Beating the Petroff

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Andreas Tzermiadinos

BATSFORD
TO THE MEMORY OF MY BELOVED SISTER KIRIAKI

VASSILIOS

TO MY FAMILY, WHO HAVE SUPPORTED ME THROUGHOUT

ANDREAS
## Symbols

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10 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 \( \text{g}4 \) 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{g}4 \) 7 0-0 \( \text{e}7 \) 
8 \( \text{e}1 \) 0-0 9 \( \text{bd}2 \) c5?! (9...d5)
Ljuboe\v{c}evic – Smyslov, USSR v World, Belgrade 1984

11 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 \( \text{g}4 \) 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 7 h3 0-0 
8 0-0 \( \text{e}8 \) (8...c5?!?) 9 c4 c5
Fedoro\v{c}ev\v{c} – Smyslov, Dortmund 1986

12 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 \( \text{g}4 \) 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 7 h3 0-0 
8 0-0 \( \text{g}8 \) (8...c6?!?) 9 c4 \( \text{c}6 \)
Fischer – Gheorghiu, Buenos Aires 1970

13 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 \( \text{g}4 \) 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 7 h3 0-0 
8 0-0 \( \text{e}8 \) 9 c4 \( \text{bd}7 \) (9...c6) 10 \( \text{c}3 \) c6
I. Polgar – Toth, Hungarian ch, Budapest 1971

14 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 \( \text{g}4 \) 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 7 h3 0-0 
8 0-0 d5
Karpov – Timman, Euwe memorial, Amsterdam 1991

15 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 d5 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 7 0-0 \( \text{g}4 \) 
8 c4! \( \text{xf}3 \) ?!
Psakhis – Martinovsky, Philadelphia open 1989

16 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 d5 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 7 0-0 \( \text{g}4 \) 
8 c4! \( \text{c}7 \)
Kotronias – Langrock, Wichern open, Hamburg 2001

17 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 d5 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 7 0-0 \( \text{g}4 \) 
8 c4! \( \text{f}6 \) 9 \( \text{c}3 \)! dxc4 (9...\( \text{b}4 \)?!)
Malakhov – Tihonov, Minsk 1997

18 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 d5 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 7 0-0 \( \text{g}4 \) 
8 c4! \( \text{f}6 \) 9 \( \text{c}3 \)! (9...\( \text{xd}4 \)) \( \text{xf}3 \) 10 \( \text{xf}3 \) \( \text{xd}4 \) 11 \( \text{h}3 \)!
Ponomario\v{v} – Turov, 3rd Rector Cup, Kharkov 2001

19 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 d5 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 7 0-0 0-0 
8 c4 \( \text{c}6 \) (8...\( \text{g}4 \)??; 8...c6??; 8...\( \text{f}6 \))
Timman – Yusupov, World Cup, Belfort 1988

20 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 d5 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 7 0-0 \( \text{f}5 \) 
(7...\( \text{d}6 \)??)
Anand – Karpov, Siemens Giants (rapid), Frankfurt 1999

21 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 d5 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 7 0-0 \( \text{c}6 \) 
8 c4?! \( \text{e}6 \) (8...\( \text{f}5 \))
Sadvakasov – Aliev, 4th Asian ch, Doha 2003

22 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 d5 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 
7 0-0 \( \text{c}6 \) 8 c4?! \( \text{b}4 \) 9 \( \text{e}2 \) dxc4
Zagrebelny – A. Rodriguez, World tch, Luzern 1993

23 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) d6 4 \( \text{cxb3} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 5 d4 d5 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 7 0-0 \( \text{c}6 \) 
8 c4?! \( \text{b}4 \) 9 \( \text{e}2 \) 0-0 10 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{f}5 \)?? (10...\( \text{g}4 \)??; 10...\( \text{b}6 \))
Kotronias – S. Marjanovic, Greek tch, Halkidiki 2003

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24 3 ∇xe5 d6 4 ∇f3 ∇xe4 5 d4 d5 6 ∇d3 ∇e7 7 0-0 ∇c6
8 c4!? ∇b4 9 ∇e2 ∇e6 10 ∇c3 0-0 11 ∇e3 f5
Ljubojevic – Beliavsky, Investbanka, Belgrade 1995

25 3 ∇xe5 d6 4 ∇f3 ∇xe4 5 d4 d5 6 ∇d3 ∇e7 7 0-0 ∇c6
8 c4!? ∇b4 9 ∇e2 ∇e6 10 ∇c3 0-0 11 ∇e3 ∇f5 12 ∇c1 ∇xc3?!
Wang Zili – Ye Rongguang, Copenhagen 1995

26 3 ∇xe5 d6 4 ∇f3 ∇xe4 5 d4 d5 6 ∇d3 ∇e7 7 0-0 ∇c6
8 c4!? ∇b4 9 ∇e2 ∇e6 10 ∇c3 0-0 11 ∇e3 ∇f5 12 ∇c1 dxc4
Topalov – Akopian, Linares 1995

27 3 ∇xe5 d6 4 ∇f3 ∇xe4 5 d4 d5 6 ∇d3 ∇e7 7 0-0 ∇c6
8 c4!? ∇f6 9 ∇c3 ∇e6
Chandler – Hort, Bundesliga, Germany 1998

28 3 ∇xe5 d6 4 ∇f3 ∇xe4 5 d4 d5 6 ∇d3 ∇e7 7 0-0 ∇c6
8 c4!? ∇f6 9 ∇c3 ∇e6
Leko – Motylev, Russia v World (rapid), Moscow 2002

30 3 ∇xe5 d6 4 ∇f3 ∇xe4 5 d4 d5 6 ∇d3 ∇e7 7 0-0 ∇c6
8 c4!? ∇f6 9 ∇c3 0-0 10 h3!
Leko – Adams, Dortmund (ct) 2002

31 3 ∇xe5 d6 4 ∇f3 ∇xe4 5 d4 d5 6 ∇d3 ∇e6 7 0-0 0-0
8 c4 ∇g4?! (8... ∇f6?!)..
Emma – Rossetto, Buenos Aires 1965

32 3 ∇xe5 d6 4 ∇f3 ∇xe4 5 d4 d5 6 ∇d3 ∇d6 7 0-0 0-0
8 c4 ∇e6
Kamsky – Yusupov, Tilburg 1992

33 3 ∇xe5 d6 4 ∇f3 ∇xe4 5 d4 d5 6 ∇d3 ∇d6 7 0-0 0-0
8 c4 c6 9 cxd5 cxd5 10 ∇c3 ∇xc3 (10... ∇e8) 11 bxc3 ∇g4
(11... ∇d7?; 11... ∇c6) 12 ∇b1 b6
Kotronias – Rozentalis, European tch, Debrecen 1992

34 3 ∇xe5 d6 4 ∇f3 ∇xe4 5 d4 d5 6 ∇d3 ∇d6 7 0-0 0-0
8 c4 c6 9 cxd5 cxd5 10 ∇c3 ∇xc3 11 bxc3 ∇g4 12 ∇b1 ∇d7
13 h3! ∇h5 14 ∇h5 ∇b6 (14... ∇f6) 15 c4!? ∇xc4
Mahia – Pla, Mar del Plata 1988

35 3 ∇xe5 d6 4 ∇f3 ∇xe4 5 d4 d5 6 ∇d3 ∇d6 7 0-0 0-0
8 c4 c6 9 cxd5 cxd5 10 ∇c3 ∇xc3 11 bxc3 ∇g4 12 ∇b1 ∇d7
13 h3! ∇h5 14 ∇h5 ∇b6 15 c4!? ∇xf3 16 ∇xf3 dxc4 17 ∇c2! a6?!
Beliavsky – Petursson, World Cup, Reykjavik 1988

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36 3 Ñxe5 d6 4 Ñf3 Ñxe4 5 d4 d5 6 Ñd3 Ñd6 7 0-0 0-0
8 c4 c6 9 cxd5 cxd5 10 Ñc3 Ñxc3 11 bxc3 Ñg4 12 Ñb1 Ñd7
13 h3! Ñh5 14 Ñb5 Ñb6 15 c4!? Ñxf3 16 Ñxf3 dxc4
17 Ñc2! Ñc7!? (17...Ñb8)
Dolmatov – Skatchkov, Russia 2000

37 3 Ñxe5 d6 4 Ñf3 Ñxe4 5 d4 d5 6 Ñd3 Ñd6 7 0-0 0-0
8 c4 c6 9 cxd5 cxd5 10 Ñc3 Ñxc3 11 bxc3 Ñg4 12 Ñb1 Ñd7
13 h3! Ñh5 14 Ñb5 Ñb6 15 c4!? Ñxf3 16 Ñxf3 dxc4
17 Ñc2! Ñd7 18 a4 Ñb8 (18...Ñc7??)
M. Pavlovic – Raetsky, Biel 1999

38 3 Ñxe5 d6 4 Ñf3 Ñxe4 5 d4 d5 6 Ñd3 Ñd6 7 0-0 0-0
8 c4 c6 9 cxd5 cxd5 10 Ñc3 Ñxc3 11 bxc3 Ñg4 12 Ñb1 Ñd7
13 h3! Ñh5 14 Ñb5 Ñb6 15 c4!? Ñxf3 16 Ñxf3 dxc4
17 Ñc2! Ñd7 18 a4 g6 (18...Ñfe8??)
Topalov – Shirov, Amber blindfold, Monaco 2000

* * * *

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Foreword and Short Introduction

At the highest level, the Petroff Defence is one of the most popular openings and following its adoption by players such as Karpov, Anand, Shirov, Kramnik and others, many lesser mortals, including club players, have included it in their repertoire with the aim of countering White's aggressive first move (1 e4) in a solid and sound manner.

Therefore the authors, considering that a book presenting a complete arsenal of weapons against the Petroff did not exist, decided it was time to fill this gap in chess literature. However, writing such a book can be extremely tricky as this opening is very solid and hardly loses by force, and indeed, in the period of the last two years that we were occupied with our writing, we thought at certain points that we were bashing our head against a brick wall. New ideas were cropping up all the time, requiring a remedy or refutation, and this cost us a great deal of energy.

Nevertheless, we finally managed to provide readers with what we think is an up to date and well laid out work on the opening. The reader can first consult the ideas governing the various structures and then proceed with the Illustrative Games, showing these ideas at work.

The 3 dxe5 Variation of the Petroff Defence is characterised by the moves featured below:

1 e4 e5 2 d4 f6 3 dxe5 d6 4 f3 dxe4 5 d4

In this position Black can choose from the following two plans: The first one accepts a disadvantage in space by retreating the e4 knight to f6 and is relatively harmless for White, provided that he takes care not to overextend thoughtlessly; the second and most ambitious one, involves maintaining the proud knight outpost for as long as possible, with the aim of surrendering it only when Black has gained something tangible in return, such as a weakening of the enemy pawn formation. Indeed, in his
attempt to challenge control of the centre White often makes use of the move c2-c4, which often leads to the creation of three pawn islands in his pawn structure. White’s position then gains in dynamism, but the risk of losing becomes higher, as is the case when one handles structures including isolated or hanging pawns in the centre. It is particularly in the latter case that White should be on the alert, as any slight mishandling of the hanging pawns may result in an unfavourable blockade for him in the centre.

Having briefly outlined the main ideas of the opening we would now like to wish our readers happy reading followed by happy hunting!
Typical Ideas and Manoeuvres in the Petroff

When, some time ago, we told one of our friends who is an international master that we were writing a repertoire book on the Petroff, he was interested in knowing the line we were recommending to our readers. To our reply “Of course the 3 \( \text{dxe5} \) main line!” he responded with a smile and in order to tease us he said: “So, you are suggesting that White plays a French Exchange with a tempo less!” And indeed, this is not far from the truth: If we cast a glance at the position resulting after the basic introductory moves of the opening, namely \( 1 \text{e4 e5} \) \( 2 \text{d3 f6} \) \( 3 \text{dxe5 d6} \) \( 4 \text{d3 fxe4} \) \( 5 \text{d4 d5} \), we can easily notice that it could arise from an Exchange French if after \( 1 \text{e4 e6} \) \( 2 \text{d4 d5} \) \( 3 \text{exd5 exd5} \) \( 4 \text{f3} \) the move \( 4... \text{g8-e4} \) was legal!! However, this is exactly where Black’s real problem lies: White will develop by putting the knight on e4 under constant pressure; The deployment of the White pieces will involve such natural moves as \( \text{f1-d3}, 0-0, \text{c2-c4}, \text{f1-e1}, \text{b1-c3} \). In this way White will not only manage to develop harmoniously whilst creating problems for his opponent, but he will also succeed in conquering important central space. It is for this reason that Black often chooses to abandon the outpost on e4 by refraining from \( ...d6-d5 \) and instead retreats his knight to f6.

This remark practically leads us to the first major distinction arising from Black’s central strategy which, in its turn, has an impact on the central structure and Black’s way of development.

A) Black does not make an effort to maintain his knight on e4

The policy of a quick retreat of the knight to f6 was introduced into tournament praxis by the former World Champion Vassily Smyslov who was its main supporter and practitioner. After \( 5... \text{f6} \) \( 6 \text{d3} \)
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Black already faces a dilemma: should he continue with 6...\(\texttt{\text{e}}7\), leaving White the option of impeding the development of the \(\texttt{c}8\) by \(h2-h3\), or should he play ...\(\texttt{c}8-g4\) while he still has the chance?

A1) Black continues with 6...\(\texttt{g}4\)

After 7 0-0 \(\texttt{e}7\) 8 \(\texttt{e}1\) 0-0 9 \(\texttt{bd}2\) the first crucial position arises:

![Chess Diagram]

Black must decide on the configuration he is going to adopt; the natural development of the queen’s knight by 9...\(\texttt{c}6\) is not so good because after 10 \(c3\) the difference in mobility between the two sides’ pieces is more than evident. For this reason Black usually continues with moves like ...\(\texttt{b}8-d7\), ...\(\texttt{f}8-e8\) maintaining a passive but solid stance in the centre and waiting for White to declare his intentions. White’s best idea is then to continue simply by \(\texttt{d}2-f1-g3\) and \(h2-h3\), gaining the two bishops and thus obtaining a small but stable advantage. The game Schlechter-Mason, London 1899 (see Illustrative Games) is an excellent example of the exploitation of this kind of asset.

If Black wishes to prevent such a development of events he can do so only by carrying out an immediate ...\(\texttt{g}4-h5-g6\) manoeuvre. The point of doing this quickly is to avoid having to surrender the bishop pair which is inevitable after 9...\(\texttt{bd}7\) 10 \(\texttt{f1}\) \(\texttt{h}5\) (Otherwise there follows \(\texttt{f1-g3\) and \(h2-h3\)) 11 \(\texttt{g}3\) ...\(\texttt{g}6\) 12 \(\texttt{f}5\) when White will hold a small but persistent edge. However, even after 9...\(\texttt{h}5\) White can keep the upper hand by continuing 10 \(\texttt{f1}\) ...\(\texttt{g}6\) 11 ...\(\texttt{x}g6\) \(hxg6\) 12 \(\texttt{g}3\) \(\texttt{bd}7\) 13 \(c4\) (planning 14 \(\texttt{b}3\) or 14 \(d5\) when the bishop on \(e7\) will suffer from lack of space) 13...\(\texttt{d}5\) 14 \(c5!\) \(c6\) 15 \(\texttt{f}4\) when White obtains a solid space advantage and easy plan of attack on the queen’s wing (\(b2-b4\), \(a2-a4\), \(b4-b5\) followed by an opening of the b-file which White should potentially control, aided by the powerful \(\texttt{f}4\)).

A2) Black continues with 6...\(\texttt{e}7\)

In this case White should go on with 7 \(h3!\); this is a very useful move, preventing the development of the Black bishop on \(g4\). In addition, the \(\texttt{c}1\) can now be developed freely on \(e3\) where it can no longer be harassed by ...\(\texttt{f}6-g4\), or on \(f4\) where it has at its disposal an additional refuge square on \(h2\) in reply to ...\(\texttt{f}6-h5\). After 7...0-0 8
0-0 the basic position of the Smyslov System arises:

![Chess diagram]

In the diagrammed position White played 15 \texttt{\textit{c1}}! and after 15...\texttt{\textit{b4}} 16 \texttt{\textit{b1}} all his pieces were soon participating in a kingside attack. However, even if that option wasn’t available White could have contemplated bringing his rook into play via \texttt{a3} after such moves as \texttt{\textit{d3-b1}} and \texttt{\textit{c3-b5}}. In fact, the attacking combination of a bishop on the \texttt{b1-h7} diagonal and a rook on the 3\textsuperscript{rd} rank can prove very scary as shown by the famous Fischer-Gheorghiu game (Buenos Aires 1970) which arose also from a slightly different version of the Smyslov System:

![Chess diagram 2]

White continued here with 21 \texttt{\textit{e3}}! and after 21...\texttt{\textit{b6}} 22 \texttt{\textit{g3}} \texttt{\textit{h8}} 23 \texttt{\textit{f3}} \texttt{\textit{e7}} 24 \texttt{\textit{d4}} the potential of the coming attack looked so great that Black resigned himself to playing a hopeless endgame with 24...\texttt{\textit{f6}} (See Illustrative Games).

c) Usually Black continues with ...\texttt{\textit{bd7}}, ...\texttt{\textit{f8-e8}}, ....c7-c6 and ...\texttt{\textit{d7-f8}}. In that case White should still play \texttt{c2-c4}, followed by developing his pieces in a natural manner. The key to an advantage is the advance \texttt{d4-d5!} at an
appropriate moment. Let’s take a look at two characteristic examples where this idea was employed:

In the position of the diagram Black has delayed ...c7-c6, concentrating instead on the transfer of his queen’s knight to f8 in order to support his king. White should take advantage of the opportunity to gain space in the centre by 11 d5! \( \text{g6} \) 12 \( \text{Me1} \) which is in fact what he did in the game Tal-Smyslov, USSR 1971; after Smyslov’s reply 12...\( \text{d7} \) White could have made best use of his space advantage by 13 \( \text{d4}! \), obtaining a clearly better position.

Our second example comes from the game Polgar-Toth, Budapest 1971:

...White will continue with \( \text{f1-e1} \), \( \text{c1-g5} \), \( \text{f3-e5} \), activating his pieces to the utmost while Black will try to bolster d5 with ...c7-c6, ...\( \text{b(f)d5} \), ...\( \text{c8-e6} \). Our conclusion after studying many examples is that here too White maintains an edge as the space
advantage offers him possibilities of freer manoeuvring in his interior lines. Typical examples of such manoeuvring involve the **doubling of rooks on the e-line**, the dangerous attacking set-up \( \texttt{c2-wd3} \), the positional manoeuvre \( \texttt{c3-a4(e4)-c5} \), designed to suffocate Black on the queenside, manoeuvres aiming at reaching slightly favourable symmetrical pawn structures after timely exchanges on f6 and d5, etc. The Illustrative Games’ section provides several very instructive examples on how to handle such a position with White.

B) Black tries to maintain his knight on e4

This is Black’s main and most principled choice. To make it more easy to understand the underlying ideas governing the play here we thought it was imperative to divide the examples into groups with common characteristics deriving from the central pawn structure. However, before proceeding with that we will examine some general ideas that arise quite often in the Petroff and which should be part and parcel of any player’s arsenal.

B1) The sacrifice of the pawn on d4

There are quite a few instances in the Petroff where Black sets his sights on the **d4 pawn** by \( \texttt{c8-g4} \) and \( \texttt{b8-c6} \); in many of these cases White should not hesitate to continue with his development even at the cost of sacrificing the pawn, as he gets a dangerous initiative in return.

The diagrammed position is from the game Psakhis-Martinovsky, Philadelphia 1989: White quite rightly ignored the pin on the \( \texttt{f3} \) and continued with \( \texttt{c4!} \). After this energetic move it turns out that Black cannot capture the pawn on d4 immediately because after \( \texttt{...xd4? 9 xe4 dxe4 10 wxd4 exf3 11 wxc4} \) he loses a piece, so he chose instead \( \texttt{...xf3 9 xf3 xd4. However, after 10 we3! f5 11 we1!} \) Black must return the pawn due to the dangerous pin on the e-file: \( \texttt{11...e7 12 xe4 dxe4 13 we4} \) and White’s advantage is indisputable.

A different version of the d4-pawn sacrifice can be found in the following example, from the game Ponomariov-Turov, 3rd Rector Cup 2001.
White continued his development with 9 \( \text{dxc3} \), sacrificing the pawn on d4. If Black accepts the challenge by 9...\( \text{dxc4} \) then White obtains an edge by means of 10 \( \text{ed1}+! \text{e6} \) 11 \( \text{d5} \) 12 \( \text{d5} \) as his pieces dominate the board (for a complete analysis of this position the Illustrative Games section should be consulted). In the game Black chose to interpose the capture on f3 before taking on d4, yet after 9...\( \text{xf3} \) 10 \( \text{xf3} \) \( \text{dxc4} \) 11 \( \text{h3}! \) White’s compensation for the pawn was excellent; Black had to spend some time on safeguarding his king, allowing White to recover his pawn with slightly the better chances.

**B2) The doubling of rooks on the e-file**

The e-file is of great importance in the Petroff, because it is usually the only one that is open and therefore, inevitably, a great deal of the action takes place on it. Bearing this in mind it often makes sense for White to double rooks there rather than deploy them on d1 and e1, for example. The doubling of rooks can, as we shall see, be achieved in many different ways.

**a) The simple way of doubling rooks on the e-file**

A typical example of it can be seen in the game Schlechter-Mason, London 1899.

![Chessboard](image)

White has the two bishops and a solid space advantage; a logical step towards increasing the pressure is to double the rooks on the e-file:

After 17 \( \text{ed2}! \text{f6} \) 18 \( \text{d2} \) \( \text{d7} \) 19 \( \text{c4}!+ \) \( \text{d5} \) 20 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{f8} \) 21 \( \text{e1} \) White had achieved his object and was well on the way to victory as Black could not successfully oppose the adversary’s major pieces on the file.

**b) The doubling of rooks via the second horizontal**

This manoeuvre is very common in the Petroff, as for example in the game Korneev-R.Perez, Albacete 2000...
...where White continued 16 \texttt{Ka2! eae8} 17 \texttt{a2 e2! xxe2 18 wxe2}, conquering the e-file and at the same time gaining a significant advantage.

c) The multi-purpose doubling with \texttt{e1-e3}

This is the most virulent way of doubling rooks on the e-file; besides the traditional idea of simply increasing White’s firepower along the file or the relatively more refined one of switching the rook over to g3 or h3 for attacking purposes, it also conceals a deeper, positional aim; if Black tries to relieve the pressure by exchanging the rook on e3, White recaptures with the f-pawn, fortifying his centre and opening up the f-file for an attack.

In the game Yagupov-Sorokin, St. Petersburg 2001 White had the opportunity to carry out this idea: from the following diagrammed position...

Yagupov continued with 15 \texttt{e3! f6} 16 \texttt{a1 e7 17 g5 xxe3 18 fxe3! xg5 19 xg5 g6 20 e4}, gaining a solid advantage.

B3) The queen’s sortie to b3 after Black has played ...\texttt{c8-g4}

As we have already witnessed, Black quite often tries to neutralise the pressure White exerts on the centre by developing his bishop on g4. Then, however, the queenside and the b7 pawn in particular, are left without sufficient protection, albeit temporarily. This fact encourages White to seriously consider the idea of playing f1-b3, since in this way he gets the queen out of the annoying pin with gain of time. An important remark to be made here is that in most cases the pressure exerted by the queen from b3 is so serious that despite all the disadvantages this sortie may entail (such as a weakening of the kingside if, for example, White is forced to recapture on f3 with a pawn after
...g4xf3) it has a positive effect overall on White’s position.

In the game Timman-Van der Wiel, Tilburg 1984, a typical case of the \texttt{d1-b3} sortie occurred as early as on move 7:

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{timman_van_der_wiel_1984.png}
\end{center}

In the diagrammed position Timman continued with 7 c3! d7 8 b3!, highlighting the weaknesses created by the absence of the light-squared bishop from the queenside. After 8...e7 9 0-0 0-0-0 10 e1! (threatening f2-f3) Black had to lose the pawn on f5 after which he stood clearly worse.

Another example of the same theme comes from Kr.Georgiev-Popchev, Bulgaria 1987:

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{georgiev_popchev_1987.png}
\end{center}

White continued with 11 b3! a8 12 d5!, utilizing the queen sortie to achieve positional gains. After 12...e5 13 xe5 dx5 14 c4! xd5 15 xe5 xb3 16 axb3 c5 the correct follow up 17 b4! b6 18 c4 would have left him with two bishops and a lasting advantage in the resulting ending.

\textbf{B4) Provoking a weakening in the enemy castled position by employing the configuration d3-c2}

This idea is a recurring theme in many opening systems and in the Petroff as well. There is a wide variety of cases where White’s queen and light-squared bishop line-up to attack h7 in the hope of forcing a weakness that can be exploited later on and so White will formulate an appropriate strategy according to Black’s reply.

If, for example Black chooses to defend his h-pawn by ...g7-g6, then a whole dark-square complex around his king becomes weak (f6, g7, h6). In case Black chooses ...h7-h6, then it is the light squares that become weak (f5 in particular) whilst Black will have to watch out for sacrifices on h6.

It is not possible to say which way of defence is better for Black as his choice should depend upon the specific elements of each position and the calculation of certain variations.
In the game Timman-Skembris, Corfu (m/2) 1993...

...White continued with 11 \textit{Wc2}!, forcing a weakening of the protective cover shielding the Black king. Black's choice is then severely limited. If he plays 11...\textit{Qf6} there comes 12 \textit{Qg5}, winning. On 11...\textit{g6}? White unleashes a sacrificial cascade with 12 \textit{Qh6 \textit{Le8} 13 \textit{Qxe6! fxe6 14 \textit{Qxg6!}, also winning. The only solution lies in 11...\textit{h6}! 12 \textit{Qbd2 \textit{Le8} 13 \textit{Qf1 \textit{Qf8} (the knight is needed on this square, to support the \textit{Qe6} and the weakened light squares \textit{h7} and \textit{g6}) 14 \textit{Qg3!} (after 11...\textit{h6} the square \textit{f5} has been indirectly weakened too, so White sets his sights on it) 14...\textit{Qg5!} (Black seeks refuge in simplification in an effort to reduce the pressure) and we have reached a critical position that should be better for White as the analysis included in the Illustrative Games section demonstrates.

In the game Grischuk-Pavasovic, 4th IECC, Istanbul 2003...

...White continued with 13 \textit{Wc2}!? \textit{Qe6} 14 \textit{Qd3}, trying to force a weakness on the kingside. Black replied with 14...\textit{h6}! (After 14...\textit{g6} 15 \textit{Qb1 \textit{Qb8} 16 \textit{Qe1 \textit{Qf6} 17 \textit{c4 \textit{Qe7} 18 \textit{d5 White had an obvious advantage in the game Sumaneev-Grechkin, Orel 1996) in an effort to avoid a weakening on the long diagonal which might easily have been felt after a subsequent advance of White's mobile pawn centre; Still, after 15 \textit{Qb1 \textit{b6 16 \textit{Qh7+? \textit{Qh8} 17 \textit{Qe4 \textit{Qc8} 18 \textit{c4 \textit{Qf6 White could have obtained a dangerous initiative by 19 \textit{d5! \textit{Qd7 20 \textit{Qe5 \textit{Qd6} 21 f4

...as his pieces are ideally placed for an attack against the Black
monarch. A further comment we would like to make here is that the more the position opens up the more likely it is that a weakness inflicted upon Black’s kingside will be exploited. This is because White will then have the opportunity to access that sector far more easily and with a greater number of forces.

B5) The pawn structure in the centre after an exchange on e5

Black’s strategic choice of supporting the knight on e4 at all costs involves the move ...d6-d5 which unavoidably weakens e5. At first sight this is not a great price to pay, but if Black’s strategy of maintaining the knight fails and he has to retreat it to f6 or even exchange it for a White knight on c3 or d2, White has good chances of obtaining control of the e-file and the square e5 in particular. Then, a White knight is likely to settle on e5, exerting unpleasant pressure on Black’s position.

Black quite often decides to exchange this knight whereupon White may have the option of taking back on e5 with a piece or the d-pawn. The first idea that comes to mind is taking back with the pawn in order to break the symmetry of the respective pawn structures on the kingside. If the resulting majority is sufficiently mobile it may cause Black a lot of distress, especially with the advance f2-f4-f5. Such an advance creates the prospect of a dangerous passed e-pawn or a strong attack by e5-e6 or f5-f6 at some point.

Let’s now take a look at a practical example:

In the game Kuczynski-Appel, Bundesliga 1996...

...Black made a rash decision with 18...ex5?! making White a dangerously mobile kingside pawn majority. The game continued 19 dxe5 dxc3 20 bxc3 a5 21 e3! (The rook now gains access to the Black kingside) 21...d5 22 f4! (It is high time to mobilize the pawns) 22...b5 23 wff2 wb6 24 Rae1 and White was in full control as Black’s counterplay on the queenside could be easily contained. In the continuation of the game White methodically prepared and carried out the advance f4-f5, which in conjunction with a rook on g3 gave him a strong attack. An eventual e5-e6 push left Black powerless to resist (the whole game can be found fully analysed in the Illustrative Games section).

In certain cases the pawn on e5 just serves the function of cramping Black and depriving him of the important defensive square f6 for
his pieces. Instead of attacking with
pawns, White may then choose to
exploit the influence of the pawn to
launch an assault with his pieces. In
the game King-Barua, Lloyds
Bank open 1982 this different type
of function of the e5 pawn was
more than evident:

14...\textcolor{red}{\text{Qxe5?!}} 15 \textcolor{red}{\text{dxe5}} \textcolor{red}{\text{Qd7}} 16
\textcolor{blue}{\text{Wh5!}} \textcolor{red}{\text{Qc5}} 17 \textcolor{red}{\text{Qc2}} \textcolor{red}{\text{Qe6}} (looks ugly,
but White was threatening to
sacrifice the bishop on h6) 18 \textcolor{red}{\text{Qad1}}
and Black’s position gradually
became hopeless.

For a final example let’s move
on to the game Zagrebely-
Rodriguez, World tch, Luzern,
1993:

In this position, White forced his
opponent to exchange on e5 by

22 \textcolor{red}{\text{b4!}} \textcolor{red}{\text{Qac4}} 23 \textcolor{red}{\text{Qb3}}. After
23...\textcolor{red}{\text{Qxe5}} 24 \textcolor{red}{\text{dxe5}} \textcolor{red}{\text{Qf5}} White
nipped in the bud his opponent’s
intended ...\textcolor{red}{\text{Qf5-d4}} with 25 \textcolor{red}{\text{Qb5!}},
confronting him with a difficult
dilemma: either to enter a worse
ending (due to the pressure on a7,
c7) or avoid the exchange of queens
by 22...\textcolor{blue}{\text{We7}}. Black chose the second
option, but after 23 \textcolor{red}{\text{e6!}} another
utility value of the e5 pawn came to
the fore: It can be used from time
to time to open up more lines,
which can be exploited by White’s
better placed pieces. White had a
clear advantage which he went on
to convert in masterly fashion as the
reader can see by consulting the
Illustrative Games section.

Around here we feel it’s time to
proceed with a categorization of
some typical pawn structures in the
centre arising from the d4/d5
original structure.

The centre with White pawns c3,
d4 vs Black pawn c7

This type of centre occurs after an
exchange of knights on c3,
followed (or preceded) by ...\textcolor{red}{\text{d5xc4}}. It
is associated with many different
typical ideas and manoeuvres.

A) The central advance c3-c4,
d4-d5

By advancing c3-c4 and d4-d5 in
the centre White pushes his
opponent back with gain of time
and secures a space advantage for
himself. Once the \textcolor{red}{\text{Qc6}} is forced to
abandon its position White can settle with his knight on e5 (supported, if required, by a White pawn on f4). In addition, the dark squared bishop (if still on its original square) can be developed on b2, from where, besides supporting the knight, it focuses on the sensitive g7 square in front of the Black king. The central advance is even more effective if Black has already developed his queen’s bishop on b7 as the pawn on d5 interferes with its radius of action, whilst the bishop’s absence from the defence of the kingside will be felt. It is not an exaggeration to say that in such cases the d5 practically cuts the Black position in two.

A very instructive example with this type of central structure is provided by the game Kasparov-Olafsson, Kopavogur (rapid) 2000:

In this position Kasparov continued with 16 c4! \( \text{Wd}8 \) 17 d5 \( \text{Qb}8 \) 19 \( \text{Qe}5! \) \( \text{xf}6 \) 20 \( \text{Qb}2 \) g6 21 \( \text{Wd}2! \), obtaining a clear advantage as he had reached the optimal formation, granting him excellent attacking chances. An analysis of the details of this game can be found in the Illustrative Games section.

The advance c3-c4, d4-d5 can sometimes be carried out regardless of material considerations. In Anand-Ivanchuk, Monaco blindfold 1999...

...White could have continued with 17 c4!? \( \text{W}a5 \) 18 d5! \( \text{Qxa}1 \) 19 \( \text{Wxa}1 \) \( \text{Qb}8 \) 20 \( \text{Qe}5 \) f6 21 \( \text{Qc}3 \) \( \text{W}a4 \) 22 \( \text{Qd}4 \), obtaining fine attacking chances in return for the exchange. In a normal game the consequences of such a sacrifice would have been easier to evaluate, of course.

B) Central Prophylaxis

White’s centre can easily become the object of an attack by the Black pieces. It is for this reason that from time to time White has to rely on prophylactic measures to safeguard it from attacks whilst preserving its flexibility. Such typical measures are featured below:
B1) The move \( \text{a1-a2} \)

With this move White plans to defend his d-pawn from d2 and at the same time gets the rook out of the firing line of a bishop placed on b6, thus facilitating a subsequent d4-d5 advance. It also has another merit as it prevents the often annoying intrusion \( \ldots \text{we4-c2} \), exchanging queens.

B2) The move \( \text{d1-c1} \)

With this move White protects the lonely a3 pawn so as to allow the queen's rook to join the fight from the centre via the second rank. It also vacates d1 for the other rook and gets the queen out of the firing line of a Black rook on d8. Finally, from c1, the White queen can be useful in supporting the thematic c4-c5 advance.

However, despite all these significant advantages, White should always consider whether it is possible to skip \( \text{d1-c1} \) and play \( \text{a2-d2} \) immediately. The point is that this type of position is very dynamic and so time can be of far greater importance than a mere pawn. Besides, as the example featured below shows, Black rarely has time to capture the pawn and at the same time meet satisfactorily White's threats in the centre.

Both \( \text{a1-a2-d2} \) and \( \text{d1-c1} \) are prophylactic measures, supporting the White centre. A natural question arising is, what next? The reply is not so easy as White's play in these complicated positions is hardly one-sided, but a useful tool for creating play can be the above mentioned c4-c5 advance which is rather more justifiable against a \( \ldots \text{b7-b6}, \ldots \text{d6} \) configuration. Let's see how these ideas work out in practice:

The above diagrammed position arose in the game Kamsky-Yusupov, Moscow 1992. White played 17 \( \text{a2!} \) and after 17...b6 18 \( \text{e1 g6} \) 19 \( \text{c1} \) obtained a small advantage.

Stronger, however, is 18 \( \text{d2!} \) as the pawn on a3 is poisoned: 18...\( \text{xa3?} \) is answered by 19 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{g4} \) 20 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 21 \( \text{a4} \) and White wins. After 18...\( \text{fe8} \) (18...\( \text{g6} \) 19 \( \text{e1!} \) \( \text{xa3} \) 20 \( \text{a4!} \) \( \text{b4} \) 21 d5 also leads to a clear advantage for White) 19 \( \text{e1!} \) \( \text{g6} \) (19...\( \text{xa3} \) 20 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{g4} \) 21 h3 \( \text{h5} \) 22 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 23 \( \text{a4} \) \( \text{b4} \) 24 \( \text{xc6} \) is much better for White) White carries out the thematic thrust 20 c5!, leading after 20...\( \text{bxc5} \) 21 \( \text{dxc5} \) \( \text{e7} \) 22 \( \text{b5} \) a6 23 \( \text{a4} \) to a highly advantageous position for him.
C) Manoeuvring with the $\text{d}f3$

The king's knight is a very flexible piece in this type of central structure and White can manoeuvre it around in many different ways, making Black's life difficult. Some of the typical manoeuvres with this knight are categorized below:

C1) Manoeuvres starting with the move $\text{d}f3$-$d2$

The move $\text{d}f3$-$d2$ occurs quite often in the type of positions we are examining. From $d2$ the knight can jump to $e4$ and participate to a kingside attack, or manoeuvre to $e3$ (via $c4$ or $f1$) from where it controls the important squares $c4$, $d5$ and can assist a subsequent central advance. Finally, in a few instances the knight can visit $b3$ (en route to $c5$) thus provoking Black to weaken himself by playing $...b7$-$b6$. Normally this move is not considered a weakening in the Petroff but it can prove so if Black has earlier placed his queen and rook on $d7$ and $e8$ respectively. Then $...b7$-$b6$ can be met by $\text{b}b5$, pinning the $\text{c}c6$ and creating awkward threats on the diagonal $a4$-$e8$.

Let's now take a look at some examples with the knight on $d2$:

In the game Sadvakasov-Aliev, 4th Asian ch, Doha 2003...

...White continued with 14 $\text{e}e4$!? $\text{ad}8$ 15 $\text{wh}5$! with an attack.

In this particular position the very fine coordination of queen and knight is noticeable as they both control the important squares $c5$ and $g5$, a fact rendering the gain of the bishop pair very likely. The rest of the game can be found in the Illustrative Games section.

The game Kasparov-Dao Thien Hai, Batumi (rapid) 2001 revealed another typical idea of the manoeuvre $\text{d}d2$-$e4$.

In the diagrammed position Kasparov continued with 16 $\text{d}d2$! and after 16...$\text{a}a5$ (a typical reaction to $\text{f}f3$-$d2$) 17 $\text{f}f3$ $\text{wd}7$ 18 $\text{e}e4$ $\text{e}e7$ went on to provoke
weaknesses in the Black camp with 19 \( \text{g3} \text{g6} \ 20 \text{g4}! \); after 20...f5 21 \( \text{f3} \text{d6} \ 22 \text{e5} \) Black failed to find the best move 22...\( \text{ce8}! \) which would have reduced White's advantage to a minimum (as the reader can see by consulting the relevant Illustrative Game) and later on with his usual expertise Kasparov managed to exploit Black's kingside weaknesses.

In the game Wang Zili - Ye Rongguang, Copenhagen 1995 ...

...White still employed the move 15 \( \text{d2}! \), planning to attack on the kingside with \( \text{e2-d3} \) and \( \text{d1-c2} \). The continuation 15...\( \text{e7}!! \) 16 \( \text{c2} \text{g6} \ 17 \text{d3} \text{c6} \ 18 \text{e4} \) (this square again) 18...\( \text{g7} \ 19 \text{ae1} \) (followed by a doubling of the rooks on the e-file) left White a little better as Black's position was solid but passive.

In fact, a little later in the game Black tried to activate his knight on f5 when another advantage of the manoeuvre \( \text{f3-d2-e4} \) became apparent: White simply offered an exchange of knights with \( \text{e4-g3} \), nipping in the bud any counterplay Black might have devised.

Our last example comes from the game Jasinski-Taksrud, EU ch corr. 1994 where in the following diagram position White detected a temporary weakness on c5 and on the diagonal a4-e8 and continued with the clever...
17 $b3!; after the natural 17...$b6
White replied with 18 $b5! and his idea became evident, Black had great problems with his pinned knight.

C2) The manoeuvre starting with the move $h2-h3!

This original idea of Kramnik appears for the time being extremely worrying for Black: White wants to play $h2-g4-e3!, this route may well be better than the usual one $f1-e3 since the knight on g4 gains a tempo by hitting the $f6 while in case the bishop retreats on e7 White has an extra possibility in $g4-e5.

In the game Kramnik-Anand, Wijk aan Zee 2003...

...after 16 $h3! $f6 17 $h2! $a5
18 $d2 $ed8 19 $f3! $h6 20 $g4
$xg4 21 hxg4 White had a slightly better position in view of the bishop pair and possibilities to attack later on via the h-file.

C3) Manoeuvres starting with the move $f3-g5

This move usually comes to mind when the White queen is already on d3 (For example after an exchange of light squared bishops has taken place there). Its point is to force Black to weaken the pawns that protect his king, whilst from d3 the queen is ready to switch over to h3 to induce a further weakening. The game Abramovic-Radulov, Vrnjacka Banja 1983 provides us with a perfect example of what White expects to achieve:

In the diagrammed position Black wrongly continued with 13...$b5?! thinking that he had all the time in the world to set up a light square blockade on the queenside; but after 14 $f4 $d6 15 $g5! $g6 16 $h3! $h5 17 $e4 $g7 18 $e3! White’s plus was indisputable as Black’s
castled position was riddled with weaknesses.

D) The advance g2-g4

In one of the main lines of this opening, namely the one where Black configures his bishops on f5 and f6, White, by playing the move h2-h3, has often another dangerous idea in mind: To expand by g2-g4 (and even g4-g5 if the position demands).

In this way he grasps a temporary initiative since the Black pieces are forced to retreat, but if in due course White fails to convert this initiative into something tangible he risks ending up with a position full of holes on the kingside.

In Kasparov-Adams, Linares 2002...

White continued from the diagrammed position in the following energetic manner: 20 g4 g6! (20...d7? 21 d3 w7 22 g5 e7 23 e5 would have led to a clear White advantage) 21 g5 e7 22 e5 d6 23 xg6 hxg6 24 c5 with some initiative; subsequent analysis and games revealed a way for Black to equalize, yet we should in no way undervalue the practical strength of White's idea because of this.

In the game Anand-Karpov, Siemens Giants (rapid), Frankfurt 1999...

...White showed that a combination of g2-g4 and fianchetto of the light-squared bishop can be possible: 16 c1!? fd8 17 h3 h6 18 g4! g6 19 g2 wd7 20 d5 a5 21 c4! (Revealing the point behind the slightly mysterious 16 c1!?) and White had the advantage as the reader may find out by consulting the game continuation featured under the Illustrative Games section.

Someone might remark that Anand simply improved on a well known idea that had made its first outing several years ago but this is in no way striking if we take into account the recent evolution in chess theory due to the appearance of computers. In fact, the idea of g2-g4 followed by fianchettoing the f1 belongs to M. Tal who in his game versus Garcia Gonzales,
Jurmala 1983 had continued from the very same position with 16 \( \text{Ee3} \) \( \text{Da5} \) 17 \( \text{De5} \) c5 18 g4! showing to the chess world that the bishop on f5 is lacking good retreat squares.

After 18...\( \text{g6} \) 19 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{wd8} \), White went on to win in great style by 20 \( \text{dxc5} \) \( \text{exe5} \) 21 \( \text{exe5} \) \( \text{wf6} \) 22 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{c4} \) 23 g5! \( \text{wa6} \) 24 \( \text{e7} \) \( \text{xc5} \) 25 \( \text{wd4}! \) \( \text{xe5} \) 26 h4! \( \text{a5} \) 27 \( \text{ae1} \) h6 28 \( \text{f1} \) b5 29 \( \text{e8} \) 1-0

E) The pawn on c7

As we have already witnessed White likes to lure the enemy queen to d5 so that the central advance c3-c4, d4-d5 can be achieved with gain of time. This is not however the only reasoning behind White’s choice: with the queen on d5 White thinks he can gain some time by developing his bishop on f4 and hitting the unprotected pawn on c7. This is one of the key ideas in the position, for if Black meets the threat to c7 with the ‘natural’ ...\( \text{e7-d6} \) then White will retreat his bishop to e3 and all Black has done is to ruin his chances of putting the enemy centre under pressure by means of ...\( \text{e7-f6} \) and ...\( \text{a8-d8} \). For this reason Black usually replies to the attack with \( \text{a-c8} \) but in this way he essentially reconciles himself to a slightly worse position as the rook is passively placed on c8.

However, to achieve this concession on Black’s part White must be careful with the move order; in the following diagrammed position which can be considered a tabia for the whole Petroff, only one move seems to offer chances of an advantage.

White should prefer Kasparov’s flexible 14 \( \text{e1!} \) \( \text{e8} \) 15 \( \text{f4!} \) which for tactical reasons that have to do with the presence of the rook on e8 (these can be found in the Illustrative Games section) prevents Black from utilizing the idea that is applicable against the natural and also logical 14 \( \text{f4!} \): Indeed on this move there follows Kramnik’s star positional reply of 14...\( \text{a5!} \), sacrificing the c-pawn with the aim of actively deploying the pieces and applying strong pressure on White’s hanging pawns. If White refuses the offer Black hopes that he will be able to set up a blockade on the light squares – which is probably true. Thus, after 15 \( \text{xc7} \) \( \text{a8} \) 16 \( \text{xa5} \) \( \text{wa5} \) 17 c4 we reach a critical position for the assessment of 14 \( \text{f4} \). In Zhang Zhong - Karpov, Cap d’Agde 2000 the continuation 17...\( \text{f6!} \) 18 \( \text{d3!?} \) \( \text{g4!} \) allowed Black to hold the position after a series of very fine moves and apparently destroy White’s last illusions that he can be better; for this to become clear, however, it
took no less a player than Anatoly Karpov, the best defender in the world. Black’s inspired defence in this encounter can be found in the Illustrative Games section too.

The centre with White pawns c3, d4 vs Black pawn d5

This type of centre can be encountered in the old main line which arises after the moves 1 e4 e5 2 d4 d5 3 c3 dxc4 4 dxc4 c6 5 e5 c5 6 d5 exd5 7 cxd5 exd5 8 c4 c6 9 exd5 cxd5 10 c3 dxc3 11 bxc3

This is Black’s most consistent continuation in the Petroff as he does not concede the centre to White and at the same time continues developing in a most natural manner. The ensuing positions are rich in tactical and positional content but do not differ greatly so we will make an attempt to categorise the various recurring themes by starting from the most primitive ones (which are likely to arise in almost all positions) and gradually move on to more specific ones that may appear at later stages of the struggle.

A) The weakness of the square g5

By developing his bishop on d6 Black counts on dynamic play with attacking chances but at the same time abandons control of the important g5 square to White.

If Black does nothing to stop him White will use this square to attack the Black king with the direct d3-g5 or to disturb the Black pieces and provoke the creation of weaknesses with g5.

For example, in the basic position presented above, after 11...c6 White has the option of continuing 12 g5! g6 13 w f3 with attacking chances, whilst in the case of 11...d7!? (to bring the knight closer to the threatened sector) it is best to play 12 g5! (trying to provoke weaknesses) 12...c7 (Black politely declines) 13 w c2 h6 14 h4 w b6 15 g3! with a slight positional advantage. In this particular variation we witness the typical theme of an exchange of dark-squared bishops which should be favourable to White as his remaining bishop is more mobile than its Black counterpart.

B) The manoeuvre a1-b1-b5, (h2-h3), c3-c4 as a way to combat ...c8-g4

Black’s best continuation is 11...g4, apparently creating an annoying pin on the f3 and also planning ...g4-h5-g6. However, after 12 b1! the bishop’s absence from the queenside starts to make itself felt.
In reply to 12...b6 White continues with the imaginative 13 \textit{\textbf{B}}b5! (which \textit{does} threaten to capture on d5 as ...\textit{\textbf{d}}6xh2+ is met by \textit{\textbf{f}}3xh2!).

Black must protect his pawn by 13...\textit{\textbf{c}}7 but after 14 h3! he cannot continue with 14...\textit{\textbf{h}}5 in view of 15 c4!, exploiting an x-ray along the 5\textsuperscript{th} horizontal. This is a typical idea in the old main line and it would be no exaggeration to say that in all these lines Black's queen bishop attracts White's queen rook like a magnet.

Black's best is to continue with 14...a6, yet after 15 h\textit{x}g4! axb5 16 \textit{\textbf{w}}c2! g6 17 \textit{\textbf{h}}6 \textit{\textbf{e}}8 18 \textit{\textbf{xb}}5 White had excellent compensation for the sacrificed exchange in the game Kotronias-Rozentalis, Debrecen 1992 (See Illustrative Game No 33).

It is mainly for this reason that Black usually prefers to continue his development by 12...\textit{\textbf{d}}7. This logical move invites White to capture on b7, having in mind to trap the rook after 13 \textit{\textbf{xb}}7 \textit{\textbf{b}}6!. Although this is not a losing position for White it takes him time and energy to avoid material losses, allowing Black in the meantime to generate good counterplay. Therefore White continues 13 h\textit{\textbf{h}}3 \textit{\textbf{h}}5 14 \textit{\textbf{b}}5! \textit{\textbf{b}}6 15 c4!, increasing the pressure and posing Black some difficult problems.

In practice Black has almost universally chosen to win a pawn, at the cost of surrendering the two bishops by 15...\textit{\textbf{x}}f3, as the alternative 15...\textit{\textbf{xc}}4 (15...a6? 16 \textit{\textbf{xb}}6 \textit{\textbf{xb}}6 17 c5 wins for White) 16 \textit{\textbf{xd}}5! \textit{\textbf{h}}2+ 17 \textit{\textbf{xh}}2 \textit{\textbf{xd}}5 18 \textit{\textbf{xc}}4 \textit{\textbf{xc}}4 19 \textit{\textbf{w}}xh5 allows White to come out of the complications with two pieces for rook + pawn and significant chances to attack the Black king with his queen and minor pieces.

\textbf{C) Bishop sacrifices to prise open Black's kingside}

After 15...\textit{\textbf{xf}}3! 16 \textit{\textbf{xf}}3 dxc4 17 \textit{\textbf{c}}2! White has lost a pawn but keeps his king's bishop dangerously placed on the diagonal b1-h7, whilst the \textit{\textbf{b}}5 has obtained access to the kingside. Also, White has possibilities to compress Black on the other wing by a2-a4-a5; if
Black tries to force the rook back by 17...a6?!; then after 18 ♘g5! the weakness of the square g5 once more creates insoluble problems for Black, as in Beliavsky-Petursson, Reykjavik (World Cup) 1988:

...the sacrifice of the dark-squared bishop on f6 or h6 quite often makes its appearance. In this position from the game Dolmatov-Skatchkov, Russia 2000 White continued with the outrageous 20 ♘h6!? when extreme accuracy is required from Black in order to hold the position (See Illustrative Game No 36).

Finally, in the game Gavrilov-Frog, corr. 1989/90 ...

White, encouraged by Black's last feeble move (19...♗c7?!), started a fierce attack with the typical 20 ♘f6!; after 20...♖d6 21 ♙e5 ♙e7 22 a5 ♙a8 White uncered the double bishop sacrifice 23 ♘xh7+! ♙xh7 24 ♙h5+ ♙g8 25 ♘xg7!, which led to a clear advantage after 25...f6! 26 ♙h8+ ♙f7 27 ♘xf8 ♙xf8 28 ♙h5+ ♙g8 29 ♙d5+. This example shows how closely linked are the sacrifices of the two bishops and it is noticeable how often White has to sacrifice both of them in order to achieve the desired result. Without doubt, Emanuel Lasker who was the first to introduce this theme in one of his games would
have been proud to see it become so widespread nowadays.

D) Attacking the Black knight with a2-a4-a5 and the importance of the square d5

After 17 \( \text{c2} \) White is ready for a2-a4-a5, evicting the Black knight from its fine defensive position. As long as the knight remains on b6 it shields the attack on the b7 pawn and supports the one on c4. After a2-a4 the threat of a4-a5 forces Black to make a concrete decision regarding the future of his knight: Praxis has shown that if he does not have at his disposal the squares c4 or d5 for it then White will obtain a significant advantage.

This happens because on a4 the knight is cut off from the rest of its army whilst on c8 it temporarily cuts the Black position in two. In this particular case the motif a5-a6 makes its appearance, exploiting the fact that the b7 pawn is pinned along the diagonal h1-a8 due to the presence of the White queen on f3; this idea became visible in the game Timman-Anand, Tilburg 1991:

Here, the continuation 22 a6! \( \text{e7} \) 23 axb7 \( \text{ab8} \) 24 \( \text{g5}! \) left White clearly on top. To avert such a development of events Black should try to establish the knight on d5 with preparatory moves such as ...\( \text{d8-d7} \), ...g7-g6, ...\( \text{a-d8} \), ...\( \text{d6-c7} \), or rely on the alternative strategy of jumping with the knight to c4 after ...c4-c3. We think that this second scheme is more promising.

E) The pressure on the b7 pawn

Probably the most sensitive point in the Black camp is b7; with the queen on f3, a rook on b5 and the advance a4-a5 always on the cards it is obvious that White only needs to double rooks on the b-file to ensure the recovery of his pawn. The basic question is not whether Black will be able to hold on to the pawn (he almost certainly cannot) but whether he will be able to fully mobilise his pieces in order to obtain satisfactory counterplay.

The game Khalifman-Leko, New Delhi 2000 is an excellent example of this theme:
Instead of trying to hold on to the pawn with 22...\texttt{\texttt{d}d6?}, which led to a bad position for Black in the afore-mentioned game, Leko had to sacrifice it with 22...\texttt{\texttt{w}e7}!; after 23 \texttt{\texttt{x}xb7} \texttt{c}c3! 24 \texttt{\texttt{x}d8} Black must continue with 24...\texttt{\texttt{x}d8}! 25 \texttt{\texttt{e}c6} \texttt{\texttt{b}b8}! with at least equality as White cannot avoid the exchange of his active rook.

F) The transfer of a rook to the kingside via the 5\textsuperscript{th} rank

Once the d5-pawn no longer stands in the way, White should always keep in mind that the \texttt{\texttt{b}b5} can be easily transferred to g5 or h5, to assist the combined assault of White’s pieces. In the old main line for example, after 18...\texttt{\texttt{f}e8} ...

...we propose the interesting novelty 19 \texttt{\texttt{g}g5}!; the rook’s entry into the attack is associated with some concrete sacrificial ideas which are now hanging in the air, so Black must be very careful; after 19...\texttt{\texttt{x}xa4??} there follows 20 \texttt{\texttt{x}h7}+! \texttt{\texttt{x}h7} 21 \texttt{\texttt{w}h5}+ \texttt{\texttt{g}g8} 22 \texttt{\texttt{x}g7}+! \texttt{\texttt{x}g7} 23 \texttt{\texttt{h}h6}+ with a winning position for White, whilst after 19...\texttt{\texttt{e}e7??}, White also wins by 20 \texttt{\texttt{x}g7}+! \texttt{\texttt{x}g7} 21 \texttt{\texttt{w}h5} \texttt{\texttt{h}h8} 22 \texttt{\texttt{h}h6}+ \texttt{\texttt{g}g8} 23 \texttt{\texttt{w}e5} \texttt{\texttt{f}f6} 24 \texttt{\texttt{w}g3}+ \texttt{\texttt{f}f7} 25 \texttt{\texttt{w}g7}+ \texttt{\texttt{e}e6} 26 \texttt{\texttt{f}f5}+!.

Better moves for Black are 19...\texttt{\texttt{g}g6} and 19...\texttt{\texttt{f}f8}, which are both extensively analysed within Illustrative Game No 38.

Before proceeding, we would like to note that in the game Khalifman-Leko mentioned above, after Black’s mistake 22...\texttt{\texttt{d}d6?}, the attacking rook along the 5\textsuperscript{th} rank once again played a major role, this time by switching between h5 and d5:

23 \texttt{\texttt{h}h5}! g6 24 \texttt{\texttt{x}xb7} \texttt{\texttt{c}c7} 25 \texttt{\texttt{d}d5}! \texttt{\texttt{w}c8} 26 \texttt{\texttt{x}xd8} \texttt{\texttt{x}xd8} 27 \texttt{\texttt{d}d5} and White had a very strong attack.

G) The advance ...c4-c3 followed by the manoeuvre ...\texttt{\texttt{b}b6-c4-(d2)}

Despite the fact that Black has surrendered to White the bishop pair and, apparently, the initiative, things are not as simple as they look: Black has a powerful asset in the shape of the passed c-pawn which should always be taken into account. In several cases the pawn can even be sacrificed to open lines for the Black pieces (c4 for the knight and the c-file for Black’s queen and rooks).

For example, if after 17 \texttt{\texttt{c}c2} \texttt{\texttt{w}d7} 18 \texttt{\texttt{a}a4} g6 in the main line, White chooses...
19 \( \mathcal{d}2 \), Black's best possibility appears to be 19...c3!, freeing his play; after 19 \( \mathcal{e}3! \)? Black can rely on the slower 19...\( \mathcal{a}c8 \) 20 \( \mathcal{f}b1 \) c3 21 a5 \( \mathcal{c}4 \) which leads to complicated play as the knight can jump to d2, disrupting the communication of White's forces, or take the bishop on e3.
Typical Endings that arise in the Petroff

In the Petroff, not many typical endgames are to be encountered; there are, however, concrete variations where Black chooses to enter a slightly worse endgame with the sole aim of drawing.

Such a variation is the following:

1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆f6 3 ∆xe5 ∆xe4?! 4 ∆e2 ∆e7 5 ∆xe4 d6 6 d4 dxe5 7 dxe5 ∆c6 8 ∆c3! ∆xe5 9 ∆xe5+ ∆xe5 10 ∆f4 ∆d6 11 ∆g3 ∆d7 12 0-0-0 0-0-0 13 ∆e4 ∆c6 14 ∆xd6+ ∆xd6.

The type of endgame that has arisen here is characteristic for this variation: Black has been saddled with a weakness on d6 and has conceded the bishop pair to White with the sole purpose of playing a position without queens. White has very good chances to win the game by combining play on both flanks. In the game Vasiukov-Chekhov, Kishniev 1975...

...White continued with 15 f3 ∆he8 16 ∆d4! (A very important switch to the 4th rank, allowing the rook to force and attack weaknesses on both sides of the board) 16...∆c7 17 a4 f5 18 h4 g6 19 ∆f4 ∆d7 20 b4! ∆de7 21 ∆b2 a6 22 a5 d5 23 h5 ∆c8 24 hxg6 hxg6 25 ∆h6 ∆g7 26 ∆xe5 ∆xe5 27 ∆d3 ∆c7 28 g4! obtaining an obvious advantage (See Illustrative Game No 2).

Another typical endgame arises in some positions after ...∆g4xf3 followed by the exchange of queens on f3; White gets doubled f-pawns but without queens on the board this does not jeopardize his king’s safety. In this endgame White’s two bishops can become an asset if he manages to open lines on the queenside, but even if he fails to do so he is never in danger of losing as Black’s position is too passive. In the game Kotronias-Langrock, Wichern open 2001 (See Illustrative Game No 16) such an ending arose.

In the following diagrammed position White rushed to bring his king to f3 by 18 f4?!, and although he still remained a little better Black managed to gradually solve his problems...
Instead, he should have given priority to 18 a4! with a clear advantage, since Black is lacking useful moves: If the knight moves from c6, then c3-c4-c5 will come, whilst on 18...\textit{bd8} the reply 19 \textit{g5}!, tempting Black to weaken himself with ...\textit{f7-f6} is annoying. Finally on 18...\textit{h6} the move 19 \textit{f4}! has much more point than in the game as the further \textit{f4-f5} will fix some weaknesses.

In the game Timman-Yusupov, Belfort 1988 (See Illustrative Game No 19)...

...a slightly modified version of the same ending arose: Here the Black knight had already retreated on \textit{e7} so White continued unhindered with the usual plan of opening lines on the queenside by 16 \textit{c4 c6} 17 \textit{ab1} \textit{b6} and now the standard 18 a4!: After 18...\textit{ab8} 19 \textit{bb3}? \textit{h6} 20 \textit{eb1} the preparations for \textit{a4-a5} were complete and White went on to open the a-file and infiltrate with his rooks.

In the game Ehlvest-Yusupov, Saint John 1988 (See Illustrative game No 19 too)...

...Black tried (as in the note to Kotronias-Langrock) to keep the knight firm on \textit{c6} for a while with 15...\textit{ad8} 16 \textit{ad1}!!? \textit{b6} in an effort to discourage White from mobilizing his central pawns, yet after the typical 17 \textit{g5}! \textit{f6} 18 \textit{e3} White had provoked an important weakness in the Black camp.

The further course of the game was 18...\textit{e7} 19 \textit{c4 c6}! 20 \textit{c2}!? \textit{g6} 21 \textit{c5} \textit{c7} 22 \textit{c1}! \textit{bxc5} 23 \textit{dxc5} \textit{e5} 24 \textit{g2} with White maintaining a small but annoying edge.

Finally, a relatively popular variation where Black is willing to accept a slightly worse endgame in the hope of avoiding complications is the following:
1 e4 e5 2 ¼f3 ½f6 3 ½xe5 d6 4 ½f3 ½xe4 5 d4 d5 6 ½d3 ½e7 7 0-0 ½c6 8 c4!? ½f6 9 ½c3 0-0 10 h3! ½b4 11 ½e2 dxc4 12 ½xc4 ½bd5 13 ½e1 c6 14 ½g5! ½e6 15 ½b3 ½b6!? when White has nothing better than 16 ½xd5 cxd5 17 ½xb6 axb6 18 ½b3, reaching the following position:

White should be slightly better here as he has the more elastic pawn structure and more active pieces. In the game Leko-Adams, Dortmund 2002, the sequel 18...h6 19 ½f4 ½fc8 20 ½e5 g5? 21 ½h2 ½b4 22 ½e2 ½e4 23 ½d3! ½f8 24 ½ae1 ½g7

25 ½e5!

...allowed White to trade dark-squared bishops, obtaining a superb outpost on b4 for his knight and at the same time a considerable advantage (See Illustrative game No 30).
The Petroff Defence. Black resorts to a symmetrical development, aspiring to liquidate the e-pawns and obtain a free and comfortable game. These words sound nice, but in practice things are not so easy.

3 \( \text{\textit{dxe}} \text{e}5 \)

White decides to allow the above mentioned liquidation, trusting that the advantage of the first move will be sufficient to maintain an edge, even in the symmetrical positions that will now occur.

3...\( \text{\textit{we}} \text{e}7 \)

A move without much point, as the e-pawn could be recovered simply by 3...d6. The only logical explanation is that Black wishes to avoid the knight sacrifice 4 \( \text{\textit{xf}} \text{f7} \) in reply to the above mentioned continuation, but that sacrifice is merely a dubious attempt to complicate the issue, enjoying few chances of success.

4 \( \text{\textit{xf}} \text{f3} \!

It is best for White to refrain from 4 d4 as that move would allow Black chances to mix things up by 4...d6 5 \( \text{\textit{f3}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe}} \text{e}4+ \) 6 \( \text{\textit{e2}} \) \( \text{\textit{f5}} \)\!.

4...\( \text{\textit{xe}} \text{e4} \)

Relatively best, but at the same time an admission that Black’s last move will have to be retracted.

4...\( \text{\textit{we}} \text{xe}4+ \) is a logical try to develop the kingside, yet after 5
\(e2\) d5 (On 5...\(e7\) White should still play 6 0-0 as 6...0-0 7 \(e1\) leaves Black exposed on the e-line) 6 0-0 the exposed position of the queen seriously jeopardizes Black’s chances. For example:

A) 6...\(g4\) 7 \(e1\) leads to a clear advantage for White (while 7 \(b5+?! \, d8 \oplus 8 \, e2\) is also interesting).

B) 6...\(g6\) 7 \(b5+\) c6 8 \(e1+\) \(e6\) 9 \(d3 \, e4\) (Eximeno-Venturas, IECG Email 2000) 10 \(x e4!\) dxe4 11 \(h4 \, f6\) 12 \(xe4\);

C) 6...\(e7\) 7 \(e1\) 0-0 8 d4?! \(d8\) and Black must lose even more time to extricate the queen from its difficulties (8 \(c3?!\) instead, is inferior as then 8...\(b4\) offers Black a chance to coordinate his pieces more harmoniously)

5 \(e2\) \(d8\)

5...d5 6 0-0 \(e6\) [6...g6?! 7 \(e1\) \(g7\) 8 \(b5+!\) (8 \(c4?! 0-0 9 cxd5 \(c5\) 10 d4 \(xd5\) 11 \(c3 \, xc3\) 12 bxc3 \(c6\) 13 \(f4 \, a5\) 14 \(d2 \, d7\) 15 \(ab1 \, d8\) 16 \(e5\) Virumbrales-Ortiz, Monzon, tch, Spain 1987) 8...c6 9 d3 cxb5 10 dxe4 dxe4 11 \(g5! \, c7\) (11...\(f6\) 12 \(c3\) \(c3\) \(xc3\) 13 \(xe4+\) \(e6\) 14 bxc3 0-0 15 \(d4\) \(e4\) 16 \(f5! \, f6!\) 17 \(e7 \, c6\) 18 \(h6+ \, h8\) 19 \(g4!-\)] is an attempt to quickly develop the queen side; 13...e5?! fails to 14 dxe5 \(xe5\) 15 \(f4 \, fd7\) 16 \(d4\) (16 \(g3?!\) c5 17 \(xe5\) \(xd4\) 18 \(xd6\) \(xd6\) 19 \(xd4\)

6 0-0 \(e7\) 7 d4 0-0 8 c4

8...d5?!

The most logical move, wishing to transpose to an isolated QP position, where the bishop on e2 is not so well placed.

After 8...c6 9 \(c2\) White’s advantage is undisputed according to Forintos and Haag; a logical continuation is 9...d5 10 cxd5 cxd5 11 \(c3\) when we have the first parting of the ways:
A) 11...\(\text{g}5\) 12 \(\text{b}3\) \(\text{xc}3\) 13 \(\text{bxc}3\) b6 (13...\(\text{xc}7\) 14 \(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{e}6\) 15 \(\text{e}4\) \(\text{xc}3\) 16 \(\text{d}3\) g6 17 \(\text{b}1\)) 14 \(\text{e}5\)! f6 15 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 16 \(\text{d}3\); 

B) 11...\(\text{f}6\) 12 \(\text{g}5\) \(\text{c}6\) 13 \(\text{b}5\)! (13 \(\text{ad}1\)?! \(\text{e}6\) 14 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{c}8\) 15 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{b}6\) 16 \(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 17 f5 \(\text{d}7\)) is also better for White after either of the following replies:

B1) 13...\(\text{d}7\) 14 \(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 15 \(\text{xe}5\) +; 

B2) 13...h6 14 \(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 15 \(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{bxc}6\) 16 \(\text{fe}1\) \(\text{b}8\) 17 \(\text{b}3\); 

C) 11...\(\text{xc}3\) (Probably best) 12 \(\text{bxc}3\) and at this point Black should rather seek simplification to minimize the potential of White’s better developed position:

C1) 12...\(\text{c}6\) 13 \(\text{b}1\) b6 (13...\(\text{xc}7\) 14 h3 \(\text{e}6\) 15 \(\text{d}3\) h6 16 \(\text{e}1\) 14 \(\text{b}6\) (14...\(\text{g}4\)! 15 \(\text{h}5\) 16 \(\text{d}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 17 \(\text{xh}5\) transposes to 12...\(\text{g}4\)?) 15 \(\text{d}3\) h6 16 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 17 dxe5! \(\text{c}6\) 18 \(\text{e}3\); 

C2) 12...\(\text{d}7\) 13 \(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 14 \(\text{b}1\) \(\text{c}7\) 15 \(\text{e}1\); 

C3) 12...\(\text{g}4\)? 13 \(\text{b}1\) b6 (13...\(\text{xc}7\) 14 \(\text{b}3\) 14 \(\text{e}1\) \(\text{c}6\) 15 h3 \(\text{h}5\) (15...\(\text{e}6\) 16 \(\text{b}5\)) 16 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 17 \(\text{xh}5\) \(\text{g}6\) is the best choice as it yields a position where the White bishop on f3 will face the annoying ...\(\text{g}6\)-h4 and the \(\text{c}1\) hasn’t good squares; all this doesn’t mean, however, that White’s advantage should be underestimated (17...\(\text{c}4\)?? instead, is only aesthetically pleasing as after 18 \(\text{f}3\) the bishop on f3 is unchallenged and the pressure on the c-pawn blocked).

9 \(\text{cxd}5\)

9 \(\text{c}3\)? is interesting, avoiding the isolani and furthering development.

9...\(\text{f}6\)!

9...\(\text{xd}5\) 10 \(\text{c}3\) \(\text{xc}3\) 11 bxc3 is clearly better for White.

10 \(\text{c}3\) \(\text{xd}5\)

It is a bit surprising that this position may arise from a far different move order: 1 e4 e5 2 \(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 3 \(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{d}6\) 4 \(\text{e}4\) \(\text{xe}4\) 5 \(\text{d}3\) \(\text{c}5\) 6 \(\text{e}2\) d5 7 d4 \(\text{e}4\) 8 0-0 \(\text{c}7\) 9 c4 0-0 10 \(\text{cxd}5\) \(\text{f}6\) 11 \(\text{c}3\) \(\text{xd}5\). 

11 h3

11 \(\text{xd}5\)? \(\text{xd}5\) 12 \(\text{e}5\) violates the rule that the side with the isolani should refrain from exchanges, but here is an exceptional case as White will gain more time by hitting the queen. Some sample lines follow.

A) 12...\(\text{c}6\) 13 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{d}6\) 14 \(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{bxc}6\) 15 \(\text{c}2\); 

B) 12...\(\text{e}6\) 13 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{b}5\) 14 a4! is also better for White as the following variations show:

B1) 14...\(\text{a}6\) 15 b4 c6 (15...\(\text{xb}4\) 16 \(\text{b}1\) \(\text{b}6\) 17 a5+) 16 \(\text{b}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 17 b5 cxb5 18 \(\text{xb}5\) \(\text{ab}8\) 19 \(\text{f}4\); 

B2) 14...\(\text{b}4\) 15 \(\text{d}3\) \(\text{b}6\) 16 \(\text{f}4\); 

C) 12...\(\text{d}7\)! (This reserved choice is best as it doesn’t tempt fate) 13 \(\text{c}4\) (13 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{e}6\) (13...\(\text{b}5\) 14 a4 \(\text{b}4\) 15 \(\text{xd}7\) \(\text{xd}7\) 16 \(\text{b}3\)) 14 \(\text{e}1\) \(\text{e}5\) 15
\(\text{x}e5 \text{w}d6\) looks OK for Black; \(\text{w}d6 14 \text{d}f4 (14 \text{d}xf7??! is proven harmless after 14...\text{d}xf7 15 \text{w}b3 \text{w}g6 16 \text{f}e1 \text{f}8 17 \text{e}3 \text{b}5! 18 \text{w}xb3 \text{d}b6 (14...\text{d}xe5 15 \text{d}xe5 \text{d}8) 15 \text{d}xe5 \text{d}8) 16 \text{f}e1 \text{w}x\text{d}6 18 \text{w}b3↑) 16 \text{w}f3 \text{f}d6 17 \text{f}e1\)\(∓\) 15 \text{b}3 (15 \text{d}d3 \text{d}5\)→ 15...\text{d}d5 (15...\text{w}f6 16 \text{g}3 \text{e}6 17 \text{e}1\text{f}6 16 \text{g}3 \text{d}8 and although Black should be able to hold, White maintains some initiative with 17 \text{f}e1↑: After, for example, something easy going like 17...\text{e}6 18 \text{a}3 \text{c}6 19 \text{w}d3 \text{f}6 (19...\text{e}8 20 \text{c}2 \text{f}6 21 \text{h}4! \text{g}6 22 \text{d}x\text{g}6! \text{h}x\text{g}6 23 \text{e}6 \text{f}6 24 \text{w}x\text{g}6+ \text{f}8 25 \text{g}5\)→ 20 \text{c}2 \text{g}6 Black discovers, to his regret, one of the chief attacking motifs White employs in the Petroff: 21 \text{d}x\text{g}6! \text{h}x\text{x}g6 22 \text{x}e6\!\!\plus.

11 \text{w}b3?! \text{b}6 12 \text{d}d1\plus is another way to maintain a slight initiative.

11...\text{e}6 12 \text{d}3 \text{d}7 13 \text{e}1

13 \text{w}e2?! is a pointless move in this type of position, yet after 13...\text{e}8? (13...\text{c}6\plus) 14 \text{x}h7+! \text{h}x\text{h}7 15 \text{w}e4+ \text{h}8 16 \text{x}d5 \text{c}5 17 \text{x}c5 \text{w}x\text{d}5 18 \text{w}x\text{d}5 \text{f}6 19 \text{f}6 20 \text{d}f1 \text{w}d8 21 \text{d}d2\plus White was rewarded with an extra pawn and went on to win in Ni Hua-Zhu Chen, Tianjing 2003.

13...\text{c}6

It is a tribute to the richness and the variety of our ancient game that this position may arise from the Alekhine defence as well. In fact, our present game and two more

have been reached from the

Alekhine move order:

1 e4 \text{f}6 2 e5 \text{d}5 3 d4 d6 4 c4 \text{b}6 5 \text{d}xe6 \text{x}e6 6 \text{c}3 \text{e}7 7 h3 0-0 8 \text{f}3 \text{c}6 9 \text{d}3 \text{d}5 10 \text{c}xd5 \text{x}d5 11 0-0 \text{e}6 12 \text{f}27. Pretty amazing, isn’t it?

14 a3

14 \text{w}c2! h6 15 a3\plus is the accurate move-order as it ensures that the game position will be reached (while 15 \text{x}e6?! \text{x}e6 16 \text{w}e2\plus, in the style of the famous game Topalov-Anand, Wijk aan Zee 2003, is very interesting).

14...\text{e}8 15 \text{w}c2

15...\text{f}8!

15...h6 16 \text{d}d2 \text{x}c3 17 bxc3 \text{d}5 (T.Paecht-Baburin, Austria tch 2003) 18 \text{h}2\plus gives White a dangerous initiative on the centre and the kingside in view of the threatened manoeuvre \text{x}h2-g4(f1)-\text{e}3, possibly combined with a well timed c3-c4, d4-d5. After 18...\text{b}5 19 \text{g}4 \text{b}6 20 \text{c}1↑ (Instead, the immediate 20 \text{x}h6?! \text{g}xh6 21 \text{d}xh6+ is merely unclear after the best defence 21...\text{g}7! (21...\text{h}8?
22 \text{We}2\pm, with the idea \text{W}d1-h5 is good for White) 22 \text{Af}5+ \text{Af}8! (22...\text{Ag}8? 23 \text{W}d2 \text{Af}6 24 \text{Wh}6 \text{Ne}6 25 \text{Ae}3 \text{Ax}e3 26 fxe3\uparrow) it seems that Black has no easy way to meet the \text{A}xh6 threat.

16 \text{Ad}2 h6

Now in the prophylactic sense this is rather an over-reaction; Black had certainly better ways of playing the position.

17 \text{He}2 \text{Ad}6 18 \text{De}5 \text{Ax}e5?!  

It is in Black's interest to relieve his constricted position by exchanges but this is not the proper way; he had to try 18...\text{Ad}7, at least making use of the fact that now the h7 pawn is not hanging. The text move allows White to launch a dangerous kingside pawn storm.

19 dxe5 \text{Dxc}3 20 \text{Ax}c3 a5

Initiating something on the queenside is, in principle, Black's only chance for counterplay. In this particular position the attempt to exchange bishops by 20...\text{Ab}3 was also worth considering, however 21 \text{W}xb3 \text{W}xd3 22 \text{Ad}2 \text{Wa}6 23 \text{Ad}1 \text{De}6 24 \text{W}b4 \text{Ad}8 25 \text{Dd}6! intending \text{W}b4-g4, f2-f4 leaves White with a very strong initiative.

21 \text{He}3!

Now White squelches this opportunity for good and, at the same time, furthers his attacking plans on the kingside.

21...\text{Ad}5 22 f4!

The kingside pawn mass is set in motion; White is not afraid of tactics on the diagonal g1-a7 as his queen can neutralise everything by simply moving to f2.

22...b5 23 \text{Wf}2 \text{Wb}6 24 \text{Ae}1 b4 25 \text{Ad}2 \text{Wd}4 26 \text{Cc}1 bxa3

Opening up the b-file releases the tension and gives White a valuable square on c3 for his dark-squared bishop, yet Black had to somehow seek counterplay. Nothing is offered by 26...\text{De}6 27 f5 \text{Cc}5 due to 28 \text{Cc}2 b3 29 \text{Ab}1 and White has all his pieces poised for attack.

27 bxa3 \text{Ab}8 28 \text{Cc}2 \text{Aa}2 29 \text{Ad}2 \text{Wc}5 30 \text{Cc}3 \text{Ab}3 31 \text{Ab}1

A wonderful position from White's point of view; the exchange of light-squared bishops has been prevented, all his pieces are ideally placed for attacking purposes and his king is secure. It would not be premature to say that White is strategically winning here.

31...\text{Ab}d8

31...\text{Wxa}3 32 \text{Ag}3 \text{Aa}5 33 f5 \text{Ab}3 can be met with the brilliant and deadly sacrifice 34 \text{Xg}7!!; after 34...\text{Xg}7 35 f6+ \text{Ag}8 (35...\text{Ah}8 36 \text{Wf}4++) 36 \text{Gg}3+ \text{Gg}6 37 \text{Xg}6 \text{Wf}8 38 \text{Cc}2+ \text{Ah}8 39 \text{Ab}3 \text{Ab}3 the typical rook switch 40 \text{Cc}4! +
decides the game, e.g. 40...\(\text{c}2\) 41 \(\text{h}4\) \(\text{g}6\) 42 \(\text{h}2\) \(\text{h}7\) 43 \(\text{d}2\) \(\text{h}5\) 44 \(\text{g}5\) and there is no way to stop \(\text{h}4\times\text{h}5+\).

32 \(f5\) \(\text{d}1\) 33 \(\text{xd}1\) \(\text{xd}1\)

34 \(\text{g}3!\)

A fine move, demonstrating the helplessness of Black’s position; White is not afraid to exchange queens as the attack persists even in the endgame.

34...\(\text{xf}2+\) 35 \(\text{xf}2\) \(\text{h}7\)

Desperation; 35...\(a4\) would have been better, yet 36 \(\text{e}4!\) yields a decisive advantage as it wins a pawn and maintains the attacking momentum.

36 \(e6\) \(f6\) 37 \(h4\) \(a4\) 38 \(\text{xd}3\) \(\text{b}3\) 39 \(\text{xd}7\) \(h5\) 40 \(\text{e}4\) \(\text{c}8\) 41 \(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xf}8\) 42 \(\text{d}6\) 1-0

2
Vasiukov – Chekhov
Kishniev 1975

1 \(e4\) \(e5\) 2 \(\text{d}f3\) \(\text{f}6\) 3 \(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}4?!\)

After this, a pawn will be lost, but Black hopes that by developing fast he will acquire some compensation for it. Nowadays, this line has been eclipsed from tournament play because Black fails to obtain substantial compensation.

4 \(\text{we}2\) \(\text{we}7\)

4...\(d5\) 5 \(d3\) \(\text{we}7\) 6 \(\text{dxe}4\) \(\text{we}5\) 7 exd5± is obviously bad for Black.

5 \(\text{xe}4\) \(d6\) 6 \(d4\)

White reinforces the pinned knight and is by now ready to start developing the rest of his army. Black has tried several continuations in an effort to equalise the chances, but to no avail.

6...\(\text{dxe}5\)

6...\(\text{d}d7?!\) is an attempt to intensify the pressure on \(e5\). After 7 \(f4!\) (7 \(\text{c}3!\) \(dxe5\) 8 \(\text{d}d5\) \(\text{d}8?!\) (8...\(\text{f}6\) 9 \(\text{xf}6+\) \(\text{gxf}6\) 10 \(\text{b}5+!\) \(\text{d}7\) 11 \(\text{xd}7+\) \(\text{xd}7\) 12 0-0±) 9 dxe5 \(\text{c}5\) 10 \(\text{f}3\) \(c6±\) allows Black some practical chances) 7...\(f6\) (7...dxe5 8 fxe5±) 8 \(\text{c}4!\) dxe5 9 fxe5 fxe5 10 0-0± White’s advantage is more than evident, however.
6...f6?! decisively weakens the Black position. The variation 7 \( \text{dxc3} \ \text{dxe5} \ 8 \text{\textit{\textit{d5}} \ \text{\textit{\textit{d6}}} \ 9 \text{\textit{\textit{dxe5}} \ \text{\textit{\textit{fxe5}}} \ 10 \text{\textit{\textit{f4}}} \ c6 \ 11 0-0-0! \pm \) provides a convincing refutation, pointed out by Steinitz.

6...\( \text{\textit{\textit{dxc6}}}! \) is definitely inferior to 6...\( \text{\textit{\textit{dxe5}}} \), because it fails to clarify the situation in the centre. White can exploit this by 7 \( \text{\textit{\textit{b5}} \ \text{\textit{\textit{d7}}} \ 8 0-0! \text{\textit{\textit{dxe5}}} \ 9 \text{\textit{d5}} \) when the advance of his \( d \)-pawn brings panic to the enemy ranks, e.g. 9...\( \text{\textit{\textit{b8}}} \) (9...f5?! is hardly an improvement on account of 10 \( \text{\textit{\textit{e2}} \ \text{\textit{\textit{b8}}} \) (10...\( \text{\textit{\textit{d4}}} \ 11 \text{\textit{\textit{xd7+}} \ \text{\textit{\textit{xd7}}} \ 12 \text{\textit{\textit{d3}}+} \) Horak-Petraz, Czech 2000) 11 \( \text{\textit{\textit{e1}}} \ \text{\textit{\textit{xb5}}}?! \) (11...e4) 12 \( \text{\textit{\textit{xb5+}} \ c6 \text{\textit{\textit{d3}}} \text{\textit{\textit{bx5}}} \text{\textit{\textit{d5}}} \ 14 \text{\textit{\textit{g5}}} \pm \) and Black had to bite the dust in Speelman-Koegh, Amsterdam 1978) 10 \( \text{\textit{d6! \ \text{\textit{\textit{cxd6}}} \ 11 \text{\textit{\textit{b7}}} \ \text{\textit{\textit{xb5}}} \text{\textit{\textit{d8}}} \) (12 \( \text{\textit{\textit{xb5+!}}} \) ) 12...\( \text{\textit{\textit{c7}}} \ 13 \text{\textit{\textit{\textit{e3}}}+ \) and Black is badly tied up according to Ugrinovic.

7 \( \text{\textit{\textit{dxe5}}} \text{\textit{\textit{dxc6}}} \)

![Diagram]

8 \( \text{\textit{\textit{c3}}}! \)

Knights before bishops! This old move by Vasiukov is the easiest and objectively best way of obtaining a safe plus.

8 \( \text{\textit{\textit{b5}}}! \text{\textit{\textit{d7}}} \ 9 \text{\textit{\textit{c3}}} \) is the other try for an advantage; White is threatening \( \text{\textit{\textit{d3-d5}}} \), so Black is given no respite to capture the \( e \)-pawn. For the sake of completeness, and due to the fact that the line seems to be playable again for Black after a long period of abandonment we felt obliged to review the situation here.

A) 9...\( \text{\textit{\textit{wxe5}}}?? \) 10 \( \text{\textit{\textit{xc6}}}+- \) is, of course, out of the question;

B) 9...\( \text{\textit{\textit{dxe5}}} \) is punished by 10 \( \text{\textit{\textit{d5}} \ \text{\textit{\textit{d6}}} \ 11 \text{\textit{\textit{f4}} \ f6} \ 12 \text{\textit{\textit{xd7+}} \ \text{\textit{\textit{xd7}}} \ 13 \text{\textit{\textit{xe5}}}+} \) (13 0-0-0+-);

C) On 9...0-0-0?! there comes 10 \( \text{\textit{\textit{f4}}} \) with the dual purpose of guarding the extra pawn and preparing to castle long. Black’s results from this position have been quite unsatisfactory:

C1) 10...a6 11 \( \text{\textit{\textit{c4}}}! \text{\textit{\textit{e6}}}? \) (11...g5? 12 \( \text{\textit{\textit{d5}}} \) is also bad) turned out a most unfortunate choice for Black after (11...g6 12 0-0-0 \( \text{\textit{\textit{g7}}} \text{\textit{\textit{d5}}} \pm) 12 \( \text{\textit{\textit{xa6!}} \ \text{\textit{\textit{b8}}} \text{\textit{\textit{b5}} \ \text{\textit{d4}}} \text{\textit{\textit{e3}}} \text{\textit{\textit{b4}}} \text{\textit{\textit{a4}}++} \) in Sax-Hulak, Budapest 1975, as he was left two pawns down without the slightest compensation;

C2) Black would like to play 10...g6, initiating pressure on the e5
pawn, but this move has defects too as it fails to control the g5 square: 11 0-0-0 ëg7 (Langfield-Wegelin, West Germany corr. 1980) 12 ëe3!±, hitting a7 and threatening ëf4-g5;

C3) 10...ëb4?! has no point now as White simply plays 11 0-0-0 ëxe4 12 ëxe4 ëxe5 13 ëxd7+ ëxd7 14 ëg5± as in Hotting-Mes, Holland ch corr. 1987;

C4) 10...g5!? (A harmonious method of initiating pressure on the e-pawn, but it doesn’t quite succeed in the end; nevertheless, it is by far the best possibility available to Black) 11 ëg3 leads to a major parting of the ways:

C4a) After 11...f5 12 exf6 ëxf6 13 0-0± White maintains an extra pawn and a better position;

C4b) 11...a6 should now be met by 12 ëa4 with a position that is not too different from the ones reached below; for example: 12...ëg7 13 0-0-0 ëhe8 14 ëhe1 ëxe5 15 ëxd7+ ëxd7 16 ëxh7 ëxd1+ 17 ëxd1 ëf6 18 ëd5 ëh6 19 ëxh6 ëxh6 20 ëf6 ëe6 21 ëxe5 ëxe5 22 ëg4+–;

C4c) 11...h5 is inadequate because of 12 h4! ëh6 (12...ëg7 is also bad: 13 0-0-0 g4 14 ëhe1 ëb8 15 ëd5 ëe6 16 ëb1 ëc8 17 ëxc6 ëxc6 18 e6! ëxd5 19 ëxd5 ëxd5 20 ëxd5 ëxe6 21 ëc5 ëd4 22 ëxc7 ëxf2 23 ëxf7+! ëxg3 24 ëxe6 ëxh4 25 a3 1-0 Atienza-Teijeira, UECC email 1999) 13 hxg5 ëxg5 14 f4 h4 15 ëf2 h3? (a mistake in a losing position) 16 fxg5 hxg2 17 ëxh8 ëxh8 18 0-0-0 ëxg5+ 19 ëe3+– Rizouk-Brahim, Algeria 2001;

C4d) 11...ëg7 12 0-0-0 and White has managed to complete his development and should be able to capitalize on the extra pawn. The following analysis provides a method of taming Black’s counter-play:

C4d1) 12...f5? 13 exf6 ëxf6 allows the tactical shot 14 ëxc7+–;

C4d2) 12...ëxe5? should be met by 13 ëxd7+ ëxd7 14 ëxd7 ëxd7 15 ëxe5 ëe8 16 ëd1+– winning a piece and the game;

C4d3) 12...h6? is too slow, e.g. 13 ëa4 ëb8? (Better was 13...a6 even though after 14 e6! ëxe6 15 ëxa6! ëxc3 (15...bxa6 16 ëxa6+ ëb8 17 ëxc7+! ëxc7 18 ëb5+ ëb8 19 ëb6+ ëa8 20 ëc7#) 16
bxc3 ¤b8 (16...bxa6 17 3xa6+ 3xb8 18 3d3±) 17 3b5 3xb5 18 3xb5 3c6 19 3b2± White is clearly better) 14 3d5 3e6 15 3xc7! 3xc7 16 3d6 3e8 17 e6 1-0 Kwong-Teixeira, UECC email 1998;

C4d4) 12...3he8 (the widely accepted choice) 13 3he1 (13 3xh7!?) 13...3xe5 (13...f5 is best met by 14 exf6 3xf6 15 3xd7!! 3xh7 16 3g4+ 3e6 17 3c4++) 14 3xh7!? (14 3xd7+ 3xd7 15 3xh7 3xd1+ 16 3xd1 3xf6 17 3d5 3h6 18 3xh6 3xh6 19 3f6 3e6 20 3xe5 3xe5 21 3g4+- may be even better) 14...3xb5 15 3xb5 3xd1+ 16 3xd1 3xf6 17 3d4± and it appears that White has consolidated his advantage, as 17...3c4 can be met by 18 3h3+! 3b8 19 3d7 3c8 20 3b5! and the White queen returns to the theatre of action at the most appropriate moment.

D) 9...3b4! (The best move; Other tries simply leave Black a pawn down without compensation; the idea of 9...3b4 is to reach an endgame where Black will present his opponent with severe technical difficulties in the realisation of the pawn. It is important of course to play this move before White is able to castle long) 10 3c4?! (10 3f4?!± is probably the most harmonious and, as yet, untried. White acquiesces to the exchange but only on his own terms; we think White has a slight plus here) 10...0-0-0 11 a3 3a5 12 3xf7 3xe5 13 b4 3xb4 14 3xb4 3xb4 15 axb4 3xf7 16 3xa7 3f5 (a recent game confirmed that Black has other ways too of playing the position: 16...3b8 17 3e3 b6 18 3a1 3f5 19 0-0 3xc2 20 3fc1 3d3 21 3f4 3d7= Shaw-Volkmann, Plovdiv 2003) 17 3a2 3d4! 18 0-0 3hd8= (Solak-Volkmann, Istanbul 2003) is quite playable for Black and obviously not the kind of position White would like to obtain in such an inferior variation.

8...3xe5 9 3xe5+ 3xe5 10 3f4 3d6

10...f6 can be met with 11 0-0-0 3c5 (11...3e7 12 3xe5 fxe5 13 3c4±) 12 3e4 3e7 13 3b5+! 3f7 (Garbarino-Grushka, Pehuaj 1983; 13...c6 14 3xe5 fxe5 15 3c4 b5 16 3xb3 a5 17 a4±) 14 3xe5 fxe5 15 3d7!±

11 3g3 3d7

12 0-0-0

12 3e4! is a better move order, to avoid the next note. After 12...0-0-0 13 3xd6+ cxd6 14 0-0-0 3c6 we transpose to the game continuation.

12...0-0-0

12...f6!? is an interesting idea, to answer 13 3e4 with 13...3e7. In this way Black tries to exploit the omission of 12 3e4. After 13 3b5
\( \text{Beating the Petroff} \quad 47 \)

\( \text{\ldots} \text{xb5} 14 \text{\ldots} \text{xb5} + \text{f7} 15 \text{\ldots} \text{a4} \text{g6} 16 \text{\ldots} \text{b3} + \text{g7} 17 \text{\ldots} \text{he1} \text{\ldots} \text{he8} 18 \text{\ldots} \text{d5} \text{ab8} 19 \text{f3} \text{b6} 20 \text{\ldots} \text{d2} \text{\ldots} \text{f7} 21 \text{\ldots} \text{xe8} \text{\ldots} \text{xe8} 22 \text{\ldots} \text{xf7} \text{\ldots} \text{xf7} 23 \text{\ldots} \text{xd6} \text{e1+} \)

A draw was agreed in Luhrig-Wolochowicz, EU ch corr. 1988. A model way of defending a difficult position.

13 \text{\ldots} \text{e4} \text{c6} 14 \text{\ldots} \text{xd6+ cxd6}

This is how Black usually ends up in this variation: a weakness on d6 and having to face White’s two mighty bishops. We think that by generating play on both sides of the board, as Vasiukov did, White has very good winning chances.

15 \text{f3}

\begin{center}
\text{Diagram}
\end{center}

(Weakens the structure a bit without particular reason. The sophisticated 22 \text{\ldots} \text{h4}! is a better way to continue, trying to provoke more weaknesses in Black’s camp: 22...\text{h5} 23 \text{\ldots} \text{e1} (23 \text{f4? \ldots f7} 24 \text{f5 \ldots g5?}) 23...\text{\ldots f8} 24 \text{\ldots f2+} and White may use ...\text{h7-h5} to open up the kingside later on) 22...\text{\ldots f8} 23 \text{\ldots d1 \ldots d7} 24 \text{\ldots f2 g7} 25 \text{\ldots b4} \text{g5} 26 \text{h4} \text{h6} 27 \text{\ldots f1 \ldots g6} 28 \text{\ldots c2} \text{\ldots he7} 29 \text{\ldots b2 \ldots d7} 30 \text{\ldots a3 \ldots f8} 31 \text{f4?!} (right idea, wrong execution; 31 \text{\ldots d3+} \text{g7} 32 \text{f4± would have justified White’s previous play, tearing apart the barricades on the kingside) 31...f5 32 g4 \text{fxg4} 33 \text{\ldots d3+ e4!} (with this miraculous exchange sacrifice Black turns the tables, obtaining a slight advantage) 34 \text{fxg5} \text{hxg5} 35 \text{hxg5} \text{\ldots e6} 36 \text{\ldots b6} \text{\ldots f4} 37 \text{\ldots xa6 bx6} 38 \text{\ldots xc6+} \text{\ldots e8} 39 \text{\ldots xe6+} \text{\ldots xe6} 40 \text{\ldots b4} \text{\ldots xg5} 41 \text{\ldots a5} \text{\ldots e2} 42 \text{\ldots xd5+} \text{\ldots f4} 43 \text{c4} \text{g3} 44 \text{\ldots b6} \text{g2} 45 \text{\ldots d1} \text{g6} 46 \text{c5} \text{\ldots c3?!} (46...\text{\ldots h6!}) 47 \text{\ldots a1} \text{\ldots xa4} 48 \text{\ldots c7+} \text{\ldots e4} 49 \text{\ldots xa4} \text{g1=\textbf{W}} 50 \text{\ldots xg1} \text{\ldots xg1} 51 \text{\ldots a5} \text{\ldots b1}+ 52 \text{\ldots b6} \text{\ldots d4} 53 \text{b4} \text{\ldots a4} 54 \text{\ldots d6} 1/2-1/2, Kotka-Mollekens, (ol) corr. 1977. A very interesting fight, illustrating the subtleties of this ending.

16 \text{\ldots d4!}

A rook on the 4th rank is, as we have already witnessed, very useful in this type of position as it can help in provoking weaknesses on both flanks.

16...\text{\ldots c7} 17 \text{a4} \text{f5} 18 \text{h4}

The immediate 18 b4 was also playable, but Vasiukov wants to prevent an expansion by ...\text{g7-g5}. Undoubtedly, a prudent course.
18...g6
18...h6? 19 h5± would have allowed White to fix g7 as a weakness.

19 \textit{f4!} \textit{d7}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_game.png}
\end{center}

20 b4!

Finally, White is ready for this thematic advance, preparing to evict the bishop from its good post at c6. As we shall see, this soon leads to a favourable fixing of the pawns on the queenside.

20...\textit{d7} 21 \textit{b2} a6 22 a5

Once more Vasiukov prefers the most solid way of playing, seeking long-term advantages. The more dynamic 22 b5!? was, however, also playable, e.g. 22...axb5 23 axb5 \textit{d7} 24 c4 (Threatening 25 h5 as then 25...\textit{f7} fails to 26 hxg6 hxg6 27 c5!) 24...b6 25 \textit{d3}! and White has a solid edge as both pawns at d6 and b6 are considerably weak.

22 d5

This move makes a difficult position lost, but at the same time it is difficult to offer good advice. It is understandable that Black wanted to keep White from playing c2-c4, but now he gets a very bad bishop on c6 which, after the inevitable exchange of minor pieces on e5, will render all bishop endgames lost. 22...h5 is also ugly-looking, but keeps the kingside closed, and restricts the fighting to one wing. Whether this would have saved Black in the long run is, however, certainly debatable, as White's queenside pawns are dangerous looking after 23 c4 \textit{e6} 24 b5.

23 h5!

Of course! bishops and rooks need an open board to operate.

23...\textit{c8} 24 hxg6 hxg6 25 \textit{h6} \textit{g7} 26 \textit{xe5}

The advantage of having two bishops in a semi-open or open position is that almost always it is possible to part with one of them at the right moment; here the right moment has come, securing White a hegemony on the dark squares in view of the inability of the \textit{c6} to contest them.

26 \textit{xe5} 27 \textit{d3} \textit{c7}

The advantage of having two bishops in a semi-open or open position is that almost always it is possible to part with one of them at the right moment; here the right moment has come, securing White a hegemony on the dark squares in view of the inability of the \textit{c6} to contest them.

26...\textit{xe5} 27 \textit{d3} \textit{c7}

28 g4!±

Now White goes on to win by utilising his better bishop and superior pawn structure, albeit not
without mistakes. His last move ensures the creation of a second weakness in the enemy camp.

28...\textit{\textbf{N}}e3 29 gxf5 gxf5 30 f4! \textit{\textbf{K}}f7 31 \textit{\textbf{K}}h5

By piling up on the newly created target White forces his opponent to resort to desperate measures.

31...\textit{\textbf{N}}e4! 32 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xe4?

32 \textit{\textbf{Q}}c3! looks better, the rook cannot run away; now it is a game again.

32...fxe4 33 f5?

But this looks terrible, allowing Black to get to e5 with the king. 33 \textit{\textbf{K}}h4!± is stronger but Black has counterplay, a sample line being 33...e3 34 \textit{\textbf{Q}}c1 \textit{\textbf{K}}g7 35 \textit{\textbf{K}}h1 \textit{\textbf{K}}g3 36 \textit{\textbf{K}}e1 b6! 37 \textit{\textbf{K}}d3 \textit{\textbf{K}}xa5 38 \textit{\textbf{K}}xa5 \textit{\textbf{K}}f3 39 \textit{\textbf{K}}dxe3 \textit{\textbf{K}}xf4 and Black has practical chances to hold as he threatens to transfer the king to c5 and the bishop to c4 holding everything together. Still, the position should be objectively won as White needs only to change the rooks to achieve his goal.

33...\textit{\textbf{Q}}d6± 34 c4!

Black has gained counterplay and the position is no longer easy; White does best to break up the central pawn duo to avoid unpleasant surprises.

34...\textit{\textbf{Q}}e5 35 \textit{\textbf{Q}}c3 \textit{\textbf{K}}xc4 36 \textit{\textbf{K}}xc4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}f4!

Black's exchange sacrifice has offered him good activity; White needs to untangle his rooks to have chances of winning.

37 \textit{\textbf{K}}c5 e3

40...\textit{\textbf{Q}}d7?

40...\textit{\textbf{Q}}g4! would have saved the half-point. Black's move should probably be attributed to time-pressure. The only try is 41 \textit{\textbf{K}}c4+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}g5 42 \textit{\textbf{K}}xg4+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}xg4 43 \textit{\textbf{K}}xe2 \textit{\textbf{K}}xf6 44 b5! but objectively the position is a draw.

41 \textit{\textbf{K}}ce5!

Missed by Black. The threat of \textit{\textbf{K}}e7 forces the Black rook to return to f7 allowing White to win easily by effectively using the tempi gained.

41...\textit{\textbf{K}}f7 42 \textit{\textbf{Q}}d4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}g3 43 \textit{\textbf{Q}}g5+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}f4 44 \textit{\textbf{Q}}g7 \textit{\textbf{K}}f8 45 \textit{\textbf{K}}ge7 \textit{\textbf{Q}}g5 46 \textit{\textbf{K}}f7 \textit{\textbf{K}}g4 47 \textit{\textbf{K}}e4 \textit{\textbf{K}}f6 48 \textit{\textbf{K}}e7\textit{\textbf{K}} 49 \textit{\textbf{K}}c5 \textit{\textbf{Q}}f3 50 \textit{\textbf{K}}xe2 \textit{\textbf{Q}}c8+ 51 \textit{\textbf{Q}}b6 1-0

3

Honfi – Toth
Budapest 1971

1 e4 e5 2 \textit{\textbf{Q}}f3 \textit{\textbf{Q}}f6 3 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xe5 d6

The best move, ensuring the recovery of the pawn and keeping intact Black's chances.
4 \textit{d}f3 \textit{d}xe4

It looks as though Black has made more moves than White, but the fact is that the knight on e4 may become an object of attack at a later stage. It is exactly for this reason that White refrains from evicting the knight by d2-d3, preferring instead the more testing d2-d4.

5 \textit{d}4

Now White is ready to follow up with \textit{f}1-d3, 0-0; it is high time for Black to choose his defensive setup.

5...\textit{d}d7

This move is rarely met in practice; Black wishes to support his centralised knight on e4 by ...\textit{d}d7-f6 and ...d6-d5, but in doing so he unavoidably ends up neglecting control of another important square, namely e5.

6 \textit{d}d3 \textit{d}df6 7 0-0 \textit{e}e7

The immediate 7...d5 should be met with 8 c4 c6 (8...dxc4? 9 \textit{xe}4 \textit{xe}4 10 \textit{e}e1 f5 11 \textit{e}e5++) 9 \textit{c}c3 when play will most likely transpose to 9...c6 below.

8 \textit{e}e1 d5 9 c4

This move is part and parcel of White's strategy in the Petroff as it helps him challenge Black's control over e4 and open more lines for his pieces.

9...\textit{e}e6

Black tries to maintain his stance in the centre by relying solely on piece play; however, such a strategy does not fully meet the requirements of the position in the present situation.

9...c6 is possibly the best way of continuing; then 10 \textit{d}c3! \textit{xc}3 (10...\textit{f}5 11 cxd5 cxd5 12 \textit{a}a4+ \textit{d}d7 13 \textit{b}b3±) 11 bxc3 0-0 12 \textit{e}e5 \textit{e}e6 [On 12...dxc4 13 \textit{xc}4 \textit{d}d5 (13...\textit{d}d7?? 14 \textit{xf}7! \textit{xf}7 15 \textit{b}b3+) the reply 14 \textit{b}b1!! preserves an initiative for White as 14...\textit{xc}3? (14...\textit{c}7 15 \textit{b}3! \textit{f}5 (15...\textit{b}8? 16 \textit{xc}6!!++; 15...\textit{d}d8 16 a4±) 16 \textit{b}2 \textit{ab}8 17 \textit{be}2 with an initiative for White is the lesser evil) is met by 15 \textit{xf}7! ++] 13 \textit{b}1± guarantees an edge for White as the threat to b7 is slightly awkward to meet [Meanwhile 13 c5!? looks like a worthy alternative, e.g. 13...\textit{d}d7 14 \textit{f}4 \textit{xe}5 15 \textit{xe}5 \textit{f}6? (15...\textit{b}6 16 f4!)]
10 cxd5 \textit{\textbf{x}}xd5

\textbf{11 \textit{\textbf{W}}c2}

This is slightly inaccurate because it permits the Black knight to retreat, leaving \textit{\textbf{W}}hite with an isolani in the centre.

Better is 11 \textit{\textbf{Q}}c3! as it looks most appropriate for \textit{\textbf{W}}hite to exploit the situation in the centre in order to reinforce d4. For example, after 11...\textit{\textbf{Q}}xc3 12 bxc3 0-0, 13 c4!? is a very interesting move as Black has to accept the pawn and \textit{\textbf{W}}hite seems to be better in all variations (13 \textit{\textbf{Q}}e5↑ is also possible and \textit{\textbf{W}}hite has the initiative because of his mobile pawn centre, open b-file and strongly centralised pieces. In addition, the \textit{\textbf{A}}d5 is not so well placed and might become the object of an attack in the near future).

Below follows the authors' lengthy analysis after 13 c4?:

\textbf{A)} 13...\textit{\textbf{Q}}c6 14 \textit{\textbf{Q}}e5± (14 d5 \textit{\textbf{A}}d7 15 \textit{\textbf{A}}b1±)

\textbf{B)} 13...\textit{\textbf{Q}}e6 14 \textit{\textbf{A}}b1 (14 d5) 14...\textit{\textbf{A}}b8 15 \textit{\textbf{W}}c2 h6 16 d5 \textit{\textbf{A}}g4 17 \textit{\textbf{Q}}e5±

\textbf{C)} 13...\textit{\textbf{Q}}xf3! (Most natural and best) 14 \textit{\textbf{W}}xf3 \textit{\textbf{W}}xd4 15 \textit{\textbf{A}}b1 and now Black already has to be very careful:

\textbf{C1)} 15...\textit{\textbf{W}}d7 16 \textit{\textbf{A}}f5 \textit{\textbf{W}}d6 17 \textit{\textbf{A}}f4±;

\textbf{C2)} 15...\textit{\textbf{A}}ad8 16 \textit{\textbf{A}}d1! (every tempo counts in the fight for the initiative) leads to a wider, yet still unpleasant choice for \textit{\textbf{W}}hite:

\textbf{C2a)} 16...\textit{\textbf{W}}e5 17 \textit{\textbf{A}}f4 \textit{\textbf{W}}c5 18 \textit{\textbf{A}}xb7 \textit{\textbf{A}}d6 19 \textit{\textbf{A}}b5 \textit{\textbf{W}}a3 20 \textit{\textbf{A}}g5±

\textbf{C2b)} 16...\textit{\textbf{W}}h4 17 g3! (17 \textit{\textbf{A}}xb7 \textit{\textbf{A}}g4 18 \textit{\textbf{A}}f4 \textit{\textbf{A}}d6 19 \textit{\textbf{A}}xd6 \textit{\textbf{A}}xd6 20 \textit{\textbf{W}}f4 g5 21 \textit{\textbf{W}}g3 \textit{\textbf{W}}xg3 22 hxg3 \textit{\textbf{A}}fd8 23 \textit{\textbf{A}}b5 \textit{\textbf{A}}h8 24 \textit{\textbf{A}}xg5 f5+) 17...\textit{\textbf{W}}g4 (17...\textit{\textbf{W}}h5 18 \textit{\textbf{W}}xh5 \textit{\textbf{A}}xh5 19 \textit{\textbf{A}}xb7 \textit{\textbf{A}}d6 20 \textit{\textbf{A}}e3±; 17...\textit{\textbf{W}}h3
52 Beating the Petroff

18...g5 lΔg4
19 xe7 'ifxh2+ 20 lΔe5 21 lΔd6 22 lΔe2 lΔc6 23 lΔe3±

C2c) 16...c5 17 lΔxb7±

C2d) 16...h8 17 lΔxb7 lΔd6 18 lΔb2±

C2e) 16...g4 17 lΔxb7 lΔxf3 18 gxf3±

C3) 15...d6! (Best) 16 lΔb2 lWh4 (16...lWc5 17 lΔxf6 gxf6 18 lWh3 f5 19 lΔxf6 h6 20 lWe4++) 17 g3 and we are at the final crossroads:

C3a) 17...lWh5? 18 lWxh5 lAdxh5 19 c5! lAdxe5 20 lWe5 lAxf2 21 lΔf6 lAdc5 is bad for Black:

C3a1) 22...lAdg4+ 23 lAdl lAdad8 (23...c6 24 lWg5++) 24 lAd2+-;

C3a2) 22...lWfd8 23 lAxf6 lAdx3 24 lAd3 b6 25 lAxc7++;

C3b) 17...g4! is a better try: 18 lWxb7 (18 lAx2? lWxf3 19 lAx3 lAdfe8±) 18...lAd7 (18...lAb8!? may be a better chance to hold, for example 19 lWxa7 lAa8 20 lWd4 lAx2 21 c5 lAx2 22 lWxb2 lWxb2 lAxc5 23 lWc2 lAd6!± although, of course, White can press in this position for ages!) and now White has several ways to continue the pressure: One of them is 19 lZe4! (19 f3 lWh5!±; 19...lWg5 20 lWe4±; 19...lWh3 20 lWd5?) is rather second-best) 19...lWg5 20 lAh4→ with a dangerous looking kingside attack.

11...lAd6 12 lZe5 0-0 13 lZc3

13...c6?!

This allows White to get rid of his weakness and come out on top; after 13...lZe6!? 14 d5 the position is not so clear as the Black bishop can retreat to d7 or even c8 while the knight on d6 is a stout defender. Still, White probably retains a slight pull because of his space advantage.

14 lGe5 h6 15 lAf6 lAf6 16 lAxzd5 cxd5 17 lWb3!±

With this simple move White wins a pawn. Despite the ensuing simplification this advantage should be decisive as he will be able to combine play on both flanks.

17...lZe4?!

17...lZc4! was the right way to give up the pawn as, in comparison to the game, the White rook does not land on the fine square e4: 18
\textit{Beating the Petroff} 53

\textit{\&xc4 dxc4 19 wxc4 \textit{\&}c8 20 wa4 \textit{\&}xe5 21 \textit{\&}xe5 wb6 and Black has, at least, fully mobilised his pieces.}

18 \textit{\&}xe4 dxe4 19 \textit{\&}xe4 \textit{\&}xe5 20 dxe5 we7 21 \textit{\&}ae1 mac8

22 h4!

A good way to increase the pressure. Once the pawn reaches h5 Black, besides being a pawn down, will have fresh headaches because of the weakness of g7. Also, it will be easier now for White to play the thematic e5-e6 as he no longer has to worry about the first rank.

22...\textit{\&}fd8?!

22...\textit{\&}c6 23 e6! fxe6 24 \textit{\&}xe6 \textit{\&}f7 25 f3+

23 \textit{\&}g4?

23 e6! fxe6 24 \textit{\&}xe6 \textit{\&}f7 25 \textit{\&}e3+ was a clear-cut way of exploiting White’s pluses as White threatens \textit{\&}e6-e7.

23...\textit{\&}c6

Now Black can breath again.

24 \textit{\&}g3 \textit{\&}f8 25 \textit{\&}f4 \textit{\&}e7

25...\textit{\&}e6?!

26 h5 \textit{\&}d5?

Disorganising his defence while threatening nothing in return; counterattacking by 26...\textit{\&}d2! would have confirmed the motto: "Attack is the best defence". After 27 \textit{\&}g4 \textit{\&}f8 White seems to have nothing concrete.

27 \textit{\&}g4 \textit{\&}f8 28 \textit{\&}b3 \textit{\&}d7 29 \textit{\&}g6! \textit{\&}c5 30 e6!

Finally reverting to the right idea after a lot of hesitation.

30...fxe6 31 \textit{\&}gxe6 \textit{\&}xe6 32 \textit{\&}xe6+ \textit{\&}f7 33 \textit{\&}e3

White has opened the position to his benefit and Black has to transpose to a lost rook ending.

33...\textit{\&}f5 34 \textit{\&}xf5 \textit{\&}xf5 35 g4 \textit{\&}a5 36 \textit{\&}a3! \textit{\&}b5 37 \textit{\&}b3! \textit{\&}a5 38 a3 b6 39 \textit{\&}g2

39 \textit{\&}f3 \textit{\&}a4!

39...\textit{\&}f7 40 \textit{\&}c3 \textit{\&}b5 41 b3 a5 42 f4 \textit{\&}d5 43 \textit{\&}f3 \textit{\&}d1

44 \textit{\&}e4!

The game has been decided; king activity is of utmost importance in this type of ending.

44...b5 45 \textit{\&}c5 \textit{\&}a1 46 \textit{\&}xb5 \textit{\&}xa3 47 \textit{\&}f5 a4 48 \textit{\&}b7+ \textit{\&}f8 49 b4! ++ \textit{\&}f3 50 \textit{\&}a7 a3 51 b5 \textit{\&}b3 52 \textit{\&}g6 \textit{\&}xb5 53 \textit{\&}a8+! \textit{\&}e7 54 \textit{\&}xa3 \textit{\&}b4 55 \textit{\&}xg7 \textit{\&}xf4 56 \textit{\&}e3+ \textit{\&}d8 57 \textit{\&}g3! 1-0
Good technique by White, which makes up for the inaccuracies in the first part of the game.

4
Timman – Van der Wiel
Tilburg 1984

1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆f6 3 ∆xe5 d6 4 ∆f3 ∆xe4 5 d4

Here and in subsequent Illustrative Games we will examine systems of development where Black delays or completely omits the move ...d6-d5. In these systems Black’s winning chances are almost nil due to the lack of space and the symmetric nature of the position, but, on the other hand, Black’s defensive fortress is very hard to crack.

5...∆g4

This move, in conjunction with the next one, is a risky attempt to play for an attack that cannot be justified at such an early stage.

6 ∆d3

transpose to, more or less, normal play featured under subsequent games. The text is weakening (6...∆f6; 6...d5).

7 c3!

An important move, allowing the White queen access to b3, with a view to exploiting the weakening of e6 and b7.

7...∆d7 8 wB3 wE7 9 0–0 0–0–0

9...∆xf3 10 gxf3 ∆g5 11 wxb7 ∆b8 12 wD5 leaves Black without compensation for the pawn loss.

10 ∆e1!

Exposing the awkward placement of the ∆g4 and the hanging nature of the pawn on f5 gives Black enormous headaches.

10...∆h5 11 f3

Thus White wins a pawn, without making any positional or other type of concession.

11...∆g5 12 ∆xf5 ∆g6

13 ∆xg6

13 wD5!± would have deprived Black of counterplay down the h-file.

13...hxg6 14 ∆d3 wF6 15 ∆a3 wH4 16 ∆e3 wF5 17 wC2?!
This move is a step backwards in the winning process; the attacking 17 \(\textbf{b}5!\) was preferable by far as there is simply no reason to lose time: 17...\(\textbf{b}8\) 18 \(\textbf{d}5!\) \(\textbf{c}5\) (18...\(\textbf{h}3+\) 19 \textbf{gxh3} \textbf{xd3} 20 \textbf{xa7+} \textbf{c}8 21 \textbf{f}2 \textbf{c}5 22 \textbf{a}7+ \textbf{d}7 23 \textbf{xc}5 \textbf{xc}5 24 \textbf{xb}7+) 19 \textbf{xc}5 \textbf{xc}5 20 \textbf{f}2! (The bishop has done its job on the g1-a7 diagonal and now switches to a better one!) 20...\(\textbf{h}6\) (20...\(\textbf{h}3\) 21 \textbf{g}3 \textbf{xe}3 22 \textbf{hxg3} \textbf{we}5 23 \textbf{wa}4 \textbf{a}6 24 \textbf{wf}4!) 21 \textbf{g}3 \textbf{d}6 22 \textbf{xd}6 cxd6 23 \textbf{ae}1+- and Black’s position is about to collapse.

17...\(\textbf{e}7\)

Now Black suddenly obtains some practical chances by generating play on the h-file.

18 \(\textbf{b}4?\)

It is easy to criticise this move on the basis of what happens later on, yet even Fritz considers it good! The ‘human’ way proves to be better in this case: 18 \(\textbf{f}2!\) \textbf{h}6 19 \textbf{ae}1 \textbf{dh}8 20 \textbf{g}3++ leaves Black without a trace of counterplay as the White kingside is unassailable.

18...\(\textbf{d}8\)

21 \(\textbf{h}3?!\)

And ... White wins as most people would think, but in fact this move essentially throws the win away! The simple 21 \textbf{xe}5\! 21 \textbf{xe}5 22 \textbf{f}4 \textbf{d}8 23 \textbf{h}3 \textbf{c}6 24 \textbf{b}4! \textbf{f}6 25 \textbf{d}3 \textbf{e}4 26 \textbf{ae}1 would have maintained some advantage for White. Now the game starts again.

21...\(\textbf{xe}3+!!\)

A bolt from the blue! It is astounding that Black obtains an attack despite the absence of queens, all the more so as White’s kingside is not completely bare of defenders.

22 \textbf{gxh3} \textbf{xe}3 23 \textbf{f}2

23 \textbf{d}2! was surely the best move for White as it removes the bishop from the e-line, vacating the e3 square for the knight; in the variation 23...\textbf{h}1+ 24 \textbf{f}2 \textbf{h}1+ 25 \textbf{e}1! (But not 25 \textbf{e}3? \textbf{c}6! 26 \textbf{b}4 \textbf{g}5+ 27 \textbf{f}4 \textbf{h}3+ 28 \textbf{f}3 \textbf{xf}4+ 29 \textbf{xf}4 \textbf{g}5+ 30 \textbf{xe}5 (30 \textbf{e}3 \textbf{f}4+ 31 \textbf{e}4 \textbf{d}5+) 30...\textbf{xf}3+) 25...\textbf{e}8+ 26 \textbf{d}1 \textbf{e}e2 27 \textbf{b}1 \textbf{g}5 28 \textbf{e}3!± this is apparent, but of course the line is not forced.

23...\textbf{c}6 24 \textbf{f}4 \textbf{h}2+ 25 \textbf{e}1 \textbf{e}8!

All of a sudden a nasty pin has arisen on the e-file, yielding Black strong counterplay.

26 \textbf{c}4 \textbf{c}7 27 \textbf{d}1 \textbf{d}5 28 \textbf{g}1 \textbf{xf}4 29 \textbf{xe}2 \textbf{xe}2 30 \textbf{d}2

By returning part of the material White has kept some plus but comparing it to the position he had a few moves ago it looks infinitesimal. From now on Timman
makes the most out of the position and slowly outplays his opponent.

30...\texttt{f4} 31 \texttt{f2} \texttt{h8} 32 \texttt{c2} g5 33 \texttt{e2} \texttt{c7} 34 \texttt{ae1}

34...\texttt{h3}?

Probably the decisive mistake. 34...g4! is best, trying to tie down White's forces by pushing the pawn to g3. When Black decides on the pawn push later on, without rooks, it is much less effective. The point is that with rooks on the board the g-pawn is much more dangerous.

35 \texttt{e7}!\pm

A good move; White is not afraid to lose his f-pawn as then his rooks penetrate with decisive effect.

35...\texttt{h2}

35...\texttt{xd2} 36 \texttt{xd2} \texttt{xf3} 37 \texttt{g7}+-

36 \texttt{e1e2} \texttt{xe2} 37 \texttt{xe2} \texttt{d6} 38 \texttt{f1} g4?

Now this simply loses the pawn and the game.

38...\texttt{f6} 39 \texttt{e3}!\pm, 38...\texttt{b6} 39 \texttt{e3} \texttt{xe3} 40 \texttt{xe3} and 38...\texttt{f8} 39 \texttt{e3} \texttt{xe3} 40 \texttt{xe3}, were all better than the game continuation.

39 \texttt{fxg4 fxg4} 40 \texttt{f2}! \texttt{h6} 41 \texttt{g2} \texttt{f6} 42 \texttt{h2}+-

The g-pawn, Black's only asset, disappears and with it his last hope. The rest is child's play for Timman.

42...b5 43 \texttt{g4} \texttt{g4} 44 \texttt{g4} \texttt{c7} 45 \texttt{g6} \texttt{f8} 46 \texttt{f6} \texttt{d6} 47 \texttt{b3} a5 48 a4! \texttt{e7} 49 \texttt{h6} \texttt{f8} 50 \texttt{h7}+ \texttt{b6} 51 \texttt{b5} \texttt{a4} 52 \texttt{a4} \texttt{d6} 53 \texttt{f5} \texttt{e7} 54 b3 \texttt{h4} 55 c4 \texttt{dx4} 56 \texttt{bx4} \texttt{xe1} 57 \texttt{f7} \texttt{c3} 58 \texttt{d6} \texttt{a6} 59 c5 \texttt{a1} 60 \texttt{b3} \texttt{b5} 61 \texttt{b7}+ \texttt{a6} 62 \texttt{b6}+ \texttt{a7} 63 \texttt{c4} 1-0

5

Velimirovic – Murey
Moscow (izt) 1982

1 e4 e5 2 \texttt{f3} \texttt{f6} 3 \texttt{xe5} d6 4 \texttt{f3} \texttt{xe4} 5 d4 \texttt{e7}

This move will probably transpose to the variation 5...\texttt{f6} 6 \texttt{d3} \texttt{e7} (Smyslov System) or to 5...d5 6 \texttt{d3} \texttt{e7}; in any case, it is not one of the most ambitious continuations available to Black.

6 \texttt{d3} \texttt{g5}?!
Interesting is 7 0-0!? 0-0 8 ∆xg5 ∆xg5 9 ∆h5! h6 10 ∆xg5 ∆xg5 11
∆xg5 hxg5 12 ∆c3 with an initiative in the ending in view of
White’s lead in development and weakness of the g5 pawn; a recent
example follows: 12...∆e6 13 ∆fe1 a5 14 ∆e4 ∆f5 15 ∆f6+ gxh6 16
∆xf5 ∆c6 17 c3 ∆f8 18 g3 ∆f8 19
∆f1 ∆xe1+ 20 ∆xe1 ∆e7 21 ∆d3
d5 22 ∆g2 ∆d8 23 ∆f3 ∆d6 24
∆g4! ∆e6 25 ∆e2 ∆g7 26 h4!
(Another activating his king to the
utmost White resorts to the
logical follow-up, the creation of an outside
passed pawn) 26...gxh4?! (26...
∆xe2 27 ∆xe2 ∆g6 is a better
attempt to hold the position.) 27
gxh4 f5+ 28 ∆f4 ∆f6 29 h5 ∆b6 30
f3 a4 31 a3 c5 32 dxc5 ∆c6 33 ∆h2
∆xc5 34 h6 ∆c8 35 ∆e3 ∆h8 36
∆c2 ∆g5 37 f4+ ∆g4 38 ∆g2+ ∆h3 39 ∆g7 ∆xh6 40 ∆xf7 ∆e6+ 41
∆f3 ∆h2 42 ∆f2 ∆h3 43 ∆f3
∆h2 44 ∆xf5 ∆xf5 45 ∆xf5 ∆b6
46 ∆h5+ ∆g1 47 ∆g5+ ∆f1 48 f5
d4 49 cxd4 ∆b3+ 50 ∆e4 ∆xb2 51
f6 ∆e2+ 52 ∆d5 1-0 Fressinet-
7...∆xg5 8 ∆e2+!

8...∆f8

The move employed by the
champion of the variation Yaakov
Murey. It seems, however, that
forfeiting the right to castle cannot
offer Black any relief in his
constricted position.
8...∆e6?! is dubious on account
of 9 f4! ∆h4+ 10 g3 ∆e7 11 f5
∆d5 12 0-0 0-0 13 ∆c3± and in
Koc-Zamikhovsky, USSR 1962,
White’s space advantage gave him a
strong initiative;
8...∆e7 is the conservative
course: 9 0-0 0-0 10 ∆e4! [A strong
move, exploiting the absence of
defenders on Black’s kingside to
force a weakness; 10 ∆e1!? is
another interesting variation, e.g.
10...∆e8 (10...∆h4 11 g3; 10...∆f6
11 ∆e4 g6 12 ∆h6±) 11 ∆c3! c6
(11...∆c6 12 ∆d5±) 12 d5±] 10...f5
(Black wishes to avoid a weakening
on the dark squares, but in doing so
weakens e6; if 10...g6 however,
there comes 11 ∆c3! and the threat
of a knight invasion on d5 gives
Black a lot of problems. Relatively
best is then 11...c6 (11...∆f6?! 12
∆d5 ∆g7 13 ∆e7! ∆h8 14 ∆g5!
gives White a strong attack;
11...∆c6?! 12 ∆h6! is also very
threatening, e.g. 12...∆e8 13 ∆d5!
∆f5 14 ∆f4! ∆xd3 15 cxd3 and
White’s structural weaknesses are
unimportant as Black is paralysed)
12 ∆e1 ∆f6 13 ∆h6 d5!
(13...∆g7?! 14 ∆xg7 ∆xg7 15 d5!
∆f6 16 ∆ad1 is highly advantage-
ous for White) 14 ∆f4 ∆g7 15
∆e2! ∆d7 16 c3 and White’s
pressure persists despite the
symmetry) 11 ∆f3 ∆c6 12 c3 ∆g5

By interpolating this check White
attempts to prevent his opponent
from achieving further exchanges.
(12...\textit{h}8!? is worth examining) 13 \textit{d}5+! \textit{h}8 14 \textit{x}g5 \textit{x}g5 15 \textit{f}4 \textit{e}7 16 \textit{f}3 \textit{d}7 17 d5!± and White had a solid space advantage in Makarichev-Bronstein, USSR 1978.

9 \textit{e}3! \textit{c}6 10 \textit{d}2

Here 10 0-0!? looks like a good improvement.

A) On 10...\textit{e}6, 11 \textit{d}2! gives White a clear edge. For example:

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

A1) 11...\textit{b}4 12 \textit{c}4!, when both...

A1a) 12...\textit{x}c2? 13 \textit{x}e6 \textit{f}xe6 (13...\textit{x}a1 14 \textit{f}5+!) 14 \textit{e}4! \textit{x}e3 15 \textit{f}xe3+ \textit{f}6 (15...\textit{g}8? 16 \textit{g}4 \textit{x}e3+ 17 \textit{h}1+) 16 \textit{h}5!+- and...

A1b) 12...\textit{d}5 13 \textit{x}d5! \textit{x}d5 14 \textit{h}5! h6 [14...\textit{x}e3?! 15 \textit{f}xe3 c6 16 c4 \textit{e}6 17 \textit{f}4→ (17 d5!? \textit{x}d5 18 \textit{x}d5 \textit{a}5 19 e4 \textit{f}6?) 15 f4!? (15 c4?) 15...\textit{g}6 16 \textit{e}2! \textit{f}6 17 \textit{f}5 g5 18 c4 \textit{c}6 19 d5 \textit{d}7 20 \textit{e}4± lead to bad positions for Black, or...

A2) 11...d5 12 \textit{f}4 \textit{f}6 13 c3±.

B) 10...\textit{b}4!? 11 \textit{c}4! d5 12 \textit{b}3 leads to a position where

White's development advantage is the important factor: 12...c6 (12...\textit{f}5? 13 a3+-) 13 a3 \textit{a}6 14 c4 \textit{c}7 15 \textit{x}d5! \textit{xd}5 16 \textit{x}d5 \textit{xd}5 17 \textit{c}3 \textit{d}8 18 \textit{ad}1 \textit{e}6 19 d5! \textit{x}d5 20 \textit{xd}5 \textit{xd}5 21 \textit{x}g5 \textit{xd}5 22 \textit{f}5± and it looks impossible for Black to survive.

10...\textit{b}4

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

11 \textit{e}4! \textit{xe}3 12 \textit{xe}3

12 \textit{xe}3!?

12...d5 13 a3 \textit{c}6 14 \textit{d}3 \textit{h}4! 15 \textit{f}2! \textit{xf}2+ 16 \textit{xf}2 White has an endgame initiative in view of his central pawn mass.

16...\textit{e}7 17 e4!

17 c4? is also possible but more risky since after 17...\textit{xc}4 18 \textit{xc}4 White gets three pawn islands.

17...\textit{xe}4 18 \textit{xe}4!

18 \textit{xc}4 \textit{f}5 19 \textit{hel}±

18...\textit{f}5 19 \textit{he}1 g6?

19...c6 was the natural way of defending a slightly worse position; Black is in a hurry to escape with the king to g7 but this should have rebounded on him.

20 \textit{b}3 \textit{e}8
White has even managed to lose a pawn but fortunately for him the position is a trivial draw.

43...\texttt{Kf5} 44 \texttt{Ka6} \texttt{f8} 45 \texttt{Kxh6} \texttt{g7} 46 \texttt{Kb4} \texttt{f6} 47 \texttt{Kb7} \texttt{g5} 48 \texttt{Kb4} \texttt{h5} 49 \texttt{Kb5}+ \texttt{f5} 50 \texttt{Kxh6} \texttt{h5} 51 \texttt{Kb6} \texttt{Bf2} 52 \texttt{Ke5} \texttt{e3} 53 \texttt{a5} \texttt{g5} 54 \texttt{Kf6} \texttt{Ke4}+ 55 \texttt{Bf2} \texttt{Ke5} 56 \texttt{h3} \texttt{Ka5} 57 \texttt{Bf3}+ 58 \texttt{Bf2} \texttt{Ba2}+ 1/2-1/2

21 \texttt{Bxb7}!

A correct decision, taking the bull by the horns.

21...\texttt{Bxc2} 22 \texttt{Bb5} \texttt{f5}
22...\texttt{Bxd4} 23 \texttt{Bxe7} + or
22...\texttt{Bd5} 23 \texttt{Bac1}±, both fail to help Black.

23 \texttt{Bac1}?

But this amounts to a blunder, throwing away the fruits of his labour; White becomes over-enthusiastic in thinking that "everything wins".

23 \texttt{d5}± is the clear-cut way to a huge advantage as Black seems to have no defence against the coming 24 \texttt{Bac1}.

23...\texttt{Bxd4} 24 \texttt{Bc6} \texttt{Bxc6} 25 \texttt{Bxe2} \texttt{Bd4} 26 \texttt{Bxc7} \texttt{Bxe6} 27 \texttt{Bc3} \texttt{Be7}

Black has avoided the worst and the game should be drawn; 27...\texttt{Bb8} 28 \texttt{Bc8}+ \texttt{Bxc8} 29 \texttt{Bxc8} \texttt{Be7} was another way.

28 \texttt{b4} \texttt{Bd7} 29 \texttt{Bc6} \texttt{Bc7} 30 \texttt{Be4} \texttt{Bd8} 31 \texttt{b5} \texttt{Bd2}+ 32 \texttt{Be2} \texttt{Bd6} 33 \texttt{Bec2} \texttt{Bd4} 34 \texttt{Bc3} \texttt{Bf8} 35 \texttt{Bd5} \texttt{Bxb5} 36 \texttt{Bxc7} \texttt{Bxc3} 37 \texttt{Bc4} \texttt{Bf6}+ 38 \texttt{Be3} \texttt{a6} 39 \texttt{Bb7} \texttt{Bb5} 40 \texttt{Bc8}+ \texttt{Be7} 41 \texttt{Bxb5} \texttt{axb5} 42 \texttt{a4} \texttt{Bxa4} 43 \texttt{Bxa4}

6

Mestel - Lev
Beersheba 1988

1 e4 e5 2 \texttt{Bf3} \texttt{Bf6} 3 \texttt{Bxe5} d6 4 \texttt{Bf3} \texttt{Bxe4} 5 d4 \texttt{Bf6}

This retreat characterises the Smyslov System of the Petroff; Black is willing to accept a space disadvantage, trusting that his position is solid enough to repel White’s attacking efforts.

6 \texttt{Bd3} \texttt{Be7}+?!

A deviation from the Smyslov proper that does not have a sufficiently logical background; the light-squared bishop is forced to retreat to the less appealing square e2, but at the same time the Black queen is exposed on e7 and
interferes with the development of her kingside.

7 \( \text{\underline{\text{e}}2 \text{ g6}} \)

Black tries to justify his previous move by fianchettoing his king’s bishop, but it may not be too late to retreat the queen on d8, followed by \( \ldots \text{\underline{\text{f8}}-\text{e7}} \).

8 \( \text{\underline{\text{c3}}} \)

Possibly better is 8 0-0 \( \text{\underline{\text{g7}}} \) 9 \( \text{\underline{\text{b5}}}+! \); with this cunning check White ensures that the \( \text{\underline{\text{c8}}} \) will be lured to e6, providing his pieces with an object of attack: 9\ldots c6 10 \( \text{\underline{\text{e1}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{e6}}} \) 11 \( \text{\underline{\text{f1}}} \) and Black seems to have a rather unattractive choice:

A) 11\ldots h6 12 c4 d5 13 b3!\( \pm \) (13 \( \text{\underline{\text{c3}}} \) 0-0 14 \( \text{\underline{\text{f4}}} \)\( \pm \))

B) 11\ldots 0-0 12 \( \text{\underline{\text{g5}}} \)\( \pm \) and White obtains the advantage of the two bishops and with it a comfortable plus.

8\ldots \( \text{\underline{\text{g7}}} \) 9 \( \text{\underline{\text{g5}}} \) c6 10 \( \text{\underline{\text{d2}}} \)

Maintaining for the moment the option of castling long.

10\ldots h6 11 \( \text{\underline{\text{h4}}} \) b5

Black wishes to scare his opponent and force him to renounce his queenside castling idea, but in doing so he weakens his own queenside.

12 0-0 g5 13 \( \text{\underline{\text{g3}}} \) 0-0 14 \( \text{\underline{\text{f1}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{d8}}} \) 15 \( \text{\underline{\text{d3}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{h5}}} \)

16 \( \text{\underline{\text{d5}}}! \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xg3}}} \) 17 hxg3 b4 18 \( \text{\underline{\text{d1}}} \) c5 19 a3! a5 20 axb4 cxb4 21 c3!\( \pm \) \( \text{\underline{\text{a6}}} \) 22 \( \text{\underline{\text{c2}}} \) bxc3 23 bxc3 f5

To shield the hole on f5, but a new weakness arises on e6.

24 \( \text{\underline{\text{d4}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xd4}}} \) 25 \( \text{\underline{\text{wd4}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{c5}}} \) 26 \( \text{\underline{\text{b2}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{d7}}} \) 27 \( \text{\underline{\text{d3}}}! \)

Exchanging Black’s best piece will highlight all the weaknesses.

27\ldots \( \text{\underline{\text{xd3}}} \)

27\ldots \( \text{\underline{\text{e4}}} \) deserved attention, trying to keep the knights on. Still, after 28 c4 (intending c4-c5 at some point) 28\ldots \( \text{\underline{\text{f6}}} \) (28\ldots \( \text{\underline{\text{c8}}}!? \) 29 \( \text{\underline{\text{a4}}}! \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xa4}}} \) 30 \( \text{\underline{\text{xa4}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{f6}}} \) 31 \( \text{\underline{\text{xf6}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xf6}}} \) 32 \( \text{\underline{\text{c1}}}! \) \( \text{\underline{\text{c5}}} \) 33 \( \text{\underline{\text{xc5}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xc5}}} \) 34 \( \text{\underline{\text{b1}}}!\( \pm \) 29 \( \text{\underline{\text{xf6}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xf6}}} \) (29\ldots \( \text{\underline{\text{xf6}}} \) 30 c5\( \pm \)) White makes use of a key-idea (exchange of bishops) by 30 \( \text{\underline{\text{a4}}}!\( \pm \) to weaken the whole complex of light squares and gain access for his rook to the important a4 square. In this way he will succeed in piling up with his major pieces on the weak a-pawn.

28 \( \text{\underline{\text{xd3}}} \)
28...\textit{e}e8?

The space-gaining 28...a4! averts the exchange of bishops and ties the White rooks to the a-file whilst freeing a5 for use by the Black pieces. Still, the presence of the g3-g4 break is sufficient for a small advantage after 29 \textit{a}a3 \textit{w}f6 (29...\textit{e}e8 30 \textit{b}e1 \textit{w}e4 31 \textit{w}f1±) 30 \textit{b}e1 \textit{a}a5 31 c4 g4! (31...\textit{f}a8 32 g4±) 32 \textit{x}xa4 (or 32 \textit{b}b1±) 32...\textit{x}xa4 33 \textit{b}xa4 \textit{w}xa1+ 34 \textit{b}xa1 \textit{h}x1 35 \textit{h}h2±

29 g4!±

Now White's advantage assumes great proportions as he wins a pawn without making any concessions.

29...\textit{w}f6 30 \textit{b}xe8+ \textit{x}xe8 31 gxf5 \textit{d}d7 32 \textit{a}a3 \textit{f}f8 33 c4 a4 34 g3 \textit{g}g7 35 \textit{g}g2 \textit{f}f8 36 \textit{w}d1!

36...\textit{g}g7?

The last mistake; Forced was 36...\textit{w}b2! after which White would have had to find an amazing queen triangulation starting with 37 \textit{w}h5!! in order to win (37 f6 instead is not clear due to 37...g4!). After 37 \textit{w}h5!! the following entertaining variations are possible:

A) 37...\textit{w}xa3 38 f6!! \textit{g}g4 39 \textit{w}xh6+ \textit{e}e8 40 \textit{w}h8+ \textit{d}d7 41 \textit{g}g7+ \textit{c}e8 42 f7 \textit{f}f3+ 43 \textit{g}g1+-

B) 37...\textit{w}xc2 38 \textit{w}xh6+ \textit{g}g8 39 \textit{w}xg5+ leads to a lost position for Black after either...

B1) 39...\textit{f}f8 40 \textit{e}e3 \textit{w}xf5 (40...\textit{x}xf5 41 \textit{w}f6+ \textit{g}g8 42 \textit{e}e7) 41 \textit{f}f3 \textit{w}xf3+ 42 \textit{x}xf3 a3 43 \textit{w}f6+ \textit{g}g8 44 \textit{w}g6+ \textit{h}h8 45 \textit{w}xd6 a2 46 \textit{w}f6+ \textit{g}g8 47 \textit{w}a1+-

or...

B2) 39...\textit{h}h8 40 \textit{f}f3! \textit{w}e4 41 \textit{w}h6+ \textit{g}g8 42 f6+--;

C) 37...\textit{w}f6! (the toughest) 38 \textit{w}h1!! (threatening to catch the b-file) 38...\textit{b}b8 (what else?) 39 \textit{w}d1! and it suddenly transpires that the threat to the a-pawn cannot be met without consequences: 39...\textit{w}b2 (39...\textit{a}a8 40 \textit{w}b1!; 39...\textit{b}b4 40 \textit{a}xa4 \textit{x}xf5 41 \textit{w}e2\texttt{q+q}+) 40 f6!! g4 (The only defence, but now that the rook is not on a8 there is a big difference!; 40...\textit{w}xa3 41 \textit{w}h5+- loses, as usual) 41 \textit{e}e3 \textit{w}xf6 42 \textit{a}xa4 (the point becomes now clear, the dangerous pawn falls, but most importantly more avenues towards the Black king are opened) 42...\textit{b}b2 43 \textit{c}c2

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}
Beating the Petroff

\( \text{\textL} f5 44 \text{\textB} xf5 \text{\textW} x f5 45 \text{\textW} e1 \text{\textW} d8 \text{\textf}5 \text{\textL} \text{\textW} x f5 45 \text{\textW} e1 \) and White finally wins!

37 \text{\textB} b1 + \text{\textW} d8

38 \text{\textW} b4!

The culminating point of White’s strategy; now Black’s position crumbles as he cannot defend all his weaknesses.

38...\text{\textW} c7 39 f6+ \text{\textL} f7 40 \text{\textW} b1 \text{\textW} g8

White wants to cut off the retreat of the bishop by \text{\textL} f1-g3 before resorting to h2-h3.

10...\text{\textW} e8

This should have probably been prefaced with the manoeuvre \text{\textW} g4-h5-g6.

10...\text{\textL} h5!? initiates the manoeuvre in question, which is typical for so many openings; Black plans to exchange White’s good bishop by \text{\textL} h5-g6. After 11 \text{\textK} g3 \text{\textL} g6 Black achieves his aim of opposing bishops, but at a considerable amount of time.

A possible line of play is 12 \text{\textL} xg6!? [It seems that White can afford to fortify Black’s kingside because of his preponderance in space; However 12 \text{\textK} f5 is probably also good enough for a slight edge: 12...\text{\textL} xf5?! (12...\text{\textW} e8! 13 \text{\textL} g5±. \text{\textK} f3-h4, is obviously the critical test) 13 \text{\textL} xf5 \text{\textW} e8 14 c3 h6 15 \text{\textB} b3 \text{\textK} b6 16 c4 \text{\textL} f8 17 \text{\textL} d2 \text{\textL} x e1+ 18 \text{\textL} x e1 g6 19 \text{\textL} d3 \text{\textW} d7 (Rovid-Koszorus, Hungary 1993) and now

\begin{center}

diagram
\end{center}

7

Schlechter – Mason
London 1899

1 e4 e5 2 \text{\textL} f3 \text{\textL} f6 3 \text{\textL} x e5 d6 4 \text{\textK} f3 \text{\textL} x e4 5 d4 \text{\textL} f6 6 \text{\textK} d3 \text{\textK} g4

Besides 6...\text{\textL} e7, this is the only continuation with a concrete logical background: Black wishes to deploy his bishop to an active position before White denies him the chance to do so by simply playing h2-h3.

7 0-0 \text{\textL} e7 8 \text{\textK} e1 0-0 9 \text{\textL} bd2

The knight eyes f5.

9...\text{\textL} bd7?!?

By developing his knight to d7 Black thinks in terms of supporting his kingside; this can be accomplished after the further moves ...\text{\textL} f8-e8, ...\text{\textB} d7-f8.
White could have gained a considerable advantage with the energetic 20 c5! dxc5 21 dxc5 22 23xg6±] 12...hxg6 13 c4, reaching a characteristic position for the typically unambitious system chosen by Black; White’s last declares his intention of building a space advantage by d4-d5 and is only a first step in the space-gaining strategy that should dictate his efforts: 13...d5 (After 13...c6 14 2b3↑ White obtains some initiative thanks to the pressure on b7) 14 c5!? (Putting his pawns on dark squares is committal, but at the same time consistent with White’s space-gaining policy; the alternative 14 b3 dxc4!? 15 b7! leads to a position deserving analysis) 14...c6 15 b4 (The strategy for both sides is clearly outlined: White will attack on the queenside by means of b2-b4-b5, while Black will pursue the plan of simplification with the aim of reaching a better endgame; for the time being he prepares to improve the position of his knight by ...2d7-f8-e6) 16 b4 (16 c2! is a worthwhile alternative, the point being to keep an eye on c6 so that Black cannot play ...b7-b6 easily and wait for the 2 to go to f8, thus losing control of b6, before White gets in b2-b4. A possible line runs 16...f8 17 b4± 2e6? 18 2xe6! fxe6 19 2xg6→ with a powerful attack) 16...a5 (On 16...f8 17 2d3! 2e6, there follows 18 2xe6!? fxe6 19 2xg6→ with a strong attacking position for White; 16...2f8 is met by 17 2d3± preserving annoying pressure on Black’s position; On 16...a6, the reply 17 a4±, intending b4-b5, promises White a powerful initiative; 16...b5 should probably be met by 17 a4 a6 18 2e3! intending e3-a3, with dangerous queenside pressure) and here the path splits:

A) The tempting 17 b5?! cxb5! is not so promising as the following lines prove.

A1) 18 2b1!? b4 19 a3 b6 20 axb4 (20 c6 f8 21 axb4 2xb4) 20...axb4 21 c6 a1 22 2a1 f8 23 c7 (23 c1 2e6) 23...d7 24 c1 2e6 25 2e5 2c8= is a line showing that White can easily become worse;

A2) 18 2b1 b4 19 a3 b6 20 axb4 21 c6 f8 22 d2 b5 23 2xb4 (23 c2 a4 24 c7 2c8) 23...xh4 24 2b4 2d6 25 2b5 2xe1+ 26 2xe1 2xc6= is dead equal;

A3) 18 2d3 b4 19 2b5 is more testing, but Black can hold his own with accurate play:

A3a) 19...2c8?! is not so good because after 20 a3 2c6 (20...xa3 21 a3 b6 22 2e3±) 21 2xc6
bxc6 22 axb4 White can secure a slight plus no matter how Black plays, e.g.

**A3a1** 22...a4 23 b5 (23 \(\text{\texttt{\textsf{\textregistered}}}\) c7 \(\text{\texttt{\textregistered}}\) h5 24 \(\text{\texttt{xh5}}\) gxh5 25 \(\text{\texttt{\textregistered}}\) a5 \(\text{\texttt{\textregistered}}\) f6 26 \(\text{\texttt{xe8+ \texttt{xe8}}}\) 27 \(\text{\texttt{f1 g5}}\) 23...cxb5 24 \(\text{\texttt{xe8+}}\) a3 25 \(\text{\texttt{xb5 \texttt{a6}}}\) 26 \(\text{\texttt{a2+}}\), or...

**A3a2** 22...d8 23 \(\text{\texttt{eb1}}\); However,

**A3b** 19...\(\text{\texttt{a7!}}\) 20 \(\text{\texttt{e2!?}}\) (20 a3 bxa3 21 \(\text{\texttt{xa3 b6+}}\) 20...\(\text{\texttt{f8}}\) 21 a3 (21 \(\text{\texttt{g5 \texttt{d7}}}\) 22 \(\text{\texttt{xd7 \texttt{xd7}}}\) 23 \(\text{\texttt{ae1 \texttt{f8}}}\) 24 \(\text{\texttt{d6 \texttt{xd6}}}\) 25 \(\text{\texttt{h7+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{g8}}\) 26 \(\text{\texttt{xf6+ \texttt{xf6}}}\) 27 \(\text{\texttt{xe8+ \texttt{xe8}}}\) 28 \(\text{\texttt{xe8+ \texttt{f8}}}\)) 21...bxa3 22 \(\text{\texttt{xa3}}\) only allows White enough compensation to draw.

**B** 17 bxa5! is the right move; After 17...\(\text{\texttt{xa5}}\) (17...\(\text{\texttt{xa5}}\) 18 \(\text{\texttt{b1+}}\)) 18 \(\text{\texttt{b1!}}\) White has strong queenside pressure that may combine beautifully with alternating threats all over the board:

![Diagram](image) **B2a** 21...b5 22 cxb6 \(\text{\texttt{b7}}\) 23 \(\text{\texttt{de5! \texttt{xe5}}}\) 24 dxe5! (24 \(\text{\texttt{xe5?!}}\) \(\text{\texttt{d6}}\) 25 \(\text{\texttt{xd6 \texttt{xd6}}}\) 26 \(\text{\texttt{f1 \texttt{e7}}}\) 27 \(\text{\texttt{d2 \texttt{a3+}}}\) 24...\(\text{\texttt{c5}}\) (24...\(\text{\texttt{c5}}\) 25 h4\+)

25 \(\text{\texttt{a2 \texttt{a6}}}\) (25...\(\text{\texttt{a4?!}}\) \(\text{\texttt{c6}}\) 26 \(\text{\texttt{d4 \texttt{e4}}}\) 27 \(\text{\texttt{e4! \texttt{a3}}}\) 28 \(\text{\texttt{xd4 \texttt{xb2}}}\) 29 \(\text{\texttt{xb2 \texttt{d3}}}\) 30 f3\+

or...

**B2b** 21...\(\text{\texttt{a6}}\) 22 h4! \(\text{\texttt{h6}}\) (22...\(\text{\texttt{g6}}\) 23 \(\text{\texttt{g5\+}}\) 23 \(\text{\texttt{g5! \texttt{xc6}}}\) 24 h5 when the centre of developments has suddenly been switched over to the kingside, presenting Black with highly unwelcome pressure. For example: 24...\(\text{\texttt{e7}}\) (24...\(\text{\texttt{cxd4}}\) 25 \(\text{\texttt{hgx6 \texttt{fxg6}}}\) 26 \(\text{\texttt{hxg6+}}\); 24...\(\text{\texttt{f6}}\) 25 \(\text{\texttt{e6! \texttt{g5}}}\) 26 \(\text{\texttt{g6! \texttt{xf4}}}\) 27 \(\text{\texttt{xf5+}}\) 25 \(\text{\texttt{hxg6}}\)
\( \text{xg5} \) 26 \( \text{xf5} \) 27 \( \text{we1}++ \)

27 \( \text{b8} \) 28 \( \text{gxf7+} \) 29 \( \text{f5+} \) 30 \( \text{xg8} \) 31 \( \text{ce7}++ \).

11 \( \text{g3} \)

Now the bishop's retreat to \( \text{h5} \) has been cut off, allowing White to obtain the two bishops smoothly and effortlessly.

11...\( \text{f8} \) 12 \( \text{h3} \) 13 \( \text{xf3} \) ±

This position, albeit symmetrical, can be evaluated as clearly better for White. Black is lacking counterplay and the \( \text{f5} \) square is vulnerable to invasion by the White knight.

13...\( \text{c6} \) 14 \( \text{f5} \)

More bishops! White must obviously have been overjoyed to win a second "minor exchange" as such a development of events reduces Black to complete passivity.

14...\( \text{g6} \) 15 \( \text{g5} \) 16 \( \text{xe7+} \) \( \text{dxe7} \) 17 \( \text{e2} \) 18 \( \text{d2} \) 19 \( \text{c4}++!? \)

An interesting moment; White deliberately provokes...d6-d5 so as to be able to open up the position for his bishops by a subsequent c2-c4. Although this never occurs in the game, the move is nevertheless commendable as it creates new possibilities for White that could have been helpful at some point.

19...\( \text{d5} \) 20 \( \text{d3} \) 21 \( \text{ae1} \) 22 \( \text{f5} \) 23 \( \text{xe2} \) 24 \( \text{wh2} \) 25 \( \text{a5} \)

25 h4!

A typical squeezing operation starts; the difference in strength between the bishops and the knights is more than apparent, and the advance of the \( \text{h} \)-pawn will help the bishops obtain objects of attack.

25...\( \text{b6} \) 26 \( \text{h5} \) 27 \( \text{h6} \) 28 \( \text{g6} \) 29 \( \text{we6} \) 30 \( \text{xe6} \) 31 \( \text{f7} \) 32 \( \text{xe6}++ \) Black not only loses a pawn but also ends up in complete paralysis.

28 hxg7 \( \text{xg7} \) 29 \( \text{xg2} \) 30 \( \text{we8}! \)

The exchange of queens does not relieve Black of his troubles since the White rook's penetration in the heart of the enemy camp ties him up completely. Strictly speaking, the position is won for White and his last move signifies the beginning of the technical phase.
30...\textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{\texttt{w}}}}}xe8 31 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}}xe8 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{f}}}}f7 32 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{h}}}}b8 b5 33 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{h}}}}h6 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{c}}}c7 34 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{a}}}a8 a4 35 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{g}}}}g4!

35 b3!? axb3 36 cxb3 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{e}}}}e7 37 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{c}}}}c3 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{e}}}}e7 38 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{d}}}}d3± intending to get an outside passed pawn with a2-a4 was also good, but the text is more direct.

35...\textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{d}}}}}e6 36 f4! \textit{\texttt{\textsf{g}}}}g7?

Black crumbles under the inexorable pressure. 36...\textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}}xd4?! 37 f5 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{e}}}}e5 38 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{h}}}}h5+ \textit{\texttt{\textsf{e}}}}e7?? 39 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{f}}}}f8+ \textit{\texttt{\textsf{d}}}}d7 40 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{e}}}}e8# would have led to a picturesque mate, but 36...f5! 37 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{x}}}}xf5 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{x}}}}}xd4 38 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{d}}}}d3± would have slowed down the winning process. Now it’s all over.

37 f5 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{e}}}}e7

38 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{h}}}}h5+!

Black resigns. After 38 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{h}}}}h5+ \textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{x}}}}}hx5 39 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{f}}}}f8# White has parted with one of his bishops for a noble cause, as the enemy monarch ends up trapped amidst his very own knights. 1-0

\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{A}}}}} \textbf{Stein - Nezhmetdinov}
Kislovodsk 1972

1 e4 e5 2 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{f}}}}}f3 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{f}}}}}f6 3 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{e}}}}}xe5 d6 4 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{f}}}}}f3 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{x}}}}}xe4 5 d4 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{f}}}}f6 6 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{d}}}}}d3 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{g}}}}g4 7 0-0 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{e}}}}e7 8 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{e}}}}e1 0-0 9 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{b}}}}bd2 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{d}}}}d7

A move that makes a strange impression at first sight, and indeed, it is too artificial to enjoy real chances of success. In reality, it is nothing more than a tricky move order to enter the 9...\textit{\texttt{\textsf{c}}}}c6 line, to which it is closely related; in the present game Black almost manages to achieve his aim and equalise, but if White reacts accurately it would seem that it has no independent significance.

9...\textit{\texttt{\textsf{c}}}}c6 is the usual introduction to the \textit{\texttt{\textsf{\texttt{c}}}}}c6, \textit{\texttt{\textsf{d}}}}d7 set-up and at first sight a natural developing move; the intention is obvious, to follow up with ...\textit{\texttt{\textsf{d}}}}d8-d7 and ...\textit{\texttt{\textsf{a}}}}a8-e8, hoping to offset White’s advantage with exchanges along the e-file. However, it seems to us that the knight is awkwardly placed on c6 because after the simple reply c2-c3 it has nowhere to go. After 10 c3 the difference in mobility and prospects is more than evident if we compare the placing of the queen’s knights and this affects the play in White’s favour.

A) 10...d5 11 \textit{\texttt{\textsf{f}}}}f1 is better for White as the following variations show:
A1) 11... Nh5 12 Qg3 Qg6 13 Qg5↑ yields a strong initiative for White.

A2) 11... Ne8 12 h3 Nh5 13 Qg3 Qg6 occurred in Powles-Del Pozo, email 1998. After 14 axg6!? (14 Qb5! Qd6 15 Qg5 Qxe1+ 16 Wxe1 h6 17 Qh4 Qh7 18 Qe3! Qe8 (18...Qe7 19 Wxe7 Qxe7 20 Qe1 Qf8 21 Qxc6 bxc6 22 Qh5±) 19 Qxf6 Wxe3 20 fxe3 Qxg3 21 Qxc6 bxc6 22 Qe5 Qxe5 23 Qxe5 c5 24 Qf2± looks like a good alternative) 14...hxg6 15 Qg5 Qd7?? (better was 15...Wd6 16 Wd2! (16 Wd3 Qd7=-) 16...Qf8 17 Qf4 Qd7 18 Qe5 Qxe5 19 Qxe5±) 16 Qe5± White obtained a strong kingside initiative as Black had to take on e5: 16...Qxe5 17 dxe5 Qh7 18 Qxe7 Qxe7 19 h4! (an important tool in White’s scheme as he should play h4-h5 in order to destroy Black’s compact kingside structure) 19...Qf8 20 f4 Qe6 21 Wf3 Qb5 22 h5! gxh5 23 Qxh5 (White has attained his objective and now the pawn mass looks threatening) 23...Qf8 24 b3 Qd8 25 Qad1 Qg6 26 Wd3 (Playing it safe when he could attack directly by Wf3-g4; However, even in the endgame Black will suffer) 26...Wxd3 27 Qxd3 c6 28 Qed1 Qed7 29 Qf2 Wf8 30 g4 b5 31 Qe3 a5 32 c4! bxc4 33 Qxc4 Qe7 34 Qg3 (34 f5!) 34...c5 35 Qe4?! d4+ 36 Qf3 Qc7 37 Qb3 a4 38 Qb5 Qdc8 39 Qa5 Qg6 40 Qxa4+ Qc7 41 Qa6 Qc6 42 Qxc6 Qxc6 43 a4 Qf8 44 Qb1 Qd7 45 Qb7 1-0.

An instructive game, showing that White can also transpose to the ending in analogous positions since such endings are not automatic draws as many people tend to believe;

A3) 11...Wd7 12 Qg3 Qd6 13 h3! Qxf3 14 Wxf3 Qxg3 15 fxg3± left White with an imposing bishop pair in Tarrasch-Marshall, Nuremberg (m) 1905

B) 10...Wd7 (Continuing with the plan) 11 Wb3! (Initiating a forced sequence that leads to a better endgame) 11...Qab8 12 d5! (Allowing the Qc6 to be exchanged for its counterpart on f3 does not look like the best idea but here there is a concrete point behind it) 12...Qe5 13 Qxe5 dxe5 14 Qc4! Wxd5 15 Qxe5 Wxb3 16 axb3 Qc5 17 b4! (It is important to get the bishop pair; after 17 Qc4?! (Kr.Georgiev-Popchev, Bulgaria 1987) 17...Qbe8! White has nothing) 17...Qb6 18 Qc4↑ and despite the simplification that has occurred White possesses at least a slight advantage because the bishop pair will be a valuable asset on an open board.

10 Qf1
A slightly inaccurate move order that almost allows Black to equalise; but only almost! 10 c3! will probably transpose to the line with 9...\( \text{c6} \) after 10...\( \text{c6} \) since an attempt to attack the centre by 10...c5?! is met by 11 dxc5 dxc5 12 \( \text{c4} \) with a clear advantage for White who threatens \( \text{c4-e5} \) followed by \( \text{d1-c2} \).

10...\( \text{c6} \) 11 c3 \( \text{f5} \)?

A logical follow up to 9...\( \text{d7} \); Black tries to profit from the queen’s placement on \( \text{d7} \) to exchange White’s dangerous king’s bishop. However, after the natural 11...\( \text{ae8} \)! 12 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{d8} \) the position is only slightly worse for Black according to Stein as he has managed to coordinate his pieces.

12 d5!

White now obtains an initiative, leading by force to a slightly better ending.

12...\( \text{e5} \)

12...\( \text{xd5} \)? 13 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 14 \( \text{g3} \)++

13 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf5} \)

14 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{d7} \) 15 \( \text{g3} \)? is worth looking at.

The pawn on \( \text{d5} \) is taboo: 15...\( \text{xd5} \)? (15...\( \text{ae8} \)! 16 \( \text{df5} \) \( \text{d8} \) 17 \( \text{g5} \)\( \pm \) 16 \( \text{df5} \) and White wins material.

14...\( \text{dxe5} \) 15 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{d7} \) 16 \( \text{xe5} \) \( \text{d6} \) 17 \( \text{xe2} \) \( \text{xe5} \) 18 h\( \text{xe5} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 19 \( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 20 c4

An important moment; during the last few moves White allowed simplification to take place in return for a bishop vs knight advantage and prospects of invading the 7th rank. His last move poses a critical question to the Black knight: Should it move forwards or choose a more restrained course?

20...\( \text{b4} \)??

As it so often happens, the player with the slightly inferior position chooses to play ‘actively’ when solid defence would have been successful.

20...\( \text{b6} \)?? looks clumsy but would have been only slightly better for White after either 21 b3\( \pm \) or 21 \( \text{f4} \)?? \( \text{xc4} \)! (21...\( \text{fe8} \)?? 22 \( \text{ae1} \) \( \text{f8} \) 23 \( \text{xc7} \) \( \text{xc4} \) 24 b3 \( \text{xe2} \) 25 \( \text{xe2} \) \( \text{c8} \) 26 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{a5} \) 27 \( \text{d6} \)++
\( \text{g8 28 e7\textpm} \) \( 22 c1 b5! 23 b3 \)
\( (23 \text{xc7 ac8 24 f4\textpm}) \) \( 23...\text{b6} \)
\( 24 \text{xc7 d5 25 b7 a6\textpm}; \)

20...\text{f6} is the best move available to Black as the knight is secure on f6. After 21 \text{f4 e8!} \)
\( (21...c6?! 22 e7\text{++}) \) \( 22 \text{xe8+ xe8} \)
\( (22...\text{xe8? 23 d1\textpm}) \) \( 23 \text{xc7 e2} (23...\text{c8? 24 d1\textpm}) \) \( 24 \text{b8!} \)
\( a6 25 b3 h5\textpm \) White would have had only a symbolic plus since the active Black rook makes it difficult for him to undertake anything concrete.

21 \text{f4}

Now White’s initiative increases at a dramatic pace.

21...\text{d3} 22 \text{xc7 ac8}

23 \text{e7!}

The kind of move one can easily overlook! White gives away the pawn on b2 in order to settle with his rooks on the 7th rank.

23...\text{xb2} 24 \text{b1 xc4} 25 \text{xb7 h5 26 e4\textpm}

Most people would have captured on a7, but Stein is not in a hurry; the pawn cannot escape in the long run, so he prefers instead to focus on restricting the poor knight’s movements; fine technique by a very fine player.

26...\text{b6} 27 \text{d4! a8 28 a4}

A beautiful picture of coordination; The White pieces have taken up the best positions, so it’s time for the pawn to come up and cause distress to Black.

28...\text{c8} 29 \text{f4!}

Keeping the knight hemmed in!

29...a5

A sign of desperation but there was really nothing Black could do to get himself out of the tangle. The text at least gives his a8 rook some breathing space.

30 \text{d5 a6 31 c7 e7 32 xh5 c8?}

32...\text{c6} was slightly more tenacious, yet after 33 \text{c5!?} \)
\( (...\text{b7-b6; 33 d5 e8\textpm is another possibility}) \) Black would not be able to escape:

A) 33...\text{d8} 34 \text{b6 a8 35 d6 e8 loses to 36 c4! +\Delta f2-f4, g3-g4} \) (Instead, 36 \text{bb5?! messes up a little as Black has 36...f6!\textpm and it becomes obvious that White cannot take the pawn as 37 xxa5? \text{b7!} is a draw).
B) After 33...\(\text{c}8\) 34 \(\text{a}b6 \text{h}7\) 35 \(g4 \text{d}d8\) 36 \(\text{d}7++\) the outcome is also not in doubt.

33 \(\text{x}a5\)

A second pawn is lost, making the rest of the game elementary. The remaining moves require no commentary.

33...\(\text{x}a5\) 34 \(\text{a}x\text{a}5 \text{c}1+\) 35 \(\text{h}2\) \(\text{d}5\) 36 \(\text{d}7\) \(\text{f}6\) 37 \(\text{d}4\) \(\text{c}2\) 38 \(f3\) \(\text{a}2\) 39 \(g4\)! \(\text{h}7\) 40 \(\text{d}8\) \(\text{d}e8\) 41 \(a5 \text{g}6\) 42 \(\text{d}5\) \(\text{c}2\) 43 \(a6\) 1-0

9

Felgaer – Pierrot
South American zt 2003

\[1 \text{e}4 \text{e}5 2 \text{d}f3 \text{f}6 3 \text{dxe}5 \text{d}6 4 \text{d}f3 \text{dxe}4 5 \text{d}4 \text{f}6 6 \text{d}3 \text{g}4 7 0-0 \text{e}7 8 \text{e}1 0-0 9 \text{bd}2 \text{e}8\]

The objective of this move is to quickly drop the bishop back to f8, achieving the exchange of a pair of rooks.

10 \(\text{d}f1 \text{f}8\)

The alternative 10...\(\text{h}5?!\) 11 \(\text{g}3 \text{g}6\) can be met in several ways. For example:

A) 12 \(\text{x}g6 \text{hx}g6\) 13 \(c4\) \(c6\)! 14 \(\text{b}3 \text{b}6!\) 15 \(\text{a}3\)!? (15 \(\text{c}3\))

B) 12 \(d5?!±\);

C) 12 \(\text{g}5?! \text{bd}7\) (12...\(\text{h}5?!\) 13 \(\text{xe}7 \text{xe}7\) 14 \(\text{xe}7 \text{xe}7\) 15 \(\text{xe}6 \text{hx}e6\) \(\text{d}5\) \(\text{g}5\) 17 \(\text{f}5\) \(\text{xf}5\) (13...\(\text{f}8?!\) 14 \(\text{d}2±\)) 14 \(\text{xf}5±\);

White should be careful in the ensuing positions to avoid an exchange of dark-squared bishops if he doesn’t get anything concrete in return, as that significantly reduces his chances on both sides of the board, allowing Black to improve his drawing prospects.

11 \(\text{e}3?!\)

A very principled move, denying Black the much wanted rook swap; still, 11 \(\text{xe}8 \text{xe}8\) as in Huebner-Petrosian, Tilburg 1981, is not out of the question. White could have maintained an edge in that game by 12 \(h3 \text{h}5\) 13 \(\text{g}3±\) as 13...\(\text{xf}3\) (13...\(\text{g}6\) 14 \(\text{g}5\)± intending \(\text{d}1-d2, \text{a}1-e1, d4-d5,\) is the usual space advantage for White) 14 \(\text{xf}3\) \(\text{e}1+\) 15 \(\text{d}f1 \text{c}6\) 16 \(c3\) (16 \(b3\)?) \(\text{e}8\) 17 \(\text{b}1!\) allows White to restore the coordination of his pieces, consolidating the advantage of the two bishops. For example, 17...\(\text{e}6\) 18 \(\text{g}5 \text{e}4\) 19 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{f}5\)?! (19...\(\text{f}6±\) is better), can be met by 20 \(\text{e}3!\) (20 \(\text{g}3\) \(d5\))...20...\(d5\) (20...\(d2\)? 21 \(\text{d}1!\) \(\text{xb}1\) 22 \(\text{c}4+-)\) 21 \(\text{xc}7!\) \(\text{xb}2\) 22 \(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{xf}5\) 23 \(\text{xf}5 \text{xb}1\) 24 \(\text{xb}1±, x\text{d}5\).

11...\(\text{c}6?!\)

11...\(\text{h}5?!\) had to be preferred here: after 12 \(\text{g}3 \text{g}6\) 13 \(d5±\) White has only a slight edge. The
text merely misplaces the Black knight.

12 c3 h5 13 g3 g6

14 b5!

If the bishop must be exchanged, it will at least be permitted only after the bishop itself has induced weaknesses in the enemy camp. The threat is d4-d5, exploiting the awkward placement of the c6; 14 xg6 hgx6 15 b3!? is another continuation deserving attention.

14...a6 15 a4 b5!

15 d5?! 16 c4! xe3 17 fxe3 looks bad for Black as his bishops are inactive and White's massive pawn centre looks threatening.

16 b3 d7 17 h4 a5 18 xg6 hxg6 19 f3 xb3 20 axb3

The result of White's bishop manoeuvre can now be evaluated; although Black's kingside has been fortified and he therefore runs no great danger of falling under a direct attack, his queenside pawn formation gives ground for serious concern as the a-pawn is backward and the light squares weak. In the next few moves Black tries to patch the holes and he succeeds to a certain extent.

20...c6 21 g5! h7! 22 xe8 xe8

22...xg5? 23 xa8 xf3+ 24 gxf3-- is simply bad.

23 f4

23 a5?!

A double edged move; Black is afraid of being left with an organic weakness on a6 after 23 f6 24 b4. White is now given the chance to fix d6 as a long term weakness, however that may not be enough for a considerable advantage.

24 d5!

No need to be asked twice!

24...c5 25 e4 d7 26 c4 f6

Black's position is passive, so understandably he opts for piece
Beating the Petroff

exchanges. After 26...b4!? 27 \textit{W}g3 Black’s prospects look bleak as 27...\textit{H}a6?!\textpm misplaces the rook; however, 27...\textit{O}f6! 28 \textit{Q}xf6+ gxf6 29 h4 in spite of being positionally unattractive, would certainly have been a tough nut to crack as White cannot post his bishop on the long diagonal and opening up the kingside will not be an easy process.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

27 \textit{Q}xf6+ gxf6 28 \textit{A}d2

28...\textit{A}g7?!

A slight error of judgement; Black had conducted the defence well so far but now 28...b4! was more accurate, in the spirit of the previous note. The point is to fix b2 as a weakness and prevent the bishop’s placement on c3. After 29 h4! (29 \textit{W}xf6?! \textit{A}g7 30 \textit{W}f3 a4!\textpm is dangerous for White) 29...\textit{A}g7 30 h5 f5 31 hxg6 fxg6 32 \textit{W}g3 \textit{F}f7\textpm the position is only slightly better for White.

29 \textit{A}c3! f5 30 \textit{A}xg7 \textit{A}xg7 31 \textit{W}c3+ \textit{H}g8!

The anti-positional 31...f6 was less good. After 32 cxb5 \textit{W}xb5 33 h4\textup{↑} Black’s king would certainly have been the more exposed of the two.

32 h4!

White has no other way to improve the position; after 32 \textit{A}xa5?! \textit{A}xa5 33 \textit{W}xa5 b4 White has no real winning chances as he has no passed pawns and the b2 pawn is weak.

32...b4?

A bad move, leading to the deterioration of Black’s chances; it throws away the fruits of hard defensive work, when the draw was so near. The simple 32...\textit{W}e7!\textpm would have seized control of the dark squares, allowing Black to make a fight of it. Now White’s advantage increases to serious proportions.

33 \textit{W}f6 \textit{A}a7?

Black had a choice of evils, but 33...\textit{W}d8 34 \textit{W}xd8+ \textit{A}xd8 35 \textit{A}xa5\textpm was the lesser one as anything is better than being mated.

34 \textit{A}e1!+-

Delivering the knock-out blow; Black has no useful moves, he can only sit back and watch the end coming.

34...\textit{H}h7 35 f4 a4 36 h5 gxh5 37 \textit{W}e3 1-0

10

Ljubojevic – Smyslov

USSR v World, Belgrade 1984

1 e4 e5 2 \textit{Q}f3 \textit{Q}f6 3 gxe5 d6 4 \textit{Q}f3 \textit{Q}xe4 5 d4 \textit{Q}f6 6 \textit{A}d3 \textit{A}g4 7 0-0 \textit{A}e7 8 \textit{A}e1 0-0 9 \textit{A}bd2 c5?!
A thematic continuation, putting pressure on d4, but White can, nevertheless, emerge on top with proper manoeuvring.

9...d5 is certainly worth mentioning. After 10 Qf1 we have a parting of the ways:

A) 10...Nh5?! 11 Qg3 Ng6 is not mentioned anywhere, but deserves attention; White should probably play 12 Qe5 with a slight but solid advantage. The idea of capturing on g6 with the knight followed by h2-h4-h5 will result in a favourable opening of the position.

B) 10...c5 11 Qe3 Qe6 (11...Qxf3? 12 Qxf3 cxd4 13 Qf5 Qc5 14 Qh6!++ Kiefer-Vatter, Baden ch 1986) 12 Qf5 Qxf5 13 Qxf5± is better for White because of the two bishops.

C) 10...e8 11 Qg3 Qbd7 12 h3 also leads to a slight advantage for White according to Euwe.

10 h3 Nh5 11 Qf1!

White ignores the pressure on d4, concentrating on obtaining the pair of bishops.

11...Qc6

12 Qg3!

The sacrifice of a pawn is only temporary, as White’s activity will enable its easy recovery.

A very interesting alternative is 12 g4!? Qg6 13 Qg3 (13 Qxg6 hxg6 14 d5+) 13...e8 14 c3 Qc7 15 Qf5 Qf8 16 Qxe8 Qxe8 17 Qf4 cxd4 18 Qxd4 a6 19 Qa4 Qd5 20 Qg3 Qb6 21 Qc2 Qe5 22 Qe2 Qc5 23 Qd1± with just an edge for White in Stefansson-Kholmov, Czech open, Pardubice 2001.

12...Qxf3

After 12...Qg6?! White can solidify his stance in the centre by 13 c3! threatening d4-d5 (while Ljubojevic’s suggestion of 13 d5 Qxd3 14 Qxd3 Qbd4 15 Qe2 Qe8 16 c4± should also be taken into account). Then 13...cxd4 14 Qxd4! Qxd4 15 Qxg6 hxg6 16 Qxd4 d5 17 Qg5 Qd6 18 Qe5± led to a clear White advantage in Beliavsky-Barua, London 1985, as Black had a typically weak isolated QP with zero chances of counter-play.

13 Qxf3 Qxd4

Black tries to confuse the issue by activating his pieces to the utmost.
After 13...cxd4?! 14 \( \text{Q}f5 \) White’s positional superiority is evident.

14 \( \text{W}xb7 \text{Q}e8 \)

15 \( \text{Q}f5! \)

With this exchange White’s plus crystallizes as he gets rid of the annoying \( \text{Q}d4 \) while maintaining all the advantages of his position (better pawn structure, pair of bishops).

15...\( \text{Q}xf5 \) 16 \( \text{Q}xf5 \text{Q}f8 \) 17 \( \text{Q}xe8 \text{W}xe8 \)

17...\( \text{Q}xe8?! \) would have been no better. After 18 \( \text{Q}g5! \text{W}b8 \) 19 \( \text{W}c6 \text{W}xb2 \) 20 \( \text{Q}e1 \) Ljubojevic gives a modest evaluation of ±, but the position deserves more than that: 20...\( \text{W}b8 \) 21 c4! d5 (21...h6 22 \( \text{Q}b1! \) hgx5 23 \( \text{Q}xb8 \text{Q}xb8 \) 24 \( \text{W}a4+\) ) 22 \( \text{W}xd5 \) and now both

A) 22...\( \text{Q}d6 \) 23 \( \text{Q}f4 \text{a}5 \) (23...\( \text{W}d8 \) 24 \( \text{Q}d1++\) ) 24 \( \text{Q}b1 \text{W}d8 \) 25 \( \text{Q}d1 \text{Q}a6 \) 26 \( \text{W}xc5++ \) and

B) 22...\( \text{Q}c7 \) 23 \( \text{W}d7!++\)

lose for Black.

18 \( \text{Q}d2 \) g6!

Smyslov knows the best policy and it is none other than trying to harass the bishops in an effort to decrease their mobility; 18...\( \text{W}b8?! \) 19 \( \text{W}f3 \text{W}xb2 \) 20 \( \text{Q}c3 \text{W}b8 \) 21 \( \text{Q}e1++ \) would have once more been untenable as the \( \text{Q}f6 \) cannot move, and its capture leads to a decisive attack.

19 \( \text{Q}d3 \) d5

20 c4!±

Just when Black was beginning to feel a little happy, a solid positional move comes to shatter his dreams of reaching equality. Now c5 is fixed as a weakness, and one that will torture Black deep into the endgame.

20...\( \text{W}b8 \)

Seeking relief in the ending, but at the same time renouncing any chance of active counter-play. The active 20...\( \text{Q}b8 \) 21 \( \text{W}xa7 \text{Q}e5 \) was worth considering, although White maintains the upper hand after 22 \( \text{Q}e1 \) (22 \( \text{Q}c3?! \) d4 23 \( \text{Q}d2 \text{Q}xb2 \) 24 \( \text{Q}e1\pm\) ) 22...\( \text{W}xb2 \) 23 \( \text{Q}f4! \)

21 \( \text{W}xb8 \text{Q}xb8 \) 22 b3!

White correctly decides it’s time to calm down and consolidate his structural superiority. 22 cxd5?! \( \text{Q}xb2 \) 23 \( \text{Q}c3 \text{Q}b6 \) offers White nothing.
22...dxc4?!

22...d4 was possible, trying to keep the position semi-open. In that case White would have probably transferred his king over to c2 and tried to gain space on the kingside, keeping in reserve the idea a2-a3, b3-b4 for a suitable moment.

23 hxc4 dxe4 24 a5! d6 25 d5

The bishops dominate the board, yet the win, if there is one, is still a long way off. White considers it his priority to reduce his opponent's counter-play and an important step in this direction is to achieve an exchange of rooks.

25...e8 26 f1 g7 27 e1! xe1+ 28 xe1 f8 29 e2 e7 30 d3 d4 31 f4 h5

Trying to maintain the space equilibrium on the kingside, but the move has its dark sides too: From now on, a loss of the f7 pawn would mean that its colleague on g6 is vulnerable as well.

32 a4

A good move; White is planning a5-c7-b8, followed by c7xd6, d5xf7, not to mention the immediate b3-b4 (Ljubojevic).

32...d7?

Black falters. He shouldn't have allowed White to create an outside passed pawn with his next move, as that is a disadvantage his position can hardly tolerate. This example proves how difficult is to defend this type of position even for the very best.

32...g1! was called for, and it would have rendered White's task extremely difficult. He certainly keeps an edge by playing 33 g4 hxg4 34 hxg4; but, at least, one pawn has been exchanged.

33 b4!±

Now the game becomes very one-sided.

33...f2 34 b5 f6 35 c3!

Ljubo mentions 35 e2 with the idea of playing b5-b6 directly; however, we like the text as it opens the position even more for the mighty bishops.

35...g3 36 xf6 xf4 37 c3 g5 38 e1 c7

38...g4 was possible here but it wouldn't have changed the outcome.

39 a5+ b8 40 d8 g4 41 hxg4 hxg4
The time has come for White to reap the fruits of his labour. The creation of an outside passed pawn decides the game.

42 ... \[\text{b7}\]

Black played this move but didn't continue the struggle as further resistance is hopeless. Ljubojevic provides the following analysis to confirm this assessment:

42 ... \[\text{b7}\]

43 \[\text{xb7}\] \[\text{xb7}\]

44 \[\text{xa7}\]

45 \[\text{c4}\] \[\text{e3}\]

46 \[\text{b5}\] \[\text{f2}\]

47 \[\text{b6}\] \[\text{g3}\]

48 \[\text{xc5}\] \[\text{b4}\] and the follow up \[\text{b5-c4-d3-e2}, \text{e4-e1}\] decides. For example, 49 ... \[\text{e3}\] \[\text{c4}\] \[\text{f4}\] (50 ... \[\text{a6}\] \[\text{d6}\] \[\text{b6}\] \[\text{e2}\] \[\text{f2}\] 53 \[\text{e1}\] \[\text{d4}\] 54 \[\text{f3}\] will transpose) \[\text{d3}\] \[\text{c7}\] \[\text{e2}\] \[\text{a6}\] 53 \[\text{f3}\] \[\text{e5}\] 54 \[\text{e1+-}\] and White wins because his bishop covers a5 and at the same time attacks the g3 pawn.

But other moves would have also been hopeless:

42 ... \[\text{a6}\]

43 \[\text{c7+}\] \[\text{c8}\] 44 \[\text{e6}\] \[\text{b7}\] 45 \[\text{xg4+-}\];

42 ... \[\text{axb6}\] 43 \[\text{xb6}\] \[\text{c4+}\] 44 \[\text{xc4}\] \[\text{b7}\] 45 \[\text{d4}\] \[\text{c6}\] (45 ... \[\text{xf5}\] 46 \[\text{e4}\] \[\text{d6+}\] 47 \[\text{xf4}\] \[\text{xc4}\] 48 \[\text{xg4+-}\])

46 \[\text{e6}\] (46 \[\text{a5}\]? \[\text{xc4}\] 47 \[\text{xc4}\] \[\text{b7}\] 48 \[\text{b5}\] \[\text{g3}\] 49 \[\text{a6+}\] \[\text{a8=}\] is something that should be avoided; this endgame is a theoretical draw as White cannot win the g3 pawn without losing his a-pawn. This happens because his bishop lacks a square from which it could protect the a7 square and at the same time attack the enemy pawn. For example: 50 \[\text{c4}\] \[\text{d6}\] 51 \[\text{d3}\] \[\text{c7}\] 52 \[\text{e4}\] \[\text{d6}\] 53 \[\text{f3}\] \[\text{c7}\] 54 \[\text{e3}\] \[\text{d6}\] 55 \[\text{f4}\] (What else?) 55 ... \[\text{e7}\] (the safest way) 56 \[\text{xg3}\] \[\text{a7}\] 57 \[\text{g4}\] \[\text{xa6}\] 58 \[\text{f5}\] \[\text{b7}\] 59 \[\text{g4}\] \[\text{c8}\] 60 \[\text{e6}\] \[\text{ah4=!}\] 46 ... \[\text{g3}\] 47 \[\text{e2}\]

48 \[\text{f3}\] \[\text{g5+}\] 49 \[\text{xf4}\] \[\text{xe6+}\] 50 \[\text{e5}\] \[\text{c7}\] 51 \[\text{f5}\] \[\text{d5}\] 52 \[\text{g4}\]

\[\text{e7}\] 53 a5+- \[\text{d4-b6}\].

1-0

II

Fedorowicz – Smyslov
Dortmund 1986

1 e4 e5 2 \[\text{f3}\] \[\text{f6}\] 3 \[\text{xe5}\] d6 4 \[\text{f3}\] \[\text{xe4}\] 5 d4 \[\text{f6}\] 6 \[\text{d3}\] \[\text{e7}\]

With this move Black enters the main line of the Smyslov Variation. A look at the diagram is sufficient to convince almost anyone that
Black is going to suffer from the lack of space, but on the other hand the symmetric nature of the position could be annoying for a White player who needs desperately to win.

7 h3

This is a very useful move, preventing ...c8-g4 and safeguarding against back rank mates. In addition, the c1 can now develop freely on e3 or f4 as, in the first case, ...e6-g4 is no longer a nuisance, while in the second the bishop enjoys a safe retreat spot on h2.

7...0-0 8 0-0

In this position Black has several ways of trying to complete his development; In the present Illustrative Game we will focus on efforts to contest the centre by means of ...c7-c5.

8...e8

The immediate 8...c5?! can be met with the simple 9 c3! as Black cannot exert irritating pressure on d4. Then 9...e6 10 e1! leads to positions that look unpleasant for Black:

A) 10...d5 is not illogical as Black tries to prevent the shutting in of his e7 bishop after a subsequent d4-d5, yet in the isolated d-pawn position that arises White seems able to preserve an edge: 11 dxc5 xc5 12 a3! (12 g5?) 12...e6 (Better is 12...e8 but after 13 g5 xe1+ 14 xe1 e6 15 b4 e7 16 d1±, ...e2-f4(d4), combined if necessary with c2-c4, White retains a plus anyway; 12...h6 doesn’t change things as White’s initiative grows rapidly after 13 b4 b6 14 b2 d6 (Hauptmann-Grajetzky, West German ch corr. 1989) 15 a4! c7 16 b5 d8 17 e5±) 13 b4! and Black is facing a hard choice.

A1) 13...b6?! 14 a4 e4 15 xb6 axb6 (15...xb6 16 e3 c7 17 c4 d8 18 cxd5 xd5 19 c2±) 16 b2±;

A2) 13...d6 14 b5 b8 15 b2 h6 16 d2 a6 (16...e4 17 xe4 xe4 18 c3 f6 19 xe4 d5 20 e1±) 17 bd4 xd4 18 xd4 (18 xd4±) 18...d6 19 f3 d7 (Mechelke-Leckner, West German ch corr. 1989) 20 e2!± ...

B) 10...b4 11 a3! (11 f1?! as in Fernandez Forner-Bericat, Arg. corr. 1995 is inferior: After 11...f5 12 e2 d5 Black stood well) 11...xd3 12 xd3 b6 13 f4± is pleasant for White who has a space advantage and a weakness to pile up on at d6.

C) 10...a6 11 d5
11...a6?! 12 a4 a5 13 d5 c5

The idea of securing b4 as a base for the queen's knight is simply bad if we consider that a knight on that square would have no prospects at all.

11...dbd7 looks more topical, yet after 12 g5! (It is important to provoke a weakening of the light squares first) 12...h6 13 f4 e5 14 xe5! dx e5 15 e1 d6 16 e2 White enjoys an initiative as he has the plan of e1-e3, a1-e1, combined with a timely d3-f5.

12 a4! a5 13 g5 h6 14 h4 a6 15 c1!

Making room for the bishop on b1 renders the invasion of the Black knight pointless.

15...b4 16 b1±
White’s space advantage and offside placement of the \( \text{Q}b4 \) should decide the outcome in his favour. Still, Black’s speedy collapse in this game is rather surprising.

16...\( \text{Ke}7 \)

Lashing out with 16...g5 can be met in both a tactical and a strategic manner, the tactical one being the most convincing:

A) 17 \( \text{Qg}3!?? \text{Kh}5 \) (17...g4 18 h\( \text{hxg}4 \text{Qxg}4 \) 19 \( \text{Qh}4 \text{Qg}7 \) 20 \( \text{Qg}6 \text{Wh}6 \) 21 \( \text{Qxf}8 \text{Qxf}8 \), though better for White may allow Black to put up a fight;

B) 17 \( \text{Qxg}5!! \text{hxg}5 \) 18 \( \text{Qxg}5 \) leaves Black with a depressing choice:

B1) 18...\( \text{He}5 \) 19 f4! \( \text{He}3 \) (19...\( \text{He}8 \) 20 \( \text{Wh}3 \text{Qg}7 \) 21 \( \text{Wg}3 \text{Qd}7 \) 22 \( \text{Wh}4 \text{He}3 \) 23 \( \text{Hc}1+- \)) 20 \( \text{Wf}3! \) (exchanging Black’s only active piece or else the rook reaches g3 with decisive effect) 20...\( \text{Qxf}3 \) 21 \( \text{Wxf}3 \text{Qg}7 \) (21...\( \text{Qe}7 \) 22 \( \text{He}1+- \) \( \text{He}1\text{xe}7 \), is obviously unplayable.) 22 \( \text{Wg}3 \text{Qa}6 \) (22...\( \text{Qh}5 \) 23 \( \text{Wh}4+- \)) 23 \( \text{Wh}4 \text{Qc}7 \) 24 \( \text{He}1 \text{Qd}7 \) 25 \( \text{He}3!!+ \) reduces the second player to a state of helplessness as he is unable to cope with the threat of \( \text{He}3\text{g}3 \);

B2) On 18...\( \text{Ke}7 \) there comes 19 \( \text{Wf}3! \) and Black once more has insoluble problems:

B2a) 19...\( \text{Qg}7? \) loses after 20 \( \text{He}1 \text{Qg}8 \) (20...\( \text{Qd}7 \) 21 \( \text{He}7 \text{Qe}7 \) 22 \( \text{Wh}5+- \)) 21 \( \text{Wg}3! \text{Qxg}5 \) (21...\( \text{Wf}8 \) 22 \( \text{Wh}4 \text{f}5 \) 23 \( \text{Wg}6!+- \)) 22 \( \text{Qxe}8 \text{Wxe}8 \) 23 \( \text{Wxg}5+ \text{Kh}8 \)

(23...\( \text{Wf}8 \) 24 \( \text{Qh}7!\) 24 \( \text{Qb}5! \text{We}5 \) 25 \( \text{Wh}4+ \text{Qg}7 \) 26 \( \text{Cc}3+- \);

B2b) 19...\( \text{Qd}7!? \) is slightly more tenacious, yet after the most accurate reply 20 \( \text{Qh}6! \) [20 \( \text{Qxe}7 \text{Qxe}7! \) (20...\( \text{Qxe}7 \) 21 \( \text{Wg}3+ \text{Qf}8 \) 22 \( \text{Wh}4 \text{Qe}8 \) 23 \( \text{Qe}4 \text{Qxe}4 \) 24 \( \text{Qxe}4+ \text{We}7 \) 25 \( \text{Qf}1 \text{Qxe}4 \) 26 \( \text{Qxe}4+ \text{Qf}8 \) 27 \( \text{Qh}4+- \)) 21 \( \text{Wg}3+ \) \( \text{Qf}8 \) 22 \( \text{Qb}5\) is better for White but will require more work] 20...\( \text{Qf}6 \) 21 \( \text{Qe}4! \) White obtains a raging attack: 21...\( \text{Qxe}4 \) (Forced) 22 \( \text{Wxe}4 \text{Qf}8 \) 23 \( \text{Cc}3! \text{Qxc}3 \) 24 bxc3 and Black has again a choice of evils:

B2b1) 24...\( \text{Qa}6 \) 25 \( \text{He}1 \text{Qd}7 \) 26 \( \text{Qxf}8! \text{Qxf}8 \) 27 \( \text{Wf}4!+- \)

B2b2) 24...\( \text{Qf}6 \) 25 \( \text{We}3 \text{Qa}6 \) 26 \( \text{Wg}3+ \text{Qg}6 \) 27 \( \text{Qg}5 \text{Qg}7 \) (27...\( \text{Qe}5 \) 28 \( \text{Qf}4 \text{Qg}7 \) 29 \( \text{Qf}5 \text{Qe}5 \) 30 \( \text{f}6+- \)) 28 \( \text{Qxd}6-+ \);

B3) 18...\( \text{Qg}7 \) (Relatively best) 19 \( \text{Wf}3! \text{He}5 \) 20 \( \text{Qe}4 \text{Qxg}5 \) 21 \( \text{Qxg}5\) and White has a powerful attacking position; it is worth observing in all these lines how distant the \( \text{Qb}4 \) is from the theatre of action.

17 \( \text{He}1 \text{Qd}7 \) 18 \( \text{Qg}3 \)

\[ \text{Beating the Petroff} 79 \]

18...\( \text{Wb}6 \)
Smyslov intends, as we shall see, to relieve his position by wholesale exchanges along the e-file, but in the present instance this is not a real remedy. However 18...\(\text{\texttt{\textsc{Q}}\texttt{h}5\) 19 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{h}2\) g6 (19...\(f5\) 20 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{b}5\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}b5\) 21 axb5 g6 22 g4±), is also inadequate due to 20 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}4!\) and White dominates:

A) 20...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}5?\) 21 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xd}6!\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}d6\) 22 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}e8+\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}e8\) 23 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xd}6++\);

B) 20...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}6\) 21 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{fd}2!\) (21 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xd}6?\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}d6\) 22 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}d6\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}a4=)\) 21...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}e4\) 22 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}e4\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{c}7\) 23 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{d}2±;

C) 20...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{c}7\) 21 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{d}2±

A multi-purpose move, eying d6 and preparing to bring the queen into the attack via f3.

19...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}8?\)

A mechanical retreat; Black should have tried to build up some kind of resistance on the long diagonal by 19...g6!: After 20 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}3!\) (Now 20 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{de}4?!\) is not so good in view of 20...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}e4\) 21 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}e4\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}5!\) with a respectable position for Black) 20...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{h}5?!\) 21 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{h}2\) \(f5\) (Trying to keep the White knights away from e4; 21...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{g}5?!\) 22 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{ce}4+-;\) 21...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{g}7?!±) 22 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}1!\) (22 g4!? \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{g}7\) 23 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}f5\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}f5\) 24 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}f5\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}f5\) 25 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{de}4\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}8\) 26 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}2\) 22...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{g}5\) 23 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{cd}1±\) White keeps nasty pressure, but at least Black can put up a fight.

20 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}3!\)

Now it's suddenly all over! Black has no way to stop the lethal \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{d}2\)-e4 removing the chief defender of his king.

20...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}e1+\) 21 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}e1\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}8\) 22 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}e8\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}e8\)

23 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{de}4!+\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}7\) 24 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}5\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}8\)

There is no defence; on 24...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}e4\) 25 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}e4\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}8\) there comes 26 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{h}7\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}6\) 27 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}4\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}5\) 28 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{x}e5\) dxe5 29 d6+--

25 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xf}6\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xf}6\) 26 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}4\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}5\)

After 26...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}7\) 27 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{h}7\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}6\) 28 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{c}3+--\) Black cannot defend against the multiple threats.

27 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xe}5\) dxe5 28 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xe}5\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xa}4\) 29 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{b}8+\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}7\) 30 d6+ \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}6\) 31 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}8\) 1-0

Black resigned as mate is unavoidable. The ease with which White won this game is a confirmation of the ineffectiveness of Black's setup, particularly when the knight is badly misplaced on b4.

Fischer – Gheorghiu
Buenos Aires 1970

1 e4 e5 2 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}3\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}6\) 3 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xe}5\) d6 4 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}3\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xe}4\) 5 d4 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{f}6\) 6 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{d}3\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}7\) 7 h3 0-0 8 0-0 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}8\)

The rook clearly belongs to the open file, so it makes sense to develop it to e8 right away.
8...\(\text{Cc}6\)! is less flexible because after 9 c3! the knight's future on c6 looks bleak. Black has nothing better than 9...\(\text{He}8\) [9...\(\text{Ke}6!\) 10 \(\text{We}2\) h6 11 \(\text{Dd}2\) \(\text{Wd}7\) 12 \(\text{He}1\) \(\text{Ke}8\) 13 \(\text{f}f1!\) (13 \(\text{De}4!\)) 13...\(\text{Dd}5\) 14 \(\text{h}4\) \(\text{Dd}8\) (14...\(\text{Dd}4\) 15 \(\text{Df}5!\) \(\text{Wxf}5\) 16 f3 \(\text{Wg}6\) 17 fx4 \(\text{Dd}6\) 18 \(\text{Cc}3!\!\pm\) 15 \(\text{Dd}2!\!\pm\) is instead worse as White's control of f5 gives him a dangerous initiative after which White has a choice between the following moves:

A) 10 \(\text{He}1\) is the first option, emphasizing his control of the e4 square. Now...

A1) 10...h6?! 11 \(\text{Dd}2\) \(\text{Ff}8\) 12 \(\text{Df}1!\) (with the Black bishop on c8, 12 \(\text{De}4\) is pointless: 12 \(\text{De}4!\) \(\text{Dx}e4\) 13 \(\text{Dx}e4\) \(\text{Dx}e4\) 14 \(\text{Dx}e4\) d5 15 \(\text{Cc}2\) \(\text{Wd}6\) 16 \(\text{Wd}3\) g6=) 12...d5?! (12...\(\text{Xe}1\!\pm\)) 13 \(\text{Dc}5\) \(\text{Dd}6\) 14 \(\text{Df}4\) \(\text{Dx}e5\) 15 dx5 \(\text{Dd}7\) 16 \(\text{Wh}5\) \(\text{Cc}5\) 17 \(\text{Cc}2\) \(\text{He}6\) (17...\(\text{De}6\) 18 \(\text{Xh}6\) \(\text{Gx}h6\) 19 \(\text{He}3\!\rightarrow\), e.g. 19...\(\text{Dg}7\) 20 \(\text{Wh}6\) \(\text{Df}5\) 21 \(\text{Hg}3\) \(\text{Gg}6\) 22 \(\text{f}4!\!\pm\) 18 \(\text{Mad}1!\!, as in King-Barua, Lloyds Bank open 1982, looks suspect, so we will focus on the more resilient...

A2) 10...\(\text{Cd}7\) 11 \(\text{Dd}2\) \(\text{Ff}8\), which has been played by Smyslov:

In the diagrammed position, the move 12 \(\text{De}4!\!\pm\) is a typical device to soften up Black's control of d5 and kingside defences; Black has the following choice:

A2a) 12...\(\text{De}7\)! 13 \(\text{Wb}3\!\pm\);

A2b) 12...h6?! 13 \(\text{Wb}3\!\pm;\)

A2c) 12...d5?! 13 \(\text{Dxf}6!\!\pm\) [A strong improvement over 13 \(\text{Dg}3\) \(\text{Dd}6\) 14 \(\text{Dx}e8+\) \(\text{Dx}e8\) 15 \(\text{Wc}2\) h6 16 \(\text{Dd}2\) \(\text{Wf}8\) 17 \(\text{Df}5\!\pm\) which led to a just an edge for White in Bronstein-Smyslov, USSR ch 1971] 13...\(\text{Wxf}6\) 14 \(\text{Dx}e8\) \(\text{Dx}e8\) 15 \(\text{Wb}3!\) \(\text{Dd}8\) (Probably White didn't like 15...\(\text{Wd}6\) here but it appears that Black has nothing for the pawn after 16 \(\text{Wxb}7\) \(\text{Dxb}8\) 17 \(\text{Wa}6\) \(\text{Ab}6\) 18 \(\text{Aa}4\) \(\text{Db}4\) 19 \(\text{Dd}1\) \(\text{Dxd}3\) 20 \(\text{Wxd}3\!\pm\) 16 \(\text{Gg}5\) (16 \(\text{Wxd}5\) \(\text{Cc}6\) 17 \(\text{Wh}5\) g6 18 \(\text{Wg}5\) \(\text{We}6\) 19 \(\text{Af}4\) \(\text{Dxf}3\) 20 \(\text{Dxf}3\) \(\text{Dd}6\!\pm\) 16...\(\text{Wb}6\) 17 \(\text{Wxd}5\) (17 \(\text{Wxd}8\) \(\text{Dxd}8\) 18 \(\text{Gg}5!\) ? \(\text{Wxb}3\) 19 \(\text{Wxe}7+\) \(\text{Dh}8\) 20 \(\text{Ax}b3\) \(\text{Dg}7\) 21 \(\text{Dxf}7+\) \(\text{Wh}7\) 22 \(\text{Wxd}8\) \(\text{Wxd}8\) 23 \(\text{Dxa}7\) \(\text{Cc}6\!\pm\) \(\text{A}4\) 24 b4?! \(\text{Gg}5\) 25 b5 \(\text{Ax}b5\) 26 \(\text{Ax}b7\) c6=) 17...\(\text{Cc}6\) 18 \(\text{Wb}3\!\pm\) leads to a position where Black has no compensation for the lost pawn;

A2d) 12...\(\text{Dxe}4\) (loses the battle for control of d5 but looks like the lesser evil) 13 \(\text{Dxe}4\) h6! (13...g6 14 \(\text{Gg}5\) \(\text{Ce}7\) 15 \(\text{Ff}4\) \(\text{Ff}6\) 16 \(\text{Wd}2\!\pm\) 14 \(\text{Wb}3\) \(\text{Da}5\) 15 \(\text{Cc}2\) \(\text{Wf}6\) and now White should not hurry to press on the queenside with 16 b4?! (16 \(\text{Wd}3\!\pm\) looks like a prudent course) as Black has counter-play: 16...\(\text{Cc}6\) 17 b5 \(\text{Da}5\) 18 c4

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18...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}e4}! 19 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}xe4} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}}e8} 20 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}d3} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}e1+} 21 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}xe1} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e6!} 22 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c}}c2} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}xc4} 23 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e3} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}5}!=;

B) 10 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f4}?! is the second possibility; after 10...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}}h5} 11 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}}h2} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{g}}6} 12 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e1} [12 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}5}?! is also strategically justified, e.g. 12...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{b}}b8} (12...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e5} 13 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}xe5} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}xe5} 14 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{b}}b5} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}d7} 15 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{a}}xa7} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}xd7} 16 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c}}xc5} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e4} 17 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}xe2} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f6} 18 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c}}c4}±) 13 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e1] 12...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f5} (12...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{g}}g7} 13 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}5}?!) 13 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}xe8} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}xe8} 14 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{a}}a6} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{a}}a7} 15 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}b3}! \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f6} 16 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e1} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}d7} 17 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e4!} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}xe4} 18 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}xe4}↑ White's space advantage combined with control over the critical square \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}5} gave him a plus in Kavalek-Smyslov, Tilburg 1979. A possible line of play runs 18...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}d8} 19 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}5}! \texttt{\textit{\texttt{b}}6} 20 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{a}}a6} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}6} 21 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}d4} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{b}}b7} 22 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{g}}g3} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f6} 23 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{a}}a4}± and, once more in the Smyslov system, Black has problem with his knight. Now back to our main game:

9 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c}}c4} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c}}c6}

With the White pawn on \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c}}4} it is much more logical to develop the knight on \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c}}6} as the squares \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}4}, \texttt{\textit{\texttt{b}}4} are less securely defended than in the previous examples.

10 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e1} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}}6} 11 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e1}

11...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f8}?! Too passive; White is now allowed to complete his development strongly and efficiently when at the same time Black will not be able to undertake anything constructive. 11...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}b4}?! was an attempt to gain some breathing space. Then, after

A) 12 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f1}! 13 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{a}}a6} (A structure that may also arise from the Alekhine Defence) 14 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}5}±, White's space advantage guarantees him interesting prospects on both sides of the board, whilst

B) 12 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f1}!? \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f5} 13 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}}e2} also deserves attention, since 13...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f8} 14 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{a}}a3} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}xe2} 15 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}xe2} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}c2} 16 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{a}}a2} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c}}5} is better for White after either 17 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}5} or 17 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{b}}3} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}xd4} 18 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}xd4} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c}}xd4} 19 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}xd4}.

12 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{x}}xe8} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}xe8}

Black will now have to lose more time with his queen as it has landed on an unfortunate square.

13 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}}f4} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}d7} 14 \texttt{\textit{\texttt{w}}d2} \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c}}c8}?

And this is even more unfortunate; there is no realistic chance of getting in ...\texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}}7-f5} so
Black had to restrict himself to 14...\textit{d}d8.

15 \textit{d}5 \textit{b}b\textit{b} 16 \textit{e}e4!

Once more, exchanging the defender of the Black kingside is the key to a big advantage. Gheorghiu has no choice but to fall in with Fischer's plans.

16...\textit{d}xe4 17 \textit{xe}4 \textit{a}a6 18 \textit{d}d4 \textit{c}c5 19 \textit{c}c2± \textit{a}a5 20 \textit{e}e1 \textit{d}d8

Black realises his mistake but it is probably too late.

21 \textit{e}e3!

A strong move, preparing to attack whilst discouraging the Black queen from coming out on \textit{f}6.

21...\textit{b}6

21...\textit{w}f6 22 \textit{g}g3 \textit{h}h8 23 \textit{e}e3, intending \textit{d}d4-f3(b3), \textit{e}e3-d4, leads to a very strong White attack, as does 23 \textit{f}f3!? \textit{g}g8 24 \textit{e}e3 \textit{h}h4 25 \textit{f}f5→.

22 \textit{g}g3

There is no way that someone could escape from such a position against Fischer. White has focused with all his pieces on Black's kingside and the only thing Gheorghiu succeeds in doing in the next few moves is to avert a mating attack at the cost of drifting into a hopeless endgame.

22...\textit{h}h8 23 \textit{f}f3 \textit{w}e7 24 \textit{d}d4 \textit{w}f6

Forced. Now however, White wins with immense ease, exploiting the resulting weakness on \textit{f}5.

25 \textit{w}xf6 \textit{g}xf6 26 \textit{d}d4 \textit{e}e8

27 \textit{e}e3! \textit{b}b8

Also hopeless is 27...\textit{d}xe3 28 \textit{xe}3 \textit{h}h5 (otherwise White follows up with \textit{g}1-h2 and \textit{g}2-g4, completely shutting the \textit{f}8 out of the game) 29 \textit{b}3+- and White will continue with \textit{g}1-h2-g3, winning.

28 \textit{b}3 \textit{b}5?

A desperate try for activity, but Black was lost anyway. Now Fischer wraps the point quickly, as he is given the chance to invade \textit{f}5 immediately.

29 \textit{c}xb5 \textit{xb}5 30 \textit{f}f5 \textit{d}d7 31 \textit{xe}6 \textit{b}4 32 \textit{g}g3

Simple and elegant; the mating threat forces Black to surrender more material.

32...\textit{d}xh6 33 \textit{d}xh6 \textit{d}e4 34 \textit{g}g7+ \textit{h}h7?
34...\(\text{g}8\) 35 \(\text{x}e4\) \(\text{f}4\) 36 \(\text{x}f6+\) \(\text{f}8\) 37 \(\text{c}3+-\)

35 \(f3\)

Facing huge material losses, Black resigned.

1-0

13

I. Polgar – Toth
Hungarian ch, Budapest 1971

1 \(e4\) \(e5\) 2 \(\text{f}3\) \(f6\) 3 \(\text{x}e5\) \(d6\) 4 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{xe}4\) 5 \(d4\) \(\text{f}6\) 6 \(\text{d}3\) \(e7\) 7 \(h3\) 0-0 8 0-0 \(\text{e}8\) 9 c4 \(\text{bd}7\)

Played with the intention of switching the knight over to the kingside to help defend the king and, possibly, attack the centre by \(\text{xf}8\)-e6.

9...\(c6\) leads to play similar to the one witnessed in the main line. The customary queenside advance 10 \(\text{c}3\) a6 11 b4!? (also possible is 11 \(\text{f}4\) with similar play to the main line) 11...\(\text{bd}7\)?! [Too passive; Black had to try 11...b5 12 \(\text{cxb}5\)! (12 d5?! a5!\(\text{f}\) 12...\(\text{cxb}5\) (12...\(\text{axb}5\) 13 d5! \(\text{d}7\) 14 dx\(\text{c}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 15 \(\text{b}1\) \(d5\) 16 a3\(\text{f}\) 13 d5! \(\text{b}7\) 14 a4 bxa4 15 \(\text{xa}4\) \(\text{bd}7\) 16 \(\text{wb}3\) when White is slightly better but has to be very careful as there are always tricks in view of the weakness on d5) 12 \(\text{e}3\) \(\text{f}8\) 13 a4 a5 14 b5 \(\text{g}6\) 15 \(\text{e}1\) \(\text{h}5\) 16 \(\text{wd}2\) led to a clear White advantage in Tukmakov-Bronstein, Moscow 1971.]

10 \(\text{c}3\)

10...\(\text{f}8\)?! is inflexible; after 11 d5! \(\text{g}6\) [11...\(\text{c}6\) 12 \(\text{e}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 13 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{h}5\) 14 \(\text{h}2\) g6 15 \(\text{d}2\) \(\text{g}7\) (Honkaniemi-Hutunen, Finland, corr. 1976) 16 \(\text{d}2!\) \(\text{e}1\) 12 \(\text{e}1\) \(\text{d}7\) (Tal-Smyslov, USSR 1971), White should play 13 \(\text{d}4\)! with a clear advantage according to Korchnoi. This verdict was verified after 13...\(\text{f}8\) 14 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{xe}1\) 15 \(\text{xe}1\) a6 16 \(\text{f}2\) c6 17 \(\text{e}3\) cxd5 18 cxd5 b5 19 a3 \(\text{c}7\) 20 \(\text{f}3\) in Noetzold-Thunberg OMT corr. 1983.

11 \(\text{e}1\) \(\text{f}8\) 12 \(\text{f}4\)!

In spite of the above-mentioned game Tukmakov-Bronstein where White gained an edge by developing the dark-squared bishop on e3, it looks more sensible to develop this bishop on the diagonal h2-b8. After a subsequent d4-d5 the d6 pawn may become a concrete target for the \(\text{f}4\).

12...a6

An interesting moment, as White has a relatively large choice.
13 b4

13 d5!? is a very solid method of acquiring an edge; after 13...cxd5 14 cxd5 Qg6 (14...b5 15 b4±) 15 h2 d7 the position is slightly better for White as Black's queenside is vulnerable.

Also interesting is 13 Wd2!?±, intending e1-e2, a1-e1, with an edge for White according to Spassky.

13 Wb3?! Qe6 14 h2 f8 15 e2 b5! was unclear in Fischer-Petrosian, Candidates final 1971. In these positions White needs to have his b-pawn unblocked in order to seize space on the queenside with b2-b4.

13...Qe6

13...Qg6 is Yusupov's recommendation, which was tested in Pierrot-De las Heras, Najdorf open, Buenos Aires 2002: 14 h2 f8 (14...b5 15 d5!?) 15 Wd2 xe1+ (15...d7) 16 xe1 a5 17 b5!± a4 18 a3 d7 19 bxc6 bxc6 20 c2 e6 21 Wd3 a5 22 b1 d7 23 b4 d5 24 c5+. Looking at this game we got the impression that Black could not substantially improve his play;

13...b5 should be met with the typical 14 d5!, which grants White a small but permanent advantage after 14...bxc4 15 xc4 g6 16 h2 b7 17 c1 Wd7 18 a3.

14 h2 f8 15 Wb3 b5

16 d5!

After due preparation White is finally able to carry out this advance, having a certain impact on Black's position as he gets a weak d-pawn.

16...bxc4 17 xc4 cxd5 18 xd5 b7 19 ad1 xd5 20 xd5 xd5 21 xd5

Most natural, but 21 Wxd5± is also good.

21...Wb6 22 ad1 ab8?!

A bad move, giving up the d-pawn for no reason; Black probably assumed that he would have sufficient counter-play in the resulting ending but in fact this is not so. After 22...c7! 23 Wf5 e6 24 f4!± f3-g5, f4-e3, White is slightly better in view of his active pieces and potential outside passed pawn, but Black certainly has counter-chances.
23 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Qxd6 \texttt{\textbf{Qxd6 24 \texttt{\textbf{Qxd6 \texttt{\textbf{Qxb4}}}}}\\25 \texttt{\textbf{Qxb4 \texttt{\textbf{Qxb4 26 \texttt{\textbf{Qxa6= h6 27 \texttt{\textbf{a5?!}}}}}}}}}}}}}\\

Rather incomprehensible; after 27 \texttt{\textbf{a7! (intending \texttt{\textbf{Qd1-d7}) 27...\texttt{\textbf{c5}}\\28 \texttt{\textbf{c1= White is much better. In comparison to the game he has got the c-file.}}}}}}

27...\texttt{\textbf{c8 28 \texttt{\textbf{d2 \texttt{\textbf{c7}}}}}\\

Now Black has defended his second rank; the realisation of White’s advantage is no longer an easy matter.

29 \texttt{\textbf{h4! g6 30 g3 \texttt{\textbf{g7 31 g2 \texttt{\textbf{ebl}}}}}\\

32 \texttt{\textbf{e5}}\\

32 \texttt{\textbf{h5!= was a good move; White needs to force a weakness on the Black kingside to win.}}\\

32...\texttt{\textbf{e1 33 \texttt{\textbf{f3 \texttt{\textbf{a1 34 \texttt{\textbf{e2 \texttt{\textbf{b1}}}}}}}}\\35 \texttt{\textbf{a3}}\\35 \texttt{\textbf{h5!!?}}\\35...\texttt{\textbf{b5 36 \texttt{\textbf{a6 \texttt{\textbf{d5!}}}}}\\

White has played listlessly and now Black is ready for counter-play with ...g6-g5.

37 \texttt{\textbf{a4 \texttt{\textbf{c1 38 \texttt{\textbf{a2 g5! 39 hxg5}}}\\

39 \texttt{\textbf{a5 \texttt{\textbf{d1 40 hxg5 hgxg5 would have been similar to the game.}}\\39...\texttt{\textbf{hxg5 40 \texttt{\textbf{b6 \texttt{\textbf{d1 41 \texttt{\textbf{h2}}}}}\\41 \texttt{\textbf{e5 can be met in the same fashion.}}\\41...g4!!}}}}}}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chessboard.png}
\caption{An interesting tactical motif, securing the draw; In fact, it is White who has to careful from now on.}
\end{figure}

42 \texttt{\textbf{\texttt{\texttt{xg4 g5 43 f4 \texttt{\textbf{g1+ 44 \texttt{\textbf{f2}}}}}\\\texttt{\textbf{e4+ 45 \texttt{\textbf{f3 f5! 46 \texttt{\textbf{b7+ \texttt{\textbf{f8 47}}}}}\\\texttt{\textbf{h2! \texttt{\textbf{c3+ 48 \texttt{\textbf{e2 xg3+ 49 \texttt{\textbf{d2}}}}}\\\texttt{\textbf{e4+ 50 \texttt{\textbf{e2 c2+ 51 \texttt{\textbf{d3 c3+ 52 \texttt{\textbf{e2}}}}}}}}\\52 \texttt{\textbf{d4?? d1+ 53 \texttt{\textbf{e5 c5+ 54}}\\\texttt{\textbf{e6 d6!}}}\\52...\texttt{\textbf{g3+ 53 \texttt{\textbf{d2 e4+ 54 \texttt{\textbf{e2}}}}}\\\texttt{\textbf{c2+ 55 \texttt{\textbf{d3 xh2 56 \texttt{\textbf{b8+}}}}}\\56 \texttt{\textbf{xh2?? c5++}}\\56...\texttt{\textbf{g7 57 \texttt{\textbf{h2 a1}}}}}\\

And the players decided to call it a draw as there are no chances left: 
57...\texttt{\textbf{a1 58 \texttt{\textbf{b4 a4 59 \texttt{\textbf{a4}}}}}\\\texttt{\textbf{c5+ 60 \texttt{\textbf{d4 a4=} is dead equal.}}\\1/2-1/2

58...\texttt{\textbf{a5 \texttt{\textbf{b4 \texttt{\textbf{b4}}}}}\\59...\texttt{\textbf{c3+ 60 \texttt{\textbf{d3 a4=} is dead equal.}}\\1/2-1/2

\end{figure}
1.e4 e5 2.\(\text{d}f3\) \(\text{d}f6\) 3.\(\text{d}xe5\) \(d6\) 4.\(\text{d}f3\) \(\text{d}xe4\) 5.\(d4\) \(\text{d}f6\) 6.\(\text{d}d3\) \(\text{d}e7\) 7.\(h3\) 0-0 8.0-0 \(d5\)

After this move we transpose to a type of Exchange French with a valuable extra move for White in \(h2-h3\).

9.\(c4?!\)

It is a most sensible choice for White to opt for an isolated QP position as in the present situation it offers him excellent attacking chances.

9...\(\text{dxc4}\)

9...\(\text{d}c6?!\) is probably best, transposing after 10.\(\text{d}c3\) to one of the 5...d5 main lines of the Petroff, examined under a subsequent Illustrative Game.

10.\(\text{d}xc4\)

For the sake of consistency we took the liberty of using the normal Petroff move order to reach the diagrammed position. In the actual game it arose from a ... Queen’s Gambit Accepted with a saving

of two tempi!! The proof: 1.\(d4\) \(d5\) 2.\(c4\) \(\text{dxc4}\) 3.\(e3\) \(e5\) 4.\(\text{d}xc4\) \(\text{exd4}\) 5.\(\text{exd4}\) \(\text{d}f6\) 6.\(\text{d}f3\) \(\text{d}e7\) 7.0-0 0-0 8.\(h3\).

10...\(\text{bd7}\)

Black declares his intention of turning d5 into a fortress.

10...\(c5\) is an interesting idea of Salov; after 11.\(\text{d}c3!\) (11.\(d5\) \(b5\) 12.\(\text{d}xb5\) \(\text{b}7\) is Salov’s analysis; 11.\(\text{d}xc5\) \(\text{d}xc5\) 12.\(\text{w}xd8\) \(\text{w}xd8\) 13.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{bd7}\) 14.\(\text{d}d1\) \(\text{e}e8\) 15.\(\text{d}c3\)) 11...\(\text{d}c6\) 12.\(d5\) \(\text{a}5\) 13.\(\text{d}d3\) \(b6\) 14.\(\text{f}4!\) \(\text{d}d6\) 15.\(\text{g}5\) \(h6\) 16.\(\text{xf6}\) \(\text{w}xf6\) 17.\(\text{e}e1\) a dynamic position occurs, requiring accurate handling of the initiative by White.

11.\(\text{d}c3\) \(\text{b}6\) 12.\(\text{b}3\)

White’s moves are so natural that require no particular explanation; Now Black almost invariably chooses...

12...\(c6\)

...which is the most elastic move order as it permits the second player the luxury to decide next move which knight is going to settle on d5. Since 12...c6 is used in the present game as a prelude to ...\(\text{d}f6-d5\) we will devote the next
paragraph to the alternative deployment.

After 12...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{bd5}\) 13 \(\text{\texttt{He}}\) 1 (A flexible developing move) Black has a choice between employing or omitting ...c7-c6: Most usual is 13...c6 (13...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}6\) is playable, yet after the natural 14 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{g}5!\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xc3}\) 15 bxc3 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xb3}\) 16 \(\text{\texttt{W}}\texttt{xb3}\) White's prospects looked better in Vaganian-Tal Moscow 1982; Potential followers of the Armenian's 14 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{g}5\) should disregard the fact that game was shortly agreed drawn as White does have chances to mobilise his central pawn duo in an attempt to cramp his opponent; 13...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}8\) 14 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{g}5\) has no independent significance and will transpose to the positions analysed below unless Black plays the inaccurate 14...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}6?\) which loses to 15 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xf6}\) gxf6 16 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xd5}\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{xd5}\) 17 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{h}4++\) with an irresistible White attack as \(\texttt{\texttt{L}}\texttt{b}3-c2\) will be lethal) 14 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{g}5\) \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}6\)

...reaching the typical IQP position of the diagram. Now White has a choice:

A) 15 \(\text{\texttt{W}}\texttt{d}2?!\) is an interesting alternative to the most usual 15 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}5\), keeping d4 overprotected for the time being and emphasizing quick development; after 15...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{c}8\) 16 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{e}2!\) (Demonstrating the main point of White's idea which is none other than to double rooks on the e-file) 16...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\texttt{c}7\) 17 \(\text{\texttt{Qae1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qd7}}\) 18 \(\text{\texttt{W}}\texttt{c1}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qc7}}\) 19 \(\text{\texttt{Qe5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qd6}}\) 20 \(\text{\texttt{Qc2}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qcd5}}\) 21 \(\text{\texttt{Wb1}}\) h6 22 \(\text{\texttt{Qc1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qc8}}\) 23 a3 \(\text{\texttt{Qfd8}}\) 24 \(\text{\texttt{Qxd5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qxd5}}?\) [Black had to play 24...\(\text{\texttt{Qxd5}}!\) but he was probably afraid of something like 25 \(\text{\texttt{Qh7+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qf8}}\) (25...\(\text{\texttt{Qh8}}\)? 26 \(\text{\texttt{Qc4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qd6d7}}\) 27 \(\text{\texttt{Qxe6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qxe6}}\) 28 \(\text{\texttt{Qe5+-}}\) 26 \(\text{\texttt{Qc4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qd6}}\) 27 \(\text{\texttt{Qxe6}}\)! (27 \(\text{\texttt{Qf5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qxf5}}\) (27...\(\text{\texttt{Qc7?}}\) 28 \(\text{\texttt{Qxe6}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qxe6}}\) 29 \(\text{\texttt{Qh7+-}}\) 28 \(\text{\texttt{Qxf5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qf6+}}\) seems to hold for Black) 27...\(\text{\texttt{Qxe6}}\) 28 \(\text{\texttt{Qe5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qf6}}\) 29 \(\text{\texttt{Qg6+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qf7}}\) 30 \(\text{\texttt{Qe4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qc7}}\) 31 b4! (31 \(\text{\texttt{Qf3}}\) c5! 32 \(\text{\texttt{Qh5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qxd4}}\) 31...\(\text{\texttt{Qc3}}\) 32 \(\text{\texttt{Qf3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qb5}}\) 33 \(\text{\texttt{Qe5+}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qe7}}\) 34 \(\text{\texttt{Qf4}}\) with a dangerous White initiative] 25 \(\text{\texttt{Qd2!}}\) (Now White has a clear advantage) 25...\(\text{\texttt{Qe8}}\) 26 \(\text{\texttt{Qxf7!}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qxf7}}\) (26...\(\text{\texttt{Qxf7}}\) 27 \(\text{\texttt{Qg6+}}\)) 27 \(\text{\texttt{Qxe7}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qxe7}}\) 28 \(\text{\texttt{Qxe7}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qe4}}\) 29 \(\text{\texttt{Qxe4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qxe4}}\) 30 \(\text{\texttt{Qxe4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qd8}}\) 31 \(\text{\texttt{Qxb7}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qf6}}\) 32 d5 \(\text{\texttt{Qb6}}\) 33 \(\text{\texttt{Qxa7}}\) \(\text{\texttt{Qg6}}\) 34 \(\text{\texttt{Qd7}}\) (1-0) White reaped the harvest of his interesting novelty in Protaziuk-Weglarz, Polish tch, Lubniewice 1998.

B) 15 \(\text{\texttt{Qe5}}\) leads to a typical isolated QP position, with White's pieces looking optimally placed. Now, after 15 \(\text{\texttt{Qe5}}\) Black has the following options:

B1) 15...\(\text{\texttt{W}}\texttt{a5?!}\) allows White to achieve a favourable clarification of the situation in the centre by 16 \(\text{\texttt{Qxd5!}}\) [16 \(\text{\texttt{Qxf7?}}\) surprisingly doesn't work in view of 16...\(\text{\texttt{Qxc3}}\)]
(But not 16...\textit{$\text{xf7}$}? 17 \textit{\textbf{w}e2}!! e.g.
\textit{\textbf{17...\textit{\textbf{f}5} 18 \textit{\textbf{dx}d5 \textit{\textbf{dx}d5} 19 \textit{\textbf{w}x}e7+ \textit{\textbf{g}6} 20 \textit{\textbf{w}x}b7 \textit{\textbf{x}x}g5 21 \textit{\textbf{w}x}g7+ \textit{\textbf{g}6} 22 \textit{\textbf{xe}5+ \textbf{f}5 23 \textit{\textbf{fx}f5+ \textit{\textbf{xf}f5} 24 \textit{\textbf{w}e}5\#}}) 17 \textit{\textbf{h}6+ (17 \textit{\textbf{bxc}3 \textit{\textbf{xf}7} 18 \textit{\textbf{xe}7 \textit{\textbf{w}xe7} 19 \textit{\textbf{w}x}e7 \textit{\textbf{w}xg5}+) 17...\textit{\textbf{h}8 18 \textit{\textbf{bxc}3 \textit{\textbf{x}xb}3 19 \textit{\textbf{w}x}b3 \textit{\textbf{w}x}g5 20 \textit{\textbf{f}7+ \textit{\textbf{xf}7} 21 \textit{\textbf{w}x}f7 21 \textit{\textbf{w}x}f7 and Black comes out on top) 16...\textit{\textbf{c}xd5} 16...\textit{\textbf{c}xd5}?! 17 \textit{\textbf{w}x}f6 \textit{\textbf{x}xf6 18 \textit{\textbf{d}7\pm;}} 16...\textit{\textbf{c}xd5}?! 17 \textit{\textbf{w}xe7 \textit{\textbf{w}xe7} 18 \textit{\textbf{w}x}e6 \textit{\textbf{fx}e6 19 \textit{\textbf{w}b}3\pm) 17 \textit{\textbf{c}2 \textit{\textbf{x}e}8 [17...\textit{\textbf{c}ac}8 18 \textit{\textbf{w}d}3 \textit{\textbf{x}b}4! (18...\textit{\textbf{g}6? 19 \textit{\textbf{w}x}g6!\textbf{\#}) 19 \textit{\textbf{w}x}f6 \textit{\textbf{xc}2 20 \textit{\textbf{w}g}3 \textit{\textbf{g}6 21 \textit{\textbf{w}x}g6! \textit{\textbf{fx}g6 22 \textit{\textbf{w}x}e6 \textit{\textbf{xb}2} 23 \textit{\textbf{a}3\uparrow is a beautiful tactical variation at the end of which White’s pressure persists] 18 \textit{\textbf{w}d}3 \textit{\textbf{c}4 19 \textit{\textbf{w}xe}7 \textit{\textbf{xe}7} 20 \textit{\textbf{f}3\pm as his pieces are by far the ones profiting from the static nature of the emerging structure.}

\textbf{B2}) 15...\textit{\textbf{d}c7} is logical, but even more so is 16 \textit{\textbf{d}c2! avoiding exchanges that would be most welcome for Black; the sequel 16...\textit{\textbf{e}8} 17 \textit{\textbf{w}d}3 \textit{\textbf{g}6 18 \textit{\textbf{w}f}3! \textit{\textbf{fd}5 19 \textit{\textbf{w}xe}7 \textit{\textbf{w}xe7} 20 \textit{\textbf{w}x}e6 \textit{\textbf{fx}e6 19 \textit{\textbf{w}b}3\pm) 17 \textit{\textbf{c}2 \textit{\textbf{x}e}8 [17...\textit{\textbf{c}ac}8 18 \textit{\textbf{w}d}3 \textit{\textbf{x}b}4! (18...\textit{\textbf{g}6? 19 \textit{\textbf{w}x}g6!\textbf{\#}) 19 \textit{\textbf{w}x}f6 \textit{\textbf{xc}2 20 \textit{\textbf{w}g}3 \textit{\textbf{g}6 21 \textit{\textbf{w}x}g6! \textit{\textbf{fx}g6 22 \textit{\textbf{w}x}e6 \textit{\textbf{xb}2} 23 \textit{\textbf{a}3\uparrow is a beautiful tactical variation at the end of which White’s pressure persists] 18 \textit{\textbf{w}d}3 \textit{\textbf{c}4 19 \textit{\textbf{w}xe}7 \textit{\textbf{xe}7} 20 \textit{\textbf{f}3\pm as his pieces are by far the ones profiting from the static nature of the emerging structure.}

\textbf{B3}) 15...\textit{\textbf{e}8\textbf{!?} (Considered best as it waits for White to move his queen to f3 and only then resort to \textit{\textbf{d}5-c7) leads to another subdivision:}

\textbf{B3a}) 16 \textit{\textbf{w}f}3 \textit{\textbf{d}c7! 17 \textit{\textbf{w}xf}6 \textit{\textbf{x}f}6 18 \textit{\textbf{d}e}4 offers nothing after 18...\textit{\textbf{d}d5! [18...\textit{\textbf{e}xe}5?! 19 \textit{\textbf{dx}e}5 \textit{\textbf{xb}3 20 \textit{\textbf{w}xb}3 \textit{\textbf{exe}5 21 \textit{\textbf{w}xb}7 \textit{\textbf{xb}8 (21...\textit{\textbf{e}6\textbf{!?}) 22 \textit{\textbf{w}xc}6 \textit{\textbf{xb}2 23 \textit{\textbf{fd}1 \textit{\textbf{w}b}8 gives White a strong initiative after 24 \textit{\textbf{d}d}6\textbf{\#}) 19 \textit{\textbf{w}xf}6 20 \textit{\textbf{w}xf}6 \textit{\textbf{gc}6 21 \textit{\textbf{w}g}4 \textit{\textbf{g}7 22 \textit{\textbf{dx}d}5 \textit{\textbf{dx}d}5 23 \textit{\textbf{e}e}3 \textit{\textbf{exe}3= when Black has reached the safe haven of an equal endgame;}

\textbf{B3b}) 16 \textit{\textbf{w}d}2\textbf{!? is the typical Polish treatment of the position; after 16...\textit{\textbf{c}c7 17 \textit{\textbf{c}c}2 \textit{\textbf{c}5 18 \textit{\textbf{w}xf}6 \textit{\textbf{xf}6 19 \textit{\textbf{w}d}3 \textit{\textbf{g}6 20 \textit{\textbf{d}xc}5 \textit{\textbf{f}5 21 \textit{\textbf{w}xd}8 \textit{\textbf{ax}d}8 22 \textit{\textbf{w}f}5 \textit{\textbf{xe}5 23 \textit{\textbf{g}4 \textit{\textbf{d}d}2 24 \textit{\textbf{xe}4 \textit{\textbf{xb}2 25 \textit{\textbf{d}d}6 \textit{\textbf{e}7 26 \textit{\textbf{c}c}4 White won surprisingly quickly in Kruszynski-Weglarz Polish tch, Lubniewice 1994, but Black shouldn’t have played ...c6-c5 so early;}

\textbf{B3c}) 16 \textit{\textbf{c}c1! (The star move, intending \textit{\textbf{c}c1-c2-e2) takes us to the top of the tree:

\textbf{B3c1}) After 16...\textit{\textbf{d}d}7?!, c5 becomes weak, but Black hopes that exchanges will relieve his position; However, his hopes were not justified in two top-level encounters: 17 \textit{\textbf{c}c7 \textit{\textbf{xe}7 18 \textit{\textbf{c}e}4 \textit{\textbf{f}6 [An attempt at improvement over 18...\textit{\textbf{f}8 19 \textit{\textbf{c}c}5 \textit{\textbf{w}e}8 20 \textit{\textbf{w}f}3 \textit{\textbf{d}d}8 (\Delta 21...\textit{\textbf{c}c}8, 22...\textit{\textbf{c}e}6 =) 21 \textit{\textbf{xb}7! \textit{\textbf{xb}7 22 \textit{\textbf{xc}6 \textit{\textbf{xb}3} 23 \textit{\textbf{w}xb}3 \textit{\textbf{d}d}7

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24 \(\text{wa}3\) \(\text{wa}8\) 25 \(b4\) \(\text{d}g6\) 26 \(b5\) \(h6\) which occurred in Sax-Korchnoi, Brussels (m) 1991; After 27 \(\text{wg}3!\) (Threatening \(\text{e}1xe6\)) White would have had consolidated his advantage because 27...\(\text{d}f4?!\) 28 \(\text{He}4!\) \(\text{xd}4?\) fails to 29 \(\text{xd}4!\) \(\text{e}2+\) 30 \(\text{h}2\) \(\text{xe}3\) 31 \(\text{d}8+\) \(\text{xd}8\) 32 \(\text{xd}8\) \(\text{e}4\) 33 \(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{fxe}6\) 34 \(\text{c}7+\) 19 \(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}8\) 20 \(\text{f}3+\) \(\text{f}7\) (20...\(\text{f}7\) 21 \(\text{g}3\)) 21 \(\text{g}3\) \(\text{d}8\) 22 \(\text{c}5\) \(\text{f}7?!\) (22...\(\text{c}8\)?) 23 \(\text{xe}7\) \(\text{xe}7\) 24 \(\text{f}5+\) \(\text{c}7\) 25 \(\text{g}3!\) \(\text{xe}6\) 26 \(\text{xg}3\) \(b6?!\) 27 \(\text{d}7?\) \(\text{d}2\) 28 \(\text{d}6++\) and White led his army to triumph in I.Sokolov-Huebner, Wijk aan Zee 1996;

\(\text{B3c2}\) 16...\(\text{xc}8?!\) (Still waiting, because releasing the tension by 16...\(\text{xc}3\) 17 \(\text{bx}c3\) \(\text{xb}3\) 18 \(\text{wb}3\) \(\text{d}5\), as suggested by Korchnoi, is slightly better for White after 19 \(\text{d}2!\) with the idea \(\text{c}3-\text{c}4, \text{d}2-\text{c}3\); Another move is 16...\(\text{w}d6\) as in Kostin-Provotorov, Kaluga 1997; White should continue with 17 \(\text{f}3!\) \(\text{ad}8\) 18 \(\text{cd}1!\) reaching an optimal attacking formation)

17 \(\text{c}2!?!\) (17 \(\text{d}3\) \(\text{c}7!\) 18 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{xb}3\) 19 \(\text{xb}3\) \(h6?!\); 17 \(\text{d}4\))
17...\(\text{d}7\) [Interesting is 17...\(h6\) 18 \(\text{xf}6!?!\) (18 \(\text{h}4\) \(\text{f}4!\) 19 \(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{xe}6\) 20 \(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}5\)=) 18...\(\text{xf}6\) 19 \(\text{c}e2\) (\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xd}5?\) 21 \(\text{xf}7!\) 19...\(\text{d}f4!\) 20 \(\text{e}3\) \(\text{xb}3\) 21 \(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 22 \(\text{dxe}5\) \(\text{c}7!\) 23 \(\text{w}c4!\) \(\text{e}6!\) (23...\(\text{d}5\) 24 \(\text{d}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 25 \(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 26 \(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 27 \(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{cxd}5\) 28 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{c}8?!\) (28...\(\text{g}5?!\)?) 29 \(\text{e}3!\); 23...\(\text{w}g5\) 24 \(\text{g}3!\) \(\text{xe}6\) 25 \(\text{g}2\) \(\text{w}f5\) 26 \(\text{d}5\) \(\text{f}4\) 24 \(\text{d}4\) \(\text{wd}4!=;\) 24 \(\text{w}g4\) \(\text{g}5!=) 24...\(\text{w}d4!\) (24...\(\text{e}7\) 25 \(\text{f}5!\) \(\text{d}4\) 26 \(\text{f}1\) \(\text{d}5\) 27 \(\text{e}6!\) \(\text{xe}6\) 28 \(\text{xe}6\) 29 \(\text{xe}6\) 30 \(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{xe}6\) 31 \(\text{w}d3\); these positions with a 4-3 kingside pawn majority can be particularly promising for White, but also dangerous as a slight slip can lead to disaster] 18 \(\text{xe}7\) \(\text{xe}7\) 19 \(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 20 \(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{cxd}5\) 21 \(\text{c}e2!\) (Kir.Georgiev-Huebner, Batumi 1999) and now after 21...\(\text{xe}5\) 22 \(\text{dxe}5\) \(h6\) it appears best to play 23 \(\text{d}2!\) \(\text{b}6!\) (23...\(\text{e}7\) 24 \(\text{e}6\)?) 24 \(\text{b}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 25 \(\text{d}4?!\)± with some pressure due to the threat of a kingside pawn advance. Weakening \(c3\) is not desirable, of course, but it is rather imperative if White wants to make progress in this type of position. After this lengthy interval we return to our main game:

13 \(\text{e}1\) \(\text{fd}5?!\)

In this way Black covers \(g5\), but removes a good defender from the kingside.

13...\(\text{f}5\) is another idea to avoid the annoying \(\text{b}3-\text{c}2\) later on; however, 14 \(\text{g}5\) \(\text{fd}5\) 15 \(\text{xe}7\) \(\text{xe}7\) 16 \(\text{h}4\) \(\text{g}6\) 17 \(\text{w}g4!\) [17 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 18 \(\text{e}3\) (Kurajica-Huebner, European Cup, Solingen 1988) promises nothing special after
18...\textit{d}f6] 17...\textit{w}d6 18 \textit{e}e3 \textit{a}d8 (18...\textit{d}d7 19 \textit{d}xg6 \textit{x}g6 20 \textit{e}e4 \textit{w}c7 21 \textit{e}ae1±) 19 \textit{e}ae1± looks very promising for White.

14 \textit{e}e4!

Rightly avoiding piece exchanges as White controls more space; an important remark to be made here is that White ignores d5 and focuses on his own strengths, namely c5, e5 and g5. This is acceptable tactics once Black chooses to post his f-knight on d5.

14...\textit{f}f5

14...\textit{b}4?! 15 \textit{d}d2 \textit{xd}2 16 \textit{w}xd2± is clearly in White's favour as c5 has turned into a wonderful base for his knights;

14...\textit{e}e8 15 \textit{d}d2 \textit{f}f5 16 \textit{e}e5↑ leads to similar play to the main line, except that Black has rather needlessly weakened his f7 square.

15 \textit{e}e5

Vacating, among others, f3 for the queen; White needs to mass pieces on the king's flank to exploit the absence of the \textit{f}6 from the defence.

15...\textit{d}7

15...\textit{b}4?! may have had more point now; the idea is that after 16 \textit{d}d2 \textit{xd}2 17 \textit{w}xd2 Black has 17...\textit{x}e4!?! 18 \textit{x}e4 \textit{f}f6 (18...\textit{w}d6 19 \textit{e}ae1±) 19 \textit{f}4 (19 \textit{e}e3; 19 \textit{e}e2) 19...\textit{b}d5 20 \textit{f}3± reaching what looks like a tenable position.

16 \textit{w}f3

16...\textit{e}e5?!?

But this is severely compromising Black's defences; as far as we can see from the defender's point of view the move has only negative aspects: White gets rid of the isolani, the d-file is opened up for his rooks and f6 becomes accessible for sacrificial purposes to the remaining White knight. All in all, rather unpleasant scenery for the Black king. 16...\textit{g}6! 17 \textit{d}d2± would have been only slightly better for White. On the other hand, 16...\textit{e}e6 17 \textit{d}d2 \textit{e}e8 [17...\textit{xe}5 18 dxe5 \textit{c}c7 19 \textit{ad}1 \textit{d}d5 (19...\textit{xb}3 20 \textit{xb}3 \textit{w}c8 21 \textit{g}5 \textit{xe}5 22 \textit{xe}5± xd6) 20 \textit{xc}3!±] 18 \textit{ad}1! \textit{w}c7 19 \textit{g}3↑ is rather awkward to meet. For example: 19...\textit{ad}8 20 \textit{xd}5! \textit{xd}5 21 \textit{h}6 \textit{f}8 22 \textit{g}5±
17 dxe5 \( \triangle g6 \)

[Diagram]

18 \( \triangle f4 \)

18 \( \triangle d1!? \pm \) has been suggested, but the text is more thematic; it is obvious that White would feel much more confident with the a-rook on d1.

18...\( \triangle a5? \)

A questionable decision, removing the queen from the theatre of action;

18...\( \triangle xf4 \) 19 \( \triangle xf4 \) \( \triangle xe4 \) 20 \( \triangle xe4\# \) was the best practical chance although in that case too White would have maintained certain attacking chances thanks to the presence of opposite coloured bishops.

19 \( \triangle d6! \pm \)

This knight jump must have been underestimated by Timman; it is clear that the knight has to be taken, but the Dutch Grandmaster had probably thought earlier on that the resulting pawn on d6 is not too dangerous.

19...\( \triangle xd6 \) 20 exd6 \( \triangle fe8 \)

20...\( \triangle ad8 \) would have hardly saved the game for Black: 21 \( \triangle ad1 \) \( \triangle xf4 \) 22 \( \triangle xf4 \) \( \triangle d7 \) (22...\( \triangle f5? \) 23 \( \triangle xf5 \) \( \triangle xf5 \) 24 \( \triangle e7 \) \( \triangle d7 \) 25 g4!+-; 22...\( \triangle fe8 \) 23 \( \triangle xe8+ \) \( \triangle xe8 \) 24 d7 \( \triangle d8 \) 25 \( \triangle e3+- \) 23 \( \triangle e7 \) \( \triangle d8 \) 24 \( \triangle e5 \pm \) and White has terrible threats such as h3-h4-h5, or simply \( \triangle d1-e1 \) in case Black withdraws his king to the corner.

21 \( \triangle xe8+ \) \( \triangle xe8 \)

[Diagram]

22 \( \triangle xd5! \)

A simple but very effective move, highlighting the strength of the passed pawn and the weakness of Black’s back rank.

22...\( \triangle xd5 \)

There is no choice; 22...\( \triangle e1+ \) leads to a prosaic finish after 23 \( \triangle xe1 \) \( \triangle xe1+ \) 24 \( \triangle h2 \) cxd5 25 d7 \( \triangle e7 \) 26 \( \triangle xd5 \) \( \triangle d8 \) 27 \( \triangle g5\# \). Also hopeless is 22...\( \triangle xd5 \) 23 \( \triangle xd5 \) cxd5 24 d7 \( \triangle d8 \) 25 \( \triangle e1! \) f6 26 \( \triangle e7 \) and \( \triangle f4-c7 \) is unstoppable, e.g. 26...\( \triangle f8 \) 27 \( \triangle d6\# \)

23 d7 \( \triangle e7 \)

23...\( \triangle d8 \) doesn’t save Black either; 24 \( \triangle e3 \) f6 (24...\( \triangle b5 \) 25 \( \triangle c7\# \); 24...h6 25 \( \triangle e8+ \) \( \triangle h7 \) 26 \( \triangle c1 \) f6 27 \( \triangle e7 \) \( \triangle f5 \) 28 b4! \( \triangle b6 \) 29 \( \triangle c7 \) \( \triangle xd7 \) 30 \( \triangle xd7 \) \( \triangle xd7 \) 31 \( \triangle xb6 \) axb6 32 \( \triangle c7 \) \( \triangle c6 \) 33 \( \triangle xc6 \) bxc6 34 a4+-) 25 \( \triangle c1 \) \( \triangle b5 \) (25...\( \triangle xd7 \) 26
Beating the Petroff  93

\[ \text{Beating the Petroff} \]

15
Psakhis – Martinovsky
Philadelphia open 1989

1 e4 e5 2 \text{\texttt{f3}} \text{\texttt{f6}} 3 \text{\texttt{dxe5}} d6 4 \text{\texttt{f3}} \text{\texttt{xe4}} 5 \text{\texttt{d4}} \text{\texttt{d5}}

\[ \text{Beating the Petroff} \]

With this natural move Black establishes fair control of the centre, giving himself the option of developing his king’s bishop on d6. In addition, all other development options for the rest of his minor pieces are kept intact, making possible a variety of opening schemes. We are now in the Petroff main lines, where White’s strategy centres on exploiting the double-edged placement of the \texttt{d4} by means of \texttt{c2-c4}, in an attempt to create unbalanced positions and realistic winning chances.

6 \text{\texttt{d3}} \text{\texttt{c6}}

This particular move-order is linked with the ambitious setup involving an early ...\texttt{c8-g4} in anticipation of White’s \texttt{c2-c4}. However, as we shall see, Black’s configuration should not discourage White from his intended advance.

7 0-0 \text{\texttt{g4}} 8 \text{\texttt{c4}}!

24 \text{\texttt{c1}} \text{\texttt{xd7}} 25 \text{\texttt{c8+}} \text{\texttt{d8}}

26 b4!

The finishing touch, and one that had to be calculated in advance. 26 \text{\texttt{c7??}} would have been a beginner’s blunder, throwing away the game due to 26...\text{\texttt{e1++}}

26...\text{\texttt{b6}} 27 \text{\texttt{c7+-}}

Normally Black should be able to put up some resistance with rook and bishop for the queen, but here his bishop is out of play, making White’s technical task short and easy.

27...\text{\texttt{x}} \text{\texttt{xc8}} 28 \text{\texttt{xb6}} \text{\texttt{axb6}} 29 \text{\texttt{xd5}} h6 30 \text{\texttt{xb7}} \text{\texttt{c1+}} 31 \text{\texttt{h2}} \text{\texttt{c2}} 32 \text{\texttt{xb6}} \text{\texttt{xa2}} 33 \text{\texttt{d4}}!

The b-pawn’s march will decide the fight, so Black resigned. A possible continuation could have been 33 \text{\texttt{d4}} \text{\texttt{a4}} 34 \text{\texttt{c5}} \text{\texttt{h7}} 35 b5 \text{\texttt{a1}} (35...\text{\texttt{a5}} 36 \text{\texttt{c6+-}}) 36 b6 \text{\texttt{b1}} 37 \text{\texttt{c7}} \text{\texttt{e4}} 38 \text{\texttt{f3}} and Black can prevent the pawn from queening only at the cost of his rook.

1-0
It turns out that this thematic continuation is possible in view of the shaky placement of Black’s minor pieces on e4 and g4.

8...\texttt{exf3}?! 

This move is too easy-going to be of any real value. 8...\texttt{Qb4}?, on the other hand, is simply bad in view of 9 cxd5 \texttt{Qxd3} 10 \texttt{Wxd3 Wxd5} 11 \texttt{e1e}± and the pin on the e-file spells trouble for Black.

9 \texttt{Wxf3 Qxd4} 

The win of a pawn is only temporary because Black’s knights are exposed in the middle of the board and his king is uncastled. What matters in the long run is White’s powerful pair of bishops.

10 \texttt{We3! Qf5} 

11 \texttt{Wh3} 

Not the most exact, but the position, nevertheless, remains dangerous for Black. 11 \texttt{Wf4}?? is interesting; after 11...\texttt{Qfd6} (11...\texttt{Qe7} 12 \texttt{Qxe4 dxe4} 13 \texttt{Wxe4 c6} 14 \texttt{Qc3±}) 12 cxd5 \texttt{Qf6} 13 \texttt{e1e+ Qe7} 14 \texttt{We5±} White recovers his pawn with a lasting initiative; best, however, is 11 \texttt{We1!}: After the obligatory 11...\texttt{Qe7} [11...\texttt{Qe7}?! 12 \texttt{f3! Qed6} (12...\texttt{c5+} 13 \texttt{Qh1+}) 13 c5+] 12 \texttt{Qxe4}! (12 cxd5 \texttt{Qd6} 13 \texttt{Qc3 Wd7} 14 \texttt{Qf4} 0-0-0 15 \texttt{We3!} → leads to a position similar to the one arising in the game, except for the position of the White queen) 12...\texttt{dxe4} 13 \texttt{Wxe4 c6} 14 \texttt{Qc3±} White recovers his pawn whilst keeping the opposing monarch under fire in the middle of the board.

11...\texttt{Wd7} 

11...\texttt{Qe7} would have forced White to make a real gambit of it by 12 \texttt{Qc3}! (But not 12 cxd5? \texttt{Wxd5} 13 \texttt{Qe1 Qd8!} and the position is suddenly unclear) 12...\texttt{Qxc3} (12...\texttt{Qf6} 13 \texttt{Qg5±}; 12...\texttt{Wd7} 13 \texttt{Wxd7+ Qxd7} 14 \texttt{Qxe4 dxe4} 15 \texttt{Qxe4 c6} 16 \texttt{Qe3±} is a very unpleasant endgame for Black) 13 bxc3 but this is hardly something he would have disliked since his rooks and bishops would have had plenty of opportunities to exploit the open board for attacking purposes;

11...\texttt{Qfd6} 12 cxd5 \texttt{Qe7} 13 \texttt{Qe1 Qf6} 14 \texttt{Qc3 Wd7} 15 \texttt{Wf3} 0-0-0 16 \texttt{Qg5 Qf6} 17 h3 h6 18 \texttt{Qf4 Qac8} 19 a4 a6 20 a5 \texttt{Qb5} 21 \texttt{Qxb5 axb5} was the continuation in
Kasparov-Georgiadis, Corfu simul. 1996 and now Garry missed the strongest continuation 22 \( \text{e5!} \pm \) creating the annoying threat of \( \text{d3-f5} \);

11...\( \text{g6} \)!? requires accuracy from White:

A) 12 \( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{wxd5} \) 13 \( \text{e1}? \) (13 \( \text{wxf3}! \)?) 13...0-0-0² was bad for White in Jansen-Drotthammar, IECG email 1997;

B) 12 \( \text{e1}?! \) \( \text{b4} \) 13 \( \text{d2}! \) \( \text{e7} \)

14 \( \text{f4!} \) (14 \( \text{c3}?! \) just fails to 14...\( \text{xd2} \) 15 \( \text{xd5} \) 0-0 16 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{g5}! \)!) 14...0-0 15 \( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{ed6} \) 16 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{g5}! \) 17 \( \text{gx5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 18 \( \text{xf5}! \) \( \text{xf5} \) (18...\( \text{xf5} \) 19 \( \text{e4} \pm \Delta \) \( \text{wh3-c3} \)) 19 \( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 20 \( \text{b5} \) is slightly better for White because after 20...\( \text{c6} \) 21 \( \text{dxc6} \) \( \text{bxc6} \) 22 \( \text{c3} \) he gets the better pawn structure;

C) 12 \( \text{c3}! \) \( \text{xc3} \) 13 \( \text{e1}+! \) \( \text{e7} \) (13...\( \text{e7} \) 14 \( \text{xf5} \pm \)) 14 \( \text{bxc3} \) is best, leading to a very dangerous initiative for White.

12 \( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{ed6} \) 13 \( \text{c3} \) 0-0-0

On 13...\( \text{e7} \) the reply 14 \( \text{f4} \) makes it difficult for Black to castle short.

14 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{e7} \)

15 \( \text{wh5}! \)

Avoiding a queen exchange and keeping f7 under pressure. The queen is not misplaced here and may later on switch over to the queenside via d1.

15...\( \text{g6} \) 16 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{b8} \) 17 \( \text{a4}! \pm \)

White has obtained excellent attacking chances on the queenside, whilst keeping Black under restraint on the other flank. Still, the position is not automatically won as the \( \text{d6} \) is a stout defender and needs to be exchanged or driven away.

17...\( \text{e7} \) 18 \( \text{a5}?! \)

Vacating a4 in preparation of the \( \text{c3-a4-c5} \) manoeuvre, but posting the f-rook on c1 would have preserved more possibilities.

18...\( \text{f6} \) 19 \( \text{a4} \)

19...\( \text{b5}?? \)

Unveiling an attack on d5 but the move is a terrible blunder; on principle, this knight should not move before an ending has been reached!

Centralisation by 19...\( \text{d4} \) and 20...\( \text{he8} \) would have given Black fairly good chances of counter-play. Now the game could have ended abruptly.
20 hfc1?! 

Good enough for a big advantage but it is astounding that Psakhis misses a chance to terminate the game at once by utilising an x-ray along the 5th rank: 20 hxb5! wxb5

21 hxc7+! would have forced resignation as 21...hxc7 22 d6+ loses the queen.

20...wd5??

One mistake follows another, but Black’s position was already very difficult. 20...h6 was the only move, but it would have merely prolonged Black’s agony. After 21 h5 wh8 (21...wh8 22 a6 b6 23 h7(1+-) both 22 wd1 and 22 he1 he7 23 ac1 leave no lingering doubts about the outcome of the game.

21 hxb5!

A simple but nevertheless beautiful queen sacrifice. Instead of resigning, Black decides to allow his great opponent demonstrate his point, in the spirit of the 19th century.

21...wh5 22 hxc7+ he8

22...a8 23 h6+! axb6 24 axb6#

23 he5# 1-0

16

Kotronias – Langrock
Wichern open, Hamburg 2001

1 e4 e5 2 df3 dh6 3 dxe5 d6 4 dh3 dfxe4 5 d4 d5 6 dh3 dh6 7 0-0 df4 8 c4 he7

A modest move, preparing to bring the king into safety; Now, however, White can fortify his centre by simply developing.

9 dh3 dxh3

9...df6 10 cxd5 df5 11 he4! transposes to a subsequent Illustrative Game.

10 bxc3 0-0

Thus Black has brought his king into safety at the cost of strengthening the White centre.

11 he1!

Preparing to play c4xd5, followed by h3-e4; it is in White’s interest to stay in a complicated middle-game where the g4 might prove to be a liability, rather than allow an ending which, no matter how pleasant it may be, requires far greater accuracy in order to yield
something tangible. Bearing this in mind, it becomes obvious that 11 cxd5!?! \( \text{\textit{W}} \)xd5 12 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)e1 is no improvement, because after 12...\( \text{\textit{A}} \)xf3! (12... \( \text{\textit{A}} \)fe8?! 13 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)e4! \( \text{\textit{W}} \)d6 14 \( \text{\textit{B}} \)b1 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)ab8 15 h3± gave White an enormous initiative in Matulovic-Kapelan, Vrsac 1981) 13 \( \text{\textit{W}} \)xf3 \( \text{\textit{W}} \)xf3 14 gxf3 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)d6 we reach an unbalanced endgame that will, nevertheless, be the subject of discussion in both the present Illustrative Game, as well as Illustrative Game No 19. However, whilst in the latter case it looks best for White to go into the ending, in the present one this is not altogether forced and therefore, besides analysing the ending itself we will also explore ways of avoiding it.

11...dxc4

Black has no other choice but to clarify the situation in the centre.

12 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)xc4

![Chess Diagram](image)

12...\( \text{\textit{A}} \)d6

This move, guarding c7, preventing \( \text{\textit{A}} \)c1-f4 and improving the radius of the Black queen is probably the best in the position.

12...\( \text{\textit{A}} \)a5 is linked with the idea of ...c7-c5, but it looks premature as it abandons control of the centre. After 13 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)d3 Black is almost forced to surrender his light squared bishop:

A) On 13...\( \text{\textit{A}} \)e8?! the reply 14 h3!± forces 14...\( \text{\textit{W}} \)xf3 15 \( \text{\textit{W}} \)xf3±; Others fail:

A1) 14...\( \text{\textit{A}} \)h5? leads to a practically winning position for White after 15 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)e5!+- as 15...\( \text{\textit{A}} \)xf3 16 \( \text{\textit{W}} \)xf3 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)c6 is met strongly with 17 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)b5 (or 17 h5);

A2) 14...\( \text{\textit{A}} \)e6? 15 \( \text{\textit{W}} \)c2 h6 (15...g6? 16 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)xe6 fxe6 17 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)xg6 hxg6 18 \( \text{\textit{W}} \)xg6+ \( \text{\textit{A}} \)h8 19 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)g5 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)xg5 20 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)xg5+-) 16 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)h7+ \( \text{\textit{A}} \)f8 17 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)xe6 fxe6 18 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)g6+- is also hopeless;

B) 13...\( \text{\textit{A}} \)f6?! is hardly good either. After the customary 14 h3 Black dare not respond with 14...\( \text{\textit{A}} \)h5? (14...\( \text{\textit{A}} \)xf3 15 \( \text{\textit{W}} \)xf3± is the lesser evil) in view of 15 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)xh7+! \( \text{\textit{A}} \)xh7 16 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)g5+ \( \text{\textit{A}} \)h6 17 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)xf7+! \( \text{\textit{A}} \)g6 18 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)e5+ \( \text{\textit{A}} \)xe5 19 \( \text{\textit{W}} \)d3+ \( \text{\textit{A}} \)f7 20 \( \text{\textit{W}} \)f5+ \( \text{\textit{A}} \)g8 21 \( \text{\textit{W}} \)xh5+-;

C) 13...c5 (Consistent, but nevertheless inadequate for complete equality) 14 \( \text{\textit{A}} \)a3!

...and now Black has to be very careful in order to stay in the game.
as White's pieces are tremendously active:

C1) 14...\( \text{\=A}e8 \) 15 \( h3 \pm \) allows White to obtain a strong attack no matter how Black continues, the following lines providing the evidence:

\begin{itemize}
  \item C1a) 15...\( \text{\=A}e6 \) 16 \( \text{C}c2! \rightarrow \);
  \item C1b) 15...\( \text{\=A}h5 \) 16 \( \text{\=A}e5! \) \( \text{\=A}xf3 \) 17 \( \text{\=A}xf3 \) \( \text{\=Q}c6 \) (17...\( \text{cx}d4 \) 18 \( \text{\=A}e4 \) \( f5 \) 19 \( \text{\=A}xf5 \) \( \text{\=Q}xa3 \) 20 \( \text{\=A}xh7+ \) \( \text{\=A}f8 \) 21 \( \text{\=A}h8+ \) \( \text{\=Q}f7 \) 22 \( \text{\=A}g6++- \) ) 18 \( \text{\=A}d5 \pm ; \)
  \item C1c) 15...\( \text{\=A}xf3 \) 16 \( \text{\=A}xf3 \) and White's centre is untouchable as 16...\( \text{cx}d4? \) is met with the crushing 17 \( \text{\=A}e4+- \). Better is ...
\end{itemize}

\( \text{C2) 14...\=Ac8 15 \=We2!} \), and we are at a critical crossroads where Black must play with utmost precision:

\begin{itemize}
  \item C2a) 15...\( \text{\=A}e6?! \) 16 \( \text{\=A}ad1 \pm \) was visibly superior for White in Ermenkov-Radulov, Vratsa 1975;
  \item C2b) 15...\( \text{\=A}d6 \) is better than 15...\( \text{\=A}e6 \), but probably still insufficient to hold; White should continue 16 \( \text{\=A}e4 \) \( f5 \) 17 \( \text{\=A}e6+ \) \( \text{\=A}h8 \) 18 \( \text{\=A}e5 \) when Black is hard pressed to find a good defence. After 18...\( \text{\=Q}c7 \) (18...\( \text{\=A}h5 \) 19 \( \text{\=A}xf5 \) \( \text{\=Q}c7 \) (Wokurka-Mayer, West German ch corr. 1988) 20 \( \text{\=A}d3! \) \( \text{\=W}f6 \) 21 \( \text{\=W}h3! \pm \) is good for White e.g. 21...\( \text{\=W}xf2+? \) 22 \( \text{\=A}h1 \) \( g6 \) 23 \( \text{\=Q}f1+-- \) 19 \( \text{\=Q}xg4 \) \( \text{\=W}e7 \) 20 \( \text{\=W}xd6 \) \( \text{\=W}xd6 \) 21 \( \text{\=Q}xc5 \) \( \text{\=Qxe1+} \) 22 \( \text{\=Q}xe1 \) \( \text{\=W}d8 \) 23 \( \text{\=Q}xf8 \) \( \text{\=W}xf8 \) 24 \( \text{\=Q}xf5! \) [24 \( \text{\=Q}b5?! \) \( \text{\=Q}c6! \) (24...\( \text{\=Q}g8? \) 25 \( \text{\=A}e8 \) \( \text{\=fxg}4 \) 26 \( \text{\=Qxf8} \) \( \text{\=Qxf8} \) 27 \( \text{\=Q}f1+-- \) was clearly lost for Black in Cavajda-Maciejewski, EU ch corr. 1986]) 25 \( \text{\=Q}e5 \) \( g6 \) 26 \( \text{\=Q}xc6 \) \( bxc6 \) 27 \( \text{\=Q}xc6 \) \( \text{\=W}a3\# \) is close to a draw] \( g6 \) 25 \( \text{\=Q}d7! \) \( \text{\=W}a3 \) (25...\( \text{\=Q}g7 \) 26 \( h4! \) \( \text{\=W}d8 \) 27 \( \text{\=Q}e8 \) \( \text{\=W}xd7 \) 28 \( \text{\=Q}g8! \) \( \text{\=Q}xg8 \) 29 \( \text{\=Q}f6++- \) ) 26 \( \text{\=Q}e8+ \) \( \text{\=Q}g7 \) 27 \( h4! \pm \) White has mating threats, e.g. 27...\( \text{\=h}5 \) 28 \( \text{\=Q}e5 \) \( \text{\=W}c1+ \) 29 \( \text{\=Q}h2 \) \( \text{\=W}f4+ \) 30 \( \text{\=Q}h3!++- \) \( \text{\=W}xf2 \) 31 \( \text{\=Q}e7+ \) \( \text{\=Q}h6 \) 32 \( \text{\=Q}f7+ \) \( \text{\=Q}g7 \) 33 \( \text{\=Q}g5+ \) \( \text{\=Q}f8 \) 34 \( \text{\=Q}f7++; \)
  \item C2c) 15...\( \text{\=A}c6! \)
\end{itemize}
17...\texttt{xd6}! (17...\texttt{wa5}?! 18 \texttt{d5 \texttt{xa3}} 19 \texttt{dxc6±}) 18 \texttt{dxc5!} (18 \texttt{\texttt{xe5}! \texttt{xc5}} 19 \texttt{dxc5 \texttt{xf6}}!) 18...\texttt{xf3!} 19 \texttt{\texttt{xf3} \texttt{xh2+} 20 \texttt{\texttt{fl}}! \texttt{wa5} 21 \texttt{\texttt{b4}! \texttt{wa4}?!} (21...\texttt{\texttt{xb4} 22 \texttt{\texttt{d7}! \texttt{c7}} 23 \texttt{\texttt{xc7} \texttt{xc7} 24 \texttt{\texttt{xb4} \texttt{e5±}) and White has a rather pleasant final choice between...

C2e1) 22 \texttt{\texttt{g3} a5\texttt{\texttt{d5}} \texttt{g2}} (23 \texttt{\texttt{d7} \texttt{e5} 24 \texttt{\texttt{xe5} \texttt{xd7} 25 \texttt{\texttt{xa5} \texttt{wh3}+ 26 \texttt{g2 wh6}}) 23...\texttt{\texttt{xb4} 24 \texttt{\texttt{xh2} \texttt{bc3} 25 \texttt{\texttt{xc3} \texttt{wa5±}, or...)

C2e2) 22 \texttt{\texttt{b3} \texttt{wb5+} 23 \texttt{\texttt{e2 \texttt{xe2} \texttt{b8} 25 \texttt{\texttt{d7} \texttt{c7} 26 \texttt{ed2±); In this final variation, now that the smoke of complications has cleared, it becomes apparent that White enjoys a small but permanent advantage in the endgame;

The rook clearly belongs to the open file, posing Black some problems on how to meet the threat to his b-pawn.

13 \texttt{\texttt{h3}!} \texttt{\texttt{h5} 14 \texttt{\texttt{b1} is another position requiring analysis; the game Moreno-Al Badani, Istanbul (ol) 2000 was hardly a test of the idea as Black blundered immediately by 14...\texttt{\texttt{xf6}?, allowing 15 \texttt{g4+- winning a piece.

13...\texttt{\texttt{xf6}!}

Seeking transition to an endgame, which, however, may be slightly worse for Black despite White's four (!) pawn islands. This move is possible because b7 is not yet hanging due to the \texttt{\texttt{c6-a5} fork.

Another move trying to exploit this fact is 13...\texttt{\texttt{d7} but after 14 \texttt{h3 White is better no matter how Black continues:

A) 14...\texttt{\texttt{h5} 15 \texttt{\texttt{b5}?} (15 \texttt{\texttt{d3 \texttt{ae8} 16 \texttt{\texttt{e3} is slightly better for White according to Yusupov, but in fact after 16...\texttt{d8}! things are not so clear) 15...\texttt{\texttt{g6 16 \texttt{h4} allows White to gain the bishop pair and a slight advantage after 16...a6 17 \texttt{\texttt{b2} b5 18 \texttt{\texttt{xc6} hxg6 19 \texttt{\texttt{d3}±;

B) 14...\texttt{\texttt{f5}! 15 \texttt{\texttt{d3}?} (15 \texttt{\texttt{b2 \texttt{a5} 16 \texttt{\texttt{f1 \texttt{ae8}!}) 15...\texttt{b6 16 \texttt{\texttt{g5} (a key move) 16...\texttt{ae8 17 \texttt{e4} (By blocking the e-file White gains time to double his rooks) 17...\texttt{g6 (17...\texttt{\texttt{e7 18 \texttt{f3 \texttt{e8} 19 \texttt{g5! f6 20 \texttt{\texttt{d2 \texttt{g6 21 h4!} 18 \texttt{\texttt{d2 \texttt{e7 19 \texttt{f3 c6 20 \texttt{\texttt{e2 \texttt{b8 21 \texttt{\texttt{be1}±

14 \texttt{\texttt{d3}?!

This may not be best; 14 \texttt{\texttt{d5}! is a very interesting move, but didn't enter my mind because I simply didn’t choose the 11 \texttt{\texttt{e1}! move order in actual play; in the game I
transposed to the 11 cxd5!? move-order which, nevertheless, has an advantage if White has decided to go straight into the ending: The rook on a1 has not moved and this can be of some significance as the note to White's 16th reveals. However, unaware of the difference I moved all the same my rook to b1, getting the worst I could get out of both continuations!

But let's turn our attention back to 14  Qd5!: 14...Hab8 (14...Qxh2+? 15 Qxh2 Qd6+ fails to 16 Qe5!±) 15 h3 Qf5 (15...Qd7 16 Qg5†) 16 Qb2 h6 17 Qbe2 Qe7 18 Qb3 Qg6 19 Qe5 Hbd8 20 f4→ and White seems to have a strong initiative as g2-g4 is coming. If this line is good then Black has to switch to 13...Hd7.

14...Qxf3!

It's now or never! 14...Hae8? proved disastrous for Black after 15 Qg5! Qxg5 16 Qxg5 Qxd1 17 Hedx1 g6 18 Qe4 Hxe7 19 Hxb7+- in Condie-Nicholson, London 1986.

15 Hxf3 Hxf3 16 gxf3

Thus, the endgame in question has been reached; besides a slight weakness on the light squares Black looks very solid and in this case appearances are not deceptive. To gain something tangible White needs to work very hard, the main tool for effecting a breach in Black's fortress being the advance of the central pawn duo after due preparation. A slight disadvantage for White compared to Game 19 is that here the less useful Ha1-b1 has been played (instead of Qc1-e3 in that game) but this is unavoidable if White uses the 11 Hf1 move order (Which however, as I explained earlier on, I didn’t use: The actual starting moves of the present game were 1 e4 e5 2 Qf3 Qf6 3 Qxe5 d6 4 Qf3 Qxe4 5 d4 d5 6 Qd3 Hc6 7 0-0 Qe7 8 c4 Qg4 9 cxd5 Hxd5 10 Qc3 Hxc3 11 bxc3 0-0 12 Hf1 Hxf3 13 Hxf3 Qxf3 14 gxf3 Qd6 15 Hb1, reaching the diagrammed position with an economy of one move). The reason why Ha1-b1 is less good than Qc1-e3 lies in the fact that Black would have to play ...b7-b6 anyway, so White effectively loses a tempo in the struggle to mobilise his central pawns.

16...Hab8

Slightly unnatural, when the pawn could have simply been defended with ...b7-b6.

Nevertheless, even after 16...b6 17 Hc3 Qe7!? (17...Had8 18 Qg5! leads to play analogous to Ehlvest-Yusupov, featured under Illustrative Game No 19; the point of such a move is that if Black wants to avoid weakening his
position by ...f7-f6 he has to play 18...æb8 and then 19 Æb5 h6 20 Æh4 Æa5 21 Æe7 Æxe7 22 Æxe7 c6 23 Æd3 Æb7 24 Æb1 allows a White rook to penetrate on the 7th rank with some initiative; 17...æab8 transposes to the game) 18 c4 Æad8 19 Æe4!? (19 Æc2 is also possible, but 19 Æe4 may have a point in tempting Black to weaken himself by ...f7-f5) 19...c6 (19...f5 20 Æc2 f4 21 Æd2 leaves Black exposed on the light squares, e.g. 21...Æf5 22 Æc3 c5 23 Æxf5 Æxf5 24 Æ± and the plan of advancing by a2-a4-a5 seems to offer White a comfortable plus; 19...Æg6 20 a4± offers White a standard queenside initiative) 20 a4± White seems to have a small initiative with the minimum of risk;

16...æae8 17 Æe4 Æd8 was played in Cabejsek-Valenta, Czech ch 4th e-mail 2000. Now White should have continued with the typical 18 Æe3± intending to push his c-pawn.

17 Æe3 b6 18 f4?!

I should not have hurried with this move. Best is 18 a4!, avoiding f3-f4 for the time being as Black has no useful moves. On 18...h6 (intending to place a rook on d8 without being harassed by Æe3-g5, to be followed by Æd3-b5 and Æg5-e7) there follows 19 f4! (with ...h7-h6 played this threatens a cramping f4-f5) 19...Æe7 20 c4 Æg6 (20...c6 21 f5±) 21 f5 Æf4 22 Æe4± with at least a slight edge for White; if, on the other hand, after 18 a4! Black decides on the immediate 18...Æe7, then the pressure on White’s centre is removed and he may advance his c-pawn without fear. In that case, a2-a4 is clearly more useful than f3-f4, since White needs a4-a5 to open lines on the queenside.

18...Æe7 19 c4 c6 20 Æg2 Æfd8

21 Æb3!±

Despite the inaccuracy on the 18th White has kept a tiny edge because of his space advantage and two bishops. 21 Æb3 is a good move, protecting the Æd3 and preparing to double on the b-file followed by a2-a4-a5, opening lines on the queenside.

21...Æf8 22 Æeb1 g6 23 Æe4 Ædc8 24 a4 Æg7

Here or on the next move Black could have considered playing ...f7-f5, but he was understandably reluctant to do so because it weakens e6 and deprives his knight from the f5 square.

25 Æf3 Æf6!?  

This does not look like a good square for the king but I was unable to prove it; in any case If Black wants to do without f7-f5 he can always do so by posting the king on f8. 25...f5 26 Æc2 Æf7 was the
other possibility; in that case White may continue with the direct 27 a5, just as in the game, or start toying with various plans with a move like 27 \textit{d}3!?

26 a5!?

Apparently a rash decision but during the game I thought I should hurry before the Black king reaches d7. The logical alternative 26 \textit{d}2 \textit{e}6! 27 a5 bxa5 28 \textit{x}xa5 \textit{x}b3+ 29 \textit{x}b3 \textit{b}8 30 \textit{e}3 \textit{d}7 looked equal to me during the game and this assessment is probably very close to the truth because the White rook has failed to reach an active position. Therefore I decided to trust my intuition and played 26 a5!? instinctively.

26...bxa5!

Had Black refused the offer and played 26...\textit{c}7?? instead, I would have seized the a-file by 27 axb6 axb6 28 \textit{a}1\pm (whilst 28 d5!? cxd5 29 cxd5 is also worth considering, especially if we take into account the awkward placement of the Black king).

27 \textit{b}7?

A bad mistake, when White was so close to achieving something tangible.

27 c5! would have been simple and strong, locking in the Black bishop before penetrating with \textit{b}3-b7. In that case the advantage seemed to be in White’s hands, but at the last moment I noticed 27...\textit{xb}3! (27...\textit{c}7 28 \textit{b}7 \textit{xb}7 29 \textit{xb}7 \textit{b}8 30 \textit{c}2!± was my dream) 28 \textit{xb}3 \textit{b}8! contesting the b-file at the cost of sacrificing two pieces for a rook. I was not sure whether the position resulting from 29 cxd6 \textit{xb}3 30 dxe7 \textit{xe}7 31 \textit{xc}6 \textit{d}6 32 d5 was winning or not (It probably isn’t after 32...f5!) and so played without serious thought the dubious text continuation.

27...\textit{xb}7 28 \textit{xb}7 \textit{c}7 29 \textit{b}8

29...c5?

Black returns the favour, when he could obtain a slightly better position with accurate defence. 29...\textit{b}4?! was not particularly good because 30 \textit{e}2! (intending \textit{e}2-d3, c4-c5, \textit{d}3-c4) seems to offer White excellent compensation for the pawn; however, I had missed that Black could preface ...\textit{d}6-b4 with 29...\textit{d}7! using the tempo on the \textit{b}8 to set up annoying pressure on the d-pawn. After 30 \textit{a}8 \textit{b}4! (30...a4? 31 c5 a3 32 \textit{b}1! \textit{d}5 33 cxd6 \textit{c}3 34 d5! c5 35 \textit{xc}5 \textit{xb}1 36 \textit{xa}7 \textit{xa}7 37 \textit{xa}7 \textit{d}2+ 38 \textit{g}2 \textit{b}3 39 \textit{b}6! a2 40 d7 a1=\textit{w} 41 d8=\textit{w}+ \textit{g}7 42 \textit{c}7!++ is a trap that Black should obviously avoid) 31 \textit{c}2 \textit{c}3! my failure to contain the enemy bishop would have been...
more than glaring and would have forced me to find a series of good moves to secure drawing chances: 32 e4! f5 33 d5 cxd5+ 34 cxd5 b4! 35 a4! 
30 b5!
Now White is suddenly able to exploit the position of the Black king on f6; not really surprising however, if we take into consideration that Black’s last move opened the position to the benefit of the bishop pair.
30...c6
30...cxd4? 31 xd4+ e6 32 c5+ would have cost Black a piece.
31 dx5 f8 32 d5±
Material equality has been restored and a brief comparison of the pieces’ strength is sufficient to convince almost anyone that White is close to winning here. Still, the right plan has to be found, and this is none other than transferring the king over to the queenside.
32...h6
After 32...a4 33 b2!± the a-pawn will not go far. The game move, on the other hand, is an admission of defeat.
33 e4! e7+ 34 d3 c7 35 c3 h5 36 b3 h4 37 a4 f5 38 h3+ 
Sealing all entrances and denying Black counter-play. The game has been decided.
38...h6 39 xc6 xc6 40 b7! f6 41 b5 e8 42 c6 a6+ 43 b6 a4 44 c7 a3 45 a7 1-0

17
Malakhov – Tihonov
Minsk 1997

1 e4 e5 2 f3 d6 3 xe5 d6 4 f3 xe4 5 d4 d5 6 d3 c6 7 0-0 g4 8 c4 f6

A logical continuation, getting the knight out of trouble and intensifying Black’s control over d5.
9 c3!
White in his turn plays a logical and strong move, sacrificing the d-pawn for the initiative. In the present Illustrative Game we will examine what happens if Black declines the offer.
9...dxc4
A sensible way of avoiding complications, but now White can obtain a slight edge without risking too much.
9...b4?! can be met with 10 g5! which is a strong improvement over existing theory (10...bxd5 11 e1+ e7 12 h3 h5 13 g5 0-0 14 e5! with a White initiative, is also possible).
After 10 \( \text{g5!} \) Black has several continuations, but none of them is fully satisfactory:

A) 10...\text{e7} is easily dismissed in view of 11 \text{xf6}!;

B) 10...\text{e6} 11 \text{cxd5} \text{bxd5} is strongly met by 12 \text{e4}? [12 \text{xd5!?} \text{xd5} (12...\text{xd5} 13 \text{e1+ e7} 14 \text{xf6 gxf6} 15 \text{h4}±) 13 \text{e1} (13 \text{xf6 gxf6} 14 \text{e1} 0-0-0 15 \text{a4 b8} 13...\text{e7} 14 \text{c1}± also looks good] After 12...\text{e7} 13 \text{xf6} \text{xf6} 14 \text{xd5} 15 \text{e1}± Black ends up in a horrible mess;

C) 10...c6 11 \text{e1+ e6} (11...\text{e7} 12 \text{xf6 gxf6} 13 \text{cxd5} \text{xd5} 14 \text{xd5} \text{xd5} 15 \text{e4}±) is a logical way of defending, but White's better development allows him to attack frontally: 12 \text{f5! dxc4} 13 \text{xe6 fxe6} 14 \text{e6+ f7} 15 \text{e2 d3} 16 \text{e5+! xe5} 17 dxe5 and further resistance appears hopeless:

C1) 17...\text{xe6} 18 \text{xf6+ f5} 19 \text{fxg7+};

C2) 17...\text{c8} 18 \text{xf6+ gxf6} 19 \text{h5+ g8} 20 \text{xf6 g7} 21 \text{xg7 xg7} 22 \text{g5+ f8} (22...\text{f7} 23 \text{e4+}) 23 \text{d1+};

C3) 17...\text{d7} 18 \text{xf6+ gxf6} 19 \text{h5+ g8} 20 \text{e4+};

D) 10...\text{xd3} (The knight has lost several tempi to capture this bishop but it appears that there is nothing better now) 11 \text{xf6!} \text{xf6} (11...\text{xf3} 12 \text{xf3} \text{xf6} 13 \text{xd3}±) 12 \text{xd5} \text{d6} 13 \text{xd3} 0-0-0± and although Black has insufficient compensation for the pawn he is, at least, still in the game.

10 \text{xc4 e7}

10...\text{xf3}? 11 \text{xf3} \text{xd4} 12 \text{b5}±

11 d5!

In such situations drastic measures offer the best chance of getting the most out of the opening. 11 \text{e3} 0-0 12 h3± is a typical isolated QP position, slightly better for White.

11...\text{e5}

Given as only slightly better for White in several sources; whilst this evaluation may be true, Black's demise in the present Game sufficed to destroy the reputation of this variation completely.
Also possible is 11...\( \text{\texttt{xf3}} \)? 12 \( \text{\texttt{xf3 \texttt{De5 \texttt{b5+}}}} \) c6 14 \( \text{\texttt{we2 \texttt{cxb5}}} \) 15 \( \text{\texttt{xe5 \texttt{0-0}}} \) 16 \( \text{\texttt{xf4!}} \) b4 17 \( \text{\texttt{De4 \texttt{De8}}} \) reaching a position where White must play very accurately to exploit his passed d-pawn, or else his advantage will evaporate. He has available three candidate rook moves, but only one of them looks really dangerous:

A) 18 \( \text{\texttt{Mad1 \texttt{De4}}} \) 19 \( \text{\texttt{we4 \texttt{ad6}}} \) offers White very little as the d-pawn is safely blocked;

B) 18 \( \text{\texttt{Md1!?}} \) is slightly more intriguing as it reserves c1 for the queen’s rook, yet it doesn’t really change the picture after 18...\( \text{\texttt{De4 \texttt{we4 \texttt{ad6}}} \)} \[19...\text{\texttt{ XC8?! \texttt{20 \texttt{wd3!}}} \} \]
(20...\( \text{\texttt{xd6 \texttt{21 \texttt{xb7 \texttt{wc7=}}} \}} \)
20...\( \text{\texttt{d6 \texttt{21 \texttt{g3!}}} \) \text{\texttt{xf4 \texttt{22 \texttt{xf4 \texttt{xe2}}} \text{\texttt{23 \texttt{d6 \texttt{cc2}}} \text{\texttt{24 \texttt{d7+}}} \text{\texttt{is obviously unacceptable for Black} \}} \]
20 \( \text{\texttt{f3 \texttt{wd7!}}} \) 21 \( \text{\texttt{g3 \texttt{ad8}}} \) 22 \( \text{\texttt{ac1 \texttt{xf4}}} \) 23 \( \text{\texttt{xf4 \texttt{wd6?}}} \) and Black has good chances to hold the ending;

C) 18 \( \text{\texttt{De1!}} \) (The best way of backing the valuable passed pawn, giving White a small but lasting advantage; the main idea is that Black cannot blockade the d-pawn by putting his bishop on d6) 18...\( \text{\texttt{De4 \texttt{(18...\texttt{Xd5?? \texttt{19 \texttt{ad1+/-}})}} \text{\texttt{19 \texttt{we4}}} \text{\texttt{and Black has problems:}} \}

C1) 19...\( \text{\texttt{wd7?!}} \) loses at least a pawn after 20 \( \text{\texttt{d6!}} \), e.g. 20...\( \text{\texttt{xd6 \texttt{21 \texttt{wd3!+-}}} \} \]
(21 \( \text{\texttt{d4? \texttt{xe1+}}} \) 22 \( \text{\texttt{xe1 \texttt{xe8}}} \) 23 \( \text{\texttt{xf1 \texttt{xe6}}} \) or 20...\( \text{\texttt{f6 \texttt{21 \texttt{xb4}}} \)

C2) After 19...\( \text{\texttt{f6 \texttt{20 \texttt{we8+}}} \text{\texttt{xe8 \texttt{21 \texttt{xe8+}}} \text{\texttt{xe8 \texttt{22 \texttt{d1!}}}} \text{\texttt{the b-pawn is untouchable in view of 22...\texttt{xb2?}}} \} \)
(22...\( \text{\texttt{d8 \texttt{23 \texttt{d2 \texttt{f8}}} \text{\texttt{24 g4?!}} \text{\texttt{is best play for both sides, with an interesting technical struggle ahead}} \}} \)
23 \( \text{\texttt{d6 \texttt{f6 \texttt{24 \texttt{d7+}}} \text{\texttt{winning.}} \}} \]

12 \( \text{\texttt{b5+ \texttt{De7}}} \)

12...\( \text{\texttt{c6? \texttt{13 dxc6 \texttt{xc6}}} \text{\texttt{14 \texttt{xd8+}}} \)
\( \text{\texttt{xd8 \texttt{15 \texttt{xc6+ \texttt{bxc6}}} \text{\texttt{16 \texttt{De5 \texttt{d7}}} \text{\texttt{17 \texttt{e3? is very unpleasant, if not already lost for Black;}}}} \}
\( \text{\texttt{12...\texttt{f7? \texttt{13 \texttt{d4! \texttt{xf3}}} \text{\texttt{14 \texttt{xe5 \texttt{f6}}} \text{\texttt{15 \texttt{we6 \texttt{h5}}} \text{\texttt{16 \texttt{d6! \texttt{cxd6}}} \text{\texttt{17 \texttt{d4 \texttt{xc7}}} \text{\texttt{18 \texttt{e1 \texttt{d8}}} \text{\texttt{19 \texttt{f8}}} \text{\texttt{20 \texttt{d5}} \text{\texttt{led to a complete disaster for Black in Balogh-Keemink, corr. 1930.}}}} \}
\( \text{\texttt{13 h3!}} \)

A good move that challenges the universally accepted evaluation of \( \pm \)
for the diagrammed position; it is not surprising that after this game no-one seems to have repeated the line for Black, but in fact things may not be as simple as they appear.

13...\textit{h5}?

Now Black's game is bound to collapse into pieces. We can understand someone who dislikes to give up the bishop pair as early as on move 13, but common sense should have warned Black that it was imperative to castle at all costs: 13...\textit{xf3}! 14 \textit{xf3} and now:

A) 14...a6?! 15 \textit{xd7}+! \textit{xd7} 16 \textit{e1} 0-0 17 \textit{f4} \textit{e8}! (17...\textit{fe8} 18 \textit{e5}!+ leads to a strange position where Black has problems with the mobility of both the \textit{e7} and the \textit{f6}) 18 \textit{e2} \textit{d6} 19 \textit{ae1} \textit{ae8} 20 \textit{e4}\textsuperscript{\uparrow} looks tenable for Black although White certainly maintains some pressure;

B) 14...0-0 15 \textit{d6}! (If White doesn't play this I can't see any advantage) 15...\textit{xd6} 16 \textit{xb7} would have yielded an interesting position where White's advantages (two bishops, better pawn structure) are of a permanent nature, but he would still have had to contain the activity of the Black pieces.

Now, on the other hand, the duration of the game is shortened dramatically.

14 \textit{g4}! \textit{g6} 15 \textit{g5}!

Black had undoubtedly missed this move, evicting the defender of the pinned \textit{d7}. Tragicomic as it may be, Black has no defence against the coming \textit{f3}-e5 and must lose a piece.

15...\textit{e4} 16 \textit{xe4} \textit{xe4} 17 \textit{e5}+-

Black's position was already ripe for resignation at this point; he probably dragged it out a bit in an attempt to fight the extremely unwelcome feeling of frustration that overcomes chessplayers on such unfortunate occasions.

17...c6

Desperation; 17...\textit{f5} succumbs to 18 \textit{f3}+ with the double threat of \textit{f3}xf5 and \textit{b5}xd7+.

18 \textit{dx6} \textit{xe5} 19 c7+ \textit{f8} 20 cxd8=\textit{w}+ \textit{xd8} 21 \textit{we2} \textit{f3}+

At least Black has the satisfaction of the last check!

22 \textit{g2} \textit{d4} 23 \textit{xf3}

White is satisfied with being only a piece ahead, so Black resigned.

1-0

18

Ponomariov – Turov
3rd Rector Cup, Kharkov 2001

1 e4 e5 2 \textit{f3} \textit{f6} 3 \textit{xe5} d6 4 \textit{f3} \textit{xe4} 5 d4 d5 6 \textit{d3} \textit{c6} 7 0-0 \textit{g4} 8 c4 \textit{f6} 9 \textit{c3} \textit{xf3}

This variation was Yusupov's pet line for quite a while, until he suffered a crushing defeat against Kupreichik; Black plunges in without hesitation, grabbing the important d-pawn, but White's activity guarantees a lasting initiative.
The alternative method of winning a pawn by 9...\(\text{d}x\text{d}4?!\) is less good on account of 10 \(\text{w}e1+!\); then Black has serious problems as the following variations show:

\[\text{A) 10...\text{e}7!? 11 \text{d}x\text{d}4 \text{d}xc4 should be met by 12 \text{d}f5! \text{cxd}3 13 \text{d}x\text{g}7+, forcing the Black king to abandon safety. Then...}

\[\text{A1) 13...\text{f}8 14 \text{h}6 \text{g}8 15 \text{w}e5! gives White a very strong attack, for example 15...\text{f}8 16 \text{g}5 \text{e}8 17 \text{x}g4 \text{x}g7 (17...\text{x}g7 18 \text{x}g7 \text{x}g7 19 \text{f}3 \text{c}6 20 \text{d}ad1+) 18 \text{d}ad1+, while...}

\[\text{A2) 13...\text{d}7 14 \text{f}3! \text{g}8 15 \text{h}6 leads to a position where Black's exposed king offers White the better chances too;}

\[\text{B) 10...\text{e}6 prevents the loss of castling but has other minuses: 11 \text{e}5 \text{d}4 (11...\text{b}4 12 \text{x}g4 \text{x}g4 13 \text{f}5! \text{x}c3 14 \text{b}xc3 \text{f}6 15 \text{a}3! \text{w}d7 16 \text{d}d1 \text{c}6 17 \text{c}xd5 \text{c}xd5 18 \text{c}4 0-0-0 19 \text{c}xd5 \text{c}x\text{d}5 20 \text{e}5+ didn’t help Black in Beney-Vianin, Crans Montana 2000) 12 \text{d}d5 (12 \text{e}4!!?) 12...\text{h}5 13 \text{f}4! and the \text{h}5 is exposed, giving Black serious ground for concern. For example: 13...\text{e}7 (13...\text{c}6 14 \text{xf}6+ \text{gxf}6 15 \text{xc}6! \text{bxc}6 16 \text{f}5 \text{g}6 17 \text{fx}g6 \text{hx}g6 18 \text{g}6\text{f}+ 14 \text{h}4 \text{d}5 (14...\text{g}6 15 \text{xe}7 \text{d}x\text{d}3 16 \text{d}x\text{d}3 \text{w}xe7 17 \text{f}5\text{f} 15 \text{w}x\text{h}5 \text{g}6 16 \text{w}h3!\text{t.}

10 \text{w}f3 \text{d}x\text{d}4 11 \text{w}h3!\text{t.}

\[\text{The queen is excellently placed here, observing the important points e6 and h7. Black is now faced with an arduous defensive task.}

\[\text{11...\text{d}xc4}

\[\text{11...\text{e}6?! is inferior in view of 12 \text{c}xd5 \text{d}xd5 13 \text{b}5\text{f}1 \text{c}6 14 \text{d}d1 and the centralised White forces exert tremendous pressure on Black's position. For example, 14...\text{x}b5 (14...\text{d}c7?! 15 \text{d}x\text{d}5 \text{d}x\text{d}5 16 \text{b}3\text{t} gives White a strong attack according to Dolmatov and Dvoretsky; this position occurred in Carr-Frostick, England corr. 1994-95, and after the further 16...\text{e}7 17 \text{d}x\text{d}5 \text{w}c8 White missed a clear way to victory by 18 \text{e}5 \text{c}xb5 19 \text{d}2 \text{f}8 20 \text{c}7 \text{e}7 \text{c}e7 21 \text{b}4\text{t}! \text{d}8 22 \text{d}d1++) 15 \text{d}x\text{d}5 \text{w}c8 16 \text{e}3 and it seems that the final countdown has started for Black:}

\[\text{A) 16...a6 17 \text{c}1 \text{w}b8 (17...\text{c}6? is unacceptable, because...}

[Diagram]
after 18 \( \text{Wf5} \) the Black queen’s exposure on the c-file is bound to lead to disaster and duly did so after 18...\( \text{Rd8} \) 19 \( \text{RxRd8}+ \text{Qxd8} \) 20 \( \text{Qd4} \) \( \text{Qd4} \) 21 \( \text{Wg4} \) \( \text{Qxd5} \) 22 \( \text{Qg5}+ \) 1-0, in Voyna-Strautins, Lascurain mem-A corr. 1994) 18 \( \text{Qe4} \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 19 \( \text{Qc5} \) \( \text{Qxc5} \) 20 \( \text{Qxc5} \) \( \text{Qxc5} \) 21 \( \text{Qe1}+ \) \( \text{Qf8} \) 22 \( \text{Qxc5} \) b6 23 \( \text{Qc6} \) g6 24 \( \text{Qc3} \) \( \text{Qg8} \) 25 \( \text{Qc7}+ \) led to a complete bind in Elburg-Della Valle, IECG 2001, while

B) 16...\( \text{Bb4} \) 17 \( \text{Qxb5} \) 0-0 18 \( \text{Qc1} \) (18 \( \text{Wh4}?! \)) 18...\( \text{We8} \) 19 \( \text{Wg4}! \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 20 \( \text{Qc7} \) \( \text{Qxc7} \) 21 \( \text{Qxc7}+ \) allowed White’s advantage to crystallise in Pletanek-Dufek, corr. 1992;

11...\( \text{Qe7} \)

...is possible, but it allows White to divert the \( \text{Qf6} \) from the defence of h7, preventing Black from castling for quite a while; in the meantime White has the chance to develop a strong initiative: 12 \( \text{cxRd5} \) \( \text{Qxd5} \) 13 \( \text{Qe1} \) c6 (13...\( \text{Qe6} \) can be met with the brilliant shot 14 \( \text{Qg6}! \) \( \text{Qdf4} \) 15 \( \text{Qxf4} \) \( \text{Qxf4} \) 16 \( \text{Qxf7}+! \) \( \text{Qxf7} \) 17 \( \text{Qf5}+\) and White recovers his piece with a strong attack; 13...\( \text{Wd6} \) loses an important tempo that White can best make use of by 14 \( \text{Qxd5} \) \( \text{Qxd5} \) 15 b3! with many threats as both \( \text{Qd3-c4} \) and \( \text{Qc1-b2} \) (a3) are hanging in the air) 14 \( \text{Qg5} \) \( \text{Qe6} \) 15 \( \text{Qxe7} \) and no matter how Black recaptures on d5 he cannot equalise:

A) On 15...\( \text{Qxe7} \), best appears the direct 16 \( \text{Qc4}!?! \) (16 \( \text{Qad1} \) is proven less good after 16...\( \text{Wa5} \) 17 \( \text{Qc4} \) \( \text{Wf5}! \) 18 \( \text{Wg3} \) 0-0 19 \( \text{Qd7} \) \( \text{Qg6} \) 20 \( \text{Qxb7}+ \) 16...\( \text{Qd4}?! \) (16...\( \text{Qd5} \) 17 \( \text{Qad1}; \) 16...0-0 17 \( \text{Qxe6} \) \( \text{fxe6} \) 18 \( \text{Qxe6}+ \) \( \text{Qf7} \) 19 \( \text{Qe4} \) \( \text{Wd5} \) 20 \( \text{Qd6} \) \( \text{Qxe6} \) 21 \( \text{Qxe6} \) \( \text{Qf6} \) 22 \( \text{Qxe7} \) \( \text{Qxd6} \) 23 \( \text{Qxb7}+\) 17 \( \text{Qad1} \) 0-0 18 \( \text{Qxe7} \) \( \text{Qxe7} \) 19 \( \text{Qxd4}+ \) with a clear advantage that nevertheless needs hard work to be turned into a full point;

B) 15...\( \text{Wxe7} \) 16 \( \text{Qxd5} \) \( \text{cxRd5} \) 17 \( \text{Qf5} \) 0-0 0 18 \( \text{Qg3}! \) \( \text{Wd6} \) 19 \( \text{Wg7} \) \( \text{Qb8} \) 20 \( \text{Wxf7} \) \( \text{Qd4} \) 21 \( \text{Qc7} \) is a position reached in J.Horvath-Forintos, Budapest 1987) and here, after 21...\( \text{Wxb6} \) 22 \( \text{Qd3} \) White is better, but due to the activity of the Black pieces it will not be easy to drive this advantage home.

12 \( \text{Qxc4} \) \( \text{Qe7} \)

This move is the automatic choice in tournament practice; Black is behind in development and must hurry to castle.

12...\( \text{Qc2}?! \) proved a blow into empty space after 13 \( \text{Qg5}! \) \( \text{Wd4} \) (13...\( \text{Qxa1} \) 14 \( \text{Qe1}+ \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 15 \( \text{Qxf6} \) \( \text{gxf6} \) 16 \( \text{Qd5} \) \( \text{Wd6} \) 17 \( \text{Qxe7}+ \) \( \text{Qd8} \) 18 \( \text{Qxf7}+ \) is terminal.) 14 \( \text{Qxf6} \) \( \text{Wxf6} \) 15 \( \text{Qd5} \) \( \text{Wd6} \) 16 \( \text{Qad1} \) \( \text{Qd8} \) 17 \( \text{Wf5} \) and 1-0 in Lucchini-Lausch, EU ch corr. 1996;
If Black is reluctant to enter the complications, then 12...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d7}}}}} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d1}}}}} \) + \( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e7}}}}} \) 14 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd7}}}}} + \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd7}}}}} \) (14...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd7}}}}} ? \) 15 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d5}}}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e6}}}}} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xe6}}}}} \)+) 15 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf7}}}}} \) is playable, but certainly White has an edge in view of his two bishops; 15 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d1}}}}} c5 16 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b5}}}}} \) is another interesting possibility.

13 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g5}}}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c8}}}}} \!\!\!\!

Disturbing the White queen in order to compel her abandon the dominant post on h3; 13...0-0?! 14 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{ad1}}}}} \) c5 was Yusupov’s initial idea, but now it has been concluded that after 15 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{fe1}}}}} \) h6 (15...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e8}}}}} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{b5}}}) 16 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xh6}}} \) gxh6 17 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{wxh6}}} \)

...a sacrifice first employed in a Kupreichik-Yusupov encounter, White’s attacking potential is so great that Black has zero chances of survival. The full proof is provided by a subsequent game: 17...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{dh7}}} \) 18 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d3}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{g5}}} \) 19 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{wh5}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xf6}}} \) 20 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{h3}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{g7}}} \) 21 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{f4}}} \)! (a further sac with the aim of accelerating the attack) 21...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{xf4}}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{dd5}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{g5}}} \) 23 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{de7}}} \) + \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xe7}}} \) 24 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xe7}}} \) 24...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{xf6}}} \) [24...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{ce6}}} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{ee3}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{df5}}} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{wxf5}}} \) + \( \text{\textit{\textbf{dg4}}} \) (26...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{dd4}}} \) 27 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xf4}}} \)++) 27 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{ee4}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{df6}}} \) (27...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{ce5}}} \) 28 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{g3}}}) 28 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{eh4}}} \)++) 25 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{wxg5}}} \) and it becomes apparent that despite finding a series of ‘only’ moves Black cannot save himself (Thesing-Autenrieth, Budapest 1987).

14 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{w3d}}})!

14 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{w3e}}} \)?! \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d6}}} \) is equal as 15 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xf6}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xf6}}} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d5}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{wd8}}} \) offers White nothing.

14...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{de6}}} \)

14...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{g4}}} \)! 15 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xf6}}} \) gxf6 looks bad for Black but requires a look;

14...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{f5}}} \)! also looks bad in view of 15 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xd4}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xf5}}} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{fe1}}} \) \( \text{\textit{\textbf{f8}}} \) 17 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xe7}}} \)?! \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xe7}}} \) 18 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d5}}} \) and Black comes under a fierce attack.

15 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{xe6}}} \)

Dull, but at the same time not as innocent as it looks.

15...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{fxe6}}} \)

...
16 Afe1

Right idea, wrong move-order; White had to play 16 Wc4!? first, as he should have as his main priority to prevent long castling. After 16...Wd7 (16...0-0 17 Afe1 transposes to a position analysed below) 17 Aed1! Wc6 18 Wxc6+ bxc6 19 Afe1 Ad8 20 Axd8+ Axd8 21 Axc6 Aed7 22 Ae2 Aeb8± he would have obtained a pleasant ending due to his better pawn structure and kingside pawn majority.

16...Wd7!

Black finds a good way of coordinating his pieces, but will need to find some more accurate moves to reach complete equality.

The natural 16...0-0 is met strongly by 17 Wc4!+ when Black will not be able to avoid some concession with his pawn structure: 17...Ah8 18 Axc6 Wd7 19 Ad1 Aed6 and then both

A) 20 Axf6! gxf6!± (20...Axf6? 21 Axf6 gxf6 22 We4! Ab8 23 Wd4±) and

B) 20 Axf4 20...Afe8 21 Axc8+ Axc8 22 Axd6 cxd6 23 Wd4± offer White an edge.

17 Wc4 0-0-0 18 Axc6

White has recovered his pawn, but on first inspection the resulting position seems to be dead drawn; Pono's devotion allows him to detect that little something that keeps the game going.

18...Ae5

18...Ahe8!? was a trifle more combative, but it would have been illogical to criticize Black for choosing a natural (and probably the best) continuation on the grounds it has a drawish character; after all, Black is playing the Petroff in order to make a draw! A second factor that must have weighed in favour of 18...Ae5 is that on 18...Ahe8!? the reply 19 Axf4 looks threatening and presumably, Black didn't want to get himself into adventures against a young rising star.

19 Axc7! Wxe6?!

But here, Black's 'greed' to exchange as many pieces as possible leads him in making a more or less serious inaccuracy, resulting in an awkward pin. Correct was 19...Axe7! when Black only needs a couple of accurate moves to reach full equality:

A) 20 Aae1 Ac6 21 We4 (21 A6e3 Ahe8 22 Ae4 Ae5) 21...Ab8= offers White nothing;

B) 20 h3!? (Threatening Aa1-d1) is more cunning, as
B1) 20...\texttt{Qc6}?! allows White to get a slightly better ending after 21 \texttt{Kd1} \texttt{Qf7} 22 \texttt{Kxd8}+! (22 \texttt{Qxc6} \texttt{Kxd1}+ 23 \texttt{Kxd1} \texttt{Qd7}! 24 \texttt{Ke6} \texttt{Qxd1}+ 25 \texttt{Kh2} \texttt{Qd8}!=) 22...\texttt{Qxd8} 23 \texttt{Ke4} \texttt{Qxc4} 24 \texttt{Qxc4} since it will be easier for him to advance his kingside pawns thanks to superior piece activity. However,

B2) 20...\texttt{Qd5}! 21 \texttt{Ha1} \texttt{Qhf8}!= is even as the massive exchanges Black was aiming for will take place under favourable circumstances.

20 \texttt{Qxd8} \texttt{Qxd8}

21 g3!?

A very useful move, guarding \texttt{f4}, preventing back rank unpleasantries and keeping Black under pressure; 21 \texttt{Kd1} is mentioned by Ponomariov, who gives 21...\texttt{Qf4}?! 22 \texttt{Kxd8}+ \texttt{Qxd8} 23 \texttt{Qd4}+ \texttt{Qd6} 24 \texttt{Qg7} \texttt{Qe2}+! 25 \texttt{Qf1} \texttt{Qxc3} 26 \texttt{Qxc3} \texttt{Qxh2}= as equal, a fair verdict.

21...\texttt{c6} 22 \texttt{Kd1}!

Suddenly Black has been saddled with the task of trying to avoid a lost pawn endgame.

22...\texttt{g5}!

Trying to contain White’s kingside pawns before it’s too late; after 22...\texttt{d7}? 23 \texttt{Qxd5} \texttt{Qxd5} 24 \texttt{Qxd5} \texttt{Qxd5} 25 \texttt{Qxd5} cxd5 26 \texttt{f4}! \texttt{Qd7} 27 \texttt{Qf2}+= the pawn endgame is won for White because he will obtain an outside passed pawn.

23 \texttt{h4}!

A move revealing true mastery of the game; White exploits the dark sides of 22...\texttt{g5}! to obtain a positional superiority on the kingside.

23...\texttt{gxh4} 24 \texttt{Qxh4}

The benefits from White’s little operation are already evident; He has obtained a passed f-pawn and weakened the enemy’s h-pawn. In addition, he still keeps Black pinned, the \texttt{Qd5} cannot move.

24...\texttt{h6} 25 \texttt{Qg2}

A fine non-committal move, activating the king in anticipation of various types of endgame that may soon arise;

25 \texttt{Qe4}?! as suggested by Pono, is also very interesting; For example:

A) 25...\texttt{Qf7}?! 26 \texttt{Qxd5} \texttt{Kxd5} (26...cxd5 27 \texttt{Qc1}+ \texttt{Qb8} 28 \texttt{Qe5}+)
\[ \text{a8 29 \text{c7}\uparrow 27 \text{xd5 cxd5 28 \text{d4}\pm, or} } \]

\[ \text{B) 25...\text{xe4 26 \text{xe4 \text{b4} 27 \text{d6!} (27 \text{xd8+ \text{d8 28 a3 \text{d3=} offers White nothing.) 27...\text{xd6 28 \text{xd6+ \text{c7} 29 \text{f5 \text{xa2 30 \text{h6\pm when it appears to us that White has an advantage in the forthcoming race as Black has no passed pawns yet.}}}}}}}} \]

\[ \text{25...\text{e3+}!? } \]

Black cracks under the pressure and plays a double-edged move; objectively speaking, the resulting queen ending holds good promise for White, so he should have settled for a more conservative course. Such a course might have been 25...\text{d7 although after 26 \text{xd5 \text{xd5 27 \text{c4}!\pm the draw is still not trivial because White threatens \text{d1xd5 and in reply to a king move may consider either \text{d1-d4 or capturing on d5.}}}}}

\[ 26 \text{fxe3 \text{xd1 27 \text{xd1 \text{d5+ 28 \text{h2 \text{xd1 29 \text{h6 \text{c2+ 30 \text{h3}!}}}}}}}} \]

Whilst Black’s next move is going to restore material equality, White has the better chances; His queen and king are more active and he has two passed pawns compared to Black’s one. Turov caves in after a long and arduous defence:

\[ 30...\text{xb2 31 \text{e6+ \text{c7 32 g4 \text{e2}}} } \]

\[ \text{33 e4?} \]

This looks wrong. 33 \text{g3! would have been best, threatening to push the g-pawn and maintaining the e-pawn in its place as sort of cover from the checks. Now it seems to us that Black could have drawn.}

\[ 33...\text{c5! 34 e5! c4 35 \text{e7+ \text{c8 36 \text{h4 \text{d3}}} } \]

In queen endgames the initiative is important. After 36...\text{h2+ 37 \text{g5 \text{d2+! 38 \text{g6 c3= the position looks equal.}}}}

\[ 37 \text{e6+ \text{d8 38 \text{g8+ \text{e7 39 \text{g7+}}} } \]

[Diagram]
39...\textit{e}6?

And this one is a fatal mistake; in the endgame with new queens that is soon going to arise Black is without chances because he cannot battle efficiently against White’s g-pawn. Retreating to the 8th rank was imperative and might have allowed Black to hold.

40 \textit{w}f6+ \textit{d}5 41 \textit{w}d6+ \textit{e}4 42 \textit{w}xd3+ \textit{w}xd3 43 e6 c3 44 e7 c2 45 e8=\textit{w} c1=\textit{w} 46 \textit{w}d7+ \textit{e}2 47 g5 \textit{w}h1+ 48 \textit{w}h3 \textit{w}d5 49 \textit{g}g4+ \textit{f}2 50 \textit{w}f4+ \textit{e}1 51 g6!+-

White is winning; The rest is rather easy as the White king can always hide from perpetual behind Black’s queenside pawns.

51...\textit{w}xa2 52 g7 \textit{w}g8 53 \textit{w}f8 \textit{w}c4+ 54 \textit{g}g5 \textit{w}d5+ 55 \textit{f}6 \textit{w}e6+ 56 \textit{e}7 \textit{w}c7+ 57 \textit{e}6 \textit{w}c6+ 58 \textit{w}d6 \textit{w}c4+ 59 \textit{d}d7 \textit{a}4+ 60 \textit{d}8 \textit{w}b3 61 \textit{w}f8 1-0

8 c4

The traditional method of fighting for the initiative and at the same time the best one. Now Black has several replies, but none of them seems to offer full equality.

8...\textit{c}6

By threatening ...\textit{c}6-b4 Black tempts his opponent to clarify the situation in the centre. 8...\textit{g}4!?

...is not out of place; White must be accurate:

A) 9 \textit{w}b3!? is viable, yet after the correct 9...dxc4! [Inferior is 9...\textit{xf}3 10 \textit{gxf}3 \textit{w}c8! (after 10...\textit{xf}6?! 11 \textit{w}xb7 \textit{bd}7, both 12 c5± and 12 cxd5 \textit{b}6 13 \textit{c}3± are

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chess_diagram.png}
\caption{Diagram for the game Timman - Yusupov World Cup, Belfort 1988}
\end{figure}

1 e4 e5 2 \textit{d}f3 \textit{d}f6 3 \textit{xe}5 d6 4 \textit{f}3 \textit{xe}4 5 d4 d5 6 \textit{d}3 \textit{e}7

A conservative move, intending to bring the king to safety as quickly as possible; Black quite often chooses 6...\textit{d}d6 which is a more aggressive version of the same idea.

7 0-0 0-0

Introducing Mason’s Defence, a quite solid line having its roots on the previous century; The disadvantage of this line is that

19

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chess_diagram2.png}
\caption{Diagram for the game Timman - Yusupov World Cup, Belfort 1988}
\end{figure}

Black cannot answer c2-c4 with ...\textit{c}6-b4, seizing control of d5.
good for White) 11 cxd5 Ʌf6 12 Ʌf4± when White has a pleasant initiative despite his sets of doubled pawns] 10 Ʌxb7 Ʌxediting 11 Ʌxe4! (The greedy 11 gxf3?! cxd3 12 Ʌxa8 allows an immediate draw: 12 c6! 13 Ʌxa7 Ʌxh2+ 14 Ʌg2 Ʌxh4=) 11 Ʌxe4 12 Ʌxe4 Ʌf6 13 Ʌc3 Ʌe8!± White's advantage is not too big; Black must of course avoid 13 ... Ʌf6? 14 Ʌe2! when he loses a pawn without compensation.

B) 9 cxd5! is best; then 9 ... Ʌf6 (9 ... Ʌxd5?! 10 Ʌe1 f5 11 Ʌa4! Ʌh8 12 Ʌe5± is obviously much better for White) 10 Ʌc3 Ʌbd7! (10 ... Ʌxd5 11 Ʌe4 c6 12 Ʌb3!± leads to an undisputed advantage for White) 11 h3 Ʌh5 leads to a parting of the ways:

B1) 12 g4?! Ʌg6 13 g5 permits Black to generate counter-play after the correct 13 ... Ʌe8!± (13 ... Ʌh5 fails to 14 Ʌe2! Ʌf5 15 Ʌe5±); for example: 14 Ʌxg6 fxg6! 15 Ʌe2 Ʌh8 16 Ʌe1 Ʌb4! (planning ... Ʌd7-b6) and Black will recover his pawn with good prospects in view of White's weakened kingside and lack of control over f5;

B2) 12 Ʌe1! is the right move; after 12 ... Ʌb6 13 Ʌe5! [planning Ʌc1-g5 and intending to stay on e5!; 13 Ʌg5?! does not have any real potential because after 13 ... Ʌfxd5 14 Ʌxe7 Ʌxe7 the sac 15 Ʌxh7+? fails to 15 ... Ʌxh7 16 Ʌg5+ Ʌg6 17 Ʌc2+ Ʌf5!± (but not 17 ... Ʌxg5? 18 Ʌh7!+-)] 13 Ʌbd7 (13 ... Ʌd6?! 14 Ʌg5! Ʌxe5 15 dxe5 h6 16 Ʌxf6! gx6 17 Ʌd2 Ʌg7 18 Ʌd4+-) 14 g4! (Only now it's time for this move!) 14 ... Ʌg6 15 Ʌxg6 hxg6 (15 ... fxg6? 16 Ʌg5!) 16 Ʌb3 Ʌb8 (16 ... Ʌxe5?! 17 dxe5 Ʌd7 18 Ʌxb7 Ʌc5 19 Ʌb5±) 17 Ʌf4! (insisting on the rook offer) 17 ... Ʌxe5 (17 ... Ʌd6 18 Ʌg5±) 18 dxe5 Ʌd7 19 Ʌc1!+ (planning Ʌc3-e4), White gains fantastic compensation for the exchange due to the tremendous pressure on c7; 19 Ʌd1= is also possible.

8 ... c6!?... should be met by 9 Ʌe1! Ʌe6 (9 ... Ʌf5 10 Ʌc2! Ʌa6 11 a3 Ʌg6 12 Ʌe5± is better for White as Black's pieces are uncoordinated; 9 ... Ʌf6 may well be the best option, transposing after 10 h3 dxc4 11 Ʌxc4 Ʌbd7 12 Ʌc3 Ʌb6 13 Ʌb3 to a position featured in Illustrative Game No 14) and now White has two good queen moves:

A) 10 Ʌc2?! f5 11 Ʌc3, with a position where White intends Ʌc2-b3, pressurizing d5 and b7 after having forced a further weakness, is interesting. After, for example 11 ... Ʌd7?! (11 ... Ʌh8?!) 12
\( \text{Wb3 Wb6} \) is met with the surprising \( 13 \text{Wxb6 axb6} 14 \text{cx}d5 \text{cx}d5 \\

\begin{tikzpicture}[scale=0.5]
  \begin{scope}
    \draw (0,0) grid (8,8);
    \draw (0,0) -- (8,8);
  \end{scope}
  \draw (0,0) -- (0,8) -- (8,8) -- (8,0) -- cycle;
  \draw (1,1) -- (1,7) -- (7,7) -- (7,1) -- cycle;
  \draw (2,2) -- (2,6) -- (6,6) -- (6,2) -- cycle;
  \draw (3,3) -- (3,5) -- (5,5) -- (5,3) -- cycle;
  \draw (4,4) -- (4,4) -- (4,4) -- (4,4) -- cycle;
  \draw (5,5) -- (5,5) -- (5,5) -- (5,5) -- cycle;
  \draw (6,6) -- (6,6) -- (6,6) -- (6,6) -- cycle;
  \draw (7,7) -- (7,7) -- (7,7) -- (7,7) -- cycle;
\end{tikzpicture}

15 \text{xe}4! fxe4 16 \text{xe}4! dxe4 17 \text{xe}4 and White recovers his piece with interest; 11...\text{a}6!? 12 a3 \text{f}6\pm is probably only slightly better for White; however, his plus is quite solid as \text{e}5 is particularly weak, a fact he may try to exploit with the following sequence of moves: \text{c}4x\text{d}5, \text{W}c2-b3, \text{c}1-f4 and then either \text{f}4-e5 or \text{f}3-e5, according to circumstance) 12 \text{cx}d5 \text{cx}d5 13 \text{Wb3}! Black seems to be experiencing very great opening problems:

A1) 13...\text{d}f6 14 \text{W}b7 (14 \text{g}5!? \text{f}7 15 \text{x}f7 \text{xf}7 16 \text{f}3\pm may in fact be even better.) 14...\text{g}4 15 \text{e}2 \text{h}4 16 \text{g}3 \text{f}6 17 \text{h}3\pm has not much to offer to Black;

A2) 13...\text{h}8 14 \text{xe}4 \text{f}xe4 [14...\text{d}xe4 15 \text{W}xe6 \text{b}4 is convincingly met by 16 \text{xe}4! \text{f}6 17 \text{b}3 \text{xe}1 18 \text{xb7} \text{b}6 (18...\text{b}8 19 \text{g}5\pm) 19 \text{g}5! \text{w}e7 20 \text{h}3\pm and White’s attack is bound to triumph] 15 \text{xe}4 \text{d}xe4 16 \text{w}xe6 \text{f}3 17 \text{w}xe7 \text{d}6 18 \text{w}d8 \text{a}xd8 19 \text{g}x\text{f}3 \text{d}xd4 (19...\text{f}3 20 \text{e}7+) 20 \text{e}3+- leads to a big endgame advantage for White which he went on to convert into a win easily in Onischuk-Sulskis, Koszalin 1999;

B) 10 \text{Wb3}! (Most thematic as it immediately attacks the weakened spot)

10...\text{a}6!? (10...\text{w}c7 11 \text{xe}4 \text{d}xe4 12 \text{xe}4\pm 11 \text{xe}4! [The materialistic approach is best here; After 11 \text{cx}d5 \text{cx}d5 White should restrict himself to 12 a3\pm as 12 \text{w}xb7? instead, is tempting fate in view of 12...\text{b}4!+ (But not 12...\text{d}c5? 13 \text{d}xc5 \text{d}xc5 14 \text{w}d8 \text{b}8 15 \text{x}h7+ \text{x}h7 16 \text{w}e2\pm which is at least slightly better for White] 11...\text{d}xe4 12 \text{xe}4 and it seems that Black cannot exploit the position of the White queen to generate counterplay: 12...\text{f}5 (On 12...\text{b}5 there comes 13 \text{xe}6! \text{f}xe6 14 \text{c}xb5\pm and now White only needs to be accurate with the placing of his rook:

B1) 13 \text{f}4!? \text{e}6 14 \text{w}b7 \text{d}c5! (14...\text{b}4 is also good) 15 \text{w}xc6 \text{e}8 is surely not what White wants to happen;

B2) 13 \text{e}5?! \text{g}4! (13...\text{g}6? 14 \text{w}xb7) 14 \text{w}xb7 \text{d}6!\rightarrow leads to a strong Black attack;
B3) 13 Qe2! (keeping the important c2 square covered) and now best seems 13...Qc7? when Black is worse but should be able to make a fight of it. Instead, 13...Qb4 proves to be a shot into empty space after 14 a3 Qd3 15 Qe3?. Another better option than 13...Qb4 is 13...Qg4!? but it should also be insufficient for equality.

Finally, 8...Qf6 9 Qc3 has independent significance only if Black continues with 9...dxc4:

\[\text{Diagram 1}\]

A) 9...Qg4 10 cxd5 Qbd7 (10...Qxd5 11 Qe4± has already been mentioned above) 11 h3 Qh5 (11...Qxf3?! 12 Qxf3 Qb6 succumbs to 13 d6! Qxd6 14 Qxb7 Qxd4 15 Qf3± with a positional advantage for White) 12 Qe1! transposes to analysis featured above;

B) 9...Qc6 10 h3± transposes to a typical IQP position;

C) 9...dxc4 10 Qxc4 Qg4 is another attempt to play against the isolated pawn, but White’s freedom of movement guarantees a slight edge, e.g. 11 Qe1 Qbd7 12 h3 Qh5 13 g4!? Qg6 14 Qe5± and White got the bishop pair in Ree-Langeweg, Amsterdam 1968.

9 cxd5

Now White forces a transposition to a slightly better ending that we are already familiar with from a previous Illustrative Game.

9...Qxd5 10 Qc3 Qxc3 11 bxc3 Qg4 12 Qe1 Qxf3! 12...Qxe8?! 13 Qe4 Qd6 14 Qc2 h6 15 h3± is, as we know, clearly better for White.

13 Qxf3 Qxf3 14 gxf3 Qd6 15 Qe3

The bishop is needed to support d4 so that the central pawns can get moving; 15 Qb1± is an alternative that has already been dealt with under Illustrative Game No 16.

15...Qd7

15...Qad8 16 Qad1!? b6 should be met with the typical 17 Qg5! f6 [17...Qb8! 18 Qb5 h6 19 Qh4 g5 (Otherwise Qe7 follows) 20 Qg3 Qa5 21 Qg2!±, intending Qg3xd6 followed by either Qe1-e7 or f3-f4 is slightly better for White, but appears like Black’s best chance] 18 Qe3 when White has forced a
valuable weakness in the enemy formation. Then, the further moves
18...\( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{e7} \) (18...\( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{a5} \) 19 \( \text{c4} \) c5?! 20 dxc5 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{xc5} \) 21 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{xc5} \) bxc5 22 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{e4} !? \) unveils the chief merit of
White’s 17th) 19 \( \text{c4} \) c6! 20 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{c2} !? \) \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{g6} \) 21 c5 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{c7} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{c1} ! \) bxc5 23 dxc5 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{e5} \) 24 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{g2} !? \) led to an

16 \( \text{c4} \) c6 17 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{ab1} \) b6 18 a4!

Black’s position is passive and the a-pawn should be used as a tool for
effecting a breach on the queenside at an appropriate moment.

18...\( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{ab8} \) 19 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{b3} !? \)

We are already familiar with this manoeuvre from the game
Kotronias-Langrock; White prepares to double rooks on the b-file
so as to carry out a4-a5 with maximum effect.

19...h6 20 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{eb1} \) \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{fd8} \) 21 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{c2} \)
\( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{c7} !? \)?

Black seems to be doing OK, but a
closer look is sufficient to
convince us that he can only sit
back and wait for White to
undertake some action in the hope
of becoming active himself. It is not
clear whether Black’s last move
threatens ...a7-a5 or not, but
Timman rightly decides that he has
spent a fair amount of time in
preparations and proceeds to
prevent this move once and for all
by playing a4-a5 himself.

22 a5! \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{f8} \) 23 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{g2} \) \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{e8} !? \)

Marking time; 23...bxa5 24 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{b7} \) \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{b6} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{xb8} \) \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{xb8} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{f4} !? \) ± is
to, White, e.g. 26...\( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{c8} \) 27
\( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{e5} ! ? \) f6?! 28 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{d6} \) \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{c7} \) 29 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{a3} ! \)
\( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{b6} \) 30 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{f5} ! \) \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{e8} \) 31 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{g6} (31 \text{d5} !? \)
c5 32 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{c2} ) 31...\( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{c8} \) 32 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{xe7} + \\
\text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{xe7} \) 33 c5 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{c7} \) 34 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{b7} \) \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{e6} \) 35
\( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{e4} \) \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{f4} \) 36 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{xg7} ± \) \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{d8} !? \) 37 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{g4} ! \)
\( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{g5} \) 38 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{xc6} \) f5 39 d5+ \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{xd5} 40 \\
\text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{xd5} + \) \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{xd5} \) 41 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{a4} \) \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{d2} 42 \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{a2} \)
\( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{b4} \) 43 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{g3} + - \\

24 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{xb6} \) \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{xb6} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{e1} !? \)

Timman wants to force the Black
king away from his weak queenside
pawns, but it is not entirely clear
whether this is necessary.

25...\( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{f8} \)

Black continues with the policy of
"come and get me", seeing no
reason to indulge himself in dubious
adventures. After 25...\( \text{\textit{\textdagger}} \text{d7} \) White
should regroup his bishops by 26
\( \mathcal{d}3! \mathcal{a}8 \) 27 \( \mathcal{d}2! \) when the ideas of \( \mathcal{b}2-b4 \) or a timely d4-d5 (possibly preceded by \( \mathcal{d}2-c3 \)) question the correctness of the trip of the Black king to d7; 25 ...f5 is positionally suspect because it weakens the light squares. White can keep his opponent reduced to passivity by 26 f4± intending \( \mathcal{c}2-d1-f3 \) or play the refined sacrifice 26 h4!? which has the positional idea of fixing f5 and g7 as weaknesses by a subsequent h4-h5. For example: 26 ...f4 27 \( \mathcal{c}1 \mathcal{x}d4 \) 28 \( \mathcal{a}3! \) (a key move, forcing more light-square weaknesses) 28 ...c5 29 \( \mathcal{b}2 \mathcal{d}2 \) (29 ...\( \mathcal{xc}4?! \) 30 \( \mathcal{d}3 \mathcal{b}4 \) 31 \( \mathcal{xb}4 \mathcal{xb}4 \) 32 \( \mathcal{xg}7? \) 30 \( \mathcal{h}7! \) \( \mathcal{f}7 \) 31 \( \mathcal{g}7! \) \( \mathcal{c}6 \) (31 ...\( \mathcal{g}6 \) 32 \( \mathcal{c}3? \) 32 \( \mathcal{c}3 \mathcal{d}7 \) 33 \( \mathcal{f}5 \mathcal{e}7 \) 34 \( \mathcal{e}4 \mathcal{d}4 \) 35 \( \mathcal{xd}4 \) \( \mathcal{xd}4 \) 36 \( \mathcal{d}1? \) and White has clearly the more pleasant position.

26 \( \mathcal{a}3 \mathcal{a}8 \) 27 \( \mathcal{a}1 \mathcal{x}a3 \) 28 \( \mathcal{xa}3\pm \)

The position has crystallized; White has seized the open a-file and a lasting initiative, but the Black fortress is far from easy to break. In the remainder of the game Yusupov puts up a stout resistance and manages to save the half-point.

28 ...\( \mathcal{e}8! \)

28 ...b5?! just opens more lines for the White pieces; White is simply better after 29 cxb5 cxb5 30 \( \mathcal{a}7? \)

29 \( \mathcal{a}7 \mathcal{e}8 \) 30 f4 \( \mathcal{d}8 \) 31 \( \mathcal{f}3 \mathcal{d}6 \) 32 \( \mathcal{b}3? \)

An unexpected mistake when White had various good ways of maintaining the pressure; 32 \( \mathcal{d}3? \), 32 f5?±, or 32 c5?!± were all far superior to the text.

32 \( \mathcal{b}3? \) is positionally flawed because it abandons control of f5, an omission that Yusupov is alert to exploit.

32 ...c5! 33 \( \mathcal{b}7 \mathcal{f}5!\)

With this brilliant and inspired pawn sacrifice Black completely equalises; a classic example of positional escape based on White’s failure to dominate the e7 knight.

34 \( \mathcal{x}f7 \)

34 dxc5 \( \mathcal{xc}5 \) 35 \( \mathcal{x}f7 \mathcal{d}4+ \) 36 \( \mathcal{xd}4 \mathcal{xd}4\) is obviously pointless.

34 ...\( \mathcal{c}d4 \) 35 \( \mathcal{xf}5 \mathcal{xe}3 \) 36 \( \mathcal{d}5 \)

On 36 fxe3 the reply 36 ...\( \mathcal{xc}5! \) forces the rook exchange and the position is a dead draw after 37 \( \mathcal{d}5 \mathcal{xd}5 \) 38 cxd5 g5=, preventing White’s central pawn mass from becoming dangerous.

36 ...\( \mathcal{e}7? \)

A strange miss by Yusupov; after 36 ...\( \mathcal{e}2!\) a further continuation of the struggle would have been pointless, the game is dead equal.
Having missed a clear equaliser on the previous move, Black has to play very exactly from now on. The text is a step in the right direction, neutralising White’s intended expansion by e4-e5.

38 h3 gxf4 39 exf4 \(c5\) 40 \(d4\) b5!

Each exchange brings Black closer to the draw.

41 \(e4+\) \((f6\) 42 cxb5 \(xb5\) 43 \(c4\) \(h6\) 44 \(g4\) \(e7\) 45 \(e5\) \(d6\) 46 h4 \(d8\) 47 \(f5+\) \(e7\) 48 \(f7+\) \(e8\) 49 \(h7\) \(e7\) 50 \(h8+\) \(d7\) 51 \(b5+\) \(c7\) 52 h5

52 \(e8\) was the only way to maintain some pressure; now Black is able to coordinate his pieces optimally, rendering his defensive task shorter and easier.

52...\(f6!\) 53 \(h7\) \(d8=\) 54 \(d3\) \(d6\) 55 \(f5\) \(a3\) 56 \(d7+\) \(e8\) 57 \(a7\) \(d6\) 58 \(h7\) \(f8\) 59 \(h8+\) \(g7\) 60 \(d8\) \(c7\) 61 \(d7+\) \(f7\) 62 \(d5\) \(f6\) 63 \(c5\) \(d6\) 64 \(a5\) \(f8\) 65 \(f3\)

Seeing no way to make progress, White acquiesced to the inevitable draw. \(1\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}\)

A move that prepares to play ...\(\text{g}4\)-d6, carrying out a favourable exchange of bishops; it has occasionally been used by many top players, but its regular practitioner nowadays is the Cuban player Rodney Perez.

7...\(\text{d}6!?\) is another way of refraining from an immediate 0-0. Despite being somewhat artificial, it has a preventive role in stopping \(c2-c4\). White should continue with 8 \(\text{f}4!\) (Definitely the best move, as it puts an end to ...\(\text{e}8\)-f5 ideas) 8...0-0 [8...\(\text{g}4?!\) is inferior because of the line 9 \(\text{e}1\) 0-0 (9...\(\text{c}6?!\) 10 \(c3\) 0-0 11 \(\text{bd}2\) intending \(\text{d}1\)-b3, looks very artificial for Black; 9...\(\text{c}6\) 10 \(h3\) \(h5?!\) 11 \(\text{e}2!\) exposes Black to an awkward pin on the e-line) 10 \(h3?!\) \(h5\) 11 \(\text{e}5!\) \(xf3\) 12 \(\text{xf3}\) \(c6\) 13 \(c3\) \(d7\) 14 \(\text{e}2\) when the bishop pair gave White a clear advantage in Lau-Mathe,
Munich 1992] 9 \( \text{Ne1} \) and now the following lines are possible:

A) 9...\( \text{Nd7?}! \) allows White to ruin his opponent’s pawn structure with 10 \( \text{We2!} \) \( \text{Ne8} \) 11 \( \text{Nxd6 cxd6} \), as in Cascudo Pueyo - Rodriguez Solis, Oviedo 2000. White continued in masterly fashion by 12 \( \text{Oc3 Of6} \) 13 \( \text{Ob5!} \) \( \text{Nd7} \) 14 \( \text{Nxd7 Wxd7} \) 15 \( \text{Wd3} \) \( \text{a6} \) 16 \( \text{Qg5!} \) \( \text{h6} \) 17 \( \text{Oh3 Qf8} \) 18 \( \text{Qf4} \), obtaining a big advantage.

B) 9...\( \text{Qc6?}! \) is also outside the spirit of the position because after 10 \( \text{c3} \) the knight does not have access to the kingside and White will obtain strong attacking chances by developing in the same way as in Timman-Skembis below.

C) 9...\( \text{Nc8} \) is not to be dismissed lightly: After 10 \( \text{Qe5!} \) (10 \( \text{Qbd2?!} \) \( \text{Qc6} \) 11 \( \text{c3 Qf5!} \) 12 \( \text{Nxd6 Nxd3} \) 13 \( \text{Qxe7 Qxe7} \) 14 \( \text{Qxe7 Qxe7} \) 15 \( \text{Qe5} \) \( \text{Qf5=} \) ) Black has two possibilities.

C1) 10...\( \text{Qd7} \) 11 \( \text{Qxd7 Qxd7} \) 12 \( \text{Wh5!} \) \( \text{f5} \) [12...\( \text{g6} \) 13 \( \text{Wxd5 Qc6} \) 14 \( \text{Wb3!} \) \( \text{Qf6} \) (14...\( \text{g5} \) 15 \( \text{Qxe8+} \) \( \text{Qxe8} \) 16 \( \text{Qe5!=} \) ) 15 \( \text{Qxe8+} \) \( \text{Wxe8} \) 16 \( \text{Qe3 Wd7} \) 17 \( \text{h3!} \) \( \text{Qf5} \) 18 \( \text{Qxf5} \) \( \text{Qxf5} \) 19 \( \text{Qc3 Qd8} \) 20 \( \text{Qd1=} \) ] 13 \( \text{Qd2 Qe4?!} \) [13...\( \text{g6?!} \) leads after 14 \( \text{Wf3} \) \( \text{c6} \) (14...\( \text{Qe4} \) 15 \( \text{Qxe4!} \) \( \text{fxe4} \) 16 \( \text{Wb3=} \) 15 \( \text{c4!} \) \( \text{dxc4} \) 16 \( \text{Qxc4+}! \) \( \text{Qxc4} \) 17 \( \text{Qxc4=} \) to a dominant position for White in view of his control of the dark squares; in addition the b3-g8 diagonal offers him attacking chances] 14 \( \text{Qxe4} \) \( \text{g6}! \) 15 \( \text{Qf6+!} \) \( \text{Qxf6} \) 16 \( \text{Wf3=} \) transposes to a structure where both of White’s bishops are superior to their Black counterparts, but nevertheless, Black has good chances to hold;

C2) 10...\( \text{Qf8!} \) 11 \( \text{Qd2 Qd7} \) 12 \( \text{Wf3 Qxe5} \) [Inferior is 12...\( \text{c6} \) 13 \( \text{Qe3! Qf6?!} \) 14 \( \text{Qg5} \) \( \text{h6} \) 15 \( \text{Qh4!} \) (15 \( \text{Qxf6} \) \( \text{Wxf6} \) 16 \( \text{Qxf6} \) \( \text{gxrf6} \) 17 \( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qxe3} \) 18 \( \text{fxe3 f5=} \) ) 15...\( \text{g5} \) 16 \( \text{Qg3} \) \( \text{g4} \) 17 \( \text{Wb2} \) \( \text{c5?!} \) 18 \( \text{c3!} \) (18 dxc5??) 18...\( \text{cxr4} \) 19 \( \text{Qxd4 Qf5} \) 20 \( \text{Qxf5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 21 \( \text{wh4=} \) ] 13 \( \text{Qxe5=} \) leads to a position where White preserves some pressure due to the plan of doubling on the e-file, yet the symmetric nature of the position gives Black drawing hopes;

D) 9...\( \text{Qe6?!} \) 10 \( \text{c3 Qd7} \) is the other possibility, when White should play 11 \( \text{Wc2!} \)

...forcing a weakening on the pawn cover protecting the enemy king; Then Black’s choice is restricted.
D1) 11...@f6? is easily dismissed in view of 12 @g5+; 

D2) 11...g6? is bad, because of the following sacrificial cascade: 12 @h6 @e8 13 @xe6! (But not 13 @xg6? hxg6 14 @xe6 @f5+ and Black is better!) 13...fxe6 14 @xg6! +; 

D3) 11...h6 12 @bd2 @e8 13 @f1 @f8 (The knight here fulfils an important duty as it defends the @e6 and the weakened light squares h7 and g6) 14 @g3! [14 @d2 @c4! 15 @xc4 dxc4 16 @e3 (16 @e5 c5) 16...@g6! (16...c6 17 @e5±) 17 @g3 c6= is only equal] 14...@g5! reaches the critical position for this variation, featuring Black’s attempt to relieve his congestion by exchanges; White has to play with great accuracy now in order to maintain an advantage: 

D3b) 15 @xg5!? is an interesting new idea from the authors that awaits its first test; after 15...hxg5 16 @d2 f6 (16...g4 17 @e5↑) 17 h4! Black is facing problems on the kingside: 

D3b1) On 17...gxh4 there comes 18 @xh4 @d7 19 @f4!±, planning to make use of f5 for attacking purposes. If then 19...g5?! there follows 20 @xf6! gxh4 21 @e5 @f7 22 @h5! @xe5 23 @g5+ @e6 24 @f6+ @g7 25 @xd7 @xd7 26 g3! (26 f4 @e3 27 @xg6 @xg6 28 f5 @g3=) 26...hxg3 27 f4!± and White’s attack looks very menacing; 

D3b2) 17...g4 18 @h2 leads to another sub-division: 

D3b2a) 18...c6 19 @f4 @d7 20 h5± (20 @e2±) 

D3b2b) 18...@c4!? is worth a look; 

D3b2c) 18...f5! 19 h5 (to isolate the enemy f-pawn) 19...@e4 20 @f4 (20 @xe4!? dxe4 21 d5! c6 22 c4 cxd5 23 @xd5 @d6 24 h6↑) 20...@d6 21 @xd6 @xd6 (21...cx6 22 @hf1!±) 22 f3! @xf3 23 @xf3!± leads to slightly better chances for White because of the weak pawn on f5 and the better bishop. White must immediately try to attack the pawn on f5 with @f3-h4, @e1-f1; 

D3c) 15 @c1 f6!? (After 15...@xf4 16 @xf4 the pressure on Black’s position persists) 16 h4!@ @xf4 17 @xf4 @d7 18 @h2!? @f7 [18...@f7 is the major alternative, inviting wholesale exchanges along the e-file. However, after 19 @f5!? @xf5 20 @xf5 @e6 (On 20...@c6
the sequel 21 \texttt{Qg4 Qg6} 22 \texttt{Qe3 Qxf5} 23 \texttt{Qxf5 Wd7} 24 b3!? c6 25 h5!, intending c3-c4, gives Black serious difficulties) 21 \texttt{c2}! \texttt{Qf7} (21...\texttt{e7} 22 \texttt{Qe3 Qae8} 23 \texttt{Qae1} is slightly better for White) the move 22 \texttt{Wg3!} maintains a nagging edge] 19 \texttt{Qg4!?} \rightarrow led to a White initiative in Timman-Skembis, Corfu (m/2) 1993. Time to return to our game:

8 \texttt{Qe1}!

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chessboard.png}
\end{center}

8...\texttt{Qc6}

8...\texttt{Qd6}?! is dubious because after 9 \texttt{Qg5}! f6 (9...\texttt{Qc6} 10 \texttt{Qe5}!+) 10 \texttt{Qf4} Black’s underdevelopment and weakness on the light squares are a telling factor: 10...\texttt{Qxd3} and now:

A) 11 \texttt{Qxd6}!? \texttt{Wxd6} 12 \texttt{Wxd3} 0-0 13 c4! \texttt{Qa6} (13...dxc4 14 \texttt{Wxc4+ Qh8} 15 \texttt{Qc3 Wd7} 16 \texttt{Qe6 Qc6} 17 \texttt{Qae1 Qd6} 18 \texttt{We2}!+) 14 \texttt{Qc3 dxc4} 15 \texttt{Wxc4+ Qf7} (15...\texttt{Qh8}!+) 16 a3! c6 17 d5 was pleasant for White in Vazquez-R.Perez, La Habana II 2001; after 17...\texttt{Qc7} 18 dxc6 \texttt{Wxc6} 19 \texttt{Wxc6 bxc6} 20 \texttt{Qd4} c5 21 \texttt{Qc6 Qf8} 22 \texttt{Qad1} White’s powerful knights ensure a slight edge;

B) 11 \texttt{Wxd3} 0-0 (On 11...c6 there follows 12 \texttt{Wb3} \texttt{Q} 12...b5 13 a4 bxa4 14 \texttt{Qxa4} 0-0 15 \texttt{Qc3 Qh8} 16 \texttt{Qxd6 Wxd6} 17 \texttt{Wb7 Qd7} 18 \texttt{Qxa7}±) 12 \texttt{Wb3 c6} 13 \texttt{Qxd6 Wxd6} 14 \texttt{Wxb7 Qd7} 15 \texttt{Qa6}± and White was close to winning in Schneider-Jasnikowski, Wroclau 1981 as Black has not only lost a pawn but also suffers from a bad structure;

8...0-0 9 c4 c6 (9...\texttt{b4} 10 \texttt{Qe3} looks good for White.) 10 \texttt{Wc2}!± has been considered under Illustrative Game 19.

9 c4!

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chessboard2.png}
\end{center}

Once more, this typical attack on the centre is by far White’s best try.

9...\texttt{Qb4}

We don’t like so much this knight sortie.

More logical is 9...0-0!? (maintaining the option of exchanging light squared-bishops) 10 cxd5! (It is important to lure the queen on d5 as there she is exposed to subsequent attacks by c2-c4; on 10 \texttt{Qc3}?! \texttt{Qxc3} 11 bxc3 \texttt{Qxd3} 12 \texttt{Wxd3 dxc4} 13 \texttt{Wxc4}, the move 13...\texttt{Qd6}!, intending ...\texttt{Wd8-f6}, as in Polgar-Macieja, Poland (rapid m/8) 2002 leads to equality; Worth
noting here is that Black's regrouping would have not been possible with a White rook already on b1 as then 14 \( \mathord{\text{W}}d3 \), threatening both \( \mathord{\text{f}}b1xh7 \) and \( \mathord{\text{f}}f3-g5 \), grants him strong pressure) 10...\( \mathord{\text{W}}xd5 \) 11 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}c3 \) (11 \( \mathord{\text{W}}c2 \)!) \( \mathord{\text{d}}b4 \) 12 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xe4 \) \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xc2 \) 13 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xd5 \) \( \mathord{\text{A}}e8 \) 14 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xb7 \) \( \mathord{\text{A}}b4 \) 15 \( \mathord{\text{A}}xe8 \) \( \mathord{\text{A}}xe8 \) 16 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}c6 \) \( \mathord{\text{A}}b8 \) 17 g4 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}g6 \) was just unclear in Shirov-Ivanchuk, Monaco 2002) 11...\( \mathord{\text{Q}}xc3 \) 12 bxc3

12...\( \mathord{\text{A}}fe8 \) (12...\( \mathord{\text{Q}}xd3 \) 13 \( \mathord{\text{W}}xd3 \pm \) b5?! 14 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}f4 \) \( \mathord{\text{Q}}d6 \) 15 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}g5 \)! g6 16 \( \mathord{\text{W}}h3 \) h5 17 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}e4 \) \( \mathord{\text{g}}7 \) 18 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}e3 \pm \) \( \mathord{\text{A}}e8 \) 19 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}h6+ \) \( \mathord{\text{h}}8 \) 20 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}g5 \) \( \mathord{\text{f}}8 \) 21 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}f6+ \) \( \mathord{\text{g}}8 \) 22 \( \mathord{\text{W}}f3 \) ! \( \mathord{\text{Q}}g7 \) 23 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xg7 \) \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xg7 \) 24 \( \mathord{\text{W}}f6+ \) \( \mathord{\text{g}}8 \) 25 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xg6+ \)! \( \mathord{\text{fx}}g6 \) 26 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}f6+ \) \( \mathord{\text{f}}7 \) 27 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xd5 \) \( \mathord{\text{A}}e1+ \) 28 \( \mathord{\text{A}}xe1 \) \( \mathord{\text{M}}d8 \) 29 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xc7 \) b4 30 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}e6 \) \( \mathord{\text{A}}d6 \) 31 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}g5+ \) \( \mathord{\text{Q}}f8 \) was the sequel in Abramovic-Radulov, Vrnjacka Banja 1983 and now 32 \( \mathord{\text{c}}xb4+ \) would have crowned White's excellent play) 13 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}f4 \) \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xd3 \) (13...\( \mathord{\text{Q}}d6 \)?? is given as equal by Fritz but beware!; after 14 \( \mathord{\text{A}}xe8+ \) \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xe8 \) 15 c4 \( \mathord{\text{W}}a5 \) 16 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}d2 \) \( \mathord{\text{b}}4 \) 17 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xb4 \) \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xb4 \) 18 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xf5 \) \( \mathord{\text{xf}}5 \) 19 \( \mathord{\text{W}}a4 \) \( \mathord{\text{Q}}c6 \) 20 d5++ it just drops a piece) 14 \( \mathord{\text{W}}xd3 \)

...but even here White has good play as the following lines indicate:

A) 14...\( \mathord{\text{Q}}d6 \) 15 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}g5 \pm ;

B) 14...\( \mathord{\text{Q}}ac8 \) 15 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}ab1 \) b6 (15...\( \mathord{\text{Q}}d6 \)?! 16 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}g5 \) f5 17 c4!++) 16 c4 \( \mathord{\text{W}}d7 \) allows White to carry on with 17 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}e3 \)!, when he appears to have chances for a solid advantage. For example:

B1) 17...\( \mathord{\text{Q}}cd8 \)?? 18 d5 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}f6 \) 19 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}g5 \)?? (19 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}be1 \pm \) 19...\( \mathord{\text{Q}}xe3 \) 20 \( \mathord{\text{fxe}}3 \) \( \mathord{\text{W}}d6 \) 21 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}f1 \)↑;

B2) 17...\( \mathord{\text{Q}}f6 \) 18 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}be1 \) \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xe3 \) 19 \( \mathord{\text{fxe}}3 \) \( \mathord{\text{Q}}e8 \) 20 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}f1 \)±;

C) 14...\( \mathord{\text{W}}d7 \) 15 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}e3 \)! \( \mathord{\text{Q}}f6 \) 16 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}ae1 \) \( \mathord{\text{Q}}e7 \) 17 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}g5 \) (17 \( \mathord{\text{W}}b5 \)?) 17...\( \mathord{\text{Q}}xe3 \) 18 \( \mathord{\text{fxe}}3 \) \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xg5 \) 19 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xg5 \) g6 20 e4± and White's central mass deprived Black of counter-play in Yagupov-Sorokin, St. Petersburg 2001. A notable motif in all these lines is that \( \mathord{\text{Q}}e1-e3 \) allows White to fortify his centre by \( \mathord{\text{f}}2xe3 \) in case Black cannot stand the tension along the e-file.

10...\( \mathord{\text{Q}}f1 \) 0-0

10...\( \mathord{\text{dxc}}4 \)?! should be answered by 11 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}c3 \); then...

A) 11...\( \mathord{\text{Q}}xc3 \) 12 bxc3 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}d5 \) (12...\( \mathord{\text{Q}}c2 \) 13 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}e5 \) \( \mathord{\text{Q}}xa1 \) 14 \( \mathord{\text{Q}}f5 \)
0-0 15 \( \text{\&}e3 \) 13 \( \text{\&}xc4 \text{\&}e6 \) 14 \( \text{\&}b3 \pm \) gives White an excellent position but...

B) 11...\( \text{\&}f6 \) 12 \( \text{\&}xc4 \) 0-0 13 a3 is more complicated:

B1) 13...\( \text{\&}c2?! \) 14 \( \text{\&}h4 \) has been dismissed by Karpov as completely winning for White but in fact things are not so simple as the following analysis indicates:

B1a) 14...\( \text{\&}e6 \) 15 \( \text{\&}xe6 \text{\&}xe1 \) 16 \( \text{\&}b3 \text{\&}e8 \) (16...\( \text{\&}xg2 \) 17 \( \text{\&}xg2 \pm \) 17 \( \text{\&}xe1 \text{\&}e4 \) 18 \( \text{\&}f3 \text{\&}h4 \) 19 \( \text{\&}f1 \text{\&}xf2+ \) 20 \( \text{\&}h1 \text{\&}xd4 \) 21 \( \text{\&}xf7+! \pm \) is indeed bad, but...

B1b) 14...\( \text{\&}c4! \) is very complicated: 15 \( \text{\&}xe4 \text{\&}xe1! \) (15...\( \text{\&}xa1 \) 16 \( \text{\&}xf6+ \text{\&}xf6 \) 17 \( \text{\&}f3 \pm \) 16 \( \text{\&}g3! \) (the only move to win material; 16 \( \text{\&}xe1? \text{\&}xe4 \) 17 \( \text{\&}f5 \text{\&}d6!! \) 18 \( \text{\&}xe7+ \text{\&}h8\pm \) 16...\( \text{\&}e8 \) (16...\( \text{\&}d6 \) 17 \( \text{\&}xe1 \text{\&}xg3 \) 18 \( \text{\&}xg3 \text{\&}xd4 \) 19 \( \text{\&}e2 \pm \) 17 \( \text{\&}e3 \) c5?! 18 \( \text{\&}b3! \) \( \text{\&}xd4 \) 19 \( \text{\&}xf7+ \text{\&}h8 \) 20 \( \text{\&}d2 \text{\&}xg2 \) 21 \( \text{\&}xg2 \text{\&}f8 \) 22 \( \text{\&}f4! \pm \) and after all these complications White finally emerges on top;

B2) 13...\( \text{\&}c6 \) 14 d5 \( \text{\&}a5 \) 15 \( \text{\&}a2 \) c5 16 \( \text{\&}g5 \text{\&}e8 \) 17 \( \text{\&}a4! \) \( \text{\&}d7 \) 18 \( \text{\&}e2 \) h6 was the continuation in the famous game Karpov-Portisch, Tilburg 1982. Karpov now failed to find 19 \( \text{\&}xh6! \) gxh6 20 d6!, which would have given him a powerful attack. For example 20...\( \text{\&}f8 \) (20...c4 21 dxe7 \( \text{\&}xe7 \) 22 \( \text{\&}d2 \text{\&}g7 \) 23 \( \text{\&}d5 \pm \) 21 \( \text{\&}g6+ \text{\&}h8 \) (21...\( \text{\&}g7 \) 22 \( \text{\&}xf7+ \text{\&}h8 \) 23 \( \text{\&}h4! \pm \) 22 \( \text{\&}xf7 \text{\&}xe1+ \) 23 \( \text{\&}xe1 \text{\&}g7 \) 24 \( \text{\&}h4! \) (24 \( \text{\&}e5 \text{\&}c6) \) 24...\( \text{\&}f8 \) 25 \( \text{\&}e7! \) (25 \( \text{\&}d3 \) \( \text{\&}xf7 \) 26 \( \text{\&}g6+ \text{\&}g8= \) 25...\( \text{\&}c6 \) and now White has two plausible continuations: 26 \( \text{\&}d5! \) (26 \( \text{\&}e4! \) is also winning after 26...\( \text{\&}xe4 \) 27 \( \text{\&}xd7 \text{\&}g5 \) 28 f4! \( \text{\&}xf7 \) 29 \( \text{\&}xf7 \text{\&}g8 \) 30 \( \text{\&}f5 \text{\&}e8 \) 31 \( \text{\&}g6+ \text{\&}g8 \) 32 \( \text{\&}e7+ \text{\&}xe7 \) 33 \( \text{\&}xe7 \text{\&}f8 \) 34 \( \text{\&}e6+ \text{\&}h8 \) 35 d7+-) 26...\( \text{\&}xd3 \) 27 \( \text{\&}xd7 \text{\&}e5 \) 28 \( \text{\&}f5 \text{\&}b6 \) 29 \( \text{\&}e7+- \) and Black’s defences have been neutralised since he is unable to meet the twin threat of \( \text{\&}e7xe5 \) and f2-f4.

11 a3 \( \text{\&}c6 \)

12 cxd5!

The most principled way of playing, luring the Black queen away from the protection of c7;

12 \( \text{\&}c3?! \) is however, a viable alternative. After 12...\( \text{\&}xc3 \) 13 bxc3 the path splits:

A) 13...\( \text{\&}xc4 \) 14 \( \text{\&}xc4 \text{\&}f6 \) allows White to determine later the positioning of his queen’s bishop with the flexible 15 \( \text{\&}a2!? \), e.g. 15...b5 (15...\( \text{\&}d7 \) 16 \( \text{\&}g5 \text{\&}xg5 \) 17 \( \text{\&}xg5 \) h6 18 \( \text{\&}e4 \) 16 \( \text{\&}f4 \text{\&}d7 \) 17 \( \text{\&}g5 \text{\&}f8 \) 18 \( \text{\&}xf6 \text{\&}xf6 \) 19 \( \text{\&}d2 \text{\&}e7 \) (G.Garcia-R.Perez, Xalapa (zt) 1999) 20 \( \text{\&}h4 \pm \);

B) 13...\( \text{\&}f6! \) is better, yet after 14 \( \text{\&}f4 \) dxc4 15 \( \text{\&}xc4 \) \( \text{\&}d7 \) 16 \( \text{\&}a2! \)
\[ \text{Beating the Petroff} \]

Fe8 17 \( \text{Wd2} \) b5 18 \( \text{Ag5! Xg6} \) 19 \( \text{Xxf6 gxf6} \), White gains an edge by 20 \( \text{Re3!?} \); the idea is to meet the capture on e3 by f2xe3 and start pressure along the f-file. The most harmonious piece configuration will then be \( \text{Wf2, Xf1, Dh4} \); if Black doesn’t take on e3 then White may triple pieces on the e-file to force him do so.

After 20 \( \text{Wf4 Xd6} \) White has nothing and the same happens after 20 \( \text{Dh4 Xg7} \) 21 f4 \( \text{Dxe7!} \) 22 \( \text{Wf2 Xf5} \) 23 g4 \( \text{Dxh4} \) 24 \( \text{Wxh4} \) f5 25 \( \text{Xe5 f6} \) 26 \( \text{Cc5 Xe3} \) when Black obtained sufficient counter-play in Adams-Karpov, Dortmund 1999.

12...\( \text{Xxd5} \) 13 \( \text{Cc3 Xc3} \) 14 \( \text{Bxc3} \)

This position should be better for White because it compares favourably with the position after 14 \( \text{Ce1} \) in Illustrative Game No 23. The positions are almost identical, except that here the White bishop stands on f1 instead of e2 which practically amounts to an extra tempo.

14...\( \text{Af6} \) 15 \( \text{Af4!} \)

Natural and strong, this move poses Black some difficult problems to solve. Now we are at the crossroads.

15...\( \text{Ac8} \)

It seems that Black should not retreat his queen unless he is really forced to.

15...\( \text{Wd7} \) has been the pet line of Rodney Perez, but without bringing him any joy. After 16 \( \text{Da2! Xe8} \)[16...\( \text{Xad8} \) 17 \( \text{Ab2! Wc8} \) 18 h3 b6 19 \( \text{Be2} \) h6 20 \( \text{Xa3} \) \( \text{Aa5} \) 21 \( \text{Ag5} \) \( \text{Xxe5} \) 22 \( \text{Xxe5} \) c5 23 d5 c4 24 \( \text{Nd4+ Xe6?} \) 25 \( \text{Ag6! Dc6} \) 26 \( \text{Wh4 Xxd5} \) 27 \( \text{Dxf8 Xf8} \) 28 \( \text{Cc4} \)-- led to a Black catastrophe in Anand-J.Polgar, Mainz (rapid) 2003] 17 \( \text{Xae2 Xxe2} \) 18 \( \text{Xxe2} \) Black has failed to reach equality: 18...\( \text{Be6} \) (18...\( \text{Dxa5} \) 19 \( \text{Dxe4} \) \( \text{Wa4} \) 20 g4 \( \text{Be6} \) 21 g5 \( \text{Xxe5} \) 22 \( \text{Wxe5} \) c6 23 \( \text{Wh7} \) b6 24 \( \text{Xxe6 fxe6} \) 25 \( \text{Ae5 Af7} \) 26 \( \text{Cc8+} \) \( \text{Fd8} \) 27 \( \text{Xxe6} \) \( \text{Hd6} \) 1-0, was an abrupt finish in Korneev-R.Perez, Albacete 2000) 19 \( \text{Ag5} \) \( \text{Axg5} \) 20 \( \text{Xxg5} \) h6 21 \( \text{Cc1} \) a6 22 \( \text{Xf3} \) b5 23 \( \text{Xg3} \) \( \text{De7} \) 24 \( \text{Dd3! Xg6} \) 25 \( \text{Xg6 fxe6} \) 26 \( \text{Xh6} \) \( \text{Ff5} \) 27 \( \text{Df4} \) \( \text{He8} \) 28 \( \text{Ff5} \) and White’s extra pawn proved decisive in Herrera-Perez, Cuban ch, Las Tunas 2001.

16 \( \text{Ce1}!? \)

Anand likes to go his own way and this is a perfect chance for doing so.

16 \( \text{Xe3} \) \( \text{Da5} \) 17 \( \text{De5} \) c5 18 g4! (This expansion is typical with the bishop on f5, taking advantage of the fact that it usually lacks a good retreat) 18...\( \text{Xg6} \) 19 \( \text{Xg2 Wd8} \) 20 \( \text{Dxc5 Xxe5} \) 21 \( \text{Xxe5} \) \( \text{Xf6} \) 22 \( \text{Ag3} \) \( \text{Dc4} \) 23 g5! \( \text{Wd4} \) 24 \( \text{Dxe7} \) \( \text{Xxc5} \) 25 \( \text{Xd4! Xg5} \) 26 h4! \( \text{Xa5} \) 27 \( \text{Xe1} \) h6 28 \( \text{Af1} \) b5 29 \( \text{He8} \), 1-0 Tal-Garcia.
Beating the Petroff

Gonzales, Jurmala 1983, is another classical White win in this variation.

16...\(\text{Af}d8\) 17 h3 h6

Karpov’s set-up does not inspire much confidence; His rooks look a bit awkward, and his queen and light-squared bishop insecurely placed. White takes advantage of this factor to generate a space gaining effort in the centre.

18 g4! \(\text{Ag}6\) 19 \(\text{Ag}2\) \(\text{Wd}7\) 20 d5 \(\text{Aa}5\) 21 c4!

Now the point behind 16 \(\text{Ac}1\) becomes evident, White is able to support the pride of his position, the advanced d-pawn.

21...b6 22 \(\text{Ae}5!\) \(\text{Ae}7\) 23 \(\text{Ab}2\) \(\text{Ad}6\) 24 \(\text{Ae}5\) \(\text{Axe}5\) 25 \(\text{Axe}5\)±

With masterly play Anand has managed to obtain the bishop pair, yielding attacking chances on the kingside. Karpov, however, is renowned for defending difficult positions.

25...f6 26 \(\text{He}3\) \(\text{Ab}7\) 27 h4! \(\text{He}8\) 28 \(\text{Hg}3\) \(\text{Ae}5\) 29 g5 hxg5 30 hgx5 f5 31 \(\text{Wd}4\) \(\text{Ae}4\) 32 \(\text{He}3!\) c5!

A good defensive move, forcing the White queen off the dangerous diagonal; this relieves her opposing number from the burden of defending g7 and allows Black some chances of counter-play.

33 \(\text{Wd}3\) \(\text{Wd}6\) 34 \(\text{He}1\) \(\text{Cd}8\)

34...\(\text{Wf}4\) has been suggested as an improvement over the game, yet it doesn’t seem to solve Black’s problems: 35 f3! \(\text{Axg}5\) 36 \(\text{Axe}8+\) (36 \(\text{Wc}3?!\) \(\text{Wd}4!\) 37 \(\text{Wxd}4\) \(\text{Cxd}4\) 38 \(\text{Axe}8+\) \(\text{Axe}8\) 39 f4 \(\text{Ae}4\) 40 \(\text{Axe}4\) \(\text{fxe}4\) 41 \(\text{Axe}4\) d3=) 36...\(\text{Axe}8\) (36...\(\text{Axe}8\) 37 \(\text{He}7\)±) 37 \(\text{Axe}8+\) \(\text{Axe}8\) 38 \(\text{Wc}3\) and White maintains strong pressure.

35 a4

White wants to prevent counterplay by ...b6-b5. However, he could have considered the more direct 35 f3!? \(\text{Axg}5\) 36 \(\text{Axe}8+\) \(\text{Axe}8\) 37 \(\text{Axe}8+\) \(\text{Axe}8\) 38 \(\text{Wxf}5\) \(\text{Wg}3\) 39 \(\text{Wf}1\)± with promising play.

35...\(\text{Wf}4!\) 36 f3

36...\(\text{Dg}3!\)±

Although this is not really a mistake, it is the prelude to one, if we consider that Black must have been in dire time trouble; 36...\(\text{Dd}6!\) 37 \(\text{Wc}3\) \(\text{Dd}7!\) was the simple way of playing, when the position looks easily defensible, e.g. 38 \(\text{Axe}8+\)
\( \text{\textbackslash xe8!} (38...\text{\textbackslash xe8?} 39 \text{\textbackslash we5} \text{\textbackslash xe5} 40 \text{\textbackslash xe5=}) 39 \text{\textbackslash we3} (\text{On 39 \textbf{\textbackslash xe6}, 39...\text{\textbackslash wxg5!} 40 \text{\textbackslash we5} \text{\textbackslash h5!= is a fine motif, saving Black in the nick of time.}) 39...\text{\textbackslash wxe3+} 40 \text{\textbackslash xe3} f4! 41 \text{\textbackslash ac3} \text{\textbackslash h7!} \text{and the endgame is unclear as White has his weaknesses too.} \) 37 \text{\textbackslash wc3}

Now Black must be careful because he lacks ways of opposing White on the long diagonal.

37...\text{\textbackslash h5} 38 \text{\textbackslash e7!}

Considered best nowadays, the knight’s entrance to the game is designed to take the sting out of c2-c4.

8 c4!?

White, nevertheless, resorts to the traditional method of fighting for control of the centre, judging that ...

8...\text{\textbackslash e6}

Supporting the centre in this way is not very popular as now the bishop is bound to end up awkwardly placed on d5. More usual are 8...\text{\textbackslash db4} and 8...\text{\textbackslash df6}, examined under subsequent Illustrative Games. There are, however, two more alternatives.

8...\text{\textbackslash g4} 9 \text{\textbackslash dc3} \text{\textbackslash xc3} 10 bxc3\pm has been the subject of previous Illustrative Games; 8...\text{\textbackslash f5} has not been played much and it appears there is a good reason for this. After 9 \text{\textbackslash dc3}! the tension in the centre favours the better developed side:

A) 9...\text{\textbackslash db4} now is ineffective compared to 8...\text{\textbackslash db4}, e.g. 10 \text{\textbackslash db1} and the knight is misplaced as the following examples show.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Sadvakasov – Aliev}
4th Asian ch, Doha 2003
\end{center}

1 e4 e5 2 \text{\textbackslash d3} \text{\textbackslash d6} 3 \text{\textbackslash xe5} d6 4 \text{\textbackslash b3} \text{\textbackslash xe4} 5 d4 d5 6 \text{\textbackslash d3} \text{\textbackslash e7} 7 0-0 \text{\textbackslash c6}
A1) 10...c6?! hardly inspires any confidence after 11 "e1 e6 (11...dx3?? 12 bxc3 xb1 13 xb1 1-0, Brdicko-Subrt, Prague 1991, is one of the shortest games ever played in the Petroff) 12 c5! as Black cannot justify the placement of the "b4; in fact, after 12...f5? (12...dx3 13 bxc3 a6± was the lesser evil) 13 wb3!-- his position was already beyond repair and could not avoid going quickly downhill after the further 13...wa5 14 dx4 fxe4 15 d2 1-0, in Krutina-Blatsky, Czech Republic 1999;

A2) 10...0-0! (The only move) 11 a3! dx3 12 bxc3 xb1 13 xb1 c6 14 wd3 (14 wa4!? wb8 15 e1 may well be even better) 14...dx4 15 wx4 xe8! (15...a6 16 wd3! wb8 17 g5 g6 18 h3±) 16 xe1 (16 f4?, as in the similar position arising just below is also viable, except for the small difference that here the a3-pawn is hanging, giving Black an extra possibility in 16...xa3) 16...wd6 17 b2! a6 18 be2 b5 and White obtains a comfortable plus after both 19 wa2± and 19 wd3±.

B) 9...dx3 10 bxc3 dx3 11 wxd3 0-0 12 b1 b6?! [After 12...dx4 13 wxc4 xe8 (13...d6 14 wd3±...f3-g5) the strongest continuation is 14 f4! d6 15 g5! e.g. 15...we7 16 wd3 g6 17 wh3 h5 18 f3±] 13 e1! xe8 14 f4

...and Black has great difficulties in regrouping his pieces successfully due to the very annoying pressure on the sensitive spots c7, f7, h7, the following lines being the proof:

B1) 14...dx4 15 wxc4 d6 is met with the customary 16 g5!;

B2) 14...a5 15 cxd5 wxd5 16 dx7 wxa2 (16...ac8 17 f4 wa2 18 f5±) allows White to penetrate deep into the heart of the enemy position by 17 f5! (17 d5?! c5) 17...f6 (17...a4 18 e5 f6 19 d7 h4 20 g4±) 18 d7†, obtaining a powerful initiative; the presence of the passed d-pawn is a tremendous asset for White and it is the main factor that renders significant the queen's intrusion on d7;
B3) 14...\(\text{c}8\) (Trying to defend in a cool manner) 15 \(\text{e}3!\) (a traditional rook manoeuvre after which Black cannot really wait too long with \(\ldots \text{d}5\text{xc}4\)) and White obtains strong pressure; a sample line is 15...\(\text{d}xc4\) 16 \(\text{w}xc4\) \(\text{w}d7\) (16...\(\text{a}a5\) 17 \(\text{w}a6!\) \(\text{w}d7\) 18 \(\text{b}b1\) \(\text{d}d6\) 19 \(\text{xe}8+\) \(\text{xe}8\) 20 \(\text{xe}8+\) \(\text{w}xe8\) 21 \(\text{x}xd6\) \(\text{cxd}6\) 22 \(\text{w}xa7\)±) 17 \(\text{b}b1\) \(\text{d}d6\) 18 \(\text{xe}8+\) \(\text{xe}8\) 19 \(\text{xe}8+\) \(\text{w}xe8\) 20 \(\text{x}xd6\) \(\text{cxd}6\) 21 \(\text{w}d5!\) \(\text{w}d7\) 22 \(\text{g}g5!\) (22 \(\text{e}e5\) \(\text{w}f5!\)) 22...\(\text{d}d8\) 23 \(\text{c}e4\) \(\text{b}b7\) 24 \(h4\) \(\text{w}e7\) 25 \(h5\)± with a very passive position for Black.

9 \(\text{cx}d5!\) \(\text{xd}5\) 10 \(\text{c}c3\) \(\text{xc}3\) 11 bxc3 0-0

Now White should manoeuvre carefully with his knight to e3, in an attempt to exploit the insecure position of the \(\text{d}d5\).

12 \(\text{d}d2!?\)

Sadvakasov starts with the plan right away and this is a perfectly feasible way of playing; 12 \(\text{f}4!!\) is premature: After 12...\(\text{d}d6\)! 13 \(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{w}xd6\)\(=\) Black had managed to relieve his position in Loewenthal-Morphy, London (m/13) 1858;

12 \(\text{e}1\) is an elastic choice, preparing \(\text{f}3\)-\(\text{d}2\)-\(\text{f}1\)-\(\text{e}3\). A possible continuation is 12...\(\text{e}8\) 13 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{d}d6\) [13...\(g6??\), preparing to secure a retreat for the bishop on \(f7\) by \(f7\)-\(f5\), is positionally dubious because it weakens the dark squares; after 14 \(\text{d}d2!\) \(f5\) 15 \(\text{c}4\) \(\text{f}7\) 16 \(\text{b}1!!\) \(b6\) 17 \(\text{w}f3\) \(\text{w}d7\) (17...\(\text{d}5\) 18 \(\text{g}3\)) 18 \(\text{e}3\)± White obtained a tremendous initiative in Vainerman-Moskalenko, Kiev 1986] 14 \(\text{xe}8+\) \(\text{w}xe8\) 15 \(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{cxd}6\) 16 \(\text{d}d2!\) with a slightly better position for White.

12...\(\text{e}6\)

Black decides to retreat immediately as there was no point in trying to maintain the bishop on its central post.

12...\(b5??\) is bad due to 13 \(\text{w}c2!\) \(h6\) 14 \(\text{xb}5\)± \(\Delta\) 14...\(\text{gx}2\) 15 \(\text{x}g2\) \(\text{d}5+\) 16 \(\text{e}e4\) \(\text{xb}5\) 17 \(d5++\);

12...\(\text{d}6\) should be met by 13 \(\text{b}1!!\) [13 \(c4??\) proves inadequate after 13...\(\text{w}h4\)! (13...\(\text{b}4??\) 14 \(\text{b}1\) \(\text{h}4\) 15 \(\text{g}3\) \(\text{xd}4\) 16 \(\text{cx}d5\) \(\text{xa}1\) 17 \(a3!\)± is a trap Black must avoid, e.g. 17...\(\text{xd}5??\) 18 \(\text{e}c2!\) \(g6\) 19 \(\text{b}2++\)!) 14 \(g3\) \(\text{a}3\)! 15 \(\text{fx}g3\) \(\text{xd}4+\) 16 \(\text{f}2\) \(\text{e}5\) 17 \(\text{e}2\) \(\text{xa}1\) 18 \(\text{cx}d5\) \(\text{xa}2\)±] 13...\(b6\) (13...\(\text{w}h4\) 14 \(h3\)) 14 \(c4\) \(\text{e}6\) 15 \(d5\) \(\text{e}5\) 16 \(\text{hx}7+\) \(\text{hx}7\) 17 \(\text{dx}6\) \(\text{fx}6\) 18 \(\text{e}4\)± with a promising position for White in view of Black’s weakened kingside;

Finally, 12...\(\text{w}d7\) 13 \(\text{c}4\)± is slightly better for White as the knight is well on its way towards e3.

13 \(\text{e}1\) \(\text{w}d7\) 14 \(\text{e}4!??\)

Not the most elastic choice; 14 \(\text{w}h5!\) was somewhat preferable.
After 14...h6 [14...g6 15 \(\text{Wh}6\) \(\text{f}e8\) 16 \(\text{c}e4\) \(f5\) (16...\(\text{f}5\)? 17 \(\text{g}5\) \(\text{f}8\) 18 \(\text{Wh}3!\) \(\text{xa}2!\) (18...\(\text{d}5\) 19 \(\text{f}4!\) \(\pm\) 19...\(\text{xe}1+\) 20 \(\text{xe}1\) \(\text{xa}2\) 21 \(\text{xe}2+\)) 19 \(\text{xe}8!\) (19 \(\text{e}4\) \(\text{f}7\) 20 \(\text{xa}2\) \(\text{xe}4!\) 21 \(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{wa}2;\) 19 \(\text{e}3\) \(\text{d}5\) 20 c4 \(\text{b}4\) 19...\(\text{xe}8\) 20 \(\text{d}2\) \(\text{b}3\) 21 \(\text{b}1\) \(\text{a}2\) 22 \(\text{xb}7\) is clearly inferior for Black] the reply 15 \(\text{e}4!\) \(\pm\) finely demonstrates the point of delaying \(\text{d}2-\text{e}4\).

14...\(\text{Ad}8\)

14...\(f5!?\) 15 \(\text{g}5\) \(\text{xe}8\) 16 \(\text{xa}5\) \(\text{f}7\) \(\pm\) would have been only slightly better for White, who finds it difficult to mobilise his central pawns after ...\(b7-b6\) and ...\(\text{c}6-a5\), putting c4 under control.

15 \(\text{Wh}5\)

15...g6

15...h6! was the most natural and best possibility, avoiding a serious weakening of the king's position. Play might have then proceeded 16 \(\text{b}1\) [16 \(\text{c}5!\)? \(\text{xc}5\) 17 \(\text{xc}5\) (17 \(\text{xe}6!\)? doesn't quite work in view of 17...\(f5!\) (17...\(\text{g}6\) 18 \(\text{e}3\) \(\text{d}6\) 19 \(\text{xe}6\) \(f6\) 20 \(\text{xe}6\) \(g7\) 21 \(\text{Wh}5\) offers White dangerous compensation) 18 dxc5 \(\text{d}5!\) \(\pm\) 17...\(\text{d}5\) 18 \(\text{f}4\) \(b6\) 19 \(\text{b}5\) \(\text{e}7\) 20 \(\text{xd}7\) \(\text{xd}7\) 21 a4\(\pm\) is the peaceful solution, with just an edge for White in the endgame] 16...\(b6\) 17 \(\text{g}3\) [17 h3!? (\(\pm\) \(\text{c}1\)\(\text{xe}6\), \(\pm\) \(\text{d}3-b5\)] 17...\(\text{d}5!\) 18 \(\text{f}3\) \(f5\) 19 \(\text{d}2\) \(\text{xf}3\) 20 \(\text{xf}3\) \(\text{xa}2\) 21 \(\text{a}1\) \(\text{d}5\) 22 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 23 \(\text{xe}5\) \(\pm\) is another slightly advantageous endgame for White] 17...\(\text{g}4\) 18 \(\text{b}5\) \(\text{fe}8\) 19 \(\text{a}4\) \(\text{d}6\) 20 \(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{xd}6\) 21 \(\text{c}2?!\) \(\pm\) and White has a slight initiative because he controls more space and has some attacking chances on the kingside.

16 \(\text{Wh}6\) \(\text{f}5\)

16...\(f6!\)? would have probably been met with the traditional manoeuvre 17 \(\text{b}1!\) (17 \(\text{g}5?\) \(\text{fx}5\) 18 \(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{f}6\)\(\pm\)) 17...\(\text{a}5\) 18 \(\text{b}2\) \(\text{d}5\) 19 \(\text{be}2\) \(\pm\) guaranteeing kingside pressure. Nevertheless, this was better than the game continuation.

17 \(\text{g}5!\)

Now White gets the advantage of the two bishops, and lasting pressure against the enemy monarch.

17...\(\text{xe}5\) 18 \(\text{xe}5\) \(f6\) 19 \(\text{c}4+\) \(\text{h}8\) 20 \(\text{e}3\) \(\text{a}5\) 21 \(\text{e}2\) \(b5\)
22 d5!

A very important move, granting White a powerful outpost on d4 for his dark-squared bishop.

22...a6!

A prudent reaction; 22...\textit{xd5?} 23 \textit{ad1!} f7 (23...c6 24 d4 g8 25 f3 d6 26 xa7+-) 24 xb5+- would have left Black in a hopeless state.

23 \textit{f4}!?

Returning the queen to the theatre of action; keeping the \textit{a1} on its original square does not relinquish the idea of opening up the position with a2-a4 at some critical moment later on.

The natural looking 23 \textit{ad1} is by no means decisive due to 23...c4 24 c5 f8 25 h4 g5! [25...g7?! 26 d4 f7 (26...d6? 27 xc4 bxc4 28 e6!! xe6 29 dxe6+- leads to an immediate debacle) 27 g4!± is what White wants] 26 d4 g7 27 xc4 bxc4 and the opposite coloured bishops offer Black good chances of survival.

23...c4

23...\textit{xd} 24 xc7 c4 25 \textit{ad1} d7! was another possibility, but it would have not changed drastically the course of the game; Black tries to keep the position as closed as he can to prevent the White bishops from becoming active.

24 d4 \textit{d6}!?

The best practical chance; 24...\textit{xd5} 25 xc7↑ (\textit{a2-a4}), was also playable, but Black would have suffered in the long run from the bad position of his king. The game continuation forces Sadvakasov to go into an ending where more accuracy is required to turn the advantage into a full point.

25 \textit{xd6} cxd6

26 g4!

A powerful move, exploiting the tremendous power of the bishop on the long diagonal to attack directly the Black king; still, it is not clear whether the advantage deriving from White's consistent play is decisive because Black's better pawn structure offers him possibilities of decent defence even with material less.

26...c8?  

But this is too passive; he should have opted for the active 26...e4! 27 g5 xd5 28 xf6+ xf6 29 gxf6 f8 30 a4 xf6 31 axb5 axb5 32 a7 f7 when he would have had certain chances of saving the game. After the move played White is objectively winning.

27 g5 e8 28 f3?!

After a finely conducted game Sadvakasov commits a small
inaccuracy; 28 c4! bxc4 29 ∆xc4+ would have been terminal as Black can scarcely move.

28...∆g8

29 d6!

A characteristic of strong players is sensing the right moment for dynamic play. In the present instance 29 d6! opens more lines for the White bishops thus avoiding a deterioration of White’s positional superiority.

29...∆xd6 30 ∆c5 ∆d3?

A final mistake, but Black was already running out of really good moves; whilst it is hard to believe that 30...fxg5 31 ∆xd6 ∆xd6 32 ∆d5+ ∆g7 33 ∆e7+ ∆h6 34 ∆xc7± could have been defensible for Black, it nevertheless represented his only hope. Now White is given the chance to conclude the game quickly and efficiently.

31 ∆e4

Good enough, but 31 ∆ad1! + would have been elegant and more conclusive.

31...∆xc3??

Probably a time pressure blunder; 31...∆d2! 32 ∆xf8 ∆xf8 33 ∆c6

∆d6 34 gxf6 ∆f7 35 ∆e7+ ∆xf6 36 ∆xc7+ would have allowed Black to last out a bit longer, although the result would have certainly not been in doubt.

32 ∆d5+ ∆g7 33 ∆e7+ ∆h8 34 ∆d4

Overpowered by the White bishops, Black resigned.

1-0

22

Zagrebelny – A.Rodriguez
World tch, Luzern 1993

1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆f6 3 ∆xe5 d6 4 ∆f3 ∆xe4 5 d4 d5 6 ∆d3 ∆e7 7 0-0 ∆c6 8 c4!? ∆b4

A strategically well-founded move as the Black uses the tempo on the ∆d3 to improve his control over d5 and, possibly, place his queen’s knight there.

9 ∆e2 dxc4

This was Black’s original idea, but nowadays this capture is usually postponed.

10 ∆xc4 0-0 11 ∆c3

White takes advantage of the unprotected ∆e4 to gain a tempo for
his development. At this point Black has several continuations at his disposal.

11...\(\text{Qd6}\)

An attempt to avoid losing time by counterattacking on the White bishop, but it seems that Black should instead make a concession and retreat his knight to \(f6\) as control of \(d5\) is more important.

11...\(\text{Qxc3}\) 12 \(\text{bxc3 Qd5}\) can be met in various ways, the most interesting one in our opinion being 13 \(\text{Qd3}\)!. Below follows a survey of the most important possibilities:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[A)] 13 \(\text{Qe1}\) has been tried on a number of occasions, but after 13...c6 14 \(\text{Qd3} \text{Qe6} 15 \text{Qb3 Qe8} 16 \text{Qe5 Qf8} 17 \text{Qd2}\) the position compares unfavourably with the one arising in Popovic-Capelan below, because the al rook is stuck in the corner and cannot assist a kingside attack; also, the king’s rook absence from f1 is felt, as, had it stayed there, the advance f2-f4-f5 would have been on the cards;
  \item[B)] 13 \(\text{Qc2}\)! is a very logical move, preparing to deploy the bishop on \(d3\) in order to force a weakness in the enemy castled position. After 13...\(\text{Qe6}\) 14 \(\text{Qd3}\) Black has a choice:
    \item[B1)] 14...g6?! is inferior as it needlessly creates weaknesses on the kingside, that White might be able to exploit later on; 15 \(\text{Qb1}\)! \(\text{Qb8} 16 \text{Qe1 Qf6} 17 \text{c4 Qe7}\) (a position reached in Sumaneev-Grechkin, Orel 1996; 17...\(\text{Qb6}\)?) has no point and after the simple and natural 18 \(\text{d5 Qd7} 19 \text{Qf4 Qa4} 20 \text{Qe5 Qc5} 21 \text{Qxd7 Qxd3} 22 \text{Qxd3 Qxd7} 23 \text{Qg3 Qfc8} 24 \text{Qbd1}\) Black was doomed to complete passivity in Vodicka-Pliva, Czech Republic 1999) is answered by 18 \(\text{d5 Qf5}\) (18...\(\text{Qd7}\) 19 \(\text{Qb2}\)?) 19 \(\text{Qa3}! \text{Qxd3} 20 \text{Qxd3 Qe8} 21 \text{Qc3}\) when the twin threats of \(\text{Qe3xa7}\) and \(\text{Qe3-f4}\) are very hard to meet;
    \item[B2)] 14...h6 is the best choice. Still, after 15 \(\text{Qb1} b6 16 \text{Qh7+}\)\! 17 \(\text{Qh8} 18 \text{Qc4 Qc8} 18 \text{c4 Qf6} 19 \text{d5}\) (19 \(\text{Qb7} \text{Qb8} 20 \text{Qc6 Qd6} 21 \text{Qd1 Qc8} 22 \text{Qb3 Qf5} 23 \text{Qb2 Qd7} 24 \text{Qe5 Qxc6} 25 \text{Qxc6 Qg4}\!\!) allowed Black to break free in Grischuk-Pavasovic, 4th IECC, Istanbul 2003; 19 \(\text{Qd3 Qg4} 20 \text{Qe5}\!\!) \(\text{Qxd4} 21 \text{Qb2 Qd6} 22 \text{Qf1 Qcd8} 23 \text{Qe3}\) offers White interesting attacking chances in return for the pawn) 19...\(\text{Qd7}\) (19...\(\text{Qxe4}\) 20 \(\text{Qxe4 Qd7}\) 21 \(\text{Qb2}\)?) 20 \(\text{Qe5 Qd6} 21 \text{f4 Qxe4} 22 \text{Qxe4 Qg8} 23 \text{Qb2}\) the position seems at least slightly better for White as all his pieces are ideally placed for a kingside attack;
  \item[C)] 13 \(\text{Qd3}\)! c6 14 \(\text{Qb3 Qe8}\) 15 \(\text{Qe5 Qf8}\) 16 \(\text{Qd2 Qe6}\) 17 \(\text{Qae1}\)
and White had the upper hand in P.Popovic-Kapelan, Vrsac 1989;

Taimanov’s recommendation of

11...\text{\textit{f5}} 12 \text{\textit{c5} \textit{c6}} [12...\textit{d6}?! 13 \textit{b3} \textit{c6} (13...\textit{f6} 14 \textit{a3} \textit{c6} 15 \textit{e1}±) 14 \textit{a3} \textit{a6} 15 \textit{e1} \text{\textit{f6}} (15...\textit{c7} 16 \textit{f4} \textit{f6} 17 \textit{f3} \textit{e6} 18 \textit{d5}! \textit{exd5} 19 \textit{cxd5} \textit{cxd5} 20 \text{\textit{xd5} \textit{xd5} 21 \textit{wxd5}± Klundt-Roeder, Augsburg 1987)] 16 \textit{f4} \textit{g5} 17 \textit{g3} \textit{e8} 18 \textit{f3} \textit{g6} 19 \textit{f1} \textit{h5} 20 \textit{h3} \textit{b6}? (20...\textit{c7} 21 \textit{d5} \textit{c5} 22 \textit{c4}±) 21 \textit{a4} \textit{d8} 22 \text{\textit{c5} \textit{b8} 23 \textit{d5}±--

...left Black completely busted in Nataf - Harkamal Singh, FIDE Wch qual 2001. The problem for Black in these positions is that he has inadequate control of \textit{d5} and White is always able to carry out the central breakthrough \textit{d4-d5} under very favourable conditions; the effect of such an advance can be easily appreciated from the concluding moves of this game: 23...\textit{h4} 24 \textit{h2} \textit{f6} 25 \textit{dxc6} \textit{b5} 26 \textit{a4} \textit{bxc6} 27 \textit{axb5} \textit{cxb5} 28 \textit{a4} \textit{xe4} 29 \textit{xe4} \textit{d6} 30 \textit{d7} \textit{xb2} 31 \textit{f6} 32 \textit{f8} \textit{f8} 33 \textit{f5} and 1-0] 13 \textit{exc6} \textit{bxc6}, should be met by 14 \textit{f3}± with a slight advantage for White: 14...\textit{xd4}?! is not good due to 15 \textit{xf5} \textit{c3} 16 \textit{d3}! \textit{g6} 17 \textit{bxc3} \textit{xc3} 18 \textit{e4} \textit{axf1} 19 \textit{xe7}±;

11...\textit{f6} is the most natural move; After 12 \textit{e5} \textit{c6} the following choice is available:

A) 13 \text{\textit{g5}}± will probably transpose to 13 \textit{e1}! below: 13...\textit{b5}? (13...\textit{d5}!± is our argument for choosing the 13 \textit{e1} move order) 14 \textit{b3} \textit{b7} 15 \textit{xf6} \textit{xf6} 16 \textit{e4} \textit{xe5} 17 \textit{dxe5} \textit{wc7} is an anti-positional idea for Black, employed in Kaminski-Weglarz, Polish ch Warsaw 1995, that promises White a huge advantage after either 18 \textit{d4} or 18 \textit{d6}±;

B) 13 \textit{e1}! is the best move; Then, after 13...\textit{bd5} (13...\textit{f5} 14 \textit{b3}) 14 \textit{g5}± we reach a position similar to the ones we have already examined under the Smyslov System (Illustrative Game No 14). Here however, 14...\textit{e6} should not be met by a retreat of the White bishop; White should take advantage of the vacant b3 square to post his queen there and exert pressure on \textit{d5} in a way similar to Leko-Adams, Dortmund 2002
(Illustrative Game No 30). After 15 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{W}}b3}!\pm the position compares favourably with Leko-Adams because the knight is much more actively placed on e5 (in that game White had played h2-h3 instead of \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}f3}-e5). Play may continue 15...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{W}}b6} (15...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}}b8 16 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}}xd5 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}}xd5 17 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}}xf6 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xf6} 18 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}}xd5 cxd5 19 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{A}}}ac1} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}e8} 20 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}c5} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xe5} 21 dxe5 d4 22 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}d5} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}c7} 23 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{W}}}a4 d3 24 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{W}}}b5\pm is a risk-free extra pawn.) 16 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xd5 cxd5} 17 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xb6} axb6 18 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}}b3\pm with a pleasant endgame plus.

12 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}b3}

Now Black has to cope with the shortcomings deriving from the neglected d5 square.

12...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}h8}

This is the move that revived the line for a while.

12...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}g4}?! 13 h3 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}h5} 14 g4! \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}g6} 15 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}}e5\pm is rightly considered by Taimanov as clearly better for White;

On 12...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}f5}, 13 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}}e5, intending a2-a3, offers White chances of a steady plus;

12...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}f6} is an attempt to counterattack by applying pressure on d4. By choosing 13 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}}e5! White steps up the pressure on f7, so Black is in urgent need of exchanges that would relieve his position:

A) 13...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xe5}? is simply bad in view of 14 dxe5 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}f5} 15 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}}xf7++;

B) 13...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}f5}? loses material to 14 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}}xf7 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xf7} 15 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}}xf7+ \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xf7} 16 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}b3}++;

C) 13...c5?! is an attempt to force massive liquidation in the centre, but after 14 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}}f4! c4 (14...cxd4 15 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xd4} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{A}}}c6} 16 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}}xc6 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xd4} 17 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xd8} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xd8} 18 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{A}}}ad1} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}f5} 19 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}}b5\pm and 1-0, was a premature resignation in Verney-Hudak, World-Cup, corr. 1998, but the Black position was depressing and the second player decided to spare the rest, all the more so because he was facing a much stronger opponent in a correspondence game) 15 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{A}}}xc4} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{A}}}xc4} 16 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{A}}}xc4} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xd4} (16...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xd4} 17 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xd4} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xd4} 18 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}d6} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}c2} 19 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xf8} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xa1} 20 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}d6} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}c2} 21 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}d3+}) 17 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}b5!} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}c6} 18 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{A}}}xd4} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xd4} 19 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xd4} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textit{B}}}xd4}\pm the endgame was much better for White in view of his two bishops in Kuznetsov-Matsukevich, corr. 1985;
D) 13...\(f5\) leaves Black without a plan after 14 \(e1\) (Or 14 \(f4\));

E) 13...\(e8\)! is a very interesting move in a line that desperately needed an improvement. After 14 \(f4 \ e6\) (Hubley-Joutsi, email 2000) 15 \(xe6!\) (luring the rook on \(e6\) so that the push \(d4-d5\) gains in strength in all variations) 15...\(xe6\) 16 \(a3 \ c6\) (16...\(a6\) 17 \(e1\) \(c6\) 18 \(d5!\)) 17 \(xf7!\) (the point of 15 \(xe6!\)) 17...\(xf7\) 18 \(d5 \ e7!\) 19 \(xc6 \ xd1\) 20 \(fxd1 \ bxc6\) 21 \(ac1\) White has a slight endgame plus but the position is certainly tenable for Black;

F) 13...\(c6\) (This was considered as the main line for a long time, but a recent game featuring the novelty 13...\(e8!\)

...seems to change this evaluation; the point is that now Black's pawn structure gets ruined rather prematurely, a concession compared to the line 13...\(e8!\) above where Black succeeds in achieving first a strategically desirable exchange of light-squared bishops) 14 \(f4 \ f5\) (14...\(d5!?\) 15 \(c2 \ f5\) is an interesting conception if Black wants to avoid pawn weaknesses, based on the correct positional idea of exchanging light-squared bishops employed in Glaser-Cody, ICCF-Cup 6/7, corr. 1990. After, however, 16 \(d5! \ xc2\) 17 \(xc2 \ dc4\) 18 \(xf6+ \ xf6\) 19 \(xc4! \ xc4\) 20 \(g3\) White maintains an edge because he will obtain an initiative in the wide open symmetrical position that arises after the exchange of the \(d4\) for the \(c7\) pawn due to his stronger minor piece) 15 \(xc6 \ bxc6\) 16 \(d5!\) leaves Black suffering:

F1) 16...\(c5\) merits analysis: 17 \(e1!\) [17 \(a4!? \ a6\) (17...\(d4!?)\] 18 \(e1\) \(c4\) (18...\(e7?\) 19 \(c1+\) was already winning for White in A.Sokolov-G.Agzamov, USSR ch 1985) 19 \(c2 \ xd6\) 20 \(f3\) also looks better for White] 17...\(d6\) [17...\(d4?!\) 18 \(b5\); 17...\(a6?!\) 18 \(c1 \ c4\) 19 \(a4\) (19 \(c2 \ d6\) 20 \(b1\) is a worthwhile alternative) 19...\(b8\) 20 \(d2\) \(a6\) 18 \(c1 \ d4\) 19 \(e4\) \(f6\) 20 \(a4 \ f5\) 21 \(g5 \ g6\) 22 \(xc5 \ xb2\) (22...\(xc5\) 23 \(xc5 \ e4\) 24 \(xe4 \ xe4\) 25 \(c6\) 23 \(xb2 \ xg5\) 24 \(a4\) \(a4\) and White just about manages to keep the position under control;

F2) 16...\(b7\) (Best according to Sokolov, but it may not be so) 17 \(c1! \ d4\) 18 \(e3\) and White has at least a slight edge, as the following variations suggest:

F2a) 18...\(xb3\) 19 \(xb3 \ a6\) (19...\(c8?\) 20 \(e4+-\) 20 \(fd1\);

F2b) 18...\(c5\) 19 \(e4! \ xb3\) 20 \(xf6+ \ xf6\) (20...\(gx6\) 21 \(h6\) \(h8\) 22 \(xb3 \ g8\) 23 \(xc5 \ d6\) 24
\[ \text{Beating the Petroff} \quad 137 \]

\[ \text{White adheres to prophylaxis, preventing ...\text{c}8-g4 before embarking on the centralisation of his rooks. For the rest of the notes to this game we will mainly rely on Zagrebelny's analysis in the Chess Informant.} \]

13 a3 \text{c6} 14 h3!

A logical alternative was 15...\text{d}f5 with the obvious aim of putting the enemy queen's pawn under pressure; it is here however that the absolute lack of control over d5 becomes felt: 16 \text{d}5! \text{f}xd4 17 \text{xd}4 \text{xd}4 (On 17...\text{xd}4 there follows 18 \text{xc}7 \text{wd}7 19 \text{xf}6 \text{gxf}6 20 \text{g}3\pm) 18 \text{xc}7 \text{wb}8 19 \text{eb}5 \text{e}5 (19...\text{xb}2? 20 \text{xb}8 \text{xa}1 21 \text{wd}8 \text{wd}8 22 \text{c}7 \text{md}3 23 \text{c}4 \text{md}7 24 \text{xa}1 \text{a}6 25 \text{e}1! \text{e}6 26 \text{d}6 \text{xc}7 27 \text{xc}8+) 20 \text{xe}5 \text{xe}5 21 \text{xa}7\pm and Black has lost a pawn for not much.

16 \text{cl} \text{e}8 17 \text{e}1 h6

Intending ...\text{c}6-e7, c7-c6\pm, but White's next impedes this manoeuvre.

18 \text{e}5! \text{h}7 19 \text{a}4!?

White has achieved wonderful centralisation for his minor pieces and will now try to exploit their superb placement by applying pressure all over the board. The text threatens to ruin Black's pawn structure, practically leaving him with very little choice.

19...\text{a}5 20 \text{xf}6

20 \text{d}5? \text{dc}4 21 \text{xf}6 \text{gxf}6\mp 20...\text{xf}6

21 \text{e}5!

There is no time for experiments; After 21 \text{d}7?! \text{b}8 22 \text{d}5 \text{wd}8 23 \text{xc}7?! \text{e}4 24 \text{xe}4 \text{xe}4 the position becomes unclear; on 21 \text{d}5 the response 21...\text{wd}8 22 \text{e}3 b5\pm reduces White's advantage to a minimum.

21...\text{wd}8 22 \text{b}4 \text{ac}4 23 \text{b}3

An unfortunate situation for Black; his minor pieces are not functioning effectively, and the rest of his army is completely passive. In the next few moves he makes an effort to break free from his entanglement, only to realise a bit later that he has just worsened his position without acquiring any serious counter-play.

23...\text{xe}5

23...\text{xa}3? 24 \text{a}1 \text{ab}5 25 \text{xb}5 \text{xb}5 26 \text{xf}7++; 23...\text{b}6 24 a4\pm

24 \text{xe}5 \text{f}5 25 \text{b}5!\pm
A well founded move, preventing Black’s counter-play associated with ...\[f5\]-d4 and hitting several vulnerable points in the Black camp. Now White is perfectly poised for the advance e5-e6 that will have a devastating effect on Black’s position.

25...\[e7\]
25...c6?! 26 \[d6\] would have given White a tremendous passed pawn. Now, however, White is allowed to carry out his thematic advance.

26 e6! \[cd8\]
26...f6 27 \[d7\]!

27 \[g4\]
27 exf7! \[xd1\] 28 \[cxd1++ looks completely winning, but there is nothing wrong with the text move.

27...c6 28 exf7
Such pawns are like a bone in one’s throat; no wonder that this one queens after a few moves.

28...\[f6\] 29 \[c7 \[d6\]

29...\[d4\] 30 \[c4\] b5 31 \[a2+ would not have helped Black either.

30 \[g3\]
A calm move, reducing Black to a state of misery.

30...\[e4\]
30...\[f5\]? loses easily to 31 \[e6\] \[xe6\] 32 \[xe6 \[b2\] 33 \[c3\]! \[f5\]
(33...\[xf7\] 34 \[e7+] 34 \[e5 \[xf7\]
35 \[f3++; 30...\[xf7\]! 31 \[e6 \[d3\] is given in Informant as Black’s best chance, yet after 32 \[xf8 \[xg3\] 33 fxg3± it appears that Black must succumb to the combined efforts of White’s pieces; after all, White is not behind in material and his king is much safer than Black’s.

31 \[xe4\]!
The fireworks start!

31...\[xe4\] 32 \[e6\]

32...\[d3\]?
A little tougher was 32...\[g6\] 33 \[xd8 \[xd8\] 34 \[c7 \[f8\] 35 \[xb7 \[xf7\] (35...\[b2\] 36 \[xc6 \[xb3\] 37 \[xg6 \[xa3\] 38 \[c4+!) 36 \[xf7 \[xf7\] 37 \[b8+ (37 \[xc6!? \[xf2+ 38 \[h1±) 37...\[h7\] 38 \[g3, although basically it would only prolong Black’s torture since his position is riddled with weaknesses, not to mention the pawn minus and insecure king.

33 \[xf8+-

33 \[xd3 \[xd3\] 34 \[xf8-- was a similar way to win.
33...exg3 34 fxg3 \( \text{wd}4+ \)
34...\( \text{wb}2 \) 35 \( \text{dg}6+ \) \( \text{dh}7 \) 36 \( \text{fx}e7 \) would have been a most
fitting conclusion, but Black
decided to deny his opponent the
joy of mating with two knights.
35 \( \text{dh}2 \) \( \text{wf}2 \) 36 \( \text{dg}1 \) \( \text{df}5 \) 37
\( \text{e6}! \) \( \text{xe}6 \) 38 \( \text{g6+} \) \( \text{h}7 \) 39 \( \text{f}8=\text{w} \)
\( \text{wa}2 \) 40 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 41 \( \text{f}5+ \)

Black resigned. It is noteworthy
that he lost without making any
serious mistakes, which speaks
volumes about the inefficiency of
placing the knight on \( \text{d}6 \).

1-0

23
Kotronias – S.Marjanovic
Greek tch, Halkidiki 2003

1 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 2 \( \text{df}3 \) \( \text{df}6 \) 3 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 4
\( \text{df}3 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 5 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 7
0-0 \( \text{c}6 \) 8 \( \text{c}4!? \) \( \text{b}4 \) 9 \( \text{e}2 \) 0-0

A normal move, but it should
have independent significance only
if Black continues with 10...\( \text{f}5 \) or
10...b6. Normally it should
transpose to 9...\( \text{e}6 \), featured under
Illustrative Games 24-27.

10 \( \text{dc}3 \)

...we reach the critical position for
this line; It seems that White has
two good continuations (14 \( \text{f}4 \) and
14 \( \text{e}1 \)) to choose from, with 14
\( \text{e}1 \) being our favourite:
A) 14 $\text{e}4$!? is a brutal reaction that deserves attention. After 14...$\text{b}7$ [14...$\text{d}6$ 15 $\text{c}4$ $\text{w}e4$ 16 $\text{e}3\pm$ ($\Delta$ $c4$-$c5$, $\text{e}2$-$d3$, $d4$-$d5$) is slightly better for White; 14...$\text{w}d8$?! 15 $\text{d}3$ $\text{b}7$ 16 $\text{e}1$ $\text{f}6$ (S.B.Hansen-Meijers, Istanbul (ol) 2000) can be met with the thematic 17 $\text{w}c2$ $h6$ (with the idea ...$\text{c}6$-$e7$) 18 $\text{h}7$+! $\text{h}8$ 19 $\text{e}4$↑ preparing to double rooks on the e-file] 15 $\text{c}4$ Black must choose the most appropriate square for his queen:

A1) 15...$\text{w}c4$!? tempts White to take on $c7$ in the hope of gaining time to press the White centre; White has a conservative and an aggressive solution:

A1a) 16 $\text{w}d2$ $\text{d}6$ (16...$\text{f}6$? 17 $\text{d}3$ $\text{w}e7$ 18 $d5\pm$) 17 $\text{e}3\pm$ is the way to avoid risks.

A1b) 16 $\text{xe}7$! (We like this one more) 16...$\text{f}6$ (16...$\text{xd}4$? 17 $\text{xd}4$ $\text{xe}2$ 18 $\text{f}e1$+) 17 $\text{d}3$ $\text{w}e7$ 18 $\text{g}3$

A2) 15...$\text{d}8$ protects $c7$ but Black’s position becomes passive after 16 $d5$: 16...$\text{d}5$ [16...$\text{d}8$ 17 $\text{w}c2$ $\text{d}7$ 18 $\text{d}3$ $\text{f}6$ 19 $\text{e}5$ (19 $\text{e}5$?) 19...$\text{d}6$ 20 $\text{f}e1$ $\text{e}8$ 21 $\text{e}3\pm$] 17 $\text{w}c2\pm$ and White had a comfortable advantage in view of the displaced minor pieces on a5 and b7 in Savanovic-Pavasovic, Bled 2000;

B) 14 $\text{e}1$! (Kasparov’s choice, and a very principled method of improving White’s influence in the centre) leads to a position where Black must decide how to protect the $\text{e}7$ from the indirect pressure along the e-file:

B1) 14...$\text{e}8$?! is a very dubious move that appeared in Kotronias-Piket, Lisbon 2001. After 15 $\text{f}4$ Black faces a hard choice:

B1a) 15...$\text{d}5$? leads to a lost position for Black due to 16 $\text{e}5$! (16 $\text{xc}7$?! $\text{b}7$) 16...$\text{b}7$ 17 $\text{f}3$ $\text{wd}8$ 18 $\text{xb}7$ $\text{xb}7$ 19 $\text{f}3$! $\text{wc}8$ 20 $\text{xf}7$! $\text{xf}7$ 21 $\text{g}5$+ $\text{f}6$?! (21...$\text{g}8$ 22 $\text{exe}7$ 22 $\text{xe}8$ $\text{xe}8$ 23 $\text{xf}6$ $\text{xf}6$ 24 $\text{e}1$+ $\text{d}7$ (24...$\text{f}7$ 25 $\text{h}5++$; 24...$\text{f}8$ 25 $\text{xe}6$+ $\text{g}8$ 26 $\text{e}5$+) 25 $c4$! $\text{xd}6$ 26 $c5$+;

B1b) 15...$\text{d}6$?! 16 $\text{c}4$ $\text{wa}5$?! [the game continuation; 16...$\text{f}5$ 17 $\text{xd}6$ $\text{cxd}6$ 18 $\text{d}3$ $\text{d}7$ 19 $\text{wc}2$ $h6$ (19...$\text{g}6$ 20 $\text{d}2$±...$\text{d}2$-$h6$, $h2$-$h4$-$h5$) 20 $\text{exe}8+$ $\text{exe}8$ 21 $\text{e}1$+ $\text{d}2$-$e2$-$e4$-$f4$, $h2$-$h4$+$, is, however, also good for White] leads to a clear plus after the natural 17 $\text{d}2$ $\text{f}5$ 18 $\text{d}3$! $\text{xe}1$+
(18...\texttt{w}d7 19 \texttt{w}c2±) 19 \texttt{w}xe1 \texttt{w}d7
(19...\texttt{w}xd3? 20 \texttt{w}e8+ \texttt{f}f8 21 \texttt{w}xc6+) 20 \texttt{w}e4 g6 21 \texttt{c}c3±;

B1c) 15...\texttt{b}b7!? is relatively best; then 16 c4?! \texttt{w}d8 (On 16...\texttt{f}f5?! the reply 17 \texttt{a}xc7 \texttt{w}d7 18 \texttt{a}f4!
\texttt{f}f6 19 \texttt{e}e3 \texttt{e}d8 20 \texttt{w}d3!± leads to the consolidation of the extra pawn as 20...\texttt{a}xd4? 21 \texttt{a}xd4\texttt{a}xd4
22 \texttt{a}ad1++ is simply losing) 17 d5 \texttt{a}a5 18 \texttt{w}c2\texttt{A}e2-d3→, is better for White.

B2) 14...\texttt{b}b7 (Continuing with the plan) 15 \texttt{d}d3 \texttt{ae}8

16 c4 (The time has come for White to advance his central pawns, with the aim of cramping Black’s fianchettoed queen’s bishop) 16...\texttt{w}d8 [16...\texttt{h}h5 17 d5 \texttt{a}d6!? has been suggested as an alternative; after 18 \texttt{d}xc6 \texttt{b}xe1+ (18...\texttt{x}xc6 19
\texttt{e}e3±) 19 \texttt{w}xe1 \texttt{a}xc6 Black, indeed, has some compensation for the sacrificed piece, but the question
is whether it is fully adequate after 20 \texttt{e}e2! \texttt{x}f3 21 \texttt{x}f3 \texttt{w}h2+ 22 \texttt{f}f1 \texttt{h}h1+ 23 \texttt{e}e2 \texttt{w}h4 24 \texttt{w}d1!
(24 g4!? is also possible)] 17 d5 \texttt{f}f8 and we have arrived at a position first reached in the game Kasparov-Anand, Linares 2000

(17...\texttt{d}a5? is instead simply bad due to 18 \texttt{d}d2).

White should have now played 18 \texttt{d}e5! as he did in a later game Kasparov-Olaflsson, Kopavogur (rapid) 2000. The point lies in the fact that on 18...\texttt{f}f6 [18...\texttt{d}d7 19
\texttt{w}h5!? g6? (19...\texttt{f}f6 20 \texttt{w}h3±) 20 \texttt{x}xg6!! \texttt{f}xg6 21 \texttt{e}e6 \texttt{f}f6 22
\texttt{w}h6+ \texttt{x}xg6 23 \texttt{x}xg6+ \texttt{h}h8 24 \texttt{b}b2± leads to a devastating White attack; 18...\texttt{d}d6 19 \texttt{b}b2 \texttt{g}g5 20
\texttt{e}e4 f5 21 \texttt{f}f3 \texttt{h}h5 22 \texttt{a}h4 \texttt{g}g6 was prematurely agreed drawn in Stern-Kalinichenko, World ch, corr.
1999 since after 23 h3! White seems to have a strong kingside initiative, for example 23...\texttt{e}e7 24 \texttt{g}g4 \texttt{w}e8
25 \texttt{g}g5 \texttt{c}c8 (25...g6? 26 \texttt{x}xf5!) 26
\texttt{h}h4±] the simple 19 \texttt{b}b2

...makes it very hard for Black to develop his queen’s knight, e.g.
19...g6 (19...\texttt{d}d7 20 \texttt{xd}7 \texttt{b}xe1+
21 \texttt{x}xe1 \texttt{xb}2 22 \texttt{x}f8 \texttt{xa}1 23
\texttt{a}h7±) 20 \texttt{w}d2! \texttt{d}d7 21 \texttt{xd}7!
\texttt{xb}2 22 \texttt{x}f8 \texttt{xa}1 23 \texttt{x}g6!
\texttt{xe}1+ 24 \texttt{x}xe1 \texttt{hx}g6 25 \texttt{xa}1± and Garry went on to win as he was a pawn up for nothing.

11 a3 \texttt{xc}3 12 \texttt{b}xc3 \texttt{c}c6
The diagrammed position is one of the most critical in the whole Petroff; White should delicately manoeuvre to achieve something tangible because the Black position is extremely solid. The whole strategy will of course revolve around mobilising White's main asset which is his pawn centre.

13 cxd5

We feel that it is in White's interest to lure the queen to d5 although a majority of GMs disagree.

The alternative is 13 e1!!? e8 14 f4!? waiting for Black to capture on c4; after the practically forced continuation 14...dxc4 (14...a5?! 15 cxd5 wxd5 16 xc7 transposes below, to an analysis featured under 14 e1!!) 15 xc4 d6 16 xe8+ xe8 17 xd6 cxd6 18 g5 g6 19 h4 w7 20 g4 h6 we have reached a critical position that has been the subject of a major theoretical discussion lately. Since this line is not our main suggestion we will restrict ourselves to a small survey of the current theoretical status in the variation: 21

\[ \text{Qh3!!? [21 d3 w4 22 w3 d8 23 e1 w5 24 a2 w6 25 Qh2! w5 26 g4 f8 27 b1 w5 28 w4 xbl 29 e7 30 e3 e7} (\text{Grischuk-Karpov Wijk aan Zee 2003}) 31 c4±] \] and now Black has:

A) 21...w6 22 e1 [22 f4 f5 23 f3 e8 24 h5 g6 25 g3 e6 26 e1 e7 27 xe6 fx6 28 e4 f7 29 w2 e5= Shirov-Anand, Monaco (rapid) 2003] 22...f5 23 f3 (23 g3!!?) 23...f8?! (23...c8 24 f4 d7 25 g3±) 24 f4 d7 (24...xh4!? 25 xf7 g4 26 xg4 xg4 27 d5 e7 28 xb7 b8±) 25 g3±, Anand-Karpov, Prague 2002;

B) 21...e4!? 22 g3 [22 f4!? e5 23 dxe5 wxe5 24 edx6! wxc3 (24...d8!!?) 25 f1 d8 26 xg6 fxe6 27 d7 w6 28 d± b5 29 h5 gxh5 30 xh5 a6 31 w5 a5 32 w7 c7 33 d4 h8 34 g3 c1+ 35 h2 w7 36 f4 xd7 37 f8+ h7 38 e4+ g6 39 w8 g7 1-0, Mortensen-Andersson, Sweden 2003, looks like a very important game from the theoretical point of view] 22...a5 [22...d5 23 a2!? d8 24 f4 e7 25 f1 f5 26 h2±; 22...c8!!? 23 f1 d7 24 wxd6 f5 25 w4 xh4 26 d5 f5 27 wxe4 x4 28 c4 f5 29 f3 c2 30 c1 a4 31 f2 b6 32 d3 d6 33 e3 b3 34 d4 b5+ 35 e3 d6 36 d4 b4 37 e3 d6, ½-½ Topalov-Gelfand, Monaco (rapid) 2003] 23 a2 w3 24 f1!! (an important theoretical position) 24...xg3?
(24...d8!?) 25 fxg3 c8? (25...f8 26 f4 c2 27 e1 c8 28 e7 xc3 29 e8+ h7 30 xf7+) 26 h5 d3 (26...xh5 27 f5 b6 28 xh5 xc3 29 f5 c4 30 f4+) 27 xf7+ f8 28 f2 e7 (28...xc3 29 f3 c1+ 30 h2 c4 31 f4 c7 32 g8+) 29 d5 f8? (29...xc3 30 f7+ d8 31 xg7 xa3 32 g4+) 30 f4--


13...wxd5

A very important position as White might try to force it by playing 10 a3!? after 9...0-0. It is possible that after 10...c6 11 cxd5 wxd5 12 c3 xc3 13 bxc3 Black has nothing better than 13...f5.

14 f4!?

Putting his finger on a traditionally weak spot in the Black camp, namely c7; however, it appears that the more flexible 14 e1! is the best move and secures an edge as it avoids Kramnik’s line of 14...a5!, featured below.

14 e1! appears to transpose to most of the lines analysed under 14 f4 whilst avoiding the Kramnik stuff. The independent tries are the following:

A) The prophylactic 14...fe8 should be met by 15 f4; then the path splits:

A1) 15...ac8! transposes to our main game and is the most critical line after 14 e1!;

A2) 15...d6?! 16 c4 we4 17 e3 looks bad for Black as the bishop on d6 has no targets. This assessment was confirmed in the game Kasparov-Karpov, New York (rapid m/4) 2002, which went 17...ad8 18 a2 g6 19 c1! a5 20 c5 e7 21 b5 (21 b2!??) 21...d5 22 a2? (22 xe8! wa2 23 a4 c6 24 f4! would have won.) 22...c6 23 g5 cxb5 24 xe7 c8 25 e5 wd7 26 d6 f6 27 xe8+ xe8 28 xe8+ 1/2-1/2;

A3) 15...a5?! 16 c7 ac8 is not convincing with the rook on c8 due to 17 wa4! b6 18 b5 c2 19 xc2 xb5 20 f4 c4 21 a4+;

B) 14...f6 15 f4 wd7!? (15...a5 transposes to 14 f4 after 16 d2; 15...ac8 16 d2) 16 d3! g6 17 a2 (This manoeuvre again!!) 17...xd3 18 wxd3 fe8 19 a2 xe2 20 xe2 b6 (20...e7 21 wb5?) 21 xc7?! (21 g5?) 21...e7 22 g3 xa3 23 we4+ gives White an initiative;

C) 14...ad8?? does not appear thematic: After 15 f4 d6?! (15...d7 16 b5! d6 17 e5 xe5 18 xe5+ 16 c4! we4 17 g5! xd4 (17...f6 18 c5+; 17...d7 18 f1 wc2 19 xc2...
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\[ \text{x}c2 \ 20 \text{c}5 \text{e}7 \ 21 \text{d}5!+ = 18 \text{xd}4 \text{c}5 19 \text{xd}8 \text{xd}8 20 \text{f}3 \text{w}d4 21 \text{w}xd4 \text{xd}4 22 \text{ad}1 \pm \]
Black is almost lost;

**D) 14...\text{w}d6!?** (A move found by Schandorff, preventing c1-f4 that may be the principal reason for one to choose 14 c4) 15 \text{d}2! (intending \text{d}2-c4, c2-f3, c1-f4), also looks good for White.

The knight heads for e3 to control the centre and this may well be the only way to maintain an edge (For example, after the inferior 15 a4?! \text{fe}8 16 \text{w}b3 \text{f}6! 17 \text{a}3 \text{w}d7 18 \text{xb}7 \text{ab}8 19 \text{a}6 \text{b}6 20 \text{w}c4 \text{a}5 21 \text{w}a2 \text{e}6 22 \text{c}4 \text{b}3 23 \text{a}5 \text{bb}8 24 \text{ad}1 \text{a}4 25 \text{d}3 \text{xa}5 26 \text{d}5 a draw was agreed in Sutovsky-Schandorff, Esbjerg 2001, but in fact Black is already slightly better). Let us take the position after 15 \text{d}2! a bit further:

**D1) On 15...\text{fe}8 the sequel 16 \text{c}4 \text{w}f6 (16...\text{w}d7 17 \text{d}5; 16...\text{g}6 17 \text{e}3 \pm 17 \text{f}4 Underlines the weakness of c7;**

**D2) 15...\text{ad}8! 16 \text{c}4 \text{w}d7 (16...\text{g}6 17 \text{f}4 \pm) is best and now White should be careful not to let his advantage slip:**

**D2a) 17 \text{b}3 b6 18 \text{d}5? loses beautifully after 18...\text{xd}5! 19 \text{f}3 \text{w}d7 20 \text{xc}6 \text{xc}6 21 \text{xe}7 \text{b}5!!**;

**D2b) 17 \text{e}3!? \text{e}4 18 \text{g}4 \text{f}5 19 \text{h}3 (\Delta 20 \text{f}3; 19 \text{f}3 \text{d}5 20 \text{h}3 \text{e}6) does not yield anything after the correct 19...\text{h}4! (19...\text{g}5?! 20 \text{xf}5; 19...\text{b}6?! 20 \text{f}3 \text{d}5 21 \text{c}4 \text{e}6 22 \text{d}5 \pm) 20 \text{g}3 (20 \text{h}5 \text{e}7 21 \text{f}3 \text{d}3) 20...\text{g}5 21 \text{f}3 (21 \text{f}4 \text{f}6 \text{a}2) 21...\text{xe}3+ 22 \text{xe}3 \text{d}5 23 \text{f}1 \text{a}5 24 \text{f}4 \text{w}c6 25 \text{e}3 \text{c}4= as Black’s control over \text{c}4 cannot be challenged;**

**D2c) 17 \text{f}4! (once more pointing at \text{c}7 proves to be the solution) 17...\text{fe}8 18 \text{f}3! \text{d}6! (18...\text{b}5 19 \text{e}3 \text{g}6 20 \text{g}4 \text{f}5 21 \text{e}2 \pm) and we are at a final key-path: 19 \text{w}d2! (Preparing \text{xd}6 followed by \text{w}f4, putting the queen on its optimal square; it is remarkable that in these positions White should rather keep the knight, since, once landing on \text{e}3, it cooperates harmoniously with the central pawns to maintain control of the centre; Instead, 19 \text{xe}8+ \text{xe}8 20 \text{xd}6 \text{cxd}6 \text{d}5...\text{f}5-e4, is not so clear; 19 \text{xd}6 \text{cxd}6 20 \text{w}b3 \text{h}6! 21 \text{xe}8+ \text{xe}8 22 \text{w}d5 \text{g}5= is equal because Black’s activity compensates for his weaknesses) 19...\text{b}5 20 \text{xd}6! \text{cxd}6 21 \text{e}3 \pm and White’s edge, based on permanent elements of the position is likely to expand at every opportunity, e.g. 21...\text{a}5 (21...\text{e}4 22 \text{xe}4 \text{xe}4 23 \text{w}d3 \pm) 22 \text{w}a2 \text{d}3 23 \text{a}4! \text{c}4 24 \text{w}a3 \text{db}3 25 \text{g}4! \text{w}e7 26 \text{ab}1 \pm]
14...\text{\textit{\textbf{H}ac8}}!

We have chosen this move as the main line not because it is the best one after 14 \textit{\textbf{g}f4}, but in order to transpose back to our Illustrative Game which in fact was reached via the 14 \textit{\textbf{Ke1}}! move-order. Best here is considered Kramnik's 14...\textit{\textbf{Da5}}! but let's take a look at the alternatives in ascending order of importance:

14...\textit{\textbf{Wa5}}?! 15 \textit{\textbf{Wb3}}! \textit{\textbf{Dd6}}

(15...\textit{\textbf{Wb6}} 16 \textit{\textbf{Wxb6}} cxb6 17 d5 \textit{\textbf{Da5}} 18 \textit{\textbf{Dd4}} \textit{\textbf{Dd7}} 19 d6 \textit{\textbf{Df6}} 20 \textit{\textbf{Db5}}! \textit{\textbf{Db5}} 21 \textit{\textbf{Dxb5}} \textit{\textbf{Ffd8}} 22 \textit{\textbf{Mad1}} a6 23 \textit{\textbf{De2}} \textit{\textbf{Hac8}} 24 \textit{\textbf{Dd7+}} 16 \textit{\textbf{Dxd6}} cxd6 17 \textit{\textbf{Wxb7}} \textit{\textbf{Wxc3}} 18 \textit{\textbf{Fc1}} \textit{\textbf{Fxh4}} 19 \textit{\textbf{Hxc3}} \textit{\textbf{Ixe2}}+ 20 \textit{\textbf{Wh1}} \textit{\textbf{Dxc3}} 21 \textit{\textbf{Dd4+}};

14...\textit{\textbf{Wd7}} has not been played much but is a logical move, requiring energetic play from White; after 15 d5!? \textit{\textbf{Da5}} 16 \textit{\textbf{De5}} \textit{\textbf{Wd8}}! (16...\textit{\textbf{Wc8}}?! was played in the game Moiseenko-Torshin, Russian U18 tch, Orsk 2002. This voluntary retreat allowed White to develop a strong initiative after 17 \textit{\textbf{Wa4}}! b6 18 \textit{\textbf{Dc6}}!? \textit{\textbf{Dxc6}} 19 \textit{\textbf{Wxc6}} \textit{\textbf{Dd6}} 20 \textit{\textbf{Dxd6}} cxd6 21 \textit{\textbf{Wxd6}} \textit{\textbf{Wxc3}} 22 \textit{\textbf{Wf4+}} thanks to the creation of a strong passed pawn. The conclusion was 22...\textit{\textbf{Wc8}} 23 \textit{\textbf{Hac1}} \textit{\textbf{We8}} 24 \textit{\textbf{Df3}} \textit{\textbf{Dd7}} 25 \textit{\textbf{Dfe1}} \textit{\textbf{Wd8}} 26 d6 \textit{\textbf{Hc8}} 27 \textit{\textbf{Hc7}}! \textit{\textbf{He8}} 28 \textit{\textbf{Hxe8+}} \textit{\textbf{Wxe8}} 29 h3 \textit{\textbf{Hxc7}} 30 \textit{\textbf{Dxc7}} \textit{\textbf{Wc8}} 31 \textit{\textbf{Dd6}} g6 32 \textit{\textbf{Db7}} \textit{\textbf{Wd8}} 33 \textit{\textbf{Wxd7 1-0}) 17 \textit{\textbf{Ke1}}! \textit{\textbf{Dd6}} 18 \textit{\textbf{Wa4}} f6!? (18...b6 19 \textit{\textbf{Dg3}}±) 19 \textit{\textbf{Df3}}! \textit{\textbf{Dxf4}} 20 \textit{\textbf{Wxf4}} \textit{\textbf{Wxd5}} 21 \textit{\textbf{Dd4}}! \textit{\textbf{Dg6}} 22 \textit{\textbf{Hxc7}} \textit{\textbf{Hac8}} 23 \textit{\textbf{Wg3}}

White has good attacking chances because his knight is dominant in the middle of the board. A typical line is 23...\textit{\textbf{Dfe8}} 24 \textit{\textbf{Dg4}}! (provoking weaknesses on the dark squares) 24...\textit{\textbf{f5}} 25 \textit{\textbf{Df3}} \textit{\textbf{Wc4}} 26 h4! (taking advantage of the induced weakening by threatening h4-h5 and \textit{\textbf{Dd4xf5}) 26...\textit{\textbf{Wxc3}} (26...\textit{\textbf{Hxe1+}} 27 \textit{\textbf{Hxe1}} \textit{\textbf{Wxc3}} 28 \textit{\textbf{Wf5+}) 27 \textit{\textbf{Hxe8+}} \textit{\textbf{Dxe8}} 28 \textit{\textbf{Dd1}} \textit{\textbf{Da4}}! 29 \textit{\textbf{Dd5+}} \textit{\textbf{Wh8}} 30 \textit{\textbf{Hd3}} with a mounting kingside initiative;

After 14...\textit{\textbf{Dd6}}

...the weak spot is defended, but the bishop cuts off the retreat of the Black queen, resulting in traffic jams that have a negative impact on Black's position. In addition, Black lacks the possibility of putting the White centre under pressure by...

\textit{\textbf{Df7-f6}, ...\textbf{Dh8-d8}, as a reaction to a subsequent \textbf{c3-c4}. A possible
continuation is 15 c4 \( \text{We}4 16 \text{Ke}3 \text{Xad8} \) (16...\text{Xfe}8 17 \text{Kxa}2! \text{Xad8} 18 \text{Xd2} will just transpose) 17 \text{Kxa}2! (A very powerful prophylactic move, preventing ...\text{We}4-c2 and preparing to switch the rook over to d2 in order to offer the d-pawn sufficient protection) when Black seems to be suffering in all lines:

A) 17...\text{Xg}6 18 \text{Kd2}! \text{Xxa}3?! (18...\text{Xfe}8 transposes to 17...\text{Xfe}8, 18...\text{Xg}6) is met convincingly by 19 d5! \text{Xe}5 20 \text{Xg}5! \text{Xf}5 21 f4++;

B) 17...\text{Xfe}8 18 \text{Kd2}! \text{Xg}6 (18...\text{Xxa}3?! 19 d5! \text{Xb}4 20 \text{Xd}3 \text{Xg}4 21 \text{Xb}1! \text{Xxd}3 22 \text{Xxd}3 \text{Xxc}4 23 \text{Ke}1 a5 24 \text{dxc}6 \text{Xxd}3 25 \text{Xxd}3 \text{Xxd}3 26 \text{Xxd}3 \pm) 19 c5! \text{Xf}8 (19...\text{Xe}7 20 d5 \text{Xe}5 21 \text{Xxe}5 \text{Xxe}5 22 \text{Xb}5\uparrow) 20 \text{Ke}1\uparrow is also dangerous for Black, the point being that 20...\text{Xd}5 fails to 21 \text{Xe}5\pm;

C) 17...b6 (It appears logical to create a base on a5 for the knight, but now c4-c5 ideas gain in strength) 18 \text{Kd}2! (18 \text{Ke}1 \text{Xg}6 19 \text{Xc}1 \text{Xfe}8 20 h3 h6 21 \text{Kd}2\pm was less incisive in Kamsky-Yusupov, Moscow 1992, although White went on to win.) 18...\text{Xfe}8 (18...\text{Xxa}3?! 19 \text{Xd}3 \text{Xg}4 20 \text{Xxf}5 \text{Xxf}5 21 \text{Xa}4++; 18...\text{Xg}6 19 \text{Ke}1! \text{Xxa}3 20 \text{Xa}4 b4 21 d5\pm) 19 \text{Ke}1! \text{Xg}6 (19...\text{Xa}5? 20 \text{Xg}5! f6 21 \text{Xd}3 \text{Xg}4 22 h3 \text{Xh}5 23 \text{Xxf}5 \text{Xg}5 24 \text{Xe}6++; 19...\text{Xxa}3 20 \text{Xd}3 \text{Xg}4 21 h3 \text{Xh}5 22 \text{Xxf}5 \text{Xf}5 23 \text{Xa}4 b4 24 \text{Xxc}6\pm) 20 c5! \text{Xxc}5 21 dxc5 \text{Xe}7 22 \text{Xb}5 a6 23 \text{Xa}4\pm also looks very bad for Black as the pin on the diagonal a4-e8 is more than annoying. A remark to be made is that most people tend to defend the c-pawn by \text{Xd}1-c1 before embarking on \text{Xa}2-d2 in this line, but we are of the opinion that it should be omitted as it gives Black time to consolidate;

Another possibility is 14...\text{Xfe}8! when White can return to the main line with 15 \text{Ke}1, but it seems that he can afford to take the c7 pawn as Black can easily go wrong in the ensuing jungle of variations: 15 \text{Xxc}7 \text{Xac}8 16 \text{Xf}4! [16 c4?! is not good due to 16...\text{Xe}4! (whilst 16...\text{Xd}7 17 \text{Xf}4 \text{Xf}6 18 \text{Ke}3 \text{Xcd}8 19 \text{Xa}2 \text{Xxd}4! 20 \text{Xxd}4 (20 \text{Xd}2 \text{Xxe}3 21 \text{Xxd}4 \text{Xxe}2-+) 20...\text{Xxd}4 21 \text{Xxd}4 \text{Xxd}4 \text{Xxd}4\? is also fine for Black) 17 \text{Ke}5 (17 \text{Xg}3 \text{Xf}6\?) 17...\text{Xcd}8\? when it becomes clear that White’s position lacks coordination] 16...\text{Xa}5 17 \text{Xe}5 and we have reached a major sub-division: 18...\text{Xe}5 and we have reached a major sub-division:

A) 17...\text{Xxc}3 allows White to organise tremendous pressure on f7 after 18 \text{Xd}2 \text{Xc}2 19 \text{Xxa}5 \text{Xxa}5 20 \text{Xc}4 \text{Xf}8 21 \text{Xf}3\pm;

B) 17...\text{Xd}6 18 \text{Xa}4!\pm is at least slightly better for White, e.g. 18...a6?! 19 \text{Xf}3\pm;
C) On 17...f6 the typical reply 18 גg4! (Δ 19 גe3), guarantees a considerable advantage, even after the best retort 18...ウe4!: 19 גg3  licked 20 גe3  גg6 21  גf3  ツd3 22  גxd5±;

D) 17...a6 should be met by 18 c4! (18 ウa4  ツd8=) 18... ツd8 19 e5  גf6 20  גe1±;

BE) 17... גf6! (Trying to get rid of the  גe5 as quickly as possible in order to set-up a light square blockade) and here White has two good lines:

E1) 18 ウa4!? a6! 19  גf3 is tremendously complicated:

E1a) 19... גe4? loses to 20 גg4!!  גxg2 21  גhd1!  גc6 (21...גh1? 22 גf3  גxe5 23 dxe5+!) 22  גxc6  גxc6 23 c4!  ツe4 24  גe1  גxe1+ 25  גxe1  גxe1+ 26  גxg2  גe4 27  גf3+;

E1b) 19... ツd8! 20 ウb4 b5! (20...גe7 21 ウb2  גd6 22 a4±) 21 a4!  גe7 (21...גxe5 22  גxe5  גc4 23  ツb2 bxa4 24  גe2+) 22  ツb2 b4! 23  גac1!

...is a long variation that leads to some unexpectedly beautiful lines; it is only in the last of them that Black manages to defend somehow, yet it is not clear whether he can save himself in the long run:

E1b1) 23...bxc3? 24  גxc3  ツxd4 25  גxc8  ツxb2 26  גxe8+  גf8 27  גd5+-;

E1b2) 23...גxc3? 24  גxc3  ツxd4 25  גc8  ツxb2 26  גxe8+  גf8 27  גd5+-;

E1b3) 23...b3? 24 c4! ֿf6 25  גd5+  גf8

E1b3a) 26  גf7  ツd7 (26... ツb6 27  גd2±;

E1b3b) 26  גf3 26...גd3 27  גfe1  גc2 28  גxc2  ツxc2 29  ツa2  גd6 30  גxd6+ (30  גe3  גxc4! 31  גxc4  גc7) 30... ツxd6 31  גxe8+  גxe8 32  גxc2±;

E1b4) 23...f6! 24  גg4 bxc3 25 גxc3  ツxd4 26  גxc8  ツxb2 27  גxe8+  גf7 28  גa8  ツb4

E1b4a) 29 g3?!  גe4! (29...גd3 30  גb8!  ツxa4 31  גe1  גg6 32 h4!+) 30  גxe4  ツxe4 31  גxa6  גc6 (Δ...גd4) 32 h3 h5 33  גe3 גg5 34  גc7  גd4±;

E1b4b) 29  גc7!  גd3 (29...גg4 30  גxa5  ツxa5 31  גxg4  ツxa4 32  גe2 a5 33  גa7=) 30  גd1  גc2 31  גd5+  גg6 32  גe5! fxе5 33  גxa6+  גf6 34  גxa5  ツxa4 35  גc6  ツf4 36  גe8+  גf5 37  גe1±; here the rooks look better than the queen, so 18 ウa4 may well be better than 18  גf3 below.

E2) 18  גf3 (The most principled, yet, as we have noticed it may not be best) 18... ツb3!? (18...גe4!? 19  גe1  גxf3 20 ウxf3  ツxf3 21  גxf3  ツed8± might be tenable, but of
course Black is a pawn down) 19
\[ \text{Be1 wxc3 (19...wxd1 20 axd1 b5 21 \text{Qg4 Be7 22 Bc3=}) 20 \text{d5!}} \]
and although, even here White maintains strong pressure, we have not been able to find a win. The following lines are quite impressive though, and worth quoting:

E2a) 20...\text{\textit{Exe5}} 21 \text{\textit{Exe5}} Be8
should be met with the rook switch
22 Be3! [22 \text{\textit{a2?! Bc6!}} (22...\text{\textit{Be2}}
23 Wg4 Bg6 24 h4 Bc6 25 h5 \text{\textit{Exe5}} 26 dxe5 Bd4 27 Wg5=) 23 Be3 Bc2=] 22...Wb2 23 Ba2 Bc2
24 Wf1! (\( \Delta \) 25 d5) 24...Be8 25 Bg3
which after 25...Bg6 26 f4! Bc6!±
leads to a very interesting position worth analysing; (26...Bc3!? is instead bad due to 27 f5 Bxg3 28 fxg6 Bxg6 B+ 29 Wh1! Bh8 30 gxf7 Bf8 31 Wxg2 Wxa1 + 32 Wg1=);

E2b) 20...\text{\textit{Be6!}} 21 \text{\textit{Be6}} fxe6
(21...\text{\textit{Exe6?}} 22 Bc1++) 22 Bc1 Wb3
(22...Wxa3? 23 Ba1++) 23 Wh5 \text{\textit{Exe5}} 24 \text{\textit{Exe5}}
leads to a very interesting attacking position for White:

E2b1) On 24...Bc4? the beautiful sacrificial continuation 25 Bb1!
Wxa3 26 Bxg7!! Bxg7 27 Wg5+
Bf7 28 Be4 Be7 29 d5= decides the issue;

E2b2) Best is 24...Bc6 and here it appears that the self-suggesting 25 Bxg7?? (25 Be3 Wd5= may objectively be best, but the sacrifice is very tempting) 25...Bxg7 26 Wg5+ does not win, as the following surprising defence is available: 26...Bf7 27 Wf4+!? (27 Be3? is even losing after 27...Wd5! 28 Bf3+B Wxf3 29 gxf3 Bg8++; 27 Wh5+B Bg7 28 Wg5+ is a perpetual) 27...Be7! (27...Bg8? 28 Be3 \text{\textit{Exd4}} 29 Bg3+B Wxg3 30 Wxg3++) 28 Bb1 [28 d5!? is a nice try, but Black nevertheless draws: 28...Wxd5 29 Bcd1 Wc5= 30 Wh4+Bf8 and now all three continuations available to White are incapable of securing anything tangible: On 31 Be3, 31...Be7! beats off the attack; 31 Wxh7 is refuted by the centralising 31...Wf5! (31...Bc3?! 32 Be3 Be7! 33 Wh6+B Bg7 34 Bf3+B Be8 35 Wh5+B Bf7 36 Bg3 Wf8 37 Bg6=B allows White to build a strong attack.) 32 Wxb7 e5++; 31 Wf6+ (Best) 31...Bg8 32 Be3 Be7! 33 Wxe6+B Bh8 34 Wf6+B Bg8= and White has nothing better than to acquiesce to the draw] 28...Wd5 29 Bxb7+B Bd8 30 Wf6+! [After 30 Bc1? Wxd4 31 Wf3 Be7 the apparently crushing 32 Bbb1?! allows Black to uncork the stunning defence 32...Bec7?!! 33 Bd1 (33 Be1 Be7++) 33...Bc7!!++; Better in this line is 32 Bf8+! Be8 33 Wf7 Wd6 34 Wh5 e5 35 Bd1 Bd4 36 Wg5=] 30...Be7 31 Wh8+ (31 Be1? Wf5!)
31...Be8 32 Wxh7 a6=. In the final position Black still has a few
technical difficulties to overcome but should be able to draw.

14...\(\text{a5}\)!

...is a pawn sacrifice that has been adopted by Kramnik and Sakaev, with the purpose of obtaining positional compensation in case of its acceptance. Black judges that he will be able, after White wins the c-pawn, to attack the central pawn duo effectively with the aid of his rooks and bishops. In case White does not accept the offer Black hopes to set-up a light square blockade. It seems to us that Black should equalise in both cases, but in the latter one he has to avoid more pitfalls.

A) 15 \(\text{e1}\) has not been very popular; Black has several options, but it looks as though the most radical one (15...\(\text{d6}\)!?) leads to complete equality. But let's see all of them in order of importance:

A1) 15...\(\text{f6}?!\) leads to positions unpromising for Black; it is essential for White to know how to handle them as they can arise also from the 14 \(\text{e1}!\) \(\text{f6}\) move-order.

After 16 \(\text{d2}\)! Black has available the following possibilities:

A1a) If he sits and waits by 16...\(\text{d7}?!\) 17 \(\text{f3}\) \(\text{fe8}\) he gives his opponent time to build pressure on the kingside by employing the familiar plan of doubling rooks on the e-file: 18 \(\text{e4}\) \(\text{e7}\) 19 \(\text{g3}\) \(\text{g6}\) 20 \(\text{g4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 21 \(\text{f3}\) \(\text{d7}\) 22 \(\text{a2}\) \(\text{f8}\) 23 \(\text{ae2}\) \(\text{xa3}\) (Surrendering the file by 23...\(\text{xe2}?!\) allowed White to obtain a crushing superiority after 24 \(\text{xe2}\) \(\text{c6}\) 25 \(\text{h4)!\) \(\text{h6}\) 26 \(\text{h5}\) \(\text{h7}\) 27 \(\text{a4}\) \(\text{d8}\) 28 \(\text{g4)!\) \(\text{f5}\) 29 \(\text{h3}\) \(\text{f7}\) 30 \(\text{d3}\) \(\text{c4}\) 31 \(\text{xf5}+\) in Polgar-Nielsen, Las Vegas 1999) 24 \(\text{g4}\) \(\text{b5}\) 25 \(\text{xc7}\) \(\text{c4}\) 26 \(\text{h4}\)± and White is better due to his optimally placed pieces and passed d-pawn;

A1b) After 16...\(\text{c5}?!\) (Trying to work up some action) 17 \(\text{f3}\) \(\text{d8}\) 18 \(\text{e4}\) \(\text{xe4}\) 19 \(\text{xe4}\) \(\text{cxd4}\) 20 \(\text{cxd4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 21 \(\text{e3}\) \(\text{d6}\) (21...\(\text{e7}?!\)?) 22 \(\text{b1}\) \(\text{d8}\) 23 \(\text{d5}\)! (23 \(\text{a4}?!\) \(\text{b5}!\) instead, was agreed drawn in Short-Lalic, Isle of Man 1999, due to the obvious follow-up 24 \(\text{xb5}\) \(\text{xd4}\)) White seems to be doing quite well:

A1b1) 23...\(\text{xd5}\) 24 \(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{xd5}\) 25 \(\text{xb7}\) \(\text{a5}\) 26 \(\text{a4}\)± is clearly better for White because his bishops are raking the queenside; it looks as
though the loss of the a7 pawn is only a matter of time;

A1b2) On 23...\(\text{\textit{c}}\)e7 White has the strong retort 24 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)c1 preparing to unblock his passed pawn by \(\text{\textit{a}}\)e3-c5 (f4). After 24...\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c8 (24...\(\text{\textit{d}}\)xd5? 25 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c5\(\pm\); 24...b6?! 25 \(\text{\textit{f}}\)f4\(\pm\)) 25 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c4 b6 26 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d2\(\pm\) (insisting on unblocking, by \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d2-b4 this time), White obtains a powerful initiative;

A1b3) 23...\(\text{\textit{c}}\)e5 (A strategic gain for White as the Black queenside now is more exposed) 24 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a4! (Guarding the important a-pawn is the only chance for advantage) 24...\(\text{\textit{x}}\)xf3+ 25 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)xf3 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)xd5 26 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)xd5 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)xd5 27 g3\(\pm\); the d-pawn is at least slightly better for White, e.g. 27...\(\text{\textit{b}}\)5?! (27...a6 28 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)xb7\(\pm\)) 28 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)xd8 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)f8 (28...\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b8?! 29 a4! b4 30 \(\text{\textit{f}}\)f4\(\pm\)) 29 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b7 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)3 30 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c5\(\pm\) and the b5 pawn is lost;

A2) 15...\(\text{\textit{f}}\)e8?! 16 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)xc7! transposes to 14 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e1! \(\text{\textit{f}}\)e8 15 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)f4 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a5?! 16 \(\text{\textit{x}}\)c7, a position already examined; instead, 16 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e5 c6 17 c4 \(\text{\textit{x}}\)d8 18 \(\text{\textit{h}}\)h5?! g6 19 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)g4 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)g5 20 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)xg5 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)xg5 21 \(\text{\textit{x}}\)xf5 \(\text{\textit{x}}\)f5 22 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e3 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)ad8 23 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)e1! b6 24 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d1 f6 25 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)g4 \(\text{\textit{f}}\)f8 26 h3 h5 27 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)xe8+ \(\text{\textit{x}}\)xe8 28 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e3\(\pm\) also proved better for White in Shirov-Karpov, Prague (rapid m/2) 2002, but Black's play is susceptible to improvement. For example after 19...\(\text{\textit{x}}\)xg4! 20 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)xg4 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)xd4 White seems to have nothing special;

A3) 15...\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d6! (Solving the problem with the c7 pawn once and for all) 16 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)xd6?! (In Ivanchuk-Kramnik, Dortmund 1998, the inferior 16 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e5 led nowhere) and now Black has the following choice:

A3a) 16...\(\text{\textit{c}}\)xd6?! 17 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)a4! \(\text{\textit{a}}\)ac8 18 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)ac1 looks promising for White, e.g. 18...\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c6?! (18...\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b6?! 19 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)a6! \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c7 20 c4 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)a8 21 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b4\(\uparrow\) results in annoying pressure on the d-pawn; 18...\(\text{\textit{a}}\)e6 19 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d2 b6 20 \(\text{\textit{f}}\)f3 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)g5 21 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e3 d5 22 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)e1\(\pm\) leaves to us the impression that Black's weakness on d5 is more important than White's on c3) 19 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)c4! (19 c4 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a5) 19...\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a5 20 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)b3 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c7 21 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d5 with some initiative due to the strongly placed \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d5; however, even here Black should be able to gradually offset White's plus: 21...\(\text{\textit{a}}\)a5! 22 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)b4 (22 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)a2 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d3\(\clubsuit\); 22 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d1 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c4; 22 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)b2 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d3\(\clubsuit\)) 22...\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d3! 23 c4!? \(\text{\textit{x}}\)xc4 24 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d2 [24 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)g5 b5 25 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)b1 g6 26 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)e4 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)b3 (26...\(\text{\textit{w}}\)d8 27 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)h4 h5 28 \(\text{\textit{f}}\)f3 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)f6\(\diamondsuit\)) 27 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)h4 h5 28 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d4 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)d8\(\diamondsuit\)) 24...b5 25 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d4 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)d8! 26 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)xd6 \(\text{\textit{x}}\)b8 (=) as there is nothing left for White to attack;

A3b) 16...\(\text{\textit{w}}\)xd6! (The most clear-cut) 17 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d3?! (17 \(\text{\textit{h}}\)h4 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7! 18 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d3 g6\(\Rightarrow\)) 17...\(\text{\textit{w}}\)xd3! (17...\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g6\(\pm\)) 18 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)xd3 b6?! (18...\(\text{\textit{a}}\)e8 19 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)e8 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)e8 20 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b5 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c6
21 d5 a6 22 \textit{W}xb7 \textit{D}e5 23 \textit{D}xe5 \textit{W}xe5 24 \textit{D}f1 \textit{W}xc3 25 \textit{W}xa6±) 19 \textit{D}h4!? g6! (19...\textit{W}ae8 20 \textit{D}f5 \textit{W}f6 21 \textit{D}e3±) 20 \textit{W}e3 \textit{D}c4! (20...\textit{W}f6 21 \textit{D}f3 \textit{D}c4 22 \textit{W}h6 \textit{W}ae8 23 \textit{D}g5 \textit{W}g7 24 \textit{W}h4±) 21 \textit{W}g5!? \textit{W}ae8 22 \textit{D}f5 \textit{W}d8 leads to a position where despite the menacing appearance of his pieces the best White can achieve is a draw by 23 \textit{D}c7+ \textit{W}g7 24 \textit{D}f5+ \textit{W}h8 25 \textit{D}e7 \textit{g}xf5 26 \textit{W}f6±; all this means that in Kramnik’s line White should definitely accept the pawn sacrifice if he wants to maintain chances of an advantage;

B) 15 \textit{A}xc7 and now:

B1) 15...b6?! is double-edged, yet after the correct 16 \textit{D}g3! [16 \textit{D}f4?! \textit{W}ac8 17 \textit{A}d2 \textit{A}d6 18 \textit{W}e1 h6 19 a4 \textit{D}c7 20 h3 (Krackops-Illescas, European tcch, Leon 2001) 20...\textit{D}e4! looks slightly better for Black; The manoeuvre \textit{A}c7-f4-d2 is too passive a way of guarding White’s backward c-pawn] 16...

\textit{W}ac8 17 \textit{A}d2 \textit{A}d6 18 \textit{W}e1! \textit{W}xf3 19 \textit{W}xe7 \textit{D}c3 20 \textit{W}ac1! (20 \textit{D}d6 \textit{A}a8 21 \textit{W}e5 \textit{W}xe5 22 \textit{d}xe5 \textit{D}b3!) 20...

\textit{A}c6 21 \textit{W}xa7 \textit{W}xd4 22 \textit{A}xc6 \textit{D}xc6 23 \textit{W}c7± White emerges with a small but lasting advantage due to his bishop pair;

\textbf{B2)} 15...\textit{A}ac8! (With this move Black renounces any chance of playing for a win as the position now becomes too simplified) 16 \textit{A}xa5 \textit{W}xa5 17 c4

...and we have arrived at a position critical for the evaluation of the 14 \textit{D}f4!? variation; Black has certain compensation for the pawn, but the road to draw is rather narrow:

\textbf{B2a)} 17...\textit{W}c3 is a relatively new idea, played in Naumann-Kopylov, Dresden 2000. After, however, 18 \textit{W}a4! [intending c4-c5, \textit{W}a4-b4; 18 \textit{W}c1 \textit{W}a5 19 \textit{W}f4 \textit{A}f6 20 \textit{D}e5 (20 c5 \textit{A}g6 21 \textit{D}a2 \textit{W}d8 22 \textit{D}d1 b6 23 \textit{c}xb6 \textit{axb6}) 20...

\textit{A}xe5 (20...\textit{g}6? 21 \textit{D}d7±; 20...

\textit{A}e6 21 \textit{W}e4 \textit{A}xe5 22 \textit{d}xe5 b6 23 \textit{A}d3±) 21 \textit{W}xe5 (21...

\textit{A}xe5 21 \textit{d}xe5 \textit{A}g6! 22 \textit{W}d1 \textit{D}c5=) 21...

\textit{W}xe5 22 \textit{d}xe5 \textit{D}c5 23 f4 \textit{W}fc8 is equal according to Kopylov, but even this evaluation looks debatable) we think that the queen’s excursion to c3 merely helps White;

\textbf{B2b)} 17...\textit{A}f6! (This move has been the automatic choice here;) 18 \textit{A}d3!? [The most tricky move; 18
The Petroff has failed to secure an advantage on a number of occasions, the most typical one being 18...\texttt{Bb}6 19 \texttt{Bxb}6 \texttt{axb}6 20 \texttt{Bfd}1 \texttt{Bfd}8 $\frac{1}{2}$-$\frac{1}{2}$, Wahls-Alteman, Bundesliga 1998; Alteman goes on to remark that after 21 \texttt{Bxa}2 \texttt{Be}4 22 \texttt{d}5 it is essential to play 22...\texttt{Bb}5!= which secures equality by opening up the position for the bishops; 18 \texttt{Bxa}2 is another unfortunate attempt to get the advantage that allowed Black to draw effortlessly after 22...\texttt{Bb}6 21 \texttt{Bxb}6 22 \texttt{d}5 \texttt{Be}8 23 \texttt{Bg}4 24 \texttt{Bd}1 \texttt{Bxf}3 25 \texttt{Be}8+$\texttt{Bx}e\texttt{e}8 26 \texttt{Bxf}3 \texttt{Be}5 27 \texttt{g}3 \texttt{Bd}6 28 a4 a5 29 h4 g6 30 h5 \texttt{Bg}7 31 \texttt{Bf}1 \texttt{Be}7 32 \texttt{Be}2 \texttt{Be}8 33 \texttt{Bd}3 \texttt{Bf}6 34 \texttt{Bf}2 \texttt{Be}5 35 hxg6 hxg6 36 \texttt{Hh}1 \texttt{Bg}7 37 \texttt{Bf}3 $\frac{1}{2}$-$\frac{1}{2}$ in Ponomariov-Sulypa, Donetsk (zt) 1998] leads to a critical position where Black must seek refuge in opposite coloured bishops in order to equalize:

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

\textbf{B2b1} 18...\texttt{Bfd}8?! 19 \texttt{Bxf}5! (19 \texttt{Bb}1!? \texttt{Bg}4 $\square$ 20 h3 \texttt{Bxf}3 21 \texttt{Wxf}3 \texttt{Bxd}4 22 \texttt{Bxb}7 \texttt{Bcd}8 23 \texttt{Be}2 transposes to a position examined under Zhang Zhong-Karpov below) 19...\texttt{Bxf}5 20 \texttt{Wa}4 \texttt{Bxd}4! (20...a6?! 21 c5! g6 22 \texttt{Bab}1 \texttt{Wd}5 23 \texttt{Bb}4+ allowed White to consolidate his advantage in Palac-Ferecc, Croatian ch, Pula 2000) 21 \texttt{Bxd}4 \texttt{Bxd}4 22 \texttt{Wxa}7 \texttt{Bxc}4 23 \texttt{Wxb}7 h6± may be tenable but Black will certainly suffer;

\textbf{B2b2} 18...\texttt{Bg}4! (It is most thematic to opt for opposite-coloured bishops in order to weaken the White centre) 19 h3 \texttt{Bxf}3! [19...\texttt{Bh}5?! 20 g4 \texttt{Bg}6 21 \texttt{Bb}3 \texttt{Bc}7 22 \texttt{Bxg}6 fxg6 (22...hxg6 23 \texttt{g}5) 23 c5+$\texttt{Bh}8 24 \texttt{Bab}1 b6 25 \texttt{Bf}c1 \texttt{Bf}4 26 \texttt{Wc}3± is good for White] 20 \texttt{Wxf}3 \texttt{Bcd}8! [20...\texttt{Bfd}8 21 \texttt{Bab}1 \texttt{Bxd}4 22 \texttt{Bxb}7 \texttt{Bcd}8 23 \texttt{Be}2 leads to a position that Black might be able to hold but is in any case pleasant for White who can try for a long time. For example 23...\texttt{Bw}5 (23...\texttt{Bd}2 24 \texttt{Wh}5±; 23...\texttt{Bd}4 24 \texttt{Bxd}7 \texttt{Bxd}7 25 \texttt{Bb}1+) 24 \texttt{Bxa}7! (24 \texttt{Bh}5 \texttt{Bxh}5 (24...\texttt{Ww}6 25 \texttt{Bxa}7 \texttt{Bc}8 26 \texttt{Bd}1 \texttt{Bc}4 27 \texttt{Bc}2 g6 28 \texttt{Bf}3 \texttt{Bc}5 29 \texttt{Bb}7±) 25 \texttt{Bxh}5 g6 26 \texttt{Be}2, is less good due to 26...\texttt{Bc}4! (26...\texttt{Bc}8 27 \texttt{Bf}3±) 27 \texttt{Bc}1 \texttt{Bc}3 28 \texttt{Bc}1 and Black has excellent chances of drawing after either 28...\texttt{Bc}2± or 28...\texttt{Bxc}2? 29 \texttt{Bxc}3 \texttt{Bd}1+ 30 \texttt{Bh}2 \texttt{Bxf}2 31 \texttt{Bxa}7 \texttt{Bdd}2 32 \texttt{Bg}3±) 24...\texttt{Bd}2 (24...\texttt{Bf}4 25 \texttt{Bh}5) 25 \texttt{Bc}1 \texttt{Bc}8 26 \texttt{Bc}8±] 21 \texttt{Bab}1 \texttt{Bxd}4 22 \texttt{Bxb}7 g6 23 \texttt{Bc}4 \texttt{Bd}6 (Zhang Zhong-Karpov, Cap d’Agde 2000) and now 24 \texttt{Bd}5?! \texttt{Bf}6 25 \texttt{Wd}3 sets the last trap but after the correct 25...\texttt{Bb}6! the game should end in a draw (25...\texttt{Bc}5?! 26 \texttt{Bb}5 \texttt{Bc}7 27 \texttt{Bc}3 \texttt{Bb}6 28 a4±; or 25...\texttt{Bc}5?! 26 \texttt{Bd}2 \texttt{Bc}8 27 \texttt{Bh}1± merely jeopardize Black’s defensive task). For example, after the best 26
h4! (Otherwise $\text{Rf8-e8-e1}$ draws) there comes 26...$\text{xf2}$! (26...h5? 27 g3± $\Delta$ 27...$\text{Me8??}$ 28 $\text{xf7+!!}$+) 27 $\text{xf2}$ $\text{We1+}$ 28 $\text{h2}$ $\text{xf2}$ 29 $\text{h3}$! and White’s plus is merely symbolic.

15 $\text{Mfe1!}$

This is the best move here; 15 $\text{Od2}$ does not promise anything; after 15...$\text{Da5}$ 16 $\text{f3}$ $\text{Nd7}$ 17 $\text{De4}$ b6 18 $\text{g3}$ $\text{g6}$ 19 $\text{g4}$ f5 20 $\text{h5}$ $\text{d6}$ 21 $\text{f3}$ a draw was agreed in Sax-Haba, Bibinje 2001.

15...$\text{Mfe8}$!

In a roundabout way we have transposed to one of the most critical tabias in the whole Petroff; this position can, of course, be reached also via the 14 $\text{Mfe1!}$ move order (with 14 $\text{Mfe1!}$ $\text{Mfe8}$ 15 $\text{Mf4}$ $\text{Mc8}$), which, as we have already pointed out is the best one. 15...$\text{Af6}$!? is a logical alternative, yet after 16 $\text{Od2}$! White seems able to maintain some pull [whilst 16 h3?! $\text{Mfe8}$ (16...$\text{Da5}$ 17 $\text{De5}$ $\text{Wb3}$ 18 $\text{g4}$! $\text{e7}$ 19 $\text{De3}$) 17 $\text{h2}$ transposes to Kramnik-Anand below] After 16 $\text{Od2}$! Black has to deal with the knight manoeuvres $\text{Od2-b3-c5}$, $\text{Od2-e4-g3}$ or $\text{Od2-f1(c4)-e3}$ as well as with pressure on the diagonals h1-a8 and h3-c8 arising after a redeployment of the $\text{Me2}$ to f3 or g4. Below follows a survey of the practical experience from this position:

A) 16...$\text{Dxd4??}$ (Panarin-Afonin, Rybinsk 2001) loses at once to 17 $\text{Cc4!}$ $\text{Wd7}$ 18 $\text{cx4}$ $\text{Wxd4}$ 19 $\text{f3}+$;  
B) 16...$\text{Wd7??}$ 17 $\text{Db3!}$ b6 18 $\text{b5}$ was already critical for Black in Jasinski-Taksrud, EU ch, corr. 1994;  
C) 16...$\text{Wd8??}$ (intending $\text{Cc6xd4}$ or simply ...$\text{Cc6-e7}$) is the latest word in non ...$\text{Cc6-a5}$ solutions and deserves a closer look; After 17 $\text{g4}!!$? (17 $\text{f3}$ $\text{Dxd4}$! 18 $\text{cx4}$ $\text{Wxd4}$ 19 $\text{e3}$ $\text{Wxa1}$ 20 $\text{Wxa1}$ $\text{xa1}$ 21 $\text{xa1}$ b6 is just an unclear ending; 17 $\text{Db3}$ $\text{De7}$! 18 $\text{f3}$ b6= was equal in Lautier-Beikert, National I, Bordeaux 2003) 17... $\text{Xg4}$ 18 $\text{Wxg4}$ $\text{De7}$ 19 $\text{Dd4}$ $\text{Gg6}$ 20 $\text{g5}$ $\text{Xg5}$ 21 $\text{Xg5}$ c5 22 $\text{Me3}$ $\text{cx4}$ 23 $\text{cx4}$ $\text{Wd5}$ 24 $\text{Mae1}$ White maintains some pressure due to the idea h2-h4-h5, but it is quite likely that more improvements are available at an earlier stage;  
D) 16...$\text{Da5}$ (The most natural reply, but now the knight is far from the kingside) 17 $\text{f3}$ $\text{Wd7}$ 18 $\text{De4}$ $\text{De7}$ 19 $\text{Gg3}$ $\text{Gg6}$ 20 $\text{g4}$! f5 21 $\text{f3}$ $\text{d6}$ is a very logical development of events when the weakness inflicted upon Black’s castled position gives White something to work on: 22 $\text{e5}!!$ $\text{h8}$ (22...$\text{Mfe8}$? 23 $\text{xb7!}$ $\text{xb7}$ 24 $\text{Wb3+}$ $\text{Wf7}$ 25 $\text{Wxb7}$± as in
Konguvel-Suvrajit, Calcutta 2002, is clearly bad for Black; 22...\textit{c}e8?! looks like a possible improvement, e.g. 23 \textit{d}d5+ \textit{f}7 24 \textit{x}f7+ \textit{w}xf7 25 \textit{f}4± with just an edge for White.) 23 \textit{h}4! \textit{d}d5 24 \textit{w}g8 25 \textit{c}e2 \textit{c}c4 26 \textit{a}b1 \textit{b}6 27 \textit{w}c1! \textit{c}e8 28 \textit{w}f4 and White's kingside initiative was growing to alarming proportions.

\textit{K}asparov - Dao Thien Hai, Batumi (rapid) 2001. The rest of the game saw \textit{K}asparov demonstrate the attacking potential of his position in exemplary fashion: 28...\textit{x}xe5 29 \textit{x}xe5 \textit{d}xe5 30 \textit{d}xe5 \textit{e}6 31 \textit{h}6! \textit{g}6 32 \textit{e}2! c5 33 \textit{w}g3 \textit{c}c4 34 \textit{f}4! \textit{x}xe5 35 \textit{d}d1 \textit{x}f3+ 36 \textit{w}xf3 \textit{f}7 37 \textit{w}c6!!! \textit{c}8 38 \textit{e}e1 g5? (38...\textit{a}d8?!) 39 \textit{h}3!± \textit{b}7 40 \textit{w}d6 \textit{w}f6? (40...\textit{e}4?!) 41 \textit{e}e6 \textit{w}xc3 42 \textit{e}7?! (42 \textit{w}e7++) 42...\textit{c}8? (42...\textit{a}1+ 43 \textit{h}2 \textit{f}6±) 43 \textit{g}7+ \textit{x}g7 44 \textit{hxg7} \textit{g}xg7 45 \textit{d}xg5 and Black resigned;

15...\textit{f}d8 on the other hand, does not appeal very much to us because the rook has no targets along the d-file. After 16 \textit{h}3 [16 \textit{f}1?! is also interesting as 16...\textit{f}6 (Anand-Ivanchuk, Monaco blindfold 1999) can be met with 17 c4!? \textit{a}5 18 d5! \textit{a}xa1 19 \textit{w}xa1 \textit{b}8 20 \textit{a}5 \textit{f}6 21 \textit{c}c3 \textit{a}4 22 \textit{d}4\textit{a}5] 16...\textit{f}6 17 \textit{d}d2 (17 \textit{h}2?±) 17...\textit{w}d7 18 \textit{f}3 \textit{a}5 (18...\textit{x}d4?! looks like a better fighting chance, e.g. 19 \textit{cxd}4 \textit{w}xd4 20 \textit{a}xb7 \textit{w}xf4 21 \textit{a}xc8 \textit{a}c8 22 \textit{w}e2 \textit{e}6 23 \textit{a}d1?) 19 \textit{e}4 \textit{a}xe4 (19...\textit{e}7? 20 \textit{g}3 \textit{g}6 21 \textit{g}4 \textit{f}5 22 \textit{a}xf5! \textit{a}xf5 23 \textit{a}xe7 \textit{x}e7 24 \textit{a}xf5 \textit{b}8 25 \textit{w}h5 g6 26 \textit{g}g4++) 20 \textit{a}xe4 (20 \textit{a}xe4?! c5 21 \textit{f}3± looks clearly better for White as 21...\textit{c}xd4? loses to 22 \textit{w}h5+-) 20...\textit{e}8 21 \textit{e}3 \textit{c}d8 22 \textit{g}4 \textit{c}6 23 \textit{f}3 (Naiditsch-Lingnau, Senden 2000) 23...\textit{w}xf3 24 \textit{a}xf3 the ending is at least slightly better for White because of his powerful bishop pair.

16 \textit{c}4

Mobilising the pawn centre with gain of time looks like the most thematic continuation, but White avails himself of two alternatives that are not devoid of venom despite their slow, preparatory nature:

16 \textit{d}2?! is linked with the usual idea of transferring the knight to e3. Likely follow-ups include:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[A)] 16...\textit{a}5 17 \textit{f}3 (17 \textit{f}1?! \textit{w}b3! 18 \textit{c}1 \textit{c}4=) 17...\textit{w}d7 18 \textit{f}1 (18 \textit{b}3?! \textit{a}xb3 19 \textit{w}xb3 \textit{b}6 20 a4 \textit{d}6 21 \textit{e}3 \textit{e}4! was dead equal in Acs-Haba, Czech open 2003) 18...\textit{d}6 19 \textit{a}xe8+ \textit{a}xe8 20 \textit{a}xe6 \textit{c}xd6 21 \textit{e}3\textit{=} which looks promising for White because of his superior minor pieces and
  \item[B)] 16...\textit{d}6 17 \textit{a}xd6 when we have two choices for Black:
**B1)** 17...wxd6 18 d4 wxf6 19 dxe5 is slightly better for White, a sample line being 19... dxe1+ 20 wxe1 b6 21 we2! dxe5 22 dxe6 wxf6 23 fxe6 wxe6 24 d6 a6 e8 25 wxe6 g6 (25...wxe6 26 wxc7 dxe1+ 27 f1 dxe1+ 28 f2 wxe2 fxe2 29 g3) 26 h1 f5 27 f1 wxe5 28 wxc7 fxe2+ 29 fxe2 wxe6 30 f1 f2 31 g1 h6 32 w3 wxe3 33 hgx3 xe3 34 xc1

**B2)** 17...cx6!? is more interesting, yet 18 d4+ offers White chances of an edge; 16 h3!? is a very original idea by Kramnik, creating the possibility h2-g4-e3; this route is better than the usual one d2-f1-e3 because the knight from g4 attacks the bishop on f6 and in case of its withdrawal to e7 has the additional possibility of jumping to e5; the sequel 16...f6 17 h2! wa5 18 d2 ed8 19 f3! h6 20 g4 xg4 21 hxg4 g5 22 xg5 hxg5 23 xe8+ xe8 24 w3 d8! 25 g3 c6 26 g2 d6 27 f1 e7 28 c4 w7 29 h1 f8 30 f5 d7 31 d5 cxd5 32 xdx5± left White slightly better in Kramnik-Anand, Wijk aan Zee 2003, but Black managed to draw after an arduous and stubborn defence: 32...wd8 33 a4 b6 34 a5 bx6 35 d a1 w6 36 x6 w6 37 f6 38 f3 d6 39 d8 40 f4 gxf4+ 41 gxf4 c5 42 d5 a6 43 d8+ e7 44 a8 d6 45 f3 e7 46 g3 d7 47 e8 d3 48 e4 d4 49 c5 d8 50 c7+ d7 51 c8 d8 1/2-1/2 16...we4 17 e3 f6

**18 g2!**

A multi-purpose move, unpinning the d-pawn and preparing to switch over the rook to d2 or e2, according to circumstances.

18 g1!? is an alternative method of unpinning the d-pawn; after 18...b6 (18...a5 19 d2 b6 20 c5 wa8 21 a4 e4 22 xax5 bx5 23 xa5 1/2-1/2, Goloschapov-Motylev, Dubai 2003, can hardly be considered a test of 18 g1!?) 19 h3 g6 20 c5! d7 21 a6 cxd8 22 g5 White’s plan became evident in Kasparov-Karpov, New York (rapid m/2) 2002, as Black cannot avoid a ruining of his kingside pawn structure. The remainder of the game allowed the chess world to witness an unexpected turn of events for an encounter of this calibre: 22...wc6 23 cxb6 wb6 24 xxf6 gxf6 25 wa4! c6 26 g1 f8 27 e3 db8 28 g3! ed8 29 e2 d5?! 30 xc6! wb2 31 ec3 eg7 32 wxa7 wa1+ 33 e1 db1 34 xdb1 wxb1+ 35 bh2+ wa2 36 wc7?! (36 g4+-) 36...ec8 37 e2 wxa3 38 d2?! d6! and having avoided the worst, Black even plucked up the courage to win: 39 wc5 wa6 40 dh4 ec8 41 wd5 ec1
Beating the Petroff

42 \( \text{b}2 \text{e}4?! \) 43 \( \text{w}xe4?? \) (43 \( \text{w}xe4 \text{w}f1 \) 44 \( \text{a}f5+ \text{xf}5 \) 45 \( h4 \))

43...\( \text{xe}4 \) 44 \( \text{xf}5+ \text{f}8 \) 45 \( \text{xe}4 \text{c}8 \) 46 d5 \( \text{a}4 \) 47 \( \text{f}3?? \) \( \text{a}3 \) 0-1

18...b6

Creating a secure base for the knight on a5; 18...\( \text{cd}8 \) 19 \( \text{d}2 \pm \) is Kasparov’s evaluation and we have no reason to challenge it.

19 h3 \( \text{a}5 \)

20 \( \text{d}2!?! \)

A very interesting novelty, to exploit the knight’s position on a5.

The other try is 20 g4, but it has failed to secure an advantage in tournament practice so far: After 20 g4 \( \text{g}6! \) (20...\( \text{d}7?! \) 21 \( \text{d}3 \text{w}b7 \) 22 \( \text{g}5 \text{e}7 \) 23 \( \text{e}5\pm \) 21 \( \text{g}5 \) (21 \( \text{f}1!?! \) ) 21...\( \text{e}7 \) 22 \( \text{e}5 \) 23 \( \text{d}6 \) 23 \( \text{xg}6 \) (23 \( \text{d}3 \) is harmless due to 23...\( \text{w}h4 \) 24 \( \text{xcg}6 \text{h}g6 \) 25 \( \text{g}4 \) \( \text{w}xg4+ \) 26 \( \text{hxg}4 \text{f}4 \) 27 \( \text{a}e2 \text{xe}3 \) 28 fxe3 c5 29 \( \text{f}2 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 30 \( \text{g}3 \) cxd4 31 exd4 \( \text{a}e2 \) 32 \( \text{a}xg2 \text{xd}4 \) 33 \( \text{e}7 \text{c}6 \) 34 \( \text{h}7 \text{e}5 \) 35 \( \text{a}2 \) \( \text{xc}4 \) 36 \( \text{a}xh7 \) and 1/2-1/2 Svidler-Gelfand, Moscow 2002) 23...\( \text{hxg}6 \) 24 c5 (24 \( \text{g}4 \text{xc}4!?! \) ) 24...\( \text{f}8! \) [24...bxc5 25 dxc5 \( \text{f}4 \) 26 \( \text{g}4 \text{cd}8 \) 27 \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 28 \( \text{d}7\pm \) (28 \( \text{ee}2!?) \) 25 \( \text{g}4 \text{cd}8 \) 26 \( \text{a}e2 \text{wc}6! \) [The most exact; 26...\( \text{d}5 \) 27 \( \text{f}4 \text{xe}2 \) 28 \( \text{we}2 \text{c}6 \) ? (28...\( \text{wc}6! \) ) 29 \( \text{c}7 \text{a}8 \) 30 \( \text{e}5? \) (30 \( \text{a}6!+\) ) 30...\( \text{we}5 \) 31 \( \text{xe}5 \text{c}4 \) 32 d5 \( \text{xe}5? \) (32...\( \text{cd}5 \) 33 \( \text{a}5! = \) ) 33 \( \text{xe}5 \text{xd}5 \) 34 c6++ led to a White victory in Kasparov-Adams, Linares 2002] 27 cxb6= an equal position was reached which the players decided to call a draw in Anand-Adams, Linares 2002.

20...\( \text{wb}1?! \)

After this Black will be slightly worse, which however, seems to be the case no matter how he continues. It must be admitted though, that the ‘refutation’ of this move was very hard for Black to foresee over the board play.

20...\( \text{x}d4?? \) is, of course, a blunder due to 21 \( \text{xa}5++ \);

20...\( \text{b}7?! \) is not so good because of 21 \( \text{wa}4! \) \( \text{d}6 \) 22 c5! \( \text{bxc}5 \) (22...\( \text{d}5 \) 23 \( \text{cd}6 \) \( \text{xa}2 \) 24 \( \text{d}7 \) \( \text{xd}7 \) 25 \( \text{xd}7\pm \) ) 23 \( \text{b}5 \text{d}5 \) 24 \( \text{xe}8 \text{xa}2 \) 25 dxc5\( \uparrow \) and White’s initiative looks dangerous; 20...c5 is probably best; the position after 21 \( \text{f}1 \text{wc}6 \) 22 d5 \( \text{wc}7! \) (Instead, 22...\( \text{wd}7?! \) 23 \( \text{xa}5 \text{bxa}5 \) 24 \( \text{d}3\pm \) is strategically bad) is rather complicated but it seems to us that with logical play White should be able to maintain a slight edge. For example 23 \( \text{xa}5 \text{bxa}5 \) 24 \( \text{a}e2 \text{xe}2 \) 25 \( \text{xe}2 \text{d}7 \) 26 \( \text{wd}2! \) and Black is suffering, despite his two bishops.

21 \( \text{wb}1 \) \( \text{xb}1 \) 22 \( \text{xb}1 \) \( \text{xe}2 \) 23 \( \text{f}1 \text{ce}8 \)
This was the position that Black was counting on. It appears that White has completely misplayed the opening, but in a joint analysis of the authors a few months ago we had discovered a stunning possibility that turns the tables:

24 \( \text{Qg1!!} \)

Chess is a weird game. The knight retreats to the 1st rank, creating a pathetic picture for the whole White army, and yet this is only an illusion. The truth is that White's position has accumulated tremendous energy and this will be apparent after only three more moves.

24...\( \text{Qxe4?} \)

Black's game is probably lost after this. He had to sacrifice the exchange with 24...\( \text{Qxd2!} \) 25 \( \text{Qxd2} \) \( \text{Qxc4} \) 26 \( \text{Qd3 Qe7} \) although even here White has at least a slight edge after 27 a4± or 27 \( \text{Qf3}± \)

Now, all White's sleeping pieces suddenly spring to life:

25 \( \text{Qxa5! bxax5} \) 26 \( \text{Qe2!!} \) \( \text{Qf8}! \) 27 \( \text{Qxe4 Qxe4} \) 28 \( \text{Qe2±} \)

The picture has changed dramatically: White has the better pawn structure, his rook is supremely placed on the b-file for invasion purposes and his minor piece ideal for exploiting the weaknesses in the enemy camp, as well as attacking the Black king. Still, the position requires hard work to be won and Marjanovic makes it even harder by putting up a superb and tenacious defence.

28...c5!

To activate rook and bishop; this gives White a pair of double but strong passed c-pawns, but other moves would lose easily.

28...\( \text{Qxd4??} \) would certainly be the worst of them, losing prosaically to 29 \( \text{f3 Qh4} \) (29...\( \text{Qxe2} \) 30 \( \text{Qxe2} \) \( \text{Qb6} \) 31 \( \text{Qb5} \) c6 32 \( \text{Qe5±} \) ) 30 g3 \( \text{Qhx3} \) 31 \( \text{Qb8+ Qe7} \) 32 \( \text{Qxd4++} \)

28...c6 can be met strongly by either 29 \( \text{Qb3!±} \) or 29 a4!±

29 \( \text{f3 Qe3} \) 30 dxc5 \( \text{Qxa3} \) 31 \( \text{Qb8+ Qe7} \) 32 \( \text{Qb7+ Qd8} \) 33 \( \text{Qg3!} \)

The knight must join the fight and does so in the most flexible way; material considerations are not important at this stage, it is piece activity, time and direct threats that count.

33...\( \text{Qa1+} \) 34 \( \text{Qe2} \) a4!

Black tries to make use of his only asset, the passed a-pawn.
After 34...a2+!? 35 \texttt{d}3 \texttt{xe}2 White should play the accurate 36 \texttt{d}e4! [The plausible alternative 36 \texttt{f}5?! keeps e4 in reserve for the king, but it may not be best since 36...\texttt{g}5! gives Black counter-play. For example: (a) 37 \texttt{d}6 \texttt{xc}5 38 \texttt{xf}7+ \texttt{e}8 39 \texttt{d}6+ \texttt{d}8 40 \texttt{x}a7 (40 \texttt{x}g7 \texttt{g}7 41 \texttt{b}7+ \texttt{c}7 42 \texttt{xc}5 \texttt{d}6 43 \texttt{b}7+ \texttt{e}5=) 40...\texttt{h}5 41 c5 \texttt{e}7=; (b) 37 \texttt{e}4!? (to force g6, weakening all kingside pawns, but some time is lost) 37...g6 38 \texttt{d}6 \texttt{xc}5! (38...\texttt{e}5+? 39 \texttt{d}3 \texttt{xc}5 40 \texttt{xf}7+ \texttt{c}8 41 \texttt{d}6+ \texttt{d}8 42 \texttt{x}h7 \texttt{c}6 43 c5 \texttt{e}7 44 \texttt{f}7+ \texttt{e}8 (44...\texttt{e}8 45 \texttt{e}5 \texttt{xc}5 46 \texttt{h}8++) 45 \texttt{e}5+ leaves Black unable to cope with so much activity) 39 \texttt{xf}7+ \texttt{e}8 40 \texttt{d}6+ \texttt{d}8 and things are not clear as 41 \texttt{x}h7 is met by 41...\texttt{e}5+ 42 \texttt{d}3 \texttt{e}7!] which seems to guarantee a winning position. After 36...\texttt{b}2 (what else?) 37 \texttt{xf}7 \texttt{b}3+ 38 \texttt{e}2 \texttt{e}5 (38...a4 39 c6) 39 \texttt{g}5! we have not been able to find a drawing solution for Black.

35 \texttt{e}4 \texttt{e}5 36 \texttt{d}6

I (V.K) thought it was over after this, but Marjanko, always resourceful, finds a defence.

36...\texttt{f}5!

Threatening perpetual check! Thus, Black distracts the White knight for a while and gains time to push his passed pawn.

After 36...\texttt{xd}6? 37 \texttt{cx}d6 a3 38 \texttt{xa}7 a2 (38...\texttt{c}1 39 \texttt{d}3! \texttt{d}1+ 40 \texttt{e}4 \texttt{xd}6 41 \texttt{xa}3+) 39 \texttt{f}2 \texttt{c}1 40 \texttt{xa}2 \texttt{xc}4 41 \texttt{e}3! (41 \texttt{a}7?? \texttt{f}4!) 41...\texttt{c}6 (41...\texttt{d}7 42 \texttt{a}7+ \texttt{e}6 43 d7 \texttt{e}7 44 d8=\texttt{w}+ \texttt{xd}8 45 \texttt{xf}7+) 42 \texttt{a}8+ \texttt{d}7 White wins by the following forced line that requires no commentary: 43 \texttt{f}8! f6 44 \texttt{f}7+ \texttt{xd}6 45 \texttt{g}7 h5 46 \texttt{f}4! \texttt{e}6 47 \texttt{g}3 \texttt{c}8 48 \texttt{h}4 \texttt{h}8 49 \texttt{b}7 \texttt{f}5 50 \texttt{b}5+ \texttt{g}6 51 \texttt{a}5 \texttt{h}7 52 \texttt{f}4 \texttt{h}6 53 \texttt{b}5 \texttt{h}8 54 f5+ \texttt{h}6 55 \texttt{b}6 \texttt{f}8 56 g3! \texttt{f}7 57 \texttt{b}8 \texttt{b}7 58 \texttt{g}8 \texttt{b}4+ 59 \texttt{g}4 \texttt{h}7 60 \texttt{g}6 \texttt{hx}g4 61 \texttt{hx}g4 \texttt{b}6 62 \texttt{h}5 \texttt{c}6 63 \texttt{g}5+.

37 \texttt{xf}5 a3 38 \texttt{xa}7 a2

39 \texttt{e}3! \texttt{d}4! 40 \texttt{a}8+

Setting a trap in time pressure; the immediate \texttt{e}3-c2 was also possible.

40...\texttt{c}7!

40...\texttt{d}7? 41 \texttt{c}2 \texttt{g}1 42 c6+! \texttt{xc}6 43 \texttt{xa}2 \texttt{gx}2+ 44 \texttt{d}3+-
loses immediately, as the check on b4 will cost Black material.

41 \( \square c2 \) \( \text{Kg1} \) 42 \( \text{Ka7+} \) \( \text{Kd8} \) 43 \( \text{Kxa2} \) \( \text{gxg2+} \) 44 \( \text{Kd3} \) \( \text{xc5} \)

This endgame looks tenable for Black, but with the following manoeuvre White manages to coordinate his pieces beautifully.

45 \( \text{Ka5} \) \( \text{Kg1} \) 46 \( \text{Kh5}! \)

A very important move, forcing a hole on g6, that could be exploited by a penetration of the king later on.

46...h6 47 \( \text{Kg4} \)

Threatening \( \text{Kh4-g4} \), and thus gaining time to extricate the rook.

47...\( \text{Kg3} \) 48 \( \text{Ke4!} \) \( \text{Kg2} \) 49 \( \text{Kb4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 50 \( \text{Kd5+} \)

The position is won. White has activated his pieces to the utmost.

50...\( \text{Ke8}?! \)

Hurrying to cover g6, the Black king becomes victim of a tactical melee.

51 \( \text{Kg4} \) \( \text{Ke2+} \) 52 \( \text{Kd3!} \) \( \text{Kf2} \) 53 \( \text{Kxg7!} \) \( \text{Kf8} \)

53...\( \text{Kxf3+} \) allows the tactical finish 54 \( \text{Ke4} \) \( \text{Kxh3} \) [54...\( \text{Ke7} \) 55 \( \text{Kc7+}! \) (55 \( \text{Kxf7} \) \( \text{Kxf7} \) 56 \( \text{Kf5+-} \)) 55...\( \text{Ke7} \) 56 \( \text{Kg6+-} \)] 55 \( \text{Kc7+}! \) \( \text{Kf8} \) 56 \( \text{Kxe6++} \), a classical example of the domination of the knight against the bishop that arises from the presence of attacking chances against the Black king.

54 \( \text{Kc7} \) \( \text{Kd3} \) 55 \( \text{Kd4} \)

The rest requires no comment; Black continued only because he was in time-pressure.

55...\( \text{Kd2} \) 56 \( \text{Kc5} \) \( \text{Kxh3} \) 57 \( \text{Ke1} \) \( \text{Kh1} \) 58 \( \text{Kc7} \) \( \text{Kd6} \) 59 \( \text{Kd7} \) \( \text{Kd1+} \) 60 \( \text{Ke5} \) \( \text{Ke5}+ \) 61 \( \text{Kf6} \) \( \text{Kxe8} \) 62 \( \text{Kxa6} \) \( \text{Kxe5}+ \) 63 \( \text{Kf5} \) \( \text{Kg7} \) 64 \( \text{Kc8=K} \) 1-0

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Investbanka, Belgrade 1995

1 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{e5} \) 2 \( \text{Kf3} \) \( \text{Kf6} \) 3 \( \text{Kxe5} \) \( \text{d6} \) 4 \( \text{Kf3} \) \( \text{Kxe4} \) 5 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{d5} \) 6 \( \text{Kd3} \) \( \text{Ke7} \) 7 0-0 \( \text{Kc6} \) 8 \text{c4?!} \) \( \text{Kb4} \) 9 \( \text{Kxe2} \) \( \text{Kd6} \)

Intensifying Black’s control over d5; now White must play with great accuracy to maintain chances for an advantage.

10 \( \text{Kc3} \) 0-0 11 \( \text{Ke3} \)

One of the best moves in the position; White develops his last minor piece and supports d4, waiting for his opponent to make the first attempt at clarification in the centre.

After 11 \text{a3} \( \text{Kxc3} \) 12 \text{bxc3} \( \text{Kc6} \) 13 \text{cxd5} \( \text{Kxd5} \) Black gets a much improved version of Illustrative Game 21 as White has weakened his pawn formation by playing \text{a2-a3} and his bishop stands less actively on e2. All in all, a fine positional
gain for Black; 11 \( \texttt{Q}e5! ? \) is the main alternative to 11 \( \texttt{Q}e3 \) and has been extremely popular lately in top-class tournaments, Peter Leko being its foremost exponent. Since it is rather impossible for us to cover both main lines we will restrict ourselves to a brief survey of the current situation after 11 \( \texttt{Q}e5! ? \), by mainly focusing on two examples from the champion’s practice:

A) After 11...c5 12 \( \texttt{Q}xe4 \) dxe4 13 d5 (A principled line of play) Black has the following choice:

A1) 13...\( \texttt{Q}d6 \) 14 a3 \( \texttt{Q}xe5 \) 15 \( \texttt{Q}xb4 \) and now

A1a) 15...\( \texttt{Q}d7 \) 16 bxc5 \( \texttt{W}c7 \) 17 \( \texttt{Q}e3! \) \( \texttt{Q}xh2+ \) (17...\( \texttt{Q}xb2 \) 18 \( \texttt{Q}b1 \pm \)) 18 \( \texttt{Q}h1 \) \( \texttt{Q}e5 \) 19 \( \texttt{Q}d4 \) \( \texttt{W}f8 \) 20 b4 \( \texttt{W}d8 \) 21 \( \texttt{Q}xe5 \) \( \texttt{Q}xe5 \) 22 \( \texttt{Q}a3! \) \( \texttt{W}h4+ \) 23 \( \texttt{Q}g1 \) \( \texttt{Q}g5 \) 24 f4! exf3 25 \( \texttt{Q}xf3 \pm \) was practically winning for White in Wahls-Pavasovic, Dresden (zt) 1998, while

A1b) 15...\( \texttt{Q}f5 \) 16 bxc5 \( \texttt{W}c7 \) 17 g3! \( \texttt{W}xc5 \) 18 \( \texttt{Q}e3 \) \( \texttt{W}d6 \) 19 c5 \( \texttt{W}f6 \) 20 \( \texttt{Q}b3 \) \( \texttt{Q}xb2 \) 21 \( \texttt{Q}a4 \pm \) was clearly better for White in Baklan-Timman, Neum 2000;

A2) After 13...\( \texttt{Q}c8 \) 14 a3 \( \texttt{Q}a6 \)

...the novelty 15 \( \texttt{f}3! ? \) blew new life in the position in Leko-Topalov, Dubai (rapid m/2) 2002:

A2a) 15...\( \texttt{W}c7! ? \) 16 \( \texttt{Q}f4! \) \( \texttt{Q}d6 \) (16...exf3 17 \( \texttt{B}xf3 \) \( \texttt{Q}d6 \) 18 \( \texttt{Q}d3 \pm \)) 17 fxe4 \( \texttt{Q}e8 \) (17...f5!? ) 18 \( \texttt{W}a4! ? \) (18 \( \texttt{Q}d3 \) \( \texttt{Q}xe4 \) 19 \( \texttt{Q}xd6 \) \( \texttt{W}xd6 \) 20 \( \texttt{Q}f2 \pm \)) 18...\( \texttt{Q}e7 \) 19 \( \texttt{Q}d3 \) \( \texttt{Q}xe4 \) 20 \( \texttt{Q}xd6 \) \( \texttt{W}xd6 \) 21 \( \texttt{Q}f3 \pm \) is Motylev's analysis;

A2b) 15...\( \texttt{Q}f6 \) 16 f4 \( \texttt{W}d6 \) 17 \( \texttt{W}c2! ? \) seems to offer White the better chances, for example 17...\( \texttt{Q}f5 \) (17...\( \texttt{Q}xe5 \) 18 fxe5 \( \texttt{W}xe5 \) 19 \( \texttt{Q}f4 \) \( \texttt{W}d4+ \) 20 \( \texttt{Q}h1\texttt{g} \) 18 b3! \( \texttt{Q}ae8 \) 19 \( \texttt{Q}b2 \) \( \texttt{Q}b8! ? \) 20 \( \texttt{Q}ae1 \pm \) 21 \( \texttt{Q}d7 \) 21 g4+-;

A2c) 15...\( \texttt{Q}d6 \) (The game continuation) 16 f4 \( \texttt{f}6 \) 17 \( \texttt{Q}g4 \) \( \texttt{f}5 \) 18 \( \texttt{Q}e5 \) \( \texttt{Q}b8! \) 19 b4! \( \texttt{Q}d7 \) 20 bxc5 \( \texttt{Q}xe5+ \) 21 \( \texttt{Q}h1 \) \( \texttt{Q}d6 \) 22 \( \texttt{Q}b2 \) \( \texttt{Q}e8 \) 23 \( \texttt{Q}b1 ! ? \) \( \texttt{W}e7 \) (23...\( \texttt{Q}xe5 \) 24 fxe5 \( \texttt{Q}xe5 \) 25 \( \texttt{Q}xe5 \) \( \texttt{Q}xe5 \) 26 \( \texttt{W}d4 \texttt{a} \) 24 \( \texttt{Q}b3 \) (24 \( \texttt{Q}h1! ? \) ) 24...b6 (24...\( \texttt{Q}xe5 ! ? \) 25 c5? \( \texttt{a} \) 26 \( \texttt{Q}c6 ! ? \)) 25 \( \texttt{Q}h5 \) (25 \( \texttt{Q}c6 ! ? \)) 25...\( \texttt{f}8 \) 26 \( \texttt{W}g3 \pm \)

...and having consolidated the outpost on e5 White went on to win in convincing fashion: 26...\( \texttt{Q}b7 \) 27 a4 \( \texttt{Q}ac8 \) 28 a5 \( \texttt{Q}f6 \) 29 \( \texttt{Q}e2 \) \( \texttt{Q}c5 \) 30 \( \texttt{W}g5 \) \( \texttt{Q}ce8 \) 31 \( \texttt{Q}d1! ? \) e3? 32 \( \texttt{Q}f3 \)
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\[ \text{Qe4 33} \text{Wxe7 Qxe7 34} \text{Qxe4 fxe4} \]
\[ 35 \text{g3 b5? 36 cxb5 Axd5 37 Afe1! Axd6 38 Axd1 Axe5 39 Axd5 Axb2} \]
\[ 40 Axb2 Axc8 41 Ag2 Aec7 42 Af1 Axc2 43 Axc2 Axc2 44 Ad8+ Af7 \]
\[ 45 Add7+ Ad6 46 Axa7 Af5 47 h3 e2+ 48 Ae1 1-0; \]

B) 11...f6 12 \( Axf3 \) (White has apparently lost two tempi, but the weakening of Black’s castled position compensates for the time investment) and here we have a major subdivision:

B1) 12...Hf8! is a logical move, with the idea of dropping back the bishops to f8 and f7, in order to activate the rook along the e-file. After 13 Ae3 Afd8 14 a3 Axc3 15 bxc3 Axc6 16 cxd5 Axd5 17 c4 Afd7 18 Ae2 (18 Ae1 Aa5 19 Ad2 has been suggested as an alternative, but 19...Af5 seems to be OK for Black.) 18...Aa5 (18...Ag6 19 Wa4\( \pm \)) 19 Ad3 g6 20 Ad2 (20 h4!? c5 21 h5\( \pm \) looks like an interesting idea while the more elastic 20 Afe1 is also worth considering) 20...c5 White has two options:

B1a) 21 Wa4 Afc6 22 d5 Ad4! 23 Axd4 cxd4 24 Ab4 b6! is given as equal in Informator but is probably slightly better for White after 25 Axf8 Axf8 26 Wb4+ Ae7 27 Afd1\( \pm \) (or 27 Wd2\( \pm \) Aa3-a4-a5)

B1b) After the second-best 21 d5?! b5! 22 Axa5 (22 cxb5 c4! 23 Axa5 cxd3 24 Axd8 dxc2 25 Axf6 Axd5\( \mp \)) 22...wxa5 23 cxb5 Axd5 Black had almost equalised in Adams-Timman, Wijk aan Zee 2001, yet the the correct 24 Ac4 would have forced him to play accurately to secure the draw;

B2) 12...c5 is the second main reply in the position, but White’s more harmonious piece development should enable him to gain a slight advantage despite the fluid situation in the centre: 13 Ae3 Ac8 14 dxc5 Axc5 15 Axc5!? [15 Ad4 Axc3 16 bxc3 Axd4 17 Axd4 Axc6 18 c5 (18 cxd5 wxc5 was agreed drawn in Malakhov-Macieja, Saint-Vincent 2000) 18...Af7 does not give White anything special] 15...Axc5 16 Wb3 and now:

B2a) 16...Axc3 17 Wxc3 Ac6 18 b4 d4! (18...Axc4? 19 Axc4 dxc4 20 b5+ Lutz-Kutuzovic, Pula 2000) 19 Wd2 Ah5 20 Afe1\( \pm \) looks like a pleasant plus for White in view of his queenside pawn majority, while...
B2b) 16...a5 17 a4d1 w7 18 a4 (18 axd5!? axd5 19 cxd5 axf7 is probably OK for Black but should not be dismissed too lightly) 18...axf7! 19 we3 (19 axc5? axc5 20 we3 axe3 21 fx3 dxc4= gives Black more than sufficient compensation for the exchange) 19...ad7 20 a3 axa6 21 cxd5 axd6 22 axe7 axe7 23 axa6 bxa6 24 axd4 axd5 25 af5 axf5 26 axd5 ae5 27 axe5 fxe5 28 he1 xe8± (Khalifman-Karpov, Sanur 2000) left Black suffering in view of his damaged pawn structure;

B3) 12...dh8 (The main continuation, getting the king out of a perilous diagonal and keeping open several options) 13 a3 axc3 14 bxc3 ac6 15 ad2 f5 16 he1 df6

25 axb7!! he8!? [25...gxf4 26 wxf4 g5 (26...d8 27 wxe6! dh7 28 db5+) 27 wxc7 wxc7 28 wxc7+] 26 h4!? (26 db5! gxf4 27 wxb4 axb4 26...gxf4 27 wxf4 dg7! 28 wxf5 ad8 (28...we8!± Δ) 29 db5 he6) 29 g5!! (29 db5!? 29...hxg5 30 hxg5 w8= 31 wh3+ dh6 32 af5!?= (32 gxf6 he8 33 wxc7 he1+ 34 df1 de7 35 wxe7) 32...dh8 33 wxc7 he1+ 34 dh2 de7 35 g4! he6 Δ (35...he6!? 36 dg2! ha6 37 c6! wxc6 38 wxc6 dx6= 39 wxe6+ wxe6 40 gxe6+) 36 wxe6+ wxe6 37 g4! dh8 38 wxc7 de7 39 gxe7 he8 40 gxe7=) 36...h6 37 d6! wxc6 38 axb6 39 axf5 39 axf5 39 axf5 axg6 40 wxa7 we1 41 dg3 dx5= 42 df4 dh5 43 de5 dh3 44 c6 dg4 45 a5 dxf2 46 axc2 47 ac7 1-0.

11...f5

An attacking gesture that has gone out of fashion lately; Black overprotects the outpost on e4, but weakens permanently the e5 square.
12 a3 ∆xc3 13 bxc3 ∆c6

14 ∆a4

Instead of releasing the tension by c4xd5, White develops his queen, keeping the ∆e6 as a potential target for his rook on the e-file. Also, with the Black bishop on d5 White would find it much more difficult to mobilise his centre or attack b7.

14 ∆b1 is a different move order to reach our main line; The only divergence seems to be 14...dxc4 (14...∆b8 15 ∆a4 is a direct transposition to 14 ∆a4) but then 15 ∆xb7! (15 ∆a4 ∆e8!? should be OK for Black.) 15...∆d5 16 ∆b1 leaves Black's front c-pawn rather exposed. For example 16...∆d6 (16...f4 17 ∆c1 ∆e8 18 ∆b5±) 17 ∆a4! ∆xa3 18 ∆b5± and White emerges with clearly the better game; 14 c5!? is a very interesting move played in Rogers-Solomon, Southcoast open 2000; White's idea is to gain dominance over the dark squares, e5 in particular. After 14...f4 15 ∆d2 b6 16 ∆b5! ∆a5 17 ∆e5! bxc5 18 ∆e1 a6 19 ∆d3 ∆f6 20 ∆c2! (20 c4!? ∆xc4 21 ∆xc4 dxc4 22 ∆c6 ∆d7 as played in the game, is rather unclear after 23 d5! ∆d6 24 ∆c3 ∆f7 25 ∆xf6 gxf6 26 ∆c1 ∆f8) 20...g6 21 ∆a4 c4 22 ∆xa5 cxd3 23 ∆xd3± White's position looks much better, so, in our opinion, 14 c5!? holds good promise of becoming the main line after 11...f5.

14...∆h8

Getting the king out of the perilous a2-g8 diagonal, but the move has certain drawbacks, too. Below follows a survey of the alternatives.

The extravagant 14...a6?! 15 ∆ab1 b5 should be met by 16 cxb5 axb5 17 ∆xb5 ∆d7 18 ∆f4! ∆xa3 19 ∆b2± and White is better in view of the hole on e5;

14...f4 is more circumspect, preventing once and for all White from occupying the dark squares f4, g5. However, after 15 ∆c1! [15 ∆d2 is inferior, because after 15...∆h8 16 ∆ab1 ∆b8 17 ∆f6 dxc4 18 ∆xc4 Black has the strong reply 18...∆g4! 19 d5?! (19 ∆e2 a6= was equal in Rohde-Seirawan, USA 1986) 19...∆xf3 20 gxf3 ∆c5! exploiting tactically the bishop's awkward placement] 15...∆h8 16 ∆b1 ∆b8 17 ∆e1 Black starts to realise that he has to cope constantly with the positional threat of an exchange of light-squared bishops that would accentuate his weakness on the corresponding squares, e4 in particular. In that case his remaining bishop would run a serious risk of becoming a bad piece, too. These considerations dictate the play from this position;
A) After 17...dxc4 [17...\( \text{\texttt{\#f5?!}} \) does not solve Black's problems in view of 18 \( \text{\texttt{\#b5 \texttt{\#e4}} (Antipenko-Korzh, UKR corr. 1995) 19 \texttt{\#d2!}} \) a6 20 \( \texttt{\#b2} \) and the bishop on e4 only helps White to push his opponent back] 18 \( \texttt{\#xc4} \)

Black should refrain from

A1) 18...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#g4?}} \), because in comparison to Rohde-Seirawan there is no bishop hanging on d2; after 19 d5! \( \texttt{\#xf3} \) 20 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#gxf3 \#c5}} \) 21 dxc6 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#g5\#}} \) (21...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#h4}} \) 22 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#h1??+}} \)++) 22 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#h1 \#h5}} \) 23 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#f1! \#xf2}} \) 24 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#e4! \#xf3+}} \) 25 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#g2 \#d3}} \) 26 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#b5! \#d6}} \) 27 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#e2\#}} \) White had won a piece for nothing and went on to convert it into a full point in Kotronias-Vukanovic, Kavala 1997.

Better is...

A2) 18...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#f5?!}} \) 19 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#b2}} \) a6 (Zapata-Garcia Gonzalez, Santa Clara 1990) when White should grab the proffered pawn by 20 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xa6?!}} \);

Then 20...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#a8}} \) 21 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xb7 \#b8}} \) [Relatively best; 21...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#d6?!}} \) is a blunder on account of 22 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xf4!!+}} \); 21...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#d7?!}} \) allows White to complete the massacre of his opponent's queenside by 22 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#c4 \#a5}} \) 23 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xc7\#}} \) 22 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xb8 \#xb8}} \) (22...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#xb8}} \) 23 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xe7\#}} \) 23 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#b5\#}} \) (Instead, 23 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#e5?! \#d6?!}} \) is not so clear, but nevertheless also appears more pleasant for White in view of his better king. Play might continue 24 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xf4}} \) (But not 24 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#c6?!}} \) due to 24...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#e8!}} \) 25 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#f1 \#d7}} \) 26 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#b5 \#xb5!}} \) 27 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xb5 \#f3\#}} \) with a very strong Black attack) 24...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#f6}} \) 25 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#c4\#}} \) and White seems to be dictating events, e.g. 25...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#a8}} \) (25...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#d7?!}} \) is weak due to 26 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xd7 \#xf4}} \) 27 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xf7}} \) 28 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xf7 \#xh2+}} \) 29 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#f1 \#h1+}} \) 30 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#e2 \#xg2}} \) 31 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#d3!!!}} \) 26 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#d1 \#e6}} \) 27 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xe6 \#xe6}} \) (Or 27...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#xf4}} \) 28 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#f3 \#xe5}} \) 29 dxe5! and the e-pawn is an asset) 28 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#g3 \#xa3}} \) 29 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#c1 \#fa8}} \) 30 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#h3\#}} \) with a very small White plus, but of a persistent nature. White may later on contemplate c4-c5(d5), as well as a rook switch to the third or fourth horizontal after a preparatory \( \texttt{\#g1-h2} \) leaves him with a solid two-pawn compensation for the exchange plus excellent control over the light squares;

B) 17...a6 18 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#d3!}} \) is another major option when the siege on the light squares begins: 18...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#g4?!}} \) [18...dxc4?! 19 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xh7?!}} \) as in Kajumov-Serper, USSR 1987, is not as bad as it looks but White has an initiative after 19...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#d5}} \) 20 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#e4 \#xe4}} \) 21 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xe4 \#d5}} \) 22 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#c2 \#d6}} \) 23 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#d2 \#f5}} \) 24 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#be1\#}} \) 18...\( \texttt{\texttt{\#g8?!}} \) was seen in Kotronias-Miralles, Patras 1991; White should have then played 19 cxd5 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#xd5}} \) 20 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#e4!}} \) (Intending 21 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#d5 \#d5}} \) 22 c4), as 20...b5? 21 \( \texttt{\texttt{\#c2 \#g6}} \) can be met with
the brilliant 22 c4!!++] 19 cxd5 ♞xf3 20 gxf3 ♪xd5 (Benjamin-Zarnicki, Manila (ol) 1992), and now 21 ♪d1± intending ♞g1-h1, ♧e1-g1-g4, x f4, g7, appears to secure a small but steady plus for White;

Finally, 14...♕d7!?, threatening ...♕c6xd4, is playable; White should continue with 15 cxd5 ♞xd5 16 ♞c4!± obtaining a slight plus.

15 ♞ab1 ♞b8 16 ♞f1!

Carefully preparing a dark-square campaign that Black's next move fails to neutralise.

16...a6?!

Threatening ...d5xc4, but White's next move renders the threat innocuous. 16...f4! was imperative, transposing after 17 ♞c1 a6 18 ♞d3!± to 14...f4.

17 ♞f4!

A very strong move, exploiting the presence of tactical ideas to conquer the dark squares.

17...♕d6

17...dxc4!? 18 ♞xc4 b5 (18...♕xc4 19 ♪xc4 ♞xa3 20 ♞g5↑) obliges White to sacrifice the queen in two different cases, but White is clearly better in each of them. The proof: 19 ♪xa6 ♞d7 (19...♗b6 20 ♪xb6 cxb6 21 ♞xe6 ♞xa3 22 ♪xb5±) 20 ♪xb5 ♞a8 21 ♪b7 ♝a7 22 ♞xc6 ♝xb7 23 ♝xb7 ♞xa3 24 ♞g5 ♪b8 25 ♜e5±

18 ♞g5 ♞e7 19 ♞f1!↑

Completing the evacuation of the e-file with gain of time; Seeing that he has lost the strategic battle Beliavsky decides to set a positional trap in which White falls.

19...♕xg5!?

20 ♞xg5?

Failing to change course when the position was calling for it; Ljubo should have settled for 20 ♞xe6!↑ suddenly turning his attention to exploiting the opposite-coloured bishops for attacking purposes. Now Black manages to equalise by utilising a nice tactical motif.

20...♕d7 21 ♞e6 ♞xd4!=

The point; White has nothing better than to agree to massive simplification which brings the position down to an elementary drawn ending.

22 ♞xd8 ♞xa4 23 ♞xb7 ♞xd8 24 ♞xb8 ♞xb8 25 cxd4 dxc4
A game short in duration, but rich in positional content. \( \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \)

25
Wang Zili – Ye Rongguang
Copenhagen 1995

1 e4 e5 2 \( \text{Ngf3} \) \( \text{Ngf6} \) 3 \( \text{Nxg5} \) d6 4 \( \text{Nhxe5} \) \( \text{Nd7} \) 5 d4 \( \text{c5} \) 6 \( \text{e5} \) \( \text{f6} \) 7 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{b5} \) 8 \( \text{c4!?} \) \( \text{dxe4} \) 9 \( \text{Be2} \) \( \text{Bb7} \) 10 \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{Ng7} \) 11 ... \( \text{f6} \)

Black foresees the kind of structure that will arise after a2-a3, \( \text{Nh4xc3} \), b2xc3, and takes a measure that would help restrain the resulting White pawn centre.

11...\( \text{Nh4xc3} \) 12 bxc3 \( \text{Nh6} \) is also possible, but it wastes a tempo in comparison to the game. However, Black may have secret thoughts of deploying his bishop on d6 instead of f6, so White must be careful; after 13 cxd5 \( \text{Nxd5} \) he needs to play with extreme accuracy to ensure that his centre will not be contained by the enemy forces:

A) The plausible 14 \( \text{Wc2?!} \), wishing to initiate preparations for the mobilisation of the central pawns only after bringing the queen’s rook to the centre, runs into 14...\( \text{Nd4}! \) [14...\( \text{Nf5}?! \) (14...f5 15 \( \text{Bd1} \) also hardly worries White) 15 \( \text{Bd2}! \) \( \text{Ne8} \) 16 \( \text{Nxe5} \) (Intending c3-c4) 16 ... \( \text{Nf6} \) 17 \( \text{f3} \) g6 18 \( \text{Nf4} \) (18 \( \text{Nxe4} \) \( \text{Nf7} \) (18...\( \text{Ng7}?! \) 19 \( \text{Nf5} \) \( \text{c6} \) 20 \( \text{Bc3} \) \( \text{Nf6} \) 21 \( \text{Bf4} \)±)] 18 ... \( \text{g5} \) 19 ... \( \text{Nf6} \) (19 ... \( \text{f6} \) 20 \( \text{Bc3} \) \( \text{Nf6} \) 21 \( \text{Bf4} \)±) 20 ... \( \text{Bc3} \) \( \text{Ne1} \) 21 ... \( \text{Bf6} \) led to a passive position for Black in Ehlvest-Yusupov, Saint John (ct/1) 1988; White could have maintained his initiative by 22 \( \text{Ng3} \)!, intending h2-h4, according to Ehlvest] and it seems impossible to mobilise the pawns without allowing tactics. For example:

A1) 15 \( \text{Bd2} \) fails to 15...\( \text{Na6} \)!(15...\( \text{Nf8}?! \) 16 c4! \( \text{Nxd4} \) 17 \( \text{Nxd4} \) \( \text{Nxc3} \) 18 \( \text{Bxc3} \) \( \text{Wg5} \) 19 \( \text{Nh1} \) \( \text{Nxe2} \) 20 \( \text{Nxe2} \) \( \text{Nh5} \) 21 \( \text{Nh4}! \) \( \text{Nxd6} \) 22 \( \text{Nh3} \) \( \text{Wc6} \) 23 \( \text{Nh1} \)±) 15...\( \text{Nh5} \) 16 ... \( \text{Bd3} \)± is slightly better for White, as we will see later on) 16 ... \( \text{Nc4} \) (16 ... \( \text{Nf6} \) 17 ... \( \text{Nxd4} \) 18 ... \( \text{Nh4} \)±) 16 ... \( \text{b5} \)!! (16...\( \text{Nh5} \) 17 \( \text{Bc4} \) \( \text{b5} \) 18 \( \text{Nh3} \) \( \text{Nxe4} \) 17 \( \text{Bc4} \) \( \text{b5} \) 18 \( \text{Nh3} \) \( \text{Nxe4} \) 17 ... \( \text{Wxd6} \) \( \text{Wxd6} \) 18 ... \( \text{Wc6} \) 19 a4 a6= and Black is entitled to feel safe due to his light square control:

A2) 15 ... \( \text{Nh4} \) can be met by either

A2a) 15 ... \( \text{Nf8} \)!, e.g. 16 \( \text{Nxd4} \) (16 \( \text{Nf5} \) \( \text{g6} \) 17 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{Nxc3} \) 18 \( \text{Nh4} \) \( \text{Wg5} \) 19 \( \text{Nh1} \) \( \text{Nxe2} \) 20 \( \text{Nxe2} \) \( \text{Nh5} \) 21 \( \text{Nh4}! \) \( \text{Nxd6} \) 22 ... \( \text{Nf6} \)±) 16 ... \( \text{Nc4} \) (16 ... \( \text{Nh5} \) 17 \( \text{Nf5} \) \( \text{Wxd6} \) 18 ... \( \text{Nh4} \)±) 19 a4 a6= and with unclear play or

A2b) 15 ... \( \text{Nf6} \) (the best reply immediately pointing at the enemy kingside) 16 ... \( \text{Nh6} \)± and the
White central pawns are kept at bay; 16...b5!?= is another way of achieving the same objective;

B) 14 \( \text{\textit{Qd2}} \) is best, threatening to mobilise immediately his central pawns. After this move it seems to us that there is no clear path to equality for Black; For example, Ehlvest’s suggestion of 14...\( \text{\textit{Qe6}} \) [14...\( \text{\textit{f5}} \) ? 15 \( \text{\textit{f4}} \) ? (\( \text{\textit{Dd2-c4-e5}} \)) 15...\( \text{\textit{Qf6}} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{Qc4 Qe7}} \) 17 \( \text{\textit{Qe5 c6}} \) 18 \( \text{\textit{a4! Wc7}} \) 19 \( \text{\textit{Qd3}} \)± or 14...\( \text{\textit{Qf6}} \) 15 \( \text{\textit{Qb1}} \)± (15 \( \text{\textit{Qc2?!}, \text{\textit{Dc1-a1-e1}} \) transposes to Ehlvest-Yusupov) are both better options but still far away from being equal] leaves Black under serious pressure due to 15 \( \text{\textit{Qd3! Wd7}} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{Wc2 f5}} \) 17 \( \text{\textit{f4!}} \) \( \text{\textit{ae8}} \) 18 \( \text{\textit{Qf3}} \)

Here we feel obliged to mention the interesting alternative 12 \( \text{\textit{Qxe4?!}} \) making use of the fact that the f-pawn has been blocked and, consequently, Black can no longer play ...\( \text{\textit{f7-f5-f4}} \). After the logical continuation 12...\( \text{\textit{dxe4}} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{Qe1 c6}} \) 14 \( \text{\textit{Wb3 We7}} \) 15 a3 \( \text{\textit{Qa6}} \) 16 \( \text{\textit{Qc2}} \) White was slowly building pressure on the queenside in Ljubojevic-Karpov, Bugojno 1986, and Black had to defend very accurately:

16...\( \text{\textit{Qfd8}} \) 17 \( \text{\textit{Qfd1 Qac8}} \) 18 \( \text{\textit{Wxa4!}} \) (Threatening to stifle Black by \( \text{\textit{b2-b4}} \)) 18...\( \text{\textit{c5}} \) 19 \( \text{\textit{Qac1!}} \) (Renewing the threat) 19...\( \text{\textit{Qxd4}} \) 20 \( \text{\textit{Qxd4 Qc5}} \) 21 \( \text{\textit{Qxa7 Qd3}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{Qxd3!}} \) [After 22 \( \text{\textit{Qxe6?!}} \) Black should avoid 22...\( \text{\textit{Qxc1?!}} \) 23 \( \text{\textit{Qd8 Qxe2+}} \) 24 \( \text{\textit{Qf1 Qxd8}} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{Qxe2 Qd1}} \) (25...\( \text{\textit{Qc8}} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{Qd4 We6}} \) 27 \( \text{\textit{Qxf6 gxf6}} \) 28 \( \text{\textit{Qxb7 Qxc4+}} \) 29 \( \text{\textit{Qe1}} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{Qxd1}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qxb2}} \) 27 \( \text{\textit{Qb8+}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qf8}} \) 28 \( \text{\textit{Wxb7}} \) 29 \( \text{\textit{Qxe4±}} \)

23...\( \text{\textit{Qxc4}} \) 29 \( \text{\textit{Qxe4}} \) when he stands worse, in favour of 22...\( \text{\textit{Qxe6!}} \); then 23 \( \text{\textit{Qxd3 exd3}} \) 24 \( \text{\textit{b3}} \) (with the idea \( \text{\textit{a3-a4!}; 24 \text{\textit{Wb6 d2!}} \) allows him to counterattack by 24...\( \text{\textit{b5!}} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{cx5}} \) (25 \( \text{\textit{Wb6 d2!}} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{Qb1 We4+}} \) 25...\( \text{\textit{Qxc1}} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{Qxc1 d2}} \) 27 \( \text{\textit{Qxd2}} \) 28 \( \text{\textit{Qc3 We7}} \) 29 \( \text{\textit{Qe1 g6}} \) 22...\( \text{\textit{Qxd4}} \) [22...\( \text{\textit{exd3?!}} \) is a very interesting alternative to Karpov’s choice: 23 \( \text{\textit{Qxd3 Qxc4}} \) 24 \( \text{\textit{Qc3 Qa8!}} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{Wb6 Qa6}} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{Qxd8+}} \) ? (26 \( \text{\textit{Wb4 Wxb4}} \) 24 \( \text{\textit{Qxh7}} \) (27...\( \text{\textit{b5}} \) 28 \( \text{\textit{b3 Qd4}} \) 29 \( \text{\textit{Qxd4}} \) 30 \( \text{\textit{Qxc4 Qxc4}} \) 31 \( \text{\textit{Qxc4 bxc4}} \) 32 \( \text{\textit{Qf1±}} \) is too tiny an advantage but may be worth trying against a weaker opponent) 28 \( \text{\textit{Qxc4 Qxb2}} \) is close to equality) 26...\( \text{\textit{Qxd8}} \) 27 \( \text{\textit{Qxc4 Qa8}} \) 28 \( \text{\textit{g3 h6?!}} \) and the position looks too solid for Black to be in any risk of losing; the other way of making luft seems to us worse, e.g. 28...\( \text{\textit{g6}} \) 29 \( \text{\textit{Qc3 Qg7}} \) 30 \( \text{\textit{Qb4 Wd7}} \) 31 \( \text{\textit{Qc3 Wd5}} \) 32 \( \text{\textit{Qb5±}} \) 23 \( \text{\textit{Qxd3 exd3}} \) 24 \( \text{\textit{Qxd3 Qxc4}} \) 25 \( \text{\textit{Qxc4 Qxc4}} \) 26 \( \text{\textit{Qe3 Wd6}} \) 27 \( \text{\textit{h3 f6}} \) 28 \( \text{\textit{Qc5?!}} \) \( \text{\textit{Qxc5}} \) 29 \( \text{\textit{Qxc5 b5}} \) 30 \( \text{\textit{Qb4 h5}} \) and by showing his usual endgame expertise Karpov went on to draw in 44 moves; However, had now White chosen the refined 31
\( \text{\&h2!} \) (intending \( \text{h3-h4, f2-f3, \&h2-g3} \)) he could have tortured the endgame maestro for much longer, as the position is not an automatic draw.

12...\( \text{\&xc3} \) 13 \( \text{bxc3 \&c6} \) 14 \( \text{cxd5 \&xd5} \) 15 \( \text{\&d2!} \)

Intending the build-up \( \text{\&e2-d3, \&d1-c2} \); admittedly, it is more difficult here for White to get the advantage than in the analogous position with 11...\( \text{\&xc3} \), but the minus tempo is not really relevant, because the bishop on \( f6 \) does little to disturb White who can arrange his pieces at his leisure.

15...\( \text{\&e7!?} \)

Black starts regrouping, in anticipation of an advance of the enemy centre.

15...\( \text{\&a5} \) 16 \( \text{\&c2 b6} \) (1/2-1/2 Gipslis-Smyslov, Moscow Veterans 1991) 17 \( \text{\&d3} \) g6 18 \( \text{\&ae1!} \) looks promising for White who has available as an attacking tool the advance of the f-pawn; 15...\( \text{\&e8} \) (Domínguez-Hernández, Capablanca Memorial Masters I 1998) should be met by 16 \( \text{\&c2!} \) preparing \( \text{\&e2-d3, \&a1-e1} \). Then 16...\( \text{\&g5} \) 17 \( \text{\&d3! \&xe3} \) 18 \( \text{fxe3} \) \( \text{\&xe3} \) 19

\( \text{\&xh7+ \&h8} \) is not as great as it looks for Black due to 20 \( \text{\&e4!} \) \( \text{\&g5} \) 21 \( \text{\&xd5} \) \( \text{\&xd5} \) 22 \( \text{\&f4!} \) \( (\text{x} \text{d4,...\&d2-f1-g3}) \) and White is better because the Black king is insecure.

16 \( \text{\&c2 g6} \) 17 \( \text{\&d3! \&c6} \) 18 \( \text{\&e4 \&g7} \) 19 \( \text{\&ae1!} \)

White has developed in a harmonious way, massing all his troops on the kingside. The next step involves doubling rooks on the e-file, a manoeuvre we are familiar with from many Illustrative Games so far. For Black, on the other hand, there is not much to undertake as he lacks concrete targets; it is best for him to adopt wait and see tactics whilst avoiding a weakening of his kingside pawn structure. For the rest of the comments to this game we will rely on Blatny’s notes in Chessbase.

19...\( \text{b6} \) 20 \( \text{\&e2 h6} \)

20...\( f5?! \) would have weakened Black’s castled position without obtaining anything in return: 21 \( \text{\&g5} \) \( \text{\&d5} \) (21...\( h6?! \) 22 \( \text{\&e6} \) \( \text{\&d5} \) 23 \( \text{\&f4!} \) 22 \( \text{\&f3} \) \( \Delta \text{\&e3-f4-e5!} \), \( \Delta \text{\&e3-g5!} \) 22...\( \text{\&d6} \) (22...\( f4 \) 23 \( \text{\&c1!} \) 23 \( \text{\&g5} \) \( \text{\&d5} \) 24 \( \text{\&e5!} \) and
White's pressure becomes considerable.

21 \texttt{Qf6} \texttt{Qf5}

Blatny thinks that 21...\texttt{f5} 22 \texttt{Qd2} \texttt{Qd5=} is only slightly better for White, but it was difficult for Black to make such a decision in view of the resulting permanent weakness on \texttt{e5}.

22 \texttt{Qf4} \texttt{Wd7}?! 

A bad spot for the queen, provoking White's next; 22...\texttt{Qxd4?} 23 \texttt{cx}\texttt{d4} \texttt{Qxd4} 24 \texttt{Wc3} \texttt{Qxe2}+ 25 \texttt{Qxe2} \texttt{Qxe4} would have been a blunder due to 26 \texttt{Qxh6!} \texttt{f6} 27 \texttt{Qxe4} \texttt{Qe8} (27...\texttt{Qf7} 28 \texttt{Qc4+-}) 28 \texttt{Qxe8+} \texttt{Wxe8} 29 \texttt{Wxc7+-} but 22...\texttt{Qe8} was tenable.

23 \texttt{Qe5}!

It is in White’s interest to exchange dark-squared bishops as then Black’s defences would deteriorate. In this particular instance the threat of \texttt{Qe4-f6+} makes matters worse for Black who must have been regretting his previous move.

23...\texttt{Wd8}

23...\texttt{f6} 24 \texttt{Qf4} was not really an option as it would have weakened both light squared diagonals leading to the Black king.

24 \texttt{Qg3}!?

By exchanging knights White clarifies the picture on the king's wing and obtains entrance squares for his rooks along the \texttt{e}-file; the move has also a psychological impact as it makes Black realise the best he can achieve in this game is a laborious draw. Nevertheless, we feel that White had plenty of good alternatives.

24...\texttt{Qxg3} 25 \texttt{hxg3} \texttt{Wd5}!

In his miserable state Black finds the only way to stay alive; 25...\texttt{Qe8?} would have allowed White to win immediately by 26 \texttt{Qxg6!} \texttt{fxg6} 27 \texttt{Wxg6} \texttt{Qxe5} 28 \texttt{Qxe5} \texttt{Qa4} 29 \texttt{Qe7} \texttt{Wf8} 30 \texttt{Qxc7+-} \texttt{Qe1-c7}.

26 \texttt{f3} \texttt{Qxe5} 27 \texttt{Qxe5} \texttt{Wd6} 28 \texttt{Qc4}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\node at (0,0) {Beating the Petroff 169};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

28...\texttt{Qae8??}

And now he finds the route to immediate disaster! The reasonable alternatives 28...\texttt{Qg7} and 28...\texttt{Qae8!?} would have enabled him to make a fight of it. Blatny gives the lines 28...\texttt{Qg7} 29 \texttt{Qa2} (29 \texttt{Qe6??} \texttt{fxe6} 30 \texttt{Qxe6} \texttt{Wxg3} 31 \texttt{Qxc6} \texttt{Qxf3+-}) 29...\texttt{Qae8} 30 \texttt{f4=} or 28...\texttt{Qfe8!?} 29 \texttt{f4} (29 \texttt{Qe6??} \texttt{Qxe6} 30 \texttt{Qxe6} \texttt{fxe6} 31 \texttt{Wxg6+} \texttt{Qf8} 32 \texttt{Qxe6} \texttt{Qe7} 33 \texttt{Qf7+} \texttt{Qd8} 34 \texttt{Qf6+} \texttt{Qe7} 35 \texttt{Wxh8+} \texttt{Qe8} 36 \texttt{Wxh6 c6+-}) 29...\texttt{Qg7} 30 \texttt{Wb3=} to prove that despite the impressive appearance of White's game there is not a knock-out blow.

29 \texttt{Qe6}!
Suddenly everything has been decided; Black has no satisfactory defence to the threat of taking on g6.

29...a4
29...xex6 30 xex6 fxe6 31 wxg6+ h8 32 wxh6+ g8 33 xex6+ f7 34 wg6++; 29...h7 30 xxd6 xxe1+ 31 f2++

30 wb1!
Even better than 30 wd3 h7 31 xxd6 xxe1+ 32 f2 xd1! 33 wxd1 xd1 34 d7++

30...xe6 31 xe6
Faced with immense material losses, Black resigned.
1-0

26
Short – Timman
KRO (m), Hilversum 1989

1 e4 e5 2 d3 f6 3 xxe5 d6 4 f3 xxe4 5 d4 d5 6 d3 e7 7 0-0 c6 8 c4!? b4 9 e2 e6 10 c3 0-0 11 e3 f5

A strong move, trying to exploit the placement of the e3 by creating the possibility of a knight fork on c2...

12 xc1
...to which White reacts logically by bringing his queen’s rook closer to the centre and preparing to evict the Black knight by a2-a3. Now Black usually plays ...d5xc4, but in the present Illustrative Game we will deal with a rare move that leads to an interesting material imbalance.

Before proceeding, it should be noted that 12 wb3 has been the other main line here, with double-edged results. After 12...c6 White has tried practically everything: 13 c5; 13 ac1; 13 xxd5; and even the extravagant 13 g4!? The main champions of 12 wb3 are Topalov and Shirov who had in fact a theoretical discussion on it in their 2001 FIDE knock-out match, but in this book we will refrain from delving deeper into its intricacies as we think that the theory in 12 xc1 is already too much to handle. Just for the record, we present our readers with the latest GM game in this variation: 13...xc3 14 bxc3 c2 15 wb7 xa1 16 xxa1 wd7 17 wxd7 xd7 18 e5 xd8 19 xxd7 xxd7 20 b1 d8 21 a6 c7 22 f1 e7 23 b7 b8 24 xa7 d8 25 xxe7 xxe7 26 a4 f8 27 f4 b1+ 28 e2 e8 29 e3 e1 30 c4 dxc4 31 xc4 xa4 32 d3 a3+ 33 c2 h6 34 b2 a5 35 b3 ½-½, Topalov-Macieja, Edda rapid, Reykjavik 2003.

12...xc3!?
A very dangerous continuation for Black, giving up two pieces in return for rook and two pawns; he trusts that in the resulting positions his passed a-pawn will create strong counter-play, (which, to some extent is true) but on the other hand it is hard to believe that the pieces are not better than the rook as they can combine beautifully with the White queen in both attack and defence.

13 bxc3 Qxa2 14 Qe2! Qxc2 15 Qxc2 Qxc3 16 Qxc3

This position is assessed as unclear by I. Ivanov, but in fact White is better as Black is weak on the light squares and his queenside particularly vulnerable to the appetite of the enemy minor pieces. White should only be careful not to allow the passed a-pawn advance too far if he hasn't something concrete in mind.

16...c6

On 16...dxc4 the best reply is 17 Qb1! Qb8 (17...a5 18 Qxb7 a4 19 Qxc4 a3 20 Qa2±) 18 Qxc4 c6 19 Qe2! augmenting the pressure on both f7 and h7. If, for example 19...a5? (19...Qd6!%; 19...Qc7!?) there follows 20 Qf4! Qd6 21 Qg5! g6 22 Qxf7+!! Qxf7 23 Qa2+- and White wins.

17 Qb1?!

Too impulsive; The best move is 17 Qb3! and there is a good explanation for that: It is most economical for White to keep the rook for the defence of his first rank / restraint of the enemy passed pawn and use his strongest piece to attack the enemy position. An examination of the position confirms the above evaluation:

A) 17...b6? 18 Qe5± leaves Black tragically exposed on the light squares;

B) 17...Qb8?! 18 c5!? results in a passive position where White’s threat of Qe3-f4 is hard to meet;

C) 17...Qb6 18 Qxb6 (18 Qa2!?) 18...axb6 19 cxd5 cxd5 20 Qb1± is a very annoying endgame to defend, but it may not be as bad as it seems;

D) 17...a5 (The most consistent, but it looks rather insufficient) 18 Qxb7 a4 [18...Qf6!? (Preventing Qf3-e5)] 19 Qxc6 a4± requires further analysis, but it is difficult to believe it can save Black] 19 Qe5 and White’s initiative looks imposing; a possible line runs 19...Qd6 20 Qxc6 Qc8 21 Qxc8 Qxc8 22 c5! (22 cxd5?! a3 23 Qa1 Qc7 24 Qc4±) 22...Qxc6 23 Qb5! + and Black can resign with a clear conscience (23 Qf3 is also good, but after 23...Qd8! 24 Qg5 Qd7 25 cxd6 Qxd6 26 Qa1 Qa6 27 Qc1 f6 28 Qa3 Qf7 29 Qc5± Black can try to defend for a while).

17...a5!
Suddenly, it becomes evident that extreme accuracy is required on White’s part to tame the advance of the passed a-pawn. In the next few moves Short does his best to accomplish the task.

18 $\text{Exb7 a4 19 } \text{Qe5! } $ $\text{d6!}$

19...$\text{Wd6?} 20 \text{c5! } \text{Wc6 21 } \text{wa3}$ deprives Black of serious counterplay.

20 $\text{Qxc6 Wc8 21 } \text{ab6!}$

It appears that Black has no compensation for the lost material but the following brilliant reply by Timman destroys this optical illusion:

21...$\text{Ma6!!}$

A fantastic move, keeping Black into the game.

21...$\text{a3?}$ looks dangerous, but after 22 $\text{c5 a2 23 Wa1 Wc7 24 Qb4!}$ Black is doomed.; 21...$\text{Qxh2+}$? is bad in view of 22 $\text{Qf1!}$

22 $\text{c5}$

There is nothing else.

22...$\text{Exb6 23 Exb6 Wb7!}$

The results of 21...$\text{Ma6!!}$ can already be appreciated; the active White rook has been exchanged and one of the White pawns is about to fall. In addition, Black is ready to back up the passed a-pawn with his remaining rook, making up for the pawn’s temporary lack of support. All this means that White has lost his chances of an advantage, but his next move shows that he has lost his morale too.

24 $\text{Qa7??}$

An incomprehensible move; after 24 $\text{Qf3! Wxb6 25 } \text{Qxd5}$ Black would have had to find 25...$\text{Wb1+!}$ (25...$\text{Wh8?}$) 26 $\text{Qc1 Wxc1+}$ 27 $\text{Qxc1 Qc8 28 Qf1 Qf8 29 Qe2 a3}$ (29...$\text{Qe8?}$ 29 $\text{Qc4!}$) 30 $\text{c3 a2}$ 31 $\text{b2 Qa8 32 Qa1 Qa6!!=}$ and the threat of $\text{...a6-b6-b1}$ forces the draw. Now White’s game even takes a turn for the worse.

24...$\text{Wxb6 25 Qb5 Qa8 26 Qc1 Qf8 27 g3 g6 28 Qg2 Wc6+} 29$ $\text{Qd3 Wc8 30 Qb2 a3 31 Qa1 Wxc3 32 Qxc3 Qd8 33 Qc2}$

Better was 33 $\text{Qf3}$ according to Timman.

33...$\text{Qg7}$

33...$\text{Qb4}$ would have given Black only a slight edge after 34 $\text{Qa2 Qa5 35 Qf3!! (35 Qb3? Qb8 36 Qxd5}$
Abl 37 \textsc{xc}3 \textsc{xc}3 38 \textsc{xc}3 \textsc{xb}4(?) the point being that 35...\textsc{xe}8? fails to 36 \textsc{b}3! \textsc{xe}1 37 \textsc{xc}3.

34 \textsc{xa}2 \textsc{e}8 35 \textsc{b}3 \textsc{xb}8 36 \textsc{c}2 \textsc{c}8 37 \textsc{b}3 \textsc{xb}8 38 \textsc{c}2 \frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}

After 38 \textsc{c}2 \textsc{f}8 39 \textsc{c}3 \textsc{e}7 \Delta ...\textsc{e}7-e6, ...\textsc{g}7-f8 \exists, Black’s advantage would have merely been symbolic, so the players agreed to a draw.

27

Topalov–Akopian
Linares 1995

1 e4 e5 2 \textsc{df}3 \textsc{df}6 3 \textsc{xe}5 d6 4 \textsc{f}3 \textsc{xe}4 5 d4 d5 6 \textsc{d}3 \textsc{d}7 7 0-0 \textsc{c}6 8 c4!? \textsc{b}4 9 \textsc{e}2 \textsc{e}6 10 \textsc{c}3 0-0 11 \textsc{e}3 \textsc{f}5 12 \textsc{c}1 dxc4

A natural and strong continuation, after which White is hard pressed to prove an advantage; 12...\textsc{f}6?! is bad due to 13 \textsc{wb}3\pm

13 \textsc{xc}4 c6!

\textsc{xe}4 18 d5\pm is also a nagging edge as the \textsc{b}4 remains displaced;

13...\textsc{xc}3!? is an attempt to do without ...c7-c6 that requires accurate play from White; After 14 bxc3 \textsc{d}5 15 \textsc{e}5! \textsc{e}6 16 \textsc{wb}3! the following possibilities are available:

A) 16...\textsc{f}6?! 17 \textsc{d}3 \textsc{h}8 18 \textsc{fe}1 \textsc{xb}8 19 \textsc{f}4! \textsc{f}5 (19...\textsc{xf}4 20 \textsc{xf}4 \textsc{xc}4 21 \textsc{wc}4\pm was the lesser evil) 20 \textsc{xd}5 \textsc{xd}3 21 \textsc{xb}7\pm was bad for Black in Kundin-Ribshtein, Givataim, 1998;

B) After 16...\textsc{b}8! (\Delta ...b7-b5!) 17 \textsc{xd}5 \textsc{xd}5 (17...\textsc{xd}5 18 c4 \textsc{e}4\pm) 18 \textsc{wd}5 \textsc{xd}5 19 \textsc{d}7 \textsc{xa}2 20 \textsc{xb}8 \textsc{xb}8 21 \textsc{a}1 \textsc{c}4\pm Black has compensation but it is questionable whether it is fully adequate.

14 \textsc{e}5 \textsc{xc}3 15 bxc3 \textsc{d}5

Now there is the threat of ...\textsc{e}7-a3, so White must react accordingly.

16 \textsc{wf}3

The best square for the queen; 16 \textsc{wb}3?! \textsc{f}6!\exists is slightly better for Black.

16...\textsc{e}6

Ensuring that the \textsc{b}4 will find a powerful centralised post on d5; on 13...\textsc{d}6?!., the reply 14 \textsc{e}2!\pm, intending \textsc{wd}1-b3 or simply a2-a3 is better for White; 14 \textsc{b}3 \textsc{d}3 15 \textsc{c}2 \textsc{b}4 16 \textsc{d}2 \textsc{e}4 17 \textsc{xe}4...
As in so many other lines in the Petroff White has been saddled with hanging pawns in the centre. These pawns can become a weakness if the first player fails to mobilise them in a harmonious way and in this particular case his task is made more arduous by the awkward placement of the minor pieces. However, things are not that bleak if White realises the task ahead of him and starts improving the position of his pieces in a meaningful way.

17  

A bishop is a bishop, and whilst in this particular case it can be given up for the  , the text remains the most thematic continuation available to White.

17  

has been considered relatively tame, yet Black has to be careful in order to reach equality as in the ensuing positions it is easier for him to go wrong: 17...exf3 18 fxe3! [The principled recapture; 18  allowed Black to draw comfortably after 18...xc4 19  f6 20 b1 b6 21 f3 c8 22 e3 g6 23 d5 g5 24 dxc6 xe5 25 d6 26 d1 xc6 27 xc6 xc6 28 d7 fc8 29 ec7 xc3 30 h3 f8 31 xax7 xc1+ 32 xh2 c6 33 xeb7 f6 ½-½, in Kamsky-Anand, Sanghi Nagar (ct) 1994] 18...xc4 19  xd5 20 e2 f5 (Black’s position looks better but this is only an illusion) 21 e5 d6 22 f3 c8 23 c4! e4 24 c5 c7 25 c2! (White’s chances lie in the ending as his knight and rooks can combine beautifully there) 25...xc2 (25...e7 26 b1±) 26 xc2 e7 27 b2 f3 28 f2 b6! 29 cxb6 xxb6 30 e5 f4! 31 xc6!? [31 exf4 xe5 was agreed drawn in S.B.Hansen-P.H.Nielsen, Danish ch (playoff) 1999] 31...xe3 32 xe3 xe3 33 c8+ f7 34 g3 a3 35 xf4 xe6= and Black should eventually draw (35... xa2+! instead, is inexact due to 36 e3± and the active White pieces in combination with the passed d-pawn offer White an edge);

17  

...is also possible, with the idea of preventing the annoying ...f7-f6, driving away the White knight from his excellent outpost in the centre. Then Black has too wide a choice, especially in the lines arising after 17...xe3!, but we have decided to present an analysis of all the logical continuations since we believe it can be extremely beneficiary to our readers from the strategic point of view.

A) 17...d6 has been considered an adequate equaliser. However, White may have chances of an edge: 18 d2 and now:
A1) 18...\(\text{fxe5}\) 19 dx5 \(\text{Qe7}\) can be met with 20 \(\text{Qg5!}\) \(\text{Wc7}\) (20...h6? 21 \(\text{Wc4!}\) g6 22 \(\text{Qf6}\) \(\text{Wxe8}\) 23 \(\text{Wxh4+}\)) 21 \(\text{Wxh5}\) h6 (21...\(\text{Qg6}\) 22 f4 \(\text{Wd7}\) 23 \(\text{Qcd1!}\)± is also better for White) 22 \(\text{Qxh6!}\) gxh6 23 \(\text{Wxh6}\) \(\text{Qf5}\) (23...\(\text{Qf5}\) 24 \(\text{Wg5+}\) \(\text{Qg6}\) 25 f4!) 24 \(\text{Qxf5?!}\) \(\text{Qxf5}\) 25 \(\text{Wg5+}\) \(\text{Qg6}\) 26 f4! and White obtained a strong attack in Xie Jianjun-Wu Xibin, Beijing 1996;

A2) 18...\(\text{Wh4!}\) 19 \(\text{Qfe1}\) \(\text{Qf6}\) 20 h3!? (20 a4 allowed the equalising manoeuvre 20...\(\text{Qg4!}\) 21 \(\text{Qf4}\) \(\text{Qxe5}\) 22 \(\text{Qxe5}\) \(\text{Qd5=}\) in Huebner-Timman, Sarajevo (m/4) 1991) leads to a further parting of the ways:

A2a) 20...\(\text{Qd5}\) 21 \(\text{Wf3?!}\) b5!? (21...\(\text{Qxa2?!}\) 22 c4 b5 23 cxb5 cxb5 24 \(\text{Qc6!}\)\(\oplus\) is awkward for Black.) 22 a4! a6 23 \(\text{Qa1±}\) is slightly better for White who can open the a-file at his leisure while the move \(\text{Qd3-f5}\) may be employed with cramping effect at some point;

A2b) 20...\(\text{Qxa2?!}\) (Grabbing the pawn looks dangerous, but is the critical choice) 21 c4!\(\ominus\) and with the sacrifice of a second pawn White obtains interesting chances, e.g. 21...\(\text{Wxd4}\) 22 \(\text{Qc3}\) \(\text{Wh4!}\) (22...\(\text{Qc5?}\) 23 \(\text{Qg4!}\)→ leads to a tremendous White attack) 23 \(\text{We2}\) \(\text{Qb3}\) [23...\(\text{Qxe5}\)? 24 \(\text{Qxe5}\) \(\text{Qad8}\) (24...\(\text{Qb3}\) 25 \(\text{Qb1}\) \(\text{Qa4}\) 26 \(\text{Qxb7}\) c5 27 \(\text{Qa1!}\) (27 \(\text{Qxf6}\) \(\text{Wxf6}\) 28 \(\text{Wxh5}\) h6 29 \(\text{Wxc5}\) a5±) 27...\(\text{Qc6}\) 28 \(\text{Qc7}\) \(\text{Qf8}\) 29 \(\text{Qxa7}\) \(\text{Qxc7}\) 30 \(\text{Qxc7±}\) 25 \(\text{Qc3±}\) ) 24 \(\text{Wb2}\) \(\text{Qa4}\) 25 \(\text{Qa1}\) \(\text{Qxe5}\) (After 25...b5 26 \(\text{Qxc6}\)\(\ominus\) White maintains good compensation) 26 \(\text{Qxe5}\) b5 with a position that deserves further analysis as the White bishops are raking Black's kingside;

B) 17...c5!? is an interesting attempt to weaken the White centre, worthy of a closer look. White should probably play 18 \(\text{Wc4!}\) f5! (18...g6? 19 \(\text{Qh6}\) \(\text{Qe8}\) 20 \(\text{Qb5±}\) 19 \(\text{Qf3}\) with an unclear position as the loss of time is compensated for by the slight weakening of Black's kingside and e-file;

C) 17...\(\text{Qf6}\) was played in Nijboer-Fressinet, EU tch, Leon 2001. White won after an arduous struggle: 18 \(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Wd6}\) 19 \(\text{Qfe1}\) [19 \(\text{b1}\) b5 (19...\(\text{Qxe5}\) 20 dx5 \(\text{Qxe5}\) 21 \(\text{Qxb7}\)± 19...\(\text{Qb6}\) 20 \(\text{Qf4}\) \(\text{Wa3}\) 21 c4 \(\text{Qxa2}\) 22 c5±) 20 c4 \(\text{bxc4}\) 21 \(\text{Qxc4±}\) is slightly better for White according to Nijboer in his Informant notes. In fact we will rely on those notes for the remainder of the game as they are essential for a proper understanding of the chances] 19...\(\text{Qad8}\) 20 h4 [This primitive demonstration is by no means easy to meet; However, 20 c4!? \(\text{Qe7}\) 21 \(\text{Qa5}\) \(\text{Qc8}\) (21...\(\text{Wxd4?!}\) 22 \(\text{Qxd8}\) \(\text{Qxd8}\) 23 \(\text{Qcd1}\) \(\text{Qxe5}\) 24 \(\text{Qh5!}\) g6 25 \(\text{Qxe5}\) \(\text{Qxe5}\) 26 \(\text{Qxe5±}\) 22 \(\text{Qc3}\) \(\text{Qg6±}\) is slightly better for White according to the Dutch GM] 20...c5 21 h5 [21 c4 \(\text{Qe7}\) 22 \(\text{Qg5}\) \(\text{Qxg5}\) 23 hgx5 \(\text{Qg6}\) 24 \(\text{Qxg6}\) \(\text{fxg6}\) 25 \(\text{Qxb7}\) (25 dxc5!? \(\text{Qxc5}\) 26 \(\text{Wxe3=}\) ) 25...\(\text{Qxd4}\) (25...\(\text{Qxd4?!}\) 26 c5 \(\text{Wd5}\) 27 \(\text{Qxd5}\) \(\text{Qxd5}\) 28 c6±) 26 \(\text{Qc2}\) is another possibility] 21...\(\text{Qxd4}\) 22 cxd4 \(\text{Qe7}\) 23 h6 (23 \(\text{Qc3}\) was also possible as 23...\(\text{Qxa2?!}\) runs
Beating the Petroff

into 24 \(\text{We4} \ g6 \ 25 \ \text{Wxb7}\) 
23...\(\text{Qg6}\) (23...\(\text{a6e5}\) 24 \(\text{a4e5} \ \text{Wxd4}\) 
25 hgx7 \(\text{We5}\) 26 gxf8=\(W^+\) gives White a strong initiative, as does 23...\(\text{Wxd4}\) 24 hgx7 \(\text{a6e5}\) 25 \(\text{Qe5} \ \text{Wd5} \ 26 \ \text{a4e4}\) 24 hxg7 \(\text{We5}\) 25 \(\text{e4} \ \text{Qg6}\) (23 ... \(\text{Sxe5}\) 24 ... \(\text{Sxe5}\) 25 hxg7 \(\text{We5}\) 26 gxf8=\(W^+\) gives White a strong initiative, as does 23 ... \(\text{Sxe5}\) 24 hxg7 \(\text{Qxe5}\) 25 ... \(\text{Qg6}\) 26 ... \(\text{Qxd4}\) 27 \(\text{Qxe5}\) 28 ... \(\text{Qxe5}\) 29 \(\text{Qg6}\) 30 \(\text{Qg6}\) 31 ... \(\text{Qxd4}\) would have enabled Black to draw, e.g. 26 ...) 26 \(\text{a4e4} \ \text{Qd5} \ 28 \ \text{Wh6} \ \text{Qf4} \ 29 \ \text{Qxf4} \ \text{Qxf4}\) 30 \(\text{Qg6}\) 31 ... \(\text{Qf2}\) (The two bishops yield White lasting pressure for the pawn in this endgame; The main attacking device is a subsequent advance of the \(f\)-pawn. Still, with proper defence Black should be able to draw comfortably) 31 ... \(\text{Qg7}\) (31 ... \(f6\) 32 ... \(\text{Cf6}\) 33 \(\text{Qxf6} \ \text{Qxf6}\) 34 \(\text{Qxg6}\) 35 ... \(\text{Qh7}\) 36 ... \(\text{Qh2}\) 37 ... \(\text{Qc1}\) 38 ... \(\text{Qc6}\) 39 \(\text{Qe5}\) 40 \(\text{Qf5}\) 41 \(\text{Qg6}\) 42 ... \(\text{Qc6}\) 43 ... \(\text{Qe4}\) 44 ... \(\text{Qc5}\) 45 ... \(\text{Qf4}\) 46 ... \(\text{Qg5}\) 47 ... \(\text{Qd4}\) 48 ... \(\text{Qa4}\) 49 ... \(\text{Qg5}\) 50 ... \(\text{Qc7}\) 51 ... \(\text{Qd2}\) (51 ... \(\text{Qe4}\)?) 52 ... \(\text{Qa4}\) 53 ... \(\text{Qd8}\) 54 ... \(\text{Qxe5}\) 55 ... \(\text{Qa5}\) 56 ... \(\text{Qa6}\) (56 ... \(\text{Qc5}\) 57 ... \(\text{Qd6}\) 58 ... \(\text{Qg5}\) 59 ... \(\text{Qc6}\) =) 56 ... \(\text{Qd7}\) 57 ... \(\text{Qxb4}\) 58 ... \(\text{Qc6}\) 59 ... \(\text{Qb5}\) 60 ... \(\text{Qc6}\) =, a variation pointed out by Iv. Markovic) 55 ... \(\text{Qxb4}\) \(\text{Qb2}\) 56 ... \(\text{Qc3}\) \(\text{Qa2}\) 57 ... \(\text{Qe5}\) 58 ... \(\text{Qf7}\) 59 ... \(\text{Qe8}\) 60 ... \(\text{Qf8}\) 59 ... \(\text{Qb4}\) and 1-0;

D) 17 ... \(\text{Qxe3}\)! (It is best for Black to take the precious bishop before it runs away) 18 \text{fxe3}

...and we have arrived at a position which at first sight looks better for Black in view of his two bishops and superior pawn structure, but if White can exchange light-squared bishops this impression may easily change as Black’s weakness on the corresponding squares will come to the fore. At this point Black has many continuations that we will examine one by one:

D1) 18 ... \(\text{Qxa2}\) is a blunder in view of 19 \(\text{c4}\)++;
D2) 18...f5?! allows 19 g4!± with a White initiative;

D3) 18...Af6 can be met with 19 Wc4! g6 20 Ab1±, setting the trap 20...Ab8? 21 Qxc6! bxc6 22 Ab8 Wxb8 23 Axh6 ±;

D4) 18...Wc7 allows White to carry out his main strategic aim by 19 Ab5!? Axh5 (19...Wc8?! 20 Ab1 f6! 21 Qd3 Ab5f5 22 Wxf5 Wxf5 23 Wxf5 b6±=) 20 Wxf5; After 20...g6?! (20...Ad8 21 e4± gives White a slight edge thanks to his central preponderance) 21 Wh3! f6 22 Qf3 f5 23 e4! Black’s light-squared weaknesses are beginning to show; yet this may be the best option for Black since after 23...fxe4 24 Wxe6+ Af7 25 Wxe4 Af6 26 Ac1 Aad8!± (x d4), it is hard for White to mobilise the central pawns;

D5) 18...Ag5 configures the bishops in Sveshnikov Sicilian style, pressuring e3. White should switch his attention temporarily to the queenside by 19 Ab1 Ab8 (19...Wc7 20 h4!?) 20 a4± preserving a slight space advantage and keeping open several options;

D6) 18...g6?! is designed to discourage sacrificial ideas as well as an exchange of bishops by Qd3-f5. White’s best is 19 Ab1 Wc7 20 Ac4! Ac4 21 Qxc4 Aad8 22 a4! f5 23 a5± with a slight advantage due to the possibility of combining pressure on the b-file with a well timed e3-e4;

D7) 18...Ad6! (The strongest reply, cutting across White’s intentions) 19 Qc4 (Now White must change plans, slightly curbing his ambitions) 19...Ac7

...and we have reached a critical position for the evaluation of 17 Qd3!?:

Now 20 a4! [Instead, 20 e4!? allows Black to undermine the centre by 20...b5! 21 Qe3 b4 securing just about enough play to draw, e.g. 22 e5! (22 d5?! Wd6!! (But not 22...Ab6? 23 dx6 Wxd3 24 e7! Wxe3+ 25 Ah1t) is unpleasant for White) 22...Ab6 23 Wxe4 g6 24 Ah4 bxc3 (24...Axg2! 25 Qg4! leads to a strong White attack; inferior are 25 cxb4?! f5± or 25...Ac4?! Axg2 26 Qxc4 bxc3 27 Qd6 Wd7 28 Axh6 f6!± with more than sufficient counter-play for Black in both cases) 25 Axh6 Qd5! 26 Qxd5 Wxd5 27 Wxd5 cxd5=] is a prophylactic and flexible move, leading to an interesting position for White who keeps the options of advancing in the centre or pursuing the plan of exchanging light-squared bishops, depending on Black’s play. After something like 20...Ah4 (20...Ag5
21 e4±) 21 g3 w5 22 b1 bab8 23 e4 b5!? the position is very double-edged as both sides have their assets and weaknesses.

17...g5

A most natural move, designed to ease Black's position by exchanging a pair of bishops. However, the alternatives are also important:

After 17...f6 White can breathe more easily because his excellently centralised knight remains unchallenged in its place. A possible line is 18 fe1 e8 [18...g6 is designed to safeguard the king by fianchettoing the bishop, but loses precious time; After 19 b3!? (19 b1?! b8! 20 xc6?! bxc6 21 xb8 xb8 22xd5 _xd4!= as in Kajumov-Barua, Goodricke 1997, is a trap White must avoid) 19g7 (19...e8 20 c4 b6 21 h5± is slightly better for White) 20 cd1!± White is ready to advance in the centre by c3-c4, while keeping the d2 flexible] 19 e2! building pressure on the e-file; attempts to neutralise this pressure by offering exchanges do not appear to have the desired effect:

A) 19...b6!? should rather be met by 20 d3!? [Since 20 x6 e6 xe6 21 x7!? is answered by the cool 21...w7! (21...fx7? 22 w5+ e7 23 xe6+ xe6 24 e1++) 22 xe6 xe6 23 g5 xe5 24 xe5 xa2 with double-edged play]; then 20...xe5!? (20...xa2?! 21 c4± is extremely dangerous for Black as it leads to the cutting off of the bishop from the rest of his army) 21 xe5 c4 leads to a crucial position where White must take the bull by the horns: 22 g5! (22 x7+ x7 23 h5+ g8 24 h3 f6 25 h8+ f7 26 w5+ e7 27 e1+ e6 should be about equal after 28 w4; after 22 xe8+ xe8 23 e1 f8 Black should also be able to hold) 22...d7 (22...f6!? 23 x7+! x7 24 xf6! xf6 25 e4+ g8 26 xe8+ xe8 27 xe8+ leads to a position where we'd rather prefer the rook to the minor pieces, but this may represent Black's best chance) 23 f5 e6 24 c2! f6 (24...d5 25 d3±) 25 xf6! f8 (25...xf6? 26 xf6+!) 26 xh7+! xh7 27 h5+ g8 28 xg7 w7 g5± and it appears that White should be able to press
for a long time thanks to his mass of kingside pawns;

B) 19...\(\text{c7}\) is best answered in similar fashion: 20 \(\text{d3!} \text{d5?!}\) (20...\(\text{xa2?} 21 \text{c4\pm}\) 21 \(\text{g3}\) \(\text{xa2}\) 22 \(\text{c4?!}\) and Black is in danger as his queen is cut off from the rest of his forces;

C) 19...\(\text{g6}\) (Acquiescing to less forced play) 20 \(\text{ce1}\) \(\text{g7}\) 21 \(\text{b3}\) and White has a strong initiative as he has increased his attacking potential by doubling rooks on the e-line;

17...f6!?

...is a very principled continuation that bears Kramnik's approval, leading to the eviction of the White knight from a fine central square. Now White has to play energetically as otherwise he runs a risk of falling in an inferior position. The key idea is to mobilise the central pawn duo:

A) After 18 \(\text{d3}\) \(\text{d7}\) 19 \(\text{b3}\) [to mobilise the central pawns immediately; 19 \(\text{fe1}\) \(\text{d6}\) (19...\(\text{fe8}\) 20 \(\text{b3}\) \(\text{g4}\) 21 \(\text{g3}\) \(\text{h8}\) 22 \(\text{c4}\) \(\text{d6}\) 23 \(\text{h4}\) \(\text{e7}\) 24 \(\text{h3}\) \(\text{e6=}\) 20 h3 b5 21 \(\text{b3}\) \(\text{fe8}\) 22 c4 bxc4 23 \(\text{xc4}\) \(\text{f7}\) 24 \(\text{c5}\) \(\text{xc5}\) 25 dxc5 \(\text{ab8=}\) was equal in Shredder 4 – Nimzo 7.32, Computer Chess Match Tournament 2000] 19...\(\text{g4?!}\) 20 \(\text{g3}\) \(\text{h8}\) 21 \(\text{c4}\) \(\text{d6}\) 22 \(\text{c5}\) \(\text{xc5}\) 23 dxc5 \(\text{e7}\) 24 \(\text{f4}\) \(\text{fe8}\) 25 \(\text{d6}\) \(\text{e2!}\) 26 \(\text{fe1}\) \(\text{f5}\) 27 \(\text{h3}\) g6= Black was OK in Shirov-Kramnik, Monaco 2000, but 25 \(\text{fe1!}\) (to prevent ...\(\text{g4-e2}\)) would have been a more serious try for an advantage;

B) 18 \(\text{g4!}\) (Untried, but in our opinion very good; Normally the knight is retreated to d3 where it seems to interfere with the mobilisation of White's central pawns and, in fact, seems to have no future) 18...\(\text{d7}\) 19\(\text{h3}\)

...and we have reached what is in our view an important position. After securely defending his knight White now has the choice of retreating his bishop to either b3 or d3, followed by \(\text{c3-c4}\). The following analysis demonstrates that Black has difficulties in equalising: 19...\(\text{b6!}\) (19...b5 20 \(\text{d3!}\) \(\text{b6}\) can be met by 21 \(\text{ce1}\) \(\text{d5}\) 22
Beating the Petroff

$g3! \&d6 23 \textit{Wh}4! f5 24 \&e5↑ with a White initiative) 20 \&xe6+ \textit{Wxe}6 21 \textit{Fe}1! [21 c4 f5!? requires analysis; 21...\&xc4 instead looks slightly better for White after 22 \textit{Wb}3 b5 23 \&e3 \textit{Wf}8 24 \&xc4 \textit{Wxc}4 25 \&xc4! (25 \textit{Wxc}4 \textit{Wxc}4 26 \textit{Wxc}4 c5!=) 25...\textit{Wab}8 26 \textit{Wf}4 \textit{Wb}2 27 \&e3±] and we are at a key crossroads.

B1) 21...\textit{Wd}7!? is an interesting move; White now needs the services of his c-pawn to work up some action in the centre: After 22 c4! Black has the following choice:

B1a) 22...\textit{Wxd}4?! 23 \textit{Wxe}7 \textit{Wxd}2 24 \textit{Wd}1 \textit{Wg}5 (24...\textit{Wxa}2 25 \textit{Wh}6+ \textit{Wf}8 26 \textit{Wg}3++) 25 \textit{Wxb}7 c5 26 \textit{Wc}6±, \&g4-e3, is clearly better for White despite the symmetry in view of his piece activity;

B1b) 22...f5!? 23 \&e3 (23 \&e5 \textit{Wxd}4 24 \&d1!? is an interesting position to analyse) leads to a position where Black is tempted to capture the pawn on d4, but he also disposes of less greedy alternatives:

B1b1) 23...\textit{Wad}8 24 \&a5!±;

B1b2) On 23...\textit{Wae}8 the reply 24 c5 puts a difficult question to Black regarding the placing of his attacked knight; after 24...\textit{Da}8 [Relatively best; 24...\textit{Dc}8?! 25 d5 (25 \&c3!? \&e3-c4, \&d4-d5) 25...f4 26 dxc6 bxc6 27 \textit{Wf}1± x \textit{Dc}8, x c6→ is annoying for Black while 27 \&c4 \&xc5 28 \textit{Wxe}8 \textit{Wxe}8 29 \textit{Wxf}4± is another way to play] 25 \&b1!±?± White maintains certain pressure as the following variations show: 25...\textit{Wxd}4?! (25...b6!? 26 \&c3 bxc5 27 d5!

...and White’s initiative more than compensates for the pawn) 26 \&xf5 \textit{Wxc}4 26...\textit{Wxd}2 27 \textit{Wxe}7+; 26...\textit{Wxf}5 27 \textit{Wxf}5 \textit{Wxd}2 28 \textit{Wf}6+ \textit{Wf}8 29 \textit{Wxb}7+; 27 \textit{Wxe}7 (27 \&g4?!) 27...\textit{Wxe}7 28 \&xe7+ \textit{Wxe}7 29 \&b4 \textit{Wxb}4 (29...c5 30 \textit{Wd}5+ \textit{Wf}7 31 \textit{Wxc}5++) 30 \textit{Wxb}4 \textit{Wxf}3 31 \textit{gx}f3±;

B1b3) 23...\textit{Wxd}4!? (The brutal choice and one that is hard to refute) 24 \&c3 \textit{Wd}7 (On 24...\textit{Wc}5, 25 \&b1! maintains the pressure) 25 \&d1 \textit{Wc}8 26 \&d5! \&xd5 27 \textit{Wc}d5 \textit{Wf}7 28 \&b2± (\&f3-b3, x e6,) and White’s pressure on the diagonals a2-g8, a1-h8 possibly combined with a well timed advance of the h-pawn seems to amply compensate for the missing pawn;

B1c) 22...\textit{Wae}8 (This non-committal move seems to be the safest) 23 c5!? \&d5 24 \&e3 \&xe3 25 \&xe3 \&f7 26 \textit{Wed}1 \&f8 27 d5 \textit{cx}d5 28 \textit{Wxd}5 \textit{Wc}6 29 \textit{Wf}5!± and White’s grip on the d-file gives him a slight plus;

B2) 21...\textit{Wf}7 (We have chosen this as the main line on the grounds that Black keeps the important c4 square under observation) 22 c4 \textit{Wad}8 (22...\textit{Wfe}8?! 23 \textit{Wg}3! \&h8 24 \textit{Wc}7!±) leads to a choice for White:
B2a) 23  \( \text{Qe}3! ? \text{f}5! \) (23...\( \text{Exd}4? \) 24 \( \text{Qf}5 \) \( \text{Ad}7 \) 25 \( \text{Ah}6! \pm \) is out of the question) 24 \( \text{Qxf}5 \) \( \text{Wxf}5 \) 25 \( \text{Wxf}5 \) \( \text{Exf}5 \) 26 \( \text{Ax}e7 \) \( \text{Ad}4 \) 27 \( \text{Ae}3 \) \( \text{Axc}4! \) 28 \( \text{Ab}7 \) \( \text{Ax}c1+ \) 29 \( \text{Ax}c1 \) \( \text{Af}7! \) 30 \( \text{Ab}8+ \) \( \text{Af}8 \) 31 \( \text{Axf}8+ \) (31 \( \text{Ab}7 \) \( \text{Af}7 \)) 31...\( \text{Ax}f8 \) 32 \( \text{Af1} \pm \) is a small but pleasant endgame plus;

B2b) 23 \( \text{Wd}3 \) (Highlighting a difference between the placement of the queens on d7 and f7; now Black cannot really put pressure on White's centre, because after ...\( \text{Ae}7-c5 \) there always comes \( \text{Wd}3-g3 \) and White is winning) 23...\( \text{Af}8 \) 24 \( \text{Aa}5 \) and now Black should restrict himself to the conservative 24...\( \text{Af}8 \pm \) as the alternatives lose: 24...\( \text{Ac}5? \) 25 \( \text{Wg}3+--; \) 24...\( \text{Ad}6? \) 25 c5! \( \text{Ax}e1+ \) 26 \( \text{Ax}e1 \) \( \text{Axc}5 \) 27 \( \text{Wg}3! \) \( \text{Wxa}2 \) 28 \( \text{Ah}6+ \) \( \text{Ah}8 \) 29 dxc5 ghx6 30 \( \text{Wh}4+-\). Time to return to 17...\( \text{Ag}5: \\

18 \( \text{Ax}g5 \) \( \text{Wx}g5 \)

A critical position; what should White play?

19 \( \text{Afe}1 \)

This move, universally adopted, does not seem to be the best in the quest for an advantage. Black’s plan is to double rooks on the e-line by...\( \text{Aa}8-e8\)e7, ...\( \text{Af}8-e8 \), followed by seeking massive simplification along that file, and White’s last move poses few obstacles in the second player’s way towards this target.

We think that the best way of disrupting Black’s plan is the as yet untried 19 \( \text{Ab}1! \) forcing the Black rook to take a passive stance. After 19...\( \text{Ab}8 \) (19...f6 20 \( \text{Ad}3 \) b6 is met by 21 \( \text{Ab}4 \) \( \text{Ac}8 \) 22 h4! \( \text{Wx}h4 \) 23 \( \text{Afe}1! \) \( \text{Af}7 \) 24 \( \text{Axc}6 \) \( \text{Axc}6 \) 25 \( \text{Ax}d5 \) \( \text{Ac}7 \) 26 \( \text{Axf}7+ \) \( \text{Axf}7 \) 27 \( \text{Ab}5! \pm \) with a clear advantage for White in view of the awkward placement of the Black queen) 20 \( \text{Eb}2! \) \( \text{Af}8 \) (20...f6 21 \( \text{Ad}3 \) \( \text{Af}8 \) 22 \( \text{Ac}5 \) b6 23 \( \text{Axc}6 \) \( \text{Axc}6 \) 24 \( \text{Ac}2 \pm \) is clearly better for White in view of Black’s weaknesses on the light squares) 21 h4!? (21 \( \text{Ab}1 \) \( \text{Af}5 \) 22 \( \text{Wg}3 \) \( \text{Af}4 \) 23 \( \text{Af}1 \) \( \text{Ax}a2 \) 24 \( \text{Ax}b7 \) \( \text{Ab}1 \) 25 \( \text{Af}7 \) leads to a forced draw after 25...\( \text{Ah}5! \) 26 \( \text{Ex}f5 \) \( \text{Axg}3 \) 27 \( \text{Ac}4+ \) \( \text{Ah}8 \) 28 \( \text{Af}7+ \) \( \text{Gg}8 \) 29 \( \text{Ad}6+ \) \( \text{Ah}8 \) 30 \( \text{Af}7+\) ) 21...\( \text{Wd}8 \) (21...\( \text{Wx}h4 \) 22 \( \text{Ab}1 \) \( \text{Ab}6 \) 23 \( \text{Ax}e6 \) \( \text{fx}e6 \) 24 \( \text{Wf}7+ \) \( \text{Ah}8 \) 25 a4± leads to fantastic positional compensation for White; On 21...\( \text{Wf}5 \) the reply 22 \( \text{Wg}3! \) \( \text{Ab}6 \) 23 \( \text{Ad}3 \) \( \text{Wf}6 \) 24 \( \text{He}1 \) h6 25 \( \text{He}2 \uparrow \) yields fine attacking chances as the \( \text{Qe}5 \) is stable and the rest of the White army harmoniously focusing on the Black monarch) 22 \( \text{He}1 \) f6 (22...\( \text{Aa}5!? \) ) 23 \( \text{Ad}3 \) \( \text{Af}7 \) 24 \( \text{Ax}e8+ \) \( \text{Wxe}8 \) 25 \( \text{He}2 \pm \) White has a nagging edge due to Black’s inability to contest immediately the e-file, e.g. 25...\( \text{Wf}8 \) 26 \( \text{Ac}5 \) \( \text{Wd}6 \) 27 h5! and a weakness upon the enemy castled position will be forced.
19...\( \text{h}8 \# \text{a}e8 \)

Black goes ahead with his plan; since now he will be able to defend his b-pawn from the side, there is no longer any point in attacking it. Thus, White usually concentrates in (a) doubling his rooks on the e-file or (b) an advance of his central pawns or (c) a combination of these plans. It seems to us, however, that the real chance for an advantage existed on the previous move and from now on White can achieve very little, if anything.

20 \( \text{g}3 \)

A move designed to build slowly a space advantage; others have also failed to bring White a significant edge. The game Polgar-Macieja, Budapest (rapid) 2002 saw what is probably the most interesting alternative attempt in the position, namely to mobilise the central pawns immediately by means of 20 \( \text{\#b}3 \) !?; after 20...\( \text{\#f}6 \) 21 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{\#e}7 \) ! 22 \( \text{\#h}3 \) \( \text{\#f}e8 \) 23 \( \text{\#c}d1 \) \( \text{\#d}7 \) [23...c5!? looks like an interesting attempt at improvement, e.g. 24 \( \text{\#a}4 \) (24 \( \text{\#e}3 \) \( \text{\#x}e3 \) 25 fxe3 \( \text{\#e}4 \) looks fine for Black) 24...\( \text{\#d}7 \) 25 \( \text{\#x}d7 \) \( \text{\#x}d7 \) 26 \( \text{\#d}3 ! \) \( \text{\#x}e1+ \) 27 \( \text{\#x}e1 ! ? \) and White has probably only a tiny edge] 24 \( \text{\#e}3 \) \( \text{\#f}6 \) 25 \( \text{\#e}2 \) (25 \( \text{\#xf}6 \) \( \text{\#xf}6 \) 26 \( \text{\#f}4 ! ? ) 25...\( \text{\#x}e5 \) 26 \( \text{\#xe}5 \) \( \text{\#c}8 \) 27 \( \text{\#f}4 ! \) \( \text{\#f}8 \) 28 \( \text{\#e}1 \) \( \text{\#d}6 \) 29 \( \text{\#d}3 \) Black tried to lash out by 29...c5 and now Judith surprisingly refrained from 30 \( \text{\#x}h7 ! \) \( \text{\#xd}4 + \) 31 \( \text{\#h}1 \) \( \text{\#xe}5 \) 32 fxe5 which seems to offer White some chances, e.g. 32...\( \text{\#f}2 ! \) 33 \( \text{\#d}1 \) \( \text{\#f}5 ! \) 34 \( \text{\#h}8 + \) \( \text{\#c}7 \) 35 \( \text{\#xg}7 \)

\( \text{\#g}6 \) 36 \( \text{\#xg}6 \) \( \text{\#xg}6 \) 37 \( \text{\#c}2 \)± (37 \( \text{\#h}2 \)±).

20...\( \text{\#f}5 ? ! \)

Black tries to extricate his queen immediately from its somewhat precarious position, but it seems there is no point in doing that before White resorts to h2-h4. 20...\( \text{\#e}7 ! ? \) 21 h4 \( \text{\#f}5 ! \) has been suggested by Topalov, and is in fact the best continuation (21...\( \text{\#f}6 ? \) 22 \( \text{\#x}d5 \) \( \text{\#x}d5 \) 23 \( \text{\#xf}6 \) \( \text{\#xf}6 \) 24 \( \text{\#g}4 \)± is better for White in view of Black's ruined pawn structure; 21...\( \text{\#h}6 ! ? \) 22 \( \text{\#c}2 ! \) \( \text{\#f}8 \) 23 \( \text{\#e}2 \) \( \text{\#f}6 ! \) 24 \( \text{\#d}3 \)± is perhaps only slightly better for White); this suggestion was adopted in the game Sax-Pavasovic, Maribor 1996, which continued with the natural 22 \( \text{\#d}1 \) \( \text{\#f}8 \) 23 \( \text{\#d}3 \) \( \text{\#f}6 ! \)

...when Black prepares to evict the White knight from the centre by means of ...\( \text{\#f}6 - h6 \) and ...f7-f6 or ...\( \text{\#e}6 - f5 \) followed by ...\( \text{\#f}6 - d6 \) and ...f7-f6. It seems to us that White could have now fearlessly played 24 c4! finally mobilizing the central pawn majority. Then Black would have faced a difficult choice:
A) 24...\(\text{Q}b6\) 25 \(\text{He}4!\). Looks good for White who may follow up with \(\text{A}c1-c2-e2\);

B) 24...\(\text{Q}b4\) 25 \(\text{Ab}1\) \(\text{Af}5\) [after 25...\(\text{c}5\) 26 \(\text{Aa}3\) \(\text{Aa}6\) there is a choice of good lines: 27 \(d5\) \(\text{A}xd5\) (27...\(\text{A}h3\) 28 \(f4\)) 28 \(\text{W}xd5\) \(\text{Axe}5\) 29 \(\text{Axe}5\) \(\text{W}xe5\) 30 \(\text{W}xb7\) \(\text{Ac}7\) 31 \(\text{W}xa7\) \(\text{Ae}6\) 32 \(\text{W}b7\)! \(\text{A}d4\) 33 \(\text{A}d3\) is a pleasant plus, while 27 \(\text{A}c3\)! \(\text{cxd}4\) 28 \(\text{W}xd4\) \(\text{A}f5\) 29 \(\text{A}xf5\) \(\text{W}xf5\) 30 \(\text{A}ce3\) is also fine as White’s centralisation and superior knight offers him the better chances despite his inferior pawn structure] is strongly met by 26 \(\text{A}e3\)!, intending \(\text{A}e3-f3\) with an initiative;

C) 24...\(\text{Q}c7\)! (Looks awkward, but is in fact best as it is linked with the idea of a subsequent \(\text{Q}c7-e6\), applying pressure on \(\text{d}4\)) leads to very little for White:

C1) 25 \(\text{W}c2\) is best answered by 25...g6! (25...\(\text{W}h6\) 26 \(\text{He}3\) \(f6\) 27 \(\text{Q}f3\) \(\text{A}g4\) 28 \(\text{Axe}7\) \(\text{Axe}7\) 29 \(\text{Q}h2\) \(\text{A}e2\) 30 \(\text{A}b1\) \(\text{Axd}3\) 31 \(\text{W}xd3\) looks a bit better for White as the Black queen is cut off from the action) 26 h5 (intending \(f2-f4\), \(\text{W}c2-f2\)) 26...\(\text{c}5!\) when Black equalises in the nick of time;

C2) After 25 \(\text{W}h5\)? Black should refrain from...

C2a) 25...h6?! which allows White to obtain a strong initiative after 26 \(\text{A}e3\)! \(\text{A}h3\) (26...\(\text{A}c8\)? 27 \(\text{F}f3\) \(\text{W}e6\) 28 \(\text{A}f5\) \(\text{W}d6\) 29 \(\text{A}xc8\) \(\text{Axc}8\) 30 \(\text{A}xf7\)++; 26...\(\text{A}d7\)? 27 \(\text{F}f3\) \(\text{W}e6\) 28 \(\text{A}f5\) \(\text{W}d6\) 29 \(\text{A}xd7\++) 27 \(\text{A}ce1\)†, in favour of...

C2b) 25...g6! (Apparently weakening, but Black should hurry to exchange queens to avoid falling under a strong attack); then, 26 \(\text{W}g5\) \(\text{W}xg5\) 27 hxg5 leads to an ending that is basically drawish, but Black has to play accurately to achieve the draw:

C2b1) After 27...\(\text{W}d8\) 28 \(\text{Q}f3\) \(\text{He}d7\) (28...\(\text{W}f8\) 29 \(\text{A}e4\)) 29 \(\text{A}e4\) White’s plan is to continue with \(\text{A}g1-g2\) followed by \(\text{He}1-h1-h4\) and pressure on the h-pawn;

C2b2) 27...\(\text{A}c8\)?? 28 \(\text{Q}f3\) [White’s idea is to trade all the major pieces in order to relieve the pressure on d-pawn and then exploit the superiority of his minor pieces, although the advantage is very small; 28 \(f4\) on the other hand offers nothing after 28...\(\text{A}d8\) 29 \(\text{He}4\) (29 \(\text{Q}f3\) \(\text{A}xe1\) + 30 \(\text{A}xe1\) \(\text{A}g4\) 31 \(\text{A}e4\) \(\text{A}xf3\) 32 \(\text{A}xf3\) \(\text{Axd}4\) 33 \(\text{He}7\) \(\text{A}e6\) 34 \(\text{A}xb7\) \(\text{Axc}4\) 35 \(\text{A}xa7\) \(\text{A}d4\) =) 29...\(\text{W}f8\)! (29...\(\text{W}f8\) 30 \(\text{A}xc6\) \(\text{He}4\) 31 \(\text{A}xh8\) \(\text{Axd}4\) 32 \(\text{A}xf5\) \(\text{Axd}8\) 33 \(\text{A}e4\)) 30 \(\text{W}f2\) \(\text{A}f5\) 31 \(\text{He}3\) \(\text{A}e6\) as the weakness of d4 is highlighted] 28...\(\text{A}xe1\) + 29 \(\text{A}xe1\) \(\text{A}xe1\) + 30 \(\text{A}xe1\) \(f6\) ! 31 \(\text{gx}f6\) \(\text{A}f7\) should be held with proper play by Black after either 32 \(f4\) or 32 \(\text{A}c2\).

21 \(\text{W}d1\)!
Now White is effectively a tempo up on all the lines mentioned in the previous note as he didn’t have to waste time on a quick h2-h4. This fact enables him to build up his position slowly and obtain a strategic plus.

21...\( \text{\texttt{b6}} \)

21...\( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) 22 \( \text{\texttt{d3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{f6}} \) 23 c4 \( \text{\texttt{b6}} \) 24 \( \text{\texttt{e4}} \) (Topalov) is bad for Black as his queen’s position allows White to gain time and space for attacking purposes; 21...f6 22 \( \text{\texttt{d3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{h3}} \) 23 \( \text{\texttt{f1}} \) \( \text{\texttt{h6}} \) (23...\( \text{\texttt{f5}} \) 24 \( \text{\texttt{c4}} \)) may have been worth a try.

22 \( \text{\texttt{d3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{f6}} \) 23 \( \text{\texttt{c2}} \) g6 24 \( \text{\texttt{b1}} \) \( \text{\texttt{c8}} \) 25 \( \text{\texttt{e2}} \) \( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) 26 \( \text{\texttt{be1}} \) \( \text{\texttt{f8}} \) 27 \( \text{\texttt{b3}} \)

Intending a2-a4-a5; the consequences of Black’s failure to achieve a quick doubling of the rooks on the e-file are already visible, the knight has settled on e5 and it will be very hard to get rid of it.

27...\( \text{\texttt{e6}} \) 28 \( \text{\texttt{a3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{c8}} \) 29 \( \text{\texttt{e3}} \)

Now that the Black knight has been forced into passivity White takes his time and improves his position.

29...\( \text{\texttt{g7}} \) 30 \( \text{\texttt{b4}} \)!

A good move, directed against ...f7-f6. If now 30...f6, Topalov gives 31 \( \text{\texttt{c4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{xc4}} \) (31... \( \text{\texttt{d5}} \) 32 \( \text{\texttt{xb7}} \) \( \text{\texttt{x}} \) \( \text{\texttt{b7}} \) 33 \( \text{\texttt{xe8}} \) \( \text{\texttt{f7}} \) 34 \( \text{\texttt{e8}} \) \( \text{\texttt{d7}} \) 35 \( \text{\texttt{d6}} \) \( \text{\texttt{x}} \) \( \text{\texttt{d6}} \) 36 \( \text{\texttt{c7}} \)++) 32 \( \text{\texttt{xc4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{h8}} \) 33 \( \text{\texttt{e6}} \)

30...\( \text{\texttt{f8}} \) 31 a4?

Topalov later criticized this move, suggesting that it would have been better to play 31 h4 \( \text{\texttt{c7}} \) 32 \( \text{\texttt{b2}} \), planning h4-h5.

31...\( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) 32 \( \text{\texttt{b2}} \) \( \text{\texttt{d6}} \) 33 c4 \( \text{\texttt{d8}} \)!

Black is alert and avoids an immediate collapse; after 33...\( \text{\texttt{d5}} \) 34 \( \text{\texttt{g4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{xe3}} \) 35 \( \text{\texttt{f6}} \) \( \text{\texttt{h8}} \) 36 \( \text{\texttt{xe3}} \) (\( \Delta \) d4-d5++, Topalov) White’s dark-square pressure would have paid off handsomely.

34 h4!

White realises that he would not be able to achieve something substantial without this attacking gesture. The threat of undermining the king’s defences by h4-h5 is sufficient to cause distress to the best of defenders.

34...\( \text{\texttt{f5}} \) 35 \( \text{\texttt{e4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{g7}} \)
The redeployment of the rook to f3 has breathed new life into White's attacking chances; White has now all his men impressively placed and when something like this happens, it usually has a negative effect on the opponent.

37...d6! 38 g4 hxg4?

After dealing successfully with pressure for several moves, Black suddenly caves in; the modest 38...g7 39 f4± is only slightly better for White according to Topalov and would have allowed Black to put up a stiff resistance.

39 hxg4 xd4 40 h6+!

White is in no mood to simplify and give his opponent chances of survival; 40 xd4?! xd4 41 e4! xd8! (41...xe4 42 xe4 f5?! 43 xf5! gxf5 44 xf5++) 42 h2 g7 would have not been easy to win in view of White's many weaknesses.

40...g7 41 c1

Threatening c1-g5.

41...f6 42 c4 c5 43 g4 f7 44 fe3!?

44 h6+ g8 45 fe3 f8 is given by Topalov as still holding for Black, but instead of 46 c5? (which he correctly condemns due to 46...f5! ++) White avails himself of the prosaic 46 e6! which seems to guarantee a winning position, e.g. 46...f5 47 xf8+ xf8 48 ce5 f6 49 xf6+ xf6 50 a5++ and White has obtained a favourable version of the endgame mentioned in the note to White's 40th. Still, it is hard to criticize White's choice in the game because the presence of queens favours the attacker in such instances.

44...fd7

44...g5 45 b2± (Topalov) hardly helps Black.

45 e2 f8 46 c3 f5

47 h2++-

Ensuring that the h5 will be captured, after which Black's defences are bound to fall apart.

47...c5 48 g4 d8 49 f3 h8 50 xh5!

50 g5 g7.

50...xh5 51 f4 g8 52 h2 d6 53 c5 wh6 54 g3!

Black resigned, because after the loss of the f6 pawn his position would become hopeless.

1-0

28
Chandler – Hort
Bundesliga, Germany 1988

1 e4 e5 2 f3 f6 3 xe5 d6 4 f3 xe4 5 d4 d5 6 d3 e7 7 0-0 c6 8 c4!? f6
A drastic method of solving the problem with the $\text{Qe4}$; Black renounces any intentions he might have had of keeping the knight on its centralised outpost and concentrates instead on the fight for the d5 square.

9 $\text{Qc3} \text{Qg4}$

This move is not very effective as the pressure on d4 is merely academic.

10 exd5 $\text{Qxd5}$ 11 $\text{Qe4}$!

A typical reaction, exploiting the fact that Black’s 9...$\text{Qg4}$ was not consistent with the original conception of intensifying control over d5.

11...$\text{Qf6}$

11...$\text{Qxc3?!}$ 12 bxc3 0-0 13 $\text{Qb1}$ $\text{Qa5}$ (13...$\text{Qb8}$ 14 $\text{Wd3}$ h6 15 $\text{Qxc6}$ bxc6 16 $\text{Qxb8}$ $\text{Wxb8}$ 17 $\text{Qe5}$++; 13...$\text{Wc8}$ 14 $\text{Wc2}$ h6 15 h3 $\text{Qd7}$ 16 d5 $\text{Qa5}$ 17 c4+) 14 h3 $\text{Qe6}$ 15 $\text{Qe1}$ c6 16 $\text{Qc2}$+ is clearly good for White;

Pulling the bishop back by 11...$\text{Qe6}$!? would have been an admission that Black’s 9th was a failure, but it is nevertheless playable. White should continue with 12 a3?! (12 $\text{Wd3}$ $\text{Qcb4}$ 13 $\text{Wc2}$+ is also good) 12...0-0 13 $\text{Qe1}$! [13 $\text{Wc2}$ h6 14 $\text{Qd2}$ $\text{Qf6}$ 15 $\text{Qad1}$+ is best met by 15...$\text{Qxc3}$! (15...$\text{Qce7}$?! 16 $\text{Qf1}$ c6 17 $\text{Qe5}$ $\text{Wc7}$ (On 17...$\text{Wc8}$?! the reply 18 $\text{Qh7}$+! $\text{Qh8}$ 19 $\text{Qd3}$ intending $\text{Qc3-e4}$ or $\text{Wc2-c1}$, yields a White initiative) 18 $\text{Qa4}$! $\text{Qad8}$ 19 $\text{Qc5}$ $\text{Qc8}$ 20 b4+ gives White a slightly better position in view of his space advantage) 16 bxc3 $\text{Qa5}!$, trying to harass White on the weakened light squares c4, b3] 13...$\text{Qf6}$ [13...$\text{Wd7}$?! 14 $\text{Wc2}$ h6 15 $\text{Qe5}$ (15 b4?! 15...$\text{Qxe5}$ 16 dxe5 c6 17 $\text{Qxd5}$ cxd5 18 $\text{Qh7}$+ $\text{Qh8}$ 19 $\text{Qd3}$++; 13...$\text{Qxc3}$ 14 bxc3 $\text{Qd5}$ 15 $\text{Qb1}$+ (15 $\text{Qc2}$!?) $\pm$] 14 $\text{Wd3}$! h6 when he is a whole tempo up on the game Movsesian-Yusupov featured under the next Illustrative Game. The best way of exploiting this appears to be 15 $\text{Qe5}$! $\text{Qce7}$ 16 $\text{Wg3}$ $\text{Qh8}$ 17 $\text{Qd2}$ c6 18 $\text{Qad1}$+ with a solid slight edge; on 18...$\text{Qf5}$?! there follows 19 $\text{Wf3}$! as the d-pawn is immune: 19...$\text{Qxd4}$? 20 $\text{Wh5}$+ and Black is suddenly busted.

Finally, 11...$\text{Qb6}$!? is an untried possibility with ideas similar to 11...$\text{Qf6}$ that shouldn’t be too bad for Black.

12 $\text{Qxc6}$+ bxc6 13 h3 $\text{Qxf3}$

13...$\text{Qh5}$? 14 g4 $\text{Qg6}$ 15 $\text{Qe5}$ 0-0 (Della Morte-Coda, Villa Ballester 2003) should be bad for Black after the simple 16 f4! h6 17 $\text{Qxc6}$ $\text{Wd7}$ 18 $\text{Qxe7}$+ $\text{Qxe7}$ 19 f5+--

14 $\text{Wxf3}$
A conclusion to be drawn from the diagram is that a quiet, positional struggle is to be expected; White has slightly the better of it because his pawn structure is marginally superior.

14...\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\textdagger}}d7?!

We regard this as merely a sign of indecision on Black’s part.

14...0-0? is clearly bad for Black due to 15 \texttt{\textdagger}xc6 \texttt{\textdagger}xd4 16 \texttt{\textdagger}xc7 \texttt{\textdagger}d6 17 \texttt{\textdagger}b5! \texttt{\textdagger}xc7 18 \texttt{\textdagger}xd4 \texttt{\textdagger}b6 19 \texttt{\textdagger}f5 \texttt{\textdagger}f6 20 \texttt{\textdagger}e5 21 \texttt{\textdagger}xb6 \texttt{\textdagger}xf5 22 \texttt{\textdagger}d4+- (S.Nikolov-Jovan, Bled 2003).

14...\texttt{\textdagger}d5?! is a better move than the more usual 14...\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\textdagger}}d7?! and it is surprising that it has been a rare occurrence in tournament praxis; Black acknowledges that he cannot profit from the weakness on d4 and focuses on covering his own weaknesses. White has several possibilities, but it seems difficult to get a substantial edge:

A) 15 \texttt{\textdagger}f4 is not very good because of 15...\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\textdagger}}xf4 16 \texttt{\textdagger}xf4 0-0 17 \texttt{\textdagger}ad1 \texttt{\textdagger}b8! 18 b3 \texttt{\textdagger}b4!\texttt{\textdagger} and Black gets counter-play;

B) 15 \texttt{\textdagger}e3?! may well be the best: 15...0-0 16 \texttt{\textdagger}ac1 \texttt{\textdagger}b8 17 b3 \texttt{\textdagger}a3!

(17...\texttt{\textdagger}xe3?! 18 fxe3 c5 19 \texttt{\textdagger}d5! cxd4 20 \texttt{\textdagger}xc7\texttt{\textdagger} 18 \texttt{\textdagger}c2 \texttt{\textdagger}b4 19 \texttt{\textdagger}e2 \texttt{\textdagger}d5 20 \texttt{\textdagger}c1 \texttt{\textdagger}b4 21 \texttt{\textdagger}e4?! (21 \texttt{\textdagger}xd5 cxd5 as in Lanka-Schulz, Bundesliga 1993, should be better for White after 22 \texttt{\textdagger}f4! \texttt{\textdagger}c8 23 \texttt{\textdagger}c1 c6 24 \texttt{\textdagger}g4!\texttt{\textdagger} as the Black rook is tied to defending the chronic weakness at c6. In the game White tried to seize more space on the kingside by 22 g3, but after 22...\texttt{\textdagger}b6! 23 h4 \texttt{\textdagger}f6 24 \texttt{\textdagger}g4 \texttt{\textdagger}g6 Black could breath easier) 21...f5 (what else?) 22 \texttt{\textdagger}g5 \texttt{\textdagger}d6 23 \texttt{\textdagger}d3! (a multi-purpose move, opening f3 for the knight and keeping open many options for the queen) and White is better. From d3 the queen facilitates the strategically desirable exchange of bishops as can be seen in the variation 23...h6 24 \texttt{\textdagger}f3 c5 25 \texttt{\textdagger}d2! and suddenly the weaknesses in the Black camp are apparent;

C) 15 \texttt{\textdagger}xd5 (A most clear-cut way of playing) 15...\texttt{\textdagger}xd5 [15...\texttt{\textdagger}xd5 allows White to carry out quickly pressure along the c-file by 16 \texttt{\textdagger}f4 c6! (16...0-0? 17 \texttt{\textdagger}ac1 \texttt{\textdagger}d6 (17...\texttt{\textdagger}c8 18 \texttt{\textdagger}c6\texttt{\textdagger} 18 \texttt{\textdagger}xd6 \texttt{\textdagger}xd6 19 \texttt{\textdagger}c5 c6 20 \texttt{\textdagger}fc1\texttt{\textdagger} is a standard positional advantage for White) 17 \texttt{\textdagger}ac1 \texttt{\textdagger}c8 18 \texttt{\textdagger}c2?! 0-0 19 \texttt{\textdagger}fc1 but it may nevertheless be Black’s best course after the correct 19...\texttt{\textdagger}b6! (19...\texttt{\textdagger}d7?! 20 \texttt{\textdagger}g4?! accentuates the problem of the backward pawn) 20 \texttt{\textdagger}e2! \texttt{\textdagger}b7 (20...\texttt{\textdagger}f6 21 \texttt{\textdagger}d6 \texttt{\textdagger}fe8 22 \texttt{\textdagger}ce1 \texttt{\textdagger}xe2 23 \texttt{\textdagger}xe2 h6 24 \texttt{\textdagger}c5 \texttt{\textdagger}b7 25 b3\texttt{\textdagger} 21 \texttt{\textdagger}g4! (\Delta \texttt{\textdagger}f4-e5) 21...\texttt{\textdagger}f6 22 \texttt{\textdagger}ce1\texttt{\textdagger}]

16 \texttt{\textdagger}e2! (Gaining time for development by keeping the enemy king in the centre for a while; 16
**Beating the Petroff**

With \( \text{xd5? cxd5 17 \text{f4 d7}} \) would now be only equal) 16\( \text{d8!} \) and here we have a further division:

C1) After 17 b3?! it is imperative for Black to set-up a defence along his third rank by 17...\( \text{d6!} \) (17...\( \text{d7?!} \) 18 \( \text{a3 0-0} \) 19 \( \text{e7 e8 20 \text{fe1}± \) is clearly better for White); Here...

C1a) The immediate 18 \( \text{a6}?! \) questionably removes the queen from the theatre of action, allowing Black to obtain a strong initiative after 18...0-0! (18...\( \text{g6 19 \text{c8+! d8 20 \text{xd8+ d8} 21 \text{e3 d7 22 \text{fe1 b8 23 \text{c4±} \}) 19 \text{xa7 g6 20 f3 c5}±;} \)

Better is...

C1b) 18 \( \text{f4! e6} \) (18...\( \text{g6 19 \text{g3}± \) 19 \( \text{a6 0-0} \) 20 \( \text{xa7 g6 21 g3± \) which should be slightly better for White as the \( \text{f4} \) provides the White king with sufficient protection;

C2) 17 \( \text{f4 d7 18 \text{ac1} 0-0 \) is the other possibility; although White has certain pressure on Black’s weak queenside pawns it is difficult to state that this amounts to a serious edge: 19 \( \text{c4!?! \) [Opting for the exchange of queens removes any danger of losing but 19 \( \text{ac4} \) looks also good, e.g. 19...\( \text{d6 \square 20 \text{xd6 xd6} \text{xd6}?!± (20...\text{cxd6 21 \text{fe1 c7 22 b3}±}) \) 19...\( \text{f6 20 \text{xc6 xc6 21 \text{xc6 xd4 and now it appears that the passive 22 \text{c1}!± is the best way of maintaining a slight edge as 22 \text{e3?! allows 22...\text{a4! 23 xc7 xa2 24 b4 a6 25 a7 a4! with a probable draw. Time to return to the game continuation: 15 \text{f4!}} \)

A very important move in White’s strategic scheme, the text is a prelude to anchoring the bishop on e5. From there, not only it defends the d-pawn but also keeps an eye on c7 as well as Black’s kingside. In addition, it can always be given up for the \( \text{f6}, \) leaving White with the superior minor piece for exploiting weaknesses.

15...0-0 16 \( \text{e5! ab8 17 b3}

![Diagram]

In our opinion Black has already drifted into a passive position without counter-play. The practical examples from the diagram have merely served to verify this fact.

17...\( \text{e8}?! \)

Hort is a great positional player who understands that in situations like this he should try to mix things up in the Laskerian manner. The knight retreat may not be the computer’s perfect choice, but it has the advantage of preventing a smooth development of events. Speaking of smooth development of
events, here is a classical example:

17...\textbf{b7} 18 \textbf{ac1} \textbf{d8} 19 \textbf{fd1} \textbf{b4}?! (19...\textbf{d5} 20 \textbf{xd5} cxd5 21 \textbf{wg3}±) 20 d5! c5 21 \textbf{xf6}! \textbf{xf6} 22 \textbf{ec4} \textbf{d4} 23 \textbf{xc5} \textbf{wd5} 24 \textbf{xd5} \textbf{xd5} 25 \textbf{a6}! \textbf{db7} 26 \textbf{xc7} \textbf{d8} 27 \textbf{d5}! +\textbf{b2} 28 \textbf{e7}+ \textbf{f8} 29 \textbf{xd8}+ \textbf{xe7} 30 \textbf{cc8} g6 31 \textbf{f1} \textbf{f6} 32 \textbf{d6}+ \textbf{e7} 33 \textbf{dd8} \textbf{f6} 34 \textbf{g3} \textbf{a3} 35 \textbf{e8} a5 36 \textbf{c6}+ \textbf{g7} 37 \textbf{ec8} \textbf{b5} 38 \textbf{c4} 1-0, Browne-Medina Garcia, Las Palmas 1974.

18 \textbf{fd1} f6 19 \textbf{g3} \textbf{a3} 20 d5!±

A typical advance in this type of structure; Black, obviously cannot allow an opening up of the game and must acquiesce to having weaknesses at c7, c5, e6.

20...c5

21 \textbf{e4}?

But this is inexact, failing to capture the full essence of the position; after 21 \textbf{e2}!± planning a trip to e6, Black's situation would have been critical. Now Hort finds a way to stay in the game.

21...\textbf{d6} 22 \textbf{xd6}?! cxd6 23 \textbf{ab1} \textbf{b4}! 24 \textbf{wg3} \textbf{bd8} 25 \textbf{bc1}±

White has still a slight advantage, but Chandler is an experienced GM who must have felt that Black had escaped the worst and could even become dangerous later on by exploiting White's difficulty in controlling the e-file; thus... ½-½

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\textbf{Leko} – \textbf{Motylev}

Russia v World, (rapid) Moscow 2002

1 e4 e5 2 \textbf{f3} \textbf{f6} 3 \textbf{xe5} d6 4 \textbf{f3} \textbf{xe4} 5 d4 d5 6 \textbf{d3} \textbf{e7} 7 0-0 \textbf{c6} 8 c4!? \textbf{f6} 9 \textbf{c3} \textbf{e6}

A more logical move than 9...\textbf{g4}, introduced into tournament practice by Yusupov; Black develops his last minor piece and at the same time solidifies his stance in the centre.

10 cxd5 \textbf{xd5} 11 \textbf{e1} 0-0 12 a3

Now White is ready to attack by \textbf{wd1-c2} or \textbf{d3-e4} (c2), \textbf{wd1-d3}, so Black does best to take the necessary precautions for the defence of his kingside.

12...\textbf{f6}!

Switching the bishop over to f6 helps defend the king and prepares the solidifying ...\textbf{c6-e7}, turning d5 into a fortress.

12...\textbf{e8} looks suspect at first sight, but there seems to be no direct refutation. After 13 \textbf{wc2}!? (13 \textbf{c2} and 13 \textbf{e4} are the alternatives) 13...h6 (13...g6? is bad on account of 14 \textbf{xe6}!±; 13...\textbf{f6}?! proved insufficient after 14 \textbf{c3} \textbf{g4} 15 \textbf{e5}! \textbf{xd4} 16 \textbf{xd4} \textbf{xd4} 17
\( \text{\textcopyright{b5}}! \pm \) in Gonzalez-Perez, Barcelona 2000) 14 \( \text{\textcopyright{h7}} + ! ? \) (14 \( \text{\textcopyright{xе6}}?! \text{fxe6} \) is an interesting, but not convincing exchange sacrifice) 14...\( \text{\textcopyright{h8}} \) 15 \( \text{\textcopyright{e4}}! \) [15 \( \text{\textcopyright{f5}}?! \) is met with the surprising 15...\( \text{\textcopyright{f6}}! \) (15...\( \text{\textcopyright{xf5}}? \) 16 \( \text{\textcopyright{xf5}} \pm \) 16 \( \text{\textcopyright{xe6}} \text{\textcopyright{xd4}}!! \) 17 \( \text{\textcopyright{xd4}} \text{\textcopyright{xd4}} = \) ] 15...\( \text{\textcopyright{d7}}! \) (15...\( \text{\textcopyright{d6}}?! \) 16 \( \text{\textcopyright{xd5}} \text{\textcopyright{xd5}} \) 17 \( \text{\textcopyright{f4}}! \pm \) is clearly better for White) 16 \( \text{\textcopyright{d2}}! \) (16 \( \text{\textcopyright{e5}} \text{\textcopyright{xe5}} \) 17 dxe5 \( \text{\textcopyright{ad8}} = \) is just equal) 16...\( \text{\textcopyright{ad8}} \) (16...\( \text{\textcopyright{f6}} \) allows 17 d5?! \( \text{\textcopyright{xd5}} \) 18 \( \text{\textcopyright{ad1}}! \text{\textcopyright{xc3}} \) 19 \( \text{\textcopyright{xc3}} \text{\textcopyright{d6}} \) 20 b4! with very good attacking chances in return for the pawn) 17 \( \text{\textcopyright{ad1}} \) White keeps several valuable option like \( \text{\textcopyright{f3}}-e5, \text{\textcopyright{c2}-c1} \) or \( \text{\textcopyright{d2}-c1} \) at hand, maintaining an initiative.

13 \( \text{\textcopyright{e4}}! \)

The bishop here serves the useful function of preventing \( ...\text{\textcopyright{f8}}-e8 \), frees d3 for the queen and at the same time keeps d5 under surveillance. We have reached by now the first critical crossroads.

13...\( \text{\textcopyright{h6}} \)

Weakening Black’s defences along the diagonal b1-h7, but preventing annoying invasions on g5;

13...\( \text{\textcopyright{de7}}?! \) is significantly inferior; After 14 \( \text{\textcopyright{g5}}! \text{\textcopyright{xe5}} \) 15 \( \text{\textcopyright{xe5}} \) White obtains a very strong attack, a sample line being 15...\( \text{\textcopyright{f5}} \) 16 d5 \( \text{\textcopyright{xe4}} \) [Kudrin-Wolff, USA (ch) 1985] 17 dxc6! \( \text{\textcopyright{d3}} \) 18 cxb7 \( \text{\textcopyright{b8}} \) 19 \( \text{\textcopyright{e3}} \text{\textcopyright{f5}} \) 20 \( \text{\textcopyright{xd3}} \text{\textcopyright{xe5}} \) 21 \( \text{\textcopyright{e5}} \) g6 22 \text{\textcopyright{a6}} \text{\textcopyright{d2}} 23 \text{\textcopyright{c5}}! + - ;

13...\( \text{\textcopyright{e7}} \) is a major alternative to 13...\( \text{\textcopyright{h6}} \). A possible line of play runs 14 \( \text{\textcopyright{g5}}?! \) (Again, it is thematic to exploit Black’s omission of \...h7-h6) 14...\( \text{\textcopyright{xe5}} \) 15 \( \text{\textcopyright{xe5}} \) f6 16 \( \text{\textcopyright{d2}}! \) (16 \( \text{\textcopyright{c2}}?! \text{fxg5}! \) 17 \( \text{\textcopyright{xe7}}+ \text{\textcopyright{h8}} \) 18 \( \text{\textcopyright{xe6}} \text{\textcopyright{f4}} \pm \) is better for Black) 16...\( \text{\textcopyright{d7}} \) 17 \( \text{\textcopyright{c2}} \) f5 18 \( \text{\textcopyright{f3}} \) c6 (Geller-Anand, Coimbatore 1987) when 19 \( \text{\textcopyright{xd5}}! \text{\textcopyright{xd5}} \) (19...\( \text{\textcopyright{xd5}}?! \) 20 \( \text{\textcopyright{b4}}! \pm \) 20 \( \text{\textcopyright{e5}} \pm \) yields a slight advantage to White, according to Anand;

13...\( \text{\textcopyright{b8}}?! \) is a recent try by Karpov. The move seems weird at first sight, but there is a simple and basically sound strategic idea behind it: to capture later on c3, followed by ...b7-b5, fixing White’s queenside weaknesses. After 14 \( \text{\textcopyright{d3}} \) h6 15 \( \text{\textcopyright{h7}} + ! ? \text{\textcopyright{h8}} \) 16 \( \text{\textcopyright{f5}} \text{\textcopyright{xc3}} \) (16...\( \text{\textcopyright{xf5}} \) 17 \( \text{\textcopyright{xf5}} \text{\textcopyright{de7}} \) 18 \( \text{\textcopyright{h5}} \pm \) is annoying for Black as he has to abandon control of d5 in order to stave off the pending sacrifice on h6) 17 bxc3 \( \text{\textcopyright{d5}} \) 18 \( \text{\textcopyright{f4}} \text{\textcopyright{c7}} \) 19 \( \text{\textcopyright{g4}}! ? \text{\textcopyright{g6}} \) 20 \( \text{\textcopyright{g3}} \) b5! (Milos-Karpov, Buenos Aires 2001) it appears that White can maintain a slight edge by essaying the logical 21 \( \text{\textcopyright{h5}}! ? \pm ; \) for example
21...\(\mathcal{Q}h4!?)\ (On 21...\(\mathcal{Q}e7\), the natural reply 22 \(\mathcal{Q}e5\) augments the pressure on \(f7\) and at the same time threatens \(\mathcal{Q}e5-g4\) 22 \(\mathcal{Q}xh4\) \(\mathcal{Q}xh4\) 23 \(\mathcal{Q}xh4\) \(\mathcal{W}xh4\) 24 \(\mathcal{Q}e5!\) c6 25 \(\mathcal{Q}f3!\)± and in the ensuing position White's major pieces seem to be more active than their Black counterparts, giving him better chances to exploit the enemy weaknesses.

14 \(\mathcal{Q}c2!?)\n
With the pawn on \(h6\) the threat of \(\mathcal{W}d1-d3\) acquires flesh and bones. Now a Black knight is forced to retreat.

14 \(\mathcal{W}d3\) is a worthy alternative, employed in Movsesian-Yusupov, Batumi 1999. After 14...\(\mathcal{Q}ce7\) [14...\(\mathcal{Q}xc3\) 15 \(\mathcal{b}xc3\) \(\mathcal{Q}d5\) 16 \(\mathcal{Q}f4\) (16 \(\mathcal{Q}xd5\) \(\mathcal{W}xd5\) 17 \(\mathcal{Q}f4!\)± 16 \(\mathcal{Q}b1!\)±) 16...\(\mathcal{Q}e7\) 17 c4 \(\mathcal{Q}xe4\) 18 \(\mathcal{W}xe4\) \(\mathcal{Q}g6\) (Lutz-Pavasovic, Pula zt 2000) should be met with the simple 19 \(\mathcal{Q}g3!\) when White's better development and space advantage are likely to be transformed soon to attacking chances on the kingside, e.g. 19...c6 20 \(\mathcal{Q}ab1\) \(\mathcal{W}d7\) 21 \(\mathcal{Q}e5\) \(\mathcal{Q}xe5\) 22 dx5 \(\mathcal{Q}fe8\) 23 f4→] 15 \(\mathcal{Q}d2\) c6 16 \(\mathcal{W}ad1\) \(\mathcal{Q}c8!?\) (16...\(\mathcal{W}c7\) 17 \(\mathcal{Q}e5)!± is slightly better for White) 17 h3 (17 \(\mathcal{Q}e2!?)\) 17...\(\mathcal{Q}xc3\) 18 \(\mathcal{b}xc3\) b5 19 \(\mathcal{Q}f4\) \(\mathcal{Q}d5\) 20 \(\mathcal{Q}d2\) \(\mathcal{Q}e8\) 21 \(\mathcal{W}g3\) \(\mathcal{Q}h8\) White should have played 22 \(\mathcal{Q}c2!\) vacating e4 for use by his knight and keeping a slight advantage.

14...\(\mathcal{Q}de7\)

The most common move, unveiling an attack on the d-pawn; 14...\(\mathcal{Q}xc3!?\) 15 \(\mathcal{b}xc3\) \(\mathcal{Q}c4\)

...was played in the famous game Anand-Touzane, Moscow 2001, which ended in a loss for the Indian Grandmaster. After 16 \(\mathcal{Q}d2!\) \(\mathcal{Q}d5\) 17 \(\mathcal{b}b1\) \(\mathcal{g}5\) 18 c4! \(\mathcal{Q}xd2\) 19 cxd5 \(\mathcal{Q}xe1\) 20 dxc6 \(\mathcal{a}5?\) (Relatively better was 20...\(\mathcal{Q}e8!?\) 21 \(\mathcal{cxb7}\) \(\mathcal{b}8\) 22 \(\mathcal{Q}e3\) \(\mathcal{Q}a5\) 23 \(\mathcal{Q}a4!\) \(\mathcal{Q}e7\) 24 \(\mathcal{Q}c6\) \(\mathcal{Q}b6\) 25 \(\mathcal{W}g4\) \(\mathcal{Q}h8\) 26 \(\mathcal{W}f4\) \(\mathcal{Q}g8\) 27 d5± although its purpose seems to be no other than merely prolong Black's suffering for a few moves) Anand, surprisingly, missed the simple win 21 \(\mathcal{cxb7}\) \(\mathcal{b}8\) 22 \(\mathcal{W}h5!\) f5 (22...\(\mathcal{Q}b6\) 23 \(\mathcal{Q}xh6\)--) 23 \(\mathcal{Q}xe6!\) \(\mathcal{W}e8\) 24 \(\mathcal{W}g5++;\)

14...\(\mathcal{Q}ce7!?\) has been played only once and this is in our opinion strange because retreatting the c-knight to e7 looks like the most natural option at Black's disposal. After 15 \(\mathcal{Q}e5\) \(\mathcal{f}5!\) the following moves are available:

A) 16 \(\mathcal{Q}xd5\) is possible, e.g 16...\(\mathcal{W}xd5\) 17 \(\mathcal{b}b3\) \(\mathcal{W}d8\) (17...\(\mathcal{W}b5?!\) 18 \(\mathcal{a}4\) \(\mathcal{b}4\) 19 a5 intending \(\mathcal{a}1-a4\), looks dangerous for Black) 18 \(\mathcal{f}4!\) with what, admittedly, is a very slight plus for White;

B) 16 \(\mathcal{Q}xf5!?\) \(\mathcal{Q}xf5\) 17 \(\mathcal{W}f3!\) is a very interesting idea of the authors, trying to organise pressure quickly
Beating the Petroff to prevent the second player from consolidating. Black has three options:

**B1)** 17...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xd4? is the most naive of them, leading after 18 \(\text{\underline{\text{W}}}_{5}\)xd5 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{10}\)c2 19 \(\text{\underline{\text{K}}}_{5}\)f4 \(\text{\underline{\text{W}}}_{5}\)xd5 20 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xd5 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xe5 21 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xe5 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{9}\)ae8 22 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)c3± to a clear advantage for White;

**B2)** 17...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{9}\)fe7 allows White to detect a weakness on d7: 18 \(\text{\underline{\text{W}}}_{5}\)g4! \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)h8 19 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d7 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{9}\)e8 20 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d2! \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xe7 21 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xe7 24 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xe7± and the complications have netted a key-pawn which even if Black manages to recover he will stand positionally worse;

**B3)** 17...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)de7 (Relatively best) 18 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e4! \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xe5 19 dxe5 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d4 (19...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d4 20 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)f4 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xb2 21 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)ab1±) 20 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)c3 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e5 21 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e3 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xe5 22 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xe3 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e8 23 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d6 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e6 24 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e1± and White is slightly better because of his dangerously mobile kingside majority;

**C)** 16 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)b3 (The game continuation) 16...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e6 17 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e4! \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xe5 18 dxe5 b6 19 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)f3 (19 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)h5!? 19...c6 20 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e2 (20 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)g3?!?, guarding f5, is worth examining) 20...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)f5 21 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d1± [21 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d3!? looks like a viable alternative to 21 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d1, e.g. 21...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)h4 22 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d6 g6 (22...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)de7 23 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e4 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)h5 24 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)f4!++) 23 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e4 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e7 24 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e1± and Black’s kingside weaknesses should amount to something] and White’s two bishops gave him a slight edge in Hracek–Yusupov, Nussloch 1996; however this position deserves further analysis as it is not easy to make progress in view of Black’s extremely solid setup.

**15 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e3**

After this practically forced developing move we have reached a critical crossroads.

15...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)f5!? A move that is considered to give Black equality, but things are not so simple.

15...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)g4 was Yusupov’s original choice; White should play 16 h3 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)h5 [16...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xf3 17 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xf3 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xd4 18 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xd4 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xd4!? (18...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xd4 19 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d1 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)c4 20 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e4→ leads to a strong White attack according to Huebner) 19 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)b5!± is at least slightly better for White] 17 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d3 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)g6 18 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e4! when Black has to solve difficult problems, e.g. 18...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d5 (18...\(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)f5 19 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)b3! \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xe3 20 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xe3± is clearly better for White in view of the weakness on b7) 19 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)b3 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)a5 (19...b6? 20 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xf6+ \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xf6 21 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)dxe6 20 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)a4!? \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)c6 (20...c6? 21 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d2++; 20...b6! 21 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)d2±) 21 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)b3 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)a5 22 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)b5! c6 23 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e2 b5 24 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xf6+ \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xf6 25 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)e5 \(\text{\underline{\text{Q}}}_{5}\)xc2
(25...\texttt{Ad}8 26 \texttt{Axg}6 \texttt{fxg}6 27 a4!±) 26 \texttt{Wxc}2\texttt{t} and White had a positional advantage in Huebner-Yusupov, Nussloch 1996;

15...\texttt{Af}5!? is untried so far; a possible continuation is 16 \texttt{Ab}3 (16 \texttt{Aa}4!?) 16...\texttt{Ag}4 17 h3 \texttt{Ax}f3 18 \texttt{Wxf}3 \texttt{Qxd}4 19 \texttt{Axd}4 \texttt{Wxd}4 20 \texttt{Qe}4 \texttt{Qc}6 (20...\texttt{Ag}6 21 \texttt{Wf}5 \texttt{Ah}8 22 \texttt{Qxf}6 \texttt{Wxf}6 23 \texttt{Wxf}6 \texttt{gxf}6 24 \texttt{Ad}1\texttt{=} 21 \texttt{Qxf}6+ \texttt{Wxf}6 22 \texttt{Wxf}6 \texttt{gxf}6 23 \texttt{Ac}1!? \texttt{Qd}4! 24 \texttt{Aa}2 \texttt{Qe}6 (24...c6 25 \texttt{Ag}7?) 25 \texttt{Ed}1!? c5 [25...\texttt{Ad}8!? 26 \texttt{Axd}8 \texttt{Hxd}8 27 \texttt{Ax}e6 \texttt{fxe}6 28 \texttt{Qxc}7 b5 (28...\texttt{Qd}1+ 29 \texttt{Ah}2 \texttt{Qd}2 30 \texttt{Hxb}7 \texttt{Qxf}2 31 b4+?) 29 b4!±] 26 \texttt{Ad}7 b6 27 \texttt{Ac}3±.

16 \texttt{Qe}2!

Now that Black’s control over d5 has been weakened White can afford to withdraw his knight on e2.

16...\texttt{Qxe}3?!

We have chosen this game as a main Illustrative Game because of the instructive mistake Black commits here; despite gaining the two bishops the move is positionally flawed, because it allows White to fortify his centre and generate alternating threats on both sides of the board.

Somewhat better is 16...\texttt{Wd}7 17 \texttt{Wd}3 g6 as in Lutz-Yusupov, Bundesliga 1998. At this point, instead of prematurely committing his rook to the d-file by 18 \texttt{Ad}1, White could have played the immediate 18 \texttt{Qf}4!? reserving the option of placing the rook on c1; in that case he would have maintained a slight but enduring plus, e.g.

18...\texttt{Qxe}3 19 \texttt{fxe}3 \texttt{Af}5 20 \texttt{Wb}3 \texttt{Qxc}2 21 \texttt{Wxc}2 \texttt{Qe}7!? (21...\texttt{Ad}8 22 \texttt{Ac}1!) 22 \texttt{Ad}1± as White’s central superiority gives him freedom of action. But let’s return to our game:

17 \texttt{fxe}3 \texttt{Ag}4

Black’s main problem has its roots in his weakened light squares and lack of central pawn thrusts. Huzman gives 17...\texttt{He}8 as better, but goes on to remark that 18 \texttt{Qf}4 \texttt{Ag}4 19 h3! is best play by White when our evaluation of the position remains at least ±. The ‘clever’ 19...\texttt{Qxd}4? fails to 20 \texttt{Wd}3! \texttt{Qxf}3 21 \texttt{Wh}7+ \texttt{Qf}8 22 \texttt{Wh}8+ \texttt{Qe}7 23 \texttt{exd}4+ \texttt{Qf}6 24 \texttt{Qxe}8 \texttt{Qxe}8 25 \texttt{Qh}5+!!±.

18 \texttt{Qf}4 g6 19 h3!

Leko is well aware of Black’s problem and goes on methodically with his light square campaign.

19...\texttt{Qxf}3 20 \texttt{Wxf}3 \texttt{Qg}7?

A decisive positional error; Huzman’s recommendation of 20...\texttt{Wd}6! 21 \texttt{He}4 \texttt{Qd}8 22 \texttt{Ac}1 c6± would have allowed Black to keep his disadvantage to a minimum. Now Leko obtains a serious plus which he never lets go.

21 \texttt{He}4± \texttt{Ab}8

Huzman gives the line 21...\texttt{Wd}6 22 \texttt{Ac}6 \texttt{Wxc}6 23 \texttt{Wxc}6 \texttt{bxc}6 24 \texttt{Ac}1 \texttt{Ae}8 25 \texttt{Qf}2 \texttt{Hab}8 26 b4 \texttt{Ab}6 27 \texttt{He}2± to support the evaluation after 21 \texttt{He}4. Black’s problem in analogous positions is that it is too late to save the game but also too early to resign.

22 \texttt{Ac}1 \texttt{Qe}7
Surrendering a pawn in the hope of finding some counter-play looks like the best practical decision.

23 \( \text{a}x\text{b}7 \text{c}6 \) 24 \( \text{a}x\text{c}6 \) \( \text{a}x\text{c}6 \) 25 \( \text{a}x\text{c}6 \) \( \text{a}x\text{b}2 \) 26 \( \text{c}a\text{c}1 \) \( \text{w}a5 \) 27 \( \text{d}1\text{c}3 \) \( \text{d}8 \)

28 \( \text{c}c7! \)

Not only is White a clear pawn up, his compact pawn mass in the centre prevents counter-play as well; with his last move he threatens \( 29 \text{d}x\text{g}6 \), leaving Black no choice but to enter (at best) a completely lost endgame.

28...\( \text{w}f5 \) 29 \( \text{h}3\text{c}5! \) \( \text{w}b1+ \)

29...\( \text{w}f6 \) 30 \( \text{c}5\text{c}6 \) \( \text{w}f5 \) 31 \( \text{d}x\text{g}6! \) \( \text{fxg}6 \) (31...\( \text{w}x\text{f}3 \) 32 \( \text{g}x\text{f}3++ \)) 32 \( \text{w}x\text{f}5 \) \( \text{gx}f5 \) 33 \( \text{g}6++ \) is an interesting line given by Huzman.

30 \( \text{h}2 \) \( \text{a}2 \) 31 \( \text{d}d5 \)

More exact here was the spectacular 31 \( \text{a}x\text{a}7 \) \( \text{f}2 \) 32 \( \text{w}g3 \) \( \text{f}1 \) 33 \( \text{c}c7 \) \( \text{w}b1 \) 34 \( \text{w}x\text{g}6! \) + (Huzman) but there is nothing wrong with the text move.

31...\( \text{a}x\text{d}5 \) 32 \( \text{w}x\text{d}5 \) \( \text{w}x\text{d}5 \) 33 \( \text{a}x\text{d}5 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 34 \( \text{f}6++ \) \( \text{g}7 \) 35 \( \text{e}8++ \) \( \text{g}8 \) 36 \( \text{a}x\text{a}7+- \)

White has a winning advantage. The remaining moves were:

36...\( \text{b}8 \) 37 \( \text{f}6++ \) \( \text{g}7 \) 38 \( \text{d}7 \) \( \text{d}6\text{d}+ \) 39 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{g}8 \) 40 \( \text{a}6 \) \( \text{a}e5\text{+} \) 41 \( \text{d}x\text{e}5 \) \( \text{h}3 \) 42 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{e}3 \) 43 \( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 44 \( \text{g}1 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 45 \( \text{f}2 \) \( \text{c}3 \) 46 \( \text{a}6 \) \( h5 \) 47 \( h4 \) \( \text{b}3 \) 48 \( a4 \) \( \text{a}c3 \) 49 \( a5 \) \( \text{a}3 \) 50 \( g3 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 51 \( e6 \) \( fxe6 \) 52 \( \text{a}x\text{e}6 \) \( \text{f}7 \) 53 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 54 \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{h}3 \) 55 \( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{c}3 \) 56 \( \text{d}d2 \) \( \text{a}3 \) 57 \( \text{c}2 \) \( \text{e}3 \) 58 \( e5++ \) \( \text{f}7 \) 59 \( \text{b}2 \) \( \text{e}2++ \) 60 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{e}1 \) 61 \( \text{b}4 \) \( \text{b}1++ \) 62 \( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{c}1++ \) 63 \( \text{b}6 \) \( \text{b}1++ \) 64 \( \text{a}7 \) \( \text{h}3 \) 65 \( a6 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 65 \( \text{a}8 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 67 \( a7 \) \( \text{h}4 \) 68 \( \text{g}x\text{g}6 \) \( \text{g}x\text{e}5 \) 69 \( \text{a}x\text{g}8 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 70 \( \text{b}8 \) \( \text{a}4 \) 71 \( \text{b}7 \) \( \text{b}4+ \) 72 \( \text{a}6 \) \( \text{a}4+ \) 73 \( \text{b}6 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 1-0

\[ \]

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Leko – Adams

Dortmund (ct) 2002

1 \( e4 \) \( e5 \) 2 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 3 \( \text{x}e5 \) \( d6 \) 4 \( \text{x}f3 \) \( \text{x}e4 \) 5 \( d4 \) \( d5 \) 6 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 7 \( 0-0 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 8 \( c4! \) ? \( \text{f}6 \) 9 \( \text{c}3 \) 0-0

This natural continuation has been established as one of the main lines following its use by players like Karpov, Adams and Khalifman.

10 \( h3! \)

A useful move, making life difficult for the \( \text{c}8 \); It appears to us that Black should now opt for an

[Diagram]
IQP position without delay and the best way to do so is by playing 10...\( \text{a}b4 \).

10...\( \text{a}b4 \)

The most principled move, fighting for control of d5; the alternatives 10...\( \text{e}e8 \)?! and 10...h6?! are too slow and can both be met by 11 a3!, preventing ...\( \text{dxc}4 \) or ...\( \text{c}6-b4 \) and intending to answer 11...\( \text{e}e6 \) with 12 c5!±.

The immediate 10...\( \text{e}e6 \) can, besides the thematic 11 c5! b6 12 \( \text{b}5! \), be met also by 11 \( \text{g}5 \) dxc4 [11...\( \text{dxc}4 \) 12 \( \text{x}h7+ \) e8 13 dxc6 \( \text{e}xh7 \) 14 cxd5 \( \text{x}h3 \) (14...\( \text{g}8 \) 15 \( \text{xd}4 \) c6 16 \( \text{d}1 \) f6 17 \( \text{d}3 \) xc3 18 dxc6 \( \text{xd}3 \) 19 \( \text{xd}3 \) f6 20 exf7+ \( \text{x}f7 \) 21 \( \text{b}1 \) c5 22 \( \text{e}3 \)± EscandeIl-Scarcella, Villa Ballester 2003) 15 \( \text{xd}4 \) f5 16 \( \text{f}4 \) is tenable for Black, but White is slightly better because he can transfer his rooks to the third rank and attack the Black king as a consequence of his space advantage] 12 \( \text{x}e6 \) fxe6 13 \( \text{xc}4 \) \( \text{dxc}4 \) 14 d2! \( \text{c}5 \) 15 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{xe}2+ \) 16 \( \text{x}e2 \)± and White recovers his pawn with a slight edge in the ensuing bishop vs knight middlegame, according to Nisipeanu; however, this advantage may prove too small in a must-win situation;

10...dxc4 is Karpov’s choice, from one of his numerous encounters with Kasparov. After 11 \( \text{xc}4 \) \( \text{a}5 \) (Driving away the White bishop enables Black to develop his own bishop to e6) 12 \( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}6 \) (With the transparent positional threat 13...\( \text{c}4 \), which, however, White’s next move easily parries) 13 \( \text{e}1 \)

...we are at the crossroads, with Black having to solve the problem with the awkward placement of the \( \text{a}5 \):

A) 13...\( \text{c}4 \)?? is a terrible blunder on account of 14 \( \text{xc}4 \) \( \text{xc}4 \) 15 \( \text{e}2 \)±;

B) 13...c5 is an attempt to reach an equal position by liquidating the centre, yet after 14 \( \text{g}5 \) (14 \( \text{g}5 \)!? \( \text{xd}4 \) 15 \( \text{xe}6 \) fxe6 16 \( \text{e}4 \)± yields good compensation according to Yusupov) 14...h6 15 \( \text{h}4 \) c4 16 \( \text{xf}6 \)! \( \text{xf}6 \) 17 \( \text{e}4 \)± White has a slight plus according to Christiansen;

C) 13...\( \text{c}6 \) (The Black knight has fulfilled his task, so there is no more need for it to be at the edge of the board) 14 a3! (Still restricting the knight and at the same time furthering his own plans), leads to a position where White’s more carefully built set-up appears to offer him the better game:
Beating the Petroff

C1) 14...\texttt{a}e8?! is met strongly by 15 \texttt{b}5! \texttt{d}6 16 \texttt{g}5 \texttt{ed}8 17 \texttt{xf}6! \texttt{xf}6 18 \texttt{e}4 \texttt{f}4 19 \texttt{xc}6 \texttt{xc}6 20 \texttt{c}1!± and White obtains a big plus, as in Lobron-Handoko, Zagreb 1985;

C2) 14...\texttt{d}6 looks like a sensible choice; however, after 15 \texttt{e}3 \texttt{d}5 16 \texttt{c}2 \texttt{h}8 17 \texttt{ad}1 [17 \texttt{e}4!? is interesting as 17...\texttt{d}7 (17...\texttt{d}8 18 \texttt{g}3!?) 18 \texttt{eg}5 \texttt{xg}5 19 \texttt{xc}6 \texttt{h}6 20 \texttt{xe}6 \texttt{fxe}6± looks slightly better for White despite the strong-points available to the Black knights] 17...\texttt{f}5? [17...\texttt{xc}3?! 18 \texttt{bc}3 \texttt{xa}3 is also highly unpromising as 19 \texttt{xh}7! \texttt{b}3 (19...\texttt{g}6 fails to 20 \texttt{d}5! \texttt{f}5 21 \texttt{wd}2 \texttt{xh}7 (21...\texttt{a}5 22 \texttt{c}5!! \texttt{xc}5 23 \texttt{wh}6+?) 22 \texttt{dxc}6 \texttt{bxc}6 23 \texttt{d}4± with a powerful attack) 20 \texttt{f}5 \texttt{g}6 21 \texttt{f}4! \texttt{xh}7 22 \texttt{wh}6+ \texttt{g}8 23 \texttt{g}5 \texttt{xd}1 24 \texttt{xe}7! \texttt{wd}6 25 \texttt{d}7!± gives White a fantastic attack, but 17...\texttt{ad}8!? might have been a better chance] 18 \texttt{c}1 \texttt{ad}8 19 \texttt{e}2! \texttt{f}6 20 \texttt{de}1 \texttt{c}8 21 \texttt{c}4! \texttt{xc}3 22 \texttt{bc}3± White had obtained a big positional advantage in Gelfand-Adams, Wijk aan Zee (m) 1994 and went on to win.

The main problem with Black’s game, as the reader can easily discover from the continuation, is the weakness on the diagonal a2-g8 and the square g5, factors that allowed White to launch a tremendous attack: 22...\texttt{h}6 23 \texttt{a}4 \texttt{b}6 24 \texttt{h}4! \texttt{a}5 25 \texttt{a}2 \texttt{c}5 26 \texttt{g}5! \texttt{a}6 27 \texttt{e}6 \texttt{d}7 28 \texttt{xf}5 \texttt{g}5 29 \texttt{g}6 \texttt{f}7 30 \texttt{xf}7 31 \texttt{h}xg5 \texttt{cx}d4 32 \texttt{c}xd4 \texttt{c}4 33 \texttt{e}8+ \texttt{xe}8 34 \texttt{xe}8+ \texttt{h}7 35 \texttt{b}1+ \texttt{g}6 36 \texttt{g}xh6 \texttt{d}6 37 \texttt{e}3 \texttt{e}7 38 \texttt{c}8 \texttt{d}5 39 \texttt{d}3 \texttt{b}4 40 \texttt{e}2 \texttt{e}6 41 \texttt{d}8 \texttt{d}5 42 \texttt{g}5 \texttt{d}7 43 \texttt{e}8 \texttt{f}7 44 \texttt{b}8 \texttt{e}6 45 \texttt{f}3 \texttt{f}7 46 \texttt{d}8 \texttt{f}5 47 \texttt{d}2 \texttt{f}6 48 \texttt{a}8 \texttt{g}5 49 \texttt{x}a7+ \texttt{h}6 50 \texttt{a}6 \texttt{d}7 51 a5 \texttt{b}5 52 \texttt{ax}b6 1-0;

C3) 14...\texttt{wd}7 15 \texttt{b}5 \texttt{fd}8 16 \texttt{a}4 \texttt{a}6 17 \texttt{xc}6 \texttt{xc}6 18 \texttt{xc}6 \texttt{bc}6 (A.Sokolov-Koch, Marseilles 2001) is a pleasant endgame advantage for White after 19 \texttt{g}5!±;

C4) 14...\texttt{a}6 (This prophylactic move looks like the lesser evil) 15 \texttt{f}4 \texttt{d}5! [It is imperative for Black to resort to an immediate blockade on d5; 15...\texttt{wd}7?! allowed White to obtain a strong attack by 16 \texttt{e}5! \texttt{xe}5 17 \texttt{dx}5 \texttt{d}5 18 \texttt{xd}5 \texttt{xd}5 19 \texttt{c}2 \texttt{g}6 20 \texttt{ad}1→ in Kasparov-Karpov, Krasnoyarsk (m) 1984-85, as the threat of \texttt{e}5-\texttt{e}6 is very strong: 20...\texttt{c}6 21 \texttt{h}6 \texttt{fd}8 22 \texttt{e}6! \texttt{fxe}6 23 \texttt{g}x\texttt{g}6! \texttt{f}8 24 \texttt{xf}8 \texttt{xf}8 25 \texttt{e}4± \texttt{f}7 26 \texttt{e}3! \texttt{g}7 27 \texttt{dd}3! (Now, normally one would have expected the game to finish quickly as Kasparov’s attacking

\texttt{ad}3! (Now, normally one would have expected the game to finish quickly as Kasparov’s attacking
virtues in such positions are well known, yet Black’s tenacity allows him to drag it out for another forty moves or so before acquiescing to the inevitable) 27...f8 28 g3! h8 29 c3 f7 30 d3 g8 31 e5! c7 32 xg7+ xg7 33 xd5 xe5 34 xe6+ xe6 35 xe6+ (The pressure has netted a pawn and now it's simply a matter of technique) 35...

11...dxc4

Opting for the IQP position without delay;

11...c5?! is at least slightly better for White after 12 a3 c6 13 dxc4 dxc4 14 e3!+. This assessment was verified in Velimirovic-Schussler, Smederevska Palanka 1979, which went on 14...a5 (14...e6 15 a4! a5 16 ac1±) 15 c2 d7 16 ad1 c7 17 g5! g6 18 ge4 f5 19 xf6+ xf6 20 a4 xc3 21 bxc3 fd8 22 d6!± with Black’s position becoming extremely perilous.

11...e6! was played in the game Nisipeanu-Khalifman, Las Vegas (m) 1999. This move is well motivated as it fights for control of e4, but on the other hand f7 and d5 become less secure points. After 12 a3 c6 13 e1 (13 f4!? dxc4 14 xc4 e8 15 d5! d6 16 e5 e7? 17 xb7xb8 18 b3+ c6 19 xc6 xc6 20 xc6 1-0 Dolmatov-Karner, Tallinn 1985) 13...e6 (13...h6 is best met by 14 cxd5 xd5 15 b3± with a slight edge for White; 13...a6 14 g5 (14 e5!?) 14...xc4 15 xc4 h6 16 h4 b5 17 a2 a4 18 axb4 xb4 (Daamen-Hendriks, corr. 1987) 19

11 e2

An important position for the whole opening system; common sense indicates that Black should take on c4 and try to turn d5 into a fortress, but there are other moves as well.
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Ponmariov-Karpov, Wijk aan Zee 2003) 17...fxe6!? fxe6 18...Wc2±, as in Topalov-Anand, Wijk aan Zee 2003. White has very good light-square compensation and attacking chances in return for the exchange, but the rest of the game was a tribute to the art of defence by the Indian GM: 18...Wd7! 19...Wd6 20...We4...Cbd5 21...Cxd6...Cxd6 22...Cc6! 23...Cxc4 .2d6 24...Cxd5!...Cc6! 25...Cxe5!...Cxd4 26...Wc4...Wxf5 27...Cxc3 28...Cxd5!...Cxd5! 29...Cxf4 30...Cxa2...Cxd6 31...Cf6! [31...g3...Wc7 32...Cc4...We7! 33...Wc4...Wxf5 (33...d3 34...Wf4) 34...Cxd4...Wd5!]= 31...Wc6!! (Black must unblock the d-pawn at all costs as it is his only source of counter-play) 32...Cxc4!...Wf7! 33...Wb3...d3 34...Cc1?! [A time-pressure error; 34...Wb4! d2! (34...Cc6 35...Wd2...Cc6 36...Wf4±) 35...Cxd2...Cc6 36...Wb4...Cc6 37...Cc6 38...Cc6+...Cc8 39...Cc6!...Cc2 40...Cc8+...Cc7 41...Cc6 would have been close to equal; now the d-pawn turns into a monster] 34...d2! 35...Cc6! (35...Cc6?) 35...Cc6! 36...Cc5...Cc2 37...Cc2...Cc6 38...Cc3...Cc6+ 39...Cc6...Cc6 40...Cc6...Cc6 41...Cc6...Cc6 42...Cc6...Cc6 43...Cc6+...Cc7 44...Cc7 45...Cc7...Cc7 46...Cc7...Cc7 47...Cc7 48...Cc7...Cc7 49...Cc7...Cc7 50...Cc7...Cc7 51...Cc7...Cc7 52...Cc7...Cc7 53...Cc7...Cc7 54...Cc7...Cc7 55...Cc7...Cc7 56...Cc7...Cc7 57...Cc7...Cc7 58...Cc7...Cc7 59...Cc7...Cc7 60...Cc7...Cc7 61...Cc7...Cc7 0-1. A truly spectacular fighting game for which both players deserve praise.

14...Cc6
After 14...\(\text{\textit{c7}}\) even the extravagant 15 \(d5!?\) (15 \(w\text{b3}\) is the normal move) 15...\(\text{x xd5}\) 16 \(\text{\textit{c xd5}}\) \(\text{\textit{e7}}\) 17 \(\text{\textit{xd5 \textit{e7}}}\) 18 \(\text{\textit{exe7}}\) \(\text{\textit{xe7}}\) 19 \(\text{\textit{xd8 \textit{xd8}}}\) 20 \(\text{\textit{exe7}}\) seems like offering White a stable endgame advantage. For example, 20...\(b6\) 21 \(\text{\textit{c1 \textit{e6}}}\) 22 \(\text{\textit{b3 \textit{h6}}}\) 23 \(\text{\textit{h4 \textit{e6}}}\) 24 \(\text{\textit{e5 \textit{e8}}}\) 25 \(\text{\textit{xd8 \textit{xe8}}}\) 26 \(\text{\textit{c6 \textit{a8}}}\) 27 \(\text{\textit{d4}}\) (1/2-1/2 Casser-R. Fischer, IECG 2001) looks like a prematurely agreed drawn game as in the final position White retains a slight edge because of the superior minor piece and the control of the 7th rank.

15 \(\text{\textit{wb3}}\) ±

White has the better development; this position has been the subject of theoretical discussion over the past few years, the verdict being that Black is unable to fully equalise in the ensuing endgame.

15...\(\text{\textit{wb6}}\)!

Black will be saddled with doubled pawns after this, but keeping the queens on seems to offer White dangerous attacking chances.

15...\(\text{\textit{e8?!}}\) allows White to win a pawn for not too much; after 16

\(\text{\textit{xf6! \textit{xf6}}}\) 17 \(\text{\textit{xd5! \textit{xd5}}}\) (17...\(\text{\textit{xd5?!}}\) 18 \(\text{\textit{xe8+ \textit{xe8}}}\) 19 \(\text{\textit{xd5 \textit{xd5}}}\) 20 \(\text{\textit{xd5+}}\) 18 \(\text{\textit{b7}!}\) \(\text{\textit{b8}}\) (18...\(\text{\textit{a6}}\) 19 \(\text{\textit{wc6 \textit{e7}}}\) 20 \(\text{\textit{a1 \textit{c7}}}\) 21 \(\text{\textit{a4 \textit{a4}}}\) 22 \(\text{\textit{d1 \textit{b6}}}\) 23 \(\text{\textit{b3\pm \textit{xd4?!}}\) led to an abrupt finish after 24 \(\text{\textit{xe6! \textit{xf2+ \textit{xf2}}}\) 25 \(\text{\textit{fl \textit{fxe6}}}\) 26 \(\text{\textit{bxc4 \textit{e3}}}\) 27 \(\text{\textit{xd5!}}\) 1-0 in Ward-Dartnell, English ch corr. 1995) 19 \(\text{\textit{xa7?! \textit{xb2}}}\) 20 \(\text{\textit{a1 \textit{b1}}}\) (the most clear-cut; 20 \(\text{\textit{a4 \textit{b8}}}\) 21 \(\text{\textit{c5 \textit{a8}}}\) 22 \(\text{\textit{b7}}\) \(\text{\textit{d6!}}\) 23 \(\text{\textit{b5!}}\) \(\text{\textit{eb8}}\) 24 \(\text{\textit{d3 \textit{b2}}}\) 25 \(\text{\textit{a4\pm}}\) proved also good in Nataf-Delgado, La Habana 2001) 20...\(\text{\textit{xb2!}}\) (20...\(\text{\textit{e2}}\) 21 \(\text{\textit{e3!\pm}}\) 21 \(\text{\textit{xb1 \textit{h6}}}\) (21...\(\text{\textit{f5?!}}\) 22 \(\text{\textit{b5!}}\) \(\text{\textit{e4}}\) 23 \(\text{\textit{xe4 \textit{dxe4}}}\) 24 \(\text{\textit{f5\pm}}\) 22 \(\text{\textit{b5!\pm}}\) White has a clear advantage according to Nataf;

15...\(\text{\textit{xb8}}\) 16 \(\text{\textit{d5}}\) (16 \(\text{\textit{ad1 \textit{e8}}}\) 17 \(\text{\textit{h4?! \textit{h6}}}\) 18 \(\text{\textit{d5 \textit{b6}}}\) 19 \(\text{\textit{xb6 \textit{axb6}}}\) 20 \(\text{\textit{xf6 \textit{xf6}}}\) 21 \(\text{\textit{xd5 \textit{cxd5}}}\) 22 \(\text{\textit{b3\pm}}\) was slightly better for White in Leko-Kramnik, Moscow 2002) 16...\(\text{\textit{e8}}\) 17 \(\text{\textit{ad1}}\) [In fact this position was agreed drawn in Kasparov-Gelfand, Bled (ol) 2002, but the draw obviously favoured the Russians who were declared Olympiad winners] 17...\(\text{\textit{wd6?!}}\) 18 \(\text{\textit{h4!\uparrow}}\) led to strong pressure for White in Hulak-Toth, Budva 1981; after 18...\(\text{\textit{b4}}\) 19 \(\text{\textit{c2 \textit{bd8}}}\) 20 \(\text{\textit{d3 \textit{h6}}}\) 21 \(\text{\textit{g3 \textit{wa5?!}}\) (21...\(\text{\textit{b6\textit{d7}}}\) 22 \(\text{\textit{c4 \textit{a6}}}\) 23 \(\text{\textit{xd5 \textit{xd5}}}\) White took advantage of the miserable placement of the Black queen to finish the game quickly and efficiently: 24 \(\text{\textit{xe6! \textit{b4}}}\) 25 \(\text{\textit{e2 \textit{fxe6}}}\) 26 \(\text{\textit{xe6+ \textit{h8}}}\) 27 \(\text{\textit{b1!}}\) \(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 28 \(\text{\textit{f5 \textit{g8}}}\) 29 \(\text{\textit{h7+ \textit{f8}}}\) 30 \(\text{\textit{d6+ \textit{e7}}}\) 31 \(\text{\textit{b3 \textit{e8}}}\) 32 \(\text{\textit{g8+}}\) and Black resigned as he faces mate in two.
In the endgame that has arisen Black has difficult problems to solve.

18...h6

More logical is 18...\(\text{Bf}8\), yet after 19 \(\text{Bf}2\) White seems able to maintain a slight plus anyway. A critical line of play is 19...\(\text{h}8\) [19...h6 20 \(\text{f}4\) (Maintaining the pin by 20 \(\text{h}4\)?) also has its points, e.g. 20...g5 21 \(\text{g}3\) \(\text{e}4\) 22 \(\text{h}2\)± \(\text{f}3\)-e5, \(\text{f}2\)-f3) 20...\(\text{e}4\) 21 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{g}5\) 22 \(\text{d}3\) (22 \(\text{xg}5\)!! is interesting according to Huzman, e.g. 22...\(\text{h}5\) 23 \(\text{e}1\) \(\text{c}7\) 24 \(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}8\) 25 \(\text{b}4\) \(\text{f}6\) 26 \(\text{e}5\)±) 22...\(\text{f}6\) 23 \(\text{b}4\) \(\text{a}5\) 24 \(\text{d}1\) g5 25 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{g}7\) 26 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 27 g4± was a pleasant plus for White in Giaccio-Zarnicki, Pinamar 2002] 20 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{e}4\)?! and now the splendid combination 21 \(\text{d}7\)±! \(\text{x}d7\) 22 \(\text{x}e7\)+ \(\text{x}e7\) 23 \(\text{x}d5\) \(\text{e}6\) 24 \(\text{x}e4\)± won a pawn for nothing in Svidler-Yusupov, Yerevan 2001.

18...\(\text{b}4\)!! is a refined way of playing; Black unpins the \(\text{f}6\) right away so that he can redeploy it to a better position. However 19 \(\text{e}5\) (Preventing the knight from reaching e4) 19...\(\text{d}7\) 20 \(\text{e}2\) \(\text{f}6\) (Kasimdzhanov-Fridman, Essex 2002) should still be good for White provided he refrains from 21 \(\text{e}1\)? \(\text{b}8\)!, which gave Black chances for equality in that game. Correct is 21 \(\text{d}2\)!! \(\text{d}2\) 22 \(\text{x}d2\)\(±\), which leaves Black struggling because of his inferior bishop and pawn structure.

19 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{f}8\) 20 \(\text{e}5\) g5?

Huzman rightly condemned this move on the ground that it creates a weakness that White will be able to exploit later on. Better choices were 20...\(\text{e}8\) or 20...\(\text{b}4\) \(\Delta\)...\(\text{f}6\)-\(\text{e}8\)±

21 \(\text{h}2\) \(\text{b}4\) 22 \(\text{e}2\) \(\text{e}4\)

Black has apparently created some activity for himself, but it proves to be only temporary; the text threatens ...\(\text{e}4\)-\(\text{d}2\), but Leko’s next move parries it easily.

23 \(\text{d}3\)!

Resisting the temptation to win a pawn by 23 \(\text{g}4\) \(\text{h}5\) 24 \(\text{e}3\) \(\text{a}5\) 25 \(\text{x}d5\) \(\text{x}d5\) 26 \(\text{x}d5\) \(\text{x}d5\) 27 \(\text{x}e4\) \(\text{c}2\) when Black has enough compensation according to Huzman.

23...\(\text{f}8\)

23...\(\text{d}2\) is obviously a blunder now due to 24 \(\text{d}1\) \(\text{a}5\) 25 b4+-

24 \(\text{e}1\) \(\text{g}7\) 25 \(\text{e}5\)!

It is to White’s benefit to exchange dark-squared bishops in this structure as then b4 turns into a wonderful base for his knight. As it turns out, Black cannot avoid the exchange due to tactical reasons.
25...AXB5

25...ABf8 26 f3 AAb6 27 AxB6 AxB6 28 AAb6!? ABx6 29 AXe6± is bad for Black according to Huzman. Let’s take this a little further: 29...Ad8 30 AAxh6 Ac7 31 Ae6 Ab5 32 Ae5! ABx5 33 AAb5 ABf6 34 Ab2 AAd6 35 g4! Ae6 36 Ab5+ Ab6 37 f4! Axf4 38 h4! and White’s passed pawns should be able to carry the day for him; 25...f6? on the other hand is simply a blunder in view of 26 AAb4! ABx6 27 AAb5±.

26 AAb5 ABg7 27 AAd3!±

Let’s quote Stohl’s comments in Chessbase: “White has a clear positional advantage. His bishop is better than Black’s, also his central pawn is less vulnerable than the pawn on d5. Moreover Black has weaknesses on both flanks. Leko first ties down Black’s forces by transferring his knight to b4”.

27 Ab7 28 Ab4 Ad8 29 g4!

The best way of chasing away the AAb4 is by first depriving it access to f5. At the same time White squelches material considerations involving taking on d5 as they would allow Black to become active and obtain significant drawing chances.

29...Af6 30 Ab2 Ad6

30...Adc8? 31 Ae5!?± is good for White according to Stohl, e.g. 31...Ad7 32 AAd5! (32 AAb6!?±) 32...AAd5+ 33 AAd5 Agc1 (33...Ag6 34 Ab4 AAd6 35 Ab7±) 34 Ae7±

31 f3

Now White is ready for Ab2-g3 followed by h3-h4; once he achieves this, more weaknesses will be forced.

31...Ab7 32 Ab3 Af8

Black has no way out from this constricted position. Stohl mentions the variation 32...Ab5 33 Ae7 AAd7 34 AAb5 Ac4 35 Ac2!± (Ab h3-h4, Ab2-f5) concluding that Black will have a similar fate to the game.

33 h4 Ab5 34 Ae5!

Forcing the ruining of Black’s kingside pawn structure, after which the game is won for White.

34...AxAh4+ 35 AxAh4 Ac4 36 Ac2!

There is no point in allowing an exchange of bishops as the White one is by far superior.

36 Ab5

36...AAb2 37 b3 Axc2 (37...Ac3? 38 AAb5 AAb3 39 Ac3 (39 Ac4!)?) 39...Ad7 40 Ab1!? is close to winning for White according to Stohl.

37 Ac3!

A last prophylactic measure before proceeding with the final kingside operation; Black has been completely deprived of counter-play and can only wait for the end.
Beating the Petroff

37...\texttt{d}d8 38 \texttt{g}3 \texttt{g}7 39 \texttt{f}5 \texttt{f}8 40 \texttt{h}1 \texttt{g}7

41 \texttt{c}c2!

The knight's transfer to f5 leaves Black defenceless. The remaining moves were...

41...\texttt{e}e8 42 \texttt{e}3 \texttt{e}7 43 \texttt{f}4! \texttt{c}6 44 \texttt{c}2 \texttt{d}7 45 g5!

...and Black resigned as 45...hxg5+ 46 \texttt{x}g5+ will lead to mate. A splendid positional achievement by Leko.

1-0

31

Emma – Rossetto
Buenos Aires 1965

1 e4 e5 2 \texttt{f}3 \texttt{f}6 3 \texttt{x}e5 d6 4 \texttt{f}3 \texttt{xe}4 5 d4 d5 6 \texttt{d}d3 \texttt{d}d6

This move introduces the most aggressive line available to Black, and at the same time, the riskiest one: the bishop is posted actively on d6, but Black's control over d5 and g5 has become weaker, a fact White will try to exploit.

7 0-0 0-0 8 c4

White, of course, follows the traditional plan of challenging the position of the \texttt{e}e4 by attacking its supporter. Here Black almost automatically plays 8...c6 as the options examined below and in the next Illustrative Game are significantly inferior.

8...\texttt{g}4?!?

An all-out attempt to play for the attack, but it has by now been abandoned as Black does not get sufficient compensation for his material investment. On the other hand, after 8...\texttt{f}6?! 9 \texttt{g}5 White develops fast and comfortably, applying strong pressure on Black's position. For example 9...dxc4 10 \texttt{x}c4 \texttt{g}4 11 h3 \texttt{x}f3 12 \texttt{x}f3 \texttt{c}6 13 \texttt{d}d1\pm and White is slightly better according to O'Kelly but in our opinion a bit more than that.

9 cxd5 f5 10 h3 \texttt{h}5 11 \texttt{c}c3

11...\texttt{e}8!?

The best practical chance.

On 11...\texttt{d}7?! White should fearlessly grab the second pawn by 12 \texttt{x}e4! fxe4 13 \texttt{x}e4 as 13...\texttt{f}6 14 \texttt{f}5 \texttt{h}8 (14...\texttt{x}d5 15 \texttt{e}6+ \texttt{f}7 16 \texttt{g}5!+- is a trap that many players have fallen into) can be met by 15 g4! \texttt{x}d5 (15...\texttt{f}7 16 \texttt{e}6!)
16  \( \text{\textit{d}e6} \)  \( \text{\textit{f}7} \)  17  \( \text{\textit{g}5!} \)  \( \text{\textit{x}e6} \)  18  \( \text{\textit{x}e6} \)  \( \text{\textit{f}6!} \) 2? (On 18...\textit{Wh}4 there comes 19  \( \text{\textit{b}3} \) +-- and the defence triumphs, Alexander-Mallison, England 1938) 19  \( \text{\textit{x}f8} \)  \( \text{\textit{xf8}} \)  20  \( \text{\textit{d}3} \) and Black does not seem to have enough compensation for the exchange. For example: 20...b6 (20...\textit{xf4} 21  \( \text{\textit{f}3} \)  \( \text{\textit{xd}4} \)  22  \( \text{\textit{xf}4} \)  \( \text{\textit{xf}4} \)  23  \( \text{\textit{xb}7} \)  \( \text{\textit{h}5} \)  24  \( \text{\textit{gxh}5} \)  \( \text{\textit{e}5} \)  25  \( \text{\textit{fe1}} \)  \( \text{\textit{wh}5} \)  26  \( \text{\textit{wa}8} \) +  \( \text{\textit{wh}7} \)  27  \( \text{\textit{xe}8} \)  \( \text{\textit{wb}5} \)  28  \( \text{\textit{wh}8} + \)  \( \text{\textit{g}6} \)  29  \( \text{\textit{we}8} + \) + Rodriguez Rey - Casado Garcia, Spain corr. 1984; 20...c6 21  \( \text{\textit{d}2} \) \( \text{\textit{f}4} \)  22  \( \text{\textit{f}3} \)  \( \text{\textit{g}6} \)  23  \( \text{\textit{xf}4} \)  \( \text{\textit{xf}4} \)  24  \( \text{\textit{g}2} \)  \( \text{\textit{h}5} \)  25  \( \text{\textit{f}3} \)  \( \text{\textit{xd}4} \)  26  \( \text{\textit{ad}1} \pm \) Tay-Oestergaard, IECG email 1999) 21  \( \text{\textit{d}2} \) \( \text{\textit{f}4} \)  22  \( \text{\textit{f}3} \)  \( \text{\textit{xd}4} \)  23  \( \text{\textit{xf}4} \)  \( \text{\textit{xf}4} \)  24  \( \text{\textit{ad}1} \) \( \text{\textit{xd}4} \)  25  \( \text{\textit{xd}4} \) \( \text{\textit{xc}2} \)  26  \( \text{\textit{xc}2} \) \( \text{\textit{xc}2} \)  27  \( \text{\textit{a}4} \pm \)  21  \( \text{\textit{d}2} \) \( \text{\textit{h}2} \pm \)  22  \( \text{\textit{f}3} \)  \( \text{\textit{c}2} \)  23  \( \text{\textit{d}2} \) \( \text{\textit{e}2} \)  21  \( \text{\textit{xe}2} \)  \( \text{\textit{we}2} \)  22  \( \text{\textit{c}2} \)  \( \text{\textit{xe}2} \)  23  \( \text{\textit{we}2} \) \( \text{\textit{we}2} \)  24  \( \text{\textit{we}2} \) \( \text{\textit{we}2} \)  25  \( \text{\textit{g}6} \)  26  \( \text{\textit{e}2} \) \( \text{\textit{xe}4} \)  27  \( \text{\textit{xe}4} \) \( \text{\textit{f}6} \)  16...\textit{ae}8 17  \( \text{\textit{f}3} \)  17  \( \text{\textit{c}2} \) ! is also possible and probably better than the text as 17...\textit{e}2 18  \( \text{\textit{e}1} \) \( \text{\textit{c}4} \)  19  \( \text{\textit{de}4} \) ± leaves Black with insufficient compensation. 17...\textit{f}7!  The original choice in this position and probably the best one: Black will now recover the lost pawns, but during that process White will be able to acquire new advantages. 17...\textit{g}6 is a more recent effort to keep White at bay by impeding his development, yet White appears able to untangle: 18  \( \text{\textit{c}4} \) \( \text{\textit{d}3} \)  19  \( \text{\textit{xd}6} \)  \( \text{\textit{cx}d6} \)  20  \( \text{\textit{ad}1} \) \( \text{\textit{c}2} \) (20...\textit{e}2  21  \( \text{\textit{xe}2} \) \( \text{\textit{we}2} \) is best met by 22  \( \text{\textit{f}1} \) \( \text{\textit{e}2} \)  23  \( \text{\textit{d}2} \) \( \text{\textit{fc}8} \)  24  \( \text{\textit{xc}2} \) \( \text{\textit{xc}2} \)  25  \( \text{\textit{f}4} \) \( \text{\textit{xd}5} \)  26  \( \text{\textit{xd}6} \) \( \text{\textit{xb}2} \)  27  \( \text{\textit{a}4} \pm \)  21  \( \text{\textit{d}2} \) \( \text{\textit{e}1} \) +  22  \( \text{\textit{h}2} \) \( \text{\textit{c}8} \)  23  \( \text{\textit{b}3} \) !  23...\textit{e}4  24  \( \text{\textit{ad}1} \) \( \text{\textit{xd}1} \)  25  \( \text{\textit{xd}1} \) \( \text{\textit{c}2} \)  26  \( \text{\textit{g}2} \) \( \text{\textit{h}2}+ \)  27  \( \text{\textit{f}3} \) ± with a solid endgame advantage in Gipslis-Christensen, Gausdal 1992.  12  \( \text{\textit{we}2} \) \( \text{\textit{d}7} \)  13  \( \text{\textit{xe}4} \) \( \text{\textit{fxe}4} \)  14  \( \text{\textit{we}4} \) \( \text{\textit{we}4} \)  15  \( \text{\textit{xe}4} \) \( \text{\textit{f}6} \)  16  \( \text{\textit{d}2} \)!  A key move, and one that allows White’s advantage to crystallize; in the ensuing positions Black has very few, if any, drawing chances.
The transformation of White's advantage has been completed; Black has been able to restore material equality but in the meantime White has obtained the better pawn structure and a small but lasting bishop vs knight advantage in an open position. In the remainder of this game White makes masterly use of these small pluses.

25...\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{b}6?\)

White was now threatening to take on \(d5\), but retreating the knight is an admission of strategic failure on Black's part; he should have maintained his knight in the centre by 25...\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}5!\) 26 \(\text{b}3\) \(\text{b}5\) 27 \(a3\) \(a5\), rendering it difficult for White to make progress. Now Black will be pushed back methodically.

26 \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}6\) 27 \(\text{b}3!\)

Containing the Black knight; the superiority of the bishop is already evident to the naked eye as it can operate easily on both flanks.

27...\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}7\) 28 \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4!\)

A very instructive rook switch onto the 4th rank; from its superlative central position the rook is able to attack both flanks and create further weaknesses.

28...\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}8\) 29 \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}4+\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}6\) 30 \(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}4!\) \(\text{h}6\) 31 \(\text{g}4\) \(\text{c}7\)

32 \(\text{h}4!\)

Excellent play! After \(h4-h5\) both \(g7\) and \(h6\) will be fixed as organic weaknesses and there is nothing Black can do about it.

32...\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}7\) 33 \(\text{h}5\) \(\text{b}6\) 34 \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4!\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}8\) 35 \(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}6!\)

Now Black is completely tied down to defending his weaknesses and can only mark time. White exploits this in the best possible way by mobilising his kingside pawn majority.

35...\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}7\) 36 \(\text{g}4\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}7\) 37 \(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}2\) \(d5\) 38 \(f4\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}7\) 39 \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}3\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}7\) 40 \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}6\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}8\) 41 \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}8\) 42 \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}5!\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}7\) 43 \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}6+\)

The game has been decided; Material equality is deceptive here, what counts is the huge difference in the strength of all pieces, including the kings.

43...\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}6\) 44 \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}3\)

44 \(\text{\textit{x}}\text{f6+!}\) would have won faster.
44...\(\text{d}4\) 45 \(\text{b}4!\) \(\text{b}5\) 46 \(\text{f}5\) \(\text{f}6\) 47 \(\text{d}4\) \(\text{d}8\) 48 \(\text{c}5!\) \(\text{a}6\) 49 \(\text{c}6\)

Black cannot stave off material losses any more; the rest is elementary.

49...\(\text{d}4\) 50 \(\text{a}x\text{a}6\) \(\text{d}7\) 51 \(\text{b}6\) \(\text{d}6\) 52 \(\text{x}g7\) \(\text{c}4\) 53 \(\text{f}6+\) \(\text{e}8\)
54 \(\text{x}b5\) \(\text{f}7\) 55 \(\text{d}4\) \(\text{e}7\) 56 \(\text{x}d5\) \(\text{d}2+\) 57 \(\text{f}2\) \(\text{e}4+\) 58 \(\text{g}2\) \(\text{g}5\)
59 \(\text{a}5\) \(\text{e}2+\) 60 \(\text{g}3\) \(\text{d}2\) 61 \(\text{e}3\) \(\text{d}3\) 62 \(\text{f}4\)

Black resigned; an impressive display of power by Jaime Emma, who, like most of his contemporary Argentinians, was overshadowed by the great Miguel Najdorf.

1-0

32

Kamsky – Yusupov

Tilburg 1992

1 \(\text{e}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 2 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 3 \(\text{x}e5\) \(\text{d}6\) 4
\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{x}e4\) 5 \(\text{d}4\) \(\text{d}5\) 6 \(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}6\) 7
0-0 0-0 8 \(\text{c}4\) \(\text{e}6\)

This move is another dubious alternative to 8...\(\text{c}6\), but admittedly, more combative than the ones featured in the previous Illustrative Game.

9 \(\text{h}1\)

A solid developing move, but the pawn sacrifice 9 \(\text{d}3!!\) may contain more poison; 9 \(\text{d}3?!\) \(\text{x}c3\) 10 \(\text{b}xc3\) \(\text{d}xc4\) [10...\(\text{h}6\) 11 \(\text{c}5\) \(\text{e}7\) 12 \(\text{d}5?!\) (12 \(\text{e}1\pm\)) 12...\(\text{d}7\) 13 \(\text{f}4\)
\(\text{x}e5\) 14 \(\text{f}xe5\) \(\text{g}5\) 15 \(\text{f}4\) \(\text{f}6\) 16
\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 17 \(\text{x}g5\) \(\text{f}xg5\) 18 \(\text{h}5\)
\(\text{f}5\) 19 \(\text{x}f5\) \(\text{x}f5\) 20 \(\text{g}6+\)
Felicio-Marmontel, Brazil corr. 1986] 11 \(\text{e}4\)

...leads to an interesting position, with good compensation for White in view of Black's comparatively bare kingside. The following variations demonstrate White's chances.

A) 11...\(\text{c}6?!\) is clearly bad on account of 12 \(\text{d}5\) \(\text{h}6\) (12...\(\text{g}6\) 13 \(\text{x}e6\) \(\text{f}xe6\) 14 \(\text{g}4\) 13 \(\text{x}e6\) \(\text{f}xe6\) 14 \(\text{e}2!\) \(\text{b}5\) 15 \(\text{a}4\) \(\pm\) and White obtains a tremendous initiative on the light squares;

B) 11...\(\text{d}7\) is better than 11...\(\text{c}6?!\), but still leads to the deterioration of Black's pawn structure for not too much: After 12 \(\text{g}5\) \(\text{f}6\) 13 \(\text{x}e6\) \(\text{f}xe6\) 14 \(\text{b}7\)
\(\text{b}8\) 15 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{d}5\) 16 \(\text{d}2?!\) (16
\(\text{e}2?\) \(\text{x}c3\) 17 \(\text{e}6+\) \(\text{h}8\) 18
\(\text{x}c4\) \(\text{x}f3\) 19 \(\text{gxf}3\) \(\text{h}4\)
16...h6 17...g4! f6 18...c1 b5 19...b1 a4x b1?! (19...c6!? 20...xb1 h5?! (20...e5 21...b7↑) 21...f3 h4 22...g4 a4 f4 23...xf4 gxf4 24...e4± White had a solid edge in Nisipeanu-Hess, Bad Woerishofen 1995;

C) 11...w8 is an attempt to defend both wings, but it is rather artificial, as shown by the following forcing sequence: 12...g5 a5 13...f3! a4xe4 14...xe4 g6 15...h4 h5 16...e4...d7 17...f4!...xf4 18...xf4...d8 19...ae1= and White has excellent compensation for the pawn as he is about to double rooks on the e-line, obtaining significant attacking chances;

D) 11...c8 (Passive, but as we have already seen the alternatives are not appetizing either) 12...g5!? (Designed to force a weakness on the protective pawn cover of the Black king) reaches the critical position for 9...c3; now Black has available the following options:

D1) 12...d7!? 13...e2! h6 14...d2...e8 leads to a good attacking position for White after both rook moves to e1; for example, 15...ae1 (15...fe1!?) 15...b5 16...h4!...d7 17...f3↑;

D2) 12...f6 13...h4! [By keeping the enemy f-pawn pinned White creates several threats; 13...d2?! is also interesting, although after 13...c6 14...e2 b5 15...fe1 a6 16 a4 (Kotronias-Kalesis, Karditsa 1994) the sequel 16...f5?! 17...c2...c7! renders the situation rather unclear] 13...d7 [Probably the lesser evil; 13...c6? 14...c2!± is, of course, highly anti-positional; 13...f4 should be met by 14...d2 (intending...d1-h5) 14...e8 15...f3↑ when White clearly has a strong initiative; 13...c6 14...a4! is slightly better for White] 14...b1...h8 (14...f5?! 15...d5+...h8 16...xc4=, intending...f1-e1, is much better for White; if 16...h6, then 17...g3! reveals a positional edge as 17...f4? 18...h4! g5 19...g6+...g7 20...xf8...xf8 21 h3! fxg3 22...fxg3+- loses straightaway) 15...d2!± and after a series of very exact moves White is about to recover his pawn with the better chances. But now it’s time to return to the actual game:

9...w8

It appears that Black has nothing better than this developing move.

9...f5?! is dubious on account of 10...b3 dxc4 11...xc4...xc4 12...xc4+...h8 13...c3= and the Black king is rather exposed. After 13...xc3 14 bxc3 h6 15...b3 b6 16 c4...d7 17...b2...f6 18...c2...f7 White went on to exploit all the advantages of his position in masterly fashion in Zude-Rissmann, Schwaebisch Gmuend 1993: 19 d5!
9...c6 can be met with the daring 10 ½c3! as 10...
½xc3 11 bxc3 dxc4?! 

12 ½xh7+!! ½xh7 13 ½g5+ ½g6 (13... ½g8 14 ½c2) 14 h4! makes it very difficult for Black to survive, a sample line being 14... ½h8 (14... ½d7 15 h5+ ½f6 16 ½h7+ ½e7 17 ½g4+) 15 ½xe6+!! fxe6 16 ½g4 ½d7 17 h5+ ½f6 18 ½e4+ ½f7 19 ½g6+ ½f8 20 h6±. A noticeable feature of all these positions is the weakness of g5, a factor that contributes significantly to White's attacking chances.

10 c5!?

Black's piece configuration is not very harmonious, and consequently, gaining space and time in this manner cannot be bad for White.

10... ½e7

10... ½f8 is very passive and fails to cover g5 as well; after 11 ½c3 ½f5 [11...f5 12 ½b3! b6 13 ½g5! looks good for White: 13... ½c6 14 ½xe4! (14 ½xe6 ½xe6 15 ½xd5 ½xd5 16 ½xd5 ½xc5?!) 14...fxe4 15 ½xe6 ½xe6 16 ½xd5 ½xd4 17 ½c4±] 12 ½b3!

Black's situation is critical:

A) 12...
½xc5? 13 dxc5 ½xd3 loses instantly to 14 ½g5 ½xe1+ 15 ½xe1! ½xg5 16 ½xb7+;

B) 12...
½xc3 13 ½xe8 (13 ½g5?±) 13... ½xe8 14 ½xf5 ½e2+ 15 ½f1 ½xc1 16 ½xc1± is very advantageous for White as Black cannot avoid losing an important pawn;

C) 12...
½c6 13 ½xb7 (13 ½xd5?±) 13... ½xc3 14 ½xc6 ½xd3 15 bxc3 ½xe1+ 16 ½xe1 ½e4 17 ½f4± left Black a pawn down without any compensation in Kuczynski-Gdanski, Polanica Zdroj 1992.

11 ½c3 ½xc3 12 bxc3

White has managed to fortify his centre, but must watch out for ...b7-b6, Black's typical freeing move in analogous positions.
12...\textit{Qd7}!

Trying to get the knight to f8 as quickly as possible in order to avert sacrificial possibilities on e6; after 12...b6? 13 \textit{Wc2} h6 (13...g6 14 \textit{Ax}e6 fxe6 15 \textit{A}xg6 \textit{Af6} 16 \textit{Ax}h7+ \textit{Ah8} 17 \textit{Wg6+} is hopeless) 14 \textit{Ax}e6! fxe6 15 \textit{Ah7}+ \textit{Af8} 16 \textit{Ae5} \textit{Af6} 17 \textit{Ag6+}! \textit{Af7} 18 \textit{Aa3+--}

Black cannot cope with the lethal threat of \textit{Wc2-d1-h5}; 12...\textit{Qc6}?! fails to transfer the knight to the kingside allowing White significantly more attacking chances than in our main game: 13 \textit{Ab1} \textit{Ab8} 14 \textit{Wc2} h6 15 \textit{Af4} \textit{Ag4} 16 \textit{Ae5} (16 \textit{Ae3}?! 16...\textit{Ag5} 17 \textit{Ah7+}?! (17 \textit{A}xg4 \textit{Af4} 18 \textit{Ax}e8+ \textit{Wxe8} 19 g3 \textit{Ag5} 20 h4\textpm) 17...\textit{Af8} 18 \textit{Ax}f7! \textit{Ax}e1+ 19 \textit{Ax}e1 \textit{Af7} 20 \textit{Wg6+} \textit{Af8} 21 h4! \textit{Wf6} 22 h\textit{A}xg5 \textit{Wf4} 23 g\textit{A}xh6 \textit{Wxh6} 24 \textit{W}xg4 \textit{Wxh7} 25 \textit{Wf3+} \textit{Ag8} 26 \textit{Wxd5+} \textit{Af8} 27 \textit{Ae4}\rightarrow Camper-Burrell, IECC e-mail 1997.

13 \textit{Af4} b6!

A critical moment; With his last move Black resorts to the right plan which is no other than liquidating the cramping c5 pawn, so White must act energetically in order to transform his temporary assets (better development, slight space advantage) to something more permanent.

14 \textit{Wc2}!

Spotting the correct idea; Black’s last created a hole on c6, but in order to exploit it White must be able to play \textit{A}f3-e5. 14 \textit{Wc2}! serves exactly this purpose by forcing the Black knight to retreat on f8, relinquishing thus control of the important e5 square which can then be invaded by its White counterpart.

14...\textit{Qf8} 15 \textit{Ae5}! \textit{Af6}

A good defence; 15...\textit{Bxc5}?! 16 \textit{Ab5} \textit{Qd7} 17 \textit{Qc6±} is bad for Black.

16 \textit{Ab5} \textit{Ax}e5 17 \textit{Ax}e5 \textit{Ad7} 18 \textit{Cc8} 19 \textit{Ag3}

The position has crystallised; White’s two bishops are very strong but his advantage is not decisive as Black will manage with careful play to destroy the annoying wedge on c6. In the rest of this game we will often quote Yusupov’s notes from Chessbase as they are quite enlightening.

19...\textit{a6} 20 \textit{Ad3} \textit{He6} 21 \textit{He6} \textit{Axe6} 22 a4!?\textast

A strong positional move, preventing ...b6-b5 and fixing a6 as a weakness, but the direct 22 \textit{f4} might have been even stronger. However, Kamsky’s reasoning must have been rather simple: In fact, Black has no other way to free his position than ...\textit{Wd8-e8xc6} and that would turn b6 into a weakness as well because the Black c-pawn has to go in the process.

22...\textit{He8}!
There is no time for delay! 22...\(\text{\texttt{Q}6}6\) 23 \(\text{\texttt{f}4!}\) leads to a strong White attack; 22...\(\text{\texttt{A}7}\) 23 \(\text{\texttt{f}4!}\) \(\text{\texttt{W}e}8\) 24 \(\text{\texttt{f}5} \text{\texttt{A}c8}\) runs into 25 \(\text{\texttt{f}6}\) or 25 \(\text{\texttt{c}4!}\) \(\text{\texttt{W}xc6}\) 26 \(\text{\texttt{c}xd5} \text{\texttt{W}xd5}\) 27 \(\text{\texttt{Ae}5}\), in both cases with a tremendous attacking position for White.

23 \(\text{\texttt{A}xc7} \text{\texttt{W}xc6}\) 24 \(\text{\texttt{g}3}\)±

This is the position Kamsky must have been aiming for when he made his 22nd move; White's bishops are very active and there are weaknesses to pile upon at \(a6\), \(b6\). Most importantly, White didn't have to sacrifice anything to achieve this as he managed to make a successful bargain in the trade of the \(c\)-pawns. However, the advantages do not amount to an automatic win, especially against a defender of Yusupov’s class.

24...\(\text{\texttt{h}6?!}\)

Dictated by Black’s desire to activate the knight, yet it may not be best. Here or on the next move Black should have played ...\(\text{\texttt{A}a8-c8}\) in order to advance ...\(\text{\texttt{b}6-b5}\) and get rid of one weakness, e.g. 24...\(\text{\texttt{c}8!}\) 25 \(\text{\texttt{A}a3}\) \(\text{\texttt{b}5}\) 26 \(\text{\texttt{axb5} axb5}\) 27 \(\text{\texttt{W}b1}\) (27 \(\text{\texttt{A}b3} \text{\texttt{b}4}=; 27 \text{\texttt{W}b2!?}\)) 27...\(\text{\texttt{d}7}\) 28 \(\text{\texttt{A}b3} \text{\texttt{W}e}6\)± and White has only a slight plus according to Yusupov.

25 \(\text{\texttt{h}3} \text{\texttt{d}7}\)

25...\(\text{\texttt{c}8!}\)±

26 \(\text{\texttt{h}4}\)!±

Yusupov must have missed this strong reply, preventing his knight from getting to \(f6\). White now has a clear advantage as he has the prospect of pressing on both flanks while Black has failed to secure any counter-play.

26...\(\text{\texttt{W}c7}\)

Trying to prevent \(f2-f4-f5\).

27 \(\text{\texttt{Wd}2} \text{\texttt{A}f8}\) 28 \(\text{\texttt{A}a3}\)!

28 \(\text{\texttt{f}4} \text{\texttt{f}5}\)!± would have been only slightly better for White; with the text Kamsky sets about methodically laying siege to Black’s weak \(b\)-pawn.

28...\(\text{\texttt{Q}6}\) 29 \(\text{\texttt{g}6}\) \(\text{\texttt{W}b7}\) 30 \(\text{\texttt{A}b3}\) \(\text{\texttt{A}f8}\) 31 \(\text{\texttt{W}b2} \text{\texttt{d}7}\)

32 \(\text{\texttt{W}a3}\)!

Black has defended everything, so White will make progress by penetrating to \(d6\), rendering the exchange of queens unavoidable; In an ending Black’s weaknesses are likely to become more felt (especially the one on \(a6\)), whilst White’s own weakness on \(a4\) will be impossible to attack.
32...\(\text{We}6\) 33 \(\text{Wb}4\) \(\text{Aa}7\) 34 \(\text{h}2\) \(\text{Aa}8\) 35 f3 \(\text{Aa}7\) 36 \(\text{Wd}6\)! \(\text{Wxd}6\)
36...\(\text{Wxa}4\) 37 \(\text{Axb}6\)→
37 \(\text{Axd}6\) f5?

An instructive mistake, allowing White to open up the kingside to the benefit of his bishops; according to Yusupov 37...h5± was called for.

38 g4! g6 39 \(\text{g}3\) f7 40 \(\text{f}4\)! g7

40...g5 41 gxf5! gxf4+ 42 \(\text{xf}4\) --
41 gxf5 \(\text{Axf}5\) 42 \(\text{Axf}5\) gxf5

The exchange of light-squared bishops has done nothing to relieve Black, whose position is full of weaknesses. However, in the remainder of the game Kamsky fails to show the best technique and Black comes close to drawing.

43 \(\text{b}1\) \(\text{g}6\) 44 \(\text{e}1\) \(\text{f}6\) 45 \(\text{h}4\)!

Activating the king to the utmost and threatening \(\text{e}1\)-e6; Yusupov awards the move 45 \(\text{e}6\)? two question marks because of 45...\(\text{f}7\)! (\(\text{Axf}6\)-h5+). Although White does not lose a piece due to 46 \(\text{e}5\) it has to be admitted that the win is practically thrown away in view of the variation 46...\(\text{A}h5\) + 47 \(\text{f}2\) \(\text{Axf}4\) 48 \(\text{Axf}5\)+ \(\text{g}6\) 49 \(\text{Axf}4\) \(\text{A}c7\) 50 \(\text{A}f8\) \(\text{Axc}3\) 51 \(\text{A}d8\) \(\text{A}a3\) =

45...\(\text{f}7\) 46 \(\text{A}h6\) \(\text{A}c7\) 47 \(\text{d}2\) \(\text{A}c8\) 48 \(\text{g}3\)

White has won a pawn but he still has some technical difficulties to overcome as his pieces have been pushed back temporarily.

48...\(\text{A}h5\) + 49 \(\text{f}2\) \(\text{A}e8\) 50 \(\text{f}1\)!

White should of course refrain from exchanging rooks.

50 \(\text{xe}8?\) \(\text{xe}8\) 51 \(\text{e}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 52 \(\text{d}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 53 c4 \(\text{dxc}4\) 54 \(\text{xe}4\) b5+ 55 axb5 axb5+ 56 \(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}5\)+

is a variation given by Kamsky in the \textit{Chess Informant}.

50...\(\text{g}7\)! 51 \(\text{h}4\)?

This looks a bit inexact; according to Kamsky Black intended the formation \(\text{Ae}6\), \(\text{h}8\), so a good reply was 51 \(\text{b}1\)! \(\text{e}6\) (51...\(\text{A}b8\) 52 \(\text{A}f4\) \(\text{A}b7\) 53 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{Ae}6\) 54 \(\text{h}4\) --) 52 \(\text{f}4\)! disturbing Black's coordination; White could have then transferred his bishop to e5 and king to d3 followed by \(\text{b}1\)-g1, winning.

51...\(\text{e}6\) 52 \(\text{b}1\)

52 \(\text{e}1\)! would have been better; now Black can improve his position.

52...\(\text{b}8\) 53 \(\text{e}2\) ?! b5! 54 \(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 55 axb5 axb5 56 h5 f4

It is no longer easy for White to win. To make progress he must give up his passed h-pawn.

57 \(\text{a}1\) \(\text{h}8\) 58 \(\text{a}6\) \(\text{xh}5\)?

Black has defended well from a very difficult position but now it is his turn to falter. Yusupov gives 58...\(\text{f}7\)! 59 \(\text{b}6\) \(\text{xh}5\) 60 \(\text{xb}5\)+ as the best practical chance.

59 \(\text{xf}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 60 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{c}5\) +?!?

Trying to mix things up by transposing into a rook ending; 60...\(\text{h}3\) 61 \(\text{e}3\)+ would have been hopeless as the Black king is cut off from the defence of his pawns.

61 dxc5 \(\text{xe}5\)
Could this be a case of over-confidence? In any case, White was winning simply by 62 \( f4 \)+! (Yusupov awards two exclamation marks to the move but we think this is an exaggeration) 62...\( \mathbf{xf4} \) 63 \( \mathbf{d4} \)+.

Suddenly the threat of \( \mathbf{h4-c4} \) has made its appearance.

63 \( \mathbf{g4} \) \( \mathbf{h1} \) 64 \( \mathbf{d4} \)??

After a couple of further inaccuracies in time pressure, the game is already impossible to win. Black could have now drawn with the simple 67...\( \mathbf{f5} \), but due to time shortage produced the following howler:

67...\( \mathbf{c6} \)??

This move is bad because Black will not have time for \( \mathbf{xf3xc3} \) in reply to a rook check from the side followed by \( \mathbf{b4xb5} \). 67...\( \mathbf{f5} \) 68 \( \mathbf{xb5} \) \( \mathbf{xf3} \) 69 \( \mathbf{xd5+} \) \( \mathbf{c7} \) would have drawn easily as White cannot profit in any way from his doubled c-pawns.

68 \( \mathbf{g4} \) \( \mathbf{h6} \) 69 \( \mathbf{f4} \) \( \mathbf{f6} \) 70 \( \mathbf{h4} \)+

Zugzwang; The Black rook is forced to give way and White wins for the reason described above.

70...\( \mathbf{xf7} \) 71 \( \mathbf{h6+} \) \( \mathbf{c7} \) 72 \( \mathbf{xb5} \) \( \mathbf{xf4} \) 73 \( \mathbf{h7+} \) \( \mathbf{c8} \) 74 \( \mathbf{b6} \) \( \mathbf{f1} \) 75 \( \mathbf{h8+} \) \( \mathbf{d7} \) 76 \( \mathbf{c6} \) 1-0

The most consistent continuation, maintaining Black's stance in the centre.

9 cxd5

9 \( \mathbf{c3} \) allows Black an extra possibility in 9...\( \mathbf{xc3} \) 10 bxc3 dxc4!?.

9...\( \mathbf{xd5} \) 10 \( \mathbf{c3} \) \( \mathbf{xc3} \)

After 10...\( \mathbf{e8} \)?! the natural 11 \( \mathbf{e1} \) \( \mathbf{xc3} \) [11...\( \mathbf{f5} \) 12 \( \mathbf{b3} \) \( \mathbf{c6} \) 13 \( \mathbf{xd5} \) \( \mathbf{e7} \) (Brkic-Plenkovic, Pula 2002) 14 \( \mathbf{xb7} \) \( \mathbf{b8} \) 15 \( \mathbf{a6} \)!]
Beating the Petroff

15 ... $\text{bxb6}$ 16 $\text{Bxa7}$ $\text{Qc6}$ 17 $\text{Bxb6}$ $\text{Bxb6}$ 18 $\text{Qxe4+}$] 12 $\text{Qxe8+}$ $\text{Qxe8}$
13 bxc3 $\text{Qg4}$ [We are not certain this is the best; the alternatives are more conservative and appear to offer White less opportunities for dynamic play: 13 ... $\text{Qb6}$ 14 $\text{Qb3}$ $\text{Qxa3}$ 15 $\text{Qxa3}$ $\text{Qxa3}$ 16 $\text{Qxa3}$ $\text{Qe6}$ 17 $\text{Qe1}$ $\text{h6}$ 18 $\text{Qe5}$ $\text{Qf8}$ 19 $\text{Qb3}$
$\text{Qc8}$ 20 $\text{Qb1!}$ $\text{Qd8}$ 21 $\text{Qc2}$ $\text{Qf6}$ 22 $\text{Qh7+}$ $\text{Qf8}$ 23 $\text{Qd7+}$ $\text{Qxd7}$ 24 $\text{Qh8+}$ $\text{Qe7}$ 25 $\text{Qxc8}$ was bad for Black in Damaso-A.Fernandes, Maia 2003, but 13 ... $\text{Qe7}$ 14 $\text{Qb3}$
(14 $\text{Qg5}$ $\text{Qc7}$ 15 $\text{Qh4}$) 14 ... $\text{Qe6}$ 15 $\text{Qg5}$ $\text{Qc7}$ (15 ... $\text{Qf6}$ 16 $\text{Qe1}$) 16 $\text{Qb1}$ $\text{b6}$ 17 $\text{Qh4}$ $\text{Qc6}$ 18 $\text{Qg3}$ $\text{Qa5}$ 19 $\text{Qc2}$ $\text{h6}$ 20 $\text{Qh7+}$ $\text{Qh8}$ 21 $\text{Qf5}$, or 13 ... $\text{Qc6}?!$ 14 $\text{Qb3}$ $\text{Qd7}$ 15 $\text{g3}$
$\text{Qf8}$ 16 $\text{Qa3}$ $\text{Qxa3}$ 17 $\text{Qxa3}$ $\text{Qd8}$ 18 $\text{Qe1}$ Kasparov-Ehlvest, Moscow (rapid) 2002, may well be better possibilities] 14 $\text{Qb1}$+ creates awkward problems for Black as the following variations show:

A) 14 ... $\text{Qxf3}$? 15 $\text{Qxf3}$ $\text{Qe1}$+ 16 $\text{Qf1}$ is simply bad as Black cannot meet the threats to d5 and b7, e.g. 16 ... $\text{Qc6}$ 17 $\text{Qxb7}$+–;

B) On 14 ... $\text{Qb6}$, the reply 15 h3! $\text{Qh5}$ [15 ... $\text{Qd7}$ 16 $\text{Qe5}$ $\text{Qa4}$? (16 ... $\text{Qxe5}$ 17 $\text{Qh5}$) 17 $\text{Qg4}$ $\text{Qd7}$
18 $\text{Qh6}$ $\text{g6}$ (Lacey-Galvin, IECC e-mail 2000) 19 $\text{f4!}$ $\text{Qc8}$ 20 $\text{Qf5}$
$\text{Qc7}$ 21 $\text{Qe1}$ $\text{Qf8}$ 22 $\text{Qg3}$] 16 $\text{Qb5}$! introduces a typical motif that we will encounter many times from now on. In this particular instance it is extremely strong as the d5 pawn cannot be defended in a satisfactory manner, e.g. 16 ... $\text{Qe6}$ (16 ... $\text{Qxf3}$ 17 $\text{Qxf3}$ $\text{Qe1}$+ 18 $\text{Qf1}$ $\text{Qxc1}$ 19 $\text{Qxd5}$+–; 16 ... $\text{Qc6}$ 17 $\text{Qb3}$! $\text{Qxf3}$ 18 $\text{Qxf3}$ $\text{Qc7}$ 19 $\text{Qxd5}$+ 17 $\text{g4!}$ $\text{Qg6}$
18 $\text{Qg5!}$ $\text{Qe7}$ (18 ... $\text{Qd7}$ 19 $\text{Qxg6}$ $\text{hxg6}$ 20 $\text{Qf3}$+) 19 $\text{Qxd5}$ $\text{Qd6}$ (19 ... $\text{Qd7}$ 20 $\text{Qxg6}$ $\text{hxg6}$ 21 $\text{Qf3}$
$\text{Qf8}$ 22 $\text{Qe4}$) 20 $\text{Qxg6}$ $\text{hxg6}$ 21 $\text{Qf3}$+ and Black has no compensation for the loss of his central pawn;

C) 14 ... $\text{Qe7}$ (After this Black also fails to equalise) 15 $\text{h3}$ $\text{Qh5}$ 16 $\text{Qb5}$! (Now the queen has to move to d7 after which the stage is set for c3–c4, exploiting the unprotected state of the $\text{Qh5}$) 16 ... $\text{Qd7}$ 17 $\text{c4}$
dxc4 18 $\text{Qxh7}+$ $\text{Qxh7}$ 19 $\text{Qg5}$+ (The most convincing; however, 19 $\text{Qhx5}$+ $\text{Qg8}$ 20 $\text{Qc2}$ $\text{g6}$ 21 $\text{Qg5}$+
also leads to a fierce attack) 19 ... $\text{Qg6}$ 20 $\text{Qc2}$+ $\text{f5}$ 21 $\text{Qxc4}$ (Despite the extra piece Black is lost as there are too many tactical threats to cope with) 21 ... $\text{Qc6}$ (21 ... $\text{Qa6}$ 22 $\text{Qd5}$ $\text{Qf8}$ 23 $\text{Qf4}$ $\text{Qf6}$ 24 $\text{g4}$+–) 22 $\text{g4}$
$\text{Qxd4}$ [Topalov-Gelfand, Monaco (rapid) 2002] and now 23 $\text{Qd5}$+- wins elegantly.

11 bxc3

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

An interesting position, with mutual strengths and weaknesses has arisen. Both sides enjoy free
piece play, which makes the presence of tactics very likely in the ensuing struggle.

11...g4

The best square for the bishop; now White has to watch out for the ...g4-h5-g6 manoeuvre, exchanging his own good bishop.

11...c6 looks natural but after 12 g5! (an underrated move; the usual choice is 12 h3) the position is not easy for Black:

A) 12...h6?! 13 h7! e8 14 wh5 gives White a strong attack. For example: 14...b8 15 a2! (White must first exchange the defending rook on e8 and then the sacrifice on h6 will be lethal)
15...b5 16 aae1 e6 17 xxe6 a6 18 xh6 e7 (18...gxh6 19 wh6 e7 20 f4!--) 19 f4! 1-0 Lauk-Arrceaga, ICCF e-mail 2000;

B) 12...g6! is better, but even then 13 f3! gives White good play on the kingside. For example:
13...e7!? (13...h6? 14 a3 a6 15 wh3 h6 16 f4± is obviously unacceptable for Black) 14 d2!
14 c4 is also interesting; for example, after 14...b6 (14...dxc4!?)
15 xc4 f5 16 xf7! xf7 17 xf7+ xf7 18 g4! wh4 19 h3 wf6 20 xf5 xf5±) 15 cxd5 a7?! 16 wh3! h5 17 e4 xd5 18 g5 e7 19 h6 c8 20 g3 e8 21 we5!
16 f6 22 g3 g5 23 h4 g4 24 c4 h7 25 a1 d2 f5 26 xfe1 xg6 27 wb3! -- c7 28 f7 xg8 29 xg6+ xg6 30 xg3 xh8 31 xae1 xae8 32 we6 a3 33 xh5!!
1 xcl 34 f4+ h7 35 f3+ xg7 38 xh5! (1-0), White won nicely in Edwards-Jones, APCT corr. 1993]
14...xf5 (On other moves White follows up by doubling rooks on the e-file) 15 xxf5 xxf5 16 f4! g7 17 wh3 h5 18 gxh5 xhx5 19 f4! and the threatened f4-f5, opening lines for White's pieces cannot be stopped;

11...d7!? has the clear-cut aim of reinforcing the kingside. However, after 12 g5! [planning to exchange Black's precious dark-squared bishop by g5-h4-g3;
12 e1!? f6 13 e5 h6?
(13...xc7!?) 14 f4 e6 15 xg3± e8 16 g3 xh8 17 xhx6! ghx6 18 wd2 g8 19 xg8+ xg8 20 wh6 f5 21 we6+ g7 22 wg6+ xh8 23 f7+ xf7 24 xf7 walnut 25 g3 wh6 26 xf5 xg8 27 xd5 wd2 28 wh5+ 1-0, was a spectacular White win in Runge-Assmus, Germany 2000, but Black should rather refrain from putting his knight on f6 in these positions]
12...e7 (12...f6 13 e5 e7 14 f4 h5 15 xxf5 xxf5 16 b1 wc7 17 f3± Harper-Croes, Bled 2002)
13 wc2 h6 14 h4 d6 (Nataf-Rozentalis, Esbjerg 2001) 15 xg3!, intending a1-e1, White has the better game.

12 b1

Exploiting the fact that the bishop's entrance to the game has left the b-pawn unprotected to develop the rook with gain of time; Now Black usually chooses to ignore the threat by playing
12...\textit{d}d7, but here we will deal with the prosaic 12...b6.

12...b6 13 \textit{b}b5!

With this fine move, intending to meet 13...a6? by 14 \textit{x}d5! \textit{x}h2+ 15 \textit{x}h2+-, White manages to justify the rook's presence on the b-file and add fuel to the fight.

13...c7 14 h3!

The introduction to a promising exchange sacrifice that Black has no choice but to accept.

14...a6

14...\textit{h}h5? 15 c4!+- allows White to demonstrate the usefulness of the rook switch to the fifth rank;

14...\textit{e}6?! 15 \textit{g}5 h6 16 \textit{x}e6 fxe6 17 \textit{g}4 \textit{d}6 18 g3 \textit{f}6 19 \textit{e}1±

15 hxg4! axb5

In this position White has definite compensation for the exchange in view of his bishop pair and Black's weaknesses on the light squares. These factors, coupled with the fact that Black's kingside is a bit bare, contribute to excellent attacking chances for the first player.

16 \textit{c}2!

Forcing a weakening in the enemy castled position.

16...g6

16...h6? 17 g5± allows White to open quickly lines for attack against the Black king.

17 \textit{h}6 \textit{e}8 18 \textit{x}b5

Thus, White has managed to get a pawn for the exchange, while maintaining a fine attacking momentum in his game.

18...\textit{e}4!?

The only chance to complicate the issue, but it has the disadvantage of deserting the weak back rank.

18...\textit{d}7 turns out to be clearly inferior for Black after 19 \textit{g}5! \textit{f}6 (19...\textit{c}8 20 \textit{b}3) 20 \textit{d}2± (Ivanchuk's suggestion); for example: 20...\textit{e}6 (20...\textit{e}7 21 \textit{c}6 \textit{c}8 22 \textit{b}7 \textit{b}8 23 \textit{x}d5+ ±, \textit{c}3-c4, \textit{g}4-g5, x \textit{g}7) 21 c4 \textit{f}8 (21...\textit{c}8 22 \textit{b}3±; 21...\textit{d}6 22 \textit{x}d5 \textit{e}7 23 \textit{g}5+) 22 \textit{x}d5 \textit{e}7 23 \textit{g}5 f5 24 \textit{c}6 \textit{c}8 25 \textit{b}4 \textit{d}6 (25...\textit{e}4 26 \textit{d}6 \textit{x}d6 27 \textit{b}3±) 26 \textit{x}d6 (26 \textit{b}1± 26...\textit{x}d6 27 \textit{e}5 (\textit{f}2-b2, x \textit{f}8) 27...\textit{d}7 28 \textit{c}4 (28 f4±) 28...\textit{f}4 29 \textit{d}6 \textit{g}7 30 \textit{b}3 \textit{h}8 31 \textit{x}d7 \textit{x}d7 32 \textit{e}5+;

18...\textit{e}6 is also inferior because of the line 19 c4! \textit{c}6 20 \textit{x}d5 \textit{b}4 (20...\textit{d}5? 21 \textit{c}4 \textit{e}4 22 \textit{e}4 23 \textit{d}5 and White is practically winning, e.g. 23...\textit{e}6 24 \textit{x}e6 fxe6 25 \textit{c}1 \textit{c}8 26 \textit{x}c6 \textit{h}2+ 27 \textit{h}2 \textit{x}c6++) 21 \textit{b}3! (21 dxe6 is very impressive but White doesn't have more than a draw: 21...\textit{x}c2 22 \textit{e}f7+ \textit{f}7 23 \textit{c}4+ \textit{e}8 24 \textit{b}5+ \textit{f}7 25 \textit{c}4+ ) 21...\textit{x}d5 22 \textit{c}4 \textit{d}6
19...\textit{c}c8?! instead, is not as good as it seems because it allows the freeing retort 23...b5! (23...\textit{c}c8? 24 \textit{f}f3 \textit{f}6 25 \textit{c}c6+-; 23...\textit{a}a7 24 \textit{d}d2 \textit{a}a7 25 \textit{b}b4\pm; 23...\textit{a}a7 24 \textit{f}f3 \textit{b}b8 25 \textit{c}xd5 \textit{c}xd5 26 \textit{c}c6 \textit{w}c7 27 \textit{c}xb8 \textit{c}d6 28 \textit{f}f4\pm), giving Black good chances to hold his own: 24 \textit{f}f3 \textit{b}b8 25 \textit{f}f4\pm; 24...\textit{a}a7 25 \textit{f}f3 \textit{b}b8 26 \textit{f}f4 \textit{c}c6 27 \textit{c}c7 \textit{f}f6 28 \textit{f}f4! \textit{c}c7 (28...\textit{f}f6 29 \textit{b}b4\pm; 29...\textit{c}c6 30 \textit{f}f3\pm+) 29 \textit{f}f3\pm+) 26 \textit{c}c7+ \textit{w}c7! (26...\textit{h}h8 27 \textit{g}g3 \textit{c}c7 (27...\textit{c}xd4 28 \textit{w}f3\pm) 28 \textit{w}f3 \textit{d}d8 29 \textit{w}c5\pm) 27 \textit{w}f3 \textit{d}d8! 28 \textit{w}c5 \textit{f}f6 29 \textit{w}g5 \textit{x}g5 30 \textit{x}g5 \textit{a}a8 31 \textit{h}h1 \textit{b}4 32 \textit{c}c1\pm and White has only a tiny plus in the endgame. Although we originally thought that this is an interesting position as White has a pawn more, the activity of the Black pieces makes it difficult to convert it to something tangible and anyway the improvement 23 a4! renders the whole line without theoretical substance] and Black is paralysed. A possible line after 23 a4! is 23...\textit{c}c8 24 \textit{e}e5 \textit{a}b8 25 \textit{e}e1\pm when it is evident that White’s stronghold cannot be shaken.

19 c4!

It is Black’s fate to have to deal with this move in most lines in the Petroff; here it leads to a very unpleasant opening of the position, leaving the second player with a rather unattractive choice as we are going to witness below.

Instead, 19 g5?! (as played in the Short-Gelfand Candidates match in 1991) is double edged because the bishop on h6 might end up out of play. The continuation of the game revealed that Black is not in real danger: 19...\textit{d}d6 20 \textit{e}e5 \textit{e}e6?! [20...\textit{c}c6! 21 \textit{c}c6 \textit{e}e6 22 \textit{d}xe5 (22 \textit{c}c6? \textit{e}e2++) 22...\textit{c}c6\mp] 21 \textit{f}f4 \textit{g}g6!! 22 \textit{c}c6 (22 \textit{c}c6 \textit{e}e5 23 \textit{d}xe8 \textit{f}f4) 22...\textit{xf}4 23 \textit{xf}4 \textit{xf}4 24 \textit{e}e5 \textit{e}e5 25 \textit{d}xe5 \textit{w}xe5 26 a4 \textit{e}e1+ 27 \textit{c}c2 \textit{c}c8 28 \textit{d}d3 \textit{d}d5+ 29 \textit{g}g3 \textit{w}c3 30 \textit{f}f4 \textit{w}c7 31 \textit{g}g3 \textit{w}c3+ 32 \textit{c}c2 \textit{w}c7 33 \textit{g}g3 \textit{w}c3+ 1/2-1/2.

\textbf{19...\textit{x}xg4}

Winning a pawn and removing the rook from attack, but Black’s problems, nevertheless, remain.

19...\textit{w}c8 is an attempt to get Black out of trouble by activating the queen; however after 20 \textit{c}c1! (a strong novelty by the authors) 20...\textit{w}xg4 (what else?) 21 \textit{c}xd5 \textit{w}xg2+ 22 \textit{g}g2 \textit{w}g4+ 23 \textit{f}f1 \textit{w}xf3 24 \textit{w}xh7 \textit{w}f1+ 25 \textit{e}e2 \textit{w}xh6 26 a4! \textit{w}h5+ 27 \textit{f}f3 \textit{g}g5!? (27...\textit{w}xh7 28 \textit{c}c4! \textit{w}d7 29 \textit{b}b3\pm) 28 \textit{d}d6 \textit{w}g2+ 29 \textit{e}e3! Black seems to be in deep trouble.

19...\textit{w}d6 was played in one of the first games with this line, against
Beating the Petroff

one of the authors. After 20 cxd5 £e7 21 £g5! f6 22 £h4 £g7 23 £c4 £d8 24 g5! f5 25 £e5 f4 26 £e1 £d6 27 a4 £a7 28 £e4± (Kotronias-Karkanaque, Xanthi 1991) White had achieved his object of weakening the Black king whilst keeping his knight inactive.

20 cxd5

This position is very difficult for Black in view of the disharmony in his camp and particularly the cramp he is experiencing on the queenside.

20...£f4

20...£d7!? may be a better try; Then 21 £c6! £f8!? [21...£f6 22 £e5± is clearly better for White; This was verified in the game Vl.Gurevich-Meijers, Bundesliga-West 1999, after 22...£xd4? (22...£c8 23 £c1+) 23 £xf7! £h4 24 g3 £xd5 25 gxh4 £xc6 26 £xc6 £xa2 27 £g5-- when Black had simply lost a piece] 22 £e1! £d6 (22...£f4!?) 23 £e5! £xd4 24 £xf7!± gives White a dangerous initiative, but more analysis is required (24 £f3! for example, is also interesting); possibly after 24...£xf7 25 £b7+ £c7 26 £c1 £c8 the best move is the calm 27 g3!+ keeping in reserve the threat of £b5-a6 (27 £a6 £h4! 28 £xc7+ £xc7 29 £xc7+ £e7 30 £xb6 £d1+ 31 £f1 £d7 gives Black more chances to hold).

21 £e5! £h4

In view of the problems Black is facing in the game, the alternative 21...£xg2+ comes into consideration. However, even there things are not rosy for Black, e.g. 22 £xg2 £xh6 [22...£xd5+?! 23 £g1 £xh6 is inferior because of 24 £c8+ £g7 25 £c4! £xd4 26 £xf7 £c6 (26...£d7 27 £xa8 £xc4 28 £xh6 £xh6 29 £e1!± Matsuo-Barrios, Yerevan (ol) 1996) 27 £xc6 £g4+ 28 £g2 £xc4 29 £d6!± and White is close to winning] 23 £b3!± and White maintains a strong initiative.

22 £xf4 £xf4

23 £d2!

The queen's transfer on the dark squares tips the scales in White's favour.

23 £c4 failed to achieve something substantial after 23...£g7 24 £c1 £a3 25 £c2 £e4 26 £b4 £a5 27 a4 £a6 28 £b1 £xd5 29 £c6 £xd4 30 £f3 £d3 31 £b2+
\textit{h6 32 \textit{w}c1+ \textit{g}7 33 \textit{w}b2+ \textit{h}6 34 \textit{w}c1+ \textit{g}7 35 \textit{w}b2+ \textit{h}6 36 \textit{w}c1+ (1/2-1/2) in Wahls-Rozentalis, Germany 1992.}

23...\textit{Af6}

23...\textit{Af5} 24 \textit{He}1! \textit{wx}d5 25 a4 \textit{g}7 26 \textit{g}4 \textit{H}5 27 \textit{He}5! +\textit{wd}6 28 \textit{x}hx5 \textit{gx}h5 29 \textit{g}5+ \textit{g}6 30 \textit{we}5+ 1-0 Ruch-Tinture, French ch corr. 2000.

24 \textit{g}4 \textit{Ad}6

A critical position; White seems to have two good possibilities at his disposal.

25 \textit{wf}f4

Trying to prevent the Black knight from getting out via d7; 25 \textit{He}1!? \textit{xd}7 26 \textit{wf}4 \textit{Af}6 27 \textit{h}h6+ \textit{g}7 28 \textit{x}f7! \textit{x}f7 29 \textit{He}8± is another interesting continuation, giving White excellent winning chances.

25...\textit{Aa}7 26 \textit{He}1 \textit{He}7 27 \textit{He}5?

A pity; by playing 27 \textit{A}xe7 \textit{w}xe7 28 \textit{we}5!± White could have created for his opponent great difficulties, e.g. 28...\textit{w}xe5 (28...\textit{wd}8? 29 \textit{h}h6+ \textit{f}8 30 \textit{w}h8+ \textit{e}7 31 \textit{w}g7!++) 29 dxe5 \textit{d}8 30 \textit{Af}6+ \textit{g}7 31 f4 and Black will find it very hard to survive as he is almost paralysed.

27...\textit{Ad}7!

The knight is finally out and Black’s problems disappear.

28 \textit{A}xe7 \textit{w}xe7 29 \textit{A}xd7 \textit{w}xd7 30 \textit{Af}6+ \textit{A}xf6 31 \textit{w}xf6 \textit{w}xd5 32 \textit{xb}6 \textit{A}xa2 33 \textit{b}8+ \textit{g}7 34 \textit{we}5+ \textit{f}6! 35 \textit{we}7+ \textit{f}7 36 \textit{wc}5 \textit{we}6!=

Neutralising White’s slight initiative.

37 d5 \textit{we}1+ 38 \textit{wh}2 \textit{we}5+ 39 g3 \textit{h}5

After this the draw is within sight; White cannot undertake anything, his king is too open.

40 \textit{A}a7+ \textit{h}6 41 \textit{w}f7 \textit{h}4 42 \textit{w}f8+ \textit{h}7 43 \textit{f}7+ \textit{h}6 44 \textit{f}8+

Seeing no point in continuing, the players agreed to a draw.

1/2-1/2

34

Mahia – Pla

Mar del Plata 1988

1 e4 \textit{e}5 2 \textit{Af}3 \textit{Af}6 3 \textit{Axe}5 \textit{d}6 4 \textit{Af}3 \textit{Axe}4 5 \textit{d}4 \textit{d}5 6 \textit{Ad}3 \textit{Ad}6 7 0-0 0-0 8 c4 \textit{c}6 9 \textit{cx}d5 \textit{cx}d5 10 \textit{Ac}3 \textit{Axe}3 11 \textit{b}xc3 \textit{Ag}4 12 \textit{Ab}1 \textit{Ad}7

Nowadays considered as the best continuation, and not without reason; Black furthers his development and at the same time tempts his opponent to capture on b7, entering unclear complications.

13 h3!

White has a tactical idea in mind, but it can work only with the enemy bishop on h5.
13...\textit{h5}

13...\textit{xh3}? 14 \textit{xf3} \textit{b6} surrenders the initiative to White without a fight. After 15 g3! \textit{c8} 16 h4! \textit{c7} 17 h5 \textit{e8} 18 \textit{g2} g6 19 \textit{d2} White had built a solid kingside space advantage, which, in combination with the powerful bishop pair, gave him strong pressure in Dvoiris-Yakovich, Kiev 1986.

14 \textit{b5}?

The key move in White's system; it may appear opportunistic at first sight, but in fact it conceals many deep ideas.

14...\textit{b6}

14...\textit{f6}? has sporadically been played, but only once at the highest level. A possible explanation could be lying in 15 \textit{g5} \textit{c8} 16 g4! (16 \textit{xb7}?! \textit{xc3} 17 \textit{d2} \textit{c8} is only equal) 16...\textit{g6} 17 \textit{xf6} when in our opinion the resulting positions are sterile for Black and he only has chances to draw after a laborious defence.

For example:

A) 17...fxg6?! 18 \textit{b3} \textit{h8} 19 \textit{e5}! (19 \textit{e1}?! h6! 20 \textit{xf6} \textit{xf6} 21 \textit{e3} \textit{f4} gives Black compensation) 19...\textit{e8} 20 \textit{xf6} \textit{gxf6} 21 \textit{xd5} \textit{xe5} 22 dxe5 \textit{fxe5} 23 \textit{xb7}\texttt{±} is at least slightly better for White as 23...\textit{xc3}? is answered by 24 \textit{f7}! \textit{xh3} 25 \textit{g2} \textit{h4} 26 \textit{h1}! \textit{hxh1} (26...\textit{xf2}+? 27 \textit{xf2} \textit{xf1} 28 \textit{xf1}--+) 27 \textit{xf1} \textit{a8} 28 \textit{axh7+} \textit{g8} 29 \textit{g7+} \textit{f8} 30 \textit{xa8} \textit{xa8} 31 \textit{xc6} reaching what is probably a winning endgame for White;

B) 17...hxg6! 18 \textit{b3} b6 19 \textit{e1} [19 \textit{g2} is interesting; we feel that in this position White should refrain from exchanging a pair of rooks as then the c3 pawn is weak and he has fewer attacking chances; after 19...\textit{c7} (19...\textit{e8}?! 20 \textit{xd5} \textit{c7} 21 \textit{xf6} \textit{gxf6} 22 \textit{xc1} \textit{e2} 23 \textit{f1}?!\texttt{±} seems good for White (23 \textit{xc2} \textit{xc3} 24 \textit{xc2} \textit{xc2} \textit{c6} 25 \textit{b3} \textit{f8}\texttt{±} transposes to 19 \textit{e1})] 20 \textit{xf6} \textit{gxf6} 21 \textit{xc1}!\texttt{±} White will capture the d5 pawn under favourable circumstances] 19...\textit{e8} 20 \textit{xe8}+ \textit{xe8} 21 \textit{xf6} \textit{gxf6} 22 \textit{xd5} \textit{f8} 23 \textit{g2}! (23 g5?! \textit{e6} was OK for Black in Smirin-Morozevich, Biel 2003) 23...\textit{c6} 24 a4 [24 \textit{d2}\texttt{±} is also interesting; for example 24...\textit{xc3} (24...\textit{xd8} 25 \textit{c4}\texttt{±} 25 \textit{xc3} \textit{xc3} 26 \textit{e4} \textit{e3} (26...\textit{xc6} 27 \textit{d7}+) 27 \textit{xf6}+ \textit{g7} 28 \textit{e4}+ \textit{g8} 29 \textit{d7} \textit{xa2} 30 \textit{f6}+ \textit{g7} 31 \textit{e4}\texttt{±} tempts Black to enter an endgame where the knight and rook combine better than Black's rook and bishop and may be able to launch an attack on f7 by using the g4-g5 idea.

15 c4??
Here lies the point; By exploiting the x-ray along the fifth rank White introduces interesting complications.

15...\( \Boxxc4 \)

Clearly, the only serious alternative to the almost universally adopted 15...\( \Boxxf3 \).

15...a6? is bad, but White has to play accurately: 16 \( \Boxxb6 \) \( \Boxxb6 \) 17 c5 \( \Boxxc5 \) 18 dxe5 \( \Boxxe5 \) 19 \( \Boxxh7+! \) (19 \( \Boxe3?! \) d4! 20 \( \Boxxd4 \) \( \Boxxd5 \)) 19...\( \Boxxh7 \) 20 \( \Boxg5+ \) \( \Boxg6 \) 21 g4 \( \Boxxg4 \) 22 \( \Boxxg4 \) \( \Boxc4 \) 23 \( \Boxf4\)-

15...\( \Boxxc4 \)? is refuted by the simple 16 \( \Boxxh7+! \) (16 \( \Boxxh7?! \) \( \Boxxd3 \) 17 \( \Boxg5\) is also good, e.g. 17...g6 18 \( \Boxxe7 \) \( \Boxw4 \) 19 \( \Boxg4! \) \( \Boxxg5 \) 20 \( \Boxxg5 \) f6 21 \( \Boxh6 \) \( \Boxe8 \) 22 \( \Boxxf6! \) \( \Boxxf6 \) 23 \( \Boxh4\)-)

16 \( \Boxxd5! \)

With this bold capture White wins two pieces for rook and pawn, obtaining thus a material advantage. However, the resulting position is not so simple as Black has a valuable asset in his queenside pawns to compensate for his deficit.

16...\( \Boxh2+ \) 17 \( \Boxxh2 \) \( \Boxxd5 \) 18 \( \Boxxe4 \) \( \Boxxe4 \) 19 \( \Boxxh5 \)

The dust has cleared a bit, and by now both sides can pursue concrete plans.

19...\( \Boxxa2 \)

19...\( \Boxf6 \) can be met with 20 \( \Boxg4 \) as 20...\( \Boxxa2 \)?! (On 20...\( \Boxxd5 \)? there follows 21 \( \Boxe5\); 20...\( \Boxxd4 \) 21 \( \Boxe3\), with a slight advantage for White, is the lesser evil) 21 \( \Boxe3 \) allows White to maintain a dangerous passed pawn after a subsequent d4-d5; Black dare not capture it by 21...\( \Boxxd4 \)? in view of 22 \( \Boxf5 \) \( \Boxdd8 \) 23 \( \Boxg5 \) \( \Boxa1 \) 24 \( \Boxh6\)- with an easy win;

19...\( \Boxxd4 \) 20 \( \Boxf6 \) \( \Boxc4 \) (20...\( \Boxf6 \) should be met by 21 \( \Boxb5 \)! \( \Boxb6 \) 22 \( \Boxf5 \); then 22...\( \Boxg6 \) 23 \( \Boxf4\) is slightly better for White as the Black queen can no longer chase her opposing number) 21 a3 b6 22 \( \Boxe3 \) \( \Boxac8 \) (22...\( \Boxad8 \)?! 23 \( \Boxc1 \) \( \Boxd3 \) 24 \( \Boxa4\) was better for White in Dvoiris-Vladimirov, Barnaul 1988) 23 \( \Boxd4!\) is at least slightly better for White as he has dangerous attacking chances on the kingside; 23 \( \Boxf5\)! is also possible;

19...\( \Boxad8\) has not been tried in practice, but may be worth analysing.

20 \( \Boxd1 \)

20 d5! \( \Boxfd8 \) (20...\( \Boxad8 \) 21 \( \Boxd1 \) \( \Boxc2 \) 22 \( \Boxf1 \) \( \Boxd7 \) 23 \( \Boxe3 \) \( \Boxg6 \) 24 \( \Boxh4 \) b5 25 \( \Boxb4 \) \( \Boxb6 \) 26 \( \Boxb2 \) f6 27 d6 \( \Boxh8 \) 28 \( \Boxf4 \) a5 29 \( \Boxf5 \) b4 30 \( \Boxg4 \) \( \Boxa7 \) 31 \( \Boxd4 \) \( \Boxb7 \) 32 \( \Boxxg7 \) \( \Boxxg7 \) 33 d7 1-0, was a convincing White win in Fercec-Cepon, Nova Gorica 1996) 21 \( \Boxd1 \) \( \Boxac8 \) 22 \( \Boxf1\) (intending \( \Boxf1\)-e3), would
have been more exact, but even now the basic characteristics of the position guarantee a slight edge for White: The passed d-pawn is strong enough to keep the Black pieces occupied while the minor pieces and the queen combine beautifully for attacking purposes.

20...\texttt{wb3}!± 21 \texttt{d5} \texttt{a5}

Black tries to make use of his own asset; an interesting race has arisen, rich in tactical content.

22 \texttt{g4!} \texttt{a4} 23 \texttt{h6}

\textbf{23...\texttt{wb2}}

Mahia and Morgado give some analysis in \textit{Chess Informant}, refuting the logical queen sacrifice 23...\texttt{xd1+}: 24 \texttt{xd1} \texttt{gxh6} and now the key-move is 25 \texttt{g4!} when White seems to obtain an advantage in all variations:

A) 25...\texttt{a3??} allows White to mate by force after 26 \texttt{f6+! \texttt{g7} 27 \texttt{a1} (27 \texttt{h5+! \texttt{h8} 28 \texttt{g4} is faster) 27...\texttt{a2 (27...\texttt{fd8 28 \texttt{d6 a2 29 \texttt{h5+ \texttt{f8} 30 \texttt{h8#}) 28 \texttt{h5+ \texttt{g6 29 \texttt{f6+ \texttt{xh5 30 g4#}; }}}}}}

B) 25...\texttt{f5} should rather be met by 26 \texttt{xh6+! [Mahia’s and Morgado’s 26 \texttt{e3 a3 27 \texttt{c2 (\texttt{dc2-a1, \texttt{d1-d4) should also be enough for a big advantage] 26...\texttt{g7 27 \texttt{h5! ++ when Black is defenceless;}}}}]

C) 25...\texttt{g7} (The toughest) 26 \texttt{d2 \texttt{f6! (26...\texttt{f5 27 \texttt{d4+! \texttt{g6 28 \texttt{e5++-}) 27 \texttt{xh6+ \texttt{h8 28 \texttt{xf6 \texttt{f7 29 \texttt{e4 a3 30 \texttt{c3 a2 31 \texttt{xa2 \texttt{xa2 32 \texttt{e3+ is clearly better for White, but requires still some work to win.}}}}})}}}}

24 \texttt{e3}

Gaining valuable time in view of the \texttt{e3-d4} threat.

24...\texttt{f5! 25 \texttt{f3 a3 26 \texttt{d4 c2}}}

26...\texttt{xd4?? 27 \texttt{xd4 a2 28 \texttt{d1 a1=\texttt{w 29 \texttt{xal \texttt{xa1+ 30 \texttt{f1 c8 [30...\texttt{e8 31 \texttt{xf5 (31 d6+-) 31...\texttt{e1 32 \texttt{c8+! \texttt{d+ \texttt{b7-b5+-]} loses easily to 31 d6+-.

27 \texttt{d6!}

No time to lose; The passed pawn must get as far as it can.

27...\texttt{a2 28 \texttt{a1!}}

\textbf{28...\texttt{c6?}}

In reality, the losing move; better chances were offered by 28...\texttt{f7! 29 \texttt{f1 (29 \texttt{d5 \texttt{a5) 29...f4! since it is difficult to see how White}}}}
makes progress after 30 h4 (30 \( \text{d4} \text{c1} 31 \text{d7} \text{d8} 32 \text{e4} \text{fxd7} 33 \text{b3\#} \text{h8} 34 \text{xa2} \text{d1} 35 \text{e2} \text{h6} 36 \text{e8\#} \text{xe8} 37 \text{xe8\#} \text{h7} 38 \text{e4\#} ) 30...h6 31 h5 \text{d8} 32 \text{d5} \text{wb1}.

29 \text{b3\#} \text{h8} 30 \text{f3\#}

Now it’s all over as White has managed to achieve the best possible piece coordination.

30...\text{a4} 31 \text{xa4} \text{xa4} 32 d7 \text{d8} 33 \text{d2?}

Overlooking an easy win; 33 \text{g5\#} would have won at once.

33...h6 34 \text{e5} \text{g8} 35 \text{b2} \text{a5} 36 f4

Fortunately for White the position is still won.

36...g5 37 \text{f2} \text{xf4} 38 \text{xb7} \text{d5} 39 \text{a7} \text{d1} 40 \text{xa2} \text{f8} 41 \text{c3} 1-0

35

Beliavsky – Petursson
World Cup, Reykjavik 1988

1 \text{e4} \text{e5} 2 \text{f3} \text{f6} 3 \text{xe5} \text{d6} 4 \text{f3} \text{xe4} 5 \text{d4} \text{d5} 6 \text{xd3} \text{xd6} 7 0-0 0-0 8 \text{c4} \text{c6} 9 \text{cxd5} \text{cxd5} 10 \text{c3} \text{xc3} 11 \text{bxc3} \text{g4} 12 \text{b1} \text{d7} 13 \text{h3} \text{h5} 14 \text{b5} \text{b6} 15 c4?! \text{xf3}!

The best move, winning a pawn, but this is only the beginning of a long story.

16 \text{xf3} \text{dxe4} 17 \text{c2}!

The bishop is finely posted on c2, supporting the advance a2-a4-a5 and at the same time pointing dangerously at the Black kingside.

In the ensuing positions White usually employs (after moving the \text{c1}) the plan of doubling rooks on the b-file, which in conjunction with the above mentioned advance has the aim of recovering his pawn with the better game. However, in quite a few cases, White abandons the pawn recovery for the sake of a direct attack against the Black king since his rook, queen and bishops are ideally placed for such a purpose. Black’s counter-play, on the other hand, can be based upon:

a) a push of his c-pawn (enabling his knight to become active on c4)

b) transformation of d5 into a secure post for the knight

c) timely threats to the d-pawn, and

d) attacks on the b8-h2 diagonal or White’s back rank.

17...a6?!?

After this, Black’s position rapidly disintegrates; for a better continuation, the next Illustrative Games should be consulted.

18 \text{g5}!

Now Black is practically forced to give up his queen in order to stay alive.
18...axb5

18...wc7? allows White a nice sacrificial attack; after 19 Δxh7+! Δxh7 20 Wh5+ Δg8 21 f6! there is no way for Black to save himself:

A) 21...Δf4 is met with the crushing 22 Δg5+!++;

B) 21...Δd7 22 Δxg7! leaves the Black king at the mercy of White’s pieces as shown by the following variations:

B1) 22...Δh2+ 23 Δh1 Δxg7 only postpones the inevitable for a few moves as shown by the sequel 24 Δg5+ Δh7 25 Wh4+ Δg6 26 Δg5+ Δf6 27 Δe5+ Δg6 28 Δg4+--;

B2) 22...f6 is the lesser evil but can scarcely save Black: 23 Δh6 Δh2+ 24 Δh1 Δe5 25 Δc5 Wh7 26 Wh5! Δe8 27 dxe5 Δxe5 (27...Δxe5 28 Δxc4+--) 28 Δg4+ Δh7 29 Δxc4 Δg8 30 Δd4 b5 31 Δc6 Δg6 32 g4+--;

B3) 22...Δxg7 23 Δg4+ Δf6 24 Δg5+ Δe6 25 Δf5# is a beautiful mate in the middle of the board!

C) 21...Δh2+ 22 Δh1 Δf4 23 Δxg7! Δxg7 24 Δg5+ Δf6 25 Wh6+ Δe7 26 Δe5+ Δd7 27 Δxb6+--;

18...f6 is the only other possibility, but here too Black is defenceless if White plays accurately: 19 Wh5 h6 20 Δxh6! (20 Δxb6 fxg5!? 20...axb5 20...Δf7 21 Δxb6! Wh6 22 Δg6+! 21 Δxg7 f5 22 Wh8+ Δf7 23 Δh7! (A 24 Δe1) 23...Δe8 [23...Δb4 24 Δxf5 Δd5 25 Δb1!! Δc3 26 Δxb5! (diverting the queen from controlling f7) 26...Δxb5 27 Δe5+ Δe8 28 Δg6+ Δd8 29 Δc7+] 24 Δe1+ Δe7 25 Δxf8 Δxf8 26 Δxf5 Δg5 27 Δe6 Wh6 28 Whf6 29 Δe5+--; a difficult, but amply rewarding line.

19 Δxd8 Δfxd8 20 Wh5 g6 21 Whb5±

The dust has cleared and it is evident that White’s material advantage gives him a clear plus; however, to convert this advantage into a full point is not so easy as an exchange of all queenside pawns would help Black set up a kingside fortress. Beliavsky’s way of handling the technical phase is interesting as he gives priority to the dynamic element.

21...Δc7 22 a4

White does not wish to lose time, yet 22 Δb2!? protecting the
important d4 pawn was worth considering.

22...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbf{\texttt{x}}}}x\texttt{\texttt{d}}\texttt{\texttt{4}})!?

22...\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}}\texttt{5}} 23 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{w}}}}\texttt{\texttt{b}}\texttt{2} \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}d\texttt{8}} 24 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}}\texttt{1}}

would not have helped Black as White has time to improve his position by \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{w}}b\texttt{2}}-\texttt{c}3, \texttt{\texttt{g}}2-\texttt{g}3 and then proceed to attack the vulnerable b- and c-pawns.

23 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{w}}}c\texttt{5}}! \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}}}d\texttt{7}}

Now White's position is close to winning as his a-pawn has become a tremendous asset. In the next few moves Beliavsky achieves his object by concentrating on destroying the opponent's piece coordination.

27...\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}d\texttt{e}7} 28 a6 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{b}}}b\texttt{6}}} 29 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{w}}}c\texttt{8}+ \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{g}}}7 30 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{w}}}x\texttt{c}4 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{c}}}c\texttt{7} 31 \texttt{\texttt{w\texttt{a}4}} \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}}}2

24 g3!±

Suppressing the opponent's counter-play by extinguishing the possibility of a bank rank mate.

24...\texttt{\texttt{e}}e\texttt{8}

24...\texttt{\texttt{x}}a\texttt{4}?? is dismissed by Beliavsky in view of the simple 25 \texttt{\texttt{x}}a\texttt{4} \texttt{\texttt{x}}a\texttt{4} 26 \texttt{\texttt{w}}b\texttt{5}+-

25 a5 \texttt{\texttt{e}}e\texttt{5} 26 \texttt{\texttt{w}}b\texttt{4} \texttt{\texttt{d}}d\texttt{5}?

After this natural move Black can no longer hold his own; the ugly-looking 26...\texttt{\texttt{x}}a\texttt{8}!! had to be preferred, although even then 27 \texttt{\texttt{x}}a\texttt{1}± saddles Black with an awkward defensive task. In any case, it is difficult for a human to resort to a move like 26...\texttt{\texttt{x}}a\texttt{8} without feeling a bit ridiculous.

27 \texttt{\texttt{w}}x\texttt{b}7

32 \texttt{\texttt{b}}b\texttt{3} \texttt{\texttt{c}}c\texttt{3} 33 \texttt{\texttt{w}}b\texttt{4} \texttt{\texttt{a}}a\texttt{7} 34 \texttt{\texttt{c}}c\texttt{4}!+- \texttt{\texttt{c}}c\texttt{2} 35 \texttt{\texttt{d}}d\texttt{3} \texttt{\texttt{x}}d\texttt{2}?

A mistake in a lost position; 35...\texttt{\texttt{x}}a\texttt{2} would have forced White to work a bit harder: 36 \texttt{\texttt{w}}d\texttt{6}! \texttt{\texttt{b}}b\texttt{8} 37 \texttt{\texttt{w}}b\texttt{6} \texttt{\texttt{c}}c\texttt{8} 38 \texttt{\texttt{w}}b\texttt{7} \texttt{\texttt{f}}f\texttt{8} 39 \texttt{\texttt{w}}b\texttt{3}! + (Beliavsky). Now, an immediate loss of material is unavoidable.

36 \texttt{\texttt{w}}f\texttt{4}!

Black is losing one of his rooks, so he resigned.

1-0

36

Dolmatov – Skatchkov
Russia 2000

1 e4 e5 2 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{f}}}f\texttt{3} \texttt{\texttt{f}}f\texttt{6} 3 \texttt{\texttt{x}}e\texttt{5} d\texttt{6} 4 \texttt{\texttt{f}}f\texttt{3} \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}xe\texttt{4}}} 5 d\texttt{4} d\texttt{5} 6 \texttt{\texttt{d}}d\texttt{3} \texttt{\texttt{d}}d\texttt{6} 7 0-0 0-0 8 c\texttt{4} c\texttt{6} 9 cxd\texttt{5} cxd\texttt{5} 10 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{c}}}c}}}3 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}c\texttt{3}} 11 bxc\texttt{3} \texttt{\texttt{g}}g\texttt{4} 12 \texttt{\texttt{b}}b\texttt{1} \texttt{\texttt{d}}d\texttt{7} 13 h\texttt{3} h\texttt{5} 14 \texttt{\texttt{b}}b\texttt{5} \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{b}}}b\texttt{6}}} 15 c\texttt{4}!!? \texttt{\texttt{f}}xf\texttt{3} 16 \texttt{\texttt{w}}xf\texttt{3} dxc\texttt{4} 17 \texttt{\texttt{c}}c\texttt{2}! \texttt{\texttt{w}}c\texttt{7}!!?
This move has occurred rarely in tournament play, possibly because it fails to gain a tempo on the $\text{d}b5$. Dolmatov awards the move an ?! in his Informant notes, however things may not be so clear as we shall see below.

Besides the more usual 17...$\text{w}d7$, which is the subject of our next Illustrative Game, the only alternative making sense is 17...$\text{ab}8$; after 18 $\text{a}4$ $\text{a}6$?! (18...$\text{wc}7$ is a direct transposition to 17...$\text{wc}7$?!) 19 $\text{gg}5$?! Black is forced according to current theory to enter a position with few chances of survival after the ‘obligatory’ 19...$\text{axb}5$.

However, this assessment seems to us at least an exaggeration as Black’s refusal to do so by playing 19...$\text{wc}7$! leads to an interesting position after 20 $\text{gxh}7$+! (20 $\text{ff}6$?! $\text{g}6$!) 20...$\text{hxh}7$ 21 $\text{wh}5+$ $\text{gg}8$ 22 $\text{f}6$! $\text{h}2$+ 23 $\text{hl}$ $\text{ff}4$!! (23...$\text{wd}6$? 24 $\text{gxg}7$! $\text{xg}7$ 25 $\text{g}5+$ 25...$\text{f}6$ 26 $\text{e}1$!+- led to a catastrophe for Black in Kudrin-Machado, Thessaloniki 1988) 24 $\text{gxg}7$ $\text{xg}7$ 25 $\text{g}5+$ $\text{f}6$ 26 $\text{h}6+$ [26 $\text{g}4$!? $\text{ff}5$ 27 $\text{wh}4+$ (27 $\text{h}6+$? $\text{e}7$ 28 $\text{hxh}2$ $\text{xg}4$!-+)] 27...$\text{e}6$ 28 $\text{e}1+$ $\text{d}7$ 29 $\text{hxh}2$ $\text{be}8$ 30 $\text{g}5$! $\text{f}6$ 31 $\text{g}4+$ $\text{d}8$ 32 $\text{b}1$ $\text{d}6+$ 33 $\text{g}3$ is a total mess] 26...$\text{e}7$ 27 $\text{e}5+$ $\text{d}7$ 28 $\text{xb}6$ $\text{fe}8$!, as it is difficult for White to attack the Black king or capture the bishop on h2 without allowing counter-play. For example, 29 $\text{fe}1$ (29 $\text{d}1$?! $\text{xe}5$ 30 $\text{dxe}5+$ $\text{e}8$ 31 $\text{e}6$ $\text{c}7$ 32 $\text{xf}7+$ $\text{xf}7$ 33 $\text{b}1$

\text{g}7$ 34 $\text{d}4$ is unclear; 29 $\text{d}5+$ $\text{e}7$ 30 $\text{e}5+$ was agreed drawn in Toro Solis de Ovando-Barbosa, Latin American zt, corr. 1999) 29...$\text{xe}5$ 30 $\text{dxe}5$ $\text{e}8$ 31 $\text{b}4$! (The most logical try as it contains the passed pawn, prevents ...$\text{ff}4$-$d2$, and at the same time stops the Black king from running away whilst enforcing e5-e6) 31...$\text{b}5$ (what else?) 32 $\text{axb}5$ $\text{axb}5$ 33 $\text{d}1$! [a very curious position where Black appears to be in zugzwang and must sacrifice his queen; 33 $\text{d}6$? $\text{d}8$ 34 $\text{c}5$ (34 $\text{c}6+$ $\text{ff}8$ 35 $\text{e}6$ $\text{xe}6$ 36 $\text{xe}6$ $\text{ff}7$) 34...$\text{d}2$! is not good for White] 33...$\text{xe}5$!! 34 $\text{e}1$ $\text{d}7$ 35 $\text{xe}5$ $\text{xe}5$= and the logical outcome of the upcoming race should be a draw after 36 $\text{h}4$ (g4) $\text{d}6$ 37 $\text{c}3$ $\text{c}8$!. It is surprising that this idea has not been played more as it looks to us not inferior to the main lines, its only disadvantage being that White can draw whenever he wants to. White players should also investigate this idea as there are plenty of unexplored possibilities.

18 $\text{a}4$
A critical position; the usual choice here has been 18...a6 but it seems to us that this move is weakening.

18...a6?!

Designed to force the rook make a decision whether to remain on the 5th rank or not, yet White seems to be better now as he has the possibility to cut off the c4 pawn from the rest of the Black army by a4-a5. The alternative 18...cxb8 is better, but even here White has his chances:

19 c2! [19 h5?! seems strong but Black survives after 19...g6! (19...h6 20 xh6! h6! 20 h6! xg6! (20 f5 21 xf8 xf8 22 a5! axa8 23 g5) 21 f6 xf8 22 xf8 xf8 23 c5 d7 24 a5 d5±) 19...d7 (19...c3? 20 xc3! b8 does not succeed in view of 21 c1! e.g. 21...h2?! 22 h1 f6? 23 d1! xc3 24 xh7+ xh7 25 xc3+) 20 e4! b6 21 c1 a6 22 g5! g6! (22 b5?? 23 c7+! xg7 24 g4+ h8 25 f5+) 23 c6! with a double-edged position.

The rook on g5 is misplaced for positional purposes, but it may prove a valuable asset in the coming kingside attack. Let's take a closer look at what is going on:

A) 23...h6? is clearly bad as it creates a lot of weaknesses around the king; after 24 g4 h5 25 g5 f6 26 xf6! x6! 27 g3! [27 f4! xf4! (27...bd8? 28 e5+) 28 xc6 xc1 29 xc6+ fxg6 30 xc4+ g7 31 c7+ g8 32 xc1 is not convincing] 27...f4 28 f4! xf4 (28...bd8 29 e5! g8 30 xc4+ h6 31 xc4+) 29 xc6 xc1 30 c3+- White obviously has a winning position;

B) 23...f6?! is a better way of weakening Black's kingside; Still, 24 g4! (24 g3?! b5! 25 axb5 axb5 doesn't seem like working for White) 24...f5 25 d5+! (White must take with the queen on c4 in order to pressurise the a6 pawn; 25 h4?! f6 26 xc4 e7? leads to problems with the h4, with White not having at least a pawn in return for its bad position; 25 xc5?! b5! 26 axb5 axb5 27 h4 f6 28 h5 b6 is also hardly inspiring) 25...h8 26 h4 b8 [On 26...f6?! 27 xc4 f4! (trying to trap the rook) there comes 28 xa6! g5 29 h6 g7 30 xg6 xg6 31 f3+ (Δ c1-e6) and White is at least slightly better thanks to his control of the light squares and c-file] 27 xc4 b8 28 c3! leads to a position where Black must be very careful, for example 28...xc6? 29 d5+ e5 [29...c5 30 xc6 f6! 30...c3 31 xc6+ g7 32 xg7+ xg7 33 b4±) 31 xc5+ xc5 32 axa6±]
...leads to excellent compensation for the material as the c-pawn is vulnerable and can be attacked by $\text{Hf1-c1}$, $\text{Ae2-d3}$. If Black gets impatient and bursts forth by $21...b5?!$ then $22\text{.axb6 }\text{Qxb6} 23\text{.a5}$ creates a very awkward pin on the $\text{Qb6}$.

Finally, another idea is $19\text{.g5?! g6} 20\text{.a5 }\text{d7} 21\text{.d2}$ with play similar to the one we have witnessed under $18...\text{ab8}!?$.

$19...\text{ab8} 20\text{.h6}!?$

A shocking idea from Dolmatov that put the whole variation with $17...\text{Wc7}$ under a cloud for a while, but after some recent improvements by Skatchkov Black seems able to hold the draw.

$20...\text{Wc6}!$

$20...\text{gxh6}$? is simply bad: $21\text{.Wf5 }\text{g7} (21...\text{f6} 22\text{.xb6±}) 22\text{.Wxh7+ }\text{f6} 23\text{.Wxh6+ (23 }\text{e1? }\text{h8)} 23...\text{e7} 24\text{.e1+ }\text{d7} (24...\text{d8} 25\text{.Wf6+ }\text{c8} 26\text{.xb6±}) 25\text{.f5+ }\text{c6} (25...\text{d8} 26\text{.xb6 }\text{xb6} 27\text{.Wf6+ }\text{c7} 28\text{.e7+ }\text{xe7} 29\text{.xc7+ }\text{c6} 30\text{.e4#}) 26\text{.e4+ }\text{d7} 27\text{.eb1± and the attack is irresistible;}

$20...\text{f5}?! 21\text{.fb1 gxh6} 22\text{.xb6 }\text{f7} 23\text{.xf5 }\text{h8} 24\text{.a5±}$ leads to a great positional advantage for White.

$21\text{.Wf5 g6} 22\text{.Wa5}$

White now wins the exchange, but as will shall see this is not so important as Black's mobile queenside pawns offer him counter-play.
Black should refrain from placing his knight on d5 as that would result in an awkward pin: 22...\( \text{Nd5} \)? 23 \( \text{Qxf8} \) (23 \( \text{Qe4} \)?) b5 24 \( \text{Qxf8} \) Qxf8 25 \( \text{Qfb1} \pm \) 23...Qxf8 (23...b6 24 \( \text{Qxd6}! \) bxa5 25 \( \text{Qxb8} + \text{Qg7} \) 26 \( \text{Qf8} + \text{Qf6} \) 27 \( \text{Qd8} \pm \) ) 24 \( \text{Qe4} \) b5 25 axb5 (25 \( \text{Qfb1} \pm \) ) 25...axb5 26 \( \text{Qfb1} \pm \) and White wins the important b-pawn.

23 \( \text{Qc3} \)??

The only move to keep the game going on; 23 \( \text{Qxf8} \) Qxf8 24 \( \text{Qfb1} \) Qa3 25 \( \text{Qa2} \) Qd6 26 \( \text{Qab2} \) Qa3 as in Sunjaikin-Skatchko, Samara 2002, should lead to a draw by repetition.

23...\( \text{Qd5} \) 24 \( \text{Qxf8} \) Qxf8 25 \( \text{Qe1} \)
Beating the Petroff

29 \text{x}b8+ \text{x}b8 30 \text{d}3+-

Now everything is clear; the a-pawn goes and with it Black’s chances of saving the game.

30 \text{f}8 31 \text{a}x6 c2 32 \text{d}3 \text{f}4

32...\text{e}2+ 33 \text{x}e2 \text{f}4 34 a5\text{1}=\text{w} 35 \text{x}c1 \text{x}c1 36 a6++ is an interesting line given by Dolmatov in Informator.

33 \text{x}c2 \text{xc}2

34 \text{b}1!

Making sure that Black will lose one of his pieces for the a-pawn; the game has been practically decided as there are too many pawns on the kingside for Black to have any chances of drawing.

34...\text{d}4 35 a5 \text{c}6 36 a6 \text{e}5

Considered to be best by the majority of the world’s top players.

Black defends his b-pawn, attacks...
the White rook and prepares to support his passed pawn with a rook, if necessary.

18 a4 \text{\textit{f}ab8}

A rather suspect line, as the game continuation indicates; better are 18...g6 or 18...\textit{f}e8!?, examined under the next Illustrative Game.

Weaker on the other hand is 18...\textit{c}7?!?, a move protecting the \textit{d}b6 in preparation of ...\textit{a}7-\textit{a}6; after 19 \textit{e}c5! \textit{d}d6 20 a5! \textit{c}8 (20...\textit{b}xc5 21 dxc5 \textit{c}8 22 a6± was clearly better for White in Zaw - Moun Moun Latt, Yangon 1999) 21 \textit{f}5 (21 \textit{xc}4!± is a simple and strong novelty that was employed in Karasek-Kopnicky, e-mail 2001. After 21...\textit{e}7 White should have preferred 22 \textit{a}4! \textit{e}6 23 d5! as 23...\textit{d}xd5? allows 24 \textit{b}2 \textit{f}6 25 \textit{b}3 \textit{e}7 26 \textit{g}4!! with a massacre on the diagonals) 21...\textit{d}8 [Better is 21...\textit{a}4! 22 \textit{d}5! (22 \textit{xc}8 \textit{axc}8 23 \textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8 24 \textit{xb}7 \textit{c}6=) 22...\textit{b}4 23 \textit{e}4 (23 \textit{xd}6 \textit{xd}6 (23...\textit{xd}6 24 \textit{a}3 \textit{xa}5 25 \textit{xd}6±) 24 \textit{a}3 \textit{d}8 25 \textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 26 a6 \textit{d}d6 27 \textit{xb}7 \textit{b}8 is close to equality) 23...\textit{e}7 24 \textit{h}5 f5 (24...g6 25 \textit{f}6!!±) 25 \textit{xb}7 \textit{ad}8 26 \textit{g}5 g6 27 \textit{h}4 with some initiative for White, but in a very complicated position] 22 a6 \textit{e}7 23 \textit{xb}7 \textit{xb}8 24 \textit{g}5! f6 25 \textit{e}6+ \textit{h}8 26 \textit{f}4 \textit{xf}4 27 \textit{xf}4 \textit{xb}7 28 d5 \textit{g}6 29 \textit{xc}4 \textit{b}8 30 \textit{e}1± White's advantage was more than apparent in Timman-Anand, Tilburg 1991.

19 \textit{e}3!? This move, keeping the fifth horizontal open for the White rook appears best.

19 \textit{g}5?! is linked with the sacrificial possibility \textit{g}5-f6 at some point. Black has the following possibilities:

A) 19...\textit{c}8?! 20 \textit{fb}1! b6 21 \textit{h}5 f5 (21...g6? 22 \textit{f}6!!+) 22 \textit{e}2 \textit{e}7 23 \textit{xc}4+ \textit{h}8 24 \textit{d}3 g6 25 \textit{c}3 \textit{bc}8 26 \textit{b}2± is better for White according to Gavrilov;

B) 19...f6?! 20 \textit{e}3 \textit{c}7 21 \textit{fb}1 \textit{f}7 22 g3 (22 a5?!?) 22...\textit{d}6 23 a5 \textit{c}8 24 \textit{e}4 (24 \textit{f}5?!) 24...\textit{e}7 25 \textit{xb}7± was also clearly better for White in Milu-Stojkovic, Backa open, Palanka 2001;

C) 19...\textit{c}7?! (This one allows White's main idea to come to the fore) 20 \textit{f}6! \textit{d}6 21 \textit{e}5 \textit{e}7 22 a5 \textit{a}8 23 \textit{h}7+! \textit{h}7 24 \textit{h}5+ \textit{g}8 25 \textit{g}7! f6! 26 \textit{h}8+ \textit{f}7 27 \textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 28 \textit{h}5+ \textit{g}8 29 \textit{d}5± and White had a clear plus in Gavrilov-Frog, corr. 1989/90;

D) 19...\textit{f}e8! (The best move, casting a doubt on 19...\textit{g}5) 20 \textit{fb}1 \textit{c}6! (20...g6 21 \textit{e}3 \textit{c}6 22 a5 \textit{xf}3 23 \textit{xf}3 \textit{c}8 24 \textit{xb}7 \textit{xb}7 25 \textit{xb}7± De Firmian-Kosebay, Copenhagen 1996) 21 \textit{g}4 (Kopylov-Morozov, Lascurain mem. corr. 1994) 21...a6!? 22 \textit{h}7+ \textit{h}7 23 \textit{f}6 \textit{h}2+ 24 \textit{xf}2 \textit{xf}6 25 \textit{xb}6 \textit{xf}2±

19...\textit{c}8

This try at untangling looks natural, in view of the threatened \textit{f}1-\textit{b}1, a4-a5→
19...\(\text{wc6}\) is an effort to irritate White by trying to distort his ideal attacking set-up but it appears rather inadequate; After 20 \(\text{ae4 wc7}\) 21 a5 \(\text{da4}\) 22 \(\text{ac1}\) a6 (Newton-Mascioni, e-mail 1997) 23 \(\text{h6}!\)? the attack seems strong, e.g. 23...axb5 [23...gxh6? 24 \(\text{f5}\) \(\text{g7}\) (24...f6 25 \(\text{xc4}!\pm\) 25 \(\text{hxh7+}\) f6 26 \(\text{wh6+}\) e7 27 \(\text{d5}\) \(\text{bd8}\) 28 \(\text{f3!}+?\) 24 \(\text{f5}\) f6 25 \(\text{hxh7+}\) f7 26 e1 e8 27 \(\text{f5}+\) d8 28 \(\text{xe7}\)?; 19...\(\text{c7}\) is a typical retreat in this structure, but, as usual, it has the disadvantage of removing the bishop from the defence of the kingside; after 20 \(\text{fb1}\) \(\text{bd8}\) 21 a5 (21 g3?!±) 21...d5 22 \(\text{g5}\) f6 (Absolon-Hnilicka, Czech tch corr. 1999) White has the simple 23 \(\text{d2}\) \(\text{d6}\) 24 g3± maintaining dangerous attacking chances because of the weakening of the light squares in front of the Black king.

20 \(\text{fb1}\) b6

21 \(\text{h5}\)!

With this fine move White launches a dangerous onslaught.

21...g6 22 \(\text{h6}!\) \(\text{d8}\)

22...f5? is refuted by 23 \(\text{xf8}\) \(\text{xf8}\) 24 \(\text{xf5}±\) or 24 \(\text{h4}!?±\).

23 \(\text{f6}\) \(\text{f8}\) 24 \(\text{xf8}\) \(\text{xd4}\)!

White has played in great style, leaving his opponent so far with almost no freedom of choice; the text is an excellent attempt to muddy the waters as 24...\(\text{xf8}\)? is met with the brilliant 25 \(\text{hxh7}!!\) \(\text{f6}\) 26 \(\text{e5}\) \(\text{xh7}!\) when Black can resign; in this particular variation the infiltration of both White rooks via \(\text{b5}\) creates a great aesthetic impression.

25 \(\text{xd4}\) ! \(\text{xd4}\) 26 \(\text{c5}!\) \(\text{d2}\)

Thus Black recovers his piece, but White’s initiative has lost nothing of its virulence as we shall see.

27 \(\text{e5}\) \(\text{xc2}\) 28 \(\text{e8}+\) \(\text{g7}\)

A critical moment; Black is two pawns up in an endgame, but taking into consideration the pin on the 8th rank and the power of the White bishop we would rather detest the idea of taking up the Black side here.

29 \(\text{d4}+??\)

A tragedy after White’s phenomenal play; by playing 29 \(\text{f8}+!\) \(\text{f6}\) 30 \(\text{d1}!\) he would have
placed his opponent in a very difficult situation, e.g. 30...c3 (On 30...a2 the reply 31 d6!± intending d6-e5+ gives White a strong attack) 31 d3!? and the Black king is in tremendous danger. Now, however, Black manages to repel the attack and even win the game by exploiting his material advantage.

29...f6 30 e3 c3 31 d1 d3 32 c1 d7 33 f1?

Probably a time pressure blunder; after 33 f4! a8 34 xc4 d6 35 c7!= White could still have drawn this game.

33...g5! 34 e2 f7 35 h8 g7 36 e8 e7 37 d8 c7 38 h4 h6 39 f4?

39 hxg5! hxg5 40 f4.

39...gxh4 40 f5 bb7+-

Now everything is clear; Black is three pawns to the good and having just got rid of the pin can look forward to an easy win. In the remainder of the game White makes a last desperate effort to attack but his opponent parries it in a calm and composed manner.

41 f4 c6 42 cd1 a6 43 1d4 h5!? 44 e7 45 h8 d7 c7! 46 xc7 xc7 47 f4 xf5 48 xc7 xd4+ 49 e3 f5+ 50 f4 e7 51 e4 b5 52 a5 b4 53 d4 b3 0-1

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Topalov – Shirov
Amber blindfold, Monaco 2000

1 e4 e5 2 f3 f6 3 xe5 d6 4 f3 xe4 5 d4 d5 6 d3 d6 7 0-0 0-0 8 c4 c6 9 cxd5 cxd5 10 c3 xc3 11 bxc3 g4 12 b1 d7 13 h3 h5 14 b5 b6 15 c4!? xf3 16 xf3 dxc4 17 c2! d7 18 a4 g6

The main line in the ECO monograph, written by Yusupov; it is important to take control of f5 away from White and avert sacrificial possibilities on h7.

On 18...xe8!? White disposes of three interesting possibilities:

A) 19 f5 was the original attempt in this position, trying to exploit the omission of ...g7-g6; it now appears incapable of securing a plus, but Black has to overcome
several pitfalls: 19...\texttt{c7}? (19...
\texttt{c6}?? is one of them: After 20
\texttt{axh7}+ \texttt{g7} 21 \texttt{xf7} \texttt{e5} 22
\texttt{exe5} \texttt{exe5} 23 \texttt{dxe5}+ Black was
dead lost in Howell-Barua, British
ch 1991; 19...\texttt{we7}?! is simply bad,
because after 20 a5 the Black knight
cannot retreat to d7; after 20...\texttt{c8}
21 \texttt{xb7}± White had an obvious
advantage in S.Hansen-
Gunnarsson, Reykjavik 2000) 20
\texttt{a4}! (Threatening a4-a5; 20 a5
\texttt{wc6}!= is OK for Black; the game
Nataf-Schandorff, Esbjerg 2001
continued 21 \texttt{wxc6} bxc6 22 \texttt{mb2}!
c3! 23 \texttt{mc2} \texttt{db5} 24 \texttt{md7} \texttt{ed8} 25
\texttt{xc6} \texttt{db4} 26 \texttt{xc3} \texttt{ac8} 27 d5
\texttt{xd5} 28 \texttt{xc4} \texttt{db4} and here a draw
was agreed) 20...a6 21 \texttt{mb1}! (21
\texttt{ag5}?! as in Ponomariov-Safin,
Yerevan 2001, is dubious in view of
21...\texttt{exe4}! 22 \texttt{exe4} \texttt{xa4} 23 \texttt{xe1}
g6 24 h4 \texttt{ac3} 25 \texttt{wf3} \texttt{da2}! 26 \texttt{a3}
\texttt{db4} 27 h5 \texttt{d3}± and Black is
probably better) 21...\texttt{ab8} 22 a5
\texttt{dd7}? [Time consuming is
22...\texttt{ac8}?! 23 \texttt{d2} \texttt{a7} 24 \texttt{xb7}
\texttt{db5} 25 \texttt{axa6} \texttt{xd4} 26 \texttt{wd5}! when
White is better: 26...\texttt{e2}+ (26...
\texttt{b3} is hardly better, e.g. 27
\texttt{xc4} \texttt{xd2} 28 \texttt{xd2} \texttt{a8} 29 \texttt{d5}
\texttt{xa5} 30 \texttt{b7} \texttt{wd8} 31 \texttt{xf7}+ \texttt{ff8}
32 \texttt{d1}±) 27 \texttt{h1} \texttt{xb1} 28 \texttt{xb1} c3
29 \texttt{xe2} cxd2 30 \texttt{xd2} \texttt{f4} 31
\texttt{wa2}±) 23 \texttt{d2} [23 \texttt{xb7}?! is
interesting, yet after 23...\texttt{xb7} 24
\texttt{xb7} c3! (24...\texttt{xa5} 25 \texttt{d5} \texttt{f6}
26 \texttt{xc4}±) it is hard to believe that
White can get something substantial
out of the position: 25 \texttt{axa6} (Bad is
25 \texttt{d5}? \texttt{f6} 26 \texttt{c6} \texttt{b8} 27 d5
\texttt{xa5}+, while both 25 \texttt{wc6} \texttt{xc6}
26 \texttt{xc6} \texttt{e7} 27 \texttt{e3} \texttt{db8}! 28 \texttt{d5}
\texttt{c7} 29 \texttt{mc1} \texttt{d7} 30 \texttt{f1} \texttt{b4} 31
\texttt{f4} \texttt{c8} 32 \texttt{b7} \texttt{c4} 33 \texttt{xa6}
\texttt{xd4} 34 \texttt{c7} \texttt{c5}± and 25 \texttt{c6}
\texttt{c8}± seem to offer Black
sufficient counter-play) 25...\texttt{xa5}
26 \texttt{wc6} and White has nothing due
to 26...\texttt{e6}?!; instead, 26...\texttt{c7} 27
\texttt{b5} \texttt{xc6} 28 \texttt{xc6} \texttt{e7} 29 \texttt{e3}
\texttt{a3} 30 \texttt{a1} \texttt{b2} 31 \texttt{a8}+ \texttt{f8} 32
\texttt{a4} \texttt{c1}! 33 \texttt{xc1} \texttt{e1}+ 34 \texttt{h2}
\texttt{xc1} 35 d5 c2 36 \texttt{mc8} \texttt{d1} 37
\texttt{xe2} \texttt{xd8} 38 \texttt{xc7}+ \texttt{e8} 39
\texttt{xe8}± leads to an infinitesimal
White plus] 23...c3! (Ideas based on
...b7-b5 are obviously inferior) 24
\texttt{xc3}! [24 \texttt{bc1}?! \texttt{cxd2}! 25 \texttt{xc7}
\texttt{xc7} 26 \texttt{c2} (26 \texttt{d1}? \texttt{f6})
26...\texttt{f6} (26...\texttt{xa5} 27 \texttt{f5}) 27
\texttt{wc3} \texttt{f4} 28 g3 \texttt{bc8} 29 \texttt{wb2} \texttt{h6}
30 \texttt{d1} \texttt{e1}+→ leads to the creation
of a monstrous passed pawn that
White can hardly get rid of]
24...\texttt{exe4} 25 \texttt{exe4} \texttt{xc3} 26 \texttt{xb7}
[26 \texttt{wd5}?! \texttt{wc6} (26...\texttt{wc7} 27 \texttt{fe1}
\texttt{h2}+ 28 \texttt{f1} \texttt{wd6} 29 \texttt{xd6} \texttt{axd6}
30 \texttt{ce2}) 27 \texttt{xc6} bxc6 28 \texttt{xb8}+
\texttt{xb8} 29 \texttt{b1} h5!=] 26...\texttt{xb7} 27
\texttt{xb7} \texttt{b8}! (27...\texttt{xd4} 28 \texttt{xa6}+)
28 \texttt{b1} g6 29 \texttt{wd5} \texttt{c7} 30 \texttt{xb8}+
\texttt{xb8} 31 \texttt{wd8}+ \texttt{g7} 32 \texttt{xb8}
\texttt{xa5} and the complications have
petered out to a draw;

B) 19 \texttt{e3}!?
...is another trickymove, but in some lines the bishop is vulnerable on e3, allowing Black to equalise:

**B1)** 19... Axe7?! 20 Axb1 Ab8 21 a5 Ac8 22 Axf5! Wc7 23 Ag5! f6 24 Ad2 a6 25 Axb2 Aa7 26 Ab6 Ac6 27 Wd5+ Ag8 28 Wxc4 g6 29 Ag4! Ae4 30 Ac3± was clearly better for White in Kotronias-Arduman, Leon 2001;

**B2)** 19... Acd7?! 20 Af5 1te7?! 20 :fb1 :b8 21 a5lAc8 22 Aa4 23 Axc7 24 Axb7± was clearly better for White in Kotronias-Arduman, Leon 2001;

**B3)** 19... Ad8! 20 Afb1 Ac7 21 Ae4! (Preventing Black from placing his knight on d5; 21 a5? Ac5 22 Axb7 Wd61 is at least slightly better for Black) 21...Axa4 [21...c3 22 Ac5! Ae7?! (22...Axa4! 23 Ad5 We7 24 Axb7 Axed5 25 Axed5 Ab8 26 Ax8+ Ab8 27 Ab3±) 23 a5 Aa4 24 Ad5 We8 (Khilchenko-Borisov, Ljubomirov mem. corr.1993) 25 Axed8 Wxd8 26 Ab7± Axa5? 27 Axed7 We7 28 Ac2 Ab6 29 Wf5++] 22 Ab5 We7! [22...Ae6? 23 Ah5! g6 24 Ab7 Ac7 25 Ad5! Wc8 26 Axed8 Axed8 27 Ad5 Ad7 28 Wf6 Wf8 (28...Wd8? (Khilchenko-Leko, New Delhi 2000) 29 Wxd8+ Axed8 30 Ac6++) 29 Wc6 We7 30 Axec4 Ab6 31 Axa7 Axc4 32 Ab8+ Ag7 33 Wxc4? 23 Axb7 Ac3 24 Axed8! (24 Ac5! Wd6! fails for White, e.g. 25 Axh7+ Axh7 26 Wf7 Axed5 27 Ac7 2e2+ 28 Afl Ag3++ 29 Ag1 Wg6++) 24...Wxd8! [24... Wxd8 25 Ac6 Ae7 26 g3± e.g. 26...Ab6 (26...Axd6?! 27 Ag5 f6 28 Axf6++) 27 Ag5 f6 28 Axed7 Wxe7 29 Wxc3 fxe5 30 Wxc4+] 25 Ac6 (25 Af4 Wxe4 26 Wxe4 Aexe4) 25...Ab8! and Black is at least equal as the exchange of rooks is unavoidable;

**C1)** 19 Ag5! (A dynamic idea from the authors that has not been tried yet). Now Black has the following choice:

**C1)** 20 Ad5! Ac7 21 Ae4! (Preventing Black from placing his knight on d5; 21 a5? Ac5 22 Axb7 Wd61 is at least slightly better for Black) 21...Axa4 [21...c3 22 Ac5! Ae7?! (22...Axa4! 23 Ad5 We7 24 Axb7 Axed5 25 Axed5 Ab8 26 Ax8+ Ab8 27 Ab3±) 23 a5 Aa4 24 Ad5 We8 (Khilchenko-Borisov, Ljubomirov mem. corr.1993) 25 Axed8 Wxd8 26 Ab7± Axa5? 27 Axed7 We7 28 Ac2 Ab6 29 Wf5++] 22 Ab5 We7! [22...Ae6? 23 Ah5! g6 24 Ab7 Ac7 25 Ad5! Wc8 26 Axed8 Axed8 27 Ad5 Ad7 28 Wf6 Wf8 (28...Wd8? (Khilchenko-Leko, New Delhi 2000) 29 Wxd8+ Axed8 30 Ac6++) 29 Wc6 We7 30 Axec4 Ab6 31 Axa7 Axc4 32 Ab8+ Ag7 33 Wxc4? 23 Axb7 Ac3 24 Axed8! (24 Ac5! Wd6! fails for White, e.g. 25 Axh7+ Axh7 26 Wf7 Axed5 27 Ac7 2e2+ 28 Afl Ag3++ 29 Ag1 Wg6!!!) 24...Wxd8! [24...
\( \text{\textcopyright 234 Beating the Petroff} \)

\[ \text{b2 h6 26 d5+ h7 27 g4!± and the rook is freed from its entanglement, after which White's attack can continue unhindered;} \]

C4) 19...f8! (The best try) 20 a5

\[ \text{[Image]} \]

...and we have arrived at a critical crossroads where White needs to display great accuracy to maintain chances of an advantage:

C4a) 21 d5?! d6 22 f4 d8\( ^\text{??} \) is, if anything, slightly better for Black as White cannot augment the pressure on the pinned knight;

C4b) 21 f4!? d6 22 e5 is interesting, yet after 22...g6!! 23 w f6 (23 g3? b5 24 f4 f5\( ^\text{??} \)) 23...x e5 24 x e5 b5 Black has tremendous compensation for the exchange. It is best for White to acquiesce to a draw by 25 d5 d8 26 xg6! hxg6 27 xg6+ g7 28 xg7+ xg7 29 g5+ h7 30 w h5+=;

C4c) 21 b2! (Only in this way White can stir up some trouble, but still not too much if Black responds with promptitude) 21...g6! [the right choice, preventing pressure on the long diagonal; 21...e7?? 22 xh7+ xh7 23 x f7+; 21...d6 22 d5 e c8 (22...ac8?? 23 xg7++; 22...f5?! 23 x f5! x f5 24 x f5 w c7 25 w h5 g6 26 xg6\( ^\text{±} \) 23 e1 leads to a powerful White attack] 22 a1!! [A refinement; 22 c3 g7! (22...d6? 23 a4!! w xa4 24 d5 f6 25 w f6--; 22...b5? 23 d5 f6 24 xg6! hxg6 25 w f6 g7 26 xg6 e7 27 g5\( ^\text{±} \) 23 xc4 d6 24 b4 b5! 25 axb6 axb6 26 d5 a8 27 d3= is just equal] 22...d6 23 a4 w d8 24 e5\( ^\text{??} \) and White has an initiative the potential of which cannot, however, be easily measured.

19 d2

A modest move, not devoid of venom; of principal importance, however, is the alternative 19 e3.

With 19 e3?!

\[ \text{[Image]} \]

...White opens the way for his f-rook to come to b1 whilst protecting the d-pawn and keeping the e-file shut; this method is nowadays considered the strongest, but it is not entirely clear to us why.

After 19...ac8 [19...fd8? is pointless; The simple sequel 20 fb1 e7 (20...c7 21 a5! wd5 22 g5! is awkward for Black) 21
\( \texttt{Beating the Petroff 235} \)

\( \texttt{e4! (guarding d5) 21...\texttt{ab} 22 \texttt{xf4 d6 23 a5 xf4 24 xf4 Da4 25 xb7 xb7 26 xb7+ was winning for White, Voichikhovski-Kochiev, Chigorin Memorial 1999; 19...\texttt{ab}?! does not help Black create counter-play with his knight quickly and White can take advantage of it by 20 fb1 wc7 (Sharikov-Lacunza, IECG e-mail 1998) 21 h4!? (Primitive but effective as it exploits Black's delay in redeploying the knight) 21...c3 22 h5\rightarrow obtaining a strong attack; 19...\texttt{ad}?! has more point, still after 20 fb1 ec7 21 a5 \texttt{d5 22 g5 f6 23 h6 fe8 24 xb7 we6 25 g3 a6 (Nataf-Solozhenkin tt Montpellier 2001) 26 a7! \texttt{e7 27 bb7 wh3 (27...\texttt{xa} 28 \texttt{xd}5!! \texttt{x} 29 \texttt{xe}+ \rightarrow) 28 ec4\pm White has a clear advantage according to Nataf's notes in Informant] 20 fb1 c3 20...\texttt{c7 21 a5 ec8 22 xb7 \texttt{xe} 23 \texttt{e} 24 a6 (Van den Dikkenberg - Van den Bersselaar, Dieren 2000) 24...c3\pm] 21 a5 ec4

White seems to be fighting for very little:

A) The direct 22 \texttt{xb}7 leads to positions where Black should be more or less able to maintain the equilibrium by tactical means; However, even here, accuracy is required:

A1) 22...\texttt{c7?! 23 \texttt{h}6! \texttt{e}8 is a position that arose in Motylev-Ristic, Novi Sad 2000; by playing 24 \texttt{b}8!\pm White could have obtained a big advantage, for example 24...\texttt{cc}8 24...\texttt{d}2 25 \texttt{f6 f8 26 xf8+-} 25 \texttt{f6 f8 26 \texttt{lb}7! \texttt{w}e6 26...\texttt{e}1+ 27 \texttt{h}2 \texttt{w}d6+ 28 \texttt{f}4! \texttt{xf6 29 \texttt{xc}8+-; 26...\texttt{d}5 27 \texttt{xf}8 \texttt{xf}8 28 \texttt{xc}8 \texttt{xc}8 29 \texttt{xa}7\± 30 \texttt{w}a6!-) 27 \texttt{xe}6 \texttt{xe}6 28 \texttt{xc}8 \texttt{xc}8 29 \texttt{xf}8 \texttt{xf}8 30 \texttt{xa}7! and this endgame is untenable for Black as the following variations show:

A1a) 30...\texttt{c}8 fails to 31 a6! 31 \texttt{b}3?! \texttt{b}8! 32 \texttt{c}7! (32 \texttt{xc}4?! c2 33 \texttt{xe}6+ \texttt{h}8 34 \texttt{c}7 \texttt{b}1 35 \texttt{h}2 \texttt{c}1= \texttt{w} 36 \texttt{xc}1 \texttt{xc}1 37 d5 \texttt{a} 38 d6 \texttt{xa}5 39 d7 \texttt{a} 35 32...\texttt{xb}3 33 \texttt{xc}4 \texttt{a} 34 \texttt{f} 31 \texttt{xa}5 35 \texttt{xc}3 \texttt{a} 4\pm is less good] 31...\texttt{d}6 31...\texttt{a} 32 \texttt{b}7!-) 32 \texttt{d}7 \texttt{b}5 (32...\texttt{c}4 33 a7 \texttt{b}6 34 \texttt{b}7 \texttt{d}8 35 \texttt{b}8 \texttt{f}8 36 \texttt{f} 4 33 \texttt{b}7 \texttt{d}6 (33...\texttt{xd} 34 \texttt{a} 35 \texttt{c} 35 \texttt{c} 7 \texttt{a} 7 \texttt{a} 7 36 \texttt{a} 7 34 \texttt{b} 6 \texttt{a} 4 35 \texttt{b} 3!\rightarrow;

A1b) 30...\texttt{xa} 31 \texttt{b}3 c2 32 \texttt{c} 33 \texttt{c} 4 \texttt{xd} 34 \texttt{xc} 35 \texttt{xc} 35 \texttt{xc} 2+ is also clearly winning for White;

A1c) 30...\texttt{b}8 allows a clear cut win by 31 a6! 31 \texttt{c} 7 \texttt{xa}5 32 \texttt{xc} 34 \texttt{b} 4 33 \texttt{c} 5 \pm 31...\texttt{b}2 32 \texttt{b} 7! (32 \texttt{a} 8+ \texttt{g} 7 33 a7 \texttt{b} 6 34 \texttt{b} 8 \texttt{xc} 35 \texttt{xb} 36 \texttt{a} 2 36 \texttt{b} 7+ \texttt{h} 6 37 \texttt{c} 7 c 2 38 \texttt{xc} 3 \texttt{a} 7\pm)
32...\(\text{xc}2\) 33 \(\text{a}7 \text{a}2\) 34 \(\text{b}8+ \text{g}7\) 35 \(\text{a}8=\text{w} \text{xa}8\) 36 \(\text{xa}8 \text{c}2\) 37 \(\text{a}1 \text{d}2\) 38 \(\text{c}1 \text{b}3\) 39 \(\text{xc}2 \text{xd}4\) 40 \(\text{c}7++\);

A2) 22...\(\text{xd}8\)! requires analysis;

A3) 22...\(\text{e}6\)! (The best move) 23 \(\text{a}1\)! [23 \(\text{b}3\), as in Grischuk-Shirov, New Delhi 2000, is met with the surprising 23...\(\text{xf}5\)!! and Black equalises (Instead, 23...\(\text{b}8\)? (Nijboer-Piket, Holland 2000) could have been met with the brutal 24 \(\text{xc}4! \text{xc}4\) 25 \(\text{h}6\)! since 25...\(\text{c}2\) (the only move making sense) is convincingly answered with 26 \(\text{c}1\) \(\text{xd}4\) 27 g4!! and Black not only loses an exchange, but also both queenside pawns after 27...\(\text{d}6\) 28 \(\text{xf}8 \text{xf}8\) 29 \(\text{xc}2 \text{a}1+ 30 \text{g}2 \text{xa}5\) 31 \(\text{c}6! \text{e}5\) 32 \(\text{c}8! \text{a}2\) 33 \(\text{xf}8+ \text{xf}8\) 34 \(\text{e}4!\); the point is that after 24 \(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{g}5\) White has to play 25 \(\text{a}1\)! (25 \(\text{xa}7 \text{d}2\)! 26 \(\text{xd}2 \text{cxd}2\) 27 \(\text{d}1 \text{c}1\) looks dangerous) when 25...\(\text{f}4\) 26 \(\text{c}1 \text{d}2\)! (Shirov didn’t play this) 27 \(\text{d}5 \text{c}8\) 28 \(\text{xd}2 \text{cxd}2\) 29 \(\text{f}1 \text{a}3!!\) 30 \(\text{d}1 \text{d}8\)! 31 \(\text{f}3 \text{xd}4\) 32 \(\text{xa}7=\) forces a dead drawn position] and now Black should be able to equalise:

A3a) 23...\(\text{b}8\)?? (23...\(\text{e}8??\) is certainly out of the question in view of the simple 24 \(\text{d}5\)+) should be met with 24 \(\text{b}3! \text{d}6\) 25 \(\text{g}3 \text{xe}3\) [25...\(\text{c}2\) 26 \(\text{h}6 \text{xd}4\) 27 \(\text{c}1 \text{d}2\) (27...\(\text{xa}5\) 28 \(\text{xf}7\) 28 \(\text{xf}7+ \text{h}8\) 29 \(\text{xd}2++\) 26 \(\text{xf}7+ \text{h}8\) 27 \(\text{xe}3 \text{f}6\) 28 \(\text{e}6 \text{e}8\) 29 d5 \(\text{e}5\) as in Anand-Shirov, Linares 2000. Now 30 \(\text{a}4\)!! would have ensured a clear White advantage, for example 30...\(\text{c}2\) 31 \(\text{c}4 \text{d}4\) 32 \(\text{f}4! \pm \text{xf}4\) 33 \(\text{xf}4 \text{xf}4\) 34 \(\text{xc}2 \text{e}6\) 35 \(\text{xc}7++\);

A3b) 23...\(\text{xe}3\)! 24 \(\text{xe}3\) looks like a slight plus for White as the c-pawn is well blockaded and he has pressure on a7, f7, but if Black is accurate the game will nevertheless be drawn. For example 24...\(\text{c}7\) [24...\(\text{b}8\) (Nguyen Thai Binh-Tong Thai Hung, Vung Tau 2000) 25 e4! \(\text{d}6\) 26 \(\text{d}1 \text{f}6\) 27 \(\text{g}3 \pm\) 25 a6 \(\text{e}7\) 26 e4 \(\text{f}6\) 27 \(\text{xc}3 \text{ff}7\) 28 \(\text{b}3\) (1/2-1/2), Topalov-Shirov Wiik aan Zee 2004) 28...\(\text{xb}3\) 29 \(\text{xb}3\) \(\text{xb}7\) 30 axb7 \(\text{xb}7\) 31 \(\text{d}5 \text{b}4\) 32 axa7+ \(\text{h}6\) and the d-pawn will fall. Let’s now return to 22 \(\text{h}6\)!!:

B) 22 \(\text{h}6!\) \(\text{e}8\)! (22...\(\text{f}8\) 23 \(\text{f}6 \text{f}8\) 24 \(\text{xb}7 \text{c}7\) 25 \(\text{b}8! \text{c}8\) 26 \(\text{b}1 \text{e}8\) 27 \(\text{xf}8 \text{xf}8\) 28 \(\text{xc}8 \text{xc}8\) 29 \(\text{xf}7=\). 29...\(\text{a}3\) 30 \(\text{b}3++\) 23 \(\text{xb}7\) (On 23 \(\text{f}6 \text{f}8\) 24 \(\text{xb}7\), the move 24...\(\text{d}5!\) is a thematic response for Black, e.g. 25 \(\text{xf}8 \text{xf}8\) 26 \(\text{xa}7 \text{xa}5=\) 23...\(\text{e}6\) (23...\(\text{xb}7\) 24 \(\text{xb}7 \text{b}8\) 25 a6 \(\text{xb}7\) 26 axb7 \(\text{a}3\) 27 \(\text{a}4!!\) \(\text{xb}1\) 28 \(\text{xe}8 \text{a}3\) 29 g3 \(\text{c}4\) 30 \(\text{c}6\) 24 \(\text{f}1!\) [After 24 \(\text{xc}3? \text{a}3\) 25 \(\text{b}3\) (25 d5 \(\text{e}5\) 26 \(\text{xe}5\)
\[ \text{x}e5 27 \text{d}7 \text{x}b1 28 \text{x}d6 \text{c}3= \text{Solodovnichenko-Maly, Kharkov 2002) 25...\text{x}b1 26 \text{x}e6 \text{c}3c3 27 \text{xf}7+ \text{h}8 28 \text{xe}8 \text{xe}8 29 \text{d}2= White is struggling to draw] and we have once more arrived at a critical juncture:

\text{B1) 24...\text{d}2? allows 25 \text{xd}2 cxd2 26 \text{b}3+=;}

\text{B2) 24...\text{c}7!? should be met with 25 \text{b}3 \text{xa}5 (25...\text{wd}6?! 26 \text{g}3 \text{xd}4 27 \text{d}1=+) 26 \text{d}5 \text{f}5 27 \text{xf}5 \text{gx}f5 28 \text{a}7 with a slight advantage for White in the endgame in view of Black's inferior structure and weaker king: 28...\text{d}2!? 29 \text{d}6 \text{xb}3 30 \text{d}7 \text{c}2 31 \text{b}7 \text{d}4 32 \text{g}3 \text{ed}8 33 \text{dc}8=34 \text{g}2 \text{f}4! [34...\text{e}2 35 \text{a}1 \text{f}4 36 \text{a}5! \text{h}8 37 \text{g}5 \text{f}3+ 38 \text{xf}3 \text{c}1=39 \text{g}7+ \text{g}8 40 \text{f}6+ \text{g}5 (40...\text{f}5?? 41 \text{e}7+ \text{e}8 42 \text{g}8#) 41 \text{g}5=] 35 \text{xf}4 \text{e}2 36 \text{h}6 \text{c}1=37 \text{xc}1 \text{xc}1 38 \text{d}1) 38 \text{xc}1 \text{xc}1= obviously has chance to hold, but Black's pieces look certainly disco-ordinated;

\text{B3) 24...\text{e}7! (This move is best as it solves immediately Black's problems related with f7) 25 \text{xe}7 \text{xe}7!? [25...\text{xc}7 26 \text{xc}3 \text{b}4

27 \text{d}3 \text{xa}5 (27...\text{xa}5 28 \text{b}3 \text{d}6 29 \text{f}4 \text{c}3?! (29...\text{e}4!) 30 \text{a}6 \text{xb}3 31 \text{xd}6 \text{e}6 32 \text{d}5 \text{d}7 33 \text{c}1=) 28 \text{a}4 \text{d}4 29 \text{c}1! \text{d}6 30 \text{xc}8+ \text{xc}8 31 \text{f}3 a5 32 \text{g}3= looks much better for White as the Black king lacks air] and we have arrived at a double-edged position.

\text{B3a) 26 \text{d}1 \text{d}2! [But not the greedy 26...\text{xa}5?! 27 \text{d}5 \text{d}7 28 \text{d}6! \text{f}8 29 \text{xf}8 \text{xf}8 30 \text{f}6! \text{g}8 31 \text{e}1 \text{c}6 32 \text{b}3 \text{c}2 (32...\text{e}8 33 \text{xf}7+! \text{xf}7 34 \text{e}8+ \text{g}7 35 \text{xf}7 \text{c}2 36 \text{e}1 \text{xf}7 37 \text{d}7=) 33 \text{xc}2 \text{d}8 (33...\text{d}8?? 34 \text{a}4=) 34 \text{f}4= and the d-pawn becomes Black's nightmare] 27 \text{b}7= (27 \text{d}3 \text{d}6 28 \text{a}6 \text{c}4 29 \text{xd}2 \text{c}xd2 30 \text{xc}4 \text{xc}4 31 \text{xd}2 \text{b}4 32 \text{b}3 \text{c}1+ 33 \text{d}1 \text{xd}1+ 34 \text{xd}1= was dead level in Greenfeld-Alterman, Haifa 2002) 27...\text{e}8 28 \text{a}4 (28 \text{xb}7 \text{c}5! 29 \text{xc}5 \text{e}1=) 28...\text{d}8 29 \text{xa}7 (29 \text{e}7=?) 29...g5! [29...\text{e}6?? 30 \text{c}7! \text{c}4 (30...\text{e}8 31 \text{b}6=) 31 \text{xc}4 \text{xc}4 32 \text{a}6 \text{b}2 33 \text{a}1 \text{xa}4 34 \text{xa}4 \text{xd}4 35 \text{xd}4 \text{xd}4 36 \text{f}1+= wins for White]
B3b) 26 d5!?! \textit{We5} 27 f4 \textit{Wf6} 28 \textit{Wg4! \text{Hf8}?!} 29 h6! \textit{Qe5} 30 \textit{Wg3} \textit{Hc8} 31 \textit{He1}! \textit{Cd6} 32 \textit{Gg5±}

19...c3!

Black gives back the pawn immediately to activate his pieces; a logical idea, since otherwise White might block the advance by posting his bishop on c3.

Indeed, after 19...\textit{Hac8} 20 \textit{xc3}!? [20 \textit{fb1} c3! 21 \textit{h6 fe8} 22 \textit{Wf6 f8} 23 \textit{xf8 Hxf8} 24 a5 \textit{Wc6}! (24...\textit{Qd5} 25 \textit{We5}±; 24...\textit{Qc4}!? 25 \textit{xb7 Wd5} 26 a6?) 25 \textit{xc6} bxc6 26 \textit{Cc5} \textit{Qd5} 27 \textit{b7Cc7} is close to equal] 20...\textit{E7} [20...\textit{fd8} 21 \textit{fb1 Ec7} 22 d5 \textit{Wd6} 23 \textit{g3} a6 (Becerra Rivero - Liiva, ICC 2000) looks better for White after the surprising 24 \textit{Cc5}!] 21 d5 \textit{Wd6} 22 g3 a6 23 \textit{bb1 Qd7} 24 \textit{xb7 Wfe8} 25 \textit{h1Qb8} 26 \textit{xb8 Ac8} \textit{xb8} White was a little better in Kulaots-Liiva, Tallinn 2000, in view of the bishop pair;

19...\textit{Cc7} on the other hand looks rather suspect: 20 \textit{h6 fd8} [20...\textit{Wd6} 21 g3 \textit{f8c8} 22 a5\pm Aktunc-Ross, IECC e-mail 1997] 21 \textit{Dd1}↑.

20 \textit{Wxc3}!

It looks more harmonious to take with the queen, as from b3 she exerts annoying influence on the centre, as well as b7, f7.

20 \textit{xc3 Hac8} 21 \textit{e4 Hc4±} allows Black counter-play; the game Kasparov-Shirov, Linares 2000, continued with 22 \textit{bb1} (22 \textit{b3}?) 22...\textit{xa4} (22...\textit{f8}?) 23 \textit{xb7 Ha3} 24 \textit{fc1 Wc7} 25 \textit{a1} \textit{gb8} 26 \textit{e4 Hb3} 27 \textit{d2} \textit{h2}+ 28 \textit{h1 Hxf3} 29 \textit{xc7 Hxf2} 30 \textit{hxh2 Hxd2} 31 \textit{Hxa7} and now instead of the colossal blunder 31...\textit{Qc8}??+ (which lost a piece to 32 \textit{Hab7}!) Black could have drawn with 31...\textit{xd4} 32 \textit{xf7 Hxe4} 33 \textit{g7+ Hf8} (33...\textit{h8} 34 \textit{Hxh7+ Wh8} 35 \textit{Hag7+ Whf8=}) 34 \textit{Hxh7 Hg8=}

20...\textit{Hac8} 21 \textit{Wb3}

21...\textit{b8}??

21...\textit{Cc7} 22 \textit{d3 Hc8} as in A.Sokolov-Finegold, Reykjavik 1990, looks better for White after 23 a5! ±: This assessment was confirmed after 23...\textit{Qc4} 24 \textit{xc4 Hxc4} 25 \textit{xb7 Wf5} 26 \textit{xa7 Hxd4} 27 \textit{e3} in the game Kopp-Schoppmeyer, German ch corr. 1991.
22 \textit{\textbackslash d}d1!? \\
Trying to deploy the bishop on a better position; White is not afraid of Black capturing on d4 as then his bishops will have plenty of opportunities on an open board. \\
22...\textit{\textbackslash w}xd4 23 \textit{\textbackslash e}3 \textit{\textbackslash w}g7 \\
After 23...\textit{\textbackslash w}d6 24 g3 \textit{\textbackslash d}c4 25 \textit{\textbackslash h}6 \textit{\textbackslash f}e8 26 \textit{\textbackslash x}b7± White maintains some initiative. \\
24 \textit{\textbackslash g}4!? \\
White has acquired a slight initiative; the text tempts Black to abandon his back rank, which can easily become surprisingly weak due to the weaknesses on h6 and f6. \\
24...\textit{\textbackslash e}7? \\
An awkward move; Black probably didn’t like the look of 24...\textit{\textbackslash c}3 25 \textit{\textbackslash w}d1 (threatening \textit{\textbackslash e}3-d4) but should have gone for it as he has 25...\textit{\textbackslash w}f6! with what looks like a tenable position. Now White assumes control. \\
25 \textit{\textbackslash d}d1! \textit{\textbackslash e}8 26 a5± \textit{\textbackslash e}c3 \\
Now this is obligatory, but in the meantime White’s pieces have acquired impressive positions. \\
27 \textit{\textbackslash w}b4 \\
27 \textit{\textbackslash w}b1!? was also possible as then 27...\textit{\textbackslash d}c4? (27...\textit{\textbackslash x}xe3 28 fxe3 \textit{\textbackslash d}c4 29 \textit{\textbackslash d}7± is forced) 28 \textit{\textbackslash d}4 \textit{\textbackslash w}xd4 29 \textit{\textbackslash x}d4 \textit{\textbackslash d}a3 fails to 30 \textit{\textbackslash w}d1! \textit{\textbackslash x}xb5 31 \textit{\textbackslash d}8++; however, there is nothing wrong with the text, which in fact looks like the perfect practical decision. \\
27...\textit{\textbackslash d}c4 28 \textit{\textbackslash h}6! \textit{\textbackslash f}6 29 \textit{\textbackslash x}b7 \\
29...\textit{\textbackslash w}e5? \\
This should have lost right away. \\
Correct was 29...\textit{\textbackslash c}2 when Black still has chances to survive. \\
30 f4? \\
Missing a golden opportunity; The spectacular 30 \textit{\textbackslash e}7!!+ would have put an abrupt end to the fight, but it is certainly not easy to see such a move when playing blindfold chess. 30...\textit{\textbackslash h}2+ 31 \textit{\textbackslash f}1 \textit{\textbackslash h}1+ 32 \textit{\textbackslash e}2 \textit{\textbackslash c}2+ loses to 33 \textit{\textbackslash d}3! +- \\
30...\textit{\textbackslash w}e3+ 31 \textit{\textbackslash h}1 \textit{\textbackslash d}6! 32 \textit{\textbackslash w}b5 \textit{\textbackslash f}8! \\
Now that Black has solved the problem with his king’s safety the game can take easily a turn for the worse for White, which explains his preference for exchanges in the moves that follow.
The game is dead level, so the two Grandmasters decided to split the point.
The choice of World Champions and club players alike, the Petroff is currently one of the most popular and solid replies to 1 e4.

To help players of the White pieces break down this challenging defence the authors have provided a repertoire of attacking weapons, including many new ideas and theoretical innovations developed extensively over the past two years in the authors' private laboratory. These are revealed within detailed commentaries to 38 notable games played in international competitions.

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