt{wg}5 \).

It turns out that 25 \( \texttt{wh}6 \) loses by force: 25...\( \texttt{xf}2+ \) 26 \( \texttt{a}1 \) \( \texttt{xa}2+! \) 27 \( \texttt{xa}2 \) \( \texttt{wc}2+ \) 28 \( \texttt{a}3 \) \( \texttt{wc}3+ \). Now if 29 \( \texttt{a}2 \) there follows not 29...\( \texttt{wa}5+? \) 30 \( \texttt{b}2 \) \( \texttt{b}8+ \) 31 \( \texttt{c}2 \), when it is not possible to give mate, but 29...\( \texttt{wc}4+ \) 30 \( \texttt{a}3 \) \( \texttt{a}6+ \) 31 \( \texttt{b}2 \) \( \texttt{b}8+ \) 32 \( \texttt{c}3 \) (32...\( \texttt{xc}2 \) \( \texttt{wc}4+! \) 32...\( \texttt{wa}3+ \) 33 \( \texttt{d}2 \) \( \texttt{b}2+ \) 34 \( \texttt{c}1 \) \( \texttt{b}4(a5)+ \) with inevitable mate. If instead 29 \( \texttt{c}4 \), then 29...\( \texttt{wc}4+ \) 30 \( \texttt{a}5 \) \( \texttt{wa}2+ \) 31 \( \texttt{b}5 \) \( \texttt{b}8+ \) 32 \( \texttt{c}6 \) \( \texttt{c}4+ \) 33 \( \texttt{c}7 \) \( \texttt{f}7+ \) 34 \( \texttt{c}6 \) \( \texttt{b}6 \) mate.

Only after calculating this last variation to the end is it possible to notice the advantages of the queen's position at g5. After 25 \( \texttt{wg}5! \) \( \texttt{xf}2+ \) (25...\( \texttt{f}17 \) 26 \( \texttt{d}2 \), and Black has nothing real) 26 \( \texttt{a}1 \) \( \texttt{xa}2+ \) 27 \( \texttt{xa}2 \) \( \texttt{c}2+ \) 28 \( \texttt{a}3! \) \( \texttt{c}3+ \) 29 \( \texttt{a}4! \) \( \texttt{c}4+ \) 30 \( \texttt{a}5! \) \( \texttt{a}2+ \) 31 \( \texttt{b}5 \) \( \texttt{b}8+ \) 32 \( \texttt{c}6 \) \( \texttt{c}4+ \)? (32...\( \texttt{wa}6+! \) gives a draw: 33 \( \texttt{d}7 \) \( \texttt{c}8+ \) 34 \( \texttt{e}7 \) \( \texttt{f}8+ \) 35 \( \texttt{e}6 \) \( \texttt{c}8+ \) or 35...\( \texttt{b}8+ \) 33 \( \texttt{d}7 \), and Black's attack comes to a standstill, since if 33...\( \texttt{ff}7 \) there is the reply 34 \( \texttt{e}7 \).

Try not only to find all the candidate
moves, but also to decide which of them should be calculated first!


White is threatening f4–f5. Of course, neither 16...\textit{\textsc{c}}e4? 17 \textit{\textsc{g}}xg6 nor 16...\textit{\textsc{e}}4? 17 \textit{\textsc{g}}5 is possible. Black should carefully check the combination beginning with 16...\textit{\textsc{g}}xg4, and if it does not work, then simply retreat his knight to e8.

16...\textit{\textsc{g}}xg4?! 17 \textit{\textsc{h}}xg4 (17 \textit{\textsc{g}}xg6? \textit{\textsc{c}}e3) 17...\textit{\textsc{g}}xh4 18 \textit{f}5 \textit{e}5 \textit{f}5. Now after 19...\textit{\textsc{g}}5? White wins by 20 \textit{\textsc{d}}2!, while if 19...\textit{\textsc{g}}3? 20 \textit{\textsc{g}}2!

19...\textit{\textsc{e}}8! is far more dangerous.

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If 20 \textit{\textsc{d}}d5?, then 20...\textit{\textsc{g}}5! is strong. Also bad is 20 \textit{\textsc{d}}d2? \textit{\textsc{x}}e3! 21 \textit{\textsc{w}}xe3 \textit{\textsc{g}}5 22 \textit{\textsc{g}}3 (22 \textit{\textsc{h}}h3 \textit{\textsc{x}}xc1 23 \textit{f}xg6 \textit{h}xg6 24 \textit{\textsc{c}}c1 \textit{\textsc{g}}5+ 22...\textit{\textsc{h}}x5! (22...\textit{\textsc{x}}xc1 is also possible) with an excellent game for Black.

However, the simple 20 \textit{\textsc{d}}d2! parries the attack and secures White an advantage. For example: 20...\textit{\textsc{w}}b6(16) 21 \textit{\textsc{g}}xg6 \textit{\textsc{w}}xd4+ 22 \textit{\textsc{g}}2 \textit{\textsc{h}}g6 23 \textit{\textsc{h}}f4. Or 20...\textit{\textsc{g}}3 21 \textit{\textsc{g}}2! (21 \textit{f}xg6? \textit{\textsc{w}}h4! 22 \textit{g}x7+ \textit{\textsc{h}}h8 23 \textit{\textsc{f}}xe8+ \textit{\textsc{g}}e8 24 \textit{\textsc{g}}2 \textit{\textsc{w}}h2+ 25 \textit{\textsc{f}}f3 \textit{\textsc{w}}h3!) 21...\textit{\textsc{w}}h4 22 \textit{\textsc{h}}h1 \textit{\textsc{w}}d4 23 \textit{\textsc{g}}xg3!? (23 \textit{f}xg6 \textit{\textsc{w}}f2+ 24 \textit{\textsc{h}}3 is also possible) 23...\textit{\textsc{f}}5 24 \textit{\textsc{f}}f4, and the extra piece is much stronger than the opponent’s three pawns.

After calculating these variations Black must reject the combination and by the method of elimination choose a quiet continuation, retaining an acceptable position.

\begin{tabular}{cc}
16 & \ldots \\
17 & \textit{\textsc{g}}2 \\
18 & \textit{f}5
\end{tabular}

E 4-40. Kuzmín–Yusupov (Rostov on Don 1980).

The threats to the black king are much stronger than they might appear at first sight.

The game went 26...\textit{\textsc{w}}a3? 27 \textit{\textsc{c}}c4+ \textit{\textsc{h}}7 (27...\textit{\textsc{h}}h8 28 \textit{\textsc{h}}h4! with the threat of 29 \textit{\textsc{x}}h6+) 28 \textit{\textsc{w}}d7 \textit{\textsc{d}}xb1 29 \textit{\textsc{d}}d3 \textit{f}5 30 \textit{\textsc{w}}xf5+ \textit{\textsc{g}}8 31 \textit{\textsc{e}}e6+ \textit{\textsc{h}}h8 32 \textit{\textsc{g}}6 \textit{\textsc{w}}d3 33 \textit{\textsc{c}}xd3 \textit{\textsc{c}}c3 34 \textit{\textsc{f}}f7 \textit{\textsc{g}}8 35 \textit{\textsc{x}}b7 \textit{b}1\textit{\textsc{w}} 36 \textit{\textsc{x}}b1 \textit{\textsc{d}}xb1 37 \textit{\textsc{w}}c6 \textit{\textsc{d}}2 38 \textit{\textsc{g}}2. Black resigns.

Black would also have lost after 26...\textit{\textsc{w}}c5? 27 \textit{\textsc{c}}c4+ \textit{\textsc{h}}7 (27...\textit{\textsc{e}}e6 28 \textit{\textsc{e}}e6+ \textit{\textsc{h}}h8 29 \textit{\textsc{h}}h4) 28 \textit{\textsc{w}}xc3! \textit{\textsc{w}}xf2+ 29 \textit{\textsc{h}}h1 \textit{\textsc{h}}h3 30 \textit{\textsc{e}}e2.

26... \ldots \textit{\textsc{b}}6!

Only this modest move saves Black. It is important not only to unpin the knight, but also to keep the queen on the 5th rank.

27 \textit{\textsc{c}}c4+

If 27 \textit{\textsc{f}}f7, then 27...\textit{\textsc{w}}c5! (not 27...\textit{\textsc{x}}b1 28 \textit{\textsc{c}}c4+ \textit{\textsc{h}}h8 29 \textit{\textsc{w}}xd7 with the threats of 30 \textit{\textsc{x}}g6 and 30 \textit{\textsc{e}}e8+) 28 \textit{\textsc{c}}c4+ \textit{\textsc{h}}7 29 \textit{\textsc{w}}xd7 \textit{\textsc{w}}xf2+, and things end in perpetual check.

27...\textit{\textsc{h}}h8? 28 \textit{\textsc{h}}h4.

28 \textit{\textsc{w}}d7

28 \textit{\textsc{h}}h4 \textit{\textsc{x}}b1 29 \textit{\textsc{h}}h6+ \textit{\textsc{x}}h6 30 \textit{\textsc{w}}xd7+ \textit{\textsc{h}}h8 31 \textit{\textsc{d}}d3 \textit{f}5 32 \textit{\textsc{b}}b5 \textit{\textsc{w}}xf5 33 \textit{\textsc{w}}f5 \textit{\textsc{c}}c3 leads to a draw.
28 lDxe4!
Only not 28...Qxb1? 29 Me7 Wg5 30 f4.
29 lDd3 f5
30 Wxc6 lDf8
The chances of the two sides are roughly equal.

E 4-41. Sturua–Dvoretsky (Kutaisi 1978).
Black wants to double rooks on the second rank or, after winning the b2 pawn, advance his c-pawn. The game went 29 lDg5?! lxb2 30 Qxe6 lDdd2 31 lDxc5 lXh2+ 32 lDg1, and the players agreed a draw.
The threat of 29...Qxb2 can be parried by 29 lDab1, e.g. 29...lCc2 30 Qg5 lDdd2 31 lDf3 lDf2 32 Qe5! lXf1 33 lDf2 34 lDxc5+ lDf6 35 lDh5, or 29...lDf2 30 Qe5 lDdd2 31 Qg4. However, 29...lDd4! 30 lDg5 lDxb2 31 lDf3 lDd8 leads to an unclear position.
During the game I did not see any defence after an unexpected check.
29 a4+! bxa3
The king has no good square to go to.
30 bxa3
In the main variation the white knight succeeds in stopping the c-pawn just in time.
30 ... c3
31 lDg5!
31 a4+? lDc2
32 lDc4 lDd1
33 lDb3+

E 4-42. Ravinsky–Anoshin (Moscow 1958).
Totally bad is 20...lDf6? 21 Qxf6+ (simpler than 21 Wg3 lDf5 22 gxf5 Qe2+, which, however, is also advantageous to White) 21...lDf5xf6 22 lDxf4 lDf4 23 lDxf7. The tempting 20...Qh3+? 21 Wxh3 lDh5 (hoping for 22 Wf1?? lDh2+ or 22 Wg2? lDh2 23 Wxh2 lDh2+ 24 Wxh2 Wxg4 with an unclear game) is refuted by the zwischenschlag 22 Qc5! In the game there followed 22...Wc8 23 Wg2 lDh4 24 Wd5+ lDf8 25 lDh2+ 26 Wg2 dx5 27 Wg5 lDc6 28 Wxh4 lXf3 29 lDxh2 c7+ 30 lDg2 lDc6 31 lDf1. Black resigns.
Does this mean that without lengthy reflection the rook should be retreated to f7? No, here we don’t have the right automatically to employ the method of elimination – after 21 Qg5 the exchange is lost. We must first convince ourselves that Black gains sufficient compensation for it in connection with the uncomfortable position of the opponent’s queen.
20 ... lDf17!
21 Qg5 lDg7!
Weaker is 21...Wc6? 22 lDxf4 lDxf4 23 lDxf7 lXf7 24 lDxe7! g5 25 lXf7 gh4 26 lXf4 with a won position for White.
22 lXf4 lXf4
22...lDf4? 23 lDxe5.
23 lDe6 lDf6!
24 lDxg7 g5
But not 24...lDxg7? 25 lDf3 and 26 lDf2.
25 lDh5 lDxg7
26 lDd5!
The only defence against the threat of 26...lDh6.
26 ... lDg6
Bad is 26...lDh6? 27 lDxg5+. After 26...e5? White has a pleasant choice between 27 lDxe5 and 27 lDed1 lDe7 28 c4 (28...lDh6 29 lDh6+ lDxh6 30 lDxd6+).
But now 27...e6 is threatened. White does best to return the exchange, obtaining a position with chances for both sides.
27 lDf5 e6
Weaker is 27...e5 28 c4 b6 29 b3, intending f2–f3 and h3–h4, and if 30...lDe7 30 lDxf4.

Black has to choose one of two possible combinations. Both are quite complicated and pretty, and the question is which of them is the stronger.

25...\(\text{fxe4}\)? 26 \(\text{xd4} \text{xf4}\). It may seem that after 27 \(\text{xf4} \text{xd4} 28 \text{xe5} \text{d2} 29 \text{g4} \text{f7} 30 \text{e2}\) White parries the opponent's threats and remains with a material advantage. But it is here that he ends up in a decisive double attack: 30...\(\text{h5}\)! 31 \(\text{wh5} \text{xc2}\)! 32 \(\text{xc2} \text{xe4}\).

The mistake is the obvious move 30 \(\text{e2}\)? —30 \(\text{c1}\) is necessary (in order to answer 30...\(\text{h5}\) with \(\text{g6}\)). But how should the position after 30...\(\text{fxe2}\) be evaluated?

Tamaz Georgadze rejected the win of two pieces for a rook, played 27 \(\text{d1}\)? \(\text{xd4} 28 \text{xd4} \text{f7}\), and now by 29 \(\text{xf4}\) he could evidently have maintained the balance. But he allowed the manoeuvre of the black knight to \(\text{d4}: 29 \text{h2}\)?! \(\text{e5} 30 \text{a7} \text{a8} 31 \text{e3} \text{e6}\), and Black gained the advantage. After a far from faultless battle an interesting ending was reached, one that is examined in Volume 1, in the chapter 'An incomplete analysis'.

A twelve-move forcing variation has led to an interesting ending, in which for the moment Black has only two pawns for a knight, but on the next move he will pick up a third pawn, and then, if necessary, a fourth (at \(\text{b3}\)). The powerful passed \(\text{c3}\) pawn and the poor position of the white king, cut off on the back rank, ensure Black a serious, and probably decisive advantage.

Now it will be understood why after the game Yusupov lamented that he had chosen the
'wrong' combination.


First let us see what the direct win of a pawn leads to.

$$17 \text{ exf}5$$

$$18 \text{ xf}5$$

$$18 \text{ Qxf}5$$ is weaker — in reply White even has to reckon with a positional exchange sacrifice: $$18...\text{Qxf}5! 19 \text{ exf}5 \text{ e}4 20 \text{ f}6 \text{ Qf}6.$$  

$$18... \text{ e}4!$$

$$19 \text{ f}3!$$

After $$19 \text{ Qxe}4$$ it is quite possible to reply $$19...\text{Qxe}4 20 \text{ Qxe}4 \text{ We}5$$ or $$20 \text{ Wxe}4 \text{ Wf}6!$$ with counterplay. However, stronger is $$19...\text{Qxc}4! 20 \text{ Qxc}4 (20 \text{ Qxd}6 \text{ Wh}d6) 20...\text{Qxe}4 21 \text{ Wxe}4 \text{ Qxe}4$$ — Black regains the pawn and obtains an excellent position.

$$19... \text{ Ae}8$$

If $$19...\text{e}3$$, then $$20 \text{ f}4!$$ followed by $$\text{a}2-a4, 0-0$$ and $$\text{f}3-f5$$. In the variation $$19...\text{Qxe}4 20 \text{ Qxe}4 \text{ Qxf}5 21 0-0$$ or $$20...\text{Qxe}4 21 \text{ fx}e4 \text{ Wxe}4+ 22 \text{ Qf}2$$ Black has insufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

$$20 \text{ Qxe}4$$

$$20 \text{ fx}e4 \text{ Wg}5.$$  

$$20... \text{ We}5$$

$$20...\text{Qxe}4 21 \text{ fx}e4 \text{ Qxc}4? 22 \text{ Qxc}4 \text{ Wxe}4$$ does not work in view of $$23 \text{ Qbd}1! \text{ Wf}4 24 \text{ Qf}1$$. Perhaps Black would have retained slightly more counter-chances after $$20...\text{Qxf}5.$$  

$$21 \text{ g}4!? \text{ Qxe}4$$

$$22 \text{ fx}e4 \text{ Wxc}3+$$

$$23 \text{ Qf}2$$

White is a pawn up and he has attacking chances on the kingside ($g4-g5$). The advantage is on his side.

Reiner Knaak is an aggressive player. He prefers not to win material, but to sacrifice it, if only to avoid, even for a time, conceding the initiative to his opponent.

$$17 \text{ exf}5 \text{ hxg}5$$

In the event of $$17...\text{e}4$$ White would have been forced, by playing $$18 \text{ Qxe}7$$, to go into the variations examined above, since $$18 \text{ Qxe}4 \text{ Qxe}4 19 \text{ Wxe}4? \text{ hxg}5 20 \text{ f}6 \text{ Qxf}6$$ did not work.

$$18 \text{ h}6$$

White opens the h-file and wants to include his queen in the attack via h5. In Knaak's opinion, the sacrifice made by him is completely correct. Mate follows after $$18...\text{gxh}6? 19 \text{ Qxh}6 \text{ Qf}7 20 \text{ Qh}2$$ (threatening not only $$21 \text{ Qh}5$$, but also $$21 \text{ f}6$$ or $$21 0-0$$ followed by $$22 \text{ Qd}1$$) $$20...\text{Qg}7 21 \text{ f}6+! \text{ Qf}6 22 \text{ Qh}5$$ mate. Also bad is $$18...\text{Qxf}5? 19 \text{ hxg}7 \text{ Qxg}7 (19...\text{Qxg}7 20 \text{ Wxe}5+) 20 \text{ Qh}7+ \text{ Qf}7 (20...\text{Qh}8 21 0-0-0 \text{ Qf}6 22 \text{ Qh}2$$ or $$21...\text{Qf}4 22 \text{ Qe}4) 21 \text{ Qh}6 \text{ Qe}7 22 \text{ Qe}4!$$, and White's attack is irresistible.

The game went $$18...\text{Qf}6? 19 \text{ hxg}7 \text{ Qf}7 20 0-0-0 \text{ Qc}8 21 \text{ Qh}8+! \text{ Qxh}8 22 \text{ Qxh}8+ \text{ Qh}8 23 \text{ Qh}1+ \text{ Qg}7 24 \text{ Qh}5 \text{ Qg}8 25 \text{ Qe}4!$$, and Black resigned in view of $$25...\text{Qxf}5 26 \text{ Qxg}5 \text{ Qf}6 27 \text{ Qh}7.$$
principle: *The strongest reply to a flank attack is a counter-blow in the centre.*

18 e4!

Now how should the offensive be continued? Bad is 19 Qxe4 Qxe4 20 Wxe4 Qxf5 (or 20...Ee8 21 0–0–0 Qg6?). If 19 Qxe4 (hoping for 19...Qxc4 20 Wh5 with an attack), Black defends in similar fashion: either 19...Qexf5 20 hxg7 Qxg7, or 19...Qxe4 20 Wxe4 Ee8 (less good is 20...Qxf5 21 hxg7) 21 0–0–0 (21 hxg7 meets with the same reply) 21...Qg6!

If 19 Wh5 Black has a choice between 19...Wxe8 20 hxg7 Wxh5 21 gxh8+ Qxf8 22 Qxf5 exd3 and 19...g6 20 fxg6 exd3.

Finally, after 19 hxg7 Qxg7 it is pointless for White to play 20 f6+ Qxf6 21 Qf3 Qc4 22 Qxf5 22 Qe2 Qxh1+ 23 Qxh1 Qexf5 24 Qh5+ Qf8. And if 20 Qxe4 Qxe4 21 Wxe4 there is the excellent reply 21...Qg8! 22 f6+ (22 0–0–0 Qf6) 22...Qxf6, vacating the f8 square for the king.

The conclusion is obvious: the bishop sacrifice is dubious. An experienced opponent would certainly have found the counter 18...e4!, parrying the attack. And besides, there was no need for Knaak to sacrifice a piece — instead, White could have won a pawn and with a series of accurate moves consolidated his material advantage. Saviely Tartakower once aptly remarked: 'It is always better to sacrifice the pieces... of your opponent'.


If 12 Qbd2 there follows 12...Qf4, exchanging the important light-square bishop and gaining the advantage of the two bishops. In this case White would have been condemned to defend an inferior position throughout the entire game.

The consequences of the exchanges after 12 b4 Qb3 13 a2 Qxc1 14 Qxc1 Qf4 are similar.

After 12 Qd4 Black has the strong reply 12...Qc5 or 12...Qb6. If 12 a2, then 12...Qc8 13 b4 Qc7 (or immediately 13...Qc4). Again the initiative is with Black.

To avoid going totally onto the defensive, I decided to create some pawn weaknesses in my position, and if necessary, to sacrifice a pawn.

12 Qc3!? Qxc3

12...Qb3 13 Qd5.

13 bxc3 Qb3

A tempting knight raid. Black is aiming at the a3 pawn, but White finds sufficient tactical resources.

14 Qb1 Qxc1

15 Qxc1 Qc6?!

The sharp change in the character of the play immediately provokes an inaccuracy by Black, after which the game becomes completely equal. Also bad was 15...b6? 16 a2 Qc7 (16...0–0? 17 Qe4 g6 18 Qb5) 17 Qb5. Nothing is achieved by 15...Qxa3 16 a2 Qc7 (16...Qc8 17 Qb5 Qc6 18 Qd4 0–0 19 Qxc6 bx6 20 Qc4) 17 a5 Qc6 18 Qxc6+ bx6 (18...a5 19 Qd4) 19 Qa6 Qc5 20 Qb7 Qc8 21 Qdd7. But even after the best move 15...Qc7 16 Qb5 (16 Qd1 a6 17 Qe4 Qb8) 16...0–0 17 a4 Black's advantage is insignificant.

16 Qd4 0–0

Or 16...Qxa3 17 Qxc6 bx6 18 Qe4 (18 Qe1?) 18...0–0! with approximate equality (much weaker is 18...Qc8? 19 Qd1 Qc7 20 Qa6, or 18...Qc7? 19 Qa6! Qxc1 20 Qxc6+ Qf8 21 Qxa8).

17 Qxc6 bxc6

Draw.

White’s pieces are menacingly aimed at the enemy king. The only thing that restricts him somewhat is the pin on his bishop. If he should succeed by playing 22 a4, in driving the rook off the 5th rank, his attack is bound to become decisive. This means that Black should look to save the game by forcing play, beginning with an attack on the pinned bishop.

21 ... c6!

Of course, Black is not afraid of 22 ∆xf7+? ∆g7.

22 Wh6!

Vasily Smyslov gives the following variations:

22... ∆h4 23 ∆xf7+ ∆xf7 24 Wh7+ ∆f8 25 Wh8+ ∆f7 26 ∆xd8 ∆f3+ 27 ∆h1 ∆xe1 28 ∆d7+ with a decisive advantage for White;

22... ∆xd5 23 ∆xf6 Wh8 24 ∆e8l ∆d1+ 25 ∆g2 ∆f1+ 26 ∆f3 ∆d3+ 27 ∆g4 ∆e2+ 28 f3 ∆f3+ 29 ∆h3, and the king successfully hides from the checks.

In the second variation 26... ∆e2+!? (instead of 26... ∆d3+) 27 ∆xe2 ∆xe8+ 28 ∆xd1 Wh8 can be suggested, but after 29 ∆e3 Black’s position nevertheless remains difficult.

However, there is a perfectly sound defence, and, moreover, a fairly simple one.

22 ... ∆f8!

White is forced to exchange queens.

23 Whf8+ ∆xf8
24 ∆xc6 ∆c5

With his next move Black exchanges on h4 and his position in the endgame will be by no means worse.

It remains to show what in fact happened in the game.

21... ∆g7? 22 a4 ∆b4 (22... ∆a5 23 ∆d1 ∆xh4 24 gxh4 with the terrible threat of 25 b4) 23 ∆xf7! Whd7 (23... ∆xh4 24 ∆e8 ∆f3+ 25 Whf3 Whd7 26 ∆g8+ ∆xf7 27 Whd5+ ∆e6 28 ∆g7+) 24 ∆xg6 hxg6 25 ∆xf6+! ∆xf6 26 Wh8+ ∆g7 27 f4+ ∆g4 28 ∆e3 g5 29 Wh6 Exf4 30 gx4 Exf4 31 ∆f2 ∆c6 32 Whf6+ ∆g4 33 ∆g3+ ∆h4 34 Wxg5 mate.


Black stands worse. In the game there followed 23... ∆g7?! 24 ∆c3 Whc7 25 Whd2 ∆b8 26 ∆f5+! gxfs 27 Wh5+ with an obvious advantage.

The manoeuvre of the knight to c5 looks logical and promises Black definite counterchances. Why then did Yosev Dorfman not play this? He guessed his opponent’s intentions, and saw the pretty combination that he had prepared.

23 ... ∆d7
24 ∆f5! gxf5

Forced: both 25 ∆e7+ and 25 ∆xd6 were threatened.

25 exf5 ∆xf5
26 ∆xc6 ∆xc6

In the event of 26... ∆xd3 27 ∆xd7 Whd8 28 Whxd3 Whd7 29 Wh2 White has a big advantage.

27 ∆g3+ ∆g6

Otherwise the double attack 28 Wh3 is decisive.

28 h4!
The h-pawn cannot be stopped: 28...h5 29...d5 or 29...xg6+ fxg6 30...d5+. Bad is 28...g6 29...h5 (weaker is 29...f3 d5) 29...e4 30 hxg6...xg3 31...xg7+. Also not good is 28...e8 29...f5 (29...e4 30...g4) 30...f3. Finally, if 28...d8 White wins by 29...h5! (29...f3 e4! 30...xe4 f6) 29...h4 30 hxg6 (not 30...g4?...xg4 31...xg4 f6, but 30...h3 is quite possible) 30...xg3 31...d5!

And yet you very much want to play 23...d7 – otherwise the position remains difficult. After realising this, you again and again try to find a weak link in the opponent’s seemingly irrefutable idea, and, as it so happens, you find one.

28...
29...h5
30...g4

And Black parries the attack (pointed out by Alexander Chernin). This means that 23...d7 should have been played.

E 5-5. Kupreichik–Yusupov (48th USSR Championship, Vilnius 1980/81)

14...e6! 15 fxe3

For the exchange Black has full compensation – a pawn, the superior pawn formation, and strong-points for his knight on the e-file. Objectively the position is roughly equal, but psychologically Black is in a more favourable position – the attack is halted, and Kupreichik has to switch to ‘tedious’ positional play, something that he does not enjoy.

16...d4! h6! The capture of the e3 pawn would have given the white rooks active possibilities along the opened e-file.

17...e4 18...d4 e8 19...d4 a6 20...d5 c5!? 21...d3...d5 22...xd5...e4 23...f1...c7! 24...f5 g6 25...f4 e5 26...d3 ...e7 27 a4? White should have forced a draw by 27...d1...g5 28...d1.

27...d6 28...b1 (28 c4??) 28...h5 29 c4 g5!

30...f3 h4 31...d3...d7 32...b6...g7 33...d3...e7 34...f1 f6 35...d1...g4?! 36...xd6!...xd6 37...xd6...f7 38...d2? In the time scramble White commits a decisive mistake. 38...d5! was essential.

38...xc4 39 b3...c3 40...d3...e5 41...d8...c7 42...d5...c6 43...e1...xd5 44...d5...g4 45...d1 (45...xc5 h3 46 gxh3 g3, and the pawn cannot be stopped) 45...g6 46...e2...h7 47...f2...h5 48 e4...e5 49...f3 h3 50 gxh3 gxh3 51...f2...g5! 52...d3 h2 53...d1...g1. White resigns.


‘Delay is fatal!’ White is threatening to play his rook from e2 to a5, gaining a great advantage. Black’s best chance is the exchange sacrifice.
Dolmatov wants to play 34 \( \textsf{h} \text{c}2 \) and 35 \( \textsf{g} \text{e}2 \).

A timely manoeuvre of the bishop to a more active position.

The strong c3 pawn, the good placing of the black pieces, and, finally, the small amount of material remaining on the board – all this gives Yusupov every reason to hope for a draw.

Rooks like open files, but here there aren’t any. Therefore Black’s bishop is only slightly inferior in strength to one of the white rooks. The chances of a draw are very considerable.

White wants to play 31 e7, 32 \( \textsf{h} \text{e}6 \), and then either \( \textsf{h} \text{g}3 \), or h2–h3 and g2–g4, developing a fierce attack on the king.

The only defence. Many years earlier, in similar fashion – in order to blockade the e-pawn – the exchange was sacrificed by Tigran Petrosian in a famous game against Samuel Reshevsky (Candidates Tournament, Switzerland 1953). Incidentally, the exchange sacrifice was a ‘trademark technique’ of the ninth world champion.

White wants to play 31 e7, and then either \( \textsf{h} \text{g}3 \), or h2–h3 and g2–g4, developing a fierce attack on the king.

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White's position is highly unpleasant. His f3 pawn is attacked, and the attempt to defend it by 26...\texttt{Qd3} leads to disaster after 26...\texttt{e4!} 27 \texttt{fxe4} (27 \texttt{\textit{He}3 \textit{exf}3) 27...\texttt{\textit{Wf2}}+ 28 \texttt{\textit{Wh1 \textit{Hxe4}}! 29 \texttt{\textit{Hxd5}} (29 \texttt{\textit{Hg1}} is met by the same reply) 29...\texttt{\textit{He2}. It appears that he must play 26 \texttt{f1}, but then the opponent creates dangerous pressure on the kingside by 26...\texttt{h5}! 27 \texttt{\textit{He1} \textit{h4}.}

In principle, it would be desirable to transfer the rook to \textit{e3} (defending \textit{f3}) and then to place the second rook on \textit{e1}, attacking the \textit{e5} pawn. In connection with this plan, 26 \texttt{f1} turns out to be a pure loss of a tempo. But what can be done? – after 26 \texttt{\textit{He1} \textit{xf3} 27 \textit{Hxf3} \textit{\textit{Wxf3}} 28 \textit{\textit{Wh3}} \textit{xf3} the compensation for the lost pawn is hardly sufficient – Black retains the advantage by bringing his king to the centre to the defence of his weak pawns. Vadim Zviagintsev so wanted to avoid losing a tempo, that he continued his searches and nevertheless found a tactical justification for 26 \texttt{\textit{He1}, one that was rather unexpected and pretty.}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\begin{itemize}
\item 26 \texttt{\textit{He1}!! \textit{xf3}}
\item 26...\texttt{g5} 27 \texttt{\textit{He3} g4 28 \textit{f1} is not dangerous for White. 26...\texttt{h5} 27 \texttt{\textit{He3 h4} was possible, but it is clear that here the extra tempo is very useful to White (28 \texttt{\textit{Hh4} followed by 29 \texttt{\textit{Hae1}, or immediately 28 \texttt{\textit{Hae1).}}}
\item 27 \texttt{\textit{Wb3}+! \textit{Hf7}}
\end{itemize}

After 27...\texttt{\textit{Hh8} White would have won a very important tempo for the endgame – after all, the king would soon have to return to \texttt{g8}. This factor would have enabled him after 28 \texttt{\textit{Hxf3 \textit{Wxf3} 29 \textit{\textit{Wxf3} xxf3} 30 \textit{\textit{Hac1 Hf6}} 31 \texttt{\textit{He4} to create counterplay, sufficient to save the game (the reader will be able to check this for himself without difficulty).}

Lubomir Ljubojevic wants to save a tempo, but now Zviagintsev's main idea goes into operation.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\begin{itemize}
\item 29 \texttt{\textit{Xe5}!}
\end{itemize}

By tactical means White restores material equality, and a draw becomes inevitable.

\begin{itemize}
\item 29 ... \texttt{\textit{Wf12}+}
\item 30 \texttt{\textit{Hh1} \textit{xe5}}
\item 31 \texttt{\textit{Wb8}+ \textit{f8}}
\item 32 \texttt{\textit{Wxe5} \textit{f3}+}
\item 33 \texttt{\textit{g1}}
\end{itemize}

Draw.

\begin{itemize}
\item \texttt{\textbf{E 5-9. Tarrasch-Marco} (Dresden 1892). It was in this game that 7...\texttt{0–0?} was first refuted.}
\item 8 \texttt{\textit{Hxc6} \textit{xc6}}
\item 9 \texttt{\textit{dxe5} \textit{dxe5}}
\item 10 \texttt{\textit{Wxd8} \textit{\textit{Haxd8}}}
\end{itemize}

If 10...\texttt{Hxd8}, then 11 \texttt{\textit{He5 \textit{xe4} 12 \textit{\textit{He4 xe4} 13 \textit{\textit{Hd3 f5} 14 f3 c5+ 15 \textit{\textit{f1}}!}}}

\begin{itemize}
\item 11 \texttt{\textit{He5} \textit{xe4}}
\item 12 \texttt{\textit{He4} \textit{xe4}}
\item 13 \texttt{\textit{d3} f5}
\item 14 \texttt{\textit{f3} c5+}
\item 15 \texttt{\textit{xc5}!}
\end{itemize}
Now 15...\(\text{b}6\) 16 \(\text{fxe4}\) \(\text{xe4+}\) 17 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{g}5\) 18 \(\text{exe4}\) \(\text{gx4}\) 19 \(\text{e}2\) (19 \(\text{xf4}\) \(\text{d}2\); 19 \(\text{exf4}\) \(\text{d}1+\) 20 \(\text{xe2}\) \(\text{xf4}\) 19...\(\text{xe8}\) 20 \(\text{xe8+}\) \(\text{exe8}\).

15 ... \(\text{xc5}\)
16 \(\text{g}5\) \(\text{d}5\)
17 \(\text{e}7!\)

But not immediately 17 \(\text{c}4?\) \(\text{d}7\) 18 \(\text{e}7\) \(\text{d}3\). Black resigned in view of 17...\(\text{xe8}\) 18 \(\text{c}4\).


If the knight retreats to \(\text{g}5\), then after \(\text{xc6}\) or \(\text{d}2\) (followed by \(\text{e}1\)) White's chances will obviously be better. Usually a move such as 1...\(\text{c}5\) is made only after you have first convinced yourself that all the remaining, more active attempts can be refuted by force. Let us check!

1...\(\text{xc5}\)? is wrong in view of 2 \(\text{g}4!\) \(\text{fg4}\) 3 \(\text{dxc5}\) \(\text{xc5+}\) 4 \(\text{h}1\), and Black remains a piece down.

1...\(\text{c}5?\) is obviously incorrect – if only because of 2 \(\text{fxe4}\) \(\text{xd4}\) 3 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{dxe4}\) 4 \(\text{xd4}\) (or first 4 \(\text{c}4+\)).

1...\(\text{xe5?!}\) is much more interesting. In the event of 2 \(\text{fxe4}\)? \(\text{exe4}\) 3 \(\text{xe4}\) \(\text{dxe4}\) Black gains excellent compensation for the sacrificed exchange. The critical variation occurred in the game: 2 \(\text{dxe5}\) \(\text{c5+}\) 3 \(\text{h}1\) \(\text{g}3+\) 4 \(\text{hxg3}\) \(\text{wh6}\) 5 \(\text{xf4}\) \(\text{g5}\).


Since neither 6 \(\text{fxe6??}\) \(\text{d}6\) mate, nor 6 \(\text{f}5??\) \(\text{d}4\) mate is possible, it may seem that White is forced to play 6 \(\text{d}4\) with a highly unclear position. Such a turn of events would have fully satisfied Black, but his combination was refuted by the unexpected counter 6 \(\text{xf7+!!}\). There followed 6...\(\text{xh7}\) (6...\(\text{xh7}\) 7 \(\text{xf5+}\) \(\text{g}6+\) 8 \(\text{h}4\)) 7 \(\text{f5+}\) \(\text{g}6+\) 8 \(\text{h}4\) \(\text{e}6\) 9 \(\text{e}4\) 10 \(\text{d}1\) \(\text{h}8\) 11 \(\text{d}4!\) \(\text{e}8\) 12 \(\text{xf8+}\) \(\text{xh8}\) 13 \(\text{h}4+\). Black resigns.

We still have to check one other possibility, which, in my view, is in fact the strongest.

1 ... \(\text{g}3!\)

Of course, the piece sacrifice involves a risk, and to calculate its consequences accurately is very difficult. But also the opponent, in accepting the sacrifice, is taking no less of a risk – Black's attack is extremely dangerous.

2 \(\text{hxg3??}\) \(\text{fxg3}\)
3 \(\text{We3}\) \(\text{Wh4}\)

Weaker is 3...\(\text{c}5?\) 4 \(\text{fe1!}\)

4 \(\text{fe1}\)

In the event of 4 \(\text{fd1}\) the reply 4...\(\text{c}5!\) gains in strength.
The vulnerable point in White's defences is f3. If he supports it with 5 .e2, Black will calmly intensify the pressure: ...l:tf4.

5 .f1 .xe5
6 dxe5 .xf3!

The decisive blow!

7 gxf3 .h2!

Apparantly, White should not take the piece. 2 .f1? is also dubious in view of 2...xe5!
3 .xe5 .xe5! 4 h3 (4 dxe5? .c5+) 4...g5 with a promising position for Black, while after 2 ...f1! he can choose between 2...h4 and 2...f5 3 .x4 .xd4 4 .xf6 gxf6 5 d7 .e5 with an unclear game. Black's chances are in any case no worse than after 1...g5.


If in reply to 18...b4 White were forced to play 19 .b1, Black would seize the initiative by 19...b5 20 .d4 e5. This means that the evaluation of this move depends mainly on the correctness of the piece sacrifice, which White can now make.

18 ... b4
19 .xf7!
In this position I would prefer to be playing White. He has two pawns for the sacrificed piece, and the opponent's forces are scattered. After first moving his king to b1, White can then build up the pressure with \( d5 \) or \( e4-e5 \).

If you agree with this evaluation, it can be concluded that 18...\( b4?! \) is too risky.

Safer is 18...\( \text{=e8}?! \), as was in fact played in the game. There followed 19 \( \text{d2}?! \) (19 \( \text{d4} \) is stronger, preparing 20 \( \text{f5} \) or 20 \( \text{d5} \) exd5 21 \( \text{f5} \) ) 19...\( \text{f3}! \) 20 \( \text{bxa3} \) (20 \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{b}4 \) 21 \( \text{bxa3} \) bxc3 22 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{b}5 \) !) 20...\( \text{xc3} \) 21 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{a1+} \) 22 \( \text{b1} \) \( \text{xf6} \) ! (22...\( \text{d8} \) is weaker because of 23 \( \text{c}3 \) !) 23 \( \text{xf6}+ \) \( \text{e7} \) 24 \( e5 \) \( \text{g8} \) with chances for both sides.

5-12. Brinckmann–Kmoch (Kecskemet 1927).

20 ... \( \text{g5}! \)

This spectacular breakthrough brought Black not only victory, but also a brilliancy prize. First let us analyse what happened in the game.

21 \( \text{d5} \) \( \text{cx}5 \)! (but not 21...\( \text{exd5} \) 22 \( \text{fxg5} \) with the threat of 23 \( \text{xf5}+ \) ) 22 \( \text{h}8 \) \( \text{h}8 \) 23 \( \text{hxg5} \) (23 \( \text{fxg5} \) \( \text{h}8 \) !) 23...\( \text{h}4 \) 24 \( \text{xf1} \).

In the event of 24 \( \text{g2} \) there would have followed 24...\( \text{xc5} \) 25 \( \text{fe1} \) (25 \( \text{fc1} \) \( \text{xe}3+ \) ; 25 \( \text{ae1} \) \( \text{b}6 \) ) 25...\( \text{hxg3} \) 26 \( \text{fh}1 \) (26 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{h}2 \) ) 26...\( \text{b6} \) 27 \( \text{ac1} \) \( \text{d6} \) ! (the following line does not work: 27...\( \text{e7} \) 28 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{g6} \) 29 \( \text{c6} \) \( \text{h}1 \) 30 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{h}7 \) ! 31 \( \text{xe}6+ \) ) 28 \( \text{g3} \) (28...\( \text{xe}3+ \) was threatened) 28...\( \text{e}5 \) 29 \( \text{b5} \) \( \text{xe}3 \) 30 \( \text{b7}+ \) \( \text{g6} \) 31 \( \text{c}6 \) ? \( \text{exf4}+ \) 32 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{f}3 \) !

24...\( \text{hxg3} \) 25 \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 26 \( \text{wb}2 \). After 26 \( \text{ab1} \) Hans Kmoch gives the following variation: 26...\( \text{xe}3 \) 27 \( \text{xe}3 \) \( \text{xf4} \) ! 28 \( \text{c}4 \) (28 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{e}5 \) 29 \( \text{c}4+ \) \( \text{g}6 \) 30 \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{h}1+ \) ! ) 28...\( \text{xc1} \) 29 \( \text{xc1} \) (29 \( \text{b7} \) \( \text{b7} \) 30 \( \text{d}6+ \) \( \text{g}6 \) 31 \( \text{b}7 \) \( \text{e}3+ \) ; 29 \( \text{d}6+ \) \( \text{xd}6 \) !) 29...\( \text{xb7} \), and Black wins.

26...\( \text{g6} \) 27 \( \text{ab1} \) (27 \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{h}7 \) ; 27 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{h}3 \) ) 27...\( \text{g}2 \) ! 28 \( \text{xb7} \) (28 \( \text{c}2 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 28...\( \text{xe}3 \) 29 \( \text{xe}3 \) \( \text{xe}3 \) 30 \( \text{b7} \) (30 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{e}5 \) ) 30...\( \text{h}4 \) ! 31 \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{f}4 \) ! 32 \( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{a}5+ \) !

White resigns.

I think that White's very first move was not the best. It won the exchange, but in return it strengthened the opponent's position in the centre, which, as is well known, is an important condition for the success of a flank offensive.

21 \( \text{fxg5}?! \) is also bad: 21...\( \text{xe}4 \) 22 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{h}4 \) 23 \( \text{d6}+ \) \( \text{g}8 \) 24 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{xb7} \) with a very strong attack (Kmoch). If 25 \( \text{d}2 \) there follows simply 25...\( \text{xe}3+ \) 26 \( \text{h}1 \) \( \text{xf1} \) 27 \( \text{xf1} \) \( \text{g}4 \).

Instead of 24 \( \text{e}4 \) ? more tenacious is 24 \( \text{f}3 \) !? \( \text{g}5 \) 25 \( \text{h}1 \), and if 25...\( \text{h}6 \) 26 \( \text{h}2 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 27 \( \text{a}1 \) with the threat of 28 \( \text{e}4 \). Even so, Black retains the advantage by 25...\( \text{h}7 \)! ?

26 \( \text{a}1 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 27 \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{g}3 \) ! 28 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{h}4+ \) 29 \( \text{g}2 \) !

But now let us see how, in the opinion of grandmaster Yusupov, White should have countered the opponent's offensive.

21 \( \text{hxg5} \) ! 22 \( \text{xe}4 \)!
Of course, not 22 $g2? hxg3 23 $xg3 $xg5.

22 $... hxg3
23 $xg3

How should the resulting position be evaluated? Black retains a dangerous attack along the h-file, but White, who is now two pawns up, has acquired counter-threats in the centre: d4-d5 and, especially, e3-e4.

Yusupov and I spent quite a long time studying Black's various possibilities, but everywhere the play develops not to his advantage. For example, 23...$h3 (23...$h2 24 $f13) 24 $g2 $ah8, and now not 25 d5? exd5! 26 $xf5 (26 $xh8 $xe3+) 26...$h1+ 27 $xh1 $xe1+ 28 $xe1 $e4+, but simply 25 $ae1! with the strong threat of 26 e4.

Even if the conclusion drawn by us is correct, and White could indeed have repulsed the attack, all the same it would be unfair to call Kmoch's idea incorrect. In almost all variations his attack proved successful; in the conditions of a practical game to determine the correct path for White and evaluate its consequences is almost impossible. As Siegbert Tarrasch rightly remarked: 'For such 'wild' attacks, involving sacrifices, what is typical is that they are almost always refuted only after the conclusion of the game'.

Of course, it was also possible to act rather more quietly, for example, 20...$hb8. In this case Black would not have risked losing, but, most probably, he would also have been unable to win. The choice here is a matter of taste. I find more appealing the bold decision taken by Black in the game.
Index of Exercises by Thinking Skills and Types of Problems to be Solved

Do you want to find your way confidently in various situations, arising on the board, and to develop the skills necessary for taking correct decisions? A sound way to make progress is training in the field that interests you. This thematic index will help you to choose appropriate exercises.

Many exercises can be used for various aims and therefore they appear simultaneously in several sections of the index.

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