PLAN LIKE A GRANDMASTER

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PLAN LIKE A GRANDMASTER
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FOREWORD

The present book is devoted to one of the most important topics in chess theory — the strategic problem of the opening and its close connection with the middlegame. The author, GM Alexei Suetin, has long been working fruitfully in this field, and he first expressed his ideas in Modern Chess Opening Theory (Pergamon Press, 1965).

This book has little connection with the previous one, although the author's basic conception has remained practically unchanged. Suetin attaches the greatest importance to the dynamic handling of a position, and to the harmonious connection between opening mobilization and the subsequent development of ideas in the middlegame.

In the book an attempt is made to create a system of opening theory instruction on the basis of a differentiated classification and a large number of practical examples. It is well known that chess thinking constitutes an organic synthesis of visual and verbal ideas, i.e. tactical and strategic.

Since in young chess players it is visual thinking which predominates, we consider this approach by the author to be interesting and correct.

In Part I of the book, intended for less experienced players, the theoretical discussion is somewhat limited for this type of chess literature. but there are very many practical examples, which should enable the reader to improve his mastery of opening play, and also to expand his general horizons, especially in the field of attacks and combinations.

In Part II of the book, basic questions of opening strategy are examined, and certain generalizations in this field are made.

The book is intended for a wide range of players (Elo grades approx. 1700-2200; BCF 135-200) and coaches.

GM Lev Polugayevsky
PART I
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND TASKS OF THE OPENING
MOBILIZATION OF THE FORCES IN THE OPENING

The scale of relative piece values and its significance in the opening

A study of chess usually begins with an acquaintance with the scale of relative values of the pieces, in which the unit of measurement is taken to be the pawn. A minor piece — bishop or knight — is roughly equal to three units, a rook to four and a half, and the queen — the strongest piece — to nine units.

A special position is occupied by the king. Its value in the opening and middlegame is difficult to express in numerical terms, but in the endgame, when the king is rarely threatened with an attack and itself becomes an active piece, its numerical equivalent is fairly high — roughly five units.

In practice, a player very quickly comes to the conclusion that this generally-accepted scale of values is a very arbitrary and loose concept. And yet the scale is necessary! It is the starting point for the first, crude assessment of any position. As he gains experience, a player sees ever more deeply (in the second approximation) that any position is an indivisible group of actions of the forces, where each piece rarely acts in accordance with its scale value. In the position there are usually both strong pieces, operating at the forefront of the battle, and also weak, isolated pieces, standing as though to one side.

In the main, the same relative forces operate in the opening as in the middlegame, but in the former case there are specific features. In particular, it is very important to understand the opening role of the weakest unit — the pawn. With a large number of forces on the board, the weakness of the pawn also constitutes its strength. The point is that a pawn risks much less than any other piece. Thus, for example, when a pawn attacks a square, an opponent’s piece can stand there only under exceptional,
combinational circumstances. This is why pawns are so important in controlling the centre, by driving away enemy pieces.

Pawns can only move forward, and sometimes their advance can result in irreparable weaknesses. But at the same time, by advancing, pawns gain space for activity by the pieces. Here it is desirable that a pawn phalanx should be mobile, and also that the mobility of the pawns should coordinate with the play of the pieces.

The role of pawns in the opening is very varied. A pawn is by no means a ‘functional’ quantity, subject to general aims. In many cases, right from the opening it is a strong and independent fighting unit. It is sufficient to say that, other things being equal, the win of a pawn normally creates the necessary preconditions for winning the game, while at the same time, for example, the obtaining of a strong passed pawn guarantees a definite advantage.

In general, in the opening, pawns take a very active part in the play. But as for the heavy pieces – queen and rook – at the start of the game they usually play a very modest role. Space on the chess board is cramped, and is literally overrun with attacks by the pieces. This applies especially to the opening stage, when in the majority of cases the heavy pieces feel uncomfortable, or even clumsy.

The start of the game gives scope mainly to the minor pieces – the bishops and knights.

Thus, after a move (or moves) by a central pawn (or pawns), beginners are recommended first to develop the minor pieces, and to deploy the bishops as actively as possible. For example, after 1 e4 e5 2 d3 c6 the light square bishop is best developed at c4 or b5. On the contrary, it would be very bad to play 3 d3?, blocking the development of the Q-side, while 3 e2 is rather passive.

We will dwell on one further factor. Inexperienced players are recommended not to make premature attacks with the bishop. They are initially more committing than ‘solid’ developing moves by the knights.

Consider the following example.

**No. 1 Morphy–Allies**
Paris, 1853
*Philidor’s Defence*

1 e4 e5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 g4?

The initial cause of Black’s troubles. Now White forces the exchange of the g4 bishop for the knight at f3, and in an open pos-
ition (which is what the resulting position is) bishops are normally stronger than knights.

4 de \( \text{xf3} \) 5 \( \text{xf3} \) de 5 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{f6} \)
7 \( \text{b3} \) \( \text{e7} \) 8 \( \text{c3}?! \)

Of course, White could have won a pawn by 8 \( \text{xb7} \), but after 8...\( \text{b4+} \) 9 \( \text{xb4} \) \( \text{xb4+} \) 10 c3
Black would have exchanged queens, depriving White of an attack and reducing matters to the simple realization of an advantage. As if foreseeing the spectacular finale, Morphy ignores the prosaic gain of material, which, however, would have robbed the play of its interest. (I think also that a far from minor role in Morphy’s decision was played by the low standard of his opponents). In general, such pawns should not be declined!

8...\( \text{c6} \) 9 \( \text{g5} \) b5? 10 \( \text{xb5} \) cb
11 \( \text{xb5+} \) \( \text{bd7} \) 12 0-0-0 \( \text{d8} \)

Now White commences a spectacular combination, one which has become thematic.

13 \( \text{xd7!} \) \( \text{xd7} \) 14 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{e6} \)
15 \( \text{xd7+} \) \( \text{xd7} \) 16 \( \text{b8+}!! \)
\( \text{xb8} \) 17 \( \text{d8 mate!} \)

The following example is also still very instructive.

No. 2 Knorre-Chigorin
St. Petersburg, 1874
*Italian Game*

1 e4 e5 2 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 3 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 4 0-0(?) \( \text{f6} \) 5 d3 d6 6 \( \text{g5} \) h6 7 \( \text{h4}? \) (7 \( \text{xf6} \) was essential).

The combination of White’s early castling with his bishop development on move 6 is unsuccessful, the more so in that he persists in maintaining the pin along the h4-d8 diagonal. Now Black launches a very strong counterattack on the opponent’s castled position.

7...g5!

By attacking the bishop, Black advances his K-side pawns with gain of tempo for an attack on the king. It is very important that he has not yet castled, so that he can boldly move the pawns in front of his own king.

8 \( \text{g3} \) h5! 9 \( \text{xg5} \)

On 9 h4 there could have followed 9...\( \text{g4} \) 10 hg h4 11 \( \text{h2} \) \( \text{h7} \), again with a strong attack for Black, but even so this was the lesser evil for White.

9...h4! 10 \( \text{xh7} \) 10 hg 11 \( \text{xh8} \) \( \text{g4}! \) 12 \( \text{d2} \)

Black also has a spectacular win after 12 \( \text{xb4} \) 13 \( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{xf2} \) 14 \( \text{xf2} \) gh+!
when, despite his enormous material advantage, White cannot defend against the mate.

12...\( \text{d4} \) 13 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{f3}+ \) 14 gf
\( \text{xf3} \) 0-1
Development of the pieces and the role of the centre

The squares on the chess board are not all equivalent.

Their ‘market value’ depends largely on the specific situation on the board, but normally a particularly important role is played by the centre, by which we understand the group of four squares d4, e4, d5, and e5.

Any piece deployed in the centre can not only in principle exert its maximum influence on the position, but can also be switched quickly to any part of the board. This is readily apparent if one compares the actions of centralized pieces with pieces on the edge of the board (although the real strength of the pieces’ actions depends mainly on the specific situation). If one controls the centre, it is normally easy to ‘govern’ the flanks, whereas the opponent’s forces will be disunited and restricted in mobility.

The central squares are of particular significance in the opening, and therefore, until an area of specific conflict is determined, it is advisable to direct the development of one’s forces towards the centre. The neglect of the centre in the opening can lead to great difficulties, and sometimes even to a swift catastrophe.

This is confirmed by an example, taken from a game between two beginners. In an Italian Game after 1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆c6 3 ∆c4 ∆c5 4 c3 ∆f6 5 0-0?!., instead of taking an important central pawn by 5...∆×e4, Black engaged in inappropriate prophylaxis, and played 5...a6?

This allowed White after 6 d4 ed 7 cd ∆a7 8 d5 ∆e7 9 e5! to begin a powerful pawn offensive in the centre, and under its cover to quickly build up a decisive piece attack on the black king: 9...∆g4 10 h3 ∆h6 11 d6 ∆g6 12 ∆g5 f6 13 ef gf 14 ∆e1+ ∆f8 15 ∆×h6 mate!

Thus the basic struggle in the opening revolves around the centre. In graphic terms, the centre is a most important transit point, through which all strategic plans ‘pass’ (and are sometimes decided!) Therefore the development of the pieces and the struggle for the centre in the opening are inseparably linked.

The unpleasant consequences of loss of tempi

The aimless moving of one and the same piece early in the game is normally likely to have unpleasant consequences. This is eloquently confirmed in the following examples, in which
White irrationally wasted precious tempi in the opening on moves by his pieces.

In the first game — 10 \( \text{b}d2? \) and 11 \( \text{e}e3? \), and in the second game — 8 \( \text{e}e5? \) and then the inappropriate queen manoeuvre \( \text{\textit{w}}xc4-c7? \) Each time, exploiting his lead in development, Black replied with a timely opening of the centre, with a subsequent attack on the opponent's king, which was caught there.

No. 3 Rotlewi-Rubinstein
Lodz, 1908
Queen’s Gambit

1 \( \text{d}4 \text{d}5 2 \text{f}3 \text{e}6 3 \text{e}3 \text{c}5 4 \text{c}4 \text{c}6 5 \text{c}3 \text{f}6 6 \text{d}c \text{xc}5 7 \text{a}3 \text{a}6 \\
8 \text{b}4 \text{d}6 9 \text{b}2 0-0 10 \text{d}d2? \text{e}7 11 \text{d}3? \) (11 \text{cd} \text{ed} 12 \text{e}2 is better) 11...\text{dc} 12 \text{xc}4 \text{b}5 13 \text{d}3 \text{fd}8 14 \text{we}2 \text{b}7 15 0-0 \\
\text{e}5 16 \text{xe}5 \text{xe}5 17 \text{f}4(? ) (17 \text{h}3) 17...\text{c}7 18 \text{e}4? \text{ac}8 19 \text{e}5 \text{b}6+ 20 \text{h}1 \text{g}4 21 \text{e}4 \text{h}4 \\
22 \text{g}3 (22 \text{h}3 \text{xc}3!) 22...\text{xc}3 23 \text{gh} \text{d}2!! 24 \text{xd}2 \text{xe}4+ 25 \\
\text{g}2 \text{h}3! 0-1

No. 4 Belin-Lipnitsky
Riga, 1950
Queen’s Gambit

1 \text{d}4 \text{f}6 2 \text{c}4 \text{e}6 3 \text{f}3 \text{d}5 4 \text{g}5 \\
h6 5 \text{xf}6 \text{xf}6 6 \text{c}3 \text{b}4 7 \\
\text{a}4+ \text{c}6 8 \text{e}5? \text{d}7 9 \text{xc}6 (9 \\
\text{xd}7 \text{xd}4!) 9...\text{xc}3+ 10 \text{bc}

\( \text{x}c6 11 \text{b}3 \text{dc} 12 \text{xc}4 0-0 13 \\
f3 \text{e}5! 14 \text{d}5 \text{d}7 15 \text{xc}7? \text{e}4! (1) \\
16 \text{c}1 \text{ac}8! 17 \text{xd}7 \text{e}3! 18 \\
\text{a}4 \text{xc}3 19 \text{d}1 \text{fc}8 20 \text{g}3 \\
\text{c}1 21 \text{h}3 \text{xd}1+ 22 \text{xd}1 \\
\text{wc}3+ 23 \text{fl} \text{d}2! 24 \text{g}2 \text{c}1!! \\
0-1

Incidently, both here and later, for illustrative purposes, use will be made of short games, in which the crisis occurs at an early stage. They reveal very clearly the typical opening mistakes.

Short games are mainly good catalysts for remembering various characteristic opening mistakes, but their division by opening, which has become traditional in many books, essentially explains little. After all, the attack, say, on f7 lies in wait for Black in literally every opening, and this is the main basis of many short games with similar swift attacks, irrespective of the specific opening situation from which such an attack arises.
We give some examples to confirm this.

No. 5 Suetin-Arnaudov
Albena, 1970
Pirc Defence

1 e4 g6 2 d4 Àg7 3 c3 d5 4 ed Àxd5 5 Àf3 c5 6 Àe3 cd 7 cd Àc6?
7...Àf6 is correct. The position of the knight at c6 allows White to mount an offensive in the centre with gain of tempo.
8 Àc3 Àd8 9 Àb5 Àd7? (better 9...e6) 10 0-0 a6 11 Àe2 Àg4 12 d5 Àxf3 13 Àxf3 Àe5 14 d6!
The most efficient continuation, opening up the position for a decisive piece attack.
14... Ûxf3+ 15 Àxf3 Ûxd6 16 Àxb7 Àb8 17 Àa7 Àc8 18 Àfd1 Àc7 19 Àxa6 Àf6 20 Àac1 Àc6
21 Àa7 Ûa8 22 Ûb5! 1-0

No. 6 Kupreichik-Pedersen
Teesside, 1974
Pirc Defence

1 e4 g6 2 d4 Àg7 3 Àc3 d6 4 Àe3 c6 5 Àd2 Àd7 6 0-0-0 b5 7 e5! d5? (7...Àb6 is correct) 8 h4 Àb6 9 h5 gh 10 Àh3 f6? 11 Àf4 Àg4 12 f3 fe 13 de Àf5 14 Àxh5 Àf8
White would also have won after 14...Àf8 15 g4 Àg6 16 Àxb6 Ûxb6 17 Ûf4+ or 14...Àxe5 15 Àd4 Àd6 16 Àg7+.

15 Àxb5 cb 16 Àxb5+ Àf7 17 g4 Àg6 18 Àd4 e6 19 Ûf4+ Àf5 20 gf 1-0

No. 7 Kapengut-Pavlenko
Riga, 1975
Nimzowitsch Defence

1 e4 Àc6 2 d4 d5 3 Àc3! de 4 d5 Àb8 (4...Àe5 is better) 5 Ûf4 Àf6 6 Àc4 g6 7 f3 ef 8 Ûxf3 Àg7
9 0-0 0-0 10 Àe2 c6 11 Àad1! cd 12 Àxd5 Àxd5 13 Àxd5 Àb6+ 14 Àe3 Àxb2 15 Àb5 Àc3 16 Àc5
Àa3 17 Àg5 Àg4 18 Àxf7! Àxf7
Not 18...Àxe2 19 Àxf8++ Àxf8 20 Àc8 mate, while 18...Àd7 19 Àxe7+ Àh8 20 Àxg7 Àf6 21 Àcc7! is also bad, as is 20...Àxg7 21 Àd4+ Àh6 22 Àf7+ Àxf7 23 Àwd2+ etc., each time with a win for White.
19 Àf2 Àf5 (19...Àf6 20 Àxf7!) 20 Àc8+! Àf8 21 Àxf7+ Àg7 22 Àd4+ 1-0

Premature inclusion of the heavy pieces in the play

It is inadvisable to bring the heavy pieces — queen and rooks — into the game early, since they can easily come under fire from the less important forces — the minor pieces and pawns, which leads merely to loss of time. It is for this reason that an attack such as 1 e4 e5 2 Àh5 is unconvincing, since it can be
The danger of leaving the king in the centre

In the opening and middlegame the most vulnerable piece is the king. In the opening, in the overwhelming majority of cases one should remove the king from the centre and castle as soon as possible, since if the centre is quickly opened it will become a target for attack. (Also of considerable importance is the fact that castling brings into active play the rook, which in one leap moves from the edge of the board almost to the centre).

Leaving the king in the centre when behind in development can very often lead to a rapid defeat. This is a very important topic in the practical sense, and we offer several typical examples.

No. 8 Boleslavsky-Lilienthal
Moscow, 1941
King's Pawn Opening

1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 d5?! 3 ∆xe5 (3 ed is objectively stronger, e.g. 3...e4 4 ∆f4 f5 5 d3 ∆f6 6 de fe 7 ∆c3 ∆b4 8 ∆b5+! c6 9 ∆x b4 ef 10 ∆g5!, and White won quickly in Tal-Lutikov, Tallinn 1964) 3...e7? 4 d4 f6 5 ∆d3! de 6 ∆f4 ∆f7 7 ∆d2 ∆f5 8 g4! ∆g6 9 ∆c4 ∆d7 10 ∆e2 ∆xd4 11 ∆e6! ∆b6 12 ∆xe4 ∆bd7 13 ∆f4 ∆e5 14 0-0-0 ∆f7 15 ∆g5! fg 16 ∆xe5 ∆xe5 17 ∆xc7! 1-0

No. 9 Em. Lasker-Pirc
Moscow, 1935
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 ∆f3 ∆c6 3 d4 cd 4 ∆x d4 ∆f6 5 ∆c3 d6 6 ∆e2 e6 7 0-0 a6 8 ∆e3 ∆c7 9 f4 ∆a5 10 f5!? ∆c4? (leads to catastrophe; 10...e5 is better) 11 ∆xc4 ∆xc4 12 fe fe (2)
Mobilization of the forces in the opening

13 \( \text{xf6} \) gf 14 \( \text{h5} \) 15 \( \text{d8} \) \( \text{f7} \) \( \text{d7} \) (15...\( \text{e7} \) 16 \( \text{f5} \) \( \text{e8} \) 17 \( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{xd6} \) 18 \( \text{b6} \) \( \text{c7} \) 19 \( \text{d1} \) is crushing) 16 \( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{c7} \) 17 \( \text{xb8} \) \( \text{h6} \) 18 \( \text{xe6} \) 19 \( \text{xa8} \) \( \text{xe3} \) 20 \( \text{h1} \) 1-0

No. 10 Smyslov-Euwe
The Hague/Moscow, 1948
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 3 \( \text{b5} \) a6
4 \( \text{a4} \) \( \text{f6} \) 5 0-0 \( \text{xe4} \) 6 d4 h5
7 \( \text{b3} \) d5 8 de \( \text{e6} \) 9 \( \text{e2} \) \( \text{c5} \)!
10 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{xb3} \) 11 ab \( \text{c8} \) (3)

\[ \text{g7} \] 15 \( \text{a3} \) c6 16 \( \text{xc4} \) \( \text{bc} \) 17
\( \text{xc4} \) \( \text{b7} \) 18 e6 \( \text{f6} \) 19 \( \text{d7} \) \( \text{b5} \) 20 \( \text{xb5} \) \( \text{ch} \) 21 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{c8} \) 22 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 23 \( \text{xa6} \) \( \text{e5} \) 24 \( \text{b7} \) \( \text{c5} \) 25 \( \text{f5} \) 0-0 26 h3! 1-0

No. 11 Unzicker-Stahlberg
Amsterdam OL, 1954
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{f6} \)
4 \( \text{Ag5} \) \( \text{e7} \) 5 e5 \( \text{fd7} \) 6 h4 \( \text{f6} \)
7 \( \text{h5}+! \) \( \text{f8} \)

White also retains the initiative after 7...g6 8 ef \( \text{xf6} \) (8...gh? 8 fe!) 9 \( \text{e2} \) c5 10 dc \( \text{c6} \) 11 0-0-0 etc.

8 ef \( \text{xf6} \) 9 \( \text{f3} \) c5 10 dc b6?!
11 h5! bc 12 h6! g6 13 0-0-0 \( \text{bd7} \)
14 \( \text{e1} \) \( \text{b6} \) 15 \( \text{b5} \) \( \text{f7} \) 16 \( \text{h3} \)
a6 17 \( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{xd7} \) 18 \( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{xf6} \)
19 \( \text{g5}+! \) 1-0

No. 12 Tal-Minev
Munich OL, 1958
Queen’s Gambit

1 c4 c5 2 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 3 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{f6} \)
4 e3 e6 5 d4 d5 6 cd \( \text{xd5} \) 7 \( \text{c4} \)
\( \text{b6} \)? (7...cd 8 ed \( \text{e7} \) 8 \( \text{b5} \) a6
9 \( \text{xc6}+ bc 10 0-0 \) \( \text{b7} \) 11 \( \text{e4} \)
\( \text{d7} \) 12 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{b6} \) 13 \( \text{e5}+ ed 14
\( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{xd7} \) 15 ed \( \text{e8} \) 16 \( \text{e3} \)
\( \text{c7} \) 17 d5! ed 18 \( \text{ef1} \) \( \text{d8} \)

Black’s position is hopeless. White also wins after 18...de
19 \( \text{xe4}+ \) \( \text{e7} \) 20 \( \text{c5} \), or
19...\( \text{e7} \) 20 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{d8} \) 21 \( \text{b3} \)
etc.
No. 13 Suetin-Holmov  
Minsk, 1962  
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cd  
4 b4 d4 5 c3 c6 6 a5  
7 d2 c8 8 e2 d4 9 x4  
a5 10 f4 c5 11 d3 e5 12 e-e0  
13 c6 14 x66 gf 15 b1 h5 15 h4  
a6 16 f3 b5 17 e2 f5?! 18 ef  
19 gf x5 20 d2 h6? 21  
x6d6! x2+ 22 a1 g7 23  
c3!! 1-0

No. 14 Tal-Bilek  
Amsterdam, 1964  
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d4 4 d4 c4  
6 x4f6 5 c3 a6 6 a5 bd7 7 c4  
h6 8 x6f6 x6f6 9 e2! e6 10  
0-0-0 c7 11 f4 e5 12 d5! xxd5  
13 ed e7 14 fe de (4)

15 e6! d6

White also wins after 15...fe  
16 h5+ f8 17 d6 e7+!  
xe7 19 d8+ xd8 20 fe7  
mate.

16 xg7+ f8 17 e6+! e8  
18 h1 f5+ 19 b1 b5 20 h5  
f4 21 b3 a5 22 c7+! xe7 23  
d6! 1-0

No. 15 Tal-Bronstein  
USSR Ch, 1971  
Caro-Kann Defence

1 e4 c6 2 c4 d5 3 ed cd 4 d4 f6  
5 c3 c6 6 g5 g4? 7 e2!  
x2e2 8 gxe2 dc 9 d5 e5 10 f0  
h6 11 f4 g5 12 a4+ d7 13  
x4c4 c8 14 b3 e5 15 de x6e6  
16 xh7 c5 17 d4! xxd4 18  
eae1 0-0 19 xe6 fe 20 d6  
fd8 21 c7 f8 22 b5! e5 23  
x5 e5 xe5 24 xa7 d5 25  
xd4 1-0

No. 16 Suetin-Spiridonov  
Brno, 1975  
Caro-Kann Defence

1 e4 c6 2 c3 d5 3 f3 g4 4 h3  
x6f3 5 x6f3 d6 6 d3 e6 7 a3 a7  
(the alternative plan is 7...bd7  
and then 8.g6) 8 g4 de 9 de  
fd7 10 d2 g5 11 0-0-0 xd2+  
12 x2 d2 h4?

12...h6 was stronger, with  
the possible continuation 13 e3 e5  
14 f4 ef 15 x4f4 e7, when Black  
had gained an important tempo.

13 e3 e5 14 f4 ef 15 x4f4 e7  
16 h4 h6 17 e2! e5

Thus Black has gained the e5  
post for his knight, which was
the aim of his dark-square strategy, but he is behind in development, and has by no means equalized.

18 $d4$ g6 19 $h5$ $g5$ 20 $g3$ $e7$ 21 hg fg

Here some conclusions can be drawn: Black’s e6 square is hopelessly weakened. In addition his king is caught in the centre, and White wins quickly.

22 $b3$!

Now Black has no defence.

22... $f7$ 23 $e6$ $e7$ 24 $b4+$ $f6$ 25 $f2+$ $xe6$ 26 $c4+$ 1-0

No. 17 Veresov-Zhelyandinov
Minsk, 1969
Veresov Opening

1 $d4$ $f6$ 2 $c3$ d5 3 $g5$ $bd7$
4 $f3$ e6 5 e4 $h4$ 6 $h4$ g5 7 $g3$
$xe4$ 8 $xe4$ de 9 $d2$ $g7$ 10
$h4!$ $xd4$ 11 c3 gh? (11... $e5$ is correct) 12 $xh4!$ $f6$ 13 $h5!$
$g5$ 14 $xe4$ $g8$ 15 $d1$ a6 16
$g4$ e5 17 $c4$ $e7$ 18 $h4$ $f6$
19 $xg5!$ hg 20 $xf7+$ $f8$ 21
$xf6$ 1-0

In the majority of the examples, success was achieved by a sacrifice of material, leading to an abrupt opening of the position and to the elimination of important defensive barriers.

The pursuit of material to the detriment of development

At an early stage of the game you should not try at any cost to win material, to the detriment of your development (cf. games Nos. 5 and 11). We give several more games to illustrate this.

No. 18 Alekhine-Nimzowitsch
Bled, 1931
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 $c3$ $b4$
4 $g2$ de 5 a3 $xc3+$ 6 $xc3$ f5?
(6... $c6$) 7 $f3$! $f3$ 8 $xf3$
$xd4$? 9 $g3$ $f6$ 10 $xg7$
$e5+$? 11 $e2$ $g8$ 12 $h6$ $g6$
13 $h4$ $d7$ (13... $xg2$) 14 $f4$
$d4$ 15 $d1$ leads to a win for
White) 14 $g5$ $c6$ 15 0-0 $xg2$
$he1$ $e4$ 17 $h5$ $xh5$
18 $d8+$ $f7$ 19 $xh5$ $g7$ 20
$xe4$ fe 21 $h6+$ 1-0

No. 19 Tolush-Boleslavsky
USSR Ch, 1945
Queen’s Pawn Opening

1 $d4$ $f6$ 2 $g5$ c5 3 dc $e4$
4 $f4$ $c6$ 5 $d5$? f5! (5) 6 $xf5$
d5 7 $h5+$ g6 8 $h4$ $d4$ 9 $e5$
$xc2+$ 10 $d1$ $xa1$ 11 $xh8$
$a5$ 12 $c3$ $xc3+$ 13 $ xc3$
$xa2$ 14 e3 $b1+$ 15 $e2$ d4! 16
$xd4$ $d7$ 17 $h4$ 0-0-0 18 $f4
No. 22 Geller-Nahlik
Szczawno Zdroj, 1957
Petroff’s Defence

1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆f6 3 d4 ed 4 e5 ∆e4 5 ∆xd4 d5 6 ed ∆xd6 7 ∆c3
∆c6 8 ∆f4 ∆f5 9 ∆b5 ∆xg2? 10 ∆e5! g5 11 ∆e3 ∆e7 12 ∆xg6 bc
13 ∆xg6+ ∆f8 14 ∆xa8 ∆xa8 15 0-0 ∆f5 16 ∆e5 ∆g8 17 ∆d5 ∆e4
18 ∆xe4 1-0

No. 23 Tal-Uhlmann
Moscow, 1971
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ∆d2 c5 4 ∆gf3
∆c6 5 ∆b5 de 6 ∆xe4 ∆d7 7 ∆g5
∆a5+ 8 ∆c3 cd 9 ∆xd4 ∆b4 10 0-0 ∆xc3 11 bc ∆xc3 (6)

No. 21 Rovner-Kotov
Leningrad, 1949
Slav Defence

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 ∆c3 c6 4 e4 de
5 ∆x e4 ∆b4+ 6 ∆d2 ∆xd4
7 ∆xb4 ∆xe4+ 8 ∆e2 ∆a6 9 ∆c3
∆e7 10 ∆xg7 ∆xg2?
Black should have played
10...∆g8 11 ∆c3 ∆d5!
11 ∆f6! ∆c5 (11...∆xh1 12
∆d6 0-0 13 ∆g3+ ∆g6 14 ∆f3!
leads to a win for White) 12 ∆d6
0-0 13 ∆f3 ∆g6 14 ∆xe7 ∆d3+ 15
∆e2 ∆xb2 16 ∆c1 ∆e8 17 ∆h3,
and White won.

No. 20 Enevoldsen-Andersen
Denmark, 1940
Queen’s Gambit

1 c4 ∆f6 2 ∆f3 e6 3 ∆c3 d5 4 e3
∆e7 5 b3 0-0 6 ∆b2 b6 7 d4 ∆b7
8 ∆d3 dc 9 bc c5 10 0-0 cd 11 ed
∆c6 12 ∆e2 ∆x d4? 13 ∆x d4
∆xd4 14 ∆d5! ∆c5 15 ∆xf6 gf 16
∆xe7+ ∆x e7 17 ∆g4+ ∆h8 18
∆h4! 1-0
No. 24 Kondratiev–Gašić
Olomouc, 1975
Albin Counter-Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e5 3 de d4 4 f3
\( \text{c6} 5 g3 \text{e6} 6 g2!? \text{xc4} 7 0-0\)
\( \text{e6}?! (7 \ldots \text{d3}!) 8 \text{a4} \text{d7} 9 \text{d1}! \)
\( \text{d8} 10 \text{c3}! \text{c5} 11 \text{g5} \text{ge7} 12\)
e3 \( \text{g4} 13 \text{xe7} \text{xe7} 14 \text{c4}! \)
\( \text{b6} 15 \text{ed} \text{xf3} 16 \text{xf3} \text{xd4} 17\)
\( \text{b5} \text{f5} 18 \text{xc7+} \text{f8} 19 \text{g4} \)
e7 20 \text{xf5} \text{xe5} 21 \text{b5} \text{xf2}+ 22 \text{xf2} \text{xf5}+ 23 \text{g1}
1-0

No. 25 Uhlmann–Liebert
East Germany, 1976
English Opening

1 c4 \text{f6} 2 \text{c3} d5 3 cd \text{xd5} 4
g3 c5 5 \text{g2} \text{c7} 6 \text{f3} \text{c6} 7
\text{a4} \text{d7} 8 0-0 g6 9 \text{c4}?! b6 10
b4?! \text{g7} 11 \text{bc} b5! 12 \text{b3} b4! 13
\text{g5} 0-0 14 \text{xc6}?! \text{xc6} 15 \text{xb4}
\text{b8} 16 \text{f4} \text{b7} 17 \text{f3} \text{e6}! 18
\text{e3} \text{d4}! 19 \text{h6} \text{a8}! 20 \text{b1}
\text{xb1} 21 \text{xb1} \text{e4}! 22 \text{c3}
\text{xc3} 23 dc \text{xe2} 24 \text{d2} \text{d8}! 25
\text{e3} \text{xd2}!! 26 \text{xd2} \text{g5}!! 27
\text{xe2} \text{h3 mate}!

It will be noticed that in these games too the “punishment” involved strong tactical measures, and in certain cases a decisive attack on the opponent’s king.

Diversions in the opening

One of the logical principles of opening play is that, if the opponent has not made a serious mistake, forcible measures to obtain an advantage are doomed to failure. Therefore early, ill-prepared diversions in the opening, in which a small number of pieces participate, are inadvisable. If such ‘pseudoactive’ operations cannot be supported by the main forces, they are quickly refuted.

In this respect the following game is an instructive example.

No. 26 Botvinnik–Denker
USSR-USA, 1945
Slav Defence

1 d4 d5 2 \text{f3} \text{f6} 3 c4 c6 4 cd
cd 5 \text{c3} \text{c6} 6 \text{f4}

Here, instead of the natural continuation of his development, Black embarked on an unfortunate diversion (there is no other word for it) on the Q-side.

6...\text{a5} 7 e3 \text{e4}(?) 8 \text{b3} e6
9 \text{d3} \text{b4} 10 \text{c1}

White very calmly meets the opponent’s impulsive attack, completing his development and thus neutralizing the opponent’s ephemeral threats.

10...\text{xc3} 11 bc \text{a3} 12 \text{b1}
b6 13 e4! (7)

A timely switch to genuinely
decisive action, opening up the centre, which is aided by White’s considerable lead in development.

\[ 
\begin{array}{c}
\text{13. \ldots} \text{de (13. \ldots} \text{a6 is bad because of 14.} \text{a}x\text{a6} \text{a}x\text{a6 15 ed ed 16} \text{x}d\text{5) 14 b5! d7 15 d2 a6 16 x}c\text{6} x\text{c6 17 c4 f5 18 d6! e3 19 x}e\text{3} x\text{x}b\text{1+ 20} \text{x}b\text{1} x\text{x}d\text{6}}
\end{array}
\]

By giving up material Black tries to weaken White’s onslaught, but without success.

\[ 
\begin{array}{c}
21 x\text{xb}6 d7 22 b3 ab8 23 c2 b5 24 0-0 h5 25 h3, and White has a won position.
\end{array}
\]

Harmony in the development of the flanks

The development of the flanks should also be harmonious. Mobilization can hardly be considered complete if the pieces on one flank are well developed, but those on the other are totally undeveloped. In such cases the mobilization ‘balance arm’ is as though disturbed, and the weight of the undeveloped flank will sometimes overturn the entire set-up.

In this respect the following game is instructive for players of any standard.

No. 27 Keres-Botvinnik
Absolute USSR Ch
Moscow, 1941
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4 f6 2 c4 e6 3 c3 b4 4 c2 d5 5 cd ed 6 g5 h6! 7 h4
It soon transpires that 7 xf6 would have been better, but it is very tempting to maintain the pin on the knight.

7. \ldots c5 8 0-0 (8)

\[ 
\begin{array}{c}
\text{White would appear to have successfully solved his main opening problems. He has already castled, and is actively pressing against Black’s central d5 pawn. But in aiming for this position, White failed to take account of a highly significant}
\end{array}
\]
factor — the totally undeveloped state of his K-side. It is this circumstance, together with the possibility of favourably opening the position on the Q-side, which allows Black to begin a very strong attack on the white king.

8...\xc3! 9 \xc3 g5! 10 \g3 cd!

Disregarding positional weakenings, Black conducts the attack with colossal energy. His main problem is to assail the opponent’s king while White’s K-side is still bottled up. In addition, by ...g5! Black has temporarily shut out of the game another of the opponent’s pieces — his dark-square bishop.

11 \xd4 c6 12 a4 f5 13 e3 c8 14 d3 d7!, and soon Black completely overran his opponent’s position.

The following example on the same theme is no less attractive and convincing.

No. 28 Larsen-Spassky
USSR-Rest of World
Belgrade, 1970
Nimzowitsch Larsen Attack

1 h3 e5 2 b2 c6 3 c4 f6 4 B e4 5 d4 c5 6 xc6 dc 7 e3 f5 8 c2 e7 9 e2?! (9 d4!)
9...0-0-0! 10 f4? (10 a3 is better) 10...g4! 11 g3 h5! (9)

A correct and highly energetic plan. Black opens up the position on the K-side, which assists the development of his initiative. Only in this way can he exploit the ‘freezing’ of White’s Q-side.

12 h3 h4! 13 hg

Interesting variations arise after 13 \xg4 \xg4 14 hg hg 15 g1 h1! 16 h1 g2 17 g1 w4+ 18 e2 \xg4+ 19 e1 w3+ 20 e2 f3+ 21 e1 e7 or 20 d1 f2 21 c4 w1+ 22 c2 f2!, when Black wins.

13...hg 14 g1 h1!! 15 h1 g2 16 f1 (or 16 g1 w4+ 17 d1 w1 18 c3 \xg1+ 19 c2 f2 20 g w2 21 c3 \f2 22 a3 \b4 with a decisive attack for Black) 16...w4+ 17 d1 g w+ 0-1

Excessive prophylaxis

Excessive prophylaxis in the opening is often a significant mistake, and common but unnecessary pawn moves such as ...h7-h6 (or h2-h3) are especially to be condemned.
And yet how tempting it is at times to make such a move, in order, for example, to avoid a pin. Especially since in a number of cases such prophylaxis is indeed useful. Thus in the main line of the Spanish Game after 1 e4 e5 2 ¤f3 ¤c6 3 ¤b5 a6 4 ¤a4 ¤f6 5 0-0 ¤e7 6 ¤e1 b5 7 ¤b3 d6 8 c3 0-0, although this position has occurred a countless number of times, players with White have been unable to, and are unlikely to, devise anything better than the flexible 9 h3!

But in the given case this is not a significant loss of time (in addition the position is not an open one), and it restricts Black’s counterplay (it radically prevents ... ¤g4 etc). In short, it is a justified decision. But such moves, made out of a fear of what might happen, without specific reason, are a simple waste of time.

One of the simplest examples of what can result from unnecessary moves of the rooks’ pawns is the famous Legall mate: 1 e4 e5 2 ¤f3 d6 3 ¤c4 h6? 4 ¤c3 ¤g4? 5 ¤xe5 ¤xd1 6 ¤xf7+ ¤e7 7 ¤d5 mate.

Suppose that instead of 3... h6? Black had played any useful developing move, e.g. 3... ¤c6 or 3... ¤e7. Then not only would the sacrifice on e5 (5 ¤xe5) have been impossible, but White would not have even gained any immediate advantage.

In playing ... h7-h6 (or correspondingly h2-h3) inexperienced players are usually motivated by a desire to avoid either a knight attack on f7, or the ‘unpleasantness’ resulting from a pin on the h4-d8 diagonal, which usually arises after ¤c1-g5. It is not hard to show that in the majority of cases these threats can easily be parried.

For example, in the variation 1 e4 e5 2 ¤f3 ¤c6 3 ¤c4 ¤c5 4 d3 Black has no reason to fear 5 ¤g5 or 5 ¤g5. Without wasting time on 4... h6, he should continue his development with 4... d6 or 4... ¤f6. If on 4... d6 White plays 5 ¤g5, after 5... ¤h6 Black easily parries the threat against f7 and simultaneously completes the development of his K-side.

4... ¤f6 is equally safe, there being no reason to fear the pin after ¤c1-g5. Moreover, in many cases one can ignore this threat, and resort to... h7-h6 for a counterattack on the bishop in the event of the pin.

**Advantageous opening of the centre**

From the examples examined earlier it will be apparent that the exploitation of a lead in development invariably involves
the advantageous opening of the centre.

It is in an open position that a lead in development proves most significant. GM Rudolf Spielmann maintained, for example, that in the majority of cases in an open game a lead of three tempi should almost automatically ensure a won position, which logically it should be possible to find.

Here are some examples from his games.

**No. 29 Spielmann-Flamberg**
Mannheim, 1914
*Vienna Game*

1 e4 e5 2 d4 c6 3 f4 d5 4 fe c4 5 f3 Ag4 6 Ae2! Ac5? (6... Ac3 7 dc Ac6 is better, but Black considered 7 d4 to be unfavourable for White; nevertheless...) 7 d4! Ac5+ 8 Ac4 Ac4+ (10)

![](image1)

In his calculations Black considered only 9 Ac2 here, after which 9...Af2+ 10 Af2 Ae6 11 Ax dc 5 c6 and 12...Ax d4 leads to a favourable ending for him. But Spielmann’s thinking is on a broader plane. In the best traditions of Paul Morphy, the founder of opening principles in open games, he sacrifices two pawns, and for purely strategic aims — to open the centre to his advantage. Black is unable to avert this dangerous turn of events.

9 g3! Ax d4 10 Ae3 Ax e5 11 0-0-0 c6 12 Ax d5 cd 13 x d5 Ae6 14 Ac4 Ae4 15 Ax c5! 1-0

**No. 30 Bernstein-Spielmann**
Ostend, 1906
*Tarrasch Defence*

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 d c3 c5 4 cd ed 5 dc(?) d4 6 Ac4 Ax c5 7 Ax c5 Ac5+ 8 Ad2? (the start of an incorrect plan; 8 Ad2 was better)

8...Ax c5 9 b4 Ab6 10 Ab2 Ac6 11 a3 Ae6 12 Af3 Ad8 13 Ag5? (11)

![](image2)

A typical mistake, which experienced players commit very
rarely, usually as a result of an oversight, and weak players make fairly often, due to a lack of understanding of basic principles.

Of course, the queen move looks tempting: White tries to disorganize the development of Black’s K-side. But, as the winner correctly remarked in his notes to the game, can Black’s natural development really be disrupted in such an ‘unlikely way’?

White wanted to gain a tempo by threatening to capture on g7. With his next move Black directs his opponent’s actions precisely to this place; he gives up the pawn, but in turn gains a highly important tempo for the development of his pieces. And with the position being an open one, Black’s lead in development becomes decisive.

13...\textit{\textdagger}f6! 14 \textit{\textdagger}xg7? (14 \textit{\textdagger}c5 was better) 14...\textit{\textdagger}e7! (with the unequivocal threat of 15...\textit{\textdagger}xb4!) 15 \textit{\textdagger}h6 \textit{\textdagger}hg8 16 \textit{\textdagger}d1 a5! 17 \textit{\textdagger}d2 \textit{\textdagger}e4 18 \textit{\textdagger}c2 f5 19 ba \textit{\textdagger}xa5+ 20 \textit{\textdagger}d2 \textit{\textdagger}e5 21 \textit{\textdagger}c1 \textit{\textdagger}d6 22 f3 \textit{\textdagger}c3 23 g3 \textit{\textdagger}b6 24 \textit{\textdagger}f2 \textit{\textdagger}e8 25 \textit{\textdagger}g1 \textit{\textdagger}xe2+ 0-1

No. 31 Shories-Spielmann
Scheveningen, 1905
Spanish Game
1 e4 e5 2 f3 \textit{\textdagger}c6 3 b5 a6 4 \textit{\textdagger}a4 \textit{\textdagger}f6 5 0-0 \textit{\textdagger}xe4 6 d4 b5 7 \textit{\textdagger}b3 d5 8 de \textit{\textdagger}e6 9 c3 \textit{\textdagger}c5 10 a4 b4 11 \textit{\textdagger}e2 0-0 12 \textit{\textdagger}c2 f5!

It can be said that, although the game was played more than 80 years ago, this is a perfectly modern pawn sacrifice. White accepts the challenge, reckoning that after 13 \textit{\textdagger}e3 \textit{\textdagger}xe3 14 \textit{\textdagger}xe3 f4 15 \textit{\textdagger}d3 \textit{\textdagger}f5 or 15 \textit{\textdagger}e2 \textit{\textdagger}g4 Black has an undisputed advantage.

13 ef \textit{\textdagger}xf6 14 \textit{\textdagger}xe4 de 15 \textit{\textdagger}xe4 \textit{\textdagger}b3! 16 c4? (16 \textit{\textdagger}e3 is rather better) 16...\textit{\textdagger}d6! 17 \textit{\textdagger}bd2 (17 \textit{\textdagger}d5+ was essential, agreeing to an inferior ending) 17...\textit{\textdagger}ae8 18 \textit{\textdagger}b1 \textit{\textdagger}d4! 19 \textit{\textdagger}e4 \textit{\textdagger}xf3+ 20 gf \textit{\textdagger}g6+ 21 \textit{\textdagger}h1 \textit{\textdagger}xf3 22 \textit{\textdagger}e1 \textit{\textdagger}xf2 23 \textit{\textdagger}g5 \textit{\textdagger}h5 24 \textit{\textdagger}f6+ gf 25 \textit{\textdagger}xe8+ \textit{\textdagger}f7 0-1

We will also examine two striking examples from the games of Alekhine.

No. 32 Alekhine-Seitz
Hastings, 1925-26
Budapest Counter-Gambit
1 d4 \textit{\textdagger}f6 2 c4 e5 3 de \textit{\textdagger}g4 4 e4 \textit{\textdagger}xe5 5 f4 \textit{\textdagger}ec6 6 \textit{\textdagger}e3 \textit{\textdagger}b4+ (6...\textit{\textdagger}a6 followed by...\textit{\textdagger}c5 is better) 7 \textit{\textdagger}c3 \textit{\textdagger}e7 8 \textit{\textdagger}d3 f5 9 \textit{\textdagger}h5+! g6 10 \textit{\textdagger}f3 \textit{\textdagger}xc3+ 11 bc fe? (this opening of the game is inappropriate; it merely allows White to begin a decisive attack)
12 \textit{\textdagger}xe4 0-0 13 \textit{\textdagger}d5+ \textit{\textdagger}h8 14 \textit{\textdagger}h3 d6 15 0-0 \textit{\textdagger}xh3 16 \textit{\textdagger}xh3
d7 17 f5! gf 18 ab1 f4 19 xf4
xh3 20 e5+! 1-0

No. 33 Alekhine-Marshall
New York, 1927
Queen's Pawn Opening

1 d4 f6 2 c4 e6 3 f3 e4? 4
fd2! b4 5 c2 d5 6 c3 f5 7
dxe4 fe 8 xf4 0-0 9 e3 c6 10 e2
d7 11 a3 e7 12 0-0 g5 13 f3!
xf4 14 ef xf4 15 fe xf1+ 16
xf1 e5 17 d2! c5 18 de! d4 19
xf4! dc 20 f7+ h8 21 bc (12)

This underlines the hopelessness of the position for Black, who is in an unusual type of zugzwang. After 21 e6? f6 22 e7
g8 23 xf6 g4! 24 xg8+ xg8 25 d6 e8, on the contrary, it is White who would have been in a difficult position.

21...g8 22 c7 h6 23 h5!
a5 24 e6 g6 25 ed xd7 26 f7!
1-0

Retribution for routine play

A chess player’s practical thinking must be specific, and this applies also to the development of the pieces in the opening. It is not enough to be able to deploy the pieces competently— from the very first moves of the game he must get to the essence of the struggle.

Apart from direct mistakes, there is nothing more ruinous than routine play, the aim of which is mechanical development. This is clearly demonstrated by the following examples.

No. 34 Portisch-Benko
Las Palmas, 1972
English Opening

1 f3 c5 2 c4 g6 3 d4 cd 4 xd4
f6 5 c3 d5 6 g5 dc 7 e3 g7
8 xc4 0-0 9 0-0 d7 10 d2
c6 11 fd1 xd4?

An instructive mistake. Black appears successfully to relieve the tension in the centre and to achieve full equality, but White has not only a lead in development, but also very active pieces. He has available a clever tactical possibility.

12 xd4 c6 13 xf7+

This is where the weak spot is revealed! — if 13...xf7 14
\[ \text{\textit{Retribution for routine play}} \quad 31 \]

\[ \text{\textit{Portisch-Lombard}} \quad \text{Biel IZ, 1976} \]

\textit{Queen's Gambit}

1 c4 d5 2 d4 c6 3 d3 4 d1 e5 5 c3 b6 6 g5 e7 7 e3 0-0 8 d3 dc?! 9 c4 a6 10 c2 b5 11 d3 b7 12 e4! g6 13 h6? (13)

This natural move proves to be a mistake, with serious consequences. Correct was 13 e5! d5 14 dxe7 cxe7 15 c5 ed 16 0-0 with an obvious advantage to White.

13... d6 e8 14 e5 g4! 15 f4 c5 16 d4 cd 17 h3 f5!

The point of Black's idea is that his forces in the centre are sharply activated and develop very strong counterplay, while at the same time the white pieces are driven back from their active positions with gain of tempo. As a result the white king, caught in the centre, becomes a vulnerable target.

18 ed2 (18 eg5 d5 19 d5 gxe5 is bad for White, as is 18 g3 f3! etc) 18... ec5 19 fl d1! 20 d1 g5 21 hg gf 22 gl f8 23 h2 f7 24 gf ef 25 f4 d5 26 h5 e6 27 f3+ g7 28 h2 b4 29 a3 a5 30 b6 e8 31 h5 c7 32 c1 xd2+ 33 xd2 f8! 34 b3 xe5+ 35 b3 e3 0-1

We give some further examples on the same theme.

\[ \text{\textit{Bronstein-Averbakh}} \quad \text{USSR Ch, Moscow, 1963} \]

\textit{Nimzo-Indian Defence}

1 d4 f6 2 c4 e6 3 c3 b4 4 e3 0-0 5 c3 d5 6 b3 c5 7 0-0 c6 8 cd ed 9 e2? c4! 10 c2 e8 11 cd6 12 b3 cb 13 xb3 b4 14 e4!

White's position is already very difficult, a consequence of his feeble, routine play. The threat of 15... f3 16 gf g5+ 17 h1 h4 is pretty significant.

15 e1? (he could have held on by 15 e2) 15... f3 16 gf xh2! 17 xh2 h4+ 18 e2 xh2+ 19 d3 b4 mate!
No. 37 Kupreichik-Estrin
Leningrad, 1965
Centre Game

1 e4 e5 2 d4 ed 3 ♕xd4 ♗c6 4 ♗e3 ♗f6 5 ♗c3 ♘b4 6 ♘d2 0-0 7 0-0-0 ♗e8 8 ♘c4 d6 ♘h3! ♘e5(?)
10 ♘b3 ♘e6 11 f4 ♘c4 12 ♘xc4 ♘xc4 13 e5! ♘d7?
13...de is better. Now White obtains a very strong attack on f7.

14 ♗e4 ♘xd2+ 15 ♘xd2 ♘b5
16 ♘b3 ♘c6 17 ♗eg5 d5 18 ♗xf7!
♗xf7 19 ♗g5+ ♘f8 20 ♘xd5 h6
Black’s position is hopeless, e.g. 20...♗e7 21 ♘xh7+ ♘e8 22 ♘xd7 and 23 ♗g8+, or 20...
♘xd5 21 ♘xd5 ♘xe5 22 ♘xh7+ ♘e7 23 ♘xe5+ ♘d7 24 ♘d1+ etc.

21 ♘h7+ ♘e7 22 f5! ♘xd5 23 ♘xd5 ♘c8 24 f6+ ♘d8 25 f7 1-0

No. 38 Fokin-Suetin
Daugavpils Otborochnii, 1978
Slav Defence

1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 ♗f3 ♘f6 4 ♘c3 e6 5 e3 ♘bd7 6 ♘d3 dc 7 ♘xc4 b5
8 ♘d3 a6 9 e4 c5 10 d5!? c4 11 de fe 12 ♘c2 ♘c7 13 ♘g5? ♘c5 14 ♘e2 ♘b7 15 0-0 0-0 16 ♘ad1?

14

16...♗g4! 17 h3 (also bad is 17
g3 ♘de5 18 ♘f4 ♘xf2! 19 ♘xf2
♘xf3+ 20 ♘xf3 e5 etc) 17...
♘de5! 18 ♘xe5
White also loses after 18 hg
♘xf3+ 19 gf ♘g3+! 20 ♘h1
♘h3+ 21 ♘g1 ♘xf3, or 18 ♘d4
♘xd4 19 ♘xd4 ♘f3+ etc.

18...♗xf2! 19 ♘d7 ♘xe5 20
♘e3 ♘xh3+ 0-1

Flexibility of development in the opening

Another ‘delicate’ rule is that mobilization should as far as possible be flexible.

During the initial moves it is advantageous to retain as wide a choice as possible of further opportunities, while devoting the main attention to general opening tasks, i.e. the mobilization of the pieces and the struggle for control of the central squares, without tying oneself,
until a certain time, to committing operations.

Usually one should avoid an early fixing of the central formation or early exchanges, if this is to the detriment of the basic tasks of mobilization. To explain this we will consider the initial moves of the Sicilian Defence: 

1 e4 c5 2 f3 c6 3 d4 cd 4 x d4 f6 (15)

With his last move Black has attacked the e4 pawn and created pressure on the central squares. White’s strongest reply is undoubtedly 5 c3, since it assists the development of the pieces in their most active positions and increases White’s influence on the centre.

Other ways of defending the pawn are significantly worse. Thus 5 f3 leads to a premature weakening of White’s K-side, and 5 x c6 bc 6 d3 to a strengthening of Black’s pawn centre.

In the French Defence the immediate gain of space by White with 3 e5 is also very debatable. The position in the centre becomes blocked, and Black, who has not yet begun mobilizing his pieces, acquires very convenient ways of undermining White’s pawn centre. In a short time Black often seizes the initiative.

After the moves pursuing the general tasks of the opening, the main struggle gradually develops.

If, in particular, we continue the variation of the Sicilian Defence considered above for just one more move, it becomes clear that after 5 c3 d6 6 c4 (as an example we will take the Sozin Attack) the struggle begins to take on a more specific character.

Although 6 c4 strives mainly for the rapid mobilization of the pieces, it also determines the subsequent plan of active pressure along the a2-g8 diagonal, and there are already concrete threats: 7 x c6 bc 8 e5! de 9 x f7+, with which Black has to reckon.

The advantage of the first move and the initiative

In the initial chess position there exists a natural equality of force of the two sides, and this
determines their roughly equal chances in the opening struggle.

A tangible positional advantage can be achieved in the opening only after definite mistakes by one of the sides, in particular after disturbance of the equilibrium in the opening, disregard for opening principles, nonconcrete approach to the position, and so on.

However, the character of the opening struggle is also significantly influenced by the right of the first move, which belongs to White and makes him the active side. It gives White a certain initiative at the start of the game, expressed in his active aspirations and slightly greater choice of different plans.

To a certain degree Black must submit to White's initiative, and his plans depend on those of the active side. Thus in many cases the player with Black, before creating his active counterplan, must weigh things up with great care.

In the following game Black committed an instructive mistake, in playing an early ...b5. In the given variation this is in general his basic plan of counterplay, but ...b5 should have been prepared after completing his development, and tactically should have been weighed up very thoroughly. After playing ...

...b5 on the off chance, Black's idea met with a decisive refutation.

No. 39 Taimanov-Aronin
Leningrad, 1951
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 dxd4 d3 f6 5 c3 c6 6 g5 e6 7 d2 a6 8 0-0-0 h6 9 f4 d7 10 g3 b5?

(16)

11 d6! d6 12 c6 c6 13 x6 x6 14 d6 e4 15 x4 x4 16 x6!! and White won easily.

Or take the problem of the struggle for a critical point in the centre, when a typical pawn tension exists (white pawns on d4 and e4, black pawns at d6 and e5). Releasing the tension by d4xe5 d4xe5 is normally favourable to Black, since he thereby gains equality in the centre. White in turn will try to provoke the exchange ...e5xd4, after which he gains a definite
advantage in space.

In many cases the opening struggle revolves around this, and often logic dictates that Black has to make certain concessions, by being the first to release the tension in the centre. Instructive in this respect is the classic Steinitz Variation of the Spanish Game: 1 e4 e5 2 \( \triangle \) f3 \( \triangle \) c6 3 \( \triangle \) b5 d6 4 d4 \( \triangle \) d7 5 \( \triangle \) c3 \( \triangle \) f6 6 0-0 \( \triangle \) c7 7 \( \triangle \) e1.

It now transpires that Black cannot hold his e5 point, since after 7...0-0 there follows 8 \( \triangle \) x c6 \( \triangle \) x c6 9 d e d 10 \( \triangle \) x d 8 \( \triangle \) a x d 8 11 \( \triangle \) x e 5 \( \triangle \) x e 4 12 \( \triangle \) x e 4 \( \triangle \) x d 3 f 5 14 f 3 \( \triangle \) c 5 + 15 \( \triangle \) x c 5 \( \triangle \) x c 5 16 \( \triangle \) g 5 ! \( \triangle \) d 5 17 \( \triangle \) e 7 , when Black loses by force, since against the threat of 18 c 4 he has no defence. This was how the game Tarrasch-Marco (Nuremberg, 1892) concluded. In the event of 10...\( \triangle \) f x d 8 11 \( \triangle \) x e 5 \( \triangle \) x e 4 12 \( \triangle \) x e 4 \( \triangle \) x e 4 13 \( \triangle \) d 3 f 5 14 f 3 \( \triangle \) c 5 + White wins by 15 \( \triangle \) f 1.

Thus, truly with mathematical authenticity White compels his opponent to concede the centre by 7...e d 8 \( \triangle \) x d 4 0-0. But although this is forced, it does not signify that Black has conceded any great advantage. In the resulting typical structure in the centre (pawn on e4 against pawn on d6) it is true that White has a certain spatial advantage, but Black has no vulnerable points in his pawn formation, and the mobilization of his forces is largely complete. All this provides the basis for gradual equalization of the game by Black, which is often what in fact occurs.

However, White’s chances are nevertheless preferable, since he enjoys a slight but persistent initiative thanks to his greater freedom.

Does this mean that in the opening Black is doomed to passive defence and deprived of activity? By no means! On the contrary, in modern opening set-ups his activity is growing ever greater. Black merely has greater difficulties and bears more responsibility for his actions. While a slight mistake by White usually entails only the loss of his initiative, a similar mistake on the part of Black can often have much more serious consequences.

It is natural that in the opening stage White should aim to consolidate and increase his initiative, whereas Black in turn will try to neutralize such aspirations of White and if possible to seize the initiative.

In master play the firm possession of the initiative is regarded as a definite achievement, and, as is customarily
stated in chess literature, it ensures a slight but persistent advantage.

Thus in the modern opening the factor of the initiative plays a most important role. It indicates the degree of preparedness for carrying out an active plan. Therefore it is only if the initiative is held that there are real preconditions for putting one's plans into action.

It will be apparent that the struggle for the initiative in the opening revolves around the central squares. Both active and defensive means are constantly being improved, and it is this that advances the development of opening theory.

**Move order in the opening**

Move order in the opening is often of great practical importance. Sometimes a change in the order of even two adjacent moves can lead to completely different systems of play. Take, for example, the main line of the Spanish Game: 1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 f6 5 0-0 e7 6 e1 b5 7 b3. At first sight the difference between 7...0-0 and 7...d6 seems significant. In both cases after 8 c3 d6 (or 8...0-0) 9 h3 a5 10 c2 c5 11 d4 etc. the basic Closed Vari-

ation arises. And in many instances of course that is what in fact happens. But at the same time, after 7...0-0 8 c3 Black has the possibility of playing the sharper 8...d5!? leading to the Marshall Attack. On the other hand, after 7...0-0 White has the quite effective continuation 8 a4, with which Black now has to reckon.

Often the correct move order in the opening has a different, more significant practical importance. The mechanical reproduction of moves in the opening and a mix-up in their order can quickly lead to catastrophe.

As an illustration let us examine the Dragon Variation of the Sicilian Defence: 1 e4 c5 2 f3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 x d4 f6 5 c3 g6 6 f4!? Here 6...g7 simply 'asks' to be played, but before making this reply Black must weigh things up very carefully, since after 7 e5! White gains a very dangerous initiative. Correct is 6...c6!, and if 7 e3 only now 7...g7, when 8 e2 leads to one of the Classical Variations, normally reached via a different move order: 6 e2 (instead of 6 f4!?) 6...g7 7 e3 c6 8 f4 etc.

Or take another elementary example, again from the Marshall Attack: 1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 f6 5 0-0 e7
6 \( \text{b}1 \text{b}5 \) 7 \( \text{d}3 \text{b}3 \) 0-0 8 c3 d5 9 ed \( \text{b}x \text{d}5 \) 10 \( \text{b}x \text{e}5 \) \( \text{b}x \text{e}5 \) 11 \( \text{b}x \text{e}5 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 12 d4 \( \text{d}6 \) 13 \( \text{b}e1 \text{g}4 \) 14 h3 \( \text{h}4 \) 15 \( \text{b}f3 \). Here Black plays 15...\( \text{b}x \text{f}2 \), when it is unfavourable for White to capture: 16 \( \text{b}x \text{f}2 \)? (16 \( \text{b}e2 \) or 16 \( \text{b}d2 \) is correct) 16...\( \text{h}2 + \) 17 \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{g}3 \), with a very strong attack for Black. But even in serious tournament games Black sometimes 'automatically' plays 15...\( \text{h}2 + \)?? 16 \( \text{f}1 \) and here takes with the knight on \( f2 \). This transposition of moves has irreparable consequences, since after 17 \( \text{b}x \text{f}7 + \)!! Black is mated (17...\( \text{b}x \text{f}7 \) 18 \( \text{e}8 \text{mate} \! \)!

The following is also a characteristic example.

No. 40 Fischer–Tal
Bled, 1961
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 3 d4 cd
4 \( \text{b}x \text{d}4 \) e6 5 \( \text{b}c3 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 6 g3 \( \text{f}6 \)?

(17)

A careless violation of the correct move order. Correct was first 6...a6 and only then 7...\( \text{f}6 \). Now White gains a powerful initiative.

7 \( \text{d}b5 \) ! \( \text{b}b8 \) 8 \( \text{f}4 ! \) \( \text{e}5 \)
(8...e5 8 \( \text{g}5 \) a6 10 \( \text{b}x \text{f}6 \) ! ab 11 \( \text{g}5 \) etc. favours White) 9 \( \text{e}2 ! \)
\( \text{c}5 \) (after 9...d6 10 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 11
\( \text{b}x \text{d}6 + \) \( \text{d}7 \) 12 \( \text{b}5 \) \( \text{b}x \text{d}6 \) 13
0-0-0! Black stands badly) 10
\( \text{b}x \text{e}5 \) \( \text{b}x \text{e}5 \) 11 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 12 e5 a6
(12...\( \text{g}8 \) 13 \( \text{e}4 ! \) \( \text{e}7 \) 14 d2
would have given White an overwhelming advantage) 13 ef ab 14
fg \( \text{g}8 \) 15 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 16 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{a}4 \)
17 \( \text{f}6 + \) \( \text{f}6 \) 18 \( \text{x} \text{f}6 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 19
0-0-0 \( \text{x} \text{a}2 \) 20 \( \text{b}1 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 21
\( \text{x} \text{b}5 ! \) \( \text{b}6 \) 22 \( \text{d}3 \) e5 23 fe! \( \text{x} \text{f}6 \)
24 ef \( \text{c}5 \) 25 \( \text{x} \text{h}7 \) \( \text{g}5 \) 26 \( \text{x} \text{g}8 \)
\( \text{x} \text{f}6 \) 27 \( \text{h}1 \) \( \text{x} \text{g}7 \) 28 \( \text{x} \text{f}7 + \)
\( \text{d}8 \) 29 \( \text{e}6 ! \), and White won easily.

Such instances should be very carefully watched for, especially in sharp variations, full of combinatorial possibilities. Opening theory is 'spelled out' move by move, normally with mathematical accuracy, where behind the bare symbols there is in each case a 'physical' sense.

Thus a transposition of moves can not only take play along completely different lines, but can also, and this is much more important, lead to disaster.
**ACTIVE OPERATIONS IN THE OPENING**

**Combinations, early attacks and counterattacks**

As is shown by the majority of examples given above, the basic struggle in the opening very often arises before the completion of development. In many variations it is only a few initial moves which can truly be called mobilizing, when there is not yet the required contact between the two sides’ forces.

But barely do the two sides’ forces come into contact, when mobilization has to be combined in some way or other with active operations, and sometimes even with a direct attack (in the Open Games usually on the opponent’s king). It is this that comprises the serious practical difficulty of playing the opening. It can be said that successful play in the opening demands not only an understanding of basic rules, but also great ingenuity and skill.

Essentially, any developing move must be carefully considered in connection with the specific conditions of the struggle. A move which does not accord with an active plan is a waste of time. This is confirmed by an example from the Caro-Kann Defence: after 1 e4 c6 2 \( \text{xc}3 \) d5 3 d4 de 4 \( \text{xe}4 \) the manoeuvre 4...\( \text{lf}5 \) 5 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{g}6 \) is highly expedient, since Black develops his bishop on the active b1-h7 diagonal. But the same manoeuvre in an analogous variation: 1 e4 c6 2 \( \text{xc}3 \) d5 3 \( \text{f}3 \) de 4 \( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{lf}5 \)? 5 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{g}6 \)? (5...\( \text{ag}4 \) is correct) is unsatisfactory, since after 6 h4 h6 7 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{h}7 \) 8 \( \text{h}5 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 9 \( \text{ac}4 \)! Black comes under a crushing attack, e.g. 9...e6 10 \( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 11 \( \text{x}f7 \)! \( \text{x}f7 \) 12 \( \text{x}e6+ \), and mate next move is inevitable.

The difference between these variations is that in the second of them, thanks to the move 3 \( \text{f}3 \), the specific conditions arose for an attack on f7, by exploiting the gain of tempo in attacking the bishop at g6: h2-h4, \( \text{f}3 \)-e5!, \( \text{d}1 \)-h5 etc.
The triumph of tactics

Often, at a very early stage of the game, combinational motifs arise, when the outcome can be quickly decided by tactical blows, basically of the same nature as in the middlegame. But opening features can sometimes be very tangible, since at the start of the game, when almost all the forces are still on the board (although the greater part of them may be inactive), combinational difficulties may be caused by the congestion of the pieces. We give some examples on the theme of the ‘smothering’ of the queen or king.

No. 41 Gibaud-Lazard
Paris, 1924
Queen’s Pawn Opening

1 d4 \( \triangle f6 \) 2 \( \triangle d2 \) e5!? 3 de \( \triangle g4 \). Here, suspecting nothing, White impulsively made the natural move 4 h3?, but after 4...\( \triangle e3! \) he was forced to resign.

An analogous situation arose in Vasyukov-Giterman (Odessa, 1960; Spanish Game): 1 e4 e5 2 \( \triangle f3 \) \( \triangle c6 \) 3 \( \triangle b5 \) \( \triangle c5 \) 4 c3 f5 5 d4! fe 6 \( \triangle g5! \) ? \( \triangle e7? \) (6... \( \triangle b6! \) is correct) 7 de \( \triangle x e5? \) 8 \( \triangle e6!! \) 1-0.

And here is a rather different way of trapping the queen.

No. 42 Euwe-Rubinstein
Bad Kissingen, 1928
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 \( \triangle f3 \) \( \triangle f6 \) 4 \( \triangle g5 \) \( \triangle b7 \) 5 e3 \( \triangle e7 \) 6 \( \triangle c3 \) 0-0 7 \( \triangle c1 \) c6 8 \( \triangle d3 \) a6 9 cd ed 10 0-0 \( \triangle e8 \) 11 \( \triangle b3 \) h6 12 \( \triangle f4 \) \( \triangle h5? \) 13 \( \triangle x d5! \), and 13...cd fails to 14 \( \triangle c7! \) White went on to realize his advantage.

The same idea was employed in Alekhine-Rubinstein (San Remo, 1930; Queen’s Gambit): 1 d4 d5 2 \( \triangle f3 \) \( \triangle f6 \) 3 c4 e6 4 \( \triangle g5 \) \( \triangle b7 \) 5 e3 \( \triangle e7 \) 6 \( \triangle c3 \) 0-0 7 \( \triangle c1 \) \( \triangle e8 \) 8 \( \triangle e2 \) a6 9 cd ed 10 \( \triangle d3 \) c6 11 0-0 \( \triangle e4? \) 12 \( \triangle f4 \) f5 13 \( \triangle x d5! \) etc.

In the above examples it was the queen that was trapped. We now give some similar situations with the king, as a consequence of which the queen had to be given up.

No. 43 Fine-Yudovich
Moscow, 1936
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 \( \triangle c3 \) \( \triangle f6 \) 4 \( \triangle f3 \) c5 5 \( \triangle g5 \) cd 6 \( \triangle x d4 \) e5 7 \( \triangle b d5? \) a6 8 \( \triangle x d5? \) ab 9 \( \triangle x f6+ \) \( \triangle x f6 \) 10 \( \triangle x f6 \) \( \triangle b4+ \) 11 \( \triangle d2 \) \( \triangle x d2+ \) 12 \( \triangle x d2 \) gf, and being a piece down, White soon resigned.

One of the characteristic tactical ideas, especially in the ancient Open Games, is the diagonal attack on the enemy
king which is restricted by its own pieces and pawns. The following examples confirm this.

No. 44 Blackburne–Teichmann
Two Knights Defence

1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆c6 3 ∆c4 ∆f6
4 ∆g5 d5 5 ed ∆xd5? 6 d4 ed 7 0-0
∆e6 8 ∆e1 ∆d7 9 ∆xf7 ∆xf7 10
∆f5+ ∆g8 11 ∆xe6! ∆d8 12 ∆e4
∆a5? 13 ∆e8!! 1-0

No. 44 Botvinnik–Spielmann
Moscow, 1935
Caro–Kann Defence

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 ∆f6
5 ∆c3 ∆c6 6 ∆g5 ∆b6 7 cd ∆xb2?
A hazardous journey, after which Black’s queen can no longer escape from the quagmire. He should have played 7 ... ∆xd4, although here too White has a strong initiative after 8 ∆f3!

8 ∆c1 ∆b4 9 ∆a4 ∆a2 10 ∆c4
∆g4 11 ∆f3 ∆xf3 12 gf 1-0

If the queen is developed early, it will often come under fire in the middle of the board.

No. 45 Maroczy–Vidmar
Ljubljana, 1923
Two Knights Defence

1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆c6 3 ∆c4 ∆f6
4 d4 ed 5 0-0 ∆e5 6 e5 d5 7 ef dc 8
∆e1+ ∆e6 9 ∆g5 ∆d5 10 ∆c3
∆f5 11 ∆ce4 ∆f8 12 ∆xf7! ∆xf7
13 ∆g5+ ∆g8 14 g4 ∆xf6? (better
14 ... ∆g6) 15 ∆xe6 ∆d8 16 ∆f3
∆d7 17 ∆e7!! 1-0

Another well known combinational tactic in the opening is the luring of the enemy queen into a trap. This can happen in a variety of ways, one of which is to lure the queen deep into one’s own territory and then surround it.

No. 46 Kubanek–Flohr
Prague, 1930
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆c6 3 ∆b5 a6
4 ∆a4 d6 5 d4 b5 6 ∆b3 ∆xd4
7 ∆xd4 ed 8 ∆d5 ∆b8 9 ∆xd4
∆e7 10 ∆g5 f6!? 11 ∆xf6?
Black lures the white queen, which is lost as a result of White’s incorrect combination.

11 ... gf 12 ∆xf6 ∆xd5 13
∆h8 ∆f6!
This reply was obviously overlooked by White. Now the trap snaps shut.

14 0-0 ∆e7 15 f4 ∆f7 16 e5 ∆g7
0-1
\( \text{\$xd5? 10 \text{\$a4!}, and the black queen is trapped.} \)

No. 49 Robatsch-S. Garcia
Sochi, 1974
English Opening

1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{\$f3} \) g6 3 d4 \( \text{\$g7} \) 4 e4 \( \text{\$a5+?!} \) 5 \( \text{\$c3} \) \( \text{\$c6?} \) 6 d5! \( \text{\$d4} \)
7 \( \text{\$d2} \) \( \text{\$b6} \) 8 \( \text{\$xd4} \) \( \text{\$xd4} \)

Black is already in considerable difficulties. 10...cd is very strongly met by 11 \( \text{\$b5!} \)
9 \( \text{\$b1} \) d6 10 \( \text{\$h5} \) \( \text{\$g7} \) 11 \( \text{\$a4} \)
\( \text{\$d7} \) 12 \( \text{\$a5!} \) \( \text{\$a6} \) 13 \( \text{\$c7+} \) \( \text{\$f8} \)
14 \( \text{\$a3!} \) 1-0

No. 50 Krogius-Arotovsky
Saratov, 1945
Philidor's Defence

1 e4 e5 2 \( \text{\$f3} \) d6 3 d4 \( \text{\$d7} \) 4 \( \text{\$c4} \) c6 5 \( \text{\$g5} \) \( \text{\$h6} \) 6 a4 \( \text{\$e7?} \) 7 \( \text{\$xf7+!} \) \( \text{\$xf7} \) 8 \( \text{\$e6} \) \( \text{\$b6} \) 9 a5 \( \text{\$b4+} \)
10 c3 \( \text{\$c4} \) 11 \( \text{\$c7+} \) \( \text{\$d8} \) 12 \( \text{\$b3} \) 1-0

In the opening clever combinational situations sometimes arise, when the outcome is quickly decided by the threat of a pawn promoting. Here is an example from a well known variation of the Slav Defence: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 \( \text{\$f3} \) f6 4 e3 \( \text{\$f5} \) 5 \( \text{\$b3} \) \( \text{\$b6} \) 6 cd \( \text{\$xb3} \) 7 ab \( \text{\$xb1?} \) 8 dc! \( \text{\$e4} \).
Black's calculations seem justified, but after 9 \( \text{\$x} \) a7!! he has to resign: 9...\( \text{\$xa7} \) 10 c7!

‘Lightning from a clear sky’

If 9 \( \text{\$x} \) d8 Black obtains a new queen by 9...gh, winning a rook in the process, while after 9 \( \text{\$x} \) g2 \( \text{\$x} \) g5 he is a piece up.
And now another example.

No. 51 Panov-Yudovich
USSR Ch, Tbilisi, 1937
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \text{\$c3} \) \( \text{\$f6} \)
4 \( \text{\$g5} \) \( \text{\$e7} \) 5 e5 \( \text{\$fd7} \) 6 h4 \( \text{\$f6} \)
7 \( \text{\$d3?!} \) (7 \( \text{\$h5+!} \) is correct)
7...c5 8 \( \text{\$h5}+\) \( \text{\$f8} \) 9 \( \text{\$x} \) d5 fg! 10 \( \text{\$h3} \) g4! 11 \( \text{\$f4} \) \( \text{\$xe5} \) 12 de gh! 13 \( \text{\$xh7?} \) \( \text{\$xh7} \) 14 \( \text{\$xh7} \) h2!! 15 \( \text{\$e2} \) h1 \( \text{\$g6+} \) 16 \( \text{\$f7} \) 17 \( \text{\$h8+} \)
18 \( \text{\$xh8} \) 18 \( \text{\$xh8} \) \( \text{\$c6} \) 19 \( \text{\$h5+} \) \( \text{\$g8} \)
20 \( \text{\$h3} \) \( \text{\$xg2} \)! 21 \( \text{\$e8+} \) \( \text{\$f8} \) and Black won.

Thus tactical blows lie in wait at the very start of the game, and
in many cases are thematic in nature. Here are some examples of double attacks.

No. 52 Tartakower-Capablanca  
New York, 1924  
King’s Gambit

1 e4 e5 2 f4 ef 3 dxe2?! d5 4 ed $f6 5 c4 c6 6 d4 $b4+! 7 $f1 cd 8 $xf4 dc!

This looks like a crude oversight, but is in fact a subtle positional decision, based on precise calculation.

9 $xb8? (19)

White rises to the bait. 9 $xc4 was the lesser evil.

9. . $d5!

A double attack. The e3 and b4 squares are put under fire, allowing Black to regain his piece with interest.

10 $f2 (10 $g4 $f6!) 10. . $xb8 11 $xc4 0-0 12 $f3 $f6 13 $c3 b5! 14 $d3 $g4+ 15 $g1

$hb7 16 $f5 $xf3 17 gf $e3! 18 $xh7+ $h8! 19 $d3 $xc3 20 bc

$d5 21 $e4 $f4 22 $d2 $h4 23 $f1 $f5 24 $c6 $f6 25 $d5 $d8! 26 $d1 $xc6 27 dc $xd2 28 $xc2 $e6 29 $d6 $c4+ 30 $g2 $e2+ 0-1

In the following example the double blow has the nature of a latent attack.

No. 53 Petrovian-Ree  
Amsterdam, 1971  
English Opening

1 c4 e5 2 $c3 $f6 3 $f3 $c6 4 $g3 $b4 5 $d5 $xd5 6 cd e4? 7 dc ef 8 $b3! 1-0

The next example demonstrates the idea of a discovered attack, which early in the game occurs quite often.

No. 54 Monticelli-Prokeš  
1926  
Queen’s Indian Defence

1 d4 $f6 2 c4 e6 3 $f3 $b4+ 4 $d2 $xd2+ 5 $xd2 $b6 6 g3 $b7 7 $g2 0-0 8 $c3 $e4?! 9 $c2

$xc3 10 $g5!! and White wins.

The similar tactical operation is not possible in this analogous variation: 1 d4 $f6 2 c4 e6 3 $f3 $b6 4 g3 $b7 5 $g2 $e7 6 0-0 0-0 7 $c3 $e4 8 $c2 $xc3. Now on 9

$g5 Black can interpose the check 9. . $xe2+!, when it is White who loses. Thinking by analogy in such situations is dangerous, if not fatal.
The cause of defeat in the opening stage is quite often the overloading of a key defender. Here are several typical examples.

No. 55 Flohr-Gilg
Zurich, 1934
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4 ːf6 2 c4 e6 3 ːc3 ːb4 4 ːc2 d5 5 cd ːxd5 6 e3 0-0 7 ːge2
c5 8 ːd2 ːd8 9 a3 cd 10 ːxd4
 ːa5 11 ːe2 ːh6 12 ːf3 ːc6 13
 0-0 ːc7 14 ːfd1 e5 15 ːg5 h6?
 16 ːd5! 1-0

No. 56 Euwe-Kramer
Holland, 1946
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 e5 c5 4 c3 ːc6
 5 ːf3 ːb6 6 ːe2 ːge7? (6...cd 7
 ːd4 ːc7 8 ːd4 ːe5? 9 ːb5!
 ːxc5 10 ːd4! 1-0

No. 57 Krogius-Martyushov
Tula, 1948
Queen’s Indian Defence

1 d4 ːf6 2 c4 e6 3 ːf3 b6 4 g3
 ːb7 5 ːg2 ːe7 6 0-0 0-0 7 ːc2
 ːe4 8 ːa4 c5 9 d5! ed 10 ːc3 ːc6
11 cd ːxd5 12 ːxd5 ːxd5 13
 ːh4! ːc7? (better 13... ːxh4 14
 ːxd5 ːg5) 14 ːd1 ːe8 15 ːf5
 ːe6 16 ːxd7 ːxd7 17 ːxc6 ːc7
18 ːxa8 ːxa8 19 ːc6!! 1-0

No. 58 Hasin-Lilienthal
Moscow, 1955
Scotch Game

1 e4 e5 2 ːf3 ːc6 3 d4 ed 4
 ːxd4 藳c5 5 ːe3 ːf6 6 c3 ːge7 7
 ːc4 ːe5 8 ːe2 d5 9 0-0 h5? 10
 ːb5! ːb6 11 ːxc5 ːxc5 12 ːd4!
1-0

Significant among such tactical devices is the pin, most often along the h4-d8 diagonal for White and a5-e1 for Black.

No. 59 Kan-Botvinnik
Odessa, 1929
Evans Gambit

1 e4 e5 2 ːf3 ːc6 3 ːc4 ːc5 4
 ːb4 ːb6 5 a4 a6 6 ːc3 ːf6 7 ːd5!
 ːxe4 (better 7... ːxd5 8 ed e4)
8 0-0 0-0 9 d3 ːf6 (not 9... ːd6
10 ːg5 ːe8 11 ːf6+ gf 12 ːxf6
etc) 10 ːg5 d6 11 ːd2 ːg4 12
 ːxf6 ːc8 13 ːxb6 cb 14 ːf3, and
White won.

No. 60 Boleslavsky-Petzon
Minsk, 1957
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4 ːf6 2 c4 e6 3 ːc3 ːb4 4 e3
 ːb6 5 ːge2 ːa6 6 ːg3 0-0 7 e4 d6 8
 ːd3 e5? 9 0-0 ːxc3 10 bc ːc6 11
 ːf5 ːc8 12 ːg5! ed 13 ːxd4 ːe5
14 f4! ːg6 15 e5! de 16 fe ːxe5 17
 ːe4 ːg4 18 ːe1 ːd6 19 ːxf6 gf
20 ːh4 f5 21 ːxa8 ːg6 22 ːf2
 ːxa8 23 h3 ːh5 24 ːxf5 1-0
No. 61 Tarrasch-Bogoljubow
Germany, 1920
Queen’s Indian Defence

1 d4 ♘f6 2 c4 e6 ♘f3 b6 4 ♘g5 ♘b7 5 e3 h6 6 ♘h4 ♘b4+ 7 ♘bd2? g5! 8 ♘g3 (20)

8...g4 9 a3 gf 10 ab fg 11 ♘xg2
♘xg2 0-1

Since then this type of trap has often been repeated. Here is an example from one of Karpov’s early games.

No. 62 Sangla-Karpov
USSR Teams Ch, Riga 1968
Queen’s Pawn Opening

1 d4 ♘f6 2 ♘f3 e6 3 ♘g5 c5 4 c3 cd 5 cd ♘b6 6 ♘b3 ♘e4 7 ♘f4 ♘c6 8 e3 ♘b4+ 9 ♘bd2? g5! 10 ♘xg5 ♘xg5 11 ♘xg5 ♘a5 0-1

The pin is an effective tactical device in the opening, but the reverse consequences of a premature pin should also not be forgotten.

Up till now we have mainly been examining elementary tactical ideas, but in the opening stage fairly complex tactical operations are often encountered. Many of these have typical features. Thus the following combinational structure is widely known: rook at d1, bishop at g5, with mate on the 8th rank at d8 (known as Morphy’s mate—cf. Game No. 1)

To illustrate this we give several examples, each of which is a little masterpiece.

No. 63 Reti-Tartakower
Vienna, 1910
Caro-Kann Defence

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ♘c3 de 4 ♘xe4
♗f6 5 ♘d3?! e5? (5...♘bd7) 6 de ♘a5+ 7 ♘d2 ♘xe5 8 0-0-0 ♘xe4 9 ♘d8+! ♘xd8 10 ♘g5++ 1-0
(10...♗e8 11 ♘d8 mate; 10...♗c7 11 ♘d8 mate!)

No. 64 Nimzowitsch-Alapin
Carlsbad, 1911
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ♘c3 ♘f6 4 ed
♗xd5 5 ♘f3 c5 6 ♘xd5 ♘xd5 7 ♘e3! cd 8 ♘xd4 a6 9 ♘e2 ♘xg2? 10 ♘f3 ♘g6 11 ♘d2 e5 12 0-0-0 ed 13 ♘xd4 ♘c6 14 ♘f6! ♘xf6 15 ♘he1+ ♘e7 (15...♗e6 16 ♘d7 mate!) 16 ♘xc6+ ♘f8 (16...bc 17 ♘d8 mate!) 17 ♘d8+! ♘xd8 18 ♘e8 mate!
No. 65 Vukovic-N. N.  
Yugoslavia, 1926  
*Spanish Game*

1 e4 e5 2  f3  c6 3  b5  f6  
4 d4 ed 5 e5  e4 6  f4  f5 7  xc6  
dc 8  xd4  d5 9  c3  a5? 10  
d1  e7 11  d2  b6? 12  e2  
c5? 13  d8+!  xd8 14  g5++  
e8 15  d8+  f7 16  e6+!  xe6  
17  f4+  f7 18  e5 mate!

No. 66 Bronstein-N. N.  
Simultaneous display, 1950  
*Centre Game*

1 e4 e5 2  d4 ed 3  xd4  c6  
4  a4  f6 5  c3  d5 6  g5 de  
7  xe4  e7 8 0-0-0  xe4?  
9  d8+!  xd8 10  xe4 1-0

No. 67  
Bonch-Osmolovsky v. Baranov  
Moscow, 1953  
*Petroff's Defence*

1 e4 e5 2  f3  f6 3  d4 ed 4 e5  
  e5 5  xd4 d5 6 ed  xd6 7  d3  
  e7+ 8  e3  f5? 9  xf5  xf5  
10  c3  b4 11  e5+  e6 12  
0-0-0  c6 13  xc7  c8 14  f4  
  a5 15  g5  a6 16  he1  b4 17  
  d4  xc3 (21) 18  d8+!!  xd8  
19  xe6++  e7

Black loses after 19...c8 20  d8 mate!, or 10...e8 20  
  g7+  g7 21  g5+! etc.

20  g5+ f6 21  d8+! 1-0

We now give another typical combinational idea, which involves shutting out the opponent’s queen and then attacking his king. This too is accompanied by considerable material sacrifices and demands exceptional imagination.

No. 68  
Anderssen-Kieseritzky  
London, 1851  
*King’s Gambit*

1 e4 e5 2  f4 ef 3  c4  h4+  
4  f1 b5 5  xb5  f6 1 3  h6  
7 d3  h5 8  h4  g5 9  f5  c6 10  
g4!  f6 11  g1 cb 12  h4  g6 13  
h5  g5 14  f3  g8 15  xf4  f6  
16  c3  c5? 17  d5  xb2 18  
  d6!  xa1+ 19  e2  xg1 (19...  
  b2!) 20 e5!!  a6 21  xg7+  d8  
22  f6+!  xf6 23  e7 mate!

The following example too has not lost its charm.
Active operations in the opening

No. 69 Alekhine-Levenfish
St. Petersburg, 1912
Benoni Defence

1 d4 c5 2 d5 üf6 3 üc3 d6 4 e4
g6 5 f4 übd7 6 üf3 a6? 7 e5 de 8 fe
üg4 9 e6 üde5 10 üf4 üxf3+ 11
gf! üf6 12 üc4 fe 13 de üb6 14
üe2! üxb2 (22)

22

1 e4 e5 2 üf3 üc6 3 üc4 üf6 4
d4 ed 5 0-0 üxe4 6 üe1 d5 7
üxd5 üxd5 8 üf3 üa5 9 üxd4
üxd4 10 üxd4 f5 11 üg5? (better
11 üd2) 11 üc5! 12 üd8+ üf7
13 üxe4 fe 14 üad1 üd6 15
üxh8 üxg5 16 f4 üh4 17 üxe4
üxh3! 18 üxa8 üc5+ 19 üh1
üxg2+ 20 üxg2 üg4+ 0-1

The number of such combinational motifs, and especially of practical examples, is very great.

Early opening attacks

As can be seen from the above examples, in the opening an unpleasant and very strong attack can arise, in particular on the king. Confirmation of this was provided by instances of the enemy queen being shut out, and of Morphy’s mate. In the opening stage, when mobilization is not yet complete, attacks are short-lived, and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish them from complicated combinations. And yet here it is always possible to disclose the strategic state of affairs.

We will consider several characteristic instances.

In the initial position the most vulnerable points are the respect-
ive squares on the K-side, f2 and f7, which are protected only by the king. Attacks on these arise in many variations, which may be strategically very varied.

An example is provided by the Greco Attack in the Italian Game: 1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 c4 c5 4 c3 f6 5 d4 ed 6 cd b4+ 7 c3 xe4 8 0-0 xc3 9 bc xc3? 10 b3! xa1 (saving chances are offered by 10...d5! 11 xxd5 0-0 ) 11 xf7+ f8 12 g5 e7 13 e5!, and White’s attack is irresistible. Here the attack on f7 stems as though from the very nature of the opening set-up. But in the Queen’s Gambit Accepted too, where initially the struggle develops on the Q-side, the f7 square very often comes under attack, e.g. 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dc 3 e4 c5?! 4 d5 e6 5 c3 f6 6 xc4 ed 7 xxd5 xd5 8 xd5, with the unequivocal threat of 9 xf7+!

We will consider some further examples on this theme.

No. 72 N. N. - Richter
Berlin, 1952
Irregular Opening

1 d4 e5? 2 de c6 3 f3 f6?! 4 ef xf6 5 c3 c5 6 g5 g4?! 7 xd8? xf2+ 8 d2 e3+ 9 d3? d5 10 xd5 xf5+ 11 e3 xe7 12 xd8 12 xc7+ e7 13 d5+ e6 14 g5+ xd5 15 e4 e5 16

ef f2 17 e1+ e4+ 18 b3 d4+ 19 c4 b5+ 20 b4 a5+ 21 xa5 a8+ 22 b6 bh8+ 23 c7 d8+ 24 d7 a7+ 25 e8 f6 mate!

An almost fantastic game, which, however, has more than a hint of a composed idea about it.

No. 73 Hofman-Petrov
Warsaw, 1844
Italian Game

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 c4 c5 4 c3 f6 5 d4 ed 6 e5 e4 7 d5 xf2! (23)

No. 74 Maryasin-Epstein
USSR, 1967
Danish Gambit

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 d4 ed 4 c3
dc 5 a4 cb 6 axb2 d5 7 axd5 b6f 8 0-0 a7 9 b3 0-0 10 d1 be8? (it was essential to exchange off White’s strong bishop by 10... axd5; by the irony of fate is it this bishop that strikes the decisive blow) 11 a3 a6 12 ac1 ad8 13 ac4 ae7

Now 13... a3 14 ed bb8 15 a8 a7 16 e1 favours White. 14 axf7+

A splendid combinational blow. The bishop places itself under a three-fold attack.

14... axf7

14... b6xf7 15 ac5 mate! is bad, as is 14... axf7 15 bg5!

15 ac5 ac6 16 bc6 bc bg5!

But not 17 axd8? bxaxd8 18 axf7 ae6!, when it is Black who wins.

17... ae7 18 axf7 af8 19 e5 a5d 20 af3 bg8 21 axd5! ag4
(21... cd 22 bxaxd5 axg5 23 axg5+ ae6 24 axe6 etc. is equally bad) 22 we4 axg5 23 axg5 wh5 24 ad4 1-0

Sometimes these attacks are combined with threats against other weak points on the K-side.

No. 75
Ciocaltea–Nzhmetdinov
Bucharest, 1954
Two Knights Defence

1 e4 e5 2 af3 ac6 3 ac4 af6 4 ag5 d5 5 ed ac5 6 b5+ c6 7 dc bc 8 ale2 h6 9 af3 e4 10 ae5 ac7 11 ag4?! axg4 12 axg4 ac5 13 ae2 ed8 14 c3 b7 15 0-0 h5 16 d4 ed 17 axd3 ag4 18 we2+ af8! 19 g3 ad7 20 ae4 h4 21 af4 axh2

The outcome of Black’s combined attack.

22 e1 ag4 23 af3 af2 24 ae3 hg 25 axc5+ axc5 26 axc6 ah3+ 27 af1 af5+ 1-0

Analogous attacks on f2 and f7 sometimes comprise the tactical ‘seed’ in a number of variations of the Semi-Open or Closed Openings.

A variation of the Caro-Kann Defence: 1 e4 c6 2 ac3 d5 3 af3 de 4 axe4 ad7 5 ac4 af6 6 ag5 e6 7 we2 h6? 8 af7! axf7 9 axe6+ etc., or here 4... af6 5 axf6+ gf 6 ac4 ag4? 7 ae5! ad1? 8 af7 mate!

A variation of the Sozin Attack in the Sicilian Defence: 1 e4 c5 2 af3 ac6 3 d4 cd 4 axd4 af6 5 ac3 d6 6 ac4 g6? 7 axc6 bc 8 e5! de? 9 axf7+, and White wins the queen.

A variation of the Albin Counter-Gambit: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 e5 3 de d4 4 e3? ab4+ 5 ad2 de 6 axb4? ef+! 7 ab2 fg1+!, and Black’s advantage is obvious.
The castled position as a target for attack in the opening

In general, castling is a necessary ritual, but it does not always guarantee ‘peace’ for the king! Moreover, in a number of cases castling may prove premature and may merely assist the development of the opponent’s attack.

No. 76 Steinitz-Mongredien
London, 1863
Irregular Defence

1 e4 g6 2 d4 Ag7 3 c3 b6 4 Ac3
Ab7 5 Ad2 d6 6 Agf3 e5?! 7 de! de
8 Ac4 Ae7 9 Ae2! 0-0? 10 h4!
Ad7 11 h5 c5 12 hg Agxg6 13 0-0-0
a6 14 Ag5 Af6 15 Ahxh7! Ahxh7 16
Ahxh7! Ahxh7 (16...b5 17 Wh5!
bc 18 AAg7+ AAg7 19 Wh6+! favours White) 17 Wh5+ Ag8 18
Ah1 Ae8 19 Whg6 Whg6 20 Axf7+
Axf7 21 Whh8+! 1-0

No. 77 Euwe-Maroczy
Amsterdam, 1921
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 Ac3 Af6 4
Ag5 Ae7 5 e5 Afd7 6 h4 0-0? 7
Ad3 e5 8 Wh5 g6 9 Wh6 Be8 10
Axеf3 Wxe7 11 h5 (24) 11...Af8
12 Af3 cd 13 Ag5! Ab7 14 Ahxh7!
Ahxg5! 15 hg Agxg6 16 Aхg6 Ag6
17 g4! dc 18 0-0-0 1-0

No. 78 Kmoch-Alekhine
Vienna, 1922
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 Agf6 2 Agf3 d5 3 c4 c6 4 e3
Agf5 5 Abd2 e6 6 Ae2 Abd7 7 0-0?
Ad6 8 c5 Ac7 9 b4 Ae4 10 Ae4
de! 11 Ad2 h5! 12 f4 g5! 13 g3?
Agf6! 14 Ab2 gf 15 ef h4 16 Ab3 hg
17 hg Ad5 18 Ac4 Axf4! 19 Ae1
(19 gf Whh4!) 19...Whg5 20 d5 Axd3!
0-1

No. 79 Fischer-Robatsch
Varna OL, 1962
Centre Counter Game

1 e4 d5 2 ed Whxd5 3 Ac3 Whd8 4
d4 g6 5 Agf4! Ag7 6 Wd2! Axf6
(6...Axd4 7 0-0-0 or 6...Axd4
7 Axd4 Axd4 8 Axb5 favours White) 7 0-0-0 c6?! (better 7...
Axd5) 8 Ah6 0-0? 9 h4 Ab5 10 h5
gh 11 Ad3 Abd7 12 Age2 Ad8 13
g4! Afg8 (13...Aхg4 14 Adg1!!)
14 gh Ae6 15 Adg1 Whh8 16 Aхg7+
Aхg7 17 Whh6 Ag8 18 Ag5 Whd8 19
Whg1! Af5? 20 Axf5 1-0
No. 80 Bilek-Gheorghiu  
Hungary, 1968  
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 ∆c3 ∆c6 3 g3 g6 4 ∆g2 ∆g7 5 d3 d6 6 f4 e5 7 ∆h3 ∆ge7 8 0-0 0-0? (8... ∆d4) 9 f5! gf 10 ef ∆×f5 (10... ∆×f5 11 ∆h5!) (25)

Pawn storms early in the game

A pawn storm of the opponent’s castled position is one of the common strategic procedures in the middle of the game, and often this becomes the main plan in the transition from opening to middlegame. Sometimes such an offensive develops before the completion of mobilization and can be very dangerous, even if initially it is of a problematic nature.

The offensive on the K-side castled position is most often conducted by the hand gpawns, but the f-pawn is also sometimes involved.

We give some examples, the analysis of which will help in the mastering of such procedures.

No. 81 Marshall-Burn  
Paris, 1900  
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 ∆c3 ∆f6 4 ∆g5 ∆e7 5 e3 0-0 6 ∆f3 b6 7 ∆d3 ∆b7 8 cd ed 9 ∆×f6 ∆×f6 10 h4 g6? (10... c5?) 11 h5 ∆e8 12 hg hg 13 ∆c2 ∆g7 (26)

No. 82 Pillsbury-Marco  
Paris, 1900  
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 ∆c3 ∆f6 4 ∆g5 ∆e7 5 e3 0-0 6 ∆f3 b6 7 ∆d3 ∆b7
8 cd ed 9 g5 e5 bbd7 10 f4 c5?
(10. g5 e8) 11 0-0 c4 12 c2 a6
13 g3 b5 14 h3 g6 15 f5! b4 16
fg hg 17 wh4! bc 18 d7 wd7
19 xf6! a5 20 af1 a6 21
xg6! fg 22 xf8+ xf8 23
xf8+ xf8 24 wh8+ xh7 25
wh7+ 1-0

No. 83 Suetin-Fedosov
Tula, 1948
Four Knights Game

1 e4 e5 2 g4 f6 3 c3 f5 4 d4 c6 5
b5 a4 f4 0-0 6 0-0 d6 7 g5
xe3 8 bxc3 9 h4 g4?
(9... e8) 10 c4 xh8 11 f3! f6
12 ad2 g5?! 13 xf5 xf5 14 ef
h6 15 g4 c6 16 g2 d5 17 b3 b5
18 h4 xh7+ (better 18... g7,
although here too White has the
advantage after 19 c4!) 19 hg fg 20
h1 f7 21 h5 h6 22 f6! gg8 23
ah1 gg6 24 xg3! xg5 25
xh6+ xh6 26 xh6+ xh7 27
xh7+! 1-0

No. 84 Kopylov-Dommes
Leningrad, 1954
King's Indian Defence

1 e4 f6 2 d3 g6 3 d4 g7 4 e4
d6 5 f3 0-0 6 c3 e5 7 d5 c5 8 g4!
de8 9 x2 a6 10 xg2 x7 11
xg3 b5 12 h4! f6 13 h5 f7 14 hg
hg 15 h2 e7 16 h7+ f7 17
h4! g5 18 xf6+! 1-0

No. 85 Spassky-Evans
Varna OL, 1962
King's Indian Defence

1 d4 f6 2 c4 g6 3 c3 g7 4 e4
d5 f3 g6 6 e3 a6 7 d2 b5 8
0-0 bc? (better 8... a5) 9
c4 0-0 10 h4 d5 11 b3 de 12
h5! (27)

27

An early, but highly effective
offensive, which White conducts
with great vigour.

12 .. ef 13 hg h4! fg 15
h4! xg7 xg7 17
xg2 h6 18 x3 x5 19 h2
d6 20 x5 d7 21 e4 x7 22
h1 g8 23 h7+ x8 24
xf7+ x8 25 xg6!

And in conclusion a piquant
finish.

25 .. x5 26 f8++ 1-0

No. 86 Tal-R. Byrne
Biel IZ, 1976
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 x3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 x4
c6 5 b5 d7 6 xd6 xc6 xc6 7
1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 d6 4 g5 e5 5 g3 g4 6 h4! 0-0 7 d3 f5 8 g6! c5 9 gf cd 10 f6! dxf6 11 "xh7+ xh7 12 "g8 13 "g6+ "h8 14 "h3! gives White a decisive attack; 10...d6!? was the lesser evil) 11 ef dxf6 12 h5 g6 13 "xg6 e7 14 b5! c6 15 d3 e5 16 e2 d8 17 "c7! "xc7 18 d6+ 1-0

No. 88 Pokojowczyk-Schmidt
Poland, 1976
Alekhine's Defence

1 d4 f5 2 c3 f3 3 d5 e5 4 g3 e4 5 dxe4 c5 6 d5 c6 7 c3 d5 8 e4 c5 9 e4 f3 e2 d3 10 d6 e3 d6 11 g4 e2 6 0-0 e7 7 c4 b6

This move signals the start of White's attack on the K-side.

7...0-0 8 d3 e7 9 e2 c6 10 c3 d5 11 f4 d7 12 0-0-0 a6 13 f3 b5 14 e5 e8 15 e2! g6 16 dxe5 fxe5 17 h5 gh 18 d7+ g7 19 xh7 xh7 20 xh5 xh5 21 dh1

 Strategically, Black's position is clearly lost, and the finish follows quickly.

21...d6 22 g3 b4 23 d3 xh5 24 xh5 bc 25 bc e8 26
\textbf{The attack on h7}

Among the various attacks on the K-side castled position, including those early in the opening, one that is very dangerous is the threat to h7. After castling the squares h7 and h2 are the most vulnerable, similar to f7 and f2 in the initial position. In many cases there is the possibility of a sacrifice (most often of a bishop), followed by the drawing of the opponent’s king out of its shelter and a vigorous attack on it.

A model example of such an eventuality has for many years been provided by the following game.

\textbf{No. 91 Edward Lasker-Thomas}
London, 1912
\textit{Dutch Defence}

1 d4 e6 2 f3 f5 3 c3 f6 4 g5 e7 5 \textit{xf6} \textit{xf6} 6 e4 fe 7 \textit{xe4} b6 8 \textit{d3} \textit{b7} 9 e5 0-0 10 \textit{h5} \textit{e7}!

White now carried out a brilliant combination involving a sacrifice on h7.

11 \textit{xf7+} ! \textit{xh7} 12 \textit{xf6}++ \textit{h6} 13 \textit{eg4+} \textit{g5} 14 h4+ \textit{f4} 15 g3+ \textit{f3} 16 \textit{e2+} \textit{g2} 17 \textit{h2+} \textit{g1} 18 0-0-0 mate.

Returning to the main combinational theme, we should point out that in certain cases the attack on h7 is then combined with a sacrifice on g7, as is confirmed by the following examples.

\textbf{No. 92 Emanuel Lasker-Bauer}
Amsterdam, 1889
\textit{Bird’s Opening}

1 f4 d5 2 e3 \textit{f6} 3 h3 e6 4 \textit{b2} e7 5 \textit{d3} b6 6 \textit{f3} \textit{b7} 7 \textit{c3} \textit{bd7} 8 0-0 0-0 9 \textit{e2} c5 10 \textit{g3} \textit{c7} 11 \textit{e5} \textit{xe5} 12 \textit{xe5} \textit{c6} 13 \textit{e2} a6 (better 13...\textit{e4}) 14
\[ \text{No. 93 Prins-Angles} \\
\text{Leipzig OL, 1960} \\
\text{French Defence} \]

1 d4 \( \triangle f6 \) 2 \( \triangle c3 \) d5 3 \( \triangle g5 \) e6 4 e4 \( \triangle e7 \) 5 e5 \( \triangle d7 \) 6 h4! c5 7 \( \triangle b5?! \) 0-0? (after 7...f6! 8 \( \triangle d3 \) a6! Black would have seized the initiative) 8 \( \triangle d3 \) c4? (29)

\[ \text{No. 94 Chigorin-Alapin} \\
\text{St. Petersburg, 1883} \\
\text{Evans Gambit} \]

1 e4 e5 2 \( \triangle f3 \) \( \triangle c6 \) 3 \( \triangle c4 \) \( \triangle c5 \) 4 b4 \( \triangle x b4 \) 5 c3 \( \triangle a5 \) 6 0-0 \( \triangle f6 \) 7 d4 0-0 8 de \( \triangle x e 4 \) 9 \( \triangle d 5 ! \) \( \triangle x c 3 \) 10 \( \triangle x e 4 \) \( \triangle x a 1 \) (30)

\[ \text{11 \( \triangle x h 7 + ! \) \( \triangle h 8 \)} \]

Chigorin-Rosenkrantz (St. Petersburg, 1897) went 11... \( \text{\( \triangle x h 7 \)} 12 \( \text{\( \triangle g 5 + \triangle g 6 \)} 13 \( \text{\( \triangle g 4 f 5 \)} 14 \) ef \( \text{\( \triangle e 5 \)} 15 \( \text{\( \triangle g 3 ! \)} \triangle x f 6 16 f 4 \text{\( \triangle e 7 \)} 17 \triangle e 1 d 6 18 \triangle c 3 !, and White won.

12 \( \triangle g 5 g 6 \) 13 \( \triangle g 4 \) \( \triangle x e 5 \) 14 \( \triangle h 4 \triangle g 7 15 \triangle e 6 +! fe 16 \text{\( \triangle h 6 + \triangle f 7 \)} 17 \( \triangle x g 6 + \triangle e 7 \) 18 \( \text{\( \triangle h 4 + ! \)} \) \( \text{\( \triangle f 6 \)} \) 19 \( \triangle a 3 + ! d 6 20 \text{\( \triangle h 7 + \triangle f 8 \)} 21 \text{\( \triangle h 8 + \triangle e 7 \)} 22 \( \text{\( \triangle g 7 + \triangle f 7 23 \triangle x f 7 \) mate!} \)

9 \( \triangle x h 7 + ! \)
This piece sacrifice is typical of such positions, but each instance has its own special features.

9... \( \triangle x h 7 \) 10 \( \text{\( \triangle h 5 + \triangle g 8 \)} 11 \( \text{\( \triangle x e 7 \)} \triangle x e 7 12 \text{\( \triangle f 3 \)} f 6 13 \( \triangle g 5 ! \)
This is the point of White's plan. The knight sacrifices itself for the sake of opening the h-file, and suddenly the white g-pawn takes on the role of battering-ram.

13...fg 14 hg \( \text{\( \triangle b 4 + \)) 15 \( \triangle e 2} \)
Pawn weaknesses in the castled position

It has already been mentioned that weakening pawn moves in the opening on the K-side (e.g. ...h7-h6 or h2-h3) will often significantly assist the opponent in carrying out an attack on the king. Of course, for this conditions are necessary, such as a superiority in force on this part of the board, the possibility of a pawn storm, and so on. In this respect pawn weaknesses are a subsidiary, but by no means minor factor.

Let us examine a few games.

No. 95 Tal-Averbakh
USSR Ch, Moscow, 1961
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆c6 3 ∆b5 a6 4
∆a4 ∆f6 5 0-0 ∆e7 6 ∆e1 b5 7
∆b3 d6 8 c3 0-0 9 h3 ∆a5 10 ∆c2
c5 11 d4 ∆c7 12 ∆bd2 ∆c6 13 dc
dc 14 f1 ∆d8?!

The opening stage here is rather protracted. Black’s last move can hardly be good, since it leaves his K-side weakened. In completing his development he should have preferred the flexible 14. ...∆e6

15 ∆e2 g6 16 ∆e3 ∆b8 17 ∆g5!

Tal subtly senses the attacking motifs: the f7 square, Black’s rather weakened K-side pawn formation, and so on. The storm clouds are gathering over Black’s position.

17 ...∆f8

This aggravates Black’s difficulties in defending his K-side. But also after 17 ...∆b7, as in Suetin-Averbakh (32nd USSR Ch., 1965) White gained a powerful initiative: 18 ∆b3! ∆f8 (18...c4? fails to 19 ∆xc4!) 19 ∆d5! etc.

18 ∆f3 ∆g7 19 ∆d5! ∆d6 20
∆e3 h6 (31)

Black has to try and drive away the menacing knight at g5, but in doing so he makes a further pawn weakening, which proves fatal.

21 ∆xf6+ ∆xf6 22 ∆ad1 ∆e7
23 ∆xc5!

This combination, which concludes the struggle, was essentially begun by White on his 21st move.

23...∆xd1 (23...∆xc5 loses immediately to 24 ∆xf6) 24
∆xd1! ∆xc5 25 ∆xf6 hg 26 ∆b3!
The point of the combination: against the threats of 27 \( \textsymbol{W} \times f7+ \) and 27 \( \textsymbol{W} \times g6+ \) (this is where the move . . . h7-h6 tells!) Black has no defence.

26 . . . b7 27 \( \textsymbol{W} \times g6+ \) f8 28 \( \textsymbol{W} \times h6+ \) 1-0

No. 97 Botvinnik-Tartakower
Nottingham, 1936
Old Indian Defence

1 f3 f6 2 c4 d6 3 d4 \( \text{bd} \) 4 g3 e5 5 g2 e7 6 0-0 0-0 7 c3 c6 8 e4 \( \text{c7} \) 9 h3 \( \text{e8} \) 10 e3 f8? (10 . . . ed 11 \( \text{xc4} \) c5 12 c2 a5 was in the spirit of the position)

11 c1 h6? 12 d5 d7 13 d2 g5? (32)

No. 96 Foguelman-Bronstein
Amsterdam, 1954
Queen’s Gambit Accepted

1 d4 d5 2 c4 dc 3 f3 f6 4 e3 g4 5 c4 e6 6 h3 c5 7 gf c5 8 c7 bd7 9 dc(?) c5 10 f4 0-0 11 0-0 d5

The start of an interesting and highly effective plan, which has the aim of exploiting the slight weakness of White’s castled pawn formation.

12 c1

After 12 \( \text{xc5} \) b8 13 c6 b6 14 a4 ed there appears to be no defence against . . . g6+ and . . . h4. But 12 e1 would have been rather better, since now White is crushed by force.

12 . . . b8 13 c6 h4! 14 c3 b6! 15 d7 f4! 16 e2

There is a pretty finish after 16 ef xf2+ 17 h1 f3 mate!

16 . . . h3+ 17 g2 xf2 18 d4 g4! 19 f4 xh2+ 20 f1 xe3 21 d5 xf4! 0-1

A fatal weakening. 13 . . . g6 was better, although here too after 14 b4! White has pressure on the Q-side. Now White decisively opens up the game on the K-side.

14 f4 gf 15 gf g7 16 fe de 17 c5! cd 18 xd5 c6 19 c4 g6 20 d6! e6

Black’s position is already indefensible, e.g. 20 . . . xd6 21 x f6!, or 20 . . . x f8 21 x e7 x e7 22 x f6! x f6 23 x h5! etc.

21 x e7! x e7 22 x f6! x f6 23 x h5 g6 24 f5! x g8 25 x h6 x a2 26 d1 x a8 27
\begin{align*}
g5+ & \text{e6} 28 \text{xd8 f6} 29 \text{g8 f4} 30 g7 1-0 \\
Those given above have been characteristic examples of piece attacks against weak points in the castled position. The following game shows a typical instance, where the weakened pawn formation of a castled position assists the mounting of a pawn storm.

\textbf{No. 98 Suetin-Zilberstein} \\
Kislovodsk, 1972 \\
\textit{English Opening}

1 \text{c4 e5} 2 \text{d3 f6} 3 \text{f3 c6} 4 \text{g3 b4} 5 \text{g2} 0-0 6 d6 7 d3 h6(?) 8 \text{d2!} \text{xc3} 9 \text{bc d7} 10 \text{e4 h8} 11 \text{h3 b6} 12 f4 \text{g8} 13 f5 g5?! 14 \text{e3 f6} 15 \text{h4 e8} 16 \text{f3 f7} 17 \text{f2 g7} 18 \text{h1} (33)

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{d2} & \text{d1} & \text{c2} & \text{c3} & \text{b3} \\
\hline
\text{b2} & \text{b1} & \text{a2} & \text{a3} & \text{b3} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

18. \text{f8} 19 \text{e2 c8} 20 \text{h2} \\
Exploiting the weakening of Black’s K-side pawns, White mounts there a decisive offensive.

20. \text{g7} 21 \text{ah1 f7} 22 \text{hg}

\text{fg 23 d2 d8 24 xh6! (the decisive tactical blow) 24... xh6} 25 \text{xc4 g8} 26 \text{gl! h7} 27 \text{g5 f8} 28 \text{xc7 h7} 29 \text{h2+ g8} 30 \text{h4 g7} 31 \text{h6 h7} 32 \text{d2 d8} 33 \text{g4+ h8} 34 \text{g5} 1-0

\textbf{Counterattack in the opening}

In the above examples, combinations and attacks were successful and decided the outcome at an early stage, but this is by no means always the case. It can happen that active operations will fairly quickly lead to the opposite result and meet with a decisive counteraction by the opponent.

Often active operations in the opening appear very tempting from the tactical viewpoint, but if they are analyzed, it transpires that their tactical side is not supported by a sound strategic basis. In such cases a counterattack is often employed. It is an effective measure, but at the same time it requires no less ingenuity than the organization of swift opening attacks.

This is shown by the following example, in which the Belorussian master’s conduct of a brilliant counterattack was truly inspired.
No. 99 Rauzer-Veresov  
Tbilisi, 1934  
Caro-Kann Defence

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 â3 c3 d e4 d7 5 âf3 âg6 6 âxf6+ âxf6 7 âe5 âf5 (better 7...âe6) 8 âc4 (8 c3 is stronger, and if 8...e6 9 g4 âg6 10 h4, when Black stands badly, Karpov-Hort, Bugojno, 1978) 8...e6 9 g4? âe4! 10 f3 âd5 11 âd3 âd6! 12 c4 âxe5 13 de âxg4! 14 âf4 (34)

14...g5! 15 cd (bad is 15 âg3 âe3 16 âe2 âa5+ 17 âf2 âxc4 18 âxc4 âc5+ etc) 15...gf 16 fg âxd5 17 0-0 0-0-0 18 âf3 âg8 19 âh3 h5 20 âxh5 âxd3 21 âxd3 âxg4+! 0-1

Here are some further characteristic examples of this type of situation.

No. 100 Anderssen-Lange  
Berlin, 1858  
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 âf3 âc6 3 âb5 âd4 4

No. 101 A. Rabinovich v Ilyin-Genevsky  
Moscow, 1922  
Philidor's Defence

1 e4 e5 2 âf3 d6 3 d4 âf6 4 âc3 âbd7 5 âc4 âe7 6 âxf7+? âxf7 7 âg5+ âg8 8 âe6 âe8 9 âxc7 âg6 10 âxa8 âxg2 11 âfl ed! 12 âe2 dc! 13 âc4+ d5 14 âxc8+ âf7 15 âxb7 âxe4+ 16 âe3 âb8 17 âxa7 cb 18 âd2 âb4+, and Black won.

No. 102 Semenenko-Perfiliev  
Corr., 1947  
Two Knights Defence

1 e4 e5 2 âf3 âc6 3 âc4 âf6 4 âg5 d5 5 ed âd4 6 c3 b5 7 âf1 âxd5 8 âxf7 âxf7 9 cd ed 10 âf3+? âf6! 11 âxa8  
Or 11 âxb5 âe6 12 0-0 âb8 13 âc6 âd6 14 h3 g5! 15 âe4 g4! with advantage to Black.

11...âc5! 12 âxb5 âe8+! 13 âfl âa6!! 14 âc6 âe7! 15 g3 âxb5+ 16 âxb5 âe4 17 âc4+ âg6 18 âg1 âf3 19 âf1 d3 0-1
After great tactical complications in the opening, Black has attained a strategically won position. White has been aiming for an attack on the dark squares, but although he appears to have achieved the desired opposite-colour bishops, in the given situation his dark-square bishop is ineffective. And the pawn at f6 essentially merely blocks White’s initiative on the K-side.

19 \textit{\textbf{e}c1} \textit{\textbf{c}c4} 20 0-0 \textit{\textbf{d}d7} 21 \textit{\textbf{e}e7} \textit{\textbf{h}c8} 22 \textit{\textbf{f}f2} \textit{\textbf{xc}c2}! 23 \textit{\textbf{xc}c2} (23 \textit{\textbf{xc}c2} \textit{\textbf{b}b1}+) 23...\textit{\textbf{xc}c1}+!! 0-1

A highly attractive strategic plan. For the sake of the rapid development of his counter-attack on the Q-side, Black goes in for an exchange sacrifice, which creates a secure fortress for his king.

After 15...\textit{\textbf{e}e8}? 16 \textit{\textbf{g}g2} \textit{\textbf{f}f6} 17 \textit{\textbf{b}b5}! White’s attack would have been very dangerous.

16 \textit{\textbf{f}4} (after 16 \textit{\textbf{x}f8} \textit{\textbf{x}f8} 17 \textit{\textbf{b}b5} \textit{\textbf{c}c5} 18 \textit{\textbf{x}d}d4 \textit{\textbf{x}d}d4 19 \textit{\textbf{g}g2} \textit{\textbf{b}b6}! Black has irresistible threats: 20...\textit{\textbf{e}e3} or 20...\textit{\textbf{x}b2!}) 16...\textit{\textbf{a}a5!} 17 \textit{\textbf{x}f8} (or 17 \textit{\textbf{e}e} \textit{\textbf{f}d}d8 18 \textit{\textbf{f}e} \textit{\textbf{x}f6!}) 17...\textit{\textbf{x}f8} 18 \textit{\textbf{f}e} \textit{\textbf{f}f3} 19 \textit{\textbf{d}d3} \textit{\textbf{xc}c3}! 0-1
defence triumphed, but in the following example a purely tactical defence proved unreliable.

No. 106 Kupreichik-Tseshkovsky
USSR Ch., 1976
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 d4 d4
f6 5 c3 a6 6 g5 c6 7 d2 e6
8 0-0-0 h6 9 e3 d7 10 f3 b5 11
g4 e5 12 d3 b4 13 e2 d5?!
14 g3 d3+! (better 14...
7 e7) 15 d3 e5? 16 h1! ed 17
e6! de 18 e3+ e7 19 d6 e6
de c7? (20... e7 was the lesser evil) 21 d4 (21 f5! was
even stronger) 21... h5 (21...
c8 was more tenacious) 22 f5
g8 23 d6+ xe7 24 xh4 f8
25 g5 b8 26 a3 d7 27 c8+!
1-0
three

BASIC SPATIAL FACTORS

Occupation of the centre

In earlier times the problem of the central squares was regarded in a somewhat functional sense — as applied to the expedient development of the pieces in the opening. But the centre is first and foremost an independent, base factor. In the end it serves as the main arena of struggle in any opening variation. It is a typical mistake, for example, to be diverted into playing on one of the wings, to the detriment of centralization.

The classical concept of the centre was mainly the creation of an ideal pawn pair (pawns at d4 and e4, or correspondingly at d5 and e5), or at least a single fighting unit (e.g. a mobile pawn at e4). In the latter case the adjacent wing pawn could be included (e.g., pawns at e4 and f4). In both instances the pawn pair would be expected to assist the seizure of space or the dynamic advance of the pieces, with the possibility of creating an attack on one of the wings.

In this respect the following game is instructive.

No. 107 Alekhine-Marshall
Baden-Baden, 1925
Queen's Gambit

1 d4 ♞f6 2 c4 d5?! 3 cd ♞xd5 4 e4 ♞f6 5 ♞d3 e5 6 de ♞g4 7 ♞f3 ♞c6 8 ♞g5! ♞e7 9 ♞xe7 ♞xe7 10 ♞c3 ♞xe5 11 ♞xe5 ♞xe5?! 12 h3 ♞f6 13 ♞d2 ♞d7 14 ♞e3 ♞c6 15 0-0-0 0-0?! 16 f4 ♞e6 17 e5! ♞fe8 18 ♞he1 ♞ad8?! 19 f5! ♞e7 20 ♞g5 ♞d5 f6 ♞f8 22 ♞c4! ♞xc3 23 ♞xd8 ♞xd8 24 fg! ♞xa2+ 25 ♞b1 ♞e8 26 e6! ♞e4+ 27 ♞a1 f6 28 e7+ ♞d5 29 ♞xf6 ♞f7 30 e8w+ 1-0

Many of the strengths of the pawn centre, put forward by the classics, have not only retained their significance, but have also been significantly improved.

A wealth of practical experience has shown that a pawn centre is a very strong feature, but at the same time it can be
very brittle.

Let us make a short excursion into history. Until the establishment of Steinitz’s theories, central strategy was very straightforward. Sacrificing flank pawns if necessary, the active side would often endeavour to obtain a numerical pawn superiority in the centre (e.g., in the King’s Gambit or Evans Gambit). Since both sides normally had the same aim, a closed formation in the centre rarely arose. Under the influence of the constant attacks on it, the centre would sometimes fairly quickly collapse.

In the middlegame, after a heated skirmish of this type, in place of a pawn centre a corresponding open space would very often arise, which increased the sharpness of the tactical play, but restricted the strategic complexity of the two sides’ plans.

Such a tendency is clearly seen in many openings which are now rarely employed: Centre Game, Two Knights Defence, Vienna Game, Hungarian Defence, Italian Game, Scotch Game, and so on.

In opening systems such as these, White intends quickly and directly to seize the central squares, and, using the fact that the d4 square is ‘naturally’ defended, along with his development he undermines the e5 pawn by d2-d4 (or first f2-f4). But in the process Black gains the opportunity of quickly and easily mobilizing his forces, and sometimes of preparing the freeing central countermove . . . d7-d5.

Typical, for example, is the ‘fierce’ opening struggle in the well-studied Moller Attack in the Italian Game: 1 e4 e5 2 2 f3 d6 3 c4 c5 4 c3 f6! 5 d4 ed 6 cd b4+ 7 c3 (if 7 d2 Black equalizes by 7 . . . a×d2+ 8 b×d2 d5!) 7 . . . c×e4 8 0-0 c×c3 9 d5! f6! 10 e1 e7 11 e4 0-0 12 d6 cd 13 c×d6 a5 14 d5 e7 etc., or 11 . . . d6 12 g5 a×g5 13 a×g5 0-0 14 c×h7 etc., in both cases with a forced draw.

As we see, against correct and energetic play by Black, such an attempt by White to obtain predominance in the centre usually ends in the opening of the pawn position in the centre, which leads to complete equality, and after the slightest inaccuracy by White the initiative may pass to Black. The point is that, with the centre open a ‘calculating’ piece battle results, in which exceptional accuracy is demanded of both sides.

In connection with this we give the following example.
No. 108
Konstantinopolsky-Keres
USSR Ch., 1940
Vienna Game

1 e4 e5 2 .cb c3 6f6 3 f4 d5
Against White’s undermining of the centre Black replies with a counterattack, which leads to the forced opening of the centre.
4 fe 6xe4 5 6f3 6e7 6 d4 0-0 7
6.d3 f5 8 ef 6xf6 9 0-0 6c6

By the most natural and energetic moves Black parries White’s aggressive intentions.
10 6xe4 de 11 6xe4 6xd4 12
6g5 6f5! 13 6xf5 (13 c3 is more accurate) 13. 6xf5 14 6e6?

An instructive point. With the centre open, the activity of the pieces increases greatly, and the superior or poor placing of individual pieces has great significance in the assessment of the position. Every tempo acquires exceptional importance, and great accuracy and care are demanded of both sides. In the given case, in search of a nonexistent advantage, White embarks on a tempting knight manoeuvre, which however, loses precious time. The correct continuation was 14 6xd8!
6a×d8 15 6e6 6d4+ 16 6xd4
6xd4 17 6g5 with subsequent full equality.

Now Black finds an elegant way to seize the initiative.

14. 6xd1 15 6xd1 6f8! 16
6xc7 6ad8! 17 6f4 6e2 18
6xd8+ 6xd8 19 6d1 6f6

As a result of the complications Black regains the sacrificed pawn and retains a positional advantage.

This unsuccessful attempt to create a pawn centre is in marked contrast to the following modern example.

No. 109 Botvinnik-Capablanca
AVRO Tournament, 1938
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4 6f6 2 c4 e6 3 6c3 6b4 4 e3
d5 5 a3 6xe3+ 6 bc c5 7 cd ed 8
6d3 0-0 9 6e2 b6 10 0-0 6a6 11
6xa6 6xa6 12 6b2 6d7 13 a4
6fe8 (better 13. 6.cd 14 cd 6fc8
with counterplay along the c-file) 14 6d3 c4 15 6c2 6b8 16
6ae1 6c6 17 6g3 6a5 18 f3! 6b3
19 e4 6xa4 20 e5 6d7 21 6f2 g6
22 f4 (37)

[Diagram]

22. 6f5 23 ef 6xf6 24 f5 6xe1
25 6xe1 6e8 26 6e6! 6xe6 27 fe
No. 110 Taimanov-Petrosian
Zurich C, 1953
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4 2 f6 2 c4 e6 3 c3 b4 4 e3 c5 5 d3 6 f3 d5 7 0-0 c6 8 a3 c3 9 bc b6 10 cd ed 11 e5 c7 12 c6 13 f3! e6 14 e1 d7 15 e4 c4(?)

Black should have played 15... f5!?, with counterplay in the centre.

16 c2 f5 17 e5 f7 18 a4 a5 19 f4 h5 20 ab xf5 21 a3 b6 22 h4 e8 23 f3 c8 24 a4! d7 (24... d7 25 e6!) 25 e1 b1 f7 26 a7 d7 27 g3 a7 28 e7 f7 29 g6 g6 30 h4 c6 31 a3 d8 32 h5 e6 33 h4 f7 34 h6 g6 35 f6 d8 36 e7 c7 37 xg6+! hg 38 h7+ xh7 39 xf7+ g7 40 f2! 1-0

No. 111 Taimanov-Botvinnik
Match, 1953
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4 g6 2 c4 e6 3 c3 d4 4 f3 c5 5 e3 0-0 6 d3 d5 7 0-0 c6 8 a3 c3 9 bc b6 10 cd ed 11 a4 c4(?) 12 c2 g4 13 e1

No. 112 Botvinnik-Keres
USSR Ch., 1952
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 f6 2 c4 e6 3 c3 d5 4 cd ed 5 g5 e7 6 e3 0-0 7 d3
\[ \text{bd7} 8 \text{wc2} \text{e8} 9 \text{ge2} \text{f8} 10 \]
0-0 \text{c6} 11 \text{ab1} \text{d6?} (11... \text{e4} or 11... \text{h5} was in the spirit of the position) 12 \text{h1} \text{g6} 13 \text{f3!} \text{e7} 14 \text{be1}! \text{d7} 15 \text{xex7} \text{exe7} 16 \text{g3} \text{f6} 17 \text{f2} \text{e6} 18 \text{xex5} \text{xf5} 19 \text{xf5} \text{h6} 20 \text{e4!} \text{de} 21 \text{fe} \text{d8} 22 \text{e5} \text{d5} 23 \text{e4} \text{f8} 24 \text{e6} \text{c7} 25 \text{e4} \text{e6} 26 \text{h4} \text{g6} 27 \text{fxd5} \text{cd} 28 \text{c1} \text{d7} 29 \text{c3} \text{f8} 30 \text{xf5!} \text{e8} 31 \text{h6+} \text{f8} 32 \text{g6} \text{g7} 33 \text{e3} \text{f3} 34 \text{fx7} \text{e6} 35 \text{g5} \text{f5} 36 \text{h6} \text{g7} 37 \text{g4} 1-0

In the above examples White’s central pawns were harmoniously supported by his pieces. But often, when there is not the necessary piece support, a pawn centre can become weak and may be destroyed at an early stage of the game.

This is illustrated by the following example (Bronstein-Evans, USSR-USA, 1955, Slav Defence): 1 \text{d4} \text{f6} 2 \text{c4} \text{e6} 3 \text{f3} \text{d5} 4 \text{c3} \text{c6} 5 \text{e3} \text{bd7} 6 \text{d3} \text{b4} 7 \text{a3} \text{a5} 8 \text{wc2} 0-0 9 0-0 \text{ac7} 10 \text{d2} \text{dc}! 11 \text{dxc4} \text{e5} 12 \text{a2} \text{h6} 13 \text{ae1} \text{e8} 14 \text{de} \text{xe5} 15 \text{xe5} \text{xe5} 16 \text{f4?} \text{f5} 17 \text{e4} \text{b6+} 18 \text{h1} \text{xe4!}

This emphasizes the actual weakness of White’s centre, which collapses under the powerful pressure of the black pieces.

19 \text{xex4} \text{xex4} 20 \text{xex4} (forced in view of the threats of 20... \text{f2+} and 20... \text{g3+})

\[ \text{20...xe4} 21 \text{xe4} \text{d2}. \text{Black has an obvious advantage.} \]

Thus whether a pawn centre is weak or strong, the conceding to the opponent of a numerical pawn superiority is acceptable only if sufficient piece pressure on it can be developed.

In our time this problem has acquired much wider significance, since our understanding of the centre has become much more complicated. In a number of cases piece pressure on the centre proves more effective than the mechanical occupation of it with pawns. The modern forms of piece pressure on the centre are highly varied. We will examine what is for the moment the most obvious of these, the effective occupation of a piece outpost in the centre, which creates here a favourable structure for a considerable part of the game.

No. 113 Petrosian-Kozma
Munich OL, 1958
Queen’s Pawn Opening

1 \text{f3} \text{f6} 2 \text{d4} \text{e6} 3 \text{g5} \text{e5} 4 \text{e3} \text{b6?}

This imperceptible slip allows White, by the following energetic move, to obtain a strong piece outpost in the centre.

\[ 5 \text{d5! ed} 6 \text{c3} \text{b7} 7 \text{xex5} \text{d5} 8 \text{fxe6} \text{fxe6} 9 \text{xd5 (39)} \]
White has securely occupied the d5 square. At this post the queen cannot be successfully attacked by the black pieces, and it exerts very strong pressure. The main factor in the subsequent play is Black's weakness on the d-file.

9...Ac6

Bad is 9...bxb2 10 d1 b4+ 11 c3 bxc3+ 12 d2 c1+ 13 e2!, when Black loses a rook.

10 Ac4 Ac7 11 0-0-0 d8 12 d2 0-0 13 c3 Aa5 14 Ae2

The domination of the white pieces in the centre is quite striking! Black tries to weaken the pressure by the exchange of queens, but merely finishes up in a cheerless ending.

14...Be6 15 Bhd1 Bxd5 16 Bxd5 d6 17 Bf2 f5 18 f4! g6 19 g3 Bf6 20 e4 Bxe4 21 Axe4 22 Bf3 Bg7 23 b3 Ac6 24 B5d3

White intends to establish his bishop at d5, where it will operate with maximum force.

24...Ab8 25 Aa2 h5 26 Bb2!

The time has come for the king to become active. Exploiting the fact that the black forces are restricted, the leader of White's army takes up a secure post at f3, and prepares if necessary to take an active part in the battle.

26...Af8 27 Ad5 Ae7 28 Bb4 Aa6 29 Bc7 30 Bxf3 Bxd5(?)
31 Bxd5 Bxe8 32 Aa1 Ae6 33 Ae2 b5 34 h3 a5 35 g4 h5 36 hg Ac7 37 f5!, and White attains a strategically won position.

Thus the modern understanding of centralization considers not the formal occupation of the centre by pawns, but rather the real control of it. As Aron Nimzowitsch pointed out, what is important is not just the occupation of the centre by pawns — of much greater importance is the balance of the two sides' forces in the centre!

And here is another of the points he makes: "Here we have simply to abide by the meaning of the word. The 'centre' consists of the squares in the middle of the board, squares: not pawns. This is fundamental and must never under any circumstances be lost sight of."

The examples given above largely demonstrate the importance of a real advantage in the centre.
In practice, however, monopoly in the centre does not often occur, and is possible only as a result of serious mistakes by the opponent. The creation of such a situation, as has already been seen, is equivalent to a strategic victory. But in the struggle for the centre one normally has to be satisfied with very modest achievements. The gaining of an outpost in the centre or the obtaining of a strong mobile pawn is already considered a definite success.

Naturally, White has more chance of obtaining such advantages. For Black a quite optimal solution is to become established on one of the central squares d5 or e5, which promises him equal chances.

Thus in the struggle for the centre in modern strategy it is very important to have a critical approach to its mechanical occupation by pawns, which in the past seemed to be an almost obligatory condition for the achievement of an advantage. However, conceding a numerical pawn superiority to the opponent is admissible only if sufficient piece pressure on the centre can be created.

One cannot go to extremes and disclaim foundations which have developed from centuries of experience. In this sense another point put forward by Nimzowitsch is very apt: "Certainly, pawns, as being the most stable, are best suited to building a centre; nevertheless centrally posted pieces can perfectly well take their place."

Springing from this, incidentally, is the modern concept of dynamic equilibrium, where the positional advantages of one side (for example, the possession of a pawn centre) are as though balanced by the harmonious pressure of the opponent’s pieces on the centre.

**Opening up of the centre**

It is customarily thought that the rapid opening up of the centre at the start of the game contains a serious drawing ‘disease’ (as was seen in the examples of ancient openings given above), but on the whole this is a superficial and deceptive impression.

Practice confirms more and more that, in a number of instances in modern opening systems, freeing the centre of pawns opens scope for piece play and for all kinds of tactical operations.

This is shown by the examples given below.
No. 114 Suetin-Petrosian
18th USSR Ch., 1950
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 d4 c6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 d6 5 0-0 e7 6 d4 ed 7 e1 0-0 8 e5 d5? (8...e8 is correct, not allowing White an important gain of tempo for the development of his initiative) 9 xxd4 xxd4 10 xxd4 b6 11 a3 3 d5 12 ed xd6
12...xd6 is somewhat better, although here too after 13 d4 h4 14 g3 gg4 15 h3 g3 16 e3! c6 17 c3 d7 18 d3 xfx4 19 xfx4 e7 20 c3 c5 21 e4 xf5 22 xxc7 White has the advantage.
13 xe4!

Despite the fact that the centre has been cleared of pawns, due to the strong position of the white queen it is far from easy for Black to complete his Q-side development. White has powerful piece pressure on the centre.

13...f6 14 c3 b8

Perhaps the lesser evil was 14...d4 15 f4 xe4 16 xe4 d8 17 ad1 d7 18 c5 a6 19 h3, when although Black’s pieces are thoroughly tied up, for the moment he manages to avoid loss of material
15 f4 c5 16 e3!

A difficult move to find — after all, when you have the initiative you do not want to exchange queens! But there appears to be no other way for White to realize his opening advantage. If now Black simplifies with 16...xe3 17 xe3 he loses his c-pawn, since after 17...d8 18 d1 d7 19 h3 there is no defence against 20 ed3 followed by a double attack on d8 and xc7. Black must therefore avoid the exchange of queens in an unfavourable situation.

16...c6 17 g3 e6

Black is obliged to give up the pawn, since 17...d8 18 e5 g6 19 ad1 d7 20 xf4! is too unattractive, when White’s attack can hardly be parried.

18 xc7 bc8 19 e5 xb3 20 ab d7 21 xf6 xf6 22 ad1

White has emerged with an extra pawn, which he successfully converted into a win.

No. 115 Lipnitsky-Petrosian
USSR Ch., 1951
Hungarian Defence

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 c4 e7 4 d4 d6 5 c3 f6 6 h3 0-0 7 0-0

Here a typical situation has arisen. Black has the possibility of the exchanging combination 7...xe4 8 xe4 d5. Such simplification often leads to the removal of the pawn tension in the centre and to seemingly
harmless symmetry. But the outward simplicity conceals the difficulties of the defence, since after 9 \( \mathcal{A} \times d5 \mathcal{W} \times d5 \) 10 \( \mathcal{C} c3 \mathcal{A} a5 \) 11 \( \mathcal{A} \times e5 \mathcal{A} \times e5 \) 12 de \( \mathcal{W} \times e5 \) 13 \( \mathcal{A} e1 \mathcal{W} d6 \) 14 \( \mathcal{W} f3 \) it is very difficult for Black to complete his Q-side development, whereas White is threatening to ‘open fire’ on the central files.

It is interesting that at the board Tigran Petrosian remembered the lesson of the previous game. Although in the concrete opening development of these games there is not even a distant similarity, the essential point is that, after the opening of the centre, on each occasion the white queen ties down Black’s forces.

7...a6 8 a4 ed 9 \( \mathcal{A} \times d4 \mathcal{A} b4! \)

Now Black is threatening advantageously to release the tension, both by 10...\( \mathcal{A} \times e4 \) 11 \( \mathcal{A} \times e4 \) d5, and in some cases by ...d5.

The game went 10 \( \mathcal{A} d5 \mathcal{A} b \times d5 \) 11 ed \( \mathcal{A} d7 \) 12 a5 \( \mathcal{A} f6 \) 13 c3 (13 \( \mathcal{A} e6!? \) was possibly better, forcing simplification) 13...\( \mathcal{A} e5 \) 14 \( \mathcal{A} b3 \mathcal{A} e8 \) 15 \( \mathcal{A} c2 \mathcal{A} d7 \) 16 f4 \( \mathcal{G} g6 \) 17 \( \mathcal{V} f3 \) c5?! 18 dc bc 19 f5 \( \mathcal{A} \times f5 \) 20 \( \mathcal{A} \times f5 \) d5 21 \( \mathcal{A} d2 \mathcal{A} f8 \) 22 \( \mathcal{A} d3 \) c5, with a good position for Black.

In these examples the strength of the most powerful piece was very apparent.

In passing we would like to draw attention to one particular problem — the strength of a centralized queen, when it is difficult to drive it away by attacking it with minor pieces.

A frequent characteristic of modern dynamics is the sudden freeing of the centre of pawns, even sometimes in the most blocked set-ups. Such an operation is often accompanied by a sacrifice of material for the sake of active piece play, and invariably changes the picture sharply, giving the game a combinational trend.

Of course, such an opening of the centre demands deep and accurate calculation, with the position of the king assuming considerable importance.

Piece attacks after the opening of the centre are especially dangerous, when the object of the attack becomes the enemy king. In addition to earlier examples of this type (cf. Nos. 15-17) we will consider one further game.

No. 116 Kotov-Boleslavsky
USSR Ch., 1945
Queens’s Pawn Opening

1 d4 \( \mathcal{A} f6 \) 2 \( \mathcal{A} g5 \mathcal{A} e4 \) 3 \( \mathcal{A} f4 \) d6 4 \( \mathcal{F} f3 \) \( \mathcal{A} f6 \) 5 e4 g6 6 \( \mathcal{W} d2 \mathcal{D} d7 \) 7 \( \mathcal{A} h6? \) \( \mathcal{A} \times h6 \) 8 \( \mathcal{A} \times h6 \) c5 9 c3 \( \mathcal{A} b6 \) 10 \( \mathcal{W} d2 \) cd 11 cd e5 12 \( \mathcal{A} a3 \) d5! (40)
Exploiting White’s poor development and the harmonious placing of his own forces, Black advantageously opens the centre and commences a very strong attack on the opponent’s king.

13 dxex5 14 bx5+ ff8 15 ed dg7 16 e2 a6 17 c4 ee8 18 d1h3!

A brilliant stroke, emphasizing the scattered nature of White’s forces and setting him insoluble problems.

19 ef1 xf3 20 xd3 dg4! 21 xf3 e3+ 22 e1 xg2 (Black has a won position). 23 f2

Here we cannot avoid touching on the other side of the ‘coin’ — the premature opening of the centre (one of the instances of premature activity, about which we have already spoken). Practice shows that the ‘sinner’ in this case is usually Black, aiming as soon as possible for active play in the centre.

We will first examine a highly primitive example, which nevertheless shows clearly that such an approach is doomed to failure.

No. 117 Boleslavsky-Gurgenidze
Rostov-on-Don, 1960
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 df3 dc6 3 d4 d5?

A ridiculous experiment, which is energetically refuted by White. Due to Black’s lag in development, it is he who suffers from the opening of the centre.

4 ed xd5 5 xc3 de6+ 6 xe3

cd 7 dxd4 ed7 8 db5! ed8 9 ef2! f6 10 d1 e4 11 f3 wh5 12 xa7 xa7 13 d6+ 1-0

Below we give some more complicated examples, in which the drawbacks of opening the centre are disclosed by the purposeful actions of the opponent.

No. 118 Alekhine-Eliskases
Podebrady, 1936
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 df3 dc6 3 bx5 a6

4 bx4 df6 5 0-0 ef7 6 ee1 b5

7 bx3 d6 8 c3 xa5 9 xc2 c5 10 d3
e6 11 bd2 0-0 12 df1 ef8 13 ee3 d5? (41)

A premature opening of the centre. Here too there follows an immediate and very energetic rejoinder by White.
14 ed $\textit{\&}x_{d5}$ 15 $\textit{\&}x_{d5}$ $\textit{\&}x_{d5}$ 16 d4! ed 17 $\textit{\&}e_{4}$ $\textit{\&}d_{7}$ (17...$\textit{\&}d_{6}$ 18 $\textit{\&}f_{4}$! 18 cd $\textit{\&}f_{6}$ 19 $\textit{\&}g_{5}$!! $\textit{\&}x_{e_{4}}$
(19...$\textit{\&}x_{g_{5}}$ 20 $\textit{\&}x_{g_{5}}$ g6 21 dc! or 19...$\textit{\&}x_{d_{4}}$ 20 $\textit{\&}f_{5}$!! obviously favours White) 20 $\textit{\&}x_{e_{4}}$ $\textit{\&}x_{d_{4}}$ 21 $\textit{\&}x_{d_{4}}$ $\textit{\&}x_{d_{4}}$ 22 $\textit{\&}h_{5}$! $\textit{\&}b_{7}$ 23 $\textit{\&}h_{4}$
$\textit{\&}f_{5}$ 24 $\textit{\&}e_{3}$! $\textit{\&}d_{8}$? 25 $\textit{\&}x_{d_{4}}$! 1-0

No. 119 Suetin-Malich
Byelorussia-East Germany
1965
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 $\textit{\&}f_{3}$ $\textit{\&}c_{6}$ 3 $\textit{\&}b_{5}$ a6 4
$\textit{\&}a_{4}$ $\textit{\&}f_{6}$ 5 0-0 b5 6 $\textit{\&}b_{3}$ $\textit{\&}b_{7}$ 7
$\textit{\&}e_{1}$ $\textit{\&}c_{5}$ 8 c3 d6 9 d4 $\textit{\&}b_{6}$ 10 a3!? 0-0 11 $\textit{\&}c_{2}$ $\textit{\&}d_{7}$ 12 $\textit{\&}d_{3}$ $\textit{\&}e_{8}$ 13

\textit{\&}bd2 $\textit{\&}f_{8}$ 14 b4 $\textit{\&}g_{6}$ 15 $\textit{\&}f_{1}$ d5?
(42) 16 ed $\textit{\&}x_{d5}$ 17 $\textit{\&}f_{5}$!
It transpires that against the threats of $\textit{\&}h_{5}$, $\textit{\&}e_{4}$ and $\textit{\&}g_{5}$ Black has no defence.

17...$\textit{\&}d_{6}$ 18 $\textit{\&}g_{5}$ $\textit{\&}f_{6}$
(18...$\textit{\&}f_{8}$ 19 $\textit{\&}b_{3}$!) 19 $\textit{\&}x_{f6}$ gf 20
$\textit{\&}e_{4}$ $\textit{\&}g_{7}$ 21 $\textit{\&}g_{3}$ ed 22 $\textit{\&}h_{6}$+!
$\textit{\&}h_{8}$ 23 $\textit{\&}x_{f6}$ $\textit{\&}g_{8}$ 24 $\textit{\&}x_{g8}$ $\textit{\&}x_{g8}$
25 $\textit{\&}g_{5}$!, and White won.

Thus at the start of the game, opening up the centre must be approached with great care,
adapting to specific circumstances. At the same time, as the given examples show, when playing Black in the opening one must exercise due caution and sense of measure.

The art of centralization

The art of centralization is a very important feature of strategy, as is confirmed by the following instructive games, in which step by step White was able to gain a monopoly in the opening.

No. 120 Alekhine-Bogoljubow
Budapest, 1921
Bogo-Indian Defence

1 d4 $\textit{\&}f_{6}$ 2 c4 e6 3 $\textit{\&}f_{3}$ $\textit{\&}b_{4}$+
4 $\textit{\&}d_{2}$ $\textit{\&}x_{d2}$+ 5 $\textit{\&}x_{d2}$ 0-0 6 $\textit{\&}c_{3}$
d5 7 e3 $\textit{\&}b_{7}$ 8 $\textit{\&}d_{3}$ c6 9 0-0 dc 10
$\textit{\&}x_{c4}$ e5 11 $\textit{\&}b_{3}$! $\textit{\&}e_{7}$ 12 e4! ed 13
$\textit{\&}x_{d4}$ $\textit{\&}c_{5}$ 14 $\textit{\&}c_{2}$ $\textit{\&}d_{8}$ 15 $\textit{\&}a_{d1}$
A situation has arisen in which White’s piece formation gives him real prospects of an attack in the centre and on the K-side. Black’s pawn majority on the Q-side, on the other hand, does not play any significant role, and the advance of the black pawns may merely create new weaknesses.

20 h3!

After defending the g4 square, White can begin the advance of his f- and e-pawns.

20...c5 21 dxe4 cxd4 22 ed1 c4 23 f4 g6

After 23...c5+ White could have offered the exchange of queens by 24 d4, which would have guaranteed him a clear endgame advantage.

24 d4 c8 25 g4!

White’s mass pawn offensive on the K-side continues. It is difficult for Black to find a defence against 26 f5 or 26 e5 followed by f4-f5.

25...xg4 26 hg xg4 27 g2 h5 28 d5 h4 29 h1 d8 30 d1 1-0

No. 121 Keres-Lipnitsky
USSR Ch., 1951
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4 f6 2 c4 e6 3 c3 b4 4 e3 0-0 5 d3 d5 6 f3 c6 7 0-0 h6 8 h3 dc 9 xc4 d6 10 e4 e5 11 e3 a6 12 e1 d7 13 c2 e8 14 a3 ed 15 xd4 e5 16 f1

The central e4 pawn restricts Black’s manoeuvrings, and the white pieces are operating harmoniously.

16...g6 (the threat was 17 f4! and 18 e5) 17 ad1 e7 18 g3!

A characteristic situation. White sacrifices his e4 pawn—the pride of his position—for the sake of opening up the centre. Black is obliged to accept the challenge, since the threat of 19 g2 and f2-f4 with further gain
of space is highly unpleasant.

18...\textit{\textAxe4} 19 \textit{\textAc1} f5 20 \textit{\textAg2} \\
\textit{\textAe5} 21 \textit{\textAf5}!

Decisively breaking up Black's fortifications, White increases his initiative with every move.

21...\textit{\textAxf5} 22 \textit{\textAxe4} \textit{\textAf7} 23 \\
\textit{\textAb3} \textit{\textAb8} 24 \textit{\textAd2} \textit{\textAe6} 25 \textit{\textAxex6} \\
\textit{\textAxex6} 26 \textit{\textAxd6} cd 27 \textit{\textAd5}!, with a great advantage to White.

In this game too the struggle developed in the centre. Black's pieces were lacking in support and were driven back to less favourable positions.

Let us consider some further examples.

No. 122
Kapengut-Mikhalchishin
Lvov, 1973
\textit{Sicilian Defence}

1 e4 c5 2 \textit{\textAf3} d6 3 d4 cd 4 \textit{\textAxd4} \\
\textit{\textAf6} 5 \textit{\textAc3} e6 6 f4 \textit{\textAe7} 7 \textit{\textAe2} 0-0 8 \\
0-0 \textit{\textAc6} 9 \textit{\textAe3} \textit{\textAd7} 10 \textit{\textAb3} a6 11 \\
a4 \textit{\textAa5} (45) 12 e5 \textit{\textAe8} 13 \textit{\textAxax5} \\
\textit{\textVxa5} 14 \textit{\textAd2} \textit{\textAc7} 15 \textit{\textAd4} f6

An unjustified weakening, instead of which 15...\textit{\textAc6} followed by ...\textit{\textAd8} came into consideration. Now step by step White intensifies the pressure in the centre.

16 \textit{\textAe3} de 17 fe fe

17...f5! is somewhat better.

18 \textit{\textAb6} (stronger than 18 \\
\textit{\textAxe5} \textit{\textAc5}) 18...\textit{\textAc8} 19 \textit{\textFxg8}+ \\
\textit{\textFxg8} 20 \textit{\textAd1} \textit{\textAd6} 21 \textit{\textAxe5} \textit{\textAf5} \\
22 a5

As a result of the struggle for the centre White has regained his pawn and has successfully centralized his pieces. In Black's position persistent pawn weaknesses have been exposed at b7 and e6. White has a strategically won game.

22...\textit{\textAc7(?)} 23 \textit{\textAd7}! \textit{\textAxad7} \\
24 \textit{\textAc4}

White regains with interest the sacrificed material and achieves a decisive advantage.

24...\textit{\textAh8} 25 \textit{\textAxex6} \textit{\textAd2} 26 \\
\textit{\textAxf5} \textit{\textAc1+} 27 \textit{\textAf2} \textit{\textEe8} 28 \textit{\textAc2} \\
\textit{\textAg5} 29 g4! \textit{\textFf8} 30 \textit{\textAe4} \textit{\textAh4} 31 \\
\textit{\textAf2} 1-0

No. 123 Kapengut-Pytel
Ljubljana, 1973

In this game (46), as in the previous one, Black has played the opening badly and has fallen behind in development. White finds an effective plan of active play.
No. 124 Yuferov-Kupreichik
Minsk, 1972
Albin Counter-Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e5 3 de d4 4 f3
c6 5 g3 g4 6 g2 d7 7 0-0
h3 8 d3 0-0-0 9 xh3 xh3
10 bd2 ge7 11 d1?

This delay is fatal. 11 g5!
h5 12 f4 was correct, with the
initiative. Now Black obtains a
powerful striking force in the
centre.

11...g6 12 e4 e7 13 b3
f5 14 ef xf6 15 g5 he8 16
c2 xg5 17 xg5 g4 18 d2
h6 19 f3 d3! 20 h3 f5 21 e1 de
22 c3 ge5 23 h4 xh3 24
c5 d4 0-1

Thus modern opening stra-
ATEGY is notable for its rich con-
tent and for its diverse forms of
struggle for the centre. This will
be considered in more detail in
Part II of the book. But for the
moment we will dwell on some
other basic spatial factors in the
opening, which for all their
specific nature are also closely
linked with the centre.

The demarcation line of the
board

The line dividing the board
into two equal parts between the
fourth and fifth ranks can be
called the ‘demarcation’ line.
The side which controls more space also normally has greater manoeuvring freedom. Therefore the acquisition of a spatial advantage (the crossing of the demarcation line by the pieces and pawns of one of the sides, and the subsequent consolidation of the success achieved) may give a definite advantage. In turn, the conceding of a significant amount of space may have unpleasant consequences.

A spatial advantage cannot, of course, be considered in isolation from the position on the board. Its persistence will closely depend on the deployment of the forces, and therefore the hasty seizure of space often has undesirable results.

This is shown in the following line of Alekhine’s Defence: 1 e4 \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 2 e5 \( \text{\textit{d5}} \) 3 c4 \( \text{\textit{b6}} \) 4 d4 d6 5 f4 (the Four Pawns Attack) 5...\( \text{\textit{gf5}} \)

This move involves a little trap. If now White carelessly plays to exchange the opponent’s active light-square bishop with 6 \( \text{\textit{d3?!}} \) (6 \( \text{\textit{e3!!}} \) is correct), then after 6...\( \text{\textit{x}} \text{\textit{xd3}} \) 7 \( \text{\textit{x}} \text{\textit{xd3}} \) Black exploits the weakly defended state of White’s advanced central pawns: 7...\( \text{\textit{de8}} \) 8 ef c5 9 d5 e6! 10 \( \text{\textit{c3}} \) \( \text{\textit{h4+}} \) 11 g3 \( \text{\textit{xc4}} \), winning a pawn for no compensation at all.

The occupation of space is of significant importance from the very first moves of the game, and is linked in particular with the specific situation in the centre. The occupation of greater space is effective if its seizure is secured by the harmonious coordination of pieces and pawns.

Earlier we illustrated in some detail the structure with a strong pawn pair at d4 and e4 (Nos. 109-112), where Black’s piece pressure was clearly insufficient.

The position for the defending side is even worse if the pawns can be established on the fifth rank (e.g. at d5 and e5), when a crisis situation normally arises.

This is confirmed by the following examples.

No. 125 Gligorić - Schmidt
European Team Ch, Bath, 1973
Grünfeld Defence

1 d4 \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 2 c4 g6 3 \( \text{\textit{c3}} \) d5 4 cd
\( \text{\textit{xd5}} \) 5 e4 \( \text{\textit{x}} \text{\textit{c3}} \) 6 bc \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 7 \( \text{\textit{c4}} \)
c5 8 \( \text{\textit{e2}} \) 0-0 9 0-0 \( \text{\textit{c6}} \) 10 \( \text{\textit{e3}} \) cd
No. 126 Tal-Ghitescu
Miskolc, 1963
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 a6 5 0-0 e7 6 e1 b5 7

No. 127 Letelier-Fischer
Leipzig OL, 1960
King’s Indian Defence

1 d4 f6 2 c4 g6 3 c3 g7 4 e4
0-0

Here White was tempted into seizing space in the centre with gain of tempo.

5 e5 2e8 6 f4(?) d6 7 2e3 c5!

Black acts like a powerful spring. White himself has created an excellent target for his opponent to attack — his advanced pawns, which lack support by their pieces.

8 dc 2c6 9 cd ed 10 2e4 2f5 11 2g3 2e6 12 2f3 2c7 13 2b1 de 14 f5? e4! (the decisive counterattack in the centre) 15 fe ef 16 gf f5! 17 f4 2f6 18 2e2 2fe8 19 2f2 2xe6 20 2e1 2ae8 21 2f3 2xe3 22 2xe3 2xe3 23 2xe3 2xf4+!! 0-1

The problem of both secured, and unsecured seizure of space is typical of many modern opening systems, and determines the development of the corresponding middlegame ideas in Alekhine’s Defence, the Grünfeld Defence, Benoni Defence, and so on.

Consider the following variation of the Modern Benoni:

1 d4 2f6 2 c4 c5 3 d5 e6 4 2c3 ed 5 cd d6 6 e4 g6 7 f4 2g7. What is more advisable for White: to continue his mobilization by 8 2d3 (or first 8 2b5+ 2fd7 9 2d3) and then 0-0 etc., or to go in for the immediate seizure of space by 8 e5!? The latter way is as tempting as it is outwardly energetic, and it naturally touches directly on the problem of secured (or unsecured?!) space.

An answer is given by the following sample variation: 8... 2fd7 (8... de 9 fe 2fd7 10 e6! is weaker) 9 2b5!? (White does not achieve anything by 9 ed 0-0 10 2f3 2f6 followed by ...2e8) 9... de 10 2d6+ 2e7 11 2xc8+ 2xc8 12 2f3 2e8 13 2c4 2b6! 14 d6+ 2f8 15 2b5 2c6 16 0-0 2g8 17 fe 2xe5, and Black has a good game.

Thus the seizure of space by 8 e5?!, although not refutable, appears rather debatable. For this reason the flexible 8 2b5+ 2fd7 9 2d3 is more advisable.

**Space and blockade**

Above we have mainly considered situations where the mobility of the central pawns was not restricted, but often in the opening the position in the centre fairly quickly stabilizes, with one of the sides obtaining a pawn outpost on the fifth rank. In a closed position of this type great importance is assumed by the principle of blockade.

Pawns deployed in the centre have a dual significance. On the one hand, a pawn is a good building material. On the other hand, often it simultaneously blocks
important lines and becomes a serious hindrance to its own pieces. It is here that a blockade situation can arise.

No. 128 Spassky-Fischer
World Championship, 1972
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4  f6 2 c4 e6 3  c3  b4 4 e3 c5 5  d3  c6 6  f3  xc3+ 7 bc d6 8 e4 e5 9 d6  e7 10  h4 h6

Here there followed 11 f4?!  g6! 12  xg6 fg 12 fe(?)

White wrongly forces matters, after which he has an unpromising game. 13 0-0 was better, maintaining the tension on e5 and not allowing Black the important d6 square.

13...de 14  e3 b6 15 0-0 0-0
16 a4? (48)

White fails to sense the danger, and creates a further weakness in his position, taking away an important square from his bishop.

The position becomes completely blocked, which favours Black, who under the ‘cover’ of the white pawns is able to develop his initiative on the K-side.

16...a5 17  b1  d7 18  b2  b8 19  bf2  e7 20  c2 g5! 21  d2  e8 22  e1  g6 23  d3  h5 24  xf8+  xf8 25  xf8+  xf8 26  d1  f4 27  c2  xa4!
0-1

The distinction between the two flanks

Apart from the centre and its periphery there are also two flanks on the chess board — the K-side and Q-side. The character of the play on the two flanks is rather different, and this is clearly felt in the opening stage of the game.

It will have been readily apparent that, in the majority of the examples given, the battle arena quickly became the K-side. Here a role was played both by the ‘fateful’ points f2 and f7, and by the possibility of more rapidly opening up the game.

Let us compare the moves 1 e4 and 1 d4. In openings beginning with 1 e4 it is possible to castle early, and hence one’s mobilization can usually be completed more quickly than after 1 d4. On the other hand, the move 1 d4 immediately gives the game a solid, positional character,
when (as a rule) all the opening problems are solved thoroughly, if more slowly.

There is also a difference in the struggle for the central squares, especially after 1 e4 e5 and 1 d4 d5, with which Black aims to maintain the balance of seizing space in the centre.

However, the further struggle for the centre takes on different forms. It is natural that both sides (and in particular White, as the active side) will try to remove the opponent's central pawn, in order to obtain some advantage in the centre.

In openings with 1 e4 e5 it is comparatively easy to open up the game by d2-d4, since this square is guarded by the queen. But Black too, in turn, has the real possibility of making the central counterblow ... d7-d5.

Incidentally, this rather simple strategy is virtually the main one in a number of classical Open Games, such as: the Scotch Game, Ponziani Opening, Italian Game, Two Knights Defence, and so on.

This is why in these and other Open Games the centre is often very quickly cleared of pawns.

By contrast, after 1 d4 d5 the move e2-e4 (and especially ... e7-e5) is much more difficult to achieve. This explains why in very many variations the centre remains closed for a fairly long time.

After 1 d4 d5 it is much more effective to undermine the centre by c2-c4 (for White) and ... c7-c5 (for Black). For comparison it should be noted that the analogous undermining moves in the 1 e4 e5 openings — f2-f4 (or ... f7-f5) involve much greater difficulties and are normally double-edged. After all, here pawns are advanced in front of the king, which always involves a considerable risk.

It can be concluded that in the opening it is easier to initiate active, and sometimes forcing play on the K-side, whereas the struggle on the Q-side is of a slower, preparatory nature. It would seem to be this that influenced the historical process of opening theory development. Not only the Closed Games, but also systems of this type in the Open Games (with the accent on the Q-side!) began to be investigated much later.

Of course, there is a limit to the logic of these reasonings, and in the Closed Games too there is enormous scope for conducting sharp play, with attacks on the king.

The procedures of play on the K-side have already been shown in a number of examples. Below we will examine certain
characteristic methods in the opening stage of conducting the struggle on the Q-side.

The Q-side as the arena of opening play

At an early stage the fate of a game is comparatively rarely decided by an attack on the Q-side, but at the same time the Q-side often becomes the arena of battle. And quite often one of the sides fairly quickly, when the mobilization of the pieces is far from complete, gains a significant advantage, which later determines the course, and perhaps even the outcome of the game.

This is shown in the following thematic examples.

No. 129 Capablanca-Spielmann  
New York, 1927  
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c3 e6 3 c4 c6 4 c3 g6 5 g5 b4 6 cd ed 7 wa4 c6 11 c2 we7 12 0-0 a6 13 fe1 we6 14 d2! b5 15 wa5! e4? 16 xe4 de 17 a4 xd5 (49) 18 ab!! wg5 (18...b7 19 ba!) 19 xe4 b8 (19...a7 20 b6! xa5 21 ba! xa1 22 xa1 eb6 23 a8eb xa8 24 xa8 leads to a win for White) 20 ba! xa5 21 bc7 b6 22 a7 Bh3 23 eb1 xb1+

24 xb1 f5 25 a3 f4 26 ef 1-0

No. 130 Alekhine–Nimzowitsch  
San Remo, 1930  
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 b4 4 e5 c5 5 d2 e7 6 b5 xd2+ 7 xd2 0-0 8 c3 b6?

A slow plan, allowing White to obtain a solid positional advantage on the Q-side. 8...c6 or 8...f5 was better.

9 f4 a6 10 f3 f7 11 a4 bc6 12 b4! cb 13 cb b7 14 d6 f5? (50)

This conclusively kills off the
possibility of any active play for Black and leads to positional zugzwang. 14. ...a5 was comparatively best.

15 a5! c8 16 xb7 xb7 17 a6! f7 18 b5 e7 19 0-0 h6 20 fc1 fc8 21 c2 e8 22 ac1

Black has ended up in a deadly pin, which in the given case is not only tactical, but also strategical.

22. ...ab8 23 e3 c7 24 c3 d7 25 lc2 f8 26 c1 bc8 27 a4! h5 28 xb5 e8 29 a4 d8 30 h4! 1-0

No. 131 Gheorghiu-Bellon
Las Palmas, 1976
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 e5 2 f3 g6 3 d4 cd 4 xd4 c6 5 c4 g7 6 e3 f6 7 c3 0-0 8 e2 b6 9 0-0 b7 10 f3! d6 11 wd2 wd7 12 a4! e6 13 fd1 fd8 14 xc6 xc6 15 a5! ba 16 b5! a6 17 xd6 e8 18 c5 d7 19 xa5 xb2? (19. ...xd6 20 cd xd6 was the lesser evil) 20 ab1 xd6 21 xd6 xd6 22 cd fd6 23 c7! 1-0

Premature flank operations

In certain cases one of the players aims at an early stage to place the chief emphasis of his strategic action on a flank offensive. In the Closed Games, with a blocked structure in the centre, such plans are possible, especially if the offensive is mounted on the Q-side. But in the majority of cases such strategy meets with a strong counteraction, in the form of an energetic counterblow in the centre.

We will examine several examples which are characteristic in this respect. Thus a typical mistake in this type of situation is the premature release of the central tension, with the ephemeral aim of developing flank operations with the centre unsecured.
No. 133 Lyublinsky-Averbakh
Gorky, 1940
Vienna Game

1 e4 e5 2 c3 c6 3 c4 f6 4 d3 c5 5 f4 d6 6 f3 e7, after which White committed a typical mistake by playing 7 f5?

White’s intention is to transfer the weight of the struggle to the K-side, but things do not come to that. Exploiting White’s premature diversion of his attention from the centre in favour of flank operations, Black is the first to begin active play in the centre and on the Q-side.

7...d4! 8 g5 c6 9 f1 b5 10 b3 b7 (10...a5 is more energetic) 11 x d4 c x d4 12 e2 h6 13 h4 a6 14 d1 d5! 15 c3 b6 16 e3 d6 17 0–0 0–0 0–0–0 18 b1 d7 19 ed cd 20 g3 e7 21 c2 e8 22 d1 c7 23 d4 e4 24 a4 x g3 25 hg c6 26 b4 d6! 27 c2 b7 28 a1 d7!

Black’s advantage has assured real proportions. He threatens ...a5, and 29 ab fails to 29...xb5, winning the exchange.

29 a5 c7 30 b1 b7 31 f4 a7 32 a2 c8 23 af1 b7, and Black obtained a strategically won position.

This example confirms a well known pronouncement by Emanuel Lasker: “White did not stand well enough in the centre to be able to conduct operations on the flanks”. Even more categorical, but perfectly justified here, is Nimzowitsch’s aphorism: “The centre is the dominant principle, the flank the subsidiary one”.

In the following game it was Black who tried at an early stage to attack the enemy king, and by very risky means.

No. 134 Suetin-Bondarevsky
USSR Ch., 1963
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 d6 5 0–0 g5?!

A clever, but hardly justified diversion on the K-side. It is possible that in the event of slow play by White such as 6 c3 g4 7 e1 g7 followed by ...h5 Black would have succeeded in obtaining real counterplay. But White finds a strong counter, consisting in energetic action in the centre.

6 d4! g4 (after 6...b5 7 b3 g4 8 g5 h6 9 d5! Black’s position is very difficult) 7 x c6+ bc 8 e1 ed 9 x d4 f6 10 a4!

This queen manœuvre, together with White’s 12th move, emphasizes Black’s opening difficulties.

10...e7 11 c3 d7 12 a5!

Completing the queen manœuvre; to avoid loss of material Black has to give up the right to
castle.

12. ...d8 13 d3 g7 14 e5!
And now the time is ripe for this breakthrough in the centre. Bad is 14...de 15 c5, when the threat of d1 cannot be parried.

14. ...f5 15 e1 d5
15. ...g6 was comparatively best, when I was intending 16 e4! x e5 17 x e5 x e5 18 b4!, and White’s attack is very dangerous.

16 e2 g6 17 g3 e6 18 g5+ c8 19 c5 e8 20 h5!
Let us dwell here on the following feature. It is clear that White has a completely won position, and yet, out of the 20 moves made by him, 11 have been by his queen and knights! The point is that Black chose a fanciful plan with 5...g5, and the only way to refute this was by unusual, very determined means. In the given case the only way to punish the opponent for his dubious experiment was by energetic queen and knight manoeuvres.

20. ...g8 21 x g7 x g7 22 x a6 a7 23 e3 x a6 24 x a6+ d8 25 g5+ e7 26 f6 g6 27 a4 c8 28 d3 d7 29 a5 b7 30 b4 g8 31 c4 e6 32 d4 e8 33 b5 cb 34 cb e7 35 c5 d7 36 e1 1-0

Against a flank diversion — a counterblow in the centre

In reply to a flank diversion at an early stage of the game it is often expedient to make an effective counterblow in the centre. It will sometimes be sharp and tactical, demanding deep calculation, imagination and great energy. This classical procedure of a pawn counterblow in the centre in reply to a flank attack remains unshakable and is constantly being enriched by new forms.

We give a game in which this procedure was employed at an early stage.

No. 135 Neegard—Simagin
Corr., 1964

51

White has begun a pawn offensive on the K-side, relying on the solidity of his central formation. And yet Black finds an effective way of opening up the game.
Basic spatial factors

16...b5! 17 cb d5!! 18 ed e4!
Black gains the chance to mount a very strong attack on the white king.

19 ♘xe4 (19 fe ♙e5!) 19...♘xg4 20 ♑f4
Black also has dangerous threats after 20 ♘xg4 ♘xe3 21 ♙f2 ♙c5

20...♗h5 21 ♙f2 ♙e5 22 ♙g2 ♙d6 23 ♙a4 ♘c8 24 ♙d2 ♙f6
All the black pieces are participating in the attack. White’s position is hopeless.

25 ♙g5 ♙f5 26 ♙f4 ♙xf3 27 ♙h3 ♙g4 28 ♙g2 ♙c2! 0-1

No. 136 Botvinnik-Schmid
Leipzig OL, 1960
Benoni Defence

1 d4 c5 2 d5 d6 3 e4 g6 4 ♙f3 ♙g7 5 ♙e2 ♙f6 6 ♙c3 ♙a6 7 0-0 ♙c7 8 a4 a6 9 ♙d2! ♙d7 10 ♙c4 b5 (52)

Black appears to have a good position in view of his healthy Q-side pawn phalanx, but the following pawn thrust in the centre clarifies the situation.

11 e5!
An essential, and at the same time highly effective plan. White begins a swift attack in the centre, taking into account the insecure position of the black king.

11...de (White’s advantage is also obvious after 11...bc 12 ef ♙xh6 13 ♙h6!) 12 ab ab (12...♗xh5 is slightly better) 13 ♙xh5 ♙xh5 14 ♙xh5 b4 15 d6!

Black’s centre is on the point of collapse, and it is to here that the main weight of the struggle transfers. Black’s successes on the Q-side prove short-lived.

15...bc
15...ed 15 ♙xh6 bc 17 ♙f3 ♙a6 18 ♙c6! etc. is also bad.

16 dc ♙c8 17 ♙f4 cb 18 ♙xh6 ♙xh6 19 ♙b5 ♙d4 20 c3 e5 21 cd ef 22 ♙xe6+ ♙xh6 23 ♙e2+ ♙f8 24 ♙e5 ♙g8 25 ♙b1, and White soon won.

Here are some further examples.

No. 137 Spassky-Schmid
Varna OL, 1962
Benoni Defence

1 d4 c5 2 d5 d6 3 e4 g6 4 ♙f3 ♙g7 5 ♙e2 ♙f6 6 ♙c3 ♙a6 7 0-0 ♙c7 8 ♙e1 0-0 9 a4 a6 10 ♙g5 h6 11 ♙f4 ♙d7 12 ♙d2 b5? 13 e5! de
14 \(axe5\) b4 15 \(\mathbb{N}xf6\) \(\mathbb{N}xf6\) 16 \(\mathbb{Q}e4\) \\
\(\mathbb{Q}g7\) 17 \(\mathbb{Q}xc5\) \(\mathbb{Q}xb2\) 18 \(\mathbb{Q}ad1\) \(\mathbb{Q}f5\) \(\text{(18} .. \mathbb{Q}c3 \ 19 \mathbb{Q}h6, \text{with the strong threat of} \ \mathbb{Q}g5)\) 19 \(\mathbb{Q}xh6\) \\
\(\mathbb{Q}g7\) 20 \(\mathbb{Q}h4!\) \(\mathbb{Q}d6\) 21 \(\mathbb{Q}g5\) \(\mathbb{Q}fe8\) 22 \\
\(\mathbb{Q}d3!\) \(\mathbb{Q}xc5\) 23 \(\mathbb{Q}xf5\) \(\mathbb{Q}xd5\) 24 \\
\(\mathbb{Q}e6!\) 1-0

No. 138 Spassky-Mikenas
USSR Ch, Riga, 1959
Albin Counter-Gambit

1 \(d4\) \(d5\) 2 \(c4\) \(e5\) 3 \(\mathbb{Q}d4\) 4 \(e4\) \(\mathbb{Q}c6\) \\
5 \(f4\) \(g5?\) 6 \(\mathbb{Q}xe5\) 7 \(\mathbb{Q}f3\) \(\mathbb{Q}b4+?\) 8 \\
\(\mathbb{Q}bd2\) \(\mathbb{Q}c6\) 9 \(\mathbb{Q}d3\) \(g4\) 10 \(0-0!\) \(gf11\) \\
\(\mathbb{Q}xf3\) \(\mathbb{Q}d6\) 12 \(e5\) \(\mathbb{Q}xe5\) 13 \(\mathbb{Q}e1\) \(f6\) \\
14 \(c5!\) \(\mathbb{Q}e7\)

After 14 .. \(\mathbb{Q}xc5\) 15 \(\mathbb{Q}xe5\) \(fe\) \\
16 \(\mathbb{Q}xe5+\) \(\mathbb{Q}e7\) 17 \(\mathbb{Q}h5+\) \(\mathbb{Q}d7\) 18 \\
\(\mathbb{Q}b5+\) \(c6\) 19 \(\mathbb{Q}d5+!\) \(\mathbb{Q}d6\) 20 \(\mathbb{Q}f4\) \\
White wins by force.

15 \(\mathbb{Q}xe5\) \(fe\) 16 \(\mathbb{Q}xe5\) \(\mathbb{Q}f6\) 17 \\
\(\mathbb{Q}g5\) 0-0 18 \(\mathbb{Q}b3+\) \(\mathbb{Q}h8\) 19 \(\mathbb{Q}ae1\) \\
\(\mathbb{Q}xc5\) 20 \(\mathbb{Q}xc5\) \(\mathbb{Q}d6\) 21 \(\mathbb{Q}ce5\) \(\mathbb{Q}g4\) \\
22 \(\mathbb{Q}f4\) \(\mathbb{Q}d7\) 23 \(\mathbb{Q}g3\) \(\mathbb{Q}c6\) 24 \(\mathbb{Q}e5e4\) \\
1-0

No. 139 Averbakh-Aronin
Riga, 1954
King's Indian Defence

1 \(d4\) \(\mathbb{Q}f6\) 2 \(c4\) \(g6\) 3 \(\mathbb{Q}c3\) \(\mathbb{Q}g7\) 4 \(e4\) \\
\(d6\) 5 \(\mathbb{Q}e2\) 0-0 6 \(\mathbb{Q}g5\) \(c5\) 7 \(d5\) \(h6\) 8 \\
\(\mathbb{Q}f4\) \(\mathbb{Q}bd7?\) \(\text{(8} .. \mathbb{Q}e6!\) is correct, \\
and if 9 \(\mathbb{Q}d4\) \(\mathbb{Q}xe6\) 10 \(\mathbb{Q}xd6\) \(\mathbb{Q}e8\) \\
11 \(\mathbb{Q}xc5\) \(\mathbb{Q}a5\), when Black has a \\
strong counterattack) 9 \(\mathbb{Q}f3\) \(\mathbb{Q}g4\) \\
10 \(\mathbb{Q}d2\) \(\mathbb{Q}h7\) 11 \(\mathbb{Q}g3\) \(\mathbb{Q}ge5\) 12 \\
\(\mathbb{Q}xe5\) \(\mathbb{Q}xe5\) 13 \(f4\) \(\mathbb{Q}d4\) 14 \(\mathbb{Q}b5\) \\
\(\mathbb{Q}f6\) 15 0-0 \(g5?\)

Black has played the opening badly, and now, in trying forcibly 
create active play on the 
K-side, he quickly ends up in a 
lost position. The lesser evil was 
15 .. \(a6\) 16 \(\mathbb{Q}c3\) \(\mathbb{Q}d4+\) 17 \(\mathbb{Q}h1\) \\
e5!?

16 \(e5!\) \(de\) \(\text{(16} .. \mathbb{Q}gf\) 17 \(ef\) \(fg\) 18 \\
\(\mathbb{Q}d3+\) is bad for Black) 17 \(fg\) \\
\(\mathbb{Q}xg5\) 18 \(\mathbb{Q}d3+\) \(\mathbb{Q}g7\) 19 \(\mathbb{Q}e2\) \(\mathbb{Q}h8\) \\
20 \(\mathbb{Q}d6\) \(e6\) 21 \(\mathbb{Q}c7\) \(\mathbb{Q}b8\) 22 \(\mathbb{Q}xf7+!\) \\
1-0

Often, if the opponent’s king 
is in the centre and he engages in early flank operations, there 
follows an explosive, sacrificial 
attack in the centre, aimed at the king. Here are two characteristic 
games, which are similar not 
only outwardly.

No. 140 Alekhine-Böök
Margate, 1938
Queen's Gambit Accepted

1 \(d4\) \(d5\) 2 \(c4\) \(dc\) 3 \(\mathbb{Q}f3\) \(\mathbb{Q}f6\) 4 \(e3\) \\
e6 5 \(\mathbb{Q}xc4\) \(c5\) 6 0-0 \(\mathbb{Q}c6\) 7 \(\mathbb{Q}e2\) \(a6\) 8 \\
\(\mathbb{Q}c3\) \(\mathbb{Q}b5\) 9 \(\mathbb{Q}b3\) \(\mathbb{Q}b4\)? 10 \(d5!\) \(\mathbb{Q}a5\) (10 \\
.. \(ed\) 11 \(\mathbb{Q}xd5\) \(\mathbb{Q}xd5\) 12 \(\mathbb{Q}dl\!\) \\
\(\mathbb{Q}e6\) 13 \(e4\) or 10 .. \(bc\) 11 \(\mathbb{Q}a4\) \\
\(\mathbb{Q}xd5\) 12 \(e4\) (also favours White) \\
11 \(\mathbb{Q}a4+\) \(\mathbb{Q}d7\) 12 \(de\) \(fe\) 13 \(\mathbb{Q}d1!\) \(bc\) \\
14 \(\mathbb{Q}xd7!\) \(\mathbb{Q}xd7\) 15 \(\mathbb{Q}e5\) \(\mathbb{Q}a7\) 16 \(bc\) \\
\(\mathbb{Q}e7\) 17 \(e4!\) \(\mathbb{Q}f6\) 18 \(\mathbb{Q}g5\) \(\mathbb{Q}c7\) 19 \\
\(\mathbb{Q}f4\) \(\mathbb{Q}b6\)

A pretty variation would have 
resulted after 19 .. \(\mathbb{Q}b7\) 20 \(\mathbb{Q}e3!\) \\
\(\mathbb{Q}d8\) 21 \(\mathbb{Q}d3+\) \(\mathbb{Q}c8\) 22 \(\mathbb{Q}b1\) \(\mathbb{Q}xe4\)
23 $\text{f7!!}$ etc.

No. 141
Taimanov-Polugayevsky
USSR Ch., 1960
Queen's Gambit Accepted

1 d4 d5 2 c4 dc 3 $\text{f3} \text{f6}$ 4 $\text{a4+} \text{bd7} 5 \text{c3} e6 6 e4 c5 7 d5!
ed 8 e5! d4 9 $\text{xc4} dc 10 \text{ef6} 11 \text{g5} \text{c6} 12 0-0-0! (53)

12...$\text{cb+}$ (after 12...$\text{xc4} 13 \text{he1+} \text{e7} 14 \text{xe7+} \text{f8} 15$
\text{xf7+} \text{e8} 16 \text{e1+} \text{e5} 17$
\text{xe5}$ or 15...$\text{g8} 16 \text{xf7}$+$ \text{f7} 18 \text{e5}+$
White wins prettily) 13 $\text{xb2}$
\text{e7} 14 $\text{he1!} f6 15 \text{b5} \text{b6} 16$
$\text{c1} \text{fg} 17 \text{xd7+} \text{f8}$ 18 $\text{xe7!}$
\text{xe7} 19 $\text{f5+} \text{e7} 21$
\text{e5+} \text{f7} 22 \text{g5+}!$, and wins.

No. 142 Spassky-Suetin
USSR Spartakiad, 1963
Queen's Gambit Accepted

1 d4 d5 2 c4 dc 3 $\text{f3} \text{f6}$ 4 e3 $\text{e6}$ 5 $\text{xc4} c5 6 0-0 a6 7 $\text{e2} b5$ 8
$\text{b3} \text{b7}$ 9 $\text{d1} \text{bd7}$ 10 $\text{c3}$
$\text{c7?!}$ 11 e4 $\text{cd} 12 \text{e5?}$ (a mistake; 12 $\text{d5?!}$ or 12 $\text{xd4}$ is better)
12...dc 13 ef $\text{xf6}$ 14 $\text{e5} \text{c5}$!
15 $\text{f4} \text{b6}$ 16 $\text{xf7}?!$ 0-0
(16...$\text{xf7}?!$ 17 $\text{d6}!!$ wins for
White) 17 $\text{g5}$ (17 $\text{d6}$ was the lesser evil) 17...cb 18 $\text{ab1}$
$\text{ae8}$ 19 $\text{xb2} \text{wc6}$ 20 $\text{f3} \text{e4}$
21 $\text{g3} \text{c3}$ 22 $\text{wd3} \text{xd1}$ 23
$\text{xd1} \text{d8}$ 24 $\text{e2} \text{e4}!$, and
Black soon won.

Thus a strong and solid centre
is a secure guarantee against
flank diversions. At the same
time, control of the centre assists
the mounting of an attack on the
flank (examples Nos. 109-112).
Pawn Weaknesses

The pawn formation determines the course of play to a considerable degree. Many opening positions, where organic defects occur in the pawn formation (isolated, doubled or backward pawns), are considered unsatisfactory, and the variations leading to them have been rejected by theory.

In such situations it is not only the pawns which are weak, but also the squares in front of them, the latter providing excellent invasion points for the opponent’s pieces.

Organic pawn weaknesses in the opponent’s position are a considerable assistance to the long-term active deployment of the forces. In this respect the following variation of the English Opening is instructive: 1 c4 e5 2 d4 c6 3 d5 a6 4 c4 d5 5 e5 f3 6 a4 a5 7 b5 g6 8 a4 d6 9 de de 10 d6 g7 11 g5 e5 12 xe5+ xe5 13 xg6 f3 14 c6 bc (54), where Black’s pawn formation is completely unsatisfactory.

![Diagram](image)

In the above examples the
weakness of one side’s pawn formation had a significant influence on the course and the assessment of the opening struggle. However, it should be mentioned that, in modern times, pawn weaknesses in the opening are assessed only taking account of the overall coordination of the forces.

If they are compensated by an active or harmonious deployment of the pieces, pawn weaknesses are admissible in many topical opening systems.

Let us return to the structure with double pawns. As was seen, if in addition they form a separate pawn island, these pawns constitute a significant positional weakness. But in a number of modern opening systems one of the players allows the doubling of his pawns in the centre or on the flank (most often on the c-file), with the aim of controlling important squares in the centre, which in certain cases assists their occupation by pieces (and no less often facilitates the setting-up of a pawn centre, cf. No. 109, for example).

In this respect the following example is instructive.

No. 143 Botvinnik-Kan
USSR Ch., 1939
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4 ¤f6 2 c4 e6 3 ¤c3 ¤b4 4 ¤f3 c5 5 a3 ¤xc3+ 6 bc ¤a5 7 ¤d2 ¤e4 8 ¤c2 ¤xd2 9 ¤xd2 d6
10 e3 e5 11 de de

A highly noteworthy structure in the centre has resulted, where in the given instance White’s doubled pawns on the c-file constitute not a weakness, but a real strength. The point is that in Black’s position there is a serious weakness at d5, and for White to occupy it securely he will have to advance his pawn from e3 to e4. In this case the doubled c3 pawn, preventing Black in turn from becoming established at d4, will be a reliable guard of this square.

12 ¤d3 h6 13 0–0 0–0 14 f4! (55)

What, one might ask, could have been simpler and more natural than the immediate transfer of the knight to d5: 14 e4 ¤c6
15 \( \text{Af1} \) \( \text{Ae6} \) 16 \( \text{Af1} \) \( \text{Ad8} \) 17 \( \text{Ae3} \). But after 17...\( \text{Ae7} \)? 18 \( \text{Ad5(?) Axd5!} \) followed by the transfer of the knight to \( \text{d6} \), the advantage could even have passed to \( \text{Black} \). Therefore \( \text{White} \), for the moment keeping his main strategic idea a secret, makes use of another trump — his lead in development. To exploit this factor it is favourable for him to open up the game, and this is assisted by his last move.

14...\( \text{Ad7} \) (14...\( \text{ef} \) 15 \( \text{ef} \) would have merely assisted \( \text{White's plan} \)) 15 \( \text{f5 Axf6(?)} \) (15...\( \text{f6} \) was better) 16 \( \text{Ae4!} \).

The exchange of knights favours \( \text{White} \), since after it his bishop establishes itself on the critical \( \text{d5 square} \).

16...\( \text{Ad8} \) 17 \( \text{Axf6+ Axf6} \) 18 \( \text{Ae4 Ab8} \) 19 \( \text{Ad1 b6} \) 20 \( \text{h3 Aa6} \) 21 \( \text{Ad5 b5} \) 22 \( \text{cb Axb5} \) 23 \( \text{c4 with an obvious advantage to \( \text{White} \).} \)

The following example is also of interest.

**No. 144 Aronin-Suetin**  
RSFSR Ch., 1953  
**Spanish Game**

1 \( \text{e4 e5} \) 2 \( \text{Af3 Ac6} \) 3 \( \text{Ab5 a6} \) 4 \( \text{Aa4 d6} \) 5 \( \text{Axc6+ bc} \) 6 \( \text{d4 f6} \) 7 \( \text{Ac3 d7} \) 8 \( \text{Ae3 Ae7} \) 9 de de 10 0-0 0-0 11 \( \text{wd3 Ad6} \) 12 \( \text{Af1 Ae7} \) 13 \( \text{Ac4 Ab7} \) 14 \( \text{Aa4 c5} \) 15 \( \text{Ag5 We8} \) 16 \( \text{Ah4 We6!?} \) (56)

At first sight this seems anti-positional, since to go with his pawn weaknesses on the Q-side Black allows a serious worsening of his central pawn formation. But in doing so he has taken account of the specific possibilities of piece play, and in particular the establishment of his knight on the strong outpost at \( \text{d4} \).

17 \( \text{Xxe6 fe} \) 18 \( \text{Ac3 Ab8!} \) (an essential part of an important manoeuvre, aimed at invading with the knight at \( \text{d4} \)) 19 \( \text{Af3 Ac6} \) 20 \( \text{Ad2 Ad4} \) 21 \( \text{Bd1 d7} \) 22 \( \text{Ae4 a5} \) 23 \( \text{dd2 a4} \) 24 \( \text{b3 Ab6} \) 25 \( \text{Ae3 ab2} \) 26 \( \text{cb Axc4} \) 27 \( \text{bc c6!} \)

A remarkable position. If all the pieces were to be removed from the board, Black's formation would be hopeless, but in this complex 'semi-middle-game' the pawn defects are of secondary importance, and even help Black to occupy important points in the centre.

28 \( \text{Bb2 Bfa7} \) 29 \( \text{a4 Aa7} \) 30 \( \text{Aa1 Aa5} \) 31 \( \text{Aa1 Ab4} \) 32 \( \text{Axd4 ed} \) 33 \( \text{Ba2 d3!} \) (otherwise \( \text{A1-b2-d3} \))
34 a5 \(\text{d}8\) 35 f3 \(\text{d}4\) 36 \(\text{e}3\) \(\text{c}3\) 37 \(\text{b}1\) \(\text{x}a5\), and Black achieved an obvious superiority in the ending.

Thus the modern interpretation of pawn weaknesses in the centre is basically dialectical, i.e. they are admissible if they are compensated by the dynamics of the position.

**Pawn chains and their mobility**

Both in the opening and in the middlegame, pawn phalanxes are a very important offensive force in the seizure of space. Their advance creates scope for the pieces, and at the same time restricts the mobility of the opponent’s forces. In the majority of closed set-ups there is no other way of breaking up the opponent’s defences.

We give one of the typical plans of a Q-side pawn offensive.

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**No. 145 Geller-Bondarevsky**  
USSR Ch., 1963  
*Spanish Game*

1 e4 e5 2 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 3 \(\text{b}5\) a6 4 \(\text{a}4\) d6 5 0-0 \(\text{d}7\) 6 d4 \(\text{g}7\) 7 d5 \(\text{b}8\) 8 c4 \(\text{g}6\) 9 \(\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 10 \(\text{b}d2\) 0-0

Exploiting his spatial advantage on the Q-side, White begins a purposeful offensive on that part of the board.

11 b4 c5

Black does not wish to remain passive in anticipation of the c4-c5-c6 breakthrough. But now he is saddled with a weakness on the half open b-file, and the d5 pawn gains in strength.

12 bxc5 dc 13 \(\text{x}d7\) \(\text{x}d7\) 14 a4 a5 15 \(\text{b}1\) b6 16 \(\text{h}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 17 \(\text{b}1\) \(\text{b}8\) 18 \(\text{b}2\) \(\text{c}7\) 19 \(\text{b}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 20 \(\text{c}2\) \(\text{e}8\) h6 21 \(\text{f}1\) \(\text{f}4\) 22 \(\text{d}1\) \(\text{d}6\) 23 \(\text{c}1\) g6 24 \(\text{e}3\) \(\text{h}7\) 25 g3 \(\text{h}5\) 26 \(\text{g}4\)

White has achieved an obvious superiority on both wings.

26 ...f5?! 27 \(\text{x}h6\) f4 28 \(\text{g}4\) \(\text{b}8\) 29 \(\text{g}2\) \(\text{d}8\) 30 \(\text{b}2\) g5 31 \(\text{b}d3\) \(\text{g}6\) 32 \(\text{c}3\) \(\text{h}f6\) 33 \(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 34 h3 \(\text{h}8\) 35 \(\text{h}2\) \(\text{e}7\) 36 \(\text{g}1\) fg 37 fg \(\text{f}6\) 38 \(\text{f}1\), and White confidently realized his advantage.

In modern opening strategy the mobility of pawn chains has broad significance and takes on a rich variety of forms. To a great extent this determines the promise (or lack of promise) of this or that opening system. It is no accident that variations such as the following have disappeared from the scene: 1 e4 e5 2 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 3 \(\text{c}3\) \(\text{c}5\) 4 d3 d6 5 \(\text{c}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 6 \(\text{e}3\) \(\text{b}6\) 7 h3 \(\text{e}6\) 8 \(\text{b}3\) 0-0, or 1 e4 e5 2 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 3 \(\text{c}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 4 \(\text{b}5\) \(\text{b}4\) 6 0-0 0-0 d3 d6 8 \(\text{e}2\) \(\text{e}7\). For the creation of active
plans there is scope in them neither in the centre, nor on the flanks, mainly because the pawn phalanxes of both sides are frozen.

For comparison, we give a relatively new system in the English Opening: 1 c4 \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 2 \( \text{\textit{c3}} \) g6 3 g3 \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 4 \( \text{\textit{g2}} \) 0-0 5 e4 d6 6 \( \text{\textit{ge2}} \) c5 7 d3 \( \text{\textit{c6}} \).

Although White's formation in the centre looks rather modest, and he has even allowed the creation of a weak square at d4, his position is promising, since he has a highly mobile pawn phalanx both on the Q-side, and on the K-side, where depending on circumstances he can begin a pawn storm, e.g. by a2-a3 and b4-b4, or by h2-h3, f2-f4-f5 and g3-g4 etc.

Also typical is the following example, where by purely strategic methods White quickly punished his opponent for routine play.

No. 146
Botvinnik–Shcherbakov
USSR Ch., 1955
English Opening

1 c4 \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 2 \( \text{\textit{c3}} \) g6 3 g3 \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 4 \( \text{\textit{g2}} \) 0-0 5 e4 d6 6 \( \text{\textit{ge2}} \) e5(?) (6...\text{c5}) 7 0-0 \( \text{\textit{bd7}} \) 8 d3! \( \text{\textit{ec5}} \) 9 f4! c6 10 h3 \( \text{\textit{e6}} \) 11 f5 \( \text{\textit{d4}} \) 12 g4 \( \text{\textit{d8}} \) 13 \( \text{\textit{e3}} \) a6 14 \( \text{\textit{d2}} \) b5 15 \( \text{\textit{g5}} \) \( \text{\textit{f6}} \)? (57)

15...\text{f6} was more tenacious.

16 \( \text{\textit{xf6}} \) \( \text{\textit{xf6}} \) 17 \( \text{\textit{d4}} \) ed 18 \( \text{\textit{e2}} \) \( \text{\textit{b6}} \) 19 \( \text{\textit{cb}} \) \( \text{\textit{ab}} \) 20 \( \text{\textit{h6!}} \) \( \text{\textit{d7}} \) 21 g5 \( \text{\textit{h5}} \) 22 \( \text{\textit{f4}} \) \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 23 f6! 1-0

It has been repeatedly stated that in the opening one should avoid superfluous pawn moves. But the modern forms of opening struggle are so diverse that they cannot be encompassed by a single set of rules, however specific!

In certain variations, where the central structure is blocked, truly paradoxical situations are possible, in which practically pawns alone are moved in the opening.

Instructive in this respect is a variation of the Caro-Kann Defence — 1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 e5 \( \text{\textit{f5}} \)! 4 h4!? , which was introduced by Tal and successfully employed by him in a number of games, including some from his 1961 match with Botvinnik.

The following game is also of interest.
No. 147 Tal-Bagirov
29th USSR Ch., 1961
Caro-Kann Defence

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 e5 f5 4 h4 h6
Bad, of course, is 4...e6? 5 g4 when Black loses a piece, but
4...h5 comes into consideration, blocking White’s im-
iminent pawn offensive.

5 g4! d7 (5...h7? 6 e6!) 6 h5

The advance of the white pawns is by no means a conse-
quence of recklessness or impulse, but is a well thought-out
plan. White takes control of the

important squares f5 and g6, hindering Black’s expedient mobiliza-
ation. Thus the knight at g8 can
no longer be manœuvred to f5 or
g6 via e7.

6...c5 7 c3 e6 8 f4! b6

As can be seen, up till now
White has moved only pawns,
and despite this he has obtained
the more promising position. It
unexpectedly transpires that
Black has been squeezed into a
smaller amount of space and is
obliged to defend for a long
time.

9 f3 c6 10 h3 (58)

The pawns have done their
important work, and now
White’s pieces come into play. Under cover of the powerful
pawn screen they can immedi-
ately choose for themselves the
most active posts. Thus at h3 the
bishop is best placed to support
the preparation of the f4-f5
breakthrough.

10...cd

Releasing the tension in the
centre favours White (for the
umpteenth time!). 10...ge7
was preferable.

11 cd f6 12 c3 0-0-0 13 0-0
ge7 14 a4 c7 15 c5 b6

15...xd4 16 xd4 f5 17
gf! xc5 18 fe xd4+ 19 xd4
favours White.

16 d3 f5 17 e3 b8 18 h4
fg 19 xg4 f5 20 xf5 ef 21
c1

The outcome of the opening
is clearly favourable to White.

The blocking of pawn chains

In principle, every active
pawn unit of the opponent’s
should be opposed by one of
your own, to prevent him from
setting up a powerful pawn
phalanx. This was shown in the examples of various mobile pawn centres, where, in a narrower and at the same time specific sense, it was essentially the same logic which applied.

In a number of cases the blocking of pawn chains is initially carried out in the most natural way, using the simplest 'building material'—pawns.

We give a simple example to confirm this: 1 e4 e5 2 d3 d6 3 c4 c5 4 c3 d5 5 d4 ed 6 cd b4+ 7 d2 d2+ 8 b2 d5! etc. By this timely advance Black breaks up the 'ideal' white centre. After 9 ed d5 he continues ... e7 and ...c6, securely fixing White's central pawn and creating strong piece pressure on the centre.

And now let us consider a more modern system in the English Opening:

**No. 148 Holmov-Boleslavsky**

**USSR Ch., 1957**

**English Opening**

1 c4 f6 2 c3 g6 3 g3 g7 4 g2 0-0 5 e4 d6 6 c2 c5 7 0-0 d5 (59)

As has already been mentioned, in this system White has available the strategic threat of a pawn storm both on the Q-side, and in some cases on the K-side.

8 b1 e8 9 a3 c7 10 b4 e6 11 d3 b8 12 d5! ed 13 x4 d4 d4 14 g5 e8 15 d2 b6 16 f1 f6 17 e3 d7 18 b5 e6 19 c3 f5 20 f4! f6 21 a4 f3+ 22 x3 x3 23 e5!, and White retained a persistent initiative.

In this example Black based his counterplay on exploiting the slight weakness of the d4 square, but this plan is not altogether correct. In the given situation Black should first and foremost neutralize White's offensive on the Q-side, and with this aim after 8 b1 he should have already been thinking of how to put a timely check on the advance of the white pawns. For this he should have continued 8...a6! 9 a3 b8 10 b4 cb 11 ab b5! 12 cb ab, halting White's Q-side offensive and gaining equal chances.

In many cases, especially in modern games, the problem of blocking a pawn chain is closely linked with timely prophylactic measures. After all, often a pawn
phalanx arises (or a pawn phalanx of the opponent’s is destroyed) suddenly, by tactical means.

Thus after 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 c4 c6 4 d5 d6 5 dc3 df6 6 de2 0-0 the natural move 7 df3? allows a sharp counter on the Q-side — 7...b5, when unexpectedly the black Q-side pawns become active and advance energetically. It transpires that the variations 8 dxb5 dxe4 or 8 dxb5 dxe4! 9 dcxe4 dxa5 + 10 dc3 dcx3 + 11 bc db5 are favourable to Black, who has destroyed White’s centre. And the alternative of gaining a pawn phalanx on the Q-side, if White does not force matters, is also advantageous to Black.

White’s mistake was that he failed to take prophylactic measures against this counteroffensive. Instead of 7 df3 he should have played 7 a4!, radically preventing...b5.

Such an ‘explosive’ pawn wave occurs more rarely on the K-side.

In this respect the following example appears paradoxical, but I fancy that this will help the reader to remember it.

No. 149 Sakharov-Petrosian
Kiev, 1957
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 cc3 cb4 4 e5
c5 5 dc2 de7 6 a3 dc3 7 dx3
cd 8 ßxd4 df5 9 ßg4

There seemed to be no portent of danger for White after this natural move, since if 9...h5 10 ßf4. But suddenly there followed:

9...g5! 10 cb5+ cc6 12 ßd2
d4 13 cb4 ßd5

Black’s pawn offensive has enabled him to assume a dominating position in the centre and to gain a clear lead in development, whereas here the ‘weakening’ of his pawn phalanx is not at all a reality.

14 ße2 ßxg2 15 ßf3 ßxf3 16
dx3 de7 17 ßxg5 ße5 18
dx7+ ßx7 19 0-0-0 a5 20 dx2
d8, and Black already has a winning position.

Since that time 9 ßg4 has not been played. White prudently prefers to play 9 ßf4, avoiding such a plan by Black.

Modern methods of halting pawn offensives are very diverse. But this is rather a middlegame theme, and will be mentioned in Part II of the book, where certain positional elements will be examined, in particular the mounting of breakthroughs at important points, flank pawn
storms, pawn ‘wedges’ and so on.

**The coordination of pieces and pawns at the start of the game**

In the initial stage of the game the coordination of the forces merely begins to take shape, there being a large number of pieces and pawns on the board. At this stage the connection between pawn chains and the pieces acquires considerable importance. Pawn chains can both complement the actions of the pieces, and also restrict them.

In cases where the pawns of one player restrict the actions of his pieces, the coordination of his forces is destroyed. This happens if a pawn chain is fixed on squares of one colour and restrict the mobility of his bishop. Especially if it is deployed behind his pawns, as in the following example.

No. 150 Schlechter-John
Barmen, 1905
*Dutch Defence*

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 ♞c3 f5 4 ♞f3
c6 5 ♞f4 ♞d6 6 e3 ♞f6 7 ♞d3 ♞c7

Taking account of the fact that Black’s c6-d5-e6-f5 pawn chain is fixed on light squares, Schlechter consistently plays for the ‘suffocation’ of the c8 bishop.

8 g3! 0-0 9 0-0 ♞e4 10 ♞b3
♞h8 11 ♞ac1 ♞xf4 12 ef ♞f7 13
♞e5 ♞e7 14 ♞xe4! fe 15 f3! ef 16
♞ce1 ♞c7 17 ♞a3

White has successfully carried out his opening plan, exchanging the dark-square bishops and establishing control of the dark squares. As a result Black’s light-square bishop is without prospects, and this soon leads to a general ‘paralysis’ in the coordination of his forces.

17...g8 18 ♞xf3 ♞a6 19 b3
♞d8 20 c5 ♞c7 21 ♞b2 ♞d7 22
♞c2 ♞e7 23 ♞ef1 ♞ae8 24 g4 ♞c8
25 ♞h3!

An instructive point. White provokes...g6, which conclusively weakens the dark squares in Black’s position.

25...g6 26 b4! ♞f6 27 ♞h3
♞e7 28 a4 a6 29 ♞d1 ♞g7 30 ♞e3
♞e7 31 g5 ♞d7 32 ♞d3 ♞g4 ♞e8 33
♞h6+ ♞h8 34 ♞e2 ♞d8 35 ♞eg4
♞d7 36 ♞e5 ♞e8 37 ♞h3 ♞c7 38
♞f6! ♞xe5 39 fe ♞e7 40 ♞h3
♞xf6 41 ♞xf6 ♞xf6 42 ef ♞e8 43
♞f7+ ♞g8 44 ♞e5 ♞d8 45 ♞g2
♞f8 46 h4 ♞e8 47 ♞f3 ♞f7 48 ♞f4
♞e8 49 ♞b1 ♞f8 50 b5! 1-0

On the other hand, the pieces should on no account restrict pawn advances, which are very important in the struggle for
control of space, provided of course that they are supported by pieces. Therefore an attempt in the opening to retain without fail an unweakened pawn formation is often incorrect.

To illustrate this we give an instructive game.

No. 151 Smyslov-Suetin
USSR Ch., 1952
Catalan Opening

1 e4 c5 2 g3 d5 3 Qg2 Qf6 4 Qf3
dc 5 Qa4+ Qd7 6 Qxc4 Qc6 7
Qc2 Qbd7 8 0-0 e5 9 Qc3 Qc5 10
d3 0-0 11 e4!?

This move shows that White is planning a pawn offensive in the centre.

Although Black’s pieces are well developed, he is clearly short of pawn material in the battle for the central squares, and his bishops are restricting the mobility of his important c-pawn.

11...Qe8 12 Qe3 Qe7 13 Qac1
Qad8!

Black fails to sense the danger. He should have relieved the tension by 13...Qxe3 14 fe Qg4
15 Qe2 Qad8, maintaining a defensible position.

14 Qh4 Qf8 15 Qf5 Qb6 16 a3
Qg4 (now after 16...Qxe3 17
Qxe3 Qc5 White has the unpleasant 18 Qcd5) 17 Qxb6
Qxb6 18 h3 Qf6 19 f4!

And now comes the second stage of the pawn offensive. The avalanche of white pawns advances inexorably.

19...Qe6 20 gf g6 21 Qg3 Qc5+
22 Qh2 Qg7 23 h4 Qd4 24 Qf3 a6
25 Qce2 Qd7 26 Qb2 Qe7 27 Qd4
Qg8 28 Qxc6 bc 29 Qxc6 Qd6 30
Qc2 Qd7 31 Qf1 h5 32 Qg2 Qh7
33 e5 Qfd5 34 Qe4 Qh4 35 Qf2
Qxf2 36 Qxf2 Qg7 37 d4 Qa8 38
Qc5 Qdd8 39 f5! g5 40 f6+ Qh6 41
Qxa6 c6 42 Qc2 Qac8 43 Qc5 Qf4
44 Qd2 Qd7 45 Qe4 Qf8 46 h4

White has a won position, and he confidently realizes his advantage.

46...Qd8 47 Qxg5 Qxg5 48
Qxf4 Qe6 49 Qe4 Qa8 50 Qd3
Qa7 51 Qh3 Qc7 52 Qe6 fe 53 Qxe6
Qb5 54 f7 Qf8 55 Qg3 Qxa3 56
Qg8 Qaa8 57 Qc4 Qc7 58 Qe7
Qd5 59 Qe6+ 1-0

Coordination problems of this type often coincide with problems of the centre and of pawn chains, which were examined above. For example, central pawns which are far advanced but are not supported by the pieces constitute a serious weakness.

The examples given indicate the importance of harmonious coordination between the pieces and pawn chains or groups. Often this will compensate (even with interest!) for the creation of pawn weaknesses or a lack of
space, as has already been mentioned.

In this respect the following variation of the Spanish Game is typical: 1 e4 e5 2 ²f³ ²c6 3 ²b5 a6 4 ²a4 d6 5 ²xc6+ bc 6 d4 f6 (60)

²xf³ 19 ²xb3 ²h4 20 ²d3 ²f3 21 g³ ²h3! 22 ²g1 ²g2+! 23 ²xg2 fg+ 24 ²g1 ²f3+, and Black gained a decisive advantage.

Very often in the Open Games the centre is quickly cleared of pawns, and a sharp piece battle commences. Here, as has already been mentioned, it is very important to have good development and well coordinated pieces.

It is in open positions that the connection between material and time (tempi) becomes very clear. An extra pawn is approximately equivalent to three tempi. This rule does not always apply, by any means, but it does no harm to remember it during gambit play in the opening.

The employment of this rule in practice means giving up material gained (if, of course, the opponent has a growing initiative) in order to neutralize the opponent's dangerous threats and to solve one's development problems.

In this respect a variation of the Italian Game is instructive: 1 e4 e5 2 ²f³ ²c6 3 ²c4 ²c5 4 c3 ²f6 5 d4 ed 6 cd ²b4+ 7 ²c3 ²xe4 8 0-0 ²xc3 9 bc.

Here, instead of the 'draughts-like' pursuit of material (after all, in chess it is not obligatory to capture!) 9... ²xc3? 10 ²b3! ²xa1 11 ²xf7+
etc., the correct continuation for Black is 9...d5! 10 cb dc 11 b5 \(a_7\) 12 \(\vartriangle a_3\) 0-0 13 \(w_e2\) \(e_8\), returning the pawn, but successfully completing his mobilization and achieving approximate equality.

**Coordination of the forces in the opening**

It is very important that from the start of the game the coordination of the forces should be harmonious. Along with active development, the occupation of space and the creation of a favourable structure in the centre, this presupposes the harmonious and purposeful coordination of pieces and pawns.

As is shown by some of the examples from the chapter ‘Active operations in the opening’, often the cause of failure is a disruption in the harmony of the forces. Here we give several such examples.

**No. 153 Alekhine-Bogoljubow**

Triberg, 1921

*Queen’s Indian Defence*

1 \(d4\) \(f6\) 2 \(\vartriangle f3\) \(e6\) 3 \(c4\) \(b6\) 4 \(g3\) \(b7\) 5 \(g2\) \(c5\) 6 \(dc\) \(xc5\) (better 6...bc) 7 0-0 0-0 8 \(c3\) \(d5\) (61).

After this White begins an interesting plan of active play in the centre, which has the aim of disrupting the coordination of Black’s forces.

![Chess diagram](image)

9 \(d4!\) \(xd4\) (it was hardly correct to hurry over this exchange) 10 \(xd4\) \(c6\) 11 \(h4\) \(dc\) 13 \(d1\) \(c8\) 14 \(g5!\) \(d5\) 14 \(xd5\) \(ed\) 15 \(xd5\) \(db4?\) 16 \(e4!!\).

This move signifies the achievement of White’s goal. Although Black has not made any direct mistake, he has played superficially, and his pieces are now scattered and driven away from the K-side — here the most important part of the board. Black has no way of opposing the unusually active force of white pieces which now assails his K-side.

16...f5

White also has a winning position after 16...h6 17 \(\vartriangle x h6\) f5 18 \(wg5\) \(c7\) 19 \(\vartriangle x g7\) \(x g7\) 20 \(x g7+\) \(x g7\) 21 \(d7+, or 16...g6 17 \(f6\) \(x d5\) 18 \(x d5\)

17 \(xf5\) \(xf5\) 18 \(d8+\) \(xd8\)
19\textasciix26d8 \textasciix26e8 20 \textasciix26d1 \textasciix26f7 21 \textasciix26g4 \textasciix26d3 22 ed \textasciix26xd8 23 dc, and White soon won.

In the following example Alekhine exploits an inaccuracy by Black in the opening, and skillfully unites his pieces for a purposeful attack on f7.

No. 154 Alekhine-Duras
St. Petersburg, 1913
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 c5 a6 4 a4 f6 5 e2 b5 6 b3 c5 7 a4 b8 8 ab ab 9 d3 d6 10 e3 g4?! 11 h3 h5 12 bd2 0-0 13 0-0 d4? 14 \textasciix26xd4 \textasciix26xf3 15 \textasciix26xf3 ed (62)

Strangely enough, this sortie leads to a loss virtually by force. White should have played 15 f5 c5+ 16 h1 f2+ 17 xf2 \textasciix26xf2 18 fe de 19 \textasciix26xb5+ with a double-edged game. Now White encounters a harmonious and active tactical defence by Black.

15. \textasciix26c5! 16 \textasciix26xb5 b6! 17 d4 a4! 18 ae1 c5! 19 xd7+ xd7 20 xf7+ e8 21 xe6 xd4+ 22 xd4 xd4+ 23 h1 d8!

White’s position is quite hopeless, and he could have calmly resigned. From inertia there followed:

24 b1 d1+ 25 e1 d5 26
General opening problems

Thus the role of tactics in the opening is diverse and highly important. A mastery of tactical coordination is one of the most important conditions for the genuine improvement of a player.

We will examine some further examples which contain certain significant methodological features.

No. 156 Toran–Tal
European Team Ch., Oberhausen, 1961
English Opening

1 c4 e5 2 d3 c6 3 g3 f5 4 d4 e4
5 f3 d6 6 g2 ef7 7 f3 g6 8 0-0
g7 9 e4(?) fe 10 g5 0-0 11
dx e4 dxe4 12 x f8+ x f8 13
x e4 c6 14 e3

White has played the opening routinely, and his pieces are awkwardly placed.

Black’s next move emphasizes the lack of harmony in his opponent’s forces.

14...xf5 15 x d2 x e8 16 x g5
x e3!

And here comes a tactical blow based on the disharmony of White’s forces.

17 xd5+

After 17 x c6 x e7! 18 x d5+ x f8 19 x h7+ x e8! Black has a big advantage.

17...x h8 18 x f7+ x f7!! 19
x f7 x d3 20 x e2 x d4+ 21 x g2
e5 22 x d1 x e3! 23 x f1

This leads to an immediate loss, but White’s position was already unsatisfactory: 23 x f2
x b6! 24 x d5 x c6 25 c5 x c5 26
x b3 x b3!, and Black wins.

23...x e4+ 24 x h3 x f3 25
x e2 x f5+ 0-1

No. 157 Suetin–Rabar
USSR vs Yugoslavia, 1958
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 x f3 x c6 3 x b5 a6 4
x a4 x f6 5 0-0 x e7 6 x e1 b5 7
x b3 d6 8 c3 0-0 9 h3 x a5 10 x c2
c5 11 d4 x c7 12 b4!? cb 13 cb x d4
14 x bd2 x d7 (better 14...x b7)
15 x c4 bc 16 x e3 a5? (64)
(16...x ab8 is correct)

Just before this match, interestingly enough, an extensive monograph by Rabar on the Spanish Game had been published. However, the 12 b4?! variation was then little known, and
on encountering this line for the first time Rabar was not able to work things out, despite a great deal of thought. After the game he admitted that he had played \ldots a5 in analogy with Keres - Matanovic (Belgrade, 1956), a game which was well known at that time.

That game went 1 e4 e5 2 \f5 c6 3 \b5 a6 4 \a4 \f6 5 0-0 \e7 6 \e1 b5 7 \b3 d6 8 c3 0-0 9 h3 \a5 10 \c2 c5 11 d4 \c7 12 \bd2 \d7 13 \f1 \fe8 14 \e3 g6 15 b4!? cb 16 cb \c4! 17 \xc4 bc 18 \b1 \ab8 19 \ad2 c3 20 \h6, when 20 . . a5! proved very timely.

But here on 16 . . a5? there followed

17 \ba 3 18 \a3!

After this move Black’s tactical weakness on the a3-f8 diagonal is keenly felt, which emphasizes the lack of harmony in his game.

18 . . \xa5 19 de \xa3 20 ef \xf6 21 e5! \e7 22 ed \xd6 23 \g5, and Black came under a crushing attack.

\include{no.158 fischer-benko}

\include{pirc-defence}

\include{e8 14 0-0 \d6 15 \g3! \h8 16 \g4 c6?! 17 \h5 \e8?}

Black was evidently pinning great hopes on this move, intending to include his queen in the defence of his K-side. But he overlooked the following combinational possibility for White, which reveals the harmony of his attacking position.

18 \xd4 ed 19 \f6!! (the point of White’s play; his rook blocks the key f6 square, and the threat of e4-e5! becomes irresistible) 19 . . \g8 20 e5 \h6 21 \e2 1-0

Of no less importance than the tactical disruption of the forces’ coordination in the opening are certain strategic features, which will now be described.

**Isolation of part of the forces**

Often the coordination of the forces is strongly influenced by the poor placing of certain pieces, which are restricted in their movements, etc. If part of the forces are poorly defended or isolated, this often becomes a serious obstruction on the path to achieving harmonious coordination.

For example, the following variation of the Spanish Game is rightly considered unfavourable for Black: 1 e4 e5 2 \f3 \c6
3 a2b5 a6 4 a4 a6 5 0-0 e7 6 e1 b5 7 a2b3 d6 8 c3 a5 9 c2 c5 10 d3 a4(?) 11 h3 h5 12 bd2 0-0 13 g4! etc.

Here White shuts the light-square bishop out of play for a long time, and gains an obvious positional advantage.

This idea belongs to Capablanca. Both in his games and in his writings, Capablanca rejected the routine development of pieces in the opening, and reckoned that it should be subordinate to a definite plan for achieving harmonious piece coordination. One specific expression of this was the procedure, worked out by him, of isolating one of the opponent’s bishops from the main theatre of operations at an early stage of the game.

In this respect the following games are characteristic.

No. 160 Winter–Capablanca
Hastings, 1919
Four Knights Game

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 c3 f6 4 a2b5 a6 5 0-0 e7 6 e1 d6 7 c3 0-0 8 d4 b5 9 c2 a4 g4 10 d5! a8
11 h3 h5(?) 12 bd2 bd7 13 fl e8 14 g4!

The point of White’s strategic plan: the black bishop is driven back to g6, where for a long time it is shut out of play. In our time such a plan has become typical.

14...a6 15 a3 h5 16 a4 a7
17 c2 e2 b8 18 ab ab 19 b4!

Having achieved an advantage on the K-side, White switches the offensive to the Q-side, taking account of the isolation of the bishop at g6.

19...c8 20 d3 c6 21 dc dc6 22 a5! xxc3 23 xb5 cc7 24 c3 ed8 25 c1!

White has an overwhelming advantage.

No. 159 Capablanca–Black
New York, 1915
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 c3 f6 4 a4 a6 5 0-0 e7 6 e1 d6 7 c3 0-0 8 d4 b5 9 c2 a4 g4 10 d5!
11 xxf6+ xxf6 12 xg3 g4 13 h3 xf3 14 xf3 xxf3 15 gf f6

(65)

A remarkable position. White has a bishop, and yet he has not! Black wins by an attack on the opposite flank.
At the present time the isolation of part of the forces is understood in a broader sense. A splendid example of this type, which as though anticipates the modern interpretation, is provided by a game played more than 80 years ago.

No. 161 Teichmann-Chigorin
Cambridge Springs, 1904
Chigorin Defence

1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 f3 a6 4 cd cxd5 5 dc xcd 6 c3 e6 7 f4? f6 8 e3 b4 9 b3 d5 10 g3 0-0 11 d3 g5! 12 c2 (12 0-0 xcd 13 bc xcd! etc) 12... f5 13 e5 f7 14 0-0-0 xcd 15 bc b5!

Coordination and basic opening principles

The aim of achieving harmony of the forces in the opening is closely linked with a correct and skilful mastery of opening principles. Connections between pieces which are far-fetched and cut off from the real live situation on the board prove to be short-lived.

It is another matter to demonstrate this. It sometimes demands a maximum penetration into the true essence of the position. This is confirmed by the following examples.

From an early stage of the opening Black was aiming for
No. 162 Castaldi-Tartakower
Stockholm OL., 1937
Philidor's Defence

1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 d6 3 d4 ∆f6 4 ∆c3 ∆bd7 5 ∆e2 ∆e7 6 0-0 h6?! 7 b3 c6 8 ∆b2 ∆c7 9 ∆d2 g5?! 10 ∆fd1 ∆f8? (67)

Black outlined his plan back on the 6th move. He was anticipating a massed offensive on the K-side after ... ∆g6 followed by ... ∆f4 or ... g4 etc.

But while the knight has moved from d7 and has not yet reached g6, Black's control over e5 has been markedly weakened, and White notices a disruption in the tactical coordination of the black pieces.

11 de de 12 ∆xe5!

Here is the solution to the question. The knight is taboo: 12... ∆x e5 13 ∆d5! ∆xb2 14 ∆c7 mate, or 13... ∆d6 14 ∆xf6+, while on 13... ∆xe4 there follows 14 ∆xe5 etc. In the refutation of Black's play the major role was played by the good development of the white pieces, which created all the preconditions for their harmonious coordination.

12... ∆e6 13 ∆b5!

A further combinational blow. Black cannot play 13... cb because of 14 ∆xb5+, and he is bound to lose more material.

13... ∆b8 14 ∆a5 ∆d8 (or 14... b6 15 ∆xc6 ba 16 ∆xb8 ∆d8 17 ∆xf6 ∆xf6 18 ∆c7+ ∆e7 19 ∆c6 mate) 15 ∆xd8+ ∆xd8 16 ∆c7+ ∆e7 17 ∆a3+ 1-0

As we see, it is unpleasant to have to deal with an early attack, especially in an open position. But if the opening principles have been precisely observed and no mistakes have been made, an inner harmony of the forces can be found, which will not only allow the onslaught to be parried, but also in many cases an advantage to be achieved. The following example illustrates this.

No. 163 Padevsky-Botvinnik
Moscow, 1956
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 ∆f3 ∆c6 3 d4 cd 4 ∆xd4 ∆f6 5 ∆c3 d6 6 ∆e4 e6 7 0-0 ∆e7 8 ∆e3 0-0 9 ∆b3 ∆a5 10 f4 b6?! 11 ∆f3? (11 e5! is correct) 11... ∆b7 12 g4?

White begins a seemingly
very dangerous pawn storm (here 12 f5 is objectively better), which Black meets with energetic and accurately calculated counterplay on the Q-side and in the centre.

12...c8! 13 g5 c3!

An excellent tactical blow, which disrupts White's communications in the centre.

14 bc?

The lesser evil was 14 gf cxe3 15 c3 e6 16 c3 with a tolerable game for White.

14...c4! 15 g4 c8! 16 f3 bx3 17 ab f5 18 h4 (18 gf

f8! 19 f5 ef 20 xf5 f8 favours Black) 18...e5!

Black's play develops very harmoniously.

19 h3 h6 20 h5 c3 21 d1 ed 22 xd4 c6 23 gh g5!

24 g3 h1+ 24 f2 e4+ 0-1

No. 164 Klovan-Suetin
Byelorussia-Latvia, 1962

Göring Gambit

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 d4 ed 4 c3 dc 5 c4 cb 6 xb2 b4+ 7 c3 f6 8 c2

Here it appears that White can develop a strong initiative by 8 e5!, but Black has the strong counter 8...d5!, and if 9 ef cxf6!, when the advantage passes to him, as in Stein-Spassky (Tallinn 1959). A good illustration of the inner resour-

ces of well coordinated forces!

8...d6 9 0-0-0 0-0 10 e5?!

It cannot be denied that White's initiative looks very dangerous. But Black has not made any fundamental mistakes, and this allows him to look to the future with confidence. Under the influence of White's onslaught Black quickly sets up harmonious connections between his pieces, which disrupt White's plans.

10...g4 11 h4 cxe5 12 d5 c5 13 g5 g6 14 e4 f5 15 f4 (68)

15...c6!

White's pieces have overstepped the mark and lack coordination, and he now suffers a decisive loss of material.

16 fe cd 17 xd5 c8 18 b1 e3 19 e2 b6 20 a1 e4 21 xe4 xd1 22 xd1 de 23 xe5 fe8 24 b2 cd8 25 xd8 xd8 0-1

We will give two further games. In the first of these
White’s attacking plans were disrupted by an unexpected but thoroughly correct sacrifice of material. In the second the cause of Black’s misfortune was an impulsive queen sortie, which White opposed with a harmonious attack.

No. 165 Doroshkevich-Tal
USSR Ch., 1975
King’s Indian Defence

1 d4 g6 2 c4 g7 3 e4 c5 4 d5 d6 5 c3 f6 6 e2 0–0 7 f4 e6 8 f3 ed 9 cd g4 10 0–0 hxg3 11 hxg3 bd7 12 h1 a6 13 e3?? exf3 14 e8 14
g4 h6 15 g5? hg 16 e5?! gf!

By sacrificing a piece, Black destroys the white centre and seizes the initiative on the most important part of the board.

17 ef xe3 18 fg e5 19 g2
g5 20 e4 h4 21 d2 xg7 22
f2 xf2 23 xg2 f1 24 e6 d8 25 h7 fg+ 26 xg2 xd5 27 b3 d3 28 c2 e1 0–1

No. 166 Kopayev-Polyak
Kiev, 1946
Scotch Game

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 d4 ed 4
xd4 f6 5 xc6 bc 6 e5!? d5?

Strangely enough, this natural move is a mistake. Correct is 6...e7! 7 e2 d5 8 c4 a6! with fair counterplay for Black.

7 d3 h4?

This violent attempt to obtain counterplay merely aggravates Black’s difficulties. His queen soon finds itself trapped.

8 0–0 c5 9 d2 0–0 10 e4!
e7 11 e1 d6 12 c4 b4 13
f6+! xe6 14 e4! xd3 15
xh4 xh4 16 xd3 de 17 e4
f6 18 xxc6, and White won.

Disuniting the opponent’s flanks

Certainly opening variations are characterized by the procedure of disuniting the opponent’s flanks, which destroys the coordination of his forces. In this respect the following game is instructive.

No. 167 Mikenas-Goldenov
Tbilisi, 1946
English Opening

1 c4 f6 2 c3 d5 3 cd xd5 4
e4 b4 5 a4 e6!? 6 xe6 fe 7
gle2 d3+ 8 fl e6 9 b3
f7! 10 xxb7 b8 11 a6 (69)
11. . .g6 12 h4 b6 13 a4 g7 14 h3 0-0 15 d1 b4! 16 xd3 xd3 17 xc6 xe4 18 e3 xe3! 0-1

Here Black carried out a very strong and interesting opening plan. At an early stage of the game he permitted a weakening of his central pawn structure, but in return he not only weakened the opponent's light squares, but, more importantly, he established his knight at d3, deep in enemy territory. This prevented White's flanks from uniting and led to a serious disruption in the coordination of his pieces. At an early stage White was already completely helpless and he swiftly came under a crushing attack.

Often such a disuniting of the flanks is caused by a far-advanced central pawn, supported by its pieces or pawns. Here a wedge is as though driven into the opponent's ranks, disrupting the coordination of his pieces and causing 'panic'.

We illustrate this with two typical examples.

No. 168 Bronstein-Simagin
28th USSR Ch., 1961
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 c4 f6 2 c3 e6 3 d4 b4 4 a3 xc3+ 5 bc c5 6 f3 c6 7 e4 0-0 (better 7...b6, intending to at-
No. 169 E u e-Naj d o r f
Zurich C, 1953
King’s Indian Defence

1 d4 ∆f6 2 c4 g6 3 g3 ∆g7 4 ∆g2 0-0 5 ∆c3 c5 6 d5 e5 7 ∆g5 h6 8
∆xh6 g×h6 9 d6! ∆c6 10 e3 b6 11
∆d5 ∆h8 12 ∆e4 ∆d8 13 h4! f5 14
∆g5 ∆b7 15 g4 e4 16 ∆e2! ∆×b2
17 ∆f4! ∆f6 18 gf! ∆×a1 19
∆g6+ ∆g7 20 ∆×e4 ∆c3+ 21
∆f1 ∆×f5 22 ∆f4 ∆h8 23 ∆×c3
∆ae8 24 ∆ce2 ∆g8 25 h5 ∆g5 26
∆g3 ∆×g3 27 fg ∆×e3 28 ∆f2
∆e8 29 ∆e1 ∆×e1 30 ∆×e1 ∆g7
31 ∆e8 ∆c2+ 32 ∆g1 ∆d1+ 33
∆h2 ∆c2+ 34 ∆g2 ∆f5 35 ∆g8+
∆f6 36 h×h8+ ∆g5 37 ∆g7+ 1-0
An energetically conducted
attack.
We must also mention the
analogous procedure of driving a
wedge into one of the flanks,
paralyzing the latter or shutting a
large part of the enemy forces
out of play.
Such situations usually arise
in the middlegame, but some-
times also in the opening.

No. 170 Sokolsky-Gutorev
Byelorussian Ch., 1960
English Opening

1 c4 ∆f6 2 ∆c3 g6 3 e4 d6 4 g3
∆g7 5 ∆g2 e5 6 ∆ge2 0-0 7 d3
∆e6 8 0-0 ∆c8 9 f4 ∆h3? 10 f5!
∆xg2 11 ∆xg2 ∆c6 12 ∆d5 ∆xd5
13 cd ∆b8 14 f6! ∆h8 15 ∆c3 e6 16

No. 171 Alatortsev-Boleslavsky
USSR Ch., 1950
King’s Indian Defence

1 d4 ∆f6 2 c4 d6 3 ∆c3 e5 4 e4
ed 5 c×d4 c×c6 6 d2 g6 7 b3 ∆g7
8 ∆b2 0-0 9 ∆d3 ∆g4!
An illogical move from the
viewpoint of normal ideas of
development. It can be understood
only in association with Black’s
overall conception, aimed at
achieving specific coordination
of the black pieces, which are
lining up from afar against
White’s K-side.
10 ∆f3 ∆ge5 11 ∆e2 ∆xf3+ 12
∆xf3 ∆d4! 13 ∆d1 f5! 14 ef ∆xf5
15 ♞e2?

White should have played 15 0-0. In trying to exchange off the annoying black knight as soon as possible, he overlooks the attack by Black on the K-side which now develops by force.

15. . . ♝xe2 16 ♝xe2

16 ♝xg7 was somewhat better, although here too after 16. . . ♝f4! Black has a strong initiative.

16. . . ♝xb2 17 ♝xb2 ♝g5! 18 ♝e3 ♝e8 19 0-0 ♝h3 20 f4 (20 ♝fe1 ♝xf2!) 20. . . ♝xf1!!

A beautiful combinational blow, revealing the depth of Black’s strategy.

Throughout the entire game the black pieces have been well coordinated, and the finale takes the form of a miraculous harmony!

21 ♝g  ♝xe2 22 ♝c3 ♝g2! 23 ♝d3 ♝f3 24 ♝f1 ♝g2+ 25 ♝h1 ♝c6! 26 ♝xf8+ ♝xf8 27 ♝f1+ ♝f2+ 0-1

No. 172
Tseshkovsky-Lutikov
36th USSR Ch., 1969
Philidor’s Defence

1 e4 e5 2 ♝f3 d6 3 d4 ♝f6 4 ♝c3 ♝bd7 5 ♝c4 ♝e7 6 0-0 0-0 7 a4 c6 8 ♝e2 ed 9 ♝xd4 ♝xe4?! 10 ♝xe4!

After 10 ♝xe4 d5 11 ♝xd5 ♝f6 12 ♝xf7+ ♝xf7 13 ♝d3 ♝d6 Black has fair counterplay.

10. . . d5 11 ♝f5! dc (70)

12 ♝h6!

A splendid tactical blow, destroying the castled position. At the finish the actions of White’s pieces fuse into a powerful, united force.

12. . . ♝f6

White wins prettily after 12. . . ♝f6 13 ♝xg7! ♝xg7 14 ♝g4!, or 12. . . gh 13 ♝g4+ ♝g5 14 ♝xh6+ etc.

13 ♝eg3 ♝xf5 14 ♝xf5 gh 15 ♝e7+ ♝g7 16 ♝f5+ ♝g6 17 ♝e7+ ♝g7 18 ♝e5 ♝b8 19 ♝f5+ ♝g6 20 ♝d6! ♝g7 21 ♝fe1 ♝d8 22 ♝ad1 ♝d7 23 ♝d4 ♝c7 24 ♝g4+ 1-0

No. 173 Brants-Veresov
Minsk, 1956
King’s Indian Defence

1 d4 ♝f6 2 ♝f3 g6 3 g3 ♝g7 4 ♝g2 0-0 5 0-0 d6 6 0-0 d4 7 ♝c3 e5 8 e4 c6 9 h3 ed 10 ♝xd4 a5 11 ♝e3 ♝e8 12 ♝c2 ♝c5 13 ♝ad1 ♝fd7 14 ♝fe1
A routine move. 14 $\triangleleft b3!$ is much stronger.

14. .4 a4 15 $\triangleleft d e2 \triangleleft a5!$ 16 $\triangleleft x d 6$
$\triangleleft e5$ 17 b3 ab 18 ab $\triangleleft x h 3!$ 19 b4
$\triangleleft x g 2!!$ 20 $\triangleleft b 1 \triangleleft x e 4!$ 21 $\triangleleft x e 4$
$\triangleleft a 4$ 22 $\triangleleft x a 4 \triangleleft x a 4$ 23 $\triangleleft f 6+$
$\triangleleft x f 6$ 24 $\triangleleft x f 6 \triangleleft x c 4$, and Black won.

No. 174 Veresov-Bunatian
Moscow, 1965
Veresov Opening

1 d4 $\triangleleft f 6$ 2 $\triangleleft c 3$ d5 3 $\triangleleft g 5 \triangleleft b d 7$
4 $\triangleleft f 3$ g6 5 e3 $\triangleleft g 7$ 6 $\triangleleft d 3$ 0–0 7 0–0
c5 8 $\triangleleft e 5$ e6 9 $\triangleleft e 1$ $\triangleleft a 5$ 10 a3 a6 11
$\triangleleft d 2$ cd? 12 ed $\triangleleft x e 5$ 13 de $\triangleleft g 4$ 14
$\triangleleft f 4!$ $\triangleleft x e 5$ 15 $\triangleleft x e 5$ f6 16 $\triangleleft x d 5!!$
ed 17 $\triangleleft x d 5$ $\triangleleft b 6$ 18 $\triangleleft c 4$ $\triangleleft e 6$ 19
$\triangleleft e 3!$ 1–0

The intelligent application of opening principles

Correct play in the opening demands primarily an impeccable knowledge and application of opening principles. Along with real possibilities of fighting for the initiative, from the very first moves a player is faced with all kinds of variations, with both correct and incorrect active possibilities.

In the opening it is sometimes not easy to distinguish the correct path from the false, and it is in such situations that opening principles should come to one's aid. A basic mastery of them allows the numerous variations to be successfully ‘managed’. Incidentally, it is this guide which enables an experienced player to memorize new variations and to sift out irrational continuations.

As is apparent from the examples given, the struggle in the opening is often highly specific in nature. At an early stage sharp positions arise, which require that development be combined with active play. In the handling of such situations a knowledge of principles alone is by no means sufficient. Another important factor of opening play is essential — a concrete approach to the solving of the problems arising.

A concrete approach signifies a comprehensive study of the features of the position, taking account of the prospects and individual features of this or that variation. Its basic aim is to find the most effective plan, corresponding to the demands of the position. At the same time each individual move, while corresponding to the basic plan, should solve the most urgent problem of the given position.

It is from this viewpoint, in which the concrete ideas and plans of the two sides, arising sometimes in the very first moves of the game, are taken
into account, that the implementation of basic opening problems should be approached.

An important indication of a sure mastery of opening principles and a concrete approach to them is correct orientation in an unfamiliar opening situation.

Consider a variation where at an early stage a player begins unexpectedly playing sharply. His opponent is convinced that this is unfounded, but there is not time to reason in general terms. He must act, and take concrete decisions. This gives rise to a typically complex problem, where mobilization principles have to be combined with a penetration into the tactical, individual features of the position.

Of course, playing according to this method is not easy. It is much easier to be governed by general development principles in a quiet situation. From this it follows that, for the development of skill in opening play, an analysis of such situations is very useful.

Sometimes an opponent's eccentric play in the opening can be punished only by energetic manoeuvres with one and the same pieces. Thus, while firmly condemning the pointless loss of tempi in the opening, Alekhine once wrote: "One can afford to lose time, only if it gives a firm control of important squares".

A number of examples confirming this can be found in the games of Alekhine himself.

No. 175 Alekhine-Wolf
Pistyan, 1922
Queen's Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c3 c5 3 c4 cd 4 cd a6 b6 5 cxd4 a6 6 e4! xxe4 7 a4+ d7 8 h3 c5 9 e3! g6
10 c3 (71)

White appears to have broken the principles of economizing on tempi in the opening, since out of the ten moves made, six have been by his queen and knight. Nevertheless, White has gained control of the most important central points, and has obtained virtually a won position. How did this happen? The point is that Black played the opening passively (5...a6?) and his tactics could be refuted only by energetic manoeuvres of this type. These manoeuvres cannot be
considered mechanically, but only in connection with a definite purpose, the aim of which was to disorganize Black’s development and keep his king in the centre.

10. ...\=c7 11 \=c3 \=g8 12 \=e3 b6 13 \=bd2 \=g7 14 \=d4 \=xd4 15 \=xd4 \=b5 16 \=xb5 ab 17 0-0 \=a4 18 b4 \=d8 19 a3 \=bd7 20 \=fe1 \=f8 21 d6! and White mounted a decisive attack on the opponent’s king caught in the centre.

Alekhine’s method in this game is by no means exceptional. Moreover, this concrete plan has become characteristic in such situations.

Here is another typical example.

**No. 176 Portisch-Bronstein**

Monaco, 1969

*Queen’s Gambit*

1 d4 d5 2 c4 c5?! 3 cd \=f6 4 e4! \=xe4 5 dc \=xc5 6 \=f3 e6 7 \=c3 ed 8 \=xd5 \=e7+ 9 \=e3 \=c6 10 \=b5 \=d7 11 0-0 \=e6 12 \=e5! \=xe5 13 \=xe5 \=xb5 14 \=xb5 a6 15 \=ad1! \=d8 16 \=b6 \=xd1

Black’s position is hopeless. White also wins after 15...ab 16 \=xd8 \=xd8 17 \=xb5+ \=c6 18 \=fe1.

17 \=xd1 f6 18 \=f5 g6 19 \=c7+ \=f7 20 \=d5! 1-0

One should also have a concrete approach to many other opening principles and features. When playing chess in general, and in the opening in particular, it is useful to remember that there are no rules without exceptions.

Thus the main and most general task when mobilizing the forces in the opening consists in ensuring their harmonious coordination. This is assisted by a correct combining of mobilization principles with a penetration into the tactical process, and by taking account of the individual features of the opening set-up.

At the same time one should have a clear impression of the strategic contours of the impending middlegame, and aim to seize the initiative and retain it, which will hinder the opponent in carrying out his active plans.
PART II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPENING THEORY
THE CONNECTION OF THE OPENING WITH THE LATER STAGES OF THE GAME

The opening as a sum total of knowledge about the initial position

In the first part of the book we gave a fairly detailed analysis of many typical opening mistakes. In the majority of the examples given there, the outcome was decided directly or was pre-determined in the opening stage.

However, as has repeatedly been emphasized, in many cases the 'pure' mobilization of the forces is very short-lived.

When the forces come into close contact (sometimes this happens very quickly) there commences a struggle which in many respects is characteristic of the middlegame, with all the consequences following from this. Here there are all kinds of tactical surprises, attacks on the king, the concrete nature of the play in general, and so on.

The proportion of opening variations such as those given above — with a swift crisis — is comparatively small. Opening guides are largely made up of problematic variations running many moves deep, and yet not giving any obvious advantage to either side, at the end of which rather cautious assessments are given, such as "White stands slightly better", "chances are roughly equal", and so on.

Problematic variations of this type arise if both sides observe the opening principles, tactical accuracy and strategic purposefulness (which, incidentally, is a necessary condition in master play!). In these cases the opening serves mainly as a prelude to the main struggle, although many variations extend as far as sharp clashes in the middlegame, or even deep into the endgame. And yet at the end of such variations, even if they continue to move 25 and beyond, there usually arises a problematic position, the assessment of which is possible only after
serious practical testing.

In no other stage of the game is theory progressing with such intensity as in the modern opening, which has essentially long been a synthesis of the mobilisation of the forces and a concrete study of the resulting middlegame.

The development of opening theory is steadily seeing the further merging of these two stages. A study of an opening also signifies research into the middlegame which logically arises from the opening set-up.

As a result the opening appears as the sum total of knowledge of the initial position, which Wilhelm Steinitz called the most complex and enigmatic of all positions on the chess board. In the initial position, chess contains an enormous, practically inexhaustible number of possibilities.

It follows that we can be talking only about individual, partial solutions. And in studying such questions one’s attention is in general attracted by various strategic and tactical problems, among which an important place is occupied by the transition stage from opening to middlegame. Certain aspects of this transitional stage are expounded in the present part of the book.

The choice of strategic ‘weapon’

The first criterion for the viability of a particular opening system is an abundance of possible plans in the transition from opening to middlegame. If there is only one such possibility, or if the number is limited, such systems normally hold little promise.

Popular opening systems are notable for their strategic (and, of course, tactical) diversity.

In such systems the transition from opening to middlegame, and the typical paths of this sometimes imperceptible stage, are naturally of interest.

Let us first examine a closed type of game, for example the starting position of the Chigorin Variation in the Spanish Game: 1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆c6 3 b5 a6 4 ∆a4 ∆f6 5 0-0 ∆e7 6 ∆e1 b5 7 ∆b3 d6 8 c3 0-0 h3.

Mobilization is largely completed, but can it be considered that the transition to the middlegame has commenced? This is a complex, and to a certain extent, academic question, since the start of the main battle and the determination of the two sides’ plans are still some way off. For the moment each side is left to his own devices. In almost every case White must make the
obligatory moves d2-d4 and \( \text{bd}2 \), at which his mobilization is by no means complete and is subsequently notable for its great diversity. In many cases (for example, in the Smyslov Variation: 9... h6 followed by 10... e8 and ... f8) White has a choice between the knight manœuvre \( \text{d}2-f1-g3 \) and the set-up with \( \text{c}2, b2-b4, \text{b}2 \) etc., which also relates rather to development problems.

In the critical position Black has an even greater choice of the most diverse continuations: 9... a5, 9... h6, 9... b7, 9... d7, 9... a5, 9... d7, and even the paradoxical returning of his knight to its initial square 9... b8, which in recent times has been one of the most popular continuations.

For the moment all these, even the most serious and positionally well-founded, are only preliminary drafts of the plan to be chosen.

But suppose that we make the further moves 9... a5 10 c2 c5 11 d4 c7 12 bd2 c6 13 d5.

White’s last move largely determines the forthcoming struggle, although the concrete plans of the two sides are still not clear. The almost total completion of mobilization and the fixing of the central pawn formation signify only in the most general terms the conclusion of the opening stage. However, the middlegame is now imminent!

No. 177 Geller-Mecking
Palma de Mallorca IZ, 1970

13... a5 14 b3 d7 15 f1 b7 16 g3 c4(?) 17 b4!

After this the region of the main middlegame battle is decided – it will be the Q-side, where White develops a persistent initiative.

17... c8 18 f5 a8 19 h2 a5 20 e3 ab 21 cb x5? 22 ef c3 23 g4! with an obvious advantage to White.

No. 178 Keres-Vidmar
Bad Nauheim, 1936

13... d8 14 a4 b8 15 c4 b4 f1 e8

By contrast, here White has decided on the plan of a K-side offensive, after first provoking a complete blocking of the Q-side.

17 g4 g6 18 g3 g7 19 h2 f6 20 g1 f7

The battle arena has become the K-side, and Black must play very accurately in order to maintain a flexible defence.

In the given example the transition from opening to middlegame passed almost unnoticed, concealed behind the
movements of the forces within their own territory. The two sides unhurriedly embarked on a fierce battle even on unimportant parts of the board.

By contrast, in other cases, especially in gambit systems both old and new, the middlegame may ‘mature’ before development is complete and before a serious ‘declaration’ in the centre takes place.

An illustration of this is provided by the Jaenisch Variation in the Spanish Game: 1 e4 e5 2 ¤f3 ¤c6 3 ¤b5 f5 4 ¤c3 fe 5 ¤xe4 d5!? 6 ¤xe5 de 7 ¤xc6 bc 8 ¤xc6+ ¤d7 9 ¤h5+ ¤e7 10 ¤e5+ ¤e6 11 ¤xa8 ¤xa8 etc.

The greater part of both sides, forces have been completely inactive, and yet the opening stage has flashed by like a whirlwind. A typical middlegame has been reached with unbalanced material, where it is very difficult to decide who will gain a subsequent advantage.

In the given case the transition to the middlegame came very early, prompted by the move 5...d5!?, after which there followed a six-move forcing operation, leading to this strange position.

Such contrasts in the choice of plan in the transition to middlegame are not surprising, since the range of opening set-ups is immense.

A general feature of any form of transition from opening to middlegame lies in the choice of a definite strategic character of the main battle. And here the development of theory is disclosing truly enormous ‘reserves’ of highly valuable material.

Consider for example, this variation of the King’s Indian Defence: 1 d4 ¤f6 2 c4 g6 3 g3 ¤g7 4 ¤g2 d6 5 ¤c3 0-0 6 ¤f3 (72).

For a long time Black appeared to have virtually only one plan in this position: 6... ¤bd7 7 0-0 e5, and at an appropriate moment...ed, creating counterplay with the pieces in the centre. Then in the 1950s the variation 6... ¤c6 7 0-0 a6 8 d5 ¤a5 became popular, as a result of which a greater number of problems and lines arose. Comparatively recently this line acquired a further interesting addition. Along with 7...a6 they began playing 7... ¤f5!?, which also
leads to distinctive variations.

In the 1950s Black began employing the variation 6...c6 7 0-0 a6, with the intention of organizing counterplay on the Q-side and of undermining the c4 pawn by ...b5 etc. The given variation proved to be not very promising, but the move 6...c6 did not disappear, since it assisted in the creation of an interesting and topical variation – 7 0-0 ♘a5!? etc.

At the same time, reverting to the 6...♗bd7 7 0-0 e5 variation, it should be noted that its theory is being constantly enriched with new plans in the middlegame. This testifies to the promising nature of this opening system, which has long been regarded as durable.

Before moving on to an examination of how the struggle develops in complex modern variations we will dwell on some more obvious strategic situations.

The realization of an opening advantage in the middlegame

In a number of cases when, as a result of serious mistakes by the opponent, one side emerges from the opening with a big advantage, the outcome of the game may be settled. Very often things will be decided by a tactical blow, a combination, a deadly attack on the king, and so on.

Examples of this type were given in Part I of the book. In many of them the retribution for the mistakes came in the opening itself, in others it came in the early middlegame, or, more precisely, comprised the transition stage from opening to middlegame.

But the exploitation of an advantage is by no means always achieved by tactical means. In practice an opening advantage is more likely to be reinforced by a further augmenting of positional advantages, as in the following examples.

No. 179 Botvinnik–Alekhine
AVRO Tournament, 1938
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 ♗c3 ♗f6 4 ♗f3 c5 5 cd ♘xd5 6 e3 ♗c6 7 ♘c4 ♘e7
8 0-0 cd 9 ed 0-0 10 ♘e1

Here Black incautiously played 10...b6? (10...♗xc3 was better, and only then 11...b6), which allowed White to develop immediate pressure on the Q-side.

11 ♘xd5 ed 12 ♘b5 ♘d7? (73)

And this is a very serious mistake, after which Black comes under severe pressure on the Q-side. 12 ♗a5 is essential, although even then White’s
position is the more promising.

\[ \text{Diagram 73} \]

\[ \text{13} \text{a4! b8} \]

Forced. As shown by Botvinnik, on 12...\text{c8} there would have followed 13 \text{d2! a6 14} \text{xc6 xc6 15} \text{xa6}, when Black loses a pawn.

14 \text{f4 xb5 15} \text{xb5 a6 16} \text{a4 d6 17} \text{d6 xd6 xa6 16} \text{ac1 a7 19} \text{c2!} \]

White has secure control of the important open file and has practically immobilized Black’s Q-side (the position of the black knight is especially pitiful). Only now does it become clear that Black’s opening inaccuracies on moves 10 and 12 have led almost by force to a lost position.

In the resulting position even Alekhine was unable to display his ingenuity. The black king slowly but surely has to mount the ‘scaffold’!

White accurately realized his advantage:

\[ \text{19...e7 20} \text{xe7 xe7 21} \text{xc7 xc7 22} \text{xc7 f6 23} \text{f1 f7} \]

24 \text{c8+ f8 25} \text{c3! g5 26} \text{e1 h5 27} \text{h4!} \]

Black can hardly move a piece, since 27...\text{d7} and 27...\text{e8} are both met by 28 \text{c7!} Therefore, despite the small amount of material, Black loses due to positional zugzwang.

27...\text{d7 28} \text{c7 f7 29} \text{f3 g4 30} \text{e1 f5 31} \text{d3 f4 32} \text{f3 gf33} \text{a5 34} \text{a4!}, and White soon won.

In the next example the cause of Black’s misfortune was a serious concession in the centre, made in the opening.

No. 180 Averbakh-Aronin
USSR Ch., 1951
Queen’s Gambit Accepted

1 \text{d4 d5 2 c4 dc 3} \text{f3 f6 4 e3 e6 5} \text{xc4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7} \text{e2 b5 8} \text{d3 d7 9 a4 c4?} \]

By releasing the tension, Black concedes his opponent the centre, which has the main influence on subsequent events. 9...\text{cd 10 ed ba was correct, with a perfectly satisfactory game.}

10 \text{c2 bd7 11 e4 e7 12 g5 0-0 13 bd2 e8 14 f1 h6 15 f4 f8} \]

As a result of the opening White has achieved an obvious advantage in the centre, and although for the moment he does not have any concrete
threats, Black’s position is very difficult since he is deprived of active counterplay. White consistently increases the pressure.

16...\textit{Qe5}! (not allowing 16...\textit{Qg6}) 16...\textit{Qd6} 17...\textit{Qf1} \textit{Qc7} 18 \textit{Qg3} \textit{Qd6} 19...\textit{Qxd7} \textit{Qxd7}?

In a difficult position Black makes a further error. 19...\textit{Qxd7} was stronger, maintaining his knight in its important defensive position.

20...\textit{Qxd6} \textit{Qxd6} 21...\textit{Qa3}!

This gives an important impetus to White’s developing offensive. He brings his rook into play and, by switching it to g3, begins a strong K-side attack.

21...\textit{Qf6}

Had Black’s knight been at f8, he would have had 21...e5, but now he is forced to make a significant weakening of his K-side.

22...\textit{Qg3} \textit{Qf8} 23...\textit{Qe5}! \textit{Qe7} 24...\textit{Qf} 25...\textit{Qxe6} 25...\textit{Qe3} \textit{Qad8} 26...\textit{Qg4} \textit{Qf4} 27...\textit{Qe3}! \textit{Qxe3} 28...fe \textit{Qh8} 29...\textit{Qf1} \textit{Qe7} 30...\textit{Qe5} \textit{Qg8} 31...\textit{Qh8} 32...\textit{Qe5} \textit{Qg8} 33...\textit{Qf6}

This manœuvre allows White to force the win of a pawn, with a continuing attack.

33...\textit{Qd7} 34...\textit{Qxd7} \textit{Qxd7} 35 \textit{Qh6} e5 36...\textit{Qf5}!, and White safely realized his material advantage: 36...\textit{ed} 37...\textit{Qxd7} \textit{Qxd7} 38 \textit{ed} b4 39...\textit{a5} e5 40...bc \textit{bc} 41...\textit{h5} c2 42...\textit{c5} ...\textit{e4} 43...\textit{Qf2} \textit{Qb7} 44...\textit{Qg3} \textit{Qb2} 45...\textit{Qe3} ...\textit{h7} 46...\textit{h4} ...\textit{f7} 47 ...\textit{c7}+ \textit{Qe6} 48...\textit{Qc6}+ \textit{Qd5} 49...\textit{c5}+ \textit{Qd6} 50...\textit{xg7} 1-0

In the following example Black’s defeat resulted from him weakening his Q-side pawns in the opening.

No. 181 Suetin-Furman
USSR Ch., 1963
Sicilian Defence

1...e4 2...\textit{f3} e5 3 d4 ...\textit{d4} 4...\textit{Qxd4} ...\textit{c6} 5...\textit{Qc3} a6 6...\textit{Qe2} \textit{Qc7} 7 0-0 \textit{Qf6} 8...\textit{Qe3} \textit{Qb4} 9...\textit{Qa4}! b5(?) (better 9...\textit{Qg5} 0-0) 10...\textit{Qxd6} dc

10...\textit{Qxc6} is bad because of 11...\textit{b6} ...\textit{b5} 12...e5 ...\textit{g8} 13...\textit{Qf3}! etc.

11...\textit{Qc5}!

This manœuvre sets Black difficult problems, whereas after 11...\textit{b6} ...\textit{b5} 12...\textit{Qxc8} ...\textit{Qxc8} 13...\textit{f3} \textit{Qd8} he would have equalized.

11...\textit{Qxc5} 12...\textit{Qxc5} 0-0

12...\textit{Qe5} 13...\textit{b4} a5 or 12...\textit{e5} 13...\textit{Qd2} \textit{Qd7} was slightly better. Now White establishes his knight on the critical c5 square.

13...\textit{Qd4} e5

In the event of 13...\textit{Qd7} 14...\textit{Qd1}! Black would have faced a different threat: White would have securely occupied the only open file.

14...\textit{Qc3} a5 15...\textit{Qfd1} (74)

White’s superiority has assumed real proportions, and, as the further course of the game shows, Black is unable to escape from the vice. 15...\textit{Qd7} again
fails, this time to 16 \( \texttt{d7} \texttt{x7} \texttt{d7} 17 \texttt{xb5}, when White wins a pawn. Black tries to activate his bishop and reorganizes his Q-side pawns, but this creates new vulnerable points in his position.

15.\ldots \texttt{b4} 16 \texttt{e3} \texttt{d8} 17 \texttt{g5} \texttt{x1+} 18 \texttt{x1} \texttt{e7} (bad is 18.\ldots \texttt{e6?} 19 \texttt{a6!} \texttt{b6} 20 \texttt{x5!} etc) 19 \texttt{e3} \texttt{h6} 20 \texttt{a4} (aiming at \texttt{b6}) 20.\ldots \texttt{a6} 21 \texttt{a6} \texttt{a6} 22 \texttt{f3} \texttt{a7} 23 \texttt{b6!}

White has selected another excellent post for his knight — \texttt{c4}, from where it will threaten the pawns at \texttt{e5} and \texttt{a5}.

23.\ldots \texttt{b7} 24 \texttt{b3} \texttt{b8} 25 \texttt{c4!}

Black has solved part of his defensive problems by exchanging his inactive bishop for its white opponent. But (and this is an instructive point!) this does not mean that he has solved his main, general problem. In fact, in the given case White's advantage has increased still further. His knight has occupied a dominating post, and he has a strategically won position.

25.\ldots \texttt{d8} 26 \texttt{x8+} \texttt{x8} 27 \texttt{d3 c7} (after 27.\ldots \texttt{x3} 28 cd Black loses a pawn) 28 \texttt{d6!}

By continuing the 'pursuit' of the black queen, White decisively strengthens his position.

28.\ldots \texttt{a7+} 29 \texttt{f1} \texttt{d7} 30 \texttt{x6 f8} 31 \texttt{b6} \texttt{d7} 32 \texttt{d6} \texttt{a7} 33 \texttt{e5}, and White won.

As has been shown, even a single insignificant mistake in the opening can have far-reaching consequences, and chess logic dictates that in the subsequent middlegame it is very difficult to change a course of events predetermined in the opening.

At the same time the transition to the middlegame is often closely connected with various elements of positional play.

The plan of accumulating positional advantages

There exist a number of characteristic plans of accumulating positional advantages in the transition to the middlegame, associated, for example, with the exploitation of weak pawns and squares, arising from defects in the pawn formation.

Without great difficulty one could compile a whole series of
colourful variations on exploiting weak squares in the ‘extended centre’ (c3-c6-f6-f3), each point on which has numerous times been the target of an offensive. Naturally, it is not possible to cover all instances of such plans.

Our problem is mainly to give players a definite system of knowledge and (more importantly) methods, which will help in the solving of both practical and theoretical opening questions.

Certain characteristic plans and examples of ‘square-controlling’ play will be shown in the section on typical pawn structures.

Here we should once again remind the reader that, in the light of modern opening strategy, the concept of pawn weaknesses has become much broader and has been increased by new forms. Thus modern games persistently show that a pawn weakness becomes insignificant if it is compensated by active and harmoniously placed pieces. As has already been stated, a flexible pawn formation should not be an end in itself, and should certainly not be achieved contrary to the overall coordination of the forces.

At the same time, if sufficient compensation, e.g. in the form of active play, cannot be obtained, then even the most insignificant weakness in the pawn formation may carry the serious danger of eventual defeat.

New methods of creating and exploiting weak pawns and squares are constantly being found. One of these we will call the ‘fixing’ of a square. This can happen, in particular, in a fairly popular variation of the French Defence: 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 e5 c5 4 c3 c6 5 f3 b6 6 a3 c4!?

In this way Black immobilizes White’s Q-side pawn phalanx (b2-b4!), and in addition he fixes the b3 square, on which he may be able to build active plans. At the same time he must keep a very careful watch on the b3 square, since White may be able to open the b-file and begin an attack on Black’s Q-side castled position.

No. 182 Clarke–Petrosian
Munich OL, 1958

7 g3 d7 8 g2 0-0-0!? 9 0-0 a5 10 b2 h6

The correct decision. Black prevents g5 and prepares a possible offensive by ...g5. 10...f6 11 ef gf is worse, since White gains active play in the centre.

11 e1 c7 12 f1 f5 13 e3 xe3 e7 15 e1 b3!

Reasoning that the exchange
of queens is unfavourable for White, Petrosian uses b3 as a transit square for the important switching of his queen to the K-side, where he plans in time to carry out a decisive offensive.

16 \( \text{\textit{e}}2 \) \( \text{\textit{a}}4! \) 17 \( \text{\textit{e}}3 \) \( \text{\textit{b}}8 \) 18 \( \text{\textit{ed}}1 \) \( \text{\textit{e}}2! \) 19 \( \text{\textit{d}}2 \) \( \text{\textit{f}}5 \) 20 \( \text{\textit{d}}1 \) g5 21 h3 h5 22 \( \text{\textit{h}}2 \) \( \text{\textit{dg}}8 \) 23 g4 \( \text{\textit{g}}6 \)
24 \( \text{\textit{f}}3 \) hg 25 \( \text{\textit{x}}g4 \) \( \text{\textit{c}}6! \)
25. . .\( \text{\textit{b}}3 \) would have been a routine move. Black needs his knight to be attacking, not adopting an elegant pose!

26 f3 \( \text{\textit{d}}8 \) 27 \( \text{\textit{f}}2 \) \( \text{\textit{e}}7 \) 28 \( \text{\textit{e}}1 \)
\( \text{\textit{h}}6 \) 29 \( \text{\textit{f}}1 \) \( \text{\textit{gh}}8 \) 30 \( \text{\textit{x}}g3 \) \( \text{\textit{xh}}3! \)

The decisive positional sacrifice, destroying White’s K-side defences.

31 \( \text{\textit{xh}}3 \) \( \text{\textit{xh}}3 \) 32 \( \text{\textit{g}}2 \) \( \text{\textit{h}}7 \) 33 \( \text{\textit{e}}3 \) \( \text{\textit{g}}6 \) 34 \( \text{\textit{g}}4 \) \( \text{\textit{f}}4! \) 35 \( \text{\textit{xf}}4 \) \( \text{\textit{gf}} \)
36 \( \text{\textit{f}}1 \) \( \text{\textit{g}}3 \) 37 \( \text{\textit{f}}2 \) \( \text{\textit{h}}3+ \) 38 \( \text{\textit{e}}2 \)
\( \text{\textit{g}}2 \) 39 \( \text{\textit{g}}1 \) \( \text{\textit{xf}}2+ \) 40 \( \text{\textit{xf}}2 \) \( \text{\textit{h}}7 \)
41 \( \text{\textit{h}}1 \) \( \text{\textit{g}}6 \) 0-1

Such a plan with the fixing of a flank square on the sixth rank is by no means exceptional. For example, the following line of the King’s Indian Sämisch Variation is instructive: 1 d4 \( \text{\textit{f}}6 \) 2 c4 g6 3 \( \text{\textit{e}}3 \) \( \text{\textit{g}}7 \) 4 e4 d6 5 f3 0-0 6 \( \text{\textit{e}}3 \) e5
7 \( \text{\textit{ge}}2 \) c6 8 \( \text{\textit{d}}2 \) \( \text{\textit{bd}}7 \) 9 0-0-0 a6
10 \( \text{\textit{b}}1 \) \( \text{\textit{a}}5 \) 11 \( \text{\textit{c}}1 \) \( \text{\textit{e}}8 \)

In the given position, where Black appears ready to begin a promising pawn offensive against White’s castled position by . . . b5, the timely fixing of Black’s pawn phalanx is undoubtedly correct: 12 \( \text{\textit{b}}3 \) \( \text{\textit{c}}7 \) 13 de de 14 c5! (75)

While paralyzing Black’s counterplay on the Q-side, White at the same time creates powerful pressure on the central file.

No. 183 Geller-Boleslavsky
USSR Ch., 1952

14. . .\( \text{\textit{xf}}8 \) 15 \( \text{\textit{d}}6 \) \( \text{\textit{e}}6 \) 16 \( \text{\textit{c}}4! \)
\( \text{\textit{xf}}8 \) 17 \( \text{\textit{xc}}7 \) \( \text{\textit{xc}}7 \) 18 \( \text{\textit{a}}5 \) \( \text{\textit{b}}8 \)
19 \( \text{\textit{a}}4! \)

White has achieved an overwhelming positional advantage, and he now takes play into a favourable endgame. Black’s position is strategically lost.

19. . .\( \text{\textit{e}}6 \) 20 \( \text{\textit{xe}}6 \) \( \text{\textit{xe}}6 \) 21 \( \text{\textit{e}}4 \) \( \text{\textit{c}}7 \) 22 \( \text{\textit{ab}}6 \) \( \text{\textit{e}}6 \) 23 b4 \( \text{\textit{f}}4 \)
24 \( \text{\textit{d}}2 \) \( \text{\textit{bd}}8 \) 25 \( \text{\textit{hd}}1 \) \( \text{\textit{xd}}2 \) 26
\( \text{\textit{xd}}2 \) \( \text{\textit{g}}7 \) 27 \( \text{\textit{a}}5 \) \( \text{\textit{b}}8 \) 28 \( \text{\textit{xf}}4! \)
ef 29 \( \text{\textit{d}}7 \) \( \text{\textit{d}}8 \) 30 \( \text{\textit{x}}6+ \) \( \text{\textit{xf}}6 \) 31 \( \text{\textit{xd}}8+ \) \( \text{\textit{xd}}8 \) 32 \( \text{\textit{xb}}7 \), and
White won a pawn, and with it soon the game.

In many modern-day opening
systems the seizure of squares outside the extended centre, in particular b5(b4) or a5, is of considerable importance.

A characteristic example is provided by a variation of the Benoni Defence: 1 d4 󧈠f6 2 c4 c5 3 d5 g6 4 󧈠c3 d6 5 e4 󧈠g7 6 󧈠f3 0-0 7 h3 e6 8 󧈠d3 ed 9 ed 󧈠e8+ 10 󧈠e3 󧈠a6 11 0-0 󧈠c7 12 a4 󧈠a6!? 13 󧈠c1 󧈠b4 14 󧈠b1. Black has established his knight at b4, from where it controls a number of important squares on the Q-side and undoubtedly promises him definite counterplay. The knight looks fine at b4, of course, but in chess the concept of effectiveness is more significant, and it is very important that a knight there should be first and foremost an active piece, and not a passive observer, as often happens.

For this reason it is sometimes advisable to avoid establishing a knight there, as the following example confirms.

No. 184 A. Zaitsev–Gufeld
Debrecen, 1970
Modern Benoni

1 d4 󧈠f6 2 c4 c5 3 d5 e6 4 󧈠c3 ed 5 cd d6 6 e4 g6 7 f4 󧈠g7 8 󧈠b5+ 󧈠fd7 9 a4! 0-0 10 󧈠f3 󧈠a6 11 0-0 󧈠b4(?)

11...󧈠c7 should have been preferred. Now the knight only appears to be well placed; in reality it is cut off from the main battlefield.

12 󧈠e3 a6 13 󧈠c4 󧈠b8 14 h3 󧈠e8?! 15 󧈠f2 b5? 16 ab 󧈠b6 17 󧈠e2 ab 18 󧈠h4 󧈠f6 19 󧈠xf6 󧈠xf6 20 󧈠xb5 󧈠d7 21 󧈠xd7 󧈠xd7 22 󧈠d2! c4 23 e5! de 24 fe 󧈠xe5 25 󧈠xe5 󧈠xe5 26 󧈠ae1 󧈠d6 27 󧈠xe8+ 󧈠xe8 28 󧈠d4! 󧈠c2? 29 󧈠f2 1-0

Another characteristic group of plans in the transition to the middlegame is play on open files. Here too a large number of procedures has been worked out for controlling ‘in turn’ all the files from a- to h- (depending on the specific situation of this or that opening variation). The skilful opening of a file and the occupying of it, as well as the exploitation of the only open file, is sometimes the best plan in the transition to the middlegame.

The control of an open file by a rook is of importance strategically in the achievement of a plan. All other things being equal, in the majority of cases the domination of an open file guarantees a persistent initiative, and sometimes even a decisive advantage.

The control of central files is particularly important since operations on them are the most dangerous in the middlegame.
This is confirmed by the following examples.

No. 185 Botvinnik-Sorokin
USSR Ch., 1931
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c3 f3 f6 3 c4 e6 4 c3
\(\text{\textcopyright}7\) 5 g5 e7 6 e3 0-0 7 d3
\(c6\) 8 0-0 a6 9 a4 dc 10 \(x\) c4 c5 11
\(c\) 12 w2 h6 13 h4 c7
\(14 f\) f1 h5 15 x e7 x e7 16
d2! b6 17 ad1 c5 18 a2
f6 19 e4 c5 20 w3!

An instructive moment. After
concentrating his rooks on the
central file, White finds the
most effective solution for
further strengthening his position.
This involves the exchange
of queens, after which his pressure
on the d-file can only increase.

20...w x e3 21 fe g4 22 a5
\(f8\) 23 c1 x f3 24 gf c7 25
d5! c6 (25...x d5 26 x d5)
26 x f6+ gf 27 d7 b8 28 f2!
x a5 29 c7 c8 30 x f7
x c7 31 x c7+ h8 32 d5 b5
33 b3 d8 34 g3 f5 35 h4 fe 36
fe d6 37 h5 f6 38 h3 d6 39
h4 b6 40 g4 h6 41 a7 b6
42 c7 d6 43 c7 f6 44 a7
b6 45 c7 f6 46 h5 d6 47
f7! f6 (47...g7 48 d5+ and
49 b4!) 48 g6 x b3 49
x h6 f8 (or 49...g8 50 g5
f1 51 h5!, and White wins) 50
h7+ g8 51 g7+ h8 52 f7
\(x f7\) 53 xf7 g8 54 g6 d2
55 d7 1-0

No. 186 Botvinnik-Boleslavsky
USSR Ch., 1945
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 b5 a6
4 a4 f6 5 0-0 d6 6 c3 d7 7 d4
g6 8 bd2 e7 9 e1 g7 10 f1
0-0 11 g5 h6 12 h4 e8 13
c2 h5 14 c3 c7 15 de! de 16
g3! x g3 17 hg d8 18 e2
ce8 19 ed1 c6 20 d2 e7 21
d1 d6 22 b4!

By subtle manœuvring White
has first restricted Black’s
counterplay on the K-side and
then concentrated his heavy
pieces on the only open file. It is
this that becomes the main arena
of his subsequent offensive.

22...e6 23 b3 x d2 24
x d2 x b3 25 ab e6 26 c4 f6
27 c5! c8 28 d7! x b3 (or
28...d8 29 x e6 x d1+ 30
x d1 fe 31 e3, winning a
pawn) 29 x b7 g5 30 x g5 hg
31 b6 a6 e7 32 b7 e8 33 d7
f8 34 d6 x b4 35 g4! e8
36 x e5 b3! 37 d7 g8 38
d6+ g7 39 d4+!

The final subtlety. The tempting
39 e5 would have encountered resistance after 39...f6
40 d8 (40 x f7+ x f7! 41
x f7 a1+ 42 h2 g4+ 43
h3 x f2+ 44 h2 h1 mate!) 40...
\(x d8\) 41 x d8 b1+ 42
The plan of accumulating positional advantages

\[ \text{\textcopyright h2 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}e4 43 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}7 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}5}, with a draw.} \]

39. \textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}7 40 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}6+ \textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}f6 41
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}f6 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}8 42 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}2 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}8 43 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}c6!
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}7 44 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}6 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}1 45 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}4+ \textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}7
46 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}6 1-0

It often happens in practice that control of an open file fairly quickly provides the springboard for penetration into the opponent’s rear, and in particular onto the 7th rank. Regarding this, Nimzowitsch stated in his customarily categorical way: “The ideal which lies at the root of every operation in a file is the ultimate penetration by way of this file into the enemy’s game, that is to say to our 7th or 8th rank”.

We give a convincing example of such play, taken from a modern game.

**No. 187 Botvinnik-Portisch**

Monaco, 1968

*English Opening*

1 c4 e5 2 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}3 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}6 3 g3 d5 4 cd
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}x\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}d5 5 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}2 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}6 6 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}3 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}6 7 0-0
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}6 8 d3 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}7 9 a3 a5 10 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}3 0-0
11 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}4 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}a4 12 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}a4 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}d5 13
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}c1 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}8 14 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}2! \textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}8 15 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}acl
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}b8?

Black’s position is already difficult. For example, 15...e4
16 de \textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}xe4 17 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}2 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}6 18 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}4
etc. is unattractive. 15...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}b8
was probably best, intending a possible...b5. Now the white rook penetrates with great effect onto the 7th rank.

16 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}c7 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}6

This is what Black was counting on, but he failed to reckon with White’s subsequent combination.

17 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}c6! \textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}c 18 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}f7!!

The point of White’s plan. The white rook ‘rages’ along the 7th rank.

18...h6 19 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}7 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}8 20 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}4+
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}8 (20...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}6 21 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}xe5!) 21
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}4!

Black’s position is indefensible.

21...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}xb7 22 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}6+ \textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}7 23
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}4 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}6 24 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}e5+ g6 25 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}g6+
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}7 26 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}}h6+! 1-0

A similar theme is seen in the ‘Evergreen’ game Anderssen-Dufresne, and in the famous game Steinitz-Bardeleben, where the invasion of the 7th rank by a rook was a powerful stimulus for a decisive and brilliant attack by White on the enemy king.

In these games the invasion of the opponent’s rear at an early stage was the decisive factor in success.

**No. 188 Andersson-Dufresne**

Berlin, 1852

*Evans Gambit*

1 e4 e5 2 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}3 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}6 3 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}4 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}5 4
The connection of the opening with the later stages of the game

b4 \(\text{AXB}4\) 5 c3 \(\text{\Delta a}5\) 6 d4! ed
7 0-0 d3 8 \(\text{\textbackslash b}3\) \(\text{\textbackslash f}6\) 9 e5 \(\text{\textbackslash g}6\) 10 \(\text{\textbackslash a}3\) \(\text{\textbackslash g}e7\) 11 \(\text{\textbackslash e}1\) b5? (better
11...d6) 12 \(\text{\textbackslash a}xb5\) \(\text{\textbackslash b}8\) 13 \(\text{\textbackslash a}4\)
\(\text{\textbackslash a}b6\) 14 \(\text{\textbackslash d}a2\) \(\text{\textbackslash b}7\) 15 \(\text{\textbackslash e}4\) \(\text{\textbackslash f}5\) 16
\(\text{\textbackslash a}d3\) \(\text{\textbackslash h}5\) 17 \(\text{\textbackslash f}6+\) gf 18 ef \(\text{\textbackslash g}8\)
19 \(\text{\textbackslash a}d1!\) \(\text{\textbackslash x}f3\) 20 \(\text{\textbackslash e}7+!!\) \(\text{\textbackslash x}e7\)
21 \(\text{\textbackslash x}d7+!!\) \(\text{\textbackslash d}7\) 22 \(\text{\textbackslash f}5++\) \(\text{\textbackslash e}8\)
23 \(\text{\textbackslash d}7+\) \(\text{\textbackslash d}8\) 24 \(\text{\textbackslash x}e7\) mate!

No. 189 Steinitz-Bardeleben
Hastings, 1895
Italian Game

1 e4 e5 2 \(\text{\Delta f}3\) \(\text{\textbackslash c}6\) 3 \(\text{\textbackslash c}4\) \(\text{\textbackslash c}5\)
4 c3 \(\text{\textbackslash f}6\) 5 d4 ed 6 cd \(\text{\textbackslash b}4+7\) \(\text{\textbackslash c}3\)
d5 8 ed \(\text{\textbackslash x}d5\) 9 0-0 \(\text{\textbackslash e}6\) 10 \(\text{\textbackslash g}5\)
\(\text{\textbackslash e}7\) 11 \(\text{\textbackslash x}d5\) \(\text{\textbackslash x}d5\) 12 \(\text{\textbackslash x}d5\)
\(\text{\textbackslash x}d5\) 13 \(\text{\textbackslash x}e7\) \(\text{\textbackslash x}e7\) 14 \(\text{\textbackslash e}1\) f6
15 \(\text{\textbackslash w}e2\) \(\text{\textbackslash w}d7\) 16 \(\text{\textbackslash c}1\) \(\text{\textbackslash c}6\)? (better
16...\(\text{\textbackslash g}f7\) 17 d5! cd 18 \(\text{\textbackslash d}4\) \(\text{\textbackslash f}7\)
19 \(\text{\textbackslash e}6\) \(\text{\textbackslash h}c8\) 20 \(\text{\textbackslash g}4\) g6 21 \(\text{\textbackslash g}5+\)
\(\text{\textbackslash e}8\) 22 \(\text{\textbackslash x}e7+\) \(\text{\textbackslash w}f8\)!

Both here and later the rook is taboo. After 20...\(\text{\textbackslash f}f7\) 21
\(\text{\textbackslash x}c8+\) or 22...\(\text{\textbackslash x}e7\) 23 \(\text{\textbackslash e}1+\)
\(\text{\textbackslash d}6\) 24 \(\text{\textbackslash f}4+\) \(\text{\textbackslash c}7\) 25 \(\text{\textbackslash e}6+\) \(\text{\textbackslash g}8\)
26 \(\text{\textbackslash f}4+\) White wins.
23 \(\text{\textbackslash f}7+!!\) \(\text{\textbackslash g}8\) 24 \(\text{\textbackslash g}7+!!\) \(\text{\textbackslash h}8\)
25 \(\text{\textbackslash h}7+1-0\)

No. 190 Steinitz-Anderssen
Vienna, 1873
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 \(\text{\textbackslash c}c3\) \(\text{\textbackslash f}6\) 4 \(\text{\textbackslash g}5\)
\(\text{\textbackslash e}7\) 5 e3 0-0 6 \(\text{\textbackslash f}3\) b6 7 \(\text{\textbackslash d}3\) \(\text{\textbackslash b}7\)
8 0-0 \(\text{\textbackslash d}d7\) (8...dc! 9 \(\text{\textbackslash x}c4\) c5) 9
cd ed 10 \(\text{\textbackslash c}1\) c5 11 dc bc 12 \(\text{\textbackslash a}4\)
\(\text{\textbackslash e}4?\) 13 \(\text{\textbackslash x}e4\) de 14 \(\text{\textbackslash f}d1!\) \(\text{\textbackslash x}g5\)
15 \(\text{\textbackslash x}g5\) \(\text{\textbackslash x}g5\) 16 \(\text{\textbackslash x}d7\) \(\text{\textbackslash f}b8\) 17
\(\text{\textbackslash b}3!\) \(\text{\textbackslash c}6\) 18 \(\text{\textbackslash f}7+\) \(\text{\textbackslash h}8\) 19 h4!
\(\text{\textbackslash g}4\) 20 \(\text{\textbackslash a}7\) \(\text{\textbackslash a}7\) 21 \(\text{\textbackslash a}7\)
\(\text{\textbackslash b}2\) 22 \(\text{\textbackslash c}5\) \(\text{\textbackslash e}6\) 23 \(\text{\textbackslash d}1\) h6 24
\(\text{\textbackslash d}6\) \(\text{\textbackslash f}7\) 25 \(\text{\textbackslash d}1\) \(\text{\textbackslash e}2\) 26 \(\text{\textbackslash f}1\) 1-0

No. 191 Alatortsev-Capablanca
Moscow, 1935
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 \(\text{\textbackslash f}6\) 2 c4 e6 3 \(\text{\textbackslash c}3\) d5 4 \(\text{\textbackslash g}5\)
\(\text{\textbackslash e}7\) 5 e3 0-0 6 cd?! \(\text{\textbackslash d}5\) 7 \(\text{\textbackslash x}e7\)
\(\text{\textbackslash x}e7\) 8 \(\text{\textbackslash b}3\) \(\text{\textbackslash f}3\) \(\text{\textbackslash c}3\) 9 bc b6 10 \(\text{\textbackslash e}2\)
\(\text{\textbackslash b}7\) 11 0-0 c5 12 \(\text{\textbackslash f}5\) \(\text{\textbackslash e}6\) 13
\(\text{\textbackslash e}6(?)\) \(\text{\textbackslash c}6\) 14 \(\text{\textbackslash f}3\) \(\text{\textbackslash a}8\)

Black has not only successfully overcome his opening difficulties, but has even gained slightly the better prospects. In trying for further simplification, subsequently White incautiously permits the penetration of the black rooks along the c-file into his rear.
15 \(\text{\textbackslash a}4\) cd 16 cd g6 17 \(\text{\textbackslash x}e6\)
\(\text{\textbackslash x}c6\) 18 \(\text{\textbackslash d}3\) \(\text{\textbackslash b}7\) 19 \(\text{\textbackslash f}b1?\) (19
\(\text{\textbackslash a}b1\) is correct) 19...\(\text{\textbackslash f}c8\) 20 h3
\(\text{\textbackslash a}6!\) 21 \(\text{\textbackslash a}3?\) \(\text{\textbackslash c}2!\) 22 \(\text{\textbackslash f}6?\) (76)
22...\(\text{xf2}\)! 23 \(\text{g3}\) (23 \(\text{xf2}\) \(\text{c2+}\) 24 \(\text{e1}\) \(\text{g2}\) 25 \(\text{b8+}\) \(\text{g7}\) 26 \(\text{e5+}\) f6, and Black wins) 23...\(\text{e2}\) 0-1

No. 192 Petrosian–Matanović
Portorož IZ, 1958
Ragozin Defence

1 c4 \(\text{d6}\) 2 \(\text{c3}\) e6 3 \(\text{f3}\) d5 4 d4 \(\text{b4}\) 5 cd ed 6 \(\text{g5}\) h6 7 \(\text{h4}\) e5 8 e3 0-0 9 dc \(\text{bd7}\) 10 \(\text{e2}\) a5 11 0-0 \(\text{xc3}\) 12 bc \(\text{xc5}\) 13 \(\text{c1}\) b6 14 c4 \(\text{b7}\) 15 \(\text{d4}\) \(\text{ac8}\)!! (15...\(\text{dc})!\) 16 \(\text{f3}\) \(\text{b4}\) 17 a3! \(\text{xa3}\)?

This loses virtually by force. 17...\(\text{c5}\) was comparatively best.

18 \(\text{a1}\) \(\text{c5}\) 19 \(\text{xa7}\) \(\text{a8}\) 20 \(\text{a1}\) h7 21 \(\text{d1}\)! \(\text{xc4}\) 22 \(\text{e2}\) \(\text{c3}\) 23 \(\text{xa8}\)! 1-0

In a number of openings, especially modern ones with the fianchetto of the bishops at b2 and g2 (or correspondingly at b7 and g7), a plan of active play along the main diagonals becomes important. Such plans often arise at an early stage of the game, and are often associated with an attack on the king.

No. 193 Alekhine–Alexander
Nottingham, 1936
Queen’s Indian Defence

1 d4 \(\text{f6}\) 2 c4 e6 3 \(\text{B}3\) \(\text{b4+}\) 4 \(\text{bd2}\) b6 5 g3 \(\text{b7}\) 6 \(\text{g2}\) 0-0 7 \(\text{d2}\)? (7...\(\text{e8}\) 8 a3 \(\text{f8}\) 8 \(\text{xd2}\)! d6 9 b3 \(\text{bd7}\) 10 \(\text{b2}\) \(\text{b8}\)!! 11 \(\text{ad1}\) \(\text{e4}\) 12 \(\text{e3}\) f5 13 d5! ed (13...e5? 14 \(\text{h4}\), and the threat \(\text{xf5}\) cannot be parried) 14 cd \(\text{d6}\) 15 \(\text{h4}\) \(\text{d7}\) 16 \(\text{h3}\) g6 17 f3 \(\text{c5}\) 18 \(\text{g5}\) \(\text{g7}\) 19 b4 \(\text{cd7}\) 20 e4! \(\text{xe4}\) 21 \(\text{c1}\)! \(\text{e6}\) 22 \(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{h8}\) 23 \(\text{e6}\) \(\text{a6}\) 24 \(\text{fe1}\) \(\text{e5}\) 25 f4 \(\text{d3}\) 26 \(\text{xd3}\) \(\text{xd3}\) 27 g4 1-0

No. 194 Rashkovsky–Filip
Sochi, 1973
Queen’s Indian Defence

1 d4 \(\text{f6}\) 2 c4 e6 3 \(\text{f3}\) b6 4 g3 \(\text{b7}\) 5 \(\text{g2}\) \(\text{e7}\) 6 0-0 0-0 7 b3 c5 8 \(\text{b2}\) cd 9 \(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 10 \(\text{f4}\) d5 11 \(\text{d1}\) \(\text{b8}\) 12 \(\text{c3}\)! dc 13 \(\text{xc4}\) \(\text{c8}\)!! 14 \(\text{h4}\)! \(\text{d5}\) 15 \(\text{g5}\)! h6 16 \(\text{xd5}\) (77)

White’s piece attack has become very much a reality. The finish of the game is a triumph for the long-range bishops.

16...\(\text{exg5}\) 17 \(\text{g4}\) ed 18 f4 \(\text{e8}\)? (18...d4 is more
tenacious) 19 \textit{\&}xd5! \textit{\&}e7 20 fg h5 21 \textit{\&}xf7+! \textit{\&}xf7 22 \textit{\&}xh5+! \\textit{\&}g8 23 \textit{\&}xg7 \textit{\&}e4 24 \textit{\&}f6 \textit{\&}b7 25 \\textit{\&}h8+ \textit{\&}f7 26 \textit{\&}g7+ \textit{\&}e6 27 \textit{\&}e5 \\textit{\&}d5 28 \textit{\&}f6+ \textit{\&}d7 29 \textit{\&}d6+ 1-0

And what about play against a ‘bad’ bishop? Such plans are typical of the French Defence, Caro-Kann Defence, Queen’s Gambit, King’s Indian Defence, and so on. A plan of this type was given in the game Schlechter-John (No. 150), and it will also be mentioned in the section on weak square complexes.

In many opening variations a struggle takes place between a knight and an enemy bishop. Here too everything depends on the character of the position. Thus the superiority of bishops over knights is very marked in positions with an open centre. But in closed set-ups with blocked pawn chains the role of the knight increases, especially if the bishop is restricted by its own pawns, or if the knight occupies a centralized position (e.g. blockading an isolated pawn).

These features rarely appear in pure form at an early stage of the game. There is usually a complicated ‘mixture’ of them, where the main components are gradually exchanged. The following example is typical in this respect.

No. 195 Karpov-Smyslov
USSR Internal OL, 1972
Petroff’s Defence

1 e4 e5 2 \textit{\&}f3 \textit{\&}f6 3 \textit{\&}xe5 d6 4 \textit{\&}f3 \textit{\&}xe4 5 d4 \textit{\&}e7 6 \textit{\&}d3 \textit{\&}f6 7 \\textit{\&}h3 0-0 8 0-0 c5?! 9 \textit{\&}c3 \textit{\&}c6 10 \\textit{\&}e1 a6 11 d5! (78)

As a result of Black’s passive opening play, White has gained a clear and persistent advantage, consisting in his greater freedom and his control of the only open file. Now Black should probably have reconciled himself to the necessity for a lengthy defence, and retreated his knight to b8. In trying to complicate the game, he prefers the eccentric retreat to a7, but after this he is faced with a new, more serious strategic danger — for a long time the knight at a7 cannot coordinate with his other forces, and simply fails to find a good post. From this point White’s main plan becomes playing to restrict and isolate the knight at a7.
11...a7? 12 a4 Qd7 13 a5! Qe8 14 Qf1 h6 15 Qf4 Qf8 16 Qxe8 Qxe8 17 Qh2 Qd8 18 Qd2 Qc7 19 Qde4! Qxe4 20 Qxe4 Qf5 21 Qd2 Qe8 22 c3

The numerous exchanges have only favoured White. Now the poor position of the black knight is especially perceptible.

22...Qd8 23 Qb3 Qd7 24 c4! Qc8 25 g4! (taking away the important f5 square) 25...Qh7 26 Qd3 Qxh3 27 Qxd3 g6 28 Qb1 Qg7 29 b4! cb 30 Qxb4 Qc7 31 Qb3

How Black would like to have his knight at d7! But although only one square separates it from there, the way to it proves unattainable. For example, 31...b6? 32 ab Qxb6 33 c5!, and Black’s position is on the verge of collapse.

31...Qe5 32 Qxe5 Qxe5 33 Qd4 g5 34 Qg2! Qe7 35 Qd2 Qe1 36 Qb3 Qe2 37 Qf3! Qe5 38 Qe3 f6 39 Qe4 Qg7 40 Qg2! Qc7 41 Qf3 b5 42 ab 1-0

Simplifying from the opening into a complex endgame

Usually the transition from opening to middlegame as though reveals the strength of the pieces, whereas when play goes into an endgame (including straight from the opening) this always leads first and foremost to a marked reappraisal of middlegame values.

Thus in the middlegame the king usually keeps itself well hidden, but in the endgame it feels much more confident and will often take an active part in the battle (and the strength of the king in a ‘pure’ endgame sometimes achieves the level of a rook).

Pawns, after only recently being common ‘workers’, or even mere ‘cannon-fodder’, become highly respected veterans. And in general, every unit of material, even the weakest, begins to demand careful attention. Especially passed pawns. In the middlegame they are only rarely a powerful and independent force, but in the endgame they often lead an offensive, and for their life the opponent may have to pay dearly.

The strength of the rook also increases sharply. Like mortars in old war films, they are often ready to destroy the opponent’s unsupported defences.

But in many cases the importance of the minor pieces falls in comparison with the rook. There are now fewer possibilities for an attack on the king, and also their influence on the chess board is not as great as in the middle-
game. What tells here is a definite geometric restriction on the actions of minor pieces, which, incidentally, in many cases (with a small number of pieces) is subject to purely mathematical analysis.

Of course, these considerations apply mainly to exclusively endgame situations, whereas, on the transition from the opening to a complex endgame, both middle game and endgame motifs are usually present simultaneously.

Nevertheless, on each occasion a player should take serious account of these factors and have a clear impression of them, when going in for considerable simplification in the opening.

In many cases the strategic procedure of simplification is associated with the gaining in the opening of certain positional advantages, which can be most effectively exploited in the endgame, such as: weaknesses in the opponent's pawn formation, possibilities of invading with the rook to the rear, and so on.

Here are a few examples of this type.

No. 196 Simagin-Keres
Moscow, 1963
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 \( \text{d} \) f3 \( \text{c} \) c6 3 \( \text{b} \) b5 a6 4 \( \text{a} \) a4 \( \text{d} \) f6 5 0-0 d6 6 \( \text{d} \) c6+ bc 7 d4 ed(?) 8 \( \text{xd} \) d4 \( \text{e} \) c7 9 e5! c5 10 \( \text{d} \) d3 de 11 \( \text{xd} \) d8+ \( \text{xd} \) d8 12 \( \text{xe} \) e5 \( \text{e} \) e7

Black played the opening badly, leading to the significant weakening of his Q-side pawns. White successfully grasped this feature and at the transition stage he found the effective plan of taking play into a favourable endgame.

Although Black has two bishops, the situation is nevertheless dictated by the irreparable weakness of his pawns.

13 \( \text{e} \) e1 \( \text{e} \) e6 14 \( \text{c} \) c3 0-0 15 \( \text{g} \) g5 h6(?) 16 \( \text{g} \) g6! fg 17 \( \text{xe} \) e6 \( \text{f} \) f7 18 \( \text{a} \) a1 \( \text{e} \) e8 19 \( \text{xf} \) f6 \( \text{xf} \) f6 (19... \( \text{gf} \) 20 \( \text{d} \) d5!) 20 \( \text{xe} \) e8 \( \text{xe} \) e8 21 \( \text{xe} \) e8 \( \text{xe} \) e8 22 \( \text{d} \) d1 \( \text{d} \) d7 23 \( \text{f} \) f1 \( \text{c} \) c6 24 \( \text{e} \) e2 \( \text{e} \) e5 25 h3 \( \text{d} \) d5 26 \( \text{e} \) e3+ \( \text{e} \) e4 27 c3 \( \text{h} \) h5 28 \( \text{c} \) c4 \( \text{f} \) f4 29 g3 \( \text{g} \) g5 30 f3+ \( \text{d} \) d5 31 \( \text{d} \) d3 \( \text{e} \) e7 32 \( \text{e} \) e3+ \( \text{e} \) e6 33 \( \text{e} \) e4! g5 34 \( \text{c} \) c4

As early as move 21 a purely technical ending arose, and White has handled it with great mastery. We should mention that in general the transition to the endgame is closely associated with good technique required for realizing an advantage. Of course, there may be various ways of realizing an advantage, which may involve an attack and even sacrifices. And yet the realization of an
advantage by simplifying is highly typical, and improvement cannot be achieved without a mastery of its technique.

34...g6 35 g4 hg 36 fg Af6 37 a3 Ae7 38 a4 Af6 39 Ad2 Ae7 40 Af3 Af6 41 Ad2 Ad6 42 Ac4+ Ae6 43 Ab5 Ad6 44 Ad3 Ad5 45 Ac4 c6 46 Ab6+ Ad6 47 a5 Ad8 48 Ac4 Ac7 49 a4 Ax5 50 Cx5 Ab6 51 Axa6 Ae3 52 Ab4 Ac1 53 b3 Af4 54 Ac2 Ae5 55 Ad4 Af6 56 b4

White has won a pawn, which in the given situation is equivalent to winning the game.

56...Ae7 57 Af3 Af6 58 d3 c5 59 b5 Ad5 60 c4+ Ae6 61 Ae4 Ad6 62 b6 Ac6 63 Ae5+ Ab7 64 Ad7 Ad4 65 Ad6 1-0

In the following examples the transition to the endgame is seen in a different light, the theme of the active side being an attack on the king. Yes, an attack, although there is little material left on the board.

No. 197 Karpov-Mecking
Hastings, 1971/72
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 Af3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 Axd4 Af6 5 Ac3 a6 6 Ae2 e5 7 Ab3 Ae6 8 f4 Ac7 9 a4 Ac6?!

9...Ae7 or 9...Abd7 is more flexible. Now White forcibly gains control of the critical square d5.

10 f5 Axb3 11 eb Ab6 12 Ag5 Ae7 13 Axf6 Axf6 14 Ad5 Aa5+ 15 Ad2! Axd2+ 16 Axd2 Ag5+ 17 Axd3 0-0 18 h4 Ad8 19 Ac1

Despite the simplification, White has obtained a strong attacking position, whereas Black has no possibility of active counterplay. The game is finally decided by a storming of Black’s castled position, a situation which in practice often occurs in the endgame.

19...a5 20 Ad2 Ab8 21 g4! Ab4 22 Ac4 Axd5 23 Axd5 (79)

A typical structure, where the opposite-colour bishops merely facilitate White’s attack.

23...g5?!

Black tries to block the white pawn mass, but Karpov’s offensive develops inexorably.

24 fg hg 25 Ad3 Ag7 26 h5 Ab6 27 Ah3 Ac5 28 Af1 f6 29 hg Ac6 30 Af1 Ab8 31 Ah7 Ag5 32 Ae2 Af4 33 Ac1h3! Ad4 34 Ag7!

1-0

We will also consider an
example from the Exchange Variation of the Spanish Game:
1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 b5 a6
4 c×c6 dc 5 d4 ed 6 ×d4 ×d4
7 ×d4 (80)

Play has gone into a complex endgame, where Black has been given doubled pawns on the c-file and White has gained a K-side pawn majority.

This factor undoubtedly plays a certain role, and it could become decisive if a pawn ending were to be reached. But this is a long way off. For the moment not only are there many pieces on the board, but also of considerable importance is the fact that Black has no difficulties with the development of his pieces: he has two strong bishops and good possibilities for piece play.

In short, for the moment the character of the pawn formation is not so important.

The development of events in the following game is instructive.

No. 198 Verlinsky–Alekhine
St. Petersburg, 1909

7...c5 8 e2 d7 9 b3? c4! 10 bc a4 11 c3 0–0 0 12 d2 c2 13 f3 c5 14 a4 f6 15 a3 e3! 16 f1 a7 17 a5 d3 18 c5 h6 19 f2 d7 20 e3 x5! 21 d4 b3

In the best traditions of the middlegame Black has managed to disorganize his opponent's forces and achieve a decisive advantage. There was a highly elegant finish to the game:

22 e2 x3 23 b2 x3+ 24 x3 e6 25 a3 d4 26 f4 c5 27 aa1 e2+ 28 g4 e6+ 0–1

It can be considered that, in complex endgame positions arising as a result of an opening struggle, middlegame and endgame themes are very closely interwoven. Sometimes their connection is highly contradictory. After all, in spite of a certain sharpness in the tactical struggle which sometimes results, many possibilities, which are characteristic of the middlegame, markedly lose their effect as the game becomes simplified. Thus very often an attack on the king is not so sharp, it is not often that material can be sacrificed, and so on.
In this sense the development of events in the following game is instructive.

**No. 199 Chistyakov-Suetin**  
Riga, 1954  
*English Opening*

1 d4 ♘f6 2 c4 c5 3 ♘f3 g6 4 ♗c3 d5 ♘xd4 d5 c6 7 ♘db5 ♘xc3 8 ♘xd8+ ♘xd8 9 ♘xc3

(81)

In trying to activate his pieces, White has merely weakened his pawns still further; his position is now very difficult. For example, after 26 ♘xe6 ♘xe6 27 ♘d8 f6! 28 ♘f4 ♚c6 29 ♘d7+ ♙a6 30 ♘xe7 ♘xe4 31 ♘f7 ♘xe6! Black later threatens to eliminate the weak white pawns on the Q-side. It is clear that purely endgame themes have come into force, and it is they that decide the outcome of the game.

26 ♘f1 ♚c8 27 ♘f6 ♘d7 28 ♘d4 ♘c5!, and without particular difficulty Black exploited his opponent's pawn weaknesses.

In this example one can follow how inexorably White's initiative faded, and how the positional drawbacks of his set-up became more and more apparent.

In any situation the natural task for each of the two sides is to exploit the advantages of their own position while simultaneously neutralizing...
corresponding attempts by the opponent. As applied to a complex endgame, this often signifies that one side has some durable positional advantage which can be exploited through further simplification, whereas the other is aiming to exploit his dynamic advantages. Often the second factor plays a more important role, and may, for example, assist the mounting of an attack on the opponent’s king; in other cases, on the contrary, the motifs of the impending basic endgame acquire more significance.

In such positions much depends not only on who holds the initiative, but also on how persistent it is. The following example is instructive in this respect.

No. 200 Kan-Eliazarov
Moscow, 1956
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 c2 e5?!
An objectively dubious pawn sacrifice, which, however, as though changes the roles in the opening: here it is White who finds himself as the defending side.

4 de de 5 c5 e4 cxd1 + 6 cxd1 (82)
White’s task is simple: to retain his extra pawn and exploit it in the endgame. He tries to achieve this by further exchanges (expedient ones, of course). Black, on the other hand, must aim to exploit the activity of his pieces and if possible to build up an attack on the white king, which is caught in the centre. In short, we have a typical situation of the type under discussion.

6 c6 7 f4 f6!? 8 ef g4+
9 e2 0-0-0+ 10 d2 e2+
11 cxe2 cxf6 12 cxf6
A natural but routine exchange, after which Black’s initiative merely increases. 12 c2! followed by c3 would have been correct, considerably strengthening the king’s defences. Then Black’s initiative would have gradually faded and White’s material advantage would have told.

12 . . . g6 13 c3 c5 14 c2 he8 15 c1 h5! 16 e1 cxe1 17 c5 c8 18 g3 c8 19 d1 g1!, and Black gained equal chances.
Often the transition into a complex endgame is associated with square-controlling play, which is assisted by favourable simplification. A splendid example of this is provided by the following game, in which, incidentally, at the decisive stage middlegame motifs are clearly apparent.

No. 201 Fischer-Petrosian
Candidates Match, 1971
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 f3 e6 3 d4 cd 4 xd4 a6 5 d3 c6 6 xc6 bc 7 0-0 d5 8 c4! f6 9 cd cd 10 ed ed 11 c3! e7 12 a4+ d7 (White also retains the initiative after 12... d7 13 c2! 0-0 14 g5!) 13 e1!(83)

A very subtle decision. White takes play into an endgame where Black’s pawn weaknesses are a telling factor.

13... xa4 14 xa4 e6 15 e3 0-0 (White’s advantage is also obvious after 15... d7 16 f4! g6 17 d4 0-0 18 ac1) 16 c5 fe8 17 xe7 xe7 18 b4! f8 19 c5 c8 20 f3 ea7 21 e5! d7 22 xd7+! xd7 23 c1 c6 24 c7 d7 25 e2 g6 26 h5

The finish takes the form of a powerful attack by White.

27 f4 h4 28 f3 f5 29 e3! d4+ 30 d2! b6 31 ee7 d5 32 f7+ e8 33 b7 xb4 34 c4 1-0

In analyzing the various factors arising in the transition from opening to endgame, it will not be out of place to recall the following comment by Alekhine: “Every chess master is morally obliged to try as well as possible to solve the problems of a position without ‘fear’ of simplification. Playing for complications is an extreme measure, to which a player should resort only when he is unable to find a clear and logical plan”.

These words are very colourfully confirmed by the following example, where White, with a spatial advantage in the opening, accepted without hesitation the simplification offered by his opponent at the transitional stage. His subsequent, accurately calculated attack in the centre demonstrates that simplification by no means restricts the scope for imagination.
No. 202 Razuvayev-Honfi
Cienfuegos, 1976
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2  f3  c6 3 d4 cd 4 xd4 g6 5 c4  g7 6  e3  f6 7 c3 0-0 8  e2 d6 9 0-0  d7 10
  c1  xd4 11  xd4  c6 12 f3  d7 13 b4!  xd4+ 14  xd4  b6? 15  x6b6  xb6 (84)

  84

b8 10 d4 b7?! 11 de de 12  x8d8  x8d8 13  xe5  xe4 14
  e3! etc., or 1 d4  f6 2 c4 g6 3  c3  g7 4 e4 d6 5 f3 0-0 6  e3  e5 7  ge2 c6 8  b3  bd7 9 0-0-0
  a5 10 b1  b8 11 de de 12
  a4! etc.

In other cases such a solution is the optimal one.

No. 203 Polugayevsky-Ivkov
Belgrade, 1969
Sicilian Defence

1  f3  f6 2 c4 c5 3  c3  c6

  85

4 d4 cd 5  xd4  xd4 6  xd4 g6 7 e4  g7 8  e3  d6 9 f3 0-0 10  xd2
  e6 11  c1  a5 12  d5!  xd2+ (practice has shown that 12...
  x2a2 is better here) 13  xd2
  xd5 14 cd  fc8 15  a6 16 b4!

(85)

16 e5! de 17 b5  e8 18 c5!  d7 19  d5 e6 20  e7+  g7 21 c6 bc 22 bc  b6 23 c7  d7 24  fd1  a4 25
  d6!  f6 26  xb6  xe7 27
  b7  f6 28  cb1  c6 29  b8  c8 30  c1  axb8 31 cb  xb8 32  x6c  b2 33  c4 h5 34 h4 g5 35
  hg+  xg5 36  h2  f4 37  b3 a5 38  a6  b5 39  a7  f6 40
  a4 1-0

It should be mentioned that in certain variations play for simplification and the transition into the endgame is the only correct solution to the opening problems, e.g. 1 e4 e5 2  f3  c6 3  b5 a6 4  a4  f6 5 0-0  a7 6  e1 b5 7  b3 d6 8 c3 0-0 9 h3

In the resulting ending White has a number of small but significant advantages: the two bishops, greater space in the centre, and an active plan of play on the Q-side. All this allows him con-
sistently to strengthen his position.

16. ...\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\text{xf8}}} 17 a4 \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\text{d7}}} 18 a5! b2 19 c2+ \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\text{xc2}}} 20 \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\text{xc2}}} g7 21 b3 c8 22 d2 d4 23 g4 g7 24 g5!

After restricting Black’s forces on the Q-side, White begins a decisive offensive on the K-side.

24. ...\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\text{c7}}} 25 \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\text{d1}}} \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\text{f8}}} 26 f4 c8 27 g4 e8 28 f1 c7 29 h4 g7 30 h5! d4 31 h1 g7 32 h3 \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\text{f8}}} 33 h6! d4 34 d3 a7 35 h3 g1 36 c3 e8 37 e5 h2 38 ed ed 39 e3+ d8 40 e4 g1 41 d7 1-0

No. 204 Karpov-Kavalek
Nice OL, 1974
\textit{Sicilian Defence}

1 c4 c5 2 \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\text{f3}}} g6 3 d4 cd 4 \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\text{xd4}}} c6 5 e4 f6 6 c3 d6 7 e2 xd4 8 xd4 g7 9 g5 0-0 10 d2 e6 11 c1 a5 12 f3 ec8 13 h3 a6 14 a4! xd2+ 15 xd2 c6 (better 15...d7) 16 c3 ac8 (16...e8 should probably have been preferred) 17 d5 \textbf{\textcolor{red}{\text{f8}}} 18 e3 d7 19 h4 xd5(?) (19...f5 offered better chances) 20 ed ec7 21 h5 g8 22 f4 c5 23 g4! e4+ 24 d3 f5 25 f3 b5 26 g4! bc+ 27 xc4! xc4 27 bc c5+ 29 xc5

As in the Karpov-Mecking game (No. 197), here the opposite-colour bishops merely make Black’s defence more difficult.

29. ...xc5 30 h6! f8 31 c3 fg 32 xg4 f7 33 e6+ f6 34 g8 c7 35 xh7 e6 36 g8 ed 37 h7! g7?

The decisive mistake. Black would have retained drawing chances after 37...xc4+ 38 d3 g7 etc.

38 xd5 h8 39 d3 f5 40 e3 e7+ 41 f3 a5 42 a4 c7 43 e4+ f6 44 h6 g7 45 g4 1-0

In the above games the transition from the opening into a complex endgame was dictated mainly by creative considerations. Such a transition may also be motivated by purely practical or competitive reasons, for example, by a desire to avoid a complex or sharp combinational struggle. But such reasons rarely assist the creation of new procedures and methods, and for the most part are of a strictly utilitarian nature.

In general, in the modern opening one should be very watchful for sudden simplification, irrespective of the reasons for it. Objectively, such a method of play does not perhaps promise a great deal, but in practice it is often employed by players with good endgame technique if the opponent is weak in this respect.

Thus it can be said that a
player's technique and opening culture are interconnected. This question will be examined later from another viewpoint, when typical opening positions will be discussed (chapter 9).
ATTACK DURING THE TRANSITION TO THE MIDDLEGAME

Attack as an effective strategic means

As was mentioned in chapter 2, strong and sharp attacks, directed mainly at the opponent’s king, can arise at a very early stage of the game. There are many possibilities of this type, but (and this is perfectly natural) there are even more in the transition stage from opening to middlegame. After all, by this time not only have the main forces been brought into play, but the conditions have also been created for pawn storms on the flanks, the transfer of the offensive from the centre to the flank, and so on.

Along with defence, attack is undisputably the most universal strategic procedure in chess, and like many other universal concepts it can be considered from two aspects. In the broad sense of the word, all forms of offensive operations can come under this concept. In its more concrete, authentic meaning, attack is distinguished from other offensive operations mainly by decisiveness. At this moment all the power of the blow is as though concentrated on a definite, sometimes small part of the board, to achieve which a player will often have to ‘burn his boats’.

The concept of attack should on no account be restricted to cases when the king is the target, as is done in certain books. Often sharp attacks are directed at the centre, at the Q-side, at mobile targets, and so on. Such attacks sometimes demand no less determination, strategic risk and inventiveness than attacks on the king.

At the same time, in no other strategic procedure are the elements of strategy and tactics so close, as in attack. And sometimes it is difficult to decide whether a particular attack (especially on the king!) is a strategic plan or a purely tactical operation.

This relates equally to
attacks at an early stage of the game (as has already been seen in earlier examples). Certainly, an attack in the opening invariably involves the use of strong tactical measures. An outwardly similar picture is seen if, thanks to a mistake by the opponent, one side gains an advantage in the opening, which, however, can be consolidated only by tactical means.

Compare the following two examples.

No. 205 Donner-Euwe
Match, 1955/56

This position (86) was reached after 14 moves. At the transition to the middlegame White committed a serious mistake, choosing the incorrect plan of a pawn offensive in the centre:

15 f4?

Correct was 15 Axf4!, which would have set Black difficult problems. Donner chooses a different plan, which at first sight seems active and natural, but he overlooks a latent and highly dangerous counterattack on the K-side, which tactically refutes White's idea.

15...Aeh5 16 e5 Axf3!

White had reckoned only on 16...Af5, to which he had prepared 17 Af2 b4 18 ef bc 19 g4! etc.

17 ef

White's position would have been equally cheerless after 17 Axc6 b4 18 Axa8 bc 19 Ag2 Af5!

17...Axf6 18 Ae4 Aexe4!

The point of Black's tactical plan. Although White is now a rook up, the black pieces descend violently on his king.

19 Aexe4 Ae8 20 Ae3 (also bad is 20 Axc6 Af5 21 Afd2 Ad4+, or 20 Aed2 Af5 21 Axf5 Ae1+ 22 Axf2 Ah1! 23 Ah3 Ag1+ 24 Af3 Ae3++! etc) 20...Af5! 21 Axc5?

This loses immediately, but White would also have been close to catastrophe after 21 Axf5 Aexe3 22 Afd2 Ad4 23 Axd4 cd 24 Ac8 Ad5 25 Ae1 Axax2! 26 Aexe3 de 27 Aexe3 Ab1+.

21...Axe4 22 Aed2 Afx3 0-1

A possible variation is 23 Axf2 Ah3 24 Ae1 Aexe1+ 25 Aexe1 Aeg3++, and Black wins.

This is a typical instance of the tactical exploitation of an opening advantage, and here this was the only way of realizing it.
No. 206 Geller-Vatnikov
Kiev, 1950
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 f3 c6 3 d4 cd 4 dxc4 5 c3 d6 6 c4 e6 7
0-0 de7 8 b3 0-0 9 e3 a5 10
f4 b6 11 e5!

White begins an energetic
attack in the centre and on the
K-side, using the active placing
of his pieces. The alternative 11
f3 b7 12 g4? is less energetic
(cf. Padevsky-Botvinnik, No.
163)

11...e8 (bad is 11...de 12 fe
d7 13 xf7!, when White
wins) 12 f5 (87)

The logical continuation of
White's attacking plan. If now
12...xb3 13 c6! c7 14
e7+ xe7 15 f6 gf 16 ef! with
a decisive attack.

12...de 13 fe f6 14 f5! xb3
15 d5!

The decisive blow. Black
cannot play 15...xa1 because
of 16 dxe7+, when he loses his
queen due to the tactical weak-
ness of his back rank, where his
pieces are merely interfering
with one another. The game is
decided.

It might be imagined that this
game, in which White's attack
developed quickly and un-
hindered, is a typical instance of
the tactical exploitation of an
opening advantage. But this is
not altogether so.

The significant difference be-
tween the two games considered
is that in the first the attack was
calculated to the finish, whereas
in the second the plan involved
much greater risk.

Thus it is far from clear how
White's attack would have con-
cluded, if instead 13...f6 Black
had played 13...xb3 14 c6
d6!

No. 207 Bilek-Petrosian
European Team Ch.,
Oberhausen, 1961

To the natural 15 d5(?)
Black replied with the unexpec-
ted 15...h4!, after which he
had much the better chances.
The game lasted only another
four moves: 16 ef+ xf7 17 xf7
xa1 18 f1 xf6! 19 xf6+
xf6 0-1 (instead of 15 d5,
correct was 15 xd6 xd6 16
ab).

This indicates that, although
White's attack resulted from the assessment of the position, in the given case it was double-edged (which distinguishes it from the previous one). At times it is difficult to establish this, but in general it should be remembered that a plan of attack is by no means the same as the tactical realization of an advantage. And one of the indications of this is the fact that, in the majority of cases, at the starting point of the attack (irrespective of its form) at the transition from opening to middlegame the attacking side has no real advantage.

It is essential to distinguish a winning continuation of the attack (Donner-Euwe, No. 205) from a dangerous one, which can nevertheless be parried, albeit sometimes with great difficulty (Geller-Vatnikov, No. 206).

We will now turn to typical attacking plans which arise at the transitional stage.

Offensive in the centre

A superiority in the centre is not some constant factor. It implies a dynamic, skilful and timely transformation of this advantage for the achievement of more concrete aims. Therefore the outward virtues of a centre should never be overesti-

mated (incidentally, this can be applied more broadly — literally to all positional factors). The transformation may be a direct necessity, but more often it is dictated by a deep understanding of coming events. In connection with this we will look at the problem of the central pawn pair (d4 and e4 for White, or d5 and e5 for Black).

In this situation the transformation is comparatively rarely associated with a direct pawn offensive in the centre and the creation here of a strong passed pawn. And yet this method can be highly effective, as the following example shows.

No. 208 Spassky-Petrosian
World Ch., 1969
Queens Gambit

1 c4 ♞f6 2 ♞c3 e6 3 ♞f3 d5 4 d4
c5 5 cd ♞xd5 6 e4 ♞xc3 7 bc cd 8
cd ♞b4+ 9 ♞d2 ♞xd2+ 10 ♞xd2
go 11 ♞c4 ♞c6 12 0-0 b6 13
ad1 ♞b7 14 ♞fe1 ♞c8 (88)
Switching the attack from the centre to the K-side

A superiority in the centre may provide the springboard for an attack on one of the flanks, where the opponent may have vulnerable points or where it will be easier to strike a blow. In such cases at the transitional stage, the target of the attack will often become the K-side.

Examples of this were given earlier, when we were investigating the setting up of a strong centre (Nos. 109-112). In each of those cases, the painstaking construction of a centre immediately became the springboard for transferring the attack to the opponent’s king, and where necessary the centre was sometimes sacrificed.

15 d5! ed? (15...d5) 16 d5 a5 17 f4 c7 18 f5 a5 19 ed c2 20 f4 x a2 (better 20...e8) 21 d6 cd8 22 d7!

White has achieved his strategic aim. His pawn at d7 is a powerful wedge, paralyzing Black’s position.

22...c4 23 f5 h6 24 c1! a6 25 c7 b5 26 d4 (26 e8! is even stronger) 26...b6 27 c8 b7 28 c6 d6 29 xd8! xf5 30 c6 1-0

We give some further examples of this type for independent study.

No. 209 Tarrasch-Alekhine
Pistyan, 1922
Blumenfeld Counter-Gambit

1 d4 f6 2 f3 e6 3 c4 c5 4 d5 b5 5 de? (5 g5!) 5...f6 6 cb d5 7 e3? (7 g3!) 7...d6 8 c3 0-0 9 e2 b7 10 b3 bd7 11 b2 e7 12 0-0 ad8 13 c2 e5 (89)

Black has set up an ideal centre, which in combination with his prospects of a K-side attack more than compensates for the sacrificed pawn.

14 f1 e4 15 d2 e5 16 d1 fg4 17 xg4 xg4 18 f1 g5! 19 h3 h6 20 h1 f5 21 h2 d4! 22 c1 d3 23 c4+ h8 24 h2 g3+! 25 g1 d5 26 a4 e2+ 27 h1 f7 28 a6 h5! 29 b6 g3+! 30 g1 ab 31 xb6 d2 32 f1 xf1 33 xf1 e6!! 34 h1 xh3 35 gh f3 36 g3 h4 37 f6 xf6 38 xe4 xh3+ 0-1
No. 210 Botvinnik-Keres
The Hague/Moscow, 1948
Nimzo-Indian Defence

$1 \text{d}4 \text{df}6 2 \text{c}4 \text{e}6 3 \text{d}c3 \text{db}4 4 \text{e}3$ $0-0 5 \text{a}3 \text{dx}c3+ 6 \text{bc} \text{e}8 7 \text{ed} e5 8 \text{g}3 \text{d}6 9 \text{ae}2 \text{ddb}7 10 0-0 \text{c}5? \text{(better 10...b6 or 10...d8)}$

11 \text{f}3! \text{cd} 12 \text{cd} \text{db}6 13 \text{b}2 \text{ed} 14 \text{e}4! \text{ae}6 15 \text{cc}1 \text{ee}7 16 \text{dx}d4 \text{cc}7 17 \text{c}5! \text{dc} 18 \text{ec}5 \text{ff}4 19 \text{cc}1 \text{bb}8 20 \text{gg}5!$

Black has no defence, e.g. $20...\text{ee}8 21 \text{hh}5 \text{ff}6 22 \text{x}f6+$ etc.

20...\text{bd}7 21 \text{xg}7+! \text{xg}7 $22 \text{h}5+ \text{gg}6 23 \text{ee}3 1-0$

No. 211 Boleslavsky-Moiseyev
Kharkov, 1948
Queen's Gambit

$1 \text{d}4 \text{d}5 2 \text{c}4 \text{vf}6?! 3 \text{cd} \text{xd}5 4 \text{ff}3 \text{ee}6? (4...\text{ff}5) 5 \text{e}4 \text{ff}6 6 \text{cc}3 \text{ee}7 7 \text{dd}3 \text{cc}5 8 \text{e}5 \text{dd}5 9 0-0 \text{cc}6$

10 \text{dc} \text{xc}3 11 \text{bc} \text{dd}5 12 \text{cc}2 \text{hh}6 13 \text{bb}1 \text{a}6 14 \text{ff}4 \text{xc}5 15 \text{ff}1 0-0 16 \text{ee}3 \text{aa}3?$

16...\text{dd}5 is better. After removing his queen from the defence of the main battlefield — the K-side, Black comes under an irresistible attack.

17 \text{bb}3 \text{aa}4 (after 17...\text{aa}5 18 \text{bb}6 \text{dd}5 19 \text{dd}1 Black loses his queen) 18 \text{hh}6! \text{ff}5 (18...\text{gh} 19 \text{ee}4 \text{dd}5 20 \text{gg}4+ \text{hh}8 21 \text{dd}2! is bad for Black) 19 \text{ee}4 \text{ff}6 20 \text{cc}1 \text{ee}7 21 \text{aa}3 \text{dd}8 22 \text{hh}7+$

No. 212 Smyslov-Florian
USSR-Hungary, Budapest 1949
Grünfeld Defence

$1 \text{d}4 \text{ff}6 2 \text{c}4 \text{gf}6 3 \text{cc}3 \text{dd}5 4 \text{ff}3 \text{gg}7 5 \text{bb}3 \text{dc} 7 \text{xx}c4 0-0 7 \text{ee}4$

$\text{a}6 8 \text{ee}2 \text{cc}5 9 \text{dd}5 \text{ee}6 10 0-0 \text{ed} 11 \text{dd}5?! 12 \text{a}3 \text{ff}5 13 \text{hh}4 \text{ff}8 14 \text{bb}6 \text{ee}4 15 \text{xx}g7 \text{xx}g7 16 \text{gg}5! \text{xx}c3 17 \text{hh}7+ \text{ff}6 18 \text{xx}g5 19 \text{gg}7!! \text{ee}4 20 \text{ff}4+ \text{xx}f4$

$21 \text{xx}f4 \text{xx}f4 22 \text{ff}1+ \text{ee}3 23 \text{ee}5+ \text{dd}2 24 \text{cc}4 \text{xx}a3 25 \text{ff}2+ 1-0$

It should be mentioned that the procedure of transferring the attack from the centre to the K-side does not usually depend on the form of central superiority.

Here is an example with a typical central wedge at e5.

No. 213 Suetin-Ujtelky
Copenhagen, 1965
Pirc Defence

$1 \text{e}4 \text{gg}6 2 \text{d}4 \text{gg}7 3 \text{cc}3 \text{dd}6 4 \text{ff}4 \text{ff}6 5 \text{e}5! \text{dd}5 6 \text{ff}3 0-0 (6...\text{de} 7 \text{fe} \text{cc}5!) 7 \text{cc}4 \text{cc}6$

Black wrongly refrains from countering in the centre, and as a result his position becomes quite unpromising.

8 0-0 \text{aa}5 9 \text{aa}4 \text{aa}6 10 \text{aa}3 \text{cc}7 11 \text{ee}2 \text{hh}6?
Not only a loss of time, but also a significant weakening of the castled position, which conclusively determines White’s subsequent plan of attack.

12.\_d3! e6 13.\_d2 \_e7 14.\_f2 \_d8 15.\_c4 \_e8 16. g4! (90)

With his central superiority, White can confidently begin a pawn storm. Black’s position is strategically lost.

16.\_de 17.\_dxe5 \_d6 18.\_ae1 \_c7 19.\_xd6 \_xd6 20. h4! \_e7 21. h5 gh 22. gh \_d8 23. \_h2 f6 24. \_g1 \_e8 (after 24...f6 25. fe \_d7 26. \_xg7+! \_xg7 27. \_f6+ \_g8 28. \_g1+ Black is crushed) 25. \_h4 \_f5 26. \_xf5 ef 27. \_g6 \_h7 28. \_g3 \_f8 29. \_g1 \_e6 30. \_g7+ \_h8 31. \_g8+! 1–0

No. 214 Gipslis-Kostro
Dubna, 1976
Spanish Game

1. e4 e5 2. \_f3 \_c6 3. \_b5 a6 4. \_a4 \_f6 5. d4 ed 6. \_d4 \_d7 8. \_xc6 bc 9. \_c3 \_e7 10. \_f4

0–0 11. e5! \_e8 12. \_e1 d5 13. \_b3 a5 14. \_a4 f6 15. e6! \_c8 16. \_d4 \_b7 17. \_e3 c5 18. \_f5 d4 19. \_g3 \_h8

Black’s position is completely hopeless. White also wins after 19.\_e4 20. \_h6+ \_h8 21. \_f7+ \_xf7 22. ef \_d6 23. \_xc5
20. \_h5! \_d5 21. \_xh7+! 1–0

Examples with a strong central isolated pawn are also of interest.

No. 215 Botvinnik–Vidmar
Nottingham, 1936
Queen’s Gambit

1. c4 e6 2. \_f3 d5 3. d4 \_f6 4. \_c3 \_e7 5. \_g5 0–0 6. e3 \_bd7 7. \_d3 c5 8. 0–0 cd (8... dc 9. \_xc4 a6 is more flexible) 9. ed dc 10. \_xc4 \_b6 11. \_b3 \_d7 12. \_d3 \_bd5 (12... \_fd5!) 13. \_e5 \_c6 14. \_ad1 \_b4 15. \_h3 \_ad5 16. \_xd5 \_bxd5 (91)

Black’s position is already
barely defensible, as the following variations show: 19... 
\[ \text{c7 20 ddf1 a6 or 20... c6b6 21 w4h4 cbd5 22 cxf7 xxf7 23} \]
\[ \text{cxd5 cxd5 24 cxf7 cxa5 25 c6x5!! etc) 21 cxf7 cxf7 22} \]
\[ \text{cxd5 cxd5 23 cxf7 cxa5 24 w6e6!} \]
\[ 20 cxf7! cxf7 21 cxf6 cxf6 22 cxd5 w6c6 23 w6d6! w8e8 24 w7d7 1-0 \]

No. 216 Spassky-Avtonomov
Leningrad, 1949
Queen's Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c4 dc 3 c3 c6 4 e3 c5 5 cxc4 e6 6 0-0 a6 7 wxe2 b5
8 c3 b3 c6 9 c3 cd (premature; 9... b7 is preferable) 10 wdd1
b7 (10... c7 11 ed b4 12 d5! c6xd5 13 c6g5 c6e7 14 c6x6! gf
(14... cxf6 15 c6d5) 15 c6d5 cxd5 16 c6d5 ed 17 c6d4 c6f8 18
f5 h5 19 ed5! c6xd5 20 wxe7+ c6g8 21 wxf6 1-0

No. 217 Keene-Miles
Hastings, 1975/76
Queen's Gambit

1 c3 c6f6 2 c4 c5 3 c3 c6 4 e3 e6 5 d4 d5 6 cd cxd5 7 d3
cd 8 ed c6c7 9 0-0 0-0 10 c6e1 c6f6 11 c6g5 cbb4?! 12 cbb1 b6 13 cbe5
\[ \text{db7 14 c6e3!! g6 15 c6g3 c6c8? 16} \]
\[ \text{c6h6 c6e8 17 a3 c6c6 18 c6xg6! hg} \]
\[ 19 c6xg6 fg 20 w6b1! c6e5 21 de c6d4 ed 22 c6xe4 c6h7 23 c6f6+ c6x6 \]

24 c6xg6+ c6h8 25 c6g7+ c6xg7 26 c6xg7 mate.

In the examples given below there occurred a sudden, dynamic opening up of the centre.

No. 218 Suetin-Lyuboshits
Tallinn, 1956
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 c3 c6 3 b5 a6
4 c4 c6f6 5 0-0 c6e7 6 c6e1 b5
7 c6b3 d6 8 c3 0-0 9 h3 c5a5 10 c2
c5 11 d4 c6c7 12 c6d2 c6d7 13 c1f1
c6ad8? 14 c6e3 g6 (92)

15 b4! cb 16 cb c6c6 17 a3 c6f8
18 c6b2 c6f8 19 c6d5 c6d5 20 ed
c6e7 21 de c6d5 22 e6! 1-0

No. 219 Suetin-Mikenas
Moscow, 1958
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 c3 c6 3 b5 a6
4 c4 c6f6 5 0-0 c6e7 6 c6e1 b5
7 c6b3 d6 8 c3 0-0 9 h3 c6a5 10 c6c2
c5 11 d4 c6c7 12 b4!? cb 13 cb c6c6
(13. ... c4) 14 b2 cxb4 15 b3 c6 16 c3 ed? (16. ... a5 17 d5 x5 18 x5 ab7 was comparatively best) 17 x4d4 x4d4 18 x4d4 a7 (better 18... c7) 19 d5 d8 (19... x4d4? 20 xe7+ or 19... x5d5 20 xg7 mate!) 20 d3! e8 21 e5! de 22 xe5 e6 23 ae1! ef6 24 xf6+ xf6 25 h5 g6 26 xf6 xb3 27 ab wb6 28 f3 1-0

No. 220 Kapengut-Smirnov
Minsk, 1977
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 f6 5 0-0 xe4 6 d4 e7?! 7 e1 f5(?)

Better is 7... b5 8 xxe4 d5 9 xxb5 ab 10 xxe5 0-0 with a position analogous to the Marshall Attack (Kondratiev-Suetin, Kiev, 1965).

8 d5 b8 9 xe5 0-0 10 d6! xxd6

After 10. ... xxd6 11 b3+ h8 12 h5 e8 13 xxe8 fxe8 14 f7+ xf7 15 xf7 f8 16 xe7 c6 17 e8 White wins.

11 xf5+ h8 12 f7+ xf7 13 xf7 xh2+ 14 f1! d5 15 c3 c6 16 g5! g8 17 xg8+ xg8 18 g3 d7 19 f4 c5 20 b3 g5 21 e5 xc3 22 xc3 1-0

In the following examples the success of the attack on the king was determined by piece superiority in the centre.

No. 221 Furman-Spassky
USSR Ch., 1957
Sicilian Defence

1 f3 c5 2 c4 g6 3 e4 g7 4 d4 cd 5 xd4 c6 6 e3 h6 7 c3 0-0 8 e2 f5 9 ef xd4?! 10 xd4? (10 xh6!) 10... xf5 11 c5 d6 12 a3 fd4! 13 0-0 f5 14 e1 (better 14 d3) 14... d7 15 d5 f7! 16 b3 a8 17 b2 e5 18 b4 e6 19 d3? (better 19 b5) 19... g4 20 f3 xf3! 21 gf xf3+! 22 h1 h3 23 e2 e1!! 0-1

No. 222 Smyslov-Rudakovskv
USSR Ch., 1945
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 f3 e6 3 d4 cd 4 xd4 d6 5 c3 d6 6 e2 e7 7 0-0 0-0 8 c3 c6 9 f4 c7 10 e1 xd4 11 xd4 e5? 12 e3 e6? 13 f5 c4?

After this White forces a strategically won position. Comparatively best was 13... d7 14 g4 c6 15 f3 d5?! 16 ed e4 17 xe4 xd5 18 xd4, although here too White has the advantage.

14 xc4 xc4 15 g5! f6 16 xf6 xf6 17 d5 xd8 18 c3 b5 19 b3 c5+ 20 h1 c8 21 f3 h8 22 f6! gf (22... g6 23 d2! and h6!) 23 h4 g8 24 xf6 g7 25 g3! xf6 (White was threatening 26 xh7+!, as
well as 26 $\text{g}x\text{g}7 \text{g}x\text{g}7 27
$\text{h}x\text{h}7+ \text{f}x\text{f}6 28 \text{f}f1+ \text{etc}) 26
$\text{f}x\text{f}6 \text{g}8 27 \text{d}d1 \text{d}5 28 \text{g}x\text{g}7! 1-0

No. 223 Veröci-Lemachko
Roosendaal, 1976
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 $\text{f}3 \text{d}6 3 \text{d}4 \text{c}d 4 $\text{d}x\text{d}4
$\text{f}6 5 \text{c}3 \text{a}6 6 \text{f}4 \text{e}5 7 \text{f}3 \text{b}d7 8
\text{a}4 \text{b}6? (8 . . . \text{c}7) 9 \text{c}4 \text{e}7 10
0-0 0-0 11 \text{e}2 \text{b}7 12 \text{f}e \text{d}e 13
\text{g}5 \text{h}6 (13 . . . \text{c}7) 14 \text{xf}6!
$\text{xf}6 15 \text{ad}1 \text{wc}7 16 \text{h}1 \text{ff}8
17 \text{b}3 \text{b}4? 18 \text{h}4! \text{x}c3 19
$\text{xf}6! \text{gf}20 \text{f}5 \text{d}4 21 \text{ff}4+ \text{ff}8
22 \text{g}7+ \text{ee}8 23 \text{g}8+ \text{dd}7 24
$\text{xf}7+ \text{dd}8 25 \text{ff}8+ 1-0

In the last two cases with a
backward pawn in the centre, the
success of the attack was aided
by strong piece pressure on the
centre (in No. 222 – the estab-
ishment of a knight at \text{d}5, and in
No. 223 – the presence of a
powerful light-square bishop) in
combination with effective op-
erations on the \text{f}-file. As a result of
this combination, Black’s castled
position became a fruitful target
of attack for White.

But this formation does not in
itself guarantee the success of
White’s attack. Instructive in this
respect is the following example,
where one significant detail —
Black’s king had not yet castled!
— sharply changed the assess-
ment of this plan.

No. 224 Byrne-Fischer
Sousse \text{IZ}, 1967
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 $\text{f}3 \text{d}6 3 \text{d}4 \text{c}d 4 $\text{x}d4
$\text{f}6 5 \text{c}3 \text{a}6 6 \text{c}4 \text{e}6 7 \text{b}3 \text{b}5
8 \text{f}4 \text{x}b7 9 \text{x}f5 \text{e}5 10 \text{d}e2 \text{bd}7 11
\text{g}5 (11 \text{g}g3?) 11 . . . \text{e}7 12
\text{g}3? (correct was 12 \text{xf}6!
$\text{xf}6 13 \text{d}3 with equal
chances) 12 . . . \text{c}8 13 0-0 \text{h}5 14
\text{h}4 \text{b}4! 15 \text{xf}6 \text{xf}6 16 \text{d}5
$\text{x}h4 17 \text{xf}5 \text{g}5 18 \text{f}6 \text{g}6! 19
\text{g}7+ \text{d}8 20 \text{f}3 \text{g}3 21 \text{d}3
\text{h}2+ 22 \text{f}1 \text{c}5 23 \text{x}h3 \text{h}4!
24 \text{f}3 \text{x}b3! 25 \text{x}h3 \text{d}5 26
$\text{x}h3 \text{x}d5 27 \text{ed} \text{x}f6+ 28 \text{e}1
$\text{f}4 0-1

Switching the attack to the
Q-side

Instances of attacks not di-
rected against the king are fairly
common, as for example in the
Scheveningen Variation of the
Sicilian Defence, if Black tries
too early for Q-side activity by
. . . \text{b}5.

No. 225 Smyslov-Kottnauer
Groningen, 1946
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 $\text{f}3 \text{d}6 3 \text{d}4 \text{c}d 4 $\text{x}d4
$\text{f}6 5 \text{c}3 \text{a}6 6 \text{e}2 \text{e}6 7 0-0 \text{b}5?

This Q-side pawn offensive is
premature, as it is not supported
by the pieces, and it can prove successful only if White plays passively. But White has available a concrete and very effective way of refuting his opponent’s plan, involving a determined counter-offensive on the Q-side and in the centre.

8 \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{a7} \) 9 \( \text{we2!} \) \( \text{c7} \) 10 \( \text{d1} \) \( \text{bd7} \) 11 \( \text{a4! ba} \) 12 \( \text{xa4} \) \( \text{b7} \) (93)

In a few moves White destroys the opponent’s Q-side and gains a decisive advantage.

13 e5! \( \text{xe5} \) 14 \( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{xb7} \) 15 \( \text{xa6 b8} \) 16 \( \text{c6!} \)

Events develop by force.

16... \( \text{xc6} \) 17 \( \text{xc6+} \) \( \text{d7} \) 18 \( \text{c5!} \)

The concluding combinational blow. If 18... \( \text{c7} \) there follows 19 \( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{xd7} \) 20 \( \text{a8} \).

18...dc 19 \( \text{f4!} \) \( \text{d6} \) (White also wins after 19... \( \text{xf4} \) 20 \( \text{c8+} \) \( \text{e7} \) 21 \( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{f6} \) 22 \( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{g6} \) 23 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{f5} \) 24 \( \text{a7 etc}) \)

20 \( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{b6} \) 21 \( \text{xd7} \)+ 1-0

Here Black’s crushing tactical defeat resulted from his over-confidence in the opening (8...b5?)

In the majority of cases the switching of the attack to the Q-side is assisted by the presence of weak squares in the defending side’s position. Here events do not develop so forcibly, but the defensive problems are no easier.

No. 226 Rubinstein-Salwe

Lodz, 1908

Queen’s Gambit

1 \( \text{d4} \) \( \text{d5} \) 2 \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{e6} \) 3 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{c5} \) 4 \( \text{cd ed} \)

5 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{f6} \) 6 \( \text{g3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 7 \( \text{g2} \) \( \text{cd} \) 8 \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{b6} \) 9 \( \text{xc6!} \) \( \text{bc} \) 10 0-0 \( \text{e7} \)

11 \( \text{a4} \)

After achieving an early piece superiority in the centre, White quickly (and quite correctly) transfers the weight of the offensive to the Q-side. Black’s c-pawn is now weak, and the c5 square becomes a strong outpost for White. It is on this that White builds his plan, which he carries out with exceptional accuracy.

11... \( \text{xb5} \) 12 \( \text{a3} \) 0-0 13 \( \text{a6} \)

14 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{e6} \) 15 \( \text{c5} \) \( \text{fe8} \) 16 \( \text{f2} \) \( \text{d7} \) 17 \( \text{xe7} \) \( \text{xe7} \) 18 \( \text{d4} \)

19 \( \text{e8} \) 19 \( \text{f1} \) \( \text{e8} \) 20 \( \text{e3} \) \( \text{b7} \) 21 \( \text{c5} \) \( \text{xc5} \) 22 \( \text{xc5} \) \( \text{c7} \) 23 \( \text{fc2} \)

24 \( \text{b6} \) 24 \( \text{b4} \) \( \text{a6} \) 25 \( \text{a5} \) \( \text{b8} \) 26 \( \text{a3} \)

27 \( \text{xc6!} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 28 \( \text{xa7} \)

As a result of the ‘overloading’ of Black’s defences, he has had to part with a pawn. The
game is decided.

28...\textit{a}8 29 \textit{c}5 \textit{b}7 30 \textit{f}2
\textit{h}5 31 \textit{e}2 \textit{g}6 32 \textit{d}6 \textit{c}8 23 \textit{c}5
\textit{b}7 34 \textit{h}4 \textit{a}5 35 \textit{c}7 \textit{b}8 36 \textit{b}5 \textit{a}4
37 \textit{b}6 \textit{a}5 38 \textit{b}7 1-0

No. 227 Pillsbury-Mason
Hastings, 1895
Queen's Gambit

1 \textit{d}4 \textit{d}5 2 \textit{c}4 \textit{e}6 3 \textit{c}3 \textit{f}6 4 \textit{g}5
\textit{e}7 5 \textit{f}3 \textit{b}6 6 \textit{e}3 \textit{b}7 7 \textit{c}1
dc(?) 8 \textit{x}c4 \textit{bd}7 9 0-0 0-0 10
\textit{e}2 \textit{d}5 11 \textit{xe}7 \textit{xe}7 12
\textit{xd}5 \textit{ed} 13 \textit{eb}5! \textit{d}6 14 \textit{c}2 \textit{c}6
15 \textit{ad}3 \textit{f}6

Here too the vulnerable point
in Black's position is his c6 pawn.
At the same time, the attempt to
advance it by 15...\textit{c}5 16 \textit{dc} \textit{bc} 17
\textit{f}5! leads to the creation of new weaknesses.

16 \textit{fc}1 \textit{ac}8 17 \textit{a}6!(94)

A typical procedure. By ex-
changing the black bishop, the
chief defender of the c6 pawn,
White soon gains a decisive
advantage.

17...\textit{xa}6 18 \textit{xa}6 \textit{c}7 19
\textit{e}5! \textit{c}5 20 \textit{xc}5! \textit{xc}5 21 \textit{xc}5
\textit{d}7 22 \textit{c}6 \textit{b}8 23 \textit{xd}6 \textit{xa}6
24 \textit{c}6 \textit{g}6 25 \textit{xa}7 \textit{a}8 26 \textit{c}6
1-0

No. 228 Suetin-Kamyshov
Tbilisi, 1951
Spanish Game

1 \textit{e}4 \textit{e}5 2 \textit{f}3 \textit{c}6 3 \textit{b}5 \textit{a}6 4
\textit{a}4 \textit{ff}6 5 0-0 \textit{e}7 6 \textit{e}1 \textit{b}5 7
\textit{b}3 0-0 8 \textit{c}3 \textit{d}6 9 \textit{h}3 \textit{a}5 10 \textit{c}2
\textit{c}5 11 \textit{d}4 \textit{cc}7 12 \textit{bd}2 \textit{cc}6 13 \textit{dc}
dc 14 \textit{ff}1 \textit{ee}6 15 \textit{ee}3 \textit{ad}8 16
\textit{ee}2 \textit{g}6 (16...\textit{c}4 is more active)
17 \textit{g}5 \textit{cc}8 18 \textit{aa}4 \textit{c}4 19 \textit{ab} \textit{ab} 20
\textit{b}3! \textit{a}5 21 \textit{bc} \textit{bc} 22 \textit{aa}3

The start of a lengthy offen-
sive on the Q-side, the main
target of which ultimately becomes
the c4 pawn.

22...\textit{fe}8 23 \textit{xc}7 \textit{xe}7 24
\textit{ed}1 \textit{ed}7 25 \textit{xd}7 \textit{xd}7

An interesting situation. In
defending his Q-side, Black must
also concern himself over his K-
side. Thus on 25...\textit{xd}7 there
would have followed 26 \textit{ff}3 \textit{gg}7
27 \textit{xf}7! \textit{xf}7 28 \textit{dd}5!, when
White wins.

26 \textit{aa}4! \textit{aa}6 27 \textit{ff}1! \textit{bb}5 28
\textit{hb}4 \textit{cc}5 29 \textit{bb}1 \textit{bb}7 30 \textit{aa}4
\textit{aa}6 31 \textit{ff}3! (the knight aims for
d2, to attack the c4 pawn) 31...
\textit{dd}6 32 \textit{bb}5! \textit{xb}5 33 \textit{xb}5 \textit{cc}6
34 \textit{xb}7 \textit{xb}7 35 \textit{xe}5 \textit{xe}4 36
\textit{bb}5!

The decisive manœuvre. Loss
of material for Black is now inevitable.

36. ..\text{d}6 37 \text{b}8+ \text{d}e8 38
\text{c}5xc4 \text{d}d3 39 \text{e}5 \text{b}1+ 40 \text{h}2
\text{f}8 41 \text{d}6 \text{b}8 42 \text{x}f7 \text{b}2 43
\text{d}6 \text{x}f2 44 \text{d}5! \text{x}d5 45
\text{e}8+ \text{g}7 46 \text{e}5+ 1-0

\textbf{The preparation of pawn breaks}

In closed positions with pawn chains, great importance is
assumed by the organization of pawn breaks on the main sector
of the chess front. Of course, such breaks usually occur deep
into the middlegame, but right from the opening a serious
foundation must be laid for them. An example of this is pro-
vided by a number of games arising in a sharp line of the King’s
Indian Defence: 1 \text{d}4 \text{f}6 2 \text{c}4 \text{g}6
3 \text{c}3 \text{g}7 4 \text{e}4 \text{d}6 5 \text{f}3 0-0 6
\text{e}2 \text{e}5 7 0-0 \text{c}6 8 \text{d}5 \text{e}7 (95)

In this position White ex-

ploits his spatial advantage to
begin active play on the Q-side
(which in addition he has
blocked with gain of tempo!), for
which he has several ways of
quickly concentrating his forces
and preparing to open up the
game on this part of the board.
But Black too has very real pos-
sibilities of beginning a pawn
storm on the K-side.

Although the plans of the two
sides are largely determined, the
intensity of the struggle grows
with every move. The subse-
quently play is very lively and
sometimes forcing, and excep-
tional accuracy is demanded.
The difficulty of the problems
facing the two sides is due to the
necessity for a skilful combining
of attack with economical de-
fence. On no account should a
player go entirely onto the de-
fensive; the only thing that can
save him here is the organization
of an attacking breakthrough.

Practice shows that the play in
this variation proceeds with
alternating success, the player
who wins usually being the one
who is the first to organize an
effective breakthrough. And it
should also be mentioned that,
although initially the Q-side
offensive develops more easily,
the consequences of Black’s
counter-offensive on the K-side
can be more dangerous.
We give some examples of this variation, which resemble a race with different finishes (from Diag. 95).

No. 229  Taimanov-Aronin
USSR Ch., 1952

9 ∇e1 ∇d7 10 ∇e3 f5 11 f3 h5?
12 ∇d3 d4 13 ∇f2 g5 14 c5 ∇f6 15
f4 c1 g4 16 wg3! ∇h6 17 cd cd 18
∇xe5! g3 19 ∇e1 de 20 d6+ ∇h8
21 de ∇xe7 22 ∇b5 ∇e6 23 ∇b4
∇f7 24 ∇c3 gh+ 25 ∇h1 ∇g8 26
∇xe5 ∇g6 27 ∇f2, and White
had a significant advantage.

Better is 9...∇h5 10 g3 f5 with
the aim of carrying out his plan
as quickly as possible. Here
Black merely helps White to
open lines on the Q-side.

10 ∇a3! ∇h5 11 g3 f5 12 ∇g5!
A good idea, forcing the ex-
change of Black’s light-square
bishop, and thereby weakening
his attack on the K-side.

12. ∇f6 13 c5! h6 14 cd cd 15
∇e6 ∇xe6 16 de fe 17 ba ∇f5 18
b5 d5 19 ∇xf8 ∇xf8 20 ∇c1
x5 21 b3 h6 22 w2. White
has retained the advantage.

No. 230  Taimanov-Najdorf
Zurich C, 1953

9 ∇e1 ∇d7 10 ∇e3 f5 11 f3 f4
12 ∇f2 g5 13 ∇d3 ∇f6 14 c5 ∇g6
15 e1 f7!
Black switches his rook to the
7th rank, where it joins the attack on the K-side and assists in the defence of the important c7 square. Simultaneously f8 is vacated for the bishop.

16 e2 f8 17 cd cd 18 d2 g4
19 f3 c1 g3!, and by this pawn sac-
Ar2ifice Black firmly seized the initi-
teive, which here is very
important.

No. 231  Taimanov-Ciocalteea
Moscow, 1956

9 b4 a5?!

No. 232  Vaganian-Vukić
Odessa, 1975

9 d2 c5?! 10 dc! bc 11 b4
d8? (11...d5!?) 12 ∇b3 f5 13
a3 fe 14 ∇xe4 ∇f5 15 ∇g3 ∇e6
16 ∇c1 ∇h8 17 ∇e4 ∇f4?! 18 f3
∇g8 19 ∇d2 ∇h6 20 ∇c3 ∇g7 21
fd1 d5 22 b5! d4 23 a5! ∇d7 24
bc5 ∇c8 25 d3 f7 26 ∇g5
(Black is clearly losing) 26...f6
27 ∇f7+ ∇xf7 28 be ∇e6 29 c7
c8 30 b1! xc7 31 b8 ∇c6
32 c5 d6 33 d8 xc7 34 xc7
xc7 35 b1 1-0

The forms of pawn breaks can
be very varied. In modern play
they are becoming more and
more tactical, and sometimes in-
clude a pawn sacrifice as early as the
transition stage from open-
ing to middlegame.

In this respect the develop-
ment of the following game is instructive.

No. 233 Tal-Hecht
Varna OL, 1962
Queen's Indian Defence

1 d4 ♂f6 2 c4 e6 3 ♂f3 b6 4 ♦c3
/umd4 5 ♦g5 ♦b7 6 e3 h6 7 ♦h4
/umd3+ 8 bc d6 9 ♦d2

The alternative is 9 ♦d3 g5 10
/umd3 ♦e4 11 ♦c2 f5, where again
there is the possibility of a pawn
break in the centre, introduced
by Keres: 12 d5! ed 13 cd ♦xd5
13 ♦d4 ♦f6 15 f3 etc., with the
initiative for White.

9...e5 10 ♦f3 ♦e7 11 e4 ♦bd7
12 ♦d3 ♦f8 13 c5! (96)

By this move White sharply
activates his pieces, e.g. 13...bc
14 ♦b1, and it is dangerous for
Black to castle long.

13...dc 14 de ♦xe5 15 ♦a4+
c6 (15... ♦d7 is somewhat bet-
ter) 16 0–0 ♦g6

It is dangerous to play 16...
/umd3 17 ♦c4 ♦xd3 (17...b5 18
/umd6+ ♦d7 19 ♦xb5! favours
White) 18 ♦fd1 b5 19 ♦xd3 ba
20 ♦d6+ ♦e7 21 ♦f5+ ♦e8 22
/umd7+ ♦e7 23 ♦f5+, when
White wins.

17 ♦c4 ♦e6 18 e5! h5 19 ef! ba
20 fg ♦g8 21 ♦f5!

White's splendid positional
queen sacrifice on move 19 in-
volved some highly interesting
combinational variations. Thus
bad is 21... ♦xc4 22 ♦e1+ ♦e6
23 ♦xe6+ fe 24 ♦xg6+ ♦d7 25
/umd1+ ♦c7 26 ♦g3+ ♦b6 27
/umd1+ ♦a6 28 ♦d3+ ♦a5 29 ♦c7
mate, or 21... ♦xf5 22 ♦d6+
/umd7 23 ♦xf5 etc., when White
wins.

21... ♦xh4 22 ♦xh6 ♦a6 23
/umd6+ ♦e7 24 ♦c4 ♦xg7 25 g3
/umd6 26 ♦xa6

The result is a dynamic situa-
tion, where Black is a pawn up,
but White has strong piece play
and the initiative, factors which
give him the advantage.

26... ♦f5 27 ♦ab1! f6 28
/umd1+ ♦e7 29 ♦e1+ ♦d6 30 ♦f2
c4 31 g4 ♦e7 32 ♦b7! ♦ag8 33
/umd4 ♦d5 34 ♦xd5 cd 35 ♦b4
/umd8 36 ♦xa4 ♦xc3 37 ♦a6+ ♦e5
38 ♦xf6 h5 39 h3 hg 40 hg ♦h7 41
g5 ♦h5 42 ♦f5! ♦c2+ 43 ♦g3 ♦c4
44 ♦ee5! d4 45 g6 ♦h1 46 ♦c5+
/umd3 47 ♦xc2 ♦xc2 48 ♦f4 ♦g1
49 ♦g5 1–0
Pawn storms on opposite flanks

As a result of castling on opposite sides, mutual attacks on the king can arise quite regularly in the opening. In many cases the strategic picture is similar to that in the examples from the preceding section. Both there, and here, a game is often decided by pawn breaks.

The beauty of the struggle in the event of mutual pawn storms is shown by the following game.

No. 234
Nezhmetdinov-Taimanov
Baku, 1951
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 ∇f3 ∇c6 3 d4 cd
4 ∇xd4 ∇f6 5 ∇c3 d6 6 ∇g5 e6
7 ∇d2 ∇e7 8 0-0-0 0-0-0 9 ∇b3 0-0
10 ∇e3 0-0-0 11 f3 a6 12 g4 b5 13 g5
∇d7 14 f4 ∇c5 15 0-0-0 0-0-0 16 h4
∇a4! 17 ∇d2 ∇xc3 18 ∇xc3 h4 19
∇d2 a5 20 ∇b1 a4! 21 ∇c1 ∇d7 22
∇d3 0-0-0 23 h5 ∇a5 24 f5 ∇c4 25
f6 ∇f8 26 g6 ∇f5! (97)

The culmination of the strategic struggle. White’s pawn storm is slightly ahead of the opponent’s, which should have given him the advantage. This could have been achieved by 27 ∇g2! a3 28 gh+ ∇h8 29 ∇xc4 0-0-0 30 ∇c3!

30 ∇h6!, with an irresistible attack.

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But White failed to find this continuation, and played differently.

27 gh+? ∇h8 28 ∇xc5 0-0-0 29 ∇f4 gf 30 0-0-0-0 31 ∇e3
∇c8 32 ∇h1 0-0-0 33 h6 b3!

The initiative has passed to Black, which in such situations decides the outcome.

34 cb ab 35 a3 ∇xd3 36 ∇xd3
∇b5 37 ∇d2 ∇c2, and Black gained a decisive advantage.

We give a few further examples on this theme.

No. 235 Keres-Alexander
Hastings, 1954/55
Petroff’s Defence

1 e4 e5 2 ∇f3 ∇f6 3 ∇xe5 d6
4 ∇f3 0-0-0 5 d4 ∇f5 6 0-0-0-0 0-0-0-0 7 ∇e7
∇c6 8 ∇e1 ∇g4 9 c3 ∇f6?
(9...f5) 10 ∇g5 0-0-0 11 ∇bd2
0-0-0? (11...0-0) 12 ∇a4 h6 13
∇h4 g5 14 ∇g3 0-0-0 15 0-0-0-0 16
∇e5! ∇xe5 17 f5!! ∇xf5 18
\( \text{\textbf{Pawn storms on opposite flanks}} \quad 157 \)

\[ \text{\textbf{No. 236 Nadezhdin-Boleslavsky}} \]
\[ \text{Tashkent, 1965} \]
\[ \text{\textbf{Sicilian Defence}} \]

1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{\textBF f3} \) \( \text{\textBF c6} \) 3 d4 cd
4 \( \text{\textBF xd4} \) \( \text{\textBF f6} \) 5 \( \text{\textBF c3} \) d6 6 \( \text{\textBF g5} \) e6
7 \( \text{\textBF xd2} \) a6 8 0-0-0 h6 9 \( \text{\textBF f4} \) \( \text{\textBF d7} \) 10
\( \text{\textBF g3} \) \( \text{\textBF e7} \) 11 \( \text{\textBF c2} \) \( \text{\textBF xd4} \) 12 \( \text{\textBF xd4} \)
e5 13 \( \text{\textBF d3} \) \( \text{\textBF c7} \) 14 f4 0-0 15 f5(?)
\( \text{\textBF c6} \) 16 \( \text{\textBF f2} \) \( \text{\textBF e8} \) 17 h4 b5 18 \( \text{\textBF d2} \)
\( \text{\textBF a5} \) 19 a3 b4 20 \( \text{\textBF d5} \) \( \text{\textBF xd5} \) 21 ed
\( \text{\textBF c3} \) ! 0-1

\[ \text{\textbf{No. 237 Yuferov-Groz dov}} \]
\[ \text{Lvov, 1966} \]
\[ \text{\textbf{Sicilian Defence}} \]

1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{\textBF c3} \) \( \text{\textBF c6} \) 3 \( \text{\textBF a5} \) \( \text{\textBF g2} \) \( \text{\textBF g6} \)
4 d4 cd 5 \( \text{\textBF xd4} \) \( \text{\textBF g7} \) 6 \( \text{\textBF e3} \) \( \text{\textBF f6} \)
7 \( \text{\textBF c4} \) 0-0 8 \( \text{\textBF b3} \) d6 9 \( \text{\textBF f3} \) \( \text{\textBF d7} \) 10
\( \text{\textBF xd2} \) \( \text{\textBF b8} \) 11 h4 \( \text{\textBF c8} \) 12 0-0-0 b5? (better 12...a5 with the threat of
...a4) 13 h5! \( \text{\textBF a5} \) 14 hg \( \text{\textBF xb3} \) +
15 \( \text{\textBF xh3} \) hg 16 \( \text{\textBF h6} \) \( \text{\textBF h8} \) 17 \( \text{\textBF f8} \)
\( \text{\textBF xh8} \) 18 \( \text{\textBF xh8} \) + ! \( \text{\textBF xh8} \) 19 \( \text{\textBF h6} \) +
\( \text{\textBF g8} \) 20 \( \text{\textBF d5} \)! 1-0

\[ \text{\textbf{No. 238 Kupreichik-Mukhin}} \]
\[ \text{Kirovabad, 1973} \]
\[ \text{\textbf{Sicilian Defence}} \]

1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{\textBF f3} \) d6 3 d4 cd 4 \( \text{\textBF xd4} \)
\[ \text{\textbf{f6} 5 \( \text{\textBF c3} \) a6 6 \( \text{\textBF c4} \) e6 7 \( \text{\textBF b3} \) \( \text{\textBF c6} \)
8 \( \text{\textBF e3} \) \( \text{\textBF e7} \) 9 f4 0-0 10 \( \text{\textBF f3} \) \( \text{\textBF d7} \) ?!
11 g4 \( \text{\textBF c5} \) 12 0-0-0 \( \text{\textBF d7} \) 13 g5 b5
14 \( \text{\textBF b1} \) \( \text{\textBF xh3} \) 15 ab \( \text{\textBF xd4} \) 16
\( \text{\textBF xd4} \) b4! 17 \( \text{\textBF a4} \) \( \text{\textBF b8} \)? (17...
\( \text{\textBF c7} \) followed by ...e5 was correct) 18 \( \text{\textBF hgl} \) \( \text{\textBF c6} \) 19 \( \text{\textBF d3} \) \( \text{\textBF c7} \)
20 f5! ef 21 \( \text{\textBF h5} \) ! \( \text{\textBF f8} \) 22 \( \text{\textBF h3} \) \( \text{\textBF f8} \)
23 g6! fg 24 \( \text{\textBF xh7} \) \( \text{\textBF xe4} \) 25 \( \text{\textBF xg6} \)
\( \text{\textBF h4} \) 26 \( \text{\textBF c5} \) dc 27 \( \text{\textBF xg7} \) + \( \text{\textBF e7} \) 28
\( \text{\textBF xh4} \) \( \text{\textBF d6} \) 29 \( \text{\textBF f8} \) + 1-0

As can be seen, in such cases the struggle develops very quickly and at times dramatically. The player who wins is the first who manages to organise a decisive storm. Here sharpness and energy in attack must be combined with prophylactic measures in defending one's own king.

During the transition from opening to middlegame, such a plan sometimes demands considerable flexibility of thought, as the following example demonstrates.

\[ \text{\textbf{No. 239 Botvinnik-Alatortsev}} \]
\[ \text{Leningrad, 1934} \]
\[ \text{\textbf{Queen’s Gambit}} \]

1 d4 e6 2 c4 d5 3 \( \text{\textBF f3} \) \( \text{\textBF e7} \) 4 \( \text{\textBF c3} \)
\( \text{\textBF f6} \) 5 \( \text{\textBF g5} \) 0-0 6 \( \text{\textBF e3} \) a6 (better
6...\text{\textBF b7} or 6...c6) 7 cd ed
8 \( \text{\textBF d3} \) c6? (8...\text{\textBF bd7} 9 \( \text{\textBF c2} \) \( \text{\textBF e8} \)
followed by ...\text{\textBF f8} is correct) 9 \( \text{\textBF c2} \) \( \text{\textBF bd7} \)
White has available a highly
promising plan: a K-side pawn storm in combination with Q-side castling. But with what should he begin? Does he have a strong move, which will immediately set Black difficult problems?

The answer to these questions was provided by White’s next move.

10 g4!

Much more energetic than 10 h3 or 10 0-0-0. Now there is the immediate threat of 11 axf6 axf6 12 g5!, winning the h7 pawn, and in the event of 10... h6 11 af4! axg4 12 ag1 White has a very strong attack; on 12... agf6 there follows 13 axh6. The most tenacious defence was probably 10... g6, although even then after 11 h3 White has clearly the better chances.

Black however, lost his head, and chose the weakest continuation.

10... axg4? 11 axh7+ ah8 12 af4 df6 13 ad3 ah5 14 h3! agf6 15 ae5 ag8 16 0-0-0 ah6 17 ad1 ae6 18 e2 af5 19 axf5 axf5 20 ah4! 1-0

Incidentally, this type of temporary pawn sacrifice, where a storming pawn move is made without preparation, is typical in many situations. Here is a further example.

No. 240 Petrosian-Estrin
Moscow, 1968
English Opening

1 c4 e5 2 g3 ac6 3 ag2 d6 4 ac3 ae6 5 d3 g6 6 h4! ed7 (6... bx b4 7 b1 a5 8 a3 ac6 9 bx b7 favours White) 7 b5 ad8 8 af3 ag7 9 g5! e4 10 bh2 ed11 axd3 a6 12 h4! ab 13 cb ae7 14 ad2 0-0 15 h5

Having gained superiority on the K-side, White switches to a decisive attack on this wing.

15... gh 16 xh5 af5 17 ae4 ag6 18 xh7! xh7 19 xh7+ gh8 20 0-0-0 gh8 21 bh1 ah6 22 d5 f6 23 de4 xa2 24 xh6! ah6 25 xh6 g7 26 xh4! 1-0

An attack on the king is always the No. 1 threat

As we have seen, during the transition from opening to middlegame the attack on the king has various standard forms, the number of which can probably be multiplied.

It should be remembered that the threat of an attack is always hanging over the king, especially if it is caught in the centre, and in this respect the following examples are instructive.

In the first of these (No. 241) Black appeared to have successfully completed his develop-
An attack on the king is always the No. 1 threat

ment in the opening. But instead of castling as soon as possible (which, incidentally, is the insistent recommendation of theory) he prematurely and inappropriately initiated counterplay in the centre. His 'wish' was carried out—the centre was opened. But the consequences of this proved dismal for Black: he provoked an attack on his own king.

In the second game (No. 242) Black again largely overcame his opening difficulties. But when he needed to stabilize the position in the centre—19...e5, he made a tactical oversight (19...h6?), overlooking the crushing tactical stroke 20  ❧xe6+, after which his king came under an irresistible attack.

No. 241 Kupreichik-Castalloni
Student Olympiad, Ybbs, 1968
Caro-Kann Defence

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3  ❧c3 de 4  ❧xe4  ❧f5 5  ❧g3  ❧g6 6 h4 h6 7  ❧f3  ❧d7 8 h5  ❧h7 9  ❧d3  ❧xd3 10  ❧xd3

No. 242 Suetin-Hulak
Ljublin, 1976
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2  ❧f3 e6 3 d4 cd 4  ❧xd4  ❧c6 5  ❧c3 d6 6 g3  ❧e7 7  ❧g2 a6 8 0-0  ❧d7 9  ❧xc6  ❧xc6 10  ❧g4 g6 11  ❧e2  ❧c7 12 a4  ❧f6 13  ❧h6  ❧f8 14  ❧d2  ❧d8 15  ❧fe1  ❧xh6 16  ❧xh6  ❧b6 17  ❧g5  ❧d7 18  ❧d5  ❧xd5 19 ed h6? 20  ❧xe6+  ❧f8 (Black is crushed after 20...fe 21  ❧xg6+  ❧f8 22 de or 20...  ❧e7 21  ❧g7+) 21  ❧e7+  ❧g7 22  ❧e4 1-0

In games 243, 244 and 245 the main target again becomes the king in the centre, a noteworthy feature of the first two being the combining of an attack on the king with play against a weak complex of dark squares in the opponent’s position.

In No. 247 there is a dashing piece attack on the black king, while in No. 248, although the king manages to castle, even there it is caught by the white piece offensive.
No. 243 Alekhine-Bogoljubow  
World Championship, 1929  
Slav Defence

1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 ∇f3 ∇f6 4 ∇c3  
dc 5 a4 e6 6 e4 ∇b4 7 e5! ∇d5 8  
∇d2 ∇xc3? (better 8...b5) 9 bc  
b5 10 ∇g5! f6 11 ef ∇xf6 12 ∇e2  
a6 13 ∇f3! h6 14 ∇h5+! ∇xh5 15  
∇xh5+ ∇d7 (99)

20 ∇g8+ and 20 ∇g5 there is no  
defence) 18 ∇xe4 de 19 ∇d2!  
∇xc2 20 ∇f4! ∇d5 21 ∇g4! ∇f8  
22 ∇xe4 b6 23 ∇f6! ∇xf6 24  
∇a3+ ∇e8 25 ef ∇g6 26 ∇f3! 1-0

No. 245 Balashov-Miles  
Bugojno, 1978  
Queen's Gambit Accepted

1 d4 d5 2 ∇f3 ∇f6 3 c4 dc 4 ∇c3  
a6 5 e4 b5 6 e5 ∇d5 7 a4 ∇xc3 8 bc  
∇d5 9 g3 ∇e6 10 ∇g2 ∇b7 11 0-0  
∇d5 12 e6 ∇xe6 13 ∇g5 ∇d5 14  
∇xd5 ∇xd5 15 ab ab 16 ∇xa8  
∇xa8 17 ∇g4 ∇c6 18 ∇f3 f6 19  
∇e6 ∇b7 20 ∇bd5 g5 21 ∇f4 ∇h6  
22 ∇e1 ∇b6 23 ∇xc7+ ∇f8 24  
∇e6 gf 25 ∇xc6 ∇b8 26 ∇e6+  
∇e8 27 ∇c7 ∇f7 28 ∇xf4+ ∇f8 29  
∇c5 1-0

No. 246 Matanović-Kieninger  
Hamburg, 1954  
Petroff’s Defence

1 e4 e5 2 ∇f3 ∇f6 3 d4 ed 4 e5  
∇e4 5 ∇xd4 d5 6 ed ∇xd6 7 ∇d3  
∇c6 8 ∇f4 ∇e7+ 9 ∇e3 g6 10 ∇c3  
∇e6 11 0-0 ∇g7 12 ∇f1 0-0  
(12...0-0-0?! 13 ∇a4!) 13 ∇c5 b6  
(13...∇d7 14 ∇ad1 ∇fd8 is some- 
what better) 14 ∇a3 ∇xc3 15 bc  
∇d7 16 ∇ad1 ∇a5 17 ∇h6 f6  
White should also win after  
17...f5 (after 17...∇c4 18 ∇e5!  
or 17...∇xa2 18 ∇b5! he has an  
obvious advantage) 18 ∇xd6 cd  
19 ∇b5! ∇xb5 20 ∇g5 ∇f7 (or
Counterattacks and defensive barriers

In the transitional stage, to an even greater extent than in purely opening activity, one should not become carried away by attacking plans. Counter activity by the opponent must always be taken into account, and it can sometimes be very difficult to anticipate. This is shown by the following examples, where the 'victims' were such great masters of attack as Geller and Tal.

No. 249 Geller-Euwe
Zurich C, 1953
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4 &f6 2 c4 e6 3 &c3 &c6 4 d4 c5 5 &g5 &c7 6 &e2 a6 7 f4

No. 248 Kupreichik-Babev
Student Teams, Dresden, 1969
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 &c3 &c6 3 &ge2 e6 4 d4 cd 5 &x6d4 &c7 6 &e2 a6 7 f4

No. 247 Rashkovsky-Kosikov
Daugavpils Otborochnii, 1978
Slav Defence

1 &c3 &f6 2 c4 c6 3 d4 d5 4 cd cd 5 &c3 &c6 6 &f4 &f5 7 e3 e6 8
&b5 &d7 9 &a4 &b6 10 &h4 &e4 11 &c1 &c8 12 0-0 a6 13 &xc6
&xc6 14 &xe4 de (100)

15 d5! ed 16 &f5 g6 17 &d4
&xc1 18 &xc1 &xb2 19 &c8+
&e7 20 &b3 g5 21 &xg5+ f6 22
&b4+ &f7 23 &xb7 &e7 24
&xd5+ &g7 25 &xd7 &xc8 26
&xe7+ 1-0
\[ \text{\textcopyright} \]xc4 15 f5 f6! 16 \text{\textcopyright}f4 h5 17
\text{\textcopyright}h4 \text{\textcopyright}b6! 18 e5! \text{\textcopyright}xe5 19 fe
\text{\textcopyright}xd3 20 \text{\textcopyright}xd3 \text{\textcopyright}xe6 21 \text{\textcopyright}xh7+
\text{\textcopyright}f7 22 \text{\textcopyright}h6 (101)

22... \text{\textcopyright}h8!

This emphasizes the ephemeral nature of White’s attack. By shutting the white queen out of play, Black decisively seizes the initiative.

23 \text{\textcopyright}xh8 \text{\textcopyright}c2! 24 \text{\textcopyright}d1 (24 d5
was somewhat better) 24... \text{\textcopyright}xg2+! 25 \text{\textcopyright}f1 \text{\textcopyright}b3 26 \text{\textcopyright}e1 \text{\textcopyright}f3
0-1

No. 250 Tal-Petrosian
USSR Ch., 1973
Caro-Kann Defence

1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 \text{\textcopyright}c3 de 4 \text{\textcopyright}xe4
\text{\textcopyright}d7 5 \text{\textcopyright}c4 \text{\textcopyright}gf6 6 \text{\textcopyright}g5 e6 7 \text{\textcopyright}e2
b6 8 \text{\textcopyright}b3 a5!? 9 a4?! h6 10 \text{\textcopyright}f3
c5 11 \text{\textcopyright}f4 \text{\textcopyright}d6 12 \text{\textcopyright}e5 0-0 13
0-0-0? (a dangerous decision; it soon transpires that the white
king is the first to come under attack) 13... c4! 14 \text{\textcopyright}xc4 \text{\textcopyright}xa4
15 \text{\textcopyright}h3 \text{\textcopyright}b6 16 g4 a4! 17 g5 hg 18
\text{\textcopyright}h5 a3 19 b3 \text{\textcopyright}b4! 20 \text{\textcopyright}hg1?

White’s position is very difficult. 20 \text{\textcopyright}dg1 may possibly
have been comparatively better.

20...a2! 21 \text{\textcopyright}b2 \text{\textcopyright}xc4+ 22
\text{\textcopyright}xc4 \text{\textcopyright}d5 23 \text{\textcopyright}e4 f6 24 \text{\textcopyright}f4
\text{\textcopyright}a3+ 25 \text{\textcopyright}a1 \text{\textcopyright}xf4 26 h4 \text{\textcopyright}f7 27
\text{\textcopyright}g4 \text{\textcopyright}a5 0-1

No less frequently, defences may be erected in the path of an
attack (a perfectly correct one!), and often at a fairly early stage.
Such ‘barriers’ may involve material sacrifices of a positional
nature.

No. 251 Reshevsky-Petrosian
Zurich C, 1953
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4 \text{\textcopyright}f6 2 c4 e6 3 \text{\textcopyright}c3 \text{\textcopyright}b4 4 e3
0-0 5 \text{\textcopyright}d3 d5 6 \text{\textcopyright}f3 c5 7 0-0 \text{\textcopyright}c6 6
a3 \text{\textcopyright}xc3 9 bc b6 10 cd ed 11 \text{\textcopyright}b2
c4 12 \text{\textcopyright}c2 \text{\textcopyright}g4 13 \text{\textcopyright}e1 \text{\textcopyright}e4 14
\text{\textcopyright}d2 \text{\textcopyright}xd2 15 \text{\textcopyright}xd2 \text{\textcopyright}h5 16 f3
\text{\textcopyright}g6 17 e4 \text{\textcopyright}d7 18 \text{\textcopyright}ae1 de 19 fe
\text{\textcopyright}fe8 20 \text{\textcopyright}f4 b5 21 \text{\textcopyright}d1 \text{\textcopyright}e7 22
\text{\textcopyright}g4 \text{\textcopyright}e8 23 e5 a5 24 \text{\textcopyright}e3 \text{\textcopyright}d8 25
\text{\textcopyright}fe1 (102)
The storm clouds appear to be gathering over Black’s position, but the following original manoeuvre, which involves a sacrifice of the exchange, emphasizes his flexible blockade on the light squares.

25...\textit{e}6! 26 \textit{a}4 \textit{e}7 27 \textit{x}e6 \textit{fe} 28 \textit{f}1 \textit{d}5 29 \textit{f}3 \textit{d}3 30 \textit{x}d3 \textit{cd} 31 \textit{xd}3

A counter exchange sacrifice. White was threatened with ‘suffocation’ on the light squares.

31...\textit{b}4 32 \textit{cb} \textit{ab} 33 \textit{a}5 \textit{a}8 34 \textit{a}1 \textit{c}6 35 \textit{c}1 \textit{c}7 36 \textit{a}6 \textit{b}6 37 \textit{d}2 \textit{b}3 38 \textit{c}4 \textit{h}6 39 \textit{h}3 \textit{b}2 40 \textit{b}1 \textit{h}8 41 \textit{e}1 $\frac{1}{2}$-$\frac{1}{2}$

In the above examples White’s initiative quickly, directly from the opening, became threatening, and each time Black found an interesting way of impeding it. This involved considerable sacrifice of material, the practical effect of which proved pretty convincing. Although in each of these examples White did not make any direct mistake, and, moreover, played with the utmost energy, in the end Black was able at the least to hold the position.
DYNAMIC ATTACKS AND THE TACTICAL STRUGGLE FOR THE INITIATIVE IN MODERN OPENING SYSTEMS

Sharp ways of struggling for the initiative in the centre

In recent decades middle-game ideas, characteristic of positions with mobilization already completed, have been penetrating more and more into the opening stage. The struggle for the initiative in the opening is sharply tactical and at times combinational, and thus tactics are acquiring independent and ever greater importance in the initial stage of the game.

In itself this idea is not new. From early times a sharp tactical struggle for the initiative strongly attracted the ‘romantics’ in many of the Open Games. Thus the combinational complications arising, for example, in the King’s Gambit, Italian Game, Evans Gambit, Two Knights Defence, Danish and Göring Gambits and in many other Open Games were thoroughly, if not exhaustively, studied back in the last century.

In the Semi-Open and Closed Games, which are now the most popular, for a long time players avoided (or were not aware of) the immediate sharpening of the play, and preferred first the systematic (at times pedantic) deployment of the pieces.

And yet, long before the modern treatment of opening play was established, it was found in practice that the scope for combinational creativity at an early stage in the Closed Games was not less, and was perhaps even greater, than in the ancient Open Games. Incidentally, from the modern viewpoint the complications in the ancient openings often resemble a ‘storm in a teacup’.

The new approach, presupposing a sharp struggle for the initiative, led to the flourishing of many variations in popular modern openings, where tactical play begins before the mobilization of the forces is complete.

This is reflected in bold and sharp plans, proposed by one
side and uncompromisingly accepted by the other.

For example, the development of the ideas in many variations of the Slav Defence is instructive: after 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 ꙃf3 ꙃf6 4 ꙃc3 e6 White must either relieve the tension in the centre by 5 cd, or allow Black's sharp counterplay with . . . dc, . . . b5 etc.

Thus in the Botvinnik Variation (5 ꙃg5 dc 6 e4 b5) and the Meran Variation (5 e3 ꙃbd7 6 ꙃd3 dc 7 ꙃxc4 b5) Black not only actively contests the centre, but in a number of lines is active over the entire board, the play being highly combinational.

On the other hand, as if in anticipation of this counterplay, in certain variations of the Slav Defence White is the first to begin sharp gambit play. This is the case, for example, in the variation 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 ꙃc3 ꙃf6 4 ꙃf3 dc 5 e4 b5 6 e5 ꙃd5 7 a4 c6 etc.

It is a curious fact that the Boleslavsky Variation in the Sicilian Defence: 1 e4 c5 2 ꙃf3 ꙃc6 3 d4 cd 4 ꙃxd4 ꙃf6 5 ꙃc3 d6 6 ꙃe2 e5, which gives Black very active counterplay, led to a much greater practical use and study of aggressive variations for White: 6 ꙃg5 (the Richter/Rauzer Attack) and 6 ꙃc4! (the Sozin Attack). These moves were employed long before the appearance of the Boleslavsky Variation, but it is only in recent times that they have been especially thoroughly studied. It was found that in this way White has better chances in the struggle for the initiative than after 6 Ꙃe2, despite the fact that the opening play becomes tactical and double-edged.

In such cases the coordination of the forces takes shape during very tense play, often with the further course of the battle already being determined in the opening.

Take, for example, the development of events in the following popular variation of the Sicilian Defence, where in a number of lines an extremely sharp combinational struggle develops right from the opening: 1 e4 c5 2 ꙃf3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 ꙃxd4 ꙃf6 5 ꙃc3 d6 6 Ꙃe2 e5. For example, 6 . . . a6 6 ꙃg5 e6 7 f4! (103)

In reply to 7 . . . Ꙃe7 there can follow 8 ꙃf3!, and 8 . . . 0-0
9 0-0-0!, when White threatens not only the flank attack 10 g4, but also an energetic blow in the centre.

An exceptionally sharp situation arises in the line 7...\( \text{La}7 \) 8 \( \text{Lr}3 \) h6 9 La4 g5!? 10 fg Lfd7 11 \( \text{L}x\text{e}6 \) fe 12 Lh5+ Lf8 13 Lb5! etc. In general the assessment of this variation is still far from clear, although it has been intensively studied now for many years.

It must be mentioned that sharp play in the opening cannot be isolated from, or opposed to, positional ways of developing. Variations abounding in sharp play are closely associated with others, in which there is a slow battle for the accumulation of small positional advantages.

It can be said that the tactical struggle in modern opening systems is characterized by being positionally well-founded. This is its significant distinction from the ancient variations with sharp play in Open Games, where often only tactical ideas were pursued.

Typical in this respect is the following position, arising in the Nimzo-Indian Defence after 1 d4 Lf6 2 c4 e6 3 Lc3 Lb4 4 Lc2 d5 5 a3 \( \text{L}x\text{c}3+ \) 6 Lxc3 Lc4 7 Lc2 c5 8 dc Lc6 (104)

Here White has available two basic paths.

The first, 9 e3 La5+ 10 Ld2 Ld2 11 Ld2 dc! 12 Lc4 Lxc5 or 12 La5 Lxa5 leads to quiet play with roughly equal chances.

The second, 9 Lf3 La5+ 10 Ld2!? Ld4 11 Ld3 e5! 12 b4 La4 13 e2 Lf5 results in a very sharp tactical struggle, in which the chances of the two sides are extremely difficult to assess.

These variations are quite different in character, but they are closely connected, and a player choosing the Nimzo-Indian Defence must be equally prepared both for the one and the other.

Consider also a topical variation of the Sicilian Defence: 1 e4 c5 2 Lf3 Lc6 3 d4 cd 4 Lc4 Lf6 5 Lc3 e5 6 Lbd5 d6 (105)

Here too White has several plans of different character. Thus 7 Lg5 a6 8 Lxf6 gf 9 La3 b5 10 Ld5 f5 leads to a very sharp struggle, e.g. 11 Lxb5!? ab 12 Lxb5 etc.

After 7 a4 a6 8 La3 Le6 9 Lc4, on the other hand, a more
 positional, ‘square-controlling’ battle develops.

Here too the player must be ready for both types of struggle.

Such a range can essentially be found in any modern opening. Take a classical opening such as the Queen’s Gambit Accepted. A white pawn player with a rational, strictly positional style will normally choose the variation 1 d4 d5 2 c4 dc 3 f3 f6 4 e3 e6 5 x c4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 a4 (106), restricting Black’s Q-side counterplay and aiming for the subsequent concentration of his forces in the centre.

The positive features of this

No. 252 Gligoríc-Portisch
Pula, 1971

7 ... c6 8 e2 cd 9 d1 e7 10 ed 0-0 11 c3 d5 12 d3 c4 13 b1 b6 14 a5! d7 15 e5 ba 16 a3! f5 17 x d5 x d5 18 x d7 x d7 19 a5

White has obtained appreciable pressure in the centre, which he consistently increases by purposeful play.

19 ... c7 20 a2 d6 21 c4 h8 22 f3 b4 23 a1 a5 24 f4 d5 25 e5 f8 26 e2 b7 27 h3 c6 28 ac1 ac8 29 x d5 ed 30 x c6 x c6 31 d3 d7 32 g3 f8 33 b3! a8 34 c2 c8 35 d2 a8 36 g5 g8 37 f3 g6 38 c3 d8 39 c1 d6 40 f4 e5 41 x e5 a7 42 c5! e7 43 x d5 c7 44 x c7 x c7 45 x a5 b7 46 a3! b4 47 d5 g7 48 f1 f6 49 e2 e5 50 d3 x d5 51 c3 e4 52 a4 e2 53 d4+ c5 54 b4+ b5 55 e5+ c6 56 d2 e1 57 f3!, and White safely realized his advantage.

By contrast, a player with a sharp style will be more attracted here by variations such as 1 d4 d5 c4 dc 3 f3 f6 4 c3 a6 5 e4!? b5 6 e5 d5 7 a4 x c3 8 bc d5 9 g3! (107), where the opening strategy is sacrificial and ‘irrational’.
In this respect the development of the following game is instructive.

No. 253 Kavalek-Miles
Wijk aan Zee, 1978

From diagram 107: 9...\( \text{N}b7 \)
10 \( \text{N}g2 \) \( \text{Nd}7 \) 11 \( \text{Nh}4! \) \( \text{c}6 \)

White also has the advantage after 11...\( \text{Na}xg2 \) 12 \( \text{N}xg2 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 13 \( \text{N}f3 \) \( \text{Na}7 \) 14 \( \text{Nh}x b5 \) 15 \( \text{Nh}4 \), with the strong threat of \( \text{d}4-d5 \).

12 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 13 \( \text{f}5! \) \( \text{e}f \) 14 0-0 \( \text{g}6 \) 15 \( \text{Ng}5 \) \( \text{Ne}7 \) 16 \( \text{Nd}6 \) 17 \( \text{Nh}2 \) \( \text{N}e6 \) 18 \( \text{a}b \) \( \text{N}x f6 \) 19 \( \text{ef} \) \( \text{N}x f6 \) 20 \( \text{ae}1+ \) \( \text{Nd}8 \)

And here, by playing 21 \( \text{Nh}6 \) with the threat of 22 \( \text{N}x f5 \), White could have consolidated his advantage.

Or the variation 1 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 2 \( \text{c}4 \) dc 3 \( \text{Nh}3 \) \( \text{Nf}6 \) 4 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 5 \( \text{Nh}x c4 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 6 0-0 \( \text{a}6 \) 7 \( \text{Nh}2 \) \( \text{b}5 \) 8 \( \text{Nh}3 \) \( \text{Nh}7 \) 9 \( \text{Nh}3 \) \( \text{Nbd}7 \) 10 \( \text{Nd}1 \) \( \text{Nc}7 \) 11 \( \text{e}4 \) cd 12 \( \text{N}x d5! ? \) etc.

In short, there is ample scope for White to seek an initiative, although, of course, in each case Black too has resources for counterplay.

It is interesting that, in many cases, an avoidance of sharp play offered by the opponent is objectively unfavourable and signifies a passive approach.

Thus if White tries to avoid complications provoked in the opening stage by Black, he often risks losing the initiative and even handing it to Black. For example, in the line 1 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 2 \( \text{Nh}3 \) \( \text{Nf}6 \) 3 \( \text{d}4 \) cd 4 \( \text{Nh}x d4 \) \( \text{Nd}6 \) 5 \( \text{Nh}c3 \) \( \text{g}6 \), if instead of the sharp 6 \( \text{Nh}x c6 \) \( \text{bc} \) 7 \( \text{e}5 \)! White prefers quiet and routine development: 6 \( \text{Nh}e2 \) \( \text{Nh}g7 \) 7 \( \text{Nh}e3 \) 0-0 8 0-0, then by the energetic 8... \( \text{d}5 \)! Black gains an important tempo for this counterblow in the centre, and easily equalizes.

A similar avoidance by Black can have even more undesirable consequences. For example, in the variation 1 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 2 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 3 \( \text{Nh}c3 \) \( \text{Nh}4 \) 4 \( \text{Nh}d2 \)? \( \text{de} \) 5 \( \text{Nh}g4 \) it is clearly unfavourable for Black to avoid the complications resulting from the acceptance of the pawn sacrifice 5... \( \text{Nh}x d4 \), and to continue 5... \( \text{Nh}f8 \), since after 6 \( \text{Nh}e4 \) followed by 0-0-0 White has an obvious positional superiority.

These examples show that in modern opening play it is impossible to avoid sharp variations. Therefore, irrespective of
his style of play, a player should study with particular care the problems of a sharp tactical struggle in the opening. Such an approach is undoubtedly very important and promising for the further development of theory.

In modern opening variations there are a number of tactical means for enabling the forces quickly to gain manoeuvring freedom, which makes for very sharp play.

The attainment of manoeuvring freedom and the initiative at the cost of material sacrifices or positional concessions

In the 'main' lines of opening variations with sharp tactical play, where there is a basic and crucial struggle for the initiative, a sharp clash of plans takes place and the events on the board take on a forcing or even a combinational nature.

Often in the opening, if one player is aiming for the initiative, which he considers will be persistent and increasing, for the sake of this he may make positional weakenings or even sacrifice material.

Instructive in this respect are gambit lines of the Benoni Defence (1 d4 \( \text{c3} \) g6 5 e4 \( \text{g7} \) 6 \( \text{f3} \) 0-0 7 h3 b5!? 8 cb a6 9 ba \( \text{a5} \), the Benko Gambit (1 d4 \( \text{f6} \) 2 c4 c5 3 d5 b5!?), and certain lines of the Spanish Game where Black sacrifices a pawn: 1 e4 e5 2 \( \text{f3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 3 \( \text{b5} \) a6 4 \( \text{a4} \) \( \text{f6} \) 5 0-0 \( \text{e7} \) 6 \( \text{e1} \) b5 7 \( \text{b3} \) 0-0 8 c3 d5!? etc. (of the old openings, this tendency is seen in many lines of the King's Gambit Accepted, Evans Gambit and so on).

We will examine a few examples in more detail. The development of events in the following comparatively new variation of the Queen's Gambit is typical: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{f6} \) 4 \( \text{g5} \).

For a long time in this position Black chose only purely defensive ways of developing — 4... \( \text{e7} \) or 4... \( \text{bd7} \).

Then they were joined by a sharp way of battling for the centre, worked out by Keres: 4...c5!?

If White avoids the complications and prefers the quiet continuation of his development by 5 e3, then after 5... cd 6 ed \( \text{e7} \) Black transposes into a not unfavourable position from the Caro-Kann Defence (1 e4 c6 2 d4 d5 3 ed cd 4 c4 \( \text{f6} \) 5 \( \text{c3} \) e6 6 \( \text{g5} \) \( \text{e7} \)).

The crucial continuation, which can be regarded as the main line of this variation, is
5 cd! cd!? 6 ♙xd4 ♙e7! 7 e4! ♙c6 (108). The struggle for the initiative in this critical position is sharply tactical, and in the following interesting variations an assessment is possible only after an accurate analysis of the resulting complications: 8 ♙e3 ♙xd5! 9 ed ♙xg5 10 f4 ♙b4, or 8 ♙d2 ♙xe4! 9 ♙xe4 ed 10 ♙xe7 ♙xe7! 11 ♙xd5 0-0!?  

Instead of 11...0-0!? Black can regain his piece by 11...f5, but then after 12 0-0-0 fe 13 ♙e1! White gains a strong initiative in the centre, while if in reply to 12 0-0-0 Black plays 12...♗xe4, then after 13 ♙c4 ♙xd5 14 ♙xd5 ♙d7 15 ♙f3 0-0-0 16 ♙g5 it is difficult for him to avoid loss of material in view of the threat of 17 ♙f7! 

Therefore Black deliberately chooses a sharp path, aiming at all costs to retain the initiative. Practice has shown that after 11...0-0!? 12 f3 ♙b4 13 ♙c5! White has the better chances, and that Black’s initiative is most probably only of a temporary nature. However, the complications arising still contain considerable scope for research, and it is possible that the 4...c5 variation is merely experiencing a temporary crisis.

Probably more promising for Black is the similar central thrust in the variation 1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 ♙c3 ♙f6 4 ♙f3 c5 5 cd cd!?

The point is that, as regards the struggle for the important d5 and e4 squares, 4 ♙f3 is a much more neutral move than 4 ♙g5.

For example, in the main line after 6 ♙xd4 ed 7 e4 ♙c6 8 ♙b5 ♙xe4 9 0-0 ♙f6 10 ♙e1+ ♙e7 11 ♙e3 ♙f6 Black retains his extra pawn with a quite defensible position, and it is not easy for White to mount an attack on the king.

It is from a similar viewpoint that the 3...f5 variation in the Spanish Game is studied, where, as in the previous example, Black counters White’s ‘pressurizing’ aims in the centre with a sharp struggle from the very first moves.

Such paths are, of course, by no means lacking in danger. If the opponent should succeed in overcoming his period of difficulties and in neutralizing the initiative, for the sake of which concessions of a permanent nature have been made, such a
set-up may prove strategically lost. For example, the decisive influence on the outcome of the game may be the material sacrificed for the initiative in the opening.

Another problem, closely associated with this, is the case where, by contrast, one side aims to achieve in the opening a permanent positional advantage by temporarily conceding the initiative to the opponent (by 'provoking' him into taking action).

An illustration of this is provided by the following line of the Sicilian Defence: 1 e4 c5 2 \( \f3 \) c6 3 d4 cd 4 \( \x \) d4 \( \f6 \) 5 \( \c3 \) g6 6 \( \x \) c6! bc 7 e5 \( \g8 \) 8 \( \c4 \) \( \g7 \) 9 \( \f3 \) f5 10 \( \f4 \)

Black has acquired a very solid pawn mass in the centre, but his mobilization is retarded and for the moment his pieces are significantly restricted.

An interesting continuation is 10...e6 11 0-0-0 \( \g7 \) 12 \( \g3 \) \( \h6 \) 13 \( \b1 \) \( \f7 \) 14 \( \he1 \) \( \b8 \) 15 \( \b3 \)? (15 a3 is correct, not allowing Black's subsequent manoeuvre) 15...\( \b4 \)! 16 a3 \( \xf4 \) 17 \( \xf4 \) \( \xe5 \), and at a slight cost in material Black very strongly set his central pawns in motion, and soon gained a decisive advantage.

Here Black exploited White's poor play to transform his central pawn majority into a real force. The correct method of play for White is demonstrated in the following game.

**No. 254 Andersson-Bilek**
Teesside, 1972
* Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 \( \f3 \) c6 3 d4 cd 4 \( \x \) d4 \( \f6 \) 5 \( \c3 \) g6 6 \( \x \) c6 bc 7 e5 \( \g8 \) 8 \( \c4 \) \( \g7 \) 9 \( \f3 \) f5 10 \( \f4 \) \( \b8 \) 11 0-0 e6 12 \( \ad1 \) \( \c7 \) 13 \( \fe1 \) \( \e7 \) 14 b3 0-0 15 \( \xe3 \), and after reinforcing his critical e5 point, White stands better.

An important part is played in such variations by questions of dynamics. An as yet static advantage is opposed by the initiative and concrete tactical threats of the opponent, who often has a considerable lead in development.

The following example is also typical.

**No. 255 Boleslavsky-Flohr**
Moscow, 1950
* Caro-Kann Defence

1 e4 c6 2 \( \f3 \) d5 3 \( \c3 \) \( \g4 \) 4 h3 \( \xf3 \) 5 \( \xf3 \) e6 6 d4 \( \f6 \) 7 \( \d3 \) (109) 7...\( \de8 \) \( \xe4 \) \( \xd4 \)

Here Black decided to win a pawn, reckoning subsequently on neutralizing White's very strong initiative. In the given case, however, White's initiative increases with every move.
No. 256 Matanović-Barca
Yugoslavia v Hungary, 1957
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 ∆xd4 ∆f6 5 ∆c3 a6 6 Ag5 e6 7 f4 ∆b6
8 254d2 ∆xb2 9 ∆b1 ∆a3 10 e5 de
11 fe ∆fd7 12 ∆c4 ∆c5?
(12...∆b4 is correct) 13 ∆xe6!

This tactical blow, which is
White’s chief threat in the given
variation, ensures him a decisive
advantage.

13...fe 14 ∆xe6 ∆xe5+ 15
∆e3! ∆xe3+ 16 ∆xe3 ∆d6 17
∆d5! ∆f6 18 ∆xg7+, and White
created a very strong attack on
the opponent’s king.

A study of the problems of
sharp opening play shows that in
such cases the main thing to take
into account is whether the initi-
ative will fade or, on the con-
trary, will increase and develop.

Generalizing this, we can
draw the following conclusion:
the basic criterion of the viability
of this or that sharp plan in mod-
ern opening play is how persis-
tent and firm the initiative is, and
what resources for counterplay
are available to the defending
side.

The following sharp variation
of the Slav Defence is a typical
example: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 ∆c3
∆f6 4 d3 dc 5 e4!? b5 6 e5 ∆d5
7 a4 e6 8 ab ∆xc3 9 bc cb 10 ∆g5
∆b7 11 ∆h5 (110)
At the cost of a pawn White gains a highly dangerous initiative.

Practice shows that, if Black tries to neutralize this initiative positionally, aiming mainly to retain his material advantage, it can gradually grow into a strong attack. This is confirmed by the following game.

**No. 257 Geller-Unzicker**
Stockholm IZ, 1952

From diagram 110: 11...g6 12
\[ \text{Ng4 Fe7 13 Fe2 Dd7 14 Ff3 Fc7} \]
\[ 15 Fe4 Db6 16 Dh6 Pg8 17 Pg5 \]
\[ Xe4 18 Xe4 Dd5 19 Xd5 ed 20 Xf6! \]

White placed his opponent in a very difficult position.

Much more promising, in our opinion, is the as yet little-studied 11...Xd7?! (instead of the passive 11...g6), e.g. 12 Xh7 \[ \text{Fc6! 13 Xf6+ gf14 Xh8 fe} \]

It is now Black's strong initiative which is threatening to develop into an attack.

This example shows how, in a sharp tactical struggle, the defending side is not at all obliged to neutralize the opponent's threats positionally. Very often the only way of parrying the initiative is by a timely counter-sacrifice of material. Each time he should seek sharp resources for counterplay — the best way of fighting against an initiative.

**Dynamics of the modern opening**

The struggle in modern opening variations is full of inner dynamics, and abounds in unexpected tactical turns.

We have already talked about the changing of various outward features — the transformation of positional factors. In dynamic variations this is especially marked, the changes sometimes being of an unexpected, explosive nature. But in the process of outward changes (as also in transformations in classical variations), dynamics by no means signifies an arbitrary, accidental change of situation, but, on the contrary, emphasizes the regularity and strict logic of chess.

As a rule, dynamic variations are distinguished by the fact that they aim for not only a complex, but also a highly aggressive
struggle. Under the influence of these ideas, many variations, which used to be considered exclusively positional, have been reappraised.

An example of this is provided by the following variation of the Reti Opening, which used to enjoy a solid reputation: 1 \( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)f3 \( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)f6 2 g3 d5 3 \( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)g2 \( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)f5 4 c4 c6 (III). Until recent times, in this variation middlegame play would begin rather late. White would first deploy his dark-square bishop on the other long diagonal (b2-b3 and \( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)b2), then complete the mobilization of his flanks, and so on.

\[ \text{\( \Delta \)}f4 \text{\( \Delta \)}e7 10 0-0 0-0 11 \text{\( \Delta \)}ac1 \]

White gradually prepares the opening of the centre, which gives a sharp, dynamic nature to this formerly slow variation.

11...\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)d7 12 \( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)e5 \( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)xe5 13 \( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)xe5 \( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)g6

Now comes a veiled and long-planned blow in the centre, which gives White the advantage.

14 e4! \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} ad8

White also has a powerful initiative in the centre and on the Q-side after 14...de 15 de \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} ad8 16 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} fd1.

15 ed ed 16 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)}xf6 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)}xf6 17 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)}xd5 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)}e5 18 d4! \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)}b8

In the event of 18...\( \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} \)xd4 19 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} fd1 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} e5 20 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} f6+ White would have gained a material advantage, by winning queen for rook and bishop. This may have been the lesser evil.

19 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} fe1 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} fe8 20 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} xe8+ \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} xe8 21 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} e3 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} xd4 22 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} xb7 h5 23 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} c8 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} e5 24 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} c4 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} e1+ 25 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} fl \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} h7 26 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} xb8 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} d3 27 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} d2 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} e2 28 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} f3 1-0

In this respect the following game is also instructive.

No. 258 Smyslov-Bronstein
USSR Teams Ch.,
Moscow 1974

From diagram 111: 5 cd cd 6 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} b3 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} c8 7 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} c3 e6 8 d3! \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} c6 9

No. 259 Smyslov-Darga
Amsterdam IZ, 1964
Reti Opening

1 \( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)f3 \( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)f6 2 g3 d5 3 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} g2 \text{\( \text{\( \Delta \)} \)} g4 4 c4 c6 5 cd cd

Already this is probably the
root of Black's difficulties. Better was 5...\( \text{dxe}4 \) 6 \( \text{dxe}4 \) c6 followed by ...e6 with a solid position.

6 \( \text{dxe}4 \) \( \text{dxe}4 \) 7 0-0 e6 8 \( \text{dxe}3 \) \( \text{dxe}7 \)
(8...\( \text{dxe}7 \) or 8...\( \text{dxe}6 \) was preferable, aiming to neutralize the strong white knight as quickly as possible) 9 \( \text{dxe}4 \) 0-0 10 \( \text{dxe}4 \) \( \text{dxe}7 \) 11 \( \text{dxe}4 \) \( \text{dxe}4 \)?

11...\( \text{dxe}6 \) was essential. Like a fleeing ostrich, Black wishes to 'hide' in the endgame, but it proves completely unpromising for him.

12 \( \text{dxe}6 \) ab 13 \( \text{dxe}6 \) \( \text{dxe}6 \) 14 \( \text{dxe}6 \) \( \text{dxe}6 \) 15 a3 \( \text{dxe}6 \) 16 \( \text{dxe}6 \) !

Here too the decisive events come to a head in the centre. The e3-e4 break is prepared.

16...\( \text{dxe}4 \) 17 e3 \( \text{dxe}6 \) ?

This eases White's task, but Black's position was already very difficult.

18 e4! de 19 \( \text{dxe}4 \) \( \text{dxe}4 \) 20 \( \text{dxe}4 \) \( \text{dxe}4 \) 21 \( \text{dxe}4 \) \( \text{dxe}4 \) 22 dc \( \text{dxe}4 \) 23 ef 24 ef 25 \( \text{dxe}6 \) 1-0

We will now turn to an examination of the features which characterize dynamic attacks at the start of the game.

Dynamic attacks in the opening and during the transition to the middlegame

In Steinitz's positional theory, an attack was regarded chiefly as a means of realizing an advantage. It was supposed though to crown other offensive means: pressure, initiative, siege, restriction of the mobility of the enemy forces, and so on. This was perhaps the source of Steinitz's rule: the player with the advantage is obliged to attack!

In recent times, under the influence of dynamic ideas, the concept of attack has grown considerably broader. In the modern understanding, the origin of an attack is assisted (generally speaking) not so much by an objective advantage, as by how the forces are deployed (the advantage is of a localized nature, i.e. it is of significance on a certain part of the board). In all these cases the starting of an attack is a moral duty.

The modern interpretation of attack did not arise by accident. In addition, it cannot be considered that the reason for such an interpretation was the appearance of new, sharp opening variations.

Here we are obliged to encounter a problem on which little research has been done: what is it that advances theory—the development of opening or middlegame ideas? This significant question can be answered categorically: it is middlegame
ideas which are the main driving force, while opening ideas are merely functional in this respect.

Of course, the absence of necessary opening patterns was a serious hindrance to the development of dynamic ideas. The creators of new ideas were obliged to experiment, take risks, and sometimes even go to extremes.

But the dynamic interpretation paved a way for itself throughout a very long, preparatory period. This is shown by the many chess masterpieces created in particular by Andersen, Morphy, Zukertort, Pillsbury and Charousek. And in many of the best games by the leaders of the positional school — Steinitz, Tarrasch, Schlechter and others — dynamic ideas are very apparent.

Chigorin regarded dynamic ideas as a creative method. He approached the principles and rules of the positional school from the viewpoint of their real strength in a particular position. This is shown by his critical comments regarding the dogmatic impressions of the time about the centre, the advantage of the two bishops, the 'weakness' of cramped positions, and so on.

As a determined opponent of dogmatism, Chigorin regarded a game of chess as a living process, and he considered the most important factor in assessment to be a concrete approach to the given position.

Besides carrying out complex strategic opening ideas (e.g. piece pressure on the centre in connection with active counterplay, the blockade of a pawn centre, the preparation of pawn storms on the flanks, and so on), in the opening Chigorin sometimes went in for very sharp gambit continuations, laying a concrete path of dynamism. Thus his favourite openings as White were the Evans Gambit, the King's Gambit, and the Poniziani Opening, the theory of which he enriched and broadened. Even today, when these openings have become largely the property of history, Chigorin's ideas in them have not lost their topicality.

Subsequently the advance of dynamics took place mainly in the implementation of middle-game ideas, as the following games confirm.

**No. 260 Breyer-Esser**

Budapest, 1917

*Slav Defence*

1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 e3 ♘f6 4 ♗c3 e6 5 ♘d3 ♘d6 6 f4!? 0-0 7 ♗f3 dc 8 ♙b1?!
A paradoxical decision, the point of which was not appreciated by Black. In fact White intends a sharp dynamic attack on the K-side, while allowing Black a monopoly on the Q-side.

8...b5? (8...c5 is correct) 9 e4 Qe7 10 Qg5! h6 11 h4! g6 12 e5 hg

Black’s position is already very difficult. Thus after 12...Qd5 13 h5 Qxc3 14 bc hg 15 hg fg 16 Qxg6 Qg7 17 Qh7+! Qxg6 18 Wh5+ Qf5 Black is prettily mated: 19 g4+ Qe4 20 Wh1+ Qd3 21 Qh3+ Qc2 Qg2 mate!

13 hg Qd5 14 Qf1! (112)

A ‘quiet’ move, which, however, sets Black very difficult concrete problems: White prepares the following astounding combination, crowning his attack on the king.

14...Qxc3 15 bc Qb7

It would have been better to try and buy White off with a counter-sacrifice: 15...f5 16 gf Qxf6 17 ef Qxf6, although even here his attack is very dangerous.

16 Qg4 Qg7 17 Qh7+! Qxh7 18 Qh5+ Qg7 19 Qh6+ Qg8 20 Qxg6 fg 21 Qxg6+ Qh8 22 Qh6+ Qg8 23 g6!

This is where the point of White’s 14th move is revealed! Were the king still at e1, Black would have a defence: 23...Qh4+ and 24...Qe7.

23...Qf7 (otherwise mate is inevitable) 24 gf+ Qxh7 25 Qh5+ Qg7 26 f5! ef 27 Qh6+ 1-0

And in the following game the initiative gained by White in the opening grows as though ‘out of nothing’ into a powerful attack over the entire front.

This game, which won a brilliance prize over 60 years ago, has a completely youthful appearance even today.

No. 261 Reti-Bogoljubow
New York, 1924
Reti Opening

1 Qf3 d5 2 c4 e6 3 g3 Qf6 4 Qg2 Qd6 5 0-0 0-0 6 b3 Qe8 7 Qb2 Qbd7 8 d4 c6 9 Qbd2 Qe4?

Now White commences a lengthy and very fine pressurizing combination.

10 Qxe4! de 11 Qe5 f5 12 f3! ef 13 Qxf3 Qc7 14 Qxd7 Qxd7 15 ed e5 16 c5! Qf8 17 Qc2 ed 18 ef! Qad8 19 Qh5! Qe5 20 Qxd4
\( \textit{Dynamic attacks and the tactical struggle for the initiative} \)

\[ \text{Rx}f5 21 \text{Rx}f5 \text{Rx}f5 22 \text{Rx}f5 \text{Rx}d4 23 \text{Rf}1 \text{Rd}8 24 \text{Rf}7+ \text{Rh}8 25 \text{Re}8!! 1-0 \]

The next significant step in the development of the dynamic interpretation of the opening was made by Alekhine, the founder of modern dynamism. One of the main features of the modern opening is the sharp reappraisal of many closed set-ups, owing to a significant increase in their tactical sharpness.

It was Alekhine who made the positional sacrifice of material in the opening into an effective method of play. In the early 1930s when he began making his first experiments of this type, gambits in the Closed Games were rather rare. Moreover, even the eccentric experiments of his which succeeded were given a hostile reception by the conservative critics of that time.

But in essence, all that Alekhine lacked was a sufficiency of dynamic opening patterns, e.g. gambits of the type 1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 c3 c6 4 e4 d5 5 cxe4 b4+ 6 d2!

In this position Alekhine usually replied with the prosaic 6 c3, which allows Black a comfortable game after 6...c5 etc. This shows that even the great master could not overcome the routine thinking of his time.

6...\text{Rx}d4 7 cxd4 b4 \text{Rx}e4+ 8 e2, or 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 f3 f6 4 c3 dc 5 e4 b5 6 e5 d5 7 a4 c3 8 bc b7 9 g5!! etc.

At the time Alekhine had to make do with ‘one-off’ gambit variations, one of which is given below.

\textit{No. 262 Pirc-Alekhine}
\textit{Bled, 1931}

\textit{Von Hennig-Schara Gambit}

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 c3 c5 4 cd cd 5 a4+ d7 6 \text{Rx}d4 ed 7 \text{Rx}d5 c6 8 g5

This activity is inappropriate. 8 e3 f6 9 w d1 etc. is better.

8...f6 9 d2 h6 10 \text{Rx}f6 \text{Rx}f6 11 e3 0-0-0 12 0-0-0? g4

13 d5 \text{Rx}d5 14 \text{Rx}d5 a3!

15 b3 d1 16 x a3 x f2

17 d3 a4! 18 f3 x f3

19 f5+ b8 20 x f3 e1+

21 c2 c8 22 g3+ e5+!

23 b3 d1+ 24 a3 c5!

0-1

Or there were dangerous experiments, such as the sensational 6th game from Alekhine’s 1937 return match with Euwe. Here Alekhine with White played what was undoubtedly an improvised gambit: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 c3 dc 4 e4 e5 5 f3 ed 6 c4?

The practical effect of this puzzling sacrifice was very great.
Euwe not only failed to find the refutation of White’s idea, but even made a decisive error, by playing 6...b5?, on which there followed a further, this time purely tactical blow 7 Δ×b5!, when it transpired that 7...cb failed to 8 Δd5!, winning the rook.

It is curious that, in their analysis of this game, the critics regarded White’s idea as an ‘unlawful attempt’ on their orderly positional conceptions. Later a refutation was found: 6...dc! 7 Δb3 cb! 8 Δ×f7+ Δe7 9 Δ×b2 Δb6!, after which it was established that Alekhine’s experiment was dubious.

Alekhine’s eccentric pawn moves in the opening came in for particular criticism. The following game is instructive in this respect.

No. 263 Alekhine–Euwe
World Championship, 1935
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 Δc3 Δb4
4 Δe2 de 5 a3 Δe7 6 Δxe4 Δc6
7 g4!? (113)

This move, which at the time was subjected to wholesale criticism, proved highly effective in practice. Its idea is to combine the flank development of the bishop with a possible pawn storm on the K-side.

7...b6 (better 7...Δf6) 8 Δg2
Δb7 9 c3 Δf6 10 Δ2g3 0-0

(better 10...0-0-0) 11 g5 Δ×e4 12
Δxe4 Δh8 13 Δh5! Δe8 14 Δf6!
Δxf6

After 14...gf 15 gf Δa5 16 fe
Δxe7 17 Δ×b7 Δ×b7 18 Δg5 f6
19 Δh6 Δg8 20 0-0-0 Δd6 21
Δe1 White has an obvious advantage.

15 gf gf 16 Δh4 Δd8 17 Δf4! e5
18 Δg3 f5 19 de and White had an undisputed advantage.

Such searchings by Alekhine essentially began much earlier. This is strikingly shown by the following game, which to this day remains a model of dynamism.

No. 264
Alekhine–Rubinstein
Carlsbad, 1923
Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 Δf3 Δf6 4 Δc3
Δe7 5 Δg5 Δbd7 6 e3 0-0 7 Δc1
c6 8 Δc2 a6 9 a4 Δe8 10 Δd3 dc 11
\( \text{\&xc4 \&d5 12 \&f4!} \)

An original and innovative idea for that time. Of course, this decision is debatable, and 12 \( \text{\&xe7} \) was probably stronger.

But against Rubinstein, one of the classics of positional play, Alekhine’s method proved highly effective and psychologically justified. In return for his spoiled pawn formation, White gains the initiative.

12. . . \( \text{\&xf4} \) 13 ef c5 14 dc \( \text{\&c7} \)

15 0-0 \( \text{\&xf4} \) 16 \( \text{\&e4} \) \( \text{\&xc5} \)

A mistake. 16 . . \( \text{\&xc5} \) 17 \( \text{\&d3} \)
(or 17 \( \text{\&eg5} \) h6) 17 . . \( \text{\&e7} \) would have been correct, with approximate equality.

17 \( \text{\&xc5} \) \( \text{\&xc5} \) 18 \( \text{\&d3} \) b6 19 \( \text{\&xh7}+ \) \( \text{\&h8} \)?

A further significant error. It would have been better to go to f8. Now White step by step increases his initiative, which eventually develops into a powerful dynamic attack over the entire front.

20 \( \text{\&e4} \) \( \text{\&a7} \)

White also wins after 20 . . \( \text{\&b8} \) 21 g3 \( \text{\&f6} \) 22 b4 \( \text{\&d6} \) 23 \( \text{\&fd1} \) \( \text{\&e7} \) 24 \( \text{\&c6} \) \( \text{\&d8} \) 25 \( \text{\&d4} \) g6 26 \( \text{\&d2}! \) \( \text{\&g7} \) 27 \( \text{\&d1} \)

21 b4! \( \text{\&f6} \) 22 \( \text{\&c6} \) \( \text{\&d7} \) 23 g3!

\( \text{\&b8} \)

After 23 . . \( \text{\&d6} \) 24 \( \text{\&fd1} \) \( \text{\&xd1}+ \) 25 \( \text{\&xd1} \) \( \text{\&xd1}+ \) 26 \( \text{\&g2} \) \( \text{\&d7} \) 27 \( \text{\&xb6} \) \( \text{\&a4} \) 28 \( \text{\&xa6} \) \( \text{\&d7} \) 29 \( \text{\&g5} \) \( \text{\&g8} \) 30 \( \text{\&e2}! \) White wins.

24 \( \text{\&g5}! \) \( \text{\&ed8} \) (114) 25 \( \text{\&g6}!! \)

A crushing blow! In the event of 25 . . \( \text{\&f6} \) 26 \( \text{\&e4}! \) \( \text{\&xb4} \) 27 \( \text{\&h4}+ \) \( \text{\&g8} \) 28 \( \text{\&h7}+ \) \( \text{\&f8} \) 29 \( \text{\&h8}+ \) \( \text{\&e7} \) 30 \( \text{\&g7}+ \) \( \text{\&e8} \) 31 \( \text{\&g8}+ \) \( \text{\&f8} \) 32 \( \text{\&g6}+ \) \( \text{\&e7} \) 33 \( \text{\&e6} \) Black is mated!

Black played 25 . . \( \text{\&e5} \), but after 26 \( \text{\&xf7}+ \) \( \text{\&xf7} \) 27 \( \text{\&xf7} \) \( \text{\&f5} \) 28 \( \text{\&fd1}! \) White gained a decisive material advantage.

The finish was 28 . . \( \text{\&xd1}+ \)

29 \( \text{\&xd1} \) \( \text{\&xf7} \) 30 \( \text{\&xc8} \) \( \text{\&h7} \) 31 \( \text{\&xd6} \) \( \text{\&f3} \) 32 \( \text{\&d3}+ \) 1-0

Thus it is the development of middlegame ideas which has assisted the establishment of the dynamic interpretation. As a result the preconditions have been created for the appearance of new opening forms, which in turn have further influenced the development of dynamic ideas. The flourishing of the dynamic interpretation is notable in all stages of the game today, having been sharply stimulated by a plentiful supply.
of new ideas.

We will now examine certain modern forms of dynamic attacks.

‘Shock’ central attacks against the Sicilian

In modern variations of the Sicilian Defence, where at an early stage Black aims as soon as possible for active play on the Q-side, and as a consequence delays the development of his K-side, typical attacks by White have become a standard feature. Here Black has to reckon with sharp and sudden attacks in the centre by White, often involving sacrifices which are most often aimed at the e6 and d5 squares.

Here are a few examples of this type.

No. 265 Keres-Kotov
Budapest C, 1950
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 f3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 fx4
f6 5 c3 a6 6 e2 c7 7 g5
bd7 8 0-0 e6 9 h5!? c4?
(after 9...g6 10 e2 White has slightly the better game) 10
exe6! exe6 11 d5! d8
(11...xd5 12 ed f5 13 e1+
ed5 14 f4! also gives White a very strong attack) 12 g4 e5
13 f4 exd4 14 xd7 xd7 15
xf6 gf 16 xf6+ c7 17 xh8
c6 18 d2, and White won.

No. 266 Keres-Sajtar
Amsterdam OL, 1954
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 f3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 fx4
f6 5 c3 a6 6 g5 bd7 7 c4
e6 8 0-0 c7? (better 8...b6)
9 xex6! fe 10 exe6 c4 11 d5!
(f7 (after 11...xd5 12 ed e5
13 b3 c3 14 d2 h2 15 c7+!
White advantageously regains his material, with an unceasing attack) 12 xf6 exe6 (White wins quickly after 12...gf 13
h5+! or 12...xf6 13 b3)
13
c3! f6 14 xf6 gf 15 b6 c6
16 xa8 exf 17 a4! b6 18 dd5+
(d7 19 a3! d8 20 xb6+! 1-0
(20...xb6 21 f5+! or
20...xb6 21 f7+ d8 22
xf6+! etc).

No. 267 Fischer-Rubinetti
Palma de Mallorca IZ, 1970
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 f3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 fx4
f6 5 c3 e6 6 g4 a6 7 b3 b5
8 0-0 b7? (better 8...e7)
9 e1 bd7 10 g5 h6 11 b4
(11 xf6 xxf6 12 a4! was even stronger) 11...c5? (115)
11...g5 12 g3 e5 was essential, erecting a barrier on the e-file.

12 d5! ed 13 ed+ d7 14 b4!
a4 15 xa4 ba 16 c4 e8 17
xa4 xd7 18 b3 g5 19 g3 h5
20 c5! dc 21 bc xd5 22 e8+
Sudden ‘explosive’ piece attacks

This type of attack, directed mainly at the opponent’s king, is highly characteristic of modern variations in the transition from opening to middlegame and in the early middlegame.

As an example, the development of events in the following game is instructive.

No. 268 Holmov-Keres
USSR Ch., 1959
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 b5 a6 4 e5 g4 5 x c6 dc 6 0-0 g6 7 e1 g7 8 h3 h6 9 e3 b6 10 d4 cd 11 x d4 (116)

Not sensing the danger, Black played 11...c5?, on which there came an unexpected knight

It now transpires that 12...x d1 is bad because of 13 x d1 b7 (or 13...x d7) 14 d5!, when 14...x c6 fails to 15 c7+ f8 16 x a8.

12...x d7 13 x e7!!

This knight performs miracles. Out of the great wealth of combinations, there are few where a knight demonstrates such murderous strength.

13...x e7 (13...x e7 is no better in view of 14 a d5, when 14...x d7 fails to 15 x h6 and 16 x f6+, winning the queen) 14 x h6 x h6 15 f3 g7 16 d5+! d8 17 a d1 b7 18 b3!

This emphasizes Black’s helplessness. The knight at d5 dominates, and material loss for Black is inevitable.

18...c6 19 x b6 ab 20 x f7 x e5 21 x d7+ x d7 22 x e5, and Black shortly resigned.

Alekhine left a number of model examples of this type (cf.
No. 264), and the following game is typical. Black appears to play the opening soundly and even more soundly to hide his king away. But (a characteristic feature of dynamic attacks!) White gradually prepares a powerful, dynamic piece attack, under the influence of which Black’s solid defences unexpectedly collapse.

decisive after 24...h6 25 f5+ h7 26 xh6 f6 27 f5!! g6 28 h3+.

25 f5+ h8 26 xg6!! 1-0

Here are some further examples on this theme.

No. 270 Gaprindashvili-Hartoosh
Amsterdam, 1976
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 f3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 xd4
f6 5 c3 e6 6 f4 c6 7 e3 e7
8 f3 e5 9 xxe6 bc 10 f5! a5 11
c4 b8 12 b3 0-0 13 0-0-0
xb3 14 cb d5 15 ed cd 16 xd5!
xd5 17 xd5 18 d6 18 d1!
x a2 19 f6+ gf 20 h6! h8 21
xf8 a1+ 22 c2 xd1+ 23
xd1 xf8 24 e3 1-0

No. 271 Stein-Portisch
Stockholm IZ, 1962
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 f3 e6 3 d4 cd 4 xd4
a6 5 d3 f6 6 0-0 c7 7 d2
c6 8 xc6 bc (better 8...dc 9 f4
e5) 9 f4 c5+ (9...d6 is more circumspect, although here too after 10 f3 e5 11 fe de 12 h4
White has persistent pressure on the K-side) 10 h1 d6 11 f3 e5
12 fe de 13 h4! 0-0 14 f5 e6
15 e2 a5 16 c4 h8 17 g5
d7 18 ad1 b6 (118)

This leads to a rapid defeat.
The lesser evil was 18...xf5 19
xf5 b6.
Switching the weight of the attack from another target to the king

This is a strategic procedure, closely linked to the preceding one, which can perhaps be considered merely as a more complicated instance of a sudden attack. But while in the examples examined above there was a clear predominance of tactical features, here the strategic aspect is more definite. Moreover, such an attack does not arise spontaneously, but develops from an offensive begun on other parts of the board.

As has already been mentioned, such a procedure is often the logical transformation of a positional advantage, such as the exploitation of a central superiority to transfer the weight of the attack onto the opponent’s king.

Such a procedure will often take on a very sharp form, and then the play will be highly dynamic.

No. 273 Fischer-Gligorić
Havana OL, 1966
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆c6 3 ∆b5 a6 4 ∆x6 dc 5 0–0 f6 6 d4 ∆g4 7 c3 ed 8 cd ∆d7 9 h3 ∆e6 10 ∆c3 0–0–0 11 ∆f4!
White has acquired a pawn centre, and his last move clearly demonstrates his active intentions on the Q-side.

Now after 11...g5 12 Ag3 h5 13 d5! cd 14 Ac1! a sharp attack on the opponent’s king could already have arisen. In this respect, the variations given by Fischer are instructive:

(a) 14...Axd6 15 Aa4! Ab8 16 Ac5 Ae7 17 Agxh6+! ba 18 Ad4 Ac7 19 Ab3+ Aa7 20 Axc7+!! Ac7 21 Ac7 Ab5 22 Ac6+! Ac6 23 Ab6+ and mate next move.

(b) White also wins prettily after 14...De 15 Aa4! Ab8 16 Ac7!! Acd1 17 Ac8+!! Aa7 (17...Acxh8 18 Ab6+) 18 Ab8+ Aa8 19 Ab6 mate.

The game in fact developed as follows:

11...Ae7 (11...Ad6 12 Axh6 Ad6 is safer) 12 Ac1 Aa6 13 Ac3 Ad6 14 Aa4! Axc3?

After this White’s outpost at c5 gains markedly in strength. 14...Ab8 15 Ac5 Ae7 would have been better.

15 f3 Ab8
15...b6 is bad in view of 16 d5! Afd7 17 e2! etc.

16 Ac5 Axd6 17 Aa4! Aa7?

This leads to a rapid showdown. After 17...Ac8 18 Ac3 Aa8! Black could still have defended.

18 Agxh6!

The decisive blow, destroying the black king’s defences.

18...Axb3 19 e5! Axc5 20 de 12 Aa5+ Ag8 22 gh Ae4 23 Axc4 Ae7 24 Ac3 b5 25 Ac2 1-0

Such a transfer of the attack is sometimes assisted by weaknesses in the king’s pawn screen, created early in the game. Although up to a certain time these weaknesses do not play any significant part in the play, nevertheless the king’s position is always to a certain extent uncomfortable. Of course, one could give a large number of positions where this latter factor has practically no influence on the outcome of the game. But nevertheless, such a strategic feature must always be borne in mind.

Such a situation arose in the following game:

No. 274

Uhlmann–Pietzsch

East Germany, 1976

_English Opening_

1 c4 e5 2 Ac3 c5?! 3 g3 Ac6

4 Ag2 d6 5 e3 Af5 6 a3 Af6 7 d3 Ac7 8 h3! g6 9 Acg2 Ag7 10 Ab1 0–0 11 b4 h5 12 Ac5 Ab8 13 Ac3 Ac8 14 Ab3 Ae6 15 Ac2 b6 16 Acf3! Ah7 17 h5! Ac5? 18 Ac1 Af8 19 e4! Ab7 (119)

Better 19...f5 20 ef! Abxf5 21 Ac2, although here too White’s chances are preferable.
contrast, White’s offensive begins against the black king and concludes successfully on the Q-side.

No. 276 Sax-Vadasz
Budapest, 1977
Caro-Kann Defence

1 e4 c6 2 d3 d5 3 d2 d6
4 g3f3 fg4 5 h3 h5 6 g5?! c7 7 g4?! g6 8 g2 e6 9 0-0
e7 10 h4 de 11 de bd7 12 f5! ef?! (12... f8 followed by
0-0-0 was more circumspect) 13 ef xf5 14 gf gb6? 15 e1 bd5
16 bd3 b5 17 a4 b4? (17...0-0 was essential) 18 c4! bc 19 bc 0-0
(on 19...xc3 there follows 20 xc6+!) 20 c4 b4 21 cd xe1
22 c4?! xe5 23 dc! xc3 24 xc3
xc3 25 pb1 eb5 26 ec5 dc4 27
d6 ac8 28 c7 ab6 29 fc4 fe8
30 ab7! g5 31 fg hg 32 xc8
xc8 33 eb5 fb8 34 a5 1-0

A broad tactical offensive

A further feature of early attacks in modern opening variations is their combinational scope, which sometimes encompass the entire chess front.

This is shown in the following games.
No. 277  Smyslov-Botvinnik
World Championship, 1954
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3  c3  b4 4 e5
c5 5 a3  a5 6 b4 cd 7  g4  e7
8 ba! dc 9  xg7  g8 10  xh7
 d7 11  f3  f8?
A passive continuation,
which merely assists the develop-
ment of White's initiative;
11... c7 was essential.

12  d3  xa5 13 h4  d7 14
g5!  e8 15  d4!  f5 16  b1!
c4 17  f5 ef 18  xh7 e4+ 19
 xe4! de 20  b8+  c8 21  b5+
xb5 22  xb5  e6 23  f6  xg2
24 h5  a6 25 h6 1-0

No. 278  Petrosian-Taimanov
USSR Ch., 1955
Slav Defence

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3  f3  f6 4  c3
c6 5 e3  bd7 6  d3  b4 7 0-0 0-0
8  c2  d6? (better 8... dc 9  xc4  d6 followed by... e5) 9
b3! dc 10 bc e5 11  b2  e8 12
 e4!  xe4 13  xe4 h6 14  ad1!
ed 15  h7+!  h8 16  xd4  c5
17  f4  e7 18  e4  f8 19  h4  f6
20  g6  e7 21  h5!  d6 22  d1
 e5 23  a3  c5 24  h4! 1-0

No. 279  Vitolins-Yuferov
USSR, 1972
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2  f3  d6 3 d4 cd 4  xd4

\[ \text{f6 5  c3 a6 6  g5 e6 7 f4  bd7}
8  f3  c7 9 0-0-0 b5 10 e5!? (in}
recent times 10  d3 followed by
 h1 has been more often played,
intending  d5!) 10...
 b7 11  h3 de 12  xe6?! fe 13
 xe6+  e7 14  xb5 ab 15  xb5
 c6 16  d6+  d8 17  fe  c7
(120)

120

Strangely enough, a position
of equilibrium has been reached!

18  xe7  a2! 19 ef  a1+ 20
d2  d5+ 21  c3  a5+ 22  d3
d5+ 23  c3, and the game
ended in a draw.

No. 280  I. Zaitsev-Pokojowczyk
Sochi, 1976
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 e5 c5 4 c3  c6
5  f3  b6 6 a3 c4 7  bd2  a5
8 g3  d7 9  h3 f6? 10 ef gf 11 0-0
0-0-0? 12  e1  g7 13  b1  b8
14 b4! cb 15  xb3  xb3 (after
15... a4 16  xe6  xb3 17  fl
 c4 18  f4+  a8 19  e1! Black
stands badly) 16 \textit{\textcolor{red}{	exttt{b3}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{	exttt{a4}}}}

White's attack is already very strong, e.g. 16...\textit{\textcolor{red}{	exttt{c6}}} 17 \textit{\textcolor{red}{	exttt{f4+ a8}}} 18 \textit{\textcolor{red}{	exttt{e2}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{	exttt{e8}}}} 19 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{eb1}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{	exttt{c8}}} 20 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{b5}}}! etc.

17 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xb6}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{	exttt{xd1}}} 18 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{bxe6}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{	exttt{xf3}}} 19 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f4+ a8}}} 20 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c7! h6}}} 21 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xd8 xd8}}} 22 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e8}}} 1-0

The dominant role of tactics in attack

The majority of the above samples were notable for their lively and complex tactical skirmishes, and it is this feature which large distinguishes the dynamic nature of an attack.

Here we give several samples of very sharp skirmishes at an early stage of the game, in which behind the game of 'chance' a strategic pattern is nevertheless concealed.

No. 281 Tal-Donner
Wijk aan Zee, 1973
\textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{English Opening}}}

1 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c4}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{	exttt{c5}}} 2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f3}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{	exttt{f6}}} 3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d4}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{	exttt{d4}}} 4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xd4}} d5?! 6 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a4}}}!??

An alternative was 6 cd \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xd5}}} 7 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xc6}}} bc 8 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d2}}}!, obtaining a slight but persistent advantage.

6...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{b6}}}? (better 6...e6)
7 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{db5}}} e6 8 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f4}}} e5 9 cd ef 10 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xf4}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{b4}}} 11 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c7+ d8}}} 12 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xa8}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a5}}} 13 0-0-0!? (13 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d1}}! was even stronger) 13...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c5}}} 14 e4! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xa2+}}} 15 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c2}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xc3}}} 16 bc \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d6}}} (16...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{g4}} came into consideration) 17 e5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xd5}}} 18 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c4!}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f5+}}} 19 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d2}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xf2+}}} 20 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e2}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e3+}}}? (the decisive mistake; 20...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c5}} would have led to a draw) 21 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e1}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xe5}}} 22 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xd5+}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xe7}}} 23 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c7}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xc3+}}} 24 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d1}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e4}}} 25 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f3}}}! 1-0

No. 282
Tseshkovsky-Browne
Manila IZ, 1976
\textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Sicilian Defence}}}

1 e4 c5 2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f3}}} d6 3 d4 cd 4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xd4}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f6}}} 5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c3}}} a6 6 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e3}}} e6 7 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e2}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{bd7}}} 8 g4!? h6 9 f4 b5 10 g5 hg 11 fg \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{h3}}}?! 12 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f2}}}! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xc3}}} 13 gf \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{h3}}}

It was essential to play 13...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c5}}}!? 14 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xe6}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a5+}}} 15 c3 fe 16 b4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a3}}} 17 bc \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xc3+}}} 18 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f1}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xc5}}} with a double-edged game.

14 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xe6!!}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a5+}}} 15 c3 fe 16 fg! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xd6}}} 17 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e6}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{h6}}} 18 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{g1}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f8}}} 19 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{g8}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d8}}} 20 0-0-0! (121)
20...\textit{\textit{\textbf{e}7} 21 \textit{\textbf{c}6} \textit{\textbf{b}8} 22 \textit{\textbf{a}7}! \textit{\textbf{f}7} 23 \textit{\textbf{g}2!} \textit{\textbf{b}7} 24 \textit{\textbf{x}c8} \textit{\textbf{x}a7} 25 \textit{\textbf{f}1+} \textit{\textbf{f}6} 26 \textit{\textbf{e}5} \textit{\textbf{d}7} (on 26...\textit{\textbf{c}7} White has the decisive 27 \textit{\textbf{x}f6+!} \textit{\textbf{x}f6} 28 \textit{\textbf{h}5+} \textit{\textbf{g}6} 29 \textit{\textbf{x}g6} \textit{\textbf{c}8} 30 \textit{\textbf{g}5} mate) 27 \textit{\textbf{e}6+} \textit{\textbf{x}f6} 28 \textit{\textbf{h}5+} \textit{\textbf{g}6} 29 \textit{\textbf{g}6+} \textit{\textbf{e}7} 30 \textit{\textbf{e}5} 1-0\textit{}}

No. 283 Balinas-Tarjan
Odessa, 1976
Sicilian Defence

1 \textit{\textbf{e}4} \textit{\textbf{c}5} 2 \textit{\textbf{f}3} \textit{\textbf{d}6} 3 \textit{\textbf{d}4} cd 4 \textit{\textbf{x}d4} \textit{\textbf{f}6} 5 \textit{\textbf{c}3} a6 6 \textit{\textbf{g}5} e6 7 \textit{\textbf{f}4} \textit{\textbf{b}5} 8 \textit{\textbf{e}5} \textit{\textbf{d}e} 9 \textit{\textbf{e}2} \textit{\textbf{f}d} 7 \textit{\textbf{d}d} 10 \textit{\textbf{d}d} 10 0-0-0 \textit{\textbf{b}7} 12 \textit{\textbf{g}4} \textit{\textbf{x}e} 13 \textit{\textbf{e}2} \textit{\textbf{f}6} 14 \textit{\textbf{x}f6} gf 15 \textit{\textbf{f}h} 1 \textit{\textbf{a}5} 16 \textit{\textbf{x}g} 5 \textit{\textbf{f}g} 17 \textit{\textbf{h}5!} \textit{\textbf{e}7} 18 \textit{\textbf{g}f} 15 19 \textit{\textbf{f}e} 1 \textit{\textbf{x}g} 2 20 \textit{\textbf{d}x} 6+ \textit{\textbf{d}d} 21 \textit{\textbf{e}2} \textit{\textbf{b}7} 22 \textit{\textbf{d}x} 5 \textit{\textbf{c}6} 23 \textit{\textbf{e}6}+ \textit{\textbf{c}5} 24 \textit{\textbf{b}4}+ \textit{\textbf{x}b} 25 \textit{\textbf{d}d} 4+ \textit{\textbf{c}5} 26 \textit{\textbf{e}5}+ 1-0\textit{}}

No. 284 Sax-Vogt
Budapest, 1976
Scotch Gambit

1 \textit{\textbf{e}4} \textit{\textbf{e}5} 2 \textit{\textbf{f}3} \textit{\textbf{c}6} 3 \textit{\textbf{d}4} ed 4 \textit{\textbf{c}3} \textit{\textbf{d}5} 5 ed \textit{\textbf{x}d} 5 6 \textit{\textbf{g}4} 7 \textit{\textbf{c}3}!? \textit{\textbf{x}f} 3 ? 8 \textit{\textbf{x}d} 5 \textit{\textbf{x}d} 1 9 \textit{\textbf{x}c} 7+ \textit{\textbf{d}7} 10 \textit{\textbf{x}a} 8 \textit{\textbf{h}5} 11 \textit{\textbf{d}5}! \textit{\textbf{b}4}+ (better 11...\textit{\textbf{d}d} 4 12 \textit{\textbf{d}d} 3 \textit{\textbf{b}4}+ 13 \textit{\textbf{d}d} 2 \textit{\textbf{x}d} 2 + 14 \textit{\textbf{f}d} 2 \textit{\textbf{e}7} 15 \textit{\textbf{a}c} 1 \textit{\textbf{a}8} 16 \textit{\textbf{c}4} \textit{\textbf{d}f} 5 17 \textit{\textbf{g}4} \textit{\textbf{d}6} 18 \textit{\textbf{g}h} with only slightly the better game for \textit{\textbf{W}hite}) 12 \textit{\textbf{a}d} 2 \textit{\textbf{x}d} 2 + 13 \textit{\textbf{f}d} 2 \textit{\textbf{a}4} 14 \textit{\textbf{b}5}+ \textit{\textbf{d}6} 15 \textit{\textbf{a}c} 1 \textit{\textbf{f}6} 16 \textit{\textbf{c}7} \textit{\textbf{x}a} 2

\textbf{Psychological factors of dynamic attacks}

The modern dynamic style is notable for its great number of tactical and combinational means. At the same time, a characteristic feature of this style is unexpected changes of plan, which can have a psychological effect on the opponent. Such sudden storms are especially noteworthy for the further development of attacking principles.

The following game confirms this.
No. 286 Kupreichik-Planinc
Sombor, 1970
Spanish Game

1 e4 e5 2 d3 c6 3 b5 e7
4 0-0 f6 5 e1 d6 6 c3 0-0 7 d4
d7 8 h3 e8 9 bd2 f8 10 c4!? (122)

In this position Black took an apparently natural decision by playing 10...ed 11 cd d5, but then came 12 b3! (of course not 12 ed? x e1+ 13 x e1 b4 with an excellent game for Black) 12...de 13 xf7+!?

A typically ‘irrational’ sacrifice, which, however, should have led only to equality after correct play by Black. Note that after 13 g5 e6 14 x e6 fe the game would have been level.

13...xf7 14 b3+ g6?

The difficulty in defending such positions lies in the psychological effect of sudden changes of attack. Hence the rapid catastrophe. Black should have played 14...e6! 15 g5+

g8 16 x e6 a5 17 x d8 x b3 18 ab x d8 with an equal game.

15 h4+ h5 16 xe4!

The decisive blow. In view of the threat of 17 f3+, Black's king comes under an irresistible attack.

16...xe4 17 xe4 g5 (after 17...xe4 18 f3+ x h4 19 x e4+ h5 Black would have been mated by 20 x h7) 18 f7+ h6 19 f5+! 1-0

The ‘brittleness’ of dynamic attacks

Dynamic attacks are among the most ‘brittle’ of strategic means, which demands that they be carried out with particular subtlety. Sometimes, in spite of all the apparently favourable factors, the aim of such an attack proves unrealizable, on account of some unforeseen detail.

Here is an instructive example.

No. 287 Taimanov-Larsen
Vinkovci, 1970
Nimzo-Indian Defence

1 d4 f6 2 c4 e6 3 c3 b4
4 c2 c5 5 dc 0-0 6 x f4 x c5
7 f3 c6 8 e3 d5 9 a3 a5 10 c1 e7 11 e2 dc 12 x c4


\[
d5!? 13 \text{exd5} \text{ed} 14 \text{b3}
\]

Here Black literally shocked his opponent:

14...g5!? 15 Ag3 g4

In addition to his organic weakness in the centre, Black creates an even more unpleasant weakness on the K-side. Naturally, in such cases the opponent is ‘dazzled’ by the wealth of possibilities, and his ambitions increase sharply. Later analysis showed that White should have limited himself to 16 Ae5, and if 16...d4 17 ed \text{exd4} 18 \text{d5 with the initiative. But it was not easy to foresee that the chosen plan of switching to a sharp attack on the king, at first sight very dangerous, would prove unfounded!}

16 \text{d4 exd4} 17 ed Ag5 18 0-0 \text{xc1} 19 \text{xc1} Ae6 20 h3 (20 \text{xb7 is parried by 20...\text{b6}})

20...gh 21 Ae5

White was counting on this attack when he sacrificed the exchange.

21...f6 22 Ae4 fe 23 \text{g3+ Ag4}!!

A splendid defensive resource, which eloquently testifies to the practical strength of Black’s plan. Now the game swings sharply in his favour.

24 \text{xg4+ h8} 25 Ag5 \text{d2} 26 \text{c7 ef2+ 27 h2 xg2+ 28 xg2 hg 29 de \text{ac8} 30 xb7}

\text{c2 31 f7+ g7 32 e6 f6 33 e7 g1+ 34 xg1 g8+ 0-1}

**Dynamic counterattacks**

Nowhere does the early counterattack play such a part as in sharp dynamic opening variations. An eloquent example of this is the Taimanov-Larsen game just given.

In the general case a counterattack here is a reaction to a violent attacking measure, which at the same time is very brittle.

To illustrate the sudden tactical counterblow, we will consider the following interesting example.

No. 288 Poulsson-Farago

Gausdal, 1976

Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 e6 2 Ag3 f6 3 c4 d5 4 Ac3 c5 5 cd \text{xd5} 6 e3 Ac6 7 Ac4 ed 8 ed Ae7 9 0-0 0-0 10 Ae1 Ac3

11 bc b6 12 \text{d3 b7} 13 \text{c2 g6 14 d2?! f6} 15 \text{h4?! c8!} 16 h5

(123)
A strictly strategic battle appears to be in progress. Here Black would usually play for square control on the Q-side, for example with 16...\(\text{c}a5\) etc. In turn, White would aim to build up a piece attack on the black king. But here we see a completely new interpretation of this position, as now, like a bolt from the blue, there came:

16...\(\text{c}x\text{d}4!!\) 17 \(\text{c}x\text{d}4\) (after 17 cd \(\text{d}x\text{f}3\) 18 gf \(\text{c}x\text{d}4\) 19 \(\text{c}a3\) \(\text{c}c3!!\) 20 \(\text{c}e3\) \(\text{c}x\text{a}1\) 21 \(\text{c}x\text{a}1\) \(\text{c}c3!\) Black wins) 17...\(\text{c}x\text{c}3!!\) 18 \(\text{c}x\text{c}3\) \(\text{c}x\text{d}4\) 19 \(\text{c}c2\) \(\text{c}x\text{a}1\) 20 \(\text{c}a3\) \(\text{g}g5!\) 21 \(\text{c}e4\) \(\text{c}e8\) 22 \(\text{c}e2\) \(\text{c}x\text{e}4\) 23 \(\text{c}x\text{e}4\) \(\text{g}7\), and Black had a winning position.

No. 289 Uhlmann-Veresov
East Germany-Byelorussia
1969
Queen's Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 \(\text{c}c3\) \(\text{f}6\) 4 \(\text{g}5\) \(\text{c}e7\) 5 \(\text{f}3\) 0-0 6 \(\text{c}c1\) h6 7 \(\text{h}4\) b6 8 cd \(\text{c}x\text{d}5\) 9 \(\text{c}x\text{e}7\) \(\text{e}x\text{e}7\) 10 \(\text{c}x\text{d}5\) ed 11 g3!?

Before this game the given system of development was considered one of the most effective for White, e.g. 11...\(\text{c}e6\) 12 \(\text{g}2\) c5 13 \(\text{c}e5\) \(\text{b}7\) 14 \(\text{d}d3\) \(\text{d}d7\) 15 0-0 \(\text{ac}8\) 15 dc bc 17 \(\text{c}c2\), and it is not easy for Black to deploy his forces (Uhlmann-Rodriguez, Havana, 1969).

But here Veresov finds a deep and highly combinational plan.

11...\(\text{e}8!\) 12 \(\text{g}2\) \(\text{a}6!\) 13 \(\text{e}5\) \(\text{d}7!\) 14 \(\text{c}x\text{c}7\) \(\text{a}c8!!\)

A brilliant move. It transpires that after 15 \(\text{c}x\text{d}7\) \(\text{b}4+\) 16 \(\text{f}1\) (16 \(\text{d}2?\) \(\text{c}1\) mate) 16...\(\text{c}x\text{d}4!!\) Black wins.

15 \(\text{c}x\text{c}8\) \(\text{c}x\text{c}8\) 16 0-0 \(\text{c}x\text{e}5\) 17 de \(\text{c}x\text{e}5\) 18 \(\text{e}1\) d4 19 \(\text{d}d2\) \(\text{e}8\) 20 f4 \(\text{c}5\) 21 b4 \(\text{d}6\) 22 \(\text{c}f3\) \(\text{c}4\) 23 a3 b5 24 \(\text{d}1\) \(\text{d}8\) 25 \(\text{g}2\) a5 26 \(\text{b}2\) a4 27 \(\text{d}2\) g5!

After the dynamic introduction, the play has become purely classical, and Black has gained the initiative.

28 fg hg 29 \(\text{c}2\) \(\text{e}5\) 30 \(\text{e}4\) \(\text{c}x\text{e}4\) 31 \(\text{c}x\text{e}4\) \(\text{g}7\) 32 e3?

The decisive mistake. It was essential to play 32 \(\text{f}3\).

32...\(\text{e}8!\) 33 \(\text{f}3\) (33 \(\text{c}x\text{d}4\) \(\text{c}x\text{e}4!\) 34 \(\text{c}x\text{e}4\) \(\text{d}5\) 35 \(\text{c}f3\) \(\text{f}5!\) leads to a win for Black) 33...de 34 \(\text{d}1\) e2 35 \(\text{e}1\) \(\text{f}6\) 36 \(\text{c}c6\) \(\text{e}6\) 37 \(\text{d}7\) \(\text{d}6\) 38 \(\text{g}4\) \(\text{d}3+\)

39 \(\text{e}4\) \(\text{c}x\text{a}3\) 40 \(\text{c}x\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}x\text{e}2\) 41 \(\text{c}x\text{e}2\) \(\text{b}3\) 0-1

The following two examples are also typical in this respect.

No. 290 Justolisi-Primavera
Italy, 1976
King's Indian Defence

1 \(\text{f}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 2 g3 g6 3 \(\text{g}2\) \(\text{g}7\)
4 0-0 0-0 5 d4 c5 6 d5 d6 7 c4 b5
8 cb a6 9 ba \(\text{c}x\text{a}6\) 10 \(\text{c}3\) \(\text{bd}7\) 11
\(\text{d}f4\) \(\text{e}5\) 12 \(\text{c}2\) \(\text{fb}8\) 13 h3?

This carelessness has serious
consequences. 13 \( \text{Ab1} \) was necessary.

13...\( \mathcal{B} \times \text{b}2 \)! 14 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{b}2 \) \( \text{e}4 \)! 15 \( \mathcal{B} \text{c}2 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{c}3 \) 16 \( \mathcal{A} \text{d}2 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{e}2+ \) 17 \( \mathcal{B} \text{h}2 \) \( \mathcal{A} \text{a}3! \) 18 \( \mathcal{B} \text{e}4 \) \( \mathcal{A} \text{e}5! \) 19 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{e}5 \) 20 \( \mathcal{A} \text{a}1 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{g}3! \) 21 \( \text{fg} \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{g}3+ \) 22 \( \mathcal{A} \text{g}1 \) \( \mathcal{B} \text{h}2+ \) 23 \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{f}2 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{f}1 \) 24 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{f}1 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{a}2 \) 25 \( \mathcal{A} \text{e}3 \) \( \mathcal{B} \text{g}3 \) 26 \( \mathcal{B} \text{b}1 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{g}2 \) 27 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{b}8+ \) \( \mathcal{B} \text{g}7 \) 28 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{g}2 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{e}3 \) 0-1

**No. 291 Popov-Suetin**
Daugavpils, 1974
*Sicilian Defence*

1 e4 c5 2 \( \mathcal{B} \text{f}3 \) c6 3 d4 cd 4 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{d}4 \) \( \mathcal{A} \text{c}6 \) 5 \( \mathcal{A} \text{c}3 \) a6 6 g3 d6 7 \( \mathcal{B} \text{g}2 \) \( \mathcal{A} \text{d}7 \) 8 0-0 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{f}6 \) 9 \( \mathcal{A} \text{e}2 \) \( \mathcal{A} \text{e}7 \) 10 c4 0-0 11 \( \mathcal{B} \text{a}3 \) \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{c}8 \) 12 \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{b}2 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{b}5 \) 13 cb \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{d}4 \) 14 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{d}4 ? \)

White made this move without thinking, almost automatically. He clearly overlooked the counterblow which Black now interposes.

14...\( \mathcal{B} \times \text{c}2! \) 15 \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{c}1 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{b}5 \) 16 \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{d}3 \) e5 17 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{e}3 \) d5 (17...\( \mathcal{B} \times \text{a}5 \) was even stronger) 18 ed e4 19 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{f}6 \) \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{f}6 \) 20 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{e}4 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{a}1 \) 21 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{a}1 \) f5 22 \( \mathcal{B} \text{g}2 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{f}6 \), and Black retained much the better chances.

**Dynamic seizing of the initiative**

The dynamic seizing of the initiative also occurs very frequently in a number of modern variations. Normally one side (more often Black, of course), which has up till then been defending, boldly goes in for a positional sacrifice of material. The following examples are instructive in this respect.

**No. 292 Mnatsakanian-Veresov**
Lvov, 1968
*Sicilian Defence*

1 e4 c5 2 \( \mathcal{B} \text{f}3 \) c6 3 d4 cd 4 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{d}4 \) g6 5 \( \mathcal{A} \text{c}3 \) \( \mathcal{A} \text{g}7 \) 6 \( \mathcal{A} \text{e}3 \) \( \mathcal{B} \text{f}6 \) 7 \( \mathcal{A} \text{c}4 \) d6 8 f3 0-0 9 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{d}2 \) \( \mathcal{A} \text{d}7 \) 10 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{b}3 \) \( \mathcal{B} \text{a}5 \) 11 0-0-0 \( \mathcal{A} \text{f}8 \) 12 g4 \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{e}5 \) 13 h4 \( \mathcal{A} \text{c}4! ? \) (124)

![Chess Diagram](image)

14 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{c}4 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{c}4 \) 15 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{d}3 \) b5 16 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{b}3 \) \( \mathcal{A} \text{a}6 \) 17 \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{d}4 ? \) (better 17 a3)

17...\( \mathcal{A} \times \text{e}5 \) 18 \( \mathcal{A} \text{f}2 \) b4 19 \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{d}5 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{d}5 \) 20 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{d}5 \) \( \mathcal{A} \text{c}6 \) 21 \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{d}3 \) \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{b}5 \) 22 \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{d}2 ? \) (22 \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{d}5 \) was essential)

22...\( \mathcal{B} \times \text{b}2 \) 23 \( \mathcal{B} \times \text{d}5 \) \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{d}3+ ! \) 24 \( \mathcal{A} \text{b}1 \) \( \mathcal{A} \times \text{a}3 ! 0-1 \)

A sudden counterattack may occur not only against the king, but also against other targets. The following game is an
example of a sudden attack in the centre.

No. 293 Botvinnik-Smyslov
World Championship, 1954
King's Indian Defence

1 d4 ♛f6 2 c4 g6 3 g3 ♜g7 4 ♜g2
0-0 5 ♛c3 d6 6 ♛f3 ♛bd7 7 0-0 e5
8 e4 c6 9 ♛e3 ♛g4 10 ♜g5 ♛b6 11 h3

In reply to this natural move, Black began a sudden, sharp and risky attack on White's centre:
11...ed! 12 ♛a4 ♛a6 13 hg b5
14 ♛xh4 ba 15 ♛xh5 ♛xh5 16 e5
♛xh5 17 ♛xh5 ♛xh5 18 ♛c1 ♛b4
19 a3 ♛b2 20 ♛a4 ♛b7!
20...♛g4 is weaker — 21 ♛xg4?

21 ♛b1?

Sudden attacks of this type have a psychological effect on the defender.

Correct was 21 ♛xb7 ♛xb7
22 ♛c3 ♛f3+ 23 ♛xf3 ♛xf3 24
♛e7 ♛c8 25 ♛xg6, with a probable draw. This is a typical example of a modern attack as a playing method (rather than as the realization of an advantage), where objectively, perhaps, it is difficult to count on an advantage.

21...♛f3+ 22 ♛h1 ♛xa8 23
♛xb2 ♛g5+! 24 ♛h2 ♛f3+ 25
♛h3 ♛xb2 26 ♛a7 ♛e4 27 ♛a4
♛g7 28 ♛d1 ♛e5 29 ♛e7 ♛c8! 30
a5 ♛e2 31 ♛g2 ♛d4+ 32 ♛f1 ♛f3

33 ♛b1 ♛c6 0-1

No. 294 Capablanca-Alekhine
World Championship, 1927
Queen's Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 ♛c3 ♛d7
4 ♛c3 ♛gf6 5 ♛g5 c6 6 e3 ♛a5
7 ♛d2 ♛b4 8 ♛c2 0-0 9 ♛h4 c5 10
♛b3 ♛a4 11 ♛xf6 ♛xf6 12 dc
♛e4 13 cd ♛xc3+ 14 bc ♛xc5 15
♛d1 ed 16 ♛xd5 ♛xb3 17 ab ♛c6
18 ♛d4 ♛e8

Black has sacrificed a pawn, and seems thereby to have restricted the development of White's K-side. But Capablanca finds an effective and elegant plan, involving a counter-pawn sacrifice for the sake of an attack on the black king. This attack is very dangerous, although the white forces participating in it are quite modest.

19 ♛d3! ♛xg2 20 ♛xh7+ ♛f8
21 ♛e4 ♛h3 22 ♛d2! ♛e6 23 c4 a5
24 ♛g1! ♛xh2 25 ♛h1 ♛c7 26 ♛b2!

White continually comes up with highly concrete threats, in this case 27 ♛a3+ ♛g8 28 ♛h7+
♛h8 29 ♛h4 etc.

26...♛c5 27 ♛d5!

And now there is the threat of
28 ♛xe6 fe 29 ♛f4+ ♛g8 30 ♛c2.

27...♛a6 (27...♛ad8 is more tenacious, although even here White has every chance of winning after 28 ♛xe6!) 28 ♛e4!
Belief in defensive resources 195

No. 295 Estrin–Veresov
USSR, 1962
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2  \( \triangleleft f3 \) d6 3 d4 cd 4  \( \triangleleft x d4 \)  
5 \( \triangleleft c3 \) g6 6  \( \triangleleft e3 \)  \( \triangleleft g7 \) 7  \( \triangleleft e2 \)  
0–0 8  \( \triangleleft c6 \) 9  \( \triangleleft b3 \)  \( \triangleleft e6 \) 10  \( g4 \)!?  
\( \triangleleft c8 \)?! (the immediate central counterblow 10...d5 has been analyzed more) 11  \( g5 \)  \( \triangleleft d7 \) 12  
\( \triangleleft d2 \)  \( \triangleleft b6 \) 13 0–0–0  \( \triangleleft b4 \) 14  \( \triangleleft b1 \)  
\( \triangleleft c4 \) 15  \( \triangleleft x c4 \)  \( \triangleleft x c4 \) 16  \( \triangleleft d4 \)  \( \triangleleft g4 \)  
17  \( \triangleleft d e1 \)  \( \triangleleft x d4 \) 18  \( \triangleleft x d4 \)  \( \triangleleft b6 \) 19  
\( \triangleleft b3 \)  \( \triangleleft f c8 \) 20 a3(?) \( \triangleleft x c2 \) 21  \( \triangleleft x c2 \)  
\( \triangleleft e6 \) 22  \( a a 1 \)  \( \triangleleft x c3 \) 23  \( h c \)  \( \triangleleft x b3 \)  
24  \( \triangleleft b2 \)  \( \triangleleft c4 \) 25  \( \triangleleft b1 \)  \( \triangleleft a 5 \) 26  
\( \triangleleft x b3 \)  \( \triangleleft x c3 \) 27  \( \triangleleft h c 1 \)  \( \triangleleft x b3 \) 28  
\( \triangleleft x b3 \)  \( \triangleleft g 7 \) 29  \( a a 1 c3 \)  b5 30  \( h 4 \)  \( \triangleleft b6 \)  
31  \( \triangleleft e 3 \)  \( \triangleleft d 4 + \) 32  \( \triangleleft b c 3 \)  a5 33  \( \triangleleft b 1 \)  
\( \triangleleft d 1 + \) 34  \( \triangleleft b 2 \)  \( \triangleleft g 4 \) 35  \( f 5 \)  \( \triangleleft x h 4 \) 36  
e5  \( d e \) 37  \( f g \)  \( h g \) 38  \( \triangleleft f 3 \)  \( \triangleleft d 4 \) 39  \( \triangleleft d 3 \)  
b4! 0–1

No. 296 Goodman–Nunn
England, 1978
English Opening

1  \( c 4 \)  \( e 5 \) 2  \( \triangleleft c 3 \)  \( \triangleleft f 6 \) 3  \( \triangleleft f 3 \)  \( \triangleleft c 6 \)  
4  \( e 3 \)  \( \triangleleft b 4 \) 5  \( \triangleleft c 2 \) 0–0 6  \( \triangleleft d 5 \)  \( \triangleleft e 8 \)  
7  \( \triangleleft f 5 \)  \( d 6 \) 8  \( \triangleleft x f 6 + \)  \( g f \) 9  \( \triangleleft h 5 ! \)  \( d 5 \) 10  
a3  \( \triangleleft f 8 \) 11  \( d 4 \)  \( \triangleleft e 6 \) 12  \( \triangleleft d 3 \)  e4 13  
\( \triangleleft c 2 \)  \( \triangleleft e 7 \) 14  \( \triangleleft d 2 \)  f5!? 15  \( d c \)  \( \triangleleft x d 5 \)  
16  \( f 3 \)  \( \triangleleft c 6 \)?

An outwardly active, but incorrect plan. Better was 14. \( f 4 ! \)  

Belief in defensive resources

Often, in certain sharp variations of the Sicilian Defence, for example, Black deliberately exposes himself to a sharp attack by White. Many such problems arise in the Polugayevsky Variation: 1 e4 c5 2 \( \triangleleft f 3 \) d6 3 d4 cd 4  \( \triangleleft x d 4 \)  \( \triangleleft f 6 \) 5 \( \triangleleft c 3 \)  a6 6  \( \triangleleft g 5 \)  e6  
\( g 5 \) b5!?

Black draws the enemy fire, believing not only in the wealth of defensive resources in this position, but also in its latent active possibilities. In a number of cases Black as though invites his opponent to go in for a sacrifice of material, but if White's attack misfires, the material factor will triumph.

An instructive example is provided by the following game.
No. 297 Sakharov-Polugayevsky
USSR Ch, 1960
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cd
4 dxd4 d5 f6 5 c3 a6 6 g5 e6
7 f4 b5 8 d3 d7 9 e2 b6
10 e6! fe 11 e5 de 12 e5 c5!

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It transpires that White’s seemingly threatening initiative peters out move by move.

13 f4 d5 14 x d5 ed 15
0-0-0 c6!

An excellent move, which simultaneously achieves three aims — control over e6 and, even more importantly, over g6, and vacating the c5 square.

16 f5 e7 17 g4 g6 18 e6
c5 19 xg6+ hg 20 xg6+ d8
21 h1 e6 22 b4 d7 23 bc
ag8 24 d3 xg2 25 f3 g6
0-1

No. 298 Bellon-G. Garcia
Orense, 1976
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 f3 c6 3 d4 cd
4 dxd4 d5 f6 5 c3 e5 6 bd5 d6
7 g5 a6 8 a3 b5 9 x f6 gf 10
d5 f5 11 ef xf5 12 f3?! d4!
13 c7+ x c7 14 x a8+ c8
15 d3? (15 c3) 15...d5! 16 0-0

12 a3 17 ba 0-0 18 f4 b7 19
x h7+ g7 20 x f8+ x f8 21 fe

2 e2+ 0-1

No. 299 Levchenkov-Gorelov
Riga, 1977
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 f3 c6 3 d4 cd
4 dxd4 d5 f6 5 c3 e5 6 bd5 d6
7 g5 a6 8 x f6 gf 9 a3 b5 10
d5 f5 11 x b5?! ab 12 x b5

A problematic piece sacrifice. On the basis of Pereyskin-Sveshnikov (1973), in which Black gained the advantage after 12...a7 13 x a7 x a7 14 f3

c6 15 0-0-0 h6+ 16 b1 fe 17
x e4 0-0, the Encyclopaedia of
Chess Openings regarded this sacri
cifice as dubious. But it was suc
cessfully employed in Vitolins-
Katischonok, Latvian Ch., 1977
(White played 14 ef), which ap
ppeared to shake the theoretical
assessment. But now comes a fresh duel — and the scales tip the opposite way.

12...a4! 13 bc7+ d7 14 ef
Under the microscope of analysis

As a result of analysis, the theory of certain modern sharp opening variations develops not only quickly, but also with radical changes in fortune, as first attack triumphs, and then counterattack.

Typical in this respect is the development of a sharp and topical variation of the Benko Gambit: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c5 3 d5 b5 4 cb a6 5 c3 ab 6 e4!? b4 7 b5!? (126)

The idea of this continuation belongs to GM Igor Zaitsev. In certain lines White voluntarily gives up his e4 pawn with the aim of opening the e-file.

Then in a number of cases the ‘incomprehensible’ white knight at b5 becomes a formidable force.

7...d6 8 f3 (8 f4, which appears very strong, is parried by 8...g5!) 8...bd7

The basic idea of the pawn sacrifice lies in the following tactical operation (which is how many of the early games proceeded): 8...xe4 9 c4 g6 (after 9...d7 10 e2 d6 f6 11 f4 White has the very strong threats of 12 g5 and 12 d2) 10 e2 f6 (things are also difficult for Black after 10...f5 11 g5!) 11 f4 a6 12 xd6+!

As the dramatist Anton Chekhov expressed it, if in the first act of a play there is a gun hanging on the wall, it is bound to be fired sooner or later!

12...xd6 13 b5+, and White gains a great advantage.

But nowadays after 8...bd7 White’s initiative does not prove so effective. Moreover, the white knight often proves to be cut off from its main forces.

No. 300 I. Zaitsev-Benko
Szolnok, 1975

From diagram 126: 7...d6 8 f3 bd7 9 f4 bh5 10 g5 hf6 11 e2 a5! 12 e5 a6 13 ef xb5 14 fe xe7 15 xe7 he7 16 xe7+ xe7 17 xb5 xb5 18 0-0 b6 19 fe1+ d7. The
endgame favours Black.

Here the counterattack proved stronger, but this by no means signifies that the given assessment is conclusive. Many sharp, dynamic variations are constantly being reassessed under the microscope of sharper and ever deeper analysis. Thus instead of 11 \( \text{We}2 \) White can consider the immediate central pawn thrust: 11 e5?! de 12 \( \text{We}2 \) \( \text{Aa}5 \) (12...e4 13 \( \text{Cd}2! \) \( \text{Aa}6 \) 14 \( \text{Xxe}4 \) favours - White) 13 \( \text{Xxe}5 \) \( \text{Xxe}5 \) (not 13...\( \text{Aa}6 \) 14 \( \text{Cc}4! \) \( \text{Xxb}5 \) 15 \( \text{Dd}6 \) mate) 14 \( \text{Xxe}5 \) \( \text{Xb}6 \) 15 \( \text{Cc}7+ \) \( \text{Dd}8 \) 16 \( \text{Af}4! \) (but not 16 \( \text{Dd}6? \) \( \text{Xxd}6! \) 17 \( \text{Dd}1 \) \( \text{Xc}7! \) 18 \( \text{Dxd}6 \) ed with advantage to Black) 16...\( \text{Aa}7 \) 17 \( \text{Bb}5 \) \( \text{Dd}7 \) 18 \( \text{Cc}4 \) etc., with the better chances for White (recommended by Zaitsev).

Here too it is early to draw the line. Despite the tempting variations, the plan with 6 e4!? remains at the least double-edged. In this sense the development of the following game is instructive.

No. 301 Gligorić-Dezè
Novi Sad, 1976

From Diagram 126: 7...\( \text{Dd}6 \) 8 \( \text{Af}3 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 9 \( \text{e}5 \) de 10 \( \text{Xxe}5 \) \( \text{Ag}7 \) 11 \( \text{Cc}4 \) 0-0 12 0-0 \( \text{Dfd}7?! \) 13 \( \text{f}4? \) (13 \( \text{Xxd}7 \) \( \text{Xxd}7 \) 14 \( \text{d}6 \) leads to an equal game) 13...\( \text{Db}6! \) 14 \( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{Ab}7 \) 15 \( \text{Ce}3 \) \( \text{Bd}7 \) 16 \( \text{Cc}6?! \) \( \text{Axc}6 \) 17 dc \( \text{Axa}1 \) 18 \( \text{Xxa}1 \) \( \text{Axc}4 \) 19 c7 \( \text{Cc}8 \) 20 bc \( \text{Bb}7!\), and Black had the advantage.

The following example is also typical.

No. 302 Stean-Sigurjonsson
England-Iceland, Telex, 1977

\text{Sicilian Defence}

1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{Af}3 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 3 d4 cd 4 \( \text{Xxd}4 \) \( \text{Af}6 \) 5 \( \text{Cc}3 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 6 \( \text{Ag}5 \) e6 7 f4 b5 8 e5 de 9 fe \( \text{Cc}7 \) 10 \( \text{Xe}2 \) \( \text{Dfd}7 \) 11 0-0 0-0 \( \text{Ab}7 \) 12 \( \text{Gg}4 \) \( \text{Xxe}5 \) 13 \( \text{Ce}2 \) \( \text{Cc}5! \)

A prepared innovation. Balashov-Quinteros (Manila, 1976), where 13 \( \text{Al}2 \) first occurred, continued 13...h5?! 14 \( \text{Bh}4 \) f6 15 \( \text{Af}4 \) g5 16 \( \text{Xh}5+ \) \( \text{Xh}5 \) 17 \( \text{Axc}4+ \) \( \text{Cf}7 \) 18 \( \text{Axe}5 \), and White won on move 42.

14 \( \text{Af}3 \) (14 \( \text{Ahe}1 \) is probably better) 14...\( \text{Axd}4 \) 15 \( \text{Ab}7 \) \( \text{Xxc}3 \) 16 bc \( \text{Aa}7 \) 17 \( \text{Ahe}1 \) h5 (if 17...\( \text{Xxc}3 \) 18 \( \text{Axe}6+ \) \( \text{Af}8 \) 19 \( \text{Axe}7+ \) \( \text{Gg}8 \) 20 \( \text{Ae}6 \) \( \text{Aa}3+ \) 21 \( \text{Ab}2 \) \( \text{Af}8 \) 22 \( \text{Ae}8 \) 18 \( \text{Bh}4 \) \( \text{Xc}3 \) 19 \( \text{Ce}3 \) \( \text{Aa}1+ \) 20 \( \text{Ad}2 \) \( \text{Xxa}2 \) - defending e6) 21 \( \text{Axb}4 \) f6 22 \( \text{Ab}6 \) \( \text{Ab}7 \) 23 \( \text{Axe}6+ \) \( \text{Bd}8 \) 24 \( \text{Ab}4 \) \( \text{Ac}8 \) 25 \( \text{Ade}1 \) \( \text{Aa}5+ \) 26 \( \text{Cc}1! \) \( \text{Bd}8 \) 27 \( \text{Be}8 \) \( \text{Aa}1+! \) 0-1

If 28 \( \text{Ad}2 \), then 28...\( \text{Xe}1+! \) (29 \( \text{Xe}1 \) \( \text{Axe}8 \) or 29 \( \text{Xe}1 \) \( \text{Cc}5 \)).

Of course, here too research continues. It was not by accident that the winner of this game ad-
vised the loser; make a careful study of 13...$\text{c}5$!

A necessary measure of caution in active intentions

Sharp dynamic plans, both in attack and counterattack, involve a considerable risk, the degree of which is most probably determined intuitively. It is largely intuition which should suggest the necessary sense of measure in the choice and implementation of a particular dynamic plan.

Below we give some examples of this sense of measure being lost.

No. 303 Dely-Horvath
Hungary, 1977
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 $\text{f}3$ $\text{c}6$ 3 d4 cd 4 $\text{x}d4$ $\text{f}6$ 5 $\text{c}3$ e5 6 $\text{bd}5$ d6 7 $\text{g}5$ a6 8 $\text{a}3$ b5 9 $\text{x}f6$ gf 10 $\text{d}5$ f5 11 $\text{ad}3$ $\text{e}6$ 12 0-0 $\text{g}7$ 13 c4?! bc 14 $\text{x}c4$ 0-0 15 $\text{cb}6$ fe 16 $\text{x}e4$ $\text{b}8$ 17 $\text{x}h7+$ $\text{x}h7$ 18 $\text{c}2+$ e4! 19 $\text{xc}6$ $\text{d}4$

This is evidently what White was aiming for, when he embarked on his sharp and risky plan on move 13. He has won a pawn, but has overlooked Black’s powerful counterattack, which in fact decides the game.

20 $\text{a}4$ $\text{c}8$ 21 $\text{b}7$ $\text{h}4$ 22 $\text{b}4$ $\text{g}8$!

And here is the refutation! On 23 $\text{x}d4$ there follows 23... $\text{x}g2+$! 24 $\text{x}g2$ $\text{g}4+$ 25 $\text{h}1$ $\text{f}3+$ 26 $\text{g}1$ $\text{g}8+$.

The game concluded: 23 $\text{e}3$
$\text{x}e3$ 24 fe $\text{x}g2+$ 25 $\text{x}g2$
$\text{c}2+$ 0-1

No. 304 Heinsohn-Espig
East Germany, 1977
Alekhine’s Defence

1 e4 $\text{f}6$ 2 e5 $\text{d}5$ 3 d4 d6 4 c4 $\text{b}6$ 5 ed cd 6 h3 $\text{g}6$ 7 $\text{f}3$ $\text{g}7$
8 $\text{e}2$ 0-0 9 0-0 $\text{c}6$ 10 $\text{c}3$ $\text{f}5$
11 $\text{e}3$ d5 12 c5 $\text{c}4$ 13 $\text{x}c4$ dc 14 $\text{a}4$ $\text{d}3$ 15 $\text{fd}1$ f5?

In search of active counterplay, Black loses his sense of danger and soon runs into a decisive counter. Correct was 15... $\text{a}5$ 16 $\text{x}a5$ $\text{x}a5$ 17 $\text{e}1$ $\text{f}5$ 18 $\text{ac}1$ $\text{c}6$, maintaining equality (Dvoretzky-Bagirov 1973).

16 d5 f4 (127)
17 \( \text{Bxd3!} \) cd 18 dc fe 19 cb ef+ 20 \( \text{Bf1} \) Bb8 21 Bc4+ Bh8 22 c6 Bb6 23 c7 Bxb7 24 cb Bxb8 25 Bd1 d2 26 Bb3 Be7 27 Bxf2 Bc1+ 28 Bd1 Bxb2 29 Bb1 Bb8 30 g3 Bd6 31 Bg2 h6 32 Be4 1-0

Here are two further instructive examples of risky, although active plans by Black being refuted. In the first of these he was wrongly tempted at an early stage by unrealizable dreams of an attack in the centre, and overooked the loss of a rook. In the second, instead of setting up a determined defence, he began superficial active play in the centre, which led to a crushing defeat.

No. 305 Karpov–Miles
Tilburg, 1977
English Opening

1 c4 c5 2 d3 f3 f6 3 d3 c3 c6 4 d4 cd 5 Bxd4 e6 6 g3 Bb6 7 Bb3 Be5 8 e4 Bb4 9 We2 a5?! 10 Be3 Bc6 11 Bf3 0-0 12 Bxd4 Bb6 13 Bb5 d5 14 Bc7 Bd6 15 Bxa8 de 16 fe Bxe4 17 Bd1 Bc6 18 Ag2 Bxc4 19 Bd4 Bxc3+ 20 bc Bf5 21 0-0 Bcd6 22 Bb6 e5 23 Bxc8 Bxc8 24 Bxe5 Bc5+ 25 Bd4 1-0

8 Ag3 Be4 (8... 0-0) 9 Bxe4 de 10 Bc2 Bxg3 11 hg e5? 12 de Ba5 13 Bb3! Bxe5 14 Be2 Be7 15 Bc1 0-0 16 Bxe4! Bxe4 17 Bd3 Bb4+ 18 Bxb4 Bxb4 19 Bxh7+ Bh8 20 Bb1+ Bh8 21 Bc4! a5 (21... Bc6 also fails to save Black: 22 Bh7+ Bh8 23 Bb3+! Bg8 24 Bch4! etc) 22 Bh7+ Bh8 23 Bf5+! 1-0

Attack as a playing method

Above we have examined a whole series of dynamic attacks, many of which gave a positive result to one side, but this by no means signifies that there is no room for compromise (cf. No. 279). In the majority of cases defeat was by no means predestined by the preceding logic of the opening struggle. Moreover, at the start of the sharp skirmish the chances of the two sides were roughly equal. It was a question of one side having a dynamic initiative.

But this initiative, as if at the waving of a magic wand, very often was quickly transformed into an irresistible attack. This, of course, was assisted by mistakes by the opponent, who was overwhelmed by the onslaught.

This suggests that dynamic attacks are effective in the practical sense. In this type of situation
the probability of mistakes by both sides is very great (although, as already mentioned, the attacker has a certain psychological advantage).

What is required here is great combinational ingenuity and a particular tactical accuracy in defence.

In such variations a primary role is played by deep and concrete calculation, as shown by the following line of the Slav Gambit: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 c3 c6 4 e4 d6 5 e5 dxe4 6 dxe4 dxe5 7 dxe5 dxe4 8 e2 e6 9 c3 (128)

In this critical position exceptional accuracy is demanded of Black. Imperceptible but instructive mistakes were made by Black in the games Rovner-Kotov (Leningrad, 1949) and Bronstein-Kotov (Budapest, 1950), in which he was lost right from the opening.

The first went 9...e7 10 dxe7 xe7? (10...g8 is the correct defence) 11 f6!! c5 (11...xh1 12 d6! 0-0 13 g3+, winning the queen) 12 d6 0-0 13 f3 g6 14 xe7 d3+ 15 fxe2 xxb2 16 c1, and White won.

In the second there followed: 10...g8 11 c3! xg2? (the combinational 11...d5! is correct) 12 d2 xh1? (here too 12...d5! is better) 13 0-0-0 d5 14 f3 xe4+ 15 xxe4 xxe3 16 xxe3 d7 17 e5!, and again White won.

From the examples given it is apparent that, in opening variations with concrete tactical play, in many cases the outcome can be decided very quickly.

In these variations, where usually there is no formal boundary between opening and middle-game, it is rather difficult to establish any lasting features of the positions arising from the opening struggle. The assessment of such set-ups can be revealed only by their concrete study.

Thus the variation in the games just considered can lead to the following unusual position with approximate equality (cf. Diag. 128): 9...e7 10 hg7 g8 11 c3 d5! 12 cd xg2 13 de (in the event of 13 f3 xg1+ 14 xg1 xg1+ 15 e2 xd1 16 xd1 ed the advantage passes to Black) 13...xe6 14 f6
\(\text{\#} \times h1 \ 15 \ \text{\#} \text{d6!} \ \text{\#} \times g1 + \ 16 \ \text{\#} \text{d2} \ \text{\#} \text{d5}+! \ 17 \ \text{\#} \times d5 \ \text{\#} \times d5 \ 18 \ \text{\#} \times g1 \ \text{\#} \text{d7} \text{etc.}

Thus in a number of cases a sharp tactical attack is not a final aim, but a playing method, necessary for the gaining of this or that positional advantage. Sometimes with an attack of this type a game does not conclude, but merely moves into a new stage of the struggle for an advantage. It may lead to a superior ending, the seizure of important squares, the spoiling of an enemy pawn chain, the winning of a pawn in return for which the opponent may temporarily gain the initiative, and so on.

Reflected here is a deep and truly realistic penetration into the specific character of the chess battle. After all, it happens comparatively rarely, only after serious opening mistakes by one of the sides, that there is a sharp disturbance of the equilibrium. At the same time, with modern technique, success can be achieved even after an outwardly insignificant disturbance of the equality line. There are many possible plans for achieving this. Along with the accumulation of small advantages, a dynamic path is also possible, making use of all typical attacking procedures. Thus the overall aim of an attack, in its modern understanding, lies not in the obligatory destruction of the enemy position, but in the attainment of the initiative, certain positional gains, or perhaps simply a comfortable position or one conforming to a player’s style of play. But in carrying out such a plan he sets concrete problems, over which his opponent can stumble at literally every step.

Instructive in this respect is a line of the Richter/Rauzer Attack in the Sicilian Defence: 1 e4 c5 2 \text{\#}f3 \text{\#}c6 3 d4 cd 4 \text{\#} \times d4 \text{\#}f6 5 \text{\#}c3 d6 6 \text{\#}g5 e6 7 \text{\#}d2 \text{\#}e7 8 0-0-0 0-0 9 f4 \text{\#} \times d4 10 \text{\#} \times d4 h6 11 \text{\#}h4 \text{\#}a5 12 e5!? de 13 \text{\#} \times e5 \text{\#} \times e5 14 fe \text{\#}d5 15 \text{\#} \times e7 \text{\#} \times e7 16 \text{\#}d3.

On his 12th move in this line White begins a sharp plan, which involves various tactical nuances. Thus, for example, on his 13th move Black cannot avoid the exchange of queens (13... \text{\#}b6 14 \text{\#}a4!), and the game goes by force into an ending, which, however, is not easy to assess. In return for the definite weakness of his e5 pawn, White has a spatial advantage, which ensures him a certain initiative. Black must still overcome numerous difficulties in solving the problem of completing the mobilization of his forces.

Thus the direct development 16... \text{\#}d7? creates additional
difficulties for Black, even though the game is further simplified. After 17 A7+! A×h7 18
A×d7 A×c6 19 A×b7 A×e7 20 A×e1 the endgame clearly favours White.

Theory recommends 16... A×c6 17 A×e1 A×d8! 18 b4 A×d7 19
b5 A×a5 20 A×e4 A×ac8 21 A×d6 A×c5 followed by ...A×f8-e7, trying to
become established on the d-file and gradually to create counterplay against White’s e5 pawn.
Black has good chances of equalizing.

It can be considered that subsequently a positional struggle develops.
eighth

OPENING PRINCIPLES IN THEIR SECOND APPROXIMATION

Dynamic play and a new approach to opening principles

The method of sharp struggle for the initiative does not contradict the implementation of important general tasks in the initial stage of the game.

With this type of play, opening and middlegame (and sometimes even endgame) are closely linked. In variations of this sort the transition from opening to middlegame appears to take place imperceptibly, before the completion of mobilization. This is assisted by the implementation of an active strategic plan at an early stage of the game, to which even mobilization tasks are subordinate.

Since each side has the aim of taking play along the sharpest, most crucial path, in such variations the desire to disrupt the coordination of the opponent’s forces is very clearly seen. At the same time, the harmonious and purposeful coordination of one’s own forces is especially important.

But the solving of general problems also demands the observance of basic elementary opening principles, and in this respect deviations are often noticed in dynamic variations. Thus often the principle of rapid development is not strictly observed, or else the queen (and sometimes one of the rooks) is brought into play early, and so on.

In such opening set-ups the use of opening principles often depends on the early implementation of active operations, which are usually characteristic of a full-blooded middlegame. It is here that a concrete approach to opening principles is important.

It is natural that the struggle in dynamic variations differs from that in opening set-ups where forcing events develop only after the completion of mobilization. Such opening set-
ups are especially dynamic, and the handling of them, sometimes from a very early stage, demands deep and accurate concrete calculation. When analyzing them, 'constant' factors such as disturbance of material balance, 'persistent' weaknesses in the position, and so on, should be primarily assessed from the dynamic point of view.

In sharp opening variations one should place the least trust in general assessments. It is for this reason that in 'refuted' lines one can often find a concrete path to obtain a good game, while many set-ups with 'equal chances' prove to favour one of the sides.

Thus the struggle in variations with sharp tactical play takes on unusual forms. These include: the deviations from the principles of development just mentioned; the rapid switching of the weight of the struggle from the centre to one of the flanks; leaving the king in the centre for a long time, retaining the right to castle on either side, depending on circumstances, or saving an important tempo, up to a certain point, for the development of active operations.

In many cases a sharp tactical struggle for the initiative is possible only at the cost of material sacrifice. For this reason the balance is often disturbed early in the game, and unusual balances of forces arise, such as queen against rook, minor piece and pawn.

This allows us to single out new strategic problems in the opening, which to some extent contradict basic opening principles, in particular: 1) manoeuvres by the forces at an early opening stage; 2) the rapid disturbance of material equality, and an opening struggle with unbalanced material; 3) a dynamic struggle in the opening over the entire board.

It should be noted that these problems are often closely linked. Thus if the play becomes sharp at an early stage, the struggle may develop over the entire board. This may be accompanied by pawn sacrifices, and by the early development of the heavy pieces. And in general in such situations, what occurs is not so much development, as opening manoeuvring. In this respect the following topical variation of the French Defence is typical: 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 b4 4 e5 c5 5 a3 xc3+ 6 bc xc2 7 g4 cd!? 8 xg7 g8 9 xh7 c7! 10 a2 bc 6 1 4 d7 12 d3 dc (129)

Here Black's pawn screen on the K-side has been destroyed, while White's pawn formation
on the Q-side has been significantly disrupted. In such positions the number of pawns does not matter — what is important is to carry out your own plan.

White’s subsequent plan will be a pawn offensive on the K-side, combined with play on the dark squares. Black in turn intends a counter-offensive in the centre and on the Q-side, invariably combined with threats to the white king, which usually remains in the centre for a long time.

Both plans are seen in the following examples.

No. 307 Bronstein-Uhlmann
Tallinn, 1976

From diagram 129: 13 \( h4?! \)
0-0-0 14 \( \text{h}5 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 15 \( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 16
\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{h}7 \) \( \text{h}8 \) 18 \( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{h}8 \) 19
\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 20 \( \text{g}4 \) \( \text{h}4 \) 21 \( \text{h}1 \) \( \text{g}4 \)
22 \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{h}7 \) 23 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 24 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{f}3 \) 29 \( \text{h}5 \)
\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{g}8 \) 28 \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{f}3 \) 29 \( \text{h}5 \)

\( \text{xf}4 \) 30 \( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{g}5 + 0-1 \)

No. 308 Mecking-Uhlmann
Manila 1Z, 1976

From diagram 129: 13 \( \text{e}1 \)
0-0-0 14 \( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 15 \( \text{g}1 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 16
\( \text{g}4 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 17 \( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{g}4 \) 18 \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{e}3 \) 19
\( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 20 \( \text{d}1 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 21 \( \text{d}3 \)
\( \text{b}6 \) 22 \( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 23 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 24
\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 25 \( \text{f}6 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 26
\( \text{f}6 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 27 \( \text{g}2 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 28 \( \text{h}6 \)
\( \text{h}6 \) 29 \( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 30 \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{d}5 \)
c3 \( \text{h}5 \) 32 \( \text{f}8 \)

As a result of an exceptionally dynamic struggle, White has gained a favourable ending, which he confidently converts into a win.

32 ... \( \text{d}7 \) 33 \( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 34 \( \text{h}4 \)
\( \text{g}4 \) 35 \( \text{g}7 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 36 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 37
\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{e}4 \) 38 \( \text{g}8 \) \( \text{b}3 \) 39 \( \text{h}7 \) \( \text{g}4 \)
40 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{e}4 \) 41 \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 42
\( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 43 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 44 \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{d}5 \)
45 \( \text{b}8 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 46 \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 47 \( \text{c}3 \)
\( \text{d}4 \) 48 \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{d}4 \) 49 \( \text{c}6 \) \( \text{e}4 \) 50
\( \text{x} \) 51 \( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 52 \( \text{a}5 \) \( \text{a}5 \)
53 \( \text{b}6 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 54 \( \text{h}7 \) \( \text{c}3 \) 55 \( \text{a}5 \)
\( \text{d}5 \) 56 \( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 57 \( \text{c}6 \) 1-0

We have seen a whole complex of modern ideas, full of bold risks. But in each case one of these factors is the starting point (in the given examples — the destruction of the flanks), bringing about the ‘disruption’ of opening principles. It is from this viewpoint that the following problems should also be considered.
Minor piece manœuvres in the opening.
Opening exchanges

Certain interesting features of opening play, where an erroneous tendency was punished by energetic manœuvres with one and the same piece, have already been examined.

Here we will be analyzing cases where a disruption in the position has not yet occurred. Piece manœuvres have the aim not of refuting the opponent’s plans (which may be quite correct), but of achieving positional advantages by the method of opening struggle.

In this connection, before the completion of overall mobilization, an already developed and actively placed piece is sometimes transferred to another position, sometimes even to its initial square, in order to redevelop it according to a different scheme.

In such an obvious ‘breaking’ of the principle of rapid development, the concrete features of the resulting opening set-up are taken into account. In the main such manœuvres are only possible in positions with a blocked or stable pawn centre.

The basic aim of such manœuvres is to improve the coordination of the forces. This is the case with Black’s knight manœuvre on move 9 in a topical variation of the Spanish Game, suggested back in his time by Breyer: 1 e4 e5 2 ∑f3 ∑c6 3 ∑b5 a6 4 ∑a4 ∑f6 5 0-0 ∑e7 6 ∑e1 b5 7 ∑b3 d6 8 c3 0-0 9 h3 ∑b8!? (130)

The Breyer Variation has been regularly employed in practice since the early 1950s, which confirms its soundness, and its evolution is also instructive. Initially White attempted to exploit his temporary lead in development by 10 a4, and particularly by 10 d4 ∑bd7 11 c4!? For a certain time this line seemed to be the most promising, but later games and analysis in the second approximation showed that after 11...c6 12 c5!? ∑c7 13 cd ∑×d6 14 ∑g5 ed 15 ∑×d4 ∑e5! 16 ∑×f6 gf Black had highly attractive counterplay.

It is no accident that in recent times White has almost given up trying to refute Black’s knight
manoeuvre, and has turned to a purely positional method of development: 10 d4 \( \triangleleft \) bd7 11 \( \triangleleft \) bd2 \( \triangleleft \) b7 12 \( \triangleleft \) c2 etc., satisfying himself with a slight initiative.

A similar situation can occur in the French Defence: 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \triangleleft \) d2 \( \triangleleft \) c6 4 \( \triangleleft \)gf3 \( \triangleleft \) f6 5 e5 \( \triangleleft \) d7 6 \( \triangleleft \) b3 \( \triangleleft \) e7 7 \( \triangleleft \) b5 \( \triangleleft \) cb8!?

With the central pawns blocked, Black temporarily withdraws his knight (which has played an active part in the initial struggle for the centre) to its initial square, making way for the important pawn advance ...c5! At the same time, in some lines the active white bishop at b5 proves unexpectedly to be out of play.

In the variation 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 \( \triangleleft \) c3 \( \triangleleft \) b4 4 e5 b6 5 \( \triangleleft \) g4 it is Black’s bishop which returns to its initial square: 5 ... \( \triangleleft \) f8?! Then in many cases he does not aim for the traditional undermining of White’s centre by ...c5 etc., but plays completely non-standardly: ... \( \triangleleft \) b7, ... \( \triangleleft \) c6, ... \( \triangleleft \) d7, and ...0-0-0 (an alternative plan involves the exchange of light-square bishops by ... \( \triangleleft \) a6 etc).

The formation arising is typical of the King’s Indian Defence, but with flanks reversed. In that case it is well known that White’s plan involves a pawn offensive on the Q-side (here — on the K-side). And in this respect the position of the white queen at g4 is not altogether happy, and may sometimes even assist Black’s counterplay on the K-side.

Such manoeuvres are also typical of certain modern opening variations for White: he can permit himself a few more liberties than Black (for example, he can carry out manoeuvres with a fairly open formation in the centre).

This is well illustrated by a variation of the Spanish Game: 1 e4 e5 2 \( \triangleleft \) f3 \( \triangleleft \) c6 3 \( \triangleleft \) b5 a6 4 \( \triangleleft \) a4 d6 5 c3 \( \triangleleft \) d7 6 d4 \( \triangleleft \) ge7 7 \( \triangleleft \) b3 h6 (131)

Here, along with the purely developing moves 8 0-0 or 8 \( \triangleleft \) e3, the manoeuvre 8 \( \triangleleft \) h4!? is possible, and practice shows that it is precisely this plan which sets Black the most difficult, and immediately highly concrete problems.

Long before completing his opening development, White di-
rects an already developed piece towards an outpost — f5. At the same time, unpleasant tactical threats arise: 9 \text{g}f3 or 9 \text{w}h5, which enable White to gain time for carrying out the operation mentioned.

For a long time Black used to counter this plan rather passively: with 8 . . . d\text{a}5 or 8 . . . d\text{c}8, which gave White a persistent initiative, as demonstrated by the variations 8 . . . d\text{a}5 9 d\text{c}2 g5 10 f3 d5 11 ef e6 12 e3! f6 13 d5 e7 14 g4 d5 15 d5 d6 16 a4 d4 17 xh7 d8 18 e4!, with clearly the better chances for White (analysis by Boleslavsky and Suetin), or 8 . . . d\text{c}8 9 f5 g6 10 g3 g7 11 0-0 ed 12 f4 dc 13 c3 with a strong initiative for White (Geller-Keres, 18th USSR Ch., 1950).

Perhaps more promising for Black is the tactical plan consisting in a sudden counterblow in the centre: 8 . . . ed 9 cd d4! 10 xd4 c6! It transpires that the currently undefended position of the knight at h4 plays an important role.

The possibility of such operations is something of which one should beware, when carrying out this type of early improvement in the placing of the pieces (in the given case d\text{f}3-h4, aiming at f5).

Thus in Tal-Bannik (23rd USSR Ch., 1956), where this variation was first employed, after 11 \text{d}x\text{f}7+ x\text{f}7 12 \text{w}d5+ e6 13 \text{w}h5+ g8 14 0-0 e5! White found himself in a difficult position.

This plan for Black also came through later tests fairly successfully. In the battle for the initiative, White should evidently go in for a pawn sacrifice, e.g., 11 \text{w}d5 h4 12 x\text{f}7+ d8 13 d3 d5 14 g4 g4 15 e3 g2 16 0-0 etc.

In many cases the problem of improving the coordination of the forces is decided in the opening by exchanging important enemy pieces for less valuable pieces of one's own, which compensates (sometimes with interest) for a slight delay in mobilization.

The following examples show Black ‘ridding himself’ of a ‘bad’ bishop. Such a problem can arise after the closing of the centre (by d4-d5) in the King’s Indian Defence. Here the dark-square bishop at g7 has little mobility, and it is often useful for Black to exchange it, particularly for its opposite number guarding the dark squares in White’s position.

This is what happens in the variation 1 d4 d6 2 c4 g6 3 d\text{f}3 d\text{g}7 4 e4 d6 5 d\text{f}3 0-0 6 d\text{e}2 e5 7 0-0 b6 8 d5 d5 9 d2 a5 10 d2 d6! 11 b3 d\text{x}c1 12
\( a \times c1 \) \( f d7 \).

It is not in vain that Black has wasted a few tempi. He has provoked the important exchange of the dark-square bishops, which gives him fair prospects for the future.

The following game is also instructive.

**No. 309 Zukharov-Gurgenidze**

**Tbilisi, 1956**

**King's Indian Defence**

1 \( d4 \) \( f6 \) 2 \( c4 \) \( g6 \) 3 \( d3 \) \( g7 \) 4 \( e4 \)

\( d5 \) \( f3 \) \( e5 \) 6 \( d5 \) \( fd7! ? \) 7 \( e3 \) \( h6! \)

\((132)\)

13 \( b1 \) \( d7 \) 14 \( b5 \) \( \times b5 \) 15 \( c b \)

\( b8 \) 16 \( h4 \) \( bd7 \) 17 \( h5 \) 0–0–0 18 \( b3 \)

\( b6 \) 19 \( \times d2 \) \( \times d7 \) 20 \( \times c3 \) \( f5 \) 21 \( e f \)

\( g f \) 22 \( g5 \) \( \times d8 \) 23 \( g4 \) \( e4! \)

After setting up a solid blockade on the dark squares, Black does not intend to be content with what he has achieved, but wishes to exploit his advantages in dynamic play. He begins energetic action in the centre, with the aim of seizing the initiative.

24 \( g f \) \( \times f 5 \) 25 \( g4 \) \( \times f 3 \) 26 \( \times d7 + \) \( \times b x d7 \) 27 \( \times e 4 \) \( \times e 4 \) 28 \( \times e x e 4 \) \( f 4 \)

In the resulting ending Black has a small, but persistent advantage. His knight is obviously stronger than the white bishop, the opponent's pawns are more exposed, and the black rook is slightly more active. The concluding stage of the game is highly instructive.

29 \( g 2 \) \( d 8 \) ! (29 \( a h 3 \) was threatened) 30 \( c 2 \) \( g 8 \) 31 \( h 3 \)

h6 32 a3 \( g 5 \) 33 \( f 3 \) \( \times f 3 \) 34

\( \times h 3 \) \( e 5 \) 35 \( a d 1 \) a6 36 \( f 2 \) \( e 7 \)

37 \( d 2 \) \( g 3 \) 38 \( d 4 \) \( g 2 + \) 39 \( c 3 \)

\( f 2 \) 40 \( c 2 \) \( f 3 + \) 41 \( b 2 \) \( f 6 \) 42

\( d 1 \) \( g 3 \) 43 \( c 1 \) \( g 2 \) 44 \( c 3 \) \( g 5 \)

45 \( g 6 \) \( f 4 \) ! 46 \( f 1 + \) \( e 4 \) 47 \( b 4 \)

ab 48 ab \( e 3 \) 49 \( a 1 \) \( g 1 \) ! 50 \( a 8 \)

\( c 1 + \) 51 \( b 2 \) \( c 4 \) 52 \( b 3 \) \( d 2 + \)

53 \( a 3 \) \( d 4 \) 54 \( e 8 \) \( c 3 + \) 55 \( b 2 \)

\( c 4 + \) 56 \( b 1 \) \( e 3 \) 57 \( h 8 \) \( c 3 \) 58

\( \times h 6 \) \( e 1 + \) 59 \( a 2 \) \( e 2 + \) 60

\( a 1 \) \( d 2 \) 0–1
This game shows clearly how the exchange of even one important enemy piece can promote a general improvement in the coordination of one's own forces. At the decisive stage of the game the harmony of the black pieces was fully revealed.

**Early development of the heavy pieces**

As has often been mentioned, in the opening it is difficult to play actively with the heavy pieces, since normally they quickly come under attack by the opponent's pawns and minor pieces. Usually the heavy pieces develop their power later, at the height of the middlegame, without being particularly active in the opening.

Therefore here we will be talking mainly about exceptions, or, more precisely, about a different interpretation of the rules as applied to dynamic variations. Very characteristic of certain modern opening variations is the active role of the heavy pieces, if their manoeuvres disrupt the opponent's plans and assist the favourable coordination of one's own forces.

Instructive in this sense is a line of the English Opening, worked out by A. Cherepkov:

1 c4 c5 2 d4 c6 3 g3 d5 4 cd e×d5 5 a3 c7 6 f3 a6 7 w a4!? (133)

White brings his queen into play in order to hamper the opponent's basic plan, which is to set up a piece-pawn centre by . . . e5 and . . . f6 etc., and he thus seizes the initiative.

The following sequel is also typical: 7 . . . d7 8 w e4! e6? (better 8 . . . g6 9 e5 a7, reconciling himself to a slightly inferior game after 10 e7 w×d7) 9 0-0 e7 10 d4! cd 11 e7 0-0 12 d1 w c8 13 e3, with strong pressure for White in the centre.

The following example illustrates a modern opening variation, where at a very early stage the white queen penetrates into the opponent's position, and although for a long time it does not have any direct effect, it strongly influences the course of play.
No. 310
Nezhmetdinov-Sakharov
Moscow, 1957
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 f3 c6 3 d4 cd
4 d×d4 e5 5 b5 a6 6 d6+
A×d6 7 f×d6 f6

A highly dynamic variation, which should not be underestimated. Thus after 8 f×f6 g×f6
9 f3 (9 c3 d5! 10 ed b4) 9...d5
Black could have seized the initiative. White’s problem is to prevent the opening of the centre and then to exploit the weakness of the dark squares in Black’s position. One of the ways of achieving this is by the following unusual manœuvre.

8 c7! ge7 9 c3 b4 10
d3 d5 11 0-0 d4 12 e2 A×d3 13
cd g5?!

Black wishes radically to prevent the opening of the centre which was possible after 14 f4. But, as the further course of the game shows, the weakening of his castled position proves a more serious drawback. 13... c6 was better.

14 d2 c6 15 ac1 0-0 16
g3 h6 17 b4 e8 18 a4 d8 19
c5! g7 20 d5 g4 21 c1
h7 22 f5! d5 23 ef f6 24 g4

Black is in a positional zugzwang: his position is hopeless.

24... e7 25 d7 A×d7 26
g7 27 c5! b6 28 c7 b5

29 a5! g8 30 d5 b8 31 e1
A×g7 32 c5 f8 33 a7 1-0

And now an example which confirms the strength of the other form of chess ‘heavy artillery’.

No. 311 Petrosian-Bertok
Stockholm Z, 1962
Queen’s Gambit Accepted

1 d4 d5 2 c4 dc 3 f3 f6 4 e3
e6 5 A×c4 c5 6 0-0 a6 7 c3 b5
8 b3 b7 9 e2 A×d7 10 d1
d6 11 e4 cd (134)

12 A×d4!

The capture with the rook is much stronger than the usual 12 A×d4, when, for example, Petrosian-Smyslov (Candidates Tournament, 1959) continued 12... b8 13 f3 b4! with good counterplay for Black.

12... c5 (if 12... c7 13
A×d6! B×d6 14 e5 A×f3 15
A×f3 B×e5 16 A×f4! and White wins) 13 d3! (the rook is irresistible – it is not only active in
the centre, and also has its sights set on the K-side) 13...\textit{g}4 14 \textit{g}5 \textit{b}6 15 \textit{d}5! \textit{a}5? (this loses; comparatively best was 15...\textit{x}d5! 16 ed e5 17 \textit{h}4 0-0 with chances of equalizing, Versov-Suetin, Novgorod, 1961) 16 \textit{f}1 \textit{c}8 17 \textit{f}4 \textit{e}5 18 \textit{x}e5 \textit{x}e5 19 \textit{h}3 \textit{c}4 20 \textit{d}1 \textit{b}6 21 \textit{h}5 \textit{g}8 22 \textit{hd}3! \textit{d}6 23 e5 \textit{e}4 24 \textit{e}3 \textit{x}e3 25 \textit{x}e3 \textit{c}6 26 \textit{g}4 \textit{e}7 27 \textit{de}1 f5 28 ef gf 29 \textit{h}3! f5 30 f3 \textit{g}5 31 \textit{x}f5 \textit{cf}8 32 \textit{x}e6+ \textit{xe}6 33 \textit{xe}6+ \textit{d}8 34 \textit{d}3+ 1-0

**Delayed castling. Leaving the king in the centre**

In certain modern opening variations one of the players (or sometimes even both!) leaves his king in the centre for a rather long time, so as not only to retain the possibility of castling on either side, but also to do so at the necessary moment, and before this to engage in concrete operations.

Leaving the king in the centre is often associated both with a more complicated interpretation of its safety, and with a new approach to the struggle for the initiative in the opening stage of a game.

Here is an example of the centre ‘armour’ which the black king often acquires in the Richter/Rauzer Variation of the Sicilian Defence: 1 e4 c5 2 \textit{f}3 \textit{c}6 3 d4 cd 4 \textit{x}d4 \textit{f}6 5 \textit{c}3 d6 6 \textit{g}5 e6 7 \textit{wd}2 a6 8 0-0 0 \textit{d}7 9 f4 \textit{e}7 10 \textit{f}3 b5 11 \textit{x}f6 gf 12 \textit{a}d3 \textit{b}6 13 \textit{b}1 b4 14 \textit{e}2 a5 etc.

In this and similar set-ups, Black sometimes leaves his king in the centre for a long time and begins a persistent battle for the initiative, mounting an energetic offensive on the Q-side, where the white king has taken shelter.

Such a situation is one of the most complicated in modern opening strategy, but practice shows that Black has fair chances of obtaining a good game, and possibly even more. For the moment only approximate assessments are possible here.

It also happens that one of the players will often refrain from castling, in order to save an important tempo in the opening and be the first to go onto the offensive, forcing the opponent to give up his active plan (cf. No. 239, Botvinnik-Alatortsev). The following example is also instructive.
No. 312 Vasyukov-Parma
USSR v Yugoslavia
Rijeka, 1963
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 dxd4
df6 5 c3 g6 6 Ae3 d7 7 f3 e6
8 d2 0-0 9 Ac4 Ac7 10 h4

Although the central position is not blocked, for the moment
White leaves his king in the centre, so as to begin his K-side
offensive as quickly as possible and seize the initiative.

10...Ac8 11 Ab3 Ae5 12 h5!
(all in the same attacking style)
12...Bxh5 13 0-0-0 (this is the
moment to castle) 13...Ac4 14
Bxc4 Bxc4 15 g4 Ac6 16 dge1
(16 h6! is stronger) 16...e6
(here Black misses the moment
for counterplay by 16...b5!) 17
Bb1 Ba5 18 Bb3 Ac7 19 Af4! e5
20 g5! Bh5 21 d5 Bd8 22 Ae3
Ae6 23 Bf6+

The decisive opening of lines
for the attack.

23...Bxf6 24 gf Bxf6

Equally bad is 24...Bxf6 25
Bh2 h5 26 Bxh5 Be8 27 Bxg6+
fg 28 Bh7+ Bf8 29 Aa6+ and
mate next move.

25 Bg5! Bxf3 26 Bh2 Bh5 27
Bf2 Bb3 28 Be3 h6 29 Bc2 1-0

The central position of the
king in the above examples was
either a convenient or an insigni-
ficant feature of the position,
and it did not constitute a break-
ing of opening principles.

There are many nuances of
this type in modern opening var-
iations, and this applies equally
to other forms of the breaking of
old rules. For example, of no
small importance is the choice of
moment for castling, and de-
pending on circumstances it may
be on one side or the other.

No. 313 Sokolsky-Zhukovitsky
Kiev, 1945
Sokolsky Opening

1 b4 e5 2 Ab2 f6 3 b5 d5 4 e3
d6 5 c4 c6 6 d3 Ae7 7 d4 e4
8 Bfd2 0-0 9 Ac3 f5 10 g3 Bd7 11
a4 Af6 12 Aa3 Ac7 (better 12...
Axa3 13 Bxa3 dc 14 Axc4+
Aed5 with a good game for
Black, but he clearly failed to an-
ticipate White’s subsequent stra-
ategic plan) 13 Aa5! Ab6 14 Bb8 15
Bh3 C7 16 Cc5 g5 17 Bb3 Cc6
18 0-0-0!

The point of White’s plan. Al-
though he has just been mount-
ing a pawn offensive on the
Q-side, it is here that the white
king will feel safest.

18...h6 19 cd cd 20 h4 g4? 21
d2 Bb8 22 Ac2 Ac5 23 Axc5
Cc6 24 Ab3 Ad7 25 Bb2 Ac8 26
Aa2 Ae6 27 Ac2 Ae8 28 Bhe1
Bb8 29 Bb4 Axc2+ 30 Bxc2
Bd7 31 Ac1! Ac6 32 Bb3 Ac4
33 Bxb4 Bxh4 34 Ab3 Bxa3+ 35
Bxa3 Ad6 36 Ac5 Ae7 37 Bb4!
Now the white king embarks on a decisive raid. It is interesting that it is precisely on the Q-side that the fate of the game is decided.

37...\texttt{g7} 38 \texttt{dxa6! ba} 39 \texttt{dxa6 eg8} 40 c6 d7 41 e5 1-0

However, the active side should be aware that in such ‘exceptional’ cases he is always on the verge of a real breaking of principles.

Thus at times even the most solid central barriers cannot ensure a safe shelter for the king, since, apart from purely positional attacking methods, there are also sharp, tactical ones. It is a dynamic type of struggle that strikingly reveals not only the advantages, but also the drawbacks of new procedures.

The sacrifice of a pawn in the opening

In a dynamic struggle there is often a close connection between material and positional factors, and the material balance may be disturbed for a long time as a result of a positional sacrifice.

For the sake of achieving certain positional gains and seizing the initiative, it is most often a pawn which is sacrificed, and the concrete aims and the forms of this sacrifice may be very varied. Typical, for example, are pawn sacrifices with the aim of developing the pieces rapidly, eliminating strong enemy pieces or maintaining one's own active pieces, opening important lines and diagonals, gaining space, and so on. Usually these factors are closely linked and often they successively replace one another.

The innovator of this procedure, which until comparatively recently was regarded as an exception but has now become a method, was Alexander Alekhine.

Here are some of his first opening experiments of this type.

No. 314 Alekhine–Reshevsky
Kemeri, 1937
Alekhine’s Defence

1 e4 \texttt{d6} 2 e5 \texttt{d5} 3 \texttt{f3} d6
4 d4 \texttt{g4} 5 c4 \texttt{b6} 6 \texttt{e2} de 7 \texttt{xe5!? (a problematic pawn sacrifice)} 7...\texttt{x} 8 \texttt{x} 9 0-0 \texttt{d7} 10 \texttt{xd7} \texttt{xd7}?

10...\texttt{x} 9 was correct, when Alekhine was intending to play 11 a4! \texttt{c6} 12 \texttt{a3} e6 13 a5 \texttt{d7} 14 \texttt{b5} with the initiative for the pawn.

11 \texttt{c3} c6 12 \texttt{e3} e5 13 \texttt{ad1} e6 14 \texttt{f3}! 0-0-0 15 \texttt{x} 7
As a result of his novel play White has regained the pawn, while retaining the initiative.

15...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}5}} 16 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}4}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}5}} (135)

17 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}3}}?!

Here Alekhine rejects a favourable positional decision: by 17 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf}5}} he could have obtained a clear if slight endgame advantage. Instead he continues playing in the same dynamic style.

17...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}5}} 18 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}3}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}4}} 19 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}4}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}5}} 20 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}4}}! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}7}} 21 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}3}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}6}} 22 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}e}6} 23 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}3}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}8}} 24 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}4}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}e}5} 25 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}3}}! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}7}} 26 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}5}}! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}e}8} 27 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}4}}! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}8}} 28 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}6}+} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}b}6} 29 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}b}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}a}2} 30 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}3}}!

White conducts a broad offensive, forcing his opponent to think for himself at every move.

30...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}7}} 31 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}5}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}7}} 32 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}1}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}6}} 33 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}2}!} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}5}} 34 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}8}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}2}} 35 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}b}8+!} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}b}8} 36 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}5}+!} 1-0

No. 315 Alekhine-Fine
Hastings, 1936-37
\textit{Spanish Game}

1 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}4}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}5}} 2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}3}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}6}} 3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}5}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}6}}
4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}4}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}6}} 5 0-0 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}7}} 6 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}1}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}5}}
7 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}3}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}6}} 8 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}3}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}5}} 9 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}2}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}5}} 10 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}4}}
\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}7}} 11 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}d}2} 0-0 12 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}1}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}4}} 13 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}3}}! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}f}3} 14 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}f}3} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}d}} 15 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}5}}!?
(136)

Again a problematic pawn sacrifice for the initiative.

15...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}c}} 6 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}c}3} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}c}8} 17 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}3}}
\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}8}} 18 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}3}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}6}} 19 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}5}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}8}} 20
\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{ac}1}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}7}} 21 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}3}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}6}} 22 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}6}+}
\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}h}6} 23 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}h}6} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}4}} 24 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{cd}1}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}4}}
25 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}4}!} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}f}2} 26 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}f}4} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{ba}} 27 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{ba}}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}3}!} 28
\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}2}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}6}?}

Black fails to withstand the tension of constant calculation.

28...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}6}} was correct, retaining roughly equal chances.

29 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}4}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{ac}8}} 30 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}1}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}3}7} 31
\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}1}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}6}} 32 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}5}!} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}5}? (the decisive error; 32...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}8}} was more tenacious) 33 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}4}} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}7}} 34 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}2}!}
\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xe}4}} 35 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}f}7} \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}f}7} 36 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf}7}+}
\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}f}7} 37 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}6}!} 1-0
The sacrifice of a pawn in the opening

No. 316 Alekhine–Flohr
Nottingham, 1936
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 b4
4 d2 de 5 xe4?! xd4 6 xd3 xd2+ 7 xd2 d8?

Inconsistent: Black should have played 7...xb2. Now White's initiative becomes dangerous.

8 0-0-0 We7 9 f3 f6 10
9 e1 xe4 11 xe4 d7 12
5 g4 f5 13 f4 f6 14 e1 d7
15 xf5 0-0-0 16 a5 b8 17
e5 e8 18 g3!

Showing a deep penetration into the position. White goes in for the exchange of queens, foreseeing excellent opportunities for developing his initiative.

18...d5 19 e4 b6 20 We3
d5 21 a3 c5 22 xc5 xc5 c5
23 f4 d5 24 f3! d7 25 g5
e8 26 c4 f5 27 d4 f8 28 c5
5 d5 29 xe7 c6 30 g6 e7 31
f3 f6 32 e5 d5 33 e3 h8
34 h4 c6 35 c2 d8 36 b3 c7
37 f3 e8 38 e5 ec8 39 e4
sa8 40 b4 b8 41 g4! b6 (41...
xc4 fails to 42 xc4 xg4 43
c6+!) 42 g5 bc 43 bc d7 44
xd7 xd7 45 h5 f7 46 xe6!
xe6 47 xe6 fb7 48 b3 e8
49 h6 gh 50 g6 g7 51 f5 f8 52
c2 h5 53 d6 e7 54 f6 e1+ 55
d2 f1 56 f7 h4 57 d7 1-0

In the given case it would be absurd to try to determine even the most characteristic instances of the pawn sacrifice. Without exaggeration it can be said that this is a topic of encyclopaedic dimensions. We can merely conclude that the general aim uniting such sacrifices consists in the obtaining of more active coordination of the forces, ensuring a certain initiative and facilitating the carrying out of a concrete plan.

From this angle many classical variations with long-standing assessments have also been revised, in particular the following line of the Spanish Game: 1 e4 e5 2 f3 c6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 d6
5 c3 f5!?, which was introduced by Capablanca. For a long time in this variation theory mainly considered the strictly positional defensive method with 5...d7 and the plans ensuing from it.

But then in the late 1940s interest in 5...f5!? grew, and it transpired that, by handling it in modern gambit style, Black could count on rich counterplay.

Instructive in this respect are the variations 6 ef xf5 7 d4 e4
8 g5 d5 9 f3 e3!? 10 f4 d6 11
xe3 f6, or 9...h6!? 10 fe hg
11 ef d6! 12 g4 f6 13 xg5
f8!, in both cases with an excellent game for Black.

In recent times gambit ideas have 'spread' to the Q-side,
where earlier the opening struggle was of a strictly positional nature.

No. 317 Geller-Mikenas
USSR Ch., 1955
Reti Opening

1 \( \text{\Box f}3 \) d5 2 c4 d4 3 g3 c5 4 \( \text{\Box g}2 \) \( \text{\Box c}6 \) 5 0-0 e5 6 d3 \( \text{\Box e}7 \) 7 b4!? ch 8 a3 ba 9 \( \text{\Box a}4 \) \( \text{\Box d}7 \) 10 \( \text{\Box x}a3 \) \( \text{\Box f}6 \) 11 \( \text{\Box b}5! \) 0-0 (better 11... \( \text{\Box x}a3 \) and 12... \( \text{\Box e}7 \)) 12 \( \text{\Box x}e5 \) \( \text{\Box x}e5 \) 13 \( \text{\Box x}e5 \) \( \text{\Box x}a3 \) 14 \( \text{\Box x}a3! \) \( \text{\Box c}6 \) 15 \( \text{\Box x}c6 \) \( \text{bc} \) 16 \( \text{\Box e}1 \) \( \text{\Box b}6 \) 17 \( \text{\Box d}2 \) \( \text{\Box b}4? \) 18 \( \text{\Box a}5! \) \( \text{\Box d}6 \) 19 \( \text{\Box b}3 \) \( \text{\Box e}8 \) 20 \( \text{\Box b}7 \) \( \text{\Box e}5 \) 21 \( \text{\Box c}7 \) \( \text{\Box e}6 \) 22 \( \text{\Box f}3 \) \( \text{\Box h}5 \) 23 \( \text{\Box x}d4 \) \( \text{\Box e}8 \) 24 \( \text{\Box eb}1 \) 1-0
22 years later Yefim Geller again employed his plan to great effect, only this time with Black.

No. 318 Rashkovsky-Geller
Sochi, 1977
King's Indian Defence

1 d4 \( \text{\Box f}6 \) 2 c4 g6 3 \( \text{\Box c}3 \) \( \text{\Box g}7 \) 4 e4 d6 5 h3 0-0 6 \( \text{\Box g}5 \) c5 7 d5 b5! 8 cb a6 9 ba \( \text{\Box a}5 \) 10 \( \text{\Box d}2 \) \( \text{\Box b}4! \) (137) 11 \( \text{\Box c}2 \) \( \text{\Box a}6 \) 12 \( \text{\Box x}a6 \) \( \text{\Box x}a6 \) 13 a3 \( \text{\Box c}4! \) 14 \( \text{\Box b}1 \) \( \text{\Box b}4! \) 15 ab cb 16 \( \text{\Box ge}2 \) \( \text{bc} \) 17 \( \text{\Box x}c3 \) \( \text{\Box fc}8 \) 18 \( \text{\Box f}3 \) \( \text{\Box h}5 \) 19 g4 \( \text{\Box g}3 \) 20 \( \text{\Box g}1 \) \( \text{\Box e}2! \) 21 \( \text{\Box g}2 \) \( \text{\Box d}4 \) 22 \( \text{\Box d}1 \) \( \text{\Box d}3 \) 23 \( \text{\Box f}2 \) \( \text{\Box x}f3 \) 24 \( \text{\Box x}f3 \) \( \text{\Box x}d2+ \) 25 \( \text{\Box g}1 \) \( \text{\Box d}4+ \) 26 \( \text{\Box h}1 \) \( \text{\Box e}3! \) 27 \( \text{\Box e}3 \) \( \text{\Box x}e3 \) 28 \( \text{\Box c}2 \) \( \text{\Box ab}8 \) 29 \( \text{\Box g}2 \) \( \text{\Box b}3 \) 30 \( \text{\Box a}1 \) \( \text{\Box ad}4 \) 31 \( \text{\Box ac}1 \) \( \text{\Box cb}8 \) 32 \( \text{\Box d}1 \) \( \text{\Box g}7 \) 33 \( \text{\Box c}7 \) \( \text{\Box f}6 \) 34 \( \text{\Box 1c}2 \) \( \text{\Box d}3 \) 35 \( \text{\Box f}2 \) \( \text{\Box e}3 \) 36 \( \text{\Box a}7 \) \( \text{\Box bb}3 \) 37 \( \text{\Box ac}7 \) h6 38 \( \text{\Box a}7 \) \( \text{\Box h}4 \) 39 \( \text{\Box ac}7 \) \( \text{\Box x}f2 \) 40 \( \text{\Box x}f2 \) \( \text{\Box xe}4 \), and Black won.

As the above examples indicate, in each specific case one must not only very carefully, but also deeply weigh up the consequences of the pawn sacrifice. This also applies equally to its acceptance.

It can also be difficult to draw the line between the correct acceptance of a pawn sacrifice and 'pawn-grabbing'.

Here are some such 'tricky' examples.

No. 319 Ivanović-Borkovsky
Pristina, 1976
Pirc Defence

1 e4 d6 2 d4 \( \text{\Box f}6 \) 3 \( \text{\Box c}3 \) g6 4 \( \text{\Box g}5 \) \( \text{\Box g}7 \) 5 e5 \( \text{\Box fd}7 \) 6 ed cd 7 \( \text{\Box d}2 \) 0-0 8 0-0-0 \( \text{\Box c}6 \) 9 h4 \( \text{\Box x}d4? \)

White's initiative would also have been dangerous after 9...
(\( \text{\Box x}d4 \) 10 h5 \( \text{\Box e}6 \) 11 \( \text{\Box h}6 \). Here
the acceptance of the sacrifice is inappropriate.

10 h5  \( \text{\textcopyright a5} \) 11 hg hg 12 \( \text{\textcopyright x e7} \) \( \text{\textcopyright g7} \) (if 12... \( \text{\textcopyright x c3} \) White wins by 13 \( \text{\textcopyright h6!} \) 13 \( \text{\textcopyright x f8} \) \( \text{\textcopyright x f8} \) 14 \( \text{\textcopyright c4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright e6} \) 15 \( \text{\textcopyright x e6} \) \( \text{\textcopyright x e6} \) 16 \( \text{\textcopyright d e2} \) \( \text{\textcopyright cd4} \) 17 \( \text{\textcopyright x d4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright x d4} \) 18 \( \text{\textcopyright h4!} \) \( \text{\textcopyright f5} \) 19 \( \text{\textcopyright a4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright c5} \) 20 g4 \( \text{\textcopyright h6} \) 21 f4 b5 22 \( \text{\textcopyright e4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright g3} \) 23 \( \text{\textcopyright d d4} \) b4 24 \( \text{\textcopyright e2!} \), and White soon won.

No. 320 Bronstein-Geller
Göteborg IZ, 1955
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{\textcopyright f3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright c6} \) 3 \( \text{\textcopyright b5} \) g6 4 c3 \( \text{\textcopyright g7} \) 5 d4 \( \text{\textcopyright b6} \) 6 a4 cd 7 0-0?! a6 8 \( \text{\textcopyright x c6} \) \( \text{\textcopyright x c6} \)?! 9 cd \( \text{\textcopyright x e4} \)?! 10 \( \text{\textcopyright c3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright f5} \) 11 \( \text{\textcopyright e1} \) d5 12 a5 \( \text{\textcopyright d7} \) 13 \( \text{\textcopyright b3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright f6} \)? 14 \( \text{\textcopyright e5!} \) \( \text{\textcopyright d3} \) 15 \( \text{\textcopyright x e7}+ \) \( \text{\textcopyright x e7} \) 16 \( \text{\textcopyright x d5} \) \( \text{\textcopyright x d5} \) 17 \( \text{\textcopyright x d3} \) 1-0

No. 321 Spassky-Fischer
World Championship, 1972
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{\textcopyright f3} \) d6 3 d4 cd 4 \( \text{\textcopyright x d4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright f6} \) 5 \( \text{\textcopyright c3} \) a6 6 \( \text{\textcopyright g5} \) e6 7 f4 \( \text{\textcopyright b6} \) 8 \( \text{\textcopyright d2} \) \( \text{\textcopyright x b2} \) 9 \( \text{\textcopyright b3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright a3} \) 10 \( \text{\textcopyright x f6} \) gf 11 \( \text{\textcopyright e2} \) h5 12 0-0 \( \text{\textcopyright c6} \) 13 \( \text{\textcopyright h1} \) \( \text{\textcopyright d7} \) 14 \( \text{\textcopyright b1!?} \) \( \text{\textcopyright b4} \)? 15 \( \text{\textcopyright e3} \) d5? (15... \( \text{\textcopyright e7} \) 16 \( \text{\textcopyright d2!} \) 16 ed \( \text{\textcopyright e7} \) 17 c4! \( \text{\textcopyright f5} \) 18 \( \text{\textcopyright x d3} \) h4? 19 \( \text{\textcopyright a4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright d6} \) 20 \( \text{\textcopyright d1d2} \) f5? 21 a3! \( \text{\textcopyright x b6} \) 22 c5! \( \text{\textcopyright x b5} \) 23 \( \text{\textcopyright c3} \) fg 24 a4! h3 25 ab hg+ 26 \( \text{\textcopyright x g2} \) \( \text{\textcopyright h3} \) 27 \( \text{\textcopyright f6} \)! \( \text{\textcopyright f5} \) 28 c6! \( \text{\textcopyright c8} \) 29 de fe 30 \( \text{\textcopyright x e1} \) \( \text{\textcopyright e7} \) 31 \( \text{\textcopyright x e6} \) 1-0

While the first of these examples is a typical case of 'pawn-grabbing', the second and third are by no means clear-cut. Despite Black's failures in these games, in each case White's pawn sacrifice was problematic.

With regard to game No. 321, the following variations are significant: 14... \( \text{\textcopyright x b2} \) (instead of 14... \( \text{\textcopyright x b4} \)?) 15 \( \text{\textcopyright c3} \) (after 15 a3? \( \text{\textcopyright c8} \) 16 \( \text{\textcopyright f3} \) e5 17 \( \text{\textcopyright c3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright b4} \) only Black has chances) 15... \( \text{\textcopyright a3} \) 16 \( \text{\textcopyright b1} \) etc., or 1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{\textcopyright f3} \) d6 3 d4 cd 4 \( \text{\textcopyright x d4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright f6} \) 5 \( \text{\textcopyright c3} \) a6 6 \( \text{\textcopyright g5} \) e6 7 f4 \( \text{\textcopyright b6} \) 8 \( \text{\textcopyright d2} \) \( \text{\textcopyright x b2} \) 9 \( \text{\textcopyright b1} \) \( \text{\textcopyright a3} \) 10 e5 de 11 fe \( \text{\textcopyright f7} \) 12 \( \text{\textcopyright c4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright b4} \) 13 \( \text{\textcopyright b3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright a5} \) 14 0-0 0-0 15 \( \text{\textcopyright f6} \)? \( \text{\textcopyright x f6} \) 16 ef \( \text{\textcopyright d8} \) 17 \( \text{\textcopyright x b4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright x b4} \) 18 \( \text{\textcopyright g5} \) g6 19 \( \text{\textcopyright e4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright f8} \) 20 \( \text{\textcopyright f3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright c6} \) with a very complicated game.

White's gambit here is problematic, and at any rate the counterattack... \( \text{\textcopyright x b6} \) and... \( \text{\textcopyright x b2} \) cannot be regarded as 'pawn-grabbing'.

At the same time there are many tempting but insufficiently positional pawn sacrifices in the opening. Sometimes the boundary between a correct and an incorrect sacrifice is very fine. This is shown by the example just given, and also by a comparison of two analogous variations of the Spanish Game:

a) 1 e4 e5 2 \( \text{\textcopyright f3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright c6} \) 3 \( \text{\textcopyright b5} \) a6 4 \( \text{\textcopyright a4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright f6} \) 5 0-0 \( \text{\textcopyright c7} \) 6 \( \text{\textcopyright e1} \) b5 7
have had more chances after 26...\texttt{\textbackslash}d\texttt{x}b2.

27 \texttt{\textbackslash}d\texttt{x}g7 \texttt{\textbackslash}d\texttt{x}g7 28 f6+ \texttt{\textbackslash}h8 29
\texttt{\textbackslash}g5 b3 30 ab \texttt{\textbackslash}d\texttt{b}4 31 bc \texttt{\textbackslash}d\texttt{x}a4 32
\texttt{\textbackslash}f4 \texttt{\textbackslash}c2 33 \texttt{\textbackslash}h6! 1-0

Black’s play can easily be improved. Thus instead of 14...\texttt{\textbackslash}e8 he has 14...c5, setting in motion his phalanx of pawns, and so on.

Black can not only successfully defend, but he can also retain his extra pawn, which casts doubts on White’s gambit idea.

In the second case White has an extra tempo (he has not played \texttt{\textbackslash}e1, which here is unnecessary), and this allows to develop a powerful initiative which more than compensates for the pawn sacrificed. For example (from diagram 138): 11 \texttt{\textbackslash}g3!

More active than 11 \texttt{\textbackslash}d1, although even here after 11...dc \texttt{\textbackslash}d\texttt{x}c3 White has much better prospects than in the analogous variation given above.

---

No. 322 Bronstein-Keres
Budapest C, 1950

(1 e4 e5 2 \texttt{\textbackslash}f3 \texttt{\textbackslash}c6 3 \texttt{\textbackslash}b5 a6
4 \texttt{\textbackslash}a4 \texttt{\textbackslash}f6 5 0-0 \texttt{\textbackslash}e7 6 \texttt{\textbackslash}e1 b5
7 \texttt{\textbackslash}b3 0-0 8 d4 d6 9 c3 \texttt{\textbackslash}g4 10 h3
\texttt{\textbackslash}d\texttt{x}f3 11 \texttt{\textbackslash}x\texttt{f}3 ed 12 \texttt{\textbackslash}d1 dc 13
\texttt{\textbackslash}d\texttt{x}c3) 13...\texttt{\textbackslash}a5 14 \texttt{\textbackslash}c2 \texttt{\textbackslash}e8 15
f4 b4 16 \texttt{\textbackslash}d5 \texttt{\textbackslash}x\texttt{d}5 17 \texttt{\textbackslash}x\texttt{d}5 c6 18
\texttt{\textbackslash}d3 g6 19 \texttt{\textbackslash}h1 \texttt{\textbackslash}f8 20 \texttt{\textbackslash}f1 \texttt{\textbackslash}g7
21 \texttt{\textbackslash}d2 c5 22 \texttt{\textbackslash}a4 \texttt{\textbackslash}f8 23 \texttt{\textbackslash}a1
\texttt{\textbackslash}b6 (23...c4 is correct) 24 f5!
\texttt{\textbackslash}d4 25 \texttt{\textbackslash}g3 \texttt{\textbackslash}c4 26 \texttt{\textbackslash}h6 \texttt{\textbackslash}g7?

Now Black is lost. He would

No. 323
Nezhmetdinov-Zhuravlyev
USSR, 1959

11...0-0 (11...g6 12 \texttt{\textbackslash}d5!) 12
\texttt{\textbackslash}h6 \texttt{\textbackslash}e8 13 \texttt{\textbackslash}d5 \texttt{\textbackslash}d7 (or
13...\texttt{\textbackslash}h4 14 \texttt{\textbackslash}f4! gh 15 \texttt{\textbackslash}x\texttt{c}6 dc
16 \texttt{\textbackslash}x\texttt{c}3 and then 17 \texttt{\textbackslash}x\texttt{h}6 with advantage to White) 14 \texttt{\textbackslash}g4!
\texttt{\textbackslash}x\texttt{g}4 15 hg gh 16 \texttt{\textbackslash}x\texttt{c}6 dc 17
\texttt{\textbackslash}x\texttt{c}3 \texttt{\textbackslash}b8 18 \texttt{\textbackslash}d5 \texttt{\textbackslash}d8
Although White is still a pawn down, his position is very strong and it more than compensates for the slight material deficit.

19 f3 g7? 20 b4! g6 21 g3 g7 22 acl f6 23 e3 g8 24 g2 e7 25 c2 h5 26 gh f5 27 ef xf5 28 xf5 xf5 29 g4 f4 30 e4 c5? 31 dc dc 32 xc5 h6 33 d1 g5 34 c6 a5 35 a6 b4 36 xa5 b3 37 ab xb3 38 d7+ 1-0

A complex and highly unusual opening problem is provided by the struggle with unbalanced material (e.g. queen against rook, minor piece and pawn, or a piece against several pawns, and so on).

Here one player often has a slight material advantage, but as a result the other has more actively coordinated forces, and hence also the initiative.

With unbalanced material the struggle is not only very sharp, but also of a complex positional nature. Most often this critical balance of material remains on the board for a very long time (during the course of play the same pawn equivalent is usually exchanged on both sides).

Positions of this type have long been known to theory, but until recently they were regarded as exceptions and occurred mainly in 'secondary' lines of certain opening variations. This is the case, for example, with the following line of the Dragon Variation: 1 e4 c5 2 f3 e6 3 d4 cd 4 xd4 ef6 5 c3 d6 6 c2 g6 7 e3 g7 8 0-0 0-0 9 f4 b6 10 d3!! (the main line here is known to be 10 e5!! etc) 10... g4! 11 d5 xg4! 12 xg4 xe3+ 13 h1 xb6 14 xe4 xg4 15 f5 d5! etc.

In recent times the number of opening lines with unbalanced material has grown considerably. They are not of a secondary nature, but arise during a clash of the most crucial aspirations of the opponents in a number of opening variations.

The result of the struggle in such variations is problematic. In opening positions of this type with unbalanced material and full of combinational possibilities, well known relationships from the middlegame can often facilitate a general assessment. Thus, for example, three minor pieces (if they are able to seize the initiative) are slightly stronger than a queen, and a queen is stronger than a rook and minor piece. These rules have been confirmed in a number of researches of new opening variations. Instructive in this respect is the line of the Dragon Variation given above, which is rightly judged to favour Black. However, in the given situation
the concrete and dynamic possibilities of a position are very important.

**Queen against rook and minor piece**

Such a situation occurs fairly often in modern openings, in particular in the Keres Variation of the Open Defence to the Spanish Game: 1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆c6 3 ∆b5 a6 4 ∆a4 ∆f6 5 0-0 ∆xe4 6 d4 b5 7 ∆b3 d5 8 de ∆e6 9 ∆e2 ∆e7 10 ∆d1 ∆c5 11 ∆xd5!? ∆xd5 12 ∆c3 ∆c4 13 ∆xd8+ 14 ∆xd8 (139)

The dynamic struggle continues with its former intensity. Despite the fact that it is propelled by combinational motifs, it remains on the equilibrium line.

The development of events in the following game is typical.

**No. 324 Suetin-Geller**

25th USSR Ch., 1958

22. .. ∆b6 23 ∆xb4 0-0 24 ∆c6 f6 25 h4 fe 26 ∆xe5 e6 27 g4!? ∆xf2+ 28 ∆h1 ∆xh4 29 ∆e7+ ∆f8 30 ∆f5, with an equal position.

An important factor here is which player has the initiative, and how firm it is. Although a queen is somewhat stronger than rook, minor piece and also a pawn, reverse situations can often arise. The possession of the initiative can often more than compensate for the sacrificing of the queen, as is confirmed by the examples below.

**No. 325 Sokolsky-Vasiliev**

Leningrad, 1947

*Queen's Gambit*

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 ∆c3 ∆f6 4 ∆f3 ∆e7 5 ∆g5 h6 6 ∆h4 0-0 7 e3 b6 8 ∆c2 c5 9 0-0-0?! (9 ∆d1) 9... ed 10 ∆xd4 ∆b7 11 ∆xf6 ∆xf6 12 cd ed 13 ∆b1 ∆c6 14 ∆xc6 ∆xc6 15 ∆xd5? ∆xd5 16 ∆c4 ∆xc4! 17
No. 326 Bobotsov-Tal
Student Teams, Varna, 1958
King’s Indian Defence

1 d4 ♛f6 2 c4 g6 3 ♗c3 ♗g7 4 e4
d6 5 f3 0-0 6 ♗ge2 c5 7 ♗e3 ♗bd7
8 ♗d2 a6 9 0-0-0 ♗a5 10 ♗b1 b5
11 ♗d5?! (140)

This move would have been stronger after 11 dc dc.

11...♕x5! 12 ♘xa5 (after 12 cd ♘x5 13 ♘x5 c4! Black has the better ending) 12...
♕xe3 13 ♗c1 ♘xc4 14 ♘xc4 bc
15 ♘c1 ♘b8! 16 ♘xc4 ♘b6 17
♘b3 ♘xd4 18 ♘d2 ♘g7 19 ♗e2 c4
20 ♘c2 c3!

Black’s attack reaches its finale. His mounting initiative is stronger than White’s extra material.

21 ♘d3 cb 22 ♘d4 ♗d7 23 ♗d1
♗fc8 24 ♘b3 ♘a4 25 ♘xa4 ♘xa4
26 ♘b3 ♘c3! 27 ♘xa6 ♘xb3 28 ab

Queen against three minor pieces

This balance of forces occurs rather rarely in the opening stage. Such an exchange of the queen is normally unfavourable, since in the opening and middle-game the three minor pieces are usually stronger.

This situation can arise, for example, in a line of the Sozin Attack in the Sicilian Defence: 1 e4 c5 2 ♗f3 ♗c6 3 d4 cd 4 ♘xd4
♗f6 5 ♗c3 d6 6 ♘c4 e6 7 0-0 a6 8
♖e3 ♗c7 9 ♘b3 ♗a5 10 f4 b5 11
f5 ♘xb3 12 cb ♘e7 13 ♘c1 ♘d7
14 ♘f3 0-0 15 e5! ♘b7 (Black
also stands badly after 15...de 16 fe fe 17  Axe6!) 16 ef! Axf3
17 fe  Axe7 18 Axf3 (141)

The position obviously favours White, e.g. 18...e5 19 f6!
gf20 Axf5 etc.

For roughly the same reasons the following line of the Sozin
Attack is also dubious for Black: 1 e4 c5 2 Axf3 Axc6 3 d4 cd 4 Axd4
Af6 5 Axc3 d6 6 Ac4 e6 7 0-0 a6
8 Ae3 Ae7 9 Ab3 Aa5 10 f4 0-0
11 Axf3 b5 12 e5! Ab7 13 ef Axf3
14 fe Axe7 15 Axf3.

In this case White’s initiative is not so clear, but with the possi-
bility of an attack on the K-side by f4-f5 he has the better
chances.

It is no accident that this variation, where Black quickly de-
velops his Q-side, soon went out of practice.

For the same reason this variation of the Grünfeld Defence is
unfavourable for Black: 1 d4 Af6
2 c4 g6 3 Axc3 d5 4 Axf3 Ag7 5 Ab3
dc 6 Axc4 0-0 7 e4 b6 8 e5 Aa6?

9 ef! Axc4 10 fg Axf7 11 Axc4 etc.

Unusual situations, where a queen is opposed by just two
minor pieces, occur rarely in the opening. These are possible only
if there is compensation in the form of a strong initiative and
some equivalent in pawns. Here is a truly paradoxical example
where, despite the great difference in material, the queen is
helpless and the attack by the minor pieces proves decisive.

No. 328
Nezhmetdinov-Chernikov
RSFSR Ch., 1962
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 Axf3 Axc6 3 d4 cd
4 Axd4 g6 5 Axc3 Ag7 6 Ae3 Af6
7 Ac4 0-0 8 Ab3 Ag4?! 9 Axf4
Axd4 10 Wh4!?

Theory mainly considered 10
Af1, regarding Wh4 as leading to
a draw.

10...Aa5 11 0-0 Af6 (142)
Here is the theoretically

142
drawn position: it appears that White must repeat
moves by 12 \( \text{\textit{\(w\)}} h6 \text{\textit{\(g\)}} g7 13 \text{\textit{\(w\)}} h4 \text{\textit{\(f\)}} f6 \) etc. But, as
has already been mentioned, in
such situations the theoretical
assessments are very relative.
White’s next move essentially
signifies the creation of a new
and highly attractive opening
variation.

12 \( \text{\textit{\(x\)}} f6! \text{\textit{\(e\)}} e2+! \)

Comparatively best. After 12...
\( \text{\textit{\(f\)}} x b3 13 \text{\textit{\(a\)}} ab \text{\textit{\(a\)}} a1 14
\text{\textit{\(w\)}} x e7! \text{\textit{\(a\)}} a5 15 \text{\textit{\(h\)}} h6 \text{\textit{\(d\)}} d8 16 \text{\textit{\(d\)}} d5!
Black would have lost
immediately.

13 \( \text{\textit{\(x\)}} e2 \text{\textit{\(f\)}} f14 \text{\textit{\(c\)}} c3 \text{\textit{\(e\)}} e8

Later it was decided that
Black should have played 14...
d5! The play here is of an
‘irrational’ nature. Apart from 15
\( \text{\textit{\(d\)}} x d5 \) White would have also
had the interesting continuation
15 \( \text{\textit{\(d\)}} d4! ? \)

Now White’s attack develops
inexorably.

15 \( \text{\textit{\(d\)}} d5 \text{\textit{\(e\)}} e6 16 \text{\textit{\(d\)}} d4 \text{\textit{\(g\)}} g7 17
\text{\textit{\(d\)}} ad1 \text{\textit{\(d\)}} d6 18 \text{\textit{\(d\)}} d3 \text{\textit{\(d\)}} d7 19 \text{\textit{\(f\)}} f3 \text{\textit{\(b\)}} b5
20 \text{\textit{\(c\)}} c3 \text{\textit{\(d\)}} d8 21 \text{\textit{\(x\)}} x f6! \text{\textit{\(e\)}} e2 22
\( \text{\textit{\(x\)}} x h7+! \text{\textit{\(g\)}} g8

After 22...
\( \text{\textit{\(h\)}} h7 23 \text{\textit{\(x\)}} x f7+
\text{\textit{\(h\)}} h6 24 \text{\textit{\(x\)}} x e6 \text{\textit{\(x\)}} x f1 25 \text{\textit{\(d\)}} d2+ g5
26 \text{\textit{\(f\)}} f5 \text{\textit{\(h\)}} h8 27 h4! White’s attack
is irresistible.

23 \( \text{\textit{\(h\)}} h3 \text{\textit{\(e\)}} e5 24 \text{\textit{\(f\)}} f4! \text{\textit{\(x\)}} x f1 25
\text{\textit{\(x\)}} x f1 \text{\textit{\(c\)}} c8 26 \text{\textit{\(d\)}} d4! b5 27 \text{\textit{\(g\)}} g5 \text{\textit{\(c\)}} c7
28 \text{\textit{\(x\)}} x f7+ \text{\textit{\(x\)}} x f7 29 \text{\textit{\(h\)}} h8+ \text{\textit{\(x\)}} x h8
30 \text{\textit{\(x\)}} x f7+ \text{\textit{\(h\)}} h7 31 \text{\textit{\(x\)}} d8 \text{\textit{\(x\)}} x e4 32
\( \text{\textit{\(c\)}} c6 \text{\textit{\(x\)}} x f4+ 33 \text{\textit{\(e\)}} e2 1-0

Exchange sacrifices in the
opening

In the opening stage the
queen can comparatively rarely
be sacrificed (or exchanged) for
an equivalent amount of other
material. On the other hand, the
possibility of a positional sac-
ifice of rook for minor piece
occurs much more often, and is
the most common type of sac-
ifice after that of a pawn. The
aims and forms of it are varied.
The point of such sacrifices and
the general strategic structure
are largely analogous to those in
the preceding sections. Impor-
tant here are the initiative, and
the active and harmonious coor-
dination of the forces.

Early in the game there is
sometimes a possibility of
‘pursuing’ the win of the ex-
change, but in the majority of
cases the following advice is
true: don’t go in for it to the detri-
ment of your development.

Typical in this respect is the
following example, where White
tried to handle a solid variation
of the English Opening in ‘ultra-
dynamic’ style, but essentially he
seriously broke the principle of
development in pursuit of
material.
No. 329 Karasev-Nezhmetdinov
Daugavpils, 1973
English Opening

1 d3 f6 2 c4 e5 3 d4 cd 4 \(\Delta x d 4\) e6 5 c3 \(\Delta b 4\) 6 db5 0-0 7 \(\Delta f 4\)?!

More logical was 7 a3 \(\Delta x c 3+\) 8 \(\Delta x c 3\) d5 9 e3 with a roughly equal game.

7...d5! 8 a3 (after 8 c7 e4 9 \(\Delta x a 8\) f6! Black’s attack in the centre is decisive) 8...\(\Delta x c 3+\) 9 \(\Delta x c 3\) d4 10 \(\Delta b 5\)?! a6?! 11 c7 a7 12 \(\Delta b 5\)

White cannot get out of his acquisitive mood, and he soon pays for this. 12 \(\Delta d 5\) was the lesser evil.

12...ab 13 \(\Delta x b 8\) bc! 14 \(\Delta x a 7\) a5+ 15 d2 a7

The outcome of the opening is dismal for White. In return for the exchange Black has a strong pawn centre, but the main point is that the white king is hopelessly stuck in the centre of the board. The conclusion of the game is highly instructive.

16 e3 d3 17 g3 e4 18 b4 d2+ 19 e2 a6! 20 f3 c6 21 e2 d5 22 d1 e5 23 h3 b6 24 g1 c3 25 bc \(\Delta x c 3+\) 0-1

In this case the exchange sacrifice occurred in the course of events and was not in itself an active operation, but much more often, of course, this is not the case. Thus in many variations of the Sicilian Defence Black makes a typical exchange sacrifice on c3, e.g: 1 e4 c5 2 f3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 \(\Delta x d 4\) f6 5 c3 a6 6 g3 b5 7 g2 b7 8 a3 e6 9 0-0 \(\Delta b d 7\) 10 f4 \(\Delta c 8\) 11 f5 e5 12 \(\Delta b 3\)? c3! 13 bc \(\Delta x e 4\), and at the cost of a slight material deficit Black breaks up White’s pawn position on the Q-side and in the centre, firmly seizing the initiative. White must beware of such sacrifices and take timely measures to forestall them.

A problematic exchange sacrifice in one of the most important variations of the Grünfeld Defence is still topical: 1 d4 f6 2 c4 g6 3 c3 d5 4 cd \(\Delta x d 5\) 5 e4 \(\Delta x c 3\) 6 bc c5 7 c4 g7 8 e2 cd 9 cd 0-0 10 e3 c6 11 0-0 g4 12 f3 a5 13 d3 e6.

In order to forestall Black’s active intentions on the Q-side — 14...c4 or 14...c4 — White must go in for the most critical line, which involves sacrificing the exchange: 14 d5! \(\Delta x a 1\) 15 \(\Delta x a 1\) (143)
In return for the exchange White has obtained a strong pawn centre and real chances of an attack on the opponent’s castled position. In the resulting sharp struggle for the initiative, an important part is played by combinational motifs.

For over 40 years the attention of researchers has been fixed on this enigma, and there is still no clear answer to it. The analysis merely goes deeper and becomes more and more intricate.

A possible continuation is 15...f6 16 Qh6 g6 17 Qf4 Qf7 18 e5 Qxd5! 19 Qb1 Qc4, with a sharp game where Black has good defensive possibilities.

Rook for two minor pieces

In the opening and middle-game two minor pieces are usually stronger than a rook, even if the latter has two pawns. Therefore such an exchange of minor pieces is unfavourable, although the opportunity for it often occurs.

Thus in a line of Philidor’s Defence which has been known for a long time, the following variation is considered unfavourable for White: 1 e4 e5 2 Qf3 Qc6 3 Qb5 f5 4 Qc3 fe 5 Qxe4 d5 6 Qxe5 de 7 Qxc6 bc? 8 Qxc6+ Qd7 9 Qh5+ Qe7 10 Qe5+ Qe6 11 Qxa8 Qxa8 (144), in view of Black’s lack of development White’s chances are preferable.

The sacrifice of a minor piece in the opening

There are many types of minor piece sacrifice in the opening. In the majority of cases the piece is sacrificed for one or two pawns, with the possibility in mind of mounting a strong attack on the opponent’s king.

We give some further
examples of this type from the games of Rashid Nezhmetdinov, a striking representative of modern dynamism.

No. 330  
Nezhmetdinov-Mikenas  
Match, 1948  
Alekhine’s Defence

1 e4 e6 2 e5 d5 3 c4 b6 4 c5 d5 5 c4 e6 6 c3 d6 7 xd5 ed 8 xd5 c6 9 xf7+ xf7 10 cd e8 11 e2

Events developed in similar fashion in Vasyukov-Spassky (26th USSR Ch., 1959), which continued 11 f3+ g8 12 e3 e6 13 e2 d7 14 0-0, and soon an unusual position of dynamic equilibrium was reached.

11...c5 12 f3 xd6! 13 g5+!

After 13 ed xe2+ 14 xe2 e8+ 15 d1 g4 Black could have gained a dangerous counter-attack. White prefers to continue in gambit style.

13...g6 14 d3+ xg5 15 xd6 d8?

As already mentioned, in dynamic situations it is easy to go wrong tactically, and it is tactical mistakes which can have the most serious practical consequences. Correct was 15...c6 16 d4+ h5 17 xc5 e7 with a double-edged game, whereas now White’s attack proves quickly decisive.

16 d4+ f5 17 g4+ e4 18 xh5 f8 19 0-0 x3 20 h3 b6 21 c3+ e4 22 c4! 1-0

The sacrifice in the following game was even more ‘irrational’.

No. 331 Mikenas-Nezhmetdinov  
Match, 1948  
King’s Indian Defence

1 d4 d6 f6 2 c4 d5 3 g3 g6 4 c3 g7 5 e4 0-0 6 e2 c6 7 h3 bd7 8 e3 e5 9 d5 cd 10 cd c5 11 d2 a5!? 12 a3 e8 13 b4 ab 14 ab x1 15 xa1 (145)

15...xg4!

Frankly speaking, an unusual sacrifice, although highly characteristic of the modern dynamic approach.

16 dxg4 f5 17 d2

On 17 g5 there would have followed 17...b6! Had White foreseen just how dangerous Black’s attack was, he would have done best to return the
piece by 17 0-0!, remaining with a minimal positional advantage.

17...e4! 18 b3 f4 19 d4 f3 20 gf ef 21 d3 g5! 22 e3 h4 23 d2 xxb4 24 b1 h4 25 a7 e5 26 d4 f4!

With every move events turn in favour of Black, whose dynamic attack becomes more and more dangerous.

27 c2 xe3 28 fe f2+ 29 b3 xe3 30 f1 f2 31 db5 g3 32 a2

And here, by capturing the h3 pawn, Black would have gained winning chances. After exciting complications the game in fact ended in a draw, but the moral victory went to Black for his bold idea begun on move 15.

Here are some further examples, where the sacrifice is associated with a counter-attack.

No. 332 Hebell-Dormiden
West Germany, 1976
Pirc Defence

1 e4 g6 2 d4 Ag7 3 Ac3 d5 4 f4 Ac6 5 Ae3 Af6 6 h3 0-0 7 g4 e5 8 de de 9 f5 d4 10 Ac2 gf 11 gf Aexe4 (146) 12 Aexe4 Axf5 13 A3 Ac2+ 14 Ae2 Ag6! 15 Ac1 Aexe3 16 Aexe3 f5! (White’s position is indefensible) 17 Ac3+ Ay8 18 Ag2 Ag5 19 Cc3 f4 20 h4 Ag4 21 Ac3 Axc3 22 Axb7 Aa5+ 23 Aa1 f3 24 Axf3 e4 25 Aexe4 Ae8 0-1

No. 333 Smejkal-Olafsson
Reykjavik, 1978
King’s Indian Defence

1 c4 Aa6 2 Ac3 g6 3 Aa3 Ag7 4 e4 d6 5 d4 0-0 6 Ae2 e5 7 0-0 c6 8 Ae2 Abd7 9 Ad1 Ae7 10 Ab1 ed 11 Axd4 Ac5 12 f3 Ah5!? 13 Afl f5! 14 b4 fe! 15 bc dc 16 Aexe2 ef 17 gf Axf3 18 Ae4 Aef8 19 Ag5? (19 Ab2 is correct) 19...Axc3! 20 Ae7 Aa6! 21 Axf8 Aexe4 22 Ad8 Afl 23 Axc5+ Aa7 24 Aa2 Axc5 25 Axf3 Afi 26 Axd2 Afl 27 Abd1 Aa5 28 Aa2 Ag6 with advantage to Black.

And here is a 50 year-old example which still remains highly instructive.

No. 334 Euwe-Alekhone
World Championship, 1937
Slav Defence

1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 Af3 Ad6 4 Ac3
Opening principles in their second approximation

dc 5 a4 Af5 6 e3 e6 7 Ac4 Abd7 8 0-0 Ad6? 9 Ae2 Ae4 10 Axh4? (better 10 Ad2!) 10...
Axe4 11 Ad2 Ag6 12 e4 Ac7! 13 Ab3 0-0 14 f4? Af6 15 Ac2 Axd4+ 16 Ah1 Ab4 17 g4 Ad8!
18 f5 ef 19 ef Afe8 20 Ag2 Acg4 21 fg hg 22 Ad1 Agxg2+ 23 Ahg2 Aa4 24 f3 Ag4+ 25 Ah3 Ad8 26
Ag5 Ah4 27 Ad2 Ae4 28 Ab3? Ae2! 29 Ac3 Aa3 30 Adh4 Agf3!
11 Axf3 Axb2+ 32 Ah3 g5+ 33
Ag5 Ah3 34 Ad1 Ae4+ 0-1

6 bc Ag7 7 Ag4 f5 8 Ag3 Ae7 9 Axb7 Ag8 10 Aeh7 cd 11 Ad1?

It is not easy to find criteria by which to assess this position. The development of the following game is typical.

No. 335 Gligorić-Petrosian
Zurich, 1959

11...Abc6 (11...Ad7 is probably better) 12 Axf3 Axb5 13 Ag5!
Aeg6, and here, by continuing 14 Af6! (instead of 14 Axc7 Axc7 15 cd Ad7) followed by h2-h4, White would have obtained strong pressure.

Often the pawn screen on a flank is destroyed in the opening as a result of active flank pawn operations. This is the picture in many lines of the Slav Defence, in particular the Botvinnik Variation, the Meran Variation, and others.

Tactical destruction of the flanks in the opening

The tactical destruction of the flanks in the opening mainly results from dynamic attacks, which often conclude with the devastation of the pawns (especially in the French and Slav Defences).

At an early stage of the game, one of the players often begins an energetic piece attack on one of the flanks, based, of course, on there being real preconditions for its success. The most energetic strategic plan in reply is a counterattack in the centre and on the opposite flank.

Instructive in this respect is the ‘irrational’ play which arises in one of the topical variations of the French Defence: 1 e4 e6 2 d4
d5 3 Ac3 Ab4 4 e5 c5 5 a3 Ac3+

In the main line of the Botvinnik Variation after 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6
Seizure of the centre from the flanks

No. 336 Smyslov–Botvinnik
World Championship, 1954

11... $\text{b7}$ 12 $\text{g3}$ $\text{b6}$ 13 $\text{g2}$
0-0 0-0 14 0-0 $\text{e5}$? 15 $\text{e2}$ $\text{xd4}$
16 $\text{e3}$ $\text{d3}$ 17 $\text{f1}$ $\text{xe2}$ 18
$\text{xd8+}$ $\text{xd8}$ 19 $\text{xe2}$ $\text{d3}$, and in
the resulting ending Black
maintained the balance.

Black carries out a similar idea
of a Q-side pawn offensive in the
Meran Variation, from which we
will consider one interesting
line: 1 $\text{d4}$ $\text{d5}$ 2 $\text{c4}$ $\text{c6}$ 3 $\text{f3}$ $\text{f6}$ 4
$\text{c3}$ e6 5 e3 $\text{bd7}$ 6 $\text{d3}$ $\text{xc4}$
7 $\text{xc4}$ $\text{b5}$ 8 $\text{e2}$ $\text{e2}$ 9 $\text{e4}$ $\text{b4}$ 10
$\text{e5}$ bc 11 ef cb 12 fg ba $\text{d3}$ 13 gh $\text{g4}$

(148)

Almost by force, a highly un-
usual position has been reached
with four queens on the board,
in which the play has been little
studied.

A similar, highly unusual idea
was carried out in the middle-

game by Alekhine with White in
the following game: 1 $\text{e4}$ $\text{e6}$ 2 $\text{d4}$
$\text{d5}$ 3 $\text{c3}$ $\text{f6}$ 4 $\text{g5}$ $\text{b4}$ 5 $\text{e5}$ $\text{h6}$
6 ef hg 7 fg $\text{g8}$ 8 $\text{h4}$ gh 9 $\text{g4}$
$\text{e7}$ 10 $\text{c5}$ 11 gh cd 12 $\text{h5}$! $\text{d4}$
13 $\text{h6}$ $\text{b1}$ 14 $\text{a1}$ $\text{a5}$+ 15 $\text{e2}$ $\text{xa2}$
16 $\text{h7}$ $\text{xh7}$ 17 $\text{hd7}$ 18
$\text{xf7}$ $\text{xc2}$+ 19 $\text{f3}$ $\text{xc6}$! 20
$\text{gxe6+}$ $\text{c7}$ 21 $\text{f4}$+ $\text{b6}$ 22
$\text{xe3+}$ $\text{c5}$ 23 $\text{g8}$ $\text{b1}$

Here Alekhine found an ele-
gant way to win: 24 $\text{h6}$!!
(threatening 25 $\text{d8}$ mate) 24...
$\text{xf1}$ 25 $\text{b4}$+ $\text{b5}$ 26 $\text{d8}$+
$\text{a6}$ 27 $\text{ea3}$+, and wins.

Seizure of the centre from
the flanks

In modern opening set-ups
the flanks are not always func-
tionally dependent with regard
to the centre.

Sometimes a complicated
flank operation does not have
the aim of making purely local
gains, but of weakening the
opponent’s pressure on the
centre, in order later to gain
superiority there.

Thus in the line of the Spanish Game after 1 e4 e5 2 Qf3
c6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 Qf6 5 0-0
e7 6 e1 b5 7 b3 d6 8 c3 0-0
9 h3 a5 10 a2 c5 11 d4 Qc7
12 Qbd2 g6? 13 Qfl e8 14 Qe3
Qg7, the solution lies not in the
local offensive on the K-side with
15 g4, for which Black is
well prepared, but in the un-
expected flank blow 15 b4!,
which after 15... cb 16 cb Qc6 17
Qb2 enables White to begin an
effective attack on the oppo-
ten’s central defences. This
plan has become typical of such
set-ups.

It especially gains in strength
if White has a lead in develop-
ment or if his pieces are more
actively placed.

For example: 1 e4 e5 2 Qf3
c6 3 b5 a6 4 a4 Qf6 5 0-0 b5
6 b3 d6 7 c3 Qa5 8 c2 c5 9 d4
Qc7 10 Qbd2 g6 (149)

Here the most energetic plan
for White is undoubtedly the
flank attack on the enemy pos-
tions in the centre by 11 b4! cb
12 cb Qc6 13 Qb2 Qg7 14 Qc1
Qb7 15 Qb3.

White forces a favourable
opening of the centre and the
Q-side, thus gaining the oppor-
tunity to exploit his lead in de-
velopment. For example, White’s
attack developed quickly in the
following game.

No. 337 Bronstein-Evans
USSR-USA, Moscow, 1955

15... Qe7(?) 16 Qxc6! Qxc6
17 de Qh5 18 g4 df4 19 ed Qd7
20 Qe5!, and White soon won.
The following game is also
instructive.

No. 338 Kapengut-Mukhin
USSR, 1972
Sicilian Defence

1 e4 c5 2 Qf3 d6 3 Qb5+ Qc6
4 0-0 Qd7 5 e1 Qf6 6 c3 a6 7 Qfl
e5(?) 8 h3 Qe7 9 d4 0-0 10 Qbd2
b5 11 d5 Qa7

A typical structure from the
Closed Variation of the Spanish
Game has arisen. In the sub-
sequent play, exploiting his spa-
tial advantage, White conducts a
combined offensive on both
flanks, preparing the main blow
against the opponent’s king.

12 b4 c4 13 a4 Qe8 14 Qh2 g6
15 Qd3 Qg7 16 Qh6 Qc7 17 ab ab
18 \( \text{xd} 2 \text{ab} 8 \text{19 g} 4 \text{f} 6 \text{20 h} 4 \)

The white cavalry is at action stations!

20. \( \text{xe} 8 \text{21 g} 3 \text{c} 8 \text{22 f} 4 \text{d} 8 \)
23 \( \text{f} 3 \text{b} 6 \text{24 g} 2 \text{a} 8 \text{25 x} a 8 \)
\( \text{xa} 8 \text{26 h} 2 \text{b} 6 \text{27 f} 1 \text{a} 7 \text{28 h} 4! \text{d} 7 \text{29 h} 3! \text{c} 8 \text{30 f} 2 \text{a} 4 \)
31 \( \text{fe} \text{32 e} 3)? \text{1-0} \)

In the above examples the consequences of the flank blow on the Q-side were felt on the Black’s K-side. More often (and this is characteristic of the English Opening) a successful flank operation leads to the achievement of a favourable structure in the centre.

Take, for example, the following variation of the English Opening: 1 c4 c5 2 \( \text{c} 3 \text{f} 6 \text{3 g} 3 \text{d} 5 \text{4 cd x} d 5 \text{5 g} 2 \text{c} 7 \text{6 f} 3 \text{c} 6 \text{7 a} 3! \text{e} 5 \text{8 b} 4! \text{etc.} \)

After undermining one of Black’s supports in the centre, at c5, White later has the real possibility of exploiting his ‘extra’ pawn in the centre by playing d2d4, which assures him of a persistent initiative.

Undermining pawn moves of this type are Black’s strategic theme in a number of lines of the Paulsen Variation of the Sicilian Defence. For example: 1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{f} 3 \text{e} 6 \text{3 d} 4 \text{cd 4 x} d 4 \text{c} 6 \text{5 b} 5 \text{d} 6 \text{6 c} 4 \text{f} 6 \text{7 c} 3 \text{3 a} 6 \text{8 a} 3 \text{e} 7 \text{9 e} 2 \text{0-0 10 0-0 d} 7 \text{11 e} 3 \text{a} 5 \text{12 e} 1 \text{ab} 8 \) (interesting here is Boleslavsky’s idea of 12... \( \text{f} 8 \)?, and if 13 f3 b5! 14 cb ab 15 axb5 b4 with adequate counterplay for Black) 13 f3 \( \text{fd} 8 \text{14 e} 1 \text{e} 8 \text{15 f} 2 \text{b} 5! \text{16 cb ab 17 a} x b 5 \text{d} 5!, and Black has splendid prospects.

Also of interest are these variations of the English Opening: 1 c4 c5 2 \( \text{c} 3 \text{f} 6 \text{3 g} 3 \text{d} 5 \text{4 cd x} d 5 \text{5 g} 2 \text{c} 7 \text{6 d} 3 \text{e} 5 \text{7 f} 3 \text{c} 6 \text{8 0-0 e} 7 \text{9 d} 2 \text{d} 7 \text{10 c} 4 \text{f} 6 \text{11 f} 4! \text{when White has a strong initiative, or 1 c4 c5 2 c3 f6 3 g3 d5 4 cd x} d 5 \text{5 g} 2 \text{c} 7 \text{6 d} 3 \text{e} 5 \text{7 f} 4?! , or first 7 h3!? and then 8 f4.}

Flank attacks such as g2-g4 (or ...g7-g5) are more rarely encountered. Instructive in this respect are some examples from Alekhine’s games.

No. 339 Alekhine‐Euwe AVRO, 1938
Slav Defence

1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 \( \text{f} 3 \text{f} 6 \text{4 cd cd 5 c} 3 \text{c} 6 \text{6 f} 4 \text{f} 5 \text{7 e} 3 \text{a} 6 \text{8 e} 5 \text{c} 8 \) (150)

150

[Diagram of chessboard showing a position from the Slav Defence]
Here White unexpectedly played 9 g4!, beginning an original offensive plan. 9...\(\Delta d7\) 10 \(\Delta g2\) e6 11 0-0 h6 (White's main idea is revealed in the variation 11...h5 12 g5! \(\Delta g8\) 13 e4!, when, with a spatial superiority, he advantageously opens the centre) 12 \(\Delta g3\) h5 13 \(\Delta x d7\) (now on 13 g5? there would have followed 13...h4) 13...\(\Delta x d7\) 14 gh! \(\Delta f6\) 15 \(\Delta f3\), and White attained an obvious superiority in the centre and on the K-side.

**Castling on opposite sides**

In positions with castling on opposite sides the interrelation of the centre and the flanks is of particular importance. The set-ups which are most interesting and problematic are those where mutual attacks on the flanks are combined with play in the centre, and the pawn structure remains undetermined, without a clear superiority for either side.

Although the subsequent play will certainly involve attempts to mount an attack on the flank, a player must also constantly reckon with the weight of play being transferred to the centre. If the structure in the centre is undetermined, a player must watch with particular care for possible operations there.

Instructive in this respect is the Yugoslav Attack in the Sicilian Dragon, one of the most 'intriguing' variations over a long period of time: 1 e4 c5 2 \(\Delta f3\) d6 3 d4 cd 4 \(\Delta x d4\) \(\Delta f6\) 5 \(\Delta c3\) g6 6 \(\Delta e3\) \(\Delta g7\) 7 f3 0-0 8 \(\Delta d2\) \(\Delta c6\). For a long time the preferred move here was 9 0-0-0, to which Black usually replied 9...\(\Delta x d4\). But then fashion changed decisively in favour of the sharp 9...d5!? (151), by which a pawn is sacrificed in the interests of the rapid opening of lines on the Q-side, where the white king has taken shelter.

![Diagram 151](image)

Now a very sharp tactical struggle develops, and the white king may find itself in great danger.

Thus in the event of the sacrifice being accepted: 10 ed \(\Delta x d5\) 11 \(\Delta x d6\) bc 12 \(\Delta x d5\) cd 13 \(\Delta x d5\) \(\Delta c7\)!, Black develops a very strong attack. White must be on the alert, in order to maintain the balance: 14 \(\Delta c5\) \(\Delta b7\) 15 \(\Delta a3\)!
\[ \text{Af5} 16 \text{Aa6} \text{Cc7} 17 \text{Cc5} \text{Ab6! etc.} \] (recommended by Averbakh).

The main, problematic struggle develops in the line 10 \text{ed} \text{Xxd5} 11 \text{Xxc6} \text{bc} 12 \text{Ad4!} \text{e5!} (but not 12... \text{Xxd4} 13 \text{Xxd4} \text{Ab6} 14 \text{Aa4!} with advantage to White) 13 \text{Ac5} \text{Ae6!}.

In the interests of developing his attack, Black offers an exchange sacrifice, the acceptance of which probably gives him an irresistible attack.

There was an interesting battle, for instance, in the following game.

**No. 340 Trifunović-Averbakh**

USSR v Yugoslavia

Belgrade, 1956

After great complications: 14 \text{Ac4} (14 \text{Axe4} is possibly stronger) 14... \text{Xxc3} 15 \text{Xxc3} \text{Ag5}+ 16 \text{Ae3} \text{Xxg2} 17 \text{Xxe6} \text{fe} 18 \text{Xxc6} \text{Ac8} 19 \text{Ae4} \text{Xxf3} 20 \text{Ahf1} \text{Af2} 21 \text{Xxg2} \text{Acx}c2+ 22 \text{Db1} \text{Xxb2}+ the game ended in a draw by perpetual check.

The general comments at the start of this section are also confirmed by other constantly topical variations of the Sicilian Defence.

Thus in the main line of the Richter/Rauzer Variation after 1 e4 c5 2 Axf3 Adc6 3 d4 cd 4 Axd4 \text{Af6} 5 \text{Ac3} d6 6 Ag5 e6 7 Ad2 \text{Ae7} 8 0-0-0 0-0-0 (152) the position in the centre is worthy of note.

White has a spatial advantage, and hence greater freedom for manoeuvring, but the black d6 and e6 pawns securely defend important squares. One of these pawns may have the opportunity to advance, gaining space and driving away White’s centralized pieces. Other important features of Black’s position, assisting his active play on the Q-side, are the half-open c-file and the d8-a5 diagonal.

It can be concluded that Black’s forces also have sufficient possibilities for active play, and all this lends a particular sharpness to the developing struggle. There is a fierce battle for the initiative. Since White has a somewhat greater choice of possible attacking plans, considerable ingenuity is demanded of Black in finding active resources for counterplay. At all costs he must avoid going over to passive defence.
Interesting play develops, for example, after 9 \( \text{b3} \text{b6} 10 \text{f3} \text{a6} 11 \text{g4} \text{d8} \), when Spassky-Boleslavsky (25th USSR Ch., 1958) continued 12 \( \text{e3} \text{c7} 13 \text{g5} \text{d7} 14 \text{h4} \text{b5} 15 \text{g6}! \text{fg} 16 \text{h5} \text{gh} 17 \text{xh5} \text{f6} 18 \text{g5} \text{e5} 19 \text{g2} \text{f8} 20 \text{f4} \text{c4} 21 \text{xc4} \text{bc} 22 \text{d4} \text{b8} 23 \text{g1} \text{b7} \) with a double-edged game.

In the given variation the attack on the castled position is often accompanied, in the opening stage itself, by the sacrifice of pawns or even pieces with the aim of developing operations as rapidly as possible. Usually such sacrifices are made for the rapid opening of lines and diagonals with the aim of attacking on the flank.

Thus in the variation 9 \( \text{f4} \) (cf. Diag. 152) 9...\( \text{xd4} \) 10 \( \text{x} \text{d4} \text{a5} 11 \text{d2} \text{h6} \) White has the very active continuation 12 \( \text{h4}! \), sacrificing a piece to open lines on the K-side.

As shown by Averbakh-Fridstein (Moscow 1951), the acceptance of the sacrifice by 12...\( \text{hg} \) gives White a decisive attack: 13 \( \text{xe4} \text{e4} 14 \text{xe4} \text{xd2}+ 15 \text{xd2} \) followed by g2-g4 and \( \text{d7}2! \).

Instead of 12...\( \text{hg} \), correct is 12...\( \text{b5}! \), aiming for counterplay on the Q-side. In Zagorovsky-Iliivitsky (Tbilisi 1951) after 13 \( \text{x} \text{b5} \text{b8} 14 \text{a4}! \text{a6} 15 \text{b1} \text{xb5} 16 \text{ab} \text{hg} 17 \text{hxg4} \text{xe4} 18 \text{xe4} \text{xb5} 19 \text{c4} \text{xc4} 20 \text{c2} \text{xb2}+ \) interesting complications led to a draw.

Such a piece sacrifice is also typical of many other lines of this variation.

If the central structure is undetermined, possible active operations here should be watched for with particular care. Sometimes the main weight of the struggle is transferred to the centre, with the further play no longer involving an attack on the castled position.

### The double-edged nature of pawn expansions

Pawn expansions in the opening, especially in front of one's own castled position, normally create problems, but in modern variations such an advance can be highly effective, and sometimes even an essential plan, ensuring that an opening advantage is retained.

The development of events in the following game was instructive.

**No. 341 Karpov-Portisch**

Ljubljana Portorož, 1975

*Slav Defence*

1 \( \text{d1} \text{d5} 2 \text{d4} \text{f6} 3 \text{c4} \text{c6} 4 \text{c3} \)
dc 5 a4 $Af5 6 e3 e6 7 $Ax$c4 $Ab4 8 0-0 0-0 9 $Ah4 $Ag4 10 f3 $Ah5 11 g4! (153)

As Karpov pointed out, only in this way can White fight for an opening advantage. He forces the exchange of his knight for the important enemy bishop, and gains a slight but stable opening advantage — the two bishops, which can prove useful in an open game.

In the given instance the weakening of White’s K-side pawns is not important.

11...$Ag6 12 $dxc6 hg 13 $b3 $e7 14 g5 $d5 15 e4 $b6 16 $a2!

An instructive manoeuvre. White succeeds in forestalling the important advance...c5!, which would free Black’s game. It is unfavourable for Black to play 16...$xb4, since after 17 $xb4 White obtains a marked spatial advantage.

16...$Aa5 17 $e2 e5 18 $c2! $d6 19 de $xe5 20 $h1 $e8 21 $c4 $b6 22 $d3 $a6 23 $x$a6 ba

24 $d1!

White very subtly maintains his initiative and at the same time watches carefully for tactical threats by the opponent. If now 24...$ad8 25 $e3, and 25...$d5 fails to 26 $d4! etc.

24...c5 25 $e3 $ac8 26 $c3 $c4 27 $c1 $b8?

Black fails to withstand the tension and loses quickly. It was essential to play 27...$dx$c3 28 $dxc3 $dxc3 29 bc, although in the endgame too White’s chances are preferable.

28 $d5! $xb2 29 $f4 $e6 30 $db1 $h3 31 $xb8 $xb8 32 $xb2 1-0

Even here the ‘thorns’ were very close to the ‘roses’. In the next game a similar weakening of White’s castled position proved to be a serious defect.

No. 342 Bagirov-Kupreichik
Leningrad, 1965
Slav Defence

1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 $f3 $f6 4 $c3 dc 5 a4 $f5 6 $h4?! $g4?! 7 h3(?) (7 $f3) 7...$h5 8 g4 $g6 9 $xg6 hg 10 g5? (better 10 $Ae2) 10...$d5 11 e4 $b4 12 $e3 e5! 13 de $d7 14 $f4 $c5 15 $d2 $xe5 16 fe $d4 17 $e2 (17 $h2 $x$h3! 18 $x$h3 $g1+ 19 $f1 $d3+ would have given Black a crushing attack) 17...$c2+ 18 $d1 $x$a1 19 $x$x$c4 0-0-0 20 $h2 $xe5 21
\( \text{\&e2 \&d4 22 \&a2 \&f4 0-1} \)

In general such situations are highly contradictory. At any rate, provoking the advance of enemy pawns without specific grounds, especially at a cost of time, is sometimes no less dangerous than their reckless advance.

Interesting in this respect is Mikenas-Vasyukov (Moscow 1963), where Black set himself the aim of provoking the early advance of White’s pawn phalanx in the centre and on the K-side: 1 d4 d6 2 g3 \&g4 3 \&g2 c6 4 h3 \&h5 5 g4 \&g6 6 f4! e6 7 e4 f5

This last move was practically forced in view of the threat of f4-f5. The resulting position is difficult for Black: the advanced pawn mass has become a great force. Hence the \text{r}ésumé: the opponent should not be allowed to advance his pawns with gain of tempi.

8 \&e2 fe 9 \&xe4 \&h4+ 10 \&f1 \&xe4 11 \&xe4 \&e7 12 \&f3, and White had an undisputed advantage.

**Tactical ways of transforming the centre**

Early in the game one sometimes has to go in for the breaking up of stable central structures, in order to carry out specific aims. The following examples are instructive in this respect.

**No. 343 Boleslavsky-Stoltz**

Saltsjöbaden IZ, 1948

*Spanish Game*

1 e4 e5 2 \&f3 \&c6 3 \&b5 a6
4 \&a4 \&f6 5 0-0 \&xe4 6 d4 b5
7 \&b3 d5 8 de \&e6 9 \&e2 g5? 10 c4! (154)

![Chessboard](image)

An 'explosive' move. White gives up his centre for the sake of more serious gains. Only in this way can he punish Black's flank diversion.

10 . . bc 11 \&a4 \&d7 12 e6! fe
13 \&xc6 \&xc6 14 \&e5 \&d6 15 \&h5+ \&e7 16 \&xg5+ \&xg5 17 \&xg5+ \&e8 18 \&h5+ \&e7 19 \&f7+ \&d8 20 \&f6+, with a crushing attack.

**No. 344 Suetin-Donner**

Havana, 1968

*French Defence*

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 \&c3 \&b4 4 e5
c5 5 a3 xc3+ 6 bc c7 7 f3 b6
8 a4 a6 9 xa6 xa6 10 d3
  b8 11 0-0 d7 12 a5 c8?
(better 12...ba) 13 ab ab 14 dc!

White voluntarily gives up his
central base at d4, but he elimi-
nates Black's threatened counter-
play on the c-file and creates
scope for his pieces.

14...bc 15 e1 e7 16 h4! h5
17 c4! (155)

17...dc 18 xc4 f5 19 f4
  f8? (19... 0-0 was essential,
although here too after 20 g5
g6 21 f4 hg 22 xg4 g7 23 h6
White retains the initiative) 20
  d1!

A 'quiet' but unpleasant
move, threatening 21 a4+!

20... c6? 21 c4 d7 22 a6
  b6 23 b3 b8 24 g5! 1-0

No. 345
Nezhmetdinov-Chistyakov
Kharkov, 1956
French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 f6
4 g5 b4 5 e5 h6 6 d2 fd7?!
7 g4 f8 8 f3!

8 f4 looks more solid, consoli-
dating the pawn centre. But
White already had in mind the
original plan which is revealed
on move 11.

8...c5 (8...a6 is more cir-
cumspect) 9 b5! g6?

A serious weakening of the
K-side. 9...cd was better, when
White intended 10 c3! dc 11
  x c3 with compensation for
the pawn.

10 d3 g8

On 10...h5 there could have
followed 11 xe6+!! fe 12
  g6+ e7 13 g5+ f6 14 ef+
  d7 15 e5 mate!

11 c4!

This is the point of White's
opening strategy — he literally
blows up the centre, rejecting
the usual structure typical of the
French Defence. But he has
taken account of his great lead in
development, and so he opens
up the position.

11...cd

Black also has a difficult pos-
tion after 11...dc 12 xc4 a6 13
  d6+ x d6 14 ed b6 15 0-0
  x d6 16 dc x d5 17 h6.

12 cd c5 13 x d4 ed

After this Black is quickly
crushed. 13... c6 was essential,
although even here White has
the advantage after 14 e3!

14 d6+! x d6 15 ed x d6 16
0-0 dxd3 17 xd3 e6 18 fe1+ e6 19 d4! g5 20 ac1
d7 21 f5! f8 22 b5! c8 23 xb7+ c7 24 b5 a6 25 d3
d8 26 xh6 g6 27 xf7! xf7 28 f5+ d8 29 xc6 xc6 30
a5+ c7 31 xf7 1-0

Optimal plan or best variation?

It has already been mentioned that the achievement of an obvious advantage in the opening (and the more so a decisive one) is possible only in the event of serious mistakes by one of the players. At the same time, from an analysis of opening principles, the conclusion suggests itself that as a result of the opening, given correct play by both sides, the position should be roughly equal. After all, at the start of the game the struggle is just beginning, and at the transition to the middlegame there are usually several objectively equivalent plans.

In the majority of cases this presupposes the choice of an optimal plan, depending sometimes on the tastes and style of the player. Experienced players, taking a realistic viewpoint, content themselves with a slight initiative or counterplay, or else equal chances, endeavouring to develop the favourable aspects of their position.

This relates to the classical understanding of the process of completing the opening stage. In a number of cases the appearance of dynamic new opening variations demands the introduction of new ‘corrections’ into the old rules. It is this that will now be discussed.

One of the most important demands of modern analysis is the necessity for inquisitive research into the possibility of finding the most effective plan (or even the best variation!). From this viewpoint certain long-standing variations with routine assessments have been reconsidered.

Searches of this type prove the most effective if, by disclosing some serious disruption in the coordination of the opponent’s forces, one can find a way to obtain a significant advantage.

With this aim let us consider a line of the Caro-Kann Defence: 1 e4 c6 2 c3 d5 3 d3. It is well known that, apart from 3...de, the generally accepted defence is 3...g4, which, incidentally, gives Black the best counterplay. But the tempting 3...f6? 4 e5 de4, despite its apparent activity, can lead to serious difficulties, if White avoids developing routinely (e.g. 5 d3?, after
which Black’s idea would be completely justified: 5...\( \triangleleft \times c3 \) 6 bc \( \triangleleft g4 \) etc), and instead searches for an effective plan. With this aim the best continuation is 5 \( \triangleleft e2! \), when 5...\( \triangleleft f5? \) is bad because of 6 d4 e6 7 \( \triangleleft f4! \)! (the point of White’s concrete idea on move 5 is revealed: the black knight at e4 is cut off from its main forces) 7...h5 8 h4 \( \triangleleft e7 \) 9 g3 c5 10 f3, and the knight is trapped!

Also of interest is the development of events in the following game.

No. 346
Nezhmetdinov–Kamyshev
Gorky, 1950

5 \( \triangleleft e2! \) \( \triangleleft b6 \) 6 d4 c5 7 dc \( \triangleleft x c5 \) (better 7...\( \triangleleft x c5 \)) 8 \( \triangleleft d4 \) \( \triangleleft c6 \) 9 \( \triangleleft b5! \) \( \triangleleft d7 \) 10 0-0 \( \triangleleft x e5 \) 11 \( \triangleleft x e5 \) \( \triangleleft x b5 \) 12 \( \triangleleft x b5 \) \( \triangleleft x b5 \) 13 \( \triangleleft e1! \) \( \triangleleft f6 \) 14 \( \triangleleft g5 \) e6 15 c4! \( \triangleleft a5 \) 16 \( \triangleleft x f6 \) gf 17 \( \triangleleft x f7!! \) \( \triangleleft x f7 \) 18 \( \triangleleft h5+ \) \( \triangleleft e7 \) 19 cd e5 20 f4 \( \triangleleft x d5 \) 21 fe f5 22 e6 \( \triangleleft f6 \) 23 h4! \( \triangleleft c5+ \) 24 \( \triangleleft h1 \) \( \triangleleft x e6 \) 25 \( \triangleleft h6+ \) 1-0

Thus in many cases the search for an effective path at the start of the game is just as necessary as the following of mobilization principles in the majority of other situations.

We now give several examples where there is a decisive disruption of the equilibrium at the transition stage from opening to middlegame.

In the first game White found a highly effective plan at the transition stage, which enabled him to disclose a latent lack of coordination in the opponent’s forces and to crown his tactical actions with a swift attack on the black king.

No. 347 Botvinnik–Levenfish
USSR Ch., 1940

*English Opening*

1 c4 e5 2 \( \triangleleft c3 \) \( \triangleleft f6 \) 3 \( \triangleleft f3 \) \( \triangleleft c6 \) 4 d4 ed 5 \( \triangleleft x d4 \) \( \triangleleft b4 \) 6 \( \triangleleft g5 \) h6 7 \( \triangleleft h4 \) \( \triangleleft x c3 \) + 8 bc \( \triangleleft e5 \) 9 e3 (9 f4 is more energetic) 9...\( \triangleleft g6 \) 10 \( \triangleleft g3 \) \( \triangleleft e4 \) 11 \( \triangleleft c2 \) \( \triangleleft x g3 \) 12 hg d6 13 f4! \( \triangleleft e7 \) (13...\( \triangleleft f8 \) 14 \( \triangleleft e2 \) \( \triangleleft e6 \) 15 \( \triangleleft e4 \) is slightly better, although here too White retains the initiative) 14 \( \triangleleft f2 \) \( \triangleleft f8 \) 15 e5 dc 16 \( \triangleleft b5+! \) \( \triangleleft d7 \) (156)

![Chess Diagram](image)

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Already Black’s position is barely defensible, e.g. 16...c6 17 \( \triangleleft x c6! \) or 16...\( \triangleleft d8 \) 17 \( \triangleleft a d1 \) cd
18 \( \Box \times d4 + \Box \times d7 \) 19 \( \Box \times d7 \) \( \Box \times d7 \) 20 \( \Box \times d6 \) \( \Box \times c8 \) 21 \( \Box \times d7 \) \( \Box \times d7 \) 22 \( \Box \times d7 \) \( \Box \times d7 \) 23 \( \Box f5 + \), or 16... \( \Box d7 \) 17 \( \Box f5 \) \( \Box f6 \) 18 \( \Box e4 + \) \( \Box d8 \) (18... \( \Box e6 \) 19 \( \Box \times d7 + \) \( \Box \times d7 \) 20 \( \Box \times d6 + \)) 19 \( \Box \times d1 \) c6 20 \( \Box d6 + \), each time with a crushing attack for White.

17 \( \Box f5 \) \( \Box f6 \) 18 \( \Box d1 \) g6

Black also fails to save the game after 18... c6 19 \( \Box d6 \) \( \Box d8 \) 20 \( \Box e4 + \) \( \Box f8 \) 21 \( \Box e5! \) f6 22 \( \Box \times c5 + ! \) etc.

19 \( \Box \times h6 \) \( \Box f8 \) 20 g4 a6 21 g5 \( \Box e6 \) 22 \( \Box e2 \) \( \Box b6 \) 23 g4 \( \Box e7 \) 24 \( \Box f6 \) \( \Box c6 \) 25 \( \Box h7 \) \( \Box f5 \) 26 e4 \( \Box e6 \) 27 \( f5 \) 1-0

In the following two games White each time found a tactical way of refuting Black’s active but unfounded attempts to seize the initiative in the opening stage.

No. 348 Suetin–Veresov

Byelorussian Ch., 1955

Caro-Kann Defence

1 e4 c6 2 \( \Box c3 \) d5 3 \( \Box f3 \) g4
4 h3 \( \Box h5 \) 5 ed cd 6 \( \Box b5 + \) \( \Box c6 \) 7 g4 \( \Box g6 \) 8 \( \Box e5 \) \( \Box c7 ? ! \) 9 d4 e6 10 \( \Box e2 \) \( \Box f6 \) 11 h4 \( \Box b4 \) 12 h5 \( \Box e4 \) 13 f3 0-0 14 \( \Box \times c6 \) bc 15 g5 c5 (157) 16 \( \Box e3 \)!

This refutes Black’s eccentric opening strategy. Events continue to develop by force, but White emerges a piece up.

16... \( \Box \times f3 \) 17 \( \Box \times f3 \) \( \Box e4 \) 18 0-0 \( \Box c3 \) 19 bc \( \Box \times c3 \) 20 \( \Box d1 \)

No. 349 Averbakh–Estrin

Moscow, 1964

Queen’s Gambit

1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 \( \Box c3 \) \( \Box f6 \) 4 \( \Box f3 \)
\( \Box b4 \) 5 \( \Box g5 \) dc 6 e4 c5 7 \( \Box \times c4 \) cd 8 \( \Box \times d4 \) \( \Box c7 \) ? (8... \( \Box a5 \) ) 9 \( \Box b3 \) !
\( \Box x c3 + \) 10 \( \Box x c3 \) \( \Box e4 \) 11 \( \Box b5 \) !
\( \Box c5 \) 12 \( \Box x g7 ! \) \( \Box f8 \) (12... \( \Box x f2 + \)
13 \( \Box d1 \) \( \Box f8 \) 14 \( \Box c7 + ! \) ) 13 \( \Box h6 ! \)
\( \Box x f2 + \) 14 \( \Box d1 \) \( \Box d7 \) 15 \( \Box e1 \) \( \Box f6 \)
16 \( \Box x e6 ! \) \( \Box x b2 \) 17 \( \Box c1 \) 1-0

In the above games we see a tactical method of punishment, which was covered in the section on typical opening mistakes. Is this not the same thing? As we have already seen several times, in chess it is sometimes very difficult to draw a clear line between closely-related but different concepts. To a great extent this also applies to the prob-
lems in question of the modern understanding of opening principles (as was mentioned, for instance, when we considered the problem of the pawn sacrifices and ‘pawn-grabbing’). In the same way, there is a definite, although sometimes almost imperceptible, boundary between the tactical punishment of elementary opening errors and actions of this type in dynamic situations. In the latter case this is primarily a search, which will not always prove successful, even with the most brilliant combinational vision. After all, there is a considerable difference between a purely tactical operation and a dynamic plan, often highly risky but containing a bold idea.

‘Opening fashion’ and the origin of the new variations

This is a complex and highly interesting topic, deserving of an independent study. Here we will restrict ourselves to a few characteristic examples.

We will begin with new opening variations.

Even over a short period of time, intensive analysis and practical testing can lead to the origin of completely new opening variations.

Not long ago there was little interest in this variation of the Sicilian Defence: 1 e4 c5 2 Ʌf3 Ʌc6 3 d4 cd 4 Ʌxd4 Ʌf6 5 Ʌc3 e5 6 Ʌdb5 d6 7 Ʌg5 a6 8 Ʌxf6 gf 9 Ʌa3.

In opening guides this variation was judged to be unsatisfactory for Black in view of his organic weakness at d5 and his broken K-side. But modern opening analysis relates to obvious external factors with a fair degree of scepticism, and tries mainly to find a lively dynamic approach.

And as a result of such analysis it turned out that after 9...b5 10 Ʌd5 f5 Black has rich possibilities for sharp counterplay.

Other variations of the Sicilian Defence with long-standing reputations have also undergone many changes in a very short time. They are ‘eternally’ alive thanks mainly to the oscillation of assessment scales first to one side, and then the other. For example, the Polugayevsky Variation has many times been ‘buried’: 1 e4 c5 2 Ʌf3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 Ʌxd4 Ʌf6 5 Ʌc3 a6 6 Ʌg5 e6 7 f4 b5!? White’s refutations have been associated with the variations 8 e5 de 9 fe Ʌc7 10 ef Ʌe5+ 11 Ʌe4 and 10 Ʌe2 etc., but in general the 7...b5!? variation continues to be very much alive.

Or take the Velimirović
Attacked in the Sozin Variation, which has had a tempestuous development: 1 e4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 dxd4 f6 5 c3 d6 6 f4 e6 7 e3 e7 8 w2 a6 9 0-0-0 c7 10 b3 a5 11 g4 b5 12 g5 xB3+ 13 ab a7, with a whole series of intricate continuations.

It can also happen that highly prominent lines, and even entire variations, fade into the past. Thus it can be said, without exaggeration, that during several generations of chess players one of the most important concrete problems in the opening was a sharp line of the Meran Variation: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 d3 d6 4 c3 e6 5 e3 bd7 6 d3 dc 7 xC4 b5 8 d3 a6 9 ed e4 c5 10 e4!! etc.

But then in the late 1940s another pawn blow in the centre came to light: 10 d5!! It soon transpired that here there was no less scope for analysis, and in fact Black still faces very difficult problems.

At the present time the 10 e5!? variation has swelled the ranks of its 'great' predecessors, such as the King's Gambit and the Evans Gambit. However, this archive has not only avoided being covered by the sands of time, but is still very much alive. At any time some variation may be extracted from it and restored to life in the light of new trends.

The given instance is most probably one of chess 'fashion'. It can happen that for a long time theory will be indifferent to many of its creations, even its favourite ones. But it may once again return to them. The only variations condemned to the archives are those which are lacking in strategic content, or which can be exhausted by concrete analysis.
New methods of opening struggle for the initiative

In the modern opening the factor of the initiative plays a highly important role. Only if it is held is there a real possibility of putting into effect an intended strategic plan.

Hence the new approach to the role of chess ‘time’ in the opening, which rejects the mechanical counting of tempi. It is the connection between tempi and concrete ideas which must mainly be taken into account, since only in this way can a particular plan be effectively implemented.

Of course, in the opening the struggle for the initiative most often revolves around control of the central squares.

The method of struggling for the initiative in the modern opening is constantly being improved. This applies both to active means (White’s play) and defensive (Black’s play), and it is this that stimulates the development of opening theory.

White’s basic opening strategy is still to aim for a protracted and consistent increasing of the pressure on the central squares. This is clearly expressed in the popular openings of our time, such as the Spanish Game and the Semi-Open and Closed Games.

At the same time, White’s main problem in the struggle for the centre, while avoiding rapid simplification and the premature liquidation of the central tension, is to hinder Black’s free development and gradually deprive him of active play.

Such strategy for White was proposed back in Steinitz’s time, but since then it has undergone numerous changes and has been greatly enriched. At the present time it is the path to a complex, dynamic struggle, and not the prelude to the accumulation of small advantages (as was considered earlier).

In the modern opening White conducts a very active
struggle for the initiative, for which he often boldly goes in for complications.

Changes in White's strategy in the direction of aggression and dynamism have largely been induced by Black's much greater activity, and his aiming for counterplay at the very start of the game (it can be said that this is Black's basic modern strategy).

In this mode of play Black does not limit himself in the opening to the passive defence of his central squares, but tries consistently to disrupt White's plan, opposing these with his own active plans in the centre.

With Black aiming for active counterplay in the opening, White must act concretely, and not rely on the advantage of the first move. In the event of routine play, White may not only quickly lose the initiative, but may also get into great difficulties.

The strategy of counterplay is the most effective in modern opening systems for Black. Thus the most popular variations are those where Black clearly aims for active counterplay: in reply to 1 e4 — the 3...a6 defence to the Spanish Game, and in particular the splendid Chigorin (Closed) Variation, as well as the Sicilian and French Defences; in reply to 1 d4 — the Nimzo-Indian Defence, Grünfeld Defence, and the various other Indian Defences etc.

From the viewpoint of searching for counterplay, at the present time many 'approved' variations for Black are being re-considered, as a result of which they are being considerably enriched.

In opening variations with counterplay for Black in reply to White's aim for a lengthy initiative, the mechanical implementation of opening principles is the least acceptable. From the very start of the game each side aims to disrupt the coordination of the opponent's forces in the struggle for the centre, taking account of the concrete prospects for the middlegame, and a very intense struggle for the initiative ensues. In our opinion, in this lies the promise of the modern methods of opening struggle.

In the course of such a struggle, complex positions arise with rich and varied strategic plans. Approximate equality here does not foreshadow simplification and a quick draw (which is characteristic, for example, of many variations of the 'ancient' Open Games). It merely emphasizes that the two sides have aspirations of equal value in the coming struggle.
Thus counterplay is the best way of fighting for the initiative throughout the entire game. Take even the final aim: neutralizing the initiative by purely defensive methods in principle means obtaining a static equality; counterplay signifies a struggle for the initiative, for an advantage.

It is no accident that the method of counterplay has become the most effective in the struggle for the centre. Passive defence is now resorted to only in cases of extreme necessity, since passive play with the aim of neutralizing the initiative restricts Black's possibilities in the opening.

In his opening plans Black must naturally observe a certain caution, nevertheless making his main aim the obtaining of equal chances in the middlegame. But the best way of equalizing (or more accurately, of obtaining a good game) is by active counterplay.

**Positions of dynamic balance**

Characteristic of the modern opening is the rejection of the mechanical approach to the occupation of the centre.

In many opening set-ups there is an apparent breaking of the principle of occupying the centre, which is expressed, for instance, in conceding the opponent a numerical superiority or in creating a persistent pawn weakness in the centre. Such a breaking of the principle is acceptable, however, if effective piece pressure on the centre can be created.

In such cases complex positions arise with roughly equal chances. If in the subsequent play the approximate equality is retained as the outward positional factors change, such opening positions can be characterised as ones of dynamic balance.

In the subsequent play (of course, provided it takes a logical course) the active side may achieve some gains only by making equivalent concessions, and all the time a state of equality is as though in motion. One side will have certain positional advantages, while the other will have counterplay sufficient to balance them.

It must be mentioned that in such a struggle it is very difficult to maintain the balance, since the resulting concrete tactical and strategic problems are highly complex and demand of the players great mastery.

Typical in this respect is the development of events in the
following variation of the King’s Indian Defence: 1 d4 d6 2 c4 g6 3 d3 g7 4 g3 0-0 5 g2 d6 6 f3 bd7 7 0-0 e5 8 e4 e8 9 h3 ed 10 xdxd4 c5 11 e1 a5 12 wc2 a4 13 xe3 c6 14 ad1 fd7 15 f4 (158)

White has an obvious numerical and spatial superiority in the centre; in Black’s position there is an obvious pawn weakness at d6. But White’s pieces are tied to the defence of the central squares, and his initiative is not felt. Practice shows that Black has fine counterchances in the coming interesting struggle, and this position can be characterized as one of dynamic balance.

From the diagram position the game Stahlberg-Boleslavsky (Zurich C, 1953) continued:

16 f2 b6 17 fl d7 18 a3

This move is basically necessary, although it involves a weakening of White’s Q-side pawns. Otherwise how else can he consolidate his grouping on the Q-side? It should not be forgotten that without a2-a3 White would be constantly restricted by the possible threat of... a3!

18... ad8 19 h2 c8 20 a2 bd7 21 g2 f6 22 c3 d7 23 f3 de7

The weakness of the d6 pawn is illusory. In order to win it, White must remove his knight from its very important post at d4, where it controls b5, c6, e6 and f5, while simultaneously neutralizing the bishop at g7. After lengthy preparations aimed at repelling Black’s various counterattacks (...a3, ... e6, ...f5, ...d5) White has at last decided to attack the d6 pawn. But Black has succeeded in regrouping his forces and he gives up the pawn for a worthy price.

24 g1 fd7 25 d4 b6 26 xg7 xg7 27 xdxd6 xc4 28 dd1 e6

A position of dynamic balance has once more arisen, although its outward contours have changed. There are now more positional weaknesses in White’s position (the b3 and d3 squares, and the passive bishop at g2). But White has possibilities of active play against Black’s slightly weakened castled position, which equalizes the chances.
After a lively struggle this game ended in a draw.

Of course, one cannot use the name ‘dynamic balance’ dogmatically, by mechanically transferring it to other, similar positions, arising in different lines of one and the same variation. The main criterion in the assessment of a position must only be concrete analysis.

**Typical pawn structures in the centre**

A typical position is the name given to a set-up which arises fairly regularly in the opening, and can be obtained from several different opening variations.

Extensive practical experience and theoretical research have disclosed a number of typical structures in the centre, which largely determine the external contours of the position. A knowledge of the general character of the struggle in this or that central pawn structure allows easier orientation in a concrete position of this type. Such structures, which often arise right at the start of a game, have a lengthy influence on the resulting middlegame.

We have in mind, of course, solid, rather stable structures, arising as a result of the opening struggle. Each of these structures can influence the course of events. After all, the struggle for the centre normally takes place throughout the entire game.

A knowledge of the most general strategic features of such positions can not only significantly facilitate the play in these situations and an understanding of the close connection between opening and middlegame, but can also assist the intelligent assimilation and systemization of a complex of opening variations.

Typical, for example, is the following structure with a central outpost for White, arising in a variation of the French Defence after 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 c3 d6 4 g5 e7 5 e5 d6 6 x e7 w x e7 7 f4 a6 8 f3 c5 9 dc w x c5 10 w d 4 (159)

This structure is also typical of many other lines of the French Defence, and also of
some lines in the Caro-Kann and Sicilian Defences.

This structure can be obtained in various ways. Thus in the Sicilian Defence it can arise from an undetermined pawn structure in the centre, e.g. 1 e4 c5 2 d3 f3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 e4 d4 f6 5 c3 g6 6 g3 e3 g7 7 f3 0-0 8 d2 d5 9 e5! d8 e8 10 f4 etc.

In such positions the structure in the centre is of great significance. White, with his important central outpost at d4, creates pressure on the dark squares, and intends to restrict the opponent’s light-square bishop. White need not fear simplification, nor the exchange of his light-square bishop for an enemy knight.

An important resource for active play is White’s spatial advantage on the K-side. It is here that White intends later to make the decisive breakthrough. From this it follows that in such positions Black must act very energetically in the centre, and must aim primarily to undermine White’s centre by...f6!

Pawn structures and the inner content of the opening struggle

In many openings at the transition to the middlegame, the problem arises as to which is better—

...to block the centre, or to fix the pawn structure and thereby open a central file (for example, in the main line of the Spanish Game). Or there is the still undecided problem in the Sämisch Variation of the King’s Indian Defence, the essence of which is what is Black’s most expedient course in the main line: 1 d4 d6 2 c4 g6 3 c3 g7 4 e4 d5 5 f3 0-0 6 e3 e5 7 d5. Should he block the centre with...c5, which allows White the plan of an attack on the K-side with 8 g4!?, or should he leave his Q-side untouched and try in turn for counterplay on the K-side: 7...h5 8 d2 f5 9 0-0-0 d7? Or, finally, should he open a file on the Q-side: 7...c6 8 d2 cd 9 cd a6, aiming if possible for active play on both sides of the board?

The choice between these decisions is a matter of taste, but the subsequent, now stable structure largely obliges the two sides to take definite action and demands a knowledge of typical procedures.

Of interest, for example, was the course taken by the opening in the following game.

No. 350 Bronstein-Szabo
Saltsjöbaden IZ, 1948

French Defence

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 d2 d6
4 \( \text{g3} \text{f6} \text{5 e5 d7} \)

A blocked pawn position in the centre has arisen, with a certain spatial advantage for White. However, the play in the centre quickly enlivens, and the structure soon changes completely.

6 \( \text{b3} \text{f6} \) (had Black played 6...\( \text{f5} \), a closed centre would have arisen, but this would have favoured White with his spatial advantage) 7 \( \text{b5 a6?} \)

Black intends to obtain a central pawn group and later to set up a pawn centre, but this plan is ruined by White’s energetic play. 7...\( \text{cb8} \) was better.

8 \( \text{xc6 bc} \text{9 0-0 c5 10 c4!} \) (160)

In this energetic way, exploiting his lead in development, White advantageously opens the centre and causes a timely disruption of Black’s plans. Weaker was 10 ef? \( \text{xf6} \text{11 e1 c4 12 c5 xc5 13 dc 0-0 14 c6 b8 15 e5 a5!} \) with an excellent game for Black.

10...\( \text{dc} \text{11 a5 b6 12 ef xf6 13 dc!} \), and White began a strong piece attack on the black king.

In this example the structure in the centre changed successively over the course of 5-6 moves: first from a tense structure it changed into a closed one (5 e5), then Black obtained a numerical superiority (8 \( \text{xc6 bc} \text{9 0-0 c5} \)), and finally the centre was opened (10 c4), which was the most logical consequence of the dynamic struggle for the centre. This confirms that the main thing is not the structure, but the inner content of the struggle!

The following examples from the Sicilian Defence are also typical: 1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{f3} \text{d6 3 d4 cd} \)

4 \( \text{xd4 f6} \text{5 c3 a6 6 e2 e5} \)

7 \( \text{b3 e7} \text{8 0-0 0-0 9 a4 b6 10 e3 b7 11 f3 bd7 12 xd2 xc7} \)

13 \( \text{d5 xd5} \text{14 ed}, \text{or 1 e4 c5 2 f3 d6 3 d4 cd} \text{4 xd4 f6} \)

5 \( \text{c3 a6 6 g3 e5 7 de2 e7} \text{8 g2 0-0 9 0-0 d7 10 h3 xc6 11 d5 xd5 12 ed.} \)

On each occasion here the basis of the opening struggle was for control of the d5 square, and it was for this reason that such a metamorphosis occurred. And in general it can be concluded that the struggle for the critical d5 square often leads to such a creation of an immobile pawn
chain in the centre.

Also characteristic of the modern opening are new forms of structures in the centre. Thus until recently it was considered dangerous to concede to the opponent a piece-pawn superiority in the centre, arising, for example, in the following line: 1 e4 c5 2 ♞f3 ♞c6 3 d4 cd 4 ♞×d4 a6!? 5 c4.

It was this ‘blockading’ move that was feared earlier, when such set-ups were considered unfavourable for Black. Moreover, back in the 1920s and even the 1930s they were simply not taken seriously, but now a major reappraisal has taken place.

The typical result of such a struggle is a position of dynamic balance, where Black’s play is fully viable and noted for good possibilities of active counterplay.

Typical structures in the centre include: 1) open centre; 2) closed or fixed centre; 3) numerical superiority in the centre for one of the sides; 4) positions with various pawn weaknesses (pawns and squares). A detailed and systematic review of these typical structures in the centre was made by the author in his book Modern Chess Opening Theory (Pergamon, 1965).

In conclusion, we must once again emphasize the somewhat arbitrary nature of typical pawn structures, and the fact that their significance is limited in the analysis of concrete situations where such structures arise. General conceptions (and that includes typical positions) are merely a starting point for a chess player’s thinking. The decisive word always rests with concrete analysis.

And now let us turn to ‘un-typical’ topical problems of pawn structures in the opening. In practice they are much more common than those with a clearly defined outward picture.

In such situations it is especially important to be guided by general playing methods. We will consider the problem of pawn tension in the centre.

**Tense structures in the centre**

In modern positional play a primary role is assigned to the problems of tense or undetermined structures in the centre. Very often in close set-ups, pawn tension is created or else a flexible structure arises, lacking in clear form.

Between these undetermined structures there is a significant difference. Pawn tension in the centre cannot normally be prolonged, and in the transition to
the middlegame, or even in the opening, a definite form results after an exchange or the closing of the position.

Up to a certain point the release of the tension is unfavourable to the active side, who holds the initiative or has more space. Often the logic of the struggle demands that Black go in for certain concessions, being the first to release the tension and concede a central outpost (cf. Diag. 159).

On each occasion the elimination of the tension in the centre is a highly important strategic decision for both sides. With Black this normally is associated with freeing his game. Typical in this respect is this line of the Vienna Game: 1 e4 e5 2 ∆c3 ∆c6 3 ∆c4 ∆f6 4 d3 ∆b4 5 ∆ge2 d5 6 ed ∆xd5, and Black has successfully solved both his development problems, and the opening battle for the centre. Of course, it is by no means always that the defending side manages to eliminate the tension in the centre. For example, in the line of the Dragon Variation after 1 e5 c5 2 ∆f3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 ∆xd4 ∆f6 5 ∆c3 g6 6 ∆e3 ∆g7 7 f3 ∆c6 8 ∆d2 the freeing attempt 8...d5? is clearly premature, as the very strong 9 ∆b5! follows, when Black is already in difficulties.

In general the classical rule still remains in force, according to which it is advisable for the defending side to maintain his pawn base in the centre, provided this does not entail any obvious disadvantage. Thus after 1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆c6 3 ∆c4 ∆e7 4 d4 for the moment Black should play for the maintenance of the critical e5 square with 4...d6, not fearing 5 de de 6 ∆x8+ ∆xd8, with a sound game.

On the other hand, if White maintains the tension, he cannot avoid reckoning with Black's counterplay, and to avoid it he must often, at the necessary moment, take the optimal decision, closing or fixing the centre.

We give a fairly complicated example of modern strategy from the Keres Variation in the Closed Defence to the Spanish Game: 1 e4 e5 2 ∆f3 ∆c6 3 ∆b5 a6 4 ∆a4 ∆f6 5 0-0 ∆e7 6 ∆e1 h5 7 ∆b3 d6 8 c3 0-0 9 h3 ∆a5 10 ∆c2 c5 11 d4 ∆d7!?

This 'mysterious' manoeuvre is made with the aim of preparing an abrupt enlivening of the pawn position in the centre.

Instructive in this respect is the following game.
No. 351  Tal-Keres
Curacao C, 1962

12 ßbd2 cd 13 cd ßc6 14 a3(?) ed! 15 ßb3 ßde5 16 ßfxd4 ßf6
17 ßd2 ßxd4 18 ßxd4 ßd3! 19
ßc6 ßxf2! 20 ßf3 ßhx3+ 21
ßh2 ße5+! 22 ßxe5 de 23 ßed1
ßf4!, after which Black gained a
decisive material advantage.
The cause of White’s
difficulties was the strategic over-
looking of Black’s strong and
lively counterplay, involving the
freeing of his position in the
centre. Where then did White go
wrong? Perhaps he should have
radically prevented Black’s plan
by the timely fixing or closing of
the centre? However, practice
shows that both after 12 dc dc 13
ßbd2 f6! 14 ßf1 ßb6 15 ße2
ßa7! 16 ße3 ße6 17 ßf5 ße8
etc., and after 12 ßbd2 cd 13 cd
ßc6 14 d5 ßb4 15 ßb1 a5 16 a3
ßa6 17 b4 ßb6! 18 ßb3 ßd7 19
ßd3 ßc7 Black does not have
any difficulties.
The line which causes Black
the most problems nevertheless
involves maintaining the ten-
sion: 12 ßbd2 cd 13 cd ßc6 14
ßb3!
Here we encounter yet
another positional factor — the
over-protection of critical points.
At the same time White clears
the way for his bishop at c1, and
thus avoids putting off the devel-

opment of his own Q-side.
Incidentally, after the possi-
ble 14. . . a5 15 ßd3 ßa6 the clos-
ing of the centre now looks
much more appropriate: 16 d5,
creating persistent pressure on
the Q-side.
A timely release of the pawn
tension is seen in an overwhelm-
ing number of modern openings
and even classical variations of
Closed Games.
This is confirmed by a well
known line of the Orthodox De-
fence: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 ßc3 ßf6
4 ßg5 ße7 5 e3 ßbd7 6 ßf3 0-0
7 ßc1 c6.
Here there is an eternal prob-
lem: is it more advisable for
White to clarify the position in
the centre, e.g. by 8 ßd3 dc
9 ßxd4 ßd5 10 ßxc7 ßxc7 11
0-0 ßxc3 12 ßxc3 e5 etc., or
should he defer forcing events,
aiming to gain an important
tempo after the possible 8 ßc2 a6
9 a3 h6 10 ßh4 ße8, where each
side awaits a convenient
moment to release the tension:
11 ßd1 dc 12 ßxc4 b5, or 11 cd
ed, after which completely differ-
ent structures, and hence plans,
arise.

Undetermined structures in
the centre

One of the noteworthy ten-
dencies in modern strategy is the
creation for a lengthy period of flexible pawn structures, lacking in definite form, but at the same time distinguished by their great inner tension.

Such set-ups take shape right from the opening, and can occur particularly often in the English Opening, Reti Opening, Pirc Defence and so on.

A characteristic feature of such set-ups is their great flexibility in choice and implementation of strategic plan. Here there is a clear tendency towards avoiding clashes in the centre, preference being given to preparatory flank pressure by the pieces. For a long time the central pawns remain on their original squares, or else occupy modest positions.

It was the ideas of Reti, put forward in the 1920s, which confirmed the great potential strength of such positions.

Here is a classic example of such a set-up.

No. 352 Reti-Rubinstein
Carlsbad, 1923

Reti Opening

1. d3 f3 d5 2. g3 f6 3. g2 g6 4. c4
d4 5. d3 g7 6. b4 0-0 7. bd2! e5
8. b3 cb 9. b2 c6 10. bxd4
bxd4 11. e4 b6 12. a3 a6 13.
b2 ba 14. x a3 c7

Nowadays such positions have become typical, and are rightly considered to favour White in view of his powerful pawn phalanx in the centre.

15. a1!

Following Reti's example, this queen manœuvre has become characteristic of such positions. The pressure on the a1-h8 diagonal forces Black to seek simplification.

15... e8 16. xg7 xg7 17
0-0 e6 18. b1 c6 19. d4! e4
20. d1 a5 21. d5! c5 22. d4

And now White's knight obtains strong outposts at d4 and c8, which leads to a clear superiority in the centre.

22. xg2 23. xg2 ad8 24
c6 d6 25. e3 e8 26. e5 f6
27. h2 e5 28. b5! f7 29. b1
d7 30. f3 c8 31. d3!

Preventing 31. b8 because of 32 c5!

31... e4 (on 31... c5 White has the very strong 32 xb6! 32
e5 33 xb6! xc6 34 c5!, and White gained an overwhelming advantage.

In modern variations with an undetermined structure in the centre, the combining of play in the centre with operations on the flanks is acquiring ever greater importance.

The strategic procedure of rapidly transferring action from one sector of the board to another is becoming more and more common. Such a problem
is also typical of many determined structures in the centre, but in the given case it is particularly sharp and dynamic.

For example, in many lines of the Sicilian Dragon an undetermined pawn structure in the centre arises. The course of the following game is typical.

**No. 353 Rauzer-Botvinnik**
Moscow, 1933
*Sicilian Defence*

1 e4 c5 2 d3 c6 3 d4 cd 4 dxd4 c5 5 c3 d6 6 e2 g6 7 e3 g7 8 b3 g6 9 f4 0-0 10 0-0 a5 11 xa5 xa5 12 f3 c4 13 e1 fd8 14 d2 c7 15 ac1 (161)

![Diagram](image)

Up till now the two sides have been engaged in preparatory manoeuvres, and the pawn position in the centre has remained undetermined. But now Black, who has deployed his pieces much more actively, commences energetic play in the centre. This plan, which after the present game became typical of such positions, proves especially effective in the event of passive play by White in the opening.

15...e5! 16 b3? (underestimating the coming advance in the centre; 16 fe de 17 ef2 was better, fixing the central pawns) 16...d5!!

The centre is unexpectedly opened, and to the advantage of Black, whose forces combine very harmoniously.

17 ed e4! 18 bc ef 19 c5 a5 20 ed1 g4! 21 d4 f2+ 22 f1 a6+ 23 e2 xd4! 24 xd4 f6! 25 cd1 h4! (Black switches to a decisive attack against White’s poorly defended K-side) 26 d3 e8 27 e4 f5! 28 e6 xh2+ 29 e2 xf4 0-1

If the central pawn structure is undetermined, one must watch with particular care for a counter-attack in the centre when attacking on the K-side.

Here is an example of this situation.

**No. 354 Alekhine-Botvinnik**
Nottingham, 1936
*Sicilian Defence*

1 e4 c5 2 d3 c6 3 d4 cd 4 dxd4 f6 5 c3 d6 6 e2 g6 7 e3 g7 8 b3 0-0 9 f4 e6 10 g4 d5! (162)

Against White’s sharp attack
on the K-side, Black replies with an energetic blow in the centre, which is the most advisable in the given situation. Now events develop by force, exceptional accuracy being demanded of both players.

11 f5! (11 e5? is very strongly met by 11...d4!) 11...c8 12 ed b4 13 d6 xxd6 14 c5! f4! 15 f1 xh2! 16 xh4 xg4 17 xg4 g3+, with a draw by perpetual check.

In the given structure of the Sicilian Defence (the Dragon Variation) other possible structures can also arise, such as a backward pawn in the centre, a piece outpost in the centre, and so on.

With an undetermined structure, a problem of practical importance is that of choosing a convenient moment to achieve a favourable structure in the centre. For example, it is strategically highly promising for White to establish a knight at d5 in front of a backward pawn at d6. But modern practice shows that this is of real value only if there is solid control over the key point, otherwise the opponent may advantageously be able to drive the knight from its insecure post.

An elementary question: why after 1 d4 f6 2 c4 c5 3 d5 e6 4 c3 ed does White not exploit (in master games, of course) the seemingly advantageous opportunity to establish a piece at d5: 4 xxd5 xxd5 5 xxd5, but instead prefers the immediate determining of the central structure by 4 cd d6 5 e4 etc?

The point is that, in the given instance, the queen at d5 feels very much like an uninvited guest, and after 5...c6 6 b3 d6 followed by 7...e6 Black completes his development with gain of time, and has chances of seizing the initiative.

To sum up: in positions with an undetermined pawn structure, the general problem for each side with regard to the centre consists in obtaining the more favourable pawn formation.

Flexible opening structures

In many opening variations a clash in the centre does not take place. Usually an initial role is
place. Usually an initial role is played by flank pressure on the centre. An example of this is provided by the Closed Variation of the Sicilian Defence: 1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{d}c3 \text{c}6 \text{e}3 \text{g}3 \text{g}6 \text{d}3 \text{g}2 \text{g}7 5 \text{d}6 \text{etc.}

In recent times there has been a considerable increase in the number of such set-ups, in which for a long time the pawn structure in the centre is undetermined.

It would be wrong to imagine that the classical opening set-ups have been 'submerged' under the flood of sharp tactical variations. Purely positional opening laws have also been developing in parallel.

Possibly even as a reaction to the sharp tactical variations, a trend in the openings has developed, characterized by great flexibility in the subsequent choice and implementation of strategic plan. Here there is a clear aim of avoiding clashes in the centre, preference being given to preparatory flank action.

Until mobilization is completed, the pawns in the centre occupy modest positions. The struggle is as though transferred to the middlegame. Such opening set-ups are often slightly cramped, but they are fully viable, mainly for the reason that at a convenient moment the central pawns can advance with great force. In general the play is notable for its great flexibility.

Many such variations have been developed in recent years in the English Opening, for example: 1 c4 \( \text{d}f6 \text{e}3 \text{c}3 \text{g}6 \text{d}3 \text{g}7 4 \text{g}2 \text{d}6 5 \text{d}3 \text{c}5 6 \text{a}3, \text{preparing a later offensive on the Q-side, or 1 c4 \( \text{d}f6 \text{d} d3 \text{c}3 \text{d}5 3 \text{cd} \text{xc}d5 4 \text{g}3 \text{g}6 5 \text{g}2 \text{b}6 6 \text{d}3 \text{etc.}

This also applies to the Paulsen Variation of the Sicilian Defence: 1 e4 c5 2 \( \text{d}f3 \text{e}6 3 \text{d}4 \text{cd} 4 \text{xc}d4 \text{a}6. \text{Here Black avoids an immediate clash in the centre, preferring to prepare gradually for active play, and intending if possible to develop his king's bishop actively along the f8-a3 diagonal.}

The modern handling of this variation expresses very clearly the features characterizing such set-ups. In particular one should note Black's great flexibility, which enables him to adapt to White's plans. For example, after 5 c4 \( \text{d}f6 6 \text{c}3 \text{c}7 7 \text{c}2 \text{b}6 8 \text{a}d3 \text{d}6 9-0 \text{bd}7 10 \text{e}3 \text{ab}7 11 \text{f}3 \text{e}7 12 \text{d}2 0-0 13 \text{c}1 \text{ac}8 \text{Black sets up a very flexible defence and subsequently simply does not allow White's initiative to develop.}

Although in this variation (and ones similar to it) the events in the opening develop rather slowly and are rarely
forcing, nevertheless each move in the opening is very committing and full of concrete meaning. The difficulty of playing White is that, since in many lines the opponent’s activity is delayed, he must largely be guided by a clear-cut, concrete plan, in spite of the wide choice of possibilities.

Thus if White plays for the rapid development of his minor pieces, as in the analogous Scheveningen Variation (where instead of 4 ...a6 Black plays 4 ...d6), after 5 dı3 Ⓐc7 6 _enqueue 7 0-0 b5 Black already acquires fairly significant counterplay.

The main danger for White is that, in the event of routine play, he can quickly find himself in an unfavourable strategic situation in the middlegame.

In the given variation, for example, an important feature is that Black’s d-pawn remains for a long time in its initial position. As a result his dark-square bishop has a wide choice of active development at b4, c5 or even d6. The saving of a tempo in the opening is also significant. At the same time Black’s central pawn can be energetically advanced, with the aim of actively joining the battle for the centre.

It is no accident that this variation for Black has become firmly established in the opening repertoires of several leading players.

We must also mention another important feature of flexible positions: the reorganization of the pawn formation at the transition from opening to middlegame, with the aim of improving the coordination of pieces and pawns.

Many lines of the Nimzo-Indian Defence are instructive in this respect, in particular: 1 d4 addElement 2 c4 e6 3 addElement b4 4 e3 c5 5 addElement 0-0 6 a3 addElement x c3+ 7 bc addElement 8 addElement b6 9 e4 d6 followed by ...e5 with a blockade on the dark squares.

Black successfully reorganizes his pawn chain and obtains a convenient structure in the centre.

‘Cramped’ positions

Fairly often in practice, especially with Black, one has to reckon with having a ‘cramped’ position. Sometimes it is possible to escape fairly quickly from such a position by a timely freeing pawn advance in the centre. But in a number of variations, for example with solid pawn chains where the active side has a strong pawn wedge in the centre, the cramped position of the defending side is a feature
throughout the entire strategic development of the middlegame.

Tarrasch in his time put forward the 'formula': "a cramped position contains the germ of defeat". However, modern strategy does not give a simple answer to this question. Everything depends on the character of the defender's position, since in the transition from opening to middlegame there are a number of cramped positions which contain considerable manoeuvring potential. One merely needs to have patience.

Typical in this respect is a position arising in the English Opening: 1 c4 c5 2 d3 d6 3 d3 d5 4 cd e5 5 e4 d4 6 c4 d7 7 e2 xcl 8 xcl e6 9 d4 cd 10 xxd4 (better 10 b5+) 10...xd4 11 xd4 a6 12 b1. Although White has a development lead of 6 tempi and a marked superiority in space, practice shows that his advantage is insignificant. The point is that Black has no weak points and this allows him to engage in flexible manoeuvring.

* * *

Opening theory has made enormous strides, but this does not mean that opening problems are being exhausted. On the contrary, the preconditions are being created for their ever more deep, and at the same time, fascinating development.
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