An Expert’s Guide to the
7.\textit{c}4 Gruenfeld

1.d4 \textit{f}6 2.c4 g6 3.\textit{c}3 d5 4.cxd5 \textit{xd}5
5.e4 \textit{xc}3 6.bxc3 \textit{g}7 7.\textit{c}4

Konstatin Sakaev

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Contents

Part 1
1.d4 ćf6 2.c4 g6 3.ćc3 d5 4.cxd5 ćxd5 5.e4 ćxe3 6.bxe3 ćg7 7.ćc4

1  various; 7...0-0 8.će2 without 8...ćd7 and 8...ćc6 .................. 10
2 7...0-0 8.će2 ćd7 ......................................................... 30
3 7...0-0 8.će2 ćc6 .......................................................... 54
4 7...c5 8.će2 without 8...ćc6 ............................................. 84
5 7...c5 8.će2 ćc6 9.će3 various; 9...cd 10.cd b5 .................... 97
6 7...c5 8.će2 ćc6 9.će3 cd 10.cd ća5 .................................. 105

Part 2

7...c5 8.će2 ćc6 9.će3 0-0

7 10.ćb1; 10.ćc1; 10.0-0 ća5; 10...ća5; 10...e6 ...................... 120
8 10.0-0 cd 11.cd without 11...ća5 ..................................... 138
9 10.0-0 cd 11.cd ća5 12.ćd3 without 12...b6 ....................... 145
10 10.0-0 cd 11.cd ća5 12.ćd3 b6 ....................................... 151
11 10.0-0 ćc7 11.ćc1 without 11...ćd8 ............................... 164
12 10.0-0 ćc7 11.ćc1 ćd8 .................................................... 175
13 10.0-0 ćd7 ................................................................. 188

Part 3

7...c5 8.će2 ćc6 9.će3 0-0 10.0-0 ćg4 11.f3

14 11...ćd7 ................................................................. 201
15 11...ća5 12.ćd5 ............................................................. 207
16 11...ća5 12.ćd3 cd 13.cd će6 14.ća4 ................................. 217
Part 4
7...c5 8.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)e2 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c6 9.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)e3 0-0 10.0-0 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)g4 11.f3 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a5 12.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d3 cd 13.cd \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e6 14.d5

17 14...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)a1 15.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a1 f6 without 16.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)b1 and 16.\(\text{\textit{h}}\)h6. 229
18 14...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)a1 15.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a1 f6 16.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b1. 248
19 14...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)a1 15.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a1 f6 16.\(\text{\textit{h}}\)h6 various; 16...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e8 17.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b1. 275
20 14...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)a1 15.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a1 f6 16.\(\text{\textit{h}}\)h6 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e8 17.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)h1 without 17...\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c8. 283
21 14...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)a1 15.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a1 f6 16.\(\text{\textit{h}}\)h6 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e8 17.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)h1 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c8. 292

Part 5
7...c5 8.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)e2 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c6 9.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)e3 0-0 10.0-0 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)g4 11.f3 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a5 12.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d3 cd 13.cd \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e6 14.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c1

22 14...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)a2 15.d5; 15.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a4 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b3 16.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)b4 b6 17.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g5. 312
23 14...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)a2 15.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a4 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b3 16.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)b4 b6 17.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c3. 319
24 14...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)a2 15.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a4 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e6 16.d5 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7 17.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a3; 17.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)b4 b5; 17...b6. 333
25 14...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)a2 15.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a4 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e6 16.d5 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7 17.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)b4 e6 18.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c3 b6. 338
26 14...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)a2 15.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a4 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e6 16.d5 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7 17.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)b4 e6 18.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c3 ed. 345

Part 6
7...c5 8.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)e2 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c6 9.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)e3 0-0 10.0-0 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)g4 11.f3 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a5 12.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7 \(\text{\textit{x}}\)xf7 \(\text{\textit{xf}}\)7 13.fxg4 \(\text{\textit{xf}}\)1 14.\(\text{\textit{h}}\)xf1

27 14...\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7. 351
28 14...\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d6. 360
29 14.cd cd e5 16.d5; 16.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c1. 381
30 14.cd cd e5 16.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g1. 397

Illustrative Games. 410

6
The Gruenfeld Defence (1.d4 ♙f6 2.c4 g6 3.♗c3 d5) appeared as an original opening relatively recently. It began to be played at a really high level during the 30ies of the 20th century and quite rarely at that. White used to react even then in the most aggressive and natural way – he was occupying the centre immediately with: 4.cxd5 ♖xd5 5.e4. After 5...♗xc3 6.bxc3 ♖g7 White had to face the problem how to develop later? The players gradually began to understand that every possible set-up had some drawbacks too. If White played 7.♗f3, then the knight was usually pinned unpleasantly later with ♖c8-g4, while 7.♗e3 c5 8.♔d2 was slowing the development of the kingside considerably.

Presently, both 7.♗f3 and 7.♗e3 are quite popular opening systems, with plenty of nuances and fine points and they lead to complicated opening battles. I am trying with this book to increase the number of adherents of the line 7.♖c4! followed by 8.♗e2. The dawn of the popularity of the variation was marked by great players like David Bronstein and Efim Geller, but Boris Spassky made the most significant contribution to its development. He won so many brilliant games that he managed to prove that the placement of the white knight on e2 is not as passive as it seemed at first sight. The knight defends the c3 and d4 pawns and can go to f4 at an opportune moment joining in the attack. Sometimes that knight helps the advance of the h-pawn and often it supports the offence with the f-pawn not standing in its way forward.

Nowadays, the 7.♖c4 system is an integral part of the opening repertoire of numerous top-class grandmasters including the World Champion Topalov.
I have tried to touch that subject in writing back in the year 2004 – I published a book in English about that system and it enjoyed a great popularity all over the world. It turned out that the main topic of interest of the chess fans was whether a top-level professional player was going to share with the public his sacred novelties and secret analyses? I will answer that question for the skeptics – yes – I decided to give it a try! I have collected all the available theoretical material, I have worked on it and I have added plenty of my original analyses, which had been accumulated in the process of preparation for my games as well as especially intended for the book itself.

In order to illustrate some typical ideas I have chosen some 20 outstanding winning games for White and they have been commented just for the book (The comments of some games that were made before or published beforehand, were once again reworked and contributed to, especially for the book.). In fact, not all these games are pertinent to the state of the contemporary theory, but they tend to always demonstrate some typical plan or maneuver, which can be realized in practice.

The book is oriented partially to represent the point of view of White and it is intended to help players create problems for Black in the Gruenfeld Defence. Naturally, I hope it would be interesting for the players who enjoy playing the Gruenfeld Defence with Black as well.

This book has summarized the contemporary theory up to March 10 2004.

Konstantin Sakaev
March 2006
1.d4 ²f6 2.c4 g6 3.²c3 d5 4.cxd5 ²xd5 5.e4 ²xc3 6.bxc3 ³g7 7.²c4

At the beginning of Part 1, I will deal with some seldom played lines in which Black does not put White’s centre under immediate pressure, but he plans to do that successfully later. This way of playing used to be quite popular at the dawn of the development of the system, when the theory of the variation had been started from scratch. White had then to try to find over the board the best piece set-up in every particular case. Nowadays, Black does not try often that approach anymore and that is hardly surprising. White obtains a considerable advantage in all lines with a simple and straightforward play and Black is doomed to defend a passive position without any good prospects (Chapters 1-4).

I will analyze in Chapters 5-6, variations in which Black is trying to exploit the fact that White’s king has not castled, so that he can disrupt the coordination of White’s pieces. It turns out however, that the means that Black uses to achieve that aim are hardly suitable for the purpose.

GM P.Svidler, GM Luke Mc Shane and GM B.Avrukh tried to introduce the line 10...²a5, but it became clear that Black was falling back in development considerably. I am going to prove in my book that Black’s prospects are clearly worse in that case.

After 10...b5, White will be forced to exchange his bishop, but then Black weakens the c-file considerably and in particular the c5 and c6-squares. The readers will be easily convinced – Black will be left with numerous problems to worry about. There is an interesting idea for White in this line, recommended by O.Biriukov – 11.²d5 ²d7 12.²c1 ²c8 13.0-0 0-0 14.²c6 ²c6 15.²c6 ²c6 16.d5 ²d7 17.²d2 a5 18.²c1 b4 19.²d4 e6 20.d6!?
Chapter 1

1.d4 $\mathcal{f}f6$ 2.c4 g6 3.$\mathcal{c}c3$ d5 4.$\mathcal{c}xd5$
$\mathcal{c}xd5$ 5.e4 $\mathcal{c}c3$ 6.$\mathcal{b}xc3$ $\mathcal{g}g7$ 7.$\mathcal{c}c4$

We are going to deal with some rare variations for Black on moves 7, 8 and 9.

The idea of all of them is to develop the pieces on the queenside first and only then start active actions in the centre. Black refrains from the immediate c7-c5 (with the exception of the line that we analyse at the end of the Botvinnik variation) and develops his knight to c6 and a5 and his bishop to b7.

Naturally that plan has some drawbacks too.

Black presents his opponent with a free hand to act on the kingside, avoiding the immediate active counterplay in the centre. White can start an aggression along the h-file with h4-h5xg6, and then exchange the dark-squared bishops or bring his queen to the open h-file. He can feel safe in the centre because it is very sound in case Black does not attack it early with c7-c5.

White can also castle and then play e5, $\mathcal{e}e2$-f4, $\mathcal{w}g4$ and h4-h5. So White has plenty of additional possibilities in case Black shuns the immediate counterattack in the centre with c5 and $\mathcal{c}c6$. That is in fact the main drawback of the moves that we intend to deal with now.

Castling for Black in this position is naturally his strongest move. His other possibilities either transpose to the lines after c) 7...0-0, or they present White with plenty of other opportunities that he does not have in the main variations. We will analyze thoroughly here a) 7...$\mathcal{d}d7$ and b) 7...$\mathcal{c}c6$.

Black has also some other moves, which are just bad:

7...$\mathcal{e}e6$? – He creates deliberately numerous weaknesses in his camp and that is hardly advisable. 8.$\mathcal{xe}6$ fxe6 9.$\mathcal{f}f3$
c6 (He loses a pawn in case of: 9...0-0 10.♗b3 ♘d7 11.♗g5+– Bartuszt – Groschupf, Meernane 1954; after 9...♕d7 10.♗b3, it would not work for Black to try: 10...c5, because of 11.♗g5 cxd4 12.♕xe6 and White wins material, for example: 12...♗e5 13.cxd4 ♘xd4 14.♗b2 ♘xb2 15.♕xb2 ♕g8 16.♗b3 ♕h8 17.♗c3+–) 10.♗b1 b6 and here instead of: 11.♗g5 ♕d7 12.♗g4 e5 13.♗xd7+ ♘xd7 14.d5 ♘a5 15.0-0±, it would be much more energetic for White to play 11.h4, for example: 11...♕d7 12.h5 e5 13.d5 ♘a5 14.♗g5 c6 15.♗e6+ and his advantage is decisive: 15...♗f6 16.hxg6 hxg6 17.♗xh8+ ♘xh8 18.♗g4 ♘f7 19.♗h3 ♕g8 (19...cxd5 20.♗g5+–) 20.♗h6+, or 13...♗d8 14.hxg6 hxg6 15.♗xh8+ ♘xh8 16.♗h4 ♘d6 17.♗g4 ♘f7 18.c4 ♘b7 19.♗b3± ♕g3, or ♕f3+;

7...c6. This move is practically unnecessary for Black – he must counterattack White’s centre in the Grünfeld Defence with his pawn on c5. Moreover, on move seven – the line 7.♗b5+ c6 is quite popular and White even plays 8.♘c4, considering that Black’s extra tempo for the move c7-c6 is immaterial. Now, after White has been presented with free extra time he should choose some other active plan, for example: 8.♕f3 0-0 9.♗e2, followed by h2-h4-h5;

7...a6, Labahn – Heyken, Hamburg 2001. Black has lost a tempo for his development on the last move and White must play here energetically – 8.♕f3 (He should not start an attack along the h-file before Black has castled.) 8...0-0 9.e5 c5 10.♗e2 ♗c6 11.♗e3+ and later h2-h4-h5 with a powerful initiative;

The move 7...e6 – closes the diagonal of the bishop on c8 and it enables White to play: 8.♗f3 c5 9.♗e3 ♗c6 10.0-0 cxd4 11.♗xd4 a6 12.♗d2 b5, so now instead of the retreat of the bishop to the e2-square, as it was played in the game Al.Potapov – Stephenson, Montreal 1998, White had better play 13.♗b3, for example: 13...0-0 14.♖fd1 ♘b7 15.♗h6 ♘c8 16.♗xg7 ♘xg7 17.d5 exd5 18.♗xd5+ and he would have a considerable positional pressure;

The move 7...♗d7 – shares the same drawback as 7...e6: it covers the diagonal of Black’s own light-squared bishop. 8.♗f3 0-0 (or 8...♗f6 9.♗b3 0-0 and here White’s simplest line is 10.e5 and in case of 10...♗e4 11.0-0±, followed by ♖e1, Black’s knight will be seriously endangered. It would have been the lesser evil for Black to have weakened the dark squares, but to ensure the d5-square for the retreat of the knight after e4-e5: 9...e6 10.e5 ♖d5 11.0-0+, although his kingside has been considerably compromised.) 9. 0-0 ♘b6 10.♗b3 c5. Later in the game Uhlig – Behrmann, corr.
1996, there followed: 11.dxc5
\[d_7 12.\text{e}3 \text{c}7 13.\text{d}5 \text{xc}3?!\]
(\[13.\text{f}6 14.\text{d}3 \text{g}4\]
\[=\]
14.\text{ac}1 \text{g}7 15.\text{c}6\uparrow \text{f}6 (15.\text{b}6\uparrow?)
16.\text{b}5 \text{xc}6 17.\text{xc}6 \text{b}7 18.\text{c}4
\[e_6 19.\text{xe}6 \text{fxe}6 20.\text{xe}6+ \text{h}8\]
21.e5 \text{g}8 22.\text{g}5++. It would have been much simpler for
White to have prevented \[g_4\]
with 11.h3\[=\] and follow later with: \[f_4\], \[d_2\] and \[h_6\], or \[e_2\],
\[d_1\] and \[d_4-d_5\];

7...e5 – seems to be too risky, since it weakens the a3-f8 and
a2-g8 diagonals, meanwhile Black’s king remains still
stranded in the centre.

White can try to immediately refute that move in the following
fashion:

8.\text{f}3 (It is not good for White
to win the exchange with: 8.b3
0-0 9.a3 exd4 10.xf8 xf8 11.
\[d_1\] c6 12.cxd4 \[d_4\], because
Black’s compensation is more
than sufficient, Siebert – Feindt,
Internet 2001.) 8...exd4 9.cxd4
\[c_6\] 10.e3 \[g_4\] (It is preferable
for Black to play immediately:
10...0-0 11.0-0 \[g_4\], or 11.h3
\[a_5\] 12.e2 c5\[=\] 11.\text{d}5 \[d_7\]
12.b1 \[b_6\] (but not 12...0-0-0??
13.b3 b6 14.c4\[=\] Frisco – Fort-
tress, Internet 1999, 14...\text{b}8
15.g5\[=\] 13.0-0\[=\] and White
preserves a slight advantage (In-
stead, it is worse for him to fol-
low with: 13.xb7 \[a_5\] 14.b1 c6
15.b3 \[b_3\] 16.axb3 \[b_3\])

8.a3 \[c_6\] 9.d5?! (It deserves
attention for White to play here:
9.b3 \[d_7\] 10.f3 \[a_5\] 11.b5
\[xb_5\] 12.xb5+ \[d_7\] 13.\text{d}3\[=\]
and he has a slight edge in that
endgame, for example after:
13.exd4 14.xd4 \[g_4\] 15.c1\[=\]
9.a5 10.a4+ c6 11.dxc6 \[xc_6\]
12.f3\[=\] and Black lags considerably in development.

In case of 8...exd4, White fol-
lowes with: 9.b3 \[d_7\] (It is infe-
rior for Black to try: 9..f6 10.
xd4 \[c_6\] 11.e2 \[xd_4\] 12.xd4
\[xd_4\] 13.xf7\[=\] Brause – Quist,
FICS 1995.) 10.f3 \[c_6\] (10...
dx3 11.d1\[=\]) 11.cxd4 \[a_5\]
12.c2 \[xc_4\] 13.xc4. Black can-
not castle, while White is domi-
nant in the centre and Black’s
attempt 13...\[e_6\], leads after
14.xc7 \[xe_4\] 15.d2 \[h_6\] + 16.
\[c_3\] \[c_6\] + 17.xc6+ \[bxc_6\]
18.ab1\[=\] to a position in which he
cannot prevent the penetration
of White’s rook to the b7, or e7-
squares. So, after 8.a3, Black
can capture White’s d4-pawn in-
deed, but he encounters great
problems, because his king re-
mains stranded in the centre.

Black has also played 7...b6. This rare move Timman tried to
resurrect against Jussupow in
1986. He was not successful and
quite understandably so. The move presents White with an even greater choice at this moment, than on the next move. 8.\textit{\textsc{f}3} (This is obviously the most energetic line – White is trying to bring his queen as close as possible to the black king. 8.\textit{\textsc{e}2} leads to the line 8...b6, that we are going to deal with later. It is also interesting for White to play 8.\textit{\textsc{f}3} \textit{\textsc{b}7}? 9.\textit{\textsc{x}f}7\textpm; 8...0–0 9.0–0 \textit{\textsc{b}7} 10.\textit{\textsc{c}2} \textit{\textsc{c}6} 11.\textit{\textsc{e}1} \textit{\textsc{d}7} 12.\textit{\textsc{b}1} e6 13.\textit{\textsc{a}a}3 \textit{\textsc{d}f}8 14.h4 \textit{\textsc{a}a}5 15.\textit{\textsc{f}1}\uparrow with some advantage Korchnoi – Timman, Brussels 1988, or 10.\textit{\textsc{e}2} \textit{\textsc{c}6}, Donner – Lombardy, Amsterdam 1974, and now instead of developing the bishop to b2, White had to play 11.\textit{\textsc{g}5}?!± with some edge.) 8...0–0 9.e5 (It was also good for White to play 9.\textit{\textsc{e}2} \textit{\textsc{c}6} 10.h4 \textit{\textsc{a}a}5 11.\textit{\textsc{d}3} e5 12.\textit{\textsc{a}3} \textit{\textsc{e}8} 13.h5 \textit{\textsc{d}7} 14.\textit{\textsc{d}1} \textit{\textsc{a}4} 15.\textit{\textsc{c}1} c5 16.d5 \textit{\textsc{xa}2} 17.\textit{\textsc{h}6}!→, and White had an overwhelming attack against the enemy king, which after 17...\textit{\textsc{h}8} 18.\textit{\textsc{b}5}! \textit{\textsc{d}8} 19.\textit{\textsc{g}5} \textit{\textsc{b}3} 20.hxg6 \textit{\textsc{fxg}6} 21.\textit{\textsc{h}7}! \textit{\textsc{h}7} 22.\textit{\textsc{f}7}+ \textit{\textsc{g}7} 23.\textit{\textsc{f}6} \textit{\textsc{g}8} 24.\textit{\textsc{e}8} lead to a checkmate in the game Jussupow – Timman, Tilburg (m/9) 1986. Black evidently had better go into an endgame with – 14...\textit{\textsc{g}4}!± 15.\textit{\textsc{xg}4} \textit{\textsc{xg}4} 16.f3\uparrow, although White would have had better chances even then.) 9...\textit{\textsc{a}a}6 (It is too passive for Black to play 9...c6 10.\textit{\textsc{e}2} \textit{\textsc{d}7} 11.h4 \textit{\textsc{g}4} 12.\textit{\textsc{xg}4} \textit{\textsc{yg}4} 13.h5 \textit{\textsc{c}8} 14.hxg6 \textit{\textsc{h}xg}6 15.\textit{\textsc{f}4}± Balashov – Ree, Wijk aan Zee 1973, and Black’s position was critical because of the threats \textit{\textsc{f}3} and \textit{\textsc{e}6}.) 10.\textit{\textsc{d}5} (White does not need to accept the exchange sacrifice after 10.\textit{\textsc{xa}8} \textit{\textsc{xc}4} 11.\textit{\textsc{f}3} \textit{\textsc{f}6}±, because Black’s initiative is rather dangerous Kane – Benko, El Paso 1973.) 10...c6 11.\textit{\textsc{b}3} \textit{\textsc{c}7} (It is obviously better for Black to play 11...\textit{\textsc{d}7} 12.\textit{\textsc{e}2} e6 13.0–0 c5 – and Black is almost safe although after 14.\textit{\textsc{d}1} \textit{\textsc{c}6} 15.\textit{\textsc{g}5} \textit{\textsc{cxd}4} 16.\textit{\textsc{cxd}4} \textit{\textsc{xe}2} 17.\textit{\textsc{xe}2} \textit{\textsc{d}4} 18.h4 \textit{\textsc{f}c}8 19.h5 b5 20.\textit{\textsc{g}4}\uparrow White has the initiative because of the idea d4–d5 Jussupow – Timman, Bugojno 1986.) 12.h4 c5 13.h5, and Black gets checkmated again: 13...\textit{\textsc{cxd}4} 14.\textit{\textsc{cxd}4} \textit{\textsc{gxh}5} 15.\textit{\textsc{hxh}5} \textit{\textsc{b}7} 16.\textit{\textsc{d}3}– Jussupow – Timman, Tilburg (m/7) 1986. It is not any better for Black to play 12...\textit{\textsc{d}7}. After White’s best move 13.\textit{\textsc{f}4}, Black’s position becomes very difficult. (The immediate reaction 13.h5? is bad, due to 13...\textit{\textsc{xe}5}± – that is the idea of the move 12...\textit{\textsc{d}7}.) 13...e6 14.h5 \textit{\textsc{fc}8} (or 14...g5? 15.h6 \textit{\textsc{h}8} 16.\textit{\textsc{h}5}± Wiegel – Jurgensen, corr. 1974) 15.hxg6 \textit{\textsc{hg}6} 16.\textit{\textsc{h}3} c5 17.\textit{\textsc{h}6} (but not 17.\textit{\textsc{xe}6} \textit{\textsc{fxe}6} 18.\textit{\textsc{xe}6}+ \textit{\textsc{f}8} 19.\textit{\textsc{h}6} \textit{\textsc{hxh}6} 20.\textit{\textsc{hxh}6} \textit{\textsc{cx}d}4= and White is forced to give a perpetual; or 17.\textit{\textsc{h}7}+ \textit{\textsc{f}8} 18.\textit{\textsc{h}6} \textit{\textsc{hxh}6} 19.\textit{\textsc{hxh}6}+ \textit{\textsc{e}8} 20.\textit{\textsc{e}3} \textit{\textsc{cxd}4} 21.\textit{\textsc{cxd}4} \textit{\textsc{c}3}+ 22.\textit{\textsc{xc}3} \textit{\textsc{xc}3} 23.\textit{\textsc{h}8}+ \textit{\textsc{f}8} 24.\textit{\textsc{e}2}±) 17...\textit{\textsc{cxd}4} 18.\textit{\textsc{hxg}7}
\[ \text{Chapter 1} \]

\[ \text{\texttt{\textbackslash bxc3+ 19.\texttt{\textbackslash bxc3 dxc3 20.0-0-0}} and White\textquoteright s position is practically winning: 20...\texttt{\textbackslash bxg7 21.\texttt{\textbackslash bxg7}} \texttt{\textbackslash d8 22.\texttt{\textbackslash eb7 e8 (22...\texttt{\textbackslash f8 23.\texttt{\textbackslash c7+-}) 23.\texttt{\textbackslash eb8 e8 24.\texttt{\textbackslash f3+.}}}} Black cannot change much if he plays 11...\texttt{\textbackslash d7 a move earlier: 12.h4 \texttt{\textbackslash xh5 13.h5 \texttt{\textbackslash xg7 14.hxg6 h6 15.\texttt{\textbackslash g5 c8 17.\texttt{\textbackslash h4 e8 Richert - Riesenbeck, corr. 1989 and here White\textquoteright s simplest win would have been: 18.\texttt{\textbackslash h7 f8 19.\texttt{\textbackslash f4 e5 20.\texttt{\textbackslash h6+-}}.}}}}

Had Black played on move sixteen - 16...\texttt{\textbackslash f6} , then it is good for White to follow with 17.\texttt{\textbackslash h4 e8 and here not - 18.\texttt{\textbackslash f3 e5 19.\texttt{\textbackslash xh5 e5+ 20.dxe5 \texttt{\textbackslash d3 21.c4 c3+ 22.\texttt{\textbackslash e2 e5+ 23.\texttt{\textbackslash e3=, or 18.\texttt{\textbackslash h3 e5 19.\texttt{\textbackslash xh6 f6= 20.\texttt{\textbackslash h7 f8 21.\texttt{\textbackslash f3 exd4+ 22.\texttt{\textbackslash d1 e7=, because Black has excellent counterplay in both cases, but simply: 18.0-0-0 \texttt{\textbackslash e7 19.\texttt{\textbackslash b2 c5 (19...e5 20.dxe5 \texttt{\textbackslash xe5 21.\texttt{\textbackslash f3 f5 22.\texttt{\textbackslash d4 \texttt{\textbackslash e5 23.\texttt{\textbackslash f4 d6 24.\texttt{\textbackslash h6 f8 25.f5=) 20.\texttt{\textbackslash f3 \texttt{\textbackslash e2 21.\texttt{\textbackslash d1 xd1 22.\texttt{\textbackslash xd1 cxd4 23.cxd4 c8 24.g4+.}}}}}}}}}}}}}

\[ \text{a) 7...\texttt{\textbackslash d7}} \]

The move-order chosen by Black enables White to develop his bishop much more actively than usual in the system that we are presently analyzing.

8.\texttt{\textbackslash f3}

Black has covered the diagonal for his light-squared bishop with his last move and White should not be afraid of the pin \texttt{\textbackslash c8-g4 anymore.}

8...0-0

In case of: 8...b5 9.\texttt{\textbackslash b3 a7 10.0-0 0-0 11.\texttt{\textbackslash e2 c5 12.\texttt{\textbackslash f4 cxd4 13.\texttt{\textbackslash xd4 g4 14.\texttt{\textbackslash e3 \texttt{\textbackslash c6, A.Shashin - Karasev, Leningrad 1975, 15.\texttt{\textbackslash h6 a5 16.\texttt{\textbackslash xg7 xg7 17.d5=, or 15...\texttt{\textbackslash xh6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash xh6 a5 17.\texttt{\textbackslash f3= - White is completely dominating in the centre and Black\textquoteright s bishop on b7 is evidently misplaced.}}}}}}}}}}}

9.0-0 b6

After 9...c5 10.\texttt{\textbackslash e3 cxd4 11.\texttt{\textbackslash cxd4 b6 12.\texttt{\textbackslash d1 a6 13.\texttt{\textbackslash b3 xc4 14.\texttt{\textbackslash xg4 b7 15.d5 a6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash d4 a8 17.\texttt{\textbackslash d6= White had an overwhelming positional advantage in the game Gruenberg - Donchev, Polanica Zdroj 1985.}}}}}}

In case of: 9...\texttt{\textbackslash c6 10.\texttt{\textbackslash f4 a5 11.e2 b6 12.e5 e8 White should not try to exchange pieces: 13.\texttt{\textbackslash c4 xc4 14.\texttt{\textbackslash xg4 b7 15.f3 e5 16.dxe5 xe5 17.\texttt{\textbackslash xe5 xe5 18.\texttt{\textbackslash d4, as he did in the game Cobo Arteaga - Bilek, Havana 1966; it is clearly superior for White to continue with the simple move 13.\texttt{\textbackslash b1= and since Black has no counterplay against his opponent\textquoteright s centre - White manages to deploy his}}}}}}

14
pieces much more actively in comparison to the main lines.

10.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{c}6\)

10...\(\text{b}7\) 11.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{g}4\) 12.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 13.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 14.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{a}5\) 15.\(\text{x}g7\) \(\text{x}g7\) 16.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{d}6\) and here, instead of: 17.\(\text{g}4\) c5 18.\(\text{w}h6\) + \(\text{h}8\) 19.d5 \(\text{f}5\), van der Heijden – Kramer, Netherlands 1986, (Black managed to undermine White’s centre quite successfully, meanwhile it was difficult to understand why White had to lose so much time in order to place his queen on the h6-square.) it deserved attention for White to follow with 17.f4↑, with the idea f4-f5.

11.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{a}5\) 12.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{e}8\) 13.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{c}6\) 14.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{h}8\) and here White failed in his attempt to exploit his lead in development and extra space with the immediate: 15.d5 \(\text{b}7\) 16.\(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{c}8\) 17.\(\text{c}4\) f6 18.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 19.\(\text{dxc}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 20.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 21.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{ac}8\), because Black had a very good position in the game Barczay – Bilek, Miskolc 1963. That means that White must play one more developing move – 15.\(\text{ad}1\) and in answer to Black’s prepared

move 15...\(\text{f}6\), to continue with 16.\(\text{d}3\) e5 17.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 18.f4↑ with a powerful initiative.

b) 7...\(\text{c}6\)

This move does not have so evident drawbacks as the rest of Black’s rarely played lines on move seven. There arises a transposition to the variation 7... 0–0 8.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}6\) quite often. We will now analyze only these possibilities for Black in which he refrains from immediate castling short (Generally speaking, after castling the game transposes to the variations that we are analyzing in our Chapter 3), but as we are going to see quite soon, Black can hardly profit from that in any meaningful way.

8.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{a}5\)

About 8...0–0 – see 7...0–0 8.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}6\); 8...\(\text{b}6\) 9.0–0 0–0 – see 7...0–0 8.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}6\) 9.0–0 \(\text{b}6\); 8...\(\text{e}5\) 9.\(\text{xe}3\) 0–0 10.0–0 – see 7...0–0 8.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}6\) 9.0–0 \(\text{e}5\).

8...h6 9.0–0 0–0 10.\(\text{xe}3\) – and in comparison to the usual lines, arising after 7...0–0 8.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}6\), Black has simply lost a tempo for the move h6, moreover
Chapter 1

after \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d2} \) he must lose additional time in order to protect his h6-pawn.

8...\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d7} \) 9.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{e3} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{a5} \) 10.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d3} \) e5 11.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{b1} \) 0–0 12.0–0± – Black’s set-up is not in harmony with the placement of his bishop on the d7-square. There was only one game played with the move 8...\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d7} \) and it continued with 12...\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{h4}?! \) (12...\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{e7} \) 13.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{f4} \uparrow \) 13. \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d2} \) f6?! 14.f3 \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{f7} \) 15.dxe5 and Black lost a pawn at the end, Roberts – Gaiensky, Detroit 1992.

8...\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d7} \). This is a risky move – Black has not castled yet and he places his queen on the same diagonal with his knight and king too. 9.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{b5} \) (That is White’s most principled answer.) 9...0–0?! This is a dubious move. Black can hardly obtain a sufficient compensation for the piece. (It would have been preferable for him to have avoided that: 9...a6 10.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{a4} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{b8} \) 11.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{xc6} \) bxc6 12.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{a3} \pm \) – White manages to destroy Black’s pawn-structure on the queenside, or: 10.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{a4} \) b5 11. \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{c2} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{b7} \) 12.0–0± and White preserves a slight edge in both cases.) 10.d5 a6 11.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{a4} \) (11.dxc6 \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{xd1} \+ 12. \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{xd1} \) axb5) 11...\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{g4} \) 12.0–0 (White had better capture that piece: 12.dxc6 \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{xg2} \) 13.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{g1} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{xe4} \) 14.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{c2} \pm \), because Black’s two pawns are not a sufficient compensation in that middle game. It is worse for White to play: 13.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{g3} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{xc3} \) + 14.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d2} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d4} \) 15.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{f1} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d8} \), because Black’s counterplay is dangerous.) 12...

\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{e5} \) 13.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{f4} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d7} \) 14.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{xd7} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{xd7} \) 15.h3 \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{h4} \) 16.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{e3} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{fd8} \) 17.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{f2} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{h5} \) 18.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{b1} \) c6 19.c4 b5 (19...\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{xd5} \) 20.cxd5 b5±) 20.cxb5 axb5 (It is not good for Black to try here: 20...\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{xd5} \) 21.b6 dxe4 22.b7 \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{ab8} \) 23.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{a7} \pm \); but he could have attempted instead to hold the position with the move: 20...\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{xb5} \), although White preserves a clear advantage, due to Black’s weakness on c6.) 21.dxc6 \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{e5} \) 22.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d4!} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{c4} \) (or 22...\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{xd1} \) 23.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{fxd1} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{c4} \) 24.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{xb5} \) 23.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{h5} \) gxh5 24.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{f5} \) – and White easily pressed his material and positional advantage home in the game Timman – Olafsson, Buenos Aires 1980.

9.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d3} \) b6

About 9...0–0 10.0–0 – see 7...0–0 8.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{e2} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{c6} \) 9.0–0 \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{a5} \) 10.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d3} \).

10.0–0 \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{b7} \)

As for 10...0–0 11.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{g5} \) – see 7...0–0 8.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{e2} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{c6} \) 9.0–0 \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{a5} \) 10.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d3} \) b6 11.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{g5} \).

11.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{g5} \) \( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d7} \) 12.\( \texttt{\textregistered} \texttt{d2} \) 0–0–0?!

This is an original idea, which was tried by B.Gulko against N.Rashkovsky. White cannot open the a-file, while Black’s
knight is on the a5-square, but indeed as the game Rashkovsky – Gulkov, Minsk 1985 showed, White can create some threats against the enemy king with the help of c3-c4-c5. Meanwhile, it is not quite clear what the advantages are for Black to have his king on the queenside. 13...ab1 h6 14.e3 f5 15.f3 e6 16.c4 b8 17.d5± (Δd4, f4) 17...a4 18.fc1 (18.f4!? 19...c3 xc3 20.xc3 g5 21.c5 fxe4 22.b5 xa2 23.xe8 xe8 24.c6 c8 25.d6 cxd6 26.xb6 axb6 27.b4 exf3 28...xb7 29.gxf3 c8 30.c7 – and Black resigned.

In conclusion – the idea for Black to castle long in this position seems to us to be extremely risky.

c) 7...0–0

8.e2

White can choose an un-ordinary and risky line, recommended by GM L.Polugaevsky if he wants to avoid an opening argument in the main lines with: 8.e3 c5 9.e2 c6 10.c1!? (instead of 10.0–0), and after 10...cxd4 11.cxd4 a5+ retreat with the king – 12.f1, in order to push later the h-pawn forward and start playing for a checkmate (see Chapter 7).

The move 8...d7 is analyzed in Chapter 2, 8...c6 – in Chapter 3, while 8...c5 – in Chapter 4 after the following order of moves 7...c5 8.e2 0–0.

In this chapter we will deal with c2) 8...b6, as well as with some other rarely played moves, from which we will analyze thoroughly – c1) 8...e5.

Black’s other possibilities are: 8...e6 – does not help Black’s counterplay at all and it weakens the kingside considerably. White should better exploit that with the standard attack – 9.h4 and the position is going to resemble the one arising after: 8...b6 9.h4, except with the quite dubious move 8...e6 included. As you will see later, in the main lines of the 8...b6-system, White even places his bishop on the d5-square and then he retreats it back to b3. So, Black has lost a tempo in fact. In the game Lindinger – Schierholz, Germany 1995, in which that position arose, there followed: 9...d7 10.h5± c5 11.hxg6 fxg6 (or 11...hxg6 12.d3 and White’s attack along the h-file will be practically decisive) 12.xe6+ h8 13.d3++ and Black’s position is utterly hopeless.

It is just a loss of time for Black to play here: 8...g4 9.f3
d7 10.0–0. The maneuver of the bishop (g4-d7) reminds us of the main line – 7...c5 8.e2 0-0 9.0-0 c6 10.e3 g4 11.f3 cxd4 12.cxd4 a5 13.d3 e6, but it contradicts the very idea of 10...g4. In that line Black’s purpose is to force the move f3, so that after 14.d5, in the line in which White sacrifices the exchange, he has to option to check from the b6-square at an opportune moment. Of course, the main idea of that particular maneuver of the bishop is to force the retreat of White’s bishop on c4 and to enable Black to play e6. Here, the bishop on g4 will have to retreat to the d7-square and Black’s loss of time becomes senseless.

8...d7. This move does not seem to be purposeful at all, since it does not attack White’s centre and it even closes the d-file for Black. Additionally, just like in the lines 7...c6 and 8...c6, Black can have the arising positions with an extra tempo, because White often provokes the move c8-d7 himself with the check from the b5-square. 9.0-0 c6 (or 9...c5 10.d5 b5 11.d3 c4 12.e2 a6 13.e3 and later White follows with e2-d4, or e3-d4) 10.e3 h8 (This move is difficult to understand – in case Black wishes to continue with f7-f5, he could have done that by removing White’s bishop on c4 with his knight from the a5-square. It is advisable for him to play: 10...a5 11.d3 c5 12.d5± 11..d2 a5, Pakula – Lubicki, Krynica 1998 (11.f3 12.f3+), 12.d3± – Black’s loss of time will hardly be fatal; nevertheless White’s opening advantage is indisputable.

8...c6. We have already mentioned in our notes to the move 7...c6 – this is simply a loss of time for Black. 9.h4 b5 (In case of 9...h5 10.f4 h7, White should not continue with: 11.xh5 a5 12.xg7 xc3+ 13.xd2 xc4 14.f5 gxf5 15.h6+ g8, Hauschild – Oest, Germany 1992, because he cannot achieve anything more than a perpetual. He has to follow instead with the simple move 11.e5± - Black’s king is quite vulnerable and if he wishes to organize some counterplay he will have to play c6-c5, thus admitting to his mistake and the time wasted.) 10.b3 a5 11.h5 a4 12.c2 c5 13.hxg6 hxg6 14.b1 – and Black will have to comply with the transposition to the line 8...d7 9.h4, except that he has already lost a tempo.

8...d7. As usual in this opening, this move has an essential drawback – the knight precludes the natural development of the bishop and in general it is quite passive on the d7-square. White can try to exploit that with a move, which has not been played in practice yet – 9.h4 with the following eventual developments: 9...c5 (9...b6 10.b3 h5 11.f4±; 9...f6 10.e5± and h4-
h5) 10.\( \text{\&} e3 \) (After 10.h5, Black has at his disposal a non-standard resource: 10...cxd4 11.cxd4 \( \text{\&} c5 \) and the consequences are a bit unclear: 12.hxg6 hxg6 13.\( \text{\&} c2 \text{\&} e6 \) 14.\( \text{\&} e3 \text{\&} x d4 \) 15.\( \text{\&} x d4 \text{\&} x d4 \) 16.0-0-0 e5 17.\( \text{\&} x d4 \text{\&} d2 \) 18.\( \text{\&} f6=\) 13.\( \text{\&} f 2 \) \( \text{\&} x e 6 \) 14.\( \text{\&} x e 6 \) 15.\( \text{\&} e 3 \) a5+ 16.\( \text{\&} f 2 \) 16.\( \text{\&} d 2 \) 17.\( \text{\&} x d 2 \) 10...c7 (or immediately 10...\( \text{\&} f 6 \) 11.f3 – the line 11.e5 \( \text{\&} d 5 \) 12.h5 \( \text{\&} e 6 \) 13.\( \text{\&} d 3 \) presents Black with some counterplay – 11...cxd4 12.cxd4 b5 13.\( \text{\&} d 3 \) a6 14.g4 – and contrary to the main lines Black has no counterplay against White’s centre.) 11.\( \text{\&} b 3 \) \( \text{\&} f 6 \) 12.e5 \( \text{\&} g 4 \) 13.\( \text{\&} f 4 \) \( \text{\&} f 4 \), White has an overwhelming advantage in the centre, while Black has no counterplay at all.

8...a6 – the idea of that move is to prepare b7-b5; but Black could have done that in another fashion – 8...\( \text{\&} d 7 \) and that would have been more consistent with the problem of his development. 9.h4 (This is a logical attempt by White to punish Black for his lag in development.) 9...h5 10.\( \text{\&} f 4 \) e6 11.g4 b5 12.\( \text{\&} b 3 \) c5 13.\( \text{\&} x h 5 \) – White has already opened the position on the kingside and Black’s defence is extremely problematic. 13...c4 14.\( \text{\&} c 2 \) e5 15.\( \text{\&} d 5 \) exd4 16.hxg6 (or 16.cxd4 \( \text{\&} e 6 \) 17.h6 \( \text{\&} e 8 \) 18.hxg7 \( \text{\&} x d 5 \) 19.\( f 3 \) f5=\( \) 16...d3. That move helps Black to complicate White’s task to materialize his advantage. (In case of 16...f x g6, White wins with: 17.\( \text{\&} g 5 \text{\&} a 5 \) 18.h5 d3 19.\( \text{\&} x c 3+ \) 20.\( \text{\&} f 1 \text{\&} a 7 \) 21.\( \text{\&} h 5 \) dxc2 22.\( \text{\&} f 6=\) 17.\( \text{\&} x d 3 \text{\&} x d 3 \) 18.\( \text{\&} g 5 \text{\&} x c 3+ \) (18...f6 19.\( \text{\&} h 5=\) 19.\( \text{\&} c 3 \) (It is also possible for White to play here: 19.\( \text{\&} f 1 \) f6 20.\( \text{\&} h 5 \text{\&} d 7 \) 21.\( \text{\&} h 6 \text{\&} e 8 \) 22.\( \text{\&} c 3 \) 19...\( \text{\&} d 5 \), or 21...\( \text{\&} x a 1 \) 22.\( \text{\&} x f 8 \) \( \text{\&} a 7 \) 23.\( \text{\&} e 7=\) 19...\( \text{\&} d 4 \) 20.\( \text{\&} c 1 \) fxg6 21.\( \text{\&} e 3 \) \( \text{\&} c 4 \) 22.\( \text{\&} g 1 \) \( \text{\&} h 7 \) 23.\( \text{\&} d 5 \) 23...\( \text{\&} x e 4 \) 24.\( \text{\&} x c 8=\), or 23...\( \text{\&} x a 2 \) 24.\( \text{\&} c 7+ \) \( \text{\&} d 7 \) 25.\( \text{\&} b 6 \) 23...g5 24.\( \text{\&} x g 5 \) \( \text{\&} h 3 \) 25.\( \text{\&} b 3 \) \( \text{\&} e 6 \) 26.\( \text{\&} x c 4 \) \( \text{\&} x c 4 \) 27.\( \text{\&} d 5=\) – and White can easily press his advantage home.

It seems too dangerous for Black to weaken the a2-g8 diagonal: 9...e5 10.h5 \( \text{\&} e 6 \). (After the move 10...\( \text{\&} c 6 \), which does not create so many weaknesses, White cannot head up with his queen to the h-file in order to create checkmate threats, but he does not need that so much. He can simply continue with: 11.\( \text{\&} x g 6 \) hxg6 12.\( \text{\&} x e 3 \) \( \text{\&} e 8 \) 13.f3 \( \text{\&} a 5 \) 14.\( \text{\&} d 3=\), followed by \( \text{\&} d 2 \) and \( \text{\&} h 6 \) and his initiative is quite stable. It is also good for White to try: 12.\( \text{\&} h 6 \) \( \text{\&} x h 6 \) 13.\( \text{\&} x h 6 \) \( \text{\&} g 5 \) 14.\( \text{\&} h 2=\) 11.\( \text{\&} x e 6 \) fx e 6 12.\( \text{\&} x g 6 \) hxg6 13.\( \text{\&} h 6 \) (It is even more energetic for White to continue with: 13.\( \text{\&} b 3 \) \( \text{\&} d 7 \) 14.\( \text{\&} x e 5 \) \( \text{\&} x e 5 \) 15.\( \text{\&} h 6=\), because Black’s kingside is considerably compromised.) 13...\( \text{\&} f 6 \) 14.f3 g5 15.\( \text{\&} x g 7 \) \( \text{\&} x g 7 \) 16.\( \text{\&} g 3 \) \( \text{\&} h 8 \) 17.\( \text{\&} h 5=\) \( \text{\&} f 7 \) 18.\( \text{\&} f 2 \) \( \text{\&} g 6 \), Beldi – Wicht, 1989.
and here the simplest line for White would have been – 19.
dxe5± and Black is a pawn down, while his king is seriously endan-
gerered.

It seems more principled for Black to play: 9...b5 10.b3 c5,
having in mind that he can counter Bd5 with a7 – that is the
point behind the move a7-a6. Well, White’s initiative is quite
strong even then: 11.h5 c6 (It is more prudent for Black to de-
defend with 11...c4 12.c2†, but after having pushed his pawn to
the c4-square, he does not have the typical counterplay against
White’s d4-pawn for that opening.) 12.d5 d7 13.hxg6 hxg6
14.f3 → and White’s attack is very dangerous: 14...cxd4 (or
14...e6 15.h3 e8 16.h7+ f8
17.h6±) 15.xc6 xc6 16.h3
f5 17.h7+ f7 18.exf5 d6
19.h6 g8 20.xd4±.

\textbf{c1}) 8...e5?!

This move is very risky now, because Black has immediate
difficulties with the defence of the f7-square.

9.a3

This is White’s most prin-
cipled reaction. He could have
played instead 9.0-0 c6, trans-
posing to the variation 8...c6
9.0-0 e5, which we analyze in out
Chapter 3.

9...e8 10.b3

Now, Black has great prob-
lems with the defence of his f7-
pawn, particularly if you have in
mind that White can also open
the f-file with the help of the
move f2-f4.

10...f6

Black can temporarily defend
the f7-square at the cost of los-
ing a couple of tempi with:
10.e6 11.d5 c8 12.0-0 b6
13.f4 a6 (or 13...exf4 14.xf4†
and Black cannot continue with
14.xd7 e6 15.xe6 fxe6 16.dxe6
h8 17.ad1++, because he loses
the game without even manage-
ing to complete his development)
14.f5±. Black is totally cramped
and he has no counterplay what-
soever. His attempt at blocking
the position: 14.xc4 15.xc4
c5, fails after: 16.dxc6 b5 17.b6+
d5 e4 18.d4!? d8 (18...exd4
19.fxg6++), but here instead of
the beautiful, but quite unclear
sacrifice – 19.fxg6 xd5 20.gxf7+
h8 21.f8+ xf8 22.xf8+ e7
23.exd5 exd4 24.a1 dx3+ 25.
h1 xc6 26.xa8 b4 27.c1
c5 28.a8 xd5 29.xf5 d6
30.g5+ h8 31.g3∞ – that
leads by force to a position in
which Black’s king is vulnerable,
but he has the material advan-
tage, Yurtaev – Khachian, Sochi
1997, White had to play: 19.\(\text{c}5\)  
\(\text{c}7\) (or 19...\(\text{x}d5\) 20.\(\text{x}b6\) \(\text{xd4}\)  
21.\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{axb6}\) 22.d5+; 19...\(\text{a}5\)  
20.\(\text{fxg6}\) \(\text{xd5}\) 21.gxf7+ \(\text{h}8\) 22. 
\(\text{f}3\)+ \(\text{x}f8\) 23.\(\text{xf3}\) \(\text{g}7\) 24.\(\text{e}6\)  
\(\text{h}6\) 25.\(\text{f}6\)+ \(\text{h}5\) 26.\(\text{af1}\) and White checkmates) 20.\(\text{xb5}\) –  
and this time White remains with a material advantage.

11.f4!? \(\text{exf}4\)

Black gives up the centre completely with: 11...\(\text{exd}4\) 12.e5  
\(\text{f}5\) 13.\(\text{xd}4\)+ and it becomes diffi- 
cult to even imagine how he can counterattack it, since it would  
not work for him to play: 13...\(\text{c}6\)  
14.d5 and the move 14...\(\text{a}5\) is unplayable due to the double-at- 
tack 15.\(\text{a}4\).

12.e5 \(\text{h}4+?!\)

Black’s more resilient defence here is 12...\(\text{f}5\)!, for example:  
13.g4 (Meanwhile, it deserves attention for White to try the  
positional approach – 13.0–0 \(\text{g}5\)  
14.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{g}6\) 15.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{h}6\) 16.\(\text{ae}1\)  
and his compensation for the pawn is more than sufficient.)  
13...\(\text{fxg}3\) (13...\(\text{d}7\) 14.\(\text{xf}4+\)) 14. 
\(\text{xf}3\) (14.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{g}h2\) 15.\(\text{xf}7+\)  
\(\text{h}8\) 16.0–0 \(\text{g}5+\) 17.\(\text{b}2\) \(\text{d}8\)  
18.\(\text{e}6\) 19.\(\text{c}6\); 14.\(\text{hxg}3\) \(\text{e}6\)  
15. 
\(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{xe}6\) 16.\(\text{xb7}\) 19.\(\text{c}6\) 14...  
\(\text{f}3\) 15.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{e}3+\) and now, in- 
stead of GM M.Krasenkov’s re- 
ommendation – 16.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{h}8\)  
17.\(\text{xf}7\) \(\text{g}4\) 18.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{d}8\), it is  
much better for White to follow  
with 16.d1 and it becomes clear  
that White’s king must put up  
with a series of checks indeed,  
which are in fact harmless, while  
Black loses his f7-pawn with  
nearly disastrous consequences.  
He can try to save his f7-pawn  
with the move 16...\(\text{Be}6\), but sud- 
denly White counters that with  
17.\(\text{c}1\) – and Black’s queen gets  
trapped.

13.g3! \(\text{fxg}3\) 14.\(\text{xf}7+\) \(\text{h}8\)  
15.0–0 \(\text{g}2\) 16.\(\text{hg}1\) \(\text{d}8\)

17.e6. White’s passed pawn is  
not only going forward, but it  
paralyzes Black’s queenside in  
the process. Later in the game  
Lputian – Yegiazarian, Erevan  
2000, there followed: 17...\(\text{c}6\)? (17...\(\text{g}5+\) 18.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{c}6\) 19.\(\text{c}2\)  
\(\text{f}6\) 20.\(\text{e}4\) 18.\(\text{xg}2\) \(\text{e}4\)  
19.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{b}5\) 20.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{e}3\) 21. 
\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{xe}6\) 22.\(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{xe}6\) 23. 
\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{c}4\) (23...\(\text{f}7\) 24.\(\text{axg}6\)+)  
24.\(\text{axg}6\) \(\text{hxg}6\) 25.\(\text{xg}6\) \(\text{d}7\)  
26.\(\text{h}5+\) \(\text{g}8\) 27.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{d}3\) 28. 
\(\text{b}2\) \(\text{b}2\) and Black resigned in  
view of the line 28...\(\text{h}7\) 29.\(\text{e}6\)+  
\(\text{f}7\) 30.\(\text{xg}7+\).

c2) 8...\(\text{b}6\)

This is the Simagin variation  
– with the idea to fianchetto the  
light-squared bishop on \(\text{b}7\). Later  
it turned out that White’s attack-  
}
were too great and Black preferred the moves 8...d7 and 8...c6, that we are going to deal with further in this chapter.

9.h4

This is extremely effective after this order of moves. Black had so many disasters in this line that he started looking for some other moves instead of 8...b6. The moment White starts his kingside offensive with h4 – the move b7-b6 becomes obsolete.

We will now analyze c2a) 9...a6 and c2b) 9...c6.

Black’s other possibilities are:

In the game Platonov – Simkin, Dnepropetrovsk 1964, he prevented opening of the h-file with the move 9...h5 and he countered 10.f4 with 10...a6. The game continued with: 11.d5 (White would not change much if he plays 11.b3, without of the inclusion of the moves d5 and c6: 11...d6 12.e5 xe5 and it is not advisable for him to continue with 13.f3 – 13.dxe5 xe5= – 13...g7 14.g4 hxg4 15.xg4 x6 16.h3 c8, or 14.h3 c6 15.g3 e6 16.e3 e7; 16.xh5 xd4 17.cxd4 xxd4. The following sacrifice is with quite unclear consequences: 11.xg6 xc4 12.xf8 c5 13.xh5 xf8 14.xh3 d7 15.g3 f6 16xf3 wh8.) 11...c6 12.b3 d6, with the idea to play either c6-c5, or e7-e5; White continued with 13.e5, but that led to the sharing of the point after: 13...xe5 14.dxe5 xe5+ 15.e3 xc3+ 16.d2 e5+ 17.e3 c3+ 18.d2 – and a draw was agreed. It is evident that White’s simplest decision would have been just not to avoid the trade of the light-squared bishops, since it does not solve any of Black’s numerous problems: 11.e2 xc4 (or 11...c8 12.xg6++; 11...xd4 12.h3 xc4 13.xc4 g7 14.xg6++;) 12.xc4 e6 and here after 13.g4 h4 14.h5 g5 15.h6 – Black’s king is quite vulnerable;

The move 9...b7 does not prevent the accomplishment of White’s plans at all and having in mind that the h-file will soon be opened Black can hardly afford that – 10.d3 and now:

the move 10...e5 exposes the king too much after 11.h5 f6 12.hxg6 hxg6 13.h3++ Razuvaev – Gutman, Rostov 1976;

10...c6 11.h5 a5 12.hxg6, and Black is forced to part with a pawn in order to avoid the worst: 12...xc4 13.gxh7+ h8 14.xc4 xe4 15.xd4 Bajec – Gheorghiu, Ljubljana 1969, and Black’s position was very worrisome – his king was very weak and could have got checkmated.
at some moment by a white knight from g6;

Black's attempt to bring his knight into the defence: 10...\(\mathcal{d}d7\) 11.h5 \(\mathcal{f}f6\), Fedorowicz – Bidwell, San Mateo 1989, can be best countered by White with: 12.hg hxg6 (12...\(\mathcal{x}e4\) 13.\(\mathcal{x}f7\) \(\mathcal{h}7\) 14.\(\mathcal{x}xh7+\) \(\mathcal{g}xh7\) 15.\(\mathcal{w}h3++\)) 13.e5+ and his attack is decisive;

Black would not change much with: 10...\(\mathcal{w}d7\) 11.h5 \(\mathcal{g}4\) (He just blunders a pawn with 11...b5? 12.\(\mathcal{w}xh5\). The counter measure – 12...\(\mathcal{x}e4\) 13.\(\mathcal{x}xe4\) \(\mathcal{w}xh5\) 14.\(\mathcal{w}xh6\) \(\mathcal{x}xh7\) 15.\(\mathcal{w}h3++\), does not work, because of 15.\(\mathcal{w}g4\)!! – It is equally hopeless for Black to try: 12...\(\mathcal{w}d7\) 13.\(\mathcal{w}g3\) c5 14.hxg6 hxg6 15.\(\mathcal{w}h6\) \(\mathcal{x}xh6\) 16.\(\mathcal{x}xh6\) \(\mathcal{g}5\) 17.\(\mathcal{w}d2\) 1-0 Tolush – Simagin, Leningrad 1951; Black’s position is very bad too after: 11...e5 12. hxg6 hxg6 13.\(\mathcal{g}3\) \(\mathcal{x}xe4\) 14.\(\mathcal{h}4\) \(\mathcal{e}8\) 15.\(\mathcal{f}f8\) 16.\(\mathcal{h}6++\) and he either gets checkmated, or he loses a lot of material, Frankisla – Kekki, Finland 2001.)

12.\(\mathcal{g}3\) (or simply 12.f3, since the line: 12...\(\mathcal{w}xe4\) 13.\(\mathcal{g}3\) \(\mathcal{h}3\) 14. hxg6 – is extremely dangerous for Black) 12...\(\mathcal{d}d7\) 13.hxg6 hxg6 14.\(\mathcal{h}3\) \(\mathcal{f}f6\) 15.f3 \(\mathcal{d}7\) 16.\(\mathcal{h}6\) \(\mathcal{x}xh6\) 17.\(\mathcal{f}f6\) \(\mathcal{g}7\) and White's attack ended up in a swift checkmate: 18.\(\mathcal{e}3\) \(\mathcal{h}7\) (18...\(\mathcal{h}8\) 19.\(\mathcal{f}f5++\)) 19.\(\mathcal{h}3\) \(\mathcal{h}8\) 20.\(\mathcal{h}6+\) \(\mathcal{g}8\) 21.\(\mathcal{x}xg6+\) \(\mathcal{f}x8\) 22.\(\mathcal{xf}7\) Ardin – Miller, England 1993;

Black's most tenacious defence here is – 10...h6, Garcia Vicente – Semenova, Poland 1979, in order to prevent opening of the h-file. Still, for example after: 11.h5 (11.\(\mathcal{f}4\) e6; 11.f4 \(\mathcal{c}6\) 11...g5 12.f4 gxrf4 13.\(\mathcal{xf}4\), the position of the black king has been seriously compromised, i.e.: 13...e6 14.e5 c5 15.\(\mathcal{b}3\), followed by \(\mathcal{c}2\) with a powerful attack.

9...e5 (This is also very risky because Black cannot cover the a2-g8 diagonal with the move e6 anymore.) 10.h5. The play is now more or less forced: 10... exd4 11.hxg6 hxg6 12.cxd4 \(\mathcal{e}7\) 13.\(\mathcal{g}3\) (It also deserves attention for White to follow with 13.\(\mathcal{b}3\)! in order to prevent Black's bishop from being developed to the e6-square.) 13...\(\mathcal{c}6\) (In case of 13...\(\mathcal{e}6\), Venalainen – Muir, corr. 1971, White can simply exchange on e6 and follow that with \(\mathcal{h}6\), as well as he can try: 14.\(\mathcal{a}3\) \(\mathcal{c}e4\) 15.\(\mathcal{h}3!!\); 14...c5 15.d5, since it is too bad for Black to capture on a1: 15...\(\mathcal{a}1\) a1 16.dxe6 fxe6 17.e5 \(\mathcal{f}7\) 18.\(\mathcal{h}3++\), because White's threats are decisive. Black has also tried in practice: 13...\(\mathcal{e}8\) 14.\(\mathcal{h}6\) and here either: 14...\(\mathcal{e}4\) 15.\(\mathcal{e}4\) \(\mathcal{e}4\) 16.\(\mathcal{g}7\) \(\mathcal{x}g7\) 17.\(\mathcal{d}5++\); or 14...\(\mathcal{c}6\) 15.\(\mathcal{g}7\) \(\mathcal{x}g7\) 16.\(\mathcal{d}2!\) \(\mathcal{b}4\) 17.\(\mathcal{d}5\) \(\mathcal{xd}2+\) 18.\(\mathcal{xd}2\) \(\mathcal{b}7\) 19.\(\mathcal{a}1++\); 16...\(\mathcal{e}4\) 17.0–0! \(\mathcal{e}7\) 18.\(\mathcal{h}6+\) \(\mathcal{f}6\) 19.\(\mathcal{d}3\) \(\mathcal{g}4\) 20.\(\mathcal{h}3!\) \(\mathcal{xd}4\) 21.\(\mathcal{xd}4\) \(\mathcal{xe}2\) 22.\(\mathcal{e}4+\) 1-0 Berliner – Messere, corr. 1965; or 14...\(\mathcal{h}8\) 15.e5 \(\mathcal{e}6\) 16.\(\mathcal{e}6\) \(\mathcal{e}6\) 17.\(\mathcal{f}4\) \(\mathcal{c}6\) 18.\(\mathcal{f}1\) – Black barely manages to
defend his kingside. In the latter variation, it is less precise for White to play 15.0–0–0, because Black can capture the pawn - 15...\textit{\textsc{x}}e4 16.\textit{\textsc{x}}e4 \textit{\textsc{x}}e4 and in case of 17.\textit{\textsc{c}}c3 \textit{\textsc{d}}d5, he has the resource: 17...\textit{\textsc{e}}e8 18.\textit{\textsc{d}}d5 \textit{\textsc{b}}7 19.\textit{\textsc{x}}c7 \textit{\textsc{c}}8 – and despite the fact that he is still worse after 20.\textit{\textsc{f}}4, he has avoided being checkmated.) 14.\textit{\textsc{a}}a3 (White did not get much after 14.\textit{\textsc{h}}6 \textit{\textsc{x}}h6 15.\textit{\textsc{x}}h6 \textit{\textsc{g}}7 16.\textit{\textsc{h}}2 \textit{\textsc{b}}7 17.0–0–0± in the game Stocek – Jansa, Lazne Bohdanec 1997). White evidently achieves a great advantage in the complications after: 14...\textit{\textsc{b}}b4 15.\textit{\textsc{g}}3 \textit{\textsc{c}}2+ (or 15...\textit{\textsc{e}}e6, Schuh – Gruenberg, Germany 1982, 16.\textit{\textsc{c}}1±) 16.\textit{\textsc{d}}d1 \textit{\textsc{x}}xa3 17.\textit{\textsc{w}}xg6. Black is practically forced to give up his queen now: 17...\textit{\textsc{d}}d8 18.\textit{\textsc{xf}}7+ \textit{\textsc{xf}}7 (18...\textit{\textsc{f}}8 19.\textit{\textsc{h}}h8+) 19.\textit{\textsc{h}}h8 \textit{\textsc{x}}h8 20.\textit{\textsc{xf}}7±, and Black will hardly be able to defend his stranded knight as well as his king simultaneously.

c2a) 9...\textit{\textsc{a}}a6

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.3\textwidth]{chess-diagram.png}
\end{center}

Looks too risky: after Black presents White with an additional tempo to bring his queen into the attack with \textit{\textsc{d}}d3 followed by \textit{\textsc{h}}h3 and places his knight quite unfavorably on top of that.

10.\textit{\textsc{xa}}6 \textit{\textsc{xa}}6 11.\textit{\textsc{h}}5 \textit{\textsc{c}}5

11...\textit{\textsc{d}}d7 12.hxg6 fxg6 (It is hopeless for Black to play: 12...hxg6 13.\textit{\textsc{d}}d3+– Stean – Zecevic, Bar 1977.) 13.\textit{\textsc{b}}3+ \textit{\textsc{e}}6 (Black can somehow try to hold the position thanks to that move.) 14.\textit{\textsc{e}}3 c5 (It is more prudent for him to defend with 14...\textit{\textsc{c}}6, Marquez – El Amri, Buenos Aires 1978, but that would not solve all his problems either: 15.\textit{\textsc{d}}d1 \textit{\textsc{c}}7 16.\textit{\textsc{f}}4 \textit{\textsc{ae}}8 17.\textit{\textsc{d}}d3 \textit{\textsc{f}}7 18.\textit{\textsc{dh}}3 \textit{\textsc{h}}8 19.\textit{\textsc{e}}3 \textit{\textsc{ef}}8 20.\textit{\textsc{g}}1!? \textit{\textsc{f}}6 21.\textit{\textsc{f}}3 \textit{\textsc{h}}5 and here after the simple move 22.\textit{\textsc{h}}4+, Black will have to exchange his bishop on \textit{\textsc{f}}6 for the knight in order to be able to protect his g6-pawn.) 15.\textit{\textsc{d}}d1 cxd4 16.cxd4 \textit{\textsc{c}}7 17.\textit{\textsc{f}}4± and White preserves a great positional advantage, Borwell – McLardy, England 1967.

12.hxg6 hxg6

The other possible capture is at least equally dangerous: 12...fxg6 13.\textit{\textsc{b}}3+ \textit{\textsc{f}}7 14.\textit{\textsc{hxh}}7 e5 (14...cxd4 15.\textit{\textsc{h}}6+– Podgorny – Sajtar, Prague 1954) 15.\textit{\textsc{h}}6 \textit{\textsc{hxh}}7 16.\textit{\textsc{x}}f7 \textit{\textsc{hxh}}6 17.0–0–0 \textit{\textsc{g}}5+ (Now, Black can defend against the check along the \textit{\textsc{h}}-file with his queen thanks to his move fourteen.) 18.f4 \textit{\textsc{x}}g2 (18...\textit{\textsc{h}}4 19.\textit{\textsc{e}}7! \textit{\textsc{f}}6 20.\textit{\textsc{b}}7) 19.\textit{\textsc{g}}1 \textit{\textsc{xe}}4 20.f5 \textit{\textsc{e}}3+ 21.\textit{\textsc{d}}1 (21.\textit{\textsc{b}}2! \textit{\textsc{xe}}2+ 22.\textit{\textsc{a}}3+–) 21...
7.\texttt{c}c4 0-0 8.\texttt{d}e2 b6 9.h4

13...\texttt{c}8 14.\texttt{g}3 \texttt{cxd}4 15.\texttt{cxd}4 \texttt{b}4

Black's other attempts would not work either:

after 15...\texttt{c}2, Meriste – Grusman, corr. 1966, White’s simplest winning line is: 16.\texttt{h}3 \texttt{f}6 17.\texttt{h}h6 \texttt{c}8 (17...\texttt{x}xh6 18.\texttt{x}xh6 \texttt{f}7 19.\texttt{h}7+) and here even 18.\texttt{b}3+ e6 19.\texttt{f}4+–;

or 15...\texttt{e}6 16.f3 (It also deserves attention for White to try here the immediate 16.\texttt{h}2!?)

16...\texttt{b}4 17.\texttt{h}4 \texttt{f}6 18.\texttt{h}7+ \texttt{f}7 19.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{c}2+ 20.\texttt{f}2 \texttt{c}4 21.\texttt{x}g6+ \texttt{g}8 22.d5 \texttt{d}4+ 23.\texttt{g}3 \texttt{x}a1 24.\texttt{e}e6 \texttt{f}5 25.\texttt{h}7+ \texttt{f}7 26.\texttt{g}5+ \texttt{e}8 27.\texttt{g}6+ \texttt{d}8 28.\texttt{e}6+ \texttt{c}8 29.\texttt{xf}8 and the game Womack – Menzel, corr. 1970 ended up in a win for White after: 29...\texttt{xf}6 (29...\texttt{x}f8 30.\texttt{c}6+ \texttt{b}8 31.\texttt{f}4+–) 30.\texttt{e}8+ \texttt{b}7 31.\texttt{d}7+ \texttt{a}6 32.\texttt{e}6 \texttt{g}6+ 33.\texttt{f}2 \texttt{e}5 34.\texttt{a}4+ \texttt{b}7 35.\texttt{c}6+ \texttt{b}8 36.\texttt{h}8+ with a checkmate to follow.

White's attack seems to be quite convincing, but Black overlooked an amazing resource on his move 19 and that was – 19...\texttt{d}3+!, deflecting White's knight and threatening to trap his opponent's queen on the h7-square. White had to play then: 20.\texttt{xd}3 \texttt{h}8 21.\texttt{x}g6+, but that position could be better only for Black: 21...\texttt{g}6 22.\texttt{x}h8 \texttt{c}4 23.\texttt{f}4+ \texttt{f}7 24.\texttt{xa}8 \texttt{c}3+. Well, White could have also played a bit better, preventing Black from being able to create the threat \texttt{f}8-h8: 19.\texttt{h}6 \texttt{g}8 20.
\( \text{\textcopyright f4 and White wins, for example after: 20...\textit{\textcopyright}c4 21.\textit{\textcopyright}xg6+ \textit{\textcopyright}f8 22.\textit{\textcopyright}xg7+-}. \)

16.\textit{\textcopyright}h4 f5
After 16...f6 17.\textit{\textcopyright}h7+ \textit{\textcopyright}f7 18.\textit{\textcopyright}h6 \textit{\textcopyright}g8 19.\textit{\textcopyright}f4 \textit{\textcopyright}c3+ 20. \textit{\textcopyright}e2, White’s king avoids easily the checks: 20...\textit{\textcopyright}c4+ 21.\textit{\textcopyright}f3 \textit{\textcopyright}c3+ 22.\textit{\textcopyright}g4++ Fuderer – Filip, Gothenburg 1955.
17.\textit{\textcopyright}h7+ \textit{\textcopyright}f7

18.\textit{\textcopyright}h6! (It is worse for White to play 18.\textit{\textcopyright}f4 \textit{\textcopyright}c6, as well as 18.\textit{\textcopyright}h6 \textit{\textcopyright}d3+ 19.\textit{\textcopyright}d2 \textit{\textcopyright}e6, followed by \textit{\textcopyright}h8 Laschek – Herzig, corr. 1957) 18...\textit{\textcopyright}g8, and now White has the amazing move 19.\textit{\textcopyright}c1 (He cannot achieve anything with: 19.0–0 fxe4 20.\textit{\textcopyright}g3 \textit{\textcopyright}d3 21.\textit{\textcopyright}xe4 \textit{\textcopyright}f5=) – White’s rook is under the enemy knight’s fork, but it thus frees the knight from the defence of the c3-square. White is evidently winning already: 19...\textit{\textcopyright}d3+ (19...\textit{\textcopyright}e6 20.\textit{\textcopyright}f4 \textit{\textcopyright}xe4+ 21.\textit{\textcopyright}f1+-) 20.\textit{\textcopyright}d2 \textit{\textcopyright}xc1 21.\textit{\textcopyright}f4 (White is now threatening to capture on g6 as well as \textit{\textcopyright}e6+.) 21...\textit{\textcopyright}c6 22.\textit{\textcopyright}e5 and he is winning, since the threat – e6+ is impossible to parry.

c2b) 9...\textit{\textcopyright}c6

This is probably the only move that gives Black some chances to defend against the kingside attack.

10.\textit{\textcopyright}d5!?

This move was introduced in the tournament practice by B.Spassky. White is practically forcing the moves \textit{\textcopyright}d7 and e6, and the position of the black king is becoming even more dangerous.

10...\textit{\textcopyright}d7

10...\textit{\textcopyright}d7 – Black’s bishop is obviously not well placed here in view of the move b7-b6, which he has already played. 11.h5 e6 12.\textit{\textcopyright}b3 \textit{\textcopyright}a5 13.e5 (It also deserves attention for White here to follow with: 13.hxg6 fxg6 14.\textit{\textcopyright}d3 \textit{\textcopyright}f6 15.\textit{\textcopyright}g3↑) 13...c5 14.\textit{\textcopyright}d3 \textit{\textcopyright}xb3 15.axb3 cxd4 16.cxd4 f5 17.hxg6 hxg6 18.\textit{\textcopyright}f4 g5 (Black would hardly fare much better defending his g6-pawn with a move like 18...\textit{\textcopyright}g5 – his queen might come under attack by White’s bishop on c1: 19.\textit{\textcopyright}h3 \textit{\textcopyright}fc8 20.\textit{\textcopyright}e3 \textit{\textcopyright}c3 21. \textit{\textcopyright}d5++; 20...\textit{\textcopyright}g4 21.\textit{\textcopyright}wh2!? with the idea to follow with \textit{\textcopyright}xe6
and f2–f3, although White could have simply traded queens winning Black's g6–pawn. 21...\(=\)c3 22.\(\text{a}h7+\) \(\text{a}f7\) 23.d5\(\pm\); 21...\(\text{a}a7\) 22.\(\text{f}xe6\) \(\text{a}xe6\) 23.f3 \(\text{a}h5\) 24.\(\text{g}g1\) \(\text{g}6\) \(\text{c}6\) (19...\(\text{c}e8\) 20.\(\text{c}h3\) \(\text{c}6\) 21.\(\text{h}7+\) \(\text{f}7\) 22.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{g}8\) 23.\(\text{h}8\) \(\text{+}\) 20.\(\text{h}3\)! \(\text{xd}4\) 21.\(\text{e}7\) \(\text{f}7\) 22.\(\text{h}5+\) \(\text{xe}7\) 23.\(=\)a3+ \(\text{d}7\) 24.\(\text{x}d1\) \(\text{xd}1+\) 25.\(\text{xd}1\) \(\text{d}5\) 26.\(\text{h}7\) and Black resigned.

It is too passive for Black to play 10...\(\text{b}7\) 11.h5, and White's attack is very powerful, for example: 11...\(\text{e}6\) 12.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{a}5\) (both 12...\(\text{f}6\) 13.e5 \(\text{e}7\) 14.hxg6 fxg6 15.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{d}8\) 16.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 17.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{h}8\) 18.\(\text{g}6\) 1-0 Plischki – Novotny, Litomysl 2004; and 12...g5 13.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{f}6\) 14.e5 \(\text{e}7\) 15.f4 \(\text{a}5\) 16.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{f}5\) 17.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 18.\(\text{fxg}5\) \(\text{f}7\) 19.\(=\)d3+– Thirion – Doudou, corr. 1994 are bad) 13.\(\text{hxg}6\) \(\text{hxg}6\) 14.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{xb}3\) (Black fails to do anything admirable with: 14...c5 15.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{e}8\) 16.\(\text{h}7+\) \(\text{f}8\) 17.e5 \(\text{xb}3\) 18.axb3 \(\text{d}5\) 19.\(\text{g}5++\), because White has the unavoidable threat – \(\text{f}6\), Frederiks – Hosnedl, corr. 1995) 15.axb3 \(\text{f}5\) (15...e5 16.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 17.d5 \(\text{c}8\) 18.\(\text{h}7+\) \(\text{f}7\) 19.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{g}8\) 20.f4\(\pm\), and Black was defenceless in the game Petran – Krnic, Belgrade 1977) 16.\(\text{g}3\) (It is also good for White to play here 16.e5, since in case Black captures 16...\(\text{x}e5\) – otherwise White's kingside attack is running unopposed and for free – there would follow: 17.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{g}7\) 18.\(\text{g}6\) \(\text{f}6\) 19.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{g}2\) 20.\(\text{gb}1\) \(\text{f}7\) 21.\(=\)f4 – Migicovsky – Hryniw, corr. 1999.) 16...\(\text{x}e4\) (16...\(\text{f}6\) 17.e5 \(\text{f}7\) 18.\(\text{f}4++;\) 16...\(\text{f}7\) 17.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{g}5\) 18.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{g}4\) 19.\(\text{g}5\) –) 17.\(\text{g}xg6\) \(\text{f}6\) 17...\(\text{e}8\) 18.\(\text{h}7+\) \(\text{f}7\) 19.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{g}8\) 20.\(\text{f}4++;\) 18.\(\text{h}5\) (\(\Delta\)g5) 18...\(\text{e}5\) 18...\(\text{e}7\) 19.\(\text{f}4++;\) in case of 18...\(\text{f}8\), it is quite sufficient for White to continue with: 19.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{f}7\) 20.\(\text{h}7+\) \(\text{f}8\) 21.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{ec}8\) 22.\(\text{h}6++;\) \(\Delta\) \(\text{h}6\) 23.\(\text{h}8+\) \(\text{g}8\) 24.\(\text{g}6++;\) it is possibly better for Black to try here: 18...\(\text{f}4\), but White can simply capture that pawn – 19.\(\text{xf}4\) 19.\(\text{h}7+\) \(\text{f}7\) 20.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{d}8\) (20...\(\text{e}7\) 21.\(\text{g}6\) \(\text{g}8\) 22.\(\text{h}6++;\) 20...\(\text{h}8\) 21.\(\text{xf}6+\) \(\text{f}6\) 22.\(\text{d}xe5+\) \(\text{f}7\) 23.e6+ \(\text{f}6\) 24.\(\text{g}5++;\) 21.\(\text{g}6\) \(\text{g}8\) 22.\(\text{h}6\) and Black resigned, because in case of 22...\(\text{f}8\), White wins with 23.\(\text{dxe}5\) and \(\text{f}6++;\) Timman – Riemersma, Rotterdam 1997.

11.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{e}6\)

Black is in fact losing a tempo in case of: 11...\(\text{a}6\) 12.hxg6 hxg6 13.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{e}6\) 14.\(\text{g}4\) – and Black failed to repel the white bishop from b3, while after 14...\(\text{fd}8\), White has the sacrifice 15.\(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{exe}6\) 16.\(\text{g}6\) with a victorious attack: 16...\(\text{c}4\) 17.\(\text{h}7+\) \(\text{f}7\) 18.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{g}8\) 19.\(\text{h}3++;\) and Black was defenceless against the threats \(\text{g}7\) and the check from \(\text{f}3\) in the game Spassky – Timman, Amsterdam 1977 (see Game 1).

12.\(\text{b}3\)
12...a6

Black’s position is quite difficult after 12...e5 13.hxg6 hxg6 14.h6 a6 15.hxh6 g7 16. d2 a6 17.g3, threatening f5+ Finegold – De Boer, Wijk aan Zee 1992. White’s win in that game was seemingly quite convincing: 17...g4 (17...h8 18. h5+! gxh5 19.g5++ 18.d5 (18.h5+? gxh5 19.xc6 xe4+) 18...b7 19.h5!? gxh5 (White’s attack is decisive if Black does not capture the rook.) 20.f5+ f6 21.xc6 xc6 22.dxe5+ xe5 (22.e6 23.d4+ d7 24. xc6+ c8=) 23.d4+ e6 24.f3 (24.g7=) 24...xg2 25.c4+ e5! (25...d7 26.0-0-0+ c8 27.xc6=+ 26.xc6 xf3? 27. xc7+ xe4 28.g3+ d3 29. d6+ c4 30.b4+ d5 31. d1+ xd1+ 32.xd1 and White turned his material advantage into a whole point. Still, according to GM Y. Seirawan’s analysis, after the correct line for Black: 26.g1+ 27.e2 h2+! (27...xa1? 28.xc7+ f6 29. d6+ g5 30.h6#) 28.d3 (28. e3 f4+) 28...fd8+! 29.c4 ac8 White can hardly attack Black’s king successfully in that position.

It is evident that White cannot achieve more than a draw with the piece sacrifice, so we have to analyze for him some other possibilities on move nineteen: 19.h3 h8 (19...f4 20. dxe5 xd2+ 21.xd2=) 20.dxe5 (20.f5+? gx5) 20...xh3 21. gxh3 f3∞.

White should obviously simply capture the pawn: 19.dxe5!? and he maintains his advantage easily: 19...h8 20.xh8 xh8 21.e6+ fxe6 (21...f6 22.d1 h4 23.e2 h2 24.c4+) 22.xc6 xc6 23.d4+ h7 (23...g8 24. d8=) 24.c4++, capturing on c7; or 19...xe5 20.xb7 ad8 21.d5 e6 22.h2 (22.c4 xd5 23.cxd5 c4 24.c1 e5 25.f1 e8=) 22...xd5 23.h6+ f6 24.h4 c8 (24...e6 25.f4 d3+ 26.d2 dxe4 27.g5+ g7 28. h5=) 25.e3 e6 26.f1 e7 27.e1= and Black’s king is stranded in the centre in a board full of pieces.

Black’s best chance possibly is: 12...a5 (eliminating the dangerous bishop immediately) 13.hxg6 (or 13.d3 e5 14.hxg6 hxg6 15.g3 xb3 16.axb3 e8 17.h2 Berkes – Navara, Balatonlelle 2003, with a strong attack for White) 13...fxg6 (As usual, it is too dangerous for Black to capture with his h-pawn: 13...hxg6 14.d3 e5 15. g3 xb3 16.axb3 e8 17.h4 f6 18.h7+ f7 19.h6 g8 20.dxe5. In case of 20...fxe5,
White wins immediately with the move 21.\(\text{Nh}3++\); Black is therefore forced to play: 20...\(\text{Wc}6\)
21.\(\text{exf}6\) \(\text{Wxf}6\) 22.\(\text{Axg}7\) \(\text{Axg}7\) 23.\(\text{Wh}4++\), but White materialized his extra pawn in the game Harikrishna – Azmaiparashvili, Pune 2004.) 14.\(\text{Wd}3\) \(\text{Qxb}3\) 15.\(\text{axb}3\) c5, Klima – Oral, Czech Republic 2001 (or 15...\(\text{Wf}7\), Piliniosan – Shemagonov, corr. 1991, 16.\(\text{Wg}3\) – it is also possible for White to follow with 16.f3!?± – 16...\(\text{Ab}7\) 17.e5 and then \(\text{Ah}6\) with a slight edge), so now after 16.\(\text{Ah}6\)±, White maintains his positional advantage.

13.\(\text{hxg}6\) \(\text{hxg}6\) 14.\(\text{Qf}4\) \(\text{f}8\)
14...\(\text{We}7\) 15.\(\text{Ah}3\) (It is worse for White to continue with 15.\(\text{Wg}4\), due to 15...\(\text{Qxd}4\) – this is a typical tactical strike, whenever Black’s bishop is on the a6-square, since it cuts off the f1-square for White’s king – 16.\(\text{Qxg}6\) \(\text{Cc}2\) 17.\(\text{Qxc}2\) \(\text{Qxc}3\) 18.\(\text{Qd}2\) \(\text{Qxd}2\) 19.\(\text{Qxd}2\) \(\text{Wfd}8\)∞) 15...\(\text{Qa}5\) 16.\(\text{Qh}5\) \(\text{Qh}8\) (It is also bad for Black to capture the piece: 16...\(\text{gxh}5\) 17.\(\text{Wxh}5\) \(\text{f}6\) 18.\(\text{Wh}7\) \(\text{Qf}7\) 19.\(\text{Qh}6\) \(\text{Ag}8\) 20.\(\text{Ag}3\) \(\text{Qf}8\) 21.\(\text{Qxg}7\) \(\text{Axg}7\) 22.\(\text{Qxe}6+\) \(\text{Qxe}6\) 23.\(\text{Qxg}7\), because he has to give up his queen in order to avoid being checkmated.) 17.\(\text{Qd}2\) and White’s threats were decisive in the game Enricci – Palmo, corr. 1994.

14...\(\text{Qa}5\) 15.\(\text{Qf}3\) c5 16.\(\text{Wh}3\) \(\text{f}8\) 17.\(\text{Wh}7+\) \(\text{Qf}8\) 18.\(\text{Qg}6+\) (White has a crushing attack.) 18...\(\text{fxg}6\) 19.\(\text{Qh}3\) \(\text{Qe}7\) 20.\(\text{Qh}6\) \(\text{Qf}7\) (or 20...\(\text{Qxh}6\) 21.\(\text{Qh}8+\) \(\text{Qf}7\) 22.\(\text{Qf}3+\) with a checkmate) 21.\(\text{Qh}8+\) \(\text{Qe}7\) 22.\(\text{Qg}5+\) \(\text{Qf}6\) 23.\(\text{Qxf}6+\) \(\text{Qxf}6\) 24.\(\text{Qxa}8\) \(\text{cxd}4\) 25.\(\text{Qh}7+\) \(\text{Qf}7\) 26.\(\text{Qh}8\) \(\text{Qxh}7\) 27.\(\text{Qxh}7+\) \(\text{Qe}8\) 28.\(\text{Qg}6+\) 1-0 Smith – Cartagena, Email 1999.

Bad is 14...\(\text{Qfd}8\) 15.\(\text{Qxe}6!\) \(\text{fxe}6\) 16.\(\text{Qg}4\), and he has to waste additional time for 16...\(\text{Qc}8\), with disastrous consequences: 17.\(\text{Qxg}6\) \(\text{Qxd}4\) (17...\(\text{Qf}7\)? 18.\(\text{Qh}8+\)?) 18.\(\text{Qh}3!\) \(\text{Qxb}3\) (18...\(\text{Qf}8\) 19.\(\text{cxd}4\) –) 19.\(\text{Qh}7+\) \(\text{Qf}8\) 20.\(\text{Qf}3+\) \(\text{Qf}7\) 21.\(\text{Qh}6++\) and Black loses plenty of material, Cramling – Kindermann, Hamburg 1991.

15.\(\text{Qb}3\) (White can also play here 15.\(\text{Qxe}6!\) ? \(\text{fxe}6\) 16.\(\text{Qg}4\) with an attack.) 15...\(\text{Qa}5\) 16.\(\text{Qg}4\) \(\text{c}6\) 17.\(\text{Qg}6\)± Stocek – Oralc, Czech Republic 1998, and once again White’s attack is very powerful.
Chapter 2

1.d4 ♜f6 2.c4 g6 3.♗c3 d5 4.cxd5 ♜xd5 5.e4 ♜xc3 6.bxc3 ♗g7 7.♗c4 0–0 8.♕e2 ♗d7

This is one of the acceptable ways to play the line with b6, ♘b7, ♗c6-a5, decreasing the power of the immediate h4-h5 attack in the process.

9.0–0

Should White play 9.h4, Black has the resource 9...b5, organizing some counterplay immediately: 10.♕d5 c6 11.♗b3 a5 12.h5 a4 13.♗c2 c5 (Black is forced to play actively notwithstanding the creation of some pawn weaknesses.) 14.hxg6 fxg6 15.♗h6 ♘xh6 16.♗xh6 cxd4 17.♗xd4 ♗a6 18.♗b1 e5 19.♗xb5 ♗f7 20.f3 ♗xa2, and White fails to exploit the misplacement of the black queen on a2: 21.♗c7 ♘a7 22.♕d5 ♘c6 23.♗a1 ♘b2 24.♗h2 ♘e6 25.♗xa4 ♘xa4 26.♗xa4 ♘a8 and Black has a sufficient counter-

In the game Azmaiparashvili – Epishin, Tallinn 1986, White had some advantage after 9.♗b1 b6 10.0–0 ♘b7 (The position, arising after 10...♗a6 11.♗xa6 ♘xa6 12.♕e3 is analyzed in our book after the following order of moves: 9.0–0 b6 10.♕e3 ♘a6 11.♗xa6 ♘xa6 12.♗b1.) 11.f3 ♗c6 12.♗b5 (This is a quite standard idea for this line – White prevents the manoeuvre ♗c6-a5, and if Black starts repelling that bishop with a6 and b5, his queenside gets weakened and particularly the c5 square.) 12...♗d8 (In spite of all 12...a6 13.♗a4 b5 14.♗b3 ♘a5 15.♗a3± with a slight edge for White was Black’s best chance, Milov – Yermolinsky, Groningen 1998.) 13.d5 ♗c8 14.♗g5! ♗f6 15.♗xf6 ♘xf6 16.♗xc6 ♘xc6 17.♕d4†, and the position was too perilous for Black in the game, Azmaiparashvili – Epishin, Tallinn 1986.

Black can try to exploit the circumstance that in the 9.♗b1 variation White postpones his
castling and he can attack the e4 and g2-pawns with the move 9...g4, after which the only way for White to defend both pawns is to make a move with his knight on e2 and thus to enable Black to exchange queens: 10...xf4 (It also deserves some attention for White to try here: 10...xf4 xg2 11.g3 h3 12.xc7 c6 13.b5 10...xd1+ 11.xd1. The arising endgame however, is not so good for Black: 11...c6 12.a3 e8 13.e5 e6?! — this move compromises the dark squares (13...b5 14.d3 a5 15.c2 a6 16.e2!) 14.e2 (White should seriously consider here the alternative: 14.e2!? with the idea to bring his knight to the e4-outpost via the g3-square.) 14...b6 15.d6 f8 (15...b7?) 16.xf8 xf8 17.h4 a6 18.xa6 xa6 19.d3 ac8 (or 19...c5 20.xc5 xc5 21.xc5 bxc5 22.b7) 20.b3 c7 21.h5 g7 (21...c5 22.a3 b8 23.dxc5 bxc5 24.hxg6 hxg6 25.h4+) 22.f4 b8 23.b2 d7 24.e4 and White maintains his advantage due to the vulnerability of the f6 and d6-squares and the possibility to transfer his rook to the h3-square along the third rank, Baumbach – Burger, corr. 2000;
11...e6 12.d5. This move is played with the idea to force Black to either exchange on d5, so White’s knight can occupy that outpost, or to make him close the centre with the move e6-e5, after which White clearly dominates in the centre. It is also possible for him to continue with 12.h4!?, maintaining presently the pawn-structure flexible. 12...e5 (or 12...e8 13.c2 e5 14.d3 c6 15.a4 b6 16.a5 b5 17.a2 f8 18.dxc6 xc6, Novosad – Fluegel, Email 2002 and here after: 19.d5 d7 20.xb5, Black’s compensation for the pawn should not be enough: 20...d4+ 21.cxd4 xb5 22.xa8 c8+ 23.d2 h6+ 24.d1+, or 20...ab8 21.xb8 xb8 22.e3+ 13.d3 c6 14.e3 b6 15.b3 (c4) 15...d7 (Black’s bishop is placed even worse after: 15...b7 16.c4 c5 17.a4± Hebert – Burger, corr. 1995.) 16.c4 c5 17.a4± f5 18.f3 xe4 19.fxe4 a6 20.a5 fxc8 21.e2! (White’s king is safe from checks on the e2-square after Black’s possible captures: c7-e8-d6xc4 (e4).) 21...c7 22.c2 ab8 23.f2! (ag3) 23...g4+ (23...e8 24.g3+) 24.e1! a6 25.axb6 axb6 26.d2 b4 27.xb4 cxb4 28.xb4 a8 29.hb1!? xxb4+ 30.xb4 a8 31.a4+ — and White’s advantage should be practically sufficient to win the game, Hebert – Burger, corr. 1992.
9...b6
About 9...c6 10.e3 – see 8...c6 9.0-0 d7 10.e3.
Black fails to equalize with 9...b5 10.d3 c5 11.b1 a6 (Black’s pawn-structure on the queenside is destroyed after: 

31
Chapter 2

11...c4 12.\(c2 \square a6\) Sarak – Pane, corr. 1994 and here White can continue with the simple line: 13.a4 bxa4 14.\(\square x a4\)\(\#\) 12.d5 c4 (In case of 12...\(\square d6\), it is quite enough for White to follow with 13.c4\# and Black will be left either with a weakness on c5, or after: 13...b4 14.f4\(\#\), White's initiative on the kingside will be overwhelming, Mackie – Beecham, corr. 2001.) 12.d5 c4 13.\(\square c2\) e6 14.dxe6 fxe6 15.a4 bxa4 16.\(\square x a4\)\(\#\) c7 17.\(\square f4\)\(\#\) e5 (but not 17...\(\square x f 4\) 18.\(\square x f 4\)\(\#\) f4 19.\(\square d8\#\)\(\#\) f8 20.\(\square c7\)\(\#\) – and White wins material) 18.\(\square x e 5\)\(\#\) x e5 19.\(\square d4\)\(\#\) x d4 20.\(\# x d4\)\(\#\) and Black remains with numerous weaknesses in the endgame, Naumkin – Semeniuk, Riga 1988.

9...\(\square d8\). This move is obviously too provocative – Black weakens his f7-pawn prior to the development of his queenside. White can continue with the calm move 10.\(\# e3\), after which the game transposes to the usual lines, for example: 10...b6 11.\(\square d2 \square c6\) – see 9...b6 10.\(\# e3 \square c6\) 11.\(\# d2 \square d8\) – variation c3b2, but he can also try to emphasize the drawbacks of Black's last move with:

10.\(\# b3\) e6 11.\(\# g5 \# f8\) 12.\(\# a d 1\) b6 13.\(\# g 3\) (It is now a bit too risky for White to try: 13.f4 \(\square c6\) 14.d5 \(\# a 5\) 15.dxe6 \(\# c 6\) 16.exf7+ \(\# h 8\#\); it deserved attention for him instead to play: 13.d5 e5 14.\(\# c 1\)\(\#\) – 14.f4 h6 – 14...\(\# a 6\) 15.f4 exf4 16.\(\# f 4\)\(\#\); it is safer for Black to defend with:

14...\(\# a 6\) 15.\(\# a 3 \# c 5\) 16.\(\# x c 5\) bxc5\(\#\) 13...\(\# a 6\) 14.\(\# a x a 6\) \(\# x a 6\) 15.e5 (15.\(\# f e 1 ? \#\)) 15...h6 16.\(\# f 6\)\(\# x f 6\) 17.exf6 c6 18.c4 \(\# c 7\) 19.\(\# e 3\)\(\# h 7\) 20.\(\# e 4\)\(\# h 8\) 21.\(\# d 3\)\(\# g 8\)\(\#\) – and White is better indeed, but Black's position is solid enough, Kohl – Glasl, corr. 1981;

It is also possible for White to continue with the immediate 10.f4 and the following eventual developments:

10...c5 11.f5 b5 12.\(\# d 5\) \(\# b 7\) 13.fxg6 \(\# x d 5\) 14.gxh7+ \(\# h 8\) 15.exd5\#;

10...b5 11.\(\# b 3\) \(\# b 7\) 12.\(\# g 3\) b4 (12...c5 13.f5\(\#\)) 13.f5 bxc3 14.\(\# x f 7\#\)\(\# x f 7\) 15.\(\# b 3+\) \(\# d 5\) (or 15...\(\# e 8\) 16.\(\# g 8\#\)\(\# f 8\) 17.fxg6 \(\# x d 4\) 18.\(\# e 3\)\(\#\) 16.fxg6+ \(\# g 8\) 17.gxh7+ \(\# x h 7\) 18.exd5 \(\# x d 4\) 19.\(\# h 1\) \(\# x d 5\) 20.\(\# c 2+\) \(\# h 8\) 21.\(\# f 5\)\(\#\) – and Black's king remains absolutely bare;

10.\(\# c 6\) 11.f5 \(\# a 5\) 12.\(\# d 3\) c5 13.\(\# e 3\)\(\#\) – now the placement of White's pawn on the f5-square is very favourable for him.

White has already completed the necessary development of his kingside and he must choose
his subsequent plan. We are going to analyze the following main lines: a) 10.e5, with the idea to place the bishop on e3, the knight on f4 and to follow that with h2-h4-h5, b) 10.f4, with the idea to attack the f7-square and finally the calm move c) 10.\textbf{e}3.

It also deserves attention for White to consider 10.\textbf{b}1, with the idea to develop his bishop to a more active square than on e3 – for example on g5, which we have analyzed after the following order of moves: 9.\textbf{b}1 b6 10.0-0.

\textbf{a) 10.e5?}

White can now freely try to attack on the kingside with e5, \textbf{e}2-f4, g4 and h4-h5 because Black was too slow with his counterattack in the centre.

White sometimes plays with similar ideas the move 10.\textbf{d}3, in order to follow that with e5 and to bring his queen to the g3-square. Black should counter that with: 10...\textbf{b}7 11.e5 e6 (in order to prevent e5-e6) and on the next move 12...c5= – see for more details on that line – the notes to the game Gligoric – Vaganian, Odessa 1975, (Game 2).

\textbf{10...\textbf{b}7}

In the game Moehring – Pribyl, Hradec Kralove, 1978, after 10...\textbf{a}6 11.\textbf{b}3 \textbf{c}6 12.\textbf{e}1 \textbf{h}8 13.e6 fxe6 14.\textbf{f}4 e5 White sacrificed a piece with: 15.\textbf{x}g6+!? hxg6 16.\textbf{e}3 e6 17.\textbf{g}4 \textbf{ae}8 18.\textbf{x}g6, and had a powerful attack for it.

\textbf{11.\textbf{f}4 e6 12.\textbf{g}4 c5 13.\textbf{e}3}

But not 13.\textbf{xe}6? \textbf{e}8+-.

\textbf{13...\textbf{c}6 14.\textbf{ad}1 \textbf{cxd}4 15.\textbf{cxd}4 \textbf{e}7!}

This is much stronger than 15...\textbf{fd}8 16.h4 \textbf{ac}8 17.h5 \textbf{b}4 18.\textbf{b}3 \textbf{e}4?! (It is better for Black to play: 18...\textbf{d}5 19.\textbf{xd}5 \textbf{xd}5 20.\textbf{g}5 \textbf{e}8 21.hxg6 fxg6± with only a slight edge for White, Kotenko – Nesis, corr. 1978.) 19.h6! \textbf{f}5 20.\textbf{g}3±. Black cannot capture on h6 here and White's positional advantage is undisputed, Balashov – Gulko, Moscow 1976.

\textbf{16.h4}

The point is that Black can counter 16.d5, with the powerful resource 16...\textbf{c}8! and his queen is unpinned: 17.d6 (17.\textbf{b}3 \textbf{exd}5) 17...\textbf{xc}4 18.dxe7 \textbf{fe}8 19.\textbf{ed}7 \textbf{c}6=.

\textbf{16...h5}

Black should obviously prevent the move h4-h5, because now the pawn-break g2-g4 leads to a weakening of White's kingshelter, otherwise White cannot make any progress on the kingside. Should Black refrain from playing h7-h5, he might be faced with serious difficulties: 16...\textbf{ac}8 17.\textbf{b}3 \textbf{d}5 and here instead of the exchange on d5, as it was played in the game Botik – Necsany, corr. 1980, it would have been much stronger for White to have continued with: 18.h5!? , for example: 18...\textbf{xb}3
19.axb3 \(\diamondsuit d5\) 20.hxg6 hxg6 21.\(\diamondsuit h3\) \(\kappa c3\) 22.\(\diamondsuit g5\) \(\kappa xb3\) 23.\(\kappa h4\) \(\kappa c8\) 24.\(\kappa h7+\) \(\diamondsuit f3\) 25.\(\diamondsuit e4\) \(\kappa c7\) (25...\(\kappa c6\) 26.\(\kappa c1\)→) 26.\(\kappa g5\)→ and White’s attack is overwhelming – he is threatening Bg5-f6 to say the least.

17.\(\kappa e2\) \(\diamondsuit d5\)

Now, no matter how White captures on d5 – his resources would hardly be sufficient for a break in the centre as well as for a successful kingside attack.

18.\(\kappa x d5\) \(\kappa x d5\) 19.g4 \(\kappa d8\)
19...hxg4 20.\(\kappa x g4\) \(\kappa h4\) h5.

20.\(\kappa x d5\) \(\kappa x d5\) 21.\(\kappa x h4\) \(\kappa e4\)
22.hxg6 \(\kappa x h4\) 23.\(\kappa f3\)
23.gxf7+ \(\kappa x f7\) = \(\Delta \& x e 5\).
23...fxg6 24.\(\kappa g2\) \(\kappa h5\)

25.f4 \(\kappa a d 8=\) and here even after d4-d5, White can hardly obtain any real advantage, because his king is too vulnerable:

26.d5 exd5 27.\(\kappa x d 5\) \(\kappa x d 5\) 28.\(\kappa x d 5+\) \(\kappa f 7\) 29.\(\kappa c 1\) \(\kappa e 2\) 30.\(\kappa d 2\)
31.\(\kappa f 2\) \(\kappa x f 2+\) 32.\(\kappa x f 2\)
33.e6 \(\kappa e 4\) 34.\(\kappa c 7\) \(\kappa x e 6\)
35.\(\kappa x a 7\) \(\kappa d 6\) 36.a4 \(\kappa d 4\) 37.\(\kappa x d 4\) \(\kappa x d 4\) 38.a5= and the opponents agreed to a draw in that position in the game Baumbach – Vukcevic, Belgrade 1979.

b) 10.f4

This is an attempt by White to exploit his lead in development by organizing a direct attack along the f-file. Black should try to create some counterplay against White’s centre with c7-c5 and exchange his powerful bishop on c4, particularly for his knight if possible.

10...\(\kappa b 7\) 11.\(\kappa d 3\)

11.\(\kappa g 3\) is the other possibility for White to defend his e4-pawn. 11...\(\kappa c 6\) 12.\(\kappa e 3\) e6 13.f5 e5 (It would have been better for Black to have opened the position with: 13...exf5! 14.exf5 \(\kappa a e 8\) 15.\(\kappa d 2\) \(\kappa a 5\) \(\Delta \kappa d 3\) \(\kappa d 5\) and \(\kappa a 5\) c4.) 14.f6 \(\kappa h 8\) 15.d5 \(\kappa a 5\) 16.\(\kappa e 2\) c6 17.c4± (Now, Black’s bishop on h8 is completely isolated and he has no counterplay to compensate that at all.) 17...cxd5 18.cxd5 \(\kappa d 6\) 19.\(\kappa g 5\) \(\kappa f d 8\) 20.\(\kappa e 1\) \(\kappa a c 8\) 21.\(\kappa f 5\)→ \(\kappa x f 5\) 22.\(\kappa g 3\) \(\kappa c 3\) 23.\(\kappa e 3+\)
34.\(\kappa f 8\) 24.\(\kappa h 6+\) \(\kappa e 8\) 25.\(\kappa x c 3\) \(\kappa x f 6\)
26.\(\kappa x f 5\) \(\kappa e 7\) 27.\(\kappa a f 1\)← Deretic – Dracar, corr. 1977. Or 12.f5 \(\kappa a 5\) 13.\(\kappa b 3\) c5 14.e5 \(\kappa x b 3\) 15.axb3 cxd4 16.cxd4 \(\kappa f d 8\) 17.\(\kappa e 3\) \(\kappa d 5\)±. Black has the bishop pair; he
wins a pawn, while White's attacking prospects are quite bleak. Still, in the game Gil Capahe – Lalic, Murcia 1990, Black made a tactical blunder and even lost that wonderful position: 18...\(\text{Wxe2 Wxb3} 19.\text{h4 Qd8} 20.\text{Wf2 Cc3} 21.\text{We1 Qac8} 22.\text{fxg6 hxg6} 23.\text{h5 Qxe3?} (23...a5\(\)) 24.\text{Wxe3 Cc3} 25.\text{Wf4 Qxg3} 26.e6 \(\text{Qd5} 27.\text{exf7+ Qxf7} 28.\text{Qxe7} \text{Qd5} 29.\text{h6+–} \text{Gil Capahe – Lalic, Murcia 1990.}

It is much more logical for Black to exploit the absence of White's knight on e2 for an immediate counterattack against the d4-pawn: 11...c5 12.\(\text{Qe3} \) (It is not good for White to play 12. dxc5, because of: 12...\(\text{Qxc3}\); 12.e5 cxd4 13.cxd4 \(\text{Qc6}\) 14.\(\text{Qe3 Qad8}\) – and Black is already threatening to capture on d4 and he has a very good game.) 12...cxd4 13. cxd4 \(\text{Qc6}\) – Black's counter chances are quite sufficient.

11...\(\text{Qc6}\)

It is not good for Black to play: 11...e6? 12.f5\(\) – because he only enhances his opponent's attack like that.

Black blunders a pawn by playing: 11...b5? 12.\(\text{Qxb5}\), since here he cannot follow with: 12...\(\text{Qxe4}\) (or 12...\(\text{Qe6}\) 13.\(\text{Qg3 c5}\) 14.d5 \(\text{Qb6}\) 15.\(\text{Qe3}\) and Black has no compensation whatsoever, Kaspi – Muse, Berlin 1994) 13.\(\text{Qxe4 Qxb5}\) 14.\(\text{Qxa8 Qc6}\) and because of the tactical possibility 15.\(\text{Qb1}\)! – White saves his queen from danger and he re-

mains with extra material.

12.f5

It is also possible for White to play here 12.a3 with the idea to avoid the exchange of his lightsquared bishop. In the game Ershov – Nesis, corr. 1978, Black continued with: 12...\(\text{Qad8}\) 13.e5 (It is not good for White to follow with 13.f5, due to 13...\(\text{Qe5}\); but it was worth for him to try instead the prophylactic move 13.\(\text{Qa2}\)!, in order to continue with f4-f5 on his next turn. The advance of White's pawn to e5 enables Black to block the centre and the kingside and his position becomes superior.) 13...e6 14.\(\text{Qg3 Qa5}\) 15.\(\text{Qa2 c5}\) 16.\(\text{Qe3 c8}\) 17.\(\text{Qf2 cxd4} 18.\text{exd4 Qd5} 19.\text{Qe4 Qc4} 20.\text{Qxc4 Qxe4}\) – the centre has been blocked and White remains with a "bad" bishop.

12...\(\text{Qa5}\)

13.\(\text{Qb3}\)

It is understandable that White players are reluctant to present their opponents with the two bishop advantage, so they have tried in several games the line: 13.\(\text{Qa6 Qxa6}\) 14.\(\text{Qxa6, de-}
spite the fact that White’s queen becomes a bit isolated at the edge of the board:

In the game Vaganian – Ma. Tseitlin, Kragujevac 1974, White obtained some advantage after the rather optimistic variation: 14...\texttt{a4} 15.\texttt{g5} f6. This move compromises Black’s position considerably. (It is much safer for him to play instead 15...\texttt{f8}!? 16.\texttt{f4+}). 16.\texttt{c1} c5 17.\texttt{f4} exd4 18.fxg6 hxg6 (or 18...\texttt{dxc}3 19.\texttt{gxh7+ \texttt{xh7} 20.\texttt{d3+-}) 19.\texttt{d7} 20.\texttt{d3} \texttt{c4}? (20...\texttt{dxc}3? 21.\texttt{x7}+ \texttt{x7} 22.\texttt{d5+-; 20...\texttt{e5}}! 21.cxd4 \texttt{xd4+ 22.\texttt{xd4 exd4+-} – and Black is probably slightly worse due to his “bad” bishop on g7, but not much anyway...) 21.\texttt{xd4}! (but not 21.\texttt{xc4? \texttt{xc4} 22.cxd4 \texttt{d8} 23.\texttt{d1 f5?} 21...\texttt{xd4+ 22.cxd4 \texttt{d8 23.a3 h7 24.e5 f8 25.\texttt{f3+- and White remains with a solid extra pawn;

14...c5.15.\texttt{d3} (15.\texttt{xc5 \texttt{c6}}) 15...\texttt{xd4} 16.\texttt{cxd4 d8} (This is much simpler for Black than the retreat of the knight: 16...\texttt{c6 17.h2 e8 18.d1 \texttt{b4 19.\texttt{b3 b5} 20.\texttt{f4 c4 21.a3- 21.\texttt{xc4 xc4 22.a3 c6 23.\texttt{d5-} 21...a5 22.e5 \texttt{xa2 23.\texttt{xa2 xa2 24.d5 f8 25.f6 exf6 26.xf6 c4 27.xf6 c6 28.f3 b4 29.d5 d8 30.d6 c6 – and Black does not risk losing at all, Ekstroem – Wedberg, Boras 1979.) 17.e3 b5-}\texttt{c4. It is inconceivable how White can profit from the place-

13...c5

It is also not bad for Black to trade White’s light-squared bishop immediately: 13...\texttt{xb3} 14.axb3 a5 15.\texttt{g5 c5?} (Black should better play here 15...\texttt{xf5}! – this was recommended by GM Bent Larsen – 16.\texttt{xf5 f6 17.h4 e6, followed by f6-f5 and he remains with a bishop pair and an excellent counterplay.) 16.d5+ gxf5 17.\texttt{xf5 a6 18.g3 h8 19.f4 f6 20.h3? (20.\texttt{h4!}) 20...\texttt{e8 21.h6 c8} 22.xg7+ xg7 23.e6+ (23.\texttt{f8 24.f5 h8 25.e6+} 23..xe6 24.dxe6 a4+). After the exchange of the knight for White’s bishop, Black’s king is already safe and he has a good counterplay against White’s pawn-weaknesses. 25.\texttt{h5 g6 26.bxa4 xe4 27.h4 c2 28.\texttt{e3 a8d8 29.h3 h8 30.c1 d2 31.e1 g8+ – and following the exchange of the queens, Black is clearly better in that endgame, O.Rodriguez – Larsen, Orense 1975.

14.d5 c4! 15.xc4 xc4 16.xc4

36
Black has excellent diagonals for his bishops and a superior game for his temporary pawn-sacrifice. 16...\( \text{\underline{\text{a}}c8} \) (This is much more energetic for Black than the line: 16...a5 17.\( \text{\underline{\text{b}}3} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{a}}6} \) 18.\( \text{\underline{\text{f}}2} \) gxf5 19.exf5 a4 20.\( \text{\underline{\text{g}}b6} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{x}}e2} \) 21.\( \text{\underline{\text{x}}e2} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xc3}}} \) 22.\( \text{\underline{\text{b}}2} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{ab8}}} \) 23.\( \text{\underline{\text{f}}2} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xb2}}} \) 24.\( \text{\underline{\text{xb2}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xb2}}} \) 25.\( \text{\underline{\text{xb2}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xd5}}} \) 26.\( \text{\underline{\text{b4}}} \) Sarran – Cimolai, corr 1988. White preserves a slight advantage due to the vulnerability of his opponent’s king.) 17.\( \text{\underline{\text{d}}3} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{a4}}} \) 18.\( \text{\underline{\text{d2}}} \) (It deserved attention for White to try here 18.\( \text{\underline{\text{g5}}}) \) 18...\( \text{\underline{\text{a6}}} \) 19.\( \text{\underline{\text{e3}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{c2}}} \) 20.\( \text{\underline{\text{ac1}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{d3}}} \) 21.\( \text{\underline{\text{fe1}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xe3}}} \) 22.\( \text{\underline{\text{xe3}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xe2}}} \) (Black could have equalized easily with: 22...gxf5 23.exf5 \( \text{\underline{\text{fd8}}} \) 24.\( \text{\underline{\text{cd1}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{c4}}} = \) 24.\( \text{\underline{\text{f4}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xc3}}} \) 25.\( \text{\underline{\text{xc2}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{c4}}} \) 24.\( \text{\underline{\text{g5}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xc3}}} \) 25.\( \text{\underline{\text{ec2}}} \) 25.\( \text{\underline{\text{f1}}} \) f6 26.\( \text{\underline{\text{e3}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{fc8}}} \) 27.\( \text{\underline{\text{ec2}}} \) gxf5 28.\( \text{\underline{\text{d2}}} \) 27...b5 28.\( \text{\underline{\text{xa7}}} \) b4+) 25...\( \text{\underline{\text{d4}}} \) 26.\( \text{\underline{\text{e1}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xc2}}} \) 27.\( \text{\underline{\text{xc2}}} \) f6 28.\( \text{\underline{\text{h6}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{d8}}} \) 29.\( \text{\underline{\text{g4}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{c5}}} \) 30.\( \text{\underline{\text{f4}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{f7}}} \) 31.\( \text{\underline{\text{e2}}} \). In the game Vaisser – Ma.Tseitlin, Novosibirsk 1971, White managed to maintain a slight edge in the endgame and later he had considerable winning chances, but as we had already mentioned, Black could have equalized immediately on move 22. The game later followed with: 31...gxf5 32.gxf5 \( \text{\underline{\text{g8}}} \) 33.\( \text{\underline{\text{g3}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{e8}}} \) 34.\( \text{\underline{\text{f3}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{d7}}} \) 35.\( \text{\underline{\text{c4}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{c8}}} \) 36.e5 fxe5 37.\( \text{\underline{\text{h4}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{d4}}} \) 38.\( \text{\underline{\text{hxh7}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{c3}}} \) + 39.\( \text{\underline{\text{g4}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{d6}}} \) 40.h4 \( \text{\underline{\text{c8}}} \) 41.h5 \( \text{\underline{\text{g8}}} \) 42.\( \text{\underline{\text{h4}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xd5}}} \) 43.\( \text{\underline{\text{xe7}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{e4}}} \) 44.f6 \( \text{\underline{\text{f3}}} \) 45.f7 (45.h6!? e4 46.\( \text{\underline{\text{e5}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xe5}}} \) 47.\( \text{\underline{\text{xe5}}} \) e3 48.f7 \( \text{\underline{\text{f8}}} \) 49.\( \text{\underline{\text{h7}}} \) e2 50.\( \text{\underline{\text{g5}}} \) –, or 47...\( \text{\underline{\text{f4}}} \) 48.\( \text{\underline{\text{f7}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{f8}}} \) 49.\( \text{\underline{\text{e7}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{f5}}} \) 50.h7+–) 45...\( \text{\underline{\text{g4}}} \) 46.\( \text{\underline{\text{h3}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{xg3}}} \) 47.\( \text{\underline{\text{h2}}} \) \( \text{\underline{\text{g2}}} \), draw.

c) 10.\( \text{\underline{\text{e3}}} \)

This is a calm move and White opts with it for a slight advantage. He plans to place his queen on d2 and to follow that with \( \text{\underline{\text{e3-h6}}} \), in order to trade the dark-squared bishops and thus to exploit the weak dark squares around Black’s king. This attacking scheme is particularly dangerous for Black with queens present on the board, because White has some additional attacking resources like – h2-h4-h5, \( \text{\underline{\text{d2(e3)-g5}}} \), \( \text{\underline{\text{e2-g3}}} \) and then to h5, f5, or the e4-squares, e4-e5 etc. Black can avoid the exchange of the bishops indeed, but he should play at first \( \text{\underline{\text{f8-d8}}} \), so the he can counter \( \text{\underline{\text{e3-h6}}} \) with \( \text{\underline{\text{g7-h8}}} \). Still, the dangers for Black’s kingside are far from over even in that case, because White can follow for example with f2-f4-f5. Black will have
some counterplay against White’s centre – c7-c5, the pin along the d-file and he can also make use of his powerful bishop on the h8-square.

White’s other possibility is to leave his bishop on e3 and to advance his f-pawn. Black must either reply with f7-f5, in order to restrict White’s kingside offensive, or he must counterattack White’s centre urgently.

Black has two main lines in that position. At first he can play c2) 10...a7, which seems to be quite logical, he attacks White’s e4-pawn prior to the development of his knight to c6, or c3) 10...c6, which is possibly less principled at that moment, but in fact it is the more important line theoretically, because that position may be reached by transposition in the variation: 8...c6 9.0-0 d7 10.e3 b6. Black plays sometimes c1) 10...a6 too.

**c1) 10...a6**

Black complies with having his knight on a very unfortunate position after the exchange of the active white bishop on the a6-square, but he plans later to prepare somehow c7-c5, to develop his rooks and to gradually equalize. It looks like White’s task to obtain something more than just a minimal edge will be extremely difficult.

11.a6

11.d5 c6 12.a4 a7 13.

**f4 ad8 14.c2 e6 15.b3 a5 Gligoric – Gulko, Niksic 1978. Black exchanges White’s bishop and he obtains a good game.**

11...a6

12.b3

White has tried some other moves in that position in order to get some edge, but quite unsuccessfully:

12.d2 – White should probably not let Black’s queen to the weakened light squares on the queenside – a4 and c4. 12.fd8 13.ad1 a4 (It deserved attention for Black to try here 13...c5!?, preserving the contact of his queen with the kingside and if 14.f4, then 14...cxd4 15.cxd4 f5<, or 14.d5 a4 15.g3 e6< 14.f4 c5 15.f5 cxd4 16.cxd4 ac8 17.

ac3 e8 18.d5 (White could have played here 18.c1<, with the idea to follow with d5 or f2.) 18...c7 19.xc7 (White would have preferred not to exchange the knights, but after the logical move 19.f4, Black has the resource 19.b5< 19.xc7 20.f2 dc8 21.e5 c2< and Black’s counterplay is quite suf-
ficient, Fahnen Schmidt – Muse, Germany 1990;

12.f4 – this move is a bit too risky. Now, Black can play 12...c5, with the following eventual developments: 13.d5 (It is also interesting for White to continue with: 13.f5 cxd4 14.cxd4  $\text{b}1$ – and although he cannot profit too much from the activity of his rook along the f-file, Black has no active counterplay in sight.) 13.e6 14.$\text{d}3$ b5 (or 14...$\text{c}7$ 15.$\text{d}6$ $\text{ad}8$ 16.$\text{ad}1$ $\text{e}8$ 17.$\text{e}5$ $\text{f}6$ 18.$\text{e}4$ $\text{f}7$ 19.$\text{g}3$ $\text{b}7$ 20.$\text{c}4$) 15.$\text{ad}1$ (15.a4?! $\text{c}4$ 16.$\text{d}2$ b4 17.$\text{d}4$) 15...$\text{fd}8$ 16.$\text{d}6$ c4 17.$\text{c}2$ e5 18.$\text{d}5$ – and despite Black’s counterattack against his opponent’s centre, White obviously manages to push his pawn to the d6-square and keep it there. Still, it is stronger for Black to play here 12...f5, because it is principled for him to block White’s pawn-centre on the light squares. 13.e5 e6 14.$\text{c}4$ $\text{fd}8$ (Black could have tried here the line: 14...$\text{c}6$! 15.$\text{a}4$ $\text{c}7$, in order to follow with $\text{b}6$-$\text{b}5$ and to deploy his knight on the d5-outpost.) 15.$\text{c}3$ $\text{b}4$ 16.$\text{f}2$ c5 17.$\text{d}5$ b5 18.$\text{xb}5$ $\text{xd}5$ 19.cxd5 $\text{xb}5$ 20.d6± and White had a great advantage, having restricted his opponent’s bishop in the game Tikkanen – Hinttikka, Kirjepeli 1990. Meanwhile, as we have already mentioned, Black did not defend in the best possible way at all.

12.$\text{b}1$ and now:

In the game Buj – Sangiinetti, Buenos Aires 1958, there followed: 12...$\text{fd}8$ 13.$\text{b}3$ (13. $\text{c}4$?) 13...c5 14.$\text{b}5$ (14.$\text{fd}1$±) 14...$\text{xb}5$ 15.$\text{xb}5$ cxd4 16.cxd4 $\text{ac}8$ 17.$\text{b}2$ $\text{c}4$ – and Black’s counterplay was quite real. In general, the idea to exchange queens on the b5-square does not seem good for White at all;

12...c5. White does not achieve much here with: 13.$\text{xc}5$ $\text{xd}1$ 14.$\text{fxd}1$ $\text{xc}5$ 15.$\text{xc}5$ $\text{bxc}5$ 16.$\text{d}7$ (16.$\text{b}7$ $\text{fd}8$) 16...$\text{f}8$ – because he fails to penetrate his enemy’s position and to capture the pawn easily. It is also rather unclear if he follows with: 13.$\text{d}5$ f5 14.$\text{f}4$ $\text{c}7$. It seems wiser for White to play the calm move 13.$\text{b}3$!± with only a slight advantage. Meanwhile, it is not quite clear why he had to place his rook on the b1-square in the first place;

After 12...$\text{c}6$, in the game Gomez Esteban – Bofill Mas, Almeria 1989, White played: 13.$\text{d}3$ $\text{a}4$ 14.$\text{b}5$ $\text{xb}5$ 15.$\text{xb}5$ $\text{fd}8$ 16.$\text{c}1$ e5 17.$\text{g}3$ c6 18.$\text{bb}1$ $\text{c}7$ 19.$\text{d}1$ $\text{ac}8$ 20.a4 and the opponents agreed to a draw. It seems like White should not be so eager to provoke the exchange of queens. He would not have achieved anything special with the line: 14.$\text{c}4$ c5 (14...$\text{xa}2$ 15.$\text{fd}1$!±) 15.$\text{c}3$ (or 15.$\text{d}5$ $\text{b}4$ 16.$\text{b}3$ $\text{xa}2$; 15.$\text{b}3$ $\text{xb}3$ 16.axb3 cxd4 17.$\text{xd}4$ $\text{fe}8$ 18.$\text{f}3$ $\text{c}5$ 19.$\text{fd}1$ a5=) 15...$\text{d}7$ 16.$\text{d}5$ f5±. White can also try
13.\textit{c}c2!?, with the idea to prepare \textit{c}3-\textit{c}4 and not to let Black's queen to the \textit{a}4-square; meanwhile Black can place his queen on another light square and that is \textit{c}4: 13...\textit{c}c4 (13...\textit{E}fd8 14.c4\textpm) 14.\textit{G}g3 (14.\textit{D}f4 e5) 14...c5 15.\textit{B}b3 \textit{B}xb3 16.axb3 cxd4 17.cxd4 \textit{Fc}8 18.\textit{F}c1 \textit{B}b4=.

\textbf{12...\textit{F}d8}

It is much more active for Black to play: 12...\textit{c}5 13.\textit{F}d1\textpm.

After 12...c6 13.\textit{F}d1 \textit{B}c7 14.\textit{E}ac1 \textit{E}e6 15.f3 \textit{B}xb3 16.axb3 \textit{F}d8 17.c4\textpm the endgame is slightly better for White, Leitao – Costa, Porto Alegre 1994. It looks like the set-up with a queen on \textit{b}3 and rooks on \textit{c}1 and \textit{d}1 is the best for White under the circumstances.

\textbf{13.a4 \textit{c}5 14.\textit{F}d1 cxd4 15. cxd4 \textit{ac}8 16.\textit{E}ac1 e6}

\textbf{17.f3} (17.\textit{D}c3 \textit{B}b8 18.d5 \textit{a}6)

The adversaries agreed to a draw in that position in the game Gustafsson – Avrukh, Ermioni Argolidas 2005, although evidently White still has a small edge, for example: 17...\textit{E}e7 (\textit{D}\textit{b}4; 17...\textit{B}b8 18.\textit{B}b5\textpm – after the exchange on the \textit{b}5-square, Black's knight will be misplaced, while after 18...\textit{D}c6, Black will be in trouble following: 19.d5 \textit{D}e7 20.\textit{E}xd7 \textit{E}xd7 21.dxe6 \textit{E}xd1 22.\textit{E}xd1 fxe6 23.\textit{D}d7\textuparrow 18.\textit{D}c4\textpm and White still remains with a slight advantage – Black has his knight on \textit{a}6 to worry about.

\textit{c2) 10...\textit{B}b7}

This move is quite logical – Black attacks at first the \textit{e}4-pawn in order to force White to play some not so useful move for him and he accomplishes the maneuver \textit{D}b8-c6-a5 only subsequently.

\textbf{11.f3}

It is still premature for White to play 11.d5?!., because of 11...c6 12.\textit{D}d4 cxd5 13.\textit{X}xg7, Hutt – Nesis, corr. 1973 and here after 13...\textit{C}c8\textuparrow Nesis – it is only Black who can be better in that position.

White does not achieve much with 11.\textit{C}d3. Black should not play 11...\textit{D}c6, but he must counter with the immediate 11...\textit{c}5 12.\textit{E}c1 \textit{D}c6= Korelov – Nesis, USSR 1973 and in fact he has saved a tempo for the ma-
neuever $\Box c6-a5$, because White’s bishop has retreated from the c4-square anyway.

White has also tried in practice 11.$\Box g3$ $\Box c6$ (It seems quite reasonable for Black to follow here with 11...c5, in order to make use of the fact that White’s knight is not protecting the d4-pawn at the moment, for example: 12.$\Box d2$ cxd4 13.cxd4 $\Box c6?$, or 12.dxc5 $\Box c7=\Box$) 12.$\Box c1$ (12.f4 $\Box a5$ 13.$\Box d3$ c5?) 12...$\Box a5$ 13.$\Box d3$ $\Box fd8$ 14.$\Box d2$ (14.f4 c5?) 14...c5 15.d5 c4 16.$\Box c2$ e6 17.$\Box h6$ exd5 18.$\Box xg7$ $\Box xg7$ 19.$\Box g5$, Cramling – Claudio Gonzalez, Oviedo 1993 and here after: 19...$\Box h8$ 20.e5 $\Box c6$ 21.f4 $\Box e7$, White has a powerful initiative for the sacrificed pawn, but is it enough for him to claim the advantage remains unclear?

11...$\Box c6$

It is still premature for Black to continue with 11...c5, because of 12.d5 – and Black’s knight remains on a very passive position on the b8-square. Now, it is too dangerous for Black to play the unnecessarily active move 12...b5 13.$\Box d3$ c4 14.$\Box c2$ e6 15.dxe6 $\Box xe6$ 16.$\Box d4$ $\Box d7$ 17.$\Box b1$ a6 18. a4 bxa4 19.$\Box xa4$ $\Box c7$ 20.$\Box f2!$ $\Box c8$ 21.$\Box d2=\Box$ – because his pawn-structure on the queenside is left in ruins, Pytel – Pioch, Poland 1974.

11...$\Box d8$ (The idea of that move is evidently to avoid the possible pin of the knight, for example after: 11...$\Box c6$ 12.$\Box b5$.) 12.$\Box b3=\Box$! This is an interesting attempt by White to emphasize the drawbacks of the move-order chosen by Black. (White transposes to the usual lines after: 12.$\Box d2$ $\Box c6$ – see 11...$\Box c6$ 12. $\Box d2$ $\Box d8.$) 12...e6 13.$\Box g5$ $\Box e8$ 14. $\Box fd1$ c6 (It is better for Black to follow here with: 14...$\Box c6$ 15.d5 exd5 16.$\Box xd5$ $\Box a5$ 17. $\Box xb7$; 16... $\Box f8$ 17.$\Box c2=\Box$) 15.a4 $\Box a6$ 16.$\Box ab1$ $\Box xc4$ 17.$\Box xc4$ h6 18.$\Box h4$ $\Box b7$ 19.$\Box a2$ $\Box a6$ 20.$\Box f2$ $\Box f8$ 21.c4=\Box. White enjoys a space advantage. The game Kupka – Vokralova, Rimavska Sobota 1975, continued with: 21...$\Box b4$ 22.$\Box b3$ a5 23.$\Box c3$ $\Box ac8$ 24.e5 $\Box ed8$ 25.$\Box e4$ c5 26.dxc5 $\Box xd1+$ 27.$\Box xd1$ $\Box xc5$ 28.$\Box d6$ $\Box xd6$ 29. $\Box xd6$ $\Box c7$ 30.$\Box e3=\Box$.

We will now analyze in details the standard plan for the Gruenfeld Defence with: c2a) 12.$\Box d2$, followed by $\Box h6$, as well as the more original plan beginning with: c2b) 12.$\Box b5$.

White has many other possibilities too, for example in the famous game Spassky – Larsen, Beverwijk 1967, he played 12. $\Box c1$ – see Game 3.
Chapter 2

c2a) 12.\(\text{d}d2\) \(\text{a}a5\)

Black can hardly create any counterplay without the move \(\text{c}c6\)-a5. For example after 12...\(\text{fd}d8\), Carparelli – Kostic, Mendraismo 1989, 13.\(\text{h}h6\) \(\text{h}h8\) 14.\(\text{ad}1\)± he will still have to play: 14...\(\text{a}a5\) 15.\(\text{d}d3\) – transposing to the variation 12...\(\text{a}a5\) 13.\(\text{d}d3\) \(\text{fd}d8\).

He cannot solve his problems with: 12...e5 13.d5 (13.\(\text{ad}1\)?±) 13...\(\text{a}a5\) 14.\(\text{d}d3\) c5 15.\(\text{h}h6\) (15.\(\text{c}c4\) 15...c4, Vidal Alvarez – Varela Fernandez, Aviles 1991 and here after the natural move 16.\(\text{c}c2\)±, Black is still too far from equality: White trades bishops on g7 and follows that with f3-f4 and later either f4-f5, or he exchanges on e5 and continues with \(\text{g}g5\).

13.\(\text{d}d3\) c5

13...\(\text{fd}d8\) 14.\(\text{h}h6\). This move is an integral part of White’s plan anyway. (Meanwhile, he could have started with 14.\(\text{ad}1\) too, for example: 14...\(\text{ac}8\) 15.\(\text{h}h6\) \(\text{h}h8\) 16.d4 c5 17.d5 e6 18.c4 exd5 19.cxd5 c4 20.\(\text{c}c2\) and White’s attacking prospects on the kingside seem to be much more real than Black’s passed pawn: 20...\(\text{a}a6\) 21.\(\text{fe}1\) c3 22.\(\text{f}f4\) \(\text{c}c4\) 23.h5 \(\text{b}2\) 24.\(\text{c}c1\) \(\text{d}d3\) 25.\(\text{e}e3\) \(\text{xc}2\) 26.\(\text{xc}2\) b5 27.\(\text{d}d4\) \(\text{d}4\) 28.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{a}3\) 29.\(\text{cc}1\) \(\text{c}4\) 30.\(\text{ed}1\) a5 31.\(\text{d}c6\) \(\text{a}8\) 32.\(\text{h}h4\) f6 33.\(\text{g}g3\) \(\text{f}7\) 34.hxg6+hxg6 35.e5 fxe5 36.\(\text{d}xe5\)+ \(\text{xe}5\) 37.\(\text{xe}5\)+ Baumbach – Vokralova, Rimavska Sloboda 1975.) 14...\(\text{h}h8\) 15.\(\text{ad}1\)

\(\text{c}c6\). This counterplay seems to be too exotic. (It is more natural for Black to play: 15...c5 16.d5 e6 17.c4±; 16...c4 17.\(\text{c}c2\) – but not now 17...e6, because of 18.dxe6 and Black loses at least a pawn, since White will play on his next move \(\text{f}3\)-d4 with an overwhelming dominance in the centre and on the kingside, while Black’s bishop on the b7-square remains a pathetic sight..) 16.\(\text{g}g5\). White redeploy his queen to the kingside and he prepares the advance of his f-pawn to the f5-square. Black has failed to organize any effective counterplay due to his strange bishop-maneuvers. 16...\(\text{e}e8\) 17.f4 \(\text{a}4\) 18.\(\text{d}d2\) c5 19.d5 cxd4 20.dxc4 e5 (20...\(\text{ac}8\) 21.fxe6 hgx6 22.e5→) 21.d5 \(\text{ac}8\) 22.\(\text{d}d3\)→. White’s powerful kingside attack is running unopposed, while practically all Black’s pieces are misplaced and totally idle. Later, in the game Vijayalakshmi – Zhu Chen, Jodhpur 2003, there followed: 22...f6 23.\(\text{c}c4\) 24.\(\text{d}d7\) 25.\(\text{d}d6\) 26.\(\text{xf}6\) hgx6 27.\(\text{xf}6\) 28.\(\text{xc}6\) 29.\(\text{hx}h6\) 30.\(\text{h}h5\)+ 31.\(\text{g}g7\) 32.\(\text{h}h4\)+ 33.\(\text{h}h5\)+ 34.\(\text{g}g5\)+ 35.\(\text{h}h6\)+ – and Black could have resigned on the spot.

14.\(\text{h}h6\)

(diagram)

14...\(\text{c}xd4\)

It is not so precise for Black to play here: 14...\(\text{fd}d8\) 15.\(\text{c}xg7\) \(\text{xc}7\) 16.d5 e5 17.\(\text{c}c4\) \(\text{e}a6\) 18.\(\text{c}c3\) f6 19.f4±. There arose a typical
pawn-structure in the centre with a clear advantage for White. Black's knight is perfectly placed on the d6-square, but still he has a lot of problems to solve. At first, his "good" bishop is practically doing nothing. Secondly, after the exchange on e5, Black will have difficulties protecting the e5-pawn, and fighting for the open f-file and eventually defending his king against an eventual attack at the same time. White's maneuvers in the next game are quite instructive indeed: 19...\textit{xf}d6 20.\textit{xf}2 \textit{xf}8 21. \textit{a}f1 \textit{ae}8 22.g3 (White does not need to worry about the possibility exf4 anymore – now, he will capture on f4 with the pawn and gradually he will prepare the standard pawn-break e4-e5.) 22...\textit{c}8 23.\textit{g}2 \textit{b}7 24.\textit{c}1 \textit{d}7 25.\textit{c}2 \textit{d}8 26.\textit{d}3 \textit{f}7 27.\textit{h}4 \textit{e}7 28.\textit{e}1 \textit{d}6 29.\textit{d}1 \textit{g}8 30.fxe5 fxe5 31.\textit{xf}8+ \textit{xf}8 32.\textit{f}2 \textit{ff}6 33.\textit{e}3 \textit{c}8 34.\textit{g}4 (White wishes to ensure the g4-square for his knight and accordingly an access to the weak f6 and h6-squares.) 34...\textit{e}7 35. \textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8 36.\textit{f}3 \textit{d}6 37.\textit{g}4 \textit{h}8 38.\textit{d}3 h5 39.\textit{f}2 \textit{g}7 40.\textit{h}3 \textit{f}8 41.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 42. \textit{g}5. White maintains his pressure despite the simplifications – his pieces are much more active and he has a protected passed-pawn. 42...\textit{e}8 43.a4 \textit{f}7 44.\textit{xf}7 \textit{xf}7 45.\textit{d}2 \textit{d}7 46. \textit{g}5 \textit{d}6 47.\textit{h}6 \textit{f}6 48.\textit{h}7 \textit{f}8 49.\textit{xa}7 g5 50.\textit{a}8+ \textit{e}7 51. \textit{b}7+ \textit{f}8 52.\textit{c}6 1-0 Polugaevsky – Plachetka, Moscow 1977.

It is evident that White has no checkmating attack on the kingside and so Black can exchange on h6 himself: 14...\textit{xh}6 15.\textit{xh}6 cxd4 16.cxd4 \textit{c}6 17. \textit{b}5 \textit{d}6 18.\textit{fd}1 (It also deserves attention for White to play 18.\textit{ad}1! – the problem for him how to deploy his rooks is rather complex, but here possibly he should not place his second rook on the c1-square to be exchanged.) 18...\textit{ac}8 19.e5 (It was probably wiser for White to play here 19.\textit{ac}1!?± and to postpone his active actions in the centre.) 19...\textit{xe}5. This is a clear mistake for Black. (He had to play instead 19...\textit{a}3 and the game would have become quite unclear: after 20.\textit{g}3, Black already counters with 20...\textit{xe}5; while in case of 20.\textit{db}1, with the idea to transfer the rook along the third rank, then Black has 20...\textit{a}5; and finally after 20.\textit{ab}1, Black can follow with 20...\textit{fd}8, but not 20...\textit{xa}2, because of 21.\textit{c}3 \textit{a}3 22.\textit{e}4.) 20.dxe5 \textit{c}5+ A.Smirnov – Karasev, Tallinn 2000 and here White's simplest
line would have been 21.\textit{d}d4 \textit{f}d8 (It is obviously impossible for Black to capture the bishop, because of \textit{h}4 and White checkmates.) 22.\textit{d}ad1 \textit{x}d4 23.\textit{c}xd4 \textit{d}8 24.\textit{f}f4++ -- Black has nothing to attack the d4-square with anymore and after 24...\textit{x}d4 25.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xb}5 26.\textit{d}8++ his position is hopeless.

15.\textit{x}g7 \textit{g}xg7 16.\textit{c}xd4 \textit{ac}8 17.\textit{ac}1±

It is also interesting for White to preserve the heavy pieces on the board with: 17.\textit{ad}1 \textit{c}4 18. \textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4 19.d5 \textit{fc}8 20.\textit{d}4± -- and he still maintains the advantage, mostly because of the well-familiar unfortunate black bishop on the b7-square.

The opponents agreed to a draw in that position in the game Karpov -- Kavalek, Montilla 1976, but I think that was a bit premature. Black still has some problems, despite the exchange of the rooks. For example, in the game Serov -- Karasev, St Petersburg 2005, there followed later: 17...\textit{e}6 18.\textit{h}4 \textit{xc}1 19.\textit{xc}1 (We have already mentioned that White could have complied with the exchange of the second pair of rooks as well with the move 19.\textit{xc}1± 19...\textit{c}6 (19...\textit{d}8!?±) 20.\textit{b}5± \textit{xd}4?? 21.\textit{a}1 \textit{e}7 22.\textit{xd}4+ --. Naturally, Black was not obliged to blunder a piece indeed, but still he was too far from equality in that game.

\textbf{c2b) 12.\textit{b}5}

We have already seen that idea in the game Azmaiparashvili -- Epishin, Tallinn 1986. White makes use of the placement of Black’s queen on d7 in order to either hinder the maneuver \textit{c}6-a5 and c7-c5, or to provoke 12...\textit{a}6 13.\textit{a}4 \textit{b}5, which will weaken Black’s queenside pawns as well as the c5-square and it will make his bishop on b7 even worse.

Now, we will analyze thoroughly \textbf{c2b1) 12...\textit{e}6} and \textbf{c2b2) 12...\textit{a}6}.

\textbf{c2b1) 12...\textit{e}6}

Black has tested in practice too:

12...\textit{d}8 -- in this fashion he in fact transposes (losing a tempo in the process) to the variation: 8...\textit{c}6 9.0–0 \textit{b}6 without the
move \( \text{d}7 \). 13.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 14.\( \text{ad}1 \) \( \text{c}8 \), Bokor – Liptay, Budapest 1965 and here White's simplest line would be 15.\( \text{h}6 \)\( \pm \) and in case of c7-c5 – d4-d5;

12...\( \text{d}6 \) 13.e5 \( \text{d}5 \) (The following sacrifice is evidently incorrect: 13...\( \text{xe}5 \) 14.\( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 15.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 16.\( \text{c}4 \)\( \pm \) 14.\( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 15.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 16.\( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 17.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 18.\( \text{exf}6 \) \( \text{xf}6 \) 19.\( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{xf}6 \) 20.\( \text{g}3 \) (The vulnerability of Black's e6-pawn, his unsafe king and the weak e4 and e5-squares are much more important for the evaluation of the position, than Black's counterplay in the centre with c6-c5.) 20...\( \text{af}8 \) 21.\( \text{fe}1 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 22.\( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 23.\( \text{xc}5 \) \( \text{d}8 \) (23...\( \text{xc}5 \) 24.\( \text{b}5 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 25.\( \text{xa}5 \) \( \text{xd}3 \) 26.\( \text{xc}5 \)\( \pm \) 24.\( \text{xb}6 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 25.\( \text{fxe}4 \) \( \text{f}2 \) 26.\( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{f}2 \) 27.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{axb}6 \) 28.\( \text{ee}1 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 29.\( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 30.\( \text{ed}1 \) \( \text{xd}1 \)\( \pm \) and White's material advantage seems to be quite sufficient to be converted into a full point, Baumbach – Nesis, corr. 1983.

13.\( \text{b}1 \)

This move is standard in this set-up for White – he not only removes his rook away from the scope of action of Black's bishop on g7, but he also deploys it on an open file and that prevents Black's thematic move c7-c5 in many variations.

13...\( \text{ad}8 \)

Naturally, Black can remove his queen immediately: 13...\( \text{e}7 \) 14.\( \text{c}1 \). (It also seems promising for White to try: 14.\( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 15.\( \text{b}4 \) \( \text{xb}4 \) 16.\( \text{xb}4 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 17.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 18.\( \text{fc}1 \) and here Black must attack White's d4-pawn outright in order to try to hold the position: 18...\( \text{fd}8 \) 19.\( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{ac}8 \) 20.\( \text{e}7 \) 21.\( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 22.\( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 23.\( \text{a}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 24.\( \text{xe}7 \) – but still, he will be too far from equality after White's move 24.\( \text{xa}6 \), threatening to capture on e7 and \( \text{b}6 \) – 24...\( \text{xe}7 \) 25.\( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 26.\( \text{xa}6 \) \( \text{xb}4 \), Tukmakov – Ma. Tseitlin, Leningrad 1971 and Black manages to maintain the material balance, since White does not achieve anything with:

27.\( \text{xb}6 \) \( \text{d}2 \) 28.\( \text{cc}6 \) \( \text{e}3 \)\( \pm \) 29.\( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{xd}4 \) 30.\( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{xd}4 \) 31.\( \text{b}2 \)\( g5 \)=) 14...\( \text{a}5 \) 15.\( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 16.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 17.\( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 18.\( \text{g}7 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 19.\( \text{b}2 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 20.\( \text{dxe}5 \) \( \text{c}5 \)\( \pm \) 21.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 22.\( \text{f}2 \). White has a clear-cut plan for the development of his initiative on the kingside: 22...\( \text{ae}8 \) 23.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 24.e5 (It is even sharper for him to play 24.f5!? \( \text{c}4 \) 25.f6+, with the following eventual developments: 25...\( \text{h}8 \) 26.\( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 27.\( \text{xc}4 \) \( \text{xc}4 \) 28.\( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{gx}5 \) 29.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 30.\( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{g}8 \) 31.\( \text{h}3 \)\( \pm \); 26...\( \text{d}6 \) 27.\( \text{xc}4 \) \( \text{xc}4 \) 28.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 29.\( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{g}8 \) 30.\( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{h}5 \) 31.\( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{gxh}5 \) 32.\( \text{f}1 \)\( \text{f} \) 24...\( \text{f}6 \) 25.\( \text{f}6 \) \( \text{xf}6 \) 26.\( \text{e}1 \) (White can maintain his initiative too with: 26.\( \text{f}5 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 27.\( \text{e}1 \)\( \text{f} \) 26...\( \text{c}5 \) 27.\( \text{xe}6 \) \( \text{xe}6 \) 28.\( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 29.\( \text{xe}6 \) \( \text{xe}6 \) 30.\( \text{d}1 \) – Black has practically equalized and the opponents agreed to a draw in the

45
game, Hort – Huebner, Hamburg 1979. Meanwhile, we have already indicated to you that White could have posed much more serious problems for Black earlier in that game.

14.\*g5 f6 15.\*h4 g5 16.\*f2 f5 17.exf5 exf5 18.\*g3±

White has no direct threats at the moment indeed, but the weaknesses on Black’s kingside, caused by the advance of his g- and f-pawns can become a telling factor in the future battle. 18...\*f7 19.\*e1 \*e7 20.\*d3 \*h8. Now, Black’s position gradually crumbles. (Still, even after the recommendation by the commentators – 20...\*c8, Black remains with plenty of problems to worry about: 21.\*c1 \*f6 22.\*c2 \*g7 23.\*e2 \*d5 24.\*be1\up) 21.\*b3 g4 22.fxg4 fxg4 23.\*xf7 \*xf7 24.\*h5 \*h6? (It would have been a more resilient defensive line for Black to have given up his bishop: 24...\*d5 25.\*xg7 \*xg7 26.c4 \*f4 27.\*f1\up) 25.\*h4!+\*f8 26.\*f6+ \*g8 27.\*e5 \*d5 28.c4 \*b4 29.\*e4 \*xe4 30.\*xe4 \*e7 31.\*xg4+ \*f8 32.\*g7+ and White pressed his material advantage home in the game Hort – Gulko, Polanica Zdroj 1977.

\*2b2) 12...a6

13.\*a4

After 13.\*d3, GM S. Atalik recommends: 13...\*fd8 14.\*b1 \*e5 15.c4 b5\* and Black has counterplay.

13...b5

It is too passive for Black to play here: 13...\*c8 14.\*c1 \*a5 15.c4 \*c6 16.c5 b5 17.\*b3 b4 18.d5 \*b5 19.\*e1 \*xe2 20.\*xe2 \*xb3 21.axb3 e6 22.\*c4\* and White’s pawns in the centre are extremely dangerous. Later, in the game Pein – Gutman, Manchester 1980, there followed 22...exd5 23.exd5 a5 24.\*f4 \*d8 25.\*e7 \*f5 26.d6 cxd6 27.cxd6 a4 (This is the only available counterplay for Black.) 28.bxa4 b3 29.g4! \*f6 30.\*e5! \*xf3 31.\*f1 \*xa4 32.\*xa4 \*e3+ 33.\*h1 \*xe5 34.\*c4 \*h8 35.d7 b2 36.\*e8+ \*g7 37.\*xf7+ \*h6 38.\*f8+ \*g5 39.\*e7+ and Black resigned.

14.\*b3 \*a5

It seems worse for Black to
continue with: 14...e5 15.♕d2 ♦a5 16.♖fd1 ♦xb3 17.axb3 exd4 18.♗xd4 ♦xd4+ 19.cxd4+, because the dark squares in his camp are so weak that White’s knight is much stronger than Black’s bishop, Karpov – Gavrikov, Mazatlan 1988. The game followed with: 19...f5 20.e5 ♦d5 21.♗e3 c6 22.♗f4 ♦fe8 23.♗a5 ♦b7 24.♗d3 ♦b6 25.b4 ♦e6 26.♗c5 ♦a7 27.h4 ♦c8 28.d5 cxd5 29.♖xd5 ♦ae7 30.♗d4 ♦c7 31.f4 ♦g7 32.♖a3+ and White’s positional advantage was overwhelming.

After 14...e6, besides what was played in the game van de Werken – H.Kramer, corr. 1988 – 15.♗c1 (15.♗c1?!±) 15...a5 16.c4 (or 16.♗f4!? ♦xb3 17.axb3 a5 18.♗d3±) 16...c6 17.♗c2+, it deserved attention for White to transfer his knight immediately with: 15.♗f4!? b4 (otherwise White simply deploys his knight to the c5-square and his positional advantage becomes almost decisive) 16.♕d3 bxc3 17.♗c5 ♦c8 18.♗c1 ♦d8 (18...♕xd4? 19.♕xd4 ♦d8 20.e5 ♦xe5 21.♗xe5 ♦xd1 22.♗xd1+--; 18...♕xd4!? 19.♕xd4 ♦d8 20.♕d5 exd5 21.♕f6 ♦d6 22.e5±) 19.d5 ♦b8 (Or 19...exd5 20.♕xd5 ♦e7 21.♕xb7 ♦xd1 22.♗xd1 ♦e8 23.♕xa8 ♦xa8 24.♗a4, followed by Nxc3 and White remains with a material and positional advantage as well.) 20.♕e1 ♦d4 (20...exd5 21.♕xd5 ♦a5 22.♗xb7 ♦xb7 23.♕xc3! ♙xc3 24.♖xc3 ♦d6 25.♕f6++; 21...♕a8 22.♖c3!±) 21.dxe6 ♦xe6 22.♖xc3±.

15.♗c2 (Or 15.♗c1 ♖fd8 16.♕a3 ♗xb3 17.axb3 a5 18.♖fd1 ♖d6 with a very complicated position, Begic – Atalik, Bosnian League 2000.) and later, for example: 15...e6 16.♗c1 ♖c6 17.♖d2 ♗c4 18.♖xc4 bxc4 19.♕h6 ♗xh6 20.♕xh6 ♗ab8 21.♕b1 ♗e7 22.e5±. Black’s weakened dark squares make us evaluate this position clearly in favour of White, but it is not so easy for him to make any progress, since his knight has no easy access to the best possible squares for it and Black has some serious counter chances on the queenside. Later in the game Pytel – Jansa, Stockholm 1975, there followed: 22...♕a3 23.♗d2 ♖b5 24.♖xb5 axb5 25.♕b1 ♕a8 26.♗b2 ♕e7 27.♕f4 ♕g7 28.h4 h6 29.♗f2 and the opponents agreed to draw.

I believe that White’s best line here is: 15.♗f4! with the idea to follow with ♗f4-d3-c5 and he remains with a clear advantage.
Chapter 2

c3) 10...\(\mathcal{D}c6\)

This position is often reached after some other move-orders. White chooses different lines here and we are going to deal in details with: c3a) 11.\(\mathcal{E}c1\) and c3b) 11.\(\mathcal{D}d2\).

11.e5 – this activity is a bit premature. 11...\(\mathcal{D}b7\) 12.e6 (Instead of that risky move, it deserved attention for White to have tried 12.\(\mathcal{D}f4!?)\) 12...fxe6 13.\(\mathcal{D}f4\) \(\mathcal{E}f6\) 14.\(\mathcal{D}g4\) \(\mathcal{E}h8\) 15.\(\mathcal{D}xe6\) (15.\(\mathcal{D}xe6\) \(\mathcal{D}a5++\)) 15...\(\mathcal{D}d6\) 16.\(\mathcal{D}fe1?\) (White had better play here: 16.d5 \(\mathcal{D}e5\), or 16.\(\mathcal{D}b3\)) 16...\(\mathcal{D}af8\) (or immediately 16...g5 17.\(\mathcal{D}xg5\) \(\mathcal{D}h6\)) 17.g3 g5 18.\(\mathcal{D}xg5\) \(\mathcal{D}xe6\) 19.\(\mathcal{D}xe6\) \(\mathcal{D}xe6\) 20.d5 \(\mathcal{D}d7++\) and Black’s advantage is decisive, Comp – Lalic, Benasque 1990.

11.f4 – this advance is too risky. 11...e6 12.f5 exf5 13.exf5 \(\mathcal{D}a5\) (In case Black had continued here with 13...\(\mathcal{D}e7?!\), White probably would have had to sacrifice the exchange with: 14.\(\mathcal{D}d2\) \(\mathcal{D}xf5\) 15.\(\mathcal{D}xf5\) gxf5 16.\(\mathcal{D}g3\) \(\mathcal{D}d7\) 17.\(\mathcal{D}f1\) \(\mathcal{D}e7\) 18.\(\mathcal{D}h6\); 16...\(\mathcal{D}a5\) 17.\(\mathcal{D}d3\) and White has good attacking chances, at the cost of some material, though...) 14.\(\mathcal{D}d3\) \(\mathcal{D}b7\) 15.\(\mathcal{D}d2\) \(\mathcal{D}c6\) 16.\(\mathcal{D}f2\) \(\mathcal{D}c4\) 17.\(\mathcal{D}xc4\) \(\mathcal{D}xc4\) 18.\(\mathcal{D}h6\) \(\mathcal{D}fe8\) 19.\(\mathcal{D}xg7\) \(\mathcal{D}xg7\) 20.f6+ and the powerful f6-pawn provides White with excellent attacking prospects: 20...\(\mathcal{D}h8\) 21.\(\mathcal{D}f4\) \(\mathcal{A}a6\) (21...\(\mathcal{C}c5\) 22.\(\mathcal{D}h3\)) 22.\(\mathcal{D}h3\) \(\mathcal{D}e6\) 23.\(\mathcal{D}f3\) \(\mathcal{D}d6\) 24.\(\mathcal{D}g5\) \(\mathcal{D}f8\) 25.\(\mathcal{D}h3\) h5 26.\(\mathcal{D}e1\) \(\mathcal{D}xe1+\) 27.\(\mathcal{D}xe1\) \(\mathcal{D}c4\) 28.\(\mathcal{D}e4\) \(\mathcal{D}e8\) 29.\(\mathcal{D}xh5\) 1-0 Garcia Palermo – Mrdja, Alba Adriatica 1988. Or 11...\(\mathcal{D}a5\) 12.\(\mathcal{D}d3\) \(\mathcal{D}b7\) (It deserved attention for Black to defend here with: 12...f5!? 13.\(\mathcal{D}xh5\) \(\mathcal{D}e3\) 14.\(\mathcal{D}g3\) \(\mathcal{D}b7\) 15.\(\mathcal{D}h5\) \(\mathcal{D}f7?!\), blocking White’s attack on the light squares.) 13.\(\mathcal{D}f5\) \(\mathcal{D}ad8\) 14.\(\mathcal{D}f4?!\) c5 15.e5 cxd4 16.cxd4. Black has captured the f5-pawn, but he has come under a dangerous attack: 16...\(\mathcal{D}xf5\) 17.\(\mathcal{D}h5\) e6 18.\(\mathcal{D}ad1\) \(\mathcal{D}e7\) (or 18...\(\mathcal{D}c6\) 19.d5 \(\mathcal{D}xe5\) 20.dxe6 \(\mathcal{D}xe6\) 21.\(\mathcal{D}xf5\) \(\mathcal{D}xf5\) 22.\(\mathcal{D}xd7\) \(\mathcal{D}xd7\) 23.\(\mathcal{D}d1\)) 19.g4 \(\mathcal{D}e4\) 20.gxf5 \(\mathcal{D}xf5\) 21.\(\mathcal{D}xe4\) \(\mathcal{D}xe4\) 22.\(\mathcal{D}h1\) \(\mathcal{D}c4\) 23.\(\mathcal{D}c1\) e3 24.\(\mathcal{D}g1\), \(\mathcal{D}b7+\) (24...\(\mathcal{D}h8\) 25.\(\mathcal{D}g3\) \(\mathcal{D}g8\) 26.\(\mathcal{D}h3\) h6 27.\(\mathcal{D}g1\) \(\mathcal{D}f8\) 28.\(\mathcal{D}e6\)) 25.d5 \(\mathcal{D}e7\) 26.\(\mathcal{D}h6\) \(\mathcal{D}xe5\) 27.\(\mathcal{D}xe7+\) \(\mathcal{D}xe7\) 28.\(\mathcal{D}g1\) \(\mathcal{D}xg1+\) 29.\(\mathcal{D}xg1\) \(\mathcal{D}d6\) 30.\(\mathcal{D}g5+\) \(\mathcal{D}h8\) 31.\(\mathcal{D}e7\) and Black resigned in the game Fodor – Nemeth, corr. 1981.

11.\(\mathcal{D}b5\) a6 12.\(\mathcal{D}a4\) (It deserves attention for White to follow here with: 12.\(\mathcal{D}d3?!\) \(\mathcal{D}b7\) 13.\(\mathcal{D}b1\) \(\mathcal{D}ad8\) 14.\(\mathcal{D}d2\) \(\mathcal{D}a5\) and after some transposition of moves we have reached a position from the game Kramnik – Svidler, Tilburg 1998 – see varia-
tion 11...\(b2\). 12...b5 13...b3 \(a5\) 14...d2 \(b7\) 15...g3 e6 16...h6 \(xb3\) 17.axb3 \(xh6\) 18...xh6 f5 19...fe1 f4 (It is better for Black to play: 19...b4 20...a1 \(f7\), without the inclusion of the move f5-f4, because that only diminishes his possibilities.) 20...f1 a5 21. \(d2\) b4 22...ac1 c5 23...f3 cxd4 24.cxd4 \(ac8\) 25...xc8 \(xc8\) 26. \(g5\) (26.h4!?±) 26...d7 27...h3 \(c8\) (27...e8 28...h4 \(c7\) 29.e5+) 28...d1 (28...c1?±) 28...e7 29...h6 \(g7\) 30...xg7+ \(xg7\) 31...c1± and the endgame is clearly worse for Black, Steenbekkers – Gerwen, Boxtel 1987.

c3a) 11...c1!?

White removes his rook away from the scope of action of the bishop on g7 (and that enables him to play d4-d5 and c3-c4 in some variations) and he deploys it along the c-file, which might be opened after c7-c5 and the subsequent exchange of pawns on d4; meanwhile, it is not so clear, whether that is the most useful move for White in that position.

11...\(b7\)

It is hardly worth for Black to clarify the situation in the centre, prior to the completion of his development: 11...\(a5\) 12...d3 c5 13.d5 c4 14...b1 e6 15.dxe6 \(xe6\) 16...d4 \(e7\) 17...d2 \(b7\) 18...h6 \(fe8\) 19...xg7 \(xg7\) 20...c1 \(ad8\) 21...e3 f6 (It was better for Black to have attacked the key-d4-knight outright with: 21... \(c6\)! 22...h3 \(g8\) 23...h6 f6 24...xc6 \(xc6\) 25.e5 f5 26...xf5 \(xg2\) 27...xg2 \(xf5\) 28...h6+ \(g8\) 29...h3 \(c8\) 30...h6+ \(g8\) 24...g3 \(g7\) 25...c1 \(d7\) 26.h4± and White has good attacking chances against the weakened black king, Hartston – Vreeken, England 1974. White should have chosen the more aggressive set-up with a proud knight on the d5-outpost: 16...f4!? \(d7\) 17...d5± and then either \(d4\), or \(e2\) and \(d1\). Black’s pieces seem to be a bit misplaced in that case.

12...d2

12...d3 \(a5\) 13...c4 (It is preferable for White not to clarify the situation in the centre and to play instead 13...d2?) 13...e6 14...d2 f5 15.f3 (In case of: 15...exf5 \(xf5\) – 15...exf5?! 16...h6 – Black’s counterplay is sufficient to compensate the miniscule weakening of his king.) 15...fxe4 16...xe4 \(xf1+\) 17...xf1 and the opponents agreed to a draw in the game Zilberberg – L.Barczay, corr. 1970. Indeed, after, for example 17...\(d8\), it is far from clear how White can improve his position.
12.\textit{\textbf{\textup{\texttt{\&b5}}} a6 13.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&a4}}} (It deserves attention for White to try here: 13.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&d3}}}?! \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&a5}}} 14.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&d2}}}, but it is not easy to see how he can profit from the placement of Black’s pawn on the a6-square with his rook on c1. White’s rook should better be on b1 in order to prevent effectively Black move c7-c5.) 13...b5 14.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&c2}}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&ad8}}} 15.a4 e5 16.axb5 axb5 17.d5 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&a5}}} 18.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&d3}}} c6. Black has undermined White’s centre and he has a good game: 19.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&a1}}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&a8}}} 20.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&c5}}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&fb8}}} 21.d6 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&c8}}} 22.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&b1}}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&e6}}} 23.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&b4}}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&b3}}} \text{Toran – Larsen, Beverwijk 1959.})

12...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&a5}}}

The line: 12...e6 13.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&h6}}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&a5}}} 14.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&xg7}}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&xg7}}} 15.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&d3}}} c5 leads to a transposition of moves.

13.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&d3}}} c5 14.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&h6}}}

Following 14.d5, Black counters with 14...c4 15.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&b1}}} e6, undermining White’s centre.

14...e6

Or 14...e5 15.d5±.

15.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&xg7}}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&xg7}}} 16.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&e3}}}

The dark squares on Black’s kingside are vulnerable and that provides White with a long-lasting initiative, even in case the rooks are exchanged along the c-file.

It is less precise for White to follow with: 16.h4 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&e7}}} 17.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&f4}}} (In case of 17.h5, Black plays: 17...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&h4}}} 18.hxg6 hxg6 19.g3 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&e7}}}, and his rook reaches the h8-square.) 17...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&c6}}} 18.e5 cxd4 19.cxd4 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&b4}}} 20.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&c4}}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&ac8}}} 21.h5 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&d5}}}∞. Presently, White has no access to the f6-square and Black’s counter chances are quite sufficient, Starck – Gross, Leipzig 1981.

16.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&ac8}}} 17.h4 cxd4 18.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&cxd4}}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&xc1}}} 19.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&xc1}}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&c8}}} 20.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&xc8}}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&xc8}}} 21.h5↑

There are still queens present on the board (Black had no possibility to trade them anyway...) and White preserves good attacking chances. Black’s imprecise defence led him to a swift disaster after: 21...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&d6}}} (21...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&d8}}}?!) 22.e5 f5 23.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&g5}}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&f8}}} 24.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&f4}}+- and he was faced with unavoidable material losses in the game, Neidhardt – Gutzeit, Hessen 1992.

\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&c3}}}b) 11.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\&d2}}}

This is evidently White’s most
logical move. He can place his rook from a1 to many different squares, not only on c1, but on d1 as well, while the move \( \text{d2} \) will be useful for him anyway. Black has tried in this position: c3b1) 11...\( \text{b7} \), c3b2) 11...\( \text{d8} \) and c3b3) 11...\( \text{a5} \).

**c3b1) 11...\( \text{b7} \) 12.\( \text{h6} \)**

White has tested at a high level the move 12.\( \text{b5} \)? with the idea to force Black to weaken his b6-pawn with the move a7-a6, and to follow that with Rb1, in order to prevent temporarily the undermining pawn-break c7-c5.

12...a6 13.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{a5} \) 14.\( \text{ab1} \) (14. \( \text{h6} \)?) 14...\( \text{ad8} \). Here, it deserved attention for White to continue with: 15.\( \text{h6} \) e5 16. \( \text{g7} \) \( \text{g7} \) 17.\( \text{g5} \) (17.f4 exd4 18.cxd4 \( f5 \)) 17...\( f6 \) 18.\( \text{g3} \). In the game Kramnik – Svidler, Tilburg 1998, there followed: 15. \( c4 \) \( f5 \) 16.exf5 gxf5 17.\( \text{bd1} \) (It is also interesting for White to try here 17.c5!? with the following eventual variation: 17...\( f4 \) 18. \( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 19.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{d5} \) 20.\( \text{xh7} \) \( \text{xh7} \) 21.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{g3} \) 22.\( \text{g6} \), winning a third pawn, having already a rook for two light pieces, although Black’s army units are very active in that middle game.) 17...e5 18.dxe5 \( \text{xe5} \) 19.c5 \( \text{d5} \) 20.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c4} \) 21.\( \text{xc4} \) \( \text{xc4} \) 22. \( \text{xd8} \) \( \text{xd8} \) 23.\( \text{xd8+} \) \( \text{f7} \) 24. \( \text{d2} \) bxc5 25.\( \text{f2} \) and the opponents agreed to a draw.

**12...\( \text{ad8} \)**

About 12...\( \text{a5} \) 13.\( \text{d3} \) c5

14.\( \text{g7} \) \( \text{g7} \) – see 11...\( \text{a5} \).

13.\( \text{g7} \) \( \text{g7} \) 14.\( \text{d1} \) \( e5 \)

This is hardly the best line for Black, because it enables White to organize a powerful kingside attack. It is better for Black to play instead: 14...\( \text{a5} \) 15.\( \text{d3} \) c5 16.d5 \( e6 \) 17.\( c4 \).

**15.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{e7} \) 16.\( \text{f4} \)**

16...\( \text{exd4} \)?! Black loses an important tempo with that move. (He had better play: 16...\( \text{f6} \) 17.\( \text{g3} \) 17.\( \text{f5} \)→ \( \text{xf5} \) (17...\( \text{f6} \) 18.\( \text{f4} \), followed by \( \text{f4} \)-e6, would have enabled White to win at least the exchange.) 18.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{h8} \) 19.\( \text{xf5} \) and Black’s kingshelter has been turned into ruins: 19...\( \text{xf6} \) 20.\( \text{cxd4} \) \( \text{g6} \) 21. \( \text{c1} \) \( \text{d7} \) 22.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{d8} \) 23.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 24.\( \text{g6} \) \( \text{fxg6} \) 25.\( \text{g3} \) and White remained with a decisive material advantage in the game Spraggett – Hebert, Boucherville 1979.

**c3b2) 11...\( \text{d8} \)**

That is a natural and useful move – after \( \text{e3-h6} \), Black has the possibility \( \text{g7-h8} \) and he will have an additional attack along the d-file; meanwhile the
drawback of that idea is that the removal of the rook from the defence of the f7-square adds venom to White’s possible direct attack with f2-f4-f5.

12.\(a\)d1

The move 12.\(a\)h6 presents Black with an additional possibility – 12...\(c\)e5 (One of the games played in the year 2001 continued with: 12...\(a\)h8 13.f4 \(d\)a5 14.\(d\)d3 c5 15.e5 cxd4 16. cxd4 \(a\)b7 17.\(a\)c1 \(a\)d5 18.\(f\)f3 \(e\)c8 19.\(c\)c2 \(c\)c6\(\#\) and Black had good counterplay.) 13.\(b\)b3 \(a\)a6 14.\(x\)xg7 \(x\)xg7 15.f4 \(g\)4 (15... \(c\)c4 16.\(d\)d3?) 16.f5 \(d\)d6 17.g3 \(f\)f6 18.fxg6 hxg6 19.\(f\)f2 \(c\)c6 20.e5 \(d\)d5 21.\(x\)x5 (21.\(a\)f1 \(d\)f8) 21...\(x\)d5 (Black had to follow here with 21...\(x\)d5, so that to be able to counter 22.\(a\)f4 with 22...\(a\)b7 with a quite unclear game.) 22.\(a\)f4 \(c\)c4 23.e6 f5 24.g4 \(a\)b7 25.gxf5 g5 26.f6+- and White’s attack is overwhelming, Crafty – ZChess, London 2000.

12...\(b\)b7 13.\(b\)b5

It deserves attention for White here to try: 13.\(h\)h6!? \(a\)h8 14.f4, because Black has postponed the undermining pawn-break c7-c5. There might follow: 14...\(a\)a5 15.\(a\)d3 c5 16.d5 f5 17. \(g\)3 fxe4 18.\(x\)xe4 \(c\)c4 19.\(e\)e2 and f4-f5 with a dangerous attack for White.

13...\(a\)a6 14.\(d\)d3 b5

Black had to consider here the immediate 14...\(a\)a5!? – since the purposefulness of the move b6-b5 for him is rather questionable.

15.f4

White could have also tried here 15.\(h\)h6!?\(\#\), so that his bishop after f2-f4 does not remain locked behind his pawn-chain situated on dark squares throughout.

15...\(a\)a5 (It is better for Black to continue here with 15...f5 and after the following eventual developments: 16.exf5 gxf5 17.\(a\)g3 e6 18.\(h\)h5 \(e\)7 19.\(x\)xg7 \(x\)g7 – his position remains quite solid, despite the absence of his dark-squared bishop.) 16.f5 \(a\)c8 17.fxg6 hxg6 18.\(h\)h6 \(d\)d6 19.\(x\)g7 \(x\)g7 20.e5→ (White has plenty of additional resources to attack the g6-square – \(d\)d2-g5, \(e\)e2-f4, e5-e6 etc.) 20...\(c\)c6 21.\(g\)g5 \(c\)c4 22.\(f\)f3 (22.\(f\)f2?) 22...\(b\)b6 23.
move \( \text{e}3-h6 \), by attacking the a2-pawn anyway.) 14.\( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{h}8 \) (Black cannot capture White's pawn here: 14...\( \text{h}xh6 \) 15.\( \text{g}xh6 \) \( \text{xa}2 \) 16.\( \text{f}f4 \)→ \( \text{b}7 \) 17.e5++) 15.f4 (The bishop on h6 is now completely isolated. It is better for White to follow here with: 15.\( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 16.\( \text{g}3 \)−− and Black's pieces are dis coordinated.) 15...\( \text{c}4 \) 16.\( \text{f}1 \) (or 16.\( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{xc}4 \) 17.f5 c5) 16...f5 17.\( \text{f}2 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 18.e5 \( \text{f}7 \) and Black's counterplay was quite sufficient in the game Szilagyi – Liebert, Stary Smolovec 1975.

13.\( \text{ad}1 \)
White can also play here at first 13.\( \text{h}6 \).

13...\( \text{ad}8 \) 14.\( \text{h}6 \) c5 15.\( \text{g}7 \) \( \text{xg}7 \) 16.\( \text{g}5 \)
It deserved attention for White to continue with 16.\( \text{e}3 \)!

16...f6 17.\( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{h}8 \)

This position arose in the game Asanov – Tseshkovsky, USSR 1985. White could have preserved his initiative by playing: 18.\( \text{h}4 \)−−, with the idea to follow with h4-h5, e4-e5 and \( \text{e}2-f4 \).
Chapter 3

1.d4 .df6 2.c4 g6 3.¿c3 d5 4.cxd5  ¿xd5 5.e4  ¿xc3 6.bxc3 ¿g7 7.¿c4 0–0 8.¿e2  ¿c6

9.0–0

The idea of the move 8...¿c6 is to counter 9.h4 with 9...¿a5 with a good counterplay for Black. (It is also interesting to play 9...e5!? 10.¿e3 exd4 11.cxd4 ¿e7∞ Lazarev – Grunenberg, Germany 1992.) 10.¿b3 (Or 10.¿d3 c5 11.¿e3 cxd4 12.cxd4 ¿c6 13.¿c4 ¿a5 14.¿d3 ¿c6 15.¿c4 ¿a5 ½ Hertneck – Berndt, Germany 2001. The other possibility for White led to a very sharp position in the game 13.e5 ¿a5+ 14.¿f1 ¿d8 15.h5 ¿e6∞ Spassky – Sajtar, Bucharest 1953) 10...c5 11.h5 (In the game Bykhovsky – Zilberstein, USSR 1983, White got an advantage after 11.dxc5 ¿c7 12.¿e3 ¿d7 13.h5 ¿b5 14.\text{hxg6} hxg6 15.¿d5±, but Black could have played better, for ex-
ample with the move 12...¿d8.) 11...¿xb3 12.axb3 cxd4 13.cxd4 ¿d7 14.hxg6 hxg6 15.¿d3 ¿b6 16.¿d2 ¿fc8∞, and Black had a powerful counterplay in the game Spassky – Stein, USSR 1964.

Black can answer 9.¿g5 quite effectively with e7-e5 (the white bishop is not protecting the d4-square): 9...¿d7 10.¿d2 (It is also possible for White to continue with 10.0–0 e5 11.dxe5 ¿xe5 12.¿d5 h6 13.¿e3 c6 14.¿b3 ¿e7 15.¿d4 ¿d8= Razuvaev – Vaganian, Minsk 1979. Black had a good position although White had some initiative due to the threat f4-f5) 10...e5 11.¿d1 (This move enables Black to attack e4 and g2. White achieves nothing much with 11.d5 ¿a5 12.¿d3 c6 13.c4 b6 14.¿c1 ¿a6¿ Tisdall – Gulko, Thessaloniki 1988, and Black has a good counterplay on the queenside.) 11...exd4!? (Or 11...¿g4 12.0–0 ¿xe4 13.¿g3 ¿g4 14.h3 ¿d7 15.¿h6∞ Beliavsky – Milos, Szirak 1987. White had enough for the pawn but not more.)
12.cxd4 g4, and White’s compensation for the material deficit was insufficient according to Ftacnik.

Black now has a choice between: a) 9...e5, b) 9...b6 and c) 9...a5.

About 9...d7 10.e3 b6 – see Chapter 2, variation 8...d7 9.0-0 b6 10.e3 c6.

Black has also tried here:

9...a6 – This is a very dubious move, because its only idea (to prepare b7-b5) is much rather harmful for Black, since he only compromises his position by advancing his queenside pawns.

10.e3 d7, Crafty – Zarkov, 1999 (That is another incomprehensible move, after which it becomes quite clear that a7-a6 – is just a loss of time.) and now White should follow just like in the standard lines with – 11.d2 and then h6 and ad1;

9...e6 10.e3 a5 (or 10...b6 11.d2 e8 12.b5!? d7. Here in the game Chow – Martinovsky, Prairie 1987, White continued with: 13.d3 a5 14.c1=.) He did not have to retreat his bishop – instead he could have tried 13.a1!? 11.d3 f5 (Black could have followed here with: 11...c5 12.c3 cxd4 13.cxd4 b6, transposing to lines from Chapter 10.) 12.c1 b6 13.h6 f7 14. xg7 xg7, Pastore – Marson, Treviso Lega 1996, 15.e3 – Black has compromised his dark squares too much;

9...g4 10.f3 d7. That is a rather awkward maneuver for Black and now the placement of his bishop on d7 enables White to continue with: 11.g5 h6 12.e3 e6 13.d2 h7, Dillon – Jimenez Alvarez, Gijon 2000, 14.ad1= – Black has evidently played several useless moves in this type of position.

a) 9...e5

This move is not so typical for the Gruenfeld Defence and Black entices his opponent to close the centre with d4-d5, after which there arises a complex closed position, meanwhile the fact that Black’s pawn has been left on the c7-square is much rather is his favour, because his knight has the wonderful additional c5-square. Now, White has three basic possibilities: a1) 10.d5, the concrete tactical line – a2) 10. a3 and the move that maintains the tension in the centre – a3) 10.e3.

a1) 10.d5

White does not achieve the advantage in principle after closing the centre in this line. Black
usually retreats to a5 with his knight and takes it to c5 or d6 later, solving his problems in the opening.

10...\( \text{	ext{\textsection}} \text{a5} \) 11.\( \text{	ext{\textsection}} \text{d3} \)

Or 11.\( \text{	ext{\textsection}} \text{b3} \) b6 12.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{e7} \) 13.\( \text{\textsection} \text{e3} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{b7} \) 14.\( \text{\textsection} \text{a4} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{c5} \) – and White does not achieve much after bringing his bishop to c6 Arakhamia – Akopian, Moscow 1989.

11...b6

11...g4?! It is not easy to understand why Black should lose time to force White’s pawn to the f3-square – f2-f3. 12.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{d7} \) 13.\( \text{c4} \) c6 (Here, it deserved attention for Black to play 13...c5, in order after b7-b6, to maneuver the knight to the d6-square via b7. Meanwhile, after he has already developed his light-squared bishop, he does not have the possibility \( \text{\textsection} \text{c8-a6} \) anymore.) 14.\( \text{\textsection} \text{d2} \) b6 (It is too risky for Black to let White double his pawns; instead it is better for him to continue with: 14...\( \text{cxd5} \) 15.\( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{c8} \) 16.\( \text{\textsection} \text{c1} \pm \) 15.\( \text{\textsection} \text{a5} \) bxa5 16.\( \text{\textsection} \text{b1} \) (White had to consider here too the possibility 16...c5!?\( \uparrow \), with the idea to advance his pawns in the centre.) 16...\( \text{\textsection} \text{g5} \) 17.\( \text{\textsection} \text{c1} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{e7} \) 18.\( \text{\textsection} \text{b7} \) \( \text{cxd5} \) 19.\( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{fc8} \) 20.\( \text{\textsection} \text{b2} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{c5} \) 21.\( \text{\textsection} \text{h1} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{c7} \) (Black would have been clearly worse after: 21...\( \text{\textsection} \text{d6} \) 22.\( \text{\textsection} \text{b5} \pm \) – because he would have been left with a “bad” bishop and a greatly compromised pawn-structure.) 22.\( \text{\textsection} \text{c1} \) -- and Black loses material, Marie – Damary, Erevan 1996.

Black has also tried in practice the immediate move – 11...c5, although it only restricts his possibilities. White often tries to provoke that move even losing some time in the process...There might follow: 12.\( \text{c4} \) f5 13.\( \text{f3} \) b6 14.\( \text{\textsection} \text{d2} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{b7} \) 15.\( \text{a4} \) f4 16.\( \text{a5} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{xa5} \) 17.\( \text{\textsection} \text{xa5} \) bxa5 18.\( \text{\textsection} \text{a4} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{f6} \) 19.\( \text{\textsection} \text{xa5} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{e7} \) 20.\( \text{\textsection} \text{c3} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{f8} \), Panczyk – Pribyl, Warsaw 1981, 21.\( \text{\textsection} \text{fb1} \) \pm and White’s advantage is only minimal.

It is too passive for Black to play: 12...b6 13.\( \text{\textsection} \text{d2} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{b7} \) 14.\( \text{a4} \) a5 15.\( \text{\textsection} \text{b1} \) f5, Trubizin – Mikheev, Tula 2002. Here, White had better exchange on f5 and he would have preserved a slight advantage, because despite the fact that the queenside has been blocked, White maintains good prospects on the kingside and in the centre.

11...c6 12.\( \text{\textsection} \text{a3} \) (White can play immediately 12.\( \text{c4} \) b6?!, but not 12...b5 13.\( \text{\textsection} \text{xb5} \) cxd5 14.\( \text{\textsection} \text{a3} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{e8} \) 15.\( \text{\textsection} \text{c3} \) \( \text{\textsection} \text{b7} \) 16.\( \text{\textsection} \text{b4} \) \pm – Black does not need to change the character of the position from a closed one into an open one and facilitate the actions of his opponent on the queenside Rashkovsky – Yermolinsky, USSR 1985.) 12...\( \text{\textsection} \text{e8} \) 13.\( \text{c4} \) b6 (Just like we have mentioned before, it is not worth for Black to play 13...b5 14.\( \text{\textsection} \text{xb5} \) cxd5 15.\( \text{\textsection} \text{a4} \) a6 16.\( \text{b6} \) \( \uparrow \) and White had the edge in the game Murey – Sokolowski, Paris 1990.) 14.\( \text{\textsection} \text{b4} \) (14.\( \text{\textsection} \text{c1}. \) In case Black
plays c6-c5, it would become obvious that White has already played two useless moves –  c1 and  a3. Therefore – 14...c5 15.  b2  b7 16.  g3  h4 and in the game Bilobrk – Rogulj, Zadar 1995, White had, in order to prepare the pawn-break f2-f4, to retreat with his knight immediately, or  c2  d6 17.f4 and here instead of: 17...f5 18.fxe5 fxe4 19.  xe4  xe5 20.  xe5  xe5 21.  xg6± Ribeiro – Moscoso, IECC 1998, Black had better play: 17...e7 18.  c1 exf4 19.  xf4  b2 20.  xb2  e5, establishing a blockade on the dark squares. 18.f5?! gxf5 19.exf5? e4.) 14...f8 15.  c3  b7 16.  c1  c5 17.e1  a6 18.  f1∞ – the position is complicated but Black has solved the opening problems more or less, Gagunashvili – Aronian, Athens 2001. It becomes evident now that White has problems to prove his advantage in the arising positions with a closed centre and a black pawn on the c7-square. The point is that Black’s knight can easily be deployed to the wonderful blocking c5, or d6-squares and he thus obtains excellent counterplay on the kingside after f7-f5 and  d8-g5.

12.  b2

This move was recommended by GM A.Beliavsky. Its idea is that in case of opening of the game in the centre, the bishop on b2 will be very well placed after c3-c4. In fact, it is quite difficult to find a better place for the bishop, because if White places it on a3, then after c7-c5, he will have to retreat it back to b2, or to the c1-square. The defect of the said move is that Black is not forced to deploy his pawn on c5, but he can place there his knight after a while.

The other possibilities for White are:

12.c4  f5 13.  c3 c6 and here surprisingly it proved to be quite dubious for White to open the centre with: 14.dxc6?!  xc6 15.  a3  f7 16.c5  e6 17.  a4  d4 18.  ad1  bxc5 19.  xc5  c7 20.  a5?  xc5!! 21.  xc5  f8 22.  xe5  d6 23.  xd4  xh2+ 24.  xh2  xd4+ Zueger – Kindermann, Munich 1989;

12.f4 – This undermining move is a bit too early. Black fortifies his position easily on the dark squares in the centre: 12...exf4 13.  xf4  g4 14.h3  xe2 15.  xe2  e7 16.  c1  e5 17.  g4  xf4 18.  xf4  ae8 19.  h1  e5 20.  d2  b7 21.  c1  c5 – and the dark squares in the centre are so vulnerable that only White might have problems in that position, Del Rey – De la Villa Garcia, Aceimar 1995;

12.  b1 – The usefulness on this rook on the b1-square is rather questionable. 12...c6 13.  a3 c5 14.  c1 (White has spent too much time in order to provoke the move c7-c5.) 14...f5 and here the following line proved to be bad for White: 15.f4?! fxe4
16. Ax e4 w d6 (Black is much better prepared for the opening of the game in the centre.) 17. h3 w d7 18. w d3 A a e8 19. c4 e f4 20. A x f4 w e7 21. g3 w h4 22. A d6 w d4+ 23. w h2 w f2!+ Wilder – Gulko, USA 1988;

White played some rather arguable moves in the game Garcia Palermo – Ftanik, Manila 1992: 12. a4 c6 13. c4 f5 14. A a3 (The same maneuver all over again…) 14…c5 15. c3 A d7 16. A c1 f4 17. A e2 and after 17…w h4, A g6-g5-g4 Black had good counter chances.

12…f5

That is a quite opportune moment for that planned undermining move, since now White does not achieve anything favourable by exchanging on f5.

Here, it deserved attention for Black to have tried GM A. Beliavsky’s recommendation: 12…c6! 13. c4 b5∞.

Black has also played in practice: 12…c5 13. c4, but here already the move 13…f5, can be countered by White with the powerful resource: 14. e xf5! g xf5 15. g3 A d7 16. w e1 e4 (It is uncomfortable for Black to defend his hanging pawns on e5 and f5, so he has decided to advance one of them, which of course enables White to undermine it with f2-f3.) 17. x g7 w x g7 18. A f1 w g 5 19. f3 A e8. Now, this typical blocking sacrifice is not so effective anymore, because White deploys simply his knight to the d3-square and he unblocks his centre easily. (Black had better play: 19…w f3 20. w f3± – but his position would have remained difficult anyway, due to his weaknesses on the kingside and his misplaced knight at the edge of the board.) 20. w x e 4 f4 21. w d2 w e 5 22. w h1 w h8 23. w c1 w b 7 24. w c3 w d6 25. w f2 w f7 26. w f3 w c 8 27. w h1 w g 5 28. e 5 w f5 29. e 6+– and Black could have just resigned in the game Timoshenko – Topakian, Hartberg 1991.

13. f3

If here 13. e xf 5, then Black plays 13…g x f 5 14. c 4 c 6∞, attacking White’s d 5-pawn.

13…w e 7

This is an imprecise move according to Beliavsky – White now has the motive c b 2-a3. Black had better play the move 13…c 6 immediately.

14. w h 1 A d 7

Now, following: 14…c 6 15. c 4 A a 6 16. w a 4, Black cannot exchange on d 5, because his queen comes under attack after c 1-a 3.

15. c 4 f x e 4

It deserves attention for Black to play 15…A b 7, because after the standard reaction from White: 16. w x f 5 g x f 5 17. w e 1 c 5 18. g 3 A e 8, he cannot increase easily his pressure against Black’s e 5 and f 5-pawns.

16. w x e 4 w g 4

Black did not capture later on e 2, so that move proved to be unnecessary. Instead, he could
have tried: 16...\texttt{xf1}+ 17.\texttt{xf1 \f8} and \texttt{a5-b7} – and the position would have remained approximately equal.

17.\texttt{a4} – White is threatening now \texttt{a3}. (Later, in the game Beliavsky – Ftachnik, Istanbul 2000, Black played quite hesitantly and he lost, but his position had remained solid enough for a long time.) 17...\texttt{g5} (It deserved attention for Black to have continued with the blocking plan 17...c5!?, followed later by a deployment of the knight to the d6-square.) 18.\texttt{g1 \d2}. This move is played with the idea to provoke the move \texttt{a3}, so that White’s queen occupies the square for the bishop and later to deploy the knight to c5. This whole idea does not work however. (It deserved attention for Black to have followed with 18...\texttt{e3}!? – Beliavsky.) 19.\texttt{a3 \b7} (Beliavsky considers here as the best for Black – 19...\texttt{e3}!? 20.\texttt{ae1 \g5} 21.\texttt{c1 \h4} 22.g3 \texttt{h5} 23.\texttt{e7 \f6} 24.\texttt{xc7 \f7} 25.\texttt{d6 \e7} 26.\texttt{c7 \f6=}; 22. \texttt{d2! \b7} 23.\texttt{b4}, but White still maintains the advantage.) 20. \texttt{c1 \a5} 21.\texttt{xa5 \xa5} 22. \texttt{a3 \xf1} 23.\texttt{xf1 \f8} (Black had better continue here with: 23...\texttt{b7} 24.h3 \texttt{d7} 25.\texttt{f3 \e8±} 24.\texttt{b2} 24.\texttt{d6} 25.\texttt{h3 \d7} 26.\texttt{f3 \e8} 27.\texttt{c5! bxc5} 28.\texttt{a6}. White has succeeded in keeping Black’s knight away on the a5-square and he has a clear advantage. The game followed with: 28...\texttt{c8} (or 28...\texttt{b7} 29.\texttt{xb7 \b8} 30. \texttt{xe5 \xb7} 31.\texttt{c3±}) 29.\texttt{xc8} (Here, according to Beliavsky, White could have achieved a great advantage after: 29.\texttt{b5! \e7} 30.\texttt{\text{c1}}, followed by \texttt{b2-a3.}) 29...\texttt{xc8} 30.\texttt{xe5 \xe5} (or 30...\texttt{e8?} 31.\texttt{g4+-}) 31.\texttt{xe5 \c4} 32.\texttt{f4 \e8} 33.\texttt{e5} (33.\texttt{e1} \texttt{e5}) 33...\texttt{b6} 34.\texttt{d1 \d8} 35.\texttt{d6 \cxd6} 36.\texttt{g5 \e8} 37.\texttt{exd6} – and White is still playing for a win in that endgame, but objectively Black should be able to manage to draw at the end.

\begin{itemize}
\item \texttt{a2)} 10.\texttt{a3}
\end{itemize}

10...\texttt{e8} 11.\texttt{xf7+}

This is the idea of White’s previous move. The position is just equal after 11.d5 \texttt{a5} 12.\texttt{d3 b6} (12...c6 – see line \texttt{a1}) 13.\texttt{b4
Chapter 3

\( \texttt{d}7= \text{Rasuvaev} - \text{Smejkal, Germany 1991.} \)

11...\( \text{\texttt{xf7}} \) 12.\( \texttt{wb3+} \) \( \text{\texttt{ae6}} \)

It is too risky for Black; nevertheless it has never been refuted yet – the line: 12...\( \text{\texttt{sf6?!}} \) 13.f4 \( \text{\texttt{eh6}} \) 14.fxe5+(14.d5?!?) 14...\( \texttt{g7} \) 15.\( \text{\texttt{xf6}} \) (In case of 15.e6, Black follows with: 15...\( \texttt{exe6} \) 16.d5 \( \texttt{a5} \) 17.\( \texttt{b4} \) \( \texttt{e3}+ \) 18.\( \texttt{h1} \) c5; 17.\( \texttt{a4} \) \( \texttt{e3}+ \) 18.\( \texttt{h1} \) \( \texttt{g4} \); but it deserves attention for White to play 15.h3!?, with the idea to prevent Black's bishop from coming to the g4-square and White has some positional compensation.) 15...\( \texttt{g4!} \) (or 15...\( \texttt{h8} \) 16.\( \texttt{c1} \) \( \texttt{g7} \) 17.\( \texttt{g5} \) Topalov) 16.\( \texttt{xf7}+ \) (or 16.\( \texttt{xh7} \) \( \texttt{xe5} \) 17.dxe5 \( \texttt{xe2f} \) 16...h8 17.\( \texttt{xh7} \) \( \texttt{xe5} \! \) 18.\( \texttt{xc7} \) (After: 18.dxe5 \( \texttt{e3}+ \) 19.\( \texttt{h1} \) \( \texttt{xb8} \) 20.\( \texttt{d5} \) \( \texttt{xh7} \) 21.exd5 \( \texttt{exe2} \) 22.e6 \( \texttt{c4} \) 23.\( \texttt{xd7} \) \( \texttt{g8} \) – White's pawns cannot advance any further, or 20.\( \texttt{a6} \) \( \texttt{xb6} \) 21.\( \texttt{c4} \) \( \texttt{e6} \) 22.\( \texttt{xc7} \) \( \texttt{xf7} \) 23.\( \texttt{xf7} \) \( \texttt{xe5} \) – and only Black can fight for the win...) 18...\( \texttt{d7} \) (Black can make a draw if he so wishes: 18...\( \texttt{xb8} \)!? 19.\( \texttt{xa7} \) \( \texttt{a8} \) 20.\( \texttt{b7} \) \( \texttt{b8} \)=) 19.\( \texttt{e6} \) 20.\( \texttt{g3} \) (or 20.h3 \( \texttt{xc7} \) 21.\( \texttt{xc7} \) \( \texttt{c8} \) 22.\( \texttt{xc8} \) \( \texttt{xc8} \) 23.hxg4 \( \texttt{xc7} \) 24.\( \texttt{xb1} \) \( \texttt{b6f} \) – Tukmakov) 20...\( \texttt{xc7} \) 21.\( \texttt{xc7} \) \( \texttt{g5} \) 22.h3 \( \texttt{e3}+ \) 23.\( \texttt{h2} \) \( \texttt{xc3} \) 24.\( \texttt{xf1} \) \( \texttt{e6} \) 25.d5 \( \texttt{g8} \) 26.\( \texttt{f4} \) (26.\( \texttt{xa7} \)!?) 26...\( \texttt{xf4} \) 27.\( \texttt{xf4} \) \( \texttt{xf6} \) 28.\( \texttt{a6} \) \( \texttt{g7} \! \) 29.\( \texttt{xa7}+ \) \( \texttt{ff7} \) – Black has managed to neutralize White's attack and he won the game subsequently, Tukmakov – Tukmakov, Palma de Mallorca 1992.

13.\( \texttt{d5} \) \( \texttt{a5} \) 14.\( \texttt{dxe6+} \) \( \texttt{exe6} \) 15.\( \texttt{a4} \) c6 16.\( \texttt{ad1} \) \( \texttt{c7} \)

White is able to penetrate his enemy's position after the following line: 16...\( \texttt{b6} \) 17.\( \texttt{d7}+ \) \( \texttt{g8} \) 18.\( \texttt{g3} \) \( \texttt{ae8} \) 19.\( \texttt{f5} \) \( \texttt{f8} \) (or 19...\( \texttt{xf5} \) 20.\( \texttt{exf5} \) \( \texttt{f6} \) 21.\( \texttt{g4} \) \( \texttt{f7} \) 22.\( \texttt{xf7} \) \( \texttt{xf7} \) 23.\( \texttt{h5} \) –) 20.\( \texttt{b4} \) \( \texttt{b5} \) 21.\( \texttt{d1} \) c5 (or 21...\( \texttt{xb4} \) 22.\( \texttt{cxb4} \) \( \texttt{xb4} \) 23.\( \texttt{g7}+ \) \( \texttt{f8} \) 24.\( \texttt{d7} \) –) 22.\( \texttt{xa5} \) \( \texttt{xf5} \) 23.\( \texttt{exf5} \) \( \texttt{xe7} \) 24.\( \texttt{d5} \) \( \texttt{h8} \) 25.\( \texttt{exe7} \) \( \texttt{xe7} \) (or 25...\( \texttt{exe7} \) 26.\( \texttt{exe5} \) \( \texttt{g8} \) 27.\( \texttt{e1} \) –) 26.\( \texttt{f6} \) \( \texttt{d7} \) 27.\( \texttt{xe5} \) \( \texttt{g8} \) (27...\( \texttt{xa5} \) 28.\( \texttt{f7} \) \( \texttt{g7} \) 29.\( \texttt{f8} \) \( \texttt{g8} \) 28.\( \texttt{e8} \) \( \texttt{c6} \) 29.\( \texttt{d8} \) \( \texttt{d5} \) 30.\( \texttt{f7} \) \( \texttt{g7} \) 31.\( \texttt{e7} \) 1-0 Kraai – Hasangatin, Pardubice 1997.

17.\( \texttt{c4} \)

White should not let the black knight go to the excellent c4-square. It is too unclear to play 17.f4 b5 18.\( \texttt{c2} \) \( \texttt{c4} \) 19.\( \texttt{f5} \) \( \texttt{f6} \) 20.\( \texttt{c5} \) \( \texttt{f8} \) 21.\( \texttt{f2} \) \( \texttt{g8} \) – Ftacnik – Vaganian, Moscow 1985.

17.\( \texttt{d3} \) \( \texttt{g8} \) (Black is not planning to fight for the d-file. Instead he is just trying to bring his knight back into action.) 18.\( \texttt{c4} \) (Or 18.\( \texttt{fd1} \) b5 19.\( \texttt{c2} \), Haik – Ristic, Stockholm 1987, 19...\( \texttt{b6} \), \( \texttt{c4} \), \( \texttt{f8} \), \( \texttt{e6} \) – Tukmakov.) 18...\( \texttt{f8} \) 19.\( \texttt{fd1} \) \( \texttt{f6} \) 20.\( \texttt{f3} \) (Or 20.\( \texttt{d7} \) \( \texttt{b6} \) and White will have to retreat his rook back to the f1-square.) 20...\( \texttt{xa3} \) 21.\( \texttt{xa3} \) b6 22.\( \texttt{b4} \) \( \texttt{d3} \) 23.\( \texttt{ad3} \) \( \texttt{ff8} \) – Black has managed to fight successfully for the open file and he has equalized, Volke – Tukmakov, Gronin-
gen, 1990. The following line is critical: 22.\textdagger\textntilde\textdaggerdbl d3 23.\textntilde d7 24.\textntilde h1 25.\textntilde f7 26.\textntilde d7+ 27.\textntilde d1 – White gives up a pawn, but after: 27... \textdagger\textntilde c4 28.\textntilde c1∞ (Tukmakov) 28... \textntilde e3 29.\textntilde e1 \textntilde f8 (or 29...\textntilde f8 30.\textntilde h4 h6 31.\textntilde h3 \textntilde e8 32.\textntilde d3 \textntilde c4 33.\textntilde xh6 \textntilde e6 34.f4) 30.\textntilde h4 \textntilde f7 31.\textntilde xf7 \textntilde xf7 32.\textntilde xh7+ \textntilde f6, he regains it and the position remains approximately equal.

17...b6

17...\textntilde g8 18.\textntilde c1 \textntilde f8 19.\textntilde xf8 \textntilde xf8 20.\textntilde b3 \textntilde xb3 21.axb3 White had a slight edge because of his superior pawn structure and the prospects to dominate on the d-file, Campos Moreno – Tukmakov, Osuna 1991.

18.\textntilde d3

18.\textntilde c1 a6 19.\textntilde b3 \textntilde b7.

18...\textntilde d8 19.\textntilde fd1 \textntilde xd3 20.\textntilde xd3 a6

\textntilde c4 (After: 22...\textntilde e7 23.\textntilde xa5 bxa5 24.\textntilde d1 – White’s pawn-structure is superior, but Black preserves good chances to draw.) 23.\textntilde xa6 b5 24.\textntilde g3 \textntilde e7 25.\textntilde xe7 \textntilde xe7 26.a4 \textntilde b2 27.\textntilde d2 \textntilde xa4 28.\textntilde xa4 bxa4 29.\textntilde xa4+, and White maintains the advantage, because his king is much better protected in this heavy pieces middle game, Illescas Cordoba – Sion Castro, Spain 1995.

a3) 10.\textntilde e3

We will analyze thoroughly in this position the moves a3a) 10...\textntilde a5 and a3b) 10...\textntilde e7.

Black has tried some other possibilities too:

It is too weak for him to play: 10...\textntilde h4 11.f3 \textntilde a5 12.\textntilde d3 \textntilde e6 13.d5 \textntilde d7 14.\textntilde d2 \textntilde e7 15.c4 b6 16.c5 – because then he is forced to retreat with his queen losing time in the process, Organisciak – Jablonski, Rzeszow 2000;

About 10...\textntilde xd4 11.cxd4 \textntilde a5 12.\textntilde d3 – see 10...\textntilde a5 11.\textntilde d3 exd4 12.cxd4;

10...\textntilde e8 11.f3 b6 12.\textntilde d2 \textntilde a5 13.\textntilde b5 c6, Fedorovsky – Lion, Internet 2004, 14.\textntilde d3 \textntilde e6 and
Black had a very good game. White had better play instead: 12.\(\text{xb5}\)!? \(\text{d7}\) (Black’s bishop is not as active on that square as on b7.) 13.\(\text{xb1}\)± and White has managed to neutralize the pressure against his centre;

10...\(\text{h8}\), Sapiecha – Vann, Bucks 1988. The idea of that move for Black is to prepare f7-f5. 11.\(\text{d2 e7}\) 12.\(\text{d5}\)! \(\text{d7}\) (If 12...exd4 13.cxd4 \(\text{b4}\), then 14.\(\text{c4}\) – and Black cannot capture on e4, because his knight is hanging. He is forced to play: 14...\(\text{c6}\) 15.\(\text{f3}\)±, but White maintains a great advantage in the centre.) 13.\(\text{ab1}\) and White preserves his initiative. It is not good for Black to follow with: 13...b6, due to: 14.dxe5 \(\text{xe5}\) 15.\(\text{d4}\)±.

**a3a** 10...\(\text{a5}\) 11.\(\text{d3}\) b6

Or 11...exd4 12.cxd4 c5 13.d5! \(\text{xa1}\) 14.\(\text{cxd1}\)±Δ15.\(\text{c5}\); Δ15. \(\text{h6}\) – this sacrifice is even more favourable for White here, than in the main line, because the dark squares in Black’s camp are even more vulnerable, due to the absence of his e7-pawn.

11...c6 12.dxe5 (or 12.f4 exd4 13.cxd4 \(\text{f5}\) 14.e5 \(\text{e6}\)=; 12.\(\text{d2 e6}\) Smith – G.Browne, 1993) 12...\(\text{xe5}\) 13.f4 \(\text{g7}\) 14.\(\text{c2}\)±, followed by \(\text{g3}\) and \(\text{e4-e5}\) later.

11...c5 12.dxe5 c4 (or 12...\(\text{xe5}\) 13.f4 c4 14.\(\text{c2 g7}\) 15.\(\text{d4±}\) 13.\(\text{c2 xe5}\) 14.\(\text{d4±}\) – White has the edge with his powerful knight on the d4-outpost.

12.\(\text{c1}\)

In case of 12.\(\text{d2}\), Black follows with: 12...exd4 13.exd4 c5 14.dxc5 \(\text{xa1}\) 15.\(\text{xa1}\) bxc5 16.\(\text{c3 f6}\), but White preserved some compensation for the exchange in the game Golubovic – Nestorovic, Nis 1993.

It is interesting for White to try analogously to the game Sakaev – Hrachek, Herceg Novi 2001, 12.\(\text{c2}\), removing the queen away from the d-file and protecting the c3-pawn. In case Black continues with 12...\(\text{b7}\), then White has the resource: 13.dxe5 \(\text{xe5}\) 14.\(\text{ad1 e7}\) 15.f4 \(\text{g7}\) 16.\(\text{g3}\)±.

12...\(\text{b7}\) 13.\(\text{d2}\)

It is too sharp for White to continue with: 13.f4 exd4 14.cxd4 \(\text{e8}\) 15.e5 (After: 15.\(\text{c2 c8}\) 16.\(\text{b1 e4}\) 17.\(\text{xe4 f5}\) 18.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{xf5}\) 19.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{d5}\), Black remains in a good position, having destroyed White’s centre, Frank – Wittmann, Germany 1996.) 15...c5! 16.dxc5 \(\text{d5}\) 17.\(\text{f2 ed8}\) 18.\(\text{c3 c4}\) and Black seized the initiative in the game Marin – Ghinda, Buzias 1991.

13...\(\text{d7}\) 14.\(\text{h6}\)

Or 14.f4 \(\text{f5}\) 15.fxe5 fxe4 16.\(\text{c2 c4}\) 17.\(\text{b3 d5}\)=.

14...c5

It is too dubious for Black to play 14...f5?!, prior to White’s move f2-f4, because of: 15.exf5 e4 16.\(\text{c2 gxf5}\) 17.\(\text{xg7}\) \(\text{xf7}\) 18.\(\text{xf4}\)± (M.Marin).

15.\(\text{xg7}\) \(\text{xg7}\) 16.f4?! \(\text{f5}\) 17.d5
17...exf5 e4+.
17...fxe4 18...xe4 2c4 19.
2d3 2d6

It deserves attention for Black to continue here with: 19...

20.c4 b5 21.cxb5 c4 22.2e3
2xb5 23.2b1 (or 23.2c3 2b6+)
23...2e8 24.2c3. The game
Marin - Navrotescu, Buzias
1991, followed later with: 24...
exf4? 25.2d4+ 2g8 (or 25...2h6
26.2f3++) 26.2xf3!+ 2xb7 27.
d6 2f7 28.2d5 2d8 29.2e4 2x6
30.2xf7+ and White won. Ac-

It not so good for Black
to exchange here: 11...exd4 12.
cxd4 2d8 13.2ad1 2b4 14.2d2
2h8 15.f3? c6?! 16.a3 2a6 17.
2xa6 bxa6 18.2c1+ - because
he has not only surrendered
his centre, but he has compro-

According to GM M.Marin, Black
had better follow with: 24...
2xf4 25.2xf4 exf4 26.2d4+
(or 26.2xf4 2e7 27.2xb7? 2xb7
28.d6 2d6! 29.2xa8 2e1+)
26...2h6! (or 26...2g8 27.2xb7
2xb7 28.d6+) 27.2f1 2h8! - and
Black would have equalized, for
example: 28.2d2 2e5 29.2xf4
2g7. It is quite evident that
White should note the move
12.2c2!? in this variation.

10...2e7 (diagram)

That is a logical move, which
forces White to either protect his

63
than Black’s rook and a pawn in that middle game.

White maintains his advantage too in the line: 13...\(\text{a5}\) 14.\(\text{d3}\) c5 15.e5 (The thematic sacrifice would not work for White in that line: 15.d5? \(\text{xa1}\) 16.\(\text{xa1}\) c4 17.\(\text{xc4}\) \(\text{f5}\)!, because Black destroys White’s centre.) 15...\(\text{xd4}\) 16.\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{c5}\) and White maintains some pressure.

Meanwhile, Black can equalize after: 13...\(\text{b4}\) 14.\(\text{b1}\) c5 and here:

15.a3 \(\text{c6}\) (or 15...\(\text{a6}\) 16.\(\text{xa6}\) \(\text{xa6}\) 17.e5= – Black’s knight on a6 will enter the actions via the c5-square.) 16.e5 \(\text{xd4}\) 17.\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{c5}\) (or 17...\(\text{c5}\) 18.\(\text{d3}\) \(\text{a5}\) 19.\(\text{a2}\) \(\text{xe6}\)= – and the position will be more or less balanced after the simplifications;

15.e5 \(\text{xd4}\) (The tactical strike would not work for Black: 15...b5? 16.\(\text{xc5}\) 16.\(\text{xb5}\) \(\text{b8}\) – 16...\(\text{xc4}\) 17.\(\text{xb4}\) and he has no compensation for the pawn, while in case of: 15...\(\text{f5}\) 16.\(\text{b3}\) \(\text{c2}\), it is interesting for White to follow with: 17.d5?! \(\text{xa1}\) 18.\(\text{xa1}\) \(\text{c2}\) and he is a whole exchange down, moreover he has given up his rook not even for Black’s bishop on g7; nevertheless his centre is extremely powerful.) 16.\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{b7}\)= – Now, Black’s knight is much better placed than in the variation 13...\(\text{a5}\), (He has the possibility to play \(\text{b4-d5}\) at some moment.), moreover White’s queen is not so well deployed too.

It is obviously stronger for White to follow with 12.\(\text{d5}\), having in mind that Black’s knight is pinned, while the bishop on d5 cannot be easily repelled from the centre after the move e7-e5. 12...\(\text{b7}\). In the closed pawn-structure after the exchange: 13.\(\text{xc6}\) \(\text{xc6}\) 14.d5 \(\text{d7}\) 15.c4, Black maintains good chances, because his lightsquared bishop supports the planned pawn-break g5-g4: 15...c5 (In case of: 15...f5 16.f3 f4 17.\(\text{f2}\) g5 18.\(\text{c5}\) g4 19.\(\text{h1}\) h5! 20.c6 \(\text{c8}\) – White has naturally squeezed Black’s position considerably on the queenside, but he can hardly make any progress; meanwhile Black has an excellent counterplay on the kingside.) 16.\(\text{xc6}\) (Or 16.a4 \(\text{f5}\) 17.\(\text{f3}\) f4 18.\(\text{f2}\) g5= – and Black has again a good kingside counterplay.) 16...\(\text{xc6}\) 17.\(\text{c3}\) \(\text{c8}\) 18.\(\text{e2}\) – White can hardly be better here with this weak c4-pawn. Meanwhile, after: 13.\(\text{dxe5}\) \(\text{xe5}\) 14.f4 \(\text{g7}\) 15.\(\text{ad1}\), he has good hopes to maintain an advantage, because he is very active in the centre and his queenside pawn-weaknesses seem to be immaterial.

12.\(\text{d3}\) c5

Here, again in case of 12...b6, it is good for White to follow with 13.dxe5! (In the game Prusikin – Ftacnik, Germany 2002, White played: 13.\(\text{ab1}\) \(\text{f5}\)! 14.exf5 \(\text{xf5}\) 15.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{xf5}\) 16.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{f7}\) 17.
18...\texttt{\textbackslash d}e4 \texttt{\textbackslash d}7 19.dxe5 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e5=. Instead, it was quite good for White to have tried: 13.f4 exd4 14.cxd4 c5 15.e5 cxd4 16.\texttt{\textbackslash d}xd4±, reaching the same favourable situation for him as in the variation: 11...b6 12.f4 exd4 13.cxd4 \texttt{\textbackslash a}5 14.\texttt{\textbackslash d}3. It is also interesting for White to opt for: 13.\texttt{\textbackslash d}ad1!? c5 14.dc5.) 13...\texttt{\textbackslash d}xe5 14.f4 \texttt{\textbackslash g}7 15.\texttt{\textbackslash g}3↑ and he maintains his initiative in that pawn-structure thanks to his mobile central pawns.

**13.dxc5!?**

This positional idea is quite familiar in the Gruenfeld Defence. White breaks his pawn chain on the queenside, but it is not so easy for Black to attack these pawns and one of them is extra after all! Black usually counters that plan with b6, exchanging the c5-pawn and then he plays along the open a and c-files, but unfortunately all that does not work in this position: **13...\texttt{\textbackslash e}6 14.f4±** Sakaev – Hracek, Herceg Novi 2001 (see Game 4).

**b) 9...b6**

Now, we will analyze Black's possible plans in which he postpones or completely refrains from the maneuver \texttt{\textbackslash c}6-a5.

**10.\texttt{\textbackslash g}5**

Here after b6, the idea e7-e5 is less effective for Black – therefore it is worth for White to develop his bishop to a more active square – g5.

About 10.\texttt{\textbackslash e}3 see Spassky – Huebner, Tilburg 1979 (Game 5). White has often tried in that position the move 10.e5 – we have already analyzed that idea in Chapter 2 and we have come to the conclusion that the weakening of the d5-square provides Black with quite sufficient counter chances despite White's initiative on the kingside.

10...\texttt{\textbackslash b}7 and later:

11.h4 \texttt{\textbackslash a}5 12.\texttt{\textbackslash d}3 c5 13.\texttt{\textbackslash e}3 \texttt{\textbackslash d}7 14.\texttt{\textbackslash f}4 cxd4 15.cxd4, Naumkin – Sarno, Citta di Asti 1994 and here Black had to play: 15...\texttt{\textbackslash c}6, with the following eventual developments: 16.h5 \texttt{\textbackslash d}xd4 17.\texttt{\textbackslash c}4 (After: 17.hxg6 hxg6 18.\texttt{\textbackslash x}g6 \texttt{\textbackslash f}d8 19.\texttt{\textbackslash x}f4 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e5 20.\texttt{\textbackslash h}5 \texttt{\textbackslash d}6 – it is not quite clear how White’s attack can progress any further...) 17...\texttt{\textbackslash f}d8 18.hxg6
h6xg6 19.e6 (or 19...\texttt{c}xg6 \texttt{c}xg2!\texttt{=}?)
19...\texttt{c}xe6 20.\texttt{c}xd7 \texttt{c}xd7 21.
\texttt{c}xe6 \texttt{c}xa1 22.\texttt{c}xa1 \texttt{c}c8 23.\texttt{b}b3
\texttt{c}d5 and in this situation the rook
and two pawns are not weaker at all than two light
pieces;

After: 11.f4 \texttt{c}a5 12.\texttt{c}d3 \texttt{c}d5 13.\texttt{c}f2 e6 (13...c5?!) 14.\texttt{g}3 \texttt{c}d7
15.\texttt{e}3 \texttt{c}ad8 16.\texttt{d}2 \texttt{d}5 17.\texttt{e}2
\texttt{c}6 18.\texttt{c}ad1 \texttt{c}c4\texttt{=} – it is only
White who can have problems in this
position, E. Kristiansen – Schuler, Rowy 2000;

11.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{a}5 12.\texttt{d}3 c5 13.\texttt{e}3
\texttt{c}c8 14.\texttt{g}4 (Or 14.\texttt{e}2 cxd4
15.cxd4 e6 – and in the game
Ftacnik – Kindermann, Debrecen 1989, the
opponents agreed to a draw; 14.h4 cxd4 15.cxd4
\texttt{c}c6 16.\texttt{e}4 \texttt{d}7\texttt{=} and \texttt{f}d8 with
a good counterplay for Black.)
14...\texttt{c}c6 15.\texttt{c}ad1 cxd4 16.cxd4
\texttt{b}4! 17.\texttt{b}1, Gligoric – Sax,
Vrbas 1977 and after 17...\texttt{d}5= Black
exchanges his opponent's
f4-knight and then White's kingside
attacking chances seem to be quite
problematic.

10...\texttt{b}7

About 10...\texttt{a}5 11.\texttt{d}3 – see
9...\texttt{a}5 10.\texttt{d}3 b6 11.\texttt{g}5; as for
10...\texttt{d}7 11.\texttt{d}2 \texttt{b}7 – see 10...
\texttt{b}7 11.\texttt{d}2 \texttt{d}7, variation \texttt{b}2.

10...\texttt{c}6 11.e5 (Here, the
simplest for White is not to pay
attention to Black's queen
maneuver and to follow with: 11.
\texttt{d}2 \texttt{b}7 12.\texttt{c}ad1, transposing
to the line \texttt{b}1.) 11...\texttt{d}7 12.\texttt{b}5
(Or 12.\texttt{d}2 \texttt{a}5 13.\texttt{d}3 c5 14.
\texttt{h}6 \texttt{d}8 15.\texttt{x}g7 \texttt{x}g7 16.\texttt{d}1
\texttt{d}4 17.\texttt{d}4 \texttt{b}7=; it deserves
attention for White to play: 12.e6
f6e6 13.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{d}8 14.\texttt{e}1 \texttt{d}6
15.\texttt{g}4 \texttt{f}5 16.\texttt{ad}1\texttt{=}) 12...a6
(After the cold-blooded answer
12...e6, White cannot win material
at all, for example: 13.\texttt{c}4 a6
14.\texttt{a}4 \texttt{b}7 15.d5 exd5 16.cxd5
b5 17.\texttt{xc}6 \texttt{xc}6 – and Black is
better.) 13.\texttt{x}c6 \texttt{xc}6 14.\texttt{x}e7
\texttt{e}8 15.\texttt{h}4 \texttt{e}6\texttt{=} – Black
managed to block White's pawns on
the light squares in the game

11.\texttt{d}2

White has tried in several
games the move 11.f4. It is seem-
ingly attractive and aggressive
too, but White fails to protect his
centre after that. 11...\texttt{a}5 12.
\texttt{d}3 c5. Black must strive to
counterattack White's centre
immediately. 13.d5 (It is not good
for White to play: 13.f5?! cxd4
14.cxd4 \texttt{xd}4+ 15.\texttt{xd}4 \texttt{xd}4+ –
because he remains without
compensation for the sacrificed
material.) 13...f6! 14.\texttt{h}4 f5
15.\texttt{c}1 (Or 15.\texttt{g}3 fxe4 16.\texttt{xe}4
\texttt{c}4+) – Black's knight is
deployed to the ideal blocking
d6-square and his position is at least
equal.) 15...f4 16.\texttt{xe}4 \texttt{c}4
17.\texttt{d}3 \texttt{d}6 18.\texttt{f}3, Gligoric –
Hartston, Moscow 1977 and here
after: 18...\texttt{c}4 19.\texttt{d}2 \texttt{f}5 20.\texttt{f}2
\texttt{e}6, Black's position is better.

Following 11.\texttt{d}2, we will
analyze two possibilities for
Black to avoid the pin along the
d8-h4 diagonal: \texttt{b}1) 11...\texttt{d}6
and \texttt{b}2) 11...\texttt{d}7.
About 11...\(\text{d}a5\) 12.\(\text{d}3\) – see variation c2.

11...\(\text{c}8\) – it seems better for Black to first open the c-file and to place his rook there only later. 12.\(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 13.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{d}6\) 14.e5 \(\text{a}3\). As a result of some quite dubious moves for Black, his queen ended up really endangered and White made a good use out of that with: 15.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{f}6\) 16.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{a}5\) 17.\(\text{b}2\) and Black cannot avoid the material losses: 17...\(\text{a}6\) 18.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xe}2\) 19.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{a}6\), Volke – Zuse, Baden-Baden 1993 and here White’s simplest line would have been: 20.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{d}3\) 21.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{g}4\) 22.\(\text{b}3+\) \(\text{h}8\) 23.\(\text{e}4+\), or 20...\(\text{c}4\) 21.\(\text{d}7\) \(\text{cd}8\) 22.\(\text{xe}2\) \(\text{xe}2\) 23.\(\text{e}6+\) \(\text{h}8\) 24.\(\text{xe}2\) \(\text{fxg}5\) 25.\(\text{xa}7+\).

b1) 11...\(\text{d}6\)

This move is connected with an amusing trap – 12.e5? \(\text{xe}5\), Ftcanik – Gulko, Biel 1988 and here since White cannot capture: 13.dxe5 \(\text{c}6+\), he will have to continue the fight without a pawn.

12.\(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{a}5\)

12...e6 13.\(\text{d}3\) (13.\(\text{h}6!\)?) 13...\(\text{a}5\) (It deserved attention for Black to follow with: 13...e5 14.d5 \(\text{a}5\) 15.c4± and if 15...f5, then 16.exf5 \(\text{gx}f5\) 17.\(\text{g}3\) e4 18.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}6\) 19.\(\text{f}4\)\(\text{f}4\) 14.e5 \(\text{c}6\) 15.f3 – and the opponents agreed to a draw in the game Stohl – Gross, Trinec 1988, although White was slightly better due to the vulnerability of the f6-square.

The move 12...\(\text{ad}8\) – has the drawback that Black does not have the possibility to play e7-e6, or e7-e5, because of the pin along the h4-d8 diagonal. 13.\(\text{d}5!?\) \(\text{c}8\) (with the idea to prepare e7-e6), Seul – Hausner, Germany 1990 (It is also possible for Black to try here: 13...\(\text{a}5\) 14.\(\text{xb}7\) \(\text{xb}7\) 15.\(\text{h}6\)±) and here instead of the too risky move – 14.f4, White had better play: 14.\(\text{h}6\) e6 15.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{a}5\) 16.\(\text{xg}7\) \(\text{yg}7\) 17.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{xb}3\) 18.axb3 \(\text{f}5\) 19.\(\text{f}3\)± – and Black’s dark squares are too weakened.

It is also interesting for White to continue with 13.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}5\). There might follow, for example: 13...\(\text{a}5\) 14.\(\text{d}3\) c5 15.d5 c4 16.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{f}6\) (in order to prepare e7-e6, or e7-e5) 17.\(\text{h}4\) (or 17.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{xh}6\) 18.\(\text{h}6\) e6) 17...e5 (17...e6 18.e5!) 18.dxe6 \(\text{xe}6\) 19.\(\text{d}4\)\(\text{f}4\) – this set-up is quite favourable for White with his powerful knight on the d4-outpost.

13.\(\text{d}3\) c5

Black has also tried in practice here 13...e5, with the idea to exploit the placement of White’s bishop on g5 and to
attack White’s d4-pawn. 14.\(\text{h}6\)
(or 14.\(dxe5\) \(\text{gxe5}\) 15.\(f4\) \(\text{c5}\) + 16.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{c}4\)\(\text{\textsuperscript{\text{=}}}\)) 14...\(\text{a}e8\) 15.\(f3\) 
\(\text{d}8\) 16.\(\text{g}5\) \(f6\) 17.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{h}6\) 18. 
\(\text{xh}6\) \(\text{fe}8\) 19.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{f}8\) 20.\(\text{h}4\)\(\text{\textsuperscript{\text{=}}}\)
White has some initiative indeed, thanks to the compromised
black king, but still he cannot
organize any effective attack, at
least because Black is attacking
his d4 and e4-pawns. The game
later followed with 20...\(\text{g}7\)
21.\(dxe5\). The drawback of that
move is that White destroys his
central pawns. (It also deserves
attention for White to try: 21. 
\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{h}8\) 22.\(\text{b}5!?\) \(\text{c}6\) – 22...\(c6\)
23.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}3\) – 23...\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xc}6\)
24.\(d5\) \(\text{a}5\) 25.\(f4\)\(\text{\textsuperscript{\text{=}}}\)) 21...\(\text{fxe}5\) 22.\(f4\) 
\(\text{g}7\) 23.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{exf}4\) 24.\(\text{xf}4\) \(\text{g}5\)
25.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{d}6\) (Black could have captured
that pawn: 25...\(\text{xe}4\) 26. 
\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{xd}1\) 27.\(\text{xd}1\) \(\text{xe}4\) 28. 
\(\text{g}5!?) \(\text{f}5\) 29.\(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{gx}5\) 30.\(\text{d}7\) +
\(\text{h}6\) 31.\(\text{xc}7\) \(\text{e}4\) 32.\(g3\) \(\text{c}4\)=; 
28.\(\text{h}5\) + \(\text{h}8\) 29.\(\text{f}6\) \(\text{e}2\) 30. 
\(\text{xc}7\) \(\text{e}7\) 31.\(\text{d}8\) + \(\text{g}7\) 32.\(\text{e}8\)+ 
\(\text{g}8\) – and the game would have ended up in a perpetual.)
26. 
\(\text{de}1\) \(\text{g}8\) 27.\(\text{e}3\) \(c5\) 28.\(\text{ef}3\) \(c4\) 29.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{c}6\) 30.\(\text{f}2\), Shliperman –
Kudrin, USA 1999 and after
the correct reaction for Black –
30...\(\text{dds}\)!, the position would
have remained completely un-
clear.

White can also try to start
some immediate actions on the
kingside and in the centre with:
16.\(\text{xg}7\) (instead of 16.\(\text{g}5\) 16...
\(\text{xg}7\) 17.\(f4\) \(\text{exd}4\) 18.\(\text{cxd}4\) \(\text{fe}8\)
and White has certain problems
with the defence of his centre:
19.\(d5\) (or 19.\(f5\)?) \(\text{xe}4\) 20.\(f6\) +
\(\text{g}8\) 21.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{g}8\) 22...\(\text{f}6\) 22.\(\text{b}1\) 
\(\text{xd}5\) 19...\(\text{c}6\) 20.\(\text{b}2\) + \(\text{g}8\)
(The move 20...\(f6\) weakens Black’s
king considerably, because of:
21.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{xd}5\) 22.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{fxe}5\) 23.\(\text{fxe}5\)
\(\text{xe}5\) 24.\(\text{d}1\) ++; 23...\(\text{xe}5\)
24. 
\(\text{b}3\); 23...\(\text{c}5\) 24.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{e}7\) 25.\(\text{e}6\) 
\(\text{f}8\) 26.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{h}8\) 27.\(\text{e}5\) + \(\text{g}8\)
28.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{c}4\) 29.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 30. 
\(\text{xf}8\)+ \(\text{xf}8\) 31.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{a}6\) 32. 
\(\text{c}1\)\(\text{\textsuperscript{\text{=}}}\)) 21.\(\text{xc}6\)
(After: 21.\(\text{d}4\)
\(\text{xd}5\) 22.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{c}5\) 23.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{c}4\) 24. 
\(\text{f}2\) – White has some compensa-
tion for the pawn, but it would
be extremely difficult for him to
advance his kingside pawns.)
21...\(\text{xc}6\) 22.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{c}5\)+ 23.\(\text{h}1\) 
\(\text{c}4\) and Black’s counterplay is
quite sufficient.

14.\(d5\)
White can also give up the
idea d4-d5 altogether: 14.\(\text{ad}1\)
\(\text{cxd}4\) 15.\(\text{cxd}4\) \(\text{ac}8\) 16.\(\text{xg}7\) \(\text{xg}7\)
17.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{c}4\) 18.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 19. 
\(\text{d}4\)\(\text{\textsuperscript{\text{=}}}\) and he had some edge in
the game Maksimovic – Gross,
Nuremberg 1989. White’s knight
here is more useful than Black’s
bishop, moreover White can con-
continue with \(f2\)-\(f4\)-\(f5\) at some oppor-
tune moment, creating problems
for Black’s king.

14...\(e6\)
After 14...\(\text{c}4\) 15.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{e}6\) 16. 
\(\text{dxe}6\) \(\text{xe}6\) 17.\(\text{d}4\)\(\text{\textsuperscript{\text{=}}}\), or 17.\(\text{f}4\)
\(\text{e}5\) 18.\(\text{d}5\)\(\text{\textsuperscript{\text{=}}}\), White has a clear
advantage.

14...\(\text{e}5\) 15.\(\text{f}4\) \(f5\) 16.\(\text{fxe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\)
(or 16...\(\text{xe}5\) 17.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{e}7\) 18.
exf5+) 17.\( \text{\text{A}} \_h6 \text{xf6, Crawling –} \\
\text{Ftcnik}, \text{Haninge 1989 (In case} \\
of: 17...\( \text{\text{A}} \_xh2+ \\
18.\text{\text{A}}_h1, \text{the ex} \\
change sacrifice is insufficient} \\
for \text{Black: 18...\( \text{\text{A}} e5 19.\text{\text{A}}_x \_f8 \text{xf8,} \\
because of: 20.\text{\text{A}}_x \_f5 \text{xd5 21.\text{\text{A}}_f4} \\
\text{c6 22.\text{\text{A}}_e6±) 18.\text{\text{A}}_xf5! \text{\text{A}}_xh2+} \\
19.\text{\text{A}}_h1 \text{\text{A}}_e5 (or 19...\text{\text{A}}_x \_d5 20.} \\
\text{g5--; 19...\text{\text{A}}_xf5 20.\text{\text{A}}_g5 \text{\text{A}}_f7 21.} \\
\text{\text{A}}_x \_f5) 20.\text{\text{A}}_x \_g6 \text{hxg6 21.\text{\text{A}}_g5±} \\
and \text{Black’s king is quite} \\
vulnerable in all these variations.} \\

15.\( \text{\text{A}} c4 \text{\text{A}} a6 \\
Following: 15...\text{\text{A}}_e \_d5 16.\text{\text{A}}_x \_d5 \\
c4 17.\text{\text{A}}_b1 \text{\text{A}}_f8 18.\text{\text{A}}_e3 \text{\text{A}}_c8 19.} \\
\text{\text{A}}_c3 \text{\text{A}}_e5 20.\text{\text{A}}_c1 \text{\text{A}}_e6 21.\text{\text{A}}_f4, \\
\text{White’s mobile pawn-centre is} \\
much more important than} \\
\text{Black’s queenside passed} \\
pawns. \text{In the game} \\
\text{Calleri – Altrock,} \\
\text{Email 1999, there followed:} \\
21...\text{\text{A}}_f8 22.\text{\text{A}}_f5 b5 23.\text{\text{A}}_x \_g6 \\
hxg6 24.\text{\text{A}}_x \_f2 \text{\text{A}}_d6 25.\text{\text{A}}_d4 b4 26.\text{\text{A}}_x \_g7 \\
and \text{White had a clear} \\
advantage, so that after} \\
26...\text{\text{A}}_x \_g7, \text{he could have} \\
simply captured the \\
pawn with 27.\text{\text{A}}_x \_a7 and \\
re-treated with his queen later.} \\

16.\text{\text{A}}_c1 \\
The idea behind the placement \\
of \text{White’s queen on that} \\
square would become clear later.

\text{He would not have achieved} \\
anything much with the line: 
16.\text{\text{A}}_c1 \text{\text{A}}_d5 17.\text{\text{A}}_x \_d5?! \text{due to:} 
17...\text{\text{A}}_x \_d3 18.\text{\text{A}}_x \_d3 \text{f5! 19.f3} \\
(or 19.\text{\text{A}}_f4 \text{\text{A}}_x \_e4 20.\text{\text{A}}_x \_e4 \text{\text{A}}_e8 21.} \\
\text{\text{A}}_e6 \text{f5!} 19...\text{\text{A}}_x \_e4 20.\text{\text{A}}_x \_e4 \text{c6!} \\
\text{(B.Gulko).} \\

\text{In the game Yusupov – Gulko,} 
\text{Hastings 1989, White continued} 
with: 16.\text{\text{A}}_c2 \text{\text{A}}_x \_d5 17.\text{\text{A}}_x \_d5 \text{\text{A}}_d7 
(\text{Black is defending against} \text{\text{A}}_d2 
\text{and} \text{\text{A}}_a4.) 18.\text{\text{A}}_g3 \text{\text{A}}_e8 (It was} 
\text{not good for \text{Black to play} 18...} 
\text{\text{A}}_g4, \text{because of} 19.\text{\text{A}}_c4.) 19. 
\text{\text{A}}_d2?! (According to GM} 
\text{Gulko, \text{White had to follow with:} 19.\text{\text{A}}_f1 
\text{\text{A}}_x \_e1+ 20.\text{\text{A}}_x \_e1 \text{\text{A}}_e8=) 19...\text{\text{A}}_b7 
20.\text{\text{A}}_e4 \text{\text{A}}_d6 21.\text{\text{A}}_x \_d6 \text{\text{A}}_x \_d6.} 
\text{White tried to obtain some edge} 
\text{in that position (After some} 
\text{calmer moves, the position would} 
\text{have remained equal.) with the} 
\text{help of the line: 22.\text{\text{A}}_a4 (22.\text{\text{A}}_f1 
\text{\text{A}}_c8=) 22...\text{\text{A}}_c8 23.\text{\text{A}}_x \_a7 \text{\text{A}}_e5} 
24.\text{\text{A}}_h3 (\text{It is too bad for \text{White to} 
try: 24.\text{\text{A}}_h6? \text{\text{A}}_x \_h2+ 25.\text{\text{A}}_h1 \text{\text{A}}_f4} 
26.\text{\text{A}}_x \_f8 \text{\text{A}}_x \_f8 27.\text{\text{A}}_g1 \text{\text{A}}_h6 28.\text{\text{A}}_g3} 
\text{\text{A}}_g4--; \text{He had to play instead:} 
24.\text{\text{A}}_f4 \text{\text{A}}_d4+ 25.\text{\text{A}}_h1 \text{\text{A}}_g4 26.\text{\text{A}}_b1 
\text{\text{A}}_a2! 27.\text{\text{A}}_x \_e2 \text{\text{A}}_x \_e2 28.\text{\text{A}}_x \_b6} 
\text{\text{A}}_d8= \text{and despite the loss of} 
\text{two pawns, \text{Black’s counterplay} 
against \text{White’s king would have} 
been extremely powerful; 26.} 
\text{\text{A}}_e1 \text{\text{A}}_a8 27.\text{\text{A}}_e7 \text{\text{A}}_x \_e7 28.\text{\text{A}}_x \_e7} 
\text{\text{A}}_a2 29.\text{\text{A}}_c1 – \text{\text{White is still not} 
losing yet.) 24...\text{\text{A}}_d4 25.\text{\text{A}}_h1 (or} 
25.\text{\text{A}}_a3 \text{\text{A}}_x \_h3 26.\text{\text{A}}_x \_h3 \text{\text{A}}_g3+} 
27.\text{\text{A}}_h1 \text{\text{A}}_x \_h3+ 28.\text{\text{A}}_g1 \text{\text{A}}_e5+) 
25...\text{\text{A}}_f6 26.\text{\text{A}}_e3 \text{\text{A}}_x \_h3 27.\text{\text{A}}_x \_d4} 
\text{\text{A}}_x \_d4 28.\text{\text{A}}_d6 \text{\text{A}}_e5 29.\text{\text{A}}_f4} 
\text{\text{A}}_e3 30.\text{\text{A}}_b7 
\text{\text{A}}_h4 31.\text{\text{A}}_g1 \text{\text{A}}_x \_g2--; \text{and \text{Black} 

69

16...exd5 17.exd5

It is again impossible for White to capture with the c-pawn: 17.cxd5 Qxd3 18.Qxd3 Qf6 19.Qg3 Qc6 Qd4↑.

17...Qae8

It is too risky for Black to try to gobble White’s a2-pawn: 17...Qe5 18.Qfe1 Qb2 19.Qe7±, followed by d6-d7.

18.Qg3 Qd7 19.Qfe1 f5

Should Black try to exploit the defenselessness of the a4-square by playing 19...Qa4, White can counter that with 20.Qe4 and Black has no time to win any material: 20...f5 (or 20...Qxc4 21.Qf6+ Qxf6 22.Qxf6 Qh6++) 21.Qd6 (White penetrates on the e7-square.) 21...Qxe1+ 22.Qxe1 Qxa2 23.Qe7 Qd4 24.Qh4. Black has no defence against the transfer of White’s queen to the e-file, for example: 24...Qb2 25.Qe1 Qxc4 26.Qe8! Qxd5 27.Qxf8+ Qxf8 28.Qe7+ Qg8 29.Qd8+ Qg7 30.Qe8+ Qg8 31.Qf6+ Qg7 32.Qxd5++.

The difference between the placement of White’s queen on the c1 and c2-squares can be best illustrated by the amazing variation: 19...Qxe1+ 20.Qxe1 Qe8 and here the e1-square is protected, so White can continue with 21.Qe4↑, threatening to check from the f6-square.

Finally, White maintains his edge too in the line: 19...Qb7 20.Qxe8 (or 20.Qe4 f5) 20...Qxe8 21.Qe4↑, threatening again the dangerous check on f6.

20.Qe2! and White exploited later the vulnerability of the e6-square, so he organized a dangerous attack and he won the game following: 20...Qb7 21.Qf4 Qxe1+ (21...h6 22.Qxg6 hxg5 23.Qxf8 Qxf8 24.Qxg5 Qd8 25.Qe7++) 22.Qxe1 Qe8 23.Qe6 Qh8 24.Qc7! Qxe1+ 25.Qxe1 Qxc7 26.Qe8+ Qg7 27.Qd2+— Qd8 28.Qc3+ Qh6 29.Qe3+! Qg5 30.f4 Qg4 31.Qxh8 Qd1+ 32.Qf1 Qd6 33.Qh3+ Qh5 34.Qc3 Qe8 35.d6 Qd1 36.Qh3+ 1-0 Beliavsky – Gulko, Linares 1990.

b2) 11...Qd7

12.Qb5

We have already met this idea (except with a white bishop on
e3) in the Chapter 2.

It is too aggressive for White to play here: 12.f4 \(\text{\textit{a5}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\) c5 14.\(\text{\textit{e3}}\) cxd4 15.cxd4 e6 16.\(\text{\textit{ad1}}\) \(\text{\textit{a8}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{b1}}\) \(\text{\textit{a6}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{fe1}}\) \(\text{\textit{a4}}\), because Black’s counterplay was quite sufficient in the game Arlandi – Hracek, Istanbul 2003.

It is quite good for him instead to continue with 12.\(\text{\textit{h6}}\) and he preserves his advantage, which leads to variation c3b1 Chapter 2, the difference being that White’s bishop goes to the h6-square via g5 and not via the e3-square as in the above-mentioned line.

12...a6 13.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\) \(\text{\textit{a5}}\)

13...e6 14.e5 (It deserves attention for White here to try 14.\(\text{\textit{ab1}}\)± and that is in fact the idea behind the move \(\text{\textit{b5}}\) – he can now prevent Black’s undermining move c7-c5, by attacking the b6-pawn.) 14...\(\text{\textit{a5}}\) (It is safer for Black to continue here with 14...\(\text{\textit{e7}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{ab1}}\)\(\pm\)) 15.\(\text{\textit{g3}}\) c5? (or 15...f6 16.exf6 \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{fe1}}\)\) and here White followed with the surprising move – 16.\(\text{\textit{h5}}\) and Black’s position was immediately in ruins: 16...f6 (or 16...gxf5 17.\(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{h6}}\) and White checkmates; 17...h6 18.\(\text{\textit{f4}}\) \(\text{\textit{d5}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{f3}}\)\(\pm\)) 17.\(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) cxd4 19.cxd4 \(\text{\textit{xd4}}\) (or 19...\(\text{\textit{d5}}\) 20.f3 \(\text{\textit{xd4}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{h1}}\) \(\text{\textit{f7}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{fd1}}\)\) 20.\(\text{\textit{h6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 21.exf6 \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{ac1}}\) and White remained with a material advantage in the game, Lytchak – Lukin, St Petersburg 1999.

14.\(\text{\textit{ab1}}\)

Preventing the counterplay with c7-c5.

14...c6 15.\(\text{\textit{fe1}}\) e6 16.e5\(\pm\) Jussupow – Berndt, Bundesliga 2001. White stopped the enemy counterplay and had the better position. The game later followed with: 16...f6 17.exf6 \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 19.f3 b5 (This move compromises the dark squares additionally, but Black had problems to organize some counterplay anyway.) 20.\(\text{\textit{g5}}\) \(\text{\textit{af8}}\) 21.a4 \(\text{\textit{c4}}\) 22.axb5 axb5 23.\(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) bxc4 24.\(\text{\textit{g3}}\) \(\text{\textit{d5}}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{e1}}\)\(\pm\) and White maintains a clear advantage, because of the vulnerability of the dark squares in Black’s camp and his numerous pawn-weaknesses.

c) 9...\(\text{\textit{a5}}\) 10.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\)

The variations in this chapter often transpose to these analyzed in Chapter 10 – it is sufficient for Black to play c7-c5 and to exchange on d4 or to Chapter 7 – when White develops his bishop to e3. Meanwhile, the fact
that presently Black does not attack White’s d4-pawn (as he usually does in the lines analyzed in Chapters 1-3), enables White to develop his bishop to a more active position — the g5-square.

We will now analyze in details the moves: c1) 10...\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e6} and c2) 10...b6.

About 10...c5 11.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e3} — see Chapter 7, variation \textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}c2}; as for 10...e5 11.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e3} — see 9...e5 10.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e3} \textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}a5} 11.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}d3}; 10...\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}d7} 11.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e3} \textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}d8} 12.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2} b6, Lewandowski — A.Geller, USSR 1953 — see 8...\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}d7} 9.0–0 b6 10.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e3} \textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}c6} 11.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2} \textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}a5} 12.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}d3} \textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}d8} — Chapter 2, variation \textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}c3b3}.

In case of 10...\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}d7}, it deserves attention for White to play 11.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}g5}, developing his bishop actively, followed by \textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2} and \textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}h6}, exploiting the fact that Black has covered the d-file himself.

After: 10...e6 11.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e3} b6 12.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2} \textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}b7}, Valdivia – Aguerreberry, Rosario 2001, White should probably try the purposeful move — 13.h4$\uparrow$ h5.

10...c6 — This is a peculiar move and its idea is to prevent White’s pawn-break d4-d5, which could have followed, for example after 10...\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e6}. Its main drawback however is that Black refrains from playing c7-c5 presently. 11.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}g5} h6, Georgiades – Kleopas, Cyprus 1991 (It is better for Black to play here 11...\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e6}, transposing to the varia-
tion: 10...\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e6} 11.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}g5} c6.) 12.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e3} (White thus wins a tempo by attacking Black’s h6-pawn.) 12...\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e6} and here White could have prevented his opponent from occupying the c4-square with: 13.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}c1} \textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}h7} and 14.c4!? c5 15. d5!? — Now, thanks to the compromised black kingside, the exchange sacrifice for White is even more effective than in the main line, for example: 15...\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}xa1} 16.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}xa1} b6 17.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e5$\uparrow$ \textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}f4}, e4-e5 — and Black has great problems to defend his king.

\textbf{c1) 10...\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}e6}}

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This idea has been played recently by GM Yandemirov almost in his every game. Black’s plan has a solid positional basis — he wishes to occupy the weakened c4-square, without exchanging at first the c-pawns, but it still looks a bit extravagant. White’s attempts to refute it should be connected with attacks against Black’s bishop on e6 with: d4-d5 or f2-f4-f5.

\textbf{11.\textit{\texttt{\textasciitilde}g5}}

White develops his bishop outside of his pawn-chain, before
playing f2-f4. It is much worse for him to play like that immediately: 11.f4 f5 12.e5 \_d7 13.c2 \_c4 14.d1 \_fd8 15.b1 b5 with a complete blockade for Black, Truskavetsky – Yandemirov, Vladimir 2004.

Naturally, it is a serious alternative for White to play here 11.d5, exploiting the tempo presented by Black. 11...\_g4 (Following 11...\_d7, White should not play: 12.e3 c6 13.c4 b6 14.d4 e5 15.c3 \_b7 16.f4 \_c7 17.fxe5 \_xe5 18.\_xe5 \_xe5 19.d2 \_c5= Anokhin – Gurevich, Batumi 1961, but 12.b1, analogously to the game Shariyazdanov – Yandemirov, Moscow 2004. The difference in the placement of the pawns on f2, or on f3 is hardly so important in that position.) 12.f3 \_d7 13.b1 (White removes his rook under attack and he is preparing c3-c4.) 13...c6 14.c4 e6!? That is a very risky move for Black – he enables White to push d5-d6 and he will have great problems to cope with White’s pawn there. (It would have been better for him to have prevented c4-c5 beforehand: 14...b6 15.f4. This is with the idea to prepare the pawn-advance e4-e5. 15...e6 16.d6 e5 17.b2 c5 18.\_xe5 \_xe5 19.fxe5 \_c6 20.\_f4 \_xe5 21.d5 \_e6 22.\_e2 \_g7 – and White’s passed d6-pawn has been cut off from the rest of his pieces. The game is quite unclear after: 15.b2 \_xb2 16.\_xb2 e6 17.d2 \_e7 15.a3 (or 15.d2 cxd5 16.cxd5 exd5 17.exd5 \_e8 15...\_e8 16.d6 c5. That is a positional pawn-sacrifice with the idea to bring Black’s knight to the c5-square and to encircle White’s passed d6-pawn (After 16...b6 17.c5 \_b7 18.\_c2=, White’s prospects are clearly better – Black’s position is cramped, moreover White’s d6-pawn is reliably protected.) 17.xc5 b6 18.a3 \_b7 19.c4 \_c8 20.b3 (It deserved attention for White here to redeploy his pieces: 20.d3 \_c5 21.e3 e5 22.\_fd1. Black has great problems to regain his pawn in that case, for example: 22...\_e6 23.b3 \_c6 24.\_c3 20...\_c5 21.\_d2 \_c6 22.\_bd1 \_b8 (or 22...e5 23.\_c3 \_f8 24.\_xc5 bxc5 25.\_a4= \_xd6 26.\_xd6 \_xd6 27.\_xd6=) 23.\_c3 \_xc3 (It deserved attention for Black to try here 23...a6=, keeping the position elastic and not letting White’s knight to the b5-square.) 24.\_xc3. Black made a draw somehow in that position, but his compensation for the pawn was hardly sufficient: 24...e5 25.\_d5 \_xd6 26.\_xe5 (It is obviously better for White to continue with 26.\_xc5, with the idea after 26...\_xd5 27.cxd5 \_c8, to follow with: 28.f4! exf4 29.\_xf6 \_xc5 30.e5=, advancing his powerful central pawns.) 26...\_d3 27.\_xe8+ \_xe8 28.\_c2 \_e5 29.\_b2 \_f4 30.\_a1 \_e3 31.\_h1 \_xb3 32.axb3 \_d2 33.\_c3 \_xc3 34.\_xc3 \_d3 35.\_c1 a5 and
Black had good chances for a
draw in the game Sharifzadenov –
Yandemirov, Moscow 2004.

11...c6 12.f4!

This is an attempt by White
to question Black’s idea by at-
tacking his bishop on e6.

Black’s position is quite ac-
ceptable after the calmer line:
12.a4 a6 13.\h4e1 b5 14.axb5 axb5
15.\h4f4 \h4b3 16.\g4f4 f6 17.\h4h4
\h4c8 18.\g4g3 e5 19.dxe5 fxe5
20.\h4e2 \h4d7 21.\h4c1 \h4e6, be-
cause White’s pieces are not so
well placed after all, Gulko –
Yandemirov, Moscow 2004.

12...f5

It is too risky for Black to
allow the further advance of
White’s f-pawn: 12...\h4c4 13.\h4f5
\h4d7 14.\h4f3 (It also deserved atten-
tion for White to try with
similar ideas the line: 14.f6!? exf6
15.\h4xf6 \h4e8 16.\h4c2=, Kob-
alia, since Black could have pre-
vented that favourable set-up for
White following the move-order
in that game.) 14...\h4e8 (Black
could have created more prob-
lems for White with the move
14...\h4ad8!? and he would not be
able to continue like in the game
with: 15.\h4xc4 \h4xc4 16.\h4d3, be-
cause of 16...\h4e5. Meanwhile af-
ter: 15.\h4d2 f6 – Black does not
allow White to play f5–f6 – 16.
\h4e3 gxf5 17.\h4xf5 b5 18.\h4af1\;
16...e5! 17.fxg6 hxg6 18.\h4g3 \h4f7
19.\h4f1= – and in connection with
Black’s kingside weaknesses, he
has plenty of problems to worry
about.) 15.\h4xc4 \h4xc4 16.\h4d3 b5
(or 16...\h4d6 17.fxg6 fxg6 18.e5\;)
17.\h4af1 e5? (Once again, here it
is better for Black to continue
with: 17...f6 18.\h4c1 e5! 19.fxg6
hxg6 20.\h4g3 \h4f7 21.\h4g4\; but he
has the same problems on the
kingside as in the variation 14...
\h4ad8.) 18.fxe6 \h4xe6 (or 18...
\h4xe6? 19.\h4xf7 \h4xf7 20.\h4xf7
\h4xf7 21.e5=–; 18...fxe6 19.\h4f7
\h4xf7 20.\h4xf7 \h4xf7 21.e5=\) 19.
\h4g3! and it turned out that
Black’s knight on the c4-square
was placed quite beautifully
indeed, but in fact he had no real
counterplay at all and White’s
kingside initiative was develop-
ing effortlessly. 19...\h4g4 (or 19...
c5 20.\h4xf7 \h4xf7 21.\h4xf7 \h4xf7
22.e5=–) 20.h4 (or immediately
20.\h4f6!?;\) 20...h6 21.\h4f4 \h4e6 22.
\h4f6 \h4f8 23.e5 \h4b6 24.h5 g5
(or 24...\h4d5 25. hxg6 \h4f4 26.
\h4xf4=–) 25.\h4f5 \h4d5 (25...\h4xa2
26.\h4e4=–) 26.\h4e4 \h4e7 (or 26...
\h4f4 27.\h4xf4 gxf4 28.\h4g5=+! hxg5
29.\h4xg5=–) 27.\h4xg5 hxg5 28.
\h4xg5+ \h4f8 29.\h4g8=+! and in view
of the unavoidable checkmate
Black resigned, Kobalia –
Yandemirov, Moscow 2004.

13.\h4g3 fxe4
Later in the game Yevseev – Yandemirov, Vladimir 2004, there followed: 14.\( \text{	extDelta x} \text{xe4} \text{d}7 \text{(or 14...\( \text{	extDelta f} \text{f}5 \text{15.\text{	extDelta x}xf5} \text{gxf5} \text{16.\text{	extDelta h}h5=\text{\#})})} \text{14...\text{	extDelta d}d5} \text{15.\text{	extDelta g}g4} \text{\textDelta c}c4 \text{16.f5=} \text{Yevseev}) \text{15.\text{	extDelta c}c2 (or 15.\text{	extDelta d}d3 \text{c5=}\text{\#})} \text{15.\text{	extDelta a}a4} \text{b6} \text{16.\text{	extDelta a}ae1} \text{\textDelta c}c4 \text{17.\text{	extDelta f}f2} \text{e6=} \text{Yevseev}) \text{15...\text{	extDelta c}c4.} \text{Now, in order to prevent the blockade on the light squares 16.\text{	extDelta f}f2} \text{e6 17.\text{	extDelta d}d5} \text{18.\text{	extDelta e}e3} \text{\textDelta c}c4=, \text{White sacrificed the exchange: 16.f5?!} \text{\textDelta xf1} \text{17.\text{	extDelta x}xf1} \text{\textDelta c}c4 \text{18.\text{	extDelta e}e1 (or 18.fxg6 \text{	extDelta x}fxf1= 19.\text{	extDelta x}xf1} \text{h6=} \text{\#) Ae5;} \text{18.\text{	extDelta d}d3} \text{b5} \text{19.\text{	extDelta e}e1} \text{\textDelta ae8} \text{20.fxg6} \text{h6} \text{21.\text{	extDelta c}c1} \text{e5=} \text{18...e5} \text{19.fxg6, but as the game showed, he did not obtain a sufficient compensation for it: 19...h6 20.\text{	extDelta e}e2 (or 20.\text{	extDelta c}c1} \text{exd4} \text{21.\text{	extDelta f}f5} \text{\textDelta ae8} \text{22.\text{	extDelta x}h6} \text{\textDelta xh6} \text{23.\text{	extDelta x}h6} \text{\textDelta f}f6=} \text{\textDelta d}d6, \text{\textDelta fe6} \text{Yandemirov}) \text{20...\text{	extDelta d}d6} \text{21.\text{	extDelta c}c2} \text{\textDelta ae8} \text{22.\text{	extDelta e}e3} \text{exd4} \text{23.cxd4} \text{b5} \text{24.\text{	extDelta b}b3=} \text{\textDelta c}c4= \text{Yevseev} – \text{Yandemirov, Vladimir 2004.}

Instead of all that, White had to continue with:

14.\( \text{\textDelta x} \text{xe4} \text{b6} \) and here it was also possible for him to have tried: 15.\text{\textDelta e}e2 \text{d}7 \text{(or 15...\text{\textDelta f}f5 16.g4 \text{c}8} \text{17.\text{\textDelta g}g3=} \text{taking the f5-square away from Black.)} \text{16.\text{\textDelta a}ae1} \text{\textDelta f}f5 \text{(Or 16...\text{\textDelta d}d5 17.\text{\textDelta f}f2} \text{\textDelta ae8} \text{18.\text{\textDelta g}g4=} \text{deploying the knight to the e5-outpost.)} \text{17.\text{\textDelta f}f2} \text{(It is also interesting for White to follow with: 17.h3} \text{\textDelta ae8} \text{18.g4} \text{\textDelta x} \text{xe4} \text{19.\text{\textDelta x}xe4=) 17...\text{\textDelta ae8} (or 17...e6} \text{18.\text{\textDelta a}a6=} \text{\#) Ag2-g4)} \text{18.h3=} \text{and 15.\text{\textDelta g}3, reaching the same position as in the game, except that with a bishop on d3, so that Black does not have the tempo \text{\textDelta e}6-c4, necessary for the defence against the pawn-march f4-f5. After: 15.\text{\textDelta d}d7} \text{16.\text{\textDelta c}c2} \text{\textDelta c}c4 \text{17.f5, Black can capture the pawn: 17...\text{\textDelta x}x\text{xd4+} 18.\text{\textDelta h}h1} \text{\textDelta f}f6 \text{19.\text{\textDelta d}d1, but after for example: 19...\text{\textDelta x}xd3} \text{20.\text{\textDelta x}xd3} \text{\textDelta e}e8 \text{21.\text{\textDelta h}h6} \text{\textDelta f}f7 \text{22.\text{\textDelta d}f3=, White’s initiative on the kingside is more than sufficient to compensate for the sacrificed pawn.)}

\text{c2) 10...b6}

\text{11.\text{\textDelta g}5}

About 11.\text{\textDelta e}e3 \text{c5 – see Chapter 7, variation c2}

Black has a choice in that position – to play immediately \text{c2b) 11...c5, enabling White to push the pawn d2-d5, making use of the fact that his bishop is presently preventing Black’s undermining move e7-e6, or to refrain from advancing the c-pawn with – c2a) 11...\text{\textDelta d}d7, as well as the moves:}

11...h6 12.\text{\textDelta e}e3 \text{e5}, Huwer – Bott, corr. 1995, 13.\text{\textDelta d}2 (White exploits the weakening of Black’s kingside and he wins an additional tempo to develop a piece.)
Chapter 3

13...\textit{\underline{\textit{h7}} 14.\textit{\underline{a}d1\textdaggerdbl} – and in comparison to the similar structure in the variation 9...e5 10.\textit{\underline{c}}e3 \textit{\underline{d}a5 11.\textit{\underline{c}d3,} the inclusion of the weakening moves h6 and \textit{\underline{h7}} on one side and \textit{\underline{d}2} – on the other side, is definitely in favour of White; \!

The move 11...\textit{\underline{d}6} – enables White to play e4-e5 with tempo at some opportune moment. 12.\textit{\underline{d}2} (It is also interesting for him to play immediately: 12.e5 \textit{\underline{d}7 13.\textit{\underline{d}2,} but as a rule in case of e4-e5, White usually develops his bishop on e3 and not on g5, so that he can protect his backward d4-pawn.) 12...e6. This is a too risky weakening of the dark squares for Black. (He had better play here: 12...c5 13.\textit{\underline{h}6 cxd4 14.\textit{\underline{x}g7 \textit{\underline{x}g7 15.cxd4\textdagger} 13.e5 \textit{\underline{c}6 14.\textit{\underline{g}3 \textit{\underline{b}7 15.\textit{\underline{e}4 \textit{\underline{c}4 16.\textit{\underline{e}2 b5 17.f3\textdagger} – Black has no counterplay at all in that position, while the weakening of the dark squares on the kingside might become a telling factor in the future, Toelsae – Allen, corr. 1994. \!

11...\textit{\underline{b}7} – White can counter c7-c5 in that position with d4-d5, so the bishop move has the drawback that it occupies the b7-square and Black’s knight on a5 cannot enter the actions via that square in that closed pawn-structure. 12.\textit{\underline{d}2 c5 (About 12...\textit{\underline{d}7} – see 11...\textit{\underline{d}7 12.\textit{\underline{d}2 \textit{\underline{b}7}.) 13.d5 c4 (Or 13...\textit{\underline{d}7 14.\textit{\underline{a}d1 c4 15.\textit{\underline{b}1 \textit{\underline{d}6 16.\textit{\underline{d}4 a6 17.f4 h6 18.\textit{\underline{h}4 \textit{\underline{a}c8 19.f5\textdagger} and White had a powerful kingside initiative in the game Arkhangeskly – Harrison, corr. 1987; 13...f6 14.\textit{\underline{h}6 e5 15.\textit{\underline{x}g7 \textit{\underline{x}g7 16.f4\textdagger} – and Black’s knight on a5 is out of action.) 14.\textit{\underline{c}2 \textit{\underline{d}7 15.\textit{\underline{a}d1 \textit{\underline{a}6} (Black loses a tempo in order to transfer his knight to the c5-square.) 16.\textit{\underline{h}6 \textit{\underline{b}7 17.\textit{\underline{x}g7 \textit{\underline{x}g7 18.e5 \textit{\underline{c}5 19.\textit{\underline{f}4\textdagger. White has an obvious advantage in the centre, while Black’s king shelter is considerably compromised. Later, in the game Goldenberg – Mohrlok, corr. 1989, there followed: 19...\textit{\underline{g}4 20.\textit{\underline{d}4 \textit{\underline{g}5 21.\textit{\underline{f}e1 \textit{\underline{a}d8 22.d6 e6 23.\textit{\underline{e}3 \textit{\underline{g}8 24.\textit{\underline{g}3 \textit{\underline{h}6 25.\textit{\underline{h}3 \textit{\underline{g}5 26.\textit{\underline{h}5 \textit{\underline{d}7 27.f4 \textit{\underline{g}4 28.\textit{\underline{f}2\textdagger} – White trapped his enemy’s queen and he won the game. \!

c2a) 11...\textit{\underline{d}7 12.\textit{\underline{d}2 c5 \!

12...e6 – This move is played with the idea to prevent at first d4-d5 and to play c7-c5 only later. 13.\textit{\underline{h}6 \textit{\underline{b}7 14.\textit{\underline{x}g7 \textit{\underline{x}g7 15.\textit{\underline{h}4\textdagger. As usual in similar positions, White has a slight advantage, because of the weakened dark squares on Black’s kingside. Later, in the game De Mauro – Hamson, corr. 1985, there followed: 15...c5 16.\textit{\underline{a}d1 (It deserved attention for White to play: 16.h5 \textit{\underline{a}c8 17.\textit{\underline{a}c1\textdagger, not letting Black’s knight to the c4-square.) 16.\textit{\underline{a}c8 17.h5 \textit{\underline{c}xd4 18.\textit{\underline{d}4 \textit{\underline{c}4 19.\textit{\underline{g}5 (It is evidently better for White to play here 19.\textit{\underline{f}4\textdagger, avoiding attacks \!

76
against the queen of the type – h7-h6, or f7-f6.) 19...h6 (△19...f6
20.♘g3 ♦b2 21.♗c1 ♦xd3 22. ♦xd3 f5=) 20.♘g3 ♦b2 (or 20...
b5 21.hxg6 fxg6 22.♘xc4 ♦xc4 23.♗e5=) 21.hxg6! ♦xd1 (△21...
fxg6 22.♗e5+ ♘g8 23.♗b5+) 22.♗f4! f5 23.♕h5+ ♘g8 24.g7!
♗f7 25.♗g6 and Black was completely defenseless, despite his
great material advantage. 25...
♗xd4 (or 25...fxe4 26.♗xe6 ♗f5
27.♘h8+ ♔f7 28.g8♗+ ♘xg8 29.
♕h7+ ♗e8 30.♗xg8+ ♗e7 31.
♕g3=) 26.♗xe6 ♘xg7 27.♗xd1!
fxe4 (or 27...♗f7 28.♗c2 ♗b2
29.♗d3 f4 30.♗b3=+) 28.♗e2 and
Black lost.

It is too dangerous for Black to postpone undermining
White’s centre and to try to pre-
serve his bishop on g7 – 12.♗d8
13.♗h6 ♘h8 14.♗ad1 ♘b7 15.
♗g5! e6 16.e5! c5 17.♗f4= Filip –
Korchnoi, Bucharest 1954. White
has a great advantage in connection
with the idea ♘h5-f6.

12...♗e8 13.♗ad1 (It is also
good for White to play analog-
gously to the game that we have
just followed – Filip – Korchnoi,
Bucharest 1954, 13.♗h6 ♘h8
14.♗ad1 and in case Black tries
to open the e-file for his rook with
the move 14...e5, then White can
counter that with: 15.dxe5 ♘xe5
16.f4 and he has a powerful
kingside initiative, for example:
16...♘h8 17.f5 ♘b7 18.fxg6 hxg6
19.♘c4!? ♘xd2 20.♘xf7+ ♘h7
21.♘xd2 ♘xe4 22.♗f4=; 21...♗e7
22.♗g3= – White’s pawn might
be weak indeed, but it is still ex-
tra...) ♗a4 14.♗h6 ♘c4 15.♗xc4
♗xc4 16.♗xg7 ♘xg7 and here
instead of 17.♗f1, Hasanov –
Yandemirov, Kazan 1995, White
had to play immediately 17.
♕g3=, leaving his rook on the
f1-square, in case he opts for
the plan with the pawn-advance
f2-f4-f5. Generally speaking,
Black’s bishop is inferior to
White’s knight in this pawn-
structure; meanwhile Black has
problems with the defence of his
king.

Following 12...♗b7, White
has tried several moves in prac-
tice:

13.♗a1 e6 (After: 13...c5 14.
d5 c4 15.♗c2 e5, Browne – Aaron,
USA 1977, White is better in case
of: 16.dxe6 ♘xe6 17.♗d4=) 14.h4
c5 15.♗h6 ♘e7 16.♗fd1 ♘fd8
17.♗e3 ♘c6 18.♗b5 ♘h6 19.
♗xh6 ♘ac8 20.f3 ♗xd4 21.cxd4
♗b4 22.♗d2 – and White’s posi-
tion is better although it is not
so easy to find the right plan for
him to improve his position,
Vyzmanavin – Panchenko, Lviv
1987;

After 13.♗ab1 e6 14.♗fd1
♗ac8 15.f3 c5 16.♗b5 ♘c6 17.
dxc5 ♘xd2 18.♗xd2 bxc5 19.
♘a6=, the endgame is advan-
tageous for White, Dydyshko –
Thipsay, Bangalore 1981;

In the game Browne – Kind-
emann, Dortmund 1990, Black
succeeded in obtaining a good
game after practically the most
natural move for White in this
position – 13.\textit{\textasciitilde}ad1 c5 14.d5 e6 15.c4 \textit{\textasciitilde}a6 16.\textit{\textasciitilde}c2 exd5 17.exd5 \textit{\textasciitilde}fe8 18.\textit{\textasciitilde}g3 (18.h3 \textit{\textasciitilde}b7=) 18...\textit{\textasciitilde}g4 and White failed to protect his c4-pawn in a normal fashion. Later, the game followed with: 19.\textit{\textasciitilde}d2 (or 19.f4 h6 20.h3 \textit{\textasciitilde}xg3 21.\textit{\textasciitilde}f3 \textit{\textasciitilde}d4+ 22.\textit{\textasciitilde}h1 \textit{\textasciitilde}e1+ 23.\textit{\textasciitilde}f1 \textit{\textasciitilde}xf3 24.gxf3 \textit{\textasciitilde}xd1 25.\textit{\textasciitilde}xd1 hgx5) 19...\textit{\textasciitilde}xc4 20.\textit{\textasciitilde}xa5 \textit{\textasciitilde}xd3 21.\textit{\textasciitilde}xd3 c4! (or 21...bxa5 22.\textit{\textasciitilde}xc5) 22.\textit{\textasciitilde}c3 bxa5 23.\textit{\textasciitilde}xc4 \textit{\textasciitilde}ac8 – and Black had the initiative – his bishop was stronger than his opponent’s knight and White’s d5-pawn was vulnerable. It is obvious that White should better avoid pushing the pawn in that position: 14.\textit{\textasciitilde}h6 cxd4 15. cxd4 \textit{\textasciitilde}ac8 16.\textit{\textasciitilde}xg7 \textit{\textasciitilde}xg7 17.d5 \textit{\textasciitilde}g8 18.\textit{\textasciitilde}g5 \textit{\textasciitilde}c4 19.\textit{\textasciitilde}d4± – and Black’s bishop on b7 was obviously misplaced, Lautier – Ostenstad, Reykjavik 1988.

Therefore, it is worth for White to play 13.\textit{\textasciitilde}h6 immediately and to determine the placement of his rook only later. There might follow:

13...e6 14.\textit{\textasciitilde}xg7 \textit{\textasciitilde}xg7 15.h4±. In the game Razuvaev – Karasev, USSR 1972, Black was slightly worse and he chose the risky move 15...f5, weakening his king considerably. The game continued with: 16.exf5 exf5 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}g5 \textit{\textasciitilde}ae8 18.\textit{\textasciitilde}f4 \textit{\textasciitilde}e7 19.\textit{\textasciitilde}g3 \textit{\textasciitilde}h8 20. d5 \textit{\textasciitilde}d6 21.c4 \textit{\textasciitilde}c8 22.\textit{\textasciitilde}fe1 \textit{\textasciitilde}b7 23.h5 \textit{\textasciitilde}g7 24.hxg6 hxg6 25.\textit{\textasciitilde}e6 \textit{\textasciitilde}xe6 26.\textit{\textasciitilde}xg6+ \textit{\textasciitilde}h8 27.\textit{\textasciitilde}xe6+ and White won;

13...\textit{\textasciitilde}ad8 14.\textit{\textasciitilde}xg7 \textit{\textasciitilde}xg7, Filho – Lima, corr. 1981 and here besides the usual reaction for White 15.\textit{\textasciitilde}ad1, it deserves attention for him to play 15.c4 – this is an attempt to fortify the centre, making use of the fact that Black was too slow with the move \textit{\textasciitilde}c7-c5. There might follow: 15...e5 16.d5 \textit{\textasciitilde}d6 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}c3 f6 18.f4 (but not 18.c5 \textit{\textasciitilde}xc5 19.\textit{\textasciitilde}xc5 bxc5 20. \textit{\textasciitilde}fc1 c4 21.\textit{\textasciitilde}xc4 c6=) 18...\textit{\textasciitilde}fe8 19.\textit{\textasciitilde}ac1 c5 20.f5↑ and White enjoys a space advantage and a powerful kingside initiative;

13...\textit{\textasciitilde}xh6 14.\textit{\textasciitilde}xh6 e5 15.f4 (It is simpler for White to play 15. \textit{\textasciitilde}ad1!?±) 15...f5!? That is an interesting counterattack in the centre by Black, but White has a more than sufficient resource to counter it with: 16.fxe5 fxe4 17. \textit{\textasciitilde}c2 c5 18.\textit{\textasciitilde}g3! \textit{\textasciitilde}xg4 19.\textit{\textasciitilde}xe4 \textit{\textasciitilde}d5 (or 19...\textit{\textasciitilde}xe4 20.\textit{\textasciitilde}xe4 \textit{\textasciitilde}ad8 21.\textit{\textasciitilde}xf8+ \textit{\textasciitilde}xf8 22.\textit{\textasciitilde}d1±) 20.\textit{\textasciitilde}e6 \textit{\textasciitilde}xe5 21.\textit{\textasciitilde}af1 \textit{\textasciitilde}e7 22.\textit{\textasciitilde}g5 \textit{\textasciitilde}xf6 (or 22...\textit{\textasciitilde}g7 23.cxd4±) 23.\textit{\textasciitilde}xf6+ \textit{\textasciitilde}h8, Chabanon – Salau, Montpellier 1992, 24.cxd4 \textit{\textasciitilde}a6 25.\textit{\textasciitilde}d1 \textit{\textasciitilde}f8 26.\textit{\textasciitilde}e4↑ White has a passed pawn in the centre and an initiative, while in case Black tries to win White’s a2-pawn with: 26...\textit{\textasciitilde}f7 27.h3 \textit{\textasciitilde}xa2, then White plays: 28.\textit{\textasciitilde}e5 \textit{\textasciitilde}g8 29.\textit{\textasciitilde}g5 \textit{\textasciitilde}xc2 30.\textit{\textasciitilde}e6+ \textit{\textasciitilde}g7 31.\textit{\textasciitilde}e7+ \textit{\textasciitilde}h6 32. \textit{\textasciitilde}e6± – and Black cannot capture the rook, because of the checkmate and White wins at least the exchange after: 32...\textit{\textasciitilde}f2+ 33.\textit{\textasciitilde}h2 \textit{\textasciitilde}f6 34.\textit{\textasciitilde}xf8+ \textit{\textasciitilde}xf8 35.\textit{\textasciitilde}xf8+.

13.\textit{\textasciitilde}h6

In case of 13.d5, then Black
has with a queen on d7 the immediate undermining move – 13...e6 (White has failed to remove his rook from the a1-square, so he cannot support his centre with c3-c4, therefore Black is not obliged to play 13...c4 himself.) 14.dxe6 fxe6 15.\textit{ad1} c4!? 16.\textit{c2} \textit{xd2} 17.\textit{xd2} e5 18.\textit{a4} e6 19.\textit{fd1} \textit{b7}– \textit{and Black is going to maintain the balance in that endgame, Yezersky – Lukin, St Petersburg 1993.}

13...\textit{cxd4}

About 13...\textit{b7} 14.\textit{ad1} – see 12...\textit{b7} 13.\textit{ad1} c5 14.\textit{h6}.

Or 13...\textit{hxh6} 14.\textit{xxh6} e5, Gerold – Klompus, corr. 1987. This is the idea behind the exchange on h6 – Black wishes to force White to close the centre after the trade of the dark-squared bishops. On the other hand, White can exploit the placement of his queen on the h6-square and he can refrain from closing the centre with: 15.f4 (\textit{Af5-f6}) 15...\textit{exd4}. After the immediate: 16.f5 f6 17.fxg6, Black loses in case of: 17...\textit{c} 18.e5! hxg6 (or 18...\textit{cxd3} 19.\textit{exf6}+) 19.\textit{xxg6} \textit{g7} 20.\textit{h5+}, because he cannot preserve the material balance in that open position, due to the exposed placement of his king. He can try to hold the position with the help of the line: 17...hxg6 18.\textit{cxd4} \textit{g7} 19.\textit{e3} \textit{cxd4} 20.\textit{xd4} \textit{d7} 21.\textit{ac1}, although White maintains his advantage even then, thanks to Black’s numerous weaknesses. It is even simpler for White to play at first: 16.cxd4 \textit{cxd4} 17.f5 f6 18.fxg6 hxg6 19.\textit{g6+} \textit{g7} 20.\textit{h5}, because Black’s king remains practically bare...

14.\textit{xxg7} \textit{xxg7}

15.\textit{cxd4} and White preserves a minimal edge, as it is usual in similar positions, due to the compromised dark squares on Black’s kingside, Kokosinski – Neil, ICCF 1989.

11...\textit{c5} 12.\textit{d5}

12...\textit{c4}

This is a quite logical move in case Black wishes to undermine White’s centre with the help of the move e7-e6, but since White cannot play at that moment c3-c4 anyway, because his rook is
hanging, it deserves attention for Black to have waited for White to play a move with the rook on a1.

12...\(\mathcal{A}b7 \) – This move is hardly useful for Black after the centre has already been closed. 13.\(\mathcal{W}d2 \mathcal{W}c7 \) 14.\(\mathcal{W}ad1 \mathcal{W}ad8 \) 15.\(c4 \mathcal{A}a6 \) 16.\(\mathcal{B}c1 \mathcal{C}c8 \) (Black has achieved what he was after – he has let his rook to the d8-square, but he has lost several tempi and it was hardly worth it...) 17.f4 f6 18.\(\mathcal{A}h4 \) and in order to play e7-e5, without being afraid of the exchange on e5, Black, in the game Salvador – Fernandez, corr. 1996, played 18...\(\mathcal{A}h6 \) and White had better counter that with 19.\(\mathcal{W}cd1 \pm \) and if 19...e5, then 20.\(\mathcal{W}c3 \), after which White is threatening to capture on e5, while in case of 20...\(\mathcal{A}g4 \), he has the resource 21.fxe5 and Black will be forced to enter the unfavourable variation for him: 21...\(\mathcal{E}e3+22.\ \mathcal{W}h1 \mathcal{A}d4 \) 23.\(\mathcal{W}xd4 \mathcal{C}xd4 \) 24.\(\mathcal{W}xd4 \mathcal{A}xd1 \) (24...\(\mathcal{W}c6 \) 25.d6 \(\mathcal{W}f7 \) 26.\(\mathcal{W}a1 \mathcal{A}xd1 \) 27.\(\mathcal{W}xf6 \mathcal{A}g4 \) 28.\(\mathcal{A}xh8 \) or 26...\(\mathcal{W}xe5 \) 27.\(\mathcal{A}xf6 \) 25.\(\mathcal{W}xf6 \) (25.\(\mathcal{W}xd1 \mathcal{W}c6! \) 25...\(\mathcal{W}g4 \) (or 25...\(\mathcal{W}c6 \) 26.\(\mathcal{W}e3 \mathcal{A}g4 \) 27.\(h3 \pm \) 26.f7+ \(\mathcal{A}xf7 \) 27.\(\mathcal{W}xf7 \mathcal{W}xf7 \) 28.\(\mathcal{W}f6+ \\mathcal{W}e8 \) 29.c5+\(\Delta \mathcal{A}b5 \).)

12...f5 13.\(\mathcal{A}e3 \) (Now, White’s bishop can come back, because the move f7-f6 has weakened the e6-square.) 13...c4 14.\(\mathcal{A}c2 \) e6 (In the closed position after: 14...e5 15.f4\(\Delta f4-f5, \) or fxe5, White’s prospects are somewhat better.) 15.dxe6 \(\mathcal{A}xe6 \) 16.\(\mathcal{W}d4 \) \(\mathcal{W}f7 \) – Black’s bishop has been placed on the good f7-square and he followed later with \(\mathcal{Q}a5-c6, \) equalizing gradually the game: 17.\(\mathcal{W}e2 \mathcal{W}e7 \) 18.h4 \(\mathcal{B}c8 \) 19.h5 \(\mathcal{W}fd8 \) 20.\(\text{hxg6} \) \(\text{hxg6} \) 21.f4 (or 21.\(\mathcal{W}ad1 \mathcal{Q}c6 \) 22.\(\mathcal{B}xc6 \mathcal{B}xc6 \) 23.\(\mathcal{W}xd8+ \\mathcal{W}xd8= \) 21...\(\mathcal{Q}c6 \) 22.\(\mathcal{W}ad1 \) \(\mathcal{Q}xd4 \) 23.\(\mathcal{W}xd4 \) \(\mathcal{W}f5 \) 24.\(\mathcal{W}fe1 \) \(\mathcal{Q}xd4+ \) 25.\(\mathcal{W}xd4 \) \(\mathcal{W}xe4 \) 26.\(\mathcal{W}xe4 \) \(\mathcal{W}f6 \) 27.d5 \(c3 \) Donner – Hartoch, Leeuwarden 1971. It is obvious that White did not need to exchange on e6 himself. It would have been better for him to have played 15.\(\mathcal{W}d2 \) – because the d5-pawn might have turned in perspective into a powerful passed pawn: 15...f5 16.\(\mathcal{W}xf5 \) \(\mathcal{G}xf5 \) 17.d6\(\uparrow \), or 15...exd5 16.\(\mathcal{W}xd5 \) \(\mathcal{B}e8 \) 17.\(\mathcal{W}ad1 \).)

12...f5 – That attempt to undermine White’s centre compromises Black’s kingside considerably. 13.\(\mathcal{W}c1 \) c4 (so that White cannot protect his d5-pawn with the move c3-c4) 14.\(\mathcal{W}b1 \) fxe5 15.\(\mathcal{W}xe4 \) \(\mathcal{W}d6 \) 16.\(\mathcal{W}g3 \)\(\uparrow \). White’s d5-pawn is vulnerable indeed, but Black cannot attack it effectively, while his weaknesses on e6 and e7 are a serious reason for him to worry about. Later, in the game Mercadal – Jimenez, corr. 1995, there followed: 16...\(\mathcal{W}b7 \) 17.\(\mathcal{W}e1 \) b5. That is a loss of time. (Black had better play 17...\(\mathcal{W}ad8 \) 18.\(\mathcal{W}f3 \) \(\mathcal{W}f7 \) and he is threatening to capture on d5, but White manages to defend his pawn: 19.\(\mathcal{W}e2 \) \(\mathcal{W}d7 \) – in case of 19...\(\mathcal{W}xd5, \) White will follow with 20.\(\mathcal{W}xe7 \) – 20.\(\mathcal{W}ed1 \)\(\Delta h4-h5 \); and here,
contrary to White, Black’s plan for further actions is rather unclear.) 18...d3 e8 19.e3 (Or 19.e4 c7 20.g4 Δg4-e6 and later h4-h5, exploiting Black’s compromised kingside.) 19...a6 20.e4 c7 21.g5 c8 22.d6 xd6 (It is too bad for Black to play: 22...xd6 23.d5+ h8 24.b6! xe1 25.xe1 xb6 26.f7 xf7 27.xf7, because White checkmates.) 23.xd6 exd6 24.d5+ h8 25.f7 xf7 26.xf7± Black’s compensation for the exchange is quite insufficient.

12...d7 13.b1 c4 14.c2 e5. In the game Zhukova – Yegiazarian, Batumi 2002, White complied with a closed pawn-structure and he played: 15.d2 b7 16.g3 d6, but it was impossible to play f2-f4 immediately with a bishop on g5, because Black would have countered that with h7-h6. He had to return the bishop to the e3-square at first. Well, that was hardly so important in that closed position... White played: 17.a4 f6 18.e3 b7 19.f4 h6 20.f5 xe3+ 21.xe3 e7 22.f2 c8 23.fxg6 hxg6 24.bf1 d7± – and he had the initiative, but Black’s position was solid enough. He could have countered White’s activity on the kingside with the move f6-f5 just in case. It deserved attention for White to try too 15.dxe6, because after 15...fxe6 16.xd7 xd7 17.fd1± – White would have been dominant on the only open file in that endgame and after 15...xe6 16.d4±, he would have maintained the initiative as well.

Black has also tried in practice two other moves with the same idea – to prepare e7-e5:

12...d6 13.b1 e5 14.c4 f5 15.f3 (White’s standard reaction – 15.exf5 gxf5 16.f3, so that he can attack the e5-square along the semi-open e-file, would not work here because of: 16.e4 17.fxe4 fxe4 and White cannot play 18.xe4?, due to 18...xe5±) 15...f4 16.h4 xf6 17.e1 (Black has closed the position and he has occupied some space on the kingside, but he has not equalized completely yet.) 17...b7 18.c3 g5 19.c2 e7 20.a4 d6 21.c6 b8 22.b5 (It is more precise for White to play here 22.e2±) 22...h8 (Black should have preferred here 22...xc4 – because the break of the blockade is not fatal for Black at all, for example: 23.d6 xf7 24.a4 e3 25.f2 d8 26.d2 a6±, or 24.d7 b7 25.d6 xd6 26.xd6 xc6 27.xc6 bd8 28.d1 xa2x) 23.xd6 xd6 24.e3 g8 25.g4±. Black has no attack on the kingside, while White has at his disposal the plan with a4-a5 and subsequent pressure against the b6-pawn. In the game Tukmakov – Stean, Graz 1972, Black opened the position in an attempt to organize some counterplay. His position crumbled just in a few moves: 25.fxg3 26.hxg3 h3 27.f2
g4?! 28.f4 h5? 29.\textit{\textwedge}d2+- exf4
30.e5 \textit{\textwedge}xe5 31.\textit{\textwedge}xf4 \textit{\textwedge}g5 32.\textit{\textwedge}e1
and Black resigned.

12...\textit{\textwedge}c7 – Black intends to
close the centre with the move
e7-e5, without covering the
diagonal for his bishop on c8
and without occupying the d6-
square with the queen, because
it has to be taken by his knight.
13.\textit{\textwedge}d2 e5 14.\textit{\textwedge}h6 (or 14.dxe6
\textit{\textwedge}xe6 15.\textit{\textwedge}f4 \textit{\textwedge}e5=; 14.\textit{\textwedge}e3!?)
14...\textit{\textwedge}b7 15.\textit{\textwedge}xg7 \textit{\textwedge}xg7 16.f4
exf4 17.\textit{\textwedge}xf4 (or 17.\textit{\textwedge}xf4 \textit{\textwedge}xf4
18.\textit{\textwedge}xf4 f6=) 17...\textit{\textwedge}e7 18.\textit{\textwedge}e3
(18.\textit{\textwedge}af1 \textit{\textwedge}d6) 18...\textit{\textwedge}d7 19.\textit{\textwedge}af1
\textit{\textwedge}ae8 and after the trade of
the dark-squared bishops, Black for-
tified his position on the dark
squares in the game Maksimovic –
Nestorovic, Niska Banja 1996.
It deserved attention for White
to play instead: 13.\textit{\textwedge}c1 e5 (or
13...c4 14.\textit{\textwedge}b1 e6 15.\textit{\textwedge}d2 exd5
16.exd5+) 14.c4 f5 15.\textit{\textwedge}d2 \textit{\textwedge}b7
and later he could follow either
with 16.f3, with a plan analogous
to the one in the game Tukmakov –
Stean, Graz 1972, or with:
16.exf5 gxf5 17.\textit{\textwedge}c3 \textit{\textwedge}d6 18.\textit{\textwedge}g3
and then \textit{\textwedge}e1, in order to force
Black to advance the pawn – e5-
e4 and later to undermine it with
the move f2-f3.

Finally, Black can try to get
rid of the pin against the e7-
pawn in a radical fashion with:
12...h6 13.\textit{\textwedge}h4 g5 14.\textit{\textwedge}g3 e6
15.f4+. White has a powerful ini-
tiative in that position, thanks to
the weakening of Black's kings-
side. Later in the game Kharlov –
Timofeev, Elista 2001, there
followed: 15...exd5 16.exd5 f5
(This move practically forces
White to sacrifice a piece; Black
would not have solved his prob-
lems either, after his two other
possibilities recommended by
GM Krasenkow: 16...g4 13.f5+,
or 16...\textit{\textwedge}g4 17.fxg5 hxg5 18.
\textit{\textwedge}d2+ – and White would have
maintained clearly better pros-
tspects in both cases, due to Black's
compromised kingside.) 17.fxg5
hxg5 18.d6\textit{\textwedge}e8 19.\textit{\textwedge}d2 f4 20.
\textit{\textwedge}xf4! Now, Black's king is
completely devoid of any pawn-shel-
ter. 20...gxg4 21.\textit{\textwedge}xf4 \textit{\textwedge}e5 22.
\textit{\textwedge}g6 \textit{\textwedge}xf1+ 23.\textit{\textwedge}xf1 \textit{\textwedge}xd6 24.
\textit{\textwedge}e2∞ and White's attack was
decisive in the game Kharlov –
Timofeev, Elista 2001. It con-
tinued later with: 24...\textit{\textwedge}b7 (or 24...
\textit{\textwedge}e6 25.\textit{\textwedge}e4 \textit{\textwedge}d4+ 26.\textit{\textwedge}h1∞–)
and here White could have fin-
ished his opponent off outright
with: 25.\textit{\textwedge}h5 \textit{\textwedge}xc3 (or 25...\textit{\textwedge}f6
26.\textit{\textwedge}e5 \textit{\textwedge}xe5 27.\textit{\textwedge}g6+) 26.\textit{\textwedge}g5
\textit{\textwedge}g7 27.\textit{\textwedge}e7+ \textit{\textwedge}h8 28.\textit{\textwedge}g6 –
(M.Krasenkow).

13.\textit{\textwedge}c2 \textit{\textwedge}d6

13...\textit{\textwedge}d7 – This way to prepare
the undermining move e7-
e6 for Black has the drawback
that after: 14.\textit{\textwedge}d2 e6, Rucker –
Kretschmer, corr. 1989, his
queen precludes the bishop from
capturing on e6 and after: 15.
dxe6 \textit{\textwedge}xe6 (Or 15...fxe6 16.\textit{\textwedge}xd7
\textit{\textwedge}xd7 17.\textit{\textwedge}ad1± and the endgame
is favourable for White.) 16.\textit{\textwedge}f4±,
followed by \textit{\textwedge}fd5, White main-
tains the advantage.
14.\textit{\=d}2

It is useless for White to occupy the weakened d4-square immediately: 14.\textit{\=d}4 e5 15.dxe6 fxe6 16.f4 e5\textsuperscript{5}.  

14...\textit{\=f}5

This undermining move is quite logical for Black, although it weakens the e6-square.

In case of 14...e5, or 14...e6, the simplest for White is to follow with: 15.dxe6 \textit{\=x}xe6 16.\textit{\=d}4\textsuperscript{6}.

Black has also tested in practice the line: 14...\textit{\=d}7 15.\textit{\=f}4 \textit{\=a}3 (or 15...\textit{\=e}5 16.\textit{\=x}e5 \textit{\=x}e5 17.f4\textsuperscript{1} and e4-e5 to follow...) 16.\textit{\=e}3 (16.\textit{\=h}6\textsuperscript{7}) 16...\textit{\=a}d8 17. \textit{\=d}4 e5 18.dxe6 \textit{\=x}xe6 19.\textit{\=e}3 f6!?\textsuperscript{8} \textit{\=c}6, Moehring – Liebert, Goerlitz 1972. It would have been better for White to have advanced his central pawn: 16.e5 \textit{\=f}d8 17.\textit{\=d}4\textsuperscript{1}.

15.\textit{\=a}d1

It also looks good for White to continue with 15.\textit{\=d}4 fxe4 (Black fails to equalize after: 15...f4 16.\textit{\=a}e1 e5 17.dxe6 \textit{\=x}e6 18.e5\textsuperscript{9} \textit{\=x}e5 19.\textit{\=e}7 \textit{\=x}e7 20. \textit{\=x}e5\textsuperscript{4}--; 16.\textit{\=d}7 17.e5 \textit{\=x}e5 18.\textit{\=f}3 \textit{\=f}6 19.\textit{\=x}f4 \textit{\=a}3 20. \textit{\=d}5\textsuperscript{11}) 16.\textit{\=x}e4 \textit{\=b}7 17.\textit{\=c}6\textsuperscript{1} – White has a clear advantage with his powerful knight on the c6-square.

15...fxe4

After 15...e5 16.dxe6 \textit{\=x}xd2 17. \textit{\=x}d2 \textit{\=x}e6 18.\textit{\=d}4 \textit{\=c}8 19.\textit{\=e}1\textsuperscript{11}, the endgame is favourable for White.

16.\textit{\=g}3

Or 16.\textit{\=x}e4 \textit{\=b}7 17.\textit{\=e}3 \textit{\=c}5.  

16...\textit{\=b}7 17.\textit{\=x}e4 \textit{\=d}7 18. \textit{\=f}e1\textsuperscript{1}

The exchange of the bishops – 18.\textit{\=h}6, enables Black to play: 18...\textit{\=d}8 19.\textit{\=x}g7 \textit{\=x}g7 20.\textit{\=d}4+ (or 20.\textit{\=e}3 \textit{\=x}d5) 20...\textit{\=g}8 21.\textit{\=g}5 \textit{\=x}d5 (or 21...\textit{\=x}d5 22.\textit{\=g}4 \textit{\=c}6 23.\textit{\=e}4 \textit{\=f}6 24. \textit{\=x}d8 \textit{\=x}d8 25.\textit{\=x}b7 \textit{\=x}b7 26. \textit{\=x}xc4\textsuperscript{1}+) 22.\textit{\=e}4 \textit{\=c}6 23.\textit{\=x}g6 \textit{\=x}d4 24.\textit{\=x}h7+ \textit{\=h}8 25.\textit{\=c}d4 \textit{\=d}5\textsuperscript{1}.

Now, in order for Black to have some counterplay against White's d5-pawn, he must play: 18...\textit{\=f}5 19.\textit{\=d}6 (Or 19.\textit{\=c}5 bxc5 20.\textit{\=x}f5 \textit{\=x}f5 21.\textit{\=x}e7 \textit{\=f}8 22. \textit{\=e}1\textsuperscript{10}) 19...\textit{\=x}d6 (Or 19...\textit{\=d}5 20.dxe7! \textit{\=x}d2 21.\textit{\=x}d2 \textit{\=d}5 22.\textit{\=x}d1\textsuperscript{1}+) 20.\textit{\=x}d6 \textit{\=d}5 21.\textit{\=f}8 (or 21...\textit{\=x}c3 22.\textit{\=e}7\textsuperscript{12}) 22.\textit{\=g}3 (\textit{\=e}7 22...\textit{\=e}5 (or 22...\textit{\=x}d1 23.\textit{\=x}d1\textsuperscript{1}+) 23.\textit{\=x}e5 \textit{\=x}d1+ 24.\textit{\=x}d1 \textit{\=x}d6 25.\textit{\=e}2\textsuperscript{1} and White had the two bishop advantage, while Black's king position was compromised considerably.
Chapter 4

1.d4 \( \Delta f6 \) 2.c4 g6 3.\( \Delta c3 \) d5 4.cxd5 \( \Delta xd5 \) 5.e4 \( \Delta xc3 \) 6.bxc3 \( g7 \) 7.\( \Delta c4 \) c5

This is a natural and strong move – Black has developed his bishop to g7 and allowed the opponent to build up a powerful pawn-centre in order to attack it later. He often castles before playing c7-c5, but that usually leads only to a simple transposition of moves.

8.\( \Delta e2 \)

This development of White’s knight is quite typical for the system that we are analyzing – it should be deployed here in order for him to be able to parry the possible pin \( \Delta c8-g4 \) with the move f2-f3.

We will deal now in this chapter with the different possibilities for Black on his move eight: a) 8...\( \Delta d7 \), b) 8...\( \Delta a5 \), c) 8...cxd4 and d) 8...0-0, besides the main line: 8...\( \Delta c6 \) 9.0-0 0-0 (or by a transposition of moves – 8...0-0 9.0-0 \( \Delta c6 \)), to which the rest of our chapters have been devoted.

His other lines are:

About 8...a6 9.0-0 \( \Delta c6 \) 10.\( \Delta e3 \) 0-0 – see 8...\( \Delta c6 \) 9.\( \Delta e3 \) 0-0 10.0-0 a6 – Chapter 7; as for 8...e6 9.0-0 0-0 10.\( \Delta e3 \) \( \Delta c6 \) – see 8...\( \Delta c6 \) 9.\( \Delta e3 \) 0-0 10.0-0 e6 – Chapter 7;

8...\( \Delta c7 \) 9.\( \Delta f4 \) \( \Delta a5 \) (about 9...e5 10.dxe5 \( \Delta xe5 \) 11.\( \Delta xe5 \) \( \Delta xe5 \) 12.\( \Delta d5 \) 0-0 13.0-0 – see variation d1 – 8...0-0 9.0-0 \( \Delta c7 \) 10.\( \Delta f4 \) 10.0-0 0-0 11.\( \Delta b1 \) a6. There arises a position analogous to the variation 8...\( \Delta a5 \), except that White has an extra tempo. He can exploit that in several different ways, for example with: 12.\( \Delta c1 \) \( \Delta c6 \) 13.\( \Delta h6 \) b5 14.\( \Delta xg7 \) \( \Delta xg7 \) 15.\( \Delta d5 \) \( \Delta b7 \) 16.\( \Delta e3 \) – and White has managed to accomplish the thematic exchange of the dark-squared bishops a move earlier;

8...\( \Delta g4 \) – This move is in fact just a loss of time. 9.f3 \( \Delta d7 \) 10.\( \Delta e3 \) cxd4 11.cxd4 0-0. Now,
White can either choose 12.0–0±, or he can try the more energetic plan with a direct kingside attack: 12.h4 dc6 13.h5 da5 14. d3 cc8 15. cd2 (It also deserves attention for White to play 15. bb1!?, in order by attacking Black’s b7-pawn to prevent temporarily da5-c4 and to prepare d4-d5 at the same time. His prospects are evidently superior then.) 15...ec8 (Black had better try here: 15...dc4 16. xc4 xc4, in order to be able to counter 17. h6 (17. f2?!) with 17...hxh6 18. xh6 a5+ and since after 19. f2 g5, White’s queen gets trapped on the h6-square, he must retreat it back to d2 aiming at a transfer to a slightly superior endgame.) 16. h6 h8 17.e5 e6 18. g5+— and White’s attack is checkmating, Spreng – Fletzer, Roncegno 1988.

a) 8...d7 9.0–0 c7

The idea of this line is to enable Black, in comparison to the variation 8...0–0 9.0–0 c7 10. f4 e5, which we are going to analyze a bit later, to capture on e5 with the knight instead of with the queen. He would loses plenty of tempi in case he has to take with the queen, while capturing with the knight in the centre may turn out to be very purposeful.

About 9...0–0 – see line d.

10. f4 e5 11. dxe5 xe5

After 11...xe5, Black comes under an annoying pin: 12. d5 0–0 13. g3 e6 14. f4 fe8 15. b1 ab8 16. xe6 (It also deserves attention for White to try here another plan: 16.c4 16...d7 17. d3 c6 18. h1 bd8 19. b3 e7 20. xe5 xe5 and he could have maintained his advantage by playing: 21. xe5 xe5 22.f4 g7 23.e5±. In the game Portisch – German, Stockholm 1962, there followed: 21.f4 d4 22.f5 xd5 23.exd5 b6 – Black somehow neutralized White’s powerful pressure in the centre and he obtained a quite acceptable position.) 16...xe6 17. c4 (or 17.f4 exd5 18.fxe5 bd8 19.exd5 xe5 20. xe5 xe5 21. c4±) 17...e7 (or 17...a6 18. b3 c6 19. xe5 xe5 20.f4 g7 21. f5†; 17...h8 18. b3±) 18. a4 (18. xe5 xe5 19.f4 xc3 20.f5 d4+ 21.h1 h4∞) 18...a8 (18...a6 19. b6) 19. e2±, followed by f2-f4 and a retreat of the bishop to the c4-square, from where it attacks Black’s vulnerable e6-pawn.

12. xe5 xe5 13. d5

White has played here much more often in practice the exchange: 13. b5+ d7, but it is
not favourable for him at all. This bishop should not be traded – it should instead occupy an all-important central square.

13...\( \triangle g4 \)

This is a logical move; otherwise Black risks ending up in a very passive position without any real counter chances, since he has allowed White to build a powerful centre, for example after: 13...0-0 14.f4 \( \triangle g4 \) 15.\( \triangle d3 \pm \), or 14.h3 \( \triangle d8 \) 15.f4 \( \triangle c4 \) 16.\( \triangle d3 \) \( \triangle b6 \) 17.c4±.

14.\( \triangle g3 \) h5 15.\( \triangle e1 \) \( \triangle xh2 \)

16.e5 \( \triangle g4 \) 17.e6

This is quite understandable – Black is so far back in development.

17...\( \triangle xe6 \) 18.\( \triangle x e6 \) fxe6 19.\( \triangle x e6+ \) f7

20.\( \triangle d5 \) (Now, Black can only defend by exploiting the vulnerable placement of White’s rook on e6 and by attacking his queen.) 20...\( \triangle f6 \) (It is obviously much worse for him, despite with similar ideas, to try: 20...\( \triangle h d8 \) 21.\( \triangle c4 \) \( \triangle g7 \) 22.\( \triangle e4 \); 21...\( b5 \) 22.\( \triangle c6+ \) bxc4 23.\( \triangle x c7+ \) \( \triangle e6 \) 24.\( \triangle e1+ \) \( \triangle d6 \) 25.\( \triangle g7 \) \( \triangle g8 \) 26.\( \triangle g e7 \pm \); 20...\( \triangle g7 \) ? 21.\( \triangle g5 \)) 21.\( \triangle c4 \) b5 22.\( \triangle c6+ \) bxc4 23.\( \triangle x c7+ \) \( \triangle e6 \) 24.\( \triangle e1+ \) \( \triangle d6 \) 25.\( \triangle g7 \) \( \triangle g8 \) 26.\( \triangle g e7 \) ±; 20...\( \triangle g7 \) ? 21.\( \triangle g5 \))

b) 8...\( a5 \)

This queen-sortie is evidently premature. Contrary to many other schemes of the Gruenfeld Defence, here White’s a2-pawn is defended by the bishop and he can castle, while Black’s queen not only occupies an important base for his knight, but it can also come under attack (\( \triangle b1-b5 \), \( \triangle c1-d2 \)).

9.0-0 0-0 10.\( \triangle b1 \)

That is a multi-purpose move – the rook is removed from the dangerous long a1-h8 diagonal and meanwhile White creates the threats \( \triangle b1-b5 \), or d4-d5, preventing the development of Black’s bishop on c8.

10...\( cxd4 \)
10...a6 11...e3 (11...g5 cxd4
12...xe7 e8 13.b4 c7∞) 11...
xc5 xc5 15.exc5 xc4. His move 12 is a mistake. He would not have fared much better with the line: 12.d5 d8 13.axb7
xb7 14.axb7 xa2 either. It is not so clear what happens after:
12.c1 b5 (12...f6 13.e5 g4
14.h5) 13.d5 (13.b3 b7
14.d5) 13.a7 14.dxc5 c7
15.d4 xc5 (15.e5 f4 16.c4
bxc4 bxc4 18.c6) 16.c6
xc6 17.xc6 a4 18.d2 xc3 – Black has a pawn for the exchange and quite decent counter
opportunities.

It looks like the best for White now is to restrict his opponent’s possibilities with the move 12.a4 – Black cannot play b7-b5 and he will have problems without that move: 12.b6 (or 12...d8
13.b3; 12...f6 13.e5 g4
14.h4; 12...b6 13.e5 and in case of 13...b7, White follows with 14.e6) 13.b3 c4 (13..d7
d4; 13..cx4 14.cxd4 d7
15.e5 d2 – and Black’s queen is endangered) 14.c2 – Now, Black will have to lose time to retreat his knight from the b6-square and White preserves a clear advantage.

11.cxd4 c6

The move 11...e6 is not good for Black, since it weakens the d6-square. 12.f4 c6 13.d6

(13.e8 (It is not any better for Black to continue with: 13...d8 14.e5 – his rook occupies a square, which is needed for the retreat of his queen.) 14.e5 d8 15.c3 – Black lags in development and his dark squares are vulnerable, Stange – Sparreboom, Vlissingen 2002.)

12.e3 a6

12...c7 13.c1 a6. This is only weakening Black’s position. (It was obviously better for him to follow with: 13...d8, but even then after for example: 14.d1 d7 15.a4 Black’s position is rather cramped.) 14.d1 d8 15.b3 d7 16.d5 e5, Janoska – Zoltan, Hungary 2003 and here White could have obtained an overwhelming advantage with the simple line: 17.f4 g4 18.
b6 e8 19.c2.

It is also possible for White to continue with: 13.c1 d6 14.g4
d4 15.d5 a3 16.b3 (the following line deserves attention too: 16.d2 a5 17.d3) 16...
d4 17.xd4 xe2 18.xe2
d4+ 19.h1 e8 20.cd1 and White is dominant in the centre in this position with opposite coloured bishops. Later, in the game Dommes – Fedorov, Leningrad 1971, there followed: 20.b4 21.e5 a5 22.d6 e6 (22...
exd6 23.e6) 23.f5! a4 (23...gx5
24.f4) 24.fxe6 axb3 25.e7
bxa2 26.exf8+ xf8 27.xa2++.}

13.c1

White is better too following: 13.d5 e5 14.b6 a3 15.b3,
but he should not be so much in a hurry to push the central pawn, since Black does not have any useful moves at his disposal.

13...\texttt{b8}

Otherwise it is inconceivable how Black can develop his queenside.

14.\texttt{f4} e5

Now, instead of the quite unclear move 15.\texttt{d5}, Gomez Camacho – Gonzalez Zamora, Tenerife 2001, 15...\texttt{exf4} 16.\texttt{dxc6} f3 17.\texttt{gxg3 Bh3}, White could have won a pawn with: 15.\texttt{d2} \texttt{c7} (or 15...\texttt{d8} 16.d5 \texttt{e7} 17.\texttt{xa6\pm}) 16.d5 \texttt{d4} 17.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{exd4} 18.\texttt{xa6\pm}.

c) 8...\texttt{cxd4} 9.\texttt{cxd4}

9...0–0

About 9...\texttt{c6} 10.\texttt{e3} – see 8...\texttt{c6} 9.\texttt{e3} cd 10.cd Chapter 5; as for 9...a6 10.0–0 0–0 11.\texttt{e3 c6} – see 8...\texttt{c6} 9.\texttt{e3} cxd4 10.\texttt{cxd4} 0–0 11.0–0 a6 (Chapter 8).

9...\texttt{a5+?!} 10.\texttt{d2} \texttt{a3} (The best that Black could have done here was to lose some time and go back with his queen – 10...\texttt{d8.}) 11.\texttt{b1 c6?} (Once again Black had better retreat his queen – 11...\texttt{d6} 12.\texttt{f4\pm}) 12.d5 \texttt{e5} 13.\texttt{b4 \texttt{f3} 14.\texttt{a4} 1-0 Dannner – Bodrogi, Budapest 1994.

9...\texttt{c7}. Now, contrary to some other lines with \texttt{d8-c7}, Black’s queen already attacks the bishop on c4 and White cannot play \texttt{c1-f4}. On the other hand Black’s queen is rather exposed on the open c-file and he will have to remove it from there sooner or later. 10.\texttt{b3} 0–0 11.0–0 (It is not so clear for White to play in this position: 11.\texttt{f4} e5 12.dxe5 \texttt{xe5} 13.\texttt{xe5 \texttt{xe5} – after the exchange of the c-pawns, he cannot protect his bishop on d5 with the move c3-c4 – and as a consequence he will not enjoy such dominance in the centre as for example in the line 8...\texttt{c7} 9.\texttt{f4.}) 11...\texttt{c6} 12.\texttt{e3 d8} 13.\texttt{c1 e6 and here instead of: 14.f4 \texttt{b6} 15.e5 \texttt{a5} 16.\texttt{c2 c4}, Wood – Cassar, corr. 1993, it deserved attention for White to continue with: 14.d5 \texttt{exd5} 15.\texttt{e7} 16.\texttt{c5 \texttt{f6} (16...\texttt{h4} 17.\texttt{d2\pm}) 17.\texttt{g3 e5 (17...\texttt{a5} 18.\texttt{e1 \texttt{xb3} 19.\texttt{e7 \texttt{a6} 20.axb3\pm}) 18.\texttt{e1\uparrow and he would have a dangerous central passed pawn and a powerful initiative.}
9...\textit{\texttt{\textsc{g}4}} 10.f3 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}7}} 11.e3 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c}7}} 12.c1 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c}6}} 13.0-0 0-0.

Here, White tried to exploit the unfavourable placement of Black's queen on c7 in the game Cova – Bruni, corr. 1975 and he played 14.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{xf}7+ \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xf}7}}} 15.d5 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}8}}} (15...e6!? 16.dxe6 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xc}6}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{b}3}}} \textit{\texttt{\textsc{b}8}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{fd}1 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xd}1+}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{xd}1 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{f}8}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}4 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xd}4}}}}} 21.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{xd}4+}}, but in general the idea to exchange the light-squared bishop did not impress at all. It would have been better for him to follow with: 14.f4 (in order after d4-d5 to prevent Black's knight from coming to the e5-square) 14...e6 15.d5 (15.e5!? \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}e}2-g3-e4} 15...exd5 16.exd5 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}a}5} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}3}} (17.d6!?\uparrow) 17...\textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}8}} 17...\textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}6}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{c}5 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xd}5}}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{xf}8 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xf}8}}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{xg}6\uparrow}} 18.f5 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e}8}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}2\uparrow}} – and there arises a position resembling one of the main lines – (8...\textit{\texttt{\textsc{c}6}} 9.0-0 0-0 10.e3 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{g}4}} 11.f3 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{a}5}} 12.d3 cxd4 13.cxd4 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e}6}} 14.c1 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xa}2}} 15.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{a}4 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{e}6}}}} 16.d5), except that the material is equal. White has a strong d5-pawn and a powerful initiative.

10.0-0 e6

About 10...\textit{\texttt{\textsc{c}6}} 11.e3 – see Chapters 8-10; 10...\textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}7}} 11.g5 – see variation d2: 8...0-0 9.0-0 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}7}} 10.g5 cxd4 11.cxd4.

10...\textit{\texttt{\textsc{g}4}} 11.f3 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}7}}, Lilligan – Bandy, USA 1980 and here White must simply continue with his development: 12.e3 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c}6}} 13.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{c}1\uparrow}} and the fact that Black has managed to provoke the move f2-f3 can hardly be in his favour.

11.a3

This is a straightforward attempt at exploiting the vulnerability of the dark squares and it seems quite effective.

11...\textit{\texttt{\textsc{e}8}} 12.e5 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c}6}}

13.d6 (White is trying to deploy his knight on the e4-outpost.) 13.a5 (Or 13...b6 14.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{b}5}} and the natural move 14.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{b}7}} is bad, because of: 15.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{a}4 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}7}}}} 16.d5 exd5 17.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{d}4 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xc}8}}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{ac}1+-}}) 14.d3 b6 15.g3 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{b}7}} 16.b5 (or 16.e4 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xe}4}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{xe}4 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c}8}}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{c}1 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{c}4}}}} 16...c6 17.\textit{\texttt{\textsc{xc}6 \textit{\texttt{\textsc{xc}6}}}} 18.e4\uparrow – the weakness of the d6-square is much more important than the vulnerability of the d5-square.

d) 8...0-0 9.0-0

We will now deal in details.
with: d1) 9...\(\text{c7}\) and d2) 9...
\(\text{d7}\).

Main line is 9...\(\text{c6}\) 10.\(\text{e}3\) – see Chapters 7-30;

Black’s other possibilities are:
9...\(\text{a}5\) – see variation b; 9...
\(\text{cxd}4\) 10.\(\text{cxd}4\) – see variation c;
about 9...\(\text{e}6\) 10.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{c6}\) 11.
\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{c7}\) 12.\(\text{ac}1\), Hemmert –
Hoffmann, Hessen 1994 – see
Chapter 11, line c, after the
following order of moves 7...c5
8.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}6\) 9.\(\text{e}3\) 0–0 10.0–0 \(\text{c}7\)
11.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{e}6\) 12.\(\text{d}2\);

In case of 9...\(\text{a}6\), Tozer –
James, England 1996, White
should follow simply with 10.\(\text{e}3\)
and Black has hardly anything
better than 10...\(\text{c}6\), transposing
to a variation that we have
already analyzed after the fol-
lowing order of moves: 8...\(\text{c}6\)
9.\(\text{e}3\) 0–0 10.0–0 \(\text{a}6\) – see Chap-
ter 7;

About 9...\(\text{g}4\) 10.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 11.
\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 12.\(\text{b}1\) – see Chapter
14; as for 11...\(\text{cxd}4\) 12.\(\text{cxd}4\) \(\text{c}6\)
– see Chapter 8; 11...\(\text{e}6\) 12.\(\text{d}2\)
\(\text{c}6\) 13.\(\text{h}6\)\(+\) – Black’s maneu-
vers with the light-squared
bishop are clearly disadvan-
tageous for him.

d1) 9...\(\text{c7}\)

This move is in fact not so sel-
dom played. Its idea is to attack
the white bishop on c4.

10.\(\text{f}4\)

That is White’s most prin-
cipled answer.

10...\(\text{e}5\) 11.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 12.
\(\text{dxe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 13.\(\text{d}5\)

Black has surrendered the e5-
outpost and he permitted White
to trade the dark-squared bish-
ops. As a result the dark squares
around his king have been con-
siderably weakened and that
would enable White to organize
a direct attack f2–f4–f5 and later
depending on circumstances ei-
ther f5–f6, or an exchange on g6,
followed by an attack against the
f7-pawn. Black is so far back in
development that the tourna-
ment practice has shown that his
defence is extremely problem-
atic.

13...\(\text{d}7\)

Black’s defence is not any
easier after: 13...\(\text{g}7\) 14.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{e}7\)
15.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{c}6\) 16.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}8\), Ilic –
Gajic, Caorle 1989, because here
White could have continued with
the straightforward line: 17.\(\text{f}5\) \(\text{f}6\)
18.\(\text{f}4\) – and Black has practi-
cally no useful moves left, since
it would not work for him to fol-
low with 18...\(\text{f}7\), at least be-
cause of: 19.\(\text{e}6\) gxf5 (or 19...\(\text{e}5\)
20.\(\text{xc}8\) \(\text{fxc}8\) 21.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 22.
fxg6\(+\)) 20.\(\text{d}5\)\(+\).

Black cannot reach any origi-
nal positions with the move 13...\(\text{c}7\), Wallis – Landau, Bour-
nemmouth 1939, 14.f4 \( \text{c}6 \text{-- see} \) 13...\( \text{c}6 \), or 14...\( \text{d}7 \text{-- see} \) 13...\( \text{d}7 \).

He has more often played: 13...\( \text{c}6 \) 14.f4 and here:

14...\( \text{w}h5 \text{-- this is an attempt by Black to hamper White’s onslaught, by transferring the queen to the kingside, but it cannot change the evaluation of the position.} \) 15.\( \text{w}e1 \) (15.\( \text{g}3 \text{!?} \text{xd1} \) 16.\( \text{fxd1} \pm \)) 15...\( \text{e}6 \) 16.\( \text{g}3 \) (16.\( \text{xb1} \text{!?} \text{xd5} \) 17.\( \text{g}3 \pm \)) 16...\( \text{w}h4 \text{ 17.\( \text{f}2 \) (17.\( \text{xc}6 \text{ bxc6} \) 18.\( \text{e}3 \text{ c4 19.\( \text{f}2 \text{ w}e7 20.f5} \uparrow \)) 17...\( \text{ac8} \text{ 18.f5 \( \text{xd5} \text{ 19.exd5} \text{ e5 20.wf4} \text{ xf4 21.xf4 \( \text{d}3\text{∞ -- White’s play can easily be improved at several moments, Kramer – van} \) den Bosch, Amsterdam 1954; \) 14...\( \text{c7} \) 15.f5 \( \text{e}5 \) (Black’s position is very difficult too in case of: 15...\( \text{e}5 \) 16.\( \text{d}2 \text{ g4 17.\( \text{g}3 \pm \text{g}7? \) 18.\( \text{g}5 \text{ f6 19.\( \text{xg}6 \text{ fxg6 20.xf6} \text{ -- Nguyen Anh Dung – Goundar, Novi Sad 1990.} \) 16.\( \text{d}2 \text{ gxf5 17.\( \text{g}3 \text{ fxe4 18.ae1 \( \text{e}6 \text{ 19.\( \text{xe}4 \text{ ad8 20.wc1} \text{ d5} \) (Black has no squares for his queen: 20...\( \text{g}7 \text{ 21.\( \text{h}5} \uparrow \)) 21.\( \text{xd5} \text{ xd5 22.\( \text{h}6 \text{ 1-0 Dydyshko – Litvinov, Minsk 1980;} \) 14...\( \text{e}7 \) 15.\( \text{d}2 \) (Here after: 15.f5 \( \text{e}5 \) 16.\( \text{d}2 \), Black has the active possibility 16...\( \text{wh4}. \)) 15...\( \text{e}6 \) 16.f5 \( \text{xd5} \text{ 17.exd5} \text{ fe8 18.\( \text{g}3 \text{ e5 19.ae1 \( \text{h}4 \text{ 20.e4} \) (It would have been better for White to have exchanged on g6 beforehand: 20.fxg6 fxg6 21.\( \text{e}4 \text{ d7 22.\( \text{d}6}\pm; 20...\text{hxg6 21.\( \text{e}4 \text{ f5 22.xc5}\pm; 21...\text{g7 22.d6} \text{h8 23.h3} \uparrow 20...\( \text{c4} \text{ c4 21.wc2} \text{ e5} \) (Black had to play here: 21...\( \text{gxf5} \text{ 22.g3 \( \text{h6 23.xf5} \text{ e3 24.xf6+} \text{ xf6 25.xe3} \uparrow 22.fxg6 \text{ hxg6 23.\( \text{d}3 \text{ b5 24.\( \text{f6+} \text{ g7 25.\( \text{xe5} \text{ xe5 26.\( \text{e}3=– Graf – Anev, Chania 1997.} \) 14.f4 \( \text{e}7 \) After 14...\( \text{c7} \) 15.c4 \( \text{b6} \) 16.\( \text{c3} \text{ d8 17.\( \text{f3} \text{ h4 18.e5} \text{ g4 19.\( \text{e}3 \text{ xd5 20.cxd5} \text{ b6 21.\( \text{e}4=– White’s positional advantage is overwhelming, Bars – Fahrbach, Germany 1996.} \) 15.c4 \( \text{b6} \) Or 15...\( \text{f6} \) 16.\( \text{c3} \text{ d8, Babur – Katki, corr. 1954, 17.e5} \text{ g4 18.\( \text{f3=–.} \) 16.a3 \( \text{e6} \) 17.wd3 \( \text{e}8 \) 18.ac8 \( \text{d7 20.\( \text{g}3 \text{ ad8 19.a5} \text{ d7} \) 20.g3 \( \text{f6 21.\( \text{ae1} \text{ xd5 22.cxd5} \text{ c4 23.\( \text{f2} \text{ g4 24.\( \text{d4} \text{ f6 25.e5=– Ilic – Anic, Caorle 1987.} \) 18.a4 \( \text{ac8} \text{ e5 19.a5} \text{ d8 20.\( \text{g}3 \text{ c7 21.f5} \text{ xd5} 22.\text{exd5} \) Black’s pieces are extremely passive, his f6-square is weak and White can organize an attack against his king at any moment. In the game Gligoric – Wexler, Buenos Aires 1960, there}} \)
followed: 22...\(\text{\#e8} 23.\text{\#f6} \text{\#d6} 24.\text{\#g5} \text{h6} 25.\text{\#xh6} \text{\#xf6} 26.\text{\#b5} \text{\#e5} 27.\text{\#ae1} \text{\#b2} 28.\text{\#f4} \text{a6} 29.\text{\#b1} \text{\#c2} 30.\text{\#a7} - and Black resigned.

\textbf{d2) 9...\#d7}

Contrary to the main lines Black now places his knight to a passive position on d7, instead of to an active position on c6. He plans to develop his queenside in the following fashion – a6, b5, \#b7 and later to try to undermine White's pawn centre with e7-e6, or e7-e5 (in case White plays d4-d5). This plan is too complex and too long and meanwhile Black does not exert any pressure against White's pawn centre in the process.

\textbf{10.\#g5}

This move is considered presently to be the best and it was played for the first time in the game Bronstein – Botvinnik, Moscow (m/2) 1951. Black plans to take his queen to the queenside (usually to the c7 square) and so he must play h6 in order to avoid the attack against the e7-pawn, weakening his king in the process even more.

White’s task to fight for an advantage after 10.\#e3, is much harder for example: 10...\#c7 11.\#c1 (It is ineffective for White to play 11.\#c1 b6 12.e5 e6 13.\#g3 \#b7 14.f3 a6 15.a4 \#c6 16.\#e4 b5 17.axb5 axb5 18.\#d3 c4 19.\#b1 \#xe4 20.\#xe4 \#a3 21.\#d2 f5 22.\#xf6 \#xf6=) Ilivitzki – Averbakh, Tula 1950, and Black was completely safe, or 11...\#b8 12.\#b3 e6 13.f4 c4 14.\#c2 \#a5 15.g4, Schoen – Gutman, New York 1987, and now Black had the quite standard reaction: 15...f5!? with a sufficient counterplay.) 11...b6 12.\#f4 e6 13.d5 \#e5 (After 13...e5 White has a positional pawn sacrifice aimed at piece domination: 14.d6!?? \#b8 (The game Rovner – Tolush, USSR 1947, continued with: 14...\#xd6 15.\#d1 \#b8 16.\#d5 b5 17.\#b1 a6 18.a4 and White's initiative was very powerful and he was about to regain his pawn at any moment. Black played the move 16...b5 quite prematurely indeed, it would have been better for him to have tried 16...\#d6 instead, but even then White would have had a full compensation for the pawn.) 15.\#d5 \#xd6 16.\#g5 \#b8 17.\#d1 \#h8 18.\#e7 \#e8 19.\#b5 \#b7 20.\#b1= Tolush – Kotov, Moscow 1948. Black has no sensible moves left.) 14.\#e2 c4 (otherwise White will play c4.) 15.\#d4 \#e8 16.dxe6 fxe6 17.\#e3 \#b7 18.\#ad1 \#c6
19.f3 b5∞ and the game was unclear, Borisenko – Lilienthal, Tula 1950.

10...h6
10...c7?! – This is a bad move, after which Black either loses material, or his position remains very passive. 11.\textit{\textasciitilde}xe7 \textit{\textasciitilde}e8 (After 11...cxd4 12.\textit{\textasciitilde}xf8 \textit{\textasciitilde}xf8 13.\textit{\textasciitilde}b3 dxc3 14.\textit{\textasciitilde}c1+ – Black remains an exchange down without any compensation whatsoever.) 12.d5! (Now Black cannot capture the bishop due to the fork.) 12...\textit{\textasciitilde}e5. This is the only move that enables Black to preserve the material equality. (It is too bad for him to try: 12...\textit{\textasciitilde}f8 13.\textit{\textasciitilde}xf8 \textit{\textasciitilde}xf8 14.d3+ Garcia Vicente – Emberger, corr. 1981.) 13.d6 \textit{\textasciitilde}xe4 (In case of: 13...\textit{\textasciitilde}b6, Eidenfeldt – Brask, corr. 1955, White’s simplest line is: 14.b5 \textit{\textasciitilde}d7 15.dxe7 dxe7 16.a4 \textit{\textasciitilde}b6 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}c2+ – and Black has problems regaining his pawn.) 14.\textit{\textasciitilde}d5 \textit{\textasciitilde}f5 15.\textit{\textasciitilde}g3 \textit{\textasciitilde}f4 16.\textit{\textasciitilde}e1! \textit{\textasciitilde}xc3 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}e2 (In the game Hejdul – Foglar, corr. 1955, White organized a direct attack with: 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}e4 \textit{\textasciitilde}d2 18.\textit{\textasciitilde}xf7 – this decision is somewhat dubious – 18...\textit{\textasciitilde}xf7 19.\textit{\textasciitilde}f3+ \textit{\textasciitilde}g8 20.\textit{\textasciitilde}d1 \textit{\textasciitilde}c2? 21.c4 \textit{\textasciitilde}e5 22.\textit{\textasciitilde}d5+ \textit{\textasciitilde}g7 23.\textit{\textasciitilde}xc3! \textit{\textasciitilde}xc3 24.\textit{\textasciitilde}e4 \textit{\textasciitilde}b2 25.\textit{\textasciitilde}f6+ \textit{\textasciitilde}h6 26.\textit{\textasciitilde}xc5 \textit{\textasciitilde}e2 27.\textit{\textasciitilde}c1+ and Black resigned in view of the unavoidable checkmate. He had to play instead 20...\textit{\textasciitilde}b2∞ and the position would have been rather unclear.) 17...\textit{\textasciitilde}e5 18.cxc3 \textit{\textasciitilde}xc3 19.\textit{\textasciitilde}c1± – Black’s extra pawn is completely immaterial, due to his enormous lag in development and his vulnerable dark squares.

10...cxd4 11.cxd4 \textit{\textasciitilde}b6 12.\textit{\textasciitilde}b3 \textit{\textasciitilde}g4 13.f3 \textit{\textasciitilde}d7 14.\textit{\textasciitilde}b1 \textit{\textasciitilde}c6 15.\textit{\textasciitilde}d2 (White should have tried here the move 15.a4, in order to deprive Black’s bishop of the b5-square and to create the threat – a4-a5 at the same time. He would have achieved a great advantage then, for example: 15...h6 16.\textit{\textasciitilde}e3; or 15...a5 16.d5 \textit{\textasciitilde}e8 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}e3†; or 15...\textit{\textasciitilde}d7 16.a5; or 15...a6 16.d5 \textit{\textasciitilde}e8 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}e3† – and Black’s position is rather cramped.) 15...\textit{\textasciitilde}d7 16.\textit{\textasciitilde}fd1 (After 16.d5 \textit{\textasciitilde}b5 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}fd1 \textit{\textasciitilde}c4 18.\textit{\textasciitilde}b4 \textit{\textasciitilde}d6 – Black improved the placement of his knight and he had a quite acceptable game: 19.\textit{\textasciitilde}d4 \textit{\textasciitilde}fc8 20.\textit{\textasciitilde}bc1 \textit{\textasciitilde}xc1 21.\textit{\textasciitilde}xc1 a5 22.\textit{\textasciitilde}d2 a4 23.\textit{\textasciitilde}d1 \textit{\textasciitilde}c4 24.\textit{\textasciitilde}f2 \textit{\textasciitilde}c6 25.\textit{\textasciitilde}e2 \textit{\textasciitilde}c8∞ Witschel – Behrmann, Email 1996.) 16...\textit{\textasciitilde}b5 (16...\textit{\textasciitilde}fc8 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}c3; 16...a4 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}xa4 \textit{\textasciitilde}xa4 18.\textit{\textasciitilde}b4±) 17.\textit{\textasciitilde}c3 \textit{\textasciitilde}c4± and White’s advantage is only minimal.

10...\textit{\textasciitilde}f6 11.f3 (It is much more energetic for White to continue with: 11.e5 \textit{\textasciitilde}d5 12.
\( \text{xd}5 \text{\texttt{xd}5 13.e\texttt{xe}7 e\texttt{e}8 14.\texttt{d}6\pm, because Black's compensation for the pawn is insufficient, while in case of 11...\texttt{d}d7, he can simply play: 12.\texttt{b}3\uparrow \) and it becomes obvious that Black has lost too much time on knight-maneuvers.) 11...\texttt{cxd}4 12.\texttt{cxd}4 h6 13.e\texttt{e}3 e6 14.e\texttt{d}2 h7 15.e\texttt{ac}1 b6 16.e\texttt{f}4 e\texttt{e}7?! (Instead, Black should have completed his development first: 16...\texttt{b}7 17.e\texttt{fd}1\pm) 17.e5 e\texttt{e}8 18.e\texttt{d}3 \texttt{b}7 19.e\texttt{h}5?! (In the game Zhukova – Petrenko, Elista 2004, there followed: 19.e\texttt{c}3 c\texttt{c}7 20.e\texttt{c}2 – 20.e\texttt{f}1 \texttt{d}5 21.e\texttt{xd}5 e\texttt{d}5 22.e\texttt{c}7 a3 – 20...\texttt{d}5 21.e\texttt{xg}6 – so Black did not capture the piece and lost the game, meanwhile the consequences of the line: 21...fxg6 22.e\texttt{xg}6 e\texttt{xe}3 23.e\texttt{xe}3 e\texttt{f}c8 24.\texttt{x}c8 e\texttt{f}7 25.e\texttt{c}2 e\texttt{g}6 were far from clear...) 19...e\texttt{h}4 (19...d\texttt{d}8 20.e\texttt{c}3\pm) 20.e\texttt{xg}7 e\texttt{xg}7 21.e\texttt{c}7 \texttt{d}5 22.e\texttt{f}c1\pm – Black’s kingside is quite vulnerable without the dark-squared bishop, while White will counter 22...\texttt{f}5 with 23.g3 \texttt{wh}5 (or 23...e\texttt{d}8 24.e\texttt{xf}5 e\texttt{xf}5 25.e\texttt{xh}6 e\texttt{h}8 26.e\texttt{g}5\pm) 24.e\texttt{g}4 \texttt{wh}3 25.e\texttt{gf}5 e\texttt{xf}3 26.e\texttt{g}6+ \texttt{g}8 27.e\texttt{xf}7+ e\texttt{xf}7 28.e\texttt{xf}7+-.

Black fails to equalize too after: 10...\texttt{b}6 11.e\texttt{b}3 \texttt{c}7 (11...c4 12.e\texttt{c}2 \texttt{c}7 13.e\texttt{d}2 e6 14.f3. This move is not necessary. White should better go to g3 with the knight immediately. 14...d\texttt{d}7 15.e5 b6 16.e\texttt{g}3\pm – The dark squares on Black's kingside are extremely vulnerable. Later, in the game Corinthios – Moreira, corr. 1971, there followed: 16...d\texttt{d}5 17.e\texttt{e}4 b6 18.e\texttt{f}6+ e\texttt{xf}6 19.e\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{h}8 20.e\texttt{f}4 e\texttt{d}7 21.e\texttt{e}4 \texttt{b}7 22.e\texttt{e}5 d\texttt{d}5 23.e\texttt{g}5 e\texttt{d}8 24.\texttt{xd}5 ex\texttt{d}5 25.f4\rightarrow and White's attack was running smoothly and unopposed, or 12...f5 13.e\texttt{d}2 fxe\texttt{e}4 14.e\texttt{xe}4 e\texttt{c}7 15.e\texttt{g}3 e\texttt{f}5 16.e\texttt{xf}5 gxf5 17.e\texttt{h}5 e\texttt{f}7 18.e\texttt{f}1\pm – and Black had numerous weaknesses in his camp to worry about in the game Taboada – Dunn, corr 1999.) 12.e\texttt{d}2 e5 (Black only loses time after: 12...e\texttt{h}8 13.e\texttt{h}6 e\texttt{d}7 14.e\texttt{g}7+ e\texttt{g}7 15.e\texttt{g}5 (15.e\texttt{g}3?!?) 15...c4 16.e\texttt{c}2 e6 17.e\texttt{e}3 e5 18.f4 e\texttt{e}8 19.d\texttt{xe}5 fxe\texttt{e}5 20.f5 e\texttt{c}6 21.e\texttt{g}3 e\texttt{c}8, Taborska – Kolar, Klatovy 2002 and here it deserved attention for White to follow with 22.e\texttt{ad}1!?\pm and Black’s position would have been very passive. He should have tried instead 12...e\texttt{e}8!?, with the idea to prevent the exchange of the dark-squared bishops, 13.e\texttt{ad}1\pm Letelier – Eliskases, Mar del Plata 1951.) 12...e5 13.e\texttt{d}1 e\texttt{e}8 14.d5 (White does not achieve much by closing the centre. It is much better for him to continue with: 14.d\texttt{xe}5 e\texttt{xe}5 15.f3\pm) 14...c4 15.e\texttt{c}2 e\texttt{d}7. Black thus manages to deploy his knight on the wonderful d6-square and White’s task to maintain an advantage becomes very hard. In the game M.Socko – Petrenko, Leon 2001 there followed: 16.h4 (It is not good for White to play instead
16.f4 h6 17.\h4 exf4.) 16...\c8
17.h5 \d6 18.h6 \h8 19.f4 \c5+ 20.\h1 exf4 21.\xf4 f5 22.\xf5
\xf5 23.\xf5 \xf5 24.\g4 \e5 – the sacrifice on f5 is fruitless
and Black’s position is quite acceptable.

It is evident that White had to play 13.\h6 instead and
Black’s best defence against that is: 13...\e8 14.\xg7 \xg7 15.
\e3 \f4, but White preserves his initiative, because it is too
dangerous for Black to try: 13...
\xh6 14.\xh6 \e8 15.f4→, for
example: 15...exd4 16.f5 gxf5 17.
\xf3 \xe4 (or 17...\e5 18.\g3+
\h8 19.\xf7 \d8 20.\f4++) 18.
\f4→.

11.\e3

11...\c7

In case of 11...\a5 12.\b1
\b6 13.\b3 cxd4 14.cxd4 \d7
15.\f4 e6 16.\e1 \ac8 White
organizes the pawn break 17.d5 with an advantage Chekhov –
F.Aguado, Barcelona 1984.
11...\b6 12.\b3 cxd4 13.cxd4
\g4 14.f3 \d7 15.\d2 \b5
16.\fe1 (White achieves only a
draw with: 16.\xh6 \xh6 17.
\xh6 \xe2 18.\xg6+ \h8=; but
it deserves attention for him to continue with 16.\ac1?) 16...
\e4 17.\xc4 \ac4 18.\ac1 b5 –
Black counterplay is sufficient,
Beland – Vinkes, email 1999.
White could have prevented
Black’s pieces from activating
with the help of: 16.\d2 \h7
17.\b4, threatening a4-a5 and
Black’s compensation for the
pawn is only miniscule: 17...a5
18.\a5 \c4 19.\xd8 \fxd8 20.
\f2→) 16.\d2 \h7 17.\fc1 –
Black’s knight is just miserably
placed on the b6-square.

12.\c1

Black should neutralize pos-
sible threats to the g6-point and
so he has to repel the bishop and
play c4. His pressure against
White’s centre disappears then
and White has a free hand to act
against Black’s kingside.

12...\a6

The other possibility was
12...\b8 13.\f4 b5 14.\b3 c4
15.\c2 \d8 16.\f3 \b7 17.\h3
e5 18.\e2 h5 19.f4→ and White
had excellent prospects to attack
Black’s weakened kingside in the
game Murey – Gutman, Holon
1986. The game followed with:
19...exd4 20.\xd4 (It seemed
purposeful for White to prevent
the appearance of the black
knight on the d3-square with the
move 20.cxd4?; with the idea to
proceed with f4-f5, for example:
20...\f6 21.f5→; or 20...\e8 21.
f5 and if 21...\xe4, then 22.\f4
\d8 23.\xb8→) 20...\c8 (Black
preserved greater possibilities of
organizing some counterplay after: 20...\( \text{	exttt{c}} \text{c5} \) 21.e5 – 21.\( \text{\texttt{c}} \text{xb5} \) \( \text{\texttt{w}} \text{e7} \) – 21...\( \text{\texttt{d}} \text{d3} \) 22.\( \text{\texttt{b}} \text{b1} \) 21.\( \text{\texttt{h}} \text{h4} \) \( \text{\texttt{e}} \text{e8} \) 22.h3 (22.e5!? ) 22...\( \text{\texttt{b}} \text{b6} \) 23.e5 \( \text{\texttt{c}} \text{c5} \) 24.\( \text{\texttt{f}} \text{f2} \) b4 (It is preferable for Black to play here: 24...\( \text{\texttt{d}} \text{d3} \) 25.\( \text{\texttt{c}} \text{xd3} \) cxd3 26.\( \text{\texttt{d}} \text{d2} \)) 25.\( \text{\texttt{f}} \text{f5} \) gxf5 26.\( \text{\texttt{c}} \text{xc5} \) \( \text{\texttt{a}} \text{a6} \) 27.\( \text{\texttt{d}} \text{d6} \) (27.cxb4 \( \text{\texttt{x}} \text{xa2} \) 28.\( \text{\texttt{a}} \text{a1} \) \( \text{\texttt{xa1}} \) 29.\( \text{\texttt{xa1}} \) a6 30.\( \text{\texttt{d}} \text{d4} \) – ) 27...\( \text{\texttt{d}} \text{d8} \) 28.\( \text{\texttt{d}} \text{d1} \) \( \text{\texttt{xd6}} \) 29.exd6 \( \text{\texttt{xd6}} \) 30.\( \text{\texttt{a4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{e4}} \) 31.\( \text{\texttt{cd1}} \) \( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) 32.cxb4 – Black’s compensation for the exchange is evidently insufficient.

The move 12...\( \text{\texttt{b}} \text{b6} \), just like on move 11, provides White with a clear edge: 13.\( \text{\texttt{b}} \text{b3} \) c4 14.\( \text{\texttt{c}} \text{c2} \) \( \text{\texttt{d7}} \) 15.\( \text{\texttt{d2}} \) \( \text{\texttt{h7}} \) 16.\( \text{\texttt{g3}} \) e6 17.e5↑. This move opens the b1-h7 diagonal for the bishop on c2 and creates the threat to continue with \( \text{\texttt{h5}} \) in the future. Later, in the game Juergens – Bilo, Detmold 1960, Black’s kingside was crushed: 17...\( \text{\texttt{d}} \text{d5} \) 18.\( \text{\texttt{fe1}} \) \( \text{\texttt{xe3}} \) 19.\( \text{\texttt{xe3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{d8}} \) 20.\( \text{\texttt{h5}} \) \( \text{\texttt{g5}} \) 21.\( \text{\texttt{e2}} \) \( \text{\texttt{ac8}} \) 22.f4 \( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) 23.\( \text{\texttt{g4}} \) \( \text{\texttt{h8}} \) (Black had better defend with: 23...\( \text{\texttt{h8}} \) 24.\( \text{\texttt{g3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{g8}} \) (It was just necessary for Black to fight on with: 24...\( \text{\texttt{h8}} \) 25.\( \text{\texttt{xg6}} \) \( \text{\texttt{fxg6}} \) 26.\( \text{\texttt{xg6}} \) \( \text{\texttt{f8}} \) 27.\( \text{\texttt{xg7}} \) + \( \text{\texttt{xg7}} \) 28.\( \text{\texttt{xg7}} \) – and White won.

13.\( \text{\texttt{d2}} \)

According to D.Bronstein, White’s best move here is 13.\( \text{\texttt{f4}} \), threatening to capture on g6 already. Black cannot play 13...b5 because of 14.\( \text{\texttt{d5}} \) – and the rook on a8 is hanging contrary to the game Murey – Gutman, Holon 1986.

13...\( \text{\texttt{h7}} \) 14.\( \text{\texttt{d3}} \) b5

The game Bronstein – Botvinnik, Moscow (m/2) 1951, continued with 15.\( \text{\texttt{f4}} \) e5 16.\( \text{\texttt{d5}} \) \( \text{\texttt{d6}} \) 17.dxc5 \( \text{\texttt{xc5}} \) 18.c4 \( \text{\texttt{xd3}} \) 19.\( \text{\texttt{xd3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{d8}} \) 20.c5 (it was better for White to play 20.\( \text{\texttt{fd1}} \) ) 20...\( \text{\texttt{c6}} \) 21.\( \text{\texttt{fd1}} \) \( \text{\texttt{e6}} \) 22.\( \text{\texttt{d2}} \) \( \text{\texttt{d7}} \) 23.\( \text{\texttt{cd1}} \) a5↑ and Black had a sufficient counterplay on the queenside.

White had to play instead 15.e5!? (recommended by D. Bronstein) or 15.f4!?↑ – and he would have preserved some initiative on the kingside in both cases.
Chapter 5

1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 g6 3.♘c3 d5 4.cxd5 ♘xd5 5.e4 ♘xc3 6.bxc3 ♗g7 7.♗c4 c5 8.♗e2 ♗c6 9.♗e3

9...cxd4

We are going to analyse in this chapter lines dealing with early attempts by Black to create counterplay against White’s uncastled king with the idea to disrupt the coordination of his pieces.

The other possibilities, with the exception of 9...0–0, as a rule, only transpose to positions that we are going to analyze in our next chapters:

In case of 9...♗a5 10.♗d3 cxd4 11.cxd4 0–0 12.0–0 – see Chapters 9-10;

After 9...e6 10.0–0 (following 10.d5 ♘e5 11.♗xc5 ♘xc4 12.♗a4+ ♘d7 13.♕xc4, Lyubimov – Willemie, corr. 1998, 13...♗c8 14.♗b4 a5 15.♗a3 ♗c7 16.♗d4 e5 17.♗e3 ♗c4=, Black could have prevented White from castling and he would have some compensation for the pawn, because of his couple of powerful bishops.) 10...0–0 11.♕d2 – see Chapter 7, variation c3;

Or 9...♕a5 10.0–0 0–0 (It is a mistake for Black to play 10...b5?, because of 11.♗d5 ♘b7 12.♗xc6+ ♘xc6 13.d5 ♕d8 14.♕c2 ♘b7 15.♗xc5 ♕c8, Bosch – Sergent, Bethune 2001 and here White’s simplest line would be: 16.♗d4 ♘xd4 17.♗xd4+-) 11.♕b1!, or 10...cxd4 11.cxd4 0–0 12.♕b1 – see Chapter 7, variation c1;

The line 9...♕c7 10.♗c1 0–0 11.0–0, transposes to Chapters 11-12, while the variation: 9...♗g4 10.f3 ♘d7 (10...♗a5?? 11.fxg4 ♘xc4 12.♕a4+– Jardin – Gilardi, Val Maubuee 1989) 11.0–0 0–0 leads to positions analyzed in Chapter 14.

10.cxd4 b5

About 10...♕a5 – see Chapter 6, while about 10...0–0 11.0–0 – see Chapters 8-10.

Black transposes to Chapters 9-10 with the variation: 10...♗a5
11. \( \text{d}3 \) (In case of the careless line: 11. \( \text{b}5+?! \text{d}7 \) 12. \( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{c}6= \) H.Schneider – Freitag, Weiler 1993, White loses all his chances to obtain any opening advantage.) 11...0–0 12.0–0, while 10...\( \text{g}4 \) 11.\( \text{f}3 \) d7 (Black cannot play 11...\( \text{a}5?? \) before castling, because of 12.fxg4 \( \text{xc}4 \) 13.\( \text{a}4+ \text{d}7 \) 14.\( \text{xc}4+- \) B.Rogers – Owens, Lansing 1987.) 12.0–0 0–0 13.\( \text{b}1 \) is dealt with in Chapter 14.

11. \( \text{d}5 \)

The tactical complications after 11.\( \text{x}b5 \) \( \text{a}5+ \) 12.\( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{xc}3+ \) 13.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{xd}4 \) 14.\( \text{xc}6+ \) \( \text{d}7 \) 15.\( \text{x}a8 \) \( \text{xa}1 \) 16.\( \text{xa}1 \) \( \text{xa}1= \) lead to an absolutely equal position.

In case of 11.\( \text{b}3 \) Black can play 11...0–0 12.0–0 (the line 12.\( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 13.0–0 just transposes to the same position) 12...\( \text{a}5 \) (it is less precise for Black to play 12...\( \text{b}7 \) due to 13.d5 \( \text{a}5 \) 14.\( \text{d}4\pm \) 13.\( \text{c}1 \) (White does not achieve anything after 13.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 14.\( \text{xb}7 \) \( \text{xb}7 \) 15.\( \text{b}3 \) a6 16.\( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{a}5 \), because Black can counter 17.\( \text{c}4 \) with 17...\( \text{c}6= \), and if 17.\( \text{d}3 \), then 17...\( \text{c}4= \) 13...e6 (after 13...\( \text{a}6?! \) 14.d5 b4 15.e1 \( \text{xb}3 \) 16.\( \text{xb}3 \) \( \text{xe}2 \) 17.\( \text{xe}2 \) a5 18.\( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 19.\( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 20.\( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{c}3 \) 21.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{xd}2 \) 22.\( \text{xd}2\pm \) in the game Pachman – Jimenez, Havana 1967, White occupied the c-file. He preserves better chances after 13...\( \text{b}7 \) 14.d5\pm, as well as after 13...\( \text{g}4 \) 14.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{xb}3 \) 15.\( \text{xb}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 16.d5\pm) 14.d5 \( \text{xb}3 \)

15.\( \text{xb}3 \) exd5 16.exd5 16...\( \text{d}7? \) (16...a5?! is insufficient for Black due to 17.\( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 18.\( \text{d}4 \pm, but Black can play instead 16...a6 17.\( \text{fd}1 \) \( \text{g}4 \) 18.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 19.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 20.\( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{h}4 \) 21.\( \text{f}2 \) \( \text{g}5= \) as in the game Donchenko – V.Kozlov, Vladivostok 1990) 17.\( \text{d}4 \) (if 17.\( \text{d}4 \), Black can play 17...\( \text{h}6! \) 18.\( \text{cd}1 \) \( \text{e}8\circ \) and avoid the trade of the dark-squared bishops) 17...a6 18.\( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{h}4\pm \) with a rather complicated game.

11...\( \text{d}7 \)

But not 11...\( \text{b}7?! \) because of 12.\( \text{b}3\pm \).

12.\( \text{c}1 \)

White has also played here 12.0–0 0–0 13.\( \text{d}2 \) (it is still not too late for White to transpose to the main line with 13.\( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{c}8 \)), but after 13...e6 14.\( \text{xc}6 \) \( \text{xc}6 \) 15.f3 by playing 15...\( \text{c}8 \) (after 15...a5 in the game Naumkin – Baikov, Moscow 1992, with the help of 16.\( \text{ac}1! \) \( \text{c}8 \) 17.\( \text{h}6\pm \) White could have achieved some edge) 16.\( \text{ac}1 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 17.\( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{xd}6 \) 18.\( \text{xd}6 \) b4= Black could have equalized.

12...\( \text{c}8 \) 13.0–0

This is the universally ac-
cepted order of moves, but possibly White should better play: 13.\textit{xc6}!? \textit{xc6} 14.\textit{xc6} \textit{xc6} 15.d5 \textit{d7} 16.\textit{d2}! (In case of 16.0–0 \textit{a5}!, Black has no problems at all after: 17.\textit{d2} \textit{xd2} 18.\textit{xd2} 0–0 19.\textit{c1} \textit{c8} 20.\textit{xc8+} \textit{xc8}= Sapi – Juhasz, Hungary 1992, as well as after: 17.\textit{b3} 0–0 18.\textit{c1} \textit{c8} 19.\textit{xc8+} \textit{xc8}= Papp – Khechumyan, Budapest 1999.) 16...a5 (There is another way for Black to transpose to the main line – 16...0–0 17.0–0 a5, because here after 17...f5?! and 18.\textit{xa7} fxe4 19.\textit{d4} \textit{xd4} 20.\textit{xd4} \textit{a5} 21.\textit{a1} \textit{f5} 22.h3\textpm Grosso – Pena Gomez, corr. 2000, Black was left with numerous pawn-weaknesses to worry about.) 17.0–0 (The exchange of the bishops – 17.\textit{d4} \textit{xd4} 18.\textit{xd4}, following 18...0–0 19.0–0 b4 20.\textit{c1} \textit{b6} 21.e5 a4 22.e6 fxe6 23.dxe6 \textit{c8}\textsuperscript{\texttt{Q}} Quiroga – Lambrakis, corr. 1999, led to a position in which Black preserved some counterplay, which was enough to keep the balance. Capturing with the queen – 18.\textit{xd4} after 18...0–0 19.0–0 \textit{b8}!, was also good enough to equalize.) 17...0–0 18.\textit{c1} and later just like in the text of the main line. In case White exchanges on \textit{c6} before castling – he reduces Black’s choice considerably.

13...0–0

It is too risky to play 13...e6?!., because after 14.\textit{xc6} \textit{xc6} 15.\textit{xc6} \textit{xc6} 16.d5 exd5 17.\textit{c2}! \textit{d7} 18.\textit{c5→} in the game Spassky – Witkowski, Riga 1959, Black’s king was stranded in the centre and White had a strong attack.

After 13...\textit{a5} 14.\textit{xc8} \textit{xc8} (the other capture – 14...\textit{xc8} after 15.a4 \textit{a6}, Krug – Heidl, Hessen 1998, 16.axb5 \textit{xb5} 17.\textit{e1} 0–0 18.\textit{c3} \textit{c6} 19.\textit{a2} e6 20.\textit{d2\textpm} leaves White with better chances too) 15.\textit{d2} \textit{d8} (after 15...\textit{c4} 16.\textit{xc4} bxc4 17.\textit{b4\textpm} Black loses a pawn; following 15...\textit{a6} Dussol – Zarrouati, France 1989, it is very good for White to play: 16.\textit{b4→} and Black will have problems to castle, because he must take care about the defence of his e7-pawn, for example: 16...\textit{c6} 17.\textit{c5} 0–0 18.\textit{c1} \textit{c8} 19.\textit{xc6} \textit{xc6} 20.d5\textpm 16.\textit{g5}! h6 (in case of 16...0–0 17.\textit{xe7} \textit{xe7} 18.\textit{xa5}\textpm Black again remains a pawn down) 17.\textit{e3} e6 18.\textit{b3} \textit{c6} 19.d5?! (White can also play here 19.f3?! h5 20.d5\textup{ with a powerful initiative} 19...exd5 20.\textit{c5\texttt{Q}} in the game Piskov – Krasenkow, Moscow 1989, Black had problems to castle safely.

It looks like a loss of time for Black to play here: 13...a5. After 14.\textit{xc6}?! (in answer to 14.\textit{b3}, in the game Barber – Jones, corr. 1994, Black had to continue with: 14...0–0\textsuperscript{\texttt{Q}} 14...\textit{xc6} 15.\textit{xc6} \textit{xc6} 16.d5 \textit{d7}, it is worth testing in practice the line: 17.\textit{d4}?! (about 17.\textit{d2} 0–0 – see 13...0–0) 17...0–0 18.\textit{g7} \textit{g7}
Chapter 5

19.\textjadi d4+ \textjadi g8 20.\textjadi a7 b4 21.\textjadi c1± and White’s pieces penetrate easily his opponents camp.

14.\textjadi xc6

White concedes the bishop pair advantage to Black in order to seize the initiative on the queenside and in the centre. As the game Grigorian – Chekhov, USSR 1976, showed after 14.\textjadi d2 \textjadi a5 15.\textjadi b2 e6 16.\textjadi b3 \textjadi b4= Black’s task is much simpler.

14...\textjadi xc6

Black should not avoid the trade of a pair of rooks. In case of 14...\textjadi xc6 White can play 15.d5 \textjadi d7 (After 15...\textjadi b7 16.\textjadi xa7 \textjadi a8 17.\textjadi d4 \textjadi xa2 18.\textjadi c3 \textjadi a5 19.\textjadi xg7 \textjadi xg7 20.\textjadi d4+ \textjadi g8 21.\textjadi fd1 \textjadi a8 22.\textjadi b1±, Black’s b5-pawn is very weak, Knaus – Francisco, corr. 1999.) 16.\textjadi xa7 \textjadi a8 (After 16...\textjadi a5 due to the fact that Black did not exchange a pair of rooks he would need to consider the line 17.\textjadi c5!? \textjadi xa2 18.\textjadi xe7 \textjadi fe8 and now after 19.\textjadi xc8 \textjadi xc8 20.d6 \textjadi d7 21.\textjadi f4 b4 22.\textjadi d5± White gets a clear advantage because the threat 23.\textjadi b6 is very unpleasant for Black.) 17.\textjadi d4 \textjadi xa2 18.\textjadi xg7 \textjadi xg7 19.\textjadi d4+ \textjadi g8 20.\textjadi c3 \textjadi a6 21.e5 \textjadi b6 22.\textjadi b4± and in the game Campos Moreno – Santos Santos, Spain 2001, White had a great advantage.

15.\textjadi xc6 \textjadi xc6 16.d5 \textjadi d7 17.\textjadi d2

Contrary to the line that we analysed in our notes to Black’s move 14, the capture of the pawn 17.\textjadi xa7 is hardly productive for White. After 17...\textjadi a5 18.\textjadi d4 (the line 18.\textjadi c5 \textjadi xa2 19.\textjadi xe7 \textjadi e8 20.d6 b4 21.\textjadi f4 is not effective, because of 21...b3 22.\textjadi d5 b2= Black’s passed b-pawn gives him a powerful counterplay and White does not have 23.\textjadi b6? due to 23...\textjadi b5=) 18.\textjadi a2 19.\textjadi xg7 \textjadi xg7 20.\textjadi d4+ \textjadi g8 21.\textjadi f4 (In case of 21.\textjadi c1, Nagel – Barth, Wiesbaden 2000, Black should strive to enter an endgame with: − 21...\textjadi a4?!=) 21...\textjadi c4!? (after 21...\textjadi a8?! White has the powerful reply 22.d6±, but Black can play instead 21...\textjadi a4!? which leads after 22.\textjadi e5 \textjadi e8 23.d6 \textjadi xd6 24.\textjadi xd6 \textjadi e6= to an equal position) 22.\textjadi xc4 \textjadi xc4 23.\textjadi c1 \textjadi c8 24.\textjadi f1 \textjadi g7 (after 24...c3 25.\textjadi e2± as in the game S.Kiselev – Baikov, Moscow 1990, the c-pawn is only causing trouble for Black) 25.\textjadi e1 \textjadi f6= and Black’s chances are at least equal.

17...\textjadi a5 18.\textjadi c1

White occupies the c-file with the rook in order to exploit the weakness of the c6-square later. The tentative move 18.a3 enables Black to play 18...f5!? (it is also possible to play the calmer 18...e6! 19.\textjadi d4 \textjadi xd5 20.\textjadi xd5 \textjadi a8 21.\textjadi b3 b4 22.\textjadi xb4 \textjadi xb4 23.\textjadi xb4 \textjadi xd5 24.\textjadi d2 \textjadi c6= as in the game Kalantarian – Baikov, Azov 1991) 19.\textjadi g3 \textjadi xe4 (It is weaker for Black to play 19...b4?! because after 20.\textjadi xb4 \textjadi xb4 in the game Anikaev – Lukin, Moscow 1990, with 21.
\[ \text{xb4 f4 22.\textcolor{red}{b}b6 \textcolor{red}{w}e8 23.\textcolor{red}{d}e2 f3 24.gxf3 \textcolor{red}{x}f3 25.\textcolor{red}{d}d4 e5 26.dxe6 \textcolor{red}{x}e6 27.\textcolor{red}{d}xg7 \textcolor{red}{x}g7 28.\textcolor{red}{d}d4= White could have achieved a great advantage.)} \]

\[ 19...\text{fxe4 20.\textcolor{red}{x}xe4 \textcolor{red}{f}5 21.\textcolor{red}{c}c5 b4 22.axb4 axb4 23.\textcolor{red}{x}xb4 \textcolor{red}{x}d5= and Black equalizes.} \]

The other possibility for White here is: \[ 18.\textcolor{red}{d}d4 e6 19.\textcolor{red}{c}c1 exd5 20.exd5 b4 21.h3 \textcolor{red}{e}e8 22.\textcolor{red}{c}c6 \textcolor{red}{x}c6 23.\textcolor{red}{x}xc6!?= (He obtains only a dead-even position with the variation: 23.\textcolor{red}{d}xc6 \textcolor{red}{x}d2 24.\textcolor{red}{d}xd2 \textcolor{red}{e}5= Sakaev – Najer, Sochi 2005.) and we reach a position, which is analogous to the one that we have analyzed in our notes to Black's move 21 in line b. \]

Presently, Black's attempts at creating some counterplay are connected with the variations a) \[ 18...\textcolor{red}{f}5 \] and b) \[ 18...b4. \]

In case of 18...e5 (with the idea to prevent White's knight from coming to the d4-square), Black should consider White's possibility 19.d6?. Now, it would be very difficult for Black to fight against his opponent's passed pawn, because his dark-squared bishop is restricted by his own e5-pawn.

\[ \text{a) 18...\textcolor{red}{f}5 19.\textcolor{red}{e}xf5} \]

White did not achieve anything after 19.\textcolor{red}{d}d4 \textcolor{red}{x}d4 (Black has also tried here 19...e5!? 20.\textcolor{red}{c}c5 \textcolor{red}{f}f7=) 20.\textcolor{red}{x}d4 \textcolor{red}{f}xe4 21.\textcolor{red}{g}3 \textcolor{red}{f}5= in the game Najer - V.Kozlov, Moscow 1999. The attempt to hold the centre with 19.f3 after 19...\textcolor{red}{f}xe4 20.\textcolor{red}{f}xe4 \textcolor{red}{e}5 (it was also possible for Black to play 20...e5!? 21.a3 \textcolor{red}{f}f7=) 21.\textcolor{red}{d}d4 (in case of 21.\textcolor{red}{d}d4 b4= like in the game Cramling – Sion Castro, Linares 1991, the prospects were about equal) 21...\textcolor{red}{b}b8 22.\textcolor{red}{x}xe5 \textcolor{red}{x}xe5 23.\textcolor{red}{d}d4 \textcolor{red}{g}5= M.Marin – Lalev, Berlin 1989, lead to an equality.

\[ 19...\textcolor{red}{x}f5 20.\textcolor{red}{c}c5 b4 21.\textcolor{red}{d}d4 \textcolor{red}{d}7 \]

The game Kuligowski – Maciejewski, Poznan 1976, reached that position. The prophylactic move \[ 22.h3!± \] (the abovementioned game continued 22.\textcolor{red}{c}c2 \textcolor{red}{e}5 23.\textcolor{red}{e}e4 \textcolor{red}{f}6 24.h3± with some edge for White) was ensuring a comfortable advantage for White.
b) 18...b4

19.\(\text{\textit{d4}}\)

It is not good for White to play 19.\(\text{\textit{d4}}\), because of 19...e5! 20.\(\text{\textit{c5}}\) (after 21.\(\text{\textit{e3}}\), P.Nielsen – Sutovsky, Reykjavik 2004, Black could have played the attractive line 21...\(\text{\textit{b8}}\)\(=\), with the idea to follow with 22...\(\text{\textit{c8}}\)\(=\) 20...\(\text{\textit{e8}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{g3}}\) \(\text{\textit{b8}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{f1}}\) \(\text{\textit{c8}}\)\(=\) Zilberstein – Lukin, USSR 1974 and Black’s position is at least equal.

19...e6

This counterstrike in the centre is absolutely necessary for Black; otherwise he might quickly fall into trouble. For example after: 19...\(\text{\textit{a8}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{c6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) \(\text{\textit{c8}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\) \(\text{\textit{b7}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{b5}}\)! (Black’s last rank is vulnerable now.) 23...\(\text{\textit{d7}}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{xc5+}}\) and White’s pieces penetrate Black’s camp, McCraw – Francisco, corr. 1999.

20.\(\text{\textit{c5?!}}\)

This is a multi-purpose move. White fortifies his d5-pawn and he simultaneously prepares to attack Black’s queenside pawns.

In case of: 20.\(\text{\textit{h6}}\) \(\text{\textit{hxh6}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{xh6}}\) exd5 22.exd5 \(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{c6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) 24.dxc6 \(\text{\textit{c8}}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{e3}}\) \(\text{\textit{b2}}\) 26.\(\text{\textit{d1}}\) \(\text{\textit{xa2}}\) 27.\(\text{\textit{c7}}\) \(\text{\textit{b2}}\) Lakic – Chekhov, Banja Luka 1976, White has some compensation for the pawn, but nothing more, while after: 20.\(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) exd5 22.exd5 \(\text{\textit{d7}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{c5}}\), Black preserves the balance as well with the help of the line: 23...\(\text{\textit{c3}}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\) \(\text{\textit{a4}}\)\(=\).

White has not tried in practice yet the move 20.d6?! Thus, he can prevent opening of the e-file (the weakness of the last rank might be very important in some lines) and so he can neutralize temporarily the activity of enemy’s light-squared bishop, thanks to the e6-pawn. Black’s most principled move here, although not the best, is 20...\(\text{\textit{a8}}\)! (After the calm line 20...\(\text{\textit{a4}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{c6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) \(\text{\textit{a8}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{c4}}\)\(=\), or 20...\(\text{\textit{e5}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{f4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf4}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{xc4}}\)\(=\) White is slightly better.). See our analysis: 21.\(\text{\textit{xc7}}\) \(\text{\textit{d8}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{b3}}\)! (in case of 22.\(\text{\textit{xd3}}\) \(\text{\textit{e5}}\)! 23.\(\text{\textit{g5}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd6}}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{xd8}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd8}}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{c1}}\) \(\text{\textit{c8}}\) 26.\(\text{\textit{d1}}\) \(\text{\textit{e5}}\)\(=\) Black has an excellent compensation for the exchange) 22.\(\text{\textit{b3}}\)! \(\text{\textit{c3}}\) (Black loses a piece after 22...\(\text{\textit{xe4}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{c5}}\) \(\text{\textit{b1}}\)\(=\) 24.\(\text{\textit{c1}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc1}}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{xc1}}\) \(\text{\textit{b5}}\) 26.\(\text{\textit{d7}}\) \(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 27.\(\text{\textit{c8}}\) \(\text{\textit{g7}}\) 28.\(\text{\textit{xd8}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd8}}\) 29.\(\text{\textit{b7}}\) \(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 30.\(\text{\textit{d8}}\)\(=\) 31.\(\text{\textit{xd8}}\)\(=\); following 22...\(\text{\textit{c6}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{g5}}\) \(\text{\textit{f6}}\), it is very strong for White to continue with 24.\(\text{\textit{d4}}\)\(=\); if 22...\(\text{\textit{e5}}\), then 23.f4 \(\text{\textit{c3}}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\) \(\text{\textit{c6}}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{c5}}\)\(=\) 23.\(\text{\textit{d1}}\) (23.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\) \(\text{\textit{c6}}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{f3}}\) \(\text{\textit{e5}}\)\(=\))
23...\text{\textbullet}c6 (in case of 23...\text{\textbullet}e5 24.\text{\textbullet}a7, after 24...\text{\textbullet}xe4 25.\text{\textbullet}c5 \text{\textbullet}a4 26.\text{\textbullet}xe4 \text{\textbullet}xd1 27.\text{\textbullet}b6\text{+}.-- as well as after: 25...\text{\textbullet}b8 25.\text{\textbullet}xa5 \text{\textbullet}xd6 26.\text{\textbullet}b7 \text{\textbullet}xh2+ 27.\text{\textbullet}h1++ Black’s position is just terrible) 24.\text{\textbullet}g5! (24.\text{\textbullet}f3 \text{\textbullet}e8\text{=}.) 24...f6 25.\text{\textbullet}c5! \text{\textbullet}e5 (25...\text{\textbullet}xg5 26.\text{\textbullet}f3 \text{\textbullet}e8 27.\text{\textbullet}xe6++) 26.\text{\textbullet}xe6! \text{\textbullet}xg6 27.\text{\textbullet}g7+ \text{\textbullet}h8 28.\text{\textbullet}xd6!! (That is the point!) 28...\text{\textbullet}xd6 29.\text{\textbullet}xf6 h6 (It is even worse for Black to play here 29...h5, because of 30.\text{\textbullet}g5 \text{\textbullet}xh2+ 31.\text{\textbullet}h1++ 30.\text{\textbullet}xg6+ \text{\textbullet}h7 31.\text{\textbullet}g7+ \text{\textbullet}h8 32.e5! \text{\textbullet}f8 33.\text{\textbullet}a7+ \text{\textbullet}g8 34.\text{\textbullet}xa8 \text{\textbullet}xa8 35.\text{\textbullet}xf8 \text{\textbullet}xf8 36.\text{\textbullet}d8 a4 37.\text{\textbullet}a5 b3 38.axb3 axb3 39.\text{\textbullet}c3 \text{\textbullet}d5 40.f3++.

20...\text{\textbullet}exd5 21.\text{\textbullet}exd5 \text{\textbullet}e8?!

This is a natural move and it is practically the only move that Black has played in that position. Still, having in mind how dangerous White’s d-pawn might become, it is worth for Black to try here the move 21...\text{\textbullet}e5. Now, after 22.\text{\textbullet}c6 \text{\textbullet}xc6 23.\text{\textbullet}xc6 (in case of 23.\text{\textbullet}xc6 \text{\textbullet}xd2 24.\text{\textbullet}xd2 \text{\textbullet}d8! 25.\text{\textbullet}e1 \text{\textbullet}c7=, White suffers, because of the lack of an escape-square for his king on the last rank) 23...\text{\textbullet}d7 24.h3\text{+} and Black must still fight for the draw, despite the fact that he has managed to stop White’s passed pawn relatively early.

22.\text{\textbullet}c6 \text{\textbullet}h4

After 22...\text{\textbullet}xc6 23.\text{\textbullet}xc6 \text{\textbullet}c7 (Black loses immediately in case of 23...\text{\textbullet}d4?, because of 24.c7++-. His attempt to simplify the position, exploiting the weakness of the first rank after: 23...\text{\textbullet}xd2 24.\text{\textbullet}xd2 \text{\textbullet}f8 25.\text{\textbullet}xa5 \text{\textbullet}d8 26.\text{\textbullet}e1 \text{\textbullet}d1 27.\text{\textbullet}f1 \text{\textbullet}c1 28.\text{\textbullet}a6 b3 29.\text{\textbullet}xb3 \text{\textbullet}xb4 30.\text{\textbullet}a8+ \text{\textbullet}g7 31.\text{\textbullet}e8 \text{\textbullet}xe1 32.\text{\textbullet}xe1 \text{\textbullet}xc6 33.b4++, leads to a lost rook and pawn endgame for him. In case of: 23...\text{\textbullet}f8 24.\text{\textbullet}xd8 \text{\textbullet}xd8 25.\text{\textbullet}c1 \text{\textbullet}e8 26.\text{\textbullet}f4 f6 27.h4 \text{\textbullet}f7 28.c7\text{+}, Black can hardly save the game either.) 24.g3\text{+}, White’s passed c-pawn remains extremely dangerous.

23.d6!

This is a very powerful move. White will have the possibility to play the move \text{\textbullet}c6-e7+ in many lines and thus he will be able to cover the e-file with tempo.

Capturing of the a5-pawn would have been much weaker. For example after 23.\text{\textbullet}xa5, Black can follow with the powerful move 23...\text{\textbullet}h4!\text{=} and White will be forced to weaken the a8-h1 diagonal with the move g2-g3, since he cannot play 24.h3?, because of 24...\text{\textbullet}xh3! 25.gxh3 \text{\textbullet}xh3 26.f4 \text{\textbullet}c3--.

After 23.\text{\textbullet}xa5, Black’s best line to fight for equality is to play: 23...\text{\textbullet}c3! (in case of 23...
e4 24...xb4 c2 25.h3!, Black must still prove that his compensation for the missing pawns is sufficient) 24.d1 (following 24.d3 f5 25.d1, White must retreat with his queen to the first rank anyway, while the placement of Black's bishop on f5 (controlling the b1-square) enables him to play: 25...b3! 26.axb3 a5 27.axa5 b4) 24...e4! (As long as Black's bishop remains on the d7-square, he cannot play the pawn-break 24...b3, because of 25.a3!+, while in case of 24...c4, White has enough time to include the move 25.h3?!, because after 25...xc6 26.c5! xa2 27.dxc6 c8 28.c7± his passed pawn is extremely powerful.) 25.c5 c8 26.a5 g4 27.xc1 d3± and it is inconceivable how White can improve his position.

23.a4

Black is trying to distract White at the cost of a pawn.

23...c3 24.d3±, and White had the advantage, because of his powerful passed d-pawn and the weakness of Black's queenside pawns, Polugaevsky – Bagirov, Tbilisi 1978.

It looks like Black cannot stop White's passed pawn in case of: 23...xc6 24.xc6 e4 25.c7! (after 25.c5 d8 26.f3 e6 27.d5 a4=, Black's counterplay on the queenside is still not good enough to equalize.) 25...d8 (in case of 25...e5, White has 26.f3! h4 27.g3 and Black's counterattack 27...xg3 would not work because of the line: 28.d7 d8 29.c8+; after 25...c3 26.d1 e5, it is very strong for White to follow with: 27.e7! d8 28.h6± 26.d7 e6 27.g5 f6 (the move 27...f6 28.e3±, covers the diagonal for the bishop on g7 and it weakens the shelter of Black's king too) 28.h4!±.

24.xb4? (The other possibility for White here is: 24.e7+ f8?! 25.c7 d8 26.g5 e4 27.c1!, but it is much more complex. In the main line after: 27...e8 28.g8! b8 29.f6 f8 30.xd7 xg8 31.e7 d5 32.d7 xf6 33.e8+ g7 34.xb8±, White obtains a material advantage with practically super-human efforts.) 24.e5 25.h3 e6 26.d5 e4 27.d3 b7 (in case of the active move for Black 27...a3?!, Sakaev – Kurnosov, Copenhagen 2005, White had better play 28.a6! and the threat 29.c5++ would have created terrible difficulties for Black) 28.a3?!±. White should not need to put up too much of an effort to press his material advantage home.
Chapter 6

1.d4  İf6 2.c4 g6 3.İc3 d5 4.cxd5  İxd5 5.e4  İxc3 6.bxc3  İg7 7.İc4 c5 8.İe2  İc6 9.İe3 cxd4 10.cxd4  İa5

Now, just like in Chapter 5, Black is trying to discoordinate his opponent’s pieces, making use of the fact that White’s king has not castled yet.

11.İd2

Black’s chances to equalize would have been much greater if White had complied with the exchange of queens with the move 11.İd2. For example after 11...İxd2+ 12.İxd2 0–0 13.İhd1 (in case of 13.İac1  İd8 14.d5  İa5= in the game Kozma – Dolezal, Prague 1954, Black had some counterplay because the white king was in the centre of the board) 13...İa5 14.İd5 (if 14.İd3, then 14...İe6= and the black pieces occupy the c4-square) 14...e6 15.İb3 b6 16.İac1 İb7= as in the game Harestad – Fogerasi, Senec 1998, and Black had no problems whatsoever.

The black queen now has three main possibilities to retreat: a) 11...İa3, b) 11...İh5 and c) 11...İd8.

All the other possibilities for Black are worse here. For example after: 11...İb6, White wins an important tempo in order to evacuate his rook away from the a1-h8 diagonal and after 12.İb1 İd8, Portalo – Morillo, Coria del Rio 2005, he can play: 13.d5! İe5 14.İb5+ İd7 15.İxd7+ İxd7 16.İc3 0–0 17.f4 İg4 18.İxg7 İxg7 19.İd4+ İg8 20.0–0=, so he obtains an overwhelming advantage.

The same drawback is typical for the move 11...İc7 too. After 12.İc1 0–0 13.0–0 İd8 (it is not any better for Black to play: 13...İd8 14.İc3 İa5 15.İd3 İh6 16.f4 a6, Ambrosewicz – Tietze, corr. 1980 and here, it would have been very good for White to follow with 17.d5!, because Black’s attempt to undermine his centre with 17...e6 would not work, because of:
18.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}b6+ 19.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d8 20.d6 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xd6 21.\texttt{\textasciitilde}c5±) 14.d5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e5 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d6, Retamal – Barrenechea, Santiago 1998, White’s simplest line here would have been 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}c3±, followed by f2-f4.

\textbf{a) 11...\texttt{\textasciitilde}a3}

Tournament practice has already shown that Black’s queen is not well placed on the a3-square. As a result of that, Black is often forced to resort to tactics in order to evacuate it away from entrapment.

\textbf{12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b1}

White uses the opportune moment to take his rook away from the a1-h8 diagonal in order to organize the pawn-thrust in the centre d4-d5.

\textbf{12...0–0}

The d4-pawn is untouchable: 12...\texttt{\textasciitilde}xd4? because of the line 13.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xd4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xd4 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b5+ \texttt{\textasciitilde}f8 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}h6+–.

After 12...\texttt{\textasciitilde}d6, Seifert – Owczarzak, Swidnica 1998, White can play: 13.d5! \texttt{\textasciitilde}e5 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b5+ \texttt{\textasciitilde}d7 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xd7+ \texttt{\textasciitilde}xd7 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}c3 0-0 17.f4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}g4 18.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xg7 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xg7 19.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d4+ \texttt{\textasciitilde}g8 20.0-0±. He can obtain an excellent position in the same fashion after 11...\texttt{\textasciitilde}b6 too.

\textbf{13.0–0}

The immediate 13.d5? is a mistake due to 13...\texttt{\textasciitilde}e5 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b4 and Black has the surprising tactical strike 14...\texttt{\textasciitilde}f3! and after 15.0–0 (White cannot capture that queen because after 15.gxf3 he gets checkmated spectacularly 15...\texttt{\textasciitilde}xf3+ 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}h3#) \texttt{\textasciitilde}xe4 White loses a pawn.

\textbf{13...\texttt{\textasciitilde}g4}

Black cannot solve his problems with 13...\texttt{\textasciitilde}d6 because of 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e3!? (White can also play 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f4, but then Black must answer with 14...\texttt{\textasciitilde}a3!≤, because after 14...\texttt{\textasciitilde}d8 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e3±, or 14.e5 15.dxe5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xd1 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}fxd1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xe5 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d5± White’s advantage is evident.) 14...\texttt{\textasciitilde}d8 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3 e6 16.e5± and Black has a long way to go before the completion of the development of his queenside.

The move 13...a5 weakens Black’s queenside considerably. White has a very pleasant choice to make, for example: 14.d5 (It is also good for White to play 14.e5 with the idea to trap the enemy queen with the help of the move \texttt{\textasciitilde}d2-c1, and that forces Black to compromise his position in the centre with – 14...e6 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}g5 f6 16.exf6 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xf6 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xf6 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xf6 18.d5 exd5 19.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xd5+ \texttt{\textasciitilde}g7 20.\texttt{\textasciitilde}g3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}f8 21.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}f5, Lukacs – M.Pavlov, Baile Herculane 1982 and here White had the powerful resource 22.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b6!±) 14...\texttt{\textasciitilde}e5 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d6 (after 15...
Black's queen gets trapped; the move 15...e6 would not bring Black any solace after: 16.\text{\underline{\text{a}}\text{c}1} \text{\underline{\text{d}}6 17.\text{\underline{\text{a}}\text{a}4±}} and White is threatening 18.\text{\underline{\text{a}}\text{a}3) 16.\text{\underline{\text{a}}\text{a}4} \text{\underline{\text{g}}4 17.\text{\underline{\text{f}}\text{f}4} \text{\underline{\text{e}}5 18.\text{\underline{\text{d}}\text{x}e5} \text{\underline{\text{d}}\text{x}e5, Scheichel – Muniz, Teesside 1973.} Now, after the simple line: 19.f4 \text{\underline{\text{b}}6+ 20.\text{\underline{\text{d}}d}4 \text{\underline{\text{d}}\text{xd}4+ 21.\text{\underline{\text{d}}\text{x}d}4 \text{\underline{\text{g}}4 22.\text{\underline{\text{f}}c}1±}} White's advantage is overwhelming.

14.\text{\underline{\text{d}}5}
This is the beginning of tactical complications.

14...\text{\underline{\text{b}}5}
The move 14...\text{\underline{\text{e}}5? in answer to 15.\text{\underline{\text{b}}4+-} leads to the loss of the black queen. After 14...\text{\underline{\text{d}}d4} and 15.\text{\underline{\text{b}}4 \text{\underline{\text{d}}xe2 16.\text{\underline{\text{d}}xa}3 \text{\underline{\text{d}}xd1 17.\text{\underline{\text{f}}xd1} \text{\underline{\text{fc}}8 18.\text{\underline{\text{f}}f1} \text{\underline{\text{c}}7 19.e5!± as in the game Gulko – Spiridonov, Sofia 1967, the bishop pair and the powerful pawn centre ensures White's overwhelming advantage. Black can try to save his queen with the help of the move 14...\text{\underline{\text{c}}c5, but after 15.dxc6 \text{\underline{\text{c}}xc4 16.f3 \text{\underline{\text{e}}6 17.cxb7 \text{\underline{\text{d}}ad8 18.\text{\underline{\text{e}}e1! (The careless 18.\text{\underline{\text{h}}1? after 18...\text{\underline{\text{a}}xa2}} in the game Kalisvaart – Golod, Vlissingen 1999, gave Black excellent counter-chances.) The tactical complications are over and White has won a pawn. Black's bishop pair is a sufficient compensation and the position is quite unclear. White takes queen away from the pin with his last move. 18...\text{\underline{\text{a}}a6} (In case of 18...\text{\underline{\text{c}}c5+ 19.\text{\underline{\text{f}}2!}} \text{\underline{\text{a}}a2 20.\text{\underline{\text{c}}c1} \text{\underline{\text{d}}6 21.\text{\underline{\text{f}}4} \text{\underline{\text{e}}5 22.\text{\underline{\text{e}}3} \text{\underline{\text{d}}7 23.\text{\underline{\text{a}}5} \text{\underline{\text{e}}6 24.\text{\underline{\text{a}}6} \text{\underline{\text{b}}8 25.\text{\underline{\text{b}}1} \text{\underline{\text{b}}3 26.\text{\underline{\text{c}}1+--Black can stop White's passed b-pawn only at the expense of considerable material losses.) 19.\text{\underline{\text{f}}4} \text{\underline{\text{a}}a2 (This is the beginning of a new series of tactical complications. After 19...\text{\underline{\text{c}}c4 20.\text{\underline{\text{c}}7} \text{\underline{\text{b}}8 21.\text{\underline{\text{b}}x}b8 \text{\underline{\text{b}}x}b8 22.\text{\underline{\text{f}}2} \text{\underline{\text{b}}x}b8 23.\text{\underline{\text{d}}1± Black will just be left an exchange down.) 20.\text{\underline{\text{b}}8} \text{\underline{\text{a}}x}b8 21.\text{\underline{\text{b}}x}b8 \text{\underline{\text{b}}x}b8 22.\text{\underline{\text{b}}x}b8 \text{\underline{\text{b}}6+}} 23.\text{\underline{\text{f}}2} \text{\underline{\text{b}}8 24.\text{\underline{\text{d}}4} \text{\underline{\text{b}}6 25.\text{\underline{\text{a}}a2} \text{\underline{\text{d}}xd4+ 26.\text{\underline{\text{h}}1±}} White has all the chances to press his advantage home.

15.\text{\underline{\text{c}}1!}
This is White's most precise move.

15...\text{\underline{\text{e}}x}e2
After 15...\text{\underline{\text{d}}6 16.\text{\underline{\text{b}}x}b5 \text{\underline{\text{d}}d4 17.f3} \text{\underline{\text{b}}x}b5, Hevesi – Csapo,
Hungary 1992, White’s simplest line is 18.fxg4± and he remains with an extra pawn.

In case of 15...\textit{\textbf{c}}c5 16.\textit{\textbf{x}}xb5 \textit{\textbf{e}}e5 (or 16...\textit{\textbf{d}}d4 17.\textit{\textbf{e}}e3 \textit{\textbf{x}}xb5 18.\textit{\textbf{d}}xb5 \textit{\textbf{x}}xe2 19.\textit{\textbf{d}}xd4 \textit{\textbf{d}}xd1 20.\textit{\textbf{x}}xd1 \textit{\textbf{x}}xd4 21.\textit{\textbf{d}}xd4+— Barnsley – Wollin, Great Britain 1976 and Black remains a pawn down in a rook and pawn endgame) 17.\textit{\textbf{a}}a3 \textit{\textbf{a}}a3 18.\textit{\textbf{d}}d2 a6 19.\textit{\textbf{b}}b3 \textit{\textbf{d}}d6 20.\textit{\textbf{d}}d3 f5, in the game Galonska – Thiel, Germany 1995, Black’s initiative could have been neutralized by White with: 21.\textit{\textbf{d}}d4 \textit{\textbf{x}}xe2 22.\textit{\textbf{x}}xe2 fxe4 23.\textit{\textbf{e}}e3±. White’s two bishop advantage and the weakness of Black’s e4-pawn make his defence extremely difficult.

\textit{\textbf{16.\textit{\textbf{x}}xe2 \textit{\textbf{c}}c3 17.\textit{\textbf{x}}xc6!}}

The variation: 17.\textit{\textbf{d}}xb5 \textit{\textbf{d}}d4 18.\textit{\textbf{d}}d3 \textit{\textbf{x}}xb5 19.\textit{\textbf{x}}xb5 \textit{\textbf{c}}c2 20.\textit{\textbf{a}}a3 \textit{\textbf{f}}fe8 21.\textit{\textbf{b}}b3 \textit{\textbf{x}}xe4 22.\textit{\textbf{f}}fe1 \textit{\textbf{h}}h4± Fridstein – B.Bilunov, USSR 1967, leaves Black with somewhat better chances for a successful defence.

\textbf{17...\textit{\textbf{w}}xc4}

If 17...bxc4, then 18.\textit{\textbf{e}}e3±.

\textbf{18.\textit{\textbf{w}}xc4 bxc4 19.\textit{\textbf{b}}b4 c3}

\textbf{20.\textit{\textbf{e}}e4± as in the game I.Sol-}

kolov – Ristic, Yugoslavia 1986, and the difference in strength between the passed c-pawns was evident enough.

\textbf{b) 11...\textit{\textbf{w}}h5}

\textbf{12.d5}

White is making use of the fact that capturing on a1 is unfavourable for Black right now. In case of 12.\textit{\textbf{c}}c3?! after 12...\textit{\textbf{g}}g4 13.\textit{\textbf{g}}g3 0–0 14.\textit{\textbf{f}}f3 \textit{\textbf{g}}g5 15.\textit{\textbf{f}}f2 by playing 15...\textit{\textbf{d}}d8! (after 15...\textit{\textbf{e}}e5 16.d5 \textit{\textbf{d}}d7 17.d6 \textit{\textbf{d}}d8 18.\textit{\textbf{d}}d1 \textit{\textbf{d}}d4 19.\textit{\textbf{d}}d2 \textit{\textbf{x}}xe6 20.\textit{\textbf{b}}b4 \textit{\textbf{c}}c7 21.\textit{\textbf{f}}f8 \textit{\textbf{f}}xf8=} in the game Korchnoi – Ma.Tsei-tlin, Israel 1992, Black had an excellent compensation for the exchange) 16.d5 \textit{\textbf{h}}h4± Black was even slightly better.

\textbf{12...\textit{\textbf{e}}e5 13.\textit{\textbf{b}}b5+ \textit{\textbf{d}}d7 14.\textit{\textbf{e}}xe7+ \textit{\textbf{x}}xe7 15.\textit{\textbf{b}}b1!}

It is weaker for White to play 15.\textit{\textbf{c}}c1 due to 15...0–0 16.\textit{\textbf{c}}c7 (White has nothing after 16.0–0 because of 16...\textit{\textbf{f}}fc8 17.f3 \textit{\textbf{e}}e5 18.\textit{\textbf{b}}b1 and now in the game Naumkin – Alterman, Formia 1994, Black could have equalized with the simple 18...b6=) 16.\textit{\textbf{f}}fd8 17.\textit{\textbf{b}}b1 (after 17.\textit{\textbf{c}}c2 \textit{\textbf{e}}e5 18.\textit{\textbf{x}}xb7
19.\texttt{wb}1 \texttt{dc}5 20. \texttt{bb}4 \texttt{wg}4^\parallel as in the game Milov – Mikhailovsky 1992, Black had better prospects) 17...b6 18.\texttt{f}4 and now in the game Bondarevsky – Kato
tov, Moscow 1946, after 18...e6 19.dxe6 fxe6 20.f3 \texttt{a}5+ 21.\texttt{d}2 \texttt{e}5 (Black can also play 21...
\texttt{a}4 22.0–0 \texttt{ac}8^\infty) 22.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{a}5= the position was equal.

15...0–0

After 15...\texttt{g}4, Williams – Wittmann, Thessaloniki 1984, White has the powerful resource 16.\texttt{a}4! (after the trade of the
queens with 16.\texttt{g}3 \texttt{xd}1+ 17. \texttt{xd}1 b6^\parallel Black’s defence is much easier) and now after 16...b5 (Black can also play the timid 16...b6, but then after 17.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{e}5 18.h3 \texttt{g}5 19.g3 \texttt{f}6 20.\texttt{c}1= his pieces are rather misplaced and the pin of the knight on d7 is hurting badly.)
17.\texttt{xb}5 0–0 (after 17...\texttt{xg}2 18.\texttt{g}1 \texttt{hb}3 19.\texttt{b}3 \texttt{xh}2 20.\texttt{b}7 \texttt{d}8 21.\texttt{a}5+- Black is bound to lose plenty of material) 18.\texttt{g}3= Black’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient.

16.0–0 b6

16...\texttt{c}5 17.\texttt{b}4! Black will have to compromise his pawn structure on the queenside now. 17...b6 (After 17...\texttt{xe}4 18.\texttt{xe}7 \texttt{fe}8 19.\texttt{xb}7= Black was losing a pawn.) 18.\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{xc}5 19.\texttt{c}2=. White has better prospects due to the weak black c5-pawn.

17.\texttt{b}4?!

It is less precise to play 17.f3, although even then after 17...

The game might follow with: 17...\texttt{fe}8 (in case of 17...\texttt{e}5 18. \texttt{c}1=, White, prior to Black, takes immediately the open c-file under control) 18.f3 \texttt{fc}8 19. \texttt{c}1=, and White’s prospects are clearly better. Black’s pieces are forced to defend the e7-pawn as well as the c6-square against the penetration of the enemy’s knight.

c) 11...\texttt{d}8

This is the most principled line. Black increases the pressure against the white d4-pawn. White can choose now between c1) 12.d5 and c2) 12.\texttt{c}3.
Chapter 6

c1) 12.d5
White clarifies the situation in the centre because it is unfavourable for Black to capture on a1 right now.
12...\(\Box\)e5

13.\(\Box\)c3
Black does not mind simplifications in principle. After 13. \(\Box\)b5+ \(\Box\)d7 14.\(\Box\)xd7+ \(\Box\)xd7 (it is better to capture with the queen, because after 14...\(\Box\)xd7 15.\(\Box\)c1 0–0 16.0–0± White is slightly better) 15.\(\Box\)c3 \(\Box\)c8 (in answer to 15...\(\Box\)g4?! in the game Veingold – Dvoirys, Budapest 1989, White should have accepted bravely the piece sacrifice, because after 16.f4! \(\Box\)xf2 17.\(\Box\)f1± Black’s compensation for the piece is insufficient) 15...\(\Box\)c8 16.0–0 0–0 (the exchange sacrifice 16...\(\Box\)f3+?! 17.gxf3 \(\Box\)xc3 18.\(\Box\)xc3 \(\Box\)xh3 19.\(\Box\)c1 \(\Box\)e5 20.\(\Box\)g2± is not correct) 17.f4 \(\Box\)c4 18.\(\Box\)xc4+ \(\Box\)xc4 19.\(\Box\)d4+ \(\Box\)g8= and the position is approximately equal.

In case of 13.\(\Box\)c1 0–0 14.0–0 Black can play 14...\(\Box\)d7! (14...\(\Box\)xc4?! 15.\(\Box\)xc4 e6 16.\(\Box\)c3 exd5 17.exd5± Rashkovsky – Dvoirys, USSR 1986; 15...\(\Box\)d7 16.\(\Box\)b3 b5 17.\(\Box\)c2±) 15.\(\Box\)b3 (if 15.\(\Box\)c3, then after 15...\(\Box\)c8 16.\(\Box\)b3 \(\Box\)b5≠ Black has an excellent counterplay) 15...b5 16.\(\Box\)d3 a6= and White has hardly any advantage.

13...0–0 14.\(\Box\)b3 \(\Box\)b6
After Black’s risky adventure: 14...\(\Box\)g4?! 15.f3 \(\Box\)h5, following: 16.0–0 \(\Box\)d7 17.\(\Box\)g3 \(\Box\)xf3+ 18.\(\Box\)xf3 \(\Box\)xf3 19.\(\Box\)xf3 \(\Box\)xc3 20.\(\Box\)xc3 \(\Box\)ac8 21.\(\Box\)d4+ Jordan – Zwangger, Germany 2000, White materialized easily his advantage.

In case of Black’s humble move – 14...\(\Box\)d7, White proceeds with his plan to trade the dark-squared bishops – 15.f4 \(\Box\)g4 16.\(\Box\)xg7 \(\Box\)xg7 17.\(\Box\)d4+ \(\Box\)g8, J.Donner – Ree, Leeuwarden 1977, and here after the quite evident move 18.0–0±, White maintains a great advantage.

Black has not tested in practice yet 14...g5 (trying to prevent the move f2-f4) 15.\(\Box\)d2 h6 16.0–0±, but White preserves his edge due to Black’s compromised kingside.

15.f4
White’s alternative here is the move 15.0–0. Black will have to fight for equality then with 15...\(\Box\)d7!? (after 15...\(\Box\)g4 16.h3 \(\Box\)xe2 17.\(\Box\)xe2 \(\Box\)xc8 18.\(\Box\)ac1 a5 19.\(\Box\)d2 h5 in the game A.Shneider – Huzman, Kherson 1989, White could have played 20.\(\Box\)xc8+ \(\Box\)xc8 21.\(\Box\)h2 \(\Box\)d7 22.f4 \(\Box\)c5 23.\(\Box\)c4± with some edge due to the bishop pair.) 16.a4 (otherwise the black bishop can go to
the a6-f1 diagonal via the b5-square) 16...\&ac8∞.

15...\&d7

It looks attractive for Black to play here 15...\&g4?! with the idea to create some threats against the white king, but that move turns out to be unsatisfactory. After 16...\&d4 \&a5+ (the simplifications after 16...\&xd4 17.\&xd4 \&xd4 18...\&xd4 \&f6 19.e5 \&e4 20.\&c1+ or 18...\&d7 19.\&e2 \&fc8 20.e5 \&c5 21.h3 \&h6 22.\&ac1 \&ac8 23.\&xc5 \&xc5 24.g4+ De Sa – Urquiza, corr. 2000 lead to a difficult endgame for Black) 16...\&a5+ 17.\&d2 \&xd2+ 18.\&xd2 and the attempt to provoke complications with 18...e5?! (after 18...\&f6?! 19.e5 \&e4+ 20.\&e3+– Black’s position is hopeless, but it is possibly more stubborn to play 18...\&xd4 19.\&xd4 \&d8 20.h3 \&f6 21.\&e3±, or 18...\&d8 19.h3 \&f6 20.\&e3±, although Black’s position remains very difficult in both cases) is followed by 19.h3 exd4 (19...\&f6 20.fxe5 \&xe4+ 21.\&e3 \&f5 22.g4 \&h6+ 23.\&f4+–) 20.hxg4 g5 (after 20...\&xg4 21.e5 \&xe2 22.\&xe2+- Black can hardly save the game despite the opposite coloured bishops. He can prolong his resistance with 20...d3 21.\&c3 \&e8 22.\&ae1 \&xg4 23.\&xd3±) 21.g3 \&xg4 22.e5+- and Black’s position was hopeless in the game Kramnik – Svidler, Dortmund 1998.

16.\&xg7 \&xg7 17.\&c1 \&d8

The attempt to create some counterplay with 17...\&f6?! after 18.e5 \&b4+ 19.\&f2 \&e4+ 20.\&e3 \&c5 21.\&d4 \&xd4+ 22.\&xd4 b6 23.\&d1 \&b7 24.\&f3± in the game Atalik – Berndt, Halkidiki 2002, lead to a difficult endgame for Black.

Black cannot solve his problems with: 17...\&b4+ 18.\&d2 \&xe4, because after: 19.0–0 \&f5 20.\&g3 \&f6 21.\&fe1 \&d8 22.\&h1!\&f, White has an excellent compensation for the pawn (according to GM S. Atalik’s analysis), because of the lack of mobilization of Black’s queenside. His attempt to complete his development with 22...b6?!, might lead after a line like, for example: 23.\&c6 \&h4 24.\&d4+ \&g8 25.d6 e6 26.\&xe6! \&c5 27.\&e7 \&e6 28.\&xe6 \&xe6 29.\&xe6 fxe6 30.\&c7 \&h6 31.\&e4+–, to a total disaster.

18.\&c4 e5!

Black is trying to block White’s central pawns on the dark squares. This is the best decision.

After 18...\&f6 19.\&d4 \&xd4 20.\&xd4 \&g4 21.h3 (21.\&g3 \&ac8 22.h3 \&d7\&f V. Barskij) 21...\&d7
(White should not mind his knight being exchanged – 21...
\( \texttt{\textit{\textbf{x}}x\texttt{e}2 \texttt{x}x\texttt{e}2 \texttt{f}f\texttt{a}c8 \texttt{b}h\texttt{d}1\pm) 22.e5 \texttt{f}e8 23.ff2 \texttt{f}ac8 24.g4\pm
and the game steers into an endgame in which White enjoys a space advantage.

19.\( \texttt{xb}1 \texttt{e}8

Black needs to play very precisely. After 19...f6?! 20.\( \texttt{w}c3 \texttt{ex}f4
21.\( \texttt{xf}f4 \texttt{de}5 22.\texttt{xc}7+ \texttt{h}h8 23.\texttt{f}f1 \texttt{d}d7 24.\texttt{e}e6 \texttt{dc}8 (or 24...\( \texttt{xe}6
25.\texttt{x}f6 \texttt{g}g1+ 26.\texttt{ff}1 \texttt{x}h2 27.g3 \texttt{h}h5 28.dxe6\pm) 25.\texttt{x}f6 \texttt{xc}7
26.\texttt{x}f8+ \texttt{xf}8 27.\texttt{xe}5\pm in the game P.Nielsen – McShane, Copenhagen 2003, Black had to resign coming under a crushing attack.

20.\( \texttt{c}3 \texttt{g}8 21.f5

In case of 21.\( \texttt{ff}1 \texttt{ex}f4 22.\( \texttt{xf}f4 \texttt{de}5\infty, or 21.\texttt{b}4 \texttt{d}d6 22.0-0 \texttt{ex}f4
23.\( \texttt{xf}f4 \texttt{de}5\infty, according to the analysis of GM Krasenkow, Black manages to deploy his knight to the powerful blocking outpost on e5, while after 21.\( \texttt{a}4 \texttt{ex}f4 22.\texttt{b}4 \texttt{d}d6 23.0-0 g5\infty, White must still prove that his compensation for the sacrificed pawn is sufficient.

21...\( \texttt{gx}f5 22.\texttt{ex}f5 \texttt{f}6\infty

Contrary to the line c1 White intends here to keep the tension in the centre.

12...0-0

In case of 12...\( \texttt{d}d7 13.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{c}8 14.\texttt{c}1 0-0 15.0-0, after some transposition, the position becomes quite identical to the main line.

The move 12...\( \texttt{g}4?! fails to force White to clarify his intentions in the centre. After 13.f3
\( \texttt{d}7 14.\texttt{d}2 0-0 15.\texttt{b}4 it is quite probable that Black's only acceptable answer is 15...\texttt{h}6 (in case Black allows the opening of the h-file he comes under a dangerous attack: 15...\texttt{h}5 16.\texttt{g}4! \texttt{hxg}4 17.\texttt{h}5 \texttt{gf}3 18.\texttt{f}4\rightarrow; 15...
\texttt{c}7 16.\texttt{c}1 \texttt{fd}8 17.\texttt{b}3 \texttt{b}6
18.\texttt{h}5→ Lukacs – van Mil, Lillafured 1989; 15...\texttt{c}8 16.\texttt{b}3 \texttt{b}5
17.\texttt{h}5 \texttt{b}6?! 18.\texttt{x}g6 \texttt{x}g6 and here in the game Yevseev – Vokarev, St Petersburg 2005, White could have acquired a decisive advantage with: 19.\texttt{gg}5!)
e6 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}h4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}fd8 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d2!→. The drawback of Black’s last move is that after White pushes d4-d5, Black’s h6-pawn becomes often endangered. According to GM D.Yevseev’s analysis, White can try to exploit that by playing: 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d1 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}c8 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}b3 b5 (Should Black try here 17...e6, White should already forget about his breakthrough in the centre d4-d5 in favour of the line: 18.h5?! g5 19.0-0= with the idea to continue with his kingside attack according to the scheme e4-e5 and f3-f4.) 18.d5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}e5 (18...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xc3 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xc3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}a5 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}e3=) 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xe5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xe5 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xh6 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}g7 (White’s attack is decisive after 20...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}a5+ 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}f1! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}g7 22.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}g5+ \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}f6 23.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}g3→) 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d2 (Black’s defense is much easier after the exchange of queens – 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}g5 a5 22.d6 e6=) 21...a5 22.h5 a4 23.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}c2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}b6 (23...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}c7 24.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d3=) 24.hxg6 fxg6 25.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}b1= (White creates the threat 26.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xa4 in that fashion, while after 25.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d3 b4= Black could have obtained some counterplay on the queenside.) and Black’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient.

13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d2

White is not in a hurry to castle short and solidifies his position in the centre. The point is that he intends to use the h-pawn in order to attack the black king in some lines.

After the natural move 13.0-0 White must consider 13...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}g4!? (after 13...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d7 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}b1 is insufficient for White due to 14...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}c7=, while after 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}c1 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}c8 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}b3 as in the game Piket – J.Polgar, Wijk aan Zee 1998, Black could have played 15...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}c7?!= with equality. It is however quite obvious that White could have played 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d2! in answer to 13...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d7, transposing to the main lines of the variation.) 14.f3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d7 and after the move f2-f3 has been provoked, White must watch for the possibility of \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}b6 with a check, every time he thinks about pushing d4-d5. There might follow: 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}b1 (after 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d2, Black can play 15...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}c8=) 15...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}c7 (It is also interesting for Black to play here 15...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}b8, with the idea after 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d2 a6 17.a4, to inflict the spectacular tactical strike: 17...b5! 18.axb5 axb5 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xb5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xb5 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xb5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xd4, Ugo – Szabados, corr. 1950, but we have to mention, for the sake of objectivity, that after the best line for White: 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xd4!? \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xb5 22.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xb5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}b6+ 23.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d4 e5 24.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}d1 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}c8 25.f4 exd4 26.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xd4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xd4+ 27.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xd4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xd4+ 28.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\#}}xd4, Black will have to work hard for the draw in the
rook and pawn endgame.) 16. \texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}2} a6 (The attempt to equalize tactically with – 16... \texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}xd4 does not work due to the line 17.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{x}}}xf7! \texttt{\textit{\textsc{x}}}xf7 18.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}xd4 e5 19.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}}}e3=) 17. \texttt{\textit{\textsc{b}}}b3 (in answer to 17.a4, Vasconcelos – Pires, Linares 1999, Black has the powerful resource 17...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}xd4!? 18.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}xf7+ \texttt{\textit{\textsc{x}}}xf7 19. \texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}xd4 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}xd4+ 20.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{w}}}xd4 e5 21.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{w}}}b4 b5\textsubscript{∞}, with mutual chances and after 17.a3 b5 18.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{a}}}a2\textsubscript{∞}, and if 17.d5, then after 17...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}}}e5 18.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}b3 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{b}}}b5\textsubscript{=} Black’s pieces are very active in the centre of the board) 17...b5 18.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{h}}}h1 (in case of 18.d5 you can witness the negative aspects of f2-f3 and after 18...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{w}}}b6+ 19.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{f}}}f2 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{x}}}xc3 20.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}xc3 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}}}e5\textsubscript{=} Black has a quite sufficient counterplay, because it is far from easy to repel the strong knight away from the centre – 21.f4? \texttt{\textit{\textsc{g}}}g4=+) 18...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{w}}}b6= and as the game Beliavsky – Svidler, Madrid 1998, showed Black’s prospects are definitely not worse.

13...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}d7

In case of 13...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{g}}}g4 14.f3 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}d7 15.h4! the game transposes to the variation, which we have already analyzed in our notes to Black’s move 12.

After 13...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}d6 14.0-0 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}d8 15.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}ad1, Black has problems to create any counterplay. For example after: 15...e5 16.d5 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}}}c5 17.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}d3 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}d4 (following 17...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}}}e7 18.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{b}}}b2, Black’s position is again difficult, because the natural move 18...f6 19.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{b}}}b4 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{b}}}b6 20. \texttt{\textit{\textsc{a}}}a3\textsubscript{+}, loses a piece for him, while after 18...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}d6, White has the powerful resource 19.f4!\textsuperscript{+} 18.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}xd4 exd4 19.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{b}}}b4 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}}}c7 20. \texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}}}c1 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}}}e5 21.f4 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{h}}}h5 22.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}}}c7 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{b}}}b8 23.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{f}}}fc1\textsuperscript{+}, and Black’s position turned out to be strategically hopeless, Cruz Filho – Almeida Soares, Rio de Janeiro 1948.

14.0-0

It seems very attractive to start an attack against the black king with 14.h4. Things are far from clear, though...After 14...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}}}c8 (in case of 14...h5 15.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}d1 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}}}c8 16.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{b}}}b3 there arises a position that we are going to deal with later, after the order of moves – 14...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}}}c8 15.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{b}}}b3 h5 16.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}d1) 15. \texttt{\textit{\textsc{b}}}b3 (it is interesting for White to play here 15.h5!? and now it is bad for Black to respond with 15...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}e5?! because of 16.dxe5 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{x}}}xc4 17.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}d1=, as well as with 15...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{b}}}b6?! due to 16.hxg6 hxg6 17.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}d1=, but after 15...e5! 16. hxg6 hxg6= the position is quite unclear) 15...h5 16.f3 (if 16.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}d1 then after 16...\texttt{\textit{\textsc{h}}}h7 Black is OK after 17.f3 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{h}}}h6\textsuperscript{?}, as well as after 17.0-0 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{c}}}c7=) 16...e6 17.\texttt{\textit{\textsc{d}}}d1 \texttt{\textit{\textsc{e}}}e7 and White must evidently
comply with the equality – 18. \( \text{g}5 = \) or 18. \( \text{e}3 = \). In the game Radjabov – Svidler, Plovdiv 2003, White tried to fight for more with 18.f4?! As a result of 18...\( \text{f}d8 \) 19.e5 \( \text{b}5 \) 20.f5 \( \text{exf}5 \) 21.\( \text{f}4 \) “the cold-blooded” 21...\( \text{h}7 \)? (but not 21...\( \text{xe}5 \) because of 22.\( \text{d}5! \) \( \text{f}3+ \) 23.\( \text{f}2 \) \( \text{xd}2 \) 24.\( \text{xe}7+ \) \( \text{f}8 \) 25.\( \text{xe}6+ \) \( \text{fxe}6 \) 26.\( \text{b}4+ \) \( \text{e}8 \) 27.\( \text{xd}2 \), and after 21...\( \text{e}6 \) 22.\( \text{xe}6 \) \( \text{fxe}6 \) 23.\( \text{xe}6 \) \( \text{a}3 \) 24.0–0 the position is with mutual prospects) 22.0–0 \( \text{b}4 \) 23.\( \text{b}2 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 24.\( \text{f}2 \) \( \text{b}5 \) 25.\( \text{f}e1 \) \( \text{c}4 \) and Black managed to parry White’s threats keeping his extra pawn.

14...\( \text{xc}8 \) 15.\( \text{ac}1 \)

It is too premature to play 15.\( \text{b}3 \) due to 15...\( \text{b}5 \)! 16.\( \text{ac}1 \) \( \text{b}6 = \) and Black managed to equalize in the game Sakaev – Avrukh, Israel 1998.

15...\( \text{a}6 \)

Black is trying to create some counterplay on the queenside where he has a pawn majority. If 15...\( \text{e}6 \), then after 16.\( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{h}4 \) (in case of 16...\( \text{b}5 \) the move 17.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) is even stronger) 17.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 18.\( \text{xg}7 \) \( \text{g}7 \) in the game Kouatly – van Mil, Belgium 1988, White played 19.\( \text{xd}5 \) and preserved some edge due to his active pieces.

Black’s attempt at solving the problems tactically with the help of: 15...\( \text{e}5 \)?, is not working, because after: 16.\( \text{dxe}5 \) \( \text{xc}4 \) 17.\( \text{fd}1 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 18.\( \text{e}6 \) \( \text{fxe}6 \) 19.\( \text{xg}7 \) \( \text{xc}1 \) 20.\( \text{xc}1 \) \( \text{xg}7 \) 21.\( \text{xd}7 + – \), he loses a piece.

The other possibility for him – 15...\( \text{b}5 \)?, fails too, because of: 16.\( \text{xb}5 \) \( \text{xd}4 \) 17.\( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{xc}3 \) (17...\( \text{xd}4 \) 18.\( \text{xd}4 + \) – and Black cannot regain his bishop, due to the checkmating threat on the g7-square.) 18.\( \text{xc}3 \) \( \text{xb}5 \) 19.\( \text{fd}1 \) \( \text{a}4 \) 20.\( \text{d}3 + – \) and Black cannot restore the material balance.

16.\( \text{b}3 \)!

White retreats his bishop in anticipation of the move b7-b5 and prepares d4-d5. It is weaker to play 16.\( \text{fd}1 \) because after 16...\( \text{b}5 \) 17.\( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 18.d5 (in case of 18.\( \text{g}5 \) as in the game Korobov – Avrukh, Istanbul 2003, Black can continue with 18...\( \text{b}4 \) 19.\( \text{a}1 \) \( \text{a}5 \) without being afraid for the future of his e7-pawn, because after 20.\( \text{xc}8 \) \( \text{xc}8 \) 21.\( \text{xe}7 \) \( \text{xb}3 \) 22.\( \text{AXB} \) \( \text{a}4 \) 23.\( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{xc}1 + \) 24.\( \text{xc}1 \) \( \text{c}6 + \) White is clearly worse, and even after the relatively best 20.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{xb}3 \) 21.\( \text{AXB} \) \( \text{xc}1 \) 22.\( \text{xc}1 \) \( \text{d}6 + \) Black’s chances are preferable due to his bishop pair) 18...\( \text{xc}3 \) (it is weaker for Black to play 18...\( \text{e}5 \)?! because after 19.\( \text{d}4 \)
Additionally White’s threat to manoeuvre the knight along the route $\mathcal{D}d4$-$c6$) White can increase the pressure with the help of $20.\mathcal{E}e3!$ (the exchange $20.\text{exf}6 \text{exf}6 \pm$ would just be a positional concession in this situation). The following line is quite indicative: $20...\mathcal{D}xb3$ (in case of $20...\mathcal{D}c4$
$21.\mathcal{A}xc4 \mathcal{A}xc4 22.e6! Black loses immediately with $22...\mathcal{A}c6$ due to $23.\mathcal{D}d1 \mathcal{A}b7 24.\mathcal{B}h3+, while after$ $22...\mathcal{A}c8 23.\mathcal{A}d1 \pm$ Black’s position is again very difficult because of the annoying white pawns.)
$20...\mathcal{D}xb3 21.axb3 \mathcal{F}f5 22.\mathcal{D}g3
\text{fxe}5 23.\mathcal{A}xe5 \mathcal{E}e6 24.\mathcal{W}h6 \mathcal{A}d3$ (The black king is quite exposed and he has plenty of weaknesses after $24...\text{exd}5 25.\mathcal{D}xf5 \mathcal{W}xf5$
$26.\mathcal{A}xf5 \text{gxf}5 27.\mathcal{W}e6+ \mathcal{G}g7 28.\mathcal{W}xf5 \pm$ and White has a great advantage.) $25.\mathcal{W}e1 \mathcal{C}c2 27.\mathcal{D}h1! \pm$ and Black has problems defending his e6-pawn.

17.d5 exd5 18.\mathcal{A}xg7

White’s alternative here is the move $18.\mathcal{A}xd5? \mathcal{A}xc3$ and now the capture $19.\mathcal{A}xc3$ enables White to dominate along the c-file. For example after $19...\mathcal{W}h4$
(in case of $19...b5 20.\mathcal{F}c1 \mathcal{D}e7$
$21.\mathcal{F}f4 \pm$ the black pieces are very passive, while after $19...\mathcal{W}e7$
White pushes the f-pawn forward energetically – $20.f4! \mathcal{A}e6$
$21.f5 \mathcal{A}xd5 22.exd5 \mathcal{F}d8 23.f6
\mathcal{W}f8 24.\mathcal{D}g3 \mathcal{D}e5 25.\mathcal{A}xc8 \mathcal{A}xc8$
$26.\mathcal{D}e4$ and develops a powerful initiative. Black’s best defence probably is: $19...\mathcal{D}e6 20.\mathcal{D}f4 \mathcal{G}g5!?$, but after $21.h4! \mathcal{W}e5$
22.h5± he is not out of the woods yet.) 20.h3 (White can weaken Black’s queenside pawns additionally with 20.\textit{b}1 \textit{b}5 21.\textit{a}3, but after 21...\textit{b}8 22.\textit{d}4 \textit{e}7± Black’s position is still quite defendable mostly because of the control over the c-file.) 20...\textit{b}5 (20...\textit{e}6 21.\textit{f}4±) 21.\textit{f}1 (White can also try here 21.\textit{d}1 \textit{e}7 22.\textit{b}3±) 21...\textit{f}8 (21...\textit{e}7 22.\textit{b}7±) 22.\textit{e}3 \textit{e}7 23.\textit{b}3± and White exerts some positional pressure.

18...\textit{x}g7 19.\textit{x}d5

The game Sakaev – McShane, Germany 2003 (see Game 7), reached that position. Black had to cover the a1-h8 diagonal immediately with the move 19...\textit{f}6 (Black played instead 19...\textit{f}6?! in the game and after 20.\textit{f}4 \textit{e}7 21.\textit{h}3 \textit{fd}8 22.\textit{e}3 \textit{h}8 23.\textit{b}6 \textit{e}8 24.\textit{b}1 \textit{b}8 White could have played 25.\textit{e}6! \textit{d}6 26.\textit{c}5± and exploit the weak e6-square to regroup his forces favourably.), but even then after 20.\textit{f}4?! (if 20.\textit{e}3, Black can equalize with 20...\textit{e}6=, while after 20.f4 \textit{g}4 21.\textit{h}3 \textit{xe}2 22.\textit{xe}2 \textit{b}4 23.\textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8 24.\textit{b}3 \textit{d}4+ 25.\textit{h}2 \textit{d}3± Black has good counterplay) 20...\textit{b}5 (if 20...\textit{fd}8, White can play 21.\textit{e}3± avoiding the pin along the d-file, because the black knight can not join the action so easily as long as the black pawn is on b7.) 21.\textit{d}3 \textit{d}4 22.\textit{fd}1 \textit{e}7 23.\textit{c}5 \textit{xd}2 24.\textit{xd}2± and White preserves some advantage mostly because of his active pieces.
Part 2

1.d4 .df6 2.c4 g6 3.d3 d5 4.cxd5 ignedxd5 5.e4 ignedxc3
6.bxc3 ignedg7 7.d4 c5 8.e2 ignedc6 9.ignede3 0-0

I will analyze in this part schemes in which Black avoids complicated forced lines and he tries at first to calmly complete his development, solving in the process the problem with his bishop on c8. Understandably, White should fortify his centre and he must try to seize the initiative behind the cover of his wonderful pawn-centre. It is worth noting that Black’s knight, which has been deliberately placed on the a5-square by him, often remains an impartial witness in the process of White’s occupation of the c-file and the preparation of the pawn-break d4-d5. He often uses the weakened c6-square (after Black plays b7-b6) in order to establish there his powerful knight.

White has also another plan - to exchange the dark-squared bishops on h6 and to develop his initiative on the dark squares on the kingside. He then advances his h-pawn and he often pushes forward his e-pawn; that is e4-e5 with a pawn on the d4-square. This idea is not anti-positional at all, because Black’s knight on a5 does not participate in the fight for the central squares. Generally speaking, it is quite interesting and enjoyable to play with White and he has many different plans, which provide him with excellent prospects, but the lines are not so forced in Chapters 7-11.

In Chapter 12, I am analyzing an ancient, but still quite logical piece set-up for Black. He postpones the development of his bishop on c8 and he frees the d8-square for his rook. He increases the pressure against White’s d4-pawn in that fashion and he creates a dangerous X-ray pressure
for White along the d-file. The drawbacks of that plan are that Black’s f7-square gets weakened in the process and White can exploit that by advancing his f-pawn and also the fact that Black determines the position of his queen a bit too early.

The system with the development of the bishop – 10...d7 (Chapter 13) – is becoming quite popular lately and it has been played numerous times quite successfully by GM Peter Svidler. Black is not so keen or creating some immediate pressure against White’s centre, but he is trying instead to organize some counterplay on the queenside. He occupies the c-file and he advances his a and b-pawns. His queen enjoys the wonderful a5-square in that scheme. All would have been just perfect for Black, in case White did not have the wonderful resource – 11. b1!. He avoids the X-ray juxtaposition of his rook with Black’s bishop on g7 in that fashion and he thus forces Black simultaneously to tie up his pieces with the defence of the b7-pawn. After the game Sakaev – Belov, Krasnoyarsk 2003, it already seems that Black would have to place that system in a deep reserve... He has tried recently, instead of 11...a6, the move 11...c7 rather successfully (The author of this book failed to obtain any serious advantage against GM Boris Avrukh at the European Club Championship in Izmir in the year 2004.). The readers will see in this chapter how they should fight against that new and rather fashionable system.
Chapter 7

1.d4 ♜f6 2.c4 g6 3.♗c3 d5 4.cxd5 ♟xd5 5.e4 ♖xc3 6.bxc3 ♗g7 7.♗c4 c5 8.♕e2 ♘c6 9.♕e3 0–0

10...♗a5 11.♕d3 cxd4 12. cxd4 b6

This is Black’s simplest reaction to White’s set-up. The game thus transposes to the variation: 10.0–0 cxd4 11.cxd4 ♗a5 12.♕d3 b6 (see Chapter 10) with the somewhat strange move ♘b1 – since White’s rook now is useless on the b-file, because it is attacking the well-protected b6-pawn.

13.0–0

After 13.h4, Kouatly – Zueger, Schweiz 1990, with the idea for White to attack on the kingside, making use of the fact that his opponent lags considerably in development, it deserves attention for Black to follow with: 13...e5 14.d5 f5 15.h5 f4 16.♕d2 g5!? 17.♗xa5 bxax5∞ (Kasparov) – and White’s pawn-structure is superior indeed, but he has given up his bishop and his weak h5-pawn precludes his castling short.

13...e6 14.♕d2

White’s other possibility to fight for the advantage is – 14.♗a4 ♚b7 15.♗fd1 ♜c8 16.♕d2. This move is played with the idea

This is no doubt the best and the most natural line for White on move ten – c) 10.0–0. We devote the rest of our chapters to it. Now, in this chapter, we are analyzing some other moves, which are seldom played in the grandmaster practice: a) 10.♗b1 and b) 10.♗c1, both of them with the idea to remove the rook from the scope of action of Black’s bishop on g7.

a) 10.♗b1

Now, contrary to the variation 10.♗c1, against that move, Black should better play not: 10...cxd4 11.cxd4 ♗a5+, because in that case White’s rook is better placed on the b1-square – Black cannot develop easily his light-squared bishop – but he must play instead:
to force Black to retreat his knight, so that his queenside actions are not so effective anymore. (In case of 16.\(\text{Qf4}\), Black can play: 16...\(\text{Wh4}\) 17.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{Wh6}\); 17.d5 e5 18.\(\text{De2}\) \(\text{xd5}\) 19.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{g4}\) 20.\(\text{h3}\) \(\text{c6}\) 21.\(\text{xc6}\) \(\text{xe2}\) 22.\(\text{d7}\) \(\text{xa2}\) 23.\(\text{xa7}\) \(\text{a8}\) 24.\(\text{xb6}\) \(\text{c4=}\) Kasparov. The best for White is to follow with: 18.\(\text{xd2}\) exf4 19.\(\text{xa5}\) \(\text{xd5}\) 20.exd5 bxa5 21.d6↑. It is possibly even simpler for Black to defend with: 17...exd5 18.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{f6}\) 19.\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{e6=}\) 16...\(\text{c6}\) 17.\(\text{c3}\) \(\text{h4}\)! Black’s queen retreats to an active and also safe enough position, after the deployment of White’s dark-squared bishop on the c3-square. 18.\(\text{xe1}\) (or 18.\(\text{a1?!}\) \(\text{fd8}\) 19.\(\text{bc1}\) a6= Kasparov) 18...\(\text{fd8}\) 19.f3 \(\text{e7}\). Black has created some counterplay against White’s d4-pawn and he has equalized. Later, in the game Korchnoi – Kasparov, Reykjavik 1988, there followed: 20.\(\text{b5?!}(\text{20.}\(\text{f2=})\) 20...a6! 21.\(\text{xa6}\) \(\text{xa6}\) 22.\(\text{xa6}\) \(\text{xd4}\) 23.\(\text{f2??}\) (23.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{d4}\) 23...\(\text{e8=}\) 24.\(\text{d3}\) 25.\(\text{xd4}\) (25.\(\text{b3}\) \(\text{f3=})\) 25...\(\text{xd3}\) 26.\(\text{xd3}\) \(\text{d7}\) and Black materialized easily his material advantage.

14...\(\text{b7}\)

Now, there arises the same position as in variation b1, Chapter 10, except that White’s rook is on the b1-square. We have to see how that circumstance influences the chances of both sides.

15.\(\text{h6}\)

In our Chapter 10, in an analogous position, we have recommended: 15.\(\text{h4}\) \(\text{xc8}\) (Black cannot capture that pawn: 15...\(\text{xh4}\) 16.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{g4}\) 17.f3 \(\text{h5}\) 18.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{xd4+}\) 19.\(\text{xf2}\) \(\text{xf2+}\) 20.\(\text{xf2}\) and here you can see the difference between the placement of White’s rook on c1 and on b1: White does not achieve anything after: 16.h5 \(\text{c4}\) 17.\(\text{xc4}\) \(\text{xc4}\), since he cannot exchange the dark-squared bishops: 18.f3 \(\text{d7}\) and it is not good for him to follow with 19.\(\text{h6}\), because of 19...\(\text{h6}\) 20.\(\text{xh6}\) \(\text{xc2}\) 21.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{a6}\) and White loses his d4-pawn.

Therefore he is forced to continue with 16.\(\text{fc1}\) and Black has countered that in the tournament practice with: 16...\(\text{d7}\) (Now, evidently Black can capture the pawn: 16...\(\text{xh4}\) 17.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{g4=}\) and White cannot follow with: 18.f3 \(\text{h5}\) 19.\(\text{g3}\) ? \(\text{xd4+}\) 20.\(\text{f1}\) \(\text{h2=}\), meanwhile it is quite unclear how he can try to trap Black’s queen if at all...) 17.\(\text{h6}(17.\text{h5}\ \text{xc1+} 18.\text{xc1}\ \text{c8=}\). This was recommended by Kasparov and that position, after
some transposition of moves, was tested in the game Perdomo – Semerene, Brazil 2000, which followed with: 19.hxg6 hxg6 20.f3
\(\text{xc}1+\) 21.\(\text{xc}1\) and the opponents agreed to a draw. In fact, in comparison to the variations in which White places his rook on the c1-square immediately, Black has an extra tempo.)
17...\(\text{xc}1+\) 18.\(\text{xc}1\) \(\text{xe}6\) 19.\(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{c}8\) (or 19...\(\text{c}6\) 20.e3 \(\text{d}8\) 21.\(\text{b}5\) a6 22.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) and Black has an excellent game after: 23.e4 \(\text{b}7\) 24.d1 \(\text{a}4\), but in case of 23.d1± White’s position is still preferable.)
20.\(\text{xc}8+\) \(\text{xe}8\) 21.h5 and after 21...\(\text{a}6\) and the exchange of the bishops, Black should manage to hold the position, Vettel – Pfrommer, Germany 1989.
15.\(\text{fc}1\) \(\text{d}7\) (It is also not bad for Black to play 15...\(\text{e}7\)?) immediately.) 16.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{e}7\) 17.f3 \(\text{ac}8\) 18.h4 \(\text{xc}1+\) 19.\(\text{xc}1\) \(\text{c}8\)
20.\(\text{xc}8+\) \(\text{xc}8\) 21.\(\text{c}1\) and in the game Ehs – Kropik, Ybbs 2001, the adversaries agreed to a draw in an approximately equal position.

15...\(\text{c}8\)

Black should also consider here: 15...\(\text{e}7\)!? 16.\(\text{xg}7\) \(\text{xg}7\), followed by \(\text{fd}8\) and \(\text{c}6\), as we have already recommended in an analogous position in our chapter ten.

16.\(\text{xg}7\) \(\text{xg}7\) 17.\(\text{fd}1\)

It is too risky for White to opt for: 17.f4 \(\text{f}5\) 18.d5 \(\text{fxe}4\) 19.\(\text{xe}4\), Amerllahi – Jacobi, Munster 1996, because after: 19...\(\text{exd}5\)
20.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{c}4\) 21.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{f}6\), or 20.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{c}4\), he will have great problems to prove that his compensation for the pawn is sufficient.

17...\(\text{e}7\) 18.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{fd}8\) 19.e5 \(\text{d}5=\) and Black obtained a very good position in the game Conquest – Smejkal, Prague 1989, because White had to lose additional time in order to defend his a2-pawn. Meanwhile, Black will play f7-f5 after a couple of moves and following White’s capturing en passant – the weaknesses on d4 and e6 will eventually balance each other.

Generally speaking, after 10.\(\text{b}1\), Black has the possibility to transpose to the variations from Chapter 10, in which White’s move ten is practically an inprecision, which enables Black to equalize easily.

b) 10.\(\text{c}1\)

This line was often played at a very high level during the 90ies of the last century until finally Black found a clear-cut plan for equality.
10...cxd4 11.cxd4 a5+ 12. f1

This is the idea of the 10.c1 variation – White loses his castling rights, but he leaves his rook on the h1-square and later he opens the h-file.

He does not achieve anything much by exchanging queens: 12.d2 xd2+ 13.xd2 d8 – since White cannot profit from his powerful centre, while his king is so misplaced. Now, after the natural line: 14.d5 e6 (recommended by GM L.Ftachnik) 15.hd1 (or 15.g5 f6 16.f4 a5 17.b5 d7=) 15...exd5 16. exd5 a5 17.e1 xc4 18.xc4 b6= he achieves nothing from the opening.

The other moves are not any better for White:
14.c3 a5 15.b2 xc4+ 16.xc4 b6 17.ed1 f5 18.f3 fxe4 19.fxe4 b7= and White’s king is obviously misplaced, Grotnes – Elvesness, Norway 2000;
14.hd1 xd4 15.xd4 xd4 16.xd4 xd4+ 17.e3 xd1 18. xd1 and here Black develops easily his pieces after: 18.g4 19.f3 c8 20.d5 e6 21.xe6 fxe6 22.d7 f7 23.xb7 c2 24.axa7 xg2 25.h4 h2 26. a4 xh4= and the endgame is rather drawish, Jupner – Mikuev, Czech Republic 2000;
14.d5 xd4 (It also deserves attention for Black here to follow with: 14...e5 15.g5 d6 16.dxe5 xe5.,) so now, since White has no advantage in case of: 15.xd4 e6 16.b5 exd5 17.c7 dxe4+ 18.c2 d7 19. xa8 xa8 and Black has a sufficient compensation for the exchange, Lopez Abad – Podesta, Buenos Aires 1993, White must try the pawn-sacrifice: 15.xd4 e6 16.xg7 xg7 17.d4 exd5 18.e5 d7 19.c3 e7 (19...b6 20.hc1 a6 21.c7 ad8 22. e6=) 20.hc1 f5 – and his compensation for the pawn seems to be satisfactory, but not more.

White can hardly achieve any advantage by playing 12.d2 either, analogously to the variation, which we analyze in our Chapter 6 – the line: 9...cxd4 10.cxd4 a5 11.d2. The difference between these two lines is the inclusion of the moves 0–0 and c1 – but it is in favour of Black. He can exploit that, for example with: 12...h5. (After the order of moves: 9...cxd4 10.cxd4 a5 11.d2 h5, White is capable of playing: 12.d5 e5 13.b5+ d7 14.xd7+ xd7 15.b1. Now, he does not have the possibility to check from the b5-square.) 13.c3 (Here the move 13.d5, allows Black to trade
Chapter 7

White's light-squared bishop and he obtains a good game after that: 13...\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{e}5\) 14.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{g}3\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{x}d1+\) 15. \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{x}d1\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{c}4\) 16.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{x}c4\) \(e6\).\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{r} - \text{Ostenstad}, \text{Gausdal 1995.}\) 13...\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{g}4\). This queen-maneuver is encountered rather often in the Grunfeld Defence, but Black's queen goes to that square much more frequently from d7. The attack against the g2 and e4-pawns forces White to exchange queens: 14.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{g}3\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{x}d1+\) 15.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{x}d1\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{d}8\). Now, White must either retreat with his knight – 16.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{e}2\) (Such maneuvering with a piece, here and there, can hardly bring White any advantage.) 16...\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}7\) 17.0–0 \(\text{\textit{a}}\text{c}8\)= –, or he must play 16.e5 (weakening his d4-pawn and the d5-square) 16...\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}7\) 17. \(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}3\) \(\text{\textit{a}}\text{c}8\)= – and Black has a very good game in both cases, since White must lose plenty of time due to the unstable placement of his bishops along the c-file.

12...\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{3}\)

This is the most precise way for Black to obtain a good position. The main idea behind that move is to free the a5-square for the knight in order to organize some counterplay on the queenside.

We will now analyze thoroughly the moves: b1) 13.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}2\), b2) 13.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}3\) and b3) 13.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}3\).

White's other possibilities are:

In case of the immediate move 13.d5, Black’s simplest reaction is 13...\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}5\) 14.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}3\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}7\), followed by \(\text{\textit{a}}\text{c}8\);

After 13.e5 \(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}4\) 14.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}3\) \(\text{\textit{x}}\text{x}b3\) 15.axb3 \(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}5\) 16.f3 \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}2\) \(\text{\textit{a}}\text{c}8\) 18.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}2\) \(\text{\textit{x}}\text{x}c4\) 19.bxc4 f6 – Black has the two bishop advantage and excellent prospects, Abdulla – Konguvel, Calcutta 2002;

Or 13.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}3\) e5 14.d5 \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4\) 15. \(\text{\textit{x}}\text{x}d4\) exd4 16.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}4\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}7\) 17.f3 \(\text{\textit{a}}\text{c}8\) 18.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}2\) a5 19.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}3\) b5 20.d6 \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}3\) – White was busy improving the placement of his king and Black managed to organize a dangerous counterplay on the queenside, Krutti – Keating, Clay, Harkany 1999;

13.h4 \(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}4\). Now White cannot play f2-f3, because his bishop on e3 is hanging (this is another plus of the placement of Black’s queen on the a3-square). His d4-pawn is seriously endangered.

White has tried in practice here:

14.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}2\), Hauschild – Plischki, Germany 1996, 14...\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{fd}8\) 15.f3 and now despite all, Black can still play 15...\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{xd}4\) and after 16. fxg4 – 16...\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}3\) and his threats are very dangerous, for example: 17.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}2\) \(\text{\textit{x}}\text{xe}3\) 18.gxf3 \(\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}3+\)
19.\texttt{g1} \texttt{e3+} 20.\texttt{f1} \texttt{d2} – and White’s position is very difficult;
14.\texttt{b3} \texttt{xe2+} 15.\texttt{xe2} \texttt{ac8}
It is too early for the move 15...\texttt{b2+}, Lie – Johansen, Gausdal 2002, 16.\texttt{c2} \texttt{xd4+} 17.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd4} 18.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd4} 19.\texttt{c7} 16.d5 (or 16.h5 \texttt{b2+}; 16.\texttt{c2} \texttt{d8}) 16...\texttt{e5} – and White’s king has remained stranded in the centre;
White should not play 14.h5 either, because Black can simply capture: 14...\texttt{axh5}! 15.\texttt{axh5} gxh5 16.\texttt{g3} \texttt{xd4} (16...\texttt{d6}?) 17.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd4} 18.\texttt{exh5} \texttt{d6}–+

\texttt{b1) 13.\texttt{d2} \texttt{d8}}

14.d5
Black can just take bravely on d4 in answer to White’s other moves:
14.h4, Liardet – Miton, Geneve 1990, 14...\texttt{xd4} 15.\texttt{c3} \texttt{d6} 16.\texttt{d3} (or 16.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd4} 17.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd4} 18.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{d4} – and White’s e4-pawn is hanging) 16...\texttt{e5}, or 15.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd4} 16.h5 \texttt{b2} 17.\texttt{d4} \texttt{e6} and White’s compensation for the pawn is obviously insufficient;
14.f3, Nussbaumer – Kalod,

Aschach 1999, 14...\texttt{xd4} 15.\texttt{c3} (or 15.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd4} 16.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{d4}–+) 15...\texttt{a5} (Now, Black can even try for more than he obtains in the line: 15...\texttt{d6} 16.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd4} 17.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd4} 18.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd4} 19.\texttt{e2} \texttt{d7} 20.\texttt{d5} 16.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd4} 17.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{e5} 18.\texttt{d5} \texttt{exd4} 19.\texttt{d3} \texttt{xd2} 20.\texttt{xd2} \texttt{e6} 21.\texttt{d4} \texttt{xd5} 22.\texttt{exd5} \texttt{ac8}–;)

14.\texttt{d1} \texttt{xd4} (or 14...\texttt{a5} 15.\texttt{d3} \texttt{d7} 16.h4 \texttt{h5} \texttt{ac8}, \texttt{c4}) 15.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{e5} 16.\texttt{d5} \texttt{exd4} 17.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{h8} 18.\texttt{c2} \texttt{c5} and Black has the two bishop advantage in an open position, Laframboise – Gravel, Montreal 2003.

14...\texttt{e5} 15.\texttt{b5}
In case of 15.\texttt{b3}, GM I.Gurevich recommends 15...\texttt{b6}, with the idea to follow with \texttt{a6} and \texttt{d3} and if 16.f4, then 16...\texttt{g4} 17.\texttt{d4} \texttt{e5} (or 17...\texttt{xd4} 18.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{a6} 19.\texttt{d1} \texttt{d6} 20.e5 \texttt{c5}?) 18.\texttt{b2} \texttt{e7} 19.h3 \texttt{f6} – and no matter what happens in the centre, White has great problems with his king stranded in the middle of the board without casting.

15...\texttt{b6}
In case Black plays 15...\texttt{a6}, then after 16.\texttt{c5}, he must perform just heroic deeds in order to preserve his queen: 16...\texttt{f3}! Kobylin – Khamrakulov, Menorca 1996, 17.\texttt{xe7} \texttt{h3} 18.\texttt{f4} axb5 (The other possibility for Black seems to be in favour of White: 18...\texttt{h6} 19.\texttt{hxh3} \texttt{d2} 20.gxf3 \texttt{xc1} 21.\texttt{xd8} axb5 22.
\( \text{e}6 \text{d}7 23.\text{g}2. \) 19.\text{e}xh3 \text{xe}4 20.\text{c}xd8 \text{xd}8= and Black has compensation for the exchange.

16.\text{f}4?!

White is in trouble after that move.

There have been some recommendations for him to play instead: 16.\text{d}4 \text{a}6 17.\text{c}xa6 \text{x}xa6\uparrow; or 16.\text{c}3 \text{a}5 17.a4 \text{a}6 18.\text{b}3 \text{xd}2 19.\text{c}xd2 \text{xb}5 20.axb5 \text{ac}8\uparrow; or 16.\text{d}4 \text{a}6 17.\text{c}xa6 \text{xa}6\uparrow 18.\text{e}2 \text{a}3\uparrow — but White’s situation is quite dubious in all lines, because of his lag in development.

Still, the commentators have overlooked the possibility – 16.\text{c}3, which enables him to exchange the queens and transfer to a complicated endgame. After the following eventual developments: 16...\text{xc}3 17.\text{c}xc3 f5 18.\text{g}5 \text{f}3 19.f3 a6 20.\text{e}2 b5 21.\text{f}2 \text{b}7, there arises an unclear position, in which Black’s chances are mostly connected with \text{ac}8 and \text{c}4.

16...\text{g}4 17.\text{d}4

17...e5!

Opening of the position, while his king is misplaced, can be quite troublesome for White. Later, in the game Ftacnik – I.Gurevich, Biel 1993, there followed: 18.\text{b}2 (18.dxe6 \text{xe}6\uparrow; 18.h3 exd4 19.hxg4 \text{g}xg4 20.\text{c}4 \text{e}3\uparrow; 18.fxe5 \text{xe}5 19.\text{b}2 \text{e}7\uparrow) 18...\text{xa}2 19.\text{a}1 (19.h3 exf4 20.\text{c}3 \text{e}3+ 21.\text{g}1 \text{b}3\uparrow; 19.\text{c}3 \text{b}3 20.\text{c}6 \text{b}8 21.h3 \text{e}3+ 22.\text{xe}3 \text{xb}2\uparrow; 19.\text{c}4 \text{e}3+; 19.\text{c}3 \text{a}6 20.\text{a}1 \text{xa}1 21.\text{xa}1 \text{xb}5 22.\text{e}1 \text{ac}8 23.\text{b}3 a6\uparrow) 19...\text{b}3 20.\text{c}6 \text{b}8

21.\text{xa}7 \text{e}3+ 22.\text{f}2 \text{c}4 23.\text{c}3 \text{xb}2 24.\text{xc}4\uparrow \text{ex}4 25.\text{d}3 \text{g}4 26.\text{e}1 \text{f}6 27.\text{c}1 (27.\text{d}1 \text{f}8\uparrow) 27...\text{f}8\uparrow and Black ended up with a material and positional advantage, Ftacnik – I.Gurevich, Biel 1993.

b2) 13.\text{c}3 \text{d}6

14.h4

Or 14.\text{d}3 \text{a}5 15.\text{d}5 (15.\text{b}5 \text{d}7\uparrow) 15...e6 16.\text{f}4 \text{a}6 17.\text{b}3 \text{d}7 and Black creates powerful threats: 18.h4 \text{b}5 19.\text{e}3 \text{xb}3 20.axb3 \text{xd}4\uparrow De Wolf – Mikhailovsky, Vlissingen 1999.

14.\text{d}2 \text{d}8 15.\text{d}3 b6 16.f3 (16.\text{f}4 \text{b}4) 16...\text{b}7 17.\text{f}4
14.f3  \( \triangle a5 \) (It is also possible for Black to follow here with: 14...\( \triangle \)xd4 15.e5 \( \triangle \)xe2 16.exd6 \( \triangle \)xc3 17.\( \triangle \)d2 exd6=; 15.\( \triangle \)xd4 e5 16.\( \triangle \)d3 exd4 17.\( \triangle \)xd4 \( \triangle \)e6=) 15.\( \triangle \)d3 \( \triangle \)e6 16.\( \triangle \)f4 \( \mathbb{W} \)b4 17.\( \triangle \)d2 b6 18.\( \mathbb{W} \)c7 \( \mathbb{W} \)d6 19.\( \triangle \)f4 \( \mathbb{W} \)d8 20.d5 \( \triangle \)d7 21.\( \triangle \)a6 e6 22.dxe6 \( \triangle \)xe6 23.\( \mathbb{W} \)c2 \( \triangle \)c8 24.\( \triangle \)b5 a6 – and the position is quite opened, so Black should not have any worries while White’s king is so misplaced, Browne – Kudrin, Philadelphia 1992.

14...\( \mathbb{W} \)h5

Black has other possibilities too – for example he can capture on d4 and the variations are more or less analogous to the lines after 14.f3 \( \triangle \)xd4.

15.\( \mathbb{W} \)d3 \( \triangle \)a5

Black should not close the centre altogether: 15...e5 16.d5 \( \triangle \)a5 17.\( \triangle \)b5 b6 18.\( \triangle \)c1! – now White’s king is quite safe in the middle of the board and he can seize the initiative: 18...\( \mathbb{W} \)d8 19.\( \triangle \)a3 \( \mathbb{W} \)f6 20.\( \mathbb{W} \)g3 \( \triangle \)g4 21.f3 \( \triangle \)d7 22.\( \triangle \)xd7 \( \mathbb{W} \)xd7 23.\( \mathbb{W} \)h3 \( \mathbb{W} \)d8 24.g4\( \uparrow \) Boor – Kudrin, Philadelphia 2004.

(diagram)

16.\( \triangle \)f4. This is White’s only chance to fight for the opening advantage. (Otherwise he cannot preserve his light-squared bishop, because it is not good for him to play: 16.\( \triangle \)b5 a6 17.\( \triangle \)a4 b5 18.\( \triangle \)c2 \( \triangle \)c4\( \uparrow \) 16...\( \mathbb{W} \)b6? 17.\( \triangle \)c7++) 17.dxe5 \( \mathbb{W} \)xd3 18.\( \triangle \)xd3 \( \triangle \)c6 19.\( \triangle \)c4 (In case of 19.\( \mathbb{W} \)c5 \( \mathbb{W} \)d8 20.\( \triangle \)c2 \( \triangle \)e6 – White has not completed his development yet and Black regains easily his pawn with a very good game.) 19...\( \mathbb{W} \)d8 20.\( \triangle \)d5 \( \triangle \)e6 21.\( \triangle \)c5 \( \triangle \)xe5 – and White should already think about equalizing with his vulnerable king on the f1-square.

b3) 13.\( \mathbb{W} \)b3

13...\( \mathbb{W} \)d6

This is evidently even better for Black than the transition into an endgame with 13...\( \mathbb{W} \)xb3. Later, in the game Kamsky – Anand, Las Palmas 1995, there followed: 14.\( \triangle \)xb3 (This move is with the idea to free the c-file and
to penetrate with the rooks along it.) 14...\texttt{d7} 15.f4 \texttt{xfc8} 16.\texttt{f2} (or 16.d5 \texttt{a5} 17.\texttt{x8}=? \texttt{x8} 18.\texttt{xa7} \texttt{xb3} 19.axb3 \texttt{b5} 20.\texttt{e1} \texttt{c2+}) 16...\texttt{a5} 17.d5 \texttt{xb3} 18.\texttt{axb3} \texttt{b2}! 19.\texttt{xc8}+ \texttt{xc8} 20.\texttt{xa7} \texttt{c2} (Black's active pieces more than compensate his sacrificed pawn.) 21.\texttt{f3} (or 21.\texttt{e3} \texttt{g4} 22.\texttt{e1} \texttt{xe2} 23.\texttt{xe2} \texttt{c1+} 24.\texttt{d3} \texttt{xe2} 25.\texttt{xe2} \texttt{xf4=} 21...\texttt{f5} 22.\texttt{exf5} (22.e5 \texttt{d2} 22...\texttt{xf5} 23.\texttt{d1} \texttt{a3} 24.\texttt{e3} \texttt{d6} 25.h3 \texttt{a2} 26.\texttt{d4} \texttt{d7} 27.\texttt{c1} \texttt{f7} 28.g4 h5\texttt{!}. Black's compensation for the pawn is quite sufficient and after: 29.\texttt{g3} \texttt{a5} 30.\texttt{e6} \texttt{xe6} 31.dxe6+ \texttt{xe6}, the game soon ended in a draw.

Instead of White's move fifteen, which presents Black with a tempo for \texttt{c8}, we must also consider the immediate pawn-break 15.d5, after which 15...\texttt{e5} is still not good for Black: 16.\texttt{c7} \texttt{xc8} (or 16...\texttt{b5} 17.\texttt{f4} \texttt{g4} 18.\texttt{xd7} \texttt{xe3}+ 19.\texttt{f2} \texttt{c4} 20.\texttt{xe7}+\texttt{)} 17.\texttt{xb7} \texttt{a5} 18.\texttt{f4} \texttt{a4} 19.\texttt{d1} \texttt{c4} 20.\texttt{xd7} \texttt{xe3}+ 21.\texttt{f2}+. On the other hand after 15...\texttt{a5}, Black should not be afraid of the penetration of White's rook: 16.\texttt{c7} \texttt{fd8} 17.\texttt{d2} \texttt{xb3} 18.axb3 b5 (It is more accurate for Black to play here 18...b6, avoiding the weakening of the dark squares.) 19.\texttt{a5} \texttt{ac8} 20.\texttt{b7} \texttt{b8} 21.\texttt{xd8} \texttt{xb7} 22.\texttt{f4} (22.\texttt{xe7} \texttt{f5} 22...\texttt{f3} 23.\texttt{f2}, Goletto – Martin, France 2001 and here the simplest road to equality for Black is the line:

\begin{center}
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23...\texttt{e8} 24.\texttt{a5} b4 25.\texttt{c1} f5 26.\texttt{c4} fxe4 27.\texttt{xe4} \texttt{f5} 28.\texttt{xb4} \texttt{d7}.

14.\texttt{d5}
14.e5 \texttt{d8}; 14.\texttt{c3} \texttt{e6}.
14...\texttt{a5} 15.\texttt{b5}
Or 15.\texttt{a4} \texttt{d8} (15...\texttt{b6} 16.\texttt{d2} \texttt{c6} 17.\texttt{xc6} bxc6\texttt{=} 16.\texttt{d2} \texttt{c6} 17.\texttt{xc6} bxc6\texttt{=} – White can capture that pawn indeed, but his king remains on the f1-square in that open position, so Black's compensation is more than sufficient.
15...\texttt{d8}
After 15...\texttt{b6} 16.\texttt{xb6} axb6 17.\texttt{f3} e6 18.\texttt{b3} \texttt{xb3} 19.axb3 \texttt{a3} 20.\texttt{f2}! \texttt{d7} 21.\texttt{a1} \texttt{xb3} 22.\texttt{hb1} \texttt{xb1} 23.\texttt{xb1} \texttt{c6} 24.\texttt{xb6} \texttt{a8} 25.\texttt{c3} \texttt{a3}, in the game Atalik – M.Rytshagov, Cappelle la Grande 1997, the opponents agreed to draw having in mind the forced simplifications after the move 26.d5.
16.\texttt{c5}
16.\texttt{d2} \texttt{c6}.

16...\texttt{d7}! 17.\texttt{xa5} b6 18.\texttt{d2} bxc5 19.\texttt{xa8} cd! 20.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd4} 21.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xa8}, and since White cannot play here: 22.\texttt{xd7? d8} 23.\texttt{a4} \texttt{xe4}! 24.\texttt{b3
\[ \text{c4 c5 8.e2 c6 9.e3 0-0 10.0-0} \]

\[ \text{d2 25.g3} \text{d4!} + (S. Atalik), Black remains in a superior position with material equality present on the board.} \]

Presently, the plan for White including 10.e1 and 12.f1 has almost disappeared from the grandmaster practice. Black has found an order of moves after which White fails to organize any attack on the kingside, while his king, deprived of castling rights, remains a serious long-term liability in his position.

c) 10.0-0

The diagrammed position is a key starting point of several systems that we are going to analyse in different chapters in the following order: \[ 10...\text{cxd4} \] (Chapters 8-10), \[ 10...\text{c7} \] (Chapters 11-12), \[ 10...\text{d7} \] (Chapter 13) and \[ 10...\text{g4} \] (Chapters 14-30).

In this chapter we will pay main attention to the rather rare lines, such as: c1) \[ 10...\text{a5}, \] c2) \[ 10...\text{a5} \] and c3) \[ 10...e6. \]

The rest of the moves in this position are not so popular, but still it is worth mentioning the move \[ 10...b6 \] (Black's try to exert some pressure against White's centre with the help of the move \[ 10...e5?! \], backfires because after: \[ 11.dxc5 \text{ h4 12.f3} \text{d8} 13.d5 \text{e6} 14.c4 \text{e7} 15. \text{b3} \text{ Gonzalez Dominguez - Greciano, Collado Villalba 2003, he not only loses a pawn, but he presents White with a wonderful outpost on the d5-square.) planning to develop the lightsquared bishop on the long a8-h1 diagonal. In that case after 11.dxc5! \text{ c7} (if 11...\text{bxc5} 12. \text{xd8} \text{xd8} 13.xc5 \text{b7} 14. \text{ad1 dc8} in the game Marta – Micaloni, Italy 1998, White could have retreated his bishop – 15.e3 remaining with a solid extra pawn) 12.d4 \text{ e5} (It is not advisable for Black to play 12...b7 due to 13.cx\text{xb6 axb6} 14.\text{b5} \text{e5} 15.d5 e6 and now in the game L.Christiansen – Jansa, Luzern 1982, by playing 16.f4 \text{ b8} 17.\text{c4} \text{ White could have achieved a clear advantage) White can play 13.e2! (13.b5 \text{ b8} 15.a3 b5z Knaak – Ftacnik, Bratislava 1983) introduced in the tournament practice by GM L.Portisch, gaining the upper hand. The game Portisch – Ftacnik, Wijk aan Zee 1985 continued: 13...b7 (Black loses after 13...\text{d8?} due to 14.b5++, but maybe it was better to play 13...\text{bxc5} 14.b5 \text{c6}, although after 15.d5! \text{xd5} 16.exd5 a6 17.a3 recommended by GM R.Simic, White still has the} \]
edge.) 14.cxb6 axb6 (Here by playing 14...\textit{xc3 15.\textit{c1?! \textit{a3 16.e7 \textit{xe4 Black can restore the material balance, but after 17.\textit{b5 \textit{a5 18.f3 \textit{f5 19.xa7 \textit{xa2 20.b5 White’s passed b-pawn becomes really dangerous.}) 15.b5 \textit{c6 16.f3 \textit{c4 (Black loses after 16...f5? because of 17.b3+ h8 18.d4++, after 16...fd8 White has 17.b3\pm, while in case of 16...fc8, with the idea to manoeuvre the knight along the route d7-c5-a4, White has the excellent resource 17.a4!\pm 17.xc4 xc4 18.b3\pm, and Black’s bishop pair is still not a sufficient compensation for the pawn.

Black plays only very seldom 10...a6. White can counter that with 11.b1!? (in case of 11.dxc5 d7 12.b1, he is able, if he wishes, to transpose to positions from Chapter 13, variation c) 11...a5 (if 11...c7, Sebih - Rojas, Thessaloniki 1988, then with the help of: 12.f4! e5 13.g3 e7 14.dxe5 xex5 15.d5, White can occupy the d5-square, while in case of: 11...xd4 12.cxd4, after some immaterial transposition of moves, there arises the situation in the game Korchnoi – Magrabi, Bordeaux (simultan) 1989, in which after: 12.b5 13.d5 d7 14.g5 h6 15.h4\pm, White managed to preserve some pressure against Black’s position.) 12.d3 c4 (in case of 12...b5, White has the powerful resource 13.a4\pm, forcing Black to clarify his pawn-structure on the queenside.) 13.c2 b5 14.d2 e5 15.h6 c6 16.d5 e7 17.xg7 xg7 18.f4+ and in the game Franz – Weber, Germany 1998, White managed to seize the initiative on the kingside.

\textbf{c1) 10...a5} 

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c}
\textbf{11.b1!?}
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\end{center}

White prevents the natural development of Black’s queenside with that move and he also creates the threat 12.b5.

\textbf{11.a6}

Black cannot really threaten White’s d4-pawn with the help of the line: 11...xd4 12.cxd4 d8, because after: 13.b3! e6 14.d5 exd5 15.xd5 c7 16.fc1 e7 17.f3 e5 18.c5+, White seizes completely the initiative, Ulms – Uhlendorf, Germany 2001.

\textbf{12.d5}

This move serves the same strategy quite consistently and that is – White creates maximal difficulties for Black to develop his pieces on the queenside.

\textbf{12...cxd4}
After 12...\textit{d}\textsubscript{d}8 13.\textit{w}b3?! e6 14.\textit{h}xc6 bxc6 15.dxc5\textsubscript{±} Porte – Broersen, Hengelo 2000, Black loses a pawn and his bishops remain passive.

\textbf{13.cxd4 e6}

Opening of the game with the move: 13...e5?! is extremely dangerous for Black, because his queenside is not developed at all, for example: 14.dxe5 \textit{d}xe5 15.f4 \textit{g}4 16.\textit{b}6 \textit{a}3 17.\textit{f}3 \textit{e}7 18.\textit{c}1 \textit{e}8 19.\textit{c}7++ M.Horvath – Wilkie, Thessaloniki 1988.

\textbf{14.\textit{h}xc6 bxc6 15.\textit{e}c2 \textit{d}7 16.\textit{b}7 \textit{c}8 17.\textit{b}3 \textit{d}7 18.\textit{c}3\textsubscript{±} A.Graf – Pandavos, Greece 1995.}

Black has the two bishop advantage, but his pawn-structure is too far from being perfect and his c6-pawn is very weak. This last circumstance is tremendously important for the correct evaluation of the position, because Black’s light-squared bishop (the one without an opponent) remains extremely passive, while White’s plan is crystal clear – he must bring his knight to the c5-square, via c1-d3 (or b3).

c2) 10...\textit{a}5

\textbf{11.\textit{d}3}

White has no other good move, since he would not like to retreat his bishop to the b3-square, where it can be exchanged by Black’s knight.

\textbf{11...b6}

The same position, after the previous exchange of pawns in the centre – 11...cxd4 12.cxd4, has been analyzed in Chapters 9-10.

As a rule in similar positions, in which the pawn-structure in the centre is still variable, it is unfavourable for Black to reduce the tension with the move 11...c4?! I would like to illustrate White’s possibilities with a fragment of the game Tarjan – Maya Cortez, La Valetta 1980, in which after 12.\textit{c}2 b5 (Black tried to defend here in another fashion: 12...b6 13.\textit{d}2 e5 in a game, which was played much later – Deriabina – Petrenko, St Petersburg 2005, but even then after: 14.f4?! f6 15.\textit{f}2 \textit{e}7 16.\textit{af}1 \textit{d}7 17.\textit{g}3\textsuperscript{†}, followed by 18.\textit{x}e5 fxe5 19.\textit{f}5, Black had practically nothing left to counter

131
White’s actions with...) 13.\textit{d}2 e6 14.\textit{h}6 f5 15.\textit{x}xg7 \textit{x}xg7 16.\textit{fe}1 \textit{d}6 17.\textit{h}4 h6 18.\textit{ad}1 \textit{b}7 19.\textit{ex}f5 \textit{ex}f5 20.d5 \textit{ae}8 21.\textit{df}4↑ and White had a powerful initiative.

The move 11...Bg4, having in mind the absence of the knight on the c6-square, does not create any serious threats against White’s d4-pawn. It can only be considered as a provocation, aimed at forcing White to play the move f2-f3. After 12.\textit{b}1 (It seems also good for White to try here the move 12.h3!?, with the idea after: 12...\textit{cxd}4 13.\textit{cxd}4 \textit{e}6, to sacrifice the exchange with the move: 14.d5!, just like in the lines that we have analyzed in Chapter 9) 12...f5 13.\textit{exf}5 \textit{cxd}4, in the game Haik – Lombardy, Amsterdam 1985, White could have played: 14.\textit{x}d4!? \textit{xd}4 15.\textit{cxd}4 \textit{xf}5 16.\textit{g}3 \textit{xd}3 17.\textit{xd}3↑ and having exchanged the dark-squared bishops, White seizes the initiative on the kingside.

\textbf{12.\textit{c}1}

In case of 12.dxc5 bxc5 13.\textit{xc}5 \textit{c}7 14.\textit{d}4 e5 15.\textit{e}3 \textit{c}4\textit{c}5, Black obtains an excellent compensation for the pawn, because his knight occupies the important c4-outpost.

(diagram)

\textbf{12...\textit{b}7}

If Black postpones the development of his queenside and he plays instead 12...e6, with the idea to prevent White’s possibil-
extra pawn with the help of the line: 14.cxb6 axb6 15.c4 \&e6 16.c5 bxc5 17.\&xc5 \&d7 18.\&c1?!±, but it is possibly even stronger for him to continue with 14.c4!?\uparrow, in order later to redeploy his knight to the d5-outpost via c3.) 14.c4! (In case Black’s knight manages to reach the excellent c4-square, then his compensation for the pawn would be more than sufficient.) 14...bxc5 15.\&xc5 \&e8 16.\&e3 \&e7 (Black chooses White’s bishop on d3 as a target for his counterplay, otherwise, for example after: 16...\&c8 17.c5± White’s passed c-pawn would have become quite dangerous.) 17.\&c2 \&d7 18.\&fd1 \&c6 (Black is threatening 19...\&b4.) 19.a3 \&a5 (It is evidently a bit better for Black to play 19...\&b8, recommended by GM M.Golubev, because after 20.\&c3 \&d4, White would hardly comply with Black’s powerful knight on d4, so he would be forced to surrender to Black the two bishop advantage: 21.\&xd4 exd4 22.\&d5±) 20.\&c3! (White gives back his extra pawn in order to parry Black’s eventual counterplay along the d-file – 20.\&c3 \&ad8\&\uparrow 20...\&xa3 (Here already, in case of 20...\&d4, White may ignore Black’s knight and he can follow with – 21.\&b2±) 21.\&d5\uparrow and White maintained his initiative, thanks to his powerful knight on the d5-outpost in the game Topalov – Svidler, Linares 2006.

The move 12...\&c7, in combination with the maneuver \&c6-a5, reduces the pressure against White’s d4-pawn, so he remains with a free hand to organize some aggressive actions on the kingside. After: 13.\&f4! (it is not good for White to play here: 13.d5?! because of 13...e5!∞, while after 13.\&d2 \&b7 14.\&h6 \&ad8?!, Black is threatening to increase the pressure against White’s d4-pawn with the move \&a5-c6, so White will be more or less forced to enter the variation: 15.\&xg7 \&xg7 16.\&e3 e5 17.d5 c4, Furman – Taimanov, Tbilisi 1959 and here only the line: 18.\&c2! \&c8 19.f4 f6!±, leaves for White somewhat better chances. We must also mention here the possibility 13.h4?!?, which has been tested in only one game until now – Kharlov – A.Timofeev, Moscow 2002.) 13...\&b7 (in case of 13...e6, it is good for White to follow with: 14.e5! \&b7 15.\&g4 \&ad8 16.h4 \&c6 17.h5± Forgacs – Rissanan, corr. 1999) 14.e5! \&d7 (after 14...\&ad8 15.\&g4 \&c6 16.\&fd1 e6 17.h4 \&d7 18.h5→, White managed to organize an overwhelming attack against the black king in the game Kavalek – Tseshkovsky, Manila 1976) 15.h4 e6 (Black’s defence will not be any easier even after some simplifications, for example: 15...cxd4 16.cxd4 \&ac8 17.\&xc8 \&xc8 18.e6 fxe6 19.\&g4 \&c6, Borczes – Szeberenyi, Budapest 2005 and here it would
have been very strong for White to play: 20.h5! → and his attack would have been victorious.)
16.h5  c6 17.hxg6 hxg6, Juhnke – Cordes, Germany 1977 and White would have maintained a dangerous initiative with the move 18.  g4↑.

13.d5

In similar positions, after the previous exchange of pawns on d4, which have been analyzed in Chapter 10, White acts in absolutely the same fashion. Accepting the pawn-sacrifice with:
13.dxc5 bxc5 14.  xc5  c7 15. e3  c4± is not favourable for White at all, the same like on move twelve.

13...c4

White has clarified his pawn-structure in the centre and the move c5-c4 is much more justified now, than on move eleven. In case Black postpones that move – White will be very happy to place a pawn of his own on the c4-square. For example after:
13...  d7 14.c4!? a6 15.f4 e6 16. f5! exf5 17.exf5  fe8 18.f4  d8, Donner – Darga, Hengelo 1968, White could have proceeded with his kingside initiative with the move: 19.  g5↑. In case of 13...e5, Stamenkovic – Nestorovic, Belgrade 1994, White should start to prepare immediate kingside actions with the move 14.f4!?±.

14. e2 e6

Black must necessarily fight against White’s centre right now! After: 14...  c7 15. d4  d8 16.f4  c8 17.f5  b7 18. c6±, White managed to achieve everything that he could have possibly dreamed about in the game Razuvaev – V.Kozlov, Moscow 1972.

In case of 14...  d7 15. d4 e5 16.dxe6 fxe6 17.  g4  c8, it deserves attention for White to play: 18.e5!? . After 18...  xe5, Portisch – Uhlmann, Zagreb 1965, he could have played 19. cd1  g7 20.f4± and he would have an excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn. Black would have great problems to complete his development without giving up his e6-pawn.

15.dxe6 fxe6 16. d4

White can also fight for the advantage in the endgame after:
16.f4  xd1 17.cxd1  fd8 18.e5  f8 19.d4  c5 20.f2±, as he did in the game Vyzmanavin – Chiburdanidze, Sochi 1989.

16...  e7 17.  g4 e5 18.  g5  f6

Following 18...  e8, A.Williams – Rayner, Brighton 1977, Black should consider White’s possibility 19.  e6↑
19.\textit{\texttt{f5}} (this is the beginning of a forced line) 19...\textit{\texttt{c7}} (after 19...\textit{\texttt{gxf5}} 20.\textit{\texttt{xf6}} \textit{\texttt{xf6}} 21.\textit{\texttt{g5}} \textit{\texttt{af8}} 22.\textit{\texttt{h6+}} \textit{\texttt{h8}} 23.\textit{\texttt{g4}} \textit{\texttt{e6}} 24.\textit{\texttt{cd1}} \textit{\texttt{e7}} 25.\textit{\texttt{h4}}) Gligoric – Pachman, Moscow 1956. Black's kingside has been compromised, because of the absence of the dark-squared bishops; moreover his e5-pawn needs permanent protection. All these factors provide White with an edge.

c3) 10...\textit{\texttt{e6}}

11.\textit{\texttt{wd2}}?!

White plans to trade the dark-squared bishops in order to seize the initiative on the kingside.

The straightforward approach 11.f4, after 11...\textit{\texttt{d7}} 12.\textit{\texttt{dxc5}} \textit{\texttt{a5}} 13.\textit{\texttt{d3}} \textit{\texttt{c7}} 14.\textit{\texttt{e1}} \textit{\texttt{ad8}} 15.\textit{\texttt{d1}} \textit{\texttt{a4}} 16.\textit{\texttt{d2}} \textit{\texttt{fe8}} presented Black with a sufficient compensation for the pawn in the game, Cooper – Davies, Birmingham 2002.

The move 11.\textit{\texttt{c1}} seems to be somewhat tentative. After 11...\textit{\texttt{e7}}! 12.\textit{\texttt{d2}} \textit{\texttt{b6}} 13.\textit{\texttt{h6}} \textit{\texttt{b7}} 14.\textit{\texttt{xg7}} \textit{\texttt{xg7}} 15.\textit{\texttt{e3}} \textit{\texttt{ac8}} 16.\textit{\texttt{g3}} \textit{\texttt{fd8}} 17.\textit{\texttt{fd1}} \textit{\texttt{a5}} 18.\textit{\texttt{d3}} \textit{\texttt{xd4}} 19.\textit{\texttt{xd4}} \textit{\texttt{xc1}} 20.\textit{\texttt{xc1}} \textit{\texttt{c6}}, Black managed to organize some counterplay against White's d4-pawn, Remlinger – Dvoirys, Gausdal 1991.

In case of 11.\textit{\texttt{b1}}, it is possible for Black to follow with: 11...\textit{\texttt{xd4}} 12.\textit{\texttt{xd4}} \textit{\texttt{a5}} 13.\textit{\texttt{d3}} \textit{\texttt{b6}} 14.\textit{\texttt{a4}}. Now, contrary to the analogous variation with the previous trade of pawns on d4, which we have analyzed in Chapter 10, the absence of the white rook on c1 is very important. After: 14...\textit{\texttt{d7}} (It seems even more natural for Black to play here: 14...\textit{\texttt{b7}}!? 15.\textit{\texttt{fd1}} \textit{\texttt{c8}} 16.\textit{\texttt{d2}} \textit{\texttt{c6}} 17.\textit{\texttt{c3}} \textit{\texttt{h4}} 18.\textit{\texttt{e1}} \textit{\texttt{fd8}} 19.\textit{\texttt{f3}} \textit{\texttt{e7}}, as it was played (with a certain transposition of moves) in the game Korchnoi – Kasparov, Reykjavik 1988.) 15.\textit{\texttt{xb5}} \textit{\texttt{xb5}} 16.\textit{\texttt{xb5}} \textit{\texttt{e8}} 17.\textit{\texttt{b4}} \textit{\texttt{c6}} 18.\textit{\texttt{g3}} \textit{\texttt{fc8}} 19.\textit{\texttt{bc1}} \textit{\texttt{d7}} and Black managed to equalize in the game Leoni – Davies, Bratton 2000.

11...\textit{\texttt{a5}}

This move is played with the idea to trade queens after: 12...\textit{\texttt{xd4}} 13.\textit{\texttt{xd4}} \textit{\texttt{xd2}}.
It is also logical for Black to exchange immediately pawns in the centre with 11...cxd4 12.cxd4 with the idea to organize some pressure subsequently with the move 12...b6. In this case, White should take care at first about the safety of his d4-pawn with the move 13. \textit{\textbf{Q}d1!}, because it might become vulnerable after the trade of the dark-squared bishops. (The straightforward move 13.\textit{\textbf{K}xc1}, after 13...\textit{\textbf{Q}b7} 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}f3} \textit{\textbf{K}c8} 15.\textit{\textbf{Q}c2} \textit{\textbf{Q}a5} 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}d3} \textit{\textbf{K}xc2} 17.\textit{\textbf{Q}xc2} \textit{\textbf{Q}d7} 18.\textit{\textbf{K}c1} \textit{\textbf{K}c8} 19.\textit{\textbf{Q}b2} \textit{\textbf{K}xc1+} 20. \textit{\textbf{Q}xc1} a6=, enabled Black to simplify the position in the game Bolduc – Caprioglio, corr. 2001. White does not achieve anything after: 13.\textit{\textbf{Q}g5}, because Black is not forced to reduce the pressure against White’s d4-pawn and he can play: 13...\textit{\textbf{Q}d7}! 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}ad1} \textit{\textbf{Q}a5} 15.\textit{\textbf{Q}d3} \textit{\textbf{Q}b7} 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}h4} \textit{\textbf{Q}fc8} 17.\textit{\textbf{Q}h5} \textit{\textbf{Q}c4} 18.\textit{\textbf{Q}xc4} \textit{\textbf{Q}xc4} 19.\textit{\textbf{Q}h6} \textit{\textbf{Q}f8=} and he obtained excellent counter chances in the game A.Graf – Baramidze, Lausanne 2001.) 13...\textit{\textbf{Q}a5} (in case of 13... \textit{\textbf{Q}b7} 14.e5 \textit{\textbf{Q}a5} 15.\textit{\textbf{Q}d3} \textit{\textbf{Q}c8}, Hurme – Sioris, Dresden 1969, White can organize an attack with 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}h6} \textit{\textbf{Q}d5} 17.f3, followed by \textit{\textbf{Q}f4} and \textit{\textbf{Q}g3-h5} 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}d3} \textit{\textbf{Q}b7} 15.\textit{\textbf{Q}h6} \textit{\textbf{Q}c8} 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}f4}!? (This move is much more precise than: 16. \textit{\textbf{Q}xg7} \textit{\textbf{Q}g7} 17.\textit{\textbf{Q}f4}, because Black can counter all that with 17... \textit{\textbf{Q}f6}?!=) 16...\textit{\textbf{Q}c7} 17.\textit{\textbf{Q}h4} \textit{\textbf{Q}fd8} 18.\textit{\textbf{Q}xg7} \textit{\textbf{Q}xg7} 19.f4! (19.e5 \textit{\textbf{Q}c6} 20.\textit{\textbf{Q}e4} \textit{\textbf{Q}a6=}) 19...f5 20.\textit{\textbf{Q}g3} \textit{\textbf{Q}xd4} 21.\textit{\textbf{Q}xf5} \textit{\textbf{Q}xf5} (following 21...\textit{\textbf{Q}d8}, White is not forced to trade queens – 22.\textit{\textbf{Q}h3}! and after 22...\textit{\textbf{Q}xf5}, he can continue with: 23.\textit{\textbf{Q}xf5}+! \textit{\textbf{Q}xf5} 24.\textit{\textbf{Q}xf5} and his attack is overwhelming, which can be illustrated by the following line: 24...\textit{\textbf{Q}xd1} 25. \textit{\textbf{Q}xh7}+ \textit{\textbf{Q}f8} 26.\textit{\textbf{Q}h6}+ \textit{\textbf{Q}f7} 27. \textit{\textbf{Q}g6}+ \textit{\textbf{Q}e6} 28.\textit{\textbf{Q}h3}+ \textit{\textbf{Q}f6} 29. \textit{\textbf{Q}f5}+ \textit{\textbf{Q}e7} 30.\textit{\textbf{Q}f7}–) 22.\textit{\textbf{Q}xf5}! (after 22.\textit{\textbf{Q}xf5}+ \textit{\textbf{Q}xf5} 23.\textit{\textbf{Q}xf5} \textit{\textbf{Q}xd1} 24.\textit{\textbf{Q}xh7}+ \textit{\textbf{Q}f8} 25.\textit{\textbf{Q}h8}+ \textit{\textbf{Q}f7} 26.\textit{\textbf{Q}h5}+ \textit{\textbf{Q}f8}, White managed only to draw in the game Pytel – Straat, England 1975) 22...\textit{\textbf{Q}c5} 23.\textit{\textbf{Q}h1} \textit{\textbf{Q}f8} 24.\textit{\textbf{Q}e6} and White maintains a dangerous initiative.

\textbf{12.\textit{\textbf{Q}b2}}

White should better avoid the possible exchange of queens.

\textbf{12...cxd4 13.cxd4 b6}

The move 13...\textit{\textbf{Q}b4} practically forces the trade of the trade of queens, but Black loses time in the process. After: 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}xb4} \textit{\textbf{Q}xb4} 15.\textit{\textbf{Q}fc1} (White should not allow the move 15...\textit{\textbf{Q}c2}.) 15...\textit{\textbf{Q}d8} 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}ab1} \textit{\textbf{Q}c6} 17.\textit{\textbf{Q}d1}± and White is clearly better, because of his superior development.

\textbf{14.\textit{\textbf{Q}ac1}}

White has also tried in practice here 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}b5}, but after 14... \textit{\textbf{Q}b4} 15.\textit{\textbf{Q}xb4} \textit{\textbf{Q}xb4} 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}fc1} \textit{\textbf{Q}b7} 17.\textit{\textbf{Q}d2} (17.\textit{\textbf{Q}ab1} a5!; 17.a3 a6 18.axb4 axb5 19.f3 \textit{\textbf{Q}xa1} 20.\textit{\textbf{Q}xa1} \textit{\textbf{Q}a8} 21.\textit{\textbf{Q}xa8}+ \textit{\textbf{Q}xa8=} 17...\textit{\textbf{Q}a6} 18.\textit{\textbf{Q}c6} \textit{\textbf{Q}xc6} 19.\textit{\textbf{Q}xc6} \textit{\textbf{Q}fd8} 20. \textit{\textbf{Q}c4} \textit{\textbf{Q}d7} 21.\textit{\textbf{Q}ac1} f5 22.\textit{\textbf{Q}xf5} \textit{\textbf{Q}xf5}–, Black had a good position

136
in the game Flear – Marzolo, France 2004.

14...\textbf{b}7 15.\textbf{fd}1 \textbf{ac}8

\textbf{16.d}f4!

Black’s queen is not so comfortable now. Additionally, he should worry about the possible sacrifice of his opponent’s knight on the e6-square. White’s attempt to cover the b4-square against the possible trade of queens with the move 16.a3, turned out to be just a loss of time and after: 16...\textbf{wh}5 17.f3 \textbf{fd}8 18.\textbf{df}4 \textbf{wg}5 19.\textbf{f}f2 \textbf{e}7=, Black managed to solve all his problems in the opening in the game van Wely – McShane, Reykjavik 2003.

\textbf{16.e}5

This is the most principled move for Black. In case of 16...\textbf{wb}4, the complications after: 17.\textbf{xb}4 \textbf{xb}4 18.\textbf{exe}6!± turn out to be in favour of White at the end.

17.\textbf{d}2

It is insufficient for White to play: 17.\textbf{e}e6?!, because of 17...\textbf{fxe}6 18.\textbf{exe}6+ \textbf{wh}8 19.d5 \textbf{d}d4 20.\textbf{xc}8 \textbf{xc}8 21.\textbf{xc}8+ \textbf{xc}8=.

17...\textbf{a}4 18.\textbf{d}5 \textbf{xd}4

After 18...\textbf{fe}8? 19.\textbf{b}5 \textbf{xd}4 20.\textbf{b}1 a6 21.\textbf{c}4+++, Black will be forced to give up his queen, because of White’s threat 22.\textbf{e}3.

19.\textbf{e}7+ \textbf{wh}8 20.\textbf{xc}8 \textbf{xc}8

21.\textbf{d}3±

Black has some compensation for the sacrificed exchange, because of his powerful knight on d4 and his pawn, but that is hardly enough.
Chapter 8

1.e4 e5 2.d4 e5 3.d5 c6 4.cxd5 

Black does not have to worry now about the c5-pawn, after this exchange of pawns in the centre, nevertheless this must be considered as a small positional concession. White’s pieces are better developed and as a result he usually manages to occupy the open c-file first.

After the trade of pawns on the d4-square, Black’s aggressive maneuver with the queen to the queenside is not so effective anymore. For example after: 11...a5 12.b1, the game transposes to a line that we have already analyzed in Chapter 7 after the following order of moves: 10...a5 12.b1 cxd4 12.cxd4. In case Black makes up his mind in favour of the line: 11...c7, then it is good for White to play: 12.c1 e6 (after 12...d8 13.b3 

14.b5 d6 15.xc6 bxc6 16.f4+ Barrmeyer – Stuehmeier, Verden 2004, Black’s c6-pawn will need permanent defence, while in case of: 12...d8 13.d2 a6 14.fd1 a5 15.d3+ van Leberghe – Kukina, Tallinn 1997, or 12...a5 13.b3 d8 14.d1 a5 15.d3 b6 16.d2 b7 17.h6 Jaskula – Nass, Germany 1999, White can now develop his kingside initiative effortlessly. He plans to trade the dark-squared bishops and follow that with the pawn-advance h2-h4-h5.) 13.d5 d8 and in the game D.Marshall – Scoville, Seattle 1988, White could have obtained an overwhelming advantage with the help of: 14.g5! d6 (after 14...d7?! 15.e1 exd5 16.exd5 e5 17.b5=, Black loses material, while in case of 14...f6 15.d2 e5 16.b3 d6 17.f4+, he cannot prevent the penetration of the white knight to the d5-square.) 15.f4 e5 16.b3+ and the pin along the b8-h2 diagonal is extremely annoying for Black.
The move 11...a6 for Black is also not so attractive for him after the previous exchange of pawns on d4. White plays: 12. \( \text{c}1! \) (We have already analyzed the position after 12.\( \text{b}1 \) in our Chapter 7, while we were discussing the move 10...a6.) 12... \( \text{d}7 \) (Black cannot play: 12...b5??, because of 13.\( \text{d}5+ \); while in case of 12...e6 he should consider 13.d5 exd5 14.\( \text{x}d5 \pm \) Colbus – Zeitz, Fischbach 1993 and White maintains a powerful piece-pressure in the centre; after 12...\( \text{a}5 \) 13.\( \text{d}3 \) b5 14.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 15.\( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 16.\( \text{x}g7 \) \( \text{x}g7 \) 17.h4 \( \text{f}c8 \) 18.h5\( \uparrow \) Razuvaev – Arikok, Geneve 1990, White had a dangerous initiative on the kingside.) 13.d5 \( \text{e}5 \) (It is not any better for Black to play 13...\( \text{a}5 \), because 14.\( \text{d}3 \) b5 15.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 16.\( \text{x}c8 \) \( \text{x}c8 \) 17.\( \text{c}1 \pm \) and in the game Feierfeil – Hobl, Klatovy 1997, Black lost the fight for the c-file; moreover White was threatening the quite unpleasant line: 18.\( \text{x}c8 \) \( \text{x}c8 \) 19.\( \text{xa}5+ \)) 14.\( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{c}8 \), P.Kon- dratiev – Averbakh, Sverdlovsk 1951 and here after: 15.\( \text{x}c8! \? \) \( \text{x}c8 \) 16.f4 \( \text{c}4 \) (16...\( \text{g}4 \) 17.\( \text{d}4 \pm \); 17.\( \text{b}6 \pm \) 17.\( \text{d}4 \pm \), White could have achieved an over- whelming advantage.

Black can still transpose to the main lines with the move 11...\( \text{g}4 \) that we are going to deal with in Chapter 7, and after 12.f3 \( \text{a}5 \) (It is obviously bad for Black to play 12...\( \text{e}6 \)!!), because after 13.\( \text{xe}6 \) \( \text{fxe}6 \) 14.\( \text{b}1 \) b6 15.\( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 16.\( \text{fd}1 \pm \) De Souza Mendes – Tavares da Silva, Sao Paulo 1967, Black’s pawn-structure is compromised considerably. In answer to 12...\( \text{c}8 \), White should play 13.\( \text{b}1 \), while after 12... \( \text{d}7 \) 13.\( \text{b}1 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 14.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 15.d5! there arises a position from Chapter 9 line b – see 16...\( \text{c}8 \) 17.d5!) 13.\( \text{xf}7+ \) (It is not advisable for White to part with his light-squared bishop just like that – 13.\( \text{c}1 \)! \( \text{xc}4 \) 14.\( \text{xc}4 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 15.\( \text{b}3 \) a6 16.\( \text{c}3 \) b5 17.\( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{c}8 \) = Balashov – Savon, Moscow 1971, 13.\( \text{b}3 \)?! \( \text{d}7 \) 14.\( \text{b}1 \) e6 15.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{b}5 \) 16.\( \text{fd}1 \) \( \text{xb}3 \) 17.\( \text{xb}3 \) \( \text{c}8 \) = Razuvaev – Ftacnik, Moscow 1985, or 13.\( \text{b}5 \)! \( \text{d}7 \) 14.\( \text{b}1 \) \( \text{xb}5 \) 15.\( \text{xb}5 \) \( \text{c}8 \) = Ftacnik – W.Schmidt, Trnava 1984) 13...\( \text{xf}7 \) 14.\( \text{fxg4} \) \( \text{xf}1 \) \( \pm \) 15.\( \text{xf}1 \) and we reach positions analysed in Chapters 27-30, or in case of 13.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 14.d5!? the game transposes to the really sharp lines in Chapters 17-21.

Black has tried some other moves in the diagrammed position, besides those that we have already mentioned i.e.: a) 11... \( \text{b}6 \), b) 11...\( \text{d}7 \) and 11...\( \text{a}5 \) (Chapters 9-10).

a) 11...\( \text{b}6 \)

In this line, after the exchange of pawns in the centre (on the d4-square), Black usually develops his light-squared bishop on c8 to the long a8-h1 diagonal. In general however, this idea is
hardly successful for Black in that position and presently it is played very seldom.

12.\(\text{\texttt{xc1}}\)

Black’s knight is temporarily unprotected and White makes use of that to attack it with tempo, taking his rook away from the X-ray attack of the black bishop on \(g7\) against the \(a1\)-square.

12...\(\text{\texttt{b7}}\)

The move 12...e6 turned out to be very bad for Black in the game Molander – Karttunen, Vammala 1995, because of 13. \(\text{\texttt{b5 a5}}\) (if 13...\(\text{\texttt{e7}}\), then 14. \(\text{\texttt{f4}}!\) and White is threatening to capture Black’s queen with the move 15.\(\text{\texttt{c7}}\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{d2 a6}}\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{d3 b7}}\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{a4}}\)± and Black has great problems to defend his vulnerable queenside. After 12...\(\text{\texttt{a5}}\) 13.\(\text{\texttt{d3}}\) the game transposes to variations from Chapter 10.

13.\(\text{\texttt{b5?!}}\)

It is premature to play 13.\(\text{\texttt{d5}}\) because after 13...\(\text{\texttt{e5}}!\) 14. \(\text{\texttt{b5 d6}}\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{f4 g4}}\) 16.\(\text{\texttt{d4}}\) Black has the powerful resource 16...e5! and in the game Seirawan – Granda Zuniga, Zagreb 1987, White had to comply with the line 17.\(\text{\texttt{h3! exd4}}\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{hxg4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{ac8}}\), because 17.\(\text{\texttt{dxe6}}\) was not good due to 17...\(\text{\texttt{xe6}}\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{xg7}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xe4}}\)!±.

13...\(\text{\texttt{c8}}\)

In case of 13...\(\text{\texttt{a5}}\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{d5}}\) Black’s attempt to get rid of the annoying advanced d5-pawn with 14...e6 enabled White with the help of 15.\(\text{\texttt{dxe6}}\) fxe6 16.\(\text{\texttt{f4 g5}}\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{d7 f7}}\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{xe6\uparrow}}\) in the game Spassky – D.Byrnes, Palma de Mallorca 1968, to seize the initiative.

14.\(\text{\texttt{a4 a5}}\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{d5?!}}\)

Now, from the point of view of theory, it is at least as strong for White to play instead: 15. \(\text{\texttt{xc8?! xc8}}\). (If 15...\(\text{\texttt{xc8}}\), as in the game Avrukh – Vaydeliger, Beer-Sheva 1996, after 16.\(\text{\texttt{c1 a8}}\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{d5\pm}}\) White could get some edge too.) 16.\(\text{\texttt{c1\pm}}\).

However 15.\(\text{\texttt{d5}}\) is more logical, white killed two birds with one stone: he restricted the mobility of Black’s light-squared bishop as well as the knight on \(a5\) considerably.

15...\(\text{\texttt{d6}}\)

In case of 15...a6, Parramon Guillamet – Garriga Nualart, Malgrat del Mar 1998, after 16. \(\text{\texttt{d3! b5}}\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{b4\pm}}\) Black is going to have problems with his knight on \(a5\) because of the threat 18. \(\text{\texttt{d2}}\).

16.\(\text{\texttt{d2 xc1}}\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{xc1 c8}}\)

But not 17...\(\text{\texttt{f5?!}}\) 18.\(\text{\texttt{d7 e5}}\), which was played in the game Furman – Smyslov, Moscow 1949 (see Game 7), because of 19.\(\text{\texttt{b5!}}\) 20.\(\text{\texttt{e6+ h8}}\) 21.\(\text{\texttt{exf5}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xf5}}\) 22.\(\text{\texttt{c3 b8}}\) 23.\(\text{\texttt{b2+}}\).

18.\(\text{\texttt{xc8+ xc8}}\)

(diagram)

19.\(\text{\texttt{b4\uparrow}}\)

White maintains his initiative in that position, despite the trade of rooks, mostly because of
the unfavourable placement of Black's knight. It would have been weaker for him to play instead: 19.\( \text{bxa5 bxa5 20.\( \text{xa5 c5=} \) because then Black's bishop pair would have been almost a sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.}

b) 11...\( \text{d7}

In Chapter 13 we will analyze a similar position, except that Black has refrained from the exchange of pawns on the d4-square.

12.\( \text{b1!}

Here, just like in line a, White's first task is to evacuate his rook away from the a1-square. He prefers now to deploy his rook on b1, because it will exert pressure along the b-file against Black's queenside.

12...\( \text{a5}

It seems too optimistic for Black to try 12...a6, as it was played in the game Kramnik – Svidler, Internet (blitz) 1999. After 13.\( \text{xb7 (White has a move, which is quite typical for similar positions – 13.d5, but here is does not work, because of: 13...\text{e5= Celis – Ricardi, Omega 1990 and Black has some counterplay on the light squares on the queenside.) 13...\text{a5 14. b4 xc4 15.xc4 b5 16.c5=} Black's couple of bishops is obviously not a sufficient compensation for the pawn. His attempt to restore the material balance with the help of 16...\text{xe2?! 17. xe2 xd4?!, does not work, because of 18.xd5=.)}

In case Black defends his b7-pawn with the move 12...\( \text{c7, White can continue with 13. f4?!}, (It is also good for White to play 13.\( \text{d2=} \), planning to follow with \text{f1-c1}; moreover that Black's tactical operation – 13...\text{xd4?!}, which was tested in the game Sadler – Conquest, Dublin 1991, could have been refuted by White with the help of the line: 14.\( \text{xd4 xc4 15. xg7 xg7 16.xb7=} ) ensuring after 13...e5 14.g3= the wonderful d5-outpost for White's lightsquared bishop. It is also very important here that the move 14...\text{xd4?}, based on the defenselessness of the bishop on the c4-square, does not work, because of: 15.\( \text{x4! fc8 16.}}

141
\[a6\] exd4 17.\[a6\] xc7 \[a6\] c7 18.\[a6\] xf7+-.

The easiest way for Black to defend the b7-pawn is with the move 12..b6, but then, in the fight for the dominance on the c-file, he should worry about White’s possibility to play \[a6\]. There might follow: 13.\[a6\] d2 (White plans to trade the dark-squared bishops and to follow that with the pawn advance d4-d5.) 13..e6 (After 13..\[a6\] c8 14.\[a6\] a6 \[a6\] c7, Krueger – Lampe, Freudenstadt 1996, White could have played 15.d5!? \[e5\] 16.\[a6\] d4 \[c4\] 17.\[b4\] and he would have realized both ideas that we have mentioned before. He can act in the same fashion after: 13..\[a5\] 14.\[a6\] a6 \[a6\] c8 15.\[a6\] d3 \[b7\] 16.\[f1\] \[c6\] 17.\[b5\] \[c8\], Jarvenpaa – Alho, Tampere 2001, choosing 18.d5!? \[e5\] 19.\[a6\] d4+, followed by f2-f4. In case of 13..\[a6\] e8 14.\[f1\] \[a5\] 15.\[a6\] d3 \[a6\] c6, Prazak – Dolezal, Czech Republic 2001, it is not so difficult already to guess that White’s best move is again – 16.d5!+- 13..e6 14.\[b6\] \[a5\] 15.\[a6\] d3 \[e7\] and here in the game Debnar – Koval, Topolcianky 1993, White could have started an immediate onslaught against Black’s king with the help of the move 16.h4!!?. The tactical justification of that move is the line: 16..\[g4\] 17.\[g5\] \[g6\] 18.f3 \[h5\] 19.\[g3\] \[d4\] 20.\[f2\] \[xf2\] 21.\[xf2\] \[h2\] 22.\[h1\]+- and Black’s queen gets trapped.

Black can try to defend his b7-pawn with the help of simple tactics, by exploiting the unstable placement of White’s bishop on the c4-square – 12..\[a6\]. In this case, White should better choose 13.\[d3\] (Naturally not 13.\[xb7\]??, because of 13..\[a5\]–+. The move 13.\[b5\], Richter – Schosse, Germany 1993, is not so good for White, because of the possible exchange of the light-squared bishops after: 13..\[a5\]! 14.d5 \[xb5\] 15.\[xb5\] b6=. White’s plan to trade the dark-squared bishops with the move 13.\[d2\], turns out to be a bit slow here, because of: 13..\[a5\]? 14.\[d3\] \[c4\] 15.\[xc4\] \[xc4\] 16.\[xb7\] \[c6\] 17.\[xa7\] \[xe4\] 18.\[c1\] \[xc1\]+ 19.\[xc1\] \[d3\] Bromberger – Neverov, Pardubice 2003 and Black’s compensation for the pawn is quite real.) 13..b6 (After 13..\[a5\] 14.d5! b6 15.\[a6\] \[c7\] 16.\[f4\] \[c5\] 17.\[d3\] \[c8\] 18.\[f1\] \[xc1\] 19.\[xc1\] \[d3\] Furman – Dubinin, Gorky 1950, Black lost the fight for the important c-file. He has serious problems to solve too in case of: 13..\[c7\] 14.\[d2\] b6 15.\[fd1\] \[c8\] 16.\[b5\] \[b7\] 17.\[f4\] \[c8\] 18.d5 \[e5\] 19.\[h6\] Karapanos – Bounis, Ethniki 2001.) 14.\[a6\]! (This is much stronger than 14.\[d2\] \[a5\] 15.\[f1\] which transposes to positions from the main line after the move 12..\[a5\].) 14..\[c7\] 15.d5 \[e5\] 16.\[d4\] \[c8\] 17.\[b5\] \[d6\] 18.\[f4\] and White manages to exchange the dark-squared bish-
ops. Later, in the game Zhukova – S.Petrenko, Elista (m/1) 2004, there followed: 18...\(\text{\textg}4\) 19.h3 \(\text{\texth}6\) 20.\(\text{\textx}g7\) \(\text{\textx}g7\) 21.\(\text{\textd}4+\) \(\text{\textg}8\) 22.\(\text{\textf}c1\) \(\text{\textc}5\) 23.\(\text{\textx}c5\) bxc5 24.\(\text{\textw}c4\) \(\text{\textb}7\) 25.\(\text{\texta}4\) and White's advantage was more than obvious.

13.\(\text{\textd}3\)

13...\(\text{\textb}6\)

In answer to 13...\(\text{\textc}8\), Black should consider the move 14.d5!, which we have already analyzed in our previous notes, devoted to the move 12...\(\text{\textc}8\).

Black can prevent d4-d5, with the help of 13...e6, but the plan with the trade of the dark-squared bishops provides White with better prospects too. There might follow: 14.\(\text{\textw}d2\) \(\text{\textc}8\) (after 14...b6 15.\(\text{\textg}5\) f6, Ragozin – Kholmov, Moscow 1949, White had to trade the dark-squared bishops with the move 16.\(\text{\texth}6\pm\)) 15.\(\text{\textg}5\) f6 16.\(\text{\texth}6\) \(\text{\textx}h6\) (16...b6 17.\(\text{\textx}g7\) \(\text{\textx}g7\) 18.\(\text{\texta}6\) \(\text{\textc}7\) 19.\(\text{\textf}c1\) \(\text{\textc}8\), Kemmler – Lueck, Fuessen 1993, 20.\(\text{\textf}4\)±) 17.\(\text{\textw}xh6\) \(\text{\textw}e7\), Ubiennykh – Matveeva, Sochi 2004, 18.\(\text{\textw}d2\)?! b6 19.\(\text{\texta}6\) \(\text{\textc}7\) 20.\(\text{\textf}c1\) \(\text{\textx}c1+\) 21.\(\text{\textxc}1\) and White would have won the battle for the c-file.

In case of 13...a6 14.\(\text{\textw}d2\)?! (It also deserves attention for White to continue with 14.a4?!, so that after 14...\(\text{\textb}8\), Alonso – Oltra, Spain 1992, he can play 15.d5!\(\text{\texth}\) and thus he can create the extremely unpleasant threat for Black – 16.\(\text{\textb}6\).) 14...b5 (It is worth noticing that after: 14...\(\text{\textc}8\) 15.\(\text{\textf}c1\) \(\text{\textx}c1+\) 16.\(\text{\textx}c1\)\(\text{\texth}\), Black cannot simplify the position with the help of: 16...\(\text{\textb}5\)!, because in the line: 17.\(\text{\textx}b5\) ab 18.\(\text{\textw}b4\) \(\text{\textd}4\) 19.\(\text{\textx}b5\), White's bishop on e3 is defended by the f2-pawn.) 15.\(\text{\texth}6\) \(\text{\textc}8\) 16.\(\text{\textx}g7\) \(\text{\textx}g7\) 17.\(\text{\textf}c1\) (After 17.\(\text{\textg}3\) \(\text{\textc}4\) 18.\(\text{\textx}c4\) \(\text{\textx}c4\) 19.d5 \(\text{\textc}7\)\(\text{\texth}\), Black managed to occupy the c4-square with his knight in the game, Brichta – Bogatyrev, corr. 1958.) White realizes the standard plan with the exchange of the dark-squared bishops, without allowing Black's knight to occupy the c4-square. After: 17.\(\text{\textb}6\) 18.d5 \(\text{\textb}7\) 19.e5 \(\text{\textx}c1+\) 20.\(\text{\textx}c1\) \(\text{\textc}5\) 21.\(\text{\texte}3\) \(\text{\texta}4\) 22.\(\text{\textd}4\) \(\text{\textc}8\), Tieymeyer – H.Mueller, corr. 1968, White could have started a dangerous kingside attack with the help of the move 23.e6!\(\text{\textrightarrow}\).

14.\(\text{\textd}2\)

After 14.d5, White should consider Black’s possibility 14...e6?!\(\text{\textg}\), because his a2-pawn will be hanging after the exchange on e6.

14...\(\text{\textc}8\)

The move 14...\(\text{\textg}4\) is in fact
a loss of time. It is not amazing that after: 15.d5 \( \mathbb{B}b7 \) 16.\( \mathbb{A}fc1 \) \( \mathbb{C}c8 \)
17.\( \mathbb{B}xc8 \) \( \mathbb{B}xc8 \) 18.\( \mathbb{A}d4 \) \( \mathbb{A}d7 \) 19.\( \mathbb{A}c1 \) \( \mathbb{D}c5 \) 20.\( \mathbb{D}c6! \) (winning a pawn) 20...\( \mathbb{A}xc6 \) 21.\( \mathbb{A}xc5 \) \( \mathbb{B}xc5 \) 22.\( \mathbb{A}xc5 \) \( \mathbb{B}b8 \) 23.dxc6\( \pm \) Denayer, Huy 1991, White obtained a great advantage.

15.\( \mathbb{B}fc1 \) \( \mathbb{B}xc1+ \)

It is also interesting for Black to play: 15...\( \mathbb{E}e5 \) 16.\( \mathbb{A}g5 \) \( \mathbb{B}xc1+ \) 17.\( \mathbb{A}xc1 \) \( \mathbb{B}b8 \), A.Graf – Gogichaishvili, Odessa 1991, but even then after: 18.dxe5 \( \mathbb{B}xe5 \) 19.\( \mathbb{F}f4 \) \( \mathbb{E}e6 \) 20.\( \mathbb{E}e5 \uparrow \), White's pieces are much more active.

In case of 15...\( \mathbb{E}e6 \), White can continue in the already familiar fashion: 16.\( \mathbb{A}h6 \) \( \mathbb{E}e7 \) 17.\( \mathbb{A}xg7 \) \( \mathbb{A}xg7 \) 18.\( \mathbb{A}a6 \) \( \mathbb{B}xc1+ \) 19.\( \mathbb{A}xc1 \) \( \mathbb{D}c6 \)
20.\( \mathbb{B}b5 \) \( \mathbb{D}b8 \), Alvarez del Monte – L.Williams, Quebec 1982. White could have occupied the c-file with the help of the line: 21.\( \mathbb{A}xd7 \) \( \mathbb{B}xd7 \) 22.\( \mathbb{E}c3 \uparrow \) and that would have provided him with clearly better prospects.

16.\( \mathbb{B}xc1 \) \( \mathbb{B}b8 \)

17.\( \mathbb{F}f4 \) \( \mathbb{E}e5 \) 18.\( \mathbb{A}g3 \) \( \mathbb{D}c8? \), or 17.\( \mathbb{A}a6 \) \( \mathbb{A}c8 \) 18.\( \mathbb{F}f4 \) \( \mathbb{E}e5 \uparrow \).

17...\( \mathbb{A}c8 \)

The central counterstrike 17...\( \mathbb{E}e6 \) is not dangerous for White, because of 18.dxe6 \( \mathbb{A}xe6 \) 19.\( \mathbb{A}d4 \uparrow \).

18.\( \mathbb{D}d4 \) \( \mathbb{B}b7 \)

It is worse for Black to play:
18...\( \mathbb{B}xc1+ \) 19.\( \mathbb{B}xc1 \) \( \mathbb{B}c8 \) 20.\( \mathbb{B}xc8+ \) \( \mathbb{A}xc8 \), because after: 21.\( \mathbb{D}b5 \) \( \mathbb{A}a6 \) 22.\( \mathbb{F}f1 \uparrow \), he is forced to present White with the two bishop advantage, otherwise he loses the a7-pawn.

19.\( \mathbb{F}f3 \) \( \mathbb{B}xc1+ \) 20.\( \mathbb{B}xc1 \) \( \mathbb{F}f8 \)

Black refrained from further simplifications with the move 20...\( \mathbb{B}c8 \), because of 21.\( \mathbb{B}xc8+ \) \( \mathbb{A}xc8 \) 22.\( \mathbb{D}b5 \) \( \mathbb{A}a6 \) 23.\( \mathbb{F}f1 \uparrow \).

In case of 20...\( \mathbb{A}a6 \) 21.\( \mathbb{A}a3 \) \( \mathbb{F}f8 \) 22.\( \mathbb{B}b4 \uparrow \), the weaknesses on Black’s queenside are quite vulnerable.

21.\( \mathbb{B}b5 \uparrow \)

This position was reached in the game Marini – Beretta, Buenos Aires 1946. White’s prospects are superior, because of his space advantage and his much more active pieces.
Black now has three basic responses a) 12...\textit{e}6, b) 12...
\textit{c}6 and c) 12...\textit{b}6.

We must also note (it is important!) that in case of 12...\textit{g}4
Black is not threatening to capture the d4-pawn (the black knight is absent from the c6-square) and that enables White to improve the placement of his pieces on the queenside. After 13.\textit{b}1 (After the move order chosen by Black, White is not forced to play 13.f3 \textit{e}6 and to transpose to the variations from Chapters 16-26. Black should bear in mind the possibility for White to sacrifice the exchange – 13.h3!? \textit{e}6 14.d5 \textit{x}a1 15. \textit{w}xa1=, after which there arises a position analogous to variation a, which has been analyzed in this chapter.) 13...a6 in the game

Vaisser – Simic, Vrnjačka Banja 1986, White could have played 14.\textit{d}2!? b5 15.\textit{fc}1± with a small but lasting advantage.

The move 12...\textit{e}6, has no separate importance, because after 13.\textit{d}2, the game transposes to variation c3 from Chapter 7 (see 10...\textit{e}6).

The same thing applies to the move 12...\textit{d}7, which leads after 13.\textit{b}1 to line b from Chapter 8.

a) 12...\textit{e}6

This move preceded the appearance of the contemporary line with the manoeuvre \textit{g}4-e6 (see Chapters 14-30) with which Black tries to provoke the move f2-f3.

13.d5!
White is sacrificing the ex-
change in order to get a powerful initiative on the dark squares. The other less aggressive lines enable one of Black’s pieces to occupy the c4-square.

13...\texttt{\texttt{x}a1}

Should Black avoid accepting the sacrifice with 13...\texttt{d}d7 14. \texttt{c}c1 \texttt{b}6 15.\texttt{d}d4 (It is also possible for White to play here: 15.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{c}c8 16.\texttt{a}a6 \texttt{xc}1 17.\texttt{xc}1 \texttt{b}8 18.\texttt{f}f4 \pm J.Morgado – Douaouria, corr. 1993 and that leads in fact to a position from line b, Chapter 8, except that White has several extra tempi.) 15...\texttt{c}c8 16. \texttt{d}d2\pm White just achieves a great advantage effortlessly.

14.\texttt{xa1} f6

About 14...\texttt{e}8 15.\texttt{h}6 – see 14...f6.

15.\texttt{h}6 \texttt{e}8

Black has also tried here 15...\texttt{f}7 16.\texttt{xf}8 \texttt{xf}8 and now in the game Perdomo – Lojo, Buenos Aires 2000, White could have played 17.\texttt{d}d4!? a6 18.\texttt{c}c1 \texttt{c}8 19.\texttt{xc}8 \texttt{xc}8 20.f4 \texttt{b}5 and start an offence in the centre 21.e5 \texttt{b}7 22.\texttt{f}2. If Black tries to simplify the position by trading queens 22...\texttt{c}c5 23.e6 \texttt{e}8 24.\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{xc}5 25.\texttt{e}3 \texttt{b}4 26. \texttt{c}c1\pm White achieves a great advantage in an endgame with light pieces.

16.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{f}7

In case of 16...\texttt{d}7 White organizes a pawn-break in the centre immediately with 17.e5! and has a powerful attack against the black king. For example after 17...\texttt{c}c8 (in case of 17...a6 18. \texttt{b}1! White’s threat to sacrifice the bishop on g6 is irresistible and after 18...\texttt{fxe}5 19.\texttt{g}6++ in the game Belkadi – Martinez, Siegen 1970, Black had to resign. He could not have saved the game with 17...e6 either, because of 18.\texttt{dx}e6 \texttt{xe}6 19.\texttt{b}5 \texttt{d}7 20.\texttt{ex}f6 \texttt{f}7 21.\texttt{xd}7 \texttt{xd}7 22. \texttt{h}3 \texttt{e}6 23.\texttt{f}7++ as in the game Sokolsky – Tolush, USSR 1944.) 18.e6 \texttt{a}4 19.\texttt{b}1 \texttt{b}6 (Black loses after 19...\texttt{h}8 due to 20. \texttt{g}6 \texttt{hx}g6 21.\texttt{g}7++ like in the game Eigil Pedersen – Poul sen, Copenhagen 1949.) 20.\texttt{g}6 \texttt{xb}1 21.\texttt{f}7+ \texttt{h}8 22.\texttt{xb}1 \texttt{c}2 (in case of 22...\texttt{g}8 White wins by force with 23.\texttt{g}8 \texttt{g}8 24.d6! \texttt{ex}d6 25.\texttt{d}5++ 26.\texttt{d}6 \texttt{e}6 24.\texttt{h}5 \texttt{g}8 25.\texttt{x}g8 \texttt{g}8 26.\texttt{xf}6+ \texttt{h}8 27.\texttt{e}1++ and in the game Sadler – Straub, Ostende 1992, White had a winning position because of his powerful passed e-pawn.

17.\texttt{b}5

White restores the material balance. This manoeuvre with the bishop to b5 (it is important!) in a similar position in Chapters
17-21, where Black plays \( \text{g}4 \text{e}6 \) in order to force the move f2-f3, is not possible for White because of the resource \( \text{b}6 \) with a check.

17...\( \text{d}6 \) 18.\( \text{x}e8 \) \( \text{x}e8 \) 19.\( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 20.\( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 21.\( \text{d}3 \)

White does not achieve anything with 21.\( \text{c}7 \)?! because of 21...\( \text{c}5 \)!

21...\( \text{d}8 \) 22.\( \text{h}3 \)

After 22.\( \text{f}4 \) as in the game Enevoldsen – Flores Alvarez, Dubrovnik 1950, White should consider the possibility 22...\( \text{e}5 \)!

22...\( \text{e}8 \)

Black intends to play 23...\( \text{b}5 \).

23.\( \text{e}5 \)!

This pawn advance is aimed at opening the way for the white queen to the dark squares on the kingside. 23...\( \text{x}d5 \) 24.\( \text{exf}6 \) \( \text{x}d3 \) 25.\( \text{f}7+ \) \( \text{xf}7 \) 26.\( \text{g}7+ \) \( \text{e}6 \). The black king was forced to venture that dangerous expedition to the centre of the board. White needs to find now the best attacking line. 27.\( \text{g}5 \)! (After 27.\( \text{e}1+ \) \( \text{d}5 \)! – it was bad for Black to play 27...\( \text{d}6 \)? due to 28.\( \text{xe}7+ \) \( \text{c}6 \) 29.\( \text{e}6+ \) \( \text{d}5 \) 30. \( \text{e}3! \) \( \text{d}1+ \) 31.\( \text{e}1+- \) – 28.\( \text{xe}7 \) \( \text{d}7 \) as in the game Gligoric – Ilincic, Kladovo 1990, White still had a sufficient compensation for the piece, but his attack was hardly decisive.) 27...\( \text{d}7 \) 28.\( \text{e}1+ \) \( \text{d}6 \) 29.\( \text{f}8 \)±. White preserves his attack against the black king and the material is equal.

b) 12...\( \text{c}6 \)

Black is attacking the d4-pawn.

13.\( \text{b}5 \)!

This is the best move. The retreat to c2 seems to be very passive, while \( \text{c}4 \) might lead to a repetition of moves.

13...\( \text{g}4 \)

Black is trying to exert some pressure against White’s d4-pawn.

His attempt to attack White’s centre from the other side – 13...f5?! is wrong, because after the move 14.\( \text{e}5 \) White isolates Black’s bishop on g7 from the actions for a long time to come. Later, the game continued with: 14...\( \text{a}5 \) 15.\( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 16.\( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{xb}5 \) 17.\( \text{xb}5 \) \text{e6} 18.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 19.
fd1 a6 20.\textit{b}4 g5, De Cozar Mena – Arjona, corr. 1991 and here after the quite evident move 21.\textit{h}5!± White could have emphasized his overwhelming positional advantage.

The retreat of the knight – 13...\textit{a}5 after 14.\textit{c}c1 a6 15.\textit{d}d3 b5 16.\textit{d}d2 e6, Brumm – Richter, Germany 1991, could have caused after 17.\textit{f}4!± (threatening 18.\textit{c}7) great trouble for Black.

Should Black play 13...e6 preventing the march of the white d-pawn, White can again use the already familiar plan with the exchange of the dark-squared bishops that we mentioned in our notes to Black's move 11. After 14.\textit{d}d2!? \textit{d}d7 15.\textit{h}6 a6 16.\textit{x}g7 \textit{x}g7 17.\textit{a}4 \textit{e}7 18.\textit{b}3 \textit{c}6 19.\textit{g}3 \textit{d}7 20.\textit{ad}1 \textit{ad}8 21.\textit{g}5± in the game Campos – Lasanta Rica, Zaragoza 1994, White had the initiative.

In case of 13...a6 White can play 14.\textit{xc}6 bxc6 and then in the game Riha – Hajduk, Brno 1961, White had the opportunity with the move 15.\textit{c}1!± not only to attack Black's c6-pawn, but to prepare the trade of the dark-squared bishops too.

In answer to 13...\textit{a}5 White can play the move 14.a4! recommended by Botvinnik. After 14...\textit{d}8 (After 14...\textit{g}4 15.f3 \textit{d}7, Greene – Neff, corr. 1976, White had better refrain from the advance d4-d5, so he should have preferred instead 16.\textit{b}3±) 15.\textit{c}1 (White does not have anything after 15.d5 because of 15...a6 16.\textit{xc}6 bxc6 17.\textit{b}1 c5 18.\textit{c}2 \textit{d}7 19.\textit{xc}5 \textit{xa}4= as in the game Taborska – Londyn, Czech Republic 1999) 15...\textit{d}7 (the combination 15...\textit{xd}4?? 16.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 17.\textit{xd}4 e5 does not work due to 18.\textit{c}3+) 16.\textit{b}3 e6 (now the move 16...\textit{xd}4 looks more attractive although after 17.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 18.\textit{c}4! \textit{xe}3 19.\textit{xf}7+ \textit{g}7 20.\textit{xe}3↑ White still has the initiative because the black king is rather exposed) 17.\textit{bd}1± and according to M.Botvinnik Black's position is still rather difficult.

Black often plays 13...\textit{d}7 in order to create threats against White's d4 pawn (threatening 14...\textit{xd}4). In this case White can play 14.\textit{b}1 (White does not have much after 14.d5 due to 14...\textit{b}4!∞, and after 14.\textit{c}1 Black can play 14...a6 15.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 16.d5 \textit{b}5 with equality, Scheeren – Witkowski, Velp 1978) 14...e6 (The move 14...\textit{a}5?, after 15.d5 \textit{e}5 16.\textit{xd}7 \textit{xd}7 17.\textit{xd}7+, Filutowski – Bielak, corr. 1995, lost a pawn for Black. Should Black play 14...a6, White can counter with 15.\textit{xc}6 bxc6 16.\textit{d}2± with the idea to play 17.\textit{h}6, and in answer to the move 14...\textit{a}5 White can simply retreat with the bishop –15.\textit{d}3!±) 15.\textit{d}3 (The plan with the exchange of the dark-squared bishops 15.\textit{d}2 a6 16.\textit{d}3 \textit{a}5! 17.\textit{xa}5 \textit{xa}5 in
the game J. Pribyl – Kirov, Lodz 1978, lead to a draw because of the line 18.\texttt{h}fc1 \texttt{h}fc8 19.\texttt{h}xc8+ \texttt{h}xc8 20.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{c}c4 21.\texttt{c}c4 \texttt{c}c4 22.\texttt{x}xb7 h5! 23.\texttt{x}xd7 \texttt{e}c2=) 15...
\texttt{c}c8 and now White could have ensured the excellent e4 square for his pieces because of the undeveloped black queenside with 16.e5?!. After 16...b6 17.\texttt{g}g3 (White could also play 17.\texttt{e}e4 \texttt{b}b7 18.\texttt{g}g3 \texttt{d}d7 19.\texttt{g}g4 \texttt{ac}8 20.h4 \texttt{e}e7 21.\texttt{x}xb7 \texttt{xb}7 22.h5± and in the game Knaak – Kirov, Potsdam 1985, White has a powerful positional pressure over Black’s kingside) 17...\texttt{b}b7 18.\texttt{e}e4 and the tactical complications after 18...\texttt{x}xd4 followed by 19.\texttt{d}d6 \texttt{x}g2 20.\texttt{x}xd4 \texttt{xf}1 21.\texttt{xf}1 (it is weaker for White to play 21.\texttt{xf}1 due to 21...\texttt{g}g5+ 22.\texttt{g}g2 \texttt{ad}8∞ as in the game van der Sterren – Kirov, Amsterdam 1978) 21...\texttt{h}h4 22.\texttt{b}b2± lead to an advantage for White.

16.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{d}d7 15.\texttt{b}b1 \texttt{a}a5

The move 15...a6, after 16.\texttt{x}xc6 bxc6 in the game Simagin – Fridstein, Moscow 1949, enabled White to obtain a better pawn structure and he could have emphasized that with the move 17.\texttt{d}d2± with the idea to trade the dark-squared bishops with 18.\texttt{h}h6. If Black plays 15...e6, White can counter that with 16.\texttt{d}d3?! \texttt{c}c8 17.e5± planning to occupy the e4-square as we mentioned in our notes to Black’s move 13...\texttt{d}d7.

16.\texttt{d}d3!

It is quite easy to notice that the arising position is almost identical with the situation in variation b, Chapter 8 after White’s move thirteen, the only difference being that White has already played the move f2-f3. It is evident that all these lines are quite similar to the variations, which we have been analyzing earlier in this chapter.

16...b6

In case of 16...\texttt{c}c8, White should continue with: 17.d5!. After 17...b6 18.\texttt{a}a6 \texttt{c}c7 19.\texttt{f}f4?! (There arise great complications in the line: 19.\texttt{d}d3 \texttt{b}b7 20.\texttt{f}f4 \texttt{d}d6 21.e5 \texttt{f}f5 22.exd6 \texttt{x}xd3 23.dxc7 \texttt{xd}5 24.\texttt{x}xd3 \texttt{xd}3∞ Gligoric – W.Schmidt, Bath 1973.) 19...\texttt{c}c5 20.\texttt{d}d3 \texttt{c}c8, J.Wilson – Barnes, Birmingham 2000 and here White had to follow with 21.\texttt{fc}1±.

After 16...e6 17.\texttt{d}d2 b6 18.\texttt{fc}1 \texttt{c}c8 19.\texttt{g}g5±, White managed to obtain a great advantage in the game Gligoric – Kaufman, Los Angeles 1974.

Black has played often in practice here: 16...a6. White

149
should counter that with: 17. \texttt{$\text{a}$d2}!? (It is also interesting for him to try: 17.a4!?), which after: 17...\texttt{c}$c8$ 18.\texttt{a}$b$b4 \texttt{w}$e$e8 19.\texttt{f}$f$f4 e6 20.\texttt{a}$a$1 \texttt{c}$c7$ 21.\texttt{e}$e$e2 \texttt{w}$e$7 22.\texttt{f}$b$b1 \texttt{c}$c8$ 23.e5\texttt{$\pm$}, led to an advantage for White in the game Balanel – Franz, Erfurt 1955; in case Black defends with: 17...\texttt{b}$b$8, Sidelnikov – Jamaletdinov, Cherepovets 2001, White should study the line: 18.d5!? b5 19.axb5 axb5 20.\texttt{d}$d$2 \texttt{c}$c$4 21.\texttt{x}$x$c4 bxc4 22.\texttt{x}$x$d4\texttt{$\pm$} 17...\texttt{c}$c8$ (17...b5 18.\texttt{f}$c$c1!? \texttt{c}$c$8 19.\texttt{x}$x$c8 \texttt{x}$x$c8, Shamkovich – Cordell, USA 1987, 20.\texttt{c}$c1 \texttt{d}$d$7 21.d5 e6 22.\texttt{f}$f$4 e5 23.\texttt{e}$e$2 \texttt{b}$b$7 24.a4\texttt{$\pm$}) 18.\texttt{f}$c$c1 \texttt{x}$x$c1\texttt{$+$} (in case of 18...b5 19.\texttt{x}$x$c8 \texttt{x}$x$c8 20.\texttt{c}$c1 – there arises the same position as after the move – 17...b5) 19.\texttt{x}$x$c1 \texttt{c}$c$6 (Should Black try to exchange the light-squared bishops with the move 19...\texttt{d}$d$5?!), Razuvaev – Toshkov, Saint John 1988, White can win a pawn with: 20.\texttt{x}$x$b5 axb5 21.\texttt{b}$b$4 \texttt{c}$c$4 22.\texttt{f}$f$2 \texttt{d}$d$7 23.a4\texttt{$\pm$}) 20.a4 a5 21.\texttt{b}$b$5 \texttt{b}$b$4 22.\texttt{c}$c$3\texttt{$\pm$} and in the game Genov – Komljenovic, Plancoet 2003, White managed to preserve some edge thanks to the more active placement of his pieces.

17.\texttt{$\text{a}$d2}!? White has tried in practice the immediate move 17.d5, but then he should seriously consider Black’s response 17...e6\texttt{$+$}. After the eventual developments: 18.\texttt{f}$f$4 e5 19.\texttt{e}$e$2 \texttt{b}$b$7 20.\texttt{a}$a$6 \texttt{d}$d$6\texttt{$\infty$}, Black’s knight is deployed favourably back to the centre.

17...\texttt{c}$c$8 18.\texttt{f}$c$c1 \texttt{x}$x$c1\texttt{$+$}

After: 18...\texttt{c}$c$6 19.\texttt{a}$a$6 \texttt{b}$b$7 20.\texttt{x}$x$b7 \texttt{x}$x$b7 21.\texttt{x}$x$c8 \texttt{x}$x$c8 22.\texttt{c}$c$1 \texttt{d}$d$7 23.\texttt{c}$c$2\texttt{$\pm$}, White won the fight for the open c-file, Goroshkova – Dvoretska, Kharkiv 2004.

19.\texttt{x}$x$c1 \texttt{b}$b$8

\begin{center}
\textbf{Diagram 150}
\end{center}

This position was reached, after some transposition, in the game Metz – Klotz, Germany 1995. White should have continued here with the move 20.d5\texttt{$\pm$}, just like in variation \textbf{b}, Chapter 8, and he would have maintained superior prospects.

Black intends to improve the variation a from Chapter 8 with the inclusion of the moves c6-a5 and c4-d3.

13.BackColorRed c1

White plans to push d4-d5 and so he needs to take his rook away from the a1-h8 diagonal. We must analyse now in details two moves for Black a) 13...BackColorRed b7 and b) 13...BackColorRed e6. The move 13...BackColorRed e5 can hardly be qualified as satisfactory, because after 14.dxe5! BackColorRed xe5 15.f4 BackColorRed g7 in the game Kramer – D.Yanofsky, Beverwijk 1952, White could play 16.e5± and restrict the dark-squared bishop of his opponent considerably.


Black tries sometimes in practice the move 13...BackColorRed d7. Its idea for Black is to be able to counter d4-d5, with a counter-strike against White’s centre with the move e7-e6. The game then might develop in the following fashion: 14.BackColorRed d2 (It is also attractive for White to play: 14.BackColorRed f4 e6 15.BackColorRed d2 BackColorRed b7 16.BackColorRed c7,
Cramling – Chiburdanidze, Jakarta 1993, but after Black’s “cold-blooded reply” – 16...\textsuperscript{a} $\mathcal{d}8!\textsuperscript{a}$, White must solve two problems at the same time – how to protect his d4-pawn and how to defend against Black’s move e6-e5.) 14...\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{d}8$ (This is with the idea to prevent the trade of the dark-squared bishops, because after: 14...\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{b}7$ 15.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{h}6$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{ac}8$ 16.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{h}4$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{x}c1$ 17.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{x}c1$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{c}8$ 18.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xg}7$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{x}c1+$ 19.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{x}c1$ $\mathcal{g}xg7$, Cramling – Doncevic, Benidorm 1988, despite the exchange of the rooks after: 20.h5\textsuperscript{2}±, White preserves superior prospects.) 15.d5!? (This is the most principled answer for White, since he should exchange the dark-squared bishops in order the advance of the h-pawn to be effective: 15.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{h}4$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{b}7$ 16.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{h}5$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{ac}8$ 17.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{hxg}6$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xg}6$ 18.f3 e6 19.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xc}8$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xc}8$ 20.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{c}1$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xc}1+$ 21.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xc}1$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{a}4= Mielke – Kretschmer, corr. 1991.) 15...e6 16.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{g}5$ f6 17.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{f}4$ exd5 18.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{x}c7$ dxe4 (The move 18...\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{e}8$, does not work, because of 19.exd5 \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xd}5$ 20.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{c}4+–; 18...\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{e}6$ 19.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{d}4$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{e}8$ 20.exd5 \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xd}5$ 21.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{e}1$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{d}8$ 22.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{c}7+–) 19.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xd}7$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xd}7$ 20.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{c}4+$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xc}4$ 21.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{c}e2$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{e}5$ 22.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{x}e5$ fx5 23.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xc}6$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{b}8$ 24.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{c}3± Ulko – Klimov, Moscow 2005. Black’s compensation for the queen is seemingly enough; at least material-wise, but his bishops and rooks are bound to remain passive, while White’s queen and knight can coordinate their actions perfectly.

\textbf{a) 13...\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{b}7$} 
Black completes the development of his queenside.

\textbf{14.d5!} 
We know this treatment of the position from the notes to Black’s move 11. Both the knight and the light-squared bishop of Black are rather restricted after that move.

\textbf{14...\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{d}7$} 
Black’s attempt to undermine White’s pawn centre with 14...e6?! after 15.dxe6 fxe6 16.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{f}4$ leads to the formation of new pawn weaknesses in Black’s camp. There followed 16...\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{d}6$ (after 16...\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{e}7$ 17.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{g}4$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{ad}8$ 18.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{fd}1$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{d}6$ 19.e5! \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xe}5$ 20.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xe}g6$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xf}4$ 21.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{f}7!$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{h}8$ 22.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xf}4$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xd}1$ 23.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xd}1$+) in the game Wells – Groszpeter, Austria 2000, the absence of the dark-squared bishop makes the black king quite vulnerable) 17.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{g}4$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{ae}8$ (in case of 17...\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xf}4$ 18.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xf}4$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xd}3$ 19.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xe}6+\mathcal{h}8$ Black is faced with grave problems after E.Geller’s recommendation – 20.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{e}5+–, and in answer to 17...\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{c}8$, which was played in the game J.Gustafsson – Khamrakov, Ano Liosia 2000, White can play another recommendation of GM E.Geller – 18.e5! \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xe}5$ 19.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xg}6$ hxg6 20.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{g}xg6$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{f}6$ 21.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xf}8$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xf}8$ 22.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{c}7+–) 18.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{b}5$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{e}7$ 19.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{fd}1$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{e}5$ 20.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{d}7$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xe}4$ (20...\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xe}4$ also loses for Black after 21.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xe}6+\mathcal{h}8$ 22.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{d}4$ \textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{b}5$ 23.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{a}4+–) 21.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{xe}6+\mathcal{h}8$ 22.\textsuperscript{a}$\mathcal{d}4$! (this move wins practically by
force) 22...\textit{\texttt{xf}}4 (if 22...\textit{\texttt{xd}}4 23. \textit{\texttt{x}}xd4 \textit{\texttt{xd}}4, White wins with 24. \textit{\texttt{xg}}x6+\texttt{\texttt{h}8} 23.\textit{\texttt{d}}d8+! (23.\textit{\texttt{c}}c8+ is a mistake, because after 23...\textit{\texttt{x}}xc8 24.\textit{\texttt{d}}d8+ \textit{\texttt{f}}8 25.\textit{\texttt{xf}}8+ \textit{\texttt{g}}7 26. \textit{\texttt{g}}g8+ \textit{\texttt{f}}6 27.\textit{\texttt{xf}}8+ \textit{\texttt{g}}7\texttt{=} White must comply with a repetition of moves and a draw (in case of 23...\textit{\texttt{f}}8 White wins with 24. \textit{\texttt{xf}}8+ \textit{\texttt{xf}}8 25.\textit{\texttt{d}}d4++) 24.\textit{\texttt{xf}}8+ \textit{\texttt{xf}}8 25.\textit{\texttt{xe}}4 and here in the game Geller – Kapengut, Leningrad 1971, Black had to resign because of the line 25...\textit{\texttt{xe}}4 26. \textit{\texttt{d}}d4+ \textit{\texttt{g}}7 27.\textit{\texttt{c}}c8+\texttt{\texttt{=}.)

Black has a difficult position after 14...\textit{\texttt{d}}d6 as well. In the game Hallerova – Savkov, Czech Republic 2001, White could have played 15.\textit{\texttt{d}}d4!? \textit{\texttt{fc}}8 (White can answer 15...\textit{\texttt{a}}6 with 16.\textit{\texttt{b}}b3 \textit{\texttt{xb}}3 17.\textit{\texttt{xb}}3 b5 18.\textit{\texttt{a}}4!\texttt{=} It is extremely risky for Black to play here: 15...\textit{\texttt{xd}}4 16.\textit{\texttt{xd}}4 e6 17. \textit{\texttt{f}}6 \textit{\texttt{fc}}8, B.Koch – M.Christensen, corr. 1958, because he wins a pawn indeed, but after: 18.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2 \textit{\texttt{exd}}5 19.\textit{\texttt{e}}5\texttt{=} White’s compensation for it is just excellent.) 16. \textit{\texttt{x}}xc8+ \textit{\texttt{xc}}8 (16...\textit{\texttt{xc}}8 is not an improvement for Black due to 17. \textit{\texttt{f}}4 \textit{\texttt{d}}d7 18.\textit{\texttt{b}}b5\texttt{=} 17. \textit{\texttt{b}}b5 \textit{\texttt{b}}b8 18. \textit{\texttt{e}}2\texttt{=} followed by \textit{\texttt{f}}4 and \textit{\texttt{d}}d4 and Black would have a quite difficult task.

The move 14...\textit{\texttt{c}}c8 for Black leads to the same position as 14...\textit{\texttt{d}}d7. 15.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2 (After 15.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2 \textit{\texttt{e}}6 16.\textit{\texttt{xa}}5 \textit{\texttt{bxa}}5≈ in the game Fulvi – Bonucci, Italy 1997, Black’s bishop pair was enough to keep Black out of trouble.

White does not achieve much either after 15.\textit{\texttt{xc}}8 \textit{\texttt{xc}}8 16.\textit{\texttt{a}}4, which happened in the game A.Hoffman – Marino Bravo, Oviedo 1991, because of 16...\textit{\texttt{e}}6!=) 15...\textit{\texttt{d}}d7 (It is too risky for Black to play 15...\textit{\texttt{e}}6, because of 16.\textit{\texttt{dxe}}6 \textit{\texttt{fxe}}6 17.\textit{\texttt{xc}}8 \textit{\texttt{xc}}8 18.\textit{\texttt{f}}4 \textit{\texttt{h}}8 19.\textit{\texttt{g}}3 \textit{\texttt{d}}d4 20.\textit{\texttt{f}}5\texttt{=} and White has good attacking chances against Black’s king, Cardilli – Traversi, Arco 2003.) 16.\textit{\texttt{d}}d4?\texttt{\texttt{=}.

Meanwhile, in this case, besides the possible placement of the white knight to the d4-square, Black should worry about the move 16.\textit{\texttt{b}}4. He can counter that with: 16...\textit{\texttt{xc}}1. (After 16...\textit{\texttt{a}}8 17.\textit{\texttt{d}}d4 \textit{\texttt{b}}7 18. \textit{\texttt{c}}c6\texttt{=} in the game Canovas – Trelle, Paris 1994, White’s knight was really annoying. In case of 16...\textit{\texttt{e}}5 17.\textit{\texttt{d}}d4 \textit{\texttt{d}}d6, White’s most principled move is 18.\textit{\texttt{b}}2!? and after 18...\textit{\texttt{f}}6?! 19.\textit{\texttt{xe}}5 \textit{\texttt{fxe}}5 19.\textit{\texttt{c}}3\texttt{=}, White had a clear advantage in the game: Zhukova – Ricci, St Vincent 2004, while in case Black accepts the pawn-sacrifice with: 18...\textit{\texttt{xh}}2+ 19.\textit{\texttt{h}}1 \textit{\texttt{xc}}1 20.\textit{\texttt{xc}}1 \textit{\texttt{f}}4 21.\textit{\texttt{xf}}4 \textit{\texttt{xf}}4 22.\textit{\texttt{e}}3\texttt{=} White has a powerful initiative on the dark squares.) 17.\textit{\texttt{xc}}1 \textit{\texttt{c}}8 18.\textit{\texttt{xc}}8+ \textit{\texttt{xc}}8 19.\textit{\texttt{d}}d4 \textit{\texttt{e}}6 (After 19...\textit{\texttt{f}}8 20.\textit{\texttt{c}}3 \textit{\texttt{g}}7 21. \textit{\texttt{f}}3\texttt{=} White’s prospects are better thanks to his space advantage, Mehwald – Kaminski, corr. 1974. In the game Lytchak – von Rahden, Pinneberg 1996, there
followed 19...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b7}}, and here White had most probably to take some measures about the safety of his king along the first rank with 20.h3!?!±\texttt{\textbackslash b5} 20.d8 21.\texttt{\textbackslash dxe6} fxe6 22.h3±. The game Knaak – Szitkey, Berlin 1987, reached that position. White is still slightly better. His pieces are a bit more active and his pawn structure (he has three pawn islands against two) seems to be more compact.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

\textbf{15.\texttt{\textbackslash d4}!}

First of all White prevents Black's counterplay in the centre concerned with e7-e6.

The careless move 15.\texttt{\textbackslash d2} after 15...e6! 16.dxe6 \texttt{\textbackslash xxe6} 17.\texttt{\textbackslash d4} \texttt{\textbackslash e5= in the game A.Maric – S.Hill, Oakham 1990, enabled Black to equalize immediately.}

\textbf{15...\texttt{\textbackslash ac8}}

Black's attempt to win a pawn at the expense of the dark-squared bishop – 15...\texttt{\textbackslash xd4}? 16.\texttt{\textbackslash xd4} e6, after 17.\texttt{\textbackslash f6} h6 (in case of 17...exd5 18.\texttt{\textbackslash d2} \texttt{\textbackslash e6} 19.e5±, Black has no satisfactory defence against the transfer of White's queen to the h6-square) 18.\texttt{\textbackslash g4} \texttt{\textbackslash ac8} 19.\texttt{\textbackslash h4=, ended up in a catastrophe for him in the game Matassa – Falco, corr. 1977.}

After 15...a6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash d2} \texttt{\textbackslash ac8} in the game Kis – Utto, Hungary 1998, White could have played 17.\texttt{\textbackslash e2} \texttt{\textbackslash d6} 18.\texttt{\textbackslash b1± emphasizing the weaknesses on Black's queenside.}

In case of 15...\texttt{\textbackslash fc8} 16.\texttt{\textbackslash d2} \texttt{\textbackslash xcl} (worse is 16...e6?! 17.\texttt{\textbackslash b5} \texttt{\textbackslash d6} 18.\texttt{\textbackslash c6} \texttt{\textbackslash xcl} 19.\texttt{\textbackslash xcl}± and in the game Radev – Orev, Bulgaria 1975, White's passed c6-pawn supported by the bishop pair turned out to be extremely dangerous.) 17.\texttt{\textbackslash xcl} \texttt{\textbackslash c8} – see 15...\texttt{\textbackslash ac8.}

\textbf{16.\texttt{\textbackslash d2} \texttt{\textbackslash xcl}}

The penetration of Black's queen 16...\texttt{\textbackslash a4}, can be dangerous only for him. After: 17.\texttt{\textbackslash b5} \texttt{\textbackslash a3} 18.\texttt{\textbackslash c6} \texttt{\textbackslash xcl}, Ganesan – Roy Chowdhury, Calcutta 1993, White could have played 19.\texttt{\textbackslash xcl}± and he would have remained with a passed c-pawn, supported by a couple of powerful bishops.

There might arise a more or less similar situation after the line: 16...e6 17.\texttt{\textbackslash b5} \texttt{\textbackslash d6}, M.Ortega – Hervas, Onati Gip 1994, in case White had chosen the variation: 18.\texttt{\textbackslash c6} \texttt{\textbackslash xcl} 19.\texttt{\textbackslash xcl}±.

\textbf{17.\texttt{\textbackslash xcl} \texttt{\textbackslash c8} 18.\texttt{\textbackslash b5} \texttt{\textbackslash xcl+ 19.\texttt{\textbackslash xcl} \texttt{\textbackslash d6} 20.\texttt{\textbackslash f1} \texttt{\textbackslash d7}}

After 20...\texttt{\textbackslash b8} 21.\texttt{\textbackslash b5} \texttt{\textbackslash e5} 22.\texttt{\textbackslash f4} \texttt{\textbackslash g7} 23.\texttt{\textbackslash c7} \texttt{\textbackslash xcl} 24.\texttt{\textbackslash xcl7±, in connection with the}
line 25.\( \Box b5 \), White had great problems to defend his queenside in the game, Plachetka – Mocary, Trenčín 1991. 

21.\( \Box b5 \) \( \Box a6 \)

22.a4† Lukacs – Dembo, Budapest 2002. White’s prospects are clearly superior, because of his space advantage and his more active pieces. It is easy to notice that White’s plan in this variation is quite similar to line b, Chapter 8.

b) 13...e6

Black prevents the appearance of the white pawn on d5.

White has two basic ways to fight for the advantage: b1) 14.\( \Box d2 \) and b2) 14.\( \Box a4 \).

It was not good to play 14.\( \Box d2 \), because after 14...\( \Box d6 \) 15.\( \Box f4 \) \( \Box b4 \) 16.\( \Box c7 \) \( \Box b7 \) 17.\( \Box d2 \) \( \Box x d2 \) 18.\( \Box x d2 \) \( \Box f c8 \) 19.\( \Box f c1 \) \( \Box a b 8 \) in the game Beliavsky – Tukmakov, Vilnius 1975, Black managed to neutralize White’s activity considerably with the exchange of the queens.

The players for White in this position resort to actions on the kingside most of the times. The plan to exchange the dark-squared bishops serves this purpose as well as the idea to push 14.e5 restricting the dark-squared bishop of the opponent. Still after 14.e5 \( \Box b 7 \) 15.\( \Box f 4 \) Black has the powerful resource 15...\( \Box h 4 \)! (It is weaker to play 15...\( \Box e 7 \) due to 16.\( \Box g 4 \) \( \Box c 6 \) 17.\( \Box h 4 \) \( \Box b 4 \) 18.\( \Box c 4 \) b5 19.\( \Box b 3 \) h5 20.\( \Box g 3 \) as in the game Gligoric – Tukmakov, Odessa 1975, or 15...\( \Box d 7 \) because of 16.h4 \( \Box a c 8 \) 17.\( \Box x c 8 \) \( \Box x c 8 \) 18.h5 \( \Box c 4 \) 19.hxg6 hxg6 20.\( \Box g 4 \) which happened in the game Browne – Silman, Reno 1988). Now if White plans to continue with his attempts to seize the initiative on the kingside he must weaken the long a8-h1 diagonal with the move 16.g3 (after 16.\( \Box e 2 \) \( \Box a c 8 \) 17.\( \Box a 6 \) \( \Box e 7 \) 18.\( \Box b 7 \) \( \Box b 7 \) 19.h4 \( \Box x c 1 \) 20.\( \Box x c 1 \) \( \Box c 8 \) 21.h5 \( \Box x c 1 + \) 22.\( \Box x c 1 \) \( \Box c 6 \) in the game Reust – Goormachtigh, Winterthur 1976, the position was simplified and Black’s pawn majority on the queenside became a telling factor together with the weakness of the light squares in White’s camp) in order to repel
the black queen from the g4 square. There might follow: 16...\textit{g}e7 17.\textit{g}g4 \textit{fd}8 (after 17...\textit{fc}8 18.h4 \textit{xc}1 19.\textit{xc}1 \textit{c}6 20.h5↑ in the game Vogel – Gerbert, Germany 1981, White managed to preserve his initiative on the kingside) 18.h4 \textit{c}6 19.\textit{fd}1 (it is not good for White to play 19.\textit{b}1? because of 19...\textit{xe}5 20.\textit{xe}6 \textit{d}6? and the weaknesses along the a8-h1 diagonal were a real trouble for White in the game Mista – Trapl, Trnava 1980) 19...\textit{xd}4!? (after 19...\textit{b}4 20.\textit{b}1 \textit{d}5 21.h5 \textit{xf}4 22.\textit{xf}4↑ in the game Vogel – Schirm, Germany 2000, White still had the initiative) 20.\textit{xe}6 \textit{h}xg6 21.\textit{xd}4 \textit{b}4 22.\textit{e}2 \textit{d}7 and White’s pieces in the centre were unstable and so his initiative on the kingside was too hard to organize.

\textbf{b1) 14.\textit{d}2}

White plans to trade the dark-squared bishops in order to develop his initiative on the kingside.

14...\textit{b}7

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

15.h4!?

This is an important moment. White brings into the attack of his opponent’s kingside his h-pawn, before the exchange of the dark-squared bishops.

The attempt to capture the pawn with 15...\textit{hx}4? leads to a disaster for Black after 16.\textit{g}5 \textit{g}4 17.f3 \textit{h}5 18.\textit{g}3 \textit{xd}4+ 19.\textit{f}2 \textit{xf}2+ 20.\textit{xf}2 \textit{h}2 21.\textit{h}1+ and the black queen gets trapped.

The immediate trade of the bishops with 15.\textit{h}6 was countered with 15...\textit{e}7!? 16.\textit{hx}g7 (16.h4 \textit{fd}8 17.\textit{hx}g7 \textit{g}7 18.h5 \textit{c}6 Farago – Tukmakov, Hastings 1982, and enabled Black to create some counterplay against White’s d4-pawn) 16...\textit{hx}g7 17.\textit{f}4 \textit{ac}8 18.h4 \textit{c}6 19.h5 (White’s passed d-pawn after: 19.d5 \textit{ex}d5 20.\textit{ex}d5 \textit{e}5 21.\textit{d}4 \textit{f}6 22.h5 \textit{cd}8↑, did not trouble Black at all in the game Ftcnik – Banas, Strbske Pleso 1978.) 19...e5!? (It is also possible for Black to play: 19...\textit{fd}8 20.\textit{g}3, Lobron – Dorfman, Cannes 1992 and here it seemed very good for him to follow with: 20...\textit{d}6! in order to be able after 21.e5?! to win a pawn with: 21...\textit{xe}5! 22.\textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8 23.\textit{dx}e5 \textit{ex}d3↑ 20.\textit{e}3 (In case of 20.\textit{g}3? \textit{xd}4 21.\textit{xd}4 \textit{ex}d4 22.\textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8↑, White has no compensation for the pawn, Potratz – Brenke, corr. 1992. Following 20.h6+ \textit{h}8 21.\textit{xd}4, Podewski – Schaefer, corr. 1976, Black can equalize easily after: 21...
22...\text{f6}=) 20...\text{exd4} 21.h6+ (21...\text{xd4} \text{xd4} 22...\text{xd4} f6=) 21...\text{g8} (Black can also try to simplify the position with: 21...\text{h8}!?) 22...\text{xd4} \text{xd4} 23. \text{f6=} 22...\text{xd4} \text{e5} (In case Black's king remains on g8, the exchange: 22...\text{xd4} 23. \text{f6, after:} 24...\text{c4}+ \text{h8} 25. \text{d5±, leaves White with clearly superior prospects.)} 23. \text{e2 h4!} (Now, White must defend his pawns on e4 and h6.) 24...\text{f3} \text{xf3}+ 25. \text{xf3} g5 26. \text{fd1} \text{hxh6} (26...\text{xc1} 27...\text{xc1}, Wendt – Geider, corr. 1986, 27...\text{h6} 28...\text{xc7} \text{c8} 29...\text{xa7} \text{f6=}) 27. \text{g4} (27. \text{d7} \text{xc1}+ 28. \text{xc1} \text{c8} 29...\text{xa7} \text{f6=}) 27...\text{xc1} 28...\text{xc1} \text{g7=} \text{L.Szabo – Filip, Moscow 1956.}

15...\text{d7}

Black places his queen on the d7-square and he hopes in the future (after the exchange of the dark-squared bishops) to be able to build some pressure against White's d4-pawn.

The tournament practice has shown that the other possibilities for Black are worse.

For example after 15...\text{f5}, White plays 16.e6! \text{d7} 17.h5 \text{fc8} 18.hxg6 hxg6 19...\text{h6± and not only Black must worry about the vulnerable dark squares around his king, but he should think about the defence of his weak e6 and g6-pawns, Knaak – Heinig, Cottbus 1983.}

The exchange of a pair of rooks – 15...\text{c8} 16.h5 \text{xc1} 17...\text{xc1} \text{a8} (after 17...\text{d7} 18.h6 \text{f6} 19.e5 \text{e7} 20...\text{g5± Black's dark squares are again too weak) 18.h6 \text{h8, in the game Guseinov – V.Kozlov, USSR 1987, led after 19.f3! (with the idea to follow with e4-e5) 19...\text{f6} 20.e5 \text{e7} 21...\text{g5} \text{d8} 22...\text{xe7} \text{xe7} 23...\text{f4± to a position, in which he has great problems defending the dark squares around his king.}

It is logical for Black to follow with 15...\text{c6}, with the idea to exert pressure against White’s d4-pawn, but then Black should worry about the line: 16...\text{b5!? c8} (16...\text{e7} 17.f3 \text{e8} 18...\text{h6} a6 19...\text{a4 b5} 20...\text{b3} \text{d6} 21.h5\text{ De Boer – Henley, Amsterdam 1983) 17.h5 a6 18...\text{xc6} \text{xc6} 19...\text{f3} \text{d7} 20...\text{h6± Knaak – Jansa, Polanica Zdroj 1979.}

Black has tried in practice the move 15...\text{e7}, but after: 16.h5 \text{fc8} (In principle, Black cannot change anything with: 16...\text{ac8} 17...\text{g5! f6} 18...\text{xf6} \text{xf6} 19.h6 \text{xc1} 20...\text{xc1} \text{d8} 21...\text{c7± Lu- kacs – Kaposztas, Hungary 1984.) the fact that the dark-squared bishops have not been exchanged yet – works in favour of White. He has the additional resource – 17...\text{g5!}. Now, before he exchanges the dark-squared bishops, White plans to either worsen the placement of Black's pieces, or to provoke the move f7-f6, which will compromise the shelter of his opponent's king. Black has tried in this position:
17...\(\text{\#}a3\) (After 17...\(\text{\#}f6\) 18.\(\text{\#}h6\), the trade of the dark-squared bishops after: 18...\(\text{\#}c6\) 19.\(\text{\#}xg7\ \text{\#}xg7\), Maiorescu – Fecht, corr. 1988, 20.\(\text{\#}e3!\)? \(\text{\#}d6\) 21.\(\text{\#}xg6\ \text{hxg6}\) 22.\(\text{\#}e5\ \text{fxe5}\) 23.\(\text{\#}e4\), enables White to organize a dangerous attack. Should Black avoid the exchange of bishops – 18...\(\text{\#}h8\), Markytan – Kuhn, corr. 1986, White maintains his initiative with: 19.\(\text{\#}xg6\ \text{hxg6}\) 20.\(\text{\#}f4\). It is possible that Black’s best defence is the move: 17...\(\text{\#}d7\), but even then after 18.\(\text{\#}e5\), White’s position is better.) 18.\(\text{\#}e5\) \(\text{\#}a4\) (Black has also tried in practice: 18...\(\text{\#}d5\) 19.\(\text{\#}c3\ \text{\#}c4\), B.Zueger – Gobet, Geneve 1988, but then after: 20.\(\text{\#}e2\) Black cannot keep his knight on the c4-square and the tactical combination: 20...\(\text{\#}e3!\) 21.\(\text{\#}xe3\ \text{\#}xc3\) 22.\(\text{\#}xc3\ \text{\#}xc3\), does not work, because of: 23. \(\text{\#}f2\ \text{\#}f8\) 24.\(\text{\#}e7+\) 19.\(\text{\#}f6\ \text{\#}d7\) 20.\(\text{\#}xg7\ \text{\#}xg7\) 21.\(\text{\#}f4\) as in the game Lukacs – At.Schneider, Hungary 1984, Black’s position was very difficult because of the weaknesses of the dark squares around the black king.

16.\(\text{\#}h6\)

Now, White must exchange the bishops. In case he postpones that, Black might remove his rook away from the f8-square and the trade of the bishops would become impossible.

For example after: 16.\(\text{\#}h5\ \#fc8!\) (or 16...\(\text{\#}ac8\) 17.\(\text{\#}h6\)) 17.\(\text{\#}h6\) (Black can counter 17...\(\text{\#}h6\) with 17...\(\text{\#}h8\) 18.\(\text{\#}xc8+\ \text{\#}xc8\) 19.\(\text{\#}c1\ \text{\#}xc1+\) 20.\(\text{\#}xc1\ \text{\#}c6=\) Knaak – Kirov, Polanica Zdroj 1976.) 17...\(\text{\#}f8\) 18.\(\text{\#}g5\ \text{\#}xc1\) (Or 18...\(\text{\#}e7?!\) 19.\(\text{\#}f4\) Lukacs – Mohr, Budapest 1991. 19.\(\text{\#}xc1\ \text{\#}c8\) 20.\(\text{\#}xc8\ \text{\#}xc8\) 21.\(\text{\#}g3\ \text{\#}c6=\), the position had been simplified, but White did not achieve anything real on the kingside in the game, Erdos – Banas, Pula 2003.)

16...\(\text{\#}xh6!\)

Black exchanges the bishops on the h6-square with the idea to maim White’s queen away from the defence of the d4-pawn.

Black has tested in practice mostly the move: 16...\(\text{\#}ac8?!\), with the idea to begin simplifying the position, but that is in fact an imprecise move. After 17.\(\text{\#}xg7\ \text{\#}xg7\) 18.\(\text{\#}h5\) (It is weaker for White to play 18.\(\text{\#}g5\), because of 18...\(\text{\#}d8\) 19.\(\text{\#}g3\ \text{\#}c6\) 20.\(\text{\#}h5\ \text{\#}e7\), and Black managed to organize his defence successfully, Razuvaev – Jansa, Polanica Zdroj 1979.) 18...\(\text{\#}xc1\) (The move 18...\(\text{\#}h6\), weakens the shelter of Black’s king and after: 19.\(\text{\#}b2\ \text{\#}h7\) 20.\(\text{\#}f4\) 21.\(\text{\#}e2\) \text{f6} 22.\(\text{\#}f4\) \(\text{\#}g7\) 23.\text{fxg5} \text{hxg5} 24.\text{d5} \text{\#xc1} 25.\text{\#xc1} \text{exd5} 26.\text{e5} \text{\#c6}, Kaiser
Pomm, corr. 1990, White could have postponed capturing on f6 with the help of the move 27. \(\text{\textit{e3!}}\) and he would have created plenty of difficult problems for Black. The move 18...f6, Prescha – Seils, Germany 1997, has similar drawbacks too. White should counter it with: 19.hxg6!? hxg6 20.e5\(\pm\) 19.\(\text{\textit{xc1}}\) \(\text{\textit{c8}}\) 20.h6+ (White’s h6-pawn becomes extremely unpleasant for Black’s king, because of the absence of the dark-squared bishop.) 20...\(\text{\textit{g8}}\) (It is not better for Black to play: 20...\(\text{\textit{f8}}\), because of 21.\(\text{\textit{xc8+}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc8}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{xf4}}\) \(\text{\textit{e7}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{e5}}\) f6 24.\(\text{\textit{xb8}}\) \(\text{\textit{b7}}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{f4+}}\) E.Vladimirov.) 21.\(\text{\textit{xc8+}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc8}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{g5}}\) \(\text{\textit{f8}}\) (22...\(\text{\textit{c6}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{f6}}\) \(\text{\textit{f8}}\) 24.d5! exd5 25.exd5 \(\text{\textit{b8}}\) 26.d6 \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 27.\(\text{\textit{b5}}\) \(\text{\textit{c8}}\) 28.\(\text{\textit{f4}}\) \(\text{\textit{d7}}\) 29. \(\text{\textit{d5+-}}\) L.Christiansen – Wurzel, Porz 1991) 23.\(\text{\textit{f4}}\) \(\text{\textit{c6}}\) (After White has pushed his h-pawn all the way up to the h6-square, it seems logical for Black to ensure an escape square for his king with the move 23...f6, but then it is very strong for White to play: 24.\(\text{\textit{g4}}\) \(\text{\textit{c8}}\) 25.e5! \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 26.\(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) \(\text{\textit{f7}}\) 27.\(\text{\textit{a6}}\) \(\text{\textit{d7}}\) 28.d5\(\pm\) E.Vladimirov – Semenjuk, USSR 1987.) 23...\(\text{\textit{c6}}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{h5}}\) (It is also good for White to follow with: 24.d5 exd5 25.\(\text{\textit{xd5+}}\) E.Vladimirov.) 24...\(\text{\textit{d6}}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{f6+}}\) \(\text{\textit{h8}}\) 26.e5 \(\text{\textit{d8}}\) (26...\(\text{\textit{xd4?}}\) 27.\(\text{\textit{d7+}}\)\(\pm\)) 27.\(\text{\textit{e4+}}\) and Black was on the verge of disaster in the game, Knaak - Hartston, Tallinn 1979.

White’s initiative is developing in a more or less similar scheme after: 16...\(\text{\textit{xf8}}\). Following: 17.\(\text{\textit{xg7}}\) \(\text{\textit{xg7}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{e5}}\) \(\text{\textit{e7}}\) (The weakening of the position of the black king with the move 18...f6, after 19 hxg6 hxg6 20.\(\text{\textit{f4}}\) \(\text{\textit{c6}}\), Prats – Castro, corr. 1988, and then: 21.e5! fxe5 22.\(\text{\textit{g5+}}\), enabled White to organize a dangerous attack. In case of 18...\(\text{\textit{d8}}\), Seifert – Noack, Leutersdorf 2000, it was worth for White to continue with his initiative on the dark squares with the move 19.\(\text{\textit{xf4+}}\)\(\uparrow\) 19.\(\text{\textit{xf4}}\) (19.h6+ \(\text{\textit{g8}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{e3}}\) \(\text{\textit{c6}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{xf4}}\) \(\text{\textit{d4}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{c4}}\) \(\text{\textit{h4+}}\) Lepikhov – Finhaber, corr. 1988) 19...\(\text{\textit{g5}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{e3}}\) h6 21.e5 f5 22.exf6+ \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 23.f4! (This move destroys the pawn-shelter around Black’s king even more...) 23...\(\text{\textit{xc1}}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{ xc1}}\) \(\text{\textit{c8}}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{xc8}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc8}}\) 26.fg hg 27.\(\text{\textit{g3+}}\), it becomes obvious that Black’s king shelter is quite unreliable, De Mauro – Mallee, corr. 1991.

Instead of the exchange on the h6-square, Black can try instead the move 16...\(\text{\textit{c6}}\). In this case, White can follow with: 17.\(\text{\textit{xg7}}\) \(\text{\textit{xg7}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{b5}}\) a6 19. d5! (19.\(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) 20.d5 \(\text{\textit{b5=}}\) Kasparov – Lutz, Frankfurt (simultan) 1986) 19...\(\text{\textit{xb5}}\) (19... \(\text{\textit{exd5??}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{c3+}}\) \(\text{\textit{g8}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{xc6+}}\)\(\pm\) 20.\(\text{\textit{c3+}}\) \(\text{\textit{e5}}\) (After 20...\(\text{\textit{g8??}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{xc6+}}\), Black loses a piece, while following: 20...\(\text{\textit{d4}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{xd4}}\) \(\text{\textit{g8}}\) 22. \(\text{\textit{xb6\pm}}\), he loses a pawn.) 21. \(\text{\textit{xe5+}}\) f6 (21...\(\text{\textit{g8??}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{c7+-}}\)\(\pm\) 22.\(\text{\textit{xc7}}\) fxe5 23.\(\text{\textit{xd7+}}\) \(\text{\textit{f7}}\) 24.
what better in that position, because of the vulnerability of the dark squares around Black’s king.

b2) 14.a4!? 

White plans to exploit the misplaced position of the knight on a5.

14...d7

The idea to exchange queens with 14...d7 is not good for Black at all after 15.b5 b7 16.f3. Moreover if 16...a6 17.d3 d7 18.b4 f8 like in the game Razuvaev – Gorshkov, Cheliabinsk 1975, White could have played 19.xc8+!? xc8 20.b1 b8 21.a3!± followed by 22.f4 emphasizing the weakness of Black’s queenside.

In case of 14...b7 the black knight is deprived of the b7 square to retreat to and White can exploit that with the move the move 15.d2! is with the idea to compromise Black’s pawn-structure on the queenside. After: 15...c8 (In case of 15...e8, Del Rey – Saldano Dayer, Buenos Aires 1993, White can play the enterprising line 16.xa5 bxa5
17.\textit{c}5\pm. The attempt to create some counterplay in the centre with 15...f5 16.exf5 gxf5 17.\textit{xa}5 bxa5 in the game Graf–Semerniuk, Khabarovsky 1990, lead to the formation of additional pawn weaknesses in Black’s position and White had to make use of that immediately with the move 18.\textit{c}4\pm. The waiting move 15...\textit{h}8 after 16.\textit{xa}5 bxa5 17.\textit{xc}5 e5 18.d5\pm in the game Bangiev–Kaposztas, Kecskemet 1988, gave White clearly better prospects due to the weak pawns on Black’s queenside.) 16.\textit{xc}8!? (This move is better than 16.\textit{b}4 \textit{c}6 17.\textit{a}3 \textit{h}6 18.\textit{cd}1 \textit{e}8\pm as in the game Hrvpinak–Lisko, Czech Republic 1991) 16...\textit{xc}8 17.\textit{c}1 \textit{d}7 18.\textit{a}3 \textit{c}6 and in the game Norqvist–Rygaard, Stockholm 1993, White could have squeezed Black completely with the manoeuvre 19.\textit{d}6! \textit{e}8 20.e5\pm.

Black has tried 14...f5, but this is hardly a move that can be attractive to human players. After: 15.\textit{f}4!? (It is possibly worth testing for White the standard move 15.e5!!?, since “the silicon monsters” do not quite understand that after: 15...\textit{xe}5 16.\textit{dxe}5 \textit{xd}3 17.\textit{c}7\textit{a}, White has a good compensation for the pawn and should Black capture the piece – 17...\textit{xe}2??, he loses immediately, because of: 18.\textit{h}4 h5 19.\textit{e}7\pm) 15...\textit{exe}4 (after 15...\textit{d}7, White must not exchange the light-squared bishops; he should play instead the much stronger line for him: 16.\textit{b}4!? \textit{c}8 17.\textit{exe}5 \textit{exe}5 18.\textit{a}6 \textit{c}6 19.d5 \textit{xc}1 20.\textit{xc}1\pm Genius 3–Fritz 3, 1995) 15...\textit{exe}4 \textit{d}7 17.\textit{a}3 \textit{c}8 18.\textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8 19.\textit{c}1 \textit{b}8 20.\textit{d}3\pm Nimzo 3.5–Gideon 1.0, 1997–and Black should constantly worry about White’s possible penetration on the e5-square.

Black can try to anticipate White’s queen actions with the waiting move 14...\textit{d}7. After 15.\textit{b}5 \textit{b}7 16.\textit{f}3 a6 17.\textit{d}3 \textit{d}7 18.\textit{b}4, Black has great problems to coordinate his pieces. 18...\textit{d}6 (in case of 18...\textit{f}c8, Razuvaev–Gorshkov, Cheliabinsk 1975, White can play 19.\textit{xc}8+!? \textit{xc}8 20.\textit{c}1 \textit{b}8 21.\textit{a}3!\pm, followed by 22.\textit{f}4 and thus he can emphasize the vulnerability of Black’s queenside) and as a result of the line: 19.\textit{a}3 \textit{fc}8 (after 19...\textit{fd}8 20.e5 \textit{a}5 21.\textit{c}3 \textit{c}6 22.\textit{e}4 \textit{b}5, Nimzo 3.5–Fritz 3, 1997, White should better avoid the exchange on b5 and he must choose instead 23.\textit{fd}1!?\pm) 20.e5 \textit{f}8 21.\textit{b}3 \textit{a}5 22.\textit{b}2 b5 23.\textit{g}3 \textit{c}6 24.\textit{d}2 \textit{c}7 25.\textit{e}4–White has the initiative, because of the powerful placement of his knight on the e4-square, Kluve–Hansen, corr. 1986.

You have already seen that in all these lines White’s queen on the a4-square is quite ready, if necessary, to occupy the a3–f8 diagonal and it might be
very useful there too. After 14...\textit{We}e7 (with the idea to follow with \textit{Wd}7) Black can prevent this possibility for White. In case of 15.\textit{Wd}2 \textit{Wd}7, White should obviously fight for the advantage only in lines like: 16.\textit{b}4 (The exchange of the light-squared bishops as a rule can be good for White only if he occupies the c-file; otherwise like for example after: 16.\textit{b}5 \textit{xb}5 17.\textit{Wxb}5 \textit{fd}8 18.\textit{xa}5 \textit{ba} 19.\textit{xa}5 \textit{xd}4 20.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4=, White achieves nothing more than equality, Brumm – Waldschlæger, Germany 1990) 16...\textit{xa}4 17.\textit{xe}7. Black is close to equalizing, but still his pieces lack coordination. 17...\textit{fe}8 (in case of 17...\textit{fe}8, Black must worry about the variation: 18.\textit{d}5!? \textit{exd}5 19.\textit{exd}5 \textit{d}7 20.\textit{d}6↑ and White’s passed d-pawn might cause a lot of trouble for Black.) 18.\textit{g}5 \textit{c}6 (after 18...\textit{c}6 19.\textit{b}4 \textit{b}4 20.\textit{e}2 \textit{d}7 21.\textit{fd}1↑, Black must be permanently on the alert about White’s possibility a2-a3, while in case of 18...\textit{ec}8 19.\textit{a}6 \textit{xc}1 20.\textit{xc}1 \textit{c}6 21.f3±, he loses the control over the c-file.) 19.\textit{xc}2 \textit{ac}8 20.\textit{fc}1 \textit{b}7 21.\textit{xc}7 \textit{xc}7 22.\textit{xc}7 \textit{ec}8 23.\textit{d}7± – and White’s rook manages to penetrate Black’s position.

15.\textit{wa}3

(diagram)

15...\textit{We}8

The move 15...\textit{ac}8, looked very attractive but White has again 16.\textit{d}2! (after 16.\textit{a}6 \textit{xc}1 17.\textit{xc}1 \textit{c}6 18.f3 \textit{d}7= in the game Rovner – Arulaid, Vilnius 1949, Black managed to equalize, while after 16.\textit{xc}8 Black can play 16...\textit{xc}8! 17.\textit{e}1 \textit{b}7= and restore the coordination of his pieces) 16...\textit{c}6 (Black in fact changes nothing with the line: 16...\textit{xc}1 17.\textit{xc}1 \textit{c}6, Neibults – Zontges, corr. 1985, 18.\textit{d}6±) and now after 17.\textit{d}6! (White preserves some advantage too after 17.\textit{c}3 \textit{e}7 18.\textit{xe}7 \textit{xe}7 19.\textit{b}4 \textit{fe}8 20.\textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8 21.\textit{c}1 \textit{a}5 22.\textit{a}3 \textit{f}8 23.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 24.\textit{c}7 \textit{d}8± as in the game Arbakov – Hresc, Passau 1995, but still the simplifications are clearly in favour of the defending side i.e. Black) 17...\textit{e}8 (Black loses after 17...\textit{e}7? due to 18.\textit{xc}6++, as well as after 17...\textit{c}7? because of 18.\textit{xc}7 \textit{xc}7 19.d5++, and 17...\textit{xd}4? is also not working because of 18.\textit{xd}4 \textit{a}4 and 19.\textit{b}4++) 18.\textit{a}6 \textit{c}7 19.\textit{g}3± and Black has still a long way to go before he coordinates his pieces successfully.

It has become already obvious that the move \textit{e}3-d2 is a typical maneuver for White to fight
for the advantage in this position. Still, that idea does not guarantee White's edge automatically. For example after 15...b5, he should better continue centralizing his pieces with 16.\[d]f3 (the standard move 16.\[d]d2, after 16...\[c]c4 17.\[d]xc4 bxc4 18.\[d]b4 \[e]e8 \[\infty] led to a position, in which White failed to capture Black's c4-pawn, because of \[d]d7-b5, Belifante - J. Donner, The Hague 1951) 16...a6 17.\[f]f4±, with the idea to follow with d4-d5.

16.\[f]d1

The move 16.\[d]d2?! is already useless here: 16...\[c]c6 17.\[c]c3 \[f]f8 and after 18.\[b]b2 \[e]7 19.\[b]b1 \[c]c8 20.\[f]f1 \[a]3 in the game Ivanchuk - Ehvest, Reykjavik 1991, White agreed to a draw, because his opening advantage was dissipated. It is worth mentioning that the pawn break in the centre d4-d5 is not so effective when there is a black pawn on e6. After 16.d5 exd5 17.exd5 \[h]h4 \[\infty] in the game Polugaevsky - Razuvaev, Tbilisi 1978, this fact was confirmed once again.

White has also tried 16.\[c]c3 \[f]f8 17.\[b]b2 \[c]8 18.\[f]c1 \[x]c3 19.\[x]c3± and he had some edge due to the control over the c-file in the game Kishnev - B. Schmidt, Giessen 1992.

The pawn-break 16.d5 for White in the centre cannot be effective, because it is not sup-

ported sufficiently by his pieces and after 16...ed 17.ed \[h]4 \[\infty], Black had an excellent counterplay in the game, Polugaevsky - Razuvaev, Tbilisi 1978. Having in mind the pawn-structure, (Black's pawn is already on the e6-square and it prevents temporarily White's pawn-break d4-d5. On the other hand, the control over the d6 and f6-squares has been weakened.) as well as the placement of pieces, White must seriously consider the other possible pawn-advance in the centre - e4-e5, followed by the deployment of the knight to the e4-outpost.

16...\[f]f8

In case of 16...\[c]c8, White can follow with 17.\[x]c8 \[x]c8 18.e5± and then he can try to bring his knight to the e4-square.

17.\[b]2 \[e]7 18.\[c]3 \[e]c8 19.\[b]5 \[c]6

The game Graf - Dvoirys, Novgorod 1995, reached that position. White should have played 20.\[f]4± emphasizing the weak dark squares in the black position.
Capturing the pawn with 11.dxc5 is a failure for White because after 11...\texttt{\textdagger}e5 12.\texttt{\textdagger}b3 \texttt{\textdagger}g4 13.\texttt{\textdagger}f4 \texttt{\textdagger}xc5\texttt{\textdagger} Black takes his pawn back with an excellent game, Xanthos – Vita, Bratto 1996.

We should mention now, although this will be the subject of the next chapters, that White often tries to cause disharmony in Black’s set-up, with the help of the move 11.\texttt{\textdagger}f4, particularly when Black’s queen is on the c7-square. This move now however, turns out to be premature. After 11...\texttt{\textdagger}d7 12.dxc5 \texttt{\textdagger}a5 13.\texttt{\textdagger}d5 (White does not achieve anything with: 13.\texttt{\textdagger}xd7 \texttt{\textdagger}xd7\texttt{\textdagger}, because after the active move 14.\texttt{\textdagger}fd1?, Black plays 14...\texttt{\textdagger}a4\texttt{\textdagger}, winning material.) 13...\texttt{\textdagger}b5 14.\texttt{\textdagger}e3 e6 15.\texttt{\textdagger}b3 \texttt{\textdagger}d7 16.\texttt{\textdagger}d4 \texttt{\textdagger}a6\texttt{\textdagger} and Black had an excellent compensation for the pawn in the game Nagle – Gerard, Budapest 2004. White had great problems to preserve his material advantage, because of Black’s possible maneuvers \texttt{\textdagger}f8-c8, followed by \texttt{\textdagger}f8-c5.

White often plays in practice
the move 11...\(e5\). His rook will be much more active on the b-file, but he must constantly worry about his unprotected bishop on c4; moreover the d4-pawn needs additional defending as well. There might follow: 11...\(\text{g}a5\)? (After 11...a6 12. \(\text{f}4\)?, there arises a position that we have already mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 8. The most principled line for Black: 11...cxd4 12.cxd4 \(\text{x}d4\) 13.\(\text{xf}7\) \(\text{xf}7\) 14.\(\text{x}d4\) leads to a position in which he still has difficulties despite his two bishop advantage, because his pawn-structure on the kingside is far from perfect.) 12.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}8\) 13. \(\text{d}2\) (White's traditional maneuver 13.\(\text{f}4\), is not so effective anymore, after his other bishop has abandoned the a2-g8 diagonal, because of the variation: 13...e5?! 14.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 15.d5 c4 16.\(\text{c}2\) f5 17.f3 f4 18.\(\text{f}2\) b6 19.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{f}6\) and Black had good counter chances on the kingside in the game Danner – Kolbus, Budapest 1994.) 13...a6 14.d5 (After 14.\(\text{f}4\) e6!= White’s d4-pawn is obviously vulnerable, because of the absence of his rook on the c1-square, while the standard move 15.e5?! does not work, because of 15...c4 16.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{xe}5\)\(\text{f}\).) 14...b5 15.\(\text{h}6\) e6 16. \(\text{x}g7\) \(\text{x}g7\) 17.\(\text{g}3\) f6 18.c4 (It is now easy to notice that with White’s rook still on the c1-square – that move would have been much more effective.) 18...

\(\text{xc}4\) 19.\(\text{xc}4\) bxc4 20.\(\text{fd}1\) exd5 21.exd5 \(\text{e}6\) 22.d6 c3 23.\(\text{xc}3\) \(\text{c}6=\) and the position was perfectly equal in the game Lukacs – Leko, Budapest 1992.

We are going to deal now with four basic responses for Black: a) 11...a6, b) 11...\(\text{a}5\), c) 11...e6 and 11...\(\text{d}8\) (Chapter 12).

We have already analyzed the situation after: 11...cxd4?! 12.cxd4, at the beginning of Chapter 8.

Black’s maneuver: 11...\(\text{g}4\)?! 12.f3 \(\text{a}5\), seems awkward, while his queen is placed on the c7-square. In case of: 13.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}7\), White can play 14.\(\text{d}2\) and he can prepare his standard attacking plan on the kingside. After 14...c4 15.\(\text{b}1\) e6 16.e5 \(\text{c}6\) 17.\(\text{g}3\) f6 18.exf6 \(\text{xf}6\) 19.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{g}7\) 20.\(\text{x}g7\) \(\text{x}g7\) 21.\(\text{ce}1\) \(\text{e}7\) 22.\(\text{g}5\)\(\rightarrow\), White had a powerful kingside attack in the game, Deues – Klein, Bad Woerishofen 2001.

It is wiser for Black to play the immediate 11...\(\text{d}7\). Meanwhile, White can proceed with the same attacking plan on the kingside. After: 12.\(\text{d}2\)!? (The
other possibility for White is – 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{f} \! 4 \)! and after the seemingly attractive line for Black – 12...e6?! White played: 13.d5! \( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{e} \! 5 \) 14.dxe6 \( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{c} \! 4 \) 15.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{d} \! 5 \) \( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{x} \! 3 \) 16. fxe3 \( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{e} \! 5 \) 17.exd7 \( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{a} \! 8 \) 18.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{a} \! 4 \) and he obtained a great advantage in the game, Rej – Castor, Churchill 2000, but even after Black’s relatively best line: 12...\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{a} \! 8 \) 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{d} \! 5 \) \( \mathcal{c} \! \mathcal{c} \! 8 \) 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{b} \! 5 \) \( \mathcal{f} \! \mathcal{e} \! 8 \) 15.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{g} \! 5 \)↑, White would have maintained his initiative.) 12...\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{a} \! 8 \) (Naturally, Black can avoid the trade of the dark-squared bishops with the help of the line: 12...\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{f} \! 8 \) 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{h} \! 6 \) \( \mathcal{h} \! 8 \), but after 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{e} \! 3 \) \( \mathcal{e} \! 8 \) 15.e5 \( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{a} \! 8 \) 16.h4 a6 17.h5 b5 18.hxg6 hxg6, Averchenko – A.Ibragimov, Seversk 1997, White could have proceeded with the best move – 19.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{b} \! 3 \)± and Black’s defence would have been extremely problematic. In case White’s queen remains on the d2-square, Black can try the move: 12...\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{a} \! 5 \), with the idea to try to exchange queens, but he cannot equalize anyway, at least because of the line: 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{b} \! 2 \) \( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{a} \! 8 \) 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{f} \! 1 \)± 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{h} \! 6 \) \( \mathcal{f} \! 8 \) 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{g} \! 7 \) \( \mathcal{g} \! 7 \) 15.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{f} \! 1 \) a6 16.h4± and White’s prospects are preferable, De Lagontrie – Bernard, Le Touquet 1992.

In answer to 11...b6 with 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{f} \! 4 \)!? (White does not have any advantage after 12.dxc5 bxc5 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{f} \! 4 \) e6 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{d} \! 3 \) \( \mathcal{a} \! 5 \) 15.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{a} \! 4 \) as in the game Pekarek – Smejkal, Prague 1989, because of 15...\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{d} \! 7 \) 16.\( \mathcal{B} \! 5 \) \( \mathcal{b} \! 5 \) 17.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{x} \! 5 \) c4=). White can again try the standard attacking plan on the kingside: 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{d} \! 2 \) \( \mathcal{b} \! 7 \) 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{h} \! 6 \) and here after: 13...\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{a} \! 8 \) 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{x} \! 7 \) \( \mathcal{x} \! 7 \) 15.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{e} \! 3 \) e5!? 16.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{d} \! 5 \) \( \mathcal{a} \! 5 \) 17.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{x} \! 7 \) \( \mathcal{x} \! 7 \), he can maintain his advantage with the move 18.f4± Hoen – Olsson, Lidkoping 1969, while after 13...\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{a} \! 5 \) 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{d} \! 3 \), the game transposes to positions from Chapter 7, variation c2, 12...\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{c} \! 7 \).) 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{d} \! 8 \) (after 12...\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{d} \! 7 \) 13.dxc5! bxc5 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{x} \! 7 \) \( \mathcal{x} \! 7 \) 15.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{f} \! 1 \)± Black has to defend a very difficult endgame, while after 12...e5 which was played in the game Ludgate – Littlewood, Blackpool 1971, White had 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{e} \! 3 \)!? 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{d} \! 5 \)± 12...\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{d} \! 8 \) 13.dxc5!? (in answer to the move 13.d5, which was played in the game A.Shashin – Faiibisovich, Leningrad 1974, Black had to play 13...\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{e} \! 5 \) 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{b} \! 3 \) b5= with an approximately equal position) 13...bxc5 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{b} \! 1 \)± and White has a slight but stable advantage.

Black has also tried in practice the move 11...\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{b} \! 8 \). It seems attractive for White to play here 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{f} \! 4 \)!?, forcing Black after: 12...e5 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{g} \! 3 \), to weaken the d5-square, so that White’s light-squared bishop might exploit that later. 13...\( \mathcal{Q} \! \mathcal{g} \! 4 \) 14.f3 \( \mathcal{d} \! 7 \), Sotela Vargas – Falconi, corr. 2000, and here White should not have closed the centre with the move d4-d5 as he did. Instead it was much more in the spirit of the position for him to follow
with: \textbf{15.\textit{d}2\pm}, planning to capture later \textit{d}4\textit{x}e5 and to deploy his bishop to the \textit{d}5-outpost.

\textbf{a) 11...a6}

\textbf{12.\textit{d}2!?!}

White starts preparing his standard attacking plan on the kingside connected with the maneuver \textit{B}h6, followed by \textit{h}4-\textit{h}5.

The other attempt at an offensive on the kingside includes the \textit{f}4 pawn-advance, but it promises less. After \textit{12...e6} (the move \textit{12...g}4, Kostadinov – Angelvette, Vancouver 1999, does not threaten White’s \textit{d}4-pawn, therefore he can play the simple line: \textit{13.h}3 \textit{x}e2 \textit{14.\textit{x}e2\pm}) White has hardly anything better than \textit{13.dxc5 \textit{d}8\texttt{\textl}}.

White’s attempt to parry Black’s queenside actions with the help of the move \textit{12.a4} cannot be recommended. His \textit{a}4-pawn, as a result, can easily become a target for Black’s counterplay. After \textit{12...a}5 \textit{13.a}2 \textit{d}7 \textit{14.dxc5 \textit{fd}8\texttt{\textl}}, Black has a sufficient compensation for the pawn, Rebaudo – Russo, corr. 2002.

We have advised you to play \textit{12.f}4 in Chapter 7 in a similar position, except that White’s rook was then on the \textit{b}1-square.

\textbf{12...\textit{d}8 13.\textit{f}d1}

It is also logical for White to play: \textit{13.h}6 \textit{h}8 \textit{14.e}3, while after: \textit{14...d}7, Swathi – Xu Yuanyuan, Calicut 1998, he can defend his \textit{d}4-pawn with the move \textit{15.e}5\texttt{\textu}, restricting Black’s dark-squared bishop.

\textbf{13...b}5

The maneuver \textit{13...a}5, does not prevent the trade of the dark-squared bishops, because after: \textit{14.h}6 \textit{cxd}4 \textit{15.xg}7 \textit{xg}7, White has the powerful resource \textit{16.f}4! (making use of the absence of a black rook on the \textit{f}8-square) \textit{16.e}6 \textit{17.xe}6 \textit{fxe}6 \textit{18.xd}4 \textit{xa}2 \textit{19.xc}7\texttt{\textl}.

\textbf{14.d}5 \textbf{b}7

In the game Quintana – Iglesias, corr. 1990, Black reduced the tension in the centre with the move \textit{14...c}4?!. This decision can only seldom be reasonable, particularly when he plays like that without any serious necessity. White had to act according to the basic plan – \textit{15.h}6 \textit{h}8 and then \textit{16.f}4 \textit{d}7 (in case of \textit{16...e}5 \textit{17.g}3\texttt{\textu}, White’s bishop will be comfortably deployed on the \textit{d}5-square for a long time, while after: \textit{16...b}7 \textit{17.b}1\texttt{\textu}, he creates the powerful threat \textit{18.xc}4.) \textit{17.g}5 (threatening \textit{18.xe}7) \textit{17.e}8 \textit{18.f}4 \textit{e}6 \textit{19.xc}6 \textit{xc}6 \textit{20.e}5 \textit{b}7 \textit{21.f}3\texttt{\textu}, followed by \textit{g}3-\textit{e}4.
The move 14...e6 is much more to the spirit of the position. 15.\(\text{dxc6} \text{xc6} 16.d5 \text{exd5} \) (After 16...\(\text{c7} 17.\text{c4 b4} 18.\text{c2 a5} 19.\text{d2 e5, Black managed to block the position somehow, but he remained with a weak c5-pawn.} 20.\text{cd1 d7} 21.\text{c1 a4} 22.\text{b3 c7, Kaskinen - Salmenaru, Jyvaskyla 1994, and here after:} 23.\text{d6! c8} 24.\text{d5, White could have exploited that perfectly.}) 17.exd5 \text{d6} 18.\text{h6 e5} 19.\text{f4 e8} 20.\text{c4 g4} 21.f3 \text{f5} 22.\text{xe5 xe5} 23.\text{g3} \) and White maintains a clear advantage, thanks to his protected passed d5-pawn and the weaknesses on the dark squares on Black’s kingside in the game Stoffers – Baier, corr. 2000.

15.\(\text{h6} \)

White should not slow down. After 15.f3?! e6 16.\(\text{xc6 xc6} 17.h4, Black can exploit the absence of White’s light-squared bishop with the help of the move: 17...\(f5\) \) and here the move 18.e5 would not work, because of 18...\(\text{xe5} \) Viertlboeck – Holzapfel, Germany 1992.

15...\(\text{a5} \)

After 15...e6 16.\(\text{xg7 xg7} 17.\text{b3 e7} 18.\text{e3 ac8} 19.\text{f4 a5} 20.\text{c2 c4} 21.\text{g3 d7} 22.e5, Black’s counterplay in the centre is too slow to matter, Kraai – Lonoff, Lincolnwood 1990.

16.\(\text{xg7 xg7} 17.\text{xb7 xb7} 18.\text{f4 c4} \)

19.\(\text{d3} \) (It is also good for White to play the simple 19.e5, followed by a deployment of his rook on the kingside via the d3-square.) 19...e5 20.\(\text{h4 xd4} 21.cxd4 exd4 22.\text{xd4} V.Azamatov – Mavljanov, Tashkent 1976. Black has opened the game, but he is still too far from equality. It is quite obvious that the absence of his dark-squared bishop has weakened his king’s position considerably. He should worry now about White’s threat 23.f5+.

b) 11...\(\text{a5} \)

Black repels the enemy bishop away from the a2-g8 diagonal, but thus he reduces the pressure against the d4-pawn.

12.\(\text{d3} \)

Black cannot create any seri-
ous threats against the d4-pawn, because of the juxtaposition of his queen on c7 against White’s rook on c1.

tion for the pawn was sufficient in the game Ertl – Soergel, Bayern 1999) 13...\textsuperscript{c}6 14.e5 \textsuperscript{b}ad8 15.\textsuperscript{g}4 b5 16.h4 \textsuperscript{d}7 17.\textsuperscript{g}3 \textsuperscript{d}5, Tarjan – Romanishin, Indonesia 1983 and here after the immediate 18.h5↑, White was obviously better.

The position after 12...b6 13.\textsuperscript{c}4f4! (This move is more precise than 13.\textsuperscript{f}d2 \textsuperscript{b}7 14.\textsuperscript{h}6 \textsuperscript{b}ad8?!, see Chapter 7, variation \textsuperscript{c}2, because Black’s defence against White’s standard kingside attack is much easier with a rook on \textsuperscript{f}8, after the trade of the dark-squared bishops.) 13...\textsuperscript{b}7 (after 13...e6 14.e5 \textsuperscript{b}7 15.\textsuperscript{g}4 \textsuperscript{b}ad8 16.h4 \textsuperscript{c}6 17.h5±, in the game Forgacs – Rissanen, corr. 1999, White’s achievements on the kingside turned out to be much more important than Black’s counterplay in the centre) 14.e5! has already been analyzed in Chapter 7, variation \textsuperscript{c}2 in our notes to Black’s move twelve.

13.\textsuperscript{d}2

Black can counter 13.f4 with 13...f5! (After White has pushed f4 – Black’s move f5-f7 becomes much more sensible, because White’s pieces would not have the f4-square available to them in that closed position. Meanwhile, the passive move 13...b6?, after 14.f5 \textsuperscript{b}7 15.\textsuperscript{e}1 \textsuperscript{f}8 16.\textsuperscript{h}4 \textsuperscript{d}7 17.\textsuperscript{f}3 cxd4 18.\textsuperscript{h}3 h5 19.cxd4→, enabled White to organize a victorious attack in the game Tozer – Johansson, Lyngby 1988.) 14.exf5 \textsuperscript{f}5 15.\textsuperscript{xf}5 gxf5 16.\textsuperscript{c}2 e6 17.dxc5 \textsuperscript{c}4∞ and in the game Dei – Laurain, Cannes 1996, the opponents agreed to a draw in a position in which Black was not worse at all.

13...b6 14.\textsuperscript{h}6

14...\textsuperscript{h}8

Black is already beyond salvation. For example after: 14...e5?! 15.\textsuperscript{x}g7 \textsuperscript{x}g7 16.f4 \textsuperscript{b}7 17.fxe5, Black tried: 17...c4 18.\textsuperscript{c}2 \textsuperscript{xe}5 19.\textsuperscript{f}4 \textsuperscript{ac}8 20.\textsuperscript{f}1 \textsuperscript{c}7 21.\textsuperscript{f}5 \textsuperscript{e}8 22.\textsuperscript{g}3!→ and he restored the material balance, but White’s attack was just crushing after that, Klompus – Matt, corr. 1987.

In case of 14...\textsuperscript{b}7?! 15.\textsuperscript{x}g7 \textsuperscript{x}g7 16.f4 cxd4 17.cxd4 \textsuperscript{d}7 18.f5 \textsuperscript{c}6, White wins with: 19.\textsuperscript{b}5! a6 20.\textsuperscript{c}3 axb5 21.d5+ \textsuperscript{e}5 22.\textsuperscript{xe}5+ f6 23.\textsuperscript{g}3 \textsuperscript{dc}8 24.fgx6 hxg6 25.\textsuperscript{f}4+ and Black was soon forced to resign in the game Verner – R.Romanovsky, USSR 1973.

Black can try to counter the advance of White’s f-pawn with the help of the move 14...e6, but even then after: 15.\textsuperscript{x}g7 (follow-
ing 15.e5 \textit{b}7 16.\textit{g}3?! Hertneck – Anka, Dortmund 1988, White overlooked the simple combination – 16...c4 17.\textit{x}g7 \textit{x}g7 18.\textit{e}4 \textit{xe}5!\textit{f} 15...\textit{x}g7 16.\textit{e}3 \textit{b}7 17.h4 cxd4 18.cxd4 \textit{e}7, Pein – Mekhitarian, Internet 2004, Black would have great problems to counter White’s kingside initiative after the move 19.h5↑.

\textbf{15.\textit{e}3 \textit{d}7}

After 15...\textit{d}7 16.\textit{h}1 \textit{a}4 17.d5 c4 18.\textit{b}1 \textit{b}7 19.f4 \textit{c}5 20.d4 \textit{g}7 21.\textit{f}5 \textit{f}8 22.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 23.\textit{h}6+ \textit{g}7 24.\textit{f}6 f6 25.\textit{g}4 g5 26.e5→ R.Cruz – Spiridonov, Tel Aviv 1964, as well as after: 15...c4 16.\textit{b}1 e6 17.e5 \textit{b}7 18.\textit{g}3 \textit{g}7 19.\textit{x}g7 \textit{x}g7 20.\textit{g}5 h6 21.\textit{h}5+ \textit{h}7 22.\textit{f}6 \textit{g}8 23.\textit{fe}1 \textit{af}8 24.\textit{e}3→ Dimov – Fotev, corr. 1992, White managed to demonstrate the power of his kingside attack.

In case Black plays something else: 15...e6, Beyen – Fedder, Montana Crans 1976, or 15...\textit{b}7, Hoegerl – Brunsch, Germany 1995, White should continue with the development of his initiative in a similar fashion with the move 16.e5↑.

\textbf{16.e5!}

This move solves the problem with the defence of the d4-pawn and it restricts simultaneously Black’s dark-squared bishop. Black cannot exploit effectively the weakness of the d5-square, because his knight is misplaced on the a5-square.

Meanwhile, even after the not so enterprising move 16.\textit{cd}1, following 16...cxd4 17.cxd4 \textit{b}7 18.d5 e6 19.\textit{f}4±, White preserved superior prospects in the game Vaganian – Sax, Budapest 1973.

\textbf{16...\textit{b}7 17.\textit{f}4 \textit{d}5 18.\textit{g}3}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

After 18...cxd4 (or 18...e6 19.\textit{f}5! \textit{xe}5 20.dxe5 \textit{xd}3 21.fxe6 fxe6 22.\textit{f}8+← Vaganian) \textbf{19. cxd4 \textit{ac}8 20.\textit{cd}1}→, White’s attack is very powerful, because Black can hardly parry the dangerous threat f4-f5.

c) \textbf{11...e6}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\textbf{12.\textit{d}2}

White is planning to exchange the dark-squared bishops.

\textbf{12...\textit{a}5}

The line 12...b6 13.\textit{h}6!? (the
variation $13.h4 \text{a}5\ 14.\text{d}3$ will be analysed later after the move $12...\text{a}5$ – see the notes to White’s move $15)$ $13...\text{a}5\ 14.\text{d}3$ just transposes to the main line.

In case of $12...a6\ 13.\text{h}6\ b5\ 14.\text{xg7}\ \text{hg7}\ 15.\text{b}3$, in the game Dussol – Piankov, Meudon 1991, Black reduced the tension in the centre with the move $15...c4$ and as a result of the line: $16.\text{c}2\ \text{e}7\ 17.\text{g}5\ f6\ 18.\text{e}3\ \text{d}7\ 19.\text{cd}1\ \text{ae}8\ 20.\text{fe}1\ \text{g}8\ 21.\text{f}4\pm$, White’s chances turned out to be better.

In answer to $12...\text{d}8$, White should think about some prophylactics – $13.\text{fd}1!$? (After the traditional $13.\text{h}6$, Plyusnin – Laczay, corr. 2001, Black had a surprising tactical resource – $13...\text{xd}4\ 14.\text{xg7}\ \text{xg7}\ 15.\text{xd}4\ \text{e}5\pm$ and White had problems defending his central pawns. The idea to trade the dark-squared bishops can be elaborated with the intermediate move $13.\text{g}5$!? and only in answer to $13...f6$, White plays $14.\text{h}6\pm$) $13...\text{a}5$ (13...a6 $14.\text{g}5\ f6$, Federau – Michaelsen, Germany 1989, 15. $\text{h}6;\ 13...b6\ 14.\text{g}5\ f6$, Nasjleti – Dezan, Buenos Aires 1992, 15. $\text{h}6\pm$) $14.\text{d}3$ (in case of $14...c4\ 15.\text{c}2$, White after: $15...b6$, Juhasz – Barson, Zemplen 1998, as well as after: $15...b5$, Gilbert – Wojciechowski, St Helier 2000, should better continue with his basic plan with the move $16.\text{h}6\pm$) $14...b6$. White should persist with the idea to trade the dark-squared bishops: $15.\text{h}6\ \text{b7}\ 16.e5\ \text{c}6\ 17.\text{hg7}\ \text{hg7}\ 18.\text{f}4\ \text{e}7\ 19.h4\pm$ Wiley – Piankov, Avoine 1994.

$13.\text{d}3\ b6$

14.\text{h}6!?  

This is obviously the best. In case of $14.h4\ \text{b}7\ 15.h5$ Black can play $15...\text{ad}8!$ (after $15...f5$? A.Graf – Safin, Tashkent 1992, White could have played $16.e5!$ with a clear advantage after $16...c4\ 17.\text{c}2\ \text{ad}8\ 18.\text{g}5\ \text{d}7\ 19.e3\pm$ as well as after $16...\text{fd}8\ 17.\text{g}5\ \text{d}7\ 18.e3\pm$) 16. $\text{g}5\ f6\ 17.\text{f}4\ e5\ 18.\text{g}3\pm$ and Black has some pressure against White’s d4-pawn.

$14...\text{b}7\ 15.e5$!

The trade of the dark-squared bishop is unavoidable. White fixes immediately the f6-square – the potential weakness in Black’s camp. It is weaker for White to play $15.h4$, because after $15...\text{e}7\ 16.h5\ \text{hxh6\ 17.xh6}$ Black has the powerful resource $17...\text{h}4!=.$

White has also played $15.\text{xg7}\ \text{xg7}\ 16.\text{g}5$ (after $16.\text{e}3\ \text{ad}8$ against $17.\text{fd}1$ or $17.h4$
Black can answer with 17...e5!=, and if 17.f4, then 17...f5!∞), but even then after 16...Ec6! (Black should not weaken his kingside with 16...h6?!), because after 17.£e3 £ad8 18.h4 £e7 19.h5 cxd4 20.cxd4 g5 21.f4± as in the game Gligoric - Puc, Ljubljana 1960, the white rook can join the attack against the black king along the f-file, and if 16...£d8 17.£g3 £c8 18.h4 £c6 19.£fd1 cxd4 20.cxd4 £e7 21.h5↑ as in the game Haik - Kappler, France 1988, White has a powerful initiative on the kingside. If Black repels the white queen with 16...f6, then after 17.£e3 £ac8, which was played in the game Bae - Fairbairn, Port Erin 2003, White could have emphasized the weaknesses on Black's kingside with the move 18.£f4↑) 17.£fd1 (in case of 17.dxc5?! £e5 18.cxb6 £c5! 19.£g3 £xd3 20.£xd3 axb6 in the game Furman - Gulko, Erevan 1975, the weakness of the White's pawns on the queenside became a telling factor after the opening of additional files) 17...£ad8= and Black has a strong pressure against the d4-pawn.

It is now worth analyzing the moves c1) 15...£ad8 and c2) 15...£e7.

The stabilization of the situation in the centre is favourable for White and after 15...c4 16.£b1 £c6 17.£g3 £e7 18.£xg7 £xg7 19.£g5→ he organized a powerful attack against the black king in the game Gentes - Langner, Manitoba 1991.

c1) 15...£ad8 16.£xg7

In case of 16.h4 £e7! (the move 16...£c6 - is not effective due to 17.f3±) 17.£g5 (after 17.h5 £xh6 18.£xh6 or 17.£xg7 £xg7 18.h5 Black has 18...£h4! =) 17...f6 18.exf6 £xf6 19.£e3 £d5= the black queen manages to defend the kingside just in time.

16...£xg7

17.£g5!

White is bringing more pieces as close as possible to the black king. This idea is even stronger due to the isolation of the black knight on a5.

17...£f6

Black fails to bring his knight to the kingside. After 17...£c6 18.
\( \text{c2) 15...\textsf{e7}} \)

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

16.\( \text{\textbf{g5}} \)?

White intends to clarify Black’s intentions immediately with that move.

It is also possible for him to play: 16.h4 \( \textsf{ac8} \) 17.\( \text{\textbf{xg7}} \)? (It is not good for White to play: 17.\( \text{\textbf{h5}} \)!, because of 17...\( \text{\textbf{xh6}} \) 18.\( \textsf{hxh6 \textsf{h4\#}} \); while after 17.\( \text{\textbf{g5}} \), Black’s undermining of the centre is much more effective: 17...\( \text{\textbf{f6}} \)? 18.exf6 \( \text{\textbf{xf6}} \) and it becomes clear now that in case of: 19.\( \text{\textbf{xf6}} \) \( \textsf{xf6\#} \) the move 20.\( \textsf{h6?} \) does not work for White because of 20...\( \text{\textbf{xg2\#}} \), while after the timid move 19.\( \text{\textbf{g3}} \), Black played: 19...\( \text{\textbf{g5}} \) 20.\( \textsf{hxg5 \textsf{d6}} \) 21.\( \textsf{e3 \textsf{cxd4}} \) 22.\( \textsf{cxd4 \textsf{d5}} \) 23.\( \textsf{xc8 \textsf{xc8=}} \) and equalized completely in the game Sakaev – Dvoirys, Moscow 2004.) 17...\( \text{\textbf{xg7}} \) 18.\( \textsf{f4} \) and we have reached the same position that we had already analyzed in our notes to Black’s twelfth move.

16...\( \text{\textbf{f6}} \)

After the retreat of the black queen from the e7-square, White can play 17.\( \textsf{f4} \) depriving Black of the counterplay connected with the move f7-f6.

17.exf6 \( \text{\textbf{xf6}} \) 18.\( \text{\textbf{xf6 \textbf{xf6}}} \)

Following 18...\( \text{\textbf{f6}} \) 19.\( \text{\textsf{xc5 \textsf{bxc5}}} \) 20.\( \text{\textsf{e3\#}} \), White remains with a superior pawn-structure.

19.\( \textsf{fe1}\)

White’s position is preferable because of his better pawn-structure and the vulnerability of the shelter of the black king.
Chapter 12

1. d4 d6 2. c4 g6 3. c3 d5 4. cxd5  
\[
\text{\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}[scale=0.5]
  \draw (0,0) grid (8,8);
  \draw[thick] (1,1) -- (7,7) -- (7,1) -- cycle;
  \draw[thick] (2,2) -- (6,6);
  \fill[black!50!white] (4,4) circle (0.5);
  \fill[white] (5,5) circle (0.5);
  \fill[black!50!white] (6,6) circle (0.5);
  \fill[white] (7,7) circle (0.5);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}
\]
\]
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
\text{xe3} 6. \text{bxc3 g7 7. c4 c5 8. e2 c6 9. e3 0-0 10. 0-0}
\text{c7 11. c1 d8}
\end{equation}

Black increases the pressure against the d4-pawn.

We will analyse now the moves: a) 12. \text{d2} and b) 12. e4.

The other possibilities are played quite rarely nowadays. So, in case of 12.f4, White should consider not only the calm move 12...e6?! (see Game 9 Geller – Smyslov, Moscow 1965), but also the much more aggressive line for Black: 12...g4! 13.f5 a5!\text{∞}, while after 12.h3 b6\text{∞} Black develops his bishop on the a8-h1 diagonal without any problem. About 12.e1 see Game 8 (Spassky – Fischer, Santa Monica 1966)

\begin{equation}
a) 12. d2
\end{equation}

White tries to act as in Chapter 11 that we have analysed, and tries to trade the dark square bishops. This traditional method of playing however turns out to be not so effective in this variation.

\begin{equation}
12... a5!
\end{equation}

This is a strong move. Black is threatening 13...cxd4 followed by the exchange of queens and White’s d4-pawn will remain defenceless.

Following 12...e6, the game transposes to variation c, Chapter 11 – see the notes to Black’s move twelve.

\begin{equation}
13. f1
\end{equation}

If White abandons his plan to trade the dark-squared bishops and plays 13.b2, then after 13...b6!? 14.dxc5 (otherwise Black solves all his problems with the exchange of the light-squared bishops, because after 14.f4 a6\text{=} Black was even slightly better in the game Muratov – Balashov, USSR 1974, while after 14.e1 a6 15.xa6 xa6= as in the game Fedorowicz – Gutman, Porz 1988, or 14.d5 b7 15.e1 e6 16.b3
cx<sub>d</sub>4 17.cx<sub>d</sub>4 ½ac<sub>8</sub>= and once again Black was OK in the game Gligoric – Tukmakov, Leningrad 1973) 14...¾e<sub>5</sub> (the careless 14...bx<sub>c</sub>5? after 15.¾b<sub>5</sub> ¾d<sub>7</sub> 16.¾xc<sub>5</sub> e<sub>6</sub> 17.¾fd<sub>1</sub>± lead to a loss of a pawn for Black without any compensation at all in the game Rashkovsky – Anikaev, Sochi 1974). After 15.¾d<sub>5</sub>, Black's simplest line to equalize is: 15...¾xd<sub>5</sub>!? (It is much more complex for him to play: 15...¾b<sub>8</sub> 16.e<sub>6</sub> b<sub>5</sub> 17.¾b<sub>4</sub> ¾c<sub>7</sub>, but after: 18.¾c<sub>5</sub> ¾b<sub>6</sub> 19.¾b<sub>4</sub> ¾b<sub>8</sub> 20.¾c<sub>5</sub> ¾b<sub>6</sub> 21.¾b<sub>4</sub> ¾b<sub>8</sub>= Rashkovsky – Tukmakov, USSR 1974, as well as after: 18.¾a<sub>3</sub> ¾g<sub>4</sub> 19.¾f<sub>4</sub> ¾e<sub>5</sub> 20.¾xe<sub>5</sub> ¾xe<sub>5</sub> 21.¾xd<sub>1</sub> ¾b<sub>6</sub> 22.f<sub>4</sub>= Rashkovsky – Kleiman, Sverdlovsk 1979, the games ended in a draw.) 17.¾b<sub>1</sub> ¾xc<sub>1</sub> 18.¾xc<sub>1</sub> ¾f<sub>5</sub>! (The seemingly attractive line: 18...bxc<sub>5</sub> 19.¾d<sub>6</sub>↑, enabled White to seize the initiative in the game Kasyan – Sai, Singapore 2004.) and here Black could have more or less leveled the chances after: 18...¾f<sub>5</sub>! 19.¾b<sub>3</sub> bxc<sub>5</sub>=. His two bishop advantage compensates the temporary activity of White's pieces.

13...¾e<sub>5</sub>!?  
Black is trying to exploit favourably the juxtaposition between his rook and the white queen along the d-file. Presently, that is the most precise way for Black to equalize completely. His other possibilities leave White with chances to still fight for an opening advantage.

Should he try to equalize by exchanging pieces – 13...cx<sub>d</sub>4 14.cx<sub>d</sub>4 ½xd<sub>2</sub> 15.½xd<sub>2</sub> ¾d<sub>7</sub> (Possibly, it is slightly better for Black to play 15...e<sub>6</sub>, but even then after: 16.¾g<sub>5</sub> f<sub>6</sub> 17.¾f<sub>4</sub> ¾a<sub>5</sub> 18.¾d<sub>3</sub> b<sub>6</sub> 19.¾c<sub>7</sub> ½f<sub>8</sub> 20.¾b<sub>5</sub>±, White's prospects are superior, Mikulcik – J.Pribyl, Czech Republic 1993.) 16.d<sub>5</sub> ¾a<sub>5</sub> 17.¾d<sub>3</sub> leads to a difficult endgame for Black. Later, for example there might follow: 17...b<sub>6</sub> (White preserves some queenside pressure after: 17...e<sub>6</sub> 18.¾f<sub>4</sub> ¾dc<sub>8</sub> 19.¾c<sub>7</sub> b<sub>6</sub> 20.¾a<sub>6</sub>↑ I.Farago – Braun, Bad Woerishofen 2001) 18.¾d<sub>4</sub>!? (The move 18.¾a<sub>6</sub> was less precise for White in the game Hjartarson – Conquest, Copenhagen 1982, because of 18...¾c<sub>8</sub>!? 19.¾xc<sub>8</sub> ¾xc<sub>8</sub> 20.¾dc<sub>2</sub> ¾xc<sub>2</sub> 21.¾xc<sub>2</sub> e<sub>6</sub>±) 18...¾ac<sub>8</sub> 19.¾dc<sub>2</sub> ¾xc<sub>2</sub> 20.¾xc<sub>2</sub> ¾c<sub>8</sub> 21.¾xc<sub>8</sub>+ ¾xc<sub>8</sub> 22.f<sub>4</sub> and the light pieces endgame is rather unpleasant for Black, for example after 22...¾b<sub>7</sub> (in case of 22...¾xd<sub>4</sub> 23.¾xd<sub>4</sub> f<sub>5</sub> 24.¾f<sub>2</sub> fxe<sub>4</sub> 25.¾xe<sub>4</sub> ¾c<sub>4</sub> in the game Bellon Lopez – Gobet, Biel 1988, the simple move 26.¾f<sub>3</sub>± could have presented White with
excellent chances to materialize his bishop pair advantage) 23. \( \text{b}5 \ \text{a}6 24. \text{f}2 \pm \) and Black had serious problems to defend his queenside pawns in the game Tarjan – Algeo, USA 1980.

Black has tried to improve his chances in an eventual endgame with the move: 13...b5. Tournament practice has shown however that following: 14. \( \text{d}5! \) (In the endgame after – 14. \( \text{b}3 \text{cx}d4 15. \text{cx}d4 \text{xd}2 16. \text{xd}2 \text{d}5 17. \text{d}5 \text{b}7 18. \text{xb}7 \text{xb}7 19. \text{c}7 \text{d}6 20. \text{exe}7 \text{f}8 21. \text{c}7 \text{exe}4 22. \text{d}1 \text{d}6=, Black has really solved all his problems successfully, Grunwald – Kronenberg, corr. 1986.) 14. \( \text{d}5 \text{b}7 15. \text{h}6! \) Black might not even survive until the endgame... 15...e6 (after 15...\( \text{xd}4 16. \text{g}7 \text{g}7 17. \text{f}4 \text{e}6 18. \text{xc}6 \text{xc}6 19. \text{xd}4 \text{ac}8 20. \text{d}3 \text{d}7 21.e5 \text{c}7 22. \text{cd}1 \text{g}8 23. \text{f}6 \text{f}8 24.h4 h5 25.g4! White’s attack was quickly victorious in the game Melander – Englund, corr. 1980) 16. \( \text{g}7 \text{g}7 17. \text{xc}6 \text{xc}6 18. \text{g}5 \text{cx}d4 (18...\text{xa}2 19. \text{f}4 \text{c}4 20.d5 \text{ex}d5 21. \text{ex}d5 \text{b}7 22. \text{h}5+ \text{f}8 23. \text{f}6 \text{g}7 24. \text{g}4 \text{d}6 25. \text{e}5+ – Roesch Bav – Krueger, Germany 2000) 19. \text{xd}4 \text{e}8 20. \text{d}3 \text{h}6 21. \text{e}5+ \text{g}8 and here in the game Peckford – A.Kuznetsov, Winnipeg 1985, White had to continue his attack against the enemy king with: 22.h4! \text{xa}2 23. \text{cd}1 (threatening 24. \text{xe}6) 23...\text{d}7 24.h5→.

It used to be considered for a long time that Black’s most reliable line here was 13...\( \text{d}7. \) It is however quite strong for White to follow with: 14. \( \text{b}2! \) (After 14. \( \text{h}6 \text{cx}d4 15. \text{g}7 \text{g}7 16. \text{f}4, \) Black’s position is quite reliable – he can even opt for the sharp line: 16...\( \text{xc}3!? 17. \text{xf}7+ \text{h}8 18. \text{d}5 \text{b}4! 19. \text{f}4 \text{xc}4 20. \text{g}6 \text{hxg}6 21. \text{g}6 \text{g}4! 22. \text{h}6+ \text{g}8 23. \text{g}6 \text{h}8=, leading to a draw by a repetition of moves and a perpetual, Kuligowski – Szymczak, Lublin 1976) 14...b5. The arising complications turn out to be in favor of White. (Black should not give up his b7-pawn, while after: 14...\( \text{ab}8 15. \text{f}4 \text{e}5 16. \text{g}8 \text{f}8 17. \text{d}8 18. \text{g}3 \text{b}5 19. \text{e}2 \text{b}7 20. \text{d}2 \text{e}8 21.h4 \text{d}6 22.h5↑, White is much ahead of his opponent in the development of his initiative on the kingside, G.Fraga – Schwab, corr. 1995.) 15. \( \text{xb}5 \text{xb}5 16. \text{xb}5 \text{d}4 17. \text{d}4 \text{cx}d4 18. \text{xd}7 \text{exe}3 19. \text{xe}3 \text{ab}8 (Black is still in a grave danger after: 19...\text{e}5 20.\text{c}4 \text{d}6 21. \text{a}4 \text{a}3 22. \text{b}1 \text{e}6 23. \text{f}2 \text{f}2 24. \text{h}3 \text{xd}1 25. \text{xd}1 \text{g}8 26. \text{b}5 \text{c}7 27. \text{d}3 \text{c}5 28. \text{d}8+ \text{g}7 29. \text{f}3 \text{Th} – Schwarzw, corr. 1987.) 20. \text{c}4 \text{b}2 (in case of 20...\text{h}6 21. \text{f}2 \text{b}2+ 22. \text{f}3 \text{g}7 23. \text{c}5 \text{e}5 24. \text{a}4 \text{c}7 25. \text{d}4↑, Black fails to create any threats against White’s a-pawn, Kluve – Glaser, corr. 1989) 21. \text{c}2 \text{b}7 22. \text{cd}2 \text{a}3 23. \text{d}5 \text{c}7 24. \text{d}1 \text{d}5 \text{c}5 25. \text{f}2 \pm J.Pinter – Jansa, Prague 1985. Black must
defend a rather unpleasant endgame in which the presence of opposite coloured bishops on the board does not guarantee him a draw at all.

Black’s plan to try to exchange the light-squared bishops does not lead to equality either – 13...b6, because of 14.\h6 \a6 after 14...cxd4 15.\xg7 \xg7, Seifert – Shmirin, Leutersdorf 2001, White is absolutely not forced to trade queens and he can continue the fight in a middle game with: 16.\f4! f6 17.cxd4\+ 15.\xa6 \xa6 (in case of 15...
\xh6 16.\xh6 \xa6 17.\f4 cxd4 18.\xd3!, Black has great problems to defend against the threats 19.\h3 and 19.\h5) 16.\xg7 \xg7 17.d5 e6 (17...
\e5 18.c4 \g8 19.\xc2 \c8 20.f4 \g4 21.\c3 \d7 22.\g3 \ab8 23.e5\+ Gil Capape – Drummond, Toowoomba 1986; 17...
\c4 18.\g3 f6 19.\c2 \b5 20.c4 \e8 21.\e3\+ Buch – Fedder, Lyngby 1975) 18.c4 e5 19.f4 f6 21.\f1\+ and White developed a dangerous kingside initiative in the game Gligoric - Weinstein, Los Angeles 1974.

The tactical complications after 13...\g4 14.f3 \e5 15.\d5 \xd5 16.exd5 \c4 17.\d3 \b2 18.\b1 (the line 18.\d2 \c4 only leads to a repetition of moves) 18...\xd1 19.\xb7 (It is also interesting for White to try here: 19.\xd1 \a6 20.fxg4 \xe2 21.\e1 \xg4!? 22.\xb7 \e8, but it looks like after: 23.\xa7 cxd4 24.\xd4 \xd4+ 25.\xd4 \xd4+ 26.cxd4= R.Garcia – Poch, Argentina 1974, as well as after: 23.\xc5 \xc5 24.\c1 \e2 25.\f2 \xa2 26.\d7 \b8=, Black can defend successfully.) 19...\d8 20.\xd4! (Black did not play so well in the game Ftacnik – Stohl, Trnava 1984, which continued 20...\c8 21.\xe7 \f8 22.\f6 \e8 23.\f4 \xa2 24.\g3 \xd5 25.\e4 \g7 26.\xc5\+ 21.\xd4 (after 21.\xd4 \xd5 22.\xd5 \xd5 23.fxg4 e5\± Black recaptures his piece) 21...\c8! (but not 21...\d7? due to 22.c4 \e5 23.f4 \b8 24.\b2\+ Volchikhin – Bragin, corr. 1979, while the line: 21...\xd5? 22.\xd5 \xd5 23.fxg4 e5, loses for Black, because of the vulnerability of his last rank – 24.\b1\+)) 22.\xe7 \f8 23.\c6 \x5 24.\xd5 \xd5 25.\e8 \e6 26.\xe6 \xe6\± lead to a position in which Black could defend successfully with his active bishop pair despite White’s two extra pawns in the game Razuvaev – Tukmakov, USSR 1979.

14.\b3

After 14.\d5 \g4 15.\g5 \f6 16.\xf6 \xf6 17.\f4 \f8 18.h4 (in case of 18.dxc5 \xc5 19.\b1 \a5 20.\d2, White can try to hamper the development of Black’s queenside; still following: 20...\e6! 21.\xb7 \xd5 22.exd5 \d8, after 23.\e3, Oller – Hagenbach, corr. 1991, 23...\xd5\+, as well as after: 23.\e4 \ab8 24.\xb8 \xb8 25.\h3 \xc3 26.
\(\text{x}c3 \text{x}c3=\), Black obtains a good game) 18...\(\text{h}g7\) 19.\(\text{g}3\) e6 20.\(\text{e}b3\) in the game Burger – Popovic, Saint John 1988, Black had the bishop pair advantage and he could have played 20...e5!? (if 20...cxd4 21.cxd4 e5 22.dxe5, then after 22...\text{xe}5\? White has the powerful resource 23.\(\text{xf}7+\), while in case of 22...e5 Black must consider 23.\text{g}5\! and the pin along the 5th rank is definitely troublesome for him.) 21.dxe5 \text{c}7=.

14...\(\text{g}4\)

Black pins White’s knight on c2 and thus he increases the tension even more.

It is considerably weaker for him to play: 14...\(\text{g}4?!\) 15.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 16.f3 \(\text{f}6\), Antas – Alves, corr. 1995, because White can play: 17.e5 \(\text{h}5\) 18.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{f}8\) 19.\(d5\pm\) and he occupies the centre with his pawns and avoids the trade of queens.

The reduction of the tension in the centre with the move 14...c4?! is definitely in favour of White. 15.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{g}4\) 16.\(\text{g}5\) h6 (in case of 16...\(\text{f}6\) 17.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 18.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{a}4\) 19.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 20.\(\text{h}4\pm\) White remains with a free hand to prepare his active actions on the kingside, C.Hansen – Kallmeyer, corr. 1988) 17.\(\text{h}4!\) (Capturing of the pawn – 17.\(\text{xe}7\), enables Black to play: 17...\text{c}7! 18.\(\text{xd}8\) \(\text{xh}2+\) 19.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{h}1+\) 20.\(\text{g}1\) \(\text{h}2+\) 21.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{xg}2\) and his attack against White’s king is very dangerous.) 17...\(\text{xh}2\)

18.\(\text{xe}7!\) (It works now!) 18...\(\text{e}8\) 19.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{g}4\), Depoorter – Burgnies, Bethune 2000 and here after the simple move 20.e5\pm, White maintains an obvious advantage.

15.f4

White cannot neutralize the pin of the knight on e2 so easily. The move 15.f3? would not work because of 15...\(\text{xf}3!\)–++. He has tried 15.\(\text{d}5?!\), but after 15...\(\text{a}6!\) 16.dxe5 \(\text{xe}2\) 17.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{b}5\) 18.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{d}7\), White’s pawn-chain is completely in ruins. The radical solution of the problem – 19.c4 \(\text{a}4\) 20.\(\text{f}4\) e6 21.\(\text{f}6\) exd5 22.cxd5 \(\text{a}5\), led to a position in which White had no compensation for the sacrificed piece, Obsivac – Beshukov, Katowice 1993.

15...\(\text{c}6\)

After 15...cxd4 16.cxd4 \(\text{xd}2\) 17.\(\text{xd}2\) \(\text{c}6\) 18.d5 \(\text{xe}2\) 19.\(\text{xe}2\) \(\text{d}4\) 20.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{xb}3\) 21.axb3\pm as in the game Djouadi – Santa Maria, Gausdal 1986, White won the battle for the c-file and in case of 15...\(\text{a}6\) 16.fxe5 \(\text{xe}2\) 17.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{c}4\) like in the game Burlov – Beshukov, Moscow 1990, White
Chapter 12

had to take immediately his queen away from the scope of action of the black rook with the move 18.\texttt{\_\_\_f2}.\texttt{\_\_\_f2}.

\textbf{16.d5 \texttt{\_\_\_a6} 17.\texttt{\_\_\_e1} c4!}

This is necessary; otherwise White breaks through with his central pawns – 17...b6 18.h3 \texttt{\_\_\_c8} 19.c4 e6 20.\texttt{\_\_\_f2} \texttt{\_\_\_a5} 21.\texttt{\_\_\_h4} \texttt{\_\_\_xb3} 22.axb3 \texttt{\_\_\_e8} 23.e5± and his advantage is overwhelming, Santoro – Celli, corr. 1975.

\textbf{18.\texttt{\_\_\_c2} e6=}

The position is approximately equal.

\textbf{b) 12.\texttt{\_\_\_f4}?}

White is trying to disrupt the coordination of Black’s pieces. The other moves are weaker.

Black has played here most of all the lines: \textbf{b1)} \textbf{12...e5}, or \textbf{b2)} \textbf{12...d7}.

Meanwhile, Black’s queen does not have so many possible retreats at all. He loses immediately after: 12...\texttt{\_\_\_b6??}, because of 13.\texttt{\_\_\_b1} \texttt{\_\_\_a5} 14.\texttt{\_\_\_b5} \texttt{\_\_\_a3} 15.\texttt{\_\_\_c1++} – and his queen gets trapped.

The move 12...\texttt{\_\_\_a5} is seemingly logical. Black defends his c5-pawn just in case. On the other hand that move has a serious drawback – his knight will not have the a5-square available. White can follow with 13.\texttt{\_\_\_b3}! and he can make use of that.

13...\texttt{\_\_\_f8} (Black’s position remains difficult too after: 13...e6, because of: 14.d5! exd5 15.\texttt{\_\_\_xd5} \texttt{\_\_\_d7} 16.\texttt{\_\_\_c1} \texttt{\_\_\_a6} 17.\texttt{\_\_\_d2} \texttt{\_\_\_e5} 18.\texttt{\_\_\_xe5} \texttt{\_\_\_xe5} 19.f4 \texttt{\_\_\_c7} 20.c4 \texttt{\_\_\_e7} 21.\texttt{\_\_\_b2±} and White’s bishop has occupied a very powerful position on the d5-outpost, Garcia Paolicchi – Omuku, Dubai 1986. It is even worse for Black to play: 13...cxd4?!, since following 14.\texttt{\_\_\_xf7+} he loses immediately after: 14...\texttt{\_\_\_f8}, because of 15.\texttt{\_\_\_g8!} e6 16.\texttt{\_\_\_xe6} dxc3 17.\texttt{\_\_\_g8} \texttt{\_\_\_d7} 18.\texttt{\_\_\_d6+} \texttt{\_\_\_e8} 19.\texttt{\_\_\_f1+--} Rau – Wohlfahrt, Stuttgart 2003, while in case of 15...\texttt{\_\_\_h8} 15.cxd4 \texttt{\_\_\_xd4} 16.\texttt{\_\_\_xd4} \texttt{\_\_\_xd4}, Wilde – Bachmann, Muenster 1987, White plays 17.\texttt{\_\_\_d5+--} and Black’s rook on d4 becomes extremely endangered.) 14.\texttt{\_\_\_f1} a6 (The move 14...\texttt{\_\_\_d8}, T. Andersson – Salmensuu, Tjele 1994 is too passive and White can emphasize that with the help of the
line: 15.\textgambit{g}5 \textgambit{c}7 16.d5\# and it turns out that Black fails to block White's central pawns with the move 16...e5?!., because of 17.d6 \textgambit{d}7 18.\textgambit{e}7++. The other blocking attempt – 14...e5 fails as well, because Black cannot force White to play d4-d5 and after: 15.\textgambit{e}3 \textgambit{c}7 16.\textgambit{d}5 \textgambit{a}5 17.\textgambit{a}3 c4 18.dxe5 \textgambit{xe}5 19.f4 \textgambit{g}7 20.\textgambit{c}5 \textgambit{e}8 21.\textgambit{d}4 White can use the d5-square for his bishop, Dickson – Bolshoi Theater, Altschuler 1955. Black's defence is not any easier after: 14...\textgambit{c}xd4 15.\textgambit{c}xd4 \textgambit{d}8 16.\textgambit{g}3 \textgambit{a}5 17.d5 \textgambit{b}8 18.\textgambit{d}4 b6 19.\textgambit{e}5\# Rebaudo – Hilton – Estes Park 1987) 15...c4 16.\textgambit{b}b1 b6 17.\textgambit{d}2 \textgambit{b}7 18.\textgambit{cd}1 \textgambit{d}6=, Black has placed his knight on the beautiful d6-square and his position is quite acceptable, McAlister – Spiegel, corr. 1993.

Black's attempt to block White's centre on the dark squares with 12...\textgambit{e}5 13.\textgambit{xe}5 \textgambit{xe}5 14.\textgambit{b}3 \textgambit{g}4 15.\textgambit{g}3 c4 (after 15...\textgambit{f}4 16.\textgambit{h}3 \textgambit{e}5 17.\textgambit{c}2 b6 18.\textgambit{e}2 \textgambit{h}6 19.f4 \textgambit{c}6, Le Corre – Malmstrom, corr. 2001, White could have played 20.d5\# and his mobile central pawns would have been really dangerous) 16.\textgambit{c}2 e5 17.h3 \textgambit{f}6 (The tactical trick for Black – 17...\textgambit{exd}4 18.\textgambit{cxd}4 \textgambit{e}3, backfires after: 19.fxe3 \textgambit{xe}3 20.\textgambit{f}3 \textgambit{g}5 21.\textgambit{d}2 b5 22.\textgambit{cf}1 \textgambit{d}7 23.\textgambit{f}2 \textgambit{e}7 24.e5\# Lees – Barre, corr. 2000) 18.\textgambit{f}3 \textgambit{d}7 19.\textgambit{e}3 b5 20.f4\# failed in the game Pekarek – Sygulski, Germany 1991.

\textbf{b1) 12...e5 13.\textgambit{g}5}

White retreats with his bishop with tempo.

The standard move 13.\textgambit{g}3, with the idea to prepare later the occupation of the d5-square with the other bishop is not effective here, because of: 13...\textgambit{e}7! and White must clarify his intentions concerning the pawn-structure in the centre. After for example: 14.d5 \textgambit{a}5 15.\textgambit{d}3 (15.\textgambit{b}3 c4 16.\textgambit{c}2 b5 17.\textgambit{b}b1 a6 18.a4 \textgambit{c}5= Burtman – Saveride, Estes Park 1987) 15...c4 16.\textgambit{b}b1 b6 17.\textgambit{d}2 \textgambit{b}7 18.\textgambit{cd}1 \textgambit{d}6=, Black has placed his knight on the beautiful d6-square and his position is quite acceptable, McAlister – Spiegel, corr. 1993.

13...\textgambit{d}7

That move is not so aesthetic, but that is the only way Black can prevent the penetration of White's bishop to the d5-square.

The exchange-sacrifice 13...\textgambit{exd}4? 14.\textgambit{xd}8 \textgambit{xd}8, after 15.\textgambit{d}5 \textgambit{f}6 16.\textgambit{cxd}4 cxd4 17.\textgambit{b}3 \textgambit{e}7 18.\textgambit{b}b1 \textgambit{g}4 19.f3 \textgambit{c}8 20.\textgambit{fd}1\#, led Black into a lost position in the game, Henrichs – Hillenbrand, Germany 2003.
The retreat of the black rook to the last rank enables White’s d-pawn to advance promptly into Black’s camp, for example after: 13...\(\text{d}8\) 14.d5 \(\text{c}a5\) (Black’s position here became immediately critical in a game played on the Internet after: 14...h6 15.e3! \(\text{d}a5\) 16.d6 \(\text{d}7\) 17.d5 c4 18.f4 exf4 19.xfx4 \(\text{b}h7\) 20.d2\(=\) and White’s advantage was overwhelming.) 15.d6! (White should play very actively here; otherwise Black will have enough time to solidify his position as that happened for example after: 15.b3 \(\text{d}6\) 16.c4 a6 17.d2 \(\text{x}b3\) 18.axb3 a5 19.a1 b6 20.\(c\)c1 \(\text{d}7\) 21.d3 f5 22.exf5 gxf5\(\infty\), in the game Ahling – Genkin, Germany 1999.) 15... \(\text{d}7\) 16.d5 \(\text{c}6\) (16...\(\text{x}d6??\) 17.xf7--\) 17.f4 (White is in a hurry to support his d6-pawn.) 17...h6 18.h4 \(\text{d}h7\) (The double attack – 18...exf4 19.xfx4 g5, does not work, because of: 20.\(g\)g6 gxh4 21.xf8 \(\text{xf}8\) 22.xf7+ \(\text{xf}7\) 23.xf7 \(\text{xf}7\) 24.d7--) 19.fxe5 \(\text{xe}5\) 20.xc6 \(\text{xc}6\) 21.e7 \(\text{e}6\) 22.xf8 (It is probably even more precise for White to follow with: 22.xf4?! creating the threat to capture on e6, while in case of 23.c4, White wins with 24.xg6!) 23.xf8 23.xf4\(=\) and White acquired a material advantage, Roetteler – Brunsch, Germany 2001.

The other retreat of the black rook is not any better at all – 13..\(\text{e}8\). After 14.d5 \(\text{a}5\) (the move 14...\(\text{d}8\), Rensen – Mitchell, corr. 1998, should have been countered by White with: 15.d6!? \(\text{c}6\) 16.d3\(\uparrow\) 15.d6! (It is too slow for White to play: 15.b5 \(\text{d}7\) 16.xd7 \(\text{d}7\) 17.c4 b6 18.d2 b7 19.c3 \(\text{d}6\) 20.\(e\)2 \(f\)5\(=\), because that enables Black to deploy his knight to the beautiful d6-square and to obtain some counterplay, Lutz – Michaelsen, Germany 1989.) 15... \(\text{d}7\) 16.d5 \(\text{c}6\) (After 16...\(\text{f}\)8 17.f4 \(\text{c}6\) 18.f5\(=\), White had an overwhelming attack against the black king in the game Wiedenkeller – Lemmens, Liechtenstein 1988. In case of 16...\(\text{h}\)8 17.e7 \(\text{xe}7\) 18.dxe7 \(\text{xe}7\) 19.a4\(=\), Black has lost material and he has his knight on a5 to worry about too, Roemer – K.Keller, Eger 1991) White can play: 17.f4!? h6 18.xe5 \(\text{xe}5\) 19.e7 \(\text{xe}7\) 20.dxe7 \(\text{xe}7\) 21.f4 c4 22.a4\(=\) and he wins material.

Following 13...\(\text{d}6\) 14.d5!, White’s bishop occupies a powerful outpost in the middle of the board. (It is less principled, but still quite possible for White to play here: 14.d5 \(\text{a}5\) 15.d3 c4 16.b1 b5 17.f4 f6 18.xe5 fxe5 19.e1\(=\) and his chances turned out to be again superior mostly because of the fact that Black’s knight failed to come back to the centre in time, because of the unfortunate placement of his rook on the d6-square, Bus – Teske, Erfurt 1989.) 14...\(\text{e}6\) (After 14...\(\text{d}7\) 15.e3 \(\text{d}8\) 16.dxe5
deploy his bishop on the d5-square, so he is forced to close the centre.

14...\a5 15.\c3

White’s bishop has nothing to do on the b5-square: 15.\b5 \d6 16.c4 (after 16.f4 a6 17.\d3 c4 18.\b1 \c6 19.\e1 f6 20.\h4 \d8 21.fxe5 fxe5 22.\g3 \f7, Black managed to bring his knight to the defence of his kingside in the game, Fourzan – De Oliveira, corr. 2002) 16...f5 17.f4 a6 18.\a4 fxe4 19.\g3 \f5 C.Pedersen – Borisek, Budva 2003.

15.c4 16.\c2 b5

Black has also tried in practice here: 16...b6 17.\d2 \b7 18.\cd1 \d6 19.f4 f6 20.fxe5 fxe5, Kakagedyev – Chudinovskih, Naberezhnye Chelny 1988. It was worth for White to trade the bishops with the move 21.\h6 in order to weaken the dark squares around Black’s king and to deprive the e5-pawn of one of its defenders.

17.\d2 \b7 18.\h6

White is in a hurry to create some threats on the kingside, while Black’s knight is too far away from the centre.

18...\xh6 19.\xh6 \d6 20.\f4 \c5+ 21.\h1 f6

In case of 21...\e3, it is advisable for White to play 22.\h4!, because after 22...\xe2 23.fxe5, Black will be forced to give up his extra piece back.

22.fxe5 \f7 23.\d2 fxe5 24.\g1±
This position was reached in the game Ruether – Buchner, Bayern 2003. Black’s king shelter is quite unreliable, because of the absence of the dark-squared bishops.

b2) 12...\(\text{d7}\)

13.dxc5!

White captures the c5 pawn at a moment in which Black’s pieces are a bit misplaced.

The move 13.d5 has been tested numerous times. On the other hand, recently after: 13...\(\text{c}5\)!? (During the 70ies and the 80ies of the 20\(^{th}\) century Black was analyzing and playing regularly: 13...\(\text{a}5\) 14.\(\text{d}3\) and as a rule he managed to obtain a solid position, particularly in case he managed to bring back into active actions his knight on a5, see Game 10 Jussupow – Kamsky, Tilburg 1992.) Black often solved his opening problems successfully. White is faced with a permanent dilemma in this variation – whether to present Black with the two bishop advantage, or not. In case he chooses the second option – 14.\(\text{b}3\) (The other principled possibility for White is to play: 14.\(\text{x}e5\) \(\text{x}e5\) 15.f4 \(\text{g}7\)\(\infty\), but it leads to a position in which Black’s couple of bishops contain White’s pressure in the centre) 14...b5 15.h3 as for example in the game Piskov – Stajcic, Budapest 1989 (after 15.c4 \(\text{xc}4\) 16.\(\text{xc}4\) bxc4 17.\(\text{xc}4\)\(\infty\) as in the game Maksimovic – Bogdanovic, Zlatibor 1989, or 15.\(\text{x}e5\) \(\text{x}e5\) 16.f4 \(\text{g}7\) 17.c4 \(\text{a}6\) 18.\(\text{xb}5\) \(\text{xb}5\)\(\infty\) like in the game Berry – Knott, Torquay 2002, Black’s bishop pair compensated White’s superior pawn structure) and Black could get some counterplay on the queenside with the move 15...a5!\(\infty\).

13...\(\text{e}8\)

The seemingly active line – 13...\(\text{g}4\), after 14.\(\text{b}3\) e6 (14...\(\text{f}8\) 15.f3 \(\text{h}5\) 16.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{e}5\) 17.\(\text{d}5\) a6 18.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{d}3\) 19.c6 \(\text{xc}1\) 20.\(\text{xc}1\) bxc6 21.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{e}6\) 22.\(\text{xa}8\) \(\text{xa}8\) 23.c4\(\infty\), leads to a position in which Black’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient, Lund – Paaske, Copenhagen 2004) 15.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{h}5\) 16.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{e}5\) 17.\(\text{b}5\) a6 18.\(\text{cd}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 19.\(\text{xd}7\) \(\text{xd}7\) (19...\(\text{xd}7\)? 20.\(\text{c}7\) \(\text{e}5\) 21.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{h}4\) 22.\(\text{xd}7\) ...
The move 13...\(\mathcal{Q}a5\) is evidently unsatisfactory due to 14.\(\mathcal{Q}b5\)! (it is weaker for White to play 14.\(\mathcal{Q}b3\) because of 14...\(\mathcal{W}e8\) 15.\(\mathcal{W}c2\) \(\mathcal{Q}d7\) and Black completed his development successfully and equalized in the game Blasko – A.Zubov, Balatonlelle 2000) 14...\(\mathcal{W}xd1\) 15.\(\mathcal{W}fxd1\) \(\mathcal{W}xd1\)+ 16.\(\mathcal{W}xd1\) \(\mathcal{E}e6\) 17.\(\mathcal{Q}c7\) \(\mathcal{Q}c6\) (after 17...\(\mathcal{W}c4\) 18.\(\mathcal{B}b1\)!! -- Black’s position was hopeless in the game Sakaev – Zezjulkin, Warsaw (active) 2003) 18.\(\mathcal{Q}d4\)± with an advantage for White.

Theory considered the move 13...\(\mathcal{Q}e5\) to be good enough for equality for a long time. Presently this evaluation has changed and White has good prospects to fight for an advantage. After 14.\(\mathcal{Q}xe5\) \(\mathcal{Q}xe5\) 15.\(\mathcal{W}b3\)! (in the endgame after 15.\(\mathcal{W}xd7\) \(\mathcal{W}xd7\) 16.f4 \(\mathcal{Q}g7\) 17.\(\mathcal{Q}d5\) \(\mathcal{Q}b5\) 18.\(\mathcal{F}fe1\) \(\mathcal{M}ac8\) 19.\(\mathcal{Q}xb7\) \(\mathcal{X}xc5\) 20.e5 \(\mathcal{G}e5\) as in the game Knaak – Malich, Potsdam 1974, Black had some compensation for the pawn because of his strong bishop pair) 15...e6 16.f4! (White cannot avoid that move anyway. It is possible for him to follow with: 16.\(\mathcal{Q}cd1\) \(\mathcal{W}e7\) 17.\(\mathcal{W}xd8+\) \(\mathcal{W}xd8\) and here after 18.f4!, everything leads to a simple transposition of moves, while after: 18.\(\mathcal{Q}d1\) \(\mathcal{W}e7\) Knaak – Liebert, Halle 1974, White might forfeit his opening advantage altogether) 16...\(\mathcal{Q}g7\) 17.\(\mathcal{Q}cd1\) (after 17.\(\mathcal{f}f5\) \(\mathcal{W}e7\) 18.\(\mathcal{X}xe6\) \(\mathcal{X}xe6\) 19.\(\mathcal{X}xe6\) \(\mathcal{X}xe6\) 20.\(\mathcal{Q}f4\) \(\mathcal{E}e8\) 21.\(\mathcal{Q}d3\) \(\mathcal{X}ad8=\) Black survived White’s pressure in the game D.Yanovsky – Friedman, Netanya 1973) 17...\(\mathcal{W}c7\) 18.\(\mathcal{W}xd8+\) \(\mathcal{W}xd8\) 19.\(\mathcal{f}f5!\) (it is not so good for White to play 19.\(\mathcal{Q}d1\) due to 19...\(\mathcal{W}c7\) 20.\(\mathcal{W}b5\) \(\mathcal{Q}f8\) 21.\(\mathcal{W}f1\) a6 22.\(\mathcal{W}e8\) \(\mathcal{X}xc5\) 23.\(\mathcal{Q}b3\) \(\mathcal{Q}e7\) 24.\(\mathcal{Q}d8\) \(\mathcal{Q}xe8\) 25.\(\mathcal{Q}xe8\) and here in the game Kaidanov – Jones, USA 1992, Black sacrificed a pawn with 25...\(\mathcal{b}5!?\) 26.\(\mathcal{f}f5\) \(\mathcal{X}xf5\) 27.\(\mathcal{X}xf5\) \(\mathcal{X}b7\) 28.\(\mathcal{X}xe6\) \(\mathcal{X}xe6\) \(\mathcal{G}h8\) 30.\(\mathcal{G}g3\) \(\mathcal{Q}g7\) 31.\(\mathcal{Q}e1\) \(\mathcal{Q}d8=\), but he managed to simplify the position considerably) 19...\(\mathcal{W}e7\) 20.\(\mathcal{Q}h1!?\) (after 20.\(\mathcal{X}xe6\) \(\mathcal{Q}xe6\) 21.\(\mathcal{Q}xc5+\) 22.\(\mathcal{Q}h1\) \(\mathcal{F}xe6\) 23.\(\mathcal{X}xe6+\) \(\mathcal{Q}h8\) 24.\(\mathcal{Q}d7\) \(\mathcal{Q}c4\) 25.\(\mathcal{X}xb7\) \(\mathcal{G}g8\) 26.\(\mathcal{E}e1\) \(\mathcal{Q}xa2±\), White will hardly be able to press his material advantage of an extra pawn home in case Black defends precisely, Bares – Ederer, corr. 1999) 20...\(\mathcal{W}xf5\) 21.\(\mathcal{Q}d4\) \(\mathcal{X}xe4\) (21...\(\mathcal{W}xc5\) 22.\(\mathcal{Q}xf7+\) \(\mathcal{Q}h8\) 23.\(\mathcal{Q}xf5\) \(\mathcal{X}xf5\) 24.\(\mathcal{Q}xf5\) \(\mathcal{G}xh5\) 25.\(\mathcal{Q}xb7\) \(\mathcal{Q}d8\) 26.\(\mathcal{Q}c4\+) -- White’s advantage was decisive in the game Shariyazdanov – Cherniaev, Biel 2003.) 22.\(\mathcal{Q}xf7\) \(\mathcal{Q}h8\) 23.\(\mathcal{Q}d5\) \(\mathcal{Q}e7\) 24.\(\mathcal{Q}b5!\) (in case of 24.\(\mathcal{Q}c6\) \(\mathcal{Q}xc6\), Black saves the day with the line: 25...\(\mathcal{Q}a6!\) 26.\(\mathcal{Q}xa8\) \(\mathcal{Q}xf1\) 27.\(\mathcal{Q}b8+\) \(\mathcal{Q}f8\) 28.\(\mathcal{Q}xa7\) \(\mathcal{Q}c4=\) 24...\(\mathcal{Q}a6\) 25.\(\mathcal{Q}b6\) a5 26.\(\mathcal{Q}b1\) \(\mathcal{Q}a6\) 27.\(\mathcal{Q}b5\) \(\mathcal{Q}f3\) 28.\(\mathcal{Q}c6\) \(\mathcal{Q}xc6\) 29.\(\mathcal{Q}xc6\) \(\mathcal{Q}c7\) 30.a4± and White’s
positional advantage is quite obvious. Black’s pieces on the queenside are forced to occupy rather unfavourable positions.

14.\textit{d}5

14...\textit{d}7

14...\textit{a}5? 15.\textit{c}7+-.

The move 14...\textit{d}e5 is not so good here as before since after 15.\textit{d}d4! (after 15.\textit{b}3 \textit{e}6 White can capture another pawn with 16.\textit{xb}7 16...\textit{xb}7 17.\textit{xb}7 \textit{d}3 18.\textit{cd}1 \textit{xc}5 19.\textit{b}1 \textit{c}6= Knaak – Ribli, Amsterdam 1974, as well as with 16.\textit{xe}5 \textit{xe}5 17.\textit{xb}7 \textit{b}8 18.\textit{c}6 \textit{xb}7 19.\textit{xb}7 \textit{c}6 20.\textit{c}2 \textit{xb}7 21.\textit{fd}1 \textit{db}8 22.\textit{b}1 \textit{xb}1 23.\textit{xb}1 \textit{xb}1+ 24.\textit{xb}1 \textit{c}7=, but Black equalizes in both cases). There might follow: 15...\textit{e}6 16.\textit{b}3 \textit{e}7 17.\textit{e}3!? (White can also try 17.\textit{h}1!! \textit{xc}5 18.\textit{g}5) 17...\textit{d}7 18.\textit{b}5! (the immediate aggression on the kingside is not productive after 18.f4 \textit{xc}5 19.\textit{f}3 \textit{d}7 20.\textit{f}5 \textit{xb}3 21.\textit{axb}3 \textit{xf}5 22.\textit{exf}5 \textit{xf}5 23.\textit{xf}5 \textit{gx}f5=) 18...\textit{e}5 19.\textit{h}1! (after 19.\textit{d}4 as in the game Firt – J.Pribyl, Brno 1990, Black could play 19...\textit{f}4! 20.\textit{b}1 \textit{e}5 21.\textit{e}3 \textit{e}3 22.fxe3 \textit{xc}5= with equality) 19...\textit{a}6 20.\textit{f}4± and the white knight is very powerful in the centre of the board.

15.\textit{d}3!

White is ready to part with one of his bishops in order to organize some active play on the dark squares. Black’s light-squared bishop is quite restricted mostly due to White’s e4-pawn. It is much weaker for White to play like in the game Kushner – Gaprindashvili, Riga (m/12) 1972, where after 15.\textit{g}5?! \textit{a}5! 16.\textit{f}4 \textit{dc}8 17.\textit{f}5 \textit{e}6 18.\textit{fxe}6 \textit{exe}6 19.\textit{b}3 \textit{xc}5= Black seized the initiative.

15...\textit{e}6

Black’s attempt to restore the material balance with 15...\textit{f}8 16.\textit{e}3 \textit{dc}8 17.\textit{g}3 (just like after 17.e5 \textit{e}6 18.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 19.\textit{g}3) 17...\textit{e}6 18.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 19.\textit{e}5 \textit{xc}5 after 20.\textit{f}3! (but not 20.\textit{d}2 \textit{e}7 21.\textit{g}5 \textit{c}4∞ as in the game Knaak – Garcia Martinez, Polanica Zdroj 1974) 20...\textit{e}7 21.\textit{e}4± lead to a position in which the weakness of the dark squares on Black’s kingside is quite considerable.

The move 15...\textit{f}6 seems to be just a loss of time. After 16.\textit{e}3 \textit{e}6 17.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 18.\textit{d}6 \textit{e}5 19.c4 \textit{h}6 20.\textit{xb}6 \textit{xe}4 21.\textit{c}3 \textit{c}6 22.\textit{d}5 \textit{xd}5 23.\textit{cxd}5 \textit{b}6 24.\textit{fd}1 \textit{ac}8 25.\textit{e}3±, Black’s defence is very difficult, Gustafsson – Mamedyarov, Gothenburg 2005.

Black has also tried here
15...\texttt{c}c8 16.\texttt{f}e3 \texttt{d}a5, B.Johnson – Alm, Elitserien 2005. It deserved attention for White now to play the move 17.\texttt{g}g5!?\texttt{,} followed by a march of the f-pawn, for example: 17...\texttt{f}f8 18.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{e}e8 19.\texttt{f}5\texttt{.}

\textbf{16.\texttt{d}xc6!}

This is the logical consequence of White’s move 15.

\textbf{16...\texttt{d}xc6 17.\texttt{d}d6 \texttt{e}5}

It is not any better for Black to play here: 17...\texttt{b}6, because of 18.\texttt{e}e3 \texttt{b}b7 19.\texttt{e}5 \texttt{c}c6 20.\texttt{f}f3 \texttt{bxc}5, Quinn – Knott, Scarborough 2004, and now White had to follow with 21.\texttt{g}g3\texttt{!}, with the idea to deploy the knight to the e4-outpost.

\textbf{18.\texttt{e}e3 \texttt{f}5}

Black wants to remove the obstacle in front of his bishop on c6. After 18...\texttt{e}e6 19.c4 \texttt{f}f8 20.\texttt{xf}8 \texttt{xf}8 21.\texttt{f}d1 \texttt{fd}8 the positional exchange sacrifice – 22.\texttt{d}d5!? \texttt{xd}5 23.\texttt{xd}5 \texttt{e}e7 24.\texttt{f}f3 \texttt{ac}8 25.\texttt{c}c2\texttt{+} (planning \texttt{d}c1-d3) helps White to reach a position in which his powerful central pawns on the fifth rank are quite dangerous.

\textbf{19.exf5}

It is weaker to play 19.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{f}4 20.\texttt{f}f2 because Black gains plenty of space on the kingside. White’s extra pawn does not matter much because the knight on e2 is quite restricted in its movement.

\textbf{19...gx\texttt{xf}5 20.\texttt{f}3!}

White continues with the idea to restrict the light-squared bishop of his opponent. He is also fixing the potential weakness on e5 in the process. It was weaker to play 20.\texttt{f}4 because of 20...\texttt{exf}4 21.\texttt{xf}2! (after 21.\texttt{xe}8+ \texttt{xe}8 22.\texttt{xf}4 \texttt{e}e4 23.\texttt{h}h5 \texttt{e}e2 24.\texttt{f}f2 \texttt{ae}8= Black preserves the balance because all his pieces are active) 21...\texttt{e}3?! (this is definitely better than 21...\texttt{f}3 22.\texttt{xf}3 \texttt{h}6 23.\texttt{g}g3+ \texttt{g}6 24.\texttt{b}1\texttt{±}) 22.\texttt{d}4 \texttt{xf}2\texttt{+} (22...\texttt{e}4 23.\texttt{xe}3 \texttt{fxe}3 24.\texttt{ce}1 \texttt{b}6 25.\texttt{xe}3 \texttt{bxc}5 26.\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{d}d5\texttt{±}) 23.\texttt{xf}2 \texttt{e}4\texttt{±} and Black’s light-squared bishop is joining the action effectively.

\textbf{20...\texttt{f}4 21.\texttt{f}f2 \texttt{ac}8 22.c4}

After 22.\texttt{fe}1, Black plays 22...\texttt{h}5 followed by \texttt{f}6-h4.

\textbf{22...\texttt{f}7 23.\texttt{fe}1\texttt{+}}

Black’s central e5-pawn is becoming quite weak now.
Chapter 13

1.d4  \( \text{c}f6 \) 2.c4 \( \text{g}6 \) 3.\( \text{c}c3 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 4.cxd5 \( \text{d}xd5 \) 5.e4 \( \text{xc}3 \) 6.bxc3 \( \text{g}7 \) 7.\( \text{c}c4 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 8.\( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 9.\( \text{e}3 \) 0–0 10.0–0 \( \text{d}7 \)

11.\( \text{b}1 \)

After numerous tournament experiments it turned out that the rook must come right here in order to run away from the scope of action of the black bishop on \( g7 \). It is weaker to play 11.\( \text{c}c1 \) because of 11...\( \text{c}8 \) 12.\( \text{d}2 \) (after 12.d5 \( \text{e}5 \) 13.\( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 14.h3 \( \text{a}6 \) 15.a4 \( \text{c}4 \) Black was even better in the game Onischuk – Svidler, Halkidiki 2002) and after 12...\( \text{a}5 \) (Black can also play 12...\( \text{b}5 \)!, because after 13.\( \text{xb}5 \) he has 13...\( \text{xd}4 = \) ) White cannot easily avoid the trade of the queens, for example after 13.\( \text{b}2 \) cxd4 14.cxd4 \( \text{b}4 \) 15.\( \text{xb}4 \) \( \text{xb}4 \) 16.a3 \( \text{c}6 \) 17.\( \text{a}2 \) \( \text{a}5 \) and Black had an excellent counterplay in the game Syre – Suhl, Germany 1999.

After White maneuvers his rook to h1, Black usually chooses the moves: a) 11...\( \text{c}7 \), b) 11...\( \text{c}8 \) or c) 11...\( \text{a}6 \).

We have analyzed the position after 11...cxd4 12.cxd4 in Chapter 8, while in case of 11...e6, Strong – Sugden, corr. 1985, White could have played
the move 12.\textit{\texttt{d}2}!?, with the idea to proceed with the standard plan connected with the trade of the dark-squared bishops.

The situation resembles a lot variation a after: 11...\textit{\texttt{c}a}5?! 12.\textit{\texttt{d}d}3 \textit{\texttt{c}c}7 (In case of 12...\textit{\texttt{c}xd}4 13.\textit{\texttt{c}xd}4, the game transposes to positions from Chapter 9. You can find the lines after 12...\textit{\texttt{c}c}8 analyzed in variation b. Following 12...\textit{\texttt{e}e}5 13.\textit{\texttt{d}xe}5 \textit{\texttt{c}c}7 14.\textit{\texttt{f}f}4 \textit{\texttt{ad}8}, Timoschenko – Tseshkovsky, Moscow 1989, and after 15.\textit{\texttt{g}g}3, Black’s compensation for the pawn was not sufficient. In case of 12...\textit{\texttt{c}c}8, Boettcher – Nuenchert, Erfurt 1973, as well as when Black’s queen is deployed on the \textit{\texttt{c}7}-square, White should better play the move 13.\textit{\texttt{d}d}5↑). Black’s knight on \textit{\texttt{a}5} is misplaced at the edge of the board and White could take advantage of that by closing the centre. The actions are bound to develop on the kingside and in the centre in that case and Black’s knight will not manage to join in the defence. After 13.\textit{\texttt{d}d}5 (White can try another order of moves with the similar idea i.e. – 13.\textit{\texttt{w}d}2 \textit{\texttt{fd}8} 14.\textit{\texttt{d}d}5 \textit{\texttt{c}c}4 15.\textit{\texttt{c}c}2 and he is again better after: 15...\textit{\texttt{e}e}5 16.\textit{\texttt{f}f}6 17.\textit{\texttt{h}h}4±, while in case of 15...\textit{\texttt{e}e}6?! 16.\textit{\texttt{d}d}6! \textit{\texttt{c}c}6 17.\textit{\texttt{f}f}4 \textit{\texttt{e}e}5 18.\textit{\texttt{f}xe}5 \textit{\texttt{xe}e}5 19.\textit{\texttt{g}g}5!±, Black loses the exchange, Polugaevsky – Romanishin, Tilburg 1985.) 13...\textit{\texttt{c}c}4 14.\textit{\texttt{c}c}2 \textit{\texttt{b}b}6 15.\textit{\texttt{f}f}4!? (White can also try the prophylactic move 15.\textit{\texttt{h}h}3± instead of sacrificing a pawn.) 15...\textit{\texttt{g}g}4 16.\textit{\texttt{h}h}3 \textit{\texttt{xe}e}2 17.\textit{\texttt{xe}e}2 \textit{\texttt{xc}c}3 18.\textit{\texttt{e}e}5=, White’s compensation for the pawn is quite satisfactory. There might follow: 18...\textit{\texttt{d}d}7 19.\textit{\texttt{e}e}4 \textit{\texttt{f}f}5 20.\textit{\texttt{f}f}3 \textit{\texttt{a}a}4, van Wely – Nijboer, Amsterdam 2002 and here after: 21.\textit{\texttt{fc}1}! \textit{\texttt{a}a}3 22.\textit{\texttt{d}d}6 \textit{\texttt{exd}6} 23.\textit{\texttt{xa}8} \textit{\texttt{xa}8} 24.\textit{\texttt{f}f}3↑ (van Wely) White’s initiative was very powerful (see Game 11).

\textbf{a) 11...\textit{\texttt{c}c}7 12.\textit{\texttt{f}f}4}

It is not so clear to play 12.\textit{\texttt{d}xc}5 \textit{\texttt{a}a}5∞ like in the game Kouatly – Ftcnik, Lyon 1988.

White often plays 12.\textit{\texttt{d}d}3. Black should better exploit immediately the possibility to prevent White’s eventual activity in the centre with the move 12...\textit{\texttt{e}e}6!?±. He has tested in practice instead 12...\textit{\texttt{fd}8} (In case of 12...\textit{\texttt{a}a}6 13.\textit{\texttt{w}d}2 \textit{\texttt{b}b}5 14.\textit{\texttt{f}f}4 – see Game 12 P.Nielsen – Garguly, Tripoli (m/1) 2004, but it is stronger for White to follow with 13.\textit{\texttt{f}f}4↑, since Black’s standard reaction 13...\textit{\texttt{g}g}4!? would not work, because of: 14.\textit{\texttt{h}h}3 \textit{\texttt{c}xd}4 15.\textit{\texttt{c}xd}4 \textit{\texttt{xe}e}2 16.\textit{\texttt{xe}e}2±) and here White must test 13.\textit{\texttt{f}f}4!? (After 13.\textit{\texttt{d}d}5 \textit{\texttt{e}e}5= Lahner – Meszaros, Czech Republic 2005, White is forced to concede the two bishop advantage to his opponent. It is interesting for him to continue with: 13.\textit{\texttt{c}c}1 \textit{\texttt{ac}8} 14.\textit{\texttt{d}d}1±, with the idea to play 15.\textit{\texttt{a}a}3 next and in the game Berkes – Sutovsky, Paks 2005, Black failed to unveil White’s plans and
after: 14...a6?! 15...a3! ...a5 16. ...xc5 ...xc5 17.dxc5 ...e6 18....xb7 ...xa2 19.h3 ...c4 20...d4! ...xd3 21...xc6 ...xc6 22...xd3±, his position turned out to be difficult.), because after the move 13... ...g4?!, Black would not have any counterplay, due to the line 14.d5 ...a5 15.c4±.

In case of 12...f4, Black must either comply with the weakening of the d5-square following a1) 12...e5, or his queen would be forced to retreat to a less active placement after: a2) 12... ...c8.

a1) 12...e5

![Diagram](image)

13...g3

White must strive to occupy the d5-square with his bishop.

After 13.dxe5 ...xe5 14...xe5 (It seems logical for White to follow with 14...d5, but Black counters that with: 14...ab8 15.c4 b5± and he preserves some counterplay.) 14...xe5 15.f4 ...g7 16...d5, White still managed to realize that idea, but he had to surrender the two bishop advantage to his opponent. 17...c6 17.c4 ...ab8 18...f3 b5∞ – and Black succeeded in undermining the support of White's bishop and the fight in the centre became tense once again, Bick – Mikhailuk, Philadelphia 2003.

13...ad8

Black loses a piece after: 13...cxd4? 14.cxd4 ...xd4 15...xd4 exd4 (15...fc8 16.bxc1 exd4 17...xc7 ...c6 18...f4 ...xe4 19...fd1+– O.Alexandrova – Dvoret- ska, Nikolaev 2003; 15...a8 16...fc1 exd4 17...xc7 ...xc7 18...xf7+–) 16...xc7 ...ac8 (16...fc8 17...xb7 ...c6 18...d5+–) 17...xb7 ...c6 18...xa7 ...xe4 19...d1+– Navas Lopez – Omuku, Thessaloniki 1988.

In answer to 13...b6, White's most resolute decision seems to be 14.dxc5! (The correct evaluation of the position is not so evident after the break forward of White's d-pawn – 14.d5 ...a5 15.d6!? ...b7 16...d5 ...c6∞. Black is only slightly worse in case of: 14...d5 cxd4 15.cxd4 ...ac8 16...b3 ...d8 17.dxe5 ...xe5 18.f4 ...c6 19...fd1 ...e7±) 14...bxc5 15...d3 (After 15.f4 ...g4 16.f5, White should consider 16...ad8, followed by ...a5. The move 15...d2 enables Black to cover reliably the d5-square at the cost of some compromising of his pawn-structure after: 15...e6!? 16...xe6 fxe6±) 15...ab8 (The exchange of the bishops in unfavourable for Black with a white queen placed on the d3-square: 15...e6? 16...xe6 fxe6, because of 17...c4+–) 16...xb8! (White
needs his rook on the f-file, because after: 16.\textit{\ddot{a}}e3 \textit{\ddot{a}}xb1 17. \textit{\ddot{a}}xb1 \textit{\ddot{a}}b8 18.\textit{\ddot{a}}d1 \textit{\ddot{a}}a5 19.\textit{\ddot{a}}d5 \textit{\ddot{a}}b5=, Black prevails in the fight for the c4-square.) 16...\textit{\ddot{a}}xb8 17. f4↑ and White has a powerful initiative.

14.\textit{\ddot{a}}h4!

It is not so good for White to play 14.\textit{\ddot{a}}d5, because of 14...\textit{\ddot{a}}e6!? (After 14...\textit{\ddot{a}}g4?! 15.f3 \textit{\ddot{a}}e6, turns out to be in favour of White, because after: 16.\textit{\ddot{a}}xe6 fxe6 17.\textit{\ddot{a}}b3 cxd4 18.\textit{\ddot{a}}xd4 \textit{\ddot{a}}xd4 19.cxd4 \textit{\ddot{a}}xd4, he has the resource: 20.\textit{\ddot{a}}f2 \textit{\ddot{a}}c4 21.\textit{\ddot{a}}xa7=) 15.\textit{\ddot{a}}xe6 fxe6 16.\textit{\ddot{a}}b3 cxd4 17. \textit{\ddot{a}}xd4 \textit{\ddot{a}}xd4 18.cxd4 \textit{\ddot{a}}xd4 19.f3 b6 20.\textit{\ddot{a}}xe6+ \textit{\ddot{a}}f7 21.\textit{\ddot{a}}xf7= and Black manages to trade the majority of White’s pieces suffering only minimal defects of his pawn-structure.

14...\textit{\ddot{a}}c8 15.d5

This breakthrough of the d-pawn now is much more effective with the bishop poised on the h4-d8 diagonal.

15...\textit{\ddot{a}}a5 16.d6 \textit{\ddot{a}}b8

(diagram)

17.\textit{\ddot{a}}d5=*

Black’s position is very difficult as a result of that forced line. White’s bishop has been deployed on the strategically important d5-square and its dark-squared partner is ready to support the d-pawn from the e7-square.

a2) 12...\textit{\ddot{a}}c8

13.d5!?

In case White postpones that pawn-break, he might lose his opening advantage altogether.

After 13.\textit{\ddot{a}}d3 \textit{\ddot{a}}d8 14.\textit{\ddot{a}}fc1 \textit{\ddot{a}}a5 15.\textit{\ddot{a}}b5 a6 16.\textit{\ddot{a}}xd7 \textit{\ddot{a}}xd7 17.\textit{\ddot{a}}g3 \textit{\ddot{a}}ac8=, Black succeeded in exchanging favourably the light-squared bishops in the game Kolly – Avrukh, Biel 2002.

The inclusion of the moves 13.\textit{\ddot{a}}c1 \textit{\ddot{a}}d8 is in favour of Black, because his light squared bishop might retreat to the e8-square if that need be, in order not to ham-
per the actions of his other pieces. After 14.d5 e5 15.xe5 xe5 16.f4 g7 17.b3 b8 18.a4 b6 19.e5 e8 20.g3 a6 21.cd1 b5 22.axb5 axb5 23.e2 b7, Black organized successfully some counterplay on the queenside, M.Rodshteyn – Huzman, Ashdod 2004.

13...a5

In case Black retreats with his knight to the centre – 13...e5, contrary to the line that we have analyzed in our previous notes, it is now very strong for White to follow with: 14.xe5 xe5 15.f4 g7 16.e5. After 16...a6 17.a4 c7 18.a5 ab8 19.b6 c8 20.g3 h8 21.d3 f6 22.d6 exd6 23.exd6 d7 24.f5±, Black failed to organize any counterplay on the queenside in the game I.Farago – Karavade, Budapest 2005.

14.d3 e5 15.e3!

This is more precise than 15.g3 – since the g3-square might come about handy for the deployment of the knight. After 15...c4 16.c2 b6 17.d2 b7 18.f4 f6 19.h1 d6 20.g1 d8, Black’s knight returned to the centre and that prevented the development of White’s initiative on the kingside, Sakaev – Avrukh, Izmir 2004.

15.f5

Now, when White’s bishop is on e3 – the plan 15...c4?! 16.c2 b6 17.f4 f6, is not so good for Black, because it enables White to play: 18.f5 b7 19.g3± and to occupy additional space on the kingside.

16.exf5

White must open the position; otherwise he would hardly manage to break Black’s defence. He should also make use of the circumstance that his opponent’s knight is temporary at the edge of the board and Black will lose valuable time centralizing it.

16...gx5 17.f3

This move reduces in a way the mobility of Black’s central pawns. Meanwhile, White’s queen gains access to the valuable e1-h4 diagonal in order to be redeployed to the kingside. The line 17.g5 e8 only helps Black to bring new defensive forces to the kingside.

17.b6

Black will hardly manage to bring back into the actions his knight on a5 without that pawn-move.

18.e1!

The variation: 18.g5 e8, would be quite inconsistent for White.

18...b7 19.h4 d6

20.g3†
White thus brings one more piece to the kingside, closer to the enemy king, making use of the fact that Black cannot fork with the move f5-f4 right now. Presently, Black must worry about his king as well as for the future of his central pawns. After an eventual exchange of the dark-squared bishops, his e5-pawn might become chronically weak.

b) 11...\textit{\textcolor{red}{xc}}8

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

12.\textit{\textcolor{red}{d}}3

White removes his bishop in advance away from the juxtaposition with the black rook and he creates the threat to capture on b7.

It is not so clear what happens after 12.dxc5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{c}}7\textsuperscript{\textcolor{red}{\infty}}.

12...e5

Now, after White's bishop has abandoned the a2-g8 diagonal, Black wishes to clarify the situation in the centre.

In case of 12...\textit{\textcolor{red}{c}}7?! (this is an obvious loss of time in comparison to variation a) it is very strong for White to follow with: 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{f}}4! e5 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{g}}3 cxd4 15.cxd4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{h}}6, Timoschenko - M.Rytshagov, Cappelle la Grande 1993 and here White could have exploited the pin along the b8-h2 diagonal with: 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{b}}3! \textit{\textcolor{red}{a}}5 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{b}}2\textsuperscript{\textcolor{red}{\pm}}.

Black has also tried in practice the move 12...\textit{\textcolor{red}{a}}5. White can exploit that voluntary exile of the black knight with the help of: 13.d5?! (The move 13.dxc5 was quite successful after 13...e5?! 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{c}}2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{c}}7 15.c4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{c}}6 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{c}}3\textsuperscript{\textcolor{red}{\pm}} Gretarsson - Krasenkow, Reykjavik 2003, but after 14...\textit{\textcolor{red}{c}}7 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{d}}4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{fd}}8 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{we}}2 e6 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{f}}4, Krush - Matveeva, Internet 2004, having in mind the placement of White's pawn on f4, Black could have played the standard move 16...e5\textsuperscript{\textcolor{red}{\infty}}, quite effectively.) 13...e6 (The counter strike – 13...f5?! 14.exf5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{xf}}5 15.c4, in case of 15...\textit{\textcolor{red}{d}}7 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{xf}}5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{xf}}5 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{c}}2 b6 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{f}}4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{b}}7 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}}6\textsuperscript{\textcolor{red}{\pm}} Lukacs - Jansa, Baile Herculane 1982, as well as after: 15...\textit{\textcolor{red}{d}}6 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{g}}3 b6 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{xf}}5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{xf}}5 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{h}}5\textsuperscript{\textcolor{red}{\pm}} M.Socko - Jaracz, Poland 2001, would have led to the appearance of a backward black pawn on the e7-square and a chronical weakness of the light squares. In answer to 13...b6 White's most logical line is 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{h}}3?!\textsuperscript{\textcolor{red}{\pm}}, followed by f2-f4, meanwhile even after 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{c}}4 e5 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{f}}3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{f}}5 16.exf5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{xf}}5 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{c}}1\textsuperscript{\textcolor{red}{\pm}}, White's prospects are clearly preferable, Zsinka - Michaelsen, Hamburg 1991.) 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{d}}2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{a}}4 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{c}}4\textsuperscript{\textcolor{red}{\pm}} Farago - Filipovic, Banja Luka 1985.

13.d5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{a}}5 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{d}}2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{f}}5
Chapter 13

If Black plays the tentative 14...\textit{w}c7, then after 15.f4 f5 16.\textit{g}3↑ as in the game Razuvaev – De la Villa, Palma de Mallorca 1991, White has a powerful initiative.

15.\textit{g}5

White should try to open the game in the centre. He must not allow Black to push f5-f4.

After 15.f3 f4 16.\textit{f}2 c4 17.\textit{c}2 b6 18.\textit{b}4 \textit{f}7∞ the position was with mutual prospects in the game Van der Werf – Nijboer, Leeuwarden 2001.

15...\textit{e}8 16.\textit{xf}5!?\n
Should White abstain from exchanging on f5 after: 16.c4?! b6 17.\textit{c}3 \textit{b}7 18.\textit{be}1 f4 19.f3 h6 20.\textit{h}4 g5 21.\textit{f}2 \textit{f}6 22.\textit{e}2 h5 23.\textit{b}1 \textit{g}6, Black easily organized dangerous counterplay on the kingside in the game, Planas – De la Villa, Palma de Mallorca 1991.

16...\textit{gx}f5 17.\textit{g}3 \textit{g}6 18.f4!

The mobility of Black’s pawns in the centre should be restricted.

18...\textit{e}4

\textbf{19.\textit{e}2 \textit{f}6?} (It is better for Black to play here: 19...\textit{d}6

20.\textit{h}5 \textit{h}8 21.\textit{e}3!?↑, M.Krassenkow, but White still maintains his kingside initiative.) 20.\textit{h}5 \textit{d}8 21.c4 \textit{b}6 22.\textit{bc}1→ and White redeployed his rook along the third rank with a decisive effect in the game Shariyazdanov – E.Vorobiov, Tomsk 2004.

c) 11...\textit{a}6

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

Black is planning to gain some space on the queenside because right now the b7 pawn is untouchable due to the move \textit{a}5.

\textbf{12.\textit{xc}5!}

Otherwise it is not easy for White to stop b7-b5. For example after 12.a4 (if 12.\textit{d}3 \textit{cx}d4 13.\textit{cx}d4 \textit{b}5 14.\textit{d}2 \textit{a}5 15.\textit{xa}5 \textit{xa}5 16.\textit{fc}1 \textit{fc}8 17.f3 e5 18.\textit{f}2∞ the opponents agreed to a draw in the game Milov – Svidler, Frankfurt 1999) 12...\textit{a}5 13.\textit{a}2 \textit{cx}d4 14.\textit{cx}d4 \textit{c}8 15.d5 \textit{e}8 16.\textit{b}4 \textit{b}5 17.\textit{xb}5 \textit{xb}5 18.\textit{e}1 \textit{c}4∞ and Black had no problems at all in the game Najer – E.Vorobiov, Moscow 2003.

Recently, the move 12.d5 has been analyzed and tested a lot.
In that case it is possible for Black to follow with: 12...\textit{c}e5 (The retreat to the edge of the board – 12...\textit{a}a5, after 13.\textit{d}d3 \textit{c}7 14.\textit{c}4 \textit{ab}8 15.\textit{f}4 \textit{e}5 16.\textit{x}e5 \textit{xe}5 17.f4 \textit{c}7 18.\textit{c}3 b5 19.e5\textpm, enabled White to occupy the centre, Gulko – Pierrot, Buenos Aires 2003.) 13.\textit{b}3 and here the move 13...\textit{g}4! should be analyzed thoroughly (It seems attractive for Black to play 13...\textit{c}7, with the idea after 14.f4 \textit{g}4 15.\textit{c}1 c4 16.\textit{c}2 e6, to obtain some counterplay in the centre, but in that case White can continue with: 17.dxe6! \textit{xe}6 18.\textit{d}d4 \textit{c}8 19.\textit{fd}3 \textit{d}8 20.h3 \textit{f}6 21.f5\textpm and his initiative on the kingside would be very powerful thanks to the wonderful position of his knight on d4, Berkes – Smerdon, Kochin 2004) 14.\textit{c}1 c4 15.\textit{c}2 (15.\textit{xc}4?? \textit{c}7\textpm) 15...b5 16.h3 \textit{e}5 17.f4 \textit{d}3 18.\textit{xd}3 \textit{xd}3 19.\textit{xd}3 \textit{a}5\textpm. Black has an excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn, because of his bishop pair and the pressure on White's queenside.

\textbf{12...\textit{c}7}

In case of 12...\textit{a}a5 13.\textit{d}d3 (following 13.\textit{b}3, Black can utilize the placement of his pawn on a6 and he can equalize with the help of: 13...\textit{b}5 14.\textit{e}1, A. Shneider – van Mil, Kusadasi 1990 and now 14...\textit{xd}1!? 15.\textit{xb}d1 \textit{xb}3 16.axb3 \textit{xe}2 17.\textit{xe}2 \textit{xc}3 18.\textit{c}2 \textit{fd}8=) 13...\textit{e}6 (13...\textit{c}7 14.\textit{d}4! and the game transposes to a position that we will analyze later after the following order of moves – 12...\textit{c}7 13.\textit{d}d4 \textit{a}5 14.\textit{d}3) and here White plays 14.\textit{b}4! (in case of 14.\textit{c}2, it would not work for Black to continue with: 14...\textit{xa}2? 15.\textit{xa}2 \textit{xd}3, because of 16.f4\textpm, but after: 14...\textit{c}4 15.\textit{f}d1 \textit{c}7 16.f4\textpm, as well as after: 14...\textit{c}4 15.\textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4 16.\textit{f}d1 \textit{c}7 17.\textit{b}4! \textit{xe}2 18.\textit{xe}2 \textit{xc}3, Sulava – Sutovsky, Geneve 2004, 19.\textit{c}4! \textit{e}5 20.\textit{g}3 \textit{fd}8 21.\textit{b}1\textpm E.Sutovsky, White's advantage is only minimal) with the idea to prevent the penetration of Black's light pieces to the c4-square. There might follow: 14...\textit{c}6 (After 14...\textit{xa}2 15.c4\textpm, Black's bishop gets trapped. It is also bad for him to play here: 14...\textit{c}7, because of 15.\textit{f}4\textpm) 15.\textit{xb}7 \textit{xa}2 and now with the help of: 16.f4! (16.\textit{d}4 \textit{xd}4 17.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 18.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 19.\textit{c}2 \textit{e}6= E.Sutovsky) 16...\textit{c}8 17.\textit{b}2 (It is also good for White to try: 17.\textit{b}6 \textit{d}8 18.\textit{c}2 \textit{e}6 19.f5 \textit{d}7 20.\textit{f}4\textrightarrow and he begins active operations on the kingside.) 17...\textit{e}6 18.\textit{d}4 \textit{d}7 (In case Black's bishop remains on the e6-square – White can start a kingside offensive with 18...\textit{d}8 19.f5 \textit{d}7 20.\textit{c}4\textrightarrow) 19.e5\textpm White can shorten considerably the functional a1-h8 diagonal for Black's dark-squared bishop.

\textbf{13.\textit{d}d4!}

This is White's best. In case
of the immediate 13.f4 after 13...\(a\)5 14.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)3 \(\text{\textit{f}}\) \(\text{\textit{d}}\)8 (14...\(a\)6 is weaker for Black due to 15.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a4 \(\text{\textit{f}}\)d8 16.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)d4 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)7 17.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)b4 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)c8 18.e5 as in the game Ftacnik – Svidler, Berlin 2003) 15.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d4 (White managed to win the exchange after 15.c6 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)xc6 16.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)b6 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)4 17.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)xd8 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)xd8 in the game P. Nielsen – Ivanchuk, Malmö 2003, but he failed to coordinate his pieces in the middle of the board after 18.h3 \(\text{\textit{w}}\)c5+ 19.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)h2 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)4 20.hxg4 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e3 21.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)d2 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)4 22.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)d1 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e3=) Black can play bravely 15...\(\text{\textit{w}}\)xc5! (this is stronger than 15...e5 16.fxe5 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)xe5), and he should not be afraid of 16.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)f5 because of 16...\(\text{\textit{w}}\)a3 17.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)c1 (if 17.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)xg7, Black has the powerful move 17...\(\text{\textit{a}}\)4\(\text{\textbar}\)) 17...\(\text{\textit{w}}\)c5+ (Black can also try here 17...\(\text{\textit{w}}\)xa2 18.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)xe7+ \(\text{\textit{h}}\)h8 19.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)d5 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)6=) 18.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)e3 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)3= with equal chances.

![Diagram](image)

13...\(\text{\textit{a}}\)5

After 13...\(\text{\textit{a}}\)5 14.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)xc8 14.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)xc6 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)xc6 15.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d5 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)xc3 16.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)xc6 bxc6 17.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)d3 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)e5 18.f4 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)cd8 19.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)c4 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)7 20.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)xa6 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)4 21.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)xd4+, in the game Schuurman – Harika, Calvia 2004, the opponents agreed to a draw. This can only be explained if we take into account that it was a team-competition...

The move 13...\(\text{\textit{a}}\)e5 only enhances White's kingside offensive. After: 14.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)h2 h5 15.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)b3 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)b8 16.f4 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)g4 17.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)xg4 hxg4 18.f5=, Black's position remained quite difficult in the game Gormally – Wagener, Gothenburg 2005.

The adherents to the move – 13...e6 (with the idea, after the retreat of the rook away from the f8-square, to recapture the pawn with the help of \(\text{\textit{a}}\)f8-c5) were considerably reduced lately. After 14.f4 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a5 15.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d3 e5 (Or 15...\(\text{\textit{a}}\)f8 16.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)e1= and White plans to redeploy his queen to the h4-square with the idea to attack Black's king and not to stand in the way of the rook on f1, which can not only create threats along the f-file, but it can go to the h3-square via f3.) in the game Sakaev – V.Belov, Krasnoyarsk 2003, White proceeded with a beautiful attack: 16.f5!! (Black's defensive idea can be seen in the variation: 16.fxe5 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)xe5 17.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)h6 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)xh2+ 18.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)h1 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)e5! 19.\\(\text{\textit{a}}\)xf8 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)xf8 and despite the fact that he is an exchange down, Black has a full positional compensation.). 16.exd4 17.cxd4 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)f8 (This is the most natural move for Black indeed, but still his best defence would have been: 17...gxf5! 18.exf5 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)f6! 19.\\(\text{\textit{a}}\)f3! \(\text{\textit{a}}\)e8 20.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)h1 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)c6 21.\\(\text{\textit{w}}\)h3 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)e3 22.\(\text{\textit{w}}\)e3 – and
there would have arisen a rather complicated position on the board with an edge for White.)
18.f6 \( \text{e}8 \) (In case Black continues with the ugly move – 18...
\( \text{h}8 \), White’s task is to solidify his position on the dark squares. He can accomplish that in the following fashion: 19.\( \text{b}6 \)! \( \text{b}5 \). Black must try to weaken White’s centre somehow. 20.\( \text{f}4 \! \! \text{d}8 \) 21.\( \text{d}6 \! \! \text{c}8 \) 22.a4 \( \text{d}3 \) 23.
\( \text{xd}3 \! \! \text{e}6 \) 24.\( \text{g}3 \! \! \text{xd}6 \) 25.\( \text{xd}6 \! \! \text{c}6 \) 26.\( \text{c}2 \). Now, White can afford to continue the fight without sacrificing his a4-pawn. 26...\( \text{c}8 \) 27.d5 \( \text{d}7 \) 28.e5 – Black is completely paralyzed and White’s victory is just a matter of time; or 20...
\( \text{c}8 \) 21.\( \text{d}6 \! \! \text{e}6 \) 22.e5 \( \text{c}4 \) 23.\( \text{xc}4 \! \! \text{xc}4 \) 24.\( \text{f}3 \! \! \text{xf}1 \) 25.\( \text{xf}1 \! \! \text{a}7 \). Black should not give up his b7-pawn, because White’s passed c-pawn will promote quickly and easily. Now, White should not be in a hurry, so he can play for the time being: 26.h3 \( \text{e}8 \) 27.\( \text{g}1 \). White’s king is safe here from the potential checks from the h2-square. Later, he can proceed with a2-a4-a5 and then advance his powerful pawn-centre, with d4-d5 and then c5-c6, or e5-e6, depending on circumstances. Black is completely helpless against that plan and he cannot facilitate his defence even if he manages to exchange queens.) 19.\( \text{c}1 \)! White intends to checkmate Black by exploiting the h6-square. (It would not work for him to try the
same idea by playing – 19.\( \text{d}2 \), because of 19...
\( \text{b}5 \) 20.\( \text{h}6 \! \! \text{xc}5 \! \! \text{ed}8 \) and the tables are suddenly turned around. Black becomes the attacking side...) 19...\( \text{c}6 \) 20.\( \text{h}1 \)!
etc. – see Game 13.

14.\( \text{d}3 \)

The weaker 14.\( \text{e}2 \)?! \( \text{fc}8 \) 15.f4 e5 16.xe5 \( \text{xe}5 \) 17.\( \text{d}3 \! \! \text{e}7 \) 18.b3, lead to an equal position and a draw in the game Kramnik – I.Sokolov, Wijk aan Zee 1999.

14...\( \text{fd}8 \)

Black usually removes his rook from the f8-square with the idea, following e7-e6, to be able to recapture his pawn with the maneuver \( \text{f}8 \)-c5. Should he avoid doing that – 14...\( \text{ad}8 \)
15.\( \text{e}2 \! \! \text{fe}8 \), Berczes – Kristjansson, Budapest 2005, White can prepare his kingside attack quite comfortably with the move 16.\( \text{h}1 \)!?. In case Black pushes 16...e5, before his opponent has played f2-f4, White’s knight can head for the d5-outpost via the route \( \text{c}2 \)-b4-d5.

Following 14...\( \text{fc}8 \) 15.\( \text{e}2 \! \! e6 \), Gustafsson – C.Horvath, Austria

197
2003, White should not delay his active actions. He must play 16.f4 and start attacking operations on the kingside immediately.

15.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e2}}}}

This is a multi-functional useful move for White. His queen avoids the juxtaposition with the black rook along the d-file; it supports the action of the white bishops and it helps the connection of the rooks. In order to regain his c5-pawn Black will have to play e7-e6 sooner or later, followed by \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g7-f8}}}}. Therefore, White is in anticipation of the move e7-e6, because the immediate move 15.f4 will be countered by Black with 15...e5.

15...e6

Black’s plans include the maneuver \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f8-c5}}}}.

The risky move 15...e5 leads to a chronical weakness on the d5-square. White can make use of that with the help of 16.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c2}}}}, followed by \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b4-d5}}}} (in the game Berzces – Wilson, Biel 2005, White preferred 16.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b3}}}} and after 16...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{ab8}}}}?! 17.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xa5}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xa5}}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c4}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c6}}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g5}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d7}}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xa6}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xc5}}}} 21.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e3}}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a5}}}} 22.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b5}}}}=, he was clearly better, but Black could have played much stronger – 16...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c6}}}!!}, with the idea to prevent White’s bishop from occupying the a2-g8 diagonal once again).

15...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{ac8}}}} (Just like in the previous lines, Black waits for the move 16.f4, in order to play 16...e5 at once, but White now can follow with another prophylactic move, which is at least as useful as his previous one.) 16.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h1}}}}! (Now, Black’s possible useful moves are practically over, since after 16...e6, White has the powerful argument 17.f4, while in case of 16...e5, he can play 17.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c2}}}}, followed by 18.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b4}}}}.) 16...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a4}}}} (Black intends now to continue with 17...e5, in order to exchange his light-squared bishop on the c2-square and then to try to regain his c5-pawn with the help of the maneuver \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g7-f8}}}}. Meanwhile, White begins active actions in the centre and Black’s bishop on a4 becomes quite isolated.) 17.f4! e5 18.fxe5 \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xe5}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f3}}}}! (That is a wonderful square for White’s rook.) 19...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e8}}}}. Black’s bishop on e8 defend the f7-pawn indeed, but that weakens the eighth rank and it does not contribute to the fortification of the vulnerable dark squares on the kingside. (It is quite possible that my opponent had overlooked the fact that the rook on f3 defends indirectly the h2-pawn, since Black cannot play 19...\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xh2}}}, because of the beautiful combination: 20.g3! \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xe3}}}} 21.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f5}}} and White’s attack is decisive.}) 20.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b1}}} \textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xh2}}}. Now, White inflicts a spectacular strike from the other side of the board: 21.\textit{\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e6}}}!++-. You can follow the entire game – Sakaev – Kurnosov, Moscow 2004, at the end of our book (Game 14).
16.f4!
This move is played with the straightforward idea to begin a kingside attack.
After 16.\(\mathcal{D}\)b3?! the opponents agreed to a draw in the game Gulko – Shabalov, Seattle 2003.
16...e5
It is very dangerous for Black to lose time in order to restore the material balance with the move 16...\(\mathcal{A}\)f8, since White is completely prepared for a kingside offensive. Besides the simple move 17.f5\(\uparrow\), White can also counter that with 17.\(\mathcal{A}\)f3! e5 (in case of 17...\(\mathcal{A}\)xc5, Black’s king remains with one defender less and after: 18.\(\mathcal{A}\)f2 \(\mathcal{A}\)e7 19.\(\mathcal{A}\)f5\(\rightarrow\), White’s kingside attack develops effortlessly) 18.fxe5 \(\mathcal{A}\)g4 19.e6\(\pm\). Black’s king shelter has been compromised considerably and White’s compensation for the exchange is excellent.
17.fxe5 \(\mathcal{A}\)xe5 18.h3\(\pm\)

White’s positional advantage is quite stable.
Part 3

1.d4 ♜f6 2.c4 g6 3.♕c3 d5 4.cxd5 ♜xd5 5.e4 ♣xc3 6.bxc3 ♗g7 7.♕c4 c5 8.♗e2 ♣c6 9.♕e3 0–0 10.0–0 ♔g4

10...♔g4! It’s Black’s strongest and most principled move and marks the beginning of plenty of interesting lines. Black tries to develop quickly and attacks something with every move, trying to exploit weaknesses in White’s camp, which is not so solid yet. We are going to analyse in this part variations in which one of the sides is trying to avoid the main lines. You will be convinced soon that in principle a way of playing like that for both sides is only looking for trouble.
Chapter 14

1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 g6 3.♗c3 d5 4.cxd5 ♘xd5 5.e4 ♘xc3 6.bxc3 ♗g7 7.♗c4 c5 8.♗e2 ♘c6 9.♗e3 0–0 10.0–0 ♗g4

11.f3

This is White’s most natural move. His d4-pawn is completely safe now.

White has also tried in practice here the pawn-sacrifice: 11.d5 ♘a5 12.♗d3 (after 12.♗d3 ♘xc4 13.♗xc4 ♘xe2 14.♗xe2 ♘xc3 15.♗ac1 ♘d4 16.♗fd1 ♘xe3 17.♗xe3 b6 18.e5 f6 Black managed not only to hold to his extra pawn, but he simplified the position considerably, Azmaiparashvili – Huzman, Kujbyshev 1986) 12...c4 13.♗c2 ♘xc3 (Black can capture the c3-pawn after the preliminary exchange: 13...♘xe2 14.♗xe2 ♘xc3, but then in case of: 15.♗ad1 ♘c7 16.f4 b5 17.e5= White preserves a good compensation for the sacrificed pawn, because of his two bishops and the mobile pawn-centre, Kaidanov – Greanias, Chicago 1992.) 13...♘xc3 14.♗b1 ♗g7 15.f3 ♘d7 16.f4 b5 17.e5 a6 18.♗c3 Polugaevsky – Timman, Breda (m/6) 1979.

11...♘d7

This retreat of the bishop to d7 usually transposes to lines that we have already seen in Chapter 13.

The more principled move for Black – 11...♗a5 will be dealt with in the next chapters.

12.♗b1 ♘c7

Trading pawns in the centre – 12...cxd4 13.cxd4 leads to positions that are analogous to these analyzed in Chapter 8, variation b. Meanwhile, the placement of White’s pawn on the f3-square introduces some additional nuances in that position:

The move 13...♗a5, after 14.♗d3 transposes to lines from Chapter 9, variation b, (see there the position of the main line after: 15...♗a5 16.♗d3).

In case of 13...b6 14.♗d2 ♘a5, White should better play 15.♗d3!? and transpose to variation b, from Chapter 9 (see there the
position from the main line after 16...b6 17.\textit{\v{c}}d2).

13...\textit{\v{c}}c8 14.\textit{\v{c}}d3 b6 is bad for Black, due to 15.\textit{\v{c}}a6 \textit{\v{b}}b8 16.d5 \textit{\v{c}}e5, Hej1 – Hampel, Prague 2003 and here the standard maneuver 17.\textit{\v{c}}d4± works perfectly for White;

In answer to 13...\textit{\v{c}}c7, White can play 14.\textit{\v{c}}f4 e5 15.\textit{\v{c}}g3 \textit{\v{a}}d8 16.\textit{\v{c}}d3↑ and the pin along the b8-h2 diagonal is very annoying for Black;

Following 13...a6, White should better avoid the complications after: 14.\textit{\v{a}}xb7, because of 14...\textit{\v{a}}a5 15.\textit{\v{a}}b4 \textit{\v{a}}xc4 16.\textit{\v{a}}xc4 \textit{\v{a}}b5 17.\textit{\v{a}}b4 (17.\textit{\v{a}}c5 \textit{\v{a}}xe2 18.\textit{\v{a}}xe2 \textit{\v{a}}xd4 19.\textit{\v{a}}d5 \textit{\v{a}}xe3+ 20.\textit{\v{a}}xe3 \textit{\v{a}}c7 21.\textit{\v{a}}c1 \textit{\v{a}}b7 22.\textit{\v{a}}cd1 \textit{\v{a}}ac8= and the position is approximately equal. It would be much more dangerous for Black if White continues with: 14.\textit{\v{a}}d2!? \textit{\v{a}}c8 15.\textit{\v{a}}d3 b5 16.\textit{\v{a}}fc1 e6 17.\textit{\v{a}}c2 \textit{\v{e}}e8 18.\textit{\v{b}}bc1 \textit{\v{e}}e7 19.\textit{\v{a}}a4± Knaak – Tseshkovsky, Rostock 1984.

After 13...e6, the best for White is to follow in a positional manner with – 14.\textit{\v{a}}d2!? (in case of 14.\textit{\v{a}}xb7 \textit{\v{a}}a5 15.\textit{\v{a}}b4 \textit{\v{a}}xc4 16.\textit{\v{a}}xc4 \textit{\v{a}}b5 17.\textit{\v{a}}b4 \textit{\v{a}}a5 18.\textit{\v{a}}b2 \textit{\v{a}}fd8 19.\textit{\v{a}}e1 \textit{\v{a}}xe2 20.\textit{\v{a}}exe2 \textit{\v{a}}xd4 21.\textit{\v{a}}xd4 e5= Krmar – Soural, corr. 1997, the placement of the pawn on the f3-square turns out to be a liability, because White cannot follow with: 22.\textit{\v{a}}bd2 exd4 23.\textit{\v{a}}xd4??, because of 23...\textit{\v{a}}c5 24.\textit{\v{a}}ed2 \textit{\v{a}}xd4 25.\textit{\v{a}}xd4 \textit{\v{a}}d8+) 14...\textit{\v{a}}a5 (after 14...\textit{\v{a}}b8 15.\textit{\v{a}}fc1 \textit{\v{a}}a5 16.\textit{\v{a}}d3 \textit{\v{a}}c8 17.\textit{\v{a}}xc8 \textit{\v{a}}xc8 18.\textit{\v{a}}g5 f6, besides 19.\textit{\v{a}}h6 \textit{\v{a}}c6 20.\textit{\v{a}}xg7 \textit{\v{a}}xg7 21.\textit{\v{a}}b5 \textit{\v{a}}f7 22.\textit{\v{a}}xc6 \textit{\v{a}}xc6 23.\textit{\v{a}}c3 \textit{\v{a}}d6 24.\textit{\v{a}}c1± Portisch – Miley, Moscow 1956, White could have continued with 19.\textit{\v{a}}f4!±) 15.\textit{\v{a}}d3 a6 16.\textit{\v{a}}g5 f6 17.\textit{\v{a}}f4!? (There was a line played in a correspondence game: 17.\textit{\v{a}}h6 \textit{\v{a}}c8 18.\textit{\v{a}}fc1 b5 19.\textit{\v{a}}xg7 \textit{\v{a}}xg7 20.\textit{\v{a}}xc8 \textit{\v{a}}xc8 21.\textit{\v{a}}c3 and White remained slightly better.) 17...e5 (It is too difficult for Black to try to continue without playing that move in case of 17...b5 18.\textit{\v{a}}fc1, because then he would have to comply with: 18...e5 19.\textit{\v{a}}e3± anyway.) 18.\textit{\v{a}}dxe5 fxe5 19.\textit{\v{a}}g5 \textit{\v{a}}f6 20.\textit{\v{a}}xf6 \textit{\v{a}}xf6 21.\textit{\v{a}}c3 \textit{\v{a}}d6, Spassky – Miley, Bucharest 1953 and here after the calm move 22.\textit{\v{a}}c1±, White maintains his advantage thanks to his superior pawn-structure.

In case of 12...a6 13.\textit{\v{a}}xc5 (the retreat 13.\textit{\v{a}}d3 enables Black after 13...\textit{\v{a}}xc4 14.\textit{\v{a}}xd4 b5= to get some counterplay) 13...\textit{\v{a}}a5 (the line 13...\textit{\v{a}}c7 14.\textit{\v{a}}d4 \textit{\v{a}}a5 15.\textit{\v{a}}d3!? transposes again) 14.\textit{\v{a}}d3 (It is weaker for White to play 14.\textit{\v{a}}b3 due to 14...\textit{\v{a}}b5?\textit{\v{a}}e or 14.\textit{\v{a}}d5 because of 14...\textit{\v{a}}c7 15.\textit{\v{a}}d4 e6 16.\textit{\v{a}}xg7 \textit{\v{a}}xg7 17.\textit{\v{a}}d4+ \textit{\v{a}}g8 18.\textit{\v{a}}b3 \textit{\v{a}}ac8=) 14...\textit{\v{a}}c7 (you can now see that the presence of the move f2-f3, contrary to the similar situation that we have already analysed in Chapter 13, makes an important difference in the line – 14...\textit{\v{a}}e6 15.\textit{\v{a}}c2 \textit{\v{a}}xa2
16.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}xa2 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}xd3, and now the bishop on e3 is not protected, so White must play 17.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d4 e5, as in the game Nadj – Novak, Novo Mesto 2000, and now 18.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f2!? \text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}b8 19.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}d1 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c4 20.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}xa5 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}xe2 21.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d7±. The other possibility for Black to play 15...\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c4, is out of question due to the presence of White’s pawn on the f3-square. The line: 16. \text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}x\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}4 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}x\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}4 17.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}b7 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d3 18.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d2+— would not work for Black then, because White’s e4-pawn is protected.) 15.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d4?! (it is weaker for White to play 15.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}c2 because of 15...\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}d8 16.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c1 e6 17.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}b3 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}a4 18.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}d1 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f8 19.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f2 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c8= as in the game Abril – Fernandez Garcia, Cordoba 1995, and after 15.f4 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}d8 16.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d4 White must consider the line 16...\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}xc5 17.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f5 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}a3 18. \text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xg7 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}a4∞) 15...\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}d8. After the move 16.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}e2!, the game transposes to a position, which is analogous to the one that is analyzed in Chapter 13, variation c. In this particular case, the difference in the placement of White’s pawn on f3, instead of on the f2-square, is immaterial.

After 12...\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}a5 13.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d3 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c8 (13...e5? 14.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xe5 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}a4 15.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}xa4 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}xd3 16.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xc5+− Gonzales Garcia – Boekhoff, Internet 2004. 13...\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xd4 14.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xd4 – transposes to lines from Chapter 9, variation b, see there the position of the main line after: 15...\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}a5 16.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d3. In case of 13...a6 14.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xc5!? we reach a position from the previous paragraph, while after the move 13...c4, which reduces the tension in the centre, White plays 14.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c2 e6 15.e5 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c6 16. \text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}g3 b6 17.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}e4± as in the game Ball – Ross, Isle of Lewis 1995, and Black’s position is very difficult. In answer to 13...\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}c7, White can play 14.d5 and reach a position similar to the one that we have analyzed in Chapter 13, except that with a White’s pawn on the f2-square.) 14.d5!? (In case of 14.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d2, we should consider the consequences of the line: 14...a6 15.d5 b5 16.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}b6 e6 17. \text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xg7 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}g7∞ Williams – Ganguly, Edinburgh 2003. After 14.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xc5, it is possible for Black to follow with: 14...\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}e6!? 15.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}c2 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}xa2 16.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}xa2 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}xd3 17.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d4 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}d8∞ 14...e5 (in case of 14...e6 15.c4± White is better thanks to his space advantage and Black’s attempt to free his position with the help of: 15...b5?! 16.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}b5 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}d5 17.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}xd5 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e8 18.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f2 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash g}}g5, Baumenegger – J.Horvath, Budapest 1997, would not have been successful after 19.\text{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}a4!±) and there arises a position of a closed type in which White’s prospects are slightly better.

![Diagram](image-url)
There might follow: 15...\textit{d}d2 (after 15.c4 b6 16.\textit{c}c3 \textit{b}7 17.a4 \textit{d}d6 18.\textit{b}b5 \textit{xb}5 19.axb5 \textit{f}5, White’s reluctance to exchange on \textit{f}5, as a result of: 20.\textit{a}a1 \textit{c}7 21.\textit{c}c2 \textit{f}4 22.\textit{d}d2 \textit{h}4\textit{x} Laren – Murphy, corr. 1990, enabled Black to close the position indefinitely, while his only weakness – the a7-pawn can be easily defended by Black’s heavy pieces along the seventh rank) 15...\textit{e}7 (After Black undermined the base of White’s d5-pawn on the kingside with: 15...f5 16.exf5 gxf5, Grabliauskas – Delchev, Aalborg 1991, White had to fortify it from the other side – 17.c4\textit{=} 16.f4 exf4 17.\textit{xf}4 \textit{e}5 18.\textit{h}1 f6 19.\textit{g}1 \textit{xf}4 20.\textit{xf}4 \textit{e}5 (After Black refrained from the blockade on the e5-square with: 20...\textit{b}6 21.\textit{f}3 \textit{ce}8 22.\textit{be}1 \textit{b}7 23.\textit{g}3 \textit{d}6 24.\textit{e}5, White succeeded in breaking through in the centre and seizing the initiative in the game Cramling – Sion Castro, Ceuta 1993.) 21.\textit{xe}5 \textit{f}xe5 22.\textit{xf}8+ \textit{xf}8 23.\textit{f}3 \textit{e}8 24.\textit{g}1\textit{=} and the endgame is better for White, Cramling – Fernandez Garcia, Ponferrada 1992. Black’s rook is stuck with the defence of the e5-pawn.

There are some fine points concerning the move 12...\textit{c}8. Contrary to the similar situation that has been analyzed in Chapter 13, with a white pawn on the f2-square, now White should obviously continue with 13.dxc5!? (After the much more traditional approach: 13.\textit{d}3 \textit{c}7, the following line would not work for White due to the placement of his pawn on the f3-square: 14.\textit{f}4 e5 15.\textit{g}3, because of 15...\textit{x}d4 16.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 17.\textit{xd}4 \textit{c}5!=. After 14.\textit{d}2 \textit{fd}8 15.\textit{f}4 e5 16.\textit{g}3, in the game Mielke – W.Bauer, corr. 1988, Black overlooked the possibility to continue with: 16...\textit{c}xd4 17.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 18.\textit{xd}4 \textit{c}5!=). Now, Black’s most principled line is: 13...\textit{c}7 (After 13...e6?! 14.\textit{xb}7! \textit{e}5 15.\textit{b}5! \textit{xb}5 16.\textit{xb}5 \textit{c}4 17.\textit{d}4 e5 18.\textit{b}4 \textit{exd}4 19.\textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}3 20.\textit{xd}8! \textit{xd}8 21.\textit{c}1 \textit{d}2 22.\textit{f}1 \textit{xa}2 23.\textit{xc}3 \textit{xc}3 24.\textit{xc}3\textit{=} Black was doomed to a long and laborious defence without a pawn in the game Korchnov – Sion Castro, Leon 1994. In case of 13...\textit{a}5, White can follow with 14.\textit{b}3!, preventing the appearance of Black’s bishop on the e6, or b5-squares and here as a result of: 14...\textit{c}7 15.\textit{c}2 e6 16.\textit{fd}1 \textit{fe}8 17.\textit{c}1, in the game Murugan – Tilak, India 1989, it became clear that it would not work for Black to play: 17...\textit{f}8, because of 18.\textit{d}3 \textit{b}5 19.\textit{c}4 \textit{a}6 20.\textit{h}1\textit{=} 14.\textit{d}4!? (White does not let Black’s bishop to occupy the e6-square, since the line: 14.f4 \textit{a}5 15.\textit{d}3 \textit{e}6\textit{=} provided Black with a sufficient compensation for the pawn in the game Sakhatova – Ferenc, Pula 1990.) 14...\textit{a}5 15.\textit{d}3 \textit{fd}8 (15...\textit{xc}5? 16.\textit{f}5 \textit{a}3 17.}
\( \Box xg7 \pm \) 16.\( \Box e2 \) e6 17.f4 e5 18.\( fxe5 \Box xe5 \) 19.h3 \pm leads to a position analogous to the one that we have analyzed in Chapter 13, variation c, but with the move \( \Box a8-c8 \) instead of a7-a6.

The position after 12...e6 has been already mentioned in Chapter 13. We have recommended there for White to play 13.\( \Box d2 \)? and to proceed with the standard plan, connected with the trade of the dark-squared bishops.

13.\( \Box f4 \)?

White has tested in practice also 13.dxc5 \( \Box a5 \) (it is obviously more precise for Black to continue with 13...\( \Box fd8 \), because after 14.\( \Box d4 \) \( \Box a5 \) 15.\( \Box d3 \) e5 16.\( \Box b5 \Box xb5 \) 17.\( \Box xb5 \Box c4 \) 18.\( \Box f2 \Box f8 \overline{=} \), or 14.\( \Box e1 \) \( \Box a5 \) 15.\( \Box b3 \) e6 16.\( \Box f2 \Box b5 \overline{=} \) J.Pribyl – P.David, Czech Republic 1995, his compensation for the pawn is sufficient) 14.\( \Box b5 \). There might follow: 14...\( \Box fd8 \) (but not 14...\( \Box xb5 \)?!) 15.\( \Box xb5 \Box c4 \) because of 16.\( \Box f2 \Box fd8 \) 17.\( \Box a4 \Box d2 \) 18.\( \Box e1 \pm \), while after 14...\( \Box e6 \) White can play 15.\( \Box a4 \) a6 16.\( \Box d3 \Box fd8 \) 17.\( \Box fd1 \pm \) recommended by J.Lautier) 15.\( \Box a4 \) (it is not so good for Black to play 15...e6?! due to 16.\( \Box d4 \) \( \Box f8 \) 17.\( \Box xd7 \Box xd7 \) 18.\( \Box b5 \pm \) analysis of Lautier) 16.\( \Box xd7 \) (if 16.\( \Box fd1 \)!, then 16...\( \Box e6 \) with an equality) 16.\( \Box xd7 \) 17.\( \Box fd1 \Box ad8 \) (Black cannot equalize with 17...\( \Box xd1 \)?) 18.\( \Box xd1 \Box d8 \) due to 19.\( \Box d5 \Box f8 \) 20.\( \Box b5 \pm \) 18.\( \Box xd7 \Box xd7 \) (the combination 18...\( \Box xd7 \)? 19.\( \Box xa5 \Box d3 \) does not work because of 20.\( \Box f2 \) b6 21.\( \Box b5 \)– 19.\( \Box d1 \Box xd1+ \) (Black loses after 19...\( \Box c6 \)?? due to 20.\( \Box xd7 \) \( \Box xa4 \) 21.\( \Box d8+ \Box f8 \) 22.\( \Box h6+ \), while after 19...\( \Box c6 \) White preserves his advantage with 20.\( \Box d5 \)\( \Box d5 \) recommended by Lautier) 20.\( \Box xd1 \Box c4 \) (in case of 20...\( \Box f8 \)?? after 21.\( \Box d5 \Box c6 \) 22.\( \Box c1 \Box e7 \) 23.\( \Box c4 \pm \) Black fails to recapture his pawn) 21.\( \Box f2 \Box f8 \) 22.\( \Box d5 \) (22.\( \Box b3 \)? is not good because of 22...\( \Box xc5 \)\( \Box d5 \) 22...\( \Box b2 \) (in case of 22...\( \Box b5 \)?! Lautier intended to follow with 23.\( \Box c1 \) a5 24.\( \Box d3 \)\( \Box d5 \) 23.\( \Box c1 \) \( \Box a4 \) (the mistaken 23...a5? after 24.\( \Box f1 \pm \) in the game Lautier – Kozul, Biel 1991, enabled White to keep his extra pawn) 24.\( \Box c4 \) (White has no advantage after 24.\( \Box b3 \) due to 24...\( \Box xc3 \) 25.\( \Box d3 \)\( \Box a4 \)=), or 24.\( \Box d3 \) because of 24...\( \Box xc3 \) 25.\( \Box b3 \Box e2+ \) 26.\( \Box f1 \Box f4 \)=) 24...\( \Box xc5 \) 25.\( \Box d3 \) b6 26.\( \Box f1 \Box d6 \) 27.\( \Box xc5 \Box xc5 \) 28.\( \Box b4 \pm \) and according to Lautier White preserves some advantage because of his control over the important d5 square.

13...\( \Box c8 \)

If Black plays 13...e5, White
has the powerful and simple retreat of the bishop 14.\(\mathcal{L}g3!\) (in case of 14.dxe5 \(\mathcal{L}xe5\) 15.\(\mathcal{L}d5\) 16.c4= White is still slightly better). After 14...\(\mathcal{L}ac8\) (or 14...cxd4 15.cxd4 \(\mathcal{L}d6\) 16.\(\mathcal{L}d5\)± as in the game Roeschlaub – Fette, Groningen 1988, and the pin along the b8-h2 diagonal is very annoying for Black; after 14...\(\mathcal{L}a5\) 15.\(\mathcal{L}d5\) \(\mathcal{L}c6\), Breutigam – Fish, Altenkirchen 2005, White should make a good use of the favourable placement of his bishop on the d5-square with the help of: 16.dxe5!? \(\mathcal{L}xe5\) 17.\(\mathcal{L}xe5\) \(\mathcal{L}xe5\) 18.\(\mathcal{L}xc6\) \(\mathcal{L}xc6\) 19.\(\mathcal{L}xb7\) \(\mathcal{L}ad8\) 20.\(\mathcal{L}c1\)±) 15.\(\mathcal{L}d5\) b6 16.\(\mathcal{L}xc5\) bxc5 17.\(\mathcal{L}f2\) \(\mathcal{L}a5\) 18.c4= and White had a clear advantage because of the dominating position of his light-squared bishop in the game Begunov – Verdihanov, St Petersburg 1994.

14.d5 \(\mathcal{L}a5\) 15.\(\mathcal{L}d3\) e5

It is too dangerous for Black to delay that move. For example after: 15...\(\mathcal{L}d8\) 16.\(\mathcal{L}d2\) \(\mathcal{L}a4\) 17.c4 b6 18.\(\mathcal{L}c3\) \(\mathcal{L}e8\), Melas – Rambert, Yerevan 1996, the simple move 19.e5± maintains White’s huge space advantage.

16.\(\mathcal{L}e3\)

White had no advantage after 16.dxe6 \(\mathcal{L}xe6=\), while after 16.\(\mathcal{L}d2\) he had to consider the line 16...c4 17.\(\mathcal{L}c2\) \(\mathcal{L}c5+\) 18.\(\mathcal{L}h1\) b5=.

16...f5

In answer to 16...b6, White can follow with 17.f4↑ and thus he begins active actions on the kingside before his opponent has organized any counterplay.

17.exf5

It is evidently bad for Black to play here 17...\(\mathcal{L}xf5=!\), because of 18.\(\mathcal{L}g3=\) and he loses the fight for the e4-outpost.

17...\(\mathcal{L}gxf5\) 18.\(\mathcal{L}e1!\)↑

![Chess diagram]

We have reached the same position as in Chapter 13, variation a2, except that White has an extra tempo.

Instead of White’s last move, it would not be good for him to try 18.c4, because of 18...e4! (after 18...b6 19.\(\mathcal{L}d2\) \(\mathcal{L}b7\) 20.\(\mathcal{L}g3\) \(\mathcal{L}e8\) 21.\(\mathcal{L}c3=\), in the game Seirawan – Ftcn, Lugano 1989, White’s decision to fortify the d5-pawn turned out to be quite justified) 19.fxe4 fxe4 20.\(\mathcal{L}xf8+\) \(\mathcal{L}xf8\) 21.\(\mathcal{L}xe4\) \(\mathcal{L}xc4\) 22.\(\mathcal{L}f4\) \(\mathcal{L}d4=\)↑ (it is possible for Black to play here 22...\(\mathcal{L}f5\), Trajanovski – Jakovljevic, corr. 1991, but in that case after 23.\(\mathcal{L}xf5\) \(\mathcal{L}xf5\) 24.\(\mathcal{L}xb7\) \(\mathcal{L}e4\) 25.\(\mathcal{L}e1\) \(\mathcal{L}xd5\) 26.\(\mathcal{L}e7=\) it is much more pleasant to play with White) 23.\(\mathcal{L}h1\) (23.\(\mathcal{L}xd4\) \(\mathcal{L}xf4=\)) 23...\(\mathcal{L}e8=\) and Black’s position is at least equal.
Chapter 15

1.d4 ²f6 2.c4 g6 3.²c3 d5 4.cxd5 ²xd5 5.e4 ²xc3 6.bxc3 ²g7 7.²c4 c5 8.²e2 ²c6 9.²e3 0–0 10.0–0 ²g4 11.f3 ²a5

Black intends to repel the white bishop away from the a2-g8 diagonal.

12.²d5

Now, contrary to the line 12.²xf7+ (see Chapters 27-30), White is not in a hurry to part with his light-squared bishop.

12...²d7

Black tries sometimes 12...cxd4 13.cxd4 ²c8 (Black cannot play here 13...e6??, because after 14.²b3 ²h5 15.g4+– Guyomarch – Goyet, France 1997, he loses his bishop. In case of 13...²e6?! 14.²xe6 fxe6 as in the game A.Tikhanov – S.Krasnov, Moscow 1970, White should choose the move 15.²a4!±, recommended by M.Botvinnik and after the relatively best for Black 12...cxd4 13.cxd4 ²d7 14.²b1 a6, the game transposes to a position that we are going to deal with later in our main line). In this case White can play 14.²g5 (White has also tried 14.a4 with the idea to prolong the a2-g8 diagonal, but after 14...e6 15.²a2 b6 16.²d3 ²b7 17.²fc1 ²d7 18.²b5 ²c6 19.²b4 ²fc8≠ in the game Posada – Ruiz, Barranquilla 1972, Black had a good counterplay against White’s queenside) 14...h6 (The line 14...²e6?! is not so good for Black, because after 15.²xe6 fxe6 16.²a4 ²c8 17.²ac1 ²xc1 18.²xc1 ²c6 in the game Kholmov – Shamkovich, Leningrad 1955, White preserved a clear advantage after the simple move 19.²e3?!±. In case Black does not bother his opponent’s bishop on g5 in any way, White takes complete control over the c1-h6 diagonal with: 14...²c6 15.²d2 ²d7 16.²ab1 b6 17.²fc1 ²c8, Goedhart – Koopmans, corr. 1998, and here he plays 18.²c4?!±, followed by 19.d5, or 19.²a6. After 14...²d7 15.²d2!, the same plan with the occupa-
tion of the c1-h6 diagonal works again in case of: 15...e6 16.♗xe6 fxe6 17.♕xa5 b6 18.♗a3 a5 19.♗e3 ♘a6, Verdier – García Rojas, corr. 2001 and now 20.♗b2, as well as after: 15...♗c6 16.♗fd1 e5, Schlieder – Gieselbrecht, corr. 1955 and White follows with the attractive line 17.♖h6+. Still, after 14...♖d6!, following 15.♗d2 e6 16.♗xa5 b6 17.♗d2 exd5 18.e5 ♖d7 19.♗fe1 ♘a6 20.♗f4 ♘xe2 21.♗xe2 ♘ac8=∞, it would not be so easy to prove White’s advantage. Garcia Albarra¬ cin – V.Zsuzsa, Bad Kissingen 1979) 15.♗h4 g5 (in case of 15...a6 White can already play 16.a4 as in the game Ilivitzki – Korchnoi, Moscow 1955, while after 15...♖d7 16.♗d2 ♗c6 17.♗fd1 as in the game Szilagyi – Benko, Budapest 1955, Black failed to displace the white bishop from the a2-g8 diagonal) 16.♗f2 e6 17.♗b3 ♖xb3 (After 17...b6 18.♗c2 ♘a6, Seres – Kahn, Budapest 1998, White should have solidified the placement of his knight with: 19.♗d3 ♘xd3 20.♖xd3± and open files on the kingside with the help of f2-f4 only later. In answer to 17...♖d7, Kolpakov – Khatene¬ ver, St Petersburg 2002, White could have proceeded with the same plan with: 18.♗c2 ♗b5 19.♗d3±) 18.♖xb3 (White has also played 18.axb3 ♘d7 19.♖g3 ♘c6 20.♖h5↑ and in the game Fuderer – Unzicker, Gothenburg 1955, Black was exposed to an over¬ whelming attack after the exchange of his dark-squared bishop for the white knight) 18...b6 19.♗fd1 ♘a6 (in answer to 19...♖b7, Bareiss – ENDL, corr. 1990, or 19...♖d7, Celedon – Purga, corr. 1998, White should have maneuvered immediately his knight to the h5-square with the move 20.♖g3↑) 20.♖g3 ♖d7 21.♖h5 ♘h8 and here in the game Spassky – A.Geller, Leningrad 1956, White had to fix Black’s weaknesses on the dark squares on the kingside with the move 22.e5!?↑.

13.♖b1

Contrary to the positions that we have already analysed in our notes to White’s move 12, the move 13.♖g5 now is not so good because of 13...♗b5!. After 14.♗b1 ♘a6 (but not 14...♖d7?! due to 15.♖xb5! ♖xb5 16.♖xe7±, and after 14...♘xe2 15.♗xe2 cxd4 16.cxd4 ♘xd4+ 17.♖h1 White has a good compensation for the pawn because of his active bishop pair) 15.f4 cxd4!? (the move 15...♖d7 is not so precise because after 16.f5 gx6 17.♗f3∞ which was played in the game Spassky – Timman, Montreal 1979, Black should refrain from 17...e6?! due to 18.♖g3 ♘h8 19.exf5!→ and White has a powerful attack) 16.cxd4 ♘d7± and Black has an excellent counterplay because the threat e7-e6 is very unpleasant for White, while after 17.f5? as in the game Norri – Malisauskas, Espoo
1992, Black could have played 17...gxf5 18.♕f3 e6 19.♕g3 ♕h8 20.exf5 ♕xe2 21.♕xe2 ♕xd4+ 22.♕h1 ♕xd5++ with a winning position.

13...cxd4

Black often avoids the exchange of the pawns in the centre and defends the b7 pawn with the queen. The fine point of this idea is the fact that the presence of the c-pawns enables Black to operate with the additional possibility to trap the white bishop on d5 with c5-c4 and e7-e6. We are going to abandon now the common sense reasoning in favour of some concrete lines and see what happens then.

If Black plays 13...♗c7, then White has 14.♗f4 (here the move 14.dxc5 is not as popular as after the retreat of the queen to c8, because of 14...e6 15.♗b3 ♗b5 16.♗c2 ♘fd8 17.♘d1 ♘xb3 18..axb3 ♘xe2 19.♗xe2 ♗xc3 20.♗c4= and the opponents agreed to a draw in the game Illescas Cordoba – J.Polgar, Leon 1996, while if White prolongs the a2-g8 diagonal for his bishop with the move 14.a3, then Black can play 14...a6 15.dxc5 e6 16.♗e6 ♗xc6 17.♗b6 ♗e7 18.♗xc6 ♘xc6= like in the game Ehvest – Gavrikov, Sverdlovsk 1984) 14...♗c8 15.e5 (White must be careful because after the exchange of the light-squared bishops with: 15.a3 a6 16.♗f2 ♗b5 17.♗a2 ♗c4 18.♗xc4 ♘xc4 19.a4 ♖d8 20.d5 e6 21.♗d3 which happened in the game Polugayevsky – Timman, Tilburg 1985, Black has the possibility after 21...b5! 22.axb5 ♘xa3 23.♖d1 axb5= to seize the initiative. White should play instead 15.a4 ♘c6 16.♗xc6 ♗xc6 17.d5 ♗d7 18.♗c2 e5 19.♗c1 c4 20.♗e3 ♘fe8= as in the game Beliavsky – Svidler, Plovdiv 2003, but Black had a good counterplay anyway, because of the absence of the light-squared bishops) 15...♖d8!? (It is worse for Black to play 15...♗e6, because of 16.♗e4!? ♗c4 17.♗a4! ♘xe2 18.♗f2 ♗a6 19.♗xa5 cxd4 20.cxd4 ♗d7, Simoncini – Denero, corr. 1989 and here White would have maintained his advantage with the move 21.d5=. Black can transpose to the main line with 15...♗c6 16.♗e4 ♘d8 – because after the trade of the light-squared bishops: 16.♗xc6 ♘xc6=, White can hardly rely on obtaining any advantage.) 16.♗e4 ♘c6 (Black’s passive move 16...♗e8, Henriksen – Bjerke, Gausdal 1988, would have enabled White to play 17.♗e1= and to start bringing his queen to the kingside) 17.♗e1 (It seems at-
tractive for White to play: 17.d5?! V.Belov – Neverov, Minsk 2000, but then after 17...e6! 18.c4 b6 19.\textit{A}g5 \textit{D}d7 17, it is not clear how White can maintain his position in the centre.) 17...\textit{W}e6 18.\textit{A}g3 \textit{W}c4 19.\textit{A}h1 b6 20.\textit{A}h4 \textit{D}d7 21.\textit{B}b2 \textit{c}c8 17, and the position remains with mutual chances, Kobalia – A.Timofeev, Kazan 2005.

Having in mind all that, it seems more precise for Black to defend his pawn on b7 with the move 13...\textit{W}c8!? After 14.dxc5 (contrary to the position with a black queen on the c7-square, now it is not so good for White to play 14.e5, because of 14...\textit{D}d8 15.\textit{A}e4 \textit{c}c6 16.\textit{A}xc8 17.\textit{A}xe5! (After 16.\textit{A}b5 17.\textit{W}c2 \textit{c}c4 18.\textit{A}xc4 \textit{A}xc4 18.\textit{A}fd1, Black should not play 18...b5?!, because of the possible exchange of his dark-squared bishop: 19.\textit{A}d4! \textit{W}xc5 20.\textit{D}f5 17, while in case of: 18...b6 19.\textit{Ac}1 \textit{B}xc5 20.\textit{A}a4 \textit{W}a6 21.\textit{W}xa6 \textit{A}xa6 22.\textit{A}b3 \textit{A}fc8 23.\textit{A}xc5 17, Hort – Timman, Niksic 1978, or 18...\textit{A}a6 19.f4! e5 20.\textit{f}5 \textit{R}amma – Sakaev, Dimitrovgrad 1988, he fails to regain his pawn.) 16.\textit{W}c2 \textit{f}8 17.\textit{h}1 \textit{A}xc5 18.\textit{A}g5 \textit{E}e8, Black restored the material balance and obtained a quite decent counterplay in the game Krstev – Perry, Auckland 2005.

Black has one more interesting possibility connected with the move 13...\textit{a}6. Its idea is that after: 14.\textit{A}xb7 \textit{c}xb7 (It is too bad for Black to play 14...\textit{A}a7 15.\textit{A}d5 \textit{b}5, due to 16.dxc5! \textit{D}d7 17.\textit{W}e1 \textit{e}6 18.\textit{A}c6 \textit{D}d6 19.\textit{A}c4 \textit{D}xc4 20.\textit{A}xc4 21.\textit{A}c5 \textit{xc}6 22.\textit{A}xf8 \textit{xc}8, Verdier – Jelen, Cannes 1997 and here after: 23.\textit{A}c1 \textit{W}a3 24.\textit{A}c2 17, White could have preserved his extra exchange without any risk.) 15.\textit{A}xb7 \textit{A}b5 Black can try to trap White’s rook in his camp. Well, the rook cannot get back into the actions indeed, but it would not just perish in vain. After 16.\textit{E}e1 (In case of 16.\textit{A}g5 \textit{c}e8 17.d5 \textit{f}6 18.\textit{A}f4 \textit{e}5 19.\textit{A}e3 \textit{W}c8 20.\textit{W}xg7+ \textit{D}xg7 21.\textit{A}c2 \textit{A}xe2 22.\textit{A}xe2 \textit{c}4 17, Saccetti – Serradimigni, corr. 2000, White ended up with only a pawn for the exchange. After 16.d5 \textit{W}c8 17.\textit{A}xe7 \textit{A}f6 18.\textit{A}d6 \textit{W}xe7 19.dxe7 \textit{E}e8 17, White’s e7-pawn is too far away from the rest of his forces and it seems doomed.) 16...\textit{W}c8 17.\textit{A}xe7 (White achieves more or less the same after: 17.\textit{b}6 \textit{E}d8 18.\textit{b}7 \textit{A}c8. 17...\textit{A}f6 (In case of 17...\textit{A}d8 18.\textit{W}b7 \textit{c}8 19.\textit{b}6 \textit{d}8 20.\textit{W}xb5 \textit{xb}5 21.\textit{A}b3 17, White captures two pawns for the exchange) 18.\textit{E}e5 \textit{A}xe5 19.dxe5 \textit{E}d8 20.\textit{W}b3 (White’s threat \textit{D}f4 17, forces in fact Black to exchange his bishop for White’s knight.) 20...\textit{W}xe2 21.\textit{A}xe2 17, and White remains with a couple of pawns for the exchange.

14.cxd4
14...a6

Black has no comfortable defence of the b7-pawn now, so he has to part with a pawn temporarily.

For example after 14...\texttt{wc}c7, White can solve the problems with a tactical operation – 15. \texttt{Af}4! \texttt{wc}8 16.\texttt{Dd}2 e6 17.\texttt{Xxb}7! (This move is even stronger than: 17.\texttt{Wxa}5 exd5 18.\texttt{Wxd}5 \texttt{Ae}6 19.\texttt{Wxb}7 \texttt{Xxa}2+, because Black can still offer some resilient resistance thanks to his powerful couple of bishops.) 17...\texttt{Dxb}7 18.\texttt{Ff}c1 \texttt{Ac}6 19.d5 exd5 20.exd5 \texttt{Dd}8 (or 20...\texttt{Dd}8 21.\texttt{Xxc}6 \texttt{Wxc}6 22.\texttt{Dxc}6 \texttt{Dxd}2 23.\texttt{Exb}7++ and White’s passed pawn will win a rook at the end) 21.\texttt{Dd}4 \texttt{Be}8 (Black can reduce the pressure of White’s powerful bishop on c6 only at the cost of compromising the safety of his king – 21...\texttt{Xxd}4+ 22.\texttt{Wxd}4 \texttt{Be}8 23.\texttt{Ah}6++) 22.\texttt{Dxc}6++ Filutowski – Kasperski, corr. 1992.

The other possible defence of the queen is hardly any better – 14...\texttt{Cc}8. After 15.\texttt{Dd}2 \texttt{Ce}6 16.\texttt{Ff}c1 e6 (in case of 16...\texttt{Dd}8 17.\texttt{Ag}5 \texttt{Ff}8 18.\texttt{Xxc}6 bxc6 19.d5 f6, Arshakuni – Arutjunian, St Petersburg 1998, it would have been excellent for White to continue with: 20.\texttt{Ee}3 \texttt{Fa}6 21.\texttt{Cc}5+ and because of the threat 22.Ra5, Black would have problems to save his pawn) 17.\texttt{Xxc}6 bxc6 18.\texttt{Ah}6 \texttt{Xh}6 19.\texttt{Wxh}6 \texttt{Fa}6 20.\texttt{Ab}2 \texttt{Fa}b8 21.\texttt{Dd}2 \texttt{Fa}3 22.e5+, Black had to fight against a powerful positional pressure, because the dark squares in his camp were catastrophically weak, Kopilov – Babuev, Novosibirsk 2001.

The move 14...\texttt{Xb}8 is only an illusory defence, because with the help of the line: 15.\texttt{Af}4 e5 16.\texttt{Xxe}5 \texttt{Xxe}5 17.dxe5 \texttt{We}7 (in answer to 17...\texttt{Dc}6, Koehler – Hauck, Germany 1998, or 17...a6, Alhambra – Coll, corr. 1990, White should have solidified his central army unit with the move 18.f4+-) 18.f4 \texttt{Fe}6 19.\texttt{Xxe}6 fxe6 20.\texttt{Wd}6++, White acquired a material advantage in the game Arnalds – Kjartansson, Gardabaer 2000.

Black can prolong the existence of his pawn only for a while with the move 14...\texttt{Cc}6. After 15.\texttt{Xxc}6 bxc6 (15...\texttt{Dxc}6 16.\texttt{Xxb}7+- Angus – Piviroto, corr. 1997) 16.\texttt{Fa}4 \texttt{Cc}7 17.\texttt{Ff}c1 \texttt{Fc}8 (in case of 17...\texttt{Ffb}8 18.\texttt{Xxb}8+ \texttt{Xxb}8, Jovan – Vehreschild, Zalakaros 1997, following 19.\texttt{Dd}2++, Black is bound to lose more than just a pawn) 18.d5 \texttt{Db}7 19.\texttt{Xxc}6++ and White won material due to the deadly pin in the game Sapi – Wapner, Budapest 1994.
It seems to be a better idea for Black to try here 14...\textit{e}8. Still, if you make a comparison to the position that we have analyzed in our notes to Black's move twelve, White in fact has an extra tempo utilized for the quite useful move \textit{\textit{f}}a1-b1. After 15.\textit{g}5 (Here, just like before, White's best plan is to occupy the c1-h6 diagonal, because after: 15.a3 \textit{e}6 16.a2 b6 17.d3 \textit{b}7 18.f4, Korobov – Arshchenko, Kramatorsk 2001, Black could have played 18...c\textit{c}6, creating some pressure against White's centre.) 15...h6 (Black must try to preempt his opponent's plan somehow, because after: 15...\textit{d}7 16.d2 c6 17.f1 e6 18.cxc6 bxc6, Pregarac – Petrachi, Porto- roz 1995, White could have played 19.e5 and he would have been totally dominant over the dark squares of almost the whole board.) 16.h4 g5 17.f2 e6 18.b3 \textit{xb}3 19.xb3 b6 20.\textit{f}d1 a6 21.g3\uparrow and White maintained a powerful positional pressure, Darrigues – Sorbe, Creon 2002.

Black obviously cannot defend his b7-pawn comfortably, therefore he should sacrifice it. He tried to do that in other ways, besides the move 14...a6. It did not work well, though...

For example after: 14...e6 15.xb7 cxb7 (in case of 15...c4 16.f4 g5 17.c1 gxf4 18.xc4 \textit{b}8, Chaitchits – Vojan, Logrono 1998, White increased his material gains, winning in addition Black's a7-pawn with the help of the line: 19.e5 \textit{g}5 20.a6\uparrow) 16.xb7 c8 17.b2 c6 18.a4 cxe2 19.xe2+- and White remained with a solid extra pawn in the game Borges – Tsuboi, Canela 1987.

Following 14...\textit{c}8 15.xb7 d4 16.f2 b8 17.d3 \textit{b}5 18.d5 \textit{b}2 19.d2 c4 20.xc4 xc4 21.xb8 xb8 22.c1\uparrow, as it was played almost half a century ago in the game Omelczenko – Timonow, Kislovodsk 1954, Black's couple of bishops did not compensate sufficiently his sacrificed pawn.

15.xb7

After 15.a4 e6 16.a2 (in case of 16.xb7?? \textit{a}7++ White loses a piece) 16...\textit{c}8 17.d5 c4= and Black had no problems in the game Gurgenidze – Beliavsky, Tbilisi 1976.

15...\textit{c}7

It is weaker for Black to play 15...\textit{xb}7 16..xb7 \textit{b}5 because of 17.e1 (Black has fewer problems after 17.f2 \textit{c}8 18.d6 \textit{c}4\uparrow like in the game V.Georgiev – Bacrot, Germany 2001.) 17...\textit{c}8 (after 17...e6?! 18.a4 \textit{c}8 19.d6 cxe2 20.dxe2 \textit{d}8 21.d2\uparrow Black had no compensation for the pawn in the game Kasparov – Bofill, (simultan) 1986, while after 17...\textit{a}5?! 18.a4 \textit{a}4 19.a1\uparrow as in the game Dolmatov – Malisaukas, USSR 1985, Black's pieces are pinned along the a-file quite annoyingly)
18.\texttt{\textipa{b6}} \texttt{\textipa{c4}} and now in the game Rogozenko – Kocsis, Netherlands 2001, White could have played 19.\texttt{\textipa{d2}!±} or 19.\texttt{\textipa{b3}!±} with some advantage.

16.\texttt{\textipa{d5}}

\begin{center}
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\end{center}

16...\texttt{\textipa{b5}!±}

After 16...\texttt{\textipa{e6}} 17.\texttt{\textipa{b3}} \texttt{\textipa{xb3}} (in case Black postpones the exchange – 17...\texttt{\textipa{b5}}, White can counter that with: 18.\texttt{\textipa{d5}!±} \texttt{\textipa{d7}} 19.\texttt{\textipa{a4}} and now the trade on b3 is obviously too slow: 19...\texttt{\textipa{xb3}?} 20.\texttt{\textipa{axb5}} \texttt{\textipa{a5}} 21.\texttt{\textipa{bxa6}++} Schnaek – Rodi, Buenos Aires 1987, while after 19...\texttt{\textipa{xe2}} 20.\texttt{\textipa{xe2}} \texttt{\textipa{xb3}} 21.\texttt{\textipa{xb3}} \texttt{\textipa{exd5}} 22.\texttt{\textipa{xa6}} \texttt{\textipa{xex4}} 23.\texttt{\textipa{fxe4}±}, even if White loses his extra pawn, his dangerous passed a-pawn will remain on the board, Rusjan – Kos, Bled 1998) 18.\texttt{\textipa{axb3}} (in case of 18.\texttt{\textipa{xb3} \texttt{\textipa{b5}} 19.\texttt{\textipa{f1} \texttt{\textipa{xe2}} 20.\texttt{\textipa{xe2} \texttt{\textipa{d4}±}} as in the game Szymczak – Staniszewski, Porabka 1986, Black restores the material balance, and the intermediate move 18.\texttt{\textipa{d5}} after 18...\texttt{\textipa{b7}} 19.\texttt{\textipa{xb3} \texttt{\textipa{b5}±} in the game Szymczak – J.Pribyl, Leipzig 1983, was equally fruitless for White) 18...\texttt{\textipa{b5}} 19.\texttt{\textipa{e5}} (It is weaker for White to play 19.\texttt{\textipa{f2} because of 19...\texttt{\textipa{d7} as in the game Kochyev – Chekhov, Dresden 1985) 19...\texttt{\textipa{d7}} 20.\texttt{\textipa{c2}! (after 20.\texttt{\textipa{e1} \texttt{\textipa{f6}} 21.\texttt{\textipa{exf6} \texttt{\textipa{xf6}} 22.\texttt{\textipa{f2} e5 23.\texttt{\textipa{d5} \texttt{\textipa{xd5}} 24.\texttt{\textipa{c3} \texttt{\textipa{d3}}= the prospects were equal in the game Dolmatov – G.Kuzmin, Kharkiv 1985) 20...\texttt{\textipa{f6} (if 20...\texttt{\textipa{c7}, then 21.\texttt{\textipa{a2}±} 21.\texttt{\textipa{exf6} \texttt{\textipa{xf6}} 22.\texttt{\textipa{fd1}± Black needs more efforts to prove he has an adequate compensation for the pawn.) 17.\texttt{\textipa{a4}}

In case of 17.\texttt{\textipa{g5}} Black plays 17...\texttt{\textipa{d7}! (after 17...\texttt{\textipa{h6}} 18.\texttt{\textipa{h4} g5 19.\texttt{\textipa{f2} e6 20.\texttt{\textipa{b3} \texttt{\textipa{xb3}} 21.\texttt{\textipa{axb3} \texttt{\textipa{xe2}} 22.\texttt{\textipa{xe2} \texttt{\textipa{xd4}} 23.\texttt{\textipa{e5} a5 24.\texttt{\textipa{f4}± in the game Furman – Byvshev, Riga 1954, the position was rather simplified but Black’s weaknesses on the kingside were quite indicative.) 18.\texttt{\textipa{h1} e6 19.\texttt{\textipa{b3} \texttt{\textipa{xb3}} Black’s idea 19... \texttt{\textipa{c6}?! is evidently insufficient, because after: 20.\texttt{\textipa{e3} \texttt{\textipa{xe2}} 21.\texttt{\textipa{xe2} \texttt{\textipa{xd4}} 22.\texttt{\textipa{f2} \texttt{\textipa{d8}} 23.\texttt{\textipa{bd1} \texttt{\textipa{c7}} 24.\texttt{\textipa{d3} \texttt{\textipa{b5}} 25.\texttt{\textipa{fd1} e5 26.\texttt{\textipa{f4} \texttt{\textipa{cd7}} 27.\texttt{\textipa{d5}±, the material is equal indeed, but the light squares in Black’s camp are chronically weak, Boenisch – Wotitski, Muenster 1990) 20.\texttt{\textipa{axb3} \texttt{\textipa{xe2}} 21.\texttt{\textipa{xe2} \texttt{\textipa{xd4}} 22.\texttt{\textipa{fd1} e5 23.\texttt{\textipa{e3} \texttt{\textipa{d8}} 24.\texttt{\textipa{xd4} exd4 25.\texttt{\textipa{d3} \texttt{\textipa{b5}± and Black managed to equalize in the game Gheorghiu – Kochyev, Leningrad 1977.

White can try to preserve his extra pawn with the help of the move 17.\texttt{\textipa{e1}}, but he would
hardly be so happy after that: Black’s pieces remain too active. See some of the possible developments: 17...e6 (Black should not delay that move, because in answer to 17...d7?!), Hovmoller – Brinck Claussen, Copenhagen 2001, White could have played 18.\(\text{e}f4\)\(\pm\) and Black’s possible move e7-e6 would have been very difficult to prepare, because of the possible sacrifice of White’s knight on that square. Meanwhile, White’s threat a2-a4 becomes even stronger after the knight is removed from e2.) 18.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{xb}3\) (This exchange should not be postponed either, at least because of the line: 18...d7 19.\(\text{a}4\) c6 20.\(\text{xb}5\) axb5 21.\(\text{xb}5\) \(\text{xd}4\) 22.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xd}4\), Mader – Darnstaedt, Leipzig 1994 and here after the simple move 23.\(\text{e}2\), White remains with a solid extra pawn.) 19.axb3 d7 20.\(\text{d}2\) (in case of 20.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{c}1\) \(\text{xe}2\) 22.\(\text{ex}e2\) \(\text{xd}4\) 23.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xd}4\) 24.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{fd}8\), the pawns are equal, Duboc – Levermore, Witley 1998) 20...\(\text{xe}2\) 21.\(\text{xe}2\) \(\text{xd}4\) (Black should better continue simplifying, because after: 21...a5?! 22.e5 \(\text{d}5\) 23.\(\text{ec}1\) \(\text{b}6\) 24.\(\text{c}5\), his bishop on \(\text{g}7\) remains restricted by White’s e5-pawn, Lesteiro Lores – Aquilera, corr. 1997) 22.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xd}4\) 23.\(\text{xa}6\) \(\text{d}2\) (in answer to 23...\(\text{b}8\), Garfinkel – Muir, corr. 1982, White plays 24.\(\text{a}5\), and Black has no easy access to his opponent’s second rank) 24.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{b}6\) 25.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{a}8\) 26.\(\text{ed}1\) c2 27.\(\text{dc}1\) \(\text{d}2\) 28.\(\text{a}1\) \(\text{b}8\) 29.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{b}4\) 30.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{bd}8\) and Black had some compensation for the pawn in the game Leserer – Albrecht, corr. 1992. White can repel the black rook away from the second rank only at the cost of his b3-pawn.

17...\(\text{xe}2\) 18.\(\text{xe}2\) e6

19.\(\text{c}4\)

White is forced now to give his extra pawn back. The pieces-sacrifice 19.\(\text{xe}6?\) \(\text{fxe}6\) 20.d5 fails after 20...\(\text{a}8\) 21.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{d}6\) 22.\(\text{fc}1\) (Black counters 22.\(\text{xa}5?\) quite effectively with 22...\(\text{c}5\++)\(\text{a}8\) 23.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{xb}6\)! (Black can also play 23...\(\text{ex}d5\) 24.\(\text{xa}5\) \(\text{xb}1\) 25.\(\text{xb}1\) dxe4\(\mp\) 24.\(\text{xb}6\) \(\text{a}3\) and White had to fight for a draw in the game Spassky – Beliavsky, Riga 1975.

19...\(\text{xd}4\) 20.\(\text{fd}1\) \(\text{xe}3\)

Following 20...\(\text{d}7?\) 21.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 22.\(\text{xc}4\) e5 23.\(\text{xa}6\) exd4 24.\(\text{d}3\), Black failed to restore the material balance in the game Verdier – Santos, corr. 1998.

21.\(\text{xe}3\) \(\text{d}7\)

In case of 21...\(\text{c}7\) 22.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{b}8\), Kinlechner – Lauckner,
corr. 1983, White could have continued with: 23.\(\mathcal{A}\)xb8+ \(\mathcal{A}\)xb8 24.\(\mathcal{A}\)d4=, preserving some edge. His pieces are placed more actively; meanwhile Black must take care of his a6-pawn.

22.\(\mathcal{A}\)e2

22.\(\mathcal{A}\)xd7 \(\mathcal{A}\)xd7 23.\(\mathcal{A}\)xa6 \(\mathcal{A}\)xa4 24.\(\mathcal{A}\)b5 \(\mathcal{A}\)a2= has been tested in a number of games, but of course, there is no intrigue here.

22...\(\mathcal{A}\)xd1+

It is obviously insufficient for Black to play 22...\(\mathcal{A}\)c6?! because after 23.\(\mathcal{A}\)dc1 \(\mathcal{A}\)b8 24.\(\mathcal{A}\)b6 \(\mathcal{A}\)d6 25.a5 \(\mathcal{A}\)d7 26.\(\mathcal{A}\)cb1=, his a6-pawn turned out to be extremely vulnerable, Veingold – Lechtynsky, Tallinn 1979.

It is a bit more acceptable for Black to try: 22...\(\mathcal{A}\)c8 23.\(\mathcal{A}\)dc1 (after 23.\(\mathcal{A}\)xd7 \(\mathcal{A}\)xd7 24.\(\mathcal{A}\)c3 \(\mathcal{A}\)c6 25.\(\mathcal{A}\)d1 \(\mathcal{A}\)a7+ 26.\(\mathcal{A}\)f1 \(\mathcal{A}\)c8 27.\(\mathcal{A}\)c4 a5=, Black’s pawn is not on a6 anymore and White has no more targets to attack, Spartinos – Belis, corr. 2001) 23...\(\mathcal{A}\)c7, as it was played in the game Kaszowski – Janaszk, Poznan 2003, but in that case after: 24.\(\mathcal{A}\)xc7 \(\mathcal{A}\)xc7 25.\(\mathcal{A}\)xa6 \(\mathcal{A}\)c2 26.\(\mathcal{A}\)a1 \(\mathcal{A}\)b3 27.\(\mathcal{A}\)e1=, Black must still prove that he has compensation for the pawn.

23.\(\mathcal{A}\)xd1

This is the critical position of the whole variation.

(diagram)

23...\(\mathcal{A}\)c8

Besides the natural move in the text, defending the a6-pawn, Black has tried in practice 23...\(\mathcal{A}\)c7 too. The position after 24.\(\mathcal{A}\)xa6 (In case of 24.h4 \(\mathcal{A}\)d8 25.\(\mathcal{A}\)c1 \(\mathcal{A}\)b8= the opponents agreed to a draw in the game Beliavsky – Mikhalchishin, Portoroz 2001; In case of 24.\(\mathcal{A}\)c1, Kaminik – Jezierski, Naleczow 1989, Black is not forced to transpose to the main line with the move 24...\(\mathcal{A}\)b7, since he has a much stronger move at his disposal – 24...\(\mathcal{A}\)d6=) 24...\(\mathcal{A}\)c2 25.\(\mathcal{A}\)d4 (it is weaker for White to play 25.\(\mathcal{A}\)d4 due to 25...e5! 26.\(\mathcal{A}\)b4 \(\mathcal{A}\)c6 27.\(\mathcal{A}\)c4 \(\mathcal{A}\)d1+ 28.\(\mathcal{A}\)f2 \(\mathcal{A}\)d4= that is an analysis of Jussupow and Dvoretzky, 25...e5! (after 25...\(\mathcal{A}\)b3? 26.\(\mathcal{A}\)d3 \(\mathcal{A}\)xd3 27.\(\mathcal{A}\)xd3 \(\mathcal{A}\)a8 28.\(\mathcal{A}\)b5= Black remained a pawn down in the game E.Vladimirov – Kudriashov, Barnaul 1988.) 26.\(\mathcal{A}\)a1 \(\mathcal{A}\)b8 (in case of 26...\(\mathcal{A}\)b3 27.\(\mathcal{A}\)b1 \(\mathcal{A}\)c5+ 28.\(\mathcal{A}\)h1 \(\mathcal{A}\)b4 29.\(\mathcal{A}\)b5 \(\mathcal{A}\)c8 30.h3 followed by \(\mathcal{A}\)b2 and \(\mathcal{A}\)h2= White has an indisputable advantage according to Jussupow and Dvoretzky) 27.\(\mathcal{A}\)d3 (27.\(\mathcal{A}\)f1= Jussupow – Korchnoi, Luzern 1985. White must also consider 27.\(\mathcal{A}\)b5 \(\mathcal{A}\)b3 28.\(\mathcal{A}\)b1 \(\mathcal{A}\)c5+ 29.\(\mathcal{A}\)h1 \(\mathcal{A}\)d4 30.\(\mathcal{A}\)d3, although after 30...\(\mathcal{A}\)xb5 31.\(\mathcal{A}\)b1
Chapter 15

$\Box b6$ 32.axb5 $h5 \pm$ White can hardly convert his extra pawn into a full point – analysis of Jussupow and Dvoretsky) 27...

$\Box c5+$ 28.$\Box h1$ $\Box b3$ 29.$\Box b2$ $\Box d6$

30.$\Box c3$ $\Box d4$ 31.$a5 \pm$ and Black's defence is quite problematic, Krzyzanowski – Rissanen, corr. 1995.

$24.\Box c1$

After $24.\Box c1$ $\Box b7$ 25.$\Box c5$ $\Box b3$

26.$\Box e3$ $\Box a5$ 27.$\Box d6$ $\Box b4$ 28.$\Box d2$

$\Box x a 4$ 29.$\Box x a 6$ Black played tactically: 29...

$\Box a 1+ 30.\Box f 2$ $\Box b 3!$

31.$\Box x a 1$ $\Box x d 2= and avoided the unpleasant pin in the game Spassky – Timman, Bugojno 1978.

In case of $24.e5$ Black can play $24...\Box c 6$ ($24...\Box c 2!? = was obviously good enough to equalize in the game Schinzel – Schmidt, Slupsk 1979) 25.$\Box d 4$ $\Box b 8$ (after 25...

$\Box c 8$ 26.$h4$ $\Box b 6$ 27.$\Box f 2$ $\Box b 3$

28.$\Box c 4$ $\Box x e 3+$ 29.$\Box x e 3$ $\Box c 4$

30.$\Box x c 4= a draw was agreed in the game Razuvaev – Mikhalchishin, Ashkhabad 1978) 26.$h 4$

$\Box b 1+ 27.\Box h 2$ $\Box b 6$ 28.$\Box d 3$ $\Box x e 3$

29.$\Box x e 3$ $\Box a 1=$ and the unavoidable exchange of the a-pawns was the herald of the draw outcome in the game H.Olaftsson – W.Schmidt, Dubai 1986.

$24...\Box b 7$ 25.$h 4$

After 25.$\Box f 2$ $\Box b 4$ 26.$\Box c 3$ $\Box b 8$

27.$\Box x b 4$ $\Box x b 4$ 28.$\Box c 8+ \Box g 7$ 29.

$\Box a 8$ $\Box b 3$ 30.$\Box x a 6$ the opponents decided to share the point in the game Polugaevsky – Mecking, Luzern (m/5) 1977, because after the move 30...

$\Box c 5=$ Black was restoring the material balance.

$25...h 5$

Black should not let White's h-pawn go too far forward. After 25...

$\Box c 6$ 26.$h 5 \uparrow$ in the game Taborov – Halasz, Szekszard 1995, White had the initiative and the immediate simplifications after 25...

$\Box c 8$ 26.$\Box x c 8+$

$\Box x c 8$ 27.$\Box b 6$ $\Box c 4$ 28.$\Box b 4 \pm$ could cause a lot of problems for Black.

$26.f 4$

After 26.$\Box h 2$ $\Box b 4$ 27.$\Box c 1$ $\Box b 8$

28.$\Box e 5$ $\Box f 8=$ White is incapable to avoid the trade of the a-pawns.

$26...\Box c 8$

![Chess Diagram]

This position was reached in the games Kaminik – Jezierski, Naleczow 1989, and Veress – Halasz, Hungary 1999. In the first game after 27.$\Box x c 8+$ $\Box x c 8=$ Black preserved the equality easily, while in the second one in answer to 27.$\Box d 1$ Black had to play 27...

$\Box b 4!$ (the game continued with 27...

$\Box c 4$ 28.$\Box d 4 \pm$) 28.$f 5$

$\Box c 4$ 29.$\Box x c 4$ $\Box x c 4$ 30.$f x g 6$ $f x g 6=$ with an equal position.
Chapter 16

1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 g6 3.♘c3 d5 4.cxd5 ♘xd5 5.e4 ♘xc3 6.bxc3 ♗g7 7.♗c4 c5 8.♗e2 ♗c6 9.♗e3 0–0 10.0–0 ♗g4 11.f3 ♘a5 12.♗d3

12...cxd4

Black intends to retreat with his bishop to the e6-square.

The immediate 12...♗e6?! is not good because of 13.d5 c4. This is practically forced. (After 13...♗d7 14.♗xc5 b6 15.♗d4 e5 16.dxe6 ♘xe6 17.♗xg7 ♘xg7 18.♗d4 ♘c4 19.♗e2 ♗c8, Hlavac – Filipovic, Pula 1999, White could have played 20.♗ad1± followed by f3–f4 and he would have preserved his extra pawn and a powerful kingside initiative.) 14.♗c2 (The tactical operation – 14.dxe6? ♘xd3 15.♗xd3 cxd3† ends up obviously in favour of Black, Royo – Andreu, corr. 1990.) 14...♗d7 15.♗d4!? (Having in mind that the decisive actions will definitely develop on the kingside,

White should try to trade the dark-squared bishops, although he can also continue with: 15.♗b1 ♘c7 16.♗d4↑ Lagontrie – Vedrunes, corr. 1992.) 15...e5 16.dxe6 ♘xe6 17.♗xg7 ♘xg7 18.♗d4 ♘b6, Ji Yunqi – Vereb, Budapest 1999 and here White could have followed with 19.f4↑ maintaining his initiative on the kingside.

In case of 12...♗d7 13.♗b1 the game transposes to a line from Chapter 14 (11...♗d7 12.♗b1 ♘a5 13.♗d3).

13.cxd4 ♘e6

In case of 13...♗d7 14.♗b1, there arises a position, which we analyze in Chapter 9, after White’s move 16 (except that there was an inclusion of the moves ♘a5–c6–a5 for Black and ♘d3–b5–d3 for White).

14.♗a4

White does not want to let any black light piece to the c4-square just like in the lines after the move 14.♗c1. Meanwhile, White often plays here 14.d5 (see Chapters 17–21), or 14.♗c1 (Chapters 22–26).
Now, we will deal with Black's three basic replies: a) 14...\textit{c8},
b) 14...\textit{d7} and c) 14...\textit{a6}.

Naturally, it is bad for him to play 14...\textit{c6}?!; because after
15.\textit{ad1±} Black must cope with the extremely unpleasant threat
d4-d5 (It is not advantageous for White to try to trade the light-
squared bishops, because of 15.\textit{b5?! \textit{d7}= Barouillet – Le
Corre, France 2000).

After 14...b6 15.\textit{ac1 \textit{d7} (In case Black does not try to find
some active counterplay, then after d4-d5 White will obtain an
overwhelming advantage and that can be easily verified by two
illustrative examples: 15...\textit{a6} 16.d5 \textit{b5} 17.\textit{b4 \textit{d7} 18.\textit{f4+}
Metzger – L.Horvath, Mureck
1998, or 15...\textit{c8} 16.\textit{fd1 \textit{b7} 17.
d5 \textit{d6} 18.\textit{d2 \textit{fc8} 19.\textit{b4 \textit{d8} 20.\textit{a3 \textit{f8} 21.\textit{d4 \textit{xc1} 22.
xc1 \textit{c8} 23.\textit{xc8 \textit{xc8} 24.\textit{xa5 \textit{xa5} 25.\textit{xa5 \textit{h6} 26.\textit{c2±}
Olivera – Valido, Camaguey
1999; in case of 15...\textit{c8}, after
16.\textit{b5?! the game transposes to
variation a) 16.\textit{a3?! (The exchange of the light-squared
bishops after: 16.\textit{b5?! \textit{xb5
17.\textit{xb5 \textit{e6} 18.\textit{c2 \textit{a6} 19.\textit{d3
b5=} enabled Black to occupy the
c4-square in the game Junquera – Lisardo Gonzalez, Asturias
1998.) and there arises a position, which is analogous to the
one that we are analyzing in our
Chapter 10, variation \textbf{b2}, except
that White has played an extra
move – f2-f3.

\textbf{a) 14...\textit{c8}
There is a fight now for the
c4-square.
15.\textit{ac1
White not only prevents
Black’s pieces from occupying
the c4-square, but he also takes
his rook away from the scope of
action of his opponent’s bishop on
g7. Meanwhile, he creates the
positional threat d4-d5.
It is obviously worse for White
to play here 15.\textit{ad1?!}, because of
15...\textit{c4}! 16.\textit{f2 \textit{b2} 17.\textit{xa7
\textit{xd1} 18.\textit{xd1 \textit{a8} 19.\textit{xb7
\textit{xa2=} Wall – Reynaud, San
15...\textit{d7}
Black retreats his bishop with
tempo in order to be able to pre-
vant White’s positional threat
d4-d5 with the help of e7-e6.
In case of 15...\textit{a6?!}, White can
immediately exploit the positi-
ional idea that we have already
mentioned: 16.d5! \textit{xc1 (after
16...\textit{b5} 17.\textit{a3 \textit{d7} 18.\textit{xc8
\textit{xc8} 19.\textit{c1± Black’s knight on
a5 is quite vulnerable, J.Rodri-
gez – Albert, Tarragona 2000)
17.\textit{xc1 \textit{d7 (The bishop-sacri-
fice 17...\textit{xd5 18.exd5 \textit{xd5

218
19.\( \mathcal{e}4+ \) does not bring any solace for Black, Pobelte – Richardson, corr. 1999.) 18.\( \mathfrak{w}b4 \). White’s pawn-advance d4-d5 creates additional dangers for Black’s misplaced knight on the a5-square. In case Black tries to bring it back into the actions – he must pay with at least a pawn: 18...b5 19.a4 \( \mathcal{b}7 \) 20.axb5 axb5 21.\( \mathcal{a}xb5 \) \( \mathcal{a}xb5 \) 22.\( \mathfrak{x}xb5 \) \( \mathcal{d}6 \) 23.\( \mathfrak{w}d3+ \) Babinetz – B. Hofmann, Wattens 1997.

Black can fortify his knight on a5 with the move 15...b6?! but then after 16.\( \mathfrak{b}5?! \) he is faced with new problems, because of White’s threat d4-d5, and that is his light-squared might be in trouble. He has tried in this position: 16...\( \mathfrak{x}c1 \) (Should Black avoid the immediate exchange of that rook with: 16...f5 17.d5 \( \mathcal{f}7 \) 18.\( \mathfrak{x}c8 \) \( \mathfrak{w}xc8 \) 19.\( \mathfrak{c}1 \) \( \mathfrak{d}8 \) 20.\( \mathcal{d}7+ \) Wuest – Vierling, Waldshut 1991, as well as with: 16...f6 17.d5 \( \mathcal{f}7 \) 18.\( \mathcal{d}4+ \) Armbruster – Schargorodskij, Lingen 1995, he loses the control over the light-squares in the centre. After 16...c7 17.\( \mathfrak{x}c7 \) \( \mathfrak{x}c7 \) 18.\( \mathfrak{c}1 \) \( \mathfrak{b}7 \) 19.d5\( \pm \) Black lost the fight for the c-file in an even worse situation than after the immediate exchange of the rook, Stekelenburg – Daamen, Dieren 1980.) 17.\( \mathfrak{x}c1 \) \( \mathcal{c}8 \) 18.\( \mathfrak{f}4! \) (It is still too early for White to play 18.d5, because of 18...e6!\( \mathfrak{z} \) 18...\( \mathcal{b}7 \) (Black can of course prevent White’s move d4-d5 radically with the help of 18...e6, but then after: 19.\( \mathfrak{c}7 \) \( \mathfrak{e}7 \) 20.e5\( \pm \) his heavy pieces become terribly cramped in his own camp.) 19.\( \mathcal{c}7 \) \( \mathfrak{a}8 \) 20.d5\( \pm \) and Black had to suffer under a powerful positional pressure in the game Baez – J. Perez, Santiago 1992.

It is possibly slightly better for Black to follow with: 15...\( \mathfrak{x}c1 \) 16.\( \mathfrak{x}c1 \) \( \mathcal{d}7 \) 17.\( \mathfrak{b}4 \) b6 18.d5\( \uparrow \) Naumkin – Russo, Rome 2004, or 15...\( \mathfrak{c}6 \) 16.\( \mathfrak{d}1 \) \( \mathcal{d}7 \) 17.d5\( \uparrow \) Rippinger – Schroeder, Stetten 1988, but these lines do not solve the principled problem – how to fight against White’s pawn-advance d4-d5.

16.\( \mathfrak{a}3 \)

We cannot recommend the exchange 16.\( \mathfrak{b}5 \) \( \mathfrak{b}5 \) 17.\( \mathfrak{xb5} \), La Marra – Serrano, corr. 1975, because in that case after: 17...\( \mathfrak{x}c1 \) 18.\( \mathfrak{x}c1 \) a6 19.\( \mathfrak{b}4 \) b5\( \mathfrak{z} \) Black occupies the important c4-square.

It is much more interesting for White to test 16.\( \mathfrak{x}c8 \) \( \mathfrak{xa4} \) (In case Black avoids the endgame with 16...\( \mathfrak{x}c8 \), White manages to realize his main positional idea with the move 17.d5\( \pm \) ) 17.\( \mathfrak{xd8} \) \( \mathfrak{xd8} \) 18.\( \mathfrak{c}1 \)
(Now, the move 18.d5 does not achieve the desired effect, because of 18...e6?). But in that case after 18...e6! (It is absolutely essential for Black to prevent d4-d5; otherwise after 18...c6?!) 19.d5 d5 20.a1 b5 21.c3 d3 22.xa7# he simply remained a pawn down in the game Kay – Rossiter, Wanganui 2003.) 19.f2 (The penetration of White’s rook – 19.c7, suddenly enabled Black to organize a quite effective counterplay against White’s d4-pawn with the help of: 19...d1! 20.f2 xe2 21. xe2 xd4 22.d2 b6 23.xa5 xa5 24.xb7 b6=) 19...c6 20.c3 b4 21.b1 e8 and Black repelled White’s attack successfully.

16.e6

Black has also tried here 16.c6 17.f1 (The principled line: 17.d5 e5 18.xc8 xc8 19.c1 d8 after 20.a7 21.xd4 22.a5 23.xd4 24.c3 25.a6 does not win a pawn for White, while 20.d4 leaves White’s bishops unprotected and Black can counter that with 20...e6!) 17.f1 a5 (in case of 17...a6, Reis – Bazzo, corr. 2000, White can continue with a great effect: 18.d5 e5 19.xc8 xc8 20.d4 xd3 21.xg7 22.g7 22.xd3%) 18.b3 (White can try to trade queens immediately with: 18.xa5 xa5 19.d5 a4 20.e1 b2 21.b1 a3 22.xa7 c2 23.xc2 xc2 24.d4 xa2, Vaya – E.Garcia, corr. 2003 and here he should necessarily get rid of Black’s active rook with: 25.e2 xe2 26.xe2 18...b4 19.d5 x3b3 20.axb3 b4 21.b1 b6 22.f2 and the endgame was clearly better for White in the game Dieterle – Vierling, Germany 1985.

17.f1

Whenever Black’s pawn is on e6, White should as a rule try to push e4-e5, followed by a deployment of the knight to the e4-square. The pawn breakthrough in the centre only enhances the activity of Black’s pieces, for example after: 17.d5, Black played 17...exd5 18.exd5 b6 19.d6 e8 20.xc8 xc8 21.f4 b7 22.d1 c5 23.c4 e6 and a complicated position with mutual chances was reached in the game Browne – Keyes, Boston 1988.

17...b6?

White plans to continue with g3-e4. His position is slightly better due to his extra space. Instead of e4-e5, it would have been a blunder for him to play: 18.a6? xc1 19.xc1, Cubero
Ferreiro – Iglesias Iglesias, Vila de Padron 2000. White has won the battle for the c-file indeed, but it is quite unclear what he can do to save his bishop after the move 19...b5!\(\pm\).

b) 14...\(\mathsf{d}7\)

\[\text{(Diagram)}\]

15.\(\mathsf{a}3\)

It is not advantageous for White to trade the light-squared bishops, therefore he should retreat.

15...b5

For example after: 15...a6?! 16.\(\mathsf{ac1}\) b5 17.d5 \(\mathsf{b}7\) 18.\(\mathsf{d}4\)± White occupied plenty of space in the centre, Jensen – Donschev, corr. 1981.

It is not any better for Black to play here: 15...\(\mathsf{c}6\)?! 16.\(\mathsf{ab1}\) \(\mathsf{c}8\), De Avila – E.Garcia, Barranquilla 1999, because White could have countered that with: 17.d5 \(\mathsf{e}5\) 18.\(\mathsf{d}4\)± realizing his basic positional threat. Black would not have changed anything with: 15...\(\mathsf{c}8\) 16.\(\mathsf{fc1}\) \(\mathsf{xc1+}\) 17.\(\mathsf{xc1}\) \(\mathsf{c}6\), Ulms – Uhlandorf, Germany 1997, because White could have continued again with the standard 18.d5±.

15...e6 16.\(\mathsf{ac1}\) b6 (White remains slightly better after: 16...\(\mathsf{e}8\) 17.\(\mathsf{f}2\) \(\mathsf{c}6\) 18.\(\mathsf{fd1}\)\(\pm\) Bareev – Lputian, Lviv 1987. In case of 16...\(\mathsf{c}6\), Speisser – Bras, corr. 1997, White should have proceeded with the centralization of his pieces with the move 17.\(\mathsf{fd1}\)\(\pm\) 17.\(\mathsf{f}4\) (17.\(\mathsf{fd1}\) \(\mathsf{c}8\) 18.e5 – see line a) 16...\(\mathsf{c}6\), Pechy – Kanyadi, Hungary 2000 and he could have penetrated Black’s position with his bishop following the line: 18.\(\mathsf{d}6!\) \(\mathsf{e}8\) 19.\(\mathsf{fd1}\)\(\pm\) squeezing his opponent’s pieces.

16.\(\mathsf{ab1}\)!

The standard line 16.\(\mathsf{ac1}\) would not work here, because of 16...\(\mathsf{c}4!\) 17.\(\mathsf{xc4}\) bxc4 18.\(\mathsf{xc4}\) \(\mathsf{b}5\) 19.\(\mathsf{c}2\) \(\mathsf{xe}2\) 20.\(\mathsf{xe}2\) \(\mathsf{xd}4\) 21.\(\mathsf{xd}4\) \(\mathsf{xd}4\) 22.\(\mathsf{e}3\) \(\mathsf{fd}8\) 23.\(\mathsf{xd}4\) \(\mathsf{xd}4\) 24.\(\mathsf{b}1\) \(\mathsf{ad}8\) 25.\(\mathsf{b}7\) \(\mathsf{fd}7\) and the position turned out to be completely equal, Doudaniotis – Angouras, Athens 2001.

16...a6

The move 16...\(\mathsf{c}8?!\) Bodnar – Schreiber, Hungary 1999, after 17.\(\mathsf{xb}5\) \(\mathsf{xb}5\) 18.\(\mathsf{xb}5\) \(\mathsf{c}4\) 19.\(\mathsf{d}3\)\(\pm\) would have lost a pawn for Black, while after 16...\(\mathsf{c}4\) 17.\(\mathsf{xc4}\) bxc4 18.\(\mathsf{fc1}\) a6 19.d5 \(\mathsf{b}5\) 20.\(\mathsf{b}4\) \(\mathsf{d}7\) 21.\(\mathsf{c}3\)\(\pm\) Black’s queenside needs additional protection.

17.\(\mathsf{fc1}\) \(\mathsf{e}8\), Peysachovich – Rogulj, Rome 1990 and here White should exploit the right moment to continue with 18.d5±.
15.d5
This is the most principled move.

In case of 15.\textit{ac}1 b5= Black has no problems and after 15.\textit{xf}4 b5 16.\textit{xe}6 \textit{fxe}6= White must part with his d4–pawn.

15...b5
This is the most logical move, but 15...\textit{d}7 deserves some attention too. It used to be consi-
dered as absolutely unacceptable for Black, because after 16.\textit{b}4 Black was faced with the danger-
ous threat \textit{e}3-b6. It is not so clear however. After 16...b5 (it is also interesting for Black to play
16...\textit{xa}1 because after 17.\textit{b}6 \textit{e}8 18.\textit{xa}1 he has the resource
18...\textit{b}5, although is is worth mentioning that the complica-
tions after 19.\textit{xa}5 \textit{xd}3 20.\textit{f}4 \textit{b}5 in the game Vives – Sanche-
z Almejra, Barcelona 1992, in case of 21.a4! \textit{c}4 22.\textit{h}1! \textit{fe}8 23.\textit{d}2 \textit{c}2 24.\textit{d}6 \textit{e} could have given
White an excellent compensation for the exchange) 17.\textit{ac}1 e6 18.
\textit{dxe}6 \textit{xe}6 19.\textit{fd}1 \textit{c}8 20.\textit{c}5 (the following line leads only to sim-
plications: 20.\textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8 21.\textit{c}3 \textit{c}6 22.\textit{c}5 \textit{d}4 23.\textit{xd}4
\textit{xd}4 24.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 25.\textit{b}1 \textit{e}6 26.\textit{f}2 \textit{d}8= Chmelik – Sysala,
Czech Republic 1995) 20...\textit{c}6 21.\textit{a}3 \textit{e}5 and White must
find the move 22. \textit{b}1! (other-
wise after 22.\textit{xb}5?! \textit{ab} 23.\textit{xd}8 \textit{fxd}8 24.\textit{f}4 \textit{c}4 25.\textit{b}4 \textit{d}2= as
in the game A.Graf – Krasenkov,
Russia 1987, Black is at least
equal, while after the tempting
22.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 23.\textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8 24.
\textit{b}2 White had after 24...\textit{c}5+ 25.\textit{h}1 \textit{xf}3!! 26.\textit{f}4 \textit{hx}2 27.
\textit{xe}6 \textit{h}5 28.\textit{f}4 \textit{xd}1+ 29.
\textit{xe}2 \textit{h}6 30.\textit{d}5 \textit{xd}3 31.\textit{e}5
\textit{a}3 32.\textit{e}7+ \textit{f}8 33.\textit{d}5= to
agree soon to a draw in the game
A.Graf – Chuchelov, Novosibirsk
1989) 22...\textit{h}4 (after 22...\textit{c}4
23.\textit{xd}8 \textit{fxd}8 24.\textit{b}4 \textit{d}2 25.
\textit{c}2 \textit{d}1+ 26.\textit{f}2 \textit{xb}1 27.\textit{xb}1
\textit{xc}5 28.\textit{d}1+= White parries
gradually the activity of the black pieces and remains with a
decisive material advantage)
23.\textit{xf}8 \textit{fxf}8 24.\textit{c}5+ with the
idea to follow with 25.\textit{f}2=.

The move b7-b5 enhances
the mobility of Black’s knight;
therefore Black should not re-
frain from it at all. After 15...
\textit{xa}1 16.\textit{xa}1 f6 (In case of 16...
b5 17.\textit{d}4 \textit{d}7 18.\textit{h}6= Jensen – Ogdernik, corr. 1980, or 16.
\textit{c}8 17.\textit{d}4 \textit{d}7 18.\textit{h}6 f6 19.
\textit{xf}8 \textit{fxf}8 Kierzek – Schnitz-
span, corr. 1995 and now 20.f4= White regains his sacrificed ex-
change and he remains in a bet-
ter position. After 16...\textit{xd}5 17.
exd5 \textit{xd}5 18.\textit{e}4= van der Berg

222
– Daamen, Dieren 1980 White’s two light pieces are clearly superior to Black’s rook and a couple of pawns.) White can continue with 17...d1!? Black’s bishop is hanging and after White redeployes his queen to the h4-square Black will face the threat e3-b6. Accordingly, Black came back to the idea to follow with the move 17...b5 18.b4 f7 (18...d7 19.a4!) White however, can try to exploit the loss of a tempo for Black’s move f7-f6 with the help of the line: 19.a4! c4 20.xc4 (20.c5, Vogel – Schirm, Germany 1995, 20...d6=) 20...bxc4 21.xc4 d7 (It is obviously slightly better for Black to play here 21...e5, but even then after 22.b1 White’s compensation for the sacrificed material is quite sufficient.) 22.d4 White has a pawn for the exchange and additionally his knight will penetrate the c6-square and it will be extremely powerful there, Lytchak – Al.Kharitonov, Germany 1996. 16.b4

16...xa1
After 16...d7 17.ac1 there arises a position that we have analyzed in our notes to Black’s move fifteen – see 15...d7.

In case of 16...c6, it deserves attention for White to follow with: 17.b1!? (The move 17.c5 worked quite well after the line: 17.xa1 18.xa1 e5 19.h6 d7 20.d4 f6 21.xf8 xf8 22.f4 xd3 23.xd3+ Browne – Wolff, San Francisco 1991, but in case of 17.e5! 18.ad1 d7= the position was equal, Pisulinski – Malisauskas, Bydgoszcz 1990.) 17.e5 (or 17...xa1? 18.xa1 b4 19.b1 d7 20.a3=) 18.d4 (after 18.d1 c8 19.d4 e6 20.wb2 xd3 21.xd3 xd4+ 22.xd4 exd5 23.g3 b7 24.exd5, Waagmeester – Goedkoop, corr. 1988, Black could have played 24.f5 with the idea to follow with 25...f6= and he would have solved his opening problems quite successfully) 18...d7 19.f4 xd3 20.xd3 xd4+ 21.xd4 (in case of 21.xd4 wb6 22.e3 e6 23.f5 xe3+ 24.xe3 exd5 25.xd5 e6 26.c7 c4 27.xa8 xf1 28.xf1 xa8= the position was simplified with roughly equal chances, Kuhlmann – Hoyneck, corr. 1995) 21.c8 22.f5+ and White preserves some initiative, thanks to the absence of the dark-squared bishops.

17.xa1 d7
In case of 17...f6 18.d1!?, there arises a position, which has been dealt with in our notes to Black’s move 15 – see 15...xa1.
18.\(d4\)

It is still too early for White to play 18.e5?! , because then Black’s knight enters the actions effortlessly. After 18...\(c4\) (Black is much better indeed, but he should be on the alert, because after the careless move 18...\(e8\)?! , White countered that with 19.\(f4\), creating the threat e5-e6 and the attempt to defend with the move 19...e6? Deutschmann – Sutterer, Schonach 1979 turned out to be a real disaster for Black after: 20.\(h5!!\) exd5 21.\(f6+ g7\) 22.\(f4+-\). Meanwhile, Black can bring his knight on a5 back into the actions a move later i.e.: 18...\(c8\) 19.\(f4\) \(c4\) 20.\(d4\) a5 21.\(e1\), Kunz – Hijikata, corr. 1977 and here after 21...\(c6\) Black maintains a clear advantage.) 19.\(d4\) \(c8\) 20.\(e1\) \(a5\) White has no compensation for the exchange whatsoever, Franz – Aigmueller, corr. 1979.

It seems logical for White to play now: 18.a4, but after 18...\(c4\) 19.\(xc4\) \(bc4\) 20.\(xc4\) (but not 20.\(b6?!\), because of 20...\(b8\) 21.\(b1\) \(e8\) 22.\(xc4\) \(b5\) Budraitis – Akoral, Vaxjo 1992) 20...e5 the position is quite sharp with mutual chances.

18...\(f6\)

You should be able to guess by our previous notes that the move 18...\(e8\) can only lead Black down into the precipice. After 19.e5! (It would not work for White to follow with 19.\(h6?\) \(f6\) 20.e5 \(xe5\) 21.\(xe5\) \(b6+-\), because after 22.\(e3\) \(f6\) 23.\(c7\) \(xa1+\) 24.\(f2\) \(f6\) 25.\(xd7\) \(c4++\) Delgado – Colias, USA 1990, or 22.\(d4\) \(f6\) 23.\(e3\) e5+ Wahlbrink – Nadenau, corr. 1991, Black’s queen manages to come back to the defence of the king just in time.) 19...e6 20.d6 \(c6\) (or 20...\(c8\) 21.\(g3\) \(c4\) 22.\(h5!\) \(f8\) 23.\(f6+\) – H.Roeder – Behnke, corr. 1981) 21.\(f4\) \(f8\) 22.\(g3\) \(f6\) 23.\(xg6!\) hxg6 24.\(xg6+ h8\) 25.\(f4\) and Black resigned in the game Priem – Boekeman. corr. 1980. The reasons behind that decision can be best illustrated with the following lines: 25...\(xe5\) 26.\(h6+ g8\) 27.\(g6\) \(xg6\) (27...\(c6\) 28.\(e7+\) \(f7\) 29.\(h5+ g7\) 30.\(h6+-\)\(+) 28.\(xg6+ h8\) 29.\(h5+ g8\) 30.\(h6\) \(f7\) 31.g6+-\).

The other move with the black rook – 18...\(c8\) is much more reliable. After 19.\(h6\) (the breakthrough 19.e5? does not work after 19...\(c4\) 20.\(f2\) \(c7\) 21.f4 \(d8+\) 19...\(f6\) 20.\(xf8\) \(xf8\) 21.\(f2\) (in case of 21.h3 \(c4\) 22.\(c1\) and 22.\(e5\) 23.\(xc8\) \(xc8\) 24.f4 \(xd3\) 25.\(xd3\) \(c5=\)Black preserves the equality. White does not achieve much ei-
ther after 21...\texttt{a7} because of 21...\texttt{a8} 22.\texttt{e3} \texttt{c8=}) 21...\texttt{c7} (Black can also play 21...\texttt{c4=}) 22.\texttt{c1} \texttt{xh2} 23.\texttt{xc8+} \texttt{xc8} 24.\texttt{c3} \texttt{c4} 25.\texttt{xc4} \texttt{bxc4} 26.\texttt{xc4} \texttt{h3} 27.\texttt{xa6} \texttt{g2} 28.\texttt{e3} \texttt{g5+} 29.\texttt{f2} \texttt{g2} 30.\texttt{e3} \texttt{g5+} 31.\texttt{f2=} and a draw was agreed in the game Piket – Van Wely, Rotterdam 2000.

19.\texttt{e5}

White needs to open the position in order to try to attack the black king on the dark squares; otherwise Black’s extra exchange might tell sometime soon.

The inclusion of the moves 19.\texttt{h6} \texttt{e8} is not favourable for White since after: 20.e5 \texttt{fxe5} 21.\texttt{b6+} Black’s queen comes to the f6-square with tempo (see 18...\texttt{e8} 19.\texttt{h6} f6).

19...\texttt{fxe5}

But not 19...\texttt{c8?} because of 20.e6 \texttt{xe6} 21.\texttt{h6} \texttt{c4} 22.\texttt{xf8=}

Still, it deserves attention for Black to follow with 19...\texttt{e6?}. In this case, it looks like after: 20.\texttt{f4!} (following 20.\texttt{d1} \texttt{c8} 21.\texttt{h6} \texttt{f6} 22.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{f6} 23.\texttt{d6} \texttt{f7} 24.\texttt{xa6} \texttt{c4=} White must fight for the draw, R. Venis – Daamen, Boxtel 1989) 20...\texttt{xe5} 21.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{f6} 22.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{xf6} 23.\texttt{dxe6} \texttt{a6} 24.\texttt{e4} \texttt{e8} (after 24...\texttt{d8} 25.\texttt{b6} \texttt{d6} 26.\texttt{c7=} White again regains his sacrificed exchange) 25.\texttt{xe6} \texttt{fxe6} 26.\texttt{d5=} everything ends up in an equal endgame.

20.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{b8}

Black gives up a pawn voluntarily, but he increases the mobility of his pieces.

After 20.\texttt{f5} 21.\texttt{d4} \texttt{f6} 22.\texttt{xf5} \texttt{gxf5} 23.\texttt{g3} \texttt{d6} W. Browne recommended the strong move 24.\texttt{e1=}, which practically forces Black to give back his extra exchange.

In the game V. Medvedev – Bernad Suarez, corr. 1994, after 20.\texttt{c4} 21.\texttt{xc4} \texttt{f5} 22.\texttt{d4} \texttt{bxc4} 23.\texttt{g3} \texttt{f7=} the opponents agreed to a draw.

21.\texttt{xe7}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics{chess_diagram}
\end{center}

21...\texttt{xe8}

The other possibility – 21...\texttt{e8} is also acceptable for Black. After 22.\texttt{c5} \texttt{b7} (in case of 22...\texttt{c8} 23.\texttt{d4} \texttt{c4} 24.\texttt{h6} \texttt{f7} 25.\texttt{c1=} White’s compensation for the exchange is quite sufficient, Gligoric – Portisch, San Antonio 1972) 23.\texttt{d4} \texttt{e7} 24.\texttt{g3} \texttt{d6} 25.\texttt{d2} \texttt{f5} 26.\texttt{b4} \texttt{xd4} 27.\texttt{xe7} \texttt{f7} 28.\texttt{c5} \texttt{f5} 29.\texttt{e4} \texttt{d8} and the adversaries agreed to a draw in the game Belozerov – Smikovski, Omsk 2002, because of the variation: 30.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd5} 31.\texttt{f6+} \texttt{fxe6} 32.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{xd3=}.

22.\texttt{c5}
The main drawback of the move 22...\(\text{g5}\) is that Black can exchange queens. Meanwhile, even then after 22...\(\text{e5}\) (in case of 22...\(\text{e5}\) 23.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{f5}\) 24.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{xe4}\) 25.\(\text{fxe4}\) White’s d-pawn was protected, van Ee – Louro, corr. 1998) 23.\(\text{exe5}\) \(\text{exe5}\) 24.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{xd5}\) (There are no queens on the board, but it is still a middle game in fact, because after: 24...\(\text{e8}\)! 25.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{b7}\) 26.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{f7}\) 27.\(\text{f6}\) \(\text{ed8}\) 28.\(\text{hxh7}\) \(\text{f5}\) 29.\(\text{g5+}\) \(\text{g8}\), Hein – Beckel, corr. 1980, White managed to win a pawn and he had to follow with 30.\(\text{e4}\) consolidating his material gains.) 25.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 26.\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{xd5}\) = the position remains approximately equal.

22...\(\text{b7}\) 23.\(\text{c1}\)

White usually plays like that when he wishes to avoid the exchange of queens by all means.

His other alternative is 23. \(\text{d4}\). The trade of queens after: 23...\(\text{e5}\) (White’s queen is extremely powerful in the centre and therefore the move 23...\(\text{d6}\), Malmberg – Fuller, corr. 1996, seems to be too optimistic: 24. \(\text{g3}\) threatening \(\text{e3-f4}\) and \(\text{g3-e4}\) would have forced Black to enter the line: 24...\(\text{f5}\) 25. \(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{xf5}\) 26.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{gx5}\) 27.\(\text{d6}\) \(\text{h5}\) 24.\(\text{xe5}\) (The e4-square is the ideal outpost for the knight and it is hardly purposeful to occupy it with the bishop: 24.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{xg4}\) 25.\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{ac8}\) 26.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{c4}\) 27. \(\text{d1}\) \(\text{d6}\) \(\text{f5}\), as it was played in the game Neubauer – Ramm, corr. 1991.) 24...\(\text{xe5}\) 25.\(\text{d4}\) (It is quite acceptable for White to follow with: 25.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{e8}\) 26.\(\text{d1}\) \(\text{c5}\) 27.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{xd3}\) 28.\(\text{xd3}\) \(\text{g7}\) 29.\(\text{f2}\) Duben – Fedorko, corr. 2001, but he should not have parted with his light-squared bishop without any necessity.) 25...\(\text{ee8}\) 26.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{f7}\) 27.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{h6}\) 28.\(\text{d1}\) \(\text{ed8}\) 29.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{f5}\) led to a position in which White has a sufficient compensation for his minute material losses thanks to his wonderful centralized knight on the e4-square, Laczay – J.Martin, corr. 2000.

In case of 23.\(\text{b6}\) \(\text{d6}\) 24.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{f5}\) 25.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{xd3}\) 26.\(\text{xd3}\), after an immaterial transposition of moves, the game enters the variation with the move 23.\(\text{c1}\).

23...\(\text{d6}\)!

It is evidently weaker for Black to play 23...\(\text{f5}\)!, because after 24.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{gx5}\) 25.\(\text{d4}\)! \(\text{exe2}\) 26.\(\text{g5+}\) \(\text{f7}\) 27.\(\text{f6+}\) \(\text{e8}\) 28. \(\text{h8+}\) \(\text{d7}\) 29.\(\text{xe7}\) 30. \(\text{xf5}\) White’s attack is extremely dangerous despite the material deficit of a whole rook.

It is too risky for Black to play 23...\(\text{d6}\)!!, because of 24.\(\text{e4}\)
24.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{xf5} \)

Black loses by force after 24...\( \text{xf5} \)? because of 25.\( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 26.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 27.\( \text{h6} \) \( \text{d7} \) 28.\( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{gxf5} \) 29.\( \text{f6} \) \( \text{f8} \) 30.\( \text{g5} \) + \( \text{f7} \) 31.\( \text{e1} \) –.

It is too dubious for Black to try: 24...\( \text{xf5} \)?!, because of 25.\( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 26.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{xf8} \) (Black loses by force after: 26...\( \text{d6} \)?, due to 27.\( \text{h6} \) \( \text{d7} \) 28.\( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{gxf5} \) 29.\( \text{f6} \) \( \text{f8} \) 30.\( \text{g5} \) + \( \text{f7} \) 31.\( \text{e1} \) –) 27.\( \text{h6} \) \( \text{b7} \) 28.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{f7} \) 29.\( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 30.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{d7} \) 31.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{gx} \) 29.\( \text{e6} \) \( \text{f4} \) 33.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{g7} \) 34.\( \text{b6} \) – and Black is already more than willing to give back the exchange only to get rid of the dangerous white dark-squared bishop, Jensen – Sonski, corr. 1982.

25.\( \text{xd2} \)

It is insufficient for White to play 25.\( \text{xf5} \)?! \( \text{xf5} \) 26.\( \text{xf5} \) (26.\( \text{f2} \) because of 26...\( \text{e5} \) – W.Browne) 26...\( \text{gxf5} \) 27.\( \text{f2} \) (in case of 27.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{e5} \) 28.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{d6} \) 29.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{ac8} \) 30.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{f4} \) 31.\( \text{a1} \) \( \text{c4} \) 32.\( \text{b2} \) \( \text{g6} \) – Black is already attacking and not White...Nenashev – Vyzmanavin, Tashkent 1987) 27...\( \text{e5} \) 28.\( \text{b1} \) \( \text{f4} \) 29.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{ed8} \) 30.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{d6} \) – and White was forced to think about defend-

ing in the game Packroff – Kar-

White achieves almost the same by playing: 25.\( \text{xf5} \)?! \( \text{xf5} \) 26.\( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{gxf5} \).

25...\( \text{xd3} \) 26.\( \text{xd3} \) \( \text{d8} \)

The move 26...\( \text{c4} \) enables

White’s knight to occupy the e4-
square. As a result of: 27.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{f4} \) 28.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{e5} \) 29.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{ac8} \) 30.\( \text{e3} \) – Gasco – Borbiro, corr. 1990, White managed to improve the placement of his pieces considerably.

27.\( \text{c5} \) \( \text{b7} \! \)!

This is Black’s best move. His defence is much more difficult after 27...\( \text{c8} \) 28.\( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{b6} \) +

29.\( \text{h1} \) \( \text{xd6} \) 30.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{f4} \) (in case of 30...\( \text{e5} \) 31.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{ed8} \), Wahlbrink – C.Graf, corr. 1992, 32.\( \text{d6} \) – White’s compensation is more than sufficient thanks to the powerful knight on e4 and the passed d-pawn) 31.\( \text{g3} \) – as it was played in the game Browne – Kudrin, USA 1989.

28.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{d6} \)

The game Browne – T.Ernst, Reykjavik 1990 reached that dy-

namically balanced position.
The variation 14.d4-d5 is enjoying a new wave of popularity presently. It used to be fashionable during the 50ies and the 60ies of the 20th century, but gradually White almost stopped playing like that and the development of the line subsided. This situation changed dramatically recently because world’s top-grandmasters enjoy sacrificing the exchange for the initiative and often quite successfully at that.

We still believe that Black’s position is quite defendable and Black’s failures are mostly due to insufficient theoretical preparation. This line is really hard to play without thorough analysis and excellent memory because there are so many forced lines that the tournament player should master to perfection. It often takes just one mistake to compromise the position irreversibly.

The line 14.d5 is very suitable for players who enjoy studying and analysing a certain position extensively and then they are ready to compare and to compete with their opponents the quality of their knowledge and preparation. That is all the more important for Black, because without really extensive perfect preparation Black is doomed to have a really hard time over the board.

The objective and purely chess-evaluation of that variation presently is that it is quite equal and even possibly – just drawish.
Chapter 17

1.d4 ♜f6 2.c4 g6 3.♕c3 d5 4.cxd5 ♜xd5 5.e4 ♜xc3 6.bxc3 ♗g7 7.♕c4 c5 8.♗e2 ♗c6 9.♗e3 0–0 10.0–0 ♗g4 11.f3 ♗a5 12.♗d3 cxd4 13. cxd4 ♗e6 14.d5

If we have a close look at the position after Black’s move 13 we will note that he needs just one more tempo to enjoy a wonderful game. He has to establish one of his light pieces on the c4-square and that practically forces White to act swiftly in order to stop the aggressive plans on his opponent. The move d4-d5 seems like the right thing to do. White must pay a certain price for that indeed i.e. sacrifices the exchange. Despite the risky sacrifice this sharp line is focusing the attention of the theoreticians again in the last several years. Surprisingly even the huge capabilities of analysis of the contemporary computers are still not able to bring about complete clarification of its evaluation.

14...♗xa1

Should Black shun the sacrifice he will have to defend for long a really difficult position, for example: 14...♗d7 15.♗b1 b6 16. ♕d2 ♗c8 17.♗fc1 ♗xc1+ 18.♗xc1 e6 19.♗g5 f6 20.♗f4 e5 20...♗e3± and in the game Herzog – Ebner, Taufkirchen 1998, White was dominant in the centre as well as on the queenside. The black knight at the edge of the board on a5 will not be able to join the fight effectively for a long time to come.

15.♗xa1 f6

In this chapter we will deal with the following possibilities for White: a) 16.♗b1, b) 16.♗d4, c) 16.♗d2.

The most popular variation with the move 16.♗h6 will be analyzed in Chapters 19-21.

White has also tried in practice:

16.♗e1 ♗f7 17.♗d4 ♗c8 18. ♗e2 a6 19.f4 b5 20.h4 ♗c4 21. ♗f2 ♗h8 22.h5 gxh5 23.♗f5
\( g6 \) and in the game Simagin – IIlivitzki, Moscow 1952, White failed to create any concrete threats on the kingside, meanwhile the black knight joined the fight quite actively;

The line: 16.\( \mathcal{D}d4 \mathcal{D}d7 17.\mathcal{h}h6 \mathcal{E}e8 \), transposes to the variation: 16.\( \mathcal{h}h6 \mathcal{E}e8 17.\mathcal{D}d4 \mathcal{D}d7 \), meanwhile Black has the additional possibility – 17...\( \mathcal{E}f7 \);

16.\( \mathcal{h}h1 \) (This move is quite useful and the game might transpose after it to the main line 16.\( \mathcal{h}h6 \).) 16...\( \mathcal{h}d7 17.e5 \) (Possibly, White should better play immediately 17.\( \mathcal{h}h6 \), transposing to Chapter 20, variation \( a \): 16.\( \mathcal{h}h6 \mathcal{E}e8 17.\mathcal{h}h1 \mathcal{D}d7 \) and here:

17...\( \mathcal{E}c8 18.\mathcal{h}h6 \mathcal{f}xe5?! \) (Black is trying to exploit White’s transposition of moves – so he sacrifices the exchange immediately in order to create a blockade on the dark squares.) 19.\( \mathcal{h}xf8 \mathcal{g}xf8 20.\mathcal{E}xe5 \mathcal{g}f6 21.\mathcal{g}e3 \) (After 21.\( \mathcal{g}xf6 \mathcal{E}xf6 \) the endgame is better for Black. It deserves attention for White to play 21.f4=, preserving his queen on its active position on the \( e5 \)-square.) 21...\( g6 22.\mathcal{g}g3 \mathcal{c}c4 23.\mathcal{w}e2 \mathcal{d}d6 – \) and Black had a good position, having deployed his knight on the ideal square for it in the game Milov – van Wely, Batumi 1999;

17...\( e6 18.\mathcal{h}h6 \mathcal{E}f7 \). Black is trying to make use of the fact that White has delayed the maneuver \( \mathcal{h}h6 \). (That is the only move, which leads to original positions, because 18...\( \mathcal{E}e8 \) transposes to the variation: 16.\( \mathcal{h}h6 \mathcal{E}e8 17.\mathcal{h}h1 \mathcal{d}d7 18.e5 \mathcal{e}6 \).) 19.\( \mathcal{g}f4 \mathcal{e}7 \) (Black had better play immediately 19...\( \mathcal{f}xe5! \), for example: 20.\( \mathcal{E}xe6 – 20.\mathcal{d}xe6 \mathcal{g}xe6 21.\mathcal{g}xe5 \mathcal{c}c4 – 20...\( \mathcal{g}xe6 21.\mathcal{d}xe6 \mathcal{c}c7 \) with an unclear position.) 20.\( \mathcal{E}e1 \). White is threatening to place his queen on \( g3 \) and the exchange on \( e5 \) is already unfavourable for Black: 20...\( \mathcal{f}xe5 21.\mathcal{d}xe6 \mathcal{E}xf4 22.\mathcal{g}xf4 \mathcal{E}xf4 23.\mathcal{d}xe7 \mathcal{g}xd7 24.\mathcal{h}xg6 \mathcal{h}xg6 25.\mathcal{h}xa5 \pm \) and Black’s king shelter has been compromised in a position with active heavy pieces and that spells danger for him, Eriksen – Nylen, Haninge 1997. On move 19, it is interesting for White to try the straightforward approach 19.\( \mathcal{g}b1 \), threatening to capture on \( g6 \). There might follow: 19...\( \mathcal{h}h8 20.\mathcal{g}f4 \) (After: 20.\( \mathcal{E}xe6 \mathcal{E}xe6 21.\mathcal{g}xe6 \mathcal{c}c4 22.\mathcal{g}xc4 \mathcal{E}xc4 23.\mathcal{g}b3 \mathcal{E}c8 24.\mathcal{E}c1 \mathcal{d}d5 \) – White’s compensation for the exchange is evidently insufficient without the light-squared bishops. It is inconceivable how he can attack his opponent’s king; moreover Black’s knight is perfectly placed on \( c4 \).) 20...\( \mathcal{f}xe5 21.\mathcal{d}xe6 \mathcal{E}xf4 22.\mathcal{g}xf4 \mathcal{E}xf4 23.\mathcal{a}1+ \mathcal{g}8 24.\mathcal{d}xe7 \mathcal{g}xd7 25.\mathcal{d}d1 \mathcal{g}7 – \) Now, White cannot brag about anything more than equality in this position.

\( a \) 16.\( \mathcal{g}b1 \)

The queen protects the bishop and eyes the \( g6 \)-square (after \( e4-e5 \)).
Now, Black’s bishop has two squares to retreat to. After – \textbf{a1)} 16...\textcolor{orange}{\textbf{d}f7} – it defends the g6-pawn, which is a potential target for White to attack, but he has the possibility to regain his exchange now with \textcolor{blue}{\textbf{h}6} and \textcolor{green}{\textbf{b}5}. Following the other retreat – \textbf{a2)} 16...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}7}, the g6-pawn is not protected directly indeed, but Black’s rook can retreat in case it comes under attack.

\textbf{a1)} 16...\textcolor{orange}{\textbf{d}f7} 17.\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{d}4} \textcolor{green}{\textbf{c}8}

17...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}7}. This is a logical move, which is played with the idea to enable the retreat of the rook on f8, in case White plays \textcolor{blue}{\textbf{e}3-h6}. It has a certain drawback though, Black’s queen can be attacked after: 18.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{b}4} b6 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}5}, so he is forced to enter the variation: 19...\textcolor{orange}{\textbf{d}6} (or 19...\textcolor{green}{\textbf{b}7} 20.\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{c}6}↑) 20.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{x}d6} exd6 21. \textcolor{blue}{\textbf{x}f4}, in which White has good chances to capture Black’s d6-pawn. Later, in the game Roldan – Collado, corr. 1985, there followed: 21...a6 (or 21...\textcolor{orange}{\textbf{f}d8} 22. \textcolor{blue}{\textbf{a}6}↑ and \textcolor{green}{\textbf{b}5}, for example: 22...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}8} 23.\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{c}1} \textcolor{green}{\textbf{e}7} 24.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{b}5} \textcolor{green}{\textbf{c}7}, so that Black should better give up the idea to defend his d6-pawn with his king.) 22.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{c}6} \textcolor{green}{\textbf{x}c6} (or 22...\textcolor{orange}{\textbf{a}d8} 23.\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{h}6}±) 23.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{x}c6} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}8} 24.\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{e}7}+ (After: 24.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{c}1} \textcolor{green}{\textbf{x}c6} 25.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{x}c6} b5 – Black will soon have his own passed pawn on the queenside.) 24...\textcolor{orange}{\textbf{f}7} 25.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}d6}. Now, of course Black loses after: 25...\textcolor{orange}{\textbf{a}7}? 26.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{c}8}+−, as it was played in the abovementioned game, but following: 25...\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{d}7} 26.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{c}1} \textcolor{green}{\textbf{f}e8} 27.\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{c}6} \textcolor{green}{\textbf{a}c8} 28. \textcolor{green}{\textbf{g}3} Black should be able to hold the position.

17...a6!? – This move prevents \textcolor{green}{\textbf{b}5} (after \textcolor{blue}{\textbf{h}6} and \textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}8}) and it prepares b5 and \textcolor{green}{\textbf{c}4}. 18.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{b}4} b5 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}1}. (In case of 19.d2, Black plays 19...\textcolor{green}{\textbf{b}6}; it is obviously stronger for White to play 19.a4, attacking Black’s knight and exploiting the fact that after its retreat from a5, there would follow \textcolor{green}{\textbf{c}6} – that is the drawback of the move b7-b5. The game might continue with: 19...\textcolor{orange}{\textbf{b}xa4} 20.\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{a}1} e5 – 20...\textcolor{green}{\textbf{b}3} 21.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{c}6} – 21.\textcolor{orange}{\textbf{b}xa4} exd4 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}d4} \textcolor{green}{\textbf{e}8} 23.\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{xa}5} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}8} 24.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}2}± – and White had already a pawn for the exchange and his pieces are quite active.) 19...e6 (19...\textcolor{green}{\textbf{e}8}!?). Here, in the game Starke – Vasiliev, corr. 1987, White played 20. \textcolor{green}{\textbf{xe}6}?, sacrificing a piece incorrectly and he had to lose the game after: 20...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}e6} 21.dxe6 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}d3} 22.\textcolor{blue}{\textbf{h}6} \textcolor{blue}{\textbf{f}e8} 23.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{x}c8}+ (23. \textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}a5} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{xc}1}+ 24.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}c1} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}1}+ 25. \textcolor{green}{\textbf{f}2} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{xc}1}+) 23...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}c8} 24.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}a5} (24.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{e}7} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}1}+ 25.\textcolor{green}{\textbf{f}2} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}2}+ 26. \textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}1} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}3}+ 27.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}1} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}7}+) 24...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}4}+ 25.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}1} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}2}+. Instead of
all that, White should have played: 20.dxe6! â xe6 21.â xe6 â xd3 22.â f4 â c4 23.â xf8 â xf8â – so that he has regained his exchange, but Black’s knight has been centralized and he can feel safe about his king, despite its being weakened.

18.â b4 b6

After: 18...e6 19.dxe6 â xe6 20.â xe6 â xd3 21.â d2 b6 (Black cannot preserve his extra exchange – in case of 21...â fe8, White can follow with 22.â f4â–) 22.â xf8 â xf8 23.â h6 â e8 24.â b2 (It deserved attention for White to play: 24.â c1 â d7 25.â c3â±, keeping Black’s knight at the edge of the board.) 24...â f7 25.â c1 â d7, Knaak – W. Schmidt, Halle 1976 and here after 26.â d2â±, White could have maintained a slight advantage by transferring his bishop to a more useful placement. Black could have tried: 25...â c4 26.â b4 (26.â b5 â e5). Now, after 26...â d4â+ Black risks suffering from the pin: 27.â h1 â c8 28.â a4 â c7 (or 28...a5 29.â d1 b5 30.â xd4 bxa4 31.â d7â±) 29.â f4 â d7 30.h3 and after the retreat of the knight, White trades queens and he wins the a7-pawn. But even after: 26...â d6â!? 27.â c3 â d1+ 28.â f2 â e7â±, White is still slightly better.

18...â e8 (It is completely unclear – why Black should come under attack deliberately.) 19.â b5 â b6â? (Black had better retreat – 19...â f8 and in case of 20.â h6, he should play: 20...â b6 21.â xf8 â xf8 22.â d2â±, making use of the fact that the bishop on b5 has deprived White’s queen from attacking the b6-square. Black’s position is quite acceptable.) 20.â f5 â c7 21.â c1 â xc1+ 22.â xc1 â xc1+ 23.â f2 gxf5 24.â xe8 â xe8 25.â xe7â− and White regains one of Black’s pieces and he wins the game, Harms – Woestmann, Ruhrgebiet 1996.

18...â h8â?! – that is a very peculiar move, played with the idea to ensure the g8-square for the retreat of the rook in case White plays â h6. 19.â d1 (Or 19.â b5 â c6 20.â a3 a6 21.dxc6 axb5 22.cxb7 â b8 23.â xb5 â xb7 24.â c6 â b8= and the most probable outcome of the game is a draw, Weiszleder – Rupp, corr. 1972.) 19...b6 20.â a6 â c7 21.â h6 â g8 22.â f4 â c5 23.â e3. In the game Bernard – Matisson, corr. 2002, after: 23...â c7 24.â f4 â c5, the opponents agreed to a draw. White can hardly obtain anything more from that position, indeed. It is not better for Black to try: 23...â d7 24.â e6 â c6 (24...â c2â?) 25.â b5 â xe6 26.â a4 â d8 27.â d4 â g7 28.dxc6 â c7 29.e5â†, because White maintains his initiative, Bernard – Gorge, corr. 2002.

19.â h6

It is interesting for White to play 19.â a6, in order to remove his bishop on d3 from attacks along the d-file and thus to pre-
vent the undermining move for Black – e7-e6. 19...\textit{c}5 20.\textit{h}6 \textit{c}7 21.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 22.\textit{d}2 \textit{g}7 23.\textit{b}1 \textit{c}4 (23...\textit{d}6?!?) 24.\textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4 25.\textit{d}1 \textit{d}6 26.\textit{h}4± – White is slightly better, thanks to the superiority of the knight against the bishop in that position, Knaak – Gauglitz, Fuerstenwalde 1981.

19...\textit{c}5

It is worse for Black to give his rook for White’s light-squared bishop – 19...\textit{e}8 20.\textit{b}5, because his dark squares are in fact much more weakened. Later, there might follow: 20...\textit{d}6 (Or 20...\textit{c}7 21.\textit{xe}8 \textit{xe}8 22.\textit{c}1 \textit{d}7 23.\textit{b}5± and Black has great problems, because White is threatening to penetrate with his rook to c7 and Black cannot parry that without material losses, Jacek – Adamiecz, corr. 1980.) 21.\textit{xd}6 \textit{exd}6 22.\textit{xe}8 \textit{xe}8 23.\textit{c}1 \textit{xc}1+ 24.\textit{xc}1 \textit{c}4 25.\textit{f}2 \textit{d}7 26.\textit{e}2 \textit{f}7 27.\textit{d}3 b5 28.\textit{c}3± – and Black has a very difficult endgame to defend, Krecmer – Hoyer, corr. 1981.

20.\textit{b}5 \textit{e}6

Black cannot preserve his extra exchange anyway – after 20...\textit{e}8, White plays 21.\textit{e}3, while in case of 21...\textit{c}8 – he follows with 22.\textit{xa}7.

It is less precise for Black to play 20...\textit{d}7 (He should better undermine White’s centre immediately.) 21.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 22.\textit{d}1± \textit{e}6. After: 23.\textit{c}1 \textit{e}7, we have a transposition to the game Berkes – Flument, Budapest 2004, but in this order of moves, White can also play: 23.\textit{d}4 \textit{g}7 24.\textit{dxe}6 (24.d6 a6?) 24...\textit{xe}6 25.\textit{f}1 \textit{c}6 26.\textit{d}7 a6 27.\textit{c}7 \textit{xd}7 28.\textit{xd}7 \textit{c}1 29.\textit{d}5± – Black still has plenty of problems; nevertheless he should be able to save the draw after some accurate defence. Later in the game Damjanovic – Szabo, Kecskemet 1964, there followed: 29...b5 30.\textit{c}7 \textit{f}8 31.a3 a5 32.\textit{h}4 b4 33.axb4 axb4 34.\textit{xb}4 \textit{xf}1+ 35.\textit{xf}1 \textit{xb}4 36.\textit{e}2± and White managed to win the game, thanks to the misplaced black knight.

21.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 and here White could have preserved some symbolic advantage in the endgame with: 22.\textit{c}1 (In the game Berkes – Flument, Budapest 2004, the opponents agreed to a draw after 22.\textit{xa}7.) 22...\textit{e}7 23.\textit{xc}5 \textit{xc}5+ 24.\textit{xc}5+ \textit{bxc}5 25.\textit{xa}7 \textit{exd}5 26.\textit{exd}5 \textit{xd}5 27.a3± – White maintains slightly better prospects, due to the fact that the a-pawn is further away from the kingside than the c-pawn.
a2) 16...\textit{d7}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{chessboard}
\end{center}

\textbf{17.\textit{h6}?!}

It is obviously better for White to play the immediate 17.e5, without forcing Black’s rook to go to the f7-square and Black should counter that with 17...\textit{xf5}!, with the following eventual developments: 18.\textit{xf5} (If 18.\textit{h6}, then 18...\textit{xd3} 19.\textit{xd3} \textit{b6} and after 20.\textit{h1}, Black’s rook can simply retreat – 20...\textit{fd8} and White’s compensation is hardly sufficient. In case of 20.\textit{e3} (removing the bishop from the h6-square), Black can answer simply with: 20...\textit{b2} 21.\textit{d4} \textit{xa2} 22.\textit{f4} \textit{c4}†; 21.\textit{f4} and he has at least a draw after 21...\textit{xe5}=, so that White can sacrifice on the g6-square with a perpetual.) 18...gxf5 19.\textit{h6} (After: 19.\textit{f4} fxe5 20.\textit{e6} \textit{xd5} 21.\textit{xf3} \textit{xf6} – Black does not risk losing; 19. exf6 \textit{xf6} 20.\textit{g5} \textit{f7} 21.\textit{f4} \textit{d6}, meanwhile he is threatening h6 and White’s knight on f4 is hanging. His compensation for the exchange is probably insufficient.) 19...\textit{xd5} 20.\textit{xf8} \textit{xf8} 21.\textit{xf5} \textit{xe5} and the draw in this endgame is the most likely outcome.

\textbf{17...\textit{f7}!}

Black can afford to let White sacrifice on g6. This is an improvement in comparison to: 17...\textit{c7}?! 18.\textit{c1} \textit{d6} 19.\textit{xf8} \textit{xf8} 20.\textit{b2} b6 21.\textit{b5}!± Anikaev – Kalinski, Beltsy 1977 and after the trade of the light-squared bishops, Black’s king is vulnerable as well as his e6 and c6-squares.

18.\textit{e5} fxe5 19.\textit{xg6}, Heamer – Murach, corr. 1981 and here after: 19...\textit{hxg6}! 20.\textit{xg6}+ \textit{h8} 21.\textit{xf7} \textit{b6}† (This resource is what Black’s defence is based on.) 22.\textit{h1} \textit{xh6} 23.\textit{xe7} \textit{g7} 24.\textit{h4}+ \textit{g8} 25.\textit{g3} \textit{f8}† Black could have questioned White’s exchange sacrifice by playing like that.

\textit{So, the move 16.\textit{b1} can hardly promise White any real advantage. In case of 16...\textit{f7}, Black as a rule gives back his extra exchange and he has good chances to equalize. The answer 16...\textit{d7}, leads to sharper positions, but still after most precise play from both sides – it all ends up in equality as well.}

b) 16.\textit{d4}

White creates the threat to capture on e6, but that move can easily turn out to be a loss of time, because White’s queen is placed on a1 hardly worse than on d4.
We will analyze now the following retreats of the bishop: b1) 16...\(\texttt{\&d7}\) and b2) 16...\(\texttt{\&f7}\).

**b1) 16...\(\texttt{\&d7}\) 17.e5**

After 17.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&d4}}\) \(\texttt{\&d7}\), Black is threatening to exchange queens with 18...\(\texttt{\&b6}\) and White must temporarily abandon the idea to advance e4-e5 in favour of the move 18.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&b1}}\). This enables Black to consolidate his position in the centre with: 18...e5! 19.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&f2}}\) (White only helps his opponent to fortify his position with the line: 19.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&b4?!}}\) b5 20.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&e3}}\) a6 21.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&d6}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&b7}}\) 22.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&a3}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&e7+}}\) J. Uhmman – Styblo, Czech Republic 1999.) 19...b5 20.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&c3}}\) a6 21.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&e3}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&e7?!}}\) (It is not so good for Black to play the seemingly attractive line: 21...\(\texttt{\textbf{\&c7}}\) 22.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&c1}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&c4}}\), because of 23.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&a4!}}\) Poobalasingam – Kolas, Hastings 2005.) 22.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&c5}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&g7}}\).

17.f4 (This is a quite rare idea for the system with the exchange sacrifice, because White usually leaves the c1-h6 diagonal free, in order to be able to play \(\texttt{\&h6}\) at some moment. Meanwhile, White usually uses the f4-square for the maneuver \(\texttt{\&e2-f4}\).) 17...b5

(It deserved attention for Black to try 17...b6!?, in order to bring his knight to the c5-square via b7. 18.e5 e6 19.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&c3}}\) exd5 20.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&xd5+}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&f7}}\); 19.d6 \(\texttt{\textbf{\&c6}}\) 20.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&e4}}\) fxe5 21.fxe5 \(\texttt{\textbf{\&xf1+}}\) 22.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&xf1}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&f8+}}\) 23.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&g1}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&g7}}\) 24.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&d4}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&c8}}\) – and White has a powerful passed pawn indeed and it compensates the sacrificed exchange. Still, in comparison to the main lines, White’s chances to attack the enemy king are quite minimal now.) 18.e5 a6 (Or 18...\(\texttt{\textbf{\&c4}}\) 19.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&xc4}}\) bxc4 20.e6 \(\texttt{\textbf{\&c8}}\) 21.f5 \(\texttt{\textbf{\&b7}}\) 22.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&c3}}\); here Black should have considered 18...\(\texttt{\textbf{\&e6?!}}\) as well.) 19.e6 \(\texttt{\textbf{\&c8}}\) 20.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&f3}}\) (White should have transposed moves, by playing 20.f5 first.) 20...\(\texttt{\textbf{\&b7}}\) 21.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&c3}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&c8}}\) (Black had to close the kingside with the move 21...\(\texttt{\textbf{\&f5}}\) and White cannot exploit the weakening of the long diagonal, for example: 22.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&e5}}\) b4 23.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&d4}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&f6=}}\), or 22.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&c1}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&c8}}\) 23.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&b2}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&c4}}\) 24.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&a1}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&b6+}}\) 22.f5 g5 23.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&h3}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&c4}}\), Haller – Kessler, Leimen 2001 and here White’s attack would have been very powerful after: 24.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&g4}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&e8}}\) 25.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&xg5}}\).

17.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&f4}}\) b6 18.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&d2}}\) (If here White plays 18.e5, then 18...\(\texttt{\textbf{\&f6!}}\) 19.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&xe5}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&b8}}\) 19...\(\texttt{\textbf{\&f6?!}}\) – 20.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&xe7}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&e8}}\) 21.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&xd7}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&xe3}}\) 22.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&e6}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&b7=}}\) and Black exchanges queens and eventually draws the endgame.) 18...\(\texttt{\textbf{\&c7}}\). Black prevents the pawn-advance e4-e5. (It also deserves attention for him to try 18...\(\texttt{\textbf{\&b7?!}}\) 19.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&b4}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&d6}}\) 20.\(\texttt{\textbf{\&a6}}\) \(\texttt{\textbf{\&c8}}\) and Black sub-
sequently brings his knight to the c5-square via b7, Toften – Martin, London 1984.

It is also possible for White to play at first 17.\\textit{b}1 \textit{b}6 and then: 18.e5 fxe5 19.\\textit{xe}5 \textit{b}8 20.\\textit{xe}7 \textit{e}8 21.\\textit{g}5 \textit{f}7 22.\\textit{b}4 \textit{c}8, but Black managed to develop all his pieces at the expense of his e7-pawn in the game Kakageldyev – Mukhin, Riga 1975. It is possibly the best for Black here to play 17...e5, closing the position with tempo, taking advantage of the rather “slow” move for White – 17.\\textit{b}1 and forcing his opponent to lose tempi for queen moves on the queenside. 18.\\textit{b}4 (or 18.\\textit{b}2 b5 19.f4 \textit{c}7 20.fxe5 fxe5 21.\\textit{h}6 \textit{f}7 22.\\textit{d}2 \textit{c}4\textsuperscript{U} Uhlmann – Nemec, Brno 1987) 18...b6 19.\\textit{c}3 \textit{c}8 20.\\textit{a}6 \textit{b}8 21.\\textit{d}1 \textit{f}7 22.\\textit{h}1 \textit{g}7\textsuperscript{=} – White has lost plenty of time and he can hardly create any serious threats, Clay – Daamen, Budapest 2000.

17...fxe5

17...\textit{c}7 18.d6 exd6 19.\\textit{d}5+ \textit{h}8 20.exf6 \textit{c}6 (The move – 20...\textit{c}6! would have enabled Black not to let the enemy bishop to the long diagonal and he would have defended successfully.) 21.\\textit{d}4 \textit{f}7 22.\\textit{g}5 \textit{g}8 23.\\textit{f}4 \textit{d}7 24.\\textit{e}1 \textit{c}6 25.\\textit{e}7! \textit{xe}7 26.\textit{f}e7+ \textit{g}7 27.\\textit{e}6 \textit{c}8 28.\\textit{xg}7 \textit{g}8 29.\\textit{h}5, Black resigned. R.Gomez – Pereda, Tenerife 1993. White maintains his advantage as well after the calmer line: 18.e6 \textit{e}8 (Or 18...\textit{c}8 19.\\textit{f}4 \textit{b}6 20.\\textit{xb}6 axb6 21.\\textit{c}3\textsuperscript{=} – and Black cannot develop comfortably his queenside.) 19.\\textit{c}1 \textit{d}6 20.\\textit{c}5 \textit{d}8 21.\\textit{h}6\textsuperscript{=} and White’s advantage is overwhelming.

It is interesting for Black to try here 17...a6!? with the idea to trade the light-squared bishops on b5 and so to defend against the eventual threats against the g6-square. 18.a4 (In case of: 18.e6 \textit{b}5 19.\\textit{x}b5 axb5 20.\\textit{c}3 \textit{c}4 21.\\textit{h}6 \textit{e}8 22.\\textit{x}b5 \textit{d}6 – Black succeeds in exchanging too many pieces and his position becomes quite acceptable. If 18.\\textit{f}4, preventing Black’s bishop from coming to the b5-square and eyeing his g6-pawn then: 18...\textit{c}8, for example: 19.e6 \textit{b}5 20.\\textit{xg}6 hxg6 21.\\textit{xg}6 \textit{c}4; or 19.h4 fxe5 20.\\textit{xe}5 \textit{c}4 21.\\textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4 22.\\textit{d}4 \textit{f}6; or 19.\\textit{b}4 fxe5 20.\\textit{xe}6 hxg6 21.\\textit{b}6 \textit{e}8 22.\\textit{xa}5 \textit{f}5\textsuperscript{=} 18...fxe5 (It deserves attention for Black to try here 18...b5, with the idea after 19.e6, to give back the exchange with the move: 19...\textit{e}8 20.\\textit{h}6 bxa4 21.\\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 22.\\textit{b}1 \textit{b}3 obtaining an excellent position.) 19.\\textit{xe}5 and with pawns on a6 and a4, Black has some additional possibilities, for example connected with capturing on a4: 19...\textit{f}6 (With pawns on a2 and a7, White would have answered that simply with \textit{d}4 and then retreat with the queen, while now after 20.\\textit{d}4, Black has the resource 20...\textit{b}3.)
20...\texttt{b1} (In case of 20.\texttt{c3}, Black can play: 20...\texttt{c8} 21.\texttt{e4} \texttt{f5} 22.\texttt{d4} \texttt{b5} 23.\texttt{axb5} \texttt{xd5} 24.\texttt{b6} \texttt{xb6} 25.\texttt{xb6} \texttt{xd3} 26.\texttt{xa5} axb5=) 20...\texttt{xa4} 21.\texttt{c5} \texttt{f7} 22.\texttt{d4} \texttt{d7} 23.\texttt{b6} \texttt{b5} 24.\texttt{xb5} axb5 25.\texttt{e6+}, Kristensen – Bae, Fredrikstad 2003 and after the correct line for Black: 25...\texttt{xe6} 26.\texttt{dx6+} \texttt{f8} 27.\texttt{a1} \texttt{f4+} he will already be better.

It also deserves attention for Black to try 17...\texttt{e6}, for example:

18.\texttt{d1}? \texttt{b6} 19.\texttt{f4} \texttt{xe5} 20.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{f6} 21.\texttt{xf6} (It is not good for White to avoid the exchange of queens: 21.\texttt{e4} \texttt{e8} 22.\texttt{d6} \texttt{e5} 23.\texttt{e2} and here Black can play 23...\texttt{e6+}, or he can even capture the pawn, sacrificing his queen: 23...\texttt{xd6} 24.\texttt{c4} \texttt{xc4} 25.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{xd6} 26.\texttt{d5+} \texttt{e6} 27.\texttt{g3} \texttt{c8} – White has no direct threats anymore, while Black has a material advantage, or 21.\texttt{d6} \texttt{ad8} and Black is threatening \texttt{a4} – the placement of White’s rook on d1 turns out to be quite unfavourable for him.) 21...\texttt{xf6} 22.\texttt{dxe6} \texttt{c6} (22...\texttt{xe6} 23.\texttt{e4} \texttt{c4} 24.\texttt{xa8} \texttt{xe3=} 23.\texttt{f2} g5 24.\texttt{e2} \texttt{xe6} 25.\texttt{g5} \texttt{f8} and the position is rather unclear;

Or 18.\texttt{f4} \texttt{xe5} 19.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{f6} 20.\texttt{c7} \texttt{d8} and White has nothing better then the repetition of moves after 21.\texttt{e5=}. For example: 21.\texttt{d6}!? \texttt{c8} (or 21...\texttt{exd5} 22.\texttt{xd5} \texttt{f5} 23.\texttt{e7+} \texttt{f7} 24.\texttt{xf5} \texttt{gxf5} 25.\texttt{e5} \texttt{xd3} 26.\texttt{d4} \texttt{d2} 27.\texttt{e1} \texttt{xe1}+ 28.\texttt{xe1} – and Black’s king is bare and

White’s advantage is overwhelming. The line: 22...\texttt{c6} 23.\texttt{c4} \texttt{g7} 24.\texttt{d1}, seems to be very dangerous for Black, because his king remains on the long open dark squared diagonal a1-h8.) 22.\texttt{e5} (Following the exchange of queens, Black can fight for the advantage: 22.\texttt{xd8} \texttt{xd8} 23.\texttt{d2} \texttt{b6} 24.\texttt{e4} \texttt{e5} 25.\texttt{d3} \texttt{b7} 26.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{xd5} 27.\texttt{g5} \texttt{xe4} 28.\texttt{xd8} \texttt{xd8} 29.\texttt{fxe4} \texttt{d2+} 22.\texttt{c5}?! \texttt{xd6} 23.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{xf4} 24.\texttt{xf4} \texttt{exd5} 25.\texttt{c1} \texttt{c6} 26.\texttt{c5} \texttt{e6} 27.\texttt{a6} \texttt{d8+} 22...\texttt{f6} 23.\texttt{c7=} and Black can either repeat the moves, or he can try to play for a win with 23...\texttt{b6}, making use of the fact that the bishop on c8 is protected.

18.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{b8}

Black is trying to prevent White from forming a battery “queen and bishop” on the long diagonal.

If he had done that immediately with: 18...\texttt{f5} 19.\texttt{d4} \texttt{f6} 20.\texttt{xf5} \texttt{gxf5} 21.\texttt{g3} \texttt{d6} (It is obviously better for Black to play here 21...\texttt{c4}?, in order to manage to exchange the bishops at the price of the e-pawn and not giving his rook on f6: 22.\texttt{f4} \texttt{d6}, or 22.\texttt{e2} e5 23.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{xe5} 24.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{b6+} 25.\texttt{h1} \texttt{af8=} and White has a good compensation for the exchange, but not more.) 22.\texttt{e1} (or 22.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{xd6} 23.\texttt{xf5} \texttt{d7} 24.\texttt{e1=} and the endgame is quite unclear) 22...\texttt{xd5} 23.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{exf6} 24.\texttt{h5}. White has a powerful initiative despite
the loss of a pawn, because of the vulnerability of the black king. It is stronger for White to prevent the possibility for Black on move 21 – (21...\(c4\)) with the move 21.\(xc1\), and after 21...b5, with the idea for Black to follow that with \(c4\), White can continue with 22.\(xf4\) and Black will be forced to go with his rook to g6, giving away his f5-pawn. It would be a disaster for him to play: 22...\(xd5\) 23.\(xf6\) exf6 24.\(g3+\) \(h8\) 25.\(c7+\). Black has great problems too after: 21...\(d6\) 22.\(e3\) \(f7\) 23.\(f4\) \(h6\) (He should not let White’s knight to the e6-square: 23...b5 24.\(e6\) f4 25.\(e1\) \(c4\) 26.\(h4\) \(e5\) 27.\(g5+\) \(g6\) 28.\(h4+-\) and White wins the enemy knight.) 24.g3+, and now White’s queen is freed from the protection of the knight on f4. Black’s position is extremely difficult: he cannot play 24...b5, because of 25.\(e6\) \(xe6\) (or 25...\(g5\) 26.\(c8+\) \(xc8\) 27.\(xc8+\) \(f8\) 28.\(xf8+-\)) 26.dxe6 \(ff8\) 27.\(d5\) \(fe8\) 28.\(c7\) \(f8\) 29.\(c5--\) and Black loses his e7-pawn. Well, after: 24...b6 25.\(e6\) \(xe6\) 26.dxe6 \(ff8\) 27.\(d5\) \(fe8\) 28.\(c7\) \(f8\), White does not have the move \(c5\) and in case of 29.\(f6\), Black has the tactical resource 29...\(c6!\), but instead White should not be so much in a hurry and he can continue with: 25.\(c7\) \(d6\) 26.\(e5\) \(h6\) 27.\(c3\)± and his advantage would be overwhelming.

Naturally, Black should be careful not to lose the exchange after: 18...\(xf5\)? 19.\(xf5\) \(xf5\) 20.\(d4+-\) Becker – Duemmke, Bad Segeberg 1995.

**19.\(xe7\)**

It is not good for White to avoid capturing the pawn, despite the fact that it leads to an exchange of queens. After: 19.\(g5?! \(f5\) 20.\(d1\) \(d6\) 21.\(d4\) \(xd3\) 22.\(xd3\) \(c4\) 23.\(f2\) \(f4\) 24.\(xf4\) \(xf4+-\) White has a hopeless endgame, since he did not even have a single pawn for the exchange in the game Lombardy – Castro Rojas, Biel 1976.

**19.\(e8\) 20.\(c5\) b6 21.\(c1\)**

After: 21.\(d4\) \(e5\) 22.\(xe5\) \(xe5\) 23.\(f4\) \(xd5\) (This is the simplest line for Black from the point of view of the fight for equality.) 24.\(e4\) \(c6\) 25.\(xd5+\) \(xd5\) 26.\(c3\) \(c6=\) – Black will exchange White’s knight on e4 with his bishop and without it White cannot exploit the vulnerability of the dark squares on Black’s kingside. The position is equal.

**21...\(c8\)**

It is more principled for Black to play here: 21...\(e5\) 22.\(d4\)
\( \text{x}d5 \text{e}4 \text{xa}2 \) (It is more or less the same after: 23...\text{xe}4 24.\text{fx}e4 \text{xe}4 25.\text{h}6 \text{e}7 26.\text{f}6 \text{f}8 – because Black parries the direct threats, but White’s dominance on the dark squares is an excellent compensation for his sacrificed pawn.) 24.\text{xa}8 (or 24.\text{g}5 \text{xe}4 25.\text{fx}e4 \text{c}6 26.\text{c}3 \text{f}8) 24...\text{xa}8 25.\text{a}1 – and it becomes clear that White has more than sufficient compensation, because of the considerable weakness of the long diagonal.

22.\text{d}2

After: 22.\text{g}3 \text{xc}1 23.\text{xc}1 \text{e}5 24.\text{e}4 (or 24.\text{e}4 \text{c}4) 24...\text{f}8 25.\text{d}6 \text{d}5, the most probable outcome of the game should be the draw.

22...\text{c}4

In general, Black would like to trade the light-squared bishops and he can try to do that immediately with: 22...\text{f}5. Still, White manages to bring his knight to the e4-square, maintaining the initiative: 23.\text{c}1 \text{d}7 24.\text{xf}5 \text{xf}5 25.\text{g}3 \text{f}7 26.\text{e}4↑.

\( \text{h}4 25.\text{g}3 \text{ac}8 26.\text{xc}8 \text{xc}8 27.\text{e}4 \text{c}2 28.\text{d}1 \text{a}4 29.\text{g}5 \text{g}2+ 30.\text{g}2 \text{g}5+ 31.\text{a}5 \text{xd}1 32.\text{f}4\) and White preserves a slight advantage in the endgame, Buonocore – Mauro, corr. 1991.

b2) 16...\text{f}7

As usual, this move enables White to attack Black’s rook at first from \text{h}6 and after \text{e}8 – from the b5-square.

17.\text{h}6 \text{e}8

After: 17...e5 18.\text{dxe}6 \text{exe}6 19.\text{xf}8 \text{xf}8 20.\text{b}4+ \text{g}8 21.\text{d}1 (The endgame is rather drawish after: 21.\text{d}4 \text{c}6 22.\text{exe}6 \text{xb}4 23.\text{dxe}8 \text{xd}3 24.\text{xb}7 \text{b}8 25.\text{d}1 \text{xb}7 26.\text{xd}3 \text{b}1+ 27.\text{f}2 \text{b}2+ 28.\text{g}3 \text{xa}2= Battaglini – Vitoux, France 2003.) 21...\text{b}6 22.\text{f}4\) – White’s prospects are slightly better.

18.\text{b}5 e5

It is not good for Black to give back the exchange immediately; moreover for White’s light-squared bishop after: 18...a6?! 19.\text{exe}8 \text{exe}8, Suarez – Shih, Dallas 2000, 20.\text{b}4 b5 (Or 20...\text{b}5 21.\text{e}1 \text{xe}2 22.\text{xe}2

239
20...b6 21.fxe6 fxe6 22.dxc5 (with the idea to follow with 22...bxc5) 22...c5 (After the exchange 22...xc4 xc4 and later 23...c5 d7 24.a3 c8 25.b4 c2 26.e3 d7, in the game Gralka – W.Schmidt, Krakow 1978, the opponents agreed to a draw. Black can consider either doubling along the second rank, or he can try to redevelop his bishop to the b5-square via e8.) ec7 23.b4 e8 24.c3 a3 (In the game Gligoric – Portisch, Nice 1974, there followed: 24...d6 25...xe8 xe8 26...b6 f7 27...e3 g7 28...d1 d6 29...d3 d7 30.h3 b5 31.b5 xb5 32.a3 and White managed to reach a quite favourable set-up of his pieces.) 25...xe8 xe8, Mestila – Kumpare, corr. 1986 and at the price of his a7-pawn, Black succeeded in exchanging favourably the light-squared bishops and he developed both his rooks. The knight on c3 is hanging and the forced variation: 26.d6 (The line: 26.xa3 xc3 27.b4 c2, leads to positions analogous to the one in the game Gligoric – Portisch, Nice 1974, but with extra tempi for Black.) 26...xc3 27.d2 (White does not capture on c3, because Black’s rook should better remain on the c8-square.) 27...xc2 28.d7 xd2 29.dxe8 xe8 30.xd2= and everything ended up in an equal endgame.

20...exf4!?

The immediate exchange 20...b6, compromises Black’s pawn-structure and it leaves the
14.d5 \(a1\). 15.\(a1\) f6


The line: 20...\(\text{\large \textit{W}}\)d6 21.fxe5 fxe5 22.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}\)g5 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}\)c7 23.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}\)f6 \(\rightarrow\) Rossi – Franzoso, corr. 1989, enables White to bring his bishop to the excellent f6-square, although even then after, for example: 23...\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}\)f8 24.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}\)g3 a6 25.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}\)d3 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}\)c4 26.h3 b5 27.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}\)h2 it will not be so easy for him to exploit the magnificient placement of his bishop.

21.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}\)xf4 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}\)b6+ 22.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}h1 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}d5

This is a forced line, which leads to a good position for Black. He has the possibility in this case to capture on b5. Of course, it would not work for him to play immediately: 22...\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xb5?? 23.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f6 and White checkmates either on g7, or on f8.

23.exd5 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xb5 24.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf6 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}e8 25.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}d4

This is obviously the best move for White in this position.

He can now capture Black's knight on a5, but he cannot win the game: 25.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}d2 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f7 (That is simpler than: 25...\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f8 26.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}a1\(\textit{\textcopyright}\) and White has excellent attacking chances along the totally opened long diagonal. It is worse for him to play: 26.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf8+ \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf8 27.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf8+ \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf8 28.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}b4 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f7, because he cannot defend his d5-pawn, due to his misplaced king at the corner of the board.) 26.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf7+ \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf7 27.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf7 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf7 28.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xa5\(\textit{\textcopyright}\). After, for example: 28...\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}e8 29.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}d4 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}e3 30.h4 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}d3, White loses his d5-pawn and the endgame becomes favourable for Black, because he can create a passed pawn on the queenside.

25...\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}d8

It is too dangerous for Black to try: 25...\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}d7 26.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}d2 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}ae8 27.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}c3 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}e5 28.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f4 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}d3 – because his unreliable blockade along the long diagonal crumbles.

The other possibilities for Black seem to be quite acceptable:

25...\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f7 26.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf7 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf7 27.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}d2 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}c4 28.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}c3 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f8 – Now, White has a perpetual on the h8 and f6-squares, but he can hardly achieve anything more: 29.h3 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}c8 30.d6 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}e8 31.d7+ \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xd7 32.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}h8+ \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f7 33.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xh7+ \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}e8 34.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xg6+ \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f7\(\textit{\textcopyright};

25...b6 26.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}g3 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f7 27.h4 (It deserves attention for White to play the more modest move 27.h3!?), so that his h4-pawn is not hanging in some variations.) 27...\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf1+ 28.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf1 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f7 29.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}g3 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}c8 30.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}e4 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}e7 (or 30...\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}b7 31.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f6\(\textit{\textcopyright} +) 31.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f6+ and the game obviously should end in a draw, for example: 31...\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f7 32.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xh7 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}g8 33.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f6+ \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f7 34.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}d7 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}g8 (Now, Black's king is forced to be moved back and forth on the f7-g8-squares, in order not to allow the check from g7.) 35.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}g4 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}c4 36.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xg6+ \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}h8 37.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}g5 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xh4+ 38.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xh4 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xh4+ 39.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}g1 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}e1=.

26.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f8+

White cannot avoid capturing the enemy queen in this case, for example: 26.d6 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}f7 27.\(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}g3 \(\text{\large \textit{\textbullet}}}xf1+
28.\(\text{\textit{Q}}/\text{xf1} \text{\textit{W}}/\text{xf7} \) 29.\(\text{\textit{Q}}/\text{g1} \text{\textit{Q}}/\text{c6+}; 26.\text{\textit{A}}/\text{d2} \text{\textit{Q}}/\text{c6+}.

\[ 26...\text{\textit{W}}/\text{xf8} \] 27.\(\text{\textit{A}}/\text{xf8} \text{\textit{W}}/\text{xf8} \) 28.\(\text{\textit{Q}}/\text{g1} \) and here the simplest line for Black is: 28...\(\text{\textit{A}}/\text{d7} \) and after the exchange of the pawns on a7 and d5, there arises an equal position. It would be enough for Black to give his rook for White’s knight and to build a fortress in order to achieve a draw.

So, after White plays 16.\(\text{\textit{A}}/\text{d4}, \) he protects his d5-pawn and in case of 16...\(\text{\textit{A}}/\text{d7}, \) he is ready to push 17.e5, immediately. It is therefore more precise for Black to retreat with his bishop to the f7-square, after which as tournament practice has shown, as well as our analyses too – Black’s position is OK.

c) 16.\(\text{\textit{A}}/\text{d2} \)

The idea of that move is to force b7-b6 (so that Black is deprived of the possible checks with his queen from that square in many variations) and then to re-deploy his queen with tempo to the kingside via the e1-square. Meanwhile, White is threatening to play \(\text{\textit{W}}/\text{c3} \) attacking both the knight on a5 and the bishop on e6, so Black must either remove his bishop away from the attack, or defend his knight immediately.

In case of 16...b6, White succeeds in realizing his main idea i.e.: 17.\(\text{\textit{A}}/\text{h6} \text{\textit{W}}/\text{e8} 18.\text{\textit{Q}}/\text{f4} \text{\textit{A}}/\text{d7} 19.e5\rightarrow \) and Black’s defence becomes quite difficult, because in a position analogous to the main line (16.\(\text{\textit{A}}/\text{h6} \)) he does not have the resource \(\text{\textit{W}}/\text{b6+}.

Black’s attempt to bring his knight back into action with the move 16...\(\text{\textit{Q}}/\text{c6} \) is not so good either, because of 17.\(\text{\textit{A}}/\text{c3!}, \) preventing the move \(\text{\textit{Q}}/\text{e5}, \) after which Black’s last move becomes more or less senseless – his knight will hardly find a better square in that position than a5.

So, Black has the moves: c1) 16...\(\text{\textit{A}}/\text{f7} \) and c2) 16...\(\text{\textit{A}}/\text{d7} \).

c1) 16...\(\text{\textit{A}}/\text{f7} \)

This move shows Black’s intention to give back the exchange in this particular position.

17.\(\text{\textit{W}}/\text{c3} \)

Black would have countered the immediate 17.\(\text{\textit{A}}/\text{h6}, \) with:
17...\(\text{\textit{W}}/\text{b6+} 18.\text{\textit{A}}/\text{h1} \text{\textit{W}}/\text{fc8+}. \)
It is not favourable for White, because of tactical reasons, to play: 17.\(\text{\text{x}e1}\) \(\text{\text{c}e6}\) 18.\(\text{\text{h}h6}\) \(\text{\text{b}b6+}\) 19.\(\text{\text{h}h1}\) \(\text{\text{e}5}\) 20.\(\text{\text{b}b1}\) (The bishop on d3 is hanging and White has no time to capture on f8.) 20...\(\text{\text{f}c8}\) 21.\(\text{\text{h}3}\) \(\text{\text{e}8}\) and Black managed to introduce all his pieces into action, so White had no real compensation for the exchange, Thorbergsson – Gligoric, Reykjavik 1964.

17...\(\text{b}6\) 18.\(\text{\text{h}h6}\)

It is not so logical for White to win the exchange with: 18.\(\text{\text{a}a6}\) \(\text{\text{d}d7}\) 19.\(\text{\text{d}d4}\), Berben – Daamen, Valkenswaard 1981, because after: 19...\(\text{\text{e}5}\) the last several moves for White become a bit senseless.

18...\(\text{\text{c}c8}\) 19.\(\text{\text{a}a1}\)

Or 19.\(\text{\text{b}b4}\) \(\text{\text{e}e8}\) (It also deserves attention for Black to play: 19...\(\text{\text{e}6}\) 20.\(\text{\text{a}a6}\) \(\text{\text{c}c5}\) 21.\(\text{\text{f}f8}\) \(\text{\text{xf}8}\) 22.\(\text{\text{d}xe6}\) \(\text{\text{x}e6}\) and his position is excellent.) 20.\(\text{\text{b}b5}\) \(\text{\text{d}d6}\) 21.\(\text{\text{c}c6}\) edx6 exd6 22.\(\text{\text{x}e8}\) \(\text{\text{e}e8}\) 23.\(\text{\text{c}c1}\) \(\text{\text{c}c1+}\) 24.\(\text{\text{c}c1}\) \(\text{\text{f}f7}\) 25.\(\text{\text{f}f2}\) \(\text{\text{c}c4}\) 26.\(\text{\text{c}c3}\) b5 – and White cannot attack his opponent’s weakness on d6, so Black’s endgame is quite acceptable, Kulikov – Polovodin, Podolsk 1992.

White regains the exchange indeed, but he loses too much time for queen moves here and there (a1-c3-a1) and that enables Black to obtain sufficient counterplay on the queenside.

19...\(\text{\text{d}d6}\)!

This move is even stronger than: 19...\(\text{\text{e}e8}\) 20.\(\text{\text{b}b5}\) \(\text{\text{d}d6}\) 21.\(\text{\text{x}e8}\) \(\text{\text{x}e8}\) 22.\(\text{\text{c}c1}\) and here the correct move would be 22...\(\text{\text{c}c4}\)! (but not: 22...\(\text{\text{c}c5}\) 23.\(\text{\text{c}c1}\) \(\text{\text{d}d5}\) 24.\(\text{\text{c}c5}\) bxc5 25.\(\text{\text{e}3}\) because Black is forced to place his knight on a very passive position – the b7-square and the endgame becomes much worse for him, Kiprov – Litkiewicz, corr. 1961) 23.\(\text{\text{d}d4}\) \(\text{\text{c}c5}\) and after the exchange of the queens – the position becomes equal.

20.\(\text{\text{xf}8}\) \(\text{\text{xf}8}\) 21.\(\text{\text{f}4}\) \(\text{\text{a}3}\)

Black’s counterplay on the queenside is quite sufficient and he can counter White’s natural move 22.\(\text{\text{f}3}\) with 22...\(\text{\text{b}b3}\) and he wins White’s a2-pawn.

\[\text{c2})\] 16...\(\text{\text{d}d7}\)

This move leads to sharper positions than 16...\(\text{\text{f}7}\). Black is
ready to defend against White's attack and contrary to the previous variation he insists on preserving the extra exchange.

17...\=e1 b6 18.\=h6

It is not good for White to play: 18.e5?! fxe5 19.\=g3 (or 19.\=c3 \=e8 20.\=xe5 \=xd5 21.\=e4 \=xe5 22.\=xa8 \=e3\+=) 19...\=f5 20.\=e4 \=d6\+= – because he loses his central pawn just for nothing, van Vlieder – Daamen, corr. 1985.

It is too slow for White to try: 18.\=d4 \=c7. This move prevents the pawn-break e4-e5. (Black could have tried instead to improve the position of his knight: 18...\=b7 19.e5 \=c5\+= and if: 20.\=c4, then 20...b5.) 19.\=b4 \=fe8 20.\=f4 \=c4 21.\=c6 \=xc6 22.\=xc4 \=a4 23.\=e2 b5 24.\=d3 a5 25.\=a3 e6 26.d6 \=b6+ 27.\=h1 b4 28.\=b2 \=xd6 29.\=xf6 \=ac8\+= – and White remains with only practical chances to save the game, mostly because of his domination on the long diagonal, Stelzer – Metz, Waldshut 1991.

18...\=f7

Black's rook here is more useful for the defence of the king than on the e8-square: 18...\=e8 19.e5 \=c7 (Or 19...e6 20.\=g3 \=f7 21.\=f4 \=g8 22.\=e1→ and White's threats were very dangerous in the game Smirnov – Kutjanin, Moscow 1958.) 20.e6 (White has also tried to attack the g6-square immediately with: 20.\=b1 \=xe5 21.\=xg6 \=xe2 22.\=xh7+ \=h8 23.\=g7+ \=xg7 24.\=g6+ \=h8 25.\=h6+. 20...\=h8 21.e6 \=c5+ 22.\=h1 \=a4 23.\=c1 \=xd5 24.\=f4 \=d6 25.\=xg6 \=ed8 26.\=f7. He is threatening now \=f4-g6+ with a checkmate in several moves. 26...\=d1+ 27.\=xd1 \=xd1+ 28.\=xd1 \=xd1 29.\=d5 \=c6 30.\=c7 \=c8 31.\=e8 \=xe8 32.\=xe8 \=d4 33.\=f8 \=xe6 34.\=xe7\+= and the complications ended up in an endgame with a slight advantage for White, Rye – Sandstrom, corr. 1968.) 20...\=b5 21.\=e4 \=ac8. That move might turn out to be a loss of time. (It was better for Black to play immediately: 21...\=c4 22.\=g3 \=h8∞). 22.h4 \=c4 23.\=g3 \=h8 24.h5! g5 25.\=g4! \=xe2 26.\=f5 \=xe4 27.\=xe4 \=xf1 and here White did not capture the bishop, but he played instead: 28.e5! and after: 28...\=c1 29.\=xf6 \=d3+ 30.\=h2 – Black resigned because of: 30...\=xf5 31.\=g7+ \=g8 32.f7+ \=xg7 33.\=xe8+- Rushnikov – Linert, corr. 1968. Naturally, Black's play can be improved, as we have already mentioned, but it is still safer for him to keep his king's rook on the f7-square.

19.\=g3

Now, after 19.e5, Black can simply capture the pawn and he can protect the g6-square with the move \=f5.

19...e5

It is interesting for Black to try 19...\=b8!?, with the idea to either force White's bishop to retreat from the excellent h6-square to f4, or to make him play.
f3-f4, while Black's pawn is on e7, so that White's knight does not have access to the good f4-square, for example:

after 20.\( \text{\textfloatpage{14}} \)f4, Black can force the exchange of queens with the move 20...g5;

or 20.\( \text{\textfloatpage{15}} \)f4 e8 21.\( \text{\textfloatpage{16}} \)d4 (It is not good for White to play 21.e5, due to 21...\( \text{\textfloatpage{17}} \)b5 – that is the point behind the retreat of the queen to e8.) 21...e5 22.dxe6 \( \text{\textfloatpage{18}} \)xe6\( \text{\textfloatpage{19}} \) – Black has exchanged the central pawns and he has removed the dangerous white bishop from the h6-square, so he has a good game;

20.f4 \( \text{\textfloatpage{20}} \)d6 21.h4 \( \text{\textfloatpage{21}} \)h8 22.\( \text{\textfloatpage{22}} \)f3 (It is bad for White to play: 22.h5 gxh5\( \text{\textfloatpage{23}} \), followed by \( \text{\textfloatpage{24}} \)g4, or \( \text{\textfloatpage{25}} \)g8.) 22...e6 23.dxe6 \( \text{\textfloatpage{26}} \)xe6 24.f5 gxf5 25.exf5 \( \text{\textfloatpage{27}} \)d5\( \text{\textfloatpage{28}} \) and White had no compensation for the exchange in the game, Verdier – Veyssye, Orange 1990;

White can also play immediately the move 20.e5. Indeed, after: 20...\( \text{\textfloatpage{29}} \)xe5 21.\( \text{\textfloatpage{30}} \)xg6 \( \text{\textfloatpage{31}} \)xg3 22.\( \text{\textfloatpage{32}} \)xf7+ \( \text{\textfloatpage{33}} \)xf7 23.\( \text{\textfloatpage{34}} \)xg3=, Black has nothing to be afraid of in this endgame with equal material after 23...\( \text{\textfloatpage{35}} \)c4.

20.\( \text{\textfloatpage{36}} \)f4

20...\( \text{\textfloatpage{37}} \)e7

It deserves attention for Black to try the other defensive plan: 20...exf4!? 21.\( \text{\textfloatpage{38}} \)xf4 (but not 21.\( \text{\textfloatpage{39}} \)xf4 \( \text{\textfloatpage{40}} \)b7!) 21...\( \text{\textfloatpage{41}} \)e7 22.e5 (Now, this is logical, but Black has sufficient defensive resources.) 22...fxe5 (or 22...\( \text{\textfloatpage{43}} \)xe5? 23.\( \text{\textfloatpage{44}} \)xg6=) 23.\( \text{\textfloatpage{45}} \)xg6.

Black has serious problems after: 23.\( \text{\textfloatpage{46}} \)xf1+ 24.\( \text{\textfloatpage{47}} \)xf1 hgx6 25.\( \text{\textfloatpage{48}} \)xg6+ \( \text{\textfloatpage{49}} \)h8 26.\( \text{\textfloatpage{50}} \)g5 \( \text{\textfloatpage{51}} \)c5+ 27.\( \text{\textfloatpage{52}} \)h1 \( \text{\textfloatpage{53}} \)f8 28.\( \text{\textfloatpage{54}} \)d3 e4 29.\( \text{\textfloatpage{55}} \)xe4 \( \text{\textfloatpage{56}} \)f7 (or 29...\( \text{\textfloatpage{57}} \)f5 30.\( \text{\textfloatpage{58}} \)e5+ \( \text{\textfloatpage{59}} \)g8 31.\( \text{\textfloatpage{60}} \)h4++; 29...\( \text{\textfloatpage{61}} \)f5 30.\( \text{\textfloatpage{62}} \)f6+ \( \text{\textfloatpage{63}} \)h7 31.\( \text{\textfloatpage{64}} \)h4+ \( \text{\textfloatpage{65}} \)g8 32.\( \text{\textfloatpage{66}} \)g4+ \( \text{\textfloatpage{67}} \)f7 33.\( \text{\textfloatpage{68}} \)g7+ \( \text{\textfloatpage{69}} \)e8 34.\( \text{\textfloatpage{70}} \)g8+ \( \text{\textfloatpage{71}} \)f8 35.\( \text{\textfloatpage{72}} \)g6+ \( \text{\textfloatpage{73}} \)f7 36.\( \text{\textfloatpage{74}} \)xf5=) 30.\( \text{\textfloatpage{75}} \)f6+ \( \text{\textfloatpage{76}} \)g8 31.\( \text{\textfloatpage{77}} \)g6+ \( \text{\textfloatpage{78}} \)f8 32.\( \text{\textfloatpage{79}} \)h6+ \( \text{\textfloatpage{80}} \)e8 33.\( \text{\textfloatpage{81}} \)g6. White's attack is very powerful (he is threatening \( \text{\textfloatpage{82}} \)f4 \( \text{\textfloatpage{83}} \)b8+ and \( \text{\textfloatpage{84}} \)e5+) in a position with approximate material equality.

It is correct for Black to play 23...hxg6, preserving his rook for the defence – \( \text{\textfloatpage{85}} \)g7. 24.\( \text{\textfloatpage{86}} \)xf7 (or 24.\( \text{\textfloatpage{87}} \)xg6+ \( \text{\textfloatpage{88}} \)g7++; 24.\( \text{\textfloatpage{89}} \)xf1 \( \text{\textfloatpage{90}} \)xf6) 24...\( \text{\textfloatpage{91}} \)xf7 25.\( \text{\textfloatpage{92}} \)xg6 \( \text{\textfloatpage{93}} \)f6 and Black defends successfully, because the discovered checks of White's bishop on g6 would not bring him anything substantial.

It is much stronger for White to play immediately: 22.\( \text{\textfloatpage{94}} \)xg6! hxg6 23.\( \text{\textfloatpage{95}} \)xg6+, after which it is too dangerous for Black to continue with: 23...\( \text{\textfloatpage{96}} \)h8 24.e5, for example: 24...\( \text{\textfloatpage{97}} \)g8 25.\( \text{\textfloatpage{98}} \)h5 f5 26.e6 \( \text{\textfloatpage{99}} \)h7 27.\( \text{\textfloatpage{100}} \)xf5 \( \text{\textfloatpage{101}} \)e8 28.\( \text{\textfloatpage{102}} \)h3 \( \text{\textfloatpage{103}} \)c5+ 29.\( \text{\textfloatpage{104}} \)h1 \( \text{\textfloatpage{105}} \)c4 30.\( \text{\textfloatpage{106}} \)e1++. It is stronger for Black to try 23...
h7 and despite the fact that in the endgame after: 24...g7 g7 25.f6, White has four passed pawns, Black should not lose the game.

21.h4

In the game Bruehl – Potthammel, corr. 1973, there followed: 21.f5 h8 22.fxe6 hxe6 23.e3 g7 24.d4!? (That is an interesting idea, but it is hardly correct...) 24...g8 (Black could have captured that piece, for example: 24...exd4 25.e5 dxe5 26.xg6 g8 þ, or 25.xd4 b4 26.wf2 a8; 26.a1c5+ 27.h1 b5+ 25.b5+ 26.xf5 25.exf5 g5 27.xg5 fxg5 28.f6+ xf6 29.xg5+ and everything ended up in a draw by a perpetual.

It seems more natural for White to play: 23.h4 g8 24.f3 (In case of 24.xg3, Fekete – Mueller, corr. 1987, it is enough for Black to answer with 24...h7 and White has nothing better than to repeat moves with 25.h4=) 24...b7 (It is also good for Black to play: 24...c8 25.g3 g5 26.h5 g7 27.xg7 c5+ 28.h1 c1= 29.g1 xg7 – he has given back his extra exchange indeed, but his position is quite solid concerning the dark squares and he can even improve it by deploying his knight to the d6-square.) 25.g3 (Or 25.g3 g5 26.h5 h7 27.g6+ h8 28.f3 – otherwise g8 – 28...c5 29.c1 g4 30.xf6 xf6 31.xf6 g8 þ f7 – and White's compensation for the exchange is insufficient.) 25.d6 26.d2 c8 27.h6 g7+ – Black has parried White's attack and his position is better, Dieu – Cadillac, corr 2000.

21...b7

After 21...e8??, with the idea to protect the e5-pawn with pieces, so that he can retreat with the king to h8, without being afraid of the exchange on e5, White can follow with: 22.h5 h8 23.xg6 hgx6 24.fxe5 fxe5 25.xg6 xf1+ 26.xf1 g8 27.h5+ and he maintains his initiative in a position with material equality in effect.

22.h5 exf4

It deserved attention for Black to try the modest line: 22...g7 23.xg7 xg7= with a blockade along the dark squares in a position with an equal material.

23.xf4 e8

It is worse for Black to continue with: 23...c5? 24.hxg6 hxg6 (or 24...g7 25.d6=) 25.d6 e8 26.xg6+ g7 27.xe8 xe8 28.xc5 bxc5 29.xf6 because White ends up with a couple of connected passed pawns for the exchange.

24.hxg6 hxg6 25.e5

The move 25.d4?! leads to an unclear position after: 25...c5 26.e3 d6 27.xg6+ g7 28.h6 (Or 28.xf6 xf6 29.xf6 c5= and Black regains his e4-pawn with better chances.) 28.g3 (After 28...c5, White can make a draw with: 29.f4!
25...f xe5 26.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\) xg6 \(\text{\textit{xf}}\) 27. \(\text{\textit{xf}}\) 4!

It is worse for White to capture the rook: 27.\(\text{\textit{xe}}\) x8+ \(\text{\textit{g}}\) 4 28.\(\text{\textit{f}}\) 7+ \(\text{\textit{g}}\) 7 (but not 28...\(\text{\textit{xf}}\) ? 29.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\) x3 30.\(\text{\textit{xd}}\) x7 \(\text{\textit{g}}\) 7 31. \(\text{\textit{g}}\) 7+ \(\text{\textit{xg}}\) 7 32. \(\text{\textit{c}}\) 3± and White is clearly better in the endgame) 29.\(\text{\textit{f}}\) 3 (Or 29.\(\text{\textit{c}}\) 3 \(\text{\textit{c}}\) 5+ 30. \(\text{\textit{f}}\) 2 \(\text{\textit{xc}}\) 3 31. \(\text{\textit{xc}}\) 3 \(\text{\textit{c}}\) 5 -- and Black’s pieces are better placed, while White’s passed pawns are harmless.) 29...\(\text{\textit{d}}\) 6 30.\(\text{\textit{h}}\) 5 (30. \(\text{\textit{f}}\) 6?! \(\text{\textit{xe}}\) 6 31.\(\text{\textit{xe}}\) 6 \(\text{\textit{xe}}\) 6 32. \(\text{\textit{g}}\) 3 \(\text{\textit{g}}\) 6!± and Black has an extra pawn and he covers successfully all possible squares for penetration of White’s pieces.) 30...\(\text{\textit{g}}\) 5± and Black’s pieces seem to be deployed better than their counterparts, Verdier – Lehmann, corr. 1988.

27...\(\text{\textit{xf}}\) 4 28.\(\text{\textit{f}}\) 7+ \(\text{\textit{xf}}\) 7 29. \(\text{\textit{xf}}\) 4+ \(\text{\textit{f}}\) 6 30.\(\text{\textit{xf}}\) 6+ \(\text{\textit{xf}}\) 6 31. \(\text{\textit{c}}\) 7 \(\text{\textit{c}}\) 5 32. \(\text{\textit{xa}}\) 7 \(\text{\textit{e}}\) 5, and in the game Vaisser – Stohl, Tallinn 1986, the opponents agreed to a draw. Black has more than enough material for the queen, but his king is too exposed for him to play for a win.

Accordingly, after 16.\(\text{\textit{d}}\) 2, Black obtains a good game after both lines that we have just analyzed – 16...\(\text{\textit{f}}\) 7 and 16...\(\text{\textit{d}}\) 7, but still it seems more reliable for him to follow with 16...\(\text{\textit{f}}\) 7, giving back the exchange and obtaining a quite good game.
Chapter 18

1.d4 .df6 2.c4 g6 3.£c3 d5 4.cxd5 
£xd5 5.e4 3xc3 6.bxc3 £g7 7.£c4 
c5 8.£e2 3c6 9.£e3 0–0 10.0–0 
£g4 11.f3 £a5 12.£d3 cxd4 13. 
cxd4 £e6 14.d5 £xa1 15.£xa1 f6 
16.£b1

The main idea of that move is to prevent the important resource for Black in many variations – £b6. Meanwhile, White activates his rook in the process and it can be for example transferred to the kingside with £b4– 
h4.

Black has plenty of possibilities and we will analyze in details a) 16...£g7?!, b) 16...b6?!, c) 16...£f7, d) 16...£d7 and e) 16...£e8.

He has tried in practice some other lines too:

The move 16...£d6? leaves the knight on a5 unprotected and enables White to win a piece after 17.£c3+– Altenburg – Wessiepe, Tyskland 1988;

Black loses material as well after: 16...a6?? 17.£b6 £d6 18. 
£c3+– Mraz – Petzold, corr. 1990;

He compromises his kingside too much with the move 16...g5? – and that way of parrying White’s threat £h6 is just not worth it. 17.f4 h6 18.fxg5 hxg5 
19.£xg5 fxg5 20.£e5 £f6 (Black could have at least neutralized White’s direct checkmate threats with the help of 20...£f5, with the idea to follow with £d6, although his king was so bare that he would remain clearly worse despite the material equality.) 21.£xg5+ £f8 22.£f4→ and White’s attack is just winning: 22...£f7 (or 22...£xf4 23.£xf4+ 
£f7 24.£h6+–) 23.e5 £xf4 24. 
£h6+ £g8 (or 24...£e8 25.£b5+ 
£c6 26.dxc6 £b6+ 27.£h1+) 25. 
£h7+ £h8 26.£g6+ £g8 27. 
£h7+ £f8 28.£h8+ £g8 29.£h6# 
Tymms – Grobler, corr. 1974;

16...£c8. This move is with the idea to remove the bishop from the attack and to keep the d-file free. This is in general very useful for Black, since he can thus prepare the undermining move e7-e6 and prevent White’s
pawn-break e4-e5. The move is a bit ugly indeed, but there is no direct refutation in sight. It would be hardly effective for White to play immediately: 17.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f4 e5 18.dxe6 (He should continue instead with 18.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e2 and then f3-f4.) 18...\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe6 19.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d4 (Or 19.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe6 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xd3; 19.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f7 20.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)d7 21.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)b6+ – see 17.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c3.) 19...\(\mathcal{Q}\)d6;

or at first: 17.\(\mathcal{Q}\)h6 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e8 18.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f4 (It would not work for White to play: 18.e5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xd5 19.exf6 exf6 20.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xf6 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f7.) 18...e5 – and White fails to push e4-e5 in both cases;

There had been only one game played on that theme Cossette – Schulz, corr. 1990 and it continued with: 17.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c3 b6 18.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d4 e6 (Now, when White’s knight is placed on the d4-outpost – this move is quite risky for Black, because he might never manage to regain his e6-pawn.) 19.dxe6 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e7 20.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b5 (White thus prevents the immediate move for Black 20...\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe6, because he can counter that with 21.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xa5+; following 20.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xb4 21.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xb4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e8, Black gives up the exchange for White’s e6-pawn and he reaches an equal endgame: 22.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e7 23.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xe6 24.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d6 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f7 25.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe7 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xe7=) 20...\(\mathcal{Q}\)g7 (This is with the idea to remove the king away from the a2-g8 diagonal and to have the possibility to capture on e6 anyway. It also deserved attention for Black to try: 20...\(\mathcal{Q}\)e8 21.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f8.) 21.e5 f5 22.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xa5 (White had better play here 22.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d5. In case he manages to deploy his rook on d6, he will obtain a clear advantage, since Black will not be able to capture on e6: 22...\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe6 23.\(\mathcal{Q}\)g5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f7 24.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d6 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f8 25.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b5±, or 23...\(\mathcal{Q}\)f8 24.\(\mathcal{Q}\)a1 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e8 25.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d6→ and White’s attack is overwhelming – Black’s king is quite vulnerable on g7.) 22...bxa5 23.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c6 (White had to play immediately: 23.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c1 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xe6 24.\(\mathcal{Q}\)g5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)d7 25.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c7 \(\mathcal{Q}\)h8 26.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd7 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xd7 27.e6 \(\mathcal{Q}\)a4 28.e7 \(\mathcal{Q}\)fc8 – his pawn on e7 is very powerful, and he has excellent prospects, but still the sacrifice of the second exchange on a5 was hardly necessary.) 23...\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe6 24.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xc6 25.e6+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)f6 26.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xe6 27.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xf6+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)f7 and White’s position is lost.

On his move seventeen, Black could have played outright: 17...e6! 18.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f7 (The move 18...\(\mathcal{Q}\)e8 loses either the exchange, or the f6-pawn after: 19.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)d7 20.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd7 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xd7 21.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xf6+, or 19.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b4 b6 20.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)d7 21.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd7 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xd7 22.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xf6±; 18...exd5 19.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xf8 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xf8 20.exd5+) 19.dxe6 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xe6 20.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)d7 and despite the vulnerable placement of Black’s rook on f7, White does not have more than a draw: 21.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d5 (Or 21.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)b6+ 22.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)d8 and it all ends in a repetition of moves, because it is not good for White to follow with 22.\(\mathcal{Q}\)h1 due to 22...\(\mathcal{Q}\)c8.) 21...\(\mathcal{Q}\)e6 (or 21...b6 22.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d4) 22.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e7 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xe7 23.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe7+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)xe7 24.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xa5 b6=. 249
Chapter 18

a) 16...g7?! 

The idea behind that move is easily understandable – Black wishes to prevent White’s bishop from coming to the h6-square. Still, it is too risky for him to place the king on g7, because it comes under attack there from the rest of White’s pieces.

a1) 17.c3 f7 18.d2

White has also tested in practice the plan with 18.d4 and after 18...b6, the game Pedersen – Milovanovic, corr. 1978, confirmed that White’s threats are quite real in similar positions. (It would have been better for Black to have removed his king away from g7, before he had played his last move as GM Korchnoi did once: 18.e8 19.d2 h8 20.h3 (This more or less strange move is evidently played with the idea to escape with the king to the h2-square in case Black has some check in the future along the last rank.) 20...b6 21.e2 d6, Gligoric – Korchnoi, Sarajevo 1969, 22.a6 and White has some positional compensation for the exchange – he controls the c-file and Black’s knight on a5 is out of action.) 19.d2 h8 20.a6 d7 21.c1. White is threatening to penetrate on the c-file. Black will be reluctant to give up the exchange immediately, placing his rook on c8, but his other possible counterplay, connected with undermining White’s center, is extremely risky too. 21...e6 22.b5 exd5 23.d4 d8 (In case of: 23...e6 24.c7 d8, Black’s position seems to be quite precarious, but there is nothing forced for White in sight, for example: 25.h6 f7 26.xf7 xf7 27.f4 g7 28.e5 g8 and Black holds successfully.) 24.f4 g8 25.e5 c4 26.exf6 d7 (or 26...h8 27.e1+) 27.c7 d6 (otherwise h6) 28.g4! (White deprives Black’s knight of the f5-square and he is threatening h6 again.) 28...ac8 (or 28...fe8 29.h6 e6 30.e5 c4 31. b5 f7 32.xc4+ 29.e5! and White won the game after: 29...g5 30.xg5+ g6 31.h6! xc7 32.xc7 xc7 33.xd6 f7 34. b7 xf6 35.xd5+ f7 36.f8#.

18...h8 19.d4!? b6 20.e5

White has also tried 20.h6, van der Tuuk – Schenk, Utrecht 1986, but it is quite unclear whether his queen would be really useful on that square. After 20...e5, it is not good for White to play 21.dxe6 xex6, because he fails to open the long diagonal. So, he cannot capture en passant, but he should retreat instead with the bishop to b2, or
a1 and try later to advance f3-f4.

20...\texttt{xd5}

Or 20...\texttt{xd5} 21.\texttt{b5} (White should have played here simply: 21.e\texttt{f} e5 22.\texttt{b5} \texttt{x}b5 23.\texttt{x}b5 exd4 24.\texttt{xd}4\texttt{d} with a material advantage, or 22...\texttt{d}d8 23.\texttt{xe}5+, gobbling a couple of pawns and organizing a dangerous attack.) 21...\texttt{d}d8 22.\texttt{h}h6 and now the move 22...\texttt{g}8? (It is better for Black to follow with: 22...\texttt{c}6 23.exf6 exf6 24.\texttt{h}5 \texttt{g}8\texttt{c}, parrying White's direct threats.) enabled White to continue with: 23.exf6 exf6 24.\texttt{f}5!! Petran – W.Schmidt, Belgrade 1977 and to win the f6-pawn and to have an overwhelming attack for free...

21.\texttt{x}g6 \texttt{g}8

It is not so good for Black to follow with: 21...\texttt{g}8? 22.exf6 exf6 23.\texttt{d}3 \texttt{f}7 (Surprisingly, it is bad for Black to try here: 23...\texttt{xf}3 24.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{x}g2+ 25.\texttt{f}1=) 24.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{g}7 25.\texttt{c}1\texttt{c} and White’s rook penetrates to the c7-square.

22.\texttt{h}6 \texttt{c}6

Now, White seeks a tactical solution to the problems: 23.\texttt{e}4 \texttt{xd}4 24.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{e}2+ 25.\texttt{xe}2 fxe5 26.\texttt{xa}8 \texttt{xa}8 27.\texttt{c}3\texttt{c} and the position remains rather unclear, since the vulnerability of Black’s pawns compensates White’s minimal material deficit.

\textbf{a2) 17.\texttt{f}4!}

White needs to play energetically if he wishes to exploit the placement of Black’s king on g7.

17...\texttt{f}7 18.e5

The inclusion of the moves 18.\texttt{b}5 b6, before White pushes e4-e5, is not harmful for him, but it is still unnecessary, because his rook will be transferred to the kingside along the fourth rank and not along the fifth, meanwhile Black’s d5-pawn is not hanging. After 19.e5 g5, Zimmermann – Tresch, Baden 1995, 20.\texttt{d}4! there arise some lines, which are similar to these after the immediate move 18.e5.

18...\texttt{g}5

It is not good for Black to continue with 18...\texttt{xd}5 19.\texttt{d}1\texttt{d}1→. He cannot protect his bishop with the move e7-e6, because of the placement of his king on the g7-square.

19.\texttt{d}4!
Now, White can ignore the threat against his knight on f4, because of the placement of Black’s king on g7, since he will play in that case ♕xf4, threatening ♕h6.

19...♖h8

Black defends the h7-square. It is too bad for him to capture the knight immediately: 19...gxf4 20.♗xf4 ♘h8 21.♕xh7!→, because in the game Schroeder – Diener, corr. 1984, White organized a crushing attack against Black’s bare king: 21...♖xd5 (Or 21...♖xh7 22.♖h6+ ♗g8 23.♗b4 and White’s attack is checkmating.) 22.e6 (The idea of that move is to maim Black’s bishop to an unprotected square.) 22...♘xe6 23.♕h6 ♕f7 24.♕f5+–. Black loses too after: 21...♗g8 22.♗xg8 ♖xg8 23.exf6 exf6 24.♗c1+– and White’s threat ♖c7 is decisive, or: 22...♖xg8 23.♗g3+ ♖f8 24.♕h6+ ♘e8 25.♗g7+– and White wins Black’s rook on a8.

20.♗c1!

White can still keep the knight on f4 under attack, but with a rook on h8, Black’s king might run away from the checks after the capture on f4, for example in case of: 20.e6 gxf4 (But not 20...♗e8 21.♗e2 ♘g6 22.♗g3↑. Black does not lose here by force indeed, but his kingside is seriously compromised and his pieces are very passive.) 21.♗xf4 ♖xe6 22.♗g3+ (It is bad for White to follow with: 22.♕h6+ ♗g8 23.♖xe6 ♕xd3 24.♗b4 ♖c4–+) 22...
22.\(\text{\&}e2\). Now, the attack against the f4-pawn has been parried and White’s knight can retreat. 22...\(\text{\&}g6\) 23.exf6+ exf6 24.\(\text{\&}xg5\) White has already a pawn for the exchange and his position is superior, because of the vulnerable black king.

*In general, the illogical move 16...\(\text{\&}g7??!\) only presents White with an extra tempo for the attack – Black’s king is placed rather uncomfortably there. White obtains an advantage in all the lines that we have analyzed.*

b) 16...b6?!

![Diagram](image)

After this move the idea of White’s move sixteen is justified completely – the inclusion of \(\text{\&}b1\) and b6 is definitely in favour of White.

17.\(\text{\&}h6\)

Now, in this position we will analyze the natural, but still extremely risky move for Black b1) 17...\(\text{\&}e8\) and the moves with which Black gives up the exchange back, the basic one among them being b2) 17...\(\text{\&}d6\).

b1) 17...\(\text{\&}e8\)

It is analogous to the main lines if White plays 16.\(\text{\&}h6\) (see the next chapters) 17...\(\text{\&}e8\), but still the fact that Black’s queen is not on b6 enables White to save a tempo for the move \(\text{\&}h1\).

18.\(\text{\&}f4\) \(\text{\&}d7\)

Here it is too bad for Black to play 18...\(\text{\&}f7\) 19.e5 (In this case, this is better for White than just if he regains the exchange with the move 19.\(\text{\&}b5\).) 19...\(\text{\&}xd5\) (It is more resilient for Black to defend here with: 19...e6 20.\(\text{\&}b5\) exd5 21.\(\text{\&}xe8\) \(\text{\&}xe8\) 22.\(\text{\&}d1\) \(\text{\&}c6\) (or 22...\(\text{\&}c6\) 23.exf6\(\pm\)) 23.\(\text{\&}xd5\) \(\text{\&}e7\) 24.exf6 \(\text{\&}e3\) + 25.\(\text{\&}h1\)\(\pm\) Fagaró – Pribyl, Erevan 1982 – and White remains with an extra pawn, while his opponent’s king is vulnerable. On the other hand Black can place his bishop on f7, he blocks the kingside and he can still resist.) 20.\(\text{\&}d1\) e6 21.\(\text{\&}b5\) and here instead of: 21...f5 22.\(\text{\&}xe8\) \(\text{\&}xe8\) 23.\(\text{\&}xd5\) exd5 24. e6 d4 25.\(\text{\&}xd4\) – Kasparov – Schweizer, Zurich (simul) 1988, Black could have defended better with the move 21...\(\text{\&}e7\), but White had to continue instead with the simple move 21.\(\text{\&}e4\) and he would have just crushed his opponent’s position after the capture on d5.

19.e5

Black’s pawn on g6 is so weak now that he does not have the usual counterplay on the queenside for the variation with 16. \(\text{\&}h6\) and his defence would be
extremely difficult.

19...c8

Or 19...c7 20.exf6 exf6 21.\(\text{Q}xg6\) (21.\(\text{Q}xf6\) \(\text{e}e5\#)). Here, Black accepted the sacrifice and he lost immediately: 21...\(\text{c}5+\) 22.\(\text{h}1\) hXg6 23.\(\text{Q}xf6\) \(\text{e}7\) 24.\(\text{Q}xg6+\) \(\text{h}8\) 25.\(\text{f}6+\) \(\text{g}8\) 26.\(\text{d}6=\) Hauser – Kaczmarczyk, Eppingen 2004. After the correct line for him: 21...\(\text{d}6\) 22.\(\text{f}4=\) White’s compensation for the exchange is more than sufficient – he has a pawn and Black’s king position is seriously compromised.

19...\(\text{f}5\) 20.\(\text{xf}5\) gxf5 21.e1 \(\text{c}4\) (It is better for Black to play 21...\(\text{c}8\)!, in order to be able later to follow with \(\text{c}8\)-c4.) 22.\(\text{e}6\) \(\text{d}7\) 23.exf6 (White could have won outright after 23.\(\text{d}4\), without first exchanging on f6: 23...\(\text{xe}5\) 24.\(\text{xe}5\)+, or 23...\(\text{ec}8\) 24.\(\text{h}4\)+) 23...exf6 24.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{f}7\) 25.\(\text{d}4\), Tarjan – White, USA 1978 and here White has some positional advantage indeed in a situation with an approximately equal material, but Black can defend with 25...b5, not letting White’s bishop to the long diagonal.

It is also not bad for White to try 21.\(\text{f}1\)!! with the idea to create the threat to redeploy his queen to the kingside via e1 to the g3-square. Black will be forced then to give up a pawn and to defend with a practically bare king...: 21...\(\text{b}8\) (Or 21...\(\text{h}8\) 22.\(\text{e}6\) \(\text{xd}5\) 23.exf6+- and White has checkmate threats.) 22.exf6 exf6 23.\(\text{h}5\) (23.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{e}5\)) 23...\(\text{e}7\) (or 23...\(\text{e}5\) 24.\(\text{xf}6+\) \(\text{f}7\) 25.\(\text{xe}8\)+) 24.\(\text{f}4\)+ \(\text{d}8\) (or 24...\(\text{b}7\) 25.\(\text{xf}6\)+ and White captures additionally the f5-pawn.) 25.\(\text{xf}6+\) \(\text{f}7\) 26.\(\text{xh}7\) \(\text{h}8\) 27.\(\text{g}5+\) \(\text{g}6\) 28.\(\text{d}1\)+ White has a powerful attack and a passed d-pawn.

20.\(\text{d}4\)

It is weaker for White to follow with: 20.\(\text{xf}6\) hXg6 21.\(\text{xf}6\), Hanauer – I.Popov, corr. 1985, because of Black’s powerful argument – 21...\(\text{c}4\)!!, taking the fourth rank under control and isolating temporarily White’s queen on a1 from the actions.

It is bad for White to try 20.\(\text{b}4\), with the idea to bring his rook into the attack along the fourth rank, because Black can exploit White’s vulnerability on the first rank with: 20...\(\text{c}7\) and he is threatening dangerous checks from c1 and c5. There might follow: 21.e6 \(\text{c}5+\) 22.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{c}1+\) 23.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{xe}6\) 24.dxe6 \(\text{c}6\)+ – and White will have problems with the defence of his king after the exchange on b4.

20...\(\text{c}5\)

It does not seem too logical, but still it might be the best for Black if he plays 20...\(\text{f}8\) – a rook move back under attack by the enemy bishop, but it defends him against the threats against the g6-pawn. 21.\(\text{xf}8\) \(\text{xf}8\) 22.e1 \(\text{c}5\) 23.exf6 exf6 24.e6 \(\text{xe}6\) 25.\(\text{xe}6\) and White had a clearly
better position. Later, in the game Lombart – Garcia Rojas, corr. 2001, there followed: 25...
$\text{c}c1+$ 26.$\text{f}f2$ $\text{c}5$ 27.$\text{xc}5$ $\text{xc}5$
28.$\text{d}6$ $\text{d}5$ 29.$\text{e}3$ $\text{f}5$ 30.$\text{g}4$ – and White had a much better endgame with a passed pawn and a bishop against a knight.

21.$\text{e}6$

In case of 21.$\text{xe}6$ $\text{hxg}6$ 22. $\text{xe}6$, Black has the resource 22...$\text{c}4$.

In the game Delgado – Semenic, Las Vegas 2002, White continued with 21.$\text{d}1$ and Black made an immediate mistake: 21...$\text{c}6$? (He had to play instead 21...$\text{c}8+$, in order to be able to counter 22.$\text{xe}6$ with 22...$\text{xd}5$) 22.$\text{xe}6$ $\text{xd}5$ 23.$\text{g}4+$ and White’s threats were decisive. White would not have been able to occupy that square with his queen, had Black’s bishop been on c8.

21...$\text{xe}6$

Black loses immediately is he retreats with his bishop: 21...$\text{c}8$ 22.$\text{xe}6$ $\text{hxg}6$ 23.$\text{e}4+$, or 21...
$\text{c}6$ 22.$\text{xe}6$ $\text{hxg}6$ 23.$\text{e}4+$.

22.$\text{xe}6$ $\text{xd}5$ 23.$\text{xd}5$ $\text{xd}5$
24.$\text{c}7$ $\text{xd}3$ 25.$\text{xe}8$ $\text{f}7$ 26.

$\text{c}7$ $\text{g}5$ 27.$\text{f}4+$ and Black’s compensation for the piece is obviously insufficient.

b2) 17...$\text{d}6$

We have already seen that in this position Black needs to give back the exchange on f8 from variation b1.

17...$\text{d}7$ (This move is too passive in comparison to the main line 17...$\text{d}6$.) 18.$\text{xf}8$
$\text{xf}8$ 19.$\text{a}6$ $\text{e}5$ 20.$\text{c}1$ $\text{d}6$

18.$\text{xf}8$ $\text{xf}8$

It is worse for Black to capture on f8 with the queen. He should not place his king under an eventual check from White’s knight on the e6-square, while the queens are still on the board.

19.$\text{b}5$!

This is a precise move and its idea is to exchange his opponent’s bishop, in case it retreats to d7 and to acquire the e6-square for the knight. Should Black’s bishop go to some other square, White wins tempi, having prevented
the natural plan \( \texttt{\#e6-d7} \) and \( \texttt{\#f8-c8} \).

It is almost the same to the main line 19.\( \texttt{\#b5} \), what White played in the game Browne – Rao, USA 1987, 19.\( \texttt{\#d4} \), for example: 19...\( \texttt{\#d7} \) 20.\( \texttt{\#a6 \#c8} \) and here White’s simplest line would have been: 21.\( \texttt{\#xc8} \) \( \texttt{\#xc8} \) 22.\( \texttt{\#c1} \) reaching an endgame, which is rather similar to the one in the game Vaissier – A. Zakharov, Volgodonsk 1983. In fact, after that order of moves Black has the additional possibility to play 20...e6.

Or 19.\( \texttt{\#d4} \) \( \texttt{\#d8} \) 20.\( \texttt{\#c1 \#c8} \) 21.\( \texttt{\#c3 \#d7} \) 22.\( \texttt{\#xc8+ \#xc8} \) 23.\( \texttt{\#h3 \#g7=} \) and after the trade of the rooks, White can hardly obtain any serious advantage, van der Linde – Hort, Utrecht 1986.

19.\( \texttt{\#c1 \#d7} \) and now:

20.\( \texttt{\#d4 \#c8} \) 21.\( \texttt{\#xc8+ \#xc8} \) 22.\( \texttt{\#f4 \#b7} \) (Or 22...e5 23.\( \texttt{\#xe6 \#xe6} \) 24.\( \texttt{\#c3 \#c6=} \) and the position was quite equal in the game Vekshenkov – Semeniuk, Chuta 1987.) 23.\( \texttt{\#g4}?! \) (That move is unnecessarily energetic and it compromises White’s king shelter and enables Black to undermine White’s pawn chain.) 23...h6!? 24.\( \texttt{\#h3 \#g5=} \) 25.\( \texttt{\#g3 \#xf4} \) 26.\( \texttt{\#f5 \#c1=} \) 27.\( \texttt{\#g2} \) and in the game Kelecevic – Hort, Sarajevo 1980, the opponents agreed to draw in view of the perpetual check;

20.\( \texttt{\#d4 \#c8} \) 21.\( \texttt{\#xc8+ \#xc8} \) 22.\( \texttt{\#c3 \#d7} \), Blees – Krasenkow, Hungary 1989, (It is not advisable for Black to exchange queens on the c5-square: 22...\( \texttt{\#c5} \) 23.\( \texttt{\#xc5} \) \( \texttt{\#xc5} \) 24.\( \texttt{\#b5} \) \( \texttt{\#a6} \) 25.\( \texttt{\#f1=} \) and Black’s pawn on c5 is much rather a weakness.) and after 23.\( \texttt{\#h3=} \), according to GM M. Krasenkow White has a slight edge.

19...\( \texttt{\#d7} \)

The move 19...\( \texttt{\#f7} \) – surrenders to White the c-file after 20.\( \texttt{\#c1} \).

It is possible that the retreat 19...\( \texttt{\#c8} \) is stronger, Grewe – Schaefer, Telgte 1989, in order to avoid the exchange of the bishops and to continue fighting for the c-file. White’s simplest line against that is 20.\( \texttt{\#d4} \) – and Black’s bishop will have to retreat to the c8-square anyway, while after \( \texttt{\#d4} \) and \( \texttt{\#c8-b7} \), White has always the resource – \( \texttt{\#d4-e6} \). Black fails to equalize too after: 20...e6 21.\( \texttt{\#xe6 \#xe6} \) 22.\( \texttt{\#xe6 \#xe6} \) 23.\( \texttt{\#d1=} \) – because his king remains very vulnerable and his knight is still out of action.

20.\( \texttt{\#xd7 \#xd7} \) 21.\( \texttt{\#d4 \#c8} \)

22.\( \texttt{\#c1} \)

The position has been simplified considerably, but after the maneuver \( \texttt{\#d4-e6} \) and \( \texttt{\#c1-h6} \), White maintains the initiative, since his queen and knight are extremely well coordinated in the attack against the enemy king.

22...\( \texttt{\#c4} \) 23.\( \texttt{\#xc4 \#xc4} \) 24.\( \texttt{\#c1 \#a4} \)

(diagram)

25.\( \texttt{\#h4} \)! This moves ensures a leeway for White’s king and at the same time it might be useful
in an attack against Black's king as well (h4-h5). 25...b5 26.\(\triangle\)e6 \(\triangle\)a3 (Black is forced to trade queens.) 27.\(\triangle\)h6 \(\triangle\)e3+ 28.\(\triangle\)xe3 \(\triangle\)xe3 29.\(\triangle\)c7 (Now, Black fails to defend satisfactorily his queenside pawns in this endgame.) 29...b4 30.\(\triangle\)a6 \(\triangle\)c2 31.\(\triangle\)f2 (It is worse for White to advance immediately his central pawns: 31.f4 \(\triangle\)f7 32.e5, due to 32...\(\triangle\)e3 33.\(\triangle\)xb4 a5= and Black regains his pawn.) 31...\(\triangle\)f7 32.f4 (White can also allow Black to exchange the a and b-pawns on the queenside: 32.\(\triangle\)e2!? \(\triangle\)d4+ 33.\(\triangle\)d3 b3 34.axb3 \(\triangle\)xb3 35.f4 \(\triangle\)c1+ 36.\(\triangle\)d2 \(\triangle\)b3+ 37.\(\triangle\)c2 \(\triangle\)d4+ 38.\(\triangle\)d3 \(\triangle\)b5 39.e5= and he maintains a clear advantage in that king and knight endgame, because of his far-advanced pawn-centre and the misplaced black knight.) 32...e6 33.dxe6+ \(\triangle\)xe6 34.\(\triangle\)e2 f5 35.e5 \(\triangle\)d5 36.\(\triangle\)d2 b3 37.\(\triangle\)xb3 \(\triangle\)d4, Vaisser – A.Zakharov, Volgodonsk 1983 and here after 38.b4= White manages to preserve the material advantage that he has just acquired.

So, in principle after 16...b6, White's idea 16.\(\triangle\)b1 is completely justified and Black is forced to give back the exchange immediately. In this position, with an equal material, White maintains a slight, but stable advantage.

c) 16...\(\triangle\)f7

This is a quite natural move for Black and it usually transposes to some other variations.

17.\(\triangle\)h6 e6

Black is trying to undermine White's centre, giving back the exchange in the process, with the idea to exploit the fact that White's bishop on d3 is hanging.

It would not be enough for him to equalize with: 17...\(\triangle\)c8 18.\(\triangle\)xf8 \(\triangle\)xf8 19.\(\triangle\)d4 b6 20.\(\triangle\)c3=, because White preserves his domination in the centre in a position with an equal material, Peev – Honfi, Varna 1983.

The natural line for Black here is – 17...\(\triangle\)e8 18.\(\triangle\)b5 \(\triangle\)b6+ (Now, the reciprocal exchange-sacrifice fails for Black after: 18...\(\triangle\)d6 19.\(\triangle\)xe8 \(\triangle\)xe8 20.\(\triangle\)c3 b6 21.\(\triangle\)c1 \(\triangle\)b7 22.\(\triangle\)e3= and in the game Pinter – Pribyl, Sochi 1981, White obtained an obvious positional advantage, dominating on the only open file.) 19.\(\triangle\)d4
\[\text{Chapter 18}\]

\[\text{\#ed8 20.\#e3 and the game transposes to the variation: 16.\#h6 \#e8 17.\#b1 \#f7 18.\#b5 \#b6 19.\#d4 \#ed8 20.\#e3.}\]

18.dxe6

18.\#xf8 \#xf8 19.\#f4 (In case of 19.dxe6, Black follows with: 19...\#xd3 20.\#xf6+ \#xb1 21.\#f2 \#b6+ 22.\#d4 \#c7 23.\#xf7 \#b6!!--; 20.\#xf7 \#xe2 21.\#xf6 \#d3= M.Krasenkow.) 19...\#xd5 20.\#xd5 g5! 21.\#e6+ (or 21.\#h3!? h6 22.\#e4 \#d6=) 21...\#xe6 22.\#xe6 \#xd3 23.\#xf6+ \#g8 24.\#f7+ \#h8 25.\#f6+ and the game Najer – Mikhailovski, Moscow 2002, ended in a draw by a perpetual.

18...\#xe6

Here after 18...\#xd3 19.\#xf6 Black gets checkmated.

19.\#xf8 \#xf8

Or 19...\#xd3 20.\#h6± and the position with opposite coloured bishops is favourable for White, because Black’s king is vulnerable, while Black cannot play 20...\#xe2?, because of 21.\#xf6+.

\[\text{20.\#f4±.}\]

After 16...\#f7 17.\#h6, Black should better follow with the move 17...\#e8, transposing to the variation: 16.\#h6 \#e8 17.\#b1 \#f7. In general – the line 16...\#f7 seems to be quite reliable for him.

d) 16...\#d7

\[\text{This is the main theoretical variation for Black.}\]

In this position, White usually chooses between the immediate d1) 17.e5 and the maneuver d2) 17.\#h6.

About 17.\#d4 – see 16.\#d4 \#d7 17.\#b1.

White does not achieve much with 17.\#f4 \#b8. This move prevents White’s pawn-break e4-e5, so now he has to look for a purely positional compensation for the exchange. 18.\#c3 b6 19.\#a6 \#d6 20.\#d3 \#c8 21.\#b5 \#b7 22.\#f4 \#fc8 23.\#d3 a6 24.\#a4 b5± and in view of the possible maneuver \#c4, White’s compensation for the exchange is hardly sufficient, Nikolac – Hort, Amsterdam 1978.

d1) 17.e5 \#c6!

That is the best for Black.

About 17...e6 18.\#h6 \#f7 – see d2b, as for 18...\#e8 see Chapter 19 – 16.\#h6 \#e8 17.\#b1 \#d7 18.e5 e6.
14.d5 a1 15.a1 f6 16.b1

It is not good for Black if he tries: 17...e6 18.f4 xd5 19. d1. His bishop has no good square to retreat to and the line 19...e6 20.e4± enables White to organize a powerful attack, since he can capture on d5 and place his bishops on the d5 and d4-squares, Nunn – De Jong, Utrecht 1986.

The move 17...b6 is too slow for Black, Barberi – Samaritani, Bratto 1998, since its idea is only to provide the b7-square for the knight and so Black does not support his centre with it at all. After: 18.h6 e8 19.d4 White is threatening to continue with e5-e6 and d3-b5 and he has very good prospects, moreover that after e2-f4 he has the possibility of the standard sacrifice on g6.

17...fxe5 18.xe5 b8. Black must repel White’s queen away from the e5-square immediately, because of the threat d4. (It is bad for Black to play: 18...c8? 19.d4 f6 20.d6 f7 21.dxe7 xe7 22.xa5– Hauke – Saenger, Endingen 1987.) 19.d4 d6 20.d2 b6 21.c3 (In the endgame after: 21.b4?! f6 22.xf6 xf6 23.xe7 f7 White does not have a full compensation for the pawn; the line 21.c3 f6 22.e3 d6 23.d4= just leads to another draw by a repetition of moves.) 21...f6 (It deserved attention for Black to continue with 21...c6!?, avoiding the repetition.) 22.e3 d6 23. d4 f6 24.e3 d6 25.d4 and in the game Lukacs – W. Schmidt, Trnava 1986, it all ended in a draw again.

It is better for White to follow with: 19.xe7 e8 20.c5 b6 21.c1 d6 (Or 21...e5 22.e4 ac8 23.d1 c4 24.f4 f6 25.d6, White won the e7-pawn and he preserved the queens, so his compensation for the exchange was excellent, Miles – Bor, Utrecht 1986.) 22.e4 ac8 23.d1 b7 24.d2 c5 25.g3 f8 26.d4 and in the game Stigar – S.Larsen, corr. 1987, the opponents agreed to draw. Indeed after 26...f7 (or 26...xe4 27.xe4 c4 28.h1=) 27.a1 cf8 28.d4= White has at least a draw – it is enough for him to retreat with his queen, while Black’s rook is on f6.

It deserves attention for White to play 22.c3, with the idea to deploy his knight to e4, where it will be clearly stronger on that square than Black’s bishop. It is not so easy for White to accomplish that though, because his d5-pawn is hanging. There might follow: 22...f8 23.d4 (It does not seem so convincing for White to continue with: 23.e4 xd5 24.f3 xf6 25.e4 xa2 26.xa8 c6.) 23...ae8 (It seems dangerous for Black to try here: 23...f4 24. e4 xd5 25.a1.) 24.h6 e7 25.d1= and White has a pawn for the exchange and a powerful bishop on d4, so his compensa-
tion seems to be quite sufficient in that position.

17...b5!? This move ensures the c4-square for Black's knight and the possibility of a check from b6. 18.♘h1 ♛c4 19.♗xc4 bxc4 20.♗h6 ♗f5! 21.♕d1 ♘a5?!
(Black did not need to give back the exchange here. He had better play 21...♗e8=) 22.♗xf8 ♘xf8 23.exf6 exf6 24.♗c3± and there arose a very favourable structure for White with a permanent blockade of Black's c4-pawn by White's knight on c3, Cramling – Miralles, Bern 1991. The move 18.♘h1 was not the best for White – it was not worth for him to lose a tempo defending against the possible check from the b6-square. He had to continue with the immediate 18.♕d4, with the following eventual developments: 18...♕c4 19.♗xc4 bxc4 20.e6 ♗c8 21.♗xc4= – Black's pieces are all on their initial squares and his material advantage is quite minimal: or 18...♗c8 19.e6 ♗e8 20.♕h6, White has a great space advantage in a position with an equal material; 18...fxc5 19.♗xe5 ♛c4 20.♗xc4 bxc4 21.♗d4 ♘f6 22.d6, White has the edge. Black has great problems to defend the long diagonal.

17...♗f5. This move is quite typical and it is good here too. The exchange of the bishops parries the eventual threats against the g6-square and it helps Black to bring his knight into action via c4. 18.♗xf5 gxf5 19.exf6 (In case of: 19.♕h6 ♘xd5 20.♗xf8 ♘xf8 21.exf6 ♘xf6= Fedorowicz – Kudrin, USA 1986, Black's extra pawn is much more important than the partial vulnerability of his king.) 19...♕xf6 20.♗f4 b6 21.♗d4 ♘f7=. The long diagonal was very weak indeed, but White could not rearrange his pieces successfully in order to create the checkmating threat ♘h8 in the game Knaak – Gauglitz, Dresden 1985.

Black has also tried in practice here: 20...♗c8 21.♗d4 ♘f7 22.♗b5, but he did not need to blunder – 22...♗c7 (22...♗d6=) 23.♗c5=c ♘xf4 (It was equally bad for Black to play 23...♗d8 24.♗e1=) 24.♗xc8+ ♘f8 25.♗c3 ♘xc8 26.♗xc8+ ♘f7 27.♗e6+ ♗e8 28.♗e3± and White had the better king, winning Black's f5-pawn in the process, Brees – Chiburdanidze, Amsterdam 1986.

18.♗c3

Now, contrary to the variation 17...♗e6, White does not have the possibility 18.♗f4 due to 18...g5=.
In case of 18...e4, Black counters with 18...f5! (but not 18...xd5 19.d1 e6 20.f4 e7 21.xd5 exd5 22.xd5+ and White is clearly better, Schoen – Candea, Berlin 1987) and after the exchange of the light-squared bishops Black’s king is completely safe.

It is not advisable for White to play 18.exf6 xd5! 19.fx7 (It is slightly better for him to follow with 19.e4 d6+, but he has no compensation for the exchange anyway.) 19...xf3! 20. h6 (or 20.gxf3 xf3++ – and White cannot defend simultaneously the checkmate threat on g2 and his bishop on e3.) 20...f7 21.f4 c5+ 22.h1 xe7 23.e1 h4++ – and White had no threats at all and he had a considerable material deficit in the game, Ilic – Krasenkow, Wattens 1990.

It is not good for White to follow here with 18.h6, because of Black’s simple reaction 18... xd5 (but not 18...f7 19.e6 g7 20.dxc6, Azam – Houk, corr. 1998) 19.f4 (White loses a piece after: 19.xf8 xd3 20.xe7 xe2++) 19...c5+ 20.h1 fe8 21.exf6 e5 and White fails to create any real threats: 22.h3 d4 23.g5 d5 24.e4 f7+.

18...xd5 19.d1 e6 20. exf6

Or 20.xg6 b8 21.e4 xe5++.

20...exf6 21.xg6 e7 22. e4

Here, just like before, Black’s king shelter is compromised, but White cannot attack so easily, although he has some compensation for the exchange.

The variation with the immediate move 17.e5 can hardly be recommended to White. The best that he can hope for is some chances for an attack as a compensation for the exchange.

Now, contrary to the main lines with the move 16.h6, Black preserves his rook on the f-file and that is useful for him in the defence of his kingside.

About 17...e8 18.e5 – see Chapter 19 (16.h6 e8 17.b1 d7 18.e5).

18.e5

Black must take care now
against White’s threat – 19.e6: 
\textbf{d2a)} \textbf{18...fxe5}, or \textbf{d2b)} \textbf{18...e6}.

If 18...\textit{\text{\text{c6}}}, then 19.e6 and it is not good for Black to follow with: 19...\textit{\text{\text{f8?}}} 20.\textit{\text{\text{xf8}}} \textit{\text{\text{xf8}}}

\textit{\text{\text{21.\textit{\text{\text{c6}}} hxc6 bxg6 22.dxc6 bxg6 23.\textit{\text{\text{c3!}}}}}} – because his king is vulnerable and his knight on a5 is out of action as before. Still after 19...\textit{\text{\text{g7}}, White failed to obtain any serious advantage, despite the unfavourable placement of Black’s rook on g7: 20.dxc6 (White can only draw with the line: 20.\textit{\text{\text{xf7}}} \textit{\text{\text{xf7}}} 21.\textit{\text{\text{xf6}}} \textit{\text{\text{xf6}}}

22.\textit{\text{\text{xf6}}} =) 20...\textit{\text{\text{xd3}}} 21.cxb7 (or 21.\textit{\text{\text{d1?}}} \textit{\text{\text{xe2}}} 22.c7 \textit{\text{\text{c6+}}}) 21...

\textit{\text{\text{xb7}}}

and here:

White will have to force a draw after: 22.\textit{\text{\text{xf7}}} \textit{\text{\text{xe2}}} 23.\textit{\text{\text{xf6}}} \textit{\text{\text{xf6}}} 24.\textit{\text{\text{xb7}}} \textit{\text{\text{c8!}}}

25.h4? (White’s only move, which would help him to save the day would be – 25.\textit{\text{\text{h1!}}, so that later he might manage to bring his rook back to the first rank, giving his e6-pawn in the process.)

25...\textit{\text{\text{xc2}}}

26.\textit{\text{\text{xf1}}} \textit{\text{\text{e3+}}} 27.\textit{\text{\text{h2}}} \textit{\text{\text{f4+}}} 28.\textit{\text{\text{h3}}}

\textit{\text{\text{g5+}}+ and Black’s attack was decisive in the game, Eibersberger – Walter, corr. 1992;}

It is not good for White either to continue here with: 22.\textit{\text{\text{xb7}}} \textit{\text{\text{xe2}}} 23.\textit{\text{\text{b1}} (or 23.\textit{\text{\text{xf7}}} \textit{\text{\text{e3+}}}

and \textit{\text{\text{c8}} and Black maintains the initiative) 23...\textit{\text{\text{xe6}. White now has to fight for the draw. In the game L.Christiansen – Diesen, Internet 2001, he played 24.\textit{\text{h3}}

and Black after the correct move 24...\textit{\text{c8}}, managed to preserve his rook on g7 and he remained with an extra exchange, because White was not able to capture on g7, due to the line: 25.\textit{\text{\text{xf7}}} \textit{\text{\text{e3+}} 26.\textit{\text{h2}}} \textit{\text{\text{f4+}};}

White equalizes after: 22.\textit{\text{xf4}}

\textit{\text{\text{e3+}} 23.\textit{\text{h1}}} \textit{\text{\text{c8}} 24.\textit{\text{c1}} \textit{\text{\text{d2}}

25.\textit{\text{d1}} (or 25.\textit{\text{\text{d1}}} \textit{\text{\text{x1}}} 26.\textit{\text{xd1}}

\textit{\text{g5}} 27.\textit{\text{d5}} \textit{\text{\text{c6}}} 28.\textit{\text{\text{xf7}}} \textit{\text{\text{xf7}}}

29.\textit{\text{\text{xe7}}} \textit{\text{\text{xe6}}} 30.\textit{\text{\text{f5+}}} \textit{\text{\text{f7=})}

25...\textit{\text{\text{e3=;}}}

He cannot achieve anything much after: 22.\textit{\text{\text{b2}}} \textit{\text{\text{c5}} (It is worse for Black to play: 22...\textit{\text{\text{d8}}

23.\textit{\text{\text{f4}}} \textit{\text{\text{e3+}} 24.\textit{\text{f1}} and here he even loses after: 24...\textit{\text{a5?}, Frederiks – Bulla, corr. 1994, 25.\textit{\text{b5}}

\textit{\text{\text{xe6}}} 26.\textit{\text{\text{d5++}}, while the other possibility for him in not so much better either: 24...\textit{\text{g5}} 25.\textit{\text{\text{b5}}}

\textit{\text{\text{xe6}}} 26.\textit{\text{\text{d5}}} \textit{\text{\text{xf4}} 27.\textit{\text{\text{b8+}}} \textit{\text{\text{f7}}

28.\textit{\text{d5}} \textit{\text{\text{g6}}} 29.\textit{\text{\text{e1+})} 23.\textit{\text{\text{b8+}}

\textit{\text{d8}} 24.\textit{\text{\text{d8+}} (or 24.\textit{\text{\text{b4}} \textit{\text{\text{xe6}}

25.\textit{\text{\text{b3}}} \textit{\text{\text{b6+}} 26.\textit{\text{\text{xb6}}} \textit{\text{axb6}} 27.\textit{\text{\text{xb6}}}

\textit{\text{\text{c5}}} 28.\textit{\text{\text{xf7}}} \textit{\text{\text{xa2=}) 24...}

\textit{\text{\text{xa8}}. White’s e6-pawn is isolated from the rest of his pieces, so he cannot obtain any advantage and after 25.\textit{\text{b5? (The correct line for White here is 25.Nd4}}

with equality, for example: 25...\textit{\text{\text{h8} 26.\textit{\text{c6}}} \textit{\text{\text{c8}}} 27.\textit{\text{\text{xa7}}} \textit{\text{\text{a8=)}}}}
25...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xe6}} 26.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xg7}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xg7}}} 27.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&b7}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d2}}} 28.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c3}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&f5}}} 29.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xa7}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&h4}}} - White is much worse, Frederiks - Watson, corr. 1998; }

He can also try here: 22.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d4}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d6}}} (or 22...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d8}}} 23.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xb7}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xd4}}} 24.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&f1}}}++; 22...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c5}}} 23.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c1}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&a4}}} 24.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xg7}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xg7}}} 25.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c7}}} 23.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&b3}}} (23.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d1}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c4}}} 23...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c4}}} 24.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c3}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d5}}} - White must now defend his e6-pawn permanently, so he can hardly rely on obtaining any real advantage.

\textbf{\textit{\underline{\textbf{d2a}})} 18...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\textit{f}xe5}}} 19.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\textit{\&x}xe5}}}

\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c8}}}

19...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c8}}} This is a strange move and its idea is for Black to play \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d6}}} on his next move and if White follows, as in the majority of the other variations with 20.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d2}}} (The game D'Alfonsi – Marks, Email 1999, followed with: 20.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&f4}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d6}}} 21.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d4}}} e5 22.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c3}}} exf4 23.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xa5}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&f5}}}+, but White had no compensation at all for his material deficit.), then Black plays 20...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c6}}} and White is forced to continue with a line, which is not favourable for him: 21.dxc6 \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xd3}}} 22.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&b2}}} (It would not work for White to try: 22.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c3}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xb1}}}+ 23.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&f2}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&f6}}} 24.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xe7}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&b6}}+} 25.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d4}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xc6}}} 26.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xf6}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d7}}}+; 22...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d6}}}+, or with: 21.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c3}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xd5}}} 22.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c4}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&f5}}} 23.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&b5}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&f6}}} 24.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xf7}}}+ \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xf7}}} 25.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d4}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&f6}}}) - and he has some compensation for the pawn, but not more...

White can opt for the line: 20.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&e1}}} and if 20...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d6}}} (or 20...b6 21.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&f4}}}++; 20...b5 21.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xb5}}} and Black has no other useful moves) 21.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d4}}} (or 21.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xd6}}} exd6 22.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&g3}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d7}}}) and White should not be afraid to enter the endgame. There might follow: 21...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d7}}} (or 21...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xe5}}} 22.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xe5}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d7}}} 23.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d6}}} - and White wins the e7-pawn with a double attack.) 22.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&e6}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xe5}}} 23.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xe5}}}. Now, Black cannot capture on e6: 23...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xe6}}} 24.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xe6}}}, meanwhile White is threatening \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&g5}} and Black's position is extremely passive anyway.

It is not good for Black to play in this line: 19...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&f5}}} 20.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xf5}}} gxf5 21.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&g3}}}+ \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&h8}}}, Jensen – Galow, corr. 1978, 22.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&d2}}} \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xd5}}} (The relatively best choice for him is: 22...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c8}}} 23.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c3}}}+ \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xc3}}} 24.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xc3}}}+ 23.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c3}}}+ \textit{\underline{\textbf{\&f6}}} 24.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c7}}}+. Now, White is attacking on a5 and e7 simultaneously and if Black follows with 24...\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&c6}}}, White wins with 25.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xf6}}}+ exf6 26.\textit{\underline{\textbf{\&xb7}}}-.

19...b5. This move is played with two ideas – to obtain the c4-square for the knight and to be able to check with the queen from b6. Its main drawback is that the b5-pawn is hanging in some lines and secondly Black's knight on a5 in left unprotected

263
and White can exploit that with his next move. 20.\( \text{c4!} \) (It is worse for White here to follow with 20.\( \text{c3} \) – because the bishop is not attacking Black's knight on a5 from there and Black can counter that with: 20...\( \text{b8} \) 21.\( \text{c3} \) 22.\( \text{e5} \) 22.\( \text{b8} \) and in the game Kavalek – Timman, Wijk aan Zee 1978, the opponents agreed to a draw.) and here:

20...\( \text{b6+} \) 21.\( \text{h1} \) \( \text{e8} \) 22.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{f6} \). Now, in the game Feichtinger – Siegler, corr. 1985, White continued with 23.\( \text{g3} \), with the idea to follow with \( \text{e4} \), but Black had the resource: 23...\( \text{b7} \) 24.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{c5} \) and White's logical reaction would have been: 25.\( \text{xf6+} \) 26.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{xd3} \) 27.\( \text{xd3=} \) with approximate equality.

We can suggest an improvement for White here – 23.a4. In case of 23...a6, the difference in comparison to the immediate transfer of the knight to the e4-square is that after: 24.axb5 axb5 25.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{b7} \) 26.\( \text{e4} \), in case of 26...\( \text{c5} \), White will follow with 27.\( \text{xf6+} \) 28.\( \text{d4=} \) – and Black's queen on b6 is hanging, he cannot capture on d3 and White remains with a powerful bishop pair and a clear advantage. If Black allows his opponent to capture on b5 – then the position remains almost the same, except that White has a pawn as a compensation: 23...\( \text{b7} \) 24.axb5 \( \text{d6} \) (or 24...\( \text{c5} \) 25.\( \text{c4=} \) 25.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{b7} \) 26.\( \text{c3=} \) – and Black's rook on f6 is not stronger at all than White's bishop on d4;

20...\( \text{c8} \) (It does not work for Black to play here: 20...\( \text{c4} \) 21.\( \text{xc4} \) bxc4 22.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{f6} \), in view of 23.d6= – and White wins material.) 21.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{f6} \) (After: 21...\( \text{xc3} \) 22.\( \text{xc3=} \) in the game Tarjan – Frasco, USA 1978, White had an overwhelming positional advantage in a position with material equality.) 22.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{b7} \), Termorshuizen – Legemaat, corr. 1993 (Or 22...\( \text{c4} \) 23.\( \text{xc4} \) \( \text{xc4} \) 24.\( \text{e4=} \) and now White's best line would be to play immediately: 23.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{c5} \) (Or 23...\( \text{f5} \) 24.\( \text{xf6+} \) \( \text{exf6} \) 25.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{xd3} \) 26.\( \text{xd3=} \) – Black's king shelter seems to be quite unreliable without the dark-squared bishop.) 24.\( \text{xc5} \) \( \text{xc5} \) 25.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{c8} \) 26.\( \text{g4} \). White is threatening now g4-g5. (He achieves only a draw with the line: 26.d6 \( \text{f7} \) 27.\( \text{exe7} \) \( \text{exe7} \) 28.\( \text{exe7=} \) \( \text{exe7} \) 29.\( \text{xf6+} \) \( \text{xf6} \) 30.\( \text{xb5} \) \( \text{xb5} \) 31.\( \text{xb5} \) \( \text{c1=} \) 32.\( \text{f2} \) \( \text{c2=} \) 26...\( \text{h6} \) 27.\( \text{h4} \) (White could have simply captured the pawn here – 27.\( \text{exe6=} \) 27...\( \text{f8} \) 28.\( \text{d6} \) (Now, it is not so clear if White plays: 28.g5 \( \text{hxg5} \) 29.\( \text{hxg5} \) \( \text{xf3} \) 30.\( \text{exe6} \) because of 30...\( \text{h3=} \) 28...\( \text{f7} \) 29.\( \text{h5} \) and White has a powerful attack, for example: 29...\( \text{xd6} \) 30.\( \text{exe6=} \) \( \text{exe6} \) 31.\( \text{hxg6+} \) \( \text{exe6} \) 32.\( \text{exe4} \) \( \text{f7} \) 33.\( \text{h7} \) \( \text{e8} \) 34.\( \text{g7=} \).

19...\( \text{b6} \). This move is more precise, but still it is more pas-
sive too than 19...b5 – Black protects his knight on a5 and he frees his queen for the maneuver \( \text{d}8-\text{c}7 \). 20.\text{d}2 \text{c}8 (It is worse for Black to try: 20...\text{b}7 21.\text{c}3 \text{f}6 22.\text{g}3 \text{d}6 23.\text{e}1\uparrow, because White's kingside initiative is very dangerous. Later, in the game Donner–Ree, Amsterdam 1971, there followed: 23...\text{b}5 24.\text{b}1 \text{c}8 25.\text{h}5! and White won the exchange with a great advantage.) 21.\text{c}3 \text{f}6 22.\text{g}3 (In the game Dokhoian–Huzman, Uzhgorod 1987, White followed with 22.\text{d}4, but after 22...\text{e}8 – he had to attack on his next move again the d5-square with his bishop or his rook and that led to a draw by a repetition of moves: 23.\text{e}4 \text{d}6 24.\text{e}5 \text{f}6 25.\text{e}4 \text{d}6 26.\text{e}5. In fact, White could have brought his queen to d4 with a tempo: 22.\text{e}3 \text{d}6 23.\text{d}4 \text{f}6 and here 24.\text{g}3\pm, obtaining an extra tempo in comparison to the game Dokhoian–Huzman, Uzhgorod 1987.) 22...\text{e}6?! (It was better for Black to exchange queens, giving back the exchange immediately: 22...\text{c}7 23.\text{xc}7 \text{xc}7 24.\text{xf}6 \text{exf}6 25.\text{e}1 \text{c}3 26.\text{e}7 \text{xd}3 27.\text{xd}7 \text{f}5= with an equal endgame.) 23.\text{xa}5 \text{bxa}5 24.\text{a}6 \text{c}5 25.\text{e}4 \text{xd}5 26.\text{xf}6+ \text{xf}6 27.\text{xf}6\pm and White has the better king in that middle game and a superior pawn-structure in the endgame, Liebowitz–Hux, corr. 1988.

19...\text{b}8. Black loses his knight on a5 if he exchanges queens. 20.\text{xb}8+ (White must capture the enemy piece. It is worse for him to follow with: 20.\text{d}4 \text{b}5 21.\text{h}1 \text{b}6= Laflair–G.Hernandez, New York 1992, or 20...\text{d}6 21.\text{d}2 \text{b}6 22.\text{c}3 \text{f}6 and White has nothing better than to repeat the moves: 23.\text{e}3 \text{d}6 24.\text{d}4= Li Shilong–van Wely, Bilbao 2004.) 20...\text{xb}8 21.\text{d}2 \text{f}5 22.\text{xf}5 \text{xf}5 23.\text{xa}5 \text{xd}5 24.\text{c}3\pm White has managed to take under control all possible squares for the penetration of Black's rooks. 24...b6 (Or 24...\text{f}7 25.\text{g}3 \text{b}5 and here White should not maneuver with his rook along the fourth rank – \text{b}1-\text{b}4-\text{f}4-\text{h}4 – as he did in the game Meskanen–Froberg, Finland 1988, but instead he had to play simply 26.\text{e}4\pm and then centralize his king.) 25.\text{f}2 \text{d}3 (Or 25...\text{c}8 26.\text{e}3 \text{f}7 and here not 27.\text{b}4 \text{e}5 28.\text{h}4 \text{h}5 29.\text{a}4 \text{a}5 30.\text{e}4 \text{dc}5 31.\text{d}3, Bruderle–Bontewecck, Germany 1989, corr. 2000, 31...\text{d}8+, but 27.\text{b}2\pm, in order then to remove the bishop from the c3-square and to redeploy the knight to the e4-outpost, or if as in the game – 27...\text{e}5, then 28.\text{e}4 \text{e}6 29.\text{f}4\pm) 26.\text{b}2 \text{c}8 27.\text{b}4 \text{f}7 28.\text{g}3\pm and White obtained a slight edge, but it was quite difficult to press it home, because Black would create a passed pawn on the queenside, Haik–Chiburdanidze, Montpellier 1986.)
Chapter 18

20.\textbf{d2}

White is threatening \textbf{c3} and he wishes to force Black to either give the exchange on the c3-square, or to place his rook on the unfavourable f6-square.

White achieves nothing much with: 20.\textbf{f4} \textbf{c7} and if 21.\textbf{xg6}, van der Heijden – P. Jansen, Netherlands 1987, then 21...\textbf{hxg6} 22.\textbf{g5} \textbf{c3} (It is the same after 22...\textbf{c5}+ 23.\textbf{h1} \textbf{c3}.) 23.\textbf{xg6} \textbf{d4}+ 24.\textbf{h1} \textbf{f6} 25.\textbf{h5} \textbf{g7} 26.\textbf{g7} \textbf{g7} – and White cannot proceed with his attack without the participation of the rook on b1, which has to protect the first rank.

\textbf{20...c5}

About 20...b6 21.\textbf{c3} – see 19...b6 20.\textbf{d2} \textbf{c8} 21.\textbf{c3}.

20...\textbf{c4} 21.\textbf{xc4} \textbf{xc4} 22.\textbf{c3} \textbf{xc3} (It is worse for Black to play here 22...\textbf{f6} 23.\textbf{d6}+ and his defensive construction on the long diagonal crumbles, for example: 23...\textbf{f7} 24.\textbf{dxe7} \textbf{xe7} 25.\textbf{xex7+} \textbf{xe7} 26.\textbf{xf6}+ \textbf{xf6} 27.\textbf{xb7} \textbf{e6} 28.\textbf{xa7} \textbf{c2} 29.\textbf{d4} \textbf{xa2} 30.\textbf{xh7} –) 23.\textbf{xc3}+ White’s pieces are more active and his pawn-structure is superior too.

Black’s rook on c5 can be attacked by White’s bishop, so it is better for him to play 20...\textbf{f5} (The tactical justification of that move is that after: 21.\textbf{c3} \textbf{xc3} 22.\textbf{xf5}, Black has the resource: 22...\textbf{xf3} and White cannot play the natural move 23.\textbf{e6}??, because of 23...\textbf{b6}+! and Black checkmates. Following 23.gxf3 \textbf{xf5}, Black remains with a material and positional advantage. It was unsatisfactory for White to continue with: 22.\textbf{xc3} \textbf{xd5} 23.\textbf{f4} \textbf{d6} 24.\textbf{xa5} \textbf{xd3} 25.\textbf{xh3} \textbf{d3} – since Black remained with a solid extra pawn in the game Galuska – Zacek, corr. 1999.) Evidently, White should better play: 21.\textbf{xf5} \textbf{c4} 22.\textbf{d4} (or 22.\textbf{e6} gxf5 23.\textbf{c3} \textbf{b6} \textbf{d6} – and it is not clear how White can exploit the vulnerability of the long diagonal.) 22...\textbf{xf5} 23.\textbf{c3} e5 24.\textbf{dxe6} \textbf{xd4}+ 25.\textbf{xd4} \textbf{d5} 26.\textbf{e2}, White’s e6-pawn is cut off from the rest of his forces and he can hardly play for a win.

\textbf{21.\textbf{d4}}

It is bad for White to follow with 21.\textbf{b4}? \textbf{c6}!; but it deserves attention for him to try: 21.\textbf{c3} \textbf{xc3} 22.\textbf{xc3} b6, Koplek – Schuett, corr. 1991 and here he could have maintained his advantage with: 23.\textbf{e1}+ \textbf{h4}–h5, preventing \textbf{f5}.

\textbf{21...b6} 22.\textbf{b4} \textbf{c8} 23.\textbf{c3} \textbf{f6}

Just like on move 21, the position after the immediate: 23...\textbf{xc3} 24.\textbf{xc3} is in favour of
White, meanwhile he preserves his advantage even after the exchange of the bishops on f5, because of his safer king.

24.\(\triangle g3\)

It is more ambitious for White to try here 24.\(\triangle a1\)!, not exchanging his bishop for Black's rook. Following: 24...\(\triangle f5\) 25.\(\triangle xf5\) gxf5 26.\(\triangle f4\) White has excellent attacking prospects in view of the threats \(\triangle h5\) and \(\triangle f2\)-g3, De Lagontrie – Gibney, corr. 1990.

24...\(\triangle xc3\) 25.\(\triangle xc3\) \(\triangle c8\)

It is also possible for Black to continue with: 25...\(\triangle d6\) 26.\(\triangle e4\) \(\triangle c8\) 27.\(\triangle e3\) \(\triangle c4\) 28.\(\triangle g5\) \(\triangle c5+\) 29.\(\triangle h1\), but White preserves some edge, because of his superior king shelter, Pinter – Komljenovic, Bad Woerishofen 1986.

26.\(\triangle d4\) \(\triangle b7\)

27.\(\triangle e4\) \(\triangle f7\), Lechtrynsky – Jansa, Namestovo 1987 and here after 28.\(\triangle e3\)!, White could have seized the c-file from Black's queen and he would have obtained a great advantage, because Black would have no real counterplay at all.

Accordingly, in the variation with capturing on e5, Black obtains a good game with the line:

18...f5 19.\(\triangle xe5\) \(\triangle c8\) 20.\(\triangle d2\) \(\triangle f5\).

\(\text{d2b) 18...e6}\)

19.\(\triangle f4\) \(\triangle xe5\)

In answer to 19...\(\triangle e7\), in the game Voltolini – Ernst, Bolzano 1990, White played: 20.exf6 \(\triangle xf6\) (It deserved attention for Black to try here: 20...\(\triangle c5+\) 21.\(\triangle h1\) exd5.) 21.\(\triangle xf6\) \(\triangle xf6\) 22.dxe6 (It is also not bad for White to continue with: 22.\(\triangle g5\) \(\triangle xf4\) 23.\(\triangle xf4\) exd5 24.\(\triangle d2\) b6 25.\(\triangle xa5\) bxa5 26.\(\triangle b7\) – and he does not risk losing at all.) 22...\(\triangle xe6\) and the position becomes quite equal after: 23.\(\triangle b5\) b6 24.\(\triangle xe6\) \(\triangle xe6\) 25.\(\triangle e4\) \(\triangle xe4\) 26.fxe4 \(\triangle f7\), or 23.\(\triangle g5\) \(\triangle xf4\) 24.\(\triangle xf4\) \(\triangle xa2\) 25.\(\triangle a1\) \(\triangle c4\) 26.\(\triangle e4\) \(\triangle c6\) 27.\(\triangle b1\).

White can improve his game with: 20.\(\triangle c3\), bringing his queen closer to the kingside: 20...b6 (The move 20...f5 is not so good anymore in view of: 21.dxe6 \(\triangle xe6\) 22.\(\triangle xe5\), with a double attack against e6 and a5.) 21.d6 \(\triangle d8\). It has become obvious now that Black has lost two tempi in vain by maiming White's pawn.
to the d6-square. White should exploit the time gained by playing sharply: 22.\(\text{\text{d}}\text{xg6 hgx6 23.}\text{\text{h}}\text{xg6}\) and his attack is very powerful – he is threatening to bring his queen to g3, for example: 23...f5 (or 23...\(\text{\text{c}}\text{c8 24.}\text{\text{e}}\text{e1 fxe5 25.}\text{\text{b4 with an attack for White}}\) 24.f4→.

20.\(\text{\text{f}}\text{xe5}\)

It is a mistake for White to follow with: 20.dxe6 \(\text{\text{x}}\text{e6 21.}\text{\text{f}}\text{xe5}\) (He has no compensation after: 21.\(\text{\text{x}}\text{e6 xxd3 22.}\text{\text{d1 f5 23.}\text{\text{g5 d7 24.g4 ad8-- because he cannot even open the long diagonal, Hidalgo – Andersen, Email 1998.}}\) 21...\(\text{\text{xa2}}\) (It is inferior for Black to try: 21...\(\text{\text{f}}\text{5 -- his bishop must control the a2-g8 diagonal. 22.}\text{\text{xf5 xf5 23.}\text{\text{e6 f6 24.}\text{\text{d5 and Black is forced to give back the exchange: 24...}\text{\text{xb6 25.}\text{\text{d8 e3+ 26.}\text{\text{h1 xd8 27.xd8+ g7 28.\text{\text{xa5 and the opponents agreed to a draw in the game Plachetka – Langner, Namestovo 1987. Black’s attempt to avoid that line with 22...\text{\text{c6, can be countered by White with: 23.}\text{\text{e6 d4 24.}\text{\text{xb7 xe6 25.xe6\text{\text{x6 and he has a very good compensation for the queen.}}\) 22.}\text{\text{e1 (White had some practical chances left after: 22.}\text{\text{a1 c6 23.}\text{\text{e3 b3+)} 22...\text{c6 23.}\text{\text{b2 d4+ 24.}\text{\text{xd4 xd4-- and White’s position becomes hopeless after the exchange of queens, Pekarek – W.Schmidt, Prague 1987.}}\) White cannot obtain any ad-

20...\(\text{\text{exd5}}\)

It is interesting for Black to try 20...\(\text{\text{f6!}}\) ?. He gives back the exchange in the arising positions, but he thus reaches an
approximately equal endgame.
14.\textdollar{}a1 15.\textsterling{}a1 f6 16.\textsterling{}b1

21.\textdollar{}xg6! 

The other not so radical lines will not work here:

The variation: 21.\textsterling{}g5 \textdollar{}c6 22.\textsterling{}xd5 \textdollar{}e6\textsuperscript{f}, forces either the trade of queens, or the super important dark-squared bishop for White, Bruderle – Ihlenfeld, corr. 1986, for example: 23.\textsterling{}c5, Bruderle – Ihlenfeld, corr. 1986, 23...\textsterling{}d4+ 24.\textsterling{}xd4 \textdollar{}xd4 25.\textdollar{}xe6 \textdollar{}xe6\textsuperscript{f}.

21.\textdollar{}xd5 \textdollar{}c6! (Black should not retreat immediately his knight to c6, because he loses his control over the c4-square and White’s bishop can occupy it: 21...\textdollar{}c6, Landi – Larghi, corr. 1984, 22.\textsterling{}e3 \textdollar{}f5 23.\textdollar{}c4. The point here is that Black cannot play 23...\textdollar{}xb1\textsuperscript{f}, because of 24.\textsterling{}c3, Tuomala – Koskinen, Vantaa 1987 and White has the unavoidable threats of a check on e7 and a checkmate on g7, while after: 23...\textdollar{}a5 24.\textdollar{}e7+ \textdollar{}xe7 25.\textsterling{}xe7 \textdollar{}xc4 26.\textsterling{}b4 \textdollar{}xb1 27.\textdollar{}xc4 \textdollar{}f5 28.h4 \textdollar{}c8 29.\textdollar{}d4\textsuperscript{f} White has the edge in view of the vulnerable black king, moreover that he has the threat to deploy his bishop on the long diagonal.) 22.\textdollar{}e4 \textdollar{}c4 23.\textdollar{}d4 \textdollar{}b6 24.\textdollar{}xb6 \textdollar{}xd5 (Black can also play here 24...\textdollar{}xb6, because after 25.\textdollar{}d2, he can parry the threat \textdollar{}c3, forcing White’s queen to go back with: 25...\textdollar{}a4 26.\textsterling{}e5 \textsterling{}e8\textsuperscript{f} 25.\textdollar{}xg6+ hxg6 26.\textdollar{}xd5 \textsterling{}b6 27.\textsterling{}xb6 axb6\textsuperscript{f} and Black gradually pressed his material advantage home in the game Christiansen – Kudrin, Estes Park 1987.

21...\textdollar{}xg6 

Now, Black must capture the enemy piece as his most principled reaction.

His attempt at avoiding that with 21...\textdollar{}f6, leads to an advantage for White: 22.\textdollar{}g5 \textsterling{}g7 (Or 22...\textdollar{}xe5 23.\textdollar{}xe5 \textsterling{}g7 24.\textdollar{}f6\textsuperscript{f} and after White regains his exchange, his connected passed pawns on the kingside are stron-
Chapter 18

ger than Black’s queenside pawns.) 23.\textsuperscript{g}xg7+ \textsuperscript{g}xg7 (After: 23...\textsuperscript{x}xg7 24.\textsuperscript{e}e7+ \textsuperscript{f}f7 25.\textsuperscript{h}h6± White regains his exchange again and he maintains some edge.) 24.\textsuperscript{e}e5 \textsuperscript{f}f5 (the forced play continues...) 25.\textsuperscript{x}xf7 \textsuperscript{x}xd3 26.\textsuperscript{d}d1. Suddenly, it becomes clear that Black cannot follow with: 26...\textsuperscript{c}c4?! 27.\textsuperscript{d}d6 b5 (or 27...\textsuperscript{a}xa2? 28.\textsuperscript{a}a1 \textsuperscript{c}c4 29.\textsuperscript{b}b5! \textsuperscript{b}b3 30.\textsuperscript{d}d4— and White traps Black’s bishop quite amazingly!) 28.\textsuperscript{xc}xc4 dxc4 29.\textsuperscript{d}d7+ \textsuperscript{g}g8 (or 29...\textsuperscript{g}g6 30.\textsuperscript{d}d2 \textsuperscript{c}c6 31.\textsuperscript{e}e6— and Black loses his knight) 30. \textsuperscript{f}f6—, Black was forced to retreat with his king to a very unfavourable position and White had an overwhelming advantage. Black could have tried instead: 26...\textsuperscript{xf}xf7 27.\textsuperscript{xd}xd3+, but White’s bishop together with his connected passed pawns is much stronger than Black’s knight and his isolated passed pawns, Hovde – Slekeys, corr. 1988.

22.\textsuperscript{g}xg6 \textsuperscript{f}f6 23.\textsuperscript{xf}xf7+ \textsuperscript{xf}xf7

It is not so good for Black if he remains with a piece for three pawns after: 23...\textsuperscript{xf}xf7 24.\textsuperscript{xd}d5+ \textsuperscript{e}e6 25.\textsuperscript{xa}xa5 \textsuperscript{h}h6 26.\textsuperscript{xb}xb7+ \textsuperscript{g}g8 27.\textsuperscript{e}e5†.

24.\textsuperscript{b}b4

White is threatening: 25. \textsuperscript{g}g5+\textsuperscript{h}h7 26.\textsuperscript{h}h4, or 25.\textsuperscript{f}f4.

24...\textsuperscript{g}g6

The move 24...\textsuperscript{c}c4, closes the fourth rank at the price of letting White’s rook to an even juicier target – Black’s seventh rank: 25.\textsuperscript{g}g5+ \textsuperscript{h}h7 26.\textsuperscript{xb}xb7 \textsuperscript{d}d6.

25.\textsuperscript{g}g7 \textsuperscript{f}f5 (Or 27...\textsuperscript{e}e6 28.\textsuperscript{e}e5 \textsuperscript{f}f5 29.g4!?±; 27...\textsuperscript{xa}xa7 28.\textsuperscript{h}h5!± \textsuperscript{g}g8 29.\textsuperscript{xb}xb5+ \textsuperscript{f}f7 30.\textsuperscript{d}d7 and White has three pawns for the piece and an initiative, meanwhile he has managed to preserve the queens on the board, so that he can exploit the compromised shelter of Black’s king.) 28.\textsuperscript{e}e5 \textsuperscript{g}g8 29.\textsuperscript{f}f4± and the pin on the seventh rank is quite annoying for Black, although White cannot achieve immediately anything decisive out of it.

25.\textsuperscript{xd}d5+

It is worse for White to play here: 25.\textsuperscript{h}h4 \textsuperscript{d}d6 26.\textsuperscript{xd}d5+ \textsuperscript{e}e6 27.\textsuperscript{b}b5 \textsuperscript{f}f6 28.\textsuperscript{xb}xb7 (It is more resilient for White to try 28.\textsuperscript{h}h5, but after 28...\textsuperscript{d}d8†, Black has the material advantage and White’s king is endangered.) 28...\textsuperscript{a}a1+ and in the game Frederiks – Wallner, corr. 1997, White resigned in view of the line: 29. \textsuperscript{f}f2 \textsuperscript{b}b8 30.\textsuperscript{xc}xc6 \textsuperscript{b}b2+ 31.\textsuperscript{e}e3 \textsuperscript{e}e1+.

25...\textsuperscript{e}e6 26.\textsuperscript{d}d2 \textsuperscript{b}6

It is also possible for Black here to bring his knight to the d5-outpost: 26...\textsuperscript{c}c4 27.\textsuperscript{f}f4 \textsuperscript{b}6∞.

27.\textsuperscript{b}b5 \textsuperscript{h}h7

270
Black’s king shelter has been compromised indeed, but it is not clear how White can bring his rook into the attack. Later, in the game Diesner – Traut, corr. 1995, there followed: 28.\&e3 a6 29.\&xb6 \&c4 30.\&b7+ \&g8 31.\&d4 \&xe3 32.\&xe3 \&xa2 33.\&b6 \&xf5 34.g4 \&d5 35.\&g6+ \&f7 36.\&g5 \&d1+ 37.\&g2 \&c2+ 38.\&g3 \&c7+ 39.\&e5∞ – and Black’s position is rather unpleasant to defend, because his king is practically bare. We were losing after: 28...\&c8? 29.\&e1, but instead it deserved a serious attention for him to try 28...\&f8, with the idea to go to f5 with the rook and not to let his opponent’s rook to the kingside: White could not continue with: 29.\&g5 \&b1+, while in the lines: 29.\&d6 \&f5 30.\&e7+ \&f7 31.\&xf5 (or 31.\&h4+ \&h5) 31...\&xf5 and 29.\&d4 \&f5 30.\&h4+ \&g7, White will have to fight for a draw.

The complications arising after: 18...e6 19.\&f4 fxe5, are not so dangerous for Black – his king is devoid of a pawn-shelter indeed, but he manages to defend it with his pieces. As a result, there appears a situation, in which White has two pawns for a piece, but his insufficient attacking forces are not capable of creating any real threats.

e) 16...\&e8!?

(diagram)

This is a good move, which has not been tested in practice enough yet. The retreat of the rook here is not forced, but still it is useful for Black to deprive White of the future resource of attacking the rook on f8 with tempo with the move \&h6.

17.\&f4

Now, White can play 17.\&h6 and he can transpose to the line: 16.\&h6 \&e8 17.\&b1 – see Chapter 19.

In case of 17.\&d4, Black can again retreat with the bishop to the f7-square: 17...\&f7 (It is worse for him to play: 17...\&d7 18.e5 e6 19.exf6 exd5 20.\&g5 \&f7 21.\&h4 \&h8 22.\&f4→ and White has a powerful attack, De Boer – F.Visser, corr. 1986.) 18.\&b5 (After 18.f4, Friedrich – Wokura, corr. 1989, Black can play 18...b6\&f7 \&a7, since the move 19.\&b5 is harmless for him when his pawn is on f4 – 19...\&f8 and White does not have the possibility \&e3-h6.) 18...e5, Ledwidge – Bradley, IECG 1995, 19.\&a4 \&e7∞. Black saves his rook, for example after: 20.\&c5 \&c7 21.\&b4 \&cc8, while for the eventual plan with f3-f4, White’s pieces (the queen and the rook) are placed far from perfectly on the queenside.
Now, as well as on the next move, it deserves attention for White to try 17...d4, in order to advance e4-e5, not allowing Black, after the exchange on e5 and capturing ³xe5, to try to exchange queens with the move ³d6. It is too risky for Black to play in answer to that 17...f4 (Instead he should continue with 17...f7 18.d4, after which there arises a position, which we have analyzed in the following move-order: 17.d4 f7 18.d4.) 18.d4 – now it is too dangerous for Black to leave his g6-pawn unprotected with a rook on e8. In the game Hauser – Saering, Eppingen 2004, there followed later: 18...³f8 (or 18...e5 19.dxe6 ³xe6 20.³xf6) 19.e5 b6 20.³e1 ³c8 21.d6 fxe5 22.³xe5 ³f7 (or 22...exd6 23.³xd6 ³f7 24.³d5 ³e7) 23.³d5 e6 (Or 23...³c6 24.³xe7+ ³xe7 25.dxe7 and Black cannot play 25...³xd3, because of 26.³h8 and White checkmates.) and here the simplest line for White is: 24.³f6 ³e8 25.³e7+. 17...³d7?

It is not so good for Black to retreat to d7 with his bishop: 17...³d7?! 18.e5!+ – and the g6-pawn is hanging and Black is deprived of his standard counterplay on the queenside. Later, in the game Azam – Kniest, Email 1998, there followed: 18...b6 (Or 18...fxe5 19.³xe5 ³f8 20.³h5 and Black loses after: 20...gxh5 21.³g5+ ³h8 22.³xh5 ³f5 23.³xf5+, as well as after: 20...³f6 21.³c5 ³f7 22.³e1+) 19.e6 ³c8 and here White should simply bring his queen into the attack with 20.³d4 and the sacrifice on g6 will be practically decisive: 20...³b7 (20...³d6 21.³xg6+–) 21.³xg6 ³xe6 22.³h4 ³c5 23.³f8++. 18.³b5

Now, White cannot attack Black’s rook on f8 with the move ³e3-h6, so it is hardly advisable for him to force Black’s rook to occupy that square: 18.³b5 ³f8 19.h4 a6 20.³e2 b5 (Here, White’s bishop on b5 provides Black with a tempo to bring the knight on a5 into action via the c4-square.) 21.e5 fxe5 22.³xe5 ³d6 23.³g5 ³f6 and White’s compensation is insufficient. Later, the game Nieuwenhuis – Timman, Utrecht 1986, followed with: 24.³h6 ³g7 25.³g5 ³f6 26.³h6 ³c4 27.³xc4 bxc4 28.³b6 (In case of 28.³d1, Black can parry the threat ³e3-d4 with the move 28...c3 and White cannot continue with 29.³d4?, due to 29...c2+) 28...³a1+ 29.³f2 ³ab8 30.³e2 ³g7 31.³g5 ³xb6 32.³xb6 ³f6+ and White remains an exchange down without any compensation whatsoever.

In case White follows with 18.e5, then Black can counter that analogously to the main line with: 18...fxe5 19.³xe5 ³d6+. It is obviously the best for White to play 18.³d4!? , with the following eventual developments:
18...b6. Now, White obtains no advantage with the immediate pawn-break: 19.e5 £xd5 (It deserved attention for Black to play here: 19...g5 20.e6 gxf4 21.exf7+ £xf7=) 20.£xd5 £xe5 21.£xb6 (or 21.£xe5 £xd5 22.£e4 £f7 23.£xa8 £xa8=) 21...£xd5 22.£e4 £d2 23.£d1 £b4 – and the position will be approximately equal after White regains the exchange. He should consider 19.£d1, in order to prepare e4-e5: 19...£c7. This move is with the idea to attack the knight on f4 and to protect the g7-square along the seventh rank just in case. (or 19...£d7 20.e5 £xe5 21.£xe5£xe5; 19...£b7 20.£b5 £f8 21.e5£b7 (or 20...£ad8 21.£b5 £f8 22.d6 exd6 23.e6£; 20...g5 21.£e6 £xe6 22.dxe6£ 20...£ed8 21.£c1£ 21.£b5. This move forces Black to remove his rook from the e8-square and it creates the threat d5-d6 and if Black captures – then e5-e6. (The other moves are worse for White: 21.d6 exd6 22.exf6 £c5£ 21.exf6 £xf4 22.fxe7 £xe7=; 21.g3 g5 22.£e6 £xe6 23.dxe6 £c5 24. exf6 exf6 25.£xf6 £xd3 26.£xd3 £xe6£) 21...£ed8 (or 21...£f8 22. d6£; 22.£c1 £c5 23.d6 exd6 24.e6 £e8 25.£c4 and White preserves very dangerous threats) 22.£c1 £c5 (or 22...£b8 23.£c6£) 23.d6 exd6 24.e6£ and White wins a piece;

It is evident that Black should better follow on his move eighteen with 18...£c8, in order to prepare £c7, preventing White’s move £c1. There might follow: 19.£d1 (After: 19.e5 £xd5 20. exf6 £c6 21.fxe7 £d6 – Black parries all the threats and he preserves his material advantage; 19.£xa7 £d6 20.g3 e5 21. dxe6 £xe6! 22.£xe6 £xd3 23.£f4 £xf3 24.£xf6 £xe4 25.£f1 £c6 and Black exchanges queens and he equalizes.) 19...£c7 (or 19...a6 20.e5) 20.e5 £ed8 21.d6 £d7 with the idea to follow with Na5-c6 – and the assault of White’s pawns seems to be ineffective.

18...b6!

This is the most precise move for Black. White’s idea is that after e4-e5 and the exchange on e5 – Black’s knight on a5 is hanging. Meanwhile, Black’s queen cannot move because of that and White is threatening £d4 with a subsequent checkmate. Therefore, Black must protect his knight.

It is possible that the move 18...a6 is as good for Black, for example: 19.£b6 £c8 20.e5 (It is worse for White to play here: 20.£d4 £c7 21.d6 e5£ – because he fails to capture on f6, W.Gar-
cia – R.Alonso, Varadero 1987.) 20...fxe5 21.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash e\textbackslash t}} and here the move 21...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}c\textbackslash 7}}, repels White's queen from its wonderful placement in the centre and it leads to a draw. (Or 21...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}c\textbackslash 4}? 22.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash c\textbackslash 4}} 23.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash c\textbackslash 4}} 24.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}e\textbackslash 6}}! \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash e\textbackslash 6}} 24.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash e\textbackslash 6}}+ \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}h\textbackslash 8}} 25.d6=; 24...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}g\textbackslash 7}} 25.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash b\textbackslash 7}} and White’s material equivalent is quite sufficient and he has powerful threats on the dark squares and along the seventh rank.) 22.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}g\textbackslash 5}} (Or 22.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash g\textbackslash 6}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash e\textbackslash 5}} 23.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash e\textbackslash 5}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash d\textbackslash 5}} 24.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash h\textbackslash 7}}+ and White makes a draw by a perpetual, while after: 22.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}e\textbackslash 4}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}c\textbackslash 4}} 23.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}e\textbackslash 6}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}e\textbackslash 5}}, he will be forced to trade queens quite unfavourably.) 22...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}c\textbackslash 3}} and White had to sacrifice a piece, completely correctly, in order to achieve a draw by a perpetual: 23.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash g\textbackslash 6}} (or 23.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}f\textbackslash 2}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}c\textbackslash 4}}) 23...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash g\textbackslash 6}} 24.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash g\textbackslash 6}}+ hxg6 25.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash g\textbackslash 6}}+ \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}g\textbackslash 7}} 26.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}e\textbackslash 6}}+ \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}h\textbackslash 8}}, Krantz – Toro Solis de Ovando, corr. 1996, (or 26...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}f\textbackslash 7}} 27.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}h\textbackslash 7}}+ \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}g\textbackslash 7}} 28.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}h\textbackslash 6}}+ and White checkmates) and here White had to settle the issue in a draw with 27.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}h\textbackslash 3}}+ (He continued instead in the game with: 27.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}e\textbackslash 4}}? e6 28.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}d\textbackslash 4}} e5=) 27...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}g\textbackslash 8}} 28.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}e\textbackslash 6}}=.

\textbf{19.e5 fxe5 20.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}x\textbackslash e\textbackslash 5}} \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}d\textbackslash 6}}.}

Black neutralizes White’s threat \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}d\textbackslash 4}}, repelling his opponent’s queen from the e5-square and White’s compensation turns out to be insufficient.

The variation 16...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}e\textbackslash 8}}, without 17.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}h\textbackslash 6}}, seems to be quite acceptable for Black. White’s only serious chance to organize some attack is connected with the move 18.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}d\textbackslash 4}}, which still has not been tested in the tournament practice yet. The idea behind it is – \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}d\textbackslash 1}} and e4-e5. Meanwhile, Black’s position seems to be satisfactory after that too.

In conclusion, White’s move 16.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}b\textbackslash 1}}, does not seem to provide him with any advantage at all. Evidently, its drawback is that White does not create any immediate threats and it is only useful to prevent his opponent’s maneuver \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}d\textbackslash 8}}-\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}b\textbackslash 6}}. Black has a great choice of good defensive lines – 16...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}f\textbackslash 7}}, 16...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}d\textbackslash 7}}, 16...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}e\textbackslash 8}}. In general, White’s only hopes of achieving some advantage are connected with the thematic move 16.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash n}h\textbackslash 6}} and we are going to analyze it in details in our next chapters.
Chapter 19

1. d4 ♜f6 2. c4 g6 3. ♜c3 d5 4. cxd5 ♜xd5 5. e4 ♜xc3 6. bxc3 ♜g7 7. ♜c4 c5 8. ♜e2 ♜c6 9. ♜e3 0–0 10. 0–0 ♜g4 11. f3 ♜a5 12. ♜d3 cxd4 13. cxd4 ♜e6 14. d5 ♜xa1 15. ♜xa1 f6 16. ♜h6

The dark squares around Black’s king are vulnerable, his bishop on e6 is unstable and the knight on a5 is too far away from the kingside. All these circumstances are what White’s exchange-sacrifice is based on.

16...♗e8

It is too bad for Black to play 16...♖xd5?, because of 17. exd5 ♔xd5, van Mullem – Weyers, Colle 1999 and here the simplest way for White to obtain a decisive advantage would have been 18. ♔b1 ♔f7 19. ♔f4 ♔c5+ 20. ♔h1+–.

Black gives back the exchange deliberately sometimes with the hope of organizing a blockade of White’s central pawns on the dark squares. This is not so easy to accomplish, though... For example, after 16...♗f7, White can play 17. ♔xf8 ♔xf8 18. ♔d4 (It is weaker to play 18. ♔d4 because of 18...♔c8 19. ♔c1 and after 19...♔e5=, White’s central pawns are stopped.) 18...a6 (in case of 18...♔e6, White would not achieve anything substantial after: 19. dxe6 ♔xd4+ 20. ♔xd4, because of 20...♔d8!= Norri – Holmsten, Finland 2004, but it is much better for him to follow with: 19. ♔b4+! ♔g7 20. d6= and White maintains an overwhelming advantage because of his far-advanced passed d6-pawn) 19. ♔c1 ♔c8 20. ♔xc8 ♔xc8, and now in the game Niemetz – Huth, Hassloch 1997 White could have played 21. f4 b5 22. e5 ♔b7 23. ♔f2 ♔c5 24. e6 ♔e8 25. ♔xc5 ♔xc5 26. ♔e3 b4 27. ♔c1= with excellent chances for a win because of his super-active king despite the simplified position.

After 16...♖d7 17. ♔xf8 ♔b6+ (in case of 17...♔xf8 18. ♔c3 b6 19. ♔a6 ♔c8 20. ♔d3 ♔d7 21. ♔c7 ♔c8 22. ♔c1= as in the game Schon – Szymanski, Krakow

275
1996 the open c-file was in White’s hands, while after 17...\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}f8 18.d4 b5 19.f4 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{b}6 20.c1 e8 21.xb6 axb6 22.e5 d8 23.e6 e8 24.b1 as in the game Kharlov – Jelen, Ljubljana 2002, Black was cramped and he had problems defending his pawns on the queenside.) 18.d4! (White’s straight-forward central strategy was not working well after 18.h1 xf8 19.f4 c8 20.e5 e3 21.f3 d2 22.h3 c4 and Black’s pieces were penetrating. The move 18.d4, was not promising much either after 18...xf8 19.b1 d6 20.c3, and by playing 20...e5, as in the game L.Christiansen – Lagunow, Porz 1991, Black managed to organize a successful blockade of White’s central pawns on the dark squares.) 18...xd4+ 19.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}d4 xf8 20.c1 c8 21.xc8 xc8 22.f4! (White must act swiftly; otherwise after 22.xf2 e5! 23.dxe6 xe7 24.e3 xe6 25.xe6 xe6 26.f4 c6=, as in the game Elguezabal – Kuzawka, Alcobendas 1993, Black reached a quite satisfactory minor pieces endgame.) 22...f7 (Should Black slow down the preparation of his counterplay in the centre connected with the move e7-e6, then after 22...a6 23.f2 b5 24.e3 f7 25.f3 g4 26.e5 xf3 27.xf3 b7 28.e3= he might have to suffer against a long-term positional pressure, Gustafsson – Oral, Germany 2005.) 23.e5! (This was much stronger than 23.f2 a6 24.e3 e6 25.xe6 xe6 26.dxe6+ xe6 27.d4 as in the game Palo – Ruck, Istanbul 2003, although White had some edge there too.) 23...fxe5 24.fxe5 b6 25.f2 b7 26.e4, and Black has to defend a difficult minor pieces endgame, moreover his knight at the edge of the board can not join the action easily at all. Black loses after 26...c4? 27.d6+–.)

The queen check 16...b6+ is not very popular. After 17.d4!? (In case of 17.h1 White must consider 17...d7 and now after 18.e5! fxe5 19.xe5 f6! 20.c7 f8 21.xa5 g5 22.d6 xh6 23.dxe7 xe8, the position is very complicated, but White’s edge is far from clear. In case White plays 18.b1, he preserves his advantage after: 18...d6 19.xf8 xf8 20.d4 b6 21.f4 e5 22.dxe6 xe6 23.f5 Svirjov – Kalygin, Alushta 2004, as well as after: 18...c5 19.c1 a3, but Black can play: 18...f2! 19.c3 b6 20.xf8 c8=, or 19.xf8 xf8 20.c3 e3! 21.d1 b6 22.c7 a4= and he still has equal chances.) 17...d7 (if 17...fd8, then 18.b1=) 18.b1 c5 (It is essential that after 18...d6 19.c3! in answer to 19.e5 White’s dark-squared bishop is still active and he has 20.f4 ac8 21.fxe5!? xc3 22.e6± with a clear advantage, while after 19...b6 White can play 20.xf8 xf8 21.a6± and Black must surrender the c-file.) 19.
Hc1 Hb6 (After 19...Ha3 20.Hxf8 Hxf8 21.Hc3 Hxc3 22.Hxc3 Hc8 23.Hxc8+ Hxc8 24.f4± White preserves a clear advantage despite the considerable simplifications. The black knight will remain isolated at the edge of the board for a long time to come.) 20.Hxf8 Hxf8 21.h4!? (It is not so precise for White to play 21.Hh1, Bergsson – Kjartansson, Reykjavik 2004, due to 21...g5!? 21...Hd8 22.Hh1± and in the game D. Bronstein – Boleslavsky, Budapest 1950, White preserved a strong pressure.

17.Hb1

This move was introduced by Salo Flohr. The main continuation 17.Hh1 will be examined in details in Chapters 20 and 21.

The alternatives are clearly worse, for example 17.Hf4?! Hf7 18.Hh1 (18.e5, Shamkovich – Afansev, USSR 1956, does not work because of 18...Hxd5 19. exf6 exf6 20.Hxd5 Hxd5 21.Hxf6 Hxe5+) 18...He71+ and in the game Raessler – Manigk, corr. 1989, White’s initiative subsided. In case of 17.Hd2 Black can play 17...Hf7 (but not 17...b6, since after 18.Hb1 Black has to give back the exchange if he retreats with the bishop to f7: 19.Hb5 Hf8 20.Hh6 L.Christiansen – Gavrikov, Biel 1993, while after 18...Hd7 19.e5! White will have a dangerous attack.) 17...Hf7 18. He1 (White now fails to get back the exchange in the traditional fashion for this line with 18.Hb5, because Black plays 18...Hc6! 19. Hd4 Hxd4 20.Hxd4 e51+ 18...Hc61+ and Black is better.


If White tries 17.Hd4, then Black is safe after the other retreat of the bishop – 17...Hd7 (The other move 17...Hf7?!, is evidently weaker after 18.Hb5 e5 19.Hxe8 Hxe8 19.He2 g5 20.f41 Riley – Koehler, Denver 1969 or 18...Hb6 19.Hxe8 Hxe8 20.He3 Hc4 21.Hf2 Ha6 22.Hc1+ as it was played in the game Damjanovic – Mikhalchishin, Zagreb 1971, and White managed to get the exchange back with a big positional plus.). There might follow: 18.e5 (If White delays the
central pawn-break and plays instead 18.f4, then after 18...\(\text{c}8\) 19.f5 \(\text{c}4\) 20.fxg6 hxg6 21.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{g}4\) 22.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{xf}3\) 23.gxf3 \(\text{f}7\)\(\text{+}\), as in the game Minic – Gligoric, Belgrade 1964, Black succeeds to centralize his knight and consolidate his position completely. If White proceeds with a pawn-break in the centre – 19.e5, Black should counter that with: 19...\(\text{c}7\)\(\text{+}\) Liegel – Gerhardt, corr. 1987, or 19...\(\text{c}4\)\(\text{+}\) Ulms – Peters, Leipzig 1996, but only not 19...e6?, because after: 20.f5! exf5 21.e6 \(\text{a}4\) 22.\(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{c}2\) 23.\(\text{x}c2\) \(\text{x}c2\) 24.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{c}7\) 25.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{g}4\) – Sacripanti – V.Tatarenko, corr. 1971 and White’s attack against the black king was absolutely unstoppable.) 18...\(\text{c}8\) (But not 18...fxe5? due to 19.\(\text{e}6\)!! and after 19...\(\text{b}6\) 20.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{d}6\) 21.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{f}7\) 22.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{g}8\) 23.\(\text{x}e5\) \(\text{f}6\) 24.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{h}8\) 25.\(\text{d}2\) b6 26.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{g}7\) 27.d6\(\text{+}\) in the game L.Christiansen – Rao, Philadelphia 1988, Black failed to neutralize White’s attack, while in case of 18...e6 19.d6 fxe5 20.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{f}6\) 21.\(\text{c}2\), White had more than sufficient compensation for the exchange, Delva – Struss, corr. 1980) 19.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{c}7\) 20.e6 \(\text{a}4\) 21.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{c}3\)! (White cannot preserve the queens on the board anymore.) 22.\(\text{x}c3\) \(\text{x}c3\) 23.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{a}3\) 24.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{xb}5\) 25.\(\text{xb}5\) \(\text{d}8\) 26.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{c}6\) 27.\(\text{d}2\) g5 28.h4 and now in the game K.Grigorian – Beliaevsky, Vilnius 1975, Black could have played 28...\(\text{a}6\)! (White would have some really serious problems then.

The lines 17.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{d}7\) and 17...\(\text{f}7\), have already been analyzed earlier in Chapter 17 – see 16.\(\text{d}4\).

17...\(\text{a}6\)!

Black must play very carefully and this is the best move. The bishop will have to retreat from the e6-square sooner or later and Black will have to consider White’s central pawn-break e4-e5. White plays like that usually after the retreat of the bishop to d7, while after the retreat to f7 he brings his bishop to b5 most of the times.

For example after 17...\(\text{d}7\) there will follow 18.e5! (18.\(\text{f}4\)? \(\text{c}7\)\(\text{+}\) Loeffler – Graeser, corr. 1989). Now after 18...e6 (It is too bad for Black to play here 18...b5, because of 19.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{c}4\) 20.e6 \(\text{c}8\) 21.\(\text{f}4\) a6 22.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{h}8\) 23.\(\text{x}g6\)!\(\text{+}\) Cordes – Aigmueller, corr. 1979. Following 18...\(\text{f}5\) 19.\(\text{x}f5\) gxf5 20.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{f}7\) 21.\(\text{d}4\)\(\text{d}4\) – Oud – Vonach, Bad Woerishofen 2001, White’s attack is quite dangerous. After 18...\(\text{c}8\), it is possible for White to continue with
19.\textit{\texttt{d4!}} → and the threat e5-e6 is extremely difficult to parry. In case of 18...a6, White would follow with 19.\textit{\texttt{f4}}↑ and his kingside initiative is running smoothly, van der Heyden – Kramer, corr. 1988. Should Black defend with 18...\textit{\texttt{c7}}, then after: 19.exf6 exf6 20.\textit{\texttt{x6f6}}\textit{\texttt{c7}} Voracek – Sebenik, Mureck 1998, White’s compensation for the exchange is quite promising.) 19.exf6 \textit{\texttt{f7}} (19...e5 20.\textit{\texttt{g3 c8}}, Nasri – Sheripov, Tehran 2001, 21.\textit{\texttt{e4+}}) 20.\textit{\texttt{g5}}! (This is stronger than 20.\textit{\texttt{g7}}, because the complications after 20...\textit{\texttt{exd5}} 21.\textit{\texttt{xd4 f5}} 22.\textit{\texttt{xf5 xe2}} 23.\textit{\texttt{d3 e6}} 24.\textit{\texttt{b5 d6}} 25.\textit{\texttt{h4 g8}} 26.\textit{\texttt{h6 b6}} 27.\textit{\texttt{f7+ xf7}} 28.\textit{\texttt{g5 f8}} 29.\textit{\texttt{b4}}, as was played in the game Staniszewski – Tomaszewski, Poland 1986, in case of Black’s best 29...\textit{\texttt{g8}}! 30.\textit{\texttt{e7 e8}} 31.\textit{\texttt{xd6 e3+}} 32.\textit{\texttt{f2 xd3}} 33.\textit{\texttt{e1 c6}} 34.\textit{\texttt{e6+ h8}} 35.\textit{\texttt{h3 f5}} 36.\textit{\texttt{xf5 gx5}} 37.\textit{\texttt{b5 d8}} 38.\textit{\texttt{xd5 g8=}}, would have only lead to a draw.) 20...\textit{\texttt{exd5}} (after 20...\textit{\texttt{c6??}} 21.dxc6, in the game Neverov – Huzman, Uzhgorod 1987, Black had to resign because 21...\textit{\texttt{xd3}} was refuted by 22.\textit{\texttt{d1+}}) 21.\textit{\texttt{d4}}→ in the game Schoen – Birnboim, Netanya 1987, White had a strong initiative on the dark squares and good prospects for a kingside attack.

After 17...\textit{\texttt{c8}} White can play successfully 18.\textit{\texttt{d4 f7}} (if 18...\textit{\texttt{d7}}, White can play not only the obvious 19.\textit{\texttt{xa7}}, but also 19.\textit{\texttt{e5?! f5}} 20.\textit{\texttt{xf5 gxf5}} 21.d6\textit{\texttt{c4}} 22.\textit{\texttt{f2 h8}} 23.\textit{\texttt{d4 exd6}} 24.\textit{\texttt{xf5+}} with a clear advantage.) 19.\textit{\texttt{b5 e5}} 20.\textit{\texttt{xa7 e7}} 21.d6\textit{\texttt{e6}} 22.d7\textit{\texttt{a8}} 23.\textit{\texttt{c5}} and White’s powerful passed d-pawn is a great nuisance for Black. For example after 23...\textit{\texttt{b6}} 24.\textit{\texttt{xb6 xb6}} 25.\textit{\texttt{e3±}} Black had to give back the exchange.

Black fails to solve his problems with 17...\textit{\texttt{b6}} either. After 18.\textit{\texttt{f4}} (It is not so precise for White to play 18.\textit{\texttt{d4}} due to 18...\textit{\texttt{f7}} 19.\textit{\texttt{b5 e5}} and now after 20.\textit{\texttt{f2! e7}} 21.f4 \textit{\texttt{d6}} 22.fxe5 \textit{\texttt{fxe5}} 23.\textit{\texttt{c1 a6}} 24.\textit{\texttt{d3 d7}} 25.\textit{\texttt{h1 e8}} 26.\textit{\texttt{g1 f7}} 27.\textit{\texttt{a2}} in the game Atalik – Nikolaidis, Hania 1994, White kept some pressure on the dark squares, but the position was far from clear. The other manoeuvre with the knight 18.\textit{\texttt{d4}} is not played so often, but requires attention too, since after 18...\textit{\texttt{d7}} 19.e5!\textit{\texttt{e6}} as in the game Hanewinkel – Otto, Leipzig 1996, White could have played 20.\textit{\texttt{b5?!}}\textit{\texttt{d6}} with a good compensation for the exchange.) 18...\textit{\texttt{d7}} (In case of 18...\textit{\texttt{f7}} White could play 19.\textit{\texttt{b5?! d6}} 20.\textit{\texttt{xe8 xe8}} 21.\textit{\texttt{e1}} as in the game Farago – Wartlick, Deizisau 2002, and restore the material equality and preserve a strong initiative.) 19.e5!\textit{\texttt{c7}} (After 19...\textit{\texttt{f5}} 20.\textit{\texttt{xf5 gxf5}} 21.\textit{\texttt{e1 c4}} 22.\textit{\texttt{c6 d7}} 23.\textit{\texttt{xex6 exf6}} 24.\textit{\texttt{xf6 f7}} 25.\textit{\texttt{d4++}} as in the game Tarjan –
White, USA 1978, Black’s position was in ruins due to the weaknesses on the dark squares. After 19...\texttt{c8} White had a powerful argument 20.\texttt{d4} depriving Black’s bishop from the a4-square and creating the powerful threat e5-e6, now, after 20...\texttt{c5} in the game Delgado – Semenic, Las Vegas 2002, White could have followed with: 21.e6 \texttt{c8} 22.\texttt{exg6}+–, while 20...\texttt{f8} is obviously insufficient due to: 21.\texttt{xf8} \texttt{xf8} 22.\texttt{e1} \texttt{c5} 23.\texttt{exf6} exf6 24.\texttt{e6} ex6 25.\texttt{exe6} \texttt{c1}+ 26.\texttt{h2} \texttt{c5} 27.\texttt{xc5} \texttt{xc5} 28.d6 \texttt{d5} 29.\texttt{e3}+ Lombard – Garcia Rojas, corr. 2001.) 20.\texttt{xf6} exf6 21.\texttt{e6} (21.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{e5}+) 21...hxg6 (The careless move 21...\texttt{c5}+? reduced the control over the seventh rank and after: 22.\texttt{h1} hxg6 23.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{e7} 24.\texttt{e6}+ \texttt{h8} 25.\texttt{f6}+ \texttt{g8} 26.\texttt{d6}+– Black had to resign, Hauser – Kaczmarezyk, Eppingen 2004.) 21...hxg6 22.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{f5} 23.\texttt{xf5} gxf5 24.\texttt{g6}+ \texttt{h8} 25.\texttt{g5} \texttt{f8} 26.\texttt{f6}+ \texttt{xf6} 27.\texttt{xf6}+ \texttt{g7} 28.\texttt{xf5} and White already has three pawns for the piece.

Should Black play 17...\texttt{f7} in order to prevent the march of White’s e-pawn in the centre, then after 18...\texttt{b5} \texttt{b6}+ (Black’s attempt to sacrifice the exchange with 18...\texttt{d6} 19.\texttt{xe8} \texttt{xe8} 20.\texttt{c3} b6 21.\texttt{c1}+ in the game J.Pinter – Pribyl, Sochi 1981 or 18...\texttt{c8} 19.\texttt{xe8} \texttt{xe8} 20.\texttt{f4}+ Karsa – Deak, Hungary 1989, failed to solve his problems

White was dominant on the only open file and his positional advantage was quite obvious. It is probably right for Black to give his rook for White’s dark-squared bishop, if he decides to return the exchange, although even then after 18...\texttt{f8} 19.\texttt{xf8} \texttt{xf8} 20.\texttt{d4} b6 21.\texttt{a6}+ in the game Vaisser – Dorfman, Tallinn 1988, he did not equalize.) 19.\texttt{d4} \texttt{ed8} (19...\texttt{e8}?! 20.\texttt{d7} \texttt{a6} 21.\texttt{xc8} \texttt{xc8} 22.\texttt{d2} \texttt{c4} 23.\texttt{b4}+ Farago – Raicevic, Belgrade 1984) 20.\texttt{e3}! (It is weaker for White to play 20.\texttt{d2}, because after 20...\texttt{c7} White will have to comply with the repetition of moves – 21.\texttt{c1} \texttt{b6} 22.\texttt{b1}=, since after 21.\texttt{c3}?! \texttt{xc3} 22.\texttt{xc3} b6 23.\texttt{xa5} bxa5 24.\texttt{c6} \texttt{d7} Black would be better.) 20...\texttt{c5} (After 20...\texttt{d6} 21.\texttt{d2} b6 22.\texttt{a6}! \texttt{d7} 23.\texttt{e1}+ in the game Lukacs – Biro, Budapest 1984, White preserved his initiative compensating the exchange deficit.) 21.a4! (Weaker is 21.\texttt{f2} due to 21...\texttt{a3}+, or 21.\texttt{c1} because of 21...\texttt{a3}! 22.\texttt{c2} \texttt{d6} 23.\texttt{c3} a6 24.\texttt{f1} b6 25.\texttt{d4} \texttt{dc8}! 26.\texttt{xc8}+ \texttt{xc8} 27.\texttt{xc8}+ \texttt{g7}!, while after 21.\texttt{f5} \texttt{a3} 22.\texttt{c1} \texttt{c5}+ 23.\texttt{e3} \texttt{a3} 24.\texttt{c1} \texttt{c5}= in the game Gaalen – Van der Wiel, Gemini 1986 the opponents agreed to a draw.) 21...\texttt{a6} (but not 21...\texttt{dc8}? due to 22.\texttt{f5} \texttt{c7} 23.\texttt{d6}+) 22.\texttt{f1} (after 22.\texttt{f5} \texttt{c7} 23.\texttt{d6} \texttt{xd6} 24.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{xd6} 25.\texttt{f1} \texttt{c8} Black is slightly better) 22...\texttt{d6}
(if 22...c4, then 23...f2↑) 23. 
\[\text{d2 b6 24.\text{b2 }d8 25.\text{e1↑}
White’s initiative more than}
compensates the exchange, be-
cause Black has great problems
defending and keeping his extra
material.

\[\text{18.\text{d4}}
It is also interesting for White
to try 18.\text{f4 }f7, Schoppmeyer
– Hallier, corr. 1981, 19.e5 \text{xd5}
with the idea after 20.b4!? (in
case of 20.exf6 exf6 21.\text{xd5}
\text{xd5 22.xf6 e5+ Black de-
fends successfully) to bring his
rook to the attack of Black’s}
kingside. Still after 20...f7! (but
not 20...c6 due to 21.exf6! e5
22.d5! ?xb4 23.xb4 \text{b6 24.f1}
exf6 and now it be-
comes clear that Black cannot
play 24...xb4? because of 25.
\text{b2!!--}, while after 25.d5 \text{h4}
26.e3 White’s chances with
three pieces for two rooks are
preferable.) 21.e1 (It is impor-
tant that after 21.b1 e6 22.
\text{xg6 Black can save himself
with the calm 22...f5! 23.f4}
\text{c6+} 21...e6 (defending against
White’s threat 22.e6) 22.g3
(and now after 22.exf6 e5--), as

well as after 22.h5 \text{xd3 23.}
\text{xf6+ h8 24.h4 c6--} Black
defends successfully against
White’s attack preserving a de-
cisive material advantage, while
the line 22.h4 fx5! 23.g5
\text{d6-- leaves White in a hope-
less situation too.) and now by
playing 22.h8+ Black manages
to defend successfully and re-
main on top.

\[\text{18.\text{f7}}
Black can retreat now with
his bishop to f7 thanks to the
prophylactic move a7-a6.

After 18.d7 White plays the traditionally annoying for
Black pawn-break in the centre
19.e5! b5 20.e4 c8 21.e6\text{Bra}
ivoic – Ademi, Yugoslavia
1977 and has a quite sufficient
compensation for the exchange.

\[\text{19.b6}
After 19.a4 in the game Stanis-
lewski – W.Arencibia, Gausdal
1986, Black had to play 19...e6!±
with some edge. He is better too
after 19.f4 c8 20.f5 b5 21.fxg6
hxg6 22.a4 \text{c4 23.axb5 axb5
24.xb5 e5+ as in the game}
M.Popov – Toshkov, Bulgaria
1988, mostly because his knight
managed to occupy the powerful
e5-square.

\[\text{19.c8}
The move 19...e6? does not
work well after 20.d2! e5 21.
\text{e3+}, while after 19...e5?!
20.c5 c6 21.xb7 (It is also
possible for White to try 21.c4,
although after 21.b8 22.xb7
d7 23.d6 \text{f8± Black’s de-}
fence is easier.) 21...Ec8 22.Eb6± and White’s advantage is quite considerable.

20.Ee3

White’s rook definitely needs some additional protection. After 20.h4 Black can exploit the vulnerability of White’s rook with 20...Ec4!± and bring his knight into the action. If White plays 20.Eb4 now, then again the black knight with 20...Ec6! (here 20...Ec4 is not so effective due to 21.Exb7∞) 21.Eb1 (after 21.dxc6 Efxd3 22.cxb7 Ec2+ White loses) 21...Ec5± finds his way back into the centre of the board.

White with a clear advantage.

21.Edc3

This is the only way for White to keep the tension in the centre. 21.Ea4? was losing after 21...Exd5 22.Exa5 dxe4 23.Exe4 f5=+, and 21.d6?! is bad because of 21...Ec6±, Weisshaupt – Plassonke, Germany 1991.

In case of 21.Eh6?! Ec4 22.Exb7 Exd5 23.exd5 Ed6 24.Eb6, as in the game Shliperman – Shahade, New York 2000, Black had the simple but effective tactical strike 24...Edxe2! 25.Exe2 Edf5 26.Exf6 Edxh6± and White would have only marginal chances to save the game.


White’s powerful passed d-pawn is annoying Black considerably, but it hardly compensates the exchange.
Chapter 20

1.d4 ƒf6 2.c4 g6 3.¢c3 d5 4.cxd5 
xd5 5.e4 ¾xc3 6.bxc3 ½g7 7.¢c4  
c5 8.¢e2 ¾c6 9.¢e3 0–0 10.0–0  
¢g4 11.f3 ¾a5 12.¾d3 cxd4 13.  
cxd4 ¾e6 14.d5 ¾xa1 15.¾xa1 f6  
16.¾h6 ¾e8 17.¾h1? 

This prophylactic move was  
suggested by Max Euwe and it  
brought about a new wave of in-  
terest towards the exchange sac- 

tifice.

Black has tried numerous  
possibilities in the past fifty  
years since the appearance of  
that move: a) 17.a6, b) 17...  
¾d7, c) 17...¾c8 and 17...¾c8  
(Chapter 21).

It would be evidently weaker  
for Black to retreat the bishop  
immediately to f7. For example  
after 17...¾f7 there will follow  
18.¾b5 ¾f8 (After 18...e5 19.  
¾xe8 ¾xe8 20.¾c3 ¾b5 21.¾c1  
White managed not only to re-  
gain his sacrificed exchange,  
but he occupied the c-file too, Wu  
– Chakanyuka, Coventry 2005.  
It is worth mentioning that  
the trade 21...¾xe2 22.¾xa5±  
leads to a position with opposite  
coloured bishops present on the  
board, but Black is not out of the  
woods yet. The dark squares in  
his camp remain catastrophi-  

cally weak. It was more or less  
the same situation after: 18...  
¾b6 19.¾xe8 Ñxe8, Mirzanurov  
– Khakimov, Dagomys 2004 and  
White could have maintained his  
advantage here with the move  
20.¾c1±) 19.¾d4 ¾d6 20.¾xf8  
¾xf8 21.¾c3 b6 22.¾a6 ¾d8 23.  
¾c1± as in the game Adnan –  
Abdullah, Abudhabi 2000, and  
White restored the material bal- 
ance and kept a considerable po-  
sitional advantage because of the  
domination along the only open  
c-file.

We have to mention that it is  
very dangerous for Black to leave  
his knight without proper de- 
fence, before going further into  
the main lines. The careless  
17...¾d6? after 18.¾c3 b6 19.  
¾f4 ¾d8 20.de+– in the game  
Stocek – Gavrjushin, Pardubice  
1997, lead to a loss of a piece for  
Black.
a) 17...a6?!

Black plays just like in Chapter 19. It seems at first sight that the prophylactic move with the a-pawn here is even stronger because Black can simplify the position with the manoeuvre \( \text{d7-b5} \) utilizing the overburdened white pieces along the a6-f1 diagonal.

18.\( \text{\&f4} \)!

White brings his knight closer in order to prepare his kingside attack.

It is weaker to play 18.\( \text{\&e1} \text{f7} \) 19.\( \text{\&g3} \text{d6}\) as in the game Drentchev – Macieja, Rimavska Sobota 1992, or 18.f4 \( \text{c8} \) 19.f5 \( \text{\&f7}\) as in the game Thtiteca – Lavrenov, Antwerp 1997.

![Diagram](image)

Black’s bishop is forced to retreat now: a1) 18...\( \text{\&d7} \), or a2) 18...\( \text{\&f7} \).

a1) 18...\( \text{\&d7} \)

Black is now incapable to prevent White’s pawn-break in the centre.

19.e5!

This standard pawn-break is based mostly on the placement of the black bishop on d7. If

White plays somewhat slowly like 19.a4 e5 20.dxe6 \( \text{\&xe6} \) 21.\( \text{\&d1} \text{e7}\) or 19.\( \text{\&d1} \text{a4} \) 20.\( \text{\&e6} \text{d6} \) 21.\( \text{\&f4} \text{a3} \) 22.\( \text{\&c1} \text{d6} \) 23.\( \text{\&f4}\) he risks losing his advantage altogether.

19...\( \text{\&b5} \)

It seems now White will have to comply with the exchange of the light-squared bishops and that will reduce his pressure against Black’s kingside.

![Diagram](image)

20.\( \text{\&xg6}!! \)

This powerful tactical strike is totally destructive! Black’s task to defend his king becomes extremely complex now because his light pieces are away on the other side of the board and fail to help the timely defence of the king. White’s other moves justify Black’s idea to trade the light-squared bishops with the move a7-a6. For example, after 20.\( \text{\&e4?} \text{xf1} \) 21.\( \text{\&b1} \text{c4} \) 22.\( \text{\&xg6} \text{xe5} \) 23.\( \text{\&xh7+} \text{h8} \) 24.\( \text{\&g7+} \text{h8} \) 25.\( \text{\&e6+} \text{h8} \) 26.\( \text{\&xd8} \text{xd8} \) 27.\( \text{e4} \text{b5}-- \) in the game Riediger – Liepold, Furth 1999, White’s attack failed and Black remained with a decisive material advantage. In case of
20.\textbf{axb5 axb5 21.exf6} (White loses after 21.\textbf{xb1 due to 21...fxe5 22.\textbf{dxg6} \textbf{d6=}}) 21...exf6 22.\textbf{e6} \textbf{xd5} 23.\textbf{c7} (if 23.\textbf{xf6}, then 23...\textbf{d7=}) 23...\textbf{f7} 24.\textbf{exe8} \textbf{exe8} 25.\textbf{b1}\textsuperscript{=}. The position was simplified considerably, but Black was left with an extra pawn, doubled though...

\textbf{20...hxg6}

After 20...\textbf{xf1} 21.\textbf{hxh7+ h8} 22.\textbf{b1}+-- White is threatening the three move sequence - \textbf{g6=}, \textbf{f8=} and \textbf{h7=} and it is deadly for the black king.

\textbf{21.\textbf{b1}}

White is forcing the creation of additional weaknesses around the black king with this move.

\textbf{21...f5} 22.\textbf{e1}!

The white queen is headed now to attack the “Achilles heel” of the black position – the g6-pawn. 22.\textbf{gxg6} is obviously weaker, because after 22...\textbf{xd5} 23.\textbf{xf5} \textbf{d3}= the black queen joins in the defence of the kingside and White is forced after 24.\textbf{exe7+ exe7} 25.\textbf{g5+ h7} 26.\textbf{xe7}+ \textbf{h6=} to fight for a draw.

\textbf{22...\textbf{b6}}

Should Black capture the white rook 22...\textbf{xf1}, then after 23.\textbf{g3 b6} 24.d6! (in case of 24.e6 \textbf{gxg2}+ 25.\textbf{hxg2} \textbf{b2=} 26.\textbf{h3} \textbf{h8} 27.\textbf{hxg6} \textbf{f6} 28.\textbf{h5 g8} 29.\textbf{g5 h8} 30.\textbf{h6 f6} 31.\textbf{g5=} the best that White can hope for is a draw by repetition) 24...\textbf{gxg2}+ 25.\textbf{hxg2} \textbf{b2=} 26.\textbf{h3=} there arises the same position as in the main line by transposition.

After 22...\textbf{c4} 23.\textbf{g3} \textbf{exe5} 24.\textbf{xg6} \textbf{g4} 25.\textbf{fxg4} \textbf{d6} 26.\textbf{exe7=}! \textbf{exe7} 27.\textbf{gxg5+ h8} 28.\textbf{f6} \textbf{f7} 29.\textbf{h4 g8} 30.\textbf{f3=}-- White’s attack is again victorious.

\textbf{23.\textbf{g3}!}

This is consistent with White’s idea. The careless 23.e6 in the game Gustafsson – Hintze, Internet 2003, enabled Black with 23...\textbf{d4}! 24.\textbf{g1 h8} 25.\textbf{g5 c4=} to bring more pieces to the defence of his king.

\textbf{23...\textbf{xf1}}

Black could not defend the g6-pawn any better. After 23...\textbf{h7} 24.e6 \textbf{g8} 25.\textbf{h4 g7} 26.\textbf{hxg7+ xg7} 27.\textbf{xe7}+ \textbf{h6} 28.g4= he would be checkmated.

\begin{center}
\textbf{24.d6!}

Black has a huge material advantage (two rooks!) nevertheless his king is totally helpless.

\textbf{24... \textbf{gxg2}+ 25.\textbf{hxg2} \textbf{b2=} 26.\textbf{h3} \textbf{hxg6=} 27.\textbf{f8=}.}

\textbf{26.\textbf{h3} xe5} 27.\textbf{hxg6= h8}

\textbf{28.d7!}

This is the simplest. This position was played in the game
Negyesy – Gereben, Budapest 1951, and after 28...\f7 \g8 29.\h5! the opponents agreed to a draw and quite surprisingly at that. Black has an only move – 29...\g3 and after the forced 30.hxg3 \xd6 31.\g6+ \g8 32.\f4 \d8 33.\e5 \f8 34.\g6+ \g7 35.\e6+ \h7 36.\xf5+ \g8 37.\e6+ \h7 38.\b6 \c6 39.\xb7 \xe5 40.\xa8+ White's extra pawn advantage should be sufficient to win.

28...\ed8

The silicon monster suggested 28...\ec8 with the idea to bring the rook to the 6th rank, but it is not enough to save the game after 29.dxc8\+ \xc8 30.\e6 \g8 31.\h5 \g3+ 32.hxg3 \xe6 33.\d2+.

29.\f7 \g8 30.\h5+. Black has no satisfactory defence.

a2) 18...\f7

19.e5!

White breaks through in the centre here, just like in variation a1.

19...e6

In case of 19...\xd5 20.\d1+ Masse – Prahov, Montreal 2003 the pin along the d-file will be deadly for Black.

It is now much more interesting for Black to try: 19...g5 20.e6 gxf4 (After 20...\xe6, White wins with: 21.\b1! gxf4 22.\xh7+ \h8 23.\g7+! \xg7 24.\g6+ \h8 25.\h6+) 21.\xf7+!? (White can regain his sacrificed exchange with the help of the line: 21.\b1 \xd5 22.\xh7+ \h8 23.\f7 \xf7 24.\g6 \c4= Aubert – Harstad, Gausdal 2003, but he loses a considerable part of his initiative as a result.) 21...\xf7 22.\d1. Now, Black has an extra exchange, but his defence is extremely difficult. His king's shelter is under attack from White's powerful bishops and his knight on a5 cannot come back to the centre anytime soon. See, how the game might develop eventually: 22...\b6 (Black is doomed to a swift disaster after: 22...\h8?! 23.\b1 \d6 24.\f5 \e8 25.\e6 \d8 26.\c1 b5 27. a4+; in case of 22...\g8?! 23.\b1 e5 24.\xh7+ \h8 25.\f5, Black's king remains defenseless – 25...\e7 26.\g6 \g8 27.\c1+, while his attempt to bring his knight back into the defence 25...\c4, fails after: 26.\g6 \g8 27.\d6++; following 22...\d6 23.\f5 \g8 24.\d4 \g6, White has the pleasant choice between regaining his material, or continuing the attack with: 25.\e6+!? \e8 26.\xf4 \c5, Ravi – Harika, Mumbai 2004 and here it is very strong for him to follow with:
27.d6!→) 23.♖c1! (It is obviously bad for White to play here 23.♘f5?! due to 23...♗c4∞ Wornath – Dunsbach, Germany 2004, Black is threatening to exchange queens with 24...♗b2; in case of 23.♖xf4, Rau – Dourerassou, Balatonlelle 2003, Black counters with: 23...♗ad8! 24.♗xh7 e5 25.dxe6+ ♖xe6 26.♗c1 ♖c8∞ and his pieces become very active.)

23...♜e3 (Once White’s queen is redeployed to the kingside – the game will be immediately over: 23...♗b4?! 24.♗f5 ♕g8 25.♗c2 ♖h8 26.♗xh7 ♕g8 27.♗f5++, or

24...♔ed8 25.♖e6+ ♕g6 26.♖xf4 ♖c4 27.♗d2 ♖a4 28.♖c1 ♖c6

29.♖c7++; opening of the centre after: 23...e5?! 24.dxe6+ ♖xe6 25.♖xf4 ♖ae8 26.♗h4 ♖c5 27.♖d2 h5 28.♖b4 ♕g5 29.♖xg5 fxg5 30.♖xa5++ leads to a dangerous activation of White’s powerful bishops) 24.♗b1. Our analysis of that position shows that Black cannot save the day even if he gives up the exchange – 24...♖g8 25.♖e1! (White had to be careful here not to fall into the trap: 25.♖xh7? ♖xg2 26.♖xg2 ♖e2=) 25...♖f2 26.♖e2 ♖h4 27.♖b4 ♖ge8 28.♖xf4 b5 (This is an attempt by Black to bring his knight back into the action; otherwise his position would have been just terrible: 28...♖ad8 29.♖f5→) 29.♖f5 ♖c4 30.♖g4 f5 31.g3 ♖f6 32.♖h5+ ♕g8 33.♖e1!! (The “exchange”: 33.♖xe8 ♖xe8 34.♖e1 ♖f7±, would have presented Black’s queen with additional squares.) 33...♖ed8 34.♖e6 ♖d4 35.♖xe7 ♖xd5 36.♖g2! (White is threatening 37.♖c3, but he could not have played like that immediately – 36.♖c3, because of 36...♖d1+ 37.♖g2 ♖d2+ 38.♖xd2 ♖xd2+ 39.♖xd2 ♖xd2+ 36...♖d6 (In case of 36...♖d7 37.♖h6 ♖xe7 38.♖xe7 ♙e5 39.♖f7+ ♖h8 40.♖e6++, Black has no defence against the maneuver ♖g5-f6.) 37.♖f7+? (It is also possible for White to follow with: 37.♖e8!? ♖f6 38.♖c7++) 37...♖xf7 38.♖xf7 ♖xf7 39.♖xd6 ♖xd6 40.♖d2 ♖e7 41.♖h6+-.

20.dxe6 ♖xe6
20...♖xe6 21.♖xe6 ♖xd3 22.♗f4 ♖f5 23.e6 ♘e8, Petrov – Pamula, corr. 1982, 24.♗d5– and Black cannot defend his f6-square in that position.

21.exf6 ♖f7 22.♖d1

It is also possible to play 22.♗e4 ♘c6 23.♖d1 ♖a5 24.♖d5± as in the game Emodi – Juhasz, Budapest 1997, and it turned out that Black cannot defend easily against the threat 25.♖e7+!

22...♖c7 23.♖e4 ♖e5

24.♖d5!? (After 24.♖xe5 ♖xe5 25.♖d7 ♖e8 26.♖d5 ♖c6±
in the game Kobalija – Odeev, Linares 2001, White dissipated most of his advantage.) 24...\textit{\texttt{\#}}xa1 25.\textit{\texttt{\#}}xa1± and Black will have to give back his extra exchange and defend a rather difficult endgame subsequently.

\textbf{b) 17...\textit{\texttt{\#}}d7}

\begin{center}
\textbf{18.e5!}

White breaks immediately in the centre.

It is too slow to play 18.\textit{\texttt{\#}}e1 b6 19.\textit{\texttt{\#}}g3, because after 19...e5?! in the game De Raad – De Jong, Alkmaar 1982, Black consolidated his position in the centre.

\textbf{18...\textit{\texttt{\#}}c8}

About 18...a6 19.\textit{\texttt{\#}}f4 – see line \textit{\texttt{\#}}1.

After 18...\textit{\texttt{\#}}c7 19.e6 \textit{\texttt{\#}}a4 20.\textit{\texttt{\#}}b1 \textit{\texttt{\#}}ec8 21.\textit{\texttt{\#}}xg6 \textit{\texttt{\#}}c2 22.\textit{\texttt{\#}}f7± according to M. Euwe’s analysis White had a great advantage.

18...\textit{\texttt{\#}}f5?! does not work after 19.\textit{\texttt{\#}}xf5 gxf5 20.\textit{\texttt{\#}}f4! \textit{\texttt{\#}}c4 21.\textit{\texttt{\#}}e1++ and in the game Pavlovic – Olzem, Bad Woerishofen 2002, Black’s position was already totally resignable.

Black’s attempt to save the day with the help of an exchange-sacrifice: 18...\textit{\texttt{\#}}f8 19.\textit{\texttt{\#}}xf8 \textit{\texttt{\#}}xf8 20.f4 \textit{\texttt{\#}}c8 21.f5 g5, Alexanian – Orlyanskaya, Alushta 2005, fails to solve his problems. White can continue with the quite evident move 22.\textit{\texttt{\#}}d4!± with the idea to follow with 23.\textit{\texttt{\#}}e6+.

White can counter 18...e6 with 19.\textit{\texttt{\#}}f4 exd5 20.exf6 \textit{\texttt{\#}}f7 21.\textit{\texttt{\#}}d4↑ and his initiative is dangerous, Peters – Lam, Herts Congress 1999.

It is too risky for Black to try here 18...e6, because of 19.exf6! (After 19.\textit{\texttt{\#}}f4 exd5 20.exf6 \textit{\texttt{\#}}f7 21.\textit{\texttt{\#}}d4↑ Peters – Lam King Wai, Hichin 1999, White maintains his initiative and the game is not so sharp anymore.) 19...\textit{\texttt{\#}}f7 20.\textit{\texttt{\#}}g5

\begin{center}
\end{center}

And now:

in case Black tries to prevent the appearance of his opponent’s queen on the d4-square with the move 20...\textit{\texttt{\#}}b6, then White can find for it another way to go to the kingside anyway: 21.\textit{\texttt{\#}}e1! exd5 22.\textit{\texttt{\#}}h4 \textit{\texttt{\#}}h8 23.\textit{\texttt{\#}}e1 \textit{\texttt{\#}}c6 24.\textit{\texttt{\#}}c3 and here Black already loses after: 24...\textit{\texttt{\#}}ae8 25.\textit{\texttt{\#}}xe8 \textit{\texttt{\#}}xe8
26.\textit{\$}h6 \textit{\$}e6 27.\textit{\$}g7 \textit{\$}f2 28.\textit{\$}e2 \textit{\$}f1+ 29.\textit{\$}g1 \textit{\$}xd3 30.\textit{\$}xh8 \textit{\$}f7 31.\textit{\$}c8++, as well as after: 24... \textit{\$}a5 25.\textit{\$}c4 \textit{\$}e6 26.\textit{\$}xe6 \textit{\$}xe6 27.\textit{\$}xd5++. White can win even more spectacularly following the computer-recommendation: 23. \textit{\$}f4 \textit{\$}d4 24.\textit{\$}b5!! \textit{\$}xb5 25.\textit{\$}e1 \textit{\$}ae8 26.\textit{\$}xe8 \textit{\$}c6! 27.\textit{\$}e1 \textit{\$}b4 28.a3++; 20...\textit{\$}g3! 20...exd5 21.\textit{\$}d4! \textit{\$}c6 (After: 21...\textit{\$}f5 22.\textit{\$}h4 h5 23.\textit{\$}xf5 \textit{\$}xe2 24.f4!! \textit{\$}c6 25.\textit{\$}xg6+ \textit{\$}xg6 26. f5++, White wins by force.) 22. \textit{\$}h4 \textit{\$}h8 23.\textit{\$}f4 \textit{\$}a5 24.\textit{\$}xd5→ and White's attack is extremely dangerous.

19.\textit{\$}g3!

This is now much stronger than 19.\textit{\$}f4 \textit{\$}c4 – see Chapter 21.

19...\textit{\$}c4

In case of 19...\textit{\$}a4, White maintains a clear advantage after: 20.\textit{\$}e4 \textit{\$}xd5 21.exf6 e5 22.\textit{\$}g5 \textit{\$}c7 23.\textit{\$}b1± (M.Pruiskhin).

20.\textit{\$}xc4 \textit{\$}xc4 21.\textit{\$}e4 \textit{\$}b6 22.\textit{\$}d1!

This is an important moment. In case of 22.exf6, Black plays 22...\textit{\$}d4∞ and his queen manages to join into the defence of his kingside.

22...\textit{\$}xe4

Following 22...\textit{\$}c2, with the idea to continue with \textit{\$}b6-b2, White should not capture on f6 immediately, since he has the powerful intermediate move 23.\textit{\$}b1!+-.

23.fxe4 fxe5 24.\textit{\$}xe5 \textit{\$}f6 25.\textit{\$}g3!!

The other alternative for White – 25.\textit{\$}c7!? was suggested by GM M.Krasenkow. In case of 25...\textit{\$}g4 26.\textit{\$}c1 g5, White follows with 27.\textit{\$}g3±, while in answer to 25...\textit{\$}a4 26.\textit{\$}b1 g5, he has the resource 27.d6!± with the idea to capture Black's bishop with the move 28.\textit{\$}c4.

25...\textit{\$}e6

After 25...\textit{\$}c8 26.\textit{\$}g5 \textit{\$}g7 27.e5 \textit{\$}a4 28.\textit{\$}e1 \textit{\$}f7, Perdomo – Preuss, Buenos Aires 2004, White's advantage is decisive after: 29.e6 \textit{\$}g7 30.\textit{\$}a3++. It is possibly more resilient for Black to defend with 25... e5, but even then after 26.h3± White's advantage is beyond any doubt.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{Diagram 26}
\end{figure}

26.d6 e5 27.h3± and Black's position was rather difficult in the game P.Nielsen – McShane, Malme 2003.

c) 17...\textit{\$}c8

This retreat of the bishop to its initial square is not very popular. It has certain logic behind it. The black queen controls now White's d5-pawn and the
pawn break e4-e5 in the centre is not easy to accomplish.

18.\textbf{\textit{b1}}!?

White has several possibilities to fight for the initiative. Only time will tell what the best is. The main advantage of the move in the text is that after White breaks in the centre with e4-e5 he will be ready for sacrifices on g6. White’s light-squared bishop is also protected now and the black knight will not be able to get centralized easily by some tactical motives. White has also tried in practice: 18.\textbf{\textit{d4}} e6 (after 18...e5 19.\textbf{\textit{f2}}= White has some compensation for the exchange) 19.\textbf{\textit{b5}} and now in the game D.Bischoff – Fournell, Hohenlimburg 1978, the quite evident move 19...\textbf{\textit{d7}} was giving a certain edge to Black.

White has another interesting move besides the move in the text – 18.\textbf{\textit{d1}}!?. The idea is familiar – to prepare the central pawn break e4-e5. Now after 18...\textbf{\textit{d6}} (the preventive 18...e5?! does not work now because of 19.dxe6 \textbf{\textit{e7}} 20.\textbf{\textit{b5}} \textbf{\textit{d8}} 21.\textbf{\textit{xd8+}} \textbf{\textit{xd8}} 22.\textbf{\textit{f4+-}}, and in case of 18...\textbf{\textit{b6}} Black has to consider the pawn-break again 19.e5\textup{\textdagger} 19.\textbf{\textit{f4}} (if 19.\textbf{\textit{d2}} \textbf{\textit{c6}}!\textup{\textasciicircum}\textup{\textcircled{}} Black can exploit the fact that White’s light-squared bishop is temporary defenceless and centralize his knight) 19...\textbf{\textit{b4}} 20.e5 \textbf{\textit{f5}} 21.\textbf{\textit{xf5}} gxf5 22.\textbf{\textit{d4}}= and White had a sufficient compensation for the exchange.

White has tried in practice here:

18.\textbf{\textit{d4}} e6 (after 18...e5 19.\textbf{\textit{f2}}= White has some compensation for the exchange) 19.\textbf{\textit{b5}}, D.Bischoff – Fournell, Hagen 197 and here after the quite obvious move 19...\textbf{\textit{d7}} Black maintained a certain advantage;

In case of 18.\textbf{\textit{f4}}, Black can follow with 18...\textbf{\textit{d6}} (18...e5?! 19.dxe6 \textbf{\textit{xe6}} 20.\textbf{\textit{b5}} \textbf{\textit{c6}} 21.\textbf{\textit{xe6}} \textbf{\textit{xe6}} 22.\textbf{\textit{c4+}}) 19.\textbf{\textit{e1}} (after 19.\textbf{\textit{b5}} \textbf{\textit{d8}} 20.\textbf{\textit{d3}} a6 21.e5 fx\textbf{\textit{e5}}= White failed to obtain a sufficient compensation for the sacrificed material in the game Martinez Martin – Herrera, Mondariz 2000) and here he saves the day with: 19...\textbf{\textit{e5}}\textup{\textasciicircum} (after 19...\textbf{\textit{b4}}? 20.e5! \textbf{\textit{d7}} 21.\textbf{\textit{d6}}\rightarrow, Black comes under a crushing attack; while in case of 19...g5?, as a result of 20.e5! fx\textbf{\textit{e5}} 21.\textbf{\textit{e6}} \textbf{\textit{xe6}} 22.\textbf{\textit{xe5}}= he cannot save the immediate disaster either. Should Black try to prevent White’s breakthrough in the centre with the move 19...e5?!, then after 20.dxe6 \textbf{\textit{e5}} 21.\textbf{\textit{d5}}! \textbf{\textit{xa1}} 22.\textbf{\textit{xa1}} \textbf{\textit{xe6}} 23.\textbf{\textit{c7}}= White re-
stores the material balance and his positional advantage is obvious).

18...♖h8

This prophylactic is necessary because the pawn-break e4-e5 is coming. After 18...♗b6 19.♗b5! (It is weaker for White to play 19.♗e1 due to 19...♗c5—) 19...♗d8 20.♗b4 ♗d6 21.♗d2 a6 22.♗d3— and Black loses material. If he tries to prevent e4-e5 with 18...♗d6, after 19.♗b5! ♗d8 20.e5 fxe5 21.f4 b6 22.fxe5 ♘b7 23.♗f4— White’s attack is very powerful.

19.♖f4

Unfortunately for White after the standard 19.e5 Black plays 19...♗xd5 20.♗xg6 (after 20.♗f4 ♗f7= Black has an excellent position) 20...hxg6 21.♗xg6 ♗g8 22.♗h5 ♗xe5 23.♗g5+ ♗g7 24.♗h6+ ♗h8= and White has nothing more than a draw.

19...e5

After 19...♗g8 20.e5!— White’s attack is very strong. For example after 20...fxe5 21.♖a1! (It is weaker for White to play 21.♗b2? ♗d6 22.♖e1 ♗f6 23.♗xe5 ♘f5 24.♗xf5 ♗c4!++ and the black knight joins the action with a winning position for Black) 21...♗d6 22.♖e1 ♗f6 23.♗xe5 ♘f5 24.g4! ♘xd3 25.g5+— and White wins by force.

White has excellent attacking chances after 19...♗d6 20.♗b5 ♗d8 21.e5 fxe5 22.♖e1—, and in case of 19...e6 White plays the annoying 20.♗b5!±.

20.♕e2

After 20.dxe6 ♗xe6 21.♗b5 ♘c6 the black knight is centralized effortlessly. So it is not surprising that after 22.♗xc6 (22.♗b2 ♗e7 23.♗d5 ♘xd5 24.exd5 ♗e5!+) 22...bxc6 23.♖xe6 ♘xe6 24.♗b7 ♗e7 25.♗xc6 ♗d7= White will have to fight for a draw.

20...b6 21.f4=}

White has a good compensation for the exchange. He starts opening files on the kingside, while Black is still having problems completing his development on the queenside.
Chapter 21

1.d4 əf6 2.c4 g6 3.əc3 d5 4.cxd5 
əxd5 5.e4 əc3 6.bxc3 əg7 7.əc4 
c5 8.əe2 əc6 9.əe3 0–0 10.0–0 
əg4 11.f3 əa5 12.əd3 cxd4 13. 
cxd4 əe6 14.d5 əxa1 15.əxa1 f6 
16.əh6 əe8 17.əh1!? əc8

This move marks Black’s ba-
sic defensive line. He intends to 
bring back his knight into action 
via the c4-square as quickly as 
possible.

18.əf4

White is concentrating his 
pieces closer to the black king 
just like in the line a, Chapter 
20.

The pawn offensive 18.g4?! is 
evidently not good here. After 
18...əd7! (with the idea əc4-e5) 
19.g5 əc4 20.əxc4 əxc4 21.gxf6 
exf6 22.əf4 əf7+ as in the game 
Geller – Gavrikov, Riga 1985, 
Black easily refuted White’s 
strategy.

It is too slow for White to 
play 18.əd4. Black gradually 
manages to consolidate his posi-
tion then. After 18...əd7 (18... 
əf7 is weaker after 19.əxa7 e6 
20.əb5 əa8 21.əc5 exd5 22. 
əxe8 əxe8 and in the game 
Nasri – Niknaddaf, Teheran 
2001, White managed to equal-
ize with 23.əf4 dxe4 24.əd5 
əxd5 25.əxd5+ əf7 26.fxe4=; In 
case of 18...a6, V.Malinin – 
Hotting, corr. 1997, 19.əd1 əf7 
20.əb4, White is threatening 
əh6-d2 and Black is forced to 
pay the price of a pawn to get 
his knight back into the actions 
after: 20...b5 21.a4 əc4 22.axb5 
axb5 23.əd4 əb1 (in case of 
19.əxa7 the black knight be-
comes really powerful after 19... 
əc4 20.h4 əe5 21.əb1 əb5= and 
in the game Furman – Suetin, 
Kiev 1954, Black had a clear ad-
vantage) 19...əc7! (The position 
is deceptively calm. It is enough 
for Black to play just one impre-
cise move like – 19...b6?! and 
after 20.e5! əc5 21.əf4 əc7 22. 
əxg6! hxg6 23.exf6 it turned out 
that after the most natural 23... 
exf6 24.d6 əd8 25.əxg6→ White 
had an irresistible attack. In the 
game Deze – J.Pribyl, Zalaegerszeg 1977, Black preferred 23...
e5, but in that case, had White followed with 24...h4!→, his attack would have been extremely powerful. Black’s attempt to organize some counterplay with 24...c8, does not work, because of 25.f7+! xf7 26.xg6++ 20. xa7 c5 21. xc5 xc5 22.e3 c8 23.d2 c4 24.f4 It is hardly any better for White to play here: 24.xb7 xd2 25. xd7 a8 26.g1 a3 27.b5 xa2 28.d4 b8 29.h4 f8± V.Malinin – Brobakken, corr. 1998.) 24...b5 25.d4 g5± in the game Dreev – Gavrikov, Lviv 1987, Black sacrificed a pawn, but exchanged queens favourably will excellent chances for the future.

18...d7

Black has tried here to give back the exchange in order to stop White’s pawn-break in the centre. After 18...f7 White can still play 19.e5!? (He can restore the material equality with 19. b5 d6 20.xe8 xe8± as in the game Kuehne – Kretschmar, corr. 1985 or 19...c4 20.xe8 xe8 21.d3 d6± Heinrich – Szenczy, corr. 1987). Now after 19...xd5 (after the complications 19...g5 20.e6 gxf4 21.b1 xd5 22.xh7+ h8 23.exf7 xf7 24.g6 c4 25.xe8 xe8 26.c1 f7 as in the game Stocek – Zitin, Tallinn 1997, White could have achieved a considerable edge with 27.c7!? a6 28.xf4±) 20.d1 e6 21.exf6 (White can also try 21.e4, but after 21...

fxe5 22.xd5 exd5 23.xd5+ h8 24.xb7xb7 25.xd8 cxd8 26.e3 a6∞ his initiative is not running smoothly due to the weakness of the first rank.) 21.c7 22.b1 e5 (after 22...f7 23.g7 c4 24.e4! ed8 25.e1→ and Black has no satisfactory defence against the sacrifice 26.g6!) 23.xg6 xf6 24.xe8 xe8 25.d5 xh6 26.c3 g7 27.e4± and White’s advantage was quite considerable in the game Gustafsson – Bachmann, Dresden 2002.

19.e5

This is the traditional central pawn-break based on the placement of the bishop on d7. The attempt to attack the black king on the side with – 19.g4?, after 19..c7 20.e2 d6 21.h4 c4++ lead quickly to a lost position for White in the game Erozbek – Cherem, Nice 1974.

19..c4

Black centralizes his knight in order to bring it closer to the defence of his king. Black can try to stop the advance of White’s e-pawn with 19...e6?!, but that fails since White has several ways to
achieve a clear advantage. The best probably is: 20...e1! (after 20.dxe6 dxe6 in the game Kharlov – Mamedyarov, Batumi 2002, White could have played 21. b5!, recommended by GM M. Krasenkov and after 21...f5 22. xe8 xe8 23.d1 = Black would be forced to give back the exchange, because the alternative 21...d7?! would be really bad after 22.exf6 f7 23.d1 xb5 24.xd8 xd8 25.h3 c5 26. e1! c6 27.g5+ xg5 28.xg5 a4 29.d2++) 20...f7 (20...f5 21.g3 f7 22.xf5 exf5 23.e6+ xe6 24.dxe6+ xe6 25.dxe6 xe6 26.e1++; 20...exd5 21.g3 xe5 22.xg6 g5 23.xg5 fxg5 24.d6! hxg6 25.xg6+ f8 26.h6+ g8 27.h7+ f8 28. e1 f6 29.xd7++; 20...c4 21.g3 xe5 22.xg6 hxg6 23. xg6 h8 24.xe8 e7 25.d6 h7 26.g5 g7 27.xf6+ xf6 28.f4 f3 29.xd7 xd7 30. xf3++) 21.g3 g8 22.e1 f5 22...c5 23.h4 b6 24.dxe6+ xe6 25.g5+ b6 23.c7 24.h4+– 24.h4 h5 25.e7+ and it is time for Black to resign.

20.e6

Black has tried often in practice lately the following retreats of his bishop: a) 20...b5 and b) 20...a4.

GM V. Korchnoi suggested the move 20...e5?! in his comments. This recommendation is quite dubious, though... After 21.exd7 (in case of 21.e1 xd3 22.exd7 e7 23.xd3 x[d5 24. f4 c4– V. Korchnoi evaluates the position as unclear) 21...xd7 22.d1!? (It is also possible for White to play 22.b1 xd3 23.xd3 e5 24.e2 a4, and here in the game P.Nielsen – Turov, Copenhagen 2002, White had to play 25.d6! c4 26.b1! f7 27.xd1 ed8 28.g3+ with a clear advantage) and Black’s attempt to trap White’s dark-squared bishop with the move 22...f7 lead to a disaster on Black’s kingside after 23.b1 xh6 24.xg6+–.

a) 20...b5

Is aimed at the exchange of the light-squared bishops after the retreat of the black knight to d6.

21.e1!

The immediate bishop-sacrifice on the g6-square does not work for White. After: 21.xg6? hxg6 22.b1 e5 23.e1 (23. xb5 h7++) 23.a4 24.xe5 c2 25.e1 h7 26.h4 h8! (in case Black accepts one more sacrifice after: 26...fxe5 27.f8+ g8 28.h6 xf8 29.xg6 xg6 30.xg6= the game ends in a
draw by a perpetual) 27.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{g}g8+= and Black repels the attack successfully.

White’s attempt to prepare the bishop sacrifice on g6 with the help of 21.\texttt{w}b1?! would not work, because of 21...\texttt{d}a3 22.\texttt{b}b3 (22.\texttt{b}b4 \texttt{d}d6+=) 22...\texttt{a}a5+ (recommended by I. Smikovski).

The inclusion of the moves 21.a4 \texttt{a}a6 is not in favour of White either. After 22.\texttt{w}e1 (The bishop-sacrifice 22.\texttt{x}g6 loses for White after: 22...hxg6 23.\texttt{w}b1 \texttt{e}e5 24.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{b}b6++, while in case of a knight-sacrifice – 22.\texttt{x}g6, it is possible for Black to defend with 22...hxg6 23.\texttt{x}g6 \texttt{d}e5 24.\texttt{d}e4 and here after the maneuver 24...\texttt{a}a5! 25.\texttt{a}a2 \texttt{g}g4! 26.fxg4 \texttt{x}f1 Black parries all aggressive intentions of White’s queen) 22...\texttt{d}e5! (The consequences of the line: 22...\texttt{d}d6 23.\texttt{x}g6 hxg6 24.\texttt{g}g3 \texttt{d}d3 25.\texttt{d}xd3 \texttt{h}h7 26.\texttt{f}f4 \texttt{g}g8 are quite clear.) 23.\texttt{x}xa6 bxa6= and White has no attacking chances whatsoever against Black’s king.

In case of the immediate knight-sacrifice – 21.\texttt{x}g6, Black can counter that with the powerful move 21...\texttt{d}d6! (if Black accepts the sacrifice with: 21...hxg6 22.\texttt{w}e1 \texttt{h}h7 23.\texttt{x}g6+ \texttt{x}g6 24.\texttt{g}g3+ \texttt{x}h6 25.\texttt{h}h3= the game ends in a draw by a perpetual) 22.\texttt{x}xb5 \texttt{xb}5 23.\texttt{f}f4 \texttt{h}h8= (recommended by P. Skachkov) and his prospects are in fact slightly better.

21...\texttt{d}d6!

Black loses after 21...\texttt{w}b6? due to 22.\texttt{x}g6 hxg6 23.\texttt{g}g3 \texttt{e}e5 24.\texttt{x}g6= as in the game Rau – Markl, Germany 2003, and after 21...\texttt{h}h8?! 22.\texttt{x}g6+ hxg6 23.\texttt{h}h4= Black has a very difficult position.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\textbf{22.\texttt{b}1!}

This is a spectacular move. White intends to sacrifice his knight on the g6-square, while his bishop will take part in the attack subsequently.

White has often tried in practice here the attractive move: 22.\texttt{x}g6. There might follow: 22...hxg6 (It is bad for Black to capture the rook – 22...\texttt{x}f1?, due to: 23.\texttt{g}g3 \texttt{h}h8 24.\texttt{g}g7+!! \texttt{x}g7 25.\texttt{x}h7+ \texttt{h}h8 26.\texttt{h}h3 \texttt{g}g7 27.\texttt{f}f5 \texttt{x}f5 28.\texttt{g}g4+ \texttt{f}f8 29.\texttt{g}g6+ \texttt{g}g8 30.\texttt{h}h4= – P. Skachkov.) 23.\texttt{g}g3 (White fails in his attempt to bring his queen into the attack via the queenside with 23.\texttt{b}1?, because of 23...\texttt{f}5 24.\texttt{xb}5 \texttt{x}h6 25.\texttt{d}d3 \texttt{f}5 26.\texttt{x}g6 \texttt{c}7=) 23...\texttt{d}d3! (23...\texttt{g}5? 24.\texttt{x}g5 \texttt{f}5 25.\texttt{g}4 \texttt{e}e3 26.\texttt{h}h5 \texttt{d}d3 27.\texttt{g}6 \texttt{x}g6 28.\texttt{x}g6+ \texttt{h}h8 29.\texttt{h}h5+ \texttt{g}g8 30.\texttt{h}h6= – Gustafsson – Perlitz, Dresden)

295
2001) 24.\(\text{Q}x\text{d}3\) (White is forced to lose time for capturing that bishop, because 24.\(\text{Q}x\text{g}6?\) would not work, because of: 24...\(\text{h}7\) 25.\(\text{f}3+\) \(\text{x}h6\rightarrow+)\) 24...\(\text{h}7\) 25.\(\text{f}4\) (Now, White's bishop remains trapped in Black's camp, but he has nothing better, because in case of its retreat: 25.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{h}8\) Black has already the advantage.) 25...\(\text{g}8!\) (It is weaker for Black here to follow with: 25...\(\text{g}5?!\), Skachkov – Smi- kovski, Russia 2003, due to 26.\(\text{g}4!\) \(\text{g}8\) 27.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{h}8\) 28.\(\text{x}5\) \(\text{g}7\) 29.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{g}8\) 30.\(\text{h}4+\) \(\text{h}7\) 31.\(\text{h}5+\) \(\text{g}7\) 32.\(\text{g}6+\) \(\text{f}8\) 33. \(\text{f}2\) a6 34.\(\text{b}1\), recommended by I. Smikovski) 26.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{h}8\) 27.\(\text{f}8+\) \(\text{g}8\) 28.\(\text{xe}7?!\) (after 28.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{c}4!\) 29.\(\text{x}6+\) \(\text{xf}8\) 30.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{x}5\) 31.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{g}7\)–, or 28.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{g}5!\) 29.\(\text{g}6\) \(\text{f}5\) 30.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{e}3\) 31.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{xd}5\) 32.\(\text{xb}7\) \(\text{h}7\) Black repels the attack and he remains with a material advantage) 28...\(\text{xe}7\) (28...\(\text{e}8\)–I. Smi- kovski) 29.\(\text{x}8+\) \(\text{x}8\) 30. \(\text{x}6+\) \(\text{g}7\) 31.\(\text{xe}7\) \(\text{c}7\) 32.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{xe}7\) 33.\(\text{c}1\) (after 33.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{c}7\) 34.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{c}5\) 35.\(\text{d}1\) b5– Akopian – Boros, Las Vegas 2003, Black's rook has occupied a very active position) 33...\(\text{f}5!\)– Black has a knight for three pawns and his prospects are at least equal, Yermolinsky – Kudrin, Denver 2003.

22...\(\text{xf}1\)

Black is forced to capture the rook, otherwise he loses after: 22...\(\text{h}8?\) 23.\(\text{x}g6+\) \(\text{hx}g6\) 24. \(\text{h}4\) \(\text{g}8\) 25.\(\text{x}g6\) \(\text{xf}1\) 26.\(\text{f}7+\) \(\text{xf}7\) 27.\(\text{ex}f7+\) \(\text{xf}7\) 28.\(\text{h}5+\) \(\text{g}8\) 29.\(\text{g}6\)–, as well as after: 22...\(\text{g}5?\) 23.\(\text{x}g5\) \(\text{x}f1\) 24.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{h}8\) 25.\(\text{g}6+\) \(\text{g}7\) 26.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{c}7\) 27.\(\text{f}8+\) \(\text{h}8\) 28.\(\text{hx}h7\) \(\text{xf}8\) 29. \(\text{h}4\).

23.\(\text{x}g6\)

In case of 23.\(\text{g}3?\), the simplest way for Black to repel White's attack is: 23...\(\text{d}3!\) 24. \(\text{g}6\) \(\text{g}6\) 25.\(\text{x}g6\) \(\text{h}8\)–.

23...\(\text{c}7!\)

Black places his queen on the c7-square in anticipation of the appearance of White's queen on g3 and thus he guarantees the transfer into an endgame.

It is impossible for Black to accept the knight-sacrifice, because after: 23...\(\text{hx}g6?\) 24.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{h}8\) 25.\(\text{x}g6\) \(\text{g}2+\) 26.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{g}8\) 27.\(\text{h}3\)– White wins.

Black loses too in case of: 23...\(\text{b}6?\), because of 24.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{g}2+\) 25.\(\text{h}2\) \(\text{h}3+\)– Zhukova – Shomoev, Internet 2004.

Black can try to stop the development of White's attack with the help of a counter sacrifice of his rook – 23...\(\text{c}1?!\) 24.\(\text{xc}1\)
After 16.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{e}8\) 17.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{c}8\) 18.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 19.e5, \(\text{b}6\), but after 25.\(\text{f}4\)? \(\text{a}6\) 26.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{h}8\) 27.\(\text{xd}6\) exd6 (27...\(\text{xd}6\)?? 28.\(\text{e}4\)--) 28.\(\text{xh}7\) \(\text{xh}7\) 29.\(\text{f}5\) \(\text{c}7\) 30.e7 \(\text{xe}7\) 31.\(\text{xe}7\)\(\text{+}\) he will have to defend a position without a pawn.

White’s first rank is vulnerable and in case of: 23...\(\text{d}3\) 24.\(\text{xd}3\) \(\text{c}7\) (in the line 24...\(\text{f}5\) 25.\(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 26.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{h}8\), analyzed by M.Golubev, White has three light pieces against his opponent’s two rooks and following 27.h3!?\(\text{+}\) his chances are slightly better) he cannot place his queen on \(g3\) immediately, but after 25.h3! \(\text{hxg}6\) 26.\(\text{xf6}\) \(\text{g}5\) 27.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{e}5\) 28.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{c}1\) 29.\(\text{xc}1\) \(\text{xf}5\) 30.\(\text{h}6\) (in case of 30.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{c}8\) 31.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{h}7\) 32.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{xd}5\) 33.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{g}8\) 34.\(\text{g}4\)=, or 30.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{d}8\) 31.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{xd}5\) 32.\(\text{g}4\)= White must force a draw by a perpetual) White obtains two pawns for the exchange. It might even seem that his position is better due to the quite unsafe placement of Black’s king. This assumption is wrong however. Following 30...\(\text{g}6\)! 31.\(\text{e}3\) (or 31.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f}5\) 32.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{g}6\)=) 31...\(\text{b}1\)! (this is simpler than 31...\(\text{f}5\) 32.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{d}8\) 33.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{xd}5\) 34.\(\text{xe}7\) \(\text{e}5\)= although even then White can hardly rely on anything more than a draw by a perpetual) 32.\(\text{h}2\) \(\text{f}5\)= and according to I.Smkovski’s analysis Black draws easily.

24.\(\text{g}3\)
24.\(\text{f}8\)? \(\text{h}8\) 25.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{d}3\)\(\text{+}\).
24...\(\text{f}5\) 25.\(\text{xe}7\)\(\text{+}\) \(\text{h}8\)

26.\(\text{xf}5\)!

White’s alternative here is to exchange queens immediately.

The main drawback of the variation: 26.\(\text{xc}7\) \(\text{xc}7\) (or 26...\(\text{g}2\)? 27.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{h}4\) 28.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{xc}7\) 29.\(\text{hxh}4\) \(\text{xe}7\) 30.\(\text{g}4\)=) 27.\(\text{xf}5\) is that White will have to lose time in the future in order to ensure a leeway for his king. There might follow: 27...\(\text{c}4\) 28.\(\text{e}4\) (in case of 28.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{a}8\) 29.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 30.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{d}4\) 31.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{d}8\), Black will be out of danger after an exchange sacrifice on \(d5\)!) 28...\(\text{xa}2\) (following 28...\(\text{c}5\) 29.\(\text{d}6\), it is too risky for Black to play 29...\(\text{b}8\)?!, a move that was tested in a game Shomoev – Smikovski, Internet 2004, because of 30.\(\text{e}3\)! \(\text{xd}5\) 31.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{d}1\) 32.\(\text{g}1\)=, while in case of 29...\(\text{e}7\), White can choose between 30.\(\text{f}5\)= with repetition of moves and playing for a win – 30.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 31.\(\text{g}4\)=) 29.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{c}5\) (in case of 29...\(\text{xe}6\) 30.\(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{xe}6\), S.Gordon – Holzke, Port Erin 2004, Black must take into account the line: 31.\(\text{f}4\)! \(\text{d}7\) 32.\(\text{d}6\) and he will be in a serious trouble after: 32...\(\text{b}6\)?! 33.\(\text{e}8\) \(\text{f}7\) 34.\(\text{f}6\)\(\text{+}\), while
in the variation 32...a5 33.\(\texttt{-}e_7\) \(\texttt{b7}\) a4 34.\(\texttt{-}d_6\) \(\texttt{xd6}\) 35.\(\texttt{-}d_6\) a3 36.\(\texttt{-}b_1\) \(\texttt{g7}\) 37.\(\texttt{-}g_2\) a2 38.\(\texttt{-}axa2\) \(\texttt{xa2}\)±, Black will have to fight for a draw, despite the fact that the material on the board has been considerably reduced) 30.\(\texttt{-}g7\) (It is obviously bad for White to play: 30.\(\texttt{d6}\)?, because after 30...\(\texttt{a8}\) 31.e7 \(\texttt{xd5}\) 32.\(\texttt{e8}\) 33.\(\texttt{xe8}\) \(\texttt{xe4}\) 34.\(\texttt{fxe4}\) \(\texttt{c6}\) he will be helpless against Black’s passed pawns on the queenside – this line has been analyzed by P. Skachkov) 30...\(\texttt{e7}\) 31.d6! \(\texttt{g8}\) 32.\(\texttt{e7}\) \(\texttt{f7}\)∞ 30...\(\texttt{e7}\) 31.\(\texttt{f5}\) \(\texttt{e8}\). It is now quite evident that Black must comply with the repetition of moves, because in the line: 31...\(\texttt{xd5}\) 32.\(\texttt{xd5}\) \(\texttt{xd5}\) 33.\(\texttt{-xe7}\) \(\texttt{xe5}\) 34.\(\texttt{c8}\)∞ he risks much more than White in case the game continues.

**26...\(\texttt{-}xg3\)**

The move 26...\(\texttt{g8}\)? loses, because after: 27.\(\texttt{-xc7}\) \(\texttt{xc7}\) 28.\(\texttt{g1}\) \(\texttt{xc7}\) 29.\(\texttt{f2}\) \(\texttt{h3}\) 30.d6 \(\texttt{c6}\) 31.\(\texttt{f4}\)+ (analyzed by P. Skachkov) Black cannot oppose at all White’s passed pawns.

**27.\(\texttt{hxg3}\) \(\texttt{c4}\) 28.\(\texttt{e4}\)**

**28...\(\texttt{cd8}\)!**

Black has no time to play 28...\(\texttt{xa2}\)? here, because after: 29.e7 b5 30.d6 \(\texttt{e6}\) 31.d7!++ (analyzed by P. Skachkov) White wins, since Black cannot capture the d7-pawn because of the checkmate.

**29.\(\texttt{g7}\) 30.\(\texttt{xf6}\) \(\texttt{xd5}\)**

(30...\(\texttt{xd5}\)? 31.e7 \(\texttt{xe4}\) 32.\(\texttt{h6}\)+) **31.\(\texttt{xd5}\)** (After 31.\(\texttt{h6}\)+ \(\texttt{f8}\) 32.e7 \(\texttt{xe7}\) 33.\(\texttt{xe7}\)+ \(\texttt{xe7}\) 34.\(\texttt{xd5}\) \(\texttt{xd5}\) 35.a3 \(\texttt{e6}\)= White must fight for a draw despite his extra pawn, because of his misplaced knight.) **31...\(\texttt{xd5}\)** **32.\(\texttt{e7}\) \(\texttt{f7}\) **33.\(\texttt{h4}\) \(\texttt{e6}\) **34.\(\texttt{g7}\)+ **35.\(\texttt{xe8}\) \(\texttt{xe8}\) **36.a3 b5 37.\(\texttt{g4}\) a5 38.\(\texttt{e1}\) \(\texttt{xe7}\) **39.\(\texttt{xa5}\) \(\texttt{f7}\)= Skatchkov – Modestov, St Petersburg 2004. White has two extra pawns indeed, but despite that the position is drawish, because of the presence of opposite coloured bishops on the board.

**b) 20...\(\texttt{a4}\)**

Black plans to place his knight on e5 and his bishop on c2 and White’s chances for a successful kingside attack would be just non-existent.
21.\(\text{hxg6!}\)

We are now quite familiar with this knight sacrifice because of the a lines (Chapter 20). It is however much more complicated now. Black’s light pieces can defend the king and the outcome of White’s attack is far from clear. White cannot afford to wait, though...After 21.\(\text{xe1}\) 22.\(\text{e5}\) 22.\(\text{g3}\) (22.\(\text{xg6}\) 22.\(\text{hxg6}\) 23.\(\text{g3}\) does not work because of 23...\(\text{c2} \rightarrow\) 22...\(\text{d6}\) (but not 22...\(\text{c2}\) due to 23.\(\text{b5} \pm\) 23.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{c2} \rightarrow\) and White had a lost position in the game Gligoric – Idigoras, Mar del Plata 1955. He was an exchange down and without any attacking chances.

21...\(\text{hxg6}\) 22.\(\text{xg6}\)

Black has played in practice mostly b1) 22...\(\text{e5}\), in this position, although after b2) 22...\(\text{h8}\) his prospects are quite acceptable.

b1) 22...\(\text{e5}\) 23.\(\text{e4}\)

Black has an extra rook, but if the white queen joins the attack Black will not survive for long...

Black plans to exchange the potentially dangerous white light-squared bishop. His other possibility is to try to prevent the manoeuvre of the white queen to the kingside. He plays sometimes 23...\(\text{a5}\) with the idea not to let the white queen to e1. White’s queen can find another route to the kingside with 24. \(\text{b2!}\) (Weaker is 24.\(\text{d4!}\) due to 24...\(\text{c2!}\) 25.\(\text{xc2}\) \(\text{xc2}\) 26. \(\text{h4}\) \(\text{c4}\) 27.\(\text{f4}\) and now in the game S.Ernst – Jens, Apeldorn 2001, after 27...\(\text{a3!}\) White’s chances to attack were very problematic.) and White plans to bring the queen to the kingside via the f2-square and also controls the c2-square in order to prevent the exchange of the light-squared bishops. There might follow: 24...\(\text{c4}\) (24...\(\text{c5}\) with the idea not to let the white queen to the kingside loses because of 25.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{c4}\) 26.\(\text{e1}\) \(\text{h8}\) 27.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{c2}\) –, but maybe Black had to try 24...\(\text{c2!}\) although after 25.\(\text{xc2}\), following 25...\(\text{c3}\) 26.\(\text{xc3}\) \(\text{xc3}\) 27.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{c4}\) 28.\(\text{h4}\) \(\text{d8}\) 29.\(\text{d1}\) \(\text{Rau – M.Bauer, Germany 2003, as well as after 25...\(\text{xd5}\) 26.\(\text{b1}\) \(\text{h8}\) 27.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{xe6}\) 28.\(\text{f5}\) \(\text{±}\), Black would suffer a lot and that would be practically in vain.) 25.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{xe4}\) 26.\(\text{fxe4}\) \(\text{c3}\) 27.\(\text{d6!}\) \(\text{d3}\) (27...\(\text{c6}\) 28.\(\text{dxe7}\) \(\text{g4}\) 29.\(\text{f5}\) \(\text{xh6}\) 30. \(\text{g6}\) \(\text{h8}\) 31.\(\text{xh6}\) \(\text{g8}\) 32. \(\text{g6}\) \(\text{h8}\) 33.\(\text{h5}\) \(\text{g7}\) 34.\(\text{f7}\) \(\text{h8}\) 35.\(\text{xf6}\) –; in case of 27...\(\text{a3}\) 28.\(\text{d7}\) \(\text{d8}\) 29.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{±}\), or 27...

23...\(\text{c2!}\)
\[ \text{b5 28.d7 \text{d}d8 29.\text{c}c1 \text{d}d3 30.} \]
\[ \text{\text{c}c5= Black’s position would be quite difficult to defend, because of White’s powerful passed d-pawn} \]
\[ 28.\text{dxe7 \text{b}b5 (28...\text{g}g4 29.\text{f}f5-= Holst – Duesterwald, Izmir 2004; 28...\text{xe}e4 29.\text{xf}f6 \text{g}g6 30.\text{h}h4 \text{g}g4 31.\text{f}f8+ \text{h}h7 32.\text{f}f7+= Torres – Ramos, corr. 1990) 29.\text{e}e1 \text{g}g4 30.\text{f}f5 \text{x}xh6} \]
\[ 31.\text{g}g6+ \text{h}h8 32.\text{x}xh6+ \text{g}g8 33.\text{g}g6+ \text{h}h8 34.\text{xf}f6+ \text{h}h7 35.\text{f}f7+ \text{h}h8 (35...\text{h}h6 36.g4! \text{d}d2 37.g5+ \text{x}xg5 38.\text{g}g1=) 36.a4 \text{xa}a4 37.\text{f}f1+= White has excellent chances to press his advantage home.} \]

**24.\text{xc}c2**

White must exchange; otherwise after 24.\text{w}e1? \text{xe}e4 25.\text{f}xe4, Crickmore – Soergel, Budapest 2004, \text{h}h8 26.\text{h}h4 \text{h}8 – Black’s defence is easy. This is mostly due to the untouchable black knight on e5.

**24...\text{xc}c2 25.\text{d}d1**

This is the critical position of the whole variation. The black rook is hanging and White is threatening f3-f4. Black has two basic replies: **b1a) 25...\text{c}c7** and **b1b) 25...\text{h}h7**.

Black loses outright after 25...\text{xa}a2? due to 26.f4 \text{h}h7 27.\text{f}xe5 \text{h}h6 and now White has the decisive 28.\text{f}f4!! (weaker is 28.\text{f}xe6 \text{ex}e6 29.\text{d}d4 \text{g}g7 30.\text{g}g4+ as in the game Ahlander – T.Ernst, Sweden 2003, because after 30...\text{h}h6! White has nothing better than a perpetual).

The move 25...\text{c}c5? is not better than the capture of the a2-pawn after 26.f4 \text{xd}5 (capturing with the queen – 26...\text{xd}5 27.\text{h}h5 after lead to a winning position for White 27...\text{xc}c2 28.\text{g}g1 \text{xe}e6 29.\text{xe}e8+ \text{h}h7 30.\text{f}f8 \text{g}g4 31.\text{f}xe5 \text{c}c8 32.\text{xe}7+ \text{h}h6 33.\text{ex}f6+= van Wely – Kovchan, Moscow 2003 or 27...\text{xe}e6 28.\text{xe}8+ \text{h}h7 29.\text{f}xe5 \text{x}h6 30.\text{ex}f6+= Kharlov – Sands, Chalkidiki 2002) 27.\text{h}h5 \text{h}8 28.\text{f}xe5 \text{xe}5 29.\text{g}g5+ \text{g}7 30.\text{h}h6+ \text{g}8 31.\text{g}g6+ \text{h}8 and now White can win in a plenty of different ways. For example 32.\text{f}f4 (Or 32.\text{d}d2 \text{c}c5 33.h3 b5 34.\text{f}f4 \text{c}4 35.\text{h}h5+ \text{g}8 36.\text{xc}c4 \text{bxc}4 37.\text{h}h6++ and White wins by force as GM M. Krasenkov pointed out) 32.\text{d}d5 (if 32...\text{xe}e6, then 33.h3! with the idea to bring the rook to the attack with 34.\text{f}f3+–) 33.h3! (with the same idea 34.\text{f}f3) 33...\text{d}d1 34.\text{h}h5++ and Black loses a rook (analysis of V. Zakhartsov).

After 25...\text{c}c4 26.f4 \text{c}c7 27.\text{e}e1!? (It would not work for White to play 27.\text{h}h5?, due to 27...\text{c}c1 28.\text{xe}8+ \text{h}h7 29.\text{b}b5 \text{g}g4 30.d6 \text{c}c5–, while in case of 27.d6 \text{xd}6 28.\text{h}h5, Black can
make a draw with the line: 28...\textit{\texttt{d}}3! 29.\textit{\texttt{xe}}8+ \textit{\texttt{h}}7 30.\textit{\texttt{xe}}7+ \textit{\texttt{xh}}6 31.\textit{\texttt{xf}}8+ \textit{\texttt{h}}7 32.\textit{\texttt{g}}1 \textit{\texttt{xf}}4 33.e7 \textit{\texttt{f}}1 34.e8\textit{\texttt{g}}g1 35.\textit{\texttt{g}}xg1 \textit{\texttt{e}}3=) Black should better not cling to his huge material advantage. His wish to preserve the extra rook with: 27... \textit{\texttt{h}}7?! (It is better for Black with the help of: 27...\textit{\texttt{xc}}1 28.\textit{\texttt{xc}}1 \textit{\texttt{xcl}} 29.\textit{\texttt{xc}}1 \textit{\texttt{g}}4 30.h3 \textit{\texttt{xh}}6, to transpose to the variation \textbf{b1a}, as a result of 28.fxe5 \textit{\texttt{h}}6 29.d6, might bring Black on the verge of the precipice. There might follow: 29...\textit{\texttt{xc}}5?! (It is probably better for Black here to follow with: 29...\textit{\texttt{d}}8 30.exf6 exf6 31.\textit{\texttt{f}}3 \textit{\texttt{c}}6 32.\textit{\texttt{d}}1, but even then White’s winning chances are considerable, because of the vulnerable placement of Black’s king. See for example this line: 32...a6 33.\textit{\texttt{h}}3+ \textit{\texttt{g}}7 34.\textit{\texttt{g}}4+ \textit{\texttt{h}}8 35.e7 \textit{\texttt{xe}}7 36.dxe7 \textit{\texttt{xe}}7 37.\textit{\texttt{h}}4+ \textit{\texttt{g}}7 38.\textit{\texttt{g}}3+ \textit{\texttt{h}}7 39.\textit{\texttt{e}}1=) 30.d7 \textit{\texttt{d}}8 31.exf6 \textit{\texttt{g}}5 32.fxe7 \textit{\texttt{xe}}7 33.\textit{\texttt{d}}2+ \textit{\texttt{g}}7 34.\textit{\texttt{h}}3! \textit{\texttt{h}}4 (Black is a rook up indeed, but he is defenseless – 34...\textit{\texttt{c}}6 35.\textit{\texttt{d}}4+ \textit{\texttt{h}}7 36.\textit{\texttt{e}}5 \textit{\texttt{xe}}6 37.\textit{\texttt{e}}4=) 35.\textit{\texttt{c}}3+ \textit{\texttt{g}}8 36.\textit{\texttt{g}}3+ \textit{\texttt{h}}8 37.\textit{\texttt{e}}5+ \textit{\texttt{h}}7 38.\textit{\texttt{f}}1=– and Black resigned in the game Dimitriadis – Reichardt, corr. 2000.

The move 25...\textit{\texttt{c}}8 leads to positions quite similar to the lines \textbf{b1a} and \textbf{b1b}. If after 26.f4 Black tries to play something original instead of following the abovementioned lines he can get crushed real soon. For example after 26...\textit{\texttt{h}}7 (26...\textit{\texttt{c}}1 transposes to the line \textbf{b1a}) 27.fxe5! (in case of 27.\textit{\texttt{g}}5 fxg5 28.\textit{\texttt{h}}5+ \textit{\texttt{g}}8 29.fxe5 \textit{\texttt{f}}8 30.\textit{\texttt{g}}6+ \textit{\texttt{h}}8 31.\textit{\texttt{h}}6+= White has only a perpetual) and now the “creative” 27...\texttt{c}4? (after 27...\texttt{xh}6 28.exf6 exf6? is very bad because of 29.\texttt{d}4!, but after 28...\texttt{f}8 29.f7 \texttt{c}4 30.d6, or 28...\texttt{c}4 29.f7 \texttt{f}8 30.d6 still transposes to \textbf{b1b}) and Black loses by force. In the game Prusikin – Hermansson, Budapest 2003, there followed: 28.\texttt{d}2! (this was the best because after 28.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{e}2 29.\texttt{xe}2 \texttt{xe}2 30.exf6 exf6, or 28.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{e}2 29.\texttt{xe}2 \texttt{xe}2 30.exf6 exf6 31.\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{d}2= Black can still offer some more resistance.) 28...\texttt{c}8 (after 28...\texttt{xd}2 29.\texttt{h}5+ \texttt{g}7 30.exf6+ exf6 31.\texttt{f}7=– White checkmates in seven moves utmost) 29.\texttt{h}5+! (The attempt to bring this rook to the fourth rank with the move 29.\texttt{f}4 enables Black to reach a rook and pawn endgame with 29...\texttt{c}1 30.\texttt{xc}1 \texttt{xc}1 31.\texttt{f}1 \texttt{xd}1 32.\texttt{xd}1 \texttt{fxe}5=) 29...\texttt{g}8 30.\texttt{g}6+ \texttt{h}8 31.\texttt{g}1 \texttt{f}5 (in case of 31...fxe5 32.\texttt{h}5+ \texttt{g}8 33.\texttt{h}6=– Black will get checkmated, while after 31...\texttt{xd}2 32.\texttt{h}6+ \texttt{g}8 33.exf6 exf6 34.\texttt{xd}2=– White manages to trap the black rook.) 32.\texttt{h}6+ \texttt{g}8 33.\texttt{g}6+ \texttt{h}8 34.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{c}5 (The pin after 34...\texttt{g}4 is not so dangerous, because of 35.h3! \texttt{e}4 36.\texttt{xe}7=– and White unpins eas-
ily.) 35...h5+ g8 36.f7+ h8
37.xe7 xg1+ 38.xg1 c1+ 39.f2+ and Black had only
some more checks left before re-
signing.

b1a) 25...c7
Black’s last move is with a
very interesting idea suggested
by V. Zakhartsov. Black plans to
go into an endgame and in order
to do that he is ready to give up
temporarily some of his huge
material advantage.

26.f4
White wants to repel the
knight from the e5-square and
bring his queen into the attack
of the enemy king so his move is
forced.

26...c1!?
Black gives back the rook in
order to exchange the queens. In
answer to 26...h7 White could
have played 27.fxe5! (after 27.
h5 c1 28.g5+ g7 29.h6+ h7=
White had only a draw,
just like after 27...xg5 28.h5+
g7 29.xg5+ g6 30.f5 f8
31.xg6+ h8=) 27.fxe5 27...
h6 (as we already know 27...
c4? loses due to 28.d2!--) 28.exf6 c4 29.f7 f8 30.d6, and
that transposes to the line b1b.

It would not be enough for
Black to equalize with the move
26...c4, because of 27.e1 h7
28.fxe5 xh6 29.d6 c5 30.d7
d8 31.exf6± and he fails to
counter successfully White’s cen-
tral pawns and to defend his king
at the same time, Dimitriadis –


27.xc1 xc1 28.xc1 g4
This is the essence of Black’s
idea. White’s bishop is now
trapped.

29.h3!
This is necessary because af-
after 29.xc7 xh6 30.xb7 a6
31.a7 d8 32.xa6 xxd5 the
black rook is set free and White’s
first rank is weak.

29...xh6 30.g4
The black knight has no-
where to go now.

30.d8
The passive move 30...b8?!
can only cause new troubles for
Black. After: 31.c7 f8 32.g2
a6 33.f3 b5 34.a7 b6 35.e3
b4 36.d4 g8 (or 36...b3? 37.
xb3 xxb3 38.a8+ g7 39.d6+-
Behm – Abelson, Willingen 2004)
he will be forced to await White’s
active actions. There might fol-
low: 37.c4 h6 38.f5!? (The
straightforward approach – 38.
c5 backfires, because of the
spectacular pawn-break: 38...
b3! 39.axb3 xxb3 40.a8+ g7
41.d6 exd6+ 42.xd6 g8=) 38...
g8 39.d7 h6 40.d8+ g7
41.c8 and White has the pow-
erful threat 42.c6±.

31.c7 f8
Black does not intend to let
White get a dangerous passed e-
pawn.

32.d7
After 32.xb7 xxd5 the
black rook was free for action and
that was absolutely contrary to
White’s plans.
32...\textit{\texttt{d7}}!? 

Black cannot exchange rooks here. After 32...\textit{\texttt{f7}}? 33.\textit{\texttt{e7}} \textit{\texttt{f7}} White’s d7-pawn is too dangerous and ties up Black’s forces completely. If White plays 34.\textit{\texttt{f5}}! (weaker is 34.\textit{\texttt{g2}}, because after 34...\textit{\texttt{f5}}! 35.g5 \textit{\texttt{g7}} 36.h4 \textit{\texttt{g6}} 37. \textit{\texttt{f3}} \textit{\texttt{h5}} 38.\textit{\texttt{e3}} \textit{\texttt{g6}} 39.\textit{\texttt{d4}} \textit{\texttt{h5}} 40.\textit{\texttt{c5}} \textit{\texttt{d8}}= White cannot penetrate anywhere) fixing Black’s kingside pawns, Black’s position becomes obviously beyond salvation. There might follow: 34...\textit{\texttt{g7}} 35.\textit{\texttt{g2}} b5 (Black cannot remain just passive because after 35...\textit{\texttt{h6}} 36.h4 \textit{\texttt{d8}} 37.\textit{\texttt{f3}} \textit{\texttt{f7}} 38.\textit{\texttt{f4}} \textit{\texttt{g7}} 39.g5 \textit{\texttt{d8}} 40.g6 \textit{\texttt{h6}} 41.h5 \textit{\texttt{g7}} White deprives the black knight from the f7-square and after 42.\textit{\texttt{e4}} \textit{\texttt{h6}} 43.d6 exd6 44.\textit{\texttt{d5}} b5 45. \textit{\texttt{xd6+}}-- goes with his king to the d7-pawn.) 36.\textit{\texttt{f2}} \textit{\texttt{h6}} 37.h4 a5 38.\textit{\texttt{e3}} b4 39.\textit{\texttt{d4}} a4 40.\textit{\texttt{c4}} \textit{\texttt{e5+}} 41.\textit{\texttt{xb4}} \textit{\texttt{xd7}} 42.\textit{\texttt{xa4}} \textit{\texttt{e5}} (Black is not saved due to 42...\textit{\texttt{b6+}} 43.\textit{\texttt{b5}} \textit{\texttt{xd5}} due to 44.a4--) 43.\textit{\texttt{b5}} \textit{\texttt{g4}} 44.a4 \textit{\texttt{e3}} 45.d6! (and according to V.Zakhartso\v{c} this is the only winning move, but in fact after 45.\textit{\texttt{c6}} \textit{\texttt{xf5}} 46.a5 \textit{\texttt{d6}} 47.a6 \textit{\texttt{c8}} the same pawn-break 48.d6! exd6 49.b7+- forces the win for White too) 45...\textit{\texttt{e6}} 46.a5 \textit{\texttt{d5}} 47.\textit{\texttt{c6}} \textit{\texttt{b4+}} 48.\textit{\texttt{xd6}} \textit{\texttt{g7}} 49. \textit{\texttt{e6}} \textit{\texttt{a6}} 50.h5 \textit{\texttt{c7+}} 51.\textit{\texttt{d7}} \textit{\texttt{a6}} 52.\textit{\texttt{e7}} \textit{\texttt{b4}} 53.h6+ \textit{\texttt{hxh6}} 54.\textit{\texttt{xf6+}}-- and now according to V.Zakhartso\v{c}'s analysis White wins.

32...\textit{\texttt{e8}} 33.\textit{\texttt{xb7}}!? (White cannot exchange queens because after 33.\textit{\texttt{xd8}}+? \textit{\texttt{xd8}} 34.\textit{\texttt{g2}} \textit{\texttt{c7}} 35.\textit{\texttt{f3}} \textit{\texttt{d6}} 36.\textit{\texttt{e4}} \textit{\texttt{f5+}} 37. \textit{\texttt{gxf5}} \textit{\texttt{g8+}} his pawns will be easy targets for Black’s pieces.) 33.\textit{\texttt{xd5}} 34.\textit{\texttt{xa7}} (The trade of the rooks fails again 34.\textit{\texttt{b8+}}? \textit{\texttt{d8}} 35.\textit{\texttt{xd8+}} \textit{\texttt{xd8}} because of \textit{\texttt{c7-d6+}}) 34...\textit{\texttt{f8}} 35.\textit{\texttt{g2}} \textit{\texttt{d6}} 36.\textit{\texttt{f5}} \textit{\texttt{g8}}. We were following the analysis of V. Zakhartso\v{c} until now and after 37.a4 \textit{\texttt{d2+}} 38.\textit{\texttt{g3}} \textit{\texttt{d3+}} 39.\textit{\texttt{h4}} \textit{\texttt{g7=}} Black preserves the equality. But after 37.\textit{\texttt{a3+}} White defends the h3-pawn with his rook and accordingly his king is completely free for action, while the black knight is totally isolated on the kingside.

33.\textit{\texttt{xb7}}

Weaker is 33.\textit{\texttt{g2}}? because of 33...b5 34.\textit{\texttt{f2}} and in the game Kobalija – Zakhartso\v{c}, St Petersburg 2001, Black could have played 34...a5! with a good counterplay on the queenside.

White did not act too convincingly either in the game M.Carlson – L’Ami, Gausdal 2004: 33.h4 b5 34.\textit{\texttt{g2}} a5 35.\textit{\texttt{f3}} a4 36.\textit{\texttt{e3}} b4. The position is already equal,
but White must still play precisely. He can try 37.\textcolor{red}{d}2!= (It is wrong for him to play 37.\textcolor{red}{d}3?,
with the same idea, because of 37...\textcolor{red}{b}8−+) and thus he can neutralize Black’s actions on the queenside. M.Carlsen preferred the move 37.\textcolor{red}{a}7?! and after 37...\textcolor{red}{h}6 38.g5 \textcolor{red}{f}5+ 39.\textcolor{red}{e}4 \textcolor{red}{d}6 Black’s knight was freed back into action.

Following 33.g5, Black can already trade rooks: 33...\textcolor{red}{x}d7 34.exd7 \textcolor{red}{g}7 35.h4 \textcolor{red}{g}6 36.\textcolor{red}{g}2 f5. Actually, we have the same position that we have analyzed in our notes to Black’s move 32, in the case that White refrains from the pawn-break f4−f5. After 37.\textcolor{red}{f}2 \textcolor{red}{d}8 38.\textcolor{red}{e}3 b5 39.\textcolor{red}{d}4 \textcolor{red}{b}7 40.\textcolor{red}{c}3 a5 41.d4 \textcolor{red}{h}5= in the game Aandal – Harstad, Oslo 2005, White got convinced that it would be impossible to break Black’s solid defence and he agreed to a draw.

33...\textcolor{red}{d}6 34.\textcolor{red}{x}a7 \textcolor{red}{c}8
Black must defend his e7-pawn. Therefore the active line does not work 34...\textcolor{red}{c}4 35.a4 \textcolor{red}{x}d5 due to 36.\textcolor{red}{a}8+ \textcolor{red}{g}7 and now 37.\textcolor{red}{e}8! (V.Zakhartsov).

35.a4 \textcolor{red}{c}5=

White has four pawns for the piece indeed, but Black’s position is quite defensible.

b1b) 25...\textcolor{red}{h}7

Black does not lose any time to defend his rook and tries to improve the situation on the kingside instead.

26.f4!
This is a crucial moment. White attacks the all-important black knight on e5, which is tantamount for Black’s defence and ignores capturing the rook.

It was not good to retreat with the bishop due to 26.\textcolor{red}{e}3 \textcolor{red}{c}3! 27.\textcolor{red}{x}a7 \textcolor{red}{d}3=.

White can also play 26.\textcolor{red}{x}c2+ but it is not as promising as the move in the text due to 26...\textcolor{red}{x}h6 27.f4 \textcolor{red}{g}6 and White must evidently start fighting for a draw. He can do that with 28.\textcolor{red}{b}3 (One of the earliest games in this line proceeded with 28.\textcolor{red}{f}5? \textcolor{red}{h}8 29.g3 \textcolor{red}{a}5 30.\textcolor{red}{d}1 \textcolor{red}{xa}2 31.\textcolor{red}{g}4 \textcolor{red}{c}2−+ and White’s position was just hopeless in the game Bannik – Novotelnov, Tbilisi 1951. In one rather recent game 28.\textcolor{red}{d}2? was tried and after 28...\textcolor{red}{g}7 29.g4
...c7 30.g5 f5 31.d3 d6 32.f3 c8 33.d4+ g8=+ and again White was in trouble in the game Rau – Braun, Willingen 2003, but White can play 28.f5 e5 29.b3 b6 30.h3= and he draws by a perpetual.) 28...b6 29.h3+ g7 30.f5 e5 31.g3+ h7 32.h4= and the game ends in a draw by a perpetual again (V.Zakhartsov).

26...xh6
26...g6?? 27.h5 h8 28. f3+ g8 29.xg6+ xf8 30. f7#.

It is possible for Black to play here 26...c8 27.fxe5 and now after: 27...xh6 (or 27...c4? 28. d2 c8 29.h5+ g8 30.g6+ h8 31.g1+– Prusikhin – Hermansson, Budapest 2003) Black should transpose to the variation b1b2.

27.fxe5

Black can defend his rook on c2 in two different ways: b1b1) 27...c7 and b1b2) 27...c8.

But not 27...xa2?, because after 28.f5 g7 29.h5+= White’s rook joins the attack with a decisive effect and there is no defence against the threat 30.g4. The move 27...c4 cannot be refuted directly (This rooks stops the white pieces to join the attack along the fourth rank.), but nevertheless Black’s position remains very suspicious. There might follow: 28. d3!? (White gets nothing much after 28.d6 due to 28...b5! 29. d2+ g7 30.e3 f8! 31.g3+ h8 32.h3= pointed out by V. Zakhartsov) 28...b5 (but not 28...g4?! because of 29.h3+ g5 30.f3 b4 31.f5+ h6 32.f6 bxf6 33.b3 h4 34.g3 g8 35.xg8 xg8 36.xf6+ h5 37.h3++, while after 28...h4 29.d6→ White still has a dangerous attack. For example 29...f5?! loses after 30.xf5 f8 31.e3+ h7 32.g5 f5 33. xh4+ g6 34.e4 c8 35.h4 xg6 36.g4++, and even after the relatively best 29...h5 30.f6 xh6 31.xd6 exd6 32.f7 f8 33. e7 xf7 34.xf7 xh5 35.h3 g6 36.e8 xh6 37.xb7± Black has to fight for a draw in a rook and pawn endgame) 29.exf6 (White does not get much with 29.d6 due to 29...fxe5 30.d7 f8 31.h3+ g6 32.g3 h6=) 29...exf6 30.d6 g7 (Black’s position is difficult after 30...f5 31.h3+ g7 32.xf5 f8 33.e5+ g6 34.e1±, and after 30...c6 31. e+ g7 32.d1→ or 30...g8 31.e3+ g7 32.xa7= Black’s defence is again very difficult because of the super dangerous white tandem of pawns on the sixth rank) 31.g3+ h8 (in
case of 31...\hale7 as in the game C. Hansen – McShane, Malmo 2003, White could play 32.d7! \eale7 33.\alef7 and Black has grave problems) 32.d7 (White can also play 32.e7 \alef7 33.h3 \aleg8 34.\alef3 \alex6 35.\aleh5+ \aleg7 36.e8\ale \alexe8 37.\alexe8+ and White’s chances are preferable because the black king is rather exposed) 32...\alee7 (after 32...\alef8 33.\alee3 \alee7 34. \aleh6+ \aleg8 35.h3!– the white rook is ready for the attack against the black king.) 33.\alef3 \aleh7 34.h3\ale and Black can hardly cope with the well advanced white passed pawns having a rather exposed position of his king.

We must also note that after 27...\alec8 28.exf6 \alef8 (it is too dangerous for Black to play 28...exf6?! because of 29.\aled4!→ and Black cannot save the f6-pawn and its defence with 29...\alef8? does not do the job because of 30.e7+--) 29.f7 \alec4 (Black loses after 29...\alec4? due to 30.\aled2--> 30.d6 and we reach by transposition a situation that we are going to deal with later in our mainline.

**b1b1** 27...\alec7?? 28.exf6

In case of 28.d6 Black can draw quite easily with 28...\alec6! 29.\aleg4 fx e5, Vaisser – Shomoev, ACP (blitz) 2004, 30.d7 \alef8=.

28...\alec4

Black must avoid 28...exf6?, because after 29.\aled4 \alef8 30. d6 \alec4 31.\alexc4 \alexc4 32.e7++ White’s couple of connected passed pawns becomes unstoppable.

The move 28...\alef8!? also transposes to the main line after 29.f7 (in case of 29.\aled4 \alexf6 30.\alexf6+ exf6 31.\alexf6+ \aleh7 32. g3= White can fortunately draw with a perpetual, while after 29.d6 \alec6! 30.\aleg4 \alexf6= White’s hopes for more than a draw are just as futile.) 29...\alec4 (Black loses after 29...\alec5? due to 30.h3 \alee5 31.\aled2+ \aleg6 32.\alef4+, and if 29...\alec4? White gets a decisive advantage after 30.\aled2+ \aleg7 31.\aleg5+ \aleh7 32.g3!– and Black cannot stop the white rook from joining the attack with 33.\alef5.) 30.d6 etc.

29.f7

After 29.fxe7? \alee2 30.\alexe2 \alexe2 31.d6 \aled2= White’s first rank is weak and the central white pawns are doomed to perish.

After 29.d6 \alee4 White can be saved only with 30.\alef3 (but not 30.\alef3 due to 30...\alexf3 31.gxf3 \aleg5 32.fxe7 \alef6!+, White also loses after 30.\aleg1 because of 30...\aleg5! 31.fxe7 \aleh8+ Sakaev) 30...\alec6 31.\aleh3+ \aleg5 32.\alef1 \alec1 33.\aleg3= pointed out by M. Prusikhin. Finally after 29.\alef3 \alec3 30.\alef5 \alec1 31.\aleh3+ \aleg6 32.\aleg3+ \aleh5 33.\alee5+ \aleg6= the game should end in a draw by a perpetual.

29...\alef8 30.d6

White has no time for 30.h3? because of 30...\alee4 31.\alef3 \aleg6=.
The following line leads only to a transposition of moves: 30. \textit{h}e1 h\textit{f}2 31.d6.

\textbf{30...exd6}

\textbf{31.e1!}

This is White's only way to fight for an advantage. After 31.e7 \textit{xf}7 32.\textit{xd}6+ (but not 32.\textit{xf}7?? because of 32...\textit{c}1++)
32...\textit{h}7 (32...\textit{g}7? 33.e8\textit{c}+! \textit{g}8 34.\textit{f}6+ \textit{g}7 35.\textit{g}3+ \textit{f}8 36.\textit{g}8+ \textit{e}7 37.\textit{e}8+ \textit{d}6 38. \textit{e}4+ \textit{xe}4 39.\textit{d}1+-) 33.\textit{xf}7+ \textit{xf}7 34.\textit{d}3+ \textit{g}7, Erdos – Sammalvuo, Budapest 2004. 35. \textit{d}4= and White has to force a draw because his first rank is weak.

In case of 31.\textit{g}1 \textit{e}2 32.\textit{xd}6 \textit{g}7 33.\textit{g}3+ \textit{h}7 (Black loses after 33...\textit{f}6? due to 34.\textit{f}1+ \textit{xe}6 35.\textit{h}3+ \textit{e}5 36.\textit{f}5+ \textit{d}6 37.\textit{d}1+ \textit{c}7 38.\textit{d}7+ \textit{b}6 39. \textit{d}6+– analysed by Prusikhin) 34.\textit{h}3+ \textit{g}7= and the game ends once again in a draw by a perpetual.

\textbf{31...\textit{f}2}

This is the natural move and the rest is really bad, for example 31...\textit{c}6? loses after 32.\textit{g}4+-.

\textbf{32.h3 d5 33.\textit{a}1!?}

This is a clever move because the white queen plans to join the attack against the black king along the long diagonal. In case of 33.e7 after 33...\textit{xf}7 34.\textit{e}8\textit{f}1+ 35.\textit{xf}1 \textit{xf}1+ 36.\textit{xf}1 \textit{h}2 \textit{f}4= Black makes a draw by force.

White fails to trouble the black rook with the move 33.\textit{g}1 because of 33...\textit{c}5!. And after 34.\textit{h}1 \textit{c}4 35.\textit{g}1 \textit{c}5, in the game J.Rodriguez – Bildat, corr. 2001, the opponents began repeating moves and agreed to a draw.

The move 33.a4 has been tested and Black’s simplest method to equalize is: 33...\textit{c}8! (the move 33...d4? is bad, because it covers the a7-g1 diagonal and that enables White to play: 34.\textit{g}1! \textit{xf}7 35.\textit{xf}7 \textit{xf}7 36.e4= and to obtain a decisive advantage, Lobron – Koster, Amsterdam 2004) 34.\textit{g}1 \textit{c}5 35.\textit{h}1 \textit{c}4 (35...\textit{e}7?! 36.\textit{e}5 \textit{h}4 37.e7 \textit{xf}7 38.e8\textit{f} \textit{xe}8 39.\textit{xe}8\textit{f} 36.\textit{g}1 \textit{c}5=.

\textbf{33...d4}

This is most logical move because Black covers the a1-h8 diagonal. After 33...\textit{xf}7?! 34.\textit{xf}7 Black fails to restore the material balance because 34...\textit{xf}7 loses after 35.\textit{h}8++. If Black covers the h8-square with the move 33...\textit{h}7, then after 34. \textit{e}5! \textit{xf}7 35.\textit{xf}7 \textit{xf}7 36. \textit{h}5+ \textit{g}7 37.\textit{g}5+ \textit{h}7 38.\textit{e}5 \textit{f}1+ 39.\textit{h}2 \textit{f}4+ 40.\textit{xf}4 \textit{xf}4 41.\textit{xd}5= the simplification of
the position leads to a difficult rook and pawn endgame for Black.

34.\textit{\textbf{d}1!}

This is the point. White is threatening to play 35.\textit{\textbf{g}1} and because the black pawn is placed on d4 the rook has to quit the favourable f2-square.

34...\textit{\textbf{a}8}

After 34...\textit{\textbf{g}7}? 35.\textit{\textbf{g}4}+- the disadvantages of the placement of the black d-pawn on the fourth rank are evident once again. It looks logical now for Black to play 34...d3, but then the a6-f1 diagonal gets closed for the black queen and White has 35.e7 \textit{\textbf{h}2xf7} 36.exf8\textit{\textbf{w}8} \textit{\textbf{x}f8} 37.\textit{\textbf{d}2}+ \textit{\textbf{g}6} 38.\textit{\textbf{e}3} \textit{\textbf{f}1} 40.\textit{\textbf{h}2}+. The sacrifice of the rook 34...\textit{\textbf{x}2xf7} 35.exf7 \textit{\textbf{h}7} after 36.\textit{\textbf{d}2}+ \textit{\textbf{g}6} 37.\textit{\textbf{e}4} \textit{\textbf{f}1}+ 38.\textit{\textbf{h}2} \textit{\textbf{c}7}+ 39.g3+ is not bringing Black any relief at all.

Should Black remain passive, for example with 34...a6, there might follow 35.\textit{\textbf{g}1} \textit{\textbf{x}a2} 36.\textit{\textbf{g}4} \textit{\textbf{f}6} 37.\textit{\textbf{e}2} \textit{\textbf{b}1}+ 38.\textit{\textbf{h}2} \textit{\textbf{g}6} 39.\textit{\textbf{h}4}+ \textit{\textbf{g}7} 40.\textit{\textbf{d}4}± and White has good prospects for an advantage because of the exposed black king.

35.\textit{\textbf{g}1} \textit{\textbf{f}5}

After 35...\textit{\textbf{x}a2} 36.\textit{\textbf{g}4} \textit{\textbf{f}6} 37.\textit{\textbf{h}4}+ \textit{\textbf{g}7} (37...\textit{\textbf{g}6} 38.\textit{\textbf{e}5}±) 38.\textit{\textbf{x}d}4± Black’s position is rather difficult.

36.\textit{\textbf{g}4} \textit{\textbf{d}5} 37.\textit{\textbf{g}8} \textit{\textbf{c}4}=

There arose a dynamically balanced position on the board. After 38.\textit{\textbf{g}4} \textit{\textbf{d}5} we have a repetition of moves and in case of

38.\textit{\textbf{xc}8} \textit{\textbf{xc}8} 39.e7 \textit{\textbf{xf}7} 40.e8\textit{\textbf{w}8} \textit{\textbf{xe}8} 41.\textit{\textbf{xe}8} \textit{\textbf{f}5} 42.\textit{\textbf{e}7} \textit{\textbf{a}5} 43.\textit{\textbf{xb}7} \textit{\textbf{xa}2} 44.\textit{\textbf{d}7} \textit{\textbf{a}4} 45.\textit{\textbf{f}2} a5 46.\textit{\textbf{d}5} \textit{\textbf{g}6} 47.\textit{\textbf{f}3} \textit{\textbf{f}6}= the rook and pawn endgame is drawish.

b1b2) 27...\textit{\textbf{c}8}?! 

Black controls the eighth rank and thus he has additional possibilities in his fight for complete equality.

28.\textit{\textbf{e}6}

White would not achieve anything substantial with 28.\textit{\textbf{f}3}, due to the standard reply 28...\textit{\textbf{c}4}! (It is also quite enough for Black to equalize with 28...\textit{\textbf{f}8} =) 29.\textit{\textbf{ex}e6} \textit{\textbf{c}3} 30.\textit{\textbf{f}5} \textit{\textbf{c}1} and here he would be forced to draw by a perpetual – 31.\textit{\textbf{h}3}+ \textit{\textbf{g}6} 32.\textit{\textbf{g}3}+ \textit{\textbf{h}5} 33.\textit{\textbf{e}5}+ \textit{\textbf{g}6}=.

In answer to 28.\textit{\textbf{g}4}, it is again good for Black to play 28...\textit{\textbf{c}4}!? (It is too bad for him to try 28...\textit{\textbf{d}5}?, because White can take control over the c1-square with tempo – 29.\textit{\textbf{f}4}+ \textit{\textbf{g}7} 30.\textit{\textbf{g}5}+ \textit{\textbf{h}8} and then he can follow with 31.\textit{\textbf{h}3}!±, with the idea to bring his rook into action along the fourth rank. It is for the same reason that the move 28...\textit{\textbf{f}xe5}?
is bad too – 29.\(\text{h}3+\) \(\text{g}6\) 30.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{h}6\) 31.\(\text{e}3+\) \(\text{g}6\) 32.\(\text{h}4+\) 29.\(\text{h}3+\) \(\text{g}6\) 30.\(\text{f}5+\) \(\text{h}6\) 31.\(\text{exf}6\) \(\text{c}1\) 32.\(\text{h}3+\) \(\text{g}6\) 33.\(\text{g}3+\) \(\text{h}5\) 34.\(\text{h}3=\) and a draw by a perpetual.

28...\(\text{g}8!\)

About 28...\(\text{c}4\) – see variation b1b1.

After 28...\(\text{f}8\) (It is extremely dangerous for Black here to follow with 28...\(\text{exf}6\)!!, because of 29.\(\text{d}4\)\(\text{h} \to\) and he will fail to save his \(\text{f}6\)-pawn, while the defence 29...\(\text{f}8\)?, fails due to 30.\(\text{e}7\)\(\text{+}\))

29.\(\text{f}7\) \(\text{c}4\) (29...\(\text{c}4\) 30.\(\text{wd}2\)\(\text{+}\)) 30.\(\text{d}6\) and the game transposes to the variation b1b1.

29.\(\text{f}7\) \(\text{g}xg2\) 30.\(\text{c}2\)

In case of 30.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{c}4\) 31.\(\text{xf}8\) \(\text{xh}2\) 32.\(\text{g}1\) \(\text{cg}2\) 33.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{h}1\) 34.\(\text{xf}2\) \(\text{xd}1\) 35.\(\text{d}8\) \(\text{g}6\) 36.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 37.\(\text{e}4\)\(\text{=}\) Korotylev – Timofeev, Tomsk 2004, neither side has any real winning chances.

30...\(\text{xc}2\) 31.\(\text{f}8\) \(\text{c}+\) 32.\(\text{xf}8\) 32.\(\text{xf}8\) \(\text{d}2\) 33.\(\text{f}7\)

It is not dangerous for Black if White continues with 33.\(\text{d}8\), because of the passive placement of White’s king: 33...\(\text{g}6\) 34.\(\text{d}7\) (34.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{d}4\)=) 34...\(\text{f}6\) 35.\(\text{xb}7\) \(\text{xa}2\)\(\text{=}\).

33...\(\text{xd}5\) 34.\(\text{x}e7\) \(\text{g}6\)!

This is one more fine point. In case of: 34...\(\text{d}1\)+? 35.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{d}2\) 36.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{xa}2\) (or 36...\(\text{g}6\) 37.\(\text{f}7\)! \(\text{h}2\) 38.\(\text{f}8\) \(\text{h}7\) 39.\(\text{e}4\)=) White’s king manages to reach the e-file on time and as a result of that he can play

37.\(\text{h}7\)\(\text{+}\).

It is not convincing for Black to try here 34...\(\text{a}5\)\(\text{=}\), because of 35.\(\text{e}8\) (35.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{xa}2\) 36.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{g}6\)=; 35.\(\text{xb}7\) \(\text{xa}2\) 36.\(\text{e}7\) \(\text{e}2\) 37.\(\text{xa}7\) \(\text{g}6\)=) 35...\(\text{g}7\) 36.\(\text{b}8\) \(\text{f}6\) 37.\(\text{e}7\) \(\text{xe}7\) 38.\(\text{xb}7\)\(\text{+}\) \(\text{f}6\) 39.\(\text{b}2\) and he will have to fight for a draw in a position with a pawn down.

35.\(\text{xb}7\) \(\text{d}1\)+ 36.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{d}2\)+ 37.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{xa}2\) 38.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{a}5\)=

Black will manage to draw easily here.

b2) 22...\(\text{h}8\)!?

It is quite possible that might be the simplest way for Black to solve his opening problems. This move was played for the first time back in 1973, but nobody paid attention to that game then...

23.\(\text{e}1\)

White’s attempt to redeploy his queen to the h4-square along the fourth rank – 23.\(\text{d}4\)\(\text{?!}\) fails, due to 23...\(\text{e}5\)\(\text{=}\) (it is weaker for Black to play here 23...\(\text{g}8\), because of 24.\(\text{d}3\)).

23...\(\text{g}8\) 24.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{e}8\) 25.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{g}6\)!

309
This is a quite reliable defence and White cannot break it. White does not achieve anything with:

26.\textit{\textbf{W}}h5

White can hardly achieve anything substantial after 26.f4. Moreover, in case of: 26...\textit{\textbf{Q}}d6 (The following line also leads to a draw: 26...\textit{\textbf{Q}}d3 27.\textit{\textbf{Q}}f5 \textit{\textbf{Q}}g4 28.\textit{\textbf{W}}h3 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xe4 29.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xe3+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}g8 30.\textit{\textbf{Q}}g3+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}h7=) 27.\textit{\textbf{Q}}d3 (White must control the c4-square, because after 27.\textit{\textbf{Q}}b1?, Black has the powerful argument - 27...\textit{\textbf{Cc}}4=), he must consider Black’s possibility: 27...\textit{\textbf{f}}5!? (After 27...\textit{\textbf{Q}}h7 28.\textit{\textbf{Q}}f8+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}g8 29.f5 \textit{\textbf{Q}}g5 30.\textit{\textbf{Q}}h6 \textit{\textbf{Cc}}3 31.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xg5 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xd3 32.\textit{\textbf{Q}}f4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xd5 33.\textit{\textbf{Q}}g4+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}h7= the game is bound to end in a draw by a repetition of moves.) 28.\textit{\textbf{Q}}g5+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}g8 29.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xe7 \textit{\textbf{Q}}a5! (It is a mistake for Black to play here 29...\textit{\textbf{Cc}}7?, because of: 30.\textit{\textbf{Q}}x6 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xd6 31.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xf5 \textit{\textbf{Q}}g7 32.\textit{\textbf{Q}}e4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}a3 33.h3± and White already has four pawns for the piece.) 30.\textit{\textbf{Q}}f6 (Black’s knight is untouchable due to: 30.\textit{\textbf{Q}}x6? \textit{\textbf{Q}}xd5+=) 30...\textit{\textbf{Q}}xf6 31.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xf6 \textit{\textbf{Q}}c3 32.\textit{\textbf{Q}}g5 \textit{\textbf{Q}}g7=. Black is even slightly better in that position, because his knight turns out to be an excellent blocker of White’s pawns.

26...\textit{\textbf{R}}e5

It is also possible for Black to follow here with 26...\textit{\textbf{Q}}g5!? and that forces White to play: 27.\textit{\textbf{Q}}g7+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}xg7 28.\textit{\textbf{Q}}h7= and to draw by a perpetual, N.Alexander – J.Anderson, Eastbourne 1973. 27.f4

After 27.\textit{\textbf{Q}}f4+?! \textit{\textbf{Q}}g7 28.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xe5 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xe5 29.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xg6 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xg6 30.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xe5+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}h7, Zude – van Wely, Kuppenheim 2004, 31.f4\# White’s compensation for the piece would have been more or less sufficient, but after the more precise retreat – 27...\textit{\textbf{Q}}g8\# Panelo – Crickmore, Castellde 2005, Black has all the chances to press his material advantage home.

27...\textit{\textbf{Cc}}4

Black’s rook cannot abandon its defensive posture on the g6-square, because of the variation: 27...\textit{\textbf{Q}}g4 28.\textit{\textbf{Q}}g7+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}xg7 29.\textit{\textbf{Q}}h7+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}f8 30.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xe5++ and White is forced to comply with the draw.

28.\textit{\textbf{Q}}f5 (28.\textit{\textbf{Q}}b1 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xg2 29.\textit{\textbf{Q}}g7+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}xg7 30.\textit{\textbf{Q}}h7+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}f8=) 28...\textit{\textbf{Q}}xg2 29.\textit{\textbf{Q}}g7+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}xg7 30.\textit{\textbf{Q}}h7+ \textit{\textbf{Q}}f8= and a draw by a perpetual.
Part 5

1.d4 ♝f6 2.c4 g6 3.♘c3 d5 4.cxd5 ♝xd5 5.e4 ♝xc3
6.bxc3 ♗g7 7.♗c4 c5 8.♗e2 ♖c6 9.♗e3 0–0 10.0–0
♖g4 11.f3 ♖a5 12.♗d3 cxd4 13.cxd4 ♖e6 14.♗c1

15.♔a4 ♖e6 and it promises
White excellent prospects with a
quite interesting play and initia-
tive.

The retreat of the bishop –
15...♗b3, has been introduced
into top-level grandmaster prac-
tice relatively recently (Jussu-
pow – Anand, Wiik aan Zee 1994)
and it has been considered that
it just closes for White the sys-
tem 14.♗c1 according to the offi-
cial theory...I have analyzed that
line myself quite thoroughly and
so the variation: 16.♔b4 b6 17.
♖c3! – has been presented to the
readers’ judgment...

311
Chapter 22

1.d4 ♙f6 2.c4 g6 3.♘c3 d5 4.cxd5 ♙xd5 5.e4 ♙xc3 6.bxc3 ♙g7 7.♗c4 c5 8.♗e2 ♙c6 9.♗e3 0–0 10.0–0 ♙g4 11.f3 ♙a5 12.♗d3 cxd4 13.♘xd4 ♙e6 14.♗c1

This move was introduced in practice in the middle of the 1950ies. The idea is typical for the Gruenfeld Defence – White sacrifices a pawn but exerts a powerful pressure in the centre. He does not have the kingside attack typical for the line 14.d5 and his compensation for the pawn is mostly positional.

Black is practically forced to capture the pawn otherwise the development of the bishop to e6 seems to be senseless.

14...♗xa2 15.♖a4

White can play 15.d5?! but this is wrong. He has to develop his queen anyway in order to put his rook on a1, so he should better do it immediately attacking the knight on a5 in the process. Black now manages to undermine White’s centre in a very favourable situation: 15...♗b3 16.♗e1 (Or 16.♗d2 e6 17.♗b4 – after 17.♗c5 the arising variations are quite similar to what we are going to analyse later – 17...exd5 18.♗c5 ♙c4 19.♗xa5 ♙xd3 20.♗xd5 ♙xe2 21.♗xd8 ♙fxd8 22.♗e1 a5, and as usual in the Gruenfeld Defence, Black has a sufficient compensation for the queen with a rook, a light piece and a passed a-pawn, supported by the bishop on g7, Maksimovic – Lalic, Yugoslavia 1989, or 19.♗xc4 ♙xc4 20.♗xd5 ♙xd5 21.exd5 ♙xe3 22.♗c1 ♙xd5 once again with a good compensation 16...e6 17.♗c5 (White wins the exchange now, because the retreat of the rook to e8 will be countered by White with 18.♗b5, nevertheless Black has excellent compensation for it with the couple of pawns on the queenside and his dark-squares domination. 17.♗b4 has been dealt with in our previous variation.) 17...exd5 18.♖xf8 ♙xf8 19.e5 (This is White’s chance to organize something on the kingside. His pieces are hanging after 19.♖c3 dxe4 20.♖xe4 ♙c4±,
and White cannot defend his knight on e2 comfortably, because the line 21.\textit{f}e1 \textit{b}6+ 22.\textit{h}1 \textit{b}4 is very bad for him. Black now has two possibilities:

1) 19...\textit{c}4 20.\textit{d}1 \textit{c}6 (the manoeuvre with the black queen to e3 is not so good for Black anymore – 20...\textit{b}6+ 21.\textit{h}1 \textit{e}3 due to 22.\textit{xc}4 dxc4 23.\textit{xa}5 \textit{xe}2 24.\textit{fe}1, and White can choose between the idea to play e5-e6, or \textit{c}7 to regain his pawns on the queenside) 21.f4 (Or 21.\textit{xc}4 \textit{b}6+ 22.\textit{h}1 dxc4 23.\textit{f}4 and White has excellent prospects on the kingside with the idea to play 24.\textit{d}5 followed by \textit{f}6, or 24.e6.) 21...\textit{b}6+ 22.\textit{h}1 \textit{b}4 23.\textit{c}1 (but not 23.\textit{xc}4? dxc4 24.\textit{g}3 \textit{d}3, and White had a very difficult position because of the powerful black knight on d3 in the game Shabalov – Huzman, Norilsk 1987. He failed to improve his prospects even with the help of f3-f6.) 23...\textit{xd}3 24.\textit{xd}3 \textit{a}6 25.\textit{f}3 \textit{e}8 26.f5 gxf5 27.\textit{xf}5. The position of the black king seems rather vulnerable in that middle game, while after 27...\textit{xd}3 28.\textit{g}3+ \textit{g}7 29.\textit{xd}3 \textit{xd}3 30.\textit{xd}3 the draw outcome seems to be most likely.

2) 19...\textit{b}6+! (this is more energetic than 19...\textit{c}4) 20.\textit{h}1 \textit{e}3 21.\textit{xa}5 \textit{xd}3 22.\textit{c}7 b6! (Black must preserve his bishop pair. The other possibility is not so good: 22...\textit{xe}2 23.\textit{xb}7 \textit{e}8 24.\textit{xb}3 \textit{xe}5 25.f4, and White’s task is easier because of the weak black pawns.) 23.\textit{g}3 \textit{c}4. Black is threatening to push forward his a-pawn if White plays passively, so he should probably react dynamically with 24.e6 fxe6 25.\textit{c}6 \textit{d}8 26.\textit{xe}6+ \textit{g}7 27.\textit{fd}1 (or 27.\textit{e}5+ \textit{g}8) 27...\textit{a}3, and force a draw by a perpetual on the e5 and e6 squares.

15...\textit{b}3

This move is very popular presently. It was introduced in the grandmaster practice by V.Anand in his match against A.Jussupow in 1994 and was played twice by A.Shirov against V.Kramnik in their match in 1998.

It is evident that Black risks a lot leaving his bishop behind enemy lines. It can become a juicy target after the eventual d4-d5. On the other hand Black defends his bishop with tempo with his last move and forces the enemy queen to the b4 square intending to try to exchange queens with \textit{d}6. Black’s other possibility 15...\textit{e}6 will be
analysed in Chapters 24-26.

16.\texttt{b4 b6}

Black is reluctant now to go back to e6 with the bishop because he will just be a tempo down in comparison to the line 15...\texttt{e6}.

17.\texttt{g5}

White tries to force the weakening of the e6-square, because he will be able to manoeuvre later his knight there after d5 and \texttt{d4}.

The game that we have already mentioned Jussupow – Anand, Wijk aan Zee (m/2) 1994, continued with 17.d5, and Black played 17...\texttt{d6}! – realizing one of the main ideas of the variation otherwise he would have problems with the defence of the bishop on b3. 18.\texttt{d2}?! (White is playing mostly 18.\texttt{xd6 exd6} in some subsequent games, with a partial compensation for the pawn, but not more, for example: 19.\texttt{c7 a4} – this is another standard manoeuvre for the 15...\texttt{b3} variation – Black is trying to bring his knight to c5 – 20.\texttt{c3 xc3 21.xc3 db3 22.g2 fcc8 23.xc8+ xxc8 24.xb3 xb3,} Cramling – Shirov, Barcelona 2000 – and the endgame looks very drawish.) 18...\texttt{f8!} (\texttt{e6}) 19.\texttt{xd6 exd6} 20.\texttt{g5 dc8 21.a6 cc5+}, and Black has an extra passed pawn.

The strongest move for White, according to our analysis is – 17.\texttt{c3} and we have devoted a separate Chapter 23 to it.

17...\texttt{f6}

This is Black’s only move. After 17...\texttt{f6}? 18.\texttt{xf6 exf6} 19.d5 White wins the bishop on b3, or 17...\texttt{e8}? 18.\texttt{b5}.

18.\texttt{h4}

It was considered until quite recently that White could obtain an advantage by playing like that.

He did not achieve anything in the game Ahlander – Hellers, Malmo 1994 after 18.\texttt{e3 f7} (making use of this square for the retreat of the bishop) 19.\texttt{a6 d6 20.b2 ab8}, and because of the threat b5, followed by a6, Black seized the initiative.

Black can answer 18.\texttt{f4} with 18...\texttt{e5} 19.\texttt{e3} (After 19.\texttt{g3!} exd4 20.d4 f5 – Black takes advantage of the fact that the white bishop is not defending the d4-square, but not 20...\texttt{f7?} 21.\texttt{c7}, and Black must give up his queen for a rook and a bishop – 21.d6 xd4+ 22.xd4 gb7 23.e5 xd6 24.exd6 \texttt{f6} and White’s passed pawn compensates the minute material deficit, but not more than that, while in case of 21.\texttt{xb3 xd3 22.xa5 bxa5+} Black is slightly better.) 19...\texttt{exd4} 20.d4 f7 21.a6 e8 22.f1 e7 23.xe7 xe7 24.c6 xc6 25.xc6 and in the game Kramnik – Shirov, Cazorla 1998, the opponents agreed to a draw, because Black’s passed pawns are blocked indeed, but White cannot play for a win either.
Black has two basic replies in this position: a) 18...\textit{f}7 and b) 18...\textit{d}6.

He should avoid playing 18...e5 19.\textit{c}3!± and White is attacking the enemy bishop on b3 and protects his own bishop, threatening dxe5.

18...\textit{h}6 is useless because of 19.f4± – Black’s bishop should go to h6 only if that move is unplayable.

\textbf{a) 18...\textit{f}7}

This quite logical retreat has been suggested by Kramnik and Dolmatov. It is one of the two best moves for Black in this position. He is taking the bishop to safety in anticipation of d4-d5.

\textbf{19.d5!}

White has tried some other moves in this position like 19.\textit{g}3 (threatening \textit{c}7 and \textit{b}5) 19...e5 20.\textit{a}6 (but not 20.d5 \textit{b}7, and the black knight goes to an excellent position) 20...b5!? (This idea is quite typical for this line – to isolate the bishop on a6) 21.\textit{f}2 (It is dangerous for White to capture on b5 because of the pin along the b-file.) 21...\textit{b}6 22.\textit{a}1 \textit{c}6 (22...\textit{xa}6 23.\textit{xa}5±)

23.\textit{xb}5 Mikhelevski – Liss, Ramat Aviv 1998 – and after the exchange on d4 White’s pawns will be only on one side of the board and his winning chances will be quite minute. The game continued 23...\textit{xd}4 (it is possible that Black could play the simpler 23...\textit{xb}5 24.\textit{xb}5 \textit{xd}4 25.\textit{xd}4 \textit{ex}d4 26.\textit{xd}4 f5±) 24.\textit{xd}4 \textit{ex}d4 25.\textit{d}3 \textit{ad}8 26.\textit{fb}1 \textit{e}6 27.\textit{b}7 f5 28.\textit{xf}5 \textit{xf}5 29.\textit{xf}5 gxf5 30.\textit{d}3±, and now for example after 30...\textit{g}6 Black should be able to draw easily. He made a mistake in the game and played 30...\textit{e}6? and lost a pawn after 31.\textit{xa}7 \textit{f}7 32.\textit{xf}5!

It is not efficacious for White to play 19.\textit{a}6 (with the idea to prevent the manoeuvre of the black knight to c5 via b7) 19...\textit{d}6 20.\textit{xd}6 \textit{ex}d6 21.\textit{c}7 (White should not play 21.d5 due to the manoeuvre 21...\textit{b}3 22.\textit{c}7 \textit{c}5 23.\textit{b}5 \textit{fc}8 – and Black has an excellent position.) 21...d5. White needs to fix the weakness on d6 in order to try to achieve some real advantage after the exchange of the queens. The GM practice shows in general that the endgame is not dangerous for Black at all:

22.\textit{c}3 \textit{ad}8 23.\textit{f}2 \textit{dx}e4 24.\textit{exe}4 \textit{e}6 25.\textit{xa}7 \textit{c}6 26.\textit{c}7 \textit{xd}4 27.\textit{d}5± Schneider – De Vreugt, Cappelle la Grande 1999;

Or 22.\textit{ex}d5 \textit{xd}5 23.\textit{c}3 \textit{f}7 24.d5 \textit{b}3 25.\textit{b}7 \textit{ad}8 26.\textit{d}1 \textit{c}5 27.\textit{c}6 \textit{e}8 28.\textit{xe}8 \textit{f}xe8;
29.d6  \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{e}6 \) 30.d7  \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{f}7 \) = V. Georgiev – Pierrot, Linares 1999.

White did not have any real winning chances in these games due to the considerable reduction of material.

19...\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{d}6 \)

Black has only tried up to now 19...\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{b}7 \) 20.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{d}4 \) (After 20.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{b}5 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}5 \) 21.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{f}2 \) it is better for White to play 21.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{fd}1 ! ? \) – 21...a6 and White is forced to retreat to c4 with the bishop, because 22.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}6 \) does not work due to 22...\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{d}3 \) 23.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{xb}6 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}1 \).) 20...\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}5 \) 21.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{b}5 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{h}6 \) Amura – Qin Kanying, Shenyang 2000, and now White had to play 22.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}2 ! ? \) not attacking the black queen yet. Instead White played in the game 22.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}6 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}7 \) 23.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{g}3 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{b}7 \) 24.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}2 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{fc}8 \) (Black would not have had that possibility with a queen on d8.) 25.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{f}2 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{f}8 \) 26.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{xc}5 \) bxc5 27.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{xc}5 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{b}6 \) 28.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{fc}1 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}7 \) 29.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{xb}6 \) axb6\( \infty \), and White would hardly win that endgame without his dark-squared bishop.

20.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{xd}6 \) exd6 21.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{d}4 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{fc}8 \)

22.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{b}5 \)

The other possibility leads to a quite unclear position after 22.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}6 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{xc}6 \) 23.dxc6\( \infty \).

22...\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{b}7 \)

In the game Jussupow – Ruck, Ohrid 2001, in a similar position to the main line (except with a black bishop on b7) Black had an idea to trap the knight on d6 (with \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{xc}1 \), a6 and \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{d}8 \)). Now this idea does not work because the bishop is on f7 and the pawn on d6 must be defended.

23.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{xc}8 \+)

It is useless for White to try to bring the knight to e6 when the black bishop is on f7 – 23. \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}7 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{ab}8 \) 24.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{a}6 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{d}8 \) 25.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{e}6 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{xe}6 \) 26.dxe6 \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}5 \) 27.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}4 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{f}8 \)

and the pawn on e6 is reliably blocked.

23...\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{xc}8 \) 24.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{xa}7 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{c}3 \)

25.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{d}1 ! \)

White took back his sacrificed pawn and his position is clearly preferable. The enemy passed pawn is reliably blocked and Black has two weaknesses on d6 and b6. It was not worth creating any counterplay for the opponent with the bishop retreat 25.\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{b}5 \) \( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{f}5 \).

b) 18...\( \text{\texttt{\textregistered}} \text{d}6 ! \)
19.\(\textit{\text{\text{x}}}\textit{d}6\textit{\text{\text{x}}}d6\) 20.\(d5\textit{\text{\text{f}}}c8\)

Black has not tested in practice yet neither 20...\(\textit{\text{\text{a}}}a4?!\) (with the idea to bring the knight to c5 immediately), nor 20...\(\textit{\text{\text{a}}}ac8?!\) (contrary to the line 20...\(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}fc8\), Black is now defending the f6-pawn, but the rook is very passive on f8 and the a-pawn is not supported).

It is too risky to play 20...\(f5\) 21.\(\textit{\text{\text{e}}}xf5\textit{\text{\text{g}}}xf5\) (Black should better play 21...\(\textit{\text{\text{a}}}xd5?!\) 22.\(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}xg6\textit{\text{\text{h}}}xg6\) 23.\(\textit{\text{\text{a}}}xg6\textit{\text{\text{c}}}c4\) 24.\(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}f2\) d5, Kramnik, Dolmatov – and the material is equal, but the black king is safer. There is no white knight on f5 now and Black can hope to advance his queenside pawns successfully sometime in the future.) 22.\(\textit{\text{\text{g}}}g3\) (The black king has been weakened and his passed pawns are still static.) 22...\(\textit{\text{\text{b}}}b2\) (Or 22...\(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}d4\) 23.\(\textit{\text{\text{h}}}h1\) f4 24.\(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}f5\) \(\textit{\text{\text{c}}}c5\) 25.\(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}f6\uparrow\uparrow\) 23.\(\textit{\text{\text{xf}}}f5!\) \(\textit{\text{\text{c}}}c4\) (White’s initiative is too powerful after 23...\(\textit{\text{\text{xc}}}c1\) 24.\(\textit{\text{\text{xe}}}c1\)\(\uparrow\) threatening \(\textit{\text{\text{h}}}h6\) and \(\textit{\text{\text{c}}}c7\) 24.\(\textit{\text{\text{e}}}e7+\) \(\textit{\text{\text{h}}}h8\) 25.\(\textit{\text{\text{x}}}c4\) \(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}f4\) 26.\(\textit{\text{\text{g}}}g5\) \(\textit{\text{\text{xc}}}c4\) 27.\(\textit{\text{\text{ce}}}c1\) \(\textit{\text{\text{c}}}c2\) 28.\(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}f5\) (It was worth trying the straightforward 28.f4!? \(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}f4\)\(\textit{\text{f}}5\)\(\textit{\text{f}}6\).) 28...\(\textit{\text{\text{c}}}c4\) 29.\(\textit{\text{\text{e}}}e6\) \(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}f8\), and now according to Dolmatov, White was better after 30.\(\textit{\text{\text{g}}}g4!\). In the game Kramnik – Shirov, Cazorla 1998, White played 30.\(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}d6\) \(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}d6\) 31.\(\textit{\text{\text{xd}}}d6\) \(\textit{\text{\text{e}}}e8\), and Black managed to activate his rooks 32.\(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}d1\) \(\textit{\text{\text{e}}}e2\) 33.\(\textit{\text{\text{h}}}h1\) \(\textit{\text{\text{g}}}g2\) 34.\(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}d8+\) \(\textit{\text{\text{g}}}g7\) 35.\(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}f4\) \(\textit{\text{\text{f}}6\uparrow}\), and saved the draw.

21.\(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}d4\) \(\textit{\text{\text{h}}}h6\)

This active move was quite correct – Black must fight for the only open file.

22.\(\textit{\text{\text{b}}}b3\)

In the game Jussupow – Ruck, Ohrid 2001 White attacked the weak pawn on d6 immediately – 22.\(\textit{\text{\text{x}}}c8+\) \(\textit{\text{\text{x}}}c8\) 23.\(\textit{\text{\text{c}}}c5\) (Should White capture on f6, Black will have more than sufficient counterplay due to has passed pawns, despite the material quality: 23.\(\textit{\text{\text{x}}}b3\) \(\textit{\text{\text{e}}}e3\) 24.\(\textit{\text{\text{h}}}h1\) \(\textit{\text{\text{b}}}b3\) 25.\(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}f6\) \(\textit{\text{\text{f}}7\) 26.\(\textit{\text{\text{b}}}b2\) – it is better to preserve the bishop 26.\(\textit{\text{\text{h}}}h4\) \(\textit{\text{\text{c}}}c3\) 27.\(\textit{\text{\text{b}}}b5\) – 26...\(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}d4\) 27.\(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}d4\) \(\textit{\text{\text{x}}}d4\) 28.\(\textit{\text{a}}a6\) \(\textit{\text{\text{c}}}c3\) 29.\(\textit{\text{h}}h4\) \(\textit{\text{\text{a}}}a3\), Hillarp Persson – Rowson, Torshavn 2000, and the pawns go forward and White cannot do anything about it.) The move 23.\(\textit{\text{\text{b}}}b5\) did not bring White any advantage either: 23...\(\textit{\text{\text{a}}}a6\) 24.\(\textit{\text{\text{x}}}d6\) \(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}d8\). The knight is trapped, so White has to play 25.e5, and after 25...\(\textit{\text{\text{e}}}e3\) 26.\(\textit{\text{\text{h}}}h1\) g5 27.\(\textit{\text{\text{g}}}g3\) \(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}xe5\) 28.\(\textit{\text{\text{xe}}}e5\) \(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}f4\) 29.\(\textit{\text{\text{xf}}}f4\) \(\textit{\text{\text{g}}}xf4\) 26.\(\textit{\text{\text{e}}}e5\) \(\textit{\text{\text{h}}}h4\) \(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}f8\), and now according to Dolmatov, White was better after 30.\(\textit{\text{\text{g}}}g4!\). In the game Kramnik – Shirov, Cazorla 1998, White played 30.\(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}d6\) \(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}d6\) 31.\(\textit{\text{\text{xd}}}d6\) \(\textit{\text{\text{e}}}e8\), and Black managed to activate his rooks 32.\(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}d1\) \(\textit{\text{\text{e}}}e2\) 33.\(\textit{\text{\text{h}}}h1\) \(\textit{\text{\text{g}}}g2\) 34.\(\textit{\text{\text{d}}}d8+\) \(\textit{\text{\text{g}}}g7\) 35.\(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}f4\) \(\textit{\text{\text{f}}}6\uparrow\), and saved the draw.

22...\(\textit{\text{\text{b}}}b3\) 23.\(\textit{\text{c}}c6\) \(\textit{\text{\text{a}}}5\)!

Black now materializes his basic trump-card – the passed a-pawn.
23...\(\text{xe}3+\) 24.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{xc}6\) 25. \(\text{dxc}6\) \(\text{g}7\). White's passed pawn is much more important in this endgame than Black's extra pawn. 26.\(\text{e}1\) (White is trying to clarify the intentions of the black bishop. It must retreat either to d4 or to c5 and will occupy an important square for the black knight.) 26...\(\text{d}4\) (26...\(\text{c}5\)? is just impossible, because White wins after 27.\(\text{a}6++\)) 27.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{c}5\) (But not 27...\(\text{a}5?\) 28.\(\text{a}6\), and Black loses at least a knight.) 28.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{e}5\) 29.\(\text{e}1\)! (White must repel the black bishop from e5 if he wants to play for a win. There will appear an additional weakness on d6 and White will have to retreat his bishop from h4.) 29...\(\text{c}8\) 30.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{c}7\) (White's idea is not to let Black's passed pawns advance: 30...\(\text{a}5\) 31.\(\text{b}1\)! 32...\(\text{d}3\) 32. \(\text{xb}6\) \(\text{xe}1\) 33.\(\text{b}7+\) \(\text{h}6\) 34.\(\text{c}7\), and Black will have to give a whole rook for this passed pawn although he can still continue fighting for the draw: 34...\(\text{d}3\) 35.\(\text{e}6\) \(\text{xc}7\) 36.\(\text{xc}7\) d5 37.\(\text{e}7\) dxe4 38.fxe4 \(\text{f}2+\) 39.\(\text{g}1\) \(\text{xe}4\) 40.\(\text{g}8\) – and White captures on h7 with considerable winning chances.) 31.g3\(\pm\). White has a powerful positional pressure for the sacrificed pawn. Black's passed pawns cannot advance and after f4, the pawn on d6 will be rather weak. Nevertheless Black's resources seem to be enough for a draw after some careful defending.

24.\(\text{b}1\)

After 24...\(\text{a}4\) Black's passed pawn has become so powerful, that he probably has the advantage already, Nyback – Hermansson, Stockholm 2004. The game continued with: 25.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{g}7\) 26.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{c}5\) 27.\(\text{g}3\) f5 28. \(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{d}4+\) 29.\(\text{e}2\) a3 30.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{bxc}5\) 31.\(\text{xc}8+\) \(\text{xc}8\) 32.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{b}8\) 33.\(\text{a}2\) \(\text{xb}1\) 34.\(\text{xb}1\) \(\text{fxe}4\) 35.\(\text{fxe}4\) \(\text{f}7\) 36.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{e}7\) – Black made a draw quite easily, meanwhile his play should be improved somewhere without too much of an effort. We have failed to find any improvement for White at any moment, so we have to admit that the move 17.\(\text{g}5\) does not provide him with any advantage at all.

We are going to concentrate our efforts on the move 17.\(\text{c}3\) – see the next chapter.
Chapter 23

1.d4 2.c4 g6 3.d3 d5 4.cxd5 5.e4 6.xc3 6.bxc3 g7 7.c4 c5 8.e2 c6 9.e3 0–0 10.0–0 g4 11.f3 a5 12.d3 cxd4 13.
cxd4 e6 14.c1 xa2 15.a4 b3 16.b4 b6 17.c3!

This move has been played before, but it has never been connected with the order of moves that we recommend. White
places his rook on c3 and refrains temporarily from the pawn-advance d4-d5. His plan is to double
the rooks along the c-file and to penetrate to the c7-square.

17...e6

In this position we will analyze thoroughly the moves: a) 18.g5, b) 18.f4 and c) 18.
f1.

White’s other possibilities are:

18.a6 d6 (or 18...c8=) 19.xd6 exd6 20.f1 f5! 21.
f4, Fedorko – Miller, Email 1999 and here after: 21...f7!? 22.exf5 gxf5 23.c7 the position
is rather unclear – Black has weakened his kingside pawn-structure, but White cannot attack it effectively. Now, Black
can equalize with the calm line 20...d5 and if 21.f4 a8, threatening to capture on e4
and then on d4. 22.xe6 fxe6 23.d3 c4 24.xc4 dxc4 25.
c4 d7 26.f2 f8 27.e2 b5= Alexandrova – Blazkova,

It does not seem very good for White to try: 18.f4 c8 19.f1
xc3 20.xc3 d7, since he cannot place his rook on c7, because of e7-e5 and that means that his
bishop-move to f4 had not been so purposeful either. It is far
from clear where White’s compensation is after: 19.xc8 xc8
20.c1 e5 (Black exploits the defenselessness of the bishop on d3
and he seizes the initiative.) 21.g3 h6 22.f4 exd4 23.xd4

a) 18.g5

White attacks Black’s e7-
pawn, but he weakens his own
d4-pawn, which cannot be
pushed forward to d5, because of the pin. Black can make a good use of that and he can equalize.

18...\textit{\texttt{d6}}?!

Black only isolates his bishop on g7 out of the actions with the line: 18...f6?! 19.\textit{\texttt{f4}} Mielke – Hase, Germany 1996.

It is quite possible for him to try: 18...\textit{e8} 19.\textit{\texttt{b5}}. That is White’s only way to try to obtain some edge. (He cannot do anything on the c-file, in case of: 19.\textit{\texttt{fc1}} \textit{d6} 20.\textit{\texttt{xd6}} exd6 21.\textit{\texttt{b5}} \textit{ec8} 22.\textit{\texttt{a6}} \textit{xc3} 23.\textit{\texttt{xc3}} d5 24.\textit{\texttt{c7}} h6=, as well as after: 19.\textit{\texttt{a6}} \textit{d6} 20.\textit{\texttt{xd6}} exd6 21.\textit{\texttt{c7}} d5= Habermehl – Hase, corr 1994. White’s rook on c7 does not attack anything in both cases.)

19...\textit{d7} 20.\textit{\texttt{xd7}} \textit{xd7} 21.\textit{\texttt{fc1}}. White plans again to place his rook on c7, or if Black deploys his rook on c8, White can exchange rooks and capture the e7-pawn. Black has several acceptable possibilities:

He reaches a rather unclear position after: 21...\textit{d6} 22.\textit{\texttt{a4}}, Parry – Fedorko, Email 2001, 22...\textit{\texttt{ed8}};

Black manages to preserve the balance with the line: 21...\textit{\texttt{ad8}} 22.\textit{\texttt{c7}} \textit{\texttt{xd4}}+ 23.\textit{\texttt{f1}} \textit{d6} (or 23...\textit{\texttt{c5}} 24.\textit{\texttt{xc5}} bxc5 25.\textit{\texttt{xa5}}) 24.\textit{\texttt{xd6}} \textit{\texttt{xd6}} 25.\textit{\texttt{xe7}} \textit{\texttt{e6}}= with a possible draw;

21...\textit{\texttt{ac8}} 22.\textit{\texttt{xc8}} \textit{\texttt{xc8}} 23.\textit{\texttt{xc8}}+ \textit{\texttt{xc8}} 24.\textit{\texttt{xe7}} h6=, or 24...\textit{\texttt{c6}} – White has not advanced his central pawns yet, so it remains completely unclear whose passed pawns are stronger here.

19.\textit{\texttt{xe7}}

After: 19.\textit{\texttt{xd6}} exd6 20.\textit{\texttt{e7}} \textit{\texttt{b3}} 21.\textit{\texttt{xf8}} \textit{\texttt{xf8}}, Black captures White’s d4-pawn and he has an excellent compensation for the exchange.

19...\textit{\texttt{xb4}} 20.\textit{\texttt{xb4}} \textit{\texttt{fd8}}

21.\textit{\texttt{xa5}}

It is inferior for White to continue with: 21.e5 \textit{\texttt{b3}} 22.\textit{\texttt{e4}} \textit{\texttt{xd4}} 23.\textit{\texttt{xd4}} \textit{\texttt{xd4}} 24.\textit{\texttt{xa8}} \textit{\texttt{xb4}} 25.\textit{\texttt{f4}} \textit{\texttt{f8}} – since Black’s connected passed pawns serve as an excellent compensation for the exchange.

21...\textit{\texttt{xd4+}} 22.\textit{\texttt{xd4}} \textit{\texttt{xd4}}

23.\textit{\texttt{a1}}

Or 23.\textit{\texttt{xb6}} axb6 24.\textit{\texttt{b1}} \textit{\texttt{ad8}} 25.\textit{\texttt{e2}} (After: 25.\textit{\texttt{f1}} \textit{\texttt{d1}} 26.\textit{\texttt{xb6}} \textit{\texttt{a8}} 27.\textit{\texttt{b2}} \textit{\texttt{aa1}} 28.\textit{\texttt{f2}} \textit{\texttt{d7}} 29.\textit{\texttt{b3}} \textit{\texttt{e6}} – White should not let Black’s bishop occupy the a6-f1 diagonal, so the game will end in a draw.) 25...\textit{\texttt{d2}} 26.\textit{\texttt{f1}} \textit{\texttt{a8}} 27.\textit{\texttt{d3}} \textit{\texttt{c2}} 28.\textit{\texttt{d1}} \textit{\texttt{c6}}= – the material is equal and White has no chances to win the game at all.

23...\textit{\texttt{ad8}}

24.\textit{\texttt{e2}} (24.\textit{\texttt{f1}} bxa5 25.\textit{\texttt{xa5}}

24...\textit{\texttt{e2}}

25.\textit{\texttt{e2}}

26.\textit{\texttt{f4}}
\[ \text{d1=} \] 24...\text{d2} 25.\text{f2} \text{b2} 26.\text{e3} \text{bxa5} 27.\text{xa5} \text{dd2} 28.\text{f1} \text{f2} 29.\text{c1} \text{a2=} \text{and the endgame is equal.}

b) 18.\text{f4}

![Chessboard diagram]

Black cannot allow White to capture on e6 in that position. He has the following possibilities:

b1) 18...\text{d7, b2) 18...d6.}

The move 18...\text{h6} is a very artificial attempt to prevent White from capturing the bishop on e6. 19.\text{c1 w6} 20.\text{xd6 exd6} 21.\text{xe6 xc1} 22.\text{xf8 e3+} 23.\text{h1 xd4} 24.\text{c7 xf8} 25.\text{a6±.} Black is OK, from the point of view of material, but his position is terrible. His passed pawns have not been advanced yet, while White’s rook is already on the seventh rank.

b1) 18...\text{d7} 19.\text{d5}

We recommend the same idea in the line: 18.\text{f1 c1} \text{c8} 19.\text{f4 d7.} The variations here seem to favour White as well.

There were some games played in the line: 19.\text{f1 e6} 20.e5 (This plan seems to be too slow.) 20...\text{c8} 21.\text{e4 xc3} 22.\text{xc3} (or 22.\text{xc3 b5=}) 22...\text{wb8} (Black has tried here too: 22...\text{b5} 23.\text{b4 d7} 24.d5 \text{e8} 25.\text{h4 xe5} 26.dxe6 fxe6 27.h5∞ – and White has some compensation for the two missing pawns, due to Black’s compromised king shelter, but not more, Barkhagen – Akesson, Stockholm 1998) 23.\text{c7 b5} 24.h4, Barkhagen – M.Rytshagov, Gothenburg 1999, and here after: 24...\text{h6= Dxb3, White’s activity ebbs away.}

19...\text{e6}

It is too dangerous for Black to let White’s powerful knight remain on the d5-square: 19...e5 20.\text{xc1} Katz – Surender, Email 1998.

It would not work for Black to play: 19...\text{h8} 20.\text{xe7} (or 20.\text{xe7 c6} 21.\text{xd8 axd8=} 20...\text{e8} 21.\text{d5 c6}, with the idea to trade the e7-pawn for White’s d4-pawn, because of: 22.\text{b2! xd4} 23.\text{c7± – and in order for Black to regain the exchange, he must retreat with his knight from the d4-square and capture on c3 with his bishop. Subsequently, the vulnerability of the long diagonal will be much more important than some irrelevant queenside pawns.}

20.\text{e7+ h8}

In case of 21.d5, Black can play not only: 21...\text{xc3} 22.\text{xc3+ f6} 23.d6\text= and White has an excellent compensation for the exchange, but also: 21...\text{b7! Dc5.}

21.e5 h6
Chapter 23

It is not good for Black to try 21...f6, due to 22.d5!, followed by a sacrifice on g6 and ♙h4, or the other way around...

21...♗b7 22.♖a6 (Or: 22.♗g5 a5± Δf6) 22...♗c5 23.♕xg6+ (23.dxc5 ♙xe7±) 23...fxg6 24. dxc5± and Black must either comply with White's pawn being pushed all the way up to the c6-square, or he must enter the variation: 24...bxc5 25.♕xc5 ♙f7 26.f4±, remaining with plenty of pawn-weaknesses, or he must capture on e5 with the following eventual developments: 24... ♘xe5 25.♗d3 (25.♗d1 ♙f6; 25. ♘d4 ♘f6 26.♕xf6+ ♙xf6 27.c6 ♘c8=) 25...bxc5 26.♗xc5 ♙b8 27.♕e4 (or 27.♕d2 ♙f7 28.♗d1 ♙c7) 27...♗f5 28.♗d4 ♘xd4+ 29.♕xd4+ ♙g8 30.♕xa7± and despite the simplifications White still has some minute chances to press on for victory.

22.d5! exd5 23.♕h4 ♙h7 24.♗g5 (♗xg6) 24...b5 25.♗h1 (Black has defended against capturing on g6 with his last move: 25.♗xg6 ♙b6+) 25...♗b8 26. ♙xd5! (But not: 26.♗f6 ♙xf6 27. ♙xf6 ♙b6 28.♗xd5 ♙e6. Black avoids the fork in this fashion and he exchanges the queens too. 29.♕xe6 ♙xe6 30.♗f6+ ♙g7 31.♗xb5 ♙fc8=) 26...♕xe5 27. ♙f6+ ♙xf6 (Or: 27...♗h8 28.♕c5! ♙e7 29.♖e1 ♙e6 30.♖c7+- and White deflects Black's queen from the defence of the f6-square and he wins the game.) 28. ♙xf6→. White's threats more than compensate the couple of missing pawns on the queenside. For example: 28...♗b8 29.♕c5 ♙g8 30.♕h5 ♙f8 31.♗g5++; 28... ♙e6 29.♖e1 ♙a2 30.♖c5++; 28... ♙d6 29.♖e7 and he wins at least the exchange for a pawn.

b2) 18...♗d6!

This is Black's best bet! Now, in comparison to the line: 18.♕c1 ♙c8 19.♗f4 ♙d6, there remains another couple of rooks and that somehow reduces the effect of White's penetration to the c7-square. For example, he will not be threatening to capture on a7, because Black still has a rook protecting the pawn.

19.♕xd6 exd6 20.♖c7

In case of 20.♗a6, contrary to the position without the couple
of rooks, Black can answer with 20...\(\texttt{c8}\) and since White would
not like to exchange the bishops – his move Ba6 turns out to be
useless.

20.\(\texttt{cxe6}\) fxe6 21.\(\texttt{fc1}\) (Black
can play d6-d5 and he obtains a
good game in the line: 21.\(\texttt{a6}\) d5
22.\(\texttt{e5}\) c4 23.\(\texttt{xc4}\) dxc4 24.\(\texttt{xc4}\)
\(\texttt{fc8}\) 25.\(\texttt{fc1}\) \(\texttt{xc4}\) 26.\(\texttt{xc4}\) a5,
since his passed pawns on the
queenside are much more effective
than White’s blocked central
pawns. He fails to capture on e6
after: 27.\(\texttt{xc6}\) b5 28.\(\texttt{xe6}\) a4 29.d5
a3 30.\(\texttt{d4}\) \(\texttt{f8}\) \(\texttt{b4-b3}\) 21...d5
22.e5 a6 23.\(\texttt{a3}\). He can prevent
b6-b5 and \(\texttt{a5-c4}\) and he thus
preserves the balance, but noth-
thing more, Wagener – Sveinsson,
Email 2003.

20...\(\texttt{b3}\) 21.\(\texttt{xe6}\)

21.d5 \(\texttt{fc8}\) (or 21...\(\texttt{c8}\) 22.
\(\texttt{b5}\)) 22.\(\texttt{xe6}\) fxe6 23.\(\texttt{xc8}\)+
\(\texttt{xc8}\) 24.\(\texttt{xe6}\) \(\texttt{f8}\) – and even
White’s e6-pawn is not so dan-
gerous as Black’s queenside
passed pawns.

21...\(\texttt{fxe6}\) 22.\(\texttt{c4}\) \(\texttt{xd4}\) 23.
\(\texttt{xe6}\+)

White has absolutely no ad-
advantage following: 23.\(\texttt{xd4}\)
\(\texttt{xd4}\) 24.\(\texttt{d1}\) b5, because after:
25.\(\texttt{xd4}\) bxc4 26.\(\texttt{xc4}\) \(\texttt{fd8}\) and
27.\(\texttt{c6}\), Black can try to play for
a win with the line: 27...a5
28.\(\texttt{dx6}\) \(\texttt{xd6}\) 29.\(\texttt{xd6}\) a4, as
well as after: 25.\(\texttt{a2}\) \(\texttt{fc8}\) 26.
\(\texttt{xc8}\)+ \(\texttt{xc8}\) 27.\(\texttt{xd4}\) \(\texttt{c1}\)+ 28.\(\texttt{f2}\)
\(\texttt{c2}\)+, Black remains with con-
nected passed pawns on the
queenside.

23...\(\texttt{h8}\) 24.\(\texttt{f2}\) \(\texttt{xe3}\)+ 25.
\(\texttt{xe3}\) \(\texttt{c5}\) 26.\(\texttt{d5}\) \(\texttt{fc8}\) 27.\(\texttt{f7}\)
\(\texttt{f8}\) – Black attacks White’s
rook and thus he avoids losing
his a7-pawn, so it all ends in a
draw by a repetition of moves.
Therefore, the variation – 18.
\(\texttt{f4}\), despite White’s domination
on the c-file, does not bring him
any advantage. We suggest the
following improvement – 18.\(\texttt{fc1}\)
\(\texttt{c8}\) and only here – 19.\(\texttt{f4}\).

c) 18.\(\texttt{fc1}\)

18...\(\texttt{xc8}\)

It also deserves attention for
Black to continue without plac-
ing a rook on the c-file: 18...\(\texttt{d6}\)
19.\(\texttt{a4}\) (Or 19.\(\texttt{xd6}\) exd6 20.\(\texttt{c7}\)
d5 21.\(\texttt{a6}\), Peschardt – Do Pra-
do, corr. 2000, 21...\(\texttt{fd8}\) – as
usual in this pawn-structure, in
case Black manages to push d6-

323
d5, his position is quite acceptable; 19.\(\text{b2!? f8}\) 20.\(\text{a6 xc3}\) 21.\(\text{xc3 b3}\) 22.\(\text{b1 a3}\) 23. \(\text{d3 a5}\) 24.\(\text{b5.}\) The placement of Black’s knight and queen on the queenside seems to be quite suspicious, but it looks like White cannot exploit that in any way: 24...\(\text{d8}\) 25.\(\text{d5 c5}\) 26.\(\text{c4 d7}\) 27.\(\text{xc5 bxc5=}\). Presently, Black has an extra pawn and White cannot regain it immediately, because of: 28.\(\text{xc5? a6}\); meanwhile the arising position is quite safe for Black, no matter what...\) 19...\(\text{d7}\) 20.\(\text{b5 xb5}\) 21.\(\text{xb5=}\). White maintains his control over the c-file and he has a good compensation for the pawn. In case Black tries to redeploy his knight to the c4-square with: 21...\(\text{a6}\) 22.\(\text{a4 d8}\), White can prevent that with: 23.\(\text{c7f}\).

19.\(\text{f4}\)

Now, just like on move 18, it is not so good for White to play: 19.\(\text{f4?! xc3}\) 20.\(\text{xc3 d7}\), impeding the move \(\text{c7}\) and preparing \(\text{a5-c6}\).

It deserves attention for White to follow with: 19.\(\text{xc8!}\) \(\text{xc8}\) 20.\(\text{g5}\) (20.\(\text{d5 e6}\)) 20...\(\text{f6}\) 21.\(\text{d2}\) Peschardt – García Rojas, corr. 2000.

In the position arising after 19.\(\text{f4}\), we will analyze the exchange of the rooks c1) 19...\(\text{xc3}\) and Black’s attempt to exchange queens c2) 19...\(\text{d6}\).

c1) 19...\(\text{xc3}\) 20.\(\text{xc3 d7}\)

Here it is not good for Black to try to trade queens with 20...\(\text{d6}\), since after: 21.\(\text{xd6 exd6}\) 22.\(\text{c7}\) (about 22.\(\text{a6}\) – see 19...\(\text{d6}\)) 20.\(\text{d6 ed6}\) 21.\(\text{a6 c3}\) 22. \(\text{c3}\) White’s rook penetrates to the seventh rank and Black is helpless against that. After: 22...\(\text{b3}\) 23.\(\text{xa7f}\) White has a clear advantage, since both black queenside pawns are very weak.

White still cannot push d4-d5, while his rook is on the c3-square, but he has an interesting maneuver at his disposal – 21.\(\text{d5}\), with the idea to force e7-e6 and then to check with this knight on e7 and to follow that with \(\text{e3-g5}\) and in perspective d4-d5, \(\text{c3-c7}\). Naturally, White’s knight on e7 seems to be a bit suspicious, but if he manages to accomplish that entire plan everything will end up perfectly for him.

21...\(\text{e6}\)

The move 21...\(\text{e8}\), enables White to penetrate with his rook to c7: 22.\(\text{c7}\) e6 (Black’s position is very bad after: 22...\(\text{d6}\) 23. \(\text{a4 e5}\) 24.\(\text{xa7}\) 23...e6 24.\(\text{b5 exd5}\) 25.\(\text{xd7 h4}\) 26.\(\text{g3 f6}\) 27.\(\text{xc6 xf3}\) 28.\(\text{f2}\); 23...\(\text{b8}\) 24.\(\text{xa7}\) e6 and here after 25.\(\text{c3}\), Black has the additional tactical possibility – 25...\(\text{c6}\) 26.\(\text{xb6 xd4}\) 27.\(\text{d6 c8}\) 28.e5f – but White maintains his advantage, while the move 25.\(\text{b4}\) prevents Black’s knight from coming to the c6-square. The material is equal.
and Black’s b6-pawn is hanging and his pieces remain very passive.) 23...d6 a4 24.e7+ h8 25.xd8 xd8 26.d5 exd5 (or 26...a8 27.d6+-) and here not: 27.exd5 f6 28.xa7 xe7 29. xe7 xd5 30.f1= - because Black will easily make a draw with an equal quantity of pawns on one side of the board, but 27...xd5, capturing either on f7, or on a7 and b6.

22.e7+ h8 23.e5

White cannot play 23.d6, because of 23...b7, forcing his queen to go back. He plans now to play e3-g5 and he hampers in advance the eventual possibility for Black – f7-f6.

\[ \text{Diagram} \]

We will deal in details in this position with the moves: \( \text{c1a} \)

23...e8 and \( \text{c1b} \) 23...h6.

If Black persists with the move 23...f6, then after 24.d5, he will be faced with a catastrophe on the g6-square:

24.fxe5 25.h4 e4 26.xg6+ g8 27.e7+ f7 28.g5++. White is threatening to checkmate on the h5-square and Black can save that neither with: 28...xc3 29.xh7+ e8 30. xe4 c7 31.c6, with a checkmate, nor with: 28...d4+ 29. h1 exd3 and here, for example: 30.xh7+ e8 31.g6+ f7 32.dxe6 xe6 33.xe6 xe7 34.xe7 d7 35.c8+ xc8 36.xc8+ xe7 37.f5++;

Or 24...exd5 25.xg6+ hxg6 26.h4+ g8 27.xg6 f7 28.h7+ f8 29.h6++, and here Black cannot defend his rook with: 29...e8 30.xg7+, so he loses at least a whole rook, remaining an exchange down at the end.

23...b5. This is with the idea to vacate the b6-square for the queen, but after 24.a3 (exploiting the drawback of Black’s move...) 24...c4 (or 24...d6 25.xc6 xc6 26.xa7+) 25. xc4 bxc4 26.xa7 h6 27.d2 b5 28.c5 White’s pieces penetrate this time the enemy camp from the queenside.

\( \text{c1a} \) 23...e8 24.g5 b8

After 24...c6, White should not continue with: 25.d6 xe7 26.c7 a4 (but not 26...f5 27. xd8 xd6 28.xd7 f5 29. f2+ and g2-g4 – Black’s position remains extremely passive) 27.xe7 b8= and suddenly Black’s pieces are activated, but: 25.xc6 xc6 26.xg6+ hxg6 27. xd8 xd8 28.f1= – Black does not lose here immediately indeed, but his compensation for the queen is evidently insufficient. His king had been weakened considerably too, due to the
absence of the h7-pawn.

**25.\( \text{\textit{\&}}e4 \)**

It is also possible for White to follow with 25.f4 at first.

**25...h6 26.f4**

Black cannot capture: 26...h\(_x\)g5 27.h3+ h6 28.xh6+ (or 28.xg6 g7 29.xf7 h8 30.\( \text{\textit{\&}}h5 \rightarrow \)) 28...g7 29.fxg5 d8 and here White, despite that his knight on e7 is hanging, can afford patiently to redeploy his queen – 30.e1+ and it turns out that Black is helpless: 30...xe7 31.h4 g8 32.h7+ f8 33.xg6+ and he cannot follow with: 33...xg6 34.h8+ g8 35.h6+, because White checkmates; otherwise he captures on f7 winning Black’s queen and checks – h7 with a victory.

If Black’s cannot capture on g5 – it is not easy to find any useful move for him. For example, in case he tries to redeploy his bishop on d7 (which is placed just terribly there, since it has only a single square to go to – c8...) to b7, or to a6, with the move 26...c8, then after: 27.b5 b7 28.xb7 xb7 29.d7+ Black still cannot capture White’s bishop on g5, meanwhile all of his opponent’s pieces penetrate Black’s position easily.

Black loses too after: 26...h7 27.b1 and he is forced to retreat, because of White’s threat to capture on g6. At that time, White after: 27...h8 28.e1 continues with the transfer of his queen to the kingside and Black is helpless against that, for example: 28...b5 29.h4 b6 30.c5+ and besides capturing on h6, White is also threatening – g5-f6xg7, followed by h4-f6 with a decisive attack.

**c1b) 23.h6 24.d5!**

White wishes to bring his queen to the h4-square.

**24...exd5 25.h4**

In case of 25.d6, Black counters with 25...f5!, freeing his position and forcing favourable exchanges.

**25...h7 26.g5 b5**

**27.f1!**

The idea of that precise move can be illustrated with the following variation: 27.h1 e8 28.f4 b6 (or 28...c4 29.xg6 a5 30.e7+ h8 31.h3++) 29.
$\text{xd}5 (29.f5) 29...$\text{e}6 30.$\text{f}6+$\text{xf6}$ and White cannot play 31.$\text{xh6}$?, because after: 31...$\text{g}8$ 32.$\text{xf6}$ $\text{xf6}$ he cannot capture on $f6$, due to the checkmate along the first rank. Therefore, he is forced to play: 31.$\text{xf6}$ $\text{a}2+$ and the position remains quite unclear, because White cannot organize any checkmating attack again, due to Black's already familiar threats along the first rank.

Now, White is threatening to capture on $g6$ and in case of $\text{gx}$g5 – he has a double check capturing his opponent's rook on $f8$. Black must retreat either his rook, or his queen.

27...$\text{e}8$

27...$\text{e}8$ 28.f4 (This move now protects the e5-pawn and it creates the threat $\text{xd}5$.) 28...d4 29.$\text{c}7$ $\text{c}4$ 30.$\text{f}6$ $\text{e}3+$ (The rest of Black's pieces are so passive that he does not achieve much even after the appearance of his knight to the e3-square.) 31.$\text{g}1$ $\text{f}5$ (Or 31...$\text{a}8$ 32. $\text{g}3+$ and in order for Black to defend against the threat of capturing on $g6$, he has to take on $g2$, but that leads to a hopeless position for him.) 32.$\text{xf5}$ $\text{xf5}$ 33.$\text{xg7}$ $\text{xg7}$ 34.$\text{f}6+$ $\text{h}7$ 35.$\text{xf5}$ $\text{gx}5$ 36.$\text{e}6+$ and White wins, for example: 36...d3 37. $\text{xf5}$+$ $\text{g}7$ 38.$\text{e}5+$ $\text{h}7$ 39. $\text{e}4+$ $\text{g}7$ 40.$\text{d}4+$ $\text{h}7$ 41. $\text{xd}3+$ $\text{g}7$ 42.$\text{f}5+$.

28.f4

White thus defends his bishop on g5 and he is again threatening to capture – $\text{xg}6$.

28...$\text{c}4$

Here, Black already loses after: 28...$\text{b}6$ 29.$\text{xd}5$ $\text{e}6$ 30. $\text{f}6+$ and White either checkmates following: 30...$\text{xf6}$ 31. $\text{xh}6+$, or Black loses plenty of material.

29.$\text{xd}5$ $\text{d}2+$ 30.$\text{f}2$ $\text{a}5$

31.$\text{c}7+$ and White's position is already winning, as you can see in the following lines: 31...$\text{e}6$ 32.$\text{f}6+$ $\text{xf6}$ 33.$\text{xh}6+$ $\text{g}8$ 34.$\text{xf6}$ $\text{e}4+$ (Or 34...$\text{b}6+$ 35.$\text{e}1$ $\text{g}1+$ 36.$\text{xd}2$ $\text{f}2+$ 37. $\text{c}1$ $\text{e}3+$ 38.$\text{b}2$ $\text{d}2+$ 39.$\text{c}2$ $\text{b}4+$ 40.$\text{c}1$ $\text{e}1+$ 41.$\text{d}1$ $\text{e}3+$ 42.$\text{b}1$ $\text{e}4+$ 43.$\text{c}2$ $\text{b}4+$ 44. $\text{c}1$ $\text{a}3+$ 45.$\text{d}2$ $\text{b}4+$ 46. $\text{e}2+$ and White's king comes back, avoiding the perpetual check.) 35.$\text{f}3$ (but not 35.$\text{xe}4$ $\text{d}2+$ with a draw by perpetual) 35...$\text{d}2+$ 36.$\text{g}3$ $\text{e}4+$ 37.$\text{h}4$ $\text{e}1+$ 38.$\text{g}3+$–.

c2) 19...$\text{d}6$!

(diagram)

Just like in many other situations in the variation: 14.$\text{c}1$ $\text{xa}2$ 15.$\text{a}4$ $\text{b}3$, this move is
now critical. White must prove in the endgame that his domination on the c-file is more important than Black’s passed a-pawn.

20.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{x}}d6} exd6 21.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{x}}}x6

White obtains the two bishop advantage with that move and he can play for a win, practically risking nothing.

His other promising possibility is: 21.\textit{\texttt{a}}a6!? \textit{\texttt{xc}}x3 22.\textit{\texttt{xc}}x3 \textit{\texttt{a}}a2 (White is threatening \textit{\texttt{c}}c7, so now Black can counter it with f7-f5.) 23.g4!? (or 23.\textit{\texttt{xc}}7 f5!) 23...f5 24.exf5 gxf5 25.g5= – White is dominant on the only open file and in the centre too, so that should be a more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

21...\textit{\texttt{xc}}x3 22.\textit{\texttt{xc}}x3 fxe6 23.\textit{\texttt{b}}b5!

White plans to attack Black’s e6-pawn from the back with the move 24.\textit{\texttt{d}}d7. The immediate penetration with 23.Rc7, does not promise anything for him, due to: 23...\textit{\texttt{f}}f7 24.\textit{\texttt{c}}c8+ \textit{\texttt{f}}f8=.

23...d5!

Black’s passive defence – 23...\textit{\texttt{f}}f7, would not bring anything good for him after: 24.\textit{\texttt{e}}e8 \textit{\texttt{e}}e7 25.\textit{\texttt{c}}c8 \textit{\texttt{f}}f8 26.\textit{\texttt{f}}f2 \textit{\texttt{g}}g7 (Now, it is too late for the move 26...d5, because of 27.\textit{\texttt{g}}g5 and Black will have to give up the exchange.) 27.\textit{\texttt{e}}e2± and Black’s sensible moves are practically over, so he has nothing else to do except wait for his opponent to finish him off...

24.\textit{\texttt{c}}c7

White must still play precisely. The hasty move – 24.\textit{\texttt{d}}d7? will be countered by Black with 24...e5.

24...\textit{\texttt{c}}c4

Black’s defence will be even more difficult without that knight: 24...\textit{\texttt{f}}f7?! 25.\textit{\texttt{d}}d7.

25.\textit{\texttt{f}}f2 \textit{\texttt{f}}f7

This is the critical position of the entire variation, started on move 21. White has three purposeful lines and we will deal with them according to their logical value: c2a) 26.\textit{\texttt{d}}d7 (It is quite obvious that White wins the exchange with that move.), c2b) 26.\textit{\texttt{c}}c8 (This is an improved version of the attack against the e6-pawn, because White now controls the e8-square in an X-ray fashion too...) and c2c) 26.\textit{\texttt{c}}c6.
c2a) 26.\textit{d7 e7} 27.\textit{h4}

White does not achieve much by regaining the pawn with: 27. \textit{x}a7, because after 27...\textit{f7}, his pieces remain pinned along the seventh rank. 28.\textit{c7} (White's attempt to win the game with 28.e5, with the idea to follow with 29.\textit{h4}, would not work, due to the line: 29....\textit{xe5} 30. \textit{dxe5} \textit{xe5}.) 28...b5. Black's powerful knight on the c4-square and his passed pawn provide him with a sufficient counterplay. There might follow: 29.\textit{f1} b4 30.\textit{xe6+ xe6} 31.\textit{dxe5+ d6} 32.\textit{g3+} (or 32.\textit{xc4 b7} 33.\textit{e2} b3 34.\textit{c1 b2} 35.\textit{b1 xd5=}) 32...\textit{e5} 33.\textit{xc4} (but not 33. \textit{dxe5?? xc7} 34.\textit{d6+ d7} 35.\textit{dx7 b3--}) \textit{xg3} 34.\textit{hxg3 b7} 35.\textit{e2 b3} 36.\textit{c1 b2} 37.\textit{b1 xd5=).

27...\textit{xd4+} 28.\textit{f1 xd7!}

Black must sacrifice the exchange immediately. In case he tries to gobble in addition his opponent’s g2-pawn, he loses outright: 28...\textit{e3+} 29.\textit{e2 xd7} 30.\textit{xd7 xg2} 31.\textit{g5 a5} 32.\textit{exd5 exd5} 33.\textit{xd5++}.

29.\textit{xd7 a5} 30.\textit{e2} a4 31. \textit{exd5 exd5} 32.\textit{xd5 e5}

Black has only a pawn for the exchange in this endgame, but his couple of passed pawns enables him to preserve the balance somehow.

33.\textit{f4}

White can reach a king and bishop endgame with an extra pawn “three against two”, but it is a draw and he would only re-

main the moral winner at the end... 33.\textit{d3 a3} 34.\textit{xc4 a2} 35. \textit{d1 a1 f6} 36.\textit{xa1 a1} 37.\textit{f2 e5} 38.g3 \textit{c7}=

33...\textit{b2}! (It is worse for Black to play here: 33...\textit{g7} 34.\textit{d3 a3} 35. \textit{d8+ f7} 36.\textit{d7+ g8} 37.\textit{e1} and he cannot follow with 37...a2, because of 38. \textit{hxg7 xg7} 29.\textit{c3+} and 30. \textit{xc4+-}) 34.\textit{d3 a3} 35.\textit{d8+ f7} 36.\textit{a8 b5}=.

c2b) 26.\textit{c8+ f8} 27.\textit{c6}

27...\textit{a6}!

This active defence by Black practically forces the draw immediately.

After: 27...\textit{a3} 28.\textit{a6 e8} 29.\textit{c7!}, Black remains in a very passive position and White will soon regain his pawn, so his two
bishop advantage would remain a telling factor for the future. 29...b5 (or 29...\f8 30.e5) 30.exd5 exd5 31.\b7 \d8 32.\h4 \xd4+ 33.\f1 \b8 34.\xd5+ \h8 35.\xa7! b4 (but not 35...\xf6?? 36.\f6#) 36.\d7 \c3 (or 36...\c2? 37.\e4 b3 38.\xd4 \xd4 39.\f6 \g8 40.\xd4 b2 41.\b1+–). White preserves good chances to win the game in that position after 37.\b3, as well as after 37.\g3.

28.\xc4

Black can easily draw the endgame without rooks after: 28.\xa6 \a8 29.\c8+ \xc8 30.\xc8 \f7=.

28...\xc4 29.\xb6

After: 29.\xc4? a5! 30.\c6 \b8, it is only Black who plays for a win.

29...\c8 30.\e3 c3 31.e5

Or 31.\xe6 c2 32.\c1 \b8=.

31...c2 32.\c1 \c4 33.\b8+ \f7 34.\b7+ \g8 35.\b8=.

c2c) 26.\c6!

So, we have come to the conclusion that with the intermediate check on the c8-square White prevents the appearance of his opponent’s rook on e8 indeed, but after the move 26...a6, Black still makes a draw.

Now, White attacks immediately Black’s e6-pawn and he can protect it with his rook, but White thus maintains the initiative.

26...a6

This method of defence proved to be quite efficient in answer to the move 26.\c8.

After 26...\a3, White can choose between: 27.\c8+ \f8 28.\d7 \xc8 29.\xe6+ \f8 30.\xc8, regaining his pawn after the exchange of the rooks and relying on his two bishop advantage and the move 27.\a6!?, which increases the pressure against Black’s position.

Following 26...\e7, White can again choose between two promising lines: 27.\c8+ \f7 28.\c6 dxe4 29.fxe4 \h6 30.d5, developing his initiative further and: 27.\f1 \f7 28.\e2, bringing his king towards the centre.

27.\xa6 \a7 28.\xc4 \xc4

29.g4!

Black was threatening to play 29...\a1.
It is less precise for White to follow with 29.g3, because Black gives up his bishop on g7, but he forces a draw by playing temp by temp: 39...b5 30.d5 Aa1+ 31.g2 exd5 32.Ac8+ Af7 33.Ac7+ Ae6! 34.Axg7 c3 35.Ac7 b4 36.Ac5 (White is trying to weave a checkmate net...) 36...c2 37. Ae7+ Af6 38.e5+ Af5 39.Ae3 h5! (but not: 39...g5? 40.g4+ Ae6 41.Ae6+ Af7 42.Ac6 b3 43.e6+ Ae6 44.e7+ Af7 45.Axg5 b2 46.Af6+ Axe7 47.Ab6+ Af7 48. Ab2±) 40.h3 g5 41.g4+ hxg4 42. hxg4+ Ae6 43.Ae6+ Ae7 44. Ac5 b3=.

29...b5 30.d5

Here, you can see the difference, concerning the placement of Black’s rook on a7, (in variation c2b that rook was placed on the a8-square...) while now it is under attack by White and he wins an important tempo.

30.Aa8

In the variation: 30...Aa1+ 31.g2 exd5, you can note the difference in the placement of the pawn on g4, instead of on the g3-square, because after: 32.Ac8+ Af7 33.Ac7+ Ae6 34.Axg7 c3 35. Ac7 b4 36.Ac5, Black does not have the move 36...c2, due to the checkmate – 37.Ac7+ Af6 38.e5 Ag5 39.Ae3+ Ah4 40.Axh7#

31.d6

After 31.dxe6? c3, Black is already better.

31...Af8

This is Black’s most resilient defence.

He loses after: 31...Ad8 32.f4! e5 (or 32...g5 33.e5 gxf4 34.Ac4 Aa8 35.d7 Af7 36.Ac8 Aa1+ 37. Af2 Ad1 38.d8C++; 32...Af8 33. e5 g5 34.Ac7 gxf4 35.Ac4; 34...b4 35.Ac4 gxf4 36.Ac6 Ab7 37. Ad4; 34...c3 35.Ac3 gxf4 36.Axh4 Ae8 37.Ac6 Ab8 38.Ac7) 33.Ac4! Ad7 34.Ac7 Af7 (or 34...exf4 35. Ac7) 35.Ac7 Ae8 36.Ac8+ Af7 37. f5 gxf5 38.gxf5 Ah6 39.Af2 Axe7 40.dxe7 Axe7 41.Ac5–.

Black’s position is very difficult too following: 31...Aa1+ 32.Ac2 Ad1 33.Ac8+ Af7 34.Ac7+ Ag8 35.d7 Af6 36.Ab6 b4 37. Ac8+ Af7 38.d8C+ Ad8 39.Ad8 b3 40.Ac7+ Ae8 41.Af6 b2 42. Ab2 Ad2+ 43.Ag3 Ab2 44. Ac4±.

32.f4

It deserves attention for White to improve his position in the following fashion: 32.Ac5 Ad8 33.f4.

After 32.Ab6, Black can make a draw with: 32...Ab2! with the idea to continue with 33...e5. (It is weaker for him to play: 32... Aa1+ 33.Af2 Aa2+ 34.Ae3 Ah6+ 35.f4 Aa3+ 36.Af2 and his position is just terrible, for example:
36...\( \text{xa}2 + 37.\text{\textit{f}}3 \text{\textit{a}3} + 38.\text{\textit{e}3}, \)

or 36...\( \text{\textit{xf}}4 37.\text{\textit{d}7} \text{\textit{a}2} + 38.\text{\textit{f}3} \text{\textit{g}5} 39.\text{\textit{c}5} \).

32.\text{\textit{e}1} \text{e}5 34.\text{\textit{f}4} (or 34.\text{\textit{d}7} \text{\textit{e}7} 35.\text{\textit{d}8} \text{\textit{d}8} 36.\text{\textit{xd}8} + \text{\textit{xd}8} 37.\text{\textit{c}5} \text{c}3 38.\text{\textit{e}2} \text{b}4 39.\text{\textit{d}3} \text{b}3 40.\text{\textit{xc}3} \text{\textit{xc}3} 41.\text{\textit{xc}3} \text{\textit{b}2} 42.\text{\textit{xb}2} \text{g}5) =)

34...\text{\textit{exf}4} 35.\text{\textit{e}2} \text{\textit{e}5}! 36.\text{\textit{d}7} \text{\textit{e}7} 37.\text{\textit{d}8} \text{\textit{d}8} + \text{\textit{xd}8} 38.\text{\textit{xd}8} + \text{\textit{xd}8} 39.\text{\textit{c}5} \text{\textit{d}6} 40.\text{\textit{xb}5} \text{c}3. \text{Black advances his pawn all the way up to} \text{f}2 \text{and he builds up an unassailable fortress, for example:}

41.\text{\textit{d}3} \text{f}3 42.\text{h}3 \text{f}2 43.\text{\textit{b}1} \text{c}5 44.\text{\textit{xc}3} \text{\textit{e}7} =,

or 41.\text{\textit{b}7} \text{f}3 + 42.\text{\textit{d}3} \text{f}2 43.\text{\textit{f}7} \text{c}5 44.\text{\textit{xc}3} \text{\textit{e}8} 45.\text{\textit{f}6} \text{\textit{e}7} 46.\text{e}5 \text{g}5 47.\text{\textit{c}4} \text{\textit{e}3} 48.\text{\textit{f}3} \text{\textit{e}6} 49.\text{\textit{d}3} \text{\textit{b}6} =.

32...\text{\textit{g}5}

\text{Black loses immediately with the move 32...\text{\textit{e}5}, because of: 33.\text{\textit{h}4}! \text{\textit{a}1} + 34.\text{\textit{f}2} \text{\textit{a}2} + (or 34...\text{\textit{d}1} 35.\text{\textit{c}8} + \text{\textit{f}7} 36.\text{\textit{c}7} + \text{\textit{e}6} 37.\text{\textit{xg}7} \text{\textit{xd}6} 38.\text{\textit{f}5} =))}

\text{33.\text{\textit{f}5} \text{\textit{exf}5} (33...\text{\textit{e}5} 34.\text{\textit{b}6}) 34.\text{\textit{gxf}5} \text{\textit{c}3} (34...\text{\textit{e}8} 35.\text{\textit{c}7}) 35.\text{\textit{g}2} \text{\textit{d}8} (35...\text{\textit{e}5} 36.\text{\textit{g}3}; 35...\text{\textit{b}4} 36.\text{\textit{c}5}) 36.\text{\textit{g}3} \text{\textit{d}4} 37.\text{\textit{e}5} \text{\textit{b}4} 38.\text{\textit{e}6} =). \text{It is quite possible that} \text{Black’s play can be improved somewhere between moves 21 and 33, but doubtlessly he will be forced to a long and laborious defence in this whole variation.}

Therefore, according to my analysis – the line 17.\text{\textit{c}3} provides \text{White with excellent chances to maintain an opening advantage. His main idea is to play after: 17...\text{\textit{e}6} 18.\text{\textit{f}1} \text{\textit{c}1}, and to counter 18...\text{\textit{c}8} with the move 19.\text{\textit{f}4}, attacking Black’s bishop on} \text{e}6. In answer to: 19...\text{\textit{xc}3} 20.\text{\textit{xc}3} \text{\textit{d}7}, \text{White has a powerful initiative, which is often transformed into a kingside attack with the idea: 21.\text{\textit{d}5} \text{e}6 22.\text{\textit{e}7}. \text{Black cannot solve his problems by a transfer into an endgame after: 19...\text{\textit{d}6} 20.\text{\textit{xd}6} \text{\textit{exd}6}, either.}
Chapter 24

1.d4 ♘f6 2.c4 g6 3.♗c3 d5 4.cxd5 ♘xd5 5.e4 ♘xc3 6.bxc3 ♘g7 7.♗c4 c5 8.♗e2 ♘c6 9.♕e3 0–0 10.0–0 ♗g4 11.f3 ♘a5 12.♗d3 cxd4 13. cxd4 ♘e6 14.♗c1 ♘xa2 15.♕a4 ♘e6

White plays 17.♕a3 quite rarely. The queen is not so active on this square and it is not attacking the b-pawn. Black has good chances to equalize in this line. 17...e6. This is probably the best for Black.

White now gets no advantage with 18.♗c5 ♘e8 19.♗b4 b6 20. dxe6 ♘xe6! (but not 20...♕xe6 21.♕f4†, bringing the knight to the d5 outpost with tempo, Reynaud – Chudnovsky, Washington 1996) and now Black is not afraid of 21.♗b5 ♘d7 22. ♗fd1 because of 22...♗xb5 23. ♕xd8 ♕xd8∞ – and Black’s compensation is quite sufficient, because of his bishop pair and passed pawns.

White does not achieve much either with 18.d6 ♘c6 19.f4 (After 19.♗b1 Black plays 19...♗b8!∞, avoiding to weaken the b6-square) 19...a5. This possibility for Black to activate his queenside became possible, because he played ♘c6 without having played b6 before that and as a result the white bishop never came to a6. (It is much
worse for Black to play here 19...e5?! 20.f5↑ and White has a powerful initiative, Lukacs – Bjerring, Bad Worishofen 1989) 20.ʃfd1 ʃb4 21.ʃb1 b5=. Black managed here, contrary to some other lines, to advance his pawns on the queenside, so he had good counterchances Glek – Mishin, corr. 1988.

18.ʃfd1 – this is White’s best. 18...exd5 19.exd5 ʃe8 20.ʃf2 b5!= Black now must follow the strategy in the game Jussupow – Kasparov, Moscow 1988 (see Chapter 25), and equalize by exchanging a knight and a pawn for the white bishop on d3 and push his a-pawn forward.

It is not so good for Black to play 20...ʃf5 because of 21.ʃb5! ʃd7 22.ʃc3↑ followed by d5-d6.

Or 20...ʃf8 21.ʃa2↑ Kishnev – Feldman, Budapest 1989 – White’s queen is safe here and if Black blocks the pawn on d6 – his kingside will be weakened. An almost similar position (only without the knight on e2 and the black bishop on d7) arises in the variation 17.ʃb4 e6. The presence of the knight may be favourable for White in the long run, because of the resource ʃc3-e4.

After 17.ʃb4 Black has to make a choice now between three possibilities – a) 17...b5, b) 17...b6 and the main line 17...e6 (Chapters 25-26).

a) 17...b5 18.ʃd4 a6

Black’s attempt to give back his extra pawn for the sake of the passed a-pawn leads to an advantage for White: 18...ʃc4 19.ʃxc4 a5 20.ʃa3 bxc4 21.ʃxc4 (Black does not have problems in a similar position in the line 17...e6 after the exchange of the e-pawns. The position is closed now and Black cannot create counterplay easily.) 21...ʃe8 22.ʃfc1 e6 23.ʃc6 f5 (White is threatening ʃc5, and in case of the trade on d5 – 23...exd5 24.ʃe7+ ʃh8 25.ʃxd5↑ it turns out that Black’s pieces are terribly misplaced.) 24.d6 fxe4 25.ʃe7+ ʃh8 26.ʃxe4 a4 27.ʃd4↑. White has a powerful initiative in this position due to the weakened placement of the black king, the strong passed pawn and the possible penetration to c7 with the rooks. After 27...ʃxd4+ 28.ʃxd4 ʃf7 (this is necessary otherwise the black king is defenceless) 29.ʃc7 ʃf6 30.ʃb4 ʃfd8 31.h3 ʃa6 32.ʃd3 ʃa5 White had to play 33.ʃd2!? (instead of repeating the moves and a draw 33.ʃa3 ʃa6 34.ʃd3 ʃa5 35.ʃa3, like in the game Bae – Prasad, Port Erin 2003). Now according to our analysis White has excellent chances to attack the enemy king, while Black is too far from making use of his main trump – the passed a-pawn, for example: 33...ʃaa8 (It is not good to play 33...a3 immediately due to the forced line 34.ʃxd7 ʃxd7 35.ʃb8+ ʃg7 36.ʃg8+ ʃf7 37.ʃh6
e5 38.\textit{\textasciitilde}xh7+ \textit{\textasciitilde}e6 39.\textit{\textasciitilde}xg6 \textit{\textasciitilde}xd6
40.\textit{\textasciitilde}xf6+ \textit{\textasciitilde}xf6 41.\textit{\textasciitilde}h4+, and White has a winning position. He
will either checkmate or win a whole rook before Black can pro-
mote his pawn: 41...\textit{\textasciitilde}f7 42.\textit{\textasciitilde}f5
\textit{\textasciitilde}d1+ 43.\textit{\textasciitilde}f2 \textit{\textasciitilde}e6 44.\textit{\textasciitilde}e7+ \textit{\textasciitilde}xf5
45.\textit{\textasciitilde}f7+ \textit{\textasciitilde}g5 46.h4+ \textit{\textasciitilde}xh4 47.
\textit{\textasciitilde}f6+ \textit{\textasciitilde}h5 48.g4#; 46...\textit{\textasciitilde}h6 47.
g4+-, and White wins.) 34.\textit{\textasciitilde}h6
a3 35.\textit{\textasciitilde}g4 a2 36.\textit{\textasciitilde}xg6+ \textit{\textasciitilde}xg6 37.
\textit{\textasciitilde}xg6 a1\textit{\textasciitilde}+ 38.\textit{\textasciitilde}h2 \textit{\textasciitilde}d4 39.f4→,
and now White has a victorious kingside attack, which more
than compensates the negligible material deficit.

19.\textit{\textasciitilde}fd1

The other possibility leads to
an unclear position 19.f4 e5
20.dxe6 \textit{\textasciitilde}xe6 21.\textit{\textasciitilde}xe6 \textit{\textasciitilde}xd3 22.
\textit{\textasciitilde}c5 \textit{\textasciitilde}c6 23.\textit{\textasciitilde}e1 \textit{\textasciitilde}fe8 24.\textit{\textasciitilde}f3 (re-
pelling the black queen away
from the e4-pawn) 24...\textit{\textasciitilde}d7 25.
\textit{\textasciitilde}xg7 \textit{\textasciitilde}xg7 26.\textit{\textasciitilde}c3 \textit{\textasciitilde}g8 27.\textit{\textasciitilde}d3= Moskalenko – Kozlov, Pinsk 1986 – and White has some compen-
sation but it is not quite clear
whether it is sufficient.

19...\textit{\textasciitilde}e5

This move enables Black to stop the attack against the
knight on a5 and prevent White’s idea \textit{\textasciitilde}d4-c6 followed by c6-c7
after the capture on c6.

Black has also tried here:

19...\textit{\textasciitilde}e8. This is too slow and it turns out that Black cannot
afford to play like that. 20.\textit{\textasciitilde}e2!
(threatening \textit{\textasciitilde}c6 and Black does
not have any satisfactory defence against that) 20...\textit{\textasciitilde}e5 21.\textit{\textasciitilde}c6
\textit{\textasciitilde}xc6 22.dxc6 \textit{\textasciitilde}c7 23.\textit{\textasciitilde}d7 \textit{\textasciitilde}xh2+
24.\textit{\textasciitilde}f1 \textit{\textasciitilde}xc6 25.\textit{\textasciitilde}d2 \textit{\textasciitilde}c8 26.\textit{\textasciitilde}d5
\textit{\textasciitilde}d8 27.\textit{\textasciitilde}xd8+ \textit{\textasciitilde}xd8 28.\textit{\textasciitilde}xc6± Kaidanov – Ehlvest, Lviv 1985,
and White’s position is techni-
cally winning;

19...\textit{\textasciitilde}c8. Black is too far from
equality in this line as well.
20.\textit{\textasciitilde}xc8 \textit{\textasciitilde}xc8, and now White
should have considered the immed-
iate 21.\textit{\textasciitilde}a1!? (Black had
some counterplay in the game
Lukacs – Horvath, Szekszard
1994, after 21.\textit{\textasciitilde}e2 \textit{\textasciitilde}e5 22.\textit{\textasciitilde}a1
\textit{\textasciitilde}c7 23.\textit{\textasciitilde}b2 \textit{\textasciitilde}d6 24.g3 \textit{\textasciitilde}b6∞,
and the bishop on b6 is quite use-
ful), and Black will get back his
material with interest: 21...e5
22.\textit{\textasciitilde}xb5 \textit{\textasciitilde}c6 23.\textit{\textasciitilde}b1, and White
has good chances to win the a6-
pawn without any compensation
for Black.

20.f4 \textit{\textasciitilde}d6 21.\textit{\textasciitilde}b2 f6

The bishop went to the queen-
side and now the kingside became
rather weak.

22.\textit{\textasciitilde}a2 \textit{\textasciitilde}h8 23.h3 \textit{\textasciitilde}c8

24.\textit{\textasciitilde}f3↑

Dokhoian – Kozlov, USSR
1985, and after pushing e4-e5
White will have a powerful ini-
tiative in the centre and on the
queenside.
b) 17...b6

Black defends his knight with the intention to redeploy it to c5, or start some actions in the centre.

18.\text{\&}a6

This is most probably the best.

18.f4. White is not getting any advantage with this move presently. 18...e6 19.d6 \text{\&}c6 (Black needs to return the knight on a5 promptly to the centre in order to organize some counterplay. After 19...e5 20.f5 it becomes too dangerous for Black to have the knight so isolated at the edge of the board: 20...\text{\&}c8 21.\text{\&}c3 \text{\&}c6 22.\text{\&}b5 \text{\&}d7 23.f6 \text{\&}h8 24.\text{\&}e2 \text{\&}fd8 25.\text{\&}cd1\pm, and the bishop is caged on h8 and Black is in trouble Balashov – Hansen, Malmö 1987.) 20.\text{\&}b3 e5 21.f5 \text{\&}c8\text{\&}, and the idea to bring the knight to d4 (after White plays \text{\&}c3 and d4-d5) provides Black with enough counterchances Dolmatov – Gavrikov, USSR 1986.

18.\text{\&}c8

The move 18...\text{\&}e8 enables White to accomplish his plan (this move is not necessary when Black plays \text{\&}c6) 19.\text{\&}d4 e5 20.\text{\&}c6 \text{\&}xc6 21.dxc6 \text{\&}f8 22.\text{\&}b5\pm, and White’s passed pawn becomes unstoppable: 22...\text{\&}c7 23.\text{\&}fd1 \text{\&}d6 24.\text{\&}xd6! \text{\&}xd6 25.c7 \text{\&}ec8 26.\text{\&}d5! \text{\&}f6 27.\text{\&}h6! b5 28.\text{\&}xc8 \text{\&}xc8 29.\text{\&}d7++ and White is winning Balashov – Polovodin, Tallinn 1983.

In the game Tsemekhman – Kudrin, Dearborn 1992, Black failed to equalize after 18...e5 19.\text{\&}c3 \text{\&}f6 20.\text{\&}h6 \text{\&}g7 21.\text{\&}xg7 \text{\&}xg7 22.f4 \text{\&}f6 23.f5 g5 24.\text{\&}e2 \text{\&}fd8 25.\text{\&}g3 – and the appearance of the knight on h5 is very unpleasant for Black;

18...e6 19.\text{\&}c3 and we have reached a position that we are analyzing in the line 17...e6 18.\text{\&}c3 b6. This seems to be Black’s best choice in this position.

19.\text{\&}xc8 \text{\&}xc8 20.\text{\&}xc8 \text{\&}xc8 21.\text{\&}xe7 \text{\&}c2

Black gave back his extra pawn to be able to play that active move.

22.\text{\&}f2!

This is much better than 22.\text{\&}e1 \text{\&}c4 23.\text{\&}f4, and now Black had to play 23...\text{\&}b2!! (in-
stead of the line 23...\texttt{\textit{c}3} 24.\texttt{\textit{c}xc3} \\
\texttt{\textit{x}xc3} 25.\texttt{\textit{c}c1} \texttt{\textit{d}4}+ 26.\texttt{\textit{h}h1} \texttt{b5} \\
27.\texttt{h}h4 – or 27.\texttt{d}d6++ – 27...\texttt{\textit{b}b6} \\
28.\texttt{d}d6 \texttt{\textit{d}d8} 29.\texttt{\textit{a}d1} \texttt{\textit{e}e8} 30.\texttt{\textit{xe}e8+}, \\
\texttt{V.\textit{G}eorgiev – \textit{P}elletier, \textit{G}ermany} \\
1998, and Black resigned be- \\
cause of 30...\texttt{\textit{x}xe8} 31.\texttt{\textit{d}d7} \texttt{\textit{d}d8} \\
32.\texttt{\textit{g}g5} \texttt{f}6 33.\texttt{\textit{xf}xf6} \texttt{\textit{xf}xf6} 34. \\
\texttt{\textit{d}d8\texttt{\textit{d}d}+} \texttt{\textit{xd}xd8} 35.\texttt{\textit{xd}xd8+} \texttt{\textit{f}f7} 36. \\
\texttt{\textit{d}d7++}, or 23...\texttt{\textit{a}a5} 24.\texttt{\textit{d}d6} \texttt{a4} 25. \\
\texttt{\textit{d}d7} \texttt{\textit{d}d3} 26. \texttt{\textit{c}c7} \texttt{\textit{d}d2} 27.\texttt{\textit{f}f1} \\
\texttt{\textit{d}d3+} 28.\texttt{\textit{f}f2}++; 26...\texttt{\textit{a}a3} 27.\texttt{\textit{d}d8\texttt{\textit{d}d}++} \\
\texttt{\textit{M}iralles – \textit{A}tanasiadis, \textit{V}rnja- \\
\textit{c}ka \textit{B}anja 1987, and \textit{W}hite’s \\
passed pawn promotes in both \\
cases.) 24.\texttt{\textit{c}c7} (or 24.\texttt{\textit{c}c1} \texttt{\textit{d}d1} \\
25.\texttt{\textit{e}e2} \texttt{\textit{c}c4} 26.\texttt{\textit{d}d6} \texttt{\textit{c}c3} 27.\texttt{\textit{e}e1} \\
\texttt{\textit{d}d5} 28.\texttt{\textit{xd}d5} \texttt{\textit{xf}xf4\texttt{\texttt{\textit{a}}}}, and \textit{B}lack \\
disrupts \textit{W}hite’s pawn structure) \\
24...\texttt{\textit{c}c8} 25.\texttt{\textit{\textit{x}xc2} \texttt{\textit{xc}c2\texttt{\texttt{\textit{a}}}} – and \\
\textit{B}lack manages to stop \textit{W}hite’s \\
passed d-pawn. \\
22...\texttt{\textit{d}d3} \\
The line 22...\texttt{\textit{c}c4} 23.\texttt{\textit{c}c1} \texttt{\textit{d}d3} \\
transposes to the same position. \\
23.\texttt{\textit{c}c1} \texttt{\textit{e}e4} 24.\texttt{\textit{f}f4} \texttt{\textit{a}a5} \\
It is not good for \textit{B}lack to play \\
24...\texttt{\textit{f}f5?} 25.\texttt{\textit{d}d6} \texttt{\textit{b}5} (the knight on \\
c4 was hanging) 26.\texttt{\textit{e}e5++}, and \\
\textit{a}lthough \textit{B}lack played \textit{f}5, he \\
failed to open the \textit{f}-file and \\
\textit{w}as helpless against the \\
march of \textit{W}hite’s passed central \\
pawn \texttt{M}alysev – \texttt{Z}eleznik, \textit{B}led \\
1989.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
  \draw (0,0) grid (8,8);
  \draw [fill=white] (1.5,1.5) circle (0.3);
  \draw [fill=black] (2.5,2.5) circle (0.3);
  \draw [fill=white] (3.5,3.5) circle (0.3);
  \draw [fill=black] (4.5,4.5) circle (0.3);
  \draw [fill=white] (5.5,5.5) circle (0.3);
  \draw [fill=black] (6.5,6.5) circle (0.3);
  \draw [fill=white] (7.5,7.5) circle (0.3);
  \draw [fill=black] (8.5,8.5) circle (0.3);
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

25.\texttt{\textit{d}d6\texttt{\texttt{\textit{a}}}} \\
\textit{B}lack’s counterplay is too \\
slow to matter.
1.d4 ♞f6 2.c4 g6 3.♗c3 d5 4.cxd5 ♞xd5 5.e4 ♞xc3 6.bxc3 ♙g7 7.♗c4 c5 8.♗e2 ♕c6 9.♕e3 0–0 10.0–0 ♕g4 11.f3 ♗a5 12.♗d3 cxd4 13.♘xd4 ♗e6 14.♗c1 ♗xa2 15.♕a4 ♘e6 16.d5 ♗d7 17.♗b4 e6

18.♗c3

In the line 18.♗fd1, after the game Jussupow – Kasparov, Moscow 1988, White has not produced any significant improvement: 18...exd5 19.exd5 ♗e8 20.♗f2 b5 21.♗d4 ♗c4 22.♗c6 (White had no advantage after 22.♗xc4 a5 23.♗a3 bxс4 24.♗xc4 a4 25.♗c6 ♘xc6 26.♗xc6 ♗d7 27.♗c4 ♗b5 28.♗b4 ♘e2= Schneider – Rytshagov, Barnaul 1988 – and the opposing passed pawns balance each other and the chances too.) 22...♗xc6 23.dxc6 ♘b2 24.♗xb5 (But not 24.c7? ♗xd3 25.♗xd3 ♘xd3 26.♗b1 ♘xc1 27.♗xc1 b4= Kalesis – Khenkin, Corfu 1991, and the c7-pawn is stopped, while Black’s passed pawns supported by the bishop are coming closer to promotion) 24...♗xd1 25.c7 ♗d5! This is the most direct way to equality. 26.♗xe8 ♘xf2 27.c8=♕ (Or 27.♕c4 ♘h3+ 28.♕h1 ♘xc4 29.♘xc4 ♘xe8 30.c8=♕ ♘xc8 31.♘xc8+ ♘f8 32.gxh3= and the most probable outcome is again a draw Alexander – Matveeva, Herceg Novi 2001) 27...♗xc8 28.♘xc8 ♘h3+! 29.gxh3 (White gets checkmated after 29.♗f1? ♗d3+ 30.♘e1 ♗e3+ 31.♘d1 ♘f2+ 32.♗c2 ♗d3+ 33.♗c1 ♗d1#) 29...♗d1+ 30.♗g2 ♘e2+ 31.♗g1=, and it was a draw by a perpetual Jussupow – Kasparov, Moscow 1988.

18...♗b6

Black is trying to be clever. He makes a useful move defending the knight and delays the exchange on d5, planning to organize some counterplay along the c-file and the long a1-h8 diagonal. White in his stead must play d6 at an opportune moment, or try f4 threatening e5 in order to force the opponent to capture on d5 and then exploit the powerful knight in the centre.

About 18...ed see Chapter 26. White has two logical moves in this position: a) 19.♗fd1 and b) 19.♗a6.
a) 19...\textit{fd1 f6} 
19...\textit{b7} 20.\textit{a6} (Black equalizes easily in this line, so maybe it will be worth for White to try instead: 20.\textit{dxe6!? xe6 21. c4x} 20...\textit{c5} 21.\textit{xc5 bxc5 22. xc5 b6}, and Black is out of danger in the endgame: 23.\textit{xb6 axb6 24. b5 fd8 25. xd7 xd7 26. b5 exd5 27. exd5 a5 28. b1 f5= Roos – Groszpeter, Oberwart 1996, since White’s passed d-pawn is reliably stopped.

19...\textit{h4!?} (Contrary to the lines after 19...\textit{f6}, the black queen does not come under fire after \textit{e5 and d5}, but it can be isolated on the kingside in some lines.) 20.f4 exd5 21.\textit{xd5 e6 22.e2!?} (The idea of this move is to restrict the black queen on the kingside and bring the bishop to the long diagonal.) 22...\textit{xd5} (It is risky for Black to allow his queen to be isolated after 22...\textit{fd8 23.f2 h6 24.f3\textit{f3}, and Black has his habitual problems to solve and his queen is out of play too.) 23.\textit{x5 fd8 24.g3 fd6 25.e5= The position is very complicated and White has some compensation for the pawn, but he can hardly hope to play for a win.

20.f4 
White should consider here 20.\textit{a6}, transposing to line b.

20...\textit{exd5} 
After 20...e5 White plays 21. \textit{f5}, isolating the enemy bishop and queen and depriving Black from any counterplay Moska-


21.\textit{xd5 b2 22.e7} 
This is an attempt to exploit the unsatisfactory placement of the black queen on b2. Black must play very precisely now in order to get back his stranded queen to safety.

White will hardly have anything more than a sufficient compensation for the pawn in the endgame after 22.\textit{xb2!? xb2 23. c7=}

22...\textit{c6} 
You can see in the line 22...\textit{e6 how important it is for Black to control the b5-square: 22...\textit{e6 23.b1. Here the opponents agreed to a draw in the game Barkhagen – Ernst, Sweden 1993, but this decision was quite premature for White, who could have after 23...\textit{a2 24.d2 either forced Black to sacrifice his queen, or exchange the all-important in this position bishop on g7 with disastrous consequences: 24...\textit{xd5} (the point is that after 24...\textit{a4 25.f6+ Black must capture on f6, otherwise after 25...\textit{h8 26.b5 the black queen is trapped and Black loses plenty of material) 25.xa2 xa2 26. c1\textit{f and Black’s compensation for the queen is absolutely insufficient because his passed pawns are on their initial squares yet. The attempt to trade the queen immediately for the seemingly sufficient material equivalent after: 22...\textit{a4 23.b1 xd1 24. xb2 xb2, fails too, because 25.}
e5± keeps the black bishop away from the kingside and the dark squares f6 and h6 are terribly weak.

23.\textbf{b1} 24.\textbf{d2}

It is not enough for White to play 24.\textbf{b4} 25.\textbf{c2} \textbf{b5} 26.\textbf{d3} \textbf{h5=} and the black queen is safe and White’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient Simonenko – Malisauskas, corr. 1988.

\textbf{24...a4}, and it looks like White has nothing better than a draw by repetition 25.\textbf{c2} 26.\textbf{d3} \textbf{a4}=.

\textbf{b1) 19.a6}

This is White’s best order of moves here, because it stops the centralization of the knight on a5.

19...\textbf{f6}

White has two basic plans in this position – \textbf{b1) 20.f4} threatening e5 and \textbf{b2) 20.\textbf{f}d1} intending to push the d-pawn forward.

\textbf{b1) 20.f4 exd5 21.\textbf{xd5} 22.\textbf{e1}!?

White used to exchange queens in practice until now, but his advantage in the endgame is not enough for a full point: 22.\textbf{e}7+ (After \textbf{c}7, \textbf{fc}8 White will have to check from the e7-square and attack the bishop with the rook from d1, and it is better to do that immediately because the black king will have to go to the corner.) 22...\textbf{h}8 23.\textbf{x}b2 \textbf{x}b2 24.\textbf{c}7 \textbf{fd}8 25.\textbf{d}1 (Or 25.\textbf{f}5 \textbf{e}5 26.\textbf{x}g6 \textbf{x}g6 27.\textbf{g}5 \textbf{g}7 28.\textbf{d}5 \textbf{xc}7 29.\textbf{xc}7 Reina – Ramos, corr. 1990, and now after 29...\textbf{f}8 30.\textbf{xa}8 \textbf{xa}8 it is enough only for a draw.) 25...\textbf{e}6 26.\textbf{xd}8 \textbf{xd}8 27.\textbf{xa}7, and Black has an easy equality after: 27...\textbf{c}4 28.\textbf{xc}4 \textbf{xc}4 29.\textbf{xb}6 \textbf{d}4+ 30.\textbf{xd}4+ \textbf{xd}4 Spassky – Dueball, Dortmund 1973, and White cannot keep his extra pawn because it is not good to play: 31.\textbf{f}5 \textbf{xe}4 32.\textbf{f}6? \textbf{e}1+ 33.\textbf{f}2 \textbf{f}1+ 34.\textbf{e}3 \textbf{xf}6=.

White will have a dangerous threat to push f5-f6 in the middlegame and Black should be careful about it.

(diagram)

22...\textbf{fe}8

This is evidently the only playable defence again the above-
mentioned threat f5-f6.

The other possibilities are:

22...\$h8 23.f5 gxf5 24.exf5 \$e5 (Black should play 24...\$g8 intending to meet 25.f6 with 25...\$h6 although his castling position remains compromised), which is not good because of 25.f6 \$xd5 26.fxg7+ \$xg7 27.\$c3+ f6, and White has the tactical strike 28.\$h6!+-, which practically settles the issue, because Black cannot capture that bishop since 29.\$xf6+ checkmates;

22...\$a3 23.f5 \$b3, loses for Black by force after 24.f6! \$xc1 25.\$xc1 \$xa6 26.\$e7+ \$h8 27.\$c3-+, and Black gets checkmated, for example: 27...\$g8 28.fxg7+ \$xg7 29.\$xf7;

22...\$b3 23.\$c7 \$e6 24.\$e7+ \$h8 25.f5 \$e5 26.\$f2! \$a3 27.\$xe6 \$xa6 28.\$xf7 \$xf7 29.\$exf7+-, and White’s attack is victorious, because the rook is untouchable due to the checkmate;

22...\$e6 23.\$f2 (There is no use now to play f4-f5 if Black can exchange on d5. After 23.\$e7+ \$h8 24.f5 \$b3\$ White fails to push his pawn to f6. Therefore he should try to delay that advance after he repels the enemy queen away from the long diagonal.) 23...\$a3 24.\$c7 \$b3 (It is now too dangerous for Black to play 24...\$ad8 25.f5, followed by f6 with a strong attack for White – the black queen has been repelled.) 25.\$b1 (The idea of Black’s previous move is that now after 25.f5 \$c8\$ Black relies on the vulnerability of the knight on c7 (in case White captures on c8), the bishop on a6 and the rook on c1 and the position is quite unclear because of that.) 25...\$c5 26.\$xc5 \$b3 (The Bishop on a6 is hanging and after 26.\$xa8 Black plays 26...\$xa6.) 26...\$xc5 27.\$c1 \$a3 28.\$f3 (the rook must defend against \$d4) 28...\$a4 29.f5! 29.\$xa8 \$xa8 30.\$b7± and Black has the typical for the Grunfeld Defence compensation for the exchange, but not quite sufficient though... 29...gxf5 30.exf5 \$d5 31.\$g3 \$d4+ 32.\$f2 \$h8 33.\$xg7?!, and White gets two pieces for a rook and a pawn and he has a great advantage even in the endgame, because of the weak black king.

23.e5

It is not so good to play 23.\$c7 \$b5 24.\$xb5 \$xb5 and the knight fork on c7 is the best that White can do (after the retreat of the rook on c1): 25.\$c1 \$d3 26.\$c7 \$c4 27.\$f3 \$xe3 28.\$e5 \$c2 29.\$xd3 \$xe1 30.\$xe1 \$ed8, and only White risks losing. The immediate 23.\$c7 is
Chapter 25

not good either because after 23...\texttt{\texttt{x}e4 24.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{f}}}a8 \texttt{\texttt{x}e3+} – Black has two pawns for the exchange and White's knight on a8 is in danger.

\texttt{\texttt{23...\texttt{\texttt{x}d8 24.\texttt{\texttt{f}}}f2}}

This is the logical attempt to exploit the misplacement of the black queen. The analysis shows however that Black manages to defend successfully.

\texttt{\texttt{24...\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{a}3 25.\texttt{\texttt{c}}}c3}}}

25.\texttt{\texttt{c}c7?! \texttt{\texttt{f}b8 26.\texttt{\texttt{d}}}d2 (26.\texttt{\texttt{f}c2 \texttt{\texttt{f}f5 27.\texttt{\texttt{c}}}c3 \texttt{\texttt{b}4+}, and White cannot attack Black's queen anymore and he has no compensation for the pawn at all. White has nothing after 26.\texttt{\texttt{b}b5 \texttt{\texttt{x}b5 27.\texttt{\texttt{x}b5 d5 28.\texttt{\texttt{f}1 \texttt{\texttt{d}d8+}}, and the bishop pair is harmless. 26.\texttt{\texttt{f}f1 \texttt{\texttt{a}4 27.\texttt{\texttt{b}b5 (The line 27.e6? \texttt{\texttt{x}e6 28.\texttt{\texttt{x}e6 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}e8+ does not work due to the pin along the e-file.) 27...\texttt{\texttt{x}b5 28.\texttt{\texttt{a}xb5, and that transposed to a position that we have already analysed in the lines after 26.\texttt{\texttt{b}b5) 26...\texttt{\texttt{b}b3 27.\texttt{\texttt{c}c3 (White’s other attempt to pin the knight – 27.\texttt{\texttt{e}e3 fails due to 27...\texttt{\texttt{f}f5+ threatening to take on d2 with the rook.) 27...\texttt{\texttt{b}b4 (It is not good for Black to play 27...\texttt{\texttt{a}a4 28.\texttt{\texttt{c}c4 \texttt{\texttt{a}a1 29.\texttt{\texttt{x}a1 \texttt{\texttt{x}a1 30.\texttt{\texttt{b}b4+, and White wins the exchange with an advantage.) 28.\texttt{\texttt{d}d3 (Now if 28.\texttt{\texttt{c}c4 Black plays 28...\texttt{\texttt{e}e7, and White's best probably is – 29.\texttt{\texttt{b}b4 \texttt{\texttt{c}c5 30.\texttt{\texttt{d}d5 \texttt{\texttt{e}e6 31.\texttt{\texttt{c}c7, and if the black queen does not retreat to e7, White recaptures his pawn after taking on c5. He has nothing more than that because the knight on d5 is hanging.) 28...\texttt{\texttt{a}a4+. This precise move emphasizes the fact that White's queen – hunting failed. (Surprisingly Black loses after 28...\texttt{\texttt{x}d2 29.\texttt{\texttt{x}d2 due to the pin along the d-file: 29...\texttt{\texttt{e}e7 30.\texttt{\texttt{d}d5 \texttt{\texttt{e}e6 31.\texttt{\texttt{f}f5 \texttt{\texttt{x}f5 32.\texttt{\texttt{f}f6+ \texttt{\texttt{x}f6 33.\texttt{\texttt{f}f6++ and Black has to capture on f6 with the queen and so he loses his bishop on d7. Or 30...\texttt{\texttt{c}c5 31. \texttt{\texttt{f}f6+ \texttt{\texttt{x}f6 32.\texttt{\texttt{x}f6 \texttt{\texttt{c}c7 33.\texttt{\texttt{f}f5 \texttt{\texttt{f}e8 34.\texttt{\texttt{x}g6 \texttt{\texttt{h}xg6 35.\texttt{\texttt{c}c3++, and Black loses material because of the threat \texttt{\texttt{x}h6. The same thing happens after 32...\texttt{\texttt{c}c6 33.\texttt{\texttt{d}d6 \texttt{\texttt{c}c7 34.\texttt{\texttt{f}f5++; 33...\texttt{\texttt{a}a4 34.\texttt{\texttt{f}f1 \texttt{\texttt{f}e8 35.\texttt{\texttt{f}f5+)).}}}}}}}}}

\texttt{\texttt{25...\texttt{\texttt{a}a4 26.\texttt{\texttt{c}c7 \texttt{\texttt{g}g4 27.\texttt{\texttt{c}c3 \texttt{\texttt{b}4 28.\texttt{\texttt{d}d2}}}}}}}

This is necessary because 28.h3 will be met with 28...\texttt{\texttt{d}d1!}

\texttt{\texttt{28...\texttt{\texttt{x}d2 29.\texttt{\texttt{x}d2 \texttt{\texttt{b}b3 30. \texttt{\texttt{d}d5 \texttt{\texttt{e}e6 31.\texttt{\texttt{b}b5 (31.\texttt{\texttt{e}e4 \texttt{\texttt{a}a3++}}}}}}}}}

\texttt{\texttt{31...\texttt{\texttt{x}b5 32.\texttt{\texttt{x}b5 \texttt{\texttt{c}c5=, and it all ends in a draw – White wins the pawns on the queenside, but he fails to win the game.}}}}}

\texttt{\texttt{b2) 20.\texttt{\texttt{f}d1!}}

\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{This is the best.}}}

\texttt{342}
Black now can choose between repelling the white bishop from a6: **b2a) 20...\textit{\texttt{c}}8, or make a useful move: b2b) 20...\textit{\texttt{fd}}8.**

**b2a) 20...\textit{\texttt{c}}8**

This bishop was rather passive on d7 and Black should try to redeploy it to b7 preventing the attack against the c8-square and eventually organizing some counterplay along the c-file.

**21.\textit{\texttt{bd}}5**

White has tried in practice the other retreat: 21.\textit{\texttt{f}}1 (the bishop goes to a safe square vacating the b5-square for the knight) 21...\textit{\texttt{d}}8 (Black can also try 21...\textit{\texttt{b}}7!? 22.d6 \textit{\texttt{fd}}8 and the game is unclear. White in his stead can play 22.\textit{\texttt{d}}4 e5 23. \textit{\texttt{e}}3= and now the centre is stable and the bishop on b7 is misplaced, but White has lost two tempi in the process.) 22. \textit{\texttt{db}}5 (White could also play the standard 22.d6?!?) 22...\textit{\texttt{exd}}5 23. \textit{\texttt{xc}}7 d4= and Black’s compensation is sufficient. (This order of moves is better for Black than 23...\textit{\texttt{b}}7 24.\textit{\texttt{xa}}8 d4, Astrom – Sulipa, Minsk 1993, because after 25.\textit{\texttt{xb}}6! dxe3 26.\textit{\texttt{d}}5=, Black loses without the key b6-pawn. He could have tried instead 24...\textit{\texttt{x}}xa8!? with an unclear position).

21...\textit{\texttt{d}}8!

This is Black’s best.

It is rather dubious to play 21...\textit{\texttt{exd}}5?! 22.\textit{\texttt{d}}4! (after 22. \textit{\texttt{xd}}5 Black has 22...\textit{\texttt{b}}2= with good chances to equalize after the trade of the queens; but White can try instead 22.\textit{\texttt{exd}}5 \textit{\texttt{d}}8 23.\textit{\texttt{e}}4↑ followed by d6 and d7 or \textit{\texttt{c}}7) 22...\textit{\texttt{g}}5 23.\textit{\texttt{xa}}7 \textit{\texttt{xa}}7 24.\textit{\texttt{xd}}5 – and White can organize an attack against the black king because the exchange of the bishops was clearly to his satisfaction.

21...\textit{\texttt{b}}7 22.d6 \textit{\texttt{c}}6?! (it was better for Black to play 22...\textit{\texttt{fd}}8, because the exchanges of light pieces were in White’s favour) 23.\textit{\texttt{xc}}6 (White can also try 23. \textit{\texttt{a}}4!? \textit{\texttt{e}}5, with the idea to play \textit{\texttt{f}}4 and e5, 24.\textit{\texttt{e}}2=) 23...\textit{\texttt{xc}}6 24. \textit{\texttt{xb}}5 \textit{\texttt{xb}}5 25.\textit{\texttt{xb}}5=. As usual in the Grunfeld Defence, White’s passed d6-pawn is stronger than Black’s couple of pawns a7 and b6, because Black has no real counterplay Stuart – van den Hooven, corr. 1991.

22.\textit{\texttt{d}}6 \textit{\texttt{d}}7

It is too bad for Black to play 22...\textit{\texttt{f}}8 23.f4, and 23...e5 does not work due to 24.\textit{\texttt{d}}5 \textit{\texttt{xd}}6 25.\textit{\texttt{xd}}6 \textit{\texttt{xd}}6 (25...\textit{\texttt{xd}}6 26. \textit{\texttt{fxe}}5++) 26.\textit{\texttt{fxe}}5 \textit{\texttt{e}}6 27.\textit{\texttt{c}}7 \textit{\texttt{b}}8 28.\textit{\texttt{d}}8= and Black loses plenty of material.

23.\textit{\texttt{a}}4 \textit{\texttt{xb}}5
24.\(\Boxxb5\uparrow\)
White's passed d6-pawn provides him with a powerful initiative, because Black has no counterattacking chances along the long diagonal.

b2b) 20...\(\Boxxf8\) 21.d6
White should refrain from 21.\(\Boxxd2\)? (with the idea to prevent \(\Boxxb2\) after the exchange on d5) 21...\(\Boxxc8\)! 22.\(\Boxxb5\) \(\Boxxb7\), and now 23.d6 fails due to 23...\(\Boxxc6\) 24.\(\Boxxc2\) \(\Boxxf8\), and White will lose his d6-pawn: 25.\(\Boxxd2\) \(\Boxxe5\) 26.f4 \(\Boxxd6\) 27.\(\Boxxe5\) \(\Boxxc5\) Lputian – Mikhailchishin, Lviv 1987, and White was a couple of pawns down in an endgame.


21...\(\Boxxc6\)
After 21...\(\Boxxc8\) 22.\(\Boxxb5\) Black should avoid 22...\(\Boxxf8\)?! (it is better to play 22...\(\Boxxd7\) 23.\(\Boxxa4\) \(\Boxxb5\) 24.\(\Boxxb5\uparrow\), and we transpose to lines from the variation 20...\(\Boxxc8\) that we have already analysed. White is better.) 23.f4± Mielke – Kasten, corr. 1990, and White pushes his pawn to e5, because 23...e5 does not work due to 24.\(\Boxxd5\) \(\Boxxd6\) 25.\(\Boxxd6\) \(\Boxxd6\) 26. fxe5 \(\Boxxe6\) 27.\(\Boxc7\) and White wins material.

Black fails to equalize after 21...\(\Boxxc6\) 22.\(\Boxxa3\uparrow\) planning 23.f4, and if 23...e5 – 24.\(\Boxxd5\).

22.f4!
This is stronger for White than the line that was played in the game Walther – Evers, corr. 1981, 22.\(\Boxxb5\)?! \(\Boxxb2\)! 23.\(\Boxxb2\) \(\Boxxb2\) 24.\(\Boxxc6\) (or 24.\(\Boxxc2\) \(\Boxxf6\uparrow\) – and the passed pawn has been reliably blocked) 24...\(\Boxxc6\) 25. \(\Boxxb7\) \(\Boxxe5\) 26.\(\Boxxa8\) \(\Boxxa8\uparrow\) – and White's passed pawn is not so dangerous anymore after the trade of the queens.

White could consider 22. \(\Boxxd2\)?, in order to try to put his knight on b5 and prevent \(\Boxxb2\) – now contrary to the game Lputian – Mikhailchishin, Lviv 1987 (see the notes to White's move 21), White controls the c-file.

22...e5 23.\(\Boxxd5\) \(\Boxxd5\) 24.fxe5 \(\Boxxe6\) 25.\(\Boxxd5\) \(\Boxxe5\)

26.\(\Boxxd1\uparrow\)
Black is incapable to prevent the march of the white passed d-pawn to d7 after which White has more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.
1. d4 ♜f6 2. c4 g6 3. ♜c3 d5 4. cxd5 ♜xd5 5. e4 ♜xc3 6. bxc3 ♜g7 7. ♜c4 c5 8. ♜e2 ♜c6 9. ♜e3 0–0 10. 0–0 ♜g4 11. f3 ♜a5 12. ♜d3 cxd4 13. cxd4 ♛e6 14. ♜c1 ♜xa2 15. ♜a4 ♜e6 16. d5 ♜d7 17. ♜b4 e6 18. ♜c3 exd5

19. ♜xd5

White has no advantage after 19. exd5 because of 19... ♜e8 20. ♜f2 ♜f8 (White failed to achieve any advantage in practice after 20...b5!? with the idea of Black to force the exchange of the bishop on d3 for the knight on c4 and then rely on the bishop pair and the passed a-pawn in a position with equal material) 21. ♜b2 (the queen cannot go to the kingside because of the manoeuvre ♜b3–c5) 21... ♜g7 22. ♜b4 ♜f8 23. ♜b2, and the opponents agreed to a draw in the game Beliavsky – Kasparov, Moscow 1988.

19... ♜e6

The line 19...b6 20. ♜fd1±, has not been tested in practice and quite reasonably so. Black can hardly put up with White's knight on d5 for long.

20. ♜fd1 ♜xd5 21. exd5 ♜e8

It is not good for Black to capture the pawn: 21... ♜xd5 22. ♜e4 ♜b3 23. ♜d2! b6 24. ♜xa8 ♜xa8 25. ♜e7 and Black has a couple of connected passed pawns indeed, but they are on their initial squares and his compensation for the exchange is insufficient Wilder – Kudrin, USA 1988.

22. ♜f2

White’s main trump card is the passed d-pawn. Should he manage to push it all the way up to d7 it will decide the outcome of the game. As we saw it is more valuable than Black’s a7 and b6-pawns. So Black must try to
block the passed d-pawn preferably on d6 with the bishop. He has several weaknesses in his position – the dark f6 and h6-squares (after the bishop goes to d6) and the stranded knight on a5, at the edge of the board. He has to worry about White’s passed pawn and White can create threats on both sides.

He is threatening to push the d-pawn forward immediately and Black must take certain measures: a) 22...dı8 or b) 22...kxe5.

a) 22...dı8 23.dıb2

Now in case of 23.dıa4 (White places his queen on this square in line b) Black has the powerful countermeasure 23...a6! (controlling the b5-square for the white bishop and planning b5 and dıc4) 24.d6 dıxd6!, and here it turns out that White cannot exploit the pin along the d-file with any decisive effect, but Black must still play accurately. After 25.dıe4, it is too bad for Black to play the seemingly attractive line: 25...dıe6 26.dıd5 ıxe2, because of the far from obvious resource for White – 27.dıf1!! (There was a series of imprecision, but it all ended in a draw in the game Shipov – Neverov, St Petersburg 1994: 27.dıh4 ıxb6+ 28.dıh1 ıbb5?! 29.ıxb5?! axb5 30.ıxf7+ ıxf7 31.ıxd6 and Black managed somehow to hold the balance: 31...dıc4 32.ıd7+ ıg8 33.ıxb7 ıd6 34.ıb6 ıf5 35.ıf6 ıae8 36.g4 ı2e6=+. It would have been much stronger for Black to have played 28...ıb4!, forcing the exchange of queens without losing material unnecessarily; meanwhile White had to continue with 29.ıg4!, avoiding the exchange of queens.) 27...ıxf2 (It is just terrible for Black to follow with: 27...ıb2 28.ıd4 ıb4 29.ıa2; and it is hardly any better for him to try: 28...ıb5 29.ıc3 either.) 28.ıxf2 ıb6+ 29.ıd4 ıxd4 30.ıxd4 ıd8 31.f4 ıg7 32.ıf3 and White should be able to press his advantage home after a while. Still after 25...ıc6! Black should be manage to hold the position: 26.ıxc6 (It is not so dangerous for Black if White continues with: 26.ıxc6 bxc6 27.ıxc6 ıe6!) 26...bxc6 27.ıxc6 (It would not work for White to play: 27.ıxc6 ıe6 28.ıg3 ıe8!) 27...ıc8! 28.ıxa6 ıxc1 29.ıxc1. The almost total annihilation of material is over now and the opponents can agree to draw already...

b) 23...dıg7

Black can also play:

23...dıd6 24.dıd4 ıg5 25.dıb5↑, and the weaknesses along the a1-h8 diagonal should cause Black considerable worries;

23...dıh6 (The idea of this move is to let the white pawn be pushed to d7 at the expense of the exchange of the dark-squared bishops. Black then encircles that pawn with his pieces and
hoped captures it.) 24.\textit{b}1 – White has the initiative now and he has in addition a passed d-pawn. (Unfortunately for him, the ingenious exchange sacrifice with the idea to seize the domination on the dark squares does not work: 24.\textit{e}4 \textit{xc}1 25.\textit{xc}1 \textit{c}8 26.\textit{h}6 \textit{d}6! 27.\textit{d}4 \textit{f}8. After the retreat of the white queen, Black plays f7-f5 and White’s compensation can be sufficient only for equality.) 24... \textit{e}3 25.\textit{xe}3 (White can create problems for Black with the line: 25.\textit{b}5 \textit{xf}2+ 26.\textit{xf}2 \textit{e}5 27.d6 a6 28.\textit{f}1 b5 29.d7!) 25...\textit{xe}3 26.\textit{b}4. White’s d-pawn is ready to march forward and Black can hardly neutralize White’s initiative.

\textit{24.\textit{a}2 a6}

\textit{25.\textit{e}4!±}

The idea of this move is that presently Black is incapable of blocking the passed pawn and stopping the white rook from penetration on the 7th rank at the same time. White gets a big advantage by pushing the pawn forward. In the game Jussupow – Leko, Ubeda 1997, White played 25.d6 immediately, but after 25...\textit{c}6 26.\textit{e}4 \textit{d}7 Black blocked the passed pawn and defended the squares for penetration along the c-file reliably. His position seemed impenetrable. The game continued 27.\textit{b}6 \textit{ac}8 28.\textit{c}7 \textit{xc}7 29.\textit{xc}7 \textit{xc}7 30.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 31.\textit{xa}6, and Black had no problems to draw with a pawn for the exchange: 31...\textit{e}5 (it is useful to weaken the white king a bit) 32.h3 c5 33.\textit{b}5 \textit{d}7 34.\textit{xd}8+ \textit{xd}8 35.\textit{h}1 \textit{d}4 and Black made an easy draw in this middlegame because of the excellent outpost on d4 for the bishop and the vulnerable white king.

\textbf{b) 22...\textit{e}5}

\textit{23.\textit{b}5 \textit{d}6}

This is Black’s only move otherwise White pushes his passed pawn to d7.

\textit{24.\textit{a}4 \textit{f}8}

It is too dangerous for Black to try 24...\textit{e}7 25.\textit{h}4, and now he must play 25...\textit{b}6+, in order to save the exchange. This move prevents him from playing b7-b6 and creates problems with the
defence of the knight on a5: 26. \( \text{h}1 \text{c}7 \) (26...a6 27.\( \text{xe}7 \text{xb}5 \) 28.\( \text{h}4+ \)--) 27.\( \text{a}1 \pm \). Black must worry about his knight on a5 and the threat of White to push the d-pawn (after the black bishop is forced to retreat from d6) and so White is clearly better, for example: 27...a6 28.\( \text{f}1 \text{b}4 \) 29. \( \text{db}1 \text{xa}4 \) 30.\( \text{xa}4 \text{c}5 \) 31.\( \text{e}1 \text{c}7 \) 32.d6 and the black pieces are totally misplaced.

**25.\( \text{h}4 \) f6**

Black is compelled to weaken the e6-square.

It is dangerous for Black to give a check with the queen now, just like on the previous move: 25...\( \text{b}6+ \) 26.\( \text{h}1 \text{fc}8 \) (it is even worse to play 26...a6 27.\( \text{d}7+ \)--; and the black rooks are out of play) 27.\( \text{a}1 \) a6 28.\( \text{f}1 \text{b}4 \) (or 28...\( \text{b}3 \) 29.\( \text{ab}1 \text{c}3 \) 30.\( \text{e}1+ \)--; and White wins a piece) 29.\( \text{xb}4 \text{xb}4 \) 30.d6 \( \text{c}6 \) 31.d7\( \pm \). White has managed to push his pawn to d7 and has a great advantage despite his minute material deficit.

**26.\( \text{e}1 \)**

It is evidently better to occupy the e6 square with the rook instead of with the bishop: 26.\( \text{d}7 \) \( \text{h}8 \) (it is not quite clear what the better square for the king is — here or on g7 — 26...\( \text{g}7 \) 27.\( \text{e}6 \) b6\( \infty \)) 27.\( \text{e}6 \) b6\( \infty \). In the game Wessman – Lputian, New York 1990, Black brought his knight to c5 via b7 and started pushing forward his a and b-pawns. He fortified his position on the dark squares over the rest of the board.

**26...b6**

After 26...a6 White has the resource: 27.\( \text{d}7 \) b5 28.\( \text{g}4 \pm \) — and he manages to create powerful threats against the black king. In the game Cramling – Tsuboi, Manila 1992, there followed 28...\( \text{a}7 \) 29.\( \text{e}6+ \) \( \text{g}7 \) 30.\( \text{c}8! \) \( \text{xd}7 \) 31.\( \text{xf}6+ \) \( \text{xf}6 \) 32. \( \text{g}8+ \) \( \text{h}6 \) 33.\( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{c}5+ \) 34.\( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 35.\( \text{h}4+ \) \( \text{h}5 \) 36.\( \text{hx}5+ \) \( \text{hx}5 \) 37.\( \text{e}5+ \) \( \text{h}6 \), and now the easiest way for White to win was 38.g4 (with the threat 37.\( \text{h}5+ \) \( \text{gxh}5 \) 38.g5#) 38...\( \text{e}3 \) (the same as 38...\( \text{e}7 \) 39.f4) 39.h4 with threats to checkmate.

**27.\( \text{e}6 \) \( \text{c}8 \)**

After the immediate 27...\( \text{c}5+ \) White’s best is the positional sacrifice 28.\( \text{xc}5! \) bxc5, and now 29.\( \text{g}3! \) (weaker is 29.\( \text{a}6 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 30.\( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{h}8 \) 31.\( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{e}7\pm \) — it is probably not worth for White to decentralize the rook in order to attack the a7-pawn Astrom – Ernst, Gothenburg 1990) 29...a6 30.\( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 31.h4!--, and despite the material deficit White has good attacking chances against the weak enemy king’s position. His bishop pair is definitely not worse than a rook and a knight.

**28.\( \text{c}e1 \) \( \text{c}5+ \) 29.\( \text{f}1 \)??**

This seems to be risky, but it has its advantages too. White preserves the possibility to be able to capture on f6 with his bishop on the next move.
By the way it is quite possible to play 29.\(\textit{\texttt{h1 xxd5 30.xf6 (It}}\) is not good to play now 30.xf6 due to 30...f2 – making use of the weak 1\textsuperscript{st} rank. This was the idea behind f1 – 31.\(\textit{6e5 b3) 30...d4 31.a2+ g7 32.xf8 xfx8 33.g3 d6 34.f2 f4 35.a1+ g8 36.g1\textsuperscript{t} Lukacs – Fogarasi, Budapest 1993, and after having defended his king safely White still has the initiative because of the vulnerable enemy king.

29...\(\textit{x}d5 30.xf6 b3!\)

Black sacrificed the exchange in the only game in which that position was played – 30...xf6, but after 31.xf6 d2 32.h4 g5 33.g3 b4 34.e6++ it turned out that White defended his king easily and preserved his material advantage Lukacs – Lindnau, Budapest1993. The move 30...b3 is of course stronger.

31.\(\textit{6e2 b4}\)

White would answer the immediate capture on f6 with c4.

32.xb4 xf6 33.a6

White repels the black rook from the 8\textsuperscript{th} rank and that weakens the defence of the black king even more.

33...c7

It is too dangerous for Black to play 33...c5 34.e8+ (with the idea to occupy then the 7\textsuperscript{th} rank with a check) 34.g7 (but not 34...f8 35.xf8+ f8 36.f4+ and White’s threats are decisive) 35.e5 d2+ (otherwise the knight on b3 will be lost) 36.g1 d6 37.e7+, and White has good attacking chances with his rook on the 7\textsuperscript{th} rank.

34.e5

White now fails to occupy the 7\textsuperscript{th} rank with his rook – 34.e8+ g7 35.e5 d2+ 36.g1 d6 37.e7+ xe7 38.xe7+ h8, and the game ends in a draw: 39.xd6 xd6 40.xa7 b3=.

34...d2+ 35.g1 d6

36.g4\textsuperscript{t}

White still has the initiative because of the idea to push h2-h4-h5, and also due to the misplacement of the knight on d2 which is cut off from the rest of the black pieces.
1.d4 ♞f6 2.c4 g6 3.♕c3 d5 4.cxd5 ♞xd5 5.e4 ♞xc3
6.bxc3 ♞g7 7.♕c4 c5 8.♕e2 ♞c6 9.♕e3 0–0 10.0–0
♕g4 11.f3 ♞a5 12.♕xf7 ♞xf7 13.fxg4

The capture on f7 used to be considered as harmless for Black for a long time. White’s interest towards that line increased dramatically at the end of the 80ies of the last century. The four games that Karpov and Kasparov played in this variation in their match for the world title in Seville (5th, 7th, 9th and 11th) marked the new outbreak of popularity of this line.

The theory of this line is developing so extensively presently that some variations are studied quite thoroughly and sometimes to the very end. We plan to acquaint you with the contemporary theory and also to suggest to you some new precise lines as well as some novelties. We hope that to be interesting and useful to all players studying this line.

We can recommend the 12.♕f7 variation to players who enjoy hard-fought positional battles and we have to add that the good knowledge of theory makes the risk to lose with White almost non-existent. Most of the lines are in fact quite safe for White and particularly the main line: 12.♕f7 ♞f7 13.fg4 ♞f1 14.♕f1 cd4 15.cd4 e5 16.♕g1 ♞c8 17.♕b1.

I believe that the extensive analysis of that position will attract the interest of many players. The move 17.d5 still focuses our attention and it leads to a very sharp game. I will like to emphasize on the line – 14...♗d6 15.e5 ♖d5 16.g5!?, because the official theory considers it as harmless for Black, but I think that he is faced with a lot of problems there as well. Naturally, the main theoretical line beginning with the move – 16.♕f2 has been analyzed extensively here too and the readers will find plenty of new and interesting ideas there as well.
13...\textit{\texttt{xf1}}+

Black is practically forced to trade the rooks, because in case of: 13...\textit{\texttt{cxd4}}?! 14.\textit{\texttt{xf7}} \textit{\texttt{xf7}} 15.\textit{\texttt{cxd4}} \textit{\texttt{g8}}, Virtanen – Virmajoki, Helsinki 1988, he will have to lose additional time to evacuate his king away from the danger zone. Now, the move 16.\textit{\texttt{c1}}± creates plenty of problems for Black, because his knight on a5 will not be able to enter the actions anytime soon.

14.\textit{\texttt{xf1}}

All these moves were more or less forced until now. We have to mention that capturing on f1 with the queen 14.\textit{\texttt{xf1}} is hardly satisfactory for White, because it lets the black knight immediately into action – 14...\textit{\texttt{c4}}!. After 15.\textit{\texttt{f3}} (in case of 15.\textit{\texttt{c1}} \textit{\texttt{d7}} 16.h3 \textit{\texttt{e6}} Black can answer 17.\textit{\texttt{g3}}?! with 17...\textit{\texttt{d8}}! 18.e5 \textit{\texttt{cxd4}} 19.\textit{\texttt{cxd4}} \textit{\texttt{xe5}}! 20.\textit{\texttt{dxe5}} \textit{\texttt{xe5}} and after the temporary piece sacrifice Black is better) 15...\textit{\texttt{cxd4}} (Black stands well after 15...\textit{\texttt{d7}}, with the idea to bring the rook to f8, which after 16.e5 \textit{\texttt{f8}} 17.\textit{\texttt{e4}} \textit{\texttt{xe3}} 18.\textit{\texttt{xe3}} \textit{\texttt{xe4}} 19.\textit{\texttt{e1}} \textit{\texttt{h4}}= lead to an equal position in the game Lakat – Ravagnani, Budapest 1999) 16.\textit{\texttt{cxd4}} \textit{\texttt{b6}} Black has good compensation for the pawn and that was well known even during the “pre-computer age”. For example after 17.\textit{\texttt{f2}} (It might be possible that 17.e5 is the best for White, but still after 17...\textit{\texttt{e6}} 18.\textit{\texttt{c1}} \textit{\texttt{f8}} 19.\textit{\texttt{e4}} \textit{\texttt{b2}}∞ the position is with mutual chances.) 17...\textit{\texttt{b2}} 18.\textit{\texttt{c1}} (in case of 18.\textit{\texttt{c3}} \textit{\texttt{xe2}} 19.\textit{\texttt{e1}} \textit{\texttt{xa2}} 20.\textit{\texttt{a1}} Black might return the sacrificed piece with 20...\textit{\texttt{b2}} 21.\textit{\texttt{xc4+}} \textit{\texttt{h8}}∞ and even try to play for a win as in the game G.Hund – Mallee, Menden 1974) 18.\textit{\texttt{xa2}}∞ was played in the game Kamishov – Flohr, USSR 1950 and Black’s chances proved to be at least equal.
14...\textit{d7}

We are dealing with the move 14...\textit{d6} in Chapter 28, while 14...\textit{cxd4} – is analyzed in Chapters 29 and 30.

It is worth mentioning that now after White has captured Black’s rook with his king, Black has to delay the centralization of his knight. The point is that after 14...\textit{c4} White has 15.\textit{b3}!, and now after 14...\textit{b5} (15...\textit{f8}+? 16.\textit{g1} \textit{f7} 17.\textit{f1}+- Fedin – Mathisen, Norway 1998) 16.\textit{a4} \textit{a6} 17.\textit{f2}+ and White keeps a lasting initiative.

Checking with the queen – 14...\textit{f8}+?! is obviously unnecessary, since after 15.\textit{g1}± (It is weaker for White to try 15.\textit{f2}?!), Wendelbo – Riscado, Internet 2004, because Black creates counterplay by playing 15...\textit{f7} and 16...\textit{f8}+) White simply improves the position of his king.

It is useless for Black to lose time for the move 14...\textit{a6}?! because of 15.\textit{dxc5}± (in case of 15.\textit{e5} \textit{d5} 16.\textit{f2}∞ in the game Gavrikov – Kallai, Mazatlan 1988, there was something like a transposition to line \textit{b} from Chapter 28, except that Black’s pawn was on \textit{a6}, instead of on the \textit{a7}-square) and not only Black is two pawns down, but the light squares in his camp are extremely vulnerable too.

After 14...\textit{b6}, White’s most principled answer is 15.\textit{dxc5}!? (following 15.\textit{g1} \textit{e6} 16.\textit{d3}, we reach the position from Chapter 28, variation \textit{a}); 15...\textit{f8}+ 16.\textit{g1} \textit{a6} 17.\textit{g5}± leads to a situation in which Black must still prove that he has compensation for the two missing pawns.

The move 14...\textit{c8} did not enjoy popularity and quite deservedly so. After 15.\textit{g5}! (but not 15.\textit{a4}?!), which after 15...\textit{cxd4} 16.\textit{cxd4} \textit{c4} 17.\textit{f4} \textit{a6} 18.\textit{g5} \textit{b5} 19.\textit{b3} \textit{e5} 20.\textit{dx e5} \textit{c6}∞ enabled Black to get excellent counterchances in the game Portisch – Korchnoi, Reykjavik 1988, while the position after 15.\textit{h3} \textit{e6} 16.\textit{d3} will be analysed by us in the line \textit{a}). The swap 15...\textit{cxd4}?! is a mistake for Black (after 15...\textit{e6} Black transposes to line \textit{b}, and White is only slightly better then) and after 16.\textit{cxd4} \textit{c4} 17.\textit{g1} \textit{d8} 18.\textit{e1} \textit{c6} 19.\textit{e5} \textit{e6} 20.\textit{f2} \textit{b4} 21.\textit{f4}± the game Seirawan – Kudrin, USA 1989 reached a typical position that White dreams to achieve. Black’s bishop will be out of action for a long time due to White’s pawns on \textit{g5} and \textit{e5}, and White has an excellent outpost on \textit{e4} for his knight in the middlegame and his king in the endgame.
White is on crossroads now whether to push his g-pawn forward or to protect it with h2-h3. After the first possibility White can hope to restrict Black’s bishop considerably, but at the expense of weakening the light squares. The second possibility relies on the exploitation of the extra pawn which is presently doubled, but might tell in the future.

We are going to deal with the two lines: a) 15.h3 and b) 15.g5 in details further.

While now we will only mention that White gains nothing by capturing one more pawn with 15.dxc5. After 15...\texttt{dxf8+} (15...\texttt{dxf4}+ 16.\texttt{gxf4} 16.\texttt{gxf4} 17.\texttt{xf4} \texttt{gxd1}+ (Black loses after 17...\texttt{gxf4}? 18.\texttt{xf4} \texttt{gxf4} because of 19.\texttt{d8}+--) 18.\texttt{gxd1} \texttt{xc3} 19.\texttt{d5} (after 19.\texttt{e6} \texttt{g8} 20.\texttt{d7} \texttt{xf7} White’s pieces are hanging and the move 21.\texttt{g5}? is refuted tactically with 21...\texttt{f6}! 22.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{xe6}--) 19...\texttt{f6} 20.\texttt{h6} \texttt{e8} (It is very bad for Black to play 20...\texttt{f7} because of 21.\texttt{xf6}+ \texttt{xf6} 22.e5 \texttt{f5} 23.g4 \texttt{xe5} 24.\texttt{f1}--+) 21.\texttt{xf6}+ exf6 22.\texttt{d7} \texttt{exe4} 23.\texttt{g7}+ \texttt{h8} 24.\texttt{c7} (after 24.\texttt{f7} \texttt{e8} 25.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{g8} with the idea 26...\texttt{d6}= Black equalizes easily) 24...\texttt{g8} 25.\texttt{g7}+ (after 25.\texttt{d2} \texttt{c6} 26.\texttt{xb7} \texttt{e7}= the game is equal) 25...\texttt{h8} 26.\texttt{c7} \texttt{g8} 27.\texttt{g7}+ \texttt{h8} 28.\texttt{c7} and the game Chernin – Gavrikov, Lviv 1987 ended in a draw because of repetition of moves.

\begin{center}
a) 15.h3
\end{center}

15...\texttt{d4}!

Black’s chance to get good counterplay lies in exploiting the somewhat slow and inert last move of White.

Black often tries in practice here 15...\texttt{e6}, but White still maintains his advantage: 16.\texttt{f3} (about 16.e5 \texttt{c4} – see Chapter 28: 14...\texttt{d6} 15.e5 \texttt{e6} 16.h3 \texttt{c4}) 16...\texttt{cxd4} (It is bad for Black to play: 16...\texttt{c4}?!), due to 17.\texttt{f2} \texttt{h6} 18.\texttt{g1} \texttt{f8}, Walzer – H.Schneider, Hessen 1990 and here after 19.d5 \texttt{e5} 20.\texttt{f5}± White would have been dominant on the light squares. It is also quite dubious for Black to follow with: 16...\texttt{d6}?!., because of 17.\texttt{g1} a6 18.\texttt{d1} \texttt{d8} 19.\texttt{f4} \texttt{cxd4} 20.\texttt{cxd4} b5, Kocisicak – Gatrgian, Chalkidiki 2003 and now White could have seized additional space in the centre with: 21.e5!? \texttt{d7} 22.d5, because after 22...\texttt{xe5} 23.\texttt{xc6} hxg6 24.\texttt{xg6}+ \texttt{g7} 25.\texttt{b6} \texttt{d6} 26.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{exd6} 27.\texttt{xa5} e6 28.\texttt{f2}± Black will be faced with defending a difficult endgame. In case of 16...\texttt{c4}, White should not ex-
change queens outright, but he should follow with 17.¥d2!? ¥a6 18.¥c2±, analogously to the line that we will analyze later in the text – 16...cxd4 17.cxd4 ¥c4 18.¥d2 ¥a6 19.¥c2.) 17.cxd4 ¥c4 (Black must fight for the light squares in the centre; otherwise, for example after: 17...¥c8?! 18.¥f4 ¥f7 19.¥g1 a6 20.¥d5 ¥e6 21.¥b1 b5, Zitin – Volcansek, Zagan 1995, 22.a4!+ he will soon end up in a difficult position. White is again better after: 17...¥f8+ 18.¥g1 ¥c4 19.¥d2 ¥a6 20.¥c2 ¥c4 21.¥b3 e6, Stimpel – Bunk, Travemuende 2002, 22.¥g5!?±, or 17...¥c4 18.¥f4 ¥f8 19.¥g1 b5, Verhoeven – Matsch, corr. 1996 and here in case of 20.e5!? ¥d7 21.¥e4±, despite the fact that Black has managed to bring his knight back into action he still has problems, mostly because his bishop is cramped by White’s pawns. In practice, Black often tries to trade queens after the preliminary moves: 17...¥d8 18.¥g1 ¥c4. White preserves his advantage in that case after: 19.¥d2!? ¥a6 20.¥c2 ¥c4 21.¥c1 b5 22.e5 ¥xc2 23.¥xc2 ¥c4, Toth – Gau- glitz, Germany 1996 and here he should have avoided the exchange with the move 24.¥c1!±, maintaining his control over the c1-h6 diagonal.) Now White has the excellent move 18.¥d2! when Black has to solve the problem of his isolated knight on a5, since the ideal square for it is presently occupied by the queen. (Strangely enough Black gets very good chances in the endgame after 18.¥xc4+ ¥xc4 19.¥g5 by means of 19...e5! 20.d5 h6 21.¥c1 ¥d6 22.¥g3 ¥c8 23.¥e3 ¥c3! 24.¥e2 ¥f6 25.a4 ¥g5 26.¥xg5 hxg5 and in the game Dlugy – Nickoloff, Toronto 1989, and Black had very active pieces and a good compensation for the sacrificed pawn.) 18...¥a6 (Black creates the threat of a knight fork – 19...¥b3, while after 18...¥f7+ 19.¥g1 ¥c4 20.¥c3 ¥f8 21.¥b1 b6 22.a3 b5 23.¥d3 a6 24.g5 Formby – Kubasky, corr. 1997 or 20...¥xe3 21.¥xe3 ¥c8 22.e5 ¥c2 23.a3 ¥c4 24.¥e1± as in the game Kalinkin – Padalkin, Kiev 2001 White can effortlessly put into action the standard plan with g4-g5, restricting Black’s bishop.) 19.¥c2 (19.¥b4?! ¥f8+ 20.¥e1 ¥d3 G.Mester – Menyhart, Erkelmem 1992) 19...¥c4 (following 19...e5, Johansen – Selmer, corr. 1990 White should better avoid the pin of the knight with the move 20.¥g1!, since it is not advantageous for Black to exchange on d4, while White can counter 20...¥c4 with 21.¥b3±) 20.¥b3 ¥h8 21.¥g1 ¥d2 (After 21...¥d6? 22.¥g3 ¥c6 23.¥c1 ¥d7 24.e5 ¥c8 25.¥e4+ White’s pieces were dominating in the game Degtiaev – Mustakaev, Smolensk 2001. It seems dubious for Black to play: 21...¥f8?! 22.¥g5 e6 23.¥d3 ¥c6 24.e5 ¥d5 25.¥f4 ¥c6 26.¥f1±, because his
bishop ended up trapped in its own camp in the game Talaber – I. Kiss, corr. 1991.) 22.\textit{\texttt{xf7}}\texttt{xf7} 23.\texttt{g7} 23.\texttt{e5} 24.\texttt{e3} 25.\texttt{xa2} 26.\texttt{c5} 27.\texttt{d5}, Degtiarev – Voigt, Hoekendorf 2004, 27.\texttt{c3}+ – and despite the material equality, White’s prospeicts are superior thanks to his active rook.) 23...\texttt{e8} 24.\texttt{e5} b5 25.\texttt{c1}+ Spassky – Korchnoi, Moscow 1955) 24.\texttt{e1} 25.\texttt{e2} 26.\texttt{e1}+ 27.\texttt{e2} 28.\texttt{e2} 29.\texttt{e2} 30.\texttt{e7} 31.\texttt{e7}+.

16.\texttt{d3}

The pin of the black knight is useless in this position. After 16...\texttt{b3} b5 17.\texttt{f2} cxd4 18.cxd4 \texttt{d8} Black has a good compensation for the pawn, while the careless 19.\texttt{g1??} after 19...\texttt{xf2}! forced White to resign immediately, in the game Tabak – Perrot, Ostende 2002, because of the line 20.\texttt{xf2} 21.\texttt{cxd4} 21.\texttt{cxd4}+. The routine retreat 16.\texttt{f2} after 16...cxd4 (It is hardly advisable for Black to try 16...\texttt{c6}?! 17.\texttt{d3} \texttt{b2} 18.\texttt{c2} \texttt{c4} 19.\texttt{g1}, because it becomes evident that he has just lost tempi on useless knight-maneuvers, A. Graf – Tseshkovsky, Novgorod 1995. In case of 16...\texttt{f8} 17.\texttt{g1}, Black must comply with an inferior position after: 17...\texttt{e6} 18.e5 \texttt{f7} 19.\texttt{e1} \texttt{h6} 20.\texttt{g3} cxd4 21.\texttt{cxd4} \texttt{d5} 22.\texttt{e4}+ Sharma – Daamen, Lyngby 1991, because his risky attempt at counterplay: 17...cxd4 18.cxd4 \texttt{h6}?! backfires after: 19.\texttt{b3} b5 20.a4 a6 21.\texttt{axb5} axb5 22.\texttt{c3} \texttt{xf2}, Tatarliyev – Mont Reynaud, Duisburg 1992 and here White could have settled the issue with move 23.\texttt{xb5}+– 17.\texttt{cxd4} e5! (this is a quite typical idea in order to prevent White from restricting the mobility of the black bishop) 18.dxe5 (after 18.\texttt{d5} \texttt{h6} Black’s bishop is quite useful along the c1-h6 diagonal, and according to Jussupow Black’s compensation for the pawn is satisfactory) 18...\texttt{d2}+! (weaker is 18...\texttt{f7} due to 19.\texttt{g1} \texttt{xe5} 20.\texttt{c1} b5 21.\texttt{d5}+) 19.\texttt{e1} (White’s king now has to remain in the centre, because after 19.\texttt{g1?} \texttt{xe5} 20.\texttt{c1} \texttt{b2}! White will suffer considerable material losses after 21.\texttt{c2} \texttt{xf3}–+) and now following Jussupow’s analysis Black can play 19...\texttt{h6}! (19...\texttt{xe5}? looks attractive, but after 20.\texttt{c1}+ White achieved a considerable edge due to the pin of the black knight in the game Jussupow – Popovic, Belgrade 1989) 20.\texttt{c2} (20.\texttt{d4?} \texttt{f8} 21.\texttt{e2}, van Wely – Sutovsky, Greece 2003, 21...\texttt{f4}+–) 20...\texttt{c8} 21.\texttt{b2} \texttt{d8}!\texttt{e6} with an excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn.
16...b5

If Black exchanges his knight for the bishop with 16...\textit{\textsc{d}xe3+ 17.\textit{\textsc{w}}xe3 cxd4 18.cxd4 e5 19.d5 \textit{\textsc{h}f8} 20.\textit{\textsc{g}}1} his task to organize an effective counterplay is much harder.

17.\textit{\textsc{f}2} \textit{\textsc{f}8} 18.\textit{\textsc{g}1} \textit{\textsc{h}6}

Black uses the opportune moment to activate his bishop.

19.\textit{\textsc{h}4}

White has to be rather careful now. After the naive 19.d5?, Black can follow with 19...\textit{\textsc{d}xf2}! 20.\textit{\textsc{d}xf2} \textit{\textsc{e}3+} and after 21...\textit{\textsc{d}6} Black has a dangerous attack against the white king.

19...\textit{\textsc{e}3+} 20.\textit{\textsc{h}1}

The game Razuvaev – Krasenkow, Moscow 1991 reached that position. After 20...\textit{\textsc{c}xd4}!? 21.\textit{\textsc{c}xd4} e5 22.d5 a6= Black’s active pieces were more or less compensating the pawn deficit.

b) 15.g5!?

The idea behind that move is to restrict the black bishop. But as we saw in our survey of the line a the black bishop might be quite useful along the c1-h6 diagonal.

15...\textit{\textsc{c}4}

Black is acting in the similar fashion as in the line a. This plan is not so effective anymore, because the black bishop can not join the action along the c1-h6 diagonal.

In answer to 15...\textit{\textsc{d}d8}, White can play 16.\textit{\textsc{g}1} e5 (in case of 16...e6, Gligoric – Popovic, Yugoslavia 1988, White should continue with 17.\textit{\textsc{w}c}2!, for example: 17...\textit{\textsc{c}c}6 18.e5 cxd4 19.cxd4 \textit{\textsc{b}4} 20.\textit{\textsc{b}b}3 \textit{\textsc{d}d}5 21.\textit{\textsc{f}2}\pm and his advantage is quite obvious thanks to the poor placement of Black’s bishop on g7) 17.d5 b6 18.h3 (It is weaker for White to play 18.\textit{\textsc{h}1}, because after: 18...\textit{\textsc{g}4} 19.\textit{\textsc{d}3} \textit{\textsc{b}7} Black’s pieces can concentrate on attacking White’s e4-pawn.) 18...\textit{\textsc{c}4} 19.\textit{\textsc{d}3} \textit{\textsc{d}6} 20.a4 c4 21.\textit{\textsc{c}2} \textit{\textsc{f}8} 22.\textit{\textsc{h}1}! (White plans to redeploy his knight to f3, via the g1-square, in order to exert pressure against Black’s e5-pawn.) 22...\textit{\textsc{b}7} 23.\textit{\textsc{g}1} \textit{\textsc{c}5} 24.\textit{\textsc{e}2} \textit{\textsc{xe}3} 25.\textit{\textsc{xe}3} \textit{\textsc{f}7} (after 25...\textit{\textsc{c}5} 26.\textit{\textsc{f}3} \textit{\textsc{d}3} 27.\textit{\textsc{h}2}!– White’s knight comes to the g4-square as a dangerous attacking unit) 26.\textit{\textsc{f}3} \textit{\textsc{f}4} 27.\textit{\textsc{xf}4} exf4. In the arising end-
game after: 28.\texttt{d}d4! (28.\texttt{d}d1 \texttt{c}c5 29.\texttt{d}d4 \texttt{x}xa4 30.\texttt{x}xc4 \texttt{c}c5 31. \texttt{d}e5, Sakaev – van Wely, Internet 2004, 31...a5=2 and Black has counterplay on the queenside) 28...\texttt{c}c5 29.\texttt{c}c6 \texttt{d}d7 30.e5 \texttt{g}g7 31.d6\texttt{z} White’s central pawns are much more mobile and dangerous than Black’s queenside pawns.

In case of 15...\texttt{e}e6 White should better choose 16.\texttt{d}d3?! (White played the attractive move 16.e5 in the game Karpov – Gavrikov, Gijon 1988 and after 16...\texttt{c}c4?! 17.\texttt{g}g1 \texttt{d}d8 18.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{c}c6 19.\texttt{f}f2\texttt{z} White had a clear advantage, but after Black’s best 16...\texttt{d}d4! he would have had to solve quite complex problems. 17.\texttt{d}d3? loses after 17...\texttt{f}f5!-- while the retreat 17.\texttt{f}f2?! is not satisfactory either. After 17...\texttt{f}f8 18.\texttt{g}g1 \texttt{f}f5 19.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{x}xg5= White loses his extra pawn, Fecht – Vegh, Bad Orb 1989, and the third possibility 17.\texttt{f}f4, Finegold – Amura, Azov 1990, 17...\texttt{f}f8! 18.\texttt{g}g1 \texttt{d}d5\texttt{z} leads to a situation where White can hardly improve his position.). After 16.cxd4 (White preserves better chances after 16...\texttt{c}c4 17.\texttt{d}d2! \texttt{e}e6 18.\texttt{c}c2 \texttt{c}c4 19.\texttt{f}f4 \texttt{f}f8 20.\texttt{g}g1\texttt{z} 17.cxd4 (White should not compromise his pawn -structure in the centre in order to trade the dark-squared bishops: 17.\texttt{xd}d4 \texttt{f}f7+ 18.\texttt{f}f3 \texttt{c}c4 19.\texttt{g}g7 \texttt{x}g7 20.\texttt{e}e3, Barbe – Drost, Hengelo 2003, because here after the simple move 20...e5 Black would have had a good counterplay for the sacrificed pawn.) 17...\texttt{c}c4 (In case of 17...\texttt{c}c4 18.\texttt{f}f2 b5 19.\texttt{g}g1 \texttt{d}d6 20.e5 \texttt{c}c4 21.\texttt{xc}c4+ \texttt{xc}c4 22.\texttt{c}c3 \texttt{b}b8 23.\texttt{c}c1= Sobek – Bo lacky, Czech Republic 1999, Black will have to defend a difficult endgame with his bishop cramped on the g7-square. Following the inclusion of the moves 17...\texttt{d}d8 18.\texttt{g}g1, White should fight for the advantage in a similar fashion: in answer to 18...\texttt{c}c4, Groth – P.Toth, corr. 1999, he should better avoid the exchange of queens with 19.\texttt{d}d2?±, while after 18...\texttt{c}c4 19.\texttt{f}f2 b5, he should try to restrict the mobility of Black’s bishop with: 20.h3?! a6 21.\texttt{c}c1 \texttt{d}d6 22.e5 \texttt{c}c4 23.\texttt{e}e4\texttt{z} Taboada – Yaroshenko, corr. 1997.) 18.\texttt{d}d2! (After 18.\texttt{xc}c4+ \texttt{xc}c4, White must preserve his control over the d2-square, but it is unfavourable for him to retreat 19.\texttt{f}f4?!., since that move enables Black to play: 19...\texttt{f}f8! 20.\texttt{c}c1 \texttt{d}d2+ 21.\texttt{g}g1 \texttt{c}c4 22.\texttt{c}c7 \texttt{xd}d4 23.\texttt{xe}e7 \texttt{c}c3= and equalize completely practically by force. Therefore White’s only chance to maintain his advantage is to follow with the seemingly passive move – 19.\texttt{c}c1?! Its idea is that after: 19...\texttt{e}5 20.d5 \texttt{d}d6 21.\texttt{g}g3 \texttt{e}e8 22.\texttt{e}e3\texttt{z}, Black fails to activate his pieces, because of the vulnerability of his a7-pawn.) 18...\texttt{a}a6 19.\texttt{c}c2 \texttt{c}c4 (19...\texttt{c}c4?! 20.\texttt{c}c1\texttt{z}) 20.\texttt{b}b3
(20.\textit{f2} \textit{c8} 21.\textit{g1±} Luzuriaga – Soto, corr. 2002) 20...\textit{h8} 21.\textit{g1±} Heite – Kemp, corr. 1997.

Black sometimes tries to occupy the c4-square with his knight after a preliminary exchange of pawns in the centre. In this case there might follow: 15...\textit{cxd4} 16.\textit{cxd4} b5 (The same position can be reached after a different move order – 16...\textit{c4} 17.\textit{b3!} b5 18.\textit{g1}. The situations arising after: 16...\textit{e6} 17.\textit{d3} \textit{c4} 18.\textit{d2}, or 16...\textit{c6} 17.\textit{d3} \textit{c4} 18.\textit{d2}, have already been analyzed before – see the previous notes. It is obviously insufficient for Black to equalize with: 16...\textit{d8}!? 17.\textit{c1} \textit{c6} 18.\textit{b3}+ \textit{h8} 19.\textit{d5} \textit{e5}, Furnes – Havttum, corr. 1998 and here White could have established complete dominance over the light squares in the centre with 20.\textit{g1}+ followed by \textit{f4-e6}. In case of 16...\textit{g4}?! 17.\textit{d3} e5 18.\textit{d5} \textit{c8} 19.\textit{c1} \textit{xc1+} 20.\textit{xc1} b6, Black can hope to reach an acceptable position if he manages to accomplish the maneuver \textit{b7-d6}, but after 21.\textit{d6!} \textit{d7} 22.\textit{g1+} that idea becomes an illusion.) 17.\textit{g1}!? (White must run away with his king from the f-file as usual in the majority of similar positions.) 17...\textit{c4} 18.\textit{b3} a6 (in case of 18...\textit{h8}, Pantaleev – Kadrev, Sofia 1958, or 18...\textit{d8}, Kangasjaervi – Scribner, corr. 1995, White can proceed with his standard plan starting with 19.\textit{f1}!?, threaten-
gerous for him to play 24.\textit{ex}b5?!.

because of 24...\textit{eb}2!± and Black has the extremely unpleasant threat 25...\textit{eg}e3!) 18.\textit{eg}1 \textit{ef}7
19.\textit{ef}5 \textit{eh}8 20.\textit{eh}1±. There is an important point here that Black fails to occupy the c4 square with his knight with the move 20...

b5?!., because of 21.a4! \textit{eb}2 22.

\textit{ec}3 \textit{e}xa4 23.\textit{ec}3+--.

17.\textit{df}5!?  

White played worse in the game Jussupow – van Wely, Germany 1998. After 17.\textit{dxc}5 \textit{ed}8
18.\textit{exd}7 \textit{exd}7 19.\textit{eh}1 \textit{eb}2 20.

\textit{ec}1 \textit{e}a4± he failed to preserve

his material advantage.

17...\textit{eg}8  

Black’s bishop is trying to find

a new field of action because the

c1-h6 diagonal is closed for it
due to the presence of the white

pawn on g5.

van Wely recommended here – 17...b6, but after 18.\textit{eg}3 (18...

\textit{ed}6 19.\textit{eh}1 \textit{ec}8 20.a4 \textit{ef}7 21.

\textit{ec}3 \textit{ed}6 22.\textit{ed}3 c4 23.\textit{ed}1 \textit{eb}7

24.\textit{ea}2 \textit{ec}5 25.a5 b5 26.\textit{xc}5

\textit{xc}5 27.\textit{fh}1 a6 28.\textit{ee}3 \textit{ec}8

29.\textit{ff}2 \textit{ff}8 30.\textit{gg}4± Gaidot –

Dubois, corr. 1998) 18...\textit{ff}8 19.

\textit{gg}1± White manages to consoli-
date his position.

Now should Black choose 17...

\textit{gg}4, White plays 18.\textit{eg}3 \textit{exd}1+
19.\textit{exd}1 \textit{ff}8 20.a4 a6 21.\textit{aa}1± and

prevents Black’s counterplay on the light squares quite

successfully.

18.\textit{dd}3

The prophylactic move 18.a4

is only helping Black to organize

some active counterplay on the

queenside. After 18...\textit{aa}5!± with

the idea to push c5-c4 later, Black’s position is quite

acceptable.

18...\textit{aa}4 19.\textit{gg}1±

The arising position is comp-

lex enough, but White is better.

Black should have in mind that

White’s pieces can easily per-

enetrate along the f-file and the c8-
h3 diagonal.
White has a choice now whether to defend his pawn with the king a) 15.\( \text{g1} \), or start restricting Black’s bishop immediately with b) 15.\( \text{e5} \).

In case of 15.\( \text{a4} \) (with the idea to provoke the move b7-b6) Black can sacrifice a piece 15...\( \text{xh2} \)! (after 15...b6 White’s idea is justified as a result of 16.\( \text{g1} \) cxd4 17.cxd4 \( \text{e6} \) 18.d5 \( \text{xg4} \) 19.\( \text{e1} \) followed by 20.h3± and White preserves some edge. Black has also tried here 15...\( \text{a6} \), Kyeck – Kopylova, Kiel 2001 and White should better counter that with 16.\( \text{c2} \), preparing to run away from the pin with his king.) 16.\( \text{xa5} \) \( \text{f8} + \) and create a dangerous attack against the white king. There might follow 17.\( \text{e1} \) (White loses after 17.\( \text{f2} \)? due to 17...\( \text{h4} \) 18.g3 \( \text{h1} + \) 19.\( \text{g1} \) \( \text{h2} - + \) 17...\( \text{h1} + \) 18.\( \text{g1} \) (18.\( \text{g1} \) is too bad for White after 18...\( \text{h6} \)! 19.\( \text{xc5} \) \( \text{xg2} - + \) 18...\( \text{xg2} \)! (Black could also play 18...\( \text{h6} \), Oua-khir – Negi, Istanbul 2005, and after 19.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{f2} + \) 20.\( \text{d3} \) c4+! 21.\( \text{xc4} \) \( \text{xe3} \) 22.\( \text{d5} + \) \( \text{f8} \) 23.\( \text{d8} + \) \( \text{f7} \) 24.\( \text{d5} = \) that might lead to a draw by repetition of moves) 19.\( \text{b5} \) cxd4 (after 19...\( \text{h6} \) 20.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{g3} + \) 21.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{f2} \) 22.\( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{xe2} + \) 23.\( \text{xe2} \) \( \text{h3} \) 24.g5± as in the game Zaharov – Khenkin, USSR 1989 White was somewhat better) 20.cxd4 \( \text{xe4} \) 21.\( \text{e2} \) e6± and Black has an excellent compensation for the piece, because of the exposed position of the white king.

b1) 15.\( \text{g1} \) \( \text{e6} \)

Black is trying to get some counterplay on the light squares making use of the weak white pawns.

In case of 15...\( \text{d8} \) 16.g5 \( \text{e6} \) 17.\( \text{d3} \), the game transposes to positions that we have analyzed in Chapter 27.

Black often plays 15...cxd4 16.cxd4. Now, the only way for
him to reach original positions is to try 16...\textit{a}3 (in case of 16...
\textit{d}8, 16...\textit{f}8, or 16...\textit{d}7 it seems logical for White to restrict the mobility of Black's bishop with the move 17.g5!?±; if Black tries 16...e5 17.d5 \textit{c}4 18.f2 – see Chapter 30: 14...
\textit{d}4 15.\textit{d}x\textit{d} 16.\textit{g}1 \textit{d}6; the position after 15...\textit{d}4 16.\textit{d}4 \textit{e}6 17.\textit{d}3! is evaluated in favour of White and it will be analyzed in details in Chapter 29, variation a) 17.\textit{c}1 \textit{d}6, but White can counter that with: 18.\textit{d}3! (18.\textit{a}4 b5!? 19.\textit{d}1, Speikermann – Paris, St Ingbert 1987, 19...e5!?) 18...\textit{c}8 (Now, it is too bad for Black to play 18...
e5?, because of 19.\textit{d}2 \textit{c}6 20.\textit{b}3++; after 18...\textit{d}8 19.e3± the vulnerability of Black's a7-pawn might become a telling factor in the future) 19.a3 \textit{e}6 20.\textit{g}5± and White still has some edge.

All the other possibilities for Black do not seem to be convincing at all:

It is evidently bad for him to try: 15...\textit{d}7?! , because that is in fact a loss of a tempo in comparison with the variations that we have analyzed in Chapter 27. After 16.g5 \textit{d}4 17.\textit{d}4 \textit{c}4 18.\textit{b}3 \textit{c}8, Comp “Pepito” – Comp “Sjeng”, Brussels 2002, the most logical line for White seems to be 19.\textit{f}1 with the idea to follow with 20.d5±;

It is also not advisable for Black to follow with 15...\textit{h}8?!,

due to 16.\textit{d}5! \textit{e}6 17.\textit{d}4 \textit{c}6 18.\textit{x}g7+ \textit{xe}g7 19.\textit{d}4 \textit{xe}4 20.\textit{d}6 \textit{c}6 21.\textit{d}4+ \textit{g}8 22.\textit{e}1± Kuba – Henry, California 1993;

In answer to 15...\textit{f}8, analogously to the previous variation, White should continue with: 16.\textit{d}5!? \textit{a}6 17.g5± and there arises a position, which we have already dealt with after the move 14...\textit{b}6 in our Chapter 27.

16.\textit{d}3!?

White protects his e4 pawn and consolidates.

The other possibility for White – 16.\textit{g}3 is less promising, mostly because of 16...\textit{c}4! (It is also quite acceptable for Black to follow with: 16...\textit{d}4 17.\textit{d}4 \textit{d}8 and that transposes to lines from Chapter 29, variation a.) 17.\textit{d}2 (17.\textit{e}2? \textit{xc}3 18.\textit{c}1 \textit{xe}3+! 19.\textit{xe}3 \textit{xd}4++) 17...\textit{d}8!? (It is evidently enough for Black to maintain the balance with 17...\textit{a}6, because after 18.\textit{d}5 \textit{c}4 19.\textit{e}2 \textit{xe}3 20.\textit{xe}3 \textit{d}8 White has won a second pawn indeed, but he has numerous weaknesses in his camp and in case of 18.\textit{e}2, Puth
Black wants to swap queens and this is the best way to find counterplay.

The exchange 16...cxd4 17. cxd4 transposes to lines from Chapter 29, variation a.

In case Black restores the material balance with: 16...\textit{xcg}4 17.\textit{xf}1 \textit{xd}8, as it was played in the game Llanos – C.Amura, Buenos Aires 1992, then after 18.\textit{f}4!!± White maintains better prospects due to the vulnerability of the light squares in Black’s position.

Concerning a subject that will be discussed in details later, I would like to mention a very important moment here: after the c-pawns have been exchanged Black’s attempt to go into an endgame with 17...\textit{xc}4 can be safely avoided by White with: 18.\textit{d}2! (Now, Black’s knight on a5 will be hanging in some lines.) 18...\textit{a}6 19.\textit{c}2±.

17.\textit{xc}4+

White has nothing better but exchange queens.

Here, Black can counter 17.\textit{d}2 with 17...\textit{e}6! (17...\textit{cxd}4 18.\textit{cxd}4 \textit{a}6 19.\textit{c}2±) and that is a motive, which would not be avaible for Black in case of a preliminary exchange of the c-pawns, because of the defenselessness of his knight on a5.

Now if White does not wish to retreat the queen back to d3 and plays for example 18.\textit{c}2, Black can equalize with 18...cxd4 19.cxd4 \textit{xg}4=.

- Hoegerl, Wittlich 1997, Black can play 18...\textit{xe}2! 19.\textit{xe}2 \textit{c}4, transposing to positions from the main line in our text – see 16.\textit{d}3 \textit{c}4 17.\textit{xc}4 \textit{x}4c. 18.\textit{c}1 (After 18.\textit{d}1 \textit{a}4 Black succeeded in creating a powerful pressure against White’s d4-pawn; following 18.\textit{f}2 cxd4 19. cxd4 \textit{xd}4 20.\textit{xa}5 \textit{xf}2+ 21. \textit{xf}2 \textit{d}4+ 22.\textit{e}2 \textit{b}2+ 23.\textit{e}3 \textit{d}4+ 24.\textit{e}2 \textit{b}2= the game ended in a draw by a perpetual) 18...cxd4 (in answer to 18...\textit{a}4, White must play 19.\textit{d}5∞ – as it was recommended by GM Krasenkow, because after: 19.\textit{h}6?! \textit{h}6 20.\textit{xh}6 cxd4 21.\textit{h}5 \textit{g}xh5 22.\textit{g}5+, A.Graf – Macieja, Ohrid 2001, Black could have played 22...\textit{f}8! 23.\textit{f}5+ \textit{e}8 24.\textit{xh}5+ \textit{d}7 25.\textit{f}5+ \textit{e}6 26. \textit{f}7+ \textit{d}6= and the black king would have run successfully from the chase of the white queen) 19.cxd4 \textit{a}4 20.\textit{d}1 (after 20.\textit{f}2 \textit{xd}4 21.\textit{xd}4, Lundstrom – Onnela, corr. 1991, Black could have reached a superior endgame by playing: 21...\textit{xd}4+ 22.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4=) 20...\textit{a}3 21.\textit{d}2 (in case of 21.\textit{g}5 \textit{xd}4+ 22.\textit{h}1 \textit{c}6= Comp “The Baron” – Comp “Goliath Light”, Le Loce 2002, or 21.\textit{f}1 \textit{xd}4 22.\textit{xd}4 \textit{d}6= Comp “Hagrid” – Comp “Knight X”, Le Loce 2002 Black’s position is better) 21...\textit{xe}3+ 22. \textit{xe}3 \textit{xd}4= and it is only White who should worry about maintaining equality.

16...\textit{c}4!
17...\(\Boxxc4\) 18.\(\Boxxf2\)

White players have tried plenty of times to preserve the bishop on the c1-h6 diagonal with 18.\(\Boxxg5\). White must take into consideration the move 18...e5!? (after 18...\(\Boxxd4\) 19.\(\Boxxd4\) e5 20.\(\Boxxe5\)! \(\Boxxe5\) 21.\(\Boxxd1\) \(\Boxxd6\) in the game Hertneck – Holzke, Germany 2002, White could have played 22.\(\Boxxf6\)!? \(\Boxxf6\) 23.\(\Boxxd6\) \(\Boxxg7\) 24.\(\Boxxf2\)\(\pm\) with a clearly better endgame; while in case of 18...h6, White should probably choose the line: 19.\(\Boxxc1\)! \(\Boxxd8\) 20.e5 b5 21.g5\(\pm\) Roque Fuentes – Fedorko, corr. 2001, because the move 19.\(\Boxxe7\), after 19...\(\Boxxe8\)! 20.\(\Boxxc5\) b6 21.\(\Boxxb6\) axb6 22.e5∞ leads to a quite unclear position with a non-standard material ratio, Dyer – McGowan, corr. 1992) 19.d5 (in case of 19.\(\Boxxe5\) \(\Boxxe5\) 20.\(\Boxxd1\) \(\Boxxe8\) 21.\(\Boxxd7\) \(\Boxxd6\)= the white pawns are a sorry sight and become an easy target for the black pieces) 22...b5 20.\(\Boxxb1\) \(\Boxxb8\) 21.a4 (after 21.\(\Boxxf2\) a5 22.\(\Boxxc1\) h6 23.\(\Boxxe3\) in the game Lputian – C. Hansen, Dortmund 1988 playing 23...\(\Boxxd6\)! 24.\(\Boxxf3\) \(\Boxxf8\)+ 25.\(\Boxxe2\) c4\(\pm\) Black could have achieved an excellent game, since White’s e4-pawn was very weak) 21...a6 22.axb5 axb5 23.\(\Boxxf2\) \(\Boxxf8\)= and Black is at least equal. White’s e4-pawn needs protection and Black’s threat to create a passed b-pawn is disrupting the coordination of White’s pieces.

18...\(\Boxxd4\)

Black was usually choosing the move 18...e5 in some games between computers. After 19.\(\Boxxd6\) (in case of 19...b6, it is logical for White to play 20.g5!!= in order to close the c1-h6 diagonal for Black’s bishop.) 20.\(\Boxxd3\) b6 you can see that the arising positions are quite different than those we have analyzed in our previous notes. Thanks to the presence of White’s bishop on the a7-g1 diagonal, Black’s c5-pawn remains under pressure and he cannot create easily a passed pawn on the queenside. There has been played in practice: 21.\(\Boxxe3\) \(\Boxxf8\) 22.\(\Boxxf1\) \(\Boxxf6\) 23.g5\(\pm\) with an advantage for White, Comp “Mephisto” – Comp “Junior”, Internet 1995.

After 18...\(\Boxxd2\) 19.e5 \(\Boxxc8\) (in case of 19...e6 20.\(\Boxxd1\) \(\Boxxe4\) Black’s knight becomes endangered and as a result of 21.\(\Boxxe3\) \(\Boxxc8\) 22.\(\Boxxc1\) b5 23.g3 \(\Boxxd4\) 24.\(\Boxxd4\) \(\Boxxc1\)+ 25.\(\Boxxc1\) b4 26.\(\Boxxg2\) \(\Boxxf8\) 27.\(\Boxxf3\) \(\Boxxc3\) 28.\(\Boxxc3\) bxc3 29.\(\Boxxe4\)+ Comp “The Crazy Bishop” – Comp “Crafty”, Szalai 1999, there arose a position in which White’s advantage would have been probably quite sufficient for him to win in a game between human players.) 20.\(\Boxxe3\) \(\Boxxc4\) 21.\(\Boxxf4\) b5 22.\(\Boxxc1\) a6 23.\(\Boxxf2\) e6 24.\(\Boxxf3\) \(\Boxxf8\) 25.g5\(\pm\) and Black’s bishop got trapped like in a sack in the game Gehret – Kosmol, corr. 2001.

19.\(\Boxxd4\) e5

Black fixes the weak white
pawn on e4 and prevents the standard plan of White to play e4-e5 and g4-g5 in order to restrict the mobility of the black bishop. If Black tries to organize some immediate action on the queenside with 19...b5 20.\(\text{b1}\) A.Karpov and I.Zaitsev evaluate the position in favour of White.

Following 19...\(\text{d2}\) 20.e5!? \(\text{c8}\) 21.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{c2}\) 22.\(\text{xc1}\) \(\text{xc1+}\) 23.\(\text{xc1}\) \(\text{c4}\) 24.\(\text{g5}\) e6 25.\(\text{d3}\) in the game Olsen – Brinck-Claussen, Copenhagen 1998, there arose a quite typical light pieces endgame for the line with the move 12.\(\text{xf7}\) +.

20.d5

White now has to refrain from 20.\(\text{c1}\), because of the weakness of the e4 pawn, since Black can answer that with 20...\(\text{d6}\) 21.\(\text{dxe5}\) \(\text{exe5}\)= with equality (analysis of A.Karpov and I.Zaitsev).

20...\(\text{d6}\)!

Black puts the e4-pawn under pressure immediately.

After 20...\(\text{h6}\) 21.\(\text{h4}\)!! (It is too slow for White to play here 21.\(\text{d1}\) and as a result of 21...\(\text{d6}\)! 22.\(\text{g3}\) b6 23.\(\text{h4}\) \(\text{c8}\) 24.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{f8}\) 25.\(\text{e1}\) \(\text{c4}\) Black can eas-

ily organize an effective counterplay against White’s e4-pawn, Brueckel – Espindola, corr. 2002. In case of 21.\(\text{b1}\) b6 22.\(\text{h4}\) as in the game Makharadze – Kvirianshvili, Tbilisi 1998 Black could have played 22...\(\text{d2}\)! 23.\(\text{b4}\) \(\text{f8}\) 24.\(\text{a4}\) b5 25.\(\text{xa7}\) \(\text{xa7}\) 26.\(\text{xa7}\) \(\text{exe4}\) 27.\(\text{b8}\) \(\text{f6}\) 28.\(\text{exe5}\) \(\text{xd5}\) and the position has been simplified so much that White will hardly be able to win with his extra doubled pawn) 21...\(\text{d2}\) 22.\(\text{d1}\) b5 (in case of 22...\(\text{a5}\) 23.\(\text{c1}\) b5 24.\(\text{c2}\) \(\text{d6}\) 25.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{c4}\), White can follow with 26.\(\text{f1}\) \(\text{d6}\) 27.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{c4}\) 28.\(\text{g5}\) A.Karpov – Kasparov, Sevilla (m/11) 1987, as well as with 26.\(\text{g5}\), which is even more precise, because after 26...\(\text{a6}\) 27.\(\text{f1}\) \(\text{f7}\) 28.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{d6}\) 29.\(\text{g4}\) \(\text{Krivonosovs – Megier, corr. 1990}, as well as after: 27.\(\text{f1}\) a6 28.\(\text{e2}\) \(\text{f8}\) 29.\(\text{e1}\) \(\text{f8}\) 30.\(\text{h2}\) \(\text{b4}\) 31.a4 \(\text{f4}\) 32.\(\text{d3}\) \(\text{d7}\) 33.\(\text{axb5}\) axb5 34.\(\text{a2}\) – Seipel – Bernal, corr. 2001. White maintains an obvious advantage.) 23.\(\text{c1}\) a5 (The exchange 23...\(\text{xc1}\) 24.\(\text{xc1}\) \(\text{d6}\), De Oliveira – Ramos, corr. 1995, renders the placement of Black’s knight on d6 quite unstable and White can emphasize that with the line: 25.\(\text{e1}\) a6 26.\(\text{c5}\) \(\text{c4}\) 27.\(\text{d1}\) \(\text{c8}\) 28.\(\text{h7}\) 24.\(\text{d3}\) \(\text{c3}\) (24...\(\text{e8}\) 25.\(\text{c5}\) \(\text{d8}\) 26.\(\text{e6}\) – Vernersson – Carlhammar, Sweden 1993.) 25.\(\text{c5}\) (in case of 25.\(\text{c5}\) \(\text{d6}\), White must worry about his vulnerable e4-pawn) 25...b4 (Black should not post-
pone his queenside counterplay, because after the passive move 25...\textit{E}c8, Cardelli – Simonenko, corr. 2001, White can follow with the simple 26.\textit{f}f2\textit{=d}+ 26.\textit{h}f2 (26.\textit{g}5?!?) 26...\textit{c}d2 27.\textit{e}e3 \textit{b}3 28.axb3 \textit{x}xb3, Cardelli – Kosebay, corr. 2001 and here White would have preserved some edge with the move 29.\textit{a}3\textit{=}.

\textbf{21.\textit{g}3 \textit{h}6}

Black prevents the move \textit{g}4-\textit{g}5 and deprives White’s rook from the c1-square.

\textbf{22.\textit{c}5}

The other possibility 22.\textit{e}1 might be even better, but even then after 22...\textit{b}6 23.\textit{e}3 (23.h4 \textit{f}4 24.\textit{f}1 \textit{c}8\textit{=}?) 23...\textit{xe}3 24.\textit{xe}3 \textit{c}8 25.\textit{f}2 a5 26.g5 \textit{b}5\textit{=} Black has a full compensation for the pawn.

\textbf{22...\textit{c}4 23.h4}

White has also tried in practice: 23.\textit{b}1 \textit{b}6 24.\textit{b}4 \textit{c}8 (It is worse for Black to play here 24...\textit{e}3+?!), because after 25.\textit{f}1 \textit{c}5 26.\textit{e}2 \textit{xb}4 27.\textit{xb}4 \textit{d}6 28.\textit{d}3\textit{=} Verschuuren – Rawlings, corr. 1992, White would have managed to centralize his king.) 25.h3 \textit{e}3 26.\textit{d}6 \textit{c}2 27.\textit{xe}5 \textit{xg}2\textit{=} 28.\textit{h}1 \textit{xa}2 29.\textit{c}1 \textit{c}2 30.\textit{xc}2 \textit{xc}2 31.\textit{e}2, Herbst – Conナー, corr. 1997 and here Black should have played 31...\textit{b}5!\textit{=} in order to set his passed pawns in motion.

\textbf{23...\textit{c}8!}

Black can leave now his \textit{a}7-pawn unprotected for a while.

The move 23...\textit{b}6 turned out to be a loss of time after: 24.\textit{f}2 \textit{d}2 25.\textit{f}1 \textit{b}4 26.\textit{c}1 \textit{d}6 27.\textit{g}3 \textit{c}8 28.\textit{xc}8+ \textit{xc}8 29.\textit{f}1\textit{=}, because White maintained some advantage in a light pieces endgame, Vernersson – Engsner, corr. 1992.

\textbf{24.\textit{f}2}

Should White capture a second pawn with 24.\textit{xa}7?!?, after 24...\textit{b}6 25.\textit{g}5 \textit{f}8 26.\textit{c}1 \textit{a}3 27.\textit{c}3 \textit{b}4 28.\textit{c}2 \textit{c}5+ 29.\textit{h}1 \textit{e}3 30.\textit{c}3 \textit{a}8\textit{=} he will have to give the exchange in order to free his bishop from captivity.

\textbf{24...\textit{f}4 25.\textit{e}2}

Following 25.\textit{f}1 \textit{d}6 26.\textit{xa}7 \textit{xe}4 27.\textit{e}3 \textit{c}3 28.\textit{g}3 \textit{xe}3+ 29.\textit{xe}3 \textit{c}5= Black restores the material equality, Semmelroth – Henk, corr. 1996.

\textbf{25...\textit{d}2 26.\textit{d}1 \textit{a}5\textit{=} }

\begin{center}
\textbf{Diagram:}
\end{center}

The game Naumkin – Neve-
rov, Moscow 1989 reached that position. It became clear later that Black had an excellent compensation for the pawn.

\textbf{b) 15.e5?!}

White is not losing time to retreat with his king and tries to deprive the black bishop from
good prospects along the a1-h8 diagonal.

15...\textit{\textbf{\textbf{d5}}}

15...\textit{\textbf{\textbf{e6}}} is less precise due to 16.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{f4}}}! (After 16.h3 \textit{\textbf{c4}} 17.\textit{\textbf{d3}} \textit{\textbf{d8}} 18.\textit{\textbf{e4}} \textit{\textbf{c6}}! 19.\textit{\textbf{xc6}} \textit{\textbf{xe3+}} 20.\textit{\textbf{f2}} \textit{\textbf{xg4+}} 21.hxg4 \textit{\textbf{bxc6}} 22.\textit{\textbf{gb1}} \textit{\textbf{xd4}} 23.\textit{\textbf{xd4}} c5 24.\textit{\textbf{e3}} \textit{\textbf{xd4+}} 25.\textit{\textbf{xd4}} which was played in the game Makarov – Hodko, USSR 1988 Black could play 25...\textit{\textbf{c8}}! 26.\textit{\textbf{b7}} \textit{\textbf{xe5=}} and equalize easily, while after 16.\textit{\textbf{g1}} \textit{\textbf{yg4}} 17.\textit{\textbf{d3}} \textit{\textbf{e6}} 18.\textit{\textbf{g5}} \textit{\textbf{f8}} 19.h3 \textit{\textbf{cxd4}} 20.\textit{\textbf{cxd4}} \textit{\textbf{xe5}}!? 21.\textit{\textbf{dxe5}} \textit{\textbf{xe5}} 22.\textit{\textbf{c1}}! \textit{\textbf{xa1}} 23.\textit{\textbf{d5+ e6}} 24.\textit{\textbf{xa5}} \textit{\textbf{c8}} 25.\textit{\textbf{d2}} as in the game L.Hansen – Fercec, Aosta 1989 the position was very sharp with mutual chances. 16.g5 – see Chapter 27, 14...\textit{\textbf{d7}} 15.g5 \textit{\textbf{e6}} 16.e5.) 16...\textit{\textbf{c4+}} (The pin 16...\textit{\textbf{f8}} is not dangerous due to 17.\textit{\textbf{g1}}) 17.\textit{\textbf{e2}}! (the careless 17.\textit{\textbf{d3?}} enabled Black after 17...g5 18.\textit{\textbf{xc4+}} \textit{\textbf{xc4+}} to win a piece) 17...g5, Salmi – Salokangas, corr. 1989 (17...\textit{\textbf{f8}} 18.\textit{\textbf{xc4+!}} \textit{\textbf{xc4}} 19.\textit{\textbf{e2}}) 18.\textit{\textbf{d3}} \textit{\textbf{f8+}} 19.\textit{\textbf{f2}} with an advantage for White.

It is not so logical for Black to play here 15...\textit{\textbf{c7}}, Razafison – Natale, Tarbes 2003, because it is quite clear that Black should strive to block White’s pawns on the light squares. In that case White should consider at first the prophylactic move 16.\textit{\textbf{g1}}!\textit{±} and only then he should proceed with the typical plan in similar positions to follow with g4-g5 in order to restrict the mobility of Black’s bishop.

In case of 15...\textit{\textbf{d5}}+ 16.\textit{\textbf{g1}} \textit{\textbf{d5}} (16...\textit{\textbf{e6}} 17.\textit{\textbf{f4+}}) 17.\textit{\textbf{f2}}, after some transposition of moves, there arises a position from variation \textit{\textbf{b1a}}, in which White preserves some chances to obtain the advantage.

Following 15...\textit{\textbf{d5}}, White has two possibilities to fight for the opening edge: \textit{\textbf{b1}}) 16.\textit{\textbf{f2}} and \textit{\textbf{b2}) 16.g5}.

The move 16.\textit{\textbf{f4?}} is bad, because after 16...\textit{\textbf{f8}} 17.\textit{\textbf{g1}} Black has the powerful answer 17...\textit{\textbf{e4}}!. Later after 18.\textit{\textbf{xf3}} \textit{\textbf{xf3}} 19.gxf3 \textit{\textbf{h6}} 20.\textit{\textbf{d5}} \textit{\textbf{xe3+}} 21.\textit{\textbf{xe3}} \textit{\textbf{xf3}} (21...\textit{\textbf{cxd4}} 22.\textit{\textbf{xd4}} \textit{\textbf{c6=}} Lytchak – Asrian, Leningrad 1990) 22.\textit{\textbf{e1}} \textit{\textbf{xd4}} 23.\textit{\textbf{cxd4}} \textit{\textbf{c6}} 24.\textit{\textbf{c2}} (24.d5 \textit{\textbf{xe5}} 25.\textit{\textbf{f5}} \textit{\textbf{xf5}} 26.gxf5 \textit{\textbf{d3+}} 27.\textit{\textbf{f2}} \textit{\textbf{xe1+}} Tavares Perez – Sahelices Casado, Spain 2000) 24...\textit{\textbf{e3}} 25.\textit{\textbf{e2}} \textit{\textbf{d3+}} and White’s position is hopeless, L.Gustafsson – Lacunza, corr. 1998.

After 16.\textit{\textbf{g1}} \textit{\textbf{d8}}!? (it is not favourable for Black to reduce the pawn tension in the centre with – 16...\textit{\textbf{xd4}}? 17.\textit{\textbf{cxd4}} \textit{\textbf{d8}}
18.\text{f}c2 \text{d}c6 19.\text{f}f1\pm Hanzl – Adamek, Neratovice 1992; after 16...\text{c}4 17.\text{f}2, in case of 17...
\text{f}8 18.g5 \text{f}7 19.\text{f}f1 – see 16.
\text{f}f2 \text{f}8 17.\text{g}1 \text{c}4 18.g5 \text{f}7
19.\text{f}f1!, while after 17...\text{h}6, White has the powerful argument – 18.dxc5!± P.Richard –
Kordts, corr. 1999) 17.\text{c}2 (after
17.\text{f}4, Damaso – R.Pinochet,
corr. 1995, 17...\text{c}4!\text{c}4 White’s
pieces are not stable at all)
17...\text{c}4 (17...\text{c}8 18.\text{f}4 \text{c}4
19.\text{c}1 \text{c}6 20.\text{b}2 \text{f}5 21.\text{c}1
\text{f}8 22.h4 b6 23.\text{c}2± Sanchiz –
\text{g}5 (18.\text{f}4 \text{f}8 Effatian –
Peyrou, Tehran 1991) Black
plays 18...h6! (if Black tries to
sacrifice a piece temporarily with
– 18...cxd4? 19.cxd4 \text{xe}5 20.
dxe5 \text{xe}5 and solve his problems
like that – disaster comes swiftly after 21.\text{b}3+! because
Black’s king cannot retreat to
the corner due to a1-d1, and the
move 21...e6 is not saving him
because of 22.\text{d}8 \text{xa}1+ 23.
\text{f}2 \text{d}4+ 24.\text{f}3 \text{f}1+ 25.\text{e}4
\text{xe}2+ 26.\text{x}d4 \text{d}2+ 27.\text{d}3
e5+ 28.\text{d}4+ – V.Golod – Al-
brecht, Berlin 1994) 19.\text{c}1 g5!∞
when Black sends back White’s
active pieces.

b1) 16.\text{f}2

(diagram)

Black has two main answers:
b1a) 16...\text{f}8 and b1b) 16...\text{d}8.

The other possible rook
moves are clearly worse, for
example: 16...\text{e}8?? loses immedi-
ately due to: 17.\text{a}4 b6 18.\text{xe}8+
Warfield – Brewer, corr. 1993. In
answer to 16...\text{c}8?! Boudreaux –
Leveille, corr. 1989, it is strong
for White to follow with: 17.\text{f}4!
\text{f}7 (in order not to let White’s
knight to the e6-square) 18.\text{f}3
\text{f}8 19.\text{d}5!± and White main-
tains a clear advantage.

The exchange of the pawns
16...cxd4?! 17.cxd4 is usually in
favour of White – he has the ad-
ditional possibility to place his
knight on the e4-square via c3.
For example: 17...\text{c}8 (or 17...
\text{c}4 18.\text{g}1 \text{f}8 19.\text{c}3 \text{f}7 20.
\text{e}4 \text{d}5 21.\text{e}2 \text{f}4 22.\text{e}1±
Fecht – C.Johansson, corr. 1988;
in case of 17...\text{d}8 18.\text{a}4 \text{f}8,
Vingre – Lamole, corr. 1989, it
is reasonable for White to play
19.\text{g}1 in order to take his king
away from the juxtaposition with
the black rook) 18.\text{g}1 b6 19.h3
\text{e}4 20.\text{g}3 \text{c}2 21.\text{f}3 \text{c}4 22.
\text{e}2± Cranbourne – Sande, corr.
1999.

Here is one more example illu-
strating the same theme:
16...\text{e}4?! 17.\text{g}3 \text{f}4 18.\text{g}1
\text{f}8 19.\text{e}2 cxd4 20.cxd4 \text{f}7 21.
\text{f}1 \text{d}5 22.\text{c}1± Wijesundara –
b1a) 16...Af8 17.®g1

This is a useful prophylactic move.

After 17.g5, the fact that White has failed to evacuate his king away from the f-file should make him worry about the possibility – 17...Af7!? (the immediate 17...Cd4?! is weaker, because of 18.®g1 e4 19.®g3 Af4 20.e2± the black bishop is out of play and White’s knight goes to the dominant e4-square) 18.®e1 and now Black’s knight joins the action forcefully – 18...Cd4! (After I.Zaitsev’s recommendation 18...Cd6 White can play 19.Bb1! b6 20.Bb2±, and after 18...h6 19.gxh6 hxh6 20.®g1 Cd4 21.®g3 d2 22.®e2 xc3 23.Cf1± as in the game A.Kuzmin – Khenkin, Moscow 1989 White manages to preserve some edge; in case of 18...Bf5 19.h4, it is too slow for Black to play 19...Cd4, because of 20.®g1 e4 21.®g3 xh4 22.f5 xg5 23.xg7 xg7 24.h4± Comp “Nimzo” – Comp “Hiarcs”, 1997; and finally after 19...h6 20.®g1 hxg5 as in the game Kallai – Gavrikov, Mazatlan 1988 White could have played 21.®g3! ®g4 22.hxg5± and get some advantage too). There might follow 19.®g3 (After 19.®g1 a3!? or 19.®g1 a3! 20.®e2 b5!? Black has good counterplay) 19...b2 20.®e4 d3 21.®d2 (if 21.®e3 ®xf2 22.®xf2 as in the game A.Kuzmin – Malishauskas, Podolsk 1989, Black had 22...Cc4+?! 23.®g1 ®d8 with the idea to answer 24.dxc5 with 24...®d5± and fight for the advantage) 21...®xf2 (21...®f4 is less precise due to 22.®e1±) 22.®xf2 ®d8 (after 22...®f4 23.®xf4 ®xf4 24.®d1± it becomes obvious that the black bishop is quite restricted by the white pawns on e5 and g5) 23.®b2 cxd4 24.cxd4 b6 (Black can also equalize with 24...®c4+ 25.®g1 xd4 26.®xb7 ®xe5 27.®xe7 ®e2=) 25.®g1 ®f4 26.®d1 ®xg5 27.®e2= and the chances are equal.

17...®h6

Black is trying to bring his bishop into action, before it has been restricted by White with the move g4-g5.

Following 17...Cd4, White can play 18.g5!? ®f7 and thanks to the fact that his king is not placed on the f-file anymore, he can continue with: 19.®f1! (the line 19.®e1 would not work, because of 19...a3!=) Cranbourne – Teichmeister, corr. 1999; after 19.®g3 ®e3 White loses in case of 20.®b3?? due to 20...c4 21.e6 ®f1= Small – Stuart, New Zealand 1992, while after 20.®c1 Black follows with: 20...®xg2! 21.®f1 ®e3 22.®xf7+ ®xf7∞ Sveinsson – D.Belov, corr. 2002 and he restores the material balance) and Black still has serious problems. For example: 19...®d5 (White plans to continue with 20.®g3 and Black’s queen cannot retreat from the f-file, because in answer to 19...®e8?!
White can continue with 20. \( \text{Qf4}! \) and the defenselessness of Black's knight on the c4-square becomes a decisive factor.) 20. \( \text{Qc1} \) \( \text{Qf7} \) 21. \( \text{Qg3} \) and White can gradually consolidate his position, while Black's bishop is bound to remain out of action for a long time.

After 17...\( \text{Qf7} \) and 18.\( \text{Qh4} \) \( \text{Qc4} \), Boensh – Lhagvasuren, Novi Sad 1990, White can proceed with: 19.\( \text{Qd3} \)? b5 20.\( \text{Qf3} \) and he maintains his advantage.

**18.\( \text{Qh4}! \)**

White is trying to prepare g4-g5 and paralyse Black's bishop on the kingside.

White tried another possibility 18.\( \text{Qxc5} \) \( \text{Qxe5} \) 19.\( \text{Qd3} \) in the game Razuvaev – D. Andersen, Dortmund 1992, which lead to an unclear position.

**18...\( \text{Qf7} \)**

This is the only way for Black's bishop to enter the actions. After 18...\( \text{Qc4} \)?! 19.\( \text{Qg5} \) \( \text{Qg7} \) 20.\( \text{Qb3} \) \( \text{xc4} \) 21.\( \text{Qxd4} \) b5, Restifa – Gimenez, Argentina 1990, it is going to be restricted permanently. White only needs to redeploy his knight to the e4-square and the simplest way to do that is: 22.a4!? a6 23.\( \text{axb5} \) \( \text{axb5} \) 24.\( \text{Qc3} \) \( \text{Qf7} \) 25.\( \text{Qa2} \) b4 26.\( \text{Qe4} \).

**19.\( \text{Qg3} \) \( \text{Qe3} \)!”**

Black prevents the move 21.\( \text{Qd3} \).

(diagram)

**21.\( \text{Qxc5} \)!**

That's White's only chance to fight for an advantage. Black's bishop is now away from the kingside and White wishes to make use of that circumstance.

21.\( d5 \) was not good because of 21...\( \text{Qg4} \) 22.d6 and now after 22...\( \text{Qf2} \)! 23.\( \text{Qxe7} \) \( \text{Qg3} \) 24.\( \text{Qxg3} \) \( \text{Qh4} \) 25.\( \text{Qg1} \) \( \text{Qxe7} \) (analysis of I. Zaitsev) White was lost.

After 21.\( \text{Qb1} \) b6 (but not 21...\( \text{Qxa2} \)? due to 22.\( \text{Qa1} \) \( \text{Qb3} \) 23.\( \text{Qd3} \) \( \text{Qc4} \) 24.\( \text{Qb1} \) \( \text{Qa2} \) 25.\( \text{Qxh4} \) the theoretical recommendations are utterly wrong: 22.\( \text{Qb2} \) (I. Zaitsev recommended 22.\( \text{Qxc5} \)!, but Black can use the motive of the temporary defenseless a2-pawn to his advantage with 22...\( \text{Qxc5} \)!

23.\( \text{Qd4} \) \( \text{Qxa2} \) 24.h5, Moraes – Maia, corr. 1988, 24...\( \text{Qxd4} \)! 25.\( \text{Qxd4} \) \( \text{Qc4} \) and obtain a superior game. Now, White's best move is obviously 22.a4, De Winter – Ruiz, Mexico 1995, but even then he has no advantage, because after 22...\( \text{Qd8} \) it is not clear how he can avoid the pin easily.) 22...\( \text{Qd5} \)!! (22...\( \text{Qc6} \)?! C. Pedersen – H. Kristensen, corr. 1992, 23.\( \text{Qb1} \)!! \( \text{Qxd4} \) 24.\( \text{Qxd4} \) \( \text{Qd5} \) 25.\( \text{Qb5} \) \( \text{Qc4} \) 26.\( \text{Qb3} \) \( \text{Qxb3} \) 27.\( \text{Qxb3} \) the lines have been analyzed by
G. Kasparov, Black is preparing 25...\( \text{\textbf{f}}2 \), since to play that move immediately 24...\( \text{\textbf{f}}2 \) would not have worked due to 25.\( \text{\textbf{f}}4 \). In the game Karpov – Kasparov, Seville (m/5) 1987 Black played 24...b5, but White could have achieved a draw outright with a line analyzed by GM I. Zaitzev: 25.\( \text{\textbf{x}}b5 \text{\textbf{xe}}5 26.\( \text{\textbf{xc}}5 \text{\textbf{g}}4+ 27.\( \text{\textbf{h}}3 \text{\textbf{d}}7 28.\( \text{\textbf{c}}4+ \text{\textbf{g}}7 29. \text{\textbf{d}}5 \text{\textbf{f}}2 + 30. \text{\textbf{h}}2 \text{\textbf{g}}4 = \). White has problems now and quite serious at that. See some examples: 25.\( \text{\textbf{d}}1 \) (25.h5?? \( \text{\textbf{f}}2 \) – Dueben – Christ, corr. 1998) 25...gxh4 (here the move 25...\( \text{\textbf{f}}2 \), after 26.\( \text{\textbf{d}}5 \text{\textbf{c}}5 \), D’Arruda – Ham, corr. 1994, would enable White to make a draw with the help of the line: 27.\( \text{\textbf{xf}}2 \text{\textbf{xf}}2 28. \text{\textbf{d}}8+ \text{\textbf{f}}8 29.\( \text{\textbf{d}}5+ \text{\textbf{xd}}5 30. \text{\textbf{xd}}5 \text{\textbf{e}}3 31.\( \text{\textbf{d}}7 \) =) 26.\( \text{\textbf{h}}4 \text{\textbf{f}}2 \) (now is the moment!) 27.\( \text{\textbf{h}}3 \) (27.\( \text{\textbf{g}}5 \text{\textbf{b}}2 28.\( \text{\textbf{c}}2 \text{\textbf{xd}}1 29. \text{\textbf{xd}}1 \text{\textbf{e}}4 – Djubek – Soucek, corr. 1989) 27...\( \text{\textbf{e}}4 28.\( \text{\textbf{xe}}7 \) (after 28.\( \text{\textbf{g}}3 \text{\textbf{f}}4 29.\( \text{\textbf{h}}1 \text{\textbf{e}}3 30.\( \text{\textbf{a}}1 \text{\textbf{xd}}4 \) – Dijksman – Fedorko, corr. 1999, White lost his all-important d4-pawn) 28...\text{\textbf{ff}}7! (It seems now that Black can win a piece with: 28...\( \text{\textbf{xe}}2 29.\( \text{\textbf{h}}6 \text{\textbf{f}}7 30.\( \text{\textbf{g}}5+ \text{\textbf{g}}7 \), but then White can manage to save the day in an almost unbelievable fashion: 31.\( \text{\textbf{f}}4 \)!! \( \text{\textbf{xe}}7 32.\( \text{\textbf{g}}5+ \text{\textbf{f}}8 33.\( \text{\textbf{f}}6+ \text{\textbf{e}}8 34.\( \text{\textbf{c}}6+ \text{\textbf{d}}7 35.\( \text{\textbf{e}}5 36. \text{\textbf{xd}}7 + \text{\textbf{xd}}7 37.\( \text{\textbf{xf}}3 \text{\textbf{xf}}3 38. \text{\textbf{gxf}}3 =) 29.\( \text{\textbf{f}}6 \text{\textbf{e}}3 30.\( \text{\textbf{g}}5 \text{\textbf{g}}4+ \) (The following line leads to a draw by a perpetual: 30...\( \text{\textbf{xd}}1 ? \)) 31.\( \text{\textbf{c}}8+ \text{\textbf{f}}8 32.\( \text{\textbf{e}}6 \) =) 31.\( \text{\textbf{h}}1 \text{\textbf{xd}}4 32.\( \text{\textbf{g}}3 (32.\text{\textbf{xf}}3 \text{\textbf{f}}2 + 33. \text{\textbf{g}}1 \text{\textbf{xf}}3 34. \text{\textbf{xf}}3 \text{\textbf{xd}}1 + 35. \text{\textbf{xd}}4 \text{\textbf{d}}7 +) 32...\( \text{\textbf{f}}4 33.\( \text{\textbf{h}}5 (33. \text{\textbf{d}}2 \text{\textbf{e}}3 +; 33.\text{\textbf{e}}1 \text{\textbf{xf}}1 + 34. \text{\textbf{xf}}1 \text{\textbf{f}}2 + 35. \text{\textbf{h}}2 \text{\textbf{xe}}5 +) 33... \text{\textbf{xf}}3 34.\text{\textbf{xd}}4 \text{\textbf{f}}2 + 35.\text{\textbf{g}}1 \text{\textbf{xd}}1 36. \text{\textbf{xd}}1 \text{\textbf{e}}3 + 37. \text{\textbf{h}}1 \text{\textbf{xd}}4 38. \text{\textbf{h}}5 \text{\textbf{d}}2 39.\text{\textbf{g}}6 \text{\textbf{d}}7 + (Zaitzev).)

21...\text{\textbf{xe}}5

White can meet now 21...\( \text{\textbf{xc}}5 \) with 22.\( \text{\textbf{d}}4 \)!(22.\( \text{\textbf{d}}7 \), Stull – Grasso, corr. 2000, 22...\( \text{\textbf{xe}}2 23.\text{\textbf{d}}5 \text{\textbf{e}}6 24.\text{\textbf{xc}}5 \text{\textbf{c}}4 =), which makes the difference between the lines with the inclusion of the moves \text{\textbf{a}}1-b1 and b7-b6 that we mentioned in our previous notes. After 22...\( \text{\textbf{xc}}3 23.\text{\textbf{e}}6 \text{\textbf{f}}2 24.\text{\textbf{xf}}4 \text{\textbf{e}}3 (24...\text{\textbf{c}}4 25.\text{\textbf{d}}7 +; 24...\text{\textbf{xf}}4 25.\text{\textbf{d}}8+ \text{\textbf{f}}7 26.\text{\textbf{g}}5 +) 25.\text{\textbf{d}}5 \text{\textbf{xa}}1 (after 25...\text{\textbf{xf}}4 + 26.\text{\textbf{xf}}4 + \text{\textbf{f}}7 27.\text{\textbf{e}}6 \text{\textbf{c}}6 28.\text{\textbf{g}}5 \text{\textbf{xe}}5 29. \text{\textbf{b}}1+ Black’s compensation for the exchange is insufficient) 26.\text{\textbf{xe}}3 \text{\textbf{e}}1 27.\text{\textbf{xf}}8 + \text{\textbf{xf}}8 28.\text{\textbf{h}}6 + \text{\textbf{e}}8 29.\text{\textbf{d}}2 \text{\textbf{xf}}4 + 30.\text{\textbf{g}}1 \text{\textbf{c}}6 31.\text{\textbf{e}}6 \text{\textbf{f}}8 32.\text{\textbf{d}}7 \uparrow and White has developed a powerful initiative because the dark squares around the black king are decisively weakened.

22.\( \text{\textbf{d}}4 \)

After 22.\( \text{\textbf{d}}3 \) White should have in mind 22...\( \text{\textbf{f}}2 \)!

22...\( \text{\textbf{xd}}1 23.\text{\textbf{xd}}1 \text{\textbf{d}}8 24.\text{\textbf{e}}6

24.\text{\textbf{b}}1 is weaker for White because of 24...\( \text{\textbf{xd}}4 25.\text{\textbf{xd}}4 \text{\textbf{xd}}4 26.\text{\textbf{b}}5 \text{\textbf{a}}4 27.\text{\textbf{e}}1 \text{\textbf{c}}6 28.\text{\textbf{xb}}7 \text{\textbf{f}}7 = and the opponents
agreed to a draw in the game M.Pribyl – J.Pribyl, Lazne Bohdanec 1997.

24...d5 25.h3 h5

The game Lerner – J.Pribyl, Prague 1988, reached this position. White had better play 26.d3! c4 27.b8 a5 28.a7± preserving a slight edge.

b1b) 16...d8

Black now uses the pin along the d-file in order to prevent opening of the position with d4xc5.

White now has two main lines: b1b1) 17.c2 and b1b2) 17.a4.

We need to mention as well that 17.f4?! is evidently weaker due to 17...c7 (Black has no problems equalizing with 17...c4+ 18.d3 d3+ 19.xd3 cxd4 20.cxd4 c6 21.c5 xd4 22.xb7 d5, Vinagre – Lamole, corr. 1989, 23.e1 e5 24.xe5 xe5 25.d8 a6=) 18.f3 c4 (18...f8?! was rather dubious due to 19.d5± as was played in the game Prystenski – Burstow, Manitoba 1992) 19.g1 cxd4 20. cxd4 xe5 21.dxe5 (21.e4? xg4 22.e6 xf2 0-1 Siracusa – Espindola, corr. 1994) 21... xe5 22.f1 xf4 23.xf4 xf4 24.xa7 e5 Black’s chances proved to be even preferable.

White has also tried 17.e1 in the diagrammed position. But after 17...d4! (in case of 17...h6, Plosila – Frisk, corr. 1991, White plays the standard 18.h4! f8 19.g5 g7 20.g1± and restricts the black bishop considerably, while after 17.c4 18.g5 b5 19.g1 b4 White could have played 20.c1 and preserved a slight edge in the game Naumkin – Jasnikowski, Moscow 1991) 18.g5 (in case of 18.h3 c4! 19.g1 h6 20.g3 xe1+ 21. xe1 d2 22.b1 xc3– Black’s position is not worse at all) 18...f5 19.h4 (after 19.g3?! xg5 20.e4 f4 21.xc5 xh2 22. e6 c8= Black has a slight edge) 19.c4 20.g1 g4 21.a4 h6= in the game Karpov – Kasparov, Sevilla (m/7) 1987 Black managed to activate his bishop equalizing in the process.

b1b1) 17.c2 c4
Weaker is 17...c8?! due to
18.\textsuperscript{a} a4! cxd4 19.cxd4 \textsuperscript{h} h6 20.\textsuperscript{g} g1 a6 21.h4 \textsuperscript{d} d2 22.\textsuperscript{d} d1 b5 (if 22...\textsuperscript{c} c4, then 23.\textsuperscript{b} b3\textsuperscript{±}) 23.\textsuperscript{a} a3 b4 24.\textsuperscript{d} d3 \textsuperscript{c} c4 when in the game Akopov – Kolotsov, corr. 1988, White had 25.\textsuperscript{x} xd2 \textsuperscript{c} x d2 26.\textsuperscript{x} xd2\textsuperscript{±} with a clear advantage.

Black’s attempt to activate his bishop fails after: 17...\textsuperscript{h} h6, because of 18.h4 \textsuperscript{f} f7 19.g5 \textsuperscript{c} c4 20.\textsuperscript{g} g1 \textsuperscript{g} g7 21.\textsuperscript{f} f1 \textsuperscript{h} h8 22.\textsuperscript{c} c1 b6 23.\textsuperscript{g} g3 \textsuperscript{d} d5 24.\textsuperscript{f} f4 \textsuperscript{d} d7 25.\textsuperscript{f} f2\textsuperscript{±} the bishop ends up cramped in its own camp for a long time to come, Fourrage – Chauссard, corr. 1999.

After 17...\textsuperscript{f} f8 18.\textsuperscript{g} g1!? (It is also quite possible for White to play here: 18.h4 \textsuperscript{c} c4 19.\textsuperscript{g} g1 \textsuperscript{f} f7 20.\textsuperscript{g} g3\textsuperscript{±} Gauche – Horst, Lages 1990.) 18...\textsuperscript{c} c4 19.\textsuperscript{c} c1 a6 20.\textsuperscript{h} h4 \textsuperscript{h} h6 21.g5 \textsuperscript{g} g7 22.\textsuperscript{f} f2 b5 23.\textsuperscript{g} g3 \textsuperscript{f} f5 24.\textsuperscript{f} f4\textsuperscript{±} Comp “Crafty” – Comp “Arasan”, Belgium 1999, Black has again failed to solve the problem of his bishop.

In case of 17...\textsuperscript{c} c4, the best for White is to close immediately the c1-h6 diagonal for Black’s bishop with the move 18.g5!?\textsuperscript{±} (after 18.\textsuperscript{g} g1 \textsuperscript{h} h6 19.\textsuperscript{b} b3 \textsuperscript{f} f8 20.dxc5, Penas – Guillen Marco, corr. 1993, Black is two pawns down indeed, but he can still obtain good counter chances with the move 20...\textsuperscript{d} d3\textsuperscript{±}).

18.\textsuperscript{b} b2

White now has no time to push up his pawn to g5 because of the threat 18...cxd4.

Following 18.\textsuperscript{c} c1 \textsuperscript{h} h6\textsuperscript{±} Black exploits the absence of White’s bishop from the c1-h6 diagonal. We have to note that 18.\textsuperscript{e} e4 is not promising anything to White because of 18...\textsuperscript{c} c6!\textsuperscript{•}.

18...\textsuperscript{f} f8

Black’s attempt to organize an attack against his opponent’s king with 18...\textsuperscript{f} f7? 19.\textsuperscript{g} g1 \textsuperscript{c} c4 backfires. After 20.\textsuperscript{b} b7 \textsuperscript{d} d2 21.\textsuperscript{e} e3 \textsuperscript{f} f8 22.\textsuperscript{g} g3 White neutralizes Black’s threats and preserves his extra pawns, Ebbett – Tiemann, corr. 1988.

Black’s move 18...\textsuperscript{d} d3 is premature when White’s king is on f1, because of 19.\textsuperscript{b} b1 \textsuperscript{a} a6 20.\textsuperscript{g} g5 \textsuperscript{h} h8 and now in the game P.Nielsen – Walach, Koszalin 1997 White could have got a slight edge with 21.\textsuperscript{e} e1!\textsuperscript{±}.

The other possibility for Black leads to great complications 18...\textsuperscript{h} h6 19.h4 \textsuperscript{f} f7 (now 19...\textsuperscript{f} f8?! 20.g5 \textsuperscript{d} d3 is bad for Black due to 21.\textsuperscript{b} b1! \textsuperscript{e} e3 22.\textsuperscript{e} e1 \textsuperscript{g} g7 23.\textsuperscript{g} g1 \textsuperscript{e} e4 24.\textsuperscript{g} g3\textsuperscript{±} as in the game Karpov – Timman, Rotterdam 1989, see Game 17) 20.g5 (after 20.\textsuperscript{g} g1 \textsuperscript{f} f8 21.\textsuperscript{g} g3 \textsuperscript{c} c4 22.\textsuperscript{e} e2 \textsuperscript{xf} x f2+! 23.\textsuperscript{xf} x f2 \textsuperscript{e} e3 24.\textsuperscript{x} xe3 \textsuperscript{xe} xe3 25.\textsuperscript{d} dxc5 \textsuperscript{c} c8 26.\textsuperscript{b} b1 \textsuperscript{x} xc5 27.\textsuperscript{b} b7 \textsuperscript{g} g4= which happened in the game Karpov – Kasparov, Amsterdam 1988 the position was equal) 20...\textsuperscript{c} c4 (after 20...\textsuperscript{f} f8?! 21.\textsuperscript{g} g3\textsuperscript{±} White managed to consolidate his position) 21.e6! (in case of 21.\textsuperscript{c} c1 \textsuperscript{f} f8 22.\textsuperscript{f} f4 \textsuperscript{d} d5! 23.\textsuperscript{g} g3 \textsuperscript{d} d2+ 24.\textsuperscript{g} g1 \textsuperscript{e} e4 25.\textsuperscript{e} e3 \textsuperscript{x} x g5 26.hxg5 \textsuperscript{f} f2 27.\textsuperscript{f} f1 \textsuperscript{e} e4 28.\textsuperscript{x} xe4 \textsuperscript{g} gxe4= Black’s chances are slightly bet-
ter) 21...\(\text{ex}6\) (21...\(\text{f}5\)? was a mistake and after 22.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{ex}6\) 23.\(\text{xb}7\) \(\text{f}8\) 24.\(\text{e}1\)! in the game Vyzmanavin – T.Ernst, Stockholm 1991 even the best for Black 24...\(\text{f}7\) after 25.\(\text{e}2\) with the idea 26.\(\text{g}1\) was not solving Black’s problems) 22.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{f}7\)! (Black loses after 22...\(\text{f}5\)? because of 23.\(\text{e}2\)! and the black knight is hanging, moreover White is threatening 24.\(\text{e}6\) and the position is unclear with mutual chances.

19.\(\text{g}1\)

19.\(\text{d}1\)? after 19...\(\text{f}7\) 20.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{c}4\) 21.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{xf}2\)+ 22.\(\text{xf}2\) \(\text{e}3\)+ 23.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{xf}2\)+ 24.\(\text{xe}3\), Baturinsky – Pare, corr. 1989, 24...\(\text{xa}2\) leads to an advantage for Black.

19...\(\text{d}3\)!

This is Black’s best move and after it became popular the whole line with 17.\(\text{e}2\) was played quite rarely.

The other possibility is weaker – 19...\(\text{h}6\), since after 20.\(\text{d}1\) (in case of 20...\(\text{a}4\) 21.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{xd}4\) as in the game Ljubojevic – Timman, Linares 1989 White could have achieved a great ad-
vantage with 22.\(\text{cxd}4\) \(\text{c}8\) 23.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 24.\(\text{e}4\) 20...\(\text{e}6\) 21.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{c}4\) 22.\(\text{xb}7\) (if 22...\(\text{e}3\), White can play 23.\(\text{a}1\) \(\text{f}7\) 24.\(\text{xe}3\) \(\text{xe}3\)+ 25.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{f}2\) 26.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{xd}4\) 27.\(\text{x}d4\)+, analysis of L. Hansen) 22...\(\text{e}3\) 23.\(\text{xe}3\) \(\text{xe}3\) 24.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}7\) (the attempt to organize an attack against the white king with 24...\(\text{f}1\)+ 25.\(\text{h}2\) \(\text{gx}4\)+ 26.\(\text{hx}g4\) \(\text{gx}4\) is not working due to 27.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{h}5\)+ 28.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{xe}2\) 29.\(\text{xe}7\) \(\text{f}7\) 30.\(\text{e}8\) \(\text{f}8\) 31.\(\text{e}6\)+ \(\text{g}7\) 32.\(\text{e}7\)+ \(\text{f}7\) 33.\(\text{hx}7\)+) with the help of 25.\(\text{f}3\)! \(\text{xf}3\) 26.\(\text{gf}3\) \(\text{xf}3\) 27.\(\text{dxc}5\) \(\text{f}1\)+ 28.\(\text{h}2\) \(\text{f}2\)+ 29.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{xe}2\) 30.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{xa}2\) 31.\(\text{xe}3\) as in the game L.Hansen – Jasnikowski, Warsaw 1990 White managed to reach a very promising and advantageous rook endgame.

20.\(\text{g}3\)

After 20.\(\text{e}1\) Black can play 20...\(\text{c}4\) 21.\(\text{c}1\) (but not 21.\(\text{b}1\)? because of 21...\(\text{d}2\)! 22.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{b}5\) 23.\(\text{xb}5\) \(\text{b}2\)–+, and after 21.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{h}6\) Black preserves his initiative) 21...\(\text{d}2\) and Black has an ample compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

20...\(\text{h}6\)

The dark-squared bishop joins the action now. Black’s knight can wait for a while, since the careless 20...\(\text{c}4\)? after 21.\(\text{b}1\)! \(\text{xc}3\) 22.\(\text{e}4\)+ as in the game Lukacs – Fogarasi, Budapest 1992, enabled White to obtain a substantial advantage.

21.\(\text{b}1\)
Chapter 28

After 21.\textit{\texttt{We}}2?! \textit{\texttt{Xc}}3 22.\textit{\texttt{Ad}}1 cxd4 23.\textit{\texttt{Axd}}4 \textit{\texttt{Cc}}4 24.\textit{\texttt{Axa}}7 \textit{\texttt{Xe}}2 25.\textit{\texttt{Xe}}2 \textit{\texttt{Ac}}6 White had problems in the game Z.Polgar – Wolff, San Francisco 1991. The other try 21.\textit{\texttt{Af}}1?! is not good either due to 21...\textit{\texttt{Cc}}4 22.\textit{\texttt{Bb}}3 \textit{\texttt{Ah}}8 23.\textit{\texttt{Ee}}1 \textit{\texttt{Cd}}2 24.\textit{\texttt{Dd}}1 c4?! and the game Comp “Fritz 6” – Comp “Nimzo 7.32”, Cadaqués 2000 showed that Black had the initiative. After 21.\textit{\texttt{Af}}1 Black can preserve the equality with 21...\textit{\texttt{Ae}}3 22.\textit{\texttt{Axe}}3 \textit{\texttt{Xe}}3+ 23.\textit{\texttt{Ah}}1 \textit{\texttt{Xf}}1+ 24.\textit{\texttt{Xf}}1 \textit{\texttt{Dd}}3 25.\textit{\texttt{Df}}2 \textit{\texttt{Cc}}6 26.e6 \textit{\texttt{Dd}}8=.

**b1b2) 17.\textit{\texttt{Aa}}4**

White intends to provoke the move b7-b6, planning to make use of the weaknesses later.

**17...b6**

After 17...\textit{\texttt{Af}}8?! 18.\textit{\texttt{Ag}}1 \textit{\texttt{Ff}}7 19.\textit{\texttt{Gg}}3 \textit{\texttt{Hh}}6 20.\textit{\texttt{Hh}}4 \textit{\texttt{Ee}}3+ 21.\textit{\texttt{Hh}}2 b6 22.\textit{\texttt{Cc}}2 cxd4 23.cxd4 \textit{\texttt{Dd}}5 24.\textit{\texttt{Dd}}1 \textit{\texttt{Dd}}8 Black’s bishop is freed and it is back into action, Gomes Filho – Dos Santos, corr. 1995; nevertheless he cannot create any real threats in case of: 25.\textit{\texttt{Dd}}3?! \textit{\texttt{Cc}}4 26.\textit{\texttt{Bb}}3 \textit{\texttt{Dd}}2 27.\textit{\texttt{Af}}4=.

Black’s move 17...\textit{\texttt{Cc}}4 is interesting too. White must seize the opportune moment and restrict Black’s bishop with 18.g5!? (but not the greedy 18.\textit{\texttt{Xa}}7??, since after 18...cxd4 19.cxd4 \textit{\texttt{Xe}}4!→ Black is threatening \textit{\texttt{Cc}}4-d2+, as well as \textit{\texttt{Cc}}4-e3+ and as a result White fails under a powerful attack, while after 18.\textit{\texttt{Gg}}1 \textit{\texttt{Hh}}6 19.\textit{\texttt{Xa}}7 \textit{\texttt{Ee}}3 20.\textit{\texttt{Xe}}3 \textit{\texttt{Xe}}3+ 21.\textit{\texttt{Hh}}1 \textit{\texttt{Ff}}8 22.\textit{\texttt{Aa}}4 \textit{\texttt{Ff}}2 as in the game Balcazar Novoa – Lukin, corr. 2001, White had two extra pawns, but had to force a draw by perpetual with the help of 23.\textit{\texttt{Xe}}8+ \textit{\texttt{Gg}}7 24.\textit{\texttt{Xe}}7+ \textit{\texttt{Hh}}6 25.\textit{\texttt{Hh}}4+ \textit{\texttt{Gg}}7 26.\textit{\texttt{Ee}}7+ \textit{\texttt{Hh}}6 27.
18...\texttt{c6}

Recently, White has tried to find an improvement with the help of the line: 18...\texttt{f4} 19.\texttt{f7} (Black's queen cannot abandon the a2-g8 diagonal with 18...\texttt{e4?}, because of 19.\texttt{e6=}) 19.\texttt{h3} 19..\texttt{c4} 20.\texttt{g1=} Black fails to create any threats and his knight is quite unstable. The exchange of queens 19...\texttt{c4+} 20.\texttt{xc4+} \texttt{xc4} 21.\texttt{e2=} enables White to bring his king quickly into action.) 20.\texttt{g5}. White has succeeded in restricting Black's bishop, but his knight now is on an extremely passive position at the edge of the board. It seems that the positive and negative sides of his quite original idea are balancing themselves more or less. There, for example might follow: 20...\texttt{c6!} – Black wishes to trade queens on the c6-square, so that his knight can enter the actions with tempo. (In case of 20...\texttt{f5} 21.\texttt{g1} 22.\texttt{d1} \texttt{xc3} 23.\texttt{dxc5} \texttt{xd1+} 24.\texttt{xd1} \texttt{xe5} 25.\texttt{cb6} \texttt{xb6} 26.\texttt{xb6} \texttt{c4} 27.\texttt{f2} \texttt{b2} 28.\texttt{d5=} \texttt{f8} 29.\texttt{h1=} White's prospects are superior, because of his outside passed pawn, moreover his knight is ready to join the actions along the route h3-g1-f3, P.Nielsen – Sutovsky, Dortmund 2005.) 21.\texttt{xc6} (In case White avoids the exchange of queens with 21.\texttt{a3}, Black can easily equalize with the line: 21...\texttt{b5} 22.\texttt{g1} \texttt{xd4} 23.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{c6=}, or by simplifying: 21...\texttt{e6} 22.\texttt{g1} \texttt{c4} 23.\texttt{b3} \texttt{d2} 24.\texttt{c2} \texttt{e4} 25.\texttt{e1} \texttt{xf2} 26.\texttt{xf2} \texttt{xd4} 27.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{c4} 28.\texttt{f4} \texttt{xd4} 29.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xe6} \texttt{d5=}) 21...\texttt{c6} 22.\texttt{f4} \texttt{cxd4}!? (It is not quite clear what happens after: 22...\texttt{f7}, because then White can prevent the further activating of Black's king with – 23.\texttt{e6=+) 24.\texttt{dxc5} \texttt{xc3} 25.\texttt{b1} \texttt{e5} 26.\texttt{g} \texttt{bxc5} 27.\texttt{xc5} \texttt{d2} 28.\texttt{b7} \texttt{xa2} 29.\texttt{d3} \texttt{c3} 30.\texttt{c7} \texttt{a6} 31.\texttt{b4} \texttt{xb4} 32.\texttt{xb4=} and despite the fact that the material on the board is equal, White is clearly better, since his pieces are very active.) 23.\texttt{e6} \texttt{c8} 24.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{b4} 25.\texttt{f4} \texttt{c4}. We can evaluate the arising position as approximately equal. See the following line as an argument: 26.\texttt{g3} (Black was threatening 26...\texttt{xe5=}) 26...\texttt{f7} 27.\texttt{e2} (after 27.a3 \texttt{c2=} Black equalizes the material ratio.) 27...\texttt{c2} (in case of 27...\texttt{d5} 28.\texttt{c1} \texttt{a4} 29.\texttt{xf4} 30.\texttt{gxf4} \texttt{e6} 31.\texttt{c6=} \texttt{d7} 32.\texttt{c2=} the decisive factor for the evaluation of the position is the unfortunate placement of Black's bishop on g7) 28.\texttt{a3} \texttt{d5} 29.\texttt{c1} \texttt{xc1=} (This solution is much simpler than: 29...\texttt{a2} 30.\texttt{c3} \texttt{xc3} 31.\texttt{xc3=} 30.\texttt{xc1} \texttt{e6} (Black is threatening to play 31...\texttt{f8}) 31.\texttt{b3} \texttt{b5} 32.\texttt{c5} \texttt{f8} 33.\texttt{e2} \texttt{xc5} 34.\texttt{dxc5} \texttt{e7=} and
it becomes evident that after Black brings his knight to the c6-square his position would be rock solid.

18...Ec8!?

Black is threatening to exchange on d4.

Black can not equalize with 18...Af8?! either. After 19.Ag1 Ac4 20.Ad2! (In answer to 20. Ac4, which was recommended by GM I. Zaitzev, it is possible for Black to follow with 20...Ag6!; 20...Ah6? is bad as well for Black: 21. Ah4 cxd4 22.cxd4 Ac6 23.Ad3 Ae6 24.g5 Ag7 25.Ag3+ 20...Ac6 (White is better after 20...Ah6, Dean – Kido, IECC 1996, 21.Ag3! Ae8+ 22.Ae8 Ad5 23. Af4 Af7 24.g3; 22...cxd4 23. Axh4± as well as after 20...Af7 Ac4 22.Ac2 cxd4 23.cxd4 Ad5 24.Ag4+ 21.h3 Ac4 22.Ag5! h6 23.Ac1± and Black failed to coordinate his pieces in the game Karpov – Kasparov, Belfort 1988 (see Game 18). Black’s bishop on g7 can not be redeployed to the c1-h6 diagonal anymore.

In case of 18...Ac6 (with the idea to create the threat c5xd4 thanks to the juxtaposition of the queens) White can follow with 19.a4! (in answer to 19.Ac1 Ah6! Black reduces the stability of White’s queen; it is insufficient for White to play here 19.Ac1, because of 19...Af8 20. Ag1 Ae4 and Black restores the material balance) 19...Af8 (19...cxd4 20.Ac2 Ac4 21.cxd4+) 20.Ag1 e6, Yeremenko – Thanhauser, corr. 1990 and here after 21.Ac2, with the idea to continue with 22.Af1, White maintains some edge.

The fine point of the manoeuvre of the queen to a4 is that in answer to 18...Ac4 White has 19.Ac4! and the black knight can not occupy the c6-square as before. This assumption is true, but only partially. The point is that after 19...Af8 (in case of 19...a4 20.Ag1 White’s idea is completely justified after: 20...Ac6 21.Af4 Axe5 22.Ag6 Ad6 23.Af3 Axe6 24.Ad5 cxd4 25.Axe6+ Ag7 26.Af1+ Tisdall – Bjerke, Asker 1988, as well as after 20...cxd4 21.cxd4 Ac6 22.Ac1 Axe5 23. Af4+ 20.Ag1 the move 20...Ah6 for Black turns out to be possible after all. (It is too bad for Black to play 20...Ah6?! due to 21.Ah4+ Oeller – Maurer, corr. 1991.). White preserves his extra pawn indeed with: 21.Ag3 (following 21.Ac6 Axe2 22. Ae6+ Ah8 23.Af1 Ah6, White will be forced to comply with a repetition of moves: 24.Ac6 Af2 25.Ae8+ Ag7 26.Ae7=) 21...cxd4 22.cxd4 Ac4 23.a3 Ac2
24.\(\textit{wxc2} \textit{xc2} 25.\(\textit{xa2}\) (25.\(\textit{c1}\) \(\textit{h6}\) 26.\(\textit{xf4} \textit{xf4}, Salimov - Cadillon Costa, corr. 1988, 27.\(\textit{xf4} \textit{xd4} -\)) 25...\(\textit{e3}\) 26.\(\textit{h3} \textit{f1}\) 27.\(\textit{h2} \textit{h6}+\), but all Black's pieces enter the actions effectively and that balances the chances of both sides.

19.\(\textit{wd1}\)

The other retreat of the white queen 19.\(\textit{d2}?!\) is evidently worse because of 19...\(\textit{xf8}\) 20.\(\textit{g5}\) (20.\(\textit{g1}\) \(\textit{xe5}\) 21.\(\textit{d1} \textit{h2}+\) Schulze - Filipovic, Bad Woerishofen 1989) and now in the game A. Shneider - Sibarevic, Pernik 1988, Black could have played 21...\(\textit{cxd4}\) 22.\(\textit{cxd4} \textit{c6}\) 23.\(\textit{g1} \textit{c4}\) 24.\(\textit{e1} \textit{xa2}\) and obtain a slight edge.

The exchange of the pawns in the centre 19.\(\textit{dxc5} \textit{bxc5}\) is not dangerous for Black at all. After 20.\(\textit{d1} \textit{c4}\) (20...\(\textit{xe5}?!\) 21.\(\textit{a4} \textit{f8}\) 22.\(\textit{d3} \textit{f6}?!\) 23.\(\textit{f3} \textit{b6}\) 24.\(\textit{xf8}\) 25.\(\textit{xe3}, K. Berg - Wessman, Kirseberg 1988, 25...\(\textit{e5} -\) 21.\(\textit{g3} \textit{g4}\) and now the game is equal.

Finally in case of 19.\(\textit{d4}\), Ugge - Jones, corr. 1990, Black can play 19...\(\textit{c4}+\) 20.\(\textit{d3} \textit{cxd4}\) 21.\(\textit{d4} \textit{xe5}\) 22.\(\textit{xc4}+\) 23.\(\textit{xe6} hxe6\) 24.\(\textit{dxe5} \textit{xe4}\) with even chances.

19...\(\textit{d8}\)

We have now almost the same position as after Black's move 16, but with a small difference - Black's pawn is on b6.

After 19...\(\textit{d4}\) 20.\(\textit{g5} \textit{e4}\) 21.\(\textit{b3} \textit{cxd4}\) 22.\(\textit{cxd4} \textit{h8}\) 23.\(\textit{h3} \textit{f3}\) 24.\(\textit{e1} \textit{e3}+\) 25.\(\textit{g1} \textit{c2}\) 26.\(\textit{c3} \textit{f4}\) 27.\(\textit{e3} \textit{f7}\) 28.\(\textit{d1} \textit{c4}\) 29.\(\textit{f2} \textit{d8}\), Black manages to maintain the dynamic balance, Riebel - Acevedo Villalba, corr. 1990.

20.\(\textit{e1}\)!

This is the best for White. After 20.\(\textit{c2} \textit{c4}\) the position is repeated. The retreat 20.\(\textit{c1}?!\) is less satisfactory due to 20...\(\textit{f8}\) 21.\(\textit{g5}\) (after 21.\(\textit{h3}?!\) 22.\(\textit{e1} \textit{h6}+\) Black had a slight edge in the game Lputian - Janjgava, Simferopol 1988) 21...\(\textit{e4}\) and Black's chances were not worse.

20...\(\textit{e4}\)

The exchange 20...\(\textit{cxd4}?!\) 21.\(\textit{cxd4} \textit{h6}\) after 22.\(\textit{g1} \textit{e4}\) 23.\(\textit{h3} \textit{c4}\) 24.\(\textit{g3}\) \(\textit{d3}\) turned out to be premature. White's queen was not forced to defend his c3-pawn and it was freed for action: 25.\(\textit{b1!} \textit{xd4}\) 26.\(\textit{xd4} \textit{xd4}+\) 27.\(\textit{h1} \textit{xe5}\) 28.\(\textit{e1!} \textit{f4}\) 29.\(\textit{xe5} \textit{xe5}\) 30.\(\textit{c1} \textit{d6}\) 31.\(\textit{e2}\) Heim - Burnat, corr. 1998.

White can answer 20...\(\textit{c4}\) with 21.\(\textit{g5}\) and after 21...\(\textit{e4}\) 22.\(\textit{g1} \textit{g4}\) 23.\(\textit{g3} \textit{cxd4}\) 24.\(\textit{cxd4}\) \(\textit{g5}\), Douven - Ilincic, Alma-Ata 1989, White could have kept
some advantage by playing 25. \textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{e2!}}}±.

\textbf{21.}g5 \textbf{\textit{\texttt{f5}}} \textbf{22.}d\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{g3}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{xg5}}} \textbf{23.}d\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{e2}}} cxd4

The c6-square has been weakened as a result of the move b7-b6 and Black can not organize any pressure against White's d4-pawn. 23...d\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{c6?}}} is bad for Black after 24.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{e4}}} d\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{d8}}} 25.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{e3+}}}- and Black's knight has nowhere to retreat, as well as 23...cxd4 24.cxd4 d\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{c6?}}} is bad because of 25.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{c4+}}}.

\textbf{24.}cxd4

This position was reached in the game Kolander – Christ, corr. 1993. Following \textbf{24...}\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f4!}?∞} the chances of the opponents would have been about equal.}

\textbf{b2) 16.g5}

The already familiar idea to restrict Black's bishop with 16.g5 requires certain precision from Black.

\textbf{16...}\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{e4}}}

About 16...d\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{c4}}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f2}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{f8}}} 18. \textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{g1}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{f7}}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f1}} – see 16.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f2}}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f8}}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{g1}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{c4}}} 18.g5 \textbf{\textit{\texttt{f7}}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f1}}.}

\textbf{17.}\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f2}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{f8}}} \textbf{18.}\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{g1}}}

In case of 18.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{g1}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{f5}}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{e3}}} (If White gives back his extra pawn: 19.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{g3}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{xg5}}} 20.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{d3}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{g4}}} 21.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f1}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{xf1+}}} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{xf1}}} cxd4 23. cxd4 c\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{c8=}}} the position again remains more or less equal, Groiss – Eriksen, corr. 1990) 19...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{e4=}} the game might end up in a draw by a repetition of moves.

\textbf{18...}\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{c4}}} \textbf{19.}\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f3}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{e3+}}} \textbf{20.} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{x}}e3 \textbf{\textit{\texttt{xe3}}} 21.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{b3+}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{h8}}} 22. \textbf{\textit{\texttt{e1}}}

White cannot capture the pawn 22.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{xb7?}}, because after 22...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{xc3}}} 23.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{e1}}} cxd4\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f}} he will face a lot of trouble.}

\textbf{22...}\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{g5}}}

The seemingly attractive exchange-sacrifice: 22...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{xf3+}}} 23. \textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{xf3}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{xf3+}}} 24.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{g1}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{g4+}}} 25.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f2}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{f4+}}} (or 25...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{g5?}}} 26.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{xb7}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{h6}}} 27.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{e4}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{d2+}}} 28.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{e2}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{xc3}}} 29.d5+- Volke – Voekler, Germany 1993) 26.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{e2}}} cxd4 27.cxd4 \textbf{\textit{\texttt{xd4}}, can be countered by White with the powerful argument 28.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f7!}} (in case of 28.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f3}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{h4}}} 29.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{e6}}} Black should not capture the rook immediately, but he can play instead: 29...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{h6}}} 30.gxh6 \textbf{\textit{\texttt{xe1}}} 31.hxg7+ \textbf{\textit{\texttt{g7}}} 32.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{xe7+}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{h6}}} 33.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{f8+}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{h7}}} 34.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\texttt{e7+}}} \textbf{\textit{\texttt{h6}}}}}

51
35.e6 c3= in order to transfer to an approximately equal king and queen endgame, L. Hansen – T. Ernst, Haninge 1992) 28...fxe5+ 29.f3 (White’s king avoids the checks easily too after: 29.f1 b5+ 30.e2 c6 31. f4±) 29...c3+ 30.e3 c6+ 31. g3 (31.e4 b5! 32.f2 c5+ 33. f3= Sanchez Rodenas – Walter, corr. 2001; 32.xe7 f1+ 33.g3 e5+! 34.h4 e1+ 35. h3 e3+ 36.g2 e2+ 37.f2 f4+ 38.f1 c4=) 31...c7+ 32.h3 c8+ 33.e6 (in case queens remain on the board – 33.h4 h5! 34.h3 c5= Black can organize some counterplay much easier) 33...c1 34.f3± and White still maintains some advantage.

23.xb7 d2

Otherwise Black has no compensation for the pawn.

24.xe7

White achieves much less with 24.dxc5, after 24...xc3 25.d5 (25.xe7 xf3=; 25.c6 xf3+ 26.gxf3 xf3=) 25...h6 26.c6 f4 27.e4 (27.g1?? xe1=+!) 27...c1+ 28.e1 c3 29.e4= and White had to comply with a repetition of moves in the game Beliavsky – Kasparov, Linares 1992.

24...xc3

In case of 24...d3=?, White counters with: 25.f2! (or 25.e2 cxd4 26.cxd4 d1+ 27.e1 xf3+ 28.gxf3 xf3+ 29.g1 g4= Lukacs – C. Horvath, Budapest 1992.) 25...cxd4 26.cxd4 xd4+

27.f1 c4+ (27...d3+ 28. g1=) 28.e2 f7 29.d8+ f8 30.d6= and he manages to bring his king to safety and he preserves his extra pawn.

25.b7!!

White’s alternative here is the line: 25.h4!? cxd4 26.e6↑ and he maintains some initiative.

25...c4+

After 25...xd4, or 25...cxd4, Black should consider the possible advance of White’s e-pawn – 26.e6↑.

26.g1 c3 27.e4 cxd4

28.e6!

White has tested in practice until now only the move 28.d1. In this case the seemingly attractive move 28...e8? turns out to be unsatisfactory due to 29.h1! (after 29.xd4 xd4+ 30.xd4 xe5 31.xe5 xe5 32.d8+ g7 33.d7+ f6 34.xa7 e2= Black can easily make a draw, despite his lack of a pawn, Onischuk – Grischuk, Poikovsky 2005) and Black is already beyond salvation. For example after: 29...a5 (in case of 29...e3 30.xd4 xd4 31.xd4 g8
32.\textit{h4 f7 33.d5± Black loses a pawn; following 29...a5, White has the powerful move 30.d5± with the idea to capture on d4 with the rook, while the move 30.xd4 is not good, because of 30...\textit{xe5 32.d7 b8 33.g5 c7=; after 29...d3 30.xd3 \textit{xe5 31.d7 f8 32.g5 g7 33.e6 g8 34.xa7±, or 31...b8 32.xe5 xe5 33.xa7±, White remains with an extra pawn) 30.xd4! (30.c6 d8 31.e6 f6=) 30...x5 (following 30...xa2 31.d7 g8 32.xa7± White can preserve his extra pawn as well) 31.e4 (in case of a transfer to a heavy pieces-endgame after: 31.xe5 x5 32.xa7± Black will have to fight long and hard for the draw) 31.e7 32.d5± and Black can get rid of the annoying pin only at the price of a pawn.}

Unfortunately, all that is not forced at all. In answer to 28.\textit{d1, Black has a much simpler solution at his disposal: 28...\textit{e3+! (instead of 28...e8), which leads after 29.xe3 dx3=} to an absolutely equal endgame.}

28...\textit{f6}

This is Black’s best defence.

After 28...c5 29.e7 e8 30.\textit{e6 d3+ 31.h1 f5 32.c6 f7 33.g5 g8 34.d6± Black’s pieces are quite misplaced.}

The seemingly active move 28...d3 is not so good for Black either, due to: 29.d1 (29.e7?!

\textit{e8 30.d5 d2 31.xd2 xd2 32.xd2 c3=} 29.d8 30.e7 e8 31.xd3 c1+ (after 31...a1+ 32.f2 xa2+ 33.g3± Black has great problems to solve with the defence of his e7-pawn) 32.e1± and Black can get rid of White’s e7-pawn only by giving up his a-pawn.

If Black tries to neutralize White’s e7-pawn with the help of the move 28...e8, he should worry about White’s possibility – 29.b7!±.

29.e5!

White would not have achieved anything substantial with 29.e7, because of 29...e8 30.e6 g7=, while in case of 29.b7, Black has the powerful argument – 29...g5!±.

29.e8

After 29...x5 30.xe5+ g8 31.e7 e8 32.h4± Black has no counterplay whatsoever.

30.d3↑

White has some dangerous initiative in that position. His future plans include: g2-g3, h2-h4, g1-g2 and e1-e2±.
Chapter 29

1.d4 ♜f6 2.c4 g6 3.♗c3 d5 4.cxd5 ♜xd5 5.e4 ♜xc3 6.bxc3 ♗g7 7.♗c4 c5 8.♗e2 ♗c6 9.♗e3 0–0 10.0–0 ♗g4 11.f3 ♗a5 12.♖xf7 ♖xf7 13.fxg4 ♖xfl 14.♗xf1 cxd4

16.cxd4. You can find there, in the same chapter, the position arising after: 15...b5 16.♔g1 (White tried some original maneuver with his knight – 16.♗g1 ♖c8 17.♗f3= in the game Kallai – Schulze, Bern 1989.) 16...♗d7, Sikelos – Lonnie, Oklahoma 1997, 17.g5!?

In case of 15...♗d6, there arise positions that are similar to these from Chapter 28. Just like there, White can continue with 16.e5!? (His other quite acceptable possibility is 16.♔g1, because after 16...♗e6 17.♗d3 there happens a transposition to the variation a, from the same chapter, while in answer to 16...e5, White can play 17.♗d2!? ♖c4 18.♗b3 b5 19.a4 exd4 20. axb5 ♖c8 21.♖c1= and following 16...♖d8 17.♖a4! b6 18.♖c1! ♖e6 19.♖c2 ♖xg4 he continued with 20.d5! ♖b7 21.♖d4 ♖d6 22.♖e6 ♖c8 23.♗xc8+ ♖xc8 24.♖xc8+ ♗f7 25.♖g5+ ♗f6 26.♖c6+ ♗e5 27.♗f3++ and he simply crushed Black’s position in the game Naumkin – Tocchioni, Montecatini Terme 2004.) 16...♗d7 (The intermediate move 16...♖f8+...
17.\textit{g}1 and now 17...\textit{d}7 Helm – Salaun, corr. 1994 is not changing anything much, due to 18.\textit{g}5±; in case of 16...\textit{d}5 17.\textit{f}2!? there arises a transposition to a situation favourable for White from Chapter 28, variation \textit{b}1; the retreat of the queen – 16...\textit{a}6 is bad because of 17.\textit{g}1 \textit{d}8 18.\textit{c}2 \textit{c}4 19.\textit{g}5 \textit{d}7 20.\textit{c}1 b5 21.\textit{a}4 \textit{b}6 22.\textit{b}3+- Wiik – Rise, corr. 1990; in answer to 16...\textit{e}6 White can play 17.\textit{f}4!±; if 16...\textit{b}6, then White can follow with 17.\textit{b}1!? \textit{c}4 18.\textit{f}4±; Black’s attempt to complicate the game with the move 16...\textit{c}4 should be parried by White simply with the help of: 17.\textit{f}2 \textit{d}7 18.\textit{b}3 b5 19.\textit{a}4 \textit{b}8 20.axb5 \textit{xb}5 21.\textit{xb}5 \textit{xb}5 22.\textit{c}3 \textit{b}3 23.\textit{d}5 \textit{b}7 24.\textit{h}4 \textit{f}8 25.\textit{c}1± Gerstenhauer – Timme, corr. 1993.) 17.\textit{g}5 \textit{c}4 (after 17...\textit{f}8+ 18.\textit{g}1 \textit{h}8, Brassat – Suess, Nuremberg 2004, White can prevent Black’s knight from coming to the c4-square with the move 19.\textit{c}1±) 18.\textit{f}4 \textit{f}8 19.\textit{g}1 \textit{b}6 20.\textit{b}3+ \textit{h}8 21.\textit{f}1 \textit{d}5 22.\textit{d}2 \textit{xf}1+ 23.\textit{xf}1 b5, Gimenez – Mezquita Broch, Valencia 2004 and here it seems quite reasonable for White to continue with 24.\textit{f}3± with the idea to deploy the knight to the e4-square, creating the threat 25.\textit{c}3 in the process.

In case the c-pawns are still present on the board, the check with the queen – 15...\textit{f}8+?! was defined earlier (see Chapter 27) as unnecessary. After the trade of the c-pawns this evaluation remains correct as well. 16.\textit{g}1 \textit{f}7 (16...\textit{d}8 17.\textit{a}4 b6 18.\textit{c}1 \textit{f}7 19.h3 \textit{f}8 20.\textit{d}7 \textit{xa}2 21.\textit{c}3 \textit{a}3 22.\textit{d}5 \textit{xd}4, Castillo Miguel – Aburto, Mexico 1999, 23.\textit{e}6+ \textit{f}7 24.\textit{c}8+ \textit{g}7 25.\textit{xd}4+-) 17.\textit{a}4 b6, Chang – Sarmento, Paulista 1999 and in case of 18.\textit{c}1 \textit{e}6 19.\textit{g}3± Black is faced with considerable difficulties, because he cannot play 19...\textit{xg}4?, because of 20.\textit{c}7+.

Black’s position is quite suspicious after: 15...\textit{c}8?! 16.\textit{c}1 \textit{xc}1 17.\textit{xc}1. White is planning d4-d5 and following 17...\textit{e}5 (Black cannot ignore White’s threats, because of: 17...\textit{c}6? 18.d5 \textit{e}5 19.h3 \textit{a}6 20.\textit{d}4 \textit{d}3 21.\textit{c}4 \textit{e}5 22.\textit{b}3 \textit{d}7 23.\textit{e}6++ Gipp – Duerlich, Rostock 1997.) 18.\textit{c}3± Black’s knight is so terribly misplaced at the edge of the board that it is unfavourable for him to reduce the pawn-tension in the centre.

The prophylactic move 15...\textit{h}8?! is just a waste of time in this position. After 16.\textit{c}1 \textit{d}7 (in case of 16...\textit{c}8, Ortega – Dias, Linares 1993, White has a free hand to prepare the thematic pawn-break in the centre 17.d5±) 17.h3 (It is even better, by the way, for White to play here the standard move 17.g5!?) 17...\textit{e}6 18.\textit{c}2 b5, Fedotov – Tsipkin, USSR 1977 and in case of 19.d5?! \textit{f}7+ 20.\textit{g}1 \textit{c}4 21.

382
d4+ the results of Black’s prophylactic are far from being advantageous for him.

On the other hand, when Black’s king is on the g8-square, it is dangerous for him to continue with 15...c4, because then after: 16.b3! his knight gets pinned. Black has tried in that position: 16...b5 (after 16...f8+ 17.g1 f7 Black avoided the pin indeed, but as a result of: 18.f1 e6 19.xb7 f8 20.xf8+ gxf8 21.f4++ he lost a second pawn in the game Prestage – Lacunza, corr. 2002; following 16...c7, F.Cobo – D.Cobo, Leon 2000, it is possible for White to continue with 17.g1+ and he is threatening to pin Black’s knight once again with the move 18.c1) 17.g1 h8, Westin – Elliott, corr. 2002 and here it would have been quite reasonable for White to follow with: 18.f1+ with the idea d4-d5.

\textbf{a) 15...b6}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
  \begin{scope}[scale=0.5]
    \node (a) at (0,0) {\textcolor{red}{\textbullet}};
    \node (b) at (1,0) {\textbullet};
    \node (c) at (2,0) {\textbullet};
    \node (d) at (2,1) {\textbullet};
    \node (e) at (1,1) {\textbullet};
    \node (f) at (0,1) {\textbullet};
  \end{scope}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

Black is threatening to play 16...e5.

\textbf{16.g1}

This is the best move. In case of 16...e5 White can make use of the fact that his king is now away from the open f-file and play 17.b1 e6 18.dxe5!? xe5 19.b5 b6 20.d5 c4 21.h6+ and as the game Thorarinsson – Naes, Selfoss 2002 showed, Black can hardly cope with White’s initiative.

\textbf{16...e6}

Two of White’s pawns are under attack now – e4 and g4.

The “non-human” move 16...b2?!, after 17.b1 a3 (in case Black captures the pawn 17...xa2? 18.a1 b3 19.xb3+ xb3 20.a3+ it becomes evident that his knight will never get out of White’s camp) 18.c4 19.f4 b6 20.b3+ xb3 21.axb3 c8 22.xc1 xc1+ 23.xc1 d7 24.f2+ and the game between two computer programs – Comp “BigGenius” – Comp “Crafty” 1995, reached a position with an extra pawn for White.

\textbf{17.d3!}

White is ready to part with his g4-pawn in order to consolidate his position.

He can still hold on to his extra pawn with the help of the move 17.g3. Black, however, preserves some initiative in that case – 17...d8! (after 17...c4 18.d2+ Papenbrock – Herzog, corr. 1990 the unfortunate placement of Black’s knight on a5 becomes a telling factor; in answer to 17.c4, White can pin that knight quite annoyingly: 18.b3! c8 19.c1 b5 20.f2 a6 21.a4
\( \text{\textit{d7 22.axb5 axb5 23.e5}}^{\text{\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{\textbf{Modlich}}}} - \text{\textit{Hofaecker, Germany 1993;}}} \text{\textit{Black does not have enough time to prepare the maneuver}} \text{\textsuperscript{\textbf{c5-c4}}, because then after: 17...\textit{\textbf{c8}} 18.d5!} \text{\textit{his position remains very difficult in case of}} \text{\textsuperscript{\textbf{18...\textbf{d7}}}, Klausen - Rise, corr. 1992, 19.\textbf{\textit{d4+}}, as well as a result of: 18...\textbf{\textit{e5}} 19.\textbf{\textit{c1 \textbf{xc1}} 20.\textbf{\textit{xc1 b6}}, Ivanovic - Erceg, Omis 2003, 21.\textbf{\textit{g5!\textsuperscript{\textit{\pm}}}} 18.\textbf{\textit{b1?}}} \text{\textit{This is possibly White's best decision. (Now, the move 18.\textbf{\textit{g5?!}} is obviously wrong, because after: 18...\textbf{\textit{c6}} 19.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{b3 \textbf{xd4+}}} White loses his d4-pawn, Hallberg - Livner, Stockholm 1994; following 18.\textbf{\textit{a4 b6}} 19.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d1 e5!}}} \text{\textit{White has again problems with the defence of his d4-pawn, Housieaux - Saez, Rochefort 1998; in case of 18.\textbf{\textit{c1 b6}} 19.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e2 c6}} 20.\textbf{\textit{b1 \textbf{xd4}} 21.\textbf{\textit{xb6 f3+ 22.f2 \textbf{xd1}} 23.\textbf{\textit{xb7 c2}} 24.g5 \textbf{\textit{g4=}}}} \text{\textit{the tactical complications led to an equal endgame, Alfeevsky - Verner, corr. 1984.)}}} 18...\textbf{\textit{xa2}} (18...\textbf{\textit{b6?!}} 19.d5± Kuehne - Ozolinsh, corr. 1990) 19.\textbf{\textit{a1 \textbf{b3}} 20.\textbf{\textit{xb3 c2}} 21.\textbf{\textit{xa7 xd4}} 22.\textbf{\textit{xd4 c2}} 23.\textbf{\textit{xb7 f7}} 24.f2 \textbf{a8\textsuperscript{\textit{\textbf{\textbf{g4}}}} and White's extra pawn is just a symbolic consolation for him in that position.}}} \text{\textbf{\textit{17...\textbf{\textit{\textbf{\textbf{xg4}}}}}}}

In Chapter 28 (variation \textbf{a}) we have analyzed a similar position, but without the preliminary exchange of the c-pawns.

In case Black tries to trade queens with the move 17...\textbf{\textit{c4}}, White can counter that with the move 18.\textbf{\textit{d2!}} and the defenselessness of Black's knight on \textbf{a5} should worry him a lot.

Following 17...\textbf{\textit{c4}}, it is possible for White to continue with: 18.\textbf{\textit{f2 f8}} 19.g5 \textbf{\textit{d6 20.e5 c4}} 21.\textbf{\textit{c3 a6}, F.Andersen - Jardorf, corr. 1989 and here he could have played 22.a4\textsuperscript{\textit{\pm}} (with the idea to prepare comfortably \textbf{\textit{e4}}) and he would have maintained his advantage.

The move 17...\textbf{\textit{d8}} is not so effective anymore, when White's knight is on the e2-square (see our notes to White's move seventeen) and after 18.g5 \textbf{\textit{c4}} (18...\textbf{\textit{c4}}, Groth - P.Toth, corr. 1999, 19.\textbf{\textit{d2?!\textsuperscript{\pm}}}) 19.\textbf{\textit{f2 b5}} 20.h3!? \textbf{\textit{a6 21.c1 d6 22.e5 c4 23.e4\textsuperscript{\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\pm}}}}} White preserved some advantage thanks to the passive role of Black's bishop in the game Taboada - Yaroshenko, corr. 1997.

After 17...\textbf{\textit{c8}} 18.d5 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{xg4}} 19.\textbf{\textit{f1 (The seemingly attractive move 19.\textbf{\textit{d4}? Skaloud - Nemec, Hradec Kralove 1994, can be countered by Black with a tactical refutation - 19...\textbf{\textit{xe2!}} 20.\textbf{\textit{xe2 xd4+ 21.f1 f8+ 22.e1 xa1 23.b5 b6\textsuperscript{\textit{\pm}}}) 19...\textbf{\textit{c4}} 20.h3 and there arises the same position as after the move 17...\textbf{\textit{\textbf{xg4}.}}} 18.\textbf{\textit{f1}}}

White is preparing the move \textbf{d4-d5}. 18.\textbf{\textit{c1}} is weaker due to 18...\textbf{\textit{c8=}}.

\textbf{18...\textbf{\textit{c8}}}

After 18...\textbf{\textit{f8}} 19.\textbf{\textit{xf8+ \textbf{\textit{xf8}}}}
20.d5 b6 21.\textcircled{c}d4± White gets a big advantage according to the analysis of A.Karpov and I.Zaitsev.

In case of 18...\textcircled{f}d7 19.d5 e6 20.\textcircled{f}f4 exd5 21.exd5 \textcircled{h}d6 22.\textcircled{e}e6± White’s pieces have occupied the key-squares in the centre. Black’s attempt at counter-attacking – 22...\textcircled{e}e5?! was refuted with the help of 23.\textcircled{c}c5! \textcircled{x}h2+ 24.\textcircled{h}h1 \textcircled{g}g3 25.\textcircled{d}d4 \textcircled{e}e5 26.\textcircled{f}f2 \textcircled{f}f4 27.\textcircled{x}xf4+- and White remained with an extra piece in the game Rzepecki – Brzoza, corr. 1992.

19.h3

It is wiser for White to first repel Black’s queen from its active position.

In case of the immediate 19.d5 \textcircled{c}c4, White would not achieve anything much by grabbing a pawn – 20.\textcircled{x}xa7 (after 20.\textcircled{d}d4 \textcircled{e}e5 Black’s queen remains very active and it keeps White’s knight on the e2-square under attack) because of 20...b6 and White’s bishop gets trapped. It can be freed only by playing 21.\textcircled{c}c1 \textcircled{e}e5 (it is wrong for Black here to follow with 21...\textcircled{b}b2?

22.\textcircled{c}c8+ \textcircled{h}h8 23.\textcircled{b}b3 \textcircled{c}c5+ 24.\textcircled{h}h1 \textcircled{c}c4, because of 25.d6! exd6 26.\textcircled{x}xb6±) 22.\textcircled{c}c8+ \textcircled{h}h8 23.\textcircled{b}b5 \textcircled{c}c2 24.\textcircled{x}xb6 \textcircled{c}c4± and Black has a powerful counter-play for the sacrificed pawn.

19...\textcircled{d}d7 20.d5 \textcircled{c}c4

The computer programs (and they are traditionally greedy...) preferred at the end of the 20th century the move 20...\textcircled{a}a4 in order to attack White’s a2-pawn. In that case White can continue with 21.\textcircled{x}xa7 (now White’s bishop would not be trapped, but in the endgame after 21.\textcircled{g}g5 \textcircled{c}c2! 22.\textcircled{f}f4 \textcircled{x}d3 23.\textcircled{d}d3 \textcircled{c}c4 24.\textcircled{x}xe7 \textcircled{x}xe4 25.d6 \textcircled{c}c6 26.\textcircled{g}g5 \textcircled{d}d4 27.\textcircled{c}c5 \textcircled{x}d6 28.\textcircled{x}xb7 \textcircled{d}d7= Black does not risk anything at all, Comp “Meph Risc” – Comp “Hiarcs”, 1994.) 21...\textcircled{c}c4 22.\textcircled{d}d4 \textcircled{x}xa2 23.\textcircled{x}g7 \textcircled{x}g7 24.\textcircled{f}f4 \textcircled{a}7+ 25.\textcircled{h}h2 \textcircled{b}b8 26.\textcircled{h}h1 \textcircled{g}8 27.\textcircled{e}e6±, and Black has problems to defend his king, Comp “Genius” – Comp “Hiarcs”, 1993.

21.\textcircled{d}d4

White plans to deploy his knight to e6, but he cannot achieve that with any straightforward attempts.

After 21.\textcircled{d}d4 \textcircled{x}e3 22.\textcircled{c}cxe3 \textcircled{c}c4 23.\textcircled{d}e6 \textcircled{x}e6 24.\textcircled{d}xe6 \textcircled{d}d4 25.\textcircled{x}xd4 \textcircled{d}xd4 26.\textcircled{f}f7 \textcircled{x}xe4 27.\textcircled{x}xe7 b5= the arising rook endgame is roughly equal, while 21.\textcircled{x}xa7 b6 22.\textcircled{b}b8, leads to a position with equal material after 22...b5 23.\textcircled{g}3 \textcircled{a}7+ 24.\textcircled{h}h2 \textcircled{x}xa2∞
21...e5

Otherwise Black can hardly prevent the appearance of White’s knight on the e6-square.

In case of 21...a5 22.ae5 \xe5 23.d4 c4, it is good for White to follow with 24.xa7 d2 25.h4+ and he remained with an extra pawn in the game, Comp “Rebel” – Comp “Gambit Tiger”, Mohlsdorf 2001.

After 21...\xe5, Black should consider the move 22.b3! (Black can counter T.Giorgadze’s recommendation – 22.ae5 \xe5 23.d4 with 23...b8! 24.f3 d6 and his counterplay is quite enough to maintain the balance: 25.f7+ h8 26.f3 b6+ 27.h1 f6=) 22...b6 (22...h8? 23.b2 d6 24.xb7 c7 25.xc7, Rios Filho – Guimaraes, Rio de Janeiro 1998, 25...xc7 26.b8+ xf8 27.xe5+) 23.b2+ and White has again the dangerous threat d4-e6.

22.dxe6 \xe6 23.xg7 h7 24.f4 d6

After 24...b6+ 25.h1 e5 26.a3 \e8 27.d5, Black complied with playing the line: 27...a6 28.xa6 bxa6 29.f6 \e7 30.xa6+ entering a difficult endgame without a pawn, Brico – Barbosa de Oliveira, corr. 1998.

25.c3+ h6?!

Black loses after 25...e5? because of 26.e6+ g8 27.\xc4!+-.

In case of 25...g8?! 26.d5 b6 27.f6+ h8 28.b2 c5+, we intend to introduce some changes in the evaluations of an old analysis of A.Karpov and I.Zaitzev and that is – 29.xh1! (The ex-world champion and his second analyzed: 29.h2 \c3 30.e8 g8 31.b5 c5 32.f6+?, but then the placement of the white king on the h2-square proved to be wrong in the line: 32...g7 33.e8 e5 29...c3 30.e8! d7 (Now, because of the position of White’s king on h1 and not on h2, in answer to 30...g8, White wins immediately with 31.f2++) 31.xc3+? (White is already not satisfied with only an extra pawn in the variation: 31.xb7 \xe8 32.xd7+ 31...xc3 32.f7 c8 32...d3 33.e5+ 33.d6 e5 33...c1+ 34.h2 c5 35.e8! g8 36.c7+ 34.e7 (in case of 34.xh7+? h7 35.xc8 g7 36.xa7 f6 Black preserves good chances to make a draw, because of his active king) 34.c1+ (34...d8 35.xb7+) 35.h2 d3 (35...c4 36.c7+) 36.xb7+-.

This position was reached in the game Karpov – Kasparov, Sevilla (m/9) 1987. White had to
play here the move 26.\(\text{d}3\)! (Instead of that, the game continued with 26.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{\pm}\) and White's advantage proved to be insufficient for victory.) with the idea to continue with the maneuver \(\text{f}2\)-g4 and Black's defence then would have been extremely difficult.

b) 15...e5

\begin{center}
\includegraphics{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

Black agrees to let White create a protected passed d-pawn in the centre with the idea to compensate this with some active piece play.

Following Black's move 15 White has a choice of: b1) 16.d5, b2) 16.\(\text{c}1\) and 16.\(\text{g}1\) (Chapter 30).

We must note that the move 16.dxe5 after 16...\(\text{exchange}\) 17.\(\text{xd}8\) (White fails to exchange the dark-squared bishops with 17. \(\text{d}4??\) because of 17...\(\text{f}6+\) 18. \(\text{g}1\) \(\text{d}8\)-\(\pm\) 17...\(\text{xd}8\) 18.\(\text{c}1\) in case of 18...\(\text{b}5??\) (18...\(\text{c}6??\) is worse for Black due to 19.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 20.\(\text{g}3\) a6 21.\(\text{f}4\) b5 22.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{e}7\) 23.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{e}2\) \(\text{\pm}\) and now Black tried to solve his problems by simplification of the position with 24...\(\text{c}7?\) 24.\(\text{xc}7\) \(\text{xc}7\) 25. \(\text{e}6\) \(\text{e}5\) 26.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{c}6\) 27.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 28.\(\text{c}7\)-\(\pm\) but as a result he reached a lost knight endgame in Chabanon – C.Horvath, Bischwiller 1999) 19.\(\text{xa}7\) \(\text{c}4\) lead to a position that we are going to analyse later in the line b2.

b1) 16.d5

White gets now a protected passed d-pawn, but Black's knight is activated effortlessly as a result.

16...\(\text{c}4\)

This move is much stronger now, because White's d5-pawn has covered the a2-g8 diagonal.

Black's attempt at counterattacking connected with the move 16...\(\text{h}4??\) fails due to 17.d6! and it becomes clear that he is in a big trouble, because White is threatening to check from the d5-square and to win Black's knight. 17...\(\text{c}6\) (Black loses after 17...\(\text{h}2\), because of 18.\(\text{d}5+\) \(\text{h}8\) 19.\(\text{xa}5\) \(\text{f}8+\) 20.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{h}1+\) 21.\(\text{g}1\)-\(\pm\); in case of 17...\(\text{f}6+\) 18.\(\text{g}1\) \(\text{e}6\) 19.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{xd}4\) 20.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{h}6\) 21.d7 \(\text{c}6\) 22.\(\text{d}8\)+ \(\text{xd}8\) 23.\(\text{xd}8\) \(\text{h}7\) 24.\(\text{e}7\)-\(\pm\) White will easily win with an extra piece and his victory is just a matter of time, Villar – Rawlings, corr. 2000; following 17...\(\text{h}8\) 18. \(\text{d}5\) \(\text{\pm}\) White's advantage is overwhelming.) 18.\(\text{b}3+\) \(\text{h}8\) 19. \(\text{xb}7\) \(\text{f}8+\) 20.\(\text{g}1\) \(\text{d}4\) (Black loses after 20...\(\text{xd}4\) 21.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xe}2\) 22.\(\text{xa}7\)-\(\pm\), as well as af-
ter 20...\textit{a}h6 21.\textit{a}xh6 \textit{a}xh6 22. \\
\textit{a}xc6 \textit{e}3+ 23.\textit{h}1 \textit{xe}2 24. \\
\textit{g}1+-- these lines have been 
analyzed by V. Golod.) 21.\textit{b}2 \\
\textit{f}6 22.\textit{d}7! \textit{d}6 (after 22...\textit{b}6 
23.\textit{x}b6! \textit{xe}2+ 24.\textit{h}1 axb6 
25.\textit{g}5!-- Black will have to give 
up his rook for White's passed d-
pawn; in case of 22...\textit{d}8 23. \\
\textit{c}1! \textit{d}6 24.\textit{g}5 \textit{xe}2+ 25.\textit{xe}2 
\textit{xd}7 26.\textit{c}8+ \textit{f}8 27.\textit{f}1\pm Black 
remains a pawn down and his 
position is extremely difficult to 
defend, because of the pin along 
the eighth rank.) 23.\textit{xd}4 \textit{exd}4 
24.\textit{d}1 \textit{d}3 (Black loses after 24... 
\textit{dxe}3, because of 25.\textit{xd}6 \textit{xb}2 
26.\textit{d}8\textit{xc}8 27.\textit{xd}8+ \textit{g}7 
28.\textit{f}1++, as well as after: 24... 
\textit{xd}7 due to 25.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4+ 26. 
\textit{xd}4+ \textit{xd}4+ 27.\textit{xd}4+- V. Golod) 
25.\textit{b}3 \textit{xd}7 26.\textit{xd}3 \textit{a}4 
27.\textit{d}2+- Golod – Liss, Ramat 
Aviv 1998.

After 16...\textit{d}6 17.\textit{c}2 b5 18. 
\textit{a}4 \textit{c}4 19.\textit{f}2 \textit{c}8 20.\textit{g}1 \textit{a}6 21. 
\textit{axb}5 \textit{axb}5, Rouillon – Baillargeant, 
Avoine 2001, White can 
continue with 22.\textit{b}3\pm with 
the idea to follow with 23.\textit{a}7 and he 
can preserve some advantage 
thanks to the active placement 
of his pieces.

In case of 16...\textit{f}6+ 17.\textit{g}1 
\textit{c}4 White can exploit the fact 
that Black has transposed the 
move order in the following fash-
on: 18.\textit{d}3 (After 18.\textit{f}2 we 
reach a position from the main 
line.) 18...\textit{xe}3 19.\textit{xe}3 \textit{a}6 
(Black would be too generous if 
he continues with: 19...\textit{f}8? 
20.\textit{xa}7 \textit{h}4 21.\textit{g}3 \textit{yg}4 22. 
\textit{xb}7+- Brigelhuber – Sohier, 
Paris 2002.) 20.\textit{g}3 \textit{c}8 21.\textit{b}3\pm 
and White's position seemed to 
be slightly superior in the game 
Karttunen – Myllyniemi, Kuopio 
1995.

17.\textit{f}2

White has also tested 17.\textit{d}3. 
In case White complies with the 
exchange 17...\textit{xe}3+ (White can 
counter 17...\textit{b}5 with 18.\textit{g}5!?)
18.\textit{xe}3 his opponent would 
have excellent chances to orga-
nize an effective counterplay on 
the dark squares. There might 
follow: 18...\textit{h}4!? (It is obviously 
bad for Black to play: 18...\textit{c}8?!, 
because of 19.\textit{xa}7 \textit{h}6, Ameri-
ne – Heffington, corr. 1998 and 
here White would have main-
tained his advantage with: 20. 
\textit{b}1! \textit{g}5 21.\textit{g}1\pm; but instead 
it is quite possible for him to play 
18...\textit{f}8 and after 19.g3 \textit{b}6 20. 
\textit{g}2 \textit{c}5\!= Black had a sufficient 
compensation for the pawn in the 
game Quevedo Gomez – 
Gonzalez Diaz, Spain 1998, while 
in case of 19.\textit{c}1 \textit{h}4\!, after 
White's terrible blunder 20.\textit{g}1? 
\textit{c}5! in the game R. Fernandez 
– Tsuboi, Brazil 1995, Black 
even managed to win quickly; it 
also deserves mentioning that the 
computer line – 18...\textit{a}5!? 
19.\textit{g}1 \textit{c}8 is interesting and 
its idea becomes clear in the 
variation: 20.\textit{c}1 \textit{c}2\!=, while 
in case of 20.\textit{d}3 \textit{b}6+ 21. 
\textit{h}1 \textit{b}2 22.\textit{d}1 \textit{xa}2 23.\textit{d}6 
\textit{e}6\!= Black has no reasons to
complain about anything at all.) 19.h3 (19...g3 was weaker and after 19...xf8+ 20.g1 xg3 21.xg3 h6 22.f1 e3+ 23. h1 c8 24.h4 c2= Black had even a slight edge in the game Tuchfeld – Stephan, Germany 1993; After the generous move 19.g1, in the game Cooper – Bates, England 2001, Black had to react with: 19...xg4 20.c1 h4! (followed by 21...h6=) 19...h6 (In case White’s knight manages to reach the key e6-square as it happened after: 19...b6!? 20.g1 f8 21.h1 c5 22.d3 f6 23.g1 f2 24.f3 d6 25.a6 f8 26.g5± A.Graf – Conquest, Groningen 1997, Black is faced with serious problems; the transposition of moves after 19...xf8+?! 20.g1 h6 enables White to capture a second pawn – 21.xa7=, but we still have to mention that in the games Dobrov – V.Belov, Eforsie Nord 1998 and Vazquez Alvarez – Carraminana Lopez, Orense 2000 White failed to materialize his advantage into a victory.) 20.d3 f8+ 21.g1 f2+ 22. h1 (The trade of queens, which is possible after 22.h2 e3 23.d1 f2 24.xe3 xe3 25. c3 f3= Guthrie – Wastney, New Zealand 2001 is favourable for Black, because of the active placement of his pieces and his pawn-majority on the queenside.) 22.e3 23.c4 (after the queens swap 23.xe3 xe3 24. d1 f2 25.g1 f7 26.d3 as in the game Kramnik – Shirov, Cazorla (m/3) 1998, Black could have played 26...d4=, recommended by V.Kramnik and S. Dolmatov and obtain somewhat better chances) 23.b5 (Black loses after 23...f2? due to 24. d6+=) 24.xb5 f2 (should Black regain his sacrificed pawn with 24...xe4, after 25.g3 d4 26.b1 d8 27.e2 White is threatening to occupy the all-important outpost in the centre with the move 28.e4=) 25.e8+ f8 (if 25...f8 26.e6+ h8 27.g5! xg5 28.xe5+ f6 29. d6 g7 30.g1 xe4 31.c1 h5 as in the game van Wely – Shirov, Belgrade 1999, White could have obtained a great advantage according to van Wely with 32.g3!? followed by 33. d6±) 26.e6+ (if 26.d6 xe2 27.d7 xe4 28.g1, Black could play 28...f3! 29.gxf3 xf3+ 30.h2 f4= and force a draw by perpetual) 26...h8 27.e2? (This line is more precise than: 27...xe4 28.g1 xd6 29.xd6 xe2 30.b8+ g7 31.xa7+ f7 32.c5 Lubas – Traut, corr. 2002; nevertheless Black still managed to equalize and draw in that game.) 28.xe5+ (if 28.d7 xe4 29.g1, Black can force a draw once again with 29...f3! 30.g5 e7! 31.gxf3 xf3+ 32.g2 f1+ 33.h2 f4=) 28...g7 29.e8+ f8 30.d7 d3 31.e5 h6 (It is not good for Black to play here 31...g8?, because according to G.Kasparov White should
continue with: 32.\textit{g}g1 \textit{xe}5 33.\textit{ee}6+ \textit{ff}7 34.\textit{xe}5 \textit{xd}7 35.\textit{bb}1=.) 32.e6 (if 32.\textit{ee}7, then 32...\textit{hh}7 33.e6 \textit{dd}5 34.\textit{gg}1 \textit{ff}3!= with a draw) 32...\textit{hh}7 33.\textit{gg}1 \textit{ff}3! 34.\textit{bb}8 \textit{hx}3+ and the opponents agreed to a draw in the game Kramnik – Kasparov, Linares 1999.

I am going to mention here that the move 17.\textit{bb}3 is of no separate importance, because with the help of the move 17...\textit{xe}3+ Black can transpose to variations that we have already analyzed.

17...\textit{ff}6

Black is threatening 18...\textit{ee}3+.

18.\textit{gg}1

\textbf{18...\textit{ff}8!}

Black plays extremely actively, trying to seize the initiative. He leaves his a7-pawn unprotected with his last move.

Taking care about the defence of the a7-pawn is unnecessary here and it usually leads to Black losing the initiative, moreover his queenside gets weakened. Here is a quite illustrative example: 18...b6?! 19.\textit{cc}1 \textit{ff}8 20.\textit{ee}1 \textit{dd}6 21.\textit{gg}3 \textit{hh}6 22.\textit{cc}6= as it was played in the game Thomson – Cumming, corr. 1999. White maintained better prospects too after: 18...a6 19.\textit{gg}3 \textit{cc}8 20.\textit{bb}3 b6 21.g5! \textit{dd}6 (22...\textit{xe}5 23.\textit{xx}b6=} 22.\textit{cc}1 b5 23.a4 \textit{dd}7 24.axb5 axb5 25.\textit{aa}1= in the game Martinez – Schipper, corr. 2000.

In case of 18...b5 19.a4 \textit{dd}6, Gofshtein – Baquero, Cannes 1999, White had to continue with: 20.\textit{bb}1!? bxa4 21.\textit{xa}4, and this would have guaranteed his advantage, because his passed a-pawn was in fact rather a liability in that position.

19.\textit{ee}1

After 19.\textit{xa}7 b6= White’s bishop might get trapped. White has tried in practice here: 20.\textit{hh}1 \textit{ee}3!? (after 20...\textit{ff}2 21.\textit{dd}3 \textit{ee}3 22.\textit{gg}1 \textit{xe}4 23.h3= there arose some complications: 23...\textit{aa}8 24.\textit{xx}b6 \textit{xx}b6 25.hxg4 \textit{xa}2 26.\textit{cc}3 \textit{ff}2 27.\textit{aa}1 \textit{dd}8 28.\textit{gg}3 \textit{ff}4 29.\textit{bb}1 h6 and the result of all that was a draw in the game Gerber – Pappenbrock, corr. 1990) 21.\textit{gg}1 \textit{hh}6 22.\textit{bb}1 \textit{cc}4 23.\textit{gg}3 (In case White becomes too greedy – 23.\textit{xx}b6? \textit{xx}b6 24.\textit{xx}b6 after 24...\textit{ff}1= he will lose a piece.) 23...\textit{ee}3 24.\textit{dd}1 \textit{dd}4= Holmberg – Bachmann, corr. 1998 and we can already witness that Black is playing for a win. White failed to solve the problem of his bishop on a7.

White has also tried another
line with the same idea: 19...\texttt{\textbf{c5}} \texttt{\textbf{c8}} (19...\texttt{\textbf{xf7}}? Barbot – Levieux, Torcy 1991, 20...\texttt{\textbf{a4}} \texttt{\textbf{d2}} 21. \texttt{\textbf{g3+}}) 20...\texttt{\textbf{xa7}} (in case of 20. \texttt{\textbf{xf2}}, Black can retreat with his rook – 20...\texttt{\textbf{f8}}, but additionally White should also consider the possibility 20...\texttt{\textbf{h6}}∞ Schuil – L’Ami, Haarlem 2000) 20...\texttt{\textbf{b6}} and here after White’s best move 21...\texttt{\textbf{d6}}!? (The complications after 21...\texttt{\textbf{c1}} \texttt{\textbf{h6}}!? 22...\texttt{\textbf{xc4}} \texttt{\textbf{e3+}} 23...\texttt{\textbf{h1}} \texttt{\textbf{xc4}} 24...\texttt{\textbf{d6}} \texttt{\textbf{d4}} 25...\texttt{\textbf{b8}}, Bollaart – Braaf, Utrecht 2001, following 25...\texttt{\textbf{f7}}!∞ are far from harmless for White, because his first rank is very vulnerable, while Black can neutralize his opponent’s passed d-pawn with his king.) Black plays 21...\texttt{\textbf{xf7}}! (after 21...\texttt{\textbf{xd6}}? 22...\texttt{\textbf{xd6}} \texttt{\textbf{xd6}} 23...\texttt{\textbf{xb6}} \texttt{\textbf{c6}} 24...\texttt{\textbf{e3}} \texttt{\textbf{c4}} 25. \texttt{\textbf{g3}} \texttt{\textbf{xe4}} 26...\texttt{\textbf{a4}} \texttt{\textbf{xg3}} 27...\texttt{\textbf{hxg3+}} Comp “Gandalf “ – Comp “Nimzo”, Mohlsdorf 2001, Black has great problems to cope with White’s passed a-pawn) 22...\texttt{\textbf{d7}} \texttt{\textbf{d8}} 23...\texttt{\textbf{b3}} \texttt{\textbf{xd7}} 24...\texttt{\textbf{f1}} \texttt{\textbf{e6}} 25...\texttt{\textbf{c1}} \texttt{\textbf{xa7}} 26...\texttt{\textbf{xc4}} \texttt{\textbf{f8}} 27...\texttt{\textbf{c3}} \texttt{\textbf{xb3}} 28...\texttt{\textbf{AXB3}} \texttt{\textbf{f7}}\texttt{\textbf{c}} and his compensation for the sacrificed pawn is quite sufficient.

\texttt{\textbf{19...\textbf{h6}}} 20...\texttt{\textbf{g3}} \texttt{\textbf{a6}}

Black has created the threat 21...\texttt{\textbf{xf2}}!. Generally speaking it becomes clear that Black has a good game notwithstanding White’s protected passed pawn. White’s minor pieces are not well coordinated, his bishop is restricted by the e5-pawn and his knight has no comfortable square in the centre of the board.

The simplifications – 20...\texttt{\textbf{xf2}}+ 21...\texttt{\textbf{xf2}} \texttt{\textbf{e3}} 22...\texttt{\textbf{xe3}} \texttt{\textbf{xe3}}, Smits – Fuller, corr. 1997, after 23...\texttt{\textbf{b1}}!? \texttt{\textbf{b6}} 24...\texttt{\textbf{g5}} \texttt{\textbf{c8}} 25...\texttt{\textbf{e1}}\texttt{\textbf{c}} would have led to an endgame in which Black would have to fight for a draw.

\texttt{\textbf{21.\textbf{h1}}}

White’s careless move 21. \texttt{\textbf{e2}}? Feletar – Leventic, Buzovac 2002, could have been punished by Black resolutely after: 21...\texttt{\textbf{xf2}}! 22...\texttt{\textbf{xf2}} (22...\texttt{\textbf{xf2}} \texttt{\textbf{e3}}+) 22...\texttt{\textbf{b6}}+ 23...\texttt{\textbf{f1}} \texttt{\textbf{d2}}+ 24...\texttt{\textbf{e1}} \texttt{\textbf{g1}}+ 25...\texttt{\textbf{f1}} \texttt{\textbf{xf1}} 26. \texttt{\textbf{f2}} (White cannot capture the knight 26...\texttt{\textbf{xf1}}, because of 26...\texttt{\textbf{d4}} 27...\texttt{\textbf{d1}} \texttt{\textbf{c3}}+ 28...\texttt{\textbf{e2}} \texttt{\textbf{e3}}) 26...\texttt{\textbf{xf2}}+ 27...\texttt{\textbf{xf2}} \texttt{\textbf{d2}} 28...\texttt{\textbf{e1}} \texttt{\textbf{f8}}– and Black remains with two light pieces for White’s rook.

It is not good for White to play 21...\texttt{\textbf{f1}}!? because of 21...\texttt{\textbf{b2}}!\texttt{\textbf{t}} with the idea to follow with 22...\texttt{\textbf{d3}}. Black’s initiative is extremely dangerous and you can see that in the following lines: 22...\texttt{\textbf{h4}} 23...\texttt{\textbf{d3}} 23...\texttt{\textbf{c3}} (after 23. \texttt{\textbf{e2}} \texttt{\textbf{b6}}+ 24...\texttt{\textbf{h1}} \texttt{\textbf{d4}} 25...\texttt{\textbf{d1}} \texttt{\textbf{g5}} 26...\texttt{\textbf{g3}} \texttt{\textbf{f4}} 27...\texttt{\textbf{e1}}, Puth – Schwab, Eisenberg 1998, Black
could have won immediately with: 27...@c1!+- 23...@f4 24. @e1 @e2+ 25. @h1 @c1! 26. @g3 @d3 27. @b1 (27. @e2 @f2+ 28. @g1 @b6=) 27...@e3 28.h3 @d4 29. @e7 @c8= these are some details from the game Morot – Martin, corr. 1990.

21...@a3?!

This is in fact better than the much more popular 21...@a4. White can play 22. @g1!? (Black had a good compensation for the pawn after 22. @e2 b6 23.h4 @f4?! 24. @e1 @f8 25. @c1 b5 26. @c3 @e7 27.h5 @a6 28.hxg6 hxg6= in the game Ftacnik – Kudrin, Reno 1991) 22...b6 (22...@c8, and if 23. @f2, then not 23...b6?! 24. @f6= Cardelli – W.Hoffmann, corr. 1985, but 23...@f8! 24. @xa7 @xa7 25. @xa7 b6 26. @b1 @a8 27. @b4 @xa7 28. @xc4 @xa2= and Black’s compensation for the pawn is sufficient, Andrews – Crocker, corr. 1999) 23. @c3 @f7 (following 23...@c8, White’s passive move 24. @e2?! enabled Black after: 24...@d7 25.h3 @d6 26. @f3 @c4 27. @g3 @f4 28. @e1 @a4= to organize some counterplay against White’s e4-pawn, Vinagre – Simonsen, corr. 1990, but in a game, which was played sometime later – Ristorto – Reyes, corr. 2000, White continued with: 24.h3! @f4 25. @b3 @a6 26.d6! and he seized the initiative and after: 26...@d8 27. @e2 @d2 28. @h2 @g7 29. @g1 @xd6 30. @f3= he exerted powerful pressure against Black’s e5-pawn) 24. @b1 @d2 (it is too dubious for Black to play 24...@d2?! Kovacs – Slezak, corr. 1994, because of 25. @b4! @xa2 26. @xe5±; in case of 24...@d6?! 25. @xe5 @f4 26. @e6 @xg3 27.hxg3 @xe4 28. @d1= White’s advantage is out of question, while after 24...@xa2 25. @b4 @c7 26.d6 @e3 27. @xe3 @xe3 28.dxc7 @c2 29. @xe3 @xc7 30. @b1= White’s chances with a rook and two minor pieces for the queen are again preferable) 25. @d3 @f4?! (in the game Seirawan – Popovic, Manila 1990, Black chose the tempting 25...@xa2?, but after 26.d6! @xd6 27. @xd6 @xb1 28. @xd2 White had a crushing attack; but still it is quite reasonable for Black to follow with 25...@h6?! 26. @e2 @d6 27. @c3 @a3 28. @b3 @c1= Haveland – T.Andresen, corr. 1997) 26. @e2 @d6 27. @c3 @c4 28. @xc4 @xc4 29. @b4 @d6 30. @b5 @d2 31. @xd6 @xb4 32. @xf7 @xf7 33.g3 @e7= and Black’s position is super solid.

22.@e2

After the retreat of the bishop 22. @g1 Black controls the a3-f8 diagonal and 22...b5 becomes possible. After 23. @b1 a6 24. @b3 @c1 25. @e2 @a5 26. @c2 @e3 White can hardly improve his position. For example after 27. @d1 @xg1 28. @xg1 @c4 29. @b3 @xb3 30.axb3 @d6= White’s e4-pawn is weak and Black’s pawn majority on the queenside might be telling soon.
22...b5 23.b1 a6

The game Myllyniemi – Tiermann, corr. 1990, reached that position. Black's pieces are active and with his pawn majority on the queenside Black’s future seems rosy.

b2) 16.c1

White postpones temporarily his decision concerning opening the position in the centre and pushing his d-pawn forward.

Tournament practice has confirmed that Black's best possibilities are: b2a) 16...b5 and b2b) 16...f8+.

The move 16...d7 is just a loss of time and enables White to play 17.dxe5 d1+ 18.xd1 c4 19.f4! (White can also try 19.f2 xe5 20.d7 b6 and now in the game Schussler – Kudrin, USA 1990, White had to choose 21.g3?!± with some edge.) 19...xe5 20.xe5 c5 (but not 20...e3+ because of 21.e1 xd1 22.xd1 e8 23.d4 xe4 24. h3±) 21.g5± and achieve a slight advantage.

Should Black reduce the tension in the centre with 16...exd4, after 17.xd4! (it was weaker for White to play 17.xd4 e7 18. c2 and now in the game Vogt – Luecke, Germany 1991, Black could have played 18...e8!= and exert an immediate pressure against White’s e4-pawn) 17...xd4 (17...f8 – see 16...f8 17.g1 exd4) 18.xd4!? (after the weaker 18.xd4 and 18...e7 19.e1 c4 20.g1 b5 21. f3 White had to agree to a draw in the game Hort – Stohl, Germany 1993, due to the line 21.e8 22.d1 xe4 23.xe4 xe4 24.d8+ g7 25.d7+ g8 26.xa7 xg4=) 18...xd4 19. xd4 e8 (after 19...f8+? 20. e2 f4 Gilbert – Coleman, Birmingham 2000, it would have been very strong for White to follow with: 21.e3! xg4 22.g3 g5 23.c7+- and the difference in placement of the rooks renders Black’s position hopeless) 20.e1 c4 21.f2± and White could have reached a superior endgame.

b2a) 16...b5

Black is preparing to establish his knight on c4.
17.dxe5 \( \mathcal{A}c4 \)

After 17...\( \mathcal{A}xd1 + \) 18.\( \mathcal{A}xd1 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe5 \) 19.\( \mathcal{A}d5! \) (the attractive 19.\( \mathcal{A}d7 \) allowed Black to play 19...a6 20.\( \mathcal{A}d4 \) \( \mathcal{A}c4 \) 21.\( \mathcal{A}e2 \) \( \mathcal{A}xh2 \) 22.\( \mathcal{A}f3 \) \( \mathcal{A}d6 \) 23.\( \mathcal{A}d4 \) \( \mathcal{A}e8= \) and equalize in the game Rylander – Akesson, Orebro 2000) 19.\( \mathcal{A}c4 \) (19...\( \mathcal{A}xh2? \) was not good for Black after 20.g3 with the idea 21.\( \mathcal{A}g2++ \) 20.\( \mathcal{A}c5! \) a6 21.\( \mathcal{A}f2 \) \( \mathcal{A}e8 \) 22.\( \mathcal{A}f3 \) (planning g4-g5 and h2-h4 fixing Black's kingside pawns) 22...h6 (after 22...\( \mathcal{A}g7 \) 23.g5 \( \mathcal{A}e5+ \) 24.\( \mathcal{A}f4\pm \) White's pieces are much more active, while after 22...\( \mathcal{A}c7 \) 23.h3 \( \mathcal{A}e5+ \) 24.\( \mathcal{A}e3 \) \( \mathcal{A}c4+ \) 25.\( \mathcal{A}d3 \) \( \mathcal{A}e5+ \) 26.\( \mathcal{A}d4 \) \( \mathcal{A}c6+ \) 27.\( \mathcal{A}e3\pm \) White can fall back on the plan to fix Black's kingside pawns after he got rid of the annoying chase of the black knight) 23.h3\( \pm \) and White's chances are preferable.

In case the queens remain on the board after: 17...\( \mathcal{A}e5 \) 18.\( \mathcal{A}g1 \) \( \mathcal{A}c4 \) 19.\( \mathcal{A}d4\pm \) Mills – Dournes, corr. 1998 White preserves superior prospects.

18.\( \mathcal{A}xd8+ \)

White should not play now 18.\( \mathcal{A}d4?! \), because of 18...\( \mathcal{A}h6!\uparrow \).

19...\( \mathcal{A}xe5 \)

Black will lose his b5-pawn if he persists with his attack against White's a2-pawn in the line 19...\( \mathcal{A}a8?! \) 20.\( \mathcal{A}d4 \) \( \mathcal{A}xa2 \) after 21.\( \mathcal{A}c3\pm \).

It is hardly satisfactory for Black to play here: 19...\( \mathcal{A}h6?! \) due to 20.\( \mathcal{A}e1! \) (It also seems good for White to try the prophylactic move 20.\( \mathcal{A}a1?! \), because after 20...\( \mathcal{A}g7 \) 21.\( \mathcal{A}d4 \) \( \mathcal{A}xd4 \) 22.\( \mathcal{A}xd4 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe5 \) 23.\( \mathcal{A}b3 \) \( \mathcal{A}xa1 \) 24.\( \mathcal{A}xa1 \) \( \mathcal{A}d2+ \) 25.\( \mathcal{A}e2 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) 26.\( \mathcal{A}d3\pm \) the king and knight endgame will be lost for Black due to the weakness of his b5-pawn, while in case of 21...\( \mathcal{A}xe5 \), J.Pribyl – E.Pinter, Piestany 2004, White can play: 21.\( \mathcal{A}c3! \) \( \mathcal{A}xg4 \) 22.\( \mathcal{A}xb5 \) \( \mathcal{A}xh2+ \) 23.\( \mathcal{A}g1 \) \( \mathcal{A}g4 \) 24.a4\( \pm \) and his passed a-pawn would be extremely dangerous for Black.) 20.\( \mathcal{A}f8+ \) (after 20...\( \mathcal{A}d2 \) 21.\( \mathcal{A}c3 \) b4 22.\( \mathcal{A}d5 \) \( \mathcal{A}xa2 \) 23.\( \mathcal{A}c5 \) b3 24.e6++ Black can cope with White's e-pawn only at the price of a piece) 21.\( \mathcal{A}g1 \) \( \mathcal{A}a8 \) 22.\( \mathcal{A}d4 \) \( \mathcal{A}xa2 \) 23.\( \mathcal{A}c3 \) \( \mathcal{A}d2 \) 24.\( \mathcal{A}b1 \) \( \mathcal{A}xc3 \) 25.\( \mathcal{A}xc3 \) and Black will have to part with his b5-pawn sooner or later. There might follow: 25...\( \mathcal{A}e3 \) (25...\( \mathcal{A}c2 \) 26.\( \mathcal{A}d4 \) \( \mathcal{A}d2 \) 27.\( \mathcal{A}c5 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe5 \) 28.h3 \( \mathcal{A}e2 \) 29.\( \mathcal{A}xb5 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) 30.\( \mathcal{A}b8+ \) \( \mathcal{A}f7 \) 31.\( \mathcal{A}b7\pm \) – and despite the fact that the material on the board has been considerably reduced, Black's defence will be quite problematic due to the unfavourable placement of his pieces.) 26.e6 \( \mathcal{A}xg2+ \) 27.\( \mathcal{A}h1 \) \( \mathcal{A}f2 \) (after
27...\textit{\textbf{x}}g4 28.\textit{\textbf{x}}xb5 \textit{\textbf{f}}4 29.h3+--
Black's knight might get trapped in White's camp, while his opponent's e-pawn would be simply marching forward to promotion.) 28.h3± and Black will have great problems to fight against White's passed e-pawn and to defend his own b5-pawn at the same time.

\textbf{20.\textit{\textbf{d}}e1}

Black is threatening 21...\textit{\textbf{d}}2+ followed by 22...\textit{\textbf{d}}xe4, so White must defend the d2-square.

A.Kuzmin recommended 20.\textit{\textbf{c}}c2, but after 20...\textit{\textbf{d}}2+ 21.\textit{\textbf{e}}e1 \textit{\textbf{d}}xe4 22.h3 b4= White's chances to press home his advantage of an extra doubled pawn on the kingside are rather slim. The material has been greatly reduced and his a2-pawn is very weak too.

\textbf{20...\textit{\textbf{a}}a8 21.\textit{\textbf{d}}d4 \textit{\textbf{x}}h2?!}

Black can play now this seemingly risky move, because White's king is busy in the centre of the board. After the attractive 21...\textit{\textbf{x}}xd4 22.\textit{\textbf{x}}xd4 \textit{\textbf{a}}xa2 with the help of 23.\textit{\textbf{c}}c3! (in the game Timoshchenko - Urban, Cappelle la Grande 1993, White preferred 23.\textit{\textbf{a}}xb5 and as a result 23...\textit{\textbf{e}}e3 24.\textit{\textbf{c}}c8+ 24...\textit{\textbf{g}}7 25.h3 \textit{\textbf{x}}g2+ 26.\textit{\textbf{f}}1 \textit{\textbf{e}}e3+ 27.\textit{\textbf{e}}e1 \textit{\textbf{g}}2+ 28.\textit{\textbf{d}}1 \textit{\textbf{e}}e3+ 29.\textit{\textbf{c}}1 \textit{\textbf{h}}2 30.e5 \textit{\textbf{x}}h3 31.e6 \textit{\textbf{x}}g4 32.e7= Black's knight managed to catch White's passed pawn just in time) 23...\textit{\textbf{x}}g2 24.\textit{\textbf{a}}xb5 \textit{\textbf{e}}5 (24...\textit{\textbf{d}}2? is a mistake, since after 25.e5 \textit{\textbf{h}}xh2 26.e6! \textit{\textbf{f}}8 27.\textit{\textbf{c}}7! because of White's threat \textit{\textbf{c}}c3-e3 even if Black plays the best 27...\textit{\textbf{e}}e4 28.\textit{\textbf{f}}f3+ \textit{\textbf{g}}7 29.e7 \textit{\textbf{d}}6 30.\textit{\textbf{e}}e6+ \textit{\textbf{h}}6 31.\textit{\textbf{d}}3 \textit{\textbf{e}}8 32.\textit{\textbf{d}}8+- he is beyond salvation) 25.h3 \textit{\textbf{g}}7 26.\textit{\textbf{f}}1 (26. \textit{\textbf{d}}4 \textit{\textbf{f}}6 27.\textit{\textbf{e}}e2 \textit{\textbf{h}}2=) 26...\textit{\textbf{b}}b2 27.\textit{\textbf{c}}7± and White preserves some chances to convert his extra pawn into a full point.

\textbf{22.\textit{\textbf{b}}b1 \textit{\textbf{a}}xa2 23.\textit{\textbf{b}}xb5 \textit{\textbf{a}}3 24.\textit{\textbf{d}}d5 \textit{\textbf{c}}2+ 25.\textit{\textbf{f}}1 \textit{\textbf{x}}d4 26.\textit{\textbf{a}}xd4 \textit{\textbf{e}}5=}

The weak white pawns and the greatly reduced pawn potential make us evaluate this position as roughly equal.

\textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}2b) 16...\textit{\textbf{f}}8+!}

This is Black's best answer to White's last move.
Chapter 29

17.\textbf{g1 a3!}

That is the point. The straightforward attempt by Black to pin White's pieces by playing: 17...\textbf{exd4} 18.\textbf{xd4 d8} would not work, because of 19.\textbf{a4 xd4+} 20.\textbf{xd4 f4} 21.\textbf{e1 xg4} (or 21...\textbf{b6} 22.\textbf{h3 d2} 23.\textbf{f3 d7} 24.\textbf{b4+} Timoshchenko - Morris, Hastings 1991) 22.\textbf{b3!} (It is not so precise for White to play here: 22.\textbf{xa5} due to 22...\textbf{xd4} 23.\textbf{c7 d7} 24.\textbf{b8+ g7} 25.\textbf{xa7 d2} 26.h3 and White will have problems to press his advantage of an extra pawn home in this endgame with heavy pieces, A.Schneider – Alonso, Havana 1990) 22...\textbf{c6} 23.\textbf{c4+ h8} 24.\textbf{c3+ g8} 25.\textbf{c5+} and Black's position was very difficult in the game Volke – Luecke, Germany 1993.

18.\textbf{d2 exd4} 19.\textbf{xd4 d8}

Now, it is much more difficult for White to get rid of the pin, than in the similar variation that we have already analyzed in our notes to Black's move seventeen.

20.\textbf{f4 f8} 21.\textbf{e3}

White has no advantage after 21.\textbf{g5}, because of 21...\textbf{xd4+} 22.\textbf{xd4 xa2} 23.\textbf{f3} (23.\textbf{f5?! c6= H.Rodriguez – de Ovando, corr. 1988) 23...\textbf{c6} 24.\textbf{b5} (24.\textbf{h4 d4!=}) and here the line: 24...\textbf{d4!} 25.\textbf{xd4 f2+} 26.\textbf{h1 xd4} 27.\textbf{xb7 a5=} equalizes easily and Black has no problems at all.

21...\textbf{xd4}

The exchange of the queens after: 21...\textbf{xe3+?} 22.\textbf{xe3 c6} 23.\textbf{b1=} leads to an endgame in which Black will be simply a pawn down.

22.\textbf{xd4 xa2} 23.\textbf{c7 b1+} 24.\textbf{c1 b6} 25.\textbf{xb6 axb6=}

The chances of both sides in the ensuing battle are equal.
1. d4 ♜f6 2. c4 g6 3. ♗c3 d5 4. cxd5 ♘xd5 5. e4 ♘xc3 6. bxc3 ♗g7 7. ♗c4 c5 8. ♘e2 ♘c6 9. ♗e3 0–0 10. 0–0 ♗g4 11. f3 ♘a5 12. ♘xf7 ♘xf7 13. fxg4 ♘xf1 14. ♘xf1 cxd4 15. cxd4 e5 16. ♘g1!?

This is a useful prophylactic move. White’s hopes for advantage in this position are predominantly based on it lately.

Black’s most popular answers are: a) 16...exd4 and b) 16...♗c8.

Notice that contrary to the line b1 (Chapter 29) Black can not bring now his knight into action with 16...♘c4?! due to 17. ♗b3!±.

The position after 16...♗b6 17. ♗b1 ♖e6 18. dxe5!? was analysed by us already in line a (Chapter 29) – see 15...♗b6 16. ♗g1 e5 17. ♗b1.

Black has also tried in practice here the move 16...♗d7?! After 17. dxe5 ♖xd1+ (In case of 17...♖e6 18. ♗c1 Black as a result of 18...♘c4 19. ♗b3 b5 20. ♗d4 ♗b6 21. ♗f2=, or 18...♖xe5 19. ♗d4± will be faced with serious problems in the middle game, while after 18...♖xe5, White can play 19. ♗d4 ♖d6 20. ♗xg7 ♖xd1 21. ♗xd1 ♖xg7 22. ♗d7+ and he will have a clear advantage in the arising endgame.) 18. ♗xd1 ♘c4. Now White must be greedy – 19. ♗f4! (It is weaker for him to play 19. ♗f2!?, because after 19...♖xe5 20. h3 in the game Arlandi – Pont Mulet, Calvia 2004, Black could have organized an immediate counterplay with the help of 20...b5! parrying 21. ♗d5 b4!? 22. ♗d4 with 22...♘c4!±, as well as 22. ♗a5 with 22...a6∞). Now already in case of 19...♖xe5 (after 19...♖e8 20. ♗d7 ♖xe5 21. ♗xb7 ♖xg4 22. ♗b4± Comp “Rebel” – Comp “Gromit Chess”, Maastricht 2001, White remains with a solid extra pawn) White can lose a tempo for the move 20.g5! (It is not advisable for White to part with his bishop 20. ♗xe5 ♗xe5, at least because of the possibility to penetrate with his rook on the seventh rank – 21. ♗d7, since after 21...♖c8 22. ♗xb7 ♖c2 23. ♗f2 ♖xa2 24. h4 a5 25. ♗b5± he has problems to materialize his extra
pawn, because of the presence of the powerful black passed pawn on the a-file.), because Black cannot continue with 20...b5? due to 21.\( \text{\textit{d}5}\uparrow\), while after 20...\( \text{\textit{e}8}\), as it was played in the game Bick – Shivaji, Lindsborg 2004, White could have brought his king closer to the centre – 21.\( \text{\textit{f}2}\uparrow\).

Following 16...\( \text{\textit{d}6}\), White can already play 17.d5!? (The move 17.\( \text{\textit{d}2}\) might be justified in case of 17...\( \text{\textit{c}4}\)!. 18.\( \text{\textit{b}3}\) b5 19.a4 \( \text{\textit{d}4}\) 20.axb5 \( \text{\textit{c}8}\) 21.\( \text{\textit{c}1}\), but after 17...\( \text{\textit{a}6}\)! White would not achieve anything with 18.dxe5 \( \text{\textit{d}8}\), or 18.\( \text{\textit{x}a5}\) \( \text{\textit{x}a5}\) 19.\( \text{\textit{b}3}\)+ \( \text{\textit{h}8}\) 20.\( \text{\textit{x}b7}\) \( \text{\textit{f}8}\), because in comparison to variation b1 from Chapter 29, Black has lost a tempo for an unnecessary move with his queen. There might follow: 17...\( \text{\textit{c}4}\) 18.\( \text{\textit{f}2}\) \( \text{\textit{d}7}\) (after 18...\( \text{\textit{f}6}\) 19.\( \text{\textit{g}3}\) \( \text{\textit{h}6}\) 20.\( \text{\textit{b}3}\) \( \text{\textit{a}6}\) 21.a4 \( \text{\textit{c}8}\), Black has lost so much time for queen-maneuvers along the sixth rank, that White can exploit that circumstance quite effectively with: 22.\( \text{\textit{b}5}\)! \( \text{\textit{e}3}\) 23.\( \text{\textit{x}a6}\) bxa6 24.\( \text{\textit{a}2}\)± Staniszewski – Dziel, corr. 1996; in case Black opts for 18...b5, then White can follow with 19.a4?! \( \text{\textit{f}8}\) 20.\( \text{\textit{d}3}\) a6 21.axb5 axb5 22.\( \text{\textit{g}5}\)± with a clear edge) 19.\( \text{\textit{c}3}\) \( \text{\textit{c}8}\) 20.a4 b6 21.\( \text{\textit{g}5}\)± and White had the advantage thanks to the passive placement of Black’s bishop in the game Aymard – Soulas, corr. 1997.

We should also mention the possibility 16...b5 with the idea to support Black’s knight on the c4-square. White should better play then 17.dxe5!? (after 17.\( \text{\textit{b}1}\) a6 18.a4 \( \text{\textit{c}4}\) 19.\( \text{\textit{f}2}\) \( \text{\textit{d}4}\) 20.\( \text{\textit{d}4}\) \( \text{\textit{b}8}\) 21.axb5 axb5 22.\( \text{\textit{c}6}\) \( \text{\textit{x}d1}\) 23.\( \text{\textit{x}d1}\) \( \text{\textit{e}8}\) 24.\( \text{\textit{b}1}\) \( \text{\textit{e}5}\) 25.\( \text{\textit{x}e5}\) \( \text{\textit{x}e5}\) 26.\( \text{\textit{d}4}\) \( \text{\textit{x}e4}\) 27.\( \text{\textit{x}g7}\) \( \text{\textit{x}g7}\) 28.\( \text{\textit{x}b5}\) \( \text{\textit{x}g4}\)= the draw outcome became evident in the game Saric – Ruck, Neum 2002, while after 17.d5 \( \text{\textit{c}4}\) 18.\( \text{\textit{d}3}\) \( \text{\textit{x}e3}\) 19.\( \text{\textit{x}e3}\) the recommendation of D.Tyomkin 19...\( \text{\textit{b}6}\)! looks very strong and after 20.\( \text{\textit{x}b6}\) axb6 21.\( \text{\textit{f}2}\) \( \text{\textit{f}3}\) 22.\( \text{\textit{c}1}\) \( \text{\textit{c}5}\)+ 23.\( \text{\textit{e}2}\) \( \text{\textit{a}4}\) 24.\( \text{\textit{f}3}\) \( \text{\textit{c}4}\) 25.\( \text{\textit{e}2}\) \( \text{\textit{c}2}\)± Black had an excellent counterplay in the game Seidel – Schaefer, Bad Woerishofen 2000) 17...\( \text{\textit{x}e5}\) and White should try to trade the bishops immediately with 18.\( \text{\textit{d}4}\)! (White was a bit slow 18.\( \text{\textit{b}1}\) a6 19.\( \text{\textit{f}4}\) \( \text{\textit{b}6}\)+ 20.\( \text{\textit{h}1}\) \( \text{\textit{d}8}\) 21.\( \text{\textit{c}2}\) \( \text{\textit{c}6}\) 22.\( \text{\textit{x}c6}\) \( \text{\textit{xc6}\} 23.\( \text{\textit{h}3}\) \( \text{\textit{e}8}\) 24.\( \text{\textit{x}e5}\) \( \text{\textit{xe5}\} 25.\( \text{\textit{c}3}\) b4 26.\( \text{\textit{d}5}\) a5 27.\( \text{\textit{c}1}\) \( \text{\textit{e}7}\) 28.\( \text{\textit{c}5}\) \( \text{\textit{x}d5}\) 29.\( \text{\textit{x}a5}\) \( \text{\textit{xe4}\} 30.\( \text{\textit{xe5}\} \( \text{\textit{e}2}\)= in the game Arlandi – Holmsten, Bled 2002 and that let Black reach a drawish rook endgame), and after 18...\( \text{\textit{xd4}}\) (if 18...\( \text{\textit{e}7}\) 19.\( \text{\textit{c}3}\), or 18...\( \text{\textit{c}4}\) 19.\( \text{\textit{xe5}\} \( \text{\textit{xe5}\} 20.\( \text{\textit{b}3}\)+ \( \text{\textit{h}8}\) 21.\( \text{\textit{xb5}}\) and Black’s difficulties are only increasing) 19.\( \text{\textit{xd4}}\) leads to a position with better chances for White in the middlegame as well as in the endgame, Lehmann – Pepping, Germany 2001.

398
a) 16...exd4

Black reduces the tension in the centre voluntarily. It’s favourable for White, since it facilitates the exchange of the dark-squared bishops.

17.\text{\textipa{\textiid{x}d4}}

Capturing with the knight on d4 is evidently weaker.

17...\text{\textipa{\textiid{c}c4}+}

The move 17...\text{\textipa{\textiid{c}c4}} justifies the exchange on d4 only partially. There might follow: 17...\text{\textipa{\textiid{c}c4}} 18.\text{\textipa{\textiid{x}g7}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{g}xg7}} 19.\text{\textipa{\textiid{f}f4}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{w}xd1}+} (Black’s kingside is very weak in the middlegame after 19...\text{\textipa{\textiid{b}b6}+} 20.\text{\textipa{\textiid{h}h1}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{e}e3}} 21.\text{\textipa{\textiid{f}f3}±} and White’s advantage is beyond reasonable doubt.) 20.\text{\textipa{\textiid{x}d1}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{e}e5}} 21.g5! (This is a multi-purpose move. White supports his knight on f6 and fixes the pawn on h7 as a potential target.) 21...\text{\textipa{\textiid{e}e8}}. The game Maksimenko – Sulypa, Lviv 2000, reached that position. White can support his g5-pawn now with 22.h4!?± and by centralizing his king later can rely on pressing his advantage home.

In case of 17...\text{\textipa{\textiid{c}c8}}, the simplest way for White to obtain an overwhelming advantage is:

18.\text{\textipa{\textiid{x}g7}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{g}xg7}} 19.g5! (This is the key-move in similar positions, because the seemingly attractive 19.\text{\textipa{\textiid{f}f4}}, after 19...\text{\textipa{\textiid{w}xd1}+} 20.\text{\textipa{\textiid{x}d1}}, enabled Black to play 21...\text{\textipa{\textiid{f}f6}}! 21.g3 \text{\textipa{\textiid{w}e7}} 22.h4 \text{\textipa{\textiid{c}c4}} 23.\text{\textipa{\textiid{d}d5}+} \text{\textipa{\textiid{e}e6}} 24.g5 \text{\textipa{\textiid{e}e5}=} and to activate his king in the game Onischuk – Carlsen, Wijk aan Zee 2005.) 19...\text{\textipa{\textiid{c}c4}} 20.\text{\textipa{\textiid{f}f4}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{w}xd1}} 21.\text{\textipa{\textiid{x}d1}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{e}e5}} 22.\text{\textipa{\textiid{f}f6}} 23.\text{\textipa{\textiid{e}e8}±}.

18.\text{\textipa{\textiid{d}d4}}

18.\text{\textipa{\textiid{w}xd4}} is obviously weaker for White, since after 18...\text{\textipa{\textiid{w}xd4}+} 19.\text{\textipa{\textiid{d}d4}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{e}e8}} 20.\text{\textipa{\textiid{f}f3}} b5 21.\text{\textipa{\textiid{c}c1}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{c}c4}} 22.a4 a6 23.axb5 axb5 24.\text{\textipa{\textiid{h}h1}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{b}b8}} 25.\text{\textipa{\textiid{b}b4}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{e}e8}} 26.\text{\textipa{\textiid{b}b5}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{d}d6}} 27.\text{\textipa{\textiid{a}a5}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{w}xe4}} 28.g5 \text{\textipa{\textiid{e}e7}=} Black reached an endgame with pawns on only one side of the board in the game Av.Bychkovsky – Marcelin, Herzliya 2000.

18...\text{\textipa{\textiid{f}f6}}

Black’s position is just terrible after: 18...\text{\textipa{\textiid{c}c8}} 19.\text{\textipa{\textiid{f}f3}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{w}xd1}} 20.\text{\textipa{\textiid{x}d1}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{c}c2}} 21.\text{\textipa{\textiid{d}d8}+} \text{\textipa{\textiid{g}g7}} 22.\text{\textipa{\textiid{d}d7}+} \text{\textipa{\textiid{g}g8}} 23.\text{\textipa{\textiid{g}g5}} h6 24.\text{\textipa{\textiid{e}e6}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{e}e2}} 25.\text{\textipa{\textiid{g}g7}+} \text{\textipa{\textiid{h}h8}} 26.\text{\textipa{\textiid{x}g6}+} Ivanchuk – Shirov, Tallinn 2000 (see Game 19). He is obviously worse too in case of 18...a6 19.\text{\textipa{\textiid{f}f3}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{c}c4}}, Comp “Gambit T” – Comp “Yace”, Internet 2001, 20.\text{\textipa{\textiid{b}b3}!?} b5 21.g5!±.

Black has tried numerous times in practice to prove that his position is acceptable with the help of: 18...\text{\textipa{\textiid{g}g5}} 19.\text{\textipa{\textiid{f}f3}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{e}e3}+} 20.\text{\textipa{\textiid{h}h1}} \text{\textipa{\textiid{w}xe4}}. He has managed to restore the material balance indeed, but he is still
too far from equality. Black's pieces are dis coordinat ed and the pawn-shelter of his king has been compromised. There might follow: 21.\textit{Cc}1 \textit{Cf}4 (after 21...\textit{Cf}8 22.\textit{Cc}7 \textit{Ce}6 23.\textit{Cc}d4 \textit{Cf}6 24.\textit{Cc}d8+ \textit{Cf}8 25.\textit{Cf}h4 h5 26.gxh5 \textit{Cc}6 27.hxg6+- in the game Neverov – Kalod, Prerov 2001, White won in the middlegame, while after 21...\textit{Cc}4 22.\textit{Cb}3 b5 23.\textit{Cxb}5 \textit{Cb}6 24.\textit{Cc}7 \textit{Cd}8 25.\textit{Cb}3+ \textit{Cd}5 26.\textit{Cd}xd5+ \textit{Exd}5 27.\textit{Exa}7 \textit{Ed}1+ 28.\textit{Cg}1 \textit{Cc}4 29.\textit{Ce}7+ in the game Kaidanov – Peng Xiaomin, Seattle 2001, White gradually outplayed his opponent in the endgame with his couple of extra pawns) 22.\textit{Cd}5+ \textit{Ch}8 23.\textit{Cb}1 \textit{Cc}7 24.\textit{Cg}5 \textit{Cf}8 25.\textit{Cf}1 \textit{Cc}6 26.h3 \textit{Cd}8 27.\textit{Cd}4+ \textit{Cg}7 28.\textit{Cxa}7+ in the game Rogozenko – Isaev, Internet 2002, Black was not only a pawn down, but his kingside was substantially weakened due to the lack of the dark-squared bishop.

19.\textit{Cc}3 \textit{Cd}8 20.\textit{Cc}1

It is essential that White should not let Black's knight occupy the c4-square. After 20.\textit{Ce}1 \textit{Cc}4 21.\textit{Cb}1 b6± Black's defence is much easier.

20...b5 21.\textit{Cb}1 a6 22.e5

In case of 22.g5 \textit{Cf}7 23.\textit{Cc}3 \textit{Cc}4 24.\textit{Ce}1 \textit{Cf}5+ 25.\textit{Ch}1 \textit{Cf}2± Black obtains some counterplay. White must worry about his a2-pawn and he should consider Black's possibility 26...\textit{Cd}2.

22...\textit{Cf}7

This position was reached in the game Matheis – Albano Rivares, corr. 2002. White could have played: 23.\textit{Cg}5! \textit{Cf}8 (in answer to 23...\textit{Cf}8, White can continue with 24.\textit{Cd}2 \textit{Cc}4 25. \textit{Cc}d4±, as well as with the more resolute line: 24.\textit{Ce}1!? \textit{Cxa}2 25.e6 \textit{Cc}6 26.h4↑ and he has the initiative, because if in the latter variation Black blocks White's e-pawn with the move 24...\textit{Cf}6, White can continue his offensive with: 25.h4↑) 24.h4! \textit{Cxa}2 25.\textit{Cd}1! (threatening to penetrate into Black's camp) 25...\textit{Cc}6 26.h5 \textit{Cc}2 27.\textit{Cc}1 \textit{Cf}4 28.\textit{hxg}6 hxg6 29.\textit{Ce}1 \textit{Cc}2 30.e6↑ and he would have maintained his initiative.

b) 16...\textit{Cc}8

Black is trying to ensure the
c4-square for his knight, just like in the line with 16...b5 that we saw earlier. The difference now lies in the fact that after 17.dxe5 \(\text{\large A}xe5\) 18.\(\text{\large A}d4\) Black can play 18...\(\text{\large A}c4\)! fearlessly, since after 19.\(\text{\large A}xe5\) \(\text{\large W}xd1+\) 20.\(\text{\large W}xd1\) \(\text{\large A}xe5=\), White has to defend his g4-pawn in this endgame as well as his second rank from the penetration of the enemy rook.

White now has two basically different possibilities: preserve it with b1) 17.\(\text{\large B}b1\) or reduce the tension in the centre with the move b2) 17.d5.

b1) 17.\(\text{\large B}b1\)?

White is planning now to open the centre.

Black has two basic replies here: b1a) 17...\(\text{\large A}c4\) and b1b) 17...\(\text{\large E}xd4\).

Black chose 17...\(\text{\large E}d7\) in the game J.Pinter – Karr, France 2003, but White could have countered that with 18.dxe5! (the above-mentioned game continued with 18.h3, which enabled Black to play 18...\(\text{\large E}xd4\)! 19.\(\text{\large E}xd4\) \(\text{\large E}d8\) 20.\(\text{\large B}b4\) b5= and pin White's pieces along the d-file) 18...\(\text{\large E}xd1+\) (Black can hardly avoid the endgame because after 18...\(\text{\large E}g4\) 19.\(\text{\large E}d5+\) \(\text{\large W}h8\) 20.\(\text{\large A}d4\) \(\text{\large A}c4\) 21.\(\text{\large A}f2\) \(\text{\large A}d2\) 22.\(\text{\large A}e1\) \(\text{\large A}f8\) 23.\(\text{\large H}h3\) \(\text{\large A}f4\) 24.\(\text{\large E}e2=\) – he has no counterplay at all and is about to lose a lot of material) 19.\(\text{\large A}d1\) \(\text{\large A}xe5\) (but not 19...\(\text{\large A}c4?\) because of 20.\(\text{\large A}a7=\)) 20.\(\text{\large A}f4\) \(\text{\large A}e8\) (in case of 20...\(\text{\large G}g7\) White can simply cen-

tralize his king with 21.\(\text{\large G}f2\) 21.\(\text{\large E}d7\) (White has excellent winning chances after 21.\(\text{\large A}xe5\) \(\text{\large A}xe5\) 22.\(\text{\large A}c3=\) 21...\(\text{\large A}xf4\) (after 21...\(\text{\large A}g7\) White manages to defend his e4 pawn with 22.\(\text{\large A}g3=\) 22.\(\text{\large A}xf4\) \(\text{\large A}xe4\) 23.\(\text{\large A}d5\) \(\text{\large E}f8\) 24.\(\text{\large A}f6=\) and White can rely on winning this endgame.

Should Black play 17...b6, then after 18.h3! (it is weaker for White to play 18.dxe5 \(\text{\large A}xe5\), because after 19.\(\text{\large A}f4\) \(\text{\large A}c4\) 20.h3 \(\text{\large A}xf4\) 21.\(\text{\large W}xd8+\) \(\text{\large A}xd8\) 22.\(\text{\large A}xf4\) \(\text{\large A}d4=\) Farago – Holzke, Senden 2003 as well as after 19.\(\text{\large W}xd8+\) \(\text{\large A}xd8\) 20.\(\text{\large A}f4\) \(\text{\large A}xf4\) 21.\(\text{\large A}xf4\) \(\text{\large A}d4\) 22.\(\text{\large A}d5\) \(\text{\large A}c4\) 23.\(\text{\large A}e1\), Varga – Gyimesi, Miskolc 2004, according to the recommendation of M.Krasenkov, Black can follow with: 23...\(\text{\large A}f7!\) 24.g5 \(\text{\large A}e6=\) and he equalizes easily) 18...\(\text{\large A}c4\) (the exchange in the centre 18...\(\text{\large E}xd4?!\) 19.\(\text{\large A}xd4\) \(\text{\large A}xd4+\) 20.\(\text{\large A}xd4\) only increases the activity of White’s pieces, because Black fails to regain his pawn with the move: 20...\(\text{\large A}c4\), due to 21.\(\text{\large A}e6!\) \(\text{\large W}xd1+\) 22.\(\text{\large A}xd1\) \(\text{\large A}xe4\) 23.\(\text{\large A}d8+\) \(\text{\large A}f7\) 24.\(\text{\large A}g5+\) \(\text{\large A}e7\) 25.\(\text{\large A}a8=\) 19.\(\text{\large A}f2\) \(\text{\large E}d7\) (in case of 19...\(\text{\large E}xd4\) 20.\(\text{\large A}xd4\) \(\text{\large A}e7\) 21.\(\text{\large A}d3=\) White is slightly better) 20.\(\text{\large A}c1\) we reach by transposition a line that we are going to deal with later in the text of the line b1a.

b1a) 17...\(\text{\large A}c4\) 18.\(\text{\large A}f2\) \(\text{\large E}d7\)

19.h3 b6

Black’s attempt now to pin White’s knight along the d-file
with 19...exd4 20.\(\text{Qxd4}\) \(\text{d8}\) does not work because of 21.\(\text{Qb3+}\) and Black's knight on \(c4\) is vulnerable.

The position after 19...b5 20.dxe5 \(\text{Qxd1+}\) 21.\(\text{Qxd1}\) will be analysed in our notes to Black's move 12.

20.\(\text{Cc1}\)

White has not tested in practice yet the possibility: 20.\(\text{Qd3}\) exd4 21.\(\text{Qxd4}\) b5 22.\(\text{Qd1}\) \(\text{d8}\) 23.\(\text{Qe2}\) a6 24.a4 \(\text{Qd6}\) 25.axb5 axb5 26.g5=.

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20...exd4

In answer to 20...b5 Black should consider the line 21.\(\text{Qxe5}\) \(\text{Qxd1+}\) 22.\(\text{Qxd1}\) \(\text{Qxe5}\) 23.\(\text{Qd4}\) (it is not so good for White to play 23.\(\text{Qxa7}\), because after 23...\(\text{Qxa8}\) 24.\(\text{Qc5}\) \(\text{Qxa2}\) 25.\(\text{Qd4}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) the position is simplified considerably) 23...\(\text{Qd8}\) and after 24.\(\text{Qf1}\) (if 24.\(\text{Qb1}\) a6 25.\(\text{Qe6}\) \(\text{Qd2}\) 26.a3 which was played in the game J.Pinter – Gustafsson, Jenbach 2003, Black's counterplay after 26...\(\text{Qd3}\)! 27.\(\text{Qg3}\) \(\text{Qb2}\) 28.\(\text{Qd6}\) \(\text{Cc1=}\) would have been good enough to equalize) 24...\(\text{Qd3}\) (in case of 24...a6 25.\(\text{Qe6}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) 26.\(\text{Qd4}\) Black's pieces are rather misplaced, while after 24...\(\text{Qxg4}\) 25.\(\text{Qc6}\)! \(\text{Qxf2}\) 26.\(\text{Qxd8}\) \(\text{Qe4}\) 27.\(\text{Qe6}\) Black's extra pawn is not enough to compensate the deficit of the exchange) 25.\(\text{Qxb5}\) (now 25.\(\text{Qe6}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) is already not so dangerous for Black) 25...\(\text{Qxf2}\) 26.\(\text{Qxf2}\) \(\text{Qd2+}\) 27.\(\text{Qf3}\) \(\text{Qxa2}\) 28.\(\text{Qc1}\) and Black's defence seems to be very difficult.

21.\(\text{Qxd4!}\)

It is weaker for White to play 21.\(\text{Qxd4}\), because after 21...b5 22.\(\text{Qf3}\) \(\text{Qxd1+}\) 23.\(\text{Qxd1}\) a5 Black's pawn majority on the queenside becomes an important factor. For example in case of 24.\(\text{Qd5}\) (After 24.\(\text{Qd7}\) b4 25.\(\text{Qa7}\) \(\text{Qe8}\) 26.\(\text{Qg3}\) \(\text{Qxe4}\) 27.\(\text{Qa8+}\) \(\text{Qf8}\) 28.\(\text{Qf2}\) \(\text{Qf4}\) 29.\(\text{Qd4}\) \(\text{Qe4}\) 30.\(\text{Qc6}\) \(\text{Qf7}\) 31.\(\text{Qxa5}\) \(\text{Qxa5}\) 32.\(\text{Qxa5}\) \(\text{Qe7}\) = Black had an equal position in the game Farago – Flum- bort, Hungary 2003.) 24...b4 25.e5 (if 25.\(\text{Qb5}\), then 25...\(\text{Qc3!}\) and Black's a-pawn is again-threatening to become a force to reckon with) 25...a4 26.\(\text{Qb5}\) b3 27.axb3 axb3 \(\pm\) and White's extra pawn on the kingside will hardly be converted into a full point.

21...\(\text{Qxd4+}\) 22.\(\text{Qxd4}\)

After 22.\(\text{Qxd4}\) b5 23.\(\text{Qf3}\) \(\text{Qxd1+}\) 24.\(\text{Qxd1}\) a5 \(\pm\) Black will push his queenside pawns forward much easier.

22...\(\text{Qxd4+}\) 23.\(\text{Qxd4}\) a6 24.\(\text{e5}\)!

Attack is the best defence is a well known wisdom. White intends to push his e-pawn and to try to distract Black from obtain-
ing a passed pawn on the queenside. It was weaker for White to play 24.a4 because of 24...\textcolor{red}{c5}!

24\ldots\textcolor{blue}{b5} 25.e6↑

White intends to use his well advanced e-pawn in order to penetrate the position of his opponent along the f-file. Black's defence will be really problematic.

\textbf{b1b) 17...exd4}

We have already analyzed in details capturing on d4 on move sixteen in variation a. The inclusion of the moves \textcolor{blue}{a8-c8} and \textcolor{red}{a1-b1} introduces some new nuances in that position, but its evaluation remains more or less the same.

\textbf{18.\textcolor{red}{xd4}}

Capturing with the knight 18.\textcolor{red}{xd4} – is weaker, because of 18...\textcolor{blue}{c4}! The main drawback of taking with the knight is that White can hardly preserve his material advantage without considerable simplification of the position. (In the game J.Pinter – Konopka, Hungary 2002, Black exchanged his bishop – 18...\textcolor{red}{xd4}?! 19.\textcolor{blue}{xd4\pm}, but that was definitely not in the spirit of the correct handling of that position. Black’s defence will be very difficult without his dark-squared bishop.). White’s knight has two active squares to retreat to:

19.\textcolor{red}{e6}. Now after the forced line: 19...\textcolor{blue}{xd1+} 20.\textcolor{red}{xd1}, Black must find the move 20...\textcolor{blue}{f6}! (In case of 20...\textcolor{blue}{exe4} 21.\textcolor{red}{d8+} \textcolor{blue}{f7} 22.\textcolor{red}{g5+} \textcolor{blue}{e7} 23.\textcolor{blue}{exe4} \textcolor{blue}{xd8} 24.\textcolor{red}{xa7}\pm Black’s counterplay will be almost completely neutralized with the trade of the rooks and White’s extra pawn would remain a telling factor.) in order not to let White’s rook to the d8-square. There might follow: 21.\textcolor{red}{d4} (after 21.\textcolor{red}{d4}, Black’s king can enter the actions with 21...\textcolor{blue}{f7}\equiv; The move 21.\textcolor{red}{f1} is not promising much due to: 21...\textcolor{blue}{e7} 22.e5 \textcolor{red}{c6} 23.\textcolor{red}{g5} \textcolor{blue}{b4} 24.\textcolor{red}{f6} \textcolor{red}{c2=}; it is slightly trickier for White to play 21.g5, but Black is not forced to continue with: 21...\textcolor{blue}{exe4} 22.gxf6 \textcolor{blue}{exe6} 23.\textcolor{red}{g5} h6 24.\textcolor{red}{d8+} \textcolor{blue}{f7} 25.\textcolor{red}{d7+} \textcolor{blue}{e8} 26.f7+ \textcolor{blue}{xd7} 27.\textcolor{blue}{f8w} hxg5 28.\textcolor{blue}{f7+} \textcolor{blue}{d6} 29.\textcolor{blue}{f2} \textcolor{red}{c6} 30.\textcolor{blue}{d2+} \textcolor{blue}{c7} 31.\textcolor{blue}{xg5+}\equiv, instead he can play stronger: 21...\textcolor{blue}{e7!} 22.\textcolor{red}{d7} 22...\textcolor{blue}{exe4} 23.\textcolor{red}{exe7} \textcolor{blue}{exe3} 24.\textcolor{blue}{f2} \textcolor{blue}{e5} 25.\textcolor{blue}{g7+} \textcolor{blue}{h8} 26.\textcolor{blue}{e7} \textcolor{red}{g8=} 21...\textcolor{red}{c6} (In case of 21...\textcolor{red}{xd4} 22.\textcolor{red}{xd4} \textcolor{red}{c6} 23.\textcolor{red}{f6} \textcolor{blue}{exe4}, Black can temporarily restore the material balance, but after 24.\textcolor{red}{d7+} White’s rooks penetrate on his opponent’s seventh rank and Black’s position is beyond salvation; his situation is too bad too after: 21...\textcolor{blue}{a4}}
Chapter 30

22.g5, because in case of 21...\texttt{x}d4, White can preserve the rooks with the move 23.\texttt{x}d4!, so that after 23...\texttt{c}c6 24.\texttt{f}f6 \texttt{xa}2, he can follow with 25.\texttt{d}d7± and his rook will be extremely active on the seventh rank.) 22.\texttt{xc}6 bxc6 23.g5 (after 23.\texttt{xa}7 \texttt{xe}4=, or 23.\texttt{d}d6 \texttt{xe}4 24.\texttt{xa}7 \texttt{a}4=, the maximum that White may achieve is a rook and pawn endgame with three pawns against two on the same side of the board.) 23.\texttt{xe}4 (It is probably enough for Black to save the draw with: 23...\texttt{e}7 24.\texttt{d}d4 \texttt{c}3=) 24.\texttt{f}2 \texttt{e}7 25.\texttt{d}7 a5= and the prospects of both sides are approximately equal;

19.\texttt{b}5 \texttt{xd}1+ 20.\texttt{xd}1 \texttt{c}6 21.\texttt{xa}7 (White would not achieve anything with 21.\texttt{d}d6, because after 21...\texttt{a}4 22.\texttt{xb}7 \texttt{xe}4 23.\texttt{f}2 \texttt{xe}4 24.\texttt{c}1 \texttt{e}7 25.\texttt{c}2 \texttt{a}4 26.\texttt{c}5 \texttt{a}3= Black equalizes the material ratio.) 21...\texttt{xe}4 (The active move 21...\texttt{d}4? can be countered by White with 22.\texttt{f}2 \texttt{xa}4 23.a3 \texttt{xa}7 24.\texttt{xd}4 \texttt{xa}3 25.\texttt{xg}7 \texttt{xg}7 26.\texttt{d}7+ \texttt{f}6 27.\texttt{xb}7 \texttt{a}2+ 28.\texttt{g}3 \texttt{a}3+ 29.\texttt{h}4 \texttt{a}2 30.\texttt{h}3= and that would lead to a rook and pawn endgame with two extra pawns for White, while in case of 22...b5 23.a3± Black will have again to defend an endgame with two pawns down.) 22.\texttt{xc}6 \texttt{xe}3 (It is weaker for Black to play 22...bxc6?!, because following: 23.\texttt{d}8+ \texttt{f}7 24.\texttt{d}7+ \texttt{g}8 25.\texttt{f}2 \texttt{xe}4 26.\texttt{a}7= White's passed pawn will be extremely dangerous.) 23.\texttt{d}8+ \texttt{f}8 (after 23...\texttt{f}7?! 24.\texttt{d}7+ \texttt{g}8 25.\texttt{xb}7 \texttt{a}3, with the help of 26.\texttt{d}8+! \texttt{f}6 (the rook and pawn endgame after 26...\texttt{e}7 27.\texttt{b}7 \texttt{xd}8 28.\texttt{xg}7+ would be lost for Black) 27.\texttt{b}2± White manages to defend his a-pawn.) 24.\texttt{d}4 \texttt{f}7 25.\texttt{f}1 \texttt{e}7 26.\texttt{d}7 (In case of 26.\texttt{b}8 \texttt{e}4 27.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{b}4=, White fails to capture Black's b7-pawn and that means that the maneuver of the rook to the b8-square had been senseless.) 26...\texttt{e}4 (The same endgame would be reached after: 26...\texttt{d}3 27.\texttt{e}2 \texttt{a}3 28.\texttt{xb}7 \texttt{xa}2+ 29.\texttt{f}3±) 27.\texttt{f}3 \texttt{a}4 28.\texttt{xb}7 \texttt{xa}2±. White has managed to preserve his extra pawn, but the material has been considerably reduced and in case Black defends accurately White's chances to press his advantage home are quite minimal. It is also worth mentioning that with the help of: 29.\texttt{g}5+ \texttt{f}6 30.\texttt{xh}7+ White can win a second pawn, but after 30...\texttt{e}6= his knight will hardly manage to come out of Black's camp without material losses.

b1b1) 18...\texttt{c}4

The move 18...\texttt{xd}4+ will be dealt with later.

19.\texttt{xg}7

This is the beginning of a forced play.

19...\texttt{xd}1+ 20.\texttt{xd}1 \texttt{g}7 21.\texttt{e}5!
It is essential for White to restrict the mobility of Black's king. The immediate penetration of the rook 21.\text{\textit{d}}d7+ after 21...
\text{\textit{f}}f6 22.g5+ \text{\textit{e}}e6 23.\text{\textit{x}}xh7 \text{\textit{x}}xe4
24.\text{\textit{f}}f2 \text{\textit{a}}a4 provides Black with good chances for a draw. For example: 25.\text{\textit{f}}f3 (Following 25.h4, Black should not allow White to create a passed pawn on the kingside with 25...\text{\textit{xa}}2?! 26.
\text{\textit{f}}f3\pm, or 25...\text{\textit{c}}c4?! 26.\text{\textit{x}}xb7 \text{\textit{xa}}2
27.h5 gxh5 28.g6\pm, instead he can simplify the position in a more reliable fashion – 25...\text{\textit{c}}c6! 26.\text{\textit{x}}xb7 \text{\textit{xa}}4 27.\text{\textit{g}}g7 \text{\textit{f}}f5 28.
\text{\textit{c}}c7 \text{\textit{d}}d4 \text{\textit{xd}}4+ \text{\textit{xa}}4 30.\text{\textit{xa}}7
\text{\textit{xd}}5\pm) 25...\text{\textit{c}}c6 (Further centralization of Black’s king 25...
\text{\textit{e}}e5 26.\text{\textit{e}}e7+ \text{\textit{f}}f5 causes problems for him in the knight and pawn endgame: 27.h4 \text{\textit{xa}}3+ 28.
\text{\textit{e}}e3 \text{\textit{xe}}3+ 29.\text{\textit{xe}}3 \text{\textit{g}}4 30.g3
\text{\textit{d}}d4 31.\text{\textit{e}}e4\pm, as well as in the complex multi-pieces endgame after: 27.\text{\textit{g}}g3+ \text{\textit{xd}}5 28.\text{\textit{e}}e4+
\text{\textit{h}}h6 29.g4 g5 30.\text{\textit{xe}}6+ \text{\textit{g}}g7 31.
\text{\textit{xd}}5 \text{\textit{c}}c6 32.\text{\textit{g}}g3\pm) 26.\text{\textit{xb}}7 (It is weaker for White to play: 26.
\text{\textit{f}}f4+?! \text{\textit{f}}f5 27.g4+ \text{\textit{xa}}5 28.h4+
\text{\textit{f}}f6 29.g5+ \text{\textit{e}}e5 30.\text{\textit{xd}}6+ \text{\textit{f}}f5
31.\text{\textit{f}}f8, because Black saves the game in a surprising fashion: 31...\text{\textit{e}}e5+! 32.\text{\textit{e}}e3 \text{\textit{e}}e4+ 33.
\text{\textit{d}}d2 and 33...\text{\textit{xh}}4!=) 26...\text{\textit{xa}}2
(Black should refrain from 26...
\text{\textit{f}}f5?! due to 27.\text{\textit{c}}c1\pm, or from 26...\text{\textit{e}}e5+?!), because of 27.\text{\textit{e}}e3
\text{\textit{g}}g4+ 28.\text{\textit{d}}d3 \text{\textit{e}}e5+ 29.\text{\textit{c}}c3 \text{\textit{xa}}2
30.\text{\textit{d}}d4+ and now White will counter the moves 30...\text{\textit{d}}d6, as well as 30...\text{\textit{d}}d5, with 31.\text{\textit{c}}c2\pm)
27.\text{\textit{f}}f4+ (After 27.h4 \text{\textit{e}}e5+ 28.
\text{\textit{e}}e3 \text{\textit{c}}c4+ 29.\text{\textit{f}}f2 a5\pm Black’s passed a-pawn provides him with a sufficient counterplay in order to maintain the balance.) 27...
\text{\textit{f}}f5 28.\text{\textit{f}}f7+ (28.g4+ \text{\textit{xa}}5 29.\text{\textit{b}}b5+ \text{\textit{f}}f6 30.g5+ \text{\textit{e}}e7 31.\text{\textit{b}}b7+
\text{\textit{d}}d6=) 28...\text{\textit{xa}}5 29.\text{\textit{e}}e6+ \text{\textit{h}}h6
30.\text{\textit{f}}f8 \text{\textit{h}}h7 31.h4\pm and White’s advantage remains purely symbolic.
21...\text{\textit{f}}f7

In case Black goes after White’s c5-pawn with 21...\text{\textit{e}}e4, then after 22.\text{\textit{d}}d7+ \text{\textit{g}}g8 23.\text{\textit{c}}c3
\text{\textit{xe}}5 24.\text{\textit{d}}d5+ there arises a position in which White’s knight and rook will cause plenty of trouble for Black’s kingside.
22.\text{\textit{d}}d5

After 22.\text{\textit{d}}d4 \text{\textit{a}}a4= White’s rook will be very passive, while after the exchange of pawns: 22.\text{\textit{d}}d7+ \text{\textit{e}}e6 23.\text{\textit{xh}}7 \text{\textit{xa}}4
Black’s king will be extremely active.
22...\text{\textit{c}}c6

Following 22...\text{\textit{xa}}4 23.\text{\textit{d}}d4\pm White’s rook and knight combine their actions perfectly.
23.\text{\textit{d}}d7+ \text{\textit{e}}e6 24.\text{\textit{xa}}7 \text{\textit{b}}b5

Black remains two pawns down after – 24...\text{\textit{xa}}2 25.\text{\textit{f}}f4+
\text{\textit{xe}}5 26.\text{\textit{xe}}5+ 27.\text{\textit{f}}f4 \text{\textit{xa}}2
28.\text{\textit{h}}h5 \text{\textit{g}}g5 29.\text{\textit{e}}e5 29.\text{\textit{xa}}7\pm
29.\text{\textit{g}}g7+ \text{\textit{h}}h6 30.\text{\textit{xb}}7\pm and his chances of survival will be just
minute.

In case of 24...\text{\textit{xe}}5, then after 25.\text{\textit{xa}}7 \text{\textit{c}}c2 White should choose 26.\text{\textit{f}}f1! (following 26.\text{\textit{b}}b5+ \text{\textit{e}}e4 27.\text{\textit{g}}g3+ \text{\textit{f}}f4\pm Black’s
king will be very active) so that after 26...\text{\textbf{a}}xa2 27.\text{\textbf{b}}b5= Black’s king cannot advance forward due to the knight’s fork.

25.\text{\textbf{g}}g7

The attempt at activity – 25.h4 \text{\textbf{x}}xg4 26.g3 \text{\textbf{x}}xe5= loses a pawn for White, while in case of 25.h3 a5= Black’s counterplay on the queenside is sufficient to balance the chances.

25...\text{\textbf{e}}xe5

White can counter 25...\text{\textbf{e}}e7 with 26.g3=.

26.\text{\textbf{a}}xa7 \text{\textbf{x}}xg4 27.g3 \text{\textbf{e}}e5 28.\text{\textbf{f}}f2=

White preserves his extra pawn and his winning chances as well.

b1b2) 18...\text{\textbf{x}}xd4+

After 19.\text{\textbf{d}}xd4 \text{\textbf{c}}c4 20.\text{\textbf{b}}b5 (in case of 20.\text{\textbf{e}}e6 \text{\textbf{x}}xd1+ 21.\text{\textbf{x}}xd1 \text{\textbf{x}}xe4 22.\text{\textbf{d}}d8+ \text{\textbf{f}}f7 23.\text{\textbf{g}}g5 Black saves the day with: 23...\text{\textbf{e}}e7! 24.\text{\textbf{d}}d5 \text{\textbf{a}}a4 25.\text{\textbf{a}}xh7 \text{\textbf{x}}xa2 26.\text{\textbf{h}}h4= and it becomes quite unclear whose pawns will prove to be faster) 20...\text{\textbf{x}}xd1+ 21.\text{\textbf{x}}xd1 \text{\textbf{x}}xe4 22.\text{\textbf{d}}d8+ \text{\textbf{g}}g7 23.g5 (otherwise after – 23.\text{\textbf{d}}d7+ \text{\textbf{f}}f6= Black’s king will be very active) 23...a6 (It is weaker for Black to play 23...\text{\textbf{c}}c6?!), because after 24.\text{\textbf{d}}d7+ \text{\textbf{e}}e7 25.\text{\textbf{x}}xe7+ \text{\textbf{x}}xe7 26.\text{\textbf{a}}xa7= he will have to fight for a draw in an king and knight endgame being a pawn down.) 24.\text{\textbf{c}}c3 (24.\text{\textbf{d}}d7+ \text{\textbf{f}}f8=; 24.\text{\textbf{d}}d4 \text{\textbf{c}}c6=) 24...\text{\textbf{e}}e7 25.\text{\textbf{d}}d5 \text{\textbf{c}}c6 26.\text{\textbf{a}}a8 \text{\textbf{d}}d7 27.\text{\textbf{f}}f6 \text{\textbf{e}}e7= and the material balance has been restored, while White cannot create any real threats against Black’s king.

19...\text{\textbf{w}}xd4+ 20.\text{\textbf{x}}xd4 \text{\textbf{c}}c4 21.\text{\textbf{d}}d1 \text{\textbf{c}}c6

This is evidently Black’s best defence. He should try to simplify the position, basing his hopes on the traditionally drawish tendencies in the rook and pawn endgames. His other attempt at fighting for the draw is connected with the centralization of the king – 21...\text{\textbf{f}}f7, but it is less effective. 22.g5! This is a standard measure. The mobility of the black king should be restricted. (After 22.\text{\textbf{f}}f2 \text{\textbf{a}}a4 23.\text{\textbf{d}}d2 \text{\textbf{f}}f6= it would be too active. It is less appropriate for that reason for White to play 22.e5, because of 22...\text{\textbf{e}}e7=) 22...\text{\textbf{e}}e7 (Af-
ter 22...\(\text{c6}\) 23.\(\text{xc6 bx}c6\) 24.\(\text{xd7}\) \(\text{e}6\) 25.\(\text{Exh7 Exe4}\) 26.\(\text{Exa7}\) it would not be so easy for Black to save the draw. In case of 22...\(\text{a4}\), then after 23.\(\text{d2 e7}\) 24.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{c4}\) — following 24...\(\text{c6}\) 25.\(\text{xc6+ bx}c6\) 26.\(\text{e}3\) Black must try to survive in a difficult king and rook endgame — 25.\(\text{e}2 \text{d6}\) 26.\(\text{g}3\) White manages to hold on to his extra pawn without allowing considerable simplification of the position.) 23.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{c6}\). Black’s knight on the a5-square was completely idle. 24.\(\text{xc6+ bx}c6\) 25.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}6\) (In case of 25...\(\text{c2}\), White can play 26.\(\text{d2}\), because the transfer to a king and pawn endgame after — 26...\(\text{xd2}\) 27.\(\text{xd2 d6}\) 28.\(\text{d3 e}5\) 29.\(g3\) is absolutely unacceptable for Black. Following 25...\(\text{a5}\), White can improve his position with the move 26.\(h4\) Black to press his advantage home here in this king and rook endgame. For example after: 26.\(\text{d3 a4}\), or 26.\(\text{d4 c2}\)!? 27.\(\text{d2 c1}\)!, Black’s rook becomes quite active. White’s a2 and e4-pawns can easily come under attack by Black’s pieces and that would force White’s rook to become passive. White should necessarily avoid such developments and he should attack Black’s weaknesses as soon as possible. That is what White’s last move is aimed at.) 26...\(\text{c2}\) 27.\(\text{e8}\) (White’s alternative is — 27.\(\text{h8}\)!? \(\text{Exg2}\) 28.\(h4 e5\) 29.\(\text{Exh7 g}3+\) 30.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{a}3\) 31.\(\text{g7}\); 28...\(\text{xa2}\) 29.\(\text{Exh7 h2}\) 30.\(\text{f4 a5}\) 31.\(\text{g3 c2}\) 32.\(\text{g7}\) and Black will hardly be able to cope with the advance of White’s connected g and h-pawns.) 27...\(\text{f7}\) 28.\(\text{h8}\) \(\text{g7}\) 29.\(\text{c8 xa2}\) 30.\(\text{c7+ g8}\) 31.\(\text{f3}\). The material is equal indeed, but White is quite well prepared to support the advance of his e-pawn, so Black will have to fight to save the draw.

22.\(\text{xc6 bx}c6\) 23.\(\text{d8}\)

Now, in comparison to the variation in our notes to Black’s move 21, White must lose a tempo for this check; otherwise he cannot hold on to his extra pawn.

23...\(\text{f7}\) 24.\(\text{d7+ e6}\)

The passive move — 24...\(\text{g8}\)!, after 25.\(\text{xa7}\) (In case of 25.\(\text{e5}\), it is too risky for Black to play 25...\(\text{a5}\)!, because of 26.\(\text{e6}\), but still 25...\(\text{Exg4}\) 26.\(\text{a7}\) 27.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{xe5}\) 28.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{e4}\) should lead to a draw.) 25...\(\text{xe4}\) 26.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{c5}\) 27.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{c4}\) 28.\(\text{c7}\) is going to lead practically unavoidably to the exchange of White’s g5-pawn for Black’s c4-pawn.

25.\(\text{Exh7 Exe4}\) 26.\(\text{xa7 Exg4}\) 27.\(\text{f2}\)
The probable outcome of this position is obviously sharing the point; nevertheless Black must still play rather carefully.

b2) 17.d5

We have already seen in the lines b1 (Chapter 29) that White is creating a protected passed pawn with this move, but his pieces are becoming passive. He will have to solve quickly the problem of his bishop and knight and that is going to determine the outcome of the opening battle in this line.

17...c4 18.f2!?

Should White capture the second pawn with 18.axa7, after 18..b6 White must resort to swift actions in order to avoid the danger of his bishop being trapped. There might follow: 19.d6 h8! (Black can not be happy neither with 19...xd6 due to 20.xd6 xxd6 21.xe6 cxe4 22.a4, nor with 19...d7 because of 20. xe6+ xxe6 21.eb3+ c4 22.e1 a7+ 23.h1 f7 24.d7±.) 20. d3 (after 20.d5 d7 21.c1 xa7 22.h1 c5! 23.e6 xd6 24.xd6 xa2± the material has been so greatly reduced that White’s chances to win with his doubled extra pawn are quite minute) 20...h6 21.d7 (after 21.b8 xb8 22.xc4 xd6 Black’s pieces are so active that White’s extra pawn will hardly matter at all) 21..c7 22.d1 d2 (22..b2?? 23.e6! e3+ 24.h1 xd1 25.xe5+ g8 26.e8+ g7 27.xd8 f2+ 28. g1+ analysis of M.Krasenkow) 23.h1 (23.b8?? loses for White after 23..xd7 24.xc4 e3, while after 23.xd2? xd2 24. b8 xd7 25.xd7 xd7 26. xe5+ g8± according to G.Kaidanov’s analysis White’s position is not to be envied at all) 23..xd7 24.xd7 xd7 25.b8 d8 26.c7 d7= and the position was equal in the game Kaidanov – Kudrin, Seattle 2002.

We have to mention P. Leko’s recommendation, besides our main line – 18.xd3!? After 18..xe3 19.xe3 f8 20.h1 c5 21.d3 d7 22.h3 a6 23.a4 b5 24.c1± White managed to preserve some advantage in the game Jussupow – Kovchan, Moscow 2003. Black’s play can obviously be improved however. 20..a5!? looks very attractive, while 21.d6!? seems to be an evident improvement on Black’s next move.

18.h6

Black has also tried here 18..d6 19.g3 h6 (in case of 19..a5, Dixon – R.Smith, corr. 1996, White can follow with the
strong 20.g5!± recommended by A. Jussupow) 20.h4  \textit{\&}f4 (20...\textit{\&}xh4?? 21.\textit{\&}f5+-) 21.g5 and Black has problems. After the relatively best 21...\textit{\&}c4 (after 21...\textit{\&}d7?! 22.\textit{\&}f3 \textit{\&}f8 23.\textit{\&}e2± as in the game Jussupow – Sutovsky, Essen 2001, Black can not do much to counter White's natural plan 24.\textit{\&}f1 followed by 25.\textit{\&}g3, see Game 20) 22.\textit{\&}g4 \textit{\&}c8 A. Jussupow recommended to follow that with 23.\textit{\&}xc8+ \textit{\&}xc8 24.\textit{\&}e1 \textit{\&}c4 25.\textit{\&}f1! (White's knight is headed for the f6-square) 25...b6 26.g3 \textit{\&}c1 27.\textit{\&}h2! \textit{\&}g7 (in case of 27...\textit{\&}xe4 28.\textit{\&}g4 \textit{\&}xf2 29.\textit{\&}f6± White gets a great advantage) 28.\textit{\&}g4 \textit{\&}b2 29.\textit{\&}f6\uparrow and White preserved his initiative.

After 18...\textit{\&}d7 White should better play 19.g5!? (the move 19.\textit{\&}c1?! was played in the game Van Wely – Leko, Monaco (rapid) 2001, but it proved to be unsatisfactory, at least because of 19...\textit{\&}xg4 20.\textit{\&}g3 \textit{\&}xd1+ 21.\textit{\&}xd1 b6= with an equality, but White can play instead 19.\textit{\&}g3 \textit{\&}h6 20.\textit{\&}e2 which leads to our main line by transposition) since in answer to 19...\textit{\&}g4 White has 20.\textit{\&}g3 \textit{\&}xg5 21.\textit{\&}a4!± with some edge.

19.\textit{\&}g3!?

White preferred 19.\textit{\&}d3 in the game Campos Moreno – Jerez Perez, Barcelona 2002, (in case of 19.h4 White should consider 19...\textit{\&}e3∞) and after 19...\textit{\&}d7 20.h3 b5 21.\textit{\&}g3 a5 22.\textit{\&}f1 b4\Rightarrow Black managed to organize some counterplay that proved to be enough for an equality.

19...\textit{\&}d7

Black is not out of the woods yet after 19...\textit{\&}e3 20.\textit{\&}b3 \textit{\&}xg4 21.\textit{\&}xa7±.

20.\textit{\&}e2 b5 21.h4 \textit{\&}f4

After 21...a5 Black has to cope with 22.g5 \textit{\&}f8 23.\textit{\&}f1± and White's knight will approach Black's king via h2 and g4.

22.\textit{\&}f1 \textit{\&}d6

23.\textit{\&}e1! (23.g3 is premature, since after 23...\textit{\&}c1 White's rook is cut off from the centre.) 23...\textit{\&}c4 24.\textit{\&}f3± Wukits – Neubauer, Mureck 2001. White has defended his e4-pawn reliably and now can patiently put into action his plan with g3 and g5 followed by the knight manoeuvre \textit{\&}h2-g4.
1  
D86

Spassky – Timman
Match, Game 3
Amsterdam 1977

7...0–0 8.\=e2 \=b6 9.h4! \=c6
10.d5!? \=d7 11.h5 \=a6 [11...e6
12.\=b3\(\pm\)] 12.hxg6 hxg6 13.
\=f4!\(\pm\) e6 14.\=g4?! [14.\=b3\(\pm\)]
14...\=fd8

15.\=xe6! [15.\=xe6 \=e8\(\mp\); 15.\=h4
\=xd4 16.cxd4 exd5\(=\)] 15...\=fxe6
16.\=xg6 \=c4? [16...\=f7 17.\=h8;
16...\=e7 17.\=h7+ (17.\=xe6+ \=xe6
18.\=xe6\(\pm\); 17.\=g4 \=c6 18.\=xe6+\(\pm\)
\=xe6 19.\=xe6\(\pm\) 17...\=f7 (17...\=f8
18.\=h3\(=\)) 18.\=h5 \=g8 19.\=h6
(19.\=xg7 \=xg7 20.\=h5+ \=g6\(=\))
19...\=b5 (19...\=c6 20.\=h3 \=c4
21.0–0–0 \=xa2 22.\=xg7 \=a1+ 23.d2
(23.\=c2 \=a2+ 24.\=c1=) 23...\=b2+ 24.\=e3 \=e2+ 25.\=f4
\=g6+ 26.\=g5 \=f8 27.\=f3+ \=xf3
28.\=xg8+ \=xg8 29.gxf3 \=e2 30.
\=g1\(+\)) 20.0–0–0 \=a5 21.\=b1
(21.\=b2 \=c4 22.\=a1 \=b5+ 23.
\=c1\(+\)) 21...\=c4 22.\=d2 \=xc3 23.
\=h3 \=b4 24.\=a1 \=e8\(=\)] 17.\=h7+
\=f7 18.\=h5 \=g8 19.\=h3+- \=af8
20.\=xg7 \=h8 21.\=f3+ \=e7 22.
\=a3+ \=b4 23.\=xb4+ c5 24.
\=xc5 \=xh7 25.cxb6+ 1–0

2  
D86

Gligoric – Vaganian
Odessa 1975

7...0–0 8.\=e2 \=d7 9.0–0 b6
10.\=d3 \=b7 11.e5 \=c6 [11...c5?
12.e6 fxe6 13.\=f4 \=d5 14.dxc5\(=\)
11...e6!? 12.\=g5 (12.\=g3 c5 13.\=e4
cxd4 14.cxd4 b5 15.\=b3 \=xe5\(=\);
12.\=f4 c5=) 12...c5=] 12.\=f4
[12.e6!? fxe6 13.\=f4 \=d8 14.\=h3
(14.\=e1 \=d5\(=\)) 14...\=d6 15.\=xe6
\=xe6 16.\=xe6+ \=h8 17.\=e1\(=\)]
12...e6 13.\=h3 \=a5 14.\=e2 c5=
15.\=e3 cxd4 16.cxd4 \=fd8 [16...
\=c6 17.d5 \=xe5 18.dxe6 fxe6 (18.
\=e7!?)) 19.\=xe6+ \=f7=; 17.\=fd1
\=b4=; 17.\=g4 \=f8 18.d5 (18.\=ad1
\=b4\(=\)) 18...\=xe5 19.dxe6 \=e7
20.\=xf7+ \=xf7 21.\=e6 \=xe6 22.
\=xe6 g5 23.\=xf7+ \=xf7=; 16...
\=ac8\(=\)] 17.\=ad1 \=e7 [17...\=a4!?]
18.\=h4 h6\(=\)] 18.\=g3 \=ac8 19.
\=h4 \=c3 [19...\=c4 20.\=c1 (20.h5

410
Illustrative Games

23...\textit{d}g5! \textit{dxg5} 24...\textit{d}xg5 \textit{d}xg5 25...\textit{d}xg5 \textit{e}dc8 26...f31\pm \textit{d}d5? [26...\textit{d}c2 27...\textit{d}d2\pm] 27...\textit{d}f2 \textit{d}f8 28...\textit{h}1 \textit{e}e8 29...\textit{b}b5! [29...\textit{h}h8+ \textit{d}d7 30...\textit{h}7 \textit{d}c6 (30...\textit{f}f8 31...\textit{h}6 \textit{e}e8 32...\textit{x}xf7+ \textit{e}e7 33...\textit{x}xe7+ \textit{d}xe7 34.a4\pm) 31...\textit{x}f7 \textit{e}c7 32...\textit{x}c7+ \textit{d}xc7 33...\textit{d}d3\pm] 29...\textit{d}c6 [29...\textit{d}c6 30.d5! \textit{d}xb5 (30...\textit{d}c2+ 31.\textit{d}g3 \textit{d}x\textit{b}5 32...\textit{x}xe6+) 31...\textit{x}xe6 \textit{f}xe6 32...\textit{h}h8+ \textit{d}f7 33...\textit{h}7+ \textit{e}e8 (33...\textit{g}8 34...\textit{d}h1+-) 34...\textit{e}7+ \textit{f}f8 35...\textit{h}1 \textit{g}8 36...\textit{f}f6+-] 30...\textit{h}8+ [30...\textit{h}7! \textit{e}c2+ 31...\textit{g}3+-] 30...\textit{d}d7 31...\textit{h}7 \textit{e}c2+ 32...\textit{g}3 \textit{e}f8 33...\textit{h}6 \textit{e}e8 34...\textit{x}f7+-! [34...\textit{a}4!+-] 34...\textit{e}e7 35...\textit{e}f6 [35...\textit{e}x7+ \textit{d}xe7 36...\textit{g}5+ \textit{f}7 37.a4\pm] 35...\textit{xa}2\pm 36...\textit{f}8 \textit{h}7 37...\textit{d}d3 [37...\textit{c}1 \textit{b}2 38...\textit{xc}6+ \textit{xc}6 39...\textit{x}g6 (39...\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 40...\textit{x}e6+ \textit{d}d5 41...\textit{d}d6+ \textit{c}4\pm) 39...\textit{d}2 40...\textit{x}c6 \textit{xc}6 41...\textit{xe}6+ \textit{c}c7\pm] 37...\textit{e}e7 38...\textit{c}1?! [38...\textit{x}e7 \textit{e}x7 39...\textit{x}g6\pm] 38...\textit{a}6? [38...\textit{f}5+ 39.\textit{xf}5 \textit{g}5 40...\textit{d}d6 \textit{c}6 41.d5 \textit{ex}d5 42...\textit{f}8+--; 38...\textit{ed}2!\pm] 39...\textit{xe}6 \textit{xe}6 40...\textit{xe}6 \textit{a}4 [40...\textit{b}5 41...\textit{c}5! \textit{ed}2 42...\textit{xd}5+ \textit{ex}d5 43...\textit{xa}6 \textit{e}e8 44...\textit{c}5 \textit{g}7+ 45...\textit{f}4+-] 41...\textit{d}6 \textit{c}4 42...\textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4 43...\textit{f}4 \textit{a}5 44...\textit{g}4 \textit{h}3 45...\textit{g}7+

3 D86

Spassky – Larsen
Beverwijk 1967

7...0–0 8...e2 \textit{d}d7 9.0–0 \textit{b}6 10...e3 \textit{b}7 11.f3 \textit{c}6 12...c1 \textit{ad}8 13...d2 \textit{a}5 14...d3 c5 15...\textit{fd}1 [15...\textit{h}6\pm] 15...\textit{a}4?!
16.\texttt{h6! c4 [16...\texttt{xh6 17.xh6 c6 (17...\texttt{xa2 18.e5!\rightarrow) 18.d5 e5 19.f4\rightarrow] 17.xc4 xc4} 18.xg7 xg7 19.g3 f6

20.f1\# f7 [20...e5 21.e3 a4 22.d5] 21.e3 cxd4 [21...e5 22.d5] 22.cxd4 d7 [22...c8 23.h4] 23.d5 ffd8 [23...e6 24.g4\# 24.g4! h5 25.\texttt{h6+ g8 26.e3 g7 27.f4 h7

28.f2! f7 [28...f5 29.exf5 xd5\#] 29.g4! hxg4 [29...e5 30.g3\rightarrow; 29...e6\square 30.dxe6 xexe 31.xd7+ xd7 32.gxh5 gxh5 (32...xa2+ 33.g3+-) 33.a3\# (33...f5? xa2+ 34.g1 g8+ 35.f2 g5); 30.gxh5 g5 31.g4 exd5 32.f5\# 30.xg4+- g7 31.g1 e6 32.xe6 h6 33.g5 f8 34.g5 g7 35.e2 d7 36.e3 f4 37.g4 1-0

7...0-0 8.e2 c6 9.0-0 e5 10.e3 e7 11.c2N a5 12.d3 c5! 13.xc5 e6 14.f4

14...c4 [14...c4 15.f5 (15.fxe5?!\#) 15.f6d8 (15...xd3 16.xd3 ad8 17.b5 c6 18.g3\#) 16.ad1 xd3 17.xd3 c4 18.f2 gxf5 19.g3! fxe4 20.xd8+ xd8 21.f5\rightarrow; 14...h6!? 15.h1 ad8 16.g1 h4 (16...c4 17.ad1 exf4 18.xc4 xc4 19.xf4 xd1 20.xd1 xe4 21.d5\#) 17.f5! a) 17...g5 18.h3 h5?! 19.h2! xe2 20.xe2 h4 21.ad1 e7 22.g1\#; 18...xe2 19.\#d2 20.ad1 xe2 21.xe2 \#d2 22.f6!? (22.f3\#) 22.xc3 23.d5\#; 20.xc3 21.f3 (21.f6!? 21.eb4 22.a3! a4 23.xc2 c6 24.f3d3 xd3 25.xd3\#; 18...d2 19.c1! xc2 (19...h5? 20.g4\rightarrow) 20.xc2 xc1 (20...d2 21.b3 e2 22.xe2 xe2 23.d5\#) 21.fxc1 e2 22.ab1 g7\#; b) 17...gxf5 18.g3! (18.fxe5 e4\#) 18...d7 (18...fxe4 19.xe4\#; 18...f4 19.f5 e6 20.e2 xf5 21.exf5\#) 19.e2 \#d2 20.xd2 xd2 (20...xd2 21.exf5

412
\[\text{Illustrative Games}\]

**D86**

Spassky – Huebner
Tilburg 1979

7...0–0 8.\(\text{\textregistered}e2\) \(\text{\textregistered}c6\) 9.0–0 \(b6\)

10.\(\text{\textregistered}e3\) \(\text{\textregistered}b7\) [10...\(\text{\textregistered}a5\) 11.\(\text{\textregistered}d3\) \(c5\)]

11.\(f4!?!\) [11...\(\text{\textregistered}a5\) 12.\(\text{\textregistered}d3\) \(f5\) 13.\(\text{\textregistered}g3\) (13.\(\text{\textregistered}xf5\) \(\text{\textregistered}d5\) 14.\(\text{\textregistered}f2\) \(\text{xf5}\) 15.\(\text{\textregistered}g3\) \(\text{\textregistered}c4\) 16.\(\text{\textregistered}e2\) \(\text{\textregistered}xe3\) 17.\(\text{\textregistered}xe3\) \(c5\)] 13...\(\text{\textregistered}e6\) (13...\(\text{\textregistered}xe4\) 14.\(\text{\textregistered}xf4\) \(\text{\textregistered}xh6\))

14.\(\text{\textregistered}e2\) \(\text{\textregistered}e7\) \(\text{\textregistered}a5\) 12.\(\text{\textregistered}a5\) \(\text{\textregistered}d3\) \(f5\) 13.\(\text{\textregistered}a5\) \(3\) \(\text{\textregistered}d3\) \(f5\) \(\text{\textregistered}a5\) 12.\(\text{\textregistered}d3\) \(f5\) 13.\(\text{\textregistered}g3\)]

12...\(\text{\textregistered}a5\) 13.\(\text{\textregistered}a5\) \(\text{\textregistered}d5\) \(\text{\textregistered}f5\)

\[14.\(\text{\textregistered}e8?!\) [14...c5 15.\(\text{\textregistered}d2\) 14...\(\text{\textregistered}d5\) 15.\(\text{\textregistered}f4\) \(\text{\textregistered}c6\) 16.\(\text{\textregistered}c2\) \(\text{\textregistered}c4\) 17.\(\text{\textregistered}ae1\) \(\text{\textregistered}ae8\) (17...\(\text{\textregistered}xe3?!\) 18.\(\text{\textregistered}xe3\) \(\text{\textregistered}ae8\) 19.\(\text{\textregistered}g3!\)↑) 18.\(\text{\textregistered}c1\)↑ (18.\(\text{\textregistered}d5\) \(\text{\textregistered}b5\) 19.\(\text{\textregistered}d4!\) )] 15.\(\text{\textregistered}d2\) \(\text{\textregistered}e4\) [15...\(\text{\textregistered}d5\) 16.\(\text{\textregistered}f4\) (16.\(\text{\textregistered}f2\) \(\text{\textregistered}c4\)=) 16...\(\text{\textregistered}c6\) 17.\(\text{\textregistered}e6\)!↑ (17.\(\text{\textregistered}ae1\) \(\text{\textregistered}c4\) 18.\(\text{\textregistered}xe4\) \(\text{\textregistered}xc4\)) 17...\(\text{\textregistered}h8\) (17...\(\text{\textregistered}f6\) 18.\(\text{\textregistered}g5\)↑; 17...\(\text{\textregistered}xe4\) 18.\(\text{\textregistered}xe4\) \(\text{\textregistered}a5\) 19.\(\text{\textregistered}a5\) \(\text{\textregistered}c4\)) 20.\(\text{\textregistered}xc4\) \(\text{\textregistered}xc4\) 21.\(\text{\textregistered}h6\)→) 18.\(\text{\textregistered}h6\)?↑ (18.\(\text{\textregistered}f2\) \(\text{\textregistered}e7\) 19.\(\text{\textregistered}g5\) \(\text{\textregistered}d7\)

20.\(\text{\textregistered}ae1\) \(\text{\textregistered}xc3\) 21.\(\text{\textregistered}e3\)→) 18...\(\text{\textregistered}e7\) (18...\(\text{\textregistered}c4?!\) 19.\(\text{\textregistered}g5\) \(\text{\textregistered}d6\) 20.\(\text{\textregistered}fxg6\) \(\text{\textregistered}hxg6\) 21.\(\text{\textregistered}d5\) \(\text{\textregistered}xd5\) 22.\(\text{\textregistered}xd5\) \(\text{\textregistered}xd5\) 23.\(\text{\textregistered}xc7\)↑) 19.\(\text{\textregistered}g5\) \(\text{\textregistered}ae8\) 20.\(\text{\textregistered}ad1\)→; 15...\(\text{\textregistered}d5\) 16.\(\text{\textregistered}h6\) \(\text{\textregistered}c4\) 17.\(\text{\textregistered}c1\)↑] 16.\(\text{\textregistered}g5\) \(f6\) [16...\(\text{\textregistered}d5\) 17.\(\text{\textregistered}f4\) \(\text{\textregistered}c6\) 18.\(\text{\textregistered}e6\)! \(\text{\textregistered}fxe6\) 19.\(\text{\textregistered}f6\) \(\text{\textregistered}xf6\) 20.
Illustrative Games

1. c4 e5 2. Nf3 Nf6 3. e3 d6 4. Bb5 a6 5. Ba4 

25. Qxg5!+- ♪d6 26.g3 fxg5 27.gxh4 g4 28. ♪xg4 ♦xd4+ [28...cxd4 29.f6 ♪xf6 30. ♪e6+-] 29.cxd4 ♪g8 30. ♦g5 1-0

6 D86

Sakaev – McShane
Germany 2003

7...c5 8. ♦e2 ♦c6 9. ♦e3 cxd4
Furman – Smyslov  
Moscow 1949

7...c5 8.\!e2 cxd4 9.cxd4 \!c6  
10.\!e3 0–0 11.0–0 b6 12.\!c1  
\!b7 13.\!b5!? \!c8 14.\!a4 14.d5  
\!e5 15.\!d4±] 14...\!a5 14...\!d6  
15.e5 \!d7 16.d5 (16.\!xa7±) 16...  
\!xd5 17.\!f4 \!d7 18.e6 \!e8 (18...  
fxe6 19.\!fd1 \!e8 – 18...\!e8) 19.  
\!fd1 fx6 20.\!xe6+–] 15.d5 15.  
\!xc8 \!xc8 16.\!c1±] 15...\!d6 15...  
a6 16.\!d3 b5 17.\!b4±; 15...e6 16.  
dxe6 fxe6 17.\!d7±] 16.\!d2 16.  
\!f4 \!e5 17.\!e5 \!xe5 18.f4 \!b2= ]  
16...\!xc1 [16...a6 17.\!d3±] 17.  
\!xc1 f5? [17...\!c8! 18.\!xc8+ (18.  
\!b1 e6±; 18.\!d1!? \!c7 19.\!d3±)  
18...\!xc8 19.\!b4 (19.\!c2 \!b7  
20.h3 (20.\!d3 e6 21.dxe6 \!xe6  
22.\!d8+ \!f8=) 20...\!e6±) 19...\!c7  
(19...\!e5 20.\!c3±) 20.h3±]

18.\!d7!+- \!e5 [18...\!h8 19.  
\!e6±] 19.\!c3 \!xe4 20.\!e6+  
\!h8 21.\!xg7+ \!xg7 22.\!a3  
\!h4 [22...\!f6 23.\!c3+ \!e5 24.  
\!d4 \!g7 25.\!e1 \!f6 26.\!c7+–]  
23.\!c7 \!h8 [23...\!e8 24.h3!–]  
24.\!xe7 \!f6 25.\!c7 \!a6 26.  
\!f4 \!a1+ 27.\!c1 \!g7 28.\!c3  
\!e8 29.\!b2 \!c4 30.\!xg6+  
\!xg6 31.\!xc4+ \!g7 32.\!xg7+  
\!xg7 33.\!c7+ \!f6 34.f4 \!d3  
35.\!xa7 \!e4 36.h3 h5 37.\!a6  
\!b8 38.g3 \!e7 39.a4 \!d3 40.  
\!a7+ \!d6 41.\!f2 \!e4 42.\!e3  
\!xd5 43.\!xf5 \!c5 44.\!g6 h4  
45. \!xh4 b5 46.axb5 \!xb5  
47.f5 \!b4 48.h5 \!e4+ 49.\!f2  
\!d6 50.h6 \!h4 51.h7 \!xh3  
52.\!g7 \!e5 53.\!g8 \!h2+ 54.  
\!g3 \!g2+ 55.\!h3 1–0

Spassky – Fischer  
Santa Monica 1966

7...c5 8.\!e2 \!c6 9.\!e3 0–0  
10.0–0 \!c7 11.\!c1 \!d8 12.  
\!e1!? e6 [12...\!a5! 13.d1 (13.  
\!d5 e6 (13...\!d7=) 14.\!xc6 bxc6=)  
13...cxd4 14.cxd4 \!xe1 15.\!fxe1  
b6=] 13.f4
Illustrative Games

17. axd4! axd4 [17... b7 18. axg7 wxc7 19. d4 w7 20. e5! a6 (20... wac8 21. b5+) 21. wb2 b5 22. a4+] 18. cxd4 b7 19. g3 w7 [19... w7 20. c2! fxe4 21. cxe4 c6 22. d5 wxd5 (22... cxd5 23. g5 w6 23... c7 24. c4 25. c6 26. h7 27. f5 wxf5 28. c4 29. c5+] 25... cxd4 wxf5 (25... gxf5 26... d7+) 26. f6+ w7 27. w7 28. w8 29. w6+ w8 30. wxf5 gxf5 31. h4+] 24. wxe1 w8 [24... wxe4 25. wxe4 26. wxe4 27. d1 25. d1] 25. b1 w6 26. c2 [26... h6! [26... w7 27. wxf6 wxf6 28. w5+] 27. wxf6 w6 28. w2 w7 29. d4+ w6 30. d4 wxf6 [30... h7 31. f3 wxf8 wxf8 32. h4] 29. f1 w7 30. d4+ w6 31. d4+ wxf6 [31... h7 32. f7 33. f7 34. g4 35. h6 36. f6 37. g4 38. f7 39. e5 39. e5 40. c2 a5]
Illustrative Games

41.\text{\textregistered}e4 \text{\textregistered}e6 42.\text{\textregistered}f4 \text{\textregistered}f6 43.\text{\textregistered}g4±; 39...\text{\textregistered}d6 40.\text{\textregistered}g4 g5 41.\text{\textregistered}h5 \text{\textregistered}c4+ 42.\text{\textregistered}e2++; 39...\text{\textregistered}h6! 40.\text{\textregistered}d3 \text{\textregistered}f5 41.\text{\textregistered}c4 \text{\textregistered}xh4 42.\text{\textregistered}xc5 \text{\textregistered}e5±/=] 40.\text{\textregistered}h5 \text{\textregistered}h6 41.\text{\textregistered}d3 \text{\textregistered}e5 42.\text{\textregistered}a8 \text{\textregistered}d6 [42...\text{\textregistered}f4 43.\text{\textregistered}c4 \text{\textregistered}g4 44.\text{\textregistered}xc5 \text{\textregistered}xh5 45.\text{\textregistered}b5±] 43.\text{\textregistered}c4 g4 44.a4 \text{\textregistered}g8 45.a5 \text{\textregistered}h6 46.\text{\textregistered}e4 g3 [46...\text{\textregistered}g8 47.g3++; 46...\text{\textregistered}e5 47.\text{\textregistered}g6 \text{\textregistered}d6 48.g3++] 47.\text{\textregistered}b5 \text{\textregistered}g8 48.\text{\textregistered}b1 \text{\textregistered}h6 49.\text{\textregistered}a6 \text{\textregistered}c6 50.\text{\textregistered}a2 1–0

9 \text{D87}

E.Geller – Smyslov
Candidates Match, Game 5
Moscow 1965

7...c5 8.\text{\textregistered}e2 0–0 9.0–0 \text{\textregistered}c6 10.\text{\textregistered}e3 \text{\textregistered}c7 11.\text{\textregistered}c1 \text{\textregistered}d8 12.f4 e6?! 13.\text{\textregistered}h1 b6 [13...\text{\textregistered}a5 14.\text{\textregistered}d3 f5] 14.f5!? [14.\text{\textregistered}e1±] 14...\text{\textregistered}a5? [14...exf5 15.\text{\textregistered}g5--; 14...\text{\textregistered}e5! 15.\text{\textregistered}b3 (15.\text{\textregistered}f4 \text{\textregistered}e7?) 15...\text{\text registered}g4 16.\text{\textregistered}g1 (16.\text{\textregistered}f4 e5 17.\text{\textregistered}g5 \text{\textregistered}exd4 18.\text{\textregistered}f4±) 16...exf5 17.\text{\textregistered}d5 (17.exf5 \text{\textregistered}xf5 18.\text{\textregistered}g3 \text{\textregistered}h6–) 17...\text{\textregistered}exd5! (17...\text{\textregistered}b7 18.\text{\textregistered}xb7 \text{\textregistered}xb7 19.exf5±) 18.exd5 c4–] 15.\text{\textregistered}d3 exf5 16.exf5 \text{\textregistered}b7 [16...\text{\textregistered}e7 17.\text{\textregistered}f4 (17.\text{\textregistered}d2 \text{\textregistered}xf5 18.\text{\textregistered}xf5! \text{\textregistered}xf5 19.\text{\textregistered}g3±) 17...\text{\textregistered}b7 18.\text{\textregistered}d2±] 17.\text{\textregistered}d2 \text{\textregistered}e8 18.\text{\textregistered}g3 \text{\textregistered}c6 [18...\text{\textregistered}ad8 19.\text{\textregistered}h6±] 19.\text{\textregistered}f2 \text{\textregistered}ad8 [19...\text{\textregistered}xe3 20.\text{\textregistered}xe3 \text{\textregistered}xd4 21.\text{\textregistered}xf4 \text{\textregistered}dxc3 22.f6 \text{\textregistered}f8 23.\text{\textregistered}e4±] 20.\text{\textregistered}h6 \text{\textregistered}h8 21.\text{\textregistered}f4!+– \text{\textregistered}d7 [21...\text{\textregistered}d7 22.\text{\textregistered}h5!++; 21...\text{\textregistered}e5 22.\text{\textregistered}h5!+] 22.\text{\textregistered}e4 c4 [22...\text{\textregistered}c7 23.\text{\textregistered}e1±] 23.\text{\textregistered}c2 \text{\textregistered}e7 24.\text{\textregistered}e7! 24.\text{\textregistered}f1!? [24.fxg6 hxg6 25.\text{\textregistered}c1 (25.\text{\textregistered}g5? \text{\textregistered}f6! 26.\text{\textregistered}xf6 \text{\textregistered}xe4 27.\text{\textregistered}xe4 \text{\textregistered}xf4±) 25...\text{\textregistered}d7 26.\text{\text registered}a4! \text{\textregistered}xa4 27.\text{\textregistered}f6++] 24...\text{\textregistered}e4 [24...f6 25.\text{\text registered}d6 g5 26.\text{\textregistered}xg5! \text{\textregistered}xg5 27.\text{\textregistered}xg5+ \text{\textregistered}g7 28.f6 \text{\textregistered}xg5 29.f7+ \text{\textregistered}g8 30.f8\text{\textregistered}+ \text{\text registered}xf8 31.\text{\textregistered}f7±] 25.fxg6! f6 26.\text{\textregistered}xg5!? [26.\text{\textregistered}g3 \text{\textregistered}d7 27.gxh7+ \text{\textregistered}xh7 28.\text{\textregistered}f4++] 26...\text{\textregistered}d7 27.\text{\textregistered}g1!? [27.\text{\textregistered}gxh7+ \text{\textregistered}h8 28.\text{\textregistered}h5++] 27...\text{\text registered}g7 28.\text{\textregistered}xf6 \text{\textregistered}g4 [28...\text{\textregistered}xf6 29.\text{\textregistered}xf6 hxg6 30.\text{\textregistered}xg6+ \text{\textregistered}h8 31.\text{\text registered}g5 \text{\textregistered}xe6 32.\text{\textregistered}f6+ \text{\textregistered}xf6 33.\text{\textregistered}xf6++] 29.\text{\textregistered}gxh7+ \text{\textregistered}h8 30.\text{\textregistered}xg7 \text{\textregistered}xg7 31.\text{\textregistered}xg4 1–0

10 \text{D87}

Jussupow – Kamsky
Tilburg 1992

7...c5 8.\text{\textregistered}e2 \text{\textregistered}c6 9.\text{\textregistered}e3 0–0 10.0–0 \text{\textregistered}c7 11.\text{\textregistered}c1 \text{\textregistered}d8 12.\text{\textregistered}f4 \text{\textregistered}d7 13.d5 \text{\textregistered}a5 [13...\text{\textregistered}e5!] 14.\text{\textregistered}d3 e5 15.\text{\textregistered}e3 \text{\textregistered}e7 16.\text{\textregistered}d2 [16.f4 \text{\textregistered}xf4 17.\text{\textregistered}xf4 c4 18.\text{\textregistered}b1 \text{\textregistered}c6!= Browne-Kamsky, New York 1989] 16...\text{\textregistered}b6 17.f4 c4?! [17...\text{\textregistered}xf4 18.\text{\textregistered}xf4 \text{\textregistered}g4 19.\text{\textregistered}e1±] 18.\text{\textregistered}c2 \text{\textregistered}xf4 [18...\text{\textregistered}c6 19.\text{\textregistered}a4±] 19.\text{\textregistered}xf4 \text{\textregistered}c6

417
20. \( \Delta d4! \) \( \Delta xd4 \) [20... \( \Delta e5 \) 21. \( \Delta xe5 \) (21.h3\(=\)) 21... \( \Delta xe5 \) 22. \( \Delta c6 \) \( \mathfrak{w} c5+ \) (22... \( \mathfrak{w} d6?! \) 23. \( \Delta xd8 \) \( \mathfrak{w} xd8 \) 24. \( \Delta a4\#) 23. \( \mathfrak{w} f2 \) (23. \( \mathfrak{w} f2 \) \( \mathfrak{w} e8 \) 24. \( \Delta xe5 \) \( \mathfrak{w} xe5 \) 25. \( \mathfrak{w} d4\#) 23... \( \mathfrak{w} xf2+ \) 24. \( \mathfrak{w} xf2 \) \( \mathfrak{w} e8 \) 25. \( \Delta xe5 \) \( \mathfrak{w} xe5 \) 26. \( \mathfrak{w} c1 \) \( f5 \) 27. \( \mathfrak{w} e5 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x f5 \) 28. \( \mathfrak{w} x f5 \) \( g x f5 \) 29. \( \mathfrak{w} x f5\#) 21. \( \mathfrak{w} c x d4\#) 22. \( \mathfrak{w} a6 \) [21...f5 22. \( \mathfrak{w} c e1 \) (22. \( d6 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x d6 \) 23. \( \Delta x d6 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x d6\#) 22... \( \Delta g5 \) \( \Delta x d4+ \) 23. \( \mathfrak{w} x d4 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x g5 \) 24. \( \mathfrak{w} x c4\#) 22... \( \mathfrak{w} x e4 \) 23. \( d6\#)] 22. \( \mathfrak{w} f3 \) [22. \( \mathfrak{w} e3 \) f5\#; 22. \( \mathfrak{w} c3 \) b5 23.a3 f5 (23... \( \Delta b7 \) 24. \( \mathfrak{w} c e1\#) 24. \( d6\#) 22... \( \mathfrak{w} f2 \) \( \mathfrak{w} a c8 \) 23. \( \mathfrak{w} c3\#) 22... \( \mathfrak{w} a c 8 \) 23. \( \Delta h 6 \) [23. \( \mathfrak{w} f 2 \#) \( \Delta h 4 \), \( \Delta g 5 \), h4-h5] 23... \( \Delta h 8 \) [23...c3! 24. \( \mathfrak{w} e 3 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x h 6 \) 25. \( \mathfrak{w} x h 6 \) \( \mathfrak{w} c 4 \) (25... \( \mathfrak{w} b 4 \) 26. \( \mathfrak{w} e 3 \#) 26. \( \mathfrak{w} h 3 \) (26.a4 \( f5 \) 27. \( \mathfrak{w} x f 5 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x d 5 \) 28. \( \mathfrak{w} g 3 \) \( \mathfrak{w} g 7 \) 29. \( \mathfrak{w} h 4 \) \( \mathfrak{w} d 6 \) 30. \( \mathfrak{w} x g 6 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x g 6 \#) 26.h4!? \( \mathfrak{w} x a 2 \) 27. \( h 5\#) 26...f5 27. \( \mathfrak{w} x f 5 \) \( \mathfrak{w} g 7 \) 28. \( \mathfrak{w} f x g 6 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x h 6 \) 29. \( \mathfrak{w} x h 6\#) 24. \( \mathfrak{w} f 2 \) with idea h4-h5 24... \( \mathfrak{w} g 7 \) 25. \( \mathfrak{w} x g 7 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x g 7 \) 26. \( \mathfrak{w} f 1 \) \( \mathfrak{w} c 7 \) [26... \( \mathfrak{w} f 8 \) 27.e5 c3 28.d6 \( \mathfrak{w} d 7 \) 29. \( \mathfrak{w} e 1\#)] 27. \( \mathfrak{w} g 3 \) ! \( \Delta b 7 \) [27...c3 28. \( \mathfrak{w} x f 7+ \) \( \mathfrak{w} x f 7 \) 29. \( \mathfrak{w} x f 7+ \) \( \mathfrak{w} x f 7 \) 30.h4\#] 28. \( \mathfrak{w} f 6 \) \( \mathfrak{w} c d 7 \) 29. \( \mathfrak{w} f 4 \) b5 30. \( \mathfrak{w} d 6 \) [30. \( \mathfrak{w} x f 7+ \) \( \mathfrak{w} x f 7 \) 31. \( \mathfrak{w} e 5+ \) \( \mathfrak{w} g 8 \) 32. \( \mathfrak{w} x f 7 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x f 7 \) 33.h4\#] 30... \( \mathfrak{w} e 8 \) 31.h4! b4 32.h5 a5 33.d5+\# c3 34. \( \mathfrak{w} a 4 \) \( \mathfrak{w} a 6 \) 35. \( \mathfrak{w} f 2 \) \( \mathfrak{w} c 4 \) 36. \( \mathfrak{w} h 2 \) \( \mathfrak{w} g 8 \) 37.h6 \( \mathfrak{w} f 8 \) 38. \( \Delta x d 7 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x d 7 \) 39.e5 \( \Delta x d 5 \) 40.e6 \( \Delta x e 6 \) 41. \( \Delta x e 6 \) a4 42. \( \mathfrak{w} e 3 \) \( \mathfrak{w} d 8 \) 43.d7 b3 44.e8 1\# 0

11

van Wely – Nijboer
Amsterdam 2002

18... \( \mathfrak{w} d 7 \) [18...f6 19. \( \mathfrak{w} g 4 \) \( \mathfrak{w} g 7 \) (19... \( \mathfrak{w} a 8 \) 20. \( \mathfrak{w} x g 6 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x g 6 \) 21. \( \mathfrak{w} x g 6+ \) \( \Delta h 8 \) 22. \( \mathfrak{w} h 6+ \) \( \mathfrak{w} g 8 \) 23. \( \mathfrak{w} f 3 \#) 19... \( \mathfrak{w} x f 5 \) 20. \( \mathfrak{w} x g 6 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x g 6 \) \( \mathfrak{w} g 8 \) 22. \( \mathfrak{w} h 6+ \) \( \mathfrak{w} g 8 \) 23. \( \mathfrak{w} f 3 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x f 4 \) 24. \( \mathfrak{w} x f 4 \) \( \mathfrak{w} c 5+ \) 25. \( \Delta h 2 \) \( \Delta g 7 \) 26. \( \mathfrak{w} g 3 \) \( \mathfrak{w} d 4 \) 27. \( \mathfrak{w} e 1 \) \( \mathfrak{w} f 6 \) 28. \( \mathfrak{w} e 6 \) \( \mathfrak{w} x h 6 \) 29. \( \mathfrak{w} x h 6 \) \( \mathfrak{w} f 7 \) 30. \( \mathfrak{w} e 6\#) 19...f5 20. \( \mathfrak{w} x f 3\#) 20. \( \mathfrak{w} h 4\#) 19. \( \mathfrak{w} e 4 \) [19. \( \Delta f 2 \) b5 (19... \( \mathfrak{w} x d 5 \) 20. \( \mathfrak{w} f d 1 \) \( \mathfrak{w} e 6 \) 21. \( \mathfrak{w} e 3 \#) 20. \( \mathfrak{w} e 3 \) 21. \( \mathfrak{w} c 5 \) \( \mathfrak{w} d 8 \) (21... \( \Delta b 7 \) 22. \( \mathfrak{w} x c 4 \) \( \Delta c 8 \) 23. \( \Delta d 3 \) \( \Delta c 5 \) 24. \( \mathfrak{w} f 3 \) a5 25. \( \mathfrak{w} f d 1\#) 22. \( \mathfrak{w} f d 1\#]
21.g4? [21...f2 b5 22...c2 23.xc2 b4 24.a3+; 21...b4 22.b2 c5 (22...a3 23.c3 b5 24.d1 b4 25.xa4 bxc3 26.b5 a6 27.xa5 b4 28.c5++) 23.xc5 bxc5 24.b5 a3 25.a6 c3 26.e6+; 21...a3 22...c2 b4 (22...b2 23.xb6 axb6 24.xb2 25.xb2 b6 26.xb6 27.xb6 c3 28.b1 c8 29.c1++) 23.c1 c3 24.xc3 xc3 25.e3 b5 (25...g5 26.g3) 26.xb5 aab8 27.xb8 xb8 28.c2 b1+ 29.h2 xe1 30.xa7++; 21...f1 a3 22.d6 edx6 (22...ac8 23.d7 xc7 24.e6++) 23.axa8 xa8 24.fx3 xe8 25.exd6 f6 26.d5+ f8 (26...g7 27.d2 c3 28.d3++) 27.d2 c3 28.d3 xe6 29.xc3 edx6 30.f3+! 21...b4?! [21...a3 22.gxf5 gxf5 (22...exf5 23.e4 af8 24.xf5 xf5 25.f3++) 23.h1 h8 24.g2++; 21...fxg4!? 22.xg4 h8 23.e6+] 22.gxf5 xf5 [22...gxf5 23.h2+;] 23.e4 af8! [23...h5 24.f5+; 23...f7 24.f5+] 24.xf5 xf5

25.fd1! [25.d4+] 25...a3 26.d6?! [26.d2! b7 (26...e5 27.d6 (27.g2 d7 28.e6 d6); 27.h2 d7 28.g2 c3 29.d3 f5 30.xc3 xb1 31.xa3) 27...exd6 (27...d7 28.dxe7 xe7 29.d8+ 28.d5+ f8 (28...g7 29.e6--) 29.e8+ e8 30.xa7 c3 31.xb6++) 27.d6 exd6 28.d5+ ef7 29.e6 ef7 30.f5+] 26...exd6 27.exd6 d7 28.d2 xd6? [28...c5+! 29.g2 xd6! 30.xa5 xa5 31.xc4+ f8+] 29.b4!+ 30.xf4 30.d8+ g7 31.d7+ h6 32.d2 g5+ 33.h1 f5 34.xg5+ xg5 35.g1 f4 36.g4 xf6 37.e3+ g5 38.h4+ 1–0

12

P.H. Nielsen – Ganguly
Tripoli 2004

7...c5 8.e2 0–0 9.0–0 c6
Illustrative Games

14...cxd4 15.cxd4 Æxe2 16.Æxe2±] 13...b5

24.Æg4 f6 25.Æxc5 h5 [25...e6! 26.Æd4! exf5 27.Æc6 Æe8 (27...fxg4 28.Æxe5 gxe3 29.Æc6 Æd7 30.Æb8! Ædd8 31.Æb6±) 28.exf5 Æe1+ 29.Æf1 Æxf5 30.Æe3 Æc1 31.Æe7+ (31.Æb4 Æd7 32.a4±) 31...Æh8 (31...Æg7 32.Ægg3!±) 32.Æxf5 Æxf5 33.Æf3 Æd6 34.Æd4±] 26.Æxh5 Æxf5

27.Ægxg5+?! [27.Æf4! Æd6 (27...Æg7 28.Æg6 Æd6 29.Æxe7+ Æf7 30.Æxd6 Æxd6 31.Æxc8 Æxc8 32.Æh3 Æxc3 33.Æf3+-) 28.Æf2 (28.Æxd6 Æxd6 29.Æg3±) 28...Æh6 (28...Æg7 29.e5 fxg5 30.Æh7+ Æh8 31.Æg6+ Æxg6 32.Æxg6+ Æhx5 33.Æe2 Æxg4 34.Æxg4 Æf6 35.Æxg5 Æxg5 36.Æh6+ Æg8 37.Æc2 Æd6 38.Æb3+ e6 39.Æg6+ Æh8 40.Æg3+-) 29.Æhx6 Æxg4 30.e5 Æa3 31.Æe3!–] 27...fxg5 28.Æxg5+ Æf7 [28...Æh8 29.exf5±] 29.Æg3 Æf6 [29...Æh8!? 30.h3 Æf6 31.Æxf5 Æxf5 32.Æxf5 Æc8 33.Æf2 Æxc3 34.Æf1æ Æf6 35.Æh3! [35.e5 Æb6+ 36.Æh1 Æg6∞] 35...Æc1 36.e5 Æb6+? [36...Æg6∞] 37.Æh2 Æg6 38.d6 [38...Æd3! Æxc4 (38...Æc4 39.Æe3!+-) 39.Æe3! Æf7 40.Æg5+-]
Illustrative Games

38...e6 [38...xf1 39.xf1 c5 40.d3! f7 41.f3! d5 42.g7+ d7 43.f5+ e6 44.g7+ c8 45. d7+ xd7 46.f8+=] 39.h4 d7? [39...f7 40.e2! (40.d7+ xd7 41.d4+ c6 42.e2 d7 43.f3+ (43.d6 f8 44.d3 c5 45.e4+ d5=) 43..c7 44. d6->) 40..d7 41.h6! g7 (41..h7 42.f6++) 42.g4 f8 43.g3! d8 44.e3++] 40.e7+ c6 1–0

13

Sakaev – V.Belov
Ch Russia
Krasnoyarsk 2003

7..c5 8.e2 c6 9.e3 0–0
10.0–0 d7 11.b1 a6 12.dxc5


b5 20.a4 c6=) 18..xe5 19.h3 (19.h1!? xh2 20.xc1; 19..xd4 20.cxd4 d3 21.d2 xf1 22.xf1 c8d8 23.b2) 19..xd4+ 20.cxd4 d3 21.d2 xf1 22.xf1! (22. xf1 b6!) 22..f5 23.e5; 16..ad8! 17.fx e5 xxe5 18.h3 (18..f4 xf4! 19.xf4 b5; 18.h1 xh2!) 18..e6 (18..a4?! 19.xa4 d3 20. b3 xxe3 21 xd3 d5+ 22.d4+) 19.xc2 d4 20.xc4 xc4 21.d4 xe2 22.xe2 xd4+ 23.cxd4

17..ef8 [17..gxf5! 18.exf5 ef6! (18..eae8 19.f6 xe3 20.w5 h6 21.fxg7 xg7 22.ef6! xf6 23. xhx6+ e7 24.xe3+ d8 25.d5) 19.ef3! (19.h1 b5!; 19.w5 ef8 20.f3 xxe3! 21.xe3 xd4 22. g4+ g7 23.e1 c6=; 19.d5 w5 20.f3 ef8 21.f2g3) 19..ef8 (19..eae8 20.h1 h8 21.h3 xe3 (21..g8? 22.xhx7+! xxh7 23.h5–+) 22.xe3 xd4 23.h3 f6 24. xe4! w5 25.e4 ecx5 26. xhx7+ xhx7 27.w5+ g7 28. wg6+ h8 29.w6+ g8 30. d5+ xxd5 31.wg6+ h8 32. h4#) 20.h1 c6 21.db3 xe3 22.xe3=] 18.f6 f8 [18..h8 19..b6! b5 20.cf4! d8 (20.. c8 21.d6 e6 22.e5 c4 23.
Illustrative Games

\( \text{hxg4 29.e6!; 24...\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}b8 25.e5 \textcolor{red}{\text{w}}xd6} \\
26.\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}f3 \textcolor{red}{\text{dxe5}} 27.\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}xh5+ ...\textcolor{red}{\text{g}}8 28.\textcolor{red}{\text{dxe5}} \textcolor{red}{\text{x}}e5 (28...\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}h5 29.\textcolor{red}{\text{exe6}} 29.\textcolor{red}{\text{exe6}} \textcolor{red}{\text{dxe6}}) 29.\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}h6 \textcolor{red}{\text{h}}f8 30.\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}f4 \textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h5 31.\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}g3 \textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h6 32.\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}fe1! (32.\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}b7 \textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h3!) 32...\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}e6 33.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}7\textcolor{red}{\text{+}}] 25.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}5 \textcolor{red}{\text{wxd6}} \\

19.\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}6! [19.\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}d2 \textcolor{red}{\text{b}}5 20.\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}6 \textcolor{red}{\text{xc}}5! 21.\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}xc5 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}d8!] 19...\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}6 \\
[19...\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}h8 20.\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}6 \textcolor{red}{\text{g}}4 (20...\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}h6 21.\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}xh6 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}g8 22.\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}f4 g5 23.e5+-] 21.\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}xf8 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}xf8 22.\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}h6 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}g8 23.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}f4 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}d7 24.e5 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}ae8 (24...\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}6 25.\textcolor{red}{\text{xb}}7 \textcolor{red}{\text{xb}}7 26.\textcolor{red}{\text{xe}}g4) 25.\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}3 \textcolor{red}{\text{h}}5 26.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}e1; 19.\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}5 20.\textcolor{red}{\text{xb}}5 \textcolor{red}{\text{axb}}5 21.\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}6 \textcolor{red}{\text{xe}}4 22.\textcolor{red}{\text{xf}}8 \textcolor{red}{\text{xf}}8 23.\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}6+ \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}e8 24.\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}e1 \textcolor{red}{\text{c}}6 25.\textcolor{red}{\text{xb}}7 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}d8 26.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}d4 \textcolor{red}{\text{d}}xd4 (26...\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}xh1 27.\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}xh1+ \textcolor{red}{\text{w}}e6 28.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}xh6+ -) 27.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}xh4+ \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}xh4 28.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}e4+ \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}e4 29.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}e4+ \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}e4 30.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}e4 31.d5+] 20.\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h1! \\
[20.\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h6 \textcolor{red}{\text{d}}xd4 21.\textcolor{red}{\text{xf}}8 \textcolor{red}{\text{xf}}8 22.\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h6 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}e6 23.\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}4? \textcolor{red}{\text{x}}c5+] 20...\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}5 \\
21.\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}4! [21.\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h6 \textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h7 22.\textcolor{red}{\text{xf}}8 \textcolor{red}{\text{xf}}8 23.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}d8] 21...\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}d8 [21... \textcolor{red}{\text{a}}5 22.\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}6 \textcolor{red}{\text{xd}}6 23.\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}xd6 \textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h7 (23...\textcolor{red}{\text{x}}d4 24.\textcolor{red}{\text{w}}h6 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}e6 25.e5) 24.\textcolor{red}{\text{xb}}7 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}d8 25.\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}4 \textcolor{red}{\text{g}}8 26.e5! \textcolor{red}{\text{a}}5 27.\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}1] 22.\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}6 \textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h7 23.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}d6 \textcolor{red}{\text{d}}xd6 [23...\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h6 24.\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}2] \\
24.\textcolor{red}{\text{cxd}}6 \textcolor{red}{\text{c}}8 [24...\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}5 25.e5 \textcolor{red}{\text{w}}b6 26.\textcolor{red}{\text{g}}5 \textcolor{red}{\text{g}}4 27.\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}4 \textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h8 28.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}g4! \\

26.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}g6+! \textcolor{red}{\text{f}}xg6 27.\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}7 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}e7 28.\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}xe8 \textcolor{red}{\text{w}}xe8 29.\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}6 \textcolor{red}{\text{w}}e7 [29... \textcolor{red}{\text{g}}7 30.\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}f1 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}e6 31.d5! \textcolor{red}{\text{x}}d5 32.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}6] 30.\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}f1 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}e6 31.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}4 \textcolor{red}{\text{f}}5 [31...\textcolor{red}{\text{g}}8 32.d5] 32.\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}xf5 \textcolor{red}{\text{gxf5}} \\
33.\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}xf5+ \textcolor{red}{\text{g}}8 34.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}g6+ 1–0

14

Sakaev – Kurnosov
Moscow 2004

7...\textcolor{red}{\text{c}}5 8.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}2 \textcolor{red}{\text{c}}6 9.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}3 0–0 \\
10.0–0 \textcolor{red}{\text{d}}7 11.\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}1 \textcolor{red}{\text{a}}6 12.\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}xc5 \\
13.\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}c7 13.\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}d4 \textcolor{red}{\text{a}}5 14.\textcolor{red}{\text{d}}d3 \textcolor{red}{\text{f}}d8 \\
15.\textcolor{red}{\text{e}}2! \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}ac8 16.\textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h1! \textcolor{red}{\text{a}}a4 17.\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}4! \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}5 18.\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}xe5 \textcolor{red}{\text{xe}}5 19.\textcolor{red}{\text{f}}3! \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}8 \\
20.\textcolor{red}{\text{b}}f1 \textcolor{red}{\text{h}}h2

422
21. e6! Bb8 [21...fxe6 22. Bf8+ g7 23. f3 e7 (23...e5 24. Kg8++) 24. h3 g5 25. xh2 22. f2! [A23.f7; 22. xdx8 exd8] 22...d7 23. g3 e5 24. f4 xc3 25. xh2 c6 26. d2 g7 27. g2 e5 28. c3 g4 29. c6 c3 xc5 30. dxe6 30. xe6+ [29. f7 h8 28. f7 29. g5+ e8 30. xdx6 xc1 31. xc1 29. xe6+ [29. xc7 xc7 30. b1 w8 31. xe6+ 29...g4 30. xc7 xc7 31. a1 xc1 e7 32. a2 e6 [32...f8 33. b3! h6 (33...g5 34. f7+ f7 35. xf7 xfx7 36. xf7 gxf4 37. el+) 34.g3 35. f7 g7 36. xhx6 xhx6 37. c6+ h5 (37...g7 38. c3+) 38. h3 xh3 39. f3+ 33. c6 xc6 xe6 34. xa7 f8 [34...e5 35. f1 e3+ 36. h1 f8 37. a2 xf4 38. f7+ xf7 39. xf7 xe5 40. c1+] 35. f1 g5 [35...b3 36. f3! b4 37. g3 e1+ 38. g2 w2+ 39. h3 e2 40. f7+ g8 41. g5+] 36. f5 xe5 37. xe6 d4+ 38. f2 xf2 39. a4 1-0

15. D89

Vyzmanavin – Ivanchuk
Tashkent 1987

7...0-0 8. d2 c5 9. 0-0 d6 10. d3 cxd4 13. cxd4 e6 14. e1 a4 15. a4 e6 16.d5 d7 17. b4 b6 18. f4 e8 19. c3 b7 20. a6 e7 21. e5 c5 22. c4 [22.d2! e5 23. c3 a5 24. f1] 22...w8 [A5; 22...c8 23. a3] a6 (23...a5 24. w1) 24. d2 a5 25. w1] 23. w3! [23. b5] 23... e8 24. f1 w8? [24...g4 25. d2 f5=]


16. D87

Jussupow – van Wely
Germany 1997

7...0-0 8. d2 c5 9. 0-0 d6 10. e3 g4 11.f3 a5 12. xf7+ xf7 13. fxg4 xf1+ 14. xf1 w7 15. g5 c4 16. e2 e5!? 17. dxc5 [17.d5! b6 18. g3 g8 19. g1±] 17...d8 [17...d2+ 18. e1 (18. g1 d8 19. g3±) 18...d8 (18...f8 19. xd2 xd2+ 20. xd2 xf2 21. b1) 19. c2 xf7 20. g3! (20. d1 f8∞) 20...d4 21. b1 f8 22. e2±] 18. xd7 [18. b3 d3] 18...xd7 19. e1 b2 20. c1 [20. g1 a4 21. c3 f7 22. f3 e6 23. e2 f8 24. g3 g7 25.c6 bxc6=] 20...a4 [20... d1 21. b3 - 20...a4] 21. b3 [21.
Illustrative Games

31...g3!+- [31...a4 f4±] 31...a5 32.b6 [32.a4 b2 33.xa5 c4±] 32.b2 33.c2 a4 34.xa5 b7 35.c4 b2 36.c5 a4 37.xe5 b2 38.d2 b6 39.c5 d7 40.d5 b6 41.d4 e6 42.e3 d7 43.a4 e5 44.a6+ d7 45.c3 b3 46.d4 f3+ 47.c4 b1 48.h4 d1 49.d3 g1 50.e5 xg3 51.e6+ e8 52.c4 1–0

17

Karpov – Timman
Rotterdam 1989

7...0–0 8.e2 c5 9.0–0 c6
10.xe3 g4 11.f3 a5 12.xf7+ xf7 13.fxg4 xf1+ 14.xf1 xd6 15.e5 xd5 16.f2 xd8 17.c2 xd4 18.wb2 xh6 [18...xf8!] 19.h4 xf8?! [19...xf7!]
27. \( \text{d}1+ \text{d}3 [27...\text{dxc}3 \text{e}28.\text{dxc}3 \text{c}6 29.\text{b}3+-] \) 28.\( \text{e}3 \text{c}6 29.\text{dxc}3 \text{a}4 30.\text{e}3 \text{a}5 31.\text{e}6 \text{d}8 32.\text{f}4 \text{e}5 33.\text{d}5 \text{c}5+ 34.\text{h}1 \text{c}1\text{e}0 \\

18 D87

Karpov – Kasparov

Belfort 1988

7...c5 8.\( \text{e}2 \text{c}6 9.\text{e}3 \text{e}0 0-0 10.0-0 \text{g}4 11.\text{f}3 \text{a}5 12.\text{xf}7+ \text{xf}7 13.\text{f}g4 \text{xf}1+ 14.\text{xf}1 \text{d}6 15.e5 \text{d}5 16.\text{f}2 \text{d}8 17.\text{a}4 \text{b}6 18.\text{c}2 \text{xf}8?! \) [18...\text{c}8!] 19.\( \text{g}1 \text{c}4 20.\text{b}2 20...\text{f}6 21.\text{h}3 \text{c}4 \\

22.\( \text{g}5! \text{h}6 23.\text{c}1\text{f}7 [23...\text{h}5 24.\text{g}xh5 \text{f}5 25.\text{e}1\text{e}1; 23...\text{b}5 24.\text{c}2 \text{f}7 25.\text{g}3\text{f}7] 24.\text{g}3 \) [24.\( \text{e}1 \text{a}3! (24...\text{cxd}4 25.\text{cxd}4 \text{a}3 26.\text{e}1 \text{a}2 27.\text{c}7+ 24... \text{b}2 25.\text{g}3\text{f}7; 24...\text{b}5 25.\text{g}3\text{f}7] 25.\text{e}1 \text{a}2 26.\text{dxc}5 \text{c}5 26.\text{e}5 27.\text{cxb}6 \text{axb}6 28.\text{cxb}6 \text{e}5 29.\text{d}4 \text{d}4 \text{f}5 29.\text{d}5 \text{e}6 \text{f}7 27.\text{e}1\text{e}1; 26...\text{e}3 27.\text{d}2 \text{c}4 (27...\text{cxd}4 28.\text{xf}8 \text{dxc}3 29.\text{f}2 \text{xf}8 30.\text{e}1 \text{c}2 31.\text{f}4+-) 28.\text{e}1 \text{e}3 29.\text{e}2+-; 26...\text{cxd}4 \\

27.\( \text{xf}8 (27.\text{cxd}4 \text{e}3 28.\text{d}2 \text{c}4 29.\text{e}1 \text{e}3 30.\text{e}2 \text{e}3 31.\text{f}3 \text{f}3 32.\text{xf}3 \text{xf}8) 27...\text{e}3 28.\text{d}2 \text{dxc}3 29.\text{f}2 \text{xf}8 30.\text{e}1 \text{c}2 31.\text{f}4--; 26...\text{c}8 27.\text{f}4! (27.\text{b}1 \text{bxc}1+ (27...\text{d}2 28.\text{e}1\text{e}1) 28.\text{xb}1 \text{cxd}4 (28...\text{d}2 29.\text{e}1 \text{cxd}4 30.\text{cxd}4 \text{e}2 31.\text{d}5) 29.\text{cxd}4 \text{e}3! 30.\text{e}3 \text{e}1+ (30...\text{d}5 31.\text{f}4) 31.\text{h}2 \text{d}5 27...\text{xf}4 28.\text{xf}4! (28.\text{xf}4 29.\text{g}3 \text{cxd}4 30.\text{cxd}4 \text{e}3) 28...\text{c}4 29.\text{g}3 \text{cxd}4 30.\text{cxd}4 \text{e}3! 30.\text{e}1 \text{c}1+ (30...\text{d}5 31.\text{f}4) 31.\text{f}3 \text{e}5 27...\text{xf}4 28.\text{xf}4! \\

19 D88

Ivanchuk – Shirov

Tallinn 2000

7...c5 8.\( \text{e}2 0-0 9.0-0 \text{cxd}4 10.\text{cxd}4 \text{c}6 11.\text{e}3 \text{g}4 12.\text{f}3 \text{a}5 13.\text{xf}7+ \text{xf}7 14.\text{f}xg4 \text{xf}1+ 15.\text{xf}1 \text{e}5 16.\text{g}1 \text{cxd}4 17.\text{xd}4 \text{xd}4 18.\text{xd}4 \text{c}8 19.\text{f}3\text{f}3+ \text{e}1+ [19...\text{b}6+ 20.\text{h}1 \text{e}6 21.\text{d}4! (21.\text{d}3\text{f}1) 21... \text{c}6 22.\text{a}4\text{f}1 19...b5 20.g5] 20...
Illustrative Games


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Grandmaster Konstantin Sakaev is one of the leading world experts on the Gruenfeld Defence and a strong player as well. He was a world champion under 18 in Duisburg 1992, champion of Russia in 1999, two times Olympic gold medalist in 1998 and 2000, Russian team champion in 1992, 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2002, winner of many international tournaments.