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The Art of Chess Analysis
Jan Timman
International Grandmaster

Introduction by Lubomir Kavalek
Introduction

Jan Timman, like the soccer superstar Johan Cruyff, is among the most celebrated Dutchmen of the present time. Like Cruyff, who is capable of directing and executing the most surprising attacks on the soccer field, Timman excels in displaying a great variety of unusual ideas in chess, and his playing style is daring. But, unlike Cruyff, who probably has only a few years left as an active player, Timman has a long future before him. And what a bright future it is! Timman is capable of winning any strong international tournament, and in fact some experts, and certainly many people in Holland, believe that he is a future world champion.

What has brought him so far? In my opinion, it is that Timman has mastered the art of chess analysis and has been able to apply his mastery to his practical play. It took him several years, but the result was most gratifying: not only has he become one of the world’s leading grandmasters, but he also must be considered one of the world’s greatest chess analysts.

I met Timman for the first time in 1968, in The Hague, where I played my first tournament after leaving Czechoslovakia. He was sixteen years old and “had talent,” as the other Dutch players put it. That year was rather significant also in that it marked the birth of a new Dutch chess magazine, Schaakblad, published by Wim Andriessen. Within a few years Timman and other leading Dutch players had become contributors to the magazine. They had one purpose in mind: “to produce fascinating analysis.

Thus Timman, under the influence of Botvinnik’s life and work, started to analyze games. Not just any games; they had to meet certain specific criteria: they had to have been played by leading grandmasters; they had to have several critical points; they had to have no obvious mistakes; they had to be hard, tough chess struggles with a strong tactical element. The response of the readers in Holland was very enthusiastic, but it was also critical and challenging of Timman’s verdicts. But, as Timman himself explains, that was precisely the challenge he was seeking.

As the years passed, his analysis deepened and improved. He explains that there were four stages in the development of his analytical approach:

I) Analysis of a maturing master: the year 1971 (games 1–6 of this book).
II) Bobby Fischer’s influence and Timman’s successful drive for the grandmaster title, which he earned in 1974 at the age of twenty-two: the years 1972–1974 (games 7–12).
THE ART OF CHESS ANALYSIS

IV) Analysis of a mature grandmaster: 1977-1979 (games 19-24). Although at the end of this period Timman seems to have reached quite considerable heights, he recognizes that the learning process has not ended.

This book embraces the whole decade of the 1970’s and explains the battles of the chess giants in modern terms. In my opinion it deserves the superlatives many experts have used to describe it. In historical terms it is a classical book. One expert claimed that only Reit’s Masters of the Chessboard comes close, whereas Raymond Keene claims that it deserves to have as much impact as Tarrasch’s works and Nimzovich’s My System. And yet, what Timman has done is quite simple: he has tried to strip every game of its mysteries, to find the logical patterns in each player’s thinking, to show the mistakes—in other words, to come as close as possible to the truth. Timman despises the artificial and superficial notes and the random comments we see too often in chess magazines and books. In his own analysis he does not stop at half measures, and thus he sets an example for other commentators and analysts. At the same time, he very often creates a profitable dialogue among leading grandmasters.

In 1976, before the Interzonal Tournament in Manila, I was asked to choose a player to be my second. I was glad when Timman agreed to fulfill this task. From my point of view, he was the best second I have ever seen at work. His analysis was always sharp and to the point, and it was very enjoyable to work with him. He worked hard in Manila, as he did writing this book. Once you start reading it you will need no further description of its qualities.

Timman’s striving for depth and accuracy has of course had a positive effect on his own play. His ten years of hard analytical work may be the model for many young adepts who are looking for an answer to that most typical question, “How do I improve in chess?” It certainly worked for Timman: he understands more about the game, and although his talent would have prevailed eventually anyway, his analytical work has speeded his development.

This book was first published in Holland in 1979 and was dedicated to Jan’s father, Rein Timman. For this English-language edition Timman has revised the text and has corrected and expanded the analysis. But still, he wants his judgments to be challenged and urges readers to be critical. When he presented me with a copy of the original edition, he wrote in it: “I hope this work, which kept me busy for many years, will give you pleasant and inspiring hours. You might find ideas to add to it. We should continue to write such books!”

I agree. Only books of such magnitude and depth can explain to the chess historian of the 21st century what we in our own time were trying to prove in our wonderful world of chess.

Lubomir Kavalek
Reston, Virginia, Summer 1980

Preface

In the winter of early 1971, at the Hoogovens tournament, I achieved my second master result and thus obtained the title of International Master. That summer my first Grandmaster tournament—the IBM—was on the program. The list of participants was an impressive one, and I decided to be as well prepared as possible. But how? During my high school years I had spent useful afternoons training with Bouwmeester, but that period was now definitely behind me; if I was to continue to grow and make progress, I would have to depend entirely on myself.

Not surprisingly, I turned to Botvinnik: the first chess book I had ever seen was Müller’s biography of him, Zo speelt Botvinnik, and now I owned an English translation of Botvinnik’s work, One Hundred Selected Games. In his Foreword, Botvinnik asks the rhetorical questions, “How do I prepare?”, and he immediately answers, “That has never been any secret”: fifteen to twenty days in the fresh country air, prescribes Dr. Botvinnik.

So it was that Hans Böhm and I, among others, bid farewell to our carefree lifestyle and began a long retreat at a house in the Friesland countryside. For three months we lived like health fanatics. Our luggage contained little more than chess literature and track suits.

The tournament began... and the first five games were lost. I remember exactly how I felt. During play my body was overflowing with so much energy that I could hardly stay seated in my chair. After each game I still had enough energy to run several times around the Vondel Park. But why bother?

This painful start drove me to a firm decision. I threw all my Spartan habits overboard and indulged myself in everything that had been declared unhealthy. In short, I went back to my old lifestyle. And lo and behold, immediately everything went wonderfully. Thanks to a good winning streak, a total catastrophe was averted and I managed a reasonable result.

So much for that part of the wisdom I had hoped to find in Botvinnik’s work. The only lesson I really learned is that you must never change your normal rhythm just because you are faced with an important tournament. As Botvinnik
says a little later in the same Foreword: “Possibly some of my suggestions will not be of much benefit to some players; each must consider them critically and apply them with caution, taking his own individual capacities and habits into account.”

Far more useful was Botvinnik’s advice to analyze games at home and then publish the analysis. As he put it: “During play your analytical work is continually being tested against your critically-minded opponents, but in home-analysis it is very easy to be unobjective. To fight this tendency and to get away from poor analysis it is useful to publish your individual analytical work. Then you are subject to objective criticism.”

So I began to analyze games. Luckily, there was an independent magazine in Holland, *Schaakbulletin*, which was eager to publish this analytical work. In the framework of “The Game of the Month,” a more-or-less thorough analysis was published in every issue. I limited myself to games between top players, hoping for as much critical comment as possible. In that respect the result was disappointing: only after the game Fischer-Petrosian, which I had worked on for about forty hours all told, did two reactions arrive (both of which have been gratefully worked into this book).

Even more disappointing was the reaction to my book about the Fischer-Spassky match, which appeared a year later. To put it plainly, the reactions were very enthusiastic and full of praise. But that was just the trouble! There had been a lot of competition to bring out the quickest books on the match. Commerce had run riot, and countless rushed works had appeared in a colorful variety of languages. In a way, my book stood out: despite its fairly quick appearance, it consisted of analysis over which some care had been taken. It was inevitable that a number of experts would declare it the best book on the match. But good heavens, imagine what would have happened if they had examined all the variations critically! A new book would have been necessary to accommodate all the mistakes and inadequacies in the analysis. I actually considered writing such a book, but it very quickly became apparent that not a single publisher had the slightest interest in it. There remained no other course for me but to completely revise the most interesting games from that match for this collection. The only real support in this respect was the Icelandic book on the match written by Fridrik Olafsson. It did not appear until a year after the match, and only in Icelandic, so it fell quite outside the commercial book category. Modestly, but with my heart at peace, I can say that there is no doubt which is the best book of that match.

The match in Reykjavik signalled the end of the Fischer era. His sudden indolence had a chaotic effect on the chess world. The number of chess enthusiasts the world over, particularly in the United States, had increased frighteningly, and although countless numbers of people were interested exclusively in Fischer’s games, there was no fresh supply. My own state of mind was adversely affected. My analytical work was put aside a little. In the summer of 1979 I completely revised my analysis of Bronstein-Ljubojevic (game 10 in this book), trying to show that interesting play was still taking place in the interval between the eras of Fischer and Karpov.

We must learn to live with Karpov as World Champion. His games are generally less absorbing than Fischer’s, but on the other hand, the title has had a beneficial effect on Karpov. He has continued to play, and his games have even begun to show a little more color. Games 17 and 18 are good examples.

My own play underwent a ripening process, and the analysis of games 14-18 (game 13 was done later) flowed from my pen with great ease. There is a definite difference between the analysis of games 1-6 and that of games 14-18.

During the last two years I have published little detailed analysis. But on those few occasions I received more response than ever before—a happy phenomenon. Four of the last five games in this book are brand new. I gave them a great deal of attention and tried for the greatest possible precision. Obviously, imagination takes its own course, like time and tide. Not only play itself but also analysis must be fed by inspiration. My hope is that you will feel free to make critical comments.

J. H. Timman
Amsterdam, August 19, 1979

**Note on Sources**

Games 4, 12, 13, 19, 20, 21, and 22 were annotated especially for this volume. Games 7 and 16 appeared in somewhat different form in the respective tournament books. All the others appeared first in *Schaakbulletin* magazine and have been corrected and completely revised for this volume.
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Game One
Portisch-Smyslov

In chess it is customary to play off ties for reserve places in the candidates matches. Portisch and Smyslov, who had shared seventh place in the Interzonal tournament in Palma de Majorca 1970, played a six-game match which ended in a tie, 3-3. Since none of the eight candidates withdrew to make room for a reserve, the match stopped at that point instead of continuing to a decision.

Though it was in effect only a practice match, Portisch-Smyslov left us with some interesting games, particularly this one. Smyslov played the Leningrad Variation of the Dutch Defense very unconventionally. Portisch, who is known for his methodical opening play and rather dogmatic handling of the middlegame, was evidently thrown into confusion. Instead of striving for a small positional advantage, he entered complications which Smyslov seems to have evaluated better.

Third Match Game  
Portoroz 1971  
Dutch Defense

Lajos Vasily  
Portisch Smyslov

2 e4 e5 3 f4 d5 4 exd5

This in itself is already a surprise. As far as I know, Smyslov has never played this before.

Also somewhat surprising. One would have expected Portisch to fight the Leningrad in the manner popularized by Taimanov; namely, 4 c4 Qc7 5 c3 0-0 6 Qh3, as was shown in the Championship of the Netherlands 1971, among other tournaments.
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PORTISCH-SMYSLOV

4 ... $a_7
5 \text{b}3

A fairly unknown move, first used in 1960 by Trifunovic against Matulovic.

5 ... 0-0
6 \text{\textbf{B}}b2 d5?!?

A very unusual move in this position. Known is 6 ... d6 7 0-0 and now:

A) 7 ... \text{a}5 8 \text{a}3 \text{c}6 9 \text{B}bd2 \text{Da}6 10 \text{e}3 \text{\textbf{L}}d7 11 \text{\textbf{W}}e2 \text{Wc}7 12 \text{a}4 with slightly better play for White (Bolbochan-Garcia, Mar del Plata 1966).

B) 7 ... \text{De}4 8 \text{Vc}1 \text{e}6 9 \text{c}4 \text{Wc}8 10 \text{Dc}3 \text{Dxc}3 11 \text{Lxc}3 \text{Dd}7 12 \text{c}5 \text{Wd}7 13 \text{cx}d6 \text{cx}d6 14 \text{Wc}3 \text{Df}6 15 \text{Df}1 \text{Dd}5 16 \text{Dd}2 \text{Df}6 and the position is equal (Garcia-Petersen, Lugano 1968).

C) 7 ... \text{Dc}6 8 \text{d}5 \text{Da}5 9 \text{Dfd}2 \text{c}5 10 \text{\textbf{A}}d7 11 \text{e}3 and now 11 ... \text{De}8 (instead of 11 ... \text{Dc}8) is good (Larsen-Reyes, Lugano 1968).

Perhaps Smyslov passed over 6 ...

... $d6$ because of 7 $d5$?!?, an interesting field for further research.

7 c4 c6
8 0-0 \text{Le}6??

If this was his intention, 8 ... \text{Dh}8 might have been considered, with the idea of being able to retreat the Bishop later from $e6$ to $g8$. The curious text move is somehow typical of Smyslov: he sometimes has a definite preference for Knights over Bishops.

9 $\text{Dg}5$ \text{Lc}7
10 $\text{Dc}3$ \text{We}8

The last “strange” move.

11 $\text{Wd}3$

An unfortunate square for the Queen in certain cases. 11 $\text{Dc}1$ comes strongly into consideration, although the consequences of 11 ... \text{Dxc}4 are not so easy to foresee. White gets the advantage after 12 $\text{Wxf7}$ $\text{Wxf7}$ 13 $\text{Dxc}4$ $\text{Wxc}4$ 14 $\text{Dd}5$

... $\text{Dxa}2$ 15 $\text{Dc}7$ $\text{Da}6$ 16 $\text{Dxa}8$ $\text{Wxb}2$ 17 $d5$ because of the poor circulation of the Black pieces. In other cases White can develop his Queen elastically to $e2$ after 12 $\text{e}3$.

11 ... \text{h}6
12 $\text{Dxf}7$ $\text{Dxf}7$
13 $f3$ \text{Dbd}7

When you see the continuation of the game, you wonder why Black did not play 13 ... $\text{Dxc}4$ first and then 14 ... $\text{Dbb}7$. After 15 $\text{e}4$ $\text{Dbb}6$ the same position as in the game would arise, but White would have the better 15 $\text{Da}4$, so as to meet 15 ... $\text{Dad}8$ strongly with 16 $\text{Wb}3$. With the text, Smyslov hopes for the move Portisch now plays, a move that looks good and was undoubtedly played without much thought; otherwise, Portisch would have realized the dangers involved.

14 $\text{e}4$?

Now the unusual position of the Black Queen on f7 becomes optimally justified. The correct move is 14 $\text{Dxc}4$ and then:

A) 14 ... $\text{Dxc}5$? 15 $\text{e}4$ $\text{e}6$ 16 $\text{e}5$ $\text{Dh}7$ (unfortunately, 16 ... $\text{Dg}8$ fails to 17 $\text{Dd}3$) 17 $\text{Dd}5$ and wins.

B) 14 ... $\text{Dxd}5$ 15 $\text{e}4$ $\text{Dxc}3$ (15 ... $\text{Dd}4$ 16 $\text{Dd}2$ $\text{Dad}8$ 17 $\text{Da}4$! and Black loses) 16 $\text{Lxc}3$ $\text{Dad}8$ 17 $\text{Dd}1$ with a slight advantage for White.

14 ... $\text{Dxc}4$

White is suddenly in great difficulties. The pawns on $c4$ and $d4$ are weak and the Queen is uncomfortably situated on $d3$.

16 $\text{c}5$?

Portisch goes wrong again, but now this was very difficult to foresee. 16 $\text{exf}5$ is even worse because of 16 ... $\text{Wxc}4$, but 16 $\text{d}5$ seems to be White's best practical chance. After 16 ... $\text{Dfd}7$ White has the following possibilities:

A) 17 $\text{f4}!$ $\text{fxe}4$! (not 17 ... $\text{Dc}5$ 18 $\text{Wc}2$ $\text{Lxc}3$ 19 $\text{Lxc}3$ $\text{Dxe}4$ 20 $\text{Dxe}4$ $\text{fxe}4$ 21 $\text{Dxc}6$) 18 $\text{Dxe}4$ $\text{Dc}5$, etc.

B) 17 $\text{Wc}2$ $\text{Lad}4$ + 18 $\text{Dh}1$ $\text{Dd}5$ 19 $\text{Dad}1$ $\text{c}5$! and White loses a pawn without much compensation; e.g., 20 $\text{Dd}5$ $\text{Lxb}2$ 21 $\text{Wxb}2$ $\text{Dxc}4$ 22 $\text{Wc}3$ $\text{Df}6$.

C) 17 $\text{Dd}1$ $\text{Da}4$! 18 $\text{Wxg}7$ $\text{Wxg}7$ 19 $\text{Dc}3$ $\text{Dac}5$ 20 $\text{Wd}2$ $\text{fxe}4$ 21 $\text{fxe}4$ $\text{Dxf}1$ + 22 $\text{Dxf}1$ $\text{Df}8$ and White can hold the game although Black has a positional advantage.
Game Two
Polugaevsky-Mecking

Polugaevsky has a very clear style: somewhat classical, enterprising, and not very dogmatic. In the following game we see him go to work turning a well-known type of positional advantage into victory. He was rather helped by Mecking's eighteenth move, after which he only once strayed from the best path. The Bishop endgame contains study-like continuations. The game is a convincing whole, which, like the rest of the tournament, Polugaevsky played with great power. He allowed only four draws and finished first, three points ahead of his closest rival. Perhaps he was inspired by the manner in which Fischer was making himself at home in tournaments of the same caliber around that time.

Mar del Plata 1971

English Opening, Slav Formation

Lev Polugaevsky    Henrique Mecking
1 e4            c6
2 d4            d5
3 e3            c5
4 d3            e6

More active is 4 ... Db7 to answer 5 b3 with 5 ... e5. After 4 ... Db7 5 d4 e6 the game follows Slav paths, but with 5 ... cxd5 cxd5 6 d4 White can try a sort of Exchange Variation where the Black Knight does not stand very well on d7.
The point of the White setup. In the normal Slav opening the fianchetto of the White Queen Bishop is hardly possible because b2-b3 can always be answered by ... \( \text{\texttt{\textbf{Q}}b4} \). Whether this setup actually promises much is doubtful.

7 ... \( 0-0 \)
8 \( \text{\texttt{Q}}d3 \) \( \text{\texttt{B}}e8 \)

The correct way to equality. Black wants to answer 9 \( 0-0 \) with 9 ... \( \text{\texttt{e}}5 \), when 10 \( \text{\texttt{cxd}}5 \) does not work because of 10 ... \( \text{\texttt{e}}4 \). Therefore White's following move.

9 \( \text{\texttt{w}}e2 \) \( \text{\texttt{e}}5 \)
10 \( \text{\texttt{cxd}}5 \) \( \text{\texttt{cxd}}5 \)
11 \( \text{\texttt{dxe}}5 \) \( \text{\texttt{Qxe}}5 \)
12 \( \text{\texttt{Qxe}}5 \) \( \text{\texttt{Qxe}}5 \)
13 \( \text{\texttt{d}}2 \)

White wants to prevent Black from dissolving his isolated pawn with ... \( \text{\texttt{d}}5-\text{\texttt{d}}4 \) and practices Reti's dictum: castle only if there are no better moves.

13 ... \( \text{\texttt{w}}d6 \)

Black should try to exploit the position of the White King in the middle. The most obvious attempt is 13 ... \( \text{\texttt{w}}a5+ \), but after 14 \( \text{\texttt{c}}3! \) \( \text{\texttt{Qxc}}3+ 15 \text{\texttt{w}}x\text{\texttt{c}}3 \text{\texttt{Qxc}}3+ 16 \text{\texttt{w}}x\text{\texttt{c}}3 \), 16 ... \( \text{\texttt{d}}4 \) is not good because of 17 \( \text{\texttt{b}}5 \text{\texttt{dx}}\text{\texttt{e}}3 18 \text{\texttt{Qc}}7 \text{\texttt{exf}}2+19 \text{\texttt{Qxf}}2 \). The best, therefore, is 16 ... \( \text{\texttt{Qd}}7 \), but after 17 \( 0-0 \) \( \text{\texttt{Qac}}8 \) 18 \( \text{\texttt{Qc}}1 \) White keeps a small positional advantage.

Still, there must be something, and that "something" is 13 ... \( \text{\texttt{d}}4! \), a move which can be easily overlooked. The analysis:

A) 14 \( \text{\texttt{Ad}}1 \) or 14 \( \text{\texttt{f}}4 \) then 14 ... \( \text{\texttt{wa}}5+ \), etc. The possibility of this check in general assures the correctness of Black's play.

B) 14 \( \text{\texttt{e}}4 \) \( \text{\texttt{Qxe}}4! 15 \text{\texttt{Qxe}}4 \text{\texttt{d}}3 16 \text{\texttt{Qxd}}3 \text{\texttt{Qxb}}2 17 \text{\texttt{A}}d1 \text{\texttt{wa}}5 +18 \text{\texttt{Qf}}1 \) (if 18 \( \text{\texttt{Qe}}2 \text{\texttt{Qc}}3) 18 ... \( \text{\texttt{Qf}}6 \) and now 19 \( \text{\texttt{Qxh}}7+ \) is very dangerous for White.

C) 14 \( 0-0-0 \) \( \text{\texttt{Qd}}7! \) and White's situation is critical; e.g., 15 \( \text{\texttt{exd}}4 \) \( \text{\texttt{Ac}}8 \) 16 \( \text{\texttt{Ac}}4 \text{\texttt{Qb}}8 \) or 16 \( \text{\texttt{Qc}}3 \text{\texttt{Qd}}6 \).

D) 14 \( \text{\texttt{exd}}4 \) \( \text{\texttt{Qxd}}4 ! 15 \text{\texttt{Qxd}}4 \text{\texttt{Qxd}}4 \) 16 \( 0-0 \) \( \text{\texttt{Qb}}6 \) with equality.

Nevertheless, the text move is not at all that bad.

14 \( \text{\texttt{Qxe}}5 \) \( \text{\texttt{Qxe}}5 \)
15 \( 0-0 \) \( \text{\texttt{Qd}}7 \)

Mecking might have been planning the seemingly stronger 15 ... \( \text{\texttt{Qg}}4 \) here. Intricate complications can develop:

A) 16 \( \text{\texttt{g}}3? \text{\texttt{w}}h5 17 \text{\texttt{h}}4 \text{\texttt{Qe}}5 \) with a clear advantage for Black.

B) 16 \( \text{\texttt{Qg}}3 \text{\texttt{h}}5! 17 \text{\texttt{A}}f1 \text{\texttt{h}}4 18 \text{\texttt{Qf}}1 \) and Black stands excellently and perhaps can already play 18 ... \( \text{\texttt{h}}3 \) 19 \( \text{\texttt{g}}3 \text{\texttt{w}}f6 \). To play first 16 \( \text{\texttt{Qxh}}7+ \text{\texttt{Qh}}8 \) and then 17 \( \text{\texttt{Qg}}3 \) is hardly an improvement after 17 ... \( \text{\texttt{g}}6 \) 18 \( \text{\texttt{Qxg}}6 \text{\texttt{fxg}}6 \) 19 \( \text{\texttt{Qxg}}6 \text{\texttt{Qg}}8 \).

C) 16 \( \text{\texttt{Qf}}4 \) and now:

After 16 \( \text{\texttt{Qf}}4 \) (analysis)

\begin{itemize}
  \item C1) 16 ... \( \text{\texttt{g}}5? 17 \text{\texttt{h}}3 \text{\texttt{Qxe}}3 18 \text{\texttt{fxe}}3 +19 \text{\texttt{Qh}}2 \text{\texttt{gxf}}4 20 \text{\texttt{Qf}}3 \) with a strong attack.
  
  \item C2) 16 ... \( \text{\texttt{d}}4 17 \text{\texttt{Qxh}}7+ \text{\texttt{Qh}}8 18 \text{\texttt{h}}3 \text{\texttt{dxe}}3! [18 ... \text{\texttt{Qxf}}2 19 \text{\texttt{Qxf}}2 \text{\texttt{dxe}}3 20 \text{\texttt{Qh}}4 \text{\texttt{g}}5 21 \text{\texttt{Qh}}6! (21 \text{\texttt{Qh}}5 \text{\texttt{gxf}}4 22 \text{\texttt{Qf}}5 +\text{\texttt{Qg}}7 \text{is nothing}) 21 ... \text{\texttt{Qg}}7 22 \text{\texttt{Qxg}}7+ \text{\texttt{Qxg}}7 23 \text{\texttt{Qh}}5+ \text{\texttt{Qxh}}7 24 \text{\texttt{Qf}}6+, or 18 ... \text{\texttt{Qf}}6 19 \text{\texttt{Qg}}6!! \text{\texttt{dxe}}3 20 \text{\texttt{Qf}}7 \text{\texttt{Qxf}}4 21 \text{\texttt{Qxe}}8 \text{\texttt{Qxe}}8 22 \text{\texttt{fxe}}3! (\text{\texttt{Qxe}}3+ 23 \text{\texttt{Qh}}1 \text{\texttt{Qae}}8) \text{\texttt{Qae}}1 \text{\texttt{Qg}}4 \text{\texttt{Qxe}}1 \text{\texttt{Qxf}}4 \text{\texttt{Qxf}}4 \text{\texttt{Qf}}6] \) \text{\texttt{g}}5 18 \text{\texttt{h}}3 \text{\texttt{gxf}}4 19 \text{\texttt{hxg}}4 \text{\texttt{Qxg}}4 \text{Black has no problems.}
  
  \item C3) 16 ... \( \text{\texttt{Qf}}6 \) and it is difficult for White to meet the neutralizing 17 ... \( \text{\texttt{d}}4 \) because after 17 \( \text{\texttt{Qe}}2 \) Black can force a draw by repetition of moves with 17 ... \( \text{\texttt{Qg}}4 \). Perhaps he can try 17 \( \text{\texttt{Qb}}5 \text{\texttt{Qd}}8 \) 19 \( \text{\texttt{Qc}}5 \), possibly followed by 20 \( \text{\texttt{Qd}}4 \).
\end{itemize}

16 \( \text{\texttt{Qd}}4 \)

Now all complications are out of the way and a simple position with a slight plus for White has arisen.

16 ... \( \text{\texttt{Qae}}8 \)
17 \( \text{\texttt{Qe}}2 \) \( \text{\texttt{w}}d6 \)
18 \( \text{\texttt{Qb}}2 \) \( \text{\texttt{a}}6? \)

It was difficult to see at this moment that this move would be the root cause of Black's defeat. The fact is, however, that it violates the general positional rule against placing one's pawns on the same color squares as one's Bishop.

19 \( \text{\texttt{Qae}}1 \) \( \text{\texttt{Qg}}4 \)

Now this is only an innocuous demonstration.
White can ignore the "threat" 22 ... \textit{Dxe}3 because after 23 \textit{Dxc}8+ \textit{Dxc}8 either 24 \textit{Dc}1 or 24 \textit{Dc}5 wins.

White is going to fix Black's Queenside pawns on squares the same color as Black's Bishop, the result of Black's eighteenth move.

Black can prevent the fixing of his Queenside pawns with 26 ... a5, but the cure seems worse than the disease because after 27 \textit{Lxb}5 \textit{Lxb}5 28 \textit{Lxb}5 both White pieces have optimal possibilities.

Black now has not only the weakness on d5 but also a more serious weakness on b7. If the Knights were not on the board and the White King could reach d4 (which should be possible because White could keep the Black King off the squares e5 and c5 with the moves b3-b4 and f2-f4), the position would be won because White could then play e3-e4 at the right moment.

Still, Black would have great drawing chances by playing 28 ... d6 here; e.g., 29 \textit{Lxe}6 (otherwise White cannot make progress: 29 \textit{Dc}5 is answered by 29 ... d5) 29 ... fxe6 30 f4 a7 31 Dc2 h6.

I think a better idea is 32 d5 e5 33 e2! (not 33 f3 dxd3 34 xd3 d6 35 b4 g5! and the winning chances are nil. White must keep his Bishop on the board for the time being; it is unimportant that Black can win the f2-pawn, because then the White King can penetrate.) 33 ... d4+ (33 ... d6 is safer, but then White can strengthen his position with 34 f3 possibly followed by 35 g4, 36 h4, 37 g5, and bringing his Bishop to c2) 34 d6xf2 (again, 34 ... d6 is safer) 35 d5 and now:

A) 35 ... d4+ 36 d6 d6 37 d6 38 d3 d6 39 g4 and 40 d65+ or 37 ... f5 39 d6 36 d6 32, and in either case both d5 and thus also b7 fall.

B) 35 ... d8 36 dxd5! d7 37 d5 with a great spatial advantage.

Strange as it seems, this may be the losing mistake. 34 ... b5! is imperative because the pawn endgame after 35 dxb5 dxd5 is drawn; e.g., 36 d3 d6 37 d4 d4! White must therefore play 35 d6 36 d3 d2 d7! (White first tempts the Black Bishop to f1 where it stands less well) 37 d1 (Black has nothing better) 38 d4 d4! 39 d4 d4 40 d4 d7 d4 41 d4 d4 42 d4 d2 d2 43 d3 b6! and White has these choices.
35 \( \text{Cc}3 \) \( \text{Le}6 \)

Now the pawn endgame after 35 ...
\( \text{Lb}5 \) is lost: 36 \( \text{Lxb}5 \) \( \text{axb}5 \) 37 \( \text{Lb}4 \) \( d4 \) 38 \( fxe5+ \) (this is the difference: if the Black King were on e6 this capture would not be with check) 38 ...
\( \text{f}xe5 \) 39 \( \text{exd}4+ \), etc.

36 \( \text{Db}4 \)

This threatens the crushing 37 \( fxe5+ \) \( \text{Dxe}5 \) 38 \( \text{Cc}5 \). Black is therefore forced to give up the d4-square, which the White King then naturally makes use of.

49 \( \text{b}5 \) also wins, but less convincingly; e.g., 49 ...
\( \text{Lxb5} \) 50 \( \text{Lxb5} \) \( \text{Le}4 \) 51 \( \text{La}4 \) 52 \( \text{Lb}3 \) \( \text{Le}4 \) 53 \( \text{La}2 \) \( \text{Lc}6 \) 54 \( \text{Cc}5 \) \( \text{Cc}5 \).

49 ...
50 \( \text{fs}1 \)

Or 50 ...
\( \text{gxf}5 \) 51 \( \text{Lhx}5 \) \( \text{Cc}6 \) 52 \( \text{Le}2 \) followed by \( h5-h6 \) and possibly \( \text{Lxa}6 \) and \( b4-b5 \).

51 \( \text{Ldx}5 \)
52 \( \text{e}4 \)

The crowning of White's refined maneuvers: Black is in zugzwang.

52 ...
53 \( \text{Ce}5 \)
54 \( \text{hx}g5 \)
55 \( g6 \)
56 \( g7 \)
57 \( g8w \)
58 \( \text{Lf}7+ \)
59 \( \text{Lf}8+w \)

Black resigns.

Game Three
Gligoric-Portisch

Neither Gligoric nor Portisch had a good start in this IBM tournament. A tense duel was therefore expected in their fifth-round encounter, as indeed occurred. The Yugoslav showed his most inventive side; his three pawn sacrifices were reminiscent of the two occasions when he showered Hort with a total of four Exchange sacrifices. There were relatively many mistakes for grandmasters of this class, but no one can take this amiss. Such complicated problems can hardly be solved in the limited two and a half hours available for thinking. Indeed, the players are to be complimented for not fearing to enter such dense thickets, even against each other. This was certainly the most interesting game of the tournament.
IBM Tournament
Amsterdam 1971

Grünfeld Defense

Svetozar
Gligoric
1 d4
2 c4
3 d3
4 Qg5
5 Qh4
Lajos
Portisch
f
f
f
f
f

Two games with Fischer as Black continued with 8 Ab1 b6:
A) 9 W2 3f 10 d2 0-0 11 Wxc4 d5 12 Q2 d7 13 d3 c5 14 f3 Qa 15 df5 with equal chances (Mecking-Fischer, Buenos Aires 1970).
B) 9 Le2 Lh6 (seems strange at first, but it is directed against both 10 Wf3 c6 11 Le2 and 10 Qf3 followed by a later Le5) 10 Wf3 c6 11 We5 Lg7 12 f4 d5 13 0-0 d7 14 Wxc4 0-0 15 a4 c5 16 We5 Qxe5 17 dxe5 f6 18 Qb2! with some advantage for White (Taimanov-Fischer, Vancouver 1971).

8 ... Lg7
9 Le3

Very interesting positions can arise after 9 Ab1 d5 and now:
A) 10 f3 f5 11 Q3 h6 12 Qf4 g5 13 Wd5 Wd5 14 Qf2 or 14 Qd4+ Wd7 15 Wxd7+ Qxd7 16 Qd3 0-0 17 Qd4 e5 (18 Le6 Wxe8!! and Black does not stand badly in either case.
B) 10 Qf3 c5?? (10 ... 0-0 11 e4 Le6 12 Le2 is good for White) 11 Wd4+ Le6 12 Le6+ Lxc6 13 Lxb7 Wc8 and now 14 Lxc7 Wf8 15 Ld4 leads to intricate complications which are probably not unfavorable for Black

9 ... 0-0
10 0-0 c5

Perhaps too sharp. If Black wants to keep the pawn he can also try 10 ...

... c6 11 Qd5 b5. White would then have to decide whether to capture on e6 or to bring his Knight later to c5 via e4.

11 Lg5!

This leads forcibly to advantageous play for White.

11 ...
12 e4 La6

The alternative is 12 ... h6. In the tournament bulletin Gligoric then gives the variation 13 exd5 hxg5 14 Le5 cxd5 15 Qd7 16 Qxe4 17 Qc7 18 e4 0-0-0 with a strong attack for White. I find this unclear because Black can build a sturdy position with 16 ... Ld7 17 b5 Le6 18 Qb3 Wd6 (19 f4 Qh4!). However, White has the much better 16 Le1!, because 16 ... Le8 17 d6 Le6 18 Qf3 wins easily. Black must play 16 ... Le7, but even then his position is hardly playable after 17 Qb3 Ld7 18 Lxe7.
THE ART OF CHESS ANALYSIS

Black has taken the necessary trouble to hold the c4-pawn, but the price has been high. White has a great preponderance in the center and the Black Bishop on a6 cannot help in the defense.

perhaps he would have played 16 ... \(\text{\textit{W}}e8\), where the Queen covers many vital squares. White would then have three possibilities:
A) 17 d6 \(\text{\textit{Q}}e6\) 18 d7 \(\text{\textit{W}}b8\) and White has achieved nothing. After 19 \(\text{\textit{Q}}g3\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}d8\) 20 \(\text{\textit{Q}}d6\), Black sacrifices the Exchange with 20 ... \(\text{\textit{W}}x d7\).
B) 17 \(\text{\textit{e}}5\) \(\text{\textit{exd}}5\) 18 \(\text{\textit{Q}}x d5\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}e6\) and it is Black who stands better.
C) 17 \(\text{\textit{A}}e1!\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}d7\) 18 \(\text{\textit{Af}}1\) and Black has a problem with his Queen vis-à-vis the Rook on the e-file. He would do best to close the file with 18 ... \(\text{\textit{e}}5\).

17 \(\text{\textit{e}}5!\)

White's plan is the natural f2-f4 followed by e4-e5 or f4-f5, but first he must defend e3. Both 15 \(\text{\textit{E}}c1\) and 15 \(\text{\textit{Q}}c2\) (perhaps followed by \(\text{\textit{A}}d1\)) are possible. The move Gligoric chooses is weak because the unprotected Queen on d2 gives Black a chance for counterplay.

15 \(\text{\textit{Q}}d2\) \(\text{\textit{e}}6\)

Another manner of profiting from the unprotected position of the Queen is 15 ... \(\text{\textit{e}}5\), intending an immediate blockade. In that case White opens the position at once with 16 f4; e.g., 16 ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}d7\) 17 f3 h6 18 f3 g5 19 \(\text{\textit{Af}}2\) and White's prospects are more favorable.

16 f3 \(\text{\textit{Q}}d6\)

If Black knew what awaited him,

White correctly feels nothing for 17 \(\text{\textit{Q}}g3\) \(\text{\textit{e}}5\) but offers a pawn which can be accepted in two ways. One of them, 17 ... \(\text{\textit{A}}x e5\) 18 \(\text{\textit{A}}x e5\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}x e5\) 19 \(\text{\textit{Q}}f3\), leads to an uncomfortable position, so Black actually has no choice.

17 ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}x d5\)
18 \(\text{\textit{W}}e3\)

White had the difficult choice between 18 \(\text{\textit{Q}}e3\) and 18 \(\text{\textit{W}}f4\). Gligoric wrote that he did not play 18 \(\text{\textit{W}}f4\) because of 18 ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}d7\) 19 \(\text{\textit{A}}f d1\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}x e5\). This is astonishing: either 20 \(\text{\textit{Q}}e3\) (which Gligoric gives) or 20 \(\text{\textit{Q}}x d5\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}x f4\) 21 \(\text{\textit{Q}}x d7\) wins a piece.

However, the question remains whether 18 \(\text{\textit{W}}f4\) is better. In the variation 18 \(\text{\textit{W}}f4\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}d7\) 19 \(\text{\textit{A}}f d1\) Black must play 19 ... \(\text{\textit{W}}c6\), whereupon White has the possibility of 20 \(\text{\textit{Q}}f6\), for example. Black must then be careful to avoid being trampled underfoot and must play 20 ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}x f6\) (not 20 ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}x f6\) 21 \(\text{\textit{Q}}x d7!\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}g7\) 22 \(\text{\textit{A}}d1\)). After 21 \(\text{\textit{Q}}x f6\) e5 22 \(\text{\textit{Q}}x e5\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}x f6\) 23 \(\text{\textit{Q}}x f6\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}x f6\) 24 \(\text{\textit{Q}}d7\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}x c3\) 25 \(\text{\textit{Q}}a c1\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}d4\) Black has a tenable endgame.

I spent a long time on the Exchange sacrifice 18 \(\text{\textit{W}}f4\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}d7\) 19 \(\text{\textit{A}}d1\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}c6\) 20 \(\text{\textit{Q}}x d7\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}x d7\) 21 \(\text{\textit{Q}}f6\). Black then has a satisfactory reply in 21 ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}f d1!\) followed by ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}e8\), or if 22 \(\text{\textit{Q}}g5\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}d2\). If White uses the same maneuver as in the game \(\text{\textit{Q}}h4-\text{\textit{e7-d6}}\), which is probably the best, I personally think the Queen stands better on e3.

18 ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}d7\)
19 \(\text{\textit{Q}}f d1\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}c6\)
20 \(\text{\textit{Q}}e7\)

White is going to overprotect his e5 outpost. 20 \(\text{\textit{Q}}d6\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}c7\) 21 \(\text{\textit{A}}d1\) is not good because of 21 ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}b6\) followed by 22 ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}d5\). If White first tries 20 a5 then Black replies ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}e7\), and the e5-square is difficult to defend; on 21 \(\text{\textit{Q}}e7\) Black again offers the Exchange with 21 ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}x e5\), and after 22 \(\text{\textit{Q}}d6!\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}x f3 + 23\)

GLIGORIC-PORTISCH

21 ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}e8\)
22 \(\text{\textit{Q}}d6\) \(\text{\textit{f}}6\)
23 \(\text{\textit{Q}}c4\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}d8\)

The players strengthen their positions in the prescribed manner.

23 \(\text{\textit{h}}5\)

Probably an inaccuracy, which, however, is not taken advantage of. With 23 a5! White can prevent Black's possible Knight maneuver and thus also his counterplay.

23 ... \(\text{\textit{g}}x h 5\)

The tendency to capture such pawns has been seen in Portisch's games before. This time he misses the chance, prepared by his last two moves, to further undermine the configuration e5-d6 with the strong

23 ... \(\text{\textit{Q}}b6\) 24 \(\text{\textit{Q}}x g 6\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}d 5\) (not 24 ...
hxg6 25 hxh4 Qd5 26 Wg3 g5 27 Qg6! 25 gxh7+ Wh8 26 Wc1 (White must keep c3 defended) 26 ... Axd6! 27 exd6 f5 and Black has good play in the center for the Exchange.

After 26 ... f5 (analysis)

24 Ad2

Now White has some control over the game again because 24 ... Db6 is bad in view of 25 exf6 Ad5 26 Wg5.

24 ... b6
25 Ad1 Le7

One can understand that Black is losing patience. Whatever he does, his position will worsen. The pressure on c5 must not be eased, so his Knight must remain on d7. As a result, the squares c7 and e7 must remain protected. I cannot give a reasonable alternative to the text move.

26 Axg4 Axa4

27 exf6

White can win here in an intricate manner with 27 Ac7!1. Here is the analysis:
A) 27 ... Axg3 28 exf6 Axc4 (28 ... Axg1 29 Axg6+) 29 Axf3 and then continuing as in the game.
B) 27 ... Axg5 28 Axh3 Axc4 29 Axg3+, etc.
C) 27 ... Axc4 28 Axg7 with a decisive attack.

27 ... Axc4
28 Ae7 Axf3?

Black will finally come out of the complications an Exchange behind and without compensation. 28 ... Wg4! keeps the struggle alive; e.g., 29 Axg8 and now:
A) 29 ... Axg8 30 Ahe1 Wg6 31 Axg6 Wxf6 with rough equality.
B) 29 ... Axg3 30 Wxg3 Wxf3 31 gx3 Axg6 32 c4! and White still has some advantage. Perhaps Black can try 32 ... Ad5!?

29 Wxf3 Axg6

30 Axd8 Axd8
31 Axd7 Axf8
32 Axa7 Wh4

Gligoric indicates that 32 ... Axc3 does not work because of 33 Wg3 +

and 34 Aa1. Even better is 33 Ar8 + and mate. Relatively best, according to Gligoric, is 32 ... Wg4, although White must win eventually after 33 Ad3. After the text move it ends quickly.

33 Aa8 Axa8
34 Wxa8 Ad7+
35 Aa7 Ac7
36 Wf3+ Ae8
37 Ab7 Ad5
38 Wxd5 exd5
39 Ab6 Ad7
40 Ac1 c4
41 Ae2 b4

Black resigns.
Game Four
Fischer-Larsen

Despite the overwhelming manner in which Fischer accounted for Taimanov in the first of the series of candidates matches, various experts thought that the ensuing match against Larsen could go either way. After all, Larsen had beaten Fischer in the Interzonal. Larsen himself was, as usual, optimistic. Even before the candidates matches had begun, he was declaring that the next World Champion would be named Bent Larsen. Fischer thoroughly awakened him from that dream.

The first game of the match was undoubtedly the most interesting one. Larsen played uninhibitedly yet without being too reckless, but in the end he could not match Fischer's precise, direct play.

**Semifinal Candidates Match**
**Denver 1971**
**Game 1**

**French Defense**
**Winawer Variation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bobby Fischer</th>
<th>Bent Larsen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 e4</td>
<td>e6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An unusual choice for Larsen, and the last time in the match that he deviates from his usual Sicilian.

2 d4 d5
3 Oc3

Larsen had undoubtedly reckoned on this. Fischer is the sort of fighting player that never plays the Tarrasch Variation.

3 ... Lb4
4 e5

This may have been a slight surprise for Larsen. Fischer always used to be willing to enter the Winawer Variation, but when he returned to the chess world in the tournament at Rovinj-Zagreb 1970 he changed to the treatment with 4 a3 Lxc3 + 5 bxc4 dxe5 6 Og4, at first with success against Uhlmann, then with catastrophic consequences against Kovacevic. Larsen might therefore have assumed that Fischer had still not found a reliable weapon against the Winawer.

4 ... Le7
after 12 \( \text{Na3} \) 0-0! 13 \( \text{Nc1} \) \( \text{f7} \) 14 \( \text{exf6} \), \( \text{gxf6} \) 15 \( \text{Nf1} \) \( \text{e8} \) 16 \( \text{Qh4} \), \( \text{Dg6} \) 17 \( \text{Nh5} \), \( \text{g7} \) 18 \( \text{g3} \), \( \text{a5} \) 19 \( \text{Qb2} \) \( \text{Qd8} \) 20 \( \text{Nc3} \) \( \text{f7} \) 21 \( \text{Qh1} \), \( \text{Qd6} \) and Black already had the initiative.

\[ \text{Nx}\text{e6} 0-0-0 \] and the position is far from clear.

\[ \text{13} \ldots \text{fxe5} \]
\[ \text{14} \text{dxe5} \text{Qxe5} \]
\[ \text{15} \text{Qxe5} \text{Qxe5} \]

Capturing with the Queen is hardly to be considered: 15 \( \text{Qxe5} \) 16 \( \text{Qxc4} \), \( \text{Qxc3} \), 17 \( \text{Qxd5} \) 0-0-0 18 \( \text{Qb3} \) and Black has no compensation at all for the pair of Bishops.

\[ \text{f4} \]

\[ \text{Dg6} \]

Capturing with the Queen is hardly to be considered: 15 \( \text{Qxe5} \) 16 \( \text{Qxc4} \), \( \text{Qxc3} \), 17 \( \text{Qxd5} \) 0-0-0 18 \( \text{Qb3} \) and Black has no compensation at all for the pair of Bishops.

12 \( \text{Nc1} \)

An important improvement. If Black now castles short, White can capture on f6 and answer the pawn recapture with \( \text{Qh6} \). Black must therefore play to win the e5-pawn.

12 \ldots \( \text{Qg6} \)

Again Fischer has the chance to capture on f6, but he does not concern himself with this possibility.

13 \( \text{Qa3} \)

According to Byrne, 13 \( \text{g3} \) would also give White a small advantage. But in that case Black could accept the pawn offer without too many problems: 13 \( \text{fxe5} \) 14 \( \text{dxe5} \), \( \text{Qxe5} \) 15 \( \text{Qxe5} \), \( \text{Qxe5} \) 16 \( \text{Qg4} \), \( \text{Qxc3} \) 17

\[ \text{Qxe6} \]

\[ \text{Qxe6} 0-0-0 \] and the position is far from clear.

\[ \text{13} \ldots \text{fxe5} \]
\[ \text{14} \text{dxe5} \text{Qxe5} \]
\[ \text{15} \text{Qxe5} \text{Qxe5} \]

The Queen keeps an eye on both flanks from here. Larsen, in his notes to this game, points out an interesting opening finesse. If this position had come about in a slightly different way (the way that has repeatedly occurred in practice up to Black's eleventh move)—namely, 7 \( \text{Qxc7} \) (instead of 7 \( \text{Dxc6} \) 8 \( \text{Qf3} \) b6 9 \( \text{Qb5} \), \( \text{Qd7} \) 10 \( \text{Qd3} \), \( \text{Qf6} \) 11 0-0 c4 12 \( \text{Qe2} \), f6 13 \( \text{Nc1} \), \( \text{Qg6} \) 14 \( \text{Qa3} \), \( \text{fxe5} \) 15 \( \text{dxe5} \), \( \text{Qxe5} \) 16 \( \text{Qxe5} \) \( \text{Qxe5} \)—then, because of the extra move b7-b6, Black could have taken

17 \( \text{Qh5} \)

18 \( \text{f4} \)

"Typical of Fischer's style," is the accurate comment found in The Games of Robert J. Fischer. White seeks to clear the center in order to attack the Black King on an open board. I assume that a player like Karpov or Romanishin would continue less energetically with 18 \( \text{Qe3} \) or even 18 \( \text{Qe5} \) to continue the attack in a half-open position purely on the dark squares after a possible exchange on g6.

18 \ldots \( \text{Qg8} \)

The only answer. Black is forced to put his King on f6 where it will be exposed to some drafts.
20 \( \text{xd}5 + \) \( \text{d} \)  
20 \( \text{xd}5 + \) \( \text{d} \)

20 ... \( \text{Le}6 \) loses directly because of 21 \( \text{dxe}6 \) \( \text{dxe}6 \) 22 \( \text{xf}5 + \) \( \text{e}6 \) 23 \( \text{d}5 + \) \( \text{e}6 \) 24 \( \text{f}1 + \) and White is a piece up.

21 \( \text{f}3 ! \)

Once again correctly called typical of Fischer's style in the abovementioned book. Having converted a half-open position directly into an open one, he continues his attack slowly but clearly. The sharp 21 \( \text{g}4 \), to immediately demonstrate the compromised position of the Black King, was recommended in the Russian press. The variations given after 21 ... \( \text{Ad}8 \) 22 \( \text{d}4 + \) are attractive:

\[ \text{dxe}7 \) 24 \( \text{e}3 + \) \( \text{f}4 \) 25 \( \text{xe}7 + \) \( \text{a}7 \) (not 25 ... \( \text{h}6 \) 26 \( \text{xe}8 \) and the Queen is immune because of 27 \( \text{g}3 \) mate) 26 \( \text{xe}7 + \) \( \text{h}6 \) 27 \( \text{a}7 ! \) \( \text{g}6 \) (27 ... \( \text{b}6 + \) 28 \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{f}6 \) offers no salvation because of the deadly pin after 29 \( \text{xf}6 + \) \( \text{gf}6 \) 30 \( \text{a}1 \)) 28 \( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{b}6 + \) 29 \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{e}3 \) (the only chance) 30 \( \text{xe}3 \) \( \text{xe}3 \) 31 \( \text{e}1 \) and Black must give up the Exchange with 31 ... \( \text{g}7 \) 32 \( \text{e}6 \) \( \text{xe}6 \). The endgame is then only a matter of technique for White.

These results are hardly satisfying for Black. But he has a far better defense than 21 ... \( \text{Ad}8 \); namely, 21 ... \( \text{b}6 + \) ! 22 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{c}6 \). At first sight it appears that White's extra Bishop move only makes things more difficult for Black, but the point is that after 23 \( \text{d}4 + \) the Black King can go to \( \text{g}5 \) without the White Queen's decisive capture on \( \text{g}7 \) (but not 23 ... \( \text{f}7 \) 24 \( \text{xf}5 \) \( \text{xf}5 \) 25 \( \text{a}1 \) and wins). Partly because of the centralized position of Black's pieces, White cannot take direct advantage of the position of Black's King; e.g., 23 \( \text{d}4 + \) \( \text{g}5 \) 24 \( \text{h}4 + \) \( \text{xh}4 \) 25 \( \text{xf}5 + \) \( \text{xh}5 \). The White King has become as exposed as the Black one due to the reckless push 21 \( \text{g}4 \).

Fischer's intuition—I assume he chose the text move mainly on intuitive grounds—was thus (again) faultless. The text move, after a forest of complications, ultimately gives him the better chances in every variation.

A) 22 ... \( \text{f}7 \) 23 \( \text{e}7 ! \) \( \text{d}7 \) 24 \( \text{dxe}7 + \) \( \text{e}7 \) 25 \( \text{dxe}7 \) 26 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{d}6 \) and wins.

B) 22 ... \( \text{g}5 \) 23 \( \text{e}7 ! \) (a nice dual with move 23 in variation A) 23 ...

21 ... \( \text{e}5 ! \)

Byrne gives this a question mark without any reason at all; as he points out, there are no decent alternatives. Indeed, the endgame after 21 ... \( \text{e}6 \) 22 \( \text{xe}7 \) \( \text{xe}7 \) 23 \( \text{xe}7 \) \( \text{a}8 \) 24 \( \text{a}1 \) would be discouraging to play, especially against Fischer. The text move shows a sharp appraisal of the coming complications and demonstrates how lively and fresh Larsen's play still was at the beginning of the match.

22 \( \text{d}4 \)

This looks like an unpleasant pin, but Larsen shows that the consequences are bearable.

22 ... \( \text{g}6 \)

23 \( \text{xe}5 \)

There is no more to be squeezed out of the position; e.g., 23 \( \text{xe}7 \) \( \text{xe}7 \) 24 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 25 \( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \) and White has achieved nothing. An interesting attempt is 23 \( \text{g}1 \) to clear g1 in advance for the Rook should the g-file be opened by an exchange on \( \text{f}3 \). However, Black can see to it that if there is an exchange, the Kingside will remain closed: 23 ... \( \text{g}4 \) and White has nothing better than repetition of moves with 24 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 25 \( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 26 \( \text{c}6 \).

23 ... \( \text{xe}5 \)

Naturally not 23 ... \( \text{xe}5 \) 24 \( \text{d}6 \).

24 \( \text{xd}7 \) \( \text{xd}8 \)

Centralizing the heavy artillery to the utmost.

25 \( \text{xb}7 \)

25 ... \( \text{e}3 + \)

A difficult choice, but the consequences are slightly more favorable than those following the alternative 25 ... \( \text{xe}3 \). That move looks overwhelming at first; the White pieces do not seem to be working together while the Black ones are all itching to give mate. However, it
seems the attack against the Black King still continues: 26 \textit{f}6 + \textit{g}5 27 \textit{h}1 + \textit{f}4 (or 27 ... \textit{h}4 28 \textit{g}3 + \textit{h}3 29 \textit{g}2 + \textit{g}4 30 \textit{h}3 + \textit{g}x3 31 \textit{g}c7 + \textit{g}5 32 \textit{g}x5 + \textit{h}x5 33 \textit{g}5! and Black must lose material to avoid mate) 28 \textit{h}4 + \textit{g}5 (not 28 ... \textit{x}h4 29 \textit{h}2 and the Black King is ensnared in a mating net) 29 \textit{g}4 + ! (this energetic continuation of the attack was found by Zaitsev) 29 ... \textit{fx}g3 30 \textit{g}2.

![Diagram](image)

**After 30 \textit{g}2 (analysis)**

The Black attack has been beaten off and, although there are no direct threats, he is in difficulties. Taking the Rook is too dangerous: 30 ... \textit{x}xa1 31 \textit{g}4 + \textit{g}5 (31 ... \textit{x}g4 32 \textit{f}3 + and mates) and now not 32 \textit{b}5 + \textit{d}6 33 \textit{b}4 + \textit{d}5 34 \textit{a}3 (as given by Zaitsev), because of the saving 34 ... \textit{e}5!1, but 32 \textit{c}5 + \textit{d}5 33 \textit{e}3 + \textit{d}6 (or 33 ... \textit{f}6 34 \textit{x}e8 with mating threats on \textit{c}6) 34 \textit{a}3 + \textit{c}7 35 \textit{xa}7 + \textit{c}6 36 \textit{a}6 + \textit{c}7 37 \textit{xc}4 + \textit{b}8 (or \textit{b}6) 38 \textit{xd}5 \textit{xa}3 39 \textit{b}5 +.

Brilliant teamwork by Queen and Bishops on an open board.

Still, the best for Black is 30 ... \textit{d}4 (instead of 30 ... \textit{x}a1), but after the calm 31 \textit{g}x3 White has the better prospects because his King is in just a little less danger.

26 \textit{f}1 \textit{e}2

This looks threatening, but Fischer must have seen it all along before and now comes up with the precise defense.

27 \textit{e}6 + \textit{e}6

28 \textit{e}5!

Improbable but true. The Black attack is refuted in the nick of time. The following series of moves is forced.

28 ... \textit{f}2 +

29 \textit{g}1 \textit{g}2 +

Making the best of it.

30 \textit{g}x2 \textit{d}2 +

31 \textit{h}1 \textit{c}6

32 \textit{c}x6

32 ... \textit{c}3?

Optimism or desperation? Knowing Larsen, I choose the first. Having conducted an energetically defense with extraordinary strength, Black suddenly loses his way. A pity, really, because one could expect a very interesting fight after 32 ... \textit{e}5. At first sight the White Bishops seem supreme, particularly with the possession of \textit{d}4, but the Black King can still find shelter behind the Kingside pawns; e.g., 33 \textit{f}4 \textit{h}6 34 \textit{e}1 \textit{g}5 or 33 \textit{g}1 + \textit{f}7 (33 ... \textit{h}6 34 \textit{f}8) 34 \textit{d}4 \textit{g}5. It is difficult to judge the position. A comparison with "La Grande Variante" of the Open Ruy Lopez is not out of place. The theoreticians are still not agreed on who stands better after 1 \textit{e}4 \textit{c}5 2 \textit{f}3 \textit{d}6 3 \textit{b}5 \textit{a}6 4 \textit{a}4 \textit{g}4 5 0–0 \textit{d}4 6 \textit{b}4 7 \textit{b}3 \textit{d}5 8 \textit{d}xe5 \textit{xe}6 9 \textit{c}3 \textit{c}5 10 \textit{d}bd \textit{e}2 \textit{f}5 12 \textit{g}3 \textit{b}6 13 \textit{d}f4 \textit{d}x\textit{d} 14 \textit{d}x\textit{d} 15 \textit{c}xd4 \textit{f}4 16 \textit{f}3 \textit{g}3 17 \textit{h}x\textit{g}3 \textit{f}x\textit{g}3 18 \textit{d}d3 \textit{f}5 19 \textit{xf}5 \textit{xf}5 20 \textit{xf}5 \textit{h}4 21 \textit{h}3 \textit{xd}4 + 22 \textit{h}1 \textit{xe}5.

In Chess Encyclopedia Korchnoi judges the chances to be equal, but he gives a few examples to show that every seemingly trivial inaccuracy can swing the balance strongly. The position after 32 ... \textit{e}5 in the Fischer-Larsen game is perhaps a little better for White than in "La Grande Variante," but only if White can prevent the formation of the pawn duo \textit{f}5–\textit{g}5. Therefore, the best appears to be 33 \textit{d}4 \textit{h}6 34 \textit{f}1!, which forces 34 ... \textit{f}4. White must still remain on his guard; e.g., 35 \textit{c}5 \textit{g}5 36 \textit{h}4? \textit{e}2! 37 \textit{h}x\textit{g}5 + \textit{g}6 38 \textit{d}8 + \textit{f}5 with win of material. A good move seems to be 35 \textit{h}5 and only after 35 ... \textit{x}c2 36 \textit{e}5. After 36 ... \textit{g}5 37 \textit{g}7 (not 37 \textit{xf}4 \textit{d}1 + 38 \textit{g}2 \textit{e}2+) the Black pawns have been split, which insures White's advantage.

33 \textit{g}1 +

34 \textit{f}6

34 \textit{a}7

The White Bishops come into their own even more with a passed wing pawn. Black is helpless against its advance.
Little by little, White's passed pawn progresses toward promotion.

| 34 ... | g5          |
| 35 Qb6 | Qxc2        |
| 36 a5  | Qb2         |
| 37 Qd8+| Qe6         |
| 38 a6  | Qa3         |
| 39 Qb7 |

If 41 ... c2 42 Qe1+

Stein's sudden death in 1973, just before he was due to travel to the European Team Championship in Bath, England, shocked all genuine chess lovers. His enterprising style had a very personal tint. Keene analyzed sixty of the Ukrainian grandmaster's games in his book, *Master of Attack*. The book includes only games he won, all the more clearly to emphasize Stein's impressive attacking skill.

The following game does not appear in the book. Though it is not really an attacking game, it does show his individual, enterprising style. Taimanov, who had just recently lost disastrously to Fischer, is defeated in a difficult positional game.
39th U.S.S.R. Championship
Leningrad 1971

Modern Benoni Defense

Mark
Taimanov
1 d4
2 c4
3 d5
4 Qc3
5 e4
6 Qf3
7 Qe2
8 c0
9 cxd5 a6

Leonid
Stein
1 d5
2 c5
3 d5
4 Qc3
5 e4
6 Qf3
7 Qe2
8 c0
9 cxd5 a6

The alternative 9 ... Qe8 is more current. After 10 Qd2 extensive complexes of variations begin after both 10 ... Qbd7 and 10 ... Qa6.

10 a4 Qg4
11 Qf4

A) 11 Qg5 Qbd7 (11 ... h6!? 12 Qh4 Qxf3! with equal chances; 11 ... h6! 12 Qf4! Qe8 13 Qd2 Qxe2 14 Qxe2 Qh5 15 Qe3 Qbd7 16 Qh1 and White stands a little better. However, not 16 f4 f5! 17 Qxf5? Qxe3.) 12 Qd2 Qe2 13 Qxe2 Qe8 14 f4! Qc7 15 Qf3 Qc4 16 Qh1 h6! 17 Qae1 h5 18 Qxf6 Qxf6 19 Qg5 with advantage to White (Gligoric-Hartoch, Amsterdam 1971). In Timman-Nunn, London 1975, Black tried 16 ... Qe8 (instead of 16 ... b6), a slightly more purposeful move but nevertheless not satisfactory. After 17 Qae1 b5 18 axb5 axb5 19 e5 dx5 20 f5 Qf8 21 Qd4 White had a known type of pressure on the Black position.

B) 11 Qd2 Qxe2 12 Qxe2 Qbd7 (not 12 ... Qe8? 13 Qd4, Donner-Hug, Berlin 1971) 13 Qe4.

11 ...
12 Qc2

12 Qd2 also comes into consideration here: 12 ... Qxe2 13 Qxe2 Qh5 14 Qe3 Qd7 with chances for equal play. Black has the same position as in variation A after White's 11th move, but without the slight weakness at h6.

A well-known mistake is 12 h3? because of 12 ... Qxe4 (Uhlmann-Fischer, Palma de Majorca 1970).

12 ...
13 f4
14 Qxf3 Qbd7
15 a5

Many games have taken an almost identical course. For example, after 15 ... Qab8 16 Qf1 we have the game Tal-Stein, Rostov 1971, by transposition of moves. Black continued with 16 ... b5?! 17 axb6 Qxb6 18 Qa2 Qe8 19 Qe2 a5 20 Qae1 and White stood a little better.

I played Black against Portisch in Hastings 1969/70 and tried 15 ... c4, with the interesting continuation 16 Qd1 (16 Qd2 Qac8) 16 ... Qc5 (16 ... Qac8?!) 17 Qxc4 (17 Qd2 Qd3 18 Qe3 Qd5 with chances for both sides) 17 ... Qxc4 18 Qa2 f5! 19 Qd2?! (if 19 b4 Qe6!, but 19 Qc1! should be considered) 19 ... Qxd2 20 Qd2 Qac8 and Black had the advantage. Stein's move is solid, but probably not better.

15 ...
16 Qe7

16 g4

An interesting idea. White wants to increase his influence on the center with his Bishops on g2 and g3 and then to follow with f2-f4. The other

side of the coin is that the squares f4 and thereby e5 are weakened. In any case, 16 Qf1 is a good alternative.

16 ...
17 Qg2 Qg8
18 Qg3 g7
19 Qb1

Why not 19 f4? If 19 ... g5 then 20 g5 is strong: 20 ... dx5 21 fxg5 hxg5 22 d6 or 20 ... gx4 21 exd6 Qxd6 22 Qxf4 Qe5. Black, however, has the stronger 19 ... c4 with good play.

19 ...
20 Qd2 Qe5
21 Qa4

A rather strange move but not a bad one. White wants to prevent 21 ... c4. If he does this with 21 Qf1, to simultaneously free f1 for his Knight, there follows, for instance, 21 ... Qf1 22 Qf1 Qg6 23 Qe2 Qf4 24 Qf5 Qf7 and Black stands satisfactorily. The immediate f2-f4 may also be considered, however.

21 ...
22 Qf1

30
22 f4!

Now or never.

22 ... gxf4
23 ef4 dfg6
24 ef1

The idea 21 ef5, so as possibly to play the Rook to h5 later, springs to mind. A double-edged business.

24 ... df8!

A strong move, the prelude to a regrouping.

25 ef3 ef7!!

More accurate is 25 ... ed7 to overprotect d6, followed by 26 ... ef7 and 27 ... ec8. The reason becomes clear in the next moves.

26 ef3 ef4

Also dubious: the Queen becomes tied to the protection of the Knight. One gets the impression that Stein was in time trouble. Still good is 26 ... ef7 27 ef6 ed8, after which there is little wrong with the Black position.

27 ef6 ef4?!
28 ef4!

Threatens to take on d6. The Black pieces are in one another's way.

28 ... ef8

Black must therefore try 34 ... c3 35 ef3 ef4 36 axb5 axb5, but then 37 ec5 is very good (37 ... ef8 38 df6).

34 ... axb5
35 ef2 ef8!

Here lies the difference. Black immediately becomes active.

36 ef6 ed7
37 ef7 ef3
38 ef3 axb5

Perhaps the prophylactic 38 ... f6 is preferable to the text move. The weakening is a lesser evil than the advance of the White center pawns. The a5-pawn, as the saying goes, will not run away.

39 ef6?!?

White should lose no time in playing 39 exa5 exa5 40 ef1; e.g., 40 ... ef8 41 ef6 ef6 42 ef6 ef6 43 df6 ef6 ef7 44 ef1 ef2 45 ef2 ef6. White stands better. Black must therefore defend with 40 ... ef8, whereupon 41 g5 comes into consideration.

39 ... ef6
40 ef7 ef4
41 ef4

The best chance.

41 ... ef2

It is clear that the time-trouble is over. Black's last move is very strong and well founded because the a-file is opened for the Rook.

42 axb4 df6
43 ef4 ef2+
44 ef1 ef2+

44 ... ef5 + 45 exf5 exf5 46 ef4 ef5 gives White counterplay.

45 ef3?

This loses in a prosaic fashion. With 45 ef3 he would pose a more troublesome problem:

A) 45 ... c3 46 d6 c2 47 ef2 (not 47 ef2 ef3 48 ef2 ef3 f6) 47 ef3 ef3 f6 (the only move) 47 ... ef8. 48 ef3 ef3 f6 49 ef3 ef3 f5.

B) 45 ... ef5 46 ef5 ef5 47 ef5 ef5 48 ef5 ef5 49 ef5 ef5 50 ef5 ef5 51 ef5 ef5 52 ef5 ef5 53 ef5 ef5 54 ef5 ef5 55 ef5 ef5 56 ef5 ef5 57 ef5 ef5 58 ef5 ef5 59 ef5 ef5 60 ef5 ef5 61 ef5 ef5 62 ef5 ef5 63 ef5 ef5 64 ef5 ef5 65 ef5 ef5 66 ef5 ef5 67 ef5 ef5 68 ef5 ef5 69 ef5 ef5 70 ef5 ef5 71 ef5 ef5 72 ef5 ef5 73 ef5 ef5 74 ef5 ef5 75 ef5 ef5 76 ef5 ef5 77 ef5 ef5.
White queens with check. However, the Black attack arrives first after 47 d6 c2 48 d7 c1# 49 d8# + e7; the question is whether it is a mating attack. Assume that White plays 50 f6, the only possibility to create counterthreats.

After 50 f6 (analysis)

Black now has various checks at his disposal, but, because all the White pieces are protected, he must be all the more careful that the White King does not escape to safety on the Queenside; e.g., 50 ... a3+ 51 f4 d4 + 52 f3 e3 + 53 d1 e6 + 54 c5 b6 + 55 b5 and Black has no continuation. He need not let it get that far, of course. On the 51st move, 51 ... f3+ is far stronger; but even that is not the nicest or most forcing win. From the diagram position, that distinction is held by 50 ... f1 + 51 d4 e1 + 52 d5 and now the well-known smothered mate follows, in a very unusual part of the board: 52 ... d3 + 53 d5 e5 + 54 d5 e4 + 55 xhx4 d7 mate.

45 ... d3
46 c5
Or 46 f6 c3 47 d3 dxd4 c2.
47 bx5 c5
48 f3 b2

Thus the Queenside pawns become mobile while the Bishop restrains the White d-pawn. The rest is simple.

49 c4 b5
50 f5 b2 +
51 g3 d2
52 e8 + h7
53 c8 xh6 +
54 f4 a3!
55 c6 c5
56 xh6 + g8
57 a6 c3
58 d4 c2!
59 dxc2 c1 +
60 c3 c3
61 a8 + g7
White resigns

After 62 c8 b4 and 63 ... b3 followed by the exchange of pieces on c3, the Black b-pawn queens.
THE ART OF CHESS ANALYSIS

Final Candidates Match
Buenos Aires 1971
Game 1

Sicilian Defense
Taimanov Variation

Bobby Fischer
Tigran Petrosian

1 e4
d5
2 d4
c5
3 dxe5
cxd4
4 Nf3
te4
5 Qh4
c6
6 Nh3
d5
7 Ld3
cxe4
8 Be3
c6

advantage to White (Adorjan-Bobotsov, Amsterdam-IBM 1971).

B3) 13 ... b6! 14 Lb5+ Ld6 15 0-0-0 Lb7 16 f4 Lxe8! and White's advantage is small.

9 Ld3 a6
10 Lxf6 gxf6
11 Ld3 d5!

The justification of this move is to be found in Black's eleventh, and so it must be regarded as the best reaction to the system chosen by White. Two alternatives are, in brief:

A) 8 ... a6 9 Lxf6 gxf6 10 Lc5 c6
11 Nh5 Oxd4 12 Lf4! (also 12 ... Lxe5+ 13 Lxe5 Lxe5, as suggested in Schachbundesliga 46), gives White the advantage after 14 Lxe6 Oxd4 + 15
Qe1 Lxe6 16 exf5 Qf4 17 Qf3 or 16
... Qd4 17 Qxd4) 13 Qxd2 Lxe5 + 14
Lc2 Lxe5 (Bronstein-Polugaevsky, 1964), and now after 15 Lxe5 White stands better (Fischer).

B) 8 ... Lxe5+ 9 Qd2 Lxe4 10
Lxe5 Lxe5 11 Lc3 Qd7 12 Lc3!
Ld3 13 Lxe5 and now:

B1) 13 ... Od8 14 Lb5 Qc6 15
0-0-0 b6 16 f4 with advantage to
White (Fischer-Taimanov, 2nd match game 1971).

B2) 13 ... Od7 14 0-0-0 Ld8 15
Qc6 Qc6 16 Lb5, again with

advantage to White (Adorjan-
Bobotsov, Amsterdam-IBM 1971).

B3) 13 ... b6! 14 Lb5+ Ld6 15
0-0-0 Lb7 16 f4 Lxe8! and White's
advantage is small.

9 Ld3 a6
10 Lxf6 gxf6
11 Ld3 d5!

The idea of this move is not new; it is also found in the Pelikan Variation. There it is insufficient for equality, but here it is at least sufficient.

12 exd5

On 12 Qxd5 Lxa3 13 bxa3 Black has two good continuations: 13 ...
Qa5+ 14 Qd2 Lxd2 + 15 Qxd2
0-0-0 16 c4 f5, or directly 13 ...
f5.

12 ... Lxa3
13 bxa3 Qa5
14 Lf2 0-0-0
15 Lc4

Everywhere unremarked, but in my opinion this is the mistake which

gets White into trouble. In most cases the Bishop should stand on d3, and it is therefore logical to postpone making the choice between Lc4 and
Ld3 by playing 15 Ld1!!:

A) 15 ... Qd4? 16 Lxe6 Lf3 + 17
gxf3 Lxd2 18 Lxd2 and wins.

B) 15 ... Lh8 16 Ld3!

C) 15 ... Lxd5 16 Lxd5 Lxd5 17
Qxa5 Lxd1 + 18 Lxd1 Qxa5 19
Ld3 or 17 ... Qxa5 18 Lc4; in either
case both sides' pawn structures have been weakened, but White has the better prospects because his light-
square Bishop is stronger than the Knight in this position.

D) 15 ... Qg8!? 16 Lc4! Lxd2 + 17
Lxd2 Lxd5! 18 Lxf6 Lxa2 19
Lxd8 + Lxd8 20 Ld3 with a slight advantage to White (not 20 Qxh7
Qxd2 21 Ld3 f5).

E) 15 ... Qe7? 16 d6! Lc6 17 Qd4
with a small advantage to White; e.g., 17 ...
Lxd2 + 18 Lxd2 f5 19
Lc3 Lh8.

15 ... Lh8

In Schachbundesliga 47 the alternative 15 ...
Lh5 is given, with the intention 16 0-0-0 Ld4 17 Ld3
Lb8 18 Qf5 Lxe3. After 19 Qxh3
Qe2 + 20 Qh1 Lxe3 21 f4! White does not stand badly in the ending;
e.g., 21 ... e4 22 Lc1 or 21 ...
Lxd5
22 Lf3 e4 23 Lxe3 Lxe3 24 g3.

The move Petrosian chooses holds the White position in a vise; White cannot play 16 0-0 because of 16 ...
Lh3.

A very critical point indeed. Before investigating the consequences of the much-discussed 16 ...
Lxe2, I first want to examine the following possibilities, most of
which are also good for Black:

A) 16 ... Lg4? 17 Ld3! (17 Lb3
Ld4) and Black has had his say.

B) 16 ... Qe7. Given by O'Kelly in
Europe Echecs. The threat is the maneuver Qg8-g4-d4. He gives the
following variation: 17 Lc4 Lc7 18
Lc3 Lxd5 19 Lxd5 Lxd5 20
Qxc7 + Lxc7 21 Lxf6 Lxe2 22
Lxe8 Lxh1 with advantage to
Black. Indeed, in this case Black is even winning. Therefore, White
should play the better 17 Lb3, profiting from the fact that the Black
Knight can no longer go to the strong
d4. White has counterplay with 18 Lxe4 in answer to either 17 ...
Lxe2 or 17 ... Lg4.

C) 16 ... Lg4. A good suggestion by Korchnoi and Furman in 64, with
the idea of playing 17 ...
Lxe2 only after 17 f3. They give the variation
THE ART OF CHESS ANALYSIS

17 f3 \textit{La}f5 18 \textit{De}4 \textit{Xa}g2 19 \textit{Xa}x5 \textit{Xa}x5 20 \textit{Ld}3 \textit{Xa}x5 21 \textit{Lx}f6 and now the Exchange sacrifice 21 ... \textit{Xa}x3 22 \textit{cxd}3 \textit{Xxa}2 is forced and strong.

At that time I even suggested 18 \textit{Xa}b3 to answer 18 ... \textit{Dd}4 with 19 \textit{De}4. Spanjaard, in his column in the \textit{Utrecht Nieuwsblad}, pointed out that Black can then give mate immediately with 19 ... \textit{Xg}x2 20 \textit{Xa}x5 \textit{Xa}e2 + 21 \textit{Df}1 \textit{Xh}3 + 22 \textit{Dg}1 \textit{Xf}3 mate.

But why didn’t Petrosian play 16 ... \textit{Xg}x2? It is more difficult to answer this question than to give variations.

After 16 ... \textit{Xg}x2 (analysis)

First, let us look at 17 \textit{Xe}3, which in some columns was given as a refutation. After 17 ... \textit{Dd}4 18 \textit{Df}1 there can follow:

\textbf{A)} 18 ... \textit{Df}5, here and there given as the best. After 19 \textit{Df}1, \textit{Xxf}2 + ! is sufficient for a decisive attack. However, O’Kelly showed that White can force a draw as follows: 19 \textit{Xa}7! \textit{Xc}3 20 \textit{Xxa}6!

\textbf{B)} 18 ... \textit{Xxe}2 19 \textit{Df}3! (not 19 \textit{Dd}2 \textit{Xh}3 or 19 \textit{Xf}3 \textit{Xxf}2 with a decisive attack) 19 ... \textit{Dg}4 (now 19 ... \textit{Xxf}2 20 \textit{Dc}2 \textit{Dc}5 + 21 \textit{Dc}2 \textit{Dg}4 + 22 \textit{Dd}2 is not sufficient) and now, besides 20 \textit{Dc}2 \textit{Dc}4 21 \textit{Dx}e6, which leads to better play for Black after 21 ... \textit{Dxe}3! 22 \textit{Dxc}3 \textit{Dxc}3 23 \textit{Dxf}7 \textit{Df}8, White can offer the Queen with 20 \textit{Dx}e6. Langeweg judges that Black runs no risk with 20 ... \textit{Dxd}3 21 \textit{Dxd}3 \textit{Dxa}3, but I cannot agree, because after 22 \textit{Dxf}7, \textit{Dxc}4 fails to 23 \textit{Dg}1, and otherwise a White Rook gains control of the g-file; e.g., 22 ... \textit{Dd}4 23 \textit{Dg}1 \textit{Dxg}1 + 24 \textit{Dxg}1 \textit{Df}5 (to stop \textit{Dg}3) 25 \textit{Df}6 + .

\textbf{C)} 18 ... \textit{Dg}4! Although mentioned by nobody, this move is very strong. The main variation runs: 19 \textit{Xg}x2 \textit{Df}3 + 20 \textit{Dh}3 (otherwise he loses the Rook with a lost position) 20 ... \textit{Dc}7?! 21 \textit{Dxd}4 (mate in two was threatened) 21 ... \textit{Dd}7 + and now:

\textbf{C1)} 22 \textit{Dh}4 \textit{Df}5!!, threatening 23 ... \textit{Dh}5 + and 24 ... \textit{Dg}8 and mate. Barendregt drew my attention to 23 \textit{Dh}6 which, it is true, does avert the mate, but after 23 ... \textit{Dxe}4 24 \textit{Dg}1 \textit{Dxe}3 the Black attack continues despite the restored material equality.

\textbf{C2)} 22 \textit{Dg}3 \textit{Lx}h1 23 \textit{Dg}4 \textit{f}5 24 \textit{Dc}5 + \textit{Dh}8 25 \textit{Dg}7 (25 \textit{Dg}5 \textit{f}6) 25 ... \textit{Dc}8 and White cannot hold on to his extra material; e.g., 26 \textit{Df}4 f4 + 27 \textit{Dh}4 \textit{Dd}8 + 28 \textit{Dh}3 \textit{f}6 29 \textit{Dg}4 \textit{h}6 + 30 \textit{Dh}4 \textit{Dg}6 31 \textit{Dg}4 \textit{h}5 + 32 \textit{Dh}4 \textit{Df}3 mate.

White must therefore play 19 \textit{Dc}2 or \textit{Df}5, but in either case 19 ... \textit{Df}5 is strong, perhaps too strong.

My conclusion is that 17 \textit{Xe}3 must be rejected and that White must play 17 \textit{Dd}4. Black then has three possibilities:

![Diagram](image-url)

After 17 \textit{Dd}4 (analysis)

\textbf{A)} 17 ... \textit{Dg}6 18 \textit{Xxa}5 \textit{Dxa}5 19 \textit{Dxe}6 \textit{Dxc}4 20 \textit{Dxf}7 \textit{Df}8 21 \textit{Df}5 \textit{b}6 and White stands a little better (Korchnoi and Furman).

\textbf{B)} 17 ... \textit{Dg}4 18 \textit{Xxa}5 (if 18 \textit{Dc}1 \textit{Df}3) 18 ... \textit{Dxa}5 19 \textit{Dc}2 \textit{Dxe}2 20 \textit{Dxe}2 \textit{Dg}6 21 \textit{Dg}3 \textit{e}4 22 \textit{h}4 with chances for both sides.

\textbf{C)} 17 ... \textit{Dh}6! 18 \textit{Xe}3 (18 \textit{Xc}3 \textit{f}5 19 \textit{Df}1 \textit{Dxe}4 20 \textit{Dh}3 + \textit{Dg}8 21 \textit{Dxg}2 \textit{Dxc}2 and Black wins) and now Black—can get a decisive endgame advantage with 18 ... \textit{Dxe}3 + 19 \textit{f}xe3 \textit{Dg}4 followed by 20 ... \textit{Df}3. Also 18 ... \textit{Dd}4 19 \textit{Df}1 \textit{Dg}4 20 \textit{Dxg}2 \textit{Df}3 + 21 \textit{Dxf}3 \textit{Dxf}3 22 \textit{Dx}f3 \textit{f}5 is good because Korchnoi’s and Furman’s suggested 23 \textit{Dd}2 is answered by 23 ... \textit{Dd}4, while the more natural 23 \textit{Dg}3 is strongly answered by 23 ... \textit{Dg}6.

I hope I have shown with these variations that Black could have obtained a winning position with 16 ... \textit{Xg}2, which was indeed quietly assumed by others.

The move played by Petrosian is not bad either.

16 ... \textit{Df}5
17 \textit{Dd}3 \textit{Xxd}3

17 ... \textit{Dd}4 leads to the same position after 18 \textit{Dx}f5 \textit{Dxf}5 19 \textit{Dd}3 (19 0-0 \textit{Dh}4) 19 ... \textit{Dd}4, but Black can also try 19 ... \textit{Dd}6. It is strange that Petrosian limits his choices like this.

17 ... \textit{e}4 is a whole chapter in itself. White can react as follows:

\textbf{A)} 18 \textit{Dxe}4 ? \textit{Dx}e4 19 \textit{Dxe}4 \textit{Dg}8 20 0-0 \textit{Dxe}4 21 \textit{Dd}3 \textit{f}5 and Black wins.

\textbf{B)} 18 \textit{Dxe}4 \textit{Dxe}4 19 \textit{Dxe}6 \textit{Dg}5 !

18 ... \textit{Df}1 \textit{Dx}g2 19 \textit{Dxe}4 \textit{Dd}5 20 \textit{Df}1. White stands better, according to \textit{Deutsche Schachzeitung}, because 21 \textit{Dx}e4 is possible when the Black Rook withdraws. However, Black can play 20 ... \textit{Dg}4 21 \textit{Dx}g4 \textit{Dx}g4 22 \textit{h}3 \textit{Dh}4 with a difficult position for White (23 \textit{Dg}3 \textit{h}5 or 23 \textit{Dd}4 \textit{Dc}5!).

18 \textit{Dxd}3 \textit{Dd}4
19 0-0 \textit{Df}8
20 \textit{Dh}1
Black has a draw with 23 ... $\text{Axc2}$ 24 $\text{Axc2}$ $\text{Axc2}$ (24 ... $\text{Axc2}$ 25 $\text{Be2}$) 25 $\text{Axc2}$ $\text{Axc2}$ 26 $\text{Dxf6}$ $\text{Dxe3}$! 27 $\text{Be1}$ (27 $\text{Df3}$ $\text{Dxe3}$) 27 ... $\text{Dxg2}$ 28 $\text{Dg1}$ $\text{Dg6}$ 29 $\text{Dd7}$ + $\text{Df7}$ 30 $\text{Dxe5}$ $\text{Dxf4}$ 31 $\text{Dxf6}$ $\text{gx6}$, as shown by Kholmov. Perhaps 26 $\text{fxe5}$ is worth trying as a winning attempt.

23 $\text{cxd3}$

An important alternative is 20 ... $\text{Ae8}$. White gets the advantage after 21 $\text{Dd4}$ $\text{Dxd5}$ 22 $\text{c3}$ $\text{f5}$ 23 $\text{Dg3}$ $\text{f4}$ 24 $\text{cxd4}$ $\text{f6}$ 25 $\text{fxg3}$. O'Kelly, however, points out the Exchange sacrifice 22 ... $\text{Bxc3}$ 23 $\text{Bxc3}$ when Black has just enough compensation.

21 $\text{f4}$

In Schack Bulletin 47, 21 $\text{Dd4}$ is correctly given as better. However, the possibility 21 ... $\text{Bxa2}$ is not mentioned: 22 $\text{Dxf6}$ $\text{Ag6}$ 23 $\text{Dxe4}$.

21 ... $\text{Bxg3}$ 22 $\text{Dxe4}$

22 ... $\text{Bxa2}$ leads to nice continuations such as 23 $\text{Dxf6}$ $\text{Axg2!}$. Then 24 $\text{Dd7} + \text{Ag7}$ 25 $\text{fxe5}$ $\text{Axc2}$ 26 $\text{Axd4}$+ leads to the beautiful King maneuver 26 ... $\text{Ag8}$ 27 $\text{Axb6}$ + $\text{Gb8}$ 28 $\text{Axd7}$ + $\text{Gb8}$ 29 $\text{Axb6} + \text{Db8}$ 30 $\text{Dh4} + \text{Db8}$ and Black wins. White must therefore play 23 $\text{Dd2}$! (Korchnoi and Furman), after which

This has not been commented on anywhere. Yet 23 $\text{Dxd3}$, with the idea of attacking the Knight's position, is interesting. A drawn position arises after the long, practically forced continuation 23 ... $\text{Bxc2}$ 24 $\text{g3}$ $\text{Bxa2!}$ 25 $\text{Dxf6}$ $\text{Ag8}$ 26 $\text{fxe5}$ $\text{Bxc2}$ 27 $\text{Dg4}$ h5 28 $\text{Df2}$! (28 $\text{Dc3}$ $\text{Axb2}$ + 29 $\text{Dg1}$ $\text{Db3}$) 28 ... $\text{Axh2}$ $\text{Axh2}$ 30 $\text{Axd4}$ $\text{h5}$! (31 $\text{d6}$ $\text{Gc8}$ 32 $\text{Axe4} + \text{Dd8}$).

23 ... $\text{Ae2}$

24 $\text{Dd2}$

Now 24 $\text{g3}$ is bad because of 24 ... $\text{Axa2}$ 25 $\text{Dxf6}$ $\text{Ag8}$, etc.

24 ... $\text{Bxd2}$

25 $\text{Dxd2}$ $\text{f5}$

Sharply seen. Examine also these lines:

A) 25 ... $\text{Bf6}$? 26 $\text{f5}$, etc.

B) 25 ... $\text{Dd8}$ 26 $\text{fxe5}$ $\text{fxe5}$ 27 $\text{Dxf7}$.

C) 25 ... $\text{Bc8}$? 26 $\text{fxe5}$ $\text{Bc2}$ (26 ... $\text{fxe5}$ 27 $\text{Dxf7}$ $\text{Bc2}$ 28 $\text{Df1}$ $\text{Bxa2}$ 29 $\text{g4}$) 27 $\text{Dd4}$ $\text{fxe5}$ 28 $\text{g4}$! with slightly better play for White.

D) 25 ... $\text{exf4}$ 26 $\text{Bxf4}$ $\text{Bc8}$ 27 $\text{Dxf6}$ with advantage to White.

26 $\text{Dxe5}$ $\text{Bxe5}$

27 $\text{Bc1}$ $\text{Bc2}$

28 $\text{Bc1}$ $\text{Bc2}$

28 $\text{Dc1}$ is recommended by Panov. The luminous point is 28 ... $\text{Axe5}$? 29 $\text{Df3}$ $\text{Ac2}$ 30 $\text{De6}$! $\text{Bc8}$ 31 $\text{Dg1}$ $\text{Dd7}$ 32 $\text{Df1}$ winning a piece. After 28 ... $\text{Db4}$ (28 ... $\text{Dd4}$? 29 $\text{Dc4}$ b5 30 $\text{Dxb6}$ little is happening: 29 $\text{Dd4}$ $\text{Dxd5}$ and although the Black Kingside pawns are indeed weak, if White attacks them Black will get the c-file. Furthermore, Black has the advantage on the Queenside. White

28 ... $\text{Db4}$ was suggested here, with the idea 29 $\text{Dc4}$ $\text{Dxd3}$ 30 $\text{e6}$ $\text{fxe6}$ 31 $\text{Dd6}$ $\text{Bf7}$ 32 $\text{Dxf5}$? $\text{Axf7}$. Better seems 30 g3 and White stands a little better (30 ... $\text{Bb5}$ 31 $\text{Dg5}$).

29 $\text{Bc3}$ $\text{Dc2}$

30 $\text{Dh3}$

Naturally.

30 ... $\text{Dxe5}$

31 $\text{Df3}$ $\text{Dxd5}$

Disapproved by Kholmov. He gives 31 ... $\text{Dc2}$ as correct, with the variation 32 $\text{Dh7}$ $\text{Dd4}$ 33 $\text{Dxf7}$ $\text{Axh7}$ 34 $\text{h4}$ $\text{Dxf3}$ 35 $\text{Bxf3}$ $\text{Aa4}$, drawing. But 33 $\text{Dxf7}$ is ridiculous and must be replaced with the immediate 33 $\text{h4}$. Then the Black f-pawns only make it more difficult to stop the h-pawn.

32 $\text{Dxh7}$
It is possible to say that this is the decisive mistake. It is much more logical to mobilize the majority on the Queenside immediately with 32 ... b5. In Schaakbulletin 47, a variation ending in a draw is given: 32 ... b5 33 h4 a5 34 h5 b4 35 axf7 a4 36 h6 d6 37 h7 h6 + 38 g1 b3 39 axb3 a3 and White has nothing better than repetition of moves with 40 f8+ and 41xf7+. Foreign magazines again fail to comment here.

33 h4 dxe3

This is the move generally considered to be the decisive mistake, and it is also mentioned that 33 ... d4 holds the draw. This is correct as far as the Rook-endgame is concerned. Korchnoi and Furman analyze: 34 dxe4 dxe4 35 h2 f6 36 g3 g4 + 37 h3 g6, or 36 h3 d3 + 37 g3 f4; also, 34 e5 d3 35 dxe7 f4 36 h5 f3 37 gxf4 dxe3 38 g2 h4 + 39 g1 f2 f3 + 40 e2 f6 41 h6 f5 leads to a draw, according to them. The variation is rather long and thus not quite convincing. On the 35th move, worthy of consideration is 35 d7+ followed by 36 xf7. Kholmov, however, shows an even more convincing way to keep White's advantage: 34 g5! f6 35 h3 and Black's f-pawns again get in the way of his pieces.

34 xf7

If 34 h5, 34 ... g4 follows. Then 35 xf7 is too late: 35 ... d1 + 36 g1 37 h2 g4 + , drawing.

34 ... d1 +

A little better is 34 ... c8 to offer the exchange of Rooks after 35 h5 d1 + 36 h2 d7. But after 37 b8 + c7 38 a3 or 37 ... d8 38 d8 + d8 39 g3 White keeps matters firmly under control.

35 h2 a1

Perhaps still 35 ... c8, although now 36 h5 can be replaced by 36 g3.

36 h5 f4

36 ... a2 is equally hopeless after 37 h4 (37 ... f1 + 38 g3 a3 + 39 f3).

37 xf4 a2

38 e4!

Fischer has played the whole second half of the game very accurately. The text move prevents xg2+ because the Black Knight is hanging.

38 ... g2

39 g3 a5

40 e5 Black resigns.
... a6 because he feared that White would then castle short and the move a7-a6 would just be a lost tempo. We will see that Spassky has a different opinion about this.

9 0-0

The first significant decision. About five years before this game, Fischer had begun to prefer 9...\(\text{w}e2\)2, intending to castle long. Then he lost to Larsen in the above-mentioned game, which went 9...\(\text{w}e2\) a6 10 0-0 0-0 \(\text{w}c7\) 11 \(\text{g}d7\) 12 \(\text{h}d4\) \(\text{d}c5\) 13 \(\text{g}5\) \(\text{b}5\) 14 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{q}d7\) 15 \(\text{g}g2\) \(\text{b}4\) 16 \(\text{d}e2\) \(\text{d}xb3\) + 17 \(\text{a}xb3\) a5 and the Black attack came first. The cause was mainly White’s twelfth move, which, as indicated by Velimirovic, should have been 12 \(\text{g}5\). Nevertheless, a year later Fischer returned to the old system with Kingside castling in two games of his match with Larsen, and he won both of them.

9 ... a6

Spassky sees a7-a6 as a waiting move rather than a tempo-loss. Other possibilities in this much-played position are:

A) 9 ... \(\text{d}a5\) (Botvinnik’s move) 10 f4 b6 11 e5 (White must play sharply because after 11 \(\text{w}f3\) \(\text{b}7\) the threat of the Exchange sacrifice \(\text{a}8\)-\(\text{a}8\)-\(\text{c}8\)-\(\text{c}6\) is strong) 11 ... \(\text{d}e8\) 12 f5 dxe5 13 fxe6 \(\text{d}xb3\) 14 \(\text{d}f6\) \(\text{w}d6\) 15 \(\text{w}xd6\) \(\text{a}xd6\) 16 axb3 \(\text{a}xe6\) 17 \(\text{d}a7\) and the endgame is a little better for White (Kostro-Doda, 1957).

B) 9 ... \(\text{d}d7\) 10 f4 and now:

B1) 10 ... \(\text{d}xd4\) 11 \(\text{a}xd4\) \(\text{d}c6\) 12 \(\text{d}d3\) b5 13 e5 dxe5 14 fxe5 \(\text{d}d7\) 15 \(\text{d}d4\) \(\text{d}xe4\) 16 \(\text{d}xe4\) \(\text{d}c5\) 17 \(\text{d}xc5\) \(\text{d}x\text{e}5\) + 18 \(\text{d}f1\) \(\text{d}d4\) and Black stands a little better (Jimenez-Lein, 1972). White should play 12 \(\text{w}e2\).

B2) 10 ... \(\text{d}c8\) 11 f5 \(\text{d}xd4\) 12 \(\text{d}xd4\) exf5 13 \(\text{d}d3\)! and White obtains reasonable compensation for the pawn (Fischer-Larsen, 5th match game 1971).

C) 9 ... \(\text{d}xd4\) 10 \(\text{d}xd4\) b5 11 \(\text{d}xb5\) \(\text{d}a6\) 12 c4 \(\text{d}xb5\) 13 cxb5 \(\text{d}xe4\) 14 \(\text{w}g4\) \(\text{d}f6\) 15 \(\text{w}e2\) \(\text{d}d7\) and now White can gain the advantage with 16 \(\text{d}a1\).

10 f4

After this move Black can subject the e4-pawn to constant pressure. However, if White makes a waiting move (say, 10 a3) in order to support the e-pawn later with f2-f3, then 10 ... \(\text{d}a5\) is good for Black.

10 ... \(\text{d}xd4\)

11 \(\text{d}xd4\) b5

Larsen, who also castled at this point in his game against Fischer in the 1970 Interzonal tournament, remarks in his book, *Ich spiele auf Sieg*, that he did not want to play 8

12 a3

Little can be achieved by such restrained play. Fischer apparently still wishes to play his favorite advance, f4-f5. However, the most suitable way to exploit White’s opening advantage at this point, as shown by later practice, is 12 \(\text{w}e2\). After 12 ... dxe5 13 fxe5 \(\text{d}d7\) 14 \(\text{d}e4\) \(\text{d}b7\) 15 \(\text{d}d6\) \(\text{d}xd6\) 16 \(\text{d}xe6\) \(\text{w}g5\) a difficult position arises with chances for both sides, but White’s credentials are probably slightly better. An example from practice is 17 \(\text{w}e2\) e5 18 \(\text{d}e3\) \(\text{w}g6\) 19 \(\text{d}ad1\) \(\text{d}f8\) 20 c3 \(\text{d}e4\) 21 \(\text{w}f2\) and Black stood well (Hamman-Gligoric, Skopje 1972). However, 17 \(\text{w}f2\) is stronger.

12 ... \(\text{d}b7\)

13 \(\text{d}d3\) a5!
ficulty. There is no longer time to advance the f-pawn, so Fischer decides to push the e-pawn.

14 e5 dxe5
15 fxe5 Dd7
16 Dxb5

White must carry on. If 16 Dc4, then after 16 ... Dxe4 17 Dxe4 Dc5, a position arises similar to that in variation B1 after Black's ninth move.

16 ... Dc5
17 Dxc5

After this, Black has two mighty Bishops raking the board. Although it is true that after 17 Wc2 Dxb3 18 cxb3 Wa6 19 Dd1 Wd5 20 a4 Wxb3 White's position collapses, Olafsson's suggestion 17 Dc3 keeps White's feet more firmly on the ground. The point is that White suffers no material loss after 17 Dxb3 18 Wxb3 a4 19 Wd3, although Black would want good compensation for the pawn; e.g., 19 Wd5 20 Wf2 Wc8 (prevents 21 c4 and threatens 21 ... Wa6) 21 Dc3 Wc6 and White's pawn preponderance on the Queenside is of little significance.

Fischer preserves his "Sicilian Bishop" with the text move, but he gets little joy from it. The Black Bishops will exert a paralyzing effect.

17 ... Dxc5+

Initially it was thought that this move indicated Spassky's intention to play for a win, but a closer analysis shows that the alternative, trading Queens, is no guarantee of an easy draw: 18 ... Wxd3 19 cxd3 and now:

A) 19 ... Wa6 20 Dc7 Dxd3 21 Bf1! with advantage (21 ... Ba8 22 Dxe6, or 21 ... Dc3 22 Dc3 Dd8 23 Dd1).

B) 19 ... Dc6 21 Bf1 Dxb5 21 Dxc5 Dxd3 22 Dd1 with a small but lasting advantage for White.

19 We2

A very passive move by Fischer's standards, which shows that he underestimated the dangers facing his position. Otherwise he would have chosen 19 Wg3, to head for a draw; e.g., 19 ... Wxg3 20 hxg3 and now:

A) 20 ... a4 21 Dc4 Da5. Black now has the strong threat 22 Da6 which indirectly threatens the e5-pawn. White can save himself with 22 b4 axb3 23 cxb3 Da6 24 a4.

B) 20 ... Da6 21 Dc4 Dxb5 22 Dxb5 Dd4 23 c3 Dxe5 and, although the situation is virtually balanced, Black stands just a little better because of his center pawns.

19 ... Ad8

Spassky thought about this for nineteen minutes. His judgment is correct and based on the following grounds:

First: White will be compelled to move his Rook from the f-file because of the threat 20 ... Ead2, and thus White's pressure against f7 will be reduced.

Second: The Bishop on b7 has the square a8 available in answer to a possible Dd5-d6.

Third: The d-file which White obtains is of only secondary importance because the struggle will take place mainly on the Kingside.

20 Dd1 Dxd1
21 Dxd1 h5

An almost thematic continuation. Black threatens to advance the pawn to h3 and thereby strengthen the grip his Bishop-pair exerts on White's position. Nevertheless, there are good alternatives:

A) 21 ... Ef8, recommended by Nci. 22 Dd6 is not possible now because of 22 ... Wxg2+ 23 Dg2 Dxe5 and Black wins. Nci gives the continuation 22 Dxd8+ Wxd8 23 c3 Wg5 24 Dd4 (24 ... Wxg2+ was threatened) 24 ... Wc1+ 25 Dd1 Dd5 with more than enough compensation for the pawn. However, it is an open question whether it does more than merely win back a pawn on d4 after 26 Wc2 Wf4 27 Wc2.

B) 21 ... Dc3. This direct move with the dual threats 22 ... Wxe5 and 22 ... Df4 puts White in great difficulties. If he tries to resist with 22 Dd6 Dc6 23 Df1 Df4 24 Df2 he faces 24 ... Wg4! (Olafsson) with the crushing threat 25 ... Wh3. More stubborn is 23 Dc4 (instead of 23 Df1) 23 ... Df4 24 Wg1. After 24 ... a4 25 Da2, 25 ... h5 follows with even stronger effect than in the game.

22 Dd6

Reshevsky rejects this move and feels that White should use the Knight for defense with 22 Dd4. With hindsight, there is certainly something to be said for it; for instance, after 22 ... h4 23 Df3 Wf4 24 h3 White stands passively indeed.
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But there is no immediate way to exploit that situation. The text move can be justified from a practical point of view: in many lines White has the possibility of sacrificing on f7, and the Knight also has the possibility of returning to the defense via e4. On the other hand, the strongpoint on d6 can become shaky, as will become apparent.

22 ... La8
23 Le4

Fischer must have played this strong defensive move, which protects the Queen on e2 and in general brings the Bishop back into the game, purely by intuition. Attempts to re-exert pressure against f7 fail: 23 Lf1 h4 24 Lxf7 h3! (even stronger than 24 ... Lxf7 25 Le6 h3) 25 Lxg5 hxg2+ and mate next move.

23 ... h4

Once again 23 ... Le3 comes into consideration. White would have no better than 24 Ld3 Lf4 25 Le4

... xe5 (not 25 ... bh4 26 g3 Lxg3 27 Lxa8 Lxa8 28 Wg2 and White wins) 26 g3! Lxe4 + 27 Lxe4 Lxe4 + 28 Lxe4 Re5 and Black's strong Bishop gives him the advantage in the endgame.

24 h3

Although not as bad as was generally thought, this move is clearly an example of superficial calculation. Other moves:

A) 24 Ld3 is not as easy to refute as it seems. After 24 ... Lc1 + 25 Ld1 Lxb2 the Black Queen is somewhat out of play and Black must constantly watch out for White's combinational possibility Lxf7. If now 26 Lxf7 h3 27 Lxh6 + Lh8 28 Lf7 + Lxf7 29 Wh5 + Wg8 30 Wxh3 Wxc2 31 Ld8 + Lf8 White has nothing more to say.

B) 24 Le4 Lxe5 25 Lxc5 Lxc5 26 h3.

After 26 h3 (analysis)

Opinions are divided on this position. Some find that Black has a great advantage, others that White does not stand much worse. Indeed, it is not easy to find the best plan for Black. After much searching, I think the solution lies in 26 ... Le5! After 27 Wg1 Lxc8 White is faced with the threat 28 ... Lxc5 + and must make the concession of choosing a square for his Bishop at this unsuitable moment. After either 28 Le3 Ld4 or 28 Ld3 Lg5 followed by the advance of the e-pawn (with White's Bishop no longer on the a2-g8 diagonal, the f7-square is no longer so weak), Black is clearly in a position to control matters.

24 ... Lc3!

At last, and now with even greater effect. Destruction is threatened with 25 Le4 and 25 ... Wg3. White has less to fear from 24 ... Wg3 25 Le4 (but not 25 Ld3 Lxg2 + 26 Lxg2 Wxe1 + 27 Lh2 Wxe5 + and wins) 25 ... Lxe5 26 Lxc5 Lxc5 and the same position as in the above variation B arises, but with White having an extra move.

25 Wg4 Lxe5

Black correctly keeps the Queens on the board. The endgame after 25 ... Wg4 26 hxg4 does not offer much:

A) 26 ... h3 27 Lf1 Lf4 28 Ld4 and White keeps his head above water.

B) 26 ... Lf4 (the Knight is prevented from going to c4) 27 Le2!

(much stronger than 27 Lf1 h3 28 Lf1 f6 with overwhelming play for Black) 27 ... Lxe5 28 Ld4 followed by 29 Lf3 and the White position holds together.

26 Lxe4

For the moment, White holds his extra pawn. 26 Lxf7 is again incorrect because after 26 ... Lxf7 27 Lxe6 + Lf6! (not 27 ... Wxe6 28 Ld7 +) 28 Lf1 + Lf7 White has nothing for the piece.

26 ... Kg5

With gain of tempo, this frees a square for the King so that the Rook may be used for attack along the half-open h-file. On the other hand, the position of the Black King is weakened, which White can exploit. Also, 26 ... Kg5 27 We1 (not Nei's suggested 27 Wd4 which leads to a very favorable endgame for Black after 27 ... Wxd4 28 Lxd4 Lf6) achieves little, but Olafsson's recommendation, the bold pawn-
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grab 26 ... \( \text{Qxb2} \) is very strong. Black meets the direct attack 27 \( \text{Qxf7} \) with the counteroffer 27 ... \( \text{Qxg2} \) + !.

29 \( \text{Qxd1} \) Black can try:

A) 28 ... \( \text{Qxf7} \) 29 \( \text{Qd7} \) + with an immediate draw by perpetual check.
B) 28 ... \( \text{Qg3} \)?? 29 \( \text{Qh6} \) + . All(!) commentators thought that White had a perpetual check here—all except Donner, who after initially making the same mistake, discovered that Black gets mated after 29 ... \( \text{Qg7} \) 30 \( \text{Qd7} \) + !

C) 28 ... \( \text{Qe4} \) ! 29 \( \text{Qf1} \) \( \text{Qxf7} \) 30 \( \text{Qd7} \) + ! \( \text{Qf6} \) 31 \( \text{Qd8} \) + \( \text{Qxe5} \) 32 \( \text{Qe7} \), and despite everything, Black cannot avoid a draw.

28 \( \text{Qb5} \)

Fischer again takes his Knight out of play and thereby lands in a hopeless situation. Instead, he can use the weakened position of the Black King by showing that the Knight was not really threatened after all: 28 \( \text{b4} \) !. After 28 ... \( \text{Qxb4} \) (the point is that 28 ... \( \text{Qxd6} \) 29 \( \text{Qxd6} \) \( \text{Qxd6} \) 30 \( \text{Qxg5} \) + leads to perpetual check) 29 \( \text{Qxb4} \) \( \text{Qxb4} \) 30 \( \text{Qe2} \) White has the opportunity to play the Knight back to \( \text{c4} \) and to further neutralize the position with \( \text{Qf3} \). Since Black would have pawns on only one wing, his winning chances would be limited.

28 ... \( \text{Qg7} \)

Threatening the decisive \( \text{Qf8-h8} \) + h4. The Knight must return to the defense.

29 \( \text{Qd4} \) \( \text{Qh8} \)

After 27 ... \( \text{Qxg2} \) + (analysis)

The Bishop cannot be taken, but after 28 \( \text{Qh2} \) \( \text{Qxc2} \) 29 \( \text{Qh8} \) + (the White Knight is in the way!) 29 ... \( \text{Qxf7} \) 30 \( \text{Qd7} \) + \( \text{Qe8} \) 31 \( \text{Qd8} \) + \( \text{Qxd8} \) 32 \( \text{Qxf8} \) + \( \text{Qc7} \) White has no perpetual check and the Black King escapes to the Queenside.

What better move does White have after 26 ... \( \text{Qxb2} \)? The attacking attempt 27 \( \text{Qd3} \) is easily brushed aside with 27 ... \( \text{Qh6} \). The best is 27 \( \text{Qb3} \), defending \( \text{c2} \), maintaining the threat 28 \( \text{Qxf7} \), and at the same time allowing the Knight to spring to \( \text{c4} \). However, Black has regained his pawn and can keep a solid positional advantage with 27 ... \( \text{g5} \).

27 \( \text{Qg4} \) \( \text{Qc5} \)

Black correctly saw that after 27 ... \( \text{Qd8} \) White could force a draw with 28 \( \text{Qxf7} \). After 28 ... \( \text{Qxd1} \) +

The first reports and analyses from Reykjavik all mentioned that Spassky had missed a win here. Not with 29 ... \( \text{Qd6} \), when 30 \( \text{Qf5} \) + draws at once. The important alternative is 29 ... \( \text{Qd8} \). Now 30 \( \text{Qxe6} \) \( \text{fxe6} \) 31 \( \text{Qxd8} \) \( \text{Qe1} \) + and 30 \( \text{Qf5} \) + (i.e. \( \text{Qf6} \) don't work, so the Knight must be defended. After 30 ... \( \text{Qc3} \) Black has these possibilities:

A) 30 ... \( \text{Qh8} \) (with the thought that now White can't exchange Queens on \( \text{c3} \), as he can in the game) and now:

A1) 31 \( \text{Qd3} \). The intention is to answer 31 ... \( \text{Qh4} \) with the constantly recurring 32 \( \text{Qf5} \) + However; Black simply plays 31 ... \( \text{Qg8} \) (Nef's suggestion of 31 ... \( \text{Qd6} \) is also good, but 31 ... \( \text{Qf8} \) is weaker because of 32 \( \text{Qf1} \) with counter-attack) and the threat 32 ... \( \text{Qh4} \) is even stronger than before.

A2) 31 ... \( \text{Qf1} \). First given by Smyslov in 64. The idea is the same as in variation A but the execution is more refined. It is nevertheless hardly sufficient after 31 ... \( \text{Qh4} \) 32 \( \text{Qf5} \) + \( \text{Qxf5} \) 33 \( \text{Qxf5} \) \( \text{Qg4} \) 34 \( \text{Qxc5} \) \( \text{Qxg2} \) 35 \( \text{Qxa5} \) (the showy 35 ... \( \text{Qd5} \) leads to a lost pawn endgame after 35 ... \( \text{Qxd5} \) 36 \( \text{Qxd5} \) \( \text{Qxd5} \) 37 \( \text{Qxg2} \) \( \text{a4} \) 35 ... \( \text{Qf3} \) 36 \( \text{b3} \) (Byrne's 36 ... \( \text{Qxf1} \) \( \text{Qxb2} \) + is certainly not better) 36 ... \( \text{Qg6} \) and penetration by the Black King cannot be stopped (37 \( \text{Qa7} \) \( \text{f6} \)).

A2) 31 ... \( \text{Qxe6} \) ! \( \text{Qxd4} \) 32 \( \text{Qxd4} \) (this is where the advantage of \( \text{c2-c3} \) shows) 32 ... \( \text{Qxe6} \) 33 \( \text{Qxg5} \) + \( \text{Qg6} \) 34 \( \text{Qe5} \) + , and although three pawns are insufficient compensation for a piece in this position, an eventual win for Black is problematical.

After 34 ... \( \text{Qe5} \) + (analysis)

Olaussen now gives 34 ... \( \text{Qh7} \). Nei goes 34 ... \( \text{Qf6} \) 35 \( \text{Qc7} \) + \( \text{Qh6} \) 36 \( \text{Qd5} \) \( \text{Qf4} \) + \( \text{Qg5} \) 38 \( \text{Qf3} \) with good winning chances for Black.

B) 30 ... \( \text{Qd6} \) 31 \( \text{Qg1} \) \( \text{Qe3} \) + 32 \( \text{Qf1} \) (after 32 ... \( \text{Qg1} \) \( \text{Qh3} \) 33 \( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qf4} \) 34 \( \text{Qd7} \) \( \text{Qg6} \) the threat 35 ... \( \text{Qf5} \) is deadly) 32 ... \( \text{Qg3} \) 33 \( \text{Qe2} \) \( \text{Qf4} \) + 34 \( \text{Qg1} \) \( \text{Qh2} \) + 35 \( \text{Qh1} \) \( \text{Qh8} \) and now not 36 \( \text{Qf1} \) \( \text{Qh3} \) 37 \( \text{Qxf4} \) \( \text{Qxf4} \) + 38 \( \text{Qg1} \) \( \text{Qd3} \) + and wins, but 36 \( \text{Qxe6} \) \( \text{fxe6} \) 37 ... \( \text{Qd7} \) + . Here the weakened position of the Black King
The Art of Chess Analysis

Game Eight

Fischer-Spassky

Perhaps influenced by Spassky's strong handling of the opening in the fourth game, Fischer decided to open with 1 e4 the next two times he had the White pieces. And with success: he won both games. Having thus built up a 3½-3½ lead, in the tenth game he returned to his old, trusted 1 e4. Spassky answered it classically, and after an interesting opening phase they went into a middlegame full of unclear combinational twists and turns. Fischer, as usual, pressed on very purposefully, and, when Spassky failed to play with absolute accuracy, he converted his small material advantage into victory in a virtuoso endgame performance.

The game is fascinating throughout all its phases, and in my opinion it is the best game of the entire match.

32 ... $\text{c3}

This Queen exchange removes all danger. The resulting endgame is a dead draw. That the players still continued for so long indicates the fighting spirit that characterized the whole match.

32 ... $\text{xc3}$
33 bxc3 $\text{e5}$
34 $\text{d7}$ $\text{f6}$
35 $\text{g1}$ $\text{xc3}$
36 $\text{e2}$ $\text{e5}$
37 $\text{f1}$ $\text{c8}$
38 $\text{h5}$ $\text{c7}$
39 $\text{xc7}$ $\text{xc7}$
40 a4 $\text{e7}$
41 $\text{e2}$ f5
42 $\text{d3}$ $\text{e5}$
43 c4 $\text{d6}$
44 $\text{f7}$ $\text{g3}$
45 $\text{e5}$ + Drawn.

Again plays a role.

C) 30 ... $\text{e3}$. Given by Donner. Black keeps the more direct attempts in reserve and maintains his grip on the position. It is difficult to find a defense to the threatened $\text{d8-h8-h4}$. White can just survive, however, by playing 31 $\text{e2}$ with the neutralizing threat 32 $\text{f3}$. After 31 ... $\text{xd4} 32 \text{xd4 f5!} 33 \text{h5} \text{xd4} 34 \text{cxh4} g4 White is again obliged to offer a piece: 35 hxg4 $\text{xe2} 36 \text{g5} + \text{ff7} 37 \text{gxh5}$. His drawing chances are better here than in variation A3.

All things considered, there is no reason to fault Spassky's continuation. His mistake comes two moves later.

30 $\text{f3} \text{xf3}$

30 ... $\text{f4}$ is an interesting try. After 31 $\text{xf4} \text{gx4} 32 \text{e2}$ Black has more than sufficient compensation for the pawn, and 31 $\text{xf5} + \text{gxf5} 32 \text{hgf5}$ seems no more attractive because after driving the Knight back Black can capture on h3 with great force. However, White still has a way out:

A) 32 ... $\text{h5} 33 \text{exe6} + \text{fxe6} 34 \text{exe6}$ and White has four pawns for the piece while h3 is defended.

B) 32 ... $\text{f6} 33 \text{e1}$ (Donner) and White saves himself.

31 $\text{xf3} \text{d6?}$

In slight time trouble, Spassky must have overlooked the spoiling answer to this. The many-sided 31 ... $\text{h4}$ is required to continue the attack. Whereas White can force the exchange of a pair of heavy pieces with 32 $\text{xf1} \text{xf4} 33 \text{e2}$, this would hardly stop the attack: 33 ... $\text{xf1} + 34 \text{xf1} \text{ed6} 35 \text{g1} (35 \text{g1} is even worse) 35 ... $\text{h2} + 36 \text{f2} \text{c5} + 37 \text{f1} \text{e5} +$ and Black wins two Queenside pawns, obtaining a passed a-pawn, for if 38 $\text{e2} \text{exb2} 39 \text{a4} + 40 \text{d1} \text{f2} + 41 \text{f2} \text{d3} + 42 \text{f1} \text{g3} 43 \text{e2} \text{c1} +$ and mate. You can see how dangerous the Black attack remains despite the reduced material.
and Black's initiative endured into the endgame.

Spassky used the Marshall frequently as an attacking weapon in his younger years. Now he plays the Breyer Variation almost exclusively, as in this game.

For the first time in the match—and not unexpectedly—Spassky plays an "open" defense. Just as he usually replies to $1 \text{d}4$ with an orthodox defense, so he often answers $1 \text{e}4$ with $1 \ldots \text{c}5$.

2 $\text{d}3$ $\text{d}6$
3 $\text{h}5$ $\text{a}6$
4 $\text{a}4$

In game sixteen of this match, Fischer reverted to the Exchange Variation with which he had beaten Portisch, Jimenez, and Gligoric quickly and convincingly in the 1966 Havana Olympiad.

4 \ldots $\text{f}6$
5 0-0 $\text{e}7$
6 $\text{e}1$ $\text{b}5$
7 $\text{b}3$ $\text{d}6$

In Santa Monica 1966, Spassky prepared the way for the Marshall Attack against Fischer with 7 \ldots 0-0. The result was a draw after 35 moves: 8 $\text{c}3$ $\text{d}5$ 9 $\text{exd}5$ $\text{cxd}5$ 10 $\text{exf}5$ $\text{exf}5$ 11 $\text{dxe}5$ $\text{c}6$ 12 $\text{g}3$ $\text{d}6$ 13 $\text{dxe}5$ 14 $\text{b}1$ $\text{g}4$ 15 $\text{d}3$ $\text{c}5$ 16 $\text{d}xc5$ $\text{exf}5$ 17 $\text{h}3$ $\text{d}8$ 18 $\text{f}4$ $\text{b}6$ 19 $\text{d}3$ $\text{g}5$ 20 $\text{e}3$ $\text{x}e3$ 21 $\text{f}xe3$ $\text{d}2$

8 $\text{c}3$ 0-0
9 $\text{h}3$ $\text{g}8$
10 $\text{d}4$ $\text{bd}7$

In 11 $\text{db}2$

Fischer always used to play 11 $\text{db}4$, an immediate attempt to question the efficacy of Black's time-consuming Knight maneuver.

According to Byrne, Byrne's game against Spassky in Moscow 1971 was probably Fischer's reason for trying something else this time. The then World Champion reached comfortable equality with Black in that game: 11 \ldots $\text{cxd}4$ 12 $\text{exd}4$ $\text{db}6$ 13 $\text{a}2$ $\text{c}5$ 14 $\text{f}2$ $\text{cxd}4$ 15 $\text{h}3$ $\text{e}8$ 16 $\text{dxe}4$ $\text{a}8$ 17 $\text{b}3$ $\text{b}7$, etc.

Fischer also once tried the other direct method against the Breyer, 11 $\text{c}4$, versus Portisch in Santa Monica 1966. It was a gripping game in all its phases, though it finally ended in a draw. After 11 $\text{c}4$ $\text{c}6$ 12 $\text{c}5$ $\text{xc}7$ 13 $\text{xc}6$ $\text{xc}6$ 14 $\text{g}5$ $\text{xc}4$ 15 $\text{x}f6$ $\text{xf}6$ 16 $\text{xc}4$ $\text{xd}5$ 17 $\text{db}2$ $\text{d}3$ 18 $\text{xc}1$ $\text{d}3$ 19 $\text{db}6$ $\text{f}4$ 20 $\text{xf}6$
difficult complications arose.

11 \ldots $\text{b}7$
12 $\text{e}2$ $\text{e}8$
13 $\text{b}4$

At this point White has the choice of bringing the $\text{db}2$ to the Kingside with 13 $\text{f}1$ or beginning an immediate action on the Queen's side. The text move initiates the latter plan.

13 \ldots $\text{f}8$

A direct reaction with 13 \ldots $\text{a}5$ only leads to difficulties after 14 $\text{g}3$ $\text{b}4$ 15 $\text{cxb}4$ $\text{xb}4$ 16 $\text{a}5$ $\text{c}6$ (or 16 \ldots $\text{a}8$ 17 $\text{d}5$) 17 $\text{xb}7$ $\text{xb}7$ 18 $\text{b}3$ and White has gained the pair of Bishops at no cost (Suetin-Tringov, Titovo Uzice 1966).

14 $\text{d}4$

After this game, this immediate attack became fashionable. Formerly, White always aimed for $\text{c}3$-$\text{c}4$.

14 \ldots $\text{d}6$

And this is currently the most common reply. Black tempts the a-pawn to advance farther and will later aim for $\text{c}7$-$\text{c}5$. Alternatives are:

A) 14 \ldots $\text{c}5$ 15 $\text{bxc}5$ $\text{dxc}4$ 16 $\text{dxc}4$ $\text{dxc}5$ and White stands better, although it is not entirely clear (Balashov-Podgaets).

B) 14 \ldots $\text{d}5$. In principle Black's pieces are ideally placed to justify this advance. After 15 $\text{dxe}5$ $\text{dxe}4$ 16 $\text{dxe}4$ $\text{dxe}4$ 17 $\text{g}5$ $\text{f}6$ 18 $\text{dxe}4$ $\text{dxe}4$ 19 $\text{dxe}4$ $\text{dxe}5$ 20 $\text{d}4$

$\text{d}x\text{f}3$ + 21 $\text{x}f3$ $\text{d}e$ 22 $\text{b}1$ $\text{c}8$ White has not achieved much (Vasiukov-Zuidema, Wijk aan Zee 1973). More enterprising is $\text{d}5$ $\text{dxe}4$ 16 $\text{f}4$ as in Vasiukov-Kholmov, Dubna 1973. White stood a tiny bit better after 16

\ldots $\text{exf}3$ 17 $\text{dxf}3$ $\text{dxe}5$ 18 $\text{dxe}5$

$\text{d}6$ 19 $\text{b}4$. 
C1) 14 ... a5. This other way of forming a square of pawns seems strange at first sight. It was popular for a while until it was discovered that 15 bxa5 axa5 16 5b1 leads to advantage for White in all variations; e.g.:  

C1) 16 5a6 17 d5 5a8 18 5a3 c5 19 dx6 5xc6 20 5b4 (Belyavsky-A. Petrosan 1973).  

C2) 16 ... 5a8 17 axb5 exd4 18 5xd4 5xe4 19 5xe4 5xe4 20 5xe4! 5xe4 21 5g5 5h4 and now 22 g3! is the correct reply to maintain the advantage, according to Geller. Instead, White played 22 5xf7 5xf7 23 5g5 5e4 24 5f3 + 5f6 25 5xf6 5e1+ and Black just managed to save himself (Geller-Portisch 1973).  

15 a5 5bd7  
16 5b2  

In Savon-Vogt, Skopje 1972, White let his opening advantage slip away entirely with 16 5b1 d5! White must pay attention first of all to the center.  

16 5b8  

Black prepares c7-c5 by indirectly protecting the e-pawn. This does not work badly here, but later experiences brought Spassky around to playing 16 ... 5b8. A sharp struggle developed against Planine (Amsterdam 1973) after some preparatory manoeuvring: 17 5b1 5a8 18 5a1 g6 19 c4 exd4 20 cxb5 axb5 21 5xd4 d5 22 5xf3 5xe4 23 5g5 c3!  

24 5b3 and now, instead of 24 ... 5d5, Black could have played 24 ... 5xf2 + 25 5xf2 5d5, as given by Keene.  

This line does not seem unfavorable for Black. Nevertheless, Smejkal varied on the 19th move against Browne at Wijk aan Zee 1976 with 19 ... bxc4. White had some advantage after 20 5dx5 5dx5 21 5xe5 5xe5 22 5f3 5f6 23 5f2 5b5 24 5xc4 c5 25 bxc5 5xc5 26 5b3. Six months later, Karpov reached full equality against Browne, in Amsterdam 1976, with 25 ... 5c8!—a theoretical novelty on the 25th move—with the idea of capturing on c5 with the Rook.  

17 5b1  

A very logical move. White covers b4 and at the same time places his Rook vis-a-vis the Black Queen. Yet it is not the most energetic continuation. White can get a big advantage with 17 c4!. The point is that he will not waste time recapturing after 17 ... bxc4 but will continue sharply with 18 5a4 and Black has difficulties: 18 ... c6 19 5xc4 5c7 20 5dx5 5dx5 21 5h3 (Saven-Mukhina, U.S.S.R. 1973), or 19 ... exd4 20 5xd4 d5 21 exd5 5xe1 + 22 5xe1 5d5 23 5d3 (Kavalek-Reshevsky, Chicago 1973). In both cases the Black position is shaky.  

17 ...  
18 bxc5  

A fundamental decision. In a game played not very much earlier, Fischer decided to close the center with d4-d5, which focused the play entirely on the Kingside. In that case he did not achieve very much; i.e., 18 d5 g6 19 5a3 (threatens 20 c4 with a spatial advantage on the Queenside) 19 ... c4 20 5f1 5h5 and the thematic attacking push g2-g4 was no longer feasible.  

18 ...  
19 dxe5  
20 5xe5  

In 64, Polugaevsky recommends 20 c4, which would achieve excellent results after 20 ... 5d6 21 5h4. Better, however, is 20 ... 5xf3 + 21 5xf3 5e6 and Black does not stand badly.  

20 ...  
21 c4  
22 5f6  

The most easy-going solution of the problems of the position. White gives up control of many dark squares and thus can no longer hope for advantage. Interesting and more enterprising is 22 5e5; e.g.:  

A1) 22 ... 5d8 23 5xf6! (the position is too sharp for the quiet 23 5e3, which threatens nothing and gives Black the chance to get an excellent square on d5 for his Knight with 23 ... bxc4). Black now has a choice of captures:  

After 23 5xf6 (analysis)  

A1) 23 ... 5xd2 24 5xd2! 5xd2 25 5xh8. The brilliant point is 25 ... 5xc2 26 5g7 5xb1 + 27 5h2 and
Black is lost. White has only a few pieces left but their position makes mate unavoidable. Also 25...\text{\textit{Qc6}} loses immediately: 26 \textit{fxg7} \textit{Axh8} 27 \textit{Axe8} 27 \textit{Axe7 +} \textit{Axe7} 28 \textit{xg8w}, etc.

The only move is 25...\textit{gx6}. I originally thought that White must continue elegantly with 26 \textit{Abe1} \textit{Axc2} 27 \textit{Ae1} 28 \textit{Ae7} 28 \textit{Ae7} + \textit{Ae6} 29 \textit{Axe6}, but it does not offer many chances; e.g., 29...\textit{Qb1} + 30 \textit{Qh2} \textit{Ae6} 31 \textit{Ae7} + \textit{Ae5} 32 \textit{Axe5} \textit{Axe5} 33 \textit{Qf4} \textit{f6}, followed by 34...\textit{Axe5} and White has little chance of saving himself. 26 \textit{Ae1} is stronger, simpler, and actually more esthetic than the fantastic 26 \textit{Abe1}?. Again, 26...\textit{Qxc2} fails: 27 \textit{Ae6} \textit{Qxe1} + 28 \textit{Qh2} with unstoppable mate. The only way to avoid this mate is 26...\textit{Qd7}, but then White breathes new life into the attack with an Exchange sacrifice:

After 26...\textit{Qd7} (analysis)

27 \textit{Axf8} + \textit{Qxf8} 28 \textit{Axe6} + \textit{Qg8} (not 28...\textit{Qe8} 29 \textit{Axe1} + and 30 \textit{Ad1}) 29 \textit{Ae3} and it seems to me that there is no sufficient defense against the threatened 30 \textit{Axe6} + \textit{Qh8} 31 \textit{Ag6} + \textit{Qg8} 32 \textit{Axe6} + \textit{Qg8} 33 \textit{Ag6}! (more convincing than 33 \textit{Ag7} \textit{Qd1} + 34 \textit{Qh2} \textit{Qd6}) 33...\textit{Qe4} 34 \textit{Qe4} + and 35 \textit{Ad3} =) or 33...\textit{Qg8} 34 \textit{Ae4} + and 35 \textit{Axe5} +.

For instance: 29...\textit{bxc4} 30 \textit{Axe6} + \textit{Qg8} 31 \textit{Axe6} \textit{Qxe6} 32 \textit{Axe6} + \textit{Qg8} 33 \textit{Axe6} + \textit{Qe8} 34 \textit{Qf6} + \textit{Qe7} 34 \textit{Qf6} + \textit{Qe7} 35 \textit{Qe7} + \textit{Qe8} 36 \textit{Qe7} and although the Black King has reached the Queenside, the White attack is not extinguished and loss of material is inevitable (36...\textit{Qd5} 37 \textit{Qf3} or 36...\textit{Qd6} 37 \textit{Qf3} \textit{Qb8} 38 \textit{Qe5} + \textit{Qa7} 39 \textit{Qf3}). Although this is a rather far-reaching analysis, in my opinion it is difficult to find anything against it: Black must not allow the Queen sacrifice.

A) 23...\textit{Axe1} + 24 \textit{Qxe1} \textit{Axd2} (stronger than 24...\textit{Axd2} 25 \textit{Ae1} \textit{Qg5} 26 \textit{Ae1} and Black does not get enough compensation for the Exchange) 25 \textit{fxg7} (or 25...\textit{Axe1} + 26 \textit{Axe1} \textit{Qxe4} 27 \textit{Qxe4} \textit{Ed2} 28 \textit{Qe5} \textit{b4} and Black can hold the position thanks to the finesse 29 \textit{Qxe4} \textit{Ed1} + 30 \textit{Qh2} \textit{Ae6} 25...\textit{Axe1} + (with Queens on the board, the Black King's shattered position would be a factor) 26 \textit{Axe1} \textit{Qg7} 27 \textit{Qxg7} \textit{Qxg7} 28 \textit{Qxe7} \textit{Ad2}! and Black can just hold the balance.

B) 22...\textit{Qed8} 23 \textit{Qe3}! (naturally, 23...\textit{Axe6} is now pointless) 23...\textit{Qe8} 24 \textit{Qe2} and White has a great advantage.

C) 22...\textit{Qd7} and now both 23 \textit{Ae4} \textit{Qxe4} 24 \textit{Qxe4} \textit{Qf5} 25 \textit{Qe2} and 23 \textit{Qf3} \textit{Qad8} 24 \textit{Qe1} \textit{Qxc4} 25 \textit{Qd3}

are favorable for White.

It is clear that Black must look in variation A for any chance to maintain the balance. It is much easier for him after the text move.

22...
23 \textit{Qe6}

White is a pawn ahead for the moment but that is of minor importance here. Black has great influence over the whole board because of his control of the dark squares.

23...
24 ... \textit{Qc3}

The beginning of an ambitious plan. Other possibilities:

A) 24...\textit{Qf4}. Aiming to exchange Queens. After 25 \textit{Axe1} \textit{Axe1} 26 \textit{Qxe1} \textit{Qxb5} 27 \textit{Axb5} \textit{Qa6} 28 \textit{Qb6} \textit{Qe2} White has achieved nothing. Therefore 25 \textit{Qd4}!, with the intention of sacrificing the Exchange, comes into consideration: 25...\textit{Qxe1} 26 \textit{Qxe1} \textit{Qxb5} 27 \textit{Qxb5} \textit{Qa6} 28 \textit{Qa4} \textit{Qxb5} 29 \textit{Qxb5} with the positional threat of transferring the Bishop to d5 via c6. In any case, White cannot lose.

B) 24...\textit{Qxb5}. Later the same year, Smyslov played this move against Vasiukov at Polanica Zdroj. The continuation illustrates the chances for both sides: 25 \textit{Qxb5} \textit{Qad6} 26 \textit{Qb6} \textit{Qc3} (The advantage over the text move becomes clear: the
Black Queen saves time by moving only when it is attacked. Polugaevsky's notes—written before the game in Poland was played—gives 26 ... \( \text{Qf4} \) 27 \( \text{Df3} \) \( \text{Qxcl} \) 28 \( \text{Dxc1} \) c4 and White keeps his advantage with 29 e5, although Black would not necessarily lose.) 27 \( \text{Dxb3} \) g6! 28 e5 (if 28 \( \text{Dxe3} \) \( \text{Qxe5} \) 28 ... \( \text{Dh6} \) 29 \( \text{Dxh1} \) c4 30 \( \text{Dxc5} \) \( \text{Dxa5} \) (winning the pawn back, but now the initiative reverts to White) 31 \( \text{Dxe4} \) \( \text{Dc8} \) 32 \( \text{Dd6} \) \( \text{Dxa6} \) 33 \( \text{Dc8} \) \( \text{Dc8} \) 34 \( \text{Dc4} \) \( \text{Dc4} \) 35 \( \text{Dc8} \) \( \text{Dxc8} \) 36 \( \text{Dxc8} \) \( \text{Dc7} \) 37 \( \text{Dc3} \) \( \text{Dxc6} \) 38 \( \text{Df1} \) 39 \( \text{Df4} \) \( \text{Dc6} \) 40 \( \text{Dxe2} \) \( \text{Dg7} \) and in this equal position a draw was agreed.

25 \( \text{Df3} \) \( \text{Qxa5} \)

At this late moment it would be unfavorable for Black to capture on b5, as we see after 25 ... \( \text{axb5} \) 26 e5! (Less clear is 26 \( \text{Dxb5} \) \( \text{Dc6} \) 27 e5, as given by Byrne. He continues his variation with 27 ... \( \text{Dxe1} + \) 28 \( \text{Dxe1} \) \( \text{Dxb5} \) 29 \( \text{Dxb1} \) and now 29 ... \( \text{Dxa5} \). But that allows White a winning attack with 30 \( \text{Dxh7} + \) \( \text{Dh8} \)

31 \( \text{Dg5} \) \( \text{Dc4} \) 32 \( \text{Dg8} \), etc. Instead, 29 ... \( \text{Dc4} \) wins an important tempo; e.g., 30 \( \text{Dxh7} + \) \( \text{Dh8} \) 31 \( \text{Dg5} \) \( \text{Dc4} \) 32 \( \text{Dg8} \) \( \text{Dc3} \) 33 \( \text{Dxh7} + \) \( \text{Dxh8} \) and Black comes out best) 26 ... \( \text{Dg6} \) (not 26 ... \( \text{b4} \) 27 \( \text{Dc3} \) and the Queen has no retreat) 27 \( \text{Dxb5} \) and Black is in trouble after both 27 ... \( \text{Dxf3} \) 28 \( \text{Dxb3} \) \( \text{Dxa5} \) 29 \( \text{Dxf3} \) and 27 ... \( \text{Dae6} \) 28 \( \text{Dxb6} \) \( \text{Dxax5} \) 29 \( \text{Dxh2} \).

Another attempt to maintain the initiative is 25 ... c4. The threat is 26 ... \( \text{Dxe3} \); e.g., 26 \( \text{b6} \) \( \text{Dxa3} \) 27 \( \text{Dc3} \) \( \text{Dc3} \) with advantage to Black. Olafsson, however, gives something more powerful: 26 \( \text{bxa6} \) \( \text{Dxa6} \) 27 e5 \( \text{g6} \) 28 e6 and White has an attack.

26 \( \text{Dxb3} \)

Spassky must have underestimated this. White suddenly goes on the attack, and it is a surprisingly dangerous one.

26 ... \( \text{axb5} \)

There is no useful alternative.

27 \( \text{Df4} \) \( \text{Dd7} \)

After long detours the Black Queen returns to the defense. But now White comes up with a sublime continuation of the attack.

29 \( \text{Dxb1} \)

Fischer had this in mind on the 26th move. 29 ... \( \text{Dxd1} \) fails to 30 \( \text{Dxf7} + \) \( \text{Dh8} \) 31 \( \text{Dg6} + \) \( \text{hxg6} \) 32 \( \text{Dh4} \) mate.

Spassky chooses the worst of the two possibilities, but that was difficult to appreciate in advance. The sensational 29 ... \( \text{Dxd8} \) is necessary, adding yet another pin. As with the text move, Black loses an Exchange, but the difference is that a pair of Rooks will be traded, and long variations show that this helps Black.

After the forcing continuation 30 \( \text{Dxf7} + \) \( \text{Dxf7} \) 31 \( \text{Dxf7} + \) \( \text{Dxf7} \) 32 \( \text{Dxf7} \) \( \text{Dxd1} \) 33 \( \text{Dxd1} \) the position becomes very complicated because White will always have a problem holding back Black's dangerous passed pawns. It is striking that not one of the authors of the many books on the match comes to a well-founded judgment at this important moment, although Olafsson comes very close with some study-like variations. Their beauty and depth are the reasons I give them here at length.
right at the gate) 35 e5 c3 36 Ab1
(the requisite method of holding the pawns) 36 ... Lx6d 37 exd6 Jf7 38 f3! (a subtle move; White prevents 38 ...
8c2 with the followup 39 ... Le4)
38 ... Ge6 39 Ab3 b4 (the toughest;
Black gives up his least advanced pawn in order to get his King into the game in time) 40 Ax6 d4 41 Ab1
Ac4 42 Ac2 c2 43 Ac1 Ac3 44 Ac1
Bd7 and White must be satisfied
with a draw.

It is remarkable that Olafsson,
having got that far, did not get the idea that White can win by giving up his Rook for the dangerous passed
pawn. The idea is 43 Aal (instead of
43 Ac1) 43 ... Ac4 44 Ac7 45 Ac4
g6 46 f5! gxf5 47 g5 and either the
White passed pawn or candidate
passed pawn will stroll through to
queen.

C) 33 ... Lx4. The correct
decision. Black directly stops the
formation of the strongpoint on d6.
Most commentators are satisfied
to say here that White wins after 34
Aa5; e.g., 34 ... Ax4 35 Aa5 d6 36
Ac4, or 34 ... Ac2 35 Ab8 Ac3 36
Aexf7 Axf7 37 Abx8 and the Black
passed pawns are not dangerous
eough.

It is Olafsson once again who
looks further than the rest by sacrificing, in sum, a whole Rook with 34 ...
Aa2 35 Ab8 b4! His main variation runs: 36 Ge6 Af7 37
Axf8 b3 38 Ab8 c4 39 Ad7 c3.

A) 33 ... b4. Nei considers this the
best. Without giving variations he
claims that Black has good drawing
chances. It is insufficient, however,
because of 34 Aa6. White threatens
to maintain the point d6 with 35 e5;
Black can hardly avoid this threat, so
he must eliminate it directly with 34
Aa6 35 Aa6 Aa4. Black now
threatens to win with 36 ... b3, so the
Rook must get behind the pawn
immediately: 37 Aa6. Now White
threatens 38 Bb5. Black is com-
peled to play 37 ... Aa3, after which
his King is cut off by 38 Aa7. White
now comes just in time: 38 ... Aa8 39
Aa8 40 Aa2 Aa8 41 Aa3 and if 41 ...
Aa8, 42 Aa7 is decisive.

B) 33 ... c4. Olafsson’s drawing
method, to which he adds the
following marvelous variation: 34
Aa6 Ac6 (here Black allows White
to support d6; but not 34 ... Aa6
because of 35 Aa1 b4 36 Aa6 c3 37
Aa4 and White stops the pawns.

After 33 Aa4 (analysis)

The passed pawns are exceedingly
dangerous now, but Olafsson thinks
that White can just keep matters in
hand with 40 Aa5 + Aa6 41 Aa4
Ab1 (Threatening to win with the c-
pawn. At first I thought that Black
could save himself with the indefatigable 41 ... Aa5, to rush the
King to the aid of the passed pawns;
but then White wins by attacking the
c-pawn with his Knight: 42 Ac6 + Aa4
43 Aa4 followed by 44
Aa8 + ... 42 Aa3 c2 43 Aa2 bxc2 44
Ac8 Aa5 45 Aa1 Aa4 46 Aa1 Aa3
47 Aa1 + Aa3 48 Axd1 and White
wins the pawn endgame, according
to Olafsson.

But let’s take Olafsson’s endgame
a little further. The pawn endgame
after 48 Aa1 exd1 + Aa4 49 Axd1
Aa3 seems not to be a win for
White, due to the Black King’s active
position.

After 39 ... c3 (analysis)

White can force the King back a
little with 50 Aa1, but that doesn’t
seem to be enough: after 50 ... Aa5
51 Aa1 Aa4 52 Aa2 h5! Black keeps
the opposition; e.g., 53 Aa3 Aa4 or 53
Aa3 h4 54 Aa2 Aa5 55 Aa3 Aa5 56 Aa4
57 hxa4 Aa4 58 Aa4 Aa3 and both
sides queen at the same time.
Later, however, Donner found that
with 53 Aa4! White breaks the
opposition and wins the game: 53 ...
Aa4 54 Aa4 Aa4 55 Aa4 Aa4 56 Aa3
Aa5 57 Aa3, or 53 ... Aa4 54 Aa4
55 Aa4 Aa3 56 Aa3 Aa3 and

After 49 ... Aa3 (analysis)

Spassky finds his best chance,
despite his time trouble, and reduces
White’s pawn preponderance on the
Kingside. 32 ... c4t to immediately
begin dangerous actions with the
pawns, was tempting. But with three
Rooks on the board, the base at d6
after 33 Aa6 Aa6 34 e5 would be
even stronger than in the variations.
after move 29 that begin with the trade of Rooks.

33 \( \text{Ax}e4 \)

There is no time to weaken the position of the Black King with 33 \( \text{Qh6+} g\times h6 34 \text{Ax}e4 \) because it will be difficult to stop the passed pawns after 34 ... b4.

33 ... \( g\times f7 \)
34 \( \text{Ad}7+ \) \( g\times f6 \)
35 \( \text{b}7\)

![Chess Diagram](image)

Fischer plays the ending purposefully and instructively right from the start. One Rook behind the passed pawns, the other operating from the flank—in short, the strategy that the player with the Rooks must adopt in the struggle against two connected passed pawns.

35 ... \( \text{Aa}1+ \)

Black again faced a difficult choice: on which side of the passed pawns must his Rook stand? The game continuation shows that, because of the text move, the position of his Bishop becomes too insecure. The only drawing move is 35 ... b4, keeping his Rook on the back rank, as suggested by Larsen during the game. Byrne considers this insufficient because after 35 ... b4 36 \( \text{Af1} \) \( \text{Ac}8 \) 37 \( \text{Ae}4 \) \( \text{Ad}8 \) 38 \( \text{Ae}2 \) \( \text{Ae}6 \) 39 \( \text{Ab}5 \) Black's King cannot reach either d5 or d6 without losing a Queenside pawn, so "Fischer would proceed then to win just as in the game, by advancing his Kingside pawns."

How did Byrne actually envisage that? In the game, both of Fischer's Rooks are positioned actively and so he can create a passed pawn on the Kingside, which, partly through tactical means, forces the decision. But if the Rooks were to stand as passively as Byrne has them, there would absolutely be no chance of this.

Nei and Olafsson both give 36 \( \text{Ab}6+ \), which is clearly much stronger. White reduces his opponent's space because after 36 ... \( \text{Af5} \) Black is in a mating net—not with 37 \( \text{Ab}6 \), as given by Olafsson, because of 37 ... \( \text{Aa}1+ \) 38 \( \text{Ag}2 \) \( \text{Ab}6+ \) 39 \( g3 \) \( g3 \) \( b3 \) and Black suddenly has all sorts of chances, but with the laconic 37 \( f3 \) (Nei), already threatening \( b4 \), possibly followed by 39 \( \text{Ab}6 \). The retreat 36 ... \( f7 \) is thus forced. Olafsson now continues his variation with 37 \( \text{Ae}6 \) \( c4 \) 38 \( \text{Ae}6 \) \( e3 \) 39 \( \text{Ab}7+ \) \( \text{Ag}8 \) 40 \( g3 \), but as a winning plan this is rather deficient. White's Rooks are indeed as active as possible, but the Black pawns have advanced far enough to pose a permanent danger to White. Thus after 40 ... \( h5 \), 41 ... \( \text{Aa}2 \) is already threatened.

A more likely winning plan is given by Nei: 37 \( f4 \). White will utilize his majority on the Kingside under far more favorable conditions than in Byrne's variation. Whether this will succeed in out-running Black's position if Black simply waits is an open question. It is hardly possible to analyze it to the end.

36 \( \text{Fh}2 \) 37 \( \text{Ad}6+ \)

Thus Black manages to post his Bishop more actively but, as we will see, it does not stand very sturdily.

37 \( g3 \) 38 \( \text{Ag}2 \) \( h5 \)

It is too committal to play the Bishop to a stronger square with 38 ... \( \text{Af}5 \). Byrne gives 39 \( f4 \) \( \text{Ad}4 \) 40 \( g4 \) (the formation of the pawn duo is, already almost decisive) 40 ... \( \text{Aa}2+ \) 41 \( \text{Af}1 \) \( \text{Ae}3 \) 42 \( h4 \) and there is no time to advance the b-pawn (42 ... \( b3 \) 43 \( f5 \)). Nei points out a method of playing the Bishop to d4 by preparing it with 38 ... \( \text{Af}5 \), but this isn't good enough either: 39 \( \text{Ah}4 \) \( \text{Le}5 \) 40 \( \text{Ah}5+ \) (much stronger than 40 \( \text{Axh}7 \) \( \text{Ad}4 \) as given by Nei) 40 ... \( \text{Ag}6 \) 41 \( \text{Ab}6+ \) \( \text{Ad}6 \) (or 41 ... \( \text{Aa}5 \) 42 \( f4 \) 42 ... \( \text{Ax}c5 \). The Rooks work together beautifully.

40 ... \( \text{Ef}7 \)

Fischer plays logically and perfectly. First he tied the Black Rook down, and now he will attack it while at the same time centralizing his King. It is wrong to try to form the pawn duo f4-g4 directly with 40 \( f4 \) because Black can activate his King with 40 ... \( \text{Af}5 \). Neither 41 \( \text{Ac}4 \) \( \text{Ad}2+ \) 42 \( \text{Af}3 \) \( \text{Ad}3+ \) nor 41 \( \text{Af}3 \) \( \text{Af}1+ \) 42 \( \text{Ag}2 \) \( \text{Exe}4 \) 43 \( \text{Ef}1 \) \( \text{Dd}5 \) is unfavorable for Black.

40 ... \( \text{Ef}7 \)

The last move in time trouble, and an unfortunate one. Spassky weakly allows the formation of the pawn duo f4-g4. 40 ... \( g5 \) was unanimously recommended afterwards, but it doesn't save Black either. White continues with 43 \( f4 \) and after 42 ... \( \text{hxg}4 \) 43 \( \text{hxg}4 \) Black is in virtual zugzwang. He must play 43 ... \( \text{Ef}7 \), but then White can improve the position of his Rooks with 44 \( \text{Ab}7+ \) \( \text{Ef}6 \) 45 \( \text{Ad}7 \) to make the zugzwang
complete. Tougher is 44 ... g78 in order to exchange a Rook. But with the King cut off it is still hopeless; e.g., 45 \( \text{Ee6 } \text{Ee5} + 46 \text{Exe5 } \text{Lxe5} \\
47 \text{Dd3 } \text{Ld4} 48 \text{f3 } \text{Lf4} 49 \text{Ec4 } \text{Ee8} 50 \text{Ld7 } \text{Lf2} 51 \text{Ad5 } \text{Lc3} 52 \text{Lxe3} \)
and Black's Bishop must give up its protection of one of the two pawns.

41 \( \text{Cc2} \quad \text{Ld5} \)
42 \( \text{f4} \quad \text{g6} \)
43 \( \text{g4} \)

The pawn duo is formed.

43 ... \( \text{h}xg4 \)
44 \( \text{h}xg4 \quad \text{g5} \)

Spassky's seconds evidently found this to be his best chance. If he doesn't play it, then 45 \( \text{Lb5} \) is even stronger because, Black would not have the square e5 to give check on if White's Rook took the b-pawn; e.g., 44 ... \( \text{Df6} 45 \text{Lb5 } \text{Df7} \) (or 45 ... g5 46 \( \text{s5} \)) 46 g5! (certainly not 46 \( \text{Exb4? } \text{xb4} 47 \text{Exd5 } \text{Lxf4} \) and the endgame is a theoretical draw even if White wins the b-pawn) 46 ... \( \text{Ff5} 47 \text{Se3} \) and Black is outmaneuvered. If

47 ... \( \text{Ld5} \) then 48 \( \text{Exb4} \) wins, or if, e.g., 47 ... \( \text{Dg7} 48 \text{Lb6 } \text{Ld5} 49 \text{Lxe6} \) is hopeless. The Black King is systematically driven back.

45 \( \text{f5} \)

Naturally White does not take the pawn. The protected passed pawn and the squares it gains are mighty possessions.

45 ... \( \text{Lc5} \)
46 \( \text{Lb5} \quad \text{Df6} \)

The Bishop cannot go to d4 because White gets a mating attack with 47 \( \text{Dd7} + \text{f5} 48 \text{L} \).

47 \( \text{Exb4} \quad \text{Ld4} \)

Black still has a vague hope: the King to f4.

48 \( \text{Lb6} + \quad \text{c5} \)
49 \( \text{c6} \)

Fischer winds it up very nicely. Mate in one is threatened.

49 ... \( \text{Ld8} \)
50 \( \text{Lb8} \quad \text{Dd7} \)
51 \( \text{Lb7} \quad \text{Dd6} \)
52 \( \text{Lb6} \quad \text{Dd7} \)
53 \( \text{Lb6} \quad \text{c5} \)
54 \( \text{Lb6} \quad \text{Ld5} \)
55 \( \text{f6} \quad \text{Dd4} \)
56 \( \text{Lb1} \quad \text{Black resigns} \)

If 58 ... \( \text{Exf6} 59 \text{Dd1} + \text{c4} 60 \text{Exe5} \)

Undoubtedly the most dramatic game of the match was the thirteenth. Fischer chose the Alekhine Defense and Spassky, after treating it rather inaccurately, soon found he was forced to offer a pawn for vague attacking chances. Fischer, in turn, played superficially. Spassky's attacking chances became very real and for a long time it was unclear who had matters best in hand. It developed into a very unusual ending which Fischer finally decided in his favor.

Both players seemed to have been affected by that far from faultless game. The next two games, both finally drawn, were full of serious tactical and strategical mistakes. Then the weight of all that tension seemed to lift, and both combatants played freely again. The series of five draws that preceded the last decisive game contained chess of the highest level. Fischer continued to experiment in the opening, with Black as well as with White: a Najdorf in the fifteenth game without the capture on b2, a Pirc Defense in the seventeenth, and again an Alekhine Defense in the nineteenth.

The nineteenth game is discussed here. It is a textbook example of attack and defense balancing each other; as in the tenth game, one can identify mistakes only after deep analysis. It was also Spassky's final, mighty attempt to keep the world title from Fischer—the title which would bring Fischer to a state of total inertia.
World Championship Match
Reykjavik 1972
Game 19

Alekhine Defense

Boris Spassky
Fischer
1 e4 Df6
2 e5 Dd5
3 d4 d6
4 Df3 Lg4

An older continuation than the 4 ... g6 played in the thirteenth game of the match. It was popular for a while, until the latest experiences showed that White has several ways to get the advantage.

5 Le2 e6
6 0-0 Lle7
7 h3

Whether or not this move is played will prove to be important later.

7 ... Lh5

Black cannot very well capture, as shown by Vasiukov-Torre, Manila

1974 (via a different move order): 7 ...
Lxf3 8 Lxf3 Dc6 9 4e Dd6 10
Lxc6 bxc6 11 b3 0-0 12 Dc3 a5?! 13
Dd3 Dd7 14 Lh5! with great positional advantage.

8 4e Dd6
9 Dd3

The capture on d6 used to be played here automatically. With the text move, White intends to wait for Black to play Db8-c6.

9 ...
0-0

9 ... dxe5 10 Dxe5 Lxe2 11 Lxe2!
Dd4 12 Dd1 Lc5 13 b4 Db4 14
Db5 is too dangerous.

10 Le3 d5

The point of White's avoidance of exd6 on his ninth move is that this push would be more favorable for Black if there were no pawns on e7 and e5. 10 ... Dc6 is followed by 11
exd6 cxd6 12 d5 and White keeps an enduring advantage after either 12 ...
Lxf3 13 Lxf3 Df3 14 dxe6 fxe6 15
Lg4 or 12 ... exd5 13 Dxd5 Lxd5 14
Db5.

11 4c5

This leads to a great advantage in space. Although experience has shown that White can certainly expect an advantage, a different move to gain the upper hand has been tried more recently; e.g.,

Sznipak-Schmidt, Polish Championship 1977, went 11 exd5 Dxd5 12
Dd3 Dd6 13 Df1 Dc8 14 d5 Dxd5
15 Dxe5 c5 16 Dxe5 and, according to Sznipak, Black could have minimized his disadvantage by playing 16 ... Dc6.

11 ...
Lxf3

In Gaprindashvili-Kushnir 1969, the game that originated this system (but without White's h3 and Black's Lh5), White recaptured with the pawn, forcing the Black Knight to retreat. The White doubled pawn signifies no disadvantage, as appears from, among other games, Pokojowczyk-Schmidt, Poland 1976 (again, without h3 and Lh5): 11
gxf3 Dc8 12 f4 Lh4 13 Ld3 g6 (13 ...
Dc7 is probably probably better. Then Enklaar's 14 Lxh7+ is not at all convincing because White retains the bad Bishop and Black is able to blockade the position. Better is 14
Lh5 Df5 15 Lxf5 g6 16 Lg4 exf5
17 Lxf3) 14 f5! exf5 15 Lf3 c6 16

12 ...
Dc4
13 b3

After the match, the system used by Fischer understandably became popular. Geller particularly, one of Spassky's seconds in Reykjavik, made grapple with the improvements found during the match (see also the sixth match game); he introduced 13
Lf4 against Hecht in Budapest 1973, and achieved quick success after 13 ...
Dc6 14 b3 Dd4 15 Ld2 b6 16
Axc1 bxc5 17 dxc5 Lxc5 18 Dxd5 Ld4 19 b4 exd5 20 bxa5 Ld7 21
Lxc6 Dxc6 22 Lxd4 Ld8 23 Lc1
Lb7 24 Lg5, 1-0.

The latest example from practice is equally discouraging: 13 Lf4 Df6 14
b3 Dxa5 15 Lc1 b6 16 Ld4! (after 16 Ld2 the improvement 16 ...
bxc5 17 dxc5 Lxb8! 18 Lxd5 exd5 19
Dxd5 Ld5! 20 b4 Dxb4 21 Dxb4
Lxd2 22 Lxd2 Lxc5 is possible, with roughly equal play, as in Geller-
Timman, Wijk aan Zee 1975) 16 ...
Lg5 17 Lxg5 Lxg5 18 Dd3 Lgb8
19 Lg4 Lf4 20 Ld1 f5 21 exf6
Dxf6 22 Lc3 with advantage to White (Geller-Timman, Teesside
1975).

13 ...
Dc4
14 fxe3

This manner of attacking the pawn chain is dubious. On the other
method, 14 ... f6, White has two reactions (the direct solution with 15 exf6 Qxf6 16 Rg4 Qe7 gains nothing):

A) 15 c4 dxc4! 16 Qxc4 (or 16 Qxe4 fxe5 17 dxe5 Qe6) 16 ... Qc6! 17 Qxc6 bxc6 18 Qg4 f5 and Black certainly does not stand worse. His doubled pawn is compensated for by his majority on the Kingside.

B) 15 Qg4 and now:

B1) 15 ... Qd7 16 exf6 (This is best now that the Black Queen is on a less favorable square—as in the above variation, e7 is better) 16 e4 dxe4 17 exf6 gxf6! (not good) 16 ... Qxf6 17 b4 with freer play for White.

B2) 15 ... f5 16 Qe2 and White moves the Bishop to d3. Again he stands a little better.

Petrosian draws attention to 14 ... Qc6, a typical Petrovian waiting move. White's best is 15 Ab1 followed by 16 b4 (the immediate 15 b4 is premature because of 15 ... Qxb4 16 Ab1 Qc6 17 Bxb7 Qa3); e.g., 15 ... b6 16 b4 and 17 Qa4 with advantage to White.

15 e4

A strong answer. 15 b4 promises nothing after 15 ... a5 16 a3 (16 Qa4 Qd7) 16 ... axb4 17 axb4 Qc6!. White must play 15 e4 immediately or the pawn formation will become static.

15 ... c6

He must keep the long diagonal closed because 15 ... bxc5 16 exd5 cxd4 17 dxe6! (much stronger than 17 d6 cxd6 18 Qxa8 dxc3 with unclear play) 17 ... c6 18 exf7+ Qxf7 19 Qe4 gives White a great positional advantage.

16 b4

White need not fear a7-a5 now that Black has a pawn on c6, occupying a favorable square for Black's Knight.

16 ... bxc5

Fischer must have done a lot of deep calculation and evaluation here. He cannot free his game with 16 ... a5; e.g.,

A) 17 b5. This method of increasing the tension is inadequate; 17 ... bxc5 18 bxc6 cxd4 and now both 19 Qxd5 and 19 exd5 dxc3 20 d6 Qxe6! 21 dxe7 Qxe7 are in Black's favor.

B) 17 a3, and White keeps a spatial advantage on the Queenside. It is true that Black gets counterplay with 17 ... axb4 18 axb4 Qxa1 19 Qxa1 Qg5, but White plays 20 e1 with advantage. The Black Knight is still badly placed.

17 bxc5 Qa5

The only possible followup to the previous move. If White were able to play 18 Qa4 he would have the position well under control; e.g., 17 ... Qd7 18 Qa4 Qc7 19 Ab1 Ab8 20 Qa6 with enduring pressure.

18 Qxd5

This attractive piece sacrifice leads to great complications. However, White can keep a clear advantage with the quiet 18 e1 (Olafsson), threatening 19 Qxd5. Gligoric in his book gives 18 ... Qg5, but, as Olafsson remarks, after 19 exd5 cxd5 20 Qxd5 Qe1 21 Ab1 Ab6, White does not continue with 23 Ab7 Ab7 24 Ab8 Ab8 with an unclear position, but with 23 e6! and Black has no defense; e.g., 23 ... Ab8 24 Ab5 or 24 Ab4 followed by 25 e7, or 23 ... fxe6 24 Qxe6 Ab1 + (24 ... Qc7 25 Qh8 + and mates) 25 Qxf1 Ab8 + 26 Qf6 + and wins.

Remarkably, Black has no satisfactory response to 18 e1. Olafsson further points out 18 ... Qb4 19 Ab1 a5. Black not only protects the Queen with this move but also opens an escape for his Queen Rook. White, however, should not be discouraged; now he can sacrifice the Bishop on d5: 20 exd5 cxd5 21 Ab5 Ab5 22 Ab5 Ab7 23 Ab4 Ab7 24 Ab1 and White has overwhelming compensation for the piece.

After 18 e1 Black thus can do nothing except retreat the Queen empty-handed: 18 ... Ab8. It is true that Black has prevented Qd1-a4 in a roundabout way, but only extensive analysis is able to show this.

18 ... Qg5

Fischer did not hesitate at all with this reply, which cuts off the retreat of the White Knight. Such a quick
response does not necessarily imply that the player had been waiting for his opponent's previous move. In a game Botvinnik-Spassky, Moscow 1969, Botvinnik at one point played a subtle, unexpected move and Spassky replied immediately—"so quickly," wrote Botvinnik, "that I came to the conclusion that Spassky wanted to avoid creating the impression that he had overlooked the move." One is unlikely to come to the same conclusion in this case. Finding a flashy move like 18 \text{xd}5 is child's play for Fischer, as is the provoking of such a move.

His reply confronts White with a difficult choice: either to play for attack or to try to hold the extra pawn and if possible maneuver his Knight to d6 via e3 and c4. I examine:

A) 19 \text{wd}3 \text{d}6 (capturing on d5 is still not good, but now it is threatened) 20 \text{wc}4 (White must carry on because 20 \text{ex}3 leads to complications favorable to Black after 20 ... \text{ad}8; e.g., 21 \text{dc}4 \text{xc}5 22 \text{hd}6 \text{bd}4. But the immediate 20 ... \text{db}4 is not so good because of 21 \text{dc}4 \text{xc}5 22 \text{ex}3 \text{bc} + 23 \text{xe}3 \text{xc}4 24 \text{ec}2! \text{dc}2 25 \text{xc}4 \text{ex}3 26 \text{fc}1 \text{fd}8 27 \text{ff}2 and White stands a little better.) After 20 \text{wc}4, inferior is 20 ... \text{cxd}5 21 \text{ex}d5 \text{ex}d5 22 \text{xd}5 and the f-pawn goes too; White's three center pawns give him great influence on the board (22 ... \text{ce}7 23 \text{ce}6). The wonder is that Black need not capture the Knight but can get satisfactory counterplay with 20 ... \text{wb}5. Exchanging Queens with 21 \text{xb}5 \text{xb}5 does not solve White's problem of how to maintain his strong central position.

B) 19 \text{wc}2 \text{d}6 20 \text{ex}3 \text{c}3 21 \text{dc}2 \text{bd}4 and Black wins the pawn back with advantage.

C) 19 \text{we}1 \text{yd}8 and White lacks a useful move.

D) 19 b4. A striking attempt. White returns the pawn to temporarily limit the activity of Black's Bishop. A sharp position with mutual chances arises after 19 ... \text{xh}4 20 \text{we}2 (not 20 \text{ex}3 \text{c}3) 20 ... \text{d}6 21 \text{dc}3. In some cases Black can sacrifice his Knight on c5 for three pawns.

19 \text{kh}5!

Spassky's decision to play for attack is fully justified, considering the previous variations, and was probably made when he played his last move. White has many chances and Black must defend carefully, as we shall see.

19 ... \text{cxd}5

\text{xd}5 and now:

B1) 22 ... \text{d}6 23 \text{f}3! (not 23 \text{gs}5 \text{xd}4 24 \text{af}1? \text{h}6!—but not 24 ... \text{d}6? 25 \text{gg}7 + \text{gx}7 26 \text{ff}7 + \text{mate}) 23 ... \text{gb}4 24 \text{ff}1 \text{xd}4 + 25 \text{gh}1 \text{xc}5 26 \text{ce}7 and White is winning.

B2) 22 ... \text{wd}2 23 \text{gs}4 (the difference from the actual game is that here the d4-pawn is protected; 23 \text{ce}7 achieves nothing because of 23 ... \text{d}6 24 \text{gb}7 \text{c}3 + 25 \text{gh}1

Bad is 19 ... \text{g}6 because White gets a decisive attack with 20 \text{f}6 + .

20 \text{ff}7 +

White pushes on energetically, but he overlooks an ingenious saving resource. Interpolating 20 \text{ex}5 before the sacrifice increases its strength:

A) 20 ... \text{d}6 (Nei). Black's idea is to save himself after 21 \text{d}6 \text{fxe}6 22 \text{gs}4 with 22 ... \text{ce}3 + 23 \text{gh}1 \text{ce}7. The advance 21 \text{d}6 is nothing special after 21 ... \text{g}6. The White pawn mass looks impressive but can be destroyed at any moment by a countersacrifice, so it remains White's task to destroy the Black King's shelter: 21 \text{ff}7 + \text{ff}7 22 \text{ff}7 \text{f}5 + \text{gg}8 24 \text{gx}5. At the moment, White has three pawns for the piece and Black cannot satisfactorily oppose them with his badly placed Knight; e.g., 24 ... \text{c}3 25 \text{dd}1 \text{ex}5 26 \text{c}6 \text{ce}7 27 \text{ge}5 and White controls the board.

B) 20 ... \text{ex}5 21 \text{ff}7 + \text{ff}7 22 \text{ff}7 and now:

B1) 22 ... \text{d}6 23 \text{f}3! (not 23 \text{gs}5 \text{xd}4 24 \text{af}1? \text{h}6!—but not 24 ... \text{d}6? 25 \text{gg}7 + \text{gx}7 26 \text{ff}7 + \text{mate}) 23 ... \text{gb}4 24 \text{ff}1 \text{xd}4 + 25 \text{gh}1 \text{xc}5 26 \text{ce}7 and White is winning.

B2) 22 ... \text{wd}2 23 \text{gs}4 (the difference from the actual game is that here the d4-pawn is protected; 23 \text{ce}7 achieves nothing because of 23 ... \text{d}6 24 \text{gb}7 \text{c}3 + 25 \text{gh}1
This brilliant defensive move forces a drawable endgame. Nearly all other moves lose quickly:

A) 21 ... \textit{Re}3 + 22 \textit{Sh}2 \textit{xf}7 23 \textit{wh}5 + \textit{Re}7 24 \textit{xf}1 \textit{dd}7 25 \textit{xf}7 + \textit{dd}8 26 \textit{c}6 and wins.

B) 21 ... \textit{dc}6 22 \textit{gg}4 (simpler than Olfafsson’s 22 \textit{Sh}5) 22 ... \textit{xf}7 23 \textit{h}1 + \textit{gg}8 24 \textit{exe}6 + and White will have no less than four pawns for the piece.

C) 21 ... \textit{Cc}3 is the most reasonable alternative. Black ties the White Queen to the protection of the Queen Rook. Nei now gives 22 \textit{dxc}5 25 \textit{b}1 \textit{dc}6 24 \textit{bb}7 \textit{wh}6 25 \textit{gg}4 \textit{xd}4 + 26 \textit{wh}x4 \textit{x}d4 27 \textit{wh}x7 with a complicated ending; as I see it, White has the better chances. Olfafsson gives a far more convincing way to keep the advantage: 22 \textit{f}1!. The White Rooks are connected so that the White Queen can threaten to penetrate the Black position destructively from either side: via a4, g4, or h5. After 22 ... \textit{dc}6 23 \textit{gg}4! \textit{xd}4 + 24 \textit{wh}1 \textit{xe}5 25 \textit{dxc}5 Black has no satisfactory way to recapture: if 25 ... \textit{dxc}5 26 \textit{b}1 \textit{exe}3 27 \textit{xf}3 or 25 ... \textit{dd}5 26 \textit{ag}1 \textit{exe}5 27 \textit{ad}6 (27 \textit{xf}3 \textit{exe}5 and Black’s f8-square is covered twice) and now: (I) 27 ... \textit{ff}8 28 \textit{exe}6 + (surprisingly, 28 \textit{ff}8 + \textit{ff}8 29 \textit{xf}3 + \textit{ee}7 30 \textit{exe}6 \textit{we}1 + 31 \textit{gg}2 \textit{exe}3! gives Black dangerous threats, so White must take the perpetual check with 32 \textit{ee}7 + \textit{dd}8 33 \textit{ff}8 + \textit{xc}7 34 \textit{dd}6 +, etc.) 28 ... \textit{exe}6 29 \textit{xf}8 + \textit{xf}8 30 \textit{ee}6 and the endgame is advantageous for White; (2) 27 ... \textit{ee}7 28 \textit{exe}6 \textit{dd}5 (28 ... \textit{xf}5 29 \textit{h}4 wins) 29 \textit{ee}1 (threatening 30 \textit{ee}6) 29 ... \textit{ff}5 (29 ... \textit{h}6 30 \textit{h}4 wins) 30 \textit{gg}4 \textit{h}8 (30 ... \textit{dd}5 31 \textit{exe}5 \textit{x}d5 32 \textit{ee}5 wins material) 31 \textit{ee}7 \textit{ee}7 32 \textit{ee}7 and White should win.

With the Queens on the board, White has attacking chances because the Black pieces are always hanging.

22 \textit{xd}2

There is nothing better; 22 \textit{ee}7 \textit{dd}6 23 \textit{ee}6 \textit{db}4 24 \textit{exe}6 \textit{dx}e4 leads to a sharp position in which Black would have the better chances.

22 ... \textit{xd}2

23 \textit{fa}1

The Rooks are finally connected. It seems like a whole game has been played, but we are only just past move twenty!

23 ...

24 \textit{ee}6

Spassky must have seen the forced draw-position already. The play would have remained more complicated after 24 \textit{ee}7, which Byrne and Nei consider more dangerous for Black. Their opinion is correct, but their variations do not prove it conclusively. The point is that after 24 ... \textit{dd}4 25 \textit{ff}7 \textit{hh}6 26 \textit{ex}5 27 \textit{ff}7 \textit{wh}6 reaches the same position as in the first line of variation C above (after Black’s 21st move), a complicated position in which White nevertheless has the better chances. Byrne and Nei both note, however, that the White attempt 24 \textit{ee}7 would achieve nothing after 24 ... \textit{dd}8 25 \textit{ee}7 \textit{dc}6 26 \textit{exe}6 \textit{dd}4 27 \textit{ee}7 \textit{ee}3 + 28 \textit{gg}1 \textit{ex}e4 29 \textit{ff}1 \textit{fe}6! and Black has the advantage. But this variation gives Black no more than a draw if White decides to play his Rook back to \textit{c}7 on the 26th move. Moreover, White can undertake a well-founded winning attempt with 25 \textit{ex}5 \textit{ex}5 26 \textit{ff}7, since the Black Knight would stand too passively. Olfafsson therefore proposes the pseudo-sacrifice 24 ... \textit{dx}e4, as sharp as the actual game. Black fully recover the sacrificed material after 25 \textit{xf}6 63; e.g., 26 \textit{exe}6 \textit{ee}2 27 \textit{bb}1 \textit{ff}8!, and he threatens to win even more than a Rook with 28 ... \textit{ff}1 + followed by 29 ... \textit{ee}3 +.

But White doesn’t have to let it get that far! He can give up a Rook for the pawn with 26 \textit{ff}4!!.

24 exd5

After 26 \textit{ff}4 (analysis)

Now there is nothing better than 26 ... \textit{ee}2 27 \textit{ee}4 \textit{ef} + 28 \textit{ee}1 \textit{xe}1 29 \textit{exe}6 and White’s three pawns are abundant compensation for the piece. Therefore, this is what Spassky had to aim for to keep his chances in the match alive. However, White’s 26th move in the last variation was very difficult to see in advance.

24 ...

25 \textit{ff}7

26 ... \textit{ee}3 +

25 \textit{ff}1

26 \textit{ff}4

The position still seems critical for Black, but Fischer quickly dispels that illusion.

25 ...

26 ... \textit{ee}3 +

Capturing with the Bishop improves the coordination of his minor pieces.

27 \textit{ee}6 \textit{ee}5!

Fischer’s defense is hair-fine. The
The safest solution. White would be the only one with winning chances after 30 ... $\text{Bxd6} 31 \text{cxd6} \text{Bf8} 32 \text{Bc1 Bd8} 33 \text{Bc8} \text{Be8} 34 \text{Bc7}.$

31 $\text{Bxc6}$  
32 $\text{Bxe5}$  
33 $\text{Bd5}$  
34 $\text{Bh5}$  
35 $\text{Bh2}$  
36 $\text{c6}$

Of course it was not possible to keep both Queenside pawns.

36 ...  $\text{Bxc6}$  
37 $\text{Bxa5}$  
38 $\text{Bf3}$  $\text{Bf6}$  
39 $\text{Bf3}$  $\text{Bc3+}$

Drawn.

Bronstein and Ljubojevic are representatives of different generations, but their styles have common elements: sharp, rich in ideas, and with a tendency toward the bizarre. Neither of them, in the end, had an important result in the 1973 Interzonal. When their game was played, however, Ljubojevic was leading with 7½ out of 10 and Bronstein was somewhere in the middle with 5½. Knowing this, one must admire Ljubojevic's courageous and admirable choice of opening. Although he had the Black pieces, his play was razor-sharp from the beginning, and he certainly did not concern himself with trying for mere equality.

He found a worthy opponent in Bronstein. Grandmasters nowadays combat the Alekhine Defense almost exclusively with the quiet 3 $\text{d3}$, which in most variations guarantees White a slight but tangible advantage. Bronstein, however, took off the velvet gloves and chose the Four Pawns Attack, the old main line of this opening, which promises extremely sharp positions with mutual chances.

This indeed proved to be the case. I have analyzed the opening fairly extensively, not only because it is interesting and still little researched, but also because the game reached critical heights already in the opening stage.
The attempt to further sharpen a sharp variation stems from the Russian Argunov, who used it with success in the 1920’s. Still, the most striking characteristic of the move is its riskiness. White gets a tremendous center.

7 d5 e6
8 0-0

A healthy developing move which also covers the e4-square. 8 d6 is premature because of 8 ... Wh4+ 9 g3 Wh4+ 10 Wh2 Whxh1 11 Dh3 Dh6 12 Db2 Dh7, and White has no good way to win the Black Queen, as shown in the consultation game Nekrasov and Tokar against Argunov and Yudin, U.S.S.R. 1931.

8 ... exd5
9 cxd5 e4

Mikenas’ move. The alternative is 9 Wh4+ 10 g3 Wh4. Practically all standard theoretical works, including the Encyclopedia of Chess Openings and Bagirov’s book on the Alekhine Defense (revised edition, 1979), give 11 Db5+ Dd7 12 Dc2 as the refutation, citing the game Ljubojevic-Moses, Dresden 1969, which continued: 12 ... Dxe5 13 f4 Dh6 14 Whxh6+ Dh7 15 Dh3 Dh6 16 Dc2 Dh6 17 Dh4 Dh6 18 Dc4 with great advantage for White. Adams points out in the British Chess Magazine, however, that all the theory books have forgotten an old game between Dragomiresk and Kairev from the semifinal of the All-Russian Championship, Sverdlovsk 1934, where Kairev improved Black’s play with 15 ... Wh4 (instead of 15 ... Dh6).

After 15 ... Wh4 (analysis)

Black gets a decisive attack after 16 Lxd7+ Dxd7 17 Dg5 0-0 18 Df7 Dh6 19 Dh8+ (19 Dxd8 is a little better, although Black still has many chances after 19 ... Dxd8) 19 ... Dd4 20 Wh4 Dh6 21 Wh2 Dh8+ 22 Dh1 Dc4—he does not even bother taking the time to capture the Knight on h8! Instead of helping his opponent to complete his development, White does better to play energetically for attack with the (most often temporary) piece sacrifice 16 Dxe5! Lxe5 17 Lg5 and the complications are probably in White’s favor.

Nevertheless, the question remains whether 11 Db5+ is a clear refutation of 9 ... Wh4+. White has a much more solid approach in 11 Dh4. The ending after 11 ... g5 12 Dg5 Wxe5+ 13 Dc2 is clearly better for White.

10 Dh3

11 Df4 Whx4 and now 12 a3 D4xd5 13 Dxd5 Dxd5 14 Dxd5 Dxd5 15 Dxe4 Dc7 leads to a roughly equal ending (Ciocaltea-Ljubojevic, Malaga 1971). That was the first time Ljubojevic tried this system for Black.

The alternative is 10 Lg4.
Boleslavsky then gives 11 Lxc4 Dxc4 12 Dxc4+ Dh6 13 Dxe6 Dxc3+ 14 bxc3 b5 15 Wh4! a5 16 Dc5 Whd3 17 Wh7 with very dangerous threats. Rees showed in the Haagse Post, however, that Black can offer an excellent pawn sacrifice with 11 ... Dxc3+ 12 bxc3 Dxc4 13 Dg4+ Df7! 14 Dxc4 Dd6 15 Dh5+ Wh7. Black is guaranteed equal play because of the opposite-color Bishops and his resulting pressure on the light squares.

White has better, however: 11 Wh4+. Now 11 ... Wh4 12 exf6 Whf6 13 Wh2+ would be disastrous for Black, while 11 ... Dxd5 12 Dxd5 Dxc3+ 13 bxc3 Dxd5 14 0-0-0 brings no relief either.

Once again, sound development above all. Estrin and Panov recommend 10 a3 to keep Black’s King Bishop out of b4, but Black stands well after the simple 10 ... Dc5. Bagirov’s recommendation, 10 d6, is again premature, since White will have difficulty defending the e-pawn after 10 ... Dc6, e.g., 11 Dh3 Lg4 or 11 Dh4 g5. Finally, 10 Wh4 also promises little after 10 ... Dc6.
A quiet continuation would not achieve so much this time because 11 \( \text{Lc2} \) would be followed by the annoying 11 ... \( \text{Lc5} \) (but not 11 ... \( \text{Lb4} \) 12 0-0 0-0-0 because of 13 \( \text{Qg5!} \) \( \text{Lxe2} \) 14 \( \text{Qxe2} \) h6 15 e6! with a strong attack, as in Silyakov-Bagirov, Baku 1969).

The text is a many-sided move. The Black Queen Bishop is attacked, a later Queen check on h4 is prevented, the c5-square is taken away from the King Bishop, and, finally, the c-pawn is attacked. White can also take the c-pawn immediately with 11 \( \text{Lxc4} \), but that gives him little chance of advantage after 11 ... \( \text{Lxc4} \) 12 \( \text{Qa4} \) + \( \text{Qd7} \) 13 \( \text{Qxc4} \) \( \text{Qxf3} \) 14 \( \text{gxf3} \) \( \text{Qxe5} \) 15 \( \text{Qxe2} \) (or 15 \( \text{Qe4} \) \( \text{Wh4} \) + !) and now not 15 ... \( \text{Qe7} \) 16 0-0! with advantage to White (Browne-Nicevski, Rovinj-Zagreb 1970), but 15 ... \( \text{Qh4} \) + with good play for Black.

Before bringing his own King to safety, White launches an immediate attack, supported by his mighty pawn duo in the center, against the enemy King. Remarkably, Ljubojevic already had this position with White, at Cacak 1970. His opponent, Honfi, replied 14 ... \( \text{Qe7} \) but was quickly mated after 15 e6 f6 16 \( \text{Qh6} \)

The correct square for the Queen. After 15 ... \( \text{Qc8} \) 16 \( \text{Qb3} \) \( \text{Lc5} \) 17 \( \text{Qh4} \) \( \text{Qxg1} \) 18 \( \text{Qh6} \) mate can only be deferred by 18 ... \( \text{Qe3} \).

16 \( \text{Qb3} \) \( \text{Lc5} \)

17 \( \text{Qd4} \)

Black takes the Rook, a much criticized decision. Hort gives the text move a question mark in the Encyclopedia of Chess Openings—yes, we are still very much in the opening—as do Kotov, Blackstock, and Wade in their joint book World Championship Interzonal 1973. Zaitsev and Shashin were the first to criticize the capture of the Rook. They give two variations in 64:

A) 17 ... \( \text{Qd8} \) 18 d6 \( \text{Qc6} \) and now:

A1) 19 \( \text{Qd4} \) \( \text{Qxe5} \) 20 \( \text{Qxe5} \) \( \text{Qae8} \) 21 \( \text{Qe7} \) \( \text{Qxd6} \) and Black wins.

A2) 19 \( \text{Qd4} \). This move was suggested by Ree during an informal analysis session with me when we first saw the game. The point is that Black runs out of moves after 19 ... \( \text{Qxg1} \) 20 \( \text{Qd6} \) \( \text{Qxd6} \) 21 \( \text{Qxd6} \) \( \text{Qxe8} \) 22 \( \text{Qh6} \) \( \text{Qxe4} \) + 23 \( \text{Qf1} \) \( \text{Qb5} \) + 24 \( \text{Qxg1} \). Soon after this variation was published in Schackbuletten, Marovic found a hole in it. In the Yugoslav magazine Sahovski Glasnik he showed that Black has the much stronger 23rd move 23 ... \( \text{Qe7} \) + ! He continues with 24 \( \text{Qg2} \) \( \text{Qe2} \) + 25 \( \text{Qxg1} \) \( \text{Qc5} \) + 26 \( \text{Qh1} \) \( \text{Qxh2} \) 27 \( \text{Qxh2} \) \( \text{Qf5} \) with unclear play. I wonder whether he saw that 28 \( \text{Qxf7} \) + was possible—the Bishop can be captured only on pain of mate. However, even after 28 ... \( \text{Qh8} \) White has achieved little. The Bishop will be forced to retreat when Black captures on f6, and thus 28 \( \text{Qxf7} \) + seems to be merely a wasted tempo for the win of a relatively unimportant pawn. White's best seems to be 28 \( \text{Qg3} \) \( \text{Qxf6} \) 29 \( \text{Qe1} \) with good compensation for the pawn.

A3) 19 0-0-0. Zaitsev and Shashin now give a variation which superficially appears to give Black equal play; i.e., 19 ... \( \text{Qxg1} \) 20 \( \text{Qxg1} \) \( \text{Qc5} \) 21 \( \text{Qe1} \) \( \text{Qae8} \) 22 \( \text{Qe7} \) \( \text{Qxe7} \) 23. But Marovic goes further and concludes that White clearly has the better chances after 23 \( \text{Qxe7} \) \( \text{Qxe7} \) 24 \( \text{Qxe7} \).

Let us underline this judgment: White is in fact winning. 27 ... \( \text{Qd4} \) (instead of 27 ... \( \text{Qxf3} \) ) would be tougher, but 28 a3 would best illustrate the helplessness of Black's
position. While White quietly prepares to further strengthen his position, Black cannot free himself.

B) 17 ... əe8. How treacherous the position is can be seen in the variation 18 d6 əxd6 19 əb5 əxe5 20 əxc7 əxc7 + 21 əe4 with the better ending for White, a variation originally given by Ree and me and unquestionably adopted by Kotov, Blackstock, and Wade in their book. However, it fails to consider an important finesse for Black. Adams gives 18 d6 əxd6 19 əb5 and now:

Afx7 + əg7. O'Kelly tries to improve the White play with 20 dxe7, but after 20 ... əd3 + 21 əf1 əxf4 22 əg4 əd6! 23 əd4 əc7 24 əc1 White by no means has the better of it, as O'Kelly thinks; Black plays simply 24 ... əac8 with good chances.

B) 19 əe4!. Very refined.

After 19 əd5 (analysis)

19 ... əxe5 +!! 20 əxe5 əb4 + and Black wins.

Therefore, after 17 ... əe8 White must resort to 18 əf6, the move analyzed by Zaitsev and Shashin. After 18 ... əd8 there can follow:

B) 19 d6 (Zaitsev and Shashin). However, Black comes out of it well after 19 ... əxe5 (not 19 ... əxd6? 20 əxf7 + əxf7 21 əe7 +! winning the Queen) 20 əf1 əxd6 21 əb5 əc6 22 əxd6 əxd6 23 əd1 əc6 24 əxe5 əb5 + 25 əf2 əxe5 26

After 19 əd4 (analysis)

The subtle point came to light in a game Marjanovic-Filipowicz, Yugoslavia 1974: 19 ... əxe5 20 əxg6 +!! with a crushing attack. 19 ... əxe5 is better, but White clearly has the better chances after 20 əxe5 əxe5 21 əg2.

In short, neither of Black's two alternatives, 17 ... əd8 and 17 ... əe8, lead to satisfactory play. Even so, is either of them a relatively better try than the text move? If you look at the game superficially you might tend to think so, but analysis proves that the opposite is true.

18 d6

Black won quickly after 18 əe2? in Gheorghiu-Ljubojevic, Manila 1973: 18 ... əc5! 19 əxf1 əxf4 20 əf6 əg2 + 21 əe3 əxb2 22 əd3 əd8 23 əd4 əa8 24 əh6 əf6 + 25 əe3 əe3 + and White resigned.

It is remarkable that this short game was played after Petropolis, puzzling that Gheorghiu, who also played in the Interzonal tournament, would deviate from Brontgen's play, and surprising, too, that Ljubojevic would risk losing with the same variation twice in a row. All this rather confused some commentators. Adams wrote that Gheorghiu-Ljubojevic was also played at Petropolis, and thus he created the impression that Bronstein had improved White's play later in the tournament. Bagirov, though correctly locating the game in Manila, asserted that the Interzonal had been held later, and thus he too implied that Bronstein had prepared his novelty. But there is really no doubt that Bronstein had thought it all out over the board. Gheorghiu probably remembered the line incorrectly, and Ljubojevic, the eternal optimist, probably wanted to try the system once more.

18 ... əc8

It was difficult to foresee that this is the wrong square for the Queen. Besides the text move, I analyze the following possibilities:

A) 18 ... əc6. A suggestion of the Danish analyst Bo Richter Larsen.

After 19 əf6 əd8 20 əh6 əf6 21 əxf6 əf6 + White has nothing better than 22 əe4, after which the play is similar to that in variation A2 above (after Black's 17th move). 19 0-0-0 is much stronger. White wins at least a whole Rook back while maintaining a great positional advantage after 19 ... əc5 20 əe əd8 21 əc7.

B) 18 ... əc5. The commentators either did not mention this move or dismissed it with 19 əe4 əe3 + 20 əxe3 əc3 + 21 əc3 with satisfactory play for White; if 19 ... əb4 + 20 əf1 and White wins. But why should Black panic and give check? After the centralized 19 ... əd4, it seems White generally does not have such dangerous threats against the Black King. If 20 əf6 + əh8, and 21 əd1 əxb2 21 əf6 + əh8 22 əh4 əxh2 also leads nowhere. It was later shown that 19 ... əd4 is indeed the better move. The game Grunfeld-Ljubojevic, Riga 1979, went 18 ... əc5 19 əe4 əd4 20 əd1 əxb2 and Black won fairly quickly: 21 əe6 əd7 22 əe7 əxh2 23 əxh2 əxh2 24 əe8 + əe8 25 əd7 + əc7 26 əd7 əd7 27 əd7 əd7 28 əf1 əc5 29 əc1 əc5 30 əd1 əf6 31 əxh6 əxh6 32 əc4 əd8 33 əf3 əd3 34 əf1 əe5 35 əf4 + əe6 36 əc4 + əf6 37 əf3 b5 and White resigned.

After 18 ... əc5 19 əe4 əd4, the indicated move is 20 əf1 so that after the virtually forced 20 ... əxb2 White has a choice of places to put his Rook. The best is 21 əe1 with
the idea of indirectly protecting the e-pawn after 21 ... \( \text{Wh2} \) 22 \( \text{Wg4} \). Black then loses his Bishop, and White has sufficient compensation for the Exchange after, e.g., 22 ... \( \text{h5} \) 23 \( \text{gxh6} \) \( \text{h6xg5} \) + 24 \( \text{hxg5} \) \( \text{Whd7} \). I think the reason Ljubojevic repeated the variation against Gheorghiu was that he had found 19 ... \( \text{Whd4} \) and felt that the resulting possibilities were sharp enough and not one-sidedly in White’s favor. It would be interesting to see what Ljubojevic would play against 20 \( \text{Whf1} \).

19 \( \text{Wxe5} \)

Bronstein errs too. His unconcern for the safety of his King might have cost him dearly. 19 0-0-0 is indicated, as Bronstein gave after the game. White would then be unable to make immediate use of his Knight in the attack against the Black King with \( \text{De4} \), but, remarkably enough, Black would still have time to set up a watertight defense. Bronstein’s variation continues 19 ... \( \text{Le5} \) 20 e6 \( \text{fxe6} \) 21 \( \text{We5} \) \( \text{Le8} \) 22 \( \text{Lh6} \) \( \text{Wh7} \) 23 \( \text{De4} \) and White wins. 19 ... \( \text{Wc5} \) is tougher, but even then Black has hardly any survival chances after 20 e6 \( \text{Whd7} \) (the standard move to cover f6 in this position) 21 \( \text{fxe6} \) + \( \text{Wg7} \) 22 \( \text{Whb1} \) (threatening 23 \( \text{Wh4} \)) 22 ... \( \text{Wxe5} \) 23 \( \text{Lxg1} \), and White already has two pawns for the Exchange.

The best seems to be 22 ... \( \text{Wxe5} \), although White keeps clear compensation for the Exchange after 23 \( \text{Lxc4} \) \( \text{Lxf4} \) 24 \( \text{Lxf4} \).

20 \( \text{De4} \)

Now everything goes according to White’s desires.

20 ... \( \text{Whd7} \)

The most obvious. Yet 20 ... \( \text{Whd7} \) would have made heavier demands on White’s attacking ability. O’Kelly comes up with two variations, one showing how not to continue, the other an (alleged) route to victory:

A) 21 \( \text{Lc1} \) (this move was given with a question mark) 21 ... \( \text{b6} \) 22 \( \text{Lxf6} \) \( \text{Lxf6} \) 23 \( \text{Lxf6} \) + \( \text{Wg7} \) 24 \( \text{Wh5} \) + \( \text{gxh5} \) 25 \( \text{Wh6} \) + \( \text{Wg8} \) (or 25 ... \( \text{Wh7} \) 26 \( \text{Lc2} \) + \( \text{Wh6} \) 27 \( \text{Wh6} \) + \( \text{Wg8} \) 28 \( \text{Wh6} \) + \( \text{Wh8} \) 27 \( \text{Wh6} \) + \( \text{Wh8} \) 28 \( \text{Lc2} \). Black must contort himself to avoid direct mate; i.e., 24 ... \( \text{Wh7} \) 25 \( \text{Lxf6} \) \( \text{Wh8} \) 26 \( \text{Lx7} \) + \( \text{Wh8} \).

B) 21 \( \text{Lxf6} \) (given an exclamation mark) 21 ... \( \text{Lxf6} \) 22 \( \text{Lxf6} \) + \( \text{Wg7} \) 23 \( \text{Wh5} \) + \( \text{gxh5} \) 24 \( \text{Wh6} \) + \( \text{Wg8} \) 25 e6 \( \text{Wg8} \) 26 \( \text{Wh5} \) + \( \text{Wh8} \) 27 \( \text{Wh6} \) + \( \text{Wh8} \) 28 \( \text{Wh4} \) + f6 29 e7 \( \text{Wh8} \) 30 \( \text{Wh8} \) + \( \text{Wh8} \) 31 \( \text{Wh2} \) and wins.

A rather unconvincing business. How does White actually win? Not by attack, for the Black King is safe enough. Admittedly, White’s far-advanced passed pawns keep the opponent from making use of his material advantage, but beyond that, there is little to say.

In variation B it makes sense for White first to force a further weakening of the Black King’s position with 23 \( \text{Wh4} \) instead of rushing ahead with the showy Knight sacrifice. Then 23 ... \( \text{Wh8} \) fails to 24 \( \text{Wh5} \) + \( \text{Wh8} \) 25 \( \text{Wh7} \) + mate, so 23 ... \( \text{h3} \) is the only possibility. Now White indeed offers the Knight with 24 \( \text{Wh5} \) + , but now Black can’t take it because of mate after 24 ... \( \text{gxh5} \) 25 \( \text{Wh6} \) + \( \text{Wh8} \) (or 25 ... \( \text{Wh7} \) 26 \( \text{Lc2} \) + \( \text{Wh6} \) 27 \( \text{Wh6} \) + \( \text{Wg8} \) 28 \( \text{Wh6} \) + \( \text{Wh8} \) 27 \( \text{Wh6} \) + \( \text{Wh8} \) 28 \( \text{Lc2} \). Black must contort himself to avoid direct mate; i.e., 24 ... \( \text{Wh7} \) 25 \( \text{Wh6} \) \( \text{Wh8} \) 26 \( \text{Wh7} \) + \( \text{Wh8} \).

After 26 ... \( \text{Wh8} \) (analysis)

Strangely enough, there is no clear win for White here: 27 \( \text{Wh6} \) fails to 27 ... \( \text{Wh7} \) and after 27 \( \text{Wh6} \) + \( \text{Wh7} \) 28 \( \text{Wh8} \) + \( \text{Wg8} \) 29 \( \text{Wh7} \) + \( \text{Wh8} \) 30 \( \text{Wh6} \) Black escapes with perpetual check after 30 ... \( \text{Wh4} \) + .

So, after 20 ... \( \text{Whd7} \), how does White win? The attentive reader must have seen it by now: White plays the move rejected by O’Kelly in variation A, 21 \( \text{Lc1} \). Now after 21 ... \( \text{b6} \) 22 \( \text{Lxf6} \) \( \text{Lxf6} \) 23 \( \text{Lxf6} \) + \( \text{Wg7} \).
White continues 24 \( \text{Wh}4! \) (instead of 24 \( \text{Wh}5 \)) 24 ... \( \text{h}6 \) 25 \( \text{Wh}5 + \text{h}7 \) 26 \( \text{Wh}6 \text{g}8 \) 27 \( \text{Wx}f7 + \text{Wh}8 \) 28 \( \text{Wh}6 + \text{Wh}7 \) 29 \( \text{Wx}g8 + \text{Wx}g8 \) 30 \( \text{Wc}7 + \text{Wh}8 \) 31 \( \text{Wh}6 \) and wins because Black now has no saving check on c4.

Earlier, Black’s possible Queen check on a6 never had any point because White could have met it with \( \text{Qc}4 \).

21 \( \text{Ac}1 \) \( \text{We}6 \)

Threatens to start checking on b5, but White’s following move removes any possible sting from that.

22 \( \text{Axe}5 \)

White gets a proud Knight on f6 by means of this Exchange sacrifice.

22 ... \( \text{Dxe}5 \)
23 \( \text{Df}6 + \text{Wh}8 \)
24 \( \text{Wh}4 \)

Black is lots of material ahead, but he cannot prevent loss. He tries a few last checks.

24 ... \( \text{Wb}5 + \)
25 \( \text{Fe}3! \)

The crowning point of White’s attacking play. Black’s only reasonable check is 25 ... \( \text{Wd}3 + \), but after 26 \( \text{Wf}2 \) he has no more to say; e.g., 26 ... \( \text{h}5 \) 27 \( \text{Dxh}5 \text{gxh}5 \) 28 \( \text{Lf}6 + \text{Gg}8 \) 29 \( \text{Gg}5 + \) and mate.

Note that the immediate 25 \( \text{Wf}2 \) (instead of 25 \( \text{Fe}3 \)) only draws after 25 ... \( \text{Dd}3 + 26 \text{Gg}1 \text{Wc}5 + 27 \text{Wh}1 \text{h}5 \) 28 \( \text{Dxh}5 \text{Wf}2 \) 29 \( \text{Gg}3 + \text{Gg}8 \) 30 \( \text{Lf}6 \) and Black has perpetual check with 30 ... \( \text{Wf}3 + \). The move 26 \( \text{Gg}2 \) (instead of 26 \( \text{Gg}1 \)) is not better; Black has such a great advantage in material that he can afford 26 ... \( \text{Df}1 + \).

And 25 \( \text{Df}1 \) is even worse because of 25 ... \( \text{Wb}4 + \), forcing the exchange of Queens.

25 ... \( \text{h}5 \)
26 \( \text{Dxh}5 \) \( \text{Wxb}3 + \)

Black must give back quite a lot of material to prevent immediate mate.

27 axb3 \( \text{Dd}5 + \)
28 \( \text{Dd}4 \)

The King is a strong piece.

28 ... \( \text{Df}6 + \)
29 \( \text{Dx}d5 \) \( \text{Wx}d5 \)
30 \( \text{Df}6 + \) \( \text{Gg}7 \)
31 \( \text{Wxg}5 \)

Now White has the material advantage. Ljubojevic continued playing until the time control because Bronstein was in serious time trouble. The rest is not interesting.

31 ... \( \text{Wc}8 \)
32 \( \text{e}6 \) \( \text{fxe}6 + \)
33 \( \text{Dxe}6 \) \( \text{Wf}8 \)
34 \( a5 \)
35 \( \text{Gg}4 \)
36 \( \text{Gf}5 + \)
37 \( \text{Wxf}5 \)
38 \( \text{d}8 \text{W} \)
39 \( \text{Wd}7 + \)
40 \( \text{Wxb}7 \)
41 \( \text{f}4 \)

Black resigns.
Game Eleven
Karpov-Spassky

When Spassky, with the Black pieces, won the first game of his 1974 semifinal match against Karpov, almost every expert considered Spassky the clear favorite. This was due primarily to the manner in which he won—that is, unmistakably in the powerful style of his best years. But surprisingly, we saw little of the old Spassky again. After a short draw in the second game, Karpov hit back hard in the third. It was only the second time in his life that Karpov opened with 1 d4 and not 1 e4—curiously, Fischer, too, regularly found alternatives to his favorite 1 e4 in his match against Spassky. When Karpov had built up a 2-1 lead with five draws after eight games, he again opened with the King pawn. And with what virtuosity!

"His play is dry, but very good," declared Hort after the game. Hort was present in Leningrad during the match, as I was. Nearly all the grandmasters in the press room were deeply impressed. This is undoubtedly one of Karpov's best games and is very typical of his style, although it is not to be found in his book of fifty of his own games. The contours of the future World Champion were already becoming clear.

In this match, Karpov employed the modest 6 ... Le2 for the first time in his life. In five earlier games he tried the sharp Keres Attack with success: he won all five, including a famous one against Hort in Moscow 1971.

6 ... Le7
7 0-0 0-0
8 f4 D6
9 Le3 Dd7

In the first game, Spassky succeeded with the then virtually unknown 9 ... e5. Complications favorable for Black arose after 10 Dd3 a5 11 a4 Dd4 12 f3 Le6 13 Df1 Dc7 14 Df2 Dfd8 15 Dc2 Dc4 16 Db5! Dxb5 17 axb5 a4 18 Dc1 d5! Geller, one of Karpov's seconds during the 1974 match, strengthened White's play a few months later in a game against Spassky: 12 Dh1 Dc7 13 Df1 and White clearly had the better play after 13 ... Le6 14 Dd2 exf4 15 Db5 Dd8 16 Dxf4.

10 Dd3 a5
11 a4 Dd4
12 f3 Le6

An interesting novelty that could be an important improvement over 12 ... e5. After that move White gained the advantage with 13 Dh1 Dc5 14 fxe5 Dxe5 15 Dc2 Dc7 16 Df2 Dd7 17 Dd1 in Geller-Polugaievsky, 1973.

13 Dd4 g6

An idea connected with the previous move: Black will give up the Bishop-pair in return for a strong central position.

14 Dh2 e5
15 Dxe6 Dxe6
16 fxe5

A good move which Karpov must have played with pleasure. He has a great preference for positions with fixed pawn structures.

16 ... Dxe5
17 $f1

White concentrates his pieces off the f-file, not the d-file. If he could now also play his King Bishop to c4, the f7-square would be fatally weak.

17 ... $c8
18 h3

A typical Karpov move. There was no actual threat of 18 ... $g4, because of the reply 19 $xg4 $xg4 20 $c4, but, just to make sure, he removes any possibility of it. Perhaps he is dreaming of getting his Bishop to c4 and doesn't want to have to exchange it on g4.

18 $d1 should also be considered.

18 ... $d7

And this is typical of the way Spassky played against Fischer two years earlier. In the eighth game of the 1972 match, Spassky played an incomprehensible tactical blunder with 19 ... $f6-d7 (Fischer-Spassky: 1 c4 $c3 2 $c3 $c3 3 $f3 $f6 4 g3 $g6 5 $g2 $g7 6 0-0 0-0 7 d4 exd4 8 $xd4 $xd4 9 $xd4 d5 10 $g5 $e6 11 $f4 $a5 12 $e1 $ab8 13 b3 $c8 14 $d2 $a5 15 $e3 $b5 16 $a7 $bx4 17 $xb8 $xb8 18 $xc4 $xc4 19 $fd1 $d7). Now in the ninth game of this match, he commits an equally incomprehensible positional blunder with 18 ... $f6-d7.

The exchange of White's bad light-square Bishop for the Knight leads to a strategically ruinous position. The right plan for Black is to force the exchange of White's other Bishop; e.g., 18 ... $g7 (the immediate 18 ... h5 is not bad either) 19 $c1 (Intending to bring the Bishop to c4. Perhaps 19 $d1 is better, but if 19 $c4 $a6) 19 ... h5 20 $e2 $h7 and now 21 $c4 is answered by the advance f7-f5, and other moves are answered by 21 ... $g5.

In 64, Tal gives 18 ... $e6 19 $c1 $ad8 20 $e2 $d4 for Black. He must have done this analysis in a great hurry, because we had both concluded in the press room during the game that this attempt to keep the Bishop out of c4 was inadequate due to 21 b3 $xe4 (what else?) 22 $xd4 exd4 23 $xe4 (better than 23 $c4 $xf2! 24 $xe6 fxe6) ...

$x4 24 $d3 or 24 $c4, and Black does not have enough compensation for the Exchange.

After 18 ... $g7 (or 18 ... h5) 19 $b1 (to regroup), then Black can play 19 ... $e6.

19 $g4

Tal writes that Furman predicted Karpov's moves here and on the 24th move. Indeed, Karpov's old teacher always joined in the analysis when his pupil stood well, and at such times it was impossible to remove the smile from his face.

The text move is actually very easy to find: it is the only way to prevent the positional threat 19 ... $c5.

19 ... h5
20 $xd7 $xd7
21 $e4

A consequence of White's 19th move. Black would have nothing to complain about if he could play his Queen to e6.

21 ... $h4
22 $d2 $e7

The other move prophesied by Furman. Now even the Knight on b4 will be driven back, and the Black position goes rapidly downhill.

24 $d1!

A strong quiet move.

25 ... $b7
26 $h2

Only Karpov's 18th move was deserving of some criticism; all his other moves are extraordinarily
strong. The text move maximizes the pressure on Black's position.

27 ... a7
28 d2 c8
29 f3 f6
30 d2 e7
31 e6 ad8
32 xd8 xd8

While we in the press room were occupying ourselves with the spectacular 33 a4, which we thought nicely decides matters after 33 ... c7 (Timman) 34 f4 d5 35 c4 exd5 36 a5 c4 37 axb8 a7 38 d8 + e5 39 a8 + c8 40 c8 + c4 41 g4 + 1 xh4 42 a8 + a8 + 43 a7 (Hort), Karpov mercilessly made his final, prosaic moves.

Later, our rushed analysis was indeed shown to be faulty. Black wins with 43 ... g5 in the last position (after 43 xg6). The right way is 40 f12 (instead of 40 e8) with the crushing threat 41 h4 + g4 42 g3 mate. After the forced 40 ... d3, White wins with 41 h4 + g4 42 h8 fxe4 43 g3 + f5 44 xg6 + f4 45 f7 + .

33 d1 db8
34 a5 f8
35 a8 Black resigns

if 35 ... a8 36 e7.

Game Twelve
Korchnoi-Karpov

The Korchnoi-Karpov match, the finals of the 1974 candidates series—only later did it become clear that it was actually for the World Championship—was greeted by only lukewarm enthusiasm by the chess world. Karpov won two games with White right in the opening; both times Korchnoi had deviated from his favorite French Defense. Then Korchnoi won a game with White. Karpov won another game when Korchnoi cooked his own goose in a horrible manner, and Karpov's second loss came when he underestimated the dangers in a very clearly drawn position. And it rained draws.

Yet there were no boring games, although the combinational possibilities only rarely surfaced. One of these games is the eleventh.

The opening followed a traditional path and both players then undertook traditional maneuvers. Analysis shows that much hidden beauty did not come to the fore; the game seemed to follow a gradual progression to an ending which, at first, both players were trying to win. Korchnoi finally turned out to be the only one with chances. Karpov, slippery as an eel, managed to trade down to a Rook endgame which seemed to be only a draw despite Korchnoi's two extra pawns.
Final Candidates Match
Moscow 1974
Game 11

Queen's Indian Defense

Viktor Korchnoi  Anatoly Karpov
1 d4       d5
2 c4        c6
3 g3        g6

Black had the alternative 3 ... b5 available, to prevent White from forming a center with c2-c4. Karpov, however, has a small opening repertoire which he understands very thoroughly and from which he seldom deviates.

6 Lg2        Lb7
5 c4          Le7
6 Dc3

Earlier, 6 0-0 used to be played exclusively. The text move conceals a finesse which would appear after 6 ... Dc4 7 Ld2. In the variation 7 ... Lf6 8 Lc2 Dxd2 9 Dxd2 White can answer the advance 9 ... c5 with 10 d5 because after 10 ... Lxc3 + 11 Dxc3 Black's g-pawn is unprotected.

6 ...     0-0
7 Dd3

An unusual square for the Queen. In the fifth game White placed his Queen on c2, which Karpov answered with 7 ... c5. That advance is unattractive here, so Black is compelled to look for another way to challenge the center.

7 ...      c5

More or less forced because of the threatened c2-c4. Later, Karpov also took to answering 7 0-0 with 7 ... d5. As Ree points out in the Haagse Post, this was Botvinnik's method of playing for a win with Black in the Queen's Indian. The former World Champion would then answer 8 Dc5 with 8 ... Lc8—but White can gain the advantage with 9 cxd5 exd5 10 Lg5.

The present World Champion approaches it differently; after 7 0-0 d5 8 Dc5 he plays 8 ... Da6, a move first used in Smejkal-Byrne, Biel 1976. It introduces an important area of opening theory, since the position can also be reached via the English or the Catalan.

8 cxd5      Dxd5

Seen in the light of the above comments, 8 ... exd5 is a worthy alternative. White doesn't have many choices other than 9 Dc5, and then 9 ... c5 can be played, possibly followed by Db8-a6-c7.

9 Dxd5      exd5
10 0-0       Dd7
11 Lf4

The next time Korchnoi had White, he deviated with 11 Dd1. The idea was probably to answer 11 ... c5 with 12 Dxc5 bxc5 and immediately fianchetto the Queen Bishop with 13 b3 and 14 Lb2. After 11 ... c5 12 Lc3 Ld6 13 Lc1 a5 14 Lc2 c6 Black certainly did not stand worse.

11 ...     c5
12 Dxe5      bxc5

Black would not have enough compensation for the positional disadvantage of the isolated pawn after 12 ... Dxe5 13 Dd1. After the text move he has a reasonable version of the hanging center.

13 Lfd1     Df6
14 Lc2       Lb6
15 Dd2

White reveals his plans. After an undefined buildup typical of his style, Korchnoi is ready for 16 e4, which Black opposes with his following move.

15 ...     Dfe8
16 Df3

This move received unanimous praise. Polugaevsky, in his notes in 64, called it Korchnoi's best move of the first half of the match.

White indirectly increases the pressure on d5; for instance, 16 ... Dd8 is prevented. This is a good tactic in this sort of position. The player opposing the hanging pawns must work mainly with pin-pricks to entice an early c5-c4 or d5-d4 or to create disharmony among the enemy pieces. The player with the hanging pawns must try to be ready for the crucial advance of one of the pawns at the most unexpected moment.

16 ...     Df6

An understandable response. Black must play this sooner or later. For instance, after 16 ... Lf8 17 c3 h6 18 Lh4 Black has little other than 18 ... Df6. Then 19 Lxf6+ the threat 20 Lf1 c4 21 Dxc4 comes into consideration, so Black, just as in the game, should play 19 ... Dc6.

Polugaevsky shows also that Black cannot profit from the position of
The Queen returns to its post, not entirely empty-handed. The Black Queen and Queen Bishop are a little more vulnerable than before. In seven moves they will again stand on b6 and b7.

18 ... Lc4

It is clear that Karpov still does not know what to do with his position. The text move loses at least a tempo, since the ensuing pawn move is certainly not disadvantageous for White.

Polugaevsky writes that the Black position was already ripe for a pawn advance: 18 ... d4. After 19 Lxc6 Wxc6 20 exd4 Qd5 he looks at two variations:

After 20 ... Qd5 (analysis)

A) 21 Lc3 Lxe3 22 fxe3 Lg5 23 Qf1 Lxe3 + 24 Qxe3 Lxe3 25 Wxe5 Wc4 or 25 ... Wh6 and Black has compensation for the pawn. One must certainly agree with this. White's open King position guarantees Black a draw. The

Russian also mentions that this direct attempt is not even necessary and that 21 ... Wc8 with the intention 21 Qf1 c4 is possible. This is also correct, but it seems to me that 21 Lc3 hardly comes into consideration. The main variation is:

B) 21 dx5 Qxf4 22 gx4 Lxe5. At first sight it seems that Black has quite sufficient compensation for the pawn with his strong Bishop and the ragged White King position, but he will experience some annoyance with the pin on the c-file. 23 Ac1 Ac8 24 Db3 Wf3! achieves nothing for White, but it is not so easy after 23 Qb3. Polugaevsky gives 23 ... Ae6 since White's King is in a sticky position; e.g., 24 Wxe5 Ag6 + 25 Qf1 Ag6 + 26 Le1 Le8 + 27 Ld2 Ac6 28 Wh5 Ac6 + 29 Le1 Wc4 + and the White King cannot escape. However, after the better 24 f5 Ac4 25 h3 Ac4 26 Wh3 the question is whether Black has sufficient compensation. His initiative is exhausted, and on 26 ... Lb6 27 Ac1 consolidates. Therefore, after 23 Qb3, the indicated move is 23 ... Wf3, aiming for perpetual check with 24 ... Wg4 +.

In any case, we may conclude that this was a good moment to dissolve the hanging pawns. But it was not yet necessary, since Black had moves to strengthen his position: 18 ... Wac8, 18 ... Aad8, 18 ... h6, etc.

The text shows, besides Karpov's uncertainty of the value of his position, an unbridled optimism. Karpov seems to think he can do whatever he pleases. In the next few moves, Korchnoi firmly strengthens his position and gets a dangerous initiative.

19 b3 Le6
20 Wc1 f8
21 Qf3

One of the results of Black's unenterprising play becomes clear; White is ready to transfer his Queen Bishop to the long diagonal.

21 ... Lb7

Polugaevsky thinks Black could still have kept the White Bishop off the long diagonal with 21 ... Qd7. In Schaakbulletin 84, Enklaar writes that this attempt is refuted by 22 Qd4 Lb7 23 Qf5, but this is hardly convincing after the simple 23 ... Qf6. Polugaevsky's variation continues with 23 Qf5 Lc6 24 Qh3 Qc6, but now Black is squeezed in a bottleneck: the White Knight comes back with great force (25 Qd4) and Black's prospects are gloomy.

22 Le5 Qd4
23 Qa1 Aad8
24 De5 Qb6

This offers the possibility of a complicated combinational twist, but one which would not have turned out badly for Black. His position is not enviable, but Karpov is often at his very best when he really stands badly and is threatened by genuine danger.
25 \( \text{Lxe}4 \)

The critical moment of the game. White's pieces are optimally placed and he has a subtle way of trying to take advantage of this immediately: 25 b4. According to Flohr in Schach-Echo, Karpov declared after the game that he had not feared that sharp move because he had the simple answer 25 ... \( \text{Lc}8 \) available. This shows a certain underestimation of the strength of White's position, since after 25 b4 \( \text{Lc}8 \) 26 \( \text{Lxe}4 \) dxe4 27 \( \text{Qd}7 \) White wins a pawn. If he were actually faced with the problem of 25 b4, the future World Champion would probably have solved it in another way, by accepting the challenge with 25 ... cxb4. After 26 \( \text{Qc}7 \) Black has the following possibilities:

\begin{itemize}
  \item A) 26 ... f6 27 \( \text{Qf}7 + \text{Hh}8 \) 28 \( \text{Qd}7 \) \( \text{Wb}5 \) 29 \( \text{Qxf}6 ! \) \( \text{Qxf}6 \) 30 \( \text{Lxf}6 \) \( \text{Wd}7 \) (30 ... \( \text{gx}f6 \) 31 \( \text{Qd}7 \) is even worse) 31 \( \text{Axe}7 \) \( \text{Qxe}7 \) 32 \( \text{Qxf}7 \) \( \text{Qxf}6 \) 33 \( \text{Lxe}7 \) with a great endgame advantage for White.
  \item B) 26 ... \( \text{Qc}7 \) 27 \( \text{Axe}7 \) \( \text{Dc}3 \) 28 \( \text{Lxe}3 \) \( \text{bx}c3 \) 29 \( \text{Qxf}7 \). Enklaar disagrees with Polugaevsky's judgment that White stands better here: he thinks that after 29 ... \( \text{Lb}8 \) Black himself may have the advantage because of his dangerous passed c-pawn and White's out-of-play Knight. However, White can solve both these problems with one stroke: 30 \( \text{Qg}5 \), threatening 31 \( \text{Lxe}7 \) as well as the hanging c-pawn. There is little else besides 30 ... h6, and after White exchanges with 31 \( \text{Lxe}7 \) \( \text{hx}5 \) 32 \( \text{Lxd}5 + \text{Qh}8 \) 33 \( \text{Lxe}8 \) \( \text{Lxe}8 \) 34 \( \text{Lxe}4 \) he maintains good winning chances. On the other hand, 31 \( \text{Qh}3 \) is bad because of 31 ... \( \text{Lc}8 ! \) 32 \( \text{Lxe}7 \) c2 and White ends up an Exchange behind.
  \item C) 26 ... \( \text{Qe}7 \). This move, though it is Black's best fighting chance, is not mentioned by a single commentator. The point is that he wins the piece back after 27 \( \text{Qxb}6 \) \( \text{axb}5 \) 28 \( \text{Qxe}4 \) f6.
\end{itemize}

After 26 \( \text{Qc}7 \) (analysis)

White can then maintain a firm central position with 29 f4. He undoubtedly has a great positional advantage after, e.g., 29 ... \( \text{Qe}8 \) (not 29 ... \( \text{fxe}5 \) 30 \( \text{Lxe}5 \) \( \text{Qxe}8 \) 31 \( \text{Qc}7 \), etc.) 30 \( \text{Lc}2 \) \( \text{fxe}5 \) 31 \( \text{Lxe}5 \) \( \text{Lxe}5 \) 32 \( \text{Qf}2 \) followed by 33 \( \text{Lb}3 \). So Black must play as sharply as possible to retain counterchances: 29 ... \( \text{fxe}5 \) 30 \( \text{Lxe}5 \) \( \text{Qxe}5 \) 31 \( \text{fxe}5 \) \( \text{Lc}5 \) 32 \( \text{Qg}2 \) \( \text{Qf}7 \) and now it is Black who has the better of it in the center. White's weak pawn on e5 and Black's pair of Bishops give Black reasonable compensation for the Exchange.

One can conclude, overall, that 25 b4 would definitely have led to an advantage for White. One cannot say that about the text move. White gives up the Bishop-pair in the hope of winning the c-pawn. The whole plan is called into question by a hidden finesse available to Black in a few moves; but, besides that, Black's solid position is certainly not worse.

Korchnoi, however, seems to have a different opinion about this. Compare his first match game against Petrosian in 1977. The opening moves were 1 c4 e6 2 g3 d5 3 \( \text{gL}2 \) \( \text{Qf}6 \) 4 \( \text{Qf}3 \) \( \text{Lc}7 \) 5 0-0 0-0 6 d4 \( \text{Qxd}4 \) 7 \( \text{Qc}5 \) \( \text{Qc}6 \).

Korchnoi-Petrosian 1977

Here Korchnoi decided on the surprising 8 \( \text{Lxe}6 \)!! \( \text{bxc}6 \) 9 \( \text{Qc}3 \). The game continued 9 ... c5 10 \( \text{dx}c5 \) \( \text{Lxc}5 \) 11 \( \text{Qa}4 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 12 \( \text{Qe}4 \) \( \text{db}6 \) 13 \( \text{Qc}2 \) \( \text{Qe}7 \) 14 \( \text{Qxc}4 \) \( \text{Qxc}4 \) 15 \( \text{Qxc}4 \) \( \text{Qd}5 \) 16 \( \text{Qe}2 \) \( \text{Lb}7 \) 17 f3 \( \text{Qd}4 + 18 \text{gg}2 \) and now Petrosian simplified with 18 ... \( \text{Qxe}4 \) 19 \( \text{Qxe}4 \) \( \text{Qxe}4 \) 20 \( \text{fxe}4 \) \( \text{Qb}8 \) 21 b3 \( \text{Ld}6 \) 22 \( \text{Qf}4 \) draw.

Most experts discovered later that Black could have obtained the advantage with 18 ... \( \text{Qd}8 \), since the pair of Bishops were more important in that position than the shattered Black Queenside pawns. Korchnoi showed how much he disagreed with this by telling Ree, his second, that...
he had seriously considered preventing Petrosian’s drawing
simplification by playing 18 Oxf2
instead of 18 Oxg2.

It would have been interesting to
see how Korchnoi would have done
against Fischer with the positions he
had against Karpov and Petrosian.
Fischer, like no other player, knew
how to prove the strength of the
Bishop-pair in all sorts of positions!

25 ...
26 Oc4
27 b4

The consequence of the previous
move. The Black position seems
precarious because 27 ... Oxld1 + 28
Oxld1 Oxex5 29 Oxe5 Oxex5 fails to
30 Ox d7.

This extremely subtle continuation
was overlooked by the grandmasters
in the press room and was discovered
only later by Polugaevsky in his
analysis. The amazing point is 29
Oxd4 Oxex5. Although many pieces are
hanging, White has no fully
satisfactory way out. The best is 30
Oxex7 Oxexd4 31 Oxexd4 Oxex7 32 Oxh7
(32 Oxex4 Oxex8 is even worse for
White); still, Black keeps an
advantage with 32 ... Oxex8 33 Oxh6 +
Oxex6 34 Oxex7 Oxh3. The White King
is held more tightly in a potential
mating net than the Black King is.

Keene and Hartston, in their joint
book on the match, mention that
Korchnoi had seen 27 ... Oxh6 when
he was calculating 25 Oxex4 but had
assumed that Karpov would not find
it. Personally, I do not attach much
weight to this sort of pronouncement
right after a game. Korchnoi very
possibly did see the move: he is well
known for his highly developed
powers of calculating sharp
variations. But it seems to me an
unnecessarily great risk to have

assumed that Karpov would not see
the same continuation two moves
later—the more so since Korchnoi
had an excellent alternative. The
move 25 b4 would certainly have
given his opponent very difficult
problems.

Korchnoi’s comment to the two
English chess players is analogous to
Karpov’s telling Flohr that he had
not feared 25 b4. The great tension of
such a serious match does not
permit one to show any sign of
weakness which might come to the
attention of the enemy camp. One
simply does not admit that one’s
powers failed at a particular moment
or weakened to such an extent that a
critical continuation was overlooked.

28 Oxexd1 Oxex8
29 bxc5 Oxex6

Black cannot take the minor
Exchange because his back rank is
too weak: 29 ... Oxex5 30 Oxex5 Oxex5
31 Oxex8, and now Ree says the
counterattack fails after 31 ...
Oxex1 + 32 Oxh2 Oxex4 33 Oxex4 (introducing
the twist Oxex8+ and Oxex8
mate into the position) 33 ... Oxex3 +
34 Oxex3 Oxex1 + 35 Oxex4 Qx+ (Black
averts the mate of his own King but
allows White’s to escape) 36 Oxex5
Oxex3 37 Oxex1 Oxex4 + 38 Oxex6 Oxex7 +
39 Oxex5 Oxex4 + 40 Oxex5 and the
White King will escape from the
checks, after which the c-pawn will
decide the game in his favor.

30 Oxex4

Korchnoi continually works with
little twists to keep his pawn ad-
antage, at least temporarily.

30 ...
31 Oxex4 f6

If the Knight now goes to c4 it will
block the c-file. But Korchnoi finds
yet another little something.

32 Qxex6 Oxex5

White can definitely keep the c-
pawn after this. Much stronger is 32 ...
Qxex8! with the point that White
loses his Knight after 33 Oxex6 Oxex7.
So he has nothing better than 34
Oxex4, and with 34 Oxex5 Black
finally wins back the pawn with no
problems. “Roughly equal chances,”
according to Polugaevsky; but
according to me, the better chances
are more likely Black’s, since he has
the safer King position. It is im-
portant that 35 Oxex5, with the point
35 ... Oxex7? 36 Oxex5 Oxex5 37
Oxex8 + and wins, achieves nothing
because of 35 ... Oxex8, and Black’s
position has already been strengthened.

33 \( \text{Ec4} \)

White has finally reached what he had in mind: a solid extra pawn. Black cannot capture the c-pawn because of the same twist as in the previous note: 33 ... \( \text{Lxc5} \) 34 \( \text{Lxc5} \) \( \text{Wxc5} \) 35 \( \text{Bxd5} \) \( \text{Bxc4} \) 36 \( \text{Bb8} \), etc.

Another try to hold the pawn is 33 \( \text{Bb2} \), which would lead to a convincing result after 33 ... \( \text{Bxc5} \) 34 \( \text{Bxa1} \), but Black can parry the attack simply with 33 ... \( \text{Bb7} \).

33 ... \( \text{Bc6} \)
34 \( \text{Bxc6} \) \( \text{Bxc6} \)
35 \( \text{Ec1} \)

Polugaevsky here gives a method to prevent Black's Rook from exerting pressure along the a-file: 35 \( \text{Da5} \). The Rook must then retreat because 35 ... \( \text{Da6} \) fails to 36 \( \text{Bc3} \), after which the c-pawn walks through unhindered. After 35 ... \( \text{Ec7} \) 36 \( \text{Bb3} \) White has consolidated his extra pawn, but without having real winning chances. It is true that Black cannot win the pawn back directly with 36 ... \( \text{Bxb3} \) 37 \( \text{axb3} \) \( \text{Bxc5} \) because in the Bishop ending after 38 \( \text{Bc1} \) \( \text{Bb6} \) 39 \( \text{Bxc7} \) \( \text{Bxc7} \) 40 \( \text{Bxa7} \) \( \text{Bd6} \) 41 \( \text{Bd4} \) \( \text{Bd4} \) 42 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{f5} \) White really does have winning chances. Not, however, by walking his King over to the Queenside, because then he can make no progress: 43 \( \text{Bf2} \) \( \text{Bf7} \) 44 \( \text{fxe4} \) \( \text{fxe4} \) 45 \( \text{f5} \) \( \text{f6} \) 46 \( \text{Bd1} \) \( \text{Bf6} \) 47 \( \text{Bc2} \) \( \text{Bd5} \), and Black comes just in time. If 48 \( \text{Bc3} \), then 48 ... \( \text{Bd6} \) 49 \( \text{Bd2} \) \( \text{Bc5} \) follows. The b-pawn cannot advance because Black's King gets to \( \text{c4} \). The winning try, therefore, is 43 \( \text{Bg2} \) \( \text{Bf7} \) 44 \( \text{fxe4} \) \( \text{fxe4} \) 45 \( \text{h3} \); White plans to penetrate the Kingside in order to attack \( \text{e4} \) and thus divert the Black Bishop from \( \text{b4} \); e.g., 45 ... \( \text{h5} \) 46 \( \text{Bh4} \) \( \text{Gg6} \) 47 \( \text{g4} \) \( \text{Ec7} \) + 48 \( \text{Bh3} \) and White will gain ground.

There is no hurry to win the pawn back, of course. Black keeps the balance with the simple 36 ... \( \text{Bf7} \), and White has nothing better than to position himself so as not to lose the c-pawn.

35 ... \( \text{Bf7} \)
36 \( \text{a3} \) \( \text{Ba6} \)
37 \( \text{Bc3} \) \( \text{Bd6} \)
38 \( \text{Bd2} \) \( \text{Bd7} \)
39 \( \text{f3} \)

With both players short of time, Korchnoi forces his opponent to make a small fundamental decision.

39 ... \( \text{Bxf3} \)

This adds some dynamism to the position, but it gives up space Black could have held with 39 ... \( \text{f5} \). With this choice Karpov shows that he is not intent on simply insuring a draw.

40 \( \text{Bf2} \) \( \text{Bc5} \)

Why not 40 ... \( \text{Bc4} \) to prevent \( \text{e3-e4} \)? Enklaar explains in Schackbulletin that the text move is directed against 41 \( \text{Bxf3} \) and the plan of transferring the Knight to \( \text{d3} \). He gives the variation 41 ... \( \text{Bxf3} \) 42 \( \text{Bxf3} \) \( \text{Bc6} \) 43 \( \text{Bc4} \) \( \text{Bxc5} \) 44 \( \text{f5} \) \( \text{Bd6} \) (Enklaar actually gives 44 ... \( \text{Bd5} \), but then White has the extra possibility 45 \( \text{Bxc5} \) \( \text{Bxc5} \) 46 \( \text{e4} \) + followed by the exchange of Rooks) 45 \( \text{Bxc5} \) \( \text{Bxc5} \) 46 \( \text{Bc4} \) + \( \text{Bc5} \) 47 \( \text{Bc6} \) \( \text{Bc4} \) 48 \( \text{Bf7} \) \( \text{Bb3} \) 49 \( \text{Bxg7} \) \( \text{Exa3} \) 50 \( \text{Exf6} \), and after the respective pawn marches, a Queen endgame arises which Enklaar judges is drawn. According to me, however, it is won for White because of the bad position of the Black King.

Instead of this line, Black has a far more sober continuation: 41 ... \( \text{Bc6} \) 42 \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{f4} \) and now he can capture the Knight without risk if it moves to \( \text{d3} \), as he could also if the Rook were on \( \text{a4} \).

An acceptable explanation is that Black had one move to play before the time control and that 40 ... \( \text{Bc5} \) was careless. After 40 ... \( \text{Bb4} \) White would certainly not stand better any longer.

41 \( \text{e4} \) \( \text{Bc6} \)

The sealed move. All interim reports said that Korchnoi would be a pawn ahead with slight winning chances, according to Flohr in Schach-Echo. But, he added, Karpov had said after adjournment that he considered the position favorable for Black and would be playing for a win. "A little fairy tale from the Moscow woods," concluded the commentator jokingly—a childish way to treat a pronouncement by a man about to become the World Champion.
It is typical of Karpov’s play, and one of his strong trumps, that in positions where he can get the worst of it or already stands clearly worse, he continues indefatigably, neither permitting a further worsening of his position nor losing sight of his possible winning chances. This is part of the profile of a real fighter at the highest level. A typical example was his game against Adorjan at Las Palmas 1977. The Hungarian grandmaster had the advantage from the opening, but he could not consolidate his advantage against the fast-moving World Champion and twice ran into time trouble. Just before the end, during his second bout of time trouble, he had a draw in hand but misplayed it, and Karpov finally won. I watched the post-mortem. At one point, when he was still in difficulties, the World Champion could have simplified to a drawn pawn-down endgame.

"Why didn’t you play it then?" asked Adorjan. "Didn’t you see it?" Karpov replied, "I saw it, but why should I play it? If I keep the position as it is, I don’t see how I can lose."

Holding a position when one stands better is an art—or rather a technique—that many modern grandmasters have mastered. But the power to hold a position that is slightly worse is possessed only by the absolute greatest. Among them, Fischer was a shining example. In a lost position against Matulovic in the 1971 Interzonal tournament, for instance, he avoided a draw by repetition of moves.

The third player worthy of adding to this list is Korchnoi. Very often he has been willing to allow his position to become critical in order to keep an extra pawn. In this game, his position at adjournment is not critical and his extra pawn hardly matters. He would not have doubted for a moment that he had good reason to play for a win. And had anyone told him afterwards what Karpov had thought about the position, he would have reacted with little more than a vague laugh. This is what makes their games against each other so hard, despite the often simplified positions.

42 \( \text{fxf3} \) \( \text{gxf6} \)

In his book Anatoly Karpov, His Road to the World Championship, Botvinnik writes that Karpov can head for a draw here with 42 ... \( \text{Aa4} \) 43 \( \text{Aa3} \) g6! 44 \( \text{Axf6 Axa3} \) and adds: "In this level position, Karpov plays for a win; dangerous tactics when a pawn down." Didn’t Botvinnik himself use to do that in his days of glory?

43 \( \text{Ae3} \)

Karpov’s remark after the game is characteristic: that 43 \( \text{Ac4} \) followed by 44 \( \text{Ae6} \) is the safest way to the draw here.

43 ... \( \text{Aa4} \)

44 \( \text{Ab3} \) \( g6 \)

45 \( \text{Ad3} \) \( a6 \)

Preventing 46 \( \text{Ac4} \).

46 \( \text{Ae3} \) \( Ab5+ \)

47 \( \text{Ae2} \) \( f5 \)

But this is much too optimistic. Black opens the position at a time when White is ready for action and thus White gets chances to realize his extra pawn. The position would remain balanced after 47 ... \( \text{Ag7} \).

It is striking that Botvinnik is the only commentator who more-or-less approved of the text move, on the grounds that Black must somehow put his initiative to use. This necessity, however, seems totally absent.

48 \( \text{exf5} + \)

White thus effortlessly rids himself of a weak pawn.

48 ... \( \text{gx}f5 \)

Flohr recommends 48 ... \( \text{Axf5} \), but after 49 \( \text{Af2} \) Black would face the same problems as in the game.

49 \( \text{Af2} \) \( Ag7 \)

Karpov, apparently realizing that he had played too adventurously, offered a draw here. Korchnoi, according to Flohr, answered only with a shrug of his shoulders.

50 \( \text{Ax3} + \) \( \text{Ad7} \)

51 \( \text{Ae3} + \) \( \text{Ad6} \)

52 \( \text{Ax3} + \) \( \text{Ad7} \)

53 \( \text{Ae3} + \) \( \text{Ad6} \)

White’s repetition of moves not only wins time on the clock but also demonstrates that, at the moment, he is the only player who can choose whether to play for a win or a draw.

54 \( \text{Ab3} \)

After this King move, Black’s Rook finds itself frequently in a compromised position. All this is a consequence of Black’s 47th move.

54 ... \( h5 \)

55 \( \text{Ae3} + \) \( \text{Ad7} \)

56 \( \text{Af3} \)

White’s winning attempt is now beginning to gain momentum.

56 ... \( \text{Ae6} \)

Karpov continues as if nothing much was going on. It is high time to
THE ART OF CHESS ANALYSIS

This piece of shoddy analysis was gratuitously repeated by Botvinnik and was also printed in Chess Informant, in Three Matches of Karpov, and in The Games of Anatoly Karpov. Once again we see how little trouble is taken with the games of today's top players.

Enklaar shows that Black can easily draw by placing his Bishop on the square vacated by the Black Rook: 61 ... Aa4+ 62 Aa2 Aa1 and Black certainly does not stand worse.

There is, of course, no reason to tempt the Rook to improve its position with gain of tempo. After 57 Dc5+ Ac8 58 Df7 f4 59 Af3 hxg3 60 Dxe3 there would be real winning chances for White—for the first and last time in the game!

57 ... f4
58 Dc5 +

One move too late, says Botvinnik, and he gives the variation 58 Dc4 Ad4 59 Ad1 Ac6 (or 59 ... Ac2 60 Ad2 or 59 ... fxg3 60 Dd4 Af7 61 hgx3) 60 Ad4 Ac4 61 Ad4+ Ac5 62 Dc6+, etc.

However, as Enklaar noted in his comments for a Dutch news service, Black easily holds the draw with 59 ... fxg3 60 Dd4 Ac8 61 hgx3 Ac4 62 Ad5 axb5 Ad5 h4, and on 64 gxh4 Axh4 65 Ad6 the Rook goes right back with 65 ... Ac4.

It is remarkable that Botvinnik overlooked this fairly simple possibility. Having taken it upon himself to write a book on Karpov's rise to the top, he would have been expected to pay a great deal of attention to the analysis. As it turns out, unfortunately, there is no evidence of that kind of attention in the book.

KORCHNOI-KARPOV

57 Aa1

But after this, White's winning chances are minimal. Korchnoi was probably tempted by the positional threat 58 Ad4, but this can be adequately countered. The commentators unanimously gave the strong 57 Dc5+ here. Black has only one reasonable square for the King: c8 (not 57 ... Ac7 58 Ac6 and Black cannot offer the exchange of Rooks with 58 ... Ac4 because of 59 Acx4 Axex4 60 Ac4). After 57 ... Ac8 58 Aa7 f4, Polugaevsky, who probably spent little time on the analysis of this position, continues with 59 Ad6+ Ad7 60 gxf4 Axex4 61 Ab3 with winning chances for White.

58 ... Ac8

59 Df7 fxg3

This is the same position that would have arisen if Black had played 56 ... Ac6. In principle, it would now be favourable for White to recapture with the Bishop to hinder a possible exchange of King side pawns, but if 60 Axg3 thru 60 ... h4 gains space for Black

60 Ad6 + Ad7
61 hxg3

If 61 Axg3 then again 61 ... h4 followed by 62 ... Ac4. Not, however, 61 ... Ac4? as given by Enklaar, because the pawn endgame arising after 62 Ac4! Ac5 63 Ax4 Ax4 + 64 Axe4 Aa4 65 Ax6

68 Ab2

66 Ac5 is won for White: 66 ... h4 67 Axe6 Ac6 68 h3! Ac7 69 Ab5 and White catches the h-pawn while the Black King cannot get back to f8 in time.

61 ... Ag4
62 Ab5 axb5
63 Ah1

This looks awkward. Now, however, in a Rook endgame in which he is two pawns down, Karpov demonstrates his great skill in defending bad endgames.

63 ... Ac6!
64 Axh5 Ad4
65 Ax4 Ad4

The Black pieces are very well placed. White cannot win because of his weak a-pawn.

66 Ag5 Ac4
67 g4 Ac4
After the game Karpov showed that 68 \text{Ng}8 also leads to a draw after 68 \ldots \text{Fxc5} 69 \text{g}5 \text{Ng}4 70 \text{g}6 \text{Ng}3 + 71 \text{Fc}2 \text{Fc}4 72 \text{g}7 \text{Ng}2 + 73 \text{Fd}1 \text{Fb}3 74 \text{a}4 \text{Ng}1 + 75 \text{Fd}2 \text{Ng}2 + 76 \text{Fd}3 \text{Ng}3 + 77 \text{Fc}4 and now the White King is far enough from the Queenside for Black to give up his Rook: 77 \ldots \text{bxa}4 78 \text{Fb}8 + \text{Fc}2 79 \text{g}8 \text{Fb}8 \text{Fxb}8 80 \text{Fxb}8 \text{a}3, etc.

Botvinnik gives another way to draw: 70 \ldots \text{Cc}6 (instead of 70 \ldots \text{Ng}3++) 71 \text{Fc}3 \text{Fb}7 72 \text{Fd}3 \text{Fa}4 73 \text{Ff}3 \text{Fxa}3 + 74 \text{Ff}4 \text{Fa}1 75 \text{Fh}8 \text{Fg}1 76 \text{Fh}6 \text{Fg}7 77 \text{Ff}5 \text{Fg}7 78 \text{b}4 79 \text{Ff}6 (79 \text{Fb}5 \text{Ff}7) 79 \ldots \text{Ff}1 + 80 \text{Fg}7 \text{Cc}6.

Finally, Enklaar adds yet a third drawing method: 70 \ldots \text{Fb}6 71 \text{Cc}3 \text{Fb}7 72 \text{Fd}3 \text{b}4; however, this needs to be carried further: 73 \text{axb}4 \text{Fxb}4 74 \text{Ff}8 \text{Fg}4 75 \text{Ff}6 \text{Fc}7 76 \text{Fe}5 \text{Fg}7 77 \text{Ff}3 \text{Fg}1 78 \text{Ff}4 \text{Fg}7 and Black is just in time.

It is striking that White has no real winning chances at all despite his two extra pawns. A rare case.

\begin{align*}
68 & \ldots & \text{Ff}4 \\
69 & \text{Cc}2 & \text{Ff}3 \\
70 & \text{Fb}2 & \text{Ff}2 + \\
71 & \text{Cc}3 & \text{Ff}3 + \\
72 & \text{Ff}4 & \text{Ff}4 + \\
73 & \text{Cc}5 & \text{Fa}4 \\
74 & \text{Ng}8 & \\
\end{align*}

Although a draw would still have been unavoidable, a sharper conclusion to the game would have been
\begin{align*}
74 & \text{Cc}6 \text{Fxa}3 75 \text{Fh}5 \text{Fg}3 76 \text{g}5 \text{b}4 \\
77 & \text{Ff}7 \text{b}3 78 \text{g}6 \text{b}2 79 \text{Ff}1 \text{Fxc}5 80 & \text{Fb}1 = \text{Fg}2 81 \text{g}7 \text{Ff}2 + .
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
74 & \ldots & \text{Fxa}3 \\
75 & \text{g}5 & \text{Fxc}5 \\
76 & \text{g}6 & \text{Fg}3 \\
77 & \text{Ff}8 + & \text{Fb}4 \\
78 & \text{Ff}6 & \text{Ff}3 + \\
79 & \text{Ff}6 & \text{Fg}3 \\
80 & \text{Ff}7 & \text{Ff}3 \\
81 & \text{g}7 & \text{Drawn.}
\end{align*}

When I was awarded the Grandmaster title during the 1974 FIDE Congress, a new world opened up for me. Previously I had grabbed with both hands every conceivable opportunity to play in tournaments, even in Russia, where one receives rubles that cannot be converted into another currency. Now a fairly varied assortment of attractive tournaments awaited me. I made a quick selection and decided that I would spend a few months traveling from tournament to tournament. The journey began in the United States, continued in Yugoslavia, and finally I arrived in Venice. One night, after having played in four tournaments in as many months, a large part of my money was stolen in a bar in Florence, so I decided, after due consideration, to go home. I had just enough money left for the return trip.

The game against Gulko was played in the second round of the tournament in Sombor, Yugoslavia. Later it became clear that this game was a struggle between the tournament winners. The play well reflected my lifestyle at that time: exciting, adventurous, and full of surprises.
International Tournament
Sombor 1974

French Defense
Winawer Variation

Boris Gukko
Jan Timman
1 e4 e6
2 d4 d5
3 Qc3 Lb4
4 Qd2

An old variation in which White temporarily offers two pawns. Boleslavsky had a particular preference for it in the 1950's.

4 ... dxe4
5 Qg4 gxd4
6 0-0-0 h5

This move brought the variation into disuse. The Queen must move to another square at an inopportune moment for White.

7 Qh4

A suggestion by Keres which had never appeared in practice, although, as Gukko told me, he had played the move in a number of speed games. The usual move is 7 Qg3, but Black has the better chances after 7 ... Ld6 8 Qf4 h4 9 Qg5 (9 Qg4 Qd6) 9 ... Qf6 10 Qxf6 Qxf6 11 Qxd6 cxd6 12 Qb5 Qa6 (Lundquist-Uhmann, Marianske Lazne 1961).

7 ... Qe7
8 Qg5 We5

Theory is 8 ... We5 9 Qc4 Qg5 + 10 Qxg5 + Qc6 with better play for Black. I think this judgment is incorrect because after 11 Qf3 Qf6 12 Qf4! Black has great difficulty protecting his c-pawn; e.g., 12 ... e5 13 Qe1, or 12 ... We7 13 Qb5, or, finally, 12 ... Qb6 13 Qc4. In all cases White has excellent attacking chances for the pawn.

9 Qxe4 f6d

The point of the previous move. If White withdraws the Bishop, then 10 ... g5 follows and the Knight on e4 cannot be saved. After some thought, Gukko decides to make a virtue of necessity and boldly offers a piece.

10 Qf3! fxg5

In exchange for the piece, White, of course, has a tremendous advantage in development and fine attacking chances, especially due to the open center. I put my faith in my pair of Bishops and my partial control of the dark squares. Later, however, I was a little unhappy that I had permitted such a storm to break over my head.

The alternative is 10 ... Qf5, to offer the exchange of Queens with 11 ... Qg4 and enter the endgame a solid pawn ahead. White cannot prevent this with 11 h3 because Black then uses the won tempo with 10 ... fxg5 11 Qxg5 Qd6, again with the threat of exchanging Queens. White is not without chances after 11 Qd3 Qg4 12 Qe3, due to his centralized pieces and advantage in development; but Black's compact pawn structure makes it difficult to find compensation.

11 Qxg5 We6

Now it is not possible to aim for the exchange of Queens with 11 ... Qf5 because White mates prettily with 12 Qd3 Qg4 13 Qg6 + Qf8 14 Qh7 + Qxh7 15 Qd8 + and mate next move.

12 Qb5 + !

The correct way for White to make use of his chances. After 12 Qc4 Qc6 13 Qe1 Qd8 Black is indeed somewhat cramped, but there are no really vulnerable points.

12 ... c6

This takes the c6-square from the Knight, but there is no decent alternative, as the following shows: 12 ... Qd7 (12 ... Qc6 13 Qe4 Qd7 leads to variation A) 13 Qe4! and now:

A) 13 ... Qc6 14 Qxd7! Qxd7 15 Qxc6 + Qxc6 16 Qe5 + Qe8 17 Qg7, and although Black is a full Rook up, his position is in ruins.

B) 13 ... Qxb5 14 Qxb7 Qb6 15 Qc8 + Qd8 16 Qxd8 + (this game is all sacrifices) 16 ... Qxd8 17 Qxe6 + and Black either loses his entire material advantage after 17 ... Qd7 18 Qf7 + Qd8 19 Qd1 + Qd8 20 Qxd8 + Qxd8 21 Qe5 with a continuing White attack, or gets mated after 17 ... Qe7 18 Qc8 + Qc8 19 Qc1 + Qd7 20 Qe7 + (the final sacrifice) 20 ... Qxe7 21 Qe6 + Qf8 22 Qf7 mate.

These variations give a good picture of how strongly the White pieces combine in the attack.

13 Qe4 b5

A necessary move. Black prepares to develop his Knight via a6 so that it may support the threatened e6-point from c7 and may possibly go to d5. The immediate 13 ... Qa6 fails
because the Black position is too weakened after 14 \( \text{a}6 \) \( \text{bxa6} \). Gulko then intended 15 \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 16 \( \text{d}2 \) with the threat 17 \( \text{dxe5} \), and things remain extremely difficult for Black after, say, 16 ... \( \text{d}6 \) 17 \( \text{a}1 \) with continuing heavy pressure.

14 \( \text{a}xb5 \)

14 ... \( \text{e}5 \)

I was not at all shocked by my oversight and played the text move fairly quickly. But not too quickly: as I indicated in the notes to the 19th game of the Spassky-Fischer match (game 9 in this book), too-quick response can be a sign of shock—to your opponent and to yourself. I did not like 14 ... \( \text{cxb}4 \) 15 \( \text{w}4 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 16 \( \text{xa8} \) \( \text{g}5 \) + 17 \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{g}5 \) + 18 \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{f}4 \) 19 \( \text{d}h1 \), and White has strong attacking possibilities.

15 \( \text{c}4 \)

Back to an excellent post, but with his next move Black can make strong use of the won tempo.

15 ... \( \text{g}4 \)

With the threat 16 ... \( \text{xf}3 \). Black now takes the initiative for a while.

16 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{d}7! \)

This required careful calculation.

Just as he could have done on the previous move, Black can exchange Queens here, but after 16 ... \( \text{f}4 \) + 17 \( \text{xf}4 \) \( \text{exf}4 \) 18 \( \text{h}1 \) his King remains in a wasp's nest while the White pieces combine perfectly; e.g.:

A) 18 ... \( \text{d}6 \) 19 \( \text{f}7 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 20 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 21 \( \text{e}6! \) \( \text{e}6 \) 22 \( \text{d}6 \) + and the Black position collapses.

B) 18 ... \( \text{h}6 \) 19 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{xe}6 \) 20 \( \text{xe}6 \) and Black is tied hand and foot.

C) 18 ... \( \text{d}7 \). Perhaps the best. After 19 \( \text{f}7 \)-Black can return the Exchange with 19 ... \( \text{d}6 \). But with 19 \( \text{d}4 \) White can maintain the pressure.

17 \( \text{d}7 \)

This seems promising for White, but now we see the point of Black's last move.

17 ... \( \text{d}6 \)

18 \( \text{xh}8 \) \( \text{f}5 \)

The White Queen is trapped. Gulko, however, still finds a way out.

19 \( \text{f}7 \+)

Also winning the Queen. Black's King has no good flight square: if 19 ... \( \text{d}8 \) then simply 20 \( \text{xe}5 \), or 19 ... \( \text{f}8 \) 20 \( \text{g}6 \) + \( \text{xf}7 \) 21 \( \text{xe}5 \) + \( \text{d}5 \) 22 \( \text{xe}5 \) + \( \text{e}8 \) 23 \( \text{g}4 \) with win of material.

The dust has settled and Black has more or less emerged the victor. White is not without chances, however, since Black has three isolated pawns and White therefore has good squares for his Knight.

At this stage, each player had only about twenty minutes left. It is not unusual for so many complications to occur in only twenty-one moves, and the nervous tension they have generated is evident in the next part of the game.

22 \( \text{h}1 \)

Better is 22 \( \text{h}7 \) \( \text{xf}5 \) 23 \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 24 \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 25 \( \text{d}h5 \). White would then have three pawns for the piece, but no really strong majority on either wing (note the doubled pawns).

22 ... \( \text{f}6 \)

23 \( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{e}8 \)
24 \( \text{Dd}2 \)

White strives purposefully to hold the initiative.

24 ... \( \text{Ge7} \)

The first of a series of inferior moves. Although this does not give his advantage away, the square chosen for the Bishop is not the most desirable one. 25 ... \( \text{Le6} \) is better.

25 \( \text{Ad}3 \) \( \text{Lf5} \)

White has finally achieved something concrete. Black's Bishop-pair has been liquidated and his pawns are hanging. But what now?

26 \( \text{Bb}3 \)

White also does not take full advantage of his chances. The next move shows that the text loses a tempo.

26 ... \( \text{Ec7} \)

Anticipating a possible f2-f4.

27 \( \text{Ha}3 \) \( \text{Ff7} \)

28 \( \text{Ha}5 \) \( \text{g6} \)

But this is really an important tempo loss. The correct 29 ... \( \text{Le6} \) gives Black the clearly better play.

30 \( \text{Df6} \)

Suddenly threatening to win a Rook in broad daylight.

30 ... \( \text{Ff8} \)

31 \( \text{Dxf5} \) \( \text{gf5} \)

White has just managed to save his Rook, but the text move now cuts off his King and threatens to walk the passed pawn through unchallenged. Less clear is 38 ... e3 39 \( \text{Dd1} \) and the White King reaches e2.

32 \( \text{Bh1} \)

The wrong method. White wins a relatively unimportant pawn in exchange for two tempos. It is better to direct his attention toward the Queenside with 32 \( \text{Re}3 \). After 32 ... \( \text{Le7} \) the play remains sharp but probably balanced; but not 32 ... \( \text{Lg5} + 33 \text{f4} \).

32 ... \( \text{Ff7} \)

33 \( \text{Bxh5} \) \( \text{Fg6} \)

34 \( \text{Bh1} \) \( \text{e4} \)

Black has won valuable time. His pieces cooperate excellently.

35 b3

White, in his haste, prevents Black from maneuvering his Knight to c4, but in so doing he further weakens his position. Better is 35 \( \text{Ad1} \) \( \text{Db6} \) 36 \( \text{Ha6} \) with a playable game.

35 ... \( \text{Dd4} \)

36 \( \text{Df3} \)

Black thus gets a winning passed pawn, but the alternative 36 \( \text{Ff1} \) \( \text{De5} \) was just as unattractive.

36 ... \( \text{Le3} \)

37 \( \text{Aa}4 \) \( \text{Db6} \)

38 \( \text{Aa}6 \) \( \text{Dd7} \)

White has just managed to save his Rook, but the text move now cuts off his King and threatens to walk the passed pawn through unchallenged. Less clear is 38 ... e3 39 \( \text{Dd1} \) and the White King reaches e2.

39 \( \text{Ad1} \)

In desperation White sacrifices the Exchange. There was no alternative, of course.

39 ... \( \text{Lb2} + \)

40 \( \text{Bxb2} \) \( \text{Exd1} \)

41 \( \text{Bxa7} \)

42 c4 \( \text{e3} \)

The point of the last move. Black wins the Rook for a few pawns.

43 \( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{e2} \)

44 \( \text{Ae7} \) \( \text{e1w} \)

45 \( \text{Ae1} \) \( \text{Axe1} \)

46 \( \text{dx}c6 \) \( \text{Ae6} \)

The game is not without liveliness. Black reduces the White pawn advantage to four, but now the b-pawn advances with tempo.
Loses without a chance. White should continue his centralization with 51 ♗d5, but even then Black's win is not very difficult after 51 ... ♗e2 52 a4 ♗d7 53 a5 ♗xg2 54 ♗e5 ♗xg3 55 f4 ♗b3 with an elementary win.

51 ... ♗d6
52 a5 ♗e5!

The simplest. The White King's route to the Kingside is definitely cut off.

53 ♗c4 ♗c5+
54 ♗b4 ♗c2

The rest is not difficult.

55 g4 fxg4
56 fxg4 ♗xg2
57 a6 ♗xg4+
58 ♗a5 ♗c7
59 b6+ ♗c6
60 a7 ♗b7
61 ♗b5 ♗g6
62 ♗c5 ♗h6

White resigns.

"I always watch their games with excitement, mainly because it is a battle of ideas. They do not just play moves, there is something more involved—they know how to raise their play to the highest level of classical chess." So wrote Kavalek in his introduction to this game in the tournament book. The praise is high but not out of place. It is no accident that two games between these players are found in the present book.

This time Portisch is the winner. He employs a carefully nurtured improvement on a game between them which Gligoric had won fourteen years earlier. The novelty has the desired effect; although Black seems to become rather cramped, in fact he slowly but surely gathers all the positional trumps. At one point he accelerates this process—unnecessarily, as Kavalek showed afterwards. The resulting endgame contains unusually subtle maneuvers. Gligoric soon goes wrong and Portisch finishes the job with merciless precision.
Hoogovens Tournament
Wijk aan Zee 1975

Nimzo-Indian Defense

Svetozar
Lajos
Gligoric
Portisch

1 d4 d6
2 c4 e6
3 d3 c3
4 e3 b6
5 d2 Lb6

In a later round in this tournament I tried the controversial 5 ... dxe4 against Donner. He answered with the surprising 6 b5 f5 7 g3! and after 7 dxc3 8 bxc3 Lb7 9 d5 b5? he could have gained a great advantage with 10 Lxd2! (instead of 10 Lg2). Probably 6 ... Lb7 (instead of 6 ... f5) is more accurate.

6 d3 Lxc3+
7 bxc3 d5
8 exd5

An unusual but not unknown continuation which probably does not offer much.

8 ... Lxf1
9 Lxf1 Lxd5

Capturing with the e-pawn would give White the position he wants after 10 f3.

10 Ld3 Lbd7

The game mentioned in the introduction, Gligoric-Portisch, Torremolinos 1961, continued 10 ...
Lb6 11 e4 Ld7 12 Lg5 Lg8 13 Lc2
e6 14 Lc1 Lge7 with equal chances (Gligoric). A possible improvement is 12 Lc3.

With the text move Black achieves a more harmonious development of his pieces.

11 e4 Lc5

The point of the previous move.

12 e5

At first sight White seems to have a lot of play. The exchange of Queens with 17 ... Lxb5 18 axb5 Lc7 19 Lb4 Lfe8 20 a6 a6 21 Lc2 gives White comfortable pressure, and otherwise it seems Black will be driven back. This is an illusion, however; White must lose time getting his h-Rook into play, time which Black gratefully uses to direct his solid mass of pieces against the weakened White center.

17 ... Lb7
18 Le1

Threatening the push 19 d5.

18 ... Lfd8

Typical of the opportunistic play of which Gligoric showed several glimpses in this Hoogovens tournament. (Compare Gligoric-Hort, for example: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 d3 Lb6 4 Lxc3 dxc4 5 a4 Lda6 6 e4 Lg4
7 e5? Ld7 8 Lxc4 e6 9 0-0 Lc7 10
h3 Lh5 11 a5 Lb4 12 Ld4 0-0 13
Lf4 Lfd5 14 Lh2 Lb4 and Black stood excellently.) Here too it gives him little satisfaction. The simple 12 f3 followed by 13 Lf2 is better, with roughly equal play.

12 ... Ld5

A nice lineup. If 19 d5 then 19 ...
exd5 20 cxd5 Lc7 21 e6 Lxd5!.

White's actions are not dangerous so long as his King Rook is not participating, which explains the following move.

19 h4 Lf8
20 Lc4 Ld7
21 h5 Lf5

White is kept busy. Now his pawn structure gets a little worse.

22 Lf4 Lxf3+
23 Lxf3 c5
24 Lh4 cxd4
25 Lxd4 h6

A little dubious. White gets a point to hit at, as we will soon see.

26 Lb1

The Queen was indeed a little out of play.

26 ... Lxd4
27 Lxd4 Lc7
28 Lc4 Lc8
29 Lb4 Ld7
30 Ld6 Lc6
31 Le2

Exchanging Queens would have disastrous consequences. White's Bishop, after all, is reasonably placed only for attacking purposes. By refusing the exchange, White prepares a subtle action which would seem to find its best expression after a slow move like 31 ... a6 (intending 32 ... b5) and now: 32 g4! b5 33 g5
At the cost of a pawn Black's forces will penetrate White's camp. Perhaps 31 ... a6 is more precise, as indicated above, but Portisch's decision is an excellent practical one.

32 exb5 \( \text{w}c1 \)
33 \( \text{d}d1 \)
34 \( \text{g}4 \)
35 \( \text{g}1 \) \( \text{c}4 \)

White must of course attend to his safety.

42 ... \( \text{w}c1 \)
43 \( \text{h}2 \) \( \text{f}4 \)

Although this endgame should not have led to a win for Black, it is his best chance.

44 \( \text{xf}4 \)
45 \( \text{c}5 \)

All three Black pieces have suddenly left their modest rearward positions and have landed on vital squares.

36 \( \text{b}8 \)
37 \( \text{xa}7 \)
38 \( \text{xd}5 \)

Forced, because Black's threats are getting serious.

38 ... \( \text{exd}5 \)
39 \( \text{e}6 \)

Again the best.

Black must watch out, as we can see from 39 ... fxe6? 40 \( \text{xe}6 + \) \( \text{h}8 \)
41 \( \text{e}8 + \) \( \text{h}7 \)
42 \( \text{g}6 + \) 1 \( \text{g}6 \)
43 \( \text{hxg6} + \) \( \text{gxg6} \)
44 \( \text{b}4 \)
45 \( \text{a}4 \) and Black can just manage to draw.

40 \( \text{xf7} + \)
41 \( \text{f}3 + \)
42 \( \text{f}2 \)

45 \( \text{c}5 \)

White immediately makes the decisive mistake—something of a surprise, since the time-trouble phase is over. With the most natural move, 45 \( \text{g}3 \), White keeps the choice of a square for his Bishop open while bringing the King closer to the e5-square, where it is generally headed anyway, and thus he would keep the draw in hand. Hans Böhm and I finally completed the hellish task of examining this whole thing. The variations run 45 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{a}4 \) 46 \( \text{b}6 \) and now:

After 46 \( \text{b}6 \) (analysis)

A) 46 ... \( \text{xa}2 \) 47 \( \text{d}4 \). The difference from the game shows primarily in this variation. If 47 ... \( \text{a}2 \) 48 \( \text{c}5 \), or if 47 ... \( \text{a}4 \) 48 \( \text{c}5 \). In neither case can Black stop the dangerous march of the White King to e5.

B) 46 ... \( \text{f}7 \) is more accurate. The Black King rushes to the center while the Rook is keeping the White Bishop out of d4. Now is the time for White to play 47 \( \text{c}5 \), after which Black must maneuver very delicately: 47 ... \( \text{xa}2 \) 48 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 49 \( \text{d}4 \)
B1) 53 \( \text{Qd}4 \text{Ab}3 \) and White has three tries:

B1a) 54 \( \text{Rc}5 \text{Ge}6 \). The high point of the maneuvers worked out mainly by Böhm. White is in zugzwang and is outmaneuvered after 55 \( \text{g}4 \text{Af}3 \text{56 Lb}4 \text{Af}4 + \text{57 Ec}5 \text{Ec}4 + \text{58 Eb}5 \text{Ed}7 \text{59 La}5 \text{Ec}8 \text{60 Fa}6 \text{Gb}8 \).

B1b) 54 \( \text{Rc}7 \text{Ab}5 \) (the White King must be kept out of c5). 55 \( \text{Ec}5 \text{Ge}7 \text{56 Ff}5 \text{56 Ld}6 + \text{Ed}7 \text{57 Lf}8 \), an idea by Tabes Bas, is refuted by 57 ... \( \text{d}4 + \) and 58 ... \( \text{Gg}3 \) 56 ... \( \text{Ed}7 \text{57 Gg}6 \text{d}4 \text{58 Af}4 \text{Fb}6 + \text{59 Gg}7 \text{d}3 \text{60 g}4 \text{Ab}4 \text{61 Fx}6 \text{Fx}4 + \text{62 Gf}7 \text{Ah}4 \text{63 Gg}6 \text{Ah}2 \), and Black will win the ending, as is not too difficult to see.

B1c) 54 \( \text{Cc}5 \). This is where the nicest variations can arise: 54 ... \( \text{d}4! \) 55 \( \text{Af}4 \) (Note in passing that 55 \( \text{Ex}d4 \text{Fx}6 \) loses for White. This position is drawn only if the White g-pawn, advanced to g4, can be protected by the King. The White King must therefore reach d4 in time, but there is hardly any variation in which this happens.) 55 ... \( \text{g}4 \) (if 55 ... \( \text{Cc}6 \) 56 \( \text{g}4 \) with the intention 57 \( \text{g}5 \) 56 \( \text{Cc}6 \) (now there is no time for 56 \( \text{g}4 \) because of 56 ... \( \text{Ab}2 \) and 57 ... \( \text{d}2 \)) 56 ... \( \text{Cc}6 \) 57 \( \text{b}7 \) \( \text{Cc}5 \) 58 \( \text{Ec}3 \) \( \text{Gd}4 + \) 59 \( \text{Lb}6 \) \( \text{d}2 \) 60 \( \text{b}8 \) \( \text{Gd}1 \).

B2) 53 \( \text{Cc}4 \text{Ab}3 \) 54 \( \text{Cc}5 \text{Cc}6 \) 55 \( \text{g}4! \). Not 55 \( \text{Fd}4 \text{Ab}4 \text{56 Ec}3 \text{Ff}5 \) and White is driven back, as Höbner showed. But now Black cannot make further progress. Hans Böhm, who still tried to show that Black was winning, could hardly produce anything else; e.g., 55 ... \( \text{Ac}3 \) 56 \( \text{Fb}8 \) \( \text{Cc}4 + \) 57 \( \text{Ff}3 \) \( \text{Ff}7 \) 58 \( \text{Ld}6 \), etc.

GLIGORIC-PORTISCH

C1) 46 ... \( \text{Cc}4 \). A last try by Böhm. Black wants to take both central squares, e5 and d4, from the Bishop, but risks only danger after 47 \( \text{Cc}1 \).

45 ... \( \text{Ec}4 \) 46 \( \text{b}6 \) \( \text{xa}2 \) 47 \( \text{Cc}3 \text{Cc}2 \)

The difference from the variations with 45 \( \text{Cc}3 \) now becomes clear. If 48 \( \text{Fd}4 \text{Cc}4 \) 49 \( \text{Cc}5 \text{Ab}4 \) with an easy win.

48 \( \text{Cc}6 \) \( \text{Ab}2 \) 49 \( \text{Cc}5 \) \( \text{Cc}7 \) 50 \( \text{Cc}4 \) \( \text{Cc}6 \) 51 \( \text{g}4 \)

The same losing variation as in B2

above arises after 51 \( \text{Fd}4 \text{Ab}4 \) 52 \( \text{Cc}3 \text{Cc}5 \).

51 ... \( \text{Ec}1 \) 52 \( \text{Cc}3 \) \( \text{Cc}1 \) 53 \( \text{Cc}4 \) \( \text{Cc}4 + \) 54 \( \text{Cc}3 \) \( \text{Cc}7 \) 55 \( \text{Cc}4 \text{Cc}4 \)

A simple, efficient winning plan: b7 and g7 are held under control simultaneously.

55 \( \text{Cc}4 \) \( \text{Cc}7 \) 56 \( \text{Cc}3 \) \( \text{Cc}3 \) 57 \( \text{Cc}3 \) \( \text{Cc}3 \)

If 57 \( \text{Cc}4 + \) \( \text{Cc}6 \), etc.

57 ... \( \text{Cc}4 \)

White resigns.
Game Fifteen
Geller-Spassky

Alekhine Memorial Tournament
Moscow 1975

Sicilian Defense, Closed System

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{Yefim} & \text{Boris} \\
\text{Geller} & \text{Spassky} \\
1 & e4 \\
2 & \text{c3} \\
3 & d3 \\
\end{array}
\]

Geller rarely chooses a quiet system.

Geller had a great year in 1975. Although he was already over fifty, he won the very strong Alexander Memorial in Teesside with open-minded, fresh play. An even stronger tournament began in Moscow a month later. All the prominent Russian players except Karpov competed; for Korchnoi, it would prove to be his last tournament on Russian soil. Geller won again, half a point ahead of Spassky—a very respectable result for the latter when you consider that the Soviet Chess Federation had not allowed him to play outside his home country for more than a year.

The decisive game of the tournament began with an absorbing trench-warfare type of positional battle which culminated in a hair-raising time scramble in which Spassky made the last mistake.

plays inaccurately. The text move delays the advance f7-f5, a vital move for Black in many situations. Very satisfactory play can be obtained with 8 ... \(\text{Qg}7\); e.g., 9 \(b4\) 0-0 10 \(\text{Ke}3\) b6 11 \(\text{Qd}2\) \(\text{Kb}6\) 12 \(\text{Kd}1\) \(\text{Cc}7\) 13 \(\text{Kb}6\) \(\text{Kd}8\) 14 \(\text{Qx}g7\) \(\text{Qx}g7\) 15 d4 d5 and Black even has the advantage because White’s Knight is still not developed (Kavalek-Timman, Teesside 1975). Developing the Bishop on e3 is perhaps not the best, but also 10 \(\text{Kb}2\) b5 followed by 11 ... a5 gives Black no problems. The correct treatment of this system must probably begin with 10 \(\text{Kb}d2\).

9 \(b4\) 0-0
10 b5

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
5 & \text{Qg}2 \\
6 & 0-0 \\
7 & \text{c}3 \\
8 & \text{a}3 \\
\end{array}
\]

One may call this a slight inaccuracy, and we will soon see why.

Usually this is the move when Black has played \(\text{Qg}7\) instead of ... \(d6\). Under the present circumstances, 8 \(\text{Qb}4\) should definitely be considered; e.g., 8 ... \(\text{Qg}7\) 9 f4 \(\text{ex}f4\) 10 gxf4 f5 11 \(\text{Qxf5}\) \(\text{Kx}f5\) 12 \(\text{Ke}1\) + \(\text{Ke}8\) 13 \(\text{Qf}3\) and Black is in difficulties. The difference is that in the setup without 4 ... \(d6\) Black can meet 8 \(\text{Qb}4\) with the immediate 8 ... \(d5\), profiting by the decentralized position of White’s Knight.

8 ... \(\text{Qf}6\)

Remarkably, Spassky once again

With Black’s King Knight on e7, this advance would only have given Black the initiative after 10 ... \(\text{Qa}5\) 11 c4 \(f5\), but here White gains space on the Queenside. The d5-square, which Black has voluntarily surrendered, will thus become a sensitive weakness.

10 ... \(\text{Qe}7\)
is, freely translated, "It isn't what's removed from the board that matters, but what remains."

15 ... Lxf6
16 Qd2

The first results of the White strategy becomes visible: White threatens 17 Qc4 Lc7 18 f4 to take the initiative all over the board. This cannot be stopped by 16 ... Lc6 because after 17 Qc4 Lxc4 18 dxc4 Lc7 19 f4 White's shattered pawns on the Queenside are no disadvantage since the c3-pawn controls important squares, as Botvinnik has shown in similar cases.

Spassky finds the only satisfactory answer.

16 ... Da7!

The exchange of Knights would considerably lighten Black's task, since here one may speak of a pair of Knights in tones normally reserved for Bishops.

17 Qa3

As far as I know, this exchanging idea was first tried in Andriessen-Timman, Dutch Championship 1971: 1 c4 g6 2 Qc3 c5 3 Qf3 Lg7 4 g3 Qg6 5 Qg2 e6 0-0 Qge7 7 d3 0-0 8 Qf4 e5 and now instead of retreating to d2 White played 9 Qg5 h6 10 Lxe7 followed by 11 Qd2 and preparation for b2-b4. Later, the same idea was used by no less than Petrosian in an important game against Radulov in the last round of the 1973 IBM tournament: after 8 Qg5 (after the same moves as in Andriessen-Timman but without e7-e6 and Lf1-f4), Black did not allow the exchange but reacted with 8 ... f6, whereupon Petrosian, having provoked a small concession, retreated the Bishop to d2.

What Geller does in this game is in principle much the same, even though at the moment the diagonal of his King Bishop is closed: simply put, he wants to get rid of his Queen Bishop so that it will not be in the way of his Knights as they maneuver and operate on the flanks. The loss of the dark squares does not weigh very heavily because in some instances there is the attractive possibility of exchanging the light-square Bishops and having a Knight against Black's bad Bishop. Tarrasch's positional rule applies, which

The active 17 Qc4 seems good at first sight, but it would lead to advantage only if Black had to give up the a-file after 17 ... Lxb5 18 axb5. He does not have to give it up, however: 18 ... Lc6! with the point 19 Lxa8 Lxa8 20 Lxd6? Ld8 and Black wins.

17 ... Lc6
18 Lb1 Lg7
19 Lc4 Lc6

Protecting the square b6 and indirectly the pawn on d6.

20 Qd3 Lc7
21 Lc4 Ld7

The time-trouble phase must have been starting about now. I am always amazed when a player decides to go into action at just such a time. We will see later that White is throwing his strategical advantage away, but this was determined only by dry analysis after the game.

24 ... Lh6
25 f4

Black has thus succeeded in finding a strong square for his Queen Bishop, but this has not closed all the holes in his position.

22 a5 Lc6
23 Ld5 h5
24 Lh3

In combination with the following move, this is a sharp attempt to add tactical complications to what has been mainly a strategical game.
27 exd5  
28 Le4

White appreciates the strength of the strongpoint f5 and defers the capture on b7, which would give Black the chance for a promising Exchange sacrifice: 28 Wxb7 Wxa5 29 Wxa5 Wxa5 and now 30 Wb2 (to be able to defend important weak points from d2 or c2) 30 ... c4! Or 30 Wb3 Wd8 and Black's Queen threatens to penetrate the Kingside. The play is not entirely clear, of course, but it is understandable that White, having earlier created weaknesses in the enemy camp in a fine manner, is not willing to accept a complete reversal of roles.

28 ... Lxf4

The hand-to-hand fighting begins.

29 Lxf5 Wg5 +
30 Wh1 Wxf5
31 Wxb7

A) 32 Wxa6 Wxd5 + 33 Lg1 Wg5 + and if White wishes to avoid the repetition of moves with 34 Wh1 Wd5 +, he must allow 34 Lf2 We8 (now indeed) and his King has little chance of surviving.

B) 32 Lxf4. The main variation. White not only captures an important attacking piece but also protects both the d-pawn and the Knight. One can certainly call it a miracle that Black has sufficient counterplay despite his large material deficit: 32 ... Za7! and now:

A) 32 Lxa6 Wxd5 + 33 Lg1 Wg5 + and if White wishes to avoid the repetition of moves with 34 Wh1 Wd5 +, he must allow 34 Lf2 We8 (now indeed) and his King has little chance of surviving.

B) 32 Lxf4. The main variation. White not only captures an important attacking piece but also protects both the d-pawn and the Knight. One can certainly call it a miracle that Black has sufficient counterplay despite his large material deficit: 32 ... Za7! and now:

B1) 33 Wxa7 Wxb1 + 34 Lg2 Wc2 + and White does best to accept the perpetual if he does not want to lose his Knight.

B2) 33 Wb2. This move appears to consolidate the White position because 33 ... Wxd5 + is refuted by 34 Wg2. But after 33 ... Ze7! the disorganization of the White forces is clear.

32 Za7!

A sober defensive move. If now 32 ... Wxd3, which was probably intended, then 33 Lb1! settles the matter. The White pieces are joined again!

32 ... g5

What should White do? The chief threat is 34 ... Ze2 followed by 35 ... Wxd5 + and mate. White can prevent the execution of the first part of the threat only through heavy material loss, and the second part only with 34 Lb6, which is also his most important try. Black must now demonstrate that his strongest threat is not 34 ... Ze2, which is met by 35 Wh1 Wb3 36 Wb1 with consolidation, but 34 ... Wxf8. White's only answer is 35 Lb1, which obviously leads to perpetual check after 35 ... Ze2 36 Wh1 (not 36 Wb1 Wxb2 + 37 Wh2 Ze2 +, etc.) 36 ... Wd2! 37 Wf2 We4 + 38 Wb1 Wg4 +, as in all other variations too. It is amazing that the "doomed" Rook on a6 should play such a leading role in this analysis.

33 Wf2!
succeeds. The text move protects his Bishop and allows his Queen to move freely again.

33 \textit{\textbf{Eg}1?}

Superficially, there seems nothing wrong with this move. It pins the g-pawn and thus again restricts the Black Queen's movements. Nevertheless it is a serious mistake which throws away White's winning advantage. The cold-blooded 33 \textit{\textbf{Exa}6} is correct. Black then can capture the pawns in two different ways. The least promising is 33 ... \textit{\textbf{Exd}3}, for after 34 \textit{\textbf{Df}1} \textit{\textbf{Exd}5} + 35 \textit{\textbf{Gf}1} Black has no more play. So he must try 33 ... \textit{\textbf{Ed}5+}. After 34 \textit{\textbf{Gf}1} \textit{\textbf{Exd}3}, I analyze:

\textit{A}) 35 \textit{\textbf{Db}5} \textit{\textbf{Ee}2} 36 \textit{\textbf{Exe}2} (not 36 \textit{\textbf{Exd}6?} \textit{\textbf{Eh}2+!} and Black wins in all variations) 36 ... \textit{\textbf{Exe}2} 37 \textit{\textbf{Db}2} \textit{\textbf{Exe}4} and Black has excellent counterplay. If 38 \textit{\textbf{Ea}1} then 38 ... \textit{\textbf{h}4}! with the dangerous threat 39 ... \textit{\textbf{h}3}.

\textit{B}) 35 \textit{\textbf{Df}1!} consolidates the material advantage. On 35 ... \textit{\textbf{Dd}5}, now 36 \textit{\textbf{Db}5} \textit{\textbf{Ee}2} 37 \textit{\textbf{Dd}6} follows with a direct win. Black's best attempt is still 35 ... \textit{\textbf{Ee}2}, but this is insufficient after 36 \textit{\textbf{Ea}8+} \textit{\textbf{Gg}7} 37 \textit{\textbf{Df}3}.

33 ... \textit{\textbf{Ee}a8?}

Time trouble is affecting both players. The imperturbable 33 ... \textit{\textbf{h}4}! is necessary, instead of the somewhat panicky text move. Suddenly we see the disadvantage of White's last move: his Rook on \textit{\textbf{g}1} takes an important square away from the King, so Black can calmly leave his Rook on \textit{\textbf{a}6}. If White then still tries to justify his previous move, he quickly ends up in a hopeless position, as can be seen after 33 ... \textit{\textbf{h}4} 34 \textit{\textbf{Db}6} \textit{\textbf{Exa}5} and now:

After 34 ... \textit{\textbf{Ea}5} (analysis)

\textit{A}) 35 \textit{\textbf{Cc}6} with the intention of meeting 35 ... \textit{\textbf{Ee}3} with 36 \textit{\textbf{Exd}6}, with good prospects for White. Black has a better Rook move, however: 35 ... \textit{\textbf{Ea}8} (threatening 36 ... \textit{\textbf{Ea}6} to win a piece) 36 \textit{\textbf{Dc}7} \textit{\textbf{Exe}6} 37 \textit{\textbf{Exe}6} \textit{\textbf{Ea}5} + 38 \textit{\textbf{Dg}2} \textit{\textbf{Ea}2} and Black wins.

\textit{B}) 35 \textit{\textbf{Dd}7} \textit{\textbf{Exd}7} 36 \textit{\textbf{Dxd}7} \textit{\textbf{Eh}8}! 37 \textit{\textbf{Df}6} \textit{\textbf{Eh}8}! (the only good square for the Rook; e.g., 37 ... \textit{\textbf{Dc}8} 38 \textit{\textbf{Dh}5}! \textit{\textbf{Ee}3} 39 \textit{\textbf{Df}7} \textit{\textbf{Exg}1} 40 \textit{\textbf{Df}6} with unstoppable mate) 38 \textit{\textbf{Exf}4} (the only try to get something out of it) 38 ... \textit{\textbf{Dx}f4} 39 \textit{\textbf{Dg}2} (White can create mating threats only with the King's help) 39 ... \textit{\textbf{Ea}2} + (Black makes no progress with 39 ... \textit{\textbf{Eg}7} after 40 \textit{\textbf{Dd}7} followed by 41 \textit{\textbf{Df}3}) 40 \textit{\textbf{Df}3} \textit{\textbf{Dxh}2} 41 \textit{\textbf{Dg}4} \textit{h}3 42 \textit{\textbf{Dx}f4} \textit{\textbf{Ea}2} + 43 \textit{\textbf{Dg}5}. White finally threatens mate. However, Black now exchanges down to a winning Rook endgame with 43 ... \textit{\textbf{Eg}8} + ! 44 \textit{\textbf{Dx}g8} \textit{\textbf{Exg}8} 45 \textit{\textbf{Dh}4} + \textit{\textbf{Df}8} 46 \textit{\textbf{Exh}3} \textit{\textbf{Df}3} +! Ulf Andersson and I worked out this extremely adventurous variation together. We would very much have liked to see the inventive White play bear fruit, but it was not to be.

The conclusion is that 34 \textit{\textbf{Db}6} loses. After 33 ... \textit{\textbf{h}4} White must try 34 \textit{\textbf{Dg}1}. This is the correct square for the White Rook, as we also saw in variation \textit{B} in the notes to White's 33rd move. This gives Black a free tempo for \textit{h5-h4}, but the situation is not critical for White. Again he threatens to capture the Rook on \textit{a6}.

After 34 \textit{\textbf{Dg}1} (analysis)

Already the fatal blow. White not only wins an important pawn, but the Knight, which was posted soundly but not very actively on the Queenside, now enters the skirmishes on the Kingside with tempo.

34 ... \textit{\textbf{Dxd}6}

In desperation Black sacrifices the Exchange without getting anything for it. 34 ... \textit{\textbf{Df}6} is only worse, however; Black's position would collapse very quickly after 35 \textit{\textbf{Dd}4}. 

The variation continues 36 ... \textit{\textbf{Df}8} 37 \textit{\textbf{Df}6} + \textit{\textbf{Dg}7} 38 \textit{\textbf{Dc}7} + \textit{\textbf{Df}6} 39 \textit{\textbf{Dc}8} + \textit{\textbf{Dg}7} 40 \textit{\textbf{Dxg}2} and White wins.

Black is therefore forced to head for an endgame with 34 ... \textit{\textbf{Dc}8}. White then maintains some winning chances because of his strong a-pawn which is conveniently protected by the Knight. But Black also has strong pawns, protected by the Bishop, and an Exchange sacrifice on \textit{a5} is a possibility.
35 $\text{axa}8 + \text{g7} \\
36 \text{c4}

Protects the d-pawn in a natural way.

36 ... \text{h6} \\
37 \text{b7} \text{h3}

After 37 ... \text{xd3} the simplest win is 38 \text{e7} with the threat 39 \text{xf4}.

Black sets a final trap with the text move: he threatens 38 ... \text{exh2} with at least a draw.

38 \text{b2}

A simple preventive measure.

38 ... \text{e5} \\
39 \text{e2} \text{Black loses on time.}

Game Sixteen
Ljubojevic-Andersson

Kavalek once mentioned, with a mixture of astonishment and admiration, how remarkable it is that Andersson and Ljubojevic can walk to the tournament hall together laughing and joking and then, across the chess board, face each other in a life-and-death struggle. That they do is fortunate, for otherwise the chess world would be poorer by a lot of interesting games.

At Wijk aan Zee 1976 Ljubojevic started tremendously with three wins in a row. This is the third. A clash of styles is clearly apparent here. The actual course of the game is extremely original, and the hidden possibilities that show up in the analysis add extra refreshment. Seldom have I analyzed a game with so much pleasure and devotion.
Ljubojevic-Andersson

Naturally.

14 \textit{Af4} \textit{Ad6}

15 \textit{Ad1}

A quiet but very pregnant move. The simple threat is 16 \textit{Db3}, after which the various pins would cost Black material. He therefore frees the c7-square for the Bishop.

15 ...

\textit{Bb8}

The only move. Other methods to solve the problem of the pins fail; e.g., 15 ...

\textit{Dd5} 16 \textit{Af5!} \textit{Exf5} 17 \textit{Dxg5} \textit{Cc5} + 18 \textit{Le3} \textit{Cc6} 19 \textit{Df6 + Ch8} 20 \textit{Dxh7} with complete destruction, or the fantastic 15 ...

\textit{Df3} + 16 \textit{Dxh3} e5 17 \textit{Dxh} \textit{Dh5} 18 \textit{Dg5} \textit{Dxh4} 19 \textit{Dg5} \textit{Cc5} 20 \textit{Df6 +} and wins.

16 \textit{Dd3!}

A sparkling idea. I don't know how much of this Ljubojevic had prepared at home, but even if this maneuver was not found over the
board, it is impossible for me to suppress my admiration for its originality. The main threat is 17 $e3.$

16 ... $e8

The Bishop on $d6$ needed more protection so that the attacked Knight on $e5$ could be moved away in answer to 17 $e3.$ White therefore tries another approach.

17 $e4$ $c7$
18 $e3$

Attacks the Bishop again! This seems to be awkward for Black because 18 ... $e6$ 19 $g4$ is anything but attractive.

fxe6 21 $xe6$ $xf4$ 22 $xf4$ $f7$ 23 $xc7$ $xc7$ and Black wouldn't feel too bad if White didn't have a nice forced win: 24 $c4$ $b6$ + (24 ... $e6$ 25 $e7$, etc.) 25 $e3$ $e6$ 26 $f7 +$ $f7$ 27 $e7$ $e7$ 28 $f2$ + $g8$ 29 $e8 +$ and wins the Queen. There are still some technical difficulties because of 29 ... $xe8$ 30 $xb6$ $c2$, but White can force the Rook back with 31 $d8$ + $f7$ 32 $d7 +$ and perhaps a few more checks. So 19 ... $h6$ is no good. The question is whether there is a playable move. The only one I can find is 19 ... $d6$, to continue firmly protecting the Knight on $e5$ after White's impending Knight sacrifice on $e6$. But then White wins in another pretty way: 20 $h3$ $h6$ 21 $xe6$ $xe6$ 22 $xe6 +$ followed by 23 $xe5$.

Andersson, it seems, did not even consider the move 18 ... $c6$. After the game he showed it to Reeh with a brief comment which suggested that it was not an alternative at that point. A matter of pure intuition.

19 $xc7$ $xd4$

Not 19 ... $xc7$ because of 20 $d6 +$ $h8$ 21 $xc7$ $xc7$ 22 $xd7$ $xd4$ 23 $xc7$ $xe2 +$ 24 $f2$ with the win of the Exchange.

20 $d3$

The best square for the Bishop, directed toward the Kingside where the storm will soon break.

20 ... $b7$
21 $d5$

This shows that White still has the initiative. It is remarkable that he can complete the whole game without moving his King to $h1$.

21 ... $b5$?

This mistake has no disastrous consequences, but it does show an underestimation of White's possibilities. With 21 ... $xc7$ 22 $xc7$ $b5$ Black can hold the extra pawn and White would have little initiative for it; e.g., 23 $f4$ $xd3$ 24 $xd4$ $ac8$ followed by retreating the Bishop to the Kingside.

In Schach-Archiv Pachman gives a really lovely hidden drawing possibility for White after 21 ... $xc7$:

After 21 ... $xc7$ (analysis)

22 $xh7 +$ $xh7$ 23 $xg7 +$ ! $xg7$ 24 $g3 +$ and White checks freely on $g3$ and $h3$. I doubt that the players saw this combination, and I doubt that Andersson avoided 21 ... $xc7$ because of it.

Black can also try to hold his extra pawn with 21 ... $d5$, but then White's compensation takes on a more concrete form after 22 $xf5$ $xf5$ 23 $e5$ $b6$ 24 $xd7$ $xd7$ 25 $Ad3$. The Knight will never be able to reach the dream square $e4$.

22 $e5$

With a really nice hidden point, which is seen in the variation 22 ... $xd3$ 23 $xd4$ $xf1$ 24 $xe6$ $xe6$ 25 $xa7$ $xa7$, and now 26 $b8$ wins the Rook.

22 ... $d6$
23 $xh7 + !$

Beautiful! This is what it's all about—the maneuvers on the Queenside were merely diversionary. White unleashes his attack just when the Black pieces are all bunched together rather uselessly on the Queenside. Nevertheless, Black doesn't have too much to worry about, as we shall see.
Now Black has hardly any moves. He can still try 28...\textit{Ad}8, but the threatened penetration of the Rook need not bother White, as we see in the variation 29 \textit{Axh}3 \textit{Ae}1+ 30 \textit{Af}2 \textit{A}f1 + 31 \textit{Gg}3 \textit{f}4 + 32 \textit{Gg}4 \textit{Gf}6 + 33 \textit{G}g5 and the White King escapes while his colleague faces mate in a few moves.

In his column "Game of the Month" which appears in many chess magazines the world over, Gligoric refers to an analysis by chess enthusiasts from Bosanski Shamac in Yugoslavia. In the last variation they continue with 29...\textit{Af}6! (instead of 29...\textit{A}d1+) with the intention, after the too hasty 30 \textit{G}e7, of giving mate with 30...\textit{Ad}1 + 31 \textit{Gf}2 \textit{A}f1 + 32 \textit{G}g3 \textit{G}b8 + mate. The move 29...\textit{Af}6 has no further threat, however, so White can take the time to play a quiet move: 30 \textit{a}4! Besides the threat to capture the Bishop, this move also threatens the now crushing 31 \textit{G}e7. I see no satisfactory defense for Black.

Another attempt to strengthen Black's play is 24...\textit{A}x\textit{e}5 25 \textit{Ah}4 + \textit{Gg}8 26 \textit{Ax}e5 \textit{G}b6, as suggested by Velimirovic. After 27 \textit{Ax}h3 \textit{f}6 (or 27...\textit{f}5) the e-pawn is protected and the Black King escapes to safety. Again, however, it is much stronger to attack the Bishop first: 27 \textit{a}4! Now 27...\textit{f}6 is bad because of 28 \textit{Ax}e6 + \textit{G}xe6 29 \textit{Ax}e6 and White has at least a big advantage in the ending. But the Bishop has no good square, since after 27...\textit{Ad}7 White plays 28 \textit{Ax}h3 \textit{f}6 29 \textit{Ah}8 + \textit{G}f7 30 \textit{G}f8 + \textit{G}x\textit{f}8 31 \textit{G}d4 and the unprotected position of Black's Queen is fatal (31...\textit{Gc}6 32 \textit{Ax}d6 \textit{G}x\textit{d}6 33 \textit{Ah}8 + and win). With this in mind, Black does better to protect \textit{e}6 with his Bishop immediately: 26...\textit{G}d7 (instead of 26...\textit{G}b6). It is not a fully satisfactory defense, however. After 27 \textit{Ax}h3 \textit{f}6 28 \textit{Ah}4 \textit{Bc}8 (what else?) 29 \textit{Bc}4 Black is still in difficulties. 30 \textit{G}d8 followed by 31 \textit{Ah}8 + is threatened.

After 24...\textit{Ad}5 25 \textit{Ah}4 + \textit{Gg}8 26 \textit{Ah}5 \textit{G}b6 27 \textit{a}4, Cvetkovic, in the \textit{Informant}, recommends 27...\textit{Gd}4!, stating that Black is better after 28 \textit{Ah}4 \textit{Bx}e4. This is correct, and 27...\textit{Gc}4 is indeed Black's best move. But White, in turn, should answer with the more efficient 28 \textit{Ah}4 (28 \textit{Ah}3 \textit{f}6 29 \textit{Ah}5 \textit{G}xe6 + \textit{G}xe6 30 \textit{Ah}h5 \textit{Ad}7) 28...\textit{Gf}6 29 \textit{Ah}4 \textit{Bx}b2 30 \textit{Gd}1 and the dominating position of his pieces gives him sufficient compensation for the two pawns; the main threat is 31 \textit{Ah}8 + \textit{Ah}8 32 \textit{Ah}3 + , winning the Queen.

25 \textit{Ah}4 + \textit{Gg}8
26 \textit{Ah}3

Threatening mate in three. The White Knight plays a useful role in the attack even though it's still pinned.

26...\textit{Ad}8

During the postmortem both players branded this typical An-
\( \text{De5? 33 De4!} \) with a decisive attack.

Henk Jonker tried to find good play for Black with the Queen sacrifice 26 ... \( \text{\text{Qxc5 + 27 Qxc5 De5.} \) The three minor pieces would certainly compensate for the Queen if White did not have an immediate way to win material, also later given by Jonker: 28 \( \text{Nh8 + \text{Qf7 29 Nh8 + \text{Qf8 30 \text{Qa3!}, threatening}} \) both a crushing discovered check and 31 \( \text{Bxb5.} \)

27 \( \text{Ld4 b6} \)

The weakness that this creates is not at all obvious, but Ljubojevic must have spotted it immediately.

28 \( \text{Dxe6 Dxe6} \)
29 \( \text{Dxe6 + Qf7} \)
30 \( \text{De4} \)

This tournament was played at the same time as a tournament in Orense, Spain, where Raymond Keene and I were playing. The day before I received the Hoogovven tournament bulletin that contained this game, Keene gave me his striking opinion of Ljubojevic's play. He said he did not see Yugoslavia's top grandmaster as a deep strategist, and not even as a player with any sort of healthy ideas about chess—but this was precisely what made his play so successful and so difficult to counter; that is, it consisted of a series of tricks. Very deep tricks indeed, he added: they can be twenty moves long.

As far as this game is concerned, Keene was right on target. On the 12th move White started a series of unclear complications, and now, eighteen moves later, Black seems to be lost: while his Rook is hanging on one side of the board, mate in one is threatened on the other. But it's still only a trick.

If Andersson had not been in serious time trouble, or perhaps if he had not fallen so deeply under the spell of White's play, he would undoubtedly have found the courageous path to the draw.

30 ... \( g5? \)

Correct is 30 ... \( \text{Qxa2!}, \) and the Black pieces seem to be coordinated again. A very dangerous check is threatened, and if White takes the bait he will be in big trouble. On 31 \( \text{Qxa8 Black first plays the calm 31 \ldots g5; White does not have a Queen check on d5 and the White Rook cannot leave the fourth rank because of mate (32 \text{Nh6 Qb1 + 33 Qf2 Qf1 + 34 De3 Qf4 mate).} \)

\( \text{Qg7, but certainly not more gracefully or more quickly than with the text move.} \)

31 ... \( \text{Na7} \)
32 \( \text{Qh3} \)

After 31 ... \( g5 \) (analysis)

What can White do? If 32 \( \text{Qg4 Qd6 33 Qf3 Qb1 + 34 Qf2 Qf1 + 35 Qg3 Qf5 + 36 Qh3 Qf7 and it is all over for him.} \)
White's best after 30 ... \( \text{Qxa2} \) is to play for a draw by perpetual check with 31 \( \text{Qh7 + Qf7 32 Qh5 +.} \) Black cannot avoid it without exposing his King to serious danger.

31 \( \text{Nh6} \)

A more immediate and more graceful win is 31 \( \text{Qg3 with the crushing threat 32 Qxg5 +, leaving the Rook on a8 hanging. White was also in time trouble, however, and this is only a small blot on the game. For that matter, in a final check of the analysis I see that it is no blot at all. White indeed wins after 31 Qg3} \)

32 ... \( \text{Qg7} \)
33 \( \text{Qg6 Qf7} \)
34 \( c4 \) Black resigns.

On behalf of Raymond Keene, Ken Rogoff, and Gudmundur Sigurjonsson, who, when I showed them this game, followed it as avidly as I did when I first played it through, I want to convey the feeling that overcame us there in the Spanish town of Orense: that this was the best game of the last twenty years.
Game Seventeen
Karpov-Timman

The sixth "Sreba na Solidarnostra" international tournament, in Skopje, Yugoslavia, was the first time Karpov and I played together in a tournament since the Neimeijer youth tournament of 1967/68.

Karpov, it seems, having received the world title in 1975 without a struggle, immediately began carefully choosing tournaments to play in so as to achieve the status of an active world champion. And, unlike many of his predecessors, he succeeded. The tournament at Skopje was the first such tournament he won in a convincing fashion. There was great variety in his play: now an interesting attacking game, then a dry, technical, endgame win. Our game took place near the end of the tournament. It was a hard fight: a sharp opening developed into a middlegame where both sides seemed to have attacking chances. White's chances were more immediate, but when Karpov missed the sharpest continuation at a certain point, Black was able to save himself in a four-Rook ending in which he was a pawn down.

Despite a slight transposition of moves, we have entered the 18th Fischer-Spassky match game. I spent a long time thinking about whether there was an alternative to 16 ... $\text{c5}$, but I could see nothing else against the threatened 17 fxe6 fxe6 18 $\text{c4}$. For instance, if 16 ... $\text{d5}$ then 17 $\text{e2}$, the move White plays even after the text 16 ... $\text{c5}$.

17 $\text{e2}$

A novelty in this position. Fischer, after long thought, had played 17 $\text{c1}$ to close the Queenside after 17 ... $\text{a8}$ 18 c3 b3 19 a3. Karpov's idea is to employ the Bishop in the siege of the weak e6-point in Black's position. I was very much impressed by the idea—until ten days after the tournament, when Sosonko, Torjan, and I found that Black can force a draw. It sounds unbelievable but, as we shall see, it is true.

17 ... $\text{a8}$
18 fxe6 fxe6
19 $\text{e1}$!

A consequence of White's 17th move. The Bishop now threatens to attack the pawn from f7 or g4, and it is fortunate for Black that he can just cover both squares with his Knight.

19 ...
20 $\text{d3}$
21 $\text{xe5}$ $\text{xe5}$?


Now Black gets into trouble. Correct is 21 ... fxe5. During the game I was afraid of 22 \( \text{Qxe6} \), threatening mate in one, and after 22 ... \( \text{Qxe6} \) 23 \( \text{Wh6} \) \( \text{axa2} \) + 24 \( \text{Qxa2} \) \( b3 \) + 25 \( \text{Qa1} \) \( c5 \) (or 25 ... \( \text{Wb6} \) 26 \( \text{Ad5} \), White gets in first.

In my calculation of 21 ... fxe5 22 \( \text{Qxe6} \) \( \text{Qxe6} \) 23 \( \text{Wh6} \) 1 rejected 23 ... \( \text{Wxe4} \) because of 24 \( \text{Wxe6} \) \( \text{Wxe2} \) 25 \( \text{Ad6} \), but that was an illusion; after 25 ... \( \text{Qd8} \) White has no follow up. White must therefore play 24 \( \text{Axe1} \) \( \text{Wxe6} \). Black has only one answer to the triple threats (to take the Bishop or to check on b5 or h5) and that is 24 ... \( \text{Wf5} \). Now it is a forced draw after 25 \( \text{Axf1} \) \( \text{Axf8} \) 26 \( \text{Wh4} \) \( \text{Qe7} \) because White would be better off not to go into the endgame after 27 \( \text{Wh6} \) \( \text{Qf8} \) 28 \( \text{Axf5} \) \( \text{Axe6} \) 29 \( \text{Axf6} \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 30 \( \text{Axe6} \) \( \text{Qf8} \).

If 22 \( \text{Qxd4} \) (instead of 22 \( \text{Qxe6} \)) 22 ... \( \text{exd4} \) 23 \( \text{Qg4} \) e5 24 \( \text{Qe6} \) \( \text{Qf6} \)!. 25 \( \text{Ed1} \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 26 \( \text{Qxc7} \) \( \text{Qd6} \); or, in this line, 23 \( \text{Ah3} \) + \( \text{Qd8} \) 24 \( \text{Qg4} \) e5 25 \( \text{Qe6} \) + \( \text{Qe8} \), with the threat 26 ... \( \text{Qg8} \) 27 \( \text{Qf5} \) \( \text{Qe6} \); or, finally, if 24 \( \text{Qxd7} \) + (instead of 24 \( \text{Qe6} \)) 24 ...

Very strong, and another illustration of why the player whose Queen controls the most dark squares in this type of Sicilian position often stands better. Control of the g1-a7 diagonal is especially important.

22 ... b3

I decided to sound the emergency. Black's situation is far from appetizing and I did not feel like suffering martyrdom after, say, 22 ... 0-0.

23 \( \text{exb3} \) axb3
24 a3 f5

On the one hand, Black's 22nd move has opened the c-file to White's advantage; on the other, Black threatens to take the e-pawn with check.

25 \( \text{Qh5} \) + \( \text{Qd8} \)
26 \( \text{Axe1} \) ?

For the first time in the game, Karpov thought for a long time. And the longer he thought the more worried I became about 26 \( \text{Wf7} \). I originally thought that the threat of capturing on e4 with check had eliminated that possibility, and in fact this was the only reason Karpov didn't play it, as he admitted after the game. However, after 26 \( \text{Wf7} \) \( \text{Wxe4} \) + 27 \( \text{Qxa1} \) \( \text{Wb7} \) White's Queen returns with tremendous force: 28 \( \text{Wxe1} \), and Black can neither defend his e-pawn nor prevent his position from crumbling.

After 28 \( \text{Wxe3} \) (analysis)

If 28 ... \( \text{Wxe4} \) 29 \( \text{Wxe3} \) and 30 \( \text{Qa5} \) + , or if 28 ... e5 29 \( \text{Qxe6} \) \( \text{Qxe6} \) 30 \( \text{Wxe5} \) \( \text{Qd7} \) 31 \( \text{Axe1} \), etc. Yet it is not entirely hopeless for Black. The attempt 26 ... \( \text{Af6} \) fails, it is true, after 27 \( \text{Wxb8} \) + \( \text{Wf7} \) 28 \( \text{Qxd6} \) + (more convincing than 28 \( \text{Wxb3} \) \( \text{Wxd4} \)!) 28 ... \( \text{Wxd6} \) 29 \( \text{Wxf6} \) \( \text{Qd6} \) 30 \( \text{Qd1} \) + followed by 31 \( \text{Qxf5} \). But Black can prolong the fight awhile longer with 26 ... \( \text{Af8} \); e.g., 27 \( \text{Qd3} \) (not 27 \( \text{Qc1} \) \( \text{Wc1} \) + 28 \( \text{Wxe4} \) \( \text{Wxe4} \) 29 \( \text{Wxe4} \) \( \text{Wxe4} \) + and now with 29 \( \text{Wxa4} \) \( \text{Wxa4} \) 30 \( \text{Wxe6} \) White can simplify to a much more favorable ending than the one he gets in the game. Trading Queens is his best choice also because the alternative, 29 \( \text{Wb6} \) + \( \text{Af7} \) 30 \( \text{Qc1} \) \( \text{Wf7} \) 31 \( \text{Wxe3} \) \( \text{Qc1} \) + 32 \( \text{Qd1} \) \( \text{Af6} \), gives Black the chance to place his King rather safely on e7 (the e-file can often be blocked with \( \text{Af6} \)-e5), as given by Kavalek.

Another idea is for Black to answer 26 \( \text{Wf7} \) with 26 ... \( \text{Wxe4} \) + 27 \( \text{Qh1} \) \( \text{Wxe8} \), and if 28 \( \text{Wf4} \) \( \text{Af6} \), trying to obtain a counterattack; but this brings no salvation after the crushing 29 \( \text{Wxe6} \) + \( \text{Qxe6} \) 30 \( \text{Qxd6} \) + and now after 30 ... \( \text{Qxf6} \) White's simplest is 31 \( \text{Qxf6} \).

26 ... \( \text{Wxe4} \) +

Despite the worry which had dominated my mind while White was thinking about his previous move, I did not hesitate longer than ten seconds here. Better an endgame, I thought, even against such an endgame artist as Karpov, than to expose my King any longer to lightning attacks.

After the game I asked my op-
ponent how he would have answered 26 .... \( \text{b6} \). To my surprise, he said he had planned to exchange Queens after 27 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{xe4} \) and to capture twice on \( e4 \). Naturally he would have changed his mind if I had actually played 26 .... \( \text{b6} \), because after 27 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 28 \( \text{h6} \) is crushing. The sudden danger now comes from the other side, which once again underlines the powerful position of the White Queen. After either 28 .... \( \text{h4} \) 29 \( \text{d4} \) or 28 .... \( \text{d4} \) 29 \( \text{dxe5} \) \( \text{xe5} \) 30 \( \text{axe5} \) \( \text{xe5} \) 31 \( \text{g5} \) followed by 32 \( \text{c1} \) it is all over.

Another method of continuing, with Queens on the board, is unsatisfactory: 26 .... \( \text{xe4} \) is again answered strongly by 27 \( \text{a7} \) 28 \( \text{d5} \) 29 \( \text{exd6} \) 29 \( \text{xg7} \) 30 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{g8} \) 31 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{b7} \) 32 \( \text{g4} \) and White wins.

27 \( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xe4} \)

28 \( \text{g4} \)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{f1} \\
\text{d1} \\
\text{d6} \\
\text{b1} \\
\text{a4} \\
\text{f4} \\
\text{h6} \\
\text{e5} \\
\text{c7} \\
\text{b7} \\
\text{a7} \\
\text{b8} \\
\text{g8} \\
\text{h7} \\
\text{c6} \\
\text{h7} \\
\text{b5} \\
\end{array}
\]

Typical Karpov. He has no real winning chances and is not at all in a hurry.

38 .... \( \text{e2} \)

39 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{e5} \)

40 \( \text{a4} \) \( \text{a5} \)

41 \( \text{xb3} \) \( \text{xa4} \)

42 \( \text{b8} \) \( \text{d4} \)

A nice finesse which makes things a little less troublesome for Black.

43 \( \text{e8} \) \( \text{d6} \)

I had calculated long before that the King would arrive just in time.

52 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{d2} \)

53 \( \text{c2} \) \( \text{b7} \)

54 \( \text{b4} \) \( \text{a7} \)

55 \( \text{b5} \) \( \text{b7} \)

White cannot win the \( d \)-pawn unless he can put Black in zugzwang. The move \( h6-h7 \) is therefore necessary sooner or later. After that, however, Black doesn't need the pawn to draw.

56 \( \text{b7} \) \( \text{a7} \)

57 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{b7} \)

Drawn.
Game Eighteen
Timman-Karpov

In May 1976 a four-player tournament in honor of Max Euwe was held for the first time. The venue was uniquely situated in the Van Gogh Museum in Amsterdam, and the demonstration room was no less unique: a tent of mirrors which for a few months stood in the Museum Square. Professor Euwe turned 75 during the tournament amid an appropriate setting. A phonograph record was even made, with text added to music found in an old barrel-organ book from the time when Euwe was World Champion: the “Euwe March.” All together, a perfect 1930’s atmosphere was created.

Karpov’s participation was an extra attraction. The World Champion did not have many tournaments on his program for the rest of the year, and many people wondered whether he was taking too great a risk by playing in such a short tournament. After all, even a single “accident” could seriously jeopardize his expected first place. Karpov clearly felt this himself, for he played very cautiously. In the first round he defeated Browne, who had actually achieved a drawn position but went under in terrible time pressure. Four draws followed, and in the last round a win against Olafsson secured Karpov’s first place.

He faced his most anxious moments in the fifth round, in the game given here. After missing a win, I finally had to be satisfied with a draw.

Euwe Tournament
Amsterdam 1976

Nimzo-Indian Defense
Leningrad Variation

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jon</th>
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<tr>
<td>Timman</td>
<td>Karpov</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 d4</td>
<td>...</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 c4</td>
<td>e6</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Qc3</td>
<td>...</td>
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<td>4 Kg5</td>
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<td>5 d5</td>
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<td>6 e3</td>
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<td>7 cxd5</td>
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<td>8 Qd3</td>
<td>...</td>
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<td>9 Qe2</td>
<td>Qxd5</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 0-0</td>
<td>...</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 bxc3</td>
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This position is known with the inclusion of the moves h7-h6 and Qg5-h4, which have become fairly automatic. In most variations it is very important that White’s Bishop cannot suddenly return to the Queenside, but that is an irrelevant nuance in this game.

11 ... c4!

I saw this coming but was unable to find a satisfactory divergence from the usual continuation. The text move is an important improvement for Black in the Leningrad Variation.

12 Lf5

After 12 Qc2 Black can take the time to quietly castle and maintain the inevitable threat of 13 ... Qxc3. A nice variation is 12 ... 0-0 13 Qg3 Qxc3 14 Wh5 g6 15 Wh6 Whes 16 Wh5 and now Black defends successfully with the Petrovian-like move 16 ... Wh8!

12 ...

f6

The fact that Karpov spent forty minutes on this move shows that he had probably not hammered out the finesses of the previous move himself but had been shown them by his team of helpers. The alternatives are:

A) 12 ... Qxc3 13 Qxc3! (13 Qxd7 + Lxd7 14 Qxc3 Whg5 15 Qd4 Wh6 16 Qxd6+ Wh7 gives White no advantage) 13 ... Whx5 14 Wh4 and the threats 15 Qd5 and 15 Qxd6 can hardly be met.

B) 12 ... Whb6 holds the pawn but leads to a rather great concentration of Black pieces on the Queenside: 13 Qg3 0-0 14 Wh1 Qxc3 15 Wh5 Whx5 16 Whx5 Whx4 17 Wh6! and Black must give up his Queen with 17 ... Whx5 18 Whx5 Whx6. This position is difficult to judge, but it seems to me that White has the advantage.
THE ART OF CHESS ANALYSIS

C) 12... Df6 is undoubtedly the safest continuation. There can follow 13 Lxc8 Lxc8 14 Lxf6 Oxf6 15 Lxd6 Lc5 with equality.

13 Dd4!

Played after long deliberation. I had already used nearly an hour and a half. Although White does not really stand worse after 13 Df4 Oxf4 14 Lxd7 Lxd7 15 Lxf4, I did not find this possibility attractive during the game. Karpov likes positions such as the one that would arise after 15... d5 16 Lh5+ g6, with a worthless extra pawn and opposite-color Bishops.

The slightly more subtle 15... Df8 (instead of 15... hxg6) is not a saving move either: 16 Lxg6+ Dh7, and the double threat 18 e4 and 18 Lxd5 cannot be effectively parried by 18... Dh8 because of 19 Dh7.

During the game, 13... De5 gave me the most headaches. Karpov said afterwards that he had feared 14 Lh5+ g6 15 Lxg6+ Lxg6 16 Lxf6 but had completely overlooked the fact that he could then castle with a winning advantage. The attempt 16 Lh6 (instead of 16 Lxf6) is too fantastic. The simplest answer is 16... Lc5.

White's best line after 13... De5 begins with 14 f4 to drive the Knight from its strong central position. The resulting complications are difficult to enumerate. In the tent of mirrors, Hans Ree showed this pretty variation* to the public during the demonstration: 14... Lxe3 15 Lxh5+ g6 16 Lxg6+ Dg6 17 f5 Dxf1 18 Dxf1 19 g7+ Lh5 20 Dxf6+ and 21 Dxf1 with a winning positional advantage for White. This variation is so beautiful mainly because it expresses the Excelsior Theme in its full glory: White's f-pawn advances undisturbed to the queening square. The opposition of the Queens on a5 and h5 and the position of the minor pieces between them leads to very surprising twists and variations. Thus Black finds no salvation in the variation 17... Dxf1 18 Dxf1 Lxf1 19 Lxf1

0-0 20 Dxf5 and White's attack wins.

In the postmortem, Karpov immediately replied to 14 f4 with 14... Dh7. Now direct attacking attempts have no chance of success; e.g., 15 Dh5 Lxf5 (not 15... g6 because of 16 Lxg6 hxg6 17 Dxf6 with a very precarious position for Black) 16 Dxf5 g6 17 Dg7+ Dh8 18 De6+ Dh7 and the White attack does not break through. However, with one of Black's Knights out of the center, White need not adopt overly violent methods but can continue quietly with 15 Lh4; e.g., 15... 0-0 16 Lxc8! Lxc8 17 Dxf5 Lc5 18 Dh4 19 g4 19 e4 with a winning game.

I am sure that Karpov saw far more of these variations than he indicated after the game. While I was thinking about my thirteenth move I noticed that he was also concentrating intensely on the position. In positions where you have to dig very deeply to decide on a continuation, variations are sometimes considered subconsciously and do not rise to the surface of conscious calculation; such variations help only in the overall evaluation of a position, which is a necessary part of judging the value of a move. It was only after the game, for example, that I recognized the variation Hans Ree had shown the public. A great deal of tension is usually released right after a game, and you may not be able to remember variations you had calculated during the game or may only vaguely recognize variations that had sprung into your subconscious mind. In any case, it seems very improbable to me that Karpov had overlooked the possibility of castling after 13... De5 14 Wh5+ g6 15 Lxg6+ Dg6 16 Lxf6, since castling would have been one of his first considerations. Perhaps he then went on to look at other possibilities and, after the game, could not remember much about it.

14 Lxd7+ Dxd7
15 Lxf4 0-0

Karpov again keeps things as simple as possible and perhaps he is right again. He could have kept the extra pawn with 15... Dh5 (not 15... Dh5 16 e4), but he feared 16 Df3. Indeed, White has excellent compensation after either 16... Dg5 16 Dh6 or 16... Lh5 17 Dg6 18 Wh6. Our World Champion, however, does not like an unsafe King. In the second variation, after 18 Lxf4 19 Dxf4 Dh7 20 Df1 White threatens the annoying 21 Dg7+, and Black's King would not be at home on the Queenside.

16 Lxd6 Df8
17 Df1 b6
18 Lxe7 Dxe7
19 Db5

This maneuver, begun by White's 17th move, is the only way to give
Black problems. White can also continue with 19 $\text{d}6$ followed by 20 $f3$ and 21 $e4$. He would stand well then, but the position would be too static for him to hope for much.

19 ... $\text{e}8$

The only move.

20 $\text{d}6$ $\text{e}7$

Also possible is 20 ... $\text{e}6$, and 21 $\text{d}4$ is the best reply.

21 $\text{b}4$ $\text{e}6$

21 ... $\text{e}5$ is also to be considered, with the intention 22 $\text{x}c4$ $\text{x}c3$ 23 $\text{d}6$ $\text{e}8$. However, White plays 22 $\text{d}2$ followed eventually by $f4$.

22 $\text{f}3$ $\text{d}5$

23 $\text{x}d5$ $\text{x}d5$

24 $\text{d}1$ $\text{e}6$

25 $\text{d}4$ $\text{e}7$

26 $f3$

Black has been able to defend the c-pawn sufficiently, but White's position is a little better and easier to handle.

26 ... $\text{f}8$

27 $\text{d}6$

The right moment, especially for psychological reasons.

Karpov thought about this for a long time. He showed afterwards that he probably could have played 27 ... $\text{x}d4$. At first sight this seems very good for White, for after 28 $\text{cxd}4$ and a move by Black's Rook, White has 29 $\text{c}3$ with a winning positional advantage. But Black's Rook need not move: 28 ... $c3! 29 \text{dxc7} \text{a2}$ and, amazingly, White has only one way to stop the c-pawn: 30 $\text{e}6$. Black must take the Knight to prevent it from getting to $d3$ or $e2$ via $f4$: 30 ... $\text{c}6$. Now comes 31 $\text{b}1 \text{c2} 32 \text{c}1 \text{b3} 33 \text{f}2 \text{b5}$. With his King on $d2$ or $d3$, the best White could hope for would be to return the Exchange on $c2$; therefore, 34 $e4$ $b4$ 35 $\text{f}3$ $a5$ 36 $\text{d}5$ $a4$ 37 $\text{f}4$. Black cannot prevent the White King's occupation of $c5$ by putting his own King on $d6$, for then $f3-f4$ and $e4-e5$ would follow. So it seems to be all over now, since on 37 ... $a3$ 38 $\text{f}5$ is decisive. Black, however, has a sparkling finesse which the World Champion was not able to work out completely over the board.

After 37 $\text{f}4$ (analysis)

37 ... $\text{a}2$! After 38 $\text{x}c2$ $b3$ 39 $\text{e}8+$ $\text{c}7$ 40 $\text{x}c7+$ $\text{d}8$ (not 40 ... $\text{f}6??$ 41 $\text{b}7$ followed by $\text{f}4$ and $\text{e}5+$ with mate!) and Black wins, so White has no better than to head for a draw with 39 $\text{b}2$! (instead of 39 $\text{e}8+$) 39 ... $a3$ 40 $\text{f}3$, as given by $\text{B}$. After the "exchange" on $b2$, the White King moves back and forth between $a1$ and $b2$ so that he cannot be forced into zugzwang.

From all this it seems that White would have had to answer 27 ... $\text{x}d4$ with 28 $\text{cxd}4$, which would have been more or less the same as the actual game continuation.

28 $a4$

Not nice, fixing the pawn on the wrong color; but if White wants to make any progress, it's virtually unavoidable.

28 ... $a6$

29 $\text{d}3$

30 $\text{c}4$

31 $\text{c}2$

32 $\text{c}6$

Threatening 33 $\text{b}4$. The push 33 $a5$ $\text{bxa}5$ 34 $\text{h}4$ $\text{b6}$ leads to nothing.

32 ... $a5$

33 $\text{d}5$!

The only reasonable winning attempt. 33 $\text{f}3$ seems promising but leads to nothing after 33 ... $\text{d}6$; e.g., 34 $\text{f}2$ $\text{d}7$! and if 35 $d5$ $\text{c}5$ 36 $\text{b}6+$ $\text{f}7$ White loses his a-pawn. That wrongly-fixed pawn is a
thorn in White’s flesh, while its Black counterpart is a potential passed pawn—the Knight’s natural enemy.

33 ... Lxh5

The fact that Karpov thought a few minutes before making this capture indicates that he had overlooked White’s last move—or that he wanted to create the impression that he had overlooked it.

34 Dd4 Ac5

The best square for the Rook.

35 Lxb6 h5?

Perhaps a consequence of overlooking White’s 33rd move. The steady reaction is 35 ... Dd7, to be able to defend his weak points in time.

36 Df2?

In slight time trouble, I reacted automatically with the answer I had planned for 35 ... Dd7. Things would be much more difficult for Black after 36 Ab6. He would have to give up a pawn because of the double threat 37 Ab7+ and 37 Db5, and his compensation would be questionable.

36 ... Dd7

Now everything is in order again.

37 h4 Dc7
38 Ae6

A little joke at the end of an enervating game. The pawn ending is won for White after 38 ... Dxe6 39 Dxe6 + Dd6 40 Dxc5 Dxc5 41 De3 Dd5 42 Dh1, etc. Karpov, of course, will have nothing to do with it.

38 ... Dd7
39 Ab6 Dc7
40 Ae6

40 Ab1 is also nothing because of 40 ... Dh7 and Black is again ready to besiege White’s a-pawn.

40 ... Dd7
41 Ab6 Df7!
42 Ab6 Dc7
43 Ae6 Dd7
44 Ab6 Dc7
45 Ae6

And the draw was agreed here, before adjourning. Playing for a win with 45 Ab1 would have been risky due to 45 ... Lc8 46 Db5 + Dd8!.

Game Nineteen
Spassky-Korchnoi

After Korchnoi sought asylum in the West in August 1976, the Russians systematically tried to make life difficult for him. First Pravda and 64 published a letter signed by most Russian grandmasters condemning and criticizing him. Then the Soviet Chess Federation asked FIDE to exclude Korchnoi from the matches leading to the world championship. Their motto was, perhaps, “Even if it doesn’t help, it can’t hurt.”

Fortunately, it didn’t help. But it meant that until further notice Korchnoi could meet Soviet opponents only in matches. The confrontation peaked in 1977, when he successively met Petrosian, Polugaevsky, and Spassky. Petrosian went down after a nerve-racking equal struggle, Polugaevsky never had a chance, and it seemed at first that Spassky would be similarly run over: after nine games Korchnoi had built up a lead of 6½-2½. At that point, Spassky began to exhibit a remarkable pattern of behavior; he appeared at the board only to make his moves, and then he immediately sauntered backstage to muse over the course of the game—a unique method of thought which appears to be not very efficient. Instead of realizing this, Korchnoi took it as a serious insult. He became extremely upset and lost four games in a row. Only then did he slowly pull himself together. With two draws and two more wins, he won the match by a comfortable margin and went on to face Karpov.

This game is from the period before the relationship between Korchnoi and Spassky was so radically disturbed.
Final Candidates Match
Belgrade 1977
Game 4

French Defense
Winawer Variation

Boris Spassky
Viktor Korchnoi

1 e4     e6
2 d4     d5
3 Nc3     Nf6
4 e5     c5
5 a3     Nxc3 +
6 bxc3     Nf6
7 a4

In the second game of this match Spassky chose the sharpest system with 7 Ng4, but it turned out badly for him. He now uses the "positional" method preferred especially by Smyslov and Fischer.

7 ...     Nd7
8 Nf3     c6
9 a2      d2

The important alternative is 9 Nd2.

9 ...     Nbd6
10 Ne2     f6

Attacking the center immediately. This was first played by Korchnoi, against me, in Leuven 1976. Black provokes his opponent to open the center at once, an idea formerly considered too dangerous because of White's Bishop-pair.

In the old days Botvinnik used to close the center with 10 ... c4. Planinac has had particular success against 10 ... c4 with 11 Ng5, and even the great expert Uhlmann could not find a satisfactory reply; e.g., Kavalek-Uhlmann, Manila 1976: 10 ... c4 11 Ng5 h6 12 Nh3 0-0 0-0 13 Nh4 Qb8 14 0-0 d8 15 d5 Nh5 Ndg8 16 Qg4 Nbd6 17 Ke1 Nd4 18 Ke3 b5 19 Nh3 Ke8 20 Kg3 Ke7 21 Kc1 Ndg6 22 Ka3 Nf8 23 Qd2 Nc7 24 Nh3 Nd7 25 Nc6 Qc6 26 Nf1 Qc8 27 f4 f5 28 Nxf6 Qxg6 29 f5! and White broke the position open.

Later, Vaganian tried 10 ... Qc7 and reached a good position against Klov in after 11 0-0 0-0 12 Ke1 h6 13 Nh4 Ndg6 14 Qg3 Nce7. Kurajica, against me, later improved White's play: 13 Qc1 f6 14 Nxf6 Nxf6 15 Qc7! c4 16 d5 and White stood better.

11 c4     Qc7
12 exf6

I play 12 cxd5 first, which amounts to a transposition of moves.

12 ...     Qxf6
13 cxd5     Qxd5
14 c3

But now the game takes another route. Against Korchnoi I tried 14 c4 to aim for the endgame after 14 ... Qd7 15 dxc5 0-0 0-0 16 Kc3 e5 17 Qd6. The continuation was 17 ... Nh5 18 Qxc7 + Qxc7 19 0-0 Nf4 20 Nxf4 Nxf4 21 Kh1 Ke6 and now White should have further opened the position with 22 f4 (instead of 22 Nxd4 as played), after which the chances would have remained balanced.

The text move is based on a different strategy: White holds d4 so as to prevent Black from quickly freeing his game with e6-c5. The centralized position of the Knight on d5 helps Black to rapidly carry out this advance anyway.

14 ...     0-0-0
15 0-0     Nhg8
16 Ke1

A very tense position. After this move the storm breaks, but 16 g3 would also have been answered by 16 ... e5 17 c4 Qf4 with complications similar to those in the game.

16 ...     e5!

Very sharply judged.

17 c4

The standard reaction. White wants to establish a strong protected passed pawn in the center. Spassky now had only forty minutes left on his clock, Korchnoi eighty. The tension was palbable.

17 ...     Kh8

This blow makes the game more complicated than it would have been after 17 ... Ng4. But it is no worse a move, since 17 ... Nh4 18 Nxf4 exf4 19 d5 Kg8 produces the same position as the best variation after Black's next move.

17 ... c4 is bad because of 18 cxd5 exf3 19 Nxf3 Nxd4 20 Nc3 with positional advantage for White.

18 Nh1

18 g3 is bad here because after 18 ... Nh4 19 Nh4 exf4 Black already threatens a decisive double capture on g3, a good example of how quickly the Black attack can develop.

A very interesting possibility is 18 Ng5, to keep the g-file closed. Three White men are attacked, and in such
cases a countersacrifice is not out of place. But which one should Black take? 18 ... fxg5 19 cxd5 is simply bad, and White has the advantage also after 18 ... Qf4 19 Qxf4 Qxd4 20 Qc1; e.g., 20 ... Qxg2 21 Qg4+! Qb8 22 Qc6, or 20 ... Qf5 21 Qe3 fxg5 22 Qxd4 Qxd4 23 Qd1 and Black does not have enough compensation. Much stronger is 18 ... Qxg2, leading to very intricate and interesting complications which do not seem unfavorable for Black. It is irrelevant, however. After 18 Qg5 Qc3! the White attack is refuted elegantly and convincingly. Black remains at least a pawn ahead with an overwhelming position.

18 ... Qb6

The piece sacrifice Korchnoi has in mind looks overwhelming, but in the end it turns out to be not very promising. The alternatives are:

A) 18 ... Qxg2+. This direct try fails to 19 Qxg2 Qg7 20 Qh4 Qxd4 21 Qa3 and the Rook goes to g3.

B) 18 ... Qd6 19 d5 Qxe4 20 Qxe6 Qxe6 21 Qxe6 Qxg5 is good enough.

21 g3

The only move. 21 Qa2 fails to 21 ... Qxd2 22 Qxd2 Qxd2 23 Qxd2 Qxf3 and wins.

18 ... Qxf1

Not 22 Qxf1 because of 22 ... Qxf3 23 Qxf3 Qxd2+ and Black stays two pawns ahead.

22 c4

This is the only way for Black to win his piece back, since after 22 ... Qd3 White can defend with 23 Qc2 Qd5 24 Qe3, and 22 ... Qg4 is met by 23 Qe2 Qe4 24 Qe3 and, at best, Black can get a third pawn for his piece.

23 Qb3

A roughly equal alternative is 23 Qc2. After 23 ... Qd5 24 Qfc1 Black has the choice of having his pawn on e4 or f3. In the first case, after 24 ... Qxd2 25 Qxd2 Qxd2 26 Qxc5+ Qb8 27 Qc7+ Qa8 28 Qab1 he must be prepared to defend passively with 28 ... Qb8. Therefore, the second choice is better because Black's mate threats on the back rank: 24 ... Qxf3 25 Qxc6 Qxd2 26 Qxc5+ Qb8, and now 27 Qf3 is best, to recover the pawn. The chances are equal.

Playing to win the Exchange with 24 Qfd1 (instead of 24 Qfc1) fails after 24 ... Qxf3 25 Qc5 Qe6 followed by 26 ... Qh3 and mate.

23 ... Qd5

24 Qac1

It is possible that Spassky had been planning 24 Qfd1 here, since now it wouldn't fail as it did with the Queen on c2 (Black's f3-pawn hangs). But 24 ... Qe5 would be lethal.

24 ... Qxd2
concludes that White stands clearly better after 26 ... $\mathcal{Q}xc1 + 27 \mathcal{Q}xc1$ $\mathcal{Q}xf3 + 28 \mathcal{Q}g2$, for White's Queen and Bishop combine very well indeed. Stronger is 27 ... $\mathcal{Q}xf3$ (instead of 27 ... $\mathcal{Q}xf3 +$ ) to keep the f-pawn indirectly protected after 28 $\mathcal{Q}f4$ with 28 ... $\mathcal{Q}gf8$. Black is not badly off as far as material is concerned, but his pieces do not work well together. It is understandable why Korchnoi did not enter this variation.

25 $\mathcal{Q}xd2$ $\mathcal{Q}xd2$
26 $\mathcal{Q}xe5+$ $\mathcal{Q}b8$
27 $\mathcal{Q}b1$

Now it looks as though White is taking over the attack, but it has little potency.

27 ... $\mathcal{Q}g7$

28 $\mathcal{Q}b5$ $\mathcal{Q}d7$
29 $\mathcal{Q}e6$ e3

The safest way to a draw.

30 $fxe3$ $\mathcal{Q}ge7$
31 $\mathcal{Q}g8+$ $\mathcal{Q}d8$
32 $\mathcal{Q}b3$ $\mathcal{Q}d7$

Korchnoi offered a draw here, but Spassky, with a forced draw in hand, refused.

33 $\mathcal{Q}g8+$ $\mathcal{Q}d8$
34 $\mathcal{Q}b3$

Now Spassky offered the draw, and Korchnoi accepted. After the forced 34 ... $\mathcal{Q}bd7$ 35 $\mathcal{Q}g8+$ he could have demanded a draw by the repetition rule, but the personal tensions were not yet so great at this stage.

Game Twenty
Korchnoi-Karpov

After the 1977 Final Candidates Match, worse was expected of the ensuing World Championship Match, and reality confirmed those fears. Fodder for sensation-seeking journalists was plentiful in Baguio City, but what was most striking about it was how uninteresting the off-the-board complications were, compared to those in Reykjavik 1972, for example. I no longer remember whether Zukhar was sitting in one of the first four rows of the auditorium during this game or was with the rest of the Russian delegation in the rear of the hall, or whether Korchnoi or a member of his entourage was protesting about something or other, or whether the Ananda Marga members, with or without their folkloric costumes, were sitting in the hall or whether the Russians had already convinced the partisan match jury to make them leave both Korchnoi’s villa and the city of Baguio.

From now on I will discuss only the game.

A very interesting opening. Karpov came up with something new, but the Russian team’s preparation did not seem to be very thorough. Perhaps it was an attempt to bluff Korchnoi, but it failed miserably. Korchnoi had no problems with it and dictated matters throughout the game. Neither side seemed to have analyzed carefully after adjournment. White’s ultimate victory looked convincing, but analysis shows that some mistakes were made.
World Championship Match
Baguio City 1978
Game 21

Queen's Gambit Declined

Viktor
Korchnoi
Karpov

1 e4
5 d4
2 d3
e6
3 d3
d5
4 d4
5 Lf4

An important position for theory, the more so because it can arise from the Nimzo-Indian (1 d4 d6 2 c4 e6 3 dxe6 Qb4 4 c5 dxc5 0-0 6 Qf3
d6 7 Qf4 Lxc5 8 e5 d5 9 Qd1 Qa5
10 a3). In fact, the only difference is that here Black has played Lf8-
e7xc5 instead of Lf8-b4xc5.

5 ... d5
6 e3
e5

The logical reaction now, since the development of White's Queen Bishop does not exert maximum pressure on the center.

7 dxc5 Lxc5

8 b1 e2 Lc6
9 Lb1 d6
10 a3

A novelty with an interesting idea behind it but which nevertheless seems doomed to failure. The usual move is 10 ... Le7, which White answers with 11 Ld2. Important recent examples are:

A) 11 Lc7 12 Le2 Lxc8 13 Qb7 d8 14 cxd5 exd5 15 Ld3 b6 16 Lc5
d6 17 Lxc6 Lxc6 18 Le3 Qb6 19 Le5 with a lasting positional advantage for White (Karpov-
Spassky, Montreal 1979).

B) 11 e5 12 Lg5 d4 13 Lb3:

Korchnoi saw clearly that he need not avoid the Black threats. On the contrary, he deliberately invites the following storm, which seems only to compromise the Black position. The cautious 11 Qd5 achieves nothing, and 11 b4 is simply bad because of 11 ... dxb4, etc.

11 ... e5?

Consistent but bad.

12 Lg5 Ld4

After 13 Lb3 (analysis)

B1) 13 ... Qd8 14 Le2 h6 (in
Ree-Kuijpers, Leeuwarden 1978,
Spassky's old move 14 ... Ld4
appeared to be unsatisfactory after
15 Lxe7 Lxe7 16 exd4 Qh4 17 g3
Wf3 18 d5 Qd4 19 Lxd4 exd4 20
Lxd4 Qe3 21 Lc3 Lf1 Wh5 and now White played the important improvement 23 h3!, instead of 23 Le2 Wh3 with repetition of moves as in Portisch-
Spassky, Havana 1966) 15 Lf6
Lxf6 16 Lb4 Lf6 17 Qc5 Qe7 18
Lxd6 Lxe6 19 Qd5 with advantage
to White (Korchnoi-Karpov, 9th
match game 1978).

B2) 13 ... Qd8 14 Lxf6 Lxf6 15
Qd5 Qd8 16 Le3 g6 17 exd4 Lxd4
18 Qxd4 exd4 19 Lxf6 + Lxf6 20
0-0 Lf6 21 Ke1 Ke8 22 b3 Lc8 and Black could just hold equality
(Korchnoi-Karpov, 23rd match game
1978).

11 Qd2!
of judgment. A short analysis should be enough to convince any expert—Tal, Zaitsev, Balashov, or Karpov himself—that Black is in almost insurmountable difficulties.

reply would obviously be 11 \( \text{c}5 \). That move was undoubtedly analyzed thoroughly, and the probable conclusion was that Black would have little to fear. Perhaps 11 \( \text{d}2 \) was discussed briefly and dismissed on the grounds that Korchnoi would quickly get into time trouble due to the inevitable complications, and in that case the correctness of the Black moves would not play too great a role.

Korchnoi, however, showed his best side: no time trouble, but a clear-headed, strong reaction.

15 \( \text{e}2 \)

Good enough to keep a clear advantage, but the Steinitzian retreat 15 \( \text{f}1 \) would have led to a winning position after some complications. For instance:

A) 15 ... \( \text{g}4 \). Given by Kholmov in Shakhmaty v SSSR. He continues 16 \( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{e}5?! \) 17 \( \text{exd}4 \) e3! 18 \( \text{xf}5 \) \( \text{d}3 \) +!! 19 \( \text{xf}3 \) exd2 mate (exclamation and question marks by Kholmov). Despite the three successive piece sacrifices, the variation is rather clumsy and pedestrian, and is scarcely relevant since the Black Knight’s move to \( e5 \) is intended merely to tempt White to capture on \( d4 \). Moreover, 15 ... \( \text{g}4 \) is just a blow in the air after the simple 16 \( \text{xd}5 \). Then the c4-square becomes available to both the Knight and the King Bishop while the Knight on \( d4 \) stays in the trap.

B) 15 ... \( \text{exe}3 \). The most important move. White has the following possibilities after the forced 16 \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{gxf}6 \):

\[ \text{B1) 17 \text{xd}5? \text{b}4! 18 \text{xf}6+ \text{g}7 19 \text{ex}e8+ \text{xe}8 \text{and Black has a continuing crushing initiative despite his material deficit. If White parries the main threat 20 ... \text{b}3 \text{c}2, then 20 ... \text{g}4 \text{is very strong.} } \]

\[ \text{B2) 17 exd}4 \text{e}3 18 \text{xf}5 \text{exd}2 19 \text{xf}2 \text{bxb}2 20 \text{wc}2 \text{wb}4! \text{and Black has his opponent in a vise; e.g., 21 \text{d}3 \text{dx}4 \text{c}2 \text{h}7+ \text{g}7 \text{and Black wins the sacrificed material back with interest, or 21 b}4 \text{e}4! \text{with a strong attack.} } \]

\[ \text{B3) 17 cxd}5 \text{a}4 \text{was the case after 15 ... \text{g}4, is the correct way to capture the d-pawn. The best for Black is again 17 ... \text{b}4, but now comes 18 exd}4 \text{After 18 ... \text{e}3 19 \text{xf}5 \text{exe}3 \text{bxc}3 \text{g}4+! \text{h}8 \text{22 fxe}3 \text{exe}3+ 23 \text{xe}2 \text{exe}8 \text{24 0-0 Black’s attack has burned itself out. In other cases, too, White keeps a material advantage.} } \]

15 ... \( \text{exe}2+ \)

Black exchanges his awkwardly placed Knight, but his problems remain because his other pieces are not well coordinated.

16 \( \text{xc}2 \)

After 16 ... \( \text{xf}6 \) (analysis)

\[ \text{B1) 17 \text{xd}5? \text{b}4! 18 \text{xf}6+ \text{g}7 19 \text{ex}e8+ \text{xe}8 \text{and Black has a continuing crushing initiative despite his material deficit. If White parries the main threat 20 ... \text{b}3 \text{c}2, then 20 ... \text{g}4 \text{is very strong.} } \]

\[ \text{B2) 17 exd}4 \text{e}3 18 \text{xf}5 \text{exd}2 19 \text{xf}2 \text{bxb}2 20 \text{wc}2 \text{wb}4! \text{and Black has his opponent in a vise; e.g., 21 \text{d}3 \text{dx}4 \text{c}2 \text{h}7+ \text{g}7 \text{and Black wins the sacrificed material back with interest, or 21 b}4 \text{e}4! \text{with a strong attack.} } \]

16 ... \( \text{wa}6 \)

It is always difficult to choose between two evils. Kholmov gives the text move a question mark and claims that 16 ... \( \text{dx}4 \) offers equal play. He gives two variations after 17 \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{gf}6 \):

\[ \text{A) 18 b}4 \text{cxb}3 19 \text{xb}3 \text{exe}3 \text{b}2 20 \text{a}1 \text{wb}4 \text{21 w}b \text{wb}6 \text{22 d}5 \text{wc}6! \text{and Black is saved. This may be the continuation Karpov feared, but White has no way to undertake really dangerous action against the Black King, as can be seen from 23 \text{xf}5 \text{wa}4 \text{24 \text{xf}6+ \text{g}7 25 \text{xf}5 \text{xb}3 \text{26 wg}5+ \text{h}8 \text{not 26 \text{e}8?? 27 \text{d}7 \text{mate) 27 0-0 \text{exe}6}} \text{possibly followed by 28 ... \text{xf}6, after which White has no more than a draw by perpetual check.} \]

}
of 20 $\text{x}e4! \text{h}x\text{d}1 21 \text{h}x\text{d}1 \text{g}g6 22 \text{f}3 with superior play for White.

Korchnoi intends to capture the Black d-pawn with a Rook.

18 ... \text{g}6
19 \text{d}x\text{d}5 \text{h}h5

After this almost pointless move Black might have quickly gone downhill. 19 ... \text{e}5 is required. After the virtually forced 20 \text{d}x\text{d} 4 \text{h}x\text{d} 4 21 \text{h}x\text{d} 4 \text{g}g5 White cannot castle. Tal gave 22 \text{h}f1 an exclamation mark in 64, and almost the entire international chess press accepted this without question. It is far from convincing, however. White's King Rook will be excluded from the game for a long time, and Black can take advantage of this with 22 ... \text{h}ad8. For example:

23 \text{d}d5 \text{e}6 or 23 \text{d}e2 \text{g}g4 24 \text{h}x\text{d} 8 \text{h}x\text{d} 8 +1 25 \text{h}x\text{e} 2 (25 \text{h}x\text{e} 2 \text{h}h5 + 1) 25 ... \text{h}x\text{d} 8 26 \text{g} 3 \text{d} 3 27 \text{g} 2 \text{f} 5 with sufficient compensation for the pawn, considering that 28 \text{d}h7 fails to 28 ... \text{h}f3 +. Perhaps better is first 23 \text{h}x\text{d} 8 \text{h}x\text{d} 8 and only then 24 \text{d}e2. Black's most promising continuation then is probably 24 ... \text{d} 3 25 \text{d} 4 h 5 with compensation for the pawn.

22 \text{g} 3!, given by Andersson, is much stronger than 22 \text{h}f1. It seems at first sight to create a serious weakness, but a closer look shows that White's King does not face any serious danger. White will “castle” artificially on the Queenside via d1 or d2, and Black's compensation seems insufficient; e.g., 22 ... \text{h}ad8 23 \text{d}e2 \text{g}g4 24 \text{h}x\text{d} 8 \text{h}x\text{d} 8 (now the capture on e2 is not with check) 25 \text{d}d4.

Nevertheless, 19 ... \text{e}5 is undoubtedly Black's best chance. But not 19 ... \text{g}g6; Kholmov shows that White beats off the enemy attack with 20 0-0 \text{h}h6 (or 20 ... \text{h}h3 21 \text{f}4)

21 ... \text{h}x\text{e} 5

Korchnoi exchanges some pieces with the clear intention of castling as soon as possible. Objectively, this does not throw away the win, but it does give Black the chance to fight back and reach an ending which is not altogether hopeless.

White can make short work of his opponent with 21 \text{f}4!. If Black captures en passant he loses a piece without compensation: 21 ... \text{e}x\text{f} 3 22 \text{h}x\text{f} 5 \text{h}x\text{g} 2 23 \text{h}g 1. If he takes on d5, his pair of Bishops will have no future and White will be a pawn ahead with the better position.

21 ... \text{h}x\text{e} 5
22 \( \text{Qxf5} \) \( \text{Qxf5} \)
23 0-0

The best. White gives back the pawn temporarily but keeps the initiative. 23 \( \text{Qxe4} \) is less convincing because of 23 ... \( \text{b5} \). After 24 0-0 \( \text{Bxc4} \) 25 \( \text{Qd2} \) \( \text{Le7} \) 26 \( \text{Qg3} \) \( \text{Be6} \) 27 \( \text{Qd3} \) \( g6 \) followed by 28 ... \( \text{Qe5} \), Black stands very actively and faces little genuine danger of losing.

23 ... \( \text{Bxe4} \)
24 \( \text{Ad1} \) \( \text{Be5} \)

provides excellent extensive analysis of the twentieth match game.

At this point he shows that he was very alert. He completely refutes Tal’s analysis with the powerful move 27 \( g3 \) (instead of 27 \( \text{Qxe4} \)). White not only makes room for his King but is also ready to answer 27 ... \( e3 \) with 28 \( f4 \). White has a won position after 27 ... \( \text{Wg4} \) 28 \( \text{Qxe4} \), and after 27 ... \( f5 \) 28 \( \text{Qd5} \) White has a winning attack. Finally, Khomlov points out that Larson’s 26 ... \( \text{Af6} \) (instead of 26 ... \( \text{Wg5} \)) fails to 27 \( \text{Qxe4} \) \( \text{Qxd4} \) 28 \( \text{Qf6} \) + with mate or win of the Queen.

We may conclude that the move chosen by Karpov is the most stubborn continuation.

25 \( g3 \)
26 \( \text{Ab3} \) \( \text{b5} \)

Black’s pieces seem to be working together well again. With his next move Khorinå proved that the opposite is true.

27 \( \text{Na4} \) \( \text{Ab4} \)

This leads to a hopeless ending, but there is nothing better.

28 \( \text{Qd5} \) \( \text{Qxd5} \)
29 \( \text{Ax} \text{d5} \) \( \text{Lb8} \)
30 \( \text{axb5} \) \( \text{a5} \)

The only fighting chance. The winning process would run smoothly after 30 ... \( \text{axb5} \) 31 \( \text{Qxb5} \).

KORCHNOK-KARPOV

26 ... \( \text{h5} \) 27 \( \text{Ah7} \) \( \text{Lc5} \) 28 \( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Kf6} \)
29 \( \text{Qg2} \) \( \text{Be} \text{8} \) 30 \( e3 \) \( \text{Ah7} \) 31 \( \text{Ab5} \) \( \text{Qg7} \)
32 \( \text{Qd2} \) \( \text{Qe5} \) 33 \( \text{Qb4} \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 34 \( \text{Ah7} \)
35 \( \text{Bf3} \) \( \text{Le7} \) 36 \( \text{Ab3} \) \( \text{Qe6} \) 37 \( \text{Qe4} \) \( \text{Le7} \) 38 \( \text{Bb7} \) \( \text{Bc5} \) 39 \( \text{Qd7} \) \( \text{Kf6} \)
40 \( \text{Dc3} \) \( \text{Af8} \) 41 \( \text{Dc2} \) \( \text{Le7} \) 42 \( \text{Bc3} \)
43 \( \text{Ba5} \) \( \text{Bc4} \) \( \text{Le7} \) 44 \( \text{Ba5} \) \( \text{Kc7} \) 45 \( \text{Bc3} \) \( \text{Bc6} \) 46 \( e4 \) \( \text{Ba6} \) 47 \( \text{Bc3} \) \( \text{Bc8} \) 48 \( \text{h3} \) \( \text{Af6} \) 49 \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{Ah3} \) 50 \( g4 \) \( \text{hxg4} \) 51 \( \text{hxg4} \) \( \text{Le7} \) 52 \( \text{Bb8} \) + \( \text{Kh7} \) 53 \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{Aa1} \)
54 \( e5 \) \( \text{Bgl} \) 55 \( \text{Bc5} \) \( \text{Bc3} + \) 56 \( \text{Bf2} \)
57 \( \text{Bc4} \) \( \text{Bc5} + \) 58 \( \text{Bf3} \) \( \text{Ba3} + \)
59 \( \text{Bg4} \) \( \text{Ba4} \) 60 \( \text{Df6} \) + \( \text{Bxf6} \) 61 \( \text{gxf6} \)
62 \( \text{Bh8} \) \( \text{Bh7} \) 63 \( e6 \) \( \text{Bxe6} \) 64 \( \text{Bc8} \)
65 \( \text{Ah8} + \) \( \text{Ah7} \) 66 \( \text{Bxh7} \) 67 \( \text{Bg6} \) \( \text{Ah8} \) 68 \( \text{Dxg6} \) \( \text{Bxg6} \) 69 \( f7 + \) \( \text{Bh8} \) 70 \( \text{Bh6} \) e5 71 \( \text{Bxe6} \) \( \text{Bxe6} \) 72 \( \text{Be5} \) 1-0.

Pritchett defended himself not at all badly in this game but finally could not avoid going under. The execution of the victory took forty-six moves, which provides food for thought: Khorinå was undoubtedly hoping for a quicker win and correctly saw that keeping the advanced passed b-pawn would guarantee it.

31 31 ... \( \text{Bxb2} \)
32 \( \text{Ba8} \) \( f5 \)

Black has two ways of trying to reach an ending of four pawns to three on one wing, but both fail:

A) 32 ... \( \text{Bh3} \) 33 \( \text{Bd5} \) \( g6 \) 34 \( \text{Bxa5} \)
35 \( \text{Bc3} \) \( Bxh6 \) 36 \( \text{Bb8} + \) \( \text{Bb7} \) 39
36 \( \text{h8} \) winning a piece.

B) 32 ... \( \text{Bb4} \) 33 \( \text{Bxb4} \) \( \text{Bb3} \) 34 \( \text{Bc4} \)
35 \( \text{Bc6} \) (threatening 36 b6) 35 ...
\( \text{Lg7 36 Lc8 + Lf8 and now after 37 g4, the strongest move, Black has no chances whatsoever; e.g., 37 ... Kg7 38 Lc6 or 37 ... f5 38 gxf5 gxf5 39 Kg2 Kg7 40 Lc7 + and now 40 ... Kg6 is answered by 41 Kh2, and after 40 ... Kg6 41 Lc6 + followed by 42 b6 White also has matters all his own way.} \)

The text move gives White the greatest technical problems since the Knight will later have to move to the edge of the board to defend the b-pawn.

33 Lxa5 Lb4
34 Lxa8 + Lf7
35 da4

The attack on the Rook is necessary because after 35 Ld5 Ke1 Black gets counterplay.

35 ... Lb1 +
36 Kg2 Ld6
37 Ka7 + Lf6
38 b6 Le8

Kholmov looks at 38 ... h5, but then White wins easily after 39 Lc3 Lb3 40 Ld5 + Le6 41 Lf4 + ! Lxf4 42 gxf4 g6 43 b7 and the White King penetrates via g5.

39 Ke8

An idea of Panno's is 39 Lc7, which is quite justified tactically, as we see in 39 ... Lx7 40 bx7 Ke1 41 Ld6 Lx7 42 Ld5 + or 39 ... Ld4 40 Lc5 Lxb6 41 Ld7 + Kg6 42 Lc8. But the move achieves little after 39 ... h5, for instance. The winning variation given in the notes to the previous move is no longer possible.

Various commentators have incorrectly called this the decisive mistake. 39 ... Ld6, given as better, loses much more quickly because the White Knight then plays a decisive role in the struggle: 40 Lc3 Lb3 41 Ld5 + Le5, 42 Lc7!. The main threat is 43 Le8 +, and 42 ... Lxb6 fails to 43 Ka5 + Lf6 44 Ld5 +.

40 Lc5 Ld6
41 Lb7 Le7
42 Lg8 Le5
43 f4

The sealed move, and clearly the strongest. Black must capture en passant because his Bishop is tied to the defense of g7 and b8. White's King will now have more room to maneuver.

43 ... exf3 +
44 Lxf3 +

After 48 Ld5 (analysis)

Keene, in his book on the match, writes that Korchnoi's team analyzed the adjourned position until the last possible moment and wasted a lot of time on the unnecessary piece sacrifice 45 Ld8 Lf7 46 Ld7 + Le8 47 e4 Lb5 48 exf5 Lxe5 49 Lxe7. They could not find a clear winning line after 49 ... h6! Korchnoi chose the text move at the last moment; since no concrete winning variation had been found, he decided to hold the position as it was.

Keene and Stean were on the right track, however. The introductory moves of the variation, 45 Ld8 Lf7 46 Ld7 + Le8 47 e4 Lb5 are completely logical. Perhaps they underestimated White's chances. After a brief look, Andersson and I came to the conclusion that White must be winning and that a forced winning variation, hidden or not, existed. After nearly an hour's search, our analysis continued with 48 Ld5!, the most obvious move and the strongest. Black has two replies:
A) 48 ... \(\text{\text{b}8}\) (to keep the White King out of the center for the moment) 49 exf5 \(\text{\text{a}7}\) (threatening to simplify down to a drawn Rook ending) 50 f6! (a characteristic tactical twist) 50 ... gxg6 51 \(\text{\text{d}4}\) with an easy win.

B) 48 ... fxg4 + 49 \(\text{\text{f}6}\) \(\text{\text{b}8}\) 50 \(\text{\text{d}4}\) (or 50 \(\text{\text{f}6}\)) 50 ... \(\text{\text{a}7}\) 51 \(\text{\text{d}4}\) \(\text{\text{d}6}\) (on 51 ... \(\text{\text{b}1}\) or \(\text{\text{b}2}\), 52 \(\text{\text{d}3}\) is immediately decisive) 52 \(\text{\text{d}4}\).

After 52 \(\text{\text{d}4}\) (analysis)

Another characteristic finesse. White threatens \(\text{\text{d}5}\) to exchange Rooks and to make it difficult for Black even to give up his Bishop for the b-pawn. The last stand now is 52 ... \(\text{\text{b}8}\) 53 \(\text{\text{d}5}\) \(\text{\text{e}6}\) 54 \(\text{\text{e}5}\) \(\text{\text{e}2}\), but White still wins after 55 \(\text{\text{a}6}\) \(\text{\text{a}7}\) 56 \(\text{\text{b}8}\) + \(\text{\text{b}8}\) 57 \(\text{\text{b}8}\) \(\text{\text{f}7}\) 58 \(\text{h}3\) ! \(\text{\text{h}2}\) 59 \(\text{h}4\). But definitely not 58 \(\text{h}4\) ! \(\text{\text{e}3}\) 59 \(\text{\text{b}3}\) \(\text{\text{d}3}\) 60 \(\text{\text{d}3}\) \(\text{\text{d}6}\) and the Black King penetrates, insuring a draw.

All in all, a not too difficult and fairly forced variation. Note that White keeps the pawn formation \(h2-\)

Keene gives this an exclamation mark and even describes it as a subtle trap. And it is, too. Objectively, the best move is 46 \(\text{\text{g}8}\), to answer 46 ... \(\text{\text{f}7}\) with 47 \(\text{\text{d}8}\) (see the notes to the previous move). The text move lengthens the diagonal of Black's Bishop and puts the win in doubt.

46 e4 is another interesting winning try. The difference from the winning variation in the notes to

White's 45th move is that with 46 ...

47 \(\text{\text{d}f4}\) + 48 \(\text{\text{d}6}\) \(\text{\text{d}6}\) 49 \(\text{\text{e}6}\) \(\text{\text{e}6}\) 50 \(\text{\text{f}6}\) \(\text{\text{b}8}\) Black reaches an ending that is a theoretical draw with the Bishop on the a1-h8 diagonal—but it's hard to see how to get it there. Best seems 50 ...

48 ... \(\text{\text{b}1}\) 51 \(\text{\text{b}3}\) \(\text{\text{g}7}\), and I think Black need not despair.

46 ... h5?

A baffling inaccuracy. Karpov wants to prevent the advance of White's g-pawn, but in so doing he makes possible a smooth winning method that was not in the position before. 46 ... \(\text{\text{b}6}\), given by Larsen, is equally unsatisfactory because of 47 \(\text{\text{d}3}\) \(\text{\text{d}6}\) 48 \(\text{\text{b}8}\) h5 49 \(\text{\text{f}4}\) \(\text{\text{f}6}\) 50 \(\text{\text{g}7}\) and sooner or later Black will have to permit a Rook ending that he will slowly but surely lose.

The move 46 ... \(\text{\text{b}5}\)!, however, puts some spades in the wheel and gives White serious problems; e.g.,

47 \(\text{\text{g}4}\) \(\text{\text{f}4}\) + 48 \(\text{\text{d}6}\) 49 \(\text{\text{e}6}\) \(\text{\text{e}6}\) (not 49 ... \(\text{\text{f}6}\) 50 \(\text{\text{g}5}\) and Black does not get a passed pawn) 50 \(\text{\text{f}3}\) (if 50 \(\text{\text{f}5}\) then not 50 ... \(\text{\text{e}5}\) 51 \(\text{\text{b}8}\) \(\text{\text{b}8}\) 52 \(\text{\text{b}8}\) \(\text{\text{e}7}\) 53 \(\text{\text{g}6}\) \(\text{\text{d}4}\) 54 \(\text{\text{g}8}\) and White wins, but 50 ... \(\text{\text{f}7}\) and if 51 \(\text{\text{e}7}\) White is suddenly mated with 51 ... \(\text{\text{f}6}\) 50 ... \(\text{\text{b}7}\) 51 \(\text{\text{e}4}\) (if 51 ... \(\text{\text{b}7}\) now 51 ... \(\text{\text{f}5}\) 51 ... \(\text{\text{e}7}\) 51 ... \(\text{\text{d}5}\) and

With White's pawn on \(h3\) and Black's on \(b5\) this leads to a fairly easy win. The main variation runs 48 ...

47 \(\text{\text{g}8}\) \(\text{\text{f}7}\) 49 \(\text{\text{d}7}\) + \(\text{\text{e}8}\) (otherwise he loses material: 49 ... \(\text{\text{f}6}\) 50 \(\text{\text{d}5}\) \(\text{\text{b}8}\) 51 \(\text{\text{d}8}\) \(\text{\text{c}7}\) 52 \(\text{\text{b}6}\) or 50 ... \(\text{\text{f}7}\) 51 \(\text{\text{d}6}\) \(\text{\text{b}7}\) 52 \(\text{\text{d}7}\) winning a piece) 50 \(\text{\text{d}5}\) \(\text{\text{b}8}\) 51 \(\text{\text{f}5}\) and
49 ...  hxg4+

There is no time for 49 ... fxg4 +
50 hxg4 h4 because of 51 Qd7 and Black doesn't even get a pawn for the piece.

50 hxg4  Qxe7
51 Qg8  fxg4+

If 51 ... Qf7 then again 52 Qc8!.
Kholmov then gives 52 ... fxg4 + 53 Qxg4 Rg6 54 e4 Qf4 55 Qh5 Qf1
56 Qd7 Qe7 57 e5 and wins.

52 Qxg4  Qf7
53 Qe8  Rd6
54 e4

Certainly not 54 Qf5?? because of 54 ... Qxc5 drawing. White must keep his e-pawn safe.

54 ...  Ag1 +
55 Qf5  g4
56 e5

Korchnoi has plotted a very elegant course to victory. 56 b8=Q is good enough, of course.

56 ...  Af1 +
57 Qd4  Ael +
58 Qd5  Ael +
59 Qd3!

This is the point.

59  ...  Axd3 +
60 Qe4  Black resigns.
Black can force an ending with 11 ... \( \text{Qd6} \), since after 12 \( \text{Qe2} \) \( \text{Qf6} \) he would simply be a pawn ahead. 

Barle-Miles, Bled/Portorož 1979, continued 12 \( \text{Qg5} \) \( \text{Qxd1} \) 13 \( \text{Qxd1} \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 14 \( \text{Qxe} \) \( \text{Qf6} \) 15 \( \text{Qxf6} \) \( \text{gxf6} \) 16 \( \text{Qh5} \) \( \text{Qa7} \) 17 \( \text{Qd6+} \) \( \text{Qxd6} \) 18 \( \text{Qxd6} \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 19 \( \text{Qe1} \) \( \text{Qa8} \) and Black consolidated his extra pawn. White's 12 \( \text{Qg5} \) hardly seems the right way to get compensation for the pawn. More purposeful and better is 12 \( \text{Qxd6} \) \( \text{Qxd6} \) 13 \( \text{Qxe4} \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 14 \( \text{Qe3} \) followed by 15 \( \text{Qc5} \), after which White has reasonable pressure for the pawn. Understandably, Polugaevsky chooses the text move, having correctly calculated that he will face little danger despite the presence of Queens on the board.

There is no other way to try to prove the correctness of the pawn sacrifice.

12 ... \( \text{Qc7} \)

After 17 ... \( \text{Qf6} \) (analysed)

Things look precarious for White.
because after 18 \text{d5} \text{x}c5 19 \text{xc}5 \text{d4} he loses material on the Queenside. However, he can just save himself with 18 \text{d}1 \text{e}8 19 \text{d}6! \text{x}h5 20 \text{x}h5 \text{e}ad8 21 \text{h}3 followed by 22 \text{h}d3—a narrow escape.

The question arises whether 14 \text{e}4, given an exclamation mark by Kasparov and Sakharov in their notes, is really that strong. More solid is 14 \text{g}5 0-0 15 \text{e}1. After 15 ... \text{e}8 16 \text{f}3 \text{e}ad8 17 \text{c}1 the position is about balanced.

14 \text{e}1

A forced piece sacrifice. 14 \text{d}4 is bad because 14 ... \text{x}e6 15 \text{x}h8 0-0-0 16 \text{g}4 \text{f}6 is in Black's favor. Bellin notes in International Chess that 15 \text{f}4 (instead of 15 \text{x}h8) is refuted by 15 ... \text{c}5 16 \text{x}e5 \text{d}8. Simpler, however, is 15 ... \text{f}6 (as in Shamkovich-Arnason, Lone Pine 1980), and White is behind too much material.

14 ...

\text{d}8

Polugaukevsky does not want to accept the sacrifice immediately, but 14 ... \text{x}h5 is not so very risky. Kasparov and Sakharov give two continuations and conclude that Black gets a clear advantage in both.

\text{A} 15 \text{g}5 \text{c}5. Thus far Kasparov and Sakharov. Black indeed has the better prospects, as we see in 16 \text{d}5 \text{x}d5 17 \text{x}d5 \text{e}8 18 \text{f}3 \text{f}8! and White's grip on the position weakens, allowing Black to bring his material advantage to bear.

\text{B} 15 \text{d}4 is undoubtedly the best. The point is that after the forced 15 ... \text{f}6 White retreats the Queen with 16 \text{d}1, keeping the Black King in the middle.

\text{After 16 \text{d}1 (analysis)}

A possible variation which illustrates the dangers facing Black is 16 \text{d}8 17 \text{x}h5 + \text{f}8 18 \text{e}4\text{c}5 19 \text{f}4 \text{d}6 20 \text{x}d6 + \text{x}d6 21 \text{d}1 \text{c}7 22 \text{x}d8 + \text{x}d8 23 \text{xe}5 + and White has two pawns for the piece and strong pressure. This variation shows how carefully Black must consider his options. The most practical move to begin with is 16 ... \text{f}8, since the King has to go there anyway. White replies 17 \text{x}h5 and now Black's best choice is 17 ... \text{b}4. The point is that White's attack after 18 \text{d}4 \text{e}5 just fails to break through; e.g., 19 \text{x}h6 + \text{x}h6 20 \text{x}h6 + \text{f}7 21 \text{d}1 \text{d}8 and the danger is passed, as 22 \text{d}6 + fails to 22 ... \text{d}6. The immediate 18 \text{h}6 + is therefore better. After

\text{Black has a much better defense against 16 \text{f}4, however: 16 ... \text{c}5! After 17 \text{e}3 \text{f}6 it will be difficult for White to prove the correctness of his piece sacrifice; e.g., 18 \text{h}3 \text{f}5 (preventing 19 \text{e}6 and opening a route to g6 for the Queen) 19 \text{d}1 \text{g}6 20 \text{d}5 \text{e}8 and White's attack is over.

This means that 16 \text{d}1 is indeed the best.

Young geniuses are usually incorrigibly optimistic. It is remarkable that Kasparov, after the game, should have had so little faith in his own conception, as shown by his notes.

15 \text{f}3 \text{c}5

\text{After 16 \text{f}4 (analysis)}

\text{A} 16 ... \text{d}8 17 \text{e}3 \text{c}8 18 \text{e}5! with great pressure.

\text{B} 16 ... \text{d}7 17 \text{c}5 \text{f}8 18 \text{x}h5 with a very unclear position which can also arise out of my variation \text{B} above. This version is fairly favorable for White. One must point out that the try 17 ... 0-0-0 in Bellin's variation meets with disastrous consequences after 18 \text{d}7 \text{d}6 19 \text{d}1 \text{c}7 20 \text{x}d6 \text{x}d6 21 \text{d}4 \text{e}2 22 \text{d}1 \text{xf}4 23 \text{d}6 + .

Still postponing the capture on h5, and rightly so. 15 ... \text{x}h5 would now be very strongly answered by 16 \text{f}4.

16 \text{f}4 \text{b}6

The simplification 16 ... \text{f}3 17 \text{e}7 \text{h}5 18 \text{x}d8 \text{d}8 is bad.
for Black because his game is completely disorganized after 19 f3; e.g., 19 ... g5 20 Nfd1 + Ke8 21 Ad6! and the time is ripe for White to reap the fruits of his labor.

17 Kg3 gxh5
18 Lc7

The primitive 18 Kg7 fails to 18 ... Kg6 19 Axe7 + Axe7 20 Kg8 + Kg7 21 Cd1 + Ld5! and Black wins.

The text move speaks for itself, yet there is an alternative: 18 Le5. The idea is to continue with 19 Lc7 only after 18 ... f6, which cuts off the Black Queen's route to g6. Black has a beautiful refutation in hand, however: 18 ... Af6 19 Lc7 Uc6 20 Lxd8 Uc8!!.

![Chess board diagram](image)

After 20 ... Uc8 (analysis)

Oddly enough, after this powerful move it seems that White has run out of ammunition. The Queen sacrifice 21 Lxe7 Uxg3 22 Lxf6 + Uf8 23 De4 Ug6 is insufficient, and after 21 Lxe7 + Lxd8 22 Ud8 + Uxe7

21 Lxd1 +

White can't even force a draw because the Black King escapes via f5.

Andersson's attempt to improve the White play with 19 Uf4 (instead of 19 Lc7) also fails, because of the laconic reply 19 ... Ud7.

18 ... Ug6
19 Lxd8 Uxg3
20 hxg3 Uxd8

Although most of the tension has been resolved by the forced simplification, the position has not become any less interesting. Black can be satisfied with his material advantage, but his problem is how to complete his development while also ensuring good coordination among his pieces.

21 Lxd1 +

The most obvious, although there is also an idea behind the alternative 21 ... Uc8. He must answer 22 Qd5 with 22 ... Lxd5, as in the game (22 ...

... Ld6 is refuted by 23 Qb6 + Cc7 24 Qe8), and after 23 Lxd5, Qd6 is possible. If now White thoughtlessly plays 24 Hf5, Black achieves the desired coordination with 24 ... Ud7. Much stronger, however, is 24 Le5 and after 24 ... Ld6 only now 25 Hf5. The important Black f-pawn falls, and Black does not get a dangerous enough initiative; e.g., 25 ...

Qg4 26 Axf7 c4 27 Hf5 with a winning position. Black must therefore play more modestly.

22 Qd5 + Lxd5
23 Lxd5 h6!

Polugaevsky finds a subtle way to complete his development: he brings his Rook into the game first. He thus unavoidably loses his foremost h-pawn.

24 Lxb5 Lh7
25 He5 Ud7
26 Lec3!

Kasparov maneuvers very efficiently. Black has hardly any weaknesses, and if he manages to bring his Rook into play undisturbed, White will be in serious trouble. However, White's Rook operating along the third rank harasses the most vulnerable points in the Black position, a6 and f7. Thus White can just maintain the balance.

26 ... Ug7

Black can play 26 ... c4 to keep the White Rook out of a3, but it has the disadvantage that White can force the c-pawn's exchange with 27 b3. The opening of the c-file would be very favorable for White.

27 Ld3 + Lc7
28 Lc3 Ug6
29 Lf3 Lf6!?

After the simpler 29 ... Ug7 White has nothing better than to attack the a-pawn again with 30 Ha3. Polugaevsky's winning attempt is not unjustified, but it's rather naive.

30 e3 Ud7
31 Ld3 + Lc7

And now we see how naive Black's winning attempt was. The combatants could shake hands after 32 Lf3.

32 Lc8

White, in turn, dares a winning attempt; this one, however, is much riskier than Black's was.
Polugaevsky, in time trouble, suddenly loses the thread completely. After 32 ... De7 it is not clear whether White's Rook has penetrated or fallen into a trap. White no longer has perpetual check or repetition of moves, so Black can slowly but surely direct his pieces to strong posts; e.g., 33 Ed3 Ag7 34 Ed5 a5 followed by 35 ... a4 or 35 ... b4. The White Rooks are actively placed, but Black's pieces are very elastic. White would have to fight for a draw.

After the text move Black loses an important supporting pillar of his position, the f-pawn. In return, he gets his Knight to e6, which is not even the best place for it.

33 Ed8

More convincing than 33 Ed8 Ed8 34 Ed3 Ed6 and Black has some fight left.

33 ... De6
34 Ed7+ Eb6

Takes the e5-square from the Knight. Black is helpless, all the more so because his minor pieces are not working together effectively.

37 ... c4
38 Eh2 Ec5
39 He2 b4

A last try. The idea is to create some counterplay with 40 ... b3.

40 He4

White exchanges his g-pawn for the Black c-pawn.

40 ... bxc3
41 bxc3 Ef2
42 Axe4 Axg3+
43 Eb3 Ef1

At first sight it seems that Black has obtained some counterplay, but the following strong move ends all illusions.

44 a4!

Based on the fact that the exchange of Rooks brings Black no relief: 44 ... Ed3 + 45 Eh2 Axe3 46 Axe3 Lxe3 47 Ah7 Da5 48 Ah6 Db4 49 g4 Dxa4 50 f5 a5 51 f6 and White's connected passed pawns are faster than Black's wing pawn.

44 ...

Dc5

But this only makes it worse.

45 Ab4

A blunder in a totally lost position. If 45 ... Ec6, 46 Af5 follows anyway, since after 46 ... Axe3 he calmly takes the Knight: 47 Axa5.

46 Af5 + Black resigns

A quite abrupt end to an exhilarating fight.
Game Twenty-two
Spassky-Timman

The ten-player supergrandmaster tournament in Montreal was modestly described on the cover of the French-language tournament book as the most important in the history of chess. With an average Elo rating of 2622 and a prize fund of $110,000, it sounded tremendous; yet for such an important tournament there were serious organizational faults. It was played on the island of St. Helena at the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, the site of Expo 1967. The tournament hall was a fairly large theater in a somewhat decaying building. The drafts were so strong that a few players sometimes put on their coats during the game. Often the boards and pieces were not set up until five minutes before the beginning of the round. Apparently, the tasks had not been very efficiently divided among the local organizers. Or did they find it beneath their dignity to perform such chores? The arbiter, Svetozar Gligoric, usually had to do most of the work, but once I saw Spassky carrying the boards into the hall while Hort was setting out the name cards.

But let's forget all that. The attractive prize fund in any case insured that the games would be extremely hard fought. Witness the following game.

Montreal 1979
Grüinfeld Defense
Exchange Variation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Boris</th>
<th>Jan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spassky</td>
<td>Timman</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 d4</td>
<td>d5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 c4</td>
<td>g6</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 d3</td>
<td>d6</td>
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<td>4 exd5</td>
<td>exd5</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 e4</td>
<td>dx3</td>
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<td>6 bx3</td>
<td>Lg7</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 Lc4</td>
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The Exchange Variation is still one of the most dangerous weapons against the Grüinfeld Defense, but nowadays 7 d3 is also played regularly; e.g., Karpov-Ljubojevic, Montreal 1979: 7 d3 c5 8 Lc2 0-0 9 0-0 Lg4 10 Le3 Wa5 11 WB3 cxd4 12 cxd4 Ac6 13 Ad1 Bb4 14 h3 

The usual move is 13 Bb1, as in Hort-Timman, Niksic 1978. After 13 Bb1 Wc8 14 dxc5, Black could have had a good game with 14 ... Ad8, as Hort suggested after the game. Needless to say, taking on c5 meant that White's strategy was a failure. There were no good alternatives, however, because Black threatened to get the better position with 14 ... e6 15 Bb3 Lb3.

Spassky therefore chooses a continuation that lets him keep his Bishop on d5 for a while. It is a remarkable idea because the move Lg5 in connection with the pawn exchange on d4 (and therefore...
played on move 14) is never mentioned as an alternative to the usual 14 \(\text{Ab}1\) (after the pawn exchange). Even now, after 13 ... \(\text{cx}d4\) 14 \(\text{cx}d4\) White's position remains very good and he can sacrifice his d-pawn with little to worry about. You can see that after 14 ... \(\text{Qb}5\) 15 \(\text{Qb}1\) \(\text{Qxe}2\) 16 \(\text{Qxe}2\) \(\text{Qxd}4\) + 17 \(\text{Qh}1\) Black has serious problems.

13 ... \(\text{Qb}5\)
14 \(\text{Qb}1\)
\(\text{Qa}6\)

Not so good is 14 ... \(\text{Qd}7\), because after 15 \(\text{Qxb}5\) \(\text{Qxb}5\) 16 \(\text{Qxe}7\) White clearly has the better chances. But now Black is ready for 15 ... \(\text{Qd}7\) followed by 16 ... \(\text{e}6\), after which White's position would collapse. Therefore, the following supersharp attacking attempt is born of necessity.

15 \(\text{f}4\)
\(\text{Qd}7\)

Black can insert 15 ... \(\text{h}6\) here, at a moment when White is forced to move his Bishop to \(h_4\). But my intuition warned me that it was too risky, and a closer look shows that this was the correct evaluation; after 15 ... \(\text{h}6\) 16 \(\text{Qh}4\) \(\text{Qd}7\) 17 f5 \(\text{gx}f5\) White launches an offensive full of bold sacrifices: 18 \(\text{Qg}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 19 \(\text{Qh}5!!\) and now:

After 19 \(\text{Qh}5\) (analysis)

A) 19 ... \(\text{Qxf}1\) 20 \(\text{Qf}6\)\! \(\text{ex}d5\) 21 \(\text{Qxg}7\) and White's attack quickly becomes decisive. The imperturbable manner in which White's attack is conducted in this variation is rather typical of this position; Black's pieces are active and well coordinated, but they are not well placed for defense.

B) 19 ... \(\text{f}6\) 20 \(\text{Qxf}5\) \(\text{ex}d5\) 21 \(\text{Qxf}6\) \(\text{Qxf}6\) 22 \(\text{Qxf}6\) \(\text{Qg}7\) 24 \(\text{e}5\). Although the attack has been temporarily halted and the material situation has not turned out too badly for Black, White has the better chances because Black's minor pieces cannot be brought onto the battlefield very easily.

16 \(\text{f}5\)
\(\text{gx}f5\)
17 \(\text{Qf}3\)

It took Spassky quite a while to find this unsophisticated continuation of the attack. Now 17 \(\text{Qg}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 18 \(\text{Qh}5\) is not sufficient because of 18 ... \(\text{f}6\). Although 19 \(\text{Qxf}5\) is still possible (as in Variation B above), under these circumstances it is just too fantastic: Black reacts coldbloodedly with 19 ... \(\text{ex}d5\) 20 \(\text{Qxf}6\) \(\text{Qxf}6\) 21 \(\text{Qxf}6\) \(\text{Qh}6\), and with the pawn on \(h7\) instead of \(h6\), Black's King position is adequately defended and he has time for 22 ... \(\text{dxe}4\) with a winning advantage.

Choosing between the text move and the insertion of 17 ... \(\text{h}6\) gave me the biggest headache. After the subtle reply 18 \(\text{Qc}1\) Black's position is critical. Taking on \(e4\) is now forced, and after 18 ... \(\text{fxe}4\) 19 \(\text{Qg}3\) I investigated:

After 19 \(\text{Qg}3\) (analysis)

A) 19 ... \(\text{Qxd}5\) 20 \(\text{Qh}6\) \(\text{Qh}5\) 21 \(\text{Qg}7\) \(\text{Qxe}2\) 22 \(\text{Qc}1\) with the devastating threat of 23 \(\text{Qh}6\).

B) 19 ... \(\text{Qh}7\) 20 \(\text{Qf}4\) \(\text{Qd}3\) 21 \(\text{Qh}5\) \(\text{Qxb}1\) 22 \(\text{Qg}7\) \(\text{Qxe}2\) 23 \(\text{Qf}6\) \(\text{Qxe}2\) 24 \(\text{Qh}4\) \(\text{e}3\) 25 \(\text{Qf}1\), with the unavoidable threat of 26 \(\text{Qxe}2\), and White has a mating attack.

18 \(\text{Qg}3\)
A necessary exchange, because the White Knight threatened to enter the thick of the fight by going to f4. Nevertheless, after 18 ... \( \text{Wh}8 \) 15 \( \text{Af}4 \) Black is not lost because he still has the finesse 19 ... \( \text{Ad}3 \). White's attack is not yet strong enough for him to sacrifice a Rook: 20 \( \text{Wh}5 \) \( \text{Ax}b1 \) and if now 21 \( \text{Ax}f7 \) \( \text{Ax}f7 \) 22 \( \text{Wh}7 \) \( \text{Af}8 \) or 21 \( \text{Ab}6 \) \( \text{Ax}h6 \) 22 \( \text{Wh}xh6 \) \( \text{Ag}8 \) 23 \( \text{Ax}f7 \) e3 or 21 \( \text{Le}6 \) \( \text{Ax}d4+1 \) 22 \( \text{cx}d4 \) \( \text{Ax}d4+ \) or 23 \( \text{Hh}1 \) \( \text{Ax}a2 \), White's attack is repulsed and Black's material advantage will be decisive.

But the Rook sacrifice is unnecessary. White's pieces occupy ideal attacking positions and he can take the time to play 20 \( \text{Ac}1 \). The most important strength of Black's defensive setup is the fact that his e- and f-pawns are not yet advanced, but aside from that it is surprising how few defensive possibilities Black has. The main variation is 20 \( \text{Ac}1 \) \( \text{Wf}5 \) 21 \( \text{Wh}h3 \) (threatening \( \text{Af}6 \) 21 ... \( \text{e}6 \) 22 \( \text{Ax}c5 \) White's Bishop-pair comes to life and after 22 ... \( \text{Ax}c3 \) he would have more than sufficient compensation for the pawn.

The only way to stay in the game. The endgame after 22 \( \text{Wxe}7 \) \( \text{Wxe}7 \) 23 \( \text{Ax}e7 \) \( \text{Af}e8 \) 24 \( \text{Ab}4 \) \( \text{Do}6 \) offers White little chance of survival.

22 ... \( \text{d}3 \)

The beginning of a forced simplification leading to a roughly equal endgame. The point of White's play becomes clear after 22 ... \( \text{Af}7 \) 23 \( \text{Ax}g7! \) \( \text{Ax}g7 \) 24 \( \text{Af}6 \) \( \text{dx}c3 \) 25 \( \text{Ax}e3 \). White does not hurry to regain the Exchange, while Black's task of defending himself becomes extremely difficult and unpleasant.

A good alternative is to sacrifice the Exchange by 22 ... \( \text{dx}c3 \):

23 \( \text{Ax}f8 \) \( \text{dx}c3 \)

Sacrificing the Exchange now is out of the question because White immediately sacrifices back: 23 ... \( \text{Ax}f8 \) 24 \( \text{Ax}g7 \) (24 ... \( \text{Ae}g7 \) 25 \( \text{Ae}5+ \) or 24 ... \( \text{Ax}g7 \) 25 \( \text{Ax}d3 \) with a positional advantage for White).

24 \( \text{Ax}g7+ \) \( \text{Ax}g7 \)

25 \( \text{Ax}g7 \) \( \text{Ax}g7 \)

After 22 ... \( \text{dx}c3 \) (analysis)

If White accepts, then after 23 \( \text{Ax}f8 \) \( \text{Ax}f8 \) Black has excellent chances: his King is safe, and White's Rook on g3 is therefore out of play. The advanced passed pawn on c3 is extremely unpleasant for White. The attempt to improve White's play with 23 \( \text{Ad}1 \) fails: 23 ... \( \text{Ae}4+ \) 24 \( \text{Af}1 \) \( \text{Ae}8! \) 25 \( \text{Ax}f8 \) \( \text{Ax}e2 \) 26 \( \text{Ax}e2 \) c2 27 \( \text{Ac}1 \) \( \text{Wc}7 \) and Black is winning. White's best bet is to sacrifice the Exchange with 23 \( \text{Ax}g7 \). After 23 ... \( \text{Wd}4+ \) 24 \( \text{Af}1 \) \( \text{Wg}7 \) 25 \( \text{Ae}4! \) \( \text{Ac}6 \) (25 ... c2 26 \( \text{Ac}1 \) \( \text{Wb}2 \) 27 \( \text{Ab}2 \) is senseless, and White wins) 26 \( \text{Ax}c6 \) \( \text{bx}c6 \) 27 \( \text{Ae}b3 ! \) Black has nothing better than 27 ... \( \text{Ae}8 \), which gives White the opportunity to simplify to a drawish endgame with \( \text{Ax}c5 \) \( \text{Ax}e2 \) 29 \( \text{Ax}e2 \) (29 ... \( \text{Ae}6? \) fails to 30 \( \text{Ae}b8+ \)), and with nothing but isolated pawns, Black has no realistic winning chances.

23 \( \text{Ax}f8 \) \( \text{dx}c3 \)
White becomes too active with 31 $\text{Qe}3 \text{Bxa}2$ 32 $\text{Ld}5$. The safest is to bring the Knight into play immediately with 29 ... $\text{Dd}4$.

Instead, Spassky begins to play carelessly.

26 $\text{Qf}2$ $\text{Bc}8$

Based on a neat trap: 27 $\text{Lx}b7$? fails to 27 ... $\text{Bb}8$ 28 $\text{Ld}6$ $\text{Bh}6$ + 1 29 $\text{Bxe}1$ $\text{Be}8$ winning a piece.

27 $\text{Qxe}2$ $\text{Bf}6$
28 $\text{Ld}1$

White gives up a pawn to activate his Rook. He is in no danger of losing because of this move, but neither is there any clear reason to play it. After 28 $\text{Be}1$ $\text{Qf}6$ Black has a somewhat better position due to his well-coordinated pieces, but it would not be enough for White to worry about.

28 ... $\text{Bxc}3$
29 $\text{Ld}7+$ $\text{Qg}6$
30 $\text{Bx}a7$ $\text{Bc}2+$
31 $\text{Qd}3$ $\text{Bxa}2$
32 $\text{Ld}7$

White's Rook is again in the most active position. The direct attack 32 $\text{Bh}6$ is bad because of 32 ... $\text{B}a3 +$ 33 $\text{Qxc}2$ $\text{Bd}4$ with excellent winning chances for Black.

32 ... $\text{b}5$
33 $\text{Ld}6 +$ $\text{Qg}5$

Forcing the capture on g3. Too ambitious is 37 $\text{h}4+$ $\text{Qf}5$ 38 $g4+$

34 $\text{Bb}6$?

This is not the best way to exploit the active position of White's pieces. With 34 $\text{Ld}5$ b4 35 $\text{Qe}4$ he can win the f-pawn and simultaneously bring his Bishop to the b1-h7 diagonal, neutralizing Black's passed b-pawn.

34 ... $\text{Ar}2$
35 $g3$

White's best chance under the circumstances. The mating threat 36 $b4$ forces Black to exchange a pair of pawns on the Kingside. Black, it is true, gets rid of one of his isolated pawns, but it is more important that the total number of pawns is reduced and that, except for the passed b-pawn, Black is left only with the insignificant h-pawn.

35 ... $\text{Bh}3+$
36 $\text{Qe}2$ $\text{f4}$
37 $\text{Qd}6$

It happens quite often that a player makes a mistake on his 40th move. The text move helps only White, and Black's winning chances melt like snow in the sun.

40 ... $\text{Df}5$ is no more effective, because of 41 $\text{Lc}2$. Black should have realized that $f5\ 5$, not $e3\ 5$, is the ideal place for the Knight and that 40

... $\text{Dc}3$ is the correct move. After 41 $\text{Dd}7\ \text{h}6$ Black maintains winning chances; e.g., 42 $\text{Bh}7\ \text{Dg}6$ 43 $\text{Lc}4 +$ $\text{Dg}5$ 44 $\text{Bf}3 +$ $\text{Df}6$ 45 $\text{Dg}6 +\ \text{Dg}5$ and a draw is nowhere in sight for White: Black consolidates a solid extra pawn.

The Exchange sacrifice 41 $\text{Dx}b5\ \text{Dxb}5$ 42 $\text{Dxc}3\ \text{Dc}2 43 \text{Dc}2 \text{Dc}5$ is also not a watertight method of drawing. White's best chance is 41 $\text{Dg}5$, as Spassky suggested later, in order to keep as many checking options as possible. Black still has practical chances after, say, 41 ... $b4$ 42 $\text{Cc}7\ \text{h}6$ 43 $\text{Cc}6 +\ \text{Dg}5$ 44 $\text{Dxh}6\ \text{Af}5$ followed by 45 ... $\text{Bb}2 +$, but it is doubtful whether they are very real.

This ending bears a striking resemblance to an ending from the first game of the Spassky-Petrosian World Championship Match in 1969. After Black's 51st move the following position arose:

Spassky-Petrosian 1969

40 ... $\text{Bb}2 +$?

After putting up a heroic resistance, Spassky went wrong with 52
Ah6+ and had to resign after 52 ... 
Ec5 53 Db6 Dd4 54 Ac6 + Dd4 55 
Ac4 + Ec5 56 Dxa4 Aa1. Later 
analysis showed that White could 
have drawn with 52 Ec3; e.g., 52 ... 
Dd4 53 Ah41 Ec3 54 Ab4 Add5 + 
55 Dxd5, etc.

Although I knew during the game 
that my practical chances were not as 
good as Petrosian's were, I still had 
to play the game and hope that it 
would turn out just as well for me.

41 Aa2 b4
42 Db3

The sealed move. Home analysis 
revealed that Black has no winning 
chances.

42 ... Dc5 +
42 ... Da3 43 Dd3 achieves even 
less.
43 Ec3

White's pieces are again working 
in harmony, and Black has no ob-
jective winning chances at all. But I 
had one more trap up my sleeve.

43 ... Ec2
44 Ab5 Dd4 +
45 Ed3

Exactly what I was hoping for! 
After 45 Db3 Black has no pos-
sibility of making progress.

45 ... Ed2 +

he said he feared that 48 Ah3 might 
give Black winning chances after 48 
... Ee4 + 49 Ec3, but in the 
postmortem we couldn't find any.
The main variation we examined was 
49 ... h5 50 Ea4 Dc5 51 Ah1 Ec5 
(threatening 52 ... Eg4) 52 Ah2 h3 
53 Ae3 54 Eh3 and Black has 
made no progress. It is remarkable 
how the seemingly weak position 
of the White Rook on h3 still manages 
to spoil whatever winning chances 
Black might have.

But a closer analysis shows that 
Spassky's intuition did not fail him. 
Black must not play the routine 49 ... 
h5 but must reserve that square for 
the Rook; so 49 ... Eg4 50 Ea4 
Eg5 51 Eh4 Dxb4 Eh5. In this position 
Black is again headed for a winning 
pawn endgame.

46 Ec4 Aa2

The outlines of the trap are 
becoming visible. No matter how 
White captures Black's b-pawn, the 
resulting pawn endgame is a win for 
Black, as can easily be seen. Un-
fortunately for Black, the Rook 
endgame is still a draw.

47 Eh5

The most convincing method. It 
would have been more difficult after 
47 Dd3 Eh2.

47 ... Eg6

Unfortunately, 47 ... Ee4 + 48 
Dd3 Eg6 is not playable because in 
the pawn endgame after 49 Ah7, 
etc., White's King is within reach of 
the b-pawn's queening square.

48 Ah4

Spassky needed a good half hour 
to convince himself that this move 
guaranteed the draw. After the game

Spassky-Timman

Ah5 draws immediately) 52 Ah7 
Ee6 53 Ah7 Eg4 54 Exb4 + Exg3 
55 Eb5! Eg4 and now it all depends 
on this position:

After 55 ... Eg4 (analysis)

During the postmortem analysis 
Spassky suggested 56 Ed2 h5 57 
Ah1, but now after 57 ... Eh3 Black 
cannot exchange Rooks with 58 
Ee1. The correct method is 56 
Ed4+, and now after 56 ... Ed3 
White can let his King be cut off 
because 57 Ah4 Ed6 + 58 Ea3 Eg3 
59 Ah1 leads to a theoretical draw.

49 Eg4 + Ed5
50 Ah4

With the Black Rook on e3 this 
would not have been possible (50 ... 
Ee4 +); with the Rook on g2 it leads 
directly to a draw. Only after 50 Eg7 
h5 followed by 51 ... h4 could Black 
have won.

50 ... b3
51 Axh7 b2
52 Ah7 Drawn.
Game Twenty-three
Timman-Tseshkovsky

The Vidmar Memorial Tournament is held every two years. For some reason or other, the fifth of the series, in 1979, attracted me immediately. Not that I have ever played through a game of Vidmar's—at least, never a game he won; but probably I have seen a number of his losses printed among the collected games of Alekhine, Capablanca, and Euwe. Frankly, this splendid tournament is a rather exaggerated mark of honor for a not very brilliant chess player.

The first six rounds were played in Bled, Yugoslavia, beside a lake of serene, almost sterile beauty. The last nine were played in Portoroz, a rather mundane bathing resort with a casino which accepts only Italian lire. Venice is two hours away in a fast boat. Yet it was not even these attractive locations that made the tournament so tempting from the first moment. It was something else: a tournament that seemed cut out for me to win. Though not as strong as Montreal, it was strong enough to make a first place honorable. Larsen, at the opening ceremony, seemed to be thinking the same thing. He had just arrived by train, and the refreshing white wine being passed around was obviously doing him some good—and me too, for that matter. “Who is going to win the tournament?” one of the organizers asked us. Politely, I made a noncommittal reply, whereupon Larsen, bursting with self-confidence, swallowed a good mouthful of wine and declared, “I am going to win the tournament!” I must admit that I was at first taken aback by this display of naked optimism, and I often recalled it during the tournament.

The struggle for first place did indeed take place between Larsen and me, after Rubli dropped out of the running by losing spectacularly to Marjanovic in the eleventh round. Larsen was still half a point ahead of me after that round, but the situation was reversed when he lost to Chi and I beat Tseshkovsky.

That victory meant a great deal to me. Not only was I clearly at the top of the cross-table for the first time in the tournament, but also it had been a long time since I last beat a Russian grandmaster. A psychological factor entered into the game, too: although Tseshkovsky did most of the playing, so to speak, I went into the complications with a healthy measure of optimism and confidence.

Bled/Portoroz 1979
English Opening

Jan Vitaly
Timman Tseshkovsky
1 e4 d5
2 c4 g6
3 d3 d5
4 exd5 Qxd5
5 Be4+ Qd6

Tseshkovsky is an enormous deep-sea diver, as Langeweg once expressed it. He can sometimes sink into thought for an hour or more, even in the opening. He began very early in this game; he thought about the text move for more than forty-five minutes. It is undoubtedly a better attempt to get counterplay than the usual 5...Qd7, but, as we will see, he was not completely familiar with all the subtleties of the position.

6 Be5 Qd4
7 a3 Re4

The only reasonable move. He had already written 7...Qc2+ on his scoresheet, but White would emerge with a great advantage after 8 Bxc2 Bxe5 9 d4! Note the importance of White's seventh move: now 9...Qxd4 would fall to 10 Bb5 because Black has no check on b4.

8 axb4

The obvious 8 Bxf7 would be to Black's advantage after 8...Qd3+ 9 exd3 Bxf7. But White has the possibility 8 d4, with the tactical justification 8...Qxd4 9 Qf3 with win of material. Things are less clear, however, after 8...Qxe5 9 dxe5 Qd5, when Black's centralized position compensates for the lack of his King Bishop. In Informant 27, Tseshkovsky gives 10 Qd2 Bb6 11 Qf4 Qd4 12 0-0-0 with unclear play. Black can try 11...Qe6, but after 12 0-0-0 Qd4 the situation is still difficult to judge (13 Bb5 Qc5+).

8...Qxe5
9 b5 Qd8
10 g3

The fianchetto of the Bishop looks good, but it does not achieve much for White. To be considered is 10 e3 followed by 11 d4 in order to build up a solid center immediately.

Timman-Sax, Rio de Janeiro 1979, showed that this plan is indeed correct—it is good enough, in fact, to refute the Black setup: 10 e3 Qg7 11 d4 0-0 12 Qe2 c6 13 0-0 exb5 14...
Again a move that strikes at the heart of the position. He forces his opponent to capture on c6.

14 bxc6 bxc6
15 Qxc6

Tseshkovsky was already running into time trouble. Although I saw that the text move was risky, it seemed to be the only way to keep the game complicated. Other moves would allow Black to complete his development soundly and with easy equality.

15 ... bxc6
16 Wh4

Black's Bishop pair would provide excellent compensation for the pawn after 16 Wxc6 Ab8. After the text move White threatens to get the advantage with 18 Ah6. Black's reaction is adequate, however.

16 ... Ab8
17 Qa4

Again threatening 18 Ah6, but Black has a strong reply which takes all the sting out of the White strategy. Perhaps the pawn sacrifice 17 Ah6 is White's best chance. After 17 ... Axb6 18 Wh6 Ab2 he has sufficient compensation for the pawn. White's best would then be to force the exchange of Black's Rook with 19 Af1.

17 ... h5!
black played this immediately—which is understandable, since he had little time left on his clock. But 24 ... gs1 is safer, and only after 25 wxe5 to take the Rook with 25 ... wxe2. Then the white Queen would be out of play and threatened with capture via 26 ... wxe7 followed by 27 ... f6 and 28 ... wh8. It would make sense for white, therefore, to force a perpetual check with 26 a5 wxe1 + 27 wxe1 wxe2 + 28 wh3 f6 29 whg+ wh8 30 whh6+ draw. Tsekhovsky may have seen 24 ... g5 without quite realizing that this was the time to think of a draw. Naturally one does not make such a long combination merely to force a draw. But after the text move white gets the advantage.

25 wxe7

The white Queen is dominantly placed here.

25 ... hxg4

The smoke has cleared and black is a pawn ahead. White will win it back by force, however, and a close study of the position shows that white’s King is safer than black’s. White’s e-pawn in particular provides strong protection, and besides, the white pawn structure is more compact than black’s.

26 ... wa2

The continuation shows that 26 ... wa5 followed by 27 ... wd8 would have saved a tempo. The most sensible move, however, is 26 ... f5. After 27 a4 wa2 black stands better. Correct is 27 w6e + wg7 28 a4, which offers good winning chances if black posts his Queen passively with 28 ... wg5, but only a draw if he decides on 28 ... f6!. After 29 a6t + a6t white has no better than to take on f6, which allows black a perpetual check.

27 a6xg4 wd5 +

See the note to black’s 26th move. Black decides against 28 ... a6b8 because white would be the only player with attacking chances after 29 wd7.

29 wxd8 a6d8 30 wd7

The ending is not an easy one for black; he has two isolated pawns and the white pieces are slightly more active.

30 ... wd8

The Hungarian magazine Magyar Sakkelt gives 30 ... a5 with the variation 31 ed3 ed8 32 ad4 ef8 33 ed4 ef7 34 ef5 wd7 35 wb6 a6b8 + 36 ef5 eh5 37 wb2 with a draw. But it isn’t that simple. Much stronger is 31 ad4, when black must give up his c-pawn (31 ... ad8 32 ac5). After 31 ... ad8 32 ec6 a4 33 ec2 a3 34 ac2 white is not yet winning, but he has very real chances. The white King can walk unhindered to the center and later to the Queenside. White’s only weakness is the h-pawn, but in an emergency it can be covered by advancing the e-pawn.

31 ed3 ef7
32 ef4 +

I played this quickly, uncertain whether or not the pawn ending after 32 ... ef6 33 ef4 + ef7 34 ed8 ed8 was a win. Black, in time trouble, understandably did not want to chance it.

Closer analysis, however, showed that it is a draw. The main variation runs: 35 ed4 ef7 (or 35 ... ef7, but not 35 ... ef7 because of 36 hc4 f5 37 ef4 and white gets two passed pawns. After either 35 ... ef7 or 35 ... ef7, then 36 hc4 f5 37 ef4 would be satisfactorily answered by 37 ... ed5. 36 ef5 ef5 37 ed6 38 ef6 ed5 ef6 39 ed4 ef4 (black would have winning chances after 39 ec5) 39 ... ef4 40 ef5 ef5 41 ef6 ec2 42 ef6 ed3 43 ef5 ef5 44 ef5.
Now Black loses after the automatic 44 ...  $\text{d}3$? 45 $\text{f}6$ $\text{g}2$ 46 $\text{xf}7$ $\text{xh}2$ 47 $\text{g}4$, but the game is drawn after 44 ... $\text{f}5$ 45 $\text{f}6$ $\text{f}4$ 46 $\text{gx}4$ $\text{xf}4$ and the White h-pawn is rendered harmless.

32 ...  $\text{f}6$
33  $\text{xf}2$

Black's King is now cut off from the Queenside and White's can approach the weak pawns unhindered. 33 $\text{xa}4$ is less accurate because of 33 ... $\text{e}8 + 34 \text{xd}2 \text{xa}8$ 35 $\text{xc}3 \text{ce}5$ 36 $\text{xc}4 \text{dd}6$ and the Black King is in time to prevent his colleague from penetrating.

33 ...  $\text{b}8$
34 $\text{ce}3$  $\text{b}5$
35 $\text{ce}4$

$\text{xa}6 \text{c}4$ offers White nothing positive. Perhaps I would have tried it another way; e.g., 35 $\text{h}4$ followed by 36 $\text{g}4$. Black would still have faced many problems and the draw would not yet have been in sight.

35 ...  $\text{c}5$

Now he loses a pawn by force.

36 $\text{xa}4$

The point is that 36 ... $\text{a}5$ is quietly answered by 37 $\text{dd}2$ followed by 38 $\text{c}4$.

36 ...  $\text{b}6$
37 $\text{a}5$  $\text{c}6$
38 $\text{c}4$  $\text{b}6$
39 $\text{a}2$

White has time to protect the second rank before consuming a pawn.

39 ...  $\text{c}6$
40 $\text{c}5$  $\text{c}6$
41 $\text{xa}6+$

Black has made the time control, but the ending is lost.

41 ...  $\text{g}5$
42 $\text{xa}4$

The most accurate. 42 $\text{c}6$ $\text{b}8$ 43 $\text{h}4$ + $\text{g}4$ 44 $\text{xc}5$ $\text{xd}3$ 45 $\text{f}6$ probably wins too, but there is no reason to give the opponent a passed pawn. Black's c-pawn remains weak.

42 ...  $\text{f}5$
43 $\text{f}4$

The sealed move.

43 ...  $\text{f}6$
44 $\text{b}4$  $\text{e}8$

DURING THE TWO-HOUR ADJOURNMENT, I looked at the energetic 45 $\text{c}4$ but could find no convincing win. The main variation is as follows: 45 ... $\text{d}8 + 46 \text{xc}4 \text{e}5$ (not 46 ... $\text{d}4 + 47 \text{ac}3 \text{e}5$ 48 $\text{ex}5$ with simplification to a won ending) 47 $\text{ex}5$ (if 47 $\text{h}5$ now 47 ... $\text{d}4 +$ would follow because the pawn ending after 48 $\text{fe}3 \text{fx}4$ 49 $\text{xe}4 +$ is a draw) 47 ... $\text{gx}5$ 48 $\text{h}5$ (to post the Rook behind the passed pawn immediately; 48 $\text{f}3 \text{e}8$ 49 $\text{e}3 +$ $\text{d}6$ is not a clear win) 48 $\text{e}8$ 49 $\text{h}6$ $\text{xa}3$ 50 $\text{h}4$ $\text{g}8$ 51 $\text{h}7$ $\text{h}8$ 52 $\text{e}5$ $\text{f}4$ 53 $\text{d}4 +$ $\text{g}5$ 54 $\text{d}5$ $\text{f}3$ and now, I thought at first, play would continue 55 $\text{d}6$ $\text{f}2$ 56 $\text{h}1$ $\text{g}4$ 57 $\text{d}7$ $\text{ax}7$ 58 $\text{ax}7$ (or 58 $\text{d}8$ $\text{ax}1$ draw) 58 ... $\text{f}1$ 59 $\text{g}7 +$ $\text{h}5$ 60 $\text{d}8$ $\text{c}1 +$ 61 $\text{d}6$ $\text{h}6 +$ with a draw.

A fantastic variation, but very shaky. To begin at the end, 57 $\text{f}1$ (instead of 57 $\text{d}7$) is a win—White waits for 57 ... $\text{g}3$ before continuing with 58 $\text{d}7$. White can calmly give up the Rook because the advanced passed pawns and the out-of-play Black King will decide the issue. Black, in turn, can avoid all harm with 56 ... $\text{e}6$ (instead of 56 ... $\text{g}4$), and at best White will keep his now harmless d-pawn. All this means that White must be more circumspect about advancing his d-pawn. Instead of 55 $\text{d}6$, more accurate is 55 $\text{a}1$.

Now Black has only one answer, 55 ... $\text{e}5$, and it is just sufficient to draw. For instance, 56 $\text{d}6$ $\text{e}8 +$ and now:

A) 57 $\text{f}5$ $\text{xd}6$ 58 $\text{h}8$ $\text{ax}8$ 59 $\text{ax}8$ $\text{d}5$! and the White King is held off, which guarantees the draw: 60 $\text{a}8$ $\text{e}4$ 61 $\text{c}4$ $\text{c}3$ 62 $\text{c}8 +$ $\text{d}2$, etc.
B) 57...\texttt{B}e4 is the most venomous. Black has two ways to go wrong:

- \texttt{B1) 57...\texttt{B}d6 58 \texttt{B}h6+ \texttt{A}xh8 59 \texttt{B}xh8 \texttt{G}d5 60 \texttt{G}c3 and wins.}
- \texttt{B2) 57...f2 58 d7 \texttt{B}a8 59 \texttt{G}c5 and wins after either 59...\texttt{B}e6 60 \texttt{G}c6 or 59...\texttt{B}xh7 60 d8+\texttt{B}xh1 61 \texttt{G}d5+.}

\texttt{B3) 57...\texttt{B}b8+ is the saving check. After 58 \texttt{G}f3, f2 is good: 59 d7 \texttt{B}e6 60 h6+ \texttt{B}xh6 61 \texttt{B}xh6 f1\texttt{B} 62 \texttt{B}xh8+ \texttt{B}c1+ and White cannot evade Black's checks; e.g., 63 \texttt{B}h4 \texttt{B}b2+ 64 \texttt{B}g5 \texttt{B}c3+ 65 \texttt{B}b6 \texttt{B}xb6+ 66 \texttt{B}a6 \texttt{B}a1+ 67 \texttt{B}b7 \texttt{B}g7+ 68 \texttt{B}c8 \texttt{B}c3+, etc.}

A more difficult complex of variations, all in all, than I had suspected at first. But my intuition had not let me down: White should not play 45 e4. I had only one short hour of adjournment time left to find something better. Finally I found the text move, which looks passive at first but is based on a solid foundation: White keeps intact the pawn formation d3-e2 which served him so well in the middlegame and prepares to play the Rook behind the h-pawn. Black has no satisfactory way to stop White from freeing the h-pawn with 46 g4.

45...\texttt{B}e8

45...\texttt{B}e5+ is pointless because of 46 \texttt{G}d6. During the adjournment I had particularly kept in mind that Black might give up his weak c-pawn to cut off the White King and get active play for his King and Rook.

But after 45...\texttt{B}d8+ 46 \texttt{B}xc5 \texttt{B}e5 47 \texttt{B}f4! \texttt{B}c8+ 48 \texttt{B}h4 \texttt{B}e2 49 e4 \texttt{B}g2 50 d4+ \texttt{B}e6 51 \texttt{B}xf5+ \texttt{G}xf5 52 \texttt{B}f3 the win is not difficult. Black therefore tries to refine the idea by first waiting for g3-g4 so that the square f4 will no longer be accessible to White's Rook.

46 g4 \texttt{B}d8+
47 \texttt{B}xc5 \texttt{B}e5
48 \texttt{G}xf5 \texttt{G}xf5

The win is very simple now; White already has a passed pawn.

49 h5 \texttt{B}c8+
50 \texttt{B}b4 \texttt{B}b8
51 \texttt{B}b2 \texttt{B}b6

If 51...\texttt{G}f4 then 52 h6 is the simplest.

52 e3

Hindering the penetration of Black's King.

52...\texttt{G}f4
53 \texttt{B}xf4+

54 d4 \texttt{G}g3
55 \texttt{B}e2

Black should have resigned here. Unashamed, he plays on for some time.

55...\texttt{B}xh5
56 \texttt{B}e8 \texttt{G}f4
57 \texttt{B}c4 \texttt{B}a1
58 d5 \texttt{G}f5
59 d6 \texttt{G}f1
60 \texttt{B}xf5 \texttt{B}f6
61 \texttt{B}c6 \texttt{B}e1+
62 \texttt{B}d7 \texttt{B}a1
63 \texttt{B}f8+ \texttt{B}g7
64 \texttt{B}f2 Black resigns.

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After the double-round-robin ten-player tournament in Montreal and just before the Spartakiade, Karpov was prepared to play in a small tournament of four players at Waddinxveen, held in honor of Euwe. Considering the generally peace-loving disposition at that time of the three other competitors, Hort, Kavalek, and Sosonko, it seemed he would not have too much competition for first place. This was confirmed by the final standings, although in some games the World Champion was teetering on the edge of a precipice.

When the last round started, Karpov had a lead of one and a half points over Hort, his opponent in that round. A draw thus seemed a perfectly reasonable expectation. Karpov had White, however, and with the White pieces he is never very generous with short draws. Besides, the last three games they had played against each other were drawn, which added a certain challenge.

This was Karpov’s best game of the tournament. With subtle opening play he gained a great advantage, and then he deliberately played for a tactical twist which, it is true, reduced his advantage, but in a manner whereby he obtained his favorite type of position: a tight, safe pawn formation around his King, his opponent saddled with two somewhat weak pawns.

When Hort exchanged Queens and adopted a passive stance, he appeared to be already lost. A fabulous technique was required to show this, however, and Karpov once again proved that he has it. He thus ended up winning the tournament two points ahead of Kavalek, who won his last game. The contrast could have been even more striking: he would have been two and a half points ahead if Sosonko had accepted Kavalek’s offer of a draw in the last round.

Karpov postponed d2-d4 to avoid this.

A novelty on the sixth move! 6 ... Dc6 7 e4 Df5, as in Smekal-Larsen, Biel 1976, is also interesting. Black had a more aggressive plan after 8 d4 Dx4 9 Dxd4 Dxd4 10 Dxd4. The most usual, however, is 6 ... Dc7, aiming for the “hedgehog” formation mentioned earlier. In a game against Gheorghiu, Moscow 1977, Karpov showed that he knows how to handle this trick: 7 d4 Dxd4 8 Dxd4 Df6 9 Dc4 Dc5 10 Dd4 Df5 11 Dc3 Dc7 12 Dd4 Dc5 13 Dd3 Dd7 14 Dc4 Dd6 15 Dd4 Dd8 16 Dd5 Dc7 17 Dd3 Dd5 18 Dd3 Dc8 19 Dd4 Dd4 20 Dd4 Dd4 21 Dd4 Dd4 22 Dd4 Dd4 23 Dd4 Dd4 24 Dd4 Dd4 25 Dd4 Dd4 26 Dd4 and now:

Karpov-Gheorghiu 1976

After 26 Dd4

Black lost his patience and decided on 26 ... f5? He was then rolled up on the Kingside with remarkable
speed: 27 exf5 gxf5 28 h3 h5 29 a1 a7 30 g4! hxg4 31 hxg4 fxg4 32 hxg4 d8f8 33 d8d5 a5 34 g6 e7 35 f5! a6f6 36 a6x6 a6x6 37 a6e1! a8f8 38 c8c5 bxc5 39 fxe6 fxe6 40 d8f5+ and Black resigned. (The exclamation marks attached to White’s moves are by Karpov himself.)

Hort probably had no wish to undergo such treatment. In general, he prefers to leave the well-worn theoretical paths as soon as possible.

7 cxd5 dxd5
8 d4 dxc3

The alternative is 8 ... e7. After 9 dxd5 Black must recapture with the Bishop because 9 ... dxd5 10 e4 d7 11 d5 cxd5 12 e5 e6 13 exd5 e4 14 e1 d4 15 d4 cxd4 cxd4 16 d6 leads to great advantage for White. The above variation was given by Van Wijgerden. After 9 ... dxd5 10 cxc5 dxc3 it seems it will not be easy for White to convert his small lead in development into a lasting advantage. Van Wijgerden gives 11 b4, but Black has nothing to fear on 11 ... e7 12 b3 0-0. But 11 d5 is strong. Black must now play 11 ... e5 12 e5 e5 13 e5 e5 to avoid getting a weak isolated pawn on d5. After 13 e7 14 d1 White has a small but tangible advantage.

The text move leads to a position that has been seen often in recent tournament practice but without the fianchetto of Black’s Queen Bishop.

One cannot tell from this game whether or not that is an advantage because Hort goes wrong fairly quickly.

9 bxc3 d7

A normal developing move, although preparing to castle on the Kingside would seem more obvious. Hort seems to have an unfortunate plan in mind.

10 d1 cxd4
11 cxd4 b4

This was his idea, but White will not simply allow the exchange of Bishops. The more modest 11 ... e7 is correct.

12 e5

A venomous zwischenschlag which Hort had probably underestimated.

Van Wijgerden called this the best move of the game, but that was only because he underestimated White’s advantage. Even stronger is 15 e3!, to begin the siege of the weak e-pawn immediately. After the forced reply

15 ... e7, White continues with 16 e1. Castling is now forced, to prevent White’s immediate penetration via the c-file. After 16 0-0 17 a3 a5 18 e1 Black’s position is critical, and as soon as White’s Knight gets to d3 Black will have to weaken himself further with g7-g5. The White Bishop can later return quietly to g2. Black will not be able to get any decent counterplay because his Knight stands badly on d7.

Karpov seems to have deliberately chosen the text move over 15 e3. He has seen a tactical twist, known from the Queen’s Indian Defense, by which he will maintain at least a slight advantage. So he avoids the tension-filled position and instead heads straight for the more technical one.

15 ... e7

Hort is right to postpone castling. After 15 ... 0-0 16 e5 f4 17 a7 he would have a splintered pawn structure and an unhappy Knight against a strong Bishop.

16 e1 0-0

Necessary now, since he must be ready to counter the penetration by White’s heavy pieces along the c-file.

Van Wijgerden clearly sees the best move of the game, but that was only because he underestimated White’s advantage. Even stronger is 15 e3!, to begin the siege of the weak e-pawn immediately. After the forced reply
21 \textit{Ex}c5 \textit{bxc5}

22 \textit{Ec}11

Much stronger than the obvious 22 \textit{Ec}x5. White prevents the centralization of the Black Queen.

22 \ldots \textit{Ed}5

Another possibility is 22 \ldots \textit{Ef}5 to aim for a Rook ending. After 23 \textit{Ef}x6+ \textit{Ff}7 White can’t avoid the endgame, since his f-pawn is hanging. But the Rook ending after 24 \textit{Ec}8+ \textit{Fx}f8 25 \textit{Fxf}8+ \textit{Fxf}8 26 \textit{Ec}4 \textit{Ee}5 27 \textit{Ee}4 is no forced draw; e.g.:

A) 27 \ldots \textit{g}4 28 \textit{h}3 \textit{h}5 29 \textit{hx}g4 \textit{hx}g4 30 \textit{Ef}1 \textit{Ff}7 31 \textit{Fg}2 \textit{Ff}6 32 \textit{Ec}3 \textit{Ec}5 33 \textit{Ea}4 \textit{Ec}7 34 \textit{Ea}5 \textit{Ee}7 35 \textit{Ec}3 and Black gradually runs out of good moves.

B) 27 \ldots \textit{Ec}7 28 \textit{f}4 \textit{ex}f4 29 \textit{gx}f4 \textit{Hh}5 30 \textit{Fg}2 (much stronger than Bthm’s 30 \textit{Ec}5, which Black answers with 30 \ldots \textit{Hh}4 31 \textit{Fg}2 \textit{g}5) 30 \ldots \textit{Ed}6 31 \textit{Ea}4 \textit{Ec}6 32 \textit{Exa}7 and now Van Wijgerden’s continuation 32 \ldots \textit{Ec}4 33 \textit{Exg}7 \textit{c}5 34 \textit{Ff}3 looks hopeless for Black; e.g., 34 \ldots \textit{c}2 35 \textit{Fg}1 \textit{Ec}5 36 \textit{Ec}1 \textit{Exh}2 37 \textit{a}4 and the White passed pawns decide. Much tougher, however, is 32 \ldots \textit{g}6 to prevent White from getting two connected passed pawns. Black would then have reasonable drawing chances.

All in all, Hort had little reason to go in for this. The text move is more solid because White’s remaining pawns will all be on the Kingside.

23 \textit{Ex}c5 \textit{Exa}2

24 \textit{Exg}5

This is the position the World Champion was aiming for. His advantage is not great, but it is quite enduring.

24 \ldots \textit{Eb}1+?

Preparing to exchange Queens. However, the Rook ending looks untenable. 24 \textit{Ef}5 is correct. The point is that after the exchange of Rooks a draw would be unavoidable: 25 \textit{Exf}5 \textit{Eb}1+ 26 \textit{Fg}2 \textit{Exf}5 27 \textit{Exa}7 \textit{Ec}4+ and recovers the pawn on e2. This means that 25 \textit{Ag}4 would be the only winning try, but Black would not stand much worse after 25 \ldots \textit{a}5. His passed pawn would insure counterplay.

25 \textit{Fg}2 \textit{Fb}6

26 \textit{Ee}5

White has absolutely no objection to a Rook endgame.

The most critical position of the game. Hort now defends his weak a-pawn with his Rook on the second rank, but, as the game shows, this method fails to build a tight defensive line. Most commentators recommend 27 \ldots \textit{Ff}7 28 \textit{Fg}3 \textit{h}5 as the best defense. Böhm writes that the resulting four-against-three endgame does not look lost, and Van Wijgerden claims that sooner or later White must play \textit{g}3-\textit{g}4 with a probable draw.

I will subject this ending to a closer examination, continuing after 29 \textit{Exa}7+ \textit{Ff}6 30 \textit{Ef}5. Black has two plausible replies.

A) 30 \ldots \textit{g}6 is the soundest: Black tries firmly to hold his ground.

I will now show the several methods White has at his disposal so that we can form a good idea of this ending in its totality. I will label the methods \textit{X}, \textit{Y}, and \textit{Z}. 

\textit{X}: ...
Method X
White aims for the pawn structure e3-f4-g4, as given by Van Wijgerden and later achieved in the game. He easily reaches the following position:

Analysis Position

How does White make progress? He gains nothing tangible with 1 g5+  newPos.position 2 newPos.position 3 newPos.position 4 newPos.position 5 newPos.position 6 7 ... e5 8 fxe5 9g4, White makes no progress.

This method therefore seems to have little chance of success. White's King fails to penetrate.

Method Y
White aims for this position:

After 33 9h3 (analysis)

The threat is now 34 e5 + 9f7 35 9a7 + 9f8 36 9h4, or 34 ... 9f5 35 9a8 followed by 36 9a8 + and 37 9f6. Black has two ways of meeting this:

1) 33 ... e5. A very interesting try indeed. White can capture the pawn in two ways or can give check to cut off the Black King. After 34 9a6 + exactly the same position would occur as in the game Timman-Meulders, Amsterdam 1978. Meulders retreated his King to the most natural and correct square, f7. If instead 34 ... 9g7 (I will use the move numbering of the present game for the sake of convenience; Timman-Meulders was actually at move 43 here), Black loses in a studylike manner: 35 9f1 gx5 36 exf5 9f2 37 9g6 + 9h7 (or 37 ... 9f7 38 9g5 e4 39 9hx5 e3 40 9h4 and wins).

After 37 ... 9g7 (analysis)

38 9h4!! 9hx2 + (or 38 ... 9x5 39 9g5 9f2 40 9h3 and wins) 39 9g5 9a3 40 9g6 9e4 41 9g7 + 9h8 (or 41 ... 9h6 42 9f7 with the intention 43 9g8 and 44 9g6 mate) 42 9g4 9a7 and mate soon after 42 ... 9xg4 43 9g6. More resistance is offered by 42 ... 9a3, but White wins with 43 9a7—but not 43 9g6? 9g3! with a draw.

The game continuation was instructive: 34 ... 9f7 (instead of 34 ... 9g7) 35 9xe5 9a3 36 9a7 + 9f8 37 9h4 9x4 + 38 9g5 9e5 + 39 9xg6 9a2 40 9f7 + 9a1 41 9h3 42 9f3 9h4 43 9f2 44 9g4 9a7 45 9x4 9x5 9h6 9g7 9e6 47 9g6 9e5 48 9f1 9g3 49 9h7 and Black resigned. He could have drawn with 35 ... g3! e.g., 36 9h6 g4 + 37 9h4 9xh2 + 38 9g5 9xg2 39 9e6 + 9f7 40 9f4 9f2 + 41 9e5 9a2 42 9h7 + 9e8 and White can make no progress.

This implies that 34 9xe5 is not sufficient to win and that White must try 34 9xe5, which is a very normal move anyway (against Meulders I did
not have this possibility because my Rook was on a4 instead of a5). Black now replies 34 ... \( \text{Be2} \) and it is problematical how White can cash in his two healthy extra pawns because his King and Rook are both tied down. Pointless is 35 g4 hxg4 + 36 \( \text{Fg3} \) \( \text{Fg7} \) (the most accurate, although 36 ... \( \text{Ff7} \) is adequate too) and White has no winning chances at all. Therefore he must try 35 \( \text{Ee8} \) \( \text{Ff7} \) 36 \( \text{Ea8} \) \( \text{Ee4} \) 37 \( \text{Eh4} \) and the King threatens to penetrate via g5 (and possibly h6). The poor position of Black's Rook makes his defensive task hopeless.

\[ (II) \] 33 ... \( \text{Ef2} \).

After 37 \( \text{Fh4} \) (analysis)

\[ (Ia) \] 37 ... \( \text{Ee6} \) 38 \( \text{Ea6} + \text{Ff5} \) 39 \( \text{h3} \) and the threatened 40 g4+ cannot be adequately met; e.g., 39 ... \( \text{Ee1} \) 40 g4+ hxg4 41 hxg4 + \( \text{Fxf4} \) 42 \( \text{Eh6} \) + followed by 43 \( \text{Eh6} \) and wins, or 39 ... g5 + 40 \( \text{Eh5} \) \( \text{Fxf4} \) 41 g4 + \( \text{Ff5} \) 42 \( \text{Fg5} \) + followed by 43 \( \text{Eh6} \) and the White passed pawns decide.

After 33 ... \( \text{Ee2} \) (analysis)

A very refined defense. The point is that the White Rook is tied down after 34 e5 + \( \text{Ff5} \) 35 \( \text{Ea8} \) g5 36 \( \text{Eh8} + \text{Ee4} \). White can win a second pawn with check after 36 fxg5 (instead of 36 \( \text{Eh8} \)) 36 ... \( \text{Eg5} \) 37 \( \text{Ag8} + \text{Eh6} \) 38 \( \text{Ee8} \), but it is insufficient for victory after 38 ... \( \text{Ee2} \) 39 \( \text{Exe6} + \text{Fg5} \). The White King stands too poorly; e.g., 40 \( \text{Ee8} \) \( \text{Eh6} \) 41 e6 \( \text{Fg6} \) 42 e7 \( \text{Fg7} \).

On 33 ... \( \text{Ee2} \) White quietly replies 34 \( \text{Ah5} \). Remarkably, Black is in zugzwang.

After 34 \( \text{Ah5} \) (analysis)

He can enter variation I with 34 ... e5, of course, but we have seen that it is not enough to draw. The other try is 34 ... h4, but then White wins smoothly with 35 \( \text{Eh4} \) \( \text{Ah2} \) + 36 \( \text{Eg4} \) and the White King's penetration via g5 is not to be stopped; e.g., 36 ... \( \text{Ag2} \) 37 e5 + \( \text{Ff7} \) 38 \( \text{Ah7} \) + \( \text{Ff8} \) and now 39 \( \text{Ah3} \) followed by 40 \( \text{Eg3} \) is the simplest.

\[ (B) \] 30 ... e5. This fighting continuation (instead of 30 ... g6) was proposed by Polugaveisky. White makes no progress after 31 \( \text{Ea6} + \text{Ff7} \) 32 \( \text{Ff3} \) \( \text{Ah8} \). Correct is 31 f4. After 31 ... exf4 32 \( \text{Eg4} \) 36 33 e4 \( \text{Ah8} \) White can continue in two ways:

After 33 ... \( \text{Ah8} \) (analysis)

\[ (B1) \] 34 \( \text{Ah6} + \text{Ff7} \) 35 \( \text{Ah7} + \text{Ff8} \) (not 35 ... \( \text{Ff6} \) 36 e5! \( \text{Ah3} \) 37 \( \text{Ah7} \) \( \text{Ah7} + \text{Ah4} \) and wins) 36 \( \text{Ah3} \) \( \text{Ah3} + \text{Ah4} \) \( \text{Ah4} \) and the best White can get is an ending with an extra f-pawn and h-pawn, which is a theoretical draw.

\[ (B2) \] 34 \( \text{Ah7} \). This obvious move more or less ties the Black King down. The threat 35 e5+ cannot be adequately met; e.g., 34 ... \( \text{Ah4} \) 35 e5 + \( \text{Ff6} \) 36 \( \text{Ah3} \) with the threat 37 \( \text{Ah7} \), while 36 ... g5 fails to 37 \( \text{Ah6} + \).

Conclusion: The Black plan of immediately giving up the a-pawn and taking up a position with a pawn on h5 is insufficient to draw, although White's winning method is quite different from that in the game, where Black defends more passively.

27 ... \( \text{Ah8} \)
28 \( \text{Ah3} \) \( \text{Ah7} \)
29 \( \text{Ah5} \)
Under these circumstances it does no harm to prevent h7-h5.

32 ... b7

33 a5 c7

34 a6

Provoking g7-g6. After 34 ... b7, 35 f5 already comes into consideration. White's passed e-pawn would be extremely strong, and White's King could penetrate via h5 after the exchange on f5.

34 ... g6

35 a5

Preventing 35 ... h5 for sure.

35 ... d7

36 e3

Another quiet preparatory move.

36 ... b7

37 h5

The time is ripe for this strategic advance. Note the importance of having provoked g7-g6. White threatens to capture on g6, after which it would be simple to obtain two connected passed pawns. Black's reply is forced.

37 ... g5

38 a6

He will again work with the threat f4-f5. The alternative is 38 fxg5 + to get a protected passed pawn. But Black's position might be difficult to overcome.

38 ... gxf4

For the first and last time in the game, Black could have tried to benefit from his insignificant passed a-pawn: 38 ... b3 39 f5 b6 looks nice at first sight, but White wins with 40 a6 bxb6 41 e4 and the ending is won because of the protected passed pawn.

39 exf4

Superficially, the win seems problematical now because White's King has lost its natural protection, but Karpov has judged correctly that checks from the side pose no threat.

39 ... b3 +

38 ... a1 would not save the game either: after 40 a7 a1 + 41 g3 h1 + 42 h3 and the checks run out.

40 g2 b7

41 g3 b7

This is tougher than 41 ... b3 + 42 h4 b4 43 a7 e4 44 h7 with an easy win.

42 a4

Always systematic. He protects the fourth rank for his King before breaking through with g4-g5. The immediate 42 g5 is not so simple; 42 h5 43 h5 b3 + 44 b4 45 a5 b5 + and Black keeps on checking.

42 ... g7

43 g5 c7

44 a5

The sealed move. Now that Black's King no longer protects the e-pawn, White need not worry about the variation given on White's 42nd move.

44 ... g8

45 b5

Note that the World Champion is in no hurry to create a protected passed pawn with g5-g6. Under no circumstances can Black take on g5.

45 ... f7

46 g4 a6
At last this pawn can take a step forward.

47  \( \text{Ab8} \)

This penetration carries the unanswerable threat 48 \( \text{Ah8} \) (47 ... \( \text{Gg7} \) 48 \( \text{Ke8} \) \( \text{Gf7} \) 49 \( \text{Ah8} \)).

47 ... \( \text{Ac1} \)

Hort, in desperation, surrenders the seventh rank. 47 ... \( \text{h*}xg5 \) is equally hopeless but a little more difficult for White. Van Wijgerden gives two nice variations after 48 fxg5 \( \text{Ac4} + \) 49 \( \text{Gf3} \) \( \text{Ac3} + \) 50 \( \text{Gf4} \) \( \text{Ac4} + \) 51 \( \text{Ff3} \).

A) 51 ... \( \text{Gg4} \) (51 ... \( \text{Ac3} + \) 52 \( \text{Ff4} \) only helps White) 52 \( g6 + \) \( \text{Gg7} \) 53 \( \text{Ab7} + \) \( \text{Gg8} \) 54 \( \text{Ff3} \) \( \text{Gg5} \) 55 \( \text{Gh7} \) \( \text{e5} \) (otherwise 56 \( \text{Ff4} \) 56 \( \text{Gf4} \) a5 57 \( \text{Gd5} \) a4 58 \( \text{Ff6} \) and the White King

is in time to seal the mating net around the Black King.

B) 51 ... \( \text{Ah4} \) 52 \( \text{Gg6} + \) \( \text{Gg7} \) 53 \( \text{Ab7} + \) \( \text{Gg8} \) 54 \( \text{Ah7} \) a5 55 \( \text{Ff3} \) a4 56 \( \text{Gg3} \) \( \text{Ah1} \) 57 \( \text{Gf4} \) a3 58 \( \text{Ac7} \) \( \text{a1} \) 59 \( \text{Gg3} \) and the White King is again in time. Mate in two is threatened.

48 \( \text{Gg6} + \)

The simplest, now that Black has given up the seventh rank.

48 ... \( \text{Gg7} \)
49 \( \text{Ab7} + \) \( \text{Gf8} \)
50 \( \text{Ab6} \) \( \text{Gg1} + \)
51 \( \text{Gf3} \) \( \text{Af1} + \)
52 \( \text{Gg4} \) \( \text{Ac1} + \)
53 \( \text{Gd4} \) \( \text{Ff7} \)
54 \( \text{Axh6} \) \( \text{Ff6} \)
55 \( \text{Ac7} \)

Cuts off the Black King.

55 ... \( \text{e5} + \)

Final desperation.

56 \( \text{fxe5} + \) \( \text{Axh5} \)
57 \( \text{Ac7} + \) Black resigns

White didn't fall into it: the ending would be drawn after 57 \( \text{Af7} + \) \( \text{Gf6} \) 58 \( \text{Gh7} + ?? \) \( \text{Gxe7} \) 59 \( \text{Gxe5} \) \( \text{Gf8} \). Black resigned after the text move because of 57 ... \( \text{Ac6} \) 58 \( \text{Gf7} \) or 57 ... \( \text{Gf7} \) 58 \( \text{Af8} \) 59 \( \text{Axh6} \) and queening is not far off.