Opening for White according to Kramnik

1. \( \text{d}f3 \)

Alexander Khalifman
Opening for White According to Kramnik 1. \( \Delta f3 \)

Book III

- Maroczy System
- English (with 1...c5)
- Modern Defence
- Dutch Defence
- Rare Lines

Alexander Khalifman
14th World Chess Champion
Preface. .................................................. 7

Part 1. Maroczy System
1. ½f3 c5 2.c4 g6 3.e4

1  3... ½c6 4.d4 cd 5.½d4 ½f6 6.½c3 d6 7.½e2 ½g7
   8. ½e3 0-0 9.0-0 ½d4 .................................. 11
2  7.½e2 ½g7 8.½e3 0-0 9.0-0 ½d7 ....................... 21
3  7.½e2 ½d4 8.½d4 ½g7 9.½g5 0-0 10.½d2 a6 ....... 35
4  7.½e2 ½d4 8.½d4 ½g7 9.½g5 0-0 10.½d2 ½e6 ....... 39
5  3... ½c6 4.d4 cd 5.½d4 ½f6 6.½c3 ½g7 7.½e3 0-0 .... 49
6  3... ½c6 4.d4 cd 5.½d4 ½f6 6.½c3 ½g7 7.½e3 ½g4 ... 54
7  3... ½g7 .................................................. 66

Part 2. English with 1...c5
1. ½f3 c5 2.c4 ½c6 3.d4 cd 4.½d4

8  4... e5; 4... d5; 4... ½b6; 4... e6. .......................... 81
9  4... ½f6 5.g3 ½b6. ....................................... 93
10 4... ½f6 5.g3 ½b6 6.½g2 ½b6; 6... ½e7. .............. 101
11 4... ½f6 5.g3 ½b6 6.½g2 ½c5 .......................... 112
12 4... ½f6 5.g3 ½b6 6.½g2 ½b4 .......................... 123

Part 3. Modern Defence
1. ½f3 g6; 1... d6

13  1.½f3 g6 2.c4 ½g7 3.e4 d6 4.d4 various ............... 135
14  1.½f3 g6 2.c4 ½g7 3.e4 d6 4.d4 e5 ................. 144
15  1.½f3 d6 2.d4 ½g4. ................................... 156
16  1.½f3 d6 2.d4 g6. ................................... 163
Part 4. Dutch Defence
1.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}f3} f5 2.c4 \textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}f6} 3.g3

17 3... d6; 3... b6 ............................................................... 173
18 3... e6 4.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}g2 various; 4... d5 ........................... 179
19 3... e6 4.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}g2 \textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}e7 5.0-0 d5 ........................................ 186
20 5.0-0 0-0 6.d4 \textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}e4; 6... d6 7.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}c3 various .......... 200
21 5.0-0 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}c3 a5 .......................... 211
22 5.0-0 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}c3 \textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}e8 .................. 218
23 3... g6 4.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}g2 \textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}g7 5.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}c3 0-0 6.d4 c6 ............ 228
24 4.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}g2 \textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}g7 5.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}c3 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.0-0 \textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}c6.......... 232
25 4.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}g2 \textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}g7 5.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}c3 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.0-0 c6; 7... \textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}a6 .... 246
26 4.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}g2 \textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}g7 5.\textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}c3 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.0-0 \textit{\textit{\texttt{\textbullet}}}e8 .......... 251

Part 5. Rare Lines
1.\textit{\textit{\textbullet}}f3 various

27 1.\textit{\textit{\textbullet}}f3 b6 ............................................................... 271
28 1.\textit{\textit{\textbullet}}f3 b5 ............................................................... 287

Index of Variations ......................................................... 297
Dear Chessfriends,

If the move 1...\( \mathcal{Q} \)f6 was unifying idea for first two books, and 1...d5 would be the primary importance of the last book, then in pages of this book I tried to examine all other Black's replies to 1.\( \mathcal{Q} \)f3. It was not an easy task, as Black's possibilities on the first move (even excluding 1...\( \mathcal{Q} \)f6 and 1...d5) are very diverse, and the volume of the book is limited. Nevertheless, I hope that I coped with my task as a whole and in this book readers can find answers to the question how White should play in one or another case.

Two first parts of the book are about formation connected with 1...c5. In this case absence of Black's control over the e4-square gives White an opportunity to move e2-e4 himself. Of course, such continuation would be fine, but after 2.e4 White cannot avoid numerous Sicilian variations. For this reason I recommend to choose 2.c4.

If Black does not want to return to the variations covered in Books I and II by means of 2...\( \mathcal{Q} \)f6, he should strengthen his pressure on the central squares either by putting his dark-squared bishop on the a1-h8 diagonal after 2...g6 or by the move 2...\( \mathcal{Q} \)c6. After 2...g6 3.e4 the game, as a rule, transposes to the Maroczy System considered in Part 1. In case of 2...\( \mathcal{Q} \)c6 3.d4, that is considered in Part 2, the game transposes to the English opening, which was not examined in Book II, but, nevertheless, is closely connected with its variations.

Also we can observe a very close interrelationship among the lines from Part 3 (beginning with 1...g6 and 1...d6) and those positions, which were examined earlier in Book I, Part 1 and 3. In spite of some similarity of position's strategic features in both cases, the delay with development of the g8-knight is able to add new and
rather essential nuances to the play. The fourth part of Book III is devoted to the Dutch Defence (1...f5). White's struggle against such popular nowadays Black's systems as the Stone Wall, Ilyin-Zhenevsky System and Leningrad Variation is an important point of this Part.

In the final fifth part of the book I consider the most rare Black's continuations on the first move, such as 1...b6 and 1...b5. Under these continuations an aggressive idea of 1.\(\text{f3}\) directed to the advance of 2.e4! reveals itself especially brightly.

\textit{A.Khalifman, 14th World Chess Champion}
Part 1. Maroczy System

1.\( \text{d}f3 \text{c}5 \text{2.e}c4 \text{g}6 \)

Black intends to establish reliable piece control over the d4-square. This circumstance forces White to take retaliatory measures.

3.e4

The most precise continuation. Even if White did not venture the e2–e4 push a move earlier (not unjustified, when Black has not played 1...\( \text{d}f6 \)) aiming to avoid all the diversity of the Sicilian constructs, now the move with the king’s pawn is in a certain sense indispensable in the struggle for superiority. Otherwise Black can easily obtain convenient play.

For example, after 3.g3 \( \text{g}7 \) 4.\( \text{g}2 \) (if 4.d4, then following 4...\( \text{cxd}4 \) 5.\( \text{cxd}4 \) \( \text{c}6 \) White will have either to retreat his knight from the d4-square or to opt for e2-e3, which is in disharmony with the earlier move g2-g3) 4...\( \text{c}6 \) 5.\( \text{c}3 \) e6 6.0-0 \( \text{g}e7 \). Black has reliable control over the d4-square and White’s can only day-dream of an opportunity to advance d2–d4.

Not quite good for White is also 3.\( \text{c}3 \) in view of 3...\( \text{g}7 \) 4.e3 (in case of 4.d4 cd 5.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{c}6 \), in order to avoid the shattering of his queenside by \( \text{g}7 \) xc3, when his knight retreats from the d4-square, White will have to venture e2–e3, which is beyond his plans) 4...\( \text{f}6 \) 5.d4 \( \text{cxd}4 \) 6.\( \text{exd}4 \) \( \text{d}5 \) and he will emerge with an isolated pawn on d4 in the near future. This is of course playable, but such handling of the opening is ill-suited to White’s aspirations for superiority.

Note finally, that to choose the most suggesting itself move for White – 3.d4 he must not only be well versed in the variations listed below, but also be ready for 3...\( \text{cxd}4 \) 4.\( \text{cxd}4 \) \( \text{f}6 \). After 5.\( \text{c}3 \) with the obvious intention to move e2–e4 next, White will have to take into consideration 5...d5!? A possible continuation is
6.\textit{\textbf{Ng5}} (following 6.cxd5 \textit{\textbf{Qxd5}} 7.\textit{\textbf{Qdb5}} \textit{\textbf{Qxc3}} 8.\textit{\textbf{Qxd8+}} \textit{\textbf{Qxd8}} 9.\textit{\textbf{Qxc3}} \textit{\textbf{Qc6}}= White cannot easily take any advantage whatsoever of the almost symmetrical situation) 6.\textit{\textbf{Ng5}} \textit{\textbf{Ng7}}!? (with 6...\textit{\textbf{Qe4}} 7.\textit{\textbf{Qxe4}} \textit{\textbf{dxe4}} Black must be ready for a slightly inferior endgame after 8.\textit{\textbf{Qb5}} \textit{\textbf{Qxd1+}} 9.\textit{\textbf{Qxd1}} \textit{\textbf{Qa6}} 10.\textit{\textbf{Qe3}} \textit{\textbf{Qg7}} 11.\textit{\textbf{Qd4}}\textpm, and the continuation 6...\textit{\textbf{dxc4}} 7.e3 has been always disreputable following both 7...\textit{\textbf{Qg7}} 8.\textit{\textbf{Qxc4}} 0-0 9.0-0 \textit{\textbf{Qd7}} 10.\textit{\textbf{Qd2}}\textpm Portisch—Benko, Las Palmas 1972, and 7...\textit{\textbf{Qa5}} 8.\textit{\textbf{Qxf6}} \textit{\textbf{exf6}} 9.\textit{\textbf{Qxc4}} \textit{\textbf{Qb4}} 10.\textit{\textbf{Qc1}} a6 11.0-0\textpm Petrosian—Korchnoi, Curacao 1962) 6...\textit{\textbf{Qg7}} 7.\textit{\textbf{Qxf6}} \textit{\textbf{Qxf6}} 8.\textit{\textbf{cxd5}} (in case of 8.\textit{\textbf{Qxd5}} \textit{\textbf{Qg7}}\textpm the position of the white knights on the d-file is rather shaky) 8...\textit{\textbf{Qb6}} 9.\textit{\textbf{Qb3}} a5. At this point in the Sakaev—Khalifman game, St Petersburg 1997, White did not try to keep the extra pawn by 10.\textit{\textbf{Qc2}}!?\textpm, but had to accept the draw after 10.a4 \textit{\textbf{Qb4}} 11.e3 \textit{\textbf{Qd7}} 12.\textit{\textbf{Qd4}} \textit{\textbf{Qxb2}} 13.\textit{\textbf{Qc1}} \textit{\textbf{Qxc1+}} 14.\textit{\textbf{Qxc1}} 0-0=. Following 3.e4 Black either agrees to the Maroczy System playing 3...\textit{\textbf{Qc6}} (the most elastic move, which gives Black the widest possible choice of diverse configurations typical of the system under consideration), which will be discussed in Chapters 1-6, or evades it choosing as a rule 3...\textit{\textbf{Qg7}}. Chapter 7 is devoted to the problems of these latter positions.
Chapter 1

1.\(\text{\textit{d}f3}\) c5 2.\(\text{\textit{c}4}\) g6 3.\(\text{\textit{e}4}\) \(\text{\textit{d}c6}\)

4.\(\text{\textit{d}4}\)

This move must not be delayed. Otherwise, once Black has played \(\text{\textit{f}8-g7}\) it must be forgotten.

4...\(\text{\textit{cxd4}}\) 5.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}xd4}}\) \(\text{\textit{f6}}\)

Sometimes tournament practice offers more rare configurations for Black, characterised by the development of the knight or the bishop on h6. A possible course of events for the former case is: 5...\(\text{\textit{g}7}\) 6.\(\text{\textit{e}3}\) d6 7.\(\text{\textit{c}c3}\) \(\text{\textit{h}6}\) 8.\(\text{\textit{f}3}\) (the somewhat exotic black plan draws from the following variation: 8.\(\text{\textit{e}e2}\) 0-0 9.0-0 \(\text{\textit{f}5}\) 10.\(\text{\textit{exf5}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd4}}\)! 11.\(\text{\textit{xh6}}\) and after 11.\(\text{\textit{xd4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf5}}\)= it becomes clear that White’s dark-squared bishop has no comfortable retreat, else with 8.\(\text{\textit{e}e2}\) 0-0 9.\(\text{\textit{xd2}}\) followed by 9...\(\text{\textit{g}4}\) 10.\(\text{\textit{g}xg4}\) \(\text{\textit{g}xg4}\) 11.0-0 Black practically enjoys an extra tempo compared to the positions considered below, which permits him to arrive at an entirely acceptable position after 11...\(\text{\textit{a}a5}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{a}ac1}\) \(\text{\textit{fc8}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{b}3}\) a6 14.\(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{d}d4}\) \(\text{\textit{e}e6}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{xg7}}\) \(\text{\textit{g}xg7}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{b}b2}\) \(\text{\textit{f}6}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{d}d5}\) \(\text{\textit{d}d8=}\) Popovic – Abramovic, Novi Sad 1985) 8...\(\text{\textit{f}5}\) (with the careless 8...0-0?? and 9.\(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) bxc6 10.\(\text{\textit{f}d2}\) Black risks simply to linger on with a piece off) 9.\(\text{\textit{wd2}}\) \(\text{\textit{f7}}\) (in case of 9...\(\text{\textit{f}4}\) 10.\(\text{\textit{f}f2}\) 0-0, following 11.\(\text{\textit{c}c5}\) \(\text{\textit{xd4}}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{x}xd4}\) dxc5 13.\(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) \(\text{\textit{f7}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{c}c5}\) \(\text{\textit{xd2}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{d}d2}\) \(\text{\textit{g}7}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{d}d5}\) \(\text{\textit{f}e5}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{b}b5}\) \(\text{\textit{d}d8}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{e}e2+=}\) Stummer – De Araujo, Paranana 1993, White presented Black with serious problems by means of an expedient well-known from Book II Part 5) 10.\(\text{\textit{xf5}}\) (in the game Feinberg – Ashley, USA 1990, the attempt to win a pawn after 10.\(\text{\textit{e}e2}\) \(\text{\textit{f}4}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{f}f2}\) \(\text{\textit{b}b8}\) by way of 12.\(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) bxc6 13.\(\text{\textit{xa7}}\) tumbled upon 13...\(\text{\textit{xb2}}\)! 14.\(\text{\textit{xb2}}\) \(\text{\textit{a}a5}\), and now White’s eagerness to keep his material edge at all costs by 15.\(\text{\textit{c}c1?!}\) brought him serious prob-
lems with the completion of his kingside development after 15...
\(\text{c7} 16.\text{b3} \text{e6} 17.\text{d1} \text{d4} 18.b1 0-0) 10...gf and now 11.
c5!(with 11. f4 e5 12.\text{f3} \text{e6} 13.\text{e2 c8} 14.\text{c1 a5} 15.b3 0-0
16.0-0 a6 17.\text{fd1 fe8=} Gorelov – Rashkovsky, Moscow 1984, the
odds are roughly even) 11...dxc5 12.\text{xc6 xd2+} 13.\text{xd2 bxc6} 14.
\text{xc5 d6} 15.\text{c2 b7} 16.\text{f2}
\text{f6} 17.e4 0-0 18.a4 \text{d8} 19.\text{c4 f8} 20.d1 d1 21.d1\text{d1} Nikcevic – L. Popov, Herceg Novi
2000, permitted White to obtain
an advantage thanks to his su-
perior pawn structure.

In the second case after 5...
\text{h6} 6.\text{exh6 xhx6} 7.\text{c3} 0-0
8.\text{e2 d6} 9.0-0 (White immediately give up control over the g4-
square by means of 9.\text{d2}, which
allowed the black h6-knight to
immediately play in, and follow-
ing 9...\text{g4} 10.xg4 xg4 11.h3
\text{e6} 12.b3, Beshukov – Tiviakov,
Saint Vincent 2000, the most
straightforward way to complete
equality was 12...\text{xd4}!? 13.
\text{xd4 a5=} 9...\text{b6} (in case of
9...\text{e6} there is already 10.\text{d2}+)
10.\text{b3 e6} 11.\text{d2 g4} 12.\text{d5}
\text{xd5} 13.exd5 \text{c5} 14.xg4
\text{g4} 15.d4 d5 16.b3 \text{e8}
17.ae1= Ginzburg – Hoffmann,
Villa Ballester 2001, White
stands better due to the pow-
erful position of the d4-knight and
the prospects for exerting pres-
sure on the e7-pawn along the
semi-open e-file.

6.\text{c3}

6...d6

White’s immediate plans in-
clude the move \text{c1-e3}. Antici-
pating that Black gets ready to
meet the entrance of the white
bishop on e3 by \text{f6-g4}. The
other development plan, which is
also associated with the \text{f6-g4}
manoeuvre, but starts by 6...
\text{g7} will be considered in Chap-
ter 6. There we will discuss also
the positions, in which Black
takes his light-squared bishop
out to the long diagonal a8-h1
with the help of b7-b6 on move
six or a little later. Note, that the
swap of a pair of knights by
means of 6...\text{xd4} 7.\text{d4}, fol-
lowed by 7...d6 8.\text{g5} \text{g7} 9.d2
0-0 (as a rule, Black cannot ben-
efit by molesting the white dark-
squared bishop by h7-h6, since
this brings him nothing except
time lost and weakening the
kingside position, e.g., after
9.\text{e6} 10.\text{c1 c8} 11.b3 \text{a5}
12.f3, Polugaevsky – Beliavsky,
Erevan 1975, Black ventured
12...h6, but as a result of 13.\text{e3}
0-0 14.d3 \text{h7} 15.0-0 a6 16.b3
\text{d7} 17.f4 in view of the unpleas-
ant threat f4-f5 he had to opt for
17...f5 18.exf5 xf5 19.\text{e2}
which weakened his situation even further, due to the need to always protect the g6 pawn) provides White with the extra opportunity associated with the move 10.\( \text{\&} \text{d}3\)?? (following 10.\( \text{\&} \text{e}2\) the game is steered to Chapters 3-4, which is discussed below). Further there is 10...\( \text{\&} \text{e}6\) (the plan directed at procuring the a5-square for the queen and involving the maximum possible advance of the a-pawn ended in a complete fiasco after 10...a5 11.0-0 a4 12.\( \text{\&} \text{a}c1\) \( \text{\&} \text{e}6\) 13.\( \text{\&} \text{c}2\) \( \text{\&} \text{d}7\) 14.f4 \( \text{\&} \text{c}8\) 15.b3 ab 16.\( \text{\&} \text{f}6\) 17.\( \text{\&} \text{h}1\) \( \text{\&} \text{a}5\) 18.\( \text{\&} \text{f}5\) \( \text{\&} \text{d}7\) 19.\( \text{\&} \text{d}5\)± Portisch – Reshevsky, Petropolis 1973, and the attempt to entrench the light-squared bishop on the c6-square 10...a6 11.0-0 \( \text{\&} \text{d}7\) 12.\( \text{\&} \text{fe}1\) \( \text{\&} \text{c}6\) 13.\( \text{\&} \text{a}c1\) e6 14.\( \text{\&} \text{b}4\) b6, T. Petrosonian – Beliavsky, Erevan 1975, could have stumbled into the resolute 15.c5! with a possible follow-through: 15...\( \text{\&} \text{bxc}5\) 16.\( \text{\&} \text{xc}5\) e5 17.\( \text{\&} \text{d}5\) \( \text{\&} \text{xd}5\) 18.\( \text{\&} \text{ed}\) dc 19.\( \text{\&} \text{xc}5\) \( \text{\&} \text{d}6\) 20.\( \text{\&} \text{c}6\) \( \text{\&} \text{xd}5\) 21.\( \text{\&} \text{xf}6\) h6 22.\( \text{\&} \text{h}4\) \( \text{\&} \text{ad}8\) 23.\( \text{\&} \text{f}3\) g5 24.\( \text{\&} \text{hxg}5\) hxg5 25.\( \text{\&} \text{g}5\)±) 11.\( \text{\&} \text{c}1\) \( \text{\&} \text{a}5\) 12.0-0 \( \text{\&} \text{c}8\) 13.b3 a6 14.\( \text{\&} \text{a}4\)!? (after 14.\( \text{\&} \text{fe}1\) \( \text{\&} \text{f}8\) 15.\( \text{\&} \text{c}2\) b5 16.cb ab 17.\( \text{\&} \text{ec}1\) b4 18.\( \text{\&} \text{b}5\) \( \text{\&} \text{xc}2\) 19.\( \text{\&} \text{xc}2\) \( \text{\&} \text{d}7\) 20.\( \text{\&} \text{c}7\) \( \text{\&} \text{c}8\) 21.\( \text{\&} \text{c}1\) \( \text{\&} \text{e}5=\) Polugaevsky – Jansa, Sochi 1974, Black retained the equilibrium) 14...\( \text{\&} \text{c}5\) (14...\( \text{\&} \text{b}4\) 15.\( \text{\&} \text{d}5\) \( \text{\&} \text{xd}2\) 16.\( \text{\&} \text{xd}2\) \( \text{\&} \text{xd}5\) 17.ed \( \text{\&} \text{d}7\) 18.a5± Black is facing the need to fight for the draw in a somewhat inferior endgame, and following 14...\( \text{\&} \text{c}7\) 15.\( \text{\&} \text{fe}1\) \( \text{\&} \text{g}4\) 16.\( \text{\&} \text{e}2\) \( \text{\&} \text{e}5\) 17.h3± the careless 17...\( \text{\&} \text{c}6\)? immediately brought Black to a hopeless situation by means of 18.\( \text{\&} \text{d}5\) \( \text{\&} \text{d}2\) 19.\( \text{\&} \text{d}2\) \( \text{\&} \text{cc}8\) 20.\( \text{\&} \text{b}6+-\) 15.\( \text{\&} \text{e}3\)± Adorjan – Deak, Hungary 1993 and Black’s situation is very passive despite its stability.

7.\( \text{\&} \text{e}2\)

Attempts have been made to reliably take control of the g4-square by the move 7.f3. However, despite its obvious merits this approach has its demerits as well. After 7...\( \text{\&} \text{g}7\) 8.\( \text{\&} \text{e}3\) 0-0 9.\( \text{\&} \text{e}2\) the swap 9...\( \text{\&} \text{xd}4\)!! 10.\( \text{\&} \text{xd}4\) adds in strength (obviously 10...\( \text{\&} \text{xd}4\)?? is not quite successful in view of 10...\( \text{\&} \text{g}4\) 10...\( \text{\&} \text{e}6\) 11.\( \text{\&} \text{d}2\) (following 11.0-0 \( \text{\&} \text{a}5\) 12.\( \text{\&} \text{c}1\) \( \text{\&} \text{c}8\) 13.b3 \( \text{\&} \text{d}8\) 14.\( \text{\&} \text{a}4\) \( \text{\&} \text{d}7\) 15.\( \text{\&} \text{e}3\) \( \text{\&} \text{c}5\) 16.\( \text{\&} \text{d}2\) \( \text{\&} \text{d}8\) 17.\( \text{\&} \text{c}3\) b5= T. Ivanov – Fish, Moscow 1995, Black easily resolved his opening problems) 11...\( \text{\&} \text{a}5\) 12.\( \text{\&} \text{c}1\) (in case of 12.0-0 \( \text{\&} \text{c}8\) 13.b3 b5= Black is at least not worse) 12...\( \text{\&} \text{c}8\) 13.b3 a6 14.\( \text{\&} \text{e}3\) (inappropriate is 14.\( \text{\&} \text{b}2\) in view of 14...\( \text{\&} \text{g}5\)!! 15.0-0 \( \text{\&} \text{h}3\) 16.\( \text{\&} \text{f}2\) \( \text{\&} \text{g}4\)!! 17.\( \text{\&} \text{xf}4\) \( \text{\&} \text{xd}4\) 18.\( \text{\&} \text{hx}3\) \( \text{\&} \text{f}4\) 19.\( \text{\&} \text{c}1\) \( \text{\&} \text{e}5\)± and Black wins back the piece sacrificed keeping his superior position, while with 14.a4 \( \text{\&} \text{d}7\) 15.\( \text{\&} \text{xa}7\) \( \text{\&} \text{g}7\) 16.\( \text{\&} \text{d}5\) \( \text{\&} \text{xd}2\) 17.\( \text{\&} \text{xd}2\) \( \text{\&} \text{c}5\) 18.\( \text{\&} \text{c}3\) \( \text{\&} \text{xd}5\) 19.\( \text{\&} \text{xd}5\) a5= the strong position of the c5-knight fully compensates the certain weakness of the e7-pawn, Stefansson – Tiviakov, Mamaia 1991). The situation we have arrived at will recur in our
discussion in Chapter 4, the only difference being that it is Black's move now, so he can completely even the game by means of 14...b5 15.\(\text{cd}5\) \(\text{wx}d2+\) 16.\(\text{xd}2\) \(\text{xd}5\) 17.\(\text{cx}d5\) \(\text{d}7\) 18. \(\text{xc}8+\) \(\text{xc}8\) 19. \(\text{cl}\) \(\text{xc}1\) 20.\(\text{xc}1\) \(\text{f}8\) = T. Ernst – Petursson, Reykjavik 1994.

7...\(\text{g}7\)

The continuation 7...\(\text{xd}4\) 8.\(\text{xd}4\) will be considered below in Chapters 3-4.

8.\(\text{e}3\)

This move is a must. Black threatened \(\text{f}6\)xe4.

8...0-0 9.0-0

At this point two different plans stand out for Black: to exert pressure either on the c4 pawn by transferring the bishop onto e6, or on the e4 pawn by placing his light-squared bishop on c6. The first plan starts by the move 9...\(\text{xd}4\), and the second, as a rule, by 9...\(\text{d}7\) (Chapter 2). Sometimes Black somewhat “muddles up” the move order, but such an approach only provides White with additional opportunities. Thus, e.g., there is the transfer of the bishop to e6 without the preliminary swap on d4. As a result of that after 9...\(\text{e}6\) White gets an extra opportunity associated with 10.\(\text{xe}6!\) (with 10.\(\text{xd}2\) \(\text{xd}4\) 11.\(\text{xd}4\) it is possible to revert to the main line) 10...\(\text{fxe}6\) 11.\(\text{f}4\) (regardless of Black’s somewhat flamboyant move nine, there is no direct refutation of his design, and the attempt to gain an advantage with the help of 11.\(\text{c}5?!\) brought about the opposite outcome after 11...d5 12.\(\text{ex}d5\) \(\text{ex}d5\) 13.\(\text{f}3\) e6 14.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{e}5\Up\) Chabanon – Huber, Pau 1989) 11...\(\text{c}8\) (having set a course for advancing b7-b5, after 11...a6 12.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{b}8\) 13.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{a}5\) 14.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{e}8\) 15.\(\text{g}4\)! \(\text{c}7\) 16.\(\text{a}3\Up\) Chuchelov – Marcelin, Cappelle la Grande 1999, Black overdid it and as a result of 16...b5? 17.\(\text{cxb}5\) axb5 18.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{a}8\) 19.\(\text{c}2+\) – lost a piece) 12.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{h}8\) 13.\(\text{h}1\) a6 14.\(\text{ac}1\) \(\text{c}7\) 15.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{cd}8\) and now in the game Panno – El Ghazali, Thessaloniki 1988, White obtained a superior position by way of 16.\(\text{d}5!\) \(\text{ex}d5\) 17.\(\text{cx}d5\). Should Black accept the swap of his light-squared bishop for the white knight, he is left off without opportunities for active play, moreover, the e6-pawn, though covering the d5-square, needs also piece protection itself.

Another way to confuse White is offered by the move 9...\(\text{d}7\). It seems that Black wishes either to execute a mass swap on the d4-square, or, maybe, to transfer the knight to c5 and thus re-
vert the game to the lines from Chapter 2, which will be considered below. In this case the best continuation is 10...\(\text{c}5\) (the traditional 10...\(\text{d}2\) is not bad either, but after 10...\(\text{xd}4\) 11.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xd}4\) 12.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{b}6\) 13.\(\text{d}2\) it turns out that White’s move ten was superfluous) 10...\(\text{xd}4\) (if Black takes his time with the swap and tries to steer the game into variations from Chapter 2 by way of 10...\(\text{c}5\), then it is possible to interfere with his plan with the help of 11.\(\text{c}6\)?! \(\text{b}6\) 12.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{e}6\) 13.\(\text{a}4\), creating the unpleasant threat \(\text{c}4\)-\(\text{c}5\), furthermore, the attempt to lead away White from this idea by 13...\(\text{f}5\) was not successful after 14.\(\text{exf}5\) \(\text{gxf}5\) 15.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{c}7\) 16.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{b}8\) 17.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{h}8\) 18.\(\text{c}3\) Tukmakov – Koch, Germany 1997, since \(\text{b}4\)-\(\text{b}5\) is already on the agenda, and Black’s eagerness for complications 18...\(\text{xb}4\)?! brought him even greater problems as a result of 19.\(\text{b}5\)! \(\text{xb}5\) 20.\(\text{cx}b5\) \(\text{c}5\) 21.\(\text{f}d1\) 11.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xd}4\) (in case of 11...\(\text{h}6\) 12.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{e}5\) 13.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{xe}3\) 14.\(\text{fxe}3\) \(\text{b}6\) 15.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{g}5\) 16.\(\text{f}3\) the weakness of the \(\text{d}6\)-pawn outweighs White’s pawn structure flaw, associated with the double pawn on the e-file) 12.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{b}6\) 13.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f}6\) (the laws of chess dialectics say that the shuttle manoeuvres of the black knight to and fro cannot pass by unpunished) 14.\(\text{h}1!\) (less precise is 14.\(\text{b}3\), since to 14...\(\text{e}6\) 15.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 16.\(\text{f}4\) Black has 16...\(\text{f}6\)!, letting the bishop through to the kingside, and though after 17.\(\text{ce}1\) \(\text{h}8\) 18.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}7\) 19.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{a}8\) 20.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{g}8\) 21.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{d}8\) Hardicsay – Hicker, Schwarzach 1999, White still holds the initiative, it is extremely hard to break up Black’s defences) 14...\(\text{e}6\) 15.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{ac}8\) 16.\(\text{b}3\) and now it becomes clear that Black’s light-squared bishop cannot find himself a reliable shelter. In such a situation White’s attack can be extremely strong and dashing. Here is an example: 16...\(\text{fd}8\) (following 16...\(\text{g}4\) 17.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 18.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{h}5\) 19.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{g}7\) 20.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{d}8\) 21.\(\text{exd}6\) \(\text{exd}6\) 22.\(\text{d}4\) Wuttke – Elsner, Germany 1995, the weakness of the \(\text{d}6\)-pawn and the dark squares in Black’s camp makes his situation rather grave) 17.\(\text{f}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 18.\(\text{fxg}6\) \(\text{hxg}6\) 19.\(\text{xf}6!\) \(\text{xf}6\) 20.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{f}2\) 21.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{e}8\) 22.\(\text{f}1\) – and Black resigned shortly, Barle – Odeh, Manila 1992.

Sometimes Black resorts to the neutral move 9...\(\text{a}6\), hoping that it will come in handy in the future. In such a case White should simply continue to concentrate his pieces in the centre by way of 10.\(\text{d}2\), clearing the way for the centralisation of his rooks. A possible continuation is 10...\(\text{g}4\) (in case of 10...\(\text{xd}4\) 11.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{e}6\) 12.\(\text{ad}1\) the game reverts to a position considered below at p. 18, and after 10...\(\text{b}8\) 11.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{xd}4\) 12.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{a}5\) 13.\(\text{ab}1\) \(\text{e}6\) 14.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{h}5\) the walk of
the black queen provided White the tempi to develop his initiative and as a result of 15.f4! \( \text{h4} \) 16.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{h} \) 17.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{xd4+} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 18.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{xe5} \) 20.\( \text{xe5} \) \( \text{xd8} \) 21.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{d7} \) 22.\( \text{be1} \) Topalov – Abreu, Tenerife (simultan) 1997, Black stumble onto difficulties) 11.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{g4} \) 12.f3 (having parted with his lightsquared bishop White should not leave his c4 and e4 pawns without due protection, or else Black can obtain counterplay as he did in the game Stone – Hartman, Toronto 1985, following 12.f4 \( \text{d7} \) 13.\( \text{f5} \) \( \text{e5} \) 14.b3 \( \text{g4} \) 15.\( \text{ad1} \) \( \text{xe3} \) 16.\( \text{xe3} \) b5\( \text{c2} \) 12... \( \text{d7} \) 13.\( \text{ac1} \) \( \text{b8} \) 14.\( \text{fd1} \) \( \text{e8} \) 15.b3 \( \text{e5} \) and now in the game Rayner – Pye, Groningen 1974, White should have underscored Black’s lack of any control whatsoever over the d5-square by means of the move 16.\( \text{d5} \)\( \text{d5} \)\( \text{d5} \)\( \text{d5} \) based on the fact that after 16...b5?! 17.cxb5 axb5 18.\( \text{g5} \) \( \text{b7} \) 19.\( \text{c2} \) Black’s problems only become more acute.

On the example of the game Topalov – Abreu, Tenerife (simultan) 1997, shown above, we saw that the black queen can hardly find a reliable base-square, which would permit it to exert some influence on the course of events and at the same time not interfere with his pieces. The perfect position for the queen could be the a5, if the black e7-pawn has advanced to a4 in preparation. To that end one sometimes meets 9...a5. A deficiency of a similar plan for Black is the weakening of the b5-square, which White can exploit immediately by 10.\( \text{d} \) 12.f3 (the rather rushed offensive thrust 12.f4 is fraught with unclear tactical complications after 12...\( \text{d} \) 13.\( \text{a} \) 14.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xb2} \) 15.\( \text{d3} \)\( \text{d5} \)\( \text{d5} \)\( \text{d5} \)\( \text{d5} \)\( \text{d5} \)\( \text{d5} \) and White has superior play due to the threatening advance of the f-pawn.

\( \text{d} \) 10.\( \text{xd4} \) 10.\( \text{xd4} \)

10...\( \text{e6} \)

Sometimes Black is obstinate and instead of the plan with the attack on the c4 pawn, prefers to transfer his bishop to the c6-square by means of 10...\( \text{d7} \), which is typical of variations from Chapter 2. Such a “confused” move order permits Black
to avoid the retreat of the white d4-knight form the centre, which will be touched upon in the discussion of the peculiarities of above-mentioned variations of Chapter 2, but instead it provides White with the extra opportunity based on the move 11. \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}d3}!? (after 11.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}d2 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}c6 12.f3 the game steers into a basic position from variation b, Chapter 2) 11...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}c6 (the discussion of the continuation 11...a5 12.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}e3 will be postponed for the time being until we reach variation b of Chapter 2, and for now we will say that wherever Black's light-squared bishop goes, White does not intend to give it any peace, and should Black opt for 12...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}e6 with a tempo lost, then he must be bothered by means of 13.f4!). Now is the time, when Black's light-squared bishop is trying to make itself at home on the queenside, to embarrass it by means of the b-pawn – 12.b4! There is a difference from variation b of Chapter 2: the white queen is on d3, and not on d2, and that makes possible the move b2–b4. The key to the position is that Black's minor pieces have a single terminal square – d7, and there are two claimants (the bishop and the knight), therefore when the d7-square is occupied by one of the pieces, sometimes the other one is feeling uncomfortable. White generates similar inconveniences associated with the advance of the b– (with the bishop on c6) or f–pawns (with the bishop on e6) throughout all lines of the Maroczy System. Back to the position after White's move twelve b2-b4 note, that in the game R. Lau – Reich, Passau 1999, Black emerged in a rather restrained situation, when he tried to deal with his problems by means of 12...b6 13.a3 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}d7 14.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}fe1 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}f8 15.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}ad1 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}ac8 16.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}h3 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}e8 17.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}f1 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}f8 18.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}d5\underline{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}.

\textbf{11.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}d2}

This is a programmed move typical of the Maroczy System.

\textbf{11...a5}?!?

If this is not the best continuation for best at least it is the most principled one. Black's immediate plan includes transferring his kingside rook to c8 and arrangements for the b7-b5 push. The black queen is ready to retreat to d8, if necessary, since once the kingside rook has taken up position on c8, the black rook pair can get down to work on the b7-b5 move unattended. We have observed similar developments time and time again in Book II Part 5, where the structure of the black pawns is identical to the one in the Maroczy System. The black queen does not have a more convenient location. Thus following 11...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}c8 12.b3 a6 13.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}ad1, Cramling – Roca, Malaga 1998, Black tried to act in a nonconformist way playing 13...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textregistered}}}c7 and emerged in a difficult situation after 14.f4
Chapter 1

Af8 15. f5 Ad7 16. Ac3± in view of two unpleasant threats: Ad4-b6 and Ad4xf6 to be followed by Ac3-d5.

An outwardly very robust move is 11...Ad7, preparing the blockade on the dark squares, however, after 12.Axg7 Ac7 13.Ac4 Bb6+ (after 13...Af6 14.Ac5 Ac8 15.Ac7 Ac7 16.Ad1 Ad5 17. Ac3 a5, Belov – Kiritsenko, Karovina 1992, White carried out another standard breakthrough 18. e5! Axg5 19. Ac7 fxe5 20. fxe5 Afxf1+ 21.Axf1 Bf8 and now he could have reasserted his advantage by 22.Ac4 f6 14.Ac8 15.b3 f6 16.Ac5 Ac7 17. exd5 a5 despite the fact that Black has achieved his goal equality is not an issue to be discussed: the e7-pawn is weak and White’s active options are far from exhausted.

White gained a tangible edge by way of 18.Ac4! f5 19.Ac3 Ac6 20.Af1 Ae7 21.b3 a4 22.Ac3 Ac5 23.Ae1 ab (23...Ac7 24.Ac4) 24. axb3± in the game Cebalo – Dussol, Chartres 1990, thanks to the attack on the e7-pawn and the menacing g2-g4 push.

Possibly the relatively best continuation for Black is 11...a6. After 12.Aad1 (with 12...b5 13. cxb5 axb5, which occurred in the Larsen – Browne game, Siegen 1970, White retains a small advantage by means of 14.Axb5 Axg5 15.b4 Ae6 16.Ac2, thanks to the passed b-pawn supported by almost all his pieces) 12...Ac8 13.b3 Ad7 14.Ae3 (Black obtains some counterplay in case of 14. Ac7 Ac7 15.Af6 16.Ac5 Ac5 17.exd5 b5±) 14...Ac5 (after 14... Ac5 15.Ac5 Ac5 16.Ac4± White’s minor pieces maintain the pressure on the queenside of the adversary, regardless of the fact that Black has carried out the b7-b5 advance) 15.f3 we have arrived at a situation similar to the one just considered in the previous paragraph. There is a small but material difference, though. In the previous case Black’s kingside rook was standing on the c8-square, whereby we could assess the situation as unclear. When Black’s queenside rook is on c8, however, the rule is that it is more difficult for Black to obtain counterplay, sufficient to completely even the play. This is confirmed implicitly by the course of events in the game Marciano – Prie, France 1998, in which after 15...b5 16.Ac5 bxc4 17. Ac4 a5 18.Ac1 Ac8 19.Ac5 Ac6 White could have retained a small advantage by 20.Ac1±, due, first and foremost, to his bishop pair advantage. In the actual game, however, White permitted an inaccuracy 20.Af1?!, so Black managed to swap the bishops by the unobvious tactical stroke 20...Af6=, and whereby completely levelled the position.

12.Aad1!

The black bishop on e6 suggests by perforce the f4-f5 advance, therefore, d1 is the desti-
nation for the queenside rook, since the kingside rook might be needed to support the push of the f-pawn. With similar structures the rook disposition is of no little significance and usually depends on various nuances of the position.

12...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{a6}}}\) 13.b3 a6

Black consistently executes his plan preparing the b7-b5 push. Being aware, however, of the detrimental final effect of this design, Black every so often tries to side-track it, though it is already very difficult to do it the right way. Thus in case of 13...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d4}}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{b4}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{d4}}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d5}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{d8}}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f7}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{d7}}}\) 17.h3 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{e5}}}\), Psakhis – Gershon, Israel 1999, White staged a large-scale offensive on the kingside by way of 18...f4, which after 18...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d7}}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f5}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{e6}}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f3}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{e5}}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{g3}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{e8}}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f4}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{f7}}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e3}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{g8}}}\) was completed by the traditional breakthrough in the centre 24.c5\(\uparrow\). Following 13...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d7}}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d5}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{d8}}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{g7}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{d7}}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f4}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{f8}}}\) White could have obtained a huge advantage with the help of another breakthrough 17.e5\(\uparrow\), since 17...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{dxe5}}}\) was impossible in view of 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{h5}}}\)\(\uparrow\).

14.f4

Having placed optimally all his pieces, White starts the offensive on the black kingside. The success of this plan will no doubt be facilitated by the position of the black bishop on e6.

14...b5

Black has accomplished the long planned for advance, though, as we will see shortly, he will not be able to profit from it, since White’s threats on the opposite sector of the board will turn out more weighty. However, Black cannot avoid the unfavourable course of events. Thus after 14...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e8}}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f5}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{d7}}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d5}}}\)

Sorri – Pitkanen, Helsinki 1998, the game ended immediately in White’s favour. Not surprisingly. After 16...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d2}}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd2}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd4}}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd4}}}\), the prevention of the threats to the b6 and e7 squares, originated by the white d5-knight, transcends Black’s powers.

The attempt to cool off White’s offensive pressure by means of 14...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{g4}}}\), followed by 15.e5! \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xe2}}}\) (no better is 15...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{dxe5}}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{fxe5}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xe2}}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xe2}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{d7}}}\), which permitted White to finish off the game by a slashing attack on the black king by way of 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d5}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xe8}}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{b4}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{a4}}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e6}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd4}}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd4}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xf6}}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e5}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{c6}}}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xf6}}}\)\(\uparrow\) – Maus – Seibold, Germany 1991) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xe2}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{d7}}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d5}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{e8}}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{b4}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{d8}}}\) 19.e6 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd4}}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{xd4}}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xf6}}}\), Fang – Pham Minh Hoang, Budapest 1998, brought Black to a hopeless situation, where success can be achieved by both the actual 21.c5, and the more energetic 21.f5\(\uparrow\), based on the line 21...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d5}}}\) 22.exf7+ \(\text{\textit{\textbf{xf7}}}\) 23.fxg6\(\uparrow\), limiting the life expectancy of the black king to no more than five moves.
Chapter 1

15.f5 \text{d7}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

16.\text{xf6}!

White’s major problem in the diagrammed position is not to sell out cheap. The fact that this is a possibility is evidenced by the game Sherzer – Zivkovic, Budapest 1990, in which White introduced a preliminary swap 16.fxg6?! hxg6 and following 17.\text{xf6} exf6 18.\text{d5} \text{d8} 19.\text{xf4} \text{e6} 20.\text{xf6} \text{xf6} 21.\text{xf6} \text{xf6} 22.\text{xf6} bxc4 23.\text{xc4} \text{xc4} 24.bxc4 \text{xc4} 25.\text{dxc6} \text{a4} 26.\text{d7} \text{xf8} had to settle for an extra pawn in a drawn rook endgame.

16...\text{xf6}

After 16...exf6 17.\text{d5} \text{d8} 18.\text{d4}! + there is a threat on the f6-pawn, but also a knight fork from the b6-square, and the fact that the black f6-pawn has not only locked in jail his own g7 bishop, but is also crushed down by the white f5-pawn, is not without significance. White lacked exactly this opportunity in case of the preliminary swap on g6 in the game Sherzer – Zivkovic, Budapest 1990.

17.\text{d5} \text{xd2} 18.\text{xf6+} \text{xf6}

Black’s position disintegrates also after 18...\text{g7} 19.\text{xd2} \text{xf6} 20.\text{fxg6} \text{xf6} in view of 21.e5! bxc4 22.\text{xc4} \text{b5} 23.exd6 \text{xc4} 24.bxc4 \text{xc4} 25.dxe7+ Salmensuu – Verkasalo, Jarvanpaa 1998.

19.\text{xd2} gxf5

In case of 19...bxc4 20.\text{xd6} \text{a7} White’s most straightforward continuation is 21.bxc4?!\text{d} with excellent winning chances.

20.\text{xd6} \text{c7} 21.\text{xf5} \text{e8} 22.\text{d3} bxc4 23.bxc4!

A key point. White must prevent the bishop swap. In case of 23.\text{xc4} \text{b5} 24.\text{xb5} axb5 25.\text{xf6} \text{c2} 26.a4 \text{ee2} 27.\text{h1} bxa4 28.bxa4 \text{g2} 29.g1 \text{g1} 30.\text{g1} \text{a2} White’s edge will probably not suffice for a win, regardless of the extra pawn.

23...\text{c6}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board2.png}
\end{center}

24.\text{f4}!+

This position occurred in the game Ftacnik – J.Gonzalez, Leon 1999. White’s win is only a matter of time and technical ability. Note, that it would have been bad to take another pawn by 24.\text{xf6}? in view of 24...\text{d8}! 25.e2 \text{g7} and White has to part with the exchange.
1. åf3 c5 2.c4 g6 3.e4 åc6 4.d4 exd4 5. åxd4 åf6 6. åc3 d6 7. åe2 åg7 8. åe3 0-0 9.0-0 åd7

10. åd2

The most popular choice. White reinforces his position in the centre vacating the d1-square for the rook. Other continuations are also possible, though each has its deficiencies. E.g., on account of the fact that Black is experiencing certain deficiency of board room and, moreover, intends to swap a pair of knights on the very next move to vacate the c6-square for his bishop, oftentimes White has retreated the d4-knight from the centre. Despite that this plan is seemingly logical, as a rule, Black has managed to obtain counterplay. After 10. åb3 White’s position is most often disturbed by way of 10...a5! At this point the continuation 11. åd2 åc8 12. åc1 åd7= with the idea åc5 provided Black in the Korchnoi – Anand game, Wijk aan Zee 1990, with sufficient counterchances to maintain the balance. Black’s dealings are a little more complicated in case of 10. åc2. Thereafter Black usually looks for counterplay by increasing the pressure on the c4-pawn. After 10... åc8 (worse is 10... åa5 in view of 11. f4! and to 11... åfc8, which was planned a move earlier, White pulls out 12. c5 åd8 13. exd6 exd6= with superior odds thanks to the isolation of the black d6-pawn) 11. f3 (following 11. åd2 åe5 12. åb3 b5! 13. åf4 åeg4 14. åd4 åxc4 15. åxc4 åc7 16. åh3 e5= Black is even more pleasing) 11... åa6 12. åd2 (if 12. åc1, then there is 12... åe6 13. åa3 åd7 14. åd2 åa5 15. åfd1 and now, when the knight from the central d4-square has gone into an uncoerced exile on a3, the time has come to stir up White’s position by a typical stroke in the centre 15... åf5! 16. exf5, Masic – Ostojic, Umag 1972. Now worth attention was 16... åxf5!?, draw-
ing from the fact that after 17.\texttt{d}d5+\texttt{xd}5 18.cxd5\texttt{b}4 in-appropriate is 19.g4?! in view of 19...\texttt{xd}3! 20.\texttt{xd}3\texttt{xf}3) 12...\texttt{e}5 13.\texttt{a}3 (following 13.b3 Black obtained full-fledged play by means of 13...b5! 14.cxb5\texttt{a}5 15.b4\texttt{c}7 16.\texttt{d}d4\texttt{xb}5 17.\texttt{e}3\texttt{c}4 18.\texttt{xc}4\texttt{xc}4 19.\texttt{ac}1\texttt{wb}7= Lamoureux – Afek, Oakham 1993) 13...\texttt{e}6 14.\texttt{d}d5 \texttt{fd}7 15.\texttt{d}d4 \texttt{c}6 16.\texttt{g}g7 (in case of 16.\texttt{e}3 White has to take into consideration 16...f5!? 17.\texttt{f}f4 \texttt{f}f7=) 16...\texttt{x}g7 17.\texttt{h}h1 a5 18.\texttt{c}2 \texttt{c}5 19.\texttt{ce}3 \texttt{f}6= Goessling – Kountz, Bad Zwesten 1999, White has got nothing.

Outwardly logical looks also 10.f3, moreover, that this move is part of White’s plans. However, playing that way White must be ready for 10...\texttt{b}6?! And after 11.\texttt{h}1\texttt{xb}2 12.\texttt{a}4 in the game Rytsagov – Nielsen, Asker 1997, Black could have obtained sufficient material compensation for the queen with a rather robust position by means of 12...\texttt{x}a1 13.\texttt{x}a1 \texttt{xd}4 14.\texttt{xd}4 \texttt{xa}4=.

Closely related to the main-line move is 10.\texttt{c}1. However, it has its own tactical distinctions. After 10...\texttt{xd}4 11.\texttt{xd}4 White must be ready for the unconventional 11...\texttt{h}6?! (following 11...\texttt{c}6 12.f3 \texttt{d}7 13.e3 a5 14.b3\texttt{c}5 15.\texttt{d}2 the game reverts to the position, considered below) 12.f4 (after 12.\texttt{c}2 e5 13.e3\texttt{xe}3 14.fxe3 \texttt{c}6 15.d3 a5 16.\texttt{f}2 \texttt{d}7 17.\texttt{g}4 \texttt{c}5 18.\texttt{c}2 \texttt{d}7 19.\texttt{d}1 \texttt{e}6= Merenyi – Winants, Belgium 1997, Black managed to successfully re-organise and his position is hard to penetrate) 12...\texttt{c}6 13.\texttt{xf}6\texttt{xf}6 14.\texttt{d}2\texttt{e}8 15.\texttt{f}3\texttt{b}6+ 16.\texttt{h}1\texttt{ad}8 17.g3\texttt{g}7 18.\texttt{c}2\texttt{c}5 19.\texttt{d}5 a5= Todorovic – Abramovic, Belgrade 1992, and the flaws in Black's pawn structure to a significant extent cancel his superiority on the dark squares.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Diagram 2}
\end{center}

The position after White’s tenth move \texttt{d}1-d2 is not of the tactical type, therefore it is no wonder that Black has chosen a great variety of continuations. We will treat only two of these as independent: a) 10...\texttt{a}6 and b) 10...\texttt{xd}4, though they are naturally not equally significant.

Note that 10...\texttt{g}4 is not dangerous for White. In contrast with the variation characterised by \texttt{g}8-h6, which was considered in the note to Black’s move four, the light-squared bishop arrives at g4 twice over. This circumstance tips the scales sufficiently in White’s favour. After 11.\texttt{g}4
\( \text{\(\mathcal{A}xg4 12.f3 \text{\(\mathcal{A}d7 13.\mathcal{A}ac1 \mathcal{A}e8\)} \)
14.\(\mathcal{A}fd1 \text{\(\mathcal{E}e5\)} 15.b3 a6 16.a4 \text{\(\mathcal{A}c6\)} \)
17.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}d5 \mathcal{B}b8\)} \) (it is hard for Black to manifest any activity with
17...\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}a5\)} 18.\text{\(\mathcal{B}b4 \mathcal{B}b8\)} 19. \text{\(\mathcal{E}c2\)} \)
18.\(\text{\(\mathcal{E}e2\)} \) the attempt to break free
by means of 18...b5?! (Black had better accept the passive position
following 18...b6 19.b4 \)
permitted White to obtain a big advantage
with the help of 19.axb5
axb5 20.c5! dxc5 21.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}xc5\)} \)
\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}\) Kramnik – Adianto, London (active).} \)

Black has tried to fight for equality also by means of 10...a5.
The objectives of this plan have already been discussed a move earlier. Now, as well as then, the
prescription is the same – 11. \(\text{\(\mathcal{D}eb5!\)} \) After 11...a4 (of no avail
for Black is the inclusion of the moves 11...\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}e5\)} 12.f3, since follow-
ing 12...a4 13.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}ab1 \mathcal{W}a5\)} \)
14.b4 axb3 15.axb3 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}xb5\)} 16.b4
\text{\(\mathcal{B}d8\)} 17.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}xb5 \mathcal{W}d7\)} 18.\text{\(\mathcal{B}fc1 \mathcal{B}e8\)} \)
19.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}c2\)} \)
Kabatiantsi – Sulypa, Simferopol 1991, Black retained
his spatial problems, having parted with his light-squared
bishop on the way) 12.f4 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}a5\)} \) (after
12...\(\text{\(\mathcal{G}g4\)} 13.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}xg4 \mathcal{A}xg4\)} \)
14.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}d5 \mathcal{W}a5\)} 15.\(\text{\(\mathcal{W}f2\)} \)
the threat \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}e3\)}-\text{\(\mathcal{B}6\)} \)
\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{is very unpleasant for Black\) \ comes into play the typi-
cal breakthrough 13.c5! Now as a result of 13...dxc5 14.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}xc5 \mathcal{G}g4\)} \)
(after 14...\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}a7? 15.b4!++\) Black has to choose between losing his}
queen or losing a piece, and in case of 14...\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}fd8 15.\(\text{\(\mathcal{W}e3\)} \)
the thrust of the white bishop onto
b6 is once more on the agenda) \(15.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}xg4 \mathcal{A}xg4\)} 16.\(\text{\(\mathcal{W}e2 \mathcal{A}xc3\)} \)
following 16...b6 17.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}xe7! \mathcal{A}xe7\)} \)
18.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}xg4 a3 19.\(\text{\(\mathcal{W}e2 \mathcal{A}ac8 20.c5\)} \)
Black risks to obtain insufficient compensation for the pawn lost)
17.bxc3 \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}f6\)} 18.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}ab1 \mathcal{W}d8\)} 19.
\text{\(\mathcal{W}h1 \mathcal{A}ac8 20.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}a3 \mathcal{E}e8\)} 21.f5 \mathcal{E}c7\)}
22.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}fxg6 \text{\(\mathcal{A}xg6\)} 23.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}f2\)} \)
24.\(\text{\(\mathcal{W}g3\)} \)
Timman – Larsen, Las Palmas 1982, White is ready to start the
decisive attack on the seriously weakened shelter of the black
king.

It is worth noting that Black risks to suffocate in his own camp, if he does not take course
on swapping the knights on d4 to be followed by a blockade on
the dark squares, or does not plan to bring about the b7-b5
advance, one way or another. There are examples of that.
Moreover, White's game is rather straightforward. Thus after 10...
\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}c8 11.f3 \mathcal{E}e5\)} \) (in case of 11...a6
12.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}fd1\)} \) the game is reduced to a
situation, considered in variation a) 12.b3 b6 13.\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}ac1 h5\)} \), having
completed the centralisation of all his pieces, White pulls out his
master trump – the move 14. \(\text{\(\mathcal{A}d5!\)} \).
Only a move later, 14...
\(\text{\(\mathcal{W}h7 15.\(\text{\(\mathcal{W}h1, in the game Leko –}
Palasti, Hungary 1998, Black made an obvious concession}
playing 15...\(\text{\(\mathcal{A}xd5\)} \) and emerged in a rather deplorable situation
after 16.exd5 f5 (if Black had not made this concession, White
would have tried to simply win the black e5-knight with the help

23
of 17...h3 and 18...f4) 17...h3 \( \Box f7 \)
18...f4 \( \Box h6 \) 19...\( \Box f1 \) \( \Box e8 \) 20...\( \Box f3 \)
\( \Box g8 \) 21...\( \Box f2 \) \( \Box f6 \) 22...\( \Box e6 \pm \).

a) 10...a6

Black's plans feature the move b7-b5.

11...\( \Box f3 \)

The more reliably protected the e4-pawn is, the less chances there are of Black advancing b7-b5, since the c3-knight is relieved of the responsibility to protect the e4-pawn.

11...\( \Box b8 \)

This continuation is best suited to the plan initiated on move ten. In his quest for counterplay alongside the mainline move Black has tested other lines as well. Thus after 11...\( \Box a5 \)
12...\( \Box b3 \) \( \Box d8 \) (following 12...\( \Box h5 \)
13...\( \Box a1 \) \( \Box a5 \), Bruk – Shrentzel, Israel 1991, White could have placed Black in a difficult situation by 14...\( \Box a5 \) \( \Box a5 \) 15.c5 \( \Box e8 \)
16...\( \Box d1 \) \( \Box c6 \) 17...\( \Box d6 \) \( \Box d6 \) 18.
\( \Box d5 \) \( \Box d8 \) 19...\( \Box b6 \) \( \Box d7 \) 20...\( \Box c5 \pm \), having established two most unpleasant threats: 21...\( \Box b6 \) and 21...\( \Box e6 \pm \)) 13...\( \Box d1 \) b6, Petrosian – Venalainen, Nice 1974, White

could have forced Black immediately to make concessions in the centre by means of 14...\( \Box d5 \)!? \( \Box b8 \)
15...\( \Box g5 \pm \).

Should Black continue 11...
\( \Box e8 \), then there is 12...\( \Box d1 \) \( \Box c8 \) and after 13...\( \Box x6 \) \( \Box x6 \) (bad is 13...bxc6 in view of 14...\( \Box c5 \pm \)
White in the game Petrosian – Pilnik, Goteborg 1955, started an offensive on the queenside by means of 14.b4! \( \Box d7 \) 15.a4 b6 16.a5\pm. A similar picture with small variations can be observed also after 11...\( \Box c8 \) 12...\( \Box d1 \) \( \Box c7 \)
(with 12...\( \Box a5 \) Black has to take into consideration 13...\( \Box x6 \) \( \Box x6 \)
14.c5\pm, and in case of 12...\( \Box e5 \)
13.b3 \( \Box c6 \) 14...\( \Box a1 \) \( \Box a5 \) 15...\( \Box f1 \), Badea – Bobu, Bucharest 1994, Black quickly disintegrated as a result of the unlucky manoeuvre 15...\( \Box e8 \) following 16...\( \Box x6 \)!
\( \Box x6 \) 17...\( \Box d5 \) \( \Box d8 \) 18...\( \Box b4 \) e6 19.
\( \Box b6 \pm \)) 13...\( \Box a1 \) \( \Box b8 \) (the swap of a pair of knights 13...\( \Box x4 \)
14...\( \Box x4 \) \( \Box c6 \) only conduces to White’s offensive on the queenside, since in the game Panno – Dellagiovanna, San Luis 1992, following 15.b4! of no avail already was 15...b6 in view of 16.b5 \( \Box b7 \) 17...\( \Box d5 \) \( \Box x4 \) 18...\( \Box e7 \) \( \Box a7 \)
19.bxa6+ 14...\( \Box x4 \) \( \Box x6 \)
15.a4 b6 16.b4 \( \Box d7 \) 17...\( \Box d5 \) \( \Box e8 \)
18.b5\pm at which point of the game Mestel – Henao, Thessaloniki 1984, Black was forced to switch to repulsion of White’s threats on the queenside.

12...\( \Box d1 \)

Should White take the d4-
knight off the centre, then after 12.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}b3 \textcolor{red}{\text{e}}6 13.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}fd1, Smejkal – Hebert, Luzern 1982, Black could have satisfactorily re-grouped his forces by means of 13...\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d7 14.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}d5 b6 15.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}ac1 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}c5=.  

12...\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}e8  
Probably Black’s best recourse is to keep on waiting. True, he must do that also very carefully. After 12...\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}c7 13.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}ac1 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}fc8 14.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}b3 there was the unpleasant threat \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}c3-d5-b6, which forced Black to accept the follow-through 14...b6 15.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d5 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d8, but the timely 16.c5! b5 17.exd6 exd6 18.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}g5 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}e6 19.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xf6+ \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xf6 20.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xf6 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xf6 21.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xd6+ Bernasek – Balin, Czech Republic 1999, brought about a position, where White had an extra pawn. A similar picture arises also after 12...\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}a5 13.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}ac1 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}fc8 14.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}b3 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d8, where White forced Black to part with an exchange by means of 15.c5! dxc5 16.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xc5 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}e8 17.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}e1 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}a5 18.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}b3 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}c7 19.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d5 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xd5 20.exd5 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}e5 21.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d2 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d8 22.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}f4 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xd5 23.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xe5 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xd2 24.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xd2 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xe5 25.g3± Jansen – Sutkovic, India 1998.  
The attempt to remain loyal to one’s principles and carry out the b7-b5 advance, planned on moves ten and eleven, brings Black serious problems. Thus after 12...\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xd4?! 13.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xd4 b5 Black’s position is hopeless in view of 14.e5! \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}e8 15.exd6 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xd4 16.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xd4 exd6 17.c5+-, which occurred in the game Borgo – Pegoraro, Italy 1997. Somewhat superior is 12...b5, however, here also, following 13.cxb5 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xd4 14.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xd4 (in case of 14...\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xb5 15.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xb5 axb5 16.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}b4 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d7 17.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}e3 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}c5, G. Horvath – Anastasian, Budapest 1996, White demonstrated the horrendous power of the bishop pair by means of 18.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}ac1 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}b6 19.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}c2 h5 20.f4 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}b7 21.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}f3 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}a6 22.b3 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}fc8 23.e5+) 14...axb5 White has the “cool” 15.a3! (less precise is 15.b4, though even in this case after Bc6 16.a4 bxa4 17.b5 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}a8 18.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xa4 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d7 19.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xg7 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xg7 20.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d4+ \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}g8 21.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}a7± the passed b-pawn, supported by the white pieces, has frightful strength, Campora – Nemet, Bern 1992), preparing the b4-square for the knight and indicating that the black b5-pawn is rather a weakness, than a ram, capable of piercing White’s defences on the queenside. Now the continuation 15...\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}c6 16.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}a2 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d7 (outright bad is 16...\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d7? in view of 17.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xg7 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xg7 18.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}c3 \textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}e5 19.f4+-, which occurred in the game Yermolinsky – V. Kozlov, USSR 1985) 17.\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}b4 \textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}b7 18.\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d3±, fol-
followed by \( \text{d}1-e2 \), provides White with a huge advantage.

13.\( \text{f} \text{a}1 \) \( \text{d}4 \)

The black pieces obviously lack board room. The queen is feeling especially comfortless on d8. Its opposition on the same file with the white rook makes the move c4-c5, which is rather dangerous for Black, a very distinct possibility. By swapping a pair of knights Black hopes to provide his queen with a relatively safe retreat square on a5.

14.\( \text{f}4 \text{x}d4 \) \( \text{a}5 \)

It is very risky for Black to play 14...b5 in view of 15.c5! b4 16.\( \text{f}6 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 17.\( \text{d}5 \pm \).

15.a3 \( \text{e}6 \) 16.b4

It becomes clear that the black queen cannot find peace even on the a5-square.

16...\( \text{h}d8 \)

After 16...\( \text{x}a3 \) 17.a1 \( \text{x}b4 \) 18.\( \text{d}6 \) Black can save his queen only at the price of a piece by means of 18...\( \text{x}e4 \) 19.\( \text{x}f4 \) \( \text{x}d4 \) 20.\( \text{x}d4 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 21.\( \text{x}c5 \) dxc5 22.\( \text{f}2 \)\(+\), which obviously does not suit him. The long trip to the kingside 16...\( \text{h}5 \) will turn out a long-term exile for the black queen after 17.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 18.\( \text{c xd}5 \) \( \text{h}6 \) 19.\( \text{xe}3 \) \( \text{xe}3 \) 20.\( \text{x}e3 \)\(+\), and will result in an inevitable invasion of the queenside of the adversary by White’s major pieces.

17.\( \text{a}4 \)!

White does not need to settle for a mere spatial advantage after 17.\( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 18.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{x}d4 \) 19.\( \text{x}d4 \) f6\(+\) and is willing to have more.

17...b5

Black dreamed of this move earlier on, and now it has become a necessity. Following 17...b6 18.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 19.\( \text{x}g7 \) \( \text{x}g7 \) very unpleasant is 20.c5\(+\).

The diagram position occurred in the game Kir. Georgiev – Smejkal, Dubai 1986. Playing 18.\( \text{b}2 \) (in the actual game White chose 18.cxb5, which brought about interesting tactical complications after 18...\( \text{b}3 \) 19.\( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{x}d1 \) 20.\( \text{x}d1 \) axb5 21.\( \text{x}b5 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 22.\( \text{x}g7 \) \( \text{x}g7 \) 23.\( \text{d}4 \)\( \pm \) 18...\( \text{d}7 \) (in case of 18...\( \text{x}c4 \) 19.\( \text{xc4} \) the white knight is ready to perform another raid on Black’s queenside) 19.\( \text{e}3 \)\( \pm \) White can be satisfied by his situation. Presently there are two standard blows against the black position on the agenda: c4-c5 and e4-e5.

b) 10...\( \text{xd}4 \)

Black vacates the c6-square for his bishop. On account of the fact that Black is lacking sufficient board room, the decision to
swap a pair of knights is doubly justified.

11. \( \text{\underline{\text{\text{x}}}} \text{xd4} \)

11...\( \text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} \text{6} \)

By his very next moves Black as a rule tries to arrange a blockading position on the dark squares. To that end he sometimes uses the move 11...a5. It is entirely acceptable and oftentimes leads to the same positions as Black’s mainline move after 12.b3 \( \text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} \text{6} 13.f3 \). Such a move transposition has a slight flaw, however, in view of the fact that Black does not force White to immediately play f2-f3, which means that the third rank is not barred and can be used in the future to transfer the white rook to the kingside. Therefore, with the move 11...a5 White is provided with an additional option in the superiority contest: 12. \( \text{\underline{\text{\text{e}}}} \text{3} \)!? (this position has already been mentioned in the note to Black’s move ten in Chapter 1). Now after 12...\( \text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} \text{6} 13.\text{\underline{\text{\text{f}}}} \text{d1} \text{\underline{\text{\text{d}}}} \text{7} 14.\text{\underline{\text{\text{x}}}} \text{\underline{\text{\text{g}}}} \text{7} \text{\underline{\text{\text{x}}}} \text{\underline{\text{\text{g}}}} \text{7} 15.\text{\underline{\text{\text{a}}}} \text{\underline{\text{\text{b}}}} 1 \text{\underline{\text{\text{b}}}} 6 16.\text{\underline{\text{\text{g}}}} \text{\underline{\text{\text{f}}}} 5 \text{\underline{\text{\text{e}}}} \text{f8} 17.\text{\underline{\text{\text{d}}}} \text{3} \text{h6} 18.\text{\underline{\text{\text{h}}}} \text{4} \text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} 5 19.\text{\underline{\text{\text{d}}}} \text{5} \text{\underline{\text{\text{x}}}} \text{\underline{\text{\text{d}}}} \text{5} 20.\text{\underline{\text{e}}x\text{\underline{\text{\text{d}}}}} \text{5} \text{\underline{\text{\text{a}}}} \text{\underline{\text{\text{d}}}} \text{8} 21.\text{\underline{\text{h}}} \text{3} \text{\underline{\text{\text{h}}}} 8 22.\text{\underline{\text{b}}} \text{\underline{\text{b}}} 3 \text{~b6} 23.\text{\underline{\text{\text{b}}}} \text{\underline{\text{b5}}} \pm \)

Kosashvili – Afek, Tel Aviv 1992, White retains some advantage regardless of the black blockade on the dark squares, thanks to the fact that his rook is capable of molesting the position of the adversary both on the queenside and on the kingside. As to the impulsive role of the white lightsquared bishop, he can find a job in the future on the c8-h3 diagonal.

The other options for Black are significantly worse. Thus after 11...a6 12.f3 \( \text{\underline{\text{\text{a}}}} \text{5} \) (in case of 12...b8 13.\text{\underline{\text{\text{d}}}} \text{1} \text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} \text{8} 14.a3 (after 14.\text{\underline{\text{\text{f}}}} \text{6} \text{\underline{\text{\text{f}}}} \text{6} 15.\text{\underline{\text{\text{d}}}} \text{5} \text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} 5 16.\text{\underline{\text{\text{h}}}} \text{1} \text{\underline{\text{\text{e}}}} 6 17.\text{\underline{\text{\text{f}}}} \text{\underline{\text{f6}}} \text{\underline{\text{\text{x}}}} \text{\underline{\text{\text{f6}}} 18.\text{\underline{\text{\text{a}}}} \text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} 6 19.\text{\underline{\text{f4}}} \text{f5} 20.\text{\underline{\text{e}}x\text{\underline{\text{\text{f5}}} 21.\text{\underline{\text{\text{f}}}} \text{3} \text{\underline{\text{\text{b}}}} 6 \pm \text{Dvorak – Jirovsky, Plzen 1998}, Black obtained an entirely tenable, though inferior, position) 14...\text{\underline{\text{\text{e}}}} 6 15.b4 \text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} 7 16.\text{\underline{\text{\text{a}}}} \text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} 6 \text{\underline{\text{\text{d}}}} 7 17.\text{\underline{\text{f}}} \text{3} \text{\underline{\text{b}}} 6 \text{White created problems for his opponent by the standard stroke 18.\text{\underline{\text{\text{d}}}} \text{5} ! \text{Adamski – Liebergesell, Giessen 1992}. Further on, Black faced serious difficulties as a result of 18...\text{\underline{\text{\text{d}}}} \text{8} 19.\text{\underline{\text{\text{g}}}} \text{5} \text{\underline{\text{\text{d}}}} \text{5} 20.\text{\underline{\text{cxd5}}} \text{b5} 21.\text{\underline{\text{\text{e}}}} \text{3} \text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} \text{1} 22.\text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} \text{1} \text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} 8 23.\text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} \text{6} \text{\underline{\text{\text{b}}}} \text{6} 24.\text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} \text{8} \text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} \text{8} 25.\text{\underline{\text{\text{c}}}} \text{2} \pm \text{, followed by a3-a4).}

The move 11...\text{\underline{\text{\text{b}}}} \text{5} is not appropriate either. The unsecured position of the black queen on a5 inevitably creates prerequisites for an exchange operation associated with the jump of the white knight, to be followed by an in-
terim check from e7 or f6. A classical exhibit is the game Botvinnik – Lombardy, Wijk aan Zee 1969. There following 12.\textit{xfd1} \textit{xc8} (relatively superior is 12... \textit{h8}, though here also White could have developed some initiative on the queenside, similar to what we have already seen above, with the help of 13.a3!?) White ruined Back’s pawn structure on the kingside by means of 13.\textit{xf6}! \textit{xf6} 14.\textit{xd5} \textit{xd2} 15. \textit{xf6} \textit{g7} (Black has a difficult position also after 15...\textit{xf6} 16. \textit{xd2} \textit{e6} 17.\textit{b3}±) 16.\textit{h5}! \textit{gh5} 17.\textit{xd2}. The further course of events developed in the following instructive way: 17...\textit{f6}?! (in anticipation of the move e4-e5, in the more recent Laketic – Contin game, Cutro 1997, Black opted for the more precise 17... \textit{g4} 18.\textit{f3} \textit{e6} 19.\textit{b3} a5, though even in this case, had White prevented Black’s game, connected with the advance of the a-pawn, by the move 20.a4!±, then he would have retained a steady advantage) 18.\textit{b3} \textit{c5} 19.\textit{f4} \textit{ac8} 20.\textit{e1} \textit{e8} 21.\textit{f1} \textit{f7} 22.\textit{f2} a6 23.\textit{e3}! (the white rook starts its third rank dash for the h5-pawn) 23...\textit{a5} (the counterplay associated with 23...\textit{b5}? is impossible for the time being due to 24.\textit{b4}±) 24.\textit{a4} \textit{ac5} 25.\textit{e2} \textit{ac8} 26.\textit{g3}+ \textit{f8} (in case of 26...\textit{h6} 27.\textit{h3}±, followed by \textit{f4}–\textit{f5}, the second rook is ready to come to the rescue of the first one along the same route) 27.\textit{h3} \textit{c6} 28.\textit{f5} (it is not worth winning the exchange by means of 28.\textit{b4}?!), since after 28...\textit{xc4} 29.\textit{xc4} \textit{xc4}= the unprotected white pawns along the fourth rank will permit Black to maintain the balance) 28...\textit{b6} 29.\textit{dd3} \textit{b4} 30.\textit{xf6} \textit{g8} 31.\textit{h4}! e6 (the attempt to execute a breakthrough by means of 31...\textit{b5} could have resulted in a mate of the black king after 32.\textit{g3} bxc4 33.\textit{hg4} \textit{f7} 34.\textit{xf7} \textit{xf7} 35.\textit{g8}+–) 32.\textit{xe6} \textit{xe6} 33.\textit{d1}+– and Black must soon lose a second pawn.

12.\textit{f3}

Playing in this way, White in a sense abandons the direct attack on the black king. There is no doubt that the pawn must be protected, since after 12.\textit{xfd1} e5 13.\textit{e3} \textit{xe4} 14.\textit{xe4} \textit{xe4} 15.\textit{xd6} \textit{h4}= Puth – Wagner, Heimbach Weis 1997, Black had no problem evening the odds. The attempt to protect it by means of 12.\textit{xe3}, by analogy with the note to Black’s move eleven, can hardly be successful here, in view of 12...\textit{e5}! 13.\textit{xa7} \textit{d7} 14.\textit{a4} and now in the game Ginting – Berg, Gausdal 1992, Black could have arrested the white bishop by way of 14...\textit{xa5} 15.\textit{b5} b6= If White wants definitely to play against the black king, he chooses as a rule 12. \textit{d3}. However, this represents a serious commitment and consequently this way is less attractive. After 12...\textit{a5} (Black man-
aged to deal with the problems of defending his position also with 12...\texttt{Qd7} 13.\texttt{Qxe7} \texttt{Qxe7} 14.\texttt{Qf4e1} a5 15.\texttt{Qd4} \texttt{Qf6} 16.\texttt{Qd1} a4 17.\texttt{Qd5} e6 18.\texttt{Qb4} \texttt{Qa5} 19.\texttt{Qc2} \texttt{Qfd8} 20.\texttt{Qc3} e5 21.h3 \texttt{Qc5} Kasparov – Koch, Evry (simultan) 1989) 13.\texttt{Qae1}!? \texttt{Qd7} 14.\texttt{Qxg7} \texttt{Qxg7} 15.\texttt{Qe3} \texttt{Qb6} 16.\texttt{Qh3} h5 in the Grischuk – Serper game, New Delhi 2000, the spectacular white attack involving a rook sacrifice 17.\texttt{Qxh5}! \texttt{gxf5} 18.\texttt{Qg5+} \texttt{Qh8} 19.\texttt{Qxh5+} \texttt{Qg7} 20.\texttt{Qg5+} \texttt{Qh8} 21.\texttt{Qe1} was successful to a large extent thanks to Black’s inappropriate reply 21...\texttt{Qe5}? (following 21...\texttt{Qd4}! 22.\texttt{Qh6+} \texttt{Qg8} 23.\texttt{Qxe3} \texttt{Qe5} 24.\texttt{Qe2} \texttt{Qg4} 25.\texttt{Qg3} \texttt{Qxf2+} 26.\texttt{Qh1} \texttt{Qe1+} 27.\texttt{Qg1} \texttt{Qxg3} 28.\texttt{Qg5+} \texttt{Qh8} 29.\texttt{Qh8} \texttt{Qf2+} 30.\texttt{Qh2} \texttt{Qxd3} 31.\texttt{Qe6+} \texttt{Qg8} 32.\texttt{Qxe5= the fight could have ended in a perpetual check}, and at this point 22.\texttt{Qe3} forced Black to immediately part with his queen 22...\texttt{Qxe3} 23.\texttt{Qxe3+–.}

12...\texttt{a5}

We have already seen more than once how Black’s position shattered into pieces after the c4-c5 breakthrough. For that reason Black intends to transfer his knight to c5 and now is procuring for it a reliable post on that square. Black has another idea on the side. When the white rooks leaves a1 he will be able to intrepidly push a5-a4 and the black queen will obtain a good foothold on the a5-square. Turning down the a7—a5 push can cause Black additional inconveniences. Thus in case of 12...b6 there is 13.\texttt{b4} \texttt{c8} 14.\texttt{ac1} \texttt{Qd7} 15.\texttt{e3} \texttt{Qb7} 16.\texttt{Qfd1} \texttt{a6} 17.\texttt{Qb5} and now Black’s best bet is to accept the passive defence following 17...\texttt{Qa8} (after 17...\texttt{Qxb5} 18.\texttt{cxb5}, the c6-square will become a target for the white pieces, and the gambling 17...\texttt{Qe5}? immediately brought Black to a hopeless situation after 18.\texttt{Qxa7} \texttt{Qxc4} 19.\texttt{Qxc8} \texttt{Qxd2} 20.\texttt{Qxa6} \texttt{Qxf3+} 21.gxf3 \texttt{Qd7} 22.\texttt{Qxb6}– Ghinda – Candea, Romania 1992) 18.\texttt{a4} \texttt{Qb7} 19.\texttt{a5} \texttt{Qe8} (following 19...\texttt{bxa5} 20.c5! a6 21.\texttt{Qxd6} exd6 22.c6 \texttt{Qxc6} 23.\texttt{Qxc6=} or 19...a6 20.\texttt{Qd4} bxa5 21.c5! \texttt{Qc7} 22.c6 \texttt{Qxd4} 23.\texttt{Qxd4} \texttt{Qxc6} 24.\texttt{Qh6} e5 25.\texttt{Qxd6± White will inevitably carry out the c4-c5 breakthrough) 20.axb6 axb6 21.\texttt{Qf1±. Black’s freedom of action is restricted by the necessity to guard his own b6-pawn.

It is worth noting that the situation considered below is often arrived at by means of the move substitution 12...\texttt{Qd7} 13.\texttt{Qe3} \texttt{Qc5} (in case of 13...\texttt{a5} 14.b3

29
the play also reverts to the channels of the mainline variation, while after 13...\textit{xa}5 14.\textit{fe}c1 \textit{fe}c8 15.a3 \textit{d}d8 16.b4 b6 17.\textit{ab}1 a5 18.\textit{d}d5 axb4 19.axb4 \textit{a}a7 20.\textit{g}g5 \textit{f}f8 21.\textit{fl}± the pressure of the centralised white pieces on the black position became rather tangible, Khalifman – Collas, Ubeda 1997) 14.\textit{ab}1 (premature is 14.b4, which occurred in the game Badea – Panchenko, Giessen 1995, in view of 14...\textit{xa}4 15.\textit{xa}4 \textit{xa}4= 14...a5 15.b3.

13.b3

A must. After 13.\textit{ac}1 \textit{d}7 14.\textit{e}3 Black easily levelled the odds by means of 14...a4! 15.\textit{d}5 \textit{c}5 16.\textit{c}c2 \textit{e}8 17.\textit{d}1 \textit{a}5= Spiridonov – Ivkov, France 1993. The attempt to stir up something on the kingside by way of 13.\textit{h}h1 \textit{x}d7 14.\textit{x}g7 \textit{x}g7 15.f4, is not inarguable either, since after 15...a4 16.\textit{f}3 \textit{a}5 17.\textit{h}3 \textit{g}8 18.\textit{e}1 f5 19.\textit{f}3 \textit{ae}8 20.\textit{h}4 \textit{f}f7 A. Sokolov – Haik, Luzern 1985, the black queen on the a5-square can easily take part in the action on the kingside.

13...\textit{d}7

The black knight headed in another direction in the game Kavalek – Larsen, Reykjavik 1986 with the idea to follow 13...\textit{h}5 14.\textit{e}3 by 14...f5. However, White managed to obtain a big advantage in the endgame by means of 15.exf5 gxf5 16.f4 (entirely possible is also 16.\textit{ad}1!? with the idea to meet 16...f4 by 17.\textit{f}2± to be further followed by 18.\textit{c}d5) 16...\textit{f}6 (after 16...\textit{xc}3 17.\textit{xc}3 \textit{f}6 18.\textit{d}4 \textit{e}4 19.\textit{e}3± White also retains a huge advantage) 17.\textit{ad}1 \textit{f}7 18.\textit{f}3 \textit{f}8 19.\textit{d}5 \textit{xd}5 20.\textit{xd}5 \textit{xd}5 21.\textit{xd}5 \textit{xc}8 (Black's situation is not eased by 21...a4, in view of 22.b4 \textit{c}8 23.c5±) 22.a4 \textit{c}6 23.\textit{e}6 \textit{c}8 (if 23...\textit{f}8, then 24.\textit{d}5±) 24.\textit{xc}8+ \textit{xc}8 25.\textit{d}3±.

14.\textit{e}3

The major defect of the retreat – 14.\textit{f}2 is that in the different variations White has to take into consideration the move g6-g5. E.g., after 14...\textit{c}5 15.\textit{ab}1 e6 16.\textit{fd}1 \textit{e}5 17.\textit{f}1 \textit{w}f6 18.\textit{bc}1, Ikonnikov – P. Nielsen, Cheliabinsk 1991, Black obtained counterplay by means of 18...g5! 19.\textit{e}2 g4±.

14...\textit{c}5

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chessboard.png}
\end{center}

15.\textit{ab}1!?

This move is somewhat more precise than 15.\textit{ac}1. In the latter case White must be a bit more concerned about the continuation 15...b6 (after 15...\textit{xb}6 16.\textit{c}2 \textit{fc}8 17.\textit{b}1 the game can at Black's option revert to the lines of the variation discussed below).
Black’s plan associated with the move b7-b6 is rather passive and is, therefore, not particularly dangerous for White. However, to counter it successfully one has to combine the pawn pushes on the queenside with the invasion of the white knight onto d5. For this reason, the perfect disposition for White would have been to place his rooks on the b- and d-files. As a consequence of that after 16.\(\mathcal{E}d1\) \(\mathcal{E}a7\) (with 16...\(\mathcal{E}d7\) 17.\(\mathcal{E}d5\) \(\mathcal{E}b7\) 18.\(\mathcal{B}b1\) \(\mathcal{E}a7\) 19.\(\mathcal{E}f1\) \(\mathcal{E}e8\) 20.\(\mathcal{V}f2\) \(\mathcal{E}a8\) 21.a3, Kramnik – Ostojic, Leningrad 1991, White has organised his forces in the best possible way, and in view of the unpleasant threat \(\mathcal{D}d5\)xb6 and b3-b4 Black had to venture a pawn sacrifice – 21...\(\mathcal{E}xd5\) 22.\(\mathcal{E}xd5\) b5!? 23.\(\mathcal{E}xc5\) dxc5 24.\(\mathcal{E}xc5\) b4 25.\(\mathcal{B}b5\) \(\mathcal{E}e8\)± and put up with a difficult position) White will have to lose a little time on the move 17.\(\mathcal{B}b1\). Further there is 17...\(\mathcal{E}a8\) 18.\(\mathcal{E}d5\) (White cannot claim superior odds moving only pawns on the queenside 18.a3 \(\mathcal{B}b8\) 19.b4 axb4 20.axb4 \(\mathcal{B}a4\) 21.\(\mathcal{E}xa4\) \(\mathcal{E}xa4\) 22.\(\mathcal{E}d4\) \(\mathcal{E}a2\)– Gheorghiu – Smejkal, Moscow 1981) 18...\(\mathcal{B}b8\) 19.\(\mathcal{G}g5\)± David – G. Honfi, Zalakaros 1988, and should the opponent play passively, White has it all ready for the start of the pawn offensive on the queenside.

15...\(\mathcal{E}b6\)

Black seeks to maintain the blockade position on the queenside. In case of 15...b6 there is 16.\(\mathcal{E}d1\) (less appropriate is 16.\(\mathcal{E}d1\) \(\mathcal{B}b8\) 17.a3 \(\mathcal{E}c8\) 18.\(\mathcal{E}d5\) in view of 18...\(\mathcal{E}xd5\) 19.\(\mathcal{E}xd5\) a4 20.b4 \(\mathcal{B}b3\) 21.\(\mathcal{E}e2\) b5 22.\(\mathcal{E}xb5\) and now in the game Anand – Larsen, Cannes 1989, the game could be evened by the move 22...\(\mathcal{E}d4=\) 16...\(\mathcal{E}b8\) 17.\(\mathcal{E}d5\) (in case of 17...\(\mathcal{E}xd5\) 18.\(\mathcal{E}xd5\) White should proceed by a3-a3, followed by b3-b4↑, since after 18.\(\mathcal{E}xd5\)?! b5!= the game evens out) 17...\(\mathcal{E}e8\) 18.a3 \(\mathcal{E}d7\) 19.\(\mathcal{E}g5\) (in case of 19...\(\mathcal{E}d8\) there is 20.\(\mathcal{E}xe7+!\) \(\mathcal{E}xe7\) 21.\(\mathcal{E}xe7\) \(\mathcal{E}xe7\) 22.\(\mathcal{E}xd6\) \(\mathcal{E}xd6\) 23.\(\mathcal{E}xd6\) \(\mathcal{E}c8\) 24.\(\mathcal{E}bd1\) \(\mathcal{E}c5\) 25.\(\mathcal{E}d8+\) \(\mathcal{E}xd8\) 26.\(\mathcal{E}xd8+\) \(\mathcal{E}f8\) 27.b4± and the white rook with the pair of pawns overweighs the pair of black pieces) 19...\(\mathcal{E}f8\) 20.\(\mathcal{E}h1\) \(\mathcal{E}a7\) 21.\(\mathcal{E}f1\) \(\mathcal{B}b7\) 22.\(\mathcal{E}dc1\) \(\mathcal{E}c5\) (after 22...\(\mathcal{E}e6\) 23.\(\mathcal{E}c3\)± Black will meet new problems in view of the necessity to protect also the d6-pawn) 23.b4 \(\mathcal{E}xb4\) 24.\(\mathcal{E}xb4\) \(\mathcal{E}e6\) (in appropriate is 24...\(\mathcal{E}d7\) in view of 25.\(\mathcal{E}xe7+!\) \(\mathcal{E}xe7\) 26.\(\mathcal{E}xe7\) \(\mathcal{E}xe7\) 27.b5 \(\mathcal{E}xe4\) 28.\(\mathcal{E}e1=\) Wojtkiewicz – De Firmian, Polanica Zdroj 1995, and Black suffered an irrecoverable material loss) 25.\(\mathcal{E}e3\)± White steadily switches the focus of attention of his pieces on the black b6-pawn.

Should Black opt for 15...\(\mathcal{E}e6\), then there is 16.\(\mathcal{E}fd1\) \(\mathcal{E}e5\) 17.\(\mathcal{G}g3\)? (White has to be careful with his adversary’s game on the kingside, since in case of 17.\(\mathcal{E}fl1?!\) \(\mathcal{E}h4\) 18.\(\mathcal{G}g3?\) \(\mathcal{E}f6?=\) or 17.\(\mathcal{E}b5?!\) \(\mathcal{E}h4\) 18.\(\mathcal{G}g3?\) \(\mathcal{E}xg3\) 19.\(\mathcal{E}xg3\) \(\mathcal{E}xg3+\) 20.\(\mathcal{E}f1\) \(\mathcal{E}xe4\) 21.\(\mathcal{F}xe4\) \(\mathcal{F}xe4\) he is
heading for serious troubles, while after 17.\(\text{c}\text{d}4\) \(\text{e}7\) 18.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{f}d8\) 19.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{x}d4\) 20.\(\text{x}d4\) \(\text{e}5\) 21.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{e}6\) 22.\(\text{b}d1\) \(\text{g}7\) 23.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{h}6\) 24.\(\text{h}4\), Topalov – Reinderman, Wijk aan Zee 1999, White has retained a slight edge, having secured a job for his light-squared bishop on the c8-h3 diagonal, however, it is far from easy to break through the black defences) 17...\(\text{e}7\) 18.\(\text{b}5\)± and now as a result of the careless 18...\(\text{b}6\)? Black immediately plunged into a difficult situation after 19.\(\text{g}5\)! \(\text{f}6\) 20.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{f}d8\) 21.\(\text{f}4\)± Korneev – Cebalo, Italy 1997.

16.\(\text{f}c1\)

The time for the move 16.\(\text{d}5\) has not come yet. Following 16...\(\text{x}d5\) 17.\(\text{exd5}\) (in case of 17.\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{c}6\) 18.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{b}6\) it is not easy to puncture Black's position either, Klostermann – Giemsa, Germany 1989) 17...\(\text{b}4\) 18.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{f}c8\) 19.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{c}3\) 20.\(\text{xc}3\) \(\text{xc}3\) 21.\(\text{f}c1\) \(\text{g}7\) 22.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{b}6\) 23.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{c}7\) 24.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{h}5\)= Yudasin – Telman, Simferopol 1989 Black makes a good defence along the entire front line.

16...\(\text{f}c8\)

Sometimes seeking to interfere with the white offensive on the queenside black plays 16...\(\text{b}4\). In this case White must contest the upper hand by means of 17.\(\text{c}2!\) (with the idea \(\text{d}2\)-\(\text{c}1\), worse is 17.\(\text{f}1!\) \(\text{f}c8\) 18.\(\text{h}1\) in view of 18...\(\text{a}4\)! 19.\(\text{bxa4}\) \(\text{xc}3\) 20.\(\text{xb4}\) \(\text{xd}2\) 21.\(\text{xd}2\) \(\text{xa}4\)= and Blacks chances are even to be preferred, Murillo – Gonzalez Bernal, Guatemala 2000) and now the attempt to manifest activity on the kingside by 17...\(\text{f}5\) (bad is also 17...\(\text{a}4\)? because of 18.\(\text{d}5\)+–, while after 17...\(\text{fc8}\) 18.\(\text{c}1\) we are facing a position, which will be considered in the note to Black's move seventeen in the mainline text) 18.\(\text{exf}5\) \(\text{gxf}5\)! (possibly, relatively superior for Black is 18...\(\text{xf}5\), though even in this case after 19.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{b}6\) 20.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{d}8\) 21.\(\text{g}5\)?± White begins to exert pressure on Black's central pawns) 18...\(\text{gxf}5\) 19.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{f}4\) (in case of 19...\(\text{b}6\) Black will have to take into serious consideration 20.\(\text{d}5\)! \(\text{d}8\) 21.\(\text{g}5\)+ 20.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{b}6\) 21.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 22.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{d}8\), Greenfeld – Yudasin, Israel 1996, should bring about a tangible white edge after 23.\(\text{b}5\)+ with the idea \(\text{c}2\)-\(\text{e}2\) and \(\text{c}1\)-\(\text{e}1\), in view of the obvious white domination on the light squares.

17.\(\text{c}2!\)

White to a certain extent needs this move, as seen from the previous comments, since, e.g.,
after 17.\[h1 Black has 17...\[b4, creating the unpleasant threat a5-a4.

17...\[d8

After 17...\[b4 White continues 18.\[c1 (in case of 18.\[d5 \[xd5 19.cx\[d5 \[xd2 20.\[xd2 White has to take into account 20...a4, and if 21.b4, then Black can take advantage of the opportunity to play 21...\[b3! and intercept the initiative) 18.\[c1 (White threatens to win a piece by means of a2-a3 and b3-b4) 18...\[b6 (the black queen is forced to retire in view of the threat to lose a piece after a2-a3 and b3-b4) 19.\[f1!? (White gets nothing by 19.\[b5, because of 19...\[xb5 20.cx\[b5 \[h6!=, while after 19.\[d1 \[d8 20.\[f2 \[f8 21.\[d2 h6 22.\[c1 \[h7 23.\[h1 h5 24.\[h3 \[e6 25.\[d3 \[h6=, as in the game Van den Doel – Balduan, Germany 1999, the white knight could not get the chance to really play in) 19...\[d8 20.\[d2 and we are again facing a position from the mainline text, but with a delay of two moves.

18.\[f1

A useful prophylactic move prior to White’s offensive on the queenside. White makes it easier for his queen to gain access to the kingside and the f2-square in particular along the second rank, as he also vacates the e2-square for his knight, should the need arise.

18...\[e5

Black supports the d6-pawn in advance preparing to meet the entrance of the white knight on d5 by the move e7-e6. It is worth noting that Black has a hard task manoeuvring with little board room in the run-up of the white offensive against the black knight on c5. Now quite convincing seems 18...b6, since it weakens the light squares on the queenside, and, moreover, sometimes the black knight needs the b6-square. After 19.a3 (a similar picture occurred also following 19.\[cb8 20.b4 axb4 21.axb4 \[e6 22.\[d5 \[f8 23.\[f2 \[d7 24. \[g5 \[xd5 25.cx\[d5± in the game Vilela – Estevez, Santa Clara 1991) 19...h5 20.b4 axb4 21.axb4 (with the pawn on b6 it is very risky for the black knight to go to a4, since his retreat path will be closed) 21...\[d7 22.\[bc1 \[h7 23.\[d5 \[xd5 24.cx\[d5 \[xc2 25. \[xc2 \[a1 26.\[c1 \[a8 27. \[b5± in the game Vokarev – Melikhov, Moscow 1999, White are ready to start infiltrating the adversary’s camp via the light squares.

After 18...\[f8 19.a3 h5 in the game Yoos – Taylo, Toronto 1996, White could have emphasised the shortcomings of the black queen leaving the d8 square by way of 20.\[d5 (in case of 20.b4 axb4 21.axb4 \[a4 it turns out that the move 22.\[d5 is not dangerous for Black, since it will simply have to retreat following 22...e6), since he need not feel anxious about the variation 22...a4 23.b4 \[b3 24.\[f2 \[xd5
25. exd5±.

19.a3

White starts a pawn offensive on the queenside with the intention to push the black c5-knight off his important stronghold.

19...e6

In case of 19...wxf8 there is 20. xd5 (menacing xd5-b6) 20...xd5 21.exd5 (no good was 21. cxd5 in view of 21...a4, and following 22.b4 qa4∞ Black’s chances contesting the c-file are at least not inferior) 21...wg7 (if 21...a4, then after 22.b4 qa4 23. wxf2 wg7 24.ad1± White prevents the penetration of the black pieces onto d4 and retains his edge in connection with the c4-c5 threat) 22.b4 axb4 23.axb4 qa4 24.ab3 (intending to push c4-c5 on the very next move) 24...b6 25.a3± and the black knight on a4 is cut off from his camp and is in a very dangerous situation, Khalifman – Hracek, Pardubice 1994.

After 19...e8 which occurred in the game Wojtkiewicz – Bischoff, Altensteig 1995, White could have contested the upper hand by means of 20.wf2! wc6 (if 20...e6, then there is 21.qb5±) 21.b4 axb4 22.axb4 qa4 23.qe2± keeping the black knight in isolation from the main body of his army.

20.b4

One would like to produce the useful move 22.qxe2 sooner, but in this case White has to take into account 22...wxe4 23.fxe4 xexe4∞.

20...axb4 21.axb4 qa4 22. qa2

Naturally White does not want to swap the knights, since he intends later to take advantage on occasion of the shaky situation of the black knight on a4.

22...wxb4 23.g3 we7 24.ad4 we8 25.adc1±

This situation occurred in the game Gelfand – Anand, Manila 1990. However, the move order and numbering have been changed somewhat due to the reason pointed out in the note to Black’s move seventeen. White’s plans include ad4-b3 and c4-c5, since after that the unlucky position of the black knight on a4 will make itself felt even stronger.
Chapter 3

1.\( \text{a}f3 \) c5 2.\( \text{c}4 \) g6 3.e4 \( \text{c}c6 \) 4.d4 cxd4 5.\( \text{x}d4 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 6.\( \text{c}3 \) d6 7.e2 \( \text{xd}4 \)

![Chess Diagram]

Black immediately swaps the knights in contrast with the variations discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Incidentally, the timing has been chosen so that White is forced to take on d4 with his queen, since he has simply not yet managed to take out his dark-squared bishop onto e3, like in Chapters 1, 2.

8.\( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 9.\( \text{g}5 \)

White tries to take advantage of the early knight swap and take out his dark-squared bishop onto a position more active than the one in Chapters 1, 2. We must note, that another popular choice alongside the mainline move is 9.\( \text{e}3 \). Quite often, strange as it seems, the game converges to one and the same critical position, though every time the number of moves to get there is different.

However, on the way to that position, both when the bishop is developed on g5 and on e3, White meets with various nuances, which in effect determine his leaning to one move or another.

Thus after 9.\( \text{e}3 \) 0-0 10.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{e}6 \) (One of the definite deficiencies of the bishop development on e3 is the fact, that after 10...\( \text{g}4 \) 11.\( \text{x}g4 \) \( \text{x}g4 \) 12.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{xd}4 \) 13.\( \text{xd}4 \) White is forced to lose time on some chaotic manoeuvres with his queen. Following 13...\( \text{a}5 \) 14.0-0 \( \text{e}6 \) 15.b3 \( \text{c}8 \) a position arises which is similar the one already discussed in the analysis of the \( \text{g}8-h6 \) move at the beginning of Chapter 1, where it is far from easy to take advantage of the small spatial advantage, when the majority of the minor pieces have been swapped.) 11.0-0 (after 11.\( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 12.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 13.b3 \( \text{a}6 \) 14.\( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{xd}2+ \) 15.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 16.\( \text{g}4 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 17.\( \text{exf}5 \) \( \text{gxf5} \) 18.\( \text{h}3 \) the game every so often steers to the same situation it does with 9.\( \text{g}5 \)) 11...\( \text{a}5 \) (following 11...\( \text{a}6 \) 12.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 13.\( \text{ab}1 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 14.\( \text{fc1} \text{ab}8 \) 15.\( \text{b}4 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 16.\( \text{c}5! \) \( \text{a}5 \) 17.\( \text{a}3 \) \text{axb4

35
18.axb4 \[a8 19.\[f1\]± Kramnik – Anand, Amsterdam 1996, White managed to obtain some edge) 12.\[ab1\] (White has no time for 12.f3 in view of 12.\[fc8\] 13.b3 \[g4\] 14.\[d4\] \[xd4\] 15.\[xe4\] \[e5\] 16.\[xe5\] \[xe5\] 17.f4 \[c6\] = Arkhipov – Vershinin, Orel 1997, while with 12.\[fc1\] tactics comes into play 12...\[xe4\]! 13.\[xe4\] \[xd2\] 14.\[xd2\] \[xb2\] 15.\[f3\] \[ab6\] 16.\[xa7\] \[a8\] 17.\[e3\] \[xc1\] 18.\[xc1\] \[xa2\] 19.\[xb7\] \[b8\] 20.\[e4\] \[c8\] 21.\[d3\] d5 22.c5 d4! 23.\[h6\] \[a3\] 24.\[f1\] \[c3\] = Van der Weide – Tiviakov, Hoogeveen 1999, and in case of 12.\[ac1\] \[fc8\] 13.b3 a6 14.\[f4\] b5 15.\[f5\] \[d7\] the game enters a stage of teasing tactical complications) 12.\[fc8\] 13.b3 (after 13.\[fc1\] \[c4\]! 14.\[d5\] \[xd2\] 15.\[xe7\] \[f8\] 16.\[xd2\] \[xe4\] 17.\[xc8\] \[xd2\] 18.\[xc4\] \[xc8\] 19.\[d5\] \[a8\]! = the interesting tactical complications bring about an even position) 13...\[g4\] (inappropriate is 13...\[b5\]? in view of 14.b4 \[d8\] 15.cb \[c3\] 16.\[c3\] \[xe4\] 17.\[e1\] \[c3\] 18.\[c1\] and Black does not have sufficient compensation for the exchange given up) 14.\[d5\] \[xd2\] 15.\[xd2\] \[f8\] (with 15...\[xd5\] 16.\[xd5\] \[f6\] 17.\[d3\] \[d7\] 18.\[fe1\] \[f8\] 19.f4 \[d4\] 20.\[f1\] a5 21.\[e2\] f6 22.g3 \[c5\] 23.\[d1\] \[e8\] 24.\[g2\] White retained some edge, thanks to the bishop pair and the opportunities for a pawn offensive on the queenside, Jansa – Gonzalez, Andorra 2000) 16.\[g5\] \[f6\] 17.\[xf6\] \[xf6\] 18.\[xf6\] exf6 19.f4 (the white rook has to stay on the b-file, or else after 19.\[bd1\] \[e7\] 20.\[d2\] a5 21.f4 Black can level the odds completely by way of 21...\[c5\] 22.\[fd1\] \[a6\] 23.\[f2\] \[b6\] 24.\[e3\] a4! 25.\[d3\] \[a5\] 26.\[e1d2\] f5 27.exf5 \[xf5\] = Morovic – Cebalo, Solin 1999) 19...\[e7\] 20.\[fd1\] a5 21.\[d4\] \[a6\] (following 21...\[c5\] 22.\[f2\] h6 23.\[e3\] \[a6\] 24.\[d2\] g5 25.\[g3\] g6 26.\[f5\] f5 27.\[e1\] \[xf5\] 28.\[c1\] \[f6\] 29.\[f3\] ± Adams – Alterman, Elista 1998, White managed to retain a tiny advantage) 22.\[f2\] \[b6\] 23.\[e3\] a4 24.\[b4\] \[c6\] 25.\[c5\] 26.\[b4\] ± Ye Jiangchuan – Pignusov, Shanghai 2000, White have retained a small edge due to his slightly superior pawn structure.

9...0-0

We have mentioned earlier, that Black is best advised not to make the move 9...h6 without good reason. Therefore, it is not surprising that after 10.\[e3\] 0-0 11.\[d2\] \[h7\] 12.0-0 \[e6\] (in case of 12...\[g4\] 13.\[xg4\] \[xg4\] 14.\[d4\] \[xd4\] 15.\[xd4\] \[e6\] 16.b3 White stands somewhat better and the march of the h-pawn following the preliminary \[g1\]-h1 will only gain in strength thanks to the move h7-h6) 13.\[ab1\]? (more sharp is 13.f4 \[c8\] 14.b3 \[a5\] ± Larsen – Fischer, Denver (m/2) 1971) 13...\[c8\] (after 13...\[a5\] White accomplishes a tempo-gaining 14.b4±) 14.b3 \[a5\] 15.\[fc1\] a6 16.\[f3\] \[d7\] 17.b4 \[e5\] (in case of 17...\[d8\] White would have proceeded 18.\[d5\] ±) 18.f4
g7-bishop. White does not have the time to castle, since after 11.
0-0 \(\text{\#.e6}\) he will have to lose another move to protect his queen
by 12.\(\text{\#.ad1}\), which permitted Black to endorse the peace treaty
by means of 12...\(\text{\#.a5}\) 13.b3 b5
14.\(\text{\#.xf6}\) \(\text{\#.xf6}\) 15.\(\text{\#.d5}\) \(\text{\#.xd2}\) 16.
\(\text{\#.xf6+}\) \(\text{\#.xf6}\) 17.\(\text{\#.xd2=}\) \(\text{\#.Kramnik–Anand, Moscow (active).}\)

11...\(\text{\#.e6}\)

Note that after 11...\(\text{\#.d7}\) 12.b3 \(\text{\#.c6}\) (inappropriate are both the attempt to start play on
the queenside by means of 12...
\(\text{\#.b8}\) 13.0-0 b5?! in view of 14.\(\text{\#.fd1}\)
\(\text{\#.bc4}\) 15.e5\(\text{\#.}\) and the immediate
12...b5?! because of 13.cxb5 axb5
14.\(\text{\#.xf6}\) \(\text{\#.xf6}\) 15.\(\text{\#.xb5}\) \(\text{\#.a5}\) 16.
\(\text{\#.xa5}\) \(\text{\#.xa5}\) 17.a4 \(\text{\#.e6}\) 18.\(\text{\#.d1=}\)
13.f3 a5 14.\(\text{\#.e3}\) (a careless 14.
0-0 permits Black to obtain counterplay on the queenside by
way of 14...\(\text{\#.a4}\) 14...\(\text{\#.d7}\) 15.0-0
\(\text{\#.c5}\) 16.\(\text{\#.c2}\) \(\text{\#.b6}\) 17.\(\text{\#.b1=}\)
Kotronias – Pavlovic, Greece 1997, the game has arrived at a position
from variation b Chapter 2, but
with an extra tempo for White.

12.b3 \(\text{\#.c8}\)

In case of 12...\(\text{\#.a5}\) 13.f3 \(\text{\#.c8}\)
14.\(\text{\#.a4}\) the game is steered to a position, which will be analysed
below in Chapter 4. One has tested more than once the immediate
12...b5?!, though after 13.
\(\text{\#.xb5}\) axb5 14.\(\text{\#.xb5}\) \(\text{\#.a5}\) 15.\(\text{\#.c6}\)
\(\text{\#.a6}\) 16.\(\text{\#.a4}\) \(\text{\#.c8}\) (a similar picture arises also after 16...\(\text{\#.d2}\) 17.
\(\text{\#.xd2}\) \(\text{\#.c8}\) 18.\(\text{\#.b5}\) \(\text{\#.xc1}\) 19.\(\text{\#.xc1}\)
\(\text{\#.a5}\) 20.\(\text{\#.d3}\) \(\text{\#.d7}\) 21.\(\text{\#.d2=}\)
Kotronias – Pavlovic, Athens 1996)
Chapter 3


13.0-0!

The subtlety of this variation is that in case of 13...f3, which is typical of the variations from Chapter 4 to be discussed below, Black gets an opportunity to level the game by means of 13...b5! 14. cxb5 axb5 15. ♘xb5 ♛xc1 16. ♛xc1 ♛a5 17. ♘d2 ♛a8 18. ♛xa5 ♛xa5= Tukmakov – Vaganian, USSR 1984.

13...b5

A principled, though somewhat risky reply. Black sacrifices a pawn hoping to obtain active piece play in return. With the more leisurely 13...♛a5 White manages to consolidate his position with his very next move 14.f3. Now after 14...♛fe8 (now 14...b5?! is not dangerous anymore, in view of 15.cxb5 axb5 16. ♘xb5+, the negative result of the last variation, as we will see later, is determined most of all by the fact, that the c8-square is taken up by Black’s queenside rook, and not by his kingside rook) 15. ♜fd1 ♜d7 (after 15...♛c5 16.♛e3 ♛c8 17.♛c2 ♜d7 18.♛b1 ♛b4 19.♛c1 ♛a5 20.b4 ♛c7 21. ♛d2 ♛b6 22.♛bc1 ♛d8 23. ♛d1 ♛d7 24. ♛f2 a5 25.a3 ♛a8 26.f4± Sherzer – De Jonge, Hoogeveen 1998, White began steadily to squeeze the position of the adversary on both flanks, since Black lacks any counterplay whatsoever) 16. ♛d5 ♛xd2 17. ♛xd2 ♛f8 18.♛e3 Black attempted to break free by 18...f5, Komarov – Beni- tnah, France 1996, which White neutralised by means of 19.exf5 gxf5 20.♛cd1 ♛f7 21.♛f1 ♛g8 22. ♛g5+. Black was forced into passive defence in view of the pressure on the e7-pawn.

14. cxb5 axb5 15. ♘xb5?!

In case of 15.♕xf6 ♛xf6 16. ♘xb5 ♛b6 17.♛e3 ♛xe3 18.fxe3 ♛g5 19.♕f2 ♛xc1 20.♛xc1 f5 Black retains his counterplay thanks to his bishop pair, regardless of White’s extra pawn. E.g., after 21.e5 f4 22.exd6 fxe3 23. ♕e1 exd6 24.♕xd6, Ernst – Bern, Gausdal 1993, White would have not been able to convert his extra pawn in case of the strongest 24...♕e7! 25.♕c4 ♛xc4 26. ♛xc4 ♛b4 27.♕e2 ♛f2 28.♕xe3 ♛xa2=.

15...♛a5 16. ♘d5

This marks the beginning of a forced line.

16. ♘xb5 17. ♘xe7+ ♛h8 18.♕xf6 ♛xf6 19.♕xe8 ♛xe8 20.♕xe8+ ♛xc8 21.♕xd6 ♛g7 22.♕d2±

White has obtained a rook and three pawns for his pair of bishops and according to the analysis of I. Csom his chances are slightly superior. Note that White’s last move has prevented the active raids of the black queen both onto g5 and e2.
Chapter 4

1.\texttt{\textbf{d}f3} c5 2.\texttt{\textbf{c}4} g6 3.\texttt{\textbf{e}4} \texttt{\textbf{a}c6} 4.\texttt{\textbf{d}4} cxd4
5.\texttt{\textbf{c}xd4} \texttt{\textbf{f}6} 6.\texttt{\textbf{c}c3} d6 7.\texttt{\textbf{c}e2} \texttt{\textbf{a}xd4}
8.\texttt{\textbf{w}xd4} \texttt{\textbf{g}7} 9.\texttt{\textbf{c}g5} 0-0 10.\texttt{\textbf{w}d2} \texttt{\textbf{e}6}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\caption{Chessboard configuration for Chapter 4.}
\end{figure}

11.\texttt{\textbf{a}c1}

The reason behind this move for White is the same like in Chapter 3, which we discussed shortly.

11...\texttt{\textbf{a}5}

In case of 11...\texttt{\textbf{a}c8} 12.b3 a6 13.0-0! the game is steered back to variation from Chapter 3.

12.\texttt{\textbf{f}3!}

The principled difference compared to variation from Chapter 3. After 12.0-0 \texttt{\textbf{a}c8} (weaker is 12...\texttt{\textbf{a}ac8} 13.b3, since to 13...b5 White has the intermediate 14.e5!±, and following 13...a6 14.f3 the game reverts to a ramification of Chapter 3, which is not without its merits for White) 13.b3 a6 (of no avail is the immediate 13...b5?, since after 14.cxb5 the combination 14...\texttt{\textbf{a}xc3} 15.\texttt{\textbf{h}xc3} \texttt{\textbf{a}xe4} is refuted by the straightforward 16.\texttt{\textbf{a}c8+-}) 14.f4∞ (in case of 14.f3 Black evens the play by 14...b5=, which is the resource that would be lacking, if the c8-square were not occupied by the kingside rook, but by the queenside rook, like in variation from Chapter 3) the game as a rule soon enters a stage of sharp tactical complications, where the odds of the parties can be assessed as roughly equal.

12...\texttt{\textbf{a}fc8} 13.b3

White gets nothing by 13.\texttt{\textbf{d}d5} in view of 13...\texttt{\textbf{a}xd2} 14.\texttt{\textbf{w}xd2} \texttt{\textbf{a}xd5} (note, that even in the endgame following 14...\texttt{\textbf{a}xd5} 15.\texttt{\textbf{c}xd5} \texttt{\textbf{a}f8} 16.\texttt{\textbf{a}e3} a6 17.g3 \texttt{\textbf{a}d7} 18.\texttt{\textbf{a}e8} \texttt{\textbf{a}c8} 19.\texttt{\textbf{c}c1} \texttt{\textbf{a}c1} 20.\texttt{\textbf{a}xc1}±, which occurred in the game Stajcic – Mandl, Budapest 1991, despite the fact that White stands somewhat better due to his bishop pair advantage, should Black defend accurately, he has all reasons to expect to draw the game, thanks mostly to the fact that his b-pawn is in its initial position and therefore greatly obstructs the infiltration of the white pieces into the black

39
camp) 15.cxd5 (after 15.exd5 \(d7\) 16.b3 e6 17.dxe6 \(xe6\) 18.\(d3\) d5 19.cxd5 \(xd5=\) Vaganian – Sandor, Germany 1996, Black does away with all his difficulties) and here the most straightforward way to completely even the odds is the intermediate 15...\(f6!=.\)

13...\(a6\)

Black proceeds with the preparation of the move b7-b5 and weakens for an instant the b6-square, which, as we will see shortly, White will try to take advantage of. Because of that, sometimes Black prefers to prepare his play on the queenside by means of 13...\(ab8\). In this case White has to contest the advantage by means of 14.0-0 (after 14.\(d5\) \(xd2+\) 15.\(d2\) \(xd5\) 16.exd5 \(f6\) 17.\(e3\) \(d7=\) Black evens out) 14...\(a6\) 15.f4. Now subsequent to some interesting tactical complications 15...b5 16.f5 b4 17.fxe6 bxc3 18.exf7+ \(f8\) (in case of 18...\(xf7\) 19.\(xc3\) \(g8\) 20.\(c2\) \(xd2\) 21.\(xd2\) \(xe4\) 22.\(e3=\) White retains his edge, thanks to his bishop pair advantage) 19.\(e3\) \(xa2\) 20.\(xc3\) \(a5\) 21.\(h1\) Beliavsky – Cebalo, Bled 1998, White’s attack became formidable, thanks to the certain weakening of the b6-square, the knight retreat to the vary edge of the board gains in strength.

14.\(a4!\)

A somewhat unexpected choice. As we have seen already, White gets nothing by the thrust of the knight onto d5, however, thanks to the certain weakening of the b6-square, the knight retreat to the vary edge of the board gains in strength.

14...\(xd2+\)

There have been attempts to avoid the endgame by means of 14...\(d8\). However, in this case Black has to reckon with 15.c5. Further there is 15.\(c6\) (after 15...\(xc5\) 16.\(xd8+\) \(xd8\) 17.\(b6\) and, facing the alternative to lose
an exchange, Black is forced to accept 17...\textit{c}a7 18.\textit{c}xc5\textit{c}+, where White obviously stands better due to the extremely awkward placement of the black a7-rook) 16.\textit{f}2 (the white king is better placed on f2 with the endgame in mind, though after 16.0-0 dxc5 17.\textit{w}xd8+ \textit{x}xd8 18.\textit{c}xc5 Black's uncontainable desire to swap everything in sight as soon as possible brought him troubles after 18...\textit{x}xc5 19.\textit{c}xc5 \textit{e}c8 20.\textit{e}3 \textit{f}8 21.\textit{c}c1 \textit{d}d7 22.\textit{f}2 \textit{h}2 23. \textit{c}c2 \textit{x}xc5 24.\textit{c}xc5 \textit{e}5 25. \textit{b}6±) 16...\textit{f}8?! (Black avoids the endgame on account of the fact that the white king has not gone far off the centre, but this decision turns out to be not sufficiently justified) 17.\textit{b}4 \textit{d}d7 (following 17...\textit{h}6 18.\textit{h}4 \textit{ac}8 19.\textit{xd}6 \textit{xc}1 20.\textit{dxe}7 \textit{e}8 21. \textit{xc}1 \textit{xc}1 22.\textit{xh}6+ the dark-squared bishop and the pair of pawns more than outweigh the exchange down) 18. \textit{xd}6 (in case of 18...\textit{exd}6 19. \textit{xb}7 \textit{d}4+ the important thing is to play 20. \textit{e}3!±, since it easy to commit the mistake 20.\textit{g}3?, to which Black finds the fantastic 20...\textit{f}6!! 21.\textit{xc}6 \textit{h}5 22.\textit{h}4 f6→ and the white king cannot avoid the mate despite the extra rook) 18...\textit{xd}6 19. \textit{xb}7 \textit{d}4+ 20.\textit{e}3 \textit{b}8 21.\textit{c}7+ Krasenkov – R. Hernandez, Palma de Mallorca 1989, and Black did not manage to obtain sufficient compensation for the missing pawn.

15.\textit{xd}2

Now Black will have to cover the b6-square by means of either
a) 15...\textit{e}6 or b) 15...\textit{d}7.

a) 15...\textit{e}6 16.\textit{c}3

White has succeeded in his efforts – by swapping the queens he has to a large extent secured his king and has established contact between his rooks along the first rank. Now the appearance of the white knight on d5 significantly gains in strength in a number of variations on account of the position of the black rook on c6.

16...\textit{ac}8

The other continuations do not guarantee Black complete equality either. E.g., inappropriate was the attempt to deal with all problems by means of 16...\textit{e}8 17.\textit{d}5 \textit{d}7? intending to trap the white bishop in the black camp after 18.\textit{xe}7+ \textit{xe}7 19. \textit{xe}7 by 19...f6 (in case of 19...\textit{h}6+ 20.\textit{c}3 \textit{xc}1 21.\textit{xc}1 f6 22.\textit{d}1+ Black will simply miss a pair of pawns). White releases his bishop from its confinement with the help of 20.\textit{e}3 \textit{f}7 21.\textit{d}8 b6 22.c5! dc 23.\textit{a}6++. White’s plan is not spoilt by
the move 16...h6 either. Following 17.e3 aac8 18.d5 axd5 19.exd5 a6c7 20.b6 a7 21.
d3 e8 22.h4 h5, Huenerkopf – Vatter, Germany 1985, White gains the upper hand by 23.g4!
h6+ (after 23...e5 24.xhx5 f4+ 25.e3 Black’s kingside would be subject to demolition)
24.g5 g7 25.f4+ and there is no idea how Black can prevent the offensive of the white f-pawn.

It is quite possible that Black’s best bet is to quickly “back up” and vacate the c6-square by 16...zc8. In this case, White can try to reinforce his threat to infiltrate on d5 with his knight by means of 17.h4!?++. The immediate 17.d5 brings White nothing, in view of 17...xd5
18.cxd5, Perunovic – Ni Hua, Cannes 1997, since Black could have solved all his problems at once by 18...f6=.

17.d5

This move is especially unpleasant with the black rook on c6, since it does not permit Black to just swap knights on d5, because that way he would lose a piece.

17...f8

In case of 17...xd5 White should perhaps opt for the move 18.exd5++. After 18.cxd5 axc1
19.axc1 axc1 20.xc1 White also retains some superiority thanks to the bishop pair advantage, though the black position is very hard to tackle with no rooks and no infiltration squares on the queenside.

18.e3

White would have had a hard time exploiting the deficiencies of Black’s pawn structure after 18.xf6 xf6 19.xf6 exf6.

18...d7 19.h4+

This position arose in the game Karpov – Kavalek, Nice 1974. White starts a pawn offensive on the kingside, taking advantage of the circumstance that the black knight is busy protecting the b6-square. An evidence of the fact that Black’s problems are here to stay is the subsequent course of events in this encounter. Black let in to the tension and after 19...xd5?? (it was dangerous to try 19...h5 in view of 20.f4! to be followed by xxe6 and g2-g4, and after the relatively superior 19...f5 White could have resumed the attack on the e7-pawn by means of 20.g5++) took the concession road. Following 20.exd5 a6c7
21.h5 g8 (the standard defensive manoeuvre for positions of this type, relying on the transfer of the bishop to c5 via 21...b2 22.b1 a3?? was not available
in view of 23.b4!±) 22.f4! (proceeding with the pawn offensive White does not forget to leave the g4-square free for the bishop) 22...\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c5} 23.\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}4! \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}4 24. \text{\textit{d}}\text{d}3 \text{f}5 25.\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}3 \text{b}5 26.\text{g}4 (no good was 26.\text{\textit{x}}\text{xe}4?! on account of 26... bc 27.bc \text{f}xe4 28.\text{\textit{x}}\text{xe}4 \text{\textit{xc}}\text{c}4\text{f}5) 26...\text{bxc}4 27.\text{\textit{xc}}\text{c}4 (it is important to swap a pair of rooks in order to relieve Black's pressure on the queenside) 27...\text{\textit{xc}}\text{c}4 28.\text{bxc}4 \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}5+ 29.\text{\textit{xc}}\text{c}5! \text{\textit{xc}}\text{c}5 (after 29... \text{dxc}5 30.h6 \text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4 31.\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}1\text{±} Black's position is also difficult, Karpov) 30.h6\text{+} Black has not escaped the big troubles, regardless of the opposite coloured bishops.

b) 15...\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}7

Black exploits the fact that the black e7-pawn is untouchable lest White loses an exchange and will try to obtain counterplay by advancing the f-pawn.

16.g4

Envisaging the march of the black f-pawn White intends to manifest hostility. After 16.\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3 in the game Kramnik – Ivanchuk, London (blitz) 1994, Black acted passively 16...\text{\textit{ab}}8 (the spirit of the position would be served better by 16...\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}5!?∞) and as a result of 17.\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}3 \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}5 18.\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}5 \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}6 19.\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}6 \text{\textit{d}}\text{d}8 20.\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}d1 \text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4 21.\text{\textit{xd}}\text{d}4 \text{\textit{xd}}\text{d}4 22.\text{\textit{xe}}\text{e}3 \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}2 (22... \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}6 23.\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}4±) 23.\text{\textit{xe}}\text{e}2 \text{f}5 24.\text{\textit{ex}}\text{f}5 \text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}5 25.\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4 \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}7 26.\text{\textit{cd}}\text{d}1 \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}8 27.\text{g}4 \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}6 28.a4\text{±} White steadily squeezed Black's position.

The move 16.h4 by analogy with variation a (should Black play passively, e.g., 16...\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}8?! White's plan met with full success following 17.h5 h6 18.\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3 g5 19.g3! (threatening f3-f4) and 19...\text{\textit{cb}}8 20.\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}3 b5 21.\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}5! \text{\textit{xd}}\text{d}5 22.\text{\textit{cd}}\text{d}5\text{±} Psakhis – Pigu-sov, USSR 1980, note also that after Black has already moved b7-b5 like in the current game fragment, when swapping on d5 White can without undue hesitation take on d5 with his c-pawn) is not so appropriate here in view of 16...\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}6! 17.\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3 \text{f}5 (after 18.\text{\textit{ex}}\text{xf}5 \text{\textit{g}}\text{gf}5 19.\text{\textit{he}}\text{e}1 \text{d}5 20.\text{\textit{cd}}\text{d}5 \text{\textit{xd}}\text{d}5 21.\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}3 \text{b}5 22.\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}3 \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}6 23.\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}5 \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}7 24.\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}2 \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}5= Petursson – W. Schmidt, Aabybro 1989, the odds are completely even) 18.\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}3 (in the game Sax – Andersson, Haninge 1990, the adversaries signed the peace treaty following 18.\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}3 \text{\textit{ab}}8 19.\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}5 \text{b}5 20.\text{\textit{xb}}\text{b}5 \text{\textit{xc}}\text{c}1 21.\text{\textit{xc}}\text{c}1 \text{axb}5 22.\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}3 \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}5=) 18...\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}5 19. \text{\textit{d}}\text{d}5 \text{\textit{xd}}\text{d}5 20.\text{\textit{cd}}\text{d}5 \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}4 21.\text{\textit{fx}}\text{e}4 \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}5 22.\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}3 \text{b}4 23.\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}4 \text{a}5 24.\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}4 \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}7 25.\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}2 \text{h}5 26.\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}3 \text{a}4! and Black obtained good counterplay on the queenside in the game.

16...f6

In case of 16...e8 the bishop has more or less nothing to do any more on g5 and one could follow Kramnik’s suggestion and play 17...e3!? (the otherwise active move 17...h4 has its drawback – after the g2-g4 advance with the bishop on g5 the immediate threat to push the h-pawn further is already not so dangerous for Black, and he can play 17...c6 ready to meet 18.h5 by 18...h6 19...e3 g5 with a blockade of the kingside, on the other hand, the defect of the prophylactic 17.h3 is, that it permits Black to freely activate his dark-squared bishop by 17...d4!∞. Now following 17...f5 (in case of 17...ab8 White can continue 18. h3!? with the idea f3-f4) 18.exf5 gxf5 19.h3 in contrast to the similar positions to be discussed below Black is denied the option to play c8-f8 because of the placement of his king on f8. As a result of Black’s planless play following 19...ab8 20.c3 c5 21. h1 a5 22.d5+ Janssen – Delemarre, Enschede 1998, he committed a gross mistake by 22...a4?, which White took advantage of by means of 23.b4 d7 24.f4 f7 25.gxf5 f6 26. e6+–.

In case of 16...c6 White naturally should not be lured by the pawn playing 17...e7? in view of 17...f6 18.g5 f7 19.gxf6 h6=, but should continue 17. c3!? by analogy with variation a, which we have already considered.

17...e3 f5

All roads lead to Rome, and similarly many different move sequences lead to the diagram position. One of these was already mentioned in the note to White’s move nine and it was a move shorter.

18.exf5

White gets nothing playing on the g-file and after 18.gxf5 gxf5 19.hg1 h8 20.c3 fxe4 21. xe4 d5 22.g5 g8 23.cxd5 xd5 24.g3 xc1 25.xc1 f6= Lau – Z. Polgar, New York 1985, a draw agreement followed.

18...gxf5 19.h3

A necessary prophylactic move. Should White have played 19.c3 like in variation a, then Black could have solved all his problems by 19...f8!∞. The move 19.g5 is also not perfect, since it permits Black to even out by means of 19...d5 20.cxd5 xd5 21.hd1 b5 22.b6 xb6 23.xb6 e5= Badea – Callas, France 2000.
19...\textbf{xf8}

Black is re-grouping his forces. The rook has found no employment for itself on the c-file and is now looking for one on the f-file. In the long term Black plans to swap the dark-squared bishops via the f4. The attempt to prepare b7-b5 by way of 19...\textbf{cb8}?! is just a waste of time, since after 20.\textbf{Cc3} \textbf{f8} 21.f4 \textbf{c5} 22.\textbf{f3} a5 23.\textbf{d5} \textbf{xd5} 24.\textbf{xd5} \textbf{h8} 25.\textbf{Ce1} \textbf{e4} 26.\textbf{d3} \pm Stiri-Papandopoulou, Greece 1999, Black's situation deteriorated very quickly. The other attempt at b7-b5 - with the help of 19...\textbf{ab8} also promises Black nothing but troubles following 20.\textbf{Cc3} \textbf{f8} 21.\textbf{he1} \textbf{c5} 22.\textbf{f1} \textbf{f7} 23.\textbf{d5} \pm. Black's obstinacy pursuing his plan 23...b5? in the game Galkin-Mirzoev, Linares 2001, met with the tactical objection 24.\textbf{xe7}! \textbf{xe7} 25.\textbf{gxf5} bxc4 26.\textbf{xc5} \textbf{xc5} 27.\textbf{xe6} \textbf{d7} 28.\textbf{xc4} \textbf{xf5} 29.\textbf{ce1} \textbf{e5} 30.\textbf{h6} \textbf{xf3} (to 30...\textbf{f4} 31.\textbf{d3} \textbf{xh6}, White has 32.\textbf{ce6} \textbf{e6} 33.\textbf{xf5} \pm) 31.\textbf{h7} \textbf{c6} 32.\textbf{xa6} --, and White has a winning position.

Rather more cunning is the move 19...\textbf{c7}. In this case worth attention is 20.\textbf{Cc3}!? (with the just too slow on the timing 20.\textbf{hg1} Black managed to steer the game to an equal position by means of 20...\textbf{f8} 21.f4 \textbf{c5} 22.\textbf{Cc3} \textbf{f8} 23.\textbf{h4} b5 24.f5 b4!= Razuvaev-Mantovani, Reggio Emilia 1996) 20...b5 (if 20...\textbf{f8}, then, naturally, 21.f4 \pm) 21.gxf5

\textbf{xc3+} (21...\textbf{xf5}?? is not play-able due to 22.\textbf{d5} \pm) 22.\textbf{xc3} \textbf{xf5} (in case of 22...b4? the outcome of the game is decided in White’s favour by 23.\textbf{g1} \pm) 23.\textbf{cxb5} \textbf{xc3} 24.\textbf{xc3} axb5 25.\textbf{a1} \textbf{b8} 26.a4 \textbf{bxa4} 27.\textbf{bxa4} \textbf{h3} 28.\textbf{a5}. Regardless of the scarcity of material on the board, the passed a-pawn, supported by the bishop pair, is rather dangerous.

20.\textbf{f4}

White obliterates Black’s plan associated with the swap of the dark-squared bishops. In case of the inert 20.\textbf{hg1} this plan would have been impersonated as 20...\textbf{fxg4} 21.\textbf{fxg4} \textbf{e5} and 22...\textbf{f4}. Getting the knight back to the centre by 20.\textbf{Cc3} would have not worked either in view of 20...b5! 21.cx\textbf{b5} axb5 22.\textbf{xb5} f4 (another useful role of the f8-rook makes itself felt) 23.\textbf{f2} \textbf{xc3}+ 24.\textbf{xc3} \textbf{xa2}.

\begin{center}
\begin{figure}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{figure}
\end{center}

With the departure of the white e-pawn a real opportunity has emerged for Black to effect the d6-d5 push. Now he usually pursues his objective by resorting to either b1) 20...\textbf{ad8} or b2) 20...\textbf{f6}. The immediate 20...\textbf{d5}?
is inappropriate, since after 21.gxf5! (weaker is 21.cxd5?!), which provides White after 21...hx d5 22.h4 d1! aac8 23.gxf5 b5 24.hx c8 hx c8 25.e1 e6 26.c5 cxc5 27.hxc5 e6 28.b4 d4+ 29.e2 e4 30.e3 d5 31.g4± with a slight positional advantage only, Beliavsky – Tiviakov, Groningen 1993) 21...fxf5 22.cxd5 d6 (insufficient is also 22.e4 in view of the variation 23.hg1! axd5 24.h4 f6 25.b6+ pointed out by V. Ivanchuk) 23.b6 ad8 24.a3 the temporary piece sacrifice 24...a5d5 might as a result of 25.a5d5 e6 26.b6 a7 27.a7 c7 ff7 28.a8 f8 29.a7 c7 ff7 30.c5 f8 31.g1+ g6 32.a7 c6 d6 33.xf7 xf7, Makropoulou – Papandopoulou, Greece 1999, back-fire and present Black with unsolvable problems in view of 34.f5!±.

b1) 20.aad8 21.g5!

Grabbing the chance White immediately confines the opportunities of the black knight. In case of 21.d3 Black solved the problems facing him by means of 21...d5! 22.gxf5 (insufficient is also 22.cxd5 in view of 22...f6 23.f3 fxg4 24.hxg4 d5=) 22.fxg5 23.cxd5 f6 24.b6 a7 25.e3 c8 26.a3 e6 27.d4 edx5 28.c1 g8+ 29.a2 d4+ 30.a4 dxe4 31.xg7+ xg7 32.xg7 a8+ 33.e2 xg7= A. Rodriguez – Antunes, Matanzas 1994.

21.d5

The attempt to break free by 21...d5 does not permit Black to completely even the odds in view of 22.cxd5 axd5 23.h4 d1 e5 (after 23...b5 24.e1 g2 25.c7 bxa4 26.cxd7 a7 27.a7 cx7 28.bxa3 e5 29.xa6 exf4 30.xf4 e8+ 31.e2 f2± Nisipeanu – Khalifman, Las Vegas (active m/6) 1999, Black’s problems, associated with the neutralisation of the passed b-pawn and the active pieces of the adversary, remained, despite the obvious simplifications) 24.e1±.

22.c3

The swap of the knights on the c5-square does not suit White, since after 22.xc5 dxc5+ 23.d3 b6 24.e2 h5 25.e1 h6= the game is even, Nisipeanu – Khasin, Koszalin 1998.

22.a3

A fairly uncommon decision. To gain control of the e4-square Black is ready to voluntarily provide his opponent with the bishop pair advantage. In case of 22.e4+ 23.e4 fxe4 which occurred in the game Gross – Brendel, Germany 2000, White should have tried the move pointed out by A. Yermolinsky – 24.b6! d7 25.e3 f5 26.g4 e5 27.xe5 xg4 (if 27.xg4, then 28.c7=) 28.xg4 xe5 29.c7 e8 30.f5 d5, which guarantees White an extra even though double pawn after 31.cxd5! a5d5 32.e4±.

23.xc3 e4+ 24.b4 d7

Black can reduce the game to
a position with opposite coloured bishops by means of 24...\(\text{Q}g3\) 25.\(\text{Q}he1\) \(\text{Q}xe2\) 26.\(\text{Q}xe2\) \(\text{Q}d7\), however following 27.\(\text{Q}d4\) \(\text{Q}f7\) 28.\(\text{Q}ce1\) \(\text{Q}fe8\) 29.h4↑ it is not clear what is Black to do with the rising white initiative on the kingside. Black is tied up with the protection of the e-pawn, and the white pawn pair “g” and “h” supported by his bishop threatens to become very dangerous.

\(25.\text{hd1} \text{c6}\)

This position arose in the game Yermolinsky – Kudrin, Dallas 2000. Worth attention at this point was 26.\(\text{B}b6!?\) \(\text{Q}d7\) 27.\(\text{f}f3\) with the idea not to let Black break free by means of 27...e5?! in view of 28.fxe5 dxe5 29.\(\text{Q}xd7\) \(\text{Q}xd7\) 30.\(\text{Q}c7\) and the black e5-pawn is in danger. In the above mentioned game White preferred to open up the game by 26.c5 and following 26...dxc5+ 27.\(\text{Q}xc5\) \(\text{Q}xd1\) 28.\(\text{Q}xd1\) Black did not take advantage of the opportunity to simplify the situation still further by means of 28...\(\text{Q}d8!\) 29.\(\text{Q}e2\) (the salt of the plan is that after 29.\(\text{Q}xe7\) \(\text{Q}d7\) White’s dark-squared bishop has no-
where to go and he must agree to 30.\(\text{Q}f6\) \(\text{Q}xf6\) 31.gxf6 \(\text{Q}f7=\) 29...\(\text{Q}d2\) (weaker is 29...\(\text{Q}f7\) on account of 30.\(\text{Q}e3\) 30.\(\text{Q}c4+\) \(\text{Q}f8\) 31.\(\text{Q}e6\) \(\text{Q}xa2\) 32.\(\text{Q}xf5\) \(\text{Q}xc5\) 33.\(\text{Q}xc5\) \(\text{Q}f2\) 34.\(\text{Q}xh7\) \(\text{Q}xf4+\) 35.\(\text{Q}c4\) e5= (A. Yermolinsky’s analysis).

\(b2)\) 20...\(\text{Q}f6\) 21.\(\text{Q}hg1\)

White protects the g4-pawn and at the same time keeps an eye on the black king, for which the closeness with the white rook on the same file is not particularly pleasant.

21...\(\text{Q}ad8\)

A shortcoming of Black’s move twenty is the fact, that now the move d6-d5 is postponed indefinitely. In case of the immediate 21...d5? the fact, that Black has left the c5-square completely unattended makes itself felt after 22.\(\text{Q}c5\) \(\text{Q}e4+\) 23.\(\text{Q}e1\).

22.\(\text{Q}b6\) \(\text{Q}c8\)

Black must be extremely accurate choosing a retreat square for his rook. E.g., inappropriate is 22...\(\text{Q}d7!\). After 23.\(\text{Q}f3!\) (good is also 23.\(\text{Q}e3\) \(\text{Q}h8\) 24.\(\text{Q}f3\) \(\text{Q}g8\) 25.g5 \(\text{Q}e4\) 26.\(\text{Q}gd1\), which occurred in the game Ramon – T. Hernandez, Havana 1998) one more inaccuracy – 23...h5?! (Black’s situation would have been also difficult both after 23...\(\text{Q}xg4\) 24.\(\text{Q}xg4\) and 23...\(\text{Q}h8\) 24.\(\text{Q}ce1\)) and Black emerged in a hopeless situation as a result of 24.\(\text{Q}xh5\) \(\text{Q}h7\) 25.\(\text{Q}d4\) \(\text{Q}h6\) 26.\(\text{Q}e3\) \(\text{Q}g8\) 27.\(\text{Q}b6\) \(\text{Q}d8\) 28.\(\text{Q}d5+\) Riemersma – Van der
Weide, Netherlands 1995.

After 22...\(\text{\textdt{de}8} \ 23.\text{\textdt{f3} fxg4} 24.\text{h}xgx4 \text{\textdt{d}d7} 25.\text{\texttt{e}e3! (in case of 25.f5 \text{\textdt{e}xb6} 26.\text{\texttt{e}xb6 \text{\textdt{d}d4=} or 25.\text{\texttt{e}e3 b5=} Black evens out the odds}) 25...\text{\texttt{e}xb6} 26.\text{\texttt{e}xb6 \text{\texttt{a}b2!} (playing passively 26...\text{\textdt{b}b8} 27.f5 \text{\texttt{c}c8} 28.\text{\texttt{d}d5=} Black risks to fall under White’s strong positional press) 27.b1 \text{\texttt{a}a3} 28.b4 a5 29.f5 \text{\texttt{c}c8} 30.\text{\texttt{x}xc8} \text{\texttt{e}xc8} 31.\text{\texttt{e}xb7 \text{\texttt{c}c8} 32.\text{\texttt{d}d5} \text{\texttt{g}g7. Black must first take into consideration 33.b5!? \text{\texttt{c}c5} 34.\text{\texttt{e}e4} \text{\texttt{x}gx1} 35.\text{\texttt{x}gx1=} Regardless of the fact, that White has only a pawn for the exchange down the winning odds are in exactly his favour. His pawns both on the queenside and kingside are very dangerous, and the black a5-pawn is exceptionally weak. The white rook is by now ready to come after it along the third rank and Black can hardly interfere with this plan.

23.\text{\texttt{f3}!?

In case of 23.\text{\texttt{c}c3} very strong is 23...\text{\texttt{f}xg4! (after 23...\text{\texttt{c}c6} 24.\text{\texttt{e}e3=} White retained superior chances in the game Ivanchuk – Kir. Georgiev, Belgrade 1997) and now 24.\text{h}xgx4 d5 25.f5 (of no avail is 25.cxd5? on account of 25...\text{\texttt{x}xc3!}, if 25.g5, then unpleasant is 25...\text{\texttt{d}d7=}!, and following 25.\text{\texttt{f}f3} \text{\texttt{d}xc4} 26.\text{\texttt{g}g1} \text{\texttt{x}xg4} 27.\text{\texttt{a}xb7} \text{\texttt{b}b8} 28.\text{\texttt{x}xe7\texttt{cxb3} 29.axb3 \text{\texttt{f}f7=} Black’s chances can turn up even slightly better) 25.\text{\texttt{f}f7} 26.\text{\texttt{d}xd5} \text{\texttt{xd5} 27.cxd5 \text{\texttt{e}e5=} brings equality.

23...\text{\texttt{f}xg4

Nothing is changed also by 23...\text{\texttt{d}d7} because of 24.\text{\texttt{e}e1} \text{\texttt{f}xg4} 25.\text{h}xgx4 and we are facing the same position that occurs after 23...\text{\texttt{f}xg4. Note only, that White is not advised to play 25.\text{\texttt{x}xe6 in view of 25...\texttt{gxf3} 26.\text{\texttt{x}e7} \text{\texttt{f}f7=}

24.\text{h}xgx4 \text{\texttt{d}d7

This situation occurred inn the game Van Der Wiel – Tiviakov, Hoogeveen 2000. White should have continued to contest the superiority issue by means of 25.f5!? \text{\texttt{f}f7} 26.\text{\texttt{c}c1=} retaining definite pressure on the black position. In the game White opted for the immediate 25.\text{\texttt{e}e1 (in case of 25.\text{\texttt{e}e3} Black obtains counterplay by means of 25...b5=), which permitted Black to draw the game by way of 25...\text{\texttt{x}xf4! 26.\text{\texttt{x}xb7} 28.\text{\texttt{x}xb6 (White achieves nothing by 26.\text{\texttt{x}xe6 \text{\texttt{x}xf3} 27.\text{\texttt{x}xe7} \text{\texttt{f}f7=} either) 26...\text{\texttt{b}b8} 27.\text{\texttt{x}xe6} \text{\texttt{x}xb6 (bad is 28.\text{\texttt{x}xe7 in view of 28...\texttt{f}f6 29.\text{\texttt{c}c7 \text{\texttt{d}d8=} and after 28.\text{\texttt{a}xa6} \text{\texttt{x}xa4} 29.bxa4 \text{\texttt{b}b2} 30.\text{\texttt{e}e3} \text{\texttt{f}f2=} Black’s position is at least not inferior) 28...\text{\texttt{b}b7=.

48
Chapter 5

1.d3 c5 2.c4 g6 3.e4 d6 4.d4 cxd4
5.exd4 f6 6.c3 g7

Typical of this variation is the temporary rejection of the d7-d6 move in favour of more rapid piece development.

7.e3

Since Black does not hinder the development of the bishop to e3 White immediately takes advantage of this opportunity.

Now Black can either proceed with the development of his kingside by means of 7...0-0, or simplify the situation at once, like he did in Chapters 3 and 4, though not by a direct swap on d4, but with the help of 7...g4, see Chapter 6.

7...0-0

Within this variation we will consider the development schemes, in which Black refrains from the d7-d6 move. Otherwise, the game is reduced to the positions discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.

8.e2 b6

One has tried the march of the a-pawn, similar to the one we observed in Chapter 1. Following 8...a5 9.0-0 a4 White’s best bet is to steer the game to a position from Chapter 1, considered in the note to move nine, by means of 10.bd5!? (after 10.c5 with the idea to play b5-d5 on the very next move, Black stirred up some complications via 10...d5 11.cxd6 bxd6 12.db5 b4 13.a3 a5 14.f4 e5 Nunn – Haik, Paris 1983) 10...d6 11.h1. The attempt to prepare f7-f5 by 8...e8 also does not promise Black anything positive after 9.d2 f5 10.exf5 gxf5 11.f4 c7 12.0-0 e6 13.c2 d6 14.ad1 d7 15.f3= Heim – Moen, Norway 1996.

9.d2!

The most accurate continuation, thwarting Black’s attempt to somehow complicate the game. Following 9.0-0 b7 10.f3 (White already has no time for the move 10.d2, in view of
10...\(\text{Qxd4}\) 11.\(\text{Qxd4}\) e5! 12.\(\text{Qxe5}\) \(\text{Qxe4}\) 13.\(\text{Qxe4}\) \(\text{Qxe5}\) = Tal - R. Hernandez, Las Palmas 1977) 10...\(\text{Qh5}\) 11.\(\text{Qdb5}\) (White plans f2-f4, and the immediate 11.f4? was inappropriate because of 11...\(\text{Qxf4}\)!, while in case of 11.\(\text{Qd2}\) White has to reckon with 11...\(\text{Qf4}\)!\(\infty\), which occurred in the game Holmsten – Pyhala, Finland 1996, Black also obtains counterplay after 11.\(\text{Qe1}\) \(\text{Qf4}\) 12.\(\text{Qf1}\) by way of 12...\(\text{Qe6}\) 13.\(\text{Qde2}\) f5 14.\(\text{Qxf5}\) \(\text{Qxf5}\) 15.\(\text{Qxd2}\) \(\text{Qe5}\) 16.\(\text{Qxc4}\) \(\text{Qxd4}\) 17.\(\text{Qxd4}\) \(\text{Qxc7}\) 18.\(\text{Qd5}\) \(\text{Qxd5}\) 19.\(\text{Qxd5}\) \(\text{Qaf8}\) 20.\(\text{Qc3}\) \(\text{Qd6}\) Kirillov – Ekabson, USSR 1983) 11...a6 12.\(\text{Qa3}\) \(\text{Qb8}\) 13.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{Qxc3}\) 14.\(\text{Qxc3}\) \(\text{Qf6}\) 15.\(\text{e5}\) \(\text{Qe4}\) 16.\(\text{Qe1}\), Timman – Jussupow, Linares (m/10) 1992, with 16...\(\text{f5}\)!\(\infty\), as pointed out by A.Jussupow, Black retained counterchances, due to the weakness of the double c–pawn.

9...\(\text{Qb7}\) 10.\(\text{f3}\)

10.\(\text{Qc8}\)

The attempt to obtain counterplay by means of 10...\(\text{Qh5}\) is already nothing but a waste of time and White can reliably reinforce his positions in the center 11.\(\text{Qc2}\) \(\text{Qc8}\) 12.\(\text{Qd1}\) d6 (if 12...\(\text{Qe5}\), then 13.\(\text{b3}+\) 13.0-0 \(\text{Qf6}\) 14.\(\text{b3}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) 15.\(\text{Qfe1}\) \(\text{Qc5}\) 16.\(\text{Qf1}\) a5 17.\(\text{Qd5}\). In the Banas – Certek game, Slovakia 1996, after 17...\(\text{Qe8}\) 18.\(\text{Qb1}\) \(\text{Qe5}\) 19.\(\text{Qed1}\) h5 White could have immediately initiated active play on the queenside by way of 20.\(\text{b4}\)! axb4 21.\(\text{Qxb4}\) \(\text{Qed7}\) 22.\(\text{Qdb1}\)\(\uparrow\).

White can counter Black’s ambition to carry out d7-d5 manifested by 10...e6, by 11.\(\text{Qd1}\) (in case of 11.0-0 following 11...\(\text{Qd5}\) 12.\(\text{Qxc6}\) \(\text{Qxc6}\) 13.\(\text{Qxd5}\) exd5 14.\(\text{e5}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) 15.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{Qc5}\) 16.\(\text{Qxc5}\) bxc5 17.\(\text{Qf3}\) \(\text{f6}\)= Hulak – Garcia Martinez, Luzern 1982, Black’s plan was relatively successful) 11...\(\text{Qd5}\) (in case of 11...\(\text{Qe7}\) after 12.\(\text{Qd5}\)+ Black can forget altogether about the d7-d5 push) 12.\(\text{Qdb5}\) d5 13.\(\text{exd5}\) exd5 14.\(\text{Qxd5}\) \(\text{Qxd5}\) 15.\(\text{Qxd5}\) a6 16.\(\text{Qc3}\) \(\text{Qc4}\) (following 16...\(\text{Qe8}\) 17.0-0\(\infty\) White manages to evacuate his king from the centre) 17.\(\text{Qxc4}\) \(\text{Qh4}\)+ 18.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{Qxc4}\) 19.\(\text{Qd4}\) \(\text{Qfe8}\)+ (after 19...\(\text{Qad8}\) 20.\(\text{Qxg7}\) \(\text{Qxg7}\) 21.\(\text{Qd4}\)+ \(\text{Qxd4}\) 22.\(\text{Qxd4}\)+ White retains his extra pawn) 20.\(\text{Qf2}\). This situation arose in the Mucu – Rantanen game, Luzern 1982. Black’s attempt to keep his bishop pair by the move 20...\(\text{Qf8}\)? (Black should have agreed to the endgame with a pawn off after 20...\(\text{Qad8}\) 21.\(\text{Qxg7}\) \(\text{Qxg7}\) 22.\(\text{Qd4}\) \(\text{Qxd4}\) 23.\(\text{Qxd4}\)=) was refuted with the help of 21.\(\text{Qe4}\)!\(\infty\).

Black’s position acquires a familiar outline after the move
10...d6. However, following 11. 0-0 it turns out that in contrast with the positions discussed in Chapters 1-4 Black can hardly find an active employment for his queen. 11...\(\text{\#d7}\) (after 11...\(\text{\#x4d}\) 12.\(\text{\#xd4}\) \(\text{\#d7}\) White developed a strong initiative in the centre by means of 13.\(\text{\#xg7}\) \(\text{\#xg7}\) 14.f4 \(\text{\#c8}\) 15.\(\text{\#ad1}\) \(\text{\#f6}\) 16.e5 dxe5 17.fxe5 \(\text{\#g8}\) 18.\(\text{\#e3}\)! \(\text{\#c7}\) 19.e6↑ Cvetkovic – Cebalo, Yugoslavia 1985) 12.\(\text{\#fd1}\) (following 12. \(\text{\#db5}\) \(\text{\#fc8}\) 13.\(\text{\#ac1}\) a6 14.\(\text{\#a3}\) \(\text{\#d8}\) 15.\(\text{\#fd1}\) \(\text{\#ab8}\) 16.f4 \(\text{\#a8}\) 17.\(\text{\#f3}\) \(\text{\#e8}\) 18.\(\text{\#e2}\) \(\text{\#f8}\) 19.\(\text{\#d5}\) \(\text{\#d7}\) 20.\(\text{\#f2}\) e6 21. \(\text{\#e3}\) \(\text{\#e7}\) Portisch – Garcia Gonzales, Luzern 1982, Black entrenched along the entire front-line by erecting a pawn “hedgehog”-type screen on the sixth rank) 12...\(\text{\#fd8}\) 13.\(\text{\#f1}\) \(\text{\#xd4}\) 14.\(\text{\#xd4}\) e6. In the game Ciocaltea – Forintos, Titograd 1982, White ingeniously noted the subtleties of the position (the a-rook has remained on its original square in contrast with the variation considered below) and started an offensive on the queenside signalled by the thrust of the a-pawn – 15.a4! \(\text{\#c7}\) 16.a5 bxa5 17.\(\text{\#b5}\) \(\text{\#e7}\) (bad is 17... \(\text{\#b8}\)? on account of the fact, that Black loses an exchange after 18.\(\text{\#xa5}\) a6 19.\(\text{\#c7}\)++) 18.\(\text{\#xa5}\)±.

On account of the difficulties with the active placement of his queen, illustrated in the previous paragraph, Black has tried to employ it elsewhere by 10...\(\text{\#b8}\). However, even here after 11.0-0 \(\text{\#d8}\) (following 11...\(\text{\#h5}\) 12.\(\text{\#db5}\) \(\text{\#d8}\) 13.\(\text{\#d5}\) e6 14.\(\text{\#dc3}\) d6 15.\(\text{\#ad1}\)± I. Gurevich – A. Rodriguez, Maringa 1991, White stopped Black from breaking through in the centre), regardless of the simplification of the position, White managed to retain the edge, due to certain initiative on the queenside, by means of 12.\(\text{\#fd1}\) (it is possible to proceed by analogy with the just mentioned fragment of the game I. Gurevich – A. Rodriguez, Maringa 1991, however, now after 12.\(\text{\#db5}\) d6 13.\(\text{\#d5}\) \(\text{\#d7}\) 14.\(\text{\#g5}\) Black has at his disposal the more solid 14...\(\text{\#e8}\) 15.f4 e6, Psakhis – Vl. Georgiev, Benasque 1996, and in his search for an advantage White had to venture the sharp play connected with 16.\(\text{\#g4}\)!!) 12.\(\text{\#fd1}\) d6 13.\(\text{\#ac1}\) \(\text{\#d7}\) 14.\(\text{\#d5}\) e6 15.\(\text{\#xf6}\) 16.b4 \(\text{\#f8}\) 17.\(\text{\#xc6}\) \(\text{\#xc6}\) 18.b5 \(\text{\#b7}\) 19.a4± C. Hansen – Bellon Lopez, Malmo 1996. The attempt to break away from White’s pressure by means of 19...d5?! was refuted by the straightforward 20.exe5 \(\text{\#ad8}\) 21.a5 exe5 22.c5±.

11.0-0 d6

Apart from this move Black can hardly think up anything else. E.g., the attempt to break free by d7-d5, which begins by 11...e6 and looked unconvincingly a move earlier, now also brings Black difficulties after 12.\(\text{\#db5}\)! \(\text{\#e8}\) 13.\(\text{\#fd1}\)±.
picture is similar with the 11…\(\text{\textit{D}}\text{h}5\) move. As earlier the most straightforward way to neutralise it is 12.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}2\) (in case of 12.\(\text{\textit{R}}\text{fd}1\) Black managed to complicate the situation after 12…\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f}4\) 13.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f}1\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{e}6\) Tatai – Makropoulos, Budva 1981) 12…f5 13.exf5 gxf5 14.\(\text{\textit{R}}\text{ad}1\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f}6\) 15.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d}5\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}5\) 16.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xf}6\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xf}6\) 17.\(\text{\textit{B}}\text{b}3\) d6 18.\(\text{\textit{B}}\text{b}4\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f}7\) 19.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d}5\) Hendriks – Bosch, Enschede 1993, and White retained his pressure in the centre.

The move 11…\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{e}8\) begs to be refuted by means of 12.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{db}5\)! (there is also the calm 12.\(\text{\textit{R}}\text{fd}1\) \(\text{\textit{B}}\text{c}7\) 13.\(\text{\textit{R}}\text{ac}1\) \(\text{\textit{B}}\text{b}8\) 14.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f}1\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{h}5\) 15.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{de}2\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{e}5\) 16.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f}4\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xf}4\) 17.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xf}4\) d6 18.\(\text{\textit{B}}\text{b}3\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}6\) 19.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d}5\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{cd}8\) 20.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{g}5!\) f6 21.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{e}3\), which occurred in the game Sznapik – Ristoja, Helsinki 1981), though it is not simple at all here. The almost forced 12…a6 13.\(\text{\textit{B}}\text{a}4\) axb5 14.cxb5 (unclear is 14.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}6\) bxa4 15.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xd}8\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{exd}8\), which provides Black with three minor pieces for queen and pawn) 14…d5 15.bxc6 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xc}6\) 16.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}6\) \(\text{\textit{B}}\text{b}8\) leads us to a very interesting position. After 17.e5 (inappropriate was 17.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xd}5\) in view of 17…\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xd}5\) 18.exd5 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}2\)!) 17…\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{h}5\) (following 17…\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}6\) 18.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xf}6\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xf}6\) 19.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}6\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}6\) 20.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{h}1\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}2\) 21.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}2\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}2\) 22.\(\text{\textit{R}}\text{ab}1\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}3\) 23.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{b}6\) White can reasonably expect to convert the extra exchange) 18.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d}4\) f6 19.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}5\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{h}6\) White has at his disposal 20.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xd}5\)! (weaker is 20.

\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xe}6\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}6\) 21.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}6\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}6\) 22.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{fc}1\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}2\) 23.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xc}6\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xe}2\) Kudrin – L. Karlsson, Hastings 1983, which provided Black with sufficient compensation for the pawn down) 20…\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xd}5\) (after 20…\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xd}5\) 21.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xe}6\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}2\) 22.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{b}5\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}5\) 23.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}4\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f}7\) 24.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{e}1\) – Black is in a hopeless situation) 21.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xd}5+\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xd}5\) 22.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{hx}6\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}2\) 23.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{b}2\)! and it becomes clear, that Black will not be able to win back easily the missing pawn. The fact is that after 23…\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xa}2\) 24.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xa}2\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xa}2\) 25.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{b}5\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{b}8\) (impossible is 25…\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}8\)? because of 26.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xa}2\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xa}2\) 27.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}4\)) 26.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xa}2\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}5\) 27.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}8+\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f}7\) 28.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f}8+\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{e}6\) 29.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{g}4\) Black is a piece off.

![](chess_board.png)

12.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{ac}1\)

As long as the black queen is on d8, White cannot organise an offensive on the queenside with the help of 12.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xc}6\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xc}6\) 13.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}4\), by analogy with the above considered fragment from the game Ciocaltea – Forintos, Titograd 1982, due to 13…a5! 14.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d}3\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d}7\) 15.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}2\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}5\) De Firmian – Benjamin, Estes Park 1985, And Black, who has obtained an excellent stronghold for his knight
on c5, has no difficulties whatsoever.

12...d7

The lack of board room does not permit Black to successfully re-group his forces. His queen feels especially uncomfortable, since it often must scramble among his own pieces. E.g., after 12...c7 13.f1 d7 14.f1 a8 Black assigned his queen to the corner of the board, though following 15.db5 fd8 16.f2 h6 17.d2 g5 18.d5 e6 19. xf6+ xf6 20.cd1+ Wojtkiewicz – Szalanczy, Vienna 1995, the effect of his efforts is almost zero, and the weakness of the d6-pawn makes itself felt. Both after 12...d7 13.xc6 xc6 14. fd1 c5 15.d5 d7 16.b4 e6 17.f4 f5 18.f3 h8 19.e1+ A. Rodriguez – Pazos, Moscow 1994, and 12...xd4 13.xd4 d7 14.e3 c5 15.fd1 e6 16.d5 d7 17.b4+ Fogarasi – Tolnai, Budapest 1993, White retained his edge, first of all on account of the strong placement of the d5-knight.

13.fd1 fd8 14.db5

White makes difficult for Black to shift to a “hedgehog”-type structure and prevents the move e7-e6.

14..e8 15.e1 e6

16.g5!

Black managed to push e7-e6, but White immediately forced him to deform his pawn structure by means of a standard manoeuvre of his dark-squared bishop.

16.f6 17.e3 e7 18.g3 d7 19.d2 cd8 20.cd1+

In the Polugaevsky – Bellon Lopez game, Las Palmas 1974, White has retained strong pressure on the d6-pawn, which denies Black all hopes for active counterplay.
Chapter 6

1.\textit{\&}f3 c5 2.c4 g6 3.e4 \textit{\&}c6 4.d4 cxd4 5.\textit{\&}xd4 \textit{\&}f6 6.\textit{\&}c3 \textit{\&}g7 7.\textit{\&}e3 \textit{\&}g4

A small tactical foxery, the purpose of which, like in Chapter 4, is to swap a pair of knights.

8.\textit{\&}xg4 \textit{\&}xd4

In Chapter 1-2 we saw numerous examples to the effect that it is sometimes advantageous for Black to swap the dark-squared bishops, but this case is different. The fact is that after 8...\textit{\&}xd4?! 9.\textit{\&}xd4 \textit{\&}xd4 White plays 10.0-0-0! and Black cannot easily organise a blockade on the dark squares in the centre and on the kingside. Following a few almost forced moves 10...e5 (the consequences of 10...\textit{\&}c6 11.\textit{\&}g3 \textit{\&}a5 12.h4 h5 13.f4 d6 14.\textit{\&}d5 \textit{\&}b6 15.f5 gxf5 16.exf5 \textit{\&}d7 17.f6± Gallagher – Gelashvili, Batumi 1999, were not pleasing for Black either) 11.\textit{\&}g3 d6 12.f4 f6 13.f5 the white attack becomes very dangerous. There are at least a dozen ways to massacre Black’s position and that number is growing year after year. The most persevering continuation for Black starts with 13...\textit{\&}f7 (after 13...gxf5 14.\textit{\&}g7 \textit{\&}f8 15.\textit{\&}d5 the black position cannot be saved, here is one example only: 15...\textit{\&}d7 16.\textit{\&}xd4! \textit{\&}f7 17.\textit{\&}g8+ \textit{\&}f8 18.\textit{\&}xh7 \textit{\&}f7 19.\textit{\&}h8+ \textit{\&}f8 20.\textit{\&}h5+ Almasi – Marosi, Hungary 1992, and Black had to resign) 13...\textit{\&}f7 14.\textit{\&}e2! (less precise is 14.\textit{\&}b5, since following 14...\textit{\&}xb5 15.\textit{\&}xb5 \textit{\&}c7+ 16.\textit{\&}b1, Mestel – Karlsson, Las Palmas 1982, Black could have caused White some troubles with the development of the white offensive via 16...gxf5! 17.\textit{\&}c1 \textit{\&}e7 18.\textit{\&}c4+ \textit{\&}f8∞) 14...\textit{\&}xe2+ (White retains an excellent position also with 14...\textit{\&}c6 15.c5 gxf5 16.\textit{\&}b3+ \textit{\&}g7 17.exf5±) 15.\textit{\&}xe2 b6 (White has a most powerful attack also after 15...gxf5 16.\textit{\&}h5+ \textit{\&}f8 17.\textit{\&}xf5→, since 17...\textit{\&}xf5? is impossible due to the straightforward 18.\textit{\&}hf1++) 16.\textit{\&}a3 \textit{\&}e7 17.g4 \textit{\&}b7 18.g5! \textit{\&}f8 (inappropriate
was 18...fxg5 in view of 19.f6+ \(\text{\textbullet}\)f7 20.xd6 \(\text{\textbullet}\)c7 21.xd1 \(\text{\textbullet}\)ad8 22.c5 xdx6 23.xd6+-- with the extremely unpleasant threat 24.xc4+! 18...xf8 19.xh3 \(\rightarrow\) Serper – I. Ivanov, Las Vegas 1997, and in a few moves the black position scattered away.

9.\(\text{\textbullet}\)d1

As a rule, in this situation Black either protects his knight by a) 9...e5 or retreats b) 9...\(\text{\textbullet}\)e6. The other retreat of the knight to c6 is significantly more rare, since conceptually it is inferior to variation b. After 9...\(\text{\textbullet}\)c6 10.\(\text{\textbullet}\)d2 \(\text{\textbullet}\)a5 (Black can hardly find a more suitable square for his queen than a5, since following 10...d6 11.\(\text{\textbullet}\)e2 0-0 12.0-0 \(\text{\textbullet}\)e6 13.\(\text{\textbullet}\)d5 \(\text{\textbullet}\)d7 14.\(\text{\textbullet}\)ad1 \(\text{\textbullet}\)fc8 15.b3 \(\pm\) Russi – Sabatini, Italy 1997, White has disposed conveniently his pieces all over the centre and has everything ready for the advance of the f-pawn, while at the same time Black has no real counterplay) 11.\(\text{\textbullet}\)c1 d6 12.\(\text{\textbullet}\)e2 0-0 13. 0-0 \(\text{\textbullet}\)e6 14.b3 \(\text{\textbullet}\)ac8 (the plan with the typical for Chapters 1-4 move 14...\(\text{\textbullet}\)fc8 is not quite convincing here, since Black will need to move the f-pawn; this is confirmed by the course of events in the game Gavrikov – Pribyl, Germany 1994, in which following 15.\(\text{\textbullet}\)fd1 \(\text{\textbullet}\)e5 16.h3 \(\text{\textbullet}\)f8 17.f4 \(\text{\textbullet}\)c6 18.\(\text{\textbullet}\)f3 \(\text{\textbullet}\)ab8 19.\(\text{\textbullet}\)h1 f5 20.exf5 gxf5 21.\(\text{\textbullet}\)f2 \(\text{\textbullet}\)f7 22.\(\text{\textbullet}\)e3 \(\text{\textbullet}\)d8 23.\(\text{\textbullet}\)h4+ White put pressure on Black’s central pawns) 15.f4

f5 (the adventurous raid 15...\(\text{\textbullet}\)b4? met with a deserving refutation after 16.f5! \(\text{\textbullet}\)xc3 17.\(\text{\textbullet}\)xc3 \(\text{\textbullet}\)d7 18.\(\text{\textbullet}\)h6 f6 19.fxg6 hxg6 20.\(\text{\textbullet}\)xf8 \(\text{\textbullet}\)xf8 21.\(\text{\textbullet}\)d2++ – Ginzburg – Van Zyl, Medellin 1996) 16.exf5 \(\text{\textbullet}\)xf5 17.\(\text{\textbullet}\)f3 \(\text{\textbullet}\)h8 18.\(\text{\textbullet}\)fd1 \(\text{\textbullet}\)fe8 19.\(\text{\textbullet}\)b5 \(\text{\textbullet}\)xd2 20.\(\text{\textbullet}\)xd2 a6 21.\(\text{\textbullet}\)c3 h5 22.\(\text{\textbullet}\)a4 \(\text{\textbullet}\)b8 23.c5+ White retains a small but sustainable advantage thanks to his superior pawn structure, Polugaevsky – Suetin, Kislovodsk 1972.

a) 9...e5

Black reinforces his knight in the centre of the board at the expense of weakening the d5-square.

10.\(\text{\textbullet}\)b5!?

White tries to straighten out the situation with the black knight on d4 at once. Should it be left unmolested now, it will be much harder to contend with it later. E.g., after 10.\(\text{\textbullet}\)d2 0-0 11.\(\text{\textbullet}\)d3 d6 12.0-0 \(\text{\textbullet}\)e6 13.\(\text{\textbullet}\)ac1 a6 14.b3 (following 14.\(\text{\textbullet}\)fd1 \(\text{\textbullet}\)a5 15.\(\text{\textbullet}\)f1 Black carries out the important breakthrough on the queenside 15...b5! 16.cxb5 axb5
17.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{xb5} \text{\textcopyright} \text{xb5} \) 18.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{xa5} \text{\textcopyright} \text{xa5} \) 19.b4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \text{xa2} \) 20.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{xb5} \text{\textcopyright} \text{b8= with equality and a draw, Polugaevsky – Bagirov, Leningrad 1963}, \) sufficient to level the game is 14...\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{b8}! ? \) 15.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{e2} \text{\textcopyright} \text{b5} \) 16.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{xd4} \text{\textcopyright} \text{exd4} \) 17.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{h6} \text{\textcopyright} \text{hxh6} \) 18.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{hxh6} \text{\textcopyright} \text{a5=}, \) which occurred in the game Korneev – Vl. Georgiev, Elgoibar 1999.

Black’s tasks are somewhat more complicated after 10.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{d3} \) 0-0 11.0-0 d6 (in case of 11...b6 White gained an obvious edge following 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{d2} 13.\text{\textcopyright} \text{f3} \text{\textcopyright} \text{a6} 14.\text{\textcopyright} \text{e2} \text{\textcopyright} \text{xe2}+ 15.\text{\textcopyright} \text{xe2} \text{\textcopyright} \text{c6} 16.\text{\textcopyright} \text{a4} \text{\textcopyright} \text{b8} 17.\text{\textcopyright} \text{b4} \text{\textcopyright} \text{e8} 18.\text{\textcopyright} \text{b5± Hendriks – Afek, Wijk aan Zee 2000, on account of his superior pawn structure} \) 12.a4!? (Black can also deal with his problems after 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{b5} \text{\textcopyright} \text{xb5} 13.\text{\textcopyright} \text{xb5} \) by means of 13...\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{d5} 14.\text{\textcopyright} \text{xd5} \text{\textcopyright} \text{xd5} 15.\text{\textcopyright} \text{e6} \) 16.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{e2} \text{\textcopyright} \text{d7} 17.\text{\textcopyright} \text{fd1} \text{\textcopyright} \text{c7=} Almasi – Chatalbashev, Krynica 1998, and White’s pawn superiority on the queenside is worthless), though here also he is successful blockading the queenside by means of 12...\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{c6} \) (it does not pay to ignore White’s activity on the queenside, since after 12...a6 13.a5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \text{e6} \) followed by 14.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{a4}! \text{\textcopyright} \text{c8} 15.\text{\textcopyright} \text{d5} \text{\textcopyright} \text{d5} 16.\text{\textcopyright} \text{xd5} \text{\textcopyright} \text{c5} 17.\text{\textcopyright} \text{fc1} \text{\textcopyright} \text{e7} 18.\text{\textcopyright} \text{xc5} \text{\textcopyright} \text{xc5} 19.\text{\textcopyright} \text{c1} \text{\textcopyright} \text{d8} 20.\text{\textcopyright} \text{c4} \text{\textcopyright} \text{f8} 21.\text{\textcopyright} \text{f6} 22.\text{\textcopyright} \text{b4±, having undermined the footing of the black d4-knight from two sides, white can gain a tangible advantage, Shabalov – Baburin, Mermaid Beach 1998} \) 13.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{d5} \text{\textcopyright} \text{e6} 14.\text{\textcopyright} \text{d2} \text{\textcopyright} \text{d4} 15.\text{\textcopyright} \text{a3} \) a5, which significantly hampers the development of White’s initiative. Following 16.b4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \text{xd5} 17.\text{\textcopyright} \text{xd5} \text{\textcopyright} \text{b4} 18.\text{\textcopyright} \text{xb4} \text{\textcopyright} \text{d7} 19.\text{\textcopyright} \text{b1} \text{\textcopyright} \text{a7} 20.\text{\textcopyright} \text{a5} \text{\textcopyright} \text{fa8} 21.\text{\textcopyright} \text{b6, Vera – Matamoros Franco, Cienfuegos 1997}, Black played in the dozing unemployed dark-squared bishop by the move 21...\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{f6!} \) and despite that White won a pawn with the help of 22.c5!? \( \text{\textcopyright} \text{d8} 23.\text{\textcopyright} \text{xd6} \text{\textcopyright} \text{xd6} 24.\text{\textcopyright} \text{xd6} \text{\textcopyright} \text{xa5} 25.\text{\textcopyright} \text{xa5} \text{\textcopyright} \text{xa5} 26.\text{\textcopyright} \text{c4} \text{\textcopyright} \text{c5} 27.\text{\textcopyright} \text{xb7} \text{\textcopyright} \text{xc4} 28.\text{\textcopyright} \text{b8±, this must not suffice for a win, if Black defends accurately.} \)

10...0-0

The observable depreciation of the white queenside pawns transpires also to Black at an even greater cost after 10...\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{xb5} 11.\text{\textcopyright} \text{xb5} \text{\textcopyright} \text{e7} \) (the overall picture is similar also after 11...\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{a5+} 12.\text{\textcopyright} \text{d2} \text{\textcopyright} \text{b6} 13.\text{\textcopyright} \text{c4± or 11...0-0 12.\text{\textcopyright} \text{c4±}}) 12.\text{\textcopyright} \text{d2} 0-0 13.\text{\textcopyright} \text{c4!±.} \) The white bishop emerges on c4, taking up a perfect position in the a2-g8 diagonal, and in fact forever rules out the possibility for Black to break free by d7(6)-d5.

11.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{d2} \)

It is more than dangerous for White to win a pawn by means of 11.\( \text{\textcopyright} \text{xd4?!} \text{\textcopyright} \text{exd4} 12.\text{\textcopyright} \text{xd4. Following 12...\text{\textcopyright} \text{a5+} 13.\text{\textcopyright} \text{e2} \text{\textcopyright} \text{e8} 14.\text{\textcopyright} \text{f3} \text{\textcopyright} \text{d5! 15.\text{\textcopyright} \text{cg7} \text{\textcopyright} \text{xe4+!} 16.\text{\textcopyright} \text{d3} \text{\textcopyright} \text{xc4} 17.\text{\textcopyright} \text{e3} \text{\textcopyright} \text{c5} 18.\text{\textcopyright} \text{d4 \text{\textcopyright} \text{e7 19. \text{\textcopyright} \text{f2 \text{\textcopyright} \text{h4+ 20.\text{\textcopyright} \text{e3 \text{\textcopyright} \text{f5!}}} \rightarrow Black can develop a most powerful attack, like this happened in the game Ragozin – Maciejewski,

In case of 11.\textit{\textbf{a}}e2, White must first reckon with the seemingly paradoxical move 11...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{a}}b6}?! (after 11...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\texttt{d}}}xb5} 12.cxb5 d6, despite the fact that White has lost a tempo on a second move with his light-squared bishop, he can cause Black problems by means of 13.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{c}}}c4! \textit{\textbf{a}}e6 14.\textit{\textbf{b}}b3 \textit{\textbf{e}}7 15.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}d1 \textit{\textbf{f}}c8 16.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}d5± Sandhu – Ligezinski, Austria 1996) and after 12.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}d2 (if 12.0-0, then 12...a6!∞ and the insufficient protection of the white b2-pawn makes itself felt, while following 12.b3 a6 13.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{c}}}c3 \textit{\textbf{a}}5 14.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}d2 one has to take into consideration the continuation 14...\textit{\textbf{h}}h6?! 15.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{a}}}xh6 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{w}}}xc3+ 16.\textit{\textbf{f}}f1 \textit{\textbf{e}}8∞) 12...a6 13.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{c}}}c3 \textit{\textbf{a}}5 14.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}d5 (in case of 14.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}xd4 exd4 15.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}d5 Black obtains a roughly equal position by means of 15...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{w}}}d8 16.0-0 d6= to be followed by \textit{\textbf{c}}c8-e6) 14...\textit{\textbf{c}}c2+ 15.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}d1, Santos – Antunes, Evora 1996, Black could have led the way to a situation with mutual chances with the help of 15...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}xe3+! (no good for Black is 15...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{w}}}xd2+ 16.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}xd2 \textit{\textbf{c}}xa1? in view of 17.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{c}}}c7 \textit{\textbf{b}}b8 18.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{a}}}a7+) 16.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{w}}}xe3 d6∞.

11...\textit{\textbf{e}}8

In case of a mass exchange on d4, Black hopes to get through to the white e4-pawn along the e-file. Like before, it was of no avail for Black to agree to the swap 11...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}xb5 12.cxb5, even though after 12...\textit{\textbf{h}}h4 13.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{g}}}d3 \textit{\textbf{g}}4 he could bar the immediate infiltration of the white bishop onto c4, but this was a fleeting phenomenon, since soon in the game Ricci – Esprit, Cannes 2000, White achieved the proper piece disposition, after all, by means of 14.0-0 b6 15.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{c}}}c4! \textit{\textbf{b}}7 16.f3±.

Black is not prepared either for a gambit play of the type 11...d5 12.cxd5 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{h}}}h4 13.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{c}}}c3 \textit{\textbf{g}}4 14.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{g}}}5+. Another interpretation of the same idea connected with 11...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{h}}}h4 12.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}d3 d5 (after 12...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{e}}}e6 13.0-0 d6 14.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{a}}}xa7 \textit{\textbf{d}}7 15.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{b}}}b5 \textit{\textbf{f}}5 16.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{f}}}d3 \textit{\textbf{f}}4 17.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{f}}}f2 \textit{\textbf{h}}5 18.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}xd6+ Gross – Meulner, Germany 1996, Black is a pair of pawns off and has no attack) is also not quite convincing and permits White to obtain a very good position via 13.cxd5 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\texttt{b}}}xb5} 14.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}x5 \textit{\textbf{xe}}4 15.0-0 \textit{\textbf{f}}5 16.\textit{\textbf{e}}5 \textit{\textbf{d}}8 17.\textit{\textbf{e}}7 \textit{\textbf{d}}7 18.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{d}}}xd8 \textit{\textbf{x}}xb5 19.\textit{\textbf{c}}7 \textit{\textbf{x}}f1 20.\textit{\textbf{x}}f1 \textit{\textbf{d}}7 21.d6± G. Pinter – Philippe, Budapest 2000, on account of his strong passed d-pawn. A more successful third incarnation of the same idea is associated with 11...\textit{\textbf{e}}7 12.\textit{\textbf{e}}e2 (following 12.0-0-0 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{b}}}xb5 13.cxb5 d5! 14.exd5 \textit{\textbf{d}}8 15.d6 \textit{\textbf{e}}6 16.\textit{\textbf{b}}1 \textit{\textbf{f}}8∞ B. Lalic –
Heim, Slough 1997, Black managed to obtain sufficient compensation for the pawn, while 12. \( \text{d}c7 \text{b}b8 13.\text{d}d5 \text{h}h4 14.0-0-0 \text{b}5\text{z} J. Nielsen – Hortillosa, Leopoldsburg 2000, provided Black with counterplay) 12...\( \text{x} \text{xb}5 13.\text{c}x\text{b}5 \text{d}5, \) but here also after 14.\text{ex}d5 \text{d}d8 15.0-0 \text{b}6 16.\text{hf}d1 \text{d}d6 17.a4 \text{b}7 18.\text{c}c4 with the idea a4-a5± Rowson – Afek, Wijk aan Zee 2000, White’s chances are obviously better.

After 11...d6 12.\( \text{d} \text{xd}4 \text{ex}d4 13.\text{h}d4 \text{h}4 14.\text{h}xg7 \text{xe}4+ 15.\text{e}2 \text{xg}7 16.0-0 \text{e}6 17.b3 \text{e}5 18.\text{ad}1 \text{d}8, \) Chytilek – Simacek, Czech Republic 2000, White could have certified his obvious positional edge, connected with the weakness of the black d-pawn, by means of the move 19.\( \text{f}3!±. \) To 11...\( \text{b}6, \) which we talked about in the note to White’s move eleven, this time meets with the strong objection 12.0-0-0±.

12.\( \text{d}d6 \)

The most natural response to Black’s move eleven.

12...\( \text{f}8 \)

After 12...\( \text{e}7 13.\text{c}5 \text{b}6 14.\text{c}4 \) it becomes obvious, that 14...bxc5? is not good for Black, since Black will have to part with an exchange following 15.\( \text{g}5+-.

13.\( \text{c} \)

This way White not only supports his knight, but also, which is at least as important, he extends the working diagonal for his light-squared bishop.

13...\( \text{b}6 \) 14.\( \text{c}1 \) bxc5

In case of 14...\( \text{e}7 \) unpleasant for Black would be 15.\( \text{b}4!±, \) while after 15.b4 a5 16.a3 axb4 17.axb4 bxc5 18.bxc5 \( \text{a}6! \) (anything but 18...\( \text{b}3? \) because of 19.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{xc}1 \) 20.\( \text{x}a8+- \) 19.\( \text{x}a6 \) \( \text{x}a6 \) 20.0-0 \( \text{f}a8= \) he manages to resolve his opening problems.

15.\( \text{x} \) xc5 \( \text{b}6 \) 16.\( \text{d}5 \) a5 17.\( \text{b}5±\)

This situation occurred in the game Galkin – Shinkevic, Russia 1999. Despite the certain piece disposition disorder in the centre of the board, White retains the upper hand, first of all, on account of his superior pawn structure.

b) 9...\( \text{e}6 \)

Retreating to e6, the black knight retains control of the two important squares c5 and f4, which are often the aim of the white pawns “c” and “f”, respectively. In this way Black creates for himself the prerequisites for blockade play on the dark squares.
10.\textit{c1}!

Naturally, White does not want to double his pawns on the c-file, even more so in a situation, when Black controls the important c5-square by his knight. Another way to avoid the double pawn is connected with the move 10.\textit{d2}. However, in this case Black’s blockade strategy can easier reach its plenitude. After 10...\textit{a5} 11.\textit{c1} b6 (worse is 11...\textit{d}6 12.\textit{d}3 \textit{d}7 13.0-0 \textit{c}5 14.\textit{b}1 \textit{a}4, which provided White with a slight edge after 15.\textit{d}4 \textit{xd}4 16.\textit{xd}4 0-0 17. \textit{d}5 \textit{d}8 18.e5\textdagger Christiansen – Tomey, Palo Alto 1981) 12.\textit{e}2 (following 12.\textit{d}3 \textit{b}7 13.0-0 g5! 14.\textit{fd}1 d6 15.a3 h5= Ljubojevic – Korchnoi, Tilburg 1987, Black succeeded to spread his blockade web on the dark squares all over the board) 12...\textit{b}7 13.f3 h5 14.b3 h4 15.\textit{d}5 (Black’s blockade strategy is impressive, when one looks at the position after 15.0-0 g5! 16.\textit{fd}1 d6 17.\textit{d}5 \textit{xd}2 18.\textit{xd}2 \textit{e}5 19.a4 f6 20.\textit{cd}1 \textit{f}7\textdagger Timman – Larsen, Brussels (blitz) 1987) 15...\textit{xd}2+ 16. \textit{xd}2 \textit{h}6 17.\textit{hd}1 \textit{xe}3+ 18. \textit{xe}3 g5! 19.b4 d6= Kramnik

– Ljubojevic, Monte Carlo 1994, White had hard times overcoming his adversary’s defence, set up around the control of the dark squares all over the board.

After White’s mainline move ten, Black usually makes his choice among the moves b1) 10...\textit{a5}, b2) 10...\textit{d}6 and b3) 10...\textit{b}6. The move 10...0-0 has no independent significance, since after 11.b4 the game will be reduced to either variation b2 or b3. Note also, that outright bad for Black is 10...\textit{a5}?! in view of White’s thematic reply 11.c5=.

b1) 10...\textit{a5}

Black gets underway the same idea, we considered above with 10.\textit{d}2. However, as we will see from the variation given below, White can turn to his advantage the fact, that the d2-square is unoccupied.

11.\textit{d}3!

White needs reliable protection for the e4-pawn, or, e.g., after 11.\textit{e}2 the follow through 11...b6 12.0-0 \textit{b}7 13.f3 g5 14.\textit{f}2 h5 15.\textit{f}1 \textit{e}5 16.\textit{d}2 d6 17.\textit{d}5 \textit{f}8 18.b4 \textit{h}6, Short
Chapter 6

Larsen, Hastings 1987/88, Black created a blockade position, similar to the one we saw in the note about White's tenth move \( \text{d}1\text{-d}2 \).

11...b6

Black steadily executes his plan initiated on move ten organising a blockade position on both flanks. It is very risky for Black to win a pawn by way of 11...\( \text{x}c3+ \) 12.\( \text{xc}3 \) \( \text{xa}2 \). In this case after 13.\( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 14.\( \text{c}5! \) \( \text{e} \) White has good compensation for the pawn – his bishop pair advantage. Of no little significance is the fact, that the black king will not feel completely safe even after he has been evacuated to the kingside, since the dark squares on Black's kingside are seriously weakened by the absence of the dark-squared bishop. The move 14.\( \text{c}5 \) has not been tested yet, but the power of the white attack is evidenced by the game Eingorn – Dorfman, Lvov 1984, in which after 14.0-0 \( \text{c}7 \) (stronger is 14...d6!?) therefore we must recognise White's move fourteen c4-c5 as the most accurate, note also that after 14...b6 15.f4 \( \text{b}7 \) 16.f5 \( \text{c}5 \) 17.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{a}7 \) Yemelin – Ananchenko, Pardubice 1997, White obtained good compensation for the pawn down) 15.\( \text{c}5! \) 0-0 16.f4 f5 (White would have had a strong initiative also after 16...d6 17.cxd6 \( \text{xd}6 \) 18.f5± 17.exf5 gxf5 18.\( \text{f}3\)± White fell upon the black king with all his pieces.

There have been also tests of 11...d6 12.0-0 0-0 (the attempt to blockade the position by means of 12.\( \text{d}7 \) 13.\( \text{b}1 \) g5 is of no avail here in view of 14.\( \text{d}2 \! \text{e}5 \) 15.b4 h5 16.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{b}2 \) 17.\( \text{e}1 \) g4 18.\( \text{c}2 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 19.\( \text{c}1\)± with the idea to inflict unrecoverable material damage on Black by the move \( \text{d}2\text{-c}3 \), Korneev – Vokarev, Elista 1996). If Black's castles on the kingside, however, the placement of the black queen on a5 with the knight on e6 is of little use. It is not surprising that the following straightforward moves 13.\( \text{b}1 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 14.f4 \( \text{c}5 \) 15.\( \text{d}5\)± Mednis – Byrne, USA 1973, permitted White to obtain excellent play. One can easily see, that with Black's current piece disposition there is no way to disturb the white knight, installed in the centre of the board.

The plan associated with the blockade of the white position via 11...g5 was refuted after 12.0-0 b6 by means of 13.\( \text{d}2 \)! (this is where the circumstance that the d2 is unoccupied makes itself felt most) 13...\( \text{e}5 \) 14.b4 \( \text{f}4 \) 15.\( \text{b}1 \) 0-0 16.g3 \( \text{h}3\)± 17.\( \text{g}2 \) d6 18.f3 \( \text{e}6 \) 19.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 20.\( \text{e}3 \), Vokarev – Polovnikova, Moscow 1998, Black resigned, in view of the manoeuvre \( \text{e}3\text{-f}5 \), concluding the capture of the black h3-knight.

12.0-0 \( \text{b}7 \) 13.f4

White deprives the black queen of the e5-square and makes it feel uncomfortable even
on its safety island.

13...0-0

The dangers that await the black queen are well-illustrated by the following fragment from the game Gavrikov – Yurtaev, Vilnius 1978, where Black was forced to sacrifice it following 13...\texttt{xc} 14.\texttt{af} 2 d 6 15.a 3 \texttt{ad} 4 16.b 4 \texttt{gh} 5 17.\texttt{e} 2 \texttt{exe} 3 18.\texttt{xe}h 5 gxh 5 19.\texttt{e} 2 \texttt{xe} 4 20.\texttt{ac} 3 \texttt{xf} 2+ 21.\texttt{xf} 2. Black’s problems with the queen are none the less in the sequel of 13...\texttt{c} 5 14.\texttt{b} 1 \texttt{xc} 3 (after 14...0-0 15.\texttt{d} 2! \texttt{a} 6 16.b 4 \texttt{e} 6 17.a 4 b 5 18.axb 5+- San Segundo – Granero Roca, Zaragoza 1998, Black rescued his queen, though at the price of a healthy pawn) 15.\texttt{xc} 3 \texttt{b} 4 16.a 3! \texttt{a} 4 (in case of 16...\texttt{xb} 2 17.\texttt{d} 4 the black h 8-rook is sagging, and, moreover, there is the threat of \texttt{d} 3-e 3, capturing the black queen) 17.\texttt{e} 2 \texttt{c} 6. The black queen has completed his Odyssey rather happily, but after 18.\texttt{d} 4 0-0 19.f 5 \texttt{exe} 4 20.\texttt{e} 3+ Gosshstein – Sedina, Nova Gorica 1997, Black had to concede all his positions in the centre.

Following 13...d 6 14.f 5!? \texttt{c} 5 15.\texttt{b} 1 0-0 (inadequate for Black is 15...\texttt{xc} 3? 16.\texttt{xc} 3 \texttt{xe} 4 in view of 17.\texttt{d} 4+-) 16.\texttt{d} 2 \texttt{a} 6 (after 16...\texttt{b} 4 17.b 3 the black queen can hardly worm out of the inconvenient situation) 17.b 4 \texttt{d} 7 18.a 4 Black was forced to get along the already familiar scenario and play 18...b 5. As a result of 19.axb 5 \texttt{b} 6+ 20.\texttt{h} 1 \texttt{ac} 8, Yemelin – Kalod, Pardubice 1997 he managed to save his queen, but had White chosen the move 21.\texttt{d} 5!?+- there would have hardly been any grounds for doubt about the outcome of the encounter.

The swap of the dark-squared bishops brings about the isolation of the black d 4-knight in the centre of the board following 13...\texttt{d} 4 14.\texttt{xd} 4 \texttt{xd} 4 15.\texttt{d} 5 \texttt{xd} 5 16.cxd 5. It can be saved, but after 16...b 5 17.\texttt{b} 1 \texttt{b} 6 18.\texttt{h} 1 0-0 19.\texttt{d} 2 f 6 (a similar situation emerged also following 19...b 4 20.\texttt{c} 4 \texttt{b} 5 21.\texttt{xb} 4+- Stohl – Supancic, Astria 1995) 20.f 5 \texttt{xf} 5 21.\texttt{xf} 5 b 4 22.\texttt{c} 4 \texttt{b} 5 23.\texttt{xb} 4+- J. Horvath – Conquest, Budapest 1987, Black is simply a pawn off.

14.\texttt{b} 1 d 6 15.\texttt{f} 2

Rather good-looking, by analogy with the game Yemelin – Kalod, Pardubice 1997, is 15.f 5!?+-

15...\texttt{ac} 8 16.\texttt{d} 5 \texttt{xd} 5 17.\texttt{exd} 5 \texttt{c} 5 18.a 3 \texttt{a} 4 19.b 4 \texttt{a} 6 20.\texttt{b} 3+-

This position occurred in the
game A. Rodriguez – R. Hernandez, Cuba 1988. The black queen and knight are in a very dangerous situation.

b2) 10...d6
A typical move for the Maroczy System. However, it is not essential in the current ramification b. Black’s light-squared bishop has no particular prospects on the c8-h3 diagonal.

11.b4!? 
Black’s choice of a playing strategy is rather harmless and it is no wonder, that White has a number of ways to attain relatively good play. White’s last move is useful in this degree or that in a number of ramifications, and somewhat confines Black’s opportunities. For that reason it has been promoted to the mainline. Quite well performs also 11.\textbf{d}3 0-0 (after 11...\textbf{d}7 12.0-0 a5 13.f4 \textbf{c}6 14.b1 the move 14...\textbf{c}5!?, which is an alternative to the castling leading to a position discussed below, performed inadequately in view of 15.\textbf{e}2 0-0 16.e5! \textbf{a}4 17.\textbf{xa}4 \textbf{xa}4 18.b3 \textbf{c}6 19.\textbf{cd}1 \textbf{c}7 20.exd6 exd6 21.f5 \textbf{fe}8 22.\textbf{f}2+ Portisch – Larsen, Lugano 1968, and White gained the upper hand thanks to his superior pawn structure and active piece placement) 12.0-0 (in case of 12...\textbf{c}5 there is 13.\textbf{b}1 a5 14.f4± 12...a5 13.\textbf{b}1 \textbf{d}7 14.f4 \textbf{c}6 15.\textbf{e}2 b6 16.f5 \textbf{c}5 17.\textbf{f}2= with attacking prospects on the kingside for Black, Portisch – Petrosian, Palma de Mallorca (m/8) 1974.

11...0-0 12.\textbf{e}2
There is no much sense in the development of the light-squared bishop on d3 at this point, since the white e4-pawn is not threatened by anything in the short term, and it is good to have the d4-square under permanent control.

12...b6 
Black agrees that his light-squared bishop has no prospects on the c8-h3 diagonal. As a rule, persistency would cost him more. E.g., after 12...\textbf{d}7 13.0-0 a6 14.\textbf{d}2 b5 (playing passively 14...b6 15.\textbf{d}5 \textbf{b}8 16.f4 \textbf{c}6 17.f5 \textbf{c}7 18.\textbf{h}6 \textbf{e}8 19.d3 \textbf{xd}5 20.exd5→, like in the game Belov – Najdowski, Moscow 1990, Black risks to suffocate in his own camp with lack of board room, and he can hardly survive the kingside attack of all the white pieces) 15.\textbf{f}1 bxc4 16.\textbf{xc}4 \textbf{c}7 17.\textbf{d}3 \textbf{b}5 18.\textbf{xb}5 axb5 19.\textbf{b}3= Ciaffone – Johnson, Chicago 1997, regardless of the fact that Black has pushed
b7-b5, his situation is still difficult. White has clear prospects connected with the occupation of the open c-file by his rooks, which, combined with his bishop pair advantage and the weakness of the black b5-pawn, provides him with excellent winning chances.

We should mention the move 12...a5, the purpose of which is to knock off-balance White’s positions on the queenside. However, in this case as well White by means of 13.a3 axb4 14.axb4 \(\text{\underline{\text{d}}7\ 15.0-0\ \text{\underline{c}}6\ 16.\text{\underline{e}}2\ \text{\underline{a}}3\) (inadequate for Black is 16...\(\text{\underline{x}}c3?\) 17.\(\text{\underline{x}}c3\ \text{\underline{x}}e4?\) because of 18.\(\text{\underline{h}}6\ \text{\underline{e}}8\ 19.\text{\underline{e}}3!\ \text{\underline{c}}6\ 20.\text{\underline{b}}2\) not only repels Black’s queenside attack, but switches over to an offensive himself by means of 17.\(\text{\underline{d}}5\)!. After 17...\(\text{\underline{e}}8\) (Black must protect reliably the e7-pawn, or else following 17...\(\text{\underline{h}}8?\) 18.\(\text{\underline{b}}6\ \text{\underline{d}}7\ 19.\text{f}4\ \text{f}5\ 20.\text{exf}5\ \text{gx}\text{f}5\ 21.\text{\underline{f}}3\ \text{\underline{f}}a8\ 22.\text{\underline{c}}e1!\ \text{\underline{a}}1\ 23.\text{b}5\) his situation can very quickly become unenviable, like it did in the game Portisch – Pfleger, Manila 1974, note also that Black cannot swap on d5, since after 17...\(\text{\underline{x}}d5?\ 18.\text{cxd}5\) it turns out that the black knight has simply nowhere to retreat) 18.\(\text{h}4?\ \text{\underline{b}}8\ 19.\text{h}5\ \text{b}5\ 20.\text{h}6\ \text{\underline{h}}8\ 21.\text{\underline{e}}d1\ \text{bxc}4\ 22.\text{\underline{xc}}4\ \text{\underline{a}}4\ 23.\\text{\underline{e}}1\ \text{\underline{b}}5\ 24.\\text{\underline{e}}2\) Wiese – Klusek, Poznan 1989, White retains his advantage thanks to the passed b-pawn and the seal set on the black kingside by the h6-pawn.

13.0-0 \(\text{\underline{b}}7\)

The attack on the c4-pawn by 13...\(\text{\underline{a}}6\) 14.\(\text{\underline{d}}5\ \text{\underline{c}}7\ 15.\text{\underline{d}}2\) as shown by the game Timoshenko – Nay, Jakarta 1997, is not successful.

14.\(\text{\underline{d}}2\ \text{\underline{c}}8\)

The attempt to extend the a8-h1 diagonal for the light-squared bishop by means of 14...f5, brings to the surface, following 15.exf5 \(\text{gx}\text{f}5\) 16.\(\text{f}4\ \text{\underline{h}}8\ 17.\text{\underline{d}}5\ \text{\underline{c}}8\ 18.\text{f}e1\) Loginov – Hermlin, Riga 1975, specific targets for the white pieces (first of all – the e7-pawn) inviting play in the centre of the board.

15.\(\text{\underline{d}}5\ \text{\underline{c}}7\ 16.\text{\underline{g}}5\)

A typical coup forcing Black to make concessions in the centre of the board.

16...\(\text{\underline{x}}d5\)

In case of 16...\(\text{\underline{e}}8\) White can put up more pressure on the black position by the move 17.\(\text{\underline{g}}4\)

17.\(\text{exd}5\ \text{\underline{f}}6\ 18.\text{\underline{h}}6\ \text{\underline{g}}7\ 19.\text{\underline{xg}}7\ \text{\underline{xg}}7\ 20.\text{\underline{d}}4\) Wiese – Klusek, Poznan 1989, White retains his advantage thanks to the passed b-pawn and the seal set on the black kingside by the h6-pawn.

This situation occurred in the game Bagirov – Terentiev, Dau-
gavpils 1990. With his next few moves White intends to pump up the pressure on the black e7-pawn. Moreover, one must take into account that the white queen takes up a very strong and invulnerable position on the d4-square.

b3) 10...b6

Black is not willing to waste time on the move d7-d6 and immediately commits to a development post for his light-squared bishop.

![Chess board diagram](image)

11...d3

Now, when the e4-pawn can become a possible target for Black’s game, excessive protection can do it no harm.

11...0-0 12.0-0 b7 13.b4!?  

We mentioned already that the b2-b4 move matches any development scheme for Black in variation b2, p.62. White will not be harmed by securing control of the c5-square. Moreover, Black cannot take advantage of the advanced position of the white queenside pawns. Incidentally there are also other less committing ways to contest the superi-


13...c8

Black targets the white c4-pawn. Of all the other continuations we will focus first on 13...a5. In this case Black’s certain activity on the queenside is discouraged with the help of 14.a3 axb4 15.axb4 a3 16.b5 a2 17.c3 a3 (it turns out that 17.b2?! is dangerous for Black, since after 18.a4 b4 19.d2+ he risks losing an exchange) 18.d2. Black’s determination to keep up his dwindling initiative on the queenside by means of 18.f5 meets with the strong objection 19.d5! xd5 20.exd5 f4 21.dxe6 fxe6 22.xe6+ h8 24.e2+, where despite the missing pawn the opposite coloured bishops would have provided him with certain chances for salvation) 23.exd7 d6 24.c! dxd3 25.c6! dxc3 could have been refuted by means of 26.d2+ with the irresistible threat c6-c7, since 26...e5 is of no avail due to 27.d5+.
Too passive is 13...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}b8 14. \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e8, so it is no wonder that White obtained excellent play after 15.f4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d4 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}xd4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}xd4 17.e5 f5 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}b1 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e6 19.g4!± Smikovski – Dashko, St. Petersburg 1999. The attempt to make use of the d4-square, of which, with the bishop on d3, White has somewhat lost control, by means of 13...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d4 was not successful after 14.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}}b1 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c6 15.a3 d6 16. \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}d3 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c8 17.f4!± Suba – Taimanov, Bucharest 1979, though White will have to reckon with the certain weakening of the control of the c4-pawn, once his bishop has left d3.

Let us not forget the possible attack on the e4-pawn with the help of 13...f5, aiming to extend the a8-h1 diagonal for the black light-squared bishop. In this case, following 14.exf5 gxf5 15.f4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e8 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e2 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c8, Csom – Groszpeter, Budapest 1978, White could have retained some advantage by means of 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d5!? \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d8 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d4 e6 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}xg7 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}g7 20. \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c3!±, since Black would have had to take into account both the weakness of the dark squares in his camp and the backwardness of his own d-pawn.

14.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d2 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}}a6

There have been attempts to attack the e4-pawn by way of 14...f5, which is similar to the same move, considered on the previous move. However, after 15.exf5 gxf5 16.f4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash w}}e8 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e2 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}}f7 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c7 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}c7 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}c7 20.c5 bxc5 21.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}c5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}c5 22.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}c5 d6 23.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}}e3 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c8 24.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c1 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}c1+ 25.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}c1!± Gallagher – Huss, Neuchatel 1996, White retained his edge, despite the mass piece exchanges, thanks to his pawn superiority on the queenside.

15.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}}d5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c7 16.c5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}d3 17. \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}d3 bxc5 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}c5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}d5 19. \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}}d5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash h}}h6 20.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}d1 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}}c7 21.e5!±

This position arose in the game Nunn – Larsen, Hastings 1987. In the ensuing struggle, White's chances are somewhat higher thanks to his pawn superiority and spatial advantage.
Chapter 7  1.\( \textit{\text{f}}3 \text{ c}5 \text{ 2.} \text{c}4 \text{ g}6 \text{ 3.e}4 \text{ g}7 \)

As with \( 3...\text{c}6 \), Black intends to take piece control over the d4-square. So if White is willing to contest the opening advantage, he has practically nothing to choose from on his next move.

4.d4

If Black does not want to steer the game to the positions considered in Chapters 1-2 and 5-6, then after \( 4...\text{cxd}4 \text{ 5.} \text{cxd}4 \text{ c}6 \) (following \( 5...\text{b}6 \text{ 6.b}3 \text{ c}6 \text{ 7.e2 d6 8.0-0} \) the play may revert to a position discussed below in variation b) \text{ 6.e3 f6 7.c3} \) he can maintain the tension in the centre by one of the continuations listed below: a) \( 4...\text{a}5+ \text{, b) 4...c6} \text{ and c) 4...d6} \).

Sometimes people play \( 4...\text{b}6 \), intending to serve the same purpose. After \( 5.\text{dxc}5 \text{ xc}5 \text{ 6.e2 d6 7.0-0 g4} \) (in case of \( 7...\text{c}6 \) White can take advantage of the advanced location of the black queen by means of \text{8.a}3 \text{ g}4 \text{ 9.b}4 \text{ b}6 \text{ 10.e}3 \text{ d}8 \text{ 11.a}2 \text{ f}6 \text{ 12.c}3 \text{ 0-0} \text{ 13.d}2 \text{ d}7 \text{ 14.b}3 \text{ a}5 \text{ 15.h}3 \text{ x}f3 \text{ 16.xf3 axb}4 \text{ 17.axb}4 \text{ b}6 \text{ 18.fd1 e}8 \text{ 19.e}2 \text{ c}7 \text{ 20.b}5 \text{ b}7 \text{ 21.f4+} \) to be followed by \( \text{e4-e5} \), like in the game Kramnik – Topalov, Monte Carlo 1999 \text{8.f}d2!? (the attempt to clarify Black's intentions by \( 8.h3 \text{ xf}3 \text{ 9.xf}3 \) permits him to contest successfully the d4-square by means of \text{10...c}6 \text{ 10.e}2 \text{ c}8 \text{ 11.d}2 \text{ f}6 \text{ 12.b}1 \text{ d}4 \text{ 13.c}2 \text{ 0-0} \text{ 14.a}3 \text{ e}5 \text{ 15.d}3 \text{ d}4 \text{ 16.d}1 \text{ d}7= \), like in the game Baumgartner – Robatsch, Austria 1989, while after \( 8.e3 \text{ b}4 \text{ 9.d}4 \text{ xe2} \text{ 10.xe2 c}6= \) Black is ready to simplify the position to the maximum extent possible, like he did in the game Stohl – Kaminski, Wies 1998 \text{8..xe2} \text{ 9.xe2 d}7 \text{ 10.b}3 \text{ c}6 \text{ 11.f3 b}6 \text{ 12.a}3 \text{ f}6 \text{ 13.e}3 \text{ 0-0} \text{ 14.d}4 \text{ c}8 \)
15.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{c}}}ac1 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{b}}}bd7}, Epishin – Kudrin, Connecticut 2000, White, who has resolved the problem with the protection of the c4-pawn, started to re-group his forces by 16.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{b}}}b1! \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{a}}}6 17.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{c}}}c3 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{e}}}e6 18.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}fd1 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{c}}}c7 19.b3 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{f}}}fd8 20.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{f}}}f2\pm}}}}} White has emerged from the opening with some spatial advantage, once he has managed to prevent Black’s disengaging pushes of the types b7-b5 or d7-d5.

\textbf{a) 4...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{a}}}a5+}}

Black seeks to stir up some discomfort in the customary disposition if the white pieces.

5.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}c3 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{c}}}c6}}

The continuation 5...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{f}}}f6 6.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d2 cxd4 7.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{e}}}xd4 0-0} (7...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{c}}}c6 8.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d5 – Book I, p. 9) 8.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{c}}}c2 has been considered on page 1 of the first book, while after 5...d6 6.\textbf{b1 the arising position is from variation c, discussed below.}}}}}

6.d5

White is not capable of maintaining the tension in the centre any further. After 6.\textbf{\texttt{\textit{e}}}e3?! \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{f}}}f6 he may be headed for troubles, since of no avail is neither 7.d5 in view of 7...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}xe4! 8.dxc6 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{c}}}xc3 9.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d2 b6\pm, nor 7.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d2 due to 7...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{x}}}xd4 8.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}xd4 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{x}}}xe4! 9.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{c}}}xc6 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{x}}}xc3 10.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{a}}}axc3 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{c}}}c3+ 11.bxc3 dxc6\pm}.}}}}}}}}}

6...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d4 7.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d2 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{xf}}}f3+}}

The attempt to keep the knight on d4 does not disencumber Black of his difficulties. E.g., after 7...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d6?! 8.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{x}}}xd4 cxd4 9.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{c}}}c5 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d8 10.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{b}}}b4 a5 11.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{a}}}a3 a4 12.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{a}}}d2± Malakhatko – Salmensuu, Polanica Zdroj 1999, Black simply had to part with his d4-pawn. In case of 7...\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d8 8.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d3 e5 (the intent to take, when exchanging on d4, with the c– pawn, e.g., after 8...d6 9.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{x}}}xd4 cxd4 also brings Black problems in view of 10.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{e}}}e2 e5 11.\textbf{\texttt{\textit{a}}}a4+ \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d7 12.\textbf{\texttt{\textit{a}}}a3 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{f}}}f8 13.0-0 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{g}}}gf6 14.\textbf{\texttt{\textit{h}}}h3 \textbf{\texttt{\textit{h}}}h5, Lingnau – Hoehensteiger, Recklinghausen 2000, and now very strong was 16.\textbf{\texttt{\textit{b}}}b4?) 9.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d4 exd4 10.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{e}}}e2 d6 11.0-0 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{f}}}f6 12.h3 0-0 13.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{g}}}g3 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{e}}}e8 14.\textbf{\texttt{\textit{f}}}f4 a6 15.\textbf{\texttt{\textit{f}}}f3 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d7 16.\textbf{\texttt{\textit{a}}}ae1 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{f}}}f6 17.f5! (White closes for good the dark-squared bishop of his adversary, taking advantage of the circumstance that the black knight will need a lot of exercise to reach the e5-square) 17...g5 18.h4 h6 19.\textbf{\texttt{\textit{f}}}f2 b5 20.b3 bxc4 21.bxc4 \textbf{\texttt{\textit{b}}}b8 22.\textbf{\texttt{\textit{b}}}b1 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{c}}}c7 23.\textbf{\texttt{\textit{a}}}a5± Norri – Salmensuu, Helsinki 2000, White has excellent prospects on both flanks. Typical of all fragments considered above is the fact that with the swap on d4 White actually does not lose any time to retreat the c3-knight, since it pulls out in tempo.

8.\textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{x}}}xf3 d6 9.\textbf{\texttt{\textit{d}}}d3 \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textit{f}}}f6}}
Chapter 7

There have been attempts to walk-up the position by means of 9...e5. However, in this case very effective is 10.dxe6 \( \triangle \)xe6 11.e5! Now after 11...\( \triangle \)b6 12.exd6 0-0-0 13.0-0 \( \triangle \)xd6, D. Cramling – Zieher, Copenhagen 1982, White singed out another very strong move – 14.\( \triangle \)e4! The piece sacrifice was a hundred percent correct, as confirmed by the course of events, which brought about Black’s surrender after 14...\( \triangle \)xd2 15.\( \triangle \)ad1 \( \triangle \)g5 16.\( \triangle \)xb7 \( \triangle \)b8 17.\( \triangle \)a6 \( \triangle \)c8 18.\( \triangle \)xc8 \( \triangle \)xc8 19.\( \triangle \)d7 \( \triangle \)c7 20.\( \triangle \)xc7 \( \triangle \)xc7 21.\( \triangle \)xf7+ \( \triangle \)e7 22.\( \triangle \)d5+.

10.0-0 0-0 11.h3 \( \triangle \)b6

In case of 11...e6 White can contest the upper hand by means of 12.\( \triangle \)g5?! \( \triangle \)d7 13.\( \triangle \)e2 f6 14.\( \triangle \)d2 \( \triangle \)e5 15.\( \triangle \)c2 \( \triangle \)f7 and now in the game Ghitescu – Helmers, Roskilde 1978, White took advantage of the situation and forestalling Black’s e6-e5, opened up the game in the centre by the move 16.dxe6, providing himself with an excellent post for his knight in the centre of the board after 16...\( \triangle \)xe6 17.\( \triangle \)d5. Black’s attempt to take advantage of the weakness of the analogous d4-square in the white camp ended in a complete fiasco following 17...\( \triangle \)d8 18.f4 \( \triangle \)d7 19.\( \triangle \)e3 \( \triangle \)d8 20.\( \triangle \)c3 \( \triangle \)c6 21.f5±.

12.\( \triangle \)ab1 e6 13.a3

The opposition of the white rook and the black queen on the same file suggests the advisability of opening up the game along the b-file.

13...\( \textit{exd5} \) 14.\( \triangle \)xd5

Worth attention is also 14.\( \textit{exd5} \)? with the idea, following 14...\( \triangle \)d7 15.\( \triangle \)c2 \( \triangle \)e5 16.\( \triangle \)e2, to move b2-b4 or f2-f4, depending on the circumstances.

14...\( \triangle \)xd5 15.\( \textit{exd5} \)±

This position occurred in the Marasescu – G. Horvath game, Pecs 1998. Despite the definite simplifications, White retains some advantage due to his superiority in board room and more active piece disposition. Perhaps Black should have resisted the development of his opponent’s initiative on the queenside by means of 15...a5, however, in this case White also retains the upper hand, being the first to contest the e-file by way of 16.\( \textit{Be1} \). His plan may be based on the fact, that after 16...\( \triangle \)d7 17.\( \triangle \)e7 \( \triangle \)d8 18.\( \textit{Be1} \) the move 18...\( \triangle \)xb2 looks risky (outright bad for Black is 18...\( \triangle \)e5? in view of 19.\( \textit{Bxe5} \) dxe5 20.\( \textit{Be6} \)± to be followed by \( \textit{Be2–h6} \)) in view of 19.\( \textit{Bh6} \) \( \textit{Bg7} \) 20.\( \textit{Bxg7} \) \( \textit{Bxg7} \) 21.\( \textit{Be2} \), where White threatens with the unpleasant manoeuvre.
\( \texttt{\textcopyright f3-c3-f6}, \) while Black's extra pawn cannot be perceived.

In the actual game Black opted for the inappropriate 15...\( \texttt{\textcopyright d7?!} \) and after 16.b4 cxb4 17.axb4 \( \texttt{\textcopyright fd8} \) 18.\( \texttt{\textcopyright fc1} \) \( \texttt{\textcopyright a6} \) White could have caused Black serious problems with the help of 19. \( \texttt{\textcopyright f4!±} \) to be followed by c4-c5.

\textbf{b) 4...\( \texttt{\textcopyright c6} \)}

Black pumps up the pressure on the d4-pawn, forcing White to clarify his position in the centre.

\begin{center}
\textbf{5.dxc5}
\end{center}

In the absence of the preliminary moves \( \texttt{\textcopyright d8-a5} \) and \( \texttt{\textcopyright b1-c3} \), like in variation \textbf{a}, it is of no avail for White to let the black knight on d4.

\textbf{5...\( \texttt{\textcopyright a5+} \) 6.\( \texttt{\textcopyright fd2} \)}

White makes a second move with a developed piece. However, the white knight intends to make up for the time lost by taking it out of the black knight by attacking it on the queenside. In case of 6.\( \texttt{\textcopyright c3} \) \( \texttt{\textcopyright xc3+} \) 7.bxc3 \( \texttt{\textcopyright f6} \) or even 7...\( \texttt{\textcopyright xc3+} \) 8.\( \texttt{\textcopyright d2} \) \( \texttt{\textcopyright a3} \) the situation sharpens abruptly in view of the developing weak white pawns. After 6.\( \texttt{\textcopyright d2} \) \( \texttt{\textcopyright xc5} \)

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

7.\( \texttt{\textcopyright c3} \) \( \texttt{\textcopyright f6} \) 8.\( \texttt{\textcopyright e2} \) d6 9.0-0 0-0 10.h3, as a result of the careless 10...\( \texttt{\textcopyright e6} ?? \) White forced Black to surrender by the move 11.\( \texttt{\textcopyright a4} \) Chekhov – Razuvaev, Moscow 1982, in view of the fact, that following 11...\( \texttt{\textcopyright h5} \) 12.\( \texttt{\textcopyright g5} \)++ the black queen is trapped. In case of 10...\( \texttt{\textcopyright e5} \)\( \texttt{\textcopyright a5} \), however, the positive aspects of White’s plan are far from obvious.

\textbf{6...\( \texttt{\textcopyright xc5} \)}

A deficiency of the attempt to take advantage of White’s last move by means of 6...\( \texttt{\textcopyright d4} \) is that Black bars the important a1-h8 diagonal of the g7-bishop. As a consequence of that, White can already daringly play 7.\( \texttt{\textcopyright c3} \). Further there is 7...\( \texttt{\textcopyright xc5} \) (following 7...\( \texttt{\textcopyright f6} \), which occurred in the game Vadasz – Bohosyan, Stary Smokovec 1973, Black has to reckon with 8.e5 \( \texttt{\textcopyright g4} \) 9.\( \texttt{\textcopyright d5} \) \( \texttt{\textcopyright xe5} \) 10.b4 \( \texttt{\textcopyright d8} \) 11.\( \texttt{\textcopyright b2} \)\( \texttt{\textcopyright a5} \) and the black knights will soon have to abandon the central squares) 8.\( \texttt{\textcopyright b3} \) \( \texttt{\textcopyright xb3} \) 9.axb3 (at the price of a small defect of his pawn structure, White has obtained the possibility to actively control the events on the queenside along the a-file) 9...\( \texttt{\textcopyright f6} \) 10.\( \texttt{\textcopyright e2} \) d6 11.0-0 a6 12.\( \texttt{\textcopyright e3} \) \( \texttt{\textcopyright c7} \) 13.\( \texttt{\textcopyright d2} \) 0-0 14.\( \texttt{\textcopyright ac1} \) \( \texttt{\textcopyright d7} \) 15.\( \texttt{\textcopyright fd1} \) \( \texttt{\textcopyright fc8} \) 16.\( \texttt{\textcopyright b4} \)\( \texttt{\textcopyright d7} \) 17.\( \texttt{\textcopyright c5} \) 18.\( \texttt{\textcopyright f6} \). White had on its side a small but stable advantage, in relation with his active play on the queenside.

The reply 6...\( \texttt{\textcopyright f6} \) shares the same deficiency as the move
Chapter 7

Chapter 7

\( \text{Qc6-d4. After} \ 7.\text{Qc3} \text{Qxc5} 8.\text{Qb3} \text{Qb6} 9.\text{Qe3} \text{Qd8} \) White can immediately take his chance for the move 10.c5!? As a result of 10...0-0 11.\text{Qe2} a5 12.a3 a4 13.\text{Qd2}, L. Spassov – Schlick, Hamburg 1981, Black was completely clutched in his own camp, and the attempt to break free by means of 13...d5 14.cxd6 \text{Qxd6} could have been questioned by the move 15.\text{Qxa4}.

7.\text{Qb3} \text{Qb6}

There are records of the black queen retreating to e5, though it does not feel quite comfortable in the centre of the board with the great gathering of pieces there. After 7...\text{Qe5} 8.\text{Qc3} b6 (following 8...d6 9.\text{Qe3} \text{Qf6} 10.f3 0-0 11.\text{Qe2} \text{Qe8} 12.\text{Qd2} Black tried to obtain counterplay in the centre by means of 12...f5, but White occupied the important d5-square and retained his edge via 13.exf5 gxf5 14.f4 \text{Qf6} 15.0-0 \text{Qe6} 16.\text{Qab1 Qf7} 17.\text{Qd5} Gavrikov – Katalymov, Daugavpils 1978) 9.\text{Qe2} \text{Qb7} 10.\text{Qe3} \text{Qc8} 11.\text{Qd2} \text{Qf6} 12.f4 \text{Qe6} 13.e5 \text{Qg4} 14.\text{Qd4} It turned out that Black cannot swap on d4 because his queen is captured in the centre of the board, and the attempt to evacuate it with the help of 14...f6 15.h3 \text{Qh6} 16.exf6 \text{Qxf6} 17.\text{Qxf6} \text{Qxf6} 18.0-0\pm permitted White in the game Szilagyi – Haag, Budapest 1963, to retain his advantage due to his piece pressure on Black’s central pawns.

Little is changed by the inter-

mediate check 7...\text{Qb4}+ after 8.\text{Qd2} \text{Qb6} 9.\text{Qc3} \text{Qf6} 10.\text{Qe2} 0-0 11.0-0 d6 12.\text{Qe3} \text{Qd8} 13.f3, except the move numbering, since we are facing a position, which is discussed below in the note to Black’s move ten.

8.\text{Qe2} d6 9.0-0

9...\text{Qf6}

The black queen will inevitably be attacked by White’s dark-squared bishop. Therefore, Black sometimes employed the following stratagem: he immediately took it to the rear, e.g., by the move 9...\text{Qd8}, leaving White with the dilemma whether to develop the knight on c3 or not. One should not be afraid of pawn doubling any longer, since after 10.\text{Qc3}!? \text{Qxc3} 11.bxc3 \text{Qf6} in view of 12.\text{Qh6}! Black develops serious castling problems. White’s gambit-style play after 12...\text{Qxe4} 13.\text{Qf3} \text{Qxc3} 14.\text{Qxc6} bxc6 15.\text{Qf3} \text{Qa4} 16.\text{Qf4} \text{Qc7} 17.c5! is fully justified, and the careless 17...\text{Qe6}? brought about the loss of the pawn-eater knight following 18.\text{Qf4+} Serper – Gunawan, Dhaka 1995. In case of 9...\text{Qc7} one can afford a little
prophylactics of the type 10...\texttt{e}h1. After 10...\texttt{e}e6 White executed a no less aggressive (compared to the previous fragment) plan by means of 11.f4 a5 12.\texttt{c}a3 a4 13.\texttt{b}b5 \texttt{b}b6 14.c5 \texttt{d}d8 15.cxd6 axb3 16.\texttt{c}c7+ \texttt{f}f8 17.\texttt{x}xa8 \texttt{x}xa8 18.f5 gxf5 19.exf5 \texttt{d}d7 20.dxe7+ \texttt{e}e8 21.\texttt{c}c4 Keene – Timman, Hastings 1973, and obtained an excellent attacking position.

After 9...\texttt{e}e6 10.\texttt{e}e3 \texttt{c}c7 11.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{f}6 12.f3 0-0 13.\texttt{c}c3 \texttt{fc}8 14.\texttt{d}d5 \texttt{d}d8 15.\texttt{ac}1 \texttt{d}d7, F. Olafsson – Larsen, Buenos Aires 1980, White could have retained all virtues of his situation, associated with the position of the knight on d5, by 16.\texttt{fd}1!?±.

10.\texttt{c}c3 \texttt{e}e6

Following a more quiet course of events 10...0-0 11.\texttt{e}e3 \texttt{d}d8 12.f3 \texttt{d}d7 (after 12...\texttt{e}e6 13.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{b}6 14.\texttt{ac}1 \texttt{d}d7 15.\texttt{h}1 \texttt{c}8 16.f4 \texttt{f}5 17.exf5 gxf5 18.\texttt{d}d4 \texttt{xd}4 19.\texttt{xd}4 \texttt{f}6 20.b3± Smejkal – Podzielny, Dortmund 1977, White also retained superior prospects due to his certain pressure in the centre) 13.\texttt{d}d2 a5 14.\texttt{ad}1 a4 15.\texttt{d}d4 \texttt{xd}4 16.\texttt{xd}4 \texttt{a}5 17.\texttt{d}d5! (it becomes clear that Black cannot swap the queens now or on the next move) 17...\texttt{e}e8 18.\texttt{x}g7 \texttt{x}g7 19.\texttt{d}d4+ \texttt{g}8 20.b4 axb3 21.axb3 \texttt{d}d8 22.\texttt{f}4± Smejkal – Ivkov, Polanica Zdroj 1970, White’s prospects are better on both flanks.

11.\texttt{d}d5 \texttt{d}d8 12.f3 \texttt{c}c8 13.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{d}d7 14.\texttt{d}d2 a5 15.\texttt{ab}1!

We will meet again this important positional feat. If White cannot provide the d4-square for the retreat of his knight, then it is rather useful to consign to it the a1-square. From there, it can rather easily come across via c2 to the centre of the board, and most of all it does not get in the way of the other pieces.

15...\texttt{a}4 16.\texttt{a}1±

This position occurred in the game Miles – Schaefer, Bad Woerishofen 1997. Black should have agreed, like he does in most variations of the Maroczy System, to the painstaking defence after 16...0-0 17.\texttt{c}c2±. However, he took the retreat of the white knight to the corner of the board as a small victory and played too abruptly hoping to occupy the important d4-square with his knight with the help of 16...\texttt{xd}5?! 17.cxd5 \texttt{d}d4. This small achievement proved to be temporary, though, while the defects of his pawn structure after 18.\texttt{d}d3 0-0 19.\texttt{e}e3 \texttt{e}5 20.dxe6 \texttt{fxe}6 21.\texttt{c}c2 \texttt{e}5 22.\texttt{bc}1± were permanent.

c) 4...\texttt{d}6
**Chapter 7**

5. \( \text{\textsc{c3}} \)

A principled reply, if White does not want to follow the route to Benoni, which can occur, e.g., after 5.d5 e6 6.h3 exd5 7.cxd5 \( \text{\textsc{f6}} \) (one has to reckon with the fact, that Black can give the game an original turn, like this was after, e.g., 7...\( \text{\textsc{e7}} \) 8.\( \text{\textsc{c3}} \) 0-0 9.\( \text{\textsc{e4}} \) Vallejo Pons – Topalov, Barcelona 2000) 8.\( \text{\textsc{c3}} \), and which is outside the scope of this discussion. The endgame following 5...\( \text{\textsc{c5}} \) dxc5 6.\( \text{\textsc{xh8}} \) 7.\( \text{\textsc{e2}} \) 8.0-0 \( \text{\textsc{g4}} \) 9.\( \text{\textsc{d1}} \) 10.\( \text{\textsc{c8}} \) 11.bxc3 \( \text{\textsc{d6}} \), which occurred in particular in the game Pogorelov – Minasian, Ubeda 2001, does not promise White well.

The move 5.\( \text{\textsc{e2}} \), followed by 5...\( \text{\textsc{c6}} \) 6.d5 (6.\( \text{\textsc{e3}} \)! does not suit White, because of 6...\( \text{\textsc{g4}} \) with an unavoidable invasion of the black knight on d4, and the same is true for 6.dxc5?! dxc5 7.\( \text{\textsc{xh8}} \) 8.\( \text{\textsc{e8}} \) 9.\( \text{\textsc{d1}} \) 10.\( \text{\textsc{c3}} \) \( \text{\textsc{xe3}} \) 11.\( \text{\textsc{c3}} \), 12.\( \text{\textsc{b6}} \) 13.\( \text{\textsc{b6}} \), does not suit White, because of 6...\( \text{\textsc{g4}} \) with an unavoidable invasion of the black knight on d4, and the same is true for 6.dxc5?! dxc5 7.\( \text{\textsc{xh8}} \) 8.\( \text{\textsc{e8}} \) 9.\( \text{\textsc{d1}} \) 10.\( \text{\textsc{c3}} \) \( \text{\textsc{xe3}} \) 11.\( \text{\textsc{c3}} \), 12.\( \text{\textsc{b6}} \) 13.\( \text{\textsc{b6}} \), does not suit White, because of

opment of the white queenside) 8.0-0 \( \text{\textsc{b6}} \) 9.\( \text{\textsc{d2}} \) (after 9.\( \text{\textsc{b3}} \) \( \text{\textsc{f6}} \) 10.\( \text{\textsc{d2}} \) 0-0 11.\( \text{\textsc{d1}} \) \( \text{\textsc{d7}} \) 12.\( \text{\textsc{xb6}} \) axb6 13.\( \text{\textsc{b3}} \) \( \text{\textsc{c5}} \) 14.\( \text{\textsc{xc5}} \) bxc5 15.\( \text{\textsc{a3}} \) \( \text{\textsc{d7}} \) 16.\( \text{\textsc{g5}} \) \( \text{\textsc{f6}} \) 17.\( \text{\textsc{xf6}} \) exf6 18.\( \text{\textsc{db1}} \) \( \text{\textsc{b6}} \) Karpov – Topalov, Monaco (blindfold) 2001, Black obtained a reliable position) 9...\( \text{\textsc{f6}} \) 10.\( \text{\textsc{b1}} \) a5! (Black blocks the queenside preventing White’s b2-b4 advance) 11.b3 0-0 12.a3 (following 12.\( \text{\textsc{b2}} \) e5 13.\( \text{\textsc{a3}} \) \( \text{\textsc{h6}} \), White’s scheme, associated with active play on the queenside of the type 14.c5?! dxc5 15.\( \text{\textsc{c4}} \) \( \text{\textsc{c7}} \) Harroch – Tal, Wijk aan Zee 1973, was a futile undertaking) 12...e5 13.b4 (the variation 13.dxe6 fxe6 14.b4 axb4 15.axb4 e5?! also suits Black completely) 13...axb4 14.axb4 \( \text{\textsc{d7}} \) 15.\( \text{\textsc{d3}} \) (after 15.\( \text{\textsc{c5}} \)!! dxc5 16.bxc5 \( \text{\textsc{xc5}} \) 17.\( \text{\textsc{xb7}} \) \( \text{\textsc{a4}} \) 18.\( \text{\textsc{e1}} \) \( \text{\textsc{c2}} \) Black has dangerous initiative in view of the unproductive disposition of the white pieces) 15...\( \text{\textsc{xc5}} \) 16.\( \text{\textsc{b3}} \) \( \text{\textsc{b6}} \) Kramnik – Topalov, Dos Hermanas 1999, brought about a position, where Black has no difficulties and can consider intercepting the initiative himself.

Now, if Black does not want to revert to the positions considered in Chapter 1-2 by way of 5...\( \text{\textsc{xh8}} \), he can try to put pressure on the white centre by means of 5...\( \text{\textsc{a5}} \), 5...\( \text{\textsc{g4}} \) or 5...\( \text{\textsc{c6}} \).

**c1** 5...\( \text{\textsc{a5}} \)

Thanks to the pin on the
white c3-knight the moves .bot8-c6 and .c8-g4 must visibly gain in strength.

6..b1!? 

An interesting resource. The attempt to deny the black knight access to c6 by the move 6.d5, following 6...xc3+ 7.bxc3 .f6 leads to a sharp position, where, as a rule, the sacrifice of a single pawn by White is only the beginning of a process.

6...cxd4

The essence of White’s move six is disclosed best of all in the variation 6.c6 7.d5 .d4 (the move 7..b4, which occurred in the game Zontakh – Meister, Sala 1994, is perhaps best countered with the help of the straightforward 8..a1?!), since 8..xa2?! looks rather adventurous in view of 9..d2 .h6 10..g5 f6 11..xa2 .d8 12.h4+ 8..xd4 cxd4 9.b4± and the white rook on b1 comes in rather handy.

White’s move six is also useful in the variation 6..g4 7.d5 (to 7..d7 entirely possible is 8.h3 .xf3 9..xf3 .f6 10..d2 0-0 11..d1 e6 12..d3 exd5 13. cxd5 .ac8 14.b3 .e5, Slizhevsky – Bykov, Russia 1999, and now the continuation 15..e2 c4 16. b4 would have provided White with the superior odds) 7...xc3+ 8.bxc3 b6 (following the model 8...xc3+ 9.d2 a3 10..b7 .xa2 11.c3 .f6 12..d3 .bd7 13.0-0 .e5 14..xe5 dxe5 15.h3 .c8, Black would have had castling problems with the swap on f3, 16.b5 .d7 17..c1 White has sufficient compensation for the pawn, on account of the weakness of the dark squares on the kingside of the adversary and the vulnerability of the queenside pawns) 9..c2+. White should not feel anxiety about doubling pawns on the kingside, since with the opponent’s dark-squared bishop off the board, they cannot be blocked easily. An important fact is, that the b6-pawn is occupied by a black pawn, otherwise, retreating to b6, the black knight could perform unpleasant raids on White’s queenside.

Note also, that 6..f6 7..d2 cxd4 8..xd4 .xe4? is impossible in view of 9..xe4 .e5 10..d3 f5 (if 10..xd4, then 11..c3 –+) 11. f3 .e6 12..h5+ and White gets rid of the deadly pin.

7..xd4 .c6 8..e3 .f6 9. b3 .d8

The transfer of the queen to the kingside with the objective to swap the dark-squared bishops after 9...h5 10.f3 .h6 is easily neutralised by means of 11..f2±.
10.\textbd{e}2 0-0 11.0-0

After 11...\textbd{e}6 White should stay within the prophylactic 12.f3?!\textpm, since he is not ready for the move 12.c5?! on account of 12...d5\textpm.

11...b6 12.f3 \textbd{d}7 13.\textbd{d}2 \textbd{c}5 14.\textbd{a}1?!?

White plans for b2-b4. Entirely possible was also 14.\textbd{d}4 \textbd{xd}4 15.\textbd{xd}4 \textbd{xd}4+ 16.\textbd{xd}4 a5\textpm with subsequent play on the kingside. However, White decided that lacking board room Black’s play would be even more complicated with all pieces present.

14...a5 15.\textbd{c}2 \textbd{h}8 16.b3\textpm

This situation occurred in the game Serper – Ruban, Novosibirsk 1993. Looking for counterplay Black ventured 16...f5, and after 17.exf5 was tempted by the move 17...gxf5?! (in case of 17...\textbd{x}f5 White would have stood slightly better after 18.\textbd{bd}1\textpm in view of his piece pressure along the central files). As a result of 18.f4 \textbd{b}7 19.a3 \textbd{e}4 20.\textbd{xe}4 fxe4 21.\textbd{bd}1 \textbd{c}7 22.\textbd{g}4! \textbd{ab}8 23.a4\textpm the weakness of the light squares (and the e4–pawn) in the black camp became obvious.

6.\textbd{d}5

White needs to close the centre. After 6.dxc5 dxc5 7.\textbd{xd}8+ \textbd{xd}8 8.\textbd{e}3 \textbd{xc}3+ 9.\textbd{xc}3 b6 10.\textbd{e}5 \textbd{e}6 11.f4 f6 12.f5 fxe5 13.\textbd{fxe}6 \textbd{f}6 14.\textbd{e}2 \textbd{c}6 15.0-0 \textbd{c}7 16.\textbd{h}6 \textbd{h}g8 17.\textbd{ad}1 \textbd{ad}8\textpm Karaklajic – Forintos, Vrnjacka Banja 1966, Black turned up with the better odds. Throughout the previous parts of this book we constantly talked about the bishop pair advantage. Now we are facing an obvious exception from this rule and can definitely declare that the black knight pair scores an advantage over the white bishop pair.

6...\textbd{d}7

The attempt to play a Benoni-like 6...e6 is obviously inadequate here, in view of 7.dxe6 fxe6 (7...\textbd{xe}6 8.\textbd{b}5\textpm) 8.\textbd{b}5\textpm, while after 6...\textbd{f}6 7.\textbd{e}2 0-0 (White can again meet 7...e6 by
the appropriate 8.dxe6 fxe6 9.e5! dx e5 10.\&xd8+ \&xd8 11.\&xe5 \&xe2 12.\&xe2 \&e7 13.\&g5±, like this happened in the game V. Bagirov – Vasilevich, Berlin 1997) 8.0-0 the game can revert to a position considered in the first book.

The course of events following 6...\&xc3+ 7.bxc3 \&a5 8.\&b1!? was discussed earlier in variation c1, and the thesis that provoking Black to play b7-b6 is to White’s advantage will be illustrated at the example of the game Pogorelov – Adla, Spain 1997, where after 8.\&d2 \&d7 9.\&e2 \&gf6 10.\&c2 \&b6 following the careless 11.h3?! Black obtained good counterchances by means of 11...\&xf3 12.gxf3 \&a4 13.\&xa4+ \&xa4 14.\&b1 0-0-0 15.\&d3 \&d7 16.f4 e5\&\&, since White’s bishop pair advantage deserves no mention in view of the blockade nature of the position.

7.\&e2

Unwilling to waste time on 7.h3, moreover, since after 7...\&xc3+ 8.bxc3 \&xf3 9.\&xf3 \&a5 10.\&d3 \&gf6 11.\&d2, Stohl – Vokac, Czech Republic 1997, Black managed to sharpen the situation with the help of 11...g5!? 12.\&xg5 \&e5 13.\&c2 \&xe4 14.\&h6 \&g8\&.

7...\&xc3+ 8.bxc3 \&a5 9.\&c2

Now the move 9.\&b1 is not so successful as before, since after 9...\&xc3+ 10.\&d2 \&a3 11.\&xb7 \&xa2 12.0-0 \&gf6 the insuffi-

cient protection of the e4-pawn makes itself felt.

9...\&gf6 10.0-0 \&a6

To 10...\&b6 unpleasant for Black would be 11.e5\&.

11.\&e1

Following 11.\&b1, which occurred in the game Descovich – Stanivukovic, Vienna 1996, White had to reckon with 11...\&xe4!? 12.\&h6 (12.\&xe4? is not available, because of 12...\&f5\&+) 12...\&ef6\& and it is not clear whether the white initiative along the e-file will provide sufficient compensation for Black’s extra pawn.

11...h6

Black seeks to block the situation on the kingside by means of g6-g5. After 11...\&xf3 12.gxf3\& White’s pawns in the centre will soon be set in motion.

This overstrung situation occurred in the game Kerker – Vasiljevic, Germany 1996. White should have looked for chances to develop his initiative by means of 12.\&b1!? (after 12.\&b1 g5 13.h3 \&h5 14.\&d2 \&xe2 15.\&xe2 \&e5 16.\&b5+ \&fd7 17.g3 \&g8\& Black succeeded setting up the

75
blockade of the kingside). Thereafter following 12...g5 (unavailable for Black is 12...Rxg4? due to 13.h4 Rxh6 14.Rxg4 Rxg4 15.Rxg6+−, also risky is 12...b6 13.e5 dxe5 14.dxe5 xdx3 15...xd3 cxd5 because of 16.b5 c7 17.exd6→ with a dangerous white attack) White would have developed dangerous initiative in the centre by means of 13.h3 h5 14.e5! dxe5 15.Re5 xex5 16.Rxh5+. c3) 5...Cc6

6.d5

White must close the centre again, like he did before, since he cannot maintain the tension any further.

6...Rd8 7.Rxd8 cxd8 8.d3 g7 9.0-0 f6 10.h3 e5 the emerging position is typical of the King’s Indian Defence. It is true, that Black has managed to swap a pair of knights, which no doubt is a small plus for him, but one must also take into account the time wasted on manoeuvring with the dark-square bishop. In the game Khalifman – Alex.

Ivanov, St.Petersburg 1999, White executed in this position a standard plan, directed at limiting Black’s active options on the kingside. Here is how: 11. g5! (this pin makes it very difficult for Black to perform active operations, associated with the move f7-f5, and is a typical coup, mentioned more than once in the first book) 11...h6 12.Rh4 0-0 13. b1 d7 14.a3 (White’s plans encompass the b2-b4 push, which forces Black to provide for himself active play on the kingside) 14...c7 15.e2 (the manoeuvre of the black knight on h5 should not be permitted) 15...h7 16.d2 f5 17.exf5 gxf5 (after 17...xf5 18.d3= Black risked to forever concede the e4-square to White) 18.f4 (a necessary link in White’s plan) 18...e4 (thus Black agrees to a robust, though very passive, position, while after the swap on f4 his pieces would have obtained a slightly greater freedom of action, at the expense of the chronic weakness of the f5-pawn) 19. d1! (a very important typical transfer of the knight to e3) 19...a6 20.e3=. As a result of the last few moves Black has no prospects on the kingside and will have to reckon with White’s possible future activity on this section of the board, associated with the move g2-g4.

8.b5 b6 9.c5!

Only this pawn sacrifice justifies White’s entire plan.
9...dxc5

The take 9...exd5 makes much more easier for White to develop strong initiative by means of 10...d2. Further there is 10...b6 (losing is 10...d3 11.xd3 xxb2 in view of 12.b1 a6 13.a4 d7 14.xb2 c8 15.d4+-, which occurred in the game Haba – Vokac, Ostrava 1991, following 10...b8 there is 11.c1 b6 12.a4 f8 13.xa7 d8 14.b5 f6, Schebler – Goy, Porz 1992, and now White had a forced win by means of 15.a5! b6 16.c6 c7 17.d2 xe4 18.xb8 xb8 19.a7+-, else if Black chooses 10...f8, then following 11.c1 b6 12.a4 the game reverts to the continuation 10...b6 10...b6 11.c1 f8 12.a4 a6 (after 12...d8, Rusjan – Soln, Bled 1994, White could have simply proceeded 13.d3, retaining excellent compensation for the pawn) 13.a3 f6 14.c4 d8 (after 14...a7 15.a5 xe4 16.b6 f5 17.b4 h5 18.d3 e5 19.0-0 Cvetic – Mitrovic, Nis 1995, White had excellent attacking chances, since all black pieces take up extremely inappropriate positions) 15.a5 e8 16.b6 b8 17.e2! d7 18.d3 and now it is obvious, that White has obtained very good play for his pawn, since the black pieces are forced to jostle on the eighth rank. In the game Robatsch – Campos Lopez, Nice 1974, following 18...h5 White developed his initiative by playing in the centre with the help of 19.0-0 h4 20.h3 g5 21.c7 h6 22.e5 dxe5 23.xe5±.

10.f4 f8

11.c1?

White needs to put pressure on the black c5-pawn. This is the key to the door, which leads into the black camp. In case of 11.a4 White has to recko with 11...e5!? 12.dxe6 fxe6+, and after 11...c7 f6 12.a4 (in case of 12.c1 White needs to take into account 12...b6 13.d3 h6 14.f4 h4+ 15.g3 h3 Gelpke – Cifuentes Parada, Groningen 1991, and White developed castling difficulties) 12.a4 d7 (after 13.c1, V. Ivanov – Losev, Moscow 1990, Black should have tried to intercept the initiative by means of 13...d3!, since to 14.e5 very strong is 14...f5 15.xc5 e4+) 13.c1 b6 14.d3, Schlaeger – Darius, Germany 1991, Black could try to complete the development of his kingside via 14...h6!?, to be followed by f4+.

11.a6

In case of 11...g5 12.c7 g6 13.d3 b6 14.0-0 h6, which occurred in the game Astrom –
Chapter 7

Johansson, Uppsala 1992, White can actually beat in the black queenside by the move 15.b4!±.

12.\textbf{c}c7 \textbf{f}f6 13.\textbf{a}a3 b5 14.\textbf{xc}x5 d3 15.\textbf{xd}xd3 \textbf{xb}xb2 16.\textbf{b}b3!

The queens need to be swapped. After 16.\textbf{c}c2?! \textbf{f}f6 17.\textbf{f}f4 \textbf{d}d7 18.\textbf{c}c6 \textbf{e}e5 19.\textbf{c}c7 \textbf{x}xa2 20.0-0 \textbf{a}5 21.\textbf{c}c5 \textbf{d}d7 22.\textbf{c}c6 \textbf{e}e5

The game Ivanchuk – Topalov, Frankfurt (active) 2000. White should have continued 18.\textbf{c}c2!?±. With equal material all over, White’s pawn structure in the centre is more mobile than Black’s – on the kingside. This circumstance may make itself felt in time. Thus after 18...\textbf{g}g7 (in case the play in the centre is opened up, e.g., after 18...f5 19.0-0 \textbf{f}f6 20.\textbf{d}d1± the fact that the white pieces are better developed must make itself felt) 19.0-0 \textbf{f}f6, worth attention is the transfer of the white knight onto f3 by way of 20.\textbf{b}b1 \textbf{b}b7 (in case of 20...\textbf{g}g4 21.h3 \textbf{e}e5 22.\textbf{e}e2± White has the very unpleasant threat to eradicate Black’s entire blockade set-up in the centre by means of the move \textbf{f}f1-d1, while following 20...e6 \textbf{d}d1 Black will soon find himself fighting with the passed white d-pawn) 21.\textbf{d}d2±, which retains some advantage for White.

This situation occurred in the
Part 2. English with 1...c5
1.\( \text{\textit{f3}} \) c5 2.\( \text{\textit{c4}} \) \( \text{\textit{c6}} \)

3.\( \text{\textit{d4}} \)

White is going to open the play in centre immediately. The similar situation was seen in the beginning of Book II, Part 4, but at that moment Black’s knight was on f6, not on g8 while there was no Black’s knight on c6. The latter fact seems to be in White’s favour now. Here he need not be afraid of the possible attack of the c4-pawn with Black’s queen from c7 in case White’s bishop is fianchettoed. White can postpone the move d2-d4 for a white with 3.\( \text{\textit{c3}} \) however in that case Black is able to impede drastically this important strategic advance. Most frequently Vladimir Kramnik dealt with (and not only as White) with the 3...\( \text{\textit{d4}} \) (after 3...e5 4.e3 \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) in the game Kramnik – Kamsky, New York (m/4) 1994 White did not dare to push forward the d-pawn. In that case after the modest 5...d6 6.\( \text{\textit{e3}} \) e2 g6 7.d4 exd4 8.exd4 \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 9.\( \text{\textit{f4}} \) 0-0 10.0-0 \( \text{\textit{f5}} \) 11.d5 \( \text{\textit{e7}} \) Black would run across the certain troubles after the strongest move 12.\( \text{\textit{d2}} \)±. The move 3...g6 would be justified after 4.d4 cxd4 5.\( \text{\textit{xd4}} \) because of 5...\( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 6.\( \text{\textit{c2}} \) \( \text{\textit{xc3}} \) + 7.bxc3 d6 8.g3 \( \text{\textit{e6}} \) 9.\( \text{\textit{d4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xd4}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{xd4}} \) \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{g2}} \) \( \text{\textit{b6}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{g5}} \) 0-0 13.0-0 \( \text{\textit{xd4}} \) 14.cxd4 \( \text{\textit{xc4}} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{xb7}} \) \( \text{\textit{ab8}} \) 16.\( \text{\textit{f3}} \) \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{fb1}} \) h6 18.\( \text{\textit{d2}} \) g5= as it was in Van Wely – Kramnik, Monaco 2000. However in case 3...g6 the slower line 4.e3 \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 5.d4 would be possible with the idea to advance the pawn onto d5 with the tempo thanks to the knight c6 position). After that White can play 4.e3 (after 4.g3 \( \text{\textit{xf3}} \) + 5.exf3 \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 6.d4 e6 7.\( \text{\textit{g2}} \) d5 8.cxd5 \( \text{\textit{xd5}} \) 9.cxd5 in the game Kramnik – Anand, Frankfurt 1998 Black refused the approved 9...\( \text{\textit{xd5}} \) in favour of 9...cxd5?! and after 10.0-0 c4 11.f4 \( \text{\textit{e7}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{f3}} \) 0-0 13.\( \text{\textit{xd5}} \) \( \text{\textit{c7}} \) 14.f5 \( \text{\textit{d8}} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{e4}} \) \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 16.\( \text{\textit{d1}} \) \( \text{\textit{b6}} \) 17.g4± he ran into the great
troubles) 4...\(\mathcal{Q}x\mathcal{f}3+5.\mathcal{Q}x\mathcal{f}3\) g6 (after 5...d6 6.d4 \(\mathcal{Q}x\mathcal{f}6\) 7.d1 g6 8.e2 \(\mathcal{Q}g7\) 9.0-0 0-0 10.b3 d5 11.f3 cxd4 12.exd4 dxc4 13.bxc4 e5 14.dxe5 \(\mathcal{Q}x\mathcal{d}7\) 15.a3 e8 16.\(\mathcal{Q}d5\) \(\mathcal{Q}x\mathcal{e}5\#\) in the game Kramnik – I. Sokolov, Wijk aan Zee 1999 the double-edge position arose.) 6.b3 (after 6.d4 \(\mathcal{Q}g7\) 7.d1 cxd4 8.exd4 \(\mathcal{Q}h6\) 9.d3 d6 10.0-0 0-0 11.h3 \(\mathcal{Q}f5\) 12.d5 \(\mathcal{Q}d7\) 13.e1 e8 in Gelfand – Kramnik, Wijk aan Zee (blitz) 1998 the chances appeared reciprocal) 6...\(\mathcal{Q}g7\) 7.b2 d6 8.d1 e5 9.e2 \(\mathcal{Q}e7\) 10.0-0 0-0 11.f3 f5 12.d5 \(\mathcal{Q}e6\) 13.d3 g5 14.e4 g4 15.e2 h5\# and Black in the game Galliamova – Kramnik, Kazan 1997 succeeded to obtain the sound play at the kingside.

3...cxd4

The threat of the further advance of the d-pawn really leaves no choice for Black and compels him to agree with the exchange on d4. Sometimes Black tries the move 3...\(\mathcal{Q}x\mathcal{d}4\), but in that case it is not easy to exploit the advanced position of White’s queen after 4.\(\mathcal{Q}x\mathcal{d}4\) cxd4 5.\(\mathcal{Q}x\mathcal{d}4\). Most often in that case the play transposes to the position considered above in Part 1 with 5...\(\mathcal{Q}f6\) 6.\(\mathcal{Q}c3\) g6 7.e4 (If White likes, he could transpose the play to the positions from Book II, Part 5 Chapters 20 and 21 with 7.g3 \(\mathcal{Q}g7\) 8.g2 0-0 9.0-0 d6 10.\(\mathcal{Q}d3\).

The innovation like 5...b6 (after 5...d6 6.\(\mathcal{Q}c3\) e6 7.g3 \(\mathcal{Q}e7\) 8.\(\mathcal{Q}g2\) \(\mathcal{Q}c6\) 9.\(\mathcal{Q}d2\) \(\mathcal{Q}e7\) 10.0-0 0-0 11.b3 a6 12.a2± in J. Kristiansen – Hoidahl, Naestved 1985 Black did not reach the equality either since it is difficult for him to complete the queenside development because of the strong pressure of White’s bishop upon the diagonal a8-h1) 6.\(\mathcal{Q}c3\) \(\mathcal{B}b7\) 7.e4 e6 8.e2 f6 9.d3 \(\mathcal{B}b4\) 10.d2 g6 after 11.f3! \(\mathcal{Q}f6\) (in case 11...\(\mathcal{Q}x\mathcal{g}2\) 12.0-0-0± White has also the excellent compensation for the pawn because he is much ahead in development) 12.a3 \(\mathcal{Q}c5\) 13.b4 \(\mathcal{Q}xg2\) 14.0-0-0 \(\mathcal{Q}f2\) 15.e5 \(\mathcal{Q}h5\) 16.\(\mathcal{B}b5\) 0-0 17.\(\mathcal{Q}d6\) \(\mathcal{B}a6\) 18.\(\mathcal{Q}x\mathcal{b}7\) \(\mathcal{B}xb7\) 19.\(\mathcal{Q}e4\) \(\mathcal{C}c7\) 20.\(\mathcal{Q}g4\!\#\) in the game S. Cvetkovic – S. Nikolic, Korinthos 1999 led Black to the cruel necessity to part with the piece.

4.\(\mathcal{Q}x\mathcal{d}4\)

This is the first critical moment. Black should choose the way of his development. The idea to develop his dark-coloured bishop onto the long diagonal with 4...g6 5.e4 would bring us to the position considered above in Part 1. Hence, below in Chapter 8 the attention will be paid to such moves as: a) 4...e5, b) 4...d5, c) 4...b6 and d) 4...e6. The most used move 4...f6 will be considered further in Chapters 9-12.
1. \( \Box f3 \) c5 2. c4 \( \Box c6 \) 3. d4 \( \text{exd4} \) 4. \( \Box \text{xd4} \)

a) 4...e5?!

Black opens with the tempo the diagonal f8-b4 for the development of his bishop. Although Black succeeds to push off White's knight from the central square d4 with the tempo, this move has not become wide spread. Now Black seriously weakens the complex of the central squares along the d-file (first of all, d5) and the d-pawn itself becomes hindered. Shorter, the flaws of this move overbalance its merits. In some aspects this move is similar to the analogous idea in E. Sveshnikov variation in Sicilian Defence (B32) where Black’s e-pawn on move 4 also makes the resolute move forward. However in this case White has the additional plus: the absence of White’s pawn on e4 makes effective the development of white-coloured bishop on the diagonal a8-h1.

5. \( \Box b5 \)

With this move White deprives Black's bishop of the active position before his pawns. After 5. \( \Box c2 \) \( \Box c5 \) 6. \( \Box c3 \) \( \Box f6 \) 7. g3 \( \Box b6 \) 8. c3 d6 9. \( \Box g2 \) e6 10. b3 \( \Box b4 \) 11.0-0 \( \Box xc2 \) 12. \( \Box xc2 \) 0-0 13. \( \Box b2 \) in the game Chuchelov – Bator, Berlin 1996 in spite of the evident weakness of the square d5 it is not easy for White to use this matter since all Black’s pieces are sufficiently active.

5...d6

After 6. \( \Box d6+ \) \( \Box xd6 \) 7. \( \Box xd6 \) \( \Box f6 \) 8. \( \Box d2 \) \( \Box ge7 \) 9. \( \Box c3 \) 0-0 10. g3 \( \Box g6 \) 11. \( \Box g2 \) f5 12. b3 e4 13. \( \Box a3 \) \( \Box f6 \) 14.0-0 \( \Box e8 \) 15. \( \Box ad1 \) \( \Box e5 \) 16. \( \Box h1 \) \( \Box h8 \) 17. f3± in Kolas – Strand, Norway 1993 Black’s problems with the hindered d-pawn have become rather obvious.

6. \( \Box c3 \) a6 7. \( \Box a3 \) \( \Box e7 \)

Black intends to complete his development leaving for a while
the move $\text{Ng8-f6}$. He has the two reasons for it: first, he keeps the opportunity for his f-pawn advance, second, he does not forget about the above mentioned Sveshnikov Variation from the Sicilian Defence to which White in case 7...$\text{Nf6}$ could transpose with $\text{8.e4}!$? In whole, according to the author's opinion White has here a bit better play since Black himself has badly impeded the opportunity of the dark-coloured bishops exchange via $g5$. Still, let us pay attention to the move $\text{8.g3}!$ not to dive into the foreign system. After $\text{8.g3?! Nxe7}$ $\text{9.Ng2} 0-0$ $\text{10.0-0 Ng4}$ $\text{11.Qc2 Nh5}$ $\text{12.Qe3 Bd7}$ White retained the advantage with $\text{13.Qd5 Qxd5}$ $\text{14. Qxd5 Qd4}$ $\text{15.f3 Qd8}$ $\text{16.e3 Qe6}$ $\text{17.g4 Nf6}$ $\text{18.f4 exf4}$ $\text{19.exf4 f5}$ $\text{20.g5} \pm$ in the game Anic – N. Garcia, Lyon 1993.

After 7...$\text{Nxe6}$ the plot of the play is similar to considered above in the main line and after $\text{8.g3 Nxe7}$ (in the game M. Makarov – Shnaider, Cappelle la Grande 1994 Black preferred to reveal the activity in center with $\text{8...f5}$ $\text{9.Qg2 Qf6}$ $\text{10.0-0 Ne7}$ $\text{11.Qg5 0-0}$ $\text{12.Bd2 e4}$, but ran into $\text{13.f3! exf3}$ $\text{14.exf3}$ and here he found nothing better than to simplify the situation with the pawn sacrifice: $\text{14...Qe4}?!$ $\text{15. Nxe4 fxe4}$ $\text{16.Qxe7 Qxe7}$ $\text{17.fxe4}$ $\text{9.Qg2 Qf6}$ $\text{10.0-0 0-0}$ in the game Morovic Fernandez – Bellon Lopez, Linares 1991 White caused weakening of Black's queenside with $\text{11.Qd5?! Qxd5}$ $\text{12.cxd5 Qb8}$ $\text{13.Bb3}!$ $\text{b5}$ and then exploited it with $\text{14.Qc2 Qd7}$ $\text{15. Qb4 Qc5}$ $\text{16.Qd1 Qg5}$ $\text{17.Qc6} \pm$.

8.g3

White should not consider transposing to the Sicilian with $\text{8.e4}$ without Black's knight on $f6$ since Black would have the opportunity to change the dark-coloured bishops with $\text{8...Qe6}$ $\text{9.Qc2 Qc8}$ $\text{10.Qd2 Qg5}$ $\text{11.Qxg5}$ $\text{hxg5}$ and after $\text{12.Qd2 Qxd2}$ $\text{13.Qxd2+}$ $\text{Qxd5}$ $\text{14.Qd3 f5}$ $\text{15.f3 Qf6=}$ in the game Anand – Kramnik, Madrid 1993 the equal play has been reached.

8...$\text{f5}$ $\text{9.Qg2 Qf6}$ $\text{10.0-0}$ $\text{0-0}$ $\text{11.Qc2 Qh8}$

In the game M. Kostic – Relic, Vrnjacka Banja 1999 White could have met the rough 11...$\text{f4}?!$ with the cool capture $\text{12.gxf4} \pm$.

12.$\text{Qe3 f4}$ 13.$\text{Qd5 Qxd5}$ 14.$\text{Qxd5 Qe6}$ 15.$\text{b3}$

The accept of the pawn sacrifice after $\text{15.gxf4}$ $\text{exf4}$ $\text{16.Qxf4}$ $\text{Qxd5}$ $\text{17.cxd5 Qxf4}$ $\text{18.dxc6 bxc6}$ $\text{19.Qxc6 Qc8}$ $\text{20.Qg2 Qf6} \pm$ leaves Black the good chances for the counter play thanks to the oppo-
site-coloured bishops.

15...fxg3 16.hxg3 a8 17. a3±

With his better pawn structure White retained the superiority in the game Serper – Yermolinsky, Alexandria 1996.

b) 4...d5

Black takes the opportunity to open at most the game in centre.

5.d3!?  

Probably, this is the best move. Otherwise it is not easy for White to gain any particular profit from this position. For instance, after 5.a4 Black has the strong reply 5...b6!=. In case 5.cxd5 b5 6.dxe6 bxc6 Black’s queen impedes White’s kingside development and after 7.dxc3 dxc6 8.e4 a6 9.d3 e5 10.0-0 g4 11.f3 e6 12.g5 e7 13.e2 0-0 14.a1 c8 b6+ 15.h1 h6 16.e3 a5= in the game Akeson – Bergstrom, Sweden 1989 White obtained nothing in principle. White did not succeed to break Black’s defence either after 5.cxd5 bxc6 6.cxd5 (if 6.g3, then 6...f6 7.g2 e6=) 6...cx5 7.d3 f6 8.g5 e6 9.e4 e7 10.exd5 cxd5 11.axe7 (after 11.b5+ d7 12.xd7+ xd7 13.axe7 xe7 14.a4+ xd7 15.xd7+ xd7 16.axd5 exd5= Black would also hold the rook ending although he should keep the proper care and not admit the transfer to the pawn ending where White’s far passed pawn will be decisive.) 11...xe7 12. b5+ d7 13.axd7+ xd7 14. xd5 exd5? (it would be easier for Black to keep the balance with the queens on board) 15. 0-0 0-0 16.d4 ac8 17.ac1 xc1 18.xc1 c8 19.xc8+ xc8= and in the game Kasparov – Boissonnet, Cordoba (simultan) 1992 there appeared almost nothing on board.

5...f6

In case 5...e6 6.cxd5 exd5 7.g3 Black should play with the isolated pawn d5 that would be not fully compensated with the pieces activity. For instance, after 7...b6 (in case of the smooth 7...f6 8.g2 e7 9.0-0 0-0 10.e3± the position from Tarraush Defence will appear that can be found in Book IV. Still there will be no Black’s move h7-h6 that will be a little plus for White. The mass simplifications on d4 in case 7...c5 8.e3 xd4 9.xd4 cxd4 10.xd4 as it was in Rubinstein – O Duras, Breslau 1912 led Black to the typical troubles with the isolated pawn after 10...f6 11.g2 e6 12.0-0 0-0 13.fd1 e7 14.d2 fd8
Chapter 8

15.\ab 1±) 7...\ab 6 8.\ae 3 \xb 2 (bad is 8...\xd 4 9.\xd 4 \xb 2? in view of 10.a3!+-) 9.\xd 5 \bd 4 10.\xb 4 \xb 4 11.\bd 2 \xd 2 12.\xd 2 \ge 7 13.\ag 2 \ad 7 14.\hd 1 0-0 15.\ae 1 \fd 8 16.\ab 1± in the game R. Cruz – Amado, Buenos Aires 1963 White obtain the advantage thanks to his couple of bishops.

After 5...\xc 4 6.\xc 6 \xd 1+ 7.\xd 1 \bc 6 8.e 4 \df 6 9.f 3 e 5 (Black cannot hold the extra pawn since 9...\a 6 would be met with 10.\e 3 ±) 10.\xc 4 \c 5 11.\e 3 \bd 6 12.\e 2 \d 7 13.\c 3 \xe 3 14.\xe 3 \db 6 15.\b 3 ± in the game Santasiere – S. Bernstein, Sentnor City 1941 White retained a little superiority thanks to his better pawn structure at the queenside.

6.\xd 5 \xd 5 7.\xc 6 \bc 6 8.\d 2

After 8.e 4 \xc 3 9.\xd 8+ \xd 8 10.b 3 e 5 11.\c 4 Black equalizes easily with 11...\c 5! since 12.\xf 7 would be met with 12...\f 8±.

8...e 6

The knights swap 8...\xc 3 9.\xc 3 in Portisch – Donner, Amsterdam 1969 brought Black the troubles with his kingside development and after 9...\xd 1+ 10.\xd 1 f 6 11.g 3 e 5 12.\d 2 \d 7 13.0-0 \c 8 14.\xd 7 \xd 7 15.\h 3+ \c 7 16.a 5+ \b 7 17.a 8+ \xc 8 18.c 1 \bd 7 19.d 1± White obtained the evident advantage in the ending. After 8...\b 8 9.e 4 \xc 3 10.\xc 3 \xd 1+ 11.\xd 1 f 6 12.\c 4 e 5 13.a 3 \c 5 14.b 4 \b 6 15.e 2 ± in the game Schmitz – Silbermann, Germany 1989 the ending also appeared in White’s favour.

In case 8...e 5 9.a 4 \d 6 (after 9...\d 7 10.\e 4! \c 7 11.\xd 5 \xc 6 12.\xd 5 \c 6 13.\a 5 \a 5 14.\a 5 ± in the game M. Martinez – Pinero, Montevideo 1999 Black appeared just a pawn down) 10.\xd 5 \xd 5 11.e 4 \e 6 12.e 2 \b 7 13.0-0 \c 5 14.\c 3 0-0 15.\ad 1± White held the advantage thanks to his better queenside pawn structure in Koshnitsky – Van Rooy, Perth 1994.

9.g 3

The defect of Black’s queenside pawn structure is significantly compensated with the strong position of the knight d 5 that must not be pushed off with 9.e 4 in view of 9...\b 4.±

9...\e 7 10.\g 2 0-0 11.0-0 \a 6

After 11...\b 7 12.\c 1 c 5 13.a 4 \c 8 14.b 3 ± in the game Polugaevsky – Beliavsky, Leningrad 1974 White succeeded to complete his queenside development without problems while the defects of Black’s pawn structure still remain sound.

In case 11.\b 8 possible is 12.\c 2!? (after 12.b 3 \a 6 13.\e 1 \f 6 14.\c 1 \xc 3 15.\xc 3 \xd 1 16.\xd 1 \xc 3 17.\xc 3 \xe 2 18.\d 2 \b 5 19.\xc 6 ± White retains a little superiority thanks to his pawn advantage at the

84
queenside, but the position is very much simplified) 12...\texttt{a}6 (if 12...\texttt{c}b4, then after 13.\texttt{w}c1 \texttt{a}6 14.\texttt{d}d1 \texttt{w}b6 15.\texttt{e}e3± White keeps the advantage) as it was in Uobilava – Leko, Leon 1994, and here White could transpose with 13.\texttt{f}f3!? to the position considered below at the main line move.

12.\texttt{w}c2!?

It is very important to leave the square d1 for the rook f1 while White need not fear the knight’s attack since with White’s pawn on e2 there is nothing for the knight to do on b4. After 12.\texttt{f}f3 \texttt{b}8 13.\texttt{w}c1 \texttt{b}6 14.\texttt{b}b1 \texttt{fd}8 15.\texttt{d}d1 \texttt{bc}8 16.\texttt{a}a4 \texttt{b}5 17.\texttt{c}c3 \texttt{b}6 18.\texttt{a}a4 \texttt{b}5= the game T. Petrosian – Gligoric, Yugoslavia 1959 ended with a draw by moves repetition.

12...\texttt{b}8

In case 12...\texttt{b}4 13.\texttt{c}c1 \texttt{b}8 14.\texttt{d}d1± White just in time copes to take the rook off the X-ray action of the bishop a6 and transfer it onto the open file.

13.\texttt{f}f3 \texttt{b}4 14.\texttt{c}c1 \texttt{e}5

This position was reached in the game Splosnov – Kolar, Ceske Budejovice 1999. White could here retain with 15.\texttt{f}f4!?± a little advantage thanks to his better pawn structure at the queenside.

c) 4...\texttt{b}6

Black intends to make White to determine the place for the knight before opening the diagonal for the bishop f8 with e7-e6. As it will be seen below in many variations of this part, the place of white’s knight retreat has the certain significance.

5.\texttt{b}3

The move with the knight onto b5 has no sense until Black has played e7-e6. The other retreat – 5.\texttt{c}c2 - has also its flaws and after 5...e6! 6.g3 \texttt{c}5 7.e3 d5 8.cxd5 exd5 9.\texttt{g}2 \texttt{f}6 10.h3 0-0 11.0-0 \texttt{d}8± in the game Schandorff – De Firmian, Denmark 1998 Black obtained a good play because White was not able to block securely the pawn d5 on the square d4. In case White keeps the knight on d4 with 5.e3, then after 5...\texttt{f}6 6.\texttt{c}c3 e6 7.a3 d5 8.cxd5 exd5 9.\texttt{e}2 \texttt{e}7 10.0-0 0-0 11.b4 \texttt{xd}4 12.\texttt{xd}4
\[ \text{\( \text{\#}xd4 \ 13.exd4 \ \text{\#}e6 = \) as it was shown in the game V. Popov – Korchnoi, St. Petersburg (active) 2001 White cannot hope for anything either.} \]

5...\text{\#f6}

Black should cover the square d5 anyway, otherwise after, for instance, 5...g6 6.\text{\#c3} \text{\#g7} 7. \text{\#d5±} White's knight would invade onto this important point. If 5...e6, then 6.a3 is possible (in case 6.\text{\#c3} White should take into consideration 6...\text{\#b4=}), since Black can hardly have anything better than 6...\text{\#f6} (the original 6...a5 after 7.\text{\#e3} \text{\#a6} 8.\text{\#d2} a4 9.\text{\#d4} \text{\#xd4} 10.\text{\#xd4} \text{\#f6} 11.e4 \text{\#c6} in B. Badea – Ljubisavljevic, Romania 2000 would not either have brought equality to Black in case 12. \text{\#d3±}, and after 7.\text{\#c3} the considered below position arises.

6.\text{\#c3} e6

In case 6...g6 7.e4 \text{\#g7} 8.\text{\#e3} White gets the comfortable sort of Maroczy system concerned in Part 1.

7.a3!?  

White has better not permit the pinning of the knight c3.

7...\text{\#d5}  

Black intends to solve his beginning's problems directly. Sometimes in addition to the text move he tries to equalize either with the attack upon the pawn c4 or with the transfer to "hedgehog-like" positions. Let us consider these possibilities more in detail. For instance, after 7...\text{\#e5} 8.\text{\#e3} \text{\#d8} good for White is 9.\text{\#f4}! d6 (after 9...\text{\#xc4} 10.e4= White has the good compensation for the pawn because he is much ahead in development, and in case 9...\text{\#g6} possible is 10. \text{\#d6=} 10.c5 a6 (after 10...\text{\#h5,} very strong is 11.\text{\#xe5} dxe5 12.\text{\#xd8+} \text{\#xd8} 13.\text{\#d1=} \text{\#d7} 14.g4!± pointed by J. Speelman) 11.e3 \text{\#c7} 12.exd6 \text{\#xd6} (after 12...\text{\#xd6} 13.\text{\#d4=} it is not easy for Black to disentangle his pieces in centre since 13...\text{\#h5?} loses in view of 14.\text{\#e4=}–) 13. \text{\#e2} \text{\#e7} 14.0-0 0-0 15.\text{\#c1} \text{\#xd1} (in the middle game after 15... \text{\#b8} 16.\text{\#d4=} White pieces also occupy more active positions) 16.\text{\#fxd1} \text{\#c6} 17.\#d6 \text{\#xd6} 18.\text{\#xd6} \text{\#d8} 19.\text{\#xd8+} \text{\#xd8} 20.\text{\#a4=} and in the game Speelman – Sax, Thessaloniki), 1988 Black committed some troubles concerning non-completed development of his queenside. 7...\text{\#a5} does not bring Black the equality either, since after 8.\text{\#xa5} \text{\#xa5} 9.\text{\#d2} \text{\#f5} 10.f3 \text{\#c5} 11.e4 \text{\#h5} 12.\text{\#c2} 0-0 13.0-0-0 as was in M. Jurka – J. Petr, Pardubice 1992 Black is a bit behind in de-
velopment and – not less important – his queen at the kingside will just promote White’s advance at this part of the board.

Black can start to form the “hedgehog-like” construction either with his dark-coloured bishop development or with the useful move 7...a6. There can follow 8.e4 d6 9.\textit{\aleph}e3 \textit{\wp}c7 10.\textit{\aleph}e2 \textit{\aleph}e7 11.0-0 0-0 and here White according to his desire can operate either at the queenside – 12.f3 \textit{\db}e5 13.\textit{\Ac}c1 b6 14.\textit{\we}e1 \textit{\Ab}b7 15.\textit{\Af}f2 \textit{\Ed}e7 16.\textit{\Md}f1 \textit{\Mae}c8 17.\textit{\Ad}d2 \textit{\Ad}d8 18.b4± as it was in the game Siekanski – Grabowski, Naleczow 1989 – or the kingside – 12.\textit{\Ac}c1 \textit{\db}b8 13.f4 b6 14.\textit{\Af}f3 \textit{\Ab}b7 15.\textit{\Ad}d4 \textit{\bd}d7 16.f5 e5 17.\textit{\de}e2 \textit{\Mf}c8 18.g4 h6 19.\textit{\Gg}3 \textit{\Md}d8 20.\textit{\we}e2 \textit{\Mc}7 21.\textit{\Ad}d5 \textit{\Md}xd5 22.\textit{\exd}5 \textit{\Mb}8 23.\textit{\De}e4± Vera – Larduet, Matanzas 1997.

The similar situation occurs in case 7...\textit{\aleph}e7. There can follow 8.e4 0-0 (in the game Janjgava – P. Cramling, Debrecen 1992 White fulfilled the typical plan of Black’s queenside position suppressing after 8...d6 9.\textit{\aleph}e2 0-0 10.0-0 a6 11.\textit{\aleph}e3 \textit{\Md}d8 12.f3 b6. First he developed the strong pressure upon the pawn b6 – 13.\textit{\we}e1 \textit{\Mb}8 14.\textit{\Af}f2 \textit{\De}e5 – and then he start to prepare the advance c4-c5: 15.\textit{\Mae}c1 \textit{\Ed}e7 16.\textit{\Ad}d2 \textit{\Ab}b7 17.b4 \textit{\Mae}e8 18.\textit{\Md}f1 \textit{\Mc}7 19.\textit{\Af}f1 \textit{\Ma}a8 20.\textit{\wh}h1 \textit{\Mbc}8 21.\textit{\Ma}a4 \textit{\Md}d8 22.\textit{\Mdb}3±) 9.\textit{\aleph}e3 \textit{\Md}d8 (worse is the other queen’s retreat – 9...\textit{\Mgc}7, since when Black’s knight is on c6 White will have the opportunity to perform the typical combination like happened after 10.\textit{\Ac}c1 a6 11.\textit{\aleph}e2 b6 12.0-0 \textit{\Ab}7 13.\textit{\Af}f3 \textit{\Mb}a8 14.\textit{\wh}h1 \textit{\Mf}e8 15.\textit{\Md}d2 d6 16.\textit{\Md}d5!± in M. Stangl – Spiriev, Budapest 1989) 10.\textit{\aleph}e2 b6 11.0-0 \textit{\Ab}b7 12.\textit{\Ac}c1 d6 13.f3± and in the game Ornstein – L. Karlsson, Borlange 1992 appeared the position very similar to the those considered above.

8.\textit{\aleph}e3

After 8.\textit{\exd}5 \textit{\Md}xd5 9.\textit{\Ac}d2 \textit{\Mxc}3 10.\textit{\Mxc}c3 e5 11.e3 \textit{\aleph}e6 12.\textit{\Ad}d2 \textit{\Ab}e7 13.\textit{\Mcc}4 \textit{\Mxc}4 14.\textit{\Mxc}4 \textit{\Mpc}7 15.\textit{\Mb}b3 0-0 16.0-0 \textit{\Md}f8= Kustar – T. Tolnai, Budapest 1993 White had no achievements.

8...\textit{\Mfd}8

8...d4?! is not correct since after 9.\textit{\exd}4 \textit{\exd}4 10.\textit{\exd}4 \textit{\Mcc}5 11.\textit{\Mda}4 \textit{\Mpc}7 12.\textit{\Mb}b5 \textit{\we}e5 13.\textit{\Mcc}5 \textit{\Mxc}5 14.\textit{\Md}d4 \textit{\exd}4 15.\textit{\exd}4 \textit{\Md}d7 16.e3± Black would not get any compensation for the pawn as it was in the game Stefansson – A. Zhuravlev, Stockholm 1991.

9.\textit{\exd}5 \textit{\exd}5

The knights swap does not help Black to get rid of some troubles. As a rule the having the isolated pawn intends to keep the minor pieces on board. After 9...\textit{\exd}5 10.\textit{\exd}5 \textit{\exd}5 11.g3 \textit{\Ad}d6 (in case 11...\textit{\Af}5 12.\textit{\Gg}2 \textit{\Mfa}4 13.\textit{\Mf}f3 \textit{\Af}5 14.\textit{\Mf}4 \textit{\Af}4 15.\textit{\Mxe}4 \textit{\Mxe}4 16.\textit{\Mc}2 \textit{f}5 17.\textit{\Md}1 \textit{\Mf}6 18.\textit{\Mf}2 \textit{\Md}6 19.\textit{\Md}d4± in Przewoznik – Goetz, Germany 1993 Black succeeded to get rid
from the isolated pawn d5, but not of his problems. After 11...
\textit{Be}7 12.\textit{Ae}2 \textit{Af}6 White need not play 13.0-0 to transpose to the position considered below but can gain the significant advantage with 13.\textit{Ad}2!? d4 14.\textit{Ex}c6+ bxc6 15.\textit{Ex}d4 \textit{Ed}5 16.0-0-0! as it was in the game Speelman – Sax, Hastings 1990, and in case
11...a5!? 12.\textit{Ag}2 a4 13.\textit{Ad}4 \textit{Ba}5+ 14.\textit{Ed}2 \textit{Ex}d2+ 15.\textit{Ex}d2\pm that was in Stohl – J. Polgar, Amsterdam 1990, White still retains the advantage in the ending due to Black's isolated pawn) 12.\textit{Ag}2
\textit{Ae}5 White has the strong reply 13.0-0! (after 13.\textit{Ed}2 \textit{Ae}6 14.\textit{Ac}1 \textit{Cc}8 15.\textit{Ec}5 Black can exploit that the square f6 is not occupied with the bishop and increase the pressure upon White's queenside with 15...\textit{Ef}6\textit{c}2) 13...\textit{Xb}2 14.\textit{Ba}2 \textit{Af}6 15.\textit{Ed}2 0-0 16.\textit{Ex}d5 \textit{Ec}7 as it was in the game Razuvaev – J. Horvath, Stary Smokovec 1990. With 17.\textit{Cc}5!?\pm White could have kept the advantage thanks to more active position of his pieces.

10.g3 \textit{Be}7 11.\textit{Ag}2 \textit{Be}6 12.0-0

Worse is 12.\textit{Cc}5, since after 12...0-0 13.\textit{Xb}7 \textit{Bb}8 14.\textit{Cc}5 \textit{Xb}2 15.\textit{Aa}4 \textit{Be}5 16.\textit{Ed}3 \textit{Ff}5= in the game Stangl – Schmittdiel, Altensteig 1991 the weakness of the pawn d5 is not sound because of the active position of Black's pieces.

12...0-0 13.\textit{Ac}1

White brings up the reserves for the attack of the pawn d5. The exchange of the knight for the bishop – 13.\textit{Ad}4 \textit{Ed}7 14.\textit{Exe}6 fxe6 will bring White not much as in the majority of the similar cases and after 15.\textit{Ba}4 a6 16.\textit{Ad}1 b5 17.\textit{Cc}2 \textit{Cc}8 18.\textit{Af}4 \textit{Ad}6 19.\textit{Ag}5 \textit{Ae}5 20.e4 d4\textit{=} as was in the game Wojtkiewicz – Sokolin, New York 1994, the chances appeared reciprocal.

13...\textit{Cc}8

After 13...\textit{Cc}8 also strong is 14.\textit{Cc}2!\pm Chuchelov – V. Lazarev, France 1998.

14.\textit{Cc}2!

White's rook is aiming to d2.

14...\textit{Ba}5 15.\textit{Xa}5 \textit{Xa}5 16.\textit{Ed}2 \textit{b}6 17.\textit{Ad}4\pm

This position was seen in the game P. Schlosser – Schmittdiel, Altensteig 1991. Black's isolated pawn d5 has been firmly blocked and soon it will be the target for White's pieces.

d) 4...e6

Black exploits the absence of the pawn c5 after its swap for White's d-pawn and open the diagonal f8-a3 for his dark-coloured bishop. The similar Black's
idea shown in Book II, Part 4, p. 110 was the significant reason for White to refuse from the too early advance d2-d4.

\[ \text{Capture Diagram} \]

5.\( \text{b5!} \)

With such a way White stresses that the move e7-e6 has not only merits, but also flaws.

Worse is 5.g3 in view of 5...\( \text{b4}+ \) (also possible is 5...\( \text{b6} \) since in that case after 6.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{e5} \) 7.\( \text{f4} \) a6 8.\( \text{xe5} \) axb5 9.e4 Black could fight for the advantage with 9...\( \text{c5!} \) 10.\( \text{d2} \) f6 11.\( \text{f4} \) b4 12.\( \text{g2} \) e7 13.0-0 \( \text{g6} \) 14.\( \text{e3} \) xe3 15.fxe3 \( \text{e5} \) as it was in the game Khalifman – Ionov, St. Petersburg 1998) 5...\( \text{b4}+ \) 6.\( \text{c3}?! \) (in case of relatively the best 6.\( \text{d2} \) e7 7.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{f6} \) 8.\( \text{g2} \) 0-0 9.0-0 d5 the position considered below in Chapter 12, p. 123-124 would arise that is quite satisfactory for Black) 6...\( \text{a5} \) 7.\( \text{db5} \) d5 (if 8.cxd5, then 8...\( \text{xb5} \) 8.a3 \( \text{xc3}+ \) 9.bxc3 (after 9.\( \text{xc3} \) d4 10.b4 \( \text{xb4} \) 11.axb4 \( \text{xa1} \) 12.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{f6} \) 13.\( \text{c7+} \) \( \text{e7} \) 14.\( \text{xa8} \) \( \text{d7} \) 15.\( \text{g2} \) \( \text{xa8} \) 16.0-0 in Lerner – Huzman, USSR 1986 the move 16...\( \text{c8} \) would lead to the position where White has not sufficient compensation for the pawn) 9...\( \text{f6} \) 10.\( \text{g2} \) 0-0 11.\( \text{b3} \) dxc4 12.\( \text{xc4} \) e5 13.\( \text{d6} \) \( \text{e6} \) 14.\( \text{d3} \) in the game Topalov – Ivanchuk, Linares 1999 Black found 14...e4! 15.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 16.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{ad8} \) 17.\( \text{c2} \) \( \text{d4} \) 18.\( \text{b2} \) \( \text{xe2} \)!! 19.\( \text{xe2} \) \( \text{fe8} \) and White’s king appeared under the strong attack.

5...\( \text{f6} \)

Black can still not be very afraid of White’s knight penetration into his camp but he need not provoke its invasion either. After 5...\( \text{a6} \) 6.\( \text{d6}+ \) \( \text{xd6} \) 7.\( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{ge7} \) 8.\( \text{c3} \) 0-0 Black is compelled to part with his very important dark-coloured bishop. There can follow further 9.e3 (after 9.b3 b5 10.e4 f5 11.cxb5 axb5 12.\( \text{xb5} \) fxe4 13.0-0 \( \text{f5} \) 14.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{cd4} \) 15.a4 \( \text{b7} \) in Huebner – Wedberg, Luzern 1979 Black obtained the counter play) 9...\( \text{a5} \) 10.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{b8} \) 11.0-0 b5 as it was in Kristiansen – Schussler, Copenhagen 1988, and here White could have retained some advantage with 12.\( \text{cb5}?! \) axb5 13.b4 \( \text{xb4} \) 14.\( \text{xb4} \) \( \text{xb4} \) 15.\( \text{a3} \) \( \text{bc6} \) 16.\( \text{d6} \) \( \text{a8} \) 17.\( \text{xb5} \)±

After 5...\( \text{b4}+ \) possible is 6.\( \text{c1c3} \) (in case 6.\( \text{d2} \) Black after 6...\( \text{c5} \) 7.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{f6} \) 8.\( \text{d6}+ \) \( \text{xd6} \) 9.\( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{e4} \) would reach the equality) 6...a6 (after 6...\( \text{f6} \) in the game Pogorelov – Heimer, Mondariz 1997, White decided to manage without developing his bishop on f4 that would lead to
the variation discussed below in the main line. He preferred to get a certain advantage with 7.a3 \(\text{\textbf{hx}}3\) + 8.\(\text{\textbf{hx}}3\) h6 9.e4 0-0 10.\(\text{\textbf{e}}2\) \(\text{\textbf{a}}5\) 11.0-0 (since it would be not easy for Black to get rid of White’s pressure in center) 6...a6 7.\(\text{\textbf{d}}6\) + \(\text{\textbf{c}}7\) 8.\(\text{\textbf{f}}4\) (White should not be hurry to part with the knight d6 since after 8.\(\text{\textbf{c}}8\) + \(\text{\textbf{c}}8\) 9.\(\text{\textbf{d}}2\) \(\text{\textbf{f}}6\) 10.e3 d5 11.\(\text{\textbf{d}}5\) \(\text{\textbf{d}}5\) 12.e2 \(\text{\textbf{xc}}3\) 13.bxc3 \(\text{\textbf{d}}6\) 14.\(\text{\textbf{b}}1\) \(\text{\textbf{c}}7\) 15.\(\text{\textbf{a}}4\) h6 16.\(\text{\textbf{f}}3\) \(\text{\textbf{hd}}8=\) the play would equalized as it was in the game Bagirov – Lerner, Helsinki 1992) 8...\(\text{\textbf{f}}6\) (after 8...\(\text{\textbf{a}}5\) 9.\(\text{\textbf{c}}1\) \(\text{\textbf{e}}5\) 10.c5 \(\text{\textbf{c}}6\) 11.\(\text{\textbf{d}}2\) \(\text{\textbf{h}}6\) 12.a3 \(\text{\textbf{xc}}3\) 13.\(\text{\textbf{xc}}3\) \(\text{\textbf{c}}7\) 14.g3 \(\text{\textbf{c}}6\) 15.\(\text{\textbf{g}}1\) \(\text{\textbf{h}}7\) 16.\(\text{\textbf{g}}2\) \(\text{\textbf{c}}7\) 17.\(\text{\textbf{d}}2\) in the game Beliavsky – Sale, Bled 1999 Black did not cope to push White’s knight off the square d6, while after 8...e5 9.\(\text{\textbf{g}}5\) + f6 10.\(\text{\textbf{xc}}8\) + \(\text{\textbf{xc}}8\) 11.\(\text{\textbf{d}}2\) \(\text{\textbf{f}}7\) 12.e3 \(\text{\textbf{e}}7\) 13.\(\text{\textbf{c}}1\) \(\text{\textbf{b}}6\) 14.\(\text{\textbf{e}}4\) \(\text{\textbf{f}}5\) 15.\(\text{\textbf{d}}3\) g6 16.c5 \(\text{\textbf{a}}5\) 17.0-0 in the game Akesson – Rajskij, Stockholm 1991 although Black succeeded to get rid of the knight d6 he was still left with the problems about the square d6) 8...\(\text{\textbf{f}}6\) 9.a3 (after 9.\(\text{\textbf{c}}1\) e5 10.\(\text{\textbf{xc}}8\) + \(\text{\textbf{xc}}8\) 11.\(\text{\textbf{g}}5\) h6 12.\(\text{\textbf{xf}}6\) + \(\text{\textbf{xf}}6\) 13.\(\text{\textbf{d}}2\) \(\text{\textbf{xc}}3\) 14.\(\text{\textbf{xc}}3\) g6 15.g3 \(\text{\textbf{g}}7\) 16.\(\text{\textbf{g}}2\) \(\text{\textbf{e}}8\) 17.0-0 in J. Kristiansen – Winsnes, Gothenburg 1989 White also retain the advantage) 9...\(\text{\textbf{xc}}3\) + 10.bxc3 \(\text{\textbf{a}}5\) (in case 10...\(\text{\textbf{h}}5\) possible is 11.\(\text{\textbf{g}}5\) + f6 12.\(\text{\textbf{e}}3\) \(\text{\textbf{a}}5\) 13.\(\text{\textbf{d}}2\) + with the threat to win Black’s knight with g2-g4) 11.\(\text{\textbf{d}}2\) \(\text{\textbf{c}}5\) (11...\(\text{\textbf{d}}8\) can be met with 12.e4±) 12.\(\text{\textbf{d}}1\) (White is threatening to win Black’s queen with 13.\(\text{\textbf{xc}}8\) + followed by 14.\(\text{\textbf{d}}6\) ) 12...\(\text{\textbf{e}}5\) 13.e3 \(\text{\textbf{d}}8\) (bad for Black is 13...\(\text{\textbf{g}}6\) in view of 14.\(\text{\textbf{xb}}7\) ! \(\text{\textbf{xb}}7\) 15.\(\text{\textbf{d}}6\) –+) 14.\(\text{\textbf{e}}2\) \(\text{\textbf{e}}8\) (after 14...b5? 15.\(\text{\textbf{xb}}5\) \(\text{\textbf{xb}}5\) 17.0-0 -- Black was hopeless in the game Polugashevsky – P. Cramling, Aruba 1992) 15.\(\text{\textbf{e}}8\) (White swaps his strong knight but improves his pawn structure instead) 15...\(\text{\textbf{xe}}8\) (after 15...\(\text{\textbf{xc}}7\) ? 16.\(\text{\textbf{d}}4\) \(\text{\textbf{xc}}4\) 17.\(\text{\textbf{xd}}4\) White will win the exchange with 18.\(\text{\textbf{c}}7++\) ) 16.\(\text{\textbf{e}}4\) \(\text{\textbf{xc}}4\) 17.\(\text{\textbf{xd}}4\) ± and White’s couple of bishops brings him the advantage.

In case of 5...d6 White, in addition to 6.e4 transposing to the Scheveningen line in Sicilian (B44) can choose 6.g3!? that still was not seen in practice. When Black closes with d7-d6 the diagonal a3-f8 for his dark-coloured bishop he agrees to the smooth play and abandons the immediate counter play on the dark squares.

6.\(\text{\textbf{f}}4\)

After 6.\(\text{\textbf{c}}1\) c3 d5 the play transposes to one of English beginning lines that we are going to avoid. It will be detailed in Chapter 9.

6...\(\text{\textbf{b}}4\) +

The threat of the knight double-attack on c7 does not leave Black any choice.
8.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}\textit{d6}}

The queen invasion onto d6 after 8.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}\textit{c7} \textit{\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}e7} 9.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}\textit{d6} \textbf{\textit{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd6} 10. \textbf{\textit{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd6} does not work properly. White will now have to leave the square d6 for his knight. There can be followed further: 10...\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d8 11.e3 (in case of more active 11.e4 Black also copes with the problems with 11...\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}a5! 12.\textbf{\textit{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d2} a6 13.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d6 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}e8 14.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}e2 \textbf{\textit{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd6} 15.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd6 b5! 16. \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xb5 axb5 17.0-0 b4 18.\textbf{\textit{\textit{\textbf{d}}}b5} \textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b8 19.a4 bxax3 20.\textbf{\textit{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xa3} \textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b4= as it was in the game Kishnev – Dvoirys, Barnaul 1984, while after 11.g3 a6 12.a3 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b6 13.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b1 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b4 14.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}xb4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}xb4 15.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}g2 d5 16.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}xd5 exd5 17.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d1 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e6 18.0-0 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}fd8 19.e3 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}ab8 20.b3 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e4!= Korchnoi – Polugaevsky, Buenos Aires (m/2) 1980 or 11.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d1 b6 12. e3 a6 13.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a3 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b7 14.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e2 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a7 15.0-0 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a8 16.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d2 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e7 17.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d1 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}b8 18.f4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd6 19.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd6 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}}}f8 20. \textbf{\textit{\textbf{g}}}g4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c8 21.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{g}}}g5 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e8 22.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d2 h6= Ljubojevic – Andersson, Bugojno 1982 White’s knight b5 was compelled to retreat not into the center but to the edge of board that in significant extent helped Black to equalize) 11...\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}a5 (in case of 11...a6 Black should take into consideration 12.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c7?! \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e8 13.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xe8 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xe8 14.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}e2\pm) 12.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c2 d5 13.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd5 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd5 (13...\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd5 14. \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}e2 a6 15. \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd4 16.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e6 17.0-0 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}}}f6 18.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d8 19.h3\pm and White keeps proper control upon the square d4 that provided him some superiority in Ivanchuk – Lautier, Monte Carlo (blindfold) 1996) 14.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d5 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d2 15. \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd2 exd5 16.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d3 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e6 17.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{h}}}c1 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}ad8 18.f4 (the variation 18.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd4 19.exd4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c8= is suitable for Black) 18...d4 19.e4 f6 20.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c7 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}}}f7 21.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d5 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}e7 22. \textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d6= in the game Gulko – Kaidanov, Denver 1998 White did not succeed the isolated pawn on d5 and the play was equalized.

8...\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd6 9.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd6 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e8

Black starts the immediate pushing White’s knight off d6. After 9...\textbf{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a5 10.e3 a6 11.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e2 Black’s attempt to perform an activity at the queenside with 11...b5?! ended badly for him after 12.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}xb5 axb5 13.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xb5 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a6 14.0-0 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}}}b8 15.a4 d5 16.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c1 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b6 17.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d2 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d8 18.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}}}d1\pm in Polugaevsky – Gligoric, Belgrade 1969.

More suitable for the fight against the knight d6 is 9...\textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b6 10.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d2 (in case 10.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b1 possible is 10...\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d4 11.e3 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd6 12.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}xd4 13.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d4 (here Black can return with 10...\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e8 to the idea considered in the main line but in this case after 10...\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e8 11.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}xe8 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}xe8 12.e3 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d8 13.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c1 d6 14.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e2 a6 15.0-0 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c7 16.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}}}d1 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e7 17.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c7 18.\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c3

91
\(1\epsilon_7\ 19.e4\ b6\ 20.\epsilon_3\ \epsilon_8\ 21.a3\ \epsilon_d7\ 22.b4\pm\) as was in Kasparov – Kramnik, Moscow (blitz m/5) 1998 White retained the superiority thanks to his spatial advantage, but in this case after 11.\(\epsilon_d1!!\) \(\epsilon_xd6\ 12.\epsilon_xd4\ \epsilon_xd4\ 13.\epsilon_xd4\ d5\) (if 13...b6, then 14.\(\epsilon_g1!!\) \(\epsilon_b7\ 15.g4\ h6\ 16.h4\ \epsilon_fd8\ 17.g5\ h_xg5\ 18.h_xg5\ \epsilon_e8\ 19.\(\epsilon_g2\pm\) and Black’s kingside has become more constrained) 14.cx \(\epsilon_d5\ 15.\epsilon_xd5\ \epsilon_xd5\ 16.e3\ \epsilon_e6\ 17.\epsilon_d2\ \epsilon_fd8\ 18.\epsilon_d3\ \epsilon_ac8\ 19.f4\ f6\ 20.\epsilon_c1\ \epsilonxc1\ 21.\epsilon_xc1\ h6\ 22.\epsilon_d2\ \epsilon_f8\ 23.\epsilon_a4\ a6\ 24.\epsilon_b4\ \epsilon_d7\ 25.\epsilon_c3\ \epsilon_e7\ 26.\epsilon_d4\ White obtained not large but a stable advantage thanks to the isolated pawn d5 in the game L. Szabo – Penrose, Bath 1973.

10.e3

White immediately takes the square d4 under control to exclude Black’s opportunity similar to that considered in the note to the previous move.

10...\(\epsilon_b6\)

After 10...b6 11.\(\epsilon_e2\ \epsilon_xd6\ 12.\epsilon_xd6\ \epsilon_b7\ 13.0-0\ \epsilon_e7\ 14.\epsilon_ad1\ \epsilon_fd8\ 15.f4\ \epsilon_xd6\ 16.\epsilon_ad6\ \epsilon_f8\ 17.\epsilon_fd1\ \epsilon_e7\ 18.a3\ \epsilon_ab8\ 19.b4\ \epsilon_a8\ 20.\epsilon_a4\ \epsilon_e8\ 21.c5\pm\) in the game Suba – Monier, Buenos Aires 1978 Black did not succeed at all to push White’s pieces off d6.

11.\(\epsilon_b1\ \epsilon_e5\)

After 11...\(\epsilon_b4\ 12.\epsilon_xe8\ \epsilon_e8\ 13.\epsilon_e2\ \epsilon_d8\ 14.0-0\ b6\) in the game Korchnoi – Andersson, Johannesburg 1981 White showed a good pattern of play with 15.\(\epsilon_d2\ \epsilon_a6\ 16.\epsilon_fd1\) (more exact was 16.a3!! \(\epsilon_e7\ 17.b3\ \epsilon_ac8\ 18.\epsilon_fd1\ to transpose to the position below but excluding Black’s tactical opportunity at the next move) 16...\(\epsilon_ac8\ (here Black could have solved all of his problems with 16...\epsilonxc4! 17.a3 \epsilon_b3\ 18.\epsilon_f3\ d5\ 19.\epsilon_dc1\ d4\ 20.\epsilon_xc6\ dxc3\ 21.\epsilon_xc3\ \epsilon_ac8=\) because 22.\(\epsilon_xc4?\) would be bad in view of 22...\(\epsilon_d1+\) winning the queen) 17.a3 \(\epsilon_e7\ 18.b3\ d6\ 19.\epsilon_b2\ \epsilon_c7\ 20.\epsilon_d2\ \epsilon_e7\ 21.e4\ \epsilon_d7\ 22.\epsilon_bd1\ \epsilon_cd8\ 23.\epsilon_d3\ \epsilon_b7\ 24.\epsilon_g3\ and White succeeded to develop the unpleasant activity at Black’s kingside position.

12.\(\epsilon_e8\ \epsilon_e8\ 13.\epsilon_e2\ d6\ 14.0-0\ \epsilon_d7\ 15.\epsilon_d2\ \epsilon_ad8\ 16.\epsilon_fd1\ \epsilon_c6\ 17.b4\pm\)

This position was reached in the game Kramnik – Gelfand, Monaco (active) 2000. Here Black performed the very important advance in center – 17...d5, but after 18.c5 \(\epsilon_c7\ 19.\epsilon_b5\ \epsilon_xb5\ 20.\epsilon_xb5\pm\) White still retained some advantage thanks to his pawn majority at the queenside.
Chapter 9

1.\( \text{\underline{f3}} \) c5 2.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{\underline{c6}} \) 3.d4 cxd4 4.\( \text{\underline{xd4}} \) \( \text{\underline{f6}} \)

5.g3!?

This is the most prospective way of development. The other opportunity is the natural move 5.\( \text{\underline{b1}} \)-c3. It is worth dwelling more in detail to understand what particular reason is that this move cannot satisfy us.

5.\( \text{\underline{c3}} \) e6

So we see the position that was once upon a very popular and that we tried to avoid yet in the beginning of Book II, Part 5 (see the note to White's move 4). Here the numerous opportunities were tried for White but in any case Black succeeded to find the comfortable way of his pieces development. For example:

1) 6.a3 \( \text{\underline{xd4}} \)? (after 6...\( \text{\underline{b6}} \) 7.\( \text{\underline{b3}} \) the position from the variation e of Chapter 8 that would suit us while in case 6...\( \text{\underline{c5}} \) 7.e3 0-0 8.\( \text{\underline{e2}} \) d5 9.\( \text{\underline{xd5}} \) exd5 10.0-0 \( \text{\underline{d6}} \) 11.b4 \( \text{\underline{e5}} \) 12.\( \text{\underline{b2}} \) a6 13.\( \text{\underline{b3}} \) \( \text{\underline{c7}} \) 14.\( \text{\underline{fd1}} \) \( \text{\underline{d6}} \) 15.g3 \( \text{\underline{e6}} \) 16.\( \text{\underline{ac1}} \)± in the game Kramnik – Lautier, Paris (active) 1995 Black had certain worries because of his isolated pawn d5)

7.\( \text{\underline{xd4}} \) b6 8.\( \text{\underline{f4}} \) \( \text{\underline{c5}} \) 9.\( \text{\underline{d2}} \) 0-0 10.\( \text{\underline{d1}} \) \( \text{\underline{b7}} \) 11.\( \text{\underline{d6}} \) \( \text{\underline{xd6}} \) 12.\( \text{\underline{xd6}} \) \( \text{\underline{c8}} \) 13.e3 \( \text{\underline{e8}} \)! and in the game Karpov – Timman, Jakarta (m/20) 1993 Black's chances are at least not worse.

2) 6.\( \text{\underline{f4}} \) d5 (after 6...\( \text{\underline{b4}} \) 7.\( \text{\underline{b5}} \) the play transposes to the position considered in variation d of Chapter 8 that satisfies us)

7.\( \text{\underline{cxd5}} \) \( \text{\underline{xd5}} \) 8.\( \text{\underline{xc6}} \) bxc6 9.\( \text{\underline{d2}} \) \( \text{\underline{a6}} \)! (after 9...\( \text{\underline{b4}} \) 10.\( \text{\underline{xd5}} \) \( \text{\underline{xd2+}} \) 11.\( \text{\underline{xd2}} \) cxd5 12.e3 0-0 13.\( \text{\underline{d3}} \) \( \text{\underline{b6}} \) 14.0-0 \( \text{\underline{a6}} \)= in Korchnoi – Timman, Hilversum (m/3) 1982 the approximate equilibrium appeared) 10.\( \text{\underline{a4}} \) \( \text{\underline{b6}} \) 11.\( \text{\underline{xd5}} \) exd5 12.\( \text{\underline{c1}} \) \( \text{\underline{c8}} \) 13.g3 \( \text{\underline{e7}} \) 14.\( \text{\underline{h3}} \) \( \text{\underline{b5}} \) 15.\( \text{\underline{g4}} \) 0-0 16.\( \text{\underline{c3}} \) g6 17.0-0 c5\( \text{\underline{f}} \) was in Korchnoi – Lautier, Wijk aan Zee 1997. Black's chances are even
slightly better.

3) 6.\h5 7.e7 (6...\b4?! has also its theory) 7.e3 0-0 8.\e2 b6 (after 8...d5 9.cxd5 \xd5 10.\xc6 bxc6 11.\xe7 \xe7 12.\c2 \b7 13.0-0 c5 14.\xc1 \ac8 15.\a4 in the game M. Stangl – Kindermann, Garmisch 1994 White exerts some pressure upon Black's central pawns while after 8...\a5 9.\h4 \d8 10.0-0 d5 11.cxd5 \xd5 12.\xd4 \xd5 13.\xe7 \xe7 14.b4 \c7 15.\b5 \d7 16.\b2 in Gelfand – Kramnik, Amsterdam 1996 White retained better prospects in spite of the certain simplifications) 9.0-0 (after 9.d5 10.\xf6 11.cxd5 exd5 12.\xd5 \xd5 13.\xd5 \xb2 14.\xb1 \e5 15.\c1 \a5 16.\f4 \b2 17.\c2 \f6 18.\f3 \f5 19.\c7 \ac8 20.\xa7 \xc7 21.\xc7 \d8 in the game Stangl – Alterman, Beijing 1995 Black obtained the sufficient compensation for the pawn – the couple of the active bishops) 9...\b7 10.\c1 \e5 11.\f4 d6 12.\g3 \c8 13.b3 a6 14.\d2 \c7 15.\fd1 \a8 16.\f3 \d8 17.e4 \b8 18.\h1 \e8 19.\f1 in Akesson – M. Rytshagov, Asker 1997 Black exploited White's weak pressure on the pawns b6 and d6 and advantageously improved his position with 19...\d8! 20.\c2 \d7 21.\e3 \c7.

4) 6.g3. The best reply for this move is considered to be 6...\b6! 7.\b3 (the aggressive 7.d5 \e5 8.f4 in case 8...\fg4 9.e3 a6! leads to the sharp forced play where neither of the parts is able to unbalance the equilibrium, for instance, after 10.h3 axb5 11.\hxg4 \xc4 12.\b3 d5 13.\xc4 xc4 14.\xb5+ \xb5 15.\xb5 \b4+ 16.\e2 \a5 17.a4 \d7 18.\d6 \xd6 19.\xd6+ \e7 20.\xc4 \xa4 21.\xa4 \xa4 in the game L. Hansen – C. Hansen, Denmark 2000 the chances were completely equalized) 7...\e5!? 8.e4 \b4 9.\e2 d6 10.f4 \c6 11.\e3 \xc3+ 12.\xc3 \c7 13.\g2 0-0 14.\c5 (after 14.0-0 b6 15.\g7 \b7 16.g5 \d7 17.\f3 \e7 18.\h3 \fc8 19.\wh5 \d8 in the game Lobron – Kramnik, Dortmund 1995 Black improved his kingside while white's c-pawns remained weak) 14...\d5 15.\xc5 \d8 16.e5 \a5 17.\b4 \xb3 18.axb3 \d5 19.\we4 \d7 (after 19... \xc4 20.\xc4 \we3 21.\e4 \xc4 in the game Vaganian – Kramnik, Riga 1995 the draw was agreed) 20.\d4 \xb4 21.\xd7 \xd7 22.\xb4 \b5 23.\xb7 \ab8 24.\a6 and in Kramnik – Salov, Wijk aan Zee 1998 the struggle ceased here because of the equality of the forces.

5) 6.d5 d5! 7.\f4 (the acceptance of the pawn sacrifice 7.\xd5 \xd5 8.\xd5 \xd5 9.\xd5?! after 9...\b4+ 10.\d2 \e7! 11.\c3 0-0 12.\g5 \c7 13.e3 \e6 14.\d2 \a5 15.\h4 g5! 16.\g3 \fd8 17.\c2 \xc3+
18.bxc3 \(\text{b}4!\) → in the game Suba – Portisch, Thessaloniki 1984 gave Black the strongest attack) 7...e5 8.cxd5 exf4 9.dxc6 bxc6 10.\(\text{\textit{x}}\)xd8+ \(\text{\textit{x}}\)xd8 and in spite of the queens swap rather a sharp position arises. The long-term tournament practice has shown that Black is able to hold the balance here.

Let us return to the position after 5.g3!

![Diagram](image)

5...\(\text{b}6\)

As in the variation \(c\) of Chapter 8 Black intends to make White find the position for the knight \(d4\) before the move \(e7-e6\). The other popular move 5...e6 will be examined in Chapters 10–12.

It should be mentioned that after 5...\(\text{\textit{x}}\)xd4 6.\(\text{\textit{x}}\)xd4 g6 7.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c3 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)7 8.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g2 0-0 9.0-0 \(\text{d}6\) 10.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d3 the play can transpose to the position considered in detail in Book II, Part 5, Chapters 20-21. Very often in the variations considered below Black intends to compose a “hedgehog-like” position or similar to it. But despite the abundance of the ways to do it Black still should keep certain precautions in choosing the way to achieve his aim. For instance, after the original 5...d6 6.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g2 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7 7.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c3 a6 8.0-0 \(\text{e}6\) after 9.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b3 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c7 10.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)f4 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e5 (much worse is 10...\(\text{\textit{h}}\)h5 11.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d2 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e5 12.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c1 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c6 in view of the standard blow for this kind of positions – 13.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d5!± as was in the game Psakhis – Karp, Tel Aviv 1990) 11.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c1 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)g6 12.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g5 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e7 13.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d2 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d8 14.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d1 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c8 15.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d4 0-0 White in the game Andersson – S. Gross, Rome 1985 performed the suppression of Black’s queenside with the not less original way: 16.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)a4! \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7 17.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b6 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b8 18.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c3 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c8 19.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e3 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7 20.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)a7! \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c7 21.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)a4±.

In case 5...e5 6.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b5 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b4+ (after 6...\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c5 7.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g2 d6 8.a3 a6 9.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d5 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e6 10.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d5 0-0 11.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)bc3 h6 in the game Lokvenc – Takacs, Vienna 1927 White should have played 12.0-0 to leave Black with the long-term problems of the square d5 without the apparent compensation while after 6...d6 the simplest way to fix control upon the square d5 – with 7.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c1? a6 8.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)a3) 7.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d2 (also possible is 7.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c1 c6 8.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d6+ \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e7 9.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)f5+ \(\text{\textit{f}}\)f8 10.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e3 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c3+ 11.bxc3 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e5 12.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b3 d6 13.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g2 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c7 14.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)a3 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e6 15.0-0 as was in Prystenski – Grant, Manitoba 1990 because White’s superiority in center overcompensates the defect of his pawn structure at the queenside) 7...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e7 8.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g2 0-0 9.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c5 d6 10.0-0 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a6 11.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d5

95
Chapter 9

\[ \text{c8 12. } \text{dxc3 } b8 13. b3 } \text{xd5 14. } \text{xd5 } c6 15. \text{c3 } d7 16. \text{d2 } \text{f8 17. } \text{ad1 in the game Ranegger – Czischke, Graz 1997 Black got nothing for the weakness of the square d5.}

The move 5...\text{a5+ is seldom used. In this case 6. } \text{d2?! in view of 6... } \text{b6 7. } \text{b5 } c5+ 6... d4 7. \text{d5 (in case of 7. } \text{d2?! White should take into consideration 7... } \text{xf2?! since 8. } \text{xc6 can be met with 8... } \text{c5+, and if 7. } \text{d3?! – similar to one of King’s Indian lines – then 7... } \text{c5! appears very strong, and after 9. } \text{xd4 } \text{b3 10. } \text{d5 } \text{xd5 11. } \text{xd5 } \text{xa1 12. } \text{c7+ } \text{d8 13. } \text{xa8 } \text{c2+ 14. } \text{d1 } \text{b4 Black’s knight will escape while his White’s vis-a-vis will remain in the corner. Black has no problems either in the ending after 7. } \text{xc6 dxc6 8. } \text{a4 } \text{xa4 9. } \text{xe4 e5= Serper – P. Wolff, New York 1996. After 7. } \text{b3 } f5 8. \text{e3 } \text{xc3 9. } \text{xc3 } g6 10. \text{g2 } \text{g7 11. } \text{c1 0-0 12.0-0 } \text{e5 13. } \text{d4 d6 14.c5 } \text{d8 15.f4 } \text{c6 16.e4 } \text{e6 17.cxd6 } \text{xd6 18. e5 } \text{d8= in the game Anic – C. Bauer, France 1996 the complicated position arose with the reciprocal chances) 7...a6 (after 7... } \text{xc3 8. } \text{xc3 } g6 9. \text{d2 } \text{g7 10. } \text{d5 } \text{d8 11. } \text{c3 } \text{xc3+ 12. } \text{xc3 d6 13. } \text{g2 } \text{e6 14.0-0 0-0 in the game Pomar – T. Petrosian, Tel Aviv 1964 the position was achieved like those considered in Book II, Part 5, Chapters 20-21 and similarly White could have held the tension with 15. b3? } \text{d7 16. } \text{e1 } \text{h3 17. } \text{h1=} 7...a6 8. \text{c7+ } \text{xc7 9. } \text{xe4 } \text{e5 (after 9...g6 10. } \text{d2 } \text{g7 11. } \text{c3 0-0 12. } \text{g2 } \text{e5 13. } \text{c1 d6 14. 0-0 } \text{f5 15.b3 } \text{ac8 16. } \text{d2 } \text{fd8 17. } \text{fd1 b6 18. } \text{d4 } \text{b8 19. } \text{c3+ in the game Takemoto – D. Johansen, Jakarta 1987 again the position typical for Book II, Part 5, Chapters 20-21 was reached) 10. } \text{g2 } \text{xc4 (after the other capture of the pawn – 10... } \text{xc4 White would also gain the good compensation after 11.0-0 e5 12.b3 } \text{d6 13. } \text{b2 } \text{xe4 14. } \text{xe4 d6 15. } \text{c1 } \text{a5 16. } \text{d5=} because Black has developed only the queen of his pieces) 11.0-0 d5 12.b3 } \text{c6 13. } \text{b2 } \text{xe4 14. } \text{xe5 } \text{d7 15. } \text{c1 } \text{e6 16. } \text{d4 f6 17. } \text{f4 } \text{c6 18. } \text{fd1=} and in the game M. Ivanov – Zagorskis, Germany 1995 White obtained the good compensation for the pawn since it is not easy for Black to complete the development of his kingside.

[Diagram]

6.\text{d2}

Where should the knight retreat? This question arises in many variations of Part 2. Until
Black has played e7-e6 the active 6.\(\text{d}2\)b5 should not be correct since after 6...a6 7.\(\text{c}7\)e3 (in case 7.\(\text{d}5\)c3 e6 8.\(\text{d}3\)g2 \(\text{d}5\)e5 9.\(\text{d}3\)b3 \(\text{d}4\)b4 10.\(\text{b}2\)d2 \(\text{b}8\) 11.0-0 \(\text{c}7\) 12.\(\text{c}6\)c2 0-0 13.a3 \(\text{d}5\)c5 14.\(\text{d}4\)d1 \(\text{c}7\) 15.b3 b5 16.\(\text{d}4\)xb5 axb5 17.\(\text{d}4\)b2 \(\text{b}7\) 18.\(\text{d}4\)xb7 \(\text{b}7\)= in the game Miles – Gligoric, Bugojno 1984 Black performed the important advance b7-b5 and kept the equality) 7...\(\text{d}6\)a5+ 8.\(\text{d}5\)c3 \(\text{d}4\)g4 9.\(\text{d}2\)d2 e6 10.\(\text{d}3\)g2 \(\text{d}3\)xe3 11.\(\text{d}3\)xe3 \(\text{d}5\)c5 12.\(\text{d}2\)d2 b5 13.\(\text{d}4\)e4 \(\text{d}4\)xd2+ 14.\(\text{d}4\)bxd2 \(\text{d}4\)d4 15.0-0-0 \(\text{f}5\)= as was in the game Miles – Schmittdiel, Ostend 1993, Black has nothing to worry about.

The retreat 6.\(\text{d}2\)b3 typical for the variation c Chapter 8 after 6...e6 (also possible is 6...\(\text{d}5\)e5 7.c5 \(\text{d}5\)c6 and after the smooth 8.f3 e6 9.\(\text{d}4\)d4 d6 10.\(\text{d}4\)c3 \(\text{d}4\)ed7 11. \(\text{d}4\)xd6 12.e4 0-0 13.\(\text{d}4\)e3 \(\text{d}6\)d8 14.\(\text{d}4\)c4 \(\text{d}4\)xc4 15.\(\text{d}4\)xc4 \(\text{d}4\)e5 16.\(\text{d}4\)e2 \(\text{d}4\)b4 17.0-0 b6 18.\(\text{d}4\)d1 \(\text{d}7\) 19.\(\text{d}4\)ac1 \(\text{d}4\)e8= in the game S. Kovalev – Brodsky, Kherson 1990 White achieved nothing) 6...e6 7.\(\text{d}4\)g2 \(\text{d}4\)e5 8.\(\text{d}4\)c2 \(\text{d}4\)a6 9.c5 d5 10.\(\text{d}4\)xd6 \(\text{d}4\)xd6 11.0-0 \(\text{d}7\) 12.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}8\) 13.\(\text{d}3\)d1 \(\text{d}4\)e7 14.\(\text{d}3\)f4 \(\text{d}4\)c4 15.\(\text{d}3\)d2 \(\text{d}4\)xd2 16.\(\text{d}4\)xd2 0-0 17.\(\text{d}4\)d6 \(\text{d}4\)xd6 18.\(\text{d}4\)xd6 \(\text{d}4\)c6 19.\(\text{d}4\)d4 \(\text{d}4\)b6 20.\(\text{d}4\)b4 \(\text{d}4\)xb4 21.\(\text{d}4\)xb4 b6= in the game Gelfand – Ivanchuk, Liv 2000 led to the equal ending.

6...e6

Just now when White's knight is not able to exploit the temporary weakening of d6, Black opens the diagonal f8-a3 for his bishop. Sometimes when g2-g3 has been played Black also tries to cause the advance e2-e3 too. That purpose can be reached here with 6...\(\text{d}5\)g4, however after 7.e3 it appears that Black has nothing better than the knight's retreat back: 7...\(\text{d}4\)f6 8.\(\text{d}4\)c3=, since after 7...d5? 8.h3 \(\text{d}4\)e5 9.\(\text{d}4\)xd5 \(\text{d}4\)b4 10.\(\text{d}4\)xb4 \(\text{d}4\)xb4+ 11.\(\text{d}4\)c3 \(\text{d}4\)d7 12.\(\text{d}4\)b6 13.\(\text{d}4\)g6 14.\(\text{d}4\)g2 \(\text{d}4\)f5 in the game M. Ivanov – Amann, Liechtenstein 1994 White has just the extra pawn. In case 6...\(\text{d}4\) White can already do without e2-e3, playing 7.\(\text{d}4\)! e6 8.\(\text{d}4\)g2 \(\text{d}4\)b4+ 9.\(\text{d}4\)d2 with some advantage since after 9...\(\text{d}4\)= (Black has better go for the position after 9...\(\text{d}4\)d2 10.\(\text{d}4\)xd2 \(\text{d}4\)c5 11.b3= 10.a3 \(\text{d}4\)a5 11.\(\text{d}4\)c2 d5 12.0-0! \(\text{d}4\)xd2 (12...\(\text{d}4\)d2, can be met with 13.\(\text{d}5\)d1+) 13.\(\text{d}4\)xd5 exd5 14.\(\text{d}5\)xd5 \(\text{d}5\)f5 (after 14...\(\text{d}4\)d5 15.\(\text{d}4\)e4 \(\text{d}4\)d4 16.\(\text{d}4\)d3= White would also retain the extra pawn) 15.\(\text{d}5\)c7+ \(\text{d}4\) 16.\(\text{d}5\)e4 \(\text{d}5\)e4 17.\(\text{d}5\)xd2 \(\text{d}5\)d8 18.\(\text{d}5\)g5+ \(\text{d}4\)b8= Black has no compensation for the given pawn.

In case 6...\(\text{d}5\), possible is 7.b3 (worse is 7.\(\text{d}5\)e3 in view of 7...\(\text{d}4\)g4! 8.\(\text{d}5\)g4 \(\text{d}5\)g4 9.e3 \(\text{d}5\)c6 10.\(\text{d}5\)d6 11.\(\text{d}5\)xc6 dxc6 12.\(\text{d}5\)g2 e5= and in the game Filipov – Y. Malinov, Russia 1998 the play was equalized) 7...\(\text{d}5\)c6 (here after 7...\(\text{d}4\)g4 8.\(\text{d}4\)d4 \(\text{d}4\)g6 9.\(\text{d}4\)b3 \(\text{d}4\)c6 10.\(\text{d}4\)c3 e5 11.\(\text{d}4\)g2 \(\text{d}4\)c5 12.e3 0-0 13.b4 \(\text{d}4\)e7 14.b3 \(\text{d}5\)h6 15.0-0 a5 16.b5 \(\text{d}5\)b4 17.e4= in the game P. Schlosser – Kraai, Groningen
1997 White retained the advantage thanks to the weakness of d5. After 7...d5 8.cxd5  \(\Box\)a5+ 9. \(\Box\)d2 \(\Box\)xd5 10.\(\Box\)xd5 \(\Box\)xd5 11.\(\Box\)g2 e6 12.\(\Box\)b2 \(\Box\)b4 13.\(\Box\)e3 \(\Box\)bc6 14. 0-0 f6 15.\(\Box\)c1 \(\Box\)e7 16.\(\Box\)d2 \(\Box\)f7 17. \(\Box\)xe5 \(\Box\)xe5 18.\(\Box\)c7± in the game J. Horvath – Cao Sang, Hungary 1999 White succeeded to develop the pressure on Black’s position thanks primarily to the bishop g2) 7...\(\Box\)c6 8.f3 e6 (after 8...g6 9.\(\Box\)b2 d6 10.\(\Box\)g2 \(\Box\)g7 11.0-0 \(\Box\)c7 12.\(\Box\)c3 0-0 13.\(\Box\)h1 a6 14.\(\Box\)c1 e6 15.e4± White has better chances thanks to his spatial advantage in the game Rahman – Prasad, Erevan 1996) 9.\(\Box\)b2 \(\Box\)c7 10. \(\Box\)c3! (White should be vigilant about Black’s opportunities in center since after 10.\(\Box\)g2 \(\Box\)c5 11.\(\Box\)d4 d5 12.f4 \(\Box\)xd4 13.\(\Box\)xd4 \(\Box\)c6 14.\(\Box\)c3 0-0 15.\(\Box\)d2 \(\Box\)d8 16.0-0 b5!\(\Box\) in the game Kabatenski – P. Schlosser, Munich 1992 Black obtained a good counter play) 10...a6 11.\(\Box\)g2 d6 (in case 11... \(\Box\)c5 possible is 12.\(\Box\)a4 \(\Box\)a7 13.c5?!± and White would have a play on black squares as the good compensation for the pawn) 12.f4 \(\Box\)g6 13.0-0 \(\Box\)b8 14.\(\Box\)e4! \(\Box\)e7 (in case 14...\(\Box\)xe4 15.\(\Box\)xe4 the attempt to prevent f4-f5 with 15...f5 would lead Black to troubles after 16.\(\Box\)g2 \(\Box\)d7 17.e4±) 15.\(\Box\)xf6+ \(\Box\)xf6 16.\(\Box\)xf6 gxf6 and here in the game Yermolinsky – De Firmian, USA 1994 White could have kept the initiative with 17.f5\(\Box\).

It should be mentioned that after 6...d6 7.\(\Box\)g2 g6 8.\(\Box\)c3 \(\Box\)g7 9.0-0 0-0 10.b3 we would see the position of the game Kramnik – Kamsky, New York (m/6) 1994, considered above in Book II, Part 5, Chapter 18.

7.\(\Box\)g2 d5

Black could transpose here to the hedgehog-like structure with 7...\(\Box\)e5 8.b3 (in case 8...\(\Box\)c5 9. 0-0 0-0 10.\(\Box\)c3 \(\Box\)e7 11.\(\Box\)e3 \(\Box\)c7 12.h3 d5 13.\(\Box\)b5 \(\Box\)d7 14.\(\Box\)xa7 dxc4 15.\(\Box\)d4± in the game Schrampa – Schippers, Netherlands 1995 White retained the superiority) 8...\(\Box\)e7 9.0-0 0-0 10.\(\Box\)c3 d6 11.e4 \(\Box\)d7 12.\(\Box\)h1 \(\Box\)fd8 13.f4 \(\Box\)g6 14.\(\Box\)b2 \(\Box\)ac8 15.\(\Box\)e2 a5 16.\(\Box\)ab1 \(\Box\)f8 17.\(\Box\)e3 as was in the game Hauchard – Fayard, France 1991 but he would not get the equality.

8.0-0

White is ready to give up the pawn to support his initiative. It is not recommended to protect the pawn c4 with 8.\(\Box\)ba3?! since after 8...\(\Box\)c5 9.0-0 0-0 10.cxd5 exd5 11.\(\Box\)e3 \(\Box\)e6 12.\(\Box\)d3 \(\Box\)fd8 13.h3 \(\Box\)ac8± G. Orlov – De Firmian, Modesto 1995 the position of the knight on a3 appears not
very good. In case of immediate swap 8.cxd5 exd5 9.0-0 Black would have the additional opportunity 9...e6!? (the position after 9...e7 is discussed below in the main line with 8.0-0) 10.\(\text{c}3\) (the pawn sacrifice is not sufficient) 10.e3?! \(\text{e}b2\) 11.b3a3 \(\text{a}x\)a3 12.a1b1 \(\text{e}x\)a2 13.a1a1 \(\text{e}x\)b2. 14.e1c1 \(\text{e}x\)c1 15.e1c1 \(\text{e}x\)c1 16.e1c1 0-0 as was in the game Berezovsky – Dovzok, Simferopol 1991) 10.d8 11.d3d4 12.d4e4 dxe4 and here in the game Heino – Tuomalainen, Finland 1987 the draw was agreed. Should the play continue after 13.e4 e7=, Black’s chances were at least not worse since the pawn d4 would be not a weakness but on the contrary it would constrain White’s position.

8...e7

The acceptance of the pawn sacrifice after 8...dxc4 9.b3a3?? a6 (Black would have not the equality either after 9...e5 10.a3 e5 11.d5 a5 12.a3x5 c5 12.a3d4 cxd4 13.a3xd4 c3 14.bxc3 0-0. 15.e4+) 10.b3cxb3 11.axb3 b6 (if 11...e7, then after 12.a4c4 b5 13.a6xd6 xd6 14.a6xd6 Black would have problems with castling) 12.e3! \(\text{e}x\)b3 (in case 12...c5 13.a4 c4 \(\text{b}x\)a3 14.a4d4 a4xd4 15.a4xd4=) White has also the good compensation for the pawn since 15...a4xd4?? is bad because of the knight’s double attack 16.a6=a6+ 13.a6b1= would make Black’s position very dangerous in spite of his material ad-

vantage because he is much back in development.

9.cxd5

White should not permit the pawn onto d4. For instance, after 9.c3 d4 10.a4 e6 11.b3 e5 12.f4 ef 13.a4f4 a7 14.e3 c5 15.a4x e3 0-0 16.a1h1 aad8 17.a7c7 a7g4= in the game M. Ivanov – Hjartarson, Sweden 1997 Black’s position was not worse.

9...d5

After 9...d5 10.a3 in case 10.e4 db4 11.a4xb4 \(\text{e}x\)b4 12.a3 e3 0-0.a3 b6 14.a1d1 15.a4h5 a7 16.a3 e3 a3b3 17.a4d1 a4c4 18.a1e8= Kaidanov – De Firmian, Lexington 1995 the position is approximately equal) 10.a3xe3 11.a3xe3 \(\text{e}x\)b2 12.a3xc6+ bxc6 13.a4 d4 a7b7 14.a1g7 a1g8 15.a4c3 c5 16.a4c2 a4c6 17.a1d2 a6c6 18.a1c4 a7b7 19.a4e3 20.a4a5 a7c7 21.a4xb7 a7b7 22.a4a4+ a7f7 23.a4ad1= in the game Topalov – Ponomariov, Las Vegas (active m/4) 1999 White had more preferrable chances thanks to his better pawn structure.

10.a3c3 0-0

After 10...e6 11.a3e3 (in case 11.b3 0-0 12.a4 a5 13.a4b2, Hoelzl – Fauland, Austria 1989, after 13...b5=?) Black’s chances are at least not worse) 11...d4 12.a4ed5 a4xd5 13.a4xd5 a4xd5 14.a4xd5 0-0 15.a4b3 a4xb3 16.a4xb3 a4fd8 17.a4d1 a4f6 18.a4b1 a4ac8 19.a4d2 a4d3 20.a4xd3 a4xd3 21.a4e3= in the game Skembri – De Firmian, Vrnjacka Banja 1983 White has the superiority.
thanks to his two bishops.

This position was reached in the game Gelfand – Ivanchuk, Polanica Zdroj 2000. After 11. \textit{\textbf{\texttt{\textsc{\textcircled{\textbullet}}}} x \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}}} 12.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xd5 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} e6 13. \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} e4 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} f6 (14.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} e3 would be met with 14...\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xb2 15.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} ab1 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xa2 16.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} b7 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} fc8\textsubscript{=} , while 14.a3 would run into the pointed by B. Gelfand 14...\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} fd8 15.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} e3 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} b3\textsubscript{=}) 14.a4 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} ac8 15.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} e3 xb2 16.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} ab1

Black’s chances appeared not worse. The simplest there was 16...\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} c3!? (pointed by B. Gelfand) 17.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} fc1 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} a2! 18.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} b5 (after 18. \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xb7 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} a5 19.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} e1 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xc1 20.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xc1 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xcl 21.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xa7 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xe1+ 22.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} f1 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} e6\textsubscript{=} White would lose material) 18...\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} fe8 19.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} f4= with the equality.

However 12.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xd5!? deserves attention since after 12...\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} h3 13.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} e1 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} ad8 14.e4 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} e6, pointed by B. Gelfand, possible is 15. \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} e3!? \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} c7 (if 15...\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} c5, then 16.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xc5 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xc5 17.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} e3\textsubscript{=}, while 15...\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} a5 can be met with 16.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} d2 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} b5 17.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} e3\textsubscript{=} ) 16.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} f4 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} d7 17. \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xe6 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} xe6 18.\textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} h5 \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} f6 19. \textbf{\texttt{\textcircled{\textbullet}}} b5\textsubscript{=} and Black is to prove that he has the sufficient compensation for the pawn.
Chapter 10

1.\(\text{\textdia{f}3}\) \text{c5} 2.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{\textdia{c}6}\) 3.\(\text{d4}\) \text{cxd4} 4.\(\text{\textdia{xd}4}\) \(\text{\textdia{f}6}\) 5.\(\text{g3}\) \text{e6}

Black clears the space for his dark-coloured bishop and besides, prepares the advance d7-d5.

6.\(\text{\textdia{g}2}\)

Here Black is again before the choice. Usually he tries the following moves: a) 6...\(\text{\textdia{b}6}\) and b) 6...\(\text{e7}\), which will be examined in this Chapter. Other popular moves 6...\(\text{\textdia{c}5}\) and 6...\(\text{\textdia{b}4}+\) will be examined in Chapters 11 and 12.

The move 6...d5 will not bring White any problem. After 7.exd5 (in case 7.0-0 White should take into consideration 7...\(\text{\textdia{b}6}\)?? after that he would have no better than to transpose to the line from Chapter 9) 7...exd5 (after 7...\(\text{\textdia{xd}4}\) 8.\(\text{\textdia{xd}4}\) \(\text{\textdia{xd}5}\) 9.0-0 \(\text{\textdia{b}6}\)

10.\(\text{\textdia{e}5}\) \(\text{\textdia{f}6}\) 11.\(\text{\textdia{d}2}\) \(\text{c5}\) 12.\(\text{\textdia{xc}5}\) \(\text{\textdia{xc}5}\) 13. \(\text{\textdia{b}3}\) \(\text{\textdia{b}6}\) 14.a4 a5 15.\(\text{\textdia{f}4}\) 0-0 16.\(\text{\textdia{d}2}\) \(\text{\textdia{d}5}\) 17.\(\text{\textdia{d}6}\) \(\text{\textdia{d}8}\) 18.\(\text{\textdia{c}4}\)± in the game Mojzis – Vavra, Czech Republic 1996 Black was doomed to deal with the problems concerned with the development of his kingside – that arose because of the strong position of White’s queen on d4 – and the similar troubles at the other side because of the action of the bishop g2, while in case 7...\(\text{\textdia{xd}5}\) 8.\(\text{\textdia{xc}6}\) bxc6 9.0-0 \(\text{\textdia{e}7}\) 10.\(\text{\textdia{a}4}\) \(\text{\textdia{d}7}\) 11.\(\text{\textdia{d}1}\) 0-0 12.e4 \(\text{\textdia{b}6}\) 13. \(\text{\textdia{c}2}\) \(\text{\textdia{c}7}\) 14.\(\text{\textdia{e}3}\) c5 15.\(\text{\textdia{a}3}\) \(\text{\textdia{ac}8}\) 16.\(\text{\textdia{ac}1}\)± in the game Kohlweyer – T. Ernst, Gaudal 1993 White obtained the advantage thanks to his better pawn structure at the queenside) 8.0-0 \(\text{\textdia{e}7}\) 9.\(\text{\textdia{c}3}\) 0-0 10.\(\text{\textdia{e}3}\) arises the position typical for Tarrasch Defence in Queen’s Gambit. That was mentioned in variation b, Chapter 8.

a) 6...\(\text{\textdia{b}6}\)

Black wants to determine the position of White’s knight d4 as it was in Chapter 9 (and earlier,
in variation c Chapter 8). However, in this position the move e7-e6 has been already made and White can exploit it for his profit.

7.\(\text{b}5!\)

White could transpose to variation “a” with 7.\(\text{c}2\) from Chapter 9, but the retreat to b5 in this situation is significantly more dangerous for Black.

7...d5

In such a way Black is trying to solve the problem of the square d6. In case 7...\(\text{c}5\) 8.0-0 a6 possible is 9.\(\text{d}5\)c3!? (after 9.\(\text{d}6+\) \(\text{e}7\) 10.\(\text{xc}8+\) \(\text{xc}8\) 11.a3 \(\text{hd}8\) 12.b4 in the game Keresmecker – Wians, Cappelle la Grande 1991 White was a bit back in development of his queenside and Black could have exploited it and complicated matters with 12...\(\text{d}4!\) 9...\(\text{c}7\) (Black avoids the move \(\text{a}4\) leading to the swap of his dark-coloured bishop) 10.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 11.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{a}7\) 12.c5! (White fixes his opponent’s pawns at the queenside) 11...\(\text{h}5\) (bad is 12...\(\text{xc}5\) in view of 13.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{d}6\) 14.\(\text{c}7\) \(\text{c}7\) 15.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{d}8\) 16.\(\text{xc}7+\)\text{e}) 13.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 14.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{xc}5\) 15.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{g}5\) (also bad is 15...\(\text{c}7\) in view of 16.\(\text{c}1++\) 16.\(\text{cb}6\) \(\text{b}8\) 17.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{xf}2+\) 18.\(\text{xf}2\) 0-0 19.\(\text{f}3\) and in the game Anic – Leteglui, France 1995 Black was to resign in this position.

In case 7...\(\text{b}4+\) 8.\(\text{c}1\)c3 a6 (after 8...0-0 9.0-0 a6 10.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{d}8\) 11.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{g}4\) 12.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{e}7\) 13.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{f}6\) 14.a3 \(\text{xd}6\) 15.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{ge}5\) 16.\(\text{e}3\)\(\text{c}8\) in the game Baloutsoú – Moula, Volos 1996 White’s knight on d6 had substituted the other one 9.\(\text{e}3!\) (should a player as White want sharper impressions he can look for them after 9.\(\text{d}6+\) \(\text{e}7\) 10.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{a}5\) 11.c5! \(\text{xc}5\) 12.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{xf}2+\) 13.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{d}4\) 14.\(\text{c}2\) as was in the game Denton – Richmond, England 1997, with the overwhelming complications) 9...\(\text{a}5\) 10.\(\text{d}6+\) \(\text{e}7\) 11.\(\text{xc}8+\) \(\text{xc}8\) 12.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{h}5\) 13.0-0 \(\text{d}6\) 14.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{hd}8\) 15.e3 \(\text{xd}1\) 16.\(\text{f}x\text{xd}1\) \(\text{b}8\) 17.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{dc}8\) 18.\(\text{f}4\)\(\text{c}8\) as was in the game A. Greenfeld – Pinter, Beer-Sheva 1991, White kept the better prospects thanks to his some spatial advantage and the two bishops.

8.0-0

Less clear are matters after 8.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{a}5\) 9.\(\text{d}1\)c3 (in case 9.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{b}4\) 10.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{xb}4+\) 11.\(\text{d}2\) 0-0 12.\(\text{xc}7\) \(\text{b}8\) 13.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{d}8\) 14.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{xb}4\) 15.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{ex}d5\) in the game M. Keller – Hort, San Bernardino 1992 the knight a3 did not decorate White’s position) 9...a6!? (after 9...\(\text{xc}4\) 10.\(\text{xc}6+\) \(\text{bxc}6\) 11.\(\text{d}6+\) \(\text{xd}6\) 12.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{b}7\) 13.0-0-0\(\text{c}8\) the weakness of
the black squares in Black's position appeared rather significant in the game Terasti – Taivainen, Tampere 1998) 10. cxd5 exd5 11. dxc4 dxe5 12. 0-0 e2 e5 0-0∞. White’s two bishops were in great extent compensated with the defects of his pawn structure at the queenside.

8...a6

Worse is 8...ad7 since after 9. e3 d4 (if 9...ad8, then after 10. cxd5 exd5 11. axd5 exd5 12. ed5 Black would be just a pawn down, while 9... a5 could be met with 10. d2, and it would be difficult for Black to eliminate the tension in center because after 10...dxc4?! very strong would be 11. d6+! ad6 12. cc4±) 10. axd5 xd5 11. xd4 cc5 12. f4 bx5 13. cxb5 bx5 14. cc3 cc5 15. cc4 ba4 16. cx5 xc5 17. fc1 a5 18. bx7 xd8 19. cc6+ e8 20. ab1+ in the game P. Schlosser – Van der Wiel, Baden-Baden 1992 White obtained the significant advantage since the bad position of Black’s king intercepted the cooperation of his rooks.

In case 8...dxc4 possible is 9. 1c3 (after 9. 1a3 1xa3 10. cc3 0-0 11. cc4 cc5 12. b3 cc8 13. cc3 cc5 14. cd6 e5 in the game Brunner – I. Almasi, Budapest 1993 White was not able to exploit the advantage of his two bishops since his pieces in center were vulnerably positioned) 9...c5 (after 9...ad7 possible is 10. cc3 cc5 11. cd6+ xd6 12. xd6 0-0-0 13. ef4 e5 14. xc4 e6 as was in the game P. Schlosser – Hracek, Lippstadt 2000 and here White could have obtained the great advantage with 15. bb5! xb5 16. xb5; in case 9... a4 10. f4 that was in the game Djurkovic – Marjanovic, Nova Gorica 1999, the best for Black was to go for the position after 10...a6 11. a6, because after 10...bd5?? 11. xd5 xd5 12. xd5 exd5 13. c7+ he had to resigned) 10. d6+ xd6 11. xd6 db4 (after 11...d4 12. f4 xd6 13. xd6∞ or 11...e7 12. a3∞ White has a good compensation for the pawn as the strong pressure upon the dark squares) 12. ef4 ad7 (after 12...a6 13. d1 0-0 14. d6 cc6 15. cc3 e5 in the game Azmaiparashvili – Ebeling, Mendoza 1985 White obtain the great superiority with 16. xe5! xa2 17. xa2 xe5 18. xa7 xa7 19. cc7 cc7 15. cc5 cc5 16. xd5 cc5 (after 15...exd5 16. dd1 cc6 17. cc7 cc7 18. cc5 cc5 19. cc5 cc5 20. cc5+- in the game Wilhelm – Lindinger, Hamburg 1994 Black’s position collapsed soon) 16. cc4 cc5 and here Black paid his two pawns for the castling: 7...f6 18. xg7 0-0-0 19. e4 bg8 20. cc4 bx4 21. cc4 cc4 22. cc6± that gave White the big advantage in the game Marsalek – Doring, Czech Republic 1998.

9. e3!? The other possible way is
Chapter 10

104

9.cxd5 exd5 (after 9...axb5 10. dxc6 bxc6 11. a3 e3 h6 12. c2 b7 13. c5 xc5 14. xc5+ as was in the game R. Bilunova – T. Stadler, Budapest 1985, Black was not able to push White’s queen off the important diagonal a3-f8) 10. c5c3 d4 11. c4 c7 (after 11...b5 possible is 12.e3!? dxe3 13. a3 xe3 a6 14. bc3 and White is clearly aheard in development that is important for the open position) 12. f4 d6 13. xdx6 xdx6 14. d2 e6 (in the game Haba – Tobyas, Prague 1990 Black could get rid of White’s bishop pressure with 14...0-0 15. c1 d5 16. xdx5 dxd5 17. d3 but instead he ran into much more serious problems with the d4-pawn) 15. c1 g4 16. c5+ with White’s certain advantage thanks to the unpleasant pressure of bishop g2 upon the opponent’s queenside.

9...d8

In case 9... a5 10. c5c3 dxc4 that was in the game Chapa – De Firmian, USA 1989 White could produce the big problems about the defence of the square d6 for Black with 11. d2! cxd5 12. xc4 xe3 (after 12...xc3 13.bxc3 those problems are harder since 13...xc3 is bad in view of 14. xc1 b4 15. b6 b8 16. xc6+) 13. fxe3! (weaker is 13. xe3 because Black could castle after 13... e7 14. c4 b4=) 13... c7 14. c4+.

10. c5c3 dxc4 11. xd8+ xdx8 12. d2 g4 13. b6 d7

14. xc4 x8 15. b3 x6 16. e4

After the queens swap Black also should keep into consideration the invasion of White’s pieces onto d6.

16... xe4 17. xe4 f6 18. f3+

This position was reached in the game M. Schwarz – Gabriel, Badenweiler 1990. White’s two bishops guarantee him the advantage.

b) 6... e7

Black is going just to complete the development. In future he hopes to position his pieces according to the hedgehog-like pattern that was already discussed in Book II, Part 3.

7. c3

The additional control under
the square d5 is useful for White.

7...0-0

The move 7...♘b4?! is a useless tempo loss as it will seen in Chapter 12. After 8.0-0 ♘a5 9.♕b3 ♘a6 10.♕b5 ♘b6 11.♖e3 ♘d8 12.c5 0-0 13.a3 ♘a5 14.♗xa5 ♘xa5 15.♖d6 ♗g4 16.♗c1 ♘xe3 17.♘xe3± in the game T. Schneider – Pomahac, Lienz 1988 White invaded onto d6 with his knight and succeeded to keep there.

8.0-0 a6

This move is necessary for the hedgehog-like system. Black would have additional problems in case he refuse or delays with it. For instance, after 8...♗c7?! 9.♖db5! ♘b8 10.♕f4 e5 11.♖g5 a6 12.♗xf6 gxf6 in the game Ivkov – Deze, Vrsac 1969 White succeeded to make Black both weaken the important square d5 and badly wound his pawn structure at the kingside. Just in five moves in this game after 13.♗a3 d6 14.♖d5 ♘e6 15.♗d2 ♘g7 16.♗ad1 ♘d8 17.f4!++ Black’s position became strategically hopeless.

The move 8...♗b8?! is also a waste of time. After 9.♕f4 ♘a8 (in case 9...d6 10.♗xc6 e5 11.♖g2 exf4 12.gxf4± Black just was a pawn down in the game Kotronias – Frosinos, Korinthos 2000) 10.♖db5 ♘e8 11.♘a4 ♘g5 12.♘xg5 ♘xg5 13.♗ad1 ♘e7 14.♗d2 a6 15.♗fd1 ♘b8 16.♖d6 ♗xd6 17.♗xd6± in the game Rocha – Dorin, Buenos Aires 1976 White proved it convincingly invaded onto d6.

In case of the swap 8...♖xd4 9.♘xd4 White’s queen is safe in centre. After 9...d6 10.♗d1 a6 11.b3 ♘c7 12.♗a3 ♘d8 13.♗a4 ♘e8 14.♘b6 ♘xb6 15.♘xb6 ♘b8 16.♗d3 ♘d7 17.e4 ♘c6 18.♗ad1 e5 19.f3± that was in the game Polugaevsky – Grigorian, Leningrad 1971, the weakness of the square b6 became real because of the early swap on d4 and it was the important reason for poor estimation of Black’s position.

In case 8...♗e5 9.b3 d6 10.e4 a6 11.h3 ♘c7 12.♗e3 ♘b8 13.♗c1 b6 in the game Scarella – Paglilla, Villa Martelli 2000 Black succeeded to compose the hedgehog-like position but after 14.f4 ♘g6 15.g4 ♘d8 16.g5 ♘e8 17.♗e1 ♘f8 18.♗f2 White could develop the very strong initiative at the kingside.

Sometimes Black use 8...d5 not to give up the space. In this case after 9.cxd5 ♘xd5 (the position after 9...exd5 10.♗e3± has been several times mentioned but it will be discussed in detail in Book III) 10.♗xd5 exd5 Black is to agree to play with the isolated pawn d5. After 11.♗e3 ♘e6 12.♗c1 ♘xd4 13.♗xd4 ♘f6 14.e3 ♘xd4 15.♗xd4 ♘a5 16.a3 ♘ac8 17.♗fd1± in the game Tukmakov – Casagrande, Arco 2000 White forced the advantageous simplification that stressed his superiority.

The similar situation arises in
case of 8...\text{b}6. Here White is again before the old choice: where the knight should retreat. However in this case the choice is rather pleasant. After 9.\text{d}b5 (also possible is 9.\text{b}3 since the threat c4-c5 – arisen because of the queen's b6 position – makes Black move 9...d5 10.cxd5 exd5 that was in the game Polugaevsky – Caiafas, Luzern 1985. Here White could have obtained the certain advantage after 11.\text{e}3!? \text{a}6 12.\text{c}1\pm thanks to the isolated pawn d5.) 9...d5 (after 9...\text{c}c5 10.b3 a6 11.\text{a}4 \text{h}5 12.\text{d}6\pm in the game Beck – Herndl, Austria 1997 White invaded onto d6 obtained the big advantage while in case 9...a6 10.\text{e}3 \text{a}5 11.\text{d}6 \text{b}4 White retained the blockade of the position at the price of the two pawns after 12.c5! \text{xd}6 13.\text{xd}6 \text{xb}2 14.\text{a}4 \text{xe}2 15.\text{b}6 \text{e}8 16.\text{d}1 \text{xd}1 17.\text{f}x\text{d}1\text{f}6 in the game Fioramonti – De Souza, Zurich 1990. Here Black is to struggle for the draw.) 10.\text{e}3 (White must not win the pawn 10.cxd5 \text{xd}5 11.\text{xd}5 exd5 12.\text{d}5?? in view of 12...\text{xb}5 13.\text{c}7 \text{a}5 14.\text{xa}8 \text{h}3++ 10...\text{a}5 11.cxd5 \text{xd}5 12.\text{d}5 exd5 the position with the isolated pawn d5 has been formed. There possible: 13.\text{b}3 (after 13.\text{c}3 d4 14.\text{xd}4 \text{d}8 15.e3 \text{f}6\text{c}6 Black will win back the pawn) 13...\text{g}4 (after 13...\text{e}6 14.\text{d}4 \text{a}6 15.\text{ad}1\pm the standard position with the isolated pawn arises better for White) 14.\text{f}d1 \text{xe}2 15.\text{xd}5 \text{b}4 (after 15...\text{b}4? White obtained the big advantage in the game Krug – Barth, Germany 1998 with 16.\text{d}7 \text{b}5 17.\text{xe}7 \text{c}4 18.a4! \text{xb}3 19.\text{axb}5\pm) 16.\text{d}4 \text{xb}3 17.axb3 \text{xd}4 18.\text{xd}4 \text{f}6 19.\text{d}7 \text{ad}8 20.\text{xb}7\pm with the extra although doubled pawn for White.

9.\text{f}4!

This is the important moment. White intends to exert the maximal pressure upon the square d6 where Black's pawn is expected soon. As the tournament practice shows this plan in the strongest reply for the construction Black has chosen. Also possible is the development of the dark-coloured Bishop onto the long diagonal a1-h8 but in this case it would be more difficult for White to find the active plan in future. For instance, after 9.b3 \text{a}5 (in case 9...\text{c}7 10.\text{b}2 d6 11.\text{c}1 the threat \text{c}3-d5 compels Black to take such measures as 12...\text{xd}4 12.\text{xd}4 \text{d}7 13.\text{fd}1 \text{fd}8 and here in the game Tkachiev – Gelfand, Shenyang (active m/1) 2000,
White in the standard way for the hedgehog-like pattern restricted Black's opportunities at the queenside connected with b6-b5 with 14.a4 ᴣa8 15.ᴀa3 ᴀe8 16.ʙb4 ʙ6 17.ᴇ3!±. Besides, White prevented the typical Black's manoeuvre 17...ᴅd7?! intending to get to c5 – with the reply 18.ᴅd5!) 10.ʙb2 (better was to decline from the initial intention with 10.ᴀa4!? ᴣd8 11. ᴣd2 ᴣc7 12.ᴇ3∞ as was in the game Miguel - Cebrian, Lalín 2000) 10...ʙb8 White's pawns advance at the queenside - 11.a3 ᴣd8 12.b4 ᴣc7 13.ᴄc1 ᴣxd4 14.ɪxd4 ʙ6 15.f6d1 ᴅd6 16.e4 ᴣb7 did not bring Black any trouble but on the contrary, produced the weak pawn c4 in White's camp. No wonder that after 17.ᴇe3 ᴣa8 18.h3 ᴣb7 19.f4 ᴣb8 20. ᴣd2 ᴣb8 21.ᴇe2 ʙ5± in the game Uhlmann – Korchnoi, Havana 1969 Black obtained the good counter play as a result.

9...ᴅxd4

To complete the hedgehog-like pattern Black should play d7-d6, but this move is not so easy to be done. White's knight d4 badly hinders while it is not possible to push it off this square. It is obvious that 9...e5? is bad in view of 10.ɪx6 ᴭxc6 11. ɪxe5+– Andres Gonzalez – Fluvia, Sevilla 1999.

The move 9...ᴀa5 does not solve all the problems either in view of 10.ʏb3 d6 (it is disadvantageous to delay more with d7-d6 since after 10...ᴅd8 the position of the queen on b6 appears to be the flaw and after 11.c5! ᴣa7 12.ʏc7 ᴣe8 13.ᴅa4!± in the game Ellers – Siemies, Duesseldorf 1996 White almost stalemated Black's pieces. After 10...ғd8 11.ғd2 ғh5 12.ғd6 ғf5 13.c5 ғxd6 14.ғxd6 ᴣe7 15. ғxe7 ᴣxe7 16.ғa4!± in the game Lingnau – Noack, Senden 2000 the similar picture was seen) 11.ғxd6 ᴣd8 and here with 12.ғa4!? (also possible more smooth 12.c5 ᴣa7 13.ғxc6 ᴧxc6 14.ғd2 ғxd6 15.ɢxd6 ᴣe8 16. ғe4 ғf5 17.ɢc5 ᴣd6 18.ғd1!± and Black could hardly exploit some weakening of White's king position since Black's pieces are extremely passive) 12...ғa7 13.ғe7 ᴣxd1 14.ғxd1 ғd7 15.ғd6 ᴩ6 16.ғac1 ғce5 17.c5± in the game Kengis – Medvegy, Sweden 1997 White obtained the sufficient material compensation for the queen in addition to the excellent position since Black could hardly disentangle his pieces that very badly cooperated with each other.

Black can prepare the double attack e6-e5 with 9...ғa5. However in this case after 10.ғb3 ᴣh5 11.e4 ᴣxd1 (here with 11...e5 Black weakens strongly his position and White convincingly proves it after 12.ғxh5 ᴣxh5 13.ғe3 ᴩ6 14.ғd5 ғe6 15.ғac1 ғf6 16.ғd1 ғe8 17. ғxe7+ ғxe7 18.ғ5± as was in the game Lesiege – Teodoro, Canada
1992) 12.\( \text{fxd1} \) 8e8 13.\( \text{c5} \) g5 14.\( \text{e3} \) f6 15.\( \text{a4} \) d8 16.\( \text{d4} \) c7 17.\( \text{xc6} \) bxc6 in the game Tischbierek – Enders, Salzwedel 1982 White could have obtained the great advantage with 18.\( \text{xb6} \) ? 19.\( \text{xb6} \) b8 20.\( \text{ac1} \pm \) with the following a4-a5.

One more way to press on White’s knight is connected with 9...\( \text{c5} \). However it is obvious that the second move with the already developed piece should be a waste of time and after 10.\( \text{b3} \) b4 in the game Kross – Wuttke, Baunatal 1998 White obtained the evident advantage with 11.\( \text{d6} \) xd6 12.\( \text{xd6} \pm \).

That Black’s problem could be tried to solve with the other approach: to leave the knight on d4 and to take the knight off c6 similar to the main line move. After 9...\( \text{a5} \) 10.\( \text{d3} \) d6 Black hits the target but it is hard to understand what he is going to do further, after, for instance, 11.\( \text{b3} \). In the game Trabszys – Chojna- cki, Zakopane 2001 Black made more positional concessions with 11...\( e5 \) (in case 11...\( \text{xb3} \) 12.axb3 Black’s problems with the pawn d6 would get harder since 12...\( \text{b6} \) would be met with the unpleasant 13.\( \text{db5} \)± and then bad is 13...\( \text{d8} \) because after 14.\( \text{e3} \) Black’s queen would be trapped) and after 12.\( \text{g5} \) c6 13.\( \text{fd1} \) b4 14.\( \text{d2} \) e6 15.\( \text{xf6} \) gxf6 16.\( \text{e4} \) he committed the great troubles.

The manoeuvre 9...\( \text{h5} \) 10.\( \text{e3} \) e5 can be called more acceptable for Black. However in this case after 11.b3 \( \text{f6} \) (in case 11...d6 12.\( \text{c1} \) c7 13.h3 \( \text{f6} \) 14.f4 \( \text{g6} \) White after 15.\( \text{d2} \) e8 16.\( \text{f2} \) would also have the certain advantage) 12.\( \text{c2} \) d6 13.\( \text{h1} \) c7 14.\( \text{f4} \) c6 15.\( \text{g1} \) b8 16.\( \text{c1} \) a5 17.\( \text{d3} \) b4 18.\( \text{xb4} \) \( \text{xb4} \) 19.a3! ? a5 (19...\( \text{xb3} \) is prohibited in view of 20.\( \text{a1} \) b4 21.a4 \( \text{xb3} \) 22.\( \text{b1} \) and Black’s queen has been caught) 20.b4 c7 21.a7 a8 22.\( \text{d4} \) d7 23.e4 a8 24.e5± in the game Filippov – Gasimov, Ubeda 1998 White succeeded to break in centre while Black was completing his “hed- gehog”.

To complete the story about Black’s opportunities the move 9...d5 should be mentioned. After 10.cxd5 \( \text{xd5} \) (in case 10...exd5 11.\( \text{c1} \)± the typical position with the isolated pawn would arise) 11.\( \text{xd5} \) exd5 12.\( \text{c1} \) xd4 13.\( \text{xd4} \) e6 14.\( \text{fd1} \) a5 the knights swap appears as usual in favour of the part that plays against the isolated pawn. In the game Tratar – Vasic, Portoroz 1997 White exploited that factor with 15.\( \text{e5} \! \! \! \! \! \! \! f6 \) 16.\( \text{c7} \) \( \text{xa2} \) 17.\( \text{b6} \) f7 18.\( \text{xb7} \) e8 19.e3 c8 20.\( \text{h3} \) a8 21.e4, and Black appeared before the difficult problems.

10.\( \text{xd4} \) d6
11.♘d3

Black has also many problems after 11.♗d2 ♘c7 (after 11...♗b8 12.♗d1 e5 13.♕g5 ♘e6 14.b3 ♘c7 15.♗xf6 gxf6 16.♗d5 ♗xd5 17.♗xd5± in the game Tratar – Sutkovic, Zadar 1999 the opposite-coloured bishops on board just emphasized White's advantage: Black had nothing against the opponent's initiative on the light squares) 12.♗ac1 ♗d8 13.♗d1. Here the best for Black is the advance 13...e5 although it weakens the square d5 (after 13...♗b8? 14.c5! ♘f8 15.♗xd6 ♗xd6 16.cxd6+- in the game Prudnikova – Stojanovic, Herceg Novi 2000 Black's position at once became hopeless. The similar story was after 13...h6 14.c5! ♘xc5 15.♗d5 exd5 16.♗xc5 dxc5 17.♕c7 ♘e8 18.♗xd5± in the game Spiridonov – G. Horvath, Agard 1976. After 13...♗d7 14.♗c2 ♗b8 again happened the blow 15.c5! ♘c7 16.cd ♗xd6 17.♗d2++ with White's decisive superiority in the game B. Larsen – Kupferstich, Aalborg 1955. Not much better for Black appeared 13...♗h5 14.♗e3 ♗d7 15.♗d4 ♗f6 that led Black to the material loss after 16.♗b6! ♘xb6 17.♗xb6 ♘f8 18.♗c7 ♘e8 19.♗xd6 ♘xd6 20.c5 ♘xc5 21.♗xd7+ as was in the game Jasnikowski – Woda, Slupsk 1989 and after 14.♗e3 ♘e6 15.♕a4 ♗d7 16.b3 ♘ab8 17.♗b4 b6 18.♗c3 ♗c5 19.♗a3± White obtained the evident advantage in the game P. Szekely – Pretos, Greece 1992.

11...♗c7

11...♗b6 could be met with 12.♗a4 ♗a5 13.♗b3 ♗d7 14.♗d1 ♗c5 15.♗xc5 ♘xc5 16.♗e3 ♘c7 17.♗d2 and after 17...a5 18.♗b6 ♘b8 19.♗ad1 ♗a6 in the game Kubala – Kantorik, Martin 1996 White could have produced the very unpleasant threat of the breakthrough in centre c4-c5 with 20.♗b5+. If Black tries to reveal an activity at the kingside with 11...♗h5 12.♗e3 f5, then after 13.♗ad1 ♘c7 14.♗c1 ♗b8 he could be troubled with the move 15.e4 that brought White a large advantage after 15...g6 16.exf5 gxf5 17.♗fe1 ♗f7 18.b3± in the game Schmitt – Rau, Germany 2001.

12.♗d1

Also possible is 12.♗ac1, since after 12...♗d8 arises the position considered below. Much worse is 12...♗b8?! in view of 13.♗d1!? (after the immediate 13.c5 as was in the game Odinokov – S. Pogosian, Kolontaev 1998 Black should have ventured to sacrifice the queen with 13...♖xc5 14.♗d5 ♗xd5 15.♖xc5 ♗xf4 16.gxf4 dxc5±) 13...e5 (here after 13...
\[\text{\textbf{Chapter 10}}\]

The advance 14.c5! \(\text{\textit{xc5}}\) 15.d5 \(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) 16.d5 \(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) 17.d2\textsuperscript{=}-- brought the decisive effect in the game Hausner – Tepper, Rimavska Sobota 1975) 14.g5 \(\text{\textit{e6}}\) and here White should have played similar to the note for White’s move 12: 15.\(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{xd6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd6}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{xd6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) 18.b6 \(\text{\textit{e6}}\) 19.b7 \(\text{\textit{xb7}}\) 20. \(\text{\textit{xb7}}\) \(\text{\textit{b8}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{xa6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xb2}}\) 22.a4\textsuperscript{=} as was in the game Grivas – B. Jonasson, Kopavogur 1994. Here White would have all the chances to realize his extra pawn in spite of the opponent’s two bishops.

However after 12.a1 White should have also to take into consideration the move 12...e5. In that case possible is 13.e3 (after 13.g5 \(\text{\textit{e6}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 15.d5 \(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{xd5}}\), in the game Hill – Jackson, Isle of Man 2000 White had just a little but long-lasting advantage) 13...e6 and here in the game Mochalov – Paksa, Ajka 1992 White could have to retain his superiority by the simple way: 14.b3!\textsuperscript{=} However he preferred more tempting move 14.d5?! that was a typical mistake in that position. After 14...\(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) 15.cxd5 White’s c-pawn moved onto the adjacent file and covered the weak point d5 in Black’s camp. After that Black started the active play at the kingside with 15...\(\text{\textit{d7}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{c4}}\) \(\text{\textit{e8}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{f1}}\) f5 18.\(\text{\textit{h3}}\) g5 19.f3 \(\text{\textit{g7}}\) 20.d2 h5 21.\(\text{\textit{c2}}\) g4 22.\(\text{\textit{g2}}\) \(\text{\textit{d8}}\), and White was not able to oppose anything real at the other part of the board since the squares for the invasion on the c-file appeared to be defended securely by Black’s pieces.

\[\textbf{12...d8}\]

Since White’s rook is positioned on d1, much worse is 12...e5?! in view of 13.\(\text{\textit{g5}}\) \(\text{\textit{e6}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf6}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{xd6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{xb7}}\) \(\text{\textit{ab8}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{xa6}}\) as was in the game Burmakin – Parkanyi, Nagykanizsa 1993 with the decisive advantage for White.

\[\textbf{13.a1}\]

After 13.e4 \(\text{\textit{xe4}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{xe4}}\) \(\text{\textit{h6}}\) 15.a1\textsuperscript{=} in the game Dzin-dzicashvili – Browne, Las Vegas 1992 White retained the superiority thanks to the threat c4-c5.

\[\textbf{13.h5}\]

In case of 13...e5 possible is 14.g5 (after 14.e3 \(\text{\textit{d6}}\) in the game Chytilek – Ertl, Bayern 2000 White made the typical mistake 15.d5?! that has been mentioned above in the note for White’s move 12. There followed 15...\(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) \(\text{\textit{d7}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{c4}}\) \(\text{\textit{dc8}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{dc1}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xe8}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{f3}}\) \(\text{\textit{d8}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{g4}}\) f5 22.\(\text{\textit{h3}}\) g5\textsuperscript{=} and Black succeeded to obtain the counter play) 14...e6 and here in the game Koerholz – Somogyi, Budapest 1994 White was not tempted with the opportunity to jump with the knight onto d5 but preferred to continue pressing Black’s position avoiding swaps: 15.b3! \(\text{\textit{ac8}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{f3}}\) \(\text{\textit{b8}}\) 17.h3 h6 18.e3?! (White again intended to keep the ten-
sion of the position as long as possible and did not want to give the opponent any chances for the successive defence after 18...\texttt{xf6} \texttt{d5} 19.\texttt{xf5} 20.\texttt{xd5} 21.\texttt{c5\pm} 18...\texttt{dc8} 19.\texttt{h2} 20.\texttt{a8} 21.\texttt{b6} 22.\texttt{d3} 23.\texttt{d2} 24.\texttt{a4!\pm} Black suddenly appeared before the big problems while the attempt to get free with 24...d5? (after 24...\texttt{e8} 25.\texttt{a7} 26.\texttt{e3} 27.\texttt{b6} 28.\texttt{c7} the pressure upon Black's queenside would increase and his position would become more and more non-perspective) 25.\texttt{dxc4} 26.\texttt{xd7} 27.\texttt{xb8} 28.\texttt{bxc4+-} led him at once to the hopeless position.

14.\texttt{d2}

After 14.\texttt{e3} 15.\texttt{f3} 16.\texttt{f4} \texttt{c6} White performed the standard swap operation and obtained the better position in the game Freindzias – Kalesis, Peristeri 1992: 17.\texttt{d5!? exd5} 18.\texttt{xd5} 19.\texttt{xd5} 20.\texttt{e3} 21.\texttt{xe3} 22.\texttt{b6\pm}.

This position was seen in the game Topalov – Kramnik, Las Vegas (active m/4) 1999 although with one move later. (This way will be shown in Chapter 11, p. 120) Thanks to the secure control upon the square d5 White retained the advantage. He would be able to increase his winning chances in case he swaps the light-coloured bishops on that square.
Chapter 11

1.\(\text{\(d\)}\)f3 c5 2.c4 \(\text{\(c\)}\)6 3.d4 exd4 4.\(\text{\(d\)}\)xd4 \\
\(\text{\(f\)}\)6 5.g3 e6 6.\(\text{\(g\)}\)2 \(\text{\(c\)}\)5

In the previous variation it is shown how unpleasant White’s knight’s position on d4 is. That is why Black is trying to push it off that square before he develops his dark-coloured bishop.

7.\(\text{\(d\)}\)b3

At this moment there is no usual problems with the square for the Knight’s retreat. White’s knight shall retreat with a tempo.

Here Black has the choice: he can either retreat immediately – a) 7...\(\text{\(e\)}\)7 or put the check before – b) 7...\(\text{\(b\)}\)4+.

a) 7...\(\text{\(e\)}\)7

Black intends to compose the hedgehog-like pattern.

8.\(\text{\(c\)}\)3

Now Black can forget about d7-d5.

8...0-0 9.0-0 d6

The other opportunity for Black – is 9...b6. In that case White could transpose to the positions discussed in the variation b. It should be mentioned that there is no principal difference between the variations a and b in case the play develops in course of the line discussed below as the main one. The only little difference is that after 9...b6 with the bishop is on c1 White has the additional opportunity 10.\(\text{\(d\)}\)d5!? (in case of 10. \(\text{\(d\)}\)d4 after 10...\(\text{\(b\)}\)7 11.b3 \(\text{\(b\)}\)8 12.e4 \(\text{\(d\)}\)8 13.\(\text{\(b\)}\)2 a6 14.a4 \(\text{\(c\)}\)5 15.\(\text{\(e\)}\)e2 \(\text{\(e\)}\)7 16.\(\text{\(f\)}\)4 e5 17.\(\text{\(f\)}\)d5 \(\text{\(x\)}\)d5 18.exd5 \(\text{\(d\)}\)d4 19.\(\text{\(b\)}\)1 \(\text{\(d\)}\)62 in the game C. Hansen - B. Larsen, Odense 1988 Black obtained the counter play). After 10...exd5 11.cxd5 \(\text{\(b\)}\)7 12.d6 \(\text{\(e\)}\)8 13.dxe7 \(\text{\(x\)}\)xe7 14.\(\text{\(e\)}\)e1 \(\text{\(e\)}\)e4 15. \(\text{\(e\)}\)3 d5 16.\(\text{\(d\)}\)d4 \(\text{\(e\)}\)5 17.\(\text{\(f\)}\)3 \(\text{\(c\)}\)4 18.\(\text{\(d\)}\)d4+ in the game Gheorghiu - Taimanov, Wijk aan Zee 1981 White obtained a little advantage thanks to his two bishops and the opponent’s isolated
pawn.

Sometimes 9...a6 is played. In that case the position after 10.\textit{f}4 (The delay with d7-d6 permits White additionally to struggle for the advantage either with 10.c5 d5 11.cxd5 \textit{xd}6 12.\textit{g}5\texttt{±}) 10...d6 (it should be mentioned that the pawn sacrifice – 10...b5?! 11.cxb5 axb5 12.\textit{xb}5 d5 13.\textit{d}4\texttt{±} – is not correct while after 11...b6 White in the game Overeeem – Duijker, Haarlem 1998 applied the standard blow – 11.\textit{d}5?! exd5 12.\textit{xd}5 \textit{xe}8 13.dxc6 dxc6 14.\textit{d}4 \textit{d}7 15.\textit{c}2 \textit{c}8 16.\textit{f}5 \textit{xf}5 17.\textit{xf}5 g6 18.\textit{d}3\texttt{±} and obtained the superiority thanks to his two bishops) 11.\textit{c}1 can be found in the text of the main variation.

10.\textit{f}4!

As in the variation \textit{b} of Chapter 10 White again prepares to attack the pawn d6.

10...\textit{h}5

Certainly Black wants to cope with White’s dark-coloured bishop immediately.

However it is worth to mention the other Black’s opportuni-
ties. First of all, bad is 10...\textit{a}5?! in view of 11.\textit{x}a5 \textit{xa}5 12.\textit{xd}6 \textit{d}8 13.\textit{xe}7 \textit{xd}1 14.\textit{x}d1\texttt{±} (pointed by A. Karpov) and White has not only the sufficient compensation for the queen as the rook, bishop and pawn but also the great positional advantage. It is difficult for Black to prevent the invasion of the opponent’s pieces via the d-file.

The idea to transfer the knight f6 onto e5 to cover the pawn d6 from the bishop f4 was frequently seen in practice as well as the main text move. Its drawback is that it costs too much time while the position of the knight e5 would be not sufficiently secure. After 10...\textit{g}4 11.\textit{c}1 (White need not go for the sharper plan connected with the pawns advance at the kingside: 12.e4 \textit{ge}5 13.\textit{e}2\texttt{∞} although this plan was also used in practice) 11...\textit{ge}5 12.\textit{b}5 (White exploits that the move a7-a6 has not been done yet; the other opportunity pointed by Adorjan – 12.\textit{d}4 – could lead to the big complications after 12...\textit{xc}4 13.\textit{xc}6 e5 14.\textit{d}5) 12...a6 13.\textit{d}5d4 \textit{xd}4 14.\textit{xd}4 \textit{c}6 15.\textit{d}3 e5 16.\textit{e}3 \textit{e}6 17.\textit{fd}1 \textit{c}8 in the game Adorjan – Mokry, Prague 1985 the simplest way for White was to reveal his little advantage with 18.\textit{d}2! with the idea to transfer the knight to c3 by the way \textit{e}4-c3, while 18...f5 could be well met with 19.\textit{d}5\texttt{±}. 

113
White swaps the light-coloured bishops to stress more the weakness of the square d5.

In case of the preventive 10...a6 White could also continue the centralization of his pieces with 11.\(\mathbb{c}c1\) similar to the variation shown in the previous passage. After 11...\(\mathbb{d}h5\) (11...\(\mathbb{a}e5\) can hardly be called the proper solution of the problems since after 12.\(\mathbb{d}xe5\) \(\text{dxe5}\) 13.\(c5\) \(\mathbb{c}c7\) 14.\(\mathbb{d}a4\) \(\mathbb{d}d8\) 15.\(\mathbb{e}e1\) \(\mathbb{d}d7\) 16.\(\mathbb{b}b6\) \(\mathbb{a}b8\) 17.\(\mathbb{a}xd7\) \(\text{axd7}\) 18.\(c6\)± in the game Zhang Zhong – Wang Wen-hao, Beijing 1995 Black’s defence of queenside went down; in case 11...\(\mathbb{g}g4\) 12.\(\mathbb{d}a4\) \(\mathbb{b}b8\) 13.\(h3\) Black’s position is under the threat of the break \(c4-c5\) while the attempt to involve some complications with 13...\(b5\) did not bring Black any relief after 14.\(\mathbb{c}xb5\) \(\text{axb5}\) 15.\(\mathbb{a}xc6\) \(\text{bxa4}\) 16.\(\mathbb{a}xd6\) \(\text{axd6}\) 17.\(\mathbb{a}xd6\) e5 18.\(\mathbb{a}xb8\) \(\text{exf4}\) 19.\(\mathbb{c}c5\)± in the game E. Vladimirov – Kunte, Kielmarck 2000. A bit better for Black was 12...\(h6\) but this will be discussed a little below) 12.\(\mathbb{e}e3\) \(\mathbb{f}f6\) (in case of 12...\(f5\) as was in the game Nogueiras – Nguyen Anh Dung, Novi Sad 1990, the simplest would be 13.\(\mathbb{a}a4!\) and 13...\(f4\) could be met with 14.\(\mathbb{b}b6\) \(\mathbb{d}d7\) 15.e3± or 14...\(\mathbb{e}e8\) 15.\(\mathbb{c}c7\)±) 13.\(\mathbb{a}a4!\) White is ready for the massive pieces’ attack of Black’s queenside. In the game P. Nikolic – Gostonis, Rogatska Slatina 1991 there followed 13...\(\mathbb{d}d7\) 14.\(\mathbb{d}d2\) \(\mathbb{a}b8\) 15.\(\mathbb{f}fd1\) \(\mathbb{c}c7\) 16.\(\mathbb{f}f4\) \(\mathbb{d}de5\) 17.\(c5!\) (here when Black’s pieces were crowded on the diagonal b8-h2 this move was especially strong) 17...\(d5\) 18.e4 \(\text{dxe4}\) 19.\(\mathbb{a}xe4\) \(\mathbb{d}d8\) 20.\(\mathbb{e}e2\)± with the evident advantage for White.

Sometimes Black involves 10...\(h6\). He takes into consideration that sooner or later he will have to play e6-e5 and in advance he deprives White of the opportunity to change the dark-coloured bishop for the knight \(f6\) that would have to play the important part in the protection of the square \(d5\). However such an idea is very obligatory as far as the matter of positional play is concerned. After 11.\(\mathbb{c}c1\) e5 (Black should make this move sooner or later because of the pressure on the pawn \(d6\). Here are just the two examples: 11...\(\mathbb{e}e8\) 12.\(\mathbb{c}c2\) e5 13.\(\mathbb{d}d2\) a5 14.\(\mathbb{b}b5\) a4 15.\(\mathbb{a}a1\) \(\mathbb{g}g4\) 16.\(\mathbb{f}f6\)± Gschmitzer – Christiansen, Germany 1991 and 11...\(a6\) 12.\(\mathbb{c}c2\) e5 13.\(\mathbb{d}d2\) \(\mathbb{g}g4\) 14.\(\mathbb{e}e3\) \(\mathbb{c}c8\) 15.\(\mathbb{d}d2\) \(\mathbb{d}d7\) 16.\(\mathbb{f}fd1\) \(\mathbb{h}h3\) 17.\(\mathbb{h}h1\)± Biljanic – Bojovic, Tivat 1995) 12.\(\mathbb{d}d2\) \(\mathbb{e}e6\) 13.\(\mathbb{d}d5\) \(\mathbb{c}c8\) in the game Gavrikov – Zaichik, Tbilisi 1983 White should have played 14.\(\mathbb{c}c3\)± taking into consideration that with his last move Black had prepared the square b8 for the retreat of his knight in case of the swap on \(d5\). Then after the capture on \(d5\) White would not have to capture with the pawn. However he was careless like in the examples shown in the varia-
tion b of Chapter 10 (the notes for White's move 12 and Black's move 13) and after 14.h3?! a7.d7 15.h2 a5.c5 16.cxd5 b8 17.

\[ \text{a}1 \text{c}3 \] (in case of 17.a3 White should take into consideration 17...a4? 17...e8 18.d2 a6 19.e4 c5 20.b3 h5 21.e2 h4? Black succeeded to obtain the counter play.

11.e3!?

There is nothing special also against 11.a4. After 11...f6 (in case 11...d7 12.c1 b8 13.c2 a6 14.f1 d8 15.a4 c7 16.f4± in the game Pekarek – K. Schulz, Berlin 1988 White with the ordinary means attached Black to the defence of the pawn d6 and after 11...e5?! 12.c5 d5 13.d4 c6 14.e4 xdx4 15.xd4 dxe4 16.xe4 f6 17.

\[ \text{xf}4 \text{d5} 18.xdx5 exd5 19.ad1 \text{a}6 20.d3± in the game Mikhailchisin – Kasparov, Baku 1980 White's pawn structure was better) 12.c1 g4 (in case of 12...d7?! Black should take into consideration 13.f4! since he has not made the preventive move h7-h6 and it is not advisable for him to play e6-e5. How-

ever he is not able to refrain from this move long and after 13...b8 14.c5! e5 15.g5 e6 16.
xf6 gxf6 17.e3 dxc5 18.e4 c4 19.b5 c8 20.h5→ in the game Illescas – Franco Ocampo, Spain 1999 White obtained the strong attacking position) 12.

g4 13.d2 (quite a complicated position arose after 13.f4 g5 14.d2 ge5 15.b5 g6∞ in the game Adorjan – Hulak, Toluca 1982) 13...ge5 (Black intends to hit White's pawn c4 since after 13...d7 14.e4?! ge5 15.e2 a5 16.e3 a4 17.d2 b4 18.db1 c8 19.a3 a5 22.f4 ed3 23.cd1± in the game Gheorghiu – Hulak, Indonesia 1982 he committed the big troubles with defending of the pawn d6) 14.b5 a6 15.d4 d7 16.f4 (after 16.c3 c8 17.
x6 in the game Chekhov – Hulak, Banja Luka 1983 Black could have solved all of his problems with 17...xc6!= since the jump of White's knight onto a5 would not work because White's pawn c4 was not defended enough) 16.g6 17.e3 c8 18.f4 e8 19.xd2± in the game L. Hansen – Meyer, Gistrup 1990 White retained the better play thanks to his spatial advantage.

11...xf4

After 11...f6 White would intend to improve his position with 12.e4±, and in case 11...g6 – with 12.h6 xe8 14.e4±.

12.xf4 d7

115
After 12...\(\mathcal{D}a5\) in the game Pelletier – Larsen, Zurich 1998 White could have retained the advantage with 13.\(\mathcal{D}d2!\)\(\pm\) avoiding the knights swap. In case of 12...a6 possible is 3.\(\mathcal{E}c1 \mathcal{B}b8\) 14.\(\mathcal{G}e2 \mathcal{G}b6\) 15.\(\mathcal{A}fd1\) (15.\(\mathcal{D}d5\) exd5 16.cxd5 would not bring White any particular advantage in view of 16...\(\mathcal{D}b4\) 17.\(\mathcal{D}xe7\) \(\mathcal{D}xa2\) 18.\(\mathcal{G}c7\) \(\mathcal{G}xb3\) 19.\(\mathcal{G}xb8\) \(\mathcal{D}xc1\) 20.\(\mathcal{D}xc1\) \(\mathcal{D}f5\) 21.\(\mathcal{D}xd6\) \(\mathcal{D}xb2\); there would no complete clarity either after 15.c5 dxc5 16.\(\mathcal{D}a4\) \(\mathcal{B}b5\) 17.\(\mathcal{D}xb5\) axb5 18.\(\mathcal{D}xc5\) \(\mathcal{A}a8\) 15...\(\mathcal{D}e8\) as was in the game Nikolic – Feletar, Neum 1999, and here White could have broken forward – with 16.c5! dxc5 17.\(\mathcal{D}a4\)\(\pm\) and obtained the advantage.

13.\(\mathcal{D}d2\) \(\mathcal{B}b8\)

After 13...\(\mathcal{B}b6\) 14.\(\mathcal{A}d1\) (in case 14.c5 dxc5 15.\(\mathcal{B}xd7\) \(\mathcal{D}fd8\) 16.\(\mathcal{D}xc6\) \(\mathcal{B}xd7\) 17.\(\mathcal{B}xd7\) c4 18.\(\mathcal{D}c1\) \(\mathcal{B}xb2\) 19.\(\mathcal{D}1e2\) White would have the certain material advantage but his pieces would be badly cooperated and Black would have the fair counter chances) 14...\(\mathcal{A}d8\) 15.\(\mathcal{D}fe1\)\(\pm\) White pieces exert the certain pressure in centre.

14.\(\mathcal{D}fe1!\)

White has created the threat of the break f4-f5 exploiting the insufficient protection of the bishop e7 that, in its turn, should defend the pawn d6.

14...\(g6\)

Other moves would be met inevitably with f4-f5. For instance, after 14...\(\mathcal{D}d8\) strong is 15.f5! \(\mathcal{D}f8\) (15...exf5?? loses after 16.\(\mathcal{A}xc6\)\(+\)) 16.fxe6 fxe6 17.f4\(\pm\).

15.\(h4\)

Now the h-pawn is involved into the attack on Black’s king. After 15.\(\mathcal{A}ad1\) \(\mathcal{D}d8\) 16.\(\mathcal{D}e4\) \(\mathcal{D}e8\) 17.\(\mathcal{C}c3\) b5?! Black would obtain a counter play.

15...\(a6\)

It is dangerous for Black to weaken his king’s position with 15...h5 in view of the variation pointed by A. Karpov: 16.\(\mathcal{A}ad1\) \(\mathcal{D}d8\) 17.f5! gxf5 18.\(\mathcal{G}h6\)\(\pm\).

16.\(h5\)

16.\(\mathcal{D}d5\) would bring White nothing in view of 16...exd5 17.cxd5 \(\mathcal{D}f6\)\(=\) with the approximate equality.

This sharp position was reached in the game Karpov – Topalov, Linares 1994. In view of White’s growing initiative at the kingside Black undertook the counter blow at the other part of the board with 16...b5?! (after the relatively best for Black 16...\(\mathcal{A}a7\)
17.\(h6\) \(b5\) White could keep the tension with 18.\(\mathcal{D}d4\)\(\pm\) while 16...\(\mathcal{A}d8\) could be met with 17.\(\mathcal{A}ad1\)\(\uparrow\) with White’s initiative in
centre and at the kingside). That resulted in the following: 17.hxg6 hxg6 18.\(\text{c}c5\) dxc5 (18...\(\text{e}e8\) could be met with 19.\(\text{x}a6!\) \(\text{x}a6\) 20.\(\text{cxb}5\) \(\text{b}6\) 21.\(\text{bxc}6\)\(\pm\), while 18...\(\text{c}8\) would be well replied with 19.\(\text{x}d7\) \(\text{x}d7\) 20.\(\text{cxb}5\) \(\text{axb}5\) 21.\(\text{x}b5\) d5 22.\(\text{ec}1\)\(\pm\) and White has the extra pawn in both cases) 18...\(\text{dxc}5\) 19.\(\text{c}d7\) \(\text{c}8\) 20.\(\text{x}e6\)! (also possible is the more prosy 20.\(\text{x}c6\) \(\text{a}7\) 21.\(\text{c}d3\) \(\text{xc}6\) 22.\(\text{cxb}5\) \(\text{axb}5\) 23.\(\text{c}b5\) \(\text{c}4\) 24.\(\text{d}a7\) \(\text{x}d3\) 25.\(\text{d}c6\) \(\text{d}d6\) 26.\(\text{x}e7\)\(\pm\) \(\text{xe}7\) 27.\(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{b}4\) 28.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{a}5\) 29.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{xa}2\) 30.\(\text{exd}3\)\(\pm\) and White's two rooks are stronger than Black's queen) 20...\(\text{a}7\) (taking up the rook sacrifice 20...\(\text{fxe}6\) 21.\(\text{x}c6\) \(\text{a}7\) 22.\(\text{xe}6\)\(\pm\) \(\text{g}7\) 23.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{f}6\) 24.\(\text{g}4\)\(\pm\) would lead to the position where the king could not escape from the cooperated action of White's pieces) 21.\(\text{x}g6\)\(\pm\) \(\text{fxg}6\) (after 21...\(\text{f}8\) 22.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{fxg}6\) 23.\(\text{h}8\)\(\pm\) \(\text{f}7\) 24.\(\text{d}5\)# White mates, not better for Black either is 21...\(\text{h}7\) 22.\(\text{h}3\)\(\pm\) \(\text{g}6\) 23.\(\text{e}4\)\(\pm\) \(\text{f}5\) 24.\(\text{x}5\)\(\pm\) \(\text{g}7\) 25.\(\text{h}7\)\(\pm\) \(\text{f}8\) 26.\(\text{h}6\)\(\pm\) \(\text{e}8\) 27.\(\text{xc}6\)\(\pm\) 22.\(\text{e}6\)\(\pm\) \(\text{g}7\) 23.\(\text{xc}6\)\(\rightarrow\) and White obtained the two pawns for the exchange and the strong attack upon Black's king.

b) 7...\(\text{b}4\)+

Black intends either to spoil White's pawn structure in case he covers with the knight on c3 or at least to entice White's bishop onto d2.

8.\(\text{d}2\)!

We shall not consider in detail the labyrinth of variations after 8.\(\text{c}3\). We just like to mention that in comparison with the variation from Chapter 12 considered below Black would have much more chances to equalize after 8...d5 9.0-0 (sometimes White seeks his chances for the advantage with the gambit line 9.cxd5 \(\text{xd}5\) 10.0-\(\infty\)). The point is that in contrast to variation from Chapter 12, the move 9...dxc4 has become possible since Black succeeded to push White's knight off d4, and after 10.\(\text{d}2\) 0-0 11.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{e}7\) 12.\(\text{e}3\) (after 12.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}8\) 13.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{d}4\) 14.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{e}5\) 15.\(\text{c}6\) \(\text{c}6\) 16.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{bx}6\) 17.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 18.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 19.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{h}6\) in the game Huebner – Timman, Rio de Janeiro 1979 Black obtained even the slightly better play) 12...\(\text{d}8\) 13.\(\text{b}3\) (after 13.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 14.\(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{e}8\) 15.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{xe}4\) 16.\(\text{exe}4\) \(\text{h}6\) 17.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{c}5\) 18.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{xc}5\)\(=\) White also obtained nothing in the game Mortensen – E. Pedersen, Odense 1980) 13...\(\text{d}5\) 14.\(\text{fd}1\) (after 14.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}4\) 15.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{exd}5\) 16.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{xb}4\) 17.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{e}2\)+
Chapter 11

18.\(\text{h}1\) dxc4 19.\(\text{ha}e1\) \(\text{e}8\) 20.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{f}5\) in the game Stean – Sosonko, Amsterdam 1978 White was compelled to struggle for the equality) 14...\(\text{d}xe3\) 15.\(\text{xd}8+\) \(\text{xd}8\) 16.\(\text{d}xe3\) \(\text{xc}3\) 17.\(\text{xc}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 18.\(\text{cd}1\) \(\text{c}6\) 19.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{d}xg2\) 20.\(\text{d}xg2\) \(\text{c}6=\) in the game Timman – Polugaevsky, Breda (m/5) 1979 the chances of the parts became completely equal.

8...\(\text{e}7\)

In addition to the bishop's retreat (caused by Black's intention to construct the "hedgehog-like" position) other attempts to equalize were seen. But not all of them can be called successful. For instance, after 8...a5 9.0-0 \(\text{b}6\) 10.\(\text{d}c3\) a4 11.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{d}8\) 12.\(\text{d}d4\) \(\text{xc}3\) 13.\(\text{xc}3\) 6 bxc6 (perhaps a bit better was 13...dxc6 14.\(\text{xd}8+\) \(\text{xd}8\) 15.bxc3\(\pm\), but in that case White's initiative on the dark squares would much overbalance the pawn weakness of his queenside, especially taking into consideration that it would be hardly vulnerable from Black's part) 14.bxc3 0-0 15.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{e}8\) 16.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{a}5\) 17.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{h}8\) 18.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{g}8\) 19.\(\text{d}4\) in the game Burwick – Persson, Sweden 1994 White almost completely blocked the opponent's position on the dark squares. The other way to retain the bishop on be with 8...\(\text{e}7\) after 9.0-0 0-0 (in case 9...\(\text{b}6\)?)! 10.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{b}7\) 11.\(\text{b}5\) d5 12.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{d}5\) 13.e4 \(\text{f}6\) 14.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{xb}4\) 15.\(\text{d}6+\) \(\text{f}8\) 16.\(\text{b}7\) \(\text{xb}7\) 17.e5\(\pm\) in the game M. Makarov – Barten, Moscow 1991 Black got more problems) 10.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{xb}4\) 11.c5! a5 12.a3 \(\text{g}4\) 13.\(\text{c}3\) a4 14.d2 \(\text{d}4\) 15.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{xc}5\) 16.\(\text{xa}4\) \(\text{b}5\) 17.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{a}6\) was seen in the game Harestad – Tiller, Norway 1980 and at that moment in case 18.\(\text{b}3\)\(\pm\) Black would have had to solve the problem of his queenside's pieces development.

After 8...\(\text{xd}2+\) 9.\(\text{d}1\) d5 10.0-0 0-0 (the swap 10...dxc4 11.\(\text{xc}4\)\(\pm\) just improves White's pieces activity) 11.\(\text{c}5\) exd5 (if 11...\(\text{xd}5\), then 12.\(\text{c}4\)\(\pm\)) 12.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{f}5\) 13.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{d}4\) 14.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{e}4\) in the game Losso – Banegas Gomez, Argentina 1992 White should have to decline from the swap of the light-coloured Bishops with 15.\(\text{h}3\)\(\pm\) to retain the advantage thanks to the isolated Black's pawn d5.

Black could not also solve his problems with 8...d5. In that case after 9.cxd5 \(\text{xd}5\) (after 9...exd5 10.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{xb}4\) 11.0-0 0-0 12.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{f}5\) 13.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{e}4\) 14.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{b}6\) 15.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{d}8\) 16.a3 \(\text{c}6\) 17.\(\text{xc}6\) bxc6 18.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{b}5\) 19.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{a}6\) 20.b4\(\pm\) in the game Maherram-
3. d4 cxd4 4. cxd4 e5 5. e3 f6 6. e2 c5 7. b3

zade - Pavlenko, Baku 1998 Black's isolated couple of the pawns c6+d5 needed constant defending that determined White's advantage) 10.0-0 d6 (in the game Tukmakov - Meetei, New Delhi 1986 White proceeded into the ending after 10...0-0 11. cxb4 dxb4 12. e6 c6 xb8 12. a5 c3 e5 14. c5 b8 15. c1 ad1 d4 16. e3 de6 17. c8 d8+ cxd8 18. d1 cbc6 19. c7 d7 a5 d7 20. a5 c6 11. c3 e5 12. c1! (weaker is 12. c5 exd5 13. c3 c4 x3 14. bxc3 e6 since the pawn weaknesses of the both parts would compensate for each other. After 15. c5 0-0 16. c4 dxc4 17. e6 fxe6 18. xex6 bxc6 19. xex6 d6 20. c1 ab8= in the game Eliskases - Reinhardt, Mar del Plata 1956 the play went on in frames of equality) 12... c3 c3 c3 13. c3 c3 White keeps the superiority thanks to his advantage in development.

The game Luetzen - Neiss, Passau 1999 saw 8...0-0 9.0-0 d5 that was not of particular importance since White with 10. cxd5 could have transposed to the variations discussed just above.

9. c3 0-0 10. 0-0 b6

In the variation a considered above Black was constantly suffering the proper development of his light-coloured bishop. Here he is going to solve that problem with the simplest way. While Black's pawn is still on d7 he intends either to attack the pawn c4 (this idea is promoted with the position of the knight b3) or to develop the light-coloured bishop onto the diagonal a8-h1 and then to advance the d-pawn using that the knight c6 would be protected with the bishop.

After 10...d6 White can transpose with 11. f4 to variation a considered above but he also play 11. c1 because the square c1 is vacant.

11. f4

The bishop's development onto f4 was the main element in variation b and from variation of Chapter 10. Here it is also appropriate. With the bishop on d2, not on c1 as was in variation a White gets nothing in case 11. d5 exd5 12. cxd5 b7 13. dxc6 dxc6=, while after 11. d4 Black would satisfy with the position after 11... b7=.

11... a6

It is dangerous for Black to make the hedgehog–like construction with White's Bishop on f4. After 11... b7 12. d2 d6 in the game G. Agzamov – Romanishin, Yerevan 1982* White compelled Black to play e6-e5 with
13. \( \texttt{fxd1 \texttt{c8e8}} \) 14. \( \texttt{ac1 \texttt{c8}} \) 15. \( \texttt{b5} \) and after 15...\( e5 \) 16. \( \texttt{g5f6} \)
17. \( \texttt{e3d8c3 \texttt{xg2}} \) 19. \( \texttt{xg2d6e6} \) 20. \( \texttt{d5+} \) he exploited the weakness of the square 5 (means that the moves numeration here was changed because White’s bishop moved onto f4 from c1 directly passing by the square d2).

12. \( \texttt{b5d5?!} \)

Black bravely goes for the sacrifice of the exchange while in case of other variations White’s advantage would be sounder. For instance in case 12...\( e5 \) 13. \( \texttt{g5c8} \) 14. \( \texttt{c1e8} \) 15. \( \texttt{e3} \) the weakness of d5 would not decrate Black’s position while Black’s attempt to change matters with 15...\( \texttt{xb5} \) in the game Straat – De Bruijn, Haarlem 1987* soon led Black to the material loss after 16.\( \texttt{cxb5 b8} \) 17.\( \texttt{d5} \) d6 18.\( \texttt{h3d7} \) 19.\( \texttt{b7} \).

After 12...\( \texttt{c8} \) 13.\( \texttt{d6xd6} \) 14.\( \texttt{xd6} \) 15.\( \texttt{d6c7} \) 16.\( \texttt{c1} \) White was to play 16...\( e5 \) that was exploited by White in the typical way with 17.\( \texttt{g5e8} \) 18.\( \texttt{xe7xe7} \) 19.\( \texttt{c5d6} \) 20.\( \texttt{xd6c8} \) 21.\( \texttt{cxb6xc1} \) 22.\( \texttt{xc1} \) \( \texttt{f5} \) 23.\( \texttt{d2} \) \( \texttt{a6} \) 24.\( \texttt{h3} \) \( \texttt{+} \) in the game Smejkal – Ljubojevic, Wijk aan Zee 1976*).

13. \( \texttt{c7xc4} \) 14. \( \texttt{xa8} \)

White must take the exchange if he decides to struggle for the advantage. After 14. \( \texttt{d2c8} \) 15. \( \texttt{xc4g5} \) ! 16. \( \texttt{e5g5} \) \( \texttt{xc7} \) 17. \( \texttt{d2e5} \) 18. \( \texttt{xf6xf6} \) 19. \( \texttt{b1f8} \) \( \texttt{d8} \) Black has no problem and the draw was agreed here in the game Van Wely – Hracek, Batumi 1999*.

14. \( \texttt{xa8} \)

White has the rook for a
3.d4 cxd4 4.â xd4 5.â f6 5.g3 e6 6.â g2 7.â c5

knight and a pawn. Formally this is not a big material advantage. However the board is partitioned off with the long pawn chains and it is not easy for White’s rook to reveal an activity. Besides, Black’s minor pieces are slightly more active and his pawns are ready to start an advance. All that betokens an interesting chess conflict.

15.â c1

After 15.â d2 8 a6 16.â f3 8 e4 17.â c1 8 f6 White could temporarily prevent the advance of Black’s central pawns but another problem would arise in that case: how to activate his pieces with Black’s bishops constraining White’s position all over. In case 15.â e1 e5 16.â g5 8 d8!? (the advance of Black’s pawns in centre is not the only and main goal: after 16...e4 17.â c1 h6 18.â f4± in the game Smejkal – Hracek, Ceska Trebova 1996 White could save his bishop from the swap because of the too straightforward advance of Black’s e-pawn) 17.Rc1 the game could come to the position considered below with a little transposition of moves.

15...e5

Black has no real reason to delay with the advance of his central pawns. After 15...a5?! 16.â d4 8 xd4 17.â xc4 8 f5 18.â c1 8 c5 19.â d3 8 e4 20.e3 8 c6 21.â e5 8 b7 22.â b5 8 ed6 23.â d3 8 e7 in the game Rashkovsky – Savon, Lvov 1981 White disclosed the position in centre and obtained a big advantage with 24.e4 dxe4 25.â xe4 8 xe4 26.â xe4±.

The prophylactic 15...h6 more corresponds to the spirit of this position. However in this case after 16.â d4 8 xd4 17.â xc4 8 c6 18.â c1 8 d8 in the game Vorisek – Orsag, Czech Republic 1998* White could have obtained the advantage easily with 19.a3!? (with the idea not to admit Black’s bishop onto c5) 19...e5 (bad is 19...a5? in view of 20.â c7+! 20.â e3 8 b7 21.8 c2 with the following 8 f1-d1.

16.â g5 8 d8

Black’s pawn d5 demands a reliable defence.

17.â e1

Possible is 17.â d2 8 a6 (bad is 17...â xa2? in view of 18.â a4 8 b4 19.â c7+–) 18.â a4 8 b7 and here White could transpose with 19.â fe1 to the position considered below. In case of other possibilities than 19.â fe1 it easier for Black to obtain a counterplay. For instance, after 19.â b3 h6 20.â e3 strong would be 20...â b4! with the following 21...â c6=, while 19.e3 could be met with 19...h6 20.â xf6 8 xf6 21.â c2 e4 and Black is threatening with the manoeuvre 8 e5-d3 that will add White no pleasure.

17...h6 18.â xf6

White would not like to swap the bishop but it is not evident how to use it. After 18.â d2 a5 or 18.â e3 8 b7 Black has a suffi-
sufficient compensation for a little material loss.

18...xf6

This position was reached in the game Korchnoi – Ftacnik, Ceska Trebova (active) 1997*.

After 19.c2 the simplest way for Black to get an excellent play was 19...g5!? 20.cd1 (20.e3 would be met with 20...e4! with the following 21.e5) 20...a5 and White would be
some more constrained at the queenside. However 19.d2!? deserves attention here and after 19...a6 (19...xa2?? is still bad in view of 20.a4++, while 19...b5 can be met with 20.b4± and Black’s bishop would be compelled to retreat onto a6, since a2-a4 is threatening with the following b4-b5 winning a piece) 20.a4 b7 21.b4 a6 (after Black’s bishop has left the diagonal a6-f1, 21...d4 is not dangerous in view of 22.e3 22.b5 axb5 (if 22...d4, then 23.bxa6 xa6 24.f1±) 23xb5 xa2 24.xb6 the pawns’ swaps at the queenside on the one hand simplify the position but on the other hand they lead to opening of new files so necessary for White having the extra exchange.
Chapter 12

1.\(\text{\&}f3\) \(c5\) 2.\(c4\) \(\text{\&}c6\) 3.\(d4\) \(\text{exd}4\) 4.\(\text{\&}xd4\) 
\(\text{\&}f6\) 5.\(g3\) \(e6\) 6.\(\text{\&}g2\) \(\text{\&}b4+\)

With this check Black intends to bring the disharmony in White’s pieces cooperation in comparison with variation b of Chapter 11.

7.\(\text{\&}c3\)?

White covers from the check with his knight not fearing doubling of his pawns on the c-file. This position differs from the similar one in the variation b of Chapter 11 with White’s knight placed on d4 not on b3. This fact produces the essential correction in the treatment of the diagrammed position. Before going further let’s have a look what would not suit White in case of the natural move 7.\(\text{\&}d2\) similar to the variation b of Chapter 11. The point is that after 7.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}e7\)

White’s knight appears under attack and the standard question would arise: What is to be done with the knight d4? To swap on c6 is not desirable. In that case Black would capture with the d-pawn, play e6-e5 and everything would be fine for him. To move to b5 is senseless since with the bishop on d2 the knight could not reach the square d6. In case of the retreat onto c2 followed by mutual castling Black would play d7-d5 with a great pleasure. In that case his queen appears where it should be on contrary to the variation from Chapter 9, while Black would have no big problems with the pawn d5. To complete the picture let us mention the move 8.\(\text{\&}b3?!\) after which Black in the game Truskavetsky – Fedorchuk, Sevastopol 2000 obtained the better play with 8...\(b6\) 9.0-0 \(\text{\&}a6\) since he had an extra tempo in comparison with the variation b of Chapter 11 considered above. To speak plainer after 7.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}e7\) White has to defend the knight and this should rather be done reliably

123
with \(8.\text{c3} (8.\text{f4} \text{ was seen in the game Topalov} - \text{Kramnik, Las Vegas (active m/4) 1999 that transposed to the variation } b \text{ of Chapter 10 after Black's castle, however Black had the opportunity to cause the favourable complications with } 8...\text{a5}!?) 9.\text{c3 e5 10.b3 wb4 11.g5 xc4 12.ac1 g4}) \). Apparently White is good at all but in that case the bishop c3 hinders the normal development of the knight b1. There can follow \(8...0-0 9.0-0 \text{ d5 (the absence of the knight on c3 is sound) 10.exd5 (after 10.d2 } \text{ b6 11.cxd5 in the game Beliaovsky – Gelfand, Belgrade 1997 Black did not fall for the provocation and preferred 11...\text{xd5! instead of capturing on d4. There followed further 12.f5 xc3 13.xe7+ xe7 14.bxc3 d8= and Black solved all his problems.) 10...\text{xd5 11.xc6 bxc6 12.d4 (after 12.a4 b6 13. d4 c5 14.e5 f6 15.ac3 a6 16.c2 b8 17.d1 b7= in the game Eingorn – Dorfman, Moscow 1985 Black had no troubles because White was certainly back in development of the queenside) 12...a6? (after 12...a5 13.c3 d8 14.c1 a6 15.d1 ac8 16.c2 f8 17.a3 c5 18.e5 xc3 19.xc3 b5= 20. f3 b7 21.xb7 wb7= in the game Korchnoi – Kramnik, Las Vegas (m/1) 1999 Black's little initiative was sufficient for him to get the equality) 13.e1 (it is not so easy for White to keep his slightly better pawn structure without any changes since 13. xc3 could be met with 13...xc3 14.xc3 xd1 15.xd1 xe2 16.ad7 ce5 17.xc6 ad8= and in spite of White's pawn superiority at the queenside Black would have no problem since his light-coloured bishop will not permit White to introduce his rook a1 in the active play) 13...a5 14.d2 (here after 14.c3 b4= Black would completely equalized because of the bad position of the rook a1) 14...c5 15.e4 b4 16.ac3 b6 17.b4 g4 18.ed1 ad8= as was in the game Sakhatova – Suba, London 1990. In this position Black's chances are in no way worse since the isolated c-pawn by no means could be called a weakness.

Here, after White covered from the check with the knight, Black has the three main opportunities to continue the game: a) 7...d5, b) 7...a5 and c) 7...0-0. The attack of the pawn c4 with 7...e5?! is far from being so good since after 8.a3 e7 (in case of 8...a5?! 9.0-0 Black did not decide to swap on c3 since in that case the play would transpose to the profitable for White kind of the line b, but preferred 9.c5 that resulted into the excellent position for White after 10.cb5 0-0 11.f4 d6 12.xd6! xb6 13.b5 c5 14.xe5 xe5 15.xb4 xe2 16.fe1 h5 17.ad1 d7 in the game Risto-
vic – Trifunovic, Pozarevac 1995. Here White could have obtain a
win with 18.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}b7}\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}b8}\) 19.
\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}a7+} - \) 9.0-0 0-0 10.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}d1}\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}c7}\)
11.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}4\) d6 12.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}b5\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{b}}}8\) 13.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{b}}}4\)
a5 14.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{b}}}3\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}7\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}}c1\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}6\)
16.e4 \(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}8\) 17.h3 b6 18.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}4\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{g}}}6\)
19.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}}3\) in the game Bischoff – Zeller, Germany 1996 White ob-
tain a big advantage thanks to his strong pressure upon the
pawn d6.

The variation 7...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}c3+} 8.
\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}c3\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}}5\) does not have any prac-
tical significance since White transposes to the variation b con-
sidered below. After 7...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{b}}}6\)
White transposes to one of the
branches of the variation a of
Chapter 10 that has been dis-
cussed above.

a) 7...d5
Black exploits the pin of
White’s knight c3 and imme-
diately accomplishes the important
pawn advance. The similar op-
portunity in variation b of Chap-
ter 11 with White’s knight on b3,
not on d4 was the best decision
for Black. Now the matters are a
bit different.

8.0-0
With the knight on b3 instead
of d4 as was in variation b of
Chapter 11 White had often to
struggle for the advantage swap-
ning on d5 before castling. But
now White need not go this way
thanks to his knight being on d4.

8...0-0
Nothing in principle would be
changed with the preliminary
swap 8...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}c3\) 9.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}c3\). Among the
original opportunities 9...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}4\)
should be mentioned (in case
9...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}}5\) 10.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}d5\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}5\) in the
game Venetteanu – Podgursky,
Bucharest 1998 Black could have
run into troubles after 11.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}3!\)
0-0 12.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{a}}}3\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}}8\) 13.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}d1\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}7\)
14.c4 \(\text{\textit{\textsc{f}}}6\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{b}}}3\) while in case
9...0-0 10.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}d5\) the game would
transpose to the one considered
below) 10.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}d4! ?\) and here –
10...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}d4\) (as it was mentioned,
after 10...0-0 11.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}d5\) the position
from the main line would arise).
In that case White wins back the
sacrificed pawn with 11.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}8+\)
\(\text{\textit{\textsc{x}}}d8\) 12.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}1\) \(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}}8\) 13.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{d}}}4\) and,
in spite of some simplifications,
retains the initiative thanks to
his two bishops and bad position
of Black’s non-castled king.

9.\(\text{\textit{\textsc{c}}}d5\)
Here, after both kings have
castled, this swap gains in
strength.

9...\(\text{\textit{\textsc{e}}}d5\)
Black at once agrees with the
formation of the isolated pawn
in his camp. Instead, he immedi-

125
Chapter 12

ately opens the diagonal c8-h3 for his light-coloured Bishop and intends to get some bearing points in the centre. However, despite Black’s isolated pawn it is too early to claim White’s better pawn structure. Black is still retaining the opportunity to spoil significantly White’s pawn structure with the swap on c3. Additionally to the main line move the immediate swap on c3 was also seen in practice. After 9...♗xc3 10.bxc3 ♕xd4 (bad for Black is 10...♕xd5? in view of 11.♗xc6 bxc6 12.♕a3 ♦e8 13.c4 ♦a5 14.♕b3++ and Black’s position would become hopeless at once while after 10...exd5 11.♕g5 arises the position considered in the main line) 11.♕xd4! (in this variation White’s queen is extremely strong and not vulnerable in the centre) 11...exd5 (after 11...♕xd5 12.♕g5 ♦e6 13.♗f1 ♦e8 14.e3 ♦c8 (not better is 14...a6 in view of 15.♗xf6 ♦xf6 16.♗xf6 gxf6 17.♖xd5) 15.♕xa7 h6 16.♗xf6 ♦xf6 17.♕d4 ♦e7 18.♕xd5 ♖xd5 19.♕xd5 ♚xc3 20.♖ab1+ in the game Psakhis – Kachiani-Gersinska, Bad Wiessee 1999 Black was to commit the hard defence with a pawn down.

After 9...♕xd5 10.♕xd5 exd5 White could additionally to the weakness of the pawn d5 get the advantage of the two bishops with 11.♗c2 ♔e6 12.♕xb4 ♕xb4. White should play here 13.b3 (White ought to play accurately in spite of his achieved advantages since after 13.♕a4 ♔e7 14.♕e3 ♖fd8 15.♕d1 ♕ac8 16.♕d2 ♚c6 17.♖ad1 as was in the game J. Kristinsson – Cardoso, Skopje 1972, Black produced the strong move 17...d4!=, and White’s superiority vanished) 13...♗b6 14.♗b2 ♖fd8 15.♖d2 ♕f6 16.♖d1 ♕ac8 17.♗d4 ♕d6 18.♕ac1± as was in the game S. Pedersen – Nieminen, Gausdal 1994 where White succeeded to retain all the abovementioned pluses of his position.

10.♕g5!

Let’s make a little digression. This position reminds very much one of the key positions in Tarrasch Defence in Queen’s Gambit (D34) that will be considered in Book IV. The only difference is the position of the dark-coloured bishop that is placed here on b4, not on the usual place e7. This difference might seem to

126
be in Black’s favour. But that is far from being so.

10...\textit{x}c3

What else could Black do to exploit this difference in his favour? Quite bad is the typical way for Tarrasch Defence – 10...h6? in view of 11.\textit{xd}5 h\textit{x}g5 12.\textit{xc}6 bxc6 13.\textit{xb}4 \textit{b}6 14.\textit{xc}6 \textit{b}7 15.\textit{d}d4 \textit{xc}6 16.\textit{xb}6 axb6 17.\textit{xc}6+ as was in the game Legde – De Luca, Germany 1993, and Black remained just two pawns down.

The move 10...\textit{e}7 also deserves to be blamed although it does not lose immediately. In that case we should have the usual Tarrasch Defence position but with White’s move, not Black’s. After 11.\textit{c}1 (the position after 11...h6 12.\textit{e}3\textpm, but with Black’s move will be discussed in Book IV) 11...\textit{b}6 12.\textit{b}3 \textit{e}6 13.\textit{e}3 \textit{b}4 14.a3!? (weaker is 14.\textit{xd}5 as was in the game Castillo Gallego – Martos, Linares 1991 in view of 14...\textit{ad}8\textpm) 14...\textit{g}4 15.\textit{c}5\textpm Black may run into problems concerning the defence of the dark squares. The attempt to solve those problems with 15...d4?! would not frighten White in view of 16.\textit{xe}7 \textit{xb}3 17.\textit{xb}3 \textit{xe}7 18.\textit{b}5 \textit{c}6 19.\textit{f}3 \textit{h}3 20.\textit{d}6\textpm.

The move 10...\textit{e}6 looks slightly better. However in this case after 11.\textit{c}1 (the swap 11.\textit{xe}6 fxe6 is rather an obligatory decision for White. After 12.\textit{b}3 \textit{xc}3 13.\textit{xc}3 \textit{c}8 14.\textit{ad}1 \textit{b}6 15.\textit{e}3 \textit{xe}3 16.\textit{xe}3 \textit{b}6 17.\textit{f}4 \textit{fd}8 18.\textit{fe}1 \textit{f}7 as was in the game Van Wely – Ivanovic, Metz 1990 the position can hardly be estimated unambiguously in spite of White’s two bishops against Black’s couple of knights. It should be mentioned that the White’s tactical operation in the game Grabarczyk – Ikonnikov, Katowice 1992 – 11.\textit{e}4 \textit{xd}4 12.\textit{exd}5 \textit{xc}3 13.\textit{bd}3 \textit{xd}5 14.\textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}6 15.\textit{xd}5 \textit{b}5 16.\textit{xb}7 \textit{xc}3= – brought nothing to him.) 11...h6 12.\textit{e}3 \textit{a}5 13.\textit{a}4 \textit{d}6 White can easily refute the threat of Black’s knight invasion onto c4 with 14.\textit{cd}1!. After 14...a6 (in case 14...\textit{c}4 15.\textit{c}1\pm the position of Black’s knight c4 would be very unstable) as was in the game Prange – Keller, Germany 1997 White should have played 15.\textit{c}2 \textit{c}6 (here 15...\textit{c}4? would be just bad in view 16.\textit{xe}6 fxe6 17.\textit{xd}5! \textit{exd}5 18.\textit{xe}5+ \textit{xe}5 19.\textit{xc}4=) 15...\textit{c}6 16.\textit{b}1\textpm and he would have retained all the advantages of his position.

11.\textit{b}xc3 \textit{e}6

In case of 11...\textit{e}8 Black would be compelled to give up the pawn after 12.\textit{xf}6?! (also possible is 12.\textit{b}1 \textit{xd}4 13.\textit{cx}d4\textpm with a bit more pleasant play for White) 12...\textit{xf}6 13.\textit{xd}5\textpm, but perhaps that was the best decision for him in such a position.

12.\textit{b}1

Now White’s threats will be
following one after another.

12...\texttt{\_a5}

After 12...\texttt{\_d7} 13.\texttt{\_xf6} \texttt{\_xf6} 14.\texttt{\_d2} \texttt{\_e5} (not better for Black is 14...\texttt{\_ad8} 15.\texttt{\_xc6} \texttt{\_xc6} 16.\texttt{\_b4} \texttt{\_f5} 17.\texttt{\_h6} \texttt{\_e6} 18.\texttt{\_f3} \texttt{\_h8} 19.\texttt{\_b7} \texttt{\_a5} 20.\texttt{\_d1}± Jahnke – Straesser, Germany 1999) 15.\texttt{\_f4} \texttt{\_c4} 16.\texttt{\_d3} \texttt{\_f5} 17.\texttt{\_h3} \texttt{\_d6} 18.\texttt{\_f3} \texttt{\_f6} 19.\texttt{\_d4}± in the game Ju. Polgar – Harzevoort, Frankfurt (simultan) 1999 Black entered the hard times.

13.\texttt{\_b5}!

It appears that Black cannot defend properly the knight \texttt{\_a5}.

13...\texttt{\_a6}

After 13...\texttt{\_b6} White can develop his play at the queenside with 14.\texttt{\_f4}?! (not bad also 14.\texttt{\_xf6} \texttt{\_xf6} 15.\texttt{\_xd5} \texttt{\_ac8} 16.\texttt{\_d3} \texttt{\_f8} 17.\texttt{\_xe6} fxe6 as was in the game Grollemond – Abergel, France 1999, although in that case White would have troubles with the realization of the extra pawn even after the most prospective move 18.\texttt{\_f4}±) 14...\texttt{\_a6} (after 14...\texttt{\_h6} 15.\texttt{\_f5} \texttt{\_hxg5} 16.\texttt{\_xe6}± Black’s position is very shady) 15.\texttt{\_b4} \texttt{\_h6} (if 15...\texttt{\_c4}, then 16.\texttt{\_f5}±) 16.\texttt{\_f5} \texttt{\_hxg5} 17.\texttt{\_xe6} \texttt{\_c4} 18.\texttt{\_xf7}+ \texttt{\_xf7} 19.\texttt{\_c6} \texttt{\_g8} 20.\texttt{\_xf6} \texttt{\_gxf6} 21.\texttt{\_xd5}± with the good winning chances.

14.\texttt{\_xf6}

With this intermediate move White demolishes the cover of Black’s king.

14...\texttt{\_gxf6} 15.\texttt{\_b4} \texttt{\_c8} 16.\texttt{\_e4}!

White intends to involve the rook via \texttt{\_b4} and the light-co-

loured bishop to the attack upon Black’s king.

16...\texttt{\_dxe4} 17.\texttt{\_xe4} \texttt{\_f5} 18.\texttt{\_xf5} \texttt{\_xf5} 19.\texttt{\_xf5} \texttt{\_xd1} 20.\texttt{\_xd1} \texttt{\_xc3} 21.\texttt{\_d7}±

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_diagram.png}
\end{center}

This position was seen in the game Kasparov – Arlandi, Cannes (simultan) 1988. Black succeeded to avoid the mating attack at the price of transfer to the very hard ending.

b) 7...\texttt{\_a5}

Black reinforces the pressure upon the knight \texttt{\_c3}.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_diagram.png}
\end{center}

8.0-0!

White ignores Black's threat. Much weaker is more aggressive-looking 8.\texttt{\_d5} d5 9.\texttt{\_f4} since after 9...\texttt{\_e5} 10.\texttt{\_g5} (in case 10.cxd5? \texttt{\_xb5} 11.dxc6 \texttt{\_xf4}± in the game Hvenekilde – L. Kri-
stenssen, Aarhus 1981 White just lost a piece) 10...d4∞ Black’s chances are not worse

8...hx3

Otherwise Black’s moves 6 and 7 would be senseless. Black should already be careful that has been proven with the following examples.

After 8...exd4?! 9.exd4 xcb5 (in case 9...e5 10.d3 0-0 11.d2! xb8 12.a3 xc3 13.xc3 xc7 14.xb4+ in the game Itkis – Rauber, Erevan 1996 Black suffered the irreparable material loss) 10.d3 xa5 11.db5 0-0 12.a3 x7 13.b4 d8 14.c5 x8 15.xf4 a6 16.d6 x6 17.xd6 x6 18.xd6 x8 19.f4 x7 20.ad1 x6 21.xd6+ in the game Shabalov – Formanek, Philadelphia 1999 Black appeared constrained on the last rank without any hope to get free anyway.

After 8...a6?! 9.db3 xh5 10.e4 x11 11.xd1 0-0 12.xf4 h6 13.a4 b5 14.db6 x7 15.a3 x7 16.cxb5 axb5 17.xd6 x7 18.xc8 xc8 19.e5 x6 20.xd6+ in the game McElligott – Brady, Dublin 1993 Black’s matters are not much better than in the above examples.

Relatively acceptable for Black could be 8...0-0. After 9.db3 (9.cb5 a6 10.db3 a4 would bring White nothing since after 11.xd4 xe7 12.xc6 dxc6 13.cc2 e5= White did not succeed to exploit the awkward position of Black’s queen) 9...xh5 possible is 10.db5! 10...d5 (after 10...b6 11.a3 xe7 12.xf4 e5 in the game Kahn – Yu Mingyuan, Budapest 2000 White obtained Black’s concession in centre and started to develop the initiative at the queenside with 13.xd2 x7 14.xc3 d6 15.e3 xg6 16.a4 xe4 17.a5 xac8 18.axb6 axb6 19.xe1+ 11.cxd5 xxd5 12.e4 x13 13.xd1 xdb6 14.xd2 xe7 as was in the game Bator – Votava, Berlin 1996. Here White could have retained the slight advantage with 15.xa5+.

9.bxc3

9...0-0

The pawn is, of course, tabooed. After 9...xh3? 10.xc6 dxc6 (10...xa1 11.a3+–) 11.d6 xd7 (11...xd7 12.db1+–) 12.g5 f6 13.xb6+ x8 14.xf4 g5 15.xd6+ x7 16.ac1 x5 17.e7+ x6 18.f4 d4 19.f5+ in the game Rohrmueller – Absmaier, Germany 1995 Black resigned.

10.b3 d5

The defect of White’s pawn structure at the queenside is hard to exploit while the weakness of the square d6 can
become sound. For instance, after 10...\(a6?\) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}b5\) \(b8\) 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}a3\) \(d8\) 13.\(d6\) \(a5\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}a4\) \(c6\) 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}xa6\) \(bxa6\) 16.\(\text{\textcopyright}xb8++\) in the game Kirton – Grant, Manitoba 1992 Black was to resign. Black was trying not to admit White's knight onto d6 with 10...\(a6?!\) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}a3\) \(d8\) 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}fd1\) \(c7\) in the game De Souza – Tan Chun, Baguio 1987, but White still could have exploit advantageously the unfortunate square with 13.\(d6!\) \(a5\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}xc6\) \(dxc6\) 15.\(e7\) \(e8\) 16.\(\text{\textcopyright}xf6\) \(gxf6\) 17. \(d2\).

In the game Miles – Velimirovic, Amsterdam 1976 Black delayed a bit with \(d7-d5\) and after 10...\(e8\) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}b5\) \(d5\) White compelled Black to play an exchange down with 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}a3!\) \(d7\) (worse is 12...\(\text{\textcopyright}xa3\) in view of 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}xa3\) \(d8\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}c7\) \(b8\) 15. \(\text{\textcopyright}fd1\)) 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}xa5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xa5\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}c7\) \(\text{\textcopyright}c4\) 15.\(g5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}ac8\) 16.\(\text{\textcopyright}xe8\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xe8\) 17.e4 \(h6\) 18.\(\text{\textcopyright}c1\).

11.exd5

After 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}d1\) \(e4?!\) 12.exd5 \(\text{\textcopyright}xc6\) \(bxc6\) 14.\(c4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e6\) 15.cxd5 \(\text{\textcopyright}xd5\) 16.\(\text{\textcopyright}a3\) \(b5\) 17. \(f3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}f6=\) in the game P. Schlosser – Hracek, Brno 1991 White gained nothing.

11...\(\text{\textcopyright}xd4\)

In case of 11...\(\text{\textcopyright}xd5\) the game Taimanov – Y. Sakharov, Tallinn 1965 is known as the pattern where White after 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}e3!\) (in case 12.a4 \(e4\) 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}a3\) \(e8\) White not only obtained nothing but after 14.\(b5?!\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xe3\) 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}xc6\)

16.\(\text{\textcopyright}a5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xc6\) in the game Henttinen – Kivielpo, Finland 1980 commit the troubles) 12... \(\text{\textcopyright}e5\) 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}fd1\) \(d7\) 14.\(a4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}ac8\) 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}f4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e8\) 16.\(\text{\textcopyright}b4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}a6\) 17.\(\text{\textcopyright}b5!\) brought the difficult problems before the opponent. As a result, Black was to play an exchange down after 17...\(\text{\textcopyright}c4\) 18.\(\text{\textcopyright}c7\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xe7\) 19.\(\text{\textcopyright}xc7\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xe2\) 20.\(\text{\textcopyright}e1\).

12.cxd4 \(\text{\textcopyright}xd5\)

Certainly, Black captures with the pawn to intercept the diagonal a8-h1 for White's bishop.

13.\(\text{\textcopyright}f4\) \(b6\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}fc1\) \(\text{\textcopyright}a6\)

This position was seen yet in the beginning of the previous century.

15.\(\text{\textcopyright}e5\)
17.\( \text{d}d6 \pm \). Up to the moment there appeared no persons wishing to defend Black’s position after 16...\( \text{\textnumero} \text{xe2} 17.\text{\textnumero} \text{xf6} \text{gxf6} 18. \text{\textnumero} \text{xd5} \pm \) because of the spoiled Black’s pawn structure at the kingside.

The best move corresponding to the spirit of this position is 15...\( \text{\textnumero} \text{e4} \) that was seen in the game Karason – F.Andersson, Gothenburg 1997. The best answer for White would have been 16.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{c2} \pm \) to double the rooks on the c-file.

c) 7...0-0

Black does not hurry with the swap on c3 not to let White’s bishop onto a3.

\[ \]

c) 7...0-0

This is the scheduled move.

8...\( \text{\textnumero} \text{e7} \)

Black continues the development of his pieces so that White should take a decision about the knight c3. In case of the swap 8...\( \text{\textnumero} \text{xc3} 9.\text{bxc3} \) Black would not have anything better than to transpose to the variation considered above with 9...\( \text{\textnumero} \text{a5} \). 9...h6?! is careless here. After 10.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{a3} \) d6?! (a bit better for Black is 10...\( \text{\textnumero} \text{e8} \), but in that case after 11.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{b5} \pm \) he would have a very hard position) 11.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{xc6} \text{bxc6} 12.\text{\textnumero} \text{xd6} \text{\textnumero} \text{e8} 13.\text{\textnumero} \text{xc6} \text{\textnumero} \text{d7} 14. \text{\textnumero} \text{xa8} \text{\textnumero} \text{xa8} 15.\text{f3}+− \) in the game Cifuentes Parada – Rincon, Dos Hermanas 2000 Black did not get any compensation for his big material loss.

In addition to the move of the main line 8...a6 is often seen in practice. In that case possible is 9.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{f4}?! \) (after 9.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{a4} \) d5 10.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{xd5} \) exd5 11.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{xc6} \) bxc6 12.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{e3} \) \text{\textnumero} \text{e8} 13.\text{\textnumero} \text{c1} \text{\textnumero} \text{d7} 14.\text{\textnumero} \text{c5} \text{\textnumero} \text{b8} 15.\text{\textnumero} \text{c2} \text{\textnumero} \text{e4} 16.\text{\textnumero} \text{xb4} \text{\textnumero} \text{xb4} 17.\text{b3} \pm \) in the game Euler – Traudes, Germany 1996 White obtained the slight advantage thanks to his pressure against the isolated couple c6+d5. Let’s remind also the fragment of the game Portisch – Matulovic, Halle 1967 – 9.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{c2} \text{\textnumero} \text{xc3} 10.\text{bxc3} \) d5 11.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{e3} \) \text{\textnumero} \text{a5} 12.\text{\textnumero} \text{b2} \text{\textnumero} \text{d8} 13.\text{\textnumero} \text{b3} \text{\textnumero} \text{c7} 14.\text{\textnumero} \text{fd1} \text{\textnumero} \text{a5} 15.\text{\textnumero} \text{b4} \text{\textnumero} \text{c6} 16.\text{\textnumero} \text{c5} \text{\textnumero} \text{d7} 17.\text{\textnumero} \text{a3} \text{\textnumero} \text{xc4} 18.\text{\textnumero} \text{xc4} \pm \) – that is quoted every year by any of the books on the chess beginnings) 9...\( \text{\textnumero} \text{e8} \) (after 9...d5 10.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{xd5} \) exd5 11.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{c1} \pm \), White’s chances are better) 10.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{xc6} \) bxc6 (after 10...\( \text{\textnumero} \text{xc6} 11.\text{\textnumero} \text{xd8} \text{\textnumero} \text{xd8} 12.\text{\textnumero} \text{a4}?! \) \text{\textnumero} \text{d7} 13.\text{\textnumero} \text{fd1} \text{\textnumero} \text{e8} 14.\text{\textnumero} \text{c7} a5 as was in the game Fish – Orgovan, Budapest 1993, White could have put the complicated problems before Black with 15.c5!\( \pm \) since 15...\( \text{\textnumero} \text{xc5} \) would be met with 16.\( \text{\textnumero} \text{b6} \) \text{\textnumero} \text{a6} 17.a3 \text{\textnumero} \text{b3} 18.\text{\textnumero} \text{xb4} \text{\textnumero} \text{xa1} 19.\text{\textnumero} \text{xa1} \text{\textnumero} \text{xb4} 20.\text{\textnumero} \text{xa6} \text{\textnumero} \text{bxa6} \]
21.\textit{\text{\textit{\texttt{\_}}}}\textit{xc6} 8f8 22.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\textunderscore}}} c4\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}\texttt{\texttt{\_}}} 11.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} d6} 8xd6 (after 11...\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} a5} 12.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} e4} 8xe4 13.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} xe4} 8a7 14.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} d4} 8b7 15.c5 8d2 16.f4 8b4 17.d3 8f5 18.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} f3}± in the game T. Polak – Priehoda, Litomysl 1994 Black's light-coloured bishop appeared chained to the square c8 for good) 12.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} xd6} 8e7 13.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} xe7} 8xe7 14.e4 8b8 15.b3 e5 16.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} fd1} 8f8 (bad was 16...c5? in view of 17.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} a4}±) 17.c5! (White fixes Black's central pawns on the light squares) 17...\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} e8} 18.f4 8c7 19.f5 a5 20.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} f2}± in the game Kasparov – Ricardi, Buenos Aires (simultaneous) 1992 White obtained the superiority thanks to his evident spatial advantage.

It should be mentioned that in case of 8...d5 the position from the above considered variation a would arise.

\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} a4}?!?

White does not want to wait for the capture on c3. There are some examples proven that such a swap could be unpleasant for White. For instance, after 9.e4?! 8c5 10.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} e3} 8xc3 11.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} b5} 8xc4 12.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} d6} 8a6 13.bxc3 8e8 14.f4 8a3 15.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} c4} 8e7 16.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} a4} 8c7 17.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} d2} d5 in the game Tiller – Leverett, Gausdal 1982 Black not only won the pawn but could also refute White’s attack on the dark squares.

9.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} c2} would comply with the classic pattern Portisch – Matulovic, Halle 1967 (see the fragment in the note to Black's move 8). However after 9...\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} xc3} 10.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} bxc3} 8d8 11.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} a3} 8d6 (earlier 12.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} d2} 8c7 13.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} fd1} was widespread, but later it appeared that in case 13...8e8 14.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} d4} 8e5 15.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} b5} 8xc4 16.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} xd6} 8a6 17.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} f4} f6 18.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} xe8} 8xe8 19.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} d6} 8c6 20.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} e4} as was in the game Vakhidov – Obukhov, Krasnodar 1997, White would have nothing after 20...e5 21.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} d2} 8e6=. More dangerous is 12.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} d4} 8e5 13.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} b3} 8fd7 14.f4 as was in the game Burger – Leverett, Gausdal 1982, but in that case Black could have hoped for the satisfactory result after 14...\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} g4} 15.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} c2} 8c5 16.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} xc5} dxc5 17.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} fd1} 8e8xes with the following e6-e5) 12.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} b1} 8c7! (worse is 12...e5?! in view of 13.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} e3}±, pointed by V. Tukmakov) 13.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} d4} (13.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} e3} b6 14.g4 \textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} b7} 15.g5 8e8 16.f4 8ac8 17.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} d3} 8a5 18.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} xb7} 8xb7 19.f5 8c6 20.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} e4} 8e7 21.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} f4} exf5 22.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} xf5} was seen in the game Schlosser – Dzubasz, Germany 1995. Here in case 22...\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} e6} the position with the mutual chances would arise 13.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} d4} (worse is 13...d5 14.cxd5 8xd5 15.\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\_}}}{} c1}
\[3.d4 \text{cxd}4 4.\text{cxd}4 \text{e}5 5.\text{g}3 \text{e}6 6.\text{g}2 \text{b}4 7.\text{c}3\]

\[\text{\textcolor{red}{\&d7 in view of 16.\text{b}5 \text{e}5 17.e4 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&b}6 18.f4 \text{h}5 19.\text{d}6 \text{ab}8 20.e5}}} \text{ and in the game Shishkin - Romanov, Kiev 2000 Black committed the problems} 13... \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xd}4 14. \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xd}4} (worse is 14. cxd4?!, since after 14...\text{\textcolor{red}{\&xc}4 15.\text{d}2 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&a}6 16.\text{b}3 \text{b}8 17.e4 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&d}7}} in the game Kramnik - Kamsky, New York (m/2) 1994 Black obtained even the better chances) 14...\text{e}5 15.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&d}3 \text{e}6 (in spite of White's extra pawn Black should have obtained the draw with the accurate play thanks to the opposite-coloured bishops after 15... e4 16.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&xe}4 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xe}4 17. \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xe}4 \text{e}6 18.\text{xb}7 \text{xc}4 19. \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xc}4 \text{xc}4 20.\text{b}2}} pointed by Kramnik) 16.\text{xb}7 \text{xc}4 17.\text{b}4 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xd}3 18.exd3 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&ac}8 19.\text{c}1 (if 19.c4, then 19...d5=) 19...\text{\textcolor{red}{\&f}5 20.d4 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&c}7= Black does not suffer any apparent troubles.}}\]}

9...d5

It's hard to advise anything else to Black. For instance, after 9...\text{\textcolor{red}{\&d}8 White would easily obtained the better play thanks to his evident spatial advantage with 10.a3 \text{a}5 11.b4 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xd}4 12.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&xd}4 \text{c}7 13.\text{g}5}.}

10.cxd5 exd5

Now Black's isolated pawn d5 has appeared. After 10...\text{\textcolor{red}{\&xd}5!!? 11.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&xc}6 bxc6 as was in the game Neverov - Obukhov, Russia 1997, Black would have to play with the isolated c-pawn in case of 12.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&c}2!?+ that could hardly be better.}}\]

\[\text{\textcolor{red}{\&g}5 h6 12.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&xf}6 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xf}6}}\]

11.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&g}5 h6 12.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&xf}6 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xf}6}}\]

13.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&c}2}

White would rather keep on d4 but he is not satisfied with the prospects of changing his pawn structure after 13.e3 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xd}4 14. \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xd}4 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xd}4 15.exd4 \text{e}6=}}.}

13...\text{\textcolor{red}{\&d}8}

After 13...\text{e}6 14.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&xb}4 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xb}4 15.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&d}2=} Black is slightly passive while in case of 13...\text{\textcolor{red}{\&e}7 he should take into consideration 14.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&e}3 (after 14.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&xd}5 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&d}8=} or14.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&xd}5 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&d}8=} the activity of Black's pieces would sharply increase in spite of the loss of the pawn) 14...d4 15.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&d}5=} Black could not also retain his advantage of the two bishops.}}\]

14.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&xb}4 \text{\textcolor{red}{\&xb}4 15.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&d}2}}}

The other possible way for White - 15.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&b}3 \text{c}6 16.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&f}1} was seen in the game Sieglein - Gawehns, Bonn 1994. Still, in that case White should take into consideration 16...d4?! 17.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&c}5 \text{e}8 18.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&d}2 \text{g}5} 19.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&c}2 \text{f}5=}.}

15...\text{\textcolor{red}{\&c}6 16.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&ac}1 \text{f}5}

After 16...\text{\textcolor{red}{\&g}4 possible is 17.\text{\textcolor{red}{\&f}1! (weaker is 17.h3 in view}}\]

133
Chapter 12

of 17...\textit{f}5 18.\textit{f}d1 \textit{e}4 19.\textit{f}f4 \textit{e}7= as was in the game Akes-son – Alterman, London 1994) and here 17...\textit{e}7? does not work because of 18.\textit{x}d5 \textit{b}4 19.\textit{x}f7+! pointed by V. Zvja-ginsev.

17.\textit{f}d1 \textit{e}4

Risky is 17...d4 in view of 18.\textit{c}5! and if 18...\textit{ab}8, then 19.\textit{xb}7 \textit{xb}7 20.\textit{xc}6\pm and Black loses a pawn.

18.\textit{h}3!\pm

This position was seen in the game Ivanchuk – Zvjaginsev, Elista (m/2) 1998. With his last move White declined from the swap of the bishops. Black’s attempt to exploit this circumstance to reinforce his position in centre with 18...d4?! 19.\textit{c}5 \textit{d}5 20.\textit{xb}7 \textit{e}8 (V. Zvjaginsev’s suggestion – 20...\textit{e}5 21.\textit{g}2! \textit{x}g2 22.\textit{xd}8 \textit{f}3 doesn’t work either in view of 23.\textit{xf}7?! \textit{xf}7 24.\textit{c}5 \textit{e}8 25.\textit{xe}5 \textit{xe}5 26.\textit{xf}3 \textit{xf}3 27.\textit{xd}4 \textit{e}2 28.\textit{c}1\pm) could run into the refutation – 21.\textit{c}5?!\pm and 21...\textit{xa}2? does not work because of 22.b3+-.

18...\textit{e}5 19.\textit{c}5 \textit{c}4? is also bad for Black in view of 20.\textit{xc}4! \textit{dxc}4 21.\textit{xe}4 \textit{e}7 22.\textit{d}6+-.

Perhaps the best for Black here is to offer the swap of the bishops once more with 18...\textit{f}5, but in that case after 19.\textit{xf}5 \textit{xf}5 20.\textit{c}5\pm Black would be compelled to retreat with the queen onto the last rank not to lose the pawn. Naturally, that would not improve his position.
Part 3. Modern Defence
1.⩙f3 g6; 1...d6

Chapter 13  1.⩙f3 g6 2.c4 ⩙g7 3.e4 d6 4.d4 ⩙g4

Noted also that the move 2.d4 after 2...⩙f6 3.c4 ⩙g7 4.⩙c3 d5 can produce the Gruenfeld Defence, which is, generally, not well.
2...⩙g7 3.e4 d6

If Black does not like 3...c5 4.d4 which steers the play into the Maroczy System regarded in Part 1, then he has to choose between the move above and 3...e5. It can be seen easily that in the latter case after 4.d4 exd4 5.⩙xd4 ⩙f6 6.⩙c3 0-0 there is a position already considered in Book I (p.9). Those who have read about it may remember that it was estimated as quite satisfactory for Black there. But time passes, and some changes have taken place even in this not at all topical variation since Book I was published. In case of 4.d4 exd4 (after 4...⩙c6 5.dxe5 ⩙xe5 6.⩙xe5 ⩙xe5 7.⩙f2 ⩙f6 8.⩙c3 ⩙c6 9.⩙h6 d6 10.⩙d2 ⩙d4 11.⩙d3 ⩙g4 12.⩙g5 f6 13.⩙e3± White gained an advantage in the game Bistric – Grabics, Budapest 1999 because the black bishop felt rather uneasy on e5 and might got into trouble very
Chapter 13

soon) 5.\(\Box xd4\) \(\Box f6\) 6.\(\Box c3\) 0-0 7.\(\Box e2\) \(\Box e8\) 8.f3 \(c6\) 9.\(\Box b3!\) (Book I states that after 9.0-0 d5 10.\(cxd5\) \(\Box xd5\) 11.\(\Box xd5\) \(\Box b6\) 12.\(\Box h1\) \(\Box xd4=\) Black equalizes easily) 9...a5 (after 9...d6 10.\(\Box f4\) d5 11.\(\Box xd5\) \(\Box xd5\) in the game Sanjay – Konguveel, Calcutta 1999, White could have struggled for an advantage by 12.\(\Box xd5?!\) \(\Box h5\) 13.\(\Box g3\) \(\Box xg3\) 14.hxg3 \(\Box d6\) 15.\(g4\)\(+\), and in case of an immediate 9...d5 after 10.\(\Box xd5\) \(\Box xd5\) White can hope to gain more by 11.\(\Box g5!\), pointed out by J. Lautier, both after 11...\(\Box xe4\) 12.\(\Box xd8\) \(\Box xd8\) 13.\(\Box xe4\) \(\Box bd7\) 14.\(\Box d1\) \(\Box e8\) 15.\(\Box d6\) \(\Box e6\) 16.\(\Box f2\)\(+\) and in case of 11...\(h6\) 12.\(\Box xf6\) \(\Box xf6\) 13.\(\Box xd5\) \(\Box c6\) 14.0-0 \(\Box d8\) 15.\(\Box c5\)\(+\) 10.a4 (Black’s a-pawn should be stopped as otherwise White runs the risk of getting a worse position, for example after 10.c5 a4 11.\(\Box d2\) \(\Box h5\)\(+\) as it happened the game Kleibaumhueter – Ghinda, Dortmund 1986) 10...\(\Box a6\) (Black’s plan implies \(\Box b4\) and d6-d5) 11.0-0 \(\Box b4\) 12.\(\Box g5\) (after 12.c5 b6= Black gets rid of the obstacle on the way of his d-pawn) 12...\(h6\) 13.\(\Box h4\) d5 14.\(\Box xd5\) \(\Box xd5\) 15.\(c5\) \(g5\) (in case of 15...\(\Box f5\) 16.\(\Box d4\)\(+\) Black’s bishop feels uncomfortable on f5) 16.\(\Box f2\) \(\Box f5\) 17.\(\Box d2\) \(\Box d7\) (with the idea of \(\Box e5\)-d3), and now White should have pinned up Black’s d7-knight by 18.\(\Box b5!\) to destroy the co-ordination of Black’s minor pieces, as J. Lautier pointed out in his comments to the game

Lautier – Huzman, Albufeira Algarve 1999. At the same time, we can speak about certain advantage to White here owing to his control of the important blockade square d4.

4.d4

Black has two main methods of reinforcing his pressure upon the d4-pawn now, these are: 4...\(\Box g4\) and 4...\(e5\) (Chapter 14).

The move 4...\(\Box c6\) apparently answers this purpose too, yet it is little popular. The point is that after 5.d5?! \(\Box e5\) (the position after 5...\(\Box b8\) 6.\(\Box e2\) \(\Box f6\) 7.\(\Box c3\) 0-0 8.0-0 was already regarded in Book I) 6.\(\Box xe5\) \(\Box xe5\) (after 6...\(\Box xe5?!\) 7.\(\Box c3\) \(f5\) 8.\(\Box d3\) \(\Box f6\) 9.0-0 0-0 10.\(\Box f3\) \(c5\) 11.\(\Box b1\) \(\Box h5\) 12.\(\Box e3\) \(b6\) 13.\(b4\)\(+\) Black encountered great difficulties in the game Richter – Antoniassi, Nova Gorica 2000, which is no wonder as after dx5 Black’s control of the important c5-square decreased considerably, and the g7-bishop was blocked up) 7.\(\Box d3\) \(\Box g7\) (after 7...\(e6\) 8.\(\Box d2\) \(\Box e4\) 9.\(\Box xd5\) \(\Box f6\) 10.\(\Box f3\) \(d7\) 11.\(\Box xe5\) \(\Box xe5\) 12.0-0 0-0 13.\(\Box e2\)\(+\) White maintains better chances owing
to his pair of bishops and space advantage, I. Ibragimov – Deliathanasis, Greece 1995) 8.0-0 \( \text{gf}6 \)
9.\( \text{c} \text{c}3 \) 0-0 10.\( \text{h}3 \) e5 (in the game Kasparov – Lefstein, Catonsville (simultan) 1997, Black managed his centre not as good and got into trouble after 10...e6 11.\( \text{g}5 \)
c6 12.\( \text{xd}2 \) cxd5 13.cxd5 e5 14. a4\( \pm \) 11.\( \text{g}5 \) h6 12.\( \text{e}3 \pm \) a position can arise, typical of the King's Indian Defence, when the exchange of one pair of knights can't compensate Black fully for the time he spends for this operation.

In case of 4...c5 after 5.\( \text{c}3 \) there is a position, regarded in variation c of Chapter 7.

Apart from the plan with an attack on the d4-pawn, Black plays sometimes against two other Black's pawns, e4 and c4. After 4...f5 the play bears certain resemblance with the Dutch Defence. White can continue by 5.exf5!? (after 5.\( \text{c}3 \) there is a position from Part 4, p. 171-172, which White can avoid now with some profit) 5...\( \text{xf}5 \) (5...gx\( \text{f}5 \) is hardly good as after 6.\( \text{c}3 \) Black has problems with the advance e7-e5: an immediate 6...e5?! encounters 7.dxe5 dxe5 8.\( \text{xd}8+ \) \( \text{xd}8 \) 9.\( \text{g}5+ \) \( \text{e}8 \) 10.0-0-0\( \pm \), whereas lingering with this move is dangerous because of White's positional threat d4-d5) 6.\( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{h}6 \) (in case of 6...f6 there is an unpleasant option of 7.\( \text{d}3 \) with the idea to expose weak points in Black's camp by an exchange of the light-squared bishops, and after 7...\( \text{g}4 \) 8.\( \text{e}2 \)
\( \text{d}7 \) 9.0-0 \( \text{c}6 \) 10.\( \text{e}3 \) 0-0 11.\( \text{h}3 \)
\( \text{xf}3 \) 12.\( \text{xf}3 \) e5 13.dxe5 \( \text{xe}5 \) 14.\( \text{e}2 \) in the game Birnboim – Y. Gruenfeld, Tel Aviv 1988, the absence of Black's light-squared bishop produced an effect as well, as after the incautious manoeuvre 14...\( \text{sf}7 \) 15.\( \text{b}3 \) b6 16.\( \text{ad}1 \)
\( \text{ae}8 \) 17.\( \text{a}4 \) a5 White just won a piece by 18.c5! bxc5 19.f4\( \pm \) 7.\( \text{e}2 \) 0-0 8.0-0 \( \text{a}6 \) 9.\( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{d}7 \) (after 9...\( \text{f}7 \) 10.\( \text{e}3 \) c6 11.\( \text{d}2 \)
\( \text{f}7 \) 12.\( \text{fe}1 \) a6 in the game Dobosz – Fries Nielsen, Esbjerg 1988, White should have prevented Black from playing b7-b5 by 13.d5\( \pm \) 10.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{f}7 \) 11.\( \text{e}3 \)
\( \text{ae}8 \) 12.\( \text{ad}1 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 13.a3 e5 14.dxe5 \( \text{xe}5 \) 15.\( \text{xe}5 \) \( \text{xe}5 \) 16.b4 \( \text{b}8 \), and now in the game Rogoff – Van Wijgerden, Amsterdam 1980, Black would have to reckon constantly with White's initiative in the centre and on the queenside in case of 17.c5?!\( \pm \).

In the latter case the plan of an attack on the c4-pawn by 4...c6 5.\( \text{e}2 \) a6 (the position after 5...\( \text{g}4 \) 6.\( \text{c}3 \) will be regarded below) 6.0-0 b5 is hardly well based as the absence of White's knight on c3 increases his opportunities in this area of the board considerably. After 7.\( \text{bd}2 \) (no 7.a4 because of 7...bxc4 8.\( \text{xc}4 \) d5=, and the theoretical position after 7.\( \text{c}3 \) d7\( \text{x} \) can be avoided in this case) 7...\( \text{d}7 \) 8.\( \text{e}2 \)? (8.b3 is worse because after 8...\( \text{gf}6 \) 9.\( \text{b}2 \)
0-0 10.c1 c5 pawn Black creates counterplay, Hinojar – S. Soloviov, Villalba 1997) 8...a6 (Black has certain problems with the development of the king’s knight as in case of 8...Qg4?! there is 9.e5!, and Black can’t play 9...dxe5 10.dxe5 Qg4 because of 11.e6 fx6 12.cxb5 cxb5 13.Qg4+-, White winning a piece) 9.b4 Qg4 (in case of 9...c5 Black has to reckon with 10.bxc5 dxc5 11.cxb5 cxd4 12.b2 c6 13.Qc4 Wc7 14.Qa3† with quite unpleasant initiative on White’s side) 10.b2± (with the idea of a2-a4) White has good play on the queenside.

4...Qg4

Putting pressure upon the f3-knight, Black wants his opponent to decrease his control over the d4-square.

5.Qe2

White tries to avoid an immediate weakening of his pawn structure in the centre.

Now Black has two methods of pressing upon White’s d4-pawn: a) 5...c6 to be followed by development of Black’s queen to b6, or b) 5...Qxf3, and after the exchange Black’s knight comes to c6.

The move 5...Qc6 is of no independent significance since after 5...Qc6 6.Qe3 e5 7.d5 Qc7 (the position after 7...Qxf3 8. Qxf3 Qd4 9.Qxd4 will be dealt with below) 8.Qc3 Qxf3 (worse is 8...f5?! 9.Qg5 Qxe2 10.Qxe2 Wd7 11.Qe6 Wf7 12.f3 Qf6 13.Ac1 Qh8 14.0-0 Qg8 15.c5= Ronn- man – A. Lehtinen, Tampere 1997, or 8...h6 9.Qd2 Qd7 10.c5 f5 11.f3 Qf6 12.Qb3 Qb8 13.Qc4 0-0 14.0-0 Qh7 15.a4= Epishin – Heinola, Vancouver 2000, in both cases Black had serious difficulties) 9.Qxf3 f5 10.g3 the play steers into a position to be regarded below in the note to White’s eighth move, only with slightly reversed moves.

a) 5...c6

6.Qc3

White is going to struggle against the black queen, which is ready to jump to b6. This is better than supporting the d4-pawn by 6.Qe3 because after 6...Wb6 7.Qd2 Qxf3 8.Qxf3 c5= the advantage passes on to Black.

6...Qxf3

Otherwise Black can’t force his opponent to play d4-d5 without preliminary pawn strike at his centre. After 6...Wb6 7.Qa4 Wc5+ (also 7...Qc7 8.Qe3 can produce the same position with the difference that White can play 8.0-0 in this case) 8.Qd2
c7 9.\texttt{Ke}e3 (White should not hurry to play in the centre because after 9.\texttt{Kf}4 \texttt{Df}6 10.e5 dxe5 11.\texttt{Dxe}5 \texttt{Dxe}2 12.\texttt{Dxe}2 \texttt{Dh}5 13.\texttt{Dd}2 \texttt{Dd}7 14.f4 0-0 15.0-0 c5= the play can be equalized quickly, Zieher – I. Csom, Germany 1999) 9...\texttt{Dd}7 (after 9...\texttt{Dxf}3 10.\texttt{Dxf}3 c5 in the game Jovicic – Barlov, Arandjelovac 1990, the continuation 11.d5 \texttt{Dd}7 12.0-0 \texttt{Dg}f6 13.\texttt{Dc}3± was possible with a slight advantage to White, and the check 9...\texttt{Da}5+ is no problem for White as well since he wants to play 10.\texttt{Dc}3 anyway) 10.0-0 \texttt{Dg}f6 11.\texttt{Dc}3 (the e4-pawn needs serious protection, and the incautious 11.h3 \texttt{Dxf}3 12.\texttt{Dxf}3 could have resulted into equalization after 12...c5! 13.d5 \texttt{De}5=) 11... 0-0 12.h3 (now that the e4-pawn is safely covered, White can try to make his opponent determine the position of his light-squared bishop) 12...\texttt{Dxf}3 13.\texttt{Dxf}3 e5 14.d5 c5, and now in the game I. Belov – Csom, USSR 1968, the standard prophylactics 15.h4!?± could have gained a slight but lasting advantage to White owing to the absence of Black’s light-squared bishop on the board.

Sometimes, instead of attacking the d4-pawn, Black attacks the c4 pawn by preparation of b7-b5. However, after 6...a6 7.0-0 b5 8.\texttt{Ke}3 \texttt{Bxc}4 (in case of 8...\texttt{Dd}7 White has 9.\texttt{Kb}3! with the idea to exchange on b5 and play then \texttt{Df}3-g5. In the game Miles – Hay, Adelaide 1990, Black’s wish to oppose this design by 9...\texttt{e}6 brought him into trouble after 10.\texttt{cx}b5 \texttt{cx}b5 11.\texttt{Dxb}4 \texttt{Dxb}8 12.\texttt{Df}4 \texttt{Df}8 13.a4 \texttt{bxa}4 14.\texttt{Dxa}4±. Now in case of 8...b4 9.\texttt{Da}4 \texttt{Dd}7 10.\texttt{h}3 \texttt{Dxf}3 11.\texttt{Dxf}3 \texttt{Dc}7 White played 12.c5! \texttt{dx}c5 13.\texttt{dx}c5 \texttt{Dg}f6 14.\texttt{Db}6 \texttt{Aa}7 15.\texttt{Da}4± in the game W. Schmidt – Maciejewski, Poland 1992, and thus he did not let Black support his far advanced b4-pawn with the help of the adjacent c-pawn.) 9.\texttt{xc}4 \texttt{e}6 10.\texttt{h}3 \texttt{Dxf}3 11.\texttt{Dxf}3 \texttt{Dc}7 12.\texttt{Ac}1 0-0 13.\texttt{Ab}3 \texttt{Dd}7 14.\texttt{Dd}f1 d5 15.\texttt{Se}2 \texttt{Bb}6 16.\texttt{Dd}2 \texttt{Dac}8 17.\texttt{Ag}5! \texttt{f}6 18.\texttt{Af}4± this idea did not solve Black’s problems in the game Hort – Larsen, Lugano 1968, as the light squares in his camp were so weakened that any attempt to open up the play might turn out disastrous for Black.

7.\texttt{xf}3 \texttt{Db}6 8.d5

8...\texttt{Db}4

The fundamental continuation 8...\texttt{Dx}c4 9.\texttt{bxc}3 \texttt{Df}6, though spoils White’s beautiful pawn chain, deprives Black of castling for a long time after 10.\texttt{h}6.
danger of this variation for Black can be illustrated by the line from the game Gipslis – I. Dmitriev, USSR 1988, in which White gained an excellent compensation for the pawn after 10...\( \text{Qd} \text{d7} \) 11.0-0 \( \text{Qg} \text{g8} \) 12. \( \text{dx} \text{c6} \text{ bxc6} \) 13. \( \text{Le} \text{e3} \) \( \text{Qc7} \) 14.\( \text{c5!} \) \( \text{Qxc5} \) 15.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{Qf7} \) 16.\( \text{exd6} \text{ exd6} \) 17.\( \text{Le} \text{e1}\).

After 8...\( \text{Qd} \text{d7} \) 9.0-0 \( \text{Qg} \text{f6} \) 10. \( \text{Qb} \text{b1} \text{ a5} \) in the game Herrmann – Geisler, Dortmund 1987, there were no problems with getting an advantage. White only should avoid exchanging pieces as long as possible, and his space advantage will tell sooner or later. The simplest continuation is 11.\( \text{Le} \text{e3} \) \( \text{Qc7} \) (no 11...\( \text{Qc5??} \) because of 12.\( \text{dx} \text{c6} \text{ bxc6} \) 13.\( \text{e5} \text{+-} \)) 12.\( \text{Le} \text{e2} \text{+-} \), driving the black queen away from its active position.

9.\( \text{Qb} \text{3} \text{ a5} \)

An exchange of queens can only increase White’s activity on the queenside because the a1-rook obtains a new outlook. After 9...\( \text{Qa6??} \) 10.\( \text{dx} \text{c6} \text{ bxc6} \) 11.\( \text{e5} \text{!} \) \( \text{Qd7} \) 12.\( \text{exd6} \text{ exd6} \) 13.0-0 \( \text{Qxb3} \) 14.\( \text{axb3} \text{ Qb4} \) 15.\( \text{Le} \text{e3} \text{ Qd3} \) 16.\( \text{Qa6} \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 17.\( \text{Qa1} \text{+-} \) White poses some difficult problems for Black. It can be seen easily that the queen’s rook plays an important part at this.

10.0-0 \( \text{Qf6} \)

After 10...\( \text{Qd7} \) 11.\( \text{Le} \text{e3} \) \( \text{Qg} \text{f6} \) 12.\( \text{Le} \text{e2} \text{ cxd5} \) 13.\( \text{exd5} \) 0-0 14.\( \text{Qc2} \text{+-} \) White can exert pressure along the semi-open e-file, at the same time it’s not easy for Black to get to the c4-pawn, De Castro – Cardoso, Manila 1973.

11.\( \text{Le} \text{e2} \) 0-0 12.\( \text{Qc2} \text{ a4} \) 13.\( \text{Qd2} \text{ Qa5} \) 14.\( \text{Le} \text{ae1} \)

The very place for the rook: either the file opens up after an exchange on d5, or the rook supports the advance e4-e5.

14...\( \text{Qf7} \) 15.\( \text{Qh1} \text{ c5} \) 16.\( \text{Qf4} \) \( \text{Qbd7} \) 17.\( \text{Qf3} \text{ Qfc8} \) 18.\( \text{Qg4} \text{+-} \)

This position occurred in the game J. Pinter – Ebalard, France 1991. Having succeeded in the protection of the c4-pawn, White’s unopposed light-squared bishop takes a more active stand.

b) 5...\( \text{Qxf3} \) 6.\( \text{Qxf3} \text{ Qc6} \)

This plan is similar to the one described in Chapter 1 of Book I.

7.\( \text{Le} \text{e3} \)

After 7.d5 \( \text{Qd4} \) 8.\( \text{Qc3} \text{ c5} \) 9.\( \text{Le} \text{e3} \) (in case of 9.\( \text{dx} \text{c6} \text{ bxc6} \) 10.
0-0 əa5 11.əd2 əf6 12.əh1 əxf3 13.əxf3 0-0 14.əab1 əd7 15.əfd1 əa6 16.b3 əab8= Black has no problems, Wichmann – Mueller, Germany 1995; and after 9.əa4+ əd7 10.əxd7+ əxd7 11.əd1 a6 12.əa4+ əc7 13.0-0 əf6 14.f3 əhb8 15.əe3 əd7= in the game Vusatiuk – Ivanovsky, Kiev 2000, he obtained active play on the queenside owing to the strong position of the d4-knight) 9...əb6 10.əb1 əxf3+ 11.gxf3 əxc3+ 12.bxc3 əa6 13.əe2 əf6 14.e5 dxe5 15.əxc5 əd7 16.əe3 b6= White only could claim equality in the game Kasparov – Anand, Moscow (active) 1995 because of his destroyed pawn structure on both flanks.

7...e5

After 7...əf6 8.əd2 (two other possible moves of the b1-knight promise less to White: 8.əc3 əd7 9.əe2 əa5 10.əc1 c5 11.0-0 əc6= or 8.əa3 əd7 9.əc2 əa5 10.b3 c5=, and in case of 8.0-0 Black equalizes by 8...əd7 9.əc3 e5 10.d5 əd4 11.əb1 c5= Alard – Grosset, Creon 1999) 8...e5 (Black can’t equalize the position fully by putting piece pressure upon the centre only, for example, after 8...əd7 9.əb3 a5 White gains certain advantage by 10.d5 əce5 11.əe2 a4 12.əd4 a3 13.b3±) 9.d5 əd4 10.əxd4 exd4 we arrive again at a position to be considered within the main line.

8.d5

After the exchange 8.dxe5?! dxe5 the weakness of White’s d4-square is still more perceptible as the game Z. Polgar – Wolff, Groningen 1993, showed: 9.əc3 əd4 10.c5 c6 11.a3 əe7 12.b4 əf6 13.0-0 0-0 14.əa2 a5! 15.əxd4 axb4 16.axb4 əxa2 17.əxa2 əd8 18.əe1 əxd4=.

8...əd4

Black should not agree to 8...əce7 because after 9.əc3 f5 10.g3!? the absence of the lightsquared bishop impedes his play in the centre very noticeably. It’s easy to see that, as soon as the black pawn leaves f5, White can start to play on light squares in the centre and on the kingside. So, after 10...əf6 11.əd2 a6 12.h4 h5 13.əg5 əf7 in the game Schwabedahl – Pfeiffer, Jedesheim 1991, White could have maintained a slight advantage by 14.0-0!± because his opponent would miss the important lightsquared bishop in a relatively quiet situation. However, White preferred to play 14.0-0-0, which allowed Black to exacerbate the play by 14...b5=.

9.əxd4

After 9.əc3 Black is ready to support the position of his knight on d4 still more by 9...c5= Neverov – Nevednichy, Bucharest 1993.

9...exd4 10.əa3

The move 10.əa3 with the idea əc2-e1-d3 is less promising because of 10...c5 11.dxc6 bxc6 12.0-0 əe7= with an approxi-
mately equal position.

10...\(\square f6\)

An immediate 10...c5 is quite inefficient now that the knight stands on d2: 11.dxc6 (after 11.0-0 \(\triangle f6\) 12.\(\check{\triangle}\)e2 0-0 13.\(\check{\triangle}\)d3 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)e8 14.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)c2 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)h6 15.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)ae1 a6 16.\(\check{\triangle}\)f3 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)d7 17.a3 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)a5 18.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)e2 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)e7 19.a4 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)ae8= Pelletier – Hulak, Pula 2000, it was difficult for both sides to break the balance) 11...bxc6 12.b4, and it turns out that Black has no safe way of protecting the d4-pawn. After 12...\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)e7 13.0-0 0-0 14.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)b3 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)b6 15.a3 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)ab8 16.c5 dxc5 17.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)xc5 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)d8 18.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)d3 a5 19.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)c2 axb4 20.axb4 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)a8 21.g3= in the game Epishin – Gulko, Erevan 1996, White maintained his advantage owing to his better pawn structure and the blockade position of the knight on d3.

In case of 10...\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)e7 White can struggle for an advantage by 11.0-0 (an immediate 11.\(\check{\triangle}\)e2 is less accurate because of 11...c5!? 12.f4 g5! 13.fxg5 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)g6 14.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)a4+ \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)f8, Rogozenko – Moldovan, Romania 2001, and Black could have obtained a good compensation for the sacrificed pawn even after 15.h4 h6 16.gxh6 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)xh6\) 11...0-0 12.\(\check{\triangle}\)e2 (White’s bishop goes to d3). Now after 12...c6 (after 12...c5 13.f4 Black’s e7-knight has bad prospects for active play, and the variation 13...g5 14.fxg5 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)g6 15.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)f3 with castling already is more justified for White than in the game Rogozenko – Moldovan, Romania 2001) 13.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)f3 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)b6 14.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)d2 f5 (after 14...\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)ab8 15.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)d3 a5 16.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)fe1 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)b4 17.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)f4 Black’s active play on the queenside by 17...b5 encountered a refutation of 18.cxb5 cxd5 19.e5= Epishin – Kamstra, Groningen 1999) 15.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)d3 fx4 16.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)xe4 cxd5 17.cxd5 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)ac8 18.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)e2 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)f6 19.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)e1 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)g7 20.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)d3\) in the game Epishin – Gulko, Philadelphia 1998, White’s pawn structure looked slightly better (the pawn majority on the kingside), and also the mobility of Black’s g7-bishop was restricted considerably by Black’s own pawn on d4.

11.0-0

After 11.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)b3 0-0 12.0-0 (in case of 12.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)xd4 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)xe4! 13.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)xe4 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)h4= White can create problems for himself only, however 12.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)c2!? with the idea to win the d4-pawn after \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)a1-d1 deserves testing because in case of 12...c5 13.dxc6 bxc6 there is 14.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)xd4?; and if 14...\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)a5+, then 15.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)f1\) 12...\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)d7 13.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)xd4 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)f6 14.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)b5 \(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)xb2= the play was equalized in the game Tukmakov – B. Zueger, Geneva 2001.

11...\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)d7 12.\(\check{\check{\triangle}}\)e2
White wants to block up the d4-pawn by putting his bishop to d3.

12...d3
Black prevents White from fulfilling his plan.

13.\textsc{\textit{x}}xd3 \textsc{\textit{x}}xb2 14.\textit{e}b1 \textit{g}7 15.f4
Certainly, White can’t take the b7-pawn by 15.\textsc{\textit{x}}xb7? because of 15...\textit{c}5\textsc{\textplus}.

15...0-0
If 15...\textit{c}5, then White prepares e4-e5 by 16.\textit{f}3\textsc{\textpm}, as well as in the game.

16.\textit{f}3 \textit{f}6 17.\textit{d}2
White rejects 17.\textsc{\textit{x}}xb7 because of 17...\textit{xf}4 (and, surely, there is no 17...\textit{c}5?, because after 18.\textsc{\textit{xc}}7 \textit{d}8 19.\textsc{\textit{xc}}5 dxc5 20.e5\textsc{\textpm} White wins two pawns and has an excellent position in the centre against exchange) 18.\textsc{\textit{xc}}7 \textit{c}5\textsc{\textpm} with counterplay, connected with Black’s control of important central squares.

17...\textit{h}6 18.g3 \textit{c}5
After 18...b6 19.\textit{c}2\textsc{\textpm} Black can’t do without \textit{d}7-c5 anyway as White’s bishop is ready to move to a4.

19.\textit{be}1
White is already threatening with e4-e5.

19...\textit{ae}8 20.\textit{b}1 \textit{d}8 21.h4!?\textsc{\textsuperscript{\textdagger}}

White took the initiative firmly in the game Epishin – Djuric, Cutro 1999. Black’s bishop is fairly restricted by the white pawns, and White is just waiting for an opportunity to weaken Black’s position on the kingside by h4-h5, so that the break-through in the centre by e4-e5 becomes still more dangerous.
Chapter 14  1.\(\text{c3}\) g6 2.c4 \(\text{g7}\) 3.e4 d6 4.d4 e5

5.\(\text{c3}\)

The endgame after 5.dxe5 dxe5 6.\(\text{xd}\) 8+ \(\text{xd}\) 8= is OK with Black owing to the weakness of White’s d4-square.

Black has three main moves now to choose from: a) 5...\(\text{d7}\), b) 5...\(\text{c6}\) and c) 5...\(\text{exd}\) 4.

5...\(\text{g4}\) is unpopular because after 6.d5 \(\text{d7}\) (in case of 6...f5 Black may find himself in a hard position after 7.h3 \(\text{xf}\) 3 8.\(\text{xf}\) 3 \(\text{e7}\) 9.hf 4 0-0 10.h5 fxe4 11.\(\text{fh}\) 3 \(\text{c8}\) 12.g4 \(\text{e8}\) 13.hxg6 \(\text{g6}\) 14.\(\text{g2}\) as it happened in the game Polugaevsky – Seirawan, Lone Pine 1978) 7.\(\text{e2}\) (also 7.h3 \(\text{xf}\) 3 8.\(\text{xf}\) 3 a5 is possible, and 9.b3! allows White to avoid exchanging the light-squared bishops, which makes Black’s problems worse after 9...\(\text{h6}\) 10.\(\text{a3}\) \(\text{g5}\) 11.\(\text{d1}\) \(\text{f5}\) 12.g3 \(\text{f6}\) 13.\(\text{g2}\) b6 14.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{e7}\) 15.h5 \(\text{f7}\) 16.\(\text{b5}\) \(\text{ac}\) 8 17.\(\text{h3}\) even though his position is still rather solid, Polugaevsky – Kagan, Petropolis 1973) 7...\(\text{xf}\) 3 8.\(\text{xf}\) 3 h5 (Black can force an exchange of the dark-squared bishops by 8...\(\text{h6}\), but after 9.Xxh6 \(\text{xh}\) 6 10.\(\text{c1}\) \(\text{g8}\) 11.b4± his development lag becomes quite perceptible) 9.b3! (a typical method that allows to avoid exchanging the dark-squared bishops) \(\text{h6}\) (after 9...\(\text{gf}\) 6 10.a3 h4 11.b4 \(\text{h5}\) 12.\(\text{b2}\) \(\text{f8}\) 13.\(\text{c1}\) \(\text{g8}\) 14.\(\text{f1}\) a5 15.g3 axb4 16.axb4 \(\text{f6}\) 17.\(\text{e2}\) \(\text{b6}\) 18.\(\text{b3}\) Black was deprived of active opportunities, and White’s initiative on the queenside was rather strong in the game Avrukh – Belkhodja, Paris 1998) 10.\(\text{b2}\) \(\text{gf}\) 6 11.b4 0-0 12.0-0 \(\text{e7}\) 13.\(\text{d3}\) \(\text{e8}\) 14.\(\text{e1}\) \(\text{g7}\) 15.\(\text{d1}\) a5 16.a3 axb4 17.axb4 c5 18.dxc6 bxc6 19.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{f6}\) 8 20.\(\text{d1}\)± Polugaevsky – Gurgenidze, Kharkov 1967, White maintains a slight but lasting positional advantage as it happens often with King’s In-
Indian positions.

a) 5...\textit{d7}

Black supports the e5-pawn, preparing to develop the king's knight. This way of development has an important defect: it will be difficult for Black to reinforce pressure upon the white d4-pawn now.

\textbf{6.\textit{e}2}

Black has to decide now where to move his king's knight. Depending on his decision, the following variations are possible: a1) 6...\textit{h6}, a2) 6...\textit{e7} and a3) 6...\textit{exd4}. Sometimes Black plays 6...c6, waiting for White to castle before he determines the knight's position. Positions after 7. 0-0 (White sometimes plays more sharply 7.d5 c5 8.g4\texttimes) 7...\textit{h6} or 7...\textit{e7} will be considered below under a1 and a2.

In case of 6...\textit{gf6} 7.0-0 0-0 8.\textit{e}3 we get a position from the King's Indian Defence, already analysed in detail in Book I.

a1) 6...\textit{h6}

Black develops the knight to the side of the board, hoping that it will be useful for his following active play on the kingside, connected with f7-f5, and also it can take part in protection of the d6-pawn from f7.

\textbf{7.0-0}

White keeps to the usual King's Indian development pattern, although Black's refusal to move the knight to f6 enables him to apply a more aggressive plan with h2-h4.

\textbf{7...0-0}

In case of 7...c6 a sharp 8.c5! is possible (also there is an interesting continuation of 8.d5 c5 9.\textit{b}5 \textit{b}8 10.b4, Onischuk – Savicevic, Leningrad 1991, but after 10...\textit{a}6 Black's defensive position is very solid) 8...\textit{dx}c5 (after 8...\textit{ex}d4 9.\textit{hx}h6 \textit{hx}h6 10.\textit{w}xd4 0-0 11.cxd6, Stohl – Berezovics, Mlada Boleslav 1993, even the best continuation 11...\textit{b}6, found by I. Stohl, does not gain him a sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn after 12.\textit{wb}6 axb6 13.\textit{fd}1 \textit{g}7 14.a3 b5 15.\textit{ac}1+ 9.dxe5 0-0 (in case of 9...\textit{g}4 there is a very strong option of 10.\textit{g}5\texttimes, and Black can't take the e5-pawn with the knight from g4, whereas after 10...\textit{dxe}5 11.\textit{xd}8+ \textit{xd}8 12.f4 \textit{f}6 13.\textit{fxe}5 \textit{fxg}5 14.\textit{g}5+ \textit{e}8 15.\textit{d}1++ his king suffers a mating attack) 10.h3 \textit{h}8 11.\textit{f}4 \textit{e}7 (after 11...\textit{g}8 12.\textit{d}6 \textit{e}8 13.a4 \textit{h}6 14.\textit{fd}1 g5 15.\textit{g}3 \textit{e}7 16.a5 \textit{g}6 17.a6\texttimes in the game Uhlmann – Ciocaltea, Bucharest 1978, White destroyed
Black's position on the queenside; after 11...\textbf{\textit{c}}e8 12.\textbf{\textit{d}}d2 \textbf{\textit{g}}8 13.\textbf{\textit{d}}d6 \textbf{\textit{e}}e6 14.\textbf{\textit{a}}d1 h6 15.\textbf{\textit{d}}d2= Petran – Ivanovic, Zalaegerszeg 1977 and after 11...\textbf{\textit{e}}e8 12.\textbf{\textit{d}}d2 \textbf{\textit{g}}8 13.\textbf{\textit{c}}c4 \textbf{\textit{e}}e7 14.e6 fxe6 15.\textbf{\textit{d}}d6 \textbf{\textit{h}}6 16.\textbf{\textit{a}}d1 \textbf{\textit{f}}7 17.e5 \textbf{\textit{e}}7 18.\textbf{\textit{e}}e4\textbf{\textit{c}} Cruz Lopez – Leskovar, Ernuwa 1990, Black's pieces stayed stalemated on the back rank), and now in the game Sieglen – Lochner, Germany 1991, the move 12.\textbf{\textit{d}}c4!?* deserved attention with the idea of e5-e6.

8.\textbf{\textit{b}}b1 c6 9.b4 f6

9...f5?! is very risky for Black because of 10.exf5 gxf5 11.\textbf{\textit{g}}5 exd4 12.\textbf{\textit{e}}e6 \textbf{\textit{f}}6 13.\textbf{\textit{x}}f8 \textbf{\textit{x}}f8 14.\textbf{\textit{a}}a4 \textbf{\textit{g}}6 15.f4= Vadasz – N. Gaprindashvili, Vrnjacka Banja 1975, and after 9...a5 White played 10.b5 exd4 11.\textbf{\textit{x}}d4 \textbf{\textit{c}}7 12.\textbf{\textit{f}}4 \textbf{\textit{e}}5 13.\textbf{\textit{d}}d2 \textbf{\textit{h}}g4 14.h3 \textbf{\textit{f}}6 15.\textbf{\textit{h}}6 \textbf{\textit{e}}8 16.\textbf{\textit{x}}g7 \textbf{\textit{x}}g7 17.\textbf{\textit{b}}d1 \textbf{\textit{d}}7 18.f4 f6 19.\textbf{\textit{h}}1 in the game Polugaevsky – Ljubojevic, Palma de Mallorca 1972, and Black stayed without active counterplay.

10.\textbf{\textit{c}}c2 \textbf{\textit{f}}7 11.\textbf{\textit{d}}d1

In case of 11...\textbf{\textit{e}}e7 12.b5 \textbf{\textit{e}}e8 13.bxc6 bxc6 White has a strong continuation 14.c5!, and after 14...dxc5 15.d5 cxd5 16.\textbf{\textit{a}}xd5 \textbf{\textit{d}}8 17.\textbf{\textit{a}}d4 \textbf{\textit{e}}e6 18.\textbf{\textit{a}}c4 \textbf{\textit{d}}6 in the game Nogueiras – Gallego, Andorra 1995, White could have gained a great advantage by 19.\textbf{\textit{x}}f6+! \textbf{\textit{x}}f6 (also 19...\textbf{\textit{x}}f6 is bad for Black because of 20.\textbf{\textit{g}}5! \textbf{\textit{x}}d1+ 21.\textbf{\textit{x}}d1 \textbf{\textit{c}}6 22.\textbf{\textit{d}}5=) 20.\textbf{\textit{x}}d6 \textbf{\textit{x}}d6 21.\textbf{\textit{g}}5=.

12.b5 \textbf{\textit{e}}e8 13.\textbf{\textit{e}}e3 \textbf{\textit{f}}8 14. bxc6 bxc6 15.d5 c5 16.\textbf{\textit{d}}2 \textbf{\textit{h}}6 17.\textbf{\textit{f}}1 f5

After 17...\textbf{\textit{e}}xe3 18.\textbf{\textit{e}}e3= Black would have a passive but quite solid position.

18.\textbf{\textit{e}}xf5 gxf5 19.\textbf{\textit{h}}5=

Owing to Black's active 17th move in the game Vujic Katanic – Polihroniade, Belgrade 1989, he created initiative on the kingside.

a2) 6...\textbf{\textit{e}}7

11...\textbf{\textit{c}}7

7.0-0 0-0

In case of 7...exd4 8.\textbf{\textit{a}}xd4 0-0 9.\textbf{\textit{g}}5 \textbf{\textit{c}}5 10.\textbf{\textit{d}}2 the play sometimes becomes typical of the King's Indian Defence. So, after 10...\textbf{\textit{e}}6 11.\textbf{\textit{e}}3 \textbf{\textit{c}}6 12.\textbf{\textit{c}}2 a5
13.\(a_d1\) \(\text{c5}\) 14.\(\text{dxe4}\) \(\text{d7}\) in the game \(\text{Watarai} - \text{Mishra}, \text{Asia} 1987\), White could have obtained a better play by the manoeuvre 15.\(\text{dxe5}\)!, mentioned in Book 1 many times.

\(8.\text{e3} \text{h6}\)

Black takes the g5-square under his control in order to perform \(f7-f5\). An immediate \(8...f5\) is too risky because of 9.\(\text{g5}!\) (also 9.\(\text{exf5}\) is possible, but this continuation promises less to White both after the sharp 9... \(\text{gxf5}\) 10.\(\text{dxe5}\) \(\text{dxe5}\) 11.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{h6}\) 12.\(\text{g4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 13.\(\text{d6}\) \(\text{g6}\) 14.\(\text{d1}\) \(\text{g6}\) Kozma – Plachetka, Luhacovice 1969, and in case of the quiet 9... \(\text{xg5}\) 10.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{f6}\) 11.\(\text{xf6}\) \(\text{xf6}\) 12.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{e7}\) 13.\(\text{dxe5}\) \(\text{dxe5}\) Hallberg – Laksman, Ronneby 1998) 9... \(\text{f6}\) 10.\(\text{dxe5}\) \(\text{dxe5}\) 11.\(\text{xd8}\) \(\text{xd8}\) 12.\(\text{e5}\) \(\text{e8}\) 13.\(\text{fd1}\) \(\text{d7}\) 14.\(\text{c5}\)!, and Black faced hard problems in the game \(\text{Van Wely} - \text{Shahade}, \text{New York} 1996\).

In case of \(8...\text{c6}\) there is 9.\(\text{c2}\) \(\text{c7}\) 10.\(\text{ad1}\) \(\text{f6}\) (the move 10... \(\text{f5}\) is still too risky for Black because of 11.\(\text{g5}\) ! \(\text{f6}\) 12.\(\text{dxe5}\) \(\text{dxe5}\) 13.\(\text{c5}\) \(\text{f6}\) 14.\(\text{c4}\) !) 11.\(\text{h3}\) (White can afford this move without fearing an exchange on \(d4\) because it’s difficult for Black to exert pressure upon the \(e4\)-pawn while his knight stays on \(e7\)) 11... \(\text{h5}\), and now after 12.\(\text{dxe5}\) \(\text{dxe5}\) 13.\(\text{c5}\) \(\text{d8}\) 14.\(\text{d8}\) \(\text{xd8}\) 15.\(\text{d1}\) \(\text{e8}\) 16.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{e6}\) 17.\(\text{d6}\) \(\text{e8}\) 18.\(\text{c7}\) in the game \(\text{Maggiolo} - \text{Timon Piote}, \text{Halle} 1995\), Black had to yield the \(d\)-file because of the weakness of the \(d6\)-square.

\(9.\text{c2}\)!

It’s better to have the queen on \(c2\) in the present position, not on \(d2\), because in the latter case after 9.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{h7}\) the advance \(f7-f5\) becomes stronger, accompanied with a threat to White’s dark-squared bishop.

\(9...f5\)

Black’s other attempt to play actively 9... \(\text{g5}\), which occurred in the game \(\text{Shestakov} - \text{Tsarev}, \text{Belgorod} 1989\), could have been suppressed easily by 10.\(\text{fd1}\)!, and after 10... \(\text{g6}\) (10... \(\text{g4}\) is no better because of 11.\(\text{e1}\) \(\text{f5}\) 12.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{xf5}\) 13.\(\text{g4}\) \(\text{exd4}\) 14. \(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{dxe5}\) 15.\(\text{f6}\) \(\text{dxe5}\) (if 11... \(\text{dxe5}\), then 12.\(\text{g4}\) is possible) 12.\(\text{c5}\) ! Black would have to solve serious problems.

\(10.\text{dxe5}\) \(\text{dxe5}\)

Apart from this natural capture Black tried a gambit continuation too: 10... \(\text{f4}\) 11.\(\text{exd6}\) \(\text{f3}\) 12.\(\text{dxe7}\) \(\text{xf2+}\) 13.\(\text{dxe7}\) \(\text{f7}\). The first impression is that Black has some compensation for the pawn, namely the pair of bishops and
opportunities for further play on dark squares. However, after 14.\(d5\) \(\text{\#d8}\) (in case of 14...\(\text{\#d6}\) 15.\(\text{\#d1}\) it’s not easy to drive the white knight away from \(d5\) because 15...c6 encounters 16.\(\text{\#b6}\) \(\text{\#xd1+}\) 17.\(\text{\#xd1}\) axb6 18.\(\text{\#b1\#}\) 15.e5! (this is the point) 15...c6 (after 15...\(\text{\#xe5}\) 16.\(\text{\#xe5}\) \(\text{\#xf2}\) 17.\(\text{\#xf2}\) \(\text{\#h4+}\) 18.\(\text{\#f1}\) \(\text{\#xe5}\) 19.\(\text{\#g6+}\) \(\text{\#g7}\) 20.\(\text{\#e8+}\) 21.\(\text{\#g1}\) \(\text{\#d4+}\) 22.\(\text{\#h1}\) \(\text{\#g7}\) 23.\(\text{\#f1}\) \(\text{\#h3}\) 24.\(\text{\#xf8+}\) \(\text{\#xf8}\) 25.\(\text{\#g6+}\) Black still can’t prevent the decisive attack on his king) 16.\(\text{\#xg6}\) \(\text{\#xd5}\) 17.\(\text{\#d3}\) \(\text{\#f4}\) 18.\(\text{\#h7+}\) \(\text{\#f8}\) 19.\(\text{\#d4}\) Black only could resign in the game Speelman – Norwood, Great Britain 2001.

11.\(\text{\#ad1}\) \(\text{\#f4}\) 12.\(\text{\#c5}\) \(\text{\#f7}\)

12...\(b6\) does not help Black because of 13.\(\text{\#xe7}\) \(\text{\#xe7}\) 14.\(\text{\#d5}\) \(\text{\#d8}\) 15.\(\text{\#a4}\) \(\text{\#c5}\) 16.\(\text{\#c6}\), and after 16...\(\text{\#d7}\) 17.\(\text{\#xg6}\) \(\text{\#e8}\) 18.\(\text{\#g4}\) \(\text{\#d7}\) 19.\(\text{\#h4}\#\) White’s queen escapes.

13.\(\text{\#a3}\) \(\text{\#f6}\) 14.\(\text{\#c5}\!\)

White threatens to employ his light-squared bishop and thus win the game.

14...\(\text{\#g7}\) 15.\(\text{\#d5}\) \(\text{\#c6}\) 16.\(\text{\#b4}\) \(\text{\#a6}\) 17.\(\text{\#b2}\) \(\text{\#g5}\) 18.\(\text{\#h3}\) \(\text{\#h7}\) 19.\(\text{\#h2}\#\)

This position occurred in the game Cebalo – Minic, Yugoslavia 1986. Black’s problems are very serious already. His attack on the kingside exhausted, and the strong position of White’s knight on \(d5\) does not let him complete the development of his queenside normally.

b) 5...\(\text{\#c6}\)

Black develops the knight to a more active position than in the previous variation, forcing White to determine the position of the \(d4\)-pawn.

6.\(\text{\#g5}\)

In case of 6.\(d5\) Black can try 6...\(\text{\#d4}\) (after 6...\(\text{\#ce7}\) 7.\(\text{\#e2}\) it’s better for Black to move the knight to \(f6\) because after 7...\(f5\) 8.\(\text{\#xf5}\) \(\text{\#xf5}\) 9.\(\text{\#g5}\) \(\text{\#f6}\) 10.\(\text{\#h5}\#\) he has to agree to 10...\(\text{\#f8}\) in order to keep the material balance, and so White can arrange a nice stand for his bishop in Black’s camp by 11.\(\text{\#f7}\) \(\text{\#h6}\) 12.\(\text{\#e6+}\) \(\text{\#xe6}\) 13.\(\text{\#xe6\#}\) 7.\(\text{\#xd4}\) \(\text{\#xd4}\) 8.\(\text{\#b5}\) (if 8.\(\text{\#e2}\), then 8...\(\text{\#h4\#}\)) 8...\(\text{\#e7}\) 9.\(\text{\#e2}\) (if 9.\(\text{\#d3}\), then 9...\(c6\) 10.\(\text{\#a3}\) \(\text{\#f6}\) 11.0-0 0-0 12.\(\text{\#g5}\) \(\text{h6}\) 13.\(\text{\#h4}\) \(\text{g5}\) 14.\(\text{\#g3}\)
\[ \text{\textit{gf3 g6 2.c4 \textit{g7 3.e4 d6 4.d4 e5 5.c3}} \]}

\[ \text{\textit{g4 15.\textit{c2 c5 16.b4 b6= with an equal position, Finegold – Dzindzichashvili, New York 1992}} \]}

\[ \text{9...a6 10.\textit{xd4 \textit{xe4 11.e3 (after 11.\textit{xf3 \textit{f6 12.0-0 0-0 13.\textit{d3}} \]}

\[ \text{\textit{e7 14.e1 \textit{d8 15.h3 \textit{d7 16.g5 h6 17.e3 \textit{e8 18.c2 b5= Black equalized the play, Bleiman – Kagan, Beer-Sheva 1978) 11...\textit{xf6 12.0-0 0-0 13.h3}} \]}

\[ \text{\textit{e8 14.d3 \textit{e5 15.c2 \textit{d7 16.ae1 \textit{h5 17.d2 b5= A. Rodriguez – Gulko, Cienfuegos 1976, Black’s chances being good enough owing to his counterplay on the queenside.}} \]}

\[ \text{An immediate exchange by 6.dxe5 did not gain more than equality to White after 6...\textit{xe5 (6...dxe5? is bad because of 7.\textit{xd8 \textit{xd8 8.b5 \textit{e6 9.\textit{g5=} 7.dxe5 (also Black is OK in case of 7.e2 \textit{xf3+ 8.xf3 \textit{e7 9.e3 \textit{c6 10.0-0 0-0 11.}} \]}

\[ \text{\textit{d2 \textit{e6 12.e2 \textit{e5 13.b3 f5= Bewersdorff – Buchal, Germany 1988) 7...dxe5 8.\textit{xd8+ \textit{xd8 9.}} \]}

\[ \text{\textit{g5 f6 10.0-0-0 \textit{d7 11.e3 \textit{h6 12.c5 \textit{xe3+ 13.fxe3 c6 14.c4 \textit{e7 15.hf1 \textit{h6= Friedrichs – B. Schneider, Belgium 2001. Unlike the positions to be considered below, after the exchange on e5 it’s easier for Black to get rid of the dark-squared bishops.}} \]}

\[ \text{6...\textit{f6}} \]}

\[ \text{6...\textit{d7?! is unhappy because of 7.dxe5 dxe5 8.b5 \textit{d4 (after 8...f6 9.\textit{xd7+ \textit{xd7 10.d1+ \textit{d4}} \]}

\[ \text{11.\textit{fxd4 exd4 12.f4 c5 13.c7= Black suffers material losses, but in case of 8...\textit{ce7}} \]}

\[ \text{9.\textit{xd7+ xd7 10.0-0-0+ \textit{c6 11.}} \]}

\[ \text{\textit{e3= his position is no sugar as well) 9.\textit{fxd4 a6 (if 9...exd4, then 10.\textit{f4=) 10.\textit{a4 axb5 (if 10...c6, then 11.\textit{xc6 bxc6 12.d1=) 11.\textit{xa8 exd4 12.cxb5 \textit{f6 13.}} \]}

\[ \text{\textit{d3 0-0 14.0-0+= Miles – Quinteros, Puerto Madryn 1980. In this position Black had already every right to resign.}} \]}

\[ \text{The move 6...\textit{f6 occurs very infrequently in practice. After 7.\textit{xf6 \textit{xf6 8.d5 (otherwise White can lose the struggle for d4: 8.\textit{e2 \textit{g4=} 8...\textit{e7 9.e2 0-0 10.d2 \textit{g4 11.g1 \textit{d7 12.h4 \textit{g7 13.h5 \textit{eg8 in the game Marichal – Chaviano, Cuba 2000, White should have gone for 14.hxg6!? fxg6 15.\textit{e3 \textit{e7 16.g3= to be followed by \textit{f3. The opposition of White’s queen and h1-rook with the black king might turn useful later.}} \]}

\[ \text{7.e3 \textit{h6}} \]}

\[ \text{Black keeps the e7-square free so that his knight can retreat from c6 if White plays d4-d5. Before the mobilization of Black’s main forces the move 7...f5?! involves a great risk because after 8.exf5 \textit{xf5 (also Black experiences great difficulties in case of 8...gxf5 9.dxe5 dxe5 10.\textit{xd8+ \textit{xd8 11.0-0-0+ \textit{d7 12.g5=) 9.d5 \textit{ce7, Niemela – H. Lehtinen, Kuopio 1995, White can develop a very strong initiative by 10.c5! \textit{f6 11.b5+ \textit{d7 12.g5=) \]}

\[ \text{In case of 7...\textit{g4 8.d5 Black has to reject 8...\textit{d4 since the}} \]}

149
long diagonal is locked up by the f6-pawn and prefer 8...\textit{dxe}7. In
the game Kir. Georgiev – Azmaiparashvili, Moscow 1990, this al-
lowed White to gain a better play by 9.c5 \textit{h6} (after 9...\textit{h6} 11.
\textit{e2} 0-0 12.0-0 \textit{d7} 13.\textit{d2} f5 14.f3 \textit{f4} 15.\textit{f2} g5 16.a4 \textit{h8}
17.b5 \textit{c8} 18.\textit{c1±} in the game Pacheco – Moreira, Yerevan
1996, White got a very favourable set-up, thoroughly ana-
lysed in Book I in the chapter about the King’s Indian Defence)
10.\textit{d2} \textit{xe3} 11.\textit{xe3} \textit{f8} 12.
\textit{d2} \textit{g7} 13.f3 \textit{d7} 14.\textit{c4} \textit{e8} 15.a4 \textit{h6} 16.\textit{e2} \textit{f7} 17.0-0, Bla-
ck having no hope for any counterplay.

\textbf{8.dxe5}

Now that the h6-square is oc-
cupied by the knight, the ex-
change in the centre is more jus-
tified than it was on the seventh
move because it becomes difficult
for Black to exchange the dark-
squared bishops in this case. Also
it can be noted that after 8.d5
\textit{e7} 9.\textit{e2} 0-0 10.0-0 \textit{d7} there
was a position with mutual
chances in the game Khalifman
– Cifuentes Parada, Oviedo (ac-

\textbf{8...dxe5}

After 8...\textit{f5} White played
9.c5 (in case of 9.\textit{g5} \textit{d7} 10.
\textit{d5} 0-0 there is a position with
mutual chances on the board)
9.\textit{g4} (after 9...\textit{g4} 10.\textit{g5} \textit{f6}
11.\textit{xf6} \textit{xf6} 12.cxd6 cxd6 13.
\textit{c4} \textit{g4} 14.h3 \textit{xf3} 15.\textit{xf3}
\textit{d4} 16.\textit{d3±} Black’s temporary
control of the d4-square can’t
compensate him for the long last-
ing weakness of light squares)
10.cxd6 \textit{xf3} in the game Arso-
vic – Ermenkov, Jagodina 1998,
and could have gained an ad-
vantage if he continued by 11.\textit{xf3}?
\textit{xd6} 12.\textit{b5±}.

The knight exchange 8...\textit{dxe5}
9.\textit{xe5} \textit{dxe5} 10.\textit{d8+} \textit{d8}
11.0-0+ \textit{d7} does not let Black
equalize the play fully, unlike in
the similar position, considered
in the note under White’s sixth
move. After 12.f3 c6 (by 12...\textit{g8}
Black tried to prepare an ex-
change of the dark-squared bish-
ops in the game M.Tarasov – G.
Kuzmin, St. Petersburg 2000, but
he underestimated White’s ini-
tiative on the queenside after
13.c5! \textit{e8} 14.\textit{b5} \textit{xb5} 15.
\textit{xb5+} c6 16.\textit{c4} \textit{d8} 17.\textit{xd8+}
\textit{xd8} 18.d1+ \textit{e7} 19.d3±)
13.c5 \textit{e7} 14.\textit{c4} \textit{hd8} 15.\textit{b1}
\textit{f7} 16.\textit{a3} \textit{e6} 17.\textit{xe6} \textit{xe6}
18.c4 \textit{xd1+} 19.\textit{xd1}! (White
is going to avoid rook exchange
because his rook can be em-
ployed not only on the d-file)
19...\textit{h6} 20.\textit{h6} \textit{h6} Black
still managed to exchange the
dark-squared bishops in the

150
game Z. Polgar – Drazic, Novi Sad 1990, but then after 21.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)a5 \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)d7 22.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)e2 \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)c7 23.h4! \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)f7 24.h5 g5 25.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)d1\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\) White made Black’s pieces stay on the queenside to protect pawns there which allowed him to use the way of invasion created by the manoeuvre of the h-pawn.

9.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)xd8+ \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)xd8

There is no 9...\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)xd8? because after 10.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)d5-- Black’s c7-pawn is attacked, and also the f6-pawn may suffer from the black h6-knight.

10.0-0-0+

The move 10.h3 allows Black to develop his bishop to a more active position by 10...\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)e6.

10...\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)d7 11.h3

The g4-square needs to be covered.

11...\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)f7

After 11...\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)c8 White continued by 12.c5 \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)e6 13.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)d2 \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)f7 14.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)c4\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\) in the game C. Neidhardt – Chomet, France 1992, thus fulfilling his plan of the struggle for the a2-g8 diagonal.

12.c5 \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)c8 13.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)c4 \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)d8

14.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)d3

After 14.b4 c6 15.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)d2 \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)e6 in the game Karpov – Seirawan, Roquebrune (active) 1992, White suddenly retreated with the bishop by 16.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)e2, hoping to get his knight to c4, and finally the play was equalized after 16.... \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)h6 17.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)xh6 \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)xh6 18.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)c4 \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)df7 19.a4 \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)c7 20.b5 \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)ad8=.

14...\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)e6 15.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)d2 \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)e8 16.h4 h5 17.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)d1 c6 18.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)xe6+ \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)xe6

19.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)c4 \(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)f8 20.b4\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)

This position occurred in the game Illescas Cordoba – Todorcevic, Pamplona 1990. White maintains more active possibilities on the queenside, making Black watch the d6-square constantly. If the play opens up in some other area of the board, then Black’s problems grow at once because of the passive position of the a8-rook.

c) 5...\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)xd4

Black opens up the play with the same idea to exert pressure upon the d4-square.

6.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)xd4

6...\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)e7

This is the most precise order of moves for Black because after 6...\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)c6 there is both 7.\(\text{\textcircled{c}}\)xc6 bxc6
8...f5

According to the classical chess laws, Black meets the flank play of his opponent by a blow in the centre. Castling kingside is very dangerous for Black: after 8...0-0 9.h5  Rxd4 (9...f5 is too late because of 10.hxg6 hxg6 11.c5! fxe4 12. Rxe4 d5 13. g3  e5 14. e2 c6 15. d2, and Black has no resources to oppose White's attack, Mortensen – Rewitz, Denmark 1998; the ac-
tive 15...\(\texttt{\#c4}\) does not work because of 16...\(\texttt{\#xc4}\) dxc4 17. 0-0-0 \(\texttt{\#d5}\) 18.\(\texttt{\#h6+--}\) 10.\(\texttt{\#xd4}\) \(\texttt{\#xd4}\) 11.\(\texttt{\#xd4}\) \(\texttt{\#c6}\) 12.\(\texttt{\#e3}\) \(\texttt{\#e6}\) 13.\(\texttt{\#f4}\) \(\texttt{\#e7}\) 14.\(\texttt{\#e2}\) \(\texttt{\#ae8}\) 15.0-0 f5 16.hxg6 hxg6 17.\(\texttt{\#h6}\) \(\texttt{\#g7}\) 18.\(\texttt{\#dh1}\) White launched a strong attack on the black king in the game Gofshtein – G. Danner, Hartberg 1991.

Half measures like 8...h6 9.\(\texttt{\#e2}\) f5 (in case of 9...0-0 10.\(\texttt{\#d2}\) \(\texttt{\#h7}\) 11.\(\texttt{\#g4}\) White has good attacking prospects in regard to the black king) are ineffective because of 10.exf5 \(\texttt{\#xf5}\) 11.\(\texttt{\#xf5}\) \(\texttt{\#xf5}\) 12.\(\texttt{\#d2}\) \(\texttt{\#d7}\) 13.0-0. Now an attempt to hide the king on the queenside by 13...0-0-0 can't save him from trouble. By 14.b4! \(\texttt{\#xb4}\) (after 15...c5 there is a quiet 16.\(\texttt{\#ad1}\)±, and in case of 14...\(\texttt{\#b8}\) 15.b5 \(\texttt{\#e5}\) 16.\(\texttt{\#d5}\) g5 17.a4 \(\texttt{\#g4}\) 18.\(\texttt{\#xg4}\) \(\texttt{\#xg4}\) White wins by force by 19.\(\texttt{\#xa7}+!!\) \(\texttt{\#xa7}\) 20.b6+ \(\texttt{\#xb6}\) 21.a5 b5 22.\(\texttt{\#e3}\) \(\texttt{\#b8}\) 23.\(\texttt{\#a6}\) \(\texttt{\#c6}\) 24.a7+ \(\texttt{\#a8}\) 25.\(\texttt{\#a5}\) bxc4 26.\(\texttt{\#b6}\)+ Schoen – G. Danner, Budapest 1989) 15. \(\texttt{\#b5}!\) \(\texttt{\#c2}\) (in the forced line 15...\(\texttt{\#xa1}\) 16.\(\texttt{\#xb4}\) \(\texttt{\#e5}\) 17.\(\texttt{\#xa7}\) \(\texttt{\#b8}\) 18.\(\texttt{\#f3}\) c5 19.\(\texttt{\#a3}\) \(\texttt{\#c7}\) 20.\(\texttt{\#g4}\) even Black's best option 20...\(\texttt{\#b6}?!\) produces but a hard endgame after 21.gxf5 \(\texttt{\#xa7}\) 22.\(\texttt{\#xa7}\) 23.fxg6 h5 24.\(\texttt{\#g2}\) \(\texttt{\#hg8}\) 25.f4 \(\texttt{\#f6}\) 26.\(\texttt{\#f5}\), White's joint passed pawns on the kingside being very dangerous despite Black's extra exchange) 15...\(\texttt{\#c2}\) 16.\(\texttt{\#f3}\)! d5 (now 16...\(\texttt{\#xa1}\) is bad as well because of 17.\(\texttt{\#xa7}+\) \(\texttt{\#b8}\) 18.\(\texttt{\#b1}\) c5 19.\(\texttt{\#c6}\)+ \(\texttt{\#c8}\) 20.\(\texttt{\#a5}\) \(\texttt{\#b4}\) 21.\(\texttt{\#xb4}\) cxb4 22.\(\texttt{\#a8}+\) \(\texttt{\#c7}\) 23.\(\texttt{\#b6}\) \(\texttt{\#xb6}\) 24.\(\texttt{\#a5}\), and in case of 16...\(\texttt{\#xa1}\) White can continue by 17.\(\texttt{\#xa7}+\) \(\texttt{\#b8}\) 18.\(\texttt{\#a5}\) c6 19.\(\texttt{\#b5}!+-, also 16...\(\texttt{\#xe3}\) 17.\(\texttt{\#xe3}\) \(\texttt{\#xa1}\) gives nothing because of 18.\(\texttt{\#xa7}\) \(\texttt{\#g7}\) 19.\(\texttt{\#xb7}\) \(\texttt{\#d7}\) 20.\(\texttt{\#e1}\) \(\texttt{\#c8}\) 21.\(\texttt{\#d6}+\), and, finally, in case of 16...c5 White can increase pressure by 17.\(\texttt{\#ad1}\) \(\texttt{\#xe3}\) 18.\(\texttt{\#xe3}± without any material loss) 17.\(\texttt{\#xd5}\) \(\texttt{\#xa1}\) (after 17...c6 White wins at once by 18.\(\texttt{\#xa7}\) \(\texttt{\#b8}\) 19.\(\texttt{\#f4}+\) 18.\(\texttt{\#xa7}\) \(\texttt{\#b8}\) 19.\(\texttt{\#b4}\) (making Black part with his queen) \(\texttt{\#xd5}\) (19...c6 is of no use because of 20.\(\texttt{\#f4}\) \(\texttt{\#a8}\) 21.\(\texttt{\#b5}\)± as well as 19...c5 because of 20.\(\texttt{\#f4}\) \(\texttt{\#a8}\) 21.\(\texttt{\#a5}+) 20.cxd5 \(\texttt{\#c2}\) 21.\(\texttt{\#a5}\) \(\texttt{\#xe3}\) 22.\(\texttt{\#xe3}+- White gained a winning position and eventually made his opponent resign in the game Kasparov – Speelman, Barcelona 1989.

Blocking up White's h-pawn by 8...h5, Black weakens the g5-square, and after 9.\(\texttt{\#e2}\) \(\texttt{\#e5}\) (9...0-0 is still very dangerous for Black, and after 10.\(\texttt{\#f3}\) \(\texttt{\#e5}\) 11.\(\texttt{\#d2}\) a6 12.\(\texttt{\#h6}\) \(\texttt{\#xh6}\) 13.\(\texttt{\#xh6}\) \(\texttt{\#xc6}\) 14.\(\texttt{\#c2}\) b5 15.\(\texttt{\#g4}\) \(\texttt{\#xg4}\) 16.\(\texttt{\#xc4}\) 17.h5 White organised a strong attack in the game L. Jakobsen – Rewitz, Aarhus 1999) 10.\(\texttt{\#d2}\) a6 (if 10...\(\texttt{\#g4}\), then White can block Black's dark-squared bishop by his own f-pawn by 11.\(\texttt{\#g5}\) f6 12.\(\texttt{\#f4}±) 11.\(\texttt{\#g5}\) White can gain from this
circumstance. After 11...c6 12. \(d1\) (castling queenside 12. 0-0-0 is no good for White because of 12...b5\(\text{=}\)) 12...f6 13.\(\text{xf}4\) b5 14.\(\text{cxb}5\) axb5 15.a3 \(d7\) 16.\(\text{xf}3\) (16.\(\text{xc}2\) is less dangerous for Black because of 16...\(c8\) 17. \(e3\) \(e6=\)) 16...\(c8\) 17.\(\text{a}2\)! (White's knight wants to come to b4) 17...\(e7\) 18.\(b4\) \(b6\) (White is ready to meet 18...\(c4\) by 19.\(\text{xc}4\) bxc4 20.0-0=) 19.\(\text{xe}5\) (the pawn capture 19.\(\text{xd}6\) provides Black with counterplay after 19...\(\text{xd}6\) 20.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{ec}4=\)) 19...\(\text{dxe}5\) 20.\(\text{e}3\) c5 (again, 20...\(\text{c}4\) does not solve Black's problems because of 21.\(\text{xc}4\) bxc4 22.\(\text{c}1\) \(e7\) 23.\(\text{c}2=\)) 21.0-0! \(c8\) (after 21...\(\text{xb}4\) 22.\(\text{xb}6\) bxa3 23.\(\text{d}5\) \(b8\) 24.\(\text{xb}5=\) Black's position collapses at once, and in case of 21...0-0 22.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 23.\(\text{xd}5=\) \(\text{e}6\) 24.\(\text{xc}5=\) he has to continue a pawn down) 22. \(\text{a}6=\) M. Gurevich – Jo. Horvath, Haarlem 1998, Black still failed to manage his queenside.

9.h5 \(\text{fxe}4\) 10.\(\text{hxg}6\)

10.\(\text{xe}4\) is weaker, and after 10...\(\text{xf}5\) 11.\(\text{g}5\) \(d7\) 12.\(\text{xf}6+\) \(\text{xf}6\) 13.\(\text{xf}6\) 0-0 14.\(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{xf}5\) 15.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{e}4+\) 16.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{b}4=\) there was a position with mutual chances in the game Vaganian – Mestel, Hastings 1974.

10...\(\text{hxg}6\)

Black is not well in case of 10...\(\text{dxg}6\). After 11.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{xd}4\) 12.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 13.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{xe}7\) 14.0-0-0 \(\text{e}6\) in the game Bonsch – Azmaiparashvili, Dortmund 1990, White developed strong pressure upon Black's position by 15.f4 \(\text{c}6\) 16.\(\text{g}7\) \(\text{g}7\) 17.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{f}5\) 18.\(\text{e}1+\) \(\text{d}7\) 19.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{af}8\) 20.\(\text{xf}5+\) \(\text{xf}5\) 21.\(\text{d}3=\).

11.\(\text{hxh}8+\) \(\text{hxh}8\) 12.\(\text{xe}4\)

12...\(\text{f}5\)

In case of 12...\(\text{xf}5\) there is 13.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 14.\(\text{b}5=\) a6 (Black can't play 14...\(\text{xb}2\) because of 15.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{xa}1\) 16.\(\text{xf}6+\)) 15.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{ce}7\) (after 15...\(\text{fe}7\) Black's position falls apart because of 16.\(\text{bxd}6=\) \(\text{cxd}6\) 17.\(\text{xd}6=\) \(\text{d}8\) 18.\(\text{g}8+\) \(\text{c}7\) 19.\(\text{e}8+\) \(\text{b}8\) 20. \(\text{hxh}8=\), and in case of 15...\(\text{f}8\) 16.\(\text{bc}3\) \(\text{e}8\) 17.0-0-0 \(\text{e}6\) 18. \(\text{d}2=\) White keeps up his initiative) 16.\(\text{xe}7\) \(\text{xe}7\) (two other possible captures are losing: if 16...\(\text{xe}7\), then 17.\(\text{xc}7+\) \(\text{xc}7\) 18.\(\text{g}8=\), and if 16...\(\text{xe}7\), then 17.\(\text{bxd}6=\) \(\text{cxd}6\) 18.\(\text{xd}6=\) \(\text{d}8\) 19.\(\text{a}5+\) \(\text{c}7\) 20.\(\text{xf}7+\) \(\text{d}7\) 21.\(\text{d}1=\)) 17.\(\text{bc}3\) \(\text{f}8\) 18.0-0-0 White maintains his initiative because of the insufficiently supported position of the black king.

13.\(\text{xf}5\)

Weaker is 13.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{xd}4\) 14. \(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 15.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}6=\) with mutual chances, Z. Polgar – Sei-
rawan, Monte Carlo 1993.

13...\textit{\texttt{Qxf5}}

In case of 13...gxf5 14.\textit{\texttt{Wh5}}+ \textit{\texttt{d7}} 15.0-0-0 \textit{\texttt{g8}} 16.\textit{\texttt{c5+ c8}} White can play quietly 17.\textit{\texttt{b3}} (after 17.\textit{\texttt{e6}} in the game M. Gurevich – Speelman, Antwerp 1993, and then in the game Rajlich – H. Lehtinen, Budapest 2000, White gained an advantage by 17...\textit{\texttt{d7}}?! 18.\textit{\texttt{f4}}±, however after 17...\textit{\texttt{b2}} 18.\textit{\texttt{b2 xe6}} 19.\textit{\texttt{e8 d8}} White’s task would be much more difficult, even though his compensation for the pawn after 20.c5?! (is doubtless) 17...a5 18.\textit{\texttt{d4 xd4}} 19.\textit{\texttt{xd4 xd4}} 20.\textit{\texttt{xd4 a4}}, and now in the game Littke – Hergott, Canada 1995, White could have gained certain advantage by 21.g4! \textit{\texttt{a5}} (after 21...fxg4 22.\textit{\texttt{Xg4 f8}} 23.\textit{\texttt{g7}}! White holds a dangerous initiative) 22.gxf5 \textit{\texttt{b8}} 23.\textit{\texttt{g4 f8}} 24.\textit{\texttt{d3}}±, creating a passed pawn on the f-file, even though it is double.

14.\textit{\texttt{g5 d7}} 15.\textit{\texttt{d2 ce7}}

After 15...\textit{\texttt{e5}} 16.\textit{\texttt{d5 c6}} 17.\textit{\texttt{f6+}}! (in case of 17.\textit{\texttt{g8+ d7}} 18.\textit{\texttt{xa8 xe4+}} 19.\textit{\texttt{e2 f7+}} Black has a very strong attack at the cost of the rook) 17...\textit{\texttt{xf6}} 18.\textit{\texttt{xc6+ bxc6}} 19.\textit{\texttt{xf6 d7}} 20.\textit{\texttt{xe5 e8}} (if 20...dxe5, then 21.0-0-0+ \textit{\texttt{d4}} 22.\textit{\texttt{d3 g5}} 23.\textit{\texttt{h1}}± with a great advantage to White after Black’s pawn chain is broken into pieces) 21.f4 dxe5 22.0-0-0+ \textit{\texttt{c8}} 23.\textit{\texttt{e1 e4}} 24.\textit{\texttt{c5 a5}} 25.\textit{\texttt{d3 e3}} 26.\textit{\texttt{c2 d7}} 27.\textit{\texttt{xf5+ gxf5}} 28.\textit{\texttt{d3 h8}} 29.\textit{\texttt{e2}} in the game Sammalvuo – H. Lehtinen, Laukaa 1997, the play came to a rook endgame in which Black was going to lose the e3-pawn soon.

After 15...\textit{\texttt{e6}} 16.0-0-0 \textit{\texttt{f8}} White’s best option was 17.\textit{\texttt{e1!}}? \textit{\texttt{f7}} (in case of 17...\textit{\texttt{e8}}? Black suffers material losses after 18.g4! \textit{\texttt{fd4}} 19.\textit{\texttt{f4+}} 18.\textit{\texttt{f4}}±. White’s pair of bishops and certain weakness of the light squares in Black’s camp give prove to an estimation in White’s favour.

16.0-0-0 0-0-0 17.g4 \textit{\texttt{d4}}

18.\textit{\texttt{f6}}

White wants to get rid of the bishop.

18...\textit{\texttt{xf6}} 19.\textit{\texttt{xf6 dc6}}

20.\textit{\texttt{d3 e8}} 21.f4 \textit{\texttt{b8}} 22.\textit{\texttt{f3}}±

This position occurred in the game Gelfand – Piket, Monaco (active) 2001. White’s pair of bishops is obviously stronger than two black knights.
Chapter 15  1.\(\text{\textit{d}3}\) \(\text{\textit{d}6}\)

This continuation is very close to the one considered above in Chapters 13 and 14, and also to positions regarded in Part 3 of Book I. Often the play steers here into the King’s Indian Defence which was already analysed in detail in Book I.

2.d4

Although White’s second move is very often c2-c4, in the present situation it is not justified because of 2...\(\text{\textit{e}5}\).

We shall regard in detail two continuations for Black: 2...\(\text{\textit{g}4}\) and 2...\(\text{\textit{g}6}\) (Chapter 16). Sometimes Black tries to prepare e7-e5 by 2...\(\text{\textit{c}6}\). The easiest way to prevent this idea is 3.d5!? 4.\(\text{\textit{d}e}5\) (after 3...\(\text{\textit{b}8}\) 4.\(\text{\textit{c}4}\) e5 5.e4 g6 6.\(\text{\textit{e}2}\) \(\text{\textit{g}7}\) 7.\(\text{\textit{c}3}\) Black can develop his knight to f6, thus transposing the play into an unfavourable variation of the King’s Indian Defence (ref. to p. 15 in Book I), but also he can prefer 7...\(\text{\textit{e}7}\) which can be followed, for example, by 8.h4!? \(\text{\textit{h}6}\) 9.h5 g5 10.\(\text{\textit{d}2}\) f5 11.g4 f4 12.b4 a5 13.bxa5 \(\text{\textit{xa}5}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{b}3}\) \(\text{\textit{a}8}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{c}5}\) 0-0 16.f3 \(\text{\textit{h}8}\) 17.a4↑ Hardicsay – Sievers, Budapest 1992) 4.\(\text{\textit{x}e}5\) \(\text{\textit{d}e}5\) 5.e4 \(\text{\textit{f}6}\) (in case of 5...\(\text{\textit{e}6}\)?! 6.\(\text{\textit{b}5}\)+ 7.\(\text{\textit{d}7}\) 7.dxe6 \(\text{\textit{x}b}5\) 8.\(\text{\textit{h}5}\) \(\text{\textit{b}4}+\) Black finds a strong response 9.\(\text{\textit{c}3}\)!, and after 9...\(\text{\textit{d}4}\) 10.\(\text{\textit{x}f}7+\) \(\text{\textit{d}8}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{d}2}\) \(\text{\textit{xc}3}\) 12.0-0-0 \(\text{\textit{x}b}2+\) 13.\(\text{\textit{h}1}\) \(\text{\textit{c}8}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{g}5}\) \(\text{\textit{h}6}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{x}g}7\)– insoluble problems were posed to Black in the game P. Schmidt – Sommerbauer, Werfen 1992) 6.\(\text{\textit{c}3}\) \(\text{\textit{e}6}\) (after 6...\(\text{\textit{a}6}\) 7.f4 \(\text{\textit{d}6}\) 8.\(\text{\textit{f}3}\) \(\text{\textit{d}7}\) 9.\(\text{\textit{d}3}\) g6 10.0-0 \(\text{\textit{g}7}\) 11.f5 0-0 12.a4 \(\text{\textit{x}f}6\) 13.\(\text{\textit{h}1}\) \(\text{\textit{d}7}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{e}3}\) c5 15.a5± Black still had some difficulties in the game Van Parreren – Soetewey,
Antwerp 1994, White maintained certain advantage because of Black’s isolated e5-pawn) 9.\textit{g}5 \textit{xb}5 10.\textit{xb}5 c6 11.\textit{x}f6 gxf6 12.\textit{h}5+ \textit{e}7 13.\textit{c}3 \textit{e}8 14.\textit{f}3 \textit{h}6 15.0-0 \textit{d}8 16.\textit{ad}1 \textit{g}6 17.\textit{a}4± and White kept up his advantage owing to the unsafe position of the black king in the game M. Gurevich – Speelman, Madrid 1988.

2...\textit{g}4 3.c4

Sometimes White prefers to struggle for an advantage by 3.e4 \textit{f}6 4.h3 \textit{h}5 5.d3 e6\textit{=}, but this is not V. Kramnik’s style.

3...\textit{d}7

The move 3...e5 would be a bit untimely for Black: after 4.dxe5 \textit{xf}3 5.exf3 dxe5 6.\textit{xd}8+ \textit{xd}8 7.\textit{c}3 \textit{d}7 (7...\textit{c}6?! is worse because of 8.\textit{e}3 \textit{f}6 9.0-0-0+ \textit{e}8 10.\textit{b}5 \textit{c}8 11.g3± with an unpleasant threat of \textit{h}3 as it was in the game Olesen – Thuesen, Copenhagen 1990) 8.f4 \textit{d}6 9.fx\textit{e}5 \textit{xe}5 10.\textit{d}2 \textit{gf}6 11.0-0 \textit{e}8 12.f4 \textit{d}4 13.\textit{b}5 \textit{x}f2 14.g3 a6 15.a3 \textit{e}3 16.\textit{h}3 \textit{xd}2+ 17.\textit{xd}2 \textit{e}7 18.\textit{hd}1± White obtained a better endgame in the game Kramnik – Nikolic, Monte Carlo 1996, owing to his pair of bishops.

If Black accomplishes the exchange 3...\textit{xf}3 4.exf3 with the idea to spoil White’s pawn structure, then, as mentioned in Book I in regard to similar positions with the black knight on f6, White should try to prevent d6-d5. After 4...c6 (the situation when Black tries to do without c7-c6 in his preparation of d6-d5 is considered below in the note to the fourth move) 5.\textit{c}3 e6 (the position after 5...\textit{d}7 6.\textit{e}2 g6 7.0-0 \textit{g}7 8.\textit{e}3 \textit{gf}6 was described in Book I; the move 5...d5? does not work because of 6.cxd5 cxd5 7.\textit{b}3±, and after 5...g6 6.\textit{e}2 \textit{g}7 7.0-0 \textit{h}6 8.d5 \textit{f}5 9.\textit{d}3 \textit{d}4 Black managed to get his knight to d4, but White’s pressure upon the e7-pawn after 10.\textit{e}1 \textit{d}7 11.\textit{g}5 \textit{e}5 12.f4 h6 13.\textit{h}4± in the game Khalifman – Rashkovsky, Moscow 1995, outweighed this modest achievement) 6.d5! (d6-d5 should not be allowed) 6...ex\textit{d}5 (there is no 6...cxd5?!) 7.cxd5 e5 because of 8.\textit{b}3 \textit{c}8 9.\textit{e}3 \textit{d}7 10.\textit{c}1±, in the game Sulava – Barthel, Biel 1997, with hard problems for Black) 7.cxd5 \textit{f}6 (after 7...\textit{d}7 8.\textit{f}4 \textit{b}6 9.dxc6 bxc6 10.\textit{a}6 \textit{d}7 11.0-0 \textit{e}7 12.\textit{e}1 \textit{d}8 13.\textit{e}2 \textit{f}6 14.\textit{b}5 \textit{f}8 15.\textit{d}4 \textit{d}5 16.\textit{g}3± in the game Lukacs – Miltner, Budapest 1996, White made his opponent reject castling by his strong pressure along the e-file, and
thus created for him certain problems with completing the development of his kingside) 8.\( \text{\textit{f}}3 \text{\textit{e}}7 \ 9.\text{\textit{b}}3 \text{\textit{c}}7 \ 10.\text{\textit{d}}3 \ 0-0 \ 11.0-0 \text{\textit{b}}d7 12.\text{\textit{f}}e1 \text{\textit{c}}5 13.\text{\textit{xc}}5 \text{\textit{xc}}5 14.dxc6 bxc6 15.\text{\textit{ad}}1\pm \) in the game P. Cramling – Rivas Pastor, Cordoba 1995, the pairs of double pawns on f- and c-files turned out far from equal because of the isolation of the latter pair.

Also it is worth mentioning that after 3...\text{\textit{df}}6 4.\text{\textit{e}}c3 there is a position regarded in Book 1, and the problems that arise after 3...g6 4.\text{\textit{e}}c3 will be discussed below under variation a of Chapter 16.

4.\text{\textit{e}}c3

The variation 4.\text{\textit{b}}3 \text{\textit{b}}8 5.h3 \text{\textit{xf}}3 (5...\text{\textit{h}}5 is worse because of 6.g4 \text{\textit{g}}6 7.\text{\textit{g}}2 e5 8.\text{\textit{c}}3 \text{\textit{gf}}6 9.\text{\textit{e}}3 exd4 10.\text{\textit{xd}}4 \text{\textit{c}}5 11.\text{\textit{d}}1\pm \) Naumkin – Miles, Moscow 1990, with a slightly better play for White) 6.\text{\textit{xf}}3 is no problem for Black, because after 6...g6 7.\text{\textit{c}}3 \text{\textit{g}}7 8.e3 c5 9.d5 (in case of 9.\text{\textit{d}}1 cxd4 10.exd4 \text{\textit{b}}6 11.\text{\textit{e}}3 \text{\textit{x}}b2 12.\text{\textit{b}}5 a6 White’s only compensation for the pawn is draw: 13.\text{\textit{x}}b1 \text{\textit{x}}a2 14.\text{\textit{a}}1 \text{\textit{b}}2 15.\text{\textit{b}}1 \text{\textit{a}}2 16.\text{\textit{a}}1, Inkirov – Hodgson, Gausdal 1990) 9...\text{\textit{xc}}3+ 10.bxc3 \text{\textit{a}}5\infty produces a position with mutual chances.

In case of 4.e4 4...\text{\textit{xf}}3 (after 4...e5 5.\text{\textit{e}}2 \text{\textit{e}}7 6.\text{\textit{c}}3 in the game Kramnik – Mokry, Germany 1995, Black refused to develop his king’s knight to f6 to play then some of positions regarded in Book I, and continued by 6...\text{\textit{xf}}3 7.\text{\textit{xf}}3 \text{\textit{g}}5 8.\text{\textit{xg}}5 \text{\textit{xg}}5 9.0-0 \text{\textit{d}}8 10.dxe5 dxe5 11.\text{\textit{b}}3 \text{\textit{b}}8 12.\text{\textit{a}}3 c6 13.\text{\textit{g}}4! \text{\textit{gf}}6 14.\text{\textit{h}}3 \text{\textit{d}}8 15.\text{\textit{ad}}1 \text{\textit{e}}7 16.\text{\textit{d}}6\pm, but he encountered serious problems as the result when White’s strong pressure along the d-file impeded his castling) 5.\text{\textit{xf}}3 g6 6.\text{\textit{c}}3 6...\text{\textit{g}}7 7.\text{\textit{d}}1 c5 8.\text{\textit{e}}3 (after 8.d5?! \text{\textit{xc}}3 9.bc \text{\textit{gf}}6 10.f3 \text{\textit{a}}5 11.\text{\textit{b}}3 0-0 0 12.\text{\textit{e}}2 \text{\textit{dg}}8 13.\text{\textit{b}}1 \text{\textit{c}}7 14.\text{\textit{e}}3 \text{\textit{b}}8 15.\text{\textit{c}}2 g5\infty Black had a better position in the game Topalov – Adams, Dortmund 1996, because his knights felt at least no worse than White’s bishops with the safely blocked centre of the board) 8...\text{\textit{b}}6 9.\text{\textit{a}}4 \text{\textit{a}}5+ 10.\text{\textit{d}}2 \text{\textit{a}}6 11.d5 \text{\textit{gf}}6 12.\text{\textit{c}}3 0-0 13.\text{\textit{e}}2 e6 14.0-0 exd5 15.exd5 \text{\textit{ae}}8 16.\text{\textit{c}}2 \text{\textit{e}}7 17.\text{\textit{fe}}1 \text{\textit{fe}}8= in the game Huzman – Benjamin, Erevan 1996, Black reached a very secure position in which it was very difficult for White to gain profit from his pair of bishops.

4...\text{\textit{e}}5

Sometimes after 4...\text{\textit{xf}}3 5.exf3 g6 (in case of 5...\text{\textit{gf}}6 6.d5 g6 7.\text{\textit{e}}2 \text{\textit{g}}7 8.0-0 0-0 9.\text{\textit{e}}3 Black can reject c7-c6, leading to positions from Part 3 of Book I in favour of 9...c5, but then after 10.f4 a6 11.\text{\textit{c}}2 \text{\textit{b}}8 12.a4 \text{\textit{e}}8 13.f5\pm White still maintains certain advantage, Shariyazdanov – Novgorodskij, Moscow 1998) 6.\text{\textit{e}}2 \text{\textit{g}}7 7.0-0 Black transfers
his king’s knight to f5. However, even in this case after 7...e6 (if Black tries to get to f5 by 7...Nh6, then after 8.g4!? e6 9...e3 f5 10...e1 0-0 11.g5 f7 12.f4 c6 13...d2 c7 14...d1 ...ad8 15.h4 ...fe8 16.h5 f8 17. h6, Eperjesi – Bree, Budapest 2000, he can find himself squeezed in his own camp) 8.d5 d7 (after 8...e5 9.f4 exf4 10...xf4 g6 11...d2 0-0 in the game Z. Polgar – Epishin, Moscow (blitz) 1993, White could have gained a somewhat better position by the quiet 12...fe1± owing to his pair of bishops and certain space advantage) 9...e1 0-0 10...f1 e5 in the game Umskaya – Krasenkow, Moscow 1991, White should have prevented the black knight from coming to f5 by 11...d3!?± to keep some advantage.

In case of 4...g6 5.e3 (if the black bishop is on g4, and Black wants to develop the other bishop to g7, it’s highly recommended to support the d4-square) g7 6...e2 c5 (the position after 6...g6 7.h3 xf3 8.xf3 c6 9.0-0 was already considered in Book 1, p. 215) there is a position similar to the one to be regarded below under variation a of Chapter 16. The difference is the early placement of the black knight to d7. In this case White can maintain a slight advantage, for example, by 7.h3 xf3 8.xf3 b8= Hort – Larsen, Amsterdam 1980.

5.g3!?  
In the position after Black’s 4th move there is no sense in fortifying the d4-square by 5.e3 because of 5...g6 6...e2 e7 7. 0-0 0-0 8.e4 c6 9...e3 (this position was considered already in Part 3 of Book 1, but then it was White to move!) 9...a6 (Black uses the extra tempo to prepare b7-b5, thus forcing White to determine his position in the centre) 10.d5 cxd5 11.cxd5 xf3 12. xf3 a5 13.a3 fc8 14.fd2 d8 15.b4 c7 16.fc1, Khalifman – Gofshtein, Ischia 1996, Black created a strong defending position on Black’s queenside, and now it’s not easy to prevent an exchange of the dark-squared bishops after the preliminary 16...b8. For example, in case of 17.a4 (if White doubles his rooks on the c-file by 17.ac2, then Black just accomplishes his plan by 17...b6 18.ac1 a7=) Black can continue by 17...b5 18.xc8 xc8 19.ac1 b7 20. b2 ec8 21.h3 b6=.

5...xf3  
Lingering with the exchange of the bishop for White’s knight is unsafe for Black. So, after
5...\( \text{Ngf6} \) 6.\( \text{Ag2} \) \( \text{e7} \) 7.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{h5} \) (in case of 7...\( \text{Ax}3 \) White has already 8.\( \text{Ax}3 \), and after 8...c6 9.d5 e5 10.e4 0-0 11.\( \text{De3} \) \( \text{De8} \) 12.\( \text{Ed2} \) \( \text{Eb8} \) 13.a3 \( \text{g6} \) 14.\( \text{h6} \) \( \text{g7} \) 15.h4! \( \text{f6} \) 16.h5: the game Lerner – Weiss, Schwaebisch Gmuend 1998, followed the well known script): 8.\( \text{h4} \) c6 9.\( \text{f5} \) 0-0 (after 9...\( \text{f8} \) 10.0-0 \( \text{g6} \) 11.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{b6} \) 12.d5 \( \text{e7} \) in the game Dautov – Fritsche, Germany 1995, White accomplished a showy attack and won by 13.dxc6 bxc6 14.\( \text{e3} \) ! \( \text{xb2} \) 15.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 16.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{c8} \) 17.\( \text{d7} \) \( \text{xd7} \) 18.\( \text{a4} \) \( \text{e6} \) 19.\( \text{ab1} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 20.\( \text{fc1} \) \( \text{e4} \) 21.\( \text{xa7} \) ! \( \text{xa8} \) 22.\( \text{xb7} \) \( \text{a5} \) 23.\( \text{b5} \) !! 10.d5 c5 11.\( \text{b3} \) b6 12.e4 \( \text{g6} \) 13.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{h5} \) Black was deprived of counterplay in the game Eingorn – Mollov, Berlin 1990, and White managed to gain from this circumstance by 14.h4! h6 15.\( \text{d1} \) a6 16.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{df6} \) 17.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{e8} \) 18.a4 \( \text{d7} \) 19.\( \text{c2} \) \( \text{d8} \) 20.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{c7} \) 21.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{f8} \) 22.\( \text{g2} \) \( \text{ae8} \) 23.b4!±.

Black’s unwillingness to exchange timely on f3 after 5...g6 6.\( \text{Ag2} \) \( \text{Ag7} \) can be punished by 7.dxe5 dxe5 8.\( \text{g5} \) h6 9.h3 \( \text{f5} \) 10.e4 \( \text{e6} \) 11.\( \text{xe}6 \) \( \text{fxe6} \) 12.\( \text{e3} \)± Gulko – Gallego, Las Palmas 1996.

6.\( \text{exf3} \) \( \text{gxf6} \)

Black’s other options are no better. In case of 6...g6 he has to reckon with 7.f4!? , and after 7...\( \text{exf4} \) 8.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{h6} \) 9.\( \text{h6} \) \( \text{h6} \) 10.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{f5} \) 11.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{g7} \) 12.\( \text{e3} \)\( \text{f8} \) (if 12...\( \text{e7} \), then 13.0-0 \( \text{xe3} \) 14.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{f5} \) 15.\( \text{e4} \) 13.0-0 \( \text{f6} \) 14.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{b8} \) 15.\( \text{f6} \) h5 16.\( \text{e4} \) White had a perceptible advantage in the game Dizdar – Hickl, Erevan 1996, because of the passiveness of Black’s h8-rook.

After 6...\( \text{e7} \) 7.dxe5 \( \text{xe5} \) 8.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{d7} \) 9.\( \text{g2} \) c6 10.g4! \( \text{b6} \) 11.e2 \( \text{f6} \) 12.g5 \( \text{d7} \) 13.e3 0-0 14.0-0 \( \text{e8} \) 15.e1 \( \text{c7} \) 16.h4± White maintained an advantage in the game I. Sokolov – Hickl, Jakarta 1996, owing to his space advantage and pair of bishops. After 6...\( \text{e7} \) 7.\( \text{h3} \) exd4 8.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{e6} \) 9.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{e7} \) 10.\( \text{d5} \) 0-0 11.\( \text{e7} \) 12.0-0 \( \text{e8} \) 13.\( \text{c3} \) a5 14.b3 \( \text{c6} \) 15.\( \text{b2} \) \( \text{f6} \) in the game San Segundo – Adams, Madrid 1998, White had 16.\( \text{ad1} \)±, also preventing d6-d5 and maintaining an advantage with two bishops against two knights in a quiet position.

The move 6...exd4, in comparison with the move in the main text, offers more wide opportunities to White. After 7.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{gf6} \) (in case of 7...\( \text{e7} \) 8.\( \text{g2} \) \( \text{c6} \) 9.\( \text{e3} \) 10.0-0 0-0 11.b3 \( \text{f6} \) 12.\( \text{h2} \) \( \text{c5} \) 13.\( \text{d2} \) a5 14.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{xb2} \) 15.\( \text{xb2} \) \( \text{e7} \) 16.\( \text{e3} \) c6 17.\( \text{ad1} \) \( \text{c7} \) 18.\( \text{f4} \)± in the game Borges Mateos – R. Perez, Cuba 1995, Black still had certain problems with the defence of the d6-pawn despite the exchange of the dark-squared bishops) 8.\( \text{g2} \) \( \text{e7} \) 9.0-0 0-0 10.\( \text{f4} \) c6 11.b3 \( \text{e8} \) 12.\( \text{h2} \) \( \text{f8} \) 13.\( \text{f3} \) (after 13.
\textbf{\textit{Afd1!? \textit{Wb6 14.Wd2 Oc5 15.Fc5ab1 a5 in the game Stohl – Duer, Vienna 1996, White performed the knight manoeuvre 16.Qa4!, and after 16...Qxd4 17.bxa4 Wc7 18.Qxf6 gxf6 19.Qb2 Qe7 20. Wxf6 Qg7 21.Qf5 the stood a pawn up in the position with opposite-coloured bishops) 13...Wb6 (in case of 13...h5 there is 14.h3?) 14.Wd2! (it's better for White to avoid exchanging queens as far as possible) 14...Wc7 15.g4 (trying to press upon Black's kingside) 15...Qc5 16.Qfe1! (White takes control over the e4-square, 16.g5 is worse because after 16...Qfe4 17.Qxe4 Qxe4 18.Qc2 d5! 19.Qe5 Qxe5 20.fxe5 Qxg5 Black is fairly compensated) 16.Qfe1 a5 (the rook exchange after 16...Qxe1+ 17.Qxe1 Qe8 18.Qxe8 Qxe8 does not secure full equality to Black as well) 17.g5 Qfd7 18.h4 Wb6 (an attack on the b3-pawn does not work both after 18...a4 19.Qxe8 Qxe8 20.b4 and after 18...Qxe1+ 19.Qxe1 a4 20.b4 a3 21.a3a1) 19.Qa3! (an incautious 19.Qg2?! allows Black to start counterplay against the b3-pawn by 19...a4?) 19...Qe6 (now White is ready to meet 19...a4 by 20.b4) 20.Qad1 (there is no 20.Qxd6? because of 20...Qd4 21.Qg4 Qxd6 22.Qxd7 Qf3+) 20...Qd4 21.Qg4! in the game Van Wely – Timman, Breda (active) m/3 1998, White maintained some pressure upon Black's position.

Also it is worth mentioning that the position after 6...c6 7.Qc2 Qf6 8.0-0 Qe7 9.f4 exd4 10.Qxd4 will be regarded below.

\textbf{\textit{7.Qg2 Qe7}}

After 7...c6 8.0-0 Qe7 9.f4! (9.d5 c5 10.f4 is not as good because after 10...0-0 11.Qc2 exf4 12.Qxf4 Qh5 13.Qd2 Qg6 14.Qae1 \textit{Qg7 15.b3 Qf5 16.Qh3 Qd4 Black managed to bring his knight to d4 in the game Speelman – Bezold, Altensteig 1994) 9...exd4 10.Qxd4 a5 11.b3 0-0 12.Qb1 Qb6 13.Qd2 Qc5 14.Qb2 Qfe8 15.Qfd1 Qad8 (after 15...Qf8 there is a position from the above mentioned game Stohl – Duer, Vienna 1996) 16.Qc2± White gained a slight advantage in the game Stocek – Turzo, Budapest 1998, owing to his pair of bishops and domination in space, which he then increased by a pawn attack on the queenside.

Also White's chances look slightly better after 7...Qg6 8.0-0 Qg7 9.Qe3 0-0 10.Qd2, but this continuation has not yet been tested in practice.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\textbf{\textit{8.0-0}}

After 8.dxe5 dxe5 9.f4 c6 10.
0-0 0-0 11.\textit{e}1 exf4 12.\textit{xf}4 \textit{e}8 13.\textit{xc}2 \textit{f}8 14.\textit{ad}1 \textit{a}5 15.\textit{d}2 \textit{c}7 16.\textit{f}4 \textit{a}5= in the game Bacrot – Bezold, Cannes 1995, White was unable to gain profit from his pair of bishops as he had to reckon with the opponent’s initiative on dark squares constantly.

\textbf{8...0-0 9.f}4 \textbf{c}6 10.\textit{e}1

White has to spend time for this move to make Black release tension in the centre.

After 10.fxe5 dxe5 11.d5 \textit{c}7 12.dxc6 bxc6 13.\textit{a}4 \textit{ac}8 14.b4 a5 15.\textit{xa}5 \textit{xa}5 16.bxa5 \textit{b}4 17.\textit{a}4 \textit{xa}5 18.\textit{a}3 \textit{fe}8= in the game Ftacnik – Hickl, Jakarta 1996, Black held, and in case of 10.d5 he would have 10...\textit{c}7!=.

\textbf{10...exd}4 11.\textit{xd}4 \textit{e}8 12.b3

After 12.\textit{d}2 \textit{b}6 13.\textit{xb}6 \textit{xb}6 14.b3 Black probably should have played 14...\textit{f}8!? to prepare further simplifications by rook exchange. However, in the game Alterman – Gulko, Elenite 1995, he preferred to open up by 14...d5, and after 15.cxd5 \textit{fxd}5 16.\textit{x}d5 \textit{xd}5 17.\textit{x}d5 cxd5 18.\textit{ac}1 \textit{f}6 (in case of 18...\textit{d}6 White has 19.\textit{e}3!± to be followed by \textit{e}1-d1) 19.\textit{c}7± he encountered difficulties even though he practically had an extra pawn in the centre.

12...\textit{b}6

This position occurred in the game Dizdar – Hickl, Austria 1998. Most likely, he should have avoided exchanging queens by 13.\textit{d}2!? (after 13.\textit{xb}6 \textit{xb}6 14.\textit{b}2 \textit{f}3 15.\textit{xe}8 \textit{xe}8 16.\textit{d}1 \textit{fd}7 17.\textit{a}3= the position was equalized, and the opponents agreed to draw), and after 13...\textit{ad}8 (the refusal of the queen exchange is based on the fact that 13...d5?! does not work because of 14.cxd5 cxd5 15.\textit{xd}5 \textit{xd}5 16.\textit{x}d5 \textit{c}5, and then 17.\textit{e}3! \textit{xe}3 18.\textit{f}xe3 \textit{xe}3 19.\textit{h}1±, so that Black’s b7-pawn turns endangered) 14.\textit{b}2± he would maintain some advantage owing to his pair of bishops and prevalence in space.
In order to accomplish the planned advance e7-e5, Black develops his dark-squared bishop to the a1-h8 diagonal.

3.c4

Our plans don’t include regarding the position from the Pirc Defence after 3.e4 \( \text{\&}f6 4.\text{\&}c3. 

3...\text{\&}g7 

After 3...\text{\&}g4 4.\text{\&}c3 \text{\&}g7 (the position after 4...\text{\&}xf3 5.exf3 \text{\&}g7 6.\text{\&}e2 c6 was already considered in Chapter 15 in the note to third move) 5.e3 there is a position from variation a, see below.

4.\text{\&}c3

The order of moves, chosen by Black, allows White to avoid variation b from Chapter 13, which was possible in case of 4.e4 \text{\&}g4.

Now we have to consider two main variations a) 4...\text{\&}g4 and b) 4...e5.

a) 4...\text{\&}g4 5.e3

White needs to support the d4-square and, at the same time, to prevent Black from spoiling his pawn structure by an exchange on f3 once and for all. After 5.g3 \text{\&}xf3 6.exf3 e6 7.d5 (after 7.\text{\&}g2 \text{\&}e7 8.f4 in the game Lautier – Popchev, Sochi 1989, Black accomplished the planned advance 8...d5, and after 9.exd5 exd5 10.\text{\&}b3 \text{\&}bc6 11.\text{\&}xb7 \text{\&}b8 12.\text{\&}a6 \text{\&}b6 13.\text{\&}d3 0-0 14.0-0 \text{\&}xd4= the play was equalized and eventually drawn) 7...exd5 8.cxd5 \text{\&}e7 9.\text{\&}g2 0-0 10.0-0 \text{\&}d7 11.h4 \text{\&}b6 12.\text{\&}g5 h6∞ there was a position with mutual chances in the game Bacrot – Tkachiev, Cannes 2001.

5...c5

A strike with the other pawn at White’s centre 5...e5 was followed by 6.dxe5 dxe5 7.\text{\&}xd8+ \text{\&}xd8 8.\text{\&}g5 \text{\&}h6 9.\text{\&}e2 \text{\&}d7 10.\text{\&}d2 c6 11.0-0-0 \text{\&}a6 12.\text{\&}hg1 f6 13.\text{\&}g4 f5 14.\text{\&}g5 \text{\&}e7 15.e4
f4 16.g3 fxg3 17.hxg3 in the game Portisch - Kavalek, Montreal 1979, and did not let Black equalize the play. He got, as the result, an extra pawn islet in his position, and his knights occupied poor stands. After 5...dc6 6.d2 e5 7.d5 dc7 8.e4 dxf3 (in order to perform the advance f7-f5 Black goes for an exchange of the light-squared bishop. Indeed, 8...f5? is no good because of 9.g5+--., and after 8...df6 9. e3 c5 10.h3 d7 11.g4 0-0 12.d2 e8 13.h4 f5 14.f3 xg4 15.fxg4 df6 16.h5± allowed White to squeeze his opponent perceptibly on the kingside in the game Chuchelov - Carlier, Brussels 1995) 9.xf3 f5 (the exchange of the dark-squared bishops by 9...h6 10.xh6 xh6 11.d2 hg8 12.0-0 h5 13.e2 d7 did not solve Black's problems in the game A. Maric - Stroe, Oakham 1990, because White made use of the fact that Black's knights can't get to e5 and took the initiative by 14.f4! exf4 15.xf4 f6 16.c5? 10.h4 h6 11.h5 f4 12.g4 f7 13.e2 f6 14.b3 b6 15.d2 g5 16.f3 0-0 17.0-0-0 Vukic - Z. Nikolic, Novi Sad 1995, there was a position in which White was able to show initiative on any flank because Black had no light-squared bishop to oppose.

The position after 5...df6 6.e2 was regarded on p. 215 in Book I.

6.e2

Releasing tension in the centre by 6.d5 is no good because after 6...xc3+ 7.bxc3 dd7 8.e2 a5 there is a position with mutual chances, Sakaev - Gulko, Elista 1998.

6...dc6

Black tries to reinforce his pressure on the d4-square. Sometimes he transfers his king's knight to f5 with this aim. After 6...cxd4 7.exd4 dh6 8.0-0 df5 (the position after 8...dc6 9.d5 will be regarded below) 9.d5 dd7 (after 9...dc8 10.d2 xf3 the threat of the c4-pawn can be repelled by the intermediate 11.a4 dd7 12.xf3± 10.d2 0-0 11.b1 a6 12.h3 xf3 13.xf3 c8 (in case of 13...b5 Black has to reckon with the unpleasant response of 14.cxb5 axb5 15.a3± to be followed by a2-b4) 14.e2 d4 (in case of 14...hb6 a4 d4 with the idea of f5-g3 White drives back Black's most active pieces by 16.e4! e6 17.a5±) 14...d4 15.e1 xe2+ (otherwise White retreats with the bishop to f1) 16.xe2 e8 17.e4 df6 18.xf6+ xf6 19.a4 dd7 20.a5± in the game Marin --
Jansa, Warsaw 1987, White maintained his advantage owing to the weakness of Black’s retarded e7-pawn.

7.0-0 exd4

After castling White is ready to close the centre by d4-d5. After 7...\h6 8.d5 \a5 9.\c2 0-0 (there is no way to win the pawn by 9...\xf3 10.\xf3 \xc4?? because of 11.\a4 --) 10.b3 a6 11.\b1± in the game Suba – Jorgensen, Copenhagen 1991, White is better because he controls more space. Also the space advantage secures for him better chances in case of 7...\f6 8.d5 \a5 (Black’s position is worse after 8...\b4 9.e4 0-0 10.\e± as well, Partos – K. Honfi, Bucharest 1975) 9.\d2 0-0 10.b3 e5 11.e4 a6 12.\b1 b6 in the game Andersson – Markovic, Belgrade 2000, White should have preferred 13.h3 \d7 (the exchange 13...\xf3 14.\xf3 is to White’s favour) 14.\g5 \c7 15.\d2±. In both cited fragments, with the knight on h6 as well as on f6, the poor position of Black’s other knight on a5 can tell in the further play.

8.exd4

The exchange of the light-squared bishops after 8.\xd4 \xe2 9.\exe2 (after 9.\dxe2 \f6 10.b3 0-0 11.\b1 \a5 12.a3 a6 13.\b2 \ac8 14.\f4 e6 15.\e2 \fd8 16.\fd1 in the game Todorcevic – Garcia Padron, Las Palmas 1993, there would be a position with mutual chances in case of 16...\f5!∞) 9...\f6 10.b3 0-0 11.\b2 a6 12.\c1 \d7 13.h3 \fc8± in the game Illijin – Handke, Biel 2000, made it easier for Black to create counterplay.

8...\h6

The pawn exchanges 8...\xf3 9.\xf3 \xd4 10.\xb7 are to White’s advantage, and after 10...\b8 11.\e4 e5 12.\b5! \xb5 13.\c6+ \f8 14.cx\b5 \e7 15.\a4± White gained an obvious advantage in the game M. Sorokin – Guerra Bastida, Linares 1999.

Also Black can’t solve all his problems by 8...\c8 because after 9.b3 \d7 10.\e3 \h6 11.h3 \xf3 12.\xf3 \f5 13.\g4 d5 14.\xd5 e6 15.\xf5 gxf5 in the game Andersson – Anand, Wijk aan Zee 1990 White just missed an excellent tactical opportunity of 16.\h6! 0-0 17.\xg7 \xg7 18.\f4 \xd4 19.\f3±, and in this position White’s pawn majority on the queenside could tell, as well as the unsafe castling position of Black’s king.

9.d5 \xf3 10.\xf3 \e5 11.\e2
Also White can hope for an advantage after the other bishop’s retreat 11.\textit{\textbf{e}}4, but in this case the play is more sharp. It can continue by 11...0-0 (in case of 11...\textit{\textbf{a}}5 White has 12.\textit{\textbf{d}}2!, and if Black takes the sacrifice by 12...\textit{\textbf{xc}}4?!., then after 13.\textit{\textbf{xh}}6 \textit{\textbf{h}}6 14.\textit{\textbf{d}}4 \textit{\textbf{e}}5 15.\textit{\textbf{f}}4 \textit{\textbf{f}}5 16.\textit{\textbf{fxe}}5 \textit{\textbf{exe}}4 17.\textit{\textbf{exd}}6 \textit{\textbf{b}}6 18.\textit{\textbf{xb}}6 \textit{\textbf{axb}}6 19.\textit{\textbf{xe}}4\pm he finds himself in a troublesome endgame, whereas after 11...\textit{\textbf{f}}5 12.\textit{\textbf{c}}2 0-0 White gained a fair compensation for the pawn by 13.\textit{\textbf{d}}e2! \textit{\textbf{xc}}4 14.\textit{\textbf{d}}d4 \textit{\textbf{f}}6 15.\textit{\textbf{d}}d3 \textit{\textbf{c}}8 16.\textit{\textbf{e}}1 \textit{\textbf{g}}4 17.\textit{\textbf{h}}3 \textit{\textbf{ge}}5 18.\textit{\textbf{xe}}2\textit{c} in the game Speelman – Xu Ju, Luzern 1989) 12.\textit{\textbf{b}}3 \textit{\textbf{h}}g4 (after 12...\textit{\textbf{f}}5 13.\textit{\textbf{f}}3 \textit{\textbf{f}}4 in the game Trifunovic – Portisch, Oberhausen 1961, Black would not gain anything from his sally on the kingside if White played accurately 14.\textit{\textbf{b}}2\textit{c}+) 13.\textit{\textbf{c}}2 \textit{\textbf{c}}6 14.\textit{\textbf{c}}2 a6 15.\textit{\textbf{e}}e2 \textit{\textbf{c}}8 16.\textit{\textbf{a}}4 \textit{\textbf{e}}8 17.a5\pm in the game Morovic Fernandez – Xu Jun, Novi Sad 1990, White maintained an advantage owing to his pair of bishops and space dominance.

11...\textit{\textbf{af}}5

11...\textit{\textbf{c}}8?! is no good for Black because after 12.\textit{\textbf{xh}}6 \textit{\textbf{xh}}6 13.\textit{\textbf{a}}4+ \textit{\textbf{d}}7 14.\textit{\textbf{xa}}7 0-0 15.\textit{\textbf{b}}3 \textit{\textbf{f}}5 16.\textit{\textbf{d}}4\textit{c} he has no compensation for the missing pawn, Lobron – Meister, Germany 1988. After 11...0-0 12.\textit{\textbf{b}}3 \textit{\textbf{f}}5 (after 12...\textit{\textbf{a}}5 13.\textit{\textbf{b}}5 \textit{\textbf{f}}5 14.\textit{\textbf{d}}2 \textit{\textbf{b}}6 15.\textit{\textbf{a}}4 a6 16.\textit{\textbf{a}}5 \textit{\textbf{d}}8 17.\textit{\textbf{c}}3 \textit{\textbf{d}}4 18.\textit{\textbf{a}}4 \textit{\textbf{c}}7 19.\textit{\textbf{b}}6 \textit{\textbf{ae}}8 20.\textit{\textbf{c}}1\textit{c} in the game Ivkov – Pietzsch, Lugano 1968, White managed to squeeze Black on the queenside) 13.\textit{\textbf{b}}2 \textit{\textbf{d}}4 14.\textit{\textbf{e}}1 \textit{\textbf{xe}}2+ 15.\textit{\textbf{xe}}2 a6 16.\textit{\textbf{d}}2\textit{c} in the game Peelen – Hartoch, Leeuwarden 1997, even though Black managed to exchange one of White’s bishops, he still failed to equalize because the potential weakness of his retarded e7-pawn.

12.\textit{\textbf{h}}1 \textit{\textbf{h}}5

Black wants to secure a solid stand for his f5-knight.

13.\textit{\textbf{d}}2 a6 14.\textit{\textbf{c}}1 \textit{\textbf{c}}8 15.\textit{\textbf{e}}4 \textit{\textbf{f}}8 16.\textit{\textbf{b}}4 \textit{\textbf{d}}7 17.\textit{\textbf{c}}3 \textit{\textbf{e}}6 18.\textit{\textbf{a}}1 \textit{\textbf{d}}8 19.\textit{\textbf{a}}3\pm

This position occurred in the game Vaganian – Hamdouchi, New Delhi (m/2) 2000. Black got the f5-square for his knight, but
White still maintains some advantage because Black can’t coordinate his rooks after he refused castling.

b) 4...e5

5.dxe5

By 5.e4 White gets the position, considered in Chapter 14, but he also can try to make use of the order of moves, chosen by Black.

5...dxe5 6.\textit{x}xd8+ \textit{x}xd8

Despite the queen exchange the position is still of the middlegame sort, and the centralised position of the black king can let White develop his initiative in the further play.

7.\textit{xd}2 \textit{e}6

Also the prophylactic 7...f6 was tested. But after 8.0-0-0 \textit{e}8 (after 8...\textit{d}7 White played 9.g4! c6 10.\textit{e}4 \textit{c}7 11.\textit{b}4 \textit{f}3 in the game Groszpeter – Chilingirova, Katerini 1994, and then 12.\textit{c}3!± with the idea of g4-g5; after 8...\textit{d}7 White continued in the same way 9.g4!, and after 9...\textit{c}8 10.h3 a5 11.\textit{g}2 \textit{e}7 12.\textit{e}3 \textit{a}6 13.\textit{d}2± in the game Kasparov – Reading, Peoria (simultan) 1998, Black had problems too) 9.h3 \textit{e}6 10.b3 \textit{a}6 (in case of 10...c6 there is 11.g4! \textit{a}6 12.\textit{e}4 \textit{f}8 13.\textit{c}3±, and if 10...h5, then 11.\textit{g}1 \textit{a}6 12.g4 hxg4 13.hxg4± 11.g4! (White’s initiative develops according to the standard pattern) 11...\textit{d}8 (in case of 11...\textit{e}7 12.\textit{g}2 c6 White prepares g4-g5 by 13.\textit{e}4 \textit{c}8 14.\textit{c}3± 12.\textit{g}2 \textit{e}7 13.\textit{e}3 \textit{c}8 (in case of 13...\textit{c}6 or 13...\textit{f}7 White has 14.\textit{b}5±) 14.\textit{b}5! (Black’s unwillingness to weaken the d6-square by c7-c6 gave this additional tactical chance to White) 14...\textit{x}d1+ (after 14...\textit{f}7 15.\textit{xa}7 \textit{xa}7 16.\textit{xa}7 b6 17.\textit{xd}8 \textit{xd}8 18.\textit{d}1 \textit{xd}1+ 19.\textit{xd}1 \textit{e}7 20.a3 to be followed by b3-b4 and c4-c5 White’s bishop will get free gradually) 15.\textit{xd}1 \textit{e}7 (if 15...b6, then 16.\textit{e}1± to be followed by \textit{b}7) 16.\textit{xe}5 c6 (16...\textit{xe}5 is no better because of 17.\textit{xb}7 \textit{b}8 18.\textit{xc}7±) 17.\textit{xc}6 bx\textit{c}6 18.\textit{xc}6± in the game Kasparov – Azmaiparashvili, Moscow 1994, White’s compensation for the piece was more than enough, and he had a strong initiative.

After 7...\textit{e}8 8.\textit{b}5 \textit{a}6 9.0-0-0 f6 White managed to keep up a slight advantage by preparation of the traditional attack by the g-pawn after 10.h3 \textit{h}6 11.g4 \textit{f}7 12.\textit{g}2 c6 13.\textit{c}3 \textit{e}6 14.b3 f5 15.\textit{xf}5 \textit{xf}5 16.\textit{e}1 \textit{c}5 17.\textit{c}2 \textit{f}6 18.\textit{e}3± in the game Shariyazdanov – Gelman, Russia 1996.
8.0-0-0 \( \text{d}7 \\
In case of 8...\text{c}8 White can go for the pawn sacrifice, making use of the position of Black's bishop on e6, by 9.\text{g}5!? (the quiet play after 9.e3 h6! 10.\text{g}1 \text{d}7 11.g4 a5 12.\text{e}4 \text{g}6f6 13. \text{xf}6 \text{xf}6 14.\text{xe}5 \text{e}4 15.\text{d}3 \text{d}8 16.\text{g}2 \text{d}6 17.\text{c}5 \text{xc}4= in the game Nalbandian – I. Rogers Biel 1993, allowed Black to equalize the position). After 9...\text{xc}4 10.e4 (in case of 10.b3 Black finds 10...h6! 11.bxc4 hxg5 12.\text{g}xg5 f6 13.\text{e}3 \text{c}6= with equal play) 10...\text{xf}1 11.\text{hx}f1 \text{h}6 12.f4 \text{d}7 13.f5 \text{f}6 14.h3 a5 15.g4 gxf5 16.exf5 \text{a}6 17.\text{f}3 \text{d}7 18.\text{f}6!\text{=} in the game Van Wely – I. Rogers, Germany 2001, White's activity on the kingside was more than compensating because of the poor position of Black's pieces. \\
14.\text{b}2 \text{b}6 as result of White's too active play on the queenside, Van Wely – Topalov, Monte Carlo 1997. \\
9...\text{xc}4 10.e4 \text{xf}1 \\
After 10...\text{e}6 11.\text{xe}6+ \text{xe}6 12.\text{c}4\text{=} Black's double isolated pawns on the e-file are very weak. \\
11.\text{hx}f1 \text{h}6 12.f4 \text{c}6 \\
The exchange 12...\text{ex}f4 13. \text{xf}4\text{=} provides the semi-open f-file for the development of White's initiative, and, for example, in case of incautious 13...c6? he can perform a nice winning combination by 14.\text{e}3! \text{e}7 15.\text{xf}7 \text{xf}7 16.\text{xd}7+ \text{xd}7 17.\text{xf}7+\text{=}.
13.\text{xe}5 \text{e}7 14.\text{f}3 \\
After 14.e6 \text{xe}6 15.\text{e}3 Black equalizes by 15...\text{xc}3 16.bxc3 \text{e}5=.
14...\text{g}4 15.\text{g}5+ \text{e}8 16.e6 \\
White tries to increase the area of his activity in the centre of the board.
16...\text{fx}e6 17.\text{ad}6 \text{f}8 \\
The other way of development 17...\text{c}5 does not work because of 18.b4! \text{xc}3 19.bxc5\text{=}.
18.\text{fd}1 \text{f}6 \\
After 18...\text{h}6 19.\text{ad}8+ \text{xd}8 20.\text{xd}8+ \text{f}7 21.\text{d}2 \text{h}7 (in case of 21...\text{e}7, recommended by J. Seirawan, there is 22.\text{a}8 b6 23.\text{xa}7+ \text{d}7 24.\text{a}4\text{=} 22. \text{a}8 \text{a}6 23.\text{a}4\text{=} White invades the opponent's camp, and the striking difference in the position of the rooks makes White's compensation for the pawn at least
enough.

19.e5
In case of 19.\textit{xf6} \textit{xf6} 20. \textit{e5} Black can co-ordinate his pieces step by step, namely by 20...g5! = to be followed by \textit{e7} and \textit{g6}.

19...\textit{xg5+}
After 19...\textit{e7} 20.\textit{e4!} = White's rook on d6 is already invulnerable, and the activity of White's pieces grows.

20.\textit{xe5} \textit{xe5}
In case of 20...\textit{e7} there is 21.\textit{ec5} \textit{xe5} 22.\textit{c5=} with a sufficient compensation for the missing pawns, but still this line looks as Black's best option.

21.\textit{xe6} \textit{e7}
If 21...\textit{b8}, then 22.\textit{c5=}.

22.\textit{d8!} \textit{b8} 23.\textit{e4}=

This position occurred in the game Kramnik – Topalov, Monte Carlo 1998. White has a full compensation for the pawn: Black's rooks are disconnected, and his king is open and vulnerable. Black has to perform piece manoeuvres most accurately to avoid trouble.
Part 4. Dutch Defence

1.\(\textit{\text{d}}f3\) f5

The present part regards structures which are typical of the Dutch Defence. Variations below will demonstrate that a slight delay of the advance d2-d4 can provide some additional advantage to White here as well as in Anti-Nimzo-Indian and Anti-Queen’s Indian variations (considered, respectively, in Book II, Part 1 and Part 2).

2.\(\textit{\text{c}}4\)

A programmed move. White shows at once that he is not inclined to leave the centre without concern. Also 2.\(\textit{\text{g}}3\) occurs along with this move. For the positions to be regarded below it makes no substantial difference which of these moves White chooses, not counting an insignificant tactical nuance, explained in the note to Black’s second move (ref. to the last paragraph of the note to 2...\(\textit{\text{d}}f6\)).

The move 2.d4 is, however, less accurate. The point is that after 2...\(\textit{\text{d}}f6\) 3.\(\textit{\text{c}}4\) e6 4.\(\textit{\text{g}}3\) d5 5.\(\textit{\text{g}}2\) c6 we will have to deal with the Stone Wall in full measure, with the white knight on f3. Vladimir Kramnik himself estimates the position after 6. 0-0 \(\textit{\text{d}}6!\) (the position after 6...\(\textit{\text{e}}7\) suits us very well and will be considered in Chapter 19) as follows, “the Stone Wall is one of those few opening systems in which Black can gain some space advantage at once. I used to play this opening for both sides, and in my feeling it’s even easier to play it for Black than for White. In any case, White usually has more problems choosing a plan.”

Considering the variation with the black bishop on e7 as White’s main plan, we can see that after 7.\(\textit{\text{e}}\text{bd}2\) (after 7.b3 \(\textit{\text{e}}\text{e}7\) 8.\(\textit{\text{b}}\text{b}2\) b6 9.\(\textit{\text{e}}\text{bd}2\) \(\textit{\text{b}}\text{b}7\) 10.\(\textit{\text{e}}\text{e}5\) 0-0 11.\(\textit{\text{d}}\text{f}3\) \(\textit{\text{d}}\text{bd}7\) 12.\(\textit{\text{c}}\text{c}2\) \(\textit{\text{ac}}8\) 13.\(\textit{\text{c}}\text{xd}5\) cxd5 14.\(\textit{\text{c}}\text{d}3\) \(\textit{\text{e}}\text{e}4\) 15.\(\textit{\text{c}}\text{xd}7\) \(\textit{\text{xd}}\text{d}7\) 16.\(\textit{\text{e}}\text{e}5\) \(\textit{\text{e}}\text{e}7\) 17.\(\textit{\text{f}}\text{f}3\) \(\textit{\text{f}}\text{f}6\) 18.\(\textit{\text{c}}\text{ac}1\) \(\textit{\text{d}}\text{d}7\) 19.\(\textit{\text{c}}\text{xd}7\) \(\textit{\text{xd}}\text{d}7\) 20.\(\textit{\text{xc}}\text{xc}8\) \(\textit{\text{xc}}\text{c}8\) the position was fully
equalized in the game Van Wely – Kramnik, Arnem 1990, and an attempt to accomplish the important advance in the centre by 21.e4?! even resulted in some problems for White after 21... fxe4 22.fxe4 dxe4 23.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xe4 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xe4 24.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xe4 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e7 25.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e1 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f6\(\text{nf6}\) 7...b6 (a curious strategic structure occurred after 7...0-0 8.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e5 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)bd7 9.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)df3 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e4 10.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f4 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xe5 11. \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xe5 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e7 12.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)c2 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)d8 13.c5 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xe5 14.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xe5 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)g5 15.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)d3 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f6 16.e3 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)d7 17.b4 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f7 18.f4 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e8 19.a4 a6 20.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)c3 h6 21.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)a3\(\text{h3}\) in the game Kasparov – Sermier, Besancon (simultan) 1999, when White maintained opportunities for active play on both flanks despite the absolutely closed position) 8.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e5 0-0 9.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)d3 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)a6 10.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)c2 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e4 11.b3 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)d7 12.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f3 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)c8 13.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f4 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e7 it's very difficult for White to oppose Black's activity in the centre despite the ideal set-up of his pieces. After 14.a4 (Black's activity should not be underestimated, so, after 14.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xd6 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xd6 15.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)fd1 c5 16. dxc5 bxc5 17.e3 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)b7 18.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)b2 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)b6 19.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)ac1 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)fd8 20.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f4 dxc4 21. \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xc4 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)a6 22.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)c2 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e5 23.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)cc1 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)g4 Black took the initiative in the game Jussupow – Salov, Paris (active) 1991) 14...c5 15.a5 b5 16.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xd6 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xd6 17.b4 bxc4 18.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xc5 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)b8 19.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)ab1 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)b5 20. \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)b2 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f8 21.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f1 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)c8 22.e3 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)df6 23.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e5 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xc5 24.bxc5 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)a6 25. \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)c3 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)d7= Black had no problems in the game Van Wely – Vaisser, Hyeres 1992.

2...\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f6

The continuations 2...e6 3.g3 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f6, 3...d5 4.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)g2 c6 5.0-0 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f6 and 3...\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e7 4.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)g2 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f6 produce positions considered below in Chapters 18-22. In case of 2...d6 White should not delay 3.d4 if he wants to prevent the advance e7-e5. After 3...g6 4.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)c3 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)g7 (after 4...\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f6 5.g3 the play steers into some positions from Chapters 23-26) White has 5.e4!? (the same position occurs with transposed moves after 2...g6 3.d4 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)g7 4.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)c3 d6 5.e4!; also it should be noted that if White refrains from immediate activity in the centre of the board and goes on with the quiet development of pieces by 5.g3 c6 6.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)g2 like in the variation considered in Chapter 23 (p. 228), then Black can transfer his knight to f7 by 6...\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)h6!? 7.0-0 0-0 8.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)b1 a5 9.d5 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f7 10.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e3 e5 11.dxe6 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xe6 12.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)d3 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e5 13.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xe5 dxe5 14. \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xd8 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xd8= Alonso – Pereira, Americana 2000, thus getting good play). After 5...\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f6 (now the side maneouvre of the black knight is already inefficient, and after 5...\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)h6 6.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)d3 0-0 7.h4! \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)c6 8.d5 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e5 9.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xe5 dxe5 10.h5 f4 11. hxg6 hxg6 12.c5 b6 13.b4 a5 14.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)a3\(\text{h3}\) Black had great difficulties on both flanks in the game M.Mitkov – Ribeiro, Lisbon 2000, whereas after 5...\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xe4 6.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xe4 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)f6 7.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)xf6 exf6 8.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e2 0-0 9.0-0 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)h8 10.\(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e3 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)e6 11.d5 \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)g8 12. \(\text{\textordmasculine}}\)b3 b6 in the game Pokupec – Strozewski, Velden 1995, White
could have maintained a slight advantage by 13.\(\text{d}4!\text{?}\)± owing to his control of space and light squares) 5...\(\text{xf}6\) 6.\(\text{xf}5\) (after 6...\(\text{g}x\text{f}5\) 7.\(\text{d}5\) 0-0 8.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{a}6\) 9.0-0 \(\text{c}5\) 10.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{g}4\) 11.\(\text{g}5\)± in the game Vilela – Zapata, Havana 1982, the chronic weakness of the retarded e7-pawn turned out rather perceptible) 6...\(\text{xf}5\) 7.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{g}4\) 8.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{d}7\) (after 8...0-0 9.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 10.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 11.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{xf}3\) 12.\(\text{xf}3\)± Goormachtigh – J. Renet, Antwerp 1998, White maintained better chances owing to his pair of bishops) 9.0-0 \(\text{c}6\) 10.\(\text{e}3\) 0-0 11.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{xf}3\) 12.\(\text{xf}3\) e5 13.\(\text{dxe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 14.\(\text{e}2\)± in the game Birnboim – Y. Gruenfeld, Tel Aviv 1988, White’s position looked preferable because of the weakness of the light squares in Black’s camp, caused by the absence of the light-squared bishop.

An attempt of development in the Queen’s Indian style by 2...\(\text{b}6\) 3.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{b}7\) 4.\(\text{g}2\) with the idea to gain profit from the tactical peculiarities of the position by 4...e5?! can hardly be of great success. After 5.0-0 \(\text{d}6\) (a further advance of the e-pawn is no better: after 5...\(\text{e}4\) 6.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{g}6\) 7.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{g}7\) 8.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{a}6\) 9.\(\text{c}3\) in the game Urosevic – Diepstraten, Bela Crkva 1983, Black would have had big problems even if he had chosen his best continuation 9.\(\text{f}6\) 10.\(\text{g}5\)± 6.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{e}4\) 7.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{f}6\) 8.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 9.\(\text{f}3\) (after 9...0-0 10.\(\text{dxe}4\)± Black is unable to maintain the material balance, whatever capture on e4 he chooses) 9...\(\text{xf}3\) 10.\(\text{xf}3\) \(\text{xf}3\) 11.\(\text{xf}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 12.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 13.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{g}6\) 14.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{f}4\) 15.\(\text{dxe}4\) 0-0-0 because of 17.\(\text{b}4\)±) 16.\(\text{h}6\)± in the game Lockl – J. Urban, Hamburg 1987, Black suffered serious material losses. By \(\text{g}2\)-\(\text{g}3\) on the second move White could have eliminated the possibility of \(\text{e}7\)-\(\text{e}5\) without any detriment to the positions considered in Chapters 17-26 (after 2.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{b}6\) 3.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{b}7\) 4.0-0 the \(\text{g}2\)-bishop is already supported, and no immediate \(\text{e}7\)-\(\text{e}5\) is possible). However, as the above cited lines show, there is no special need for this trick.

3.\(\text{g}3\)

Now Black has to decide what way of development he is going to choose. Positions after 3...\(\text{e}6\) (the Ilyin-Zhenesky System) and ways of struggle against the Stone Wall are considered, respectively, in Chapters 18-22. The Leningrad System of the Dutch Defence, connected with 3...\(\text{g}6\), is analysed in Chapters 23-26. Still, before proceeding to these main systems, we are going to regard much less popular continuations in Chapter 17.
Chapter 17  1.\(\text{\textcopyright{f}3}\) f5 2.c4 \(\text{\textcopyright{f}6}\) 3.g3

Our objects now will be the continuations a) 3...\(\text{d}6\) and b) 3...\(\text{b}6\) which were mainly explored in the sixties and seventies of the last century.

a) 3...\(\text{d}6\)

The aim of this move is the same as in the variation 5.g3 c6 6.\(\text{\textcopyright{g}2}\), considered in Book I, Part 3 (Old Indian Defence): to perform the advance e7-e5 as soon as possible.

4.\(\text{d}4\)

White, naturally, tries to break Black’s plans.

4...\(\text{c}6\)

White is persistent at the pursuing his objects. He now has prepared c7 for his queen, so that it will support the desired advance from there. By 4...g6 Black can bring the play back to one of the main variations of the Dutch Defence to be considered in Chapters 23-26, or he can steer into one of the lines of the Ilyin-Zhenevsky System (Chapter 20-22) by 4...e6 5.\(\text{\textcopyright{g}2}\).

5.\(\text{\textcopyright{c}3}\) \(\text{c}7\)

Black had still another chance to return to the Leningrad Variation by 5...g6 6.\(\text{\textcopyright{g}2}\) \(\text{\textcopyright{g}7}\), this position is analysed in variation a of Chapter 25. In the game Sulyok – Wais, Austria 1999, Black tried to look for an own way, but after 5...\(\text{e}6\)? 6.d5 \(\text{cxd}5\) 7.\(\text{cxd}5\) \(\text{\textcopyright{f}7}\) 8.\(\text{\textcopyright{g}5}\) \(\text{\textcopyright{g}8}\) 9.\(\text{\textcopyright{g}2}\) \(\text{h}6\) 10.\(\text{e}6\) \(\text{\textcopyright{d}7}\) he got in trouble. The simplest way for White to emphasise his advantage now is 11.\(\text{\textcopyright{c}2}\), and if 11...g6, then 12.\(\text{\textcopyright{b}5\text{\textcopyright{c}7}\text{\textcopyright{e}1}}\) with an irrefutable threat of the intrusion of White’s knight to c7.

6.\(\text{\textcopyright{g}2}\) \(\text{e}5\)

Black got what he wanted, but the lag in development whittles away his small achievement in the centre.

7.0-0 \(\text{e}4\)

It’s not at all easy to refrain from the further advance of the
e-pawn. The point is that, for example, in case of 7...\textit{e7} Black’s pawn redoubts in the centre can be destroyed by 8.c5! (the continuation 8.dxe5 dxe5 9.e4 0-0 10.exf5 \textit{xf5}∞ occurred many times in practice and gains no special advantage to White as Black gets an active play at the cost of isolation of his e5-pawn).

Now after 8...e4 9.cxd6 \textit{xd6} White’s knight can head for the hot area by 10.\textit{d}e5!? (consequences of the timid 10.\textit{d}e1 \textit{e}6 11.\textit{g}5 \textit{bd}7 12.\textit{c}c1 \textit{a}5 13.\textit{d}d2 \textit{b}4∞ Norri – Haanpaa, Finland 1997, are much less obvious, as well as those of knight’s flank manoeuvre 10.\textit{g}5 h6 11.\textit{h}3 \textit{e}6 12.f3 \textit{exf}3 13.\textit{fxe}3 0-0 14.\textit{e}1 \textit{f}7∞ Vl. Sergeev – Ruckschloss, Bratislava 1996) 10...\textit{xe}5 (after 10...\textit{e}6 11.f3 \textit{xe}5 12.dxe5 \textit{exe}5 13.fxe4 \textit{fxe}4 14.d4 \textit{c}5 15.\textit{h}1 \textit{bd}7 16.\textit{c}c1 \textit{h}5 17.\textit{d}6 \textit{h}3 18.\textit{xh}3 \textit{xh}3 19.\textit{g}5± in the game Udovicic – Lombardy, Zagreb 1969, Black found himself in a truly hard position) 11.dxe5 \textit{exe}5 12.\textit{f}4∞ White has an excellent compensation for the missing pawn owing to the chronic weakness of the dark squares in his opponent’s camp. Then, in case of 7...\textit{e}6 it’s better to advance still another pawn: 8.d5! (after 8.c5 e4 9.\textit{g}5 \textit{c}8 10.cxd6 \textit{xd}6 11.\textit{f}3 h6 12.\textit{h}3 \textit{exf}3 13.\textit{x}f3 0-0 14.\textit{b}3+ \textit{h}7∞ there was a position with mutual chances in the game Kozma – Hort, Ostrava 1960)

8...\textit{d}7 9.e4 \textit{fxe}4 10.\textit{g}5 \textit{e}7 11.\textit{g}xe4 \textit{a}6 (after 11...0-0 White blew up Black’s centre by 12.c5!± 12.\textit{e}3∞, so that White maintains his advantage owing to the blockade position of his knight on e4.

8.\textit{e}1

8...\textit{e}7

Other continuations make Black fear, apart from the undermining f2-f3, an advance of White’s d-pawn which can deprive his own far advanced e4-pawn of its pawn support from the centre. So, after 8...\textit{e}6 9.d5 \textit{f}7 10.f3 \textit{bd}7 11.\textit{fxe}4 \textit{fxe}4 12.\textit{xe}4 \textit{cxd}5 13.\textit{xf}6+ \textit{xf}6 14.\textit{cxd}5 \textit{c}5 15.e3± in the game Jelling – V. Zhuravliov, Gothenburg 1993, Black stayed a pawn down, and after 8...\textit{f}7 9.d5 \textit{e}7 10.f3 \textit{cxd}5 11.\textit{cxd}5 \textit{exf}3 12.\textit{xf}3 0-0 13.\textit{g}5 \textit{h}5 14.\textit{d}6 \textit{xe}6 15.\textit{dxe}6 \textit{c}6 16.e4 \textit{xd}1 17.\textit{xd}1 \textit{fxe}4 18.\textit{xe}4 \textit{xe}4 19.\textit{x}e4 \textit{h}8 20.\textit{d}4 \textit{f}6 in the game Partos – Ciocaltea, Bucharest 1967, his position was no much better even despite the material balance on the board. By 21.\textit{d}5!± White could have protected his e6-pawn
easily, thus maintaining a considerable advantage in conjunction with his pair of bishops.

After 8...d5 9.cxd5 cxd5 10.\textit{\textbackslash{\textdca}}f4 \textit{\textbackslash{\textdcb}}b6 11.\textit{\textdca}d2 \textit{\textdcb}b4 12.\textit{\textdcb}c2 \textit{\textdcb}d6 13.\textit{\textdca}e5= in the game Ligtet-rink – Hostalet, Groningen 1967, Black solved the problem of safe defence of the e4-pawn, but, instead of this, the defence of the d5-pawn became urgent.

\textbf{9.f3}

White has to undertake something concerning the black e4-pawn in his camp, blocking up the long diagonal for his g2-bishop, while Black’s pieces are still underdeveloped. His lingering by 9.\textit{\textdca}f4 (obviously, with the idea of c4-c5) allowed Black to have a playable position after 9...\textit{\textdca}h5 10.\textit{\textdcb}c1 0-0 11.e3 \textit{\textdca}f6 12.b4 \textit{\textdca}bd7 13.\textit{\textdcd}b3 \textit{\textdca}h8 14.a4 a5 15.b5 \textit{\textdcb}b6= in the game Chocron – Studenetzky, Chacabuco 1965.

\textbf{9...exf3 10.exf3}

Also 10.\textit{\textdca}xf3 0-0 11.\textit{\textdca}f4 \textit{\textdcb}d8 12.\textit{\textdca}c2 \textit{\textdcb}e8 13.e4 \textit{\textdcb}h5 14.\textit{\textdca}e3 fxe4 15.\textit{\textdca}xe4 \textit{\textdcb}g6 16.\textit{\textdca}e2 \textit{\textdca}h3 17.\textit{\textdcb}g2= is possible with a slight advantage to White, Martz – Mozes, Harrachov 1967. White’s pieces stand more actively, but later in this game Black’s dark-squared bishop broke free after the f5-pawn left the board.

\textbf{10...0-0 11.\textit{\textdcb}d3 \textit{\textdca}e6}

After 11...\textit{\textdca}h5 White impeded the development of Black’s light-squared bishop by 12.f4 g6 13.\textit{\textdca}e1! in the game Barcelo – Palacios de la Prida, Spain 1990, and eventually after 13...\textit{\textdca}f6 14.\textit{\textdca}e3 \textit{\textdcb}a6 15.\textit{\textdcb}c1 \textit{\textdcb}g7 16.d5 c5 17.\textit{\textdcb}b5 \textit{\textdcb}d7 18.b4 b6 19.bxc5 bxc5 20.\textit{\textdca}f2= he got an advantage because Black failed to develop his queenside satisfactorily.

\textbf{12.b3 \textit{\textdca}f7}

After 12...\textit{\textdca}a6 13.\textit{\textdca}e1 \textit{\textdca}f7 14.\textit{\textdcb}h3 g6 15.\textit{\textdcb}f4 \textit{\textdcb}d7 16.d5 \textit{\textdca}c7 17.\textit{\textdcb}b2 h6 18.\textit{\textdcb}d4 \textit{\textdca}h7 19.dxc6 bxc6 20.\textit{\textdca}e4= in the game Udovic – Antoshin, Leningrad 1964, White transformed his space advantage into an attack on the black king.

\textbf{13.\textit{\textdcb}h3 \textit{\textdca}a6}

This position occurred in the game Zinser – Littlewood, Havana 1966. Of course, White can’t take the pawn now by 14.\textit{\textdca}xf5?? because after 14...\textit{\textdca}a5 he suffers serious material losses, but the easiest way for him to maintain his advantage is 14.\textit{\textdca}f4=, similarly to the example given in the note to Black’s 12th move.

\textbf{b) 3...b6}

Black wants to develop his pieces like in the Queen’s Indian Defence, hoping to use then the
f5-pawn in the struggle for e4. 4.\(g2 \ b7 5.0-0\)

5...e6

There were games in which Black attempted to fianchetto his second bishop as well. However, this manoeuvre does not influence White’s plan noticeably. After 5...\(g6 6.d4 \ g7\) White can cut off the long diagonal for Black’s light-squared bishop by 7.d5, as well as in the main variation. Then after 7...0-0 (after Black tried to attack White’s centre immediately by 7...b5 8.\(c3\) bxc4 9.\(d2\) e5 10.dxe6 \(xg2\) 11.exd7+ \(bxd7\) 12.\(xg2\) \(b6\) 13.\(c2\) 0-0 14.\(d1\) \(c8\) 15.\(f3\) \(c6\) 16.\(e3\) \(ae8\) 17.\(d4\) in the game Kulgowski – H. Bohm, Amsterdam 1982, White’s chances were still better owing to his more dense pawn structure; Black’s plan to block up the white pawns in the centre by 7...a5 8.\(c3\) \(a6\) 9.\(c2\) \(c5\) after 10.\(e3\) 0-0 11.\(ad1\) \(fe4\) 12.\(d4\) \(h6\) 13.\(xe4\) \(xe4\) 14.\(e5\) did not let him equalize the play fully as well in the game Vogel – Dignum, Hoogevest 2000; and in case of 7...\(e4\) which occurred in the game Chuchelov – Appleberry, Le Touquet 2000, Black trying to impede White’s development on the queenside, the best method to oppose this plan was 8.\(fd2\), and after 8...\(d6\) White would be able to develop his queen’s knight in the usual way by 9.\(c3\) 7...0-0 8.\(c3\) \(a6\) 9.\(e3\) \(c5\) it was sensible for White to make a useful consolidating move 10.\(c1!?\) anticipating an attack on the queenside. An immediate pawn attack by 10.b4 turned out quite inefficient after 10...\(ce4\) 11.\(xe4\) \(xe4\) 12.\(d4\) \(e6\) 13.\(xg7\) \(xg7\) 14.dxe6 \(e6\) 15.\(c2\) \(f6\) 16.\(ad1\) \(fd8\) in the game K. Ninov – J. Murey, Cappelle la Grande 1994.

6.d4 \(e7\)

Having maintained some control over the d5-square, Black often turns back to the plan with fianchettoing the dark-squared bishop. After 6...\(g6\) 7.d5 \(g7\) 8.\(c3\) 0-0 9.\(g5\)! (the simplifications 9.dxe6 \(dxe6\) 10.\(xd8\) \(xd8\) 11.\(f4\) \(a6\) 12.\(g5\) \(xg2\) 13.\(xg2\) give nothing to White: Black took the initiative by a pawn sacrifice after 13...\(c5\)? 14.\(xc7\) \(d2\) 15.\(ab1\) \(fe4\) in the game Salmon – Shabalov, Stratton Mountain 1999; but the possibility of 9.\(f4\) to be followed by \(d2\) and e2-e4 deserved attention, and this way White did gain an advantage in the game Amura – Botan, Moscow 1994) 9...\(e8\) 10.\(d2\) \(a6\) 11.\(d4\) \(e5\) 12.\(db5\) \(f7\) 13.e4 \(d6\) 14.exf5
gxf5 15...\texttt{a}e1 \texttt{w}f8 16.f4± in the game V. Ilkonnikov – Van Blitterswijk, Huy 1993, Black found himself in a hard situation, the support of his position in the centre being a very complicated task.

It should be noted as well that an attempt to secure against d4-d5 by 6...\texttt{w}c8 does not work, and after 7.d5 exd5 8.\texttt{a}g5 \texttt{w}e7 9.\texttt{h}h4↑ White can develop a strong initiative.

7.d5

The tempo spent for f7-f5 tells now. Unlike in the main variation of the Queen’s Indian Defence (1.d4 \texttt{f}f6 2.c4 e6 3.\texttt{f}f3 b6 4.g3 \texttt{b}b7 5.\texttt{g}g2 \texttt{w}e7 6.0-0 0-0), White performs the important pawn advance in the centre without any real problems, thus closing most of the long diagonal for Black’s light-squared bishop.

7...0-0

More than 75 years ago it was stated that Black should not take the d5-pawn right away. After 7...exd5 8.\texttt{d}d4 g6 9.\texttt{c}c3 \texttt{c}c6 10.\texttt{cx}d5 \texttt{cx}d4 11.\texttt{w}xd4 \texttt{a}c5 12.\texttt{c}c4 \texttt{d}d6 13.\texttt{b}b5± Black got in great trouble in the game E. Grunfeld – Opocensky, Meran 1924.

8.\texttt{d}d4

The most accurate continuation. After 8.\texttt{c}c3 Black organised a blockade of White’s position in the centre by 8...\texttt{h}b4?! 9.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{a}a6 10.\texttt{d}d4 \texttt{c}c5 11.\texttt{c}c2 \texttt{xc}3 12.\texttt{xc}3 \texttt{ce}4∞ in the game Kempinski – Markowski, Warsaw 1995.

8...\texttt{w}c8

Showing activity in the centre is unsafe for Black. So, after 8...c5 9.\texttt{c}c2 \texttt{w}c8 (both 9...e5?? and 9...\texttt{c}c7?? lose at once because of 10.d6++, and after 9...exd5 10.\texttt{c}c3 \texttt{a}a6 11.\texttt{d}xd5 \texttt{d}xd5 12.\texttt{c}c5+ \texttt{d}xd5 13.\texttt{w}xd5+ \texttt{w}h8 14.\texttt{d}d1 d6 15.\texttt{f}f4+ in the game Koerholz – Sterk, Schweich 1990, Black had serious problems with the defence of his d-pawn, whereas after 9...d6 10.\texttt{c}c3 \texttt{w}c8 11.e4!? exd5 12.exd5 \texttt{bd}7 13.\texttt{f}f4 in the game Wojtkiewicz – R. Luther, USA 2000, Black’s excessive care of the d6-pawn 13...\texttt{e}e8?! enabled White to accomplish a showy combination by 14.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{f}f7 15.\texttt{b}b5 \texttt{f}f8 16.\texttt{xd}d6\texttt{w}d6 17.\texttt{xe}7 \texttt{xb}5 18.\texttt{xf}7 \texttt{xf}7 19.\texttt{xb}5±) 10.\texttt{d}c3 e5 11.e4 (the consequences of another advance 11.d6 \texttt{d}d8∞ are less clear) 11...\texttt{f}xe4 (after 11...d6 12.\texttt{h}h3 g6 13.\texttt{e}e3± Black’s f5-pawn becomes his great trouble) 12.\texttt{xe}4 \texttt{xe}4 13.\texttt{h}xe4 d6 14.\texttt{e}e3 \texttt{w}e8 15.\texttt{d}d3 g6 (covering the h7-square by 15...\texttt{w}h5 does not work because of 16.\texttt{g}4 \texttt{h}h3 17.\texttt{f}f5 \texttt{w}xg4 18.\texttt{h}h1 \texttt{f}f7 19.\texttt{g}g1 \texttt{w}h5 20.\texttt{h}h6++) 16.\texttt{g}4 in the game Tal – A. Nielsen, Stockholm 1961, Black allowed a major mistake of 16...\texttt{c}c8? (after 16...\texttt{d}d7 17.\texttt{h}h6 \texttt{f}f7 18.f4± there would be at least the material balance on the board), and White gained from this immediately by 17.\texttt{xe}5! \texttt{f}f6 18.\texttt{c}c6+.

Also 8...\texttt{e}e4 9.dxe6 c5 does
not work because of 10.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xf5! \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xf5 11.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)c2 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)e5 (if 11...d5, then 12.cxd5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xd5 13.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)c3\( \text{\textcopyright} \) 12.f4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xe6 13.f5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)e5 14.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)f4\( \text{\textcopyright} \). Again, like on the previous move, there is no 8...xd5, this time because of 9.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xf5 c6 10.cxd5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xd5 11.e4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)c7 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)f4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)f6 13.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)c3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xc3 14.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)wb3\+ d5 15.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xc3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)e6 16.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)ad1+ Arboleda – Correa, Bogota 1992.

The move 8...\( \text{\textcopyright} \)c5 is relatively acceptable for Black, but even here after 9.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)c3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)g4 (9...\( \text{\textcopyright} \)e7? is bad because of 10.d6 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xd6 11.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xb7 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xd4 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xd4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xd4 13.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)b5\+ P. Meister – Keckeisen, Germany 1994; after 9...\( \text{\textcopyright} \)e8 10.a3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xd4 11.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xd4 e5 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)d3 e4 13.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)d4 d6 14.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)b5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)e7 15.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)c3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)a6 16.b4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)c8 17.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)d4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)d7 18.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)a4\+ Black’s forces were squeezed on the queenside in the game Koltshoff – Hochreiner, Pinneberg 2000; and after 9...\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xd4 10.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xd4 c5 11.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)d3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)g4 12.b3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)a6 13.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)b2 e5 14.h3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)h6 15.f4 e4 in the game Eisele – P. Berg, Germany 1989, White launched a strong attack on the black king by 16.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xe4! fxe4 17.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xe4\( \text{\textcopyright} \) 10.h3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)e5 11.b3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)f6 12.e3\+ in the game W. Schmidt – Opitz, Dresden 1993, Black had to solve problems caused by the lack of space, resulting into underdevelopment of his queenside.

9.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)c3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)a6

This position occurred in the game P. Schlosser – Wach, Graz 1993. Perhaps, White should have continued by 10.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)b3?!\( \text{\textcopyright} \), and then \( \text{\textcopyright} \)c1-b2 in order to complete the development of his queenside and keep up his space advantage at the same time.

The tactical operation of 10.dxe6 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xg2 11.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xf5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)b4 12.e7 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xf1 13.exf8w+ \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xf8 14.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xf1 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xc3 15.bxc3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)e4\+, even though it wins a pawn to White, is hardly advisable because of the numerous pawn weaknesses in White’s position, and after 10.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)f4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)c5 11.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)cb5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)e8 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)c1 (after 12.dxe6 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xg2 13.exd7 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)b7 14.dxe8w \( \text{\textcopyright} \)axe8 15.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xc7 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)xf1 16.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)xf1 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)c8 17.\( \text{\textcopyright} \)d5= in the above mentioned game the activity of Black’s pieces was comparable with the two pawns White got against exchange) 12...\( \text{\textcopyright} \)f6 13.b4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)e4 14.f3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \)g5\( \text{\textcopyright} \) Black still had some counterplay chances, first of all connected with the threat of e6-e5.
Chapter 18  1.\(\text{d}f3\) f5 2.c4 \(\text{d}f6\) 3.g3 e6

Black is going to develop his dark-squared bishop to the a3-f8 diagonal. However, right now he does not want to determine his pawn structure in the centre, which forces White to be ready for any possible turn.

4.\(\text{g}g2\)

At this moment Black usually makes his choice between 4...d5 with the intention to build the Stone Wall, already mentioned in the very beginning of this part, and 4...\(\text{e}7\), lingering with the determination of his further plans.

The move 4...c6 is of no independent significance (experts in the Dutch Defence apply this move very often in order to make White determine the position of his king’s knight in the line 1.d4 f5 2.g3 \(\text{d}f6\) 3.\(\text{g}g2\) e6 4.c4 c6, and sometimes they transfer it into the present position just mechanically) because after 5.0-0 Black becomes the first to show his intentions: whether he wants to build the Stone Wall by 5...d5 or play 5...\(\text{e}7\) 6.0-0 at first, which is quite acceptable as well and will be discussed in detail below. After 4...d6 White prevents e6-e5 by 5.d4, thus making Black choose between the Ilyin-Zhenevsky System after 5...\(\text{e}7\) 6.0-0 (ref. to Chapters 20-22) and 5...g6 6.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{g}7\) 7.0-0 0-0 (these positions are considered in Chapter 24, p. 232).

The move 4...c5 does not suit the spirit of the position well. The resulting position is close to the English Opening, and the black pawn on f5 only grants additional opportunities in the centre of the board to White. After 5.0-0 \(\text{c}6\) (after 5...\(\text{e}7\) 6.d4 cxd4 7.\(\text{c}xd4\) \(\text{c}6\) 8.\(\text{c}3\) 0-0 9.b3 a6 10.\(\text{b}2\) \(\text{c}7\) in the game Hoeksema – Etmans, Dieren 1997, White prevented Black’s light-squared
bishop from development to the long diagonal by 11.\texttt{c1\texttt{±}}, and in case of 11...\texttt{b6?!} he would have the standard continuation 12.\texttt{d5!} that we know so well from Book II) 6.d4 \texttt{cxd4} (after 6...d5 7.\texttt{cxd5} exd5 in the game Linqvist – Kuusela, Finland 1997, White should not have hurried with the exchange on c5, a mere 8.\texttt{c3\texttt{±}} would have maintained his advantage, and exchanging pawns on c5 would be good only after Black would have lost a tempo moving his dark-squared bishop) 7.\texttt{dxd4} \texttt{xd4} (after 7...\texttt{e5} 8.\texttt{b3} \texttt{e7} 9.\texttt{c3} 0-0 White made use of Black’s pawn on f5 and increased the activity of his pieces by 10.e4 \texttt{xe4} 11.\texttt{xe4} \texttt{d6} 12.\texttt{e3} \texttt{e5} 13.\texttt{c1\texttt{±}} in the game Montiel – Maderna, Buenos Aires 1946) 8.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{e7} 9.\texttt{c3} 0-0 White gained an advantage by the method which is very typical of the English Opening, namely 10.c5?! (also White can try to accomplish the advantage \texttt{e2-e4} like in the old game Takacs – Steiner, Budapest 1926: 10.b3 \texttt{a5} 11.\texttt{b2} \texttt{c5} 12.\texttt{d3} \texttt{a6} 13.a3 \texttt{c7} 14.b4 \texttt{e7} 15.\texttt{ac1} \texttt{d6} 16.\texttt{e4\texttt{±}} 10...\texttt{d5} 11.\texttt{cxd6} \texttt{xd6} 12.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{xd6} 13.\texttt{d1} \texttt{e5} 14.\texttt{f4} \texttt{xf4} 15.\texttt{xf4\texttt{±}} Spraggett – Sangadsup, Novi Sad 1990.

\textbf{4...\texttt{d5}}

Black starts to build the Stone Wall without delay. However, the fact that White’s d-pawn is still in its initial position, will help White a lot in the further play.

\textbf{5.0-0}

The best suitable moves for building the Stone Wall now are \texttt{a} 5...\texttt{d6} and \texttt{b} 5...\texttt{c6}. As for the option of 5...\texttt{e7}, its problems will be discussed below in Chapter 19.

\texttt{a} 5...\texttt{d6}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chessboard.png}
\end{figure}

\texttt{6.\texttt{c3}}

Having his pawn on d4, White often tries to use the relative weakness of the e5-square in Black’s camp. To do this, he usually transfers his queen’s knight to e5 by the shortest route via d2. But in our case White’s plan is not to fight for e5, but to prepare \texttt{e2-e4}. This idea is possible just because the d-pawn has not yet moved.

\textbf{6...0-0}

After 6...\texttt{c6} 7.\texttt{d3} 0-0 (the retreat 7...\texttt{e7} involved great problems for Black after 8.e4 \texttt{a6} 9.\texttt{cxd5} \texttt{exd5} 10.\texttt{exd5} \texttt{cxd5} 11.\texttt{d4\texttt{±}} in the game M. Ivanov – Thorhallsson, Reykjavik 1994; after 7...\texttt{c7} 8.\texttt{cxd5} \texttt{exd5} 9.\texttt{g5} 0-0 10.e4 \texttt{d7} 11.\texttt{b3} \texttt{fxe4} 12.\texttt{dxe4} \texttt{f7} 13.\texttt{exd5} \texttt{xd5} 14.\texttt{xd5} \texttt{xex5} 15.\texttt{xd5\texttt{±}} in the game Dizdar – Piskov, Bel-
grade 1988, when the shortcomings of Black's pawn structure became prominent; and in case of 7...h6 8.\(c2 \Box a6 9.e4 dxe4 10.dxe4 fxe4 11.\(xe4 \Box xe4 12.\(xe4 0-0\) after 13.\(xh6!\) in the game Pogosov – Chigvintsev, Krasnoiarask 1998, Black stayed a pawn down because, if he had taken the sacrificed bishop, then White would have launched a decisive attack) White just aduces his main argument in this variation: 8.e4!

The further play may develop as follows:
8...\(bd7 9.cxd5 exd5 10.exd5 \(x\)xd5 11.\(x\)xd5 cxd5 12.\(b3 \Box b6 13.a4 \(h8 14.g5 \(e7 15.\(xe7 \(xe7 16.a5 \(d7 17.\(xd5 \(f6 18.\(e5\), and Black stayed a pawn down without a shade of compensation in the game Dizdarevic – Lezcano, Las Palmas 1990.

8...e5 9.cxd5 cxd5 10.\(b3 \(h8 11.\(d5 \(d5 12.exd5 \(d7 13.\(e1\), and White won an extra pawn, which, even though double, impeded the development of Black's pieces considerably in the game Duncan – C. Davies, Monmouth 2001.

8...\(c7 9.cxd5 exd5 10.e5 \(fd7 11.d4 \(b6 12.e2 \(h8 13.h4 \(e6 14.f4 \(g8 15.b3 \(e7 16.a4\) with excellent prospects on both flanks for White, Vaganian – Piasetiski, Toronto 1990.

8...d4 9.\(xd4 \(xg3 10.hxg3 \(xd4 11.\(e3 \(d8 12.e5 \(g4 13.c5 \(f7 14.e2 \(a6 15.d6 h5 16.d\), and White occupied an important stand on d6 in Black's camp in the game G. Beck – G. Danner, Austria 1992.

8...\(b4 9.exf5 exf5 10.\(b3 \(xc3 11.bxc3 dxc4 12.\(xc4 \(d5 13.\(e5 \(xc4 14.\(xc4 \(d8 15.\(g5 \(e6 16.f1 \(xc4 17.dxc4 \(f7 18.\(ab1 \(d7 19.\(xf6 \(xf6 20.\(e8\), and mass simplifications resulted in a hard endgame for Black with his queen's flank paralysed in the game Sloth – Nas, Torshavn 1997.

8...\(xe4 9.\(xe4 \(b4 10.\(x\)xd5 \(xc3 11.bxc3 \(xd5 12.exd5 \(xd5 13.\(g5 h6 14.\(e4 \(a5 15.d2 \(c7 16.c4 \(f6 17.b4\), and Black encountered serious problems with the defence of his dark squares in the game Haub – D. Mueller, Kleve 1999.

Black best continuation is, perhaps, 8...\(xe4 9.\(xe4 \(e5 (White maintained a slight advantage in the endgame after 9...\(xe4 10.\(e5 \(c4 11.\(d1 \(d1 12.\(xd1 \(d4 13.\(xe4 g6 14.h4 \(g7 15.g2 \(a6 16.\(e4\) in the game Co. Ionescu – Ianukowski, Bucharest 2001, as well as after 9...\(b4 10.exf5 \(xd1
11. \( \text{Nxd1 exf5} \) 12. \( \text{Qa4 Qe4} \) 13. \( \text{Qe3} \) \( \text{Qd7} \) 14. \( \text{a3 Ae7} \) 15. \( \text{Ac1} \) in the game Krasenkow – Mencinger, Ptuji 1989) 10. \( \text{Qb3} \) (after 10. \( \text{exf5} \) \( \text{Qxf5} \) 11. \( \text{Qe1 Qg4} \) 12. \( \text{Qb3} \) \( \text{Qxf3} \) 13. \( \text{Axf3} \) \( \text{Qb6} \) 14. \( \text{Qe3 Qxb3} \) 15. \( \text{Qxb3} \) a6 16. \( \text{Qed1} \) in the game M. Marin – Caballe, Manresa 1995, White got a better position too) 10... \( \text{Qb6} \) (after 10... \( \text{Qh8} \) 11. \( \text{exf5} \) \( \text{Qa6} \) 12. \( \text{Qe3 Qe7} \) 13. \( \text{Qh4} \) \( \text{Qf7} \) 14. \( \text{Qe4 Qxe4} \) 15. \( \text{Qxe4 Qc5} \) 16. \( \text{Qxc5} \) \( \text{Qxc5} \) 17. \( \text{g4} \) \( \text{Q} \) Black stayed a pawn down in the game Ionov – Del Rio Angelis, Alcobendas 1993) 10... \( \text{Qb6} \) 11. \( \text{Qe3} \) \( \text{Qxb3} \) 12. \( \text{axb3} \), but in this line White still has better chances owing to his superior development.

7.d3

Preparing e2-e4. White failed to gain an advantage when he included the preliminary exchange 7.\( \text{Qxd5 exd5} \) in his plan in the game Kochyev – Bretsnajdr, Dortmund 1990: 8.d3 \( \text{Qh8} \) 9. \( \text{Qg5} \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 10.e4 \( \text{Qxe4} \) 11.\( \text{Qxe4 fxe4} \) 12. \( \text{Qxd8 Qxd8} \) 13.\( \text{Qd2 Qa6} \) 14.\( \text{Qdx4 Qxe4} \) 15. \( \text{Qxe4 Qxg5} \) 16. \( \text{Qxg5 h6} \) 17. \( \text{Qf3 c6=} \).

If Black develops his queen's knight prior to the pawn exchange in the centre by 7... \( \text{Qc6} \), then after 8.\( \text{Qxd5 exd5} \) (after 8... \( \text{Qxd5} \) 9. \( \text{Qxd5 exd5} \) 10. \( \text{Qb3 Qe8} \) 11. \( \text{Qxd5+ Qe6} \) 12. \( \text{Qb5 a6} \) 13. \( \text{Qa4} \) in the game Hoffmann – Thielen, Seefeld 1998, Black got no sufficient compensation for the pawn) 9. \( \text{Qb5} \) (the move 9. \( \text{Qb3} \) is out of place now because of 9... \( \text{Qa5} \) 10. \( \text{Qa4 c5=} \) 9... \( \text{Qe7} \) (9... \( \text{Qc5} \) is slightly better for Black, even though after 10. \( \text{Qf4 Qb6} \) 11. \( \text{Qc1} \) White still was exerting pressure upon Black's queenside in the game E. Maslov – A. Korsunsky, St. Petersburg 1992) 10. \( \text{Qf4 Qe8} \) 11. \( \text{Qb3 Qh8} \) 12. \( \text{Qac1 Qf6} \) 13.h4 a6 14. \( \text{Qc3 Qe7} \) White launched a breakthrough in the centre by 15.e4! \( \text{Qxe4} \) 16.\( \text{Qxe4 dxe4} \) 17.\( \text{Qcd1 Qd7} \) 18.\( \text{Qxe4} \) in the game Miralles – Ivanovic, Vrsac 1989.

After 7... \( \text{Qbd7} \) 8.\( \text{Qxd5 exd5} \) 9.\( \text{Qb5 Qc5} \) White should have played 10. \( \text{Qf4} \) in order to keep up his pressure upon the opponent's queenside.

8.\( \text{Qxc4 Qc6} \) 9.e4!?

The programmed move. It would be hard to gain an advantage without it for White. After 9.\( \text{Qb5 e5} \) 10.\( \text{Qd6 cxd6} \) 11.b3 \( \text{Qe4} \)}
12.\textit{b2} \textit{e6} 13.\textit{c1} \textit{wb6} 14. \textit{d2} \textit{c5=} in the game Kochyev – Petrienko, USSR 1987, the weakness of the d5-square was absolutely imperceptible, and Black’s pair of active knights was no weaker than White’s pair of bishops. After 9.a3 e5 10.\textit{g5} e4 11.\textit{d4} \textit{d4} 12.\textit{d4} \textit{e8} 13.\textit{c1} \textit{e5} 14.\textit{d2} \textit{e6=} in the game Thiehle – Riedel, Bayern 1999, Black managed to complete his development quietly, too.

\textbf{9...e5}

Black tries to reanimate his light-squared bishop. After 9...\textit{fxe4} 10.\textit{g5} \textit{e5} 11.\textit{e5=} White wins back the pawn he has sacrificed on the ninth move and maintains a superior pawn structure.

\textbf{10.exf5} \textit{xf5} 11.\textit{e3=}

Black’s isolated e5-pawn is certainly no weakness in the middlegame, yet allows White to have a convenient stand on e4, and after 11...\textit{e7} he made use of this fact by 12.\textit{g5} \textit{h8} 13. \textit{ge4} \textit{xe4} 14.\textit{xe4=} in the game Medic – Kokanovic, Kladovo 1990.

\textbf{b) 5...c6}

In most cases Black needs this move to finish his Stone Wall. He delays the development of his dark-squared bishop for some time, so that he can adjust his plan depending on White’s actions.

\textbf{6.d3}

White wants to perform the advance e2-e4 just like in the variation a.

\textbf{6...\textit{e7}}

Now that White has refrained from d2-d4, Black can determine his further plan. We saw already in the variation a what problems he encounters after 6...\textit{d6} 7. \textit{c3}. After e2-e4 White’s perpetual threat to win a piece by e4-e5 was very unpleasant. So Black’s wish to find a safer square for his bishop is quite justified.

Black tried to develop the bishop to c5, but it turned out no good as well. After 6...\textit{c5} 7.\textit{c2} \textit{e7} (in case of 7...\textit{b6} 8.\textit{bd2} 0-0 9.e4 \textit{bd7} 10.b4 \textit{a5} 11.\textit{c5} \textit{c7} 12.\textit{d4} \textit{e5} 13.exf5 exf5 14.b5= in the game Franz – Espig, Germany 1995, White developed a strong initiative on the queen-
side with the support of the d4-knight, and after 7...\(\text{\textit{c}}\)bd7 8.cxd5 Black had to agree to 8...cxd5 because if he had taken on d5 by the e-pawn, then after d3-d4 he would have lost the f5-pawn, so after 9.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c3 0-0 10.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)f4 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e7 11.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)a4 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d6 12.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)xd6 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)xd6 13.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)fc1 f4 14.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c7+ White occupied the c-file in the game M. Makarov – L. Arnold, Cappelle la Grande 1996) 8.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)f4 (White should see to Black’s possible activity in the centre, so, after 8.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c3 0-0 9.a3 a5 10.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)a4 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a7 11.b4 e5 12.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b2 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)bd7 13.cxd5 cxd5 14.b5 e4 in the game Lauvsnes – Gausel, Norway 1991, Black created good counterplay) 8...0-0 9.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)bd2 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)bd7 10.d4 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d6 11.cxd5 cxd5 12.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)xd6 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)xd6 13.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)fc1 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e8 14.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)a4 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b6 15.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)a5+ White won the fight for the c-file in the game Maltsev – Raivio, Finland 2000.

So far nobody has agreed to suffer after the queen exchange in the variation 6...dxc4 7.dxc4 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)xd1 8.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)xd1+. No wonder, the weakness of the e5-square in Black’s camp and the unemployed light-squared bishop can really cause great problems.

7.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)a3!?

The most fundamental continuation. White is going to accomplish the desired advance despite the little trick Black applied on the previous move. The continuation 7.b3 0-0 8.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b2 in the spirit of the Reti Opening is less consistent but possible as well. For example, after 8...a5 (in case of an immediate transfer of the bishop to h5, which is typical of the Dutch Defence, after 8...h7 9.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)bd2 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e8 White found a very strong move 10.e4!↑ in the game Kern – Froeyman, Antwerp 1999, and also a similar breakthrough was accomplished after Black’s attempt to transfer his queen to h5 in the game Petursson – Bergsøe, Gardaer 1991: 8...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e8 9.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)bd2 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)bd7 10.e4 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)h5 11.exf5 exf5 12.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d4 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)xd1 13.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)xd1 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)b6 14.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)fe1+, even after 8...\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b6 9.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)bd2 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b7 White gained a fair compensation for the exchange by 10.e4!? c5 11.cd ed 12.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)d7 13.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)e1 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)c6 14.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e5 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)xe5 15.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)xe5 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e8 16.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c2 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c7 17.g4 \(\text{\textit{f}}\)f6 18.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)f4 in the game Anic – Apicella, Vichy 2000) 9.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c3!? \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a6 10.a3 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d7 (10...\(\text{\textit{a}}\)c5 is no good because of 12.b4 ab 13.axb4 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)xa1 14.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)xa1 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a6 15.b5 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c5 16.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)a7+ Krasenkow – Kveinys, Krynica 1997) 11.e3 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a8 12.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e2 \(\text{\textit{f}}\)h5 Timman – B. Larsen, Montreal 1979, and now the easiest way for White to maintain his pressure upon Black’s position was 13.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)f4!±. 7...0-0
8.e4!
There is no need in the preliminary 8...e1.

8...fxe4
Black's attempt to solve his problems by tactical means was of no success after 8...d4 9.ex2 fxe4 (Black's decision to play a closed position after 9...c5 10. exf5 exf5 11.b4 d6 12.b5 db8 13.db5 dh5 14.dxe7 dxe7 15. db7 d6 16.db5+ did not save him trouble in the game Shchekachev – Relange, Bethune 1998) 10.dxe4 dxe4 (also the move 10... c5 turned out of little sense after 11.e5 de8 12.b4 dc6 13. bxc5 dbxc5 14.db2 dc7 15.db5+ in the game Umanskaya – Kononenko, Yalta 1995) 11.dxd4 dxf2 12. dxe2 (in case of 12.dxf2 e5 13. db3 e4= Black's idea works) 12... c5 13.db3 cxd4 14. dxd4 de6 15.db5+ in the game M. Marin – Pablo Marin, Manresa 1997.

It is worth mentioning that after 8...dxe4 9.dxe4 db7 10. be2 db5 11.d3 de8 12.e5 db4 13.dxe4 dxe4 14. db2 db5 15.dbf7 16.db3 db6 17.db3 db7 18.dbf4 dbc8 19.d5+ in the game Adamski – Askgaard, Copenhagen 1997, Black was squeezed from both flanks.

9.dxe4 dxc4
After 9...dxe4 10.db5 dbxd1 11.dbxd1 e3 12.f3 e2 13.db1 dc5+ 14.dbh1 h6 15.dbxe4 dxg4 16. dxg4 dbd4 17.dxg2 e5 18.db3+ in the game Krasch – Hinteregger, Werfen 1995, the difference in the development of the sides was just striking.

10.db5 dbx7 11.dbx7 dbd5 12.dbd2 dbd7 13.dbx4

This position occurred in the game Scarella – Lida Garcia, Florida Valle 1993. By 13...db4 Black launched an attack on the f2-square. However, White neutralized his activity by 14. dbd1 db5 15.dbc3, and after 15... dbd5 16.dbc2 db6 17.dxe4 dxg4 18.dbd3 de5 19.db3 db3+ Black encountered certain problems because of the bad position of his light-squared bishop and the defects in his pawn structure.
Chapter 19  

1. \( \text{\textgambit Qf3} \) f5 2. \( \text{c4 Qf6} \) 3. \( \text{g3 e6} \) 4. \( \text{\textgambit Kg2} \) \( \text{\textgambit Ke7} \)

Black still keeps in secret his intentions concerning the pawn structure in the centre.

5.0-0 \( \text{d5} \)

Again, Black tries to build the Stone Wall. At first sight, the disadvantages of such a transition with the bishop on e2 were stated already under \( \text{b} \), Chapter 18. However, there is a difference this time. The fact that Black did not waste time for \( \text{c7-c6} \) like in the variation \( \text{b} \), Chapter 18 changes the estimation of the position rather seriously.

Another possible continuation is 5...0-0, it does not reveal Black's intentions and will be considered in Chapters 20-22. The most important variation in this line is the Ilyin-Zhenevsky System. Now the move 5...\( \text{d6} \) brings the play to lines from this system too after 6.\( \text{d4} \) 0-0.

6. \( \text{d4} \)

White is ready to fight in one of the main variations of the Dutch Defence. Fixing the weak e5-square in Black's camp is an important decision because it weakens White's e4-square at the same time. Still, there is a slight advantage in advancing this pawn now, not on the previous move. Do remember: in the very beginning of Part 4 in the note to White's second move the black bishop moved to d6 at once. But now Black has already spent time to develop his bishop to a less active position on e7.

Now the plan to prepare e2-e4, so important for the variation from Chapter 18, is not as efficient. After 6.\( \text{d3} \) 0-0 7.\( \text{\textgambit Qc3} \) Black can take the occasion to advance his d-pawn by 7...\( \text{d4}! \) (after 7...\( \text{\textgambit Qc6} \) 8.\( \text{\textgambit exd5} \) \( \text{exd5} \) 9.\( \text{\textgambit Qg5}! \)? \( \text{h6} \) 10.\( \text{\textgambit Qxf6} \) \( \text{Qxf6} \) 11.\( \text{\textgambit Qb3} \) \( \text{\textgambit Qe7} \) 12.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{\textgambit Qxc3} \) 13.\( \text{\textgambit bxc3} \) \( \text{\textgambit Qh7} \) 14.\( \text{\textgambit exd5} \) \( \text{\textgambit Qxd5} \) 15.\( \text{\textgambit Qe6} \) 16.\( \text{\textgambit Qb6} \) 17.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{\textgambit Qg8} \) 18.\( \text{\textgambit Qac1} \) White managed to keep up some advantage in the game
Hertneck – Keitlinghaus, Germany 1991, as well as after 7...
\( \text{\textswab{h}}8 \text{ e}4 \text{ d}4 \text{ 9.e}2 \text{ fxe}4 \text{ 10.dxe}4
\text{ c}5 \text{ 11.e}5 \text{ \textswab{e}}8 \text{ 12.f}4\text{+ in the}
\text{ game Stohl – Keitlinghaus, Prague 1992) 8.d}b5 \text{ d}c6 \text{ 9.e}3
\text{ dxe}3 \text{ 10.xe}3 \text{ (after 10.fxe3 e}5
\text{ 11.d}4 \text{ e}4 \text{ 12.e}1 \text{ a}6 \text{ 13.c}3 \text{ h}5
\text{ 14.h}3 \text{ g}4 \text{ 15.d}5 \text{ d}6\text{ Black}
\text{ took the initiative in the game}
\text{ Steinbacher – Minasian, Groningen 1990) 10.e}5 \text{ 11.d}4 \text{ (after}
\text{ 11.e}1 \text{ g}4 \text{ 12.c}1 \text{ e}4 \text{ 13.dxe}4
\text{ x}d1 \text{ 14.x}d1 \text{ fxe}4 \text{ 15.g}5 \text{ x}f2
\text{ 16.f}1 \text{ in the game Summerscale – McDonald, Hove}
\text{ 1997 Black even gained an advantage by}
\text{ means of 16...x}g5 \text{ 17.x}g5 \text{ h}3+ \text{ 18.x}h3 \text{ x}h3
\text{ 19.x}f8+ \text{ x}f8 \text{ 20.f}4 \text{ d}b4 \text{ 21.x}c7 \text{ d}3\text{+})
\text{ 11.e}4\text{ and create some promising}
\text{ counterplay.}

There is also a way, similar to
\text{ the one mentioned in the note to}
\text{ White’s seventh move in variation b of Chapter 18. Thanks to}
\text{ the fact that Black has not spent}
\text{ time for c}7\text{c}6 \text{ he can now set up}
\text{ his forces more actively. For}
\text{ example, after 6.b}3 \text{ 0-0 7.h}b2 \text{ there}
\text{ is 7...b}6 \text{ (after 7...c}6 \text{ 8.d}3 \text{ the play}
\text{ comes to the position from the}
\text{ above mentioned note to White’s}
\text{ seventh move in the variation b}
\text{ of Chapter 18, and after 7...c}6
\text{ 8.e}3 \text{ b}4 \text{ 9.e}5 \text{ d}7 \text{ 10.xd}7
\text{ x}d7 \text{ in the game Csom – L.}
\text{ Karlsson, Wrexham 1996, White}
\text{ turned back to the Stone Wall in}
\text{ a favourable redaction by 11.d}4\text{!}
\text{ c}6 \text{ 12.a}3 \text{ a}6 \text{ 13.d}2 \text{ c}7 \text{ 14.f}3
\text{ e}8 \text{ 15.c}2\text{ and thus gained an}
\text{ advantage) 8.d}3 \text{ b}7 \text{ 9.bd}2 \text{ c}5.
\text{ However, after 10.e}3 \text{ c}6 \text{ (with}
\text{ the fianchetto of the light-squared}
\text{ bishop the e}6\text{ square becomes a weak point in Black’s}
\text{ camp, and after 10...bd}7?? 11.
\text{ g}5 \text{ e}5 \text{ 12.e}6\text{ in the game}
\text{ Rosiak – Jedryczka, Plock 1994, it}
\text{ turned out a real problem) 11.e}2 \text{ c}7
\text{ (after 11..e}8 \text{ 12.e}4
\text{ dxe}4 \text{ 13.dxe}4 \text{ f}4 \text{ 14.g}5 \text{ d}8
\text{ 15.e}5 \text{ x}g2 \text{ 16.xg2 c}6\text{+ 17.f}3
\text{ x}f3\text{+ 18.x}f3 \text{ d}7 \text{ 19.ad}1\text{ in the game Busch – Przewoznik,}
\text{ Netanya 1987, White maintained his advantage owing to}
\text{ his control of the open d-file) in}
\text{ the game Ogaard – Leow Leslie,}
\text{ Nice 1974, White could have ac-
\text{ complished the main plan of the}
\text{ variation by 12.e}4!\text{+ and thus}
\text{ keep up his initiative.}

6...0-0

7.c2!?

The main idea of White’s strategy is the capture of the
important e5-square to be followed by an advance on the
queenside or in the centre. In
\text{ order to hold the e}5\text{-square}
\text{ firmly, White needs to have his}
\text{ knights on d}3 \text{ and f}3. This can

187
be achieved by $\mathcal{Q}bd2$ with the idea of $\mathcal{Q}f3$-$e5$ and $\mathcal{Q}d2$-$f3$. However, this plan has a small defect. Its realisation can be impeded considerably by $7...\mathcal{Q}c6$! (the game Kasparov – Short, Bruxelles 1987, developed in a different way, and after $7...c6$ 8.$\mathcal{Q}e5$ $\mathcal{Q}bd7$ 9.$\mathcal{Q}d3$ $\mathcal{Q}e4$ 10.$\mathbb{W}e2$ there was a position which suits us absolutely and will be regarded below under 7.$\mathbb{W}c2$). Now after 8.b3 (in case of 8.$\mathbb{W}c2$ $\mathcal{Q}e4$ 9.b3 there is 9...$\mathcal{Q}b4$!! 10.$\mathbb{W}b2$ c5 11.cxd5 exd5 12.a3 $\mathcal{Q}c6$ 13.e3 $\mathcal{Q}f6$ 14.$\mathcal{Q}e5$, and after 14...cxd4 15.exd4 $\mathcal{W}b6$ 16.$\mathcal{Q}xc6$ bxc6 17. $\mathcal{Q}f3$ c5 18.$\mathcal{Q}e3$ $\mathcal{Q}b8$ 19.$\mathcal{Q}ab1$ $\mathcal{Q}a6$) Black took the initiative in the game Balashov – Y. Gusev, Moscow 1998) 8...\mathcal{Q}d7 9.$\mathcal{Q}b2$ a5 10.a3 (the move 10.$\mathcal{Q}e5$ is of little sense because of 10...$\mathcal{Q}e8$ 11.f3 a4 12.$\mathcal{Q}xc6$ $\mathcal{Q}xc6$ 13.$\mathbb{W}c2$ a3 14.$\mathcal{Q}c3$ $\mathcal{W}e8$ 15.$\mathcal{Q}ae1$ $\mathcal{Q}g6$ 16.e3 h5 17.$\mathcal{Q}f4$ h4 18.$\mathcal{Q}xh4$ dxc4 19.$\mathcal{Q}xc4$ $\mathcal{W}xg2$+ 20.$\mathcal{Q}xg2$ $\mathcal{Q}xg2$ 21.$\mathcal{Q}xg2$ $\mathcal{Q}d5+$, and Black’s endgame chances were even better in the game J. Pinter – L. Karlsson, Haninge 1988) 10...$\mathcal{Q}e8$ 11.$\mathcal{Q}c1$ (after 11.$\mathcal{Q}e5$ $\mathcal{Q}xe5$ 12.$\mathcal{Q}xe5$ $\mathcal{Q}e4$ 13.cxd5 exd5 14.$\mathcal{Q}xe4$ in the game L. Christiansen – Keitlinghaus, Germany 1995, Black could have gained a position with mutual chances if he had played 14...$\mathcal{Q}xe4$! 15.$\mathcal{Q}f3$ $\mathcal{Q}g6$) 11.$\mathcal{Q}e4$ 12.$\mathcal{Q}e1$ (the exchange in the centre by 12.$\mathcal{Q}xe4$ allows Black to exert strong counter pressure upon the d4-pawn by 12...$\mathcal{Q}xe4$ 13.$\mathcal{Q}e1$ $\mathcal{Q}f6$ 14.$\mathcal{Q}c2$ $\mathcal{W}d7$ 15.$\mathcal{Q}e3$ $\mathcal{Q}d8+$ 12...$\mathcal{Q}h5$!? 13.$\mathcal{Q}d3$ $\mathcal{Q}f6$ 14.$\mathcal{Q}d3$, and after the simplifications of 14...$\mathcal{Q}xc4$ 15.$\mathcal{Q}xc4$ $\mathcal{Q}xf3$ 16.$\mathcal{Q}xf3$ $\mathcal{Q}xd4$ 17.$\mathcal{Q}xd4$ $\mathcal{Q}xd4$ 18.$\mathcal{Q}xe4$ $\mathcal{Q}xe4$ 19.$\mathcal{Q}e5$ $\mathcal{Q}b5$ 20. $\mathcal{W}xd8$ $\mathcal{Q}xd8$ 21.$\mathcal{Q}xe4$ $\mathcal{Q}xa3$ 22. $\mathcal{Q}a1$ $\mathcal{Q}b5$ 23.$\mathcal{Q}xa5$ c6= Black equalized the position in the game Illescas Cordoba – P. Cramling, Gran Canaria 1989.

The move in the main text should decrease the efficiency of the possible attack on the d4-pawn by $\mathcal{Q}b8$-$c6$, in the note to Black’s seventh move this will be explained in detail.

White’s another very popular plan implies an exchange of the dark-squared bishops. Generally, this exchange is to White’s favour, but the time he spends for it can provide certain counter chances in the centre of the board to Black. After 7.b3 c6 8.$\mathcal{Q}a3$ (perhaps, White should turn back to the plan of maintaining a secure control over the e5-square as soon as possible by 8.$\mathcal{W}c2$!? $\mathcal{Q}d7$ 9.$\mathcal{Q}b2$ $\mathcal{Q}e8$ 10.$\mathcal{Q}e5$ $\mathcal{Q}bd7$ 11.$\mathcal{Q}d3$ $\mathcal{Q}h5$, and now in the game Eidelson – Markovic, Belgrade 1988, White used the old G. Kasparov’s recommendation 12.$\mathcal{Q}f4$, which after 12...$\mathcal{Q}f7$ 13.$\mathcal{Q}d2$ $\mathcal{Q}d6$ 14.$\mathcal{Q}f3$ $\mathcal{Q}e4$ 15.$\mathcal{Q}d3$ $\mathcal{W}e7$ 16.$\mathcal{Q}ae1$ $\mathcal{Q}ad8$ 17.$\mathcal{C}c5$ $\mathcal{Q}c7$ 18.$\mathcal{B}d4$ gained him an advantage) 8...$\mathcal{Q}d7$ 9.$\mathcal{Q}xe7$ (the queen exchange after 9.$\mathcal{W}c1$ $\mathcal{Q}e8$ 10.$\mathcal{Q}xe7$ $\mathcal{W}xe7$ 11.$\mathcal{W}a3$ $\mathcal{Q}xa3$ 12.$\mathcal{Q}xa3$ a5 13.$\mathcal{Q}e5$ $\mathcal{Q}bd7$ 14.$\mathcal{Q}d3$ $\mathcal{Q}h5$ 15.
\(\text{f}1\text{g}5\text{e}1\text{c}1\text{e}4\text{f}3\text{d}6\text{c}5\text{f}7\text{e}4\text{f}8\text{f}3\text{f}6=\text{won no additional advantage to White in the game Salov – Short, Barcelona 1989}) 9...\text{xe}7\text{e} 10.\text{bd}2\text{e}8 11.\text{e}5\text{bd}7\text{d}3\text{h}5\text{(after 12...g5 13.\text{f}3 \text{e}4 White demonstrated the security of his stand on e5 by 14.\text{xe}5?! \text{xe}5 15.\text{xe}5= in the game Sonsono – Salazar, New York 1986) 13.\text{f}4 (in case of 13.\text{f}3 White has to reckon with the apparently risky 13...\text{xf}3?! which can’t be repelled by 14. \text{ex}f3 because of 14...\text{dxc}4! 15. \text{bxc}4 \text{d}6 16.\text{f}4 \text{e}5 17.\text{dx}e5 \text{xd}1 18. \text{ax}d1 \text{xe}5=, Black equalizing the play) 13...\text{f}7 (Black does not fear to exchange the bishop for White’s knight) 14.\text{f}3 Black equalized by 14...\text{xf}3 15.\text{ex}f3 \text{dxc}4 16.\text{e}1 \text{fe}8 17.\text{bxc}4 \text{e}5 18.\text{dx}e5 \text{xe}5= in the game Lysyj – Kuzin, Smolensk 2001.}

7...\text{c}6

The move 7...\text{c}6 would be not as dangerous for White as in the above considered position with his knight on \text{d}2. After 8.\text{bd}1 (the position after 8.\text{bd}2 \text{e}4 was mentioned already in the note to White’s previous move) 8...\text{e}4 9.a3 a5 White can move his knight to a more active position by 10.\text{e}3. After 10...\text{f}6 11.\text{b}1 \text{e}7 12.\text{f}4 \text{c}6 13.\text{e}5 \text{d}7 14.\text{xf}6 \text{gxf}6 15.\text{e}1 \text{d}6 16.b3 \text{f}4 17.\text{d}3 \text{fxg}3 18.\text{hxg}3 \text{g}6 19.\text{c}5= in the game Blees – Bern, Iceland 1995, White gained an advantage owing to his superiority on dark squares.

If Black bides his time by 7...\text{d}7, then White can suspend as well by 8.b3 (if 8.\text{e}5, then 8...\text{c}6=, and in case of 8.\text{bd}2 there is 8...\text{e}4=). After 8...a5 (if 8...\text{e}8, then 9.\text{b}2 \text{h}5 10.\text{e}5 \text{bd}7 11.\text{d}3= with the idea of \text{f}4, and in case of 8...\text{c}6 White can start the knight’s transfer to e5 by 9.\text{bd}2=) 9.\text{a}3 \text{c}6 (in case of 9...\text{b}4 there is 10.\text{b}2 \text{a}4 11.\text{a}3 \text{axb}3 12.\text{xb}3 \text{a}5 13.\text{e}5=, found by J. Speelman) 10.\text{xe}7 \text{xe}7 11.\text{e}5 \text{e}8 12.\text{d}3 \text{h}5 (after 12...\text{bd}7 White just pulls his b1-knight towards f3 by 13.\text{d}2=) 13.\text{f}4 \text{g}5 (the position after 13...\text{d}7 14.\text{d}2= suits White very well) 14.\text{h}xh5 \text{e}5 15.\text{d}2 \text{d}7 16.\text{a}3 \text{hf}6 17.\text{c}3 \text{b}6 18.\text{ab}1 \text{f}7 (18...\text{xa}3?! is bad because of 19.\text{c}5 \text{bd}7 20.\text{e}3=) 19.b4 \text{xb}4 20.\text{axb}4 White took the initiative on the queenside in the game Speelman – Short, London (m/5) 1991. Note the fact that the black pawn on a5 only helped to open up the play on the queenside.

The move c7-c6 considered in
the main text of the variation is very important for the Stone Wall structure. It helps Black to fortify his centre and decrease the range White’s g2-bishop. Black’s disregard of c7-c6 after 7...a5 8.\(\text{\texttt{c5}}\) \(\texttt{\textit{b7}}\) allowed White to open up the play quickly by 9.\(\text{\texttt{cxd5}}\) \(\texttt{\textit{xd5}}\) (in case of 9...\(\texttt{\textit{xe5}}\), 10.\(\text{\texttt{dxe5 \textit{xd5}}}\) there is 11.\(\text{\texttt{d1}}\) with the idea of e2-e4, and 11...\(\texttt{\textit{b4}}\) can be repelled by 12.\(\text{\texttt{ad1}}\) 10.\(\texttt{\textit{d3}}\) \(\text{\texttt{b4}}\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{xb4}}\) \(\text{\texttt{xb4}}\) 12.\(\text{\texttt{dd1}}\) c6 13.\(\text{\texttt{d2}}\) \(\text{\texttt{wb6}}\) 14.\(\texttt{\textit{c4}}\) in the game Furman – Fortinos, Budapest 1959, which increased the strength of the g2-bishop considerably.

The position after 7...\(\text{\texttt{e4}}\) 8.\(\text{\texttt{bd2}}\) c6 9.\(\text{\texttt{c5}}\) will be dealt with below.

8.\(\text{\texttt{bd2}}\)

Now that the c6-square is occupied by the pawn White proceeds to his main plan, the knights’ transfer to d3 and f3.

We shall regard in detail Black’s most typical moves in this position, which are a) 8...\(\text{\texttt{e4}}\), b) 8...\(\texttt{\textit{d7}}\), c) 8...\(\texttt{e8}\) and d) 8...\(\texttt{b6}\).

The move 8...\(\text{\texttt{bd7}}\) with the idea to prevent the white knight from getting to \(\text{\texttt{d3}}\) via e5 does not work as after 9.\(\text{\texttt{g5?!}}\) (9.\(\text{\texttt{e1}}\) is less accurate, but even in this case after 9...\(\text{\texttt{e4}}\) 10.\(\texttt{df3 \textit{df6}}\) 11.\(\texttt{e5}^{\pm}\) Loitstein – Ovejero, Mar del Plata 1992, White fulfilled his plan and maintained his advantage) White not only accomplishes his intention, but also drives back the black knight.

After 9...\(\text{\texttt{b8}}\) 10.\(\texttt{h3 \textit{d7}}\) 11.\(\texttt{f3} \texttt{e4} 12.\(\texttt{f4 \textit{e8}}\) 13.\(\texttt{d3} \texttt{a6}\) White got the desired set-up for his pieces and launched a pawn advance on the queenside by 14.\(\text{\texttt{c5}}\) g5 15.\(\texttt{fe5} h6 16.\text{\texttt{b4 \texttt{c7}}} 17.\texttt{b1 a6}, and then he started an attack in the centre by 18.\(\text{\texttt{f3}}} \texttt{f6} 19.a4 \texttt{g7} 20.\texttt{ad2 \textit{h8}} 21.\text{\texttt{f2 \textit{h7}}} 22.\text{\texttt{e4}}} in the game Ghitescu – Demeny, Rumania 1997. White’s plan in this game deserves our particular attention because it is almost classical and we shall encounter it still many more times in our study.

Also in case of 8...a5 White has no problems. After 9.\(\text{\texttt{e5 \textit{bd7}}} 10.\text{\texttt{d3}}\) (after 10.\(\texttt{df3 \textit{xe5}}\) 11.\(\texttt{xe5 \textit{d7}}\) 12.\(\texttt{f4 \textit{xe5}}\) 13.\(\texttt{xe5 \textit{d6}}\) 14.\(\texttt{xd6 \textit{xd6}}\) 15.\(\texttt{e3 \texttt{a4}}\) 16.\(\texttt{ac1 \textit{d7}}\) = in the game Malich – Mariotti, Skopje 1972, the position was equal because, in the pawn structure known as the Stone Wall, White’s g2-bishop, blocked by the well supported d5-pawn, is no stronger than Black’s dark-squared bishop) 10...\(\text{\texttt{d6}}\) 11.\(\texttt{df3 \textit{e7}}\) 12.\(\texttt{fe5 \texttt{b8}}\) 13.\(\texttt{f4 \textit{xe5}}\) 14.\(\texttt{xe5}\)
3. g3 e6 4. dxe5 dxe5 5. d7 16. f1 b6 17. cxd5 cxd5 18. c6 a6 19. +f4± in the game L.Portisch – Mariotti, Ljubljana 1975, White invaded Black’s camp along the c-file which made the weakness of Black’s e6- and b6-pawns obvious.

a) 8...e4

\begin{center}

diagram
\end{center}

9. e5

As mentioned above, White wants to get his knights to d3 and f3 first of all.

9...d7

The possible exchange of one pair of knights by 9...xd2 10. xd2 is no problem for White because Black, actually, exchanges his only active piece in this case. So, in the further play he will either have to agree to a passive part for his second knight, covering the e5-square from d7, or let White’s pieces occupy this square freely. For example, after 10...d7 (after 10...f6 White could have made use of the absence of Black’s bishop on the f8-a3 diagonal by 11. b4±) 11. d3 (White should not exchange the knights: in the position after 11. xd7 xd7 12. f4 e8 13. e5 f6 14. xf6 xf6= in the game Post – Foertsch, Bad Driburg 1995, White’s g2-bishop was no stronger than its black opponent) 11...f6 (after 11...f6 12.e3 h8 13. b4 g8 14. f4 White kept up his advantage in the game Moskowitz – J. Levin, Hollywood 1954) 12.b4 (White’s plan includes a2-a4 and b4-b5 and then opening up of queenside files) 12...e4 in the game Priehoda – Drtina, Bratislava 1991, White could have played 13. f4 as there would be no 13...g5 because of 14. e5±.

10. d3 f6

Black can’t improve the position of his light-squared bishop by 10...b6? because of 11.cxd5 cxd5 12. c6+–.

11. f3 h8

Black can steer the game into tactical course by 11...dxc4 if he wants. In this case it’s better for White not to win the pawn back immediately, but to continue by 12. f4!? (after 12. xc4 d6 13. b4 a5 14. b3 a4 15. b4 e5 16. e1 b6 17.e3 c5 18. xc5 xc5 19.dxc5 xc5 Black was better in the games Vujic – Lake tin, Vrnjacka Banja 1999; also the line 12.e5 b5 13.b3 did not justify Black’s hopes after 13... c5= in the game Ellers – Thallinger, Balatonbereny 1995) 12... b6 13. d1 c5 (with the idea of 14.e5) to get a sufficient compensation for it, and after 13...g5
14.\(\text{\textdiamondsuit}h5\) \(\text{\textclubsuit}h8\) 15.\(\text{\textclubsuit}e5\) \(\text{\textspadeheartsuit}e8\) White can develop a dangerous initiative by 16.\(\text{\textspadeheartsuit}xe4\) \(\text{fxe4}\) 17.\(g4\)↑.

In case of the apparently active 11...\(g5\) White has to fulfil his main plan with the capture of \(e5\) and a following attack on the queenside and in the centre by 12.\(b3\) (an immediate attack on the queenside by 12.\(\text{\textspadeheartsuit}b1\) \(\text{\textspadeheartsuit}e7\) 13.\(b4\)! does not work because after 13...\(\text{\textspadesuit}d6\) 14.\(\text{\textspadesuit}xd5\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}xd5\) 15.\(\text{\textspadesuit}fe5\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}b6\) 16.\(\text{\textclubspadesuit}c5\) \(\text{\textclubspadesuit}d7\) 17.\(a4\) \(\text{\textclubspadesuit}e8\) 18.\(\text{\textspadesuit}a3\) \(\text{\textclubspadesuit}c8\) 19.\(\text{\textspadesuit}b3\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}bc4\)↑ Black takes the \(c4\)-square, G. Johansson – F. Olafsson, Reykjavik 1968) 12...\(\text{\textspadesuit}g7\) 13.\(\text{\textdiamondsuit}fe5\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}e7\), and after 14.\(c5!\) \(\text{\textclubsuit}h6\) 15.\(\text{\textdiamondsuit}f3\) \(\text{\textdiamondsuit}e6\) 16.\(\text{\textdiamondsuit}b1\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}xe5\) 17.\(\text{\textspadesuit}xe5\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}e8\) 18.\(\text{\textspadesuit}b2\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}g8\) 19.\(\text{\textspadesuit}bd1\) \(\text{\textclubdiam}d7\) 20.\(\text{\textclubdiam}d4\) \(\text{\textclubspadesuit}g7\) 21.\(\text{\textclubspadesuit}f2\)↑ in the game Vadasz – Vokoun, Graz 1972, White killed three birds with one stone: he drove away the black knight from \(e4\), got the important \(d4\)-square and started to prepare the decisive attack in the centre by \(e2\)-\(e4\).

An attempt to stabilise the position by 11...\(\text{\textspadesuit}b6\) enabled White to develop a strong initiative by the same old method after 12.\(c5\) (12.\(b3\)! is bad this time because of 12...\(\text{\textdiamondsuit}xc4\) 13.\(\text{\textdiamondsuit}xc4\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}xd4\)↑) 12...\(\text{\textclubdiam}d7\) 13.\(\text{\textspadesuit}fe5\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}g5\) 14.\(\text{\textspadesuit}b4\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}xe5\) 15.\(\text{\textspadesuit}xe5\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}e7\) 16.\(\text{\textspadesuit}b2\) \(\text{\textclubdiam}d7\) 17.\(\text{\textclubdiam}d4\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}e8\) 18.\(\text{\textspadesuit}ab1\) \(\text{\textclubdiam}d8\) 19.\(\text{\textclubdiam}f3\) \(\text{\textclubspadesuit}c7\) 20.\(\text{\textspadesuit}d2\) \(\text{\textclubspadesuit}f7\) 21.\(e4\)↑ in the game Gligoric – Naranja, Manila 1973.

The following example shows what dangers lie in wait for Black on his way. After 11...\(\text{\textspadesuit}e8\) 12.\(b3\)! (while Black holds the \(e5\)-square under his safe control, the move 12.\(\text{\textspadesuit}f4\) is out of place, and after 12...\(g5\) 13.\(\text{\textclubspadesuit}c7\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}e7\) 14.\(\text{\textspadesuit}fe5\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}b6\) in the game O'Kelly – Pachman, Bucharest 1954, the \(b8\)-\(h2\) diagonal turned out too short for White’s dark-squared bishop, so the play was fully equalized after 15.\(\text{\textspadesuit}xb6\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}xb6\) 16.\(\text{\textspadesuit}e3\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}d6\) 17.\(\text{\textspadesuit}a4\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}h8\) 18.\(\text{\textspadesuit}b4\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}xc4\) 19.\(\text{\textspadesuit}xc4\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}xc4\) 20.\(\text{\textspadesuit}xc4\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}xa4\)! =) 12...\(g5\) 13.\(\text{\textdiamondsuit}a3\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}f7\) 14.\(\text{\textspadesuit}e5\)↑ in the game C. Adrian – L. Roos, France 1994, Black decided to simplify the play by 14...\(\text{\textspadesuit}xe5\)? which cost him a piece after 15.\(\text{\textspadesuit}xe5\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}e7\) 16.\(\text{\textspadesuit}e7\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}xe7\) 17.\(\text{\textspadesuit}xc5\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}exd5\) 18.\(\text{\textspadesuit}f3\)++. 12.\(b3\)

As soon as the black bishop leaves the \(a3\)-\(f8\) diagonal, White’s dark-squared bishop wants to occupy it. It was already shown that the other typical way of development of the black bishop to \(f4\) in the Stone Wall can turn a bad decision with the black bishop on \(f6\). So, after 12.\(\text{\textspadesuit}f4\) \(g5\) White should have retreated with the bishop in the game Domotor – R. Bellin, Zalakaros 1997, but he preferred 13.\(\text{\textspadesuit}e5\)?, and after 13...\(\text{\textspadesuit}xc4\) 14.\(\text{\textspadesuit}xf6+\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}xf6\) 15.\(\text{\textspadesuit}xc4\) \(g4\) 16.\(\text{\textspadesuit}e5\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}d2\)↑ he lost by an exchange.

12...\(\text{\textspadesuit}e8\) 13.\(a4\)!

The most accurate move, recommended by G. Kasparov. After 13.\(\text{\textspadesuit}a3\) \(\text{\textspadesuit}g8\) 14.\(\text{\textspadesuit}ac1\) \(a5\) in the game Kasparov – Short, Brus-
sels 1987, White was forced to slow down his attack and agree to 15.\texttt{b2} \texttt{h5} 16.a4 \texttt{d8} 17.\texttt{a3}±.

13...\texttt{a5} 14.\texttt{a3} \texttt{g8} 15.\texttt{fe5}±

This position occurred in the game Toshkov – Batchinsky, Geneve 1989. Its further development is very typical of the Stone Wall. After 15...\texttt{exe5} 16.\texttt{dxe5} \texttt{d8} 17.f3 \texttt{g5} 18.\texttt{b2} \texttt{b8} 19.\texttt{d4} \texttt{f7} 20.c5 \texttt{c7} 21.\texttt{ab1} \texttt{d7} 22.b4 axb4 23.\texttt{xb4} \texttt{c8} 24.e4! White created a strong initiative on the queenside and in the centre of the board.

b) 8...\texttt{d7}

White wants to transfer his light-squared bishop to the kingside where it would be useful in the fight for the centre (from h5 or g6).

9.\texttt{e5}

As well as in the previous variation a, White wants to accomplish the transfer of his knights. He should not waste time at this: after 9.b3 \texttt{e8} 10.\texttt{b2} \texttt{h5} 11.\texttt{fe1} \texttt{e4} 12.a3 \texttt{d7} 13.b4 g5 14.\texttt{xe4} fxe4 15.\texttt{d2} \texttt{g6} the play was equalized in the game Dzuban – Machulsky, Alma-Ata 1989.

9...\texttt{e8}

After 9...\texttt{c7}?! 10.\texttt{df3} \texttt{e4} 11.\texttt{d3} \texttt{e8} 12.\texttt{fe5} \texttt{d7} in the game S. Schulz – Heinze, Germany 1995, the opposition of the queens on the c-file was to White’s favour. The tactical manoeuvre 13.\texttt{f4!} \texttt{f6} 14.\texttt{xd5} \texttt{exe5} 15.\texttt{exf6}± allowed him to gain a serious advantage.

10.\texttt{df3}

Also 10.\texttt{d3} is possible. After 10...\texttt{e4} 11.\texttt{f3} \texttt{d7} 12.b3 (12.\texttt{fe5} \texttt{exe5} 13.\texttt{dxe5} is weaker now because after 13...\texttt{b6} 14.\texttt{c3} \texttt{c5} \texttt{c1} \texttt{c5} Black creates counterplay in the centre, Haku- linen – Partanen, Finland 1990) 12...\texttt{f7} 13.\texttt{d1} \texttt{c8} 14.c5 \texttt{h6} 15.\texttt{de5} \texttt{exe5} 16.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{f6} 17.\texttt{f3} \texttt{d7} 18.\texttt{xf7} \texttt{xf7} 19.e4 \texttt{f8} 20.b4± in the game Barbero – Zinati, Bratto 1998, White managed to combine his advance in the centre and on the queenside successfully.

10...\texttt{e4} 11.b3

After 11.\texttt{e1} \texttt{d7} 12.\texttt{xd7} \texttt{xd7} 13.\texttt{d3} \texttt{d6} White gained profit from the early development of the black bishop to \texttt{d6} by
14.\textit{\textbf{h4}} \textit{\textbf{c8}} 15.\textit{\textbf{xd6}} \textit{\textbf{xd6}} 16.\textit{\textbf{c5}} \textit{\textbf{g7}} 17.\textit{\textbf{c3}} \textit{\textbf{c7}} 18.\textit{\textbf{f3}} \textit{\textbf{d7}} 19.\textit{\textbf{ae1}} \textit{\textbf{ce8}} 20.\textit{\textbf{e4}}, which allowed him to maintain his advantage in the game Day – Smederevac, Wijk aan Zee 1970.

\textbf{11...\textit{\textbf{h8}}}

After 11...\textit{\textbf{d7}} 12.\textit{\textbf{xd7}} \textit{\textbf{xd7}} 13.\textit{\textbf{e5}} \textit{\textbf{e8}} 14.\textit{\textbf{b2}} \textit{\textbf{f6}} White launched an attack in the centre by 15.\textit{\textbf{f3}} \textit{\textbf{d7}} 16.\textit{\textbf{d3}} \textit{\textbf{g6}} 17.\textit{\textbf{f4}} \textit{\textbf{f7}} 18.\textit{\textbf{e4}}, in the game Pukkila – Vatainen, Espoo 1994.

\textbf{12.\textit{\textbf{b2}} \textit{\textbf{d6}}}

Now that the white bishop is on b2, the black bishop comes to d6 with reason.

\textbf{13.\textit{\textbf{e1}} \textit{\textbf{d7}} 14.\textit{\textbf{d1d3}} \textit{\textbf{e7}}}

This position occurred in the game I. Sokolov – Jussupow, Nussloch 1996. After 15.\textit{\textbf{xd7}} \textit{\textbf{xd7}} 16.\textit{\textbf{c5}} \textit{\textbf{c7}} 17.\textit{\textbf{b4}} \textit{\textbf{e8}} 18.\textit{\textbf{f3}} Black could have escalated it by 18...\textit{\textbf{dxc3}}! 19.\textit{\textbf{hxg3}} \textit{\textbf{xc3}} 20.\textit{\textbf{f4}} \textit{\textbf{h5}}! 21.\textit{\textbf{e5}} \textit{\textbf{h4}} 22.\textit{\textbf{f3}} \textit{\textbf{xf4}}

I. Sokolov pointed out that White could have gained an advantage if he had started a standard attack on the queenside by 15.\textit{\textbf{f3}}?! \textit{\textbf{e6}} (15...\textit{\textbf{xe5}}? 16.\textit{\textbf{dxe5}} \textit{\textbf{c6}}+ 17.\textit{\textbf{h1}} \textit{\textbf{g5}} 18.\textit{\textbf{cxd5}}+–) 16.\textit{\textbf{c5}} \textit{\textbf{c7}} 17.\textit{\textbf{b4}},

\textbf{c) \textit{\textbf{8...\textit{\textbf{e8}}}}}

One of the oldest known methods. Black wants to transfer his queen to h5 in order to launch an attack on the white king.

\textbf{9.\textit{\textbf{e5}}}

White follows same plan.

Usually Black either accomplishes his intention at once by \textbf{c1} 9...\textit{\textbf{h5}} or delays it for some time. In the latter case he plays most often \textbf{c2} 9...\textit{\textbf{bd7}}.

Other continuations occur in the tournament practice much less frequently.

After 9...\textit{\textbf{d4}} 10.\textit{\textbf{dxe4}} \textit{\textbf{fxe4}} 11.\textit{\textbf{f3}} \textit{\textbf{exf3}} 12.\textit{\textbf{exf3}} \textit{\textbf{d7}} 13.\textit{\textbf{g4}} \textit{\textbf{f6}} 14.\textit{\textbf{f2}} \textit{\textbf{b6}} 15.\textit{\textbf{e1}}, White opened the play up in the centre of the board at once to his own benefit in the game A. Kharitonov – Narodizki, Moscow 1991.

After 9...\textit{\textbf{g5}} 10.\textit{\textbf{df3}} \textit{\textbf{d4}} there is 11.\textit{\textbf{b4}}? as the standard manoeuvre \textit{\textbf{d4}}–\textit{\textbf{d6}} in order to emphasise the weakness of the c4-square in White's camp is impossible because of the vulnerability of Black's g5-pawn.

After 9...\textit{\textbf{a6}} 10.\textit{\textbf{a3}} \textit{\textbf{b6}} 11.\textit{\textbf{b4}} \textit{\textbf{b7}} 12.\textit{\textbf{c5}}, in the game W. Koch
- Welling, Germany 1997, White managed to press his opponent down on the queenside.

After 9...b6 10.\(\Box\)df3 \(\Box\)b7 11.\(\Box\)d3 \(\Box\)e4 White started an attack in the centre by 12.\(\Box\)fe5 (a pawn advance on the queenside should be prepared carefully which was not done in these two games: 12.b4 \(\Box\)d7 13.\(\Box\)b1 \(\Box\)a6 14.b5 cxb5 15.cxb5 \(\Box\)c8 16.\(\Box\)b2 \(\Box\)b7= Langeweg – Vaganian, Buenos Aires 1978, and 12.b3 \(\Box\)d7 13.a4 a5 14.\(\Box\)b2 \(\Box\)c8 15.\(\Box\)ac1 \(\Box\)a6 16.cxd5 cxd5= Lengyel – I. Farago, Budapest 1971) 12...\(\Box\)d7 13.f3 \(\Box\)xe5 14.\(\Box\)xe5 \(\Box\)d6 15.b3 \(\Box\)f7 16.\(\Box\)d3 \(\Box\)f6 17.\(\Box\)b2 \(\Box\)c8 18.e4\(\pm\) P. Cramersen, Novi Sad 1990.

**c1) 9...\(\Box\)h5**

![Diagram](image)

Black prepares \(\Box\)f6-e4, g7-g5, and then he is going to transfer his rook via f6 to h6 to create threats to the white king. As you will see from the further text, this plan not only is cumbersome, but also very risky from the strategic point of view because most of Black's queenside pieces stay passive, whereas White organises his play in the centre.

10.\(\Box\)df3

One of the possible variations of White's play is 10.\(\Box\)b1 a5 (no 10...\(\Box\)xe2? because of 11.\(\Box\)f3++, trapping the queen) 11.b3 \(\Box\)bd7 12.\(\Box\)d3 g5 13.a3 \(\Box\)d6 (in case of 13...\(\Box\)e4 14.\(\Box\)f3 \(\Box\)f6 there is 15.\(\Box\)fe5?! with the idea that an attack on the kingside by 15...\(\Box\)h6 can be refuted by 16.h4!\(\pm\) and then 17.\(\Box\)f3) 14.\(\Box\)f3 \(\Box\)e4 15.\(\Box\)fe5! (after 15.b4?! axb4 16.axb4 Black has a very unpleasant option of 16...f4!, and if 17.gxf4, then 17...g4+ with a strong attack) 15...\(\Box\)f6 16.\(\Box\)f3 \(\Box\)h3 17.\(\Box\)g2 \(\Box\)h5 18.b4 axb4 19.axb4 \(\Box\)h6 20.h3 \(\Box\)xe5 21.dxe5 \(\Box\)f8 22.c5\(\pm\), and Black's attack was of no success in the game Reshevsky – Byrne, New York 1951.

10...\(\Box\)e4 11.\(\Box\)d3 \(\Box\)d7

After 11...g5 12.\(\Box\)fe5 \(\Box\)d7 White started an attack in the centre immediately by 13.f3!? \(\Box\)d6 14.c5 \(\Box\)f7 15.\(\Box\)xd7 \(\Box\)xd7 16.e4\(\uparrow\) in the game Munoz Moreno – Castillo Gallego, Spain 1995.

12.b4?!

White provokes his opponent to active play. In the game Lengyel – Stoppel, Warsaw 1961, he chose a more quiet continuation of 12.\(\Box\)fe5 \(\Box\)xe5 13.\(\Box\)xe5 \(\Box\)d6 14.b3 \(\Box\)f7 15.\(\Box\)f3 \(\Box\)h3 16.\(\Box\)d3 g5 17.\(\Box\)g2 \(\Box\)h5 18.f3 \(\Box\)f6 19.\(\Box\)b2 \(\Box\)g6 20.e4\(\pm\).

12...g5
Chapter 19

After 12...a5 13.b5 cxb5 in the game Cobo Arteaga – Rossetto, Santa Clara 1968, White should have continued by 14.♗f4 ♔f7 15.cxd5 exd5 16.♖b3† with initiative. The line 12...♗d6 13.c5 ♕c4 14.♗d2± is, perhaps, even better than that in the main text, as it allows White to keep up only a very slight advantage, but it complies badly with Black's plan of an attack on the kingside. It stays unclear in this case what the black queen is doing on h5.

13.♖b1 ♕f6 14.♗f5!†

An important move which should not be neglected in any case. White allowed a mistake, and after 14.a4? ♗f4! 15.gxf4 g4 16.♗f5 ♕h6→ he suffered a strong attack in the game Wirthensohn – Cox, Norwich 1972; and in the game Baginskaite – Beltz, Germany 1993, Black's chances were at least no worse after 14.b5 ♗f4 15.c5 ♕h6 16.♗b3 e5 17.bxc6 bxc6 18.g4 ♕xg4 19.♖xe5 ♕h5∞.

14...♗xe5

After 14...♕h6 there is 15. h4!± with an unpleasant threat of 16.♗f3.

15.♗xe5 g4 16.b5±

This position occurred in the game Stempin – Auchenberg, Copenhagen 1989. Black's attack on the kingside exhausted, whereas White's play on the opposite flank continued to develop quite successfully.

c2) 9...♗bd7

Black introduces certain adjustments into his plan as he rejects or delays the move ♕e8-h5.

10.♗d3

Quite naturally, White is not willing to exchange his active knight.

10...♕e4

The move 10...♗g4 is but a blank shot. After 11.♗f3 ♕h8 12. b4 a5 13.bxa5 ♕xa5 14.c5 ♕g8 15. ♕f4 White gained an advantage in the game Bolbochan – Jauregui, Mar del Plata 1953.

The move 10...♗d6 has certain shortcomings too. After 11.♗f3 h6 White played 12.♗f4! which made the black bishop retreat by 12...♗e7. As the result, White prepared an attack in the centre after 13.♗e1 g5 14.♗c1 ♕g6 15.♗fe5 ♕h7 16.f3± in the game Gligoric – Nicolai, Ha-
stings 1965.

Fighting on two fronts by 10...a5 11.b3 \(\text{Q}e4\) 12.\(\text{Q}\)f3 g5
13.\(\text{Q}\)fe5 \(\text{Q}\)h5 after 14.\(\text{Q}\)f6
15.\(\text{Q}\)d2 \(\text{Q}\)h8 16.\(\text{Q}\)ae1 \(\text{Q}\)d8 17.\(\text{Q}\)c1
h6 18.\(\text{Q}\)a3 \(\text{Q}\)g7 19.\(\text{Q}\)c3 \(\text{Q}\)a6
20.e4± still allowed White to maintain better chances in the

In case of the waiting 10...
\(\text{Q}\)h8 there is 11.\(\text{Q}\)f3 \(\text{Q}\)e4 (11...
\(\text{Q}\)h5?? is no good because of 12.
\(\text{Q}\)f4+-) 12.\(\text{Q}\)b1 (an immediate
12.b4 is not as good because of 12...
\(\text{Q}\)d6!, and White experiences difficulties with the
defence of the c4-square, whereas in case of 13.c5 \(\text{Q}\)c4 14.\(\text{Q}\)d2 there
is 14...\(\text{Q}\)xd2 15.\(\text{Q}\)xd2 \(\text{Q}\)f6=,
threatening to the d4-pawn and
with the break-through e6-e5 at the same time) 12...g5 (while the
c4-square is not weakened by an
advance of the b-pawn, the move
12...\(\text{Q}\)d6 is no problem, and
White has 13.c5 \(\text{Q}\)f7, Benko –
White’s best choice in this position was 14.b4!±, continuing with
the advance on the queenside),
and now after 13.b4! (White makes this move only when the
e4-knight is occupied with de-
fending the g5-pawn and can’t create a threat to c4) 13...
\(\text{Q}\)f6
14.\(\text{Q}\)fe5 \(\text{Q}\)d6 15.c5 \(\text{Q}\)f7 16.f4
\(\text{Q}\)dxe5 17.dxe5 \(\text{Q}\)g7 18.a4 \(\text{Q}\)d7
19.e3± White transferred his
knight to the strong d4-square
which fixed his positional advan-
tage in the game Reshevsky –

11.\(\text{Q}\)f3 g5

11...dxc4?! is an anti-posi-
tional move, and after 12.\(\text{Q}\)xc4
\(\text{Q}\)b6 13.\(\text{Q}\)c2 \(\text{Q}\)d5 14.\(\text{Q}\)fe5± White
 gained a great advantage in the
game Gysi – Hagen, Germany
1993.

Black had serious problems
with his queenside after 11...\(\text{Q}\)d6
12.b3 b5 (12...b6 is no better
because of 13.\(\text{Q}\)g5! \(\text{Q}\)f6 14.\(\text{Q}\)f4 \(\text{Q}\)d8
15.\(\text{Q}\)a3± 13.c5 \(\text{Q}\)f7 14.a4! (some
weak points appear on Black’s
queenside inevitably now) 14...
\(\text{Q}\)xa4 (after 14...\(\text{Q}\)a6 15.\(\text{Q}\)xb5 \(\text{Q}\)xb5
16.\(\text{Q}\)f4± Black would be in trouble as well) 15.\(\text{Q}\)xa4± in the game
T.Petrosian – Bondarevsky, Moscow 1950.

Also the fate of Black’s queenside was unenviable after 11...b5
12.c5 a5 13.\(\text{Q}\)f4 g5 14.\(\text{Q}\)c7 \(\text{Q}\)a7
15.\(\text{Q}\)d6 \(\text{Q}\)xd6 16.cxd6 \(\text{Q}\)b8 17.
\(\text{Q}\)fe5 \(\text{Q}\)xd6 18.\(\text{Q}\)c5 \(\text{Q}\)e7 19.\(\text{Q}\)xc6
\(\text{Q}\)xc6 20.\(\text{Q}\)xc6± in the game Filep

After 11...\(\text{Q}\)d6 White should have paid attention to Black’s
dark-squared bishop by 12.
\(\text{Q}\)f4!±

After the waiting 11...\(\text{Q}\)h8
White had 12.\(\text{Q}\)b1!? with the position considered above in the
note to Black’s tenth move.

12.\(\text{Q}\)f5 \(\text{Q}\)h8

After 12...\(\text{Q}\)xe5 13.dxe5 the
presence of Black’s pawn on g5
allowed White to create the
dreadful threat of winning the
e4-knight: an exchange on d5,
followed by f2-f3. Black’s at-
empt to save the knight by 13...g4 brought him into great trouble after 14.\texttt{c}h6 \texttt{f}f7 15.f3 gxf3 16. exf3 \texttt{c}c5 17.\texttt{d}f4 \texttt{f}f8 18.\texttt{x}f8 \texttt{x}f8 19.\texttt{a}c1± in the game B. Jansson – Ekenberg, Nassjo 1970.

13.b3 a5 14.f3 \texttt{d}d6 15.\texttt{a}d2 \texttt{f}6 16.\texttt{a}e1 b5 17.c5 \texttt{xe}5 18.dxe5 \texttt{f}7 19.e4±

In the game I. Johannsson – B. Larsen, Munich 1958 White started to play in the centre and gained an advantage.

d) 8...b6

Black wants to improve the position of his light-squared bishop, and after he completes his development fully he can try c6-c5.

\textbf{9.\texttt{e}e5}

White's universal plan with the knights transfer works also in case of 8...b6.

\textbf{9...\texttt{b}b7 10.\texttt{d}f3}

The exchange 10.cxd5 cxd5 is OK with Black, all the more that now he can bring the knight to c6 quickly. After 11.\texttt{d}f3 \texttt{e}e4 12.\texttt{d}d3 \texttt{c}c6 13.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{c}8= in the game Holst – Alfredsson, Swe-

den 1999, Black's chances were, at the least, no worse. As for 10.b3, it is not very urgent in this variation, but it does not spoil the position as well. After 10...\texttt{d}d6 11.\texttt{d}f3 \texttt{bd}7 12.\texttt{f}f4 \texttt{e}e7 13. \texttt{xd}7 \texttt{xd}7 14.\texttt{xd}6 \texttt{xd}6 15.e3 \texttt{ac}8 16.\texttt{fd}1 a5 17.\texttt{ac}1 \texttt{a}6 18.\texttt{b}2± in the game Soffer – Shachar, Tel Aviv 1994, White maintained a slight advantage.

\textbf{10...\texttt{e}e4}

One of the important features that distinguish this position with the bishop on e7 from similar positions with the bishop on d6 (such a variation was mentioned in the note to White's second move in the very beginning of Part 4) is the increased vulnerability of the e6-square, weakened by the development of the light-squared bishop to the a8-h1 diagonal. So, the apparently natural move 11...\texttt{bd}7?? lost Black's game after 12.\texttt{g}5+-

\textbf{11.\texttt{d}d3}

Developing of the dark-squared bishop to b2 is not very consistent. After 11.b3 \texttt{d}d6 12.\texttt{d}d3 \texttt{d}7 13.\texttt{b}2 \texttt{e}7 White's both bishops have no prospects, as V.Kramnik noted in one of his lectures: one of them is blocked by the own d4-pawn, the other by the opponent's d5-pawn. White experiences certain problems which the choice of a plan. So, an attempt to undertake the standard pawn advance on the queenside produced a very keen
and perplexed position after 14.\textbf{\textit{Q}}fe5 \textbf{\textit{B}}ac8 15.\textbf{\textit{Q}}xd7 \textbf{\textit{Q}}xd7 16.c5 \textbf{\textit{a}}b8 17.b4 \textbf{\textit{a}}a6 18.a4 \textbf{\textit{B}}e7 19.cxb6 axb6 20.a5 bxa5 21.bxa5 \textbf{\textit{B}}d6 22.f3 c5! in the game Gorelov – Gulko, Minsk 1985.

11.\textbf{\textit{B}}f6

Black also tried to transpose into the variation with the dark-squared bishop on d6 with the loss of a tempo by 11...\textbf{\textit{B}}d6. But in this case there is a very efficient answer of 12.\textbf{\textit{B}}f4! After 12...\textbf{\textit{B}}xe7 13.\textbf{\textit{B}}acl \textbf{\textit{Q}}d7 14.\textbf{\textit{B}}xd6 \textbf{\textit{B}}xd6 15.\textbf{\textit{B}}a4 a5 16.\textbf{\textit{B}}c2 \textbf{\textit{B}}fc8 17.\textbf{\textit{B}}fc1 c5 18.cxd5 exd5 (in case of 18...\textbf{\textit{B}}xd5 19.dxc5 0-0 20.\textbf{\textit{B}}fe5! Black still has certain problems) 19.\textbf{\textit{B}}de5 0-0 20.b3! Black still has certain problems) 19.\textbf{\textit{B}}de5 0-0 20.b3! in the game Nedeljkovic – R. Maric, Zagreb 1953, White maintained his pressure upon the c5-pawn, still more weakened after the exchange of the dark-squared bishops.

12.\textbf{\textit{B}}f4 \textbf{\textit{Q}}d7 13.cxd5!

It's very important to choose a proper moment for this exchange. In our case the decisive argument is that the black knight has left b8, so it can't come to c6 if Black takes on d5 with the c-pawn.

13...exd5

After 13...cxd5 14.\textbf{\textit{B}}fc1 \textbf{\textit{B}}c8 15.\textbf{\textit{B}}a4! White would have excellent prospects along the c-file. This variation shows that sparing time without b2-b3 was a really good idea.

14.\textbf{\textit{B}}fe5 \textbf{\textit{B}}c8 15.\textbf{\textit{B}}fc1 \textbf{\textit{Q}}xe5

After 15...c5 16.\textbf{\textit{B}}xd7 \textbf{\textit{B}}xd7 17.dxc5 bxc5 18.\textbf{\textit{B}}xe4 fxe4 19.\textbf{\textit{B}}c5± Black would stay a pawn down without full compensation because of the insufficient mobility of his light-squared bishop.

16.\textbf{\textit{B}}xe5 \textbf{\textit{B}}e7 17.\textbf{\textit{B}}a4 \textbf{\textit{Q}}a8

In case of 17...a5 there is 18.\textbf{\textit{B}}b3!±.

18.\textbf{\textit{B}}e3 c5

After 18...\textbf{\textit{B}}xe5 19.\textbf{\textit{B}}xe5 c5 20.\textbf{\textit{B}}a3± White would maintain the pressure on the c5-pawn as well.

19.\textbf{\textit{B}}xf6 \textbf{\textit{B}}xf6 20.\textbf{\textit{B}}a3 \textbf{\textit{B}}fc6 21.\textbf{\textit{B}}c2±

This position occurred in the game I. Farago – Abramovic, Brussels 1986. White keeps up an unpleasant pressure upon the c5-pawn, weakened after the exchange of the dark-squared bishops.
Chapter 20

1.\( \text{\textit{\textsc{f3}} f5} \ 2.\text{\textit{\textsc{c4 \textit{\textsc{f6}}}}} \ 3.\text{\textit{\textsc{g3 e6}}} \ 4.\text{\textit{\textsc{g2 \textit{\textsc{e7}}}}} \ 5.0-0 0-0

6.\text{\textit{\textsc{d4}}}

If White is not afraid that Black chooses the Stone Wall with the bishop on e7 by \textit{\textsc{d7-d5}} (considered in Chapter 19), then he needs not avoid this move. Sometimes in the position on the diagram White plays 6.\text{\textit{\textsc{b3}}}. However, in this redaction it turns out much less helpful than in the positions regarded in the notes to White’s seventh move in variation \textbf{b}, Chapter 18 p. 184, and to White’s sixth move in variation of Chapter 19, p. 187. In the present case Black has 6...\textit{\textsc{b6}} (after 6...\textit{\textsc{c6}} 7.\textit{\textsc{b2 d5}}} 8.\textit{\textsc{d3}} we have the above mentioned variation \textbf{b} from Chapter 18, p. 184, the continuation 6...\textit{\textsc{d5}} 7.\textit{\textsc{b2}} was considered under \textbf{b} in Chapter 18, p. 187 and after 6...\textit{\textsc{e4}} 7.\textit{\textsc{b2}} \\
\textit{\textsc{f6}} 8.\textit{\textsc{c2?! \textit{\textsc{c6}}} 9.\textit{\textsc{d3 \textit{\textsc{xb2}}}}} 10.\textit{\textsc{xb2 \textit{\textsc{ff6}}} 11.\textit{\textsc{xf6 \textit{\textsc{xf6}}} 12. \textit{\textsc{c3 d6}}} 13.\textit{\textsc{a3 \textit{\textsc{d7}}} 14.\textit{\textsc{b4 \textit{\textsc{a8}}} 15.b5 \textit{\textsc{d8}}} 16.\textit{\textsc{d2 \textit{\textsc{c8}}} 17.a4±}} in the game Stull – Nishimura, Luzern 1982, White managed to maintain his pressure upon the opponent’s queenside despite mass simplifications) 7.\textit{\textsc{e5}} (after 7.\textit{\textsc{b2 \textit{\textsc{b7}}} 8.\textit{\textsc{c3 a5}} 9.\textit{\textsc{d4 \textit{\textsc{e4}}} 10.\textit{\textsc{d5 \textit{\textsc{a6}}} 11.\textit{\textsc{d4 \textit{\textsc{xc3}}} 12.\textit{\textsc{xc3 \textit{\textsc{f6}}} 13.\textit{\textsc{d2 \textit{\textsc{c5}}} 14.\textit{\textsc{ad1 \textit{\textsc{e7}}} =}}} Black equalized the position in the game Gulko – Morozevich, Shenyang 2000) 7...\textit{\textsc{d5}} 8.d4 \textit{\textsc{b7}} 9.\textit{\textsc{b2 \textit{\textsc{bd7}}} 10.\textit{\textsc{d3 \textit{\textsc{d6}}} 11.\textit{\textsc{d2 \textit{\textsc{e4}}} 12.\textit{\textsc{e3 \textit{\textsc{e7}}} 13.\textit{\textsc{c1 a5}}} 14.\textit{\textsc{f3 \textit{\textsc{a4}}} =}} there was an approximately equal position in the game Kramnik – Gerber, Zurich (simultan) 1999. White, obviously, failed to gain all the possible profit from the fact that Black’s dark-squared bishop had spent two moves to get to d6. The development of this game was very similar to that of the game cited in the note to White’s eleventh move under \textbf{b} in Chapter 19, p. 198-199.

We shall regard following answers after White’s sixth move
d2-d4 a) 6...\(\text{e}4\) and b) 6...d6.
The move 6...d5 after 7.\(\text{c}2\) leads to Stone Wall positions already considered in Chapter 19. In case of 6...c6, which allows Black to transpose both into the Stone Wall and Ilyin-Zhenevsky System, White's best answer is 7.\(\text{c}2\). After the original 7...a5?! (in case of 7...d5 8.\(\text{b}d2\) we have the Stone Wall again (Chapter 19), and the position after 7...d6 is regarded below within the variation b2) 8.c5! d6 9.cxd6 \(\text{x}d6\) 10.\(\text{b}d2\) a6 11.a3 \(\text{e}8\) in the game Ghitescu – Pernishki, Pernik 1976, White could have gained a great advantage by 12.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{c}7\) 13.\(\text{d}2\).

a) 6...\(\text{e}4\)
Black wants to gain profit from a certain weakening of the e4-square immediately.

7.\(\text{b}d2\)
White sends his knight at once to fight against the black e4-knight. An attempt to invade the opponent's territory in return by 7.d5 does not give much to White because after 7...\(\text{f}6\) certain underdevelopment of White's queenside pieces becomes perceptible. After 8.\(\text{c}2\) (after 8.d4 c5 9.c2 \(\text{d}6\) 10.dxe6 dxe6 11.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 12.f4 \(\text{c}7\) 13.\(\text{b}a3\) \(\text{d}8\) in the game Simonovic – B. Kostic, Zagreb 1946, Black's chances turned out just better, and also after 8.\(\text{f}d2\) \(\text{xd}2\) 9.\(\text{xd}2\) e5 10.e4 \(\text{f}6\) in the game O. Kozlov – Poluljahov, Kobanya 1992, Black had a good play) 8...\(\text{a}6\)?! 9.\(\text{f}d2\) (after 9.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{b}4\) 10.\(\text{d}1\) a5 11.f3 \(\text{c}5\) 12.\(\text{c}3\) d6 13.\(\text{b}1\) c6 14.e4 \(\text{exd}5\) 15.\(\text{exd}5\) \(\text{cxd}5\) 16.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{e}8\) in the game Huerta – Nogueiras, Santa Clara 1980, Black was somewhat better too) 9...\(\text{xd}2\) 10.\(\text{xd}2\) d6 11.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{xc}3\) 12.\(\text{xc}3\) e5 13.a3 \(\text{e}8\) 14.b4 \(\text{d}7=\) the play was equalized in the game Engqvist – R. Bellin, Gausdal 1990.

7...\(\text{f}6\)
The position after 7...d5 8.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 9.\(\text{c}f3\) c6 10.\(\text{c}2\) is typical of the Stone Wall. Further development of the game Orlikov – Burlak, Moscow 1996, was very interesting: 10...\(\text{xe}5\) 11.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{g}5\) 12.\(\text{xg}5\) \(\text{xg}5\) 13.f4 \(\text{e}7\) 14.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{f}xe4\) 15.a3 \(\text{d}7\) 16.b4 \(\text{c}8\) 17.c5 \(\text{e}8\) 18.\(\text{a}4\) a6 19.\(\text{a}5\) g5 20.e3 \(\text{gxf}4\) 21.\(\text{exf}4\)+. White managed to obtain the ideal piece set for playing the Stone Wall: his strong e5-knight against Black's bad light-squared bishop, plus major pieces.

8.\(\text{c}2\)
After 8.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{f}xe4\) 9.\(\text{e}5\) d5 10.\(\text{g}4\) (as result of 10.f3 c5
11.\textit{\&e}3 \textit{\&xe}5 12.dxe5 d4 13.\textit{\&c}1 \textit{\&c}6+. Black’s chances became preferable in the game Vaganian – D. Bronstein, Leningrad 1971)
10...\textit{\&e}7 11.b3 c5 12.\textit{\&b}2 \textit{\&c}6 13.dxc5 \textit{\&xc}5 14.\textit{\&e}5 \textit{\&d}6= the play equalized in the game V. Bagirov – Gulko, Tbilisi 1978. Also 8.d5 did not justify itself after
8...\textit{\&xd}2 9.\textit{\&xd}2 d6 10.dxe6 \textit{\&c}6 11.\textit{\&c}2 \textit{\&xe}6 12.\textit{\&d}1 \textit{\&e}7 13.\textit{\&e}3 \textit{\&ae}8 14.\textit{\&ac}1 b6 15.a3 \textit{\&d}7 16.b4 \textit{\&e}5= C. Hoi – K. Schulz, Copenhagen 1988, with an equal position.

8...d5

e4! fxe4 11.\textit{\&xe}4 \textit{\&a}6 12.\textit{\&c}3±.

9.b3

Releasing tension in the centre by 9.cxd5 allowed Black to equalize after 9...exd5 10.b4 \textit{\&c}6 11.\textit{\&b}2 \textit{\&e}8 12.b5 \textit{\&e}7 13.\textit{\&e}5 a6 14.a4 b6 15.\textit{\&b}1 axb5 16.axb5 \textit{\&e}6= in the game Garcia Palermo – Bischoff, Dortmund 1985.

Black’s most active response is c7-c5. In case of 9...\textit{\&c}6 10.\textit{\&b}2 a position appears similar to the one considered in Chapter 19 (p.187-188) in the note to White’s seventh move. But now the advanced position of Black’s knight in the centre of the board can provide additional options to White. So, after 10...\textit{\&d}7 (Black’s passive play 10...\textit{\&e}7 11.\textit{\&ad}1 \textit{\&g}6 enabled White to improve his position on the queenside by 12.\textit{\&e}5 \textit{\&xd}2 13.\textit{\&xd}2 c6 14.b4 \textit{\&d}7 15.b5= in the game Louis – Brittner, Ludwigshafen 1994) 11.\textit{\&ad}1 a5 12.a3 \textit{\&e}8 13.\textit{\&e}5 \textit{\&e}7 14.\textit{\&xe}4 fxe4 15.f3 \textit{\&xe}5 16.dxe5 \textit{\&c}5+ 17.\textit{\&h}1 \textit{\&g}6 18.f4 White took some initiative in the game I. Ibragimov – Mamedov, Dubai 2000. Black’s attempt to take control over the play by 18...b5?! 19.e3 a4 had quite the reverse result after the sudden 20.b4! \textit{\&xc}4 21.\textit{\&c}1 \textit{\&xc}2 22.\textit{\&xc}2 \textit{\&e}8 23.\textit{\&fc}1 \textit{\&a}6 24.\textit{\&f}1 \textit{\&b}6 25.\textit{\&c}5±.

A transition to the classical Stone Wall by 9...c6 allowed White to keep up better chances after 10.\textit{\&a}3 \textit{\&e}8 11.e3 \textit{\&a}5 12.\textit{\&b}2 \textit{\&xd}2 13.\textit{\&xd}2 \textit{\&d}7 14.a3 \textit{\&f}8 15.b4 \textit{\&d}8 16.b5 \textit{\&d}7 17.a4= owing to his noticeable activity on the queenside in the game Cebalo – Corvi, Toscolano 1996.

10.\textit{\&b}2 cxd4

The inaccurate move 10...
\textit{\&c}6?! cost a pawn to Black after 11.cxd5 exd5 12.dxc5 \textit{\&a}5 13.\textit{\&xf}6 \textit{\&xf}6 14.\textit{\&fc}1± in the game J. Kristinsson – Asmundsson, Is-

9...c5
3.g3 e6 4.h3 g2 f7 5.0-0 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.c3


11.h4d4

The exchange of the dark-squared bishop is to White’s favour. Capturing with the knight is not as good: after 11. cd4 d6 12.xe4 fxe4 13.ad1 b6 14.d2 a7 15.xc6 xc6= the play was equalized in the game Fine – Alekhine, Amsterdam 1936.

11...c6 12.xf6 xf6 13. cxd5

The move 13.ab1? turned out a major mistake after 13... b4=.

13.exd5 14.a3 e6

After 14...a5 15.d3 d6 16.e3 ad8 17.fd1= in the game Ree – D. Bronstein, Budapest 1977, the isolated d5-pawn became a potential defect in Black’s position.

15.e3 ac8 16.d3 a5 17. fc1 f7 18.a2 fc7 19.ac2=

This position occurred in the game Naumkin – S. Hansen, Budapest 1991. White stands better here thanks to the isolated d5-pawn in Black’s camp.

b) 6...d6

This very set up of pawns in the centre of the board is the specific feature of the IIyin-Zhenevsky System. Black’s plan implies some active play in the centre, usually connected with e6-e5, and further activity on the kingside, which often requires the queen transfer to h5.

7.e3

In this position Black chooses most frequently one of the following continuations: b1) 7...c6, b2) 7...c6, b3) 7...d4, which will be examined in this chapter and 7...a5 or 7...e8, which will be examined in Chapters 21 and 22 accordingly.

Other moves are unpopular. So, after 7...e8 8.b3 d4 9.b2 f6 10.xc2 xc3 11.xc3 d7 12.fe1 b6 13.a4 b6 14.e4! fxe4 15.xe4 b7 16.xe3 a5 17.ae1= White gained a slight but stable advantage in the game Pachman – Canal, Venice 1967, owing to the success of his break-through in the centre. Sometimes Black plays 7...h8, but in this case 8.b3!? is possible as well, to be followed by ab2 and preparation of the important strategic ad-
vance e2-e4.

In case of 7...\(\text{Nd}7\) there is a more resolute move 8...\(\text{e5}\). After 8...\(\text{Be}8\) (after 8...\(\text{Bb}6\) 9.b3 White is ready to perform the important strategic advance e2-e4, and, if Black steers into the Stone Wall by 9...\(\text{d}5\) 10.c5 \(\text{Nd}7\) then White has the standard 11. \(\text{Bc}4!\) with the idea of \(\text{Ba}2-d3\) 9.e4! \(\text{Bxe}4\) (9...\(\text{Bh}5\) is bad because of 10.\(\text{Bxf}5\) \(\text{exf}5\) 11.\(\text{Be}1\) \(\text{Bd}6\) 12.\(\text{Bg}5\) \(\text{c}6\) 13.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{e}5\) 14.\(\text{Bd}2\) \(\text{Bd}4\) 15.\(\text{Bb}5\) \(\text{d}8\) 16.\(\text{Bf}6\) in the game Reilly – Fine, Warsaw 1935, and after 9...\(\text{fxe}4\) Black should reckon with the possibility of 10.\(\text{Bg}5!\) \(\text{d}8\) 11.\(\text{Bxe}4\) \(\text{h}6\) 12.\(\text{Bxf}6+\) \(\text{Bxf}6\) 13.\(\text{Bf}3\) \(\text{h}5\) 14. \(\text{Be}1\) \(\text{Bc}4\) 15.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{Bf}6\) 16.\(\text{Bd}2\) – Seils – Just, Germany 1995) 10. \(\text{Bxe}4\) \(\text{fxe}4\) 11.\(\text{Bxe}4\) \(\text{Bf}6\) (after 11...\(\text{f}6\) White could have got a pair of bishops for himself by 12.\(\text{Bg}5\) \(\text{xg}5\) 13.\(\text{xg}5\) \(\text{e}5\) 14. \(\text{Bxe}1\) 12.\(\text{Be}2\) \(\text{h}5\) 13.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{h}6\) 14. \(\text{Be}1\) \(\text{c}6\) 15.\(\text{h}4\) in the game De Luca – Iatri, Italy 1997, White was better owing to the advantage in the centre he gained after the successful advance e2-e4.

The above cited lines allow to distinguish a specific feature of the Ilyin-Zhenevsky System: when Black deprives himself of the opportunity to develop his queen’s knight to c6, White can start preparing e2-e4 by \(\text{Bd}1-c2\).

8.d5!

This break-through works because the black knight stands on c6. But for this circumstance, Black would have answered e6-e5 gladly which is important now because of the loss of piece.

8...\(\text{exd}5\)

The retreat 8...\(\text{Bb}8\)?, followed by 9.\(\text{dxe}6\) \(\text{exe}6\) 10.\(\text{Bg}5\) \(\text{c}8\) in the game Busch – Sandmeier, Germany 1994, could have cost exchange to Black because of 11.\(\text{Bd}5+\) \(\text{Bxd}5\) 12.\(\text{Bxd}5+\) \(\text{h}8\) 13.\(\text{Bf}7\) –.

In case of 8...\(\text{Be}5\) there is 9.\(\text{Bd}4\) (White gains nothing from 9.\(\text{dxe}5\) \(\text{dxe}5\) 10.e4 because of 10...\(\text{fxe}4\) 11.\(\text{dxe}4\) \(\text{exd}5\) 12.\(\text{Bxf}6+\) \(\text{xf}6\) 13.\(\text{Bxd}5+\) \(\text{h}8\) 14.\(\text{Bg}5\) \(\text{d}6\) 15.\(\text{Bxe}7\) \(\text{Bxe}7\) 16.\(\text{Be}2\) \(\text{h}3\) 17. \(\text{g}2\) \(\text{xg}2\) 18.\(\text{xg}2\) \(\text{g}8\) 19.\(\text{Be}1\) \(\text{e}8=\) with an equal position, Roe buck – Fricker, Nice 1938; but the continuation 9.b3 \(\text{Bf}3+\) deserves attention indeed, and af-
ter 10.exf3! e5 11.f4 exf4 12.\textup{\textit{Q}}xf4 \textup{\textit{Q}}g4 13.\textup{\textit{Q}}c2 \textup{\textit{Q}}f6 14.\textup{\textit{Q}}ae1 \textup{\textit{D}}d7 15.h3 \textup{\textit{D}}e5 16.\textup{\textit{D}}e3± in the
game Slezka – Pakosta, Klatovy
1994, White maintained his ad-
vantage owing to the manoeuvre \textup{\textit{D}}e2–d4) 9...\textup{\textit{D}}xc4 10.\textup{\textit{D}}xe6?! (there is a more quiet way of
development 10.dxe6, in this case
Black has no 10...g6?! because of
11.\textup{\textit{D}}h6 \textup{\textit{D}}e8 12.\textup{\textit{D}}c6!±, and after
10...c6 11.\textup{\textit{D}}xf5 \textup{\textit{D}}xe6 12.\textup{\textit{D}}xe7+
\textup{\textit{C}}xe7 13.b3 \textup{\textit{D}}b6 14.\textup{\textit{D}}a3 \textup{\textit{D}}fd8
15.\textup{\textit{D}}d4 \textup{\textit{D}}d7 16.\textup{\textit{D}}ad1 \textup{\textit{D}}ad8 17.
e4± in the game Juhasz – Pongi,
Hungary 1998, White’s advantage
was secured by his pair of
bishops) 10...\textup{\textit{D}}xe6 11.dxe6 c6 12.
\textup{\textit{D}}d3! (after 12.e4 \textup{\textit{D}}xe4 13.\textup{\textit{D}}xe4
\textup{\textit{D}}xe4 14.\textup{\textit{D}}xe4 d5 15.\textup{\textit{D}}d3 White’s
advantage would have been not
very serious if Black had played
correctly 15...g6!?±) 12...d5 13.
\textup{\textit{D}}xf5 \textup{\textit{D}}e4 14.\textup{\textit{D}}h3 \textup{\textit{D}}xe3 15.bxc3,
and, even though Black returned
the missing pawn by 15...\textup{\textit{D}}a5
16.\textup{\textit{D}}b1 b6 17.e4 \textup{\textit{D}}xa2 in the
game Hausner – Pakosta, Prague
1994, after 18.\textup{\textit{D}}f4 \textup{\textit{D}}d2 19.\textup{\textit{D}}xd2
\textup{\textit{D}}xd2 20.exd5 cxd5 21.c4± he ex-
perienced serious difficulties be-
cause of the weakness of his light
squares and White’s strong
passed e6-pawn.
9.\textup{\textit{C}}xd5 \textup{\textit{C}}e5
The knight’s retreat 9...\textup{\textit{C}}b8 is
still no good, this time because of
10.\textup{\textit{D}}d4 \textup{\textit{D}}a6 11.a3 \textup{\textit{D}}c5 12.\textup{\textit{D}}c2
\textup{\textit{D}}h5 13.\textup{\textit{D}}f3 \textup{\textit{D}}f6 14.e3 g6 15.b4±
Rosselli – Znosko-Borovsky, Nice
1931.
10.\textup{\textit{D}}d4 \textup{\textit{D}}d7

The whole variation b1 is ill-
reputed for Black. There were
plenty of opening accidents in it.
So, after 10...\textup{\textit{D}}e8 11.\textup{\textit{D}}c2 \textup{\textit{D}}g6
12.\textup{\textit{D}}cb5++, Black fails to keep
the c7-pawn. After 10...\textup{\textit{D}}b8 11.
\textup{\textit{D}}c2 \textup{\textit{D}}h8 12.\textup{\textit{D}}cb5 \textup{\textit{D}}e8 13.\textup{\textit{D}}xa7
\textup{\textit{D}}d7 14.f4 \textup{\textit{D}}g6 15.\textup{\textit{D}}ab5 in the
game Ojanen – Hoyt, Lugano
1968, Black suffered material
losses as well.

After 10...a6 11.\textup{\textit{D}}c2 \textup{\textit{D}}h5 (in
case of 11...\textup{\textit{D}}e8 12.h3 g5 13.\textup{\textit{D}}gxf4
14.\textup{\textit{D}}xf4 \textup{\textit{D}}g5 15.\textup{\textit{D}}xe5 dxe5
16.\textup{\textit{D}}xf5 \textup{\textit{D}}d6 17.\textup{\textit{D}}xd6 cxd6 18.
\textup{\textit{D}}xf8+ \textup{\textit{D}}xf8 19.\textup{\textit{D}}f1+ in the game
Kostin – Suslov, Moscow 1996,
the pair of bishops failed to com-
 pense for the missing black
pawn, and after 11...\textup{\textit{D}}h8 12.f4
\textup{\textit{D}}c4 13.e4 \textup{\textit{D}}xe4 14.\textup{\textit{D}}xe4 \textup{\textit{D}}b6
15.\textup{\textit{D}}g5 \textup{\textit{D}}e8 16.\textup{\textit{D}}e1 h6 17.\textup{\textit{D}}ge6
\textup{\textit{D}}xe8 18.\textup{\textit{D}}xe6++ in the game
Montenegro Garcia – Paul, Malaga
2000, the invasion of Black’s
camp by the opponent’s knights
made him resign soon) 12.f4 \textup{\textit{D}}g4
13.h3 \textup{\textit{D}}h6 14.\textup{\textit{D}}h2 \textup{\textup{\textit{D}}e} 15.\textup{\textit{D}}e3
\textup{\textit{D}}f6 16.\textup{\textit{D}}f2 \textup{\textit{D}}d7 17.e4 g6 18.
\textup{\textit{D}}fe1± in the game Luckis –
Ledesma, Montevideo 1941,
Black’s position was exposed to
the dreadful threat of e4-e5.

Then, after 10...\textup{\textit{D}}g6 11.\textup{\textit{D}}c2
\textup{\textit{D}}e8 White gained a considerable
advantage by 12.f4! \textup{\textit{D}}f6 13.\textup{\textit{D}}e3
\textup{\textit{D}}d7 14.\textup{\textit{D}}ac1 (there was also a
less committing way of 14.\textup{\textit{D}}f2
\textup{\textit{D}}e7 15.\textup{\textit{D}}e1±, and then e2-e4,
which occurred long ago in the
game Steinitz – Chigorin, Ha-
vana (m/18) 1892) 14...\textup{\textit{D}}e7 15.
\[ \text{Chapter 20} \]

This position occurred in the old game E. Gruenfeld – Tartakower, Vienna 1921. White maintains his advantage owing to the pressure upon Black's central pawns.

**b2) 7...c6**

A flexible move. Black does not reject a transition to the Stone Wall structure, though with the loss of a tempo, but with the white knight on c3, and, at the same time, he prepares c7 either for the queen or for the advance e6-e5 or even for the knight in case it would be needed to protect the e6-pawn.

8...\( \text{c6!?} \)

White acts according to the principle stated above in the general description of the variation b (p. 203-204). His aim is to prepare e2-e4.

8...\( \text{dxe6} \)

After 8...\( \text{dxe6} \) White should include the prophylactic move 9.d1 before he accomplishes the desired advance e2-e4 (in case of 9.e4 White has to reckon with the standard response 9...\( \text{fxe4} \) 10.\( \text{gxe4} \) \( \text{xe6} \) 11.\( \text{dxe6} \) \( \text{dxe6} \) 12.\( \text{gxe6} \), and after 12...d5! 13.cxd5 \( \text{exd5} \) 14.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{f5} \) 15.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{f6} \) 

Black even got a better position in the game Caceres – Paniagua, Spain 1997) 9...\( \text{c7} \) 10.b3! (this move is very important because after e2-e4 it makes d6-d5 useless – compare with the above cited game Caceres – Paniagua) 10...\( \text{b8} \) White has already every right for 11.e4 \( \text{xe4} \) 12.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{fxe4} \) 13.\( \text{xe4} \), which win him an advantage in the centre and a potential target of the black e6-pawn.

In case of 8...a5 there is 9.e4 (several prophylactic moves 9.b3 \( \text{d7} \) 10.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{a6} \) 11.a3 \( \text{c8} \) be-
before 12.e4 were OK in the game Sanchez – Rosello, Gran Canaria 1989, continued by 12...d5 13. exf5 exf5 14. g4 b5 15. c5 e4 16. b4 f6 17. e5±) 9...fxe4 10. dxe4 d7 (White gained a great advantage after 10...c7 11. fg5 g6 12. h3 e5 13. e6 e6 14. g7 15. g5 h5 16. dxe5 dxe5 17. h3± in the game F. Benko – Colman, Buenos Aires 1951) 11. h4 a6 12. fg5 g6 13. h3 c8 14. d1±, and also White’s position looked preferable in the game Tal – Segal, Riga 1952, because of the possibility of 15.a3 to be followed by 16.c5.

The move 8...h5 with the idea that after 9.e4 Black plays 9...f4 can’t prevent a breakthrough in the centre, and after 10. g4 f6 11. h3 fd7 12. e5 d5 13. b3 a6 14. a3± White still had a distinct advantage in the game Bertok – S. Nikolic, Yugoslavia 1969.

The traditional queen manoeuvre 8...e8 can’t impede White’s plans as well. After 9.e4 fxe4 (otherwise White’s e-pawn would have advanced still farther) 10. dxe4 h5 (the move 10...d5 makes no sense now because of 11. eg5 h6 12. h3 g5 13. e5 g7 14.f4 g4 15. f2 h5 16. c5 bd7 17. fd3± with an obvious advantage to White, Dutra – Munoz, Montevideo 1959) 11. f4 (11. fg5 turn out to major inaccuracy when after 11...xe4 12. dxe4 Black get the standard 12...d5=) Black’s attempt of counterplay by 11...d5 was no success after 12. ed2 dxc4 13. xc4 d5 14. d6 d7 15. xe7 xe7 16. fe5 d5 17. f6 18.f4± in the game E. Limp – Hirota, Registro 1997.

When Black tried to prepare e6-e5 by 8...c7, after 9.e4 fxe4 (after 9...bd7 10. e1 e8 in the game List – L. Estrin, Vilnius 1912, White could have arranged serious problems for his opponent by 11.e5! dxe5 12. dxe5 g4 13.h3± as there would be no 13...gxe5? 14. xe5 xe5 15. f4 d6 because of 16.c5+-) 10. dxe4 e5 11. dxe5 dxe5 12.b3 g4 13. b2 bd7 14.h3 h5 15. fg5± in the game Gutierrez – Cajal, Sao Paulo 2000, White had an advantage because of a certain weakness of Black’s light squares and e5-pawn.

The transition to the Stone Wall by 8...d5 9.b3 e4 in the game Meduna – Sviridov, Prague 1985, could have been answered by the standard knight manoeuvre 10. a4!?± with the idea of b2-d3.

\[\text{Diagram}\]

9.a3

It was already mentioned
above that the black knight on c6 can impede White’s activity in the centre as it threatens to occupy b4. The same refers to its position on a6 with the only difference that from this square Black’s knight can’t support the important advance e6-e5, which is, certainly, better for White. If White prefers the active 9.e4 to the prophylactics in the centre, then the play can be equalized as it happened in the game Hlinka – Strachan, Slovakia 1998, after 9...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textd{c7}}}4\text{\textit{\textbf{\textd{c7}}}}}\) \text{10.e4} \text{10.\textit{\textbf{\textd{e2}}} xe4} \text{11.\textit{\textbf{\textd{e4}}} fxe4} 12.\textit{\textbf{\textd{e4}}} e5 13.\textit{\textbf{\textd{e1}}} \text{f5} 14.\textit{\textbf{\textd{e3}}} exd4 15.\textit{\textbf{\textd{d4}}} \text{f6} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textd{d1}}} \text{f7} 17.\textbf{\textd{b3}} a5=.

\text{9...\textit{\textbf{\textd{c7}}}7}

After 9...\textit{\textbf{\textd{d7}}} there is an immediate 10.e4 (after 10.b4 \textit{\textbf{\textd{c7}}} 11.\textit{\textbf{\textd{b1}}} \textit{\textbf{\texte8}} 12.c5 \textit{\textbf{\textd{f5}}} 13.\textit{\textbf{\textd{xd5}}} exd5 14.\textit{\textbf{\textd{f4}}} \textit{\textbf{\texte6}} 15.\textit{\textbf{\textd{xd6}}} \textit{\textbf{\textd{d6}}} 16.cxd6 \textit{\textbf{\textd{xd6}}}= in the game Etchegaray – Delahaye, Toulouse 1995, White suddenly turned out unable to repel the threat of \textit{\textbf{\textd{f5}}}-f4), and after 10...f\textit{\textbf{\textf{xe4}}} 11.\textit{\textbf{\textd{xe4}}} \textit{\textbf{\textd{xe4}}} 12.\textit{\textbf{\textd{xe4}}} \textit{\textbf{\textd{c7}}} 13.b3 \textit{\textbf{\texte8}} 14.\textit{\textbf{\textd{b2}}} \textit{\textbf{\textg6}} 15.\textit{\textbf{\textf{e3}}} \textit{\textbf{\textd{d7}}} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textf{f1}}} \textit{\textbf{\texte8}} 17.\textit{\textbf{\textg5}}= White’s chances were higher in the game Bee – Dreckmeier, Germany 1991, thanks to his pressure on the e6-pawn.

The move 9...c5 does not comply with the spirit of Black’s position, and a simple 10.\textit{\textbf{\textd{d1}}} could have gained a slight but lasting advantage to White in the game Khodotov – Shianovsky, Kiev 1998.

10.b3?!

This prophylactic move is standard for the given type of positions, it should support the c4-pawn before the breakthrough by e2-e4. Also an immediate 10.e4 occurred many times, but its efficiency can be decreased without b2-b3, for example by 10...d5 (after 10...\textit{\textbf{\textf{xe4}}} 11.\textit{\textbf{\textd{xe4}}} \textit{\textbf{\textd{xe4}}} 12.\textit{\textbf{\textd{xe4}}} d5 13.\textit{\textbf{\textc{2}}} \textit{\textbf{\textd{c2}}}=, Black fails to equalize the play fully) 11.exd5 (in case of 11.e5 \textit{\textbf{\textd{e4}}} 12.b3 b5 13.c5 \textit{\textbf{\textd{xc3}}} 14.\textit{\textbf{\textd{xc3}}} a5= it is very difficult for White to break the stronghold of Black’s pawns) 11...exd5 12.cxd5 (after 12.b3 \textit{\textbf{\textd{e6}}}= White hardly can gain from the weakness of the e5-square in Black’s camp because of the absence of safe protection of the d4-pawn and the permanent threat of f5-f4) 12.\textit{\textbf{\textf{xd5}}} 13.\textit{\textbf{\textd{d2}}} \textit{\textbf{\texte6}}=, when the weakness of Black’s e5-square was compensated to some extent by his control of the strong stand on d5 in the game Kolev – Pizarro, St. Cugat 1994.

10...\textit{\textbf{\texte8}} 11.e4 \textit{\textbf{\textf{xe4}}} 12.\textit{\textbf{\textd{xe4}}} \textit{\textbf{\texth5}}

After 12...\textit{\textbf{\textg{6}}} 13.\textit{\textbf{\textf{xf6+}}} gxf6 in the game Menchik – Sae-
misch, Karlsbad 1929, White could have avoided the queen exchange by 14.\textit{d}d2±.

13.\textit{f}f4 \textit{xe}4 14.\textit{x}e4 g5 15.\textit{d}d2±

This position occurred in the game Babula – Novotny, Mlada Boleslav 1992. Black should have agreed to have a retarded pawn on e6 and played the position after 15...\textit{f}f6 16.\textit{c}c3±. Instead of this, he just tried to solve all his problems at once by 15...e5?, and after 16.dxe5 \textit{f}f5 17.\textit{e}e3 \textit{ae}8 18.exd6 \textit{f}f6 19.\textit{x}xa7+-- he stayed without sufficient compensation for his material losses.

b3) 7...\textit{e}4

One more Black’s attempt to gain profit from a certain weakening of the e4-square, similar to the above considered variation a.

8.\textit{c}c2

White starts to fight against the e4-knight again like in the variation a.

8...\textit{xc}3

If Black tries to transpose the play into the Stone Wall with the loss of a tempo but with the knight on c3 by 8...d5, then White can respond by 9.b3, preparing the transfer of his queen’s knight to its traditional stand by \textit{a}a4-b2-d3.

9.\textit{xc}3 \textit{f}f6

In case of 9...\textit{d}d7 White seized space on the queenside by 10.b4, and then after 10...\textit{f}f6 11.\textit{b}b2 \textit{e}4 12.\textit{c}c2 g5 he proceeded to an attack in the centre by 13.\textit{e}e1 \textit{f}f6 14.\textit{d}3 \textit{e}8 15.\textit{ae}1 \textit{e}4 16.f3 \textit{f}f6 17.e4± in the game Komljenovic – Paul, Malaga 1999.

10.b4!

A necessary move. White is preparing to drive back the black knight if it tries to support the advance e6-e5 from e6. A refusal of the opposition with the black queen by 10.\textit{e}e2 allowed Black to gain an advantage after 10...e5 11.dxe5 dxe5 12.\textit{d}d2 e4 13.\textit{e}e1 \textit{d}d4 14.\textit{b}b1 \textit{e}6 15.b3 \textit{c}c6+ in the game Rue Bullsens – Pi Pares, Spain 1999, and a timid 10.b3 enabled him to equalize the play by 10...\textit{c}c6 11.\textit{b}b2 e5 12.e3 \textit{e}e8= in the game Juhnke – Huisl, Germany 1981.

10...\textit{e}e7

Black’s attempt to make use of the opposition of the queen and
the bishop by 10...c5 was no success after 11.bxc5 dxc5 12.e3 ²c6 13.²b2 ²c7 14.²a3 b6 15.²ab1 ²a5 16.²fc1 ²b7 17. dxc5 ²e4 18.²xf6 ²xf6 19.²b5!± in the game San Segundo – Vega, Cala Galdana 1999.

11.²b2 ²c6

Black’s wish to break White’s defence on the kingside by 11...g5 12.²b3 g4 brought quite the reverse result after 13.²e1 ²c6 14.e3 ²d8 15.f4 gxf3 16.²xf3 e5 17.dxe5 dxe5 18.e4!± in the game Irzhvannov – Langier, Roque Saenz Pena 1997.

12.b5

The advance of the b-pawn on the tenth move does not let Black prepare the important move e6-e5 now.

12...²d8 13.²fe1 g5 14.e4!

A typical breakthrough in the Ilyin-Zhenevsky System.

14...fxe4 15.²xe4 ²g7 16.h3 c5 17.bxc6 bxc6 18.c5 d5 19.²e3±

This position occurred in the game Tratar – Langier, Argentina 1997. White’s position is preferable because of the retarded e6-pawn in Black’s camp.
Chapter 21  

1.\( \text{d}f3 \) f5 2.\( c4 \) \( \text{d}f6 \) 3.\( g3 \) e6 4.\( \text{g}2 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 5.0-0 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.\( \text{c}3 \) a5

Black wants to gain space on the queenside. From the previous variation \( \text{b}3 \) of Chapter 20 it’s evident how unpleasant White’s advance on the queenside can be.

8.\( \text{b}3! \)

The expediency of this prophylactic move was already shown above. Now we shall note only that the preparation of e2-e4 by 8.\( \text{e}1 \) encounters 8...\( \text{d}e4! \), and in case of 9.\( \text{d}3 \) Black can steer into a Stone Wall position by 9....d5!? (the d3-square is already occupied, so the white knight can’t get there), as it happened in the game lotti – Naumkin, Montecatini Terme 1998. If White prepares e2-e4 by 8.\( \text{c}1 \), then he has to reckon with the continuation 8...\( \text{c}6 \) 9.e4 \( \text{b}4 \) 10.\( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 11.\( \text{xe}4 \) \text{fxe}4 12.\( \text{xe}4 \) e5 with serious complications.

Now Black tries usually to gain from the weakening of White’s e4-square by a) 8...\( \text{d}e4 \) or continues with the development of his queenside by b) 8...\( \text{c}6 \). In case of 8...c6 9.\( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) (after 9...\( \text{a}6 \) we get the variation b) White organised a break-through in the centre and gained an advantage by 10.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 11.e4 \text{fxe}4 12.\( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 13.\( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 14.\( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 15.\( \text{e}3 \) b5 16.\( \text{ad}1 \) in the game Levchouk – Vallieres, Quebec 1994. After 8...\( \text{e}8 \) the play steers into the variation from Chapter 22.

a) 8...\( \text{d}e4 \)

One more variation with \( \text{f}6-e4 \), similar to the lines a and \( \text{b}3 \) from Chapter 20.

9.\( \text{b}2 \)

Unlike in \( \text{b}3 \) from Chapter 20, White’s b-pawn does not get to the fourth rank this time, but instead, there is a more convenient way to protect the c-knight. Then, in case of 9.\( \text{e}1 \)
White has to reckon with 9...\(\text{Q}e4\), and White's attempt to gain an advantage by 10.\(\text{Q}xe4\) \(fxe4\) 11.\(\text{Q}d2\) \(d5\) 12.\(f3\) in the game Rotstein – J. Bauer, Werfen 1989, could have had the reverse result after 12...\(\text{N}b4!\)±.

9...\(\text{N}f6\)
After the exchange 9...\(\text{Q}xc3\) 10.\(\text{B}xc3\) \(\text{Q}d7\) (after 10...c6 11.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{Q}d7\) 12.\(a3\) \(\text{Q}e8\) 13.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{Q}f6\) 14.\(\text{d}2\) \(d5\) in the game I. Belov – Bogumil, Stare Mesto 1992, Black did build the Stone Wall, but, as he lost time for this, White took the initiative on the queenside by 15.\(b4!\)±) White quickly creates his own play in the centre of the board by 11.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{Q}e8\) 12.\(e4\). After 12...\(f4\) 13.e5 \(dxe5\) 14.\(\text{dxe5}\) \(\text{h}5\) 15.h3! (15.\(\text{Q}ae1\) is weaker, and after 15...\(g5\)± Black creates a sufficient counterplay on the kingside) 15...\(\text{Q}c5\) 16.g4 \(\text{Q}h6\) 17.a3 (also White is OK after 17.\(\text{Q}h2\) \(\text{Q}d7\) 18.\(\text{Q}d4!\)± 17...\(\text{Q}d7\) 18.\(b4\) \(\text{Q}c6\) 19.\(\text{bxc5}\) \(\text{Q}xf3\) 20.\(\text{Q}xf3\) \(\text{Q}xh3\) 21.\(\text{Q}e2\)± White repelled Black's attack and kept an extra piece in the game J. Parker – S. Williams, England 2000.

In the position after 9...\(\text{Q}d7\) 10.\(\text{Q}d2\) \(\text{Q}xd2\) 11.\(\text{Q}xd2\) \(c5\) 12.\(dx5\) \(dxe5\) 13.\(b5\) it was not easy for Black to drive the white knight away from his territory as the move c7-c6 would weaken the d6-square very noticeably, and the white knight would come there as soon as possible. An ugly attempt to perform this task by 13...\(f6?!\) brought Black into great trouble after 14.\(f4\)! \(c6\) 15.\(fxe5\) \(\text{Q}e6\) 16.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{Q}xe5\) 17.\(\text{Q}f4\)± in the game Tatai – Levy, Camaguey 1974.

An attempt to support the e4-knight by developing the light-squared bishop to the long diagonal after 9...\(b6\) was encountered by 10.\(\text{Q}xe4!\) \(fxe4\) 11.\(\text{Q}e1\) \(d5\) 12.\(f3\) \(\text{exf3}\) 13.\(\text{Q}xf3\) \(\text{Q}b7\) 14.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{Q}d7\) 15.e4 \(c6\) 16.\(\text{Q}ae1\)±, and White gained an advantage in the centre in the game Paldanious – Nevanlinna, Finland 1991.

10.\(\text{Q}c2\) \(\text{Q}xc3\)
Also Black used to transpose into the Stone Wall by 10...\(d5\) in this position. But after 11.\(\text{Q}d1\) \(c6\) 12.\(\text{Q}e5\) \(\text{Q}a6\) 13.a3± Black's light-squared bishop stayed unemployed, so the position in the game Jovanovic – Paulic, Vrnjacka Banja 1996, was advantageous to White.

11.\(\text{Q}xc3\) \(\text{Q}e6\)
After 11...\(\text{Q}e8\) White could have gained an advantage by 12.e4±.

12.e4!
This way only allows White to struggle for an advantage in the
centre. The move 12.d5, similarly to the variation b1 from Chapter 20, does not work because of the position of the white queen on c2, and after 12...\(\textit{\text{e}}\)b4 13.\(\textit{\text{xf6}}\) \(\textit{\text{xf6}}\) 14.\(\textit{\text{d2}}\) \(\textit{\text{e5}}\) 15.\(\textit{\text{a3}}\) \(\textit{\text{a6}}\) 16.\(\textit{\text{b4}}\) \(\textit{\text{f4}}\) 17.\(\textit{\text{gxf4}}\) \(\textit{\text{g6}}\) 18.\(\textit{\text{f5}}\) \(\textit{\text{xf5}}\) Black even was better in the game Herreraiz – S. Williams, Calicut 1998. A delay of e2-e4 can result into loss of White’s advantage as well. After 12.\(\textit{\text{ad1}}\) \(\textit{\text{e8}}\) 13.\(\textit{\text{e4}}\) (in case of 13.\(\textit{\text{a3}}\) \(\textit{\text{e5}}\) 14.\(\textit{\text{d5}}\) \(\textit{\text{e7}}\) 15.\(\textit{\text{e4}}\) \(\textit{\text{h5}}\) there was an approximate equality in the game N. Pert – S. Williams, Aberdeen 1994) 13...\(\textit{\text{e5}}\) 14.\(\textit{\text{dxe5}}\) \(\textit{\text{dxe5}}\) 15.\(\textit{\text{exf5}}\) \(\textit{\text{h5}}\) 16.\(\textit{\text{e4}}\) \(\textit{\text{xf5}}\) 17.\(\textit{\text{d5+}}\) \(\textit{\text{h8}}\) Black’s chances looked no worse in the game A. Cooper – S. Williams, Scarborough 1999.

12...\(\textit{\text{fxe4}}\)

The move 12...\(\textit{\text{f4?!}}\) did not justify itself after 13.\(\textit{\text{gxf4}}\) \(\textit{\text{e8}}\) 14.\(\textit{\text{e5}}\) \(\textit{\text{e7}}\) 15.\(\textit{\text{e4}}\) \(\textit{\text{h5}}\) 16.\(\textit{\text{fe1}}\) \(\textit{\text{d8}}\) 17.\(\textit{\text{d5+}}\) in the game Sundararajan – S. Williams, Scarborough 1999.

13.\(\textit{\text{xe4}}\) \(\textit{\text{e8}}\) 14.\(\textit{\text{fe1}}\) \(\textit{\text{d7}}\) 15.\(\textit{\text{ac1}}\) \(\textit{\text{d8}}\) 16.\(\textit{\text{d2}}\) \(\textit{\text{h5}}\) 17.\(\textit{\text{e3}}\) ±

This position occurred in the game R. Ruck – S. Williams, Tallinn 1997. White’s chances are preferable because of Black’s retarded e6-pawn.

b) 8...\(\textit{\text{a6}}\)

Black is preparing to develop his queenside pieces harmoniously in order to be ready for White’s activity in the centre of the board.

9.\(\textit{\text{b2}}\)

Also White wants to complete his development before putting up an active play in the centre.

The most important of Black’s options are now b1) 9...\(\textit{\text{e8}}\) and b2) 9...\(\textit{\text{c6}}\).

Other continuations are much less popular. So, an attempt to take the e4-square by 9...\(\textit{\text{e4}}\) was a bit tardy. After 10.\(\textit{\text{xe4}}\) \(\textit{\text{fxe4}}\) 11.\(\textit{\text{e1}}\) d5 12.\(\textit{\text{f3}}\) Black’s attempt to struggle for the initiative by 12...\(\textit{\text{e8?!}}\) (after 12...\(\textit{\text{exf3}}\) 13.\(\textit{\text{xf3}}\) White’s position would stay a little better as his knight would be able to come to e5, whereas the e4-square would be closed for its black opponent) left Black a pawn down without any compensation after 13.\(\textit{\text{fxe4}}\) \(\textit{\text{xf1+}}\) 14.
Chapter 21

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{10.} & \text{\text{\text{e}}1!}\text{?} \\
\text{In the above considered variations White's queen often supported the advance e2-e4 from c2. In the position shown on the diagram this idea is of no great value as the black knight on a6 can disturb the queen.}
\end{align*} \]

10...\text{\text{b}8}

Black is going to put up counterplay on the queenside. If he ignores White's activity and continues with his original plan with the queen's transfer to the queenside by 10...\text{\text{h}5}, then after 11.e4 \text{\text{xe}4} 12.\text{\text{xe}4} \text{\text{f}4} 13.\text{\text{xe}4} \text{\text{c}6} 14.\text{\text{e}3} (after 14.
\text{\text{d}1} \text{\text{xd}1} 15.\text{\text{xd}1} \text{\text{e}8} 16.\text{\text{f}4} \text{\text{d}7} 17.\text{\text{e}2} \text{\text{ab}8} 18.\text{\text{d}3} \text{\text{c}6} 19.\text{\text{f}2} \text{\text{ax}g}2 20.\text{\text{x}g}2 \text{\text{b}5} 21.\text{\text{c}1} \text{\text{xc}4} 22.\text{\text{xc}4} \text{\text{b}7} \text{\text{x}c6}) \text{Black had some counterplay in the} \\
\text{game Trapl – Kolbak, Harrachov 1967})
\]

14...\text{\text{d}5}! \text{\text{ex}d}5 19.\text{\text{c}d}5 \text{\text{b}4} 20.\text{\text{xf}6} \text{\text{xf}6} 21.\text{\text{d}4} \\

The move 10...\text{\text{g}6} can't hinder White from the advance e2-e4. After 11.e4 \text{\text{xe}4} 12.\text{\text{xe}4} \text{\text{f}xe}4 13.\text{\text{xe}4} \text{\text{d}7} (after 13... \text{\text{xe}4} 14.\text{\text{h}4} \text{\text{h}4} \text{\text{h}4} \text{\text{ex}d}4 15.\text{\text{xd}4} \text{\text{c}5} 17.\text{\text{e}1} \text{White's pair of bishops was very strong in the open position in the game Lomineishvili – A. Rychagov, Moscow}}
1997; and in case of 13...\( \ Diamond b4 \) 14.\( \ Diamond e2 \) \( \text{Wh}5 \) 15.a3 \( \text{Qa}6 \) 16.\( \text{Qd}2 \) \( \text{Qxe}2 \) 17.\( \text{Qxe}2 \) \( \text{c6} \) 18.\( \text{Qae}1 \) \( \text{Qb}8 \) 19.\( \text{Qc}3 \) \( \text{Qd}8 \) 20.\( \text{Qh}3 \)± in the game Rieke – Moser, Oberwart 2000, Black had problems with the defence of his weak pawns on a5 and e6) 14.\( \text{Qe}2 \) \( \text{c6} \) 15.\( \text{Qe}1 \) \( \text{Qc}7 \) 16.\( \text{h}4 \)± in the game R. Mandl – Schweiger, Bayern 1991, White exerted pressure upon the e6-pawn.

Black can prevent his opponent from e2-e4 by 10...\( \text{Qe}4 \), but after 11.e3 \( \text{c}6 \) (Black should remember about the possible knight exchange e4 constantly, as after 11...\( \text{Qg}6 \) 12.\( \text{Qxe}4 \) \( \text{fxe}4 \) 13.\( \text{Qd}2 \) \( \text{d}5 \) 14.\( \text{Qf}3 \) \( \text{Qb}4 \) 15.\( \text{Qa}3 \) \( \text{exf}3 \)± White would be advantageous) 12.a3 \( \text{Qd}8 \) 13.\( \text{Qc}2 \) in the game Schoen – Kampmann, Dortmund 1991, he had to transpose into the Stone Wall by 13...\( \text{d}5 \) (in case of 13...\( \text{Qg}6 \) there would be 14.c5!±). White accomplished the standard knight transfer to d3 and gained an advantage after 14.\( \text{Qe}2 \) \( \text{Qb}8 \) 15.\( \text{Qe}5 \) \( \text{Qd}7 \) 16.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{Qf}6 \) 17.\( \text{Qf}4 \) \( \text{Qc}7 \) 18.\( \text{Qfd}3 \) \( \text{Qe}7 \) 19.\( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{Qd}8 \) 20.\( \text{Qa}3 \)±.

The advance 10...\( \text{c}6 \) introduces an attempt to organise some active play on the queenside, as well as the move in the main text of the variation. In this case after 11.e4 \( \text{fxe}4 \) 12.\( \text{Qxe}4 \) \( \text{Qxe}4 \) (after 12...\( \text{Qh}5 \) 13.\( \text{Qfd}2 \) \( \text{Qg}6 \) 14.\( \text{Qf}6 \)± \( \text{xf}6 \) 15.\( \text{Qe}4 \) \( \text{Qf}5 \) 16.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{Qd}7 \) 17.\( \text{Qf}2 \)± in the game Zhurina – Lysova, Moscow 1995, the pressure upon the e6-pawn maintained White’s advantage) 13.\( \text{Qxe}4 \) \( \text{Qd}7 \) 14.\( \text{Qd}2 \) \( \text{Qh}5 \) 15.\( \text{Qe}3 \) \( \text{Qc}7 \) (after 15...\( \text{b}6 \) White found a winning combination in the game Kachiani-Gersinska – Moser, Istanbul 2000: 16.d5 \( e5 \) 17.\( \text{Qxe}5 \) dxe5 18.\( \text{Qxe}5 \) \( \text{Qf}7 \) 19.\( \text{dx}c6 \) \( \text{Qb}4 \) 20.\( \text{Qe}3 \)+) 16.\( \text{Qae}1 \) \( \text{b}5 \) 17.\( \text{Qd}3 \) \( a4 \) 18.\( \text{Qc}3 \) \( \text{axb}3 \) 19.\( \text{Qxb}3 \) \( \text{Qf}5 \) 20.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{cx}d5 \) 21.\( \text{Qd}4 \) \( \text{Qg}6 \) 22.\( \text{cx}d5 \) \( \text{Qa}2 \) 23.\( \text{Qxa}2 \) \( \text{Qxd}3 \) 24.\( \text{Qd}2 \) \( \text{Qxd}2 \) 25.\( \text{Qxd}2 \)± White gained an advantage owing to the weakness of the e6- and c6-squares in Black’s camp in the game Schoen – Bohn, Germany 1991.

\textbf{11.e4}

White accomplishes the break-through in the centre, which is but standard for the whole Ilyin-Zhenevsky System.

11...\( \text{fxe}4 \) 12.\( \text{Qxe}4 \) \( \text{Qxe}4 \) 13.\( \text{Qxe}4 \) \( \text{b}5 \)

Black meant this counter-strike when he made his tenth move.

\textbf{14.c5!?}

After 14.\( \text{cx}b5 \) \( \text{Qxb}5 \) 15.\( \text{Qd}2 \) \( \text{Qb}4 \) 16.\( \text{Qe}3 \) \( \text{Qb}5 \)± in the game Borik – Trapl, Czech Republic
2001, Black pulled one more piece to the kingside.

14...\text{f}6

After 14...dxc5 15.d5 the pin-up along the e-file would be very unpleasant for Black.

15.cxd6 cxd6 16.\text{d}2 \text{b}7 17.e3 \text{c}7 18.ae1 b4 19.h4±

This position occurred in the game Chuchelov – Lupu, Cappelle la Grande 1995. White restricted the opponent’s pieces with the necessity to defend the e6-pawn. After 19...\text{h}5 20.e2 h6 21.d2 (the white knight wants to get to c4 or e4) 21...\text{xe}2 22.\text{xe}2 \text{a}6 (after 22...\text{xe}2 23.\text{xe}2 d5 24.c1 White would be first to take the c-file) 23.e3 d5 24.f3± Black not only had a weak pawn on e6, but also had to protect the e5-square against the possible intrusion of the white knight.

\textbf{b2) 9...c6}

This move is, perhaps, linked with Black's previous move most harmoniously. It prepares c7 for his knight, so that it would be able to protect the e6-pawn from there and possibly support the advance b7-b5, aimed at the organisation of active play on the queenside.

10.e1

The black knight on a6 does not let White prepare e2-e4 by \text{d}1-c2, so he has to use the rook. White tried 10.e1 as well, and in this line the move 10...e5!? deserves attention first of all, because after 10...c7 11.\text{d}3 \text{d}7 12.e4 \text{xe}4 13.\text{xe}4 \text{e}8 14.e1 \text{e}4 15.\text{xe}4 \text{f}6 16.\text{g}2 \text{f}7 17.e2± White gained an advantage easily in the game Orsag – J. Roos, Berlin 1996.

10...d7

Black's attempt to play on the queenside by 10...e4 11.\text{d}2 \text{xd}2 12.\text{xd}2 \text{g}5 13.\text{d}1 \text{f}4 was no success after White's well-timed opposition in the centre: 14.e3! fxe3 15.fxe3 \text{b}4 16.\text{d}2 \text{e}7 17.\text{f}1 \text{d}7 18.e4 \text{h}6 19.a3± Wrede – Pfeufer, Oberhof 1998.

The transition to the Stone Wall by 10...d5 after 11.e3 (White's immediate play in the centre by 11.e5 \text{d}7 12.\text{xd}7 \text{xd}7 13.f3 \text{h}8 14.e4 turned out too impatient after 14...fxe
15. fxe4 dxc4 16. bxc4 e5!± in the game Gemmell – R. Bellin, Swansea 1987) 11... d4 12. d5 e8 13. a3 d6 14. f3 b5 15. e2± in the game Lecuyer – J. Roos, Rouen 1987, allowed White to maintain a certain advantage owing to the transfer of the e2-knight to d3 via f4.

After 10... b8 11. e4 fxe4 12. dxe4 dxe4 13. b5 in the game Sandmeier – Huisl, Bad Neuenahr 1978, the easiest way to keep up White’s slight advantage, connected with the pressure upon the retarded e6-pawn, was 14. e2±.

11. e4

As mentioned above, this advance is the characteristic feature of the whole Ilyin-Zhenevsky System.

11... fxe4 12. dxe4 dxe4 13. e4 a4

Black tried to create counterplay in other ways as well. But after 13... f6 14. b2 b5 15. c1 e7 White put serious problems to his opponent by 16. h4! bxc4 17. bxc4 c5 18. e5!± in the game Lautier – J. Roos, Rouen 1987, and Black failed to solve them after 18... cxd4? (also White’s advantage would be big after 18... dxe5 19. dxe5±, and in case of the bishop’s retreats 18... a4 or 18... e8 White would have 19. g4±) 19. x d7 x d7 20. x e6!±.

After 13... e8 14. e1 f7 15. e2 e8 16. d3± in the game A. Greenfeld – Gerber, Bonnevoie 1998, White still exerted pressure upon Black’s retarded pawn.

14. h4!

A very good move which prepares g2-h3.

14... c7

In case of 14... b6 there is 15. h3 c7 16. g5 xg5 17. hxg5 axb3 18. axb3 x a1 19. x a1 a8 20. c3±, maintaining the pressure upon Black’s position, and in case of 20... a3? J. Lautier pointed out the following line: 21. h5 b x b3 22. f4 g6 23. h6 a8 24. h4+-.

15. e3 axb3

In case of 15... b5 White keeps up the pressure upon the e6-pawn by 16. h3±.

16. axb3 xa1 17. xa1 a8 18. b1±

This position occurred in the game Lautier – Bricard, Besançon 1999. White maintains his advantage owing to his command of space and pressure upon the e6-pawn.
Chapter 22

1.\( \text{\textcopyright{d}f3} \) f5 2.c4 \( \text{\textcopyright{d}f6} \) 3.g3 e6 4.\( \text{\textcopyright{g}g2} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{e}e7} \)

5.0-0 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.\( \text{\textcopyright{c}c3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{e}e8} \)

This move is very typical of the Dutch Defence. Black usually makes it to transfer then the queen to h5 for further active play on the kingside. However, sometimes he just wants to have the d8-square free for his bishop or knight. For example, when after \( \text{\textcopyright{b}b8-c6} \) White plays in the centre d4-d5.

8.b3!

In the position shown on the diagram White's prophylactic move is the best way of struggling for an advantage, as well as in Chapter 21. Preparing e2-e4 by \( \text{\textcopyright{e}e1} \) after 8...\( \text{\textcopyright{g}g6} \) 9.e4 fxe4 10.\( \text{\textcopyright{d}xe4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{d}xe4} \) 11.\( \text{\textcopyright{d}xe4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{d}c6!} \) (but no 11...\( \text{\textcopyright{d}xe4} \) because of 12.\( \text{\textcopyright{h}h4!} \), trapping the black queen) gives a complex position with mutual chances, in which White not only needs to care of his rook, but also he has to be ready for the break-through e6-e5 which increases the activity of Black's pieces rather noticeably. The move 8.\( \text{\textcopyright{c}c2} \) is not very good as well, because after 8...\( \text{\textcopyright{h}h5} \) (in case of 8...\( \text{\textcopyright{c}c6} \) White can reject e2-e4 in favour of 9.d5!? \( \text{\textcopyright{b}b4} \) 10.\( \text{\textcopyright{b}b3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{a}a6} \) 11.\( \text{\textcopyright{d}xe6} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{c}c5} \) 12.\( \text{\textcopyright{c}c2} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{a}xe6} \) 13.\( \text{\textcopyright{d}d4} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{x}xc4} \) 14.\( \text{\textcopyright{d}xf5} \) with some advantage) 9.e4 (after 9.b4 Black can get good counterplay by 9...\( \text{\textcopyright{c}c6} \) 10.b5 \( \text{\textcopyright{d}d8} \) 11.a4 \( \text{\textcopyright{f}f7} \) 12.\( \text{\textcopyright{a}a3} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{g}5=} \) there is 9...e5!? (the position after 9...\( \text{\textcopyright{f}xe4} \) 10.\( \text{\textcopyright{d}xe4} \) e5 11.\( \text{\textcopyright{d}xe5} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{d}xe5} \) 12.\( \text{\textcopyright{x}xf6} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{xf6} \text{\textcopyright{e}e3} \text{\textcopyright{c}c6=} \) is about equal) 10.\( \text{\textcopyright{d}xe5} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{d}xe5} \) with mutual chances. The defect of the active 8.b4 is that there is 8...e5 9.\( \text{\textcopyright{d}xe5} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{d}xe5} \) 10.\( \text{\textcopyright{d}d5} \) \( \text{\textcopyright{d}d8=} \).

In the position after White's eighth move Black has several options, each of them deserving attention: a) 8...\( \text{\textcopyright{h}h5} \), b) 8...\( \text{\textcopyright{c}c6} \), c) 8...\( \text{\textcopyright{b}bd7} \), d) 8...\( \text{\textcopyright{c}c6} \) and e) 8...a5.

a) 8...\( \text{\textcopyright{h}h5} \)
Black sends his queen to the kingside at once. However, this idea is not absolutely accurate as it provides White with an additional (and good) opportunity to struggle for an advantage.

9.\(a3?!\)

This move emphasises the bad side of the early transfer of the queen to h5. White is going to make use of the tactical nuance connected with the insufficient protection of the e7-bishop.

9...g5

The peculiarity of the bishop's position on a3 instead of the traditional b2 manifests most efficiently if Black chooses the prophylactic 9...a5?!. In this case White can break his pawn chain in the centre immediately by 10. d5! After 10...\(a6\) (the standard continuation 10...e5? does not work now because of the underprotected e7-bishop, and after 11.\(xe5!\) White failed to launch a real attack even by 11...f4 after 12.\(gxf4\) \(g4\) 13.\(xg4\) \(xg4\) 14.\(f3\) \(h3\) 15.\(xh3\) \(xh3\) 16.e3 \(f6\) 17.\(e2\) \(g6+\) 18.\(h1\) \(f6\) 19.\(b2\)-- in the game Adamski – Roehrl, Siegen 1970; after 10...f4 11.\(gxf4\) \(g4\) 12.h3 \(h6\) 13.e3 \(f6\) 14.\(c1\) e5 15.\(xe5\) \(xh3\) in the game Saidy – Weingberger, New York 1968, White escaped a perpetual check and won a piece by 16.\(exf6!\) \(xg2\) 17.\(xg2\) \(g4+\) 18.\(h1\) \(h3+\) 19.\(h2\) \(xf6\) 20.\(e4+\); and after 10...\(e4\) 11.\(c1\) \(a6\) 12.\(xe6\) \(xe6\) 13.\(d4\) \(xc3\) 14.\(xc3\) \(c8\) 15.\(b5\) \(b8\) 16.\(e3\) \(e8\) in the game Yevseev – Gavritenkov, Tula 1998, White won material too by the precise answer 17. \(d2!\) a4 18.\(bxa4\) \(h8\) 19.a5+ 11.\(dxe6\) \(xe6\) 12.\(d4\) \(c8\) 13.e3 \(g6\) (Black wouldn't feel any better after a queen exchange) 14.\(c1\) \(c5\) White fixed the black pawns in the centre with the help of the traditional King's Indian manoeuvre 15.\(db5!\) \(d8\), and then he just won one of them by 16.\(xc5!\) \(dxc5\) 17.\(a4\) \(e4\) 18.\(bc3\) \(xc3\) 19.\(xc3\) \(f6\) 20.\(d5+\) \(h8\) 21.\(xc5\) \(d7\) 22. \(cc1\)-- in the game L. Portisch – Rossolimo, Monte Carlo 1969.

Alternative continuations don't promise equality to Black as well. After 9...\(bd7\) 10.\(c2!\) \(g4\) (after 10...g5 White could have resorted to 11.d5! again, so that Black would be deprived of e6-e5, this time because of the underprotection of the f5-pawn, and after 10...\(f7\) 11.\(ad1\) \(e8\) 12.\(c1\) g5 13.\(e1\) f4 Black's unjustified activity allowed White to develop a strong initiative on the kingside by 14.\(d3\) \(h6\) 15.\(e4\) \(f8\) 16.h4! in the game.
I. Farago – K. Schulz, Altensteig 1987) 11.\textit{a}1d a6 12.\textit{f}e1 \textit{b}8
White accomplished the programmed advance 13.e4, and after 13...\textit{f}xe4 14.\textit{d}xe4 b6 15.h3
\textit{g}h6 (the other retreat 15...\textit{g}f6 loses the e6-pawn after 16.
\textit{e}g5\textpm) 16.\textit{c}1 \textit{g}6 17.\textit{e}2 \textit{b}7 18.\textit{e}g5\textpm in the game Alex-
ander – Tartakower, Nottingham 1936, he had an excellent
position, exerting strong pressure upon the e6-pawn.

The move 9...\textit{c}6 is no better as it enables White to break the
black pawn chain by 10.d5!, using the knight’s position on c6.
After 10...\textit{d}8 11.\textit{c}1 (White need not hurry with the ex-
change on e6 while there is an opposition of bishops along the
a3-e7 diagonal) 11...a6 (the adventurous 11...e5? 12.\textit{xe}5 f4
can be easily refuted by 13.gxf4
\textit{g}4 14.\textit{g}xg4 \textit{g}xg4 15.f3 \textit{h}3
16.\textit{h}h3 \textit{h}h3 17.e3\textpm) 12.e3 g5
13.dxe6 \textit{e}xe6 14.\textit{d}5 \textit{d}8 15.
\textit{d}4 \textit{xd}1 16.\textit{fxd}1 \textit{xd}4 17.
\textit{xd}4 \textit{b}8 in the game Newe-
rovski – Gavritenkov, Tula 1995,
Black’s defence in the centre was
eventually broken by 18.c5\textpm.

If Black protects the e7-
bishop by 9...\textit{e}8, then White can try 10.\textit{e}1. Now Black’s natural
with to defend the c7-square as safe as possible against the in-
trusion of White’s knight by 10...c6 (in case of 10...e5 11.dxe5
dxe5 12.\textit{xe}7 \textit{xe}7 13.e4 \textit{xd}1
14.\textit{xd}1\textpm the endgame is to
White’s favour, primarily owing
to his superior development) en-
countered a tough response of
11.e4! \textit{xd}1 12.\textit{xd}1 \textit{f}xe4 13.
\textit{xe}4 \textit{xe}4 14.\textit{e}4 d5 15.\textit{e}7
\textit{xe}7 16.\textit{g}2 \textit{d}7 17.\textit{d}3 b6
18.\textit{f}e1 \textit{b}7 19.cxd5 cxd5 20.
\textit{c}1\textpm with a distinct advantage
to White in the game Mititelu –
Radovici, Romania 1961.

If Black tries to support the
e7-bishop by 9...\textit{f}7, then White
can answer by 10.e3!? (if White
chooses a more active method of
10.\textit{e}1 \textit{bd}7 11.e4 \textit{xd}1 12.
\textit{xd}1 \textit{f}xe4 13.\textit{xe}4 \textit{xe}4 14.
\textit{xe}4, then after 14...d5!? 15.
\textit{xe}7 dxe4 16.g5 b6\textpm to be fol-
lowed by \textit{c}8-b7 it is Black who gains
from the tactical nuance,
created by the opposition of the
bishops along the a3-f8 diagonal)
10...\textit{bd}7 11.\textit{e}1 \textit{h}6 (in case of
an exchange of the queens the
tempo, spent by Black to activate
it, would be wasted for nothing)
12.\textit{d}3 c6 (no 12...e5?! because
of 13.\textit{d}5 \textit{d}8 14.\textit{xf}6+ \textit{xf}6
15.\textit{d}5 \textit{exd}4 16.\textit{f}4\textpm), and now
after 13.d5!? \textit{cxd}5 14.cxd5 e5
15.\textit{b}5 g5 16.\textit{c}1 e4 17.\textit{b}2 \textit{e}5
18.\textit{c}4\textpm White managed to ex-
ert pressure upon the d6-pawn
in the game De Boer – A. Rot-
stein, Wijk aan Zee 1993.

10.e3!?

A standard move which Black
uses when his queen is on h5.
White is going to offer a queen
exchange.

Showing activity in the cen-
tre immediately can’t be recom-
mended to White. After 10.c5 d5
11.\( \text{b}5 \text{e}8 \) 12.\( \text{d}e5 \) in the game Navarro – Bianchi, Santiago 1995, Black got rid of White's active knights by 12...\( \text{c}6 \), and the standard break-through in the centre 10.d5 after 10...g4 11.\( \text{e}1 \) allowed Black to keep his pawn chain untouched by 11...e5 in the game Gligoric – Bhend, Moscow 1956.

10...\( \text{f}7 \)

After Black's passive 10...\( \text{e}8 \)?! White played 11.c5! \( \text{f}6 \) 12.\( \text{d}2 \text{xd}1 \) 13.\( \text{f}xd1 \) dxc5 14.\( \text{xc}5 \text{xc}5 \) 15.dxc5 c6 16.\( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 17.\( \text{d}8 \text{f}8 \) 18.\( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 19.\( \text{ad}1 \) and got excellent play on dark squares and along the d-file in the game Simonet Pons – Segura Ariza, Spain 1995.

11.c5!

A very strong move. With the rook on f7 it's very unfavourable for Black to weaken the e5-square, allowing the white knight to jump there.

11...\( \text{d}7 \)

After 11...g4 12.cxd6 \( \text{xd}6 \) 13.\( \text{xd}6 \) cxd6 (no 13...\( \text{gx}f3 \)? because of 14.\( \text{xf}3 \) \( \text{g}4 \) 15.\( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{fxe}4 \) 16.\( \text{f}4++ \), and White was not just a pawn up in the game Bouwmeester – Bhend, Bern 1957, his position was really overwhelming) 14.\( \text{d}2 \) White has excellent potential stands for his knights on c4 and f4.

12.\( \text{d}2! \)

White forces a queen exchange because of the weakness of the b7-pawn.

12...\( \text{xd}1 \) 13.\( \text{xd}1 \) d5 14.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 15.\( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \)

This position occurred in the game Kozma – Bhend, Munich 1958. White could have supported his strong initiative on the queenside by 16.\( \text{b}4 \uparrow \).

b) 8...\( \text{c}6 \)

Preparing the advance e6-e5.

9.d5

Just as in the variation b1 from Chapter 20, White uses the position of the black knight on c6 to break the pawn chain in the centre.

9...\( \text{d}8 \)

Now, unlike in b1 from Chapter 20, Black finds a relatively convenient square for the knight to retreat to.

In case of a pawn exchange in the centre the play develops
similarly to the variation b1 of Chapter 20 (p. 204-206). After 9...exd5 10.cxd5 e5 11.d4 d8 (after 11...g6 12.f4 e4 13.h3 h6 14.d3 d7 15.d2± in the game Karpeshov – E. Rotshtein, Lvov 1986, White was better owing to the superior activity of his pieces, and later in the game Adamski – J. Christensen, Copenhagen 2000, after 11...h5 12.f4 eg4 13.h3 h6 14.d3± Black allowed an instructive mistake of 14...e4? and was punished by 15.g4!± 12.wc2 wh5 13.f4 eg4 14.h3 h6 15.d2± in the game Kramer – Bakker, Beverwijk 1962, White’s pieces were positioned much more actively than Black’s.

After 9...e5 10.dxe6 xf3+ in the game Sulava – Vilarnovo, Benasque, 1999, White chose the strange move 11.exf3!?. The further development of events proved his right: after 11...xe6 12.e1 f7 13.f4 c6 14.a3 h5 15.d3 d7 16.e2 e8 17.d4 d8 18.h3 g6 19.e2± his pressure upon Black’s central pawns restricted the black pieces considerably, whereas White was ready to double his rooks on the only open e-file.

10.dxe6

Black was threatening with e6-e5, and after 10.b5 he found 10...d5! 11.d6 d6!? 12.cxd5 e5 13.e4 h5 14.b2 f7 15.d2 g6 16.exf5 xf5∞ with mutual chances in the game Tichy – Polasek, Czech Republic 1996.

10...xe6 11.d4


11.c5

After the erroneous 11...h5? 12.d5 xd4 (in case of 12...xd5 13.xd5± the fatal bind along the a2-g8 diagonal does great damage to Black) 13.e7 f7 14 xd4 xe7 in the game Bondarevsky – Ilyin-Zhenevsky, Tbilisi 1937, White made use of the defects in the black knight’s position by 15.c5! xe2 16.cxd6+ xd6 17.g5 f7 18.xf6 gxf6 19.f1±.

12.b2

Since White has a space advantage, he should try to avoid simplifications. After 12.d5 d8 13.cf6 f6 14.b1 d7 15.b2 a5 16.e3 a4 17.e2 axb3 18.axb3 c6= the position was equal in the game G. Hanssen – Ogaard, Norway 1994.

12.a5 13.c2 h5 14.a1±
This position occurred in the game Fritz – Reim, Germany 1996. White maintains a certain advantage owing to his command of space. Black’s attempt to break free by 14...f4?! in this game could have been repelled easily by 15.gxf4 hxg3 (15...g4 16.h3 h6 17.d5±) 16.f3.±

c) 8...bd7
As well as in the previous variation b, Black wants to perform the advance e6-e5.

9.b2
This natural move is, at the same time, the strongest one.

9...h5
It turns out that the planned advance 9...e5 brings serious problems. After 10.dxe5 10...dxe5 (after 10...exf5 in the game Markland – Parr, Blackpool 1971, White had a nice option of 11.e5! dxe5 12.b5 d8 13.a1, Black either losing by an exchange after 13...h8 14.a3!+–, or losing a pawn after 13...xd5 14.xd5+ h8 15.xe6+ 11.e4?! f4 (after 11...fxe4 12.xe4 x4 13.d5+ h8 14.e4± the weakness of the e5-pawn is perceptible) 12.gxf4 exf4 13.e5 d4 14.d5 d8 (after 14...c5?? 15.xc7– in the game Rieke – Krings, Germany 1989, Black stayed without compensation for the missing material) 15.e1 c6 16.e6 cxd5 17.exd7 xd7 18.xd5+ xd5 19.cxd5± the passed d-pawn promised better play to White.

In case of 9...c6 White gains an advantage by 10.g5! d8, and now in the game Riedel – H. Mayer, Germany 1996, he could have tried 11.d5! cxd5 (otherwise the white knight comes to e6) 12.cxd5 exd5 13.xd5+, breaking the opponent’s pawn chain in the centre of the board.

The waiting 9...h6 allows White to prepare e2-e4 by 10.e2, and after 10...h7 in the game P. Schmidt – Kaspar, Passau 1998 (if Black tries to prevent e2-e4 by 10...g6, then White has 11.d5± as there is no 11...e5? because of 12.h4+–), he need not linger with this advance any more. By 11.e4 f4 12.e5 White gained an advantage.

10.c2
Having completed the prophylactic measures, White proceeds to the organisation of the advance e2-e4. Another way to accomplish the same task by 10.e1 was unsuccessful, and after 10...e4! 11.xe4 fxe4 12.dxe4 13.fxe4 g5 14.f1 15.h3 e5 16.dxe5 dxe5 17.xe5 xh3 18.xf6 xg2 19.xg2 xf6 20.d5+ h8± Black

223
had an excellent compensation for the pawn in the game Borisfenko-Belova – Lazarevic, Leninigrad 1964.

10...\(\text{\textit{c4}}\)

After 10...a6 11.\(\text{\textit{f1}}\) e5 12. \(\text{\textit{dxe5}}\) \(\text{\textit{dxe5}}\) 13.e4 f4 14.gxf4 \(\text{\textit{g4}}\) 15.f5 \(\text{\textit{c5}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{d1}}\) g6 17.h3 \(\text{\textit{h6}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{xe5}}\)-- in the game Romanzko – Just, Rodewisch 2000, Black’s attack failed. Also the immediate 10...e5 is unlucky because of 11.\(\text{\textit{b5}}\) \(\text{\textit{d8}}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{dxe5}}\). At last, the waiting move 10...h6 allows White to play 11.e4!± at once.

11.h3 \(\text{\textit{h6}}\)

This position occurred in the games E. Gruenfeld – Bogoljubow, Zandvoort 1936. White did not venture on the programmed advance 12.e4!??, although it was, most likely, the best continuation. After 12... \(\text{\textit{fxe4}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{xe4}}\)± (also an intermediate 13.g4± is possible) the move 13...\(\text{\textit{xf3}}\)? would do material losses to Black after 14.\(\text{\textit{e2}}\) \(\text{\textit{f5}}\) 15.g4±.

d) 8...c6

9.\(\text{\textit{c2}}\)

Now that the c6-square is inaccessible for the black knight, White prepares e2-e4.

9...\(\text{\textit{h5}}\)

If Black tries to prevent e2-e4 by 9...\(\text{\textit{g6}}\), then after 10.\(\text{\textit{a3}}\) \(\text{\textit{bd7}}\) (after 10...\(\text{\textit{e8}}\) White resumed the threat of e2-e4 by 11.\(\text{\textit{f1}}\) e5, and after 11...\(\text{\textit{d4}}\) 12. \(\text{\textit{c4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf4}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{d2}}\) d5 14.\(\text{\textit{xe7}}\) \(\text{\textit{xe7}}\) 15.f3! e5 16.cxd5 e3 17.\(\text{\textit{e4}}\) \(\text{\textit{f5}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{c5}}\) \(\text{\textit{d7}}\) 19.dxe5 \(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{xe3}}\) \(\text{\textit{xe4}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{xe4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xe4}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{xd4}}\)± White gained a noticeable development advantage plus an extra pawn in the game M. Puagach – V. Palermo, Buenos Aires 1965) White applied the waiting move 11.e3!? (also after 11.d5 cxd5 12.cxd5 \(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) 13. \(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) cxd5 14.\(\text{\textit{fd1}}\) \(\text{\textit{b6}}\) 17. \(\text{\textit{ac1}}\)± White would have a fair compensation for the pawn), and after 11...\(\text{\textit{e8}}\) (Black wants to play e6-e5, but with his rook on e8 White’s break-through in the centre becomes still more dangerous) 12.d5! \(\text{\textit{g4}}\) (now in case of 12...cxd5 there is 13.\(\text{\textit{b5}}\)±) 13.h3 \(\text{\textit{ge5}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{d4}}\) exd5 15.cxd5 \(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 16.dxc6 bxc6 17.\(\text{\textit{ce2}}\)± in the game Pavlovic – Vlahovic, Kla-
doxo 1990, Black’s central pawns suffered from White’s strong pressure.

Another attempt to prevent White from e2-e4 by 9...d5 after the standard 10.\textit{c}a4! (in case of 10.\textit{c}e5 \textit{c}bd7 11.\textit{c}f4 \textit{c}xe5 12.\textit{c}xe5 \textit{c}d7 13.\textit{c}c7 \textit{c}f6 14.\textit{c}d6 \textit{c}e7 15.\textit{c}xe7 \textit{c}xe7= the position turned equal in the game Prein-falk – Nedeljkovic, Ljubljana 1938, because the way of the white knight from c3 to e5 was too long) 10...b6 11.\textit{c}b2 \textit{c}a6 12.\textit{c}d3 allowed White to set up his knights ideally for the Stone Wall structure, on d3 and f3. Black’s attempt to break free by 12...\textit{c}b4 after 13.\textit{c}xb4 \textit{c}xb4 encountered 14.\textit{c}c5!, and after 14...\textit{c}xc5 15.a3 \textit{c}a5 16.\textit{c}xc5 \textit{c}b6 17.\textit{c}c2 a5 18.a4 \textit{c}a6 19.\textit{c}a3± White gained an advantage in the game G. Forintos – Bogumil, Hungary 1995.

Also Black tried to disturb the white queen by his knight from a6. But in case of 9...\textit{c}a6 10.a3 the knight on a6, unlike on c6, does not support the advance e6-e5, so Black has to proceed to defence. After 10...\textit{c}g6 (Black’s position was no better after 10...\textit{c}h5 11.b4 \textit{c}d7 12.\textit{c}f4 h6 13.c5 dxc5 14.dxc5 \textit{c}d5 15.\textit{c}e5 \textit{c}ad8 16.\textit{c}d2 \textit{c}ac7 17.\textit{c}c4± in the game F. Olafsson – B. Milic, Marianske Lazne 1961) 11.b4 \textit{c}c7 12.a4 \textit{c}e4 13.b5 \textit{c}d7 14.\textit{c}b1 \textit{c}fc8 White performed an interesting exchange operation by 15.\textit{c}xe4 \textit{fxe}4 16.\textit{c}h4! \textit{c}xh4 17.\textit{c}xe4 \textit{c}g4 18.\textit{c}f3 \textit{c}xd4 19.\textit{c}d1 \textit{c}f6 20.\textit{c}xd6 \textit{c}e7 21.\textit{c}d3 \textit{c}e8 22.\textit{c}xh4±, which eventually won him a perceptible advantage in the game Ribli – R. Rodriguez, Riga 1979.

If Black does not impede White’s plans neither directly nor indirectly and continues, for example, by 9...\textit{c}bd7, then after 10.e4 \textit{c}xe4 11.\textit{c}xe4 \textit{fxe}4 12.\textit{c}xe4 \textit{c}f6 13.\textit{c}e2 \textit{c}h5 14.\textit{c}e1 \textit{c}e8 15.\textit{c}g5 \textit{c}xe2 16.\textit{c}xe2 \textit{c}f6 17.\textit{c}f3 c5 18.\textit{c}b2± White exerts pressure upon the e6-pawn, Wilde – Winkler, Wuertemberg 1991.

10.e4

White has no reason to reject this planned advance. After 10.\textit{c}a3?! \textit{c}a6 in the game White-ley – I. Farago, Moscow 1977, White delivered a different blow at Black’s centre: 11.d5 (the main defect of the position of White’s bishop on a3 is that now there is no 11.e4? because of 11...\textit{fxe}4 12.\textit{c}xe4 \textit{c}xe4 13.\textit{c}xe4 d5!–, Black winning a piece), and after 11...\textit{exd}5 12.\textit{cxd}5 c5 13.\textit{c}ad1 \textit{c}d7 14.\textit{c}c1 \textit{c}ae8 15.\textit{c}d3 \textit{c}b4 16.\textit{c}c4 \textit{c}e4± it was Black who turned out advantageous.

10...\textit{fxe}4 11.\textit{c}xe4 e5 12.\textit{dxe}5 dxe5

An attempt to attack the white king by 12...\textit{g}4? failed after 13.\textit{exd}6 \textit{c}xf3 14.\textit{h}3 \textit{c}e5 15.\textit{dxe7} \textit{c}a6 16.\textit{c}d1+– in the game Elster – Goldt, Aachen 1982.

13.\textit{g}5 \textit{c}bd7 14.\textit{c}ae1 \textit{c}b4 15.\textit{d}2 \textit{c}xd2 16.\textit{c}xd2 \textit{c}g4
17.h3 \( \square h6 \) 18.\( \triangle c3 \) \( \triangle f7 \) 19.f4!\( \uparrow \)

This position occurred in the game Karpman – Rasidovic, Belgrade 1988. By his last move White opened up the play to the maximum in order to use his development advantage in the best possible way.

e) 8...a5

Before starting any activity on the kingside, Black takes prophylactic measures on the queenside.

9.\( \triangle e1! \)

White is preparing e2-e4. If he chooses another popular continuation 9.\( \triangle b2 \), then, apart from 9...\( \triangle a6 \) 10.\( \triangle e1 \), considered in Chapter 21 as variation b1, he has to reckon with 9...\( \triangle h5 \), 9...\( \triangle d8 \) and 9...c6 as well.

9...\( \triangle g6 \)

Black tries to impede White's plan. Without success, as the variations below will show. Sometimes he moves his knight to e4 at once in order to prevent e2-e4. In this case after 9...\( \triangle e4 \) there is 10.\( \triangle d3 \) (10.\( \triangle c2 \) is less accurate as after 10...\( \triangle g6 \) 11.\( \triangle b2 \) \( \triangle f6 \) White can’t drive the black knight away from e4 by \( \triangle d2 \) because of the insufficient defence of the d4-pawn) 10...\( \triangle g6 \) (also Black tried to gain from the advanced position of the white queen by 10...\( \triangle c6 \), but after 11.\( \triangle x e4 \) \( \triangle b4 \) 12.\( \triangle b1 \) fxe4 13.\( \triangle x e4 \) e5 in the game San Segundo Carrillo – Castillo Gallego, Ubeda 2000, White ventured on all the complications by 14.\( \triangle x e5! \) \( \triangle f5 \) 15.\( \triangle x b7 \) \( \triangle c2 \) 16.\( \triangle b2 \) \( \triangle x a1 \) 17.\( \triangle x a1 \) \( \triangle b8 \) 18.\( \triangle d5+ \) \( \triangle h8 \) 19.\( \triangle d4 \) \( \triangle a6 \) 20.\( \triangle x d6 \) \( \triangle x d6 \) 21.\( \triangle x f5 \) \( \triangle x d5 \) 22.\( \triangle x g7+ \) \( \triangle g8 \) 23.\( \triangle x d5+ \) and got a winning position, and in case of 10...d5 after 11.\( \triangle x d5 \) \( \triangle x c3 \) 12.\( \triangle x c3 \) \( \triangle b4 \) 13.\( \triangle x c7 \) \( \triangle a6 \) 14.\( \triangle e5 \) \( \triangle x e1 \) 15.\( \triangle x e1 \) exd5 16.\( \triangle d5 \) \( \triangle h8 \) 17.\( \triangle x a5 \) \( \triangle x e2 \) 18.\( \triangle x f4 \) in the game Bilek – Papp, Budapest 1957, White not only had two pawns against exchange, but most of his pieces were positioned more actively than Black's) 11.\( \triangle b2 \) \( \triangle a6 \) (in case of 11...\( \triangle f6 \) White plays 12.\( \triangle d2 \), making use of the fact that the d4-pawn is covered already) 12.a3 \( \triangle f6 \) 13.\( \triangle d2 \), and White gains an advantage, driving the black knight away from e4.
In case of 9...\(\mathcal{W}h5\) after the standard break-through in the centre by 10.e4 fxe4 11.\(\mathcal{W}xe4\) 12.\(\mathcal{W}xe4\) \(\mathcal{W}c6\) (if Black tries to play actively in the centre by 12...e5?!), then after 13.dxe5 \(\mathcal{W}g4\) 14.\(\mathcal{W}f4\) \(\mathcal{W}c6\) 15.\(\mathcal{W}d5+\) \(\mathcal{W}h8\) 16.\(\mathcal{W}xd6\) \(\mathcal{W}xd6\) 17.\(\mathcal{W}xf8+\) \(\mathcal{W}xf8\) 18.\(\mathcal{W}xh5\) \(\mathcal{W}xh5\) 19.\(\mathcal{W}g5\) \(\mathcal{W}e5\) 20.\(\mathcal{W}b1\) \(\mathcal{W}g6\) 21.\(\mathcal{W}e4\) \(\mathcal{W}d4\) 22.\(\mathcal{W}f4\)+, White keeps his extra pawn and repels all Black's threats, R. Mandl – Lerch, Baden-Baden 1993) 13.\(\mathcal{W}b2\) \(\mathcal{W}f6\) 14.\(\mathcal{W}h3\) \(\mathcal{W}d7\) 15.\(\mathcal{W}h2\) \(\mathcal{W}xd1+\) 16.\(\mathcal{W}xd1\) a4 17.\(\mathcal{W}g4\) axb3 18.\(\mathcal{W}xf6+\) \(\mathcal{W}xf6\) 19.axb3 \(\mathcal{W}a2\) 20.\(\mathcal{W}d2\) e5 21.dxe5 \(\mathcal{W}xe5\) 22.\(\mathcal{W}ee2\)+, White maintained his advantage owing to his pair of bishops in the game Ruiz – Cayon, Bogota 1991.

10.e4

A principal continuation, recommended by I.Chom. But after 10.\(\mathcal{W}a3\) \(\mathcal{W}a6\) 11.e3 \(\mathcal{W}b4\) 12.\(\mathcal{W}b2\) c6 13.a3 \(\mathcal{W}a6\) 14.b4+ in the game Csom – Szabolcsi, Hungary 1972, White also maintained a slight advantage owing to a certain superiority on the queenside.

10...\(\mathcal{W}xe4\) 11.\(\mathcal{W}xe4\) fxe4 12.\(\mathcal{W}xe4\) \(\mathcal{W}c6\)

After 12...\(\mathcal{W}xe4\) 13.\(\mathcal{W}h4\) \(\mathcal{W}xd4\) 14.\(\mathcal{W}xd4\) \(\mathcal{W}f6\) 15.\(\mathcal{W}d3\) \(\mathcal{W}xa1\) White has 16.\(\mathcal{W}e4!\) g6 17.\(\mathcal{W}xg6\) hxg6 18.\(\mathcal{W}xg6\) \(\mathcal{W}h8\) 19.\(\mathcal{W}h6\) \(\mathcal{W}d7\) (no 19...\(\mathcal{W}g8\)? because of 20.\(\mathcal{W}h5+\) –) 20.\(\mathcal{W}xf8\) \(\mathcal{W}xf8\) 21.\(\mathcal{W}e8\) \(\mathcal{W}g7\) 22.\(\mathcal{W}e7+\) \(\mathcal{W}g8\) 23.\(\mathcal{W}xc7\)=, which allowed him to develop a mighty initiative, fully compensating for the little material loss.

Also it should be mentioned that Black can't use the pin-up of the white knight after 12...e5 13.\(\mathcal{W}e3\) \(\mathcal{W}g4\) 14. dxe5 \(\mathcal{W}c6\) because of 15.\(\mathcal{W}d5+\) \(\mathcal{W}h8\) 16.\(\mathcal{W}a3\)=, White maintaining his advantage.

13.\(\mathcal{W}b2\) \(\mathcal{W}f6\) 14.\(\mathcal{W}e2\) \(\mathcal{W}d7\) 15.a3 \(\mathcal{W}ae8\) 16.\(\mathcal{W}d2\) \(\mathcal{W}h5\) 17.h4 \(\mathcal{W}h6\) 18.\(\mathcal{W}ae1\)

This position occurred in the game Bosbach – R. Gabriel, Germany 1996. White's pressure upon the e6-pawn ensured him a slight advantage.
Black could run into troubles with the development of his queenside) 8.a3 c7 9.0-0 d6 10.
bd2 h8 (bad for Black is 10...e5?! in view of 11.dxe5 g4 12.
exd6 xb2 13.dxc7+) 11.a4 a6 12.
e1! e8 13.d3 e6 14.cc1 g5
15.e3 d8 16.e2 f7 17.f3= in
the game Kramnik – Illiescas
Cordoba, Dos Hermanas 1999
White succeeded to carry out
the advance e3-e4 after that
Black’s position became more
constrained.

4...g7

In case of 4...d6 White has
better prevent Black’s opportu-
nity e7-e5 with 5.d4 that would
bring us after 5...g7 6.c3 to
the position considered below in
course of the Chapters 24-26.

5.c3 0-0

Here after 5...d6 6.d4 0-0 the
game would also simply trans-
pose to the Chapters 24-26.

6.d4

Now it is time for Black to
reveal his plan in centre. As a
rule, he chooses either 6...c6 or
6...d6 (Chapters 24-26).

6...c6
Black intends to perform the play in centre connected with $\mathcal{D}f6-e4$. In this case the possible swap of the knights on e4 could demand from Black to play d7-d5. For this purpose at move 6 he modestly advances his c-pawn one step forward. Still, the move c7-c6 would not exclude for Black the transfer to the main lines of Leningrad Variation attached with d7-d6.

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7.0-0
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White need not prevent Black’s idea with, for instance, 7.$\mathcal{D}c2$ since in that case Black could transfer with 7...d6= to the course of the main lines of Leningrad Variation where White queen is not necessarily wanted on c2. After 7.d5 d6 8.0-0 e5 9.dxe6 $\mathcal{D}xe6= the game could also transpose to the line of Leningrad variation undesirable for White.

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7...$\mathcal{D}e4$
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The position after 7...d6 can be easily found in Chapter 25. Black can also transfer to the structure of the “stonewall” kind with 7...d5 but in that case the position of Black’s bishop g7 can hardly be called proper. After 8.$\mathcal{D}b3$ e6 (in case 8...$\mathcal{D}b6$ 9.$\mathcal{D}f4$ $\mathcal{D}bd7$ 10.cxd5 $\mathcal{D}xb3$ 11.axb3 $\mathcal{D}xd5$ 12.$\mathcal{D}xd5$ cxd5 13.$\mathcal{D}a5$ e6 14.$\mathcal{D}c1$ $\mathcal{D}f6$ 15.b4 $\mathcal{D}e7$ 16.$\mathcal{D}ca1$ a6 17.b5= in the game Sammalvuo – Marttal, Hallstahammar 1997 the defence of Black’s queenside appeared not sufficiently reliable while in case 8...$\mathcal{D}h8$ 9.$\mathcal{D}f4$ e6 10.$\mathcal{D}ad1$ h6 11.$\mathcal{D}e5$ $\mathcal{D}e8$ 12.$\mathcal{f}3$ g5 13.$\mathcal{D}c1$ $\mathcal{D}bd7$ 14.$\mathcal{D}xd7$ $\mathcal{D}xd7$ in the game Summermatter – Horn, Zug 1991 White succeeded to perform the very important advance 15.e4= that brought him the initiative in centre) 9.$\mathcal{D}f4$ in the game Suomalainen – Sihvo- nen, Finland 1997 Black still invaded onto e4 with 9...$\mathcal{D}e4$ (in case of 9...$\mathcal{b}6$ Black would also have to solve the uneasy problems after 10.$\mathcal{D}ac1!?$ $\mathcal{b}7$ 11. cxd5, since the typical capture here 11...cxd5 would run into the strong refutation 12.$\mathcal{D}b5!+$ and White’s pieces will penetrate into Black’s camp weakened with the non-playing bishop g7), but after 10.$\mathcal{D}fd1$ $\mathcal{D}d7$ 11.cxd5 exd5 12. $\mathcal{D}xe4$ fxe4 13.$\mathcal{D}g5!$ $\mathcal{D}f6$ 14.$\mathcal{D}xe4$ $\mathcal{D}xe4$ 15.$\mathcal{D}xe4$ $\mathcal{D}xe4$+ he appeared a pawn down without any sufficient compensation.

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8.$\mathcal{D}b3!?$
```

This opposition of White’s queen against Black’s king seems to bring the hardest troubles for Black. After 8.$\mathcal{D}c2$ $\mathcal{D}xc3$ (weaker is 8...$\mathcal{D}c2$ since after 9.$\mathcal{D}f4$ Black’s attempt to solve the problem of the development of his
light-coloured bishop with 9...\(\text{dxc6} \) is refuted with 10.\(\text{f} \) d1! h6
11.\(\text{cxd} \) 5 \(\text{cxd} \) 5 12.\(\text{b} \) 5 \(\text{a} \) 6 13.\(\text{b} \) 3\(\pm \) and in the game Solozhenkin – Szabolcsi, France 1998
White obtained the significant advantage thanks to the bad position of the knight a6) 9.\(\text{xc} \) 3
(9.\(\text{bxc} \) 3 d6\(\text{=} \) is not clear either)
9...d6 (after 9...c5 10.\(\text{e} \) 3 \(\text{c} \) 6
11.\(\text{d} \) 2 \(\text{cxd} \) 4 12.\(\text{xd} \) 4 a6 13.\(\text{f} \) d1\(\pm \) in the game Meyer – Schwekendiek, Zalakaros 1991
the position arose similar to En-
lish Beginning but with Black’s
pawn on f5 instead of f7 that just
weakens Black’s position) 10.b3
\(\text{d} \) 7 11.\(\text{b} \) 2 e5 12.dxe5 \(\text{cxe} \) 5 13.
\(\text{xf} \) e5 \(\text{xe} \) 5 14.\(\text{d} \) 2 \(\text{f} \) 6 – as was in the game Whiteley – Zwaig, Hastings 1976, the chances are
approximately equal. It is hard
for White to arrange the pres-
sure upon Black’s pawn d6 and
besides, he should take into con-
ideration Black’s advance f5-f4.

13.c5! \(\text{d} \) 8 14.\(\text{cxd} \) 6 e4 15.\(\text{c} \) 4+
\(\text{h} \) 8 16.\(\text{e} \) 5 \(\text{e} \) 8 17.f3 \(\text{xe} \) 5
18.dxe5 \(\text{xe} \) 5 19.\(\text{c} \) 3 exf3 20.
exf3\(\pm \) as was in the game J.
Horvath – Anic, Cannes 1993.
The prophylactic move 8...\(\text{h} \) 8
permits White to strengthen his
power in centre with 9.\(\text{d} \) 1. Af-
ner 9...d6 10.\(\text{e} \) 1 \(\text{cxc} \) 3 11.\(\text{xc} \) 3
Black’s try to exploit the tactical
peculiarities of the position with
11...\(\text{c} \) 5?! (in case of relatively
the best 11...d5 12.\(\text{f} \) 4\(\pm \) White
would also retain the pressure
upon Black’s position) led to the
material loss in the game Arlan-
di – Anic, Montecatini Terme
1997 after 12.\(\text{c} \) 2 \(\text{e} \) 6 13.d5! cd
14.\(\text{cxd} \) 5 \(\text{d} \) 4 15.\(\text{c} \) 4 \(\text{a} \) 5 16.\(\text{g} \) 5
b5 17.\(\text{d} \) 3 b4 18.\(\text{e} \) 3. In case of
8...d6 possible is 9.c5+ \(\text{h} \) 8 10.
\(\text{f} \) 4 b6 11.\(\text{xb} \) 6 axb6 as was in the
game Sosnovskiy – F. Afanasiev,
Novokuznetsk 1998 and here
12.\(\text{fc} \) 1!? deserved attention to
meet 12...\(\text{b} \) 7 (12...\(\text{a} \) 6 could
also be replied with 13.\(\text{c} \) 7\(\pm \),
much worse for Black is 12...
\(\text{d} \) 7? in view of 13.\(\text{xd} \) 5\(\pm \),
while after the prophylactic
12...\(\text{h} \) 8 possible is 13.\(\text{e} \) 5
with 13.\(\text{c} \) 7! \(\text{xc} \) 3 14.\(\text{xd} \) 5 \(\text{d} \) 6
15.\(\text{c} \) 7\(\pm \) and White would obtain
the rook and the two pawns for
the two pieces that will be clearly
in White’s favour there.

After 8...e6 9.\(\text{xe} \) 4 fxe 4 10.
\(\text{g} \) 5 d5 (in case 10...\(\text{xd} \) 4 11.
\(\text{xe} \) 4 d5 12.\(\text{c} \) 3\(\pm \) White would
exert the certain pressure upon
the opponent’s centre) 11.\(\text{e} \) 3
\(\text{a} \) 6 12.\(\text{cxd} \) 5 cxd 5 13.\(\text{ad} \) 1 \(\text{b} \) 6
14.\textit{\textbf{xB}}b6 axb6 15.a3 \textit{\textbf{d}}d7 16.f3 exf3 17.exf3 b5 18.\textit{\textbf{fe}}1 h6 19.\textit{\textbf{h}}h3\textpm in the game Touzane – Szabolcsi, France 1994 Black has got the retarded pawn e6 that provided White with the certain advantage. White also succeeded to retain the better play after 8...\textit{\textbf{d}}d6 9.\textit{\textbf{fe}}e1 \textit{\textbf{a}}a6 10.c5+ \textit{\textbf{f}}f7 11. e4 fxe4 12.\textit{\textbf{xe}}e4\textpm in the game S. Schmid – Voss, Giessen 1993.

9.bxc3

After 9.\textit{\textbf{xc}}c3 d6 arises the position considered in the note to White’s move 8.

9...\textit{\textbf{h}}h8

After 9...c5 10.\textit{\textbf{a}}a3 \textit{\textbf{a}}a6 11. dxc5 \textit{\textbf{c}}c7 12.\textit{\textbf{b}}b5 \textit{\textbf{xc}}c3 13.\textit{\textbf{ab}}1 \textit{\textbf{b}}b8 14.\textit{\textbf{fd}}1 \textit{\textbf{f}}6 15.\textit{\textbf{d}}d4\textpm in the game I. Farago – G. Danner, Budapest 1993, it appeared difficult for Black to develop his pieces of the queenside.

10.\textit{\textbf{e}}e1

After 10.\textit{\textbf{a}}a3 d6 11.c5 \textit{\textbf{a}}a6 12.cx\textit{\textbf{d}}6 exd6 13.e4 fxe4 14.\textit{\textbf{d}}d2 \textit{\textbf{c}}c7 15.\textit{\textbf{xe}}e4 \textit{\textbf{b}}b5 16.\textit{\textbf{b}}b2 d5 17.\textit{\textbf{d}}d2 \textit{\textbf{g}}g4 18.a4 \textit{\textbf{d}}d6\textpm in the game Bacrot – Anic, Vichy 2000 the chances of the both sides are reciprocal.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

White retains the advantage thanks to his pressure on the light squares (analysis by E. Bacrot).
Black prepares the advance e7-e5.

7.0-0

This is the key position of Leningrad Variation. Black has several opportunities each of them having the separate significance: 7...\(\texttt{c}6\), which will be examined in this Chapter, 7...\(\texttt{c}6\) and 7...\(\texttt{a}6\) (in Chapter 25), and also 7...\(\texttt{e}8\) (in Chapter 26). Rarely Black uses the prophylactic move 7...e6 to secure properly his position against the advance d4-d5. In that case White can struggle for the advantage with 8.b3 \(\texttt{c}6\) 9.\(\texttt{a}3!\)? \(\texttt{e}4\) 10.\(\texttt{d}3\) \(\texttt{xc}3\) 11.\(\texttt{x}c3\) \(\texttt{d}7\) (in case of 11...\(\texttt{f}6\) that was seen in the game M. Makarov – Malaniuk, Smolensk 2000, White should have to consolidate his position in centre with 12.\(\texttt{ad}1!?\), similar to the game considered here) 12.\(\texttt{ad}1\) \(\texttt{f}7\) 13.\(\texttt{d}2\) \(\texttt{e}7\) 14.d5 \(\texttt{d}8\) (after 14...\(\texttt{ex}d5\) 15.\(\texttt{c}x\texttt{d}5\) \(\texttt{e}5\) 16.\(\texttt{d}4\) Black has got the retarded pawn c7 and the troubles with the defence of the square e6) 15.\(\texttt{g}5\) \(\texttt{h}6\) (15...\(\texttt{f}8\)? is not available for Black in view of 16.\(\texttt{xe}6\) \(\texttt{xe}6\) 17.\(\texttt{dxe}6\) \(\texttt{c}8\) 18.\(\texttt{c}5!\) \(\texttt{dxc}5\) 19.\(\texttt{a}5\) b6 20.\(\texttt{xc}5!\)++) 16.h4 e5 17.f4 \(\texttt{f}4\) (after 17...\(\texttt{f}8\) 18.\(\texttt{e}3\) \(\texttt{e}8\) 19.c5↑ White would also keep the initiative) 18.\(\texttt{gxf}4\) \(\texttt{f}8\) as was in the game Ionov – R. Zysk, Dortmund 1992. Here 19.\(\texttt{ad}1!?↑\) deserves attention to prepare the advance e2-e4.

It should be mentioned that after 7...\(\texttt{a}5\) possible is 8.d5 and Black has nothing better than 8...\(\texttt{e}8\) to transfer to the variation of Chapter 26. It is no good for Black to try to improve his pawn structure with the move 8...e5?! in view of 9.\(\texttt{dxe}6\) \(\texttt{xe}6\) 10.\(\texttt{g}5\) \(\texttt{xc}4\) (it is quite bad for Black to play 10...\(\texttt{c}8\)? because of 11.\(\texttt{d}5+\) \(\texttt{xd}5\) 12.\(\texttt{d}5\) \(\texttt{h}8\) 13.\(\texttt{f}7\) \(\texttt{xf}7\) 14.\(\texttt{xf}7\)++ as it was
in the game Devenney – O’Hare, Cork 1977) 11.\texttt{\textbackslash}x b 7 \texttt{\textbackslash}a 7 12. \texttt{\textbackslash}g 2 \pm, and White would obtain the significant advantage thanks to the threat of winning the piece with 13.\texttt{\textbackslash}d 4.

7...\texttt{\textbackslash}c 6

Black intends the advance e7-e5. Should he perform this idea he will obtain the definite advantage in centre. Therefore, for this reason White must take the counter measures urgently.

8.d5

Here it is sensible to consider separately the knight’s retreats both onto the edge of the board
a) 8...\texttt{\textbackslash}a 5, and into the centre
b) 8...\texttt{\textbackslash}e 5.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_diagram.png}
\caption{Chess board with moves 8.a5 and 8.e5}
\end{figure}

9.\texttt{\textbackslash}a 4!

This is the only way for White to obtain the beginning’s advantage. After 9.\texttt{\textbackslash}d 2 c 5 or 9.\texttt{\textbackslash}d 3 e 5 10.dxe6 \texttt{\textbackslash}xe 6 \texttt{\textbackslash}b 6 Black has a good play.

9...c 5

Weaker is 9...b 6. In that case possible is 10.\texttt{\textbackslash}c 2!? \texttt{\textbackslash}xc 4 (after 10...\texttt{\textbackslash}d 7 11.b 3 c 5 12.dxc 6 \texttt{\textbackslash}xc 6 13.\texttt{\textbackslash}b 2 \texttt{\textbackslash}c 8 14.\texttt{\textbackslash}ad 1 \texttt{\textbackslash}e 8 15.\texttt{\textbackslash}d 2 h 6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash}d 4 \texttt{\textbackslash}xg 2 17.\texttt{\textbackslash}xg 2 \texttt{\textbackslash}f 7 18.\texttt{\textbackslash}e 3 \texttt{\textbackslash}c 6 19.\texttt{\textbackslash}xc 6 \texttt{\textbackslash}xc 6 20. \texttt{\textbackslash}b 5 \pm in the game Beim – Rustemov, Germany 1999 White retained the certain pressure via the light squares upon Black’s position) 11.\texttt{\textbackslash}b 5 a 6 12.\texttt{\textbackslash}bd 4 b 5 13.\texttt{\textbackslash}g 5 \texttt{\textbackslash}e 8 (13...e 5 14.\texttt{\textbackslash}de 6 \texttt{\textbackslash}e 7 15.\texttt{\textbackslash}xf 8 \texttt{\textbackslash}xf 8 16.a 4 h 6 was seen in the game Minzer – A. Rodriguez, Boca 1997, and if White at that moment played 17.\texttt{\textbackslash}e 6+! \texttt{\textbackslash}xe 6 18.dxe 6 \texttt{\textbackslash}d 8 19.axb 5 axb 5 20.\texttt{\textbackslash}a 7 \texttt{\textbackslash}e 8 21.b 3 \texttt{\textbackslash}b 6 22.\texttt{\textbackslash}c 6 \uparrow he would have remained not only with the exchange up for a pawn but also with the initiative) 14.\texttt{\textbackslash}ge 6! (in the older game W. Schmidt – Matulovic, Helsinki 1972 White also succeeded to obtain the fair compensation for the sacrificed pawn after 14.b 3 \texttt{\textbackslash}e 5 15.\texttt{\textbackslash}de 6 \texttt{\textbackslash}xe 6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash}xe 6 \texttt{\textbackslash}d 7 17.f 4 \texttt{\textbackslash}f 7 18.\texttt{\textbackslash}xg 7 \texttt{\textbackslash}xg 7 19.\texttt{\textbackslash}b 2 \texttt{\textbackslash}ac 8 20.e 4 \uparrow 14...\texttt{\textbackslash}xe 6 15.\texttt{\textbackslash}xe 6 \texttt{\textbackslash}b 8 16.b 3 \texttt{\textbackslash}b 6 17.\texttt{\textbackslash}xg 7 \texttt{\textbackslash}xg 7 18.\texttt{\textbackslash}b 2 c 5 (in case of 18...\texttt{\textbackslash}g 8 possible is 19.e 4! \texttt{\textbackslash}xe 4 20.\texttt{\textbackslash}xe 4 \texttt{\textbackslash}b 7 21.\texttt{\textbackslash}xg 6! h x g 6 22.\texttt{\textbackslash}xg 6+ \texttt{\textbackslash}f 8 23.\texttt{\textbackslash}xf 6 \texttt{\textbackslash}xf 6 24.\texttt{\textbackslash}xf 6+ \texttt{\textbackslash}g 8 25.\texttt{\textbackslash}ad 1 \rightarrow and there would be no satisfactory defence from the threat of the White’s rook transfer to the kingside via rank 4) 19.dxc 6 \texttt{\textbackslash}c 7 20.a 4 bxa 4 21.\texttt{\textbackslash}d 4 \texttt{\textbackslash}ab 8 22.bxa 4 e 5 23.\texttt{\textbackslash}xb 6 \texttt{\textbackslash}xb 6 24.\texttt{\textbackslash}fb 1 \pm I. Farago – G. Schleicher, Hamburg 2000. Black has solved the problem of his kingside defence, but in spite of that his position remains yet rather difficult since the passed c-pawn
is very dangerous.

10.dxc6

Here Black is again before the choice: with what should he capture on c6 — either with the pawn a1) 10...bxc6 or with the knight a2) 10...\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc6.

a1) 10...bxc6

11.c5!

This positional sacrifice of the pawn is the strongest reply for Black's move 10. The other White's opportunity 11.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d4, also aimed to prevent Black's advance c6-c5, would lead after 11...\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d7! (the immediate 11...c5 permitted White in the game Korchnoi – Mark Tseitlin, Muenster 1996 not only to retain his extra exchange but also seize the initiative with 12.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)b3 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xb3 13.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xb3 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)e6 14.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xa8 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xa8 15.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d1 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)b8 16.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d3 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)g4 17.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)f4 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)c6 18.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)c1 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)a4 19.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)c2 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xa2 20.b4!-); 12.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc6 (in the game L. Spassov – Marin, Berga 1993 White declined the sacrificed pawn with 12.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d1?! c5 13.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)c6 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc6 14.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc6 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)b8 15.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d7 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xd7 16.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)c2 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)e6 17.b3 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)e4 18.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)b2 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc3 19.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc3 f4 but Black obtained the better play) 12...\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc6 13.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc6 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc6 14.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc6 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)c8 15.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)a4 (15.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)a6 is not better in view of 15...\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)b6 16.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xb6 axb6 17.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)a4 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc4 18.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xb6 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)b4 19.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)e3 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xb2= with the equality) 15...\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d7 16.b3 (in case 16.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xd7 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xd7 17.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d5 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)f7 18.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)e3 e6 19.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)c3 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc3 20.bxc3 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc4 21.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xa7 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)a8 22.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)e3 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc3= as was in the game Molinaroli – Van Mil, Germany 1994, Black has also nothing to worry about) 16...d5!\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\) to the position where Black has the complete compensation for the missing pawn that has been many times confirmed in practice.

11...dxc5

The tournaments' practice showed that the best for Black is to accept the pawn sacrifice. For instance, after 11...\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)h8? 12.cxd6 exd6 13.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d4 d5 14.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc6 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc6 15.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc6 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)b8 16.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d1 d4 17.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)a4= in the game Zifroni – Rinberg, Tel Aviv 1996 Black very soon appeared in the lost position. In case of 11...d5 Black would significantly weaken the square e5 that White can exploit at once with 12.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)e5. In case 12...\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d7 (after 12...\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)b7 13.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d2 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)h5 14.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xd5 cxd5 15.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xa5 in the game Hebden – Santo Roman, France 2000 Black resigned here in view of the variation 15...\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)c8 16.c6 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)a6 17.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)c3 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d8 18.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)fe1 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d6 19.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)ac1= while after 12...\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)e4 13.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xc6 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d7 14.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)xe7+ \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)h8 15.c6 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)e8 16.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)d1 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)e7 17.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)a5 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)c6 18.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)e3 \(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)fd8 19.\(\texttt{\textit{\textbf{\textdagger}}}\)
\(d4++\) in the game Palac – Mencinger, Bled 1992, the game was not finished at this place but its result was obvious) 13.\(\text{exd7!}\) (not so well is 13.\(\text{exd5 cxd5 14.}\text{exd7}\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd7 15.\(\text{exa5, since after 15...}\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)ab8 16.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}d1\) e6 17.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)}b1\) f\(\mathcal{Q}\)c8 18.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)a3}\) b5 19.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3}\) g4= in the game Biliskov – Bozanic, Pula 1997 Black obtained the compensation for the missed pawn) 13...}\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd7 14.}\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd5}\)\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xc5}\) (after 14...\(e\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)d6!}\) 15.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)f4}\) c5 16.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)a3}\) ab7 17.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3}\) e5 18.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)c6}\) exf4 19.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)c5}\) xc5 20.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xa8}\) fxg3 21.hxg3 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xa8}\) 22.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xc5}\) -- in the game Niemela – Paasikangas, Helsinki 1995 Black got no compensation for the significant material loss) 15.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe7}\) xe7 16.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xa5}\) \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)e4}\) 17.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)a4}\) c5 18.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3}\) \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)ac8}\) 19.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)ab1}\) f7 20.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)c2}\) e6 in the game Notkin – Olenin, Moscow 1996 the draw was agreed although it is evident that after 21.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)fc1}\) Black has not the full compensation for the missed pawn.

At last, in case of 11...\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)d7}\) White should probably have to improve his position with 12.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)d2!}\) 12...\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)b8}\) (12...d5? is bad in view of 13.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd5}\) 13.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)ac1}\) and Black could not perform any activity in the centre because of the unstable position of his knight a5. 12.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)e5}\)

White exploits Black's certain weakening of the square e5. It should be mentioned that besides, the diagonal a2-g8 has been also weakened and the doubled pawns (c5 and c6) are not the merits of Black's position. In principle, the question is whether Black is able at the price of his extra pawn to swap the majority of White's active pieces.

For instance, after 12.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)d1}\) b6 13.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)e5}\) a6 14.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)c2}\) f5d8 15.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3}\) in the game Konishkov – Belotserkovsky, Krasnodar 1997 the opponents agreed for a draw having not cleared up the estimation of the position. After 12.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3}\) c4 13.b4 xcb3 14.axb3 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)b7}\) 15.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)e5}\) e4 16.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe4}\) xe5 17.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)ad1}\) \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)c7}\) 18.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)g5}\) d7 19.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)c4}\) g7 20.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)d2}\) h6 21.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)f3}\) f6 22.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)d4}\) \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)b7}\) 23.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)fd1}\) a5= in the game Kahlert – Ferkingstad, Hamburg 1999 Black was passive but retained his extra pawn. In the game I. Farago – M. Grunberg, Harkany 1997 after 12.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)f4}\) b6 13.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)e5}\) e6 14.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe6}\) xe6 15.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xc6}\) \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xc6}\) 16.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xc6}\) \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)ad8}\) 17.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)ad1}\) \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)f7}\) 18.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)e5}\) \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)g4}\) 19.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xg7}\) \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xg7}\) 20.a5 d5 \(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd5}\) 21.\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd5}\) d6= White got back his sacrificed pawn but the position was simplified and the chances were equalized.

\[\text{\(12...\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)b6}\) Much weaker is 12...\(\text{\(\mathcal{Q}\)c7}\) in...}\]
view of 13.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{c}4\) (13...\(\text{b}7\) is not better in view of 14.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 15.\(\text{xc}6\)\(\text{f}5\)) 14.\(\text{xc}4+\) \(\text{h}8\) 15.\(\text{xc}5\)\(\text{d}7\) 16.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{b}6\) 17.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{c}7\) 18.e4 c5 19.d1 e5 20.d5 \(\text{e}7\) 21.\(\text{xa}7\)\(\text{f}7\) in the game Szucs – Kolcak, Slovakia 1997. With his move 12...\(\text{e}6\) Black covered the square \(\text{c}4\) and the diagonal a2-g8 in the game Bezold – Glek, Bad Ragaz 1994, but after 13.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 14.\(\text{xc}6\) he was compelled to give up the exchange to avoid something worse, and after 14...\(\text{b}6\) 15.\(\text{xb}6\) \(\text{axb}6\) 16.\(\text{xa}8\)\(\text{xa}8\) 17.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{e}8\) 18.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{d}6\) 19.b3 b5 20.\(\text{ab}1\) \(\text{xc}3\) 21.\(\text{xc}3\) \(\text{xa}2\) 22.\(\text{e}5\)\(\text{f}7\) White again obtained the obvious advantage.

Black also tried 12...\(\text{b}8\) to prevent White’s knight coming onto \(\text{c}4\). But in this case White after 13.d1!? (in case 13.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{b}4\)) 14.\(\text{xa}5\) \(\text{xc}4\) 15.\(\text{xa}7\) \(\text{d}5\) 16.\(\text{d}2\) after 16...\(\text{d}6\) the could have appeared the entangled position with the mutual invasion of the pieces into the enemy’s camps) 13...\(\text{b}6\) 14.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 15.\(\text{xc}4+\) \(\text{h}8\) 16.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{b}4\) 17.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{xb}4\) (17...\(\text{xb}4\) is much worse, since after 18.\(\text{f}4\)\(\text{f}4\) Black should miss the exchange) 18.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{c}4\) 19.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{e}4\) 20.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{e}6\) 21.\(\text{ac}1\) \(\text{c}8\) 22.b3\(\text{f}7\) in the game U. Rohde – Van Mil, Ger-

many 1996 White retained the advantage thanks to the weakness of Black’s pawns at the queenside.

13.\(\text{e}3\)?

White is completing the development of his queenside exploiting that Black’s queen must protect the knight a5. Worse is 13.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 14.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 15.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{b}8\) since, in spite of the restored material balance, the pressure of Black’s pieces upon the pawn b2 would hinder the development of the bishop c1 and the rook a1.

The move 13.\(\text{c}2\) with the idea to win back the sacrificed pawn with 14.\(\text{a}4\) will not guarantee the better position for White. In the game Gelfand – Topalov, Dos Hermanas 1994 there followed 13...\(\text{c}7\)! 14.\(\text{d}3\) (in case of 14.\(\text{f}4\) White should take into consideration 14...g5?!\(\text{g}5\) 14...c4 15.\(\text{c}5\) and here after 15...\(\text{b}7\)! 16.\(\text{a}4\) (absolutely equal position with the opposite-coloured bishops would arise after 16.\(\text{xb}7\) \(\text{xb}7\) 17.\(\text{a}6\) \(\text{a}6\) 18.\(\text{xa}6\) \(\text{xa}6\) 19.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{e}4\) 20.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{xc}3\) 21.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xb}2\) 22.\(\text{ab}1\) c3 23.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{g}7\) 24.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{h}6\) 25.\(\text{xa}8\) \(\text{xa}8\) 26.\(\text{xb}2\) \(\text{xb}2\) 27.\(\text{xb}2=\) 16...\(\text{d}6\) 17.\(\text{d}2\) (17.\(\text{f}4\)! would be strongly replied with 17...\(\text{d}5\)\(\text{f}7\), while after 17.\(\text{d}1\) e5 18.\(\text{g}5\) h6 19.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f}7\) 20.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 21.\(\text{c}1\) e4 22.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{b}8\) according to R. Dautov’s analysis the chances are reciprocal) 17...\(\text{d}5\) 18.e4 fxe4 19.
3.g3 g6 4.h6 g7 5...e3 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.0-0 c5 8.d5

\( \text{a4} \) there could have arisen the position that was estimated by B. Gelfand as unclear.

13...\( \text{b8} \)

After 13...\( \text{a4} \) 14...g4 fxg4 15...e4= White wins back the sacrificed pawn while the attempt to retain the material advantage at any rate with 15...\( \text{d4?!} \) would be refuted with 16.b4! \( \text{xa1} \) 17.bxa5 \( \text{b2} \) 18.\( \text{d1+} \). In case of 13...\( \text{e6} \) possible would be 14.\( \text{a4} \) with the idea \( \text{e5-d3} \) and \( \text{b2-b4} \), if necessary (weaker is 14.\( \text{a3?!} \) \( \text{e4} \) 15...xe4 fxe4 16...xc5 \( \text{b5} \) White's pieces in centre would be extremely vulnerable) 14...\( \text{g4} \) 15...xg4 fxg4 16...e4 \( \text{f7} \) (worse is 16...\( \text{f5} \) in view of 17...xe7 \( \text{xb2} \) 18...xc5+) 17...xe7 \( \text{xb2} \) 18...xc5± and White retains the advantage thanks to his better pawn structure. In case Black plays 13...\( \text{a6} \), possible is 14.\( \text{a3} \) \( \text{b4} \) 15...xc5 \( \text{xa3} \) 16...xa3 \( \text{e4} \) 17.f4± and despite the queens swap White’s chances are slightly better.

14...c4 \( \text{xc4} \) 15...xc4+ \( \text{h8} \)

This position was reached in the game Gorelov – Dubinskij, Moscow (active) 1997. Here White should have played 16.\( \text{ab1}!? \) (in case of 16...xc5 as was in the above mentioned game Black could have completely equalized with 16...\( \text{a6} \) 17...xb6 \( \text{xc4} \) 18...xa7 \( \text{xb2} \) 19.\( \text{ab1} \) \( \text{xb1} \) 20.\( \text{xb1} \) \( \text{d5=} \) 16...\( \text{d7} \) (16...\( \text{a6} \) could be met with 17...\( \text{xc5} \) \( \text{g4} \) 18...\( \text{xb6} \) \( \text{axb6} \) 19.\( \text{g5} \)± and Black would have to bother about the protection of his pawns \text{c6} and \text{e7}) 17...\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{d8} \) (after 17...\( \text{b4} \) or 17...\( \text{a6} \) Black should take into consideration 18...\( \text{e6=} \) 18...\( \text{a4} \) \( \text{a5} \) 19.\( \text{b3=} \) to fix Black's pieces to defending his weak \text{c-pawns}. In that case White would have retained the sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

10...\( \text{xc6} \)

11...\( \text{d1} \)

White is preparing the advance \text{c4-c5}. The similar situation was seen in Book II, Part 5, Chapters 20-21, where there was the resembling structure but with Black's pawn on \text{f7}, not on \text{f5} as here. The last peculiarity, as it will be shown below, much
more increases the effect of the break c4-c5.

11...a5

Black at once takes away his queen from the unpleasant opposition on the d-file. Otherwise the big problems would be in store for him. For instance, after 11...h8? 12.c5 a5 13.a5 a5 a5 14.cxd6 exd6 15.a6 a6 a4 16.d1 e4 17.a4 a4 a4 18.g5 g5 g5 19.xb2 a2 a2 a2 20.axb1 a7 a7 a7 21.a4 a4 a4 in the game Koniushkov – Annakov, Moscow 1995 Black appeared by force not only a pawn down but also much back in development. The false move 11...a5? was seen in the game Keres – Korchnoi, Moscow 1952. After 12.c5! d7 13.a3 e8 14.g5 e6 15.cxd6 xd6 White won the two pieces for the rook with the easy tactic operation – 16.xd6! xd6 17.a5

In case of 11...d7 the weakness of the diagonal a2-g8 would also permit White to perform the break 12.c5! After 12...dxc5 13. c4 h8 14.xc5 c8 (after 14... e8 White immediately grabbed into the weakened square e5 with 15.f4!? c8 16.e3 and Black’s attempt to recover his position with the tactical advance – 16...e4 – was refuted in the game Ribli – T. Horvath, Hungary 1974 with 17.xe4 fxe4 18.h4 xb2 19.a1 e5 20. xb2 exf4 21.xf4 c7 22.a4 a4 (in case of 15...e5 possible is 16.a3 a3 with the following c5, that brought White the better play in the game Tisdall – Reilly, Jakarta 1997 while after 15...a5 16.xa5 c5 17.e5 e5 18.a3 b6 19.xc6 a6 20.xf4 e5 21. dxe5 d7 22.b3 c5 23.a4 a5 24.a4 a4 in the game Gofshtein – Santos Roman, Montpellier 2000 White retained the advantage in spite of the fully symmetrical pawn structure since his minor pieces were more actively positioned) 16.g5! (16.e3 would permit Black to perform an activity and obtain the sufficient compensation for the pawn with 16...g4 17.a7 a7 a8 18.b5 d8! because it is not possible to parry the threat of Black’s queen coming to b6 with 19.c5? in view of 19...a7 20.c5 16.a7 a7 a7 17.c6 16.a7 a7 a7 22.a7 a7 b6 23.a7 a3 24. xb2 a7 25.a4 a4 in the game Koniushkov – Annakov, Moscow 1995 Black appeared by force not only a pawn down but also much back in development. The false move 11...a5? was seen in the game Keres – Korchnoi, Moscow 1952. After 12.c5! d7 13.a3 e8 14.g5 e6 15.cxd6 xd6 White won the two pieces for the rook with the easy tactic operation – 16.xd6! xd6 17.a5

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tain the significant superiority thanks to the vulnerable position of the bishop e6) 18.h3 e5 as was in the game Fiorito – A. Rodriguez, Boca 1997; here White should have played 19. \textit{\&e3!+ with the following 20.\textit{\&c5 or 20.\textit{\&b5} to exploit in time the weakness of the dark squares in the centre and at the queenside.}

The other move 11...\textit{\&d7} also permits Black to cover his queen from the X-ray-action of White's rook and besides to prevent the immediate break c4-c5. However, making the extra move with the developed piece in the beginning Black wastes the time that White can exploit to obtain the advantage in development. After 12. \textit{\&e3 \&h8} (in case 12...\textit{\&b6} 13. \textit{\&b5} \textit{\&d7} the break 14.c5! is again possible that brought White the significant superiority despite the swap of all the minor pieces in the game J. Johansson – Ahonen, Finland 1997 after 14...\textit{\&d4} 15.\textit{\&d3} dxc5 16. \textit{\&xd4 cxd4} 17.\textit{\&xd4} \textit{\&xd4} 18. \textit{\&xd4 \textit{\&c6} 19.\textit{\&e5} \textit{\&e8} 20.\textit{\&d5} \textit{\&xd5} 21.\textit{\&xd5+ \&xd5} 22.\textit{\&xd5} \textit{\textit{\&d8} 23.\textit{\&ad1+}) 13.\textit{\&ac1 \textit{\&c5} 14.\textit{\&b3} \textit{\&g4} 15.\textit{\&ad2} \textit{\&c5} 16.\textit{\&a3} in the game J. Ivanov – Genocchio, Cutro 2001 Black started the interesting tactical complications with 16...\textit{\&e4} but after 17.\textit{\&xe4 fxe4} 18.\textit{\&g5} \textit{\&xf2} 19.\textit{\&f1 \&d4} 20.e3 \textit{\&f6} 21.\textit{\&xh7 \&h3+ 22. \textit{\&xh3 \&xh7} 23.\textit{\&g2 \&f5} 24.\textit{\&c3± White still retained the advantage thanks to his slightly better pawn structure.}

In addition to the Black's queen move onto a5, considered in the main line, other retreats were also seen. After 11...\textit{\&e8} 12.\textit{\&b5} (worse is 12.\textit{\&d5 \&b8} 13.\textit{\&g5 \&d7} 14.\textit{\&b3} as was in the game Roemer – Lundgren, Seefeld 2000, since Black could have both created the threats to White's queen and e2-pawn and prepared the advance b7-b5 with 14...\textit{\&xd5} 15.\textit{\&xd5+ e6} 16.\textit{\&g2 \&d4} (16...\textit{\&d4}) 17.\textit{\&b8} 18.\textit{\&b3 \&h8} 14.\textit{\&e3} a6 15.\textit{\&c7 \&d7} 16.\textit{\&d5 \&e4} 17.a4 e6 as was in the game G. Hernandez – Paneque, Matanzas 1995 White should have played 18.\textit{\&b6+} to retain the advantage since the pawn d6 needs the constant protection. In case of 11...\textit{\&b6} possible is 12.\textit{\&d5} (after 12.\textit{\&e3}, White should take into consideration first of all the queen sacrifice with 12...\textit{\&xb2} 13.\textit{\&ab1 \&xc3} 14.\textit{\&d2 \&d4+}) 12...\textit{\&xd5} 13.\textit{\&xd5} \textit{\&b4} (after 13...\textit{\&e5} 14.\textit{\&xe5 \&xe5} 15.\textit{\&b1} a5 16.\textit{\&g5 \&b4} 17.\textit{\&xb4} axb4 18.f4 in the game Gyorokos – Joksic, Bern 1997 even in case of relatively the best 18...\textit{\&f6} 19.\textit{\&xf6} exf6 20.\textit{\&d4! \&xa2} 21.\textit{\&xb4± Black would get the difficult ending) 14.\textit{\&c2 \&d4} 15. \textit{\&xd4 16.\&h6 \&d8} 17.\textit{\&d2 \&d7} 18.a3 \textit{\&b6} 19.e4 \textit{\&ac8} 20. \textit{\&d3 \&f6} 21.\textit{\&e3 \&a5} 22.exf5 \textit{\&xf5} 23.\textit{\&e4 \&xe4} 24.\textit{\&xe4} \&c7 25.h4± and in the game Panno – Anelli, Villa Ballester 2000 White.
obtained the little advantage thanks to the certain superiority in space and the weakness of the light squares in Black’s position.

The move 11...\(\mathcal{D}e4\) should also be paid attention to. In this case White should probably play 12.\(\mathcal{D}g5\)!! (after 12.\(\mathcal{D}xe4\) \(\mathcal{D}xe4\) 13.\(\mathcal{D}g5\) \(\mathcal{D}d4\) 14.\(c5\) \(dxc5\) 15.\(\mathcal{D}c4+\) \(e6\) 16.\(e3\) \(\mathcal{D}xg5\) 17.\(exd4\) \(\mathcal{D}d5\) 18.\(\mathcal{D}xc5\) \(b6\) 19.\(\mathcal{D}xd5\) \(exd5\) 20.\(\mathcal{D}e3\) \(\mathcal{D}g4=\) in the game Liptay – Bilek, Hungary 1965 the position was completely equalized) 12...\(\mathcal{D}xc3\) 13.\(bxc3\) \(\mathcal{D}xc3\) 14.\(\mathcal{D}b1\) \(\mathcal{D}xe4\) getting the activated pieces as the compensation for the sacrificed pawn. The following exemplary variation shows the dangers that can be in store for Black: 14...\(\mathcal{D}c7\) 15.\(c5\) (White is threatening to win the piece with 16.\(\mathcal{D}b3+\) or 16.\(\mathcal{D}c4+)\) 15...\(\mathcal{D}f6\) 16.\(\mathcal{D}d5+\) \(\mathcal{D}h8\) (bad for Black is 16...\(\mathcal{D}g7\) in view of 17.\(\mathcal{D}xb7!\) \(\mathcal{D}xb7\) 18.\(\mathcal{D}xc6\) \(\mathcal{D}b8\) 19.\(\mathcal{D}xa8\) \(\mathcal{D}xa8\) 20.\(cxd6\) \(exd6\) 21.\(\mathcal{D}xd6\)\) 17.\(\mathcal{D}h4\) (less clear the consequences of 17.\(\mathcal{D}f7\) \(\mathcal{D}xf7\) 18.\(\mathcal{D}xf7\) \(dxc5=\) ) 17...\(\mathcal{D}xg5\) (after 17...\(h5\) Whit can obtain the decisive advantage with 18.\(\mathcal{D}f4!\) \(e5\) 19.\(\mathcal{D}f7\) \(\mathcal{D}xf7\) 20.\(\mathcal{D}h6+\) \(\mathcal{D}g8\) 21.\(\mathcal{D}xg6\) \(\mathcal{D}g7\) 22.\(cxd6\) \(\mathcal{D}d7\) 23.\(\mathcal{D}h6\) \(\mathcal{D}f8\) 24.\(\mathcal{D}xg7+\) \(\mathcal{D}xg7\) 25.\(\mathcal{D}h6=\) ) 18.\(\mathcal{D}xd6\) \(\mathcal{D}xd6\) (if 18...\(exd6\), then 19.\(\mathcal{D}xg5+\), while after 18...\(\mathcal{D}xh4\) 19.\(dxc7\) \(\mathcal{D}f6\) White wins with 20.\(\mathcal{D}xc6\) \(bxc6\) 21.\(\mathcal{D}d8\) \(\mathcal{D}g7\) 22.\(\mathcal{D}xf8\) \(\mathcal{D}xf8\) 23.\(\mathcal{D}xb8\) \(\mathcal{D}xg5\) and White is ready with his two bishops to start the powerful attack against Black’s king.

12.\(\mathcal{D}b3\)

In general, White does not object against the queens’ swap, but it has not been the proper moment here. After 12.\(\mathcal{D}xa5\) \(\mathcal{D}xa5\) 13.\(\mathcal{D}d5\) \(e6\) 14.\(\mathcal{D}e7+\) \(\mathcal{D}f7\) 15.\(\mathcal{D}xc8\) \(\mathcal{D}xc8\) 16.\(\mathcal{b}1\) \(\mathcal{e}7=\) Black would finish the development completely and the play would be equal.

12...\(\mathcal{D}b4\)

Black is still insisting on the queens’ swap. In case of the prophylactic 12...\(\mathcal{D}h8\) possible would be 13.\(\mathcal{D}d2\) \(\mathcal{b}6\) (after 13...\(\mathcal{D}b4\) 14.\(\mathcal{D}xb4\) \(\mathcal{D}xb4\) 15.\(\mathcal{D}d4\) \(\mathcal{a}6\) in the game Servat – Casas, Buenos Aires 1995 White exploited the weakness of the light squares in Black’s camp with 16.\(\mathcal{D}b3!\) \(\mathcal{d}7\) 17.\(\mathcal{a}c1\) \(\mathcal{b}8\) 18.\(\mathcal{e}3\) \(b6\) 19.\(\mathcal{D}d4\) \(\mathcal{b}7\) 20.\(\mathcal{e}6\)\) while after 13...\(\mathcal{D}d8\) 14.\(\mathcal{a}c1\) \(\mathcal{d}7\) 15.\(\mathcal{e}3\) \(\mathcal{g}4\) 16.\(\mathcal{f}4\) \(\mathcal{a}5\) 17.\(\mathcal{b}4\) \(\mathcal{c}8\) 18.\(\mathcal{d}5\) \(\mathcal{c}6\) 19.\(\mathcal{a}3\) \(b6\) 20.\(\mathcal{g}5\) \(\mathcal{f}6\) 21.\(\mathcal{f}6\) 22.\(\mathcal{f}6\) \(\mathcal{f}6\) 23.\(\mathcal{c}3\) \(\mathcal{a}5\) 24.\(b3\) \(\mathcal{f}8\) in the game Lukacs – Becx, Copenhagen 1987 White performed the important advance in the centre with 25.\(e4!\) that brought him a little advantage) 13...\(\mathcal{D}b6\) 14.\(\mathcal{e}3\) (after 14.\(\mathcal{b}6\) \(a6\) 15.\(\mathcal{e}3\) \(c6\) 16.\(\mathcal{d}2\) \(d7\) 17.\(\mathcal{a}c1\) \(\mathcal{c}5\) 18.\(b3\) \(\mathcal{a}3\) 19.\(\mathcal{d}b1\) \(\mathcal{a}6=\) in the game L. Bronstein – Pelikan, Cordoba 1970 the semi-opened a-file helped Black to equalize) 14.\(\mathcal{b}3\) 15.\(axb3\) \(\mathcal{g}4\) 16.\(\mathcal{c}1\) \(\mathcal{e}6\) 17.\(\mathcal{b}5\) \(\mathcal{f}8\) 18.\(e4\)\) \(\mathcal{g}5\) (after 18...\(\mathcal{f}xe4\) 19.\(\mathcal{g}5\) \(\mathcal{f}5\) 20.\(\mathcal{e}4\) \(a6\) 21.\(\mathcal{b}3\) \(\mathcal{d}4\) 22.\(h3\) \(\mathcal{g}5\) 23.}
\( f4 \pm \) White’s position is also more pleasant) 19.\( \text{Q}d4 \text{Q}d7 20. exf5 gxf5 21.f4± and in the game Filippov – Saleh, Dubai 2000 White retained the better chances thanks to his pressure upon Black’s central pawns.

13.\( \text{Q}xb4! \)

Here the situation is more preferable for White to swap the queens than it was on the previous move. The delay with the queens’ exchange with 13.\( \text{Q}e3 a5 14.\text{B}ac1 \text{B}e6 15.\text{Q}a4 \) can bring Black the equal play after 15...\( \text{Q}xb3 16. \text{axb}3 \text{Q}a6 \). 13...\( \text{Q}xb4 14.\text{Q}d4 \text{B}b8 \)

The tactical basis for the queen’s swap White undertook on move 13 is seen in the variation 14...\( \text{Q}e4?! 15.\text{Q}xe4 \text{Q}xd4 16.\text{Q}xd4 \text{Q}c2 17.\text{Q}d2 \text{Q}xa1 18. \text{Q}c3 \pm with the following b2-b3 and \( \text{B}b2 \). Not much better also is the other manoeuvre of Black’s knight – 14...\( \text{Q}g4 \). After 15.\( \text{Q}b1! \) \( \text{Q}e5 16.\text{Q}g5! \text{Q}f7?! \) (bad is 16...\( \text{Q}xc4?, in view of 17.a3\+

The play will go on by force) 17.\( \text{Q}b5! \) (the threat is \( \text{Q}c7, a2-a3 \) and \( \text{Q}d5\+) 17...\( \text{Q}f6 (17...\text{Q}xc4? loses the piece in view of 18.\text{Q}a3 \text{Q}a6 19. \text{Q}d5\+) 18.\text{Q}h6 \text{Q}d8 19.\text{Q}c7 \text{B}b8 20.a3 \text{Q}ec6 (20...\text{Q}bc6 would be decisively met with 21.\text{Q}d5\+, while after 20...\( \text{Q}g4 \) possible would be 21.\( \text{Q}xb4 \text{Q}xd4 22.\text{Q}xd4 \text{Q}xh6 23. c5\+ and it is hard for Black to get free without any material loss) 21.\text{Q}xb4! \text{Q}xd4 22.\text{Q}e3 e5 23.\text{Q}d5+ \text{Q}e7 24.\text{Q}xd4 \text{exd}4 25.\text{Q}b5 \text{Q}e6 26.\text{Q}xe6 \text{Q}xe6 27.\text{Q}xa7!\+ in the game Jussupow – M. Gurevich, Linares 1991 White obtained the winning position. After 14...\( \text{Q}h8 15.b3 \text{Q}g4 \) White would rather act similar to the game fragment just seen above and go on with 14.\( \text{Q}b1! \) (after 16.\( \text{Q}b2 \text{Q}e5 17.\text{Q}d5 \text{Q}xd5 18.\text{Q}xd5 \text{Q}c6 19.\text{Q}d2 \text{Q}xd4 20. \text{Q}xd4 \text{Q}xd4 21.\text{Q}xd4 \text{B}b8 22.\text{Q}e1 \text{Q}d7 23.\text{Q}g2 \text{Q}c6 24.\text{Q}f4 \) in the game Z. Gyimesi – Saleh, Dubai 1999 White could get just the better rook ending) 14...\( \text{Q}e5 15.\text{Q}g5\+ with the advantage.

15.a3!

This move is stronger than 15.b3 \( \text{Q}d7 16.\text{B}b2 \text{Q}c8 17.e3 \text{Q}f7 18.\text{B}ac1 a6 19.h3 \text{h}6 (after 19...\( \text{Q}e4? 20.\text{Q}xe4 \text{fe} 21.\text{Q}a3 \text{Q}c6 22. \text{Q}h2 \text{Q}f8 23.\text{Q}xe4\+ in the game Savchenko – Varga, Ljubljana 1996 White won the pawn) 20. \text{Q}d2 \text{Q}c6 21.\text{Q}ce2 \text{Q}e4! \) (White should always take into consideration such an opportunity) 22.\( \text{Q}xe4 \text{xe}4 23.\text{Q}xc6 \) (after 23.\( \text{Q}g2 \text{Q}e5\+) Black’s knight
would invade onto d3) 23...bxc6 24.\textasciitilde xg7 \textasciitilde xg7 25.\textasciitilde c3 \textasciitilde xh3 26.\textasciitilde xe4 g5\textasciitilde ± and in the game Savchenko - Rustemov, Minsk 1996 Black obtained even the better play.

15...\textasciitilde a6

After 15...\textasciitilde c6 16.\textasciitilde xc6 bxc6 17.\textasciitilde xc6 \textasciitilde b7 18.\textasciitilde b1 \textasciitilde e6 (if 18...\textasciitilde c7, then 19.\textasciitilde a5\textasciitilde ±) 19.b3 \textasciitilde c8 20.\textasciitilde a5 \textasciitilde b6 21.\textasciitilde d2 \textasciitilde a6 22.\textasciitilde b5 \textasciitilde e4 23.\textasciitilde e1± Black has no compensation for the pawn.

16.\textasciitilde cb5

In case 16.\textasciitilde db5 \textasciitilde e6\textasciitilde ± Black would obtain the counter play.

16...\textasciitilde a8 17.b4!

White is aiming to restrict Black's knight a6. After 17.\textasciitilde g5 \textasciitilde c5 18.\textasciitilde c7 \textasciitilde b8 19.b4 \textasciitilde ce4 20.\textasciitilde xe4 fxe4 21.\textasciitilde de6 \textasciitilde xe6 22.\textasciitilde xe6 \textasciitilde fc8 23.\textasciitilde xg7 \textasciitilde xg7 24.\textasciitilde d4 \textasciitilde c7± Black would get out his knight in time from a6 and obtain the counter play against the pawn c4.

17...\textasciitilde e4 18.f3

After 18.\textasciitilde e3 \textasciitilde d7 19.\textasciitilde ac1 \textasciitilde fc8\textasciitilde = Black would get the opportunity to escape with his knight from a6 via c7.

18...\textasciitilde f6 19.\textasciitilde g5\textasciitilde ±

After 19...h6 (in case 19...\textasciitilde d7 20.f4± White’s pressure on the pawns a7 and b7 would compel Black either return home his bishop or make the awkward move \textasciitilde f8-b8) 20.\textasciitilde xf6 \textasciitilde xf6 21.\textasciitilde ac1\textasciitilde ± (analysis by R. Dautov) White's chances are more preferable despite Black's two bishops. It is left for White only to make the move f2-f4 and after that his pressure upon the pawns a7 and b7 would paralyse Black’s queenside.

b) 8...\textasciitilde e5

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

9.\textasciitilde b3?\textasciitilde ±

After 9.\textasciitilde xe5 dxe5\textasciitilde ≈ Black would create rather a strong concentrated forces in centre and sometimes he succeeds to arrange the dangerous attack at the kingside at the price of some strategic concessions at the opposite side of the board. In the diagrammed position White refuses from the knights’ swap on e5 to make the opponent to be looking for the ways to the equalization without the slightest hint of the active counter play.

9...\textasciitilde xf3+
Black swaps the pair of the knights intending then either to transfer the other one to e5 or to improve his pawn structure with e7-e5. Otherwise the retarded pawn e7 can become in future the hit of attack for White's pieces. For instance, after 9...h6 10.\d4 a6 (after 10...\h5?! 11.e3 g5 12.\d1 \f6 13.\c2 \h5 in the game Minero Pineda – Hernandez Basante, San Jose 2001 White exploited the vulnerable position of the knight e5 with 14. f4! gxf4 15.gxf4 \g6 16.\d1 \f6 17.\h3 \g4 18.\xf5! \xe3 19.\xe3 \xf5 20.\xf5 \xf5 21.\g4 \f6 22.\e4+- with the violent attack at the kingside; after 10...g5 11.f4! gxf4 12.\xf4 \h5 13.e3 \g4 14.\ce2 \d7 15.c5 dxc5 16.d6+ \h8 17.dxc7 \e8 18.\xe6 \xe6 19.\xe6 \f6 20.\b3 e5 21.\xb7 exf4 22.\xa8 \xa8 23.\ad1± in the game Campos Moreno – Fernando, Burgas 2000 the position of the knight e5 was also the trouble) 11.\d2 \e8 12.\f4 \f7 13.e3 \d8 14.\ac1 \h8 15.\fe1 \b8 16.\c2 \f7 17.b3 \d7 18.\f3 c6 White hit the defects of the opponent's pawn structure with the breakout in centre 19.e4! fxe4 20.\xe4 \f5 21.\h4 cxd5 22.\xf5 gxf5 23.\xf6 \xf6 24.cxd5± in the game Andersson – Rodi, Pinar Mar 2001.

In case of 9...\h8 the game can go on similar to the above variations: 10.\d4 \h5 (quite bad is 10...c5? in view of 11.dxc6 \xc6 12.\xc6 bxc6 13.\xc6 \d7 14.\xa8 \xa8 15.\g5 \b8 16.\c2+- as was in the game El Ghazali – Abdel Razik, Cairo 2000, while after 10...\e4?! 11.\xe4 fxe4 12.\e6 \xe6 13.\xe6 \c8 14.c5 c6 15.\xe4 d5 16.\g2 \xe6 17.e4± Paragua – Del Monaco, Padova 2000, the weakness of the light squares in Black's position is quite sound) 11.e3±.

White also retains the better position in case 9...e6 10.\d4?! exd5 11.cxd5 \e7 12.\d2±. The pawn c7 is the eventual hit of White's play and besides Black should always take into consideration the invasion of White's knight onto e6 and the break in centre e2-e4 after some preparation.

The attempt to transfer the knight from e5 onto c5 with 9...\ed7 10.\e3 (after 10...h6 11.\d4 \c5 12.\c2 a5 13.\h4 \e8 White won the pawn with 14.\xc5! dxc5 15.\b5 \f7 16.\xc7 \b8 17.\ad1± in the game Scarella – Minzer, Buenos Aires 1990, while in case 10...\e8 11.\ad1 h6 12.\c2 \f8 as was in the game Jordan – Castellfort Fernandez, Foment 1996, White could have played 13.c5!? \g4 14.\d4 \xd4 15.\xd4 dxc5 16.\b3 \d7 17.e4± with the strong initiative in centre for the sacrificed pawn) 10...\c5 11.\c2 a5 (Black's try to improve his pawn structure with 11...\g4 12.\d4 \h6 13.h3 \f6 14.\ad1 \ce4 15.\e1 e5 16.dxe6 \xe6 as
was in the game Caoili Arianne – Belotelov, Bled 2000, could have been refuted with 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}\texttt{xf6}! \texttt{\textasciitilde}xf6 18.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xe4 \texttt{fxe4} 19.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xe4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}ae8 20.\texttt{\textasciitilde}c2\texttt{\textasciitilde} 12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}ad1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d7 permits White to get the better play thanks to his certain advantage in centre after 13.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xc5! \texttt{dxc5} 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e8 (bad is 14...\texttt{\textasciitilde}e8? in view of 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}c6! \texttt{bxc6} 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}dxc6 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d6 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}cd7 18.\texttt{\textasciitilde}a8 \texttt{\textasciitilde}a8 19.\texttt{\textasciitilde}a4+- as was in the game Frey – Henley, Lone Pine 1977) 15.\texttt{e4\textasciitilde}.

In case Black insists on changing pawn structure to get the powerful pawn force in centre with 9...\texttt{\textasciitilde}fd7 10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xe5 \texttt{dxe5} (after 10...\texttt{\textasciitilde}xe5 11.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}h8 12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}g4 13.\texttt{h3 \textasciitilde}f6 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d7 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e8 16.\texttt{e3 a6} 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}ac1 \texttt{h6} 18.\texttt{a4 \textasciitilde}h7 19.a5 \texttt{g5} 20.\texttt{c5\textasciitilde} in the game Mortazavi – Flear, London 1985 White succeeded to breakthrough at the queenside while after 10...\texttt{\textasciitilde}xe5 11.\texttt{\textasciitilde}c2 \texttt{a5} 12.\texttt{f4 \textasciitilde}g7 13.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e3 \texttt{a6} 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}ad1 \texttt{c5} in the game Bartha – Czuczai, Hungary 1995 White could have arranged the break in centre with 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f2\textasciitilde with the following e2-e4) then, in contrast to the similar position discussed in the note to White’s move 9, Black’s knight occupies the significantly worse position. In this case there can follow: 11.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}h8 12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}a3 \texttt{h6} 13.\texttt{c5} (White’s plan, promoted significantly with the position of Black’s knight d7, includes the further advance of his central pawns aimed to open the play; in case there appear some threats to the square \texttt{f2} White has the spare manoeuvre \texttt{\textasciitilde}d2-e1) 13...\texttt{e4} 14.\texttt{f3} \texttt{\textasciitilde}f3 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f3 \texttt{c6} 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e5 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}dxc6 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e8 18.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d5\textasciitilde and in the game M. Roeder – Heinzl, Bad Woerishofen 2001 the play was disclosed evidently in White’s favour.

10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xf3

After 10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xf3 \texttt{e5} 11.\texttt{\textasciitilde}dxe6 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xe6 12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xb7 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xc4 13.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d7 14.\texttt{f4 a5= in the game Anic – Santo Roman, Nice 1994 Black successfully overcame the beginning’s troubles.

10...\texttt{\textasciitilde}d7

Black transfers his knight to \texttt{e5}. The attempt to get rid of the eventual weakness – the pawn \texttt{e7} – with 10...\texttt{e5} 11.\texttt{\textasciitilde}dxe6 \texttt{c6} helps Black only a bit. After 12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e7 13.\texttt{\textasciitilde}ad1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d8 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}a3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}f8 (in case of 14...\texttt{\textasciitilde}e8 Black should take 15.\texttt{e4\textasciitilde} into consideration) in the game V. Lazarev – Grinspun, Budapest 1998 White succeeded to arrange the pressure upon the pawn \texttt{d6} with 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d3! \texttt{\textasciitilde}xe6 (in case 15...\texttt{\textasciitilde}xe6 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xc4 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d6= the disclosure of play in centre would be in White’s favour since Black
has not yet completed the development of his pieces at the queenside) 16.b3±.

11...\(\text{e}3\)

White intends to complete the development of his pieces as soon as possible with the aim to perform in future the break in centre with e2-e4 or disclose the files at the queenside with c4-c5 if possible. The attempt to start the tactic play with 11.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}2\) \(\text{e}5\) 12.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{xc}4\) 13.\(\text{b}5\) a6 14.\(\text{xc}4\) axb5 15.\(\text{xb}5\) \(\text{e}7\) 16.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{a}5\) 17.\(\text{b}4\) permitted Black to equalize completely in the game Estremera Panos – De la Villa, Leon 1997 after 17...\(\text{x}a1\) 18.\(\text{bxa}5\) (bad for White is 18.\(\text{h}6\)?! in view 18...\(\text{x}a2\) 19.\(\text{xf}8\) \(\text{a}4\) 20.\(\text{h}6\) b5±) 18...\(\text{g}7\).

11...\(\text{e}5\)

After 11...\(\text{h}8\) 12.\(\text{ad}1\) a6 13.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{e}8\) 14.\(\text{d}4\)! \(\text{e}5\) 15.\(\text{e}3\) b6 16.f4 \(\text{g}4\) 17.\(\text{xg}7\)+ \(\text{xg}7\) 18.\(\text{de}1\) \(\text{f}6\) 19.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{b}8\) 20.\(\text{e}4\)! \(\text{xe}4\) 21.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{xe}4\) 22.\(\text{xe}4\)± White properly succeeded to constrain Black's position with the swap of the dark-coloured bishops followed by the central break e2-e4 in the game Vasilchenko – Plesek, Pardubice 1992. After 11...h6 12.\(\text{ac}1\) g5 White obtained the play on the weakened dark squares in Black's position with 13.\(\text{c}5\)? \(\text{e}5\) 14.\(\text{cx}d\) \(\text{cx}d\) 15.\(\text{b}5\) f4 16.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 17.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 18.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 19.\(\text{dc}7\) \(\text{c}8\) 20.\(\text{e}6\) \(\text{xe}6\) 21.\(\text{dx}e6\)± in the game Sokalsky – Biolek, Katowice 1993.

12.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 13.\(\text{h}3\) c5 14.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{f}7\)

This position was reached in the game Campos Moreno – Castany, Spaine 1999. Here White could have obtained the initiative in centre with 15.\(\text{f}2\)? \(\text{a}6\) 16.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{b}8\) 17.\(\text{e}4\)± meanwhile restraining the opponent's play connected with the advance b7-b5.
Chapter 25
1.\( \text{	extit{c3}} \) f5 2.\( \text{	extit{c4}} \) \( \text{	extit{f6}} \) 3.g3 g6 4.g2 g7 5.c3 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.0-0 c6; 7...\( \text{	extit{a6}} \)

\[ 
\]

a) 7...c6

This is a multi-purpose move. Black is going to exploit the square \( \text{c7} \) for his queen to support the advance e7-e5. However, sometimes Black’s plan may change depending on White’s reply and the square \( \text{c7} \) could serve for the knight \( \text{b8} \) where it would cover the weakened square \( \text{e6} \) and help to prepare the active play at the queenside with the advance \( \text{b7-b5} \).

8.\( \text{	extit{b1?!}} \)

This is a useful prophylactic move. White cannot immediately fix Black’s pawns in centre with 8.d5 since after 8...e5 9.dxe6 \( \text{	extit{xex6}} \) it is not easy to defend the pawn \( \text{c4} \) comfortably because of the X-ray action of Black’s bishop \( \text{g7} \) along the diagonal a1-h8.

8...\( \text{	extit{c7}} \)

Black starts to prepare the advance e7-e5. He also tried to exploit the square \( \text{e4} \) with 8...\( \text{	extit{e4}} \) similar to the way considered in Chapter 23. In that case possible is 9.\( \text{	extit{xex4}} \) (after 9.\( \text{	extit{f4}} \) h6 10.\( \text{	extit{c2}} \) \( \text{	extit{xex3}} \) 11.bxc3 g5 12.c1 e5 13.a3 f7 14.fd1 e4 in the game Suetin – Smekhal, Ljubljanja/Portoroz 1973 Black seized the initiative while after 9.\( \text{	extit{c2}} \) \( \text{	extit{xex3}} \) 10.xc3 e5 11.dxe5 dxe5 12.e4 f4 13.b3 \( \text{	extit{e7}} \) 14.b2 g4 15.a5 c5 16.a3 b6 17.\( \text{	extit{d2}} \) \( \text{	extit{d8}} \) in the game Skembris – Leow, Novi Sad 1990 Black’s chances appeared superior than White’s) 9...fxe4 10.\( \text{	extit{xex2}} \) (after 10.\( \text{	extit{e1}} \) d5 11.\( \text{	extit{c2}} \) \( \text{	extit{d7}} \) 12.b4 \( \text{	extit{b6}} \) 13.c5 \( \text{	extit{c4}} \) 14.\( \text{	extit{e3}} \) \( \text{	extit{xex3}} \) 15.\( \text{	extit{xe3}} \) e5 16.\( \text{	extit{d2}} \) \( \text{	extit{f5}} \) = in the game J. Berry – Spraggett, Toronto 1978 Black easily equalized) 10... d5 11.e3 \( \text{	extit{e6}} \) 12.b4 b5 13.\( \text{cb5} \) \( \text{cb5} \) 14.a4 \( \text{bxa4} \) 15.\( \text{xa4} \) \( \text{d7} \) 16.\( \text{a2} \) \( \text{f7} \) 17.b3 \( \text{b6} \) 18.\( \text{a5} \) \( \text{d7} \) as was in the game Beliavsky – Agrest, Batumi 1999. Here 19.\( \text{d2!} \) ?± deserved attention with the idea to include the king’s rook into the play at the queenside with \( \text{fc1} \) while the dark–
coloured bishop be sent to the
defence of the square f2 with
\( \text{\textit{e}1} \).

The prophylactic 8...a5 already permits White to advance
9.d5 with the better effect than on the previous move. After
9...e5 10.dxe6 \textit{xe6} 11.b3 \textit{a}6
(11...\textit{Cc7} that was in the game
Kapu – J. Horvath, Hungary
1992 could have been strongly
replied with 12.\textit{f}4! \textit{d}8 13.c5
\textit{e}8 14.\textit{g}5 \pm since 14...\textit{c}8
would be not acceptable for Black
in view of 15.\textit{d}5! (+) 12.\textit{g}5
\textit{c}8 13.\textit{b}2 h6 14.\textit{f}3 g5 15.e3
\textit{g}4 16.\textit{d}2 \textit{e}7 17.\textit{bd}1 \textit{d}8
18.\textit{a}4 \textit{xb}2 19.\textit{xb}2 \textit{e}6 20.
\textit{d}4 \pm in the game Rossetto –
Pelikan, Mar del Plata 1961
White obtained the advantage
since Black’s position at the
kingside was weakened and com-
promised with the pawns ad-
vance and the absence of the
dark-coloured bishops.

It should be also mentioned
that after 8...\textit{a}6 9.b4 the play
transposes to the variation b3,
while after 8...\textit{e}8 9.d5 – to the
line of Chapter 26.

9.d5

White has no opportunity to
prevent the advance e7-e5 and
he at most decreases the effect
of it. Thanks to his Queen’s rook
has left the square a1, White
would have no problem with the
defence of the pawn c4 similar to
one that could have arisen in
case of d4-d5 on move 8.

9...e5

Otherwise White would posi-
tion his knight onto d4 first of all.

For instance, after 9...\textit{e}8 10.
\textit{d}4 e5 11.dxe6 \textit{xe6} 12.\textit{xe6}
\textit{xe6} in the game Ptacnik – R.
Keller, Lugano 1989 White ex-
pected his opportunity to change
his knight for Black’s light-co-
loured bishop and started the
advance at the queenside with
13.b4 \textit{bd}7 14.\textit{b}3 \textit{h}8 15.\textit{d}1
\textit{ae}8 16.\textit{f}4 \textit{h}5 17.\textit{d}2 \textit{hf}6
18.a4 \textit{e}5 19.b5 \pm. In case 9...\textit{h}8
10.\textit{d}4 c5 White would rather
use the smooth 11.\textit{c}2! \pm with
the idea to prepare the advance
e2-e4 in future. Meanwhile, the
invasion with 11.\textit{e}6 is not rea-
sonable since after 11...\textit{xe}6 12.
dc6 13.\textit{d}5 \textit{c}8, as was in the
game Rollansky – Moyano Mo-
rales, Mar del Plata 1967, White
is compelled to defend constantly
the broken-away pawn e6 and to
bother about the square d4.

In case Black covers the
square d4 from White’s knight
with 9...c5, then after 10.b3 a6
11.\textit{b}2 \textit{bd}7 12.\textit{g}5 \textit{b}6 White
succeeds to disclose the play in
centre with 13.e4 \textit{xe}4 14.\textit{cxe}4 \pm
and obtains the advantage.
After 9...\textit{cxd}5 10.\textit{cxd}5 \textit{bd}7 11.\textit{e}3
\textit{c}5 12.\textit{d}4 a5 13.\textit{c}1 \textit{d}7 as
was in the game Barkhagen – T.
Ernst, Gothenburg 1990, White
could have struggled for the ad-
vantage with 14.e3!? \pm followed by
\textit{e}2.

10.dxe6 \textit{e}7

Much worse for Black is the
immediate capture of the pawn
since after 10...\(\text{\textbullet}e6?!\) 11.\(\text{\textbullet}f4!\) \(\text{\textbullet}d8\) White has the opportunity to destroy Black’s position in centre with 12.c5. There can follow: 12...\(\text{d}e8\) 13.\(\text{d}g5 \text{\textbullet}e7\) (in case 13...\(\text{d}f7\) 14.\(\text{d}x\text{f7}\) \(\text{d}x\text{f7}\) 15.\(\text{d}c6 \text{\textbullet}d7\) 16.\(\text{d}e4 \text{\textbullet}e5\) 17.\(\text{d}x\text{f5 gxf5}\) in the game Capek – Kholmov, Decin 1995 White could have put the significant problems before the opponent with 18.\(\text{d}e1! \text{d}g6\) 19.\(\text{d}g5 \text{\textbullet}d7\) 20.\(\text{a}a4 \pm\) 14.\(\text{d}d5!\) (less accurate is 14.\(\text{d}xe6 \text{\textbullet}xe6\) 15.\(\text{d}e4 \text{\textbullet}a6\) 16.\(\text{d}x\text{f5 \text{\textbullet}xf5}\) 17.\(\text{d}c6\) 18.\(\text{d}e4\), as was in the game M. Roj – Civin, Czech Republic 1995, in view of 18...\(\text{\textbullet}a5=\) 14...\(\text{\textbullet}d7\) (if 14...cd, then 15.\(\text{\textbullet}xe6+-\) and White’s knight is tabooed in view of the loss of Black’s queen) 15.\(\text{d}c6\) 16.\(\text{\textbullet}a6\) 16.\(\text{\textbullet}b3 \text{\textbullet}c5\) (after 16...\(\text{d}h8\) 17.\(\text{\textbullet}xe6 \text{\textbullet}xe6\) 18.\(\text{\textbullet}xb7\) 17.\(\text{\textbullet}c5\) 19.\(\text{\textbullet}xa6 \text{\textbullet}e5\) 20.\(\text{\textbullet}xe5+\) \(\text{\textbullet}xe5\) 21.\(\text{d}fd1 \text{\textbullet}xd6\) 22.\(\text{b}b7 \text{\textbullet}ad8\) 23.\(\text{d}d2 \text{\textbullet}d7\) 24.\(\text{\textbullet}b4 \text{\textbullet}f6\) 25.\(\text{\textbullet}d4\) in the game Sheldon – Mohota, Bratislava 1993 Black appeared in the hopeless position) 17.\(\text{\textbullet}c4 \text{\textbullet}xd6\) 18.\(\text{\textbullet}xc5 \text{\textbullet}xd5\) 19.\(\text{\textbullet}xd5+\) \(\text{\textbullet}xd5\) 20.\(\text{\textbullet}xd5+ \text{\textbullet}f7\) 21.\(\text{\textbullet}b3\) and White can reasonably hope to realize his extra pawn.

11.\(\text{d}d4 \text{\textbullet}xe6\) 12.\(\text{\textbullet}xe6 \text{\textbullet}xe6\) 13.\(\text{b}b3 \text{\textbullet}a6\) 14.\(\text{\textbullet}b2 \text{\textbullet}ad8\) 15.\(\text{c}c2\)

After 15.\(\text{e}3 \text{\textbullet}c7\) 16.\(\text{\textbullet}c2 \text{\textbullet}d7\) 17.\(\text{b}bd1\) Black performed the advance 17...d5 in the game Tunik – Yagupov, Smolensk 1992, but after 18.\(\text{\textbullet}c5 \text{\textbullet}xd5\) 19.\(\text{\textbullet}xd5 \text{\textbullet}cxd5\) 20.\(\text{\textbullet}xg7 \text{\textbullet}xg7\) 21.\(\text{c}c5\) a6 22.\(\text{\textbullet}xd5 \text{\textbullet}xd5\) 23.\(\text{\textbullet}xd5\) \(\text{\textbullet}xd5\)

24.\(\text{\textbullet}xd5\) cxd5 25.\(\text{c}c1\) he appeared in the worse rook ending. The only open file was under White’s control while the isolated pawn d5 demanded the constant defence.

15...\(\text{\textbullet}e8\) 16.\(\text{\textbullet}bd1 \text{\textbullet}c7\) 17.\(\text{\textbullet}d2 \text{\textbullet}d7\) 18.\(\text{\textbullet}fd1\) 

This position was reached in the game Zoler – Rolletschek, Schwarzach 1999. After 18...\(\text{d}ed8\) 19.e3 \(\text{h}6\) 20.\(\text{\textbullet}e2 \text{\textbullet}f7\) 21.\(\text{d}d4\) a6 22.\(\text{\textbullet}f4 \text{\textbullet}e8\) White bound the opponent’s pieces with the protection of the pawn d6 and started to slacken Black’s defence at the kingside with 23.\(\text{h}4\)±.

b) 7...\(\text{\textbullet}a6\)

\[8.\text{\textbullet}b1!\]

This move is more accurate
than 8.d5 \textit{w}e8 with the transposition to one of the lines of Chapter 26.

\textbf{8...c6}

In case of 8...c5 White would rather play 9.dxc5 (after 9.d5 Black obtained the equal play in the game Madsen – Jessen, Copenhagen 1991 with 9...\textit{d}c7 10.b3 \textit{d}b8 11.\textit{b}b2 b5 12.cb5 \textit{d}xb5 13.\textit{b}xb5 \textit{d}xb5=) 9...\textit{d}c5 10.\textit{d}e3 \textit{d}ce4 11.\textit{d}xe4 \textit{d}xe4 12.\textit{d}d2 \textit{d}f6 13.\textit{d}d4 \textit{w}e8 14.\textit{d}c3 g5 15.\textit{w}b3 \textit{w}h8, as was in the game Haba – Zvara, Oberwart 1992, and here the typical advance 16.e4= would have led to the disclosure of play and the certain White's advantage.

\textbf{9.b4 \textit{d}e4}

After 9...\textit{d}c7 10.b5 \textit{d}e4 11.\textit{b}b2 \textit{d}d7 12.bxc6 bxc6 13.\textit{w}c2 \textit{b}b8 14.e3 h6 15.\textit{a}a1 \textit{x}c3 16.\textit{x}c3 g5 17.\textit{b}xb8 \textit{x}xb8 18.h4 g4 19.\textit{d}d2 \textit{e}8 20.\textit{b}b1 \textit{a}a8 21.\textit{b}b3± in the game Vaulin – Danner, Oberwart 1997, as well as in case of 9...\textit{w}h8 10.b5 \textit{d}c7 11.bxc6 bxc6 12.\textit{d}e1 \textit{d}d7 13.\textit{d}d3 \textit{c}c8 14.\textit{b}b7 \textit{e}6 15.\textit{f}f4 \textit{x}xf4 16.\textit{x}xf4 \textit{a}a5 17.\textit{d}d3 \textit{a}a6 18.\textit{f}b1± in the game Chabanon – Bandza, Torcy 1991 White succeeded to capture the opened b-file. In case 9...\textit{w}e8 10.b5 \textit{d}c7 11.bxc6 bxc6 12.\textit{a}a4 \textit{e}4 13.\textit{x}xe4 fxe4 14.\textit{d}d2 d5 15.\textit{a}a3 \textit{a}a6 16.e3 \textit{f}6 17.\textit{c}c5 \textit{f}8 18.\textit{a}5 \textit{d}d7 19.f4 \textit{e}x\textit{f}3 20.\textit{x}xf3 \textit{a}a8 21.\textit{e}5± in the game Grospeter – Danner, Budapest 1993 White occupied the two important squares e5 and c5 that brought him the superiority.

\textbf{10.\textit{d}xe4}

After 10.\textit{b}b2 \textit{e}6 in the game Kramnik – Ivanchuk, Monte Carlo 1995 White responded badly: 11.\textit{w}b3? (better was 11.b5 \textit{d}c7 12.bxc6 bxc6 13.\textit{w}a4 \textit{w}b8=) and after 11...b5! 12.\textit{d}xe4 \textit{x}c4 13.\textit{w}e3 fxe4 14.\textit{w}xe4 \textit{x}b4 15.\textit{h}3 \textit{h}8= he appeared in the difficult position.

However the immediate 10.\textit{w}b3 is possible. After 10...\textit{d}xc3 (in case of 10...\textit{e}6?! with the idea b7-b5 the reply 11.\textit{d}xe4 fxe4 12.\textit{g}5± would gain in force, while after 10...\textit{d}c7 11.\textit{d}e3 \textit{d}d7 12.a4 \textit{d}xc3 13.\textit{x}c3 \textit{w}c8 14.\textit{d}d2 \textit{e}8 15.\textit{x}fc1± in the game R. Krueger – L. Danner, Germany 1998 White's spatial expansion at the queenside was obvious) 11.\textit{w}xc3 \textit{w}e8 12.\textit{b}b2 h6 (Black could not get free with 12...\textit{d}c7 13.\textit{d}d2 e5? in view of 14.dxe5 dxe5 15.\textit{w}d6=) 13.\textit{d}d2! \textit{d}d7 (again, Black could not improve his position with 13...e5 since after 14.b5 cb5 15.cxb5 \textit{c}c7 16.\textit{w}c1 \textit{w}f7 17.dxe5 dxe5 18.\textit{c}c5 \textit{d}d7 19.\textit{w}c1 \textit{e}6 White has the exchange sacrifice 20.\textit{x}e5! \textit{x}e5 21.\textit{x}e5\textit{w} that gives him the excellent play on the weakened dark squares in Black's position) 13...\textit{d}d7 14.d5 c5 15.\textit{x}g7 \textit{x}g7 16.b5 \textit{c}c7 17.e4 \textit{x}e4 18.\textit{w}c3+ \textit{w}h7 19.\textit{d}d2 \textit{w}f7 20.\textit{w}e1 \textit{g}7, as was in the game B.Alteman – P. Nikolic, Pula 1997, where White could have retained the
certain advantage thanks to Black’s retarded pawn e7 after 21.\text{c}c2 \text{f}f7 22.\text{x}xe4 \text{h}h3 23.\text{g}g2\pm.

10...\text{fxe}4 11.\text{d}d2
Worse is 11.\text{g}g5 since after 11...d5 12.cxd5 cxd5 13.\text{b}b3 \text{h}h8 14.\text{e}e3 \text{c}c7 15.f3 \text{h}6 16.\text{h}h3 \text{exf}3 17.\text{exf}3 g5 18.\text{b}bc1 \text{b}b5 19.\text{cd}1 \text{b}6\pm in the game C. Hansen – Vasiukov, Graested 1990 Black succeeded to obtain the counterplay connected with the pressure on the pawn d4.

11...d5
After 11...\text{xd}4 12.\text{xe}4 \text{g}7 13.b5\pm White retains the pressure in centre and at the queenside.

12.b5 \text{c}7 13.e3 \text{d}d7
Black supports the pawn c6 to prevent his centre from the possible demolition. With the unstable centre the attempt of the attack at the kingside with 13...\text{e}e6?! 14.bxc6 bxc6 15.\text{a}a4 \text{g}5 16.\text{xc}c6 \text{h}3+ 17.\text{h}h1 \text{g}4 (also bad is 17...\text{xf}2+ in view of 18.\text{xf}2 \text{xf}2 19.\text{xa}a8\pm) 18.f4 e6 (in case 18...\text{exf}3 19.\text{xf}3 \text{xf}3 20.\text{xf}3 \text{f}2+ 21.\text{g}2 \text{d}3 22.\text{xf}8 \text{xf}8 23.\text{a}3\pm – Black would also lose) 19.\text{b}7 \text{f}7 20.\text{xf}7 \text{xf}7 21.cxd5 \text{c}8 22.dxe6+ \text{xe}6 23.\text{a}4 in the game M. Roeder – Beim, Vienna 1996 failed and led to the immediate resignation. After 13...\text{f}5?! 14.bxc6 bxc6 15.\text{a}a3 \text{f}7 16.\text{a}4 e5 (16...\text{d}7 17.\text{b}7 c5 18.\text{a}5\pm) 17.dxe5 \text{xe}5 18.\text{xc}6 \text{c}8 (if 18...\text{d}7, then 19.\text{b}7\pm) 19.\text{a}4\pm in the game Beliavsky – P. Nikolic, Polanica Zdroj 1996 Black did not get the sufficient compensation for the missed pawn either.

In case 13...e5 14.\text{a}a3 \text{e}8 (14...\text{f}7?! would lead to the material loss for Black in view of 15.bxc6 bxc6 16.dxe5 \text{xe}5 17.\text{xe}4! \text{f}5 18.cxd5 cxd5 19.f4 \text{g}7 20.\text{d}6 \text{xb}1 21.\text{a}d5 \text{d}5 22.\text{xd}5\pm) 15.bxc6 bxc6 16.dxe5 \text{xe}5 17.\text{a}4 \text{d}7 18.\text{fd}1\pm White retains the pressure upon Black’s central pawns.

14.bxc6 bxc6 15.\text{a}a3 \text{f}7

This position was seen in the game Gelfand – P. Nikolic, Monte Carlo (active) 1999. White could have caused the swap of the dark-coloured bishops here with 16.\text{c}2?! (in case 16.\text{b}7 e5 17.\text{d}6 Black would escape with 17...\text{g}4\pm) 16...e5 17.dxe5 \text{xe}5 18.\text{b}2\pm that would provide him with the certain advantage.
Chapter 26

1.\( \text{\textit{f3}} \) \( \text{\textit{f5}} \) 2.\( \text{\textit{c4}} \) \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 3.\( \text{\textit{g3}} \) \( \text{\textit{g6}} \) 4.\( \text{\textit{g2}} \) \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 5.\( \text{\textit{c3}} \) 0-0 6.\( \text{\textit{d4}} \) \( \text{\textit{d6}} \) 7.0-0 \( \text{\textit{e8}} \)

\[ \text{Diagram} \]

8.\( \text{\textit{d5}} \)

As in variation a from Chapter 25 White at most decreases the effect of the advance e7-e5 since he is not able to prevent it.

As a rule, Black chooses one of the moves: a) 8...\( \text{\textit{e5}} \), b) 8...\( \text{\textit{a6}} \) and c) 8...\( \text{\textit{a5}} \). The move 8...\( \text{\textit{c6}} \) has no individual significance and after 9.\( \text{\textit{xb1}} \) \( \text{\textit{a6}} \) (the position after 9...\( \text{\textit{d7}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{b4}} \) \( \text{\textit{a6}} \) will also be considered in course of variation b) 10.\( \text{\textit{b4}} \) the game will transpose to variation b.

\ a) 8...\( \text{\textit{e5}} \)

Black intends immediately to improve his central pawn formation.

9.\( \text{\textit{dxe6}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe6}} \)

In case 9...\( \text{\textit{xe6}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{d4}} \) the non-protection of the pawn b7 would be sound. After 10...\( \text{\textit{c8}} \) (quite bad is 10...\( \text{\textit{c6??}} \) in view of 11.\( \text{\textit{xe6}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe6}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{d5+}} \), as was in the game Grabarczyk – Meier, Wiesbaden 1994; in case of 10...\( \text{\textit{xc4}} \) possible is 11.\( \text{\textit{xb7}} \) \( \text{\textit{bd7}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{cb5}} \) \( \text{\textit{b8}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{xc7}} \) \( \text{\textit{f7}} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{a6}} \) \( \text{\textit{xa6}} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{xa6}} \) \( \text{\textit{b6}} \) 16.\( \text{\textit{c7}} \) \( \text{\textit{c5}} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{cb5}} \) a6 18.\( \text{\textit{c3}} \) \( \text{\textit{fe4}} \) 19.\( \text{\textit{xe4}} \) \( \text{\textit{fxe4}} \) 20.\( \text{\textit{b3}} \) and in the game Truc – Jablecnik, Czech Republic 1988 Black got no compensation for the missed pawn while after 10...\( \text{\textit{c6}} \), as was in the game Kaiser – Heidrich, Germany 1993, White could have played 11.\( \text{\textit{cb5!}} \) \( \text{\textit{cxb5}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{xb7}} \) \( \text{\textit{bxc4}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{xa8}} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{d5!}} \) \( \text{\textit{a6}} \) (in case 11...\( \text{\textit{xd5}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{xd5}} \) \( \text{\textit{h8}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{e3}} \) \( \text{\textit{c6}} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{d2}} \) the central position of White’s pieces would bring him a certain advantage) 12.\( \text{\textit{xf6}} \) \( \text{\textit{xf6}} \) (after 12...\( \text{\textit{xf6}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{h6}} \) \( \text{\textit{g7}} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{d2}} \) White would swap the dark-coloured bishops and retained the advantage) 13.\( \text{\textit{g5}} \) \( \text{\textit{f8}} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{d2}} \) \( \text{\textit{c5}} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{h6}} \) \( \text{\textit{e4}} \) 16.\( \text{\textit{e3}} \) Black would be deprived of any active counter play in view of the eventual swap of the dark-coloured
bishops.

10.\(\text{\textg}5!\)!

After 10.\(\text{\textd}5\) \(\text{\textd}7?\) 11.\(\text{\textxf}6+\) \(\text{\textxf}6\) (also possible is 11...\(\text{\textxf}6\) 12.\(\text{\textd}4\) \(\text{\textc}6\) 13.\(\text{\textxc}6\) \(\text{\textbxc}6\) 14.\(\text{\texta}4\) \(\text{\textb}7\) 15.\(\text{\textd}1\) \(\text{\texte}8\) 16.\(\text{\texte}3\) \(\text{\textf}8\) 17.\(\text{\textd}2\) \(\text{\textb}8\) 18.\(\text{\textxa}7\) \(\text{\textc}8\) 19.\(\text{\texta}4\) \(\text{\textc}5\) 20.\(\text{\textxb}7\) \(\text{\textxb}7\) 21.\(\text{\textc}3\) \(\text{\textxc}3\) 22.\(\text{\textbxc}3\) \(\text{\texte}4=\), as was in the game Lingnau – Horstmann, Lippstadt 2000) 12.\(\text{\texth}6\) \(\text{\texte}8\) 13.\(\text{\textb}1\) \(\text{\textc}6\) 14.\(\text{\textb}3\) \(\text{\texte}7\) 15.\(\text{\textd}2\) \(\text{\texte}5\) 16.\(\text{\textxe}5\) \(\text{\textdxe}5\) 17.\(\text{\texte}4\) \(\text{\textc}6\) 18.\(\text{\textbd}1\) \(\text{\texte}6=\) in the game Hlinka – Nicolini, Slovakia 1997 Black obtained the equal play.

10...\(\text{\textd}7\)

The capture of the pawn \(\text{\textc}4\) is harmful for Black. After 10...
\(\text{\textxc}4\) 11.\(\text{\textd}5\) \(\text{\texte}4\) (in case 11...\(\text{\texte}6??\) 12.\(\text{\textxf}6+\) \(\text{\textxf}6\) 13.\(\text{\textd}5\)+–
Black would lose his queen while after 11...\(\text{\textwh}8?\) 12.\(\text{\textb}3\) \(\text{\textc}5\) 13.\(\text{\texte}3\) \(\text{\texta}5\) 14.\(\text{\textb}4\)+– he would lose his rook) 12.\(\text{\textb}3\) 12...\(\text{\texta}6\) (12...\(\text{\textc}5\) would be decisively met with 13.\(\text{\texte}3\) \(\text{\texta}5\) 14.\(\text{\textb}4\) \(\text{\texta}3\) 15.\(\text{\textxc}7=\)–) 13.\(\text{\textxc}7\) \(\text{\textc}6\) 14.\(\text{\textxa}8\) \(\text{\textxa}1\) 15.\(\text{\textxe}4\) \(\text{\textxe}4\) 16.\(\text{\texth}6\) \(\text{\textg}7\) 17.\(\text{\textxg}7\) \(\text{\textxg}7\) 18.\(\text{\textd}4+\) \(\text{\textf}6\) 19.\(\text{\textxa}7=\) White’s extra pawn would be sufficient for the win.

In case of 10...\(\text{\texte}7\) the reply
11.\(\text{\textc}5?!\) would deserve attention (after 11.\(\text{\textd}5\) \(\text{\textxd}5\) 12.\(\text{\textc}xd5\) \(\text{\texth}6\) 13.\(\text{\textd}3\) \(\text{\textd}7\) 14.\(\text{\textd}2\) \(\text{\texth}7\) 15.\(\text{\textc}1\) \(\text{\textc}5\) 16.\(\text{\textc}2\) \(\text{\textd}7\) 17.\(\text{\textb}4\)+ in the game Mamediarov – Aliev, Baku 2001 White succeeded to obtain the play at the queenside thanks to Black’s retarded pawn \(\text{\textc}7\) that would lead to the position where Black doesn’t have the complete compensation for the missed pawn after 11...\(\text{\textd}xc5\) 12.\(\text{\textxb}7\) \(\text{\textxb}7\) 13.\(\text{\textb}3+\) \(\text{\textwh}8\) 14.\(\text{\textxb}7\) \(\text{\textbd}7\) 15.\(\text{\textxc}7\) \(\text{\texth}6\) 16.\(\text{\textf}3\) \(\text{\textfc}8\) 17.\(\text{\textf}4\)±.

11.\(\text{\textc}5!\)

This typical blow frequently appears the real remedy in the struggle for the advantage because Black has weakened his control upon the diagonal a2–g8. After 11.\(\text{\textb}1\) \(\text{\texth}6\) 12.\(\text{\texth}3\) \(\text{\textg}5\) 13.\(\text{\textf}4\) \(\text{\textg}4\) 14.\(\text{\textf}2\) \(\text{\textf}7\) 15.\(\text{\textb}3\) \(\text{\textc}6\) 16.\(\text{\textb}2\) \(\text{\texte}6\)∞ the play became more complicated in the game Ruban – Beshukov, Smolensk 1991.

11...\(\text{\texta}6\)

In case 11...\(\text{\textd}xc5\) 12.\(\text{\textxd}7\) \(\text{\textxd}7\) 13.\(\text{\texte}6\) \(\text{\textf}7\) 14.\(\text{\textxc}7\) \(\text{\textb}8\) 15.\(\text{\textf}4\)± Black could not avoid the material loss.

12.\(\text{\textc}xd6\)

In case 12...\(\text{\textxd}6\) 13.\(\text{\textxd}6\) (White need not try the ending with the non-standard material balance after 13.\(\text{\textb}3+\) \(\text{\textwh}8\) 14.\(\text{\textf}7+\) \(\text{\textxf}7\) 15.\(\text{\textxf}7\) \(\text{\texte}6\) 16.\(\text{\textf}4\) \(\text{\textxf}7\) 17.\(\text{\textxd}6\) \(\text{\textcxd}6\) 18.\(\text{\textxb}7\) \(\text{\textxc}7\) 19.\(\text{\textxa}8\) \(\text{\textxa}8\) 20.\(\text{\textb}5\) \(\text{\texte}4\) 21.\(\text{\textxa}7\) \(\text{\textb}6=\) 13...\(\text{\textcxd}6\) 14.\(\text{\textd}1\) \(\text{\textd}8\) 15.\(\text{\textd}5\)± White’s position
would look significantly more attractive since Black should have to defend his weaknesses while it would be difficult for him to complete the development of his queenside.

12...cxd6 13.f4±

White has the advantage thanks to Black’s isolated d-pawn.

b) 8...a6

Black developed in the similar way in variation b3 of Chapter 4 discussed above. In this position the development of the knight onto a6 is more reasonable. White has already determined the arrangement of his pawn structure and Black’s knight at the queenside is much less vulnerable with White’s b-pawn than in variation b of Chapter 25 since it has the reserved the square c5.

9.b1

This is the same prophylactic move as in variations a and b of Chapter 25. Here it is more reasonable since the diagonal a1-h8 for Black’s dark-coloured bishop has been significantly opened after the move d4-d5.

9...d7

If Black tries to improve his pawn structure with 9...e5, then after 10.dxe6 Qxe6 11.Qd4 Qc5 (11...c6?! would be strongly replied with 12.b4! Qxc4 13.b5 cxb5 14.Qdxb5 Qd8, as was in the game Salov – M. Gurevich, Reggio Emilia 1992; here White could have obtained the significant superiority with 15.Qxd6! Qxe6 16.Qa3 Qe4 17.Qcxe4 Qxe4 18.Qc2±) 12.Qxe6 Qxe6 13.Qd5± White could get the comfortable pieces’ play in centre thanks to the absence of Black’s light-coloured bishop.

In case 9...c5 10.dxc6 bxc6 11.b4 Qb8 (after 11...Qd7 the game transposes to the position considered below in the course of the main line; in case 11...c5 12.bxc5 Qxc5, as was in the game P. Nikolic – M. Gurevich, Moscow 1990, White could have played 13.Qd2! a6 14.Qxa8 Qxa8 15. Qa3± and Black would not have had the full compensation for the exchange; if 11...b7 12.Qd4 Qd7, as was in the game Browne – Yedidia, Reno 1994, then White could bind Black’s pieces to the defence of his queenside pawns with 13.Qa4!±) 12.b5 cxb5 (the same position would arise after 12...Qd5 13.Qd4 cxb5 14.cxb5) 13. cxb5 Qc5 14.Qd4 Qf7 (after 14...Qfe4 15.Qxe4 Qxe4 16.Qc6 Qb7 17.Qxc4! Qxe4 18.Qd5+ Qf7 19.Qxf7+ Qxf7 20.Qe3 a6 21.b6 Qd7 22.Qa5 Qbb8 23.Qf1± in
the game Van der Sterren – Van Mil, Netherlands 1992 Black was not essentially able to oppose anything to White’s passed b-pawn; after 14...a6 15.\textipa{c}c6 \textipa{a}b6 16.a4 axb5 17.axb5 \textipa{d}d7 18.\textipa{e}3 \textipa{xc}6 19.bxc6 \textipa{xc}6 20.\textipa{d}5 \textipa{xd}5 21.\textipa{xd}5+ \textipa{xd}5 22.\textipa{d}xe5\textipa{d}5± in the game Bany – Vasiukov, Athens 1989 it was only White who has the opportunity to play win) 15.\textipa{c}c6 \textipa{b}7 16.\textipa{e}3 \textipa{f}e4 17.\textipa{x}e4 \textipa{x}e4 18.\textipa{a}a7 \textipa{xa}2 (quite bad for Black is 18...\textipa{d}7? since after 19.a4 d5 20.a5 \textipa{c}3 21.\textipa{d}d2 \textipa{xb}1 22.\textipa{xb}1 e6 23.a6 \textipa{bb}8 24.b6+-, as was in the game Cvetkovic – Legky, Belgrade 1988, the united passed pawns reached the sixth rank bring the fast win to White) 19.\textipa{xc}8 \textipa{xc}8, as was in the game Farrell – Lund, Scotland 1995, White could have played, as pointed out by Sr. Cvetkovic, 20.\textipa{xe}4!? fx\textipa{e}4 21.\textipa{b}b4! \textipa{e}6 (21...d5? loses because of 22.\textipa{a}a4+-, while 21...\textipa{c}2 would be met with 22.b6 \textipa{h}8 23.\textipa{b}b1\textipa{d}5 24.\textipa{d}d1\textipa{d}5 and White retains the advantage thanks to the passed b-pawn.

The move 9...c6 should be mentioned as less accurate, since after 10.dxc6 White could both transpose to the variations considered above and additionally try 10.b4 cxd5 (after 10...\textipa{d}7 the position would arise that will be considered below in the course of the main line) 11.\textipa{xd}5 \textipa{xd}5 12.\textipa{d}xe5+ \textipa{h}8 13.\textipa{b}2\textipa{d}5 as was in the game B. Larsen – Korchnoi, Buenos Aires 1993.

If Black tries to transfer his knight into the centre with 9...\textipa{c}5, then White could play 10.\textipa{b}5!? (in case 10.b4 \textipa{c}e4≈ Black’s intention would be fully realized) 10...\textipa{d}8 11.\textipa{bd}4 a5 (after 11...\textipa{d}7 12.\textipa{g}5 \textipa{c}8 13.\textipa{h}3 c6 14.\textipa{f}4 e5 15.dxe6 \textipa{xe}6 16.\textipa{d}xe6 \textipa{xe}6 17.b3 \textipa{d}8 18.\textipa{b}2\textipa{d}5 in the game Portisch – Malaniuk, Moscow 1994 there were some problems left for Black to solve since the pawn d6 demands the protection) 12.\textipa{g}5 (the transfer of the knight to f4 seems to be the best way to struggle for the advantage since in case of other opportunities, for instance, after 12.b3 \textipa{d}7 13.\textipa{b}2 c6 14.\textipa{d}2 \textipa{e}8 15.\textipa{e}1 cxd5 16.cxd5 b5\textipa{c} as was in the game M. Becker – Smolka, Koerbecke 2000, Black would obtain the counter play) 12...\textipa{d}7 (after 12...\textipa{f}e4 13.\textipa{xe}4 \textipa{xe}4 14.\textipa{e}3 \textipa{e}8 15.\textipa{b}5 \textipa{d}7 16.\textipa{c}2 \textipa{c}5 17.\textipa{d}4\textipa{d}5 in the game Agdestein – Baekgaard, Kiel 2000, the swap of the dark-coloured bishops deprived Black of the opportunity to get a counter play) 13.\textipa{h}3 \textipa{e}8 14.\textipa{f}4 c6 15.b3\textipa{d}5 and in the game Malaniuk – Vasiukov, Moscow 1996 White’s control upon the square e6 provided him with a certain advantage.

10.b4

White seizes the space at the queenside.
10...c6

Black opposes to White’s plan. Otherwise White would intend, as a rule, to transfer the dark-coloured bishop to the square d4 to decrease at most Black’s active opportunities. For instance, after 10...h6 11.魁e3 g5 12.魁d4 Black’s attempt to get some air with 12...e5 13.dxe6 魂xe6, as was in the game Bjerke – Johannessen, Oslo 1992, could have been tactically refuted with 14.魁xg5! hxg5 15.魁xb7 魂xb4 16.魁xb4 c5 17.魁d5 cxb4 18.魁xf6+ 魂h8 19.魁d5! 魁e7 20.魁xd7 魂xd7 21.e4 g4 22.魁xa8 魁xa8 23.魁xg7+ 魁xg7 24.魁d4+ 魂h7 25.f3+–.

After 10...魁c8 11.魁e3 h6 (Black committed the material loss after both 11...魁g4 12.魁d4 魁e5 13.魁xe5 dxe5 14.魁xa7 b6 15.c5 bxc5 16.魁xc5 魁xc5 17.bxc5 e4 18.魁b3 魁b8 19.魁c4= in the game Haba – Zvara, Pardubice 1993, and 11...e5 12.dxe6 魁xe6 13.魁g5 魁xc4 14.魁xb7 魁b8 15.魁d4= in the game Sehrt – Buscher, Germany 1994) 12.c5 g5 13.魁b3= in the game Cifuentes Parada – Van Mil, Wijk aan Zee 1992 the prospects of Black’s knight a6 were reduced almost to nothing while White’s initiative at the queenside continued to develop.

The other rook’s move – 10...魂b8 – after 11.魁c3 c5 (bad for Black is 11...e5 12.dxe6 魁xe6, as was in the game Genova – Kalcheva, Sofia 1987, in view of 13.魁xa7 魁a8 14.魁d4 魁xc4 15.魁d2=, while in case 11...b6?! 12.魁b5 魁e4 13.魁d4 魁xd4 14.魁xd4 魁a8 15.魁d3 e5 16.dxe6 魁xe6 17.魁c3= in the game Pergel – Bonne, Geraardsbergen 1992 Black also suffered the material loss soon) 12.dxc6 bxc6 13.a3 魁c7 14.魁d2 (bad is 14.魁xa7?! 魁a8 15.魁b6 魁xa3 and 16.魁c1? does not work in view of 16...魁xc3!= Fattoumi – Guillon, Paris 1994) 14...a6 15.魁fd1= would also permit White to obtain the better play in the similar way to the variation considered below in the main line.

The attempt not to let White’s bishop onto e3 with 10...魁g4 can be replied with 11.魂b3 魂b8 (after 11...魂h8 12.魁b2 魂b8 13.魁b5 魁e5 14.魁xe5 dxe5 in the game Bonnmann – Abend, Germany 1995 White could have captured the pawn with impunity after 15.魁xa7!? 魂a8 16.魁e3=; 11...e5 is not too attractive for Black in view of 12.dxe6 魁xe6 13.魁g5 c6 14.魁b5?!↑ with the initiative, since 14...cxb5? does not work in view of 15.魁xe6 bc 16.魁xc4=) 12.c5 e5 (in case 12...dxc5 13.d6+ 魁f7 14.魁d5 e6 15.魁g5 魁e8 16.魁xc7↑ White would develop
the dangerous initiative) 13.h3 \(\text{a6} 14.\text{g5 h8} 15.\text{c4 e4} 16.c6\) bxc6 17.dxc6 \(\text{e8} 18.\text{e3} \pm\) and in the game Mikac – G. Gross, Bled 1995 White exerted the significant pressure upon Black’s queenside.

The move 10...c5 is less accurate than c7-c6 since it permits White both to transpose to the position discussed below in the main line with 11.dxc6!? and to perform the advance in centre exploiting the misplace of the knight a6 with 11.a3 h6 12.b3 b6 13.b2 g5 14.e3 \(\text{h5} 15.\text{b5 f7} 16.\text{f1} \text{g4} 17.\text{xg7 xg7} 18.\text{b2 e8} 19.\text{c3 g6} 20.e4\) as was in the game B. Alterman – Zhang Zhong, Beijing 1995.

11.dxc6

In case of the less resolute 11.b3 h8 12.a3 White should already take into consideration the advance 12...e5! 13.dxe6 \(\text{x6} 14.\text{d1 d8} 15.\text{d4 g8} 16.e3 \text{g4} 17.\text{a4 e5} 18.b2 f7=\) that gave Black the equal play in the game Peter – Galyas, Budapest 1995 thanks to his pressure upon the pawn c4.

Black would capture White’s pawn: with the piece – b1) 11...\(\text{x6} 12.\text{b3!}\)

This is the strongest move. The self-suggesting move 12.b5 was tried many times but in those cases Black managed to hold the approximate balance. For instance, after 12...\(\text{xf3} 13.\text{xf3} \) (in case 13.exf3 \(\text{c5} 14.\text{e1 f7} 15.\text{b2 f8} 16.\text{e2}\) in the game Anic – Prie, Hyeres 1992 Black should have put under control the square d5 with 16...e6=) 13...\(\text{c5} 14.\text{e3 c8} 15.\text{xc5} \) (after 15.\(\text{a4 c4}\) 16.\(\text{b3 f7} 17.b6 a6 18.\text{fc1 c6} 19.c5 d5\) in the game Hertneck – Lutz, Baden-Baden 1992 Black obtain even the better chances) 15...\(\text{xc5} 16.\text{xb7 xc4} 17.\text{b3}\) (17.\(\text{c6 f7} 18.\text{b3}\) did not work either in view of 18...d8\! 19.a4 d8! 20.a5 d5 21.a6 e6\) in the game Gelfand – M. Gurievich, Linares 1991) 17...\(\text{f7} 18.\text{d1}\) (after 18.\(\text{d5 c5}\) 19.\(\text{a1}\) 16.\(\text{xf6+}\) 20.\(\text{xf6}\) 21.\(\text{c6}\) d5 22.a4 f4 23.\(\text{d3 e5}\) 24.\(\text{f1}\) g5\) in the game Cvitan – Tabatadze, Budapest 1992 Black obtained the counter play at the kingside) 18...\(\text{c5} 19.\text{d5 d5}\) 20.\(\text{xd5}\) in the game Shipov – Kobalija, Yalta 1996 Black could have obtained the equality with 20...e6= to push White’s knight off d5.

After White has put his queen
in ambush onto b3 Black, as a rule, either uses the prophylactic move b1a) 12...h8 or tries to simplify the position with b1b) 12...e4.

The indifferent move 12...h6 after 13.c5+ h7 14.cxd6 exd6 15.b2 e7 16.e3 a8 17.fd1 fd8 18.dd4 xg2 19.xg2 c7 20.bc1 g4 21.h3 e5 22.dd5+ gave White the stable advantage thanks to Black's isolated d-pawn in the game Lukacs – Dao Thien Hai, Budapest 1994.

b1a) 12...h8

13.c5!?

White intends to disclose the play in centre exploiting the tactical peculiarities of the position connected with the not very good arrangement of Black's pieces at the queenside. In case White does not take this attempt but just continues developing his pieces, the play would gradually become equal as it was after 13.b2 e5 14.e3 d8 15.a4 b6 16.a3 a8 17.bd1 h6 18.b5 e4 19.fd4 e7= in the game Annakov – Reinderman, Buenos Aires 1992.

13...e4

Black would commit the big troubles after 13...dxc5? 14.b5 xf3 15.xf3 c7 (15...c4 16. a3 c7 17.xb7 d8 18.c5 e6 19.xc4=, as was in the game V. Lazarev – Pizzuto, Italy 1998, was not better) 16.xb7 b8 17.c6 f7 18.a3=.

14.b2 e5 15.cxd6 xd6

16.b5 c5 17.b4 xf3 18.xf3 c8 19.fd1

White succeeded to get almost by force the two bishops, and the further play of the both sides will be developed consequently as follows: either White would exploit the weakness of the light squares in Black's position or Black would block White's light-coloured bishop with e5-e4.

19.e6

In case of 19...f7 (with the idea of e5-e4) very strong is 20.d5!. After 20...g5 (here the move 20...e4 loses significantly in strength because White's light-coloured bishop has moved behind Black's pawn chain and after 21.a4! b6 22.c6= White would obtain the sound superiority) 21.a4! (in case 21...xa4 22.xa4=, as well as after 21...ge6 22.xc5 xc5 23.a5+ the pressure upon the pawns a7 and b7 would be very unpleasant for Black) 21...b6 22.xc5 (22.c6? is unsuccessful in view of 22...xc6! 23.bxc6 xc6 24.h4 ce4 25.c3 f6 26.h6 g7=) 22...xc5 (in case of 22...bxc5 possible
is 23.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)c4 f4 24.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)g2 f3 25.exf3 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xf3+ 26.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xf3 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xf3 27.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)d2\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\) (White is threatening both 24.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xg5 and 24.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)a3) 23...f4 (23...\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)h6 would not help Black in view of 24.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)g2 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)c7 25.h4 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)f7 26.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xf7+-) 24.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)a3\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\) in the games G. Kallai – Wall, Berlin 1996 and M. Gurevich – Wall, Gent 1997 White succeeded to refute Black’s threats at the kingside keeping the material advantage.

If Black plays 19...\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)e7, then 20.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)bc1!! deserves attention (the attempt to deprive the knight c5 of its support with 20.b6? appears wrong in view of the sudden 20...a5! 21.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xa5 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)c4 22.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)b4 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xb2 23.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xb2 e4 24.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)g2 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)a4 25.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)d5 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xb2 26.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xe7 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xd1 27.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xc8 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)c3++ with the decisive material advantage for Black) 20...b6 (20...e4?! is strongly replied with 21.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)d5\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\) with the following 22.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)cd2.

20.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)d5

Black intended to intercept the long diagonal a8-h1 for the light-coloured bishop with e5-e4. White opposes this intention.

20...\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)e7 21.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)c6!

White leaves the square d5 for the knight exploiting the tactical peculiarities of the position.

21...b6

After 21...bxc6 22.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xc5 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)fd8 (22...\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)f6 23.bxc6\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)± 23.bxc6\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)± Black would miss the pawn.

22.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)d5 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)e6 23.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)h4 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)f7

This position was seen in the game Beliavsky – Wall, Berlin 1996. After 24.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)bc1!!?± White could retain the better position thanks to his two Bishops.

\[\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\text{b1b)} \]

12...\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)e4

13.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)b2

White is completing the developing of his queenside.

13...\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xc3

If Black declines from simplification and plays, for instance, 13...\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)c8, then 14.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)b5!? is possible (after 14.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xe4 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xe4 15.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xg7 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xg7 16.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)bc1 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)f6= in the game Lukacs – Beim, Budapest 1994 the approximately equal position arose while in case 14.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)bc1 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xc3 15.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xc3 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xc3 16.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)xc3 \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)a4 17.\(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\textsf{\text{}}}}}}\)b2 in the game Badea – Chernov, Brasov 1998 Black could have equalized with
17...\textit{c}c6=) 14...\textit{xb}2 15.\textit{xb}2 \textit{a}8 (Black must not play 15...
\textit{xb}5?? because after 16.\textit{xb}5+ he loses a piece) 16.\textit{fd}4\pm and
White retains the advantage thanks to centralized position of his pieces. The knight \textit{b}5 is espe-
cially unpleasant for Black since it fixes Black's rook to the pro-
tection of the pawn \textit{a}7 and pre-
vents Black's knight \textit{a}6 to enter the play.

It should be mentioned that the capture with the bishop is
believed to be the most accurate. After 13...\textit{xc}3 14.\textit{xc}3 \textit{xc}3 Black should have to take into con-
ideration both the most evi-
dent and – as it will be shown below – the strongest move
15.\textit{xc}3 and the sharp way
15.c5+ \textit{e}6 16.\textit{xc}3 dxc5 17.b5!
\textit{xb}5 18.\textit{e}5 \textit{b}8 19.\textit{fe}1!\pm
(with the idea of \textit{e}2-\textit{e}4) that led in the game Kramnik – Mal-
laniuk, Moscow 1994 to the great compli-
cations.

14.\textit{xc}3 \textit{xc}3 15.\textit{xc}3 \textit{c}8

16.\textit{d}4?!

This is the most promising way. White starts getting to the
pawn \textit{a}7 while he makes Black
constantly take into consider-
ation the advance \textit{b}4-\textit{b}5. After
16.\textit{bc}1 \textit{f}6 17.a3 (17.b5? does
not work in view of 17...\textit{xb}5=) 17...
\textit{g}7 18.\textit{fe}1 \textit{b}8 19.c5 \textit{e}4
20.\textit{e}3 dxc5 21.\textit{xc}5 \textit{xc}5 22.
\textit{xc}5 a6 23.\textit{e}5 \textit{g}2 24.\textit{g}2 \textit{d}7 25.\textit{xc}3 \textit{xe}5 26.\textit{xe}5 \textit{c}6+ 27.\textit{g}1 \textit{d}6= in the game Illes-
cas Cordoba – Topalov, Leon 1993 Black easily kept the balance
thanks to the significant simpli-
fications and the absence of real
weaknesses in his position. In
case of 16.\textit{fc}1 possible is 16...
\textit{c}7 (16...\textit{f}6!? also deserves at-
tention, since 17.b5 \textit{f}3 18.\textit{ax}a6
\textit{g}2 19.axb7 \textit{xb}7 20.\textit{xb}7 \textit{e}6
21.e3 \textit{a}6= would not be danger-
ous for Black) 17.c5 dxc5 18.\textit{xc}5
\textit{e}4 19.\textit{a}1 (19.\textit{g}5? \textit{xb}1 20.
\textit{xb}7 does not work in view of
20...\textit{e}6!! 21.\textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8 22.
\textit{xc}8 \textit{g}5 23.h4 \textit{f}7+ pointed by B. Alterman) 19...\textit{d}5 20.
\textit{xa}7 \textit{b}5!? (less accurate is
20...\textit{xb}4 in view of 21.\textit{b}6= as
was in the game B. Alterman –
Grivas, Karditsa 1996) 21.\textit{xc}8
(after 21.\textit{d}4 \textit{xe}2 22.\textit{e}5 \textit{xc}1
23.\textit{xc}1 \textit{xa}2 24.\textit{g}5 \textit{d}2= Black
would have the counter play sufficient to keep the bal-
ance) 21...\textit{xc}8 22.\textit{d}4 (after
22.a3 \textit{c}3= Black would have the
full compensation for the missed
pawn) 22...\textit{xb}4 23.\textit{xe}4 \textit{xe}4= with the equal position (analysis
by B. Alterman).

White can also attack Black's
pawn \textit{a}7 with 16.\textit{e}3. However
in that case after 16...\textit{e}4 (worse
is 16...b6 in view of 17.\textit{\(a\)3 \textit{\(b\)7 18.\textit{\(f\)d1\(x\)}} 17.\textit{\(g\)5 (17.\textit{\(d\)2 is not completely clear since after 17...\textit{\(x\)b1 18.\textit{\(x\)b7 \textit{\(c\)7 19.\textit{\(x\)a6 \textit{\(e\)4 20.\textit{\(x\)xe4 fxe4 21.\textit{\(b\)5 \textit{\(a\)8 22.c5 d5\(x\) White should have to struggle against the advance e7-e5) 17...\textit{\(x\)g2 (17...\textit{\(x\)b1? does not work since after 18.\textit{\(x\)b7 \textit{\(a\)2 19.\textit{\(a\)6 \textit{\(b\)8 20.\textit{\(a\)1\(x\) Black's bishop would appear in the trap) 18.\textit{\(x\)g2 (18.\textit{\(e\)6+ \textit{\(g\)7 19.\textit{\(x\)g2 would bring White nothing since Black pushes off White's active pieces with 19...\textit{\(h\)6 20.\textit{\(f\)3 \textit{\(f\)7\(x\)} 18...e5 19.\textit{\(a\)fc1 (after 19.\textit{\(c\)x7 \textit{\(c\)7 20.h4 \textit{\(x\)c4 the superiority transfers to Black) 19...b6 20.\textit{\(a\)3 \textit{\(c\)6+ 21.\textit{\(f\)3 \textit{\(b\)7= with the approximate equality. 16...\textit{\(e\)4 17.\textit{\(d\)2! The weakness of the light squares in Black's position is so much sound that White can venture to sacrifice the exchange. 17...\textit{\(x\)g2 If Black accepts the sacrifice with 17...\textit{\(x\)b1, then possible is 18.\textit{\(x\)b7! \textit{\(x\)a2 (Bad for Black is 18...\textit{\(c\)2 19.\textit{\(x\)a6 \textit{\(b\)8 in view of 20.c5\(x\) leaving the square c4 for White's queen while after 18... \textit{\(c\)7 19.\textit{\(x\)a6 \textit{\(e\)4 20.\textit{\(x\)xe4 fxe4 21.\textit{\(b\)5 \textit{\(a\)8 22.c5 d5 23.\textit{\(e\)5\(x\) it would become evident why on move 16 White had better attack Black's pawn a7 just from d4 not from e3) 19.\textit{\(x\)a6 \textit{\(b\)8 20.b5! (20.\textit{\(a\)1 is not so clear in view of 20...\textit{\(a\)4 21.\textit{\(b\)5 \textit{\(c\)2\(x\) 20...d5 (in case 20...\textit{\(d\)8 21.\textit{\(b\)2 \textit{\(a\)5, with the idea to win White's bishop a6 exploiting the pin along b-file, very strong is 22.\textit{\(c\)2\(x\) and Black appears to have no satisfactory defence from the move 23.\textit{\(a\)1) 21.\textit{\(x\)d5+ e6 22.\textit{\(c\)5\(x\). The bishop a2 has lost its way in White's camp on a2 and can get free only at the price of Black's other material concessions. 18.\textit{\(x\)g2 \textit{\(c\)6+ 19.\textit{\(g\)1 \textit{\(c\)7 20.\textit{\(a\)7 \textit{\(a\)8 21.\textit{\(e\)3 \textit{\(a\)2 22.\textit{\(d\)1 \textit{\(f\)8 In case of 22...e5 Black should take into consideration 23.c5\(x\), while after 22...b6 23.\textit{\(a\)1 \textit{\(x\)a1 24.\textit{\(x\)a1 he would have to give up the a-file. 23.c5\(x\) This break helps White to get some new squares in centre for his pieces. By the way, 23.\textit{\(x\)e7? was bad in view of 23...\textit{\(e\)8 24.\textit{\(f\)6 \textit{\(e\)2\(x\). 23...\textit{\(x\)c5 24.bxc5 \textit{\(d\)5 25.\textit{\(e\)5\(x\) This position was seen in the game M. Gurevich – Rebers, Netherlands 2000. Black can hardly profitably exploit the a-file while his kingside is the quite}
real target for White’s pieces.

**b2) 11...bxc6**

![Diagram](image)

12.a3!

This is a prophylactic move. White is going to develop his dark-coloured bishop onto the diagonal a1-h8 and he defends the pawn b4 to do it. The attempt of the immediate advance at the queenside with 12.b5 would not give him the advantage. After 12...cxb5 13.cxb5 c5 14.a4 (in case 14.d4 fxe4 15.c3 cxe4 16.b3+ d7 17.c3 c8 18.a4 e5 19.xf7+ xxf7 20.f3 h6=, as was in the game Podeneshko – Holmirzaev, Gurzuf 2000, Black’s chances are not worse either) 14...c8 15.d4 d4 16.cxe4 cxe4 17.b2 f7 18.e3 (the tactical complications after 18.d3 a2 19.cxe4 fxe4 20.xf7 21.f6 c6 cxc6 22.bxc6 f3 23.a1 xxb2 24.d5+ h8 25.a2 c3 26.xd6 c8 f in the game Kelly – Wall, England 2001 brought even the certain advantage to Black) the move 18...c2! brings the disharmony in the cooperation of White’s pieces. In the game Babula – Beim, Ger-

many 2000 there followed the simplifications 19.c6 x6 20.xg7 c3 21.xc3 xg2 22.xg2 xxc3 23.d4 c5 24.xf1 xc8 25.xc5 xc5= and neither opponent obtained the advantage. It should be mentioned that after 12.d4 Black can solve his problems with 12...xb4!, exploiting the vulnerability of the pawn b4. After 13.xb4 c5 14.b1 (14.d5? is bad in view of 14...cxb4 15.c7 c8 16.xa8, as was in the game Garza Marco – Salamero Pelay, Zaragoza 1996; here Black could have obtained the big advantage with 16...d4! 17.xe4 fxe4 18.g5 f7 19.c2 xxa8 20.xb4 h3 21.xe1 c3 22.d5 d7, while after 14.xa8 cxb4 15.d5+ e6 16.xe6+ xxe6 17.cb5 bd7 18.b3 in the game Shabtai – Tabatadze, Biel 1993 Black could have equalized with 18...a5! 19.xe6 xxe6 20.d3 d4=) 14...xd4 15.xa8 xc3 16.g2 e6 17.b3 c4 18.a3 xc4 19.xa7 b5± in the game Schwarz – Galdunts, Wiesbaden 1994 Black obtained the good compensation for the sacrificed exchange.

12...d7

After a2-a3 the prospects of Black’s knight on a6 would be minimized. For that reason it is going to the better position – the square e6 – to support f5-f4 from there. With the other Black’s moves it is easier for White, as a rule, to obtain the advantage. For
instance, 12...\textit{d}d8 is an evident mistake since after 13.\textit{a}a4! \textit{g}g4 in the game J. Johansson – Kivi- 
jarvi, Turku 1997 (13...\textit{c}c7 is not better for Black either in view of 14.\textit{g}xa7\textsubscript{±}, and White has simply won the pawn, as was in the game Kovacs – Petro, Hung-
ary 1995; in case 13...\textit{c}c8 White would also obtain the material advantage with 14.b5\textsubscript{±}) White could have won the pawn with 14.\textit{g}xa6 \textit{x}c3 15.h3 (the imme-
diate 15.\textit{g}xa7 does not work, since after 15...\textit{a}a8 16.\textit{b}b7 \textit{b}b8= White’s queen could not escape from the pursuit of Black’s rook) 15...\textit{b}e5 16.\textit{b}xe5 \textit{b}xe5 17.\textit{g}xa7 f4 18.gxf4 \textit{x}f4 19.\textit{a}xf4 \textit{e}xf4 20. 
\textit{b}bc1\textsubscript{±} without any real Black’s counter play.

If Black does not undertake any active actions, White can break Black’s solid central position with the prepared advance c4-c5. For example, after 12... 
\textit{h}h8 13.\textit{b}b2 \textit{f}f7 (in case 13...\textit{h}6 14.\textit{d}d3 c5 15.b5 \textit{c}c7 16.a4 g5 
17.\textit{b}bd1 \textit{h}h5 18.\textit{e}fe1 \textit{f}f7 in the game Lirindzakis – Moutousis, 
Greece 1994 the breakdown in centre appeared very ef-
effective: 19.e4! fxe4 20.\textit{x}xe4 \textit{x}e4 21.\textit{x}g7+ \textit{h}xg7 22.\textit{x}xe4 \textit{g}g4 
23.\textit{e}e5! \textit{x}d1 24.\textit{x}xf7 \textit{x}xf7 25.\textit{x}xd1\textsubscript{±} 14.\textit{d}d3 \textit{c}c7 White ob-
tained the big advantage with 15.c5! dxc5 16.\textit{e}e5 \textit{e}e8 17.bxc5 
\textit{d}d8 18.\textit{fd}1 \textit{fd}5 19.\textit{xd}5 \textit{cx}d5 
20.\textit{c}6 \textit{e}e6 21.\textit{d}d4\textsubscript{±} in the game Salov – Danailov, Oviedo 1993.

Sometimes White is ready to 
give up the pawn to perform the advance c4-c5 as it happened af-
eft 12...\textit{h}6 13.\textit{b}b2 g5 (in case of 13...\textit{f}f7 the standard breakout 
again would be strong: 14.c5! 
\textit{e}e8 15.\textit{xd}6 \textit{xd}6 16.\textit{a}a4 \textit{xb}2 17.\textit{xb}2 \textit{f}f6 18.\textit{c}c2\textsubscript{±}, as was in the game Seres – Hoang Thanh 
Trang, Budapest 1999) 14.\textit{c}c5? (after the slow 14.e3 \textit{c}c7 15. 
\textit{e}e2?! Black obtained the strong attack with 15...\textit{e}5! 16.\textit{fd}1 e4 
17.\textit{d}d4 \textit{d}8 18.b5 c5 19.\textit{b}b3 \textit{f}4! 20.\textit{ex}f4 \textit{g}g4 21.\textit{fx}3 \textit{ex}f3 22.\textit{xf}3 
\textit{h}h5 23.\textit{d}d2 \textit{e}d8 24.\textit{g}g2 \textit{xf}3 
25.\textit{xf}3 \textit{g}4\textrightarrow in the game Hebe-
den – Firman, Lausanne 2000) 
14...\textit{d}xc5 15.\textit{e}e5 \textit{d}d8 16.\textit{xd}7 
\textit{xd}7 17.\textit{a}a4 \textit{xb}4 18.\textit{xa}6 \textit{bxc}3 
19.\textit{xc}3 \textit{e}e6 20.\textit{b}b7\textsubscript{±} in the game Cvitan – Borge, Manila 

Sometimes Black himself moves forward his c-pawn to 
keep the stable situation in cen-
tre. However in this case White’s 
position at the queenside is a bit 
 improved that can become sound 
in the following game. This mat-
ter would be especially signifi-
cant when the ending is coming 
where the part of White’s ad-
anced pawns at the queenside 
becomes more important. For in-
stance, after 12...c5 13.b5 \textit{c}c7 
14.a4 (the play in centre is pre-
mature: 14.e4?! \textit{xe}4 15.\textit{xe}4 
\textit{fx}e4 16.\textit{g}5 d5 17.\textit{xd}5 and here in 
the game Novkovic – Topalov, 
Dornbirn 1990 Black could have 
 obtained the evident advantage 
with 17...\textit{xb}5 18.\textit{e}1 \textit{d}3\textsubscript{±} 

262
14...h6 15.@d2 #b8 16.#b3 g5 17.e3 #g4 18.#d5 #xd5 19.\#xd5+ \#h8 20.\#b2 \#xb2 21.\#xb2 \#h5 22.h3 #f6 23.#d1 #g6 24.#a5 f4 25.exf4 gxf4 26.#b3± in the game Andriyanov – Beliavsky, Las Vegas 2000 the weakness of Black’s queenside became obvious after the simplifications.

The similar situation would have also occurred after 12...#b8 13.#b2 (in case 13...c7 14.#a1 – see 12...c7 – the position would arise that is discussed below in the course of the main line) 13...c5 14.#d5 \#xd5 15.\#xd5+ \#h8 16.#xg7+ #xg7 17.#d2 #f6 18.e3 #e6 19.b5 #c7 20.#fc1 #a8 in the game Shipov – Geisler, Passau 1994, if White had played 21.a4 #b6 22.#e2±.

Thanks to the centralized position of his pieces White easily refuted Black’s sharp attack of the kingside – 12...#g4 13.#b2 f4 – after 14.#e4 #xb2 15.#xb2 fxg3 16.hxg3 #f7 17.b5 #c7 18.c5 d5 (in case 18...cxb5 19.cxd6 exd6 20.#xd6 #f6 21.#c2± White’s chances would be also superior) 19.bxc6 #xc6 20.#eg5 #f5 21.#h3 h5 22.#b1± in the game I. Novikov – Dzhumaev, Korinthos 2000.

13.#b2 #b8

Black should constantly take into consideration the break c4-c5, and this rook’s move seems to be the best way to decrease the strength of this White’s advance. Sometimes Black used the move 13...a5 to secure himself from that break. However after 14.b5! cxb5 (in case 14...#e6 15.a4 #c8 16.#d2 #g4 17.h3 #f6 18.#b3 \#d8 19.#d2± in the game Przewoznik – Petelin, Miedzybrodzie 1991 the weakness of the pawn a5 makes White’s position clearly more preferable while after 14...#b8 15.a4 #e6 16.#d2 #c5 17.#a3 #g4 in the game Stohl – Schroll, Austria 1992 18.#xc5!? dxc5 19.#c5± deserved attention with the better pawn structure for White) 14...cxb5 15.cxb5 #b8 (in case 15...#xb5 16.#xb5 #xb5 the intermediate move 17.#b3± would be very strong to lead after 17...e6 18.#xf6 #a4 19.#xg7 #xb3 20.#xf8 #a2 21.#b2– to White’s decisive advantage) 16.a4± White would obtain the advantage thanks to the supported passed pawn at the queenside since any simplifications would be virtually in his favour.

In case Black does not undertake any try to secure himself from the advance c4-c5 but uses some indifferent move as 13...#h8 (with the idea to improve the effect of the move a7-a5 considered above), then White could soon become the master of the situation. With 14.c5! dxc5 (perhaps, Black should have had to agree to the position after 14...d5 15.#e5±) 15.bxc5 #d4 (Black is going to perform e7-e5, but the he refuses the immediate 15...e5 in view of 16.#d6±, while 15...#fd5 does not suit Black either
in view of 16.\(a\)xd5 \(a\)xd5 17. 
\(a\)xg7+ \(a\)xg7 18.\(a\)e5±) 16.\(a\)a4! 
(White swaps the dark-coloured 
bishops to stress the weakness of 
the dark squares in Black's position) 
16...\(a\)xb2 (after 16...e5 17.h3 e4 18.\(a\)xg7+ \(a\)xg7 19.hxg4 
\(e\)xf3 20.\(e\)xf3+ White wins the 
pawn by force because Black's 
knights retreat onto h6 would be 
even worse) 17.\(a\)xb2 (White 
intends to transfer his knight along 
the route \(c\)c4-e5) 17...e5 18.h3 
(18.\(a\)c4 e4 19.\(g\)d4+ \(f\)f6 20. 
\(f\)fe5± would be not bad either) 
18...\(f\)f6 (if 18...e4, then White 
again will win the pawn with 
19.hxg4 \(e\)xf3 20.\(e\)xf3 \(x\)g4 21. 
\(g\)d4±) 19.\(g\)d6 \(b\)b5 20.\(x\)xe5 
\(x\)xa3 21.\(a\)a1± in the game P. 
Nikolic – M.Gurevich, Manila 
1990 White obtained the 
significant advantage.

The reply 13...\(d\)d8 is not a 
good protection against \(c\)-4-5 
either. After 14.c5!? \(d\)xc5 15.bxc5± 
White's position is a bit preferable. 
The similar situation arises also in case of 13...\(e\)e6 (with the 
idea not only to prevent \(c\)-4-5, 
but also to start the active 
actions with f5-f4). As it was 
mentioned above, White is ready even 
for the temporary pawn sacrifice. 
After 14.c5 \(d\)xc5 (in case 14...\(e\)e4 
15.\(b\)b3 d5 16.\(x\)xe4 \(x\)e4 17.\(e\)e5 
\(c\)8 18.f3! \(x\)f3 19. \(f\)f5 \(a\)5 20.\(f\)4 
\(x\)xb4 21.\(x\)xb4 in the game 
Antunes – Zhang Zhong, Macau 
1996 Black's position should be 
called difficult in view of the 
permanent weakness of the square 
e5) 15.\(e\)e5 \(d\)d8 16. \(b\)b3! (weaker 
is 16.bxc5 that led to the equality 
after 16...\(c\)xc5 17.\(d\)d4 \(e\)ce4 
18.\(x\)xe4 \(a\)e6 19. \(x\)xf6+ \(f\)x6 
20.\(c\)xc6 \(x\)xe5 21.\(c\)c5 \(c\)8 22.\(b\)c1 
\(x\)f7= in the game V.Lazarev – 
Malaniuk, Geneve 1997) 
16...\(h\)h8 (after 16...\(c\)xb4 17.\(x\)xb4 
\(h\)h8 18.\(b\)bd1 \(g\)5 19. \(x\)xd7 
\(d\)d7 20.\(c\)c6± White would win 
back the sacrificed pawn and get 
the evident advantage thanks to 
the pin of the knight d7) 17.bxc5 
\(c\)xc5 18.\(c\)c4 \(b\)b7 19.\(a\)a6 \(d\)d6 
20.\(x\)xa7 \(f\)f7 21.\(c\)xd7 \(d\)xd7 
22.\(c\)c5± in the game Van der 
Sterren – Onischuk, Germany 
2000 White obtained the advan-
tage thanks to his two bishops 
and the remote passed a-pawn.

14.\(a\)a1!? 

The usual 14.c5 in this situation 
is not so effective as in the 
note for White's move 13. After 
14...\(d\)xc5 (weaker is 14...\(d\)5 in 
view of 15.\(a\)a2± with the following 
\(c\)c1-d3 pointed by V. Malan-
iuk) 15.bxc5 \(g\)4!? (weaker is 
15...\(e\)e4 16.\(x\)xe4 \(x\)xb2 17.\(c\)eg5 
\(d\)d5 18.\(e\)e5! \(e\)6, as was in 
the game P. Schlosser – Malaniuk, 
Brno 1993; here White could
have obtained the advantage with 19.\textit{Qg3}! \textit{Qe7} 20.\textit{Qd3}! \textit{Qc8} 21.\textit{Qd4} \textit{Qe8} 22.\textit{Qc4= as pointed by V. Malaniuk) 16.\textit{La1} (after 16.\textit{Qd2} e5 17.\textit{Qfd1} e4\textit{Qf7= Black would obtain the counter play while} 16.h3 \textit{Qh6} 17.\textit{Qd2} \textit{Qf7=} Black’s knight from f7 covered the eventually weak squares in Black’s position to prepare the advance of Black’s e-pawn) 16...\textit{Qxb1} 17.\textit{Qxb1} e5 18.h3 in the game V. Akopian – Malaniuk, Groningen 1993 18...e4!? deserved attention and after 19.\textit{Qg5} (19.\textit{hxg4} \textit{exf3} 20.\textit{exf3} \textit{fxg4=} would also be suitable for Black) 19...\textit{Qe5} 20.\textit{Qb7} \textit{Qd8=} the chances of the opponents are reciprocal.

14...\textit{Qe6}

Black is going to perform the advance f5-f4. After 14...h6 White obtain the advantage with the two standard blows at Black’s central position: 15.c5! d5 (bad for \textit{Qlack is} 15...\textit{dxc5} 16.\textit{bxc5} \textit{Qxb1} 17.\textit{Qxb1} e5 in view 18.\textit{Qb7} \textit{Qfd5} 19.\textit{Qxd5} \textit{Qxd5} 20.\textit{Qxe5} \textit{Qxe5} 21.\textit{Qxe5} \textit{Qxe5} 22.\textit{Qxd7+}, as was in the game De Boer – Riemens, Enschede 1991) 16.\textit{Qe5} \textit{Qg4} 17.\textit{Qxd7} \textit{Qxd7} 18.e4!? e6 19.\textit{exd5} \textit{Qxd5} 20.\textit{Qe2} \textit{Qxa1} 21.\textit{Qxa1} \textit{Qe6} 22.\textit{Qd4=} in the game Arbakov – Caspers, Germany 1993.

Sometimes Black arranges his play at the kingside with the move 14...\textit{Qg4} to perform the advance f5-f4. In this case possible is 15.e3 \textit{Qh6} 16.\textit{Qg5} (after 16.\textit{Qa4} a6 17.\textit{Qfd1} \textit{Qf7} 18.c5 d5 White is not able to prevent the advance e7-e5) 16...\textit{Qf6} 17.\textit{Qf7} 18.\textit{Qxf7} \textit{Qxf7} 19.\textit{Qc1} (in case 19...\textit{c5} d5 20.\textit{Qxe4} \textit{Qxa1} 22.\textit{Qxa1} \textit{Qg7=} Black would perform e7-e5 after the retreat of White’s knight) 19...\textit{Qe6} 20.\textit{Qa4} \textit{Qxc4} 21.\textit{Qfe1} \textit{Qd5} (after 21...\textit{Qxc3} 22.\textit{Qxc3} \textit{Qd5} 23.\textit{Qxd5} \textit{Qxd5} 24.\textit{Qa1} a5 25.bxa5\textit{t} Black would be compelled to switch to defence because of the weakness of the dark squares around his king and White’s passed a-pawn) 22.\textit{Qxc6} \textit{Qxc3} 23.\textit{Qxc3} \textit{Qbc8} 24.\textit{Qb7} \textit{Qxc3} 25.\textit{Qxc3} \textit{Qa6} 26.\textit{Qxa6} \textit{Qxc3} 27.\textit{Qxa7=} and in the game Cvitan – Galdunts, Bad Woerishofen 1994 White couple of united passed pawns supported with the bishop would fully compensate for his small material loss.

15.\textit{Qc3}

It is necessary to prevent the move f5-f4.

15...\textit{Qa5}

The threat of the advance c4-c5 is constantly hold upon Black’s position. After 15...h6 16.\textit{Qd4} \textit{Qd8} 17.\textit{Qb3} a6 18.\textit{Qe2} e5 19.e4 f4 White obtained the obvious advantage with 20.c5! dxc5 21.\textit{Qxc5} \textit{Qe6} 22.\textit{Qa4} \textit{Qg5} 23.\textit{h4=} in the game Priehoda – Dao Thien, Hungary 1995. The move 15...\textit{Qd8} also permitted White to get the superiority with 16.c5! d5 17.\textit{Qe2} \textit{Qf7} 18.\textit{Qe5} \textit{Qg4} 19.\textit{Qxd7} \textit{Qxd7} 20.\textit{Qxg7} \textit{Qxg7} 21.b5 \textit{Qxb5} 22.\textit{Qxd5} \textit{Qxd5} 23.\textit{Qxd5} e5 24.
\(\text{Bfc1}\)± in the game Vakhidov – Dao Thien, Calcutta 2000.

16.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}a4}\) \(\text{axb4}\) 17.\(\text{axb4}\)±

This position was reached in the game Hellsten – Zhang Zhong, Erevan 1996. After 17... \(\text{Dc7}\) 18.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d2}\) e5 19.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}b3}\) \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}e7}\) 20. \(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}a5}\) e4 21.\(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}d2}\) \(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}fd8}\) 22.\(\text{f3}\) d5 23. \(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}c5}\)± White has the certain advantage thanks to the strong position of the majority of his pieces on the dark squares.

c) 8...\(\text{a5}\)

9.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}e3}\)

White completes the development of his pieces under the cover of his centre. Black has more chances to get an active play in case of the more passive move 9.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d2}\). After 10...e5 11. \(\text{dxe6}\) \(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xe6}\) 12.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}d4}\) c6± Black obtains the counter play. The attempt to exploit the square d4 for the knight after 9.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d4}\) \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}a6}\) 10.e4 \(\text{fxe4}\) 11.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xe4}\) \(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xe4}\) 12.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xe4}\) \(\text{h3}\) 13.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}e1}\) \(\text{c5}\) 14.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}h1}\) \(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}f7}\) 15.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}e3}\) \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}ae8}\) 16.\(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}d2}\) b6 17.\(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}b3}\) \(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{Q}}h8}\) 18.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}ac1}\) \(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d7}\) 19.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}h4}\) \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}f6}\) 20.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}e2}\) e6 21.dxe6 \(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xe6}\)± led to the equalization in the game V. Akopian – Vyzmanavin, Novosibirsk 1993.

9...\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}a6}\)

Black’s try to arrange the play similar to the variation b of Chapter 24 after 9...\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}g4}\) 10.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}d4}\) \(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}e5}\) 11.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xe5}\) dxe5 12.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}c5}\) \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}d7}\) 13.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}a3}\) \(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}b6}\) 14.\(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}b3}\) e4 15.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}ad1}\) \(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{Q}}f7}\) 16.f3± led Black to the big troubles in the game Frendzas – Malakoudis, Aegina 1996. No better for Black is another trying of the same idea – 9...c6 10.\(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}d2}\) \(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}g4}\) 11.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}f4}\) \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}d7}\) 12.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}ac1}\) \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}c5}\) 13.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}h3}\) \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}e5}\) 14.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xe5}\) dxe5 15.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}e3}\) \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}a6}\) 16.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}h6}\) \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xh6}\) 17. \(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}xh6}\) \(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}d7}\) 18.\(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}fd1}\) c5 19.d6 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}b8}\) 20.dxe7 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xe7}\) 21.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}d5}\)± that was in the game Cvitan – Bircher, Bad Ragaz 1995.

If Black tries to start his play at the kingside with 9...h6, then possible is 10.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}b5}\)! ? \(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}a6}\) (after 10...\(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}d8}\) 11.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}fd4}\) \(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}h7}\) 12.c5! \(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}dxc5}\) 13.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}e6}\) \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xe6}\) 14.dxe6 \(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}c6}\) 15.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xc5}\)± in the game Pisulinski – Rublevsky, Russia 1992 Black’s pieces were evidently short of space) 11.\(\text{\textcolor{green}{\text{P}}d2}\) c6 (11...\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}e4}\) does not work in view of 12.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xa5}\) \(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}xb2}\) 13.\(\text{\textcolor{blue}{\text{Q}}xh6}\)±) 12.\(\text{\textcolor{red}{\text{Q}}c3}\) g5, as was in the game Lin Weigu – Zhu Chunhui, Beijing 1995; here
3.g3 g6 4.hg2 hg7 5.xc3 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.0-0 xe8 8.d5

White should have played 13. xd4!? e5 14.dxe6 xe6 15.ad1± to retain the better play since Black's pawns d6 and f5 needs the constant protection.

The move 9...c5 made in the game Meduna – A. Potapov, Katowice 1993 seems to be rather passive since Black essentially deprives himself of the play at the queenside. White could have obtained the play in centre with 10.d2 a6 11.cf4 xc7 12.a4± followed by Ra1 and e2-e4, with no counter play for the opponent.

In case of 9...d7 possible is 10.d2 a6 11.cf1 (the swap of the dark-coloured bishops after 11.h6 c5 12.xg7 xg7 13. d4 e5 14.dxe6 xe6 15.cf5 cf7 16.ac1 c8 17.c3 fe4 18. e2 b6 19.xd1 xh7= White nothing special in the game Donnelly – Anderton, corr. 1993) 11...b8 (in case of the attempt to get free in centre with 11...e5 12.dxe6 xe6 Black should take into consideration the variation 13.g5!? c6 14.cf4 d8 and the file opposition of White's rook and Black's queen improves the effect of the advance 15.e4±) 11...b8 12.a7 d8 13.d4 e5 14.dxe6 xe6 15.b3 c5 16.b5 ce4 17. xg5? (in case 17.xc2 xe7= the position is left approximately equal) 17...c5 18.xf6 xf6 as was in the game Anastasi – Hoang Thanh Trang, Budapest 1999; here White should have played 19.xc7!? xe7 20.ac1 xc6 21.xc3 b6 22.xb6 xc3 23.d2= to get the two pawns for the exchange.

10.d2

After 10.c1 g4 (10...e5!? 11.dxe6 xe6 12.d4 c6 13.b3 g4 14.dxe6 xe6= as was in the game Yakovich – Lastin, Elista 1997, also deserves attention) 11.cf4 (after 11.d4 h6 12.d1 c5 13.dxc6 bxc6 14.h3 f6 15.a4 e4 16.b6 b8 17.xc8 xc8 18.b3 a4= in the game Kramnik – Vyzmanavin, Moscow (active) 1994 approximately equal position arose) 11...d7 12.d1 c5 13.h3 f6 14.h6 c6 15.d4 c8 16.dxc6 xc6 17.xg7 xg7 18.xc6 bxc6 19.b3 d7 20.e3 b8= the balance was not broken in the game Kramnik – Bareev, Novgorod 1997.

10...g4

After 10...c5 11.xc5 dxc5 in the game Komljenovic – Saldana, Zaragoza 1997 White should have played 12.e4!? dxe4 13. xe4 fe 14.g5 h6 (after 14... a4 15.e2 b4 16.ab1 b6 17.xe4 d4 18.g2± Black
could not create any real threats) 15.\(\text{Aae}1\) e5 16.\(\text{Axe}4\) to obtain the advantage thanks to the better pawn structure.

11.\(\text{Af}4\)

White certainly should not permit the swap of his bishop for Black's knight without any necessity.

11...\(\text{Cc}5\)

After 11...e5 12.dxe6 \(\text{Cc}5\) 13.\(\text{Cg}5\) h6 14.\(\text{Cd}5\) hxg5 15.\(\text{Cxc}7\) gxf4 16.\(\text{Cxe}8\) \(\text{Axe}8\) 17.\(\text{Wxd}6\) \(\text{Cxe}6\) in the game Z. Gyimesi – Jakubiec, Kecskemet 1997 the non-standard balance of material arose. Still, after 18.\(\text{Wd}2\) White, with the queen and the two pawns for Black's three pieces, deserves some preference.

12.\(\text{Cb}5\)!

White is going to set such an arrangement that he could collect the most number of pieces to control the squares e6 and c6. With such a way he is trying to hinder Black's release from a bit constrained position. Otherwise the play could be equalized as it happened after 12.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{Cf}6\) 13.\(\text{Ah}6\) e5 14.dxe6 \(\text{Cfe}4\) 15.\(\text{Cxe}4\) \(\text{Ce}4\) 16.\(\text{Wc}3\) \(\text{Axe}6\) 17.\(\text{Wxh}6\) \(\text{Axe}6\) 18.\(\text{Cc}1\) \(\text{Wf}7\) 19.\(\text{Wd}2\) \(\text{Cxd}2\) 20.\(\text{Wxd}2\) c6 21.b3 \(\text{Wfd}8=\) in the game Fominyh – Szabolcsi, Budapest 1992.

Additionally to the move in the main line also possible is 12.\(\text{Wd}4\) e5 (after 12...\(\text{h}6\) 13.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{Ce}5\) 14.\(\text{Cb}5!\) \(\text{Wd}8\) 15.\(\text{Wxh}6\) \(\text{Cxc}4\) 16.\(\text{Cc}1\) \(\text{Ce}5\) 17.\(\text{Wxg}7\) \(\text{Wxg}7\) 18.\(\text{Cc}3\) in the game Kelly – Santo Roman, Linares 1995 Black ran into the great troubles) 13.dxe6 \(\text{Cxd}4\) (in case 13...\(\text{Cxe}6\) 14.\(\text{Cxe}6\) \(\text{Axe}6\) 15.\(\text{Wxb}7\) \(\text{Ab}8\) 16.\(\text{Ad}5\) Black would be just a pawn down) 14.\(\text{Wxd}4\) \(\text{Axe}6\) 15.\(\text{Wd}2\) \(\text{Cxf}4\) 16.\(\text{Wxf}4\) with a little advantage for White since Black is back in development.

12...\(\text{Wd}8\)

If 12...\(\text{Cf}4\), then 13.\(\text{Wc}2\) \(\text{Wd}8\) 14.\(\text{Wfd}4\) is possible.

13.\(\text{Wfd}4\) \(\text{Bc}8\) 14.\(\text{Cc}1\) White's spatial advantage promises him the better play.
Part 5. Rare Lines

In this part the relatively rare Black's replies after 1.Qg1-f3 will be considered.

It is easy to see that in Books I-III much attention has been paid to such Black's opportunities as 1...Qf6, 1...c5, 1...d6, 1...g6 and 1...f5. In Book IV White's ways will be shown to struggle for the advantage in case Black chooses 1...d5. It is easy to find Black's other possibilities – as many as fourteen – to complete the whole picture. But one need not fear about it. The great majority of them have quite a doubtful reputation. Kramnik could use them only in simultaneous displays. Still let us be consistent and point out of above mentioned "museum stuff" first of all: 1...b6 (Chapter 27) and 1...b5 (Chapter 28). Such moves as 1...a6, 1...h6, 1...h6, 1...f6, 1...a5 and 1...h5 can be neglected at all since they do not imply any sensible idea. After any of these Black's replies at 1.Qg1-f3 White can bravely push forward his any central pawn (2.e4 or 2.d4). Moreover, according to the Chess Base such move as 1...a5 and 1...h5 are still expecting their lovers. Black can break White's intention to push his central pawn on move 2 with such provoking moves as 1...g5 and 1...e5. Well, in that case White should go for the provocation and accept the proposed present (2.Qxg5 or 2.Qxe5). Few games seen these lines show it would be right.

Among the moves of a minor importance 1...a6, 1...c6 and 1...c6 deserve more serious attention. In case 1...a6 after 2.e4 b5 (otherwise, what would be the reason for 1...a7-a6?) 3.d4 a7-b7 5.d3 the game transposes to the variation a from Chapter 28. After 1...c6 (with the idea e7-e5) 2.d4 d5 (the position after 2...d6 3.d5 has already been considered in Chapter 15, p. 156) the initial position of Chigorin Defence arises that will be reviewed in Book IV. In case 1...c6 2.d4 (after 2.e4 d5 Black would get not the worst positions of Caro-Kann while 2.c4 could be met with the exotic 2...b5) 2...d5 (2...b5 3.e4 g6 4.Qd3 Qg7 5.0-0 Qf6 6.Qg5 0-0 7.Qe1 Qa6 8.c3± was seen in the game Jovanovic – E. Bilek,
Part 5

Split 1963, where Black principally ignored the struggle for center and doomed himself to troubles) 3.c4 the game transposes to Slav Defence that will have sufficient space in Book III.

1...e6 is the special move. It is enough popular to be considered as much as the other lines in the content of this book. However after this move, provided the further play is normal, the game would certainly transpose to one of the systems, which was considered in Book II Part 1-3 or to the variations that will be reviewed in the parts of Book IV devoted to the Queen Gambit. For instance: 1...e6 2.c4 b6 (in case 2...c6 3.c3 see Book II Part 1, and after 2...d5 3.d4 we would appear at the pages of Book IV) 3.g3 b7 4.g2 c5 (4...g5 5.h3 g7 6.d4 h6 7.c3 d6 8.e4 d7 9.0-0 e7 10.h4 g4 11.h2 h5 12.f3↑ in the game

Ianov – Igaz, Szeged 1998, the protruded Black’s pawn “g” just helped White to open the game. Normal way – 4...c6 5.0-0 e7 6.c3 – would transfer us to Book II Part 2, while after 4...f5 5.0-0 c6 6.d4 see Book III, Part 4, Chapter 17, variation b) 5.0-0 (or 5...c6 6.c3 – see Book II Part 3) 6.c3. Here, if Black plays too originally – 6...d7 (6...f6 7.e4 – see Book II Chapter 10), then after 7.d4 cxd4 8.exd4 a6 9.e4 c8 10.e4 c6 11.d6+ dxd6 12.exd6 he would commit firstly the problems with castling – 12...a5 13.b3 xg2 14.xg2 b7 15.a3 d6 16.c4 d7 (after 16...0-0 very strong would be 17.f5±) 17.e4 0-0 – and then he would have the problems with his king – 18.f5 e5 19.c5 c5 20.f4↑ as it happened in the game Hergott – Dougherty, Canada 1992.
Chapter 27  1.\(\text{d}f3\) \(b6\)

Black intends to put control upon the diagonal a8-h1 as soon as possible.

![Chess Diagram]

2.e4!

This move is the most consistent. White immediately cut off the long diagonal for Black's light-coloured bishop. In general, it is worth mentioning that the moves \(\text{d}g1-f3\) 8 e2-e4 in accordance with their essence are closely tied with each other. White's knight takes control upon the square e5 to prepare the future advance of White's e-pawn excluding the possible blocking with e7-e5. That makes of little effect the attacks of the pawn e4 with pieces that are typical for the open beginnings such as Petroff Defence and Ruy Lopez. Other White's opportunities in the diagram position also have evident drawbacks. For instance, after 2.d4 \(\text{d}b7\) 3.c4 \(\text{f}f6\) the game would transpose to the Queen Indian Defence that we tried to avoid with the move 1.\(\text{d}g1-f3\). In case 2.c4 \(\text{d}b7\) White is late with his bishop's fianchettto to transpose the game to the positions considered in Book II, p. 35 in view of 3.g3 \(\text{xf}3\)! 4.exf3 c5. Now, if White does not intend to give up the square d4 for good, he ought to play 5.d4 cxd4 6.\(\text{xf}d4\) \(\text{c}c6\) 7.\(\text{d}d1\) (after 7.\(\text{d}d2?!\) e6 8.\(\text{c}c3\) \(\text{c}c8\) 9.\(\text{b}b3\) \(\text{f}6\) 10.f4 d5 11.\(\text{b}b2\) d4 12.e4 \(\text{g}6\) 13.e2 \(\text{b}4\)+ 14.\(\text{d}d1\) \(\text{h}6\) 15.\(\text{f}3\) 0-0↑ in Titz – Kengis, Vienna 1990, Black even succeeded to deprive White's king of the castle and capture the initiative) 7...e6 8.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{c}8\) 9.0-0 (Bibli – Gutman, Germany 1987/88 saw here 9.\(\text{d}d2\) but after that move White's knight does not touch the center and Black could simply obtain the comfortable play with 9...\(\text{f}6\) 10.0-0 \(\text{c}7\) with the following 0-0 and d7-d5) 9...\(\text{f}6\) (after 9...\(\text{a}5\) White dared to play 10.b3, since 10...\(\text{f}6\) 11.\(\text{c}2\)
xa1 12. c3 could lead to trapping of Black’s queen) 10. c3 b4 11. d2 0-0 12. c1 e5 13. b3 d3 14. xc2 d5= and with some transposition of moves the game Piket – Karpov, Monte Carlo (active) 1998 has been arose that was mentioned in Book II, p. 35.

In case White plays 2.g3 b7 3. g2 to transfer to the position considered in Book II, Parts 2-3 Black could impede moving White’s c-pawn with 3...d5!? Here after 4. d4 f6 5.0-0 e6 6. c4 dxc4 7. a4+ bd7 8. g5 (in case 8. xc4 e7 9. c3 c5 10. d1 0-0 11. d5 xc5 12. g5 xc7 13. f4 xf4 xf4 14. xf4 fxd8= as happened with an insignificant transposition of moves in Miles – Beliavsky, Tilburg 1981, Black’s position is not worse at all) 8...a6! (less accurate is 8...c5?! since after 9. xf6! Black is compelled to play 9...gx6, and after 10. xc4 g7 11. c3 0-0 12. d1 cxd4 13. xd4 c6 14. e3 c8 15. d4 g2 16. xg2 a6 17. c1 f5 18. f3= in Andersson – Nogueiras, Reggio-Emilia 1986 he commits the problems) 9. xf6! (9. xc4 is not dangerous for Black in view of 9...c5 10. d1 c8 11. c3 b5 12. b3 e7 13. dxc5 wc7 14. f4 xc5 15. ac1 c6 16. e3 c5 17. xc5, Winants – Cifuentes Parada, Wijk aan Zee 1988 – and here the simplest way to the equality was 17...xc5 18. b4 0-0=) 9...xf6 10. xc4 (thanks to Black’s move 8 it is unfavourable for White to play 10...e5? because of 10...b5 11. xd7 xd7? 10...c5 11. c3 b5 12. d3 d8 13. a4 cxd4 14. e4 (after 14. xd4 xd4 15. xd4 xg2 16. xg2 b4 17. e4 c5 18. xc5 xc5 19. b3 d6= the equal ending would arise) 14... xe4 15. xe4 c5= in the game Sveshnikov – Psakhis, Frunze 1981 White had to be a bit careful not to appear in the worse position.

2...b7 3. c3

Here Black has the two main lines at his disposal: a) 3...c5 and b) 3...e6. Rarely 3...g6 is played. In this case 4.d4 is possible and after 4...g7 5. d3 (too lively advance of White’s pawns after 5. c4 e6 6.0-0 g7 7.e5 0-0 8.d5 h6 9.a4 a6= in the game B. Lalic – Kengis, Pula 1997 made White to break down the tension in center with the swap on e6 because of Black’s threat a6-b4 with increasing his pressure in center) 5...d6 6.0-0 d7 7. e3 e6 8. d2 g7 9. ad1 0-0 10. h6= White obtains a little advantage since Black is deprived of the active opportunities. Black’s attempt to create some counter play with 10...f5? led him to the very difficult position in the game Muechen – Paerr, Pang 1983 after 11. xg7 xg7 12. g5 f6 13. c4 g8 14. f1± with the threat of the advance e4-e5.

a) 3...c5

Black intends to prevent pos-
sible seizure of the center with White's pawns.

4.d4

White need not be afraid of the possible transfer to the positions alike Sicilian Defence with this move since the lines to be arisen will be far from the main systems and will not promise any equalization for Black.

4...cxd4

In case 4...e6 Black should take into consideration 5...g5!? to meet 5...e7 with the very strong reply 6.b5! and after 6...d5 (6...xg5 is not better either in view of 7.d6+ f8 8.xb7 c7 9.xc5, nor 6...d6 7.dxc5 bxc5 8.e5± 7.e5± White would have the evident superiority.

5.xd4 g6

Black has the problems with the K-side pieces development. For instance, in case 5...e6?! very strong is 6.db5! d6 7.f4 e5, and then after 8.d5 a6 (bad for Black is also 8...xf4 in view of 9.bc7+ d7 10.g4+ c6 11. b5+ c5 12.b4+- and White mates) 9.e3 e7 10.c4 f6 11.xf6+ gxf6 12.h5 0-0 13.c3 c5 14.h6 e6 15.0-0-0 c8 16.xe6 fxe6 17.d3+ in the game Hecht – Velimirovic, Budapest 1973 Black was to resign. In case 5...f6 unpleasant is 6.g5! and here after 6...c6 (it is forbidden to capture the pawn with 6...xe4? in view of 7.xe4 xxe4 8.e2 b7 9.b5 d5 10.f4++)

6...c6 7.f5 h6 8.xf6 gxf6 9.e2 a6 10.h5 e5 11.f4 e6 12.fxe5 exf5 13.0-0 c7 (after 13...c5+ 14.h1 fxe5 15.xf5 Black's position would also be demolished) 14.xf5 0-0-0 15.exf6 d6 16.h3+– Black appeared in the lost position in game Psakhis – Dizdarevic, Palma de Mallorca 1989.

5...c6 is strongly met usually with 6.f4!+. After 6...c8 (6...a6 7.xc6 xc6 8.d5 xd5 9.xd5 c8 10.b3 b5 11.a4 b4 12.d3 e6 13.a5 e7 14.d6 c6 15.xf8 xf8 16.0-0 f6 17.f4±) also brought big problems to Black in the game Howell – Alexandria, Spijkenisse 1989. It is no better for Black 6...f6 7.xc6 dxc6 as White can play 8.f3+! 6...c8 7.xc6 xc6 8.c3 d4 (after 8...f6 9.d1 d7 10.c4 e6 11.0-0± Black has also difficult position since he can hardly get free while White's bishop f4 doesn't let Black's queen onto c7) 9.xd1 c5 10.e5 d8 11.xd8+ xd8 12.e2 e8 13.0-0 f5 14.e6 f6 15.d1 d5 16.e5+– the play was over in the game Beliavsky – Quinteros, Vienna 1986.
In case of the possible 6...d6 6...g5! d7 7.d5!? (after 7.
6.d5 a6 8.g3 c8 9.d5 g6 10.
dxe7 xe7 11.g7 f8 12.e6
f6 13.g7 f3 14.e6 f8
5.g7 f8 16.e6+ in the game
Mikhailchishin – Psakhis, Vilnius
1978 White could not find any-
thing but the perpetual check)
7...g6 8.d5 xd5 (bad is 8...
xd5? in view of 9.xd6++ and
Black is compelled to give up his
queen) 9.exd5± White obtains
not only the advantage in space
but also the opportunity to play
on the light-coloured squares
that has been weakened with the
absence of Black's light-coloured
Bishop.

The move 5...a6 was seen in
practice more frequently. The
variations above show that such
prophylaxis is necessary for
Black, but it looks too slow. In
this case White can play 6.g5
(after 6.d3 g6 7.f4 g7 8.f3
d6 9.0-0 f6 10.e1 0-0 11.h4
bd7 12.f5 b5 13.h6 xh6
14.xh6 g4 15.h4 de5 16.
g5 h6 17.f3 e6– Black could
get the comfortable play in Gelf-
Fand – Topalov, Dos Hermanas
1999) 7.d5 (here the tough
move 7.d3 also permitted Black
to obtain the counter chances
after 7...g6 8.wd2 g7 9.de2
h6 10.f4 d6 11.0-0 f6 12.f3
b5 13.he1 bd7 in the game
Zuse – Alexandria, Biel 1994)
7...xd5 (after 7...e5 8.e3 e6
9.f3 xxe4 10.c7 e7 11.xa8
xa8 12.wd4 xd4 13.xd4± in
the game Groszpeter – Berezjuk,
Pardubice 2000 Black appeared
in the position where a pawn
is not any sufficient compensa-
tion for the given exchange) 8.ed
w5 9.e3 xd5 10.e2 e5 11.
f3 f6 12.0-0 e4 13.d2± (with
the threat 14.xe4!) to get the
fair compensation for a pawn as
the couple of bishops and the
advantage in development.

6.e3 g7 7.d2

White develops according the
pattern typical for the Dragon
Variation.

7.f6

With too much of prophylaxis
– 7...h5 - Black just aggravated
his problems after 8.0-0 w6
9.f3 c6 10.e2 c8 11.b1 e5
12.f4 c4 13.xc4 xc4 14.
d2 e8 15.e5 h7 16.he1
f8 17.d4 a6 18.g5 e6
19.xe6 dx6 b6 20.e3 in the
game Amos – Cappello, Skopje
1972.

8.f3 c6 9.c4 0-0 10.0-0-0
a5 11.b3 c8

After 11...xb3+ 12.xb3 d6
13.h6 c7 14.h4 ac8 15.h5→
in the game Ward – Inumerable,
Chicago 1997 White has devel-
oped the strong attack with the
typical for Dragon variation h-
pawn advance. The position of
the b7-bishop does not look proper-
ly for Dragon variations

12.h6

After the swap of the dark-
colour ed bishops Black's king
will become less defended while
Black’s counter opportunities at
the queenside will significantly decrease.

12...\(\text{\textit{d4}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{xe7}}\) \(\text{\textit{xe7}}\) 15.e5
In such a way White will push the opponent's pieces down to the last rank.

15...\(\text{\textit{e8}}\) 16.e6 \(\text{\textit{d6}}\)
Black must not play 16...fxe6?? or 16...dxe6?? in view of 17.\(\text{\textit{xe6}}\) and Black loses his queen.

17.exf7 \(\text{\textit{xf7}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{eb5}}\)\(±\)

The immediate 4...d5 is no better for Black either in view of 5.\(\text{\textit{xb5}}\)+!? (also possible 5.exd5 exd5 6.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\) \(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 7.0-0 that would lead to the position that is considered after 4...\(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 5...c6 6.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\) \(\text{\textit{f6}}\) (probably the best for Black would be to compromise in center with 6...dxe4 7.\(\text{\textit{xe4}}\)\(±\)) 7.e5 \(\text{\textit{fd7}}\) 8.\(\text{\textit{g5}}\) \(\text{\textit{e7}}\) (8...\(\text{\textit{h6}}\)? is forbidden in view of 9.\(\text{\textit{xe6}}\) fxe6 10.\(\text{\textit{h5}}\) \(\text{\textit{e7}}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{h4}}\)++) 9.\(\text{\textit{g4}}\) \(\text{\textit{f8}}\) (Black would be also bad after 9...\(\text{\textit{xe5}}\) 10.\(\text{\textit{xe5}}\) \(\text{\textit{c7}}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{h4}}\)\(±\)) 10.\(\text{\textit{xd7}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd7}}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{xd7}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd7}}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{xe7}}\) \(\text{\textit{e7}}\) 13.h4!\(±\) and Black appeared in the hard position in the game Alekhine – Rozanov, Moscow 1908.

Sometimes Black attacks White's center with the pawns included preliminary the moves 4...\(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 5.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\). However in this case after 5...c5 (here 4...d5 is more proper than on the previous move but in that case after 5.exd5 exd5 6.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\) \(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 7.0-0 \(\text{\textit{e7}}\) 8.\(\text{\textit{e1}}\) 0-0 9.\(\text{\textit{f4}}\) White obtained a better position in the game.
Chapter 27

Bobrowska – Radziewicz, Brzeg Dolny 1996 since it is difficult for Black to get any counter play. For instance, 9...c5 can be met with 10.Qb5 Qc6 11.Qf5 with the threat Qf4-c7, and if 11...Qe8, then 12.c4!±) 6.0-0 Black is not easy to find the comfortable plan for development of his pieces. For example, after 6...cxd4 (in case 6...Qe7 7.dxc5 bxc5 8.e5 Qd5 9. Qe4 f5 10.exf6 Qxf6 11.Qxf6 Qxf6 White in the game Zpevak – Nedela, Moravia 1997 crushed Black's position at the kingside with the typical blow 12.Qg5! g6 13.Qxh7 Qxh7 14.Qxg6+ Qf7 15. Qh5 Qe7 16.Qh7 Qc6 17.Qg8+ Qf8 18.Qxf7++ 7.Qxd4 Qc6 (after 8...Qc3 9.bc Qd5 10.Qg4 Qe7 11.Qb5 0-0 12.Qg5 h6 13.Qf6 g6 14.Qh4+ in the game Thorsteinsson – Danielsson, Reykjavik 1982 it appeared nothing left for Black but to resign.) 8. Qxc6 Qxc6 9.e5 Qd5 10.Qxd5 Qxd5 11.c4 Qb7 12.Qd2 Qc7 13. Qe1 d6 14.Qc3 Qd8 15. Qg4+ in the game Bo. Larsen – Pozzi, Lombardia 1990 White got a strong initiative thanks to the non-development of Black's kingside.

In case Black postpones his actions in center with 4...d6, possible is 5.Qd3 Qd7 (Black's risky play in the game Kuehn – Okan, Germany 1995 – 5...Qc6?! 6.d5 Qb4 7.Qb5+ c6 8.a4 Qd7 – could have met the proper counter action with 9.0-0 and if and 9...exd5, then 10.Qe1!±) 6.0-0 (more aggressive is 6.Qf4 Qgf6 7.Qe2+ leaving the opportunity of the long castle) 6...g6 (6...e5 is well replied with simple 7.d5± with White's not big but long positional advantage thanks to the weakness of the square c6) 7.Qg5 Qe7 8.Qd2 h6 9.Qe3 Qg7 10.Qfe1 Qf8 11.h3 (immediate 11.Qe2 could be met with 11...c5 12.c3 Qf6 13.Qg3 Qg4=) 11...Qg8 as was in the game Kovalevskaya – Gaprindashvili, Kishinev 1998, and here White could retain the special advantage and the flexible pawn structure with 12. Qe2!? Qh7 13.Qg3 c5 14.c3±

5.Qd3

5...Qf6

Black is continuing the attack upon the e4-pawn with his pieces. Let us once again pay attention at the move 5...c5. In that case after 6.0-0 (worse is 6.a3 Qxc3+ 7.bxc3 with the same purpose in view of 7...c4!? 8.Qxc4 Qxe4 9.Qd3 Qg6 10.0-0 Qe7 11.c4 Qc7 12.Qd2 Qbc6= and Black succeeded to obtain the satisfactory position in the game Marjanovic – Turchi, Caorle 1981) White's knight c3 appears already free from the pin. In case
Black does not want to consider its moves he should enter the line 6...\(\text{hx}c3+\) (in case 6...\(cxd4\) possible is 7.\(\text{d}b5!\) \(\text{e}7\) 8.\(\text{f}4\) d6 9.e5 d5 10.\(\text{b}xd4\) g5 11.\(\text{d}d2\) \(\text{d}d7\), and here in the game Adorjan – Csom, Hungary 1966 White did not want to be satisfied with some positional advantage but moved 12.\(\text{e}1!\)? That move demonstrated White was ready to enter the tactic complications based on the variation 12...g4?! 13.\(\text{d}xe6!\) fxe6 14.\(\text{d}d4\) and White would get the strong attack for his piece. In case 6...d5 Black should mind that White’s knight is not pinned more and after 7.\(\text{b}5+\) \(\text{c}6\) 8.exd5 exd5 as was in the game Tort – Sorensen, Mexico 1993 White could simply get the advantage with 9.\(\text{dxc5!}\) \(\text{xc}3\) 10.\(\text{cx}b6\) \(\text{xb}5\) 11.\(\text{b}7\) \(\text{d}7\) 12.\(\text{b}xa8\) \(\text{xa}8\) 13.\(\text{bxc3}\) \(\text{d}e7\) 8.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}7\) 9.e5 \(\text{d}5\) 10.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{c}6\) 11.a3 and White in the game Kytoniemi – Kalsi, Tampere 1994 obtained the strong pawn center with the attacking opportunities at the K-side. There followed further: 11...\(\text{ex}d4\) (11...0-0?! is very dangerous in view of 12.c4 \(\text{de}7\) 13.d5! exd5 14.cxd5 \(\text{xd}5\), and here White has the standard action 15.\(\text{h}xh7+!\) \(\text{h}xh7\) 16.\(\text{g}5+-\) that will evidently give him the decisive attack in all variations) 12.\(\text{cxd4\ a}5\) 13.c4 \(\text{e}7\) 14.\(\text{xa}5\) \(\text{bxa}5\) 15.\(\text{ab}1\pm\) with White’s obvious positional advantage. The same problem – what to do with the knight c3 – arises before Black also after 5...\(\text{d}7\) 0-0. The cardinal decision 6...\(\text{xc3}\) (after 6...\(\text{g}6\) 7.\(\text{e}2\) 0-0 8.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 9.c3 \(\text{e}7\) 10.\(\text{e}3\) a5 11.\(\text{e}1\)+ as was in Licina – Petek, Bled 1992 White retains the flexible pawn structure and the pawn center that will guarantee him not a big but a long-lasting advantage. It is worth to mention that 6...c5?! is dangerous for Black as before since after 7.\(\text{b}5!\)+ he would have to take some measures for rescuing the bishop b4 that in its turn would lead to the material losses.) 7.bxc3 d6 (7...d5 8.e5, is less proper, while the short castle 8...0-0?? could have led to the sudden disaster after the standard sacrifice: 9.\(\text{xh}7+!\) \(\text{xh}7\) 10.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{g}6\) 11.\(\text{g}4+-\) 8.a4 a5 9.\(\text{e}1\) (less proper is 9.\(\text{e}1\) 0-0 10.f4 since after 10...f5∞ it is difficult for White to use the strength of his dark-coloured bishop having no Black’s counterpart.) 9...\(\text{d}7\) (after 9...0-0 10.e5 Black should be vigilant about the sacrifice of White’s bishop on h7, while 10...h6 could be met with 11.c4\uparrow followed by c2-c3, and the cooperation of White’s queen + bishop on the diagonal b1-h7 would look very dangerous for Black) leads to the position from the game R. Sergejew – Psakhis, Internet 2001 (with the insignificant transposition of moves). Here, after 10.e5 Black did not want to give
up the initiative to White with 10...dxe5 11.\textit{\textcopyright}xe5 \textit{\textcopyright}xe5 12. \textit{\textcopyright}xe5\textup{\textcopyright} and mistakenly played for the attack of the e5-pawn: 12...
\textit{\textcopyright}xf3? After 11.\textit{\textcopyright}xf3 dxe5 12. dxe5 \textit{\textcopyright}g6 13.\textit{\textcopyright}a3 c5 (the immediate crush would follow in case 13...
\textit{\textcopyright}gxe5? 14.\textit{\textcopyright}xe5 \textit{\textcopyright}xe5 15. \textit{\textcopyright}b5+ \textit{\textcopyright}d7 16.\textit{\textcopyright}xd7+! 14.\textit{\textcopyright}ad1 \textit{\textcopyright}a7 15.\textit{\textcopyright}b5\textup{\textcopyright} Black's pieces appeared securely pinned.

It should be mentioned that the prophylaxis with 5...h6 could significantly spoil the security of Black's king in case it will appear at the kingside. After 6.0-0 \textit{\textcopyright}xc3 7.bxc3 \textit{\textcopyright}f6 8.\textit{\textcopyright}e1 0-0? 9.\textit{\textcopyright}e5! d6 10.\textit{\textcopyright}g4 \textit{\textcopyright}xg4 (Black would not live long in case 10...\textit{\textcopyright}bd7 11. \textit{\textcopyright}xh6 gxh6 12.\textit{\textcopyright}xh6\textup{\textcopyright}) 11.\textit{\textcopyright}xg4 \textit{\textcopyright}h7 12.e5+ \textit{\textcopyright}h8 13.\textit{\textcopyright}h5 f5 14. \textit{\textcopyright}xh6 gxh6 15.\textit{\textcopyright}xh6+ \textit{\textcopyright}g8 16. \textit{\textcopyright}g6+ in the game Schildheuer – Frank, Baunatal 1998 Black had to do nothing but resign.

6.\textit{\textcopyright}g5

6.\textit{\textcopyright}e2 could be the alternative opportunity, but V. Kramnik has not been noticed using it.

6...h6

The threat e4-e5 practically does not leave Black any choice.

7.\textit{\textcopyright}xf6 \textit{\textcopyright}xf6

In case of pretentious 7...gxf6 8.0-0 \textit{\textcopyright}c6 White should play the flexible 9.\textit{\textcopyright}e2\textup{\textcopyright}.

8.0-0 \textit{\textcopyright}xc3

Black changes his bishop hoping to get more flexible pawn structure to compensate for White's advantage in development and space. The plan with leaving the two bishops has not been spread in practice. The position is of closed type and besides Black is compelled to huddle on the two last ranks and all that does not helps Black to exploit his two-bishop advantage. The most significant argument against Black’s keeping two bishops is that the generally useful move 8...d6?! appears dubious without the swap on c3: after 9.\textit{\textcopyright}b5! \textit{\textcopyright}e7 10.c3 a6 11.cxh4 axb5 12.\textit{\textcopyright}xb5+ c6 13.\textit{\textcopyright}d3\textup{\textcopyright} in the game Turik - Faglic, Slovakia 2001 White gained the extra pawn, and it did not much matter it was doubled.

In the game Wells – Art. Minasian, Ljubljana 1995 the bishop returned home – 8...\textit{\textcopyright}f8?! – and after 9.\textit{\textcopyright}d2 \textit{\textcopyright}e7 10.\textit{\textcopyright}f1 d6 11.\textit{\textcopyright}b5+ \textit{\textcopyright}d7 12.\textit{\textcopyright}d5 \textit{\textcopyright}d8 13. \textit{\textcopyright}b4 (the invasion onto c6 was threatening) 13...c5 14.dxc5 bxc5 White coped to get the quite prospective position. Here White could have played 15.\textit{\textcopyright}d3?! \textit{\textcopyright}e7 (15...\textit{\textcopyright}e7? loses after 16.\textit{\textcopyright}xc5 dxc5 17.\textit{\textcopyright}ad1 \textit{\textcopyright}c8 18.\textit{\textcopyright}e5++ 16.\textit{\textcopyright}ad1 \textit{\textcopyright}d8 (bad is 16...\textit{\textcopyright}e7? in view of 17.\textit{\textcopyright}c3 \textit{\textcopyright}f6 18.e5++) 17.\textit{\textcopyright}c3\textup{\textcopyright} to get the big advantage because of great exceed in development.

8...0-0 looks better. In that case 9.\textit{\textcopyright}e2 is possible (the immediate 9.e5 would promise not much in view of 10...\textit{\textcopyright}xf3! 11. exf6 \textit{\textcopyright}xd1 12.fxg7 \textit{\textcopyright}xg7 13.\textit{\textcopyright}xd1 d5= with the equality) 9.\textit{\textcopyright}e2 \textit{\textcopyright}e8 10.c3 (10.\textit{\textcopyright}e5!? deserves atten-
tion. After that it is not favourable for Black to push off White’s knight with d7-d6 since the bishop b4 would appear in the dangerous position while 10...\(\text{xf8}\) White could improve his position with 11.f4\(\uparrow\) \(\text{xf8}\) 11.e5 \(\text{d8}\) 12.c2 d6 13.\(\text{d3}\) g6 14.e3 \(\text{d7}\) as was in the game M. Rusanov – Turikov, St. Petersburg 1999, and here the simplest way for White to retain his spatial advantage and some initiative at the kingside was 15.e4!? with the following e2-g3 and h2-h4\(\uparrow\).

9.bxc3

In this position let us consider the two lines: \textbf{b1)} 9...d6 and \textbf{b2)} 9...d5. In case 9...\(\text{c6}\) with the idea to long-castle when required, 10.e5 is possible (10.e2 was also played, but in that case Black could stop the development of White’s initiative with 10...\(\text{c5}\)) 10...\(\text{e7}\) and here with 11.a4!? (after 11.d2 d6 12.f4 0-0 0 13.e2 b8 14.a4 a5 15.a6 a8 16.a3 b7= in the game Rashkovsky – Gurfenidze, Sverdlovsk 1984 White did not find any opportunity to improve his position) White at once implied that in case of Black’s long castle the typical a-pawn sacrifice should be taken into consideration. Black had changed his initial intention – 11...d6 (in case 11...0-0-0?! Black would run into typical 12.a5! \(\text{xa5}\) 13.e2 with White’s strong pressure for the sacrificed pawn) 12.exd6 \(\text{e6}\) 13.e2 0-0, but after 14.e4 g6 15.e1 g7 16.a4\(\uparrow\) in the game Sciortino – Lovric, Montecatini Terme 1999 White succeeded to create the dangerous initiative at the kingside.

In case 9...0-0 White can improve his position with 10.d2! to prepare the f-pawn advance as in variation \textbf{b1} and to make black take care against e4-e5 (here 11.e5 does not work because of the intermediate 11...\(\text{xf8}\)=). After 10...e5 (the position after 10...d6 11.f4 will be discussed below in variation \textbf{b1}, while after 10...\(\text{e7}\) it is already possible 11.e5! \(\text{f5}\) 12.exf6 \(\text{xf6}\) 13.\(\text{g4}\) \(\text{a3}\) 14.e4 \(\text{e4}\) 15.\(\text{xe4}\) d5, as it was in the game Spal – Neumann, Trinec 1998. Here White could have obtained the strongest attack with the suggesting 16.\(\text{h7}\)+ \(\text{f8}\) 17.\(\text{f5}\) 18.\(\text{g4}\) \(\text{g5}\), and here possible is 19.\(\text{xe6}\)=! \(\text{xe6}\) 20.f4 \(\text{g4}\) 21.a1+ \(\text{d6}\) 22.\(\text{f5}\)=) 11.f4 exf4 12.e5 \(\text{h4}\) 13.e4 c5 (after 13...d5 14.g3 \(\text{h3}\) White has 15.\(\text{f6}\)=!! \(\text{xf6}\) 16.\(\text{xf4}\) and at this moment Black blundered the trapping of his queen with
\( \text{d3-f5} \) in the game Ciifuentes Parada - Ligerink, Wijk aan Zee 1988, but after the relatively strongest 16...\( \text{c8} \) he should also lose in view of 17.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{e6} \) 18.\( \text{hxh6} \) \( \text{g4} \) 19.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{g4} \) 20.\( \text{exf6} \) \( \text{e6} \) 21.\( \text{h7}+ \) \( \text{h8} \) 22.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{d7} \) 23.\( \text{f5}+ \) \( \text{g8} \) 24.\( \text{f4}+ \) 14.\( \text{d6} \) \( \text{c6} \) 15.\( \text{f5} \) \( \text{g5} \) 16.\( \text{g3} \) 3 (after 16...\( \text{fxg3} \) White will mate Black's king with 17.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{d8} \) 18.\( \text{g4} \) \( \text{g6} \) 19.\( \text{hxh6}+ \) \( \text{g7} \) 20.\( \text{xf7}+ \) 17.\( \text{xf3}! \) (the blows follow one after the other and that happens because Black's delay with the development of his queenside's pieces.) 17...\( \text{xf3} \) 18.\( \text{xf3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 19.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{d2} \) (in case 19...\( \text{d8} \) the decisive would be 20.\( \text{xf7} \) ! since after 20...\( \text{gxf7} \) 21.\( \text{f5} \) \( \text{e8} \) 22.\( \text{h7}+ \) \( \text{f8} \) 23.\( \text{hxh6} \) Black's king could not escape - 23...\( \text{e7} \) 24.\( \text{d6} \) 20.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 21.\( \text{f5} \) \( \text{h8} \) (after 21...\( \text{gxf5} \) \( \text{h7} \)- Black would lose his queen) 22.\( \text{h5} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 23.\( \text{h1} \) \( \text{d5} \) 24.\( \text{h2} \) \( \text{f5} \) 25.\( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{g8} \) 26.\( \text{e7} \) ! in the game Lux - Scherer, Stetten 1988 Black stopped his clock. White's brilliant attack in the above game has become real thanks to the fact that by the moment of disclosing the position in center Black's pieces were not completely developed while Black's queen advanced before his rest army had brought White the additional tempi for the attack.

b1) 9...\( \text{d6} \)
Black wants to perform the blockading \( \text{e6-e5} \).

\begin{center}
\text{10.}\( \text{d2} \)
\end{center}

White gives the way for his f-pawn.

\begin{center}
\text{10...e5}
\end{center}

This is the principal reply. Now Black seems to have achieved his aim but here the sharp conflict starts on board. Black has other moves with which he occasionally succeeds to decrease the development of White's initiative. However in those cases Black should admit to play only the defending part. For instance, after 10...\( \text{g6} \) 11.\( \text{f4} \) Black tried to suspend White's initiative with 11...\( \text{f5} \), but after 12.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{f7} \) there is a strong move 13.\( \text{d5} \) (after 13.\( \text{ae1} \) \( \text{d7} \) 14.\( \text{d5} \) 0-0-0 15.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{c5} \) 16.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{exd5} \) 17.\( \text{exd5} \) \( \text{g6} \) 18.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{d8} \) 19.\( \text{xc5} \) \( \text{bxc5} \) 20.\( \text{xe3} \) \( \text{xe3} \) 21.\( \text{xe3} \) \( \text{e8} \)- in the game Tsuboi - Limp, Brasilia 2000 approximately equal position arose) 13...\( \text{fxe4} \) 14.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{exd5} \). In the game Ilincic - Filipovic, Niksic 1997 White did not limit himself to the pawn sacrifice and here created one more strong move 15.\( \text{ae1} ! \). There followed 15...\( \text{d8} \) (the evident
move 15...0-0? appeared to be the decisive mistake since after 16...g5! hxg5 17...h3 g6 18. fxg5+- White’s attack upon Black’s king would soon hit the target) 16...g3 c6 17...f5 a6 18.g4 g8 19.e3 f6 (in the ending after 19...c8 20.h4+ f6 21.xf6+ gxf6 22.xh6± a lot of problems would be in store for Black brought by the disharmony in his pieces cooperation much because of the bad position of Black’s king in center) 20.fe1 c8 21.f3=c and White gained the excellent compensation for the pawn.

One more way to smooth White’s initiative connected with the move 10...g5 was tried in the game Nikolaidis – Minasian, Panormo 1998. After 11.e2 e5 12.e3 d7 b5 Black decided to find the safe place for his king at the queenside: 13...0-0-0 (after 13...c6 14.e2 White’s bishop weakened Black’s position at the queenside would be ready to take part in play on the diagonal c8-h3). However after 14.a4 a5 15.ab1 xe8 16.fe1 g6 17. d3 b8 18.xd7 xd7 19.b5 ee7 20.c4 exd4 21.xa5 d5 (if 21...xe4, then 22.cxd4 a8 23.c6+ xc6 24.xc6 d5 25. c3± with the following a4-a5 would be unpleasant) 22.xb7 xb7 23.exd5 xe1+ 24.xe1± White pieces still shattered the peace and quiet of Black’s king.

So as we have seen it is not possible to provide the safe place for Black’s king neither in center nor at the queenside. Let us have a look at the immediate short castling. After 10...0-0 11.d4 d7 the question arises before White: how to develop his initiative further? The modern theory answers – 12.g4!? (in the well-known game Nei – Rytov, Tallinn 1973 White preferred 12.e5 and after 12...e7 13.h5 f5 wrongly refused to capture Black’s f-pawn “en passant” – 14.g4! that after 14...dxe5 15.fxe5 dxe5! 16. dxe5 c5+ 17.d2 could have given Black the excellent opportunity of the strong attack upon White’s king at the price of a piece 12...e7 13.ae1 fe8 14. e5 f5 15.exf6 xf6 16.g3!? (in case 16.g6 f7 17.g3 h5= Black’s pieces start to bother White’s queen) 16...d7 (attacking White’s if he dared to play 17...c6!→). Now after queen - 16...h5?! – could unexpectedly turn into the strong White’s aggression after 17.g6 f6 18. g4!→ 17.f3 White has the long-lasting although not great initiative. Apparently Black is in order but it is not simple to find a proper plan for him. In the game Klinger – Summermatter, Luzern 1989 Black was sure his kingside is in order and tried to disturb White at the opposite side with 17...a4?! But the penalty came soon. After 18.g6 a6 (senseless is 18...xa2 in view of 19.g5! d5 20.h7 d7 f5--) 19.xa6 xa6 20.g5!
White’s bishop to create the counter play.

11...exf4 should also be considered apart. After 12.g3 g5 White can play 13.gxf4!? (in the game Spassky – Miles, Niksic 1983 White preferred to continue playing in the gambit style and after 13.a4 Qc6 14...e2 0-0-0 15.a5 Qxa5 16.bxa6 Qxa6 17.Qxa6+ Qd7 18.Qc4 Qxc4 19.Qb5 Qe7 20.Qxc4 Qe6 21.Qxc7 Qd7↑ he was compelled to struggle for the equality) 13...gxf4 14.Qg4 Qg5 15.Qxf4 Qd7 16.Qaf1 Qg8 17.Qxg5 Qxg5 18.Qh1± and Black is doomed to overcome certain difficulties in spite he has reached the ending. White has the advantage in space and in development and he can more easily get to the pawn “islands” of the opponent’s kingside than Black could do the same at the opposite side.

12.e5

White is developing the idea started with his previous move.

12...dxe5 13.fxe5
After 13.Qh5?! g6 14.Qe2 Qc6 15.fxe5 Qe7 16.e6 f5 17.Qb3 0-0-0 18.cxd4 Qxd4 19.Qxd4 Qxd4+ in the game C. Ionescu – Smyslov, Sochi 1986 Black has confidently refuted the first wave of the attack.

13...Qg5
It is obvious that White’s pawn e5 is tabooed in view of losing the queen.

14.Qf3 Qe3+
Black could capture one more
pawn with 14...\text{xf}3 15.\text{xf}3 \text{xe}5 but in that case White would unexpectedly play 16. \text{e}1! After 16...f6 (it is appeared that the transfer to the ending with 16...\text{xe}1+ 17.\text{xe}1+ is not acceptable for Black since after Black's king retreat onto d8 White's rooks would burst into rank 7 while after 17...\text{xf}8 18. \text{g}6+ Black could surely resign at once) 17.cxd4 \text{xe}1+ 18.\text{xe}1+ \text{d}8 19.\text{fe}3 \text{d}7 in the game Sepp – Vetemaa, Brugge 1995 White could put the opponent before the hardly soluble problems with the simplest way 20.\text{e}7 g5 21.\text{f}5\pm.

15.\text{h}1 0–0

To be covetous in such a position is the same as to resign. After 15...dxc3? the simple move 16.e6! would be decisive, e.g. 16...0–0 (after 16...fxe6 17.\text{e}5+– Black has no defence from White's numeral threats) 17.\text{ex}f7 \text{h}8 (bad is 17...\text{xf}7 in view of 18.\text{c}4+–) 18.\text{h}4+– and Black can resign in view of the threat 19.\text{g}6. 15...\text{f}3? 16.\text{xf}3 \text{xe}5 is not better than the above considered move. After 17. cxd4 \text{e}6 (17...\text{e}7 is well met with the familiar move 18.\text{e}1!+–) 18.d5!? looks sufficiently convincing (Black must certainly lose also after 18.\text{e}1 \text{d}8 19. \text{xe}6 fxe6 20.\text{f}7\pm, but in that case he could hold out longer) 18...\text{d}6 19.\text{e}2+ \text{f}8 20.\text{xf}7+! \text{xf}7 21.\text{f}1+– with the mating attack. Until now no one as Black has decided to check and appreciate the strength of White's initiative after 15...\text{c}6 16.cxd4 0–0–0 17.c3+–, because Black would be evidently taking bad chances in this case.

16.cxd4 \text{c}5

After 16...\text{a}6 17.\text{c}3 \text{ad}8 18. \text{c}2 \text{c}5 19.\text{ae}1 \text{f}4 20.e6 in the game J. Horvath – Lovric, Porec 1998 Black immediately resigned in view of trapping his queen in case 20...fe 21.\text{e}5+=. Perhaps we could have seen the similar variation in the game Tkachiev – Minasian, Cannes 1995 if White had replied 16... \text{d}7 with the most suggesting 17.\text{c}3?! \text{ad}8 (after 17...\text{e}4 18.\text{c}4+ the threat e5-e6 would be very unpleasant for Black) 18.\text{c}2\pm.

17.\text{e}1!

This is the very important final feature. In the game Hartung Nielsen – Brinch Claussen, Copenhagen 1984 White was able to spoil everything permitted the blockade of his central pawns after 17.\text{c}3 cxd4 18.cxd4 \text{d}5 19.\text{c}2 \text{c}6 20.\text{ae}1 \text{f}4 21.\text{h}7+ \text{h}8 22.\text{e}4 \text{e}7 23. \text{d}2 \text{g}4 24.\text{e}3 \text{ac}8 25.\text{d}3 \text{e}6=.

17...\text{xf}3

Black has no choice in principle. After 17...\text{e}2+ 18.\text{e}4! \text{xe}4 19.\text{xe}4 he would have no defence from trapping his queen with 20.\text{e}2+!+–. In case 17...\text{f}4 18. d5\pm White's two central pawns on rank 5 are more than unpleas-
ant for Black while the attempt

to get rid of them with 18...
Nd5?! would lead Black to the
loss of his piece after 19.Nh7+
Nxh7 20.Qxd5 Qa6 21.Qd3--
18.gxf3 Nxd4 19.Qe4 Qa6
20.Qxd4 cxd4 21.Nxa8 Nxa8

This position was seen in the
game Dautov – Kengis, Daugav-
pils 1989. The forced play has
been over. White has the ex-
change for a pawn. However his
pawn structure is a bit torn while
Black’s knight has the bearing
squares in center. That makes
the realization of the advantage
not a simple task. In the men-
tioned game there followed fur-
ther 22.Nad1 Bc8 (in case 22...
Nb4 R. Dautov proposed 23.Qe2
Qc6 24.f4±) 23.Qxd4 Qc5 (23...
Nxc2 can be met with 24.Na4 Qc5
Qg1 Qh3++ 28.Qf1± and White is
ready to change his pawn h2 for
Black’s one b6 after that the
passed a-pawn would be un-
stoppable) and here R. Dautov
pointed that the best oppor-
tunity to realize the advantage was
24.Qc4± with the idea of the fol-
lowing a2-a4-a5.

b2) 9...d5
Black intends to stiffen the
pawn structure in center.

10.exd5?!
As in variation b1 White is
trying to open the play to exploit
the dynamic advantages of his
position. The apparently sug-
gesting 10.e5 would only pro-
mote Black’s idea. After 10...Qe7
it would become much more dif-
cult to open the position while
Black would get the opportu-
nity for the counter play with c7-c5.
In addition to the text move
10.Qe2 also deserves attention
according to V. Kramnik.
10...Nd5 11.Qe5 0-0
White’s further actions looks
so convincing that even this natu-
ral move seems to be doubtful.
Probably, 11...Ng5 would be more
intricate. Black’s queen is not
only threatening with mate to
White’s king but also not admit-
ting his White vis-a-vis to the
kingside. In the game Santos –
Limp, Americana 2001 White de-
fended from mate with g2-g3,
and in the following play this
weakening became sound. Strong-
ger was 12.f3!? with the approx-
imate variation 12...0-0 13.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}e2}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}7}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}4}\). In several cases White could need rank 3 to transfer his major pieces to the K-side. That opportunity was excluded with the move g2-g3 in the above game.

12.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{h}}5}\)

White increases the tension at Black’s kingside position. This plan is apparently simple but White should be sure that Black has no time to pull his knight to f6. Otherwise the advance of White’s queen onto h5 would be just the waste of time. The other active move 12.f4 would be parried with 12...g6.

12...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}8}\)

In case 12...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}5}\) not bad looks 13.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{h}}3}\) with the idea to push off the queen with f2-f4, while 12...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}7}\) can be replied with 13.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{a}}e1}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}7}\) (after 13...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}a2}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}4}\) Black will not be able to rescue his bishop) and here Black has no time to swap on e5 or jump with his knight onto f6 in view of V. Kramnik’s variation 14.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}6}\) f\(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}g6}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}d5}\) exd5 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}7}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}7}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}e1}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}8}\) (if 17...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}8}\), then 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}7}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}4}\).

13.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{c}}4}\)

No respite to Black. After 13.f4 \(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}7}\) it would be easier for him to defend.

13...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{b}}7}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}5}\!\)!

With his every move White puts new problems before the opponent.

14...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}6}?\!\)

Having run into the troubles Black tries to overcome them with not the best way. Certainly he had not to play 14...exd5? in view of 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}5}\) g6 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}g6}\)++. Black has not either enough time to pull his knight to the K-side with 14...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}7}\)! because of 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}f7}}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}f7}\) 16.dxe6+. However more chances to defend successfully would bring 14...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}5}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}g5}\) hxg5 16.dxe6 fxe6 although in that case after, for instance, 17.c5?! the weakness of the pawns e6 and g5 is rather well sound.

15.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{a}}e1}\!\)

Prematurely was 15.dxe6 since after 15...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}e6}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{a}}e1}\) Black would in time transfer his knight with 16...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}7}\) to the kingside. The point is that 17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}4}\) (if 17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}5}\), then again 17...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}6}\)! would help) can be replied with 17...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}6}\)! 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}6}\) (after 18.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}h6}\);! \(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}h6}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}h6}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}4}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}3}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{g}}7}\) Black would refute White’s attack retaining the piece up) 18...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}h5}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{e}}7}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{f}}4}\) and Black’s chances are not worse in the arisen ending.

15...exd5

Thanks to White’s refusal from the swap on e6 on the previous move he could gain the large advantage after 15...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}7}\) with 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}f7}\) \(\text{\textit{\textbf{x}}f7}\) 17.dxe6+.
\[ \text{\textx{g}4\textpm Black would have to struggle for draw in the ending with a pawn down) 18.\text{\textw{g}}5 \text{\textc}{c}6 19.\text{\textx}{x}g6 \text{fxg6} (after 19...\text{\textd}{xe}5 20.\text{\textf}{f}5+ \text{\textg}{g}6 White would have the very strong reply 21.\text{\texte}{e}6!(\pm) 20.\text{\textd}{x}g6\rightarrow.} \]

17...\text{\textw}{g}7 18.\text{\textd}{xf}7!

White is demolishing the cover of Black’s king. Besides, as it is easily seen, Black’s pieces positioned at the Q-side are not taking part in defending of Black’s king.

18...\text{\textw}{xf}7

After 18...\text{\textx}{xf}7 19.\text{\texte}{e}6 \text{\textw}{f}4 (perhaps, the relatively best for Black would be agree to play the certainly very difficult ending with a pawn down after 19...\text{\textc}{c}8 20.\text{\textx}{x}d6 \text{\textx}{x}h3 21.\text{\textx}{x}g6+ \text{\textf}{f}3 22.\text{\textg}{x}h3(\pm) 20.\text{\textg}{3}! \text{\textw}{d}2 (hopeless for Black would be 20...\text{\textw}{f}3 in view 21.\text{\textx}{x}g6+ \text{\textf}8 22.\text{\textw}{x}h6+, and after 20...\text{\textw}{g}5 21.\text{\textf}{f}4 \text{\texth}{5} 22.\text{\textx}{x}g6 \text{\textw}{x}g6 23.\text{\textx}{x}g6 \text{\textx}g6 24.\text{\textf}{5} White would have the strongest attack at the enemy’s king while Black’s pieces are still quiet at the queenside.) 21.\text{\textx}{x}g6 \text{\textf}{8} (21...\text{\textf}{f}6 would lose in view of 22.\text{\textx}{x}f6 \text{\textw}{x}f6 23.\text{\textf}{f}5+ \text{\texte}7 24.\text{\texte}{e}5+ \text{\textd}7 25.\text{\texte}1(+) 22.\text{\textd}{3} Black’s position is lost. For instance, 22...\text{\textf}7 (after 22...\text{\textf}6 23.\text{\textx}{x}f6 \text{\textw}{x}f6 24.\text{\textw}{f}5 \text{\texte}7 25.\text{\texte}{e}5 \text{\textd}8 26.\text{\texte}1(+) Black’s king will not escape far away) loses after 23.\text{\textw}{g}4+ \text{\textf}8 and here is the beautiful 24.\text{\textd}{4}!+)\]

19.\text{\textw}{x}h6 \text{\textg}{8}

This position was seen in the well-known game Kramnik – Ehlvest, Moscow 1994. White’s attack would have probably been a success if he had introduced here his rook via rank 3 with 20.\text{\texte}{e}3 (in the game after 20.\text{\textd}{d}7 21.\text{\textf}{5} \text{\texth}6! 22.\text{\textw}{x}g6+ \text{\textg}{8} 23.\text{\textw}{f}4 \text{\textw}{x}f4\textpm the draw was agreed in the position with the mutual chances). After 20...\text{\textd}{7} V. Kramnik produced the following variation (in case 20...\text{\textd}{4} V. Kramnik pointed the very strong continuation of the attack with 21.\text{\textc}{5}! introducing the bishop to the attack via c4, After that the following nice variation would be possible: 21...\text{\textc}{5} 22.\text{\textc}{4}! \text{\textc}{4} 23.\text{\textw}{f}4 \text{\textg}{7} 24.\text{\texte}{7}(+) 21.\text{\texth}{7} \text{\textw}{f}8 (21...\text{\textg}{7} would not help either in view of 22.\text{\textf}{3} \text{\textf}6 23.\text{\textg}{6} \text{\textf}8 24.\text{\texth}{8} \text{\textg}{8} 25.\text{\textx}{f}6(+) 22.\text{\textf}{3}+ \text{\textf}6 23.\text{\textx}g6 \text{\textw}{e}6 (23...\text{\texte}7 24.\text{\texth}{6} \text{\textg}{7} 25.\text{\texth}{8}(+) 24.\text{\textc}{d}5! \text{\textx}d5 25.\text{\textw}{h}6 \text{\texte}7 (25...\text{\textg}{7} 26.\text{\texth}{8} \text{\textg}{8} 27.\text{\textf}{6} \text{\texte}7 28.\text{\texth}{4}(+) 26.\text{\texte}{3} \text{\texte}4 27.\text{\texth}{7} \text{\textd}8 28.\text{\textx}{e}4(+) and Black will be the two pawns down while White’s attack not going to cease.}
Chapter 28  \(1.\text{d}f3\) b5

Black is trying to get the same aim as in variation from Chapter 27, while preventing possible White’s advance c2-c4.

2.e4

White starts not only the capture of the center with his pawns but also threaten to the b5-pawn. Here Black has the two main opportunities: either to defend the b5-pawn with the move a) 2...\text{a}6 or to create the counter threat to the e4-pawn with b) 2...\text{b}7. In the move 2...c6 it is hard to find any sense. Black is intercepting the diagonal a8-h1 for his light-coloured bishop. However we mentioned the position after 2...c6 3.d4 in the beginning of Part 5 when discussed Black’s rare opportunities on move 1(we mean the variation 1...c6 2.d4 b5 3.e4).

2...b4 was almost not seen in practice either. The reason is simple. Black would not like to admit isolating his a-pawn especially when White’s rook is working along a-file. So, after 3.d4 e6 4.a3!? Black cannot protect the pawn b4 with his a-pawn while after 4...c5?! (in case 4...\text{b}7 5.axb4 \text{xe}4 6.c3\text{c} just the above mentioned situation with Black’s isolated a-pawn would arise) 5.d5 \text{f}6 6.dxe6 fxe6 7.e5 \text{d}5 8.axb4 cxb4 9.d3 \text{c}5 in the game Slipak – Agostino, Buenos Aires 1992 White brought the hardly soluble problems for Black with the typical move 10.\text{g}5!. The point was that after suggesting 10...g6 there would be 11.xh7 \text{h}7 12.xg6 f7 13.\text{h}5 e7 and here 14.\text{h}7! would not permit Black’s king get out of the pin. The check 14...xf2+ would be only in White’s favour since after 15.\text{d}1+ White’s rook will enter the play via f-file with the decisive effect.

a) 2...\text{a}6

In many books on beginnings
theory this system is called wrong. But actually this line has acquired the sound theory during the past years and can be quite reconsidered.

3. d4
As it was mentioned before in the beginning of Part 5 this position can be reached also via 1...a6 2.e4 b5 3.d4.

3...\textit{\textbf{\textsf{b7}}} 4.\textbf{\textsf{d3}} e6
The central blow with 4...c5?! is premature since after 5.\textit{\textbf{\textsf{dxc5}}} e6 6.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{e3}}} \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{c7}}} 7.b4 \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{f6}}} 8.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{bd2}}} \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{c6}}} 9.c3 \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{g4}}} in the game Blahus – Strachan, Slovakia 1997 White could have retain the material advantage without apparent problems with 10.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{f6}}} Black is also not ready for the immediate 4...\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{d6}}}?! in view of 5.e5! (in the well-known game Karpov – Miles, Skara 1980, ended by the way with Black’s win, the play developed with 5.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{e2}}} e6 6.a4 c5) 5...\textbf{\textsf{d5}} 6.a4 b4 and here 7.g5! puts the quite difficult problems before Black. The pawn h7 is under stroke while after 7...g6 (7...h6 also loses in view of 8.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{h5}}}+) 8.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{f3}}} f5 9.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{xg5}}} \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{c8}}} 10.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{e4}}}+ in the game Ochoa de Echaguen – Gomes, Sevilla 1994 Black was to resign.

5.0-0
The typical idea in such positions is the attack of the protruded b5-pawn with White’s a-pawn. However it should be prepared in the proper way. Here it is not the proper moment. After 5.a4 c5 6.c3 (6.\textit{\textbf{\textsf{axb5}}} also gives White nothing, since after 6...\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{xb5}}} 7.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{xa8}}} \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{xa8}}} 8.c3 Black will have no problems if he plays 8...c4) 6...c4 7.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{c2}}} \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{f6}}} 8.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{e2}}} \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{e7}}} 9.0-0 \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{c6}}} 10.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{a3}}} d5 11.e5 \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{d7}}} 12.b4 \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{xb3}}} 13.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{xb3}}} b4 14.cxb4 \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{xb4}}} 15.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{d2}}} 0-0 16.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{ab1}}} a5= the play gradually equalized in the game V. Lazarov – Tomescu, Arco 2000.

5...c5
Black needs this move anyway. In case of his passive play like 5...d6 6.c3 \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{d7}}} (the position after 6...c5 7.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{bd2}}} \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{f6}}} 8.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{e1}}} \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{e7}}} 9.a4 will be discussed below in the variation a1) White will strengthen the d4-pawn and take under his control the square b4. Consequently 7.a4! will gain in strength (7...\textit{\textbf{\textsf{bxa4}}} is very undesirable for Black that was confirmed in the game Leon Varela – Brito, Las Palmas 1996 where it was seen 8.\textit{\textbf{\textsf{xa4}}} \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{gf6}}} 9.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{e1}}} \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{e7}}} 10.e5 \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{d5}}} 11.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{bd2}}} 0-0 12.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{c2}}} h6 13.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{e4}}} de 14.de \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{d5}}} 15.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{xc5}}} \textbf{\textsf{\textsc{xc5}}} 16.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{a4}}}+ and White transferred his rook to the kingside via rank 4 and created the big problems for Black). After 7...a6 8.\textbf{\textsf{\textsc{e1}}} in the game Seira-
wan – Spassky, USA 1990 Black chose the careless 8...\(\text{e}7!!\) (Black does not want to intercept the diagonal for his light-coloured bishop with 8...\(\text{c}6\) in such positions since White could freely continue to improve his position in center beginning, for instance, with 9.\(\text{xf}4\)\(\text{f}4\)). There followed: 9. axb5 axb5 10.\(\text{xa}8\) \(\text{xa}8\) 11.e5! dxe5 (perhaps a bit better for Black was 11...\(\text{xf}3\) 12. \(\text{xf}3\)\(\text{e}7\)) 12.dxe5 \(\text{d}5\) 13.\(\text{xb}5\)+ and Black appeared a pawn down.

6.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{f}6\)

Up to this moment Black and White seem to have followed the compulsory program.

7.\(\text{e}1?!\)

Probably, this move is the most accurate. More passive is 7.\(\text{bd}2\) that was also used in practice. The main drawback of this move is that Black could reply in that case with the move 7...\(\text{c}6\) that is rather risky for Black here.

In this position Black tried various possibilities to struggle for the equality.

Let us still point the two most distinctive of them: a1) 7...\(\text{d}6\) and a2) 7...\(\text{e}7\). It should be mentioned that 7...\(\text{c}6\) is not so attractive for Black in view of 8...\(\text{d}5\) (here the position of the rook on e1 is sound) 8...\(\text{e}7\) 9.d6 \(\text{g}6\) 10.e5\(\text{f}4\), and in case 7...d5 8.e5 \(\text{e}4\) unpleasant for Black will be 9.a4\(\text{f}4\) since the typical for such positions 9...\(\text{c}4\)! would cost a pawn after 10.\(\text{xe}4\) dxe4 11.\(\text{g}5\).

In case Black strengthen the pressure on d4 with 7...\(\text{b}6\), he ought to consider with 8.\(\text{g}5\)!.

After 8...\(\text{cxd}4\) (if 8...\(\text{e}7\), then 9.e5 \(\text{d}5\) 10.dxe7 \(\text{xe}7\) 11.dxc5 \(\text{xc}5\) 12.b4 \(\text{c}7\) 13.a4 would be strong, while 8...\(\text{c}6\) is well met with 9.d5\(\text{f}4\) 9.d4 \(\text{d}6\) 10.\(\text{f}1\) (here 10.d5 would be not so convincingly since after 10...\(\text{d}4\) 11.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xd}4\) 12.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{e}5\) 13. \(\text{h}4\) \(\text{h}5\) 14.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{xd}1\) 15.\(\text{xd}1\) \(\text{c}5\) Black’s bishop is well placed on the diagonal a7-g1 as it was in the game Barkhagen – Laveryd, Haninge 1997) 10.\(\text{a}5\) 11.\(\text{c}3\)! (the refusal from the development of the knight b1 on d2 now permits to develop it onto the more active position) 11...\(\text{b}4\) 12.d5 0-0 13.\(\text{e}5\) and Black’s position unexpectedly appeared difficult. After 13...\(\text{c}7\) 14.\(\text{xf}6\) gxf6 15.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{f}4\) 16.e5 f5 17.\(\text{f}6\)\(\text{h}8\) 18.\(\text{h}5\)+ in the game Lutz – Laveryd, Katrineholm 1999 White won very soon.

The above material sometimes makes Black to play the prophylactic move 7...\(\text{h}6\). In that
case 8.\(\text{\$bd2}\) is possible (without Black's knight on c6 the move 8.d5 appears the blank shot and after 8...c4 9.\(\text{$\text{\$c2}$}$ \(\text{\$c=}$ in the game Niksic - Skulsky, Vancouver 1996 Black get the satisfactory play) 8...\(\text{\$e7}\) (the position of White's knight on d2 could encourage Black to the swap 8...cxd4 9.cxd4 however it is not easy to say what Black should do about White's threat a2-a4. In the game Douven - Wuts, Enschede 1995 Black himself with the help of the active 9...d5 10.e5 \(\text{\$e4}?!\) destroyed his position: 11.\(\text{\$xe4}$ dxe4 12.\(\text{\$xe4}$ \(\text{\$xe4}\) 13.\(\text{\$xe4}$ \(\text{\$d5}$\) 14.\(\text{\$g4+}$, while after 8...\(\text{\$b6}$ 9.e5 \(\text{\$d5}$ 10.\(\text{\$e4}$ cxd4 11.\(\text{\$xd4}$ c6 12.\(\text{\$xc6}$ wxc6 13.\(\text{\$g4}$ 0-0-0 14.a4\) in the game Trimp - Reedijk, Holland 1996 White obtained the strong attack) 9.e5 \(\text{\$d5}$ 10.dxc5 \(\text{\$xc5}$ 11.\(\text{\$e4}$ \(\text{\$e7}$\) 12.a4! bxa4 13.\(\text{\$xa4}$ \(\text{\$c7}$\) 14.\(\text{\$b1}$ and in the game Hennigan - Basman, Eastbourne 1991 Black had the problems with the king. The castle 14...0-0 is extremely dangerous in view of 15.\(\text{\$d3}$\), while after 14...\(\text{\$b6}$ 15.\(\text{\$d6+}$ \(\text{\$xd6}$ 16.\(\text{\$xd6}$ \(\text{\$d8}$ 17.\(\text{\$g4}$ g5 18.h4 gxh4 19.\(\text{\$d4}$ f6 20.\(\text{\$g7}$ \(\text{\$f8}$ 21.\(\text{\$g4}$ in the above mentioned game Hennigan - Basman, Eastbourne 1991 Black was to resign.

Being aware of the variation a2 one can propose Black to include the swap 7...cxd4 8.cxd4 and only here to play 8...\(\text{\$e7}$\). However as it was mentioned before the swap on d4 permits White to develop the knight at the more active position after 9.\(\text{\$c3}$ (in case 9.\(\text{\$bd2}$ \(\text{\$c6}$ the position of the variation a2 in the note for move 8 would arise) 9...0-0 10.a3 d6 11.\(\text{\$c2}$ \(\text{\$fd7}$ 12.\(\text{\$f4}$ e8 13.\(\text{\$ad1}$ \(\text{\$f8}$ 14.\(\text{\$b3}$ \(\text{\$c8}$ 15.\(\text{\$b1}$ \(\text{\$bd7}$ 16.e5\) in the game Tukmakov - Sahovic, Bor 1983 White succeeded to develop gradually his initiative at Black's kingside position.

a1) 7...\(\text{\$d6}$

Black intends to retain the elastic pawn chain and not to admit the breaking-up of the play in center.

8.\(\text{\$bd2}$

As it will be seen below White should have vacant the square b1. The move 8.a4 is immature here in view of the standard response 8...c4\).

8...\(\text{\$e7}$

After White has developed his knight he should take into consideration the swap 8...cxd4 9.cxd4. However here it is also dangerous for Black to develop his knight on c6 because of the
X-ray action of White's rook e1 while after 9...\(\text{bd7}\) (after 9...\(\text{c6}\)?! very strong is 10.d5 \(\text{b4}\) 11.\(\text{b1}\), since the trapping of Black's knight with a2-a3 is threatening while after 11...exd5 12.a3 \(\text{c6}\) 13.exd5 \(\text{e7}\) 14.\(\text{e4}\) Black couldn't survive long because of the disclosed e-file) the strength of 10.a4! will increase, e.g. 10...b4 (10...\(\text{bxa4}\) can rarely be the good decision for Black and this situation is not an exclusion. After 11.\(\text{xa4}\) \(\text{e7}\) 12.e5 \(\text{dxe5}\) 13.\(\text{dxe5}\) \(\text{d5}\) 14.\(\text{g4}\) \(\text{g6}\) 15. \(\text{c4}\) 0-0 16.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{c5}\) 17.\(\text{ed1}\) \(\text{xd3}\) 18.\(\text{exd3}\) in the game Meulders - Takahashi, Novi Sad 1990 White obtained the evident advantage thanks to the threat to invade onto d6 with his knight). Here with 11.a5! (again, the typical and very strong move since the b4-pawn will demand the constant care from Black while the prospects for the knight d7 will become vague) 11...\(\text{e7}\) 12.h3 \(\text{h6}\) 13.\(\text{e2}\) e5 14.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{b8}\) 15.b3 0-0 16.\(\text{b2}\) exd4 17.\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{e8}\) 18.\(\text{f5}\) in the game Delgado - Wade, Cienfuegos 1976 White succeeded to gain the large advantage.

9.a4!

Now the proper moment has come for this typical pawn blow upon Black's queenside.

9...\(\text{c4}\)

After 9...\(\text{cxd4}\) 10.\(\text{xd4}\)\(\text{±}\) Black's queenside position would fall apart.

10.\(\text{b1}\)

Just this way. The move 8. \(\text{d2}\) was needed for this. The light-coloured bishop keeps control upon Black's kingside and meanwhile White is preparing the new blow onto Black's pawn structure at the queenside.

10...\(\text{bd7}\) 11.\(\text{b3}\)!

This move gains in strength significantly thanks to White's bishop being placed on b1, not on c2.

11...\(\text{cxb3}\)

In case 11...d5 12.e5 \(\text{g8}\) 13.bxc4 dxc4 good is 14.\(\text{e4}\)\(\text{±}\), while 13...bxc4 can be met with 14.\(\text{f1}\)\(\text{±}\) to bring new forces to the kingside area.

12.\(\text{xb3}\)

If White's bishop retreated to c2 White would have not had this opportunity here and Black would not have had to spend the time to defend the pawn b5.

12...\(\text{c6}\) 13.\(\text{axb5}\) \(\text{axb5}\) 14. \(\text{xa8}\) \(\text{xa8}\) 15.\(\text{a3}\) \(\text{g8}\)

This move is too pretentious but after 15...0-0 16.e5 \(\text{e8}\) 17. \(\text{e4}\) \(\text{b8}\) 18.\(\text{b4}\)++ the troubles with the pawn d6 would not leave Black any chance for escape.

16.d5!→
This position was seen in Miles - I. Thomas, London 1984. White is opening the central files and getting the strongest attack at Black’s king. After 16...exd5 17.\(\text{Q}d4\) (not bad is also 17.\(\text{Ax}d6\) \(\text{Ax}d6\) 18.exd5 \(\text{Q}e7\) 19.dxc6 \(\text{Q}x\text{c}6\) 20.\(\text{Q}e4\)) 17...\(\text{f}f8\) 18.\(\text{Q}x\text{c}6\) \(\text{Q}x\text{c}6\) 19.exd5 \(\text{Q}b6\) 20.c4+ White’s superiority is evident.

**a2) 7...\(\text{Q}e7\)**

In the previous variation a1 it was evident that the X-ray’s action of White’s rook played not the least part. For that reason Black’s intention to put a secure barrier against White’s rook looks quite natural.

\[ \text{Diagram} \]

8.e5?\(^{15}\)

White intends to break up the play in center. After 8.\(\text{Q}b2\) cxd4 9.cxd4 \(\text{Q}c6\)? (in case 10.e5 \(\text{Q}d5\) the chances seem to be reciprocal) 10.a4 \(\text{Q}b6\) 11.axb5 axb5 12.\(\text{Q}x\text{a}8+\) \(\text{Q}x\text{a}8\) 13.\(\text{Q}b3\) \(\text{Q}b4\) 14.\(\text{Q}b1\) d5 15.e5 \(\text{Q}e4=\) in the game Loret – Auer, Cagnes 1989 Black obtained the quite satisfactory position.

\[ \text{Diagram} \]

8...\(\text{Q}d5\) 9.dxc5

Now Black’s bishop gets to c5 in two moves, not one. That was the reason for White to decline from the swap on c5 when Black’s bishop was on f8.

9...\(\text{Q}x\text{c}5\) 10.\(\text{Q}b2\) \(\text{f}5\)

Black does not want to admit White’s knight onto e4 where it would be placed very strongly. In the game Rosten – Roe, Gloroney 1995 Black ignored this threat and after 10...\(\text{Q}c6\) 11.\(\text{Q}e4\) \(\text{Q}e7\) 12.\(\text{Q}g5\) 0-0 White carried out the typical attack at Black’s king with 13.\(\text{Q}x\text{e}7\) \(\text{Q}x\text{e}7\) 14.\(\text{Q}d6\) \(\text{Q}b8\) 15.\(\text{Q}xh7!\) \(\text{Q}xh7\) 16.\(\text{Q}g5\) \(\text{Q}g6\) 17.\(\text{Q}g4\) f5 18.\(\text{Q}g3\) \(\text{h}5\) 19.\(\text{Q}g7=+\).

11.\(\text{exf6}\) \(\text{Q}x\text{f6}\) 12.\(\text{Q}d3\) \(\text{Q}e7\) 13.\(\text{Q}d4\) \(\text{Q}c6\) 14.\(\text{Q}xc6\) \(\text{Q}xc6\) 15.\(\text{Q}d4\)

The other White’s knight changes the first one. By the way, rank 3 is opening for White’s rook transfer.

15...\(\text{b}7\) 16.\(\text{Q}f4\) 0-0 17.\(\text{Q}e5\)

The number of White’s pieces ready to rush into Black’s K-side increases with every move.

17...\(\text{e}8\) 18.\(\text{Q}e3\) \(\text{Q}f7\) 19.\(\text{Q}c2\) g6 20.\(\text{g}3\)

This position was reached in the game Sadvakasov – Tatai, Saint Vincent 1999. It is difficult
for Black to parry the threat to the square g6.

b) 2...\textit{b7}

Black does not want to bear with the part of the defender and tries at once to organize the pressure upon the e4-pawn.

\textbf{3.\textit{xb5}}

It is not desirable to protect the e4-pawn with d2-d3 since in that case White’s light-coloured bishop appears out of play. Now in essence one of the line of Sokolsky beginning (1.b4) arises but with opposite colours and, consequently, with the extra tempo for White.

\textbf{3...\textit{xe4 4.0-0 \textit{f6}}}

It is very dangerous for Black to permit the breaking-up in center with 4...c5 5.d4 cxd4 6.\textit{xd4} likely to the similar line of Sokolsky beginning because White’s advantage in development is obvious. After 4...\textit{a4} 5.e6 (Much more significant troubles arose before Black after 5...\textit{a5} 6.\textit{c3} \textit{g6} 7.d4 \textit{f6} 8.\textit{e5} e6 9.a3 \textit{e7} 10.b4 \textit{d8} 11.\textit{f3} 0-0 12.b5± in the game Jackelen – Tischbierek, Germany 1994) 6.\textit{e1} \textit{g6} 7.d4 \textit{d6} 8.c4 \textit{e7} 9.\textit{c3} 0-0 10.\textit{e5} \textit{c7} 11.\textit{xe6} \textit{xe6} 12.d5± in the game Sarfati – Bennett, Suncoast 1999 White got the couple of bishops advantage while it was not easy for Black to complete the queenside development. Sometimes playable move 4...e6 is just a simple transposition of moves and after 5.d4 \textit{f6} 6.c4 the game will transposes to the main line considered below.

\textbf{5.d4 e6 6.c4 \textit{e7}}

After 6...\textit{c6} 7.\textit{e5} \textit{d6} White could compel his opponent to run into the piece sacrifice with 8.f3! \textit{xe5} 9.fxe4±.

\textbf{7.\textit{c3 \textit{b7}}}

Black is trying to retain his bishop on the long diagonal. After 7...\textit{g6} 8.\textit{e5} \textit{h5} 9.g4 \textit{g6} 10.\textit{e1} c6 11.\textit{a4} 0-0 12.h4± in the game Robatsch – Bartsch, Germany 1985 Black’s light-coloured bishop had not find the peaceful life at the kingside. The similar attempt to save the light-coloured bishop at the kingside after 7...\textit{f5} 8.\textit{f4} 0-0 9.d5 \textit{e4} 10.\textit{xe4} \textit{xe4} 11.\textit{e1} \textit{g6} 12.\textit{c5} d6 13.\textit{xg6} fxg6 (Black would also have many weaknesses after 13...hxg6 14.dxe6 fxe6 15.\textit{g4}±) 14.\textit{c3} e5 15.\textit{c1} a5 16.c5 \textit{d7} 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.b3± in the game Mijailovic – Nestorovic, Belgrade 1990 led Black to the permanent weakness of the light-coloured squares. After 7...0-0 8.\textit{xe4} \textit{xe4} in the game Kukovec – Saradjen, Skofja Loka
2000 White should rather have played the prophylactic $9.\text{a}4$!?. With that way he could exclude Black's opportunity $\text{e}4$-$\text{d}6$ to deprive White of the bishop pair.

$8.\text{d}5$!?

The normal developing move $8.\text{e}1$ is also not bad, but the text move implies more particular White's idea. He intends to restrict the activity of Black's light-coloured bishop to leave it only the queenside.

$8...0-0$

Black cannot eliminate the pawn wedge from his area with $8...\text{c}6$ in view of $9.\text{d}6$!±.

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$9.\text{a}4$

Here White has no time for $9.\text{e}1$ since in that case Black would eliminate White's pawn $d5$ with $9...\text{c}6$ $10.\text{dxc}6$ (here $10.\text{d}6$ is not so effective in view of $10...\text{xd}6$ $11.\text{xd}6$ $\text{cxb}5$ $12.\text{xf}5$ $\text{xf}3$ $13.\text{xf}3$ $\text{e}8$=) $10...\text{xc}6$. This position looks more pleasant for White thanks to his advantage in time however after $11.\text{f}4$ $\text{c}8$ the careless move $12.\text{d}6$?! permitted Black to develop the strong attack at White's king with $12...\text{xd}6$ 13. $	ext{xd}6$ $\text{a}5$ 14.$\text{b}3$ $\text{a}6$ 15.$\text{a}4$ $\text{xf}3$ 16.$\text{gx}f3$ $\text{xc}4$! 17.$\text{bxc}4$ $\text{xc}4$ 18.$\text{d}3$ $\text{c}7$ 19.$\text{ac}1$ $\text{h}4$ 20.$\text{f}4$ $\text{xf}4$ 21.$\text{h}3$ $\text{h}6$ in the game I.Belov – G. Giorgadze, Hamburg 1995.

$9...\text{a}6$

After $9...\text{b}4$ 10.$\text{g}5$ $\text{h}6$ (10...$\text{xc}3$ 11.$\text{bxc}3$ $\text{h}6$ 12.$\text{h}4$ $\text{a}6$ 13.$\text{e}1$ $\text{c}5$ 14.$\text{c}2$ would lead to the position considered in the main line below) White has the intermediate $11.\text{b}3$! $\text{a}6$ (11...$\text{a}5$ would not be better for Black either in view of 12.$\text{a}3$ $\text{hxg}5$ 13.$\text{xb}4$ $\text{exd}5$ 14.$\text{bxa}5$±) 12.$\text{xf}6$ $\text{xf}6$ 13.$\text{xd}7$= and White has the extra pawn without the sufficient compensation.

$10.\text{e}1$

Here is the proper moment for this move, correct in any sense.

$10...\text{b}4$ 11.$\text{g}5$ $\text{c}5$

In case $11...\text{h}6$ White has the bishop's retreat onto $h4$ as well as good-looking 12.$\text{xf}6$ and after $12...\text{xf}6$ very strong is 13. $\text{e}5$!±.

$12.\text{c}2$ $\text{xc}3$

Black could not push off White's bishop with 12...$\text{h}6$ 13.$\text{h}4$ $\text{g}5$ since after 14.$\text{c}xg$5! $\text{hxg}5$ 15.$\text{xg}$5→ he would appear under the strong attack.

$13.\text{bxc}3$ $\text{d}6$

After $13...\text{h}6$ 14.$\text{h}4$ $\text{exd}5$ (14...$g$5? is weak in view of 15.$\text{c}xg$5! $\text{hxg}$5 16.$\text{c}xg$5→) 15. $\text{cxd}5$ $\text{xd}5$ in the game Speelman - Hodgson, London 1985 White with help of 16.$\text{d}4$!? (in case of the forced 16.$\text{Bxf}6$ $\text{Bxf}3$ 17.$\text{h}7+$
\( \mathcal{D} \)xf3 b5 2.e4

\( \mathcal{D} \)xf7 18.c2+ \( \mathcal{D} \)e4 19.xe4 xf6 20.e6+ \( \mathcal{D} \)g6 21.xg6 fxg6\* it is possible that White's advantage is not enough for a win) 16...\( \mathcal{D} \)e6 (otherwise White's knight reaches the f5-square, threatening Black's king, for example, after 16...d6 17.f5 \( \mathcal{D} \)e6 18.xh6! gh 19.e3 \( \mathcal{D} \)h8 20.d2→ White's attack is irresistible) 17.e3 \( \mathcal{D} \)e8 (after 17...g5 by means of 18. \( \mathcal{D} \)xg5! hxg5 19.e5 White has a very strong attack that it is possible to repulse only with the variation 19...\( \mathcal{D} \)d5 20.e5 f5 21.e6+ \( \mathcal{D} \)h8 22.xf5 \( \mathcal{D} \)f7 23. \( \mathcal{D} \)e3 \( \mathcal{D} \)f6 24.xf6 \( \mathcal{D} \)xf6 25.xc5\*, which led Black to a complicated ending) 18.Rad1\* gets a fine compensation for a pawn in view of his strong pressure in the centre and at the kingside.

14.e4 h6 15.c4

White is pulling one more piece nearer to Black's king.

15...exd5 16.f5 \( \mathcal{D} \)cd7

Black has no time for 16...dxc4?? since after 17.e7+ \( \mathcal{D} \)h8 18.xf6 gxf6 19.\( \mathcal{D} \)h5= he could immediately resign.

17.cxd5 \( \mathcal{D} \)e8

17...\( \mathcal{D} \)xd5?? is bad for Black in view of 18.e7+ with the win of the piece.

18.d2 \( \mathcal{D} \)xd5 19.a4

In spite of his extra pawn Black has a lot of problems to get rid of the pin without material losses.

19...\( \mathcal{D} \)e4

Black could not have parried White's threat with 9...\( \mathcal{D} \)e6 in view of 20.xh6+ gxh6 21.xh6. Here after 21.g4 White wins with 22.h5 \( \mathcal{D} \)c8 (in case 22...\( \mathcal{D} \)d6 23.g5+ \( \mathcal{D} \)h8 24.e8 \( \mathcal{D} \)e8 25.h3 \( \mathcal{D} \)h7 26.e5 \( \mathcal{D} \)e5 27.\( \mathcal{D} \)f4= White would also win on the spot) 23.e2 \( \mathcal{D} \)f8 24.f3=+. In case 19.e4 20.\( \mathcal{D} \)xd7 Black would be compelled to give up the exchange after 20...\( \mathcal{D} \)xh4 21.\( \mathcal{D} \)xh4 \( \mathcal{D} \)xd7 22.\( \mathcal{D} \)f4=.

20.xf6 \( \mathcal{D} \)xf6 21.e8f5 \( \mathcal{D} \)xf5 22.e6+

This position was reached in the game Eingorn – Semeniuk, USSR 1984. White’s material advantage is sufficient for his win with the accurate play.
Index of Variations

Part 1. Maroczy System ................................................. 9

Chapter 1  1.♕f3 c5 2.c4 g6 3.e4 ♗c6 4.d4 cd 5.♕d4

  5... ♗g7 ................................................................. 11
  5... ♗h6 ............................................................... 12
  5... ♗f6  6.♕c3 ♗d4 ................................................. 12
   6.♕c3 d6  7.♕e2 ♗g7  8.♕e3 0-0 9.0-0 ♘e6 ........... 14
   6.♕c3 d6  7.♕e2 ♗g7  8.♕e3 0-0 9.0-0 ♗d7 ........... 14
   6.♕c3 d6  7.♕e2 ♗g7  8.♕e3 0-0 9.0-0 a6 ............ 15
   6.♕c3 d6  7.♕e2 ♗g7  8.♕e3 0-0 9.0-0 ♗d4 ........... 16

Chapter 2  1.♕f3 c5 2.c4 g6 3.e4 ♗c6 4.d4 cd 5.♕d4 ♗f6 6.♕c3 d6

    7.♕e2 ♗g7 8.♕e3 0-0 9.0-0 ♗d7

  10.♕b3; 10.♕c2; 10.f3; 10.♕c1 .................................. 21
  10.♕d2 various ..................................................... 22
  a)  10.♕d2 a6 .................................................... 24
  b)  10.♕d2 ♗d4 .................................................. 26

Chapter 3  1.♕f3 c5 2.c4 g6 3.e4 ♗c6 4.d4 cd 5.♕d4 ♗f6 6.♕c3 d6

    7.♕e2 ♗d4 8.♕d4 ♗g7

  9.♕e3 ............................................................... 35
  9.♕g5 0-0 10.♕d2 a6 ............................................ 37

Chapter 4  1.♕f3 c5 2.c4 g6 3.e4 ♗c6 4.d4 cd 5.♕d4 ♗f6 6.♕c3 d6

    7.♕e2 ♗d4 8.♕d4 ♗g7 9.♕g5 0-0 10.♕d2 ♘e6 11.♕c1

    ♗a5

  12.0-0 .............................................................. 39
  12.f3 ♗fc8 13.b3 various ........................................ 40
  a)  13.b3 a6  14.♕a4 ♗d2  15.♕d2 ♗c6 .................... 41
  b)  13.b3 a6  14.♕a4 ♗d2  15.♕d2 ♗d7 .................... 43
Index of Variations

Chapter 5  1..gf3 c5 2.c4 g6 3.e4 d6 4.d4 cd 5.gd4 gf6 6.gc3  
          8.ge2 7.ge3 0-0  ........................................... 49

Chapter 6  1.gf3 c5 2.c4 g6 3.e4 d6 4.d4 cd 5.gd4 gf6 6.gc3  
          7.ge7 8.ge3 9.ge4 8.ge4  .................................. 54
          a) 8.ge4 9.gf1 e5  .......................................... 55
          b) 8.ge4 9.ge1 ge6  .......................................... 58
             b1) 9.gf1 ge6 10.ge1 ge5  .................................. 59
             b2) 9.gf1 ge6 10.ge1 d6  .................................. 62
             b3) 9.gf1 ge6 10.ge1 b6  .................................. 64

Chapter 7  1.gf3 c5 2.c4 g6 3.e4 ge7 4.d4  .................................. 66
          a) 4.ge5  ..................................................... 67
          b) 4.ge6  ..................................................... 69
          c) 4.d6  ..................................................... 71
             c1) 5.gc3 ge5  ............................................ 72
             c2) 5.gc3 ge4  ............................................ 74
             c3) 5.gc3 ge6  ............................................ 76

Part 2. English with 1..e5 ........................................... 79

Chapter 8  1.gf3 c5 2.c4 gc6 3.d4 cd 4.ge4  .............................. 81
          a) 4... e5  .................................................. 83
          b) 4... d5  .................................................. 83
          c) 4... ge6  .................................................. 85
          d) 4... e6  .................................................. 88
Chapter 9
 1. d3 c5 2. c4 e6 3. d4 cd 4. d4 e6
  
  5. c3 ............................................................... 93
  5. g3 d4; 5... e5; 5... a5 ....................................... 95
  5. g3 b6 6. c2 ...................................................... 96

Chapter 10
 1. d3 c5 2. c4 e6 3. d4 cd 4. d4 e6 5. g3 e6 6. g2
  
  a) 6... b6 ............................................................ 101
  b) 6... e7 ............................................................. 104

Chapter 11
 1. d3 c5 2. c4 e6 3. d4 cd 4. d4 e6 5. g3 e6 6. g2  
  
  a) 7... e7 ............................................................ 112
  b) 7... b4 ............................................................. 117

Chapter 12
 1. d3 c5 2. c4 e6 3. d4 cd 4. d4 e6 5. g3 e6 6. g2  
  
  a) 7... d2 ............................................................ 123
  b) 7... c3 various ................................................. 124
  a) 7... d5 ............................................................ 125
  b) 7... a5 ............................................................. 128
  c) 7... 0-0 ............................................................ 131

Part 3. Modern Defence ............................................ 135

Chapter 13
 1. d3 g6 2. c4 g7 3. e4 d6 4. d4  
  
  a) 4... c6 ............................................................ 136
  b) 4... c5; 4... f5; 4... c6 ....................................... 137
  a) 4... g4 5... e2 c6 .............................................. 138
  b) 5... e2 f3 ........................................................ 140
Index of Variations

Chapter 14  1.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f3 g6 2.c4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)g7 3.e4 d6 4.d4 e5 5.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c3

5... \(\mathcal{A}\)g4 ................................................................. 144
a) 5... d7 ................................................................. 145
b) 5... \(\mathcal{Q}\)c6 ................................................................. 148
c) 5... ed ................................................................. 151

Chapter 15  1.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f3 d6 2.d4

2... \(\mathcal{Q}\)c6 ................................................................. 156
2... \(\mathcal{A}\)g4 ................................................................. 157

Chapter 16  1.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f3 d6 2.d4 g6 3.c4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)g7 4.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c3

a) 4... \(\mathcal{A}\)g4 ................................................................. 163
b) 4... e5 ................................................................. 167

Part 4. Dutch Defence ....................................................... 170

Chapter 17  1.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f3 f5 2.c4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f6 3.g3

a) 3... d6 ................................................................. 173
b) 3... b6 ................................................................. 175

Chapter 18  1.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f3 f5 2.c4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f6 3.g3 e6 4.\(\mathcal{A}\)g2

4... c6; 4... c5 ................................................................. 179
a) 4... d5 5.0-0 \(\mathcal{A}\)d6 ................................................................. 180
b) 5.0-0 c6 ................................................................. 183

Chapter 19  1.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f3 f5 2.c4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f6 3.g3 e6 4.\(\mathcal{A}\)g2 \(\mathcal{A}\)e7 5.0-0 d5

6.d3 ................................................................. 186
6.d4 0-0 7.\(\mathcal{A}\)c2 various ................................................................. 189
Index of Variations

6.d4 0-0 7...c2 c6 8...bd2 various ........................................... 190
a) 7...c2 c6 8...bd2 e4 .................................................. 191
b) 7...c2 c6 8...bd2 d7 .................................................. 193
c) 7...c2 c6 8...bd2 e8 .................................................. 194
d) 7...c2 c6 8...bd2 b6 .................................................. 198

Chapter 20 1.d3 f5 2.c4 g6 3.g3 e6 4.g2 e7 5.0-0 0-0

6.b3 ................................................................. 200
a) 6.d4 e4 .............................................................. 201
b) 6.d4 d6 7...c3 h8; 7...h8; 7...bd7 ..................................... 203
   b1) 7...c3 c6 ......................................................... 204
   b2) 7...c3 c6 ......................................................... 206
   b3) 7...c3 e4 ......................................................... 209

Chapter 21 1.d3 f5 2.c4 g6 3.g3 e6 4.g2 e7 5.0-0 0-0 6.d4 d6

7...c3 a5 8.b3

a) 8... e4 .............................................................. 211
b) 8... a6 9...b2 various ................................................ 213
   b1) 9...b2 e8 ......................................................... 214
   b2) 9...b2 c6 ......................................................... 216

Chapter 22 1.d3 f5 2.c4 g6 3.g3 e6 4.g2 e7 5.0-0 0-0 6.d4 d6

7...c3 e8 8.b3

a) 8... h5 .............................................................. 218
b) 8... c6 .............................................................. 221
c) 8... bd7 .............................................................. 223
d) 8... c6 .............................................................. 224
e) 8... a5 .............................................................. 226

Chapter 23 1.d3 f5 2.c4 g6 3.g3 g6 4.g2 g7 5...c3 0-0 6.d4

6... c6 .............................................................. 228
Index of Variations

Chapter 24  1.\(\triangle f3\) f5 2.c4 \(\triangle f6\) 3.g3 g6 4.\(\triangle g2\) \(\triangle g7\) 5.\(\triangle c3\) 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.0-0

7... e6; 7... a5. ................................................................. 232

a) 7... \(\triangle c6\) 8.d5 \(\triangle a5\) 9.\(\triangle a4\) b6. ......................................................... 233

a1) 9.\(\triangle a4\) c5 10.dc bc ........................................... 234

a2) 9.\(\triangle a4\) c5 10.dc \(\triangle c6\) ........................................... 237

b) 7... \(\triangle c6\) 8.d5 \(\triangle e5\) ........................................................ .. 242

Chapter 25  1.\(\triangle f3\) f5 2.c4 \(\triangle f6\) 3.g3 g6 4.\(\triangle g2\) \(\triangle g7\) 5.\(\triangle c3\) 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.0-0

a) 7... c6 ................................................................. 246

a) 7... \(\triangle a6\) ............................................................. 248

Chapter 26  1.\(\triangle f3\) f5 2.c4 \(\triangle f6\) 3.g3 g6 4.\(\triangle g2\) \(\triangle g7\) 5.\(\triangle c3\) 0-0 6.d4 d6 7.0-0 \(\triangle e8\) 8.d5

a) 8... e5 ................................................................. 251

b) 8... \(\triangle a6\) ............................................................. 253

c) 8... a5 ................................................................. 266

Part 5. Rare Lines. ................................................. 269

Chapter 27  1.\(\triangle f3\) b6

2.d4 ................................................................. 271

a) 2.e4 \(\triangle b7\) 3.\(\triangle c3\) c5. ......................................................... 272

b) 2.e4 \(\triangle b7\) 3.\(\triangle c3\) e6. ......................................................... 275

Chapter 28  1.\(\triangle f3\) b5 2.e4

a) 2... a6 ................................................................. 287

b) 2... \(\triangle b7\). ........................................................... 293
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