Opening for White according to Kramnik

1. e4 f3

Alexander Khalifman
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Book II Anti-Nimzo-Indian
Anti-Queen’s Indian
English Opening (with 1...e6)
“Knight Tango”

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Dear Chessfriends,

The present book completes our research of White’s possibilities of how to achieve an opening advantage in response to Black’s move 1...\( \mathcal{C} \)f6. Here I explain methods of struggle against such Black’s opening constructions as the Nimzo–Indian (e6, \( \mathcal{A} \)b4) and the Queen’s Indian (b6, \( \mathcal{A} \)b7). To avoid a direct clash with these variations, White has to refuse the advancement of the d–pawn on his second move and to prefer 2.c2–c4. Thus Black has the right to choose which of continuations he will prefer.

Black pieces’ influence on the centre is very typical of these above–mentioned openings, whereas playing by central pawns, as a rule, is postponed for some time. Until White has not defined the place of his central d–pawn, this Black’s opening strategy loses its force in many respects. There is no weakening of the e4–square that usual is after the move 1.d2–d4, because the white d–pawn, before going far away to the d4–square, is always ready to clear the neighbour e4–square from opponent’s pieces by means of d2–d3. Moreover, the attractiveness of the Nimzo–Indian Defence for Black is closely connected with a dead pin on the c3–knight. Thanks to White’s delay with the move d2–d4 in our case there is no such pin. In other words, White cannot prevent Black from developing according to scheme of the Nimzo–Indian or Queen’s Indian but he does not let Black play against the e4–square. Parts 1 and 2 of the book are devoted to this problem.

Parts 3 – 5 acquaint us with the English Opening. In Part 3 such popular constructions as the Hedgehog and the Double Fianchetto are examined in detail. Knowing about White’s desire to move d2–d4 early or late, Black often prepares to open the play in the centre beforehand by means of c7–c5. The fifth Part of the book is wholly devoted to this problem. The small but rather capacious
Part 4 stands separately. Black is not content with waiting for White’s move d2–d4, but strives for opening the play by d7–d5 as soon as possible, with the purpose of capturing space in the centre of the board, if circumstances allow to do it.

The opening analysis ends with an original construction, where Black does not hurry to define the position of his central pawns but at first brings his knights into play.

Playing these opening variations, the winning outcome of the game often becomes obvious after the middlegame or even in the ending, so there are several illustrative games of modern top–grandmasters with comments in the end of the book. The special emphasis at the selection of these games is laid on endings, which are typical of opening structures that are examined in the present book.

_A. Khalifman, 14th World Chess Champion_
Part 1. Anti–Nimzo-Indian
1.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash f3}}} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash f6}}} 2.c4 e6 3.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash c3}}}

3...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash b4}}}

Black selects a development scheme along the lines of Nimzo-Indian Defence (1.d4 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash f6}}} 2.c4 e6 3.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash c3}}} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash b4}}}), though the missing White pawn on the d4-square brings about considerable difference. First of all, in the majority of cases there is no chronic weakening of White’s e4 square, as is often the case with Nimzo-Indian Defence. Secondly, White quite often manages to set up the \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash c3}}} + \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash b2}}} piece battery, which exerts strong pressure on the opponent’s kingside exactly because the advance of the d–pawn is delayed a little. Thirdly, White keeps open the possibility to revert to the major lines of the classical Nimzo-Indian Defence at a convenient point.

Of all the other options we will note 3...d5 and 3...b6. In the first case, 4.d4 brings about a position typical of the Queen’s Gambit, which is discussed in the Book 4. The possible developments following 3...b6 are considered in Chapter 5, and also in Part 2. As to the 3...c5 move, after 4.g3 the game can divert both to the “hedgehog” system, analysed in Part 3, in case of 4...b6, and to the symmetrical system, discussed in Part 5, following 4...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash c6}}}.

The move 4...d5 converts the game to Tarrasch Defence, which will be considered in the Book 4.

4.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash c2}}}

White proceeds according to the classical system in Nimzo-Indian Defence. The other lines are considerably less promising.

After 4.g3 0–0 5.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash g2}}} Black’s simplest way to equalise is 5...d5 6.a3 (in case of 6.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash b3}}} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash c6}}} 7.d4 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash e4}}} Black’s game is also good: 8.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash c2}}} \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash d6}}} 9.cd ed 10.0-0 \textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash f5}}} 11.\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash b3=}}} with a draw in game Kramnik – Khalifman, Germany 1996) 6...\textit{\texttt{\textbf{\textbackslash e7}}} 7.d4 dxc4. The situation which has emerged closely resembles one of the variations of the Catalan Ope-
ning, with the following difference – the White a-pawn is on a3, and not on a2. This subtlety is rather to Black’s advantage, since in a number of variations the weakness of the b3 square can make itself felt. A possible continuation is 8.\textit{\textipa{c}e5} \textit{\textipa{c}c6} 9.\textit{\textipa{x}c6} bxc6 10.\textit{\textipa{x}c6} e8 11.\textit{\textipa{x}e7+} \textit{\textipa{xe7}} 12.\textit{\textipa{a}4} c5! (in case of 12...e5?! following 13.d5 White has a large advantage according to V.Kramnik, and if Black chooses 12...a5?!, then after the strong 13.\textit{\textipa{g}5!} \textit{\textipa{a}6} 14.0-0 c5 15.\textit{\textipa{x}f6} gxf6 16.\textit{\textipa{a}d1} cxd4 17.\textit{\textipa{x}d4=} Kramnik – Salov, Madrid 1993, White’s game is excellent) 13.\textit{\textipa{xc}4} cxd4 14.\textit{\textipa{x}d}4 e5 15.\textit{\textipa{h}4} (if 15.\textit{\textipa{b}4}, then 15...\textit{\textipa{e}6=}) 15...\textit{\textipa{e}6} 16.0-0 \textit{\textipa{a}6} 17.\textit{\textipa{d}1} h6= Nogueiras – Salov, Biel 1993, Black has good compensation for the pawn, due to the weak White squares in the opponent’s camp.

Every so often one meets the continuation 4.\textit{\textipa{b}3} with the idea to clarify the intentions of the Black bishop without detriment to one’s own pawn structure. However, in this case following 4...c5 5.g3 (after 5.a3 \textit{\textipa{a}5} 6.g3 0-0 7.\textit{\textipa{g}2} \textit{\textipa{c}6} 8.0-0 d5 9.d3 Black has at his disposal the seemingly inconsistent, though rather strong continuation 9...\textit{\textipa{x}c3}?! 10.\textit{\textipa{xc}3} d4, and now due to the fact, that the White queen is denied the a3-square, following 11.\textit{\textipa{c}e2} e5! 12.\textit{\textipa{d}2} a5 13.b4 axb4 14.axb4 \textit{\textipa{a}1} 15.\textit{\textipa{a}1} cxb4 16.\textit{\textipa{b}1} e7 17.\textit{\textipa{b}2} b3 18.\textit{\textipa{xb}3} e4= Black’s play in the centre counterbalances his opponent’s bishop pair advantage, Pachman – Polugaevsky, Mar del Plata 1962) 5...\textit{\textipa{c}6} 6.\textit{\textipa{g}2} (6.a3 is impertinent at this point because of 6...\textit{\textipa{x}c3} 7.\textit{\textipa{x}c3} \textit{\textipa{a}5} and if 8.\textit{\textipa{c}2}, then 8...b5!= with convenient play for Black) 6...0-0 7.0-0 d6 (Black’s position is not bad also after 7...d5 8.d3 h6=) 8.d3 h6 (the immediate 8...e5, must take into account the unpleasant 9.\textit{\textipa{g}5=} with the idea \textit{\textipa{c}3}–d5) 9.e3 e5 10.a3 \textit{\textipa{a}5} White’s queen stands in the way of his own b-pawn, which conspicuously reduces his chances to obtain an advantage. A possible continuation is 11.\textit{\textipa{d}2} \textit{\textipa{d}7!} (after 11...\textit{\textipa{e}7}?! White has at his disposal the typical 12.\textit{\textipa{d}5!} \textit{\textipa{x}d}5 13.\textit{\textipa{x}d}5 \textit{\textipa{x}d}2 14.\textit{\textipa{x}d}2 \textit{\textipa{b}8} 15.\textit{\textipa{d}4=} allowing him to obtain a perceptible advantage, Kramnik – Hracek, Berlin 1996) 12.\textit{\textipa{d}5} \textit{\textipa{b}8} 13.f4 exf4 14.gxf4 \textit{\textipa{e}8=}, which leads to a position with reciprocal chances, Van Wely – Timman, Breda (m/9) 1998.

![Chess Diagram](image_url)
move four, as a rule Black makes his choice among the following lines: 4...d5 (Chapter 1), 4...c5 (Chapter 2), and 4...0–0 (Chapter 3, 4). Also worth mentioning is 4...c6. After 5.a3  Nxc3 6. bxc3 a5 (following 6...d6 7.b4 0–0 8. b2 e5 9.e3 the game is reduced to the Chapter 3 variation considered below, and if 6...d5, then a possible line is 7.e3 0–0 8.b4  Bxe4 9. c2  g5 10. b2  d7 11. cxd5  xf3+ 12. gxf3 exd5 13. g1 f6 14. d3 with a strong White attack, Bareev – Rozentalis, Pula 1997) 7.b3 d6 White can by way of 8.d4!? lead the game to the so called Swiss variation of the Classical system of Nimzo-Indian Defence. There are records of 8...0–0 9. b2 e8 (after 9...e7 10.e3 e8 11.e2 e5 another possibility is the plan directed against the e5–pawn, 12.dxe5 dxe5 13.0–0  g4 14.h3 h5 15.fe1 with certain White pressure, Kasparov – Haldemann, Basel (simultane) 1988) 10.d1 e7 11.d5 exd5 (if 11... b8 12.e3 e5, a possibility is 13.d2 c6 14.e4 d7 to 14... h5 unpleasant is 15.c5! – 15.e2 with somewhat more pleasant play for White) 12.cxd5 e5 13.e3 g4 14.e2 e4 15. d4 f5 16.h3 xf3 17.gxf3 g5 18.f4 with superior chances for White, Rashkovsky – Estremeira, Linares 2000.

The move 4...b6 has no significance on its own, since it only slightly limits Black’s options. Then one could proceed 5.a3 Nxc3 6.bxc3 b7 7.e3, which steers the game to the variation discussed in Chapter 5.
Chapter 1

1.\( \text{\#f3} \) \( \text{\#f6} \) 2.\( \text{c4} \) e6 3.\( \text{\#c3} \) \( \text{\#b4} \) 4.\( \text{\#c2} \) d5

5.a3

This way White tries to obtain and later benefit from the so-called bishop-pair advantage. The other line 5.\( \text{\#a4} \) \( \text{\#c6} \) promises no chances for obtaining an advantage, which is the price paid for the time lost on several moves with the queen at the beginning.

5...\( \text{\#xc3} \)

In case of 5...\( \text{\#e7} \) 6.d4 a position from Book 4 emerges (Queen’s Gambit), but with a significant difference – the White pawn stands on a3 already, and not on a2. Taking into account the fact, that in the variation 1.\( \text{\#f3} \) d5 2.d4 \( \text{\#f6} \) 3.c4 e6 4.\( \text{\#c3} \) \( \text{\#e7} \) 5.\( \text{\#c2} \) the best reply is 5...\( \text{\#a6} \) (ref. Book 4) the presence of the pawn on a3 can be considered an important plus in White’s position.

6.\( \text{\#xc3} \) 0–0

After 6...\( \text{dxc4} \) White gets convenient play by way of 7.e3, since to 7...\( \text{b5} \) there is the sufficiently strong 8.b3 \( \text{cxb3} \) 9.\( \text{\#xb5+} \) with an advantage.

7.e3

The move 7.b4, which occurs from time to time, following 7...c5 (insufficient for complete equality is 7...a5, because of 8.\( \text{\#b2} \) \( \text{\#bd7} \) 9.cxd5 exd5 10.\( \text{\#c1} \) axb4 11.axb4 c6 12.e3 \( \text{\#b6} \) 13.\( \text{\#d4} \) \( \text{\#f5} \) 14.d3 \( \text{\#a2} \) 15.\( \text{\#e2} \) \( \text{\#a8} \) 16.\( \text{\#a1} \) \( \text{\#Tmoschenko} \) – Ju.Nikolaev, Bad Woerishofen 1998, while 7...\( \text{dxc4} \) 8.\( \text{\#xc4} \) b6 9.\( \text{\#b2} \) c6 10.g4!? a5 11.g5 like in the Komarov – Razuvayev game, Reggio Emilia, 1997, could have brought a complex position with mutual chances after 11...\( \text{\#d5} \) 12.\( \text{\#c3} \) axb4 13.axb4 \( \text{\#xa1} \) 14.\( \text{\#xa1} \) \( \text{\#a2=} \) 8.e3 (no good is 8.bxc5, due to 8...\( \text{\#e4} \) 9.\( \text{\#c2} \) \( \text{\#a5} \) 10.e3 \( \text{\#a6} \) 11.\( \text{\#e2} \) \( \text{\#xc5} \) 12.0–0 \( \text{\#d7} \) 13.\( \text{\#b1} \) \( \text{\#a4=} \) Pitam – Kurajica, Benasque 1999) 8...b6 confronts us with a position from the variation discussed later in the main line.

7...b6 8.b4 c5

12
The position after 8...a6 9.b2c5 10.d3 is considered below.

9.b2

The attempt to open up the position in the centre, in order to exploit consequently the strength of White’s dark-squared bishop via 9.bxc5 bxc5 10.cxd5 is premature, on account of 10...e4! (the absence of White’s dark-squared bishop on b2 tells) 11.c2 exd5 12.e2 f5! 13.d3 a5+ 14.d2 f6 15.b2 bd7= Eingorn – Sunye Neto, Havana 1986.

9.a6 10.d3 bd7 11.e2 c8 12.b5

Of no avail is 12.0–0 in view of 12...dxc4 13.dxc4 cxb4 14.axb4 xc4! 15.xc4 b5 16 xa7 xc4= with equality.

12...b7 13.a4

It is entirely possible to play 13.0–0 c7 (to 13...e7 in the Ftacnik – Ambroz game, Baile Herculane 1982, White should have simply proceeded by 14. a4!?±) 14.a4 fd8 (if Black is preparing the e6–e5 advance by 14...fe8, then White can rely on some advantage after 15.e5 xe5 16 xe5 xe5 17 xe5 d7 18.b2±) 15.a5 f8 16. e5±, White’s chances are somewhat superior, Xu Jun – Korchnoi, Linares 1998.

13.e8

An acceptable reply to 13...e8 is 14.e5 xe5 15 xe5 c7 16.a5±, with a slightly more pleasant position for White.

14.0–0 f6 15.b3 d6 16.a5±

White’s bishop–pair advantage and his spatial preponderance on the queenside determine his small advantage overall, Eingorn – King, Dortmund 1988.
Chapter 2

1.dıf3 dıf6 2.c4 e6 3.dıc3 dıb4 4.ııc2 c5

5.a3

This is the best time to clarify the intentions of the Black bishop. After 5.g3 dıc6 to 6.a3 an adequate reply could be 6...dıxc3 7.ııxc3 ııa5 and in case of 8.ııc2 (if 8.ııxa5 ııxa5 with the idea 9...dıb3=, Black's prospects are good), then 8...b5! with comfortable play for Black.

5...dıa5

Following 5...dıxc3 6.ııxc3 Black has a wide choice of lines, but every so often one way or another the game steers to the variation discussed in Chapter 4. Of all the original continuations, the variation 6...b6 is worth a closer look (in case of 6...d6 or 6...ıı0-ıı0 White competes for the upper hand by 7.b4; similarly after 6...dıc6 7.b4 b6 8.e3 0-0 9.ııb2 d6 10.ııe2 e5 – at this point of the T.Ivanov – Yemelin game, Novgorod 1999, White could have contested for the advantage by way of 11.b5!? ııe7 12.d4±, and, finally, should Black counter the queenside clamp by 6...a5, then White proceeds simply by 7.b3 to be followed by ııc1-b2) 7.b4 ııa6 (after 7...ııe7 8.e3 0-0 9.ııe2 ııb7 the game steers into the Chapter 4) 8.e3 ııe7 9.b5 ııc7 10.ııe2 ııb7 11.0-0 0-0 12.ııb2 (according to V.Kramnik worth attention is also 12.a4!? a5 13.d4 ± with an advantage) 12...d6 (to 12...d5 there is the simple option 13.d3± with a position, similar to the one discussed in the Chapter 1) 13.a4 a5 14.ııae1 ııae8 (14...e5 is a cue for 15.d4±, to 14...ııad8 one can reply by 15. d3!, and now in case of 15...e5 deliver the typical stroke in the centre 16.d4± with a slight advantage) 15.d4! ııe4 16.ııc1 f5 (to the attempt to cover up the dark squares in the centre with the help of 16...f6 there is also the rather appealing 17.ııd2 ııxd2 18.ııxd2± with superior chances for White) 17.ııd2±, in the Kram- nik – Lobron game, Dortmund
1996, White confidently overtook the initiative in the centre, owing much to the fact, that his dark-squared bishop has no opponent.

6.g3

The plan starting with 6.e3 has little popularity recently in view of 6...d5?! is bad because of the typical 7.a4! b6 8.axb1 axa6 9.cxd5 exd5 10.b5+ e8 11.0-0 b7 12.d4± with a very good position for White, Smyslov – Matanovic, Monte Carlo 1967) 7.d4 (to 7...e2, this time entirely pertinent is 7...d5 8.a4 b6 9.b3 dxc4 10.bxc4 c6 11.b2 e8 12.a3 xc3 13.xc3 e5 14.0-0 g4 15.d3 e7= with even chances, Zhe-liandinov – Sulypa, Lvov 1999) 7...b6 8.e2 a6 9.0-0 xc3 10.xc3 cxd4 11.xd4 (to 11. exd4 evens out 11...d5 12.b3 b7=) 11...d5= Ree – Tal, Wijk aan Zee 1976.

6...c6

The attempt to occupy the centre by 6...0-0 7.g2 d5 meets the rather typical for this variation opposition 8.a4! (after 8.0-0 dxc4 9.d1 b7 10.xc4 b8 11.b3 b5=, Black's prospects are good, Oney – Speelman, Malta (ol) 1980) 8...c6 (8...bd7 can be matched by the simple 9.0-0 dxc4 10.xc4 e7 11.d4 cxd4 12.b4 d8 13.xd4 e5 14.c3 e4 15.d4± with an advantage, Razuvaev – Garcia Gonzalez, Cienfuegos 1976) 8... a6, and now worth attention is 9.xc5?! (following 9.0-0 d7 10.d3 c8 11.e5 c8 12.c3 c7 13.f3 d4= Black has nothing to worry about, Dzhindzhiashvili – Rohde, New York 1992) 9.xc5 10.b4 e4 (with the other continuations White's chances are also slightly superior: 10...dxc4 11.xc4± or 10... b6 11.bxc5 xxc5 12.cxd5 xd5 13.b2± with a small advantage) 11.axa5 xa5 12.0-0, White's position is to be preferred.

7.g2 0-0

The attempt to revisit the idea discussed in the note to White's move five, regardless of the lost tempo, by 7...xc3 8.xc3 a5 meets the energetic reply 9.b4! (weaker is 9.c2, because of 9...b5! 10.e5 d4 11.d1 b8 12.e3 f5= with superior chances for Black, while in case of 9.d3 xc3+ 10.bxc3 c7= the position is even) 9...xb4 10.axb4 xb4 11.xb4! (a less clear situation results from the line 11.c2 0-0 12.a3 a5 13.0-0 e8 14.d6 f5=) 11...xb4 12.d4 d5 (after 12...e5 13.a3 d3+ 14.exd3 exd4 15.0-0± the condition of the Black king, in spite of the queen exchange, is unenviable, and in case of 12...a6 13.a4 c6 14.b5 b8 15.d6+ f8 16.a3 g8 17.0-0 b5 following the forced 18.axb5 axb5 19.xb5 xxb5 20.xc6 dxc6 21.a8 h5 22.xc8+ h7 23.xc6±, White emerges with an extra pawn, while with the relatively superior 12.c6 13.b5 0-0 14.a3± White has good compensation for the pawn)
13.\( \text{a3} \) \( \text{c6} \) 14.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{d7} \) 15.\( \text{d6} \) \( \text{f8} \) (with the other lines Black can hardly avoid the big troubles ahead, e.g., 15...\( \text{e5} \) 16.\( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{dxd5} \) 17.\( \text{f4} \)±, or 15...\( \text{d4} \) 16.\( \text{c1} \)±, or 15...\( \text{d8} \) 16.0–0± with a sizeable advantage for White in all cases) 16.\( \text{c1} \) \( \text{b6} \) (inadequate is 16...\( \text{a5} \) due to 17.\( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{dxd5} \) 18.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{cb4} \) 19.\( \text{xb4} \) \( \text{axb4} \) 20.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{exd5} \) 21.\( \text{b6} \)± with a win, and after 16...\( \text{e7} \) 17.\( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{fxd5} \) 18.e4, wherever the Black knight retreats, White gets good compensation for the pawn by 19.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{g4} \) 17.\( \text{e7} \) (deficient is 17...\( \text{xg4} \) in view of 18.\( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{exd5} \) 19.\( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{ge5} \) 20.\( \text{f4} \)± and White wins, and after 17...\( \text{h6} \) White prepares the \( g4-g5 \) advance by 18.\( \text{h4} \) 18.\( \text{g5} \), White has more than sufficient compensation for the pawn, Kramnik – Romanishin, Belgrade 1993.

8.0–0

Black stands at a parting. His usual choices are a) 8...\( \text{e7} \) and b) 8...\( \text{d6} \). The other lines are glaringly weaker. E.g., the active 8...\( \text{d5} \) is bad, because 9.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{b6} \) 10.\( \text{cxd5} \) \( \text{exd5} \) 11.\( \text{b4} \)± and White wins a piece. In case of the immediate exchange 8...\( \text{xc3} \) White follow 9.\( \text{xc3} \) \( \text{e7} \) by a stroke in the centre 10.\( \text{d4} \) 16.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{xc5} \) 12.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{d4} \) 13.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{d7} \) 14.\( \text{f4} \)±, with an advantage, Polugaevsky – Jacobsen, Kislovodsk 1972. Black does not steer clear of the difficulties also by the slow-going 8...\( \text{a6} \), since after 9.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{e7} \) (the active 9...\( \text{d4} \)±) is contraindicated for Black because of 10.\( \text{cxd4} \) \( \text{cxd4} \) 11.\( \text{e4} \) \( \text{e8} \) 12.\( \text{b4} \) \( \text{b6} \) 13.\( \text{b2} \) 14.\( \text{c5} \)± Furman – Kuindzhi, Tbilisi 1973) 10.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{cxd4} \) 11.\( \text{cxd4} \) \( \text{cxd4} \) 12.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{b8} \) 13.\( \text{b4} \) \( \text{c7} \) 14.\( \text{b2} \)±, White obtains a significant advantage, Polugaevsky – Csom, USSR 1968.

a) 8...\( \text{e7} \)

At this point White can choose to compete by both the unhurried a1) 9.\( \text{d3} \) and the more aggressive a2) 9.\( \text{e3} \). The other lines are weaker. Thus in case of 9.\( \text{d1} \) Black blocks the centre by 9...\( \text{e5} \) and consequently the rook move is of little utility. After 10.\( \text{d3} \), while protecting from the bishop thrust at \( g5 \) by 10...\( \text{h6} \)±, Black has nearly evened out the game.

If White tries to set up the b2–b4 advance by 9.\( \text{b1} \), then Black can intervene by 9...\( \text{d8} \) (weaker is 9...\( \text{xc3} \) 10.\( \text{xc3} \) \( \text{e5} \) 11.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{h6} \) 12.\( \text{b4} \) \( \text{d6} \) 13.\( \text{b2} \)±, and White's position is still to be preferred, W.Schmidt – Romanishin, Belgrade 1988), initiate counterplay in the centre following 10.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{h6} \) 11.\( \text{a2} \) by way of 11...\( \text{d5} \)±, and
even out.

**a1) 9.d3**

![Diagram](image)

**9...d6**

After 9...a6 White obtains superior chances by preparing the queening breakthrough via 10.♗b1 (weaker is 10.e3 due to 10...♗b8 11.b3 b5= Cebalo – Hulak, Pula 1998) 10...♗b8 11.♕f4! d6 12.♖a2 ♗c7 13.b4±, with superior chances, Polugaevsky – Huebner, Palma de Majorca 1970.

In case of 9...h6, White should focus on the preparation of the d3–d4 advance by way of 10.e3 (less good is 10.♗b1, since at this point Black’s prophylactic move nine will be of service to him, and following 10...e5 11.e3 ♘xc3 12.♗xc3 a5 White do not manage to pull up the knight by 13.♕e1 ♕d8 14.♗c2, because of 14...♕d5=) 10...d6 (inadequate is 10...♕d5?! due to 11.cxd5 exd5 12.♖a4 ♗d7 13.♗d2 ♘d6 14.♗b3 ♘b6 15.e4± with a substantial advantage, and in case of 10...♕d8?! strong is 11.d4 cxd4 12.exd4 d5 13.b4± with the idea c4–c5 and b4–b5) 10...d6 11.b3 ♘d7 (to 11...d5 White is well advised to react by 12.cxd5 exd5 13.♖a4 b6 14.d4± with an advantage, and in case of 11...♗xc3 12.♖xc3 e5 White successfully completes a well-known knight manoeuvre preparing the breakthrough in the centre 13.♖e1! a5 14.♗c2 ♕d8 15.d4± with superior chances) 12.♗b2 ♘ab8 13.d4 cxd4 (to 13...♖xc8 there is 14.d5 exd5 15.♖xd5 ♘xd5 16.cxd5 ♕d8 17.e4± with an advantage) 14.exd4 ♖xc8 15.b4 ♘d8 16.♖f1 ♗f8 17.♗d3 ♘e7 18.♖d2 ♖b6 19.♗b3 a5 20.d5 e5 21.♗b5!±, White’s chances are superior, Lombardy – Polugaevsky, Reykjavik 1978.

**10.♗b1**

The preparation of the d3–d4 advance by 10.e3 is late, because of 10...♖d7!, and following 11.♕d1 (to 11.d4 there is 11...♗xc3 12.♖xc3 d5 13.cxd5 cxd4 14.♗xd4 ♘xd4=) 11...♖ac8 12.♖d2 d5= Black evens out the game, Forintos – Csöm, Kecskemét 1972.

**10...h6 11.♖a2**


**11...d5 12.b4!**

As we will see later, weaker is 12.cxd5 exd5 13.b4 ♕b6=. 12...♗b6

One cannot capture the pawn and get away with it. After 12...cxb4 13.axb4 ♕xb4? White obtain a winning position by way
of 14.\textsf{\textit{a}3!} 15.\textsf{\textit{x}e}2 15.\textsf{\textit{x}e}7 16.\textsf{\textit{a}6}. 16.\textsf{\textit{xf}6} \textsf{\textit{gxf}6} 17.\textsf{\textit{fc}1} 18.\textsf{\textit{b}3+-}.

13.\textsf{\textit{e}3}!!

This move, which has been pointed out by M. Tal, is stronger than 13.\textsf{\textit{cxd}5} \textsf{\textit{exd}5} 14.\textsf{\textit{b}2} \textsf{\textit{xb}4} 15.\textsf{\textit{x}b}4 \textsf{\textit{xb}4} 16.\textsf{\textit{ax}b}4 \textsf{\textit{g}4} 17.\textsf{\textit{e}5} \textsf{\textit{d}4=} Tal  Po\textsf{lug}aevsky, Erevan 1975.

13...\textsf{\textit{d}xc}4 14.\textsf{\textit{d}xc}4 \textsf{\textit{e}5} 15.\textsf{\textit{d}2}±

White's plans involving \textsf{\textit{c}1\text{-b}2\text{-c}3} to be followed by \textsf{\textit{b}3} with a slight White advantage.

a2) 9.\textsf{\textit{e}3}!!

A rather promising continuation. White starts immediate preparation for the \textsf{\textit{d}2\text{-d}4} push.

![Diagram of chessboard]

9...\textsf{\textit{d}5}

A matter of principle. White's play in the centre cannot be constrained by 9...\textsf{\textit{e}5}?! due to 10.\textsf{\textit{d}5} 11.\textsf{\textit{cxd}5} 12.\textsf{\textit{d}4} \textsf{\textit{cxd}4} 13.\textsf{\textit{ex}d}4 \textsf{\textit{e}4} 14.\textsf{\textit{g}5} \textsf{\textit{f}5} 15.\textsf{\textit{c}5}± with an advantage. After 9...\textsf{\textit{d}6} Black must take into account 10.\textsf{\textit{d}4} and following 10...\textsf{\textit{xc}3} 11.\textsf{\textit{xc}3} 12.\textsf{\textit{ex}d}5 \textsf{\textit{cxd}4} 13.\textsf{\textit{xc}4} 14.\textsf{\textit{xc}5}± White's chances are superior, similarly after 9...\textsf{\textit{d}8} 10.\textsf{\textit{d}4}±. Following 9...\textsf{\textit{c}7} 10.\textsf{\textit{d}4} \textsf{\textit{d}5} 11.\textsf{\textit{cxd}5} \textsf{\textit{exd}5} 12.\textsf{\textit{d}5} 13.\textsf{\textit{b}4} \textsf{\textit{e}7} 14.\textsf{\textit{b}5} \textsf{\textit{b}6} 15.\textsf{\textit{b}2} \textsf{\textit{g}4} 16.\textsf{\textit{bd}4±} White obtained superior play, owing to the isolated Black pawn, Rayner-Deleyn, Groningen 1974.

10.\textsf{\textit{a}4}!

A typical device to force the Black \textsf{d}-pawn.

10...\textsf{\textit{d}xc}4

An attempt to advance the Black \textsf{d}-pawn still farther 10...\textsf{\textit{d}4} 11.\textsf{\textit{ex}d}4 \textsf{\textit{xd}4} (in case of 11...\textsf{\textit{cxd}4}? 12.\textsf{\textit{b}4} \textsf{\textit{c}7} 13.\textsf{\textit{b}5} \textsf{\textit{e}5} 14.\textsf{\textit{xd}4±} Black loses a pawn without any genuine compensation) 12.\textsf{\textit{xd}4} \textsf{\textit{cxd}4} 13.\textsf{\textit{b}4}± brings Black to a situation in which he will have to struggle against White's queening pawn offensive, which is, furthermore, actively supported by the \textsf{g2-bishop}.

11.\textsf{\textit{xc}4} \textsf{\textit{d}7}

No good was 11...\textsf{\textit{b}6}? because of 12.\textsf{\textit{b}4}±, while after 11...\textsf{\textit{b}6} 12.\textsf{\textit{b}4} \textsf{\textit{xc}4} 13.\textsf{\textit{ax}b}4± Black noticeably loses ground in the centre and stands worse. The justification of White's design is that 13...\textsf{\textit{xb}4}? is not playable, in view of 14.\textsf{\textit{xb}6+-}, neither is 13...\textsf{\textit{xb}4}? on account of 14.\textsf{\textit{xb}4} \textsf{\textit{xb}4} 15.\textsf{\textit{xb}6+-}.

12.\textsf{\textit{d}4} \textsf{\textit{b}6}

In the alternative line 12...\textsf{\textit{cxd}4}, after 13.\textsf{\textit{xd}4} \textsf{\textit{xd}4} (to 13...\textsf{\textit{c}e}5 there is 14.\textsf{\textit{c}2}± with a slight edge) 14.\textsf{\textit{xd}4}?! (in case of 14.\textsf{\textit{xd}4} one has to take into account 14...\textsf{\textit{e}5}, since after 15.
\[ \text{c4 b8= Black obtains counterplay based on b7-b5) 14...b6 (if 14...f6, then 15.f4 with superior chances for White, since Black cannot easily complete his development) 15.b5 d7} \]

White highlights the weakness of Black's b7-pawn by 16.c5+, at the same time the immediate 16.xa5 is less adequate due to 16...xa4= and Black has no problems.

13.xb6 xb6

Black cannot even out completely also after 13.axb6 14.b3 cxd4 15.exd4=. The position of the Black bishop hang-up on a5 is very vulnerable.

14.dxc5 xc5

In case of 14...xc5 15.b4 d6 16.b2= the White pieces also stand more actively.

15.xc5 xc5 16.b4 e7

17.d1 d8

After 17...f6 18.a2= White retains his advantage primarily on account of the active position of his g2-bishop.

18.b2=

White has the upper hand. His light-squared bishop exerts very strong influence on Black's queenside, which seriously impedes its development, San Segundo – Bacrot, Pamplona 1998.

b) 8...d6

9.d3 h6

Black is preparing the e6–e5 push. The immediate 9...e5 meets the unpleasant 10.g5 with the idea d5. Further there is 10...xc3 11.xc3 (on 11.bxc3 White has to take into account 11...h6 12.c1 and now 12...h7 13.e4 f5= with roughly equal chances) 11...h6 12.d2 (in case of 12.xf6 xf6 13.e3 Black evens out by 13...a5! 14.d2 e7=) 12...d4 13.xd4 cxd4 (also in case of 13...exd4 following 14.c2 c7 White can compete for the advantage by 15.e3=) 14.c2 c7 15.e3= White's chances are slightly preferable.

If 9...d7, then following 10.b1 c8 (in case of 10...e7 11.a2 d5 Black has to take into account 12.b4!? cxb4 13.axb4 where after the complications 13...xb4 14.a3 xc2 15.xe7 fe8 16.xf6 gxf6 17.xb7= White's chances are still to be preferred) 11.a2 c7 12.b4=,

10.e3

White aim to carry out the d3–d4 push. Practice has shown that this move cannot be prevented. Following the somewhat unhurried 10.b1 Black manages to regroup his forces well by way of 10...e5 11.e3 e6 12.a2 d7 (no good is 12...d5?! due to 13.b4 cxb4 14.axb4 c7 15.b5=) 13.b4 d8!= retaining a more or less equal position, Kamsky – Karpov, Reggio Emilia 1991.

10...e5

11.d2?!?

The prophylactic 11.h3 seems too leisurely. Following 11...e6 12.h2 c8 13.b3 thanks to 13...d5 14.a4 b6 (inadequate is 14...b6? on account of 15.cxd5 dxd5 16.b2=) 15.d1 d4 16.b1 a6 17.exd4 exd4 18.f4 e8∞ Black is at least not worse, Karpov – Adams, Groningen 1995.

The main line move is also a waiting move. White is on his watch for the best opportunity to make the c3–d5 thrust. To the immediate 11.d5 there is 11...xd5 (weaker is 11...e6 in view of 12.d2 c8 13.b3 h7 14.f4 d7 15.b2 f6 16.e4 f5 17. ec3±, with an advantage, Vaganian – Dautov, Reggio Emilia 1996) 12.cxd5 e7, and now to 13.d2 there is 13...f5= with the intention to counter the push e4 by 14.d4.

11...xc3

At this point to 11...e7 there is the already good looking 12. d5±. In case of 11...e6 12. d5± the play converges to a position, considered in the previous note.

12.xc3 a5 13.b3 e6 14. b2 d7 15.f4 exf4 16.gxf4

White’s chances are preferable, first of all, because of the powerful pressure on the a1–h8 diagonal, and also due to the opportunity to increase his influence on the opponent’s kingside by dispatching the rook to the semi–open g–file, Komiļje- nović – Ehlivest, Dos Hermanas 1998.
Chapter 3

1.\(\text{\textit{f}}3\) \(\text{\textit{f}}6\) 2.\(\text{c}4\) e6 3.\(\text{\textit{c}}3\) \(\text{\textit{b}}4\) 4.\(\text{\textit{c}}2\)

4...0–0

The most elastic continuation. Black leaves open the possibility to advance any pawn in the centre.

5.a3

The take-over of the centre by 5.e4 does not give White anything special. Black can peacefully complete his development by way of 5...d6 (after 5...e5 6.a3 \(\text{\textit{x}}\)xc3 7.dxc3 there is no use in developing the bishop on b7 by 7...b6, in view of 8.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g5 d6 9.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e2 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b7 10.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d2 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)bd7 11.f3 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c5 12.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)f1!± to be followed by 0–0–0, like in the Hort – Sosonko game, Tilburg 1977) 6.a3 (to 6.d4 there is 6...e5 7.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d3 exd4 8.\(\text{\textit{x}}\)xd4 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e8 9.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d2 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a6 10.0–0 and at this point in the Krasenkow – Nikolenko game, Lubniewice 1994, the simplest way to even the game was 10...\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c5! 11.\(\text{\textit{c}}\)c2 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b4=) 6...\(\text{\textit{x}}\)xc3 7.dxc3 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)bd7 8.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g5 a5 9.\(\text{\textit{a}}\)a4 e5 10.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d2 h6 11.\(\text{\textit{h}}\)h4 \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e8 12.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e2 \(\text{\textit{h}}\)h7 13.\(\text{\textit{f}}\)f1 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c5= to be followed by \(\text{\textit{e}}\)e6–f4, Milos – Slipak, Buenos Aires 1988.

5...\(\text{\textit{x}}\)xc3 6.\(\text{\textit{h}}\)xc3 d6

The basic idea of this move is to shut off as soon as possible the long dark diagonal a1–h8 by e7–e5. We will also devote some time later to 6...b6 (Chapter 4). Let us note at once, that in case of 6...c5 7.b4 b6 White is best advised to play 8.e3 (the other possibility 8.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)3 \(\text{\textit{b}}\)b7 9.\(\text{\textit{g}}\)g2 is not so appropriate, since it meets the retort 9...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e7! 10.0–0 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c8 11.d3 d5, and in the game Salov – Aseev, St. Petersburg 1997, in view of the Black pressure on the b4–pawn, White opted for the immediate pressure—releasing 12.bxc5 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)xc5 13.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e3 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c7 14.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b4 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d8! 15. \(\text{\textit{x}}\)xd5 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)xd5 16.\(\text{\textit{d}}\)d2=), otherwise, following 12.\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b2 \(\text{\textit{a}}\)a6! 13.b5 \(\text{\textit{c}}\)c7 on account of the threatening d5–d4 push, Black forced his opponent into 14.e3 and easily evened out by way of 14...a6 15.a4 dxc4 16.dxc4 \(\text{\textit{d}}\)d8=) 8...\(\text{\textit{b}}\)b7 (now 8...\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e7, and after 9.\(\text{\textit{e}}\)e2 d6 10.d4
cxd4 11.exd4 \( \square bd7 \) 12.0–0 \( \square b7 \) 13.\( \square e1 \) \( \square fc8 \) 14.\( \square b3= \) White managed to retain a slight advantage, due to his relative superiority in the centre and his bishop pair, Kramnik – Aseev, Moscow 1992) 9.\( \square e2 \) d6 10.\( \square b2 \) and convert to a position from Chapter 4. It is worth noting, that the position arising after 6...d5 7.e3 has already been discussed under the variation from Chapter 1, and in case of 6...a5 7.b3 c5 8.\( \square b2 \) d6 White can steer the game onto Nimzo-Indian Defence lines by way of 9.d4 (to 9.e3 one has to take into account 9...e5 10.\( \square e2 \) \( \square g4= \) with approximately equal chances) 9...b6 10.e3 (after 10.g3 \( \square bd7 \) 11.\( \square g2 \) \( \square a6 \) 12.0–0 \( \square c8 \) 13.\( \square ac1 \) Black easily obtained good play by way of 13...b5= Brunner – Körchnoi, Switzerland (m/3) 1996) 10...\( \square b7 \) 11.\( \square e2= \) Black will still have to neutralise the potential activity of White’s dark-squared bishop.

7.e3

Following 7.g3 e5 8.\( \square g2 \) a5 9.b3 \( \square c6 \) 10.\( \square b2 \) Black easily even out the play by 10...\( \square g4 \) 11.h3 \( \square h5 \) 12.0–0 and now 12...\( \square e4 \) 13.\( \square c2 \) \( \square c5 \) 14.d3 \( \square xf3 \) 15.\( \square xf3 \) a4 16.b4 \( \square b3 \) 17.\( \square ae1 \) \( \square cd4= \) Larsen – Taimanov, Moscow 1999.

Probably less precise is also 7.b4, in view of the fact, that after 7...b6 8.\( \square b2 \) \( \square b7 \) 9.e3 Black can obtain entirely acceptable play by 9...a5!? like in the Kramnik – Anand game, Frankfurt (active) 1998, which is mentioned also in Chapter 4 in the note to Black’s eighth move.

7...e5

At will Black can back up to the plan with the development of the light-squared bishop on the long diagonal a8–h1. Following 7...b6 8.\( \square e2 \) \( \square b7 \) 9.e3 c5 10.\( \square e2 \) the game steers into the lines of Chapter 4.

8.b4

8...a5

Other continuations have also occurred, directed primarily on reinforcing one’s position in the centre. Thus in case of 8...\( \square e8 \) 9.\( \square b2 \) \( \square c6 \) (to 9...\( \square bd7 \) a possible line is 10.\( \square e2 \) \( \square f8 \) 11.0–0 h6 12.d4 e4 13.\( \square d2 \) \( \square e7 \) 14.d5= with superior chances for White, Bagirov – Cordoso, Tbilisi 1980) 10.\( \square e2 \) \( \square g4 \) 11.d3 a6 12.0–0 d5 13.cxd5 \( \square xd5 \) 14.\( \square c4 \) \( \square d7 \) a position emerges, which is more typical of Sicilian Defence. If at this point in the Timman – Larsen game, Buenos Aires 1980, White had played 15.\( \square fd1= \) followed by \( \square a1–c1 \), then he would have had every reason to
expect to gain the upper hand.

After 8...\( \text{c}6 \) there is 9.\( \text{b}2 \)  
\( \text{c}6 \) (9.\( \text{e}8 \) 10.\( \text{e}2 \), see a little earlier) 10.\( \text{c}2 \) f5 11.\( \text{e}2 \) a5 and  
White easily managed to obtain an advantage by 12.d3  
\( \text{f}6 \) 13.b5  
\( \text{e}7 \) 14.c5! b6 15.cxd6 cxd6 16.  
\( \text{c}1 \) Portisch – Larsen, Las Palmas 1976.

If Black chooses 8...e4, then 9.\( \text{d}4 \) c5 10.\( \text{b}3 \) b6 11.\( \text{b}2 \)  
\( \text{c}6 \) 12.\( \text{e}2 \)  
White managed to obtain a good attacking position on the kingside by way of  

9.\( \text{b}2 \) axb4 10.axb4  
\( \text{xa}1+ \) 11.\( \text{xa}1 \)  
\( \text{g}4 \) 12.\( \text{e}2 \)

Worth attention was 12.d3  
\( \text{xf}3 \) 13.gxf3  
\( \text{c}6 \) 14.b5  
\( \text{e}7 \) 15.d4\( \pm \) with superior White chances thanks to the bishop pair and the pawn control over the centre.

12...e4 13.\( \text{d}4 \)  
\( \text{xe}2 \) 14.  
\( \text{xe}2 \)  
\( \text{c}6 \) 15.0–0  
\( \text{e}5 \) 16.\( \text{g}3 \)  
\( \text{d}7 \)

At this point in the game Chuchelov – Taimanov, Fuert 1999, White could have obtained a slightly superior position by 17.\( \text{c}2!\). Black would have had to reckon at all times with the weakness of the e4 pawn, which had been separated from its pawn chain, and also with the possible White play on the a1–h8 diagonal, where the light–squared White bishop is actively engaged.
Black seeks to bring his light-squared bishop onto the a8–h1 diagonal as soon as possible.

7.e3?!?

The most promising continuation. White has already obtained the bishop pair advantage and now his nearest objective is to successfully complete the development of his pieces. The key question is where to start. At the kingside or at the queenside. It would seem that the queenside has to be developed first, in order to set up as soon as possible the dangerous $\textit{W}c3+$-$\textit{b}2$ battery, which calls for the programmed move b2–b4. The otherwise useful move 7.b4, however, in this particular instance meets the energetic retort 7...a5! 8.$\textit{b}b2$ (barring move transposition 8.b5 $\textit{b}b7$ 9.$\textit{b}b2$ brings us to a position form the Hort – Korchnoi game, San Bernadino Brocco 1983, where the continuation was 9...d6 10.g3 $\textit{d}bd7$ 11.$\textit{a}g2$, and at this point the simplest way to even the play was 11...c5! 12.bxc6 $\textit{xc6}=)$ 8...axb4 9.axb4 $\textit{xa1}= 10.$ $\textit{xa1}$ c5 11.e3 d6 12.$\textit{a}e2$ e5 13.d3 $\textit{e}e8$ 14.0–0 $\textit{xc6}$ (14...$\textit{a}6$ 15.bxc5 bxc5 16.$\textit{b}b1$ $\textit{b}b4=)$ Khalifman – Anand, New Delhi (m/2) 2000) 15.bxc5 (after 15.b5 $\textit{e}e7$ 16.$\textit{b}b2$ $\textit{g}6=)$ the queenside is closed, and at the kingside the Black knights restrain any possible White activity) 15...bxc5 16.h3 $\textit{d}d7$ 17.$\textit{d}d2$ $\textit{b}b6$ 18.$\textit{h}4$ $\textit{a}8=)$, the position is even, Kramnik – Anand, Dortmund 1998.

Since the immediate activity on the queenside allows Black to create counter-play, it seems only logical to first complete the development of one’s kingside. Another issue is raised here – whether to direct the light-squared bishop to e2 or to g2. However, 7.g3 followed by 7...$\textit{b}7$ 8.$\textit{g}2$ permits 8...d5! 9.cxd5 (9.
0–0? is unacceptable in view of 9...dxc4 and 10.\textit{xc}c4 is not possible due to 10...\textit{a}a6+, while after 9.d4 Black obtains convenient play with the help of 9...dxc4 10.\textit{xc}c4 \textit{d}d5 11.\textit{d}d3 \textit{e}e4 12.\textit{c}c3 \textit{bd}7 and now in the Hrakek – Dautov game, Germany 1997, and even in even the relatively superior 13.0–0 Black has no problems after 13...c5 14.dxc5 \textit{xc}c5=; finally, 9.b4 levels out the game after 9...d4 10.\textit{b}b2 e5 11.0–0 \textit{bd}7 12.d3 \textit{e}e8 13.e4 dxe3 14.\textit{xe}e3 \textit{c}c8 15.\textit{g}g5 e4 16.dxe4 \textit{xe}4 17.\textit{fe}1 \textit{b}b7= Gabriel – Dautov, Bad Woerishofen 1997) 9...\textit{xd}d5 10.\textit{c}c2 c5 11.0–0 \textit{c}c6 12.b3 (following 12.e3 \textit{c}c8 13.b3 \textit{e}e7 14.\textit{b}b2 \textit{fd}8 15.\textit{fd}1 h6= Black had no particular problems out of the game, Rubinetti – Polugaevsky, Toluca 1982) 12...e5 13.\textit{b}b2 \textit{e}e7 14.e3 \textit{fd}8 15.d3 \textit{ac}8 16.\textit{fd}1 \textit{c}c7= and at this point the game Panno – Zarnicki, Buenos Aires 1995, was drawn.

Note also, that after 7.d4 \textit{b}b7 the game steers into one of the well-known variations of Nimzo-Indian Defence, which is theoretically assessed as entirely acceptable for Black.

7...\textit{b}b7 8.\textit{e}e2

At this point it would have been inconsistent to play 8.b4, before the a3–f8 diagonal has been shut off by the Black pawn. Following 8...\textit{e}e4 9.\textit{c}c2 a5 10.\textit{b}b2 axb4 11.axb4 \textit{xa}1+ 12.\textit{xa}1 \textit{e}7 13.b5 (to 13.\textit{b}3 strong is 13...\textit{a}a6=) Black in the Beliavsky – Garcia Gildardo game, Elista 1998, would have been at least not worse off after 13...g5!∞.

8...c5

Should Black carry out the typical manoeuvre 8...\textit{e}e4 9.\textit{c}c2 \textit{g}g5 (after 9...f5 10.b3 d6 11.\textit{b}b2 \textit{d}d7 White in the Ree – Korchnoi game, Amsterdam 1976, might have continued 12.0–0!? with the intention to counter 12...\textit{g}g5 with 13.\textit{de}1 \textit{h}3+ 14.\textit{h}1\textit{f}, to be followed by f2–f3) White can prepare his castling queenside by 10.b3 d6 (White can obtain a powerful initiative on the kingside after 10...\textit{xf}5 11.gxf5 \textit{h}4 12.\textit{b}b2 d6 13.\textit{g}g1, like in the Isaksen – Barle game, Esbjerg 1977, and, if at this point Black proceeds with 13...f6, then White obtains good compensation for the two pawns given away by 14.\textit{g}3 \textit{hx}h2 15.0–0–0 \textit{xf}2 16.\textit{dg}1 \textit{f}7 17.\textit{d}3\textit{c}c4 11.\textit{b}b2 \textit{d}d7 and at this point of the game Majorovas – Rozentalis, Vilnius 1984, prior to castling queenside White should clarified the intentions of the Black knight by
12. h4!? keeping in mind, that the variation 12...\( \text{\textasciitilde f}3+ 13. \text{gx}f3 \text{\textasciitilde e}5 14. \text{\textasciitilde h}3=\) leaves White holding the upper hand.

The attempt to skip the c7–c5 push is unlikely to be successful. After 8...d6 9.0–0 (in case of 9.b4 Black has at his disposal 9...a5!? and with minor move re-ordering we are facing a position from the Kramnik – Anand game, Frankfurt (active) 1998, in which Black managed to retain the balance following 10.\( \text{\textasciitilde b}2 \text{ax}b4 11. \text{axb}4 \text{\textasciitilde a}1+ 12. \text{\textasciitilde x}a1 \text{\textasciitilde bd}7 13.0–0 \text{\textasciitilde e}7 14. \text{\textasciitilde b}2 \text{\textasciitilde a}8 15. \text{d}4 \text{c}5 16. \text{\textasciitilde d}2 \text{\textasciitilde f}8 17. \text{f}3 \text{d}5= 9...\text{\textasciitilde bd}7 10. \text{b}4 \text{\textasciitilde e}7 \) (there have been also records of 10...a5, but in case of 11.\( \text{\textasciitilde b}2 \) this line does not look too convincing, since White has already castled, and can exchange rooks on the a1–square by overtaking with his rook, which is to his advantage compared to the position from the just mentioned Kramnik – Anand game, Frankfurt (active) 1998, following 11...\( \text{\textasciitilde e}7 12. \text{d}4 \text{ax}b4 13. \text{axb}4 \text{\textasciitilde fc}8 \) White obtained an obviously superior position by way of 14. \( \text{\textasciitilde xa}8 \text{\textasciitilde xa}8 15. \text{d}5! \text{\textasciitilde f}8 16. \text{\textasciitilde d}1 \text{\textasciitilde c}8 17. \text{\textasciitilde d}4 \text{e}5 18. \text{\textasciitilde b}3 \text{\textasciitilde d}7 19. \text{f}3=\) Kramnik – Anand, Dortmund 2000, on account of the preparation of the c4–c5 advance) 11.\( \text{\textasciitilde b}2 \text{e}5 12. \text{d}3 \text{\textasciitilde g}4 \) (it is very hard for Black to display any, however small, initiative in the centre, and after 12...h6 White gained the upper hand by 13. \( \text{\textasciitilde h}4! \text{d}5 14. \text{cxd}5 \text{\textasciitilde xd}5 15. \text{\textasciitilde c}4 \text{\textasciitilde fd}8 16. \text{\textasciitilde f}3 \text{c}6 17. \text{\textasciitilde f}5 \text{\textasciitilde f}6 18. \text{\textasciitilde g}3=\) Smyslov – Sunye Neto, Las Palmas 1982) 13. \( \text{h}3 \text{\textasciitilde h}6 14. \text{d}4 \) (worth attention is the waiting move 14.\( \text{\textasciitilde ac}1=\), since after 14...c5 White initiated tactical complications by 15.\( \text{d}4! \text{ex}d4 16. \text{ex}d4 \text{\textasciitilde xe}2 17. \text{\textasciitilde fe}1 \text{\textasciitilde xf}3 18. \text{\textasciitilde xe}2 \text{\textasciitilde xe}2 19. \text{dxc}5 \text{f}6 20. \text{\textasciitilde d}2 \text{\textasciitilde h}5 21. \text{c}6 \text{\textasciitilde e}5 22. \text{f}4 \text{\textasciitilde ef}7 23. \text{g}4=\) and managed to obtain a sizeable advantage, Vokac – Lechtynsky, Marianske Lazne 1978) 14...\( \text{e}4 =\) (inadequate is 14...\( \text{f}6 \) in view of 15.c5! \( \text{bxc}5 16. \text{bxc}5 \text{\textasciitilde d}5 17. \text{dxe}5 \text{dxe}5 18. \text{c}6 \text{\textasciitilde b}6 19. \text{a}4=\) with a substantial White advantage, Ree – Langeeweg, Netherlands 1984) 15.\( \text{d}5=\) at this point in the Drasko – Tal game, Tallinn 1985, the opponents agreed to a draw, though White’s position remains somewhat superior, thanks to his dominance on the strategically significant a1–h8 diagonal.

9.\( \text{b}4 \text{d}6 10. \text{\textasciitilde b}2 \)

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c}
10...\text{e}5
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

Black is willing to erect a barrier on the way of White’s dark-squared bishop, which has no direct opposition. If Black gives up on \( \text{e}7–\text{e}5 \) or delays it the
game might proceed as follows 10...\( \text{\#bd7} \) 11.0-0 \( \text{\#e7} \) 12.d3 \( \text{\#e8} \)
(to 12...\( \text{\#ac8} \) there is 13.b5 a5
14.e4 d5 15.cxd5 exd5 16.exd5
\( \text{\#xd5} \) – impossible is 16...\( \text{\#xe2} \)
in view of 17.\( \text{\#fe1} \)\( a+ \) with a win –
17.\( \text{\#fe1} \) \( \text{\#fe8} \) 18.\( \text{\#d2} \) \( \text{\#d6} \) and
now after 19.\( \text{\#g4} \) \( \text{\#cd8} \) 20.\( \text{\#c4} \)
\( \text{\#c7} \) White in the Ftacnik –
Rozentalis game, Moscow 1994,
could have obtained some
advantage by way of 21.\( \text{\#xe8}+! \)
\( \text{\#xe8} \) 22.\( \text{\#e1} \) \( \text{\#df6} \) 23.\( \text{\#h3} \)
13.a4 a5 14.bxc5 bxc5 15.\( \text{\#d2} \)
(with the idea \( \text{\#b1} – \text{\#a3} – \text{\#b5} \) 15...
\( \text{\#e5} \) (a counter-manoeuvre \( \text{\#c6}–
\text{\#b4} \) 16.d4?! (to 16.f4 one has to
take into account 16...\( \text{\#c6} \) 17.\( \text{\#g4} 
\text{\#e5=} \) 16...\( \text{\#xd4} \) 17.\( \text{\#xd4} \) \( \text{\#g6} \) 18.
\( \text{\#fe1} \)\( \text{\#} \) and White managed to
gain a small advantage, Van
Wely – Timman, Breda (m/3)
1998.

11.0-0 \( \text{\#e8} \)

Black intends to hold the
pawn on e5, in order to limit the
scope of White’s potentially
powerful dark-squared bishop.
After the abrupt 11...e4 White
obtain some initiative on the
kingside by 12.\( \text{\#g5} \uparrow \) to be
followed by f2–f3. In case of 11...\( \text{\#e7} \)\nWhite is best advised to adhere
to 12.\( \text{\#ae1} \) by analogy with the
main line, since after 12.bxc5
bxc5 13.d3 \( \text{\#bd7} \) 14.\( \text{\#d2} \) \( \text{\#b6} \)
15.\( \text{\#d1} \) \( \text{\#fe8} \) 16.e4 \( \text{\#c6} \) 17.a4 a5
18.\( \text{\#c2} \) Black conjured up a
curious knight manoeuvre 18...
\( \text{\#fd7} \) 19.\( \text{\#b1} \) \( \text{\#b8} \) 20.\( \text{\#c3} \) \( \text{\#a6=} 
and finally managed to level the
game, Korchnoi – Karpov, Monte

Carlo (active) 1993.

12.\( \text{\#ae1} \)!

White has to prepare the
advance of his d-pawn to d4. It
cannot be effected at once, beca
use of the hanging e2-bishop, and
preliminaries like 12.\( \text{\#fe1} \)
may clash with 12...\( \text{\#e4=} \). Too
slow-going seems 12.d3 in view of
12...\( \text{\#bd7} \) (the move 12...\( \text{\#c6} \)
looks more active, but after it the
pluses of the b-pawn’s location on
the fourth rank may tell, since
following 13.\( \text{\#ae1} \) \( \text{\#c8} \) White has
at his disposal 14.b5 \( \text{\#e7} \) 15.e4
\( \text{\#g6} \) 16.\( \text{\#g3} \) \( \text{\#c7} \) 17.\( \text{\#d2} \) \( \text{\#ce7} \) 18.a4
h6 19.a5 \( \text{\#f8} \) 20.\( \text{\#f4} \) \( \text{\#e6} \) 21.a6 \( \text{\#c8} 
22.f5 \( \text{\#d4} \) 23.\( \text{\#d1} \) \( \text{\#f8} \) 24.\( \text{\#c1} \)
\( \text{\#e8} \) 25.\( \text{\#f2} \) f6 26.\( \text{\#g4=} \) and the
outcome was (Brunner – Mas-
serey, Horgen 1994) that Black
was squeezed on both flanks.
13.\( \text{\#fe1} \) (with 13.\( \text{\#d2} \) White has
to keep an eye on 13...\( \text{\#c8} \) with
the idea d6–d5, and then after
14.e4 \( \text{\#f8} \) 15.f4 Black managed
to hold the balance by 15...\( \text{\#e6} 
16.\( \text{\#xe5} \) \( \text{\#d4} \) 17.\( \text{\#ae1} \) \( \text{\#xe5=} \) Che-
hkov – Tunik, Orel 1995) 13...a5
(in case of 13...\( \text{\#e7} \) Black must
take into account 14.d4! \( \text{\#xd4} 
15.\( \text{\#xd4=} \) with an advantage)
14...bxc5 15.d4 e4 16.c2 cxd4 17.exd4 g5∞, the outcome in the Kramnik – Adams game, Las Vegas (m/4) 1999, was a double-edged situation.

12...bd7

The location of the White rook on f1 makes 12...e4 rather risky for Black in view of 13.g5 h6 14.h3 bd7 and at this point the blow 15.f3! exf3 16.xf3 xf3 17.xf3↑ steeply gains in power, since it allows White’s major pieces to quickly tap into the attack on Black’s kingside.

13.d4

Now this move is possible, since the e2-bishop is protected.

13...c8 14.bxc5 bxc5 15.d5

Black’s occupation of the e4-square by 15...e4?! 16.c2 f5 is temporary. Following 17.d3 df6 18.h4! his position in the centre begins to disintegrate. For example, in case of 18...g6 19.f3 g5 20.f4 f7 (no good is 20...ge4 on account of 21.fxe5 dxe5 22.f3± and Black has difficulties defending the e5-pawn, while after 21.exf4 exf4 22.c3 f8 23.exf4→ White obtains a huge attack along the a1–h8 diagonal) very strong is 21.xf5! gx f5 22.xf5 with a powerful attacking position for White.

16.d2

White covers up the e4 square.

16...g6 17.b1 b8 18.c2 d7 19.fc1 e6 20.d1

In anticipation of the d6xd threat.

20...b6 21.c3 eb8 22.a5±

This position occurred in the game M.Gurevich – Rozentalis, Germany 2001. White’s play is superior thanks to the bishop-pair advantage and the space gained. The anticipated rook exchange does not scare him in the least. Black will have to both guard the queenside infiltration squares against the White pieces and impede the f2–f4 push.
Chapter 5

1. \( \text{d3} \) \( \text{d6} \) 2. \( \text{c4} \) \( \text{e6} \) 3. \( \text{c3} \) \( \text{b6} \)

This chapter stands detached from all the previous ones. Having mapped out the development prospects for his dark-squared bishop, Black temporarily abandons the idea. Taking advantage of the fact that White's three previous moves do not oblige him much, Black outlines prospects for his other bishop on the a8–h1 diagonal. His idea is rather simple. Let White speak up first.

4. \( \text{g3} \)

Thereby White intends to develop his pieces without determining ahead of time the position of his pawns in the centre. His immediate objective is to make Black clarify his intentions with respect to the position of the dark-squared bishop. The latter will either be developed to an active Nimzo-Indian Defence-like position on b4, or will prefer the more modest e7-square. In the former case, as in all variations discussed above in Part 1 of the book, the dark-squared bishop should be ready at all times to sacrifice his life in exchange for the c3 knight. In the latter case it might emerge as a serviceman of little utility in the Black pieces’ family. Certainly, White could have pushed the pawn to g3 one move earlier, but in this case Black would have had all reasons to shut them off the long diagonal by advancing d7–d5. Now Black can also revert to this option, the shortcomings of which will be discussed below.

4...\( \text{b7} \)

Whatever his plans, Black cannot do without this move, so it is only logical to play it immediately. As to the rare move 4...d5, which occurred in the game Odom Don – Salomonsson, USA 1991, it has definite shortcomings, after Black has played b7–b6. The fact is that following
5.cxd5  ﬏xd5 (in case of 5...exd5 6.d4  﫷e7 7.𢡊g2 0–0 8.0–0  𢡊b7 9.𢡊f4+ the arising positions are similar to those, considered in Part 2 of the book, the only difference being, that White has not had to play the programmed move  﫤f1–e1, which is not required with the current pawn structure) 6.﫤xd5 exd5 (in case of 6...﫤xd5?! 7.𢡊g2 the threat  﫧f3–h4 is quite unpleasant for Black) 7.𢡊g2  﫷e7 8.0–0 0–0 9.d4 the occurring positions are typical of Queen’s Indian Defence, where the Black pawn d5 shuts off the long diagonal both to White’s light-squared bishop and to his own. A possible scenario for the sequel of events is 9...﫥b7 (any attempt to find a job for the light-squared bishop elsewhere except on b7, does not promise Black anything but problems, associated with the weakness of the light squares on the queen-side, e.g., 9...﫧f5 10.𢡊e5 﫧e4 11.﫧h3+) 10.﫥f4  﫧d7 11.﫥c1 c5 (Black met with serious problems after 11...﫧c8 12.﫧a4 a6 13.﫧h3! b5 14.﫧a5 c6 15.﫥xd8 﫧xd8 16.﫧xd7  﫧xd7 17.﫧e5  﫧d6 18.﫧d3  﫧e6 19.﫧c2+ Safyanovsky – Cmelik, Tatranska Lomnica 1997) 12.﫧a4!?(switching over to a position with hanging pawns is still premature, since after 12.﫧xc5 bxc5 13.﫧e1  﫧f6 14.﫧d3  﫧c8 15.﫧e3  﫧a5 16.﫧e1  﫧b5= Black has no problems, Andersson – Karpov, Bad Lauterberg 1977) 12...a6 (Black can hardly commit anything active, since the move 12...c4? stumbles into the typical 13.b3!, which has a very ponderable effect here, since after 13...xb3 14.﫧c7+ Black simply is a piece off) 13.﫧xc5  﫧xc5 (following 13...bxc5 14.﫧fd1+ the pressure on Black’s hanging pawns is rather sensible) 14.﫧c2  﫧c8 15.﫧b1= White keeps the upper hand due to Black’s isolated pawn.

5.﫧g2  﫧b4

Again like on the previous move the immediate 5...d5 is not entirely reasonable. After 6.cxd5  﫤xd5 7.﫤xd5 Black can afford 7...exd5?! (we discussed the position resulting from 7...exd5 8.0–0  﫷e7 9.d4 in the previous note) 8.0–0  﫷e7, but this time White has at his disposal a very good opportunity, namely 9.d4! (the course of events took an interesting turn in the Taimanov – Blechzin game, Jvaskyla 2000, where White staged an attempt to take up the centre by 9.﫧a4+ 﫧d7 10.﫧c2 0–0 11.e4, though after 11...﫧c6! 12.﫧b1  﫧xe4 13.﫧e5  﫧xb1 14.﫧xc6  﫧xc6 15.﫧xb1  﫧b4 16.﫧xa8  﫧xa8 17.a3  﫧d3 18.b4 c5 19.bxc5  﫧xc5= some interesting complications brought to a position, where Black has full compensation for White’s small material edge) 9...0–0 10.﫧c2  﫧d7 11.e4  﫧b7 12.﫧d1. The attempt to escape from White’s vice at this point by 12...c5?! (the relatively superior continuation 12...﫧c8 is men-
tioned below under variation a, in the note to Black's eighth move) 13.dxc5! (after 13.d5 exd5 14.exd5 f6 15.h4 White keeps the upper hand) 13...c8 (out-right bad is 13...xc5 on account of 14.e5± and Black will have to sacrifice his queen) 14.c6! xc6 (theoretical texts often reference the variation 14...xc6 15.d4 b7 16.xc8 fx8, where Black is allegedly doing all right, however this is not so, since the simple 17.e5+ places Black in a hopeless situation) 15.xc6 xc6 16.d4 b8 17.f4 b7 18.b5 a6 19.d6 c6 20.ac1 a7 21.xf7 xf7 22.xb8 xb8 23.xc6+ Stangl – Savon, Budapest 1990, brings up a position, where White simply has an extra pawn.

We must also mention that if instead of 5...b4 Black chooses 5...e7, then a position arises, which is considered in detail in Part 2 of the book, and if Black is to prefer 5...c5, the resulting situation will be discussed in Part 3.

6.0-0 0-0 7.d3

White prepares the e2–e4 advance. Black can either try to obstruct this push by a) 7...d5, or ignore this threat altogether and spoil White's pawn structure by b) 7...xc3.

a) 7...d5 8.cxd5 exd5

The other take 8...xd5 aims to leave the a8–h1 diagonal open for the Black bishop. A disadvantage of such a strategy is, that after 9.c2 e7 White steers the game into a Queen's Indian Defence variation, which promises him superior play by way of 10.xd5!? (in case of 10.d1 in the game Topalov – Karpov, Vienna 1996, Black had at his disposal the opportunity 10...c5!, which allows him to obtain a good position in case of 11.d4 by 11...cxd4 12.xd4 xc3 13.xb7 xd1 14.xd1 a6! 15.xa8 xa8) 10...xd5 11.d4. Thus in case of the 11...c5 blow (with the tactical manoeuvre 11...c6 following 12.e4 b4 13.b1 c4 14.d1 e2 – much worse is 14...c5? due to 15.a3! c6 16.c2 – 15.d2 xf3 16.xf3 g5 17.d1 xc1 18.xc1+, regardless of the simplifications, White's chances are considerably higher, Maninang – De Guzman, Manila 1982, also after 11.d7 12.d1 c8 13.e4 b7 14.d5 e5 15.h3 d6 16.g5 e8 17.h4± White holds the upper hand in view of his spatial edge and his superior piece co-ordination, Zaichik – G.Kuzmin, Polanica Zdroj 1984) 12.e4 b7 13.d1 cxd4 14.xd4 c8 15.
White's endgame prospects are superior due to his development advantage, however small, Ivkov – Radulov, Porec 1974.

9.\(\textdagger\)f4 \(\textdagger\)e8

The exchange of the dark-squared bishops 9...\(\textdagger\)d6 10.\(\textdagger\)xd6 \(\textdagger\)xd6 following 11.d4 \(\textdagger\)e8 12.\(\textdagger\)c1 a6 13.\(\textdagger\)c2 \(\textdagger\)bd7 14.\(\textdagger\)c1 \(\textdagger\)e4 15.\(\textdagger\)d1\(\approx\) does not spare Black all difficulties, Savchenko – Vukanovic, Ljubljana 1996.

10.\(\textdagger\)b5!

This move somewhat disrupts the co-ordination of the Black pieces and contributes by transferring the knight to a more active position.

10...\(\textdagger\)a6 11.\(\textdagger\)c1 c6 12.\(\textdagger\)bd4 \(\textdagger\)c5

To 12...\(\textdagger\)c8 Black has to take into account 13.\(\textdagger\)h3\(\approx\), and if 12...c5, then following 13.a3 (worth attention is also 13.\(\textdagger\)b3!? 13...\(\textdagger\)xa3 (a good reply to 13...\(\textdagger\)a5 is 14.\(\textdagger\)b3\(\approx\)) 14.bxa3 cxd4 15.\(\textdagger\)xd4\(\approx\) White's chances are to be preferred in view of the superior pawn structure and the bishop pair.

13.a3 \(\textdagger\)h5

After 13...\(\textdagger\)xd4 14.\(\textdagger\)xd4 c5 15.\(\textdagger\)f5 White is in possession of the initiative.

14.\(\textdagger\)d2 \(\textdagger\)d7

Black covers up the f5 square. White retains the upper hand with the continuation 14...\(\textdagger\)xd4 15.\(\textdagger\)xd4 c5 16.\(\textdagger\)f5 \(\textdagger\)d7 17.e4\(\approx\) first of all, because of the active position of his knight on f5.

15.e3!

White reinforces his position in the centre.

15...\(\textdagger\)f6 16.\(\textdagger\)c3\(\approx\)

Within the next few moves White will advance b2–b4, which will give him the edge, Kramnik – Gulko, Horgen 1995.

b) 7...\(\textdagger\)xc3 8.bxc3 d6

Black has spoilt White’s pawn structure in the centre and intends to exploit this defect in his rival’s position in the future.

9.e4

9...c5

The other lines promise Black less chances to even the game. Thus following 9...\(\textdagger\)bd7 10.\(\textdagger\)h4! (as you will see from the variations to be discussed shortly the knight move is typical for
positions of this type, though, a possible continuation is also 10.a4 h6 11...d4 c5 12...c2 e8 13...e3 f5 14.f3± to be followed by a4—a5, Kramnik – T.Horvath, Germany, 1995) 10...d5 (to 10...c5 11.f4 ff7 12.f5± or 10...e5 11.f4 g6 12.f3± White increases his control on his rival's kingside, if Black plays 10...e8, then it is very important, that following 11...e2 b8 12.f4 he will be denied 12...f5? In view of the tactical stroke 13.exf5 exf5 14...xb7 xb7 15...xf5! xf5 16...e4++ Maric – Kachiani, Batumi, 1999) 11.exd5 exd5 12. f5 c5 13.a3! the Black pieces land under the cross-fire of the White bishops 13...e8 14...xc5 bxc5 15.b1 c6 (to 15...b8 strong is 16.c1± to be followed by g5) 16.c1 e6 (if 16...h6, then 17.a3±) 17.g5 e8 18. xd8 xd8 19.e1 f8 at this point of the Korchnoi – Almasi game, Ubeda 1997, the simplest way for White to re-establish his huge advantage would have been 20.e6! fxe6 21.e3±.

If Black plays 9...fd7, then after the typical 10.h4 c6 11.f4 e7 (to 11...f5? White has at his disposal 12.exf5 exf5 13.d5+ h8 14.f3+ with a win) White has the sharp retort 12.f5 (if 12.f3, then following 12...c5 13.e3 wd7 14.e1 ae8= the game gradually levels out, Gelfand – Adams, Wijk aan Zee 1996, and in case of 12.g4 White has to reckon with 12...f5!∞) 12...exf5 13.exf5 (13...xf5 xf5 14...xf5 e5 15.e3 c8 16...f4 e6=) 13...xg2 14...xg2 (if 14...xg2, then the move 14...d5= gains in power) 14...e8 (at this point 14...d5 is not so good, on account of 15.cx5 f6 16.c4 f5 17.d4± with a slight White edge) 15.d4 d5 (if Black prevents the anticipated pin on the e7 knight by 15...h6, then one has to take into account 16.f6 e6 17. xh6±) 16.g5 (after 16.cx5 f6 17.c4 Black's position on account of the manoeuvre 17...c3 18.e2 e4± becomes even more pleasing) 16...xc4 (if 16...f6, then following 17.d2 dxc4 18.a4 counter-plays of the type 18...b5 19.axb5 b6 20.f4± do not provide Black with completely even chances) 17.e4 with an attacking White position, Yermolinsky – Adams, New York 1996.

10.d4

The other knight manoeuvre starting with 10.e1 did not provide White with any advantage after 10...e8 (in case of 10...c6 Black has to reckon with 11.f4 e7 12.b1 f8 13.b2 d5 14.cx5 exd5 15.e5 e8 16.e2 d4 17.c4 with a dangerous White initiative on the kingside, B.Schneider – Stanetzek, Porz 1989) 11.e2 c7 12.f4 f5 13.c2 c6 14.d2 d7 15.e1 e8= Tsesarsky – Razuvaev, Asiago 1994.

10...e8

It is important to Black to have the f7–f5 push in reserve.
After 10...\(\text{c}6\) 11.f4 \(\text{c}8\) 12.f5 exf5 13.\(\text{c}x\text{f}5\) \(\text{e}5\) 14.\(\text{f}4\#\) White managed to gain some edge, due to the active placement of their pieces on the kingside, Ribli – Razuvaev, Germany 1992.

11.a4?\]

Weaker is 11.f4 in view of the variation pointed out by Z.Ribli – 11...f5 12.exf5 \(\text{x}g2\) 13.\(\text{x}g2\) exf5 14.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{c}7\) 15.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 16.\(\text{ae}1\) \(\text{c}6\#\).

11...\(\text{c}6\)

After 11...\(\text{c}7\) 12.a5\# Black will either inevitably develop a weak a–pawn, if he takes on a5, or White will bring his assets to bear on the b6–pawn. He might try to block the advance of the White a–pawn by 11...a5, but now the 12.f4 push gains in strength, since after 12...f5 13.\(\text{ex}f5\) \(\text{x}g2\) 14.\(\text{x}g2\) exf5 15.\(\text{ae}1\) \(\text{c}7\) (following 15...d5 16.\(\text{b}3\) d4 17.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xd}4\) 18.\(\text{b}2\#\) White can only feel happy about the prospects of his bishop on the long diagonal a1–h8, and after 15...\(\text{f}6\) 16.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{f}3\)\# Black is headed for troubles, since the natural–looking 17...\(\text{c}7??\) Is impossible in view of 18.\(\text{c}6\#\)). White has at his disposal the continuation 16.\(\text{b}1!\) \(\text{d}7\), which brings disorder to the placement of the Black pieces (following 16...\(\text{a}6\) 17.\(\text{b}2\#\) the White rook will quickly be routed to the centre of the board via the second rank, while this is not the case for the rather ugly–placed Black rook on a6) 17.\(\text{f}3\)\# White manages to monopolise the important a8–h1 diagonal.

12.f4

At this point, when in the course of the struggle against the White a–pawn Black has closed the a8–h1 diagonal to his light–squared bishop, this push obviously becomes stronger.

12...f5 13.\(\text{ex}f5\) \(\text{ex}f5\) 14.\(\text{d}5\)\# \(\text{h}8\) 15.\(\text{h}5\)

Threatening 16.\(\text{g}6\#.

15...\(\text{f}6\) 16.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{c}8\) 17.\(\text{d}2\#\)

The White bishop has a uniquely good position on d5, since it brings pressure to bear on both Black flanks. Even if Black exchanges it, this will not spare him the troubles, since the take on d5, followed by c3–c4, will permit White to bring into play his dark–squared bishop.
Part 2. Anti–Queen’s Indian Variation
1.♘f3 ♘f6 2.c4 b6

Black intends to follow a development system typical of the Queen’s Indian Defence, i.e. to immediately put his light-squared bishop into the struggle for the central squares.

3.g3

If White has decided to fianchetto his light-squared bishop, then it is best to do it at once. A delay of even one move provides Black with additional options. E.g., following 3.♗c3 ♘b7 4.g3 in addition to the mainline variation 4...e6 5.♗g2 discussed below, Black has at his disposal 4...♗xf3?! (the active 4...e5 leaves White with some advantage after 5.d3 g6 6.♗g2 ♘g7 7.0-0 d6 8.d4 exd4 9.♕xd4 ♘xg2 10.♗xg2 ♖d7 11.e4± Sanders - Van Boven, Vlissingen 1996) 5.exf3 c5 6.d4 cxd4 7.♗xd4 ♗c6 8.♗d1 e6 9.♗g2 ♖c8 10.0-0 ♘b4 11.♖d2 0-0 12.♖c1 ♕e5 13.b3 ♕d3 14.♖c2 d5= and Black managed achieve a comfortable position, Piket - Karpov, Monte Carlo (active) 1998.

3...♗b7 4.♖g2 e6

Black continues his development along the lines of the Queen’s Indian Defence. The other line 4...c5 is discussed in Part 3 of this book.

5.0-0

At will White can revert the game to the lines of Queen’s Indian by 5.d4 (1.d4 ♗f6 2.c4 e6 3.♗f3 b6 4.g3 ♘b7 5.♗g2) leaving overboard the rather complex ramification 4...♘a6, as well as the Bogoljubow System characterised by 3...♗b4+.

5...♗e7 6.♗c3

The implementation of the idea discussed below by Queen’s Indian Defence means directly via 6.d4 0-0 7.♗e1 is significantly more difficult due to 7...♗c8!? with the idea c7-c5 (another possibility is 7...♗a6 8.♗c3 ♗e4 9.♗xe4 ♗xe4 10.♖a4 ♖c8 11.♗e5 ♗xg2 12.♖xg2 c5!= and Black attained good play, Poluljahov -
Tiviakov, St.Petersburg 1998) and after 8.\n\ng5 (to 8.\n\nc3 Black has the discharging manoeuvre 8...\n\ne4, typical of the Queen's Indian Defence) 8...h6 9.\n\nxf6 \n\nx6 10.e4 d6 11.\n\nc3 \n\cd7 12.\n\c1 c5 13.\n\b5 \n\e7 14.d5 e5 15.h4 a6 16.\n\a3 \n\f6 = a position emerges, where the game is on a level, Piket - Salov, Wijk aan Zee 1993.

6...0-0

7.\n\n1!

A very important move. White intends to advance e2-e4, which lays Black under a necessity to take some counter measures. Perhaps, no other variation displays to such an extent the organic relationship with the move 1.\n\ng1-f3. Note, that after 7.d4 \n\e4 the game converged to one of the mainline variations of Queen's Indian Defence, which has approved itself as one of the most reliable for Black. If White has not ventured d2-d4 on move five, then it is still less justified on move seven, since with the castlings the K.Opocensky manoeuvre 8.\n\nd2 (White's most dangerous argument in the mainline Queen's Indian Defence) visibly loses ground in view of 8...f5.

At this point Black can counter White's plans by both 7...\n\ne4 (Chapter 6) and 7...d5 (Chapter 7-8). Note, that after 7...c5 8.e4 d6 (following 8...\n\c6 the game flows into the channels of the line Chapter 12 variation a) 9.d4 cxd4 10.\n\xd4 \n\c7 a position emerges from a variation (Chapter 12 variation c) to be discussed later.
Chapter 6

1.d3 d6 2.c4 b6 3.g3 Bb7 4.g2 e6 5.0-0 Be7 6.c3 0-0 7.e1 Be4

Black act similarly to the main line of Queen’s Indian Defence, but in the position being discussed White has some extra trumps due to the fact that the white d-pawn has not moved at all and can actively take part in the contest for the e4 square.

8.Bxe4

This exchange cannot be avoided. Following 8.d4 Bxc3 9.bxc3 Bc6 10.e4 Ba5 11.Bd2 d6= Black easily levels the game, since in contrast to the variation discussed later in Part 3 (Chapter 12 variation 0) the black knight becomes effortlessly involved in active play.

8...Be4 9.d3 Bb7 10.e4

It is exactly the e-pawn, which must advance reasserting White’s domination of the e4-
more pleasing following 17.\(\text{\$e}4\)  \\
\(\text{\$e}5=\) 17...dxc6 18.\(\text{\$e}4\)  \\
\(\text{\$e}7\) 19.\(\text{\$a}4\) \(\text{\$b}4\) 20.\(\text{a}3\) b5 21.\(\text{\$b}3=\) at \\
this point of the game Petrosian – Portisch, Palma de Mallorca \\
(m/11) 1974 the parties agreed to \\
a draw. 

10...c5 11.d4 cxd4 

The most natural. Black cross 
over to a structure similar to the 
«hedgehog» system, which will be 
discussed in detail in Part 3. 
There are records of other con-
tinuations as well. Following 11... 
\(\text{d}5\) 12.exd5 exd5 13.\(\text{\$e}5\) cxd4 
14.\(\text{\$x}d4\) \(\text{\$a}6\) 15.\(\text{\$g}4\) \(\text{\$b}4\) 16.\(\text{\$d}1\) 
\(\text{\$c}8\) (to 16...\(\text{\$c}7\) very strong is 
17.\(\text{\$f}4\)! 18.\(\text{\$d}6\) b5 19.\(\text{\$x}e5\) 19. 
\(\text{\$d}6=\) with a winning position) 
17.\(\text{\$d}2\) \(\text{\$d}6\) (17...dxc4? is inad-
quate in view of 18.\(\text{\$x}c8=-\) 
18.\(\text{\$x}b4\) \(\text{\$x}e5\) 19.\(\text{\$x}c8\) \(\text{\$x}c8\) 
20.cxd5 \(\text{\$x}b2\) 21.\(\text{\$a}b1\) \(\text{\$f}6\) 22. 
\(\text{\$h}3\) \(\text{\$c}4\) 23.\(\text{\$d}6=\) White managed 
to achieve an appreciable ad-

tantage thanks to the strong 
passed d-pawn, Gelfand – Tim-
man, Pamplona 2000. 

In case of 11...\(\text{d}6\) there is 12.\(\text{d}5\) 
(also with 12.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{\$d}7\) 13.\(\text{\$b}2\) a6 
14.\(\text{\$d}2\) \(\text{\$c}7\) 15.\(\text{\$a}d1\) \(\text{\$a}8\) 16. 
\(\text{h}4=\) White’s chances are still 
higher, Tregubov – Tsiganshinn, 
Linares 1996) 12...exd5 13.cxd5 
(with the other take 13.exd5 
following 13...\(\text{\$f}6\) 14.\(\text{\$b}3\) \(\text{\$d}7\) 
15.\(\text{\$f}4\) \(\text{\$c}7\) 16.\(\text{\$e}2\) \(\text{\$f}e8\) 17.\(\text{\$a}1\) 
\(\text{\$x}e2\) 18.\(\text{\$x}e2\) \(\text{\$f}8\) 19.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{\$g}6\) 
20.\(\text{\$g}3\) h6= Black preserved the 
equilibrium, Agdestein – Ste-
fansson, Reykjavik 1996) 13... 
14.\(\text{\$f}4\) b5 (in case of the 
more placid 14...\(\text{\$c}7\) followed by 
15.\(\text{\$c}1\) \(\text{\$e}5\) 16.\(\text{\$d}4=\) Sale – 
Ascic, Pula 1999, White used the 
pin to transfer his knight to \(\text{f}5\) 
and achieved superior play) 15.\(\text{\$c}1=\) Krivoshey – Oral, Prie-
diza 1997, White’s position is to 
be preferred, since it is diffi-
cult for the black dark-squared 
bishop to step on the long dia-
ogonal. 

12.\(\text{\$x}d4\) \(\text{\$c}6\) 

Another possibility is 12...a6. 
In this case after 13.\(\text{\$g}4\) (in case 
of 13.\(\text{\$f}4\) White must take into 
account 13...\(\text{\$c}6\)! –, and if 13.\(\text{b}3\), 
the simplest reply is 13...\(\text{\$c}6\) 
14.\(\text{\$b}2\) \(\text{\$x}d4\) 15.\(\text{\$x}d4\) e5 16.\(\text{\$d}2\) 
\(\text{\$c}7=\) with even chances) 13...\(\text{\$e}8\) 
(outright losing is 13...\(\text{\$c}6?\) in 
view of 14.\(\text{\$h}6\) \(\text{\$f}6\) 15.\(\text{\$x}c6\) 
\(\text{\$x}c6\) 16.e5=\) 14.b3 \(\text{\$f}8\) (fol-
lowing 14...\(\text{\$c}6\) 15.\(\text{\$b}2\) \(\text{\$f}6\) 16. 
\(\text{\$x}c6\) \(\text{\$x}c6\) 17.e5 \(\text{\$e}7\) 18.\(\text{\$a}d1=\) 
White’s prospects are higher) 
14...\(\text{\$f}8\) 15.\(\text{\$b}2\) d6 at this point 
instead of 16.e5 \(\text{\$x}g2\) 17.\(\text{\$x}g2\) 
\(\text{d}5\) 18.\(\text{\$x}e5\) \(\text{\$d}7\) 19.\(\text{\$e}2\) \(\text{\$c}7\) 
20.\(\text{\$f}3\) \(\text{\$b}7\) 21.\(\text{\$e}4\) \(\text{\$x}e4\) 22. 
\(\text{\$x}e4\) b5 23.\(\text{\$c}1=\), like in the 
Sunye Neto – Andersson game, 
Brazil 1981, which levelled the 
game, White should have pre-
ferred 16.\(\text{\$a}d1=\), which would 
have allowed him to keep the 
upper hand, thanks to his cen-
tralised pieces. A more detailed 
and thorough discussion of pos-
tions of this type can be found in 
Part 3 of this book.
13.\(\text{b5}!!\)

An important point. White wants to provoke Black to advance d7-d6, thus denying the black dark-squared bishop the access to the c5-square. With the other continuations Black quite often evens out by posting the bishop on c5 at a moment of his choice. Thus in case of 13.b3 we have 13...\(\text{a}xd4\) 14.\(\text{e}xd4\) \(\text{c5}\) (after 14...\(\text{c}c7\) 15.\(\text{b}b2\) \(\text{f}6\) 16.e5 \(\text{e}7=\) according to I.Stohl Black also levels the game, good-looking is also 14...e5!? 15.\(\text{d}d2\) a5 16.\(\text{d}d1\) \(\text{c}6\) 17.a3 \(\text{c}5\) 18.\(\text{b}b2\) \(\text{e}7\) 19.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{a}x\text{e}3\) 20.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 21.\(\text{x}a3\) \(\text{f}e8\) 22.\(\text{a}a2\) \(\text{h}5\) 23.\(\text{e}e3\) \(\text{c}5=\) Tregubov – Tiviakov, Krasnodar 1997) 15.\(\text{c}c3\) f5 (also after 15...\(\text{e}7\) 16.a3 a5 17.\(\text{b}b2\) \(\text{f}6\) 18.\(\text{e}e2\) \(\text{c}6\) 19.a4 \(\text{f}7\) 20.\(\text{a}a3\) \(\text{h}5\) 21.\(\text{d}d2\) \(\text{f}7\) 22.\(\text{x}c5\) \(\text{x}c5\) 23.\(\text{d}d1\) \(\text{a}f8\) 24.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xd}4\) 25.\(\text{x}d4\) \(\text{x}b8\) 26.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{b}7=\) Black has no problems, Vaganian – Yermolinsky, Tilburg 1993) 16.\(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{xe}2\) 17.\(\text{x}g2\) \(\text{xf}5\) 18.f4 \(\text{f}6\) 19.\(\text{d}d2\) \(\text{d}5\) 20.\(\text{d}d1\) \(\text{xc}4\) 21.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{d}5\) 22.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{f}7=\) Schlosser – Yermolinsky, Koop Tjuchem 1996.

After 13.\(\text{f}4\) Black can equalise by 13...\(\text{c}5\) (there have been positive mentions of 13...\(\text{c}8\) 14.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{xd}4\) 15.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{c}5\) 16.\(\text{d}d3\) \(\text{f}6\) 17.\(\text{d}d1\) \(\text{f}7\) 18.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{e}5\) 19.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 20.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{xc}5=\) Zhu Chen – Tiviakov, Beijing 1998, as well as 13...\(\text{xd}4\) 14.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{c}5\) 15.\(\text{d}d3\) \(\text{e}7\) 16.e5 \(\text{xe}2\) 17.\(\text{x}g2\) \(\text{f}6\) 18.\(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{f}xe5\) 19.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{d}6\) 20.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{b7}+\) 21.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{xe}4+\) 22.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{f}6=\) M.Gurevich – Roeder, Germany 1996) 14.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 15.\(\text{d}d6\) \(\text{xd}6\) 16.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{b}8\) 17.\(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{xd}6\) 18.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{fd}8\) 19.\(\text{ed}1\) \(\text{f}8\) 20.e5 \(\text{xe}2\) 21.\(\text{xe}2\) \(\text{e}7\) 22.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{ac}8\) 23.\(\text{x}d4\) \(\text{f}6\) 24.\(\text{xf}6+\) \(\text{xf}6\) easily keeping the equilibrium in a rook endgame, Ibragimov – Tiviakov, Elista 1997.

In case of 13.\(\text{e}3\) Black can proceed by 13...a6 (the game is even also after 13...\(\text{c}8\) 14.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{d}6\) 15.e5 \(\text{d}xe5\) 16.\(\text{xa}7\) \(\text{xa}7\) 17.\(\text{xb}7\) \(\text{xc}4\) 18.\(\text{xd}8\) \(\text{xd}8\) 19.\(\text{xb}6\) \(\text{b}8\) 20.\(\text{a}6\) \(\text{a}4\) 21.\(\text{xa}7\) \(\text{a}8\) 22.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{b}4\) 23.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{xa}7=\) Damljanovic – Yudasin, Belgrade 1998) 14.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{c}8\) 15.h3 (following 15.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{c}7\) 16.\(\text{ed}1\) \(\text{xd}4\) 17.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 18.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 19.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{b}7\) 20.\(\text{cd}3\) \(\text{b}5=\) Black even gained some advantage, Chuchelov – Tiviakov, Haarlem 1999) 15...\(\text{c}7\) 16.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{c}5\) 17.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{xd}4\) 18.\(\text{xd}4\) and now achieve an entirely satisfactory position by way of 18...f5!? (with the straightforward 18...\(\text{xd}4\) 19.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{d}6\) White achieved superior play by 20.\(\text{cd}1\) \(\text{fd}8\) 21.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{f}8\) 22.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{e}5\) 23.\(\text{h}4\)= Ribli – Atlas, Germany 1994, due to the pressure on the d6–pawn) 19.e5 \(\text{xe}2\) 20.\(\text{xe}2\)
Chapter 6

\( \text{\textbf{\textit{\textiggins{a}3 21.\textiggins{c}d1 f4}}} \) with counterplay.

Among the other continuations worth attention is 13.e5! ? Following 13...a6 14.\textiggins{\textiggins{f}4} \textiggins{c}7 15.\textiggins{\textiggins{d}f3} \textiggins{f}d8 (any activity of the type 15...b5?! is contraindicated to Black in view of 16.\textiggins{c}1 \textiggins{f}c8 17.\textiggins{\textiggins{g}5} \textiggins{x}g5 18.\textiggins{x}g5 \pm with a tangible advantage for White, due to his dominance on the dark squares, Wirthensohn – Zueger, Leukerbad 1992, though probably the most precise move would have been 15...\textiggins{a}d8?) 16.\textiggins{e}2 d6 17.\textiggins{a}d1 \pm White’s chances must be assessed as slightly superior on account of the high pressure on the \textiggins{d}6 square.

13...\textiggins{d}6 14.\textiggins{\textiggins{e}3}

To 14.\textiggins{\textiggins{f}4} there is the simple 14...\textiggins{\textiggins{e}5} =.

14...\textiggins{\textiggins{d}7}

After 14...a6 15.\textiggins{\textiggins{c}3} \textiggins{b}8 16.\textiggins{c}1 \textiggins{\textiggins{e}5} 17.b3 \textiggins{c}7 18.\textiggins{e}2 \textiggins{f}e8 19.\textiggins{\textiggins{d}1} \textiggins{\textiggins{d}7} 20.f4 \pm White enjoys a slightly more roomy position thwarting the opponent’s breakthroughs b6-b5 and d6-d5, though Black’s position is still sufficiently robust, Tregubov – V.Popov, Krasnodar 1997.

15.\textiggins{\textiggins{e}2} \textiggins{\textiggins{f}c}8 16.\textiggins{\textiggins{d}1} \textiggins{\textiggins{e}5} 17.b3 a6

At this point in the game Akesson – Fedder, Copenhagen 1982, White could have moved 18.\textiggins{\textiggins{d}4} \pm preventing the b6-b5 breakthrough, thus maintaining his spatial advantage and superior chances.
Chapter 7

1. \( \text{d}3 \) 2. \( \text{f}6 \) 2. \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 3. \( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 4. \( \text{g}2 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 5.0-0 \( \text{e}7 \) 6. \( \text{c}3 \) 0-0 7. \( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{d}5 \)

10. \( \text{f}4! \)

The strongest continuation. After 10. \( \text{d}xc5 \) \( \text{bxc}5 \) 11. \( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 12. \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 13. \( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{dxe}4 \) 14. \( \text{xd}7 \) \( \text{xd}7 \) 15. \( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 16. \( \text{xe}4 \) \( \text{f}6 \) (weaker is 16... \( \text{h}4 \) in view of 17. \( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 18. \( \text{g}2 \) \( \text{c}4 \) 19. \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{fc}8 \) 20. \( \text{d}1 \) with a slight white edge, Vukanovic - Jazbinsek, Ljubljana 1996) 17. \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{fb}8 \) 18. \( \text{b}1 \) \( \text{b}4 \) 19. \( \text{xb}4 \) \( \text{xb}4 \) 20. \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 21. \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{xd}4 \) 22. \( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{c}8 \) = Black managed to level the game, Kramnik - Ljubojevic, Belgrade 1997.

10... \( \text{c}6 \)

The positions arising after 10... \( \text{bd}7 \) are listed under variation \( \text{b} \), and those after 10... \( \text{a}6 \) - under variation \( \text{c} \). Should Black ease the pressure in the centre by 10... \( \text{c}4 \), then following 11. \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 12. \( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{c} \pm \) White's position is to be preferred thanks to the powerful position of the e5 knight and the pressure on the black d5-pawn.

11. \( \text{c}1 \)

Easing the pressure at this point by way of 11. \( \text{d}xc5 \) is still premature in view of 11... \( \text{bxc}5 \) 12. \( \text{e}5 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 13. \( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 14. \( \text{a}4 \)
11...cxd4
Black captures a pawn temporarily, but considerably spoils his pawn structure. In case of
11...±c8 12.±h3 ±a8 13.±a4 a6 14.dxc5 ±xc5 15.±ed1± Anguix - C.Franco. Zaragoza 1994, White's chances are to be preferred, owing to the pressure on the isolated black pawn on d5. Following 11...±e4 12.dxc5 ±xc3, Wilhelmi – Richter, Schoeneck 1996, White could have obtained superior play while preserving an ideal pawn structure by 13.±xc3±
12.±b5 ±b4 13.±f1 ±c5 14.a3 a5 15.±bxd4 ±xd4 16.±xd4 ±e8

17.±e2!?
A decent line for White is also 17.±g5 h6 (should Black capture a pawn by 17...±xd4 18.±xd4 ±xe2, then following 19.±e3 ±c8 20.±xc8 ±xc8 21.±c1 ±f5 22.±f1 ±c2 23.±xc2 ±xc2 24.±xb6 ±xb6 25.±xb6 a4 26.f3± White takes it back and retain the superior endgame position due to the bishop pair) 18.±xf6 ±xf6 19.e3 ±ac8 20.±d2± with superior chances owing to the isolated black pawn on d5.
17...±e4 18.±b3 ±e7 19.±c1 ±c6 20.±e3!
The proceedings in the Chuchelov – Vujovic game, Fourmies 1998, showed, that following 20...±xe3 21.±xc6 ±d7 22.±c2 ±c5 White could have reasserted his edge by 23.±d3!±, securing not only the f2 square, but also preserving his option to exert unpleasant pressure on the isolated d5–pawn by transferring the knight to f4.

b) 9...±bd7
A sound, though somewhat passive move. In the sequel Black has problems obtaining an active game.
10.±f4

At this point it is worth to consider three major black replies: b1) 10...±e4, b2) 10...±c6 and b3) 10...±c5.

b1) 10...±e4 11.±c2!?
White tries to take advantage of the fact that by leaving f6, the black knight has lost control of his d5–pawn. Thus in the run-up of the black breakthrough c7-c5
White is in a hurry to free the d1 square for his rook, in order to boost his influence on Black's centre. This possibility is also partly justified by the fact that the b8 black knight has already been developed on d7, and not on a6, and will not be able to disturb the white queen. There are also records of the more trivial 11...\textit{c1}. After 11...c5 12.dxc5 \textit{x}c5 13.\textit{f}1 \textit{x}c3 14.\textit{x}c3 \textit{f}6 15.\textit{c}2 de4 16.\textit{e}1 with the idea \textit{d}3, Kir.Georgiev – Van Wely, Groningen (m/2) 1997, White retains a tiny advantage in view of his superior pawn structure.

11...c5

There is also the continuation 11...\textit{d}xc3 12.bxc3, which reinforces White's centre. Following 12...\textit{f}6 (if 12...c5, then after 13.\textit{b}ad1 \textit{c}8 14.\textit{h}3 \textit{e}8 15.c4 \textit{xd}4 16.\textit{xd}4 \textit{f}6 17.\textit{f}5 \textit{b}4 18.\textit{d}2 \textit{c}5 19.\textit{g}2 \textit{e}4 20.\textit{e}3 \textit{xe}3, Kramnik – Karpov, Monte Carlo (blindfold) 1996, White should have proceeded simply 21.\textit{xe}3, since 21...dxc4 22.\textit{b}d4+ promises him a slightly superior position) 13.\textit{b}ad1 \textit{c}8 14.\textit{g}5 (less precise is 14.\textit{e}5, which after 14...c5 15.e3 \textit{e}4 16.dxc5 \textit{xc}5 17.h4 \textit{e}6 18.\textit{f}3 \textit{e}4 19.\textit{d}2 \textit{a}4∞ Kramnik – Vyzmanavin, Paris (blitz) 1994, brings about a position with mutual chances) 14...\textit{e}8 15.c4 c5 16.\textit{x}f6 \textit{x}f6 17.\textit{xd}5 \textit{xd}5 18.e4 \textit{b}7 19.e5 \textit{d}8 20.d5 White managed to develop a powerful initiative in the centre, Kramnik – Nikolic, Monte Carlo (blindfold) 1995.

12.dxc5 \textit{x}c5

If 12...\textit{d}xc3, then the intermediate 13.c6+ results in a white advantage, while in case of 12...\textit{d}xc5 Black has to consider 13.\textit{b}ad1 \textit{c}8 14.\textit{xe}4 \textit{xe}4 15.\textit{b}3 with superior chances for White. In both cases Black will have troubles because of his isolated pawn on d5.

13.\textit{xe}4 \textit{d}xe4 14.\textit{g}5 \textit{f}6

In case of 14...\textit{c}8 15.\textit{b}1 \textit{f}6 White has 16.b4! \textit{xf}2+! (inadequate is 16...\textit{d}4? in view of 17.\textit{d}1-) 17.\textit{xf}2 h6 18.\textit{d}1 (no good was 18.\textit{h}3 in view of G.Kasparov's variation 18...e3+! 19.\textit{g}1 \textit{g}2 20.\textit{x}g2 \textit{d}5+ 21.\textit{g}1 \textit{e}6 22.\textit{g}2 \textit{d}5=, which brings about a mutually forced move repetition) 18...\textit{e}8 19.\textit{g}1 (19.\textit{h}3 is once more inadequate due to 19...e3+ 20.\textit{g}1 \textit{g}2 21.\textit{x}g2 \textit{c}6+ 22.\textit{g}1 \textit{e}6 23.\textit{g}2 \textit{c}6=) 19...\textit{hxg}5 20.\textit{d}6 \textit{e}6 21.\textit{f}8 \textit{f}8 22.\textit{b}3 and White's chances with the exchange for pawn up are superior (V.Kramnik's analysis).

15.\textit{xe}4 \textit{xe}4 16.\textit{xe}4 \textit{d}4

With the continuation 16...\textit{c}8, which is superior for Black, following 17.\textit{d}3 \textit{xe}4 18.\textit{xe}4 \textit{d}4 19.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 20.\textit{xb}2 21.\textit{d}7 White has some edge (V.Kramnik's analysis). Black has problems protecting his pawns on the queenside.

17.\textit{f}3

Outright bad is 17.\textit{xa}8?? in
view of 17... $\text{xf2}_+ 18.\text{h1 $\text{g4}$}
19.\text{g2 $\text{g1+}$ 20.\text{xg1 $\text{f2}$}#.

17...$\text{xf2}_+$ 18.\text{h1}
It becomes clear that White's bishop pair advantage outbalances the temporary activity of the black pieces.

18...$\text{Ac8}$
If 18...$\text{Ad8}$, then following
19.\text{f1 $\text{d4}$ 20.\text{Ad1 $\text{b4}$ 21.a3 $\text{b5}$ 22.b4 $\text{e7}$ (in case of 22... $\text{d4}$ there is 23.e3, and if 23... $\text{e5}$, then 24.\text{c6} wins) 23.\text{c7} White has the edge. Black has difficulties securing suitable protection for his dark-squared bishop.

19.\text{f1 $\text{d4}$ 20.\text{Ad1 $\text{b4}$ 21.a3 $\text{b5}$ 22.\text{f5}$}$
White threatens b2-b4, which ensured him a tangible advantage in the Kramnik – Van Wely game, Tilburg 1997, since 22... $\text{xb2?}$ is not playable due to
23.\text{e5 $\text{xa3}$ 24.\text{xf6 $\text{gxf6}$ 25. $\text{e4}$ and White causes the black king enormous problems.

b2) 10...c6
While waiting for White to take action, Black reinforces his position in the centre.

11.\text{c2}$
Having allocated all his major pieces on the central files, White intends to advance e2-e4.

11.\text{f8} 12.\text{d2} f5 13.\text{h3}$
14.\text{h6} $\text{g7}$ 15.\text{d1} $\text{e8}$
To the relatively superior for Black 15...f6 White could have proceeded also by 16.\text{b3}$.

16.\text{b3} $\text{h8}$ 17.e4!
White carries out the program advance e2-e4 at any possible sacrifice.

17...$\text{fxe4}$ 18.\text{xe4} $\text{g8}$
Should Black accept the piece sacrifice 18...$\text{dxe4}$, then the simplest way to a white advantage is 19.\text{f7}! After 19...\text{f8} (in case of 19...\text{f6} there is 20.\text{xd7 $\text{f8}$ 21.\text{g5}! with the idea 22.\text{e6}+), and to 19...\text{h5}
sufficient is 20.\text{xd7 $\text{xd7}$ 21.}$
\text{g5}+\) 20.\text{xd7} White has a huge advantage.

19.\text{f5}!
This continuation, pointed out by V.Kramnik, is even stronger than 19.\text{e5 $\text{f5}$, though here (Kramnik – Vyzmanavin, Paris (active) 1994) White could have asserted his edge by 20.\text{xf5}!
\text{gxf5} 21.\text{f3 $\text{xe5}$ 22.dxe5 $\text{d7}$ 23.$\text{g5}$+.

19...$\text{f8}$ 20.\text{f3}$
17.\text{xg5 $\text{e7}$ 22.\text{g4}$}$
Black's situation is difficult in view of the 23.\text{f6} threat (V. Kramnik's analysis).

b3) 10...c5 11.dxc5 bxc5
Black is not willing to spoil his
pawn structure and rather agrees to emerge with hanging pawns. The transition to a situation with an isolated pawn on d5 has also occurred more than once in tournament games. In case of 11...\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{c}}}}\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{5}}}}?! 12.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{c}}}}\texttt{\texttt{d}4} 13.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}}}}\texttt{4} (if 12...\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{e}}\texttt{e}8, then after 13.\texttt{\texttt{c}}\texttt{c}1 \texttt{\texttt{c}8} 14.\texttt{\texttt{c}b}5± White’s position is more pleasing, since Black has not only to counter the threat on the a7 pawn, but also to block the penetration of the white knight onto d6) 13.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}}\texttt{x}e4} dxe4 White are well advised to steer to the position following 14.\texttt{\texttt{f}f}5!? \texttt{\texttt{e}8} 15.\texttt{\texttt{d}d}6±, forcing Black to give away the bishop pair advantage, since after 14.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}}}}\texttt{\texttt{d}2} \texttt{\texttt{f}6} 15.\texttt{\texttt{e}d}1 \texttt{\texttt{d}5} 16.b4 \texttt{\texttt{e}7} 17.\texttt{\texttt{b}2, Anand – Van Wely, Wijk aan Zee, 1998, Black could have obtained a position with mutual chances by way of 17.\texttt{\texttt{f}d}8 18.h3 \texttt{\texttt{e}e}8∞.

Should Black play 11...\texttt{\texttt{d}c}5, we are faced with a position to be discussed shortly under variation \texttt{\texttt{c}c} from Chapter 7.

\textbf{12.\texttt{\texttt{d}h}4!}

A manoeuvre, which has become possible to a large extent thanks to the black knight on d7.

Now Black cannot easily cover the f5-square without compromising his position.

\textbf{12...\texttt{\texttt{d}b}6}

In case of 12...\texttt{\texttt{h}h}5 the move 13.\texttt{\texttt{f}f}5! looks strong (quite good is also 13.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}\texttt{\texttt{d}5} 14.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}h}4} 15.gxh4± with an advantage) 13...\texttt{\texttt{xf}4} 14.gxf4 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{b}8}} (after 14...\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{b}6}} 15.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}x}d5} \texttt{\texttt{d}x}d5 16.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}x}d5} \texttt{\texttt{d}x}d5 17.\texttt{\texttt{d}x}d5 \texttt{\texttt{f}6} 18.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}\texttt{\texttt{c}5} \texttt{\texttt{b}8} 19.\texttt{\texttt{d}c}1 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}}}}\texttt{\texttt{f}4} 20.b3 \texttt{\texttt{g}6} 21.\texttt{\texttt{d}g}3± Shariyazdanov – S.Kasparov, Minsk 1998, Black’s compensation for the pawn was insufficient) 15.\texttt{\texttt{d}x}d5 \texttt{\texttt{d}x}d5 16.\texttt{\texttt{d}x}d5 and now 16...\texttt{\texttt{x}b}2? is inadequate in view of 17.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}a}1} \texttt{\texttt{f}6} 18.\texttt{\texttt{d}e}5+.

\textbf{13.\texttt{\texttt{f}f}5 \texttt{\texttt{e}8}?!}

Bad is 13...\texttt{\texttt{c}c}6?! on account of 14.e4 dxe4 15.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}e}7+ 16.\texttt{\texttt{d}f}6 Van Den Doel – Erwich, Haarlem 1998, but, possibly, relatively superior for Black would have been to agree to the position following 13...\texttt{\texttt{d}d}7 14.e4 d4 15.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}e}7+ \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{d}e}7} 16.\texttt{\texttt{b}5} \texttt{\texttt{f}d}8 17.\texttt{\texttt{d}d}6+. However, thanks to the knight which has burst in on d6, in this case White also stands better.

\textbf{14.\texttt{\texttt{b}5} \texttt{\texttt{d}d}7 15.\texttt{\texttt{b}d}6 \texttt{\texttt{x}d}6 16.\texttt{\texttt{d}x}d6 \texttt{\texttt{e}e}6}

Black is already facing serious problems. Following 16...\texttt{\texttt{d}e}8 17.\texttt{\texttt{c}c}1 \texttt{c}4 the continuation 18.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}b}7 \texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}\texttt{b}7} 19.\texttt{\texttt{g}5± brings about a sizeable advantage for White.

\textbf{17.\texttt{\texttt{h}3}}

Now Black will hardly be able to avoid material loss.

\textbf{17...\texttt{\texttt{c}6 18.\texttt{\texttt{c}e}1 \texttt{c}4}
Insufficient is also 18...g5 due to 19.\text{\texttrademark}e5\text{\textdagger}, or 18...\text{\textdagger}h5 on account of 19.\text{\textdagger}xe6 \text{\textdagger}xe6 (to 19...fxe6 sufficient is 20.\text{\textdagger}e5\text{\textdagger}) 20.\text{\textdagger}xc5 \text{\textdagger}xf4 21.gxf4 \text{\textdagger}g4+ 22.\text{\textdagger}h1\text{\textdagger}-- and White's material edge should bring in the win.

19.\text{\textdagger}e5 \text{\textdagger}f8

Following 19...\text{\textdagger}e7 20.\text{\textdagger}f5 \text{\textdagger}f8 21.\text{\textdagger}d4 \text{\textdagger}ae8 22.\text{\textdagger}g5 \text{\textdagger}h8 23.b3± Black has also experienced huge difficulties.

20.\text{\textdagger}f4 \text{\textdagger}h5 21.\text{\textdagger}xe6 \text{\textdagger}xe6

After 21...\text{\textdagger}xe6 the simplest move is 22.\text{\textdagger}f5\text{\textdagger}--.

22.\text{\textdagger}d4\text{\textdagger}--

So far we are following the game Kramnik – Ribli, Groningen 1993. Black's position is hopeless.

c) 9...\text{\textdagger}a6

![Diagram]

10.\text{\textdagger}f4!

An all-purpose move. The other lines are weaker. Following 10.\text{\textdagger}e5 c5 11.\text{\textdagger}e3 (if 11.\text{\textdagger}g5, then after 11...h6 12.\text{\textdagger}xf6 \text{\textdagger}xf6 13.e3 \text{\textdagger}xe5 14.dxe5 \text{\textdagger}c7\text{\textdagger} the chances are mutual) 11...\text{\textdagger}c7 12.dxc5 (after 12.\text{\textdagger}a4 \text{\textdagger}e6 13.\text{\textdagger}ed1 \text{\textdagger}c7\text{\textdagger} Black is better off than White) 12...bxc5 13.\text{\textdagger}d3 d4! 14.\text{\textdagger}xb7 \text{\textdagger}b8 15.\text{\textdagger}f3 dxe3 16.fxe3 \text{\textdagger}d6\text{\textdagger} Black's chances are even preferable, Kruppa – Timoshenko, St.Petersburg 1996. In case of 10.b3 c5 11.\text{\textdagger}b2 \text{\textdagger}c7 12.\text{\textdagger}c1 \text{\textdagger}e6 13.e3 \text{\textdagger}e8! 14.\text{\textdagger}e2 \text{\textdagger}e4= Gavrikov – Almasi, Germany 1998, Black has nothing to worry about.

With 10.\text{\textdagger}g5 c5 (weaker is 10...c6 11.\text{\textdagger}a4 \text{\textdagger}c7 12.\text{\textdagger}e5 b5 13.\text{\textdagger}b3 \text{\textdagger}e6 14.\text{\textdagger}f3\text{\textdagger} Portisch – Spassky, Mexico (m/6) 1980) 11.\text{\textdagger}c1 h6 12.\text{\textdagger}xf6 \text{\textdagger}xf6 13.e3 \text{\textdagger}e8 14.\text{\textdagger}f1 (if 14.\text{\textdagger}a4?!, then very strong is 14...\text{\textdagger}b4 with the idea 15...\text{\textdagger}c6\text{\textdagger}, and in case of 14.\text{\textdagger}d2 \text{\textdagger}e7 15.dxc5 \text{\textdagger}xc5 16.\text{\textdagger}d4 \text{\textdagger}e4 17.\text{\textdagger}xe4 \text{\textdagger}xe4\text{\textdagger} Black’s chances are even to be preferred, Karlsson – Ftachik, Lucerne 1982) 14...\text{\textdagger}c7 15.dxc5 bxc5 16.\text{\textdagger}a4 d4 17.\text{\textdagger}xc5 \text{\textdagger}xf3 18.\text{\textdagger}xf3 dxe3 19.\text{\textdagger}xe3 \text{\textdagger}xe3 20.\text{\textdagger}xe3 \text{\textdagger}xb2 21.\text{\textdagger}c2 \text{\textdagger}a3= the play has evened out, Degerman – Brynell, Ronneby 1998.

10...c5

Black definitely has his options, but in all cases White’s prospects are superior. Thus after 10...\text{\textdagger}d7 11.\text{\textdagger}e5 \text{\textdagger}e6 12.\text{\textdagger}d3 \text{\textdagger}e4 (if 12...c5, then following 13.\text{\textdagger}e5\text{\textdagger} with the idea to gain a tempo for 14.\text{\textdagger}f4 White’s prospects are superior due to the pressure on the d5 pawn) 13.f3! (if 13.\text{\textdagger}b3, then following 13...\text{\textdagger}xc3 14.bxc3 c5= the play is even) 13...\text{\textdagger}xc3 14.bxc3 c5 15.e4 \text{\textdagger}e8 16.\text{\textdagger}e3 cxd4 17.cxd4 \text{\textdagger}b4 (if 17...\text{\textdagger}b4, then strong is 18.\text{\textdagger}f4 with the
idea a2-a3\textsuperscript{±} 18...\textit{d}d2?! (after 18...\textit{c}xb4 \textit{d}xb4 19...\textit{b}b3 \textit{a}a6 20...e5± White’s position would have been also superior due to his bishop pair advantage and spatial edge) 18...\textit{xd}d2 19...\textit{xd}d2 dxe4 20...fxe4 \textit{c}c4 21...\textit{f}f4\textsuperscript{±} Vaganian – Salov, Skelleftea 1989, White has the edge due to his strong mobile centre.

After 10...h6 11...\textit{c}c2 (weaker is 11...\textit{e}e5 in view of 11...c5 12...\textit{c}c1 \textit{e}e8 13...\textit{a}a4 cxd4 14...\textit{b}b5 \textit{c}c5 15...\textit{xd}d4 \textit{xe}4\textsuperscript{±} and Black intercepted the initiative, Andonov – Eingorn, Saint John 1988) 11...c5 12...\textit{ad}1 \textit{xc}8 13...\textit{xc}5 (after 13...\textit{d}d8 14...\textit{e}e5 \textit{xe}6 15...\textit{xc}5 \textit{bx}c5 16...\textit{e}e3 \textit{d}d7 17...\textit{b}b3 \textit{xe}5 18...\textit{xb}7?? \textit{ab}8 19...\textit{xa}7 \textit{d}d7\textsuperscript{→} Jimenez – Pogorelov, Linares 1995, White’s queen was trapped) 13...\textit{bx}c5 14...\textit{h}h4 \textit{b}b4 15...\textit{b}b1 \textit{d}d4 16...\textit{f}f5\textsuperscript{→} Lingnau -Loginov, Berlin 1995, the clouds on Black’s kingside are piling up.

Should Black proceed by analogy with variation b1 - 10...\textit{e}e4, then after 11...\textit{c}c2 \textit{xc}3 (in case of 11...\textit{xf}6 12...\textit{ad}1 \textit{xc}3 13...\textit{b}xc3?! \textit{e}e7 14...e4!± White grab the initiative by carrying out the all-important e2-e4 advance, Schlosser – Enders, Passau 1998) 12...bxc3 c5 13...\textit{ad}1 \textit{xc}8 14...\textit{e}e3 \textit{xe}8 15...h4 cxd4 (following 15...\textit{c}c7 16...\textit{xc}5 \textit{bx}c5 17...\textit{g}g5 \textit{xg}5 18...\textit{xe}6 19...\textit{f}f5\textsuperscript{±} Vaganian – Portisch, Reggio Emilia 1987/88, White obviously has the upper hand due to the strong pressure on the d5-pawn) 16...\textit{ex}d4\textsuperscript{±} the odds are in White’s favour, thanks to the centralised placement of his pieces.

A seemingly logical move is 10...\textit{e}e8, but after 11...\textit{c}c1 c5 (if 11...\textit{h}h5 as in the game Cosma – Itkis, Bucharest 1998, White’s simplest continuation is 12...\textit{xe}3?!± maintaining the tension) 12...\textit{xc}5 \textit{bx}c5 White has 13...\textit{b}b3?! (following 13...\textit{e}e5 \textit{d}d6! 14...\textit{d}d3 \textit{ab}8 15...\textit{g}g5 \textit{e}e7 16...\textit{a}a4 c4 17...\textit{f}f4 \textit{c}c5 18...\textit{d}d1 \textit{d}d4 19...\textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}6 20...\textit{cd}5, Krasenkow – Cvitan, Pula 1997, Black could have obtained good counter chances by way of 20...\textit{a}a6\textsuperscript{→} 13...\textit{b}b6 14...\textit{e}e5! \textit{xb}3 15...\textit{xb}3 \textit{e}e4 (if 15...h6, Kengis – Almasi, Bern 1997, then as pointed out by E.Kengis the most uncomplicated continuation would have been 16...h4!± blocking Black’s counterplay based on g7-g5) 16...\textit{ed}1 \textit{ad}8 17...\textit{xe}4 \textit{dx}e4 18...\textit{c}c4 \textit{d}d5 (after 18...\textit{xd}1+ 19...\textit{xd}1 \textit{d}d8 20...\textit{xd}8+ \textit{xd}8 21...g4!± White retained his advantage on account of the fact that the black pawn on e4 has no pawn backing) 19...\textit{b}h3! (weaker is 19...\textit{a}a1 \textit{b}b4 20...\textit{xa}7 \textit{c}c6\textsuperscript{→} with a subsequent invasion on d4) 19...\textit{c}c6 20...\textit{d}d6± and the endgame odds are in White’s favour, Khalifman – Stefansson, Arhus 1997. It is very unpleasant to Black to bear the white knight on d6.

In case of 10...\textit{c}c8, after 11...\textit{e}e5 (if 11...\textit{c}c1, then following 11...\textit{d}d8 12...\textit{e}e5 c5 13...\textit{xc}5 \textit{bx}c5 it is by no means easy to break...
Black’s defences, as showed in the proceedings in the Ehnlvest – Wojtkiewicz game, Haninge 1990) 11.\(\text{c}e5\) c5! 12.\(dxc5\) \(\text{xc}5\) (bad is 12...\(\text{xc}5\)? on account of 13.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 14.\(\text{xd}5\)\(\pm\) 13.e3 (13.\(\text{xd}5\)? is not playable, because of 13...\(\text{xd}5\) 14.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xf}2+\) 15.\(\text{xf}2\) \(\text{c}5+\) 13.e3 \(\text{b}4\) (to 13...\(\text{e}6\) with the idea g7-g5 White has 14.\(\text{d}3\)\(\pm\) 14.\(\text{xc}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 15.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{xc}3\) 16.\(\text{xc}3\) \(\text{e}4\) 17.\(\text{c}1\) f6 (threatening g7-g5) 18.g4 \(\text{ac}8\) 19.h3 \(\text{xc}1\) 20.\(\text{xc}1\)\(\pm\) White’s position is a trifle more pleasant thanks to his domination on the dark squares, Kramnik – Ehlvest, Horgen 1995.

11.\(dxc5!\)

White acts in the same way as in variation \(b3\) above. The other lines do not promise White any specific plus values. Thus following 11.e3 \(\text{e}4\) = (Ftacnik – Browne, San Francisco 1999) the game levelled out rather quickly, and the move transposition 11.\(\text{c}1\) allows Black to obtain excellent prospects by way of 11...\(\text{e}4\) 12.\(dxc5\) (in case of 12.a3 \(\text{e}8\) 13.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{xc}5\) 14.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{xc}3\) 15.\(\text{xc}3\) \(\text{af}6\) 16.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{e}6\) 17.b4 \(\text{xd}4\) 18.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{e}6\) 19.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}4\)= Black also managed to maintain the equilibrium without much effort, Piket – Salov, Wijk aan Zee 1998) followed by 12...\(\text{xc}5!\) 13.\(\text{xe}4\) dxe4 14.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{e}7\) 15.\(\text{a}4\) e3! (anything but 15...\(\text{fe}8?\) because of 16.\(\text{xe}4!\)\(\pm\)).

11...\(\text{xc}5\)

This position as we have already seen could arise out of variation \(b3\). The switchover to a position with hanging pawns is a risky decision for Black. After 11...\(\text{bxc}5!\) 12.\(\text{e}5\) (with the idea e2-e4) 12...\(\text{c}7\) 13.\(\text{c}4!\) \(\text{e}6\) (no better is 13...\(\text{dc}4\) 14.\(\text{xb}7\) \(\text{b}8\) 15.\(\text{xd}8\) \(\text{xd}8\) 16.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{xb}2\) 17.\(\text{ed}1\) \(\text{b}5\) 18.\(\text{xb}5\) \(\text{xb}5\) 19.\(\text{d}6\)\(\pm\), with complicated problems for Black, Vaganian – Levitt, Copenhagen 1988) 14.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{e}4\) 15.\(\text{xe}4\) dxe4 16.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{f}5\) (following 16...\(\text{d}5\) 17.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{ad}8\) 18.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 19.\(\text{h}3\)\(\pm\) White also maintains most powerful pressure, Dinstuhl – Stoering, Muenster 1993) 17.\(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{c}8\) 18.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{xd}6\) 19.\(\text{xd}6\)\(\pm\) White, who is in possession of the bishop pair, stands significantly better, Jukic – Farago, Balatonbereny 1985.

12.\(\text{c}1\)

Other attempts to contest for superiority have been made as well. Thus after 12.\(\text{e}5\) with the idea to place the bishop on \(d4\) (setting the knight on the blockading square facing the isolated black pawn by 12.\(\text{d}4\) hardly promises anything to White in view of 12...\(\text{d}7\) 13.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{a}8\) 14.a3 \(\text{e}4\)= Vaulin – S.Kasparov, Minsk 1998, and following 12.a3 \(\text{c}4\) 13.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{c}5\) 14.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{c}8\) 15.\(\text{a}2\) \(\text{g}4\) 16.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{e}7\) 17.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{h}6\) 18.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{f}8\) 19.e3 \(\text{f}5\)= Pelletier – Bunzmann, Biel 1999, Black managed to level the play) 12...\(\text{d}7\) (after 12...\(\text{e}8\) 13.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{c}8\) 14.\(\text{ad}1\)\(\pm\) (V.Kramnik’s analysis) White has the
upper hand, also after 12...\textit{c8} 13.\textit{c1} \textit{ce4} 14.\textit{a4} \textit{c5} 15.\textit{d4} \textit{c6} 16.\textit{d1} \textit{e7} 17.\textit{h3}+ following the game Shariyazdanov – Syrchikov, Pskov 1998) 13.\textit{c2} (if 13.\textit{d4}, then after 13...\textit{ad8} 14.\textit{mc1} \textit{e6} 15.\textit{b3} \textit{e4} 16.\textit{ed1} \textit{xd4} 17.\textit{xd4} \textit{c5} 18.e3 \textit{e7}= Black levelled the odds, Gausel – Akesson, Asker 1997) Black obtained equal chances by way of 13...\textit{ce4} 14.\textit{d2} \textit{f5} 15.\textit{dxe4} \textit{xe4} 16.\textit{xe4} dxe4= Landa – Tiviakov, Linares 1999.

In this fairly typical position Black as a rule choose one of two major lines: c1) 12...\textit{fe4} and c2) 12...\textit{ce4}. The prophylactic 12...\textit{a6}, after 13.a3 \textit{e8} 14.\textit{d4} \textit{d6} (if 14...\textit{d7}, then 15.b4 \textit{e6} 16.\textit{h3}+, and to 14...\textit{fe4} strong is 15.b4+, in both cases with a huge white advantage) 15.\textit{xd6} \textit{xd6} 16.\textit{wd2} \textit{ad8} 17.\textit{ed1} g6 18.\textit{f4}! \textit{xf4} 19.gxf4 \textit{f8} 20.e3+ Gelfand – Karpov, Vienna 1996, allowed White to obtain the upper hand due, not only to the reliable control of the d4-square, but also to Black's need to constantly take into account his opponent's threat to advance b2-b4 and \textit{c3-a4}. The consequences of Black's move a7-a6 tell all the time.

\textbf{c1}) 12...\textit{fe4} 13.\textit{d4}?

The transfer of the bishop to d4 by 13.\textit{e5} \textit{e8} 14.a3 \textit{f8} 15.\textit{d4} hardly promises White the upper hand, in view of 15...\textit{d7} 16.e3 \textit{ac8} 17.b4 (after 17...\textit{xc5}?! \textit{xc3} 18.\textit{xc3} bxc5\textit{=} in the Gausel – Akesson game, Munkebo 1998, a draw was agreed, though probably Black's prospects are preferable) 17...\textit{e6} 18.\textit{h3} \textit{d6} with the idea to match 19.\textit{e5} with 19...\textit{e7}= and obtain roughly equal odds.

Following 13.\textit{b5} \textit{e6} 14.\textit{e5} \textit{d7} 15.\textit{bd4} \textit{ac8} 16.\textit{xc8} \textit{xc8} 17.\textit{h3} \textit{c5} 18.a3 a5 19.e3 \textit{e8} 20.\textit{g4} the game Kramnik – Huebner, Erevan 1996, was drawn.

\textbf{13.\textit{f6}}

One cannot accept 13...\textit{d7} as appropriate because of 14.b4! \textit{e6} 15.\textit{h3} \textit{g5}?! (bad is 15...\textit{xb4}? due to 16.\textit{xe4} \textit{xe1} 17.\textit{xe6} \textit{fxe6} 18.\textit{c7} \textit{xf2}+ 19.\textit{f2}+–, but probably the relatively superior continuation for Black was 15...\textit{xc3} 16.\textit{xc3} \textit{d6} 17.\textit{xd6} \textit{xd6} 18.a3 \textit{ac8} 19.\textit{f5} \textit{d7} 20.\textit{d3}+, where White retains a small but lasting advantage due to the isolated black pawn on d5) 16.\textit{xg5} \textit{g5} 17.e3 \textit{e7} (to 17...\textit{ac8} strong is 18.\textit{g4}!\textit{=} 18.\textit{xe6} \textit{fxe6} 19.\textit{b5} \textit{ac8} (if 19...\textit{c8}, then strong is
20.\(\text{wb}^3\pm\) with the idea \(\text{xb}1-\text{c}7,\) \(\text{e}1-\text{c}1,\) while after 19...\(\text{xb}4\) decides 20.\(\text{xc}7\) \(\text{bab}8\) 21.\(\text{fe}6++\) 20.\(\text{g}^4\pm\) and Black's situation is rather difficult as shown by the game M. Marin – Estremera Panos, Andorra 1997.

14.\(\text{h}3!\)

For the time being the bishop has nothing to do on the long diagonal, while it will find some work on the c8–h3 diagonal. Most important, the c8-square is banned for the black rook and the c8–h3 diagonal – for the black queen. At the same time the seemingly more active 14.b4 is weaker in view of 14...\(\text{xc}3\) 15.\(\text{xc}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 16.\(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{fxe}6,\) where to 17.\(\text{c}7\) there is 17...\(\text{f}7=\).

14...\(\text{g}5\)

Something has to be done with the pair of white bishops actively operating on the two adjacent diagonals. Otherwise, both after 14...\(\text{e}7?!\) 15.\(\text{f}5\pm\), and following 14...\(\text{e}8?!\) 15.\(\text{cb}5\) \(\text{g}5\) (insufficient to maintain the equilibrium is also 15...\(\text{e}7,\) due to 16.\(\text{f}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{bd}4\pm\) with perceptible white pressure, since the attempt to break away by 17...\(\text{e}6?\) immediately brings Black to disaster because of 18.\(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{fxe}6\) 19.\(\text{h}6\) ! \(\text{g}xh6\) 20.\(\text{xe}6\) + \(\text{h}8\) 21.\(\text{xd}7\) \(\text{xd}7\) 22.\(\text{c}7++\) 16.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{xd}4\) (to 16...\(\text{ge}6\) unpleasant is 17.\(\text{xe}6\) \(\text{xe}6\) 18.\(\text{d}6\pm\) bringing about a huge white advantage) 17.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{ge}6\) 18.\(\text{e}3\pm\) White's advantage gains strength. Should Black

counter the constant menace \(\text{b}2-\text{b}4\) by 14...\(\text{a}5,\) then 15.\(\text{cb}5\pm\) all the same leaves White with some advantage on account of his possession of the d4-square.

15.\(\text{xg}5\) \(\text{xg}5\) 16.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{f}6\)

To 16...\(\text{g}6\) 17.\(\text{ee}2\) \(\text{e}7\) (with the idea 18...\(\text{fd}8\)) one has to take into account 18.\(\text{f}3\pm,\) confronting Black with serious problems on account of the d5–pawn.

17.\(\text{e}2!\)

White intends to dispatch as soon as possible the e1 rook, which is not taking an active part in the game, to the d– or c–file. At the same time after 17.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{e}4\) 18.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{dx}e4\) 19.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{e}5!=\) the play levels out.

17...\(\text{g}6?!\)

Probably 17...\(\text{e}8\) 18.\(\text{d}2\pm\) would have been a lesser evil for Black.

18.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{e}4\)

At this point in the game Anand - Adams, Wijk aan Zee, 1996, very strong would have been 19.\(\text{e}c2!\) bringing about an obvious white advantage after 19...\(\text{e}8\) (to 19...\(\text{d}6\) adequate is 20.\(\text{g}2\)± 20.\(\text{cb}5\) \(\text{e}7\) 21.\(\text{c}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 22.\(\text{xc}6\)±. 50
c2) 12...\&e4

13.\&e5!?

Now, when the e4 square has been taken up by the very knight from c5, the transfer of the bishop to d4 gains strength, since on this square the black knight will not be able to attack it by retreating to e6. Following 13.\&b5 \&g4! (subsequent to 13...\&c5 14.e3 \&g4 15.\&c2 White's prospects are superior) 14.\&f1 \&c5 15.e3 (after 15.\&bd4 causing worries to White is 15...g5 16.\&d2 \&gxf2 17.\&xf2 \&xf2 18.\&xf2 g4 19.b4 gxf3 20.bxc5 fxe2 21.c6 \&a6 with the idea \&c4, and in case of 15.\&fd4 White has also to take into consideration 15...a6 16.\&c3 and now 16...g5 17...\&f6 the situation becomes even more complicated.

13...\&c5 14.\&d4 \&e7

Big troubles await Black after 14...\&d7? in view of 15.\&xe4 \&e4 (if 15...dxe4, then 16.\&xc5†) 16.\&e5 \&f5 17.\&xe4 \&xe4 18.\&xc5 bxc5 19.\&d7 d4 20.f3 \&e3+ 21.\&g2 and Black cannot avoid material losses.

15.\&h3!

A stroke similar to the one we met in variation c1.

15...\&fd8

After 15...\&xc3 16.\&xc3 \&b4 (White also stands slightly better after 16...\&e4 17.\&c2±) 17.\&e3 \&e4 18.\&f1 the fleeting activity of the black pieces was waning rapidly and White's prospects were preferable in view of his superior pawn structure.

16.a3 \&xc3

To 16...a5 one had to bear in mind 17.\&a4!! with the consequence that the black bishop on c5 and the b6-pawn could no longer survive without each other.

17.\&xc3 \&e4 18.\&c2

Following 18.\&e3 Black obtained counterplay by way of 18...a5 19.\&a4 \&d6±.

18...a5

At this point of the game Gelfand - Pelletier, Biel 1997, worth attention for White was 19.\&c1?! with the idea to enhance his influence on the dark squares by the move \&c1-f4.
Black does not bar the a8-h1 diagonal for his light-squared bishop and hopes to somewhat simplify the position by exchanging a pair of knights at a well-chosen moment.

9.e4

Definitely interesting is 9...\(\text{\#xd}5\). After 9...\(\text{\#xd}5\) (with 9...\(\text{\#xd}5\) one had to take into account 10.e4 \(\text{\#b}7\) 11.d4 c5 12.d5 exd5 13.\(\text{\#d}7\) 14.\(\text{\#f}4\) \(\text{\#f}6\) 15.\(\text{\#d}2\) as in the game Verduga – Gutierrez, Bayamo 1989) 10.d4 \(\text{\#d}7\) (possibly, Black is best advised to immediately venture the continuation 10...c5 11.dxc5 bxc5 12.\(\text{\#b}3\) \(\text{\#b}6\) 13.\(\text{\#e}5\) \(\text{\#d}8\) 14.\(\text{\#f}4\) with mutual chances) 11.\(\text{\#a}4\) (following 11.\(\text{\#f}4\) c5 12.dxc5 bxc5 13.\(\text{\#d}2\) a5 14.\(\text{\#c}1\) \(\text{\#a}7\) 15.\(\text{\#b}1\) \(\text{\#b}6\) 16.b3 d4 17.\(\text{\#x}b7\) \(\text{\#x}b7\) 18.e4 a4= the game evened out completely, Portisch – Karpov, Milan 1975, though worth attention is 11.\(\text{\#b}3\)!? c5 12.dxc5 \(\text{\#xc}5\) 13.\(\text{\#d}1\) \(\text{\#f}6\) 14.\(\text{\#e}3\)! with the idea \(\text{\#e}3–d4\), since 14...\(\text{\#xb}2\)? is inadequate in view of 15.\(\text{\#xc}5\) \(\text{\#xa}1\) 16.\(\text{\#xf}8\) \(\text{\#c}3\) 17.\(\text{\#a}3\) \(\text{\#d}4\) 11...c5 12.\(\text{\#d}1\) a6 13.\(\text{\#c}5\) \(\text{\#xc}5\) (probably 13...bxc5!? is stronger) 14.\(\text{\#g}4\) \(\text{\#c}8\) 15.\(\text{\#h}5\) \(\text{\#e}6\) 16.\(\text{\#g}5\) \(\text{\#e}8\) 17.\(\text{\#xe}7\) \(\text{\#xe}7\) 18.\(\text{\#d}4\) Akopian – Gulko, Erevan 1996, and White’s chances are to be preferred thanks to the fact that he has retained secure control of the d4-square.

9...\(\text{\#xc}3\)

After 9...\(\text{\#b}4\) 10.d4 c5 White can contest for the upper hand by establishing a powerful passed pawn in the centre of the board by means of 11.d5! (following 11.\(\text{\#e}3\) cxd4 12.\(\text{\#xd}4\) \(\text{\#c}6\) 13.\(\text{\#xc}6\) \(\text{\#xc}6\) 14.\(\text{\#e}2\) \(\text{\#d}3\) 15.\(\text{\#ad}1\) \(\text{\#xe}2\) 16.\(\text{\#xe}2\) \(\text{\#fd}8\) 17.\(\text{\#ed}2\) \(\text{\#xd}2\) 18.\(\text{\#xd}2\) \(\text{\#d}8\) 19.\(\text{\#xd}8\) \(\text{\#x}d8\)= Rukavina – Cuorel 1989, the odds are level) 11...exd5 12.exd5. Leaping ahead we must note that this position can
be reached also by another move order, which will be discussed in variation b, Chapter 14.

10.bxc3

A position has arisen, where White can obtain a powerful pawn centre, and Black – unconstrained play for his pieces.

10...c5

The continuation 10...c6 will be considered in Chapter 9.

11.d4

![Chess diagram](image)

Black has a choice of several lines: a) 11...cxd4, b) 11...c6 and c) 11...d5.

a) 11...cxd4

Black partly relieves the pawn tension in the centre without delay.

12.cxd4

White’s plans count on the d4–d5 advance.

12...c6


13.b2

The drawbacks of Black’s move 11 are telling. As long as the white pawn was on c3, the bishop had almost nothing to do on b2. Now the situation is entirely different. As yet, the immediate 13.d5 has not been prepared well enough. After 13...exd5 14.exd5 b4 15.a3, Sommerbauer – Casagrande, Austria 1996, Black could have obtained completely acceptable play by 15...c5 16.e5 c8=.

13...f6

In case of 13...c8, following the game Buturin – Kaunas, Czech Republic 1996, good–looking is 14.d5 exd5 15.exd5 with the idea to obtain a decisive advantage after 15...b4?! by means of 16.xe7! xe7 17.d6 e6 18.d4+. Otherwise, if 13...a5, then after 14.e5±, following the game L.Spassov – Trifunov, Pernik 1983, White’s prospects are superior. Black has to closely watch for the possible d4–d5 breakthrough, as well as keep an eye on the activity of the white pieces on the kingside, which is especially unpleasant in view of the out–of–the–way position of the a5–
Chapter 8

knight.

14...\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\textbf{b}1}}?

Seems more promising than 14...\texttt{c}e2, which after 14...\texttt{c}c8 15.d5 exd5 16.exd5 following the game Beckhuis – Rudolf, Austria 1998, would have allowed Black to complicate the situation by means of 16...\texttt{x}xb2 17.\texttt{xb}2 \texttt{e}e7 18.d6 \texttt{d}d5 19.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{c}c5∞.

14...\texttt{e}e8

After 14...\texttt{a}a5 15.\texttt{c}c3 \texttt{c}c4 16.\texttt{d}d3 (another possibility is 16.\texttt{b}b3 \texttt{c}c8 17.\texttt{b}c1 \texttt{e}7 18.\texttt{f}1 \texttt{d}d6 19.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{c}c7 20.\texttt{b}b2 \texttt{g}5 21.d5=, which provided White with an advantage, Akesson – Engqvist, Taby 1991) 16...\texttt{c}c7 (possibly, the relatively superior continuation for Black is 16...\texttt{e}e5 17.\texttt{x}xe5 \texttt{xe}5 18.a4 \texttt{c}c8 19.\texttt{ed}1 \texttt{f}6 20.a5 \texttt{e}e8 21.\texttt{xb}6 \texttt{xb}6 22.\texttt{a}a1=, which provides White with a small but lasting edge, in view of his powerful centre and the opportunities to attack the b6 pawn, R.Ibrahimov – Bar, Oropesa del Mar 1999, since in case of 16...\texttt{c}c8 17.e5 \texttt{xf}3 18.\texttt{xf}3 \texttt{e}7 19.\texttt{bd}1 \texttt{a}3 20.d5 exd5 21.\texttt{xd}5 \texttt{e}e7 22.\texttt{h}3= Libeau – Wornacka, Biel 1993, as well as after 16...\texttt{a}6 17.\texttt{bd}1 \texttt{c}c8 18.\texttt{b}1 \texttt{c}7 19.\texttt{c}c1 \texttt{fd}8 20.h4 h6 21.\texttt{b}b3 \texttt{d}7 22.\texttt{h}3! \texttt{b}7 23.d5=. L.Christiansen – Hoffmann, Germany 1994, White’s prospects are appreciably superior) 17.\texttt{ec}1 \texttt{ac}8 18.d5 \texttt{xc}3 19.\texttt{xc}3 exd5 20.exd5= Wojtkiewicz – Polaczek, Eupen 1995, White’s superiority is obvious.

In case of 14...\texttt{c}c8 15.d5 exd5 16.exd5 \texttt{d}5 the best–looking line is 17.\texttt{e}e5 (after 17.\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{xf}6 18.\texttt{e}5 \texttt{fd}8 19.\texttt{b}4 \texttt{d}6= the situation levels out, as shown by the games Ftacnik – Yudasin, Biel (izt) 1993, and A.Petrosian – Anastasian, Erevan 1996) 17...\texttt{d}4 (if 17...\texttt{d}6, then 18.\texttt{d}3= with the upper hand) 18.\texttt{xc}4 \texttt{xc}4 19.d6 \texttt{hg}2 20.\texttt{xg}2 \texttt{xb}2 21.\texttt{xb}2 \texttt{d}7 22.\texttt{d}2=. Regardless of the fact that all minor pieces are off, White retains his advantage on account of the well advanced passed d–pawn, Stean – Ostermeyer, Bergsjo 1981.

15.h4 h6 16.d5!

In this case the breakthrough is accompanied by a typical for these positions pawn sacrifice.

16...\texttt{exd}5 17.\texttt{e}5 \texttt{e}7 18.\texttt{f}8

The other continuations also do not offer an easy way to cope with White’s attack. After 18...\texttt{f}6 19.\texttt{xf}7+ \texttt{xf}7 White pounces on the black king by means of 20.\texttt{g}5+! h\texttt{x}g5 21.\texttt{h}5+ \texttt{f}8 (of no avail is 21...\texttt{g}8 in view of 22.\texttt{xe}8+ \texttt{xe}8 23.\texttt{xd}5+ \texttt{f}8 24.\texttt{a}3=) 22.\texttt{h}8+ \texttt{f}7 23.\texttt{xe}8 \texttt{xe}8 24.\texttt{xd}5+ \texttt{g}6 25.h5+ \texttt{f}5 26.\texttt{h}7= and White’s attack decides the game. In case of 18...fxe6 19.\texttt{xe}6 \texttt{d}7 20.\texttt{g}6 \texttt{f}8 21.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{e}7 22.\texttt{h}3→ White also retains a powerful attacking position.
centre without any preliminaries.

12...exd5 13.exd5 a5 14. f4 f6

If 14...d6, then following 15.e5 c7 White gained the upper hand by 16.h5! (weaker is 16.g4 Rad8 17.Rad1 in view of 17...c8 18.h5 g6 19.h6 de8= with roughly equal prospects, Smirin – Makarov, Novosibirsk 1995) 16...ae8 17.e3 g6 18.e2± Wirthensohn – Zude, Germany 1991, while the incautious 18...f6? allowed him to win a pawn by way of 19.xg6! xxe3 20.xe3 hxg6 21.e6+ f7 22.xd6 xe6 23.dxe6+–.

15.e5 xe5

Black has to concede White the bishop pair advantage, since in case of 15...e8 16.c6! xc6 17.dxc6 xc3 18.c7 xd1 19. axd1+– his prospects are outright bad.

16.xe5 d7

Inadequate is 16...c4? due to 17.xg7! xg7 18.g4+–.

17.h5 f6

If 17...c4, then after 18. xg7! xg7 19.g5+ h8 20. f6+ g8 21.e4 d6 22.e5 fe8 23.g5+ f8 24.h6+ e7 25.h3+– White’s attack gains its purpose.

18.f4 g6 19.h6!?

Less promising to White is 19.f3 g5 20.e3 ae8 21.Rad1± Moehring – Brueggemann, Salzwedel 1982.

19...fe8

If 19...g5, then White has at his disposal 20.h3 g7 21.e6+
\( \text{h8} 22.\text{\textcolor{red}{x}g7+} \text{\textcolor{red}{x}g7} 23.\text{\textcolor{red}{c}c7\pm}.\)

20.\textit{h4} \textit{c4} 21.\textit{e6!+}

This point was reached in the game Chuchelov – Lopez Martinez, Berlin 1998. Black’s dark squares on the kingside have been seriously weakened. Moreover, the white pieces are noticeably more active. These circumstances are evidence of a significant white advantage.

c) 11...

12.\textit{\textcolor{red}{f}f4}

Premature is 12.d5 owing to 12...\textit{exd5} 13.\textit{exd5} \textit{\textcolor{red}{f}f6\pm} to be followed by c5–c4 and \textit{c5}, or b6–b5 and \textit{b}b6 with counterplay. At the same time the move 12.\textit{\textcolor{red}{b}b2=} is not quite appealing, so long as the white pawn stands on \textit{c3}.

12...\textit{\textcolor{red}{d}d6}

In case of 12...\textit{cxd4} 13.\textit{cxd4} \textit{c8} (the position arising after 13...\textit{b4} 14.\textit{e3} will be discussed shortly in the mainline variation) 14.d5 \textit{exd5} 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{f}f6} 16.\textit{xc1} \textit{xc1} 17.\textit{xc1} \textit{a8} 18.\textit{g5} h6 19.\textit{e4\pm} White’s prospects are superior.

13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}e5!}

Worthy of notice is also the continuation 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{d}d3}. After 13...\textit{cxd4} 14.\textit{cxd4} \textit{b4} 15.\textit{d2} (weaker is 15.\textit{e2} on account of 15...a5\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbullet}}) 15...\textit{c8} 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}c1}, Anand – Tiviakov, Wijk aan Zee, 1996, Black made the inaccurate move 16...\textit{xc1} (stronger is 16...\textit{d7\textcolor{red}{\textbullet}}), which permitted White to obtain a slight edge by way of 17.\textit{xc1} \textit{a8} 18.\textit{f3} \textit{c8} 19.\textit{c4} \textit{a6} 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{f}f1!} \textit{d8} 21.\textit{b3} \textit{f8} 22.\textit{e3} \textit{c8} 23.\textit{c2} \textit{b7} 24.\textit{d3\pm}, due to the more well-chosen disposition of the white pieces.

13...\textit{cxd4}

There are also records of 13...\textit{c8}. After 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{d}d3} (weaker is 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}e3} in view of 14...\textit{b5\textit{\textbullet}} to be followed by \textit{b5–b4}) 14...\textit{cxd4} 15.\textit{cxd4} \textit{\textcolor{red}{b}b4} White has 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}c1}\textit{?} (in case of 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}d1} and 16...\textit{c3!}) 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}e2} 17...\textit{a8} 18.\textit{b2} \textit{\textcolor{red}{a}a5!} 19.f3 \textit{xc8} 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{e}c1}, Beliaevsky – Tiviakov, Belgrade, 1993, the most straightforward way for Black to obtain a good position was 20...\textit{xc1} 21.\textit{xc1} \textit{xc1} 22.\textit{xc1} b5= to be followed by \textit{\textcolor{red}{a}a5–b6) 16...\textit{xc1} 17.\textit{xc1} \textit{a8} 18.\textit{f3} \textit{c8} 19.\textit{c4} we are facing the position from the game Anand – Tiviakov, Wijk aan Zee 1996, which we analysed in the previous paragraph. Here, due to the fact that the white knight arrives at c4 along the route \textit{\textcolor{red}{f}f3–e5–c4}, and not via \textit{\textcolor{red}{f}f3–d2–c4}, Black is lacking the strong reply 16...\textit{d7}.

14.\textit{cxd4} \textit{\textcolor{red}{b}b4}

In case of 14...\textit{c8} White can steer to the position, con-
sidered in the previous note, by 14.\textit{\textbf{d}d3}.

15.\textit{\textbf{e}e3} \textit{\textbf{c}c8}

Part of Black's plans is the move \textit{\textbf{c}c3}. After 15...h6 16.h4 \textit{\textbf{c}c8}, along the game Sowray – Giblin, England 1998, White could have proceeded 17.d5!? exd5 18.exd5\textpm by analogy with the variations considered below.

16.d5!

Now, when most of the white pieces have been actively placed in the centre of the board, is the time to effect this strategically all-important breakthrough.

16...exd5

The position is abundant in tactical subtleties. White's arrangement in the centre is seemingly unreliable, but nevertheless any black attempt to gain a material advantage meets a deserving objection. E.g., should Black initiate a hunt for an exchange by 16...\textit{\textbf{c}c5} 17.\textit{\textbf{d}d3} \textit{\textbf{a}a6} 18.\textit{\textbf{d}d2} \textit{\textbf{b}b4}, he is confronted with 19. \textit{\textbf{c}c6}! \textit{\textbf{xc}c6} 20.dxc6\textpm, leading to a huge white advantage, and should he continue 16...\textit{\textbf{c}c3}, then subsequent to 17.\textit{\textbf{c}c6}! \textit{\textbf{xc}c6} (of no avail is 17...\textit{\textbf{xc}c6}? due to 18.dxc6 \textit{\textbf{xa}a1} 19.\textit{\textbf{xd}xd8} \textit{\textbf{xd}xd8} 20.cxb7 e5 21.\textit{\textbf{e}e1}— and White is winning) 18.\textit{\textbf{xc}c3} exd5 19. exd5\textpm White's edge is quite tangible, since Black is denied 19...\textit{\textbf{xd}xd5}? in view of 20.\textit{\textbf{xc}c8} \textit{\textbf{xc}c8} 21.\textit{\textbf{xd}xd5} \textit{\textbf{d}d8} 22.\textit{\textbf{c}c1}— and he is a piece down.

17.exd5 \textit{\textbf{d}d6}

With the pawn capture 17... \textit{\textbf{xd}xd5}, after 18.\textit{\textbf{d}d3} \textit{\textbf{xc}xg2} 19. \textit{\textbf{xd}xd8} \textit{\textbf{fx}fxd8} (19...\textit{\textbf{xc}xd8} 20.\textit{\textbf{b}b3}— makes no difference) 20.\textit{\textbf{b}b3}— Black loses his queen with no due compensation. Should the pawn be captured by 17...\textit{\textbf{c}cxd5}, then after 18.\textit{\textbf{d}d3} \textit{\textbf{xf}fx4} (also insufficient is 18...\textit{\textbf{c}c5} on account of 19.\textit{\textbf{e}e3} \textit{\textbf{b}b5} 20.a4 \textit{\textbf{a}a5} 21.\textit{\textbf{c}c4?} 19.gxf4 \textit{\textbf{xc}c2} (to 19...\textit{\textbf{e}e7} there was 20.\textit{\textbf{d}d7}—, and in case of 19...\textit{\textbf{c}c7}, followed by 20.\textit{\textbf{d}d7} \textit{\textbf{fd}8} 21.\textit{\textbf{xc}c7} \textit{\textbf{xd}xd1}+ 22.\textit{\textbf{xd}xd1} \textit{\textbf{xc}c7} 23.\textit{\textbf{d}d8}+ \textit{\textbf{f}f8} 24.\textit{\textbf{xb}xb7} \textit{\textbf{xb}b7} 25. \textit{\textbf{d}d7} \textit{\textbf{xd}xd7} 26.\textit{\textbf{xd}xd7}—, White's extra exchange is more than sufficient to ensure an almost effortless win) 20.\textit{\textbf{xd}xd8} \textit{\textbf{fx}fxd8} (to 20...\textit{\textbf{xc}xd8} quite sufficient is 21.\textit{\textbf{b}b3}—) 21.\textit{\textbf{b}b3} \textit{\textbf{c}c3} 22.\textit{\textbf{xc}xg2} \textit{\textbf{xa}a1} 23.\textit{\textbf{xf}fx7} \textit{\textbf{f}f8} 24.\textit{\textbf{g}g5} \textit{\textbf{d}d7} 25.\textit{\textbf{e}e6}—, the white queen and knight adequately complement each other. Finally, with 17...\textit{\textbf{c}c5} 18.\textit{\textbf{d}d3} \textit{\textbf{a}a6} 19.\textit{\textbf{d}d2} \textit{\textbf{b}b4} 20.\textit{\textbf{c}c6?} we arrive at a position, similar to the one analysed in the previous note.

18.\textit{\textbf{c}c6} \textit{\textbf{xc}c6} 19.\textit{\textbf{xd}xd6}

A necessary intermediate move. With 19.dxc6 \textit{\textbf{xf}fx4} 20.gxf4 \textit{\textbf{xd}xd1}+ 21.\textit{\textbf{xd}xd1} \textit{\textbf{c}c7}= the play
became level.

19...\&a4

If 19...\&xd6, the following 20.dxc6 \&xd1+ 21.\&xd1 \&c7 22.f4± the emerging endgame is very strenuous for Black, since White has a clear-cut plan for enhancing his position by staging a pawn offensive on the kingside.

20.\&xf8!!

White sacrifices his queen for a rook and a piece. In addition White has a few strong positional trumps, like the bishop pair advantage and the powerful passed d-pawn. The nearly automatic 20.\&xa4 \&xd6 21.\&xa7 \&xd5 22.\&xd5 \&xd5 23.\&xb6± brings about a position, in which White has an extra pawn, but its conversion is far from effortless.

20...\&xd1 21.\&e7 \&c7

Outright bad for Black is 21...\&xd5, due to 22.\&xd8 \&xe3 23.\&g5 \&xg2 24.\&xd1 h6 25.\&c1++, and the black knight is trapped. Possibly, his relatively superior decision would have been 21...\&d7!? 22.\&xd1 \&e8, though after 23.d6\&e with the idea \&h3 White again has excellent compensation for Black's small material advantage.

22.\&xd1 \&d7

In case of 22...\&c2 23.\&ed3 \&xa2, subsequent to 24.\&xf6! gxf6 25.d6 \&d8 26.d7±, the white d-pawn hurriedly rushes to the queening square.

23.\&h3 h6

24.\&f5!!

As shown by the Kramnik – Anand game, Las Palmas 1996, the defence of the black position is very complicated and dangers are lurking around every move.
Black spares a moment to complete his queenside development.

11.d4 a5 12.c2!? The most promising line. White intends to set in motion the c-pawn. Note, that in case of 12...e2 with the same idea, the vulnerability of White’s position along the a1–h8 diagonal tells after 12...c5! 13.d5?! exd5 14. exd5 f6.

Other continuations have also been tested. Thus after 12.f4 d6 13.e5 e8 (less precise is 13...e7, which allowed White to gain some edge by 14.g4 f6 15.f3 a3 16.c1 e8 17. h4± Kramnik – Ivanchuk, Monte Carlo (blindfold) 1997) 14.d3 (at this point to 14.g4 a good–looking option for Black is 14...f6 15.f3 xf4 16.xf4 c6 with mutual chances) 14.d8 15.g4 h8 16.e5 (to 16.ad1 there was 16...c6) 16.e7 (if 16...xg2, then after 17.exd6 b7 18.dxc7 c6 19.f3 de8 20.b4 d7 White builds up a dangerous initiative by way of 21.d5! xd5 22.ad1+) 16...e7 17.xb7 a7 18.g5 xg5 19.xg5= Akopian – Salov, Madrid 1997, a position with mutual chances has emerged.

There are records of tournament play tests of 12.h4. However, following 12...e8 (weaker is 12...c5? in view of 13.d5! exd5 14.exd5 d6 15.xe5 gxe7 16.xd5 ad8 17.g5± with a white material edge) 13.h5 (after 13.e5 d6 14.f4 f6 15.d3 e5= Black’s prospects could have been even superior) 13...h6 14. e5 d6 15.f4 (following 15. g4 xe5 16.dxe5 h8± the table turned in Black’s favour, and in case of 15.g4 f5 16.exf5 xg2 17.xg2 exf5= Black’s prospects are by no means worse) 15...e7 (if 15...f6, then after 16.g6± the white pieces pene-
trate through the breaches in Black’s pawn chain and get nearer and yet nearer to the black king) 16.\textit{g}4 \textit{h}8 17.\textit{d}3 (White does not achieve anything particular by 17.\textit{ad}1 \textit{ad}8 18.\textit{ee}2\textsuperscript{=}) 17...\textit{ad}8 18.\textit{ad}1 \textit{c}6 (the situation remains unclear after 18...c5 19.\textit{xd}6 \textit{xd}6 20.\textit{ee}5\textsuperscript{=}) 19.e5 \textit{a}3 20.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 21.\textit{e}4, Kramnik – Karpov, Dortmund 1997, Black missed his best chance to even the play by 21...\textit{a}5\textsuperscript{=} (with the idea c7–c5).

12...c5

The white c-pawn was ready to move forward, so Black had to take specific measures. In case of 12...\textit{e}4 Black must bear in mind the continuation 13.\textit{ee}2 b5 14.\textit{ee}5 \textit{xe}5 15.\textit{xb}5! c5 16.\textit{dxe}5 (White can barely count on taking the upper hand after 16.\textit{xb}7 \textit{b}8 17.\textit{xa}7 \textit{a}8 18.\textit{b}7 \textit{b}8 19.\textit{a}6 \textit{cxd}4\textsuperscript{=}) 16...\textit{c}7 17.f4 \textit{fd}8 (White’s prospects are superior also following 17...\textit{ab}8 18.\textit{d}1=) 18.\textit{e}3\textsuperscript{=} White has an extra (even though double) pawn.

13.d5!

The program move. Otherwise Black would have obtained excellent play by exchanging on d4, due to the placement of the white queen on c2.

13...\textit{exd}5 14.\textit{exd}5 \textit{f}6

It is easy to see that 14...\textit{xd}5? is impossible because of 15.\textit{d}1\textsuperscript{=} and Black has no satisfactory defence against the two dreadful threats: 16.\textit{xd}5 \textit{xd}5 17.\textit{g}5 and the uncomplicated

16.\textit{e}1.

15.\textit{d}1 \textit{e}8 16.\textit{d}2 \textit{e}5

To 16...\textit{xd}5?? suffices 17.\textit{f}1\textsuperscript{=}.

17.\textit{e}4!

Taking control of the all-important d6 square the white knight is flashing the green light to his d-pawn. There was no story in the Gelfand – Karpov game, Biel 1997, since following 17.\textit{f}3 \textit{f}6 18.\textit{d}2 \textit{e}5 19.\textit{f}3 the adversaries agreed to a draw. Note that in case of the leisurely 17.\textit{b}1 (intending to support the d5 pawn by c3–c4) White has to take into consideration 17...\textit{c}8? 18.\textit{c}4 \textit{g}6\textsuperscript{=}, and Black is fully prepared to set up a powerful bishop pair battery on the adjacent diagonals a1–h8 and b1–h7.

17...\textit{c}4 18.d6

A punch in the air would have been 18.\textit{g}5, because of the simple 18...\textit{g}6\textsuperscript{=}

18...\textit{d}7

In case of 18...\textit{xe}4 19.\textit{xe}4 \textit{xd}6 very unpleasant is the continuation 20.\textit{c}6!, which brings disharmony to the disposition of the black pieces (in case
Part 3. The “Hedgehog” and Double Fianchetto Systems

1.Δf3 Δf6 2.c4 b6 3.g3 Δb7 4.Δg2 c5

White’s post-development plans include the advance of the central pawns “e” and “d”. The purpose of Black’s most recent move is to cause a break in the pawn chain in the centre in case White advances d2–d4, since that would permit Black to simplify the position.

5.0–0 e6

In this line we will discuss a popular contemporary variation, known in the theoretical literature under the nickname “hedgehog”. Its essence is, that in case the white d-pawn is exchanged for the black c-pawn, Black intends to erect a pawn wall along the sixth rank: a6, b6, d6, and e6.

The continuation 5...g6 leading to the Double Fianchetto System will be considered in Chapter 14.

6.Δc3

Black has a choice of lines, dependent first and foremost on the order of moves by which he intends to erect the pawn wall along the sixth rank. Move order is by no means insignificant in this system, since plans to break-up the “hedgehog”, which have approved themselves for one move order, are often absolutely harmless with another. Of all the numerous opportunities for Black we will focus on the following major ones: 6...Δc6 (Chapter 10), 6...d6 (Chapter 11) and 6...Δe7 (Chapters 12–13).

Among the other less popular continuations we will note, that 6... Δe4, following 7.Δxe4 (if 7.Δc2 Δxc3 8.Δxc3, then White has to take into consideration 8...Δf6! and now 9.Δxf6 gxf6 10.d3 Δf5 Frog – Kholmov, Moscow 1997) 7...Δxe4 White has 8.d3 Δb7 9.d4± and he may rightfully rely to obtain an advantage, since, on one hand, White threatens to severely cut the prospects of the black light-squared bishop on the a8–h1
diagonal by the d4–d5 advance, and, on the other, when the position in the centre is opened up, in case the c-pawn is exchanged for the d-pawn, the underdeveloped black pieces (primarily the dark-squared bishop) may rather appreciably tell.

In case Black manifests activity in the centre by way of 6...d5, then following 7.cxd5 Qxd5 (in case of 7...exd5?! 8.d4 Qe7, in view of 9.Qe5! Qbd7 10.Qg5 0–0 11.Qxd7 Qxd7 12.dxc5 bxc5 13.Qxf6 Qxf6 14.Qxd5± Murrey – Meijere, Dieren 2000, Black runs the risk to quickly arrive at an embarrassing situation) 8.Qe1 (the attempt to immediately profit by 8.Qxd5 permits Black to equalise by means of 8...Qxd5! 9.b3 Qe7 10.Qb2 0–0 11.Qc2 Qc6= Bravo – Hernando Rodrigo, Spain 1999) 9.Qe1 Qe7 10.e4 Qb4 the game is steered into Chapter 12 variation b or as a result of 10...Qxc3 11.bxc3 0–0 12.d4 – to Chapter 8.

Finally, in case of 6...a6 White can by means of 7.Qe1 d6 8.e4 Qc7 9.d4 (the line 9.b3 Qe7 10.Qb2 Qbd7 11.d4 cxd4 12.Qxd4 0–0 13.Qc1 Qfe8=, which occurred in the game A.Petrosian – Stepin, Polanica Zdroj 1989, brought about a situation, where Black has in fact gained a tempo on account of the move 9.b3) 9...cxd4 10.Qxd4 Qe7 converge the game to a position considered in Chapter 13.
Black is eager to exchange as many pieces as possible after White advances d2–d4. Thereafter his dark-squared bishop has the perspective, on account of the fact that Black has not yet made the programmed move d7-d6, to take an active position on the c5-square, or situation permitting – on e5.

7.e4!?  

Aware of Black's short-term plans, White intends to postpone a little the d2–d4 advance. The c6-knight has barred the diagonal of Black's light-squared bishop, which permits the advance e2–e4 without the preliminary \[e\]e1. Should White ignore Black's most recent move and immediately advance his d-pawn in the centre 7.d4, then following 7...\[d\]xd4 8.\[d\]xd4 \[c\]xg2 9.\[c\]xg2 cxd4 10.\[w\]xd4 \[c\]e7 (after 10...\[w\]c8 11.\[w\]f4 \[c\]e5 12.\[w\]d3 0-0 13.\[e\]ad1 h6 14.e4 d6 15.b3 e5 16.\[c\]e3 \[c\]c6 17.\[w\]e2 a6 18.\[f\]d3 \[b\]b8 19.\[f\]d1 \[f\]e8±) Andersson - Larsen, Bugojno 1984, Black obtained a sound, but rather too passive position) 11.b3 (in case of 11.\[f\]f4, followed by 11...d6 12.\[c\]d3 0-0 13.b3 \[d\]d7 14.\[f\]f3 \[a\]c8 15.\[f\]d1 a6 16.\[f\]d3 Black managed to obtain convenient play by way of 16...b5 17.cxb5 axb5 18.a4 bxa4 19.bxa4 d5= Chiburdanidze – Maric, Shanghai 1992) 11...0-0 12.\[g\]b2 \[c\]c7 13.\[f\]d1 \[f\]fd8 14.\[f\]d3 \[w\]b7+ (not bad is also 14...d5=) 15.\[f\]f3 \[w\]xf3+ 16.\[f\]xf3 d6= Black evens out, Tal – Benjamin, San Francisco 1991. The attempt to prepare the d2–d4 advance by means of 7.e3 leads after 7...\[e\]e7 8.d4 cxd4 9.exd4 \[c\]a5 10.b3 d5 11.\[f\]e5 \[c\]c8 to a position with mutual chances, Mueller – Zawadka, corr. 1992.

7...\[w\]b8!?  

The menacing further advance of the white e-pawn compels Black to take measures. His latest move is just that: on one hand, he tries to prevent White’s
immediate e4–e5, while at the same time he does not deny the dark-squared bishop the possibility to land on c5 and e5. Should Black ignore this threat, e.g., by 7...c8?! White proceeded 8.e5 g4 9.h3! h6 10.g4 e7 11.d4 xd4 12.xd4 xg2 13. xg2 cxd4 14.exd4 c7 15.xh6 gxh6 16.ad1± Ivanchuk – Seirawan, Monaco (blindfold), 1993, and obtained a huge advantage.

If Black makes some concessions via 7...d6 and gives up the possibility to activate his dark-squared bishop when the opportunity occurs, then after 8.d4 cxd4 9.xd4 (following 9.c8 10.xc6 xc6 11. f4 e7 12.e2 0–0 13.f3 c7 14.ac1± White also threatens unpleasantly d5 and therefore obtains a slight edge, Beliavsky – Salov, Reggio Emilia 1991/92) 10.xd4 e7 11.b3 0–0 White is entitled to some advantage. In outline his plan comes down to pressure on the black d6–pawn and prevention of the b6–b5 and d6–d5 breakthrougths. The implementation of this design is best prepared by the multipurpose move 12.a3! After 12...b8 13.f3 d8 14.d2 (the game may develop in a similar way also after 14.ac1 c6 15.h3 a6 16. b4! b7 17.e3 b5 18.cxb5 axb5 19.c2± Vaganian – Hellers, New York 1990, with a white edge) 14...c6 15.ad1 a6 16.e3 (good is also 16.d3?! with the purpose to prevent 16...a7? in view of 17.e5! dx5 18.xd8+– 16.a7 17.h3 e8 18.h2 c8 19.f4. Now by 19...b5 20.cxb5 axb5 Black has fulfilled his plans in part, but the b6–b5 breakthrough does not represent an end in itself. With the help of the standard manoeuvre 21.b4± Zs.Polgar – Maric, Shanghai 1992, White blocks the black b–pawn, thus creating another potential weakness in Black’s position – the b5 pawn.

Should Black decide to completely close the centre by 7...e5, after 8.d3 g6 (if 8...e7, then 9.h4+, followed by f2–f4 and f5 permits White to grab the initiative) White is best advised to start preparations for the f2–f4 advance by means of 9.e1!? The move 9.h4 is a little less adequate for this purpose due to 9...h5?, since after 10.f3 (f4? is not available because of 10...xf4! 11.xf4 xh4 12.d5 d6†) 10...g7 11.d5 d4∞ the situation remains unclear.

8.e1

The play in the centre can be opened immediately by means of 8.d4. Following 8...cxd4 9.xd4
\( \text{xd4 10.edx4} \) Black can try to obtain counterplay by the outwardly not quite aesthetic move 10...\( \text{d6!} \) The attempt to gain the upper hand by 11.\( \text{d3} \) (if 11.\( \text{g5} \), then Black balanced the odds by means of 11...\( \text{e5} \) 12.\( \text{d2} \) h6 13.\( \text{e3} \) 0-0 14.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 15.\( \text{d4} \) e5 16.\( \text{d3} \) a6 17.\( \text{fd1} \) \( \text{c8} \) 18.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{c7} \) 19.\( \text{ac1} \) \( \text{ab8} \) 20.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{c5=} \) Smejkal – Larsen, Biel (izt) 1976) 11...\( \text{e5} \) (if 11...0-0, then White obtains a secure edge by 12.\( \text{f4} \) 12.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{d6} \) (if 12...0-0 13.\( \text{b2} \), then 13...d5 is insufficient due to 14.exd5 exd5 15.cxd5 \( \text{d8} \) 16.\( \text{ad1} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 17.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xb2} \) 18.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{a3} \) 19.\( \text{f6} \) \( \text{gxf6} \) 20.\( \text{xd8}+ \) \( \text{xd8} \) 21.\( \text{xb7=} \) and White's advantage is overwhelming) 13.\( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{xd6} \) 14.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{e5} \) 15.\( \text{b2} \) g5 Panchenko – Tregubov, Katowice 1992, was not successful, since White did not take advantage of the strongest continuation 16.\( \text{ad1} \)!, which in case of 16...0-0 (Black is denied 16...d6? because of 17.f4! \( \text{xf4} \) 18.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 19.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{e7} \) 20.\( \text{xf6}+ \) \( \text{xf6} \) 21.e5+) permits White to gain the upper hand by means of 17.f4! \( \text{xf4} \) 18.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 19.e5 \( \text{g2} \) 20.\( \text{g2}+. \)

8...d6
In case Black closes the position by 8...e5 he must take into consideration 9.\( \text{d5}! \).

9.d4 cxd4 10.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 11.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{e7} \) 12.b3 0-0 13.\( \text{b2} \) \( \text{d8} \) 14.\( \text{ad1} \) \( \text{e8} \)

The black knight has taken up a passive position. White will soon exploit this to his advantage. Note, that 14...c6?! (with the idea \( \text{b8}–\text{b7} \)) is inadequate in view of 15.\( \text{d5}! \)

15.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{c7} \) 16.\( \text{h3} \) a6
Black has finally constructed the "hedgehog" position by reliably securing the d6-pawn, but the evil comes around from the other side.

17.\( \text{a4} \)!
A standard coup against the "hedgehog" configuration. The black knight on e8 cannot possibly take part in the defence of the b6-pawn. Black is forced to weaken his position.

17...b5 18.\( \text{b6} \) \( \text{ab8} \) 19.\( \text{xb5} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 20.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xb6} \) 21.\( \text{xb6} \) \( \text{xb6} \) 22.a4+

The bishop pair and the connected pawns on the queenside provide White with a huge advantage, Romanishin – Vaisser, Sochi 1984.
Black hastens to construct the pawn wall along the sixth rank as soon as possible.

7...æe1!

White seek to effect the d2–d4 advance in the most profitable setting. In case of the immediate 7...æxd4 8...æxd4 æe6 Black’s position has both its merits and its deficiencies.

It is worth mentioning, that with the move order considered under this variation White sometimes resorts to 7...b3. Following 7...æbd7 (the otherwise typical for the Queen’s Indian Defence knight exchange 7...æe4 8...æb2± has no prospects, since Black has definitely fallen behind in his kingside development) 8...æb2 æe7 9...d4 0–0 (should Black deny the white pawn access to d5, then following 9...æxd4 10...æxd4 æxg2 11...æxg2 æc7 12.e3 æ6 13.f4 0–0 14...æf3 White retains a more pleasing position, the classical example being the game Andersson – A. Sokolov, Bilbao 1987, in which White carried out the plan to clamp Black’s position on the kingside – 14...æac8 15.g4! æc5 16.g5 æfd7 17...æad1 æf8 18.h4 æf8 19...æd2 æb8 20...æfd1 æc6 21...æxc6 æxc6 22...æxc6 æxc6 23...æa3 æe7 24...æxc5! bxc5 25...æe4 æd8 26...æf3 æf8 27...æg4 æe8 28.f5±) 10.d5 exd5 (if 10...e5, then after 11...æe1 White re-organises his forces along the scheme æd3, e2–e4, f2–f4) 11...æh4 (if 11...æe1, then one road to equality is 11...æb8! 12...æxd5 æxd5 13...æxd5 æxd5 14...æxd5 æf6=, though deserving attention is 11...æxd5!? 11...g6 (if 11...æb8, then 12...æxd5 provides White with a small advantage) 12...æxd5 (unavailable is 12...æxd5? due to 12...æxd5 13...æxd5 æxd5 14...æxd5 æxh4 15.gxh4...æxh4 16...æxd6 æg4+ 17...æg3 æxe2 18...æc3 f6= and it is already Black, who has the upper hand) 12...æe8 Kramnik – Topalov, Amsterdam 1996, White sharpened the position to the limit by means of 13.f4∞, seeking to avoid the even odds after
Chapter 11

13.\( \square f3 \) \( \square f6= \).

7...\( \square bd7 \)

The knight exchange 7...\( \square e4 \) 8.\( \square xe4 \) \( \square xe4 \) does not resolve all Black's problems. Following 9.d3 \( \square b7 \) 10.e4 e5 (in case of 10...\( \square e7 \) 11.d4 cxd4 12.\( \square xd4 \) 0-0 13.b3 a6 14.\( \square a3 \) \( \square c7 \) 15.\( \square c1= \) White is more pleasing) 11.\( \square h4 \) g6 12.f4 \( \square g7 \) 13.f5 \( \square c6 \) 14.\( \square f1 \) \( \square d4 \) 15.\( \square f3 \) Badea – Cosma, Romania 1994, Black marked time by 15...\( \square c6 \)?! (even in case of the superior 15...0-0 16.\( \square xd4 \) exd4 17.\( \square f3= \) White's odds are to be preferred), which permitted White to gain a huge advantage by the help of 16.\( \square xd4 \) cxd4 17.f6! \( \square f8 \) (unavailable is 17...\( \square xf6 \) because of 18.\( \square xf3 \)+) 18.g4\( \pm \).

In case of 7...\( \square e7 \) 8.e4 \( \square c6 \) (following 8...0-0 9.d4 the game converges to the variation Chapter 12 variation a and Chapter 13 considered below) 9.d4 cxd4 10.\( \square xd4 \) \( \square xd4 \) (the continuation 10...\( \square d7 \) following 11.b3 0-0 12.\( \square b2 \) a6 13.\( \square c2 \) \( \square fd8 \) 14.\( \square e2 \) \( \square e8 \) 15.\( \square ad1 \) \( \square f6 \) 16.\( \square e3 \) \( \square ab8 \) to weaken Black's position by means of 17.\( \square g4! \) \( \square d4 \) 18.\( \square d3 \) \( \square a8 \) 19.\( \square ed1 \) e5 20.\( \square e3 \) b5 21.\( \square x b5 \) \( \square x b5 \) 22.\( \square f5= \) J.Kristiansen – Ftcn, Helsingor 1982) 11.\( \square xd4 \) 0-0 12.b3 \( \square c7 \) 13.\( \square a3 \) (relinquishing the pressure on the d6–pawn restores the balance after 13.\( \square b2 \) \( \square fd8 \) 14.\( \square ad1 \) \( \square ac8 \) 15.h3 \( \square c6 \) 16.\( \square h2 \) a6 17.\( \square e3 \) \( \square a8 \) 18.\( \square d2 \) \( \square d7 \) 19.\( \square ed1 \) h6 20.f4 \( \square c5= \) Kamisky – De Firman, Amsterdam 1996) 13...

\( \square fd8 \) 14.\( \square ad1 \) \( \square c6 \) 15.\( \square e3 \) \( \square f8 \) 16.\( \square b5 \) \( \square e8 \) 17.\( \square d2 \) a6 18.\( \square c3 \) \( \square f6 \) 19.\( \square ed1 \) \( \square ab8 \) 20.h3 \( \square a8 \) 21.\( \square b4 \) \( \square d7 \) 22.a4= Chuchelov – Makarov, Berlin 1996, White has a more unrestricted play.

8.e4

8...a6?!

The last move is directed at the fastest possible construction of the “hedgehog” at the expense of the kingside development, however, it can bring about an attack on the black king, which remains caught in the centre. The same is true also after 8...\( \square c8 \)!! Following 9.d4! cxd4 10.\( \square xd4 \) \( \square xc4 \) White has the formidable 11.\( \square xe6! \) \( \square fxe6 \) 12.e5 \( \square xg2 \) 13.\( \square xf6 \) \( \square xf6 \) 14.\( \square xe6+ \) \( \square d7 \) 15.\( \square xg2 \) \( \square a8+ \) 16.\( \square f3 \) \( \square xc3 \) 17.\( \square xf6 \) \( \square xc1 \) 18.\( \square f7+ \) \( \square e6 \) 19.\( \square b3+ \) d5 20.\( \square xf8 \)\( \pm \) and as a result of the complications the black king cannot find a reliable shelter for himself, A.Greenfeld – Ftcn, Beer–Sheva 1990.

Too slow is also 8...\( \square e5 \). After 9.d4 \( \square xf3 \) 10.\( \square xf3 \) cxd4 11.\( \square xd4 \) \( \square e7 \) 12.b3 0-0 13.\( \square a3 \) \( \square b8 \) 14.\( \square ad1 \) \( \square d8 \) White regroups for an attack at the d6–pawn by
means of 15.\e3! \e8 16.\ed3 h6 17.\e3 \g5 18.\e2 a6 and now in the game Vaganian – Hjar tarson, Germany 1991, White could have gained a big advantage with the help of 19.e5! \xf3 20.\xf3 \dxe5 21.\xd8 \d8 22.\d7 \f6 (unavailable is 22... \f6? because of 23.\b7 \c8 24.\e4!+++) 23.\b7 \d8 24.\b6. The best black continuation is the move 8...\e7. The position emerging after 9.d4 cxd4 10.\xd4 \c7 11.\e3 a6 will be considered in more detail in Chapter 13.

9.d4 cxd4 10.\xd4 \c7

Black has problems completing his development. 10...\e7? is not possible due to 11.e5!++.

11.\d5!!

A typical blow for this type of pawn structure. White exploits Black’s lag in development. The continuation 11.b3 \e7 in fact will provide Black an extra tempo compared to variation Chapter 13, which could have been brought about by 11.\e3!%

11...exd5 12.exd5+ \d8

Black gives up his castling options. Following 12...\e7 13.\f5 \e5 (unavailable is 13...\g8 because of 14.\f4 \f8 15.\xe7! \xe7 16.\xd6 \xc4 17.\xe7+ \g8 18.\c1 \xa2 19.\h6!++ and White mates) 14.\xe7 \xe7 15.f4 \fd7 16.fxe5 \xe5 17.\e3 \c7 18.\a4+ Black’s situation is not to be envied.

If 12...\e5, then following 13.f4 0–0–0 14.fxe5 dxe5 15.\f5 White wins back the piece and retains the initiative. In the Yermolinsky – Shabalov game, USA 1994, the continuation 15...\c5? (impossible is 15...g6? in view of 16.\g5+++) 16.\e3 g6 17.\xc5 \xc5 18.\e3\+ provided White the advantage.

13.\c6+ \xc6 14.dxc6 \c5

15.b4 \e6 16.c5 bxc5

Unconvincing is 16...b5 due to 17.a4 bxa4 18.\xa4 with a strong attack. In case of 16...\e7, following 17.\xb6 \xb6 18.\e3 \xb4 19.\b1 \c4 20.c7+ \d7 21.\c1 \xc1 22.\a4 White wins, Wojtkiewicz – Kaleski, Komotini 1993.

17.bxc5 \c8

Bad is 17...d5 in view of 18.\xd5 \xd5 19.\xd5+ \e8 20.\f4 \d8 21.\xe6 \xe6 22.\xc7 Wojtkiewicz – Meinsohn, Geneva 1992. There is no forced refutation of 17...\e7 so far, though after 18.\b1 \b8 19.\xd6 \xd6 20.\xb8 \xb8 21.\e2 \e8 22.\b2 \c8 23.\b7 Wojtkiewicz – Oei, Soest 1996, White obtained sufficient compensation for the piece given up.

18.\b1 \b8
Impossible is 18...\(\text{cxc5}\) due to 19.\(\text{b7}!+--\).

19.\(\text{b7}\) \(\text{xb7}\) 20.\(\text{cxb7+}\) \(\text{b8}\) 21.\(\text{c6!}\)

Stronger than the continuation 21.\(\text{a4}\), which occurred in the game Cvitan – Foisor, Biel 1990, and following 21...\(\text{xc5}\) brought about an unclear situation.

21...\(\text{d5}\)

Losing is 21...\(\text{c5}\) in view of 22.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{e6}\) 23.\(\text{xe6}\) \(\text{fxe6}\) 24.\(\text{d3}\) \(\text{b6}\) 25.\(\text{c7+!}\) \(\text{xc7}\) 26.\(\text{c4++}\), and in case of 21...\(\text{e7}\) there is 22.\(\text{e3}\) with the idea \(\text{a4++}\).

22.\(\text{xe6!!}\)

Yet another blow, which permits the white pieces to come still closer to the black king.

22....\(\text{fxe6}\) 23.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{d7}\)

If 23...\(\text{a5}\), then following 24.\(\text{b5}\) \(\text{d7}\) 25.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{c5}\) 26.\(\text{xc5}\) \(\text{xc5}\) 27.\(\text{xc5}\) White develops and attack by means of \(\text{f1}\), \(\text{b5}\), to be followed by \(\text{a6}\).

24.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{e5}\) 25.\(\text{cxd7}\) \(\text{c5}\) 26.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{a7}\)

In case of 26...\(\text{b6}\) White presses on with the attack by way of 27.\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{c5}\) 28.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{a5}\) 29.\(\text{c6}\) \(\text{c7}\) 30.\(\text{c4}\) with the idea \(\text{xa6}\), \(\text{g5}\), \(\text{d8}\)++.

At this point of the Poluljahov – Beshukov game, USSR 1991, White missed a spectacular opportunity 27.\(\text{e7!!}+--\) with the matter-of-fact menace to take the a6-pawn with the queen, which essentially decides the game in his favour.
Chapter 12

1.\( \text{\textit{f3}} \) \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) 2.\( \text{\textit{c4}} \) \( \text{\textit{b6}} \) 3.\( \text{\textit{g3}} \) \( \text{\textit{b7}} \) 4.\( \text{\textit{g2}} \) \( \text{\textit{c5}} \) 5.0–0 \( \text{\textit{e6}} \) 6.\( \text{\textit{c3}} \) \( \text{\textit{e7}} \)

7.\( \text{\textit{c1}} \)

White plans to advance e2–e4 like in Chapter 11, but in contrast Black’s options are significantly enhanced here. Another roughly equivalent continuation in the diagram position is 7.\( \text{\textit{d4}} \) \( \text{\textit{cxd4}} \) 8.\( \text{\textit{cxd4}} \). It has both its merits and deficiencies.

The most principled are the following lines: a) 7...0–0, b) 7...\( \text{\textit{d5}} \), c) 7...\( \text{\textit{c6}} \), as well as the most complicated one 7...\( \text{\textit{d6}} \), which will be dealt with in Chapter 13.

The move 7...\( \text{\textit{c6}} \) followed by 8.\( \text{\textit{e4}} \) \( \text{\textit{e5}} \) (with 8...0–0 we are facing a position from variation a) 9.\( \text{\textit{h4}} \) (also possible is 9.\( \text{\textit{d3}} \), which leads after 9...\( \text{\textit{d6}} \) to the positions, considered in variation d) 9...\( \text{\textit{d4}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{f4}} \) \( \text{\textit{d6}} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{e2}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe2+}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{xe2}} \) 0–0 13.\( \text{\textit{d3}} \) \( \text{\textit{e8}} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{f5}} \) \( \text{\textit{d7}} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{f3}} \) \( \text{\textit{g5}} \) 16.\( \text{\textit{h4}} \) \( \text{\textit{g4}} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{h2}} \) \( \text{\textit{h5}} \) 18.\( \text{\textit{e3}} \) Wilhelmi – Mayers, Reykjavik 1997, permitted White to gain the upper hand, despite the closed nature of the game.

a) 7...0–0 8.\( \text{\textit{e4}} \) \( \text{\textit{c6}} \)

Black can still steer the game into the lines of Chapter 13 by means of 8...\( \text{\textit{d6}} \) 9.\( \text{\textit{d4}} \) \( \text{\textit{cxd4}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{cxd4}} \) \( \text{\textit{c7}} \)! (impossible is 10...\( \text{\textit{a6}} \)?, since following the almost forced 11.\( \text{\textit{e5}} \)! \( \text{\textit{dxe5}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{xb7}} \) \( \text{\textit{a7}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{c6}} \)

\( \text{\textit{xd1}} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{xe7+}} \) \( \text{\textit{h8}} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{cxd1}} \) \( \text{\textit{xb7}} \) 16.\( \text{\textit{b3}} \)! \( \text{\textit{c8}} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{a3}} \) \( \text{\textit{b5}} \) 18.\( \text{\textit{b6}} \) \( \text{\textit{b4}} \) 19.\( \text{\textit{a4}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe7}} \) 20.\( \text{\textit{xe7}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe7}} \) 21.\( \text{\textit{d8+}} \) \( \text{\textit{e8}} \) 22.\( \text{\textit{xe8+}} \) \( \text{\textit{xe8}} \) 23.\( \text{\textit{c5}} \) \( \text{\textit{a5}} \) 24.\( \text{\textit{a3}} \) Shomoev – Kofanov, Novgorod 1999, Black had to resign) 11.\( \text{\textit{c3}} \) (11.\( \text{\textit{db5}} \) brings nothing in view of 11...\( \text{\textit{c6}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{b3}} \) \( \text{\textit{a6}} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{d4}} \) \( \text{\textit{c7}} \= \text{\textit{c7}} \) and in contrast to the line from Chapter 13 White has lost time on the unnecessary b2–b3) 11...\( \text{\textit{a6}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{c1}} \) and we are again facing a position from the Chapter 13, variation a.

9.\( \text{\textit{d4}} \)

There has been also 9.\( \text{\textit{e5}} \), though, following 9...\( \text{\textit{e8}} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{d4}} \) \( \text{\textit{cxd4}} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{xd4}} \) \( \text{\textit{c8}} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{b3}} \) \( \text{\textit{f6}} \) (White has a small edge after 12...\( \text{\textit{d6}} \))
13. \(\text{dx}c6 \text{ ax}c6 14. \text{ex}d6 \text{ ax}d6 15. \text{xf}4 \text{+}) 13. \text{ex}f6 \text{ xf}6 (if 13... \text{xf}6, then 14. \text{db}5 \text{+}) 14. \text{e}3 \text{ cxd}4 15. \text{ax}d4 (inadequate is 15. \text{xb}7? in view of 15... \text{f}3 \text{+}!) 16. \text{xf}3 \text{ xc}3 17. \text{g}5 \text{ xf}3 18. \text{xd}8 \text{ xg}3+ 19. \text{hxg}3 \text{ xd}8 20. \text{ad}1 \text{ xe}1 21. \text{xe}1 \text{ d}6 \text{+}) 15... \text{ax}g2 16. \text{ax}g2 \text{ d}5! the situation remains rather complicated, Jelen – Hulak, Borovo 1981.

9...\text{cxd}4 10. \text{cxd}4 \text{ c}8

The immediate swap 10... \text{cxd}4 11. \text{cxd}4 has also been tested. After 11...\text{c}8 12.\text{b}3 (there is also 12.\text{e}5? \text{ xg}2 13. \text{wxg}2 \text{ e}8 14. \text{f}4 \text{+} with a small white edge) 12... \text{d}5 (the continuation 12... \text{c}5 13. \text{d}3 \text{ e}5 \text{+} lead to superior white play) 13. \text{ex}d5 \text{ cxd}5 14. \text{cxd}5 \text{ exd}5? (in case of the relatively superior for Black 14... \text{xd}5 15. \text{cxd}5 \text{ f}6 16. \text{g}4 \text{ xa}1 17. \text{a}3 \text{ c}3 18. \text{xf}8 \text{ xf}8 19. \text{d}1 \text{ exd}5 20. \text{ax}d5 \text{ White retains the upper hand despite the opposite coloured bishops, thanks to the pressure on the f7-square). In the game Ehlvest – Illescas Cordoba, Manila 1990, in which this position occurred, White could have obtained a considerable advantage by means of 15. \text{b}2 \text{ f}6 16. \text{d}2 \text{ xb}2 17. \text{xb}2 \text{ c}7 18. \text{ad}1 \text{ d}7 19. \text{d}4 \text{+}.

11.\text{b}3 \text{ a}6

If 11... \text{d}6, then White increase the pressure on the d6–pawn by 12. \text{a}3 \text{+}. If 11...\text{c}xd4 12. \text{xd}4 \text{ c}5 13. \text{d}3 \text{ e}5 \text{+}, then White’s prospects are somewhat more preferable.

12. \text{b}2

Also possible is 12.\text{e}5 \text{ e}8 13. \text{b}2 \text{ d}6 14. \text{x}d6 \text{+} with slightly superior white odds.

12...\text{d}6 13. \text{c}1 \text{ e}8

In case of 13... \text{cxd}4 14. \text{cxd}4 \text{ c}7 15. \text{a}4 \text{ c}6 White proceeds by (if 15... \text{b}8, then 16. \text{xb}6 \text{ b}6 17. \text{xb}6 \text{ xe}4 \text{ wins, thanks to 18. \text{xf}6 \text{+}!) 16. \text{xb}6 \text{ b}8 (if 16... \text{e}5, then 17. \text{e}3 \text{ g}4 18. \text{e}2 \text{+}) and now he has at his disposal the typical for the “hedgehog“ positions blow 17. \text{d}5! \text{ exd}5 18. \text{cxd}5

14. \text{h}3

Also possible was the immediate 14. \text{c}2 \text{+}?

14. \text{f}8 15. \text{c}2 \text{xd}4 16. \text{xd}4 \text{ c}7 17. \text{d}2 \text{ c}6

If 17... \text{d}7, then 18. \text{a}3 \text{+} with a slight white advantage.

18. \text{a}3

White initiate a typical for similar structures transfer of the bishop to b4, considered as early as Chapter 10 in the note to Black’s move seven.

18...\text{ed}8 19. \text{ed}1 \text{ b}7

To 19... \text{e}8 White completes the manoeuvre by 20. \text{b}4 \text{+}

20. \text{e}3 \text{ e}8 21. \text{b}4 \text{+}

**b) 7...d5**

Black does not wait for the white advance e2–e4 and is the first one to stage the stroke in the centre.

8.cxd5 Qxd5

The position after 8...exd5 9.d4 0–0 can be found in the Chapter 7 variation a.

9.e4


9...Qb4

The specificity of the situation of the parties after 9...Qxc3 10.bxc3 0–0 11.d4 are analysed in the Chapter 8.

10.d4 cxd4

In case of 10...0–0 Black has to take into consideration 11.d5 (following 11.Qe3 cxd4 12.Qxd4 Qc6 13.Qxc6 Qxc6 14.Qe2 Qd3 15.Qad1 Qxe2 16.Qxe2 Qfd8 17.Qed2 Qxd2 18.Qxd2 Qd8 19.Qxd8+ Qxd8= Rukavina – Zupe, Caorle 1989, the odds levelled out) 11...exd5 12.exd5= with a white edge.

**11.Qxd4**

Now we will consider separately two black options: b1) 11...Qc6 and b2) 11...0–0.

**b1) 11...Qc6 12.Qxc6 Qxc6**

The endgame after 12...Qxd1 13.Qxd1 Qc6 (with 13...Qxc6 14.e5 a position emerges, which is discussed below) is far from harmless for Black. After 14.Qf4 (in case of 14.a3 Qc2 15.Qa2 Qd8 16.Qxd8+ Qxd8 17.b4 Qd4 18.Qe3 Qb5 19.Qxb5 Qxb5 20.a4 Qd7 21.e5 0–0 22.b5 Qe7 23.Qd2 Qd8= Black gradually even the situation, Co.Ionescu – Kantorik, Pardubice 1998) 14...g5 (should Black continue 14...Qd8, then after 15.Qxd8+ Qxd8 16.Qd1 Qa6 17.Qf1 Qc7 18.a4 g5 19.Qe5 Qg8 Larsen – Szmetan, Buenos Aires 1992, White could have opted for 20.Qc4!? with the idea to meet 20...f6? with 21.Qxc7+ ) 15.Qd6 Qxd6 16.Qxd6 Qe7 (possibly, the relatively superior option for Black at this point is 16...Qd8 17.Qxd8+ Qxd8 18.a3 Qa6 19.e5 Qxg2 20.Qxg2 Qc5 21.Qb5 a6 22.Qd6 Qf8 23.Qc1 f6 24.b4± Ftacnik – Womacka, Germany 1997, with a small white advantage) 17.e5 (17.Qad1 Qd8
18.\(d4\) a5 19.a3 \(e6\) 20.e5 \(xg2\) 21.\(xg2\) \(e5\) Tratar – Blechzin, Vienna 1996) 17...\(xg2\) 18.\(xg2\) \(hd8\) 19.\(d1\) \(xd6\) 20.\(xd6+\) \(d7\) 21.a3 \(a6\) 22.\(e4\) White's advantage is rather obvious, Hoffman – Szymetan, San Martin 1993.

The take by the bishop 12...\(xc6\) followed by 13.\(e2\) 0–0 14.\(d1\) \(c8\) 15.a3 \(a6\) 16.\(f4\) \(d8\) 17.b4\(=\) provides White with indisputably superior odds, Welin – Astrom, Sweden 1996.

13.e5!?

Obviously the best. Inadequate is 13.\(g4\) due to 13...\(h5!\) 14.\(e2\) \(d4\)=.

In case of 13.\(e3\) 0–0 14.\(a4\) \(b4\) 15.\(ac1\) (15.\(ed1\) \(e7\) 16.\(ac1\) \(fd8\) 17.a3 Postny – Bar, Petah Tiqwa,1997, and Black could have evened out by means of 17...\(xc5!\) 18.\(xc5\) \(bxc5!=\) ) 15...\(e7\) 16.a3 \(e5\) (if 16...\(xc3\), then 17.\(xc3\) \(d\) with an advantage) 17.e5 \(xe3\) 18.\(xe3\) \(ac8\) 19.\(b5\) \(a5\) 20.\(e1\) \(xg2\) 21.\(xg2\) Kharitonov – Khalifman, Tashkent 1987, Black could have equalised the game by way of 21...\(xc1\) 22.\(xc1\) \(d7!\)=.

Now it is worth considering two options for Black: b1a) 13...\(0–0\) with queens, and b1b) 13...\(xd1\) without queens.

b1a) 13...\(0–0\) 14.\(g4!\)

White’s qualitative advantage on the kingside permits him to develop a strong initiative on this section of the board. The menace now is 15.\(h6\).

14...\(h8\)

If 14...\(e8?\), then after 15.\(h6\) \(g6\) 16.\(f4\) \(b8\) 17.\(b5\) \(f8\) 18.\(d6\) \(e7\) 19.\(xf8\) \(xf8\) 20.\(f6+-\) Black is caught up by the hard times, Gavrikov – Tolonen, Finland 1998.

15.\(f4\) \(b8\)

Following 15...\(a5\) 16.\(ad1\) \(c8\) 17.\(e4\)\(=\) White has a big advantage.

16.\(ad1\) \(b4?!\)

Black has severe difficulties after 16...\(d8\) 17.\(h5\) \(g8\) 18.\(e4\) \(g6\) 19.\(f3\) \(f4\), but it is quite possible that the worst is still ahead, since now the game enters a phase of tactical complications in White’s favour.

17.\(d7!\)

Now Black will hardly be able to extinguish the activity of the white pieces.

17...\(xc3\)

Outright bad is 17...\(d8\) due to 18.\(h6\) \(xh6\) 19.\(xb4+-\) with a winning white position.

18.\(xc3\) \(d8\)

Black is not to be envied also after 18...\(c8\) 19.\(ed1\) \(a5\) 20.\(xb7\) \(xb7\) 21.\(g5\) \(c6\) (if 21...
\( \text{c5, then } 22.\text{c8 e}7 23. \text{f6+} \text{--decides} ) 22.\text{f6} \rightarrow. \\
19.\text{h6!} \rightarrow \\
White has a decisive attack, Bagirov - Brodsky, Helsinki 1992.

b1b) 13...\text{exd1} \\
This is Black's best bet under the circumstances.

14.\text{xd1} \text{b8} 15.\text{b5!} \\
The only move. Following 15.\text{e3} \text{exe5} 16.\text{f4} \text{f6} 17.\text{ac1} \\
\text{xe2} 18.\text{xf2} \text{d8} 19.\text{exe5} \text{fxe5} \\
20.\text{b5} \text{a6} 21.\text{xd8} + \text{xd8} 22. \text{d1} + \text{e8} 23. \text{d6} + \text{e7} 24. \text{f7} \\
\text{f8} 25. \text{xe5} \text{f6=} Vaganian – Portisch, Saint John (m/4) 1988, \\
Black equalised.

15...0-0 16.\text{f4} \\
White managed to retain a minimal advantage on account of 
his slightly more active pieces after 16.\text{xd7} \text{xd8} 17.\text{xd8} + \text{xd8} \\
18.\text{e3} \text{d7} 19.\text{f4} \text{b4} 20.\text{xb7} \text{xb7} 21.\text{c1} \text{h5} 22.\text{c8} + \text{h7} \\
23.\text{a8} \text{a6} 24.\text{c3} \text{c5} 25.\text{f2} \text{Belavsky – Ftacnik, Germany} \\
2000.

16...g5 \\
Black stirs up complications, 
seeking to extinguish White's 
initiative based on his slight 
spatial edge.

17.\text{ac1} \text{gxf4} 18.\text{xc6} \text{fxg3} \\
19.\text{hxg3} \text{c5} 20.\text{xb7} \text{xb7} 21.\text{g2} \text{f6} 22.\text{exf6} \text{xf6} \\
The situation has been visibly 
simplified, but the draw is still 
far away.

23.\text{f3} \text{bf7} 24.\text{d3} \text{h5} 25. \text{e4} \text{=} \\
White possesses two pawn 
islands, while Black has three. 
Under the circumstances this fact 
determines the minimal White 
edge, Larsen – Gligoric, Bled 
1979.

b2) 11...0-0 \\
Black prefers to complete the 
development of his kingside, 
rather than fight the centralised 
white knight on d4.

12.a3 \\
Anything but a lost tempo, as 
it seems at first glance.

12...\text{b6} \\
The retreat 12...\text{a6}?! permits White to build up strongest 
pressure via 13.e5! (weaker is 
13.\text{xc6} \text{xc6} 14.\text{g4} \text{d7} 15.e5 \\
\text{xe2} 16.\text{g2} \text{h8} 17.\text{f4} in 
view of 17...\text{c7} 18.h4 \text{c5} 19. \\
\text{ad1} \text{b7} 20.\text{g1} \text{ad8} 21.\text{xe2} \\
\text{xd1} 22.\text{xd1} \text{d8=} and White 
has only a tiny advantage, Agrest 
– Wallace, Stockholm 1997) 13... \\
a6 14.\text{e3} \text{a7} 15.\text{xc6} \text{xc6} \\
16.\text{xd8} \text{xd8} 17.\text{ad1}. Following 
17...\text{c7} 18.\text{f4} \text{xe2} 19. \\
\text{g2} \text{d8} 20.\text{a4!} \text{b7} 21.\text{xb6!} \\
\text{d5} (Black cannot save himself 
by 21...\text{xd1} 22.\text{xd1} \text{xb6} 23. 

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In his quest for initiative White agrees to compromise his pawn structure. In case of $8.\text{dx}e4 \text{dx}e4 9.d3 there is $9...\text{b}7\text{(White has also to take into consideration $9...\text{xf}3?? 10.\text{xf}3 \text{c}6\text{11.c}4 \text{c}7 12.\text{f}4 \text{d}6 13.\text{xd}6 \text{xd}6 14.a3 \text{c}8 15.b4 0-0= Na-vrotescu – Holmov, Romania 1992) 10.e4 \text{c}6 11.d4 \text{xd}4 12.\text{xd}4 \text{xd}4 13.\text{xd}4 0-0 14.\text{f}4 (the move 14.b3 could bring about a position from the variation 4..e6 5.0-0 \text{e}7 6.\text{c}3 0-0 7.\text{e}1 \text{e}4 8.\text{dx}e4 \text{dx}e4 9.d3 \text{b}7 10.e4 \text{c}5 11.d4 \text{xd}4 12.\text{xd}4 \text{c}6 13.b3 \text{xd}4 14.\text{xd}4) and now in the game Korchnoi – Ftacnik, Ostrava 1994, the most straightforward move was 14... \text{c}5!= with a very robust black position.

Avoiding the swap $8.\text{a}4$ permits Black to even the game by $8...d5 9.\text{cxd}5 \text{e}5 10.d3 \text{f}6 11.\text{c}3 \text{b}7=. Taking with the d-pawn after the knight swap on c3 does not bring Black any particular problems either – $8.\text{c}2 \text{xc}3 9.\text{dxc}3 \text{d}6 10.e4 d6 11.\text{d}2 0-0 12.f4 a6 13.a4 \text{d}7= Vaga-nian – Ftacnik, Manila 1992.

$8...\text{xc}3$

Inadequate for Black is $8...\text{cxd}4?! in view of $9.\text{xe}4 \text{xe}4 10.\text{xd}4\text{d}7 with a white edge. In case of $8...d5 9.\text{cxd}5 \text{exd}5, which occurred in the game Razuvaev – Holmov, Moscow 1995, White could have proceeded straightforwardly $10.\text{a}4+?! \text{c}6 (if 10...\text{d}7, then there is 11.\text{c}2$
\( \text{\(c6\) 12.dxc5 \(\text{x}c5\) 13.d1\(\text{=}\) and White stands slightly better) 11.\(\text{c2}\) \(d7\) (White has the upper hand also after 11...0-0 12.e5\(\text{=}\)) 12.dxc5+ with superior odds.}

**9.bxc3 e4**

White intended to bar the a8–h1 diagonal of the b7–bishop by advancing d4–d5 and Black in turn is trying to impede this plan. The other continuations lead to positions, in which Black’s counterplay is rather limited.

At this point, for example, there is 9...d6, though after 10.d5 (in the Malinin – Holmov game, St.Petersburg 1999, White allowed the exchange of the dark–squared bishops after 10.e4 \(d7\) 11.e5 e5 12.a4 0–0, which balanced the odds following 13.d2 g5 14.f1 xc1 15.xc1 \(xc8\)=) 10...e5 11.e4 0–0 12.h4 \(d7\) 13.h3 c8 14.h2 h8 15.a4 a5 16.g2 c7 17.f1= Filippov – Simantsev, Polanica Zdroj 1999, White retained his slight superiority.

There have been tests also of 9...0–0. After 10.d5 (the move 10.e4 permits Black to dispatch his knight to a more active position and tie up the pieces of the adversary to the c4–pawn by means of 10...c6 11.d5 a5 12.d2 e5 13.f1 a6 14.d3 g5 15.e2 xd2! 16.xd2 d6\(\text{=}\), while a careless 17.h4?! d7 18.a4 h3 19.f1 ae8 20.e1 f5+ Skalik – Staniszewski, Zakopane 2000, placed White into a critical situation) 10...f6 (in case of 10...d6 11.e4 e5 12.h4 the game reverts to a situation from the game Filippov – Simantsev, Polanica Zdroj 1999, a fragment of which was discussed shortly) 11.c2 (seemingly more active is 11.d3, though in this case White has to take into account 11...exd5 12.cxd5 c4! and after 13.d2 a6 14.a3 e8 15.d4 c5 16.xc5 bxc5 17.f5 d6 17.e4 g6 18.e3 a6= Sakaev – M.Gurevich, Neum 2000, Black held the balance) 11...exd5 (following 11...e5 12.d2 d6 13.f4\(\text{=}\) Black will be forced to either swap his central e–pawn reinforcing White’s pawn centre, or give up permanently the command of the e4–square to the pieces of the adversary) 12.d2 (12.cxd5 xd5 13.e4 c6 14.f4 a6 15.ad1 c8 16.h4= Zontakh – Vuckovic, Belgrade 2000, White obtained sufficient compensation for the pawn sacrificed, but nothing more) 12...d6 13.cxd5 d7 (in contrast with the Modern Benoni Black cannot easily keep his dark–squared bishop on the long diagonal a1–h8, since after 13...g6 14.e4 he will have to take into account the infiltration of the white bishop to f4, while the attempt to prevent this by means of 14...e5 15.g5 f6 17.d2 f5 18.g5\(\text{=}\) brings about the penetration of the white knight on e6) 14.e4\(\text{=}\) White either drive the black bishop off the a1–h8 diagonal, or destroy it, which makes his position some-
what more preferable.

10.\(\text{xf1}\)

Under the circumstances White’s planned for advance 10.d5 is not so effective anymore. Following 10...\(\text{xc7}\) 11.\(\text{xf4}\) (the lengthy journey of the white knight after 11.\(\text{cd4}\) \(\text{xdg2}\) 12.\(\text{db5}\) \(\text{bb7}\) 13.\(\text{xg2}\) a6 14.\(\text{a3}\) exd5 15.cxd5 b5 16.e4 d6∞ brings about a position with a pawn structure typical of the Modern Benoni, which is favourable for Black) 11...\(\text{bb7}\) 12.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{xg2}\) 13.\(\text{xg2}\) e5 14.\(\text{xe3}\) \(\text{xc5}\) 15.\(\text{xc5}\) 0–0 16.e4 d6= the position events out.

Alongside the mainline move there has been also 10.\(\text{h3}\). However, Black can emphasise the weakness of the e4 pawn by 10...\(\text{xf3}\) 11.\(\text{xf3}\) cxd4 (with the careless 11...\(\text{c6}\)?! 12.d5 \(\text{a5}\) 13.\(\text{f1}\) White gains the upper hand) 12.cxd4 \(\text{c6}\) 13.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{c8}\) 14.\(\text{c1}\) \(\text{a5}\)! and following 15.\(\text{d3}\) (to 15.c5 adequate is 15...0–0= with the idea d7–d5) 15...0–0 16.f4 g6 17.\(\text{h2}\) \(\text{c7}\) 18.c5 d5 (Black is planning 19...\(\text{c4}\)) 19.cxd6 \(\text{xd6}\) 20.\(\text{a6}\) \(\text{d7}\) 21.\(\text{xf3}\) (in case of 21.d5 equalises 21...exd5 22.\(\text{xc8}\) \(\text{xc8}\) 23.\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{d8}\) =) 21...\(\text{xf6}\) 22.h4 \(\text{f8}\) 23.h5 \(\text{c6}\) 24.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{e7}\) = the odds balanced, Kramnik – Yudasin, Erevan (ol) 1996.

10...\(\text{xf3}\)

Worse is 10...0–0. White obtains an advantage after 11.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{b7}\) 12.e4=.

11.\(\text{xf3}\) cxd4

Black needs this swap. In case of 11...\(\text{c6}\) and the sequel 12.d5 \(\text{a5}\) 13.f4 0–0 14.\(\text{f3}\) (interesting is also 14.h4!? \(\text{f6}\) 15.\(\text{d2}\) exd5 16.cxd5 c4 17.\(\text{g2}\) b5 18.\(\text{b1}\) a6 19.\(\text{c2}\) \(\text{b8}\) 20.\(\text{e4}\) h6 21.\(\text{g2}\) , which allowed White in the game Tukmakov – Gheorghiu, Crans–Montana 2000, to develop a dangerous initiative on the kingside) 14...\(\text{f6}\) 15.\(\text{d2}\) g6 16.h4 h5 17.\(\text{ad1}\) the black knight alone was not capable of creating threats on the queenside and was practically out of play, Sakaev – Ibrahimov, Dubai 1999. Even worse is 11...0–0, since the black knight does not land anywhere at all after 12.d5=.

12.\(\text{cxd4}\) 0–0

Following 12...\(\text{c6}\) 13.\(\text{d5}\) \(\text{a5}\) 14.\(\text{d2}\) V.Popov – Nepomnishi, St.Petersburg 1997, Black proceeded with the knight manoeuvres by 14...\(\text{b7}\), losing time in the way. This circumstance did not pass unnoticed by White and permitted him to develop his initiative targeted on the opponent’s kingside by means of 15.f4 0–0 16.\(\text{b1}\) \(\text{c5}\) 17.h4 exd5 18.\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{c8}\) 19.h5=.

![](chessboard.png)
13.d5!? 

The move 13.f4 permits Black to conveniently reorganise after 13...c6 14.d5 (in case of 14.e3 Black gradually built up counterplay against the white c4-pawn by way of 14...a5 15.c1 c8= to be followed by d7-d5) 14...a5 15.d2 c8. In the game S.Savchenko – V.Gurevich, Ubeda 1998, after 16.xa5 bxa5 17.b1 c5 18.d3= the parties agreed to a draw, since the drawing potential of the opposite-coloured bishops must overbalance the slight defect of Black’s pawn structure.

13...a6 14.b1

White has no reason to hurry. Following 14.d6 f6 15.b1 c3 16.e3 f5= the black bishop, which is on a journey away, begins to interfere with the normal life of the community of the white pieces.

14...c5

After 15...f6 16.d2 c5 17.a3= the black pieces do not bother White in any specific way.

15.d6 f6 16.a3!

Black has no tangible counterplay targets. White intends to start squeezing Black’s kingside position shortly after f3–f4, by analogy with what we saw earlier in the fragment of the V.Popov – Nepomnischeny game, St.Petersburg 1997.

d) 7...d6

A very important variation, which presents a most comple outline of the opposing plans with the “hedgehog” pawn structure.

8.e4 e5

Black reliably closes the centre taking advantage of the last opportunity to avoid the “hedgehog” formation. The other most popular line 8...a6, where Black agrees to the “hedgehog” will be considered in Chapter 13.
Chapter 12

\( \mathcal{d}6 \text{ c6!} \) (if 15...\( \mathcal{e}6 \)?, wins 16.\( \mathcal{d}xe7 \text{ } \mathcal{x}e7 \) 17.\( \mathcal{w}f3+ \)) 16.\( \mathcal{w}h8! \) (to 16.\( \mathcal{f}4 \) already adequate is 16...\( \mathcal{e}e6? \)) 16...\( \mathcal{d}7 \) (impossible is 16...\( \mathcal{x}xh8??? \) because of 17.\( \mathcal{d}f6+ \text{ } \mathcal{f}8 \) 18.\( \mathcal{h}6# \)) 17.\( \mathcal{w}xh7 \text{ } \mathcal{e}e6 \) 18.\( \mathcal{f}4+ \) White does not get sufficient compensation for the piece given up.

9...\( \mathcal{c}6 \)

It is not so easy to prevent the penetration of the white knight onto f5. In case of 9...\( \mathcal{g}6 \)?! very strong is 10.\( \mathcal{f}4! \) and 10...\( \mathcal{xf}4 \)? is unavailable in view of 11.e5+.

10.\( \mathcal{f}5 \text{ } \mathcal{f}8 \)

There have been attempts to immediately deal with the white f5–knight, which is on enemy territory, however, following 10...\( \mathcal{g}6 \) 11.\( \mathcal{d}xe7 \text{ } \mathcal{x}e7 \) 12.d3 \( \mathcal{d}d4 \) 13.\( \mathcal{h}6 \text{ } \mathcal{d}7 \) 14.\( \mathcal{f}4 \text{ } \mathcal{f}6 \) 15.\( \mathcal{h}3 \) 0–0–0 Akopian – Khachian, Erevan 1996, White could have started to perturb the queenside residence of the black king at once by means of 16.b4!?±.

11.\( \mathcal{w}a4 \text{ } \mathcal{g}6 \)

White has a huge advantage after 11...\( \mathcal{d}7 \) 12.\( \mathcal{h}3 \)±.

12.d4!

Regardless of Black’s efforts to prevent this breakthrough it is still possible.

12...\( \mathcal{d}7 \)

The take 12...\( \mathcal{x}d4 \) brings Black to a hopeless situation after 13.\( \mathcal{d}xd4 \text{ } \mathcal{x}d4 \) 14.e5 \( \mathcal{d}7 \) 15.\( \mathcal{g}5! \text{ dxc3 } \text{ } \mathcal{f}6 \text{ } \mathcal{e}7 \) 17.\( \mathcal{d}ad1++ \). Should Black take the piece by 12...\( \mathcal{g}x5 \), his best course after 13.\( \mathcal{xf}5 \) is to give it back by means of 13...\( \mathcal{x}d4 \) (if 13...\( \mathcal{d}7 \), then 14.\( \mathcal{d}xe5 \text{ } \mathcal{f}xe5 \) 15.\( \mathcal{d}g5 \text{ } \mathcal{e}7 \) 16.\( \mathcal{d}ad1 \text{ } \mathcal{d}d4 \) 17.\( \mathcal{x}b7++ \) decides) 14.\( \mathcal{d}x6+ \text{ } \mathcal{x}e6 \) 15.\( \mathcal{x}c6+ \text{ } \mathcal{d}7 \) 16.\( \mathcal{d}d5 \text{ } \mathcal{c}8 \) 17.\( \mathcal{f}6+ \text{ } \mathcal{e}7 \) 18.\( \mathcal{d}5+ \text{ } \mathcal{e}8 \) 19.\( \mathcal{a}4 \)±, though he will have to play on with a king deprived of castling.

13.\( \mathcal{d}xe5 \text{ } \mathcal{d}xe5 \) 14.\( \mathcal{h}6 \text{ } \mathcal{d}d4 \)

15.\( \mathcal{d}d5 \text{ } \mathcal{c}6 \) 16.\( \mathcal{d}d1 \text{ } \mathcal{g}7 \) 17.\( \mathcal{h}4 \text{ } \mathcal{f}8 \) 18.\( \mathcal{g}5 \text{ } \mathcal{f}6 \) 19.\( \mathcal{e}3 \text{ } \mathcal{a}6 \)

In the game Vaganian – Minasian, Moscow 1991, White could have obtained superior play by advancing on the queenside 20.\( \mathcal{a}4 \)± with the idea \( \mathcal{a}4 \)–a5.
Chapter 13

1.\( \text{\&}f3 \text{\&}f6 \) 2.\( c4 \text{\&}b6 \) 3.\( g3 \text{\&}b7 \) 4.\( \text{\&}g2 \text{\&}c5 \) 5.0–0 \( e6 \) 6.\( \text{\&}c3 \text{\&}e7 \) 7.\( \text{\&}e1 \text{d}6 \) 8.\( e4 \text{\&}a6 \)

In contrast with 8...\( e5 \) Black does not obstruct White’s programmed advance \( \text{d}2–\text{d}4 \).

9.\( \text{d}4 \text{\&}xd4 \) 10.\( \text{\&}xd4 \text{\&}c7 \)

This position can be considered as the starting point of the “hedgehog” system being discussed.

11.\( \text{\&}e3 \)!

Another continuation which is kin to the mainline move is 11.\( f4 \). Regardless of the fact that these two moves share the common goal of a kingside offensive and sometimes converge to identical positions, each of them brings to the situation its specific subtleties. In view of their significance for the evaluation of the plans of the parties we will consider the move 11.\( f4 \) in somewhat more detail.

11.\( f4 \) 0–0

The primary purpose of White’s move eleven is to disallow 11...\( \text{\&}bd7 \)!, since the black knight will have no convenient retreat square after 12.\( e5 \)! Very speculative for Black is the continuation 11...\( \text{\&}xc4 \) due to 12.\( \text{\&}e3 \) and White’s threats \( e4–e5 \) and \( \text{\&}a1–c1 \) are very unpleasant. With the move order characterised by 11.\( f4 \) White tries to avoid Black’s plan that will be considered in variation \( b2 \) of this Chapter.

12.\( \text{\&}e3 \text{\&}c6 \)!

This move for Black now becomes possible. It is partially conditional on the circumstance that White will not have at his disposal a manoeuvre similar to the one considered in the Chapter 12 variation a (remember that there, after \( \text{b}2–\text{b}3 \) and the swap of the \( \text{d}4–\text{k}nights \) on \( c6 \), White dispatched the bishop along the route \( \text{\&}c1–\text{a}3–\text{b}4 \), building up pressure on the \( \text{d}6–\text{s}quare \) and reducing the effect of the \( \text{b}6–\text{b}5 \) sap in view of the blockading position of the \( \text{b}4–\text{bishop} \). Also possible is 12...\( \text{\&}e8 \) 13.\( \text{\&}c1 \text{\&}f8 \) 14.\( g4 \text{\&}fd7 \) 15.\( g5 \text{\&}c6 \) 16.\( \text{\&}xc6 \)

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\( \textit{\&}xc6 \) 17.\( \textit{\&}f2 \) \( \textit{\&}ac8 \) 18.a4 \( \textit{\&}a8 \) 19.b3 \( \textit{\&}c5= \) with counterplay, Iskusnyh – Ulibin, Maikop 1998, while the continuation 12...\( \textit{\&}bd7 \) leads to positions to be discussed shortly under variation \( \textbf{b1} \), Chapter 13. In this case, White’s plan associated with the move order starting with 11.f4 can be considered fulfilled.

13.\( \textit{\&}c1 \)

Following 13.\( \textit{\&}xc6 \) \( \textit{\&}xc6 \) 14.\( \textit{\&}c1 \) \( \textit{\&}b7 \) 15.\( \textit{\&}d4 \) \( b5= \) Black carried out the programmed advance, Schebler – Gipslis, Dortmund 1998.

13...\( \textit{\&}xd4 \) 14.\( \textit{\&}xd4 \) \( \textit{\&}d7 \)

The transfer of the knight to \( c5 \), of the dark-squared bishop – to the \( a1-h8 \) diagonal as well as the accompanying preparations to undermine White’s queenside by means of \( b6-b5 \) – these all constitute Black’s course of action. Abandoning or delaying it permits White to rely on an advantage. E.g., 14.\( \textit{\&}ac8 \) 15.b3 \( \textit{\&}fe8 \) 16.a4 \( \textit{\&}d7 \) 17.\( \textit{\&}c2 \) \( \textit{\&}f8 \) 18.\( \textit{\&}d2 \) \( \textit{\&}b8 \) (better was 18...\( \textit{\&}c5 \) 19.\( \textit{\&}f2 \) (unclear is 19.g4 in view of 19...\( e5 \) 20.\( \textit{\&}e3= \) 20...\( \textit{\&}e6 \) (following 19...\( \textit{\&}c6 \) 20.g4 \( \textit{\&}b7 \) 21.\( \textit{\&}f1= \) (the situation becomes complicated with the immediate 21.g5 followed by 21...\( b5 \) 22.axb5 axb5 23.\( \textit{\&}e3 \) \( \textit{\&}xc4 \) 24.\( \textit{\&}xc4 \) \( \textit{\&}b4 \) 25.\( \textit{\&}h5= \) 21...\( \textit{\&}d7 \) 22.g5 \( \textit{\&}c5 \) 23.\( \textit{\&}g2= \) and White retains some advantage, Kramnik – Leko, Tilburg 1997.

15.b3 \( \textit{\&}fd8 \)

Not bad is also 15...\( \textit{\&}ad8 \) 16.\( \textit{\&}e2 \) \( \textit{\&}f6= \).

16.\( \textit{\&}c2 \) \( \textit{\&}ac8 \) 17.\( \textit{\&}d2 \) \( \textit{\&}b8 \) 18.a4 \( \textit{\&}c6 \) 19.\( \textit{\&}f1 \) \( \textit{\&}e8 \) 20.\( \textit{\&}f2 \) \( \textit{\&}f6= \)

Black has developed counterplay, Beckhuis – Ruzele, Berlin 1998.

Let us revert to the position after 11.\( \textit{\&}e3 \).

Now Black can take steps to finish his development either by a) 11...0-0 with no commitment for the time being with respect to the position of the queenside knight, or by b) 11...\( \textit{\&}bd7 \). Note also, that Black cannot take the pawn. After 11...\( \textit{\&}xc4 \) 12.\( \textit{\&}c1 \) (menacing 13.\( \textit{\&}d5 \) 12...\( \textit{\&}b4 \) winning are both 13.\( \textit{\&}b3= \) with the idea a2-a3 (pointed out by L.Ftacnik), as well as 13.\( \textit{\&}c2 \) \( \textit{\&}xb2 \) (to 13...\( \textit{\&}a5 \) decides 14.\( e5= \) 14.\( \textit{\&}d2 \) with the deadly threat 15.\( \textit{\&}b1= \).

In case of 11...\( \textit{\&}c6 \) (by analogy with the variation characterised by 11.f4) White has 12.\( \textit{\&}c1 \) (menacing 13.\( \textit{\&}d5 \) 12...\( \textit{\&}xd4 \) 13.\( \textit{\&}xd4 \) (in case of 13.\( \textit{\&}xd4 \) 0-0 14.e5 dxe5 15.\( \textit{\&}xe5 \) \( \textit{\&}c8 \) 16.\( \textit{\&}xb7 \) \( \textit{\&}xb7 \) 17.\( \textit{\&}e2 \) \( \textit{\&}fd8= \) Black maintains the equilibrium) 13...\( \textit{\&}b8 \) (it
is crucial that Black cannot protect the b6-pawn by his knight, since the g7-pawn will be left unprotected) 14.b3 (unavailable is 14.\textit{a}4 \textit{c}6 15.\textit{x}xb6? due to 15...e5\# or 14.\textit{x}xb6 \textit{x}xb6 15.\textit{x}xb6 because of 15...\textit{xe}4 16.\textit{a}7 \textit{b}7 17.\textit{e}4 \textit{e}4 18.\textit{xe}4 \textit{xa}7 19.\textit{cd}1 \textit{d}7=) 14...\textit{a}8 (with 14...0-0 there is already 15.\textit{x}xb6 \textit{xb}6 16.\textit{xe}b6 \textit{xe}4 17.\textit{c}7 \textit{bc}8 18.\textit{xd}6\# and if 14...\textit{c}6 will be followed by the traditional for the entire system tactical objection 15.\textit{d}d5!\#) 15.\textit{d}d1 0-0 16.f4\# and if we compare the piece configuration in this position to the respective configuration in the 11.f4 variation, we will easily see that White is somewhat better off.

\textit{a) 11...0-0 12.\textit{c}1}

Before the situation in the centre becomes completely consolidated, White is best advised not to manifest any activity on the kingside. Thus to 12.g4 there is 12...\textit{c}6! (if 12...\textit{xc}4, then after 13.\textit{c}1\textit{e} White obtains excellent compensation for the pawn, Vaganian – D.Gurevich, Hastings 1982/83) and following 13.\textit{c}1 \textit{xd}4 14.\textit{xd}4 \textit{d}7 15.\textit{e}3 \textit{fe}8 16.b3 \textit{ac}8 17.\textit{g}5 \textit{bb}8 18.f4 \textit{c}6 19.\textit{g}4 b5\# Erdelyi – Csom, Lenk 1991, Black manages to arrange his counterplay. If 12.f4, then by means of 12...\textit{c}6! 13.\textit{c}1 \textit{xd}4 14.\textit{xd}4 Black steers the game into the 11.f4 variation.

White's last line move is directed exactly at limiting Black’s counterplay related to the move \textit{d}b8-c6.

12...\textit{e}8

At this point 12...\textit{c}6? is inadequate due to 13.\textit{d}d5=, and following 12...\textit{bd}7 13.f4 we face a situation which will be discussed under variation 13.b1.

13.f4?!

Worth attention is also 13.g4!? Anyhow, following 13...\textit{f}8 14.g5 \textit{fd}7 15.b3 \textit{c}6 after the sequel 16.\textit{c}b5! \textit{bb}8 (taking 16...\textit{xb}5 provides White with a big advantage after 17.\textit{xb}5\# and the situation emerging after 16...\textit{xc}8 17.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 18.\textit{e}2\# is roughly identical to the one in the game M.Gurevich – Cummings, England 1998) 17.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 18.\textit{d}4 \textit{b}7 19.h4 g6 (the breakthrough 19...b5 followed by 20.\textit{xb}5 \textit{axb}5 21.\textit{e}2 b4 22.\textit{c}6\# allows White to retain the upper hand) 20.\textit{d}2 \textit{e}5 (aiming at the g4-square) 21.\textit{e}2= M.Gurevich – Cummings, England 1998, White retained his spatial superiority with no tangible counterplay for his opponent.

13...\textit{f}8

Here also Black could have steered the game into the lines of variation b1 by means of 13...\textit{bd}7.

14.f5!? h6

Now the opportunity for the move 14...\textit{bd}7 has been lost already. After 15.fxe6 fxe6 16.\textit{h}3 \textit{c}5 White has a vigorous objection: 17.b4! \textit{c}xe4 18.\textit{xe}4
Chapter 13

\(\text{\&xe}4 19.\text{\&xe}6 \text{\&f}7 20.\text{\&xf}8 \text{\&xf}8 21.\text{\&f}1 \text{\&e}7 22.\text{\&d}4\#\) with a big advantage, Wirthesohn – Rajkovic, Altensteig 1990. In case of 14...\text{\&xf}5 15.\text{\&d}5 \text{\&xd}5 16.\text{\&xd}5 \text{\&b}7 17.\text{\&xf}5\# Vaganian – Bisch-choff, Walldorf 1998, the odds are significantly in White’s favour. Black is not quite well either with the continuation 14...\text{\&e}7 15.\text{\&xe}6 \text{\&xe}6 16.\text{\&h}3 \text{\&f}7 17.\text{\&f}3 \text{\&c}7 18.\text{\&g}5 \text{\&c}8 19.\text{\&b}3\# and White ahs a perceptible edge. Black’s prospects are a little brighter in case of 14...e5 15.\text{\&d}5 \text{\&d}8 16.\text{\&e}2\#, but here also Black’s pawn structure with the weakened d5-square commands a long-term white initiative.

15.\text{\&g}4 \text{\&bd}7 16.\text{\&g}5

The preliminary swap 16.\text{\&xe}6 \text{\&xe}6, followed by 17.\text{\&g}5 \text{\&xg}5 18.\text{\&xg}5, provides Black with the extra option 18...\text{\&e}5!\# (the move 18...\text{\&h}7 leads to a situation, which is discussed below in the mainline variation with the move 16.\text{\&g}5).

16...\text{\&xg}5 17.\text{\&xg}5 \text{\&h}7 18.\text{\&h}4 \text{\&e}5 19.\text{\&xe}6 \text{\&xe}6 20.\text{\&f}1 \text{\&c}8

With the idea 21...\text{\&e}7.

21.\text{\&h}3 \text{g}6

21...\text{\&xc}4? gave White after 22.\text{\&d}5\# an advantage, Poluljahov–Ulibin, St.Petersburg, 1998.

22.\text{\&b}3 \text{\&g}7 23.\text{\&d}2 \text{\&h}6 24.\text{\&xh}6 \text{\&xh}6 25.\text{\&cd}1\#

This situation arose in the game Komarov – Del Rio Angelis, Italia 1999. Black is still expe-riencing certain difficulties related primarily with the necessity to constantly protect his central pawns. For the time being White’s attention is concentrated mostly on the e6–pawn. However, his most recent move shows, that after the retreat of the white knight from d4 Black may start experiencing problems with the protection of the d6–pawn.

b) 11...\text{\&bd}7

An elastic move. The black knight is ready to take part in the offensive against the pawns c4 and e4, from e5 or c5, respectively. At the same time it does not bar the a8–h1 diagonal of the black light–squared bishop and provides operating room for the activity of the major pieces along the c–file.

12.\text{f}4!

White already needs this move in the situation that has emerged. In case of 12.\text{\&c}1, which is traditional for positions of this type, Black is provided with a counterplay opportunity via 12...\text{\&c}5!? (A.Kharitonov is of the opinion that 12...\text{\&e}5 is completely adequate) and after 13.b4
\( \text{cxe4 14. \text{dxe4 dxe4 15. g4 f6} 16. xg7 g8 17. \text{h6 xg2 18. xg2 g6 19. \text{h3 b7= Black has counterplay along the a8–h1 diagonal weakened by White.}}}

At this point we must consider again the issue which is the highest priority move for Black: b1) 12...0-0 or the attempt to coordinate queenside pressure on the white position by means of b2) 12...c8.

b1) 12...0-0 13. c1

A programmed move in the system being discussed.

13...fe8

Black is seeking to fortify the e6-pawn first. If he does not do that and plays 13...ac8 instead, then White is provided with an opportunity in relation with 14.f5! (a large-scale offensive with the help of 14.g4 c5 15. f2 g6 16.b4, followed by 16...cd7 17.g5 h5 18.e3 d8 19.h3 g7= only weakened the foundation of White's solid position - the pawns c4 and e4, Skomorokhin – Voitsekhovsky, Kstovo 1998) 14...c5 15.b3 (premature is 15.d5 because of 15...d8 16.b3 b5=) 15...d8 (impossible is 15...xc4? on account of 16. d5 xd5 17.xc4 xe3 18.xc8 xd1 19.xf8+ xf8 20.xd1±) 16.e2± and he obtains a favourable for himself pawn structure with a weakened Black's d5-square, Akopian – Shirov, Madrid 1997.

To 13...b8 White should pay attention to 14.g4 (after 14.f5 e5 15.c2 c8= White will not be able to retain without concessions a structure, which is favourable for himself), since after 14...c8 15.g5 e8 16.b3 f8 Pigott – D.King, Plymouth 1989, he could have contested the initiative by means of 17.f5!? e5 18.de2 b5 19.d5↑.

From time to time people play 13...fc8 vacating the f8-square for the knight. In this case there is 14.g4 f8 15.g5 ed7 16.h4!? (16.d5?! is not so clear, due to 16...xd5 17.f5 and now in the game Zhu Chen – Bischoff, Pulvermuele 2000, Black could have fought off White’s attack by means of 17..d8! 18.cxd5 b8 19.g4 b5 20.d4 b6=) 16...d8 17.b3 and now the attempt to manifest activity by 17...g6 Stajcic – Moiseev, Kecskemet 1991, brought Black difficulties after 18.f5 hxh4 19.fxe6 e5 20.exf7+ xf7 21.e6 d7 22. h3± in connection with the strong position of the white knight on e6.

Aware of White's most dangerous plan Black has resorted also to the move 13...h5, which is associated with a little tactical trap. Following 14.h3 fe8 White should better slow down the active operations on the kingside and choose the easygoing 15.f2 (the best of Black's design is unveiled in the variation 15.g4 hxg4 16.hxg4 c5 17.f2, where, thanks to the absence of the h-pawns, there is already 17...d5!,

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to which White's best choice is 18.e5 \(\text{f}e4\) 19.\(\text{f}e3\) dxc4 20.\(\text{f}e4\) \(\text{f}e4\) 21.\(\text{f}c2\) \(\text{c}5\) 22.\(\text{f}xc4\) and now in the game M.Gurevich – Hoffmann, Netherlands 2000, the odds could be evened by 22...\(\text{f}ac8!\) 23.\(\text{f}e2\) \(\text{f}d7=\) 15...\(\text{f}f8\) 16.\(\text{f}f3\) \(\text{a}d8\) 17.\(\text{f}e2\) g6 18.\(\text{f}g5=\) M.Gurevich – Nisipeanu, Cap d'Agde (active) 2000, where, due to the black h5–pawn, the h–file on the kingside will soon be opened, which in principle is in White's favour.

14.g4!

The diagram position is critical for the entire system with 7.\(\text{f}e1\). To contest the advantage White must act resolutely and precisely, otherwise the spring of the black pieces is ready to unwind and hit hard White's central pawns.

The assessment of the situation depends to a significant degree on the outcome for White should he choose one of the three paths: 14.\(\text{d}d5\), 14.\(\text{f}f2\) or 14.g4. The fourth path – 14.f5?! is a dead–end. Following 14...\(\text{d}d8\) (the attempt to achieve the same end by 14...\(\text{f}8\) is weak, in view of 15.\(\text{x}e6\) \(\text{x}e6\) 16.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{c}5\) 17.b4 and we are facing a position from the game Wirthensohn – Rajkovic, Altensteig 1990, mentioned earlier under variation b1 in the note to Black's move fourteen) 15.\(\text{x}e6\) \(\text{x}e6\) 16.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{f}8\) the black rook comes in rather handy at e8 and as a result of 17.\(\text{f}f2\) \(\text{d}6d7\) 18.\(\text{f}b4\) \(\text{f}6\) 19.\(\text{f}e2\) \(\text{a}c8\) 20.\(\text{f}b3\) \(\text{h}8\) 21.\(\text{f}e3\) \(\text{e}5\) Schlosser – Hoffmann, Lippstadt 1991, Black gained the advantage.

In view of the importance of the position presented on the diagram, we will devote some attention to the continuations 14.\(\text{d}d5\) and 14.\(\text{f}f2\), before we move on to the mainline move g2–g4, the most unpleasant one for Black.

1) 14.\(\text{d}d5\)!

We met this fairly standard piece sacrifice more than once on our way to the position on the above diagram. It is worthwhile to study its consequences again.

14...\(\text{e}d5\)

To opt for the variation 14...\(\text{b}8\) 15.\(\text{x}e7+\) \(\text{x}e7=\) means to acknowledge White's advantage.

15.\(\text{c}x\) 16.\(\text{b}8\)

Should Black attempt to give back the extra piece at once and opt for 15...\(\text{c}5\), then after 16.\(\text{d}7\) (immediately loses 16...\(\text{x}e4\) in view of 17.\(\text{x}e4\) \(\text{f}6\) 18.\(\text{g}2=\), otherwise if 16...\(\text{f}8\), then following 17.\(\text{f}2=\) after winning back the material, White will stand more attractively) 17.\(\text{b}c5\) \(\text{b}c5\) 18.\(\text{b}3\) a5 (18...\(\text{f}8\)
19.\text{	extdegree}d2\pm leads to a tangible white edge) 19.e5 dxe5 20.fxe5 \text{	extdegree}xd5
21.\text{	extdegree}xc5 \text{	extdegree}xc5 22.\text{	extdegree}xc5 \text{	extdegree}ad8
23.\text{	extdegree}g5\pm White’s odds are superior.

Should the black queen retreat to its initial position 15...
\text{	extdegree}d8, then following 16.\text{	extdegree}c6 \text{	extdegree}xc6
17.dxc6 \text{	extdegree}c5 18.c7 Black is best advised to choose between 18...
\text{	extdegree}xc7 and 18...\text{	extdegree}c8 crossing over to the variations discussed below, since White wins after 18...
\text{	extdegree}d7?
19.e5 dxe5 20.fxe5 \text{	extdegree}xd1 21.\text{	extdegree}ed1
\text{	extdegree}fe4 22.\text{	extdegree}xc5 \text{	extdegree}xc5 23.\text{	extdegree}xc5! bxc5
24.\text{	extdegree}xe4 \text{	extdegree}ac8 25.\text{	extdegree}d7++

16.\text{	extdegree}c6 \text{	extdegree}xc6 17.dxc6 \text{	extdegree}c5
18.c7

In case of 18.e5 dxe5 19.c7 Black’s best bet is to reduce the game to the positions to be considered shortly by means of 19...
\text{	extdegree}xc7, since after 19...\text{	extdegree}a7?! 20.fxe5 \text{	extdegree}fd7 White can obtain a winning position with the help of 21.e6! fxe6 22.\text{	extdegree}xa8 \text{	extdegree}xa8 23.b4
\text{	extdegree}e5 24.\text{	extdegree}xc5 \text{	extdegree}f3+ 25.\text{	extdegree}xf3 \text{	extdegree}xf3
26.\text{	extdegree}xe7 \text{	extdegree}c8 27.\text{	extdegree}cd1! \text{	extdegree}b7 28.
\text{	extdegree}d8+ \text{	extdegree}f7 29.\text{	extdegree}xc8 \text{	extdegree}xc8 (29...
\text{	extdegree}xe7 30.\text{	extdegree}g8++) 30.\text{	extdegree}d6+-

18...\text{	extdegree}xc7

Following 18...\text{	extdegree}a7?! 19.e5 (not bad is also 19.\text{	extdegree}xc5!? bxc5
20.e5\pm) 19...dxe5 20.fxe5 \text{	extdegree}fd7
21.e6! we are facing a situation considered in the previous note.

Another opportunity for Black in this situation can be connected with 18...\text{	extdegree}c8?! The attempt to break up Black’s defence with the help of 19.\text{	extdegree}xc5 dxc5!? (weaker is 19...bxc5 on account of 20.e5 dxe5
21.fxe5 \text{	extdegree}a7 22.exf6 \text{	extdegree}xf6 23.
\text{	extdegree}d6+- and White wins) 20.e5
\text{	extdegree}a7 21.exf6 \text{	extdegree}xf6 22.\text{	extdegree}d6 (Black
hangs on also after 22.\text{	extdegree}xe8+ \text{	extdegree}xe8 23.\text{	extdegree}e2 \text{	extdegree}f8=) 22...\text{	extdegree}f8!
23.\text{	extdegree}xb6 \text{	extdegree}xc7= does not succeed.

19.e5 dxe5

Unavailable is 19...\text{	extdegree}ac8? because of 20.exf6 \text{	extdegree}xf6 21.b4+-.

20.\text{	extdegree}xa8 \text{	extdegree}xa8

Black cannot opt for the intermediate 20...\text{	extdegree}xf4? due to 21.
\text{	extdegree}xf4+-.

21.b4 \text{	extdegree}xf4

White has the upper hand following 21...\text{	extdegree}d8 22.\text{	extdegree}e2 \text{	extdegree}d5
23.bxc5 bxc5 (even worse is 23...
\text{	extdegree}xe3 because of 24.cxb6!
\text{	extdegree}xb6 25.\text{	extdegree}xe3\pm) 24.fxe5 \text{	extdegree}xe3
25.\text{	extdegree}xe3 c4 26.\text{	extdegree}e4 \text{	extdegree}c5+ 27.
\text{	extdegree}h1\pm R.Fritz – Bromberger, Germany 1999.

21...\text{	extdegree}xf4 22.\text{	extdegree}xf4

In this situation according to L.Ftacnik Black should have opted for 22...\text{	extdegree}b7! and the variation 23.bxc5 \text{	extdegree}xc5+ 24.\text{	extdegree}e3
\text{	extdegree}b4 25.\text{	extdegree}e2 b5! 26.\text{	extdegree}d4= brings about a roughly even position, in which Black has two pawns for the exchange.

In the game Ftacnik – Browne, San Francisco 1991, Black decided otherwise choosing 22...
\text{	extdegree}a7?! which presented White with the advantage after 23.bxc5
\text{	extdegree}xc5+ 24.\text{	extdegree}g2 (impossible is 24.\text{	extdegree}e3? in view of 24...
\text{	extdegree}xe3+ 25.\text{	extdegree}xe3 b5 26.\text{	extdegree}cc3 b4 27.\text{	extdegree}b3
\text{	extdegree}e8 28.\text{	extdegree}f2 a5\pm) 24...\text{	extdegree}b7+ 25.
\text{	extdegree}f3\pm.

2) 14.\text{	extdegree}f2
White intends to advance e4–e5.

14...h6

If 14...h5?!, then following 15.h3 White is again ready to get down to the e4–e5 advance, upon which Black’s h5–pawn can become vulnerable.

15.b3

At this point already the 15.e5 advance leads to a position with mutual prospects after 15...dxe5 16.fxe5 \( \triangleleft \)h7\( \triangleleft \). E.g., with the sharp lunge 17.\( \triangleleft \)d5, well-known form the previous section, the game Perun – Shishkin, Kiev 1999, ended in a draw following 17...exd5 18.cxd5 \( \triangledown \)b8 (deserves testing also 18...\( \triangledown \)d8!? ) 19.\( \triangleleft \)c6 \( \triangledown \)xc6 20.dxc6 \( \triangleleft \)c5 21.c7 \( \triangledown \)xc7 22.\( \triangledown \)xa8 \( \triangledown \)xa8 23.b4 \( \triangleleft \)g5 24.bxc5 \( \triangledown \)c6 25.cx\( \triangledown \)b6 \( \triangledown \)h3+ 26.\( \triangledown \)f1 \( \triangledown \)h1+ 27.\( \triangledown \)e2 \( \triangledown \)e4+ 28.\( \triangledown \)f1 \( \triangledown \)h1= by perpetual check.

15...\( \triangledown \)ac8 16.h3 \( \triangledown \)b8 17.g4 \( \triangleleft \)h7

After 17...g5?! White takes over the initiative via 18.f5 \( \triangledown \)f8 19.h4\( \triangleleft \). The move 17...e5 also permits White to obtain the better odds following 18.fxe5 (weaker is 18.\( \triangledown \)de2?! in view of 18...b5\( \triangleleft \) and Black intercepts the initiative) 18...dxe5 (after 18...\( \triangledown \)xe5 19.\( \triangleleft \)d5\( \triangleleft \) White builds up pressure on Black’s position) 19.\( \triangleleft \)f5 \( \triangledown \)c5 20.\( \triangledown \)xc5 \( \triangledown \)xc5 21.\( \triangleleft \)d5\( \triangleleft \).

18.\( \triangledown \)g3 \( \triangledown \)d8!

Black prepares counterplay associated with the moves b6–b5, \( \triangleleft \)d8–b6 or \( \triangleleft \)d8–c7 and d6–d5.

19.a4 \( \triangledown \)c7 20.\( \triangledown \)c2 \( \triangledown \)c5

Black’s attention becomes fixed on the black b3–pawn. The breakthrough in the centre 20...d5? was not sufficiently prepared yet. Following 21.exd5 exd5 (to 21...\( \triangledown \)xf4 adequate is 22.\( \triangledown \)xf4 \( \triangledown \)xf4 23.dxe6\( \triangleleft \) with an advantage) 22.\( \triangledown \)xd5 \( \triangledown \)xd5 23.cxd5! Black does not have 23...\( \triangledown \)xf4 on account of 24.\( \triangledown \)xc8 \( \triangledown \)xc8 25.\( \triangleleft \)c6, and in case the black queen retreats – 26.\( \triangleleft \)e7\( \triangleleft \).

21.\( \triangledown \)f2

After 21.b4 \( \triangleleft \)d7 the weakness of the c4–pawn becomes rather tangible.

21...\( \triangledown \)f8 22.h4 \( \triangledown \)cd8\( \triangleleft \)

The game Kramnik – Anna-geldiev, Moscow 1994, arrived at a position with mutual prospects.

Let us revert to the position after 14.g4!

14...\( \triangleleft \)c5

The other tested continuations for Black also do not promise him beds of roses.

Let us note immediately, that the move 14...e5?! is not successful for Black, since after 15.\( \triangledown \)f5 exf4 16.\( \triangledown \)xf4 \( \triangledown \)e5 17.g5\( \triangleleft \) White obtains a huge advantage.
The seemingly restraining White's offensive on the kingside 14...h6 in fact after 15.g5 (anything but 15.h4?, which allows Black to intercept the initiative following 15...c5 16.a6 f2 d5! 17.e5 ffe4+! Iskusnyh – Shipov, Maikop 1998) 15...hxg5 16.fxg5 h7 17.g6 h8f8 18.gxf7 xf7 19.f1+ permitted White to develop some initiative in the game Vaganian – Co. Ionescu, Sochi 1986. The careless 19...g8 (in case of the relatively superior 19...f6!? after 20.db5! axb5 21.dbxb5 wb8 22.d6+ g8 23.xb7 xb7 24.c2! e5 25.c5 xh2+ 26.h1 bxc5 27.xc5 xc5 28.xe5 White's prospects would have remained preferable all the same) permitted White to obtain a big advantage after 20.d5!! exd5 21.cxd5 d8 22.c6 g5 (with the forced 22...xc6 23.dxc6 e5 24.d5+ h8 25.c7 c8 strong is 26.xb6+ with the idea c3) 23.d8 xe3+ 24.h1 axd8 (losing is 24...xc1 due to 25.xb7 xb2 26 xd6 e7 27.f5++) 25.c7 c8 26.h3.

In case of 14...g6 White can proceed 15.g5 h5 16.f5 f8 (even worse for Black is 16...exf5 in view of 17.xf5 e5 18.h4+ h8 19.a4 ab8 20.f1 f8 21.d4+ with a big white advantage, Ehvest – German, Italy 1997) 17.f3 e5 18.xh5 gxh5 19.c2 and now in the game Yermolinsky – Chekhov, USSR 1984, even the relatively superior continuation for Black 19...g4 led to a white advantage following 20.h3 xe3 21.xe3 c5 22.f6!±.

Finally, if Black plays passively and diverts the knight from the centre to the kingside 14...f8, vacating the d7-square, then following 15.g5 d6d7 16.b3 ac8 17.f1 (also acceptable is 17.h4!? with the idea h3, which occurred in the game Wells – Klimm, Passau 1995) 17...b8 18.f5! e5 (to 18...e5?! adequate is 19.f6 d8 20.h5 with an attack, while after 18...d8 19.h5 g6 20.h3± White gains a huge advantage) white could have obtained superior odds by means of 19.de2! with the idea g3 and f5-f6. In the game Quinteros – Bibi, Linares 1981, White played superficially 19.f3?!, which permitted Black to arrange counterplay in a rather instructive way by means of 19...d8! 20.a4 c5 21.e1 a8!±.

15.f2 g6

Black cannot afford 15...h6. In this case the central link in Black's pawn chain – the e6-pawn – can become vulnerable when its neighbouring pawn on f7 is attacked by means of 16.b4 cd7 17.g5 hxg5 18.fxg5 h7 19.g6 h8f8 20.gxf7 xf7. White managed to obtain a decisive advantage after 21.d5! exd5 22.cxd5 c5 23.bxc5 bxc5 24.e5! g8 25.e6 f6 26.f5 g6 27.g3 ad8 28.h5 e5 29.xe5
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\( \text{axe5 30...axe5!} +-- \) in the game Pogorelov – Sl.Kovacevic, Carbo-
neras (active) 1999.

Black is not prepared either to carry out the breakthrough in the centre. Following 15...d5
16.cxd5 \( \text{exf4} \) 17.b4± White has a big advantage, since 17...\( \text{cxd5} \) is not available due to 18.\( \text{gx} \) 3.
This is why the plan similar to the one being discussed right now was not feasible without the h-
pawns, which we mentioned in the note to Black’s move thirteen.

The other blow on the centre – 15...e5 permitted White to develop a dangerous initiative
after 16.\( \text{dc} \) 5 \( \text{d8} \) 17.\( \text{xe} \) 7+ \( \text{xe} \) 7
18.f5 h6 19.\( \text{h} \) 4 \( \text{c8} \) 20.\( \text{c2} \) \( \text{c6} \) 21.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{b7} \) 22.b4 b5 23.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{c7} \)
24.g5† Yermolinsky – Frias, London 1994.

16.b4!

White must play all over the board. In case of 16.g5 \( \text{h} \) 5 White unexpectedly falls into dif-
ficulties in connection with the fact that to 17.\( \text{c3} \) (White is no better with 17.\( \text{f3} \), because of 17...e5!) there is 17...d5! 18.cxd5 \( \text{xf4} \).

16...\( \text{ad8}?! \)

Black employs tactics to keep his knight on the command post. Should he retreat 16...\( \text{cd7} \)
White carries out the traditional for the entire system 17.\( \text{d5} \)!! Following 17...exd5 18.cxd5 \( \text{d8} \)
(Black is no better with 18...\( \text{b8} \) 19.\( \text{c6} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 20.\( \text{dxc6} \) \( \text{f8} \) 21.e5
dxe5 22.fxe5 \( \text{xb4} \) 23.c7 \( \text{a7} \) 24.exf6 \( \text{xe1} \) 25.\( \text{xe1} \) \( \text{ac8} \) 26.\( \text{g3} \), which leads to a big ad-
vantage for White) 19.\( \text{c6} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 20.\( \text{dxc6} \) \( \text{f8} \) in the game Lobron
– A.Greenefeld, Yugoslavia 1989, White could have gained a huge
advantage by means of 21.\( \text{c7} \) \( \text{c8} \) (impossible is 21...\( \text{d7} \), because of 22.e5 \( \text{c4} \) 23.e6++) 22.\( \text{xb6} \).

17.\( \text{f3} \)!

In case of 17.bxc5? Black wins back the piece on the pin after 17...dxc5± obtaining excellent
play.

17...\( \text{cxe4} \)

White’s tasks are simpler after 17...\( \text{cd7} \) in view of 18.\( \text{d5} \) exd5 19.cxd5 \( \text{b8}?! \) (possibly
Black’s best bet would be to give up the extra piece at once by means of 19...\( \text{c5} \), though after 20.bxc5 bxc5 21.g5 \( \text{d7} \) 23.\( \text{h} \) 3†
Krivoshey – Moltchanov, Ag-
neaux 2000, White’s position is more active and Black cannot easily pinpoint a white target to
create counterplay) 20.\( \text{c6} \) \( \text{a8} \) (no better is 20...\( \text{xc6} \) 21.\( \text{xc8} \) 22.g5† with an advantage)
21.g5 \( \text{h5} \) 22.\( \text{xd8} \) \( \text{xd8} \) (to
22...\( \text{xd8} \) strong is 23.\( \text{h} \) 3† with the idea \( \text{c7} \) 23.\( \text{h} \) 3 \( \text{f8} \) 24.\( \text{g} \) 4
\( \text{g7} \) 25.a4† and White has a perceptible edge, since regardless of Black’s small formal material
superiority he literally cannot move a piece.

18.\( \text{cxe4} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 19.\( \text{xe4} \)

Of no avail is 19...f5? in view of 20.gxf5 exf5 21.\( \text{xe7}++ \).

20.\( \text{xe4} \) d5

This entangled situation oc-
curred in the game Krivoshey –
Shipov, Yalta 1996, in which after the ill-judged 21.\(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{e}6\)? Black followed the route 21...\(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{e}8\)! 22.\(\text{\textbf{e}}\text{e}1\) \(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{e}6\) 23.\(\text{\textbf{e}}\text{e}6\) fxe6 24.\(\text{\textbf{b}}\text{b}6\) \(\text{\textbf{b}}\text{b}8\) 25.c5 \(\text{\textbf{d}}\text{d}8\) 26.\(\text{\textbf{e}}\text{x}d8\) \(\text{\textbf{e}}\text{x}d8\) 27.a3 a5\(\text{\textbf{a}}\) to arrive at a position, where White does not have sufficient compensation for the exchange.

Significantly stronger was the opportunity based on 21.\(\text{\textbf{e}}\text{e}1\!), which was pointed out by S.Shipov. Following 21...\(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{h}4\) 22.\(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{c}6\) dxc4 (weaker is 22...\(\text{\textbf{g}}\text{g}5\) 23.\(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{c}2\) \(\text{\textbf{d}}\text{d}6\) 24.cxd5 \(\text{\textbf{g}}\text{g}4\) 25.h3 \(\text{\textbf{f}}\text{f}5\) 26.\(\text{\textbf{e}}\text{e}2\) leading to a palpable white advantage) 23.\(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{x}d8\) \(\text{\textbf{e}}\text{x}d8\) 24.\(\text{\textbf{e}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{c}4\) 25.h3\(\text{\textbf{a}}\) White’s extra piece perhaps overbalances a little Black’s three pawns.

b2) 12...\(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{c}8\)??

So long as possible Black seeks to transfer his queen to the corner of the board, where it will be able to exert pressure on the white e4–pawn, and most of all it will not be X-rayed by the white rook once it moves.

13.\(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{c}1\)

The manoeuvre 13.\(\text{\textbf{f}}\text{f}2\), though similar to the one considered above, does not cause Black any specific worries. Following 13...0–0 14.\(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{c}1\) \(\text{\textbf{f}}\text{f}8\) 15.b3 (to 15.f5 Black has prepared 15...\(\text{\textbf{d}}\text{d}8\), and after 15.e5 \(\text{\textbf{g}}\text{x}g2\) 16.exf6 \(\text{\textbf{a}}\text{a}8\) 17.fxe7 \(\text{\textbf{b}}\text{b}7\) for his piece Black has a slashing attack on the white king, which was confirmed by the game V.Popov – Shipov, Russia 1997) 15...\(\text{\textbf{f}}\text{f}8\) 16.\(\text{\textbf{f}}\text{f}3\) h6 17.\(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{c}2\) the well-timed 17...e5! 18.\(\text{\textbf{d}}\text{d}5\) (if 18.\(\text{\textbf{d}}\text{d}5\), then 18...b5\(\text{\textbf{a}}\)) 18...\(\text{\textbf{b}}\text{b}8\) brought about a situation with mutual prospects, San Segundo – Shipov, Cappelle la Grande 1998.

13...\(\text{\textbf{b}}\text{b}8\)

The move 13...0–0 materialised a position from variation b1, which has already been discussed above (see the note to Black’s move thirteen).

14.b3

After 14.\(\text{\textbf{e}}\text{e}2\) \(\text{\textbf{a}}\text{a}8\) (premature is 14...0–0 due to 15.f5\(\text{\textbf{a}}\)) 15.\(\text{\textbf{f}}\text{f}2\) 0–0 (worth close attention are also 15...\(\text{\textbf{d}}\text{d}8\) 16.f5 e5 17.\(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{c}2\) g6\(\text{\textbf{a}}\), which occurred in the game Glek – Wahls, Germany 1993, and 15...g6 16.\(\text{\textbf{b}}\text{b}3\) 0–0 17.\(\text{\textbf{d}}\text{d}4\) Smejkal – Podzielny, Germany 1993) White cannot develop his initiative in a straightforward way. Thus after 16.f5 exf5 17.\(\text{\textbf{e}}\text{e}5\) \(\text{\textbf{f}}\text{f}8\) 18.\(\text{\textbf{d}}\text{d}2\) \(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{c}4\) the best that he has at his disposal is 19.\(\text{\textbf{g}}\text{g}5\) (following 19.\(\text{\textbf{e}}\text{e}7+\) \(\text{\textbf{e}}\text{e}7\) 20.\(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{x}d6\) \(\text{\textbf{e}}\text{e}6\) the advantage is already with Black, and 19.\(\text{\textbf{d}}\text{d}5\) \(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{x}d5\) 20.\(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{x}c4\) \(\text{\textbf{c}}\text{x}c4\) 21.e5 d5 22.b3 \(\text{\textbf{g}}\text{g}4\)\(\text{\textbf{a}}\), which occurred in the game Antunes – Shipov,
Thessaloniki 1996, is even worse for White) 19...f8 20.h6+ h8 21.xf7+ g8= but the game ends in a perpetual check.

14...0-0 15.g4

White proceeds by analogy with variation b1, which was favourable for him. In case of 15.e2 a8 16.f2 (this situation could have arisen from the position considered in the previous note) 16...e8 17.f3 h6!? it will be very difficult to pierce Black's defences, D.Fridman – Shipov, Berlin 1996. Note also, that 15.f5 is not quite adequate in view of 15...e5! and Black carries out b6–b5 no matter where the white knight retreats.

15...a8

Following 15...c5 16.f2 by the breakthrough 16...d5? 17. cxd5 xf4 18.g3 xg4 19.d6 d8 20.e5 xg2 21.xg2± Hartung Nielsen – Sorensen, Lyngby 1988, brought Black to a difficult situation.

16.f2 g6 17.g5 h5 18.g4

18...e8

Black envisages a plan for counterplay relying on the moves e7–d8, f7–f5, and h5xf4. The combination 18...xf4? 19.xf4 e5 does not get by because of 20.xg4 exd4 21.xd7 xg5 22. d5=-.

In case of 18...g7 Black has to keep an eye on the persistent white menace – 19.d5!? It is true that in this situation the latter is not indisputable. Following 19...d8 (unavailable is 19...exd5? due to 20.xd7+-, and with 19...e8 20.xe7+ xe7 21.c1 the weakness of the d6-pawn is obvious) 20.c3 b5 (with 20...exd5!? 21.xd7 dx4 22. e3 White has sufficient compensation for the pawn) 21.h3 exd5 (if 21...xc4, then after 22.h6?! to be followed by h4, White can obtain a strong attack subject to the black queen being detached from the kingside) 21...exd5 22.xd7 dx4 23.cxb5 e3 (following 23...b6?! 24.c6 xf2+ 25.xf2 axb5 26.e7+ h8 27.xc8 xc8 28.xd6 xh3 29.xh3 d8= Black's compensation for the pawn is the position of the white king on f2) 24.xb7! (to 24.xb7 one must take into consideration 24...exf2+ 25.xf2 a7= with good compensation) 24...exf2+ 25.xf2 xb7 26.axb7 b6 A.Greenfeld – Shipov, Belgrade 1994, White's best line would have been 27. xc8 xd4+ 28.e2 xc8 29. bxa6±, where regardless of the queen swap the tension is retained, though White is somewhat more preferable with his rook and pawns for the pair of
black pieces.

The attempt to attack immediately the e4–pawn by means of 18...ãc5 19.ãcd1 f5 does not meet with success and after 19.gxf6 (in case of 19.exf5? ãxg2 White stands clearly worse, since the take with the queen on g2 is not available because the f4–pawn lacks protection) 19...ãxf6 (with 19...ãxf6 Black has to take into account 20.f5↑, and after 19...ãxf6 20.ãh3= the vulnerability of the black e6–pawn begins to tell) 20.b4 ãxd4 21.ãxd4 ãxf4 22.ãh3 e5 23.ãe3= Black will be forced to part with an exchange.

The move 18...ãc7 intending to advance b6–b5 with the help of ãf8–c8 is no panacea either. In this case White can proceed 19.a4?! with the idea to closely follow 19...ãc5 20.ãcd1 with a ram–attack on Black’s kingside defences by f4–f5. For instance, in case of 20...ãfc8 (impossible is 20...ãxf4?! 21.ãxf4 e5 22.ãg3 exd4 23.ãxd4 ãxb3 in view of 24.ãxb6 ãxc4 25.ãd5= and Black has two pieces under fire at the same time) the 21.f5! breakthrough is very unpleasant for Black, since after 21...e5 22.fxe6 hxg6 (to 22...fxg6 very strong is 23.ãe6=) 23.ãf5! ãxb3 24.ãxb6 gxf5 25.ãxh5 ãxc4 26.g6→ the black king becomes the target of a powerful attack.

19.ãcd1

19.f5?! is not available, since after 19...exf5 20.exf5 (to 20.ãxf5 strong is 20...ãe5, which not only attacks the white queen, but also poses the unpleasant threat ãd3) 20...ãxg2 21.f6 (following 21.ãxg2 ãxg2+ 22.ãxg2 ãxg5= Black emerges with an extra pawn) 21...ãxf6 22.gxf6 Black has at his disposal a very strong objection – 22...ãh1↑. The combination 19.ãxe6?! fxe6 20.ãxe6 provides Black with a dangerous attack after 20...ãf7! 21.ãxd7 ãxg5→.

19...ãc8 20.ãde2 ãc6 21.ãg3 ãxg3 22.hxg3 b5 23.cxb5 axb5 24.ãc1 ãa8

In the game Hjartarson – Wahls, New York 1994, Black managed to execute the programmed advance b6–b5, but it is too early yet to say that the prospects are absolutely even. In case of 25.ãe2? b4 (weaker is 25...ãb8 in view of 26.ãd5!, and should the black bishop retreat to d8, the white knight will comfortably park on b4) 26.ãb5= White could exert piece–pressure on the adversary’s queenside.
Chapter 14

1.\( \text{d}f3 \) 2.\( \text{d}f6 \) 2.c4 b6 3.g3 3.\( \text{b}7 \) 4.g2 c5 5.0–0 g6

6.\( \text{d}c3 \)

A natural move contributory to piece development. During the late seventies alongside the mainline move quite popular became the humble 6.b3, thanks to a series of spectacular wins of the Swedish grandmaster Ulf Andersson. However, after 6...\( \text{g}7 \) 7.\( \text{b}2 \) 0–0 (with the impatient 7...d5 8.cxd5 0–0 9.\( \text{x}f6 \) \( \text{x}f6 \) 10.\( \text{c}3 \pm \) Black risks to encounter certain difficulties) 8.\( \text{c}3 \) it was proved gradually, that Black holds the balance after both 8...d5 and 8...\( \text{a}6 \).

There is also the immediate 6.d4 which turns out to be nothing but a move transposition after 6...cxd4 7.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{g}7 \).

6...\( \text{g}7 \)

White's plans rely on the d2–d4 advance, therefore there have been attempts to weaken its effect by means of 6...\( \text{c}6 \). However, in this case White has at his disposal the opportunity 7.e4! (if White disregards Black's move six and rams on by means of 7.d4, then Black has 7...\( \text{x}d4 \) 8.\( \text{x}d4 \) \( \text{x}g2 \) 9.\( \text{x}g2 \) cxd4 10.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 11.b3 0–0 12.\( \text{b}2 \) and can now completely even the game by a temporary pawn sacrifice 12...d5! 13.cxd5 e6. In the game Chernin – Psakhis, Kazan 1997, the adversaries agreed to a draw in this very position) 7...\( \text{g}7 \) 8.d4 cxd4 9.\( \text{d}4 \) (in case of 9...0–0 White can contest the superiority issues both by the yet untested move 10.e3!?), which reinforces his position in the centre, and by the more specific 10.\( \text{xc}c6 \) dxc6 11.e5, which permitted White to gain the upper hand after 11...\( \text{e}8 \) 12.\( \text{e}2 \) Kanstler – Zilberman, Israel 1998) 9...\( \text{d}4 \) 10.\( \text{d}4 \) d6 (if Black does not screen the white e–pawn by means of 10...0–0, then White can rely on a small but sustainable advantage after 11.e5 \( \text{x}g2 \) 12.\( \text{x}g2 \pm \) 11.\( \text{g}5 \) h6 (White exerts pressure on Black's position also with 11...0–0 12.\( \text{d}2 \pm \) 12.e3 (probably, less precise is 12.\( \text{d}2 \),

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since following 12...0–0 13...d3
\texttt{b8 14...ad1 a6 15...fe1 \texttt{d7 16.b3 \texttt{c5=} Bareev – Leko, Ubeda 1997, Black managed to successfully regroup his forces, so the d2-square is best booked for the queen, if possible) 12...0–0 13...d1 (safeguarding against the possible leap of the black knight onto g4) 13...d7 14...c1 a6 15...d2 \texttt{h7 16...d5 \texttt{b8 17. \texttt{fd1}} \texttt{±}, which permitted White to retain a slight edge in the game Schwartzman – S.Kudrin, USA 1997.}

7...d4

Indisputable mainline. However, it would not be right to neglect the move 7...e1, which was in the leading role throughout Chapters 10–13, dedicated to the “hedgehog” system.

7...e1

This move, which caused Black a lot of problems in many “hedgehog” system chapters of this book, is a rather less effective weapon in this context. The fact is that taking his bishop out to g7 Black can exploit any white delay in the centre by arranging counterplay along the long diagonal.

7...\texttt{c6}

The attempt to simplify the situation via 7...\texttt{e4} 8...xe4 \texttt{xe4} 9.d4 cxd4 can stumble into the unexpected 10...h6! \texttt{xh6 11...xd4 0–0 12...xe4 \texttt{c6 13. \texttt{ad1 c8 14.h4 c7 15.h5=} Romanishin – Lau, Dresden 1998, which provided White with a small but secure edge, emphasised by the opposite–coloured bishops. In case of 7...d6 8.e4 e5 White has also at his disposal the very strong tactical resource 9.d4! After 9...\texttt{c6 (in case of 9...cxd4?! 10...xd4 the greedy 10...exd4? brings Black to a hopeless situation after 11.e5++) 10.dxe5 dxe5 11...d5\texttt{±} Romanishin – M.Gurevich, Moscow 1987, White gained the upper hand.}

The move 7...d5!? is a theme on its own. Following 8.d4 (in case of 8.cxd5?! \texttt{xd5 9...b3 0–0 10.d3 e6 11...g5 \texttt{d7 12...ad1 \texttt{c6}} \texttt{±} Black’s prospects, as shown by the game Konopka – Kyas, Germany 1996, can become even preferable) Black has the rather strong retort 8...0–0! (in case of 8...dxc4 9...a4+ \texttt{bd7 10...c5 xc8 11...xc4 xc5 12...e3 \texttt{ce4 13...xc8+ xc8 14...d2 \texttt{d6 15...f4!? xg2 16...xg2 \texttt{c4 17...xc4 xc4 18...ac1=} Romanishin – Roeder, Bad Woerishofen 1997, White’s prospects in the endgame are to be preferred) 9.dxc5 (after 9.cxd5 \texttt{xd5 10. \texttt{xd5 xd5 11.e4 \texttt{b7 12.dxc5 bxc5 13...c2 \texttt{b6=} Black’s “extra” pawn island on c5 is no handicap because of the black pressure on the long dark diagonal a1–h8 and the potential weakness of the d4-square, to which the black knight is ready to go off any minute) 9...dxc4 10...a4 \texttt{c8 11.cxb6 axb6 12...b4 \texttt{d5! 13...xd5 xd5 14.e4 \texttt{c6! 15...xb6 \texttt{e6}} Henrichs – Alter-}
man, Recklinghausen 1998, and Black has good compensation for the pawn in view of his rather strong pressure on the a1–h8 diagonal and the b-file, which cross on the white b2–pawn.

8.e4

The most down-the-line move. The variation 8.d4 exd4 9.exd4 axg2 10.hxg2 cxd4 11.\(\text{V}x\text{d}4\) 0–0= causes Black no concerns. Comparing this position to the one we considered in the note to Black's move six, one can see that White has lost time on the not so useful move \(\text{Be}1\). 8...0–0 9.e5

The only way White can more or less genuinely enter the superiority contest. Of course, 9.d4? is inadequate in view of 9...\(\text{Q}xd4\) 10.\(\text{Q}xd4\) cxd4 11.\(\text{Q}xd4\) \(\text{Q}xe4\). This variation shows that the bishop on g7 and not on e7, which was typical of the "hedgehog" system, tells significantly in Black's favour in the plan with \(\text{Be}1\). Should White play a restrained 9.d3, then following 9...d6 10.h3 (if White immediately delays the development of his queenside 10.\(\text{B}b1\) \(\text{Q}d7\) 11.h3 a6 12.a3 \(\text{B}b8\) 13.\(\text{Q}e2\) a8 14.\(\text{Q}g5\), then following 14...b5 15.cxb5 \(\text{Q}xb5\) Steinbacher – Adorjan, Germany, 1989, Black can even gain the upper hand) 10...\(\text{Q}d7\) 11.\(\text{Q}e3\) \(\text{Q}c8\) 12.\(\text{Q}d2\) e6 13.\(\text{Q}g5\) \(\text{Q}c7\) 14.\(\text{Q}ad1\) a6 15.\(\text{Q}h6\) \(\text{Q}d4\)= Ljubojevic – Karpov, Monaco (active) 2000, Black's prospects are by no means worse.

9...\(\text{Q}e8\)!

This is the right retreat of the knight. After 9...\(\text{Q}g4\)?! 10.h3 \(\text{Q}h6\) 11.d4 \(\text{Q}xd4\) 12.\(\text{Q}xd4\) \(\text{Q}xg2\) 13.\(\text{Q}xg2\) cxd4 14.\(\text{Q}xd4\) \(\text{Q}f5\) 15.\(\text{Q}e4\) d6 16.\(\text{Q}f4\) dxe5 17.\(\text{Q}xe5\) \(\text{Q}d6\) 18.\(\text{Q}f4\) \(\text{Q}xe5\) 19.\(\text{Q}xe5\)= White's prospects are visibly brighter, Loboń – Makaričhev, Germany 1991.

10.d4 \(\text{Q}xd4\) 11.\(\text{Q}xd4\) \(\text{Q}xg2\) 12.\(\text{Q}xg2\) cxd4 13.\(\text{Q}xd4\) d6

Black is in a crowded situation, therefore his last move is simply indispensable.

14.\(\text{Q}f4\) dxe5 15.\(\text{Q}xd8\) \(\text{Q}xd8\) 16.\(\text{Q}xe5\) \(\text{Q}xe5\)!

Probably the best. There has been also 16...\(\text{Q}f6\) 17.\(\text{Q}f4\) e5 18.\(\text{Q}e3\) \(\text{Q}c8\) 19.b3 \(\text{Q}f5\) and at this point of the game Von Gleich – Vegh, Germany 1990, a draw was agreed, though possibly White somewhat hurried over this decision, since the weakness of the d5-square in the black camp, as well as the approaching struggle for the d-file, which must develop in White’s favour, make his position preferable.

17.\(\text{Q}xe5\) e6 18.c5

White seek to establish a target for the e5-rook, since in case of 18.\(\text{Q}f3\)?! \(\text{Q}d6\) 19.b3 \(\text{Q}f5\)= Black can intercept the initiative.

18...\(\text{Q}f6\)

Weaker is 18...\(\text{Q}d2\)?! in view of 19.cxb6 axb6 20.\(\text{Q}b5\)± with White having the upper hand.

19.cxb6 axb6 20.\(\text{Q}b5\) \(\text{Q}d6\) 21.\(\text{Q}d1\)

In case of 21.\(\text{Q}a4\) \(\text{Q}d5\)=
Black’s knight occupies an important command post in the centre, and White will hardly be able to dislodge it from there, since his e- and c-pawns are already off the board. The line from the Mohr – Adler game, Bled 1992, 21...\textit{c}8 22.\textit{e}2 \textit{g}7 is not particularly dangerous for Black either, since he is in possession of two central open files, so the game was drawn shortly.

21...\textit{f}d8 22.\textit{x}d6 \textit{x}d6 23. \textit{f}3 \textit{c}6 24.\textit{b}4 h5 25.\textit{h}3 \textit{g}7=

This position occurred in the game Tolstikh – Kaimov, Cheljabinsk 1993. If Black plays accurately, he must hold the balance. The obvious plus for White – his pawn superiority on the queenside – is rather hard to convert, since the advance of the b-pawn is hampered by the fact, that the c3-knight has lost his footing and its retreat from that square will bring about the occupation of the important strategic d5-square by the black knight.

Let us revert to the position after 7.d4.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess-board.png}
\caption{7...\textit{c}xd4}
\end{figure}

Black ruptures White’s pawn chain. Otherwise, should Black face the risk of the d4–d5 advance, he can easily fall into an embarrassing situation. For example, after 7...0–0 8.d5 d6 9.e4 \textit{bd}7 (in case of 9...e5?! 10.\textit{d}xe6 \textit{fxe}6 11.\textit{g}5 \textit{e}7 White won a pawn by a practically forced line via 12.e5! \textit{xf}6 14.\textit{xf}6 \textit{g}5 15.\textit{xf}5 \textit{g}5 16.\textit{xd}6 \textit{f}5 17.\textit{ae}1 \textit{a}6 18.\textit{xe}6+ \textit{xe}6 19.\textit{xe}6± Junge – W.Schmidt, Germany 1990) 10.\textit{f}4 a6 11.\textit{a}4 \textit{e}8 12.\textit{d}2 \textit{c}7 13.\textit{f}e1 White’s position is significantly more unrestrained. The attempt to break away by 13...b5?! permitted White to gain a perceptible advantage by means of 14.\textit{axb}5 \textit{axb}5 15.\textit{xb}5 \textit{b}6 16.\textit{f}1 \textit{d}7 17.\textit{h}6 \textit{f}8 18.\textit{xf}7 \textit{xf}7 19.b4± Benko – Dimitrijevic, New York 1987. The standard swap 7...\textit{e}4 8.\textit{xe}4 \textit{xe}4 does not rid Black of all difficulties after 9.d5. Black’s attempt to disengage with the help of a pawn sacrifice 9...b5 by analogy with the Volga Gambit seems rather principled (White is assured of a firm advantage following both 9...e5 10.\textit{b}3 0–0 11.\textit{h}3 \textit{xf}3 12.\textit{xf}3 \textit{f}5 13.e4 \textit{f}4 14.\textit{d}1 d6 15.\textit{d}2± Karpov – Timman, Brussels 1986, and 9...0–0 10.\textit{h}3 \textit{xf}3 11.\textit{xf}3 e6 12.\textit{e}1 \textit{d}4 13.\textit{h}6± Korchnoi – Panno, Luzern 1985). In this case White can rely on an advantage proceeding 10.\textit{xb}5 (if the pawn sacrifice is declined 10.\textit{d}2, then after 10...\textit{xf}2 11.\textit{xf}2 bxc4
12.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xc4 d6 13.\( \text{\text{n}} \)c2 0–0 14.\( \text{\text{n}} \)d2 \( \text{\text{n}} \)d7 15.\( \text{\text{n}} \)c3 \( \text{\text{n}} \)b6 16.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xg7 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xg7 17.\( \text{\text{n}} \)e4 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xe4 18.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xc4 \( \text{\text{n}} \)b6 19.\( \text{\text{n}} \)c3+ \( \text{\text{n}} \)g8 20.f4 \( \text{\text{n}} \)ab8 21.b3 \( \text{\text{n}} \)b4 22.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xb4 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xb4= Black is at least not worse, Vovsha – Tsesaryski, Israel 1996) 10.cxb5 10...\( \text{\text{n}} \)b6 11.a4!? (if 11.\( \text{\text{n}} \)d2, then after 11...\( \text{\text{n}} \)xg2 12.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xg2 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xb5 13.\( \text{\text{n}} \)b3 \( \text{\text{n}} \)a6 14.\( \text{\text{n}} \)c4 d6= Renman – Ornest, Linkoping 1984, Black is doing all right) 11...a6 12.\( \text{\text{n}} \)b3! (with 12.bxa6 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xa6 13.\( \text{\text{n}} \)d2 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xg2 14.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xg2 0–0\( \text{\text{n}} \) there arises a Volga Gambit–style position, in which Black has full compensation for the pawn and, moreover, his game is rather straightforward) 12...axb5 and now 13.\( \text{\text{n}} \)e3! After 13...c4 (if 13...b4?, tactics comes to the rescue 14.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xc5! \( \text{\text{n}} \)xc5 15.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xc1–, as well as after 13...\( \text{\text{n}} \)a5 14.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xc5+-, if 13...e6 14.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xb5 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xb5 15.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xb5 \( \text{\text{n}} \)a1 16.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xa1 d6 17.dxe6 fxe6 18.\( \text{\text{n}} \)a7 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xb2 19.\( \text{\text{n}} \)g5 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xg2 20.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xg2+– Black’s situation is probably hopeless, and, finally, after 13...d6 14.axb5 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xa1 15.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xa1± or 13...0–0 14.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xb5 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xb5 15.axb5 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xa1 16.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xa1 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xd5 17.\( \text{\text{n}} \)d4 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xd4 18.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xd4 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xg2 19.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xg2± Black will hardly be able to hold his position in the endgame. White has a big advantage despite the material equilibrium, since none of the black pieces living is developed, and White’s b5–pawn can become rather dangerous.

8.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xd4

White prefers to take the pawn precisely with his queen, regardless of the fact that in the centre of the board it is liable to attack by the black pieces. In case of 8.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xd4 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xg2 9.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xg2 Black overcomes his opening difficulties by the help of 9...0–0 (it seems that Black deals with all his problems at once by 9...\( \text{\text{n}} \)c8 10.b3 \( \text{\text{n}} \)b7+) 11.f3 d5, however, after 12.cxd5 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xd5 13.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xd5 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xe3! \( \text{\text{n}} \)c6 15.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xc6 \( \text{\text{n}} \)xc6 16.\( \text{\text{n}} \)c1– as shown by the course of events in the games Polugaevsky – Spassky, Manila 1976 and Polugaevsky – Smyslov, Moscow 1976, Black did not manage to resolve entirely all problems, regardless of the symmetrical pawn structures and the significant simplification of the position) 10.e4 \( \text{\text{n}} \)c7 11.b3 (with the other continuations Black drives the white knight away from the d4–square, staging a strong squeeze on the c4 and e4–pawns, e.g., after 11.\( \text{\text{n}} \)d3 \( \text{\text{n}} \)a6 12.\( \text{\text{n}} \)c2 \( \text{\text{n}} \)ac8 13.\( \text{\text{n}} \)e3 \( \text{\text{n}} \)c5– the prospects are even, P.Horvath – L.Bronstein, Ribnicz 1979, and in case of 11.\( \text{\text{n}} \)e2 \( \text{\text{n}} \)c6 12.\( \text{\text{n}} \)c2 a6 13.\( \text{\text{n}} \)ed1 e6 14.b3 \( \text{\text{n}} \)b7 15.\( \text{\text{n}} \)b2 \( \text{\text{n}} \)d8 16.f3 d6 17.\( \text{\text{n}} \)e3 \( \text{\text{n}} \)e5 18.\( \text{\text{n}} \)d2 g5 19.\( \text{\text{n}} \)ad1 h5† C.Hansen – Aderjan, Gladstake 1983 Black even managed to intercept the initiative) 11...\( \text{\text{n}} \)xe4 12.\( \text{\text{n}} \)xe4 \( \text{\text{n}} \)e5
13.\textit{f}f3  \textit{x}xd4 14.\textit{b}b1 (one can meet occasionally 14.\textit{a}a3, but following 14...\textit{c}c6 15.\textit{a}ad1  \textit{a}e5 16.\textit{a}xd7  \textit{a}a5 17.\textit{x}xe7  \textit{b}e5 18.\textit{d}d1  \textit{a}xd7 19.\textit{x}xd7  \textit{a}xa2 20.\textit{x}xf8  \textit{a}xf8= Karpov – Kasparov, Moscow (m/13) 1984/85, Black is doing all right) 14...\textit{e}e5 15.\textit{f}f4 Kasparov – Karpov, Moscow (m/20) 1985, the adversaries agreed to a draw. According to the analysis of A. Adorjan Black, who is a pawn up for the exchange, has full compensation for the small material damage after 15...\textit{a}e6 16.\textit{d}f6+  \textit{x}xf6 17.\textit{a}xa8  \textit{c}c6 18.\textit{b}b7 g5!\textit{=} wherever the white bishop retreats, thanks to the weakness of the light squares around the white king.

After the take on d4 with the queen, we should consider three major continuations for Black: a) 8...\textit{c}c6, b) 8...0–0 and c) 8...\textit{d}d6.

\textbf{a) 8...\textit{c}c6}

Black immediately attacks the white queen with his knight, however the position of the knight is not quite appropriate, since it bars the way of his bishop.

\textbf{The best retreat for the white queen. In case of 9.\textit{h}h4, hoping to develop his dark-squared bishop on h6 after Black has castled, White must pay close attention to the move 9...h6!, since in view of the possibility g6–g5, the white queen begins to feel rather thorned.}

\textbf{9...\textit{c}c8}

After 9...\textit{a}a5 10.b3 (not uncommon is also 10.\textit{d}d2!?  \textit{c}c8 11.b3 d5 12.\textit{a}ad1 0–0 Vakhidov – Roeder, Calcutta 2000) 10...d5 11.\textit{a}d1  \textit{c}c8 12.\textit{a}a3 dxc4 13.\textit{b}b4 \textit{c}c6 14.\textit{x}xc4 a6 15.\textit{a}ac1 0–0 White proceeded 16.\textit{d}e5!  \textit{d}xe5 (impossible is 16...b5 because of 17.\textit{x}xc6 bxc4 18.\textit{d}xe7+-) 17.\textit{x}xc8  \textit{a}xc8 18.\textit{a}xa8  \textit{c}c4 and in the game Pugovcov – Roeder, Las Palmas 1996 the parties agreed to a draw, though following 19.\textit{b}b1\textsuperscript{±} perhaps Black does not have sufficient compensation for the exchange.

If 9...0–0, then White can afford to lose another tempo for the queen move 10.\textit{h}h4!  \textit{c}c8 and now execute what he had planned a move earlier via 11.\textit{h}h6!? (it is quite possible that even in case of 11.\textit{a}5 \textit{g}g8, which occurred in the game Damljanovic – Djuric, Bled 1991, White could have prevented the deterioration of his queenside pawn structure via 12.\textit{d}d2!\textsuperscript{±}, retaining some advantage). After 11...\textit{b}b8 12.b3 d6 13.\textit{a}ad1 \textit{c}c5 14.\textit{x}g7 \textit{w}xg7 15.\textit{d}d4 \textit{b}bd7 16.e4 a6 17.\textit{f}fe1 \textit{a}8, assuming the offensive by
means of 18.\( \mathcal{Q}a4 \)! \( \mathcal{A}a5 \) 19.\( \mathcal{Q}xb6 \) \( \mathcal{Q}xb6 \) 20.\( \mathcal{W}xb6 \) \( \mathcal{A}xa2 \) (the attempt to trap the white queen with the help of 20...\( \mathcal{A}c5 \))! 21.\( \mathcal{Q}d2 \) a5 will force Black to provide evidence of his compensation for the pawn given up after 22.b4! axb4 23.\( \mathcal{W}xb4 \) 21.\( \mathcal{A}d2 \) \( \mathcal{A}xd2 \) 22.\( \mathcal{Q}xd2 \)± Speelman – A.Greenfeld, Beer-Sheva 1987, White obtained a slight edge by upsetting Black's harmonious discipline on the queenside.

A continuation, which has recommended itself as rather reliable though somewhat passive, is 9...\( \mathcal{W}b8 \)!! Following 10.\( \mathcal{W}xb8 \) (avoiding the queen swap by means of 10.\( \mathcal{W}h4 \), followed by 10...h6 11.\( \mathcal{A}d5 \) \( \mathcal{W}d8 \) 12.\( \mathcal{A}f4 \) \( \mathcal{C}c8 \) 13.\( \mathcal{B}b1 \) e6 14.\( \mathcal{A}c3 \) 0–0 15.b3 d5 16.\( \mathcal{A}a3 \) \( \mathcal{E}e8 \) 17.\( \mathcal{A}bd1 \) a6± Vaganian – Ambroz, Germany 1994, brought about a position with mutual prospects, and with 10.\( \mathcal{A}d1 \) and 10...\( \mathcal{W}xf4 \) 11.\( \mathcal{A}xf4 \) \( \mathcal{A}h5 \) White will have to either retreat with his bishop to d2, or accept the eventual swap of the g7-bishop for the c3-knight, which visibly deteriorates White's queenside pawn structure) 10...\( \mathcal{X}xb8 \) 11.\( \mathcal{A}f4 \) d6 12.\( \mathcal{A}ac1 \) (covering up the c3-knight by his rook White prepares the retreat of his dark-squared bishop to e3 or g5, in case Black plays \( \mathcal{O}f6-h5 \)) 12...0–0 13.\( \mathcal{A}fd1 \) \( \mathcal{A}fd8 \) 14.b3 \( \mathcal{A}a8 \) 15.\( \mathcal{E}e1 \) a6 16.\( \mathcal{A}d3 \) \( \mathcal{A}d7 \) 17.\( \mathcal{D}d5 \) \( \mathcal{C}c5 \) 18.\( \mathcal{D}3b4 \) \( \mathcal{X}xb4 \) 19.\( \mathcal{X}xb4 \) \( \mathcal{A}xg2 \) 20.\( \mathcal{X}xg2 \) \( \mathcal{A}b7 \) 21.\( \mathcal{D}d5 \). This position occurred in the game Huzman – Marinkovic, Vrnjacka Banja 1991. Despite the fact that White has not achieved anything tangible, his position is outwardly more attractive, thanks to his certain spatial superiority.

10.\( \mathcal{A}d1 \) \( \mathcal{D}d6 \)

A highly hazardous line for Black is 10...\( \mathcal{A}a5 \) 11.b3 \( \mathcal{H}h5 \) (to 11...b5, which occurred in the game Derikum – Spassky, Germany 1985, there is 12.\( \mathcal{E}e5 \)! \( \mathcal{X}g2 \) 13.\( \mathcal{W}xg2 \) and to 13...bxc4 very strong is 14.\( \mathcal{X}xd7 \)±, else if 11...\( \mathcal{E}e4 \), then White gains the upper hand by means of 12.\( \mathcal{E}e5(\pm) \) 12.\( \mathcal{E}e3 \) b5 in view of 13.\( \mathcal{X}xb5 \) \( \mathcal{A}xa1 \) 14.\( \mathcal{D}d6+ \) \( \mathcal{A}f8 \) 15.\( \mathcal{A}xc8 \) \( \mathcal{A}xc8 \), since now 16.g4! (weaker is 16.\( \mathcal{X}xa7 \) \( \mathcal{A}c6 \) 17.\( \mathcal{A}a8 \) like in the game Prizmic – Danailov, Pleven 1985) 16...\( \mathcal{A}g7 \) 17.\( \mathcal{A}a3 \) \( \mathcal{A}f6 \) 18.g5± would have brought about a huge white advantage.

To the sharp 10...\( \mathcal{E}h5 \) there is 11.\( \mathcal{E}e3 \) (weaker is 11.\( \mathcal{W}d2 \) in view of 11...\( \mathcal{A}a5 \) 12.b3 b5∞) 11...\( \mathcal{B}b4 \) (weaker is 11...\( \mathcal{A}a5 \) 12.b3 b5 on account of 13.\( \mathcal{X}xb5 \) \( \mathcal{A}xa1 \) 14.\( \mathcal{D}d6+ \) \( \mathcal{A}f8 \) 15.\( \mathcal{A}xc8 \) and we are facing a position advantageous for White, which we met with discussing 10...\( \mathcal{A}a5 \)) 12.\( \mathcal{B}b1 \) \( \mathcal{A}xc4 \). Black has won a pawn, but the fact that he has somewhat delayed his castling permits White to follow through 13.\( \mathcal{E}e5 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe5 \) (after 13...\( \mathcal{A}c2 \) 14.\( \mathcal{W}d3 \) \( \mathcal{D}d4 \) 15.\( \mathcal{X}xc2 \) \( \mathcal{A}xd1+ \) 16.\( \mathcal{A}xd1 \) \( \mathcal{A}xg2 \) the fact that Black has not castled allows White to obtain some edge
via 17.\( \Box xf7! \) \( \Box xf7 \) 18.\( \Box b3+ e6 \)
19.\( \Box xg2 \pm \) 14.\( \Box xe5 \) f6 15.\( \Box b5 \)
\( \Box a6 \) 16.\( \Box a4 \) \( \Box c8 \) 17.\( \Box b3 \) \( \Box g7 \)
18.\( \Box d5 \) \( \Box c6 \) (in case of 18...\( \Box xd5 \))
19.\( \Box xd5 \) \( \Box c2 \) White also takes
advantage of the fact that Black has not castled and resolutely
grab the initiative by means of
20.\( \Box h6 \) to be followed by \( \Box b1 \uparrow \)
19.\( \Box a3 \) (weaker is 19.e4 in view of
19...\( \Box e6 \) 20.\( \Box e3 \) \( \Box f7 \) 21.\( \Box a3 \)
\( \Box c2 \) 22.\( \Box b1 \) \( \Box c1 \) 23.\( \Box xcl \) \( \Box b7 \)
which led to Black's advantage in
the game Panno - Ljubojevic,
Petropolis 1973) 19...\( \Box e6 \) 20.\( \Box e3 \)
\( \Box f7 \) 21.\( \Box d2 \) Makarov - Mikhailov,
Kemerovo 1995, and obtain
more than sufficient compensa-
tion for the missing pawn in
view of the extremely awkward
position of the black rook on c4.

To 10...0-0 one can possibly play
11.\( \Box b1 \)\( ? \) (after 11.\( \Box d2 \) \( \Box h5 \)
12.\( \Box h4 \) \( \Box a5 \) 13.\( \Box b3 \) f5 14.\( \Box ac1 \) \( \Box c6 \)
15.\( \Box d5 \) e6 16.\( \Box xd8 \) \( \Box fxd8 \) 17.\( \Box c3 \)
\( \Box f6 \) 18.\( \Box f4 \pm \) Kramnik - Benja-
min, New York (active) 1994,
White gained the upper hand,
though Black could have pro-
ceeded 11...\( \Box a5 \)\( ? \) 12.b3 d5\( \approx \) thus reducing the game to a position, similar to the above mentioned
game Vakhidov - Roeder, Cal-
cutta 2000, the only difference
being that the d1-square is
occupied not by the queenside
white rook, but by the kingside
one) 11...d6 12.b3 \( \Box b8 \) 13.\( \Box b2 \)
\( \Box bd7 \) 14.e4 a6. At this point,
taking advantage of the fact,
that Black has lost time on
manoeuvres with the knight
on the queenside, White broke
through in the centre by means of
15.e5!, and after 15...\( \Box xe5 \)
(15...\( \Box xf3 \) loses immediately
because of 16.exf6+-), and White's
prospects are higher following
15...\( \Box dxe5 \) 16.\( \Box xe5 \pm \) 16.\( \Box xe5 \)
\( \Box xg2 \) 17.\( \Box xg2 \) dxe5 (inaequate
is 17...\( \Box h5 \)\( ? \) 18.\( \Box e3 \) \( \Box xe5 \) in view
of 19.\( \Box d5 \pm \) with a big white
advantage) 18.\( \Box xe5 \) \( \Box c7 \) (18...
\( \Box e8 \)\( ? \) loses due to 19.\( \Box d5 \) \( \Box c6 \)
20.\( \Box g1 \)\( - \) 19.\( \Box xc7 \) \( \Box xc7 \) 20.\( \Box d3 \)
\( \Box d7 \) 21.\( \Box xd7 \) \( \Box xd7 \) 22.\( \Box d5 \pm \) the
game Speelman - Chandler,
Hastings 1987, arrived at an
endgame, which is slightly su-
perior for White.

11.b3

The most consistent continuation. Also occurring is 11.
\( \Box d2 \). After 11...0-0 12.\( \Box ac1 \) h6
13.b3 \( \Box d7 \) 14.\( \Box d5 \) \( \Box xd5 \) 15.cxd5
Ribli - Spassky, Montpellier
1985, Black should have agreed
to the position following 15...
\( \Box b8 \) 16.\( \Box d4 \) \( \Box c5 \)\( !? \), since with the
choice of Spassky 15...\( \Box e5 \)\( ? \),
White obtained the better of the
odds by way of 16.\( \Box xe5 \) dxe5
17.\( \Box h4 \) g5 18.\( \Box h5 \pm \).

11...\( \Box e4 \)??

By no means the strongest
continuation, but definitely the
most principled objection to
White's move eleven, following
which the game enters a phase
of huge tactical complications. In
case of 11...0-0 White emerges
with a lasting though slight
advantage after 12.\( \Box b2 \)\( ± \) Lahav
- Shvildler, Holon 1986.
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12. \( \text{Qxe4!} \)

White starts the decisive offensive with no regard for the material lost, since after 12. \( \text{Qxe4 Qxc3} \) the simplification of the position was entirely in Black's favour.

12... \( \text{Bxa1} \) 13. \( \text{Qa3 Qg7} \)

Black is faced with defeat both in case of 13... \( \text{Qe5} \) 14. \( \text{Qxe5 Qxe5} \) 15. \( \text{Qxd6+ exd6} \) 16. \( \text{Qxb7+} \) --, as well as after 13... \( \text{Qf6} \) 14. \( \text{Qxd6 exd6} \) 15. \( \text{Qxd6+ Qd7} \) 16. \( \text{Qh3+} \) --.

14. \( \text{Qf5 0-0} \)

Black seeks to take away the king from the centre and to the kingside. In case of 14... \( \text{Qe5} \) he is on for a complete wipe-out after 15. \( \text{Qxd6+ exd6} \) 16. \( \text{Qxb7 Qc7} \) 17. \( \text{Qxd6 Qd7} \) 18. \( \text{Qe6! fxe6} \) 19. \( \text{Qxe6+} \) --.

15. \( \text{Qxh7!} \)

Another sparkling blow breaking down Black's fortifications on the kingside.

15... \( \text{Qxh7} \) 16. \( \text{Qg5+ Qg8} \) 17. \( \text{Qh4 Qe8} \) 18. \( \text{Qh3!!} \)

A quiet but awfully destructive move. The major threat is 19. \( \text{Qh7+ Qf8} \) 20. \( \text{Qe6+ fxe6} \) 21. \( \text{Qxe6} \) with the unavoidable mate 22. \( \text{Qg8#} \).

18... \( \text{Qf8} \)

Black has no acceptable defence. Following 18... \( \text{Qe5} \) 19. \( \text{Qh7+ Qf8} \) 20. \( \text{Qe6+ fxe6} \) 21. \( \text{Qxe6 Qf7} \) 22. \( \text{Qb2+} \) -- White mates the black king, ditto after 18... \( \text{e6} \) 19. \( \text{Qxd6 Qe7} \) 20. \( \text{Qh7+ Qf8} \) 21. \( \text{Qd7+} \) -- or 18... \( \text{e5} \) 19. \( \text{Qxd6 Qe7} \) 20. \( \text{Qh7+ Qf8} \) 21. \( \text{Qf6!! Qd8} \) 22. \( \text{Qxf7+ Qxf7} \) 23. \( \text{Qe6#} \).

19. \( \text{Qe6+ Qg8} \)

To escape from the mate Black is forced to part with his queen.

20. \( \text{Qg5 Qf8} \) 21. \( \text{Qe6+ Qg8} \) 22. \( \text{Qxd8 Qxd8} \) 23. \( \text{Qg2+} \) --

Converting the extra queen in the game Ribli – Kouatly, Lucerne 1985, was a straightforward exercise in technical ability.

b) 8...0-0

Black exercises immediately his right to castle, though as we will see shortly even this natural move has its shortcomings.

9. \( \text{Qh4!} \)

Now that Black has castled the standard manoeuvre of the queen on h4, directed at the preparation of the entrance of White's dark-squared bishop onto the h6-square, considerably gains strength.
9...d6
   If 9...h5, then following 10. \textit{\textsc{g}}g5 d6, which occurred in the game Huebner – Bacrot, Berlin 1998, White has the superior 11.\textit{\textsc{h}}ad1!	extpm, pointed out by R. Huebner, with the idea to rush the knight onto the d5-square on the very next move.

10.\textit{\textsc{h}}h6
   The most consistent. In case of 10.\textit{\textsc{g}}g5, which occurred in the game Damljanovic – Petronic, Nis 1994, Black evens out after 10...\textit{\textsc{b}}bd7 with the idea a7–a6 to be followed by \textit{\textsc{c}}c8–c5=, ditto with 10.\textit{\textsc{e}}e3 \textit{\textsc{b}}bd7 11.\textit{\textsc{f}}fd1 \textit{\textsc{c}}c8 12.b3 \textit{\textsc{c}}c7 13.\textit{\textsc{g}}g5 \textit{\textsc{b}}b8 14.e4 a6 15.\textit{\textsc{d}}d4 e6 16.\textit{\textsc{h}}h6 \textit{\textsc{c}}c5=, which occurred in the game Bareev – Andersson, Polanica Zdroj 1997.

10...\textit{\textsc{b}}bd7 11.b3
   White will not be able to dispense with this move anyway, so there are good grounds to make it immediately. He need not be anxious about Black's play along the a1–h8 diagonal, since the black dark–squared bishop has already been practically neutralised. The other continuations for White are perhaps a little less precise, though it is entirely possible to employ them in the quest for superiority. Thus after 11.\textit{\textsc{f}}ad1 \textit{\textsc{c}}c8 12.b3 \textit{\textsc{c}}c5 13.\textit{\textsc{g}}g5 \textit{\textsc{x}}xg2 14.\textit{\textsc{x}}xg2 \textit{\textsc{h}}h5 15.\textit{\textsc{x}}xg7 \textit{\textsc{x}}xg7 16.\textit{\textsc{g}}ge4 \textit{\textsc{e}}e5 17.\textit{\textsc{d}}d5 \textit{\textsc{x}}xd5 18.\textit{\textsc{x}}xd5 e6 19.\textit{\textsc{x}}xd8 \textit{\textsc{x}}xd8 20.\textit{\textsc{e}}e3 \textit{\textsc{c}}c5= Salov – Mascarinas, Manila (izt) 1990, Black managed to obtain full–fledged play.

White’s superiority expectations will be more justified with 11.\textit{\textsc{f}}ac1, though here White will be forced all the same to counter 11...\textit{\textsc{c}}c8 by 12.b3 (there was a curious incident took place during the ultimate round of the year 2000 Polanica Zdroj tournament in the game Gelfand – Krasenkow, where White played 12.\textit{\textsc{f}}fd1?!, leaving in fact the c4–pawn unprotected, but Black did not rise up to the occasion and refrained from the exchange on h6 with the subsequent take on c4, in favour of 12...\textit{\textsc{c}}c7?! 12...\textit{\textsc{c}}c5 13.\textit{\textsc{g}}xg7 \textit{\textsc{g}}xg7 14.\textit{\textsc{f}}fd1 (the following line led eventually to huge complications: 14.\textit{\textsc{d}}d4 \textit{\textsc{a}}8 15.\textit{\textsc{f}}e1 \textit{\textsc{f}}c8 16.e4 \textit{\textsc{g}}g8 17.\textit{\textsc{c}}d1 b5 18.\textit{\textsc{x}}xb5 \textit{\textsc{x}}xe4 19.\textit{\textsc{e}}e3 \textit{\textsc{e}}e5= Andersson – Sjoberg, Malmo 1994) 14...\textit{\textsc{a}}8 15.\textit{\textsc{d}}d4 \textit{\textsc{f}}c8 16.\textit{\textsc{e}}e1 (a standard manoeuvre, the purpose of which is to enrol the kingside knight for the fight over the d5–square, we will meet this manoeuvre more than once below) 16...\textit{\textsc{g}}xg2 17.\textit{\textsc{x}}xg2 a6 18.\textit{\textsc{e}}e3= and in the game Akopian – Lesiege, Cappelle la Grande 1999, White’s spatial advantage and the reliable control of the d5–square make his play somewhat more preferable. The attempt to completely disengage by the queenside breakthrough 18...b5 permitted White to develop a dangerous attack on the black king by way of 19.\textit{\textsc{c}}d5! e5 20.\textit{\textsc{h}}h4 \textit{\textsc{x}}xd5 21.\textit{\textsc{x}}xd5 bxc4 22.\textit{\textsc{x}}xc4 \textit{\textsc{c}}c4 23.bxc4 \textit{\textsc{c}}c6 24.\textit{\textsc{e}}e7
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\[ \text{White to move:} \quad \text{\textcolor{red}{c4} 25.\textcolor{red}{xd6} \textcolor{green}{xc4} 26.\textcolor{red}{g5} f6} \\
\text{27.\textcolor{green}{f5} \Rightarrow.} \]

The move 11.\textcolor{green}{fd1}, followed by 11.\textcolor{blue}{c8} 12.\textcolor{blue}{xg7} \textcolor{blue}{xg7} 13.\textcolor{green}{b3} \textcolor{blue}{c5} or 13...a6, leads with minor move transposition to a position discussed below with the mainline move 11.b3.

11...\textcolor{green}{c8}

12.\textcolor{green}{fd1}

There is no need to rush the swap on g7. The immediate swap 12.\textcolor{blue}{xg7} \textcolor{blue}{xg7} 13.\textcolor{green}{d4} \textcolor{blue}{g8} 14.\textcolor{blue}{ac1} (planning \textcolor{blue}{c3–d5} should the opportunity arise, since the direct 14.\textcolor{green}{d5} provides Black with convenient play after 14...\textcolor{green}{xd5} 15.\textcolor{green}{cx5} \textcolor{blue}{c5} \textcolor{blue}{c5} 14...\textcolor{blue}{c5}! (in case of 14...\textcolor{blue}{c7} Black had to take into account the continuation 15.\textcolor{blue}{e3} \textcolor{blue}{e8} 16.\textcolor{green}{d5}, pointed out by M. Adams) 15.b4 (instead of the responsible advance b3–b4, which however weakens the c4-pawn, worth attention was 15.\textcolor{green}{fd1}! with the standard manoeuvre \textcolor{green}{f3–e1–g2–e3 in mind}) 15...\textcolor{blue}{c8} 16.a3 (16.\textcolor{green}{d5} \textcolor{green}{xd5} 17.\textcolor{green}{cxd5} \textcolor{green}{f6} means maintains a close equilibrium) 16...\textcolor{blue}{e8} 17.e4 \textcolor{blue}{c7∞} led in the Kramnik – Adams game, Biel 1993, to a position with mutual prospects. The further course of events in this game is rather instructive. After 18.\textcolor{red}{d5} \textcolor{blue}{b8}! (stronger than 18...\textcolor{green}{xd5} 19.exd5++, which permits White to exert pressure on the backward black e7-pawn) 19.\textcolor{red}{h3} \textcolor{blue}{cd8} 20.\textcolor{red}{d2} (worth attention was 20.a4!? with the idea a4–a5) 20...\textcolor{red}{a8} 21.\textcolor{red}{g2} a6 22.\textcolor{red}{b3} \textcolor{blue}{c8} 23.f4 \textcolor{blue}{cd8} 24.\textcolor{red}{h1} \textcolor{red}{h5}! (planning e7–e6) a careless 25.g4?! ran onto 25...\textcolor{red}{xf4}! and Black intercepted the initiative.

In case of the rather rare 12.\textcolor{red}{h3} Black probably should proceed by analogy with the mainline 12...\textcolor{blue}{c5}!?, since after 12...\textcolor{red}{xf3} 13.\textcolor{red}{xg7} \textcolor{red}{xg7} 14.exf3 \textcolor{blue}{c5} 15.\textcolor{red}{d4} \textcolor{red}{e5} 16.\textcolor{red}{g2}+ Vaulin – Habibi, Kecskemet 1992, White gained the upper hand.

12...\textcolor{blue}{c5}

After 12...\textcolor{red}{xf3} 13.\textcolor{red}{xf3} \textcolor{red}{e5} 14.\textcolor{red}{g2} \textcolor{red}{xh6} 15.\textcolor{red}{xh6} \textcolor{blue}{c5} 16.\textcolor{red}{d2} \textcolor{red}{e8} 17.\textcolor{blue}{ac1} h5 18.\textcolor{red}{h3} \textcolor{red}{h7} 19.f4± Co. Ionescu – V. Stoica, Romania 1996, Black emerged with a rather unpleasant position, since he does not have any active counterplay whatsoever.

In case of 12...a6 13.\textcolor{red}{xg7} \textcolor{red}{xg7} we arrive at a position, which with minor move transposition occurred in the Stefansson – Karason game, Iceland 1997. After 14.\textcolor{blue}{ac1} \textcolor{blue}{c5} 15.\textcolor{red}{e1} \textcolor{red}{xg2} 16.\textcolor{red}{xg2} b5 17.\textcolor{red}{d3} \textcolor{red}{a8}+ 18.\textcolor{red}{f3} \textcolor{red}{h5} 19.\textcolor{red}{d4} bx4 20.\textcolor{red}{xc4}± White retained his advantage.

13.\textcolor{red}{xg7} \textcolor{red}{xg7} 14.\textcolor{red}{d4} \textcolor{red}{a8}

Black intends to counter
White’s play by exerting pressure along the a8–h1 diagonal. Following 14...\(\text{g}8\) 15.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{x}g2\) 16.\(\text{g}xg2\) \(\text{e}5\) 17.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}8\) 18.\(\text{f}3\) White’s prospects are a little better, as shown by the course of events in the game Wojtkiewicz – Mascarinas, Manila 1991.

15.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{a}6\)

The swap 15...\(\text{x}g2\) draws the white knight closer to the e3-square and following 16.\(\text{g}xg2\) \(\text{g}8\) 17.\(\text{e}3\) a position emerges, similar to the one in the game Akopian – Lesiege, Cappelle la Grande 1999 (see note to White’s move eleven) after White’s move eighteen, with a small difference – White has not made the move \(\text{a}c1\), and Black – \(\text{b}c8\). Delaying the exchange also has its demerits.

16.\(\text{h}3\)!

Probably the most principled objection to Black delaying the swap of the light-squared bishops. Alongside this move there is also 16.e4, which permitted White to gain the upper hand after the excessively abrupt 16...b5?! by means of 17.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{c}c8\) 18.\(\text{xc}b5\) \(\text{axb5}\) 19.\(\text{b}4\) Ljubojevic – Rechlis, Manila (izt) 1990.

16...\(\text{c}6\)!

An ill-judged manoeuvre, though even with 16...\(\text{g}8\) 17.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{c}7\) 18.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}8\) 19.\(\text{f}4\) White is to be preferred.

17.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{h}5\) 18.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{c}5\) 19.\(\text{x}d7\) \(\text{x}d7\) 20.\(\text{fd}5\) \(\text{e}5\) 21.\(\text{h}4\)

White has a tangible advantage, as shown by the game Dizdarevic – Rajkovic, Ptuj 1991.

c) 8...\(\text{d}6\)

Black takes his time with the castling, so as not to permit White to execute the standard manoeuvre \(\text{d}4\)–\(h4\). At the same time, he prepares the development of his b8-knight to the d7-square, where he will not bar the important a8–h1 diagonal of his light-squared bishop.

9.\(\text{d}1\)

After 9.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{bd}7\) 10.\(\text{ac}1\) (10.\(\text{fd}1\)!! is more precise and following 10...\(\text{c}8\) 11.\(\text{ac}1\) 0–0 leads to a position, discussed in the mainline text of variation b3) 10...0–0 11.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{c}8\) (the immediate swap of a pair of knights 11...\(\text{e}4\) 12.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{xe}4\) 13.\(\text{fd}1\) \(\text{c}7\) is weaker, since after the typical bishop manoeuvre 14.\(\text{h}3\)! \(\text{ab}8\) 15.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{a}8\) 16.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{b}7\) 17.\(\text{f}3\) a6 18.\(\text{c}3\) Korchnoi – Seirawan, Zagreb (izt) 1987, it provided White with a small advantage) 12.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{c}5\) 13.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{fe}4\) 14.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{xe}4\) 15.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 16.\(\text{x}g7\) \(\text{x}g7\) 17.\(\text{fd}1\) \(\text{c}7\) 18.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{x}g2\) 19.\(\text{x}g2\) \(\text{d}7\) = Kin-
dermann – Ftacnik, Biel 1988, Black evened the odds as a result of the simplifications (among these we have to single out the swap of a pair of bishops).

In case of 9.b3 and the sequel 9...\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{b}}}_{6}d7\) 10.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{b}}}_{2}b2 0-0\) 11.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{d}}}_{5}d5\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{8}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{a}}}_{c1}\) Black has at his disposal the strong reply 12...\(b5!\), which occurred in the game Mohring – M. Gurevich, Balatonbereny 1987. White’s best bet in this case is 13.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{e}}}_{x}a7\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{d}d5\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{c}d5\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{5}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{f}f6\) (bad is 15.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{a}}}_{3}\) in view of 15...\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{a}}}_{8}a8\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{b}}}_{4}b4\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{d}d5\)\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{f}}}_{5}\)\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{f}}}_{5}\)) 15...
\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{f}f6\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{a}}}_{3}a3\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{a}}}_{8}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{b}}}_{4}b4\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{a}a2\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{b}xb5\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{b}b8=\).

To 9.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{h}}}_{4}\) Black has a strong reply – 10...\(h6!\), which prevents \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}c1}}-\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{h}6}}\). However we will discuss this in more detail in the note to White’s move ten.

9...\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{b}}}_{6}d7\)

In case of 9...0–0 White has the standard manoeuvre 10.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{h}}}_{4}!\), which after 10...\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{b}}}_{6}d7\) 11.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{h}}}_{6}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{8}\) 12.b3 reduces the game to variation b.

10.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{3}\)

Probably the strongest. White crosses out all hopes of a swap of the dark–squared bishops via the \(h6\)–square and simply completes his development. Should White get down immediately to the plan with the swap of the dark–squared bishops by means of 10.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{h}}}_{4}\), then he will tumble onto 10...\(h6!\) and the white queen on \(h4\) begins to feel rather uncomfortable. After 11.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{e}}}_{3}\) (in case of 11.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{e}}}_{1}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{8}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{b}b7\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{b}b7\) 13.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{e}}}_{3}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{8}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{a}}}_{c1}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{5}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{d}}}_{4}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{h}h5\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{g}}}_{4}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{h}}}_{f}f6\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{d}}}_{4}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{h}h5=\), which occurred in the game Korchnoi – Gulko, Hastings 1988, White’s best line was to accept the repetition of the position, and with 11.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{d}}}_{4}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{g}xg2\) 12.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{xg2}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{8}\) 13.b3 \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}c5}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{d}}}_{3}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{8}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{d}}}_{4}\) 0–0 16.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{d}}}_{2}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{f}}}_{5}\)\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{f}}}_{5}\)\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{f}}}_{5}\)\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{f}}}_{5}\) Maslov – Solozhenkin, Leningrad 1990, Black even obtained superior odds) 11...\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{8}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{a}}}_{c1}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{5}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{d}}}_{4}\) 0–0 14.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{d}}}_{3}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{x}f3\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{e}}}_{3}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}c5}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{e}}}_{2}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{c4}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{d}}}_{4}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{e}}}_{5}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{b}}}_{5}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{d}}}_{7}\) 19.b3 \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{b}b5=\) Kramnik – Nikolic, Monte Carlo (blindfold) 1999, a draw was agreed upon, though White still had to prove that he had sufficient compensation for the missing pawn.

There has been also 10.b3 0–0 11.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{b}}}_{2}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{8}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{a}}}_{c1}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{a}6}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{e}}}_{2}\) (after 13.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{e}}}_{3}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{e}}}_{8}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{a}}}_{1}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{5}\) 15.a4 \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{a}}}_{8}!\) = Black relatively easily managed to hold the balance in the Karpov – Kasparov game, London/Leningrad (m/23) 1986, which decided the fate of the chess crown in the re-match) 13...\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{7}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{e}}}_{1}\) and at this point according to V.Kramnik the strongest continuation was 14...
\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{a}}}_{8}!\) (the swap 14...\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{xg2}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{x}}}_{xg2}\) speeded up the transfer of the white knight to \(e3\) and thus permitted White to gain a light advantage following 15...\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{a}}}_{8}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{e}}}_{3}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{e}}}_{8}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}d}}_{5}\) \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{c}}}_{6}\) 18.a4 \(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{b}}}_{7}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{d}}}_{4}\) Kramnik – J. Polgar, Dos Hermanas 1999) 15.\(\text{\textit{\texttwiddle{d}}}_{5}\) (possibly J.Polgar was scared
away by 15.\(\text{\textit{h}}3\)!, though even here 15...\(\text{\textit{c}}5\)∞, to be followed by the knight penetrating to e4 or, if necessary, \(\text{\textit{b}}7\)–c8, led to a position with counter chances for Black) 15...\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{xd}5\) 16.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{xd}5\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{c}8\)–=. 10...\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}8\) 11.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{ac}1\) 0–0 12.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}4\) a6

In case of 12...\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}8\) 13.b3 a6 there is 14.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}6\)! (after 14.g4?! Black obtained counterplay by means of 14...b5! 15.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{xb}5\) \(\text{\textit{x}}\text{g}4\) 16.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4\) \(\text{\textit{g}}\text{f}6\) 17.a4 \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}5\) 18.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{xa}6\) \(\text{\textit{x}}\text{xa}6\) Filippov – Nikolic, Neum 2000, and in the game Kramnik – Karpov, Monte Carlo (blindfold) 1994, there was 14.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}3\) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}7\) 15.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}6\), which will be considered in more detail shortly in the note to White’s mainline move fourteen) 14...\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}8\) (with 14...\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}5\) 15.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{g}7\) \(\text{\textit{x}}\text{g}7\) 16.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4\) \(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}8\) 17.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}1\) the emerging position is similar to the already mentioned game Akopian – Lesiege, Cappelle la Grande 1999 in variation b, the only difference being that White has arrived with his bishop at h6 in two moves, instead of one, and Black in his turn has lost time on the not entirely useful move \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}8\)–e8) 15.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}3\) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}5\) 16.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}5\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}8\) 17.e4 \(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}7\) 18.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}5\)± Tratar – Iljin, Ljubljana 1997, and White obtained superior play.

13.b3

The immediate swap of the light–squared bishops by 13.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}1\) led after 13...\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{g}2\) 14.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{g}2\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}8\) 15.b3 \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}7\) 16.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}5\) \(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}7\) 17.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3\) b5 18.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}5\) (probably better is 18.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}6\)= or 18.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{d}5\)=) 18...\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{c}4\) 19.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{xc}4\) \(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}5\)∞ Kramnik – Kasparov, London (m/14) 2000, to a position with mutual chances.

13...\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}7\)

Inappropriate is 13...\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}5\)!, which hampers the swap of the dark–squared bishops, but weakens Black’s kingside, in view of 14.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}5\) b5 15.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{xb}5\) axb5 16.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}4\) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}6\) 17.e4 \(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}6\) 18.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4\)± with a perceptible white edge, Gavrikov – Christiansen, Switzerland 1996.

14.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}1\)?

White gets nothing by 14.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}5\) because of 14...\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{d}5\) 15.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{d}5\) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}1\) 16.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{c}1\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}6\)=. Following 14.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}6\) \(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}8\) 15.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}7\) \(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}7\) 16.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4\) very strong is 16...b5! (less precise is 16...\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}8\) in view of 17.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}8\) 18.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}3\) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}5\) 19.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4\) \(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}5\). At this point in the game Yermolinsky – Ehvest, USA 2000 there was 20.g4?!± and the black rook on the fifth rank begins to feel rather uncomfortable, since 20...\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}5\)? is not available due to 21.g5+=, though there is 16.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}8\) 17.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3\) \(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}8\) 18.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{i}1\) \(\text{\textit{x}}\text{g}2\) 19.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}2\) b5 20.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{xb}5\) axb5 21.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}5\) \(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}1\) 22.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{c}1\) \(\text{\textit{x}}\text{c}1\)+ 23.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}1\) \(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}2\)= Schippel – Kiss, Finken-
stein 2000) 17.cxb5 axb5 18.\(\Boxxb5\) 
\(\Boxxc1\) 19.\(\Boxxc1\) \(\Boxxa2=\) with a completely even position, Topalov – Kramnik, Wijk aan Zee (blitz) 1999.

There have been also tests of the brusque 14.g4?! However after Black’s excellent objection 14...h6! (weaker is 14...a8 in view of V.Kramnik’s 15.g5 \(\Boxe4\) 16.d5 \(\Boxxd5\) 17.\(\Boxxd5\) e6 18.\(\Boxdd1=\) with a tangible white advantage, and after 14...h5 15.h3= White stands better, ditto with 14...e8 15.g5 \(\Boxh5\) 16.d5 c8 17.d4↑) 15.h3 g5 16.g3 b5 17.h4 (loses 17.cxb5?? because of 17...\(\Boxxc3=\), and in case of 17.\(\Boxd4\) \(\Boxxg2\) 18.\(\Boxxg2\) bxc4 19.\(\Boxd6\) e8 20.bxc4= the chances are mutual) 17...bxc4 (with 17...gxh4 18.\(\Boxxh4\) \(\Boxxg2\) 19.\(\Boxxg2\) bxc4 20.\(\Boxf5\) White has good attacking prospects – V.Kramnik’s analysis) 18.hxg5 hxg5 19.b4= Kramnik – Karpov, Dos Hermanas 1999, the chances of the parties were mutual.

One has tested 14.\(\Boxh3=\) more than once. However, after 14...\(\Boxe8\) (probably weaker is 14...\(\Boxb8\), directed at the arrangements for the b6–b5 breakthrough, in view of 15.\(\Boxh6=\), which allowed White to gain the upper hand after 15...\(\Boxxf3\) 16.\(\Boxxg7\) \(\Boxxg7\) 17.exf3 \(\Boxe5\) 18.\(\Boxg2\) b5 19.cxb5 axb5 20.\(\Boxb4=\) Topalov – Psakhis, Las Vegas (m/1) 1999, due first and foremost to the weakness of the black b5–pawn) 15.\(\Boxh6\) c5 (the attempt to spoil White’s pawn structure by means of 15...\(\Boxxf3\) is insufficient to completely even the odds, and leads to white advantage after 16.exf3 c5 17.\(\Boxxg7\) \(\Boxxg7\) 18.\(\Boxd4\) h5 19.\(\Boxa4\) e5 20.\(\Boxg2\) a5 21.f4 \(\Boxed7\) 22.\(\Boxc3=\) Wojtkiewicz – Palkovi, Stara Zagora 1990, and White’s chances are also better with 15...h8 16.\(\Boxg5\) \(\Boxf8\) 17.d5 \(\Boxxd5\) 18.cxd5 b5 19.\(\Boxf4=\) Serebrov – Iznin, Kherson 1990) 16.\(\Boxxg7\) (following 16.\(\Boxg5\) the odds are even thanks to 16...b5! 17.d5 \(\Boxxd5\) 18.cxd5 \(\Boxxc1\) 19.\(\Boxxc1\) \(\Boxxb6\) 20.\(\Boxxh6\) \(\Boxf8\) 21.b4 \(\Boxb6\) 22.\(\Boxd1\) a5= Arsovic – Almasi, Budapest 1991) 16...\(\Boxxg7\) 17.\(\Boxd4\) g8 18.b4 \(\Boxc7\) 19.\(\Boxd5\) \(\Boxxd5\) 20.cxd5 \(\Boxf6\) 21.e4 b5 22.\(\Boxe3\) \(\Boxc8\) 23.\(\Boxxc7\) \(\Boxxc7\) 24.\(\Boxc1\) \(\Boxb8\) 25.\(\Boxg2\) \(\Boxd7=\) White’s slight board–room superiority is very hard to convert to anything tangible, Kramnik – Karpov, Monte Carlo (blindfold) 1994.

14...\(\Boxxg2\)

After 14...\(\Boxa8\) one has to take into consideration 15.\(\Boxh3=\).

15.\(\Boxxg2\) \(\Boxe8\) 16.\(\Boxf4\) \(\Boxb8\) 17.\(\Boxfd5\) \(\Boxcc8\) 18.\(\Boxg5\) \(\Boxb7\)

The breakthrough 18...b5?!, followed by 19.cxb5 axb5 20.\(\Boxb4\) c5 21.\(\Boxe3\) \(\Boxxd5\) 22.\(\Boxxd5\) e6 23.\(\Boxc3=\) provides White with the edge in view of the strong pressure on the b5–pawn.

19.\(\Boxa4\)

Very interesting is 19.\(\Boxd3\), which provided White an advantage after 19...\(\Boxe5=\) 20.\(\Boxxf6!\) \(\Boxxf6\) (insufficient is 20...\(\Boxxd3\) in
view of 21.\textit{\texttt{A}}xg7 \textit{\texttt{B}}xc1 22.\textit{\texttt{A}}h6± and White obtains three pieces for his pair of rooks) 21.\textit{\texttt{A}}dd1\textit{\texttt{F}}ilippov – Janssen, Golden Sands 2000. However, in case of 19... \textit{\texttt{B}}b5!? 20.cxb5 (to 20.\textit{\texttt{A}}e3 Black finds a very strong objection – 20...\textit{\texttt{B}}h6!, since after 21.\textit{\texttt{A}}xh6 \textit{\texttt{A}}xh6 22.\textit{\texttt{B}}xh6 \textit{\texttt{B}}g4+ Black gains the upper hand) 20...axb5 21.\textit{\texttt{B}}b4! (if 21.\textit{\texttt{B}}cd1, then 21...\textit{\texttt{B}}b4!=) 21...\textit{\texttt{A}}xd5 22.\textit{\texttt{A}}xd5 \textit{\texttt{B}}xc1+ 23.\textit{\texttt{A}}c1 \textit{\texttt{B}}c5 24.\textit{\texttt{A}}d1∞ the situation is not so clear.

19...\textit{\texttt{B}}h8

Black plans to swap the knights on the d5–square and follow through with e7–e6.

20.g4!?

White's strategy relies on the manoeuvre \textit{\texttt{A}}d3–h3

20...\textit{\texttt{A}}xd5 21.\textit{\texttt{A}}xd5 e6 22.\textit{\texttt{B}}f6 \textit{\texttt{B}}xf6 23.\textit{\texttt{A}}xf6 d5

At this point of the game Illescas Cordoba – Gelfand, Pamplona 2000 White could have bolstered up his dwindling initiative by means of 24.g5! dxc4 25.\textit{\texttt{A}}xc4 (weaker is 25.\textit{\texttt{B}}h6 in view of 25...\textit{\texttt{A}}xf6 26.gxf6 \textit{\texttt{B}}g8∞) 25...\textit{\texttt{A}}xc4 26.\textit{\texttt{B}}c4↑ (an analysis of M. Illescas).
Part 4. Rare Variations
1.e4 e5 2.c4 c5

Black is waiting for his opponent to display some activity, and first of all it concerns the advance d2-d4. However, at an opportune moment he can play actively in the centre himself: d7-d5. Some continuations of the English Opening which are regarded in this book are similar to certain lines from the Nimzo-Indian Defence, the Gruenfeld Defence, the Catalan Opening and also of the Queen’s Gambit, which is an indirect evidence of the complexity of mutual problems here.

3.\(\text{\#c3}\)

Of course, this natural move is White’s main argument in his struggle for an advantage, yet, to complete the picture, we shall consider briefly what happens if White makes any of two other planned moves, 1) 3.d4 or 2) 3.g3.

1) 3.d4

This continuation is very popular. White delivers a blow at the centre at once. This move was seen many times in Vladimir Kramnik’s games, but... only when he played Black! So we can learn how he struggles against this sound but untimely move.

3...\(\text{\#xd4}\) 4.\(\text{\#xd4}\) e6

So White is first to break in the centre, and thus he gains temporarily a slight advantage in space, yet he has accomplished this break not at the best possible moment. The point is that Black can now move his dark-squared bishop to \(b4\) and \(c5\) at any moment, thus disturbing White’s pieces seriously. This is possible now since Black’s \(c5\)-pawn has left the board, and his bishop is not blocked up any more, and also it has no other responsibilities. If Black had played \(g7-g6\) in advance, then he would not have wished to develop the bishop anywhere but to the a1-h8 diagonal. Now that White is simply unable to castle quickly, the appearance of Black’s bishop on \(b4\) and \(c4\) is especially unpleasant.
for him. So we come to the conclusion that White’s third move d2-d4 has nothing in common with the strategy suggested by his first move  \( \text{g}1-f3 \), namely that of restricting Black’s play in the centre. The fact that White’s knight has not come yet to c3 is a sort of excuse for his play since there is no immediate threat of a pin-up which is possible in the Nimzo-Indian Defence (1.d4 \( d \)6 2.c4 e6 3.d3 c \( b \)4), but White still has to move the knight to c3 sooner or later. Otherwise Black can deliver the counterblow of d7-d5. By the way, note that an immediate 4...d5 is to White’s favour because after 5.cx \( d \)5 \( x \)d5 (in case of 5... \( x \)xd5 6.d3 Black has to waste time for the queen’s retreat) 6.e4 \( d \)7 (if Black does not cover the square \( b \)5, then after 6... \( d \)6 7.\( b \)5+ \( d \)7 8.\( x \)d7 \( b \)xd7 9.d3 e5 10.\( d \)5!\( d \)5 11.\( x \)d8+ \( x \)d8 12.\( c \)5! White’s initiative develops of itself as the game Sotnikov – Shinkevich, Moscow 1995 showed) 7.\( b \)4 \( e \)6 8.\( b \)5+ \( c \)6 9.\( x \)xe6 \( x \)d1+ 10.\( x \)d1 \( x \)e6 11.\( x \)c6+ bxc6 12.\( d \)g6 13.\( e \)e5 f6 14.\( c \)c3! Timman – Miles, Bugojno 1986, Black, despite his pair of bishops, has an unpleasant and disadvantageous endgame because of his pawn weaknesses on the queenside. If our assumption is that in the position shown on the diagram White should try to decrease the efficiency of Black’s break d7-d5 and find a way not to move his knight on c3 prior to castling, then we can suppose that he will have to go g2-g3 very soon to reinforce his position in the centre with the bishop’s development to g2 and to prepare castling. This circumstance makes even such a paradoxical move as 4...a6!? possible in the featured position. The point is that now in case of 5.g3 there is 5...d5! 6.\( g \)2 e5, and Black takes the centre, whereas after 5...d3 Black gains by 5...e6. This peculiar scenario happened in game seven of the match Kasparov–Kramnik, held in 2000 by Brain-games. Below we shall refer again to that game, continued by 6.g3 \( c \)7.

5.g3

An experiment of 5.\( b \)5?! after 5...d5! 6.cx \( d \)5 a6 7.\( c \)5c3 exd5 8.\( c \)3 e3 \( c \)6 9.d4 \( x \)d4 10.\( x \)d4 \( c \)7! 11.e3 \( c \)5 12.a4+ encounters a fierce opposition of 12...b5! 13.\( x \)b5+ axb5 14.\( x \)a8 0-0–, and in the game Korchnoi – A.Greenfeld, Biel 1986, White resigned on the 23rd move because he almost allowed a checkmate while trying to set his queen free.

Now in case of 5.d3 White’s life is not all roses as well. Apart from 5...a6 which after 6.g3 \( c \)7 steers into the line from the game Kasparov – Kramnik, London (m/7) 2000, with a slightly different order of moves only, White has to reckon with such a serious argument as 5...\( b \)4. A long tour-
nament practice showed that if White tries to avoid creation of pawn weaknesses on the queenside by the active 6...\(\text{c}d5\) (the humble 6...\(\text{c}d2\) after 6...0-0 7.a3 \(\text{c}e7\) 8.e4 (hoping to build the hedgehog) allowed Black to deliver an unexpected blow by 8...d5! 9.cxd5 and then 9...\(\text{c}xe4!!\) which after the forced exchanges 10. \(\text{c}xe4\) \(\text{xd}5\) 11.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{xd}4\) 12.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{e}5\) 13.\(\text{c}d4\) \(\text{g}4\) 14.\(\text{c}e5\) in the game Hess – Hardicsay, Budapest 1986 resulted in a very promising position for Black, whose advantage could be still more emphasized by 14...\(\text{e}8\)!; on the other hand, after 6.g3 0-0 a position from the Nimzo-Indian Defence appears, quite acceptable for Black but lying beyond the scope of the present book), then after 6...d5! 7.cxd5 (the move 7...\(f4\) is like a blank shot since Black has 7...0-0!, and now 8.\(\text{c}7\)? is bad because of 8...\(\text{h}5\), whereas in case of 8.a3 there is 8...\(\text{c}3+\) 9.\(\text{xc}3\) d4 10.\(\text{b}1\) e5! 11.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{f}5\) 12.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{c}6\), and Black’s strong centre and development advantage outweigh White’s pair of bishops, T. Olafsson – A. Karason, Iceland 1974) 7...exd5 8.\(\text{g}5\) 0-0 9.a3 \(\text{c}3+\) 10.\(\text{xc}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 11.e3 (after 11.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 12.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{d}4\)! Black has a fair compensation for the pawn) 11...\(\text{e}6\) 12.\(\text{d}3\) h6 13.\(\text{xf}6\) (in case of 13...\(\text{h}4\) d4 14.\(\text{e}4\) g5 15.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{xe}4\) 16.\(\text{xe}4\) dxe3 17. fxe3= White’s pair of bishops is neutralised by the defects of his

pawn structure and a slight underdevelopment) 13...\(\text{xf}6\) 14.0-0 \(\text{ad}8=\) Mi\’es – Furman, Bad Lauterberg 1977, and Black’s chances are no worse than White’s, at the least, as his isolated d5-pawn is no weakness since White is unable to block it up safely on d4.

5...\(\text{c}7\)

In the diagrammed position there are several continuations possible, promising a decent counterplay to Black. However, this very opportunity distinguishes by two reasons. First, it complies very well with the variation, chosen by Vladimir Kramnik in game seven of the above mentioned match against Kasparov, and, second, since White develops his light-squared bishop to the long diagonal, it looks absolutely consistent to demonstrate that, as soon as the f1-bishop comes to g2, White’s c4-pawn is going to lose one of its potential protectors. Also Kramnik played 5...\(\text{b}4\) for Black more than once.

The sly move 5...\(\text{b}6\)! has many adherents. Its idea is that
after 6...\texttt{g}2 Black plays 6...\texttt{c}5, putting a strong pressure along the a7-g1 diagonal and provoking the ugly 7.e3. After 7...\texttt{c}6 any retreat of White's d4-knight provides a good play to Black since the c1-h6 diagonal is temporarily blocked for White's dark-squared bishop, and the weakening of the d3-square, combined with the weakness of the c4-pawn, may tell on White's well-being very soon.

Also the sharp opportunity of 5...d5 6...\texttt{g}2 e5 should be mentioned, to be classified as a junction of the English and Catalan Openings. Black can maintain the equality after any retreat of White's knight, even though his e-pawn has come to e5 in two moves instead of one, like in the line 4...a6!? 5.g3 d5! 6...\texttt{g}2 e5.

6...\texttt{c}3

It looks as if White can support the c4-pawn in various ways, but each of them is seriously deficient in a certain aspect. Let's consider the obvious 6.b3 first. After 6...\texttt{b}4+ 7...\texttt{d}2 \texttt{c}5 8...\texttt{c}3 (it's better for White to refrain from the active 8...\texttt{b}5? because after 8...\texttt{c}6 9...\texttt{f}4 0-0 10...\texttt{g}1 \texttt{e}4 11.e3 \texttt{b}4+ 12...\texttt{e}2 \texttt{a}6 13...\texttt{g}2 d5 14...\texttt{xe}4 dxe4 15...\texttt{c}3 e5 --- in the game Lindinger – Kuehn, Hamburg 1994, he had to stop the clocks as soon as after the 15th move; now in case of 8.e3 there is 8...b6!, and after 9...\texttt{b}5 \texttt{b}7! 10...\texttt{g}1 a6 11...\texttt{g}2 \texttt{c}6 12...\texttt{d}4 d5 13...\texttt{c}3 \texttt{d}7 14...\texttt{d}2 \texttt{xd}4 15...\texttt{exd}4 in the game Korchnoi – Shaked, Cannes 1998, Black gained better chances by 15...\texttt{d}6!?) 8...\texttt{e}4 White is forced to part with his dark-squared bishop, thus making Black's life much easier: so, after 9...\texttt{g}2 \texttt{xc}3 10...\texttt{xc}3 \texttt{e}5 11.e3 \texttt{c}6 12...\texttt{de}2 0-0 13.0-0 a6 14.a3 \texttt{e}7 15.b4 \texttt{c}7 16...\texttt{b}3 a5 17.c5 axb4 18.axb4 \texttt{xa}1 19...\texttt{xa}1 b6 – an equality was maintained in the game Karpov – Mascarinas, Thessaloniki (ol) 1988.

In case of 6...\texttt{d}2 White's d2-knight can't already influence the centre of the board strongly, and after 6...b6 7...\texttt{g}2 \texttt{b}7 8...\texttt{b}5 \texttt{c}8 9.e4 (the bishop exchange 9...\texttt{xb}7 \texttt{xb}7 is absolutely harmless for Black, and after 10...\texttt{f}3 \texttt{e}4 11.0-0 a6 12...\texttt{c}3 \texttt{xc}3 13...\texttt{xc}3 \texttt{c}5 14...\texttt{d}3 0-0 15...\texttt{e}3 \texttt{xe}3 16...\texttt{xe}3 d5 17...\texttt{xd}5 ...exd5 18...\texttt{fd}1 \texttt{d}7= Black equalises, Nogueiras – Van der Wiel, Reggio Emilia 1986) 9...a6 10...\texttt{c}3 d6 11.0-0 \texttt{e}7 12.b3 0-0 13...\texttt{b}2 \texttt{bd}7 14...\texttt{e}2 Black gains a favourable hedgehog-type position, mentioned in Part 2 many a time. In the game Gomez Luesia – S.Kovacevic, Zaragoza 1998, Black found an excellent way of profiting from the passive position of White's d2-knight by 14...\texttt{a}7?? 15...\texttt{ac}1 \texttt{a}8 16...\texttt{fd}1 \texttt{c}8 17...\texttt{f}1 \texttt{c}5 18...\texttt{f}3 \texttt{c}6! 19...\texttt{e}3 \texttt{b}8 20...\texttt{d}2 \texttt{ac}7 21...\texttt{cd}1 b5= with a promising counterplay.
In case of 6...\textbf{d}3 Black has 6...a6 7.\textbf{g}2 (if 7.\textbf{c}3, then after 7...\textbf{c}6 a position from the same seventh game of the Kasparov vs. Kramnik match appears which will be regarded in detail below) 7...\textbf{c}6 8.\textbf{xc}6 (if 8.b3, then the easiest way to equalize is 8...e5 9.b2 c5 10.e3 \textbf{xd}4 11.\textbf{xd}4 \textbf{xd}4 12.\textbf{xd}4 \textbf{xd}4 13.\textbf{xd}4 b8 14.\textbf{c}3 b6=) 8...\textbf{xc}6 9.0-0 \textbf{e}7 10.b3 e5 11.\textbf{c}3 \textbf{d}7 12.\textbf{c}3 \textbf{c}5= with an equality, F.Olafsson – Karpov, Buenos Aires 1980.

If 6.\textbf{a}4, then 6...b6!? 7.\textbf{g}2 \textbf{b}7 is possible, and after the careless 8.0-0 in the game Sadiku – F.Levin, Berlin 1995, Black gained a position from the Queen’s Indian Defence by 8.\textbf{x}g2. 9.\textbf{x}g2 \textbf{e}7 (it occurs in the Queen’s Indian after 1.d4 \textbf{f}6 2.c4 e6 3.\textbf{f}3 b6 4.g3 \textbf{a}6 5.\textbf{a}4 \textbf{b}7 6.\textbf{g}2 c5 7.0-0 \textbf{xd}4 8.\textbf{xd}4 \textbf{x}g2 9.\textbf{x}g2 \textbf{c}7), but with an extra tempo.

A pawn sacrifice by 6.\textbf{g}2?! has no sense since after 8...\textbf{xc}4 7.0-0 \textbf{c}6 8.\textbf{xc}6 (no better is 8.\textbf{c}2 because of 8...d5 9.e1 \textbf{e}7 10.\textbf{f}1 \textbf{c}5 11.a3 0-0 12.b4 \textbf{d}6 13.b2 e5\textsuperscript{+} L.Hansen – C.Hansen, Copenhagen 1995) 8...\textbf{bxc}6 9.e1 \textbf{c}7 10.\textbf{f}4 d5 11.\textbf{c}1 \textbf{a}6 12.e4 0-0\textsuperscript{+} Valveny – Marin, Benasque 1996, Black actually wastes a whole tempo in comparison to the positions to be considered below in which he does not play a7-a6.

6...a6!

A necessary prophylactic. In case of an incautious 6...\textbf{xc}4 White gains a fair compensation for the pawn by 7.e4! \textbf{b}4 (7...\textbf{c}7 8.\textbf{f}4\textsuperscript{=} 8.a3 \textbf{b}6 9.\textbf{e}3\textsuperscript{=}.

7.\textbf{g}2?! As a matter of fact, White is forced to part with the pawn now because after 7.\textbf{d}3 \textbf{c}6 he has to go for a considerable positional concession to his opponent by 8.\textbf{xc}6 (in case of 8.b3 there is 8...e5 9.d2 d5, and White can’t play 10.\textbf{xd}5? because of 10...\textbf{b}4\textsuperscript{+}), and after the most natural 8...\textbf{xc}6 9.\textbf{g}2 e5 10.0-0 \textbf{e}6 in the game Kasparov – Kramnik, London (m/7) 2000 White played 11.\textbf{a}4 and proposed a draw which was accepted. Having forced White to go for the knight exchange on c6, Black has no more problems, which was demonstrated also by the game Sapis – Ivanchuk, Lvov 1988, where instead of 11.\textbf{a}4 White chose 11.\textbf{e}4, and after 11...\textbf{xe}4 12.\textbf{xe}4 g6 13.\textbf{e}3 f5 14.\textbf{g}2 \textbf{g}7 15.\textbf{c}5 e4 16.\textbf{e}3 \textbf{f}7= the Ukrainian grandmaster even tried to play for a win despite the approximate equality.
on the board.

Sometimes White sacrifices
the c4-pawn by 7...g5?! \!xc4
8.\!c1, but after 8...\!c6 9.\!b3 (in case of 9.\!c5 9.\!b4+ 10.\!d2 after
10...axb5 11.\!xb4 \!xb4+ 12.\!c3
\!xa2 Black is well compensated
for the queen, and after the
careless 13.\!b3?! Black won by
13...\!a1+ 14.\!d2 \!e4+ 15.\!e3
\!xc3 16.\!xc6 8d5+ 17.\!f3 bxc6
18.e4 c5 in the game Gauglitz –
Teske, Stralsund 1988) 9...\!e4
10.\!g2 \!xg5 11.h4 \!g4 12.hxg5
\!xg5+ he failed to get any
compensation in the game Komarov
– Aseev, St.Petersburg 1997.

7...\!xc4 8.\!f4

The same position with a
transposed order of moves occurs
in case of 8.0-0 because after
8...\!c6 White has nothing better
than 9.\!b3 \!c7 10.\!f4 or 9.\!xc6
bxc6 10.\!f4. Now in case of
8...g5 \!c6 9.\!b3?! (perhaps
White is relatively better in the
line 9.\!xc6 dxc6 10.\!xf6 gxf6
11.0-0 \!e7 12.\!c1 \!b4 13.\!d2 0-0
14.\!fd1? where he gained
certain initiative in the game
Ligterink – Friedgood, London
1980, which partially compens-
sated him for the missing pawn)
9...\!b4 10.0-0 \!xc3 11.bxc3 \!e4
12.\!d2 \!xd2 13.\!xd2 d5 14.e4
dx4 15.\!e1 f5 16.\!d6 h6 17.\!f4
\!d5 18.\!a3 \!a5 19.\!d6 \!f7+
White had no sufficient compensa-
tion for the sacrificed material
in the game Lautier -Ljubojevic,
Monte Carlo (blindfold) 1995.

8...\!c6
This position occurred in the game Lesieie – Sagalchik, Montreal 1995, and, White is compensated for the missing pawn here despite the queen exchange, but that's all.

2) 3.g3

Vladimir Kramnik applied this continuation three times in 2000, but had no great success with it. Generally speaking, this line puts many questions, but it is still necessary to mention it to make the picture comprehensive.

3...d5

Black delivers a preventive blow in the centre without waiting for White to complete the development of his kingside and play d2-d4. Other, less pretentious continuations, usually steer into different systems. So the position after 3...c6 4.c3 is regarded in Part 5. After 3...b6 4.g2 we come upon a position, discussed in Part 3. In case of 3...e6 4.g2 d5 5.cxd5 exd5 (after 5...exd5 6.0-0 c6 7.d4 e7 8.dxc5 xc5 9.a3 a variation of the Catalan Opening occurs in which White feels very comfortable) 6.d4 the game is transposed into the Tarrasch Variation from the queen's Gambit to be considered in detail in Volume three of the present series.

4.cxd5

White temporarily yields the centre to Black, hoping to develop pressure upon the unsteady position of the d5-knight along the long diagonal instead.

If White does not want Black to occupy the centre, he can go for the sharp 4.d4. This line may continue by 4...dx c4 (the other possible capture 4...cxd4!? is also fundamental, because in this case Black responds to the gambit-like 5.g2 by 5...a5!? 6.bd2, and now there is no 6...c6!? 7.0-0 e5 8.b3 d8 9.cxd5 cxd5 because of 10.xe5 db4 11.xc6 xc6 12.xc6 bxc6 13.xd4 xd4 14.xd4+ which gained a great advantage to Black in the game Topalov – Shirov, Monte Carlo (active) 1999, whereas after 6...dx c4! 7.xd4 e5 White finds it difficult to demonstrate any compensation for the pawn as the game Calotescu – Wang Yu, Yerevan 2000, showed) 5.a4+ d7 (if 5...c6, then Black has to reckon with 6.dxc5+). 6.xc4 c6 7.dxc5 (Vladimir Kramnik tried 7.g2 as well, and gained a slight advantage after 7...cxd4 8.0-0 d5 9.a3 a6 10.d1 e6 11.d4 xc4 12.xc4 c5 13.d1 db7 14.f4 0-0 15.ac1 ac8 16.d6 xd6 17.xd6± in the game Kramnik – Leko,
Frankfurt (active) 2000, but Black also could play 7...e6! 8.dxc5 .bd7 9..c3 0d5 10..b4, thus transposing the game into a well known variation of the Catalan Opening in which he equalizes by 10...a5! after any retreat of White's queen) 7...d5! (after this move it's difficult to find a proper base for the white queen) 8.a4+ c6 (continuing with the plan, started by the previous move, otherwise after 8...bd7 9..c3 c6 10..c4 White's chances grow higher) 9..c4 d5 10..c2 e6 (Black also can afford 10...e4 11..d2? bd7 12..c3 c6 13.b4 a5 14.b5 xf3 15.exf3 xc5 16..c4= with mutual chances) 11.g2 e4! (11...bd7 is weaker because of 12..c3 c6 13.b4 a5 14.b5 xf3 15.exf3 xc5 16.0-0, as well as 11...a5+ because of 12..c3 xc5 13.0-0± with a slight advantage to White in both cases) 12.c4 (in case of 12..d2 after 12...xc5 13..d8+ xd8 14..c3 c6 15.0-0 bd7= the chances of both sides are approximately equal) 12...d5 13..h4 (White can get this position sooner if he plays a4-h4 on the 10th) 13..c5 14..c3 c6 15.0-0 (15..g5?! makes no harm since after 15...bd7 there is no 16.xg7? because of 16..g8 17..h6 xf2+) and now in the game Kramnik – Kasparov, Linares 2000 the easiest way to keep up the balance for Black was 15...bd7! 16..d1 b6 17.e3 e7=.

4...xd5 5.g2

An immediate 5.d4 after 5...cxd4 6..xd4 e5 (6...g6 is weaker because of 7..g2 e6 8..c3! xc3 9.bxc3 d7 10.0-0 g7 11..a3 b6 12..b5 Van Parrenen – Luft, Biel 1991; also 6..b4 can't be recommended because of 7..a4+ xc6 8..xc6 xc6 9..g2 d7 10.0-0 g6 11..c3 g7 12..c3 0-0 13..fd1± Krogius – I.Farago, Genua 1989, White is standing better in both lines) produces a position in which the active 7..b5 (a more solid move 7..c2!? after 7...c6 8..g2 e6 9.0-0 e7 10..e3 xe3 11..xe3 0-0 12..c3 allowed Black to equalize by 12...a5! 13..d5 fd8= in the game Kholmov – Borisenko, Kiev 1954) can be parried by 7...b4+!? 8..d2 a6!, and White's best choice now is to agree to an equal position after 9..c5 c6=, because in case of 9..xb4?! xb4 10..d6+ e7 11..xc8+ xc8 12..c3 d8 13..b3 c4! 14..c1 xb3 15.axb3 xc6 16..g2 a5 17..a4 ac8 18.0-0 xc1 19..xc1 d2± he encounters great problems as the game Burger – Arnason, Brighton 1981, showed.

5..c6 6.d4

White can't linger with this move any more, or he fails to make it at all. Vladimir Kramnik defended successfully the position after 6..c3 many times. Black's most safe continuation in this line is 6...g6 (there is also
quite a popular line 6...\( \diamond c7 \) 7.d3 e5 8.0-0 \( \diamond e7 \), transposing the game into the Rubinstein system in the English Opening, which occurred, for example, in the game Ljubojevic – Kramnik, Monte Carlo (active) 1999) 7.0-0 (if White plays 7.\( \diamond g5 \) then Black will equalize by 7...\( \diamond b6 \) 8.d3 \( \diamond g7 \) 9.0-0 0-0 10.\( \diamond e4 \) c4 11.dxc4 \( \diamond xc4 \) 12.b3 \( \diamond d6= \) Solonar – M. Ivanov, Baunatal 1999 ) 7...\( \diamond g7 \) 8.\( \diamond xd5 \) (the continuation 8.\( \diamond a4 \) \( \diamond b6 \) 9.\( \diamond b5 \) was tested in the game Kasparov – Kramnik, London (m/5) 2000, where after 9...\( \diamond d7 \) 10.d3 0-0 11.\( \diamond e3 \) \( \diamond d4 \) 12.\( \diamond xd4 \) \( \diamond xd4 \) 13.\( \diamond e4 \) \( \diamond b6 \) 14.a4 a6= Black kept up the balance with a little help from his opponent; the sharp move 9...c4!? is more popular in this line) \( \diamond xd5 \) 9.d3 0-0 10.\( \diamond e3 \) and now Black simplifies accurately and draws after 10...\( \diamond d7 \)! 11.\( \diamond d4 \) \( \diamond d6 \) 12.\( \diamond xc6 \) \( \diamond xc6 \) 13.\( \diamond xc6 \) \( \diamond xc6 \) 14.\( \diamond c1 \) \( \diamond e6 \) 15.\( \diamond xc5 \) (the play is equal also after 15.\( \diamond xc5 \) b6 16.\( \diamond a3 \) \( \diamond xa2 \) 17.\( \diamond d2 \) \( \diamond fc8= \) Geller – Suba, Sochi 1977) 15...\( \diamond xa2 \) 16.\( \diamond b5 \) \( \diamond a6 \)! (a gambit continuation is possible: 16...a6!? 17.\( \diamond xb7 \) \( \diamond ab8= \), but no 16...b6 because of 17.\( \diamond a1 \) \( \diamond xa1 \) 18.\( \diamond xa1 \) \( \diamond fb8 \) 19.\( \diamond a6 \) \( \diamond f8 \) 20.\( \diamond b4 \) \( \diamond e5 \) 21.\( \diamond ba4= \), this way White gained a great positional advantage in the ending in the game Karpov – Ribli, Amsterdam 1980) 17.\( \diamond b3 \) b6=. This position was seen many times in the practice. It was estimated as equal on the basis of the analysis of the games Ribli – Timman, Tilburg 1980, and Andersson – Smejkal, Moscow 1981, and for the last twenty years this conclusion has not been reappraised.

6...cxd4

The move 6...\( \diamond f6 \)? is known as a super safe continuation here. If White tries to win a pawn by 7.\( \diamond a4 \) \( \diamond d7 \) 8.dxc5, then after 8...e5 9.\( \diamond c4 \) \( \diamond e6 \) 10.\( \diamond a4 \) \( \diamond d7 \) 11.\( \diamond c4 \) \( \diamond e6 \) 12.\( \diamond a4 \) \( \diamond d7 \) he either should draw by repetition of the position or part with the pawn, Robatsch – Mikhalchishin, Trnava 1988.

7.\( \diamond xd4 \) \( \diamond db4 \) 8.\( \diamond xc6 \) \( \diamond xd1+ \)

No middlegame, the game proceeds to an ending immediately.

9.\( \diamond xd1 \) \( \diamond xc6 \)

10.\( \diamond c3 \)

There is also a well known continuation of 10.\( \diamond xc6+ \) bxc6 in which White allows his opponent to have a pair of bishops, hoping to gain profit from the defects of his queenside pawn structure. After 11.\( \diamond e3 \) (11.\( \diamond c3 \) is considered less accurate because of 11...g6!? 12.\( \diamond e3 \) \( \diamond g7 \) 13.\( \diamond c1 \) \( \diamond e6 \)
14.b3 \(\text{\textbf{bc}3} \) 15.\(\text{\textbf{xc}3 a5} \) 16.a4 0-0 17.\(\text{\textbf{c}2 \text{\textbf{fb}8} \text{\textbf{b}2} \text{\textbf{b}7} = \text{Black}} \) had an absolutely safe position in the game Smyslov – Huebner, Velden (m/8) 1983) 11...e5 12.\(\text{\textbf{c}3} \) a position occurs which has been analysed deeply after Ulf Andersson won a game in it. The easiest way to equalize here is 12...\(\text{\textbf{b}4} \) (the game Andersson – Stean, Sao Paulo 1979, provided a classical pattern of White’s play for a win here: after 12...h5 13.h4 \(\text{\textbf{b}4} \) 14.\(\text{\textbf{d}2} \) e7 15.\(\text{\textbf{hc}1} \) d8+ 16.\(\text{\textbf{e}1} \) e6 17.a3 \(\text{\textbf{xc}3+} \) 18.\(\text{\textbf{xc}3} \) d5 19.b4 \(\text{\textbf{db}8} \) 20.d2! \(\text{\textbf{e}6} \) 21.c5! \(\text{\textbf{b}5} \) 22.cc1 f6 23.a4 \(\text{\textbf{b}7} \) 24.cc5 \(\text{\textbf{g}8} \) White played 25.f3!, creating the threat of e2-e4, and after the incalculable 25...f5?! 26.f2 \(\text{\textbf{d}8} \) 27.c3 and 27...e4 White’s rooks came to the a-file through c5 and created irresistible threats to the a7-pawn) 13.\(\text{\textbf{d}2} \) 0-0 14.\(\text{\textbf{hc}1} \) e6 15.a3 e7 16.a4 \(\text{\textbf{fb}8} \) 17.e1 d5 18.b4, and now Black played 18...a5!, and after certain complications he equalized the play in the game Andersson – Timman, Niksic 1983, not waiting for White to fix his queenside weaknesses: 19.\(\text{\textbf{b}6} \) axb4 20.\(\text{\textbf{x}a}8 \) b3 21.b6 b2 22.cb1 bx1 23.\(\text{\textbf{xa}1} \) e6 =.

10...d7 11.e3 0-0-0

After 11...g6 12.cc1 \(\text{\textbf{g}7} \) 13.f4 0-0 14.e1 e5 15.f2 exf4 16.gxf4

\(\text{\textbf{e}6} \) 17.b3 \(\text{\textbf{ad}8} = \text{Andersson – Leko, Ter Apel 1996, or 11...e5} \) 12.cc1 0-0 13.cc2 \(\text{\textbf{f}5} + 14.\text{\textbf{e}4} \) xe4+ 15.e xe4 e7 16.h1 xd1 17.xd1 d8 18.xd8+ xd8 19.b3 d7 20.c4 e6 = Andersson – De la Villa Garcia, Szirak (izt) 1987, Black keeps up as well.

12.e1

After 12.cc1 g6 13.cc1 \(\text{\textbf{g}7} \) 14.xc6 xc6 15.xa7 xc3 16.bxc3 xd1+ 17.xd1 d8+ 18.e1 \(\text{\textbf{d}5} \) the game Milos – Morovic Fernandez, Santiago 1989 was drawn; also in case of 12.cc2 e5 13.ad1 d4+ 14.b1 = there was an equal position in the game Kengis – Hegeler, Gausdal 1991.

12...e5 13.cc1 b8 14.f4 f5 15.fxe5 xe5 16.f4 e8 17.ed1 ec6 18.xc6 bxc6 19.d7

In the game Kramnik – Kasparov, Frankfurt (active) 2000 Black got rid of the binding by the simple tactical blow 19...g5! = and thus solved all his problems.
Black is at the crossroads. The development system, connected with 3...\( \text{c6} \) 4.g3, is regarded below in Part 5. After 3...e6 4.g3 in case of 4...b6 the play is reduced to hedgehog positions, examined in Part 3, whereas after 4...d5 5.cxd5 exd5 6.d4 the Tarrasch Defence from the Queen’s Gambit occurs to be dealt with in Book 4. Now if Black plays 3...g6, then after 4.e4 \( \text{c6} \) 5.d4 cxd4 6.\( \text{cxd4} \) we have typical positions of the Maroczy Variation, that we will examine in Book 3.

As for the present chapter, it is devoted to Black’s opportunities after a) 3...\( \text{b6} \) and b) 3...d5.

a) 3...\( \text{b6} \)

Black wants to get a hedgehog structure like in positions, con-

dered in Part 3, but White’s knight on c3 can influence the interpretation of this position considerably.

4.e4!

Making use of the knight’s position on c3, White grabs space in the centre of the board immediately. Also a more refrained 4.g3 is possible, and then a hedgehog structure appears in case of 5...e6 or a double fianchetto system in case of 5...g6 6.0-0 \( \text{g7} \) (this is how the game Kramnik – Benjamin, New York (active) 1994 developed, ref. to Chapter 14). Sometimes Black applies this order of moves if he wants to avoid Ulf Andersson’s boring plan (ref. to chapter 14, the note to White’s sixth move) with the symmetrical arrangement of forces, in which White tries to move his dark-squared bishop to the a1-h8 diagonal as soon as possible. In this case after 6.b3?! Black has a very strong response of 6...d5!, and after 7.cxd5 \( \text{g7} \) 8.\( \text{b2} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 9.0-0 \( \text{c6} \) 10.\( \text{b1} \) \( \text{c7} \) 11.\( \text{a4} \) \( \text{xb2} \) 12.\( \text{xb2} \) \( \text{b8} \) = he stands no worse, at the least, Andersson –
Korchnoi, Sao Paulo 1979.

It should be mentioned also that after 4.g3 Black's attempts to avoid the hedgehog structure or the double fianchetto don't promise any good to him. So, after 5...e5 White gained an advantage by 6.0-0 d6 7.d3 c8 8.g5 xg2 9.xg2 c6+ 10.g1 h6 11.ge4 h5 12.f4 h4 13.xf6+ gxf6 14.d5± in the game Eliskases – Richter, Bad Harzburg 1938. Now if Black chooses 5...d5, then after 6.e5 e6 7.cxd5 exd5 (no 7.xd5? because of 8.a4+ d7 9.xd5, and the best thing for Black is to agree to lose the pawn after 9...xd5 10.xd5 exd5 11.c6 c8 12.xd5++ , because an incautious 9...exd5? loses his game immediately after 10.Bh3+–) 8.d4 h6 9.f4 bd7 10.0-0 e7 11.dxc5 xc5 12.b4 e6 13.a4+ f8 14.ad1± he encounters serious problems, De Vreugt – Azadmanesh, Utrecht 1999.

4...d6

Black must be very accurate. After the natural 4...b7 5.e5 he may get into trouble very soon since the knight has no good place to retreat to. So, 5...e4? is losing immediately because of the unexpected 6.b1+–, and Black can't defend against the threat to catch his e4-knight by d2-d3.

In case of 5...g8 White's best response is the brave 6.d4! (the play was very complex after 6.d3 xf3 7.xf3 c6 8.g3 g6 9.f4 g7, followed by 10...d6 in the game Quinteros – Dzindziashvili, Lone Pine 1980). After 6...xf3 (better than 6...cxd4 7.xd4 xf3 8.gxf3 c6 9.e4 g6 10.f4 h6 11.0-0 xf4+ 12.xf4 b8 13.d2 c8 14.f3 Dh6 15.h3 0-0 16.hg1± as White gains a great space advantage now simply for nothing, Korchnoi – Andruet Royan 1988) 7.xf3 c6, and now the pawn sacrifice 8.d5! (things get quite confused in case of 8.dxc5 bxc5 9.e4 g6 10.d3 g7 11.f4 f5 12.e3 d6 13.c2 c4 14.a4+ e8 15.0-0 h6 16.exd6 xd6± as Black has a counterplay owing to the strong position of his knight on d4, even though he can't castle, Portisch – Quinteros, Mar del Plata 1981) 8..xe5 9.e2 d6 10.f4 d7 11.g4 g6 12.h4 h6 13.h3 g7 14.g5 a6 15.d2± brings an excellent compensation to White, Djuric – Marinkovic, Svetozarevo 1990.

In case of the other retreat 5...g4 after 6.h3 g6 Black's knight is forced to occupy a rather poor position on the side of the board. By the same 7.d4! White presents great problems to his opponent. After 7...cxd4 (in the line 7...xf3 8.xf3 c6 9.dxc5 b8 10.cxb6 axb6 11.e4 e6 in the game Mestel – Ftacnik, Hastings 1983 White could have gained a considerable advantage by 12.xh6! gxh6 13.f4± as well) 7...cxd4 8.xd4 c6 (the problems stay in case of 8...g6 because of 9.d5 g7 10.g5! g8
11.\textit{\partial}b5 \textit{\partial}xe5 12.f4\pm Dorfman – Garcia Gonzales, Cienfuegos 1988) 9.\textit{\partial}f3 g6 10.\textit{\partial}d3!? (there is also a nice opportunity of 10.\textit{\partial}f4 \textit{\partial}f5 11.\textit{\partial}d2 \textit{\partial}c8 12.\textit{\partial}e2 \textit{\partial}g7 13.\textit{\partial}d1 \textit{\partial}a5 14.b3 \textit{\partial}xf3 15.\textit{\partial}xf3 \textit{\partial}c6 16.\textit{\partial}xc6 dxc6 17.\textit{\partial}e2 \textit{\partial}c7 18.0-0 0-0 19.g4!±, gaining a perceptible space advantage to White, Gheorghiu – Panno, Sao Paulo 1979) 10...\textit{\partial}g7 11.\textit{\partial}f4 \textit{\partial}c8 12.\textit{\partial}e4 \textit{\partial}g8 (12...0-0? is losing because of 13.\textit{\partial}e2 d5 14.g4\mp, and after 12...f6 13.exf6 exf6 14.\textit{\partial}d5± White stands much better) 13.0-0 f6 (no 13...f5 14.\textit{\partial}d5 e6? because of 15.\textit{\partial}b5! exd5 16.\textit{\partial}d6\mp) 14.\textit{\partial}e1 fxe5 15.\textit{\partial}xe5 \textit{\partial}f6?! (Black should have gone for the position after 15...\textit{\partial}xe5 16.\textit{\partial}xe5 \textit{\partial}f6±) 16.\textit{\partial}xc6 \textit{\partial}xc6 (after 16...\textit{\partial}xc6 17.\textit{\partial}d5 e6 18.\textit{\partial}d4 \textit{\partial}xc4 19.\textit{\partial}xf6+ \textit{\partial}xf6 White gained the decisive advantage by 20.\textit{\partial}xe6! dxe6 21.\textit{\partial}xd8+ \textit{\partial}xd8 22.\textit{\partial}xh8\mp) 17.\textit{\partial}d6! e6 18.\textit{\partial}g5 \textit{\partial}h6 (18...h6? is losing owing to 19.\textit{\partial}e3!\mp) 19.h4 \textit{\partial}xg5 20.hxg5± because of the disastrous weakness of dark squares, creating hard problems for Black, I. Sokolov – Alterman, Tilburg 1994.

5.d4 \textit{\partial}xd4 6.\textit{\partial}xd4 \textit{\partial}b7

7.\textit{\partial}e2!? A sharp plan which often results in castling queenside. The alternative way of development is 7.f3 e6 8.\textit{\partial}e3 \textit{\partial}e7 9.\textit{\partial}e2 0-0 10.0-0 \textit{\partial}bd7 11.\textit{\partial}d2 a6 12.\textit{\partial}fd1\mp with a position, similar to a line from the Scheveningen Variation of the Sicilian Defence (1.e4 c5 2.\textit{\partial}f3 e6 3.d4 \textit{\partial}xd4 4.\textit{\partial}xd4 \textit{\partial}c6 5.\textit{\partial}b5 d6 6.c4 \textit{\partial}f6 7.\textit{\partial}c3 a6 8.\textit{\partial}a3 \textit{\partial}e7 9.\textit{\partial}e2 0-0 10.0-0 b6 11.\textit{\partial}e3 \textit{\partial}b7) in which each side gains certain achievements: Black brings the knight from b8 to d7, and White's knight comes to the centre at once, without visiting the side file.

7...\textit{\partial}c6

If White's position in the centre does not make Black worry and he chooses the quiet 7...e6, then White can afford to display some activity on the kingside by 8.g4!? (as a result of the serene continuation 8.g3 \textit{\partial}c6 9.\textit{\partial}xc6 \textit{\partial}xc6 10.\textit{\partial}g2 \textit{\partial}c7 11.0-0 \textit{\partial}d7 12.\textit{\partial}e1 \textit{\partial}b7 13.e5 \textit{\partial}xg2 14.exd6 \textit{\partial}xd6 15.\textit{\partial}xg2 0-0 16.\textit{\partial}d1 \textit{\partial}e7 17.\textit{\partial}f4 \textit{\partial}c8 18.\textit{\partial}d6 \textit{\partial}e8 19.\textit{\partial}xe7 \textit{\partial}xe7 20.\textit{\partial}d6 \textit{\partial}b7\mp 21.\textit{\partial}e4 \textit{\partial}e5= simplifications followed, and the game was drawn very soon, Kramnik – Adams, Groningen 1993) 8...h6 9.h4 a6 10.\textit{\partial}g2 g6 11.f4 \textit{\partial}c7. Now White has 12.f5!, provoking the advance 12...e5 to weaken Black's position in the centre, and after 13.\textit{\partial}c2 \textit{\partial}bd7 14.\textit{\partial}e3 \textit{\partial}c5 15.b4 \textit{\partial}cd7 16.fxg6 fxg6 17.0-0\pm White's advantage was maintained owing.
to his safe control over the d5-square in the game Kramnik – Vasquez, Villarobledo (active) 1998.

8.\(\text{\textit{xc}}\text{c}6 \text{\textit{xc}}\text{c}6 9.\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}5!\)

White not only develops his dark-squared bishop, preparing to castle queenside, but also he manages to upset the co-ordination of Black's pieces to some extent.

9...\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}7

In case of 9...h6 White can continue by 10.\text{\textit{xf}}\text{f}6 gxf6 11.0-0-0 e6 12.\text{\textit{h}}\text{b}1 \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}7 (in case of 12...\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}7 Black has to reckon with the possibility of 13.\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}5! \text{\textit{d}}\text{d}8 14.\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}4\pm) 13.\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}4 \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}7 14.\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}3 0-0-0 15.\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}5!\pm, and Black encounters certain problems, concerning a safe defence of the e6-pawn. By the way, White's last move is possible only after the exchange of Black's knights, otherwise one of them would have certainly tried to come to the excellent stand on e5 in the centre of the board. As for the position after f4-f5, according to Vladimir Kramnik, it's very difficult for Black to find a happy solution to the problem of the e6-pawn here, and in case of the natural 15...\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}8 16.fxe6 fxe6 17.\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}3 \text{\textit{d}}\text{d}7 18.\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}5 it only can grow more serious since White need not avoid an exchange of Black's light-squared bishop for his b5-knight.

10.0-0-0 h6

After 10...\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}8 11.\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}1 \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}5 12.f3 a5 13.\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}4 \text{\textit{b}}\text{b}7 14.\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}5 h6 15.\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}4 e6 16.\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}2\pm Black en-

11.\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3

The alternative retreat of the bishop 11.\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}4 is not as good because of 11...g5 12.\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}3 \text{\textit{g}}\text{g}7\infty.

11...e6 12.\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4!

White does not let Black complete the development of his kingside pieces without making certain concessions in the centre. 12.f4 is weaker because of 12...\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}7, and Black develops without any obstacles.

12...e5 13.\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3 \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}7 14.\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}1 0-0 15.\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}3

Fixing the central e4-pawn for the reasons of prophylactics. White's alternative here is 15.\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}4!?, covering the g5-square, and in case of the incautious 15...a6?! White launches an attack on the kingside by 16.g4→, making use of the far advanced position of Black's h-pawn. However, it's better for Black to play 15...\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}5\pm, attacking White's e4-pawn at once.

15...a6 16.\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}5!

Now that Black loosened his control over the b6-square, the knight's jump into the centre of the board is even stronger.

16...\text{\textit{xd}}\text{d}5

Black does not want to bear White's knight any longer and parts with his own defender of the strategically important d5-square.

17.\text{\textit{xd}}\text{d}5

The other capture 17.cxd5 is
less promising because of 17...\textit{Ag5}! (Black can’t linger with this move since after 17...b5 18.g3± the appearance of Black’s bishop on g5 is not as good already because of the possibility of f3-f4) 18.f2 (in case of 18.g3 after 18...\textit{Ax}e3 19.\textit{W}xe3 a5 20.b5 \textit{Cc}5± Black gets rid of his bad dark-squared bishop and establishes an outpost on c5) 18.h5 19.h4 \textit{h}xh6± Black’s bishop occupies the strategically important c1-h6 diagonal safely, covering c1, the base square for White’s rooks since the c-file is the only open file on the board so far.

17...\textit{Cc}7 18.g3 \textit{Af}6

This position occurred in the game Kramnik – Adams, Tilburg 1997, and the easiest way for White to maintain his obvious advantage was 19.\textit{Ad}1!±.

b) 3...d5

A fundamental move. Black performs the planned advance at once, allowing White to be relatively free as regards his further actions in the centre.

4.cxd5 \textit{Qxd}5 5.d4

Sometimes White plays 5.e4 when he does not want to yield the centre. But after 5...\textit{Qb}4 (in case of 5...\textit{Qxc}3 6.dxc3! \textit{W}xd1+ 7.\textit{W}xd1± Black’s defence is not easy despite the symmetry of the position, because Black’s c5-pawn blocks up the f8-bishop, and if Black covers the d5-square by e7-e6 later, then his c8-bishop may remain unemployed in the own camp as well) White either should agree to the weakness of the d4-square after 6.\textit{Cc}4 \textit{Dd}3+ 7.\textit{We}2 \textit{Df}4+ 8.\textit{Qf}1 \textit{Dd}6 or go for tactical complications at the cost of a pawn and with no result after 6.\textit{Bb}5+ \textit{Cc}6 7.d4 cxd4 8.a3 dxc3 9.\textit{W}xd8+ \textit{Dxd}8 10. axb4 cxb4 11.\textit{Bxb}2 e6 12.0-0 as the game Lautier – Kasparov, Tilburg 1997 showed. As a result of the strong move 12...\textit{Dd}7! (capturing one more pawn by 12...\textit{Dxb}4?! is too dangerous for Black because after 13.\textit{Af}d1+! \textit{Cc}7 14.\textit{Qxc}6 bxc6 15.\textit{Dx}g7 \textit{Dg}8 16.\textit{Dc}5+ \textit{Df}6 White has 19.\textit{Dxc}5+! \textit{Dxc}5 20.\textit{Ddc}1+ \textit{Dxb}5 21.\textit{Dd}4+ \textit{Dd}5 22.\textit{Dc}4 \textit{Dxe}4 23. \textit{Dxb}4 \textit{Dxg}2+ 24.\textit{Df}1 \textit{Dd}3+ 25. \textit{Dxg}2 \textit{Dxc}4 26. \textit{Dxc}4± and gains a great advantage according to the analysis by V. Chekhov, and in case of 12...f6 13.e5 \textit{Df}7 White gains an advantage as well by 14.\textit{Dxc}6 bxc6 15.\textit{Dd}4 \textit{Dd}7 16. \textit{Dfc}1 \textit{fxe}5 17.\textit{Dxc}6+ \textit{Dxc}6 18. \textit{Dxc}6 \textit{Dd}7 19.\textit{Daa}6±) 13.\textit{Dxc}6 \textit{Dxc}6 14.\textit{Dc}5 \textit{De}8 15.\textit{Dxc}6 bxc6 16.\textit{Ba}4 f6 17.\textit{Bfa}1 \textit{Df}7 18.\textit{Bxa}7+ \textit{Dxa}7 19.\textit{Bxa}7 \textit{De}7= an absolu-
tely equal position was achieved.

Also it is worth mentioning that in case of 5.e3 \( \text{Qxc3} \) 6.bxc3 g6 after 7.d4 \( \text{g7} \) the play is transposed usually into some of the positions from the \textbf{b3} variation, examined in the note to White's seventh move, because the line 7.\( \text{b5+} \) d7 8.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{g7} \), tested in the game L.Spassov – Dorfman, Warsaw 1983, is absolutely harmless to Black, and in case of 9.\( \text{c4?!} \) 0-0 10.\( \text{xb7} \) c6\( ^{\circ} \) he has an excellent compensation for the pawn owing to the threat of 11.\( \text{b8} \) 12.\( \text{a6} \) \( \text{b4} \). Moreover, now by 5...\( \text{e6?!} \) 6.d4 \( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{exd4} \) Black can get a standard position with isolated pawn like those which occur often in the Semi–Tarrasch Defence in the Queen’s Gambit and the Panov Attack in the Caro-Kann Defence.

Now Black can struggle for the equalization in several ways: 
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{b1) 5...e6},
  \item \textbf{b2) 5...cxd4} and
  \item \textbf{b3) 5...\text{Qxc3}}.
\end{itemize}

One more opportunity, that of 5...g6 (with the idea to transpose into the main lines of the Gruenfeld Defence after 6.e4 \( \text{xc3} \) 7.bxc3), is not popular now.

After 6.dxc5! (in case of 6.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 7.\( \text{c2} \) Black sacrifices the pawn by 7...\( \text{f5?!} \) 8.\( \text{xc5} \) \( \text{xc5} \), 9.\( \text{dxc5} \) \( \text{g7} \) and thus exerts pressure upon White’s queenside.

After 10.e3 0-0 11.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{e4} \) 12.f3 \( \text{d5} \) 13.\( \text{d2} \) d7 14.b4 in the game H.Olafsson – Schoen, Reykjavik 1988, Black could have gained a sufficient compensation for the slight material loss if he had played 14...a5 15.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{f8} \) 16.0-0 axb4 17.\( \text{xb4} \) \( \text{e5} \) 6...\( \text{xc3} \) 7.\( \text{xd8+} \) \( \text{xd8} \) 8.bxc3 White has an extra pawn, even though it is doubled, so Black has to spend time to win it back and, besides, Black’s king in the centre becomes an accessible target for White's pieces. After 8...\( \text{g7} \) 9.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{d7} \) 10.\( \text{b1} \) c7 11.e4 \( \text{c6} \) 12.\( \text{f4+} \) c8 (no 12...\( \text{e5?!} \) because of 13.\( \text{b5+} \)?) 13.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{d8} \) 14.\( \text{xc6!} \) \( \text{xc6} \) 15.\( \text{xc6} \) \( \text{xc3+} \) 16.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{bxc6} \) in the game Vekshenkov – Petrienko, USSR 1984 White’s outlooks were better despite the material balance on the board, because Black's king impeded coordinated actions of own rooks.

\textbf{b1) 5...e6}

A natural development move which steers the play into positions from the Semi–Tarrasch Defence in the Queen's Gambit. We shall regard several of the most important variations from this system below even though it is Book 4 that deals with problematic positions of the Queen’s Gambit. But even such a compe-
tent edition as Chess Informant prefers to feature these positions under different opening indexes.

6.e4

White is going to occupy the centre with his pawns since there is such an opportunity.

6...cxd4

The position after 6...cxd4 7.bxc3 in which Black allows his opponent to create a strong pawn centre is regarded in Volume three in the section, devoted to the Semi-Tarrasch Defence.

7.axd4 cxd4 8.a4

Now White’s queen, standing on d3, impedes the development of Black’s kingside because the f8-bishop has to support the g7-pawn. At the same time, the position of the white queen on c3 is not well supported itself. It is subject to attacks from Black’s pieces, so an interesting piece conflict may happen in the centre of the board.

8...c6

An attempt to disturb White’s queen from the c-file was seen in this position as well. After 8...d7 9.e2 a6 (the move 9...c6 is no threat to White because of the loss of tempo, he simply plays 10.0-0, and Black still has to solve the problem of his f8-bishop) 10.0-0 c8 11.b3 (if 11.e3, then Black equalizes by 11...c5=, but after 11.e5!? Black’s attempt to get rid of White’s queen by exchange after 11...f6 12.g5! xe5 13.xe5 c5 14.xd7 xg5 15.fd1 a5 16.a3± resulted in a hard endgame for Black in the game Palatnik – Gofshstein, Daugavpils 1978, in which the presence of opposite-coloured bishops on the board was to White’s favour) 11.e3 (now that Black’s knight occupies the c5-square, the retreat of White’s queen to e3 is more suitable) 12.e7 13.e5 0-0 14.b3 b6 (it’s not easy for Black to find an appropriate place for his queen: in case of 14...e8 there is 15.xd7 xd7 16.a3± with a lasting advantage to White owing to his pair of bishops) 15..c4 (now 15.xd7 xd7= is not as good as in the previous line because the activity of Black’s pieces is enough to balance out White’s pair of bishops) 15...c6 16.a3! (with the threat of b3-b4-b5) 16..a6 (Black can’t play 16...b5? because of 17.e5 b7 18.xd7 xd7 19.ac1+−) 17.b2 (the move 17.b4 encounters a refutation of 17...b5=) 17..fd8 18.fc1! e8 (in case of 18...c6 there is 19.a3! a6 20.b4+, and the position of the c4-knight is quite safe owing to White’s 18th move, and in case of 18...b5 19.a4 xc4 20.xc4± White’s pair of bishops, combined with the superior activity of his pieces, makes Black’s defence little pleasure) 19.e5± in the game Polugaevsky – Keres, Tallinn 1973 White created a hardly solvable problem for his opponent, threatening to go with the
c4-knight to d6.

9.a3!!?

The other way to defend against Black's threat of f8-b4 is 9...b5. The play may develop as follows in this case: 9...d7 (in the line 9...b6 10.xc6+ xc6 11.xc6+ bxc6 which occurred in the game W.Schmidt – Womacka, Germany 1994 White could have played 12.0-0!? e7 13.e3 0-0 14.f1 c5 15.xc5 xc5 16. x5, thus forcing Black to proceed to a hard defence) 9...d7 10.0-0 b6 11.a4 (11.a4 is worse because of 12...b4! 12.
xb4 = Salov – Barsov, Gorsica 1997) c5 12.d3 (there is also an interesting opportunity of 12.e1!? a6 13.e3 b4 14.
.d2 d6 15.e2 e7 16.d1 c7 17.b4 0-0 18.b5 axb5 19.
xb5 with an edge to White owing to his space advantage on the queenside, Tukmakov – Suetin, Lenk 2000) 12...d6 (White's queen should be driven away from the d-file, otherwise in case of 12...a6 there is the intermediate 13.d1!, gaining a considerable advantage to White after 13...e7 14.xc6 xc6 15.e5 c8 16.f4 f6 17.xc6 xc6 18.xc1 xc1 19.xc1 B.Zueger – Giertz, Switzerland 1995) 13.e2 c7? (Black is going to put his dark-squared bishop on c5 because in case of a passive 13...e7 after 14.d2! a6 15.e5 c7 16.d3 b4 17.xc1 xc6 18.xb4 xb4 19.d4 b6 20.
xc6 bxc6 21.e4 he may encounter serious problems like in the game Damjjanovic – Grosar, Yugoslavia 1989; and when Black tried to define the bishop's position immediately by 13...a6, White managed to keep up a slight advantage after 14.e5 c7 15.d3 d4 16.e4 c6 17.d2 c4 18.xe4 c5 19.xf1 d7 20.xc4 e7 21.g4 g8! 22.xc1 h5 23.xd4 g8 24.h4 g6 25.g5 and in the game Kramnik – Adams, Germany 1997, because of his superiority in space and, which was no less important, his control over the c-file, yet Black's position stayed very solid owing to his strong knight on d5) 13...c7 14.e5 (White can't gain much by 14.g5 a6 15.xc6 xc6 16.d4 because of 16...c5! 17.xc6 xg5 18.d4 c5 19.f3 e7 20.ac1 0-0 with an equality, Dreev – Zelcic, Las Vegas (m/3) 1999) 14...c5 15.d1 a6 16.d3 h6 (16...0-0? is no good because of 17.xh7+ xh7 18.g5+ g6 19.c2+ f5 20.exf6+ xxf6 21.
xc5+, but 16...d4?! is possible: 17.xd4 xd4 18.xf4 xc6, and 19.xh7 is not dangerous because of 19...xf2+ 20.xf2
\[ \text{\textit{Chapter 15}} \]

\[ \text{xh7 21.\textit{ac1 a5 22.b3 b4=)} 17.\textit{af4 b4 (no 17...0-0? because of 18.e4 c6, and Black felt fine after he exchanged the light-squared bishops and moved his knight into the centre in the game Anand – Adams, Groningen (m/2) 1997.}} \]

\[ 9...\textit{d7} \]

9...\textit{a5?} is bad because of 10.b4 \textit{d8} (no 10...\textit{xb4?? because of 11.d2=) 11.b2 d7 12.d1=, Black standing obviously better.

\[ 10.e2 \]

Other continuations promise less to White. After 10.g5 f6 11.e3 c8 12.d2 c7 13.c1 e7 14.d4 b8= in the game Puri – Huda, Canada 1987, as well as after 10.e3 c8 11.d3 a5= 12.d2 b4 13.d1 xd2+ 14.xd2 xd2= 15.c2 d5= in the game Sanders – Fauland, Vilissingen 1997, and also in case of 10.b4 c8 11.b3 e7 12.b2 0-0 13.d3 b6= Quinn – McLeod, Port Erin 2000, Black maintained the balance without any serious difficulties.

\[ 10.c8 \]

Black tries to disturb the white queen from the c-file because after 10...\textit{f6?} White avoids exchange by 11.e5 g6 12.0-0 \textit{e7 13.d1=, still maintaining his development advantage.

\[ 11.0-0 a5 \]

An attempt to get rid of the white queen's pressure by 11...f6?! after 12.d1 c7 13.e3 \textit{c7 14.ac1 0-0 15.d4 fd8, R. Rodriguez Lopez – Arroyo Saudo, Mondariz Balneario 1999, could have turned disastrous for Black in case of 16.g4!, and if he had tried to maintain the material balance by 16...\textit{f7, he would have lost after 17.xe6! xe6 18.\textit{xe6 xe6 19.cc4 c5 20.f4\#}.}

\[ 12.d3?! \]

After 12.e3 c5 13.cf4 b3 14.gf3 xc1 15.xc1 0-0 16.\textit{e5 f6 17.xd7 xd7 18.cc3 h8 19.cc4 e5= in the game Topalov – Adams, Linares 1997, Black had no problems. Also 12.e5 was of no sense because of 12...\textit{b3 13.b1 c7 (the position was not as clear after 13...\textit{f6 14.g3 in the game Morozevich – Moskalenko, Alushta 1993, but in case of 13...f6!?) 14.h5+ g6 15.h4 xc1 16.\textit{bxc1 g7= the balance can be preserved) 14.xc7 xc7 15.f4 c8 16.e5 (also after 16.d1 f6 17.e5 c6 18.e3 b6 19.d4 xd4 20.xd4 e7= Black keeps up the equality) 16.a4= with and even position, Winter – S.Wolf, Germany 1993.}

\[ 12.a4 \]

12...\textit{e7} can't solve all Black's problems because of 13.b4! \textit{c6 (if 13...d4, then 14.d4 b6 15.b2?) 14.b2=, and White is still better owing to the awkward position of Black's bishops.}

\[ 13.xd8+ xd8 14.e3 \]

Black's problems stay despite the queen exchange.

\[ 14.b3 \]
After 14...a6 15.\textit{Ac1}!± White stands better, threatening to come to c7 with his rook. At the same time, in case of 15.\textit{Ab6} at the end of the forced line 15...\textit{Ab3}! 16.\textit{Ax}d8 \textit{Ax}a1 17.\textit{Ax}a1 \textit{Ax}d8 18.\textit{Ae}5 \textit{Ae}7= the balance is re-established on the board.

15.\textit{Ad1} a6

Black can lose quickly in case of 15...\textit{b5} because of 16.\textit{Ax}b3! \textit{Ax}b3 17.\textit{Af}c1 (threatening to win Black's b3-bishop by \textit{f3-d2}) 17...\textit{e}5 18.\textit{Axe}5 a6 19.\textit{Ac}6 – at this point Black had to resign in the game Anand – Korchnoi, Tilburg 1998.

16.\textit{Ax}b3 \textit{Ax}b3

Black has a pair of bishops now, but his disastrous underdevelopment does not let him hope to equalize.

17.\textit{Ac1} \textit{Ad6} 18.\textit{Ab6} \textit{Aa8} 19.\textit{Ad4} \textit{Aa4} 20.\textit{Ac4} \textit{Ad7}

21.\textit{Ad1}!

After this strong move it's obvious that Black's bishops have no support even in his own camp.

21...0-0

If 21...\textit{Ae7}, then 22.\textit{Ac7}!, and white rooks penetrate Black's camp soon.

22.\textit{e}5 \textit{Ab5} 23.\textit{Ax}b5 \textit{Ax}b5 24.\textit{Ae}4 \textit{Ae7} 25.\textit{Ad7}±

Having reached the opponent's rear with one of his rooks and exchanged one of his bishops, White gained a distinct advantage in the game Kramnik – Van Wely, Monte Carlo (blindfold) 1998.

b2) 5...\textit{cxd4} 6.\textit{Ax}d4

After 6.\textit{Ax}d5 \textit{Ax}d5 7.\textit{Ax}d4 \textit{Ax}d4 8.\textit{Ax}d4 \textit{Ad7}= or 8...\textit{a6}= Black maintains the balance without excessive efforts.

6...\textit{Ax}c3

After 6...\textit{e}6 7.\textit{e}4! (after 7.\textit{Ax}d5 \textit{exd5} 8.\textit{Ae}5 f6 9.\textit{Ae}2 \textit{Ac6} 10.\textit{Aa4} \textit{Ac5} 11.\textit{e}3 0-0= Black has a slight development advantage and a free play since Black can't establish a safe piece outpost on d4) 7...\textit{Ac6} (in case of 7...\textit{Ax}c3 8.\textit{Ax}c3 a position appears which was considered above under b1) 8.\textit{Ab5} \textit{Ax}c3 (8...\textit{Ad4}?! is worse because of 9.\textit{Ax}d8+ \textit{Ax}d8 10.0-0 \textit{Ad6} 11.\textit{a}3 \textit{Aa6} 12.\textit{b}4= with an advantage to White, Southam – Kottke, Biel 1990) 8.\textit{Ab5} \textit{Ax}c3 (8...\textit{Ad4} 9.\textit{Ax}d8+ \textit{Ax}d8 10.0-0 \textit{Ad6} 11.\textit{a}3 \textit{Aa6} 12.\textit{b}4= Southam
Kottke, Biel 1990) 9.\(\text{a}xc6 +!\)? (the position after 9.\(\text{a}xc3 \text{a}d7\) was examined in the note to White’s ninth move under b1) 9...\(\text{b}xc6\) 10.\(\text{a}xc3\) \(c5\) (in case of 10...\(\text{b}b6\) 11.0-0 \(\text{a}a6\) 12.\(\text{a}e3\) \(\text{c}c7\) 13.\(\text{a}a1\) White gains a considerable advantage owing to his better development, combined with Black’s pawn weaknesses on the queenside, Weischedel – Baumann, Germany 1993) 11.0-0 \(\text{b}b7\) 12.\(\text{a}e1\) \(\text{b}b6\) 13.\(\text{a}f4\) (the position after 13.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{f}6\) 14.\(\text{x}f6\) \(\text{x}f6\) 15.\(\text{x}f6\) \(\text{g}8\) 16.\(\text{a}g5\) \(\text{a}xg5\) 17.\(\text{x}g5\) \(\text{c}7\) 18.\(\text{a}xf7\) \(\text{c}7\) 19.\(\text{f}3\) White’s chances in the ending are slightly preferable as the game Smejkal – Murray, St. Quentin 1999, was more sharp and less clear) 13...\(\text{f}6\) 14.\(\text{a}d2\) \(\text{e}7\) 15.\(\text{a}c4\) \(\text{b}4\) 16.\(\text{a}ac1\) \(\text{a}xc3\) 17.\(\text{a}xc3\) \(\text{e}5\) 18.\(\text{a}d2\) \(\text{f}7\) 19.\(\text{f}3\) White stands better, as well as after 10...\(\text{d}7\) 11.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{c}6\) 12.\(\text{a}xc6\) \(\text{c}6\) 13.\(\text{a}xc6+\) \(\text{b}xc6\) 14.\(\text{a}f4\) \(\text{f}6\) 15.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 16.\(\text{e}3\) 17.\(\text{a}c1\) \(\text{e}7\) 18.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{c}5\) Black’s queenside suffers a serious pressure from White’s forces) 14...\(\text{a}e2\) This position occurred in the game Chuchelov – Mieisz, Germany 1999, and after 15.\(\text{a}e1\) \(\text{c}4\) (if 15...\(\text{a}b5\), then White can develop his initiative by 16.\(\text{a}c5\) \(\text{f}6\) 17.\(\text{a}xf8\) \(\text{xf8}\) 18.\(\text{a}a4\) \(\text{d}3\) 19.\(\text{a}c5\) \(\text{f}5\) 20.\(\text{a}xb7\) \(\text{d}4\) 21.\(\text{a}d6\) \(\text{b}8\) 22.\(\text{a}xf5\) \(\text{xf5}\) 23.\(\text{a}c1\) \(\text{d}4\) 24.\(\text{f}4!\) 16.\(\text{a}ec1\) \(\text{xb}3\) 17.\(\text{a}xc6\) \(\text{d}8\) (simplifications come to end in case of 17...\(\text{b}xc6\) 18.\(\text{a}xc6+\) \(\text{e}7\) 19.\(\text{a}xa8\) \(\text{e}6\) 20.\(\text{a}b7\) \(\text{a}5\) 21.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{a}4\) 22.\(\text{c}6\) \(\text{d}7\) 23.\(\text{c}1\) make
Black's defence a hard task because of the unhappy position of his king) 18.\texttt{Cc7 Dd5} 19.\texttt{Dxd5 Ed5} 20.\texttt{Exb7± White stands better despite the material balance because his rook is in the opponent's camp.}

\textbf{8.e4}

\textit{8.e3} is less resolute, and after 8...\texttt{Ag4} 9.\texttt{Dd2 Exf3} 10.\texttt{Gxf3 Dd5!} 11.\texttt{Ed7} 12.\texttt{Bb5 Ec8} 13.\texttt{Ec1 a6} 14.\texttt{Exc6 Exc6} 15.\texttt{Bb3 Exc1+} 16.\texttt{Bxc1 e6} 17.\texttt{Dc2 Dd6} 18.\texttt{Ed1 Ec7=} Black gained an absolute equality in the game Ribli – Ljubojevic, Tilburg 1978.

\textbf{8...Ag4}

In case of 8...e6 the play steers into the above considered \texttt{b1} variation.

After 8...\texttt{Ba5} 9.\texttt{Bxa5 Bxa5} 10.\texttt{Dd5+ Ad7} 11.\texttt{Exd7+ Ed7} 12.0-0 Dc6 13.\texttt{Df4 e6} 14.\texttt{Dc1 Ed8} 15.\texttt{Df1+ Ae8} 16.\texttt{Exd8+ Ed8} 17.\texttt{Dc5 Exe5} 18.\texttt{Dxe5 h5} (18...f6 does not work because of 19.\texttt{Db8!} a6 20.e5±) 19.\texttt{Db8 a6} 20.e5± Tal – Zhuravliov, Sochi 1977, and Black is unable to prevent the intrusion of White's rook to c7 since his own kingside is underdeveloped.

The continuation 8...a6 9.\texttt{Dc4 Bb5} 10.\texttt{Dd2 Bxc3} 11.\texttt{Dxc3 e6} 12.0-0 \texttt{Bg8} 13.\texttt{Dfd1 b5} 14.\texttt{Dd3 f6} 15.a4 b4 16.\texttt{Dd4 Dxd4} 17.\texttt{Dxd4 Ac5} 18.\texttt{Dc4 Dxd4} 19.\texttt{Dxd4 Ae7} 20.\texttt{Dad1±} occurred in the game Korchnoi – Karpov, Riga 1970. White has an advantage here owing to his control over the central d-file.

\textbf{9.Bb5 Ec8}

\textbf{10.Be3!!?}

For the last twenty years this continuation has been considered the strongest as it allows White to employ his queen's rook in the centre as soon as possible. After 10.0-0 a6 11.\texttt{Dc6+} (in case of 11.\texttt{De5 axb5} 12.\texttt{Dxg4 b4} 13.\texttt{Dc3 g6} 14.\texttt{Df4 Dg7} 15.\texttt{Dd1 Bb6} 16.\texttt{Dh6=} the play is complicated, Duppel – Voltava, Pardubice 2000) 11...\texttt{Dc6} 12.\texttt{Bc3 Df3} 13.\texttt{Df3 g6} 14.\texttt{Dd1 Bc8} 15.\texttt{Dg5 h6} 16.\texttt{Dh4 Dg7} 17.\texttt{Dd2 Dxb2} 18.\texttt{Dad1} (Korchnoi – Ljubojevic, Belgrade 1978) Black could have maintained the balance by 18...\texttt{Df6=}.

The alternative to 10.\texttt{Be3}!? is 10.\texttt{Df4} which should deprive Black's queen of the c7-square, but in this case White has to reckon with 10...\texttt{Dxf3}! (White gained a great advantage both after 10...\texttt{Bb6} 11.\texttt{a4 Df3} 12.\texttt{Dxf3 a6} 13.\texttt{Be3 Bc7} 14.\texttt{Dc6+ Bxc6} 15.0-0 \texttt{Bf6} 16.\texttt{Bac1±} in the game H.Olafsson – T.Hansen, Gentofte 1999, and after 10...a6 11.\texttt{Dd1 Bb6} 12.\texttt{Aa4 f6} 13.0-0 e6 14.h3! \texttt{Dxf3} 15.\texttt{Dxf3 Ac5} 16.\texttt{g4±} in the game Gelfand –}
Beliavsky, Reggio Emilia 1992) 11.gxf3 (Black must take with the pawn as there is no 11...fxe3?? because of 11...a5+, losing White’s bishop) 11...b6 12.d3 d8= with mutual chances, Xu Yuhua – Wang Yu, Shenyang 2000.

10...a6

Practically, this move is forced. In case of 10...xf3?! 11.gxf3 a6 12.d1 c7 13.xc6+ xc6 14.d4 f6 15.0-0 e5 after 16.a7! e7 17.c1 d7 18.xc8+ xc8 19.c1 d7 20.a8+ d8 21.c8 f7 22.b6=– White’s pieces came to the back rank in the game Portisch – Huebner, Montreal 1979, and Black could have got rid of the unpleasant bind only if he sacrificed by an exchange.

11.d1 c7 12.a4!

Apart from the above cited variation, now in case of 12. xc6+ xc6 13.d4 f6 14.0-0 e5 White has to reject a7 because of the unsupported position of the e4–pawn, and play 15.d3 instead, which provided a better play to Black after 15...e7 16.c1 d7 17.xc8+ xc8 18. c1 d7 19.c4 e6= in the game Freisler – Vodicka, Karvina 1989.

12...b5 13.b3 a5!?

13...e5 is losing because of 14.d5=–, and after 13...e6 14.0-0 xf3 15.gxf3 d6 (a transition to the endgame by 15...e5 16.xe5 xe5 does not help Black after 17.c1! xc1 18.xc1 f7 19.f4 c6 20.f5= as the game I.Belov – Hudecek, Karvina 1992 showed: White only got rid of the doubled pawn and had a serious advantage owing to his pair of bishops, as a result) 16.xg7 xh2+ 17.h1 e5 18.xh6 xb2 e7 (after 18...xb2 19.f4= White’s compensation for the pawn is more than sufficient because of the threat of f4-f5) in the game Topalov – Beliavsky, Linares 1994 White’s great advantage could have been emphasised best of all by 19.f4! xxb2 20.f5=.

14.c1

White can’t gain anything by 14.xf7+ xf7 15.xa5 xa5 16.e5+ c6 17.xg4 h5 18.d2 c4 19.c3 xb2=, as well as by 14.xa5 xa5 15.e5 h5=.

14...xc3+ 15.xc3=

White stands better here according to the analysis by I.Belov, but this has not yet been proved in practice.

b3) 5...xc3

Black is ready to steer into some of the main variations of the Gruenfeld Defence, so he performs the knight exchange in the centre without waiting for White to play e2-e4. As it was already mentioned above, if Black plays 5...g6 immediately, he has to reckon with the opportunity of 6.dxc5!.

6.xc3 g6

After 6...e6 7.e4 there is a position from the Semi–Tarrasch
Defence to be regarded in Book 4.

7.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{g}}}5}

In the diagrammed position White often prefers to transpose the play into the Gruenfeld Defence (D85) by 7.e4 \textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{g}}}7}, but these variations lie beyond our scope. It only should be noted that a certain weakness of the d4-pawn in this case makes White to postpone the development of his kingside pieces since in case of 8.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e2} there is a strong 8...\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c6}!, and if 9.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e3}, then 9...\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{g}}}4}, provoking a damage to the powerful pawn centre. This is why White has to switch to the development of his queenside now to support the d4-pawn by 8.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b1} or 8.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e3}. The latter of these continuations carried forward Vladmir Kramnik in the second game of his match with Garry Kasparov in London. After the well known moves 8...\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a5} 9.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d2} \textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{g}}}4} 10.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b1} a6 Black encountered a novelty of 11.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{x}}}xb7}! with a slight advantage to White.

White can try to gain profit from the early knight exchange (in comparison to the Gruenfeld Defence) by 7.e3 to protect the d4-pawn safely and develop then his kingside pieces without problems. After 7...\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{g}}}7} 8.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d3} 0-0 (in this position it's much more difficult for Black to display any activity than in the corresponding variation of the Gruenfeld Defence, for example, an attempt to attack d4 immediately by 8...\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d7} 9.0-0 e5 resulted in problems for Black in the game Lerner – Lputian, Simferopol 1988, after 10.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a3} \textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a5} 11.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b3} 0-0 12.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b5} b6 13.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{a}}}ac1} 9.0-0 \textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c7} (Pressing upon the d4-pawn by 9...\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c6} in order not to allow the advance e3-e4 may turn no good for Black in case of 10.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a3}! which becomes possible now after the untimely \textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b8-c6} and poses serious problems to Black) 10.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e2} (10.e4?! is very risky because of 10...\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c6} 11.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e3} \textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{g}}}4} 12.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c1} \textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{f}}}d8} 13.d5 e6! 14.dxc6 c4!, and Black gains an advantage. Before the black knight comes to c6 the move 10.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a3} makes no great sense because of 10...\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d7}!, and the position of White's a3-bishop is far from promising) 10...\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d8} (it's still no time for 10...\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{c}}}c6} because of 11.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{a}}}a3} b6 12.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{a}}}ab1} \textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d8} 13.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{e}}}e4} \textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b7} 14.dxc5 \textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{c}}}xc3} 15.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{f}}}f1} \textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{f}}}f6}, and now White gained an advantage in the game Kramnik – Van Wely, Monte Carlo (active) 1999, by 16.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b2}! \textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{a}}}ac8} 17.exb6 axb6 18.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b5}±, in case of 10...\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{d}}}d7} there is 11.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b1} b6 12.e4 \textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{b}}}b7} 13.\textit{\underline{\textit{\textbf{g}}}5}± with a slight advantage to White) 11.
\[ d1 \ b6 12. \texttt{b2} \text{(in case of an immediate 12.\texttt{e4}) after 12...\texttt{cxd4} 13.\texttt{cx}d4 \texttt{\texttt{c6+ White suffers material losses, and after 12.\texttt{a3} \texttt{b7} 13.\texttt{axa1} \texttt{d7! 14.e4 in the game De Eccher – D’Amore, Rome 1981 Black could have gained a good counterplay just by 14...\texttt{xf6}?!? since 15.e5 \texttt{d5} 16.e6 was not dangerous because of 16...f5!) 12...\texttt{c}6 13.\texttt{axa1} \texttt{b7} 14.e4 e6 15.h4 (the continuation 15.\texttt{f3}?!? \texttt{axa8} 16.h4 occurred in the game Portisch – Kasparov, Madrid (active) 1988, and produced a complex position with mutual chances) 15...\texttt{axa8} 16.h5 \texttt{xf4}! (Black makes use of the absence of White’s bishop on the c1-h6 diagonal to impede the development of White’s initiative on the kingside considerably) 17.hg hg 18.\texttt{b1} \texttt{a5} 19.\texttt{e1} \texttt{g4} 20.\texttt{cd1} \texttt{xd4} 21.cxd4 \texttt{c4} 22.\texttt{c1} b5= in the game Kramnik – Topalov, Wijk aan Zee 1998 the position was approximately equal.}

As the cited variations show, it often turns difficult for White to employ his dark-squared bishop after the seventh move e2-e3. This is why it makes sense to develop the c1-bishop in advance. Apart from the move in the main line, it can be achieved by 7.\texttt{f4}. In this case Black usually struggles for an equality by 7...\texttt{g7} 8.e3 \texttt{a5} 9.\texttt{d2} 0-0 (after 9...\texttt{c6} 10.\texttt{b1} White has to release the tension in the centre) 10.\texttt{b1} (after 10.\texttt{e2} \texttt{c6} 11.\texttt{b1} the play was equalized by 11...\texttt{cxd4} 12.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd2+} 13.\texttt{xd2} \texttt{d8} 14.\texttt{b5} \texttt{f5}! 15.\texttt{xc6} \texttt{xb1} 16.\texttt{xb7} \texttt{xa2} 17.\texttt{xa8} \texttt{a8= in the game Portisch – Timman, Tilburg 1980) 10...\texttt{b6!} 11.\texttt{e5} \texttt{a6} 12.\texttt{xa6} \texttt{xa6} 13.dxc5 \texttt{c6} 14.\texttt{cxg7} \texttt{xg7} 15.\texttt{e2} \texttt{a3} 16.exb6 \texttt{xc3}+ 17.\texttt{d2} \texttt{xd2+}, and in this position White’s drew in the game Zvjaginsev – Ionov, St. Petersburg 1998, because of the absolute equality of forces.

7...\texttt{g7} 8.\texttt{d2}
A multipurpose move.

8...\texttt{a5}
In case of 8...0-0 White accomplishes an advantageous exchange of the dark-squared bishop by 9.\texttt{h6}, whereas in case of 8...\texttt{c6} he can proceed to 9.d5 as his c3-pawn is protected safely. In case of 8...h6 there is 9.\texttt{f4}, and Black has problems with his castling. Now after 8...\texttt{xd4} (if 9...\texttt{g5}, then 10.\texttt{e5}; in case of 9...\texttt{c6} Black has to reckon with 10.d5; and if 9...\texttt{a5}, then 10.\texttt{c1}! is possible, similarly to the main line) 10.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{c6} 11.e3 0-0 in the game Fahnenschmidt – Vettel, Bad Woerishofen 2000 White could have tried to gain an advantage in the centre by 12.\texttt{b1}?!\texttt{b6} 13.\texttt{b5} \texttt{b7} 14.d5.

9.\texttt{c1}
White can’t make his opponent release the pawn tension in the centre by 9.\texttt{b1} because of 9...\texttt{b6=}.

9...\texttt{h6} 10.\texttt{h4}
White wants to keep attacking the e7-pawn.
10...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f5}}
If 10...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c6}}, then 11.d5±.
11.e3 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c6}} 12.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e2}}
Now 12.d5?! is not safe already because of 12...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d8}}!±.
12...0-0 13.0-0 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{fd8}}
The endgame after 13...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{cxd4}}
14.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{cxd4}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd2}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd2}} is to White's favour since he alone can use the open c-file.
14.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b2}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{b6}}?!
Black solves the problem of the b7-pawn not in the best possible way. After 14...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d7}}
15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{fd1}} (15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d2}}? with the idea to force Black to open up the c-file for White's c1-rook does not work because of cxd4 16.cxd4 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{cxd4}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd4}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{xh2}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e4}}
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xb2}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xa5}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{xc1}} 20.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xc1}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{g5}}±,
Black's rook and two pawns outweigh White's two minor pieces) 15...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{ad8}} White can continue by 16.h3!? to be followed by \textcolor{red}{\textbf{f1}} and \textcolor{red}{\textbf{d2}}. An immediate 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d2}}? is bad because of 16...
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{cxd4}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{cxd4}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd4}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{exd4}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{d4}}±.

15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a3}}!
This position occurred in the game Kramnik – Van Wely, Monaco (blindfold) 2001. Black had to make a concession to White by 15...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{cxd4}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{cxd4}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{c7}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a5}}±, but he played 15...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a5}}?, and after 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xa5}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{xa5}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xe7}}
\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c8}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xc5}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{e6}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b4}}--; he stood two pawns down without any compensation.
Part 5. Symmetrical Four Knights’ System
1.\&f3 \&f6 2.c4 c5 3.\&c3 \&c6

Black maintains perfect symmetry. It is clearly observable that White’s opportunities for further development of his pieces have been exhausted. Now he will have to commit himself either by the disposition of his pawns in the centre, or at least by the development prospects for his bishops. Either way Black hopes to build up his further actions.

4.g3

White is on course to develop his light-squared bishop on the long diagonal. For the time being he intends to postpone indefinitely the eventual occupation of the centre by means of d2-d4. The direct 4.d4 permits Black to immediately open good prospects for his dark-squared bishop on the b4 and c5 squares by 4...cxd4 5.\&xd4 e6.

Now Black can choose one of four conceptually different development systems 4...d5 (Chapter 16), 4...e6 (Chapter 17), 4...g6 (Chapters 18-21) and a rare 4...e5.

4...e5

A rather rare plan of little popularity, which is not at its best with the black knight on f6. Black intends to fundamentally bar White’s d2-d4 advance.

5.\&g2 d6

The move 5...d5? is bad for Black, however, the number of players willing to make it does not decrease year after year. Following 6.cxd5 \&xd5 White employs a standard tactical stroke 7.\&xe5! to capture a pawn. The situation can develop further as follows: 7...\&xc3 (after 7...\&xe5 8.\&xd5 \&d6 9.0-0 0-0 10.b3+ one can assess White’s advantage as decisive) 8.\&xc6 \&xd1 9.\&xd8 \&xf2 10.\&xf7 (following 10...\&d3+ 11.exd3 \&xf7 12.0-0 \&e6 13.b3 \&e7 14.b2 \&f6 15.ae1+ \&f7 16.f4 \&e8 17.a4 \&e6 18.a3 \&a6 19.\&xc5 \&xa2 20.\&d5+ \&g6 21.a4+ \&f7
22.\(g4\!) → the black king ran into a powerful attack, Hermannsdoerfer – Kreucauf, Berlin 1995) 10...\(\text{fxh}1\) 11.\(\text{Exh}8\) \(\text{fxg}3\) 12.\(\text{hxg}3\) \(\text{d}6\) 13.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{e}7\) (after 13...\(\text{e}6\) 14.\(\text{xb}7\) \(\text{b}8\) 15.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 16.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{hxh}8\) 17.\(\text{b}2\) \(\text{f}8\) 18.\(\text{g}2\)± White has all reasons to expect converting the extra pawn, Gollain – Derieux, Bagneux 1993) 14.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 15.\(\text{xb}7\) \(\text{hxh}8\) 16.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{h}6\) 18.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{h}3\) 19.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{f}8\) 20.\(\text{f}3\)± and Black has no compensation for the pawn down, Gronau – Hund, Germany 1988.

6.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{e}7\)

Following 6...\(\text{g}6\) 7.0-0 \(\text{g}7\) 8.\(\text{a}3\) 0-0 9.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{a}5\) 10.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{e}6\) White played 11.\(\text{g}5\) actively engaging in the struggle for the d5 square, weakened by Black's move four. Further in the game T.Giorgadze – Franco, Salamanca 1989, there was 11...\(\text{h}6\) 12.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 13.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{c}8\) 14.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{axb}4\) 15.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{b}6\) 16.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{e}7\) 17.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{g}7\) 18.\(\text{ed}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 19.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 20.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{h}8\) 21.\(\text{a}1\) \(\text{f}5\) 22.\(\text{a}7\)± and White's position is sufficiently attractive, since he commands the d5 square and has occupied the a-file.

Black has tested 6...\(\text{h}6\) aiming to prevent the exchange of the f6-knight and as a consequence – White's occupation of the d5-square. A drawback of this approach to the problems of the position is its certain tardiness. After 7.a3 \(\text{e}6\) 8.0-0 \(\text{e}7\) White temporarily sacrificed a pawn by 9.\(\text{b}4\)! starting a offensive on the queenside, and as a result of 9...\(\text{cxb}4\) 10.\(\text{axb}4\) \(\text{xb}4\) 11.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{a}5\) 12.\(\text{a}3\) (even here White's dark-squared bishop is not unemployed) 12...0-0 13.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{axb}4\) 14.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{a}3\) 15.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{a}7\) 16.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{d}2\)± he gained the upper hand, due to the weakness of the black b7-pawn and his control of the a8-h1 diagonal, Adamski – Miezis, Giessen 1992.

7.\(\text{g}5\) 0-0 8.0-0

In the game Tichy – Moravec, Czech Republic 1997, White did not await Black to decide what to do with the \(\text{g}5\)-bishop, but hastened to clarify the situation himself with the help of 8.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\). After 9.0-0 \(\text{e}6\) 10.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 11.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{ae}8\) 12.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{b}6\) 13.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{d}4\) 14.\(\text{d}2\)± his situation is more attractive overall. The black knight on d4 is a temporary phenomenon. White can at any point ask it to retire by e2-e3, while White's claims regarding the d5 square seem more practicable. We must not forget also that with a similar pawn structure Black is constantly at risk to remain with a sedentary dark-squared bishop opposing the centralised white knight.

8...\(\text{e}6\) 9.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{h}6\)

Black urges White to exchange. There is some probability with the assumption that in case of 9...\(\text{d}7\) White would have continued 10.\(\text{d}2\)!? followed by the manoeuvre \(\text{e}1\)-c2.

10.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 11.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{g}6\)
12.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{g}7\) 13.\(\text{b}1\) \(f5\) 14.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 15.\(\text{e}3\)

In case of 15.\(\text{d}5\) White feared, that after 15...\(f4\) Black will not admit a second white knight to take part in the struggle for the d5-square.

15...\(e4\)

After 15...\(f4\) the white knight would have successfully completed the lengthy manoeuvre, which had started a few moves earlier, by 16.\(\text{ed}5\)\(+\).

Now that Black has played e5-e4 worth attention was the invasion on d5 by the other knight. Following 16.\(\text{cd}5\)?? \(\text{exd}3\) 17.\(\text{xd}3\) \(\text{e}5\) 18.\(\text{d}2\)\(=\) White would have retained the upper hand exactly because of the well-chosen placement of his knights. Moreover, the knight on e3 not only supports his companion, but also protects the important c4-pawn. In the game Kramnik – Chandler, Germany 1994, White, however, chose 16.\(\text{ed}5\)?? and the hostilities sharpened abruptly after 16...\(\text{exd}3\) 17.\(\text{xd}3\) \(\text{cxb}4\) 18.\(\text{b}5\)\(=\).
Chapter 16  1.e4 f6 2.c4 c5 3.e3 c6 4.g3 d5

Once White has decided to develop his light-squared bishop on the long diagonal, Black aims to make a pre-emptive strike in the centre.

5.d4!

This move appeared on the world scene at the end of the eighties, but it was Vladimir Kramnik, who gave an impetus to the development of this line. Should White agree to the position following 5.cxd5 Qxd5, then Black could consider his task partly fulfilled. His spatial advantage would seriously bar White from cashing on his slight development edge. Remember also, that this position has already been mentioned in Part 4 of this book. Now it is worth to devote some time to Black’s three major options: a) 5...dxc4, b) 5...cxd4 and c) 5...e6. Of the less popular continuations note also 5...g4. After 6.g2 (of no avail are 6.Qe5, due to 6...cxd4 7.Qxc6 bxc6 8.Qxd4 Qb6!? = Jukic – Pinter, Tucepi 1996, or 6.cxd5 in view of 6...Qxf3 7.exf3 Qxd5 8.Qb5 e6! as pointed out by Ribli) 6...Qxf3 (in case of 6...dxc4 White get quite good compensation for the pawn after 7.d5!? Qf3 8. Qxf3 gxf3 cxd4 (if 7...Qxd4, which occurred in the Frois – Durao game, Algarve 1999, then White would have obtained superior chances by 8.Qxd5 Qxd5 9.cxd5± (Ribli’s analysis)) 8.cxd5 dxc3 9.dxc6 Qxd1 10.Qxd1 0-0-0 (following 10...Qxb2 11.Qxb2± White stands better) 11.Qc2 bxc6 12.bxc3, Sharavdorj – Wong; Jiing, Yangon 1998, White’s position is more appealing due to his bishop pair advantage.

Another rarity is 5...g5. Now after 6.cxd5 (in case of 6.g2 dxc4 7.Qa4 cxd4 8.Qxd4 Qxd4 9.Qxc6+ Qd7=, Black manages to maintain the equilibrium) 6...Qxd5 7.Qg2 Qxc3 (insufficient to
level the odds is 7...e6 8.0-0 a8 9.\texttt{\textlydx}d5 \texttt{\textlywx}xd5 in view of the continuation pointed out by Psakhis: 10.a3! cxd4 11.a3d4 a8 12.f3 a8 13.a8c6 \texttt{\textlywx}xc6 14.a8c1\pm 8.bxc3 a8 9.0-0 e6 (should Black attempt to completely blockade play in the centre by means of 9... \texttt{\textlydd}d5, he will be confronted with 10.c4! \texttt{\textlywx}xc4 11.a3d2 \texttt{\textlywx}xd4 12.a3xe4 \texttt{\textlywx}xa1 13.a8b3! \textpm and will have to either concede his queen, or accept the wipe-out of his entire queenside) 10.a8b3 Black blundered by 10...a8d5?! (even with the relatively superior 10...a7a5 11.a8b5 a8c6 12.a8d3\pm, 10...cxd4 11.cxd4 a8d5 12.a8d3\pm, or 10...a8b6 11.a8e3 a8xb3 12.a8xb3 cxd4 13.a8xd4 a8xg2 14.a8xg2 a8xd4 15.a8xd4 a86 16.a8fd1\pm White would have had the upper hand) and White followed by 11.c4! a8xd4 (in case of 11...a7a5 12.a8c2 a8xc4 13.a8e5 a8b5 14.a8b1 a6 15.a4 after 15...a8c6 16.a8xc6 a8xc6 17.a8xb7 a8xd4 Black risks to immediately disintegrate in view of 18.e3!+\textpm, while if Black chooses 11...a8xf3 12.a8xf3, then following 12...a8xd4 13.a8xb7 a8xf3 14.exf3 a8d6 15.a8c6+ a8e7 16.a8d1\pm White is long odds ahead on account of the inappropriate placement of the black king) 12.a8xd4 a8xg2 13.a8xe6 fxe6 (White has a huge advantage in the endgame after 13...a8d6 14.a8xg2 a8c6+ 15.a8f3 a8xf3+ 16.exf3 fxe6 17.a8e1 a8d7 18.a8b2 a8e8 19.a8ad1+ a8c6 20. f4\pm, due to the weakness of the black pawn on e6) 14.a8xg2 a8d7 15.a8f3 0-0-0 16.a8b2 a8d6 (the simplest reaction to 16...h5 is 17.h4!\textpm) 17.a8ad1 a8e7 18.a8e4\pm Psakhis – Rogulj, Dresden 1998, to obtain an obvious advantage.

a) 5...dxc4?!

This deservedly infamous move, though infrequently, is still occurring in tournament practice.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

6.d5!

This is the only way for White to take the upper hand. After 6.dxc5 \texttt{\textlydx}d1+ 7.a8xd1 e6= the odds even out, Sammalvuo – Brinch Claussen, Copenhagen 1998.

6...a8b4

In the very first game, in which the variation with 5.d2-d4 occurred, Black elected to keep the c4 pawn by means of 6...a7a5, however after 7.e4 b5 (in case of 7...e6 very strong is 8.d6!\pm and the white pawn is invulnerable or Black loses a piece, while the a3-c3-b5 threat is rather unpleasant) 8.a8b5 (with 8.e5 Black must resort to 8...a8b4) 8...a8xe4 9.a8e5! (White sets up
the unpleasant threat $\text{d}d1-a4$)
9...$\text{d}d7$ (in case of 9...a6 White has no problems to reclaim the black pawn c4 by 10.$\text{d}a3$, thus fully restoring the material equilibrium, while keeping his positional edge) 10.$\text{d}xd7$ (the consequences of 10.$\text{h}h5$ g6 11. $\text{f}f3$ $\text{d}f6$ 12.$\text{d}c6$ are not so clear, in view of 12...$\text{b}6$! 13.$\text{d}d6+$ exd6 14.$\text{xf}6$ $\text{xc}6=\infty$) 10...$\text{xd}7$ 11.$\text{a}4$ $\text{b}8$ 12.$\text{c}7+$ $\text{d}8$ 13. $\text{e}6+$ $\text{fxe}6$ 14.$\text{xa}5+$ $\text{c}7$ (in case of 14...$\text{b}6$ very strong is 15.$\text{dxe}6!$ $\text{xe}6$ 16.$\text{g}2!!$) and regardless of the fact that Black has at his disposal a seemingly dangerous discovered check, his positions becomes hopeless after 16...$\text{xc}3$ 17.$\text{e}3$ $\text{xh}1$ 18.0-0-0+ $\text{e}8$ 19.$\text{d}5+$) 15.$\text{xc}7+$ $\text{xc}7$ 16. $\text{f}4+$ $\text{d}6$ 17.0-0-0 g6 18.$\text{e}5$ $\text{g}8$ 19.$\text{dxe}6$ $\text{g}7$, Tal – Timman, Hilversum (m/5) 1988, White could have obtained a clear edge by means of the unsophisticated 20.$\text{xc}7!$ $\text{xc}7$ 21. $\text{d}5$ $\text{b}6$ 22.$\text{g}2$\text{+}.

7.e4 $\text{g}4$

Black tries to extract the maximum material advantage from the position of his knight on b4. In case he is satisfied by simply exchanging White’s light-squared bishop hoping to subsequently use the weakness of the light squares in the opponent’s camp by means of 7...$\text{d}d3+$ 8.$\text{xd}3$ cxd3 9.$\text{xd}3$ e6, then following 10.d6!? a6 11.e5 $\text{d}d7$ 12.$\text{g}5$ $\text{b}6$ 13.0-0-0= Adamski – Gabriel, Crailsheim 1995, White obtained excellent play thanks to the strong pawn on d6. The attempt to support the c4 pawn by 7...b5 also brought Black serious troubles after 8.a3 $\text{a}6$ 9.b3 b4 10.$\text{xb}4$ $\text{xb}4$ 11.$\text{xc}4$ bxc3 12.$\text{xa}6$ $\text{xa}6$ 13.$\text{xa}6$ g6 14.$\text{d}4$ $\text{g}7$ 15.$\text{xc}3$ 0-0 16. $\text{d}3=\text{J.Horvath – Palkovi, Budapest 1995. Probably, Black’s best bet is to forget about his extra pawn and complete his development by 7...e6 8.$\text{xc}4$ exd5 9.exd5 $\text{d}6$ (the move 9...a6? with the idea to organise some play on the queenside, which however delays Black’s development, turns out too costly after 10.0-0 $\text{e}7$ 11.a3 b5 12.$\text{xb}4$ bxc4 13. bxc5 $\text{xc}5$ 14.$\text{a}4+$ $\text{d}7$ 15. $\text{xc}4+$ – Marin – Komljenovic, Linares 1996), though here White also preserves his superiority in the endgame following 10.a3 $\text{a}6$ 11.$\text{e}2+$ $\text{e}7$ 12.$\text{xe}7+$ $\text{xe}7$ 13.0-0 $\text{d}8$ 14.$\text{b}5=\text{Sorokin – Lesiege, Elista (ol) 1998.}$

8.$\text{xc}4$ $\text{xf}3$ 9.$\text{xf}3$ $\text{c}2+$ 10.$\text{fl}$ $\text{xa}1$

The refusal to win the rook 10...$\text{d}4$ 11.$\text{f}4$ $\text{d}7$ results in a strong white initiative on the light squares after the unsophisticated 12.$\text{g}2$\text{+}.

11.e5 a6

Black is forced to give back the piece at once. After 11...$\text{d}7$ 12.e6= White would have obtained a decisive attack.

12.$\text{xf}6$ $\text{c}2$

In case of 12...$\text{xf}6$, White obtains a huge advantage by
13.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}g2± (pointed out by M. Tal), since his h1–rook joins the attacking forces.

13.d6!

In this manner White further accentuates the weakness of the light squares in Black’s camp.

13...\textit{\texttt{e}}6

13...\textit{\texttt{gx}}f6 was not playable due to 14.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xb7+–.

14.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xb7 \textit{\texttt{b}}8

Black faces a forced defeat also after 14...\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}x\textit{\texttt{d}}6 15.\textit{\texttt{fx}}g7 \textit{\texttt{g}}8 16.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}e4 \textit{\texttt{e}}5 17.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}c6+–

15.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}c6+ \textit{\texttt{d}}8

16.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xe6!

White takes another brick out of the rampart of Black’s defence.

16...\textit{\texttt{\texttt{\textsection}}}a7

If 16...\textit{\texttt{fx}}e6, then the winning line is 17.\textit{\texttt{fx}}g7 \textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xg7 18.\textit{\texttt{g}}5+–.

17.\textit{\texttt{fx}}g7 \textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xg7 18.\textit{\texttt{g}}5+ \textit{\texttt{f}}6

19.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xc5 \textit{\texttt{d}}4

This point was reached in the game Wojtkiewicz – Yudasin, New York 1991 (note also, that 19...\textit{\texttt{fx}}g5 was inappropriate in view of 20.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xg5+ \textit{\texttt{e}}8 21.d7+–). White could have forced the win had he played here 20.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}a5+! \textit{\texttt{e}}8 21.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}f4 \textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xb2 22.d7+ \textit{\texttt{e}}7 23.\textit{\texttt{g}}4+–.

b) 5...\textit{\texttt{cxd}}4

Another principled objection to White’s fifth move. Black can initiate a forced sequence of exchanges aiming to somewhat simplify the situation.

6.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}d4

6...\textit{\texttt{dx}}c4

In case of 6...\textit{\texttt{e}}6 7.\textit{\texttt{cxd}}5 \textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xd5 8.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xc6 \textit{\texttt{bxc}}6 9.\textit{\texttt{g}}2 \textit{\texttt{b}}4 10.0-0 0-0 11.\textit{\texttt{c}}2 \textit{\texttt{b}}6 12.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}e4 \textit{\texttt{h}}6 13.\textit{\texttt{d}}2+ Makarov – Kuporosov, USSR 1989, White retains some edge thanks to the isolation of the black c–pawn. Let us recall also that we have already discussed the position occurring after 6...\textit{\texttt{e}}5 7.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xc6 \textit{\texttt{bxc}}6 in Part 4 of this book.

7.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xc6 \textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xd1+ 8.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}xd1 \textit{\texttt{bxc}}6 9.\textit{\texttt{g}}2 \textit{\texttt{d}}5

In case of 9...\textit{\texttt{d}}7 10.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}e3 \textit{\texttt{c}}3 11.bxc3 \textit{\texttt{e}}6 12.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}c4 \textit{\texttt{d}}5 13.\textit{\texttt{d}}2 \textit{\texttt{f}}6 14.0-0 \textit{\texttt{c}}5 15.\textit{\texttt{a}}5 0-0-0 16.\textit{\texttt{c}}4 \textit{\texttt{b}}6 17.\textit{\texttt{b}}3 \textit{\texttt{a}}3 18.\textit{\texttt{\textsection}}c1 \textit{\texttt{e}}7 19.\textit{\texttt{e}}3 \textit{\texttt{c}}7 20.a4+ Makarov – Tunik, USSR 1989, the white pieces are slightly more active, regardless of the symmetry of the pawn structure.

10.\textit{\texttt{e}}3 \textit{\texttt{e}}6

Now and then Black attempts to support the c4–pawn by way
of 10...\textit{a}a6, in order to keep his board room superiority on the queenside. However, following 11.\textit{d}xd5 cxd5 12.\textit{d}xd5 \textit{e}c8 13. \textit{d}d2 e6 14.\textit{f}f3! (as we will see shortly weaker is 14.\textit{e}e4 because of 14...\textit{c}c5?! 15.\textit{c}c3 \textit{f}6 16.\textit{e}e3 \textit{e}e7 17.0-0-0 \textit{b}b5 18.h4 \textit{h}5 19.\textit{d}d2 \textit{a}a4 20.\textit{f}f3 \textit{c}c6 21.\textit{xc}c6 \textit{xc}c6 22.\textit{hd}1 \textit{d}d6= Hjartarson – J. Arnason, Ostersund 1992, and Black maintained the equilibrium) 14...\textit{c}c5 (White keeps a slight advantage also with the other continuations, e.g.: 14...\textit{e}e7 15.\textit{c}c3 \textit{f}6 16.\textit{xf}f6 \textit{gxf}6 17.0-0-0 \textit{e}e7 18.\textit{d}d4\# Ftacnik – Wojtkiewicz, Bacolod 1991, or 14...\textit{d}d6 15.\textit{c}c3 \textit{f}6 16.0-0-0 \textit{c}c5, Komarov – Sakaev, Ulcinj 1997, where White by analogy with the variation discussed below should have proceeded 17.e3!?!\pm) 15.\textit{c}c3 \textit{f}6 (Black must beware sending his king away from the centre 15...0-0?!, since after 16.0-0 \textit{b}b5 17.\textit{fd}1 \textit{fd}8 18.\textit{xd}8+ \textit{xd}8 19.e3 he may face problems 19...\textit{f}6 20.\textit{e}e2 \textit{b}b8 21.a4 \textit{a}a6 22.\textit{d}d1 \textit{b}4, Xu Jun – Alterman, Erevan (ol) 1996, which would have been best highlighted by 23.\textit{d}d7! \textit{xc}c3 24.\textit{xc}c3 \textit{b}b1+ 25. \textit{g}g2 \textit{b}b7+ 26.\textit{f}3 \textit{b}b2 27.\textit{f}f1 \textit{f}f8 28.e4\# leading to a minimal white advantage) 16.e3 \textit{e}e7 17.0-0-0 \textit{b}b5 18.\textit{d}d2 \textit{a}a4 19.h4 \textit{c}c7 (Black has to let the white h-pawn go farther, otherwise, if he tries to block the white pawn by a symmetrical h7-h5, he will not be able to actively contest the d-file, since, due to the white bishop on f3, the h5–pawn needs a black rook on h8) 20.h5\# Vaganian – Kamsky, Manila (ol) 1992, White managed to obtain a spatial advantage on the kingside, due to which he does not need to worry specifically about the d-file. He can afford at any point to exchange a pair of rooks and abandon the d-file altogether, since Black has no real penetration squares on this central file. At the same time, the white rook on h1 is ready to come into play on the fourth rank and take part in the siege of the black pawn on c4 via h4.

11.\textit{xc}c4 \textit{a}a6

12.\textit{a}a5?!

A relatively new line suggested by Vladimir Kramnik. Before that the usual continuation has been 12.b3 \textit{b}b4+ 13.\textit{d}d2, though both after 1) 13...\textit{xd}d2+ 14.\textit{xd}d2 (safe for Black is also 14.\textit{xd}d2 on account of 14...0-0-0 15.\textit{c}c2 16.\textit{hc}c1 \textit{xc}c4 17.\textit{xc}c4, now in the game Salov – Timman, Moscow 1992, the simplest way to equality would have been 17...\textit{b}b6! 18.\textit{c}c3 a5=) 14...
b4 15.\textbf{d}1 (Black maintained the equilibrium also after 15.\textbf{e}4
\textbf{e}7 16.a3 \textbf{d}5 17.\textbf{c}1 c5 18.\textbf{h}4
\textbf{ac}8 19.\textbf{h}5 \textbf{h}6 20.\textbf{h}4 \textbf{b}5 21.\textbf{f}3
\textbf{hd}8 22.\textbf{c}4 \textbf{ec}7 23.\textbf{a}5
\textbf{dc}8 24.e3 \textbf{b}6 25.\textbf{e}2 \textbf{xe}2
26.\textbf{xe}2 \textbf{f}5= Ehvest - Bere-
lovich, Koszalin 1998) 15...0-0-0! (less precise is 15...\textbf{e}7 16.a3
\textbf{d}5 17.\textbf{c}1 \textbf{ac}8 18.\textbf{e}4, since only a pawn sacrifice 18...c5!
19.\textbf{xc}5 \textbf{hd}8 20.\textbf{e}1 \textbf{b}6 21.f4
\textbf{d}7 22.b4 \textbf{xc}5 23.\textbf{bxc}5 \textbf{ac}7
24.\textbf{c}6 \textbf{b}5 25.\textbf{c}5 a6 26.\textbf{f}2
\textbf{dc}8= allowed Black to hold the balance, Gelfand - Leko, Vienna
1996) 16.a3 \textbf{d}5 17.\textbf{c}1 \textbf{b}7 18.\textbf{f}3 e5 19.\textbf{e}1 \textbf{b}6 20.\textbf{c}2 \textbf{f}6
21.\textbf{cd}1 \textbf{c}5 22.\textbf{e}4 \textbf{xe}4 23.\textbf{xe}4
\textbf{b}5= Ribli - Ponomariov, Budapest 1999, as well as after 2)
13...\textbf{e}7 14.\textbf{c}1 \textbf{hc}8! (Black had troubles defending the isolated
“c”-pawn following 14...\textbf{ac}8
15.\textbf{xb}4+ \textbf{xb}4 16.a3 \textbf{d}5 17.\textbf{a}5!
\textbf{c}5 18.0-0 \textbf{hd}8 19.\textbf{c}2 \textbf{ac}7
20.\textbf{fc}1 \textbf{dc}8 21.e4 \textbf{f}6 22.f4!
\textbf{d}3 23.\textbf{e}5 \textbf{d}5, and after 24.
\textbf{b}2!± with the idea \textbf{g}1-f2 and
\textbf{b}2-d2, Kramnik - Hjartarson,
Clichy 1995, Black’s defence
turned out to be an unpleasant
cconcern) 14...\textbf{hc}8! 15.\textbf{xb}4+
\textbf{xb}4 16.a3 \textbf{d}5 17.\textbf{a}5! (17.e4
\textbf{xc}4! 18.\textbf{xc}4 \textbf{b}6 19.\textbf{c}5 \textbf{d}7
20.\textbf{c}3 a5 21.\textbf{d}2 \textbf{a}6 22.f4 \textbf{f}6
23.\textbf{h}4 \textbf{b}8 24.\textbf{f}1 \textbf{ab}6 25.\textbf{c}2 \textbf{a}4
26.b4 \textbf{c}5= Gelfand - Kramnik,
Belgrade 1995, the play levelled
out) 17...c5 18.e4 \textbf{f}6 19.e5 \textbf{d}5
20.\textbf{d}2 \textbf{ab}8 21.b4 \textbf{b}5! (following
21...c4?! 22.\textbf{xd}5 \textbf{exd}5
23.\textbf{c}3±, pointed out by V.Kram-
nik, or 21...\textbf{f}6?! 22.\textbf{xd}5 \textbf{exd}5
23.\textbf{xc}5 \textbf{xc}5 24.\textbf{bxc}5 \textbf{b}2+ 25.
\textbf{c}3 \textbf{b}5 26.\textbf{xf}6+ \textbf{xf}6 27.\textbf{b}3
\textbf{d}4+ 28.\textbf{xd}4 \textbf{xc}5+ 29.\textbf{b}2 \textbf{d}5
30.\textbf{b}3±, which occurred in the game Kramnik - J.Polgar, Til-
burg 1997, Black emerges in a
difficult situation) 22.\textbf{xd}5 \textbf{exd}5
23.\textbf{b}3 \textbf{xb}4 24.\textbf{d}4? (if 24.\textbf{xc}8
\textbf{xc}8 25.\textbf{d}4, then after 25...\textbf{c}5
26.\textbf{xb}4 \textbf{ac}4 27.\textbf{d}3 a6 28.\textbf{a}1
\textbf{h}3!= B.Gelfand) 24...\textbf{bc}5 25.
\textbf{f}5+ \textbf{e}6 26.\textbf{xc}7+ \textbf{xe}5 27.
\textbf{he}1+ \textbf{f}6 28.\textbf{xc}5 \textbf{xc}5 29.\textbf{xb}4
\textbf{c}4= Gelfand - Timman, Malmo
1999, Black avoided a few reefs
and managed to moor to the draw
harbour. The referenced frag-
ments show that the manoeuvre
\textbf{c}4-a5 has occurred more than
once in this situation or that.
Therefore, it seems only logical
to test it on move twelve as well.

12...\textbf{c}5

In case of 12...\textbf{b}4?! 13.a3 \textbf{d}8
14.0-0 \textbf{c}2 15.\textbf{xc}6+ \textbf{e}7 16.
\textbf{a}4!± White not only win a
pawn, but also obtain an over-
whelming position, on account of
the unlucky disposition of the
black pieces. Both after 12...\textbf{b}4+
13.\textbf{d}2± and 12...\textbf{d}7 13.\textbf{d}2
\textbf{b}8 14.\textbf{b}3± other things being
equal, White can be awarded
some edge thanks to the isolation
of the black c-pawn. The contin-
uation 12...\textbf{c}8 has been tested
in tournament play. After 13.\textbf{d}2
\textbf{e}7 14.\textbf{c}1 \textbf{c}5 15.b3 0-0 16.0-0
\textbf{c}7 (inadequate is 16...\textbf{xe}2? in
view of 17.\textbf{fe}1 \textbf{b}5 18.\textbf{xd}5±)
17.\textit{c}c4 \textit{b}b6 18. \textit{a}a5 \textit{xc}4 19. \textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4 20.\textit{xc}7 \textit{c}8 21.\textit{f}4 \textit{g}5 22.\textit{c}1 \textit{b}6, Kasimdzhanov – Berelovich, Hoogeveen 1999, White missed the opportunity to retain the upper hand by 23.\textit{d}d2! \textit{c}4 (if 23...\textit{d}8, then 24.\textit{a}a5\textdagger) 24.\textit{c}1 \textit{f}6 25.\textit{bxc}4 \textit{xc}4 26.\textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4 27.\textit{b}4\textdagger, in view of the bishop pair.

13.\textit{d}2 0-0?!

Shortly after this move Black will be forced to part with a pawn with inadequate compensation, so probably his best continuation would have been 13...\textit{d}d4?! In this case following 14.\textit{cc}1 (of no avail is the forced 14.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xb}2 15.\textit{b}1 \textit{a}3 16.\textit{xa}7 \textit{c}4 17.e4 \textit{xa}2 18.\textit{b}7 \textit{f}6 19.0-0 \textit{c}4=, since the activity of the white pieces cannot be converted to any material advantage whatsoever) 14...c5 (in case of 14...\textit{xb}2 15.\textit{xc}6 \textit{b}5 16.\textit{c}5 \textit{a}6 17.\textit{cc}2 \textit{a}3 18.0-0\textdagger Black's problems persist, since 18...\textit{xe}2?? is inadequate due to 19.\textit{e}1 \textit{d}3 20.\textit{xd}5+-) 14...c5 15.\textit{c}3 (the pawn exchange after 15.\textit{b}3 \textit{xb}2 16.\textit{xc}5 0-0\textdagger= does not provide White with anything) 15.\textit{b}8 (in case of 15...0-0 16. \textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 17.\textit{c}6 \textit{d}3 18.\textit{ex}d3 \textit{xd}3 19.\textit{d}2\textdagger practically all of White's pieces are more active that their corresponding counterparts, which combined with his pawn preponderance on the queenside makes his position rather promising, while after 15...\textit{xc}3+ 16.\textit{bxc}3 \textit{b}8 17.\textit{c}4 \textit{b}6 18.0-0 0-0 19.\textit{c}2 \textit{bd}8 20.\textit{fc}1\textdagger White, having secured reliably the c4-pawn and transferred his king to e1 to protect the infiltration squares on the d-file from the black rook, can get down to the siege of the black pawn on c5) 16.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 17.\textit{xd}5! (the dominance of the black knight standing on the central square d5 must cease) 17...\textit{ex}d5 18.\textit{c}2\textit{d}7 (following 18...\textit{d}3 19.\textit{ex}d3 \textit{xd}3 20.\textit{d}2 \textit{e}4 21.0-0 \textit{b}5 22.\textit{b}3 \textit{d}7 23.\textit{f}3 \textit{g}6 24.\textit{fd}1 \textit{d}6 25.\textit{d}4\textdagger, with the two pairs of rooks present, the position of the black king in the centre is especially unpleasant, while, contrariwise, in the variation 18...0-0 19.\textit{c}6 \textit{d}3 20.\textit{ex}d3 \textit{xd}3 21.\textit{c}3 \textit{e}4 22.\textit{xb}8 \textit{hx}1 23.\textit{c}6\textdagger, when a pair of rooks have been exchanged, the distant position of the black king tells) 19.\textit{c}6 \textit{bc}8 20.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xc}2 21.\textit{xc}2 \textit{c}8 22. \textit{d}2 \textit{xe}2 23.\textit{d}4\textdagger the strong centralised position of the white knight on d4, coupled with the pawn preponderance on the queenside, maintains some white advantage.

Note also that 13...\textit{d}7?! was inadequate, due to 14.\textit{cc}1 \textit{d}4 15.\textit{xc}6 \textit{b}5 16.\textit{c}1\textdagger and Black has no compensation for the pawn given up.

14.\textit{c}1

The immediate pawn capture after 14.\textit{xc}6 \textit{ac}8 15.\textit{a}5 \textit{d}4 16.\textit{b}1 \textit{c}2= provided Black with sufficient play to maintain the equilibrium.
14...\textit{d}4 15.b4!
Once more the strongest move. After 15.\textit{xc}6 \textit{b}5 16.\textit{c}2 \textit{fc}8\textit{=} White would have been forced to exchange his only active piece, which would give Black good compensation for the pawn. Black obtained counterplay also in case of 15.b3 c5 16.e3 \textit{b}2 17.\textit{xc}2 \textit{a}3 18.\textit{f}1 \textit{d}b4\textit{=}. 
15...\textit{b}5
The variation 15...\textit{e}7 16.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 17.\textit{xc}6\textit{=} would have been plain playing White’s game.
16.\textit{xc}6 \textit{b}2
The continuation 16...\textit{xc}6 17.\textit{xc}6\textit{=} providing White with an extra pawn and a pair of bishops, naturally did not suit Black.

\textit{f}6 20.a4\textit{=} , both with a perceptible white edge.
18.\textit{xc}6 \textit{ac}8 19.\textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8 20.\textit{xd}5
The immediate 20.f4 was no good due to 20...\textit{d}b6!
20...\textit{exd}5 21.f4!!\textit{=}
In the game Kramnik – Timman, Wijk aan Zee 1999, White prepared the ingenious manoeuvre \textit{h}1-f1-f3, playing in the rook, while maintaining the centralised position of the king, which ensured him a definite advantage.

\textbf{c}) 5...\textit{e}6
Black keeps the tension in the centre.
6.\textit{cxd}5 \textit{xd}5 7.\textit{g}2

17.\textit{c}5
Alongside the mainline move there was the rather enticing 17.\textit{xc}2?! \textit{a}3 (17...\textit{xc}6 18.\textit{xb}2\textit{=} ) 18.\textit{xd}5 \textit{exd}5 19.\textit{e}7+ \textit{h}8 20.\textit{xd}5 \textit{ac}8 21.\textit{e}3\textit{=} , pointed out by V.Kramnik.
17...\textit{xc}6
Following 17...\textit{a}6 V.Kramnik mentions two possible paths: 18.\textit{xd}5 \textit{exd}5 19.\textit{e}7+ \textit{h}8 20.\textit{xd}5\textit{=} or 18.0-0?! \textit{xc}2 19.\textit{b}1

7...\textit{cxd}4
In this section we will consider all Black’s options, except for 7...\textit{e}7 8.0-0 0-0-9.\textit{xd}5 \textit{exd}5 the issues of which will be addressed in detail in Chapter 17.
Thus in case of 7...\textit{a}5 White’s best bet is 8.\textit{d}2?! If 7...\textit{xd}4 8.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xc}3 9.\textit{xc}3 \textit{cxd}4 10.\textit{a}4 \textit{d}7 11.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 12.\textit{cx}d4, which follows the game Smejkal – Ribli, Skara 1980, we
are confronted with a situation from the 7...cxd4 variation, which however occurs one move later.

In addition to the mainline move and the options listed above, four different retreats of the black knight off the d5-square have been tested. We will now take a closer look at these.

After 7...\(\mathcal{D}f6\) 8.e3 \(\mathcal{A}e7\) 9.0-0 0-0 10.a3 (with the idea d4xc5) 10...cxd4 11.exd4 \(\mathcal{B}b6\) 12.\(\mathcal{W}d3\) \(\mathcal{A}d8\) 13.\(\mathcal{A}e3\) \(\mathcal{B}g4\) 14.b4 a6 15.\(\mathcal{A}d1\) \(\mathcal{B}xe3\) 16.fxe3 \(\mathcal{W}a7\) 17.\(\mathcal{B}h1\) \(\mathcal{M}ikhchalchishin\) – B.Lalic, Sarajevo 1985, Black was left with the development problems of his queenside, which, taking into account the semi-open f-file and the seclusion of the black queen form the kingside, makes the white position the preferred one.

With the other retreat 7...\(\mathcal{B}b6\) following 8.\(\mathcal{A}g5\) (with 8.e3 \(\mathcal{A}e7\) 9.0-0 0-0 10.dxc5 \(\mathcal{A}xc5\) 11.b3 e5 12.\(\mathcal{A}b2\) \(\mathcal{A}f5\) 13.\(\mathcal{W}xd8\) \(\mathcal{B}xd8\) 14.\(\mathcal{B}fd1\) f6 15.\(\mathcal{D}e1\) \(\mathcal{B}xd1\) 16.\(\mathcal{A}xd1\) \(\mathcal{E}d8\) 17.\(\mathcal{B}xd8+\) \(\mathcal{E}xd8=\) Karpov – Ivanchuk, Polanica Zdroj 1998, the play gradually evened) 8...\(f6\) 9.dxc5 (after 9.\(\mathcal{A}e3\) \(\mathcal{B}c4\) 10.0-0 \(\mathcal{B}xe3\) 11.\(\mathcal{B}xe3\) \(\mathcal{A}e7=\) Ivanchuk – Seirawan, Tilburg (active) 1992, White displays some activity, which will be compensated by Black’s bishop pair) 9...\(\mathcal{A}xc5\) 10.\(\mathcal{A}e4\) (worth of attention is also 10.\(\mathcal{W}xd8+!?\)) 10...\(\mathcal{W}xd1\) 11.\(\mathcal{B}xd1\) \(\mathcal{A}b4\) 12.\(\mathcal{A}d2\) \(\mathcal{A}xd2\) 13.\(\mathcal{B}fxd2\) \(\mathcal{A}e7\) 14.f4 a5 15.\(\mathcal{A}c5=\), regardless of the substantial simplification, White’s position is more pleasing, thanks to the active role of the g2–bishop, Agdestein – Chandler, Hastings 1991.

Now we will discuss two more active lines for Black. For example, following 7...\(\mathcal{B}xc3\) 8.bxc3 cxd4 (in case of 8...\(\mathcal{A}e7\) 9.0-0 0-0 along with 10.e4, considered earlier in Chapter 17, there is also 10.\(\mathcal{B}b1!?\) cxd4 11.cxd4 \(\mathcal{B}b8\) 12.\(\mathcal{A}f4=\) with white superiority, Vera – Giusti, Sao Bernardo 1998) 9.cxd4 (another possibility is 9.\(\mathcal{B}xd4\) \(\mathcal{B}xd4\) 10.\(\mathcal{W}xd4\), which again leads to the mainline) 9...\(\mathcal{B}b4+\) 10.\(\mathcal{A}d2\) \(\mathcal{A}e7\) (both after 10...\(\mathcal{B}xd2+\) 11.\(\mathcal{W}xd2\) 0-0 12.0-0 \(\mathcal{B}d6\) 13.\(\mathcal{A}ab1\) \(\mathcal{B}b8\) 14.\(\mathcal{B}fd1=\) W. Schmidt – Luczak, Polanica Zdroj 1980, and following 10...\(\mathcal{W}a5\) 11.\(\mathcal{A}xb4\) \(\mathcal{B}xb4+\) 12.\(\mathcal{B}d2\) \(\mathcal{B}xd2+\) 13.\(\mathcal{A}xd2\) \(\mathcal{A}d7\) 14.\(\mathcal{B}hc1=\) Suetin – Klovans, Daugavpils 1978, White retains superior prospects) 11.\(\mathcal{A}c3\) 0-0 12.0-0 \(\mathcal{A}d7\) 13.\(\mathcal{B}d2\) \(\mathcal{B}c8\) 14.e4 \(\mathcal{A}f6\) 15.\(\mathcal{B}ac1\) \(\mathcal{B}b6\) 16.d5 \(\mathcal{A}xc3\) 17.\(\mathcal{B}xc3\) \(\mathcal{Exd5}\) 18.\(\mathcal{Exd5=}\), White’s domination in the centre, determined by the passed d-pawn, promises him superior odds, Gulko – Vaganian, Erevan 1996.

The aggressive continuation 7...\(\mathcal{B}db4\) forces White to take a radical course – sacrificing a pawn by 8.e3! (after 8.a3? cxd4 9.axb4 \(\mathcal{A}xb4=\) White is a pawn off with no compensation whatsoever, and in case of 8.dxc5 \(\mathcal{B}xd1+\) 9.\(\mathcal{B}xd1\) \(\mathcal{A}xc5\) 10.a3 \(\mathcal{A}d5\) 11.\(\mathcal{B}xd5\) \(\mathcal{Exd5}\) 12.b4 \(\mathcal{B}b6=\), which
occurred in the game Filippov – Krasenkow, Shanghai 2000, Black’s prospects are by no means worse) 8...cxd4 9.exd4 6xd4 (following 9...e7 10.0-0 0-0 11.e3 we arrive at a position, similar to the one considered earlier in the variation 7...f6, the only difference being the weird black knight on b4) 10.0-0! (after 10...xd4 6xd4 11.0-0 6xd1 12.6xd1 6e7? 13.b5 0-0=, White has sufficient compensation for the pawn, but nothing more) 10...6xf3+ (inadequate is 10...6bc2? due to 11.6xd4±) 11.6xf3 6e7 12.6d1 (the active thrust of the queen 12.6g4?! is insufficiently motivated in view of 12...h5! 12...6a5 13.a3 0-0 14.f4 6c6 (the light-squared white bishop is very active and the retaliatory pawn sacrifice 14.6d5 15.6xd5 exd5 16.6xd5 6b6 17.6d2± cannot resolve all Black’s problems) 15.b4 6f5 16.b5. Now in case of 16...e5 (following 16...6a5?! 17.c7 6xf3 18.xf3 6b3 19.xb1 6c5 20.a4, which occurred in the Kramnik – Topalov game, Linares 1999, the activity of the white pieces outweighs the pawn given up) 17.e2 White has sufficient compensation for the pawn both after 17...f6 18.a4∞, and after 17...g6 18.e3∞ (V.Kramnik’s analysis).

8.6xd4 6xc3

In case of 8...6db4 there is 9.6db5?! (following 9.xc6 6xd1 10.xd1 6xc6 11.xc6+ bxc6 12.c2± Black will also have to prove that his bishop pair is sufficient compensation for the isolation of the c-pawn, moreover, one has to take into account, that as yet the role of the light-squared bishop which has no counterpart is rather passive) 9...a6 10.6xd8+ 6xd8 11.a3 6e5 12.0-0 6e6 13.e3 6c7 14.b3 6c8 15.fc1± Anand – Krasenkow, Madrid 1998.

9.xc3 6xd4 10.6xd4

After 10.cxd4 6b4+ 11.6d2 6xd4 12.6b1 a5 13.6c2 0-0 14.xb4 axb4 15.0-0 6c3=, which occurred in the game Kir.Georgiev – Portisch, Biel (izt) 1993, the activity of the white pieces will suffice only to restore the material balance.

10...6xd4 11.cxd4

Now Black is at the crossroads: he will either preserve the dark-squared bishops by c1) 11...6d6 or exchange them by way of c2) 11...6b4+.

c1) 11...6d6 12.0-0!

The only way to contest the upper hand. Following 12.b1 6b8 13.f4 6e7 14.xd6+ 6xd6
15.\textbf{B}b3 b6 16.\textbf{A}a3 \textbf{B}b7= the play evened Groszpeter – T.Karolyi, Budapest 1986, and after 12.\textbf{B}f4 \textbf{E}e7 13.\textbf{B}xd6+ \textbf{E}xd6 14.\textbf{B}d2 \textbf{B}b8 15.\textbf{B}ab1 b6 16.\textbf{H}he1 \textbf{B}d7= Dokhoian – Nasybullin, Pavlodar 1987, the adversaries even chose to sop pressing on agreeing to a draw at this point.

12.\textbf{B}b8 13.e4
Weaker is 13.\textbf{B}d2 \textbf{B}d7 14.\textbf{F}fc1 in view of 14...\textbf{A}e7! 15.e4 \textbf{H}hc8 16.e5 \textbf{A}a3 17.\textbf{B}xc8 \textbf{B}xc8 18.\textbf{B}b1 b5 19.\textbf{A}c1 \textbf{B}xc1 20.\textbf{B}xc1 \textbf{B}d7 21.\textbf{A}c7 \textbf{B}c8 22.\textbf{B}xa7 \textbf{B}c1+ 23.\textbf{F}f1 \textbf{B}e8 24.\textbf{F}f4 \textbf{B}d1 25.\textbf{F}f2 \textbf{B}xd4= Eingorn – I.Farago, Muentster 1996.

13...0-0
Black’s difficulties persist also with the other continuations. Thus after 13...b6 strong is 14.\textbf{B}b2! (following 14.\textbf{F}e3 \textbf{B}b7 15.a4 \textbf{B}d7 16.a5 \textbf{B}xa5 17.\textbf{B}xa5 a6 18.\textbf{A}a4 \textbf{A}a8 19.d5 exd5 20.exd5 \textbf{B}hb8= the play was levelled, Cebalo – Pachman, Palma de Mallorca 1989) 14...\textbf{B}b7 15.\textbf{Ac}1 \textbf{B}d7 (in case of 15...0-0 16.e5 \textbf{B}xg2 17.\textbf{B}xg2 \textbf{B}b4 18.\textbf{B}c7= the White’s major pieces start infiltrating into the black camp) 16.d5! exd5 (to 16...e5 White proceeds with his offensive by 17.f4±) 17.exd5 f6 18.\textbf{B}h3+ \textbf{B}d8 19.\textbf{F}e6 \textbf{B}c8 20.f4?! \textbf{A}c5+ 21.\textbf{B}g2 \textbf{E}e8 22.f5±, as pointed out by V.Kramnik, Black will have a very hard time tuning up the co-ordination of his pieces, especially the rooks forced to work in separation. In V.Kramnik’s opinion White retains superior prospects also after 13...\textbf{B}d7 14.\textbf{F}e3 0-0 15.\textbf{F}fc1 \textbf{F}fc8 16.\textbf{B}xc8+ \textbf{B}xc8 17.\textbf{B}c1±.

14.\textbf{F}e5!
After Black’s castling, the dark-squared bishop has remained the main guard of the dark squares in the centre. However, it can watch the c7-square and the a3-f8 diagonal only from d6. By his most recent move White has asked the black bishop to express himself on the issue of which of these two sites he considers of higher priority.

14...\textbf{H}e7
Following 14...\textbf{B}c7 15.\textbf{A}a3 \textbf{B}d8 16.\textbf{B}ac1 \textbf{B}b6 (in case of 16...\textbf{B}d7? Black loses at once on account of 17.\textbf{B}xc7! \textbf{B}xc7 18.\textbf{B}d6= ) 17.\textbf{B}d6± White has a huge advantage, having seized an important foothold in Black’s camp.

15.\textbf{F}e3 \textbf{B}d7
After 15...b6 16.\textbf{F}fc1 \textbf{B}d8 White takes advantage of the fact, that the black bishop has left the a3-f8 diagonal, and by 17.\textbf{B}d2± hurries his dark-squared bishop along the route \textbf{B}d2-b4-d6. White also retains his edge by 17.d5 exd5 18.\textbf{B}xd5±, though this line would be less dangerous for Black, since it opens up prospects for the latter’s light-squared bishop on the c8-h3 diagonal.

16.\textbf{F}fc1 \textbf{F}fc8 17.\textbf{B}xc8+ \textbf{B}xc8 18.\textbf{B}e1 \textbf{B}f8

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19.\textit{\textbf{h3}}!

White exercises patience again. Following 19.d5 exd5 20.\textit{\textbf{x}}xd5 \textit{\textbf{e}}e6 21.\textit{\textbf{x}}xe6 fxe6 22.\textit{\textbf{c}}c7 b5!? (in case of 22...\textit{\textbf{d}}d8 23.\textit{\textbf{d}}d7 \textit{\textbf{b}}6 24.\textit{\textbf{x}}xb6 axb6 25.\textit{\textbf{d}}d6± Black gets no visible relief) 23.\textit{\textbf{x}}xa7 b4± White won a pawn, but the probability for exchanging all pawns on the queenside rose. The play would soon shift to the kingside. In such a case the conversion of the extra pawn on the kingside would be a task more demanding than trading White's current positional superiority for something more tangible.

19...\textit{\textbf{e}}e8 20.d5

Now, with no pawn exchanges in sight this move significantly gains in strength.

20...\textit{\textbf{d}}d7 21.d6 \textit{\textbf{d}}d8 22.\textit{\textbf{g}}g2 \textit{\textbf{b}}6 23.f4 \textit{\textbf{c}}c8 24.\textit{\textbf{f}}f2 \textit{\textbf{x}}xc1 25.\textit{\textbf{x}}xc1±.

Regardless of the fact, that bishops are the only pieces remaining, White has a sizeable advantage, due to the powerful protected passed pawn on d6, Kramnik – Lautier, Horgen 1995.

\textbf{c2}) 11...\textit{\textbf{b}}4+

As we saw in the previous variation, the exchange of the dark-squared bishop would have to a large extent alleviated Black's sufferings.

12.\textit{\textbf{d}}d2 \textit{\textbf{x}}d2+ 13.\textit{\textbf{x}}d2

13...\textit{\textbf{e}}e7

Now that Black has exchanged the dark-squared bishops his king must remain in the centre protecting the penetration squares from the white pieces. After the incautious 13...0-0?! 14.\textit{\textbf{h}}hc1 \textit{\textbf{d}}d8 15.e3 \textit{\textbf{b}}b8 16.\textit{\textbf{c}}c7 \textit{\textbf{d}}d7 17.\textit{\textbf{a}}ac1 \textit{\textbf{x}}xc7 18.\textit{\textbf{x}}xc7 a6 19.d5 exd5 20.\textit{\textbf{x}}xd5± Johansson – Nystrom, Avesta 1991, White easily obtained a huge advantage.

Alongside the mainline move also interesting is 13...\textit{\textbf{d}}d8!? (with the idea \textit{\textbf{e}}e8-e7-c7). Further one could proceed 14.\textit{\textbf{a}}ab1 (the attempt to crash Black's defence on the queenside by 14.a4 \textit{\textbf{e}}e8 15.a5 \textit{\textbf{b}}b8 16.\textit{\textbf{h}}hb1 \textit{\textbf{e}}e7 17.\textit{\textbf{b}}b2 b5 18.axb6 axb6 19.\textit{\textbf{a}}ab1 \textit{\textbf{d}}d7 20.\textit{\textbf{b}}b4 \textit{\textbf{d}}d6= provided White with nothing more but equality, Chernin – I.Farago, Hungary 1992, the same being true for the attempt to gain some edge by transferring the rook from the kingside to the queenside by
Worth attention was also 16...\textit{c}4!? \textit{b}8 17...\textit{ac}1\# with a slight white edge. This line seems rather reasonable, since with the command of the c-file White should avoid exchanging rooks, if at all possible.

16...\textit{d}8 17...\textit{xd}7+ \textit{xd}7
Even now with a pair of rooks Black cannot feel completely safe.

18...\textit{g}4?
Like in the examples considered earlier White tries to gain more room in the kingside. This advance will allow him as occasion offers to use the third rank for rook manoeuvres while attacking the enemy pawns. Beside the mainline move 18...\textit{f}4 has been also tested. However, after 18...\textit{b}8 19...\textit{e}4 (White get nothing by 19...\textit{d}5 in view of 19...\textit{xd}5 20...\textit{xd}5 \textit{f}6 21...\textit{e}4 \textit{d}6 22...\textit{e}3 \textit{d}7 23...\textit{d}4 \textit{c}8= and the odds evened out, Huzman - Psakhis, Haifa (active) 2000) 19...\textit{b}6 20...\textit{e}3 \textit{b}7 21...\textit{h}3 \textit{d}8!? (in case of an inaccurate 21...\textit{c}8? Black risk to arrive at a very difficult position following 22...\textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8 23...\textit{d}5 \textit{c}7 24...\textit{e}5 \textit{b}5 25...\textit{d}4 \textit{b}6 26...\textit{d}6± Benko - Donner, Wijk aan Zee 1970) 22...\textit{e}5 \textit{xd}5 23...\textit{c}8 24...\textit{g}2 (Black has nothing to worry about in the pawn endgame after 24...\textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8 25...\textit{xc}8+ \textit{xc}8=) 24...\textit{f}5 25...\textit{d}4 \textit{f}6= the odds remain even.

Note also that after 18...\textit{e}4 \textit{b}8 19...\textit{e}5 \textit{d}8 20...\textit{e}4 \textit{h}6 21...\textit{e}3 \textit{b}6 22...\textit{f}4 \textit{b}7= Benko - I. Farago, Szolnok 1975, the opponents
agreed to a draw.

18...h6

Outright bad was 18...b8? because of 19.g5 b6 20.c3± and the arrival of the white rook at the destination h3 will cause Black a lot of troubles.

In this situation according to V.Kramnik worth attention was 19.h4?! and regardless of the fact that after 19...b8 20.g5 hxg5 21.hxg5 b6 22.h1 a6 23.h7 g8= Black holds his defences, he has no counterplay whatsoever yet.

In the game Kramnik – Lautier, Belgrade 1995, which gave a serious impetus to the development of the entire variation, the play proceeded 19.f4 b8 20.g5 and at this point, as shown by the more recent encounter Psakhis – Zilberman, Israel 1998, Black managed to hold the equilibrium by way of 20...hxg5! 21.fxg5 b6 22.h4 g6 (inadequate is 22...b7?! on account of V.Kramnik’s line 23.xb7 xb7 24.h5 b8 25.h1±, which brings about a position with a remote passed white h-pawn, moreover, backed up by a rook) 23.e3 (at this point 23.h1 can already be countered by 23...b7, since 24.xb7 xb7 25.h5 gxh5 26.xh5 c7 27.h7 d6= is entirely acceptable for Black) 23...a6 24.f3 h8 25.h1 c4=. 
Chapter 17  \[1.\text{d}f3 \text{f}6 2.\text{c}4 \text{c}5 3.\text{c}3 \text{c}6 4.\text{g}3 \text{e}6\]

In anticipation of the white advance d2-d4, Black rearranges prospects for his f8-bishop, aiming to complete the development of his kingside at the same time.

5.\text{g}2

White has no reason to hasten the d2-d4 advance. After the casting its effect will be more profound.

5...d5

Black can delay this push playing 5...\text{e}7 instead, though after 6.\text{g}2 0-0 7.0-0 he has nothing better than 7...d5 all the same.

6.cxd5 \text{xd}5

The problems of Tarrasch Defence, which emerges following 6...cxd5 7.d4, are the subject of a separate chapter of Book 4.

7.0-0

With the immediate 7.d4 Black get the extra option to cross over to the positions from Chapter 16, or to proceed to the lines discussed below after 7...\text{e}7.

7...\text{e}7

Aware of White’s aspirations for the d2-d4 push, Black sometimes retreats the knight from d5. However most of the time this design turns out to be illogical, since it delays his development. Thus after 7...\text{c}7?! 8.d3 \text{e}7 9.\text{e}3 0-0 White still carries out his intentions by 10.d4 and as a result of 10...cxd4 11.\text{xd}4 \text{a}5 (Black do poorly also after 11.\text{b}4 12.\text{d}2 \text{c}5 13.\text{b}3 \text{xd}2 14.\text{xd}2 \text{c}6 15.\text{e}3 Polugayevsky – Padevsky, Varna 1972) 12.\text{a}4 \text{d}5 13.\text{xd}5 \text{exd}5 14.\text{d}2! \text{c}4 15.\text{c}3 \text{e}6 (15...\text{d}7 16.\text{b}3 \text{c}6 17.e4) 16.\text{xe}6 \text{fxe}6 17.b3 \text{d}6 18.\text{g}4 \text{f}5 19.e4! dxe4 20.\text{xe}4+ Illescas Cordoba – Kamsky, Buenos Aires 1993, the game developed to White’s obvious advantage.

The continuation 7...\text{f}6?! is notorious due to 8.e3 \text{c}7 9.d4 \text{cxd}4 10.\text{xd}4 \text{cxd}4 11.\text{xd}4 0-0 12.\text{e}3 (not bad is also 12.\text{f}4 \text{b}6 13.\text{e}2 \text{d}7 14.d5 \text{fe}8 15.\text{xe}6 \text{xe}6 16.\text{b}5 \text{xb}5 17.
\( \text{Exb5} \text{ c4} 18. \text{ c7} \text{ xf1} 19. \text{ xf1} \pm, \) which occurred in the Korchnoi – Wirthensohn game, Bad Kissingen 1981) 12...\( \text{d7} \) 13.d5 exd5 14.\( \text{ cxd5} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 15.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{c6} \) 16.\( \text{xd8} \) \( \text{fxd8} \) 17.\( \text{xc6} \) bxc6 18.\( \text{ac1} \) \( \text{d8} \) 19.\( \text{c4} \) with an obvious white edge, Uhlmann – Adamski, Halle 1981.

White’s tasks are a little bit more complex with 7...\( \text{b6} \), though in this case also after 8.d3 \( \text{c7} \) 9.\( \text{e3} \) (following 9...0-0 10.\( \text{c1} \) the need to protect the c5-pawn causes Black worries, moreover, that with 10...\( \text{d7} \) like in the Poulsen – Sorensen game, Copenhagen 1980, White could have obtained a perceptible edge with the help of 11.d4! and if 11...c4, then 12.d5\( \pm \), and in case of 9...\( \text{d4} \) 10.\( \text{c1} \) 11.\( \text{f4} \) 11.\( \text{f4} \) \( \pm \), like in the Hochgraefe – Demur game, Hamburg 1992, White also retains his superiority, since Black need to take into consideration the unpleasant 12.\( \text{e4} \) 9...c4 10.\( \text{c1} \)! (White poses the threat 11.\( \text{xb6} \) and 12.dxc4, while after 10.dxc4 \( \text{xc4} \) 11.\( \text{xd8}+ \text{xd8} \) 12.\( \text{c5} \) \( \text{e7} \) 13.\( \text{xe7} \) the play does not deflect from the equilibrium, H.Olafsson – Alburt, Reykjavik 1984) 10...\( \text{xd3} \) 11.\( \text{d1} \) \( \pm \) White regains the pawn temporarily given up and Black start experiencing problems due to the arrears of his development and the lack of any counterplay whatsoever.

8.d4 0-0

The exchange 8...\( \text{cxd4} \) 9.\( \text{xd5} \) \( \text{exd5} \) 10.\( \text{xd4} \) 0-0 11.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{e6} \) (following 11...\( \text{g4} \) 12.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{e6} \) 13.\( \text{h2} \) \( \text{a5} \) 14.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{a6} \) 15.\( \text{fd1} \) Black’s traditional problems with the isolated d5-pawn remain, Salov – Dolmatov, Minsk 1987) 12.\( \text{a4} \) \( \text{d7} \) 13.\( \text{fd1} \) \( \text{fd8} \) 14.\( \text{ac1} \) \( \text{xd4} \) 15.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{f6} \) 16.\( \text{b4} \) a5 17.\( \text{d2} \) Petursson – Jansson, Reykjavik 1998, is to White’s advantage only due to the disappearance of the knights, since with no knights Black’s chances to obtain counterplay decrease.

9.\( \text{xd5} \)?

White plans for the isolation of the black d5-pawn. Another plan distinguished by 9.e4 aims to create a powerful centre. White’s idea in rather simple – he dreams of a strong centre, similar to the one we saw in Part 2. However, Black does not need to go for the position after 9...\( \text{xc3} \) 10.bxc3, as he may opt for either 9...\( \text{db4} \) or 9...\( \text{b6} \). In the first case recently there was a very curious game. Following the necessary moves 10.a3 \( \text{cxd4} \) 11.axb4 \( \text{dxc3} \) 12.bxc3 \( \text{c7} \) White in the Karpov – Gunawan game,
4.g3 e6 5.\(\text{g}2\) d5 6.cd \(\text{c}d5\) 7.0-0 \(\text{e}7\) 8.d4

Bali 2000, chose 13.\(\text{a}4?\), which had not occurred previously, and reacted to 13...\(\text{d}8\) 14.b5 \(\text{e}5\) 15.\(\text{x}e5\) \(\text{x}e5\) 16.c4 \(\text{c}7\) by an interesting pawn sacrifice 17.e5! Declining the sacrifice by way of 17...\(\text{d}7\) (in case of 17...\(\text{x}e5\) 18.\(\text{e}3\) a6 19.\(\text{f}d1\) \(\text{c}8\) Black would have experienced difficulties to complete the development of his queenside) 18.\(\text{e}3\) a6 19.\(\text{f}b1\) h6 20.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{a}5\) allowed White to gain the upper hand. However, the reputation of the other continuation 9...\(\text{b}6\), which leads to interesting and sharp play, is still incommutable. Following 10.d5 (in case of 10.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{xd}1\) 11.\(\text{xd}1\) \(\text{xc}5\) 12.\(\text{f}4\) f6 13.\(\text{ac}1\) e5 14.\(\text{c}5\) exf4 15.\(\text{xc}5\) fxg3 16.hxg3 \(\text{g}4\) 17.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{ad}8\) White has nothing to rely on, Ribli – Tukmakov, Bled 2000) 10...\(\text{exd}5\) 11.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{d}4\) 12.\(\text{c}e1\) (the situation after 12.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{d}6\) 13.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{g}4\) 14.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{xd}3\) 15.\(\text{h}6\) \(\text{f}6\) 16.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}8\) also remains rather tense, Alburt – Dlugy, USA 1988) 12...c4!? 13.\(\text{f}3\) (Black’s position is viable also after 13.a3 \(\text{a}6\) 14.\(\text{f}6\) \(\text{d}5\) 15.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{xd}6\) 16.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 17.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{ad}8\) 18.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{c}5\) Gulkov – Alburt, Erevan 1975) 13...\(\text{d}6\) 14.a3 \(\text{a}6\) 15.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{g}6\) 16.h3 \(\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{c}5\) 18.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{ad}8\) the prospects are mutual, Korchnoi – Lautier, Horgen 1994.

9...\(\text{exd}5\) 10.\(\text{xc}5\)

White will not gain anything by holding off this move any further. Following 10.\(\text{e}3\) c4 11.b3 \(\text{xb}3\) (there is also 11...\(\text{a}5\)

12.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{e}6\) 13.b4 \(\text{c}6\) 14.b5 \(\text{a}5\) 15.\(\text{d}2\) a6! 16.b6 \(\text{c}6\) and the disadvantages of White’s b-pawn raid rather outweigh its merits, Khasin – Ruban, Elista 1994) 12.\(\text{xb}3\) \(\text{a}5\) 13.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{g}4\) 14.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{c}8\) 15.\(\text{a}2\) \(\text{c}4\) 16.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{d}7\) – the play is at a level, Karpov – Tal, Montreal 1979.

10...\(\text{xc}5\)

A more or less typical position has emerged with an isolated black pawn on d5. However, it differs from the standard Tarrasch Defence positions (referring to a Queen’s Gambit variation, the specifics of which have been addressed in Book 4), since a pair of knights has been exchanged. On one hand, the simplifications are to White’s advantage, but on the other it will now be more difficult to find a suitable job for the dark-squared bishop, moreover, one will have to constantly take into account Black’s intensified control over the d4-square.

11.\(\text{g}5\)!

Undoubtedly this move, which brings some disharmony to the black army, must be accepted as the strongest. Black has a much easier task producing counterplay with all other continuations. E.g., after 11.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{b}6\) 12.\(\text{g}5\) (the equilibrium is retained after 12.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{f}6\) 13.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{e}6\) 14.\(\text{f}4\) h6 15.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}8\) 16.a4 \(\text{e}7\) 17.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{g}4\) =, and Black has nothing to complain about, Portisch – Huebner, Italy (m/10)
1980) 12...g6 13.\(d\)1 (following 13.\(d\)2 d4 14.\(e\)f3 \(e\)7 15.\(h\)h6 \(f\)6\(=\) White risks even to end up with the inferior position, Agzamov – Tal, Moscow 1981) 13...d4 14.\(e\)e4 \(f\)5 15.\(g\)5 \(f\)6 16.\(h\)h6 \(f\)7\(=\) the black d4-pawn can hardly be called weak, while White’s e2-pawn can be a source of worries, Plaskett – Dokhoian, Belgrade 1988.

White’s kingside knight manoeuvres 11.\(c\)e1 d4 12.\(d\)d3 \(b\)6 13.a4 \(e\)8 14.\(d\)d2 a6 15.\(e\)c1 \(f\)5 16.\(b\)4 \(b\)x4 17.\(x\)b4 \(d\)7 18.\(c\)c1 \(a\)c8\(=\) Panno – Karpov, Mar del Plata 1982, as well as 11.\(g\)5 h6 12.\(h\)h3 \(f\)5 13.\(f\)4 d4 14.\(b\)b3 \(b\)6 15.\(b\)5 \(h\)7 16.\(d\)d5 \(e\)8 17.\(f\)4 d3\(=\) Zaichik – Agzamov, Telavi 1982, can be dangerous only to himself.

The attempt to develop the dark-squared bishop on the long diagonal a1-h8 by way of 11.b3 seems more logical. However, after 11...\(f\)5 (following 11...\(g\)4 12.\(b\)2 d4 13.\(h\)3 \(h\)5 14.a3 a5 15.\(d\)3 \(e\)7 16.\(f\)c1 \(a\)7 17.\(g\)5 \(g\)6 18.\(e\)1 \(f\)e8 19.\(a\)1 \(a\)d8\(=\), which occurred in the game Suba – Orlowski, Lyon 1990, one also cannot say that Black is experiencing any inconveniences) 12.\(b\)2 \(c\)e4 13.\(e\)c1 (after 13.\(d\)d2 \(e\)7 14.\(a\)c1 \(b\)6 15.e3 \(f\)e8 16.\(f\)d1 \(a\)d8 17.\(a\)1 \(f\)6! 18.\(e\)2 \(h\)8 19.\(f\)1 \(a\)3\(=\) Black managed even to obtain superior play due to his activity on the queenside, Quinteros – Alburt, New York 1983) 13...\(e\)7 14.e3 \(b\)4 15.\(a\)3 a5 16.\(d\)2 \(a\)6 17.\(d\)d4 \(f\)6 18.\(f\)d1 b6= Black has set up his bristles on both flanks and it is not clear how his position can be attacked, Brook – Gruenfeld, Israel 1986.

After 11.\(g\)5 Black has at his disposal three major options: a) 11...\(f\)6, b) 11...\(d\)7, c) 11...\(b\)6.

a) 11...\(f\)6

The continuation which sticks out a mile. However, this time the certain weakness of the a2-g8 diagonal provides White with additional tactical options.

![Diagram](image)

12.\(c\)1!

The move 12.\(c\)1 is justified only by 12...\(f\)2+?! 13.\(x\)f2 \(x\)g5 14.\(x\)g5\(=\). If, however, Black acts more cautiously and chooses 12...\(b\)6, then following 13.\(d\)2 \(e\)6 14.\(e\)1 \(d\)7 15.\(d\)3 \(h\)3 16.a4 \(g\)2 17.\(x\)g2 \(f\)e8\(=\), White risks even to end up with inferior odds, Psakhis – Agzamov, Riga 1985.

12...\(f\)5

Black intends to transfer his bishop to. The attempt to fix the white pawn on e2 with the help of 12...d4 is not so successful as earlier, because of 13.b4! (White
take advantage of the weakening of Black’s position caused by f7-f6) 13...h6 14.a4 a5 15.b5 c5 16.b3+ h8 and now by way of 17.e3! White not only aims to do away with the potential weakness on e2, but he also intends to exchange the black dark-squared bishop exerting definite pressure on his position, should the occasion arise. A possible further line is 17...h3 (after 17...xf3+ 18.xf3 h3 19.xb7 xf1 20.xa8 dx3 21.xe3 22.xe3 23.axb5 xa8 24.xc3 Black will lose the a5-pawn) 18.exd4 xg2 19.xg2 20.xf3 xd4 21.ac1 (less precise is 21.ad1, though in this case White’s position is also more pleasing after 21...b6) 21...b6 (in case of 21...d7 22.fd1 d7 23.g4! Black is subjected to an unpleasant pin on the d-file, Makarov – Dvoirys, USSR 1989) 22.f4! White exerts pressure on the black queenside, forcing the black pieces to take up far from perfect positions.

More than once has been tested also 12.e6, taking under control the light squares, somewhat weakened by the f7-f6 move. In this case, naturally, White immediately block the way of the black d-pawn by 13.e3. Now in case of 13.d4 (with the more restrained continuations Black also experiences certain difficulties, both after 13...b6 14.e6 c3 d8 15.b4!+, pointed out by B. Larsen, and following 13..d7 14.c1 b6 15.c3 fd8 16.d4 xd4 17.xd4 h3 18.xh3 xh3 19.e2 xf5 20.xb3 xh8 21.fd1 xf3 22xd3 d7 23.d4+, White managed to reliably blockade the d5-pawn and turn it into an obvious weakness, Khalifman – Lukin, St. Petersburg 1994) 14.xd4 xe3 15.e3 xf3+ 16.xf3 xe3 (after 16...b6 17.xe3 xe3 18.xe3 xe3 19.xe3 f7 20.b3 aae8 21.ae1, following the Larsen – Jussupow game, Reykjavik 1985, White attained an obvious edge, thanks to the fact, that Black has difficulties protecting the light squares on both flanks) 17.xe3 d7 (17...e8 18.xb7 d5 19.xe8 xe8 20.xd5 f8 21.xe1 xd8 22.xa8+ Kleberc – Rybak, Czech Republic 1998, White’s pair of rooks and pawn for the queen should bring him an easy win) 18.f6 19.d6 fe8 20.d4 xh8 21.b3 White’s superiority in the centre and the power differential of the bishops makes, White’s position is to be preferred, Stohl – Sax, Pula 1999.

The move 12.e8 is useful on common sense alone, however, it cannot bring a cardinal resolution of Black’s problems. Following the program move 13.e3 (the slower-going 13.c1, followed by 13...b6 14.e3 f5 15.c3 d7 16.d4 xd4 17.xd4, Chernin – Lputian, Minsk 1987, brought to the conclusion of a peace treaty, since in case of
17...\textbullet e4 Black's position is very hard to beat one's way through\) 13...\textbullet f5 White played 14.\textbullet b3! (in case of 14.\textbullet c3 \textbullet e4 15.\textbullet d4 \textbullet xd4 16.\textbullet xd4 \textbullet xg2 17.\textbullet xg2 \textbullet e7=, following the Uhlmann - Tukmakov game, Leipzig 1975. Black was able to carry on with the influence-contest for the d4-square) to immediately vacate the d1-square for his rook, while gaining a tempo in the process. Further on in the Agdestein – Elseth game, Asker 1988, there was 14...\textbullet b6 15.\textbullet c3 \textbullet e4 16.\textbullet ad1 \textbullet h8 17.\textbullet h4 \textbullet c8 18.\textbullet xe4! (now that Black has fortified the d5-pawn by transferring the bishop to e4, White is trying primarily to take advantage of the dynamic power of his more centralised pieces) 18...\textbullet xe4 19.\textbullet d6 \textbullet e5 (inadequate is 19...\textbullet d8? in view of 20.\textbullet xf6!++) 20.\textbullet fd1 \textbullet g4 21.\textbullet xe5 fxe5 22.\textbullet d5= and White has superior odds, due to the centralised position of his pieces, together with his superior pawn structure.

There are records of 12...\textbullet e7. After 13.\textbullet c3 (the move 13.\textbullet b3 is not so dangerous for Black at this point in view of 13...\textbullet d8) 13...\textbullet d8 14.e3 \textbullet f5 15.\textbullet c1 (following 15.\textbullet a4 \textbullet e4 16.\textbullet ac1 \textbullet b6 17.\textbullet fe1 \textbullet e8 18.\textbullet h4 \textbullet f7 19.\textbullet cd1 \textbullet ad8= Petursson – Brunner, Horgen 1994, the white queen has nothing to do on the queenside) 15...\textbullet e4 16.\textbullet e1 \textbullet b6 17.a3 \textbullet ac8 White contested the upper hand by 18.\textbullet h3!? \textbullet c7 19.\textbullet d2 \textbullet g6 20.\textbullet g4=, attempting to take advantage of the fact, that Black has left the h3-c8 almost unattended, Agdestein – Alburt, Taxco (izt) 1985.

13.\textbullet b3 \textbullet b6 14.\textbullet e3!

If there is an opportunity to exchange the dark-squared bishops, then why not do it immediately. There are records of 14.\textbullet ad1, which following 14...\textbullet e4 (in case of 14...\textbullet e8 following 15.\textbullet e3! \textbullet xe3 16.\textbullet xd5 \textbullet e6 17.\textbullet xd8 \textbullet xb3 18.\textbullet xa8 \textbullet xa8 19.\textbullet xb3 \textbullet b6 20.\textbullet d1= Black would have to accept an endgame with a pawn off) 15.\textbullet c3 \textbullet c7 16.e3 \textbullet ad8 17.\textbullet d4 \textbullet xd4 18.\textbullet xd4 \textbullet xg2 19.\textbullet xg2 \textbullet e4 20.\textbullet g1= also allowed White to retain certain edge, Larsen – Bareev, Naestved 1988.

14...\textbullet a5

With the immediate exchange 14...\textbullet xe3 15.\textbullet xe3 after 15...\textbullet e8 (in case of 15...d4 16.\textbullet f4= White intend to simply increase the pressure on the isolated black d-pawn by means of \textbullet f1-d1-d2 and \textbullet a1-d1) 16.\textbullet b3 \textbullet a5 (in case of 16...\textbullet xe2 17.\textbullet xb7= Black's position looks suspicious because of the unsecured placement of the pieces on the light squares) 17.\textbullet b5 a6 (if 17...\textbullet e4, then by analogy 18.\textbullet ac1=) 18.\textbullet b4 \textbullet e4 (18...\textbullet xc2? 19.\textbullet d4 \textbullet c6 20.\textbullet xb7=) 19.\textbullet ac1 \textbullet c4 20.\textbullet fd1= White's odds look better, drawing from the opportunity to play on the isolated d5-pawn, Groszpeter – Farago, Budapest 1986.
15...\textbf{\textit{xc}}3

The tactical operation underlying 15...\textbf{\textit{xc}}b6? \textbf{\textit{xb}}3 16.\textbf{\textit{xd}}8 \textbf{\textit{xa}}1 17.\textbf{\textit{e}}7 \textbf{\textit{fe}}8 18.\textbf{\textit{d}}4 \textbf{\textit{g}}6 19.\textbf{\textit{xd}}5+ \textbf{\textit{h}}8\textbf{\textit{f}} does not come through, since the black knight on a1 safely escapes.

15...\textbf{\textit{xe}}3

According to V.Kramnik, in the endgame following 15...\textbf{\textit{xc}}8?! 16.\textbf{\textit{xb}}6 \textbf{\textit{xb}}6 17.\textbf{\textit{d}}4 \textbf{\textit{xd}}4 18.\textbf{\textit{xd}}4 \textbf{\textit{e}}4 19.\textbf{\textit{h}}3\textbf{\textit{f}}+, White's prospects to take advantage of the weakness of the d5 increase still further.

16.\textbf{\textit{xe}}3 \textbf{\textit{e}}8 17.\textbf{\textit{c}}5

This move is more aggressive than 17.\textbf{\textit{f}}4 \textbf{\textit{e}}4\textbf{\textit{f}}+, though the latter also leaves White holding the upper hand, in view of his superior pawn structure.

17...\textbf{\textit{b}}6?!

Of no avail was 17...\textbf{\textit{xe}}2? on account of 18.\textbf{\textit{d}}4 \textbf{\textit{e}}5 19.\textbf{\textit{f}}4\textbf{\textit{f}}+, but according to V.Kramnik Black should have accepted the position following 17...\textbf{\textit{c}}8? 18.\textbf{\textit{xa}}7 \textbf{\textit{xe}}2 19.\textbf{\textit{d}}4 \textbf{\textit{c}}6 20.\textbf{\textit{e}}5 \textbf{\textit{xd}}4 21.\textbf{\textit{xd}}4 \textbf{\textit{e}}4 22.\textbf{\textit{fc}}1\textbf{\textit{f}}. Though it is obvious that White's pawn preponderance on the queenside makes desirable for him practically any endgame.

18.\textbf{\textit{b}}5 \textbf{\textit{a}}6 19.\textbf{\textit{a}}4 \textbf{\textit{b}}5

Now after 19...\textbf{\textit{xe}}2 20.\textbf{\textit{d}}4 \textbf{\textit{e}}5 (in case of 20...\textbf{\textit{d}}7 21.\textbf{\textit{xd}}5+ \textbf{\textit{h}}8 22.\textbf{\textit{d}}1\textbf{\textit{f}} Black meets with a decisive material loss) alongside the win of an exchange by way of 21.\textbf{\textit{f}}4 \textbf{\textit{d}}7 22.\textbf{\textit{d}}1 \textbf{\textit{e}}4\textbf{\textit{f}}+, entirely possible as pointed out by V.Kramnik is 21.\textbf{\textit{xf}}5?! \textbf{\textit{xf}}5 22.\textbf{\textit{ad}}1\textbf{\textit{f}}+, which also brings about a huge white advantage.

20.\textbf{\textit{f}}4 \textbf{\textit{e}}4

At last Black has performed the long cherished transfer of the bishop to e4, but the weakness of the dark squares in his camp, emphasised by the absence of the dark-squared bishops, should have to a large extent shattered his illusions about the outcome of the opening contest.

21.\textbf{\textit{ac}}1 \textbf{\textit{c}}4 22.\textbf{\textit{b}}3 \textbf{\textit{e}}5

No better is also 22...\textbf{\textit{d}}6 in view of 23.\textbf{\textit{c}}6 \textbf{\textit{f}}7 24.\textbf{\textit{fc}}1\textbf{\textit{f}} or 22...\textbf{\textit{g}}5 on account of the unsophisticated 23.\textbf{\textit{g}}4\textbf{\textit{f}}.

23.\textbf{\textit{d}}4 \textbf{\textit{xc}}2 24.\textbf{\textit{xc}}2 \textbf{\textit{b}}6 25.\textbf{\textit{fd}}1\textbf{\textit{f}}


b) 11...\textbf{\textit{d}}7

Outwardly awkward, but in fact quite sensible. Black intends to chase away the white bishop by h7-h6 and place the rook on d8. Then the black queen will vacate the c8-h3 diagonal for the bishop and everything will be all right.

12.\textbf{\textit{e}}1?!
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Probably the strongest. White directs the knight along the route e1-d3-e4. A similar idea was not a good decision on move eleven (see p.156, the game Panno – Karpov, Mar del Plata 1982). Now, however, since the c8-h3 diagonal has been temporarily shut off for the black lightsquared bishop, this proposition is more appropriate.

The other lines are less promising. Thus after 12...c1 d6 13.d2 e7 14.e3 f5 15.c3 e4 16.e4 c8 17.c1 d8 18.d2 h6 19.fd1 e6= in the game Miles – Podlesnik, Nova Gorica 1999, Black restructured successfully along the above scheme. The somewhat off-beat attempt to play in the queenside rook by way of 12.a3 h6 13.b4!? b6! 14.c1!? d4 15.a2 d5! 16.d2 c4= did not succeed either, Budnikov – Ruban, St.Petersburg 1993. In case of 12.c2 b6 13.ad1 d4 (Black is also all right following 13...h6 14.f4 e7 15.a3 d8 16.b4 a6 17.b2 d4 18.fxe1 f5= Schwartzman – L.Hansen, Wijk aan Zee 1995) 14.c1 14.f4 f5 15.xf5 d4 16.e5 xe5 17.xe5 ad8 18.f4 xe8 19.f3 h6 20.h4 d7 21.c1 e4= Gomez Esteban – Lima, Elgoibar 1997, Black had no problems with the d-pawn, in contrast with the case of the white pawn on e2.

12...d4

This move, aiming to fix the white pawn on e2, seems sufficiently consistent. Following 12...h6 13.d2 (White has to leave the f4-square unoccupied for the knight, while in case of 13.f4 d8 14.d3 b6 with the idea d7-e7= Black has no problems) 13...b6 14.d3 d6 W.Schmidt – Greenfeld, Moscow (ol) 1994, White should have completed the knight manoeuvre by the move 15.f4!? and if 15...e6, then, following 16.xd5! xd5 17.f4 f6 18.xd5 xb2 19.b1=, White’s bishop pair gives him the upper hand.

13.d3 b6 14.a4

White aim to squeeze Black on the queenside. Though the enforced retreat 14.d2 provided White with the bishop pair advantage after 14...c7 15.f4 e6 16.a4 c8 17.ac1 d8 18.fe1 h6 19.a3 d7 20.xe6 xe6 21.c4 f5 22.d3 e6= Kramnik – Anand, Monte Carlo (blindfold) 1995, no tangible advantage is in sight. As it happens, the black d4-pawn makes White’s position rather tight and does not permit him to deploy his forces, but it is very hard to do away with it.

14...f5 15.d2 d7 16.b4 a6 17.f4 e5 18.d5

A few moves ago the f3-knight could only dream of such a position.

18.d8 19.f4 e6 20.e1 g6 21.b5±

White has visibly squeezed Black on the queenside, which together with the strong position
of the knight makes his position the preferred one, Topalov – C.Hansen, Istanbul (ol) 2000.

c) 11...b6

A seemingly more natural move than 11...d7, though, as we have already seen more than once, Black’s dark-squared bishop was often forced to retreat to b6, and now this square is already occupied.

![Chess Diagram]

12...c1

Now the prospects of the c5-bishop on the important a7-g1 diagonal have been reduced to a minimum. Therefore, White seeks to disturb him as soon as possible. Note, that accepting the pawn sacrifice 12...xd5, which Black had offered on the previous move, quickly levelled the odds after 12...e6 13...d2 h6 14...e3 xe3 15...xe3 xb2 16...fb1 cf6= Barbero – Dlugy, Mendoza 1985.

12...d4

The threat to take the d5-pawn was already quite concrete. Thus after 12...h6? 13...xd5 e7 14...xe7 xe7 15...c5= C.Hansen – H.Olafsson, Espoo 1989, Black arrived at a lost position. The continuation 12...e6, followed by 13...c2 e7 14...xe7 xe7 15...c7 d6 16...xb6 axb6 17.a3± brought about the exchange of the dark-squared bishops, and the emerging endgame was definitely beneficial for White, Lagunov – Vaganian, Porz 1991. In case of 12...b5 13...f4 b6 14.b3 g4 15.a4 b4 (inadequate is 15...a6?! in view of 16.h3 xf3 17.xf3 d4 18.b4!± Psakhis – Machulsky, Vilnius 1978) 16.xd5 e6 17.b5±, White’s odds are also superior, thanks to the pressure on the queenside of the adversary.

13...c2!

The right time to disturb the black bishop on c5, before Black has prepared for it a comfortable retreat square on f8. Black must not fear also 13...f4 f5 14...c7, since after 14...b5 15.d2 (no better is 15...b3 on account of 15...xb3 16.axb3 b6 17...xb6 axb6 18...f1 f8 19.d2 h6 20.h4 d3= Illescas Cordoba – Tukmakov, Wijk aan Zee 1993) 15...b6 16.axb6 axb6 17...c4= Kramnik – Anand, Linares 1994, the opponents decided to put an end to the hostilities.

Following 13...e1 Black already manage to secure a satisfactory retreat for his bishop by 13...e8! And as a result of 14...d3 f8 15...d2 g4 16...e6 a6 17.f4 d6 18.h3 f5 19...b3 xf4 20.xf4 ad8 21...e5 e4= Polugaevsky – Anand,
Hilversum 1993, the odds levelled out.

Due to the same reason like 13.\(\text{Q}e1\) no edge is in sight also after 13.\(\text{Q}d2\), because of 13...\(\text{Q}e8!\)
(Black lacks the time even for 13...\(\text{h}6\), due to 14.\(\text{Q}e4!\) \(\text{hxg}5\)
15.\(\text{Q}xc5!\) \(\text{Qxb}2\) 16.\(\text{Q}c2\) \(\text{Qb}4\) 17.\(\text{Q}c1\)+) 13...\(\text{Q}e8\) 14.\(\text{Q}b3\) (now 14.\(\text{Q}e4?!\) would have been simply bad, since after 14...\(\text{Q}f8\) the weakness of White's queenside can have disastrous consequences, and following 14.a3 \(\text{Q}f8\)
15.\(\text{Q}c4\) \(\text{Qb}5\) 16.\(\text{Q}f4\) \(\text{g}4\) 17.\(\text{Q}e1\) \(\text{Qad}8\)+ B.Larsen – L.Hansen,
Odense 1994, Black's position is to be preferred, on account of the extra board room and the pressure on the e2-pawn) 14...\(\text{Q}f8\)
15.\(\text{Q}e1\) \(\text{h}6\) 16.\(\text{Q}f4\) \(\text{g}4\) 17.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{Q}e6\).
\(\text{Q}xh2\) after 18.\(\text{Q}xc6\) \(\text{bxc}6\) 19.\(\text{Q}xd4\)
\(\text{Q}xh3\) 20.\(\text{Q}e3\) \(\text{Q}e6\)+ Z.Polgar –
Lautier, Polanica Zdroj 1991,
Black's bishop pair outweighed White's slightly more compact pawn structure.

13...\(\text{d}6\) 14.\(\text{Q}d2\) \(\text{e}6\) 15.\(\text{Q}e4\)
The pawn sacrifice 15.\(\text{Q}c4\) has been tested more than once. However, following 15...\(\text{Q}xc4\)
16.\(\text{Q}xc4\) \(\text{h}6\) 17.\(\text{Q}d2\) \(\text{Qxb}2\) 18.\(\text{Q}fd1\)
(in case of 18.\(\text{Q}xc6\) \(\text{Qac}8\) 19.\(\text{Q}b1\)
\(\text{Qxe}2\) 20.\(\text{Q}b7\) \(\text{Qc}7\) 21.\(\text{Q}xc7\) \(\text{Qxc}7\)
22.\(\text{Q}e4\) \(\text{b}6\)=, there is nothing more that equality, Andersson –
Lautier, Biel 1991) 18...\(\text{Q}b6\) (with
18...\(\text{Qac}8\) 19.\(\text{Q}b1\) \(\text{Qa}3\) 20.\(\text{Q}c1\) \(\text{Qc}5\)
21.\(\text{Q}xc5\) \(\text{Qxc}5\) 22.\(\text{Qxb}7\)= White's position is still more pleasing,
due to the bishop pair advantage,
Illeskas Cordoba – Tukmakov,
Wijk aan Zee 1993) 19.\(\text{Q}a4\) (the variation 19.\(\text{Q}xc6\) \(\text{Qac}8\) 20.\(\text{Q}d5\)
\(\text{Qxc}6\) 21.\(\text{Q}xc6\) \(\text{Qxc}6\) 22.\(\text{Q}xd4\) \(\text{Qc}5\)
23.\(\text{Q}e3\)= does not disturb the balance) 19...\(\text{Qac}8\) 20.\(\text{Q}xc6\) \(\text{Qxc}6\)
21.\(\text{Q}a5\) \(\text{Qa}6\) 22.\(\text{Q}xc6\) \(\text{bxc}6\) 23.
\(\text{Qxd}4\) \(\text{Qc}5\) 24.\(\text{Q}c4\), Korchnoi –
Lautier, Barcelona 1992, White did not wait for the obvious
24...\(\text{Q}b6\) 25.\(\text{Q}xb6\) \(\text{Qxa}4\) 26.\(\text{Qxa}4\)
\(\text{axb}6\)= and agreed to a draw.

15...\(\text{Q}e7\)

Black has to accept the exchange of the dark-squared bishops
(as a consequence of 11...\(\text{Q}b6\)).
The greedy 15...\(\text{Q}b4\)? 16.\(\text{Q}d2\)
\(\text{Qxa}2\) can bring about a beautiful and very energetic white attack
on the black king after 17.\(\text{Q}f6\)=!!
\(\text{Q}h8\) (inadequate is 17...\(\text{gxf}6\)
because of 18.\(\text{Q}xf6\)=) 18.\(\text{Q}d3\) \(\text{g}6\)
19.\(\text{Q}e4\) \(\text{Qxc}1\) 20.\(\text{Q}h4\) 21.\(\text{Q}xe2\)
21.\(\text{Q}h1\) \(\text{h}5\) 22.\(\text{Q}xh5\)=.

16.\(\text{Q}xe7\) \(\text{Qxe}7\) 17.\(\text{Q}c5\)!

This move is more promising than 17.\(\text{Q}g5\), since after 17...\(\text{Q}f5\)
18.\(\text{Q}c5\) \(\text{Qfe}8\) 19.\(\text{Q}b4\) \(\text{Qad}8\) 20.\(\text{Q}fd1\)
\(\text{Qf}6\) 21.\(\text{Q}f3\) \(\text{b}6\) 22.\(\text{Q}e5\) \(\text{Qxe}5\)
23.\(\text{Q}xe5\) \(\text{Qd}5\)–= Illeskas Cordoba
– Lautier, Dos Hermanas 1994,
Black maintain the equilibrium,
regardless of his seemingly dangerous position.

17...\(\text{Q}f5\)

If 17...\(\text{Q}c6\), then 18.\(\text{Q}d6\)=.

18.\(\text{Q}xb6\) \(\text{axb}6\) 19.\(\text{Q}a3\)=

The endgame is more pleasing for White, since the black pieces must tend their d4 pawn at all times.
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1.d3 d6 2.c4 c5 3.d3 d6 4.g3 g6

Black maintains the symmetry awaiting White’s active commitment.

5.d4

Now that Black has committed himself to develop his dark-squared bishop on the a1-h8 diagonal, White can afford this program move. Note, that on a par with it is also 5.g2. As a rule after 5...g7 6.d4 everything adds up to an insignificant move transposition. However, as we will see below White’s options, are a little wider with the immediate 5.d4. The fact is that after 5.g2 d5 White can hope to get an advantage only by playing 6.d4! (the position after 6.cxd5 exd5 does not suit us, as we already mentioned in Part 4) 6...dxc4 (if 6...g7, then 7.dxc5, to be discussed shortly) 7.d5 a5 (after 7...b4 8.e5 g7 9.xc4 White win back the pawn with a certain edge in the centre) 8.e4 g7 9.0-0 (following 9.e5 g4 10.f4 h6 the situation remains unclear in view of the vulnerability of the white centre) 9...0-0 10.e5 e8 11.e1 and White’s superiority in the centre is obvious, which combined with the peripheral position of the black knight on a5 adds up to a good compensation for the pawn sacrificed.

5...g7

Another route to the variations discussed below is offered by 5...cxd4 6.exd4 g7. The only variation of independent significance is 6...d6 7.g2 d7, which is often employed by V.Kramnik in rapid chess games, when playing black. In this case worth attention is the following line: 8.xc6!? (risk is 8.c5?! in view of 8...dxc6 9.xc6 xc6 10.xc6+ bxc6 11.a4 b6 12.g5 g7 13.c1 0-0 14.c2, Sorokin – Scherbakov, St.Petersburg 2000, and Black could have emphasised the fact, that his position is the more pleasing, if only by...
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15.b3 c4!++; in the case of the popular 8...c2 g7 9.0-0 we will mention only one game, in which this position has occurred with a minor move transposition: Bacrot – Kramnik, Paris (active) 1995, with the follow-up 9...0-0 10.b3 a6 11.a2 a5! 12.a4 g4 13.d2 h5 14.h3 d6 15.h2 e5 16.e3 h6= with good black counterplay; after 8.0-0 g7 10.e4 Black prevented the c4-c5 breakthrough by way of 10...a5! 11.d2 0-0 12.d5 d8 13.e3, further in the game Gelfand – Kramnik, Monaco (blindfold) 2000, the simplest route to equality was 13...c8?! 14.e1 g4=; finally, in case of 8.e4 g7 9.xc6 White has to consider first of all 9...bxc6!? 10.c5 dxc5, tested in the Lerner – Baklan game, Ordzhonikidze 2000, and based on G.Kasparov's analysis, according to which Black has sufficient compensation for the exchange after 11.e5 g4 12.e6 xe6 13.xc6+ d7 14.xa8 xa8=) 8...xc6 (in case of 8...bxc6 9.c5! in a situation, in which the light-squared bishops had not been exchanged and the long diagonal a8-h1 had not been barred by e2-e4, Black did not risk to accept the pawn sacrifice and following 9...d5 10.e4 dxe4 11.xe4 xe4 12.xe4 g7 13.0-0 0-0 14.a4 c8 15.d1 a5, Kasparov – Kramnik, Moscow (blitz, m/7) 1998, White missed the opportunity to gain the upper hand by way of 16.xd7! xd7 17.xc6 e6 18.xa8 xa8 19.e3 xb2 20.b1= and now 9.e4 g7 brings about a situation which has occurred more than once in tournament practice. A reasonable follow-up would be 10.e3 (weaker is 10.0-0 in view of 10...d7= with the idea 11...xc3) 10...0-0 (now 10...d7 is inefficient because of 11.xc1 c5 12.0-0 xc3 13.xc3 xe4 14. xe4 xe4 15.xd4 d6 16.h6=, and the tactics 10...xe4 11.xe4 f5 is rejected by 12.xd6+ xd6 13.xd6 edx6 14.xc6+ bxc6 15.0-0=) 11.0-0 a6 (following 11...d7 12.xc1 a5 13.e2 c5 14.fd1 b8 15.d5 xd5 16. cxd5 b6 17.xc2 a8 18.b3 a7 19.b5 h5 20.a3 e6 21.b4= P.Nielsen – C.Hansen, Aarhus 1997, White developed a strong initiative in the queenside thanks to the absence of a black lightsquared bishop, and in case of 11...a5 12.xc1 a4 13.e2 a5 14.fd1 fc8 White carried out the program line 15.c5! c8 16.cxd6 xd6 17.d5 xd5 18. xd5 xc1+ 19.xc1 Kasparov – Ivanchuk, Manila (ol) 1992, and also obtained a huge advantage) 12.xc1 a5 13.e2 d7 14.xd2 b6 15.b3 fc8 16.d5 d5 17.xg5 xd5, and in the Kramnik – Kamsky game, Monte Carlo (active) 1995, White could have doomed Black to long-term defence by way of 18.cxd5 with the idea g2-h3.

As to the move 5...d5, now
alongside the move 6...g2, which we considered in the previous note, Black has to also reckon with 6.dxc5!? Should he take the most principled route 6...d4 7.b5 c5 8.g5 xc5 9.xf6 xf6 10.c7+ f8 11.xa8 e4 h3 13.d5 xg2 14.xg2 e6 D.Cramling – Johansson, Stockholm 1992, provided Black with good counterplay.

We can easily see, that he will face the position discussed in Chapter 16 variation a, but with colours switched and an extra white g2-g3 move. It is this very extra move, which justifies White’s hopes to keep his material edge and clear Black’s attack after 12.g2 exf3 13.xf3∞.

6...g2

Up to now it was not possible to cash on the pawn opposition in the centre. Thus after 6.d5 a5 7.d2 0-0 the play could have reverted shortly to the so called Yugoslavian variation of the King’s Indian Defence, but we made it clear in the first book, that it is beyond the scope of our interests. The move 6.dxc5 is inconvenient, because after 6...a5 one is forced to make the awkward move 7.d2, which following 6...xc5 8.g2 d6 9.a3 0-0 10.0-0 h5 11.e4 g4 12.f3 6...cxd4

Black makes a small concession, but he cannot easily maintain the tension in the centre without impairment to his position. Thus in case of 6...0-0 White can already afford the move 7.dxc5!? Following 7...a5 8.0-0 xc5 9.b3 d6 White has to contest the upper hand by 10.h3!, in order to be able, should the black queen park on h5, to chase it away anytime by g3-g4 (weaker is 10.b2 due to 10...h5 11.d2 h6∞ with counterplay for Black), 10...d7 11.d2 (White maintained superior odds also after 11.e3 a5 12.c1 f8 13.d2 ab8 14.fd1 e8 15.g5=, since Black lacked any perceptible counterplay, Jurak – Smejkal, Mlada Boleslav 1995) 11...b6 12.e4 f8 13.e2, Uhrmann – Gligoric, Sarajevo 1983, White obtained superior play on account of his extra board room, and Black’s attempt to create counterplay by invading

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on d4 by 13...e5?! (with the normal 13...\textit{Ab}8 White also stands better and can simply proceed with the further consolidation of his position, e.g., by 14.\textit{Ab}1±) 14.\textit{Fd}1 \textit{D}d4 15.\textit{D}d3 \textit{E}e8 16.\textit{X}xd4 \textit{Ex}d4 17.\textit{D}d5 \textit{D}d8 18.\textit{A}c1 \textit{A}c6 19.\textit{D}f4 \textit{A}a5 20.\textit{A}b2± brought about a position, in which the d4–pawn cannot be saved.

The attempt to maintain the tension by 6...d6 brings about a superior endgame for White after 7.dxc5 dxc5 8.\textit{X}xd8±. This assessment is confirmed by the developments in the game Lehtinen – Cooke, Budapest 2000, where after 8...\textit{X}xd8 9.\textit{A}e3 b6 10.\textit{B}b5 0-0 11.\textit{E}e5 \textit{B}b7 12.\textit{X}xb7 \textit{X}xb7 13.\textit{A}c6 \textit{D}g4 14.\textit{D}c7 \textit{D}xe3 15.fxe3 \textit{X}xb2 16.\textit{E}d1 Black had to part with the exchange.

The reciprocal 6...d5 followed by 7.dxc5 \textit{A}a5 (in case of 7...dxc4 8.\textit{X}xd8+ \textit{X}xd8 9.\textit{D}e5 \textit{E}e6 10.c6 bxc6 11.\textit{A}xc6± White's odds are better due to the superior pawn structure and the active position of the c6 knight) 8.cxd5 \textit{X}xd5 9.\textit{X}xd5 \textit{A}xc3+ 10.\textit{A}d2 \textit{A}xd2+ 11.\textit{X}xd2 \textit{X}xc5 12.0-0 0-0 13.\textit{H}h6 f6, Konietzka – Radke, Senden 1998, allows White, in view of the more harmonious placement of his pieces, to retain his edge, which would have been best emphasised by the unsophisticated 14.\textit{F}d1?!±.

7.\textit{D}xd4 0-0 8.0-0

White has some spatial advantage. In these positions, usually the party with the more board room is willing to keep as many pieces on the board as possible. These aspirations, however, must not be mechanical. Thus the attempt to avoid exchanging the knights by 8.\textit{D}c2 permits Black to obtain counterplay rather easily after 8...d6 9.0-0 \textit{E}e6 10.b3 \textit{D}d7 by aiming his light-squared bishop at h3. A reasonable continuation would be 11.\textit{E}e1 (if White accepts the exchange of the light-squared bishops, then after 11.e4 \textit{A}h3 12.\textit{E}e1 \textit{X}xg2 13.\textit{A}xg2 the black pawns in the centre will bristle up by way of 13...e6! The counterplay based on the breakthroughs b7-b5 and d6-d5, which is typical of the "hedgehog"-type positions, will also make itself felt soon, like in the game K.Arkell – Van der Weide, York 2000, which proceeded as follows 14.\textit{A}b2 \textit{F}d8 15.\textit{E}e2 a6 16.\textit{A}ad1 \textit{C}c7 17.\textit{A}e3 \textit{A}a5 18.a3 \textit{A}ac8 19.b4 \textit{H}h5 20.f4 b5 21.cx b5 ax b5 22.\textit{X}x b5 \textit{X}xe2+ 23.\textit{A}xe2 \textit{A}xe4=) 11...\textit{A}h3 12.\textit{A}h1 \textit{G}g4 13.\textit{A}b2 \textit{F}f5 14.\textit{A}f3 (worse is 14.\textit{A}f3?! due to the unexpected 14...\textit{A}xc2!! 15.\textit{A}xc2 \textit{A}d4+ 16.e3 \textit{A}xe3 17.\textit{F}f2 \textit{C}c2 18.\textit{F}xd4 and if in the game Donner – Adorjan, Groningen 1967, Black had chosen 18...\textit{X}xd4 19.\textit{A}xe7 \textit{X}xa1 20.\textit{X}xa1 \textit{C}c2 21.\textit{A}b2 \textit{F}e8 White would have hardly been able to recover) 14...\textit{F}e5 15.\textit{A}d5 \textit{D}d7 16.\textit{D}d4 \textit{F}f6 17.\textit{A}h1 \textit{X}xd5 18.\textit{X}xd5 \textit{A}fc8 19.\textit{D}d2 \textit{F}d8 20.f3 \textit{B}b6= and further in the game.
Kosten – Todorov, France 2000, the game was completely even. So this exception only reinforces the rule. Should White mechanically keep away from the exchanges by moving backwards, then they will have to accept to exchange pieces in a few moves all the same, but the situation will be considerably less favourable.

Let us revert to the main line.

![Chess Diagram]

Now we have to set apart from the others the following major options for Black: a) 8...a6, b) 8...d6, c) 8...b6, d) 8...a5, 8...g4 (see Chapter 19) 8...xd4 (see Chapters 20 and 21).

a) 8...a6?!

Black makes a move, which is generally useful in the long term, but is mistimed at this point. White’s strong reply very distinctly emphasises the deficiency of Black’s eighth move.

9.c5!

White seals Black’s position in the centre and on the queenside. As we will see later the c4-c5 advance is a fairly standard and rather efficient means to counteract Black’s formation in various situations. The current situation is no exception.

9...c7

Black’s situation is already so disgusting, that it is hard to find for him even a slightly tolerable continuation. See for yourself:

9...e5 10.b3 b5 11.cxb6 xb6 12.e3 d8 13.d6 e8 14.fd1 f8 15.d2 b7 16.g5 d6 17.d5+ Delchev – Bulic, Porto- roz 1997, the chronic weakness of the “d”-pawn, which is a direct consequence of Black’s ninth move, decided the outcome of the game in White’s favour.

9...d5 10.cxd6 cxd4 11.dxe7 xe7 11...f3+ 12.fx3 xe7 13.b3 a5 14.a3 a6 15.e3 g4 16.d5 e5 17.f4+, Black is simply a pawn off, Linqvist – Suninen, Jyvaskyla 1998) 12. xd4 f5 13.h4 fe8 14.f5 e6, Demur – Windt, Hamburg 1992, the fact that Black does not have sufficient compensation for the pawn sacrificed, would have been best underscored by the continuation 15.fd1!? e4 16. xe4 xe4 17.xe4 xe4 18. xe4 xe4 19.d2±.


9.g8 10.xc6 bxc6 11.xc6 b8 12.g2 a5 13.d5 xc5
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14.\textit{xe}3 \textit{\textit{wd6}} 15.\textit{xc}1 \textit{ee6} 16.\textit{a}7 \textit{zb7} 17.\textit{\textit{xf4}} \textit{xa}2 18.\textit{xb}7 \textit{xb}7 19.\textit{xd}7\textit{=} Black has no compensation whatsoever for the exchange off, Minaya – Gonzales, Bogota 1978.

9...\textit{e}4 10.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}3 11.\textit{xd}8 \textit{xd}1 12.\textit{xd}1 \textit{xd}8 13.\textit{e}3 \textit{f}8 (no better is 13...\textit{xb}2, since after 14.\textit{ab}1 threatening \textit{c}5-c6, Black is forced to settle for the line 14...\textit{e}5 15.\textit{xb}7 \textit{xb}7 16.\textit{xb}7\textit{=} which permits White to take up the seventh rank) 14.\textit{d}2 \textit{e}5 15.\textit{ad}1 \textit{b}8 16.\textit{f}4\textit{=} Baburin – Formanek, Liechtenstein 1992, Black soon suffocated in his own camp.

9...\textit{b}8 10.\textit{f}4 \textit{a}8 11.\textit{a}4 \textit{h}5 12.\textit{e}3 \textit{e}5 13.\textit{b}3 \textit{e}7 14.\textit{d}2 \textit{f}5 15.\textit{g}5 \textit{f}6 16.\textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}6 17.\textit{ad}1\textit{=} R. Garcia – Bertoni, Buenos Aires 1995, White's pressure on the d-file kept the black pieces on the queenside off play to the very end of the game.

9...\textit{a}5 10.\textit{b}3 \textit{c}7 (in case of 10...\textit{b}4 11.\textit{g}5 \textit{g}4 12.\textit{d}2 \textit{d}8 13.\textit{h}3 \textit{e}6 14.\textit{f}4 \textit{d}6 15.\textit{xd}6 \textit{xd}6 16.\textit{e}4\textit{=} the black d6-pawn is very weak, Sukuba – Stefan, Slovakia 1997, and after 10...\textit{d}8 11.\textit{g}5 \textit{h}6 12.\textit{f}4 \textit{b}6 13.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 14.\textit{xd}8 \textit{xd}8 15.\textit{xb}6 \textit{d}5 16.\textit{xd}5 \textit{xd}5 17.\textit{e}4\textit{=} the pair of black bishops cannot fully compensate the pawn off, Lenz – Pleimer, Aschach 1997) 11.\textit{f}4 \textit{d}8 12.\textit{c}1 \textit{b}5 13.\textit{xb}6 \textit{xb}6 14.\textit{a}4 \textit{a}5 15.\textit{d}2 \textit{h}5 16.\textit{h}3 \textit{g}5 17.\textit{g}4 \textit{g}6 18.\textit{g}3 \textit{h}5 19.\textit{b}6 \textit{a}7 20.\textit{a}4 \textit{hx}4 21.\textit{hx}4 \textit{d}8 22.\textit{fd}1\textit{=} Black did not manage to resolve satisfactorily the queenside development problem to the very end, Anic – Guglielmi, Cannes 1992.

9...\textit{g}4 10.\textit{b}3 \textit{ge}5 (10...\textit{b}5 11.\textit{cb}6 \textit{xb}6 12.\textit{d}5 \textit{d}8 13.\textit{g}5 \textit{f}6 14.\textit{f}4 \textit{ge}5 15.\textit{xe}5 \textit{fxe}5 16.\textit{b}4 \textit{b}8 17.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 18.\textit{c}1\textit{=} Black's pawn chain tumbled down completely, Szekely – Bertholee, Haarlem 1995) 11.\textit{a}4 \textit{b}8, Maric – Madl, Belgrade 1994, at this point the simplest way to reinforce White's advantage would have been 12.\textit{f}4\textit{=} d6 13.\textit{c}1\textit{=} and Black cannot avoid the formation of a weak pawn on d6.

The exchange 9...\textit{xd}4 10.\textit{xd}4 seems more consistent outwardly (better late than never), but here also Black can hardly avoid running quickly into a lost situation. There are records of 10...d6 (following 10...\textit{e}8 11.\textit{b}4 d6 12.\textit{d}1 a5 13.\textit{a}3\textit{=} the black pieces are forced to nestle on the eighth rank, Black fares no better also with 10...\textit{h}5 11.\textit{b}4 a5 12.\textit{a}3 \textit{a}6 13.\textit{e}3 \textit{c}7 14.\textit{ac}1 \textit{f}5 15.\textit{fd}1\textit{=} and after 10...\textit{b}8 11.\textit{f}4 \textit{h}5 12.\textit{e}5 \textit{b}6 13.\textit{c}6 \textit{xe}5 14.\textit{xe}5 d6 15.\textit{e}3\textit{=} Ramirez Gonzalez – Ibanez Aullana, Spain 1994, the white c6 pawn is not a weakness but rather a formidable weapon) 11.\textit{xd}6 \textit{e}8 12.\textit{h}4\textit{=} (we seem to have centred too much on White's successes, so let us show for the sake of diversity how one can
squander away his entire advantage: 12...b4 \bxd6 13...xd6 xxd6 14...d5 e5 15...b6 xb8 16.xd5 f5 17.xe6 xxf5 18.c3 xd8= Bouton – Tamm, Dortmund 1992, or most of it 12...e3 xxd6 13.xd1 xbd8 14.xe4 xf5 15.xd6 exd6 16.a3 xe8 17. e3 Agopov – Kivenen, Finland 1996) 12...xd6 13.xd1 xbd7 (following 13...c7?? 14.xd5! the game Velickovic – Ulm, Graz 1994, immediately came to an end, and after 13...f6 14.g5 xg5 15.xg5 xb8 16.e4 f6 17.d5+ f7 18.c5 b6 19.a3 xbd6 20.d5 Adamski – Kula, Warsaw 1989, the black knight on d6 also became a target for the white pieces) 14.d5 f6 15.e3 c6 16.c5 e8 17.b6 d7 18.h3 f5 19.c7 xb2 20.ab1 f6 21.b4+ Urday – F.Torres, San Sebastian 1991, and Black had to part with an exchange.

10...b6

After 10...d8? 11.f4 e5 12.g5 e7 13.d6! xd6 14. cxd6 c6 15.d5+- Frois – Conceicao, Lisboa 1998, Black immediately tumbled into a losing situation, and the continuation 10...a5?! 11.a4 b8 12.xa5 xxa5 13.f4 d6 14.cxd6 e5 also allowed White to obtain a winning position with the help of 15.b4++ Velickovic – Wenger, Graz 1994.

Akin to the move in the mainline text is 10...b5. In this case White’s simplest choice is 11. cb6!, which leads to the line discussed below. In the game Hausner – Sluka, Czech Republic 1999, White favoured 11.f4 and following 11...a7 12.a4 Black blundered 12...b4? (after 12...bxa4 13.xa4 h5= White’s edge would have been less pronoun-
ced) 13.\(\&b5!\) axb5 14.axb5 \(\&b7\)
15.bxc6 dxc6 16.\(\&a5+\) and wound up in a losing situation.

11.cx\(b6\)

The only reason to promote this move to the main line is that it is reasonable regardless of the square Black has placed his "b"-pawn on the previous move – b5 or b6. From a purely chess-theoretic point of view very strong is also 11.\(\&f4!\) \(\&a7\)
12. cxb6 \(\&xb6\) 13.\(\&c1\) a5 14.\(\&d2\) a4
15.\(\&e3\) \(\&b8\) 16.\(\&c5\) a3 17.\(\&xa3\)
\(\&xa3\), which allowed White to force Black by means of 18.\(\&a5a4!\)
\(\&g4\) 19.\(\&c5\) \(\&xc3\) 20.\(\&xc3\) \(\&a6\)
21.\(\&d5±\) to part with his dark-squared bishop in order to rescue his rook, P.Schlosser – Pezerovic, Germany 1994, giving White an obvious positional edge.

11...\(\&xb6\) 12.\(\&e3\) \(\&e7\) 13. \(\&f4\) \(\&a7\) 14.\(\&c1\) \(\&b7\) 15.\(\&e3\)
\(\&b8\) 16.\(\&c5\)±

Black managed to somehow complete the development of the queenside (Sebenik – Demidenko, Bled 1999), but the c5-pawn was superseded by the white knight, which on combination with the g2-bishop and the c1-rook exerts very unpleasant pressure.

b) 8...d6

Knowing from the preceding section how unpleasant can be the penetration of the white pawn onto c5, Black immediately takes control of this important square. However, at this point such a decision has its flaws – Black has to part with a pawn.

9.\(\&xc6\)

If White is willing to contest the upper hand he has to accept the pawn sacrifice. In case of 9.\(\&c2\) \(\&e6\) 10.b3 \(\&d7\) a position emerges, which we have already considered in the note to White’s eighth move. Following

9.b3 easily evens out 9...\(\&xd4\)
10.\(\&xd4\) d5! 11.\(\&xd5\) \(\&xd5\) 12.
\(\&xd5\) \(\&xc3\) 13.\(\&h6\) \(\&xd5\) 14.
\(\&xd5\) \(\&d8\) 15.\(\&ad1\) \(\&h3\) 16.\(\&g2\)
\(\&xg2\) 17.\(\&xg2=\) and the opponents agreed to a draw Spassky – Tal, Moscow 1967.

The continuation 9.\(\&xc6\) bx\(c6\) 10.\(\&xc6\) \(\&d7\) is not safe for White, since the price for the possession of an extra pawn is to bid farewell to the light-squared bishop, which seriously weakened the shelter of his king.

9...bx\(c6\) 10.\(\&xc6\) \(\&b8\)

More than once has been tested 10...\(\&h3?!\) 11.\(\&xa8\) \(\&xa8\) (outright bad is 11...\(\&xf1\) in view of 12.\(\&f3\) \(\&h3\) 13.\(\&d2\) \(\&g4\) 14.b3
\(\&b6\) 15.\(\&xg4\) \(\&xg4\) 16.\(\&d5\) \(\&b7\)
17.\(\&c3+-\) 12.\(\&f3\) \(\&xf1\) 13.\(\&xf1\)
\(\&c8\) (after 13...\(\&c8\) 14.\(\&d3\) \(\&h3+\)

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15.\(\text{\textcopyright}\)\textsubscript{g1} \(\text{\textcopyright}\textsubscript{d7} 16.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}d5 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}e8 17.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}f4 \\textsubscript{\textcopyright}f5 18.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}xf5 gxf5 19.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}b1+ Mou-
\textsubscript{\textcopyright}stafa – Abdel Bary, Cairo 1998, White simply emerged in the
endgame with an extra pawn) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}\textsubscript{d3}.\] A possible continuation is
14...\(\text{\textcopyright}\textsubscript{b7}\) (in case of 14...\(\text{\textcopyright}\textsubscript{d7}\), following 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}\textsubscript{d5}! \textsubscript{\textcopyright}e5 16.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}xe7+ \textsubscript{\textcopyright}f8 17.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}xd6 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}xc4 18.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}xg6+ \textsubscript{\textcopyright}g8 19.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}e7+– Loeffler – Krogius, 
Berlin 1992, White's attack acquired decisive characteristics,
after 14...\(\text{\textcopyright}c5 15.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}e3 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}h5 the ingenious 16.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}g1! \textsubscript{\textcopyright}c8 17.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}d1 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}e3+ 18.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}e1 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}h6 19.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}d4 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}g2 
20.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}f2 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}h1 21.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}f1 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}g7 22. 
\textsubscript{\textcopyright}g2+– Baburin – Manca, Cappelle la Grande 1993, helped
White hold off all threats and keep the material edge, the
continuation 14...\(\text{\textcopyright}\textsubscript{c6}\) can be 
warded off with the help of 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}\textsubscript{c3}?! a6 16.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}c1! \textsubscript{\textcopyright}d7 17.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}g2 
\textsubscript{\textcopyright}b7 18.b3 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}g4 19.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}g1 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}e5 
20.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}e4±, like in the Pajeken – 
Bathke game, Hamburg 1997) 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}b1 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}a6\) (the move 15...\(\text{\textcopyright}\textsubscript{d7}\) does not promise Black anything
due to 16.b3! \textsubscript{\textcopyright}e5 17.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}e4 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}d7 
18.\(\text{\textcopyright}\textsubscript{d2}÷\textsubscript{\textcopyright}W.Schmidt – T.Gior
gadze, Polanica Zdroj 1976) 16.b3 
and now the breakthrough 16... 
d5 was not dangerous to White 
after 17.\(\text{\textcopyright}xd5 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}xd5 18.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}xd5 
\textsubscript{\textcopyright}xa2 19.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}d3± Huebner – Dega-
ev, Pula 1976.
11.\(\text{\textcopyright}\textsubscript{a4}?!\)

The continuation 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}g2 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}a5 
12.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}b5 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}b7! 13.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}xb7 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}xb7 14. 
\textsubscript{\textcopyright}d2 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}a6 15.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}c3 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}c8 16.a4 has 
been tested more than once (following 16.b3 d5! 17.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}xf6 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}xf6 
18.\(\text{\textcopyright}xd5 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}xa1 19.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}xa1 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}bb8= 
Black is at least not worse, 
regardless of White's two pawns 
for the exchange, Vilkov – Vaulin, 
Smolensk 1997) 16...\(\text{\textcopyright}xc4 17.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}b3 
\textsubscript{\textcopyright}c8 18.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}c1 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}e4, though the best 
White can do is to admit that 
after 19.\(\text{\textcopyright}xg7 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}xc1= the position 
is even and to agree to a peaceful 
outcome, Jussupow – Wahls, Ba-

The continuation 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}b5?! is 
 somewhat more detached. It is 
etoo early to discuss its merits, since 
it has not been sufficiently 
tested in tournament play, 
though it is worth a careful 
inspection, since after 11...a6 
(following 11...\(\text{\textcopyright}e6 12.b3 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}g4 
13.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}b1 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}b6 14.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}g2 a6 15.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}a3 
\textsubscript{\textcopyright}a5 16.h3 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}f6 17.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}b2 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}d8 
18.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}c1 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}h5 19.g4 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}h4 20.f4± 
Hulak – Mohr, Bled 1991, White 
 extinguished Black's initiative 
and retained the extra pawn) 
12.\(\text{\textcopyright}d4 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}b6 13.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}g2 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}b7 14. 
\textsubscript{\textcopyright}xb7 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}xb7 15.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}c2 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}c5 16.b3 
\textsubscript{\textcopyright}h5 17.f3± Black managed to 
 obtain some initiative for his 
pawn, but insufficient to level the 
 odds, M.Petursson – D.Cramling, 
Hallsberg 1975.

11...\(\text{\textcopyright}h3\)

Weaker is 11...\(\text{\textcopyright}b7?! on ac-
count of 12.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}b1! (in the game 
Karpov – Topalov, Monaco (ac-
tive) 1997, White elected to play 
12.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}xb7 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}xb7 first, and only then 
13.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}b1, which permitted Black to 
completely even the position by 
way of 13...\(\text{\textcopyright}c8! 14.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}d2 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}h3 
15.f3 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}h5 16.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}f2 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}e6 17.\textsubscript{\textcopyright}g2 \textsubscript{\textcopyright}c8
18.b3  \( \text{\&}d4 \) 19.e3  \( \text{\&}xc3 \) 20.\( \text{\&}xc3 \)  \( \text{\&}xe3 \) =)  12.\( \text{\&}xc6 \) 13.\( \text{\&}xc6 \)  \( \text{\&}a5 \) 14.\( \text{\&}f3 \)  \( \text{\&}d7 \) 15.\( \text{\&}d2 \)  \( \text{\&}xc3 \) 16.\( \text{\&}xc3 \)  \( \text{\&}xc3 \) 17.\( \text{\&}xc3 \)  \( \text{\&}bc8 \) 18.b3 \( \pm \).  

Nikolic – Ellers, Germany 2000, where White managed to retain the extra pawn in addition to his excellent position.

Insufficient is also 11...  \( \text{\&}g4 \)?  
12.\( \text{\&}xa7 \)  \( \text{\&}e6 \) 13.\( \text{\&}d5 \)  \( \text{\&}d7 \) 14.\( \text{\&}d1 \)  \( \text{\&}e5 \) 15.b3  \( e6 \) 16.\( \text{\&}g2 \), since Black’s tactical operation 16...  \( \text{\&}xc4 \) 17.\( \text{\&}xc4 \)  \( \text{\&}xc3 \) 18.\( \text{\&}h6 \)  \( \text{\&}xa1 \) 19.\( \text{\&}xf8 \)  \( \text{\&}xf8 \) 20.\( \text{\&}xa1 \)  \( \text{\&}b4 \), N. Nikolic – Vl.Sergeev, Yugoslavia 1991, could have been refuted by 21.c5\( \pm \).

As to the continuation 11...  \( \text{\&}c7 \), which occurred in the Supatashvili – Ubilava game, Protvino 1993, following 12.b3  \( \text{\&}h3 \) 13.\( \text{\&}d1 \)  \( \text{\&}fc8 \) 14.\( \text{\&}f3 \) it could have brought about a position, discussed below in the mainline variation.

12.\( \text{\&}d1 \)!

The exchange of the lightsquared bishops promises White no benefits. After 12.\( \text{\&}g2 \)  \( \text{\&}xg2 \) 13.\( \text{\&}xg2 \) Black has at his disposal a very strong objection 13...  \( \text{\&}d7 \)!
(after 13...  \( \text{\&}c7 \) 14.\( \text{\&}b1 \)  \( \text{\&}d7 \) 15.\( \text{\&}d5 \)  \( \text{\&}b7 \) 16.f3  \( e6 \) 17.\( \text{\&}e3 \)  \( d5 \) 18.\( \text{\&}xd5 \)  \( exd5 \) 19.\( \text{\&}d1 \)\( \pm \), following the game S.Ernst – Van der Weide, Rotterdam 1998, Black has yet to prove that he has compensation for the pawn) and it turns out, that White will not be able to keep the extra pawn. Thus in case of 14.\( \text{\&}b1 \) (following 14.\( \text{\&}xd7 \)  \( \text{\&}xd7 \) 15.\( \text{\&}d5 \)  \( \text{\&}e8 \) 16.\( \text{\&}b1 \)  \( \text{\&}e5 \) 17.b3  \( \text{\&}xc4 \) = Black also restores the material balance) 14...  \( \text{\&}xa4 \) 15.\( \text{\&}xa4 \)  \( \text{\&}fc8 \) 16.\( \text{\&}c5 \)  \( \text{\&}xc5 \) 17.\( \text{\&}e3 \) the move 17...  \( \text{\&}b4 \) completely even the odds eventually (weaker is 17...  \( c4 \)?? in view of 18.\( \text{\&}xa7 \)  \( \text{\&}b4 \) 19.\( \text{\&}c3 \)  \( e6 \) 20.\( \text{\&}d4 \)  \( \text{\&}d5 \) 21.\( \text{\&}xg7 \)  \( \text{\&}xg7 \) 22.\( \text{\&}fc1 \)  \( \text{\&}xc3 \) 23.\( \text{\&}xc3 \)  \( \text{\&}cb8 \) 24.\( \text{\&}c2 \), Kramnik – Topalov, Monte Carlo (active) 1997, and White’s extra pawn retains his winning chances in the rook ending) 18.b3 (following 18.\( \text{\&}xc5 \)  \( \text{\&}d5 \) 19.\( \text{\&}d3 \)  \( \text{\&}xe3+ \) 20.\( \text{\&}xe3 \)  \( \text{\&}bc4 \)= White would have possessed an extra pawn, though there is an obvious difference in the activity of the white and the black pieces) 18...  \( c4 \) 19.\( \text{\&}bc1 \)  \( \text{\&}d5 \) 20.\( \text{\&}xa7 \)  \( \text{\&}a8 \) 21.\( \text{\&}c5 \)  \( \text{\&}xb3 \) 22.\( \text{\&}xb4 \)  \( \text{\&}xa2 \) 23.\( \text{\&}d2 \). At this point in the Loeffler – Reeh game, Germany 1995, a draw was agreed upon, since after the prophylactic 23...  \( h5 \)! or 23...  \( f5 \)! the black a-pawn will cost White a rook.

12...  \( \text{\&}c7 \)

After 12...  \( \text{\&}b6 \)? 13.\( \text{\&}d5 \)  \( \text{\&}xd5 \) 14.\( \text{\&}xd5 \)  \( \text{\&}b4 \) 15.\( \text{\&}xb4 \)  \( \text{\&}xb4 \) 16.a3  \( \text{\&}b6 \) 17.\( \text{\&}a2 \)  \( a5 \) 18.\( \text{\&}a4 \)  \( \text{\&}b8 \) 19.\( \text{\&}b5 \)  \( S.\text{Andersen} – \text{Wesseln}, \text{Germany} 1993, \text{Black had no compensation for the missing pawn}.

13.\( \text{\&}f3 \)  \( \text{\&}fc8 \) 14.\( \text{\&}b3 \)  \( \text{\&}e4 \)

Insufficient was 14...  \( d5 \) because of 15.\( \text{\&}b5 \)  \( \text{\&}d7 \) 16.\( \text{\&}f4 \)  \( \text{\&}b6 \) 17.\( \text{\&}ac1 \)  \( \text{\&}e8 \) 18.\( \text{\&}xa7 \)\( +/- \), and Black suffered a serious setback Strating – Blees, Amsterdam 1995.

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15.\(\text{\#d5?!}\)

Up to this point we have been following the Polugayevsky – I.Zaitsev game, Riga 1968, where after 15.\(\text{\#xe4?!} \text{\#xc3} 16.\text{\#b1}\) Black played 16...\(\text{\#b4!}\) launching the unpleasant threat 17...\(\text{\#d7}\), which permitted him to obtain at least even odds. However, after 15.\(\text{\#d5?!}\) it would have been harder for Black to level the odds. Probably, his best reply would have been 15...\(\text{\#c3}\) (following 15...\(\text{\#c5} 16.\text{\#a3} \text{\#d7} 17.\text{\#b2}\) Black has no compensation for the pawn down) 16.\(\text{\#xc7}\) (insufficient is 16.\(\text{\#xc3} \text{\#xc3} 17.\text{\#b1}\) once again in view of 17...\(\text{\#b4!}\) threatening to trap the white queen by 18...\(\text{\#d7}\) 16...\(\text{\#xa4} 17.\text{\#d5} \text{\#xa1}\) (no good is 17...\(\text{\#e8?!}\) on account of 18.\(\text{\#g5} \text{\#xa1} 19.\text{\#xa1} \text{\#b6} 20.\text{\#xe7+}\) 21.\(\text{\#c6}\) and with two pawns up for the exchange White obviously stands better, which holds true also after 17...\(\text{\#c3}\) 18.\(\text{\#xe7}\) 19.\(\text{\#g5} \text{\#e8} 20.\text{\#c6} \text{\#b7} 21.\text{\#e3} \text{\#xd1} 22.\text{\#xd1}\) 18.\(\text{\#xe7}\) 19.\(\text{\#xc8} \text{\#xc8}\) (the intermediate 19...\(\text{\#c3}\) brings serious troubles after 20.\(\text{\#e1} \text{\#c8}\) 21.\(\text{\#a3}\), since the black bishop on a1 is trapped) 20.\(\text{\#xa4} \text{\#xc4} 21.\text{\#e3} \text{\#e5} 22.\text{\#d5} \text{\#xa4}\).

Black has restored the material balance, but the resulting endgame is far from simple for him. White retains the upper hand after 23.\(\text{\#f4}\), since the weakness of the black pawn on d6 tells. Note the strong position of the d5-bishop, which at the same time protects the a2-pawn, and aims at the black pawn on f7.

c) 8...\(\text{\#b6}\)

9.\(\text{\#c2}\)!

The most radical retreat. Black's plan cannot be refuted by pouncing 9.\(\text{\#db5}\). Following 9...a6 10.\(\text{\#a4}\) (no promise for White holds also 10.\(\text{\#e3} \text{\#d8} 11.\text{\#d4}\) due to 11...\(\text{\#g4} 12.\text{\#xc6}\) dxc6 13.\(\text{\#xd8} \text{\#xd8} 14.\text{\#fd1} \text{\#e6} 15.\text{\#b6} \text{\#xd1+} 16.\text{\#xd1} \text{\#e5=} C.Martinez – Blank, Sao Paulo 1998) 10...\(\text{\#d8} 11.\text{\#d4} \text{\#xd4} 12.\text{\#xd4} \text{d6} 13.\text{\#d1} \text{\#a5} 14.\text{\#c3} \text{\#g4}\) Black has good prospects, Utsch – Gather, Germany 1990.

In case of 9.\(\text{\#b3}\), after 9...d6 10.\(\text{\#g5} \text{\#e6}\) (Black needs to constantly keep an eye on the d5-square, since the incautious
10...h6?, followed by 11.\textcolor{red}{\text{\texttt{xf6}}} \\
\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xf6}} 12.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d5 \texttt{d8}}} 13.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xf6+ exf6}} \\
14.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d2 \texttt{e6}}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{ac1 \texttt{e5}}} 16. \\
\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d4+}} Ubilava – Garcia Cava, Dos \\
Hermanas 1998, brought about a \\
huge white advantage, on ac-
ount of Black's poor pawn struc-
ture) 11.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d5 \texttt{xd5}}} 12.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{cd5 \texttt{e5}}} \\
13.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e3 \texttt{a6}}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d4 \texttt{ac8}}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f4}} \\
(with the leisurely 15.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d2}} Black \\
evened out after 15...\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c4}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{fc1}} \\
\textcolor{red}{\texttt{fc8}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xc4 \texttt{xc4}}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d3}} b5= \\
Zilber – Aronin, Leningrad 1957) \\
15.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c4}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e4 \texttt{h5}}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f2 \texttt{xd4}}} \\
18.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xd4 \texttt{b6}}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{h3 \texttt{c4?}}} Ka-
pengut – Lein, Leningrad 1971, \\
Black obtained counterplay. 
Moreover, it is not hard to see, 
that with the white knight on b3 
Black can rather easily take 
advantage of the c4–square in 
White's camp.

9...d6

After 9...\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c5}} 10.b3 d6 it is 
very important to counteract 
Black's plan, relying on the 
transfer of the queen to h5 with 
the subsequent exchange of 
the light-squared bishops, therefore 
worth attention is 11.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e1?!}} (in 
case of 11.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{b2}}, following 11...
\textcolor{red}{\texttt{h5}} \\
12.e4 \textcolor{red}{\texttt{g4}} 13.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f3 \texttt{h3}}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xh3}} \\
\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xh3}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e2 a6}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{ad1 \texttt{d7}}} \\
17.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a4?! \texttt{xb2}}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xb2}}, Hartoch 
– Savon, Skopje (ol) 1972, Black 
could have easily levelled the 
ods by 18...b5!=) 11...\textcolor{red}{\texttt{h5}} 12.f3 
\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c5+}} (at this point 12...\textcolor{red}{\texttt{h3?!}} is 
no more adequate, thanks to the 
placement of the white queen on 
e1, in view of 13.g4+) 13.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e3 \texttt{a5}}} \\
14.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d2 \texttt{c5+}}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f2 \texttt{xf2+}}} 16. 
\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xf2}}. Regardless of the 
quens being exchanged, White retains 
superior play on account of his 
extra board room. Following 
16...\textcolor{red}{\texttt{d8}} 17.e4 \textcolor{red}{\texttt{e6}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{fd1 \texttt{d7}}} \\
19.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f1 \texttt{f5}}} 20.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{exf5 \texttt{xf5}}} 21.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e3 \texttt{e6}}} \\
22.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{ac1+}} Teske – Valenta, 
Graz 1995, White, with his rooks 
concentrated on the central files, 
began considering the occupation 
of the d5–square.

10.b3

White has no need to rush the occupation of the d5 square. It is 
important to complete the de-
velopment of the queenside first, 
so that the seizure of the d5– 
square can have a most profound 
effect. The attempt to im-
mediately take hold of this strategic 
square evened the odds after 
10.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e3 \texttt{e6}}} 11.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{ed5 \texttt{xd5}}} 12. 
\textcolor{red}{\texttt{cd5 \texttt{e5}}} 13.b3 \textcolor{red}{\texttt{fc8}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{b2 \texttt{c4?!}}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{c1 \texttt{d7}}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a4 \texttt{d4}}} 
17.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{b1 \texttt{xd1}}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xd1 \texttt{cb6=}}} 
Barcza – Dely, Budapest 1953.

10...\textcolor{red}{\texttt{e6}}

Alongside this developing 
moves (casually inviting 11.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{b2?!}} to 
operate the simple trap 11... 
\textcolor{red}{\texttt{xc4+}}) Black has a number of 
a few roughly equivalent options.

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E.g., after 10...\(\text{a5}\) with the already familiar idea to transfer the queen to h5, White can counter Black’s plans by 11.\(\text{d}5!\)? (following 11.\(\text{d}5 \text{xd}5 12.\text{cxd}5 \text{b}8 13.\text{d}4 \text{a}6 14.\text{d}2 \text{d}8 15.\text{c}3 \text{d}7 16.\text{d}2 \text{c}5 17.\text{e}4 \text{b}6 18.\text{f}e1 \text{a}5 19.\text{ab}1 \text{fc}8=) Irzhanov – Ortiz, Shenyang 1999, the play evened out, while with 11.\(\text{d}2 \text{h}5 12.\text{e}4 \text{g}4 13.\text{f}3 \text{h}3\) Black carries out his plan, and White’s attempt to prove something relying on 14.g4?! brought him to an inferior position after 14...\text{xe}4! 15.\text{fxe}4 \text{xe}4 16.h3 \text{c}5 17.\text{h}1 \text{f}2+ 18.\text{xf}2 \text{xf}2=) Gamboa – Giardelli, Mar del Plata 1999) and now after 11...\text{a}6 12.\text{d}2 \text{d}8 13.\text{c}3 \text{e}6 14.\text{e}4 \text{d}7 (persisting with the objective set up on move ten Black could have exchanged the light-squared bishops by way of 14... \text{d}7 15.\text{d}5 \text{ab}8 16.\text{c}3 \text{xd}5 17.\text{xe}7 \text{de}3 18.\text{xe}3 \text{xe}7 19.\text{f}4 \text{h}3 20.\text{xe}3 \text{xe}3, though after 21.\text{f}5+ his kingside would have been weakened by the absence of the dark-squared bishops, and, moreover, he would have had no control over the crucial d5-square) 15.\text{c}1 \text{de}5 16.\text{e}2 \text{c}8 17.\text{h}3 \text{d}7, having completed the development of his queenside, White seized the strategically important square by 18.\text{d}5= Clausen – Lonborg, Copenhagen 1995.

A blank shot would have been 10...\text{g}4. Following 11.\text{d}2 \text{e}6 12.h3 \text{f}6 13.\text{c}1 \text{c}7 14.\text{h}2 \text{ad}8 15.\text{c}3= Sappanen – Karpinnen, Helsinki 1992, White has consolidated his forces and is ready to invade the d5-square.

To 10...\text{d}7 there is the prophylactic 11.\text{h}3. Now after 11...\text{a}5 (in case of 11...\text{e}6 12.\text{e}3 \text{c}7 13.\text{c}1 \text{ab}8, which occurred in the game Schmitzer – Rohs, Germany 1993, White’s simplest continuation would have been 14.\text{d}2! with the idea following 14...\text{c}8 15.\text{h}2 to meet the 15...\text{b}5?! breakthrough by 16.\text{xb}5 \text{ab}5 17.\text{d}4\text{f}, else to 11...\text{ac}8, there is 12.\text{e}3 \text{d}8 13.\text{d}2 \text{e}8 14.\text{ac}1 \text{f}5 15.\text{d}4 \text{xd}4 16. \text{xd}4 \text{b}6 17.\text{e}4 \text{e}6 18.\text{f}4 \text{h}5 19.\text{g}4 \text{xd}4+ 20.\text{xd}4 \text{g}7 21.\text{f}5 \text{d}7 22.\text{f}5\text{f} with a white initiative on the kingside, J.Nielsen – Tranberg, Esbjerg 1989) White counters the black queen manoeuvre by the traditional 12.\text{b}5! \text{a}6 13.\text{d}2 \text{b}6 14.\text{c}3, and after \text{xc}8 15.\text{a}4 \text{d}8 16.\text{e}3 \text{ab}8 17.\text{b}6 \text{c}7 18.\text{c}1 \text{f}5 19.\text{g}4 \text{xc}2 20.\text{xc}2 \text{d}7 21.\text{d}2 \text{e}8 22.\text{d}1\text{f} Benko – Wolfsteiner, Augsburg 1991, white stands better due to the fact that Black lacks any counterplay whatsoever.

No deep ideas underlie 10...\text{f}5 and following 11.e4 \text{g}4 the play reverts to the mainline variation.

11.e4!? White keeps on gaining board room. Quite often, after the invasion on d5, when exchanges on this square occur, White’s best
course is to take precisely with the e-pawn, in order to set up pressure on the black e7-pawn. The immediate 11.\( \square d5 \) is not quite convincing yet in view of 11...\( \triangle x d 5 \) (a losing proposition is 11...\( \triangle x d 5 \)? due to 12.cxd5 \( \triangle f 5 \) 13.e4 \( \triangle d 4 \) 14.\( \triangle c 3 ! \)+) 12.cxd5 \( \circ e 5 \) 13.\( \triangle e 3 \) \( \triangle a 5 ! ? \) (after 13...\( \triangle a 6 \) 14.a4 \( \triangle f c 8 \) 15.\( \triangle a 3 \pm \) Keene – Littlewood, England 1971, White managed to retain superior odds) 14.\( \triangle d 4 \) (now 14.a4 would have permitted Black to obtain counterplay by way of 14...\( \triangle f c 8 \) 15.\( \triangle a 3 \) \( \triangle b 4 \pm \) ) 14..\( \circ e 7 \) 15.e4 \( \triangle f c 8 \) 16.\( \triangle e 1 \) \( \circ e 8 \) 17.\( \triangle x g 7 \) \( \triangle x g 7 \) 18.\( \circ e 3 \) \( \circ c 7 = \) Masternak – Grzesiewicz, corr. 1993, and the play gradually evened out.

11...\( \triangle g 4 \)

To 11...\( \triangle f c 8 \), which is fairly typical with these structures, White already intended to play 12.\( \triangle d 5 ! \) \( \circ d 8 \) (in case of 12...\( \triangle x d 5 \) White would proceed 13.exd5 \( \circ e 5 \) 14.h3\pm to be followed by \( \triangle c 1 \)–\( e 3 \) \( \triangle c 2 \)–\( d 4 \) and thus deny Black all hopes of counterplay based on the b7–b5 breakthrough, in view of the chronic weakness of the e7-pawn) 13.\( \circ g 5 \) (the pressure on the f6-knight from the other side by way of 13.\( \triangle b 2 ?? \) is weaker due to 13...\( \triangle x d 5 \) 14.\( \triangle x g 7 \) \( \circ f 4 ! \) 15.\( \triangle b 2 \) \( \triangle x g 2 \) 16.\( \triangle x g 2 \) \( \circ d 7 = \) and Black obtains some counterplay) 13...\( \circ d 7 \) 14.\( \circ c 1 \pm \). In this case Black’s situation would have been very constrained, and the exchange on d5 would permit White to arrange play against the e7-pawn.

12.\( \circ e 1 ! \)

Exactly at this point. After 12.\( \circ d 2 \) Black can obtain counterplay by 12...\( \circ e 5 ! \) 13.\( \circ d 4 \) \( \circ c 6 \pm \).

12...\( \circ a c 8 \)

Thanks to the fact, that the white queen does not bar the c1-h6 diagonal to the dark-squared bishop, like it does with 12.\( \circ d 2 \), White can counter the 12...\( \circ e 5 \) move, as V.Kramnik points out, by 13.\( \triangle e 3 \) \( \circ d 8 \) 14.\( f 4 = \) driving the active black pieces back to their camp. Alongside the mainline move tournament practice has seen also 12...\( \circ e 8 \) with the idea to prepare f7–f5. However, regardless of the fact that after 13.\( \circ e 3 \) \( \circ d 7 \) 14.\( \triangle b 2 \) \( \circ d 8 \) 15.\( \circ d 2 \) Black completed his plan by 15...\( f 5 \), the active placement of the white pieces permitted White to highlight the shortcomings of this design by way of 16.exf5 \( \circ x f 5 \) 17.\( f 4 \) \( \circ e 8 \) 18.\( \circ a d 1 \) b6 19.\( \circ f e 1 \) \( \circ f 6 \) 20.\( \circ e d 5 \) \( \circ x d 5 \) 21.\( \circ x d 5 + \) \( \circ h 8 \) 22.\( \circ b 5 \pm \) Dridi – Ker, Gausdal 1986. If Black just temporise, e.g., by way of 12...\( \circ a e 8 \) (forehand protection of the e7-pawn) 13.\( \triangle c 3 \) \( \circ c 7 \), like in the Spreng – E. Schmid game, Pang 1983, then White needs not hurry and he could have steadily put increasingly more pressure on Black’s position by 14.h3!? \( \circ e 6 \) 15.\( \circ d 1 \) \( \circ c 8 \) 16.\( \circ h 2 \pm \) in the run-up of the invasion on d5. If Black revisits the idea with the exchange of the knights, which he has given up a
few moves ago (8...\(\mathcal{D}xd4\), see Chapters 20-21), then after 12...
\(\mathcal{D}b4\) 13.\(\mathcal{D}xb4\) \(\mathcal{W}xb4\) 14.\(\mathcal{D}d2\) \(\mathcal{W}c5\) 15.h3 he has also to go a long way
before he achieves equality. We will illustrate the possible develop-
ments in such a case by two games. After 15...\(\mathcal{A}e6\) (in case of
15...\(\mathcal{A}d7\) 16.\(\mathcal{A}c1\) \(\mathcal{W}h5\) 17.\(\mathcal{A}d1\) \(\mathcal{A}d1\)
18.\(\mathcal{W}fxd1\) White also stands
better, while the unctuous 18...
\(\mathcal{A}ab8\) permitted White to
obtain a winning position by the
already familiar stroke 19.c5! (a
backhand) 19...dxc5 20.e5 \(\mathcal{A}h5\)
21.\(\mathcal{A}e3\) \(\mathcal{A}e6\) 22.g4+- Busch –
Schlick, Germany 1989) 16.\(\mathcal{W}e2\)
\(\mathcal{A}ac8\) 17.\(\mathcal{W}ec1\) a6 18.\(\mathcal{W}h2\) \(\mathcal{A}a3\)
19.\(\mathcal{A}c2\) the seemingly natural
move 19...\(\mathcal{A}d7\)? turned out to be
a decisive mistake (following
19...\(\mathcal{A}c7\) 20.f4± Black’s position,
in the absence of any real coun-
terplay, would have also been
rather dubious, though alive and
breathing), which allowed White
to obtain a winning position by
way of 20.f4! \(\mathcal{W}c5\) 21.e5! (this time
White tries his forehand on the
d6-pawn) 21...dxe5 22.fxe5
\(\mathcal{W}h5\) 23.\(\mathcal{A}d5\) \(\mathcal{W}f8\) 24.\(\mathcal{A}b4+-
Uhlmann – Fron, Bad Wildbad
1997. Finally, should Black pro-
cceed 12...\(\mathcal{A}d7\), like in the rather
distant game Kluger – K.Honfi,
Hungary 1964, then one can
continue by analogy with the
mainline text 13.\(\mathcal{A}e3\)!? \(\mathcal{W}a5\)
14.\(\mathcal{A}d5\) \(\mathcal{W}xe1\) 15.\(\mathcal{A}xe1\)±, which
shows the way to a superior
endgame for White.
13.h3

A necessary move. After the
inaccurate 13.\(\mathcal{A}e3\) \(\mathcal{W}a5\) 14.\(\mathcal{A}b5\)
(the move transposition does not
work, since to 13.h3 Black al-
ready has 13...\(\mathcal{W}h5\)\(\ infiltration\) \(\mathcal{W}xe1\)
15.\(\mathcal{A}xe1\) a6 16.\(\mathcal{A}a7\) \(\mathcal{A}xa7\) 17.
\(\mathcal{A}xa7\) b5 18.\(\mathcal{A}e3\) bxc4 19.\(\mathcal{A}xc4\)
\(\mathcal{A}e6\) Haessler – Fuss, Germany
1996, White did not get anything
specific.

13...\(\mathcal{A}d7\) 14.\(\mathcal{A}e3\)

As a possible alternative V.
Kramnik points out 14.\(\mathcal{A}g5\)?. In
this case after 14...\(\mathcal{W}a5\)?! (Black
are best advised to accept a
slightly inferior position via
14...\(\mathcal{W}c5\) 15.\(\mathcal{A}d2\)± 15.\(\mathcal{A}d5\)! (wea-
er is 15.\(\mathcal{A}xf6\) \(\mathcal{A}xf6\) 16.\(\mathcal{A}d5\) in
view of 16...\(\mathcal{W}xe1\) 17.\(\mathcal{A}xf6+\) \(\mathcal{W}g7\)
18.\(\mathcal{W}h5+\) \(\mathcal{W}h6\) 19.\(\mathcal{A}xe1\) \(\mathcal{A}xh5\)=
15.\(\mathcal{A}d5\)! \(\mathcal{W}xe1\) 16.\(\mathcal{A}xe1\) \(\mathcal{A}fe8\)
17.\(\mathcal{A}ad1\)±, White’s pressure on
the black position is quite serious.

14...\(\mathcal{W}a5\)

15.\(\mathcal{A}d5\)??

With no queens Black’s task
to obtain counterplay becomes
harder, though by no means
impossible, as illustrated by the
following variations: 15.\(\mathcal{A}d2\)!
\(\mathcal{W}h5\) 16.g4? \(\mathcal{A}xg4\) 17.hxg4 \(\mathcal{A}xg4\)
18.\(\mathcal{W}f4\) \(\mathcal{A}e5\)++; or 15.f4?! a6

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16.\(\text{c1 b5}\). On the other hand, White had other means to pump up the pressure: 15.\(\text{d1!}\) \(\text{g4}\) (if 15...\(\text{e8}\), then after 16.\(\text{b4}\) \(\text{d8}\) 17.\(\text{c5}\) \(\text{e5}\) 18.f4 \(\text{c4}\) 19.e5!\(\pm\), a diagrammatic position emerges, in which White bears on the black d6-pawn rarely hard) 16.b4! \(\text{xc3}\) (following 16...\(\text{xe3}\)? 17.\(\text{bxa5}\) \(\text{c2}\) 18.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{a3}\) 19.c5\(\pm\); Black's compensation for the queen is clearly insufficient, since the move 16...\(\text{xb4}\)! is refuted by the straightforward 17.\(\text{d5}\)!, while to 16...\(\text{e5}\) there is the unpleasant 17.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{f6}\) 18.f4\(\pm\) and the black queen has problems finding a retreat square) 17.\(\text{xc3}\) \(\text{e5}\) 18.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{xd4}\) 19.\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{f6}\) 20.f4\(\pm\) and the e4-e5 breakthrough cannot be avoided (proposed by I. Stohl and L. Ftacnik).

15...\(\text{xe1}\)

According to V. Kramnik in case of 15...\(\text{xd5}\) 16.\(\text{exd5}\) \(\text{xa1}\) White should rest satisfied with the huge positional advantage after 17.\(\text{xa1}\) (the variation 17.\(\text{xc6}\) \(\text{c3}\) 18.\(\text{xd7}\) \(\text{xe1}\) 19.\(\text{xc8}\) \(\text{xc8}\) 20.\(\text{xe1}\) does not bring complete clarity even though White gets three pieces for the queen and pawn of his counterpart) 17...\(\text{e5}\) 18.\(\text{h6}\) \(\text{f6}\) 19.\(\text{xf8}\) \(\text{xf8}\) 20.f4\(\pm\).

16.\(\text{fxe1}\) \(\text{e8}\)

The line 16...\(\text{xd5}\)? 17.\(\text{exd5}\) \(\text{e5}\) 18.\(\text{xa7}\) \(\text{d3}\) 19.\(\text{xe7}\) \(\text{xa1}\) 20.\(\text{xd7}\) \(\text{c3}\) 21.\(\text{xb7}\)\(\pm\) is obviously unacceptable for Black, since White gets as much as three pawns for the exchange. It is also very hard to hold the position after 16...\(\text{fd8}\)! on account of 17.\(\text{g5}\)! which was pointed out by V. Kramnik in the post mortem. The line 17...\(\text{xd5}\) 18.\(\text{exd5}\) \(\text{e5}\) 19.\(\text{xe7}\) \(\text{e8}\) 20.\(\text{xd6}\) \(\text{f5}\) 21.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{d3}\) 22.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{xe1}\) 23.\(\text{e7}\) \(\text{xe7}\) 24.\(\text{xe7}\) \(\text{xa1}\) 25.\(\text{d6}\) \(\text{g2}\) 26.\(\text{d7}\) \(\text{a8}\) 27.\(\text{g2}\) \(\text{f5}\) 28.\(\text{d8}\) \(\text{xe8}\) 29.\(\text{xf8}\)\(\pm\), put forward by I. Stohl and L. Ftacnik, however long is rather illustrative. Beside the passive knight move to e8 worth further investigation is also 16...\(\text{xe4}\)! 17.\(\text{xe4}\) \(\text{xa1}\) 18.\(\text{xa1}\) \(\text{hx3}\) 19.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{g7}\) 20.\(\text{xc6}\) \(\text{xc6}\) 21.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{d7}\)\(\pm\), accepting a position with a non-standard material parity, in which the active placement of White's minor pieces makes his position slightly more attractive nonetheless.

17.\(\text{ad1}\) \(\text{c7}\)

Black could have got rid of the importune white knight on d5 by means of 17...\(\text{e6}\) 18.\(\text{db4}\) \(\text{xb4}\) 19.\(\text{xb4}\) a5 20.\(\text{d3}\)\(\pm\), though in this case the weakness of the black d6-pawn will tell all the time, and the rook on f8 does not look particularly well-placed.

18.\(\text{f4}\)

Insufficient was 18.\(\text{c5}\)! (the move 18.\(\text{xa7}\)? is simply poor due to 18...\(\text{d5}\) 19.\(\text{exd5}\) \(\text{xa7}\)\(\pm\)) 18...\(\text{xd5}\) 19.\(\text{xa7}\) \(\text{b8}\) 20.\(\text{c6}\) \(\text{xc6}\) 21.\(\text{xa7}\) in view of V. Kramnik's continuation 21...\(\text{cxd5}\) 22.\(\text{xb8}\) \(\text{xc2}\) 23.\(\text{xe7}\) \(\text{hx3}\)! 18...\(\text{fd8}\) 19.\(\text{e2}\)!
4.d3 g6 5.d4 Qg7 6.Qg2 cd 7.Qd4 0-0 8.0-0

This situation occurred in the game Kramnik – Kamsky, New York (m/6) 1994. Black could have persisted with the passive defence by 19...£f8. In this case White would have probably continued to enhance his position by 20.Qed2!?, since the immediate breakthrough 20.c5?! was of no avail yet in view of 20...dxc5 21.Qxc5 b6!? However, Black was enticed by another opportunity 19...Qe8?! (with the idea to shake off the white knight on d5 by e7-e6 in a situation more advantageous than the one on move seventeen) and ran into 20.Qxa7!?(according to V.Kramnik equally acceptable was 20.£f2!? with the idea to play in the dark-squared bishop on the d8–h4 diagonal following by the preliminary g3–g4) 20...e6 (Black’s position is also poor after 20...Qxa7 21.Qxe7+ £f8 22.Qxc8 £xc8 23.e5! dxe5 24.fxe5±) 21.£b6 exd5 22.cxd5 (less clear is 22.£xd8 £xd8 23.£xd5∞, and White cannot easily take advantage of his edge with the continuation 22.exd5 £b8 23.£xd8 £xd8 24.£e7 and now the most straightforward way to question Black’s plan would have been 23.£a3!? £a8 (if 23...£c7, then after 24.£c2 £b5 25.£xd8 £xa3 26.£xc8 £xc8 27.£c1± the white rook penetrates Black’s camp) 24.£xd8 £xd8 25.£c4 b5 (no better is 25...£c8 because of 26.£a5±) 26.£b6±. White exchanges his knight for one of the black bishops, thereby visibly reducing Black’s chances to obtain counterplay.

d) 8...£a5

Another far from perfect raid of the black queen. Its ultimate destination is the h5–square.

9. £b3!

With the destination of the black queen known, attempts have been made to deny it the h5–square even by means of 9.£cb5?!, though after 9...a6 10.£b3 £a4! 11.£a3 d6 12.£g5 £e6 13.£d2 £a5 14.£f3 £e4 15.£c1, Ong Yok Hwa – Jansa, Sarajevo 1966, Black could have obtained superior play by 15...d5!±.

If the black queen cannot be kept off the h5–square, then maybe at least the effect of its stay there can be attenuated.
With this objective there have been tests of 9.e3, though in this case by analogy with variation b (see 8...d6) Black can play 9...d6!
10.\( \text{d}2 \) (accepting the pawn sacrifice 10.\( \text{dxc6 bxc6 11.dxc6 \text{h}b8 12.a3 \text{h}3 13.e2 \text{g}2 14.e2 \text{xc6 f8 15.b4 \text{a}6 does not bring White anything, since in the Calotescu – Ardeleanu game, Miercurea Ciuc 1998 he could not keep his extra pawn, similar is the situation with 10.d2 d7 11.d2 f8 12.b3 \text{d}8 13.e5 \text{d}8 14.e1 a6 15.d6d4 in view of 15...dxd4 16.cxd4 e5! 17.c3 c4 18.e5 d5 19.cxd5 \text{g}4 – Ruck – Feher, Harkany 1994) 10...c5! (with 10...e4?! following 11.d5! \( \text{d}1 12.a5 \text{a}5 13.e5+ \text{h}8 14.e1 e8 15.d5 c4 16.b3 \text{d}a5 17.e1 18.e5± Adorjan – Jo.Horvath, Debrecen 1990, White obtained a huge advantage) 11.b3 d4 12.a4 h5 13.exd4 e4 14.f3 h3 = a position, in which Black’s prospects are at least not worse.

In case of 9.e2 (by analogy with variation c – see 8...b6) Black obtain good play by means of 9...d6 (weaker is the immediate 9...h5 due to 10.d5! dxe5 11.cxd6 e5 12.d6! exd6 13.b4 e4 14.d3 f6 15.e4+ and White has good compensation for the pawn sacrificed, D.Godes – Shabtai, Tel Aviv 1997) 9...d6 10.d2 (of no avail for White is also 10.d5 dxe5 11.cxd6 d5 12.d2 \text{b}6 13.e3 d7 14.d4 a6 15.b3 a8= Vaganian – Smejkal, Porz 1992, while after 10.e4 e4 11.f3 \text{e}6 12.d3, which occurred in the games Zwickner – Pieri, Metz 1990, and Mancebon – Granero, Linares 1998, Black’s most straightforward way to obtain good counterplay was 12... f8! (or 10...h5 11.e4 and now following 11...g4! (the endgame after 11...d1 12.eaxd1± is somewhat more pleasing for White) 12.h3 c5 13.e5 (White has to part with a pawn also after 13.e3 cxd4 14.h5 g6 15.d3 g4 16.hxg4 17.d3 c8 18.b5± Adorjan – J. Horvath, Debrecen 1990, White obtained a huge advantage) 11.b3 cxd4 12.a4 h5 13.exd4 \text{g}4 14.f3 \text{h}3 = – a position, in which Black’s prospects are at least not worse.)

After the white knight has retreated to b3 Black as a rule makes his choice between d1) 9...h5 and d2) 9...b4. Among the other less popular retreats worth noting is 9...a6?! a very strong reply being the familiar from variation a fairly standard 10.c5! Following 10...b6 (in case of 10...d6 11.cxd6 \text{d}d8 12.e4± White forced his opponent to take on d6 by his pawn, which does no grace to Black’s pawn structure) 11.e4 c5 (after 11...b7 12.e1 the black queen is facing the 13.ef1+ threat, and in case of the relatively superior 11...b7 12.e1± Black also has little worthy of a second glance) 12.e5 e8 13.c5 a5 14.e7 d7 e7
15.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}xd7} \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xe5 16.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}d5! \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xd5 17.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xd5 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}d8 18.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xe7+ \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}h8 19.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}b1!+- Tal – Ree, Sukhumi 1972, White soon prevailed. Probably, the move 9...\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}d8 is better than its reputation, but here also the same 10.c5!? b6 11.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}f4 (11.e4 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}a6 12.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}e1 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}e5 13.f4 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}d3 14.e5 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}g4= is followed by complications, which White should probably avoid) 11...\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}a6 12.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}c1 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}c8 13.h3 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}h5 14.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}e3 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}e5 15.cxb6 axb6 16.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}d2= Antunes – Nascimento, Portugal 1993, provides White with superior play thanks to the pressure exerted by the bishop pair on the queenside of the adversary.

\textbf{d1) 9...\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}h5}

The principled reply. Black intends to advance d7-d6, in order to get an opportunity to weaken the white king’s hideaway by exchanging the light-squared bishops.

10.c5!?

As in the other positions of this type, when Black delays the d7-d6 advance, White tries to take advantage of this circumstance by pushing c4-c5. Less promising is 10.e4 in view of 10...d6 (after 10...\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xd1 11.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xd1 d6 White manages to carry out 12.c5 dxc5 13.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xc5± again, which ensures him a slightly superior endgame) 11.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xh5 (Black obtains good counterplay following 11.f3 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}e5 12.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}e2 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}h3=, and 11.c5 does not promise much at this point, due to 11...dxc5 12.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xh5 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xh5 13.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xc5 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}b8 14.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}ad1 Anic – Degraeve, Strasbourg 1992, and had Black played now 14...b6!? 15.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}b3 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}b7= he would have almost evened the play) 11...\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xh5 12.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}d5= and it is not completely clear whether White will manage to cash anything on the active placement of his pieces.

\textbf{10...d6}

In case of 10...b6 White is best advised to proceed as follows 11.e4! (following 11.cxb6 axb6 12.e4 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}a6 13.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xh5 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xh5 14.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}ad1 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}c4 15.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}d2 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}e6= Varnusz – Bilek, Budapest 1958, Black obtained a good position) 11...bxc5 (with 11...\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xd1 12.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xd1 bxc5 13.e5 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}g4 14.f4= Black must prepare for serious problems) 12.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}f3 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}e5 (inadequate for Black is 12...\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}h3 13.e5 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xe5 in view of the intermediate 14.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}g2!+-) 13.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}f4= and the black queen will have difficulties finding a comfortable resort.

\textbf{11.cxd6}

The move 11.e4, followed by 11...dxc5 12.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xh5 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xh5 13.\textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}xc5 \textit{\texttt{\textipa{\textdagger}}}b8, steers the play to the aforementioned Anic – Degraeve

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11...\textbf{\textit{d8}}

In the game Merdinjan – Guney, Bulgaria 1978, there was 11...\texttt{\textit{h3}}, to which White should have replied 12.dxe7?! \texttt{\textit{x}e7}, and following 13.e4 \texttt{\textit{g4}} 14.f3 \texttt{\textit{xg2}} 15.fxg4 \texttt{\textit{h3}} 16.\texttt{\textit{e1}}\texttt{\textit{f}}, threatening \texttt{\textit{d1}}-\texttt{e2} and eventually winning the black bishop on g2, White should hold off Black's attack. After 11...\texttt{\textit{xd6}}, which occurred in the Ramo Frontinan – Lopez Colon game, Cordoba 1995, White should have also accepted the pawn sacrifice, this time by means of the move 12.\texttt{\textit{xd6}}!?, since following 12...\texttt{\textit{g4}} (White's defences will also withstand the pressure after 12...\texttt{\textit{h3}} 13.\texttt{\textit{c5}} \texttt{\textit{e5}} 14.\texttt{\textit{f4}}\texttt{\textit{f}}, since 14...\texttt{\textit{g4}} represents no danger due to 15.f3!) 13.h4 \texttt{\textit{e6}} 14.\texttt{\textit{f4}}\texttt{\textit{f}} White has the right arguments to stand up to Black's threats and at the same time keep his material edge.

12.e4 \texttt{\textit{g4}} 13.f3 \texttt{\textit{e6}}

Following 13...\texttt{\textit{h3}} 14.g4 \texttt{\textit{h4}} 15.\texttt{\textit{e1}} \texttt{\textit{x}e1} 16.\texttt{\textit{xe1}} \texttt{\textit{xg2}} 17.\texttt{\textit{dxe7}} \texttt{\textit{xf3}} 18.exd8\texttt{\textit{w}}+ \texttt{\textit{xd8}} 19.\texttt{\textit{h3}}\texttt{\textit{f}}, which occurred in the K. Honfi – Dely game, Budapest 1968, White's material edge should suffice for a win, provided he is accurate enough. In case of 13...\texttt{\textit{xd6}}? very strong is 14.\texttt{\textit{d5}!!} and there is no satisfactory defence in sight against the two threats 15.f\texttt{\textit{xg4}} and 15.\texttt{\textit{x}e7}+ \texttt{\textit{x}e7} 16.\texttt{\textit{xd6}}.

14.\texttt{\textit{e1}}!

14.\texttt{\textit{f4}}?! is definitely weaker. Black can obtain excellent play by means of 14...\texttt{\textit{g5}}!, since after 15.g4 (to 15.\texttt{\textit{d2}} Black simply replies 15...\texttt{\textit{xd6}+}) he has at his disposal 15...\texttt{\textit{xg4}}! 16.f\texttt{\textit{xg4}} \texttt{\textit{f4}} 17.\texttt{\textit{f3}} \texttt{\textit{f3}} 18.\texttt{\textit{xf3}} \texttt{\textit{xf3}} 19.\texttt{\textit{f3}} gxf3 20.dxe7 \texttt{\textit{e7}} 21.\texttt{\textit{f4}} \texttt{\textit{g6}+}.

14...\texttt{\textit{xd6}}

In case of 14...\texttt{\textit{c4}} 15.dxe7 \texttt{\textit{xe7}} 16.\texttt{\textit{f2}}\texttt{\textit{f}+} there is hardly hundred-proof compensation for the pawn Black sacrificed.

15.g4

Forces Black to make further material offerings.

15...\texttt{\textit{xf4}}

Impossible is 15...\texttt{\textit{e5}}?? due to 16.f4+– and the black queen is trapped in the centre of the board.

16.\texttt{\textit{xf4}} \texttt{\textit{xf4}} 17.\texttt{\textit{f4}} \texttt{\textit{d3}}

18.\texttt{\textit{f2}} \texttt{\textit{d4}}

This situation occurred with minor move transposition in the game Bandza – Magai, USSR 1989. Should White have chosen 19.\texttt{\textit{e3}}\texttt{\textit{f}}, he would have had the resources to withstand Black's assault.
\[ \text{d2) 9...wb4} \]

With the white knight on b3 it is only reasonable to test the attack on the c4–pawn.

\[ \text{10.c5} \]

At this point also this move, although essentially forced, still does not lose its strength in the least.

\[ \text{10...qa5?!} \]

Probably this is not the strongest move, since following it the power of the white bishop on g2 is further enhanced, but still this very move has been the most popular choice. The assault on the white c–pawn can proceed also by means of 10...a5, though after 11.d2! (White gets nothing by 11.g5 in view of 11...a4 12.xf6 axb3 13.xg7 xg7 14.xb3 xxc5 15.ac1 b4= Balster – Zimmermann, Germany 1993) 11...a4 (following 11...c4 12.c1 we6, had White in the game Spassky – Suetin, Leningrad 1963, found the continuation 13.b5! g4 14.h3 h5 15.e3= Black would have faced rather difficult problems) 12.d5 g4 13.b6 a6 14.c1 d6 (the move 14...a3, which occurred in the game Schoebel – Timpel, Germany 1988, could have brought about a huge white advantage after 15.b4 e4 16.b1 xd2 17.xd2± 15.h3 h5 16.xc8 xxc8 17.cxd6 exd6 18.d3± White stands better thanks to the weak black pawn on d6 and the bishop pair, J.Pribyl – Gurgenidze, Tbilisi 1980.

There are also records of 10...b6. In this case worth attention is 11.e3!? (the other interpretation of the same theme follows the line 11.cxb6 axb6 12.e3 b8 13.a3 c4 14.c1 a6 15.f4± with more pleasing play for White, Feria – Martinez Espin, Sevilla 1992) 11...e8 12.a3 c4 13.c1 a6 and at this point in the Bohm – Re game, Amsterdam 1984, White could have proceeded 14.g5± with the idea 15.xf6 to be followed by 16.d5.

\[ \text{11.e3?!} \]

White simply reinforces the c5–pawn. However in this situation White has a choice of entirely acceptable means to gain the upper hand. For example, after 11.xa5 xa5 12.a4 d8 13. d2 c7 14.c1 b8 15.b3± Elwert – Virnik, Germany 1997, White obtained a superior position and a careless 15.e8? (one feels that any other move would have been at least not worse) permitted him to turn it into a winning one by 16.e1!+- in view of the threat d2-a5, which cannot be prevented. Another
option for White is $11.\he \xd 4$ (as we saw earlier oftentimes Black’s counter-options are reduced, when there are no queens on board) $11.\he \xd 4$ $12.\he \xd 4 \he 8$ (following $12..\he 6$ $13.\he b 3$ $b 6$ $14.\he x b 6$ $a x b 6$ $15.\he e 3$ $\he b 8$ $16.\he f 4$ White stands better, as it does also with $12..\he e 4$ $13.\he x e 4$ $\he x d 4$ $14.\he h 6$ $\he e 8$ $15.\he a b 1$ $f 5$ $16.\he d 2$ $\he c 6$ $17.\he f c 1$ $\he d 8$ $18.\he f 3$ $\he f 6$ $19.b 4$ Rossig – Kladiva, Balatonbereny 1995) $13.\he d 1$ $\he c 6$ (after $13...d 6$ $14.\he d 5$ $d x c 5$ $15.\he x e 7$ $\he h 8$ $16.\he b 3$ $\he x b 3$ $17.\he b 3$ $\he b 3$ Petrov – Czerniak, Buenos Aires 1939, Black developed serious problems on account of his queenside) $14.\he e 3$ $\he c 7$ $15.\he a c 1$ $\he b 8$ $16.b 3$ and White retains his advantage due to the active placement of his pieces, Koerholz – Diesterweg, Germany 1993.

$11.\he d 8$

The attack on the e3–bishop by $11..\he g 4$? fails due to $12.\he d 5$, and the endgame after $11..\he x b 3$ $12.\he x b 3$ $\he x b 3$ $13.a x b 3$ $a 6$ $14.\he f d 1$ is a compliment to White. The semi-open a-file assists White greatly in his attack on the queenside of the opponent.

$12.\he d 4$!

Now White have posed the threat to exchange on f6 and then invade d5 with his knight. The actual play in the Konopka – Hrivnak game, Sala 1995, was weaker. There after $12.h 3$ $d 6$ $13.c x d 6$ Black did not opt for $13...\he x d 6$ $14.\he d 5$ $\he x d 5$! $15.\he x d 5$ $\he x h 3$ and got himself into a difficult situation.

$12..e 6$

An attempt to cover up the d5 square.

$13.\he x a 5$ $\he x a 5$ $14.e 4$

Black’s serious queenside development problems remain, while the white pieces reign in the centre.
Chapter 19

1.\( \text{\textbf{f}}3 \) \( \text{\textbf{f}}6 \) 2.\( c4 \) c5 3.\( \text{\textbf{c}}3 \) \( \text{\textbf{c}}6 \) 4.\( g3 \) g6 5.d4 \( g7 \) 6.g2 cxd4 7.xd4 0-0 8.0-0 \( g4 \)

In contrast to the previous lines, this is a more up-to-date treatment of Black’s position. The heat on the white knight is tuned on with the help of the g7-bishop, and not of the queen, which as we saw earlier often attracted the attention of the white pieces.

9.e3

This is the only way White can contest the advantage. Of course, inadequate is 9.\( \text{\textbf{xc}}6?! \) dxc6 10.\( \text{\textbf{xc}}2 \) \( \text{\textbf{f}}5 \) 11.e4 \( \text{\textbf{e}}6 \), and now after 12.b3 b5 \( \text{\textbf{f}} \) Menghi – T.Tolnai, Mitropa 1990, White got even worse. With the 9.\( \text{\textbf{xc}}2?! \) retreat tells the fact, that the long diagonal a1-h8 is open to the gunfire of the black bishop and there is an opportunity for 9.\( \text{\textbf{xc}}3! \) 10.bxc3 \( \text{\textbf{a}}5 \). Now only 11.\( \text{\textbf{b}}4! \) d6! (in case of 11...\( \text{\textbf{xb}}4 \) 12.cxb4 \( \text{\textbf{xb}}4 \) 13.\( \text{\textbf{b}}3 \) \( \text{\textbf{xb}}3 \) 14.\( \text{\textbf{xb}}3 \) d6 15.\( \text{\textbf{a}}3= \) White has sufficient compensation for the pawn) 12.\( \text{\textbf{xc}}6 \) bxc6 13.\( \text{\textbf{xc}}6 \) \( \text{\textbf{b}}8 \) 14.\( \text{\textbf{g}}2 \) \( \text{\textbf{xc}}3 \) 15.\( \text{\textbf{g}}5 \) \( \text{\textbf{e}}5 \) 16.\( \text{\textbf{d}}5= \), which occurred in the Makarov – Atalik game, Podgorica 1992, allows White to maintain roughly equal odds. With the other retreat 9.\( \text{\textbf{b}}3 \), following 9...d6 White’s best option is to start simplifications, e.g., by means of the classical 10.c5 (in case of 10.e4?! the game could proceed 10...\( \text{\textbf{xc}}3! \) 11.bxc3 \( \text{\textbf{g}}5 \) 12.\( \text{\textbf{h}}6 \) \( \text{\textbf{e}}8 \) 13.c5 dxc5 14.\( \text{\textbf{xd}}8 \) \( \text{\textbf{xd}}8 \) 15.\( \text{\textbf{xc}}5 \) b6 16.\( \text{\textbf{b}}3 \) \( \text{\textbf{a}}6 \) with superior play for Black, Mack – K.Berg, Germany 1987) 10...dxc5 11.\( \text{\textbf{xd}}8 \) \( \text{\textbf{xd}}8 \) 12.\( \text{\textbf{xc}}5 \) \( \text{\textbf{b}}8 \) 13.\( \text{\textbf{h}}3 \) \( \text{\textbf{f}}6 \) 14.g4 \( b6 \) 15.\( \text{\textbf{b}}3 \) \( \text{\textbf{b}}7 \) 16.\( \text{\textbf{f}}4 \) \( \text{\textbf{bc}}8 \) 17.\( \text{\textbf{fd}}1 \) h5=, with even prospects and a draw, Groszpeter – J.Horvath, Hungary 1989.

After White’s ninth mainline move Black as a rule has opted for the following continuations:

a) 9...\( \text{\textbf{ge}}5 \), b) 9...\( \text{\textbf{xd}}4 \) and c) 9...d6.

The line 9...\( f5 \) has not been developed in view of the already familiar from the previous sections rather standard reply 10.\( c5 \), and after 10...\( \text{\textbf{h}}8 \) 11.\( \text{\textbf{ce}}2 \) e5

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12.\texttt{c}b5 e4 13.\texttt{c}b1 a5 14.\texttt{d}ec3 b6 15.\texttt{c}xb6 \texttt{c}xb6 16.a4 \texttt{d}ge5 17.\texttt{d}d5 \texttt{e}c5 18.b3 \texttt{d}d3 19.\texttt{f}f4 \texttt{xc}1 20.\texttt{n}c1 \texttt{e}e5 21.\texttt{d}d2\pm

Black could not completely equalise the play no matter how hard he tried, due to the chronic backwardness of the d-pawn, Portisch – Naranja, Manila 1974.

a) 9...\texttt{d}ge5

Black stages an attack on the c4-pawn, but as we will see below this knight manoeuvre is not the best plan for Black.

10.\texttt{b}3 \texttt{d}6

As we will see shortly this system is uniquely characterised by the aggressive assault on the d4 strong point in White’s camp. A similar tactics has been tested here as well. However, following 10...\texttt{xd}xd4 11.exd4 \texttt{c}c6 12.\texttt{e}e2?! (not bad, as we will see below, is the standard 12.\texttt{e}e3 to be followed by \texttt{a}a1-c1, d4-d5, \texttt{e}e3-d4) 12...d6 13.\texttt{b}b2 \texttt{b}b8 14.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{f}f5 15.d5!± Krupenski – Nybaeck, Tallin 1998, the important central square d4 soon submitted to the white knight, which paralysed Black’s opportunities for active play on both the queenside and the kingside. Moreover, the black knight on c6 indirectly cooperated, since it provided extra tempos for the development of the white initiative.

11.\texttt{h}3!

A useful prophylactic move against the entrance of the black bishop on g4. Following 11.\texttt{b}b2 \texttt{g}4 12.f3 \texttt{d}7\pm or 11.\texttt{de}c2 \texttt{g}4 12.f3 \texttt{d}7 the situation would have been less clear. A curious fact is, that in the latter case in the P.Nikolic – Anand game, Wijk aan Zee 1989, White though belatedly opted for 13.h3, however, it was already too late and after 13...\texttt{d}b4 14.a3 \texttt{bd}3 15.\texttt{d}d2 a5 16.\texttt{b}b1 \texttt{c}c5 17.f4 \texttt{c}c6\pm the play became rather complicated.

11...\texttt{xd}4

The drive to simplify the position is absolutely natural in a confined situation. An ambition to maintain the tension, e.g., by 11...\texttt{d}7 can meet the denial 12.\texttt{de}2 (a bonus of the prophylactic h2-h3, which gives rise to the threat to win the black knight on e5 by advancing f2-f4) 12...\texttt{e}8 (Black resolved the knight problem in the game Averbakh – Nezhmetdinov, Baku 1961, differently by means of 12...\texttt{b}4 13.e4 a5 14.\texttt{e}3\pm, however, he could not find any cardinal solution to the general defects of his position, like insufficiency of board room and lack of real counterplay) 13.\texttt{b}2 a6 14.f4 \texttt{d}7 15.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{c}8 16.\texttt{fd}1. Now Black’s attempt to set oneself free on the queenside by means of 16...\texttt{c}a5?! (better is 16...\texttt{c}5, but here also after 17.\texttt{de}5± White’s position is noticeably more active) brought the opposite result following 17.a3 \texttt{d}8 (poor was 17...b5? in view of 18.b4--) 18.\texttt{d}5 \texttt{xb}2 19.\texttt{xb}2 b5 20.\texttt{ac}1 bxc4 21.\texttt{xc}4\pm B.Lalic – Krasenkow,
Neum 2000. The b7-b5 break-through only surged up the activity of the white pieces.

Following 11...\texttt{a5} 12.\texttt{d2} Black revived the idea to exchange the knights 12...\texttt{xd4}, however, after 13.exd4 \texttt{c6} 14.\texttt{b5} \texttt{d8} White advanced with no time lost by 15.d5! \texttt{b8} (15...\texttt{x}a1? loses, because of 16.dxc6 bxc6 17.\texttt{xc6}+) 16.\texttt{c3} \texttt{xc3} 17.\texttt{xc3} \texttt{d7} 18.\texttt{e1} \texttt{f6} 19.\texttt{d4} \texttt{d7} 20.\texttt{e3} a6 21.\texttt{ae1}+ and the weakness of the black e7 pawn does not hold out bright prospects for Black, Dzindzichashvili – Fedorowicz, USA 1989.

12.exd4 \texttt{c6} 13.\texttt{e3} e5

Black attempts to release himself in anticipation of a forthcoming white attack on the e7-pawn. In case of 13...a6 14.\texttt{c1} \texttt{b8} 15.\texttt{e1} \texttt{e8} White played 16.d5! \texttt{e}5 17.\texttt{a7} \texttt{a8} 18.\texttt{d4} \texttt{d7} 19.\texttt{xg7} \texttt{g7} 20.\texttt{d4}+ \texttt{g8} and carried out a standard plan to put pressure on Black’s position, P.Nielsen – Brynell, Aars 1995, which can be improved by transferring the rooks to the e-file by means of 21.\texttt{c2} \texttt{f6} 22.\texttt{ce2}+, reproducing the above discussed fragment of the Dzindzichashvili – Fedorowicz game, USA 1989. In case of 13...f5 14.\texttt{c1} e5 15.dxe5 dxe5 16.\texttt{c5}± Odendahl – Lahaye, Dieren 2000, White was also better prepared for the opening of the play in the centre.

14.dxe5 \texttt{a5}

A required intermediate move. After 14...dxe5?! 15.\texttt{c5} \texttt{e}8 16.\texttt{b5} \texttt{f8} 17.\texttt{xf8} \texttt{xf8} (in case of 17...\texttt{xf8} 18.\texttt{x}d8 \texttt{x}d8 19.\texttt{fd1} \texttt{d4} 20.\texttt{xd4} exd4 21.\texttt{d2} \texttt{b5} 22.\texttt{ad1} Black will not be able to rescue the d4-pawn, Miles – Van der Werf, Groningen 1989) 18.\texttt{x}d8 \texttt{x}d8 19.\texttt{ad1} \texttt{g7} 20.\texttt{c7} \texttt{b8} 21.\texttt{xc6} \texttt{x}d1 22.\texttt{x}d1 bxc6 23.\texttt{d8} \texttt{f6} 24.\texttt{e}8+ Miles – Capossotti, Rome 1990, Black’s endgame prospects are very grim.

15.\texttt{d5}?

Following 15.\texttt{c1} dxe5 16.\texttt{d5} \texttt{a6} 17.\texttt{b5} \texttt{xb5} 18.\texttt{xb5} \texttt{d4} 19.\texttt{xd4} exd4 20.\texttt{fd1} \texttt{d8}= Santos – Reinaldo, Mondariz 2000, Black held the balance thanks to his bishop pair advantage.

15...dxe5 16.b4±

White retains his edge, due to the strong position of the d5 knight and his pawn superiority on the queenside.

b) 9...\texttt{xd4} 10.\texttt{xd4}

Black somewhat simplified the position by exchanging the knights, but the resulting deformation of his pawn structure bears danger for him to emerge
with a backward pawn on e7, which can be rather unpleasant with the lack of counterplay on the queenside. Moreover, after the exchange the dark-squared white bishop has some prospects on the c1-h6 diagonal.

10...\(\mathcal{Q}h6\)

The black knight seeks to join in the attack on the d4-square as soon as possible, though not from the c6-square as before, but from f5. The advantages of having the black knight on f5 are obvious compared to c6: the knight will not be threatened by the white d-pawn, and the white bishop on g2 will have less potential targets on the a8-h1 diagonal. It would be illogical to backtrack. Here is a model scenario of the developments in this particular case: 10...\(\mathcal{Q}f6\) 11.\(\mathcal{Q}e3\) (worth attention is the recommendation of A. Mikhailchishin 11.\(\mathcal{Q}g5\)! with the idea to save a tempo after 11...h6 12.\(\mathcal{Q}e3\) d6 13.h3 a6 by means of 14.\(\mathcal{Q}d2\)\(\pm\) 11...d6 12.h3 \(\mathcal{Q}b8\) 13.\(\mathcal{Q}c1\) a6 14.b4 \(\mathcal{Q}d7\) 15.\(\mathcal{Q}e2\) \(\mathcal{Q}c8\) 16.\(\mathcal{Q}h2\) \(\mathcal{Q}d8\) 17.\(\mathcal{Q}fd1\) \(\mathcal{Q}c6\) and now White staged a decisive offensive on the queenside by way of 18.d5 \(\mathcal{Q}d7\) 19.c5\(\pm\) Koskinen – Annala, Helsinki 1993, backed up by the entire army of centralised white pieces.

In case of 10...d6 as long as the black knight stays away from the f5-square there is 11.\(\mathcal{Q}d5\)\(?\) (with the moves 11.\(\mathcal{Q}e1\) \(\mathcal{Q}e8\) added there have been attempts to play on restricting the black knight by means of 12.h3 \(\mathcal{Q}h6\) 13.g4, though these were not successful in view of 13...f5 14.g5 \(\mathcal{Q}f7\) 15.f4 \(\mathcal{Q}b8\) 16.\(\mathcal{Q}e3\) a6 17.\(\mathcal{Q}c1\) \(\mathcal{Q}d7\) 18.d5 b5\(\pm\) Sorokin – Ricardi, Boca 1997, and Black obtained counterplay) 11...e6 12.\(\mathcal{Q}e3\) (12.\(\mathcal{Q}c3\) serves no purpose, since after 12...\(\mathcal{Q}h6\) 13.b3 \(\mathcal{Q}f5\) 14.\(\mathcal{Q}c2\) \(\mathcal{Q}b8=\), Black successfully carries through his opening strategy of transferring the knight to f5, A. Fernandes – Mellado Trivino, Loures 1997) 12...\(\mathcal{Q}f6\) (there are no records of 12...\(\mathcal{Q}e3\) 13.\(\mathcal{Q}xe3\)\(\pm\), where regardless of the certain simplification of the position, Black must fight for the draw with complete lack of any real counterplay whatsoever, while White has a clear-cut plan involving a pawn offensive on the queenside) 13.\(\mathcal{Q}b3\) (the leisurely 13.b3 permitted Black to put up a strong line of resistance after 13...\(\mathcal{Q}b8\) 14.\(\mathcal{Q}b2\) b5 15.c5 d5 16.b4 \(\mathcal{Q}b7\) 17.\(\mathcal{Q}d3\) \(\mathcal{Q}c6=\) Macek – Madl, Medulin 1997) 13...\(\mathcal{Q}c7\) 14.\(\mathcal{Q}d2\) \(\mathcal{Q}b8\) 15.\(\mathcal{Q}ac1\) b6 16.\(\mathcal{Q}a3\) a5 (following 16...a6 White break through the defence of the adversary by means of 17.\(\mathcal{Q}b4\) \(\mathcal{Q}d8\)
5.d4 g7 6.g2 cd 7.d4 0-0 8.0-0 g4 9.e3

18.c5!±, and the attempt to develop the light-squared bishop 16...b7?! 17.xa7 d7 18.c3
f8 19.xb7xb7 20.a4± Hoffmann – Derichs, Giessen 1994, brought Black no serious play for the pawn down) 17.c5±. With the queenside breakthrough White inevitably gets more foreposts in this area of the board for his obviously more active pieces.

11.xh6?!

Hold off – this is White’s major principle in this variation. Black can hardly obtain counterplay without the knight on f5, provided White makes no obvious mistakes. There have been also tests of 11.xd3 f5 12.e2 d6 13.d1 b8 14.a4, but in this case the black knight on f5 visibly contains the white forces. Even though certain accuracy is needed. Thus at this point the best bet is to set back the white pawn offensive on the queenside by 14...a5?∞. In the game Vaganian – Kassebaum, Germany 1992, Black was very much taken with his plan directed at the development of the light-squared bishop, and after 14...b6?! 15.b4
b7? (15...e6 16.a3 White’s position is more pleasing thanks to the queenside activity) 16.
xb7xb7 17.g4! h6 18.h3+ lost his knight.

11...xh6 12.e1

A little prophylactic will do White no harm. To the same end not bad is also 12.e2?! imme-

diately vacating the d1 square for the rook. There is reflection causing information about a similar idea also in the note to White’s move ten in variation c, where a similar position is discussed. The immediate retreat 12.c5 is worse, since it can after 12...g7! 13.c1 d6 (inadequate is 13...d5? in view of 14.xd5 e6 15.c3 xd4 16.xd4 xd4 17.b4 a5 18.e2 f6 19.b5 a4 20.fd1± with an ample white edge due to the underdeveloped black queenside, Raetsky – Hit-
gatsberger, Katowice 1993) 14.b4 b8 provide Black with definite counterplay, because the white queen must take on the responsibility for the d4–pawn. Thus following 15.a4 (after 15.a4 Black could have completely balanced the odds by means of 15...xd4! 16.xa7 d7 17.e2
dx5 18.xd4 cxd4 19.xd4 c6=) 15...f5 16.e1 e8 (after 16...dx5?! 17.dx5 xd1 18.
xed1+ White has an excellent endgame) 17.b5 dx5 (no good is 17...a5?! in view of 18.c6±)
18.dx5 a5 19.b3 e6, Raetsky – Krasenkov, Rostov 1993, even after the strongest continue-
tion 20.d5?! xd5 21.xd5 e6 22.g2 ed8 23.ed1∞ White can hardly turn to account any-
thing more than a draw by virtue of the opposite coloured bishops.

12...g7 13.e2 e6

After 12...xd4 13.xe7 a5 14.d6 xc3 15.bxc3 xc3 16.
c5∞ White would have had ex-
cellent compensation for the pawn in view of the completely undeveloped black queenside. In case of 12...\texttt{e}e8 13.\texttt{ad}d1 d6 14. b4+ he would have been able to build up without hindrance his pawn presence on the queenside.

14.\texttt{ad}d1 d6 15.\texttt{c}c5±

This position arose in the game Busch – Stopp, Germany 1998. Apparently Black's best bet was to accept the position after 15...d5 16.b4 (inadequate is the attempt to reach the d6 square via 16.\texttt{db}b5 due to 16...b6! 17.b4 \texttt{a}a6=) 16...\texttt{d}d7 (the attempt to face up the white queenside pawns a little earlier – 17...\texttt{a}6, hoping to open up the a-file for the rook, is rebuffed by the move 18.\texttt{da}a4!± to be followed by an invasion of b6) 17.b5±, in which the black bishop pair can hardly manifest any activity whatsoever. The careless 15...\texttt{e}e8? in the game mentioned above permitted White to carry out the decisive offensive after 16.\texttt{db}b5 \texttt{f}f8 17.d5 e5 18.c6±.

c) 9...d6

Similar to variation b, Black is willing to part with a pawn in order to complete the development of the queenside.

10.\texttt{de}2!?

Since Black was not willing to exchange on d4 one or two moves earlier, now White makes haste to deny him this opportunity altogether. As to the black pawn offering, its acceptance is fraught with unpleasant consequences. Thus after 10.\texttt{xc}c6?! bxc6 11. \texttt{xc}c6 \texttt{d}d7, the high-pressure 12.\texttt{d}d5?! (in case of 12.\texttt{d}d4, which occurred in the game Almasi – Madl, Budapest 1997, following 12...\texttt{b}b7= Black would have also got excellent compensation for the pawn in view of the weakened kingside light squares) 12...\texttt{e}e8 13.\texttt{f}f3 \texttt{b}b7 14. \texttt{ce}7 \texttt{f}f8= Hobuss – Rechmann, Dortmund 1991, brought White to huge troubles, since his knights were locked into the black camp. The other pawn take 10.\texttt{xc}c6?! bxc6 11.\texttt{xc}c6 \texttt{b}b8 12. \texttt{g}g2 (Black also stands better in the line 12.\texttt{f}f3 \texttt{e}e5 13.\texttt{e}e2 \texttt{a}a6=, which occurred in the Saadi – Fischer game, Mar del Plata 1960) 12...\texttt{e}e5 13.\texttt{a}a4 (with the other continuations Black quite
straightforwardly takes back the pawn sacrificed and both after 13.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{c}4\) 14.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 15.\(\text{e}5\) 16.\(\text{b}2\) \(\text{a}6\) Schooler. Germany 1989, as well as following 13.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{a}6\)! 14.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{xc}4\)\(\text{b}6\) Taimanov – Sozlozenkin, St. Petersburg 1998, obtains superior play 13...\(\text{d}7\)! (a familiar idea from variation \(\text{b}\), Chapter 18) 14.\(\text{c}2\) (the ambition to keep the extra pawn by means of 14.\(\text{d}7\) \(\text{d}7\) 15.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{c}4\) 16.\(\text{a}7\) \(\text{b}6\) 17.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{a}4\) brought the white knight into a trap, Shuraev – Kirov, Novi Sad 1992) 14...\(\text{xc}4\) 15.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{e}5\) 16.\(\text{b}2\) \(\text{a}6\) allows Black to take back the pawn given up earlier on and emerge with the superior position, Mitra – Murugan, Calcutta 1988.

The plan to isolate the black knight on \(\text{g}4\) by 10.\(\text{h}3\) does not work out either, due to 10...\(\text{xd}4\)! (in case of 10...\(\text{ge}5\) 11.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{d}7\) emerges variation \(\text{a}\), so, of course, White can be glad) 11. \(\text{exd}4\) \(\text{ch}6\) and now 12.\(\text{g}4\)?! permitted Black to intercept the initiative after 12...\(\text{f}5\) 13.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{f}7\) 14.\(\text{f}4\) (outright bad is 14.\(\text{d}5\)? in view of 14...\(\text{e}5\) 15.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{f}4\)! 16.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{c}7\)\(\text{f}\) 14...\(\text{e}6\) Relange – Dorfman, France 1994.

As popular as the mainline move is 10.\(\text{b}3\). In this line the most interesting continuation for us is 10...\(\text{xd}4\) (the other popular ramification of this variation 10...\(\text{a}6\) 11.\(\text{b}2\) \(\text{xd}4\) 12.\(\text{exd}4\) \(\text{b}8\) will be left out of this discussion, since it does not match well with the positions considered in Chap-
counter 17...d5 by 18.\(\text{\&b}5\), invading the d6-square) 17...a6 18.\(\text{\&b}3\) (18.c5!? d5 19.\(\text{\&a}4\) \(\text{\&d}7\) 20.\(\text{\&b}6\) is also possible here by analogy with the continuation considered in variation b) 18... \(\text{\&d}7\) 19.d5 exd5 20.\(\text{\&xd}5\) Cvitan – Delchev, Kastel Stari 1997, White retained a slight edge, thanks to his control of the d5 square.

10...\(\text{\&a}5\)

Alongside this move other continuations have been tested as well. Thus after 10...\(\text{\&ge}5\) the play steers into a position considered under variation a. In case of 10...a6 11.b3 \(\text{\&d}7\) 12.h3 \(\text{\&f}6\) (the transfer of the knight to f5 without exchanging on d4 is devoid of any specific meaning, which was confirmed after 12... \(\text{\&h}6\) 13.\(\text{\&b}2\) \(\text{\&b}8\) 14.\(\text{\&d}2\) \(\text{\&f}5\) 15.\(\text{\&fd}1\) b6 16.\(\text{\&ac}1\) \(\text{\&c}8\) 17.\(\text{\&h}2\) \(\text{\&h}6\) 18.\(\text{\&f}4\)± Fridman – D’Israel, Netanya 1993) 13.\(\text{\&b}2\) \(\text{\&e}8\) (following 13...\(\text{\&b}8\) 14.a4 \(\text{\&a}5\) 15.\(\text{\&b}1\) \(\text{\&e}8\) 16.\(\text{\&a}3\) b6 17.\(\text{\&d}3\) \(\text{\&c}6\) 18.\(\text{\&f}4\) \(\text{\&c}7\) 19.\(\text{\&fd}1\) \(\text{\&a}7\) 20.\(\text{\&b}4\) \(\text{\&c}8\) 21.\(\text{\&h}2\)± Filippov – Ulko, Smolensk 2000, White gradually enhanced his position in the centre and on the queenside, and, last but not least, avoided any exchanges whatsoever) 14.\(\text{\&d}2\) \(\text{\&c}7\) 15.\(\text{\&fd}1\) \(\text{\&e}6\) 16.\(\text{\&d}5\) \(\text{\&b}8\) 17.\(\text{\&xg}7\) \(\text{\&xg}7\) 18.\(\text{\&ac}1\) b6 19.\(\text{\&h}2\) \(\text{\&e}8\) 20.\(\text{\&f}4\)± Black did not manage to break free, and the exchange of the dark-squared bishops is by no means one of his assets either, Sehrt – T.Tolnai, Zurich 1988.

After 10...\(\text{\&e}6\) 11.b3 \(\text{\&c}8\) (in case of 11...h5 12.h3 \(\text{\&f}6\) 13.\(\text{\&b}2\) \(\text{\&c}8\) 14.\(\text{\&d}2\) \(\text{\&e}5\) 15.\(\text{\&d}4\) \(\text{\&d}7\) 16.\(\text{\&ad}1\) \(\text{\&c}6\) 17.e4 \(\text{\&ed}7\) 18.\(\text{\&f}1\) \(\text{\&h}7\) 19.\(\text{\&e}2\) \(\text{\&a}5\) 20.a3± White also squeeze the black position, Kustar – Wendt, Budapest 1993) 12.\(\text{\&b}2\) a6 13.\(\text{\&c}1\) \(\text{\&a}5\) 14.\(\text{\&f}4\) \(\text{\&d}7\) 15.\(\text{\&e}2\) \(\text{\&ge}5\) 16.h3± T.Horvath – Gaber, Hungary 1997, a position has emerged, which resembles the one we met under variation a in the note to Black’s move eleven. In this case, like in the previous one, Black could not resolve any problems associated with his lack of board room. A similar picture would have resulted also after 10...\(\text{\&a}5\) 11.b3 \(\text{\&d}7\) 12.\(\text{\&b}2\) \(\text{\&c}6\) 13.\(\text{\&e}4\) \(\text{\&c}8\) 14.h3 \(\text{\&e}5\) 15.\(\text{\&b}1\) a6, Piris – Szalanczy, Budapest 1989, had White chosen the accurate 16.\(\text{\&d}4\)!!±.

Of all the oddball continuations we will note 10...f5. Following 11.b3 \(\text{\&e}6\) 12.\(\text{\&b}2\) \(\text{\&d}7\) 13.\(\text{\&d}2\) \(\text{\&fd}8\) 14.h3 \(\text{\&h}6\) 15.\(\text{\&d}5\) \(\text{\&ac}8\) 16.\(\text{\&xg}7\) \(\text{\&xg}7\) 17.\(\text{\&fd}1\) \(\text{\&g}8\) 18.\(\text{\&ac}1\)± White has improved his position by centralising his pieces, and the exchange of the dark-squared bishops only weakened the shelter of the black king, P.Velikov – Vachier-Lagrave, Clichy 2000.

11.\(\text{\&d}5\) e6

Black drives the white knight back. After 11...\(\text{\&d}7\) 12.\(\text{\&d}2\) \(\text{\&d}8\) 13.\(\text{\&c}3\) \(\text{\&xc}3\) 14.\(\text{\&exc}3\) \(\text{\&ge}5\) 15.b3 \(\text{\&g}4\) 16.f3 \(\text{\&e}6\) 17.f4 \(\text{\&d}7\) 18.\(\text{\&d}2\)± Wojtkiewicz – Adorjan, Budapest 1993, a typical of this
system situation arises, where White increases his pressure in the centre. The attempt to display activity on the kingside by way of 11...\( \text{d}4 \text{ge}5 12.\text{d}d2 \text{d}d8 13.b3 e6 14.\text{d}dc3 g5 15.h3 f5 \) after 16.f4! \( \text{d}f7 17.\text{c}c1 h6 18.\text{h}h2 \) Kharitonov – Ulko, St.Petersburg 1998, also did not bring Black equality. White also stands better after 11...\( \text{e}b8 12.\text{d}d2 \text{d}d8 13.\text{c}c3! \text{d}ge5 14.\text{c}c1 e6 15.\text{b}b4 \) Lingnau – Krivoshey, Germany 2000, since Black will have to take into consideration the necessity to protect the d6–pawn.

In the game Lerner – Krivoshey, Oberwart 2000, following 11...\( \text{d}d8 12.\text{xb}1 \text{xb}8 13.b3 \text{d}f6 \) (inadequate was 13...b5?, since after 14.cxb5 \( \text{xb}5 15.\text{dc}3 \text{xb}6 16.\text{a}a4 \text{a}a6 17.\text{b}b4 \text{d}ce5 18.\text{b}5 \text{a}5 19.\text{d}d2 Black loses an exchange) 14.\text{b}2 \text{xd}5 15.\text{xd}5 \text{xb}2 16.\text{xb}2 \text{d}e5 17.h3!± the pawn structure underwent some changes. Black is underdeveloped and he is in for troubles containing the forthcoming advance of the white pawns in the centre.

If 11...\( \text{c}c5?! \), attacking the white pawn on c4, very strong is 12.\( \text{d}d2! \) (the attempt to protect the pawn by means of 12.\( \text{a}4? \) brought White difficulties after 12...e6 13.\text{d}d4 \text{d}ce5 14.b3 \text{d}d7± Skomorokhin – Adorjan, Hungary 1993), and now following 12...e6 White trapped the black queen by means of 13.b4! \( \text{xc}4 14.\text{c}1 \text{xa}2 15.\text{d}ec3 \text{c}4 16.\text{d}c7 \text{b}8 17.\text{d}d5 \text{a}2 18.\text{c}3 \text{d}4 19.\text{d}3d5 \text{a}2 20.\text{c}3 \text{c}4 21.\text{b}1! – Kasparov – Kramnik, Moscow (m/11, blitz) 1998.

12.\( \text{d}d2 \text{d}8 \)

No good is 12...\( \text{c}5?! \) in view of 13.b4!+–, which leads to a position from the Kasparov – Kramnik game, Moscow (m/11, blitz) 1998.

13.\( \text{dc}3 \text{b}8 \)

Following 13.\( \text{e}8 14.\text{b}3 \) of no avail is 14...d5?! on account of 15.cxd5 exd5 16.\( \text{xd}5 \text{f}6 17.\text{g}2 \text{f}5 18.\text{c}c1 \text{d}7 19.\text{a}4 \text{ad}8 20.\text{xc}6! \) bxc6 21.\( \text{a}5 \) Ruck – Stocek, Hania 1994. If 13...\( \text{f}6 \) with the d6-d5 advance in mind, then in the game Rogozenko – Hegeler, Hamburg 2000, White should have continued 14.e4!?± retaining his spatial advantage.

14.\( \text{c}c1 \text{a}6 15.\text{b}3 \text{d}e5 \)

To 15...\( \text{d}7?! \) there is the unpleasant 16.\( \text{e}4!± \) and Black's problems associated with the d6 pawn accumulate. After 15...\( \text{g}5 \) there is 16.\( \text{e}1?!± \) intending to advance f2-f4 following h2-h3.

16.\( \text{d}d4 \text{d}7 \)

Inadequate was 16...b5? on account of 17.f4+–.

17.\( \text{e}2± \)

White holds back Black's breakthroughs b7-b5 and d6-d5, and thanks to his spatial advantage stands better with all pieces on board, Skembris – Mastrokoukos, Karditsa 1994.
Black somewhat simplified the position by exchanging a pair of knights, which seems entirely justified on account of his constrained situation.

9...d6

This move is required for Black. Ignoring it in favour of, e.g., 9...a5?!, permits White to obtain excellent play by means of the fairly standard 10.c5! a6 11.f4 d5 12.cxd6 e8 13.d2 exd6 14.g5 f6 15.f4 e6 16. fd1± Krogius – Kudinov, USSR 1971. In case the queen is attacked by 9...e8 there are no contraindications for White to apply the typical of this system move 10.d3, like in the Sriram – Garcia Blazquez game, Linares 2001.

10.d3

Numerous tournament tests have confirmed that this early retreat of the queen is the strongest move. Why exactly to d3? Because here the queen protects the c4 pawn, it can also take part in the prevention of the b7-b5 breakthrough, which is typical for positions of this type, and does not stand in the way of its dark-squared bishop.

Now we will consider separately the following options for Black: a) 10...e6, b) 10...f5, c) 10...d7, d) 10...a5 and 10...a6 (Chapter 21). Of the other less popular continuations we will note 10...c7, which permits White to conveniently complete the development of his pieces by means of 11.g5!? (as expected there is also the traditional 11.d2 with a follow through 11...d7 12.ac1 fc8 13.b3 c6 14.e4 d7 15.fd1, like in the Krogius – Patz game, Worskopfen 1992) 11...e6 (the idea of the move c1-g5 is to take advantage of the inadequate placement of the black queen on c7, for example, in case of 11...d7? by means of 12.xf6 xf6 13. d5+–) 12.b3 a6 (after 12...h6
13.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{\textit{\text{e}}}3 \textit{\text{\textsuperscript{5}}}5 14.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{2}}}d2 \textit{\text{\textsuperscript{h}}}7 15.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}d4 a6 16.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}xf6 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}xf6 17.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{2}}}d5 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{d}}}7 18.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}ad1 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{d}}}8 19.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}xf6+ $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{e}}}xf6 20.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}d4\pm Arouche – Hasurdzic, Zagan 1997, the actual game closely followed the development scenario just described) 13.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{4}}}ac1 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{d}}}c8 14.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}fd1. Black’s attempt to exchange the light-squared bishops by means of 14...\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}d7?! brought about a huge white advantage after 15.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{5}}}a4 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{c}}}7 16.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{5}}}c5! dxc5 17.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{4}}}xc5 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{f}}}5 18.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}e3\pm Yedidia – Zaremba, Chicago 1997.

Should Black continue 10...\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}b8, then the most straightforward reply is 11.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}d2 (the 10...\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}b8 line followed by Black is very rare, since it permits also 11.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}e3) and now after 11...a6 (in case of the normal 11...a6 12.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{4}}}ac1 the play converges to variations from Chapter 21), which aims to justify the practicability of the move \textit{\text{\textsuperscript{4}}}a8-b8, White obtained superior play via 12.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{5}}}ad1 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{b}}}7 13.e4 \textit{\text{\textsuperscript{2}}}d7 14.b3 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{e}}}8 15.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{4}}}fe1 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{h}}}8 16.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{4}}}g5\pm R.Perez – Fernandez, La Coruna 1999.

\textbf{a) 10...\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}e6}

Black rushes to develop his dark-squared bishop in defiance of the ensuing perforce loss of the b7-pawn.

11.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}xb7

White can hardly hope to gain the upper hand, if he does not accept the pawn sacrifice. For example, after 11.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}e3 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{g}}}4 12.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}d4 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{e}}}5 13.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}xe5 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{xe}}}5 14.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}ac1 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{a}}}5 15.b3 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}ab8 = Lomer – Bohnsack, Germany 1992, or 11.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}d2 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{c}}}8 12.b3 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{h}}}3 13.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{4}}}ad1 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{g}}}2 14.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}xg2 a6 15.a4 b6 16.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}g5 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{b}}}7+ 17.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{4}}}g1 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{fe}}}8 18.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}c1 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{d}}}7 19.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}e3 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{c}}}5 20.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}b1 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{ec}}}8 = Romanishin – Neverov, Donetsk 1998, Black easily managed to even the odds.

\textbf{11...\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}b8 12.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}g2 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{a}}}5$

After 12...\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{d}}}7?! 13.b3 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{c}}}5 14.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{4}}}e3 a5 15.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{4}}}a3\pm B.Schneider – Doennebrink, Germany 1994, Black obtained no compensation for the missing pawn. Also weaker is 12...$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{c}}}8$ in view of 13.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}d5 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{xd}}}5 14.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{2}}}xd5 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{d}}}7 15.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}g5 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{xb}}}2 16.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}ab1 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{f}}}6 17.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}xf6 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{exf}}}6$ Kimelfeld – Muratov, USSR 1973, and now had White continued 18.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{4}}}a6\pm (pointed out by V.Osnos), he would have obtained a huge advantage, due to Black’s numerous pawn weaknesses. In case of 12...\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{g}}}4 13.b3 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{a}}}5 14.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}d2 we are facing the position, which occurs with the mainline 12...\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{a}}}5 in the note to move thirteen.

\textbf{13.b3 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}xb3$

Black’s only chance to avoid falling immediately into a difficult situation. In case of 13...\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{f}}}5 14.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{2}}}d2\pm or 13...\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{e}}}4 14.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}xe4 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{xc}}}3 15.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}xc3 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{xc}}}3 16.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{b}}}1\pm he is both a pawn off and has no counterplay. 13...\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{g}}}4 has been played more than once, though after 14.\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{1}}}d2 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{h}}}5 15.h3 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{e}}}5 16.g4! $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{xd}}}3$ (if 16...$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{b}}}4$, then good is 17.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{3}}}g3\pm 17.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{g}}}h5 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{xc}}}3 18.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{xc}}}3 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{f}}}4 19.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{f}}}3 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{hx}}}3$ (if 19...\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{b}}}h3+, then 20.$\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{h}}}2 $\textit{\text{\textsuperscript{g}}}5

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21. \( \text{g2} \) with the idea 22. \( f4 \pm \)
20. \( \text{f}d1 \text{e}6 \) (losing propositions are both 20... \( \text{xh}5 \) – immediately, in view of 21. \( \text{h}2 \text{f}5 \) 22. \( \text{e}4 \text{e}6 \) 23. \( \text{xh}5 \text{gxh}5 \) 24. \( \text{g}1+ \text{g}4 \) 25. \( \text{f}3 \pm \), or 20... \( \text{f}5 \) – with some deliberation, on account of 21. \( \text{h}2 \text{e}6 \) 22. \( \text{d}5 \text{g}5 \) 23. \( \text{h}1 \text{e}4 \) 24. \( \text{xf}5 \text{xc}3 \) 25. \( \text{a}5 \text{xe}2 \) 26. \( \text{e}1 \text{f}4 \) 27. \( \text{xe}7 \pm \) – Lagunov – Mattick, Berlin 1991) 21. \( \text{d}4 \text{a}6 \) 22. \( \text{h}2 \text{f}6 \) 23. \( \text{a}7 \text{bd}8 \) 24. \( \text{b}6 \text{b}8 \) 25. \( \text{c}5 \pm \), the pair of active white bishops leaves Black little chances to survive, Uhlmann – Boensch, Fuerstenwalde 1981.

14. \( \text{axb}3 \text{xa}1 \) 15. \( \text{b}5 \)!

The strongest – White prevents the normal retreat of the black queen to \( a6 \). After 15. \( \text{d}2 \text{a}6 \) 16. \( \text{b}5 \text{c}8 \) 17. \( \text{c}3 \text{d}5 \) 18. \( \text{a}1 \text{xc}4 \) 19. \( \text{xc}4 \text{b}6 \) 20. \( \text{d}4 \text{xc}4 \) – Ribli – Brunner, Germany 1991, the odds were level.

15... \( \text{a}2 \)

To 15... \( \text{a}6 \) already very strong is 16. \( \text{b}2 \pm \) with the unpleasant threat \( \text{f}1\text{a}1 \).

16. \( \text{d}4 \text{d}7 \) 17. \( \text{d}2 \text{b}8 \)

Following 17... \( \text{a}6 \) 18. \( \text{c}3 \text{c}8 \), which occurred in the game Mozetic – Nestorovic, Belgrade 1991, White could have proceeded 19. \( \text{a}! \text{b}6 \) 20. \( \text{a}3 \text{g}4 \) 21. \( \text{c}3 \pm \) retaining the pressure on the black a-pawn and keeping his knight in the centre.

18. \( \text{c}3 \text{a}6 \)

There was the threat of trapping the black queen by \( \text{f}1\text{a}1 \).

19. \( \text{a}1 \text{b}6 \) 20. \( \text{a}3 \text{g}4 \)

21. \( \text{e}3 \text{c}5 \) 22. \( \text{a}5 \text{b}6 \) 23. \( \text{h}3 \)

\( \text{d}5 \) 24. \( \text{d}2 \text{a}6 \) 25. \( \text{a}2 \pm \)

This situation occurred in the game Ribli – Weiss, Austria 1996. White's pressure on the black a-pawn is already rather tangible. After the black pieces have been forced to switch to its protection, White will be able to set in motion his pawns on the queenside.

b) 10... \( \text{f}5 \)

In view of the fact, that the immediate development of the bishop to \( e6 \) is somewhat risky, Black seeks to improve on his original plan and invoke the move \( e2\text{e}4 \) first.

11. \( \text{e}4 \text{e}6 \)

Black needs to control reliably the \( d5 \)-square. The attempt to transfer to that end the bishop to \( c6 \) via 11... \( \text{d}7 \) 12. \( \text{d}2 \text{c}6 \) takes
some time and as a result of that White can by means of 13...\textit{ac1} \textit{d7} 14.b3 a5 15.\textit{e2} \textit{c5} 16.\textit{fd1} \textit{b8} 17.\textit{d5} \textit{xd5} 18.exd5 \textit{c7} 19.h4 \textit{d7} 20.h5\textpm capture the initiative in the centre and on the kingside, Makarov – Sumaneev, Elista 1995.

\textbf{12...\textit{d2}?}

Probably the most accurate. White's plans contain two almost required moves b2-b3 and \textit{c1-d2}. The issue at hand is which of these must come first. With 12.b3 White had to take into consideration also the reply 12...\textit{a5}!? (the move 12...a6 followed by 13.\textit{d2} leads to variations from Chapter 21, and 12...\textit{d7} with 13.\textit{d2} – to the variation considered below) 13.\textit{d2} \textit{h5} 14.f3 \textit{ac8} (a very curious development took place in the game Donner – Pomar, Brunnen 1966, where after 14...\textit{h3} 15.\textit{ac1} \textit{xg2} 16.\textit{xg2} \textit{fd8} 17.\textit{fd1} \textit{h6} 18.\textit{d5} \textit{xd5} 19.\textit{cxd5} \textit{ac8} 20.\textit{c3} \textit{xd2} 21.\textit{xd2} \textit{h6} 22.\textit{dc2} \textit{f8} 23.a4 \textit{e8} 24.\textit{c7}\textpm Black landed into a very difficult situation, regardless of the fact that all minor pieces have been exchanged and the symmetrical pawn structure) 15.\textit{ac1} a6 16.\textit{fd1}. Now the seemingly illogical continuation 16...\textit{h6}! (very often with this scheme White do not mind to exchange the dark-squared bishops, but this takes place when there is no own pawn on e4) 17.\textit{xh6} \textit{wh6} 18.\textit{c2} \textit{h5} 19.\textit{dc1} \textit{a5} 20.\textit{h1} \textit{c7} 21.\textit{f1} \textit{fc8} 22.\textit{e2} (there is no danger for Black also with 22.\textit{d5} \textit{xd5} 23.exd5 b5=) 22...\textit{d7} 23.\textit{d1} b5= permitted Black to even the play, Van der Vliet – Timmerman, Hilversum 1983.

\textbf{12...a6}

Now 12...\textit{a5} is already not so unpleasant for White, in view of 13.\textit{d5} \textit{d8} 14.\textit{ac1}\textpm.

The other manoeuvres of the black queen have not gained wide popularity. After 12...\textit{c8} 13.b3 \textit{h3} 14.\textit{ac1} \textit{xg2} 15.\textit{xg2} a6 16.\textit{g5} \textit{d8} 17.\textit{d2} \textit{e8} 18.\textit{fd1}\textpm Espig – Plieger, Liechtenstein 1995. Black exchanged the light-squared bishops, which somewhat weakened the position of the white king, but during that time, White managed to centralise all his pieces gradually preparing his invasion on d5. In case of 12...\textit{d7} White's most straightforward reaction would be to play 13.\textit{fe1} a6 14.b3 and steer the game to a position considered below under Black's mainline move 12...a6.

Considerably more often occurs 12...\textit{d7}. A possible follow up is 13.b3 (in case of 13...\textit{e5} 14.\textit{e2} \textit{d7} seeking to exchange the light-squared bishops – a plan, which cannot be delayed or White will be able to prevent it by h2-h3 – White's odds are also better after 15.\textit{d5} \textit{c6} 16.\textit{ad1} \textit{h3} 17.\textit{xh3} \textit{xh3} 18.\textit{e3} \textit{c8} 19.h4\textpm Uhlmann – Moehring, Salzwedel 1982) 13...\textit{c5} 14.\textit{e3}! (following 14.\textit{e2} a6 15.\textit{ac1} b5...
16.\texttt{Q}d5 bxc4 17.\texttt{Ax}c4, Vukic – L.Popov, Banja Luka 1974, Black could have replied 17...\texttt{Q}d7!\texttt{=} and the situation would have sharpened abruptly on account of the fact that all three white major pieces happen to be on the a6-f1 diagonal at the same time) 14...a6 15.\texttt{Ac}1. Now the 15...b5 breakthrough with the follow up 16.\texttt{Q}d5 bxc4 17.\texttt{Ax}c4 \texttt{Q}d7 (White also has an ample positional advantage after 17...\texttt{Ab}8 18.b4 \texttt{Ba}4 19.\texttt{Af}c1\texttt{=}) 18.e5! \texttt{Ae}8, Lobron – Fedorowicz, Germany 1989, could have brought about a tangible advantage for White after 19.\texttt{Ad}1! \texttt{Cc}8 20.\texttt{Bb}4\texttt{=}

13.b3

There are two moves, which deserve attention in this situation most of all: \texttt{b1}) 13...\texttt{Ab}8 and \texttt{b2}) 13...\texttt{Qd}7.

Of the other continuations we will consider 13...\texttt{Qd}7. After 14.\texttt{Ac}1 Black opted for 14...b5!? (in case of 14...\texttt{Ac}5 15.\texttt{Ae}3! a situation arises, which has been considered in the previous note), but following 15.cxb5 axb5 16.\texttt{Ax}b5 \texttt{Ax}c3 17.\texttt{Ax}c3 \texttt{Axa}2 18.\texttt{Ah}6 \texttt{Ab}8 19.\texttt{Ad}3 \texttt{Cc}8 20.\texttt{Ax}c8\texttt{=} \texttt{Qxc}8 21.\texttt{Cc}1 \texttt{Bb}8 22.b4= Ivanchuk – Andersson, Reykjavik 1991, Black has not levelled the play. White has preserved a pair of powerful bishops, of which the dark-squared one is especially dangerous, since it has no opponent, and, moreover, the remote passed b-pawn also demands close attention.

\texttt{b1}) 13...\texttt{Ab}8

Black prepares the b7-b5 breakthrough.

14.\texttt{Ac}1 \texttt{Qd}7

If Black has not opted for \texttt{Qd}8-d7 on move thirteen, it is not safe to make this move now. After 14...\texttt{Qd}7?! very strong is 15.\texttt{Qd}5! b5 16.\texttt{Qf}e1 \texttt{Bb}7 (following 16...\texttt{Qd}x5 17.cxd5 \texttt{Ah}3 18.\texttt{Qx}h3 \texttt{Qx}h3 19.\texttt{Ac}7\texttt{=} White occupies the c-file, and in case of 16...\texttt{Af}c8 he probably intended to proceed 17.\texttt{Qf}1?!\texttt{=}, following which Black cannot easily release the tension in the centre, since White reliably controls the h3-square) 17.\texttt{Qf}1!! (in case Black chooses to exchange the light-squared bishop for the knight on d5, White wants to immediately place his bishop on h3) 17...\texttt{Qg}4 (if 17...bxc4, then 18.\texttt{Qx}c4\texttt{=} 18.h3 \texttt{Qx}d5 19.cxd5 \texttt{Qf}6 20.\texttt{Ac}6 \texttt{Aa}8 21.\texttt{Aec}1\texttt{=} and White has a huge advantage, due to his bishop pair and the fact that he reigns supreme on the c-file, Ehlvest – Kamsky, Reggio Emilia 1991.

15.\texttt{Qe}2

White makes an early retreat,
safeguarding himself from the jumps of the black knight.

15...\textit{$\text{c}5$}

In case of 15...\textit{$\text{c}5$} the most straightforward move is 16.h3, protecting oneself from the provocative entrance of the black bishop to g4. The fact is that White is well-prepared for 16...b5 and following 17.cxb5 axb5 18.f4 \textit{$\text{c}6$} (impossible is 18...b4? due to 19.\textit{$\text{a}4$} \textit{$\text{d}7$} 20.f5+ and the black bishop is trapped) 19.czxb5 \textit{$\text{d}7$} 20.\textit{$\text{h}2$} \textit{$\text{b}4$} 21.a4\textsuperscript{=} Van der Sterren – Blees, The Netherlands 1990, Black has no compensation for the pawn.

16.\textit{$\text{f}d1$}

There is 16.\textit{$\text{d}5$} already. After 16...a5 17.\textit{$\text{fd1}$} b6 18.h4 h5 19.\textit{$\text{g}5$}\textsuperscript{=} White stands better, Rogoff – Zuckerman, Chicago 1974.

16...b6 17.\textit{$\text{f}4$} \textit{$\text{e}8$} 18.\textit{$\text{d}5$}\textsuperscript{=}

Black will not be able to endure long the white knight on d5, Ionov – Sumaneev, Elista 1995.

b2) 13...\textit{$\text{d}7$}

Black acts rather more craftily in contrast with variation b1. His move serves many purposes – among all others it prepares b7-b5 and possibly the exchange of the light-squared bishops.

14.a4

It is not safe for White to divert the rook from f1, since after 14.\textit{$\text{fd1}$} \textit{$\text{g}4$} 15.a4?! very strong is 15...f5! 16.\textit{$\text{f}1$} \textit{$\text{e}5$} 17.\textit{$\text{e}3$} fxe4 18.\textit{$\text{xe}4$} \textit{$\text{h}3$}\textsuperscript{=} Saidy – Reshevsky, Netanya 1969, and Black’s prospects are superior. Following 14.\textit{$\text{ac1}$} \textit{$\text{h}3$} (the immediate 14...b5?! is not available, because of 15.e5!, and to 14...\textit{$\text{ab8}$} there is the unpleasant 15.\textit{$\text{d}5$}! and the game steers into variation b1) 15.\textit{$\text{fe1}$} Black resolves all his problems by means of 15...\textit{$\text{xg2}$} 16.\textit{$\text{xg2}$} b5=.

The generally not quite desirable move a2-a4 is partially justified by the fact, that the d7 square is occupied by the black queen and Black cannot immediately execute the manoeuvre \textit{$\text{d}7$}-c5 with an attack on the b3 pawn.

14...\textit{$\text{g}4$}

With the follow-up 14...\textit{$\text{h}3$} 15.\textit{$\text{ac1}$} \textit{$\text{xg2}$} 16.\textit{$\text{xg2}$} \textit{$\text{g}4$} 17.\textit{$\text{d}5$} \textit{$\text{e}5$} 18.\textit{$\text{e}2$} \textit{$\text{ab8}$}, Plachetka – Sikora Lerch, Marian-ske Lazne 1978, worth attention was 19.f4!? \textit{$\text{c6}$} 20.\textit{$\text{c3}$} \textit{$\text{xc3}$} 21.\textit{$\text{xc3}$}\textsuperscript{=}, bringing about the exchange of the dark-squared bishops. White ret-\textsuperscript{ins} a slight edge thanks to his extra board room and the strong position of the d5-knight.

15.\textit{$\text{ac1}$}

Now, when the white rook is on f1 the advance of the black f-pawn should not be feared.

15...\textit{$\text{ab8}$} 16.\textit{$\text{d}5$} \textit{$\text{e}5$} 17.\textit{$\text{e}2$} \textit{$\text{c}6$}

With 17...\textit{$\text{xd5}$} 18.exd5 \textit{$\text{g}4$} 19.\textit{$\text{xg4}$} \textit{$\text{xf4}$} 20.a5 \textit{$\text{fe8}$} 21.b4\textsuperscript{=} N.Kirov – Mollov, Toulouse 1990, White retained the upper hand due to his bishop pair advantage
and the lack of active black counterplay on the queenside.

18.\textit{xf}d1 f5

Black reverts to the idea to open up the f-file, however, this time, with the white rook on f1, the impact of this breakthrough is not so significant.

19.\textit{c}c3 \textit{h}h6 20.f4 fxe4 21.\textit{xe}4 \textit{f}f5 22.\textit{e}e3

This position occurred in the game B.Lalic – Mohebbi, Paris 2000. White retains some superiority in the centre.

c) 10...\textit{d}d7

Black switches the knight to c5, intending to win a tempo thanks to the white queen on d3.

11.b3 \textit{c}c5

Inconsistent is 11...a6. Following 12.\textit{e}e3!? (the game can be steered into variation d from Chapter 21 by means of 12.\textit{d}d2 \textit{b}b8 13.\textit{a}ac1) 12...\textit{b}b8 (in case of 12...\textit{c}c5 13.\textit{d}d2 \textit{b}b8 14.\textit{f}fd1 \textit{f}f5 15.\textit{a}ac1 \textit{e}e8 16.\textit{d}d5\pm, which occurred in the game Yermolinsky – Arkell, London 1994, the centralised white pieces also exert unpleasant pressure on Black’s position) 13.\textit{a}ac1 b6 (13...b5? is not available due to 14.\textit{cxb}5 axb5 15.\textit{a}a7 \textit{c}c5 16.\textit{e}e3 b4 17.\textit{d}d5\pm Kolesar – Salaba, Bratislava 1991) 14.\textit{f}fd1 \textit{b}b7 15.\textit{xb}b7 \textit{xb}b7, Jussupow – Gelfand, Linares 1990, Black succeeded exchanging the light-squared bishops, but the result did not match the efforts spent. White managed to put strong pressure upon Black’s position by means of 16.\textit{e}e4! \textit{a}a7 17.\textit{d}d5 \textit{c}c5 18.\textit{h}h4 \textit{b}b7 19.b4 \textit{a}a4 20.\textit{g}g5 \textit{f}6 21.\textit{e}e3 \textit{c}c8 22.\textit{e}e4±.

After 11...\textit{b}b8 12.\textit{d}d2, Loginov – S.Farago, Budapest 1994, Black opted for 12...b6 (in case of 12...a6 13.\textit{a}ac1 the play reverts to variation d from Chapter 21) and as a result of 13.\textit{a}ac1 \textit{b}b7 14.\textit{xb}b7 \textit{xb}b7 15.\textit{f}f3 \textit{c}c8 16.\textit{f}fd1 \textit{e}e5 17.\textit{g}g2 \textit{d}d7 18.\textit{d}d5 \textit{b}b7 19.\textit{c}c3\pm emerged another variation on the light-squared bishops exchange theme, similar to the one in the previous paragraph.

The manoeuvre 11...\textit{a}a5 12.\textit{d}d2 \textit{h}5 is hardly adequate with the knight on d7. In the game Dambrauskas – A.Grigoriev, Lithuania 1995, White opted for 13.\textit{f}f3 (it was possible to claim more by means of 13.\textit{d}d5!? with the idea to be able to disturb the black queen from the f4 square, and in case of 13...\textit{xa}1 14.\textit{xe}7 \textit{g}7 15.\textit{xa}1\textit{c} White obtains rather good compensation for the exchange given up – the dark-squared bishop and a pawn) \textit{xf}3 14.\textit{xf}3 \textit{b}b8 15.\textit{a}ac1 \textit{d}d8 16.\textit{d}d5
17.\textit{g5}+ thus choosing to pilot the game to a slightly superior endgame.

12.\textit{d2} a5

Black aims not only to take a reliable post for his knight on c5, but also to create a target for his knight by advancing a5-a4 when appropriate. Following 12...\textit{d7} 13.\textit{b2} \textit{c6} 14.e4 a5 15.\textit{ad1}, Mednis – Nadenau, Lugano 1986, looking for counterplay Black opted for 15...\textit{f5} 16.\textit{exf5} \textit{gxf2} 17.\textit{gxf2} \textit{xf5} 18.\textit{d5}, but did not completely even the chances because of the strong post of the white knight on d5.

The traditional b7-b5, which Black put through after 12...\textit{b8} 13.\textit{b2} a6 14.\textit{fd1} b5 was countered by 15.b4 \textit{e6} 16.\textit{cxb5} axb5 17.\textit{d5} \textit{xb2} 18.\textit{xb2} \textit{c7} 19.\textit{xc7} \textit{xc7} 20.\textit{ac1} Roeder – Guidarelli, Cappelle la Grande 1999, and regardless of the definite simplifications it is obvious that White retains the initiative, since he is in possession of both the c-file and the a8-h1 diagonal.

The attempt to exchange the light-squared bishops by means of 12...\textit{f5} 13.\textit{b2} \textit{d7} was held off by the unsophisticated 14.\textit{fe1}, and after 14...a5 15.\textit{ad1} \textit{e6} 16.\textit{h4} Ribli – Hausner, Athens 1971, White holds the upper hand, and it is a mystery why the black bishop was hanging about the c8-h3 diagonal. Rather more logical is the continuation 12...\textit{e6} 13.\textit{b2} \textit{d7} 14.\textit{fd1} \textit{ab8} 15.\textit{ac1} \textit{fc8}, but here also bearing in mind that the black knight has left f6 and will not be back soon. White can contest the advantage by 16.\textit{h4}! (weaker is 16.\textit{d5} in view of 16...\textit{xb2} 17.\textit{xb2} b5 18.\textit{cxb5} \textit{xd5} 19.\textit{xd5} \textit{xb5} 20.\textit{d2} \textit{b6}– Wenaas – Hua Lefong, Montreal 1998). Black is forced to either let the white h-pawn advance further, or following the likely 16...\textit{h5} 17.\textit{d5} \textit{xb2} 18.\textit{xb2} b5 19.\textit{cxb5} \textit{xd5} 20.\textit{xd5} \textit{xb5} 21.\textit{d2} \textit{b6} 22.\textit{g5}, the weakening of the fortifications around his king will begin to tell.

13.\textit{b2} \textit{e6}

The attempt at an immediate attack on the b3-square does not succeed, since after 13...a4 14.\textit{d5} \textit{d7} (in case Black declines the exchange of the dark-squared bishops via 14...e5 15.\textit{c2} \textit{f5} 16.e4 \textit{e6} 17.\textit{ad1}, as in the R.Garcia – Calneggia game, Buenos Aires 1964, he will have to constantly reckon with his backward d6-pawn) 15.\textit{g7} \textit{g7} White is able to gain some edge on the queenside by means of 16.b4 \textit{e6} 17.\textit{ac1} \textit{c6} 18.\textit{fd1} \textit{g8} 19.\textit{e3} \textit{c8} 20.\textit{h3} \textit{d7} 21.a3\textit{+} Krivoshey – Zawadzka, Koszalin 1998.

With some move transposition the position after 13...\textit{d7} 14.\textit{ad1} \textit{c6} 15.e4 is from the game Mednis – Nadenau, Lugano 1986, considered in the note to Black’s move twelve.

14.\textit{fd1}?
White does not need to rush the move 14...d5, intending, after 14...AXB2 15...xb2 b8 16.ac1, to deny Black the option 16...b5 17.cxb5AXB5∞, like in the Vukic – Zivkovic game, Yugoslavia 1974.

14...b6

After 14...c8 15.ac1 b6 White did not forget to incorporate the useful intermission 16.h4!? h5 and after 17.d5 xd5 18.xg7 xg7 19.cxd5 d7 20.xc8 xc8 contested actively the c-file via 21.h3! d8 22. xd7 xd7 23.xa5 c2 24. d2± Waldschlaeger – Bestmann, Germany 1983, which allowed him to win a pawn.

15.ab1 fd8

16.h4!

Once more the same useful move, based on the fact that the black knight is away from the f6-square.

16...h5 17.d5 xd5 18. xg7 xg7 19.b2+ g8 20. xd5 c7 21.bd1 ab8

It seems that Black has successfully arrived at a blockading position on the dark squares, however, the advanced position of the h5-pawn facilitates the development of White’s initiative on the kingside.

22.g4! hxg4 23.h5 e5 24. hxg6 fxg6 25.d2∞

In the game N.Kirov – Radev, Sofia 1982, White succeeded to obtain a strong attacking position.

d) 10...a5

A coup we are already familiar with from Chapter 18 variation d. Black intends to dispatch the queen to h5 to exchange the light-squared bishops. He also hopes to make use of the queen on the fifth rank to support the b7-b5 advance.

11.h3!

If White lets the black queen make it across to h5 and exchange the light-squared bishops, e.g., by 11.d2 h5 12.b3 h3 13.f3, then Black obtains counterplay by means of 13...xg2 14. xg2 c5 15.ac1 fc8 16.e4 a6∞ Lukov – R.Hernandez, Faro 1997.

Of no avail is the attempt to prevent the appearance of the black queen on h5 with the help of 11.b5 in view of 11...g4

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(after 11...a6 12.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2 \textit{\texttt{d}}d8 13.\textit{\texttt{c}}c3 the position is a few moves behind, but otherwise identical to one of Chapter 21) 12.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2 \textit{\texttt{b}}b6 13.\textit{\texttt{a}}ab1 \textit{\texttt{e}}e5 14.\textit{\texttt{c}}c2 \textit{\texttt{f}}f5 15.e4 \textit{\texttt{g}}g4 16.\textit{\texttt{e}}e3 \textit{\texttt{c}}c6 17.b3 \textit{\texttt{f}}f3+ 18.\textit{\texttt{h}}h1 a6=, and the situation somewhat sharpened due to the penetration of the black knight onto f3, Mikhalevich – Minasian, Lvov 1990.

11...\textit{\texttt{e}}e6

Black changes his original plan a little in connection with White’s move eleven. The fact is that in case of 11...\textit{\texttt{h}}h5 White will reply 12.g4! \textit{\texttt{h}}h4 (after 12...\textit{\texttt{e}}e5 13.\textit{\texttt{e}}e3 \textit{\texttt{d}}d7 14.\textit{\texttt{a}}ad1 \textit{\texttt{a}}a5, which occurred in the game Lekic – Vranovic, Nis 1994, sufficient is the straightforward, 15.\textit{\texttt{d}}d5!\texttt{±}, while the line 12...\textit{\texttt{a}}a5 13.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2 \textit{\texttt{d}}d8 14.b3\texttt{±} from the game Pribyl – Moiseev, Havoiv 1971, did not provide Black with anything but a few lost tempos) 13.\textit{\texttt{f}}f4! h5 (following 13...\textit{\texttt{h}}h5 14.\textit{\texttt{h}}h2 \textit{\texttt{f}}f6 15.\textit{\texttt{e}}e3 Black is already experiencing very serious problems, in connection with the fact that 15...\textit{\texttt{e}}e8? is not available, since he can lose his queen after 16.\textit{\texttt{g}}g3\texttt{±}) 14.\textit{\texttt{g}}g3 \textit{\texttt{g}}g5 15.f4 \textit{\texttt{c}}c5+ 16.\textit{\texttt{f}}f2\texttt{±} and beat back Black’s rush on the kingside, forcing the black queen to back off.

The preparation of the b7-b5 advance 11...\textit{\texttt{b}}b8 12.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2 a6 13.\textit{\texttt{a}}ac1 \textit{\texttt{d}}d7 brought Black serious troubles after 14.b4! \textit{\texttt{c}}c7 15.\textit{\texttt{f}}f4 (menacing c4-c5) 15...e5 16.\textit{\texttt{g}}g5\texttt{±} Panchenko – Mujagic, Prague 1982.

The plan starting 11...\textit{\texttt{d}}d7, which we are familiar with from section c, is inconsistent with the position of the queen on a5 and following 12.\textit{\texttt{d}}d5 \textit{\texttt{d}}d8 (in case of 12...\textit{\texttt{e}}e8 there is 13.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2 \textit{\texttt{d}}d8 14.\textit{\texttt{c}}c3 \textit{\texttt{c}}c5 15.\textit{\texttt{e}}e3 \textit{\texttt{x}}xc3 16.\textit{\texttt{x}}xc3 \textit{\texttt{d}}d7 17.\textit{\texttt{f}}fd1 \textit{\texttt{a}}a4 18.b3 \textit{\texttt{c}}c6 19.\textit{\texttt{a}}ac1 a5 20.h4\texttt{±} Danailov – L.Rodriguez, Zaragoza 1992, and the rest of the game closely followed the principles asserted in variation c) 13.\textit{\texttt{g}}g5 \textit{\texttt{e}}e8 14.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2 \textit{\texttt{b}}b6 15.\textit{\texttt{a}}ac1\texttt{±} Podgaets – Vitolinsk, USSR 1972, White puts Black in the role of the defending party.

From time to time one can see 11...\textit{\texttt{f}}f5 with the idea to provoke the move 12.e4. After 12...\textit{\texttt{e}}e6 13.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2 \textit{\texttt{f}}f8 (in case of 13...\textit{\texttt{a}}ac8 14.b3 a6 15.\textit{\texttt{a}}ac1 \textit{\texttt{d}}d7 16.f4 b5 very strong is 17.cxb5 \textit{\texttt{c}}c5 18.\textit{\texttt{e}}e3 axb5 19.f5\texttt{±}, and the game Franco Ocampo – Izeta, Pamplona 1991, showed that 19...\textit{\texttt{d}}d7? is unavailable, due to 20.b4\texttt{±}, else if 13...\textit{\texttt{c}}c5 14.b3 \textit{\texttt{d}}d7 15.\textit{\texttt{a}}ac1 \textit{\texttt{e}}e5 16.\textit{\texttt{e}}e2\texttt{±}, then following 17.\textit{\texttt{d}}d5\texttt{±} which occurred in the Sedlacek – Kriz game, SVK 1997, White also retains his advantage, in principle nothing is changed either by 13...\textit{\texttt{h}}h5 14.g4 \textit{\texttt{c}}c5 15.b3 \textit{\texttt{d}}d7 16.\textit{\texttt{a}}ac1 a5 17.\textit{\texttt{e}}e3\texttt{±} Cosma – M.Pavlovic, Andorra 1999) 14.b3 a6 15.\textit{\texttt{a}}ac1 \textit{\texttt{b}}b8 16.\textit{\texttt{f}}fe1 \textit{\texttt{d}}d8 Black reorganised relatively successfully by transferring his kingside rook to the queenside, however, he did
not obtain any active counterplay. As a result of 17.\( \text{h}2 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 18.\( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 19.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 20.\( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{h}6 \) 21.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 22.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 23.\( \text{f}2 \)\text{+} Chow – Federl, Illinois 1987, White set out to build up the pressure in a systematic an unhurried way.

12.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{a}6 \)

The walk of the queen in the centre of the board in not safe for Black, which is evidenced by 12...\( \text{h}5 \) 13.\( \text{g}4 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 14.\( \text{b}3 \)\text{!} \( \text{ab}8 \) 15.\( \text{ac}1 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 16.\( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 17.e3\text{+} and now after 17...\( \text{b}5 \) 18.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 19.g5 the black queen was trapped, Ricardi – Scarella, Buenos Aires 1994.

The retreat of the black queen to \( c7 \) has been tested more than once. Following 12...\( \text{c}7 \) 13.\( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{f}8 \)(there is also 13...\( \text{a}6 \) 14.\( \text{ac}1 \) \( \text{ab}8 \), after which in the Lobron – Hendriks game, Antwerp 1997, White progressively squeezed Black’s position by means of 15.\( \text{d}5 \)\text{!} \( \text{d}8 \) 16.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 17.\( \text{f}1 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 18.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 19.\( \text{c}2 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 20.\( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 21.\( \text{x}d5 \) \( \text{b}5 \) 22.\( \text{d}2 \)\text{+} and it turned out that Black has serious problems with the light-squared bishop, the c-file, and the e7-pawn) 14.\( \text{ac}1 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 15.\( \text{h}2 \) \( \text{ab}8 \) White won the black queen by means of the standard breakthrough 16.\( \text{c}5 \)! \( \text{xc}5 \) 17.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 18.\( \text{xc}5 \) \( \text{xc}5 \) 19.\( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{x}g2 \) 20.\( \text{x}g2 \) \( \text{x}c1 \) 21.\( \text{x}c1 \)\text{+} Lagunov – Marschner, Berlin 1991. However, the task of converting this in the situation at hand is fairly complicated.

13.\( \text{b}3 \) \( \text{f}d8 \)

If 13...\( \text{ad}8 \), there is also 14.\( \text{ad}1 \)!\text{?} (after 14.\( \text{e}4 \) Black evened the play with the help of the pin on the white queen by means of 14...\( \text{d}5 \)! 15.\( \text{exd}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 16.\( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{xd}5 \) 17.\( \text{xd}5 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 18.\( \text{ad}1 \) \( \text{xd}5= \) Franco – R. Hernandez, Havana 1998, and White was forced to agree to a draw) and now to 14...\( \text{d}5 \) strong is 15.\( \text{g}5 \)!\text{+}

14.\( \text{ad}1 \) \( \text{ac}8 \)

In case of 14...\( \text{d}5 \) very strong is 15.\( \text{g}5 \)!\text{,} since 15...\( \text{dxc}4 \) brings about Black’s defeat after 16.\( \text{xd}8\text{++} \).

15.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{b}6 \) 16.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 17.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 18.\( \text{a}4\text{+} \)

Black had no success organising his counterplay on the c4 pawn to be followed by d6–d5, Gheorghiu – Sahovic, Mendrisio 1987. Now he must beware of White’s threats associated with the traditional penetration of the white knight onto \( d5 \) (possibly, after a preliminary exchange on \( f6 \) and the organization of the a4-a5 advance.
Chapter 21

1.vasion 2.c4 c5 3.vasion c6 4.g3 g6
5.d4 invasion 6.g2 exd4 7.exd4 0-0 8.
0-0 exd4 9.exd4 d6 10.vasion d3 a6

The most popular continuation. Black makes a move, which is useful on all occasions.

11.vasion d2


The breakthrough 11.c5, which is traditional for these structures, is not available, in view of 11...dxc5 12.invasion x8 invasion x8 13.invasion e3 invasion e6 14.invasion a1 invasion d7 15. invasion x5 invasion f8= with an equal endgame, Langeweg – Hecht, Pain-

gtton 1970. After 11.vasion f4 invasion f5 12.e4
invasion e6 13.invasion a1 invasion d7 14.b3 invasion e5 15.invasion d2 Black carried through the programmed 15...b5!? 16.axb5 axb5 17.invasion x5 invasion a5 18.invasion c3 invasion f8 19.invasion a4 invasion x2 20.invasion x2 invasion d3∞ obtaining good compensation for the pawn, Spassky – Kasparov, Belfort 1988.

The fairly popular 11.vasion e3 leads to a complex battle with mutual chances after 11...g4 12.d4 invasion e5 13.invasion d1 invasion b8∞, and the attempt to secure a reliable post for the invasion e3–bishop by means of 11.h3 provided Black with counterplay on the queenside after 11...d7 (according to Kasparov, bad is 11...invasion e8 in view of 12.c5! invasion x5 13.invasion x8 invasion x8 14.invasion f4 invasion a8 15.invasion d1 f4) 12.b3 invasion b8 13.invasion e3 invasion b5 14.invasion x8 invasion x8 (in case of 14.invasion a7? b4 15.invasion d5 invasion b7 16.invasion d4 invasion c5 17.invasion e3 invasion x8 18.invasion x8 invasion e6 19.invasion f4 invasion b8 20.h4!∞, as pointed out by G. Kasparov, White’s claims for the advantage would be better justified) 14...axb5 15.invasion a1 b4= Hjartarsson – Kasparov, Tilburg 1989.

11..b8

In case of 11...vasion f5 12.e4 invasion e6
13.b3 we are back at a position, which has already been discussed under variation b from Chapter 20.

12...\textbf{\texttt{a}} c1

A crucial point. In this particular case the effect of the standard 12.c5 was not too intense, because of 12...\textbf{\texttt{f}} f5! (accepting the pawn offering would be beneficial for White 12...dxc5?!), since after 13.\textbf{\texttt{a}} xd8 \textbf{\texttt{a}} xd8 14.\textbf{\texttt{a}} f4 \textbf{\texttt{a}} a8 15.\textbf{\texttt{e}} a4 \textbf{\texttt{e}} d7 16.\textbf{\texttt{f}} d1 \textbf{\texttt{e}} e8 17.\textbf{\texttt{a}} ac1 \textbf{\texttt{e}} e5 18.\textbf{\texttt{e}} e3 \textbf{\texttt{e}} e4 19.b3 \textbf{\texttt{b}} 5 20.\textbf{\texttt{a}} xc5 \textbf{\texttt{a}} xc5 21.\textbf{\texttt{a}} xc5 he keeps his edge, Lezcano Jaen – Fernandez, Las Palmas 1997) 13.e4 (after 13...dxc5?! 14.\textbf{\texttt{a}} xd8 \textbf{\texttt{a}} xd8 15.\textbf{\texttt{a}} g5! \textbf{\texttt{c}} c8 16.\textbf{\texttt{e}} e5 \textbf{\texttt{g}} 4 17.\textbf{\texttt{a}} xe7 \textbf{\texttt{a}} xe5 18.h3 \textbf{\texttt{e}} h6 19.\textbf{\texttt{a}} xd8 \textbf{\texttt{a}} xd8 20.\textbf{\texttt{a}} ad1±, Black got no compensation for the exchange down, Vaganian – Heinemann, Germany 2000) 13...\textbf{\texttt{e}} e6 14.xd6 \textbf{\texttt{b}} e8 15.\textbf{\texttt{d}} d5 (following 15.\textbf{\texttt{f}} d1 \textbf{\texttt{a}} xd6 16.\textbf{\texttt{a}} g5 \textbf{\texttt{c}} c4 17.\textbf{\texttt{e}} c2 \textbf{\texttt{a}} a5 18.\textbf{\texttt{a}} xe7 \textbf{\texttt{f}} e8= Black maintains the equilibrium) 15...\textbf{\texttt{a}} xd6 16.\textbf{\texttt{a}} f4 \textbf{\texttt{a}} xd5 17.\textbf{\texttt{a}} xd5 \textbf{\texttt{a}} xb2 18.\textbf{\texttt{a}} ad1 \textbf{\texttt{c}} c8 19.\textbf{\texttt{b}} b3 \textbf{\texttt{a}} c3= Tal – Neverov, Moscow 1990.

Black's potential activity on the queenside cannot be extinguished by means of 12.a4, because of 12...\textbf{\texttt{d}} d7!? 13.\textbf{\texttt{a}} ab1 (after 13.a5 b6 14.axb6 \textbf{\texttt{a}} xb6 15.b3 \textbf{\texttt{f}} f5 16.e4 \textbf{\texttt{e}} e6 17.\textbf{\texttt{a}} ab1 \textbf{\texttt{d}} d7=, Black has no problems whatsoever, Polugaevsky – Gelfand, Moscow 1990) 13...\textbf{\texttt{c}} c6 14.e4 \textbf{\texttt{d}} d7 15.b3 \textbf{\texttt{c}} c5 16.\textbf{\texttt{e}} c2 \textbf{\texttt{e}} e6 17.b4 a5!= Brodsky – Anastasian, Rostov 1993.

Note also, that following 12.e4 Black can obtain good play via 12...\textbf{\texttt{d}} d7!? (also interesting is 12...b5 13.cxb5 axb5 14.\textbf{\texttt{a}} xb5 \textbf{\texttt{a}} a6 15.a4 \textbf{\texttt{b}} b6 16.b4 \textbf{\texttt{g}} g4 17.\textbf{\texttt{a}} ac1 \textbf{\texttt{a}} xb5 18.axb5 \textbf{\texttt{a}} xb5 19.\textbf{\texttt{a}} xb5 \textbf{\texttt{a}} xb5 20.\textbf{\texttt{c}} c7=, which occurred in the game Kir.Georgiev – Kasparov, Saint John (blitz) 1988, with the colours switched) 13.\textbf{\texttt{a}} ac1 b5! 14.cxb5 axb5 15.b3 \textbf{\texttt{c}} c5= Sommerbauer – Jost, Strasbourg 1994.

At this point it is worth to consider separately the following options for Black: a) 12...\textbf{\texttt{d}} d7, b) 12...\textbf{\texttt{e}} e6, c) 12...b5 and d) 12...\textbf{\texttt{d}} d7.

Of the more rare continuations we will note 12...\textbf{\texttt{f}} f5. Black aims to provoke White to play e2-e4, in order to bar the possibility of the c4-c5 breakthrough (a similar possibility we will see below in variation a). After 13.e4 \textbf{\texttt{d}} d7 (in case of 13...\textbf{\texttt{e}} e6 14.b3 the play steers into the channels of variation b1 from Chapter 20) 14.h3 (with 14.\textbf{\texttt{f}} d1 Black can avail himself of 14...b5, since after 15.c5 b4 16.\textbf{\texttt{b}} b1, which occurred in the game Zheliandinov – J.Pribyl, Prague 1966, he would have obtained at least equal chances by means of 16...dxc5! 17.\textbf{\texttt{a}} xc5 \textbf{\texttt{a}} a4 18.\textbf{\texttt{a}} xd8.\textbf{\texttt{f}} xd8 19.\textbf{\texttt{a}} dc1 \textbf{\texttt{d}} d7=) 14...b5 (following 14...\textbf{\texttt{b}} b6 15.b3 \textbf{\texttt{c}} c8 16.\textbf{\texttt{f}} e1 \textbf{\texttt{d}} d8 17.a4± White retained the upper hand, Smyslov – Matulovic, Hamburg 1965)
15.cxb5 axb5 16.b4 a8 17.cxb5 a2 18.c3 a8 19.b5 a3 20.a1 a5 21.xa3 xxa3 22.b6 b8 23.e3 White keeps some advantage, on account of his far advanced passed b-pawn, Smyslov – Geller, Moscow (m/2) 1965.

a) 12...d7
Black prepares the b7-b5 push.

13.c5!
Now this breakthrough in the centre is rather efficient. White can hardly hope to obtain any advantage with the other continuations, since Black is menacing to advance b7-b5. For example, after 13.b3 Black easily equalized by means of 13...b5 14.a2 bxc4 15.xc4 b6 16.fc1 fc8 17.f4 d6= Neckar – Danner, Prague 1988.

13...e8
Following 13...d5?! 14.f4 c8 15.xd5 xd5, which occurred in the game M. Becker – Griaev, Germany 1999, White could have easily obtained a substantial advantage by means of 16.xd5 e5 17.e3±. The move 13...f5 is from the game Drasko – Ye Rong-

guang, Belgrade 1988, which ended in a draw at this very point. In fact this move does not save Black the troubles, on account of 14.e4 dxc5 (after 14... e6 15.xd6 e8 16.fd1 xd6 17.g5 c4 18.e2 a5 19.xe7 fe8, in contrast to the situation we discussed in the note to White’s move twelve, the rook is already on c1 and this gives much power to the reply 20.b4!±) 15. xd8 bxd8 (following 15...fxd8 16.f4± Black will have to part with an exchange) 16.g5!± and like in the note to White’s move twelve (see the fragment of the Vaganian – Heinemann game, Germany 2000) Black has problems protecting the e7 post. After 13...dxc5 14.f4 f5 the emerging position is identical to the one in the line 13...f5, which we considered shortly.

If 13...e6 14.xd6 g2?! (with the best continuation 14... xd6 15.xd6 exd6 16.fd1 xg2 17.xg2 the position arrived at, barring an insignificant move transposition, is from the game Lirindzakis – Thallinger, Balatonberegny 1992, where Black is heading for problems due to the weakness of the d6 pawn), then in the game Lirindzakis – Thallinger, Balatonberegny 1992, white should have continued 15.dxe7!? xd3 16. exf8+ xf8 17.exd3 xf1 18. xf1 d8 19.e2 g4 20.h3 e5 21.e3± simply emerging with a pawn up.
14. \( \text{g5} \) \text{h6} 15. \( \text{e3} \) \text{e6} 16. \text{b4}! 

White seeks to disallow the activation of the black queen, which is otherwise possible after 16. \text{f1} \text{a5+}. 

16... \text{f6} 

Following 16... \text{f5} 17. \text{d2} \text{dxc5} 18. \text{xd8} \text{xd8} 19. \text{d5} ± Black is facing huge problems because he cannot protect adequately the e7 post. 

17. \text{exd6!} 

Another precise move. White is not willing to endow Black with the bishop pair advantage after 17. \text{f1} \text{g4} 18. \text{exd6} \text{xe3} 19. \text{xe3} \text{exd6±}. 

17... \text{xd6} 

To 17... \text{exd6} fine is 18. \text{f4} ±. 

18. \text{exd6!} 

Black is holding his own after 18. \text{f4} \text{xd3} 19. \text{exd3} \text{bd8} 20. \text{xb7} \text{h5} 21. \text{e3} \text{xd3} 22. \text{a4} \text{a3} 23. \text{c5} \text{b8=}. 

18... \text{exd6} 19. \text{fd1} \text{fd8} 

If 19... \text{fc8}, then 20. \text{a7}!? \text{a8} 21. \text{d4±} leads to a huge white advantage, Ye Rongguang. 

20. \text{a7} \text{a8} 21. \text{d4±} 

The weakness of the black pawn d6 and the continuing pressure on the queenside of the adversary along the a8-h1 diagonal makes Black’s position difficult, Ye Rongguang – Gelfand, Novi Sad (ol) 1990. 

b) 12... \text{e6} 

Black leaves the d7-square unoccupied for the other two of his pieces claiming it: the queen and the knight.

13. \text{b3} 

A programmed move. 

13... \text{d7} 

In case of 13... \text{d7} worth attention is (like in variation b2 from Chapter 20) the move 14. \text{a4}!? (following 14. \text{e4} \text{fc8} 15. \text{e1} \text{b5} 16. \text{d5}, which occurred in the game Kochyev – Henao, Manila 1974, we can see that the position is identical with the one from the game Ehlvest – Kamsky, Reggio Emilia 1991 (variation b1 from Chapter 20), with an extra black move \text{f8-c8}, which permitted Black to equalise by means of 16... \text{xd5} 17. \text{cx5} \text{h3=}, and in case of 14. \text{fd1} \text{b5} 15. \text{axb5} \text{axb5} 16. \text{e3} \text{f5= the play also quickly evened out, Raab – Wornath, Rhein 1998) 14... \text{h3} (after 14... \text{fc8} 15. \text{e1} \text{b6} 16. \text{e4} \text{g4} 17. \text{d5 \text{xd5} 18. \text{exd5 f6 19.a5= White keeps superior chances thanks to the bishop pair advantage and the certain superiority in the queenside) 15.e4 (following 15. \text{f1} \text{yg2} 16. \text{yg2 fc8 17. \text{g5} b6 18. \text{g1 f8} 19. \text{d5 xd5 20.cx} 5 b5= Seres – Cebalo, Nova Gorica 1997, the}
play evened out) 15...\textit{f}c8 (after 15...\texttt{\textit{a}}xg2 16.\texttt{\textit{a}}xg2 \texttt{\textit{f}}d8 17.f3 e6 18.\texttt{\textit{f}}d1 \texttt{\textit{c}}6 19.\texttt{\textit{e}}e3 White stands slightly better due to the certain weakness of the black pawn d6, Bistric – Z.Petrovic, Pula 1998) 16.\texttt{\textit{f}}d1 \texttt{\textit{a}}xg2 17.\texttt{\textit{a}}xg2 \texttt{\textit{c}}5 18.f3 \texttt{\textit{h}}5 19.h4 h6 20.\texttt{\textit{h}}1 \texttt{\textit{c}}5 21.\texttt{\textit{e}}e3 \texttt{\textit{c}}7 22.\texttt{\textit{a}}5\texttt{\textit{f}} Geller – J.Pribyl, Prague 1966, White keeps a tiny advantage.

\texttt{14.e4?!}

White steers the game to a position from b1, but with a tempo lost. Another acceptable option for him is 14.\texttt{\textit{d}}d5. Following 14...\texttt{\textit{e}}e5 (in case of 14...b5 15.\texttt{\textit{g}}g5 bxc4 16.\texttt{\textit{c}}xc4 \texttt{\textit{a}}xd5 17.\texttt{\textit{a}}xd5 \texttt{\textit{b}}5 18.\texttt{\textit{d}}d2\texttt{\textit{f}} Espig – Hess, Chemnitz 1998, White has some advantage thanks to the bishop pair) 15.\texttt{\textit{c}}c2 \texttt{\textit{c}}6 16.\texttt{\textit{c}}c3 \texttt{\textit{c}}xc3 17.\texttt{\textit{c}}xc3 a5 18.\texttt{\textit{f}}d1 \texttt{\textit{a}}xd5 19.\texttt{\textit{a}}xd5 \texttt{\textit{b}}4 20.\texttt{\textit{d}}d2 \texttt{\textit{a}}6, Rosell – Kolbak, Vejle 1974, White started an offensive with the outermost pawn 21.h4\texttt{\textit{f}}. We have met this approach, which is standard for positions of this type, in variation \texttt{c} of Chapter 20.

\texttt{14...\textit{c}5}

The attempt to punish White by 14...b5 15.cxb5 axb5 16.\texttt{\textit{d}}d5 \texttt{\textit{c}}5 17.\texttt{\textit{e}}e2 brought Black to huge difficulties following the inadequate 17...\texttt{\textit{d}}d7? (with the superior continuation for Black 17...\texttt{\textit{a}}xd5 18.exd5 b4 19.\texttt{\textit{c}}c4 \texttt{\textit{a}}5 20.\texttt{\textit{e}}e3, as pointed out by W. Uhlmann, White’s odds are also superior), which was countered by 18.e5! \texttt{\textit{e}}8 19.\texttt{\textit{e}}e3 \texttt{\textit{e}}e6 20.\texttt{\textit{d}}d6 exd6 21.\texttt{\textit{d}}d2\texttt{\textit{f}} Uhlmann – Gruenberg, Stralsund 1974.

\texttt{15.\texttt{\textit{f}}e2 \texttt{\textit{d}}7}

Following 15...b5 16.cxb5 \texttt{\textit{xc}}c3 17.\texttt{\textit{a}}xc3 axb5 18.f4 f6 19.e5 fxe5 20.fxe5 \texttt{\textit{d}}d7 21.\texttt{\textit{e}}e3 White has a sizeable edge in view of the chronic weakness of the dark squares on the black kingside, and with a careless 21...\texttt{\textit{h}}h3? followed by 22.e6! \texttt{\textit{xe}}6 23.\texttt{\textit{h}}h6\texttt{\textit{f}}, White’s win was just a few moves away, Pereira – Magalotti, Denmark 1999.

\texttt{16.\texttt{\textit{d}}d5 b5}

Black tries to break free, but this push does not provide Black with completely even odds.

\texttt{17.b4 \texttt{\textit{d}}d4 18.cxb5 \texttt{\textit{a}}xd5 19.exd5 axb5 20.\texttt{\textit{f}}e1 \texttt{\textit{e}}8}

\begin{center}
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\texttt{21.\texttt{\textit{c}}c6\texttt{\textit{f}}}


c) \textbf{12.b5}

Disregarding the pawn sacrifice Black tries to immediately disentangle himself by staging a
blow on one of White’s central pawns.

13...exb5

Superiority struggle requires that the sacrifice be accepted. In case of 13.b3 like in the game A. Schneider – Kasparov, Lyon 1994, Black should have proceeded 13...bxc4!? (as we know from variation e1 good for Black is also 13...d7) 14.xc4 a5± with counterplay. Should White chose 13.c5, which is fairly typical for positions of this type, then after 13...f5 14.e4 e6 15.d5 dxc5 16.xc5 d7 17.c2 e5 18.a3 xd5 19.exd5 c4 20. xa6 d7= Black is doing excellent, Krogius – Martinovic, Sarajevo 1968. Moreover, White already has to deal with the threat 21...b6!

13...axb5 14.xb5 f5

It is possible to try to win back on a pin the pawn sacrificed by means of 14...a6 15.a4 b6 (if 15...d7, then 16.b3±) 16.b4!? (after 16.c6 xb5 17.axb6 xd3 18.xb8 xb8 19.exd3 xb2= Black is in possession of a more compact pawn structure and an active rook, and in case of 16.c6 g4! 17.b4 e5 18.e4 e6! 19.a5 d8 20.d4 d5= White’s pieces get to hang) 16...xb5 17.axb5 d5 (in case of 17...xb5 18.xb5 xb5 Black has to take into consideration the rather unpleasant 19.c6± 18.c5 e6 19.e3± Neckar – Hicker, Werfen 1989, White kept a though double, but extra pawn, supported, moreover, by a pair of bishops. Note also, that after 14...d7 unpleasant for Black will be 15.a7! with the idea to break in on c6, and if 15...e5, then 16.a3±.

15.e4


In this situation Black has two options to chose from: the suggesting itself c1) 15...xe4, or the revisited idea with the attack on the b5–knight by c2) 15...d7.

c1) 15...xe4

Black immediately wins back the pawn sacrificed on move twelve.

16.xe4 xe4 17.xe4 xb5

The position seems perfectly equal, however this is not so. The outermost white pawns will hardly meet any serious resistance on their way, while at the same time the black pawn pair will clash with the centralised white pieces, and, possibly, with the white f-pawn.

18.b4 d5
In case of 18...\(\text{c}a8\), which occurred in the game Madl – Kurz, Germany 1989, after 19. \(\text{xa8! xa8}\) 20.a4! \(\text{bb8}\) 21.a5\(\pm\) the white pawns could immediately make a few steps forward. Following 18...\(\text{d}d7\) 19.a4 \(\text{h}5\) 20.b5\(\pm\) one can hardly spot any serious threats to the white king whatsoever, while at the same time the pair of white pawns dashes to the queening square.

19.\(\text{d}3 \text{d}7\)

Maybe Black’s best bet is the variation 19...\(\text{b}7??\) 20.\(\text{c}5 \text{d}7\) 21.a4\(\pm\), though again his problems are building up.

20.a4 \(\text{bb8}\)

Black is doing poorly also after 20...\(\text{b}7\) 21.b5 \(\text{a}8\) 22.\(\text{c}5\) e6 23.\(\text{c}2\) h5 24.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{a}7\) 25.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{d}4\) 26.\(\text{c}6\)\(\pm\).

21.b5 e5 22.\(\text{c}6\) e4

Black has a difficult position also with the follow-up 22...\(\text{f}c8\) 23.\(\text{f}c1\) \(\text{xc}6\) 24.\(\text{xc}6\)\(\pm\). After the rooks have been exchanged, Black will face additional troubles with the protection of the eighth rank.

23.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{ff}8\) 24.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{a}8\)

Now the exchange of a pair of rooks is out of the question, since after 24...\(\text{bc}8\) 25.\(\text{d}1!\) \(\text{xc}6\) 26.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 27.\(\text{xc}6\) d4 28.c7 d3 29.\(\text{b}1\) the white pawn “c” reaches the queening rank. In case of 24...\(\text{bd}8\) very strong is 25.\(\text{c}7!\).

25.b6 d4 26.\(\text{c}7!\) \(\text{f}5\)

Unavailable was 26...\(\text{xa}4\) due to 27.\(\text{xa}4\) \(\text{xa}4\) 28.b7\(\pm\)

27.b7\(\pm\)


\(\text{c}2)\) 15...\(\text{d}7\)

Compared to variation \(\text{c}1\) Black is more subtle. Having barred the long diagonal a8-h1 of the white bishop on g2 by means of the e4–pawn, he revisits the idea to attack the white knight on b5 by analogy with the plan considered in the note to Black’s move fourteen.

\begin{center}
\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image.png}
\end{figure}
\end{center}

16.a4!

The knight must be retained on b5. Weaker is 16.\(\text{c}3\) in view of the variation 16...\(\text{xb}2\) 17.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{xb}1\) 18.\(\text{xb}1\) \(\text{g}4\)\(\pm\), which provides Black with counterplay.

16...\(\text{b}6\)

In case of 16...\(\text{g}4\) Black had to take into account 17.b4?!, and if 17...\(\text{e}5\) (after 17...\(\text{b}6\) we arrive at a position, considered in the note to White’s move seventeen), then 18.\(\text{e}2\)\(\pm\).

17.h3

Another option for White would have been 17.b4!? with the likely follow-up 17...\(\text{g}4\) 18.\(\text{c}3\)
\( \varepsilon_b4 19.\varepsilon_d5 \varepsilon_d4 20.\varepsilon_xe7+ \varepsilon_h8 \\
21.\varepsilon_xd4 \varepsilon_xd4 22.\varepsilon_c4 \varepsilon_g7 23. \\
\varepsilon_c3 \varepsilon_xc3 24.\varepsilon_xc3 \varepsilon_xa4 25.\varepsilon_a1 + \\
with a slight edge on account of the isolation of the black pawn \\
d6.

17...\varepsilon_b5 18.axb5 \\
With 18.\varepsilon_xb5 \varepsilon_d4 19.\varepsilon_c3 \\
\varepsilon_b5 20.\varepsilon_xd4 \varepsilon_b4= Black would \\
have been close to making the odds even.

18...\varepsilon_xb5 \\
White keeps some edge also 
after 18...\varepsilon_d7 19.b4 \varepsilon_e5 20.\varepsilon_e2 \\
\varepsilon_xb5 21.\varepsilon_xb5 \varepsilon_b5 22.\varepsilon_c7±. 
Black’s plans include the d6-d5 
advance, and the knight on f6 will 
be of greater assistance in carrying 
that out.

19.\varepsilon_xb5 \varepsilon_b5 20.b4± \\
This situation occurred in the 
game Gulko – Khalifman, Erevan 
1996. After 20...d5?! 21.exd5 
\varepsilon_xd5 White employed a double 
attack 22.\varepsilon_c5! \varepsilon_xc5 23.bxc5± to 
force the exchange of the active 
black rook and at the same time 
advanced his passed pawn to 
towards the queening square. In 
case of 20...e6!? (with the idea 
after pushing d6-d5 to secure a 
firm position for his knight in the 
centre of the board, in case of an 
exchange on d5) 21. f4± (inten-
ding to meet d6-d5 by e4-e5) 
Black would have probably had 
less problems, though White’s 
position is a trifling more plea-
sing again thanks to the bishop 
pair advantage.

d) 12...\varepsilon_d7

Black seeks to transfer the 
knights to c5, hoping to drive back 
the white queen from the a6-f1 
diagonal and consequently to 
facilitate his important b7-b5 
advance. Note also, that with the 
black knight on c5, it is dan-
gerous to block b7-b5 by means 
of a2-a4, in view of the weakening 
of the b3-square.

13.b3 

The attempt to provide a more 
comfortable retreat for the queen 
by 13.e4 furnished Black with 
good counterplay after 13...b5 
14.cxb5 axb5 15.b3 \varepsilon_c5 16.\varepsilon_e3 
e6 17.\varepsilon_fd1 b4 18.\varepsilon_e2 \varepsilon_a6 19. 
\varepsilon_e1 \varepsilon_b6= Kasparov – Hamilton, 

13...\varepsilon_c5 

Also possible was 13...b5 
14.cxb5 axb5. However, following 
15.\varepsilon_d5 (with the idea \varepsilon_d5-b4, 
15.\varepsilon_xb5?? was not available 
because of \varepsilon_e5=+) 15...\varepsilon_e5 (in 
case of 15...\varepsilon_c5 16.\varepsilon_e3 we arrive 
at a position, considered below in 
the variation mainline) 16.\varepsilon_e3 
(weaker is 16.\varepsilon_b1 due to 16... 
\varepsilon_b7 17.\varepsilon_fd1 e6 18.\varepsilon_b4 \varepsilon_xg2 
19.\varepsilon_xg2 \varepsilon_b6 20.\varepsilon_e4 d5= Quinteros – Evans, Lone Pine 1975)
16...\textbullet b7 17.\textbullet b4 \textbullet xg2 18.\textbullet xg2 \textbullet d7 19.\textbullet c2 \textbullet fc8 20.\textbullet fc1 \textbullet xc2 21.\textbullet xc2, Anic – Spiridonov, Montpellier 1991, White keeps slightly better odds due to his prospects of invading the c6-square. The progress of this game confirms this assessment: 21...h5 22.h3 \textbullet b7+ 23.f3 e6 24.\textbullet c3 \textbullet c8 25.\textbullet xe5 \textbullet xe5 26.\textbullet e4! (doing away with another guard of the c6 square) 26...\textbullet c7 27.\textbullet xb7 \textbullet xb7 28.\textbullet c6=.

14.\textbullet e3

After 14.\textbullet b1 b5 15.\textbullet xb5 axb5 16.\textbullet d5 \textbullet b7 17.\textbullet g5 \textbullet xd5 18.\textbullet xd5 \textbullet d7 19.b4 \textbullet e6 20.\textbullet e3 Black evened the odds by means of the accurate 20...\textbullet d4 21.\textbullet d3 \textbullet f5!= Uhlmann – Smejkal, Arandelovac 1976.

Alongside the mainline move worth attention is also 14.\textbullet c2 b5 15.b4?! Following 15...\textbullet e6 (with 15...\textbullet d6 16.\textbullet cxb5 axb5 17.\textbullet d5 e6 the mass simplifications 18.\textbullet xc8 \textbullet xc8 19.\textbullet xc8 \textbullet xc8 20.\textbullet e7+ \textbullet h8 21.\textbullet xc8 \textbullet xc8 22.\textbullet c1 \textbullet xc1+ 23.\textbullet xc1\pm Adelman – Gillen, Ireland 1992, brought White to a lightly superior ending, where the careless 23...\textbullet c3? immediately put Black on the verge of defeat after 24.\textbullet c6\pm) 16.\textbullet cxb5 axb5 17.\textbullet d3\pm Espig – Wall, Berlin 1994, and White obtained superior prospects due to the certain weakness of the black pawn b5.

14...b5

It does not make any sense for Black to refrain from this programmed move. Following 14...\textbullet d7 15.\textbullet d5 \textbullet e6 16.\textbullet b6 \textbullet d4 17.\textbullet fe1 \textbullet xb6 18.\textbullet xb6 \textbullet g4 19.\textbullet f1 \textbullet c6 20.b4\pm Panchenko – Dominguez Matito, Badalona 1997, White, having reliably blockaded the queenside of the adversary, retained more loose play. In case of 14...\textbullet e6 15.\textbullet fd1 \textbullet e8 16.h4! (this move is often worthwhile with a black knight on c5) 16...h5 17.\textbullet e4 \textbullet xe4 18.\textbullet xe4 \textbullet d7 (18...\textbullet c7? in not available in view of 19.\textbullet xg6+–, which occurred in the game Skrobek – Deleka, Slupsk 1992) White’s prospects are superior, since he has carried out the programmed advance 19.c5=.

15.\textbullet cxb5

White should not allow a complete blockade of the queenside, like he did in the Kir. Georgiev – Gdanski game, Budapest 1993, where after 15.\textbullet d5 \textbullet e6 16.\textbullet fd1 (superior is 16.\textbullet xxb5 arriving at a position discussed below) 16...\textbullet xd5 17.\textbullet cxd5 (if 17.\textbullet xd5, then 17...b4=) 17...b4! 18.\textbullet h3 a5 19.\textbullet c4 \textbullet b5 20.\textbullet dc1 \textbullet b8= regardless of the bishop pair advantage White has difficulties locating a target to attack with his pieces, because of the blockading position on the queenside and the strong placement of the black knight on c5.

15...\textbullet xb5 16.\textbullet d5 \textbullet e6

After 15...\textbullet e6 17.\textbullet b4 \textbullet b7 18.\textbullet c6 (in case of 18.\textbullet xb7 \textbullet xb7 19.\textbullet fd1 \textbullet a8 20.\textbullet f3 \textbullet d7=, the game is evened, Krasenkov –
Arkell, Hastings 1993) 18...\&xc6 19.\&xc6 \&b6 20.\&g2 \&a6 21.\&c2 b4 22.\&fc1 \&b5 23.\&f4 \&e5 24.\&h4 \&a5 25.\&h6= Velickovic – Bukic, Portoroz 1994, White succeeded to obtain a slightly superior position thanks to his bishop pair. He is not afraid either of the anticipated exchange of the a2–pawn for the black pawn b4, since in this case he will get a passed b–pawn, which might be able to disturb the black knight on c5.

17.\&b4

White executes a typical manoeuvre blockading the black b–pawn and aiming to occupy the c6–square should the appropriate occasion arise.

17...\&d7 18.\&c3!

An important point. The exchange of the dark-squared bishops helps White assert his influence on the c–file.

18.\&xc3 19.\&xc3 \&bc8 20.\&fc1 \&c7

The exchange of the light-squared bishops by 20...\&h3?? was not available because of 21.\&d5=.

21.\&d4 \&fc8

22.h4!

As in numerous positions of this type, the move with the outermost pawn is rather useful with the black knight on c5.

22...\&h5 23.\&h2

Now (due to the intermission of the moves h2-h4 and h7-h5) the menace of the black bishop making his way to h3 is completely out of the question.

23...\&e8 24.e4±

This position was arrived at in the game Kanstler – Blees, Tel Aviv 1999. White plans to carry out e4-e5, thus undermining the support (d6–pawn) of the black knight on c5.
Part 6. “Knight Tango”

Chapter 22  1.\( \mathbb{Q} \)f3 \( \mathbb{Q} \)f6 2.c4 \( \mathbb{Q} \)c6

Concluding a talk about Black’s possibilities after moves 1.\( \mathbb{Q} \)f3 \( \mathbb{Q} \)f6 2.c4, let’s consider rather a rare continuation when Black brings his knight to c6-square with the idea to carry out e7–e5. Let’s note also that if on the second move Black prefers to occupy the c6-square with a pawn – 2...c6, then after 3.\( \mathbb{Q} \)c3 d6 4.d4 the game will be transposed to positions of Book 1, and after 3.\( \mathbb{Q} \)c3 d5 4.d4 we will have a position from Slav Defence, which will be tested in Book 4.

3.d4

The best thing for White is to prevent Black’s plans connected with e7–e5. This early advancement of White’s d–pawn we could see also in Part 1 of the first Book.

3...e6

Black wants to develop his bishop on b4 and in that way tries to use a certain weakening of the e4-square, caused by early advancement of the white d–pawn.

4.a3

Again White prevents Black’s plans. After 4.\( \mathbb{Q} \)c3 \( \mathbb{Q} \)b4 he would deal with Nimzo-Indian Defence, and in case of 4.g3 \( \mathbb{Q} \)b4+ (Black can, if he wants, by means of 4...d5 5.\( \mathbb{Q} \)g2 dxc4 transpose the game to a rather fashionable variation of Catalan Opening) 5.\( \mathbb{Q} \)d2 (5.\( \mathbb{Q} \)bd2 d5) 5...\( \mathbb{Q} \)e7 – with the Bogoljubow’s System.

![Chess Diagram]

After a preventive White’s move a2–a3 Black has two basic possibilities: either to start a play in the spirit of King’s Indian Defence by means of a) 4...\( \mathbb{G} \)6, or to convert a play to positions similar to ones of Queen’s Gambit by means of b) 4...d5. The move 4...d6 does not have any particular importance and after 5.\( \mathbb{Q} \)c3 g6 6.e4 (in case of 6.\( \mathbb{G} \)g5 after 6...h6 7.\( \mathbb{Q} \)h4 g5 8.\( \mathbb{Q} \)g3 g4 9.\( \mathbb{Q} \)g1 \( \mathbb{Q} \)h5 10.e3 \( \mathbb{Q} \)xg3 11.hxg3 h5 12.\( \mathbb{Q} \)d3 \( \mathbb{Q} \)g7 13.\( \mathbb{G} \)ge2 e5= Black achieved
sufficient chances for the equalization in the game Sashikiran – Bologan, Linares 1999) 6...\(\mathcal{g}7\) 7.h3 the game will be transposed to the position from variation a.

a) 4...\(g6\)

Black decides to develop his dark-squared bishop on the large diagonal.

5.\(\mathcal{c}3\) \(\mathcal{g}7\) 6.e4

Now events are moving in the spirit of King’s Indian Defence, which was discussed in detail in the first Book. It should be noted that 6.\(\mathcal{g}5\) gives White nothing. After 6...h6 7.\(\mathcal{h}4\) d5 8.e3 \(\mathcal{e}7\) 9.\(\mathcal{b}3\) 0–0 10.\(\mathcal{d}1\) b6 11.\(\mathcal{g}3\) \(\mathcal{b}7\) 12.cxd5 \(\mathcal{e}xd5\) 13.\(\mathcal{e}2\) \(\mathcal{e}7\) 14.0–0 c5 15.dxc5 \(\mathcal{xc}5\) 16.\(\mathcal{c}1\) \(\mathcal{ac}8\) = in the game Solozhenkin – Vlassov, Maikop 1998 Black achieved a good play.

6...d6

There is a rare continuation 6...d5 on the junction of variations a and b. In this case it is possible to play 7.e5 \(\mathcal{e}4\) 8.\(\mathcal{d}3\) \(\mathcal{xc}3\) 9.bxc3 dxc4 10.\(\mathcal{xc}4\) \(\mathcal{a}5\) 11.\(\mathcal{d}3\) c5 12.h4 (after 12.\(\mathcal{g}5\) \(\mathcal{c}7\) 13.0–0 \(\mathcal{d}7\) 14.\(\mathcal{d}2\) h6 15.\(\mathcal{f}6\) \(\mathcal{xf}6\) 16.\(\mathcal{xf}6\) 0–0 0–0 17.\(\mathcal{e}4\) cxd4 18.cxd4 \(\mathcal{b}8\) 19.\(\mathcal{b}1\) \(\mathcal{c}6\) 20.\(\mathcal{c}5\) \(\mathcal{a}8\) 21.\(\mathcal{b}4\) in the game Kaidanov – Vlassov, Internet 2000 in case of 21...e5! = Black’s chances wouldn’t have been worse) 12...\(\mathcal{c}7\) 13.\(\mathcal{e}3\) \(\mathcal{d}7\) (after 13...cxd4 14.cxd4 \(\mathcal{c}3\)+ 15.\(\mathcal{e}2\) White is not afraid to lose a casting: the open c-file and impossibility for the black knight to reach the d5-square are much more important) 14.h5 \(\mathcal{c}6\) and here in the game Arkhipov – Vlassov, Maikop 1998 the line 15.h6 \(\mathcal{f}8\) 16.0–0 0–0 17.\(\mathcal{d}2\) = with a certain space advantage and perspectives of a play on black squares would have deserved attention.

7.h3!? One more important preventive move. White needs a reliable control over the d4-square that is why he prepares parking on e3 for his dark-squared bishop. After 7.\(\mathcal{e}2\) 0–0 8.0–0 \(\mathcal{e}8\) it turns out, that in contrast to King’s Indian Defence, Black has a reserved e7-square for his knight in case of White’s move d4–d5. So, if now White acts by analogy with variation c of Book 1, Chapter 1, and plays 9.d5 (we have already seen this position after 9.\(\mathcal{e}3\) in the beginning of Chapter 14 of Book 1, but with the white pawn on a2, and, as well as there Black by means of 9...e5 10.d5 \(\mathcal{d}4\) 11.\(\mathcal{xd}4\) exd4 12.\(\mathcal{xd}4\) \(\mathcal{xe}4\) 13.\(\mathcal{xd}7\) \(\mathcal{xd}7\) 14.\(\mathcal{e}4\) \(\mathcal{xe}4\) 15.\(\mathcal{d}3\) \(\mathcal{e}8\) easily gains an equal play, V.Popov – Bologan, Tomsk 2001), then after 9...\(\mathcal{e}7\) (9...exd5 is worse in view of 10.cxd5 \(\mathcal{e}5\) 11.\(\mathcal{xe}5\) \(\mathcal{xe}5\) 12.\(\mathcal{f}3\) \(\mathcal{e}8\) 13.\(\mathcal{g}5\) h6 14.\(\mathcal{e}3\) a6 15.\(\mathcal{d}2\) \(\mathcal{h}7\) 16.\(\mathcal{ac}1\) \(\mathcal{e}7\) 17.\(\mathcal{c}2\) \(\mathcal{wh}8\) 18.\(\mathcal{fc}1\) \(\mathcal{e}8\) 19.\(\mathcal{d}1\) = and White keeps an advantage thanks to the pressure on the backward c7-pawn, Cebalo – Quinn, Genoa 1998; and after 9...\(\mathcal{e}5\) 10.\(\mathcal{xe}5\)
dxe5 11.\(\textbf{g}5\) h6 12.\(\textbf{e}3\) b6 13.\(\textbf{c}1\) \(\textbf{b}7\) 14.\(\textbf{a}4\) \(\textbf{e}7\) 15.\(\textbf{fd}1\) \(\textbf{ed}8\) 16.\(\textbf{f}3\) a6 17.\(\textbf{f}1\) Black's pawn structure is far from ideal, Miles – Webster, England 2000) 10.\(\textbf{xc}2\) exd5 11.cxd5 Black with the help of 11...c6! 12.\(\textbf{dc}6\) \(\textbf{bc}6\) 13.\(\textbf{cd}1\) d5 14.\(\textbf{e}3\) \(\textbf{xe}4\) 15.\(\textbf{xe}4\) \(\textbf{f}5\)\(=\) has completely equalized the game, Shulman – Berezuk, Ostrava 1998. 7...0–0

8.\(\textbf{g}5!\)

This trick is similar to the one we often met in Part 1 of Book 1, when we were speaking about King's Indian Defence. White aspires to provoke a weakening of Black's kingside because Black cannot bear the pin on the f6-knight for a long time.

8...h6 9.\(\textbf{e}3\) \(\textbf{e}8\) 10.\(\textbf{d}3\) \(\textbf{d}7\)

White is not afraid of the move 10...e5, as in this case he is ready to close the centre and after 10.d5\(=\) the black knight cannot go on the d4-square because of the loss of a pawn.

11.\(\textbf{c}2\)

Again White gives primary attention to the d4-square.

11...\(\textbf{b}6\) 12.\(\textbf{b}3\) a5

If 12...d5, then after 13.cxd5 exd5 14.e5\(=\) it will be uneasy for Black to undermine White's centre, as the move f7–f6 is impossible, because the weakening of the g6-pawn, caused by advance h7–h6 has an effect in this case.

13.\(\textbf{d}2\)

Again White reminds of shortcomings of Black's move h7–h6.

13...a4

In case of 13...\(\textbf{h}7\) after 14.\(\textbf{h}4\)\(\rightarrow\) (with the idea 15.\(\textbf{h}5\) Black risks to get under very strong attack. On the same diagonal with light-squared bishops of the opponent the black king will feel very uncomfortable.

14.\(\textbf{xh}6\)

After 14.\(\textbf{xa}4\) \(\textbf{xa}4\) 15.bxa4\(=\) the doubled isolated pawn seems already too slight achievement for White.

14...\(\textbf{axb}3\) 15.\(\textbf{xb}3\) \(\textbf{a}5\) 16.\(\textbf{xg}7\) \(\textbf{xg}7\)

Of course not 16...\(\textbf{xb}3??\) in view of 17.\(\textbf{h}6\)\(+-\).

17.\(\textbf{a}2\)\(=\)

In the game Conquest – Bologan, Ohrid 2001 Black could not receive a full compensation for the pawn, which was given on the thirteenth move.

b) 4...d5

Positions, arising after that move, are similar to positions of Queen's Gambit, which will be examined in Book 4.

5.\(\textbf{c}3\)
5...dxc4

As a whole, such Black’s solution from the strategic point of view is rather risky, because White has a possibility to get the strong pawn centre, and a traditional undermining with the c-pawn is hampered owing to Black’s c6-knight. In practice there were also other continuations for Black. So, after 5...g6 6.\texttt{f}f4 \texttt{g}g7 (in case of 6...\texttt{h}h5 7.\texttt{g}g5 f6 8.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{f}5 in the game Pelletier – Blatny, Bad Wiessee 1997 White could emphasize the weakening of dark squares of the opponent by 9.\texttt{d}g5\texttt{f}f, and after 6...a6 7.e3 \texttt{g}g7 8.h3 0–0 9.\texttt{c}c1 \texttt{e}e7 10.\texttt{e}e2 dxc4 11.\texttt{xc}c4 \texttt{b}5 12.\texttt{e}e2 \texttt{b}b7 13.0–0 \texttt{c}c8 14.\texttt{d}d4 in the game Mittelman – Gelashvili, Saint Vincent 2000 the weakness of Black’s c5–square started to tell on) 7.e3 0–0 8.\texttt{c}c2 \texttt{d}d7 9.\texttt{d}d1 a6 10.h3 \texttt{e}e8 11.\texttt{h}h2 \texttt{a}a7 12.\texttt{e}e5 \texttt{b}5 13.cxd5 exd5 14.\texttt{d}d3 \texttt{c}c8 15.0–0\texttt{f}f White has an advantage, thanks to a chronic weakness of the opponent’s c5–square Sakaev – Blumbergt, Groningen 1992.

To the typical of Queen’s Gambit answer 5...\texttt{e}e7 the move 6.\texttt{f}f4 is suitable here. After 6...0–0 (6...dxc4, as well as the same idea one move before, does not give Black anything because of the answer 7.e4) 7.e3 \texttt{e}e8 8.\texttt{c}c2 dxc4?! (in case of 8...a6 it is possible to play 9.\texttt{d}d1±, and you cannot be afraid of a position after 8...\texttt{h}h5 9.\texttt{d}d1 \texttt{xf}4 10.\texttt{xf}4± we will see how Kramnik plays for White in a similar structure in Book 4) 9.\texttt{xc}c4 \texttt{d}d5 10.\texttt{g}g3 \texttt{f}f6 11.\texttt{e}e4 \texttt{ce}7 12.\texttt{d}d3± in the game Goldin – Hoekstra, Mashantucket 1999 Black ran into large problems.

Sometimes Black resorts to the move 5...a6 with a real threat to capture on c4. In this case it is possible to play 6.cxd5 exd5 7.\texttt{g}g5 \texttt{e}e7 8.e3 h6 9.\texttt{h}h4 0–0 10.\texttt{d}d3 (the variation 10.\texttt{c}c2!? \texttt{h}h5 11.\texttt{xe}c7 \texttt{xe}7 12.\texttt{d}d3± can be even more accurate, avoiding extra exchanges) 10...\texttt{e}e6 (after 10...\texttt{e}e4 11.\texttt{xe}c7 \texttt{xc}c3 12.\texttt{d}d8 \texttt{xd}d1 13.\texttt{xd}d1 \texttt{xc}3 14.\texttt{d}d1 c6 15.b4 White keeps a better game, but the position has become noticeably simpler) 11.0–0 \texttt{d}d7 12.\texttt{d}d3 \texttt{d}d6 and now in the game Kasparov – Yermolinsky, Yerevan (ol) 1996 would have deserved attention 13.\texttt{c}c2!? \texttt{xf}xg3 14.hxg3 \texttt{e}e7 15.\texttt{d}d4 c6 16.b4± with a typical attack of pawn minority on the queenside.

6.e4 \texttt{d}d5

An attempt to justifying taking on c4 on the previous move.

After 6...\texttt{e}e7 7.\texttt{xc}c4 (as a result of 7...0–0 8.0–0 b6 9.\texttt{f}f4 \texttt{b}7 10.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{d}d7 11.\texttt{c}c1 \texttt{ad}8
12. \( \text{\&f} \) Black has got a difficult position in view of the threat 13. \( \text{\&e} \) Kaspar – Zitka, Klatovy 1998) 7... \( \text{\&g} \) 8.\( \text{h} \) 3 the erroneous 8...\( \text{g} \)? (after 8... \( \text{\&f} \) 9.0-0 0-0 10. \( \text{\&f} \) Black also has a bad position, but with material equality) in view of 9. \( \text{h} \) 4 \( \text{\&g} \) 4 10. \( \text{dxe} \) 5 \( \text{x} \) 1 + 11. \( \text{\&d} \) \( \text{\&f} \) 3 12. \( \text{x} \) 3 \( \text{\&e} \) 5 13. \( \text{e} \) led Black in the game Kramnik – Bouvard, Lyons (simult) 2001 to a losing of the piece.

7. \( \text{x} \) 4

By tactical way White wins back a pawn, which has been given before.

7... \( \text{x} \) 4 8. \( \text{a} \) 4 + \( \text{d} \) 7

An attempt to become free with the help of 8... \( \text{d} \) 7 9. \( \text{xc} \) 4 c5 is refuted by means of 10. \( \text{e} \) ! (10.0-0?! is worse owing to 10... \( \text{b} \) 6=) 10... \( \text{b} \) 6 11. \( \text{e} \) 2 cxd4 12. \( \text{xd} \) 4 f6 13.0-0 \( \text{e} \) 7 14. \( \text{d} \) 1 \( \text{d} \) 7 15. \( \text{d} \) 2. In this position Black has an advantage of the bishop pair but White outstrips in development, that is more important. After 15... \( \text{c} \) 8 (in case of 15... \( \text{c} \) 7 the line 16. \( \text{xd} \) 1 \( \text{d} \) 8 17. \( \text{b} \) 5+ is fine) in the Yakovich – Vlassov game, Moscow 1996 the forced play was started and by means of 16. \( \text{xb} \) 6 axb6 17. \( \text{ad} \) 1 \( \text{c} \) 6 (in case of 17... \( \text{a} \) 4 18. \( \text{xa} \) 4 \( \text{xa} \) 4 19. \( \text{b} \) 5+ \( \text{c} \) 6 20. \( \text{xc} \) 6+ bxc6 21. \( \text{d} \) 4 Black would search for escaping in a very difficult ending, but probably, it would be the best solution for him) 18. \( \text{d} \) 5! \( \text{d} \) 8 (after 18...exd5 19. exd5+ it can't be helped) 19. \( \text{d} \) 4 0-0

20. \( \text{f} \) 4 \( \text{a} \) 4 (if 20... \( \text{d} \) 7, then 21. \( \text{f} \) 5! exf5 22. \( \text{x} \) d7+ --, and if 20...e5, then 21. \( \text{de} \) 6+ 21. \( \text{b} \) 3 e5 22. \( \text{b} \) 4! (bad is 22. \( \text{de} \) 6? \( \text{xb} \) 3 23. \( \text{x} \) 8 \( \text{xd} \) 1 24. \( \text{a} \) 2, as after 24... \( \text{c} \) 1! 25. \( \text{d} \) 3 \( \text{c} \) 3 26. \( \text{xf} \) 8+ \( \text{b} \) 3+ White even can lose) 22... \( \text{xd} \) 4 (if 22...exf4, then 23. \( \text{f} \) 5 --) 23. \( \text{xd} \) 4 \( \text{e} \) 7 24. \( \text{d} \) 7+ White has achieved a winning position.

After 8...c6 9. \( \text{xc} \) 4 a5 as it was in the game Manninen – Benjamint, Stockholm 1997, White could not break Black's position at once, but continuing 10.0-0 \( \text{e} \) 7 11. \( \text{g} \) 5+ he kept a very perspective position because of the absence of Black's counterplay.

9. \( \text{xc} \) 4 \( \text{e} \) 7

Playing 9...\( \text{c} \) 6? against the e4–pawn, Black achieves nothing because of 10. \( \text{e} \) 5! \( \text{xe} \) 4 11. \( \text{xe} \) 4 \( \text{xe} \) 4 12. \( \text{b} \) 5+ c6 13. \( \text{xb} \) 7+--.

10.0-0 0-0 11. \( \text{d} \) 1±

This is the position from the game I.Ibrahimov – Vlassov, Moscow 1998. Continuing 11... \( \text{c} \) 6 Black would have kept a defensive position, though after 12. \( \text{e} \) 2 b6 13. \( \text{e} \) 5 \( \text{b} \) 7 14. \( \text{f} \) 4±
White’s strong pawn centre would have been more significant than Black’s bishop pair. However Black preferred a more active 11...a5?! and after 12.\text{\textit{e2 c6}} (now Black had no time for bishop’s consolidation on the a8–h1 diagonal by means of 12...\text{\textit{c6}} in view of 13.\text{\textit{d5}}} 13.g5! h6 14.h4 b5 15.e5 \text{\textit{d5}} 16.xe7 \text{\textit{xc3}} (if 16...\text{\textit{xe7}}, then after 17.e4 all Black’s dark squares in the centre would have been seriously weakened, and the d7–bishop would have had no perspectives) 17.\text{\textit{c2!}} (Black probably hoped for 17.bxc3 \text{\textit{xe7}} with the idea c6–c5) 17...\text{\textit{xe7}} 18.\text{\textit{xc3}} he had a completely unpromising position. Black’s c5– and d6–squares were weak, the c6–pawn needed a constant protection, and the d7–bishop had become similar to a pawn.
Illustrative Games

Games, given below, are bright samples of creative work of modern top–players, in which White has realized his ideas of 1.keleton–f3. You can see how a slight White's opening advantage has increased little by little and has led to a win. In essence, only after Kramnik’s wins over J. Hjartarson and J.Lautier it was possible to speak about an interpretation of 1.keleton–f3 according to Kramnik.

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Kramnik – Illescas Cordoba
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White has got an advantage of the bishop pair typical of Anti–Nimzo-Indian variation, considered in Part 1 of the present book. Black has been slow in organizing active play in the centre and, as a result, White has managed to keep a slight but stable advantage. Even despite exchanges of all major pieces, Black could not make his position completely secure. On the move 22 White started to realize a very strong transfer of his knight to the a4–square with the purpose of fixing Black’s pieces by protection of the b6–pawn. The necessity to provide reliable parking for the knight on the d7–square (the only defender of the b6–pawn) did not allow Black to oppose anything to the advancement of White’s d–pawn. After the white bishop invaded the e6–square, Black pieces were cramped in their camp. Later White continued a space expansion, but already on the kingside. In spite of some omissions followed by tactical complications, White managed to bring his advantage to a win.

1.keleton–f3 keleton–f6 2.c4 e6 3.keleton–c3 keleton–b4
4.keleton–c2 0–0 5.a3 keleton–xc3 6.keleton–xc3 b6
7.g3 (7.e3 – see page 24) 7...
keleton–b7 8.keleton–g2 c5 [8...d5!] 9.b4 d6
[9...keleton–e7!?] 10.0–0 keleton–bd7 11.keleton–b2
keleton–e7 [11...keleton–c8 12.d3 d5 13.cxd5
keleton–xd5 14.keleton–d2 keleton–e7 15.keleton–fc1 h6
16.keleton–c3 keleton–fe8 17.keleton–b2 e5 18.e4 keleton–b7
a6 14.a4 axb5 15. axb5 keleton–f8

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Illustrative Games

16.e4 ∆xa1 17.∆xa1 ∆a8 18.∆c1 ∆xa1 19.∆xa1 ∆a8 20.∆xa8+ ∆xa8 21.∆d2 ∆e8?! [21...d5? 22.exd5 exd5 23.∆f1 ∆d4 24.∆e3; 21...∆g4 22.∆f3 ∆ge5 23.∆e2 g5+ Zakhartov – Tunik, Krasnodar, 1998]

22.∆b1!± [22.f4 ∆c7 23.∆f2 d5±] ∆b7 [22...∆e5 23.∆xe5!? dxe5 24.∆c3 ∆d6 25.∆a4 ∆c8 26.∆h3 ∆f8 27.f4 exf4 28.gxf4±] 23.f4 f6 24.∆c3 ∆f7 25.∆a4 ∆e7 26.d4! ∆d8 [26...∆c7 27.e5! ∆xg2 28.exd6+ ∆xd6 29.∆xg2+ cxd4? 30.∆a3+ ∆c5 31.∆xb6 e5 32.∆a4 ∆7e6 33.f5+1] 27.d5 exd5 [27...e5? 28.∆h3+−] 28.exd5 [28. cxd5!? ∆c7 29.∆c3+ f5? 30.e5 dxe5 31.d6+−] 28...∆c7 [28...∆c7 29.∆h3 ∆f8 30.∆f2+−] 29.∆h3 ∆a8 30.∆e6 ∆f8 31.f5 ∆c8 32.∆f2 ∆d7 33.g4 ∆e7 34.g5 [34.h4! ∆xe6 35.fxe6 ∆e8 36.h5 h6 (36...g6 37.hg hg 38.g5+−) 37.∆c1 ∆f8 38.∆f4 ∆e7 39.∆g3+−] 34...∆xe6 [34...∆e8 35.gxf6 gxf6 36.∆c3 ∆d7 (36...∆e6 37.de+−) 37.∆e4 ∆e5 38.∆xe5 dxe5 (38...fxe5 39.f6+−) 39.d6+ ∆d8 40. ∆d5+−] 35.fxe6 [35.dxe6 ∆c8+] 35...∆e8 36.gxf6+ [36.∆e3+−] 36...gxf6 37.∆e3 ∆g6 38.∆d2?! [38.∆c3 ∆c7 39.∆e4 ∆e8 40. ∆f4+−] 38...∆e4 39.∆c1 ∆g2 40.∆c3 ∆f1 41.∆h6+ ∆g2 42. ∆f4 ∆f1 43.∆b2 ∆c7 44.∆d1 ∆g2 45.∆e3 ∆e4 46.∆h6 ∆e8 47.∆d2 ∆c7 48.∆e2 ∆e8 49.∆f2 ∆c7?! [49...∆b1!? 50.∆f3 ∆a2+] 50.∆g3 ∆d3 51.∆g4! [51.∆f4 ∆e8] 51...∆e8 52.∆f4 ∆b1 [52... ∆e2 53.∆e4] 53.∆f5+ ∆d8 54. ∆f3 ∆d3 55.∆e7+ ∆c7 56.∆e3+ ∆c8 57.∆g4 ∆c7? [57...∆e2+ 58.∆g3 ∆c7 59.∆f2 ∆d3 60.∆e1 ∆e4 61.∆d2±] 58.∆h5! ∆g7+ 59.∆h6 ∆e8 60.h4! ∆e8 61.∆h5 ∆c7 [61...∆e4 62.∆g4+−] 62. ∆g2! ∆e8 [62...∆xc4 63.∆xh7 (63.∆f4 ∆f1! 64.∆xh7 c4±) 63... ∆xd5 64.∆f4 ∆e4+ (64...∆xe6 65.∆xe6+ ∆d7 66.h6 ∆xh6 67.∆g6 ∆xe7 68.h7+) 65.∆g8 c4 66.∆f7 c3 67.∆xe8 c2 68.∆d8+ ∆c8 69.∆e2 ∆f3 70.∆c1 ∆xh5+ 71.∆e7+] 63.∆f4 ∆c2 [63...∆xc4 64.∆xh7 ∆f1 (64...∆xb5 65.h6 c4 66.∆e2+; 64...∆c7 65.∆g7 ∆xd5 66.∆xd5 ∆xd5+−) 65.h6 c4 66. ∆g6 c3 67.h7+−] 64.∆xf6?! [64.∆g6! hxg6 65. hxg6 ∆d3 66.g7 ∆xg7 67.∆xg7 ∆xc4 (67...∆c7 68.∆f8+−) 68. ∆xd6 ∆xb5 69.∆f8+−] 64...∆xf6
65...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{g}}7 \textbf{e}8+ 66.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{f}}7} \textbf{c}7! [66...
\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{d}}8} 67.\textbf{e}7+ \textbf{d}7 68.\textbf{e}6 \textbf{d}1 69.\textbf{f}8+ \textbf{c}8 70.\textbf{h}6 \textbf{h}5+ 71.\textbf{g}8 \textbf{f}6+ 72.\textbf{g}7 \textbf{e}8+ 73.\textbf{x}h7 \textbf{f}7 74.\textbf{h}8 75.\textbf{e}6+ 76.\textbf{e}6 77.\textbf{d}7 78.\textbf{g}7 79.\textbf{f}6 = 75...\textbf{d}7 76.\textbf{g}7 \textbf{f}6 (76...\textbf{g}6 77.\textbf{e}xh7 78.\textbf{g}8 79.\textbf{g}7 80.\textbf{x}h7 \textbf{e}xh7 81.\textbf{g}7 +; 76...\textbf{e}xh7 77.\textbf{e}xh8 78.\textbf{e}xh8 79.\textbf{g}7 +; 76...\textbf{c}7 77.\textbf{d}5 78.\textbf{h}4 \textbf{e}xh7 79.\textbf{g}7! \textbf{h}7 80.\textbf{g}6+! \textbf{e}8 81.\textbf{f}8 \textbf{d}3 82.\textbf{g}6+ 77.\textbf{f}5 78.\textbf{e}8 77...\textbf{e}g7 +; 77...\textbf{e}xg8 78.\textbf{h}7! 78.\textbf{g}6 79.\textbf{g}7 \textbf{x}h7 80.\textbf{x}f6 \textbf{xf}5 81.\textbf{x}f5 \textbf{xe}x7 82.\textbf{g}6; 77...\textbf{c}5 78.\textbf{h}7 \textbf{e}6 79.\textbf{g}8 \textbf{f}6+ 80.\textbf{g}7 \textbf{h}xh7 81.\textbf{xf}6 \textbf{xf}5 82.\textbf{x}f5 \textbf{xe}x7 83.\textbf{g}6 +] 67.\textbf{e}7 \textbf{h}6! [67...\textbf{e}b3 68.\textbf{e}6 \textbf{d}1 69.\textbf{h}6 \textbf{h}5+ 70.\textbf{f}8 \textbf{e}8 71.\textbf{g}7 +; 67...\textbf{d}7 68.\textbf{e}6 \textbf{d}1 69.\textbf{f}8+ \textbf{c}8 70.\textbf{h}6 \textbf{h}5+ 71.\textbf{g}7 \textbf{e}8+ 72.\textbf{x}h7 \textbf{f}7 73.\textbf{h}8+; 67...\textbf{d}1 68.\textbf{e}8 \textbf{h}8+ \textbf{e}xh8 69.\textbf{h}xe8 \textbf{b}3 70.\textbf{f}7 71.\textbf{g}7 \textbf{x}b5 72.\textbf{x}h7 \textbf{c}4 73.\textbf{d}e2 \textbf{e}8 74.\textbf{g}5 \textbf{x}h5! 75.\textbf{h}xh5 \textbf{h}5\textbf{=}) 70...\textbf{d}c4 71.\textbf{d}e6 \textbf{d}xb5= 68...\textbf{d}1 69.\textbf{g}6 \textbf{e}8 [69...\textbf{d}7 70.\textbf{x}c7 \textbf{xe}x7 71.\textbf{a}8 +] 70.\textbf{f}8 \textbf{e}2 71.\textbf{x}h6 \textbf{xc}4 72.\textbf{g}6 \textbf{xd}5? [72...\textbf{xb}5 73.\textbf{h}6 \textbf{d}3+ 74.\textbf{f}7 \textbf{c}4 (74...\textbf{d}c7 75.\textbf{e}6 +) 75.\textbf{xe}x8 \textbf{c}3 76.f7 +; 72...\textbf{d}3 +! 73.f7 \textbf{c}4 74.\textbf{xb}5 \textbf{c}3 75.f7 \textbf{xb}5 76.\textbf{h}6 \textbf{c}2 77.\textbf{h}7 \textbf{c}1 \textbf{a}8 78.\textbf{h}8 \textbf{f}4 \textbf{=}] 73.\textbf{h}6 + c4 [73...\textbf{e}4+ 74.\textbf{f}7 \textbf{c}7 75.\textbf{e}6 +; 73...\textbf{c}7 74.\textbf{h}7!! (74.\textbf{e}6 \textbf{x}e6 75.\textbf{h}7 \textbf{d}7 76.\textbf{h}8 \textbf{xe}x7\textbf{±}) 74...\textbf{e}4 + (74...\textbf{c}4 75.\textbf{f}6 +; 74...\textbf{d}7 75.\textbf{f}6 + \textbf{xe}x7 76.\textbf{h}7 +) 75.\textbf{g}7 \textbf{d}7 (75...\textbf{c}4 76.\textbf{f}6 \textbf{d}3 77.\textbf{d}5 +; 75...\textbf{e}8 + 76.\textbf{f}7 \textbf{x}h7 77.\textbf{xe}x8 +) 76.\textbf{f}6 + \textbf{x}e7 77.\textbf{c}4 \textbf{e}4 78.\textbf{e}6 + (77... \textbf{e}8 + 78.\textbf{g}6 +) 78.\textbf{g}8 \textbf{f}8 79.\textbf{xd}6 +] 74.\textbf{h}7 \textbf{e}4 + 75.\textbf{f}7 \textbf{x}h7 76.\textbf{xe}x8 [76...\textbf{h}7 +? \textbf{c}7 77.\textbf{f}6 \textbf{c}3 78.\textbf{d}5 \textbf{c}2 = 76...\textbf{g}8 [76...\textbf{c}3 77.\textbf{h}7 +] 77.\textbf{d}7 +? 77...\textbf{c}3 (77...\textbf{h}7 78.\textbf{f}7 +; 77...\textbf{c}6 78.\textbf{f}6 +) 78.\textbf{f}8 + 1–0

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In Part 1 it has already been noted that in a suitable moment White does not reject for himself a transition from the variation Anti–Nimzo-Indian to the classical system of Nimzo–Indian Defence (1.d4 2.c4 e6 3.c3 \textbf{b}4 4.d2). This transition took place in a game, mentioned below. Black’s delay with an attack of White’s b4–pawn did not allow him to solve his opening problems entirely. The advantage of White’s bishop pair became the determinant in position’s estimation. Black’s e4–knight hampered White’s activity in the centre and on the queenside, but even under its cover Black could not create a counterplay, sufficient
23. \( \text{b}5 \text{a}2 \) \[22...\text{e}6 \] \[22...\text{d}2 \] 
23. \( \text{c}2 \text{b}3 24.\text{c}5! \]

23. \( \text{d}1! \) \[23.\text{a}1 \text{xa}1 24. \text{xa}1 \text{a}6 25.\text{f}2\# \] \[23...\text{a}2 \]
24. \( \text{d}3 \text{f}8 25.\text{b}3 \text{a}8 26.\text{e}4 \)
25. \( \text{b}8 \) \[\text{\( \Delta \text{c}6\-\text{a}5\)} \] \[27.\text{c}5! \] \[27.\text{d}4 \]
26. \( \text{c}6 28.\text{d}xc6 \text{xc}6\# \] \[27.\text{f}2 \text{c}6 \]
28. \( \text{e}3 \text{a}5 29.\text{a}2! \) \[27...\text{bx}c5 \]
28. \( \text{d}xc5 \text{d}xc5 29.\text{c}5 \text{c}8 \)
29. \( \text{c}6 30.\text{g}4!? \text{d}7 (30...\text{b}5 \) 31. \( \text{xe}6 \text{fx}e6 32.\text{xe}6+ \text{f}7 \)
33. \( \text{c}7 \text{a}5 34.\text{c}3+\) ; 30...\text{h}6
31. \( \text{h}4 \text{d}7 32.\text{g}5 \text{hx}g5 33.\text{hx}g5 \text{e}8 34.\text{g}6\# \) \[31.\text{g}5 \] \[30.\text{e}5 \] \[30.\text{d}4 \]
30. \( \text{e}8? \) \[30...\text{d}5 \]
31. \( \text{xd}5 \text{ex}d5 32.\text{d}3 \text{a}6 (32...\text{d}7 33.\text{b}4!? \text{b}6 34.\text{d}4; \) 32...\text{f}5 33.\text{f}4\# \] \[33.\text{f}4 \text{a}7 \]
34. \( \text{a}3+ \text{g}8 35.\text{d}6\# \]

31. \( \text{a}4! \) \[\text{\( \Delta \text{a}3; \Delta \text{d}1\)} \] 
31...\( \text{c}7 32.\text{a}3 \text{g}8 33.\text{e}4! \) \( \text{xa}4 \) \[33...\text{ba}6 34.\text{d}6 \text{b}7 \]

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of the game to White’s favour.

1.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{f6} \) 2.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{b6} \) 3.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{b7} \)
4.\( \text{g2} \) e6 5.0–0 \( \text{e7} \) 6.\( \text{c3} \) 0–0
7.\( \text{xe1} \) d5 8.\( \text{cxd5} \) exd5 9.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{d6} \)
10.\( \text{f4} \) c5 11.\( \text{dxc5} \) \( \text{dxc5} \) [11...
12.\( \text{bxc5} \) 12.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{d5} \) 12.\( \text{e5} \) \( \text{e5} \) 13.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{c4} \) 13.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{c4} \) 14.\( \text{fe4} \) 15.b4; 14...\( \text{d7} \) 15.b4 \( \text{d6} \) 16.\( \text{h3} \) 15.\( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{d6} \) 16.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{a7} \)
17.\( \text{a7} \) g6

18.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{xf4} \) 19.\( \text{gxf4} \) \( \text{f8} \)
20.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{d6} \) [20...\( \text{d6} \) 7; 20...\( \text{e7} \) 21.b4 \( \text{e6} \) 22.\( \text{c1} \) \( \text{e8} \) 21.b4 \( \text{e6} \) 22.\( \text{a4} \) \( \text{f3} \) 22.\( \text{c2} \) \( \text{e7} \) 23.\( \text{a4} \)
[\( \text{a5} \) 23...\( \text{d8} \) 24.\( \text{a5} \) \( \text{d7} \) [24...\( \text{b5} \) 25.\( \text{c3} \) \( \text{e8} \) 26.\( \text{f1} \)
\( \text{bxa5} \) [26...\( \text{a7} \) 27.\( \text{b5} \) 26...\( \text{b5} \) 27.\( \text{c2} \) \( \text{d6} \) 28.\( \text{c2} \) \( \text{d6} \) 29.\( \text{d6} \) \( \text{d6} \) 30.\( \text{d6} \) 27.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{a1} \) \( \text{c7} \) ! [28...\( \text{e4} \) 29.\( \text{d5} \) 29.\( \text{d5} \) 30.\( \text{d5} \) 28.\( \text{e6} \) 29.\( \text{d6} \) \( \text{e6} \) \( \text{e6} \) \( \text{e6} \) 29.\( \text{e6} \) \( \text{e6} \) \( \text{e6} \) 30.\( \text{e6} \) 31.\( \text{e6} \) 32.\( \text{e6} \) 33.\( \text{e6} \) 34.\( \text{e6} \) 35.\( \text{b7} \) \( \text{b8} \) 29...\( \text{f6} \) 30.\( \text{d1} \) 28...\( \text{e7} \) ! 29.\( \text{a2} \) \( \text{b7} \) [29...\( \text{c6} \) 30.\( \text{a1} \) \( \text{c6} \) \( \text{a6} \) ! \( \text{a4} \)
Illustrative Games

32.\(\text{dc1} \text{xc1+} 33.\text{xc1+} 30.f3\) \\
31.\(\text{e6} 31.\text{db1} \text{e7} 31.\text{eb1} 32.\text{xd4} \text{exd4} 33.\text{e6} 34.\text{b6} \text{b5} 35.\text{xb5} \text{xb6} 36.\text{axb6} \text{axb6} 37.\text{c4+} 32.\text{b4+} \text{c5} 32.\text{xd4} 33.\text{exd4} \text{xa7} 33.\text{ee6} 34.\text{xa6!} 34.\text{xa6!} 34.\text{c1} 35.\text{c1} \text{b7} 36.\text{ab1} 37.\text{be7} 38.\text{e5} 39.\text{e5} 39.\text{e6} 40.\text{xe6} 41.\text{f8}+ \text{e7} 42.\text{exg6+} \text{hxg6} 43.\text{xc3} 44.\text{xc7} 45.\text{g5} 46.\text{d2} 47.\text{e1} 48.\text{b5} 49.\text{xb5} 50.\text{ab5} 51.\text{e5} 52.\text{d7} 46.\text{d2} 47.\text{c2} 48.\text{d2} 49.\text{e2} 50.\text{e2} 51.\text{e5} 52.\text{b7} 49.\text{a2} 50.\text{b2} 51.\text{a6} 52.\text{a6} 53.\text{a6} 54.\text{d4} 55.\text{c4} 56.\text{d5} 57.\text{b5} 58.\text{b5} 59.\text{a5} 60.\text{a5} 61.\text{a5} 62.\text{e6} 63.\text{xf6} 64.\text{e8} 65.\text{f8+} 66.\text{xa7} 67.\text{xa7} 68.\text{xe8} 69.\text{e8} 70.\text{d1} 71.\text{e1} 72.\text{f1} 73.\text{g8} 74.\text{h1} 75.\text{f2} 1–0

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Khalifman – Stefansson
Aarhus 1997

If in the game 3 White had to deal with the isolated d5–pawn, then in the game given below he had to struggle against another popular construction of Black’s pawn center – the hanging c5– and d5–pawns. Here it is necessary to pay attention to a rather stereotyped, but despite it, not less effective manoeuvre of the white queen on the move 13. In the ending an insufficient stability of Black’s centre became to make it felt rather hardly. White won a pawn, but in spite of it, Black had good chances for a draw in the rook ending owing to a limited material, which remained on the board. Black’s solution to change also the rooks and to simplify the position even more by that turned out to be a
mistake. With the outflanking manoeuvre of the king via the queenside White could force Black's zugzwang, and after his king reached the d6-square, Black's resistance became useless.

1.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{f6}\) 2.\(\text{c4}\) b6 3.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{b7}\) 4.\(\text{ag2}\) e6 5.0-0 \(\text{e7}\) 6.\(\text{c3}\) 0-0 7.\(\text{d6}\) d5 8.\(\text{exd5}\) exd5 9.d4 \(\text{a6}\) 10.\(\text{c1}\) 11.\(\text{dxc5}\) bxc5

g6 29.f3± 27.\(\text{xc5}\) \(\text{xc5}\) 28.\(\text{xc5}\) \(\text{d7}\) 29.g4 \(\text{f}x\text{g4}\) 30.\(\text{xe4}\) \(\text{e}6\) 31.\(\text{xc3}\) \(\text{f7}\) [31...\(\text{xb3}\) 32.\(\text{xb3}\) \(\text{xb3}\) 33.\(\text{d2}\)±] 32.\(\text{c7}\) \(\text{f6}\) 33.\(\text{xa7}\) \(\text{xb3}\) 34.\(\text{e}x\text{h7}\) [34.\(\text{h7}\) \(\text{h3}\) 35.b4 \(\text{h}x\text{h2}\) 36.b5 \(\text{h}x\text{h5}\) ] 34...\(\text{xb3}\)± 35.\(\text{a6}\) \(\text{e}5\) 36.\(\text{d3}\) \(\text{b8}\) 37.\(\text{a5}\) ± \(\text{f6}\) 38.\(\text{f1}\) \(\text{c8}\) 39.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{c1}\) 40.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{e}6\) 41.e3 \(\text{b1}\) 42.\(\text{b5}\) \(\text{d1}\) 43.\(\text{b6}\) \(\text{e}5\) 44.\(\text{b1}\) \(\text{x}b1\) 45.\(\text{xb1}\) \(\text{f6}\)

13.\(\text{b3}\)? [13.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{d}6\) Kra-kenkov - Cvitan, Pula 1997] 13...\(\text{b6}\) 14.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{xb3}\) 15.\(\text{xb3}\) \(\text{e}4\) [15...\(\text{h}6\) 16.\(\text{h}4\)±; 15...\(\text{d}6\) 16.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{xf4}\) 17.\(\text{e}x\text{f4}\) \(\text{ad8}\) 18.\(\text{ed1}\)±] 16.\(\text{ed1}\) \(\text{ed8}\) 17.\(\text{b3}\) \(\text{dxe}4\) \(\text{dxe}4\) 18.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{d}5\) [18...\(\text{xd}1\) 19.\(\text{xd}1\) \(\text{d}8\) 20.\(\text{xd}8\) \(\text{d}x\text{d}8\) 21.\(\text{g}4\)±] 19.\(\text{h}3\) [19.\(\text{a}1\) \(\text{b}4\) 20.\(\text{xa}7\) \(\text{c6}\)±] 19...\(\text{c}6\) [19...\(\text{d}4\) 20.\(\text{c7}\) \(\text{a}8\) 21.\(\text{a}5\)±] 20.\(\text{d}6\)± \(\text{xd}6\) ! [20...\(\text{b8}\)±] 21.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{b}5\) 22.\(\text{xd}8\) \(\text{xd}8\) 23.\(\text{f}1\)± \(\text{d}7\) 24.\(\text{g}2\) [24.\(\text{xd}7\) \(\text{xd}7\) 25.\(\text{a}1\) \(\text{b}4\) 26.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{d}5\) 27.\(\text{xa}7\) \(\text{g}5\) 28.\(\text{c}7\) \(\text{d}1\) 29.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{d}2\)±] 24...\(\text{c}6\) [24...\(\text{f}5\)± 25.\(\text{d}1\)] 25.\(\text{e}1\) [25.\(\text{g}4\)±] 25...\(\text{f}5\) 26.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{b}8\)! [26...\(\text{d}5\) 27.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{f}7\) 28.\(\text{g}4\)

46.\(\text{f}1\)!+ [\(\text{e}2\)-\(\text{d}2\)-\(\text{c}3\)-\(\text{d}4\)-\(\text{c}5\)-\(\text{d}6\) 46...\(\text{e}5\) 47.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}8\) 48.\(\text{g}6\) \(\text{f}6\) 49.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{e}5\) 50.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}5\)± 51.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 52.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{d}6\) 53.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{c}8\) 54.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 55.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{a}6\)± 56.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{e}2\) 57.\(\text{c}6\) \(\text{e}6\) 58.\(\text{c}7\) \(\text{e}7\) 59.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{f}3\) 60.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{f}4\) 61.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{f}5\) 62.\(\text{c}6\) \(\text{e}6\) 63.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 64.\(\text{c}7\) \(\text{e}4\) 65.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{e}5\) 66.\(\text{d}8\) \(\text{f}6\) 67.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{c}2\) 68.\(\text{d}7\) \(\text{e}5\) 69.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{f}5\) 70.\(\text{d}6\) 1-0

5 Anand – Tiviakov
9 Wijk aan Zee 1996

In this game Black has decided to surrender the centre to

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avoid any pawn weaknesses in his position. In the middlegame Black managed to solve the problem of White's pawn superiority, however for a possibility to simplify the position he had to pay with the advantage of the bishop pair. It is rather a crucial point and we have spoken about it many times; this game confirms this assertion. The passed pawn on the d-file did not promise White any advantages in view of a strong Black's blockade along the dark squares. However White has found a possibility to break his opponent's defence in the centre. White successfully has chosen a moment for the move e4–e5. Black's knight has been unable to occupy the d5-square, weakened by this advancement, and thus White has strengthened his influence in the centre. In the complicated ending Black held the defence for a long time. Nevertheless White could use his advantage of the bishop pair. With the typical method - by exchange of one bishop - White has ensured his king's invasion of the enemy camp that has resulted to material gains.

1.\(\text{d}f3\) \(\text{d}f6\) 2.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{b}4\) 3.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{e}6\) 5.0–0 \(\text{e}7\) 6.\(\text{c}3\) 0–0 7.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{d}5\) 8.\(\text{cxd}5\) \(\text{cxd}5\) 9.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{xc}3\) 10.\(\text{bxc}3\) \(\text{c}5\) 11.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 12.\(\text{d}f4\) \(\text{d}f6\) 13.\(\text{w}d3\) [13.\(\text{e}5!\) - see page 56] 13...\(\text{cxd}4\) 14.\(\text{cxd}4\) \(\text{b}4\) 15.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{c}8\) 16.\(\text{e}c1\) \(\text{xc}1\) [16...\(\text{w}d7=\)\(\text{f}\) 17.\(\text{xc}1\) \(\text{a}8\) 18.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{c}8\) 19.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{a}6\) 20.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{d}8\) 21.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{f}8\) 22.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{c}8\) 23.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{b}7\) 24.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 25.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 26.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{xc}4\) 27.\(\text{xc}4\)\(\text{d}5\)! 28.\(\text{d}2!\) \(\text{f}6\) [28...\(\text{f}6\) 29.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{b}4\) 30.\(\text{c}3\)! (30.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{a}6\) 31.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{b}5=\)) 30...\(\text{a}6\) 31.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{b}5\) 32.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{c}6\) 33.\(\text{d}5=\)\(\text{f}\) 29.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{f}2\)! \(\text{e}5\) 30.\(\text{dxe}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 31.\(\text{e}2\) (31.\(\text{xa}7??\) \(\text{d}4\) 31...\(\text{h}5?!\) (31...\(\text{xe}4\) 32.\(\text{fxe}4\) \(\text{xe}4=\) 33.\(\text{a}d1=\)) 32.\(\text{xa}7\) \(\text{xe}4\) 33.\(\text{h}2+\) 33.\(\text{d}3=\)\(\text{f}\) 29...\(\text{e}8\) 30.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{g}6\) 31.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{d}6\) 32.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{c}7\) 33.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{e}7\) 34.\(\text{e}5\) \(\text{e}5\) 35.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{g}7\) 36.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{c}7\) 37.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{e}7\) 38.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f}8\) 39.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{f}6\) 40.\(\text{c}6=\) \(\text{xc}6\) 41.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{e}8\) 42.\(\text{h}6+\) \(\text{g}7\) [42...\(\text{f}7\) 43.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{g}7\) 44.\(\text{d}5\) \(\text{d}5=\) 45.\(\text{f}4=\)\(\text{f}\) 43.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{f}7\) 44.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{fxe}5\) 45.\(\text{dx}e5\) \(\text{e}8\) 46.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{c}7\) 47.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{a}6\) 48.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{b}4\) 49.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{c}6\) [49...\(\text{c}2?\) 50.\(\text{f}5=\)\(\text{f}\) 50.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{a}5\) [50...\(\text{c}5\) 51.\(\text{xc}5\) (51.\(\text{f}5\) \(\text{g}5+\) 52.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{xe}5\) 53.\(\text{fxe}6\) \(\text{f}6=\)); 51.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{e}7=\)\(\text{f}\) 51...\(\text{bxc}5\) 52.\(\text{f}5\) \(\text{g}5+\) 53.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{d}4\) 54.\(\text{fxe}6\) \(\text{xe}6\) 55.\(\text{d}5=\)\(\text{f}\) 51.\(\text{a}6\) \(\text{c}5\) 52.\(\text{d}2\) [52.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{bxc}5\) 53.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{e}7\) 54.\(\text{h}4\) \(\text{d}8\) 55.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{c}7\) 56.\(\text{e}8\) 228]
53.f5! [53...c4 d7! 53...gxf5 54.gx5 exf5 55.d5 e7+ 56.e4 g6 57.b5 f7 58.g5 a3 59.c4+ g6 60.
f6 a4 61.e4 h6 62.e3 d3+ g7 67.d4 66.f4
g6 66.d3+ g7 67.d4 e3 68.h4 f7 69.c4+ f8 70.
f6 d4 71.e4 b2 72.e4 a3 73.e6 d6 74.e5+ f5
[74...c5 75.b5! g8 76.b8 a5 77.e5+ d4 78.d4]
75.xe5 g7 76.d3 c8 77.a4 e7 78.b5
c8 79.a6 e7 80.d3 c8 81.a6 e7 82.d6 83.
f5+ 84.d7 e7 85.a7 c7 e5 86.b3 f5 87.b7 d6 88.
xa7 c7 89.a6 c6 90.d1 e7 91.f3+ c7 92.b5 f5
93.g4 d6+? [93...e7 94.c4 d6 95.d4 h5+ 94.b4 d8
95.c3 e7 96.d4 b7

97. c4! d6 98.b5 c5
99.h4 h5 100.h3 e7 101.a5!
x6 102.xb6 f4 103.a6
d5+ 104.b7 d8 105.a7 c7
106. f1 d7 107.e2 1-0

6 A35
Kramnik – Hjartarson
Clichy 1995

This game was one of the first that showed how dangerous could be the ending for Black, who has a little bit weakened pawn position on the queenside (three pawn islands against two White’s islands), which was analyzed in detail in Part 5, Chapter 16. Black has not felt the danger and very fast has come to be in a losing position. The isolated c-pawn has held down own pieces. An attempt to get this pawn out has led Black to the rook ending with a pawn less. This rook ending has an educational character and deserves to be placed to any textbook. "...an absolute 7 th rank and a passed pawn almost always lead to a victory" (A. Nimzowitsch). The ending that you will see bellow confirms this statement.

1.d3 c5 2.c4 d6 3.d3 d6
4.g3 d5 5.d4 cxd4 6.xd4 dxc4
7.xc6 xd1+ 8.xb1 bxc6
9.g2 d5 10.e3 e6 11.xc4
a6 12.b3 [12.a5!? – see page 143] 12...b4+ 13.xd2 e7
14.cc1 ac8 [14...hc8! 15.
Illustrative Games

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{x} b4+ \text{\textbullet}_{x} b4 16.a3 \text{\textbullet}_{d} 5 17.\text{\textbullet}_{a} 5 \]
\[ c5 18.e4 \text{\textbullet}_{f} 6 19.e5 \text{\textbullet}_{d} 5 20.\text{\textbullet}_{d} 2 \]
\[ \text{\textbullet}_{a} b8 21.b4 \text{\textbullet}_{b} 5! = \text{Gelfand – Timman, Malmo 1999} \]

15.\text{\textbullet}_{x} b4+ \text{\textbullet}_{x} b4 16.a3 \text{\textbullet}_{d} 5 17.\text{\textbullet}_{a} 5! c5

18.0-0 [18.\text{\textbullet}_{c} 2 c4!? 18...\text{\textbullet}_{h} d8

19.\text{\textbullet}_{c} 2 \text{\textbullet}_{c} 7?! [19...c4!? 20.\text{\textbullet}_{x} c4

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{b} 6 21.\text{\textbullet}_{f} c1 \text{\textbullet}_{x} c4 22.bxc4 \text{\textbullet}_{c} 5] \]

20.\text{\textbullet}_{f} c1 [20.\text{\textbullet}_{d} 1 \text{\textbullet}_{c} 3 21.\text{\textbullet}_{x} d8

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{c} 2 22.\text{\textbullet}_{d} 2 \text{\textbullet}_{d} 4 (22...\text{\textbullet}_{x} a3? \]
\[ 23.\text{\textbullet}_{a} 2 \text{\textbullet}_{b} 5 24.\text{\textbullet}_{e} 6! 23.\text{\textbullet}_{e} 2+ 24.\text{\textbullet}_{h} 1 \text{\textbullet}_{c} 3 \]

20...\text{\textbullet}_{d} c8 21.e4

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{f} 6 [21...\text{\textbullet}_{b} 6 22.\text{\textbullet}_{f} 1? (22.f4 c4

23.\text{\textbullet}_{f} 1) 22...\text{\textbullet}_{x} f1 23.\text{\textbullet}_{x} f1 \]

22.f4! [22.f3?] 22...\text{\textbullet}_{d} 3 23.e5

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{d} 5 [23...\text{\textbullet}_{e} 4 24.\text{\textbullet}_{b} 2 (\Delta 25.\text{\textbullet}_{d} 1)

24...f5 25.exf6+ \text{\textbullet}_{x} f6 26.\text{\textbullet}_{d} 2] \]

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{e} 8 29.\text{\textbullet}_{x} d5! [29.\text{\textbullet}_{x} a7 \text{\textbullet}_{c} 1+ 30.\text{\textbullet}_{f} 2 \text{\textbullet}_{c} 2+ 31.\text{\textbullet}_{f} 3 \text{\textbullet}_{e} 3!? 32.

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{h} 3 \text{\textbullet}_{x} h 2? 33.\text{\textbullet}_{x} e 6++; 32...

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{c} 4] 29...\text{\textbullet}_{x} d 5 30.\text{\textbullet}_{x} a 7 d 4

31.\text{\textbullet}_{f} 1 – d 3 [31...\text{\textbullet}_{c} 1+ 32.\text{\textbullet}_{e} 2

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{c} 2+ 33.\text{\textbullet}_{d} 3 \text{\textbullet}_{x} h 2 34.\text{\textbullet}_{x} d 4 (34.

a4 \text{\textbullet}_{h} 3 35.a5 \text{\textbullet}_{x} g 3+ 36.\text{\textbullet}_{x} d 4 \text{\textbullet}_{a} 3

37.a6 h 5 38.f 5 h 4\text{∞} 34...\text{\textbullet}_{g} 2

35.e6! \text{\textbullet}_{x} e 6 36.\text{\textbullet}_{x} g 7+ 32.\text{\textbullet}_{e} 1

[32.a4?? \text{\textbullet}_{e} 4! 32...\text{\textbullet}_{c} 2 33.a4

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{x} h 2 34.a 5 h 5 [34...g 6.35.a 6 \text{\textbullet}_{a} 2

(35...\text{\textbullet}_{f} 8 36.\text{\textbullet}_{b} 7 \text{\textbullet}_{a} 2 37.a 7 \text{\textbullet}_{g} 7

38.e 6++) 36.a 8+ \text{\textbullet}_{e} 7 37.a 7 h 5

38.e 6! \text{\textbullet}_{x} e 6 (38...\text{\textbullet}_{x} e 6 39.\text{\textbullet}_{e} 8++; 38...

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{f} 6 39.\text{\textbullet}_{x} f 7 \text{\textbullet}_{x} f 7 40.\text{\textbullet}_{h} 8++) 39.\text{\textbullet}_{h} 8++ 35.a 6 \text{\textbullet}_{a} 2 36.f 5! \text{\textbullet}_{f} 8

[36...\text{\textbullet}_{e} 2+ 37.\text{\textbullet}_{d} 1 \text{\textbullet}_{x} e 5 38.\text{\textbullet}_{b} 7

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{x} f 5 39.a 7 \text{\textbullet}_{a} 5 40.\text{\textbullet}_{d} 2++] 37.

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{d} 1 g 5 [37...d 2 38.e 6++] 38.\text{\textbullet}_{f} 6

\[ \text{\textbullet}_{g} 8 39.\text{\textbullet}_{a} 8+ \text{\textbullet}_{h} 7 40.e 6 1–0 \]

7

Kramnik – Timman
Wijk aan Zee 1999

One more example of the same subject. Up to the position at the first diagram you can see opponent’s possibilities under variation b of Chapter 16, Part 5. Further the game very fast transposed as well as in the previous example into the rook ending where White has an extra pawn. However, this time the ending turned out to be much more difficult than the ending in the game 6.

\[ 1.\text{\textbullet}_{f} 3 c 5 2.c 4 \text{\textbullet}_{f} 6 [2...\text{\textbullet}_{c} 6 – see Book 3] 3.\text{\textbullet}_{c} 3 \text{\textbullet}_{c} 6 4.g 3 d 5\]

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5. d4 cxd4 6. exd4 dx4 7. x4c6 
\&xd1+ 8. \&xd1 bxc6 9. g2 d5 
10. e3 e6 11. xc4 a6 12. a5!? c5 13. d2 0–0 14. c1 
d4 15. b4! [see page 146] b5 
16. xc6 b2 17. c5 xc6 18. xc6 ac8 19. xc8 xc8 
20. xd5 exd5

21. f4!! [21. d1 a3 22. e3 h5 
23. \&c2 \&c2–=; 21. e3 a3 22. e2 
\&c2 23. d3 xa2 24. c3 b2!=; 
21. 0–0 \&c2 22. d1 d4 23. e3 g6 
24. xd4 xd4 25. xd4 xa2 26. e3 a5± 
21... a3 [21... c6 
22. d1 a3 (22... a6? 23. c2 
xa2 24. b3+) 23. f1± 
22. f1 
23. f3 a4 24. xb4 
xb4 25. a3 [25. b3 xb3 26. 
xb3 f8 27. d2 e7 28. c3 
a5!=] 25... h5! [25... b7? 26. a5 
da7 (26... d4 27. d2) 27. d2 
f8 28. d3 e7 (28... g6 29. d4 
e7 30. e3 e4+ 31. d3+) 29. 
d4 e6 30. g4+–] 26. a7+ b2 
[26... h4 27. f2 hxg3+ 28. hxg3 g6 
29. f3!? (29. a4 g7 30. a5 a4 
1. e3 f6=) 29... e7 30. g4 f6 
(30... b2 31. g5=) 31. a6+ e7 
2. a3!? a2 33. e3+ d6 (33... 
f6 34. g5+ f7 35. a3=) 34. a3± 
27. a4 [27. f5!? h4! (27... b1+ 
28. f2+) 28. g4 (28. gxh4 b4++; 
28. f2 hxg3+ 29. hxg3 f6 30. a4 
\h7 31. a5 a2 32. e3 a4 33. a6 
\h6=) 28... b1+ (28... b4 29. h3 
b1+ 30. d2 d1 31. a3=) 29. 
f2 h1 30. g2 e1 31. e7 a1 
32. h3 xa2 (32... f8 33. e3 d4 
34. e4=) 33. xh4 d4 34. g5 f8 
35. e4 d3= 34. h3= 27... a2 
[27... g6! 28. a5 a2 29. a6 g7 
30. a8 (30. h3 f6 31. e3 h2! 
32. h4?! a2! 33. a8 f5=) 30... 
f6 31. a7 (31. h3 f5 32. e4!) 
31... f5 32. h3 (32. e4 g4!) 32... 
h4! 33. gxh4 xf4 34. d1 f5 
35. c1 f6 36. b1 a5 37. b2 
g7=]}

28. f5! [28. a5 g6!] 28... a1+ 
[28... f6 29. a5 h7 30. a6 h6 
31. h4 g6 32. fxg6 xg6 33. a8 
f7 34. a7++; 28... h4 29. gxh4++]
29. f2?! [29. d2 f1 30. a5 f5 
31. d7 f6 (31... d4 32. a6 a5 
33. a7 h7 34. f7=) 32. xd5 g6 
33. d3 a6 34. a3=] 29... f6 
[29... d4 30. a5 a2 31. e1 a1+ 
(31... d3 32. a3= xh2 33. a6 a2 
34. d4=) 32. b2=] 30. a5 d4 
31. f3! [31. a6? a5=; 31. h3?! 
h7 32. a6 a5 33. g4 hxg4 34. 
ngx4 h6 35. a8 f5=] 31... h7 
[31... a3+ 32. e4 e3= 33. a4d4]
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\[34.a6 \text{Exh}2 (34...\text{a}a2 35.\text{h}h4++) 35.\text{xc}7 \text{a}a2 36.a7 \text{h}h7 37.\text{c}c5 \text{h}h6 38.\text{gb}6 \text{g}g5 39.\text{g}xg7+ \text{xf}5 40.\text{xb}7 \text{b}b2+ (40...\text{e}4 41.\text{a}a8 \text{xa}8 42.\text{xa}a8 \text{f}3 43.\text{g}g6 \text{f}5 44.\text{g}g5++) 41.\text{c}c8 \text{a}a2 42.\text{b}b8 \text{b}b2+ 43.\text{b}b7 \text{a}a2 44.\text{b}b4!+-] 32.a6 \text{b}b6 33.\text{h}h6 34.\text{fxg}6 [34.\text{e}4!?] 34...\text{xg}6 35.\text{xa}a8 \text{b}b2 [35...\text{h}h5 36.\text{f}f2! (36.a7 \text{a}a2! 37.e4+ \text{xe}4 38.\text{xe}3 \text{a}a1=) 36...\text{a}a2 37.\text{d}d1 \text{g}g4 (37...\text{a}a1+ 38.\text{d}d2 \text{a}a3 39.a7 \text{a}a1 40.\text{c}c2 \text{a}a4 41.\text{b}b3 \text{a}a1 42.\text{c}c4 \text{a}a4+ 43.\text{c}c5++) 38.a7 \text{h}h3 39.\text{d}d1 \text{g}g2 40.g4! (40.\text{c}c1 \text{f}f2 41.\text{b}b1 \text{a}a4 42.\text{b}b2 \text{f}5 43.\text{b}b3 \text{a}a1 44.\text{c}c4 \text{a}a4+ 45.\text{c}c5 \text{e}e1 46.\text{b}b6 \text{xe}2 47.\text{b}b5 \text{xa}7 48.\text{xa}7 \text{d}d3 49.\text{e}e7+ \text{f}f3 50.\text{c}c4 \text{d}2 51.\text{d}d7 \text{e}e2 52.\text{c}c3 \text{d}1\text{g} 53.\text{xd}1 \text{xd}1 54.\text{d}d3 \text{e}e1 55.\text{e}e3 \text{f}f1 56.\text{f}f4 \text{f}f2 57.\text{xf}5 \text{xf}5 58.\text{g}g5++) 40...\text{hxg}4 41.\text{h}h5 \text{g}3 42.\text{h}h2 43.\text{h}h7 \text{g}2 44.\text{g}g8++] 36.\text{f}f4! \text{f}f7?? [36...\text{a}a4 37.\text{e}4 \text{a}a2 38.\text{d}d3++; 36...\text{h}h7 37.a7 \text{g}g7 38.\text{f}f5++; 36...\text{g}g7?? 37.a7 \text{h}h7 38.g4! (38.\text{f}f5 \text{g}g7 39.g4? \text{a}a5+ 40.\text{f}f4 \text{a}a4!) 38...\text{a}a4 (38...\text{hxg}4 39.\text{xe}4 \text{g}g7 40.\text{h}h5 \text{h}h7 41.\text{f}f5 \text{a}a6 42.\text{h}h6++) 39.g5 (39.\text{gh}5 \text{d}d3+ 40.\text{e}e4 \text{d}2 41.\text{xd}d8 \text{xa}7 42.\text{xc}d2 \text{a}a1! 43.\text{xf}x2 \text{a}a5 44.\text{g}g4 \text{f}f5=) 39...\text{fxg}5+ (39...\text{d}d3+ 40.\text{e}e4 \text{d}2 41.\text{xd}d8 \text{fxg}5+ 42.\text{xf}xg5! \text{xa}7 43.\text{hx}d2 \text{g}g7 44.\text{hx}h5 \text{e}e7 45.\text{e}e2 \text{e}e5+ 46.\text{g}g4 \text{f}f6 47.\text{f}f4 \text{h}h5 48.e5 \text{e}e6 49.\text{g}g4 \text{h}h8 50.\text{h}h5++) 40.\text{hxg}5 \text{a}a5+ 41.\text{f}f6! (41.\text{f}f4 \text{a}a2!) 41...\text{a}a6+ (41...\text{a}a2 42.\text{e}e8! \text{a}a6+ 43.\text{e}e6 \text{xa}7 44.\text{e}e7++) 42.\text{e}e5 \text{a}a4 43.\text{d}d5 \text{g}g7 44.\text{c}c5 \text{h}h7 (44...\text{a}a1 45.\text{xd}d4++) 45.\text{b}b6 \text{b}b4+ 46.\text{a}a5++) 37.a7 \text{g}g7 38.\text{f}f5 \text{a}a5+ 39.\text{e}e4 \text{a}a4 40.\text{d}d5 \text{a}a1 41.\text{xd}d4 [41...\text{a}a4+ 42.\text{c}c5 \text{a}a2 43.\text{e}4 \text{a}a1 44.\text{g}g6 \text{b}b1+ 45.\text{c}c6 \text{c}c1+ (45...\text{a}a1 46.\text{d}d8 \text{xa}7 47.\text{d}d7++) 46.\text{d}d1+ 47.\text{e}e6 \text{a}a1 48.\text{d}d8 \text{a}a6+ 49.\text{d}d6 \text{xa}7 (49...\text{a}a1 50.\text{d}d7+ \text{g}g6 51.\text{d}d6--) 50.\text{d}d7+ \text{xd}7 51.\text{xd}7 \text{f}f5 52.e5=] 1-0

8 A35

Kramnik – Lautier
Horgen 1995

Again a very colourful ending, played by Vladimir Kramnik. And again as well as in the game 5 White did not hurry to make a passed pawn in the centre, but preferred with the help of the move 14.e5! to freeze the development of opponent’s queenside. To pay for the rooks’ exchange Black had to allow White to make the protected passed d6–pawn. Using this trump White's bishops could break in enemy camp and this predetermined his victory.

1.\text{f}f3 \text{c}c5 2.\text{c}c4 \text{f}f6 [2...\text{d}d6 – see Book 3] 3.\text{d}d3 \text{a}a6 4.\text{g}g3 \text{d}d5 5.\text{d}d4 \text{e}e6 6.\text{cxd}5 \text{xd}5 7.\text{g}g2 \text{cxd}4 8.\text{xd}d4 \text{xc}3 9.\text{b}xc3 \text{xd}4 10.\text{xd}d4 \text{xd}4 11.\text{xd}d4 \text{f}f6 12.0-0! \text{b}b8 13.\text{e}4 0-0 [\text{a}a13...\text{d}d7 – see page 149] 14.e5! \text{e}e7 15.\text{e}e3 \text{a}a7 16.\text{f}f1 \text{e}e8 17.\text{xc}8+ \text{xc}8 18.\text{c}c1 \text{f}f8 19.
\[\text{h3! e8 20.d5 d7 21.d6 d8 22.g2 [22.axa7?! a8 23.e3 xa2++] 22..b6 23.f4 c8 24.f2 xc1 25.xc1\pm b5 26.e4 h6 27.e3! [Axe1-d2-c3-b4, a4-a5; 27..c3?! d7 28..d4 c6 29.\text{d3 b5+}] 27..d7 28..e1 c6 29..d3 [29..xc6+?! \text{xc6+}]; 29..d5 30.a3 f6 31..d2 fxe5 32.fxe5 c6 [32..g5 33..xg5 hgx5 34..e3\pm] 33..c3 f3 34..c4 d5 35..a6 f3 [35..d7 36. b5+ c6 37..b4+] 36..d4 d5 [36..b5? \text{d3 b6} 38..xb6 xb6 39..xb5+!] 37.a4 b3 [37..d7 38..b5+ c6? 39..c4! a6 40..xa6 xa4 41. b5+ xb5+ 42..xb5++; 38.. c8\pm] 38..b5 b7 39..d7! d5 40..c3 a2 41..b4 [41..h4!] 41...d5?! [41..g5!\pm]

42.h4! [A\text{c1-a3, e8}, d7, f8] 42..a2 43.d2! [43..c1 d5 44..a3 a2 45..c3 d5 46..e8?! c6\pm] 43..d5 44..c1 a2 45..c3 d5 46..a3 a2 [46..a6 47..b4! a5 (47..b8 48..e8+\pm d7, f8) 48..a3 a2 49..b5 d5 50..c4 c6 51..d4 xc4 52..xc4++; 46..b8 47..e8 b7 48.d7+ A\text{f8} 47..e8! d5 48.d7 c6 49..f8+\pm xa4 [49..c7 50..xg7+\pm\text{ c7} 51..xh6 xd7 52..f7 c6 [52..e7 53..h5 d8 54..g7 e8 55..h6++; 53..h5 [53..g5 c7 54..d4++; 53..d5 54..g7 g5 55..g4 e4 56..h6 xh6 57..xh6 xe5 58..g5 f5 59..g6 f6 60..g5+ g7 61..d4 a4 [61..b5 62..e5 a5 63..f6 f8 64..xe6 xe6 65..xe6 b4 66..d5++; 62..e5 c2 63..f6+ f8 64..f4 1-0

9 A35

Kramnik – Lautier
Belgrade 1995

Here you can see a continuation of the opening duel started in the previous game. It seemed that Black was very close to a draw, as the position had become simpler. However it was not so easy. Black could avoid making weaknesses in his camp, but after on the move 26 he made a little mistake, which at first did not seem to be a serious blunder, his position became losing. If the white pawn had been on a3, instead a2, like in the game, Black would have spent a tempo less to make a passed pawn on the queenside. As a result, for lack of this tempo he could not make a draw.

1.f3 c5 2.c4 f6 [2..c6 – see Book 3] 3.d3 c6 4.g3 d5 5.d4 e6 6.cxd5 xd5 7.xg2 cxd4 8.xd4 xc3 9.bxc3

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\[ \text{\textcopyright} \text{Psakhis - Zilberman, Israel 1998] } 21. \text{xh6 gxh6 22.\textit{xc3 \textit{xb7 23. \textit{xb7 \textit{xb7 24.\textit{h3 \textit{ec7 25. \textit{exh6 [25.\textit{d3 \textit{c1 26.\textit{exh6 \textit{a1=] 25...\textit{ec4 26.\textit{h3 \textit{xd4?? [26...\textit{a4! 27.a3 \textit{xd4+ 28.\textit{xd3 \textit{xd3+ 29.\textit{xd3 \textit{e7=} 27.\textit{ed3 \textit{xd3+ 28.\textit{ed3 f6 [28...b5 29. \textit{d4 \textit{d6 30.h4 a5 31.h5 \textit{e7 32.\textit{c5 b4 33.\textit{b5++; 28...\textit{e7 29.\textit{d4 \textit{f6 30.\textit{e4 \textit{g6 31.\textit{e5 \textit{g7 32.f5!?+-] 29.\textit{c4 a6}}

\[ \text{\textit{b5 \textit{xh4 37.a4 \textit{g3 38.a5 \textit{f2 39.a6 \textit{xe2 40.a7 f3 41.a8= f2 42.\textit{e4+ \textit{f1 43.\textit{c4 f5 44.\textit{f3 f4 45.\textit{d3=) 33.h5 \textit{e7 34.\textit{c5 f7 35.\textit{b6 \textit{g7 36.\textit{xa6 \textit{h6 37. \textit{xb5 \textit{xe5 38.a4=] 31.\textit{fxe6 \textit{xe6 32.\textit{d4 \textit{f5 [32...f5 33.e4 f4 (33...\textit{fxe4 34.\textit{xe4 b5 35.\textit{d4 \textit{d6 36.h4=) 34.h4 b5 35.\textit{h5 \textit{f6 36.e5=) 33.\textit{d5 \textit{d4 [33...b5 34.\textit{c5 \textit{f4 35.\textit{b6 \textit{f5 (35...\textit{e3 36.h4=) 36.h4! \textit{g4 37.\textit{xa6 \textit{hxh4 38.\textit{xb5 \textit{g3 39.\textit{c4 \textit{f2 40.\textit{d3=] 34.\textit{e6! [34.\textit{c6? f5 35.h4 (35.\textit{xb6 \textit{e3 36.h4 \textit{xe2 37.h5 f4 38.h6 f3 39.h7 f2 40.h8= f1=) 35...\textit{g4 36.\textit{xb6 \textit{hxh4 37.\textit{xa6 \textit{g3 38.\textit{a4 \textit{f2 39.a5 \textit{xe2 40.\textit{b7 f4=} 34...f5 35.\textit{e3+ [35.h4 b5 36.h5 \textit{g5 37.h6 \textit{xf5 a5 39.\textit{e5 b4 40.\textit{d5 a4 (40...\textit{g4 41.\textit{c4 \textit{f4 42.\textit{b5=) 41.\textit{c4 b3 42.axb3 axb3 43.\textit{xb3 \textit{g5 44.\textit{c4 \textit{f5 (44...\textit{f4 45. \textit{d4=) 45.\textit{d5 \textit{f6 46.e4 \textit{e7 47.\textit{e5=] 35...\textit{g4 [35...\textit{e4 36.h4 f4 37.\textit{xf4 \textit{xf4 38.\textit{d5=] 36.\textit{h3=) [36.h4 b5 37.h5 \textit{g5 38.h6 \textit{xe5 39.\textit{xf5 a5 40.e4 \textit{g7=} 36...\textit{g5 37.h4 \textit{g6 38. \textit{h5= \textit{g5 39.h6 \textit{g6 40.h7 \textit{xe5 41.\textit{xf5 \textit{g7 [41...b5 42.\textit{e5 \textit{g6 43.\textit{d5=)] 42.\textit{e6 1-0}}

30.f5! \textit{d6 [30...\textit{xf5 31.\textit{d5 f4 32.h4 b5 (32...\textit{e7 33.\textit{c6 \textit{f7 34.\textit{xb6 \textit{g6 35.\textit{xa6 \textit{h5 36.}}]}

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