Opening for White According to
Kramnik 1.\( \text{d}f3 \)

Book I b

Modern Lines
in the King’s Indian Defence

1.\( \text{d}f3 \text{f}6 2.\text{c}4 \text{g}6 3.\text{d}c3 \text{g}7 4.\text{e}4 \text{d}6 5.\text{d}4 0–0 6.\text{e}2 \text{e}5 7.0–0
7...\text{exd}4; 7...\text{a}6; 7...\text{c}6

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14th World Chess Champion
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Dear readers,

This book is devoted to the contemporary variations of the classical system of the King’s Indian Defence. I classify into that group the lines in which after: 1.dı3 dı6 2.c4 g6 3.dıc3 dıg7 4.e4 d6 5.d4 0-0 6.dıe2 e5 7.0-0, Black plays 7...exd4, 7...dıa6, or 7...dıc6. This definition might seem to you to be a bit unusual, but I believe Black’s hopes to obtain a good counterplay are based mostly on these variations, in which the opening theory is developing most intensely.

The system with 7...exd4, used to be considered as not so good for Black for many years. It looked like Black had to defend a strategically difficult position with his chances mostly based on some tactical tricks. Still, in the middle of the 90ies of the last century, largely due to the efforts of grandmasters Anthony Miles and Igor Glek, there gained popularity an effectively new system: 7...exd4 8.dıxd4 dıe8 9.f3 dıc6 10.dıe3 dıh5!? , in which Black opts immediately for an active play on the dark squares. The theory of that variation evolves nowadays too, although White has found ways to obtain a positional advantage, which are analyzed thoroughly in the corresponding parts of our book.

The 7...dıa6 system starts with a move, which would hardly be approved by the classics (“The knight at the edge of the board...”), but it is in fact a typical example of the contemporary treatment of the openings. This idea of GM Leonid Yurtaev, who began to use that development of his queen’s knight in almost all the variations of the King’s Indian Defence, found its new adherents quickly at almost all levels. At one moment, it seemed that move of the knight at the edge of the board might even become the main line for Black, exceeding the popularity of the traditional move – 7...dıc6. Later, practice showed that the opinions of the classics should not be disregarded and White found plenty of advantageous lines and most of them are based exactly on exploiting the irregular placement of Black’s knight on a6. We have done our best to analyze thoroughly the new ideas for White and in particular the sharpest variation – 8.dıe3 dıg4 9.dıg5 dıe8 10.c5!?.
Finally, the last and of course the main part of our book is devoted to the variations with the move 7...\( \mathcal{Q}c6 \). It is worth mentioning that mostly thanks to the efforts of Vladimir Kramnik during the second half of the 90ies of the last century – the system with: 8.d5 \( \mathcal{Q}e7 \) 9.b4, became extremely fashionable and especially the variation: 9...\( \mathcal{Q}h5 \) 10.\( \mathcal{Q}e1 \). Meanwhile, the greatest contribution to the theory of that system we owe to several games between Kramnik and Topalov. If we have in mind – there will be a unification – match in the autumn of 2006 between these two players, this book is coming out of print as if at the best possible moment! We should not be surprised if these two adversaries might decide to relive the past and to test in practice the newest discoveries of the opening theory and the new original analyses collected on these pages?!

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\textit{14th World Chess Champion}
Part 1

1.\( \Delta f3 \) \( \Delta f6 \) 2.\( c4 \) \( g6 \) 3.\( \Delta c3 \) \( g7 \) 4.\( e4 \) \( d6 \) 5.\( d4 \) 0–0 6.\( \Delta e2 \) \( e5 \) 7.0–0 \( \text{exd4} \)

Black’s last move has its advantages and drawbacks too. He opens the e-file and he increases the scope of action of his dark-squared bishop. The disadvantages are quite evident as well. White obtains control over the centre and his pawns on \( c4 \) and \( e4 \) cramp his opponent’s position, just like in the Maroczy system. Some of the greatest experts of the King’s Indian Defence like I.Boleslavsky, D.Bronstein, E.Geller, Ed. Gufeld and G.Kasparov preferred other systems for Black, considering that the immediate exchange in the centre is not good enough to equalize. Still, at the end of the 80ies of the last century the Kyrgyzian master (now GM...) L.Yurtaev proved in many of his games that Black could obtain a good counterplay and later in the 90ies, grandmasters Anthony Miles and I.Glek played that variation regularly against strong opponents and they had wonderful results too. After the forced move \( 8.\Delta xd4 \), Black’s most logical reaction is \( 8...\Delta e8 \), forcing White to protect his pawn on \( e4 \) with \( 9.f3 \).

Now, Black has numerous possibilities:

In chapter 1 we have analyzed the moves \( 9...\Delta a6 \) and \( 9...\Delta d7 \) – and here White obtains the advantage almost effortlessly, because Black has no active counterplay. We have also studied in that chapter the line – \( 9...\Delta h5 \), with the idea to organize an immediate counterplay on the kingside with the help of the pawn-advance \( f7-f5 \). That line creates definitely more problems for White. He is forced to play the sharp line – 10.g2-g4, but he manages to exploit his space-advantage and also the fact that Black has lost two tempi for moves with his knight and he organizes a very powerful pressure against his opponent’s...
position. At the end, it usually transforms into a direct attack against Black’s king.

In Chapter 2 we deal with lines connected with the multi-purpose move 9...e6, which is one of the main lines for Black. He weakens his d6-pawn with that move, but he forces his opponent to consider a variety of active possibilities. White’s task is to watch carefully about Black’s possible counterplay and to try to prevent it as early as possible.

In the next few chapters we analyze Black’s most logical and popular move – 9...c6, with which he fights immediately for the central squares. After White’s natural move 10.e3, Chapter 3 is devoted to Black’s least logical move 10. He is not trying to create immediately counterplay by exerting pressure against White’s d4-pawn, or to simplify the position. White’s road to obtain the advantage in these variations is relatively simple – he centralizes his forces and he deploys his heavy pieces on the d-file (Wd1-d2, Ha1-d1), after which, depending on circumstances, he attacks on one of the flanks.

Black’s main line is 10...h5 – Chapter 4. He exploits the fact that in view of the pressure against the d4-pawn, White cannot react analogously to the lines that we have analyzed in chapters 2 and 3 (Here, the move 11.g4 would not work, because of: 11...e5 12.gxh5 &xh2!=) and Black opts for a solid, although a bit passive position.

The basic feature of the variation with 7...exd4 is that White’s centralized pieces are very powerful and he maintains a great space advantage. Therefore he can operate successfully on both sides of the board and Black has great problems to organize any counterplay. Black can try to enter sharp tactical fights, mostly on the dark squares, but still White’s strategical pluses prove to be more effective than Black’s tactical possibilities. He can also try to defend simpler positions, by exchanging pieces, but he usually ends up without any counterplay, in endgames in which White maintains a long-lasting initiative.
Chapter 1

1.\( \text{d} \text{f3} \) 2.\( \text{c} \text{f6} \) 2.\( \text{c} \text{e} \text{g4} \) 6.\( \text{e} \text{c} \text{c3} \) 7.\( \text{g7} \) 4.\( \text{e} \text{e} \text{d4} \) 5.\( \text{d} \text{d4} \) 0-0 6.\( \text{e} \text{e} \text{e} \text{e} \text{2} \) e5 7.0-0 exd4 8.\( \text{c} \text{c} \text{xd4} \)

8...\( \text{c} \text{c} \text{e} \text{e} \text{8} \)

Black starts immediately his counterplay against his opponent’s e4-pawn.

About 8...\( \text{d} \text{a} \text{a} \text{6} \) 9.\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{e} \text{3} \) \( \text{d} \text{c} \text{c} \text{5} \) – see 7...\( \text{d} \text{b} \text{b} \text{d} \text{7} \) 8.\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{e} \text{3} \) exd4 9.\( \text{d} \text{c} \text{c} \text{d} \text{d} \text{4} \) 9.\( \text{d} \text{c} \text{c} \text{5} \).

As for 8...\( \text{d} \text{b} \text{b} \text{d} \text{7} \) 9.\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{e} \text{3} \) – see 7...\( \text{d} \text{b} \text{b} \text{d} \text{7} \) 8.\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{e} \text{3} \) exd4 9.\( \text{d} \text{c} \text{c} \text{d} \text{d} \text{4} \).

About 8...\( \text{d} \text{c} \text{c} \text{6} \) 9.\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{e} \text{3} \) \( \text{d} \text{e} \text{8} \) (Or 9...\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{e} \text{8} \) 10.\( \text{f} \text{f} \text{3} \) – see 8...\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{e} \text{8} \) 9.\( \text{f} \text{f} \text{3} \) \( \text{d} \text{c} \text{c} \text{6} \) 10.\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{6} \); Black loses instantly with the “exchange combination” 9...\( \text{d} \text{g} \text{g} \text{4} \)?? 10.\( \text{d} \text{x} \text{g} \text{g} \text{4} \) \( \text{d} \text{x} \text{g} \text{4} \), Kustar – Karatorossian, Budapest 2004, 11.\( \text{d} \text{x} \text{c} \text{6} \) ! 12.\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{d} \text{7} \) 12.\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{7} \)++; 9...\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{e} \text{6} \)??, Motl – Thalwitzer, Germany 1998, 10.\( \text{d} \text{x} \text{e} \text{6} \) fxe6 11.c5++; 9...\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{e} \text{5} \) 10.\( \text{f} \text{f} \text{3} \) \( \text{d} \text{e} \text{6} \)!! 11.\( \text{d} \text{x} \text{e} \text{6} \) fxe6 12.c5++ Nemet – Valencak, Baden 1997.)

10.\( \text{d} \text{x} \text{c} \text{6} \) bxc6 11.\( \text{d} \text{d} \text{d} \text{2} \) f5 12.\( \text{d} \text{a} \text{d} \text{1} \) \( \text{d} \text{e} \text{7} \) 13.\( \text{e} \text{x} \text{f} \text{5} \) \( \text{x} \text{f} \text{5} \), Fassnacht – Juhnke, Giessen 1997, 14.\( \text{f} \text{e} \text{e} \text{1} \) \( \text{f} \text{f} \text{7} \) 15.b3±.

Sometimes Black avoids temporarily the rook-move in favour of: 8...c6 9.\( \text{d} \text{h} \text{1} \) \( \text{d} \text{b} \text{d} \text{7} \) (About 9...\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{8} \) 10.\( \text{f} \text{f} \text{3} \) – see 8...\( \text{d} \text{e} \text{8} \) 9.\( \text{f} \text{f} \text{3} \) \( \text{c} \text{c} \text{6} \) 10.\( \text{d} \text{h} \text{1} \); the immediate pawn-break in the centre – 9...d5?! would not equalize for Black, due to: 10.e5 \( \text{d} \text{d} \text{4} \) 11.f4 f6 12.cxd5 \( \text{d} \text{x} \text{c} \text{3} \) 13.bxc3 \( \text{d} \text{x} \text{d} \text{5} \) 14.\( \text{d} \text{a} \text{3} \) \( \text{e} \text{e} \text{8} \) 15.\( \text{d} \text{x} \text{f} \text{6} \) \( \text{x} \text{f} \text{6} \) and here after 16.f5! White’s pieces become even more active, so that following: 16...\( \text{d} \text{x} \text{f} \text{5} \) 17.\( \text{d} \text{x} \text{f} \text{5} \) \( \text{d} \text{x} \text{d} \text{5} \) 18.\( \text{d} \text{h} \text{6} \) + \( \text{d} \text{g} \text{7} \) 19.\( \text{d} \text{x} \text{d} \text{1} \)++, Black’s position becomes hopeless no matter which piece he chooses to capture, Khalifman – Fishbein, New York 1998.)

10.\( \text{d} \text{c} \text{2} \) \( \text{e} \text{8} \) 11.\( \text{d} \text{d} \text{1} \) \( \text{d} \text{e} \text{7} \) 12.\( \text{d} \text{g} \text{5} \) \( \text{d} \text{c} \text{5} \) (If 12...h6, then White plays simply 13.\( \text{d} \text{h} \text{4} \)++; 13.f3± and White’s prospects are better. The position is different from the standard situations that we have analyzed in Chapter 17, Book 1a (7...\( \text{d} \text{b} \text{d} \text{7} \)), because White’s king is on h1, instead of on g1 and his bishop is not on e3, but instead it has gone directly to the wonderful g5-square.

9.\( \text{f} \text{f} \text{3} \)

The other possible defence of the e4-pawn 9.\( \text{d} \text{c} \text{2} \), is unaccept-
able for White in view of: 9...\(\text{Qxe4}\) 10.\(\text{Qxe4} \text{Qxd4}\) 11.\(\text{gg5}\) f6 12.\(\text{Rad1}\) and here in the game Rossetto – Larsen, Amsterdam 1964, Black’s simplest decision would have been 12...\(\text{Qc6!}\).

We will now analyze in details:

a) 9...\(\text{Qa6}\), b) 9...\(\text{Qd7}\), c) 9...
\(\text{Qh5}\) and 9...\(\text{c6}\) (Chapter 2), 9...
\(\text{Qc6}\) (Chapters 3-4).

About 9...\(\text{Qbd7}\) 10.\(\text{Qe3}\) – see 7...
\(\text{Qbd7}\) 8.\(\text{Qe3}\) ed 9.\(\text{Qd4}\) \(\text{Qe8}\) 10.f3.

Black has also tried in practice:

9...c5?! 10.\(\text{Qc2}\) \(\text{Qc6}\) 11.\(\text{Qg5}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) (It is better for Black here to follow with: 11...\(\text{Qb6}\) 12.\(\text{Qb1}\) \(\text{Qd4}\) 13.\(\text{Qxf6}\) \(\text{Qxf6}\) 14.\(\text{Qxd5}\) \(\text{Qxe2+}\) 15.\(\text{Qxe2}\) \(\text{Qd8}\) 16.\(\text{Qxf6+}\) \(\text{Qxf6}\) 17.\(\text{Qe3}\), although he will have great problems to create counterplay, because of the vulnerability of his d6-pawn.) 12.\(\text{Qd2}\) b6 13.\(\text{Qad1}\) \(\text{Qd8}\)? – This is a blunder in a very difficult position 14.\(\text{Qd5+}\) – Petters – Almand, corr. 2001;

9...\(\text{h6}\) 10.\(\text{Qe3}\) \(\text{Qbd7}\) (About 10...
\(\text{Qc6}\) – see 9...\(\text{Qc6}\) 10.\(\text{Qe3}\) h6.) 11.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qh7}\) 12.\(\text{Qad1}\) \(\text{Qc5}\), An.Mueller – Syed Nasir, Mamba 1991 and here after: 13.b4 \(\text{Qe6}\) 14.\(\text{Qb3}\), White deprives his opponent of any counterplay on the queenside;

9...\(\text{Qfd7}\) 10.\(\text{Qe3}\) c6 11.\(\text{Qd2}\) b6?! (That is a strange move, but even after: 11...\(\text{Qc5}\) 12.\(\text{Qfd1}\), White maintains a great advantage.) 12.\(\text{Qad1}\) a6 13.\(\text{Qb3}\) \(\text{Qe6}\) 14.\(\text{Qf4}\) and Black’s position was solid, but extremely passive in the game Williams – Ling, Email 2000;

In answer to 9...\(\text{Qe6}\), Szuveseg – Nemeth, Melbourne 2000, White’s simplest reaction is: 10.\(\text{Qxe6}\) \(\text{Qxe6}\) 11.\(\text{Qe3}\);

9...\(\text{a6}\) 10.\(\text{Qg5}\) \(\text{Qbd7}\) (After 10...
\(\text{h6}\), Susedik – Matusek, corr. 2001, it is good for White to continue with: 11.\(\text{Qe3}\) \(\text{Qbd7}\) 12.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qh7}\) 13.\(\text{Qad1}\) and he is dominant in the centre. It seems a bit strange for Black to play: 10...\(\text{Qd7}\)?! 11.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qc6}\) 12.\(\text{Qb3}\) \(\text{Qd8}\) 13.\(\text{Qad1}\) \(\text{Qe6}\) 14.\(\text{Qh6}\) \(\text{Qh8}\), Notarangelo – P.Smyth, corr. 2002 and here White obtains an overwhelming advantage by simply deploying his pieces in the centre with: 15.\(\text{Qe3}\) a5 16.\(\text{Qd4}\) \(\text{Qc5}\) 17.\(\text{Qd5}\),

9...\(\text{a5}\) – The basic drawback of that move is the weakening of the b5-square and that becomes quite important in case Black wishes to develop his knight to c6. 10.\(\text{Qg5}\) \(\text{h6}\) (Or 10...
\(\text{Qc6}\) 11.\(\text{Qdb5}\) \(\text{Qa7}\)!, Pedro – Pina, Maputo 1996, 12.\(\text{Qxa7}\) \(\text{Qxa7}\) 13.\(\text{c5}\) 11.\(\text{Qe3}\) \(\text{c6}\), Minaya – Walther, Tel Aviv 1964 (Or 11...
\(\text{Qc6}\), Loeffler – Henzner, Bad Wildungen 1998, 12.\(\text{Qdb5}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) 13.\(\text{Qh2}\) \(\text{Qh7}\) 14.\(\text{c5}\) \(\text{Qxc5}\) 15.\(\text{Qxc5}\) \(\text{Qe5}\) 16.\(\text{Qf2}\), 12.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qh7}\) 13.\(\text{Qc2}\) \(\text{Qa6}\) 14.\(\text{Qad1}\).

a) 9...\(\text{Qa6}\)

That move leads to original positions only very seldom.

10.\(\text{Qe3}\) \(\text{c6}\)

About 10...\(\text{Qc5}\) – see 7...
\(\text{Qbd7}\)
8.\textit{\&}e3 exd4 9.\textit{\&}xd4 \textit{\&}e8 10.f3 \textit{\&}c5.
\textbf{11.\textit{\&}d2 \textit{\&}c7}

About 11...\textit{\&}c5 – see 7...\textit{\&}bd7.

The move 11...d5?! opens files in the centre, but White is much better prepared for that: 12.cxd5 cxd5 13.e5! \textit{\&}d7 (After: 13...\textit{\&}xe5 14.\textit{\&}xa6 \textit{\&}xe3 15.\textit{\&}xe3 bxa6 16.\textit{\&}fe1\&, Black’s compensation for the exchange is obviously insufficient.) 14.f4 \textit{\&}b6 15.\textit{\&}db5 \textit{\&}f8 16.\textit{\&}ad1 \textit{\&}e6 17.\textit{\&}e1\& and Black’s pieces are terribly misplaced. Meanwhile, his d5-pawn is hanging all the time and additionally he must worry about the possibility of White transferring his queen to the g3-square with a powerful attack against his king, Burmakin – Candela Perez, Li- 
nares 2005.

After 11...\textit{\&}e7 12.\textit{\&}ad1 d5?! – Black has no other active play in sight, but still it would have been better for him to have remained passive (about 12...\textit{\&}c7 13.\textit{\&}g5 – see 11...\textit{\&}c7). 13.cxd5 cxd5, Sebenik – Ragger, Maribor 2003 and here the most energetic proof about the fact that Black has opened the centre prematurely is the line: 14.\textit{\&}db5! dxe4 (It is hardly any better for Black to defend with: 14...\textit{\&}d7 15.\textit{\&}d4 \textit{\&}e6 16.e5 \textit{\&}d7 17.f4\&) 15.\textit{\&}d6 \textit{\&}d8 16.fxe4 \textit{\&}e8 17.\textit{\&}g5 f6 18.\textit{\&}f4\& and the activity of White’s pieces provides him with a great advantage.

\textbf{12.\textit{\&}ad1 \textit{\&}e7}

Or 12...d5?! 13.cxd5 cxd5 14.\textit{\&}db5 \textit{\&}e6 15.e5 \textit{\&}d7 16.f4\& J.Me-

\textbf{13.\textit{\&}g5 \textit{\&}f8 14.\textit{\&}h1 h6 15.\textit{\&}e3}

Black has no active play and he is evidently reluctant to remain passive. His next move seems to be logical, but in fact it blunders a pawn. \textbf{15.\textit{\&}e6? 16.\textit{\&}f4 \textit{\&}ed8 17.\textit{\&}xe6 \textit{\&}xe6 18.\textit{\&}xd6 \textit{\&}e8 19.\textit{\&}e3\& Zlatilov – Magerramov, Andorra 1991. White’s position is winning and he only needs to play accurately.}

\textbf{b) 9...\textit{\&}d7}

Black is preparing to develop his knight to the c6-square and he wishes to avoid the possible compromising of his pawn structure after: 9...\textit{\&}c6 10.\textit{\&}xc6 (White is not forced to play like that, though...).
10.\textit{g}5 \textit{c}6

The other moves for Black seem to be less logical:

10...c6 11.\textit{w}d2 \textit{a}6 12.\textit{h}b3 \textit{b}b6+ 13.\textit{h}e3 \textit{c}7 14.\textit{a}d1±. He has serious problems with the protection of his d6-pawn and he failed to solve them in the game: 14...\textit{e}6 15.\textit{f}4 \textit{b}6+ 16.\textit{d}4 \textit{e}8 17.\textit{e}3+- and in order to avoid great material losses Black had to give up his important dark-squared bishop and that ended up the game rather quickly: 17...\textit{xd}4 18.\textit{xd}4 \textit{d}8 19.f4 \textit{e}7 20.f5 c5 21.\textit{h}2 gx\textit{f}5 22.\textit{w}g5+ 1–0 Veres – Radnoti, corr. 2002;

10...h6 11.\textit{e}3 \textit{c}6 12.\textit{w}d2 \textit{h}7 (After 12...\textit{xd}4 13.\textit{xd}4 \textit{e}7 14.\textit{a}d1±, White’s space advantage provided him with a stable edge.) 13.\textit{a}d1 a5, Wilhelms – Tomashewski, Email 2000 (Here, it was obligatory for Black to follow with: 13...\textit{xd}4 14.\textit{xd}4, but not 14...\textit{e}7, because of 15.c5±, but 14...b6! 15.\textit{d}5±) and now White obtains a great advantage with the standard maneuver: 14.\textit{d}b5! \textit{e}5 (The other possibilities for Black are hardly any better: 14...\textit{e}5 15.c5 dxc5 16.\textit{f}4±; 14...a4 15.c5 dxc5 16.\textit{xc}5 \textit{e}5 17.\textit{f}2±) 15.\textit{w}c1!?± and Black has great problems to oust White’s knight away from the b5-square and he has no active possibilities in sight. Meanwhile, Black must worry all the time about the possible opening of the d-file after c4-c5, as well as about the preparation by White.

to open the game in the centre and on the kingside with f3-f4. There are also lines in which the move \textit{d}5 might turn out to be rather unpleasant for Black.

11.\textit{c}2 \textit{h}6

12.\textit{h}4 \textit{e}5, Nathe – Foerster, Bad Wildungen 2000. Here, White could have enlarged his space advantage with the line: 13.\textit{f}4 \textit{c}6 14.\textit{e}3 \textit{c}8 15.\textit{f}3±. Black is now under a terrible positional bind and it is not easy for him to find not only an acceptable defensive plan, but even a single good move... For example, his attempt to fortify the d4-square after 15...\textit{h}7 16.\textit{ed}5, leads only to further improvement of White’s position.

c) 9...\textit{h}5
The threat of f7-f5, followed at an opportunity by f5-f4 with a mass offensive on the kingside, forces White's answer: 10.g4 \(\text{xf6}\)  

10...\(\text{xf6}\)?? – This move is a grave blunder. 11.d6b5+- Bernard – Ladisic, France 1991.  
The move 10...\(\text{xe5?!}\) is quite dubious too, despite the fact that Black managed to make a draw with it, since White entered without any reason the line: 11.gxh5?! 11...\(\text{xh2+}\) 12.gxh2 \(\text{h4+}\) with a perpetual check. Senff – De Gelia, Budapest 1998, but after: 11.f4! \(\text{xd4+}\) 12.\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 13.\(\text{d1}\), Black would have no compensation for his vulnerable dark squares on the kingside.

The ultra-active move – 10...c5 can lead Black after: 11.\(\text{f5}\) gxf5 12.gxh5 \(\text{c6}\) 13.\(\text{h1}\), into trouble. For example: 13...\(\text{h8}\) (White's attack develops very quickly too in case of: 13...\(\text{h6}\) 14.\(\text{g1}\) \(\text{h7}\) 15.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{f6}\) 16.\(\text{d5}\) \(\text{d4}\) 17.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{g8}\) 18.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{e5}\) 19.\(\text{xg7}\) + \(\text{xg7}\) 20.\(\text{g1}\) 1–0 Gleizerov – Arwanitäkos, Oberwart 1999.) 14.\(\text{g1}\) \(\text{d4}\) 15.\(\text{d5}\) \(\text{h6}\) 16.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{g8}\) 17.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{xe2}\) 18.\(\text{xe2}\) \(\text{e6}\) 19.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{h7}\) 20.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{xf5}\) 21.\(\text{xg7}\) +! \(\text{xg7}\) 22.\(\text{h6+}\) – and in the game van Wely – Fishbein, New York 1993, White won some moves later.  

11.\(\text{xe3}\)

In this situation, the move 11.\(\text{g5}\) is not so good for White, because of: 11...\(\text{h6}\) 12.\(\text{h4}\) \(\text{c6}\)! 13.\(\text{xh6}\) (If 13.\(\text{c2}\), then 13...\(\text{g5}\)! 14.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{h5}\) 15.\(\text{h3}\) \(\text{h7}\), with the idea to follow with \(\text{e5}\).) 13...\(\text{hxc6}\) 14.\(\text{c5}\) \(\text{g5}\) 15.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{d5}\) – and Black’s position is not worse at all, Ftacnik – Kovalev, Passau 1994.

The other development of the bishop – 11.\(\text{f4}\) is not so effective here, because of the absence of Black's pawn on c6: 11...\(\text{h5}\) 12.\(\text{c6}\) \(\text{hxc6}\) 13.\(\text{xc6}\) \(\text{bxc6}\) 14.\(\text{xd2}\) \(\text{b8}\) 15.\(\text{d1}\) \(\text{d7}\) 16.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{e7}\) 17.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{c5}\) 18.\(\text{c3}\) \(\text{d6}\) – with an approximate equality Ehlvest – Kovalev, Moscow 1994.

![Diagram](image)

Now, Black usually chooses between **c1**) 11...\(\text{h5}\) and **c2**) 11...\(\text{c6}\).

After: 11...\(\text{c6}\) 12.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{h5}\), KingLoek – argh, ICC 1994, contrary to variation **d1**, Black controls the d5-square, but his d6-pawn is weak and White can emphasize that with: 13.g5 \(\text{h7}\) 14.\(\text{c2}\).  

Or 11...\(\text{f7d7}\) 12.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{c6}\) 13.\(\text{ad1}\) \(\text{d5}\), Toikka – Houtsonen, Finland 1999, 14.\(\text{h1}\) – see 11... \(\text{d6}\) 12.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{d7}\) 13.\(\text{ad1}\) \(\text{d5}\) 14.\(\text{h1}\).  

**c1**) 11...\(\text{h5}\) 12.\(\text{g5}\)
In case of 12.h3, Black plays 12...\(c6\) and he transposes to variation c2, in which White’s move 12 is essentially a loss of time. After: 13.\(\mathcal{W}d2\) \(\mathcal{Q}d7\) 14.\(\mathcal{G}g2\) \(\mathcal{Q}c5\) 15.\(\mathcal{Q}xc6\) bxc6 16.\(\mathcal{W}ad1\) \(\mathcal{W}e7\)∞ there arises a complex position with mutual chances, Sandstrom – I. Sokolov, Limhamn 1993.

**12...\(\mathcal{Q}h7\) 13.\(\mathcal{W}d2\)!**

White continues the game ignoring the eventual material losses.

**13...\(\mathcal{Q}xg5?!\)**

Even if Black captures the pawn after the preliminary move 13...\(\mathcal{Q}h3\), Zhukova – Calotescu, Varna 2002, 14.\(\mathcal{W}fe1\)! (It is less precise for White to play 14.\(\mathcal{W}f2\), because of 12...\(\mathcal{Q}c6\)∞) 14...\(\mathcal{W}xd4\) (Black cannot avoid having to solve serious problems either with the line: 14...\(\mathcal{Q}xg5\) 15.\(\mathcal{Q}xg5\) \(\mathcal{W}xd4+\) 16.\(\mathcal{Q}h1!\)±) 15.\(\mathcal{W}xd4\) \(\mathcal{Q}xg5\) 16.\(\mathcal{Q}d5\) \(\mathcal{Q}d7\) 17.\(\mathcal{Q}h1\)∞ and White will have an excellent compensation, because of the vulnerable dark squares around Black’s king.

The situation is more or less similar after: 13...\(\mathcal{W}xd4\) 14.\(\mathcal{W}xd4\) \(\mathcal{Q}xg5\) 15.\(\mathcal{Q}h1\) \(\mathcal{Q}c6\) 16.\(\mathcal{W}d2\)∞.

It looks like Black’s relatively best decision here is 13...\(\mathcal{Q}c6\) and in that case after 14.\(\mathcal{Q}c2\), the game transposes to variation c2, which we will analyze a bit later.

**14.\(\mathcal{W}xg5\) \(\mathcal{W}xd4+\) 15.\(\mathcal{Q}h1\) \(\mathcal{W}f6\)**

If 15...f6, then 16.\(\mathcal{W}h4\)± and the pawn-shelter of Black’s king has been considerably compromised.

**16.\(\mathcal{Q}xf6\)!** White annihilates with that move one of the few defenders of the black king.

16...\(\mathcal{W}xf6\) 17.\(\mathcal{Q}d5\) \(\mathcal{W}d8\) 18.\(\mathcal{W}h6\) \(\mathcal{Q}e6\) (If 18...c6, then after 19.\(\mathcal{Q}g1\), the game might end with a checkmating attack: 19...\(\mathcal{Q}xd5\) 20.\(\mathcal{W}xg6+\) \(\mathcal{Q}xg6\) 21.\(\mathcal{W}xg6+\) \(\mathcal{Q}f8\) 22.\(\mathcal{W}h6+\) \(\mathcal{Q}f7\) 23.\(\mathcal{Q}g1\) \(\mathcal{Q}f6\) 24.\(\mathcal{W}h7+\) \(\mathcal{Q}e6\) 25.\(\mathcal{Q}xd5+\) \(\mathcal{Q}e5\) 26.\(\mathcal{W}e4\)#. In case of 18...\(\mathcal{Q}d7\), it is quite purposeful for White to follow with 19.f4 with the idea f4-f5.)

**19.\(\mathcal{Q}g1\) \(\mathcal{Q}xd5\) 20.\(\mathcal{W}xg6\)!!+- and White’s attack was decisive in the game Ruban – Poluljahov, Elista 1994.**

**c2) 11...\(\mathcal{Q}c6\) 12.\(\mathcal{W}d2\)**

**12...\(\mathcal{W}h5\)**

Black failed to obtain any counterplay after: 12...\(\mathcal{Q}xd4\) 13.
\( \text{xd4} \) c6 14.\text{e}d1 \text{w}a5 15.\text{g}2 \text{h}5 16.\text{b}4! \text{w}d8 17.\text{g}5 \text{h}7 18.\text{x}g7 \text{x}g7 19.\text{d}4+ \text{g}8 20.\text{f}4+-, since White controlled the whole board, while Black's knight was terribly misplaced on h7 and his d6-pawn was soon about to fall, Bergloef – Grehl, corr. 1994.

The line: 12...a6 13.\text{e}d1 \text{e}5, Ftacnik – Manion, Philadelphia 1993, enables White to begin aggressive actions on the kingside with: 14.\text{g}5 \text{h}5 15.\text{f}4! \text{g}4 16.\text{f}5! → and Black's defence is tremendously difficult, for example: 16...\text{x}f5 (or 16...\text{x}e3?!) 17.\text{w}e3 \text{e}5 18.\text{fx}g6 \text{fx}g6 19.\text{x}h5 \text{gx}h5 20.\text{d}5\text{±} 17.\text{x}f5 \text{gf}5 18.\text{d}4! \text{xd}4 19.\text{w}xd4 \text{w}xg5 (Black loses after: 19...\text{g}7? 20.\text{x}g4 \text{x}g5 21.\text{ex}f5 \text{h}5 22.\text{f}4+-) 20.\text{x}f5 \text{e}3+ 21.\text{x}e3 \text{xe}3 22.\text{h}5\text{±} and White's couple of light pieces should be stronger than Black's rook and pawn, due to the absence of passed pawns.

Black has a lot of problems to worry about after: 12...\text{d}7 13.\text{e}d1! (White can achieve much less with: 13.\text{c}2 \text{de}5 14.\text{d}5 \text{f}6 15.\text{e}d1 \text{f}7\text{±} Maric – Chiburdanidze, Novi Sad 1990.) 13...\text{e}5 (If 13...\text{xd}4, then after: 14.\text{x}d4 \text{e}5 15.\text{g}5 \text{h}3 16.\text{f}2 \text{f}6 17.\text{f}4 \text{d}7 18.\text{w}d3 \text{e}6 19.\text{h}4! \text{f}7 20.\text{h}3\text{±}, with the idea to follow with c4-c5, White had a great advantage in the game Schlosser – Werner, Germany 1991, 20...\text{w}e7 21.\text{b}5 \text{c}5 22.\text{x}f6 \text{xf}6 23.\text{xc}5 \text{xc}5 24.\text{e}5 \text{g}7 25.\text{e}7 \text{w}e6 26. \text{g}4\text{±;} Black has also tried in practice the move – 15...c5, but it weakens the central squares considerably: 16.\text{e}3 \text{e}6 17.\text{b}3 \text{c}6 18.\text{b}5 \text{h}3 19.\text{f}2 \text{d}4 and now Black loses his central pawn: 20.\text{xd}4 \text{xd}4 21.\text{f}1! \text{a}6 22.\text{x}d6 \text{xd}6 23.\text{xf}3 \text{c}5 – it is not any better for him to defend with: 23...\text{ad}8 24.\text{f}1 \text{e}6 25.\text{d}3\text{±}, since just like in the game, the presence of the opposite-coloured bishops on the board does not make the draw outcome of the game more likely, but just the opposite. Black's defence is even more difficult, because there are heavy pieces on the board and White's bishop is much more active – 24.\text{g}2 \text{f}5 25.\text{xf}6 \text{xf}6 26.\text{f}4 \text{d}3 27.\text{e}5 \text{h}4, Knudsen – Siigur, Email 2001 and here after: 28.\text{d}5\text{+} \text{g}7 29.\text{g}2 \text{xf}2 30.\text{x}f2 \text{x}f2+ 31.\text{xf}2\text{±}, White has already two pawns for the exchange and his bishop on d5 is quite powerful, so his compensation for the exchange is more than sufficient.) 14.\text{h}1 \text{xd}4 (14...\text{f}6 15.\text{d}5\text{±} Legky – Bennett, Geneva 1994) 15.\text{xd}4 \text{e}6 16.\text{b}3 \text{h}4, Predein – Voitsekhovsky, Podolsk 1993 and here it looks very strong for White to continue – 17.\text{d}5! with the following eventual developments: 17...\text{xd}5 18.\text{xd}5 \text{h}6 19.\text{f}2\text{±}; 17...\text{ac}8 18.\text{g}5! \text{c}6 (or 18...\text{d}7? 19.\text{f}2 \text{h}5 20.\text{h}4 \text{xd}5 21.\text{xd}5 \text{e}5 22.\text{f}4 \text{g}4 23.\text{f}3\text{±}!) 19.\text{f}6+ \text{xf}6 20.\text{xf}6\text{±}.

13.\text{g}5 \text{h}7
14. Ñc2!

It is less precise for White to play 14.f4, in view of: 14...Ñh3 15.Ñf2 f6!± and Black has some counterplay.

14...Ñh3

He has also tried in practice here: 14...Ñe5 15.Ñh1 Ñe6 16.b3 f6?! Black has no other active possibilities indeed, but that move can hardly be recommended, since now White's kingside initiative is extremely powerful. 17.gxf6 Ñxf6 18.Ñd4 Ñh3 19.Ñd5 Ñf7 20.Ñf2 c6 21.Ñf4 Ñd7 22.Ñg1 g5 23.Ñg2± Ev.Levin – Nozdrin, Satka 2005.

It seems too risky for Black to play: 14...Ñxc3 15.bxc3!, because his king becomes chronically vulnerable.

After 14...a5 15.Ñad1 a4 16.Ñh1! Ñe6 17.Ñg1! Ña5 (In case of 17...Ñc8, White continues in an analogous fashion – 18.Ña3.) 18.Ña3 b6 19.Ñd5 Ñb7 20.Ñb5!±, Black was helpless to defend his position on the queenside, Gleizerov – Kovalev, Skorping 1994.

15.Ñf2 a5

The move 15...Ñh8?! L.Mueller – Pace, Bled 2002, seems to be just a loss of time. After: 16.f4 Ñg4 17.Ñf1 Ñd7 18.Ñd4±, White is dominant in the centre and he has superior piece-coordination.

15...Ñe5 – After that move, Black must consider the possibility that White may advance his f-pawn at any moment. 16.Ñh1 c6 17.Ñd4 Ñf8, A.Danielian – Bitman, Moscow 1996 and White is perfectly prepared to assault Black's kingside: 18.f4 Ñd7 (18...Ñg4? 19.Ñf3--; 18...c5?! 19.Ñe3 Ñg4 20.Ñxg4 hxg4 21.f5±) 19.Ñd3 Ñg4 20.Ñxg4 hxg4 21.Ñd1± and Black's g4-pawn is weak and his pieces on the kingside are too passive.

It is too optimistic for Black to try: 15...Ñxc3 16.bxc3 Ñe5, van den Doel – Polzin, Dresden 1995, because that leads to weakening of the dark squares on the kingside and after: 17.Ñh1! Ñxg5 18.Ñg1, Black has problems to protect his king, for example: 18...f6 19.Ñb4 Ñxb4 20.cxb4; 18...Ñe6 19.f4 Ña5 (It is not better for Black to try: 19...Ñxe4 20.f5! Ñg7 21.fxg6 fxg6 22.Ñxg6±, because his extra pawn on the queenside can hardly be helpful in the defence of his bare king.) 20.f5 Ñf8 21.Ñg5±. White's compensation for the pawn is more than sufficient, because of the vulnerability of the dark squares around Black's king; 18...Ñh7 19.Ñb4= and Black's defence is quite problematic, for example: 19...Ña5 20.Ñd5 Ñe5 21.f4!? Ñg4 22.f5!→ This is White's most en-
ergetic reaction. His pieces are so active that he will soon regain his sacrificed material with interest: 22...\textit{Qxf2+} (After: 22...\textit{g5 23.Qf3 Qxe3 24.Qxh3 Qxd5 25.cxd5 We8 26.Qf3\pm, White regains his pawn and he maintains a powerful positional pressure on the kingside.) 23.Qxf2 Qg4 24.Qxg4 hxg4 25.fxg6 fxg6 26.Qxg4 g5 27.Qe3 Wf8 28.Wg2+-.

(diagram)

\textbf{16.Qh1 a4 17.Qg1 Qe5 18. Qd4 c5} (That move is forced, because of White's threat - f3-f4.) \textbf{19.Qe3 Qe6 20.Qa3 Wb6 21.Qd1\pm} Black's d6 and a4-pawns are very weak, as well as the b5 and d5-squares and his knight is too passive on the h7-square, therefore White has a stable advantage, I.Ivanisevic - Miljanic, Belgrade 1998.

\textbf{Conclusion}

We have analyzed some rarely played variations in this chapter. In variation a Black develops his knight on a6, after which the least of evils for him is to transpose to the system with 7...Qbd7, if he can do that. His attempts to try some original variations, which we have analyzed here, usually lead to passive positions with no good prospects for him. It is also illogical for him to play 9...Qd7 - variation b. GM D.Bronstein wrote back in the middle of the last century that the bishop on c8 is already a developed piece in the King's Indian Defence, so Black does not need to determine its placement so early. The deployment of that bishop to the d7-square has several definite drawbacks - it occupies a square, which is essential for the maneuvers of Black's knights; he is deprived of his typical plan, connected with c7-c6, because his d6-pawn becomes tremendously vulnerable after that; the exchange of his knight on b8 for White's knight on d4, which Black is planning, is prevented by his opponent with the simple retreat Qd4-c2 and Black's position is quite cramped after that, because he has only limited space. In general, Black then has no reasonable plan available.

Variation c is seemingly attractive, because White is forced to weaken his kingside. The other side of the coin is that Black loses two tempi for the maneuver 9...Qh5 and White obtains a great space advantage not only in the centre, but also on the kingside. His positional pluses turn into a dangerous kingside attack in many variations..
Chapter 2

1. \( \text{d}f3 \) \( \text{d}f6 \) 2. \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 3. \( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 4. \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 5. \( \text{d}4 \) 0–0 6. \( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 7.0–0 \( \text{exd}4 \) 8. \( \text{d}xd4 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 9. \( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \)

10. \( \text{h}1 \)

White can hardly avoid playing that useful prophylactic move.

Now, Black has plenty of interesting possibilities: a) 10... \( \text{d}5 \), b) 10... \( \text{a}6 \), c) 10... \( \text{a}6 \), d) 10... \( \text{b}d7 \) and e) 10... \( \text{h}5 \).

He has also tried in practice:

10... \( \text{h}6 \)?! 11. \( \text{c}2 \) \( \text{a}6 \) (It is not better for Black to play: 11... \( \text{e}6 \) 12. \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{h}7 \) 13. \( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 14. \( \text{ad}1 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 15. \( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 16. \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 17. \( \text{f}4 \), because White preserves excellent attacking chances, Nguyen Thi – Huang Qian, Chennai 2001.) 12. \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 13. \( \text{d}2 \) \( g5 \) 14. \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 15. \( \text{ad}1 \) \( \text{Ovsejevitsch – A.Khudyakov}, \text{Alushta 2002} \).

10... \( \text{e}5 \)?! – This move is evidently premature. Hell – Moeldner, Germany 2003, after: 11. \( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{bd}7 \) 12. \( \text{c}2 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 13. \( \text{d}2 \), Black’s active rook is not supported by the rest of his pieces;

10...a5 11. \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{h}6 \) (About 11... \( \text{bd}7 \) 12. \( \text{wd}2 \) – see 10... \( \text{bd}7 \)
11. \( \text{g}5 \) a5 12. \( \text{wd}2 \).) 12. \( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{bd}7 \) 13. \( \text{f}2 \) – see 10... \( \text{bd}7 \) 11. \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{h}6 \) 12. \( \text{h}4 \) a5 13. \( \text{f}2 \).

a) 10... \( \text{d}5 \) 11. \( \text{cxd}5 \) \( \text{cxd}5 \) 12. \( \text{g}5 ! \)

Black has accomplished a pawn-break in the centre, but his pieces are not well developed and that proves that the opening of the game is favourable for White.

12... \( \text{dxe}4 \)

12... \( \text{xb}6 \)?! – Now, Black loses at least a pawn. 13. \( \text{db}5 \) \( \text{d}7 \) (It is not any better for him to defend with: 13... \( \text{dxe}4 \) 14. \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{xf}6 \) 15. \( \text{d}5 \), or 13... \( \text{a}6 \) 14. \( \text{exd}5 \) 14. \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{xb}5 \) 15. \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{Ritvin – Mahia}, \text{Internet 2003} \).

12... \( \text{h}6 \)?! – Black remains a pawn down after that move too. 13. \( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{xf}6 \) 14. \( \text{db}5 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 15. \( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{wd}8 \) (The other possibilities are not any better for Black: 15... \( \text{xb}2 \) 16. \( \text{b}1 \) \( \text{xa}2 \) 17. \( \text{bc}7 \), 16... \( \text{e}5 \) 17. \( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{xe}4 \) 18. \( \text{f}3 \); it seems more aggressive
7.0-0 ed 8.\(\text{Q}d\text{x}d\text{4} \text{E}e\text{8} 9.f3 c6 10.\text{Q}h1

for Black to play: 15...\text{Q}h4 16.\text{Q}d2 \text{e}5 17.\text{Q}d6 \text{h}5 18.\text{Q}f4\text{+} and here Black loses after the seemingly active move 18...\text{Q}e5?, because of: 19.\text{Q}xh4 \text{E}xh4 20.\text{Q}xc8 \text{Q}xh2 21.g3 \text{Q}xg3\text{+} 22.\text{Q}g2\text{+-} 16.\text{Q}c1 \text{Q}xb2 17.\text{Q}c2 \text{e}5 18.f4\text{+-} Andruet – Lenchner, New York 1987.

After the move 12...\text{Q}c6, White settles the issue of the winner of the opening fight with another pin: 13.\text{Q}b5 \text{W}b6 (Black has no compensation for the exchange after: 13...\text{Q}e5?! 14.\text{Q}f4 \text{Q}h5 15.\text{Q}xe5 \text{Q}xe5 16.\text{Q}d6\text{2\text{+}} Gnuşarev – Siu-

niakov, Prokojevsk 1997; it is also too dubious for him to play: 13...\text{Q}d6?! 14.exd5 \text{Q}xd4?! 15.\text{Q}xd4 \text{Q}d7 16.\text{Q}ad1\text{+} and White remains with an extra central pawn. It is better for Black to try here: 14...

\text{Q}xd5 15.\text{Q}xc6 bxc6? 16.\text{Q}xd5 1–0 Lazarev – X.Hoffmann, Cux-

haven 1992, 15.\text{Q}xc3 16.\text{Q}xa7! \text{Q}xb2 17.\text{Q}xe8! \text{Q}xa7! 18.\text{Q}b1 \text{g}7 19.\text{Q}d2\text{+}, but his compensation for the exchange is insufficient even then.) 14.\text{Q}xc6 bxc6 15.\text{Q}xf6 \text{Q}xf6 16.\text{Q}xd5! cxd5 17.\text{Q}xe8\text{+} Ein-

That is White’s most energetic answer and it possibly refutes Black’s idea.

White plays often in practice: 13.fxe4 h6 (It is unacceptable for
Black to try 13...\text{Q}bd7, because of: 14.\text{Q}db5 \text{e}5 – the game ended
rather quickly after: 14...h6 15.\text{Q}h4 g5 16.\text{Q}g3 \text{Q}xe4 17.\text{Q}xe4 \text{Q}xe4
18.\text{Q}h5! \text{e}7 19.\text{Q}c7 \text{b}8 20.\text{Q}d5 and Black resigned, Ikonnikov
– Haak, Vilissingen 1998 – 15.\text{Q}f4!
\text{Q}xe4 16.\text{Q}xe5 \text{Q}xe5 17.\text{Q}xe4 \text{W}h4,
Tal – Spassky, Montreal 1979 and here, White’s simplest line would have been: 18.g3!? \text{W}xe4+ 19.\text{Q}f3\text{+} and Black would have unsuffi-
cient compensation for the sacrificed material. White maintains a great advantage too after: 15...
\text{Q}c5 16.e5 \text{Q}e8 17.\text{Q}e4\text{+}) 14.\text{Q}h4?! (Black can preserve the equality with only moves, literally balanc-
ing at the edge of the precipice, in case of: 14.\text{Q}xf6. After: 14...\text{Q}xf6
15.\text{Q}c4 \text{Q}f8! 16.\text{Q}d5 \text{Q}g7 17.e5?! \text{Q}xe5 18.\text{Q}e1 \text{Q}d7?! 19.\text{Q}c1 \text{Q}h8!
20.\text{Q}b3 \text{Q}g7! 21.\text{Q}c7 \text{b}8 22.\text{Q}f3, in the game Spraggett – Ho Van
Hythyn, Manila 1992, Black could have saved the day with: 22...\text{Q}b6!
23.\text{Q}xd8 \text{Q}xd8=; White obtains no advantage with: 16.\text{Q}db5 \text{Q}c6
17.\text{Q}d6, Taimanov – Estevez Mor-

ales, Brno 1975, in view of 17...
\text{Q}g7! and Black’s dark-squared bishop is so powerful, having no opponent, that he manages to
hold the position thanks to it.) 14...g5 15.\text{Q}g3 \text{Q}c6 (Black only transposes to the main line with:

13.\text{Q}db5!
15...\(\text{Qxe4}\) 16.\(\text{Qxe4 Qxe4}\) – it would not work for him to play 16...\(\text{Qxd4}\), because of: 17.\(\text{Qd6}\) 18.\(\text{Qf8}\) 19.\(\text{Qxf8+}\) 20.\(\text{Qxd4}\) 21.\(\text{Qf1}\) 22.\(\text{Qxb7}\) ± R. Hernandez - A. Ibanez, Mislata 1999 – 17.\(\text{Qb5}\) 18.\(\text{Qxd1}\) \(\text{Qc6}\) 19.\(\text{Qf3}\) – see 15...\(\text{Qc6}\).) 16.\(\text{Qdb5}\) \(\text{Qxe4}\) 17.\(\text{Qxe4}\) \(\text{Qxe4}\) 18.\(\text{Qf3}\) (After the immediate exchange of queens with: 18.\(\text{Qxd8+}\) 19.\(\text{Qxd8}\) \(\text{Qf3}\) 20.\(\text{Qc7}\) 21.\(\text{Qb8}\) 22.\(\text{Qd1}\) \(\text{Qg4}\) 23.\(\text{Qxg4}\) \(\text{Qxg4}\) 23.\(\text{Qd5}\), in the game Plachetka – Ac, Cappelle la Grande 1991, Black could have held the position by a thread with the line: 23...\(\text{Qa8}\) 24.\(\text{Qf6}\) 25.\(\text{Qxf6}\) \(\text{Qe6}\) 26.\(\text{Qd7}\) \(\text{Qd8}\) 27.\(\text{Qxd7}\) \(\text{Qd1+}\) 28.\(\text{Qf1}\) \(\text{Qc4}\)=) 18.\(\text{Qxd1}\) 19.\(\text{Qxd1}\) \(\text{Qa4}\)!. That is the only move for Black that enables him to prolong the resistance...

In the game Sulava – Gaido, Montecatini Terme 1994, after: 19...\(\text{Qe8}\)? 20.\(\text{Qc7}\) +, everything was over rather quickly. 20.\(\text{Qc7}\) \(\text{Qb8}\) 21.\(\text{Qd5}\) \(\text{Qg4}\) 22.\(\text{Qxh7+}\) \(\text{Qh8}\) 23.\(\text{Qde1}\) + – and White’s pieces are evidently more active than their counterparts.

13...\(\text{Qbd7}\)

The game was swiftly over after: 13...\(\text{Qxd1}\)? 14.\(\text{Qxd1}\) \(\text{Qa6}\) 15.\(\text{fxe4}\) \(\text{Qh5}\) (White wins at least the exchange after: 15...\(\text{Qg4}\) 16. \(\text{Qd6+}\) – Pogorelov – Riveiro, San Sebastian 1999.) 16.\(\text{Qd6}\) 17.\(\text{Qxc3}\) 17. \(\text{Qxe8}\) 1–0 Vogt – Barczay, Trnava 1982.

14.\(\text{Qd6}\) \(\text{Qf8}\) 15.\(\text{fxe4}\) \(\text{h6}\) 16. \(\text{Qh4}\) \(\text{g5}\)

It all might end in a flash too after: 16...\(\text{Wb6}\) 17.\(\text{e5}\) \(\text{Qh7}\) 18.\(\text{Qd5}\) \(\text{Wxb2}\), because of: 19.\(\text{Qb1}\) \(\text{Wa3}\) 20.\(\text{Qe7+}\) \(\text{Qh8}\) 21.\(\text{e6}\)+–.

17.\(\text{Qg3}\) ± and Black has plenty of problems to worry about.

b) 10...\(\text{Qa6}\)

This development of the knight is aimed exclusively at the preparation of the pawn-break in the centre d6-d5 and it reduces Black's possibilities to play on the flanks of the board.

11.\(\text{Qg5}\)

It also deserves attention for White to play here 11.\(\text{Qe3}\)!, for example: 11...\(\text{Qc7}\) (The immediate move 11...\(\text{d5}\) !, would not work here, because of: 12.\(\text{cx}d5\) \(\text{Qxd5}\) 13.\(\text{exd5}\) \(\text{Qxe3}\) 14.\(\text{Qxa6}\) \(\text{bxa6}\)
15.\textit{\texttt{x}}c6 \textit{\texttt{e}}8 16.\textit{\texttt{w}}d2± Bogdanovski – Jacimovic, Skopje 1991.) 12. \textit{\texttt{w}}d2 and here after 12...d5, Black had difficulties after: 13.cxd5 cxd5 14.\textit{\texttt{d}}b5 \textit{\texttt{x}}b5 15.\textit{\texttt{x}}b5 \textit{\texttt{d}}7 16.\textit{\texttt{x}}d7 \textit{\texttt{w}}xd7 17.exd5 b5 18.\textit{\texttt{x}}d4 a5 19.\textit{\texttt{f}}ac1 \textit{\texttt{a}}6 20.\textit{\texttt{x}}xf6 \textit{\texttt{x}}xf6 21. \textit{\texttt{e}}e4±, in the game Neverov – Sokolin, USSR 1991.

11...h6

Black cannot equalize after his other possibilities either, for example:

11...c7 12.\textit{\texttt{w}}d2 d5 13.cxd5 cxd5 14.\textit{\texttt{d}}b5! \textit{\texttt{x}}b5 (It is not any better for him to try: 14...\textit{\texttt{d}}e6 15.\textit{\texttt{x}}xf6 \textit{\texttt{x}}xf6 16.\textit{\texttt{x}}d5± and White remains with a solid extra pawn. Black's attempt to regain his material leads him to a swift demise after: 16...\textit{\texttt{x}}xb2 17.\textit{\texttt{x}}xb2 \textit{\texttt{a}}xb2 18.\textit{\texttt{a}}ab1 \textit{\texttt{e}}5 19.f4+–) 15.\textit{\texttt{a}}xb5 \textit{\texttt{d}}7 16.\textit{\texttt{x}}d7 \textit{\texttt{w}}xd7 17.\textit{\texttt{x}}fx6 \textit{\texttt{x}}xf6 18.\textit{\texttt{x}}d5± and Black had no compensation for the pawn and he lost quickly after: 18...\textit{\texttt{d}}8 19. \textit{\texttt{a}}ac1 \textit{\texttt{g}}7 20.\textit{\texttt{c}}c7 \textit{\texttt{e}}5 21.\textit{\texttt{x}}xb7 1–0 Vanttaja – Karttunen, corr. 1992;

11...\textit{\texttt{a}}a5 12.\textit{\texttt{f}}4! (White must be very careful, because after the standard move 12.\textit{\texttt{w}}d2?, Black can exploit tactically the placement of White's bishop on g5 with the help of the line: 12...\textit{\texttt{x}}xe4! 13.\textit{\texttt{x}}xe4 \textit{\texttt{x}}d4 14.\textit{\texttt{x}}xd4 \textit{\texttt{x}}g5±.) 12...d5 (It is even worse for Black to play here: 12...\textit{\texttt{e}}8 13.\textit{\texttt{b}}b3 \textit{\texttt{b}}b6, Grebionkin – Siepelt, Internet 2003, after: 14.\textit{\texttt{x}}d6 c5 15.\textit{\texttt{e}}5 \textit{\texttt{e}}8 16.\textit{\texttt{d}}5±, or: 14...\textit{\texttt{e}}8 15.\textit{\texttt{a}}4 \textit{\texttt{e}}3 16.\textit{\texttt{f}}4± Black has no compensation for the pawn. The other possible retreats of his queen would not help either: 13...\textit{\texttt{c}}c7 14.c5±; 13...\textit{\texttt{h}}5 14.e5 \textit{\texttt{d}}d7 15.exd6±) 13.cxd5 cxd5 14.\textit{\texttt{b}}5 \textit{\texttt{d}}8 15.e5 \textit{\texttt{h}}5 16.\textit{\texttt{g}}5 f6 (\textit{\texttt{a}}ut not 16...\textit{\texttt{x}}xe5?, because of: 17.\textit{\texttt{b}}3 \textit{\texttt{w}}b4 18.\textit{\texttt{x}}d5+- Tratar – Drozdov, Bled 1994.) 17.\textit{\texttt{e}}xf6 \textit{\texttt{f}}6 (In answer to 17...\textit{\texttt{x}}xf6, S.Savchenko – Drozdov, Vienna 1995, White's simplest road to obtaining the advantage is to win a pawn with the line: 18.\textit{\texttt{x}}xf6 \textit{\texttt{x}}xf6 19.\textit{\texttt{b}}3 \textit{\texttt{b}}b6 20.\textit{\texttt{x}}d5 \textit{\texttt{e}}6 21.\textit{\texttt{x}}fx6+ \textit{\texttt{w}}xf6 22.\textit{\texttt{e}}2+) 18.\textit{\texttt{x}}xf6 \textit{\texttt{x}}xf6 19.\textit{\texttt{e}}1± and White's advantage is beyond any doubt.

Black is bound to remain in a very passive position after: 11...\textit{\texttt{e}}5 12.\textit{\texttt{w}}d2 \textit{\texttt{b}}6 (His defence is very difficult too in case of: 12...\textit{\texttt{f}}8 13.\textit{\texttt{e}}ad1 \textit{\texttt{c}}7 14.\textit{\texttt{f}}4 \textit{\texttt{f}}5? 15.\textit{\texttt{x}}xe5 dxe5 16.\textit{\texttt{b}}3 \textit{\texttt{e}}6 17.\textit{\texttt{w}}d6 \textit{\texttt{h}}f4 18.\textit{\texttt{x}}xf8+ \textit{\texttt{x}}xf8 19.g3±, because his compensation for the exchange is evidently insufficient, Kamp – Hausner, Muenster 1992; about 12...\textit{\texttt{c}}5 13.\textit{\texttt{f}}4 – see variation d1.) 13.\textit{\texttt{e}}3 \textit{\texttt{c}}7 14.\textit{\texttt{c}}ac1 \textit{\texttt{d}}7 15.\textit{\texttt{f}}4 \textit{\texttt{e}}8 16.\textit{\texttt{b}}3± Manion – Olesen, Chicago 1994, or in case of: 11...\textit{\texttt{c}}5 12.\textit{\texttt{w}}d2 (White's domination along the c1-h6 diagonal, hampers Black's possible counterplay considerably.) 12...\textit{\texttt{b}}6 (The move 12...\textit{\texttt{a}}5?!., Facchini – Porter, Mamba 1991, enables White to open favourably the a-file: 13.\textit{\texttt{b}}3 \textit{\texttt{x}}b3 14.axb3 \textit{\texttt{b}}b4 15.\textit{\texttt{e}}3. Now, Black loses his.
queen after the careless move: 15...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxb3?}}} 16.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qa4+-,}}}, but even after: 15...d5 16.cxd5 cxd5 17.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Nb5+}}}, he fails to maintain the material balance.

Black cannot equalize with: 12...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qa5}}}, 13.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Rd1}}}, a4 14.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Ne1}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qa5}}}, 15.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Nf4}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qf8}}}, 16.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qc2}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qe6}}}, 17.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxd6}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qd8}}}, 18.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qd5}}}, cxd5?! 19.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxa5}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Nxa5}}}, 20.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qc7}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qa8}}}, 21.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxd8}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxd8}}}, 22.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxd5}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qd7}}}, 23.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qe5}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qh5}}}, 24.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qg3+}}}, Pelletier – G.Hernandez, Villarrobledo 2000, but of course it would have been better for him to play: 18...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxd5}}}, 19.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxa5}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxa5}}}, 20.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qg3}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qa8}}}, 21.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxd5}}}, cxd5 22.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qd4+}}}, although even then White remains with a powerful bishop pair and that provides him with a slight, but stable advantage.

After: 12...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qc7}}}, 13.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qad1}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qe6}}}, 14.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qfe1}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qad8}}}, 15.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qf4}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qe7}}}, Schulte – Walther, Nord Baden 1997, White could have occupied an additional space on the queenside with: 16.b4 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qa6}}}, 17.b5 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qb8}}}, 18.a4+), 13.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Rab1}}}, a5, 14.b3 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qh5}}}, 15.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qfd1}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qb4}}}, 16.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qe3}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qe5}}}, (Black’s pieces are tied up on the queenside and after 16...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qe6}}}, White settles the issue with the simple move 17.a3!+– Damaso – Quadrrio, Loures 1998.) 17.a3 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qb6}}}, (if 17...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxa3}}}, then 18.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qc2}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxb3}}}, 19.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qe1+}}}–) 18.b4+ and Black cannot avoid losing material. White’s method of squeezing Black’s pieces on the queenside is quite instructive.

12.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qe3}}}, d5

Black comes under a power-ful positional bind in case of: 12.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qc7}}}, 13.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qd2}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qh7}}}, 14.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qfd1+}}}.

13.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxd5}}}, cxd5

The other possible capture here – 13...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxd5}}} is even worse, because of: 14.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxd5}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxe3}}}, 15.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxa6}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{bxa6}}}, 16.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxc6}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qb6}}}, 17.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qd2}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qe8}}}, 18.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qe4}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qd7}}}, 19.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qac1+}}}, and White remained with a positional and material advantage too in the game Neverov – Razmyslov, Simferopol 1991.

14.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qxa6}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{bxa6}}}, 15.e5 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qd7}}}, 16.f4

This move is with the idea for White to follow with: 16.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qa4}}}, b3 and \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qc1}}}. 16...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qb6}}}, 17.b3, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qb7}}}, 18.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qc1}}}, 19.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qg4}}}, \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qd7}}}, 20.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{Qg3+}}}, Eingorn – Vaganian, Lviv 1984. Black’s pieces are quite restricted on both sides of the board and he must watch carefully about the possible pawn-break by White – f4-f5.

c) 10...a6

Black is planning to create some counterplay on the queenside by advancing b7-b5; meanwhile he will use his knight on b8 to protect his c6-pawn.
11.\textit{g5}

That is White's most principled way to fight for the advantage.

It is insufficient for him to play 11.\textit{c2} – with the idea to restrict the mobility of Black's queen knight. After: 11...\textit{e6} 12.\textit{g5} (It is not good for White to play 12.\textit{f4}, because of: 12...\textit{d5} 13.\textit{exd5} \textit{cxd5} 14.\textit{xd4} \textit{c8! =} and Black equalizes.) 12...\textit{h6} 13.\textit{f4} \textit{d5} 14.\textit{exd5} \textit{cxd5} 15.\textit{xd4} \textit{c8} 16.\textit{wd2}, Sakaev – V.Zaitsev, St Petersburg 1999 and Black obtains an excellent game following GM Huzman's recommendation – 16...\textit{dxc4}! 17.\textit{ad1} (In answer to 17.\textit{xc4}, it is good for Black to continue with: 17...\textit{h5} 18.\textit{ad1} \textit{xd4} 19.\textit{wd4} \textit{xd4} 20.\textit{xd4} \textit{c6} 21.\textit{xe4} \textit{xe4} 22.\textit{fxe4} \textit{xf4} 23.\textit{xe4} \textit{e5! =}, White's attempt to prevent entering that endgame with 17.\textit{e3?!}, can be countered effectively by Black with the line: 17...\textit{xe3}! 19.\textit{xe3} \textit{xd4} 20.\textit{ad1} \textit{c6} 21.\textit{xd6} \textit{xf6+) 17...\textit{g5!} 18.\textit{xb8} \textit{xb8} 19.\textit{xc4} \textit{b5} 20.\textit{b3} \textit{b7! =.}

I would like to add that in case of 11.\textit{b3}, Black defends quite successfully with: 11...\textit{b5} 12.\textit{f4} \textit{f8} 13.\textit{c5} \textit{d5} 14.\textit{g5} \textit{a7!} 15.\textit{ec1} \textit{e7} 16.\textit{f4} \textit{e6} 17.\textit{d4} \textit{d7} 18.\textit{exd5} \textit{xd5=} Ftacnik – Piket, Groningen 1992.

11...\textit{h6}

It is worse for Black to continue with: 11...\textit{a5} 12.\textit{f4} \textit{d5}, Jelen – Luizar, Bled 1993 (After: 12...\textit{d8} 13.\textit{wd2} \textit{h5} 14.\textit{b3} \textit{wc7} 15.\textit{g5±}, Black has problems with the protection of his d6-pawn and the development of his queenside.) and here after: 13.\textit{b3!} \textit{d8} 14.\textit{cxd5} \textit{cxd5} 15.\textit{g5!} \textit{h6} 16.\textit{h4±}, opening of the centre turns out to be in favour of White, because of his superior development.

11...\textit{b5}, Rodenas – Wicklund, corr. 1998, 12.\textit{c2} \textit{e6} (Black's compensation for the sacrificed pawn is evidently insufficient after: 12...\textit{b4!} 13.\textit{xb4} \textit{a5} 14.\textit{xf6} \textit{xf6} 15.\textit{a4!} 13.\textit{c5} \textit{h6} 14.\textit{h4 – see 11...\textit{h6} 12.\textit{h4} \textit{b5} 13.\textit{c2} \textit{e6} 14.\textit{c5}.}

12.\textit{h4} \textit{bd7}

In answer to 12...\textit{b5}, White has the powerful argument: 13.\textit{c2!} \textit{e6}, R.Popov – Nevostruzhev, Novosibirsk 1999 (After 13...\textit{a7} 14.\textit{f4} \textit{d7} 15.\textit{xb5} \textit{axb5} 16.\textit{f3} \textit{wc7} 17.\textit{c1+}, Black's queenside pieces are deployed so passively that he cannot obtain a sufficient counterplay, Sousa – Grassi, Bled 2002; Black has also tried in practice 13...\textit{b7}, Estevez Morales – J.Diaz, Cienfuegos 1975 and it is quite interesting for White to try here: 14.\textit{c5!} \textit{d5} 15.\textit{a4!} and he maintains a dangerous posi-
tional pressure on the queenside. It is not any better for Black to defend with: 14...g5 15.\textit{xf2} dxc5 16.\textit{xf3} cxd1 17.\textit{xf3} d1= where and here it deserves attention for White to continue with: 14.c5!? g5 15.\textit{xf2} dxc5 (It is worse for Black to play: 15...d5 16.a4! dxe4 17.axb5 \textit{xd1} 18.\textit{xd1} b3 19.\textit{xf2} c5 20.\textit{xc2} e3 21.\textit{g3} cxb5 22.\textit{xb5} \textit{c8} 23.\textit{e2}±, because White has a stable advantage in that open position, thanks to his powerful bishop pair.) 16.\textit{xc5} \textit{bd7} 17.\textit{xf} c5 18.\textit{xe} 3 \textit{e} 5 19.a4±.

13.\textit{xc} 2

In case of 13.\textit{xc} 1 \textit{e} 5 14.\textit{xc} 2 (If 14.b4, then Black reacts in an analogous fashion: 14...g5 15.\textit{xf2} b5 16.cxb5 axb5=.) 14...g5 (Black has fortified the placement of his knight on e5 and he is preparing the freeing move – b7-b5.) 15.\textit{xf2} \textit{e} 6 16.b3 b5 17.cxb5 axb5 18.\textit{d2} d5 19.exd5 \textit{xd} 5= and Black realized his main plan and he equalized in the game I.Novikov – Yermolinsky, Vilnius 1984.

13...\textit{c} 7

After 13...\textit{b} 6=, Black fails to push d6-d5 under favourable circumstances and that proves that his knight is not well placed on b6. 14.\textit{ad1} \textit{c} 7, Verhoeven – Königs, Den Bosch 1992 and here it is worth for White to accomplish the regrouping of his pieces: 15.\textit{d2} \textit{fd} 7 16.\textit{f} d2 \textit{e} 5 17.b3±, followed by the preparation of the active pawn-break – f2-f4.

In case of: 13...\textit{e} 5 14.\textit{ad1} g5 15.\textit{f2} \textit{d} 7, Krivoshey – N.Maiorov, Prievidza 1998, White’s pieces are deployed more harmoniously and opening of the d-file will simply increase his advantage: 16.\textit{b} 3 \textit{c} 7 (or 16...\textit{e} 6 17.c5 d5 18.\textit{d} 4=) 17.c5 dxc5 (After: 17...\textit{d} 8= 18.cxd6 \textit{xd6} 19.\textit{f} 4 \textit{gxf} 4 20.\textit{d} 2 \textit{e} 6 21.\textit{c} 5=, Black’s defence against the oncoming attack would be tremendously difficult, because of his bare king.) 18.\textit{xc} 5=.

14.\textit{ad1} b5 15.cxb5 \textit{bc} 5 16.\textit{d} 2

After: 16.\textit{g} 3 b4 17.\textit{a} 4 \textit{xc} 2 18.\textit{xc} 2 d5= Korchnoi – Yermolinsky, Lucerne 1997, Black managed to equalize.

16...\textit{d} 7

If 16...b4, then after 17.\textit{a} 4 d5=, it is rather dubious for White to follow with 18.exd5=, in view of 18...\textit{d} 7= and he must play accurately to reach equality. Still, after 18.\textit{xb} 4=, it would not be easy for Black to obtain enough counter chances, for example: 18...\textit{b} 8 19.\textit{a} 3 dxe4 20.\textit{g} 3; or 18...\textit{dxe} 4 19.\textit{fxe} 4 \textit{b} 7 (It is too bad for Black to play: 19...\textit{xe} 4? 20.\textit{xf} 7=; It is not better for Black to defend with: 19...\textit{xe} 4 20.\textit{g} 3, or 19...\textit{b} 7 20.\textit{g} 3 \textit{e} 5 21.\textit{c} 5=) 20.\textit{a} 3! \textit{xe} 4 (After: 20...\textit{g} 5 21.\textit{e} 1 \textit{dxe} 4 22.\textit{f} 5= and the material is equal indeed, but Black’s kingside is visibly compromised.) 21.\textit{xf} 7 \textit{d} 5! 22.\textit{xd} 7 \textit{xd} 7 23.\textit{b} 6= White has ended up with a solid extra pawn.

d) 10...\textbf{\textit{bd7}}

\textbf{11.}\textbf{\textit{g5}}

White's main plan here remains the same – he wishes to restrict the mobility of Black's pieces.

Now, Black must choose between the following possibilities:

\textbf{d1) 11...\textbf{\textit{e5}}}, \textbf{\textit{d2) 11...\textbf{\textit{wa5}}}}, \textbf{\textit{d3) 11...\textbf{\textit{h6}}}}, \textbf{\textit{d4) 11...\textbf{\textit{a5}}}} and \textbf{\textit{d5) 11...\textbf{\textit{wb6}}}}.

About 11...\textbf{\textit{c5}} 12.\textbf{\textit{wd2}} – see 10...\textbf{\textit{a6}} 11.\textbf{\textit{g5}} \textbf{\textit{c5}}.

The other lines for Black are evidently worse and that is the reason that they are only seldom played:

\textbf{d1) 11...\textbf{\textit{e5}}}

That move looks a bit awkward.

\textbf{12.}\textbf{\textit{wd2}}!

That is the best for White.

Black can counter 12.\textbf{\textit{f4}} with 12...\textbf{\textit{h5}}! and here if 13.\textbf{\textit{xe5}}?! (White can show here some restraint with: 13.\textbf{\textit{e3}} \textbf{\textit{e8}} 14.\textbf{\textit{f2}}± and he would still maintain some edge.), then after: 13...\textbf{\textit{xe5}} 14.\textbf{\textit{g3}} \textbf{\textit{xc3}}+ 15.\textbf{\textit{hxc3}} \textbf{\textit{g3}} 16.\textbf{\textit{g2}} \textbf{\textit{g5}} 17.\textbf{\textit{h1}} \textbf{\textit{f4}}+ 18.\textbf{\textit{f1}} \textbf{\textit{e5}}→, Black maintains a powerful attack against his opponent's king.

\textbf{12...\textbf{\textit{c5}}}


It is hardly any better for Black to try: 12...\textbf{\textit{b6}} 13.\textbf{\textit{e3}} \textbf{\textit{c5}} 14.\textbf{\textit{c2}} \textbf{\textit{c7}} 15.\textbf{\textit{ad1}} \textbf{\textit{f8}} 16.\textbf{\textit{b4}} \textbf{\textit{cd7}}, Friedrichs – Klasmeier, Germany 2002, because here White can accomplish a favourable regrouping of his forces with: 17.\textbf{\textit{f4}} \textbf{\textit{e6}} 18.\textbf{\textit{ad4}} \textbf{\textit{e8}} 19.\textbf{\textit{db3}}±.

\textbf{13.}\textbf{\textit{f4}} \textbf{\textit{e8}} 14.\textbf{\textit{ad1}} \textbf{\textit{h5}} 15.\textbf{\textit{g5}} \textbf{\textit{f6}} 16.\textbf{\textit{e3}}±

(diagram)

Black's position is rather
cramped and he has problems finding good squares for his pieces. After the careless move 16...\texttt{g7?!}, he was punished with the standard tactical strike – 17.\texttt{xc6}! and he lost the game, Shetoperov – Mirzahodjaev, USSR 1989.

\textbf{d2) 11...\texttt{a5}}

\textbf{12.\texttt{e3}}

It is not good for White to play here: 12.\texttt{h4} \texttt{h5} 13.f4, due to: 13...\texttt{xf4}! 14.\texttt{xf4} \texttt{e5} and he should better repeat moves with 15.\texttt{f5} (Otherwise after: 15.\texttt{db5} \texttt{xf4} 16.\texttt{g3} \texttt{e3} 17.\texttt{c7} \texttt{xc3} 18. \texttt{bxc3}, M.Makarov – Khasanov, USSR 1987, Black could have obtained the advantage with the help of: 18...\texttt{xe4}! 19.\texttt{f3} \texttt{b8=}) 15...\texttt{xf4} 16.\texttt{g3} \texttt{g5} 17.\texttt{h4=}.

After 12.\texttt{f4} \texttt{e5} 13.\texttt{d2} a6 14.\texttt{fd1} \texttt{e6} 15.\texttt{xe6} \texttt{xe6} 16.a3 \texttt{b5} 17.\texttt{b4} \texttt{c7} 18.\texttt{xb5} axb5= Black managed to equalize in the game Fedorowicz – Strikovic, New York 1988.

With the help of the line: 12.\texttt{d2}?! \texttt{d8} 13.\texttt{b3} (After 13.b4, White must consider 13...\texttt{a5}!?\texttt{\textasciitilde}, with a counterplay for Black.) 13...\texttt{b6} 14.\texttt{c1} \texttt{e6} 15.\texttt{a5} \texttt{e7} 16.\texttt{b4} \texttt{ad8} 17.\texttt{b5} \texttt{c8} 18.\texttt{bxc6} \texttt{bxc6} 19. \texttt{c5\textasciitilde} in the game R.Hernandez – Schlosser, Thessaloniki 1988, White managed to preserve the edge.

\textbf{12...\texttt{e5}}

The move 12...\texttt{c7} – seems at least a bit strange, since he could have placed his queen on the c7-square in one move. 13. \texttt{d2} b6?! 14.b4 a6 15.\texttt{fd1} c5 16. \texttt{c2\textasciitilde} Kordts – Kunzmann, corr. 2002.

The pawn-break – 12...d5, after 13.\texttt{b3} \texttt{d8} 14.cxd5 \texttt{xd5} 15.\texttt{xd5} cxd5 16.\texttt{xd5} \texttt{xb2} 17. \texttt{ad1} \texttt{f6} 18.\texttt{d4} \texttt{e7} 19.\texttt{b3}, led to a situation in which Black had to part with his vitally important dark-squared bishop: 19...\texttt{xd4} 20.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{e5} 21.\texttt{b2\textasciitilde} Lalic – Strikovic, Pljevlja 1989.

In case of: 12...\texttt{c5}, White can play: 13.\texttt{b3} \texttt{xb3} 14.axb3 \texttt{c7} 15.\texttt{d2\textasciitilde} and he obtains a clear advantage.

\textbf{13.\texttt{d2} a6}

After 13...\texttt{e6}?! 14.\texttt{xe6} \texttt{xe6} 15.a3 a6 16.b4=, White has a powerful couple of bishops and a space advantage, B.Lalic – A.Strikovic,
Following: 13...\&d7 14.\&ad1 \&c7, White can follow with: 15. \&g5! \&h5 16.g4 \&f6 17.\&f4 \&d8 18.\&b3 \&c7 19.\&d2= and he squeezes Black’s position quite effectively, Dautov – Varavin, USSR 1988.

After 13...\&c7, van der Sterren – Piket, Hoogovens 1988, it deserves attention for White to play 14.\&fd1, in order after 14...a6, to continue with 15.\&ac1= and to remind Black about the vulnerable placement of his queen.

14.\&b3!

It is less precise for White to play here 14.\&ad1, because of 14...\&c7 and now after: 15.\&b3 \&e6 16.c5, Black can counter with 16...d5= equalizing (analysis of GM Lautier).

14...\&c7

If 14...\&b4, then White has the powerful argument – 15.c5=.

15.\&ac1! (with the idea to follow with \&fd1 and \&a4) 15...\&e6 16.\&d5 \&xd5 17.cxd5\&d5= – White’s position is clearly preferable, Lenz – Cremerius, corr. 1998.

d3) 11...h6

12.\&h4

But naturally not 12.\&e3, in view of 12...d5 13.cxd5 \&xd5 14. \&xd5 cxd5= with equality.

12...\&b6

Or 12...a5 13.\&f2 \&h5 14.\&d2 \&e5 15.g3= Monacell – Lukasevicius, Email 2002.

The move 12...\&c7 – looks too passive. 13.\&d2 a5 14.\&fd1 \&c5, Kramnik – Dlugy, Internet 1999 and here White could have played: 15.\&c2 \&e6 16.\&g3 \&e8 17.\&d4= increasing his advantage.

After 12...g5 – Black only compromises the light squares on his kingside and it still remains quite difficult for him to do anything active there. 13.\&f2 \&e5 14.\&c2 \&h5 15.\&ad1 \&f6 16.\&e3 \&f4 17.\&f2 \&xc2 (Or 17...\&d7 18.\&f1 \&ad8 19.\&fd2=) 18.\&cxe2 \&e6 (Opening of the g-file after: 18...g4 19.\&g3 gxf3 20.gxf3= only increases White’s advantage.) 19. \&xe6 \&xe6 20.b3= Tukmakov – Svendsen, Basel 2000.

It is quite difficult for Black to create any active counterplay after: 12...a5 13.\&f2 \&h5 14.\&d2
\( \text{Chapter 2} \)

\( \text{\&e5 15.g3±} \) Monacell – Lukasevicius, Email 2002.

In answer to 12...\( \text{\&b6} \), Vilela – Larios Crespo, Albacete 2003, it seems quite strong for White to deploy his pieces in the centre with: 13.\( \text{\&c2} \) \( \text{\&c7} \) 14.\( \text{\&ad1±} \), because Black has problems organizing counterplay, because after the standard line 14...a5?! White can follow with the typical piece-sacrifice: 15.\( \text{\&db5!} \) \( \text{\&xb5} \) 16.\( \text{\&xb5} \) \( \text{\&b8} \) 17.\( \text{\&xd6} \) \( \text{\&e6} \) 18.c5±.

The variation 12...\( \text{\&c5} \), enables White to obtain quickly the advantage after: 13.\( \text{\&b3} \) g5 (Opening of the a-file is quite advantageous for White after: 13...\( \text{\&xb3} \) 14.\( \text{\&xb3} \) \( \text{\&e7} \), Kocsiš – Stanec, Chalkidiki 2002, 15.\( \text{\&d3} \) \( \text{\&e6} \) 16.f4± and Black has great problems to organize any counterplay. After 13...\( \text{\&e6} \) 14.\( \text{\&g3} \) \( \text{\&f8} \) 15.f4 \( \text{\&g7} \) 16.\( \text{\&h4±} \), Black's position seems to be rather dubious, Zagorskis – Cmiel, Cologne 1994.) 14.\( \text{\&g3} \) \( \text{\&xb3} \) 15.\( \text{\&xb3} \) \( \text{\&b8} \) 16.f4 \( \text{\&xe4} \) 17.\( \text{\&xe4} \) \( \text{\&xe4} \) 18.\( \text{\&d3→} \) and White's attack is more than sufficient to compensate the sacrificed pawn, Weglarz – Drozdov, Miedzybrodzie 1991.

In case Black chooses the other route for his knight – 12...\( \text{\&e5} \) 13.\( \text{\&c2} \) and then he changes his pawn-structure with: 13...g5 (About 13...c5 14.\( \text{\&b3} \) g5 15.\( \text{\&f2} \) – see 13...g5.) 14.\( \text{\&f2} \) c5 (About 14...\( \text{\&h5} \) 15.\( \text{\&ad1} \) – see 12...g5 13.\( \text{\&f2} \) \( \text{\&e5} \) 14.\( \text{\&c2} \) \( \text{\&h5} \) 15.\( \text{\&ad1} \).) with the idea to use some outposts for his knight in the centre, then after: 15.\( \text{\&b3} \) \( \text{\&b6} \) 16.\( \text{\&fd1} \) \( \text{\&c7} \) 17.\( \text{\&d2} \) \( \text{\&h5} \) 18.\( \text{\&f1±} \), White can exploit the vulnerable d5 and f5-squares in his opponent's camp, Chekhov – Yurtaev, Frunze 1988.

Following 12...a6, White can play 13.\( \text{\&c2} \) and he can transpose to the variation c) 10...a6 11.\( \text{\&g5} \) \( \text{\&h6} \) 12.\( \text{\&h4} \) \( \text{\&bd7} \) 13.\( \text{\&c2} \).

13.\( \text{\&b3} \) \( \text{\&c7} \)

The move 13...a5?! enables White to win a pawn: 14.\( \text{\&xd6} \) and he easily parries Black's threats, while he preserves a solid extra pawn, for example: 14...\( \text{\&b4} \) (Or 14...a4 15.\( \text{\&d3} \) \( \text{\&h5} \) 17.\( \text{\&g3} \) \( \text{\&f8} \) 18.c5 b5 19.\( \text{\&c1±} \) 15.\( \text{\&ad1} \) g5, A.Peter – G.Pinter, Hungary 1997, 16.\( \text{\&d2} \) \( \text{\&xd6} \) (Black's compensation for the pawn is insufficient after: 16...\( \text{\&h5} \) 17.\( \text{\&d2} \) \( \text{\&d4} \) 18.\( \text{\&d4±} \) 17.\( \text{\&xd6} \) \( \text{\&h5} \) (In answer to 17...a4, White's most aggressive fashion to fight for the advantage is to sacrifice the exchange with: 18.\( \text{\&d4!} \) \( \text{\&f8} \) 19.\( \text{\&e5} \) \( \text{\&xd6} \) 20.\( \text{\&xd6} \) \( \text{\&e6} \) 21.\( \text{\&d2} \) 18.\( \text{\&d2±} \) and White has an extra pawn without any compensation for Black).

14.\( \text{\&d2} \) \( \text{\&e5} \) 15.\( \text{\&ad1} \) \( \text{\&e6} \)

In case of 16.\( \text{\&d4} \), Black can choose between the relatively calm line: 16...g5 17.\( \text{\&xe6} \) \( \text{\&xe6} \) and the sharp variation: 16...\( \text{\&xc4} \) 17.f4 \( \text{\&xe2} \).

It deserves a serious attention for White to play: 16.\( \text{\&xd6}?! \) \( \text{\&xd6} \) 17.\( \text{\&xd6} \) g5 18.\( \text{\&f2} \) \( \text{\&xc4} \) 19.\( \text{\&a5±} \) and he preserves better chances.
16.c5 dxc5 (In case of 16...d5, White must consider the possibility: 17.\textit{dx}f6 \textit{xf}6 18.\textit{xe}h6±) 17.\textit{xc}5 g5 18.\textit{xe}6 \textit{xe}6 19.\textit{f}2 \textit{g}6 20.\textit{fe}1+. White’s position is preferable, Gipslis – Bogdanovic, Budva 1967.

d4) 11...a5

Black is trying to improve his defensive position on the queenside.

12.\textit{d}2

That is the most logical move for White – he takes under control the important c1-h6 diagonal.

12...a4

The other possibilities for Black also lead to rather unpleasant positions for him:

After: 12...\textit{b}6 13.\textit{c}2 \textit{c}5 14.\textit{e}3 \textit{fd}7 15.\textit{ab}1 a4 16.\textit{xd}6 a3 17.bxa3, Black’s pieces are active indeed, but that is not sufficient to compensate his two pawns deficit. D.Gurevich – Brooks, Las Vegas 1994; 12...\textit{e}7 13.\textit{c}2 \textit{c}5 14.\textit{ad}1 \textit{d}8 15.\textit{fe}1 \textit{e}6 16.\textit{f}1+ Black’s pieces are well placed, but he has no active play and he is forced to wait passively, Gunter – M.Houska, Cannes 2000.

13.\textit{fd}1 \textit{a}5 14.\textit{c}2!

That is the most precise move for White.

White maintains his advantage too after the rather tentative move 14.\textit{ab}1. Following: 14...\textit{h}5 15.\textit{e}3 \textit{f}8 (Or 15...\textit{e}5 16.b4 \textit{xb}3 17.\textit{axb}3 \textit{f}5 18.\textit{f}1 \textit{xe}4 19.b4 \textit{c}7 20.\textit{xe}4 \textit{e}6 21.\textit{xf}6+ \textit{xf}6 22.\textit{g}5+ Belov – G.Kuzmin, Leningrad 1991.) 16.g4 \textit{f}6 17.\textit{c}2 (The exchange of the dark-squared bishops 17.\textit{h}6 is a mistake: 17...\textit{hx}h6 18.\textit{xe}h6 \textit{xe}5 19.\textit{d}2 \textit{d}8 20.\textit{e}1 \textit{e}6= and it only leads to an occupation of the dark squares by Black, Jelen – Rasik, Debrecen 1992.) 17...\textit{d}8 18.b4±.

14...\textit{e}5


Here, in the game Cebalo – Todorcevic, Yugoslavia 1989, White could have obtained a great advantage with the move: 15.b4!±.

d5) 11...\textit{b}6
12.\textit{\textit{\textbf{b3}}}

White should better retreat temporarily with his knight from the centre.

In case of: 12.\textit{\textit{\textbf{a4}}} \textit{\textbf{a5}} 13.\textit{\textit{\textbf{d2}}}
\textit{\textbf{e5}} 14.\textit{\textit{\textbf{c3}}} \textit{\textbf{e7}} 15.\textit{\textit{\textbf{wd2}}} \textit{\textbf{d5}} 16.
\textit{\textbf{ead1} \textbf{d7}} 17.\textit{\textit{\textbf{b3}}} \textit{\textbf{ad8}}, White’s pieces are slightly
discoordinated and his attempt to increase the pressure against his opponent’s
d6-pawn by transferring the dark-
squared bishop to the a3-f8 diagonal, after: 18.\textit{\textit{\textbf{c2}}} \textit{\textbf{c8}} 19.\textit{\textit{\textbf{b4}}} \textit{\textbf{f5}}
20.\textit{\textit{\textbf{c3}}} \textit{\textbf{d5+}} enabled Black to organize some dangerous
counterplay on the kingside with the
help of the pawn-advane f7-f5 in
the game Karolyi – Szilagyi, Bu-
dapest 1988, meanwhile that was
due to a large extent to the absence
of White’s dark-squared bishop
from that side of the board.

12...\textit{\textit{\textbf{a5}}} 13.\textit{\textit{\textbf{d2}}}

Now, contrary to the variation
\textit{\textit{\textbf{d3}}} 11...\textit{\textit{\textbf{h6}}} 12.\textit{\textit{\textbf{h4}}} \textit{\textbf{b6}} 13.\textit{\textit{\textbf{b3}}}
a5 14.\textit{\textit{\textbf{xd6}}}, White cannot oust
Black’s queen from its excel-
lent position on the b6-square,
therefore in answer to the move
13.\textit{\textit{\textbf{xd6}}}, Black obtains an ex-
cellent game with the move 13...
\textit{\textit{\textbf{a4}}}. It is quite possible for White
to continue with 13.\textit{\textit{\textbf{b1}}?}, prepar-
ing in case of 13...a4, the corner
square for the retreat of his knight:
14.\textit{\textit{\textbf{a1}}} \textit{\textbf{a5}} (The active move 14...
a3, only enhances White’s queen-
side offensive after: 15.\textit{\textit{\textbf{b4}}} \textit{\textbf{d5}}
15...\textit{\textit{\textbf{g4}}} 16.\textit{\textit{\textbf{fxg4}}} \textit{\textbf{xc3}} 17.\textit{\textit{\textbf{c1}}}
\textit{\textbf{dxc5}} 18.\textit{\textit{\textbf{b3+}} – 16.\textit{\textit{\textbf{d2}}} \textit{\textbf{d8}}
17.\textit{\textit{\textbf{b3}} \textit{\textbf{b6}} 18.\textit{\textit{\textbf{c2}}} and Black’s
far-advanced a3-pawn becomes
a juicy target for White’s pieces,
Douven – Ree, Hilversum 1990.)
15.\textit{\textit{\textbf{f4}}} \textit{\textbf{e5}} 16.\textit{\textit{\textbf{d2}}}! (It is insuffi-
cient for White to play 16.\textit{\textit{\textbf{xd6}}?},
because of: 16...\textit{\textit{\textbf{d5}}} 17.\textit{\textit{\textbf{f3}} \textit{\textbf{e6}}
and Black regains his pawn, seiz-
ing the initiative.) 16...\textit{\textit{\textbf{a7}}} 17.\textit{\textit{\textbf{c2}}}
\textit{\textbf{e6}} 18.\textit{\textit{\textbf{b3}}} \textit{\textbf{xb3}} 19.\textit{\textit{\textbf{xb3}}} \textit{\textbf{d5}}
20.\textit{\textit{\textbf{e3}}} \textit{\textbf{a5}} 21.\textit{\textit{\textbf{b4}}} and White suc-
cceeded in cramping Black’s pie-
ces on the queenside in the game
Levin – Damljanovic, Linares
1994.

13...\textit{\textit{\textbf{a4}}} 14.\textit{\textit{\textbf{e3}}} \textit{\textbf{d8}}

Black has tried in practice
some other possibilities too:
14...\textit{\textit{\textbf{c7}}} 15.\textit{\textit{\textbf{d4}}} \textit{\textbf{a5}} (Black
has problems creating coun-
terplay after his other lines: 15...\textit{\textit{\textbf{g5}}}
16.\textit{\textit{\textbf{ad1}}} \textit{\textbf{c5}} 17.\textit{\textit{\textbf{g4}}} \textit{\textbf{f6}} 18.\textit{\textit{\textbf{c2}}} Ftcn
Hausner, Pribram 1997; 15...
\textit{\textit{\textbf{e6}}} 16.\textit{\textit{\textbf{f1}}} \textit{\textbf{a5}} 17.\textit{\textit{\textbf{e1}}
\textit{\textbf{e6}}} 18.\textit{\textit{\textbf{xe6}}} \textit{\textbf{xe6}} 19.\textit{\textit{\textbf{c2}}} \textit{\textbf{ed7}}
20.\textit{\textit{\textbf{f1}}} \textit{\textbf{Ein}} – Martinovic,
Oberwart 1999.) 16.\textit{\textit{\textbf{fe1}}} (It is less
precise for White to play here
16.\textit{\textit{\textbf{c2}}}, due to 16...d5.) 16...\textit{\textit{\textbf{e5}}
17.\textit{\textit{\textbf{ad1}}} and now Black’s at-
tempt to free himself with the help
of the move 17...d5, led to a situa-

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tion after: 18.cxd5 cxd5 19.Qcb5 dxe4 20.Qxa5 Qxa5 21.Qd2 exf3 22.gxf3±, in which he had to give up the exchange in the game Kapetanovic – Brendel, Vienna 1991.

14...Qb4 15.Qd4 Qe5 (It is premature for Black to play: 15...d5? 16.cxd5 cxd5 17.Qdb5 Qa5? 18.a3 Qb3 19.Qd6+ – Tratar – Ebmer, Frohneleiten 1998, it is only slightly better for Black to try 17...Qa5, Llanos – Fernandez Lopez, Badalona 1993, but even then after: 18.Qxd5 Qxd5 19.Qxd5 Qxb2 20.Qad1± White is dominating in the centre and his pieces are better coordinated; 15...Qb6?! – Black only helps his opponent with that move, because he has no counterplay on the queenside at all after that. 16.Qc2 Qa5 17.b4 Qa6 18.Qa3± Stone – I.Ivanov, Winnipeg 1994; It is too bad for Black to play 15...a3?, because of: 16.Qc2 Qxb2? 17.Qab1+-, but even after the best for Black: 16...Qa5 17.b4 Qc7 18.Qad1± Kratochvil – Osorios, Germany 1997, he has no counterplay whatsoever, while if: 15...Qa5, then 16.Qfe1 and later see the variation with – 14...Qc7.) 16.Qc2 Qa5 17.b4!± and Black cannot capture en passant and that means that his queenside defence is doomed.

14...Qc5 15.Qd4 (It is not worth for White to capture the pawn 15...Qxd6, because of: 15...Qcxe4 16.Qd3 Qg3+! 17.hxg3 Qxe3∞, while in case of 15.Qxc5, after 15...dxc5 16.Qac1 Qd7 17.f4 Qb4 18.a3 Qa5= White only helps Black to activate his pieces, Pies esa – Buturin, Belgorod 1989.) 15...Qfd7 16.Qab1 Qf8 17.Qfd1 Qa5 (It is worse for Black to play: 17...Qfe6 18.Qxe6 Qxe6, Hole – Ask, Gausdal 2003, because after: 19.f4! Qe8 20.Qf3 Qd8 21.Qf2± White has powerful threats in the centre.) 18.Qf1 Qe5 19.Qf2 Qfe6 20.Qde2± and White’s pieces are quite mobile, but Black’s defence would not be so easy to break at all, Kolev – Rasik, Budapest 1993;

14...c5 (Black takes the d4-square under control, with the idea to exert some pressure along the a2-g8 and a1-h8 diagonals against White’s queenside, but his d5 and b5-squares become chronically weak after that.) 15.Qc1 Qe5 16.Qb1 Qe6 17.b3 axb3 18.axb3 Qa5 (In case of 18...Qa6, White would have continued just like in the game with 19.Qd1, threatening b3-b4.) 19.Qd1 Qed8 20.Qb5 (The negative consequences of Black’s move 14 are quite obvious now.) 20...Qxd2 21.Qxd2 Qe8 22.Qa2± and White transfers his knight from c1 to the c3-square and he follows that with doubling his rooks along the d-file and thus he increases his pressure against Black’s position, Kramnik – J.Polgar, Dortmund 1997.

15.Qd4 Qc5

It is worse for Black to try: 15...Qa5 16.Qc2! d5 (After 16...Qe6 17.b4! Qc7, in the game van der
Stricht – Shchekachev, Antwerp 1997, the opponents agreed to a draw, but following the simple move 18.a3±, Black would have no counterplay whatsoever.) 17. exd5 cxd5 18.b4 \(\mathbb{W}d8\) 19.\(\mathbb{B}ad1\) dxc4 20.\(\mathbb{B}xc4\) \(\mathbb{W}c7\) 21.\(\mathbb{B}b5\)± and in connection with White’s lead in development, opening of files in the centre cannot be advantageous for Black at all, Arlandi – Mauro, Forli 1992.

In answer to 15...\(\mathbb{W}e7\), Valles Moreno – Moreno Ruiz, Madrid 2002, the simplest reaction for White would be 16.\(\mathbb{C}c2\)±, followed by \(\mathbb{B}ad1\) and later, depending on the way Black deploys his pieces, White can start active actions on the queenside with b2-b4, or on the kingside with f2-f4.

After 15...\(\mathbb{B}b6\) 16.\(\mathbb{B}ad1\) d5, White can fight for the advantage with 17.exd5!? (It is also possible for him to try: 17.cxd5 cxd5 18.\(\mathbb{D}db5\) \(\mathbb{A}e6\) 19.\(\mathbb{A}f4\) \(\mathbb{A}e7\) 20.e5 \(\mathbb{D}h5\) 21.\(\mathbb{A}g5\) f6 22.\(\mathbb{A}xf6\)± and his prospects are better.) 17...cxd5 18.\(\mathbb{D}db5\) \(\mathbb{A}e6\), Ftcnik – Paunovic, Belgrade 1987 and here White had to choose the line: 19.c5 \(\mathbb{D}c4\) (or 19...\(\mathbb{D}c8\) 20.\(\mathbb{A}f4\)±) 20.\(\mathbb{A}xc4\) dxc4 21.\(\mathbb{W}xd8\) \(\mathbb{A}xd8\) 22.\(\mathbb{D}c7\) \(\mathbb{A}ac8\) 23.\(\mathbb{D}xe6\) \(\mathbb{Fxe6}\) 24.\(\mathbb{D}xa4\) \(\mathbb{D}d5\) 25. \(\mathbb{D}g5\) and his extra pawn is more important than Black’s active pieces.

16.\(\mathbb{F}fd1\) \(\mathbb{F}fd7\) 17.\(\mathbb{F}f1\)

After 17.\(\mathbb{F}ab1\) \(\mathbb{A}e5\)?, White made a quite instructive mistake: 18.b4?! (It was better for him to continue with 18.\(\mathbb{F}f1\)!) and that enabled Black to counter with: 18...\(\mathbb{A}xb3\) 19.\(\mathbb{A}xb3\) \(\mathbb{W}h4\)!! and the real fight was concentrated on the kingside. The unstable placement of White’s knight on the c3-square became a telling factor in the ensuing battle in the game Ligterink – Mozetic, Tilburg 1993.

17...\(\mathbb{A}a5\)

Black would hardly change anything with: 17...\(\mathbb{A}e5\) 18.g3 \(\mathbb{W}b6\) 19.\(\mathbb{F}ab1\) \(\mathbb{A}a5\), D.Milanovic – Mozetic, Belgrade 2001, 20.\(\mathbb{D}c2\)±.

18.\(\mathbb{D}c2\) \(\mathbb{W}b6\) 19.\(\mathbb{F}ab1\) \(\mathbb{A}e5\)
20.\(\mathbb{D}d4\) \(\mathbb{W}d8\) 21.g3± Tosic – Mozetic, Novi Sad 1995. White has restricted Black’s active possibilities on both sides of the board and he maintains a slight edge.

e) 10...\(\mathbb{H}h5\)
The pin along the d8-h4 diagonal might be rather unpleasant for Black, so he prevents it.

11...g4

In case of the calm line 11...e3, White must consider: 11...f5 12.\textit{\textsc{wd}2} f4 13.\textit{\textsc{df}2} e5 14.\textit{\textsc{fd}1} \textit{\textsc{w}f6} 15.\textit{\textsc{dc}2} e6 16.\textit{\textsc{ge}1} \textit{\textsc{d}d7}. Black’s situation is excellent in the centre and on the kingside, since after 17.\textit{\textsc{dd}3}, he has the powerful argument — 17...\textit{\textsc{gg}3}+! Villeneuve – Belkhodja, Le Touquet 1998.

11...\textit{\textsc{ff}6}

After 11...\textit{\textsc{w}f6}, it is good for White to continue with 12.\textit{\textsc{xc}6} (It is also possible for White to play: 12.\textit{\textsc{db}5} cxb5 13.\textit{\textsc{dd}5} \textit{\textsc{wd}8} 14.\textit{\textsc{gxh}5} bxc4 15.\textit{\textsc{eg}1} and he preserves better chances, Nestorovic – Simic, Belgrade 1994.) 12...bxc6 13.\textit{\textsc{gxh}5}, for example: 13...\textit{\textsc{db}7} (Or 13...\textit{\textsc{gxh}5} 14.\textit{\textsc{eg}1} and White’s prospects are superior.) 14.\textit{\textsc{e}3} \textit{\textsc{c}5} (Or 14...\textit{\textsc{we}7} 15.\textit{\textsc{wd}2} \textit{\textsc{c}5}, Grigore – Janev, Budapest 2000 and here White’s most energetic line is: 16.b4! \textit{\textsc{ge}6} 17.b5± and he gains access to the vital d5-outpost.) 15.\textit{\textsc{wd}2} \textit{\textsc{bb}8} 16.\textit{\textsc{ab}1} \textit{\textsc{wh}4}, P.Eljanov – Janev, Marseille 2003 and Black has no time to capture his opponent’s h-pawn and that means that White can provoke favourable simplifications: 17.\textit{\textsc{dd}4} \textit{\textsc{h}3} 18.\textit{\textsc{eg}1} \textit{\textsc{e}5} 19.\textit{\textsc{xe}5} dxe5 20.\textit{\textsc{w}d}6± (Now, Black loses unavoidably a second pawn.) 20... \textit{\textsc{ge}6} 21.hxg6 hxg6 22.\textit{\textsc{xe}5} \textit{\textsc{df}4} 23.\textit{\textsc{wd}4}+ and Black is quite active on the kingside indeed, but that does not compensate his two pawn-deficit.

12.\textit{\textsc{ff}4} h5

Black would not fare any better after: 12...\textit{\textsc{we}7} 13.\textit{\textsc{dc}2} \textit{\textsc{dd}8} 14.\textit{\textsc{wd}2} \textit{\textsc{e}8} 15.\textit{\textsc{gg}5} f6 16.\textit{\textsc{ee}3}+, since all his pieces are quite passive, Sakic – J.Sveinsson, Email 2003.

He had no compensation for the pawn after: 12...\textit{\textsc{da}6} 13.\textit{\textsc{b}3} d5?! 14.cxd5 cxd5 15.\textit{\textsc{xa}6} bxa6 16.e5 \textit{\textsc{dd}7} 17.\textit{\textsc{xd}5}± in the game I.Ibragimov – Ristic, Ikaria 1993.

13.\textit{\textsc{gg}5} \textit{\textsc{bh}7}

After 13...\textit{\textsc{fd}7}?! Simutowe – Belkhodja, Cairo 2001, Black loses his important d6-pawn and he has great problems to protect his vulnerable dark squares. 14.\textit{\textsc{xd}6}! \textit{\textsc{db}6} (He has no compensation for the pawn after: 14... \textit{\textsc{e}5} 15.c5 \textit{\textsc{h}3} 16.\textit{\textsc{g}1} b6 17.\textit{\textsc{g}3}±. It is not better for him to defend with: 14...\textit{\textsc{wg}5} 15.f4 \textit{\textsc{wh}4} 16.e5±) 15.c5 \textit{\textsc{h}3} 16.\textit{\textsc{g}1} \textit{\textsc{c}8} 17.f4 \textit{\textsc{xd}6} 18.cxd6 \textit{\textsc{wd}6} 19.e5± and Black has two bishops indeed, but that does not compensate his vulnerable dark squares, because his bishops are rather passive.

14.\textit{\textsc{wd}2} \textit{\textsc{aa}6}

In case of 14...\textit{\textsc{ge}5}, White should better preserve the dark-squared bishops: 15.\textit{\textsc{ee}3} \textit{\textsc{aa}6} 16.\textit{\textsc{ad}1} \textit{\textsc{h}3} 17.\textit{\textsc{eg}1} \textit{\textsc{c}5} 18.\textit{\textsc{ee}1}+, with the idea to follow with \textit{\textsc{w}h}4, Epishin – Yurtayev, USSR 1991.

If 14...\textit{\textsc{bd}7}, then 15.\textit{\textsc{ad}1} \textit{\textsc{ee}5}, Duchov – Umansky, Moscow 1993 and here White could have maintained his advantage with
the move 16...\(c3\)

15.\(\text{Ba}d1\) \(\text{Be}7\)

The move 15...\(\text{C}c5\), Dambacher – M.Bosboom, Germany 2003, enables White to occupy additional space on the queenside with: 16.b4! \(\text{Be}6\) (It is a disaster for Black to continue with: 16...\(\text{Da}6\) 17.b5 \(\text{Db}8\) 18.\(\text{B}g1\), because White has a huge lead in development.) 17.\(\text{D}xe6\) \(\text{Dxe}6\) 18.\(\text{B}g1\) and Black has no chances to equalize, because of his weak d6-pawn and his passive knight.

After 15...\(\text{W}c7\) 16.\(\text{Bg}1\) \(\text{B}f8\), Shchekachev – Belkhodja, Creon 2000, White has the interesting possibility: 17.b4!? \(\text{D}xb4\) (It is worse for Black to try: 17...\(\text{D}d7\)
18.\(\text{Db}3\) \(\text{Be}5\) 19.a3\(\pm\), because his knight on a6 is bound to remain isolated for a long time.) 18.c5 \(\text{Be}5\) (The other possibilities for Black are not any better: 18...\(\text{De}6\)
19.\(\text{D}xd6\)\(\pm\); 18...\(\text{Wa}5\) 19.\(\text{D}xd6\) \(\text{Da}6\)
20.\(\text{D}xa6\)! \(\text{W}xa6\) 21.e5\(\pm\) 19.cxd6 \(\text{W}xd6\) (19...\(\text{W}xd6\) 20.\(\text{Db}5\)) 20. \(\text{D}xe5\) \(\text{W}xe5\) 21.a3\(\pm\) and White will soon regain his sacrificed pawn with interest.

16.\(\text{Bg}1\)!

After 16.a3, Black manages to create some counterplay in the centre with the line: 16...\(\text{Wh}3\)
17.\(\text{B}g1\) \(\text{B}ad8\) 18.b4 \(\text{D}c7\)\(\pm\).

16...\(\text{D}f8\)

The move 16...\(\text{D}e5\)?! only enhances White’s activity on the kingside: 17.\(\text{D}e3\) \(\text{Wh}3\) 18.f4 \(\text{D}g7\)

After 16...\(\text{Wh}3\), White plays:
17.\(\text{We}1!\) \(\text{D}a8\) (The move – 17...\(\text{De}5\) – also enables White to organize a powerful positional pressure on the queenside rather quickly: 18.\(\text{D}e3\) 19.\(\text{Wh}4\) \(\text{Ld}7\)
20.b4 \(\text{De}6\) 21.f4 \(\text{D}g7\) 22.\(\text{B}f3\) a5 23.b5 \(\text{D}f8\), Chery – Genestier, corr. 1994 and here White wins with the natural move 24.f5\(\pm\), but even after the best defence for Black: 23...\(\text{Ec}5\) 24.\(\text{D}ge1\)\(\pm\) White has an overwhelming space advantage.) 18.\(\text{Wh}4\) \(\text{Ec}8\) 19.\(\text{D}e3\)
\(\text{Ec}7\) 20.\(\text{Ec}2\) and he manages to prevent Black’s immediate pawn-break in the centre.

17.\(\text{D}f1\)

Black did not make use of the possibility – \(\text{D}c8\)-\(h3\), so now White impedes it once and for all. The game remains much more complex after: 17.a3 \(\text{Wh}3\)\(\infty\) Shirov – Yurtaiw, USSR 1991.

17...\(\text{D}d7\)

It is even worse for Black to play 17...\(\text{Ec}7\), lkonnikov – Schmaltz, Germany 1994, 18.\(\text{D}e2\) \(\text{De}5\) 19.
\(\text{D}e3\)\(\pm\) and he either loses his d6-pawn, or he must part with his dark-squared bishop.

18.\(\text{D}g3\)

\[\text{Diagram}\]
18...\textit{b6}

After 18...\textit{ac5} 19.b4 \textit{e6}, White has at his disposal the powerful piece-sacrifice: 20.\textit{f5}! (In case of: 20.\textit{xe6} \textit{xe6} 21.\textit{xd6} \textit{c5?!}, Black’s pieces are activated.) 20...\textit{gxf5} 21.\textit{xd6} \textit{d8} 22.\textit{exf5} \textit{d4} 23.\textit{wf4} \textit{f8}, Belov – Poluljahov, Rostov 1993 and here White could have created great problems for his opponent with the move – \textit{c5}!+.

\textbf{19.b3 \textit{c5} 20.\textit{g2} \textit{e5} 21.f4 \textit{g7} 22.f5!}→

In the game Bareev – Poluljahov, St Petersbourg 1998, White started here a direct assault against his opponent’s king and it ended up successfully in a victory for him.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter deals with one of the main lines for Black. The multipurpose move \textit{c7-c6} is usually helpful for him and it is quite standard for the King’s Indian Defence. The best reaction for White here is the prophylactic move – 10.\textit{h1}, which deprives Black of the tactical possibilities, connected with the usage of the \textit{g1-a7} diagonal. Black has tried numerous resources on his move ten:

In variation a we have analyzed the immediate pawn-break in the centre – 10...\textit{d6-d5}. In general, opening of the game is in favour of the side with the superior development. After the exchange 11.\textit{cxd5} cxd5, White plays the precise move – 12.\textit{g5}! and Black has great difficulties.

Black’s attempt to prepare that pawn-break with the move 10...\textit{a6} – variation b is insufficient to equalize either. White obtains a clear advantage with a standard central strategy.

In variation c, we deal with the interesting idea for Black to organize some active actions on the queenside with \textit{a7-a6}, followed by \textit{b7-b5}. He has problems to do that however, under favourable circumstances, because when his knight is on the \textit{b8}-square, White counters \textit{b7-b5}, by attacking his opponent’s \textit{d6}-pawn, while if Black develops his knight on \textit{d7}, then his \textit{c6}-pawn is not protected well enough.

In variation d Black refrains from an immediate aggression in the centre, or on the sides and he tries to provoke the creation of some weaknesses in White’s camp by active piece-play and advancing his \textit{a}-pawn all the way up to the \textit{a3}-square. White’s basic strategy in that case should be the restriction of the active possibilities of his opponent.

With the move 10...\textit{h5} – variation e, Black loses a couple of tempi with the idea to entice his opponent to play aggressively. White pushes his \textit{g}-pawn, occupying additional space on the kingside and later he tries to cramp his opponent’s position even more.
Chapter 3  

1.\( \text{d}f3 \) \( \text{d}f6 \) 2.\( \text{c}c4 \) \( g6 \) 3.\( \text{c}c3 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 4.e4 \( \text{d}6 \) 5.d4 0–0 6.\( \text{e}e2 \) \( e5 \) 7.0–0 \( \text{exd}4 \) 8.\( \text{c}xd4 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 9.f3 \( \text{c}6 \)

This is the main line for Black and it is the most logical too. He has opened the long diagonal for his dark-squared bishop and he wishes to profit from that by increasing the pressure on the dark squares.

10.\( \text{c}c3 \)

That is White’s most natural reaction.

Black’s strongest response – 10...\( \text{c}h5 \) will be dealt with in our next chapter.

He has tried in practice some other moves too, but tournament practice has shown that Black cannot reach complete equality after them. We will analyze these possibilities in this chapter: a) 10...\( \text{d}d7 \), b) 10...\( \text{e}e5 \), c) 10...\( \text{d}d7 \), d) 10...\( \text{c}xd4 \).

Black has also played in this position:

10...\( \text{d}d7 \)?! 11.\( \text{d}d2 \) \( b6 \)? 12.\( \text{c}xc6 \) \( \text{xc}6 \) 13.c5± Szuk – Biro, Paks 1997;

10...\( \text{c}c7 \)? 11.\( \text{d}d2 \) \( \text{h}7 \) 12.\( \text{e}ad1 \) Lindenmair – Pruess, Bad Woerishofen 2000;

10...\( \text{a}5 \)? 11.\( \text{d}b5 \) \( \text{b}4 \) 12.a3 \( \text{e}e6 \) 13.\( \text{w}d2 \)± Spanjaard – Muhring, Amsterdam 1950;

10...\( \text{e}7 \)? – Black fails to push d6–d5 and that means his knight is misplaced at that square. 11.\( \text{d}d2 \) \( c6 \) (It is possibly better for Black to play here: 11...\( a6 \) 12.\( \text{e}ad1 \) \( \text{d}d7 \) 13.\( \text{h}6 \) \( \text{xh6} \) 14.\( \text{xh6} \)±, but even then it is still quite unclear what his knight is doing on the e7-square in the first place, Ley – Alard, Creon 2003.) 12.\( \text{e}ad1 \) \( \text{c}c7 \)?, Mirzoev – Weil, Athens 1999, 13.\( \text{b}b3 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 14.\( \text{f}4 \)––;

10...\( \text{h}6 \)? – Black prevents the possible pin along the h4-d8 diagonal, but he loses two tempi in the process. 11.\( \text{d}d2 \) \( \text{h}7 \) 12.\( \text{e}ad1 \) \( \text{c}e7 \) (12...\( \text{e}e5 \) 13.b3 \( \text{d}7 \), Pronstad – Ovnerud, Norway 1998, 14.\( \text{fe}1 \)±; in answer to 12...a6, S.Nikolaev – Habibi, Bad Ragaz 1990, it seems reasonable for White to continue with his standard plan in the centre: 13.\( \text{xc}6 \) bxc6 14.c5±) 13.
\( \text{\textit{a)}} \text{ 10...} \text{\textit{\textbf{e}d7}} \\

The main idea of that line is to bring the knight to the e5-square and then to exchange on d4.

\textbf{11.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}d2 \textbf{\textit{d}e}5}}

Black loses immediately after: \textbf{11.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}e7??}} \textbf{12.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}d5++}} -- Borzova – Efremova, St Petersburg 2005.
\textbf{11...}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}c5 12.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{ad}1 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}x}d4}}} (In an-

swer to \textbf{12...}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}6}, C.Braun – Kalinitschew, Dresden 2002, it seems very good for White to follow with: \textbf{13.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}xe6 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}xe6}} 14.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}d5 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}d}7?!}}}} \textbf{15.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{g}5+, 14...a5 15.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{g}5f6 16.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{h}6\pm}, 14...}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}5 15.b3\pm}} -- and Black has no reasonable plan whatsoever.)} \textbf{13.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}xd4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}d}4+ 14.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}xd4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}6 15.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}d}2 f6 16.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}4\pm}}} Black's position is very difficult, because of his compromised kingside, his lack of space and lag in development. After the obvious mistake: \textbf{16...}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}5?! 17.b4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}e}4?, Eng – Roos, Budapest 1984, White could have won a piece with: 18.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{w}d}5+--;}}}} \textbf{11...}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}8}} -- This move seems to be too passive. \textbf{12.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{ad}1 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}5}}} (About \textbf{12...}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}6 13.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}xe6 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}e}6 14.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}d5 – see 11...}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}c5 12.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{ad}1 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}6 13.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}xe6.}}} 13.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{g}5f6 14.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{h}6 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{h}8 15.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{h}1 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}6 16.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}3 c6 17.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}4\pm}} Henriksen – Kosmo, Helsinki 2000;}}}}}}}}}}}

\textbf{11...a5 12.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{ad}1 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}d}4 13.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{d}xd4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{e}5 14.f4 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{c}6 15.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}g}7 \textbf{\textit{\textbf{x}g}7 16.}\textbf{\textit{\textbf{f}3\pm}} and White's space advantage and the vulnerable dark squares on Black's kingside guarantee White a stable advantage, Kotro-

nias – Hrisanthopoulos, Karditsa 1984.)} 39
12.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}d1}  
It is premature for White to play 12.f4, due to: 12...\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xd4}  
13.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xd4} c5!± and Black has counterplay.

12...\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xd4}  
After: 12...\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}e7}?! 13.c5! c6, Eising – Dittmann, Schkopau 1954, White wins at least a pawn: 14.cxd6 \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xd6} 15.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xc6}! \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xc6} (15...\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xd2} 16.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xe7}+ \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xe7}  
17.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xd2}+-) 16.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}b5} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}c4} 17.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}e2} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}e6} 18.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xc4}+-.

12...a6 – This is an interesting move for Black with the idea to organize some counterplay on the queenside. 13.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}d5} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xd4} (It is worse for Black to try: 13...\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}d7} 14.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}g5} f6 15.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}e3} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}e7} 16.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}fe1}±, because his pieces are quite misplaced, Mehlhorn – Marcinkiewicz, Email 2002.) 14.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xd4} c5  
15.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}c3} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}c6} 16.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xg7} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xg7} 17. \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}c3}+ f6 18.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}d2} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}d4} 19.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}fd1}+ (White could have sacrificed the exchange with: 19.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xd4} cxd4 20. \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xd4}± and he would have an obvious compensation, but the move in the game is no less purposeful – his plan includes deploying the knight to c2 and later exerting pressure against Black’s weak d6-pawn.) 19...\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}e6} 20.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}e3} b5 21.b3 \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}b8} 22.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}c2} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xe2}+ 23.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xe2} bxc4  
24.bxc4 \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}f7} 25.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}ed2} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}b6} 26.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}e3}± L.Schmid – H.Lambert, Berlin 1965.

13.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xd4} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}e6} 14.f4! \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xc4}  
In case of 14...c5, then after: 15.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xe5} dxe5 16.f5 \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xd2} 17.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xd2}± White remains with a clear advantage.

15.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xc4} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xc4} 16.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xg7} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xf1} 17.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}h6} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}a6}  

18.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}d4}! (Here, it is quite strong for White to continue with: 18.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}d5} f6 19.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}c3} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}e6} 20.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xc7}± as well.) 18...f6 19.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}d5}+ \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}h8}  
20.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}f7} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}g8} 21.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}d5} \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}c4} 22. \underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}d3}!!+- and White was threatening 23.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}h3} and 24.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}xh7}, so Black was forced to part with his queen in the game Illescas Cordoba – Mohr, Yerevan 1996.

b) 10...\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}e5}  

Black places his knight on a very active position in the centre, making use of the fact that White cannot oust it from there so easily.

11.\underline{\text{\textit{\textbf{Q}}}d2} c6
11...c5? – this move loses the important d6-pawn. 12...\textit{c}db5 \textit{c}e6 13...\textit{c}xd6 \textit{c}e7 14...\textit{f}4+ – E.Oosterom – Beverdam, Haarlem 2000.

11...\textit{c}h8 – that is too passive. 12...\textit{c}d1 \textit{g}8 13...\textit{g}5 \textit{f}6 14...\textit{h}4 \textit{g}5 15...\textit{g}3 \textit{g}6 16...c5± and White opens the position exploiting the misplaced black pieces, Nylander – Chazalette, Trio 1996.

The move 11...\textit{c}e6 – presents White with a couple of bishops without any compensation at all. 12...\textit{c}xe6 \textit{b}xe6 (It is even worse for Black to defend with: 12...fxe6 13...\textit{d}d1 \textit{e}7, Kalista – Jenc, Klatovy 2004, 14...\textit{h}3 \textit{d}ed7 15...f4± and White is dominant in the centre.) 13...\textit{d}d1± Montane – Aguirre, Spain 1997.

11...\textit{d}d7 12...\textit{d}d1 a6 (In answer to 12...\textit{c}c6, it is useful for White to trade his opponent’s active bishop – 13...\textit{h}6 \textit{xh}6 14...\textit{xh}6 \textit{e}7?!, Dumbo – Grasmat, Internet 1999, Black’s last move enables White to develop a powerful initiative on the kingside: 15...\textit{h}4 \textit{c}e8 16...g4 \textit{g}7 17...g5 \textit{g}8 18...\textit{d}d7 19.e5±) 13...\textit{f}e1 \textit{b}8 14...\textit{b}4 \textit{e}7 15...\textit{f}1 \textit{bd}8, Mallet – Gregoire, France 1999, and here the pin is extremely unpleasant for Black after 16...\textit{g}5 c6 (It is even worse for Black to play: 16...\textit{e}e6 17.f4 \textit{xc}4 18...\textit{xc}4 \textit{xc}4 19.e5 dxe5 20.fxe5 \textit{xb}4 21...\textit{f}6±) 17.f4 \textit{g}4 (Black has no compensation for the pawn after: 17...\textit{eg}4 18...h3 h6 19...\textit{h}4 g5 20...\textit{f}5 \textit{hx}5 21...\textit{xf}5±, while in case of: 17...\textit{c}8 18...\textit{c}1 \textit{d}d7 19...f3± his pieces are tremendously passive.) 18...\textit{c}c1 \textit{c}8 19...h3±.

Black fails to create any counterplay on the queenside with the line: 11...a6 12...\textit{d}d1 c5 (About 12...c6 – see 11...c6; 12...\textit{h}5, Shevekain – Nesterets, Mariupol 2003, 13...\textit{g}5±; 12...b6 13...\textit{g}5 \textit{b}7 14.a3 \textit{d}d7 15.b4 \textit{ac}8 16...\textit{c}c2 \textit{b}8 17...\textit{fe}1 \textit{e}6 18...\textit{d}5± Schneider – Pereira, corr. 2000; the move – 12...\textit{fd}7 – enables White to repel Black’s active knight with: 13.f4 \textit{c}6 14...\textit{xc}6 \textit{bxc}6 15.c5± S.Romero – Gata, Albacete 2003; 12...\textit{e}6 13...\textit{xe}6 \textit{xe}6 14.f4 \textit{eg}4 15...d4± Billen – Marshall, Email 1998; 12...\textit{d}d7 13...\textit{g}5 \textit{c}6 14...\textit{b}3±, followed by \textit{d}d5, Uhlmann – Savon, Cienfuegos 1973.) 13...\textit{c}2 \textit{e}6 14.b3 \textit{a}5 15...\textit{e}1 \textit{c}7 16.f4 \textit{c}6 17.f5± and White has a superior position in the centre and on the kingside. Black’s attempt to reverse the run of play by tactical means led him to a lost position after: 17...\textit{xe}4 18...\textit{xe}4 \textit{xf}5 19...\textit{xf}5!! – in the game Luczak – Balcerowski, Lubniewice 1981.

12...\textit{d}d1
12...\textit{\v{c}}e7

After 12...d5?! 13.\textit{\v{c}}c2 b6 14. cxd5 cxd5 15.f4 \textit{\v{c}}eg4 16.e5\texttildelow, Black remains at least a pawn down, Berndt – R.Schneider, corr. 1983.

12...\textit{\v{c}}e6?! 13.\textit{\v{c}}xe6 \textit{\v{c}}xe6 14.f4 \textit{\v{c}}eg4 15.\textit{\v{c}}d4\texttildelow Billen – Marshall, Email 1998.

12...a5, van der Griendt – Schouten, Dieren 1991, 13.\textit{\v{c}}c2 \textit{\v{c}}e6 14.b3 \textit{\v{c}}f8 15.\textit{\v{c}}d4\texttildelow.

In case of 12...\textit{\v{c}}c7 13.h3 a6 14. a4 \textit{\v{c}}a5 15.\textit{\v{c}}c2 \textit{\v{c}}e6 16.b3\texttildelow, White prepares the pawn-advance f3-f4 and his position is more active, Aloni – Domnitz, Nethanya 1968.

12...\textit{\v{c}}h5 13.\textit{\v{c}}c2 \textit{\v{c}}e6 14.b3 \textit{\v{c}}a5 15.\textit{\v{c}}a4 \textit{\v{c}}xd2 16.\textit{\v{c}}xd2 \textit{\v{c}}f8, Surender – MacNair, corr. 1999, 17.c5 d5 (The other possibilities for Black are clearly worse: 17...\textit{\v{c}}ed8 18.\textit{\v{c}}fd1 d5 19.\textit{\v{c}}b4\texttildelow, or 17...\textit{\v{c}}ad8 18.g4 \textit{\v{c}}f6 19.\textit{\v{c}}xd6 \textit{\v{c}}xd6 20.\textit{\v{c}}xd6 \textit{\v{c}}xd6 21.\textit{\v{c}}d1 \textit{\v{c}}b8 22.h3\texttildelow) 18.f4 \textit{\v{c}}g4 19.\textit{\v{c}}xd5 cxd5 20.\textit{\v{c}}d4\texttildelow and White has a slight but stable advantage, because of his opponent’s weak d5-pawn.

12...a6 – This is an interesting plan for Black to prepare some actions on the queenside. 13.\textit{\v{c}}c2 \textit{\v{c}}e6 14.b3 b5 (The endgame is very difficult for Black after: 14...\textit{\v{c}}a5 15.\textit{\v{c}}a4 \textit{\v{c}}xd2 16.\textit{\v{c}}xd2 \textit{\v{c}}f8 17.\textit{\v{c}}b6 \textit{\v{c}}ab8 18.\textit{\v{c}}fd1 \textit{\v{c}}ed7 19.\textit{\v{c}}xd7 \textit{\v{c}}xd7 20.\textit{\v{c}}f4 f5 21.\textit{\v{c}}xd6 \textit{\v{c}}xd6 22.\textit{\v{c}}xd6\texttildelow – he has no compensation for the sacrificed pawn, Langeweg – Timman, Leeuwarden 1977, he would not have saved the pawn either with: 20...\textit{\v{c}}e5 21.c5\texttildelow) 15. cxb5 axb5 16.\textit{\v{c}}xd6 \textit{\v{c}}xd6 17.\textit{\v{c}}xd6 \textit{\v{c}}f8 18.\textit{\v{c}}ed1 b4 19.\textit{\v{c}}a4 \textit{\v{c}}xa4 – that move is necessary; otherwise Black remains simply a pawn down. 20.bxa4 \textit{\v{c}}xa2, Cepon – Mauro, Cannes 1994 and here after: 21.a5 c5 22.a6 \textit{\v{c}}a8 23.\textit{\v{c}}a1 \textit{\v{c}}c4 (It is too bad for Black to play: 23...b3 24.\textit{\v{c}}xa2 bxa2 25.\textit{\v{c}}a1+-; 23...\textit{\v{c}}e6 24.\textit{\v{c}}f1\texttildelow) 24.\textit{\v{c}}xc4 \textit{\v{c}}xc4 25.\textit{\v{c}}fb1 \textit{\v{c}}e8 26.\textit{\v{c}}f4\texttildelow, Black fails to exploit effectively his connected passed pawns.

13.\textit{\v{c}}c2 \textit{\v{c}}e6 14.b3 \textit{\v{c}}ad8

14...\textit{\v{c}}ed8 15.\textit{\v{c}}g5 h6 (Or 15...\textit{\v{c}}c7 16.f4 \textit{\v{c}}eg4 17.\textit{\v{c}}d4\texttildelow; 15...d5 16.exd5 cxd5 17.\textit{\v{c}}e3 \textit{\v{c}}f5 18.\textit{\v{c}}d4 dxc4 19.\textit{\v{c}}xf5 gx\textit{\v{c}}f 20.\textit{\v{c}}xc4\texttildelow Pajkovic – V.Kostic, Cetinje 1992.) 16.\textit{\v{c}}xh6 \textit{\v{c}}xh6 17.\textit{\v{c}}xh6 d5, Spiridonov – Lukov, Pernik 1984 and now, White’s most energetic way to materialize his extra pawn is to act in the centre with: 18.\textit{\v{c}}g5 \textit{\v{c}}ed7 19.e5 \textit{\v{c}}c5+ 20.\textit{\v{c}}d4 dxc4 21.f4 cx\textit{\v{c}}b3 22.\textit{\v{c}}a4. Black’s king shelter has been compromised and he has problems with the defence, so he is bound to lose some material soon, for example: 22...\textit{\v{c}}d5 23.\textit{\v{c}}xb3 \textit{\v{c}}e4 24.\textit{\v{c}}h6 b5 25.\textit{\v{c}}f5+-.

15.\textit{\v{c}}g5!

It is too dangerous for White to capture the rook-pawn after: 15.f4 \textit{\v{c}}eg4 16.\textit{\v{c}}xa7 b5 17.\textit{\v{c}}d4 bxc4 18.bxc4 c5 19.\textit{\v{c}}xf6 \textit{\v{c}}xf6\texttildelow, Black had some compensation in the game Mena – R.Peris, corr. 1991.
15...h6 (Black is not out of the woods after 15...c7?!, Baro – Rojas Sola, Malaga 1997, 16.f4 dxe4 17.f5!?) 16.xh6 xh6 17.xh6 d5 18.g5 c8, Haro de Souza – Vescovi, Registro 1997 and Black had no compensation for the pawn. White could have emphasized his advantage here with the line: 19.f4! d6d7 (It is even worse for Black to play: 19... d4e4 20.e5 d7c5 21.fd4! dxc4 22.exf6++) 21...d7h7 22.d7h4 d7f5 23.b4 d6b6 24.d7c5 d7c7 25.xg4 dxc2 26.e1c+-)

20.e5 d7c5+ 21. d7d4±.

c) 10...d7

This move is played by Black in order to avoid doubling of the pawns, because now he will be able to capture on c6 with his bishop.

11.d2 a6

About 11...e5 12.ad1 – see 10...e5; 11...h5 12.f4 – see 10...h5 11.d2 d7d7 12.f4.

11...h5?! 12.ad1 d7h7 13.c5! – opening of the d-file increases White’s advantage. 13...dxc5, Muehlbauer – Mueller, Bayern 1996 and now it is good for White to follow with: 14.d3 b3 c8 (It is not any better for Black to try: 14...e6 15.xc5 xd2 16.xd2 ad8 17.fd1±) 15.xc5 xd2 16.xd2± and White controls practically the entire centre of the board and Black can hardly defend his queenside;

After 11...h8 12.ad1 g8, Sirbiladze – Gugulashvili, Tbilisi 2002, it is logical for White to open the d-file with: 13.c5 dxc5 14.d3 c8 15.xc5±.


Black’s position remains rather cramped after: 11...xd4 12.xd4 c6 (The other possibilities for Black are not better at all: 12...a6 13.fd1 e7 14.c5 ad8 15.cxd6 cxd6 16.b6 Teixeira – Carbonaro, corr. 1990; 12...h6 13.fd1 c6, Anelli – Montes de Oca, Villa Ballester 1994, 14.ad1±; 12...h5 13.f4 f6 14.d3±; 12...c6 13.ad1 e6 14.e3±; 12...e7

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13...\textit{c8} 14.\textit{ac}1± Schipmann – Sveinsson, Email 2000, 13...\textit{c6} 14.b4 b6 15.\textit{d5} \textit{xd5} 16.\textit{cxd5}± N.Spiridonov – Kadrev, Bulgaria 1967 and White has a definite space advantage in all variations.) 13.eac1 b6 (Black would not change anything much with the line: 13...a5, Wiedenkeller – Hammar, Uppsala 1985, 14.\textit{fd1}; while in answer to 13...\textit{h5}, Sudakov – Srebrnic, Pnuit 2003, White can exchange the bishops: 14.\textit{xg7} \textit{xg7} 15.g4! \textit{f6} 16.g5 \textit{d7} 17.b4 b6 18.f4±, with a total control over the centre; therefore Black should better capture with his knight: 14...\textit{xg7} 15.\textit{d5} f5 16.\textit{d3}± 14.\textit{fd1} a5 15.\textit{f1} \textit{d7} 16.\textit{f2} \textit{c5} 17.b3 h5 18.\textit{d5}± Cebalo – Butorac, Pula 1998.

\textbf{12.\textit{ad1} \textit{b8}}

The other possibilities for Black are not to be preferred either:

12...\textit{xd4} – This move enables White to organize a powerful pressure in the centre and on the queenside: 13.\textit{xd4} \textit{c6} 14.b4 b6 15.\textit{b2} \textit{h5} 16.\textit{g7} \textit{g7} 17.\textit{c5}± Nedeljkovic – Nestler, Bled 1953;

12...b5 – Black’s attempt to create some counterplay on the queenside only leads to the appearance of new weaknesses in his position. 13.a3 bxc4 14.\textit{xc6} \textit{xc6} 15.\textit{xc4} \textit{b8} 16.\textit{d4}± Gruenenwald – Kiefer, Switzerland 2000;

12...\textit{e7} 13.\textit{b3} \textit{ad8} 14.\textit{g5}

\textbf{13.\textit{fe1} b5}, Sarkozy – Kotan, Slovakia 1994 (About 13...\textit{e5} – see 10...\textit{e5}; 13...\textit{xd4} 14.\textit{xd4} \textit{e6} 15.\textit{f1} \textit{d7}?! , Dezelak – Milic, Slovenia 1992, 16.b4 \textit{e7} 17.b5±) \textbf{14.\textit{xc6}} (White exchanges those pieces of his opponent, which are presently active and he intends to trade later the dark-squared bishops as well.) \textbf{14...\textit{xc6} 15.\textit{a7} \textit{a8} 15...\textit{b7} 16.\textit{d4}±} 16.\textit{d4}±. Black’s queenside actions led to the creation of new weaknesses. White controls the centre reliably and his opponent has no counterplay.

\textbf{d) 10...\textit{xd4}}

This is an attempt by Black to
facilitate his defence by simplifying the position.

11. \( \text{x} \text{xd}4 \)

11...c6

About 11...\( \text{d}7 \) 12.\( \text{d}2 \) – see 10...\( \text{d}7 \); as for 11...\( \text{e}6 \) 12.\( \text{d}2 \) c6 13.\( \text{e}1 \text{d}1 \) – see 11...c6.

It is too bad for Black to try: 11...\( \text{h}5 \), due to: 12.f4 \( \text{x} \text{xd}4+ \) 13.\( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 14.\( \text{e}1 \text{d}1 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 15.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 16.\( \text{e}5 \) Groszpeter – Kiss, Budapest 1992.

11...\( \text{h}5 \) – That strange move compromises Black’s kingside. 12.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 13.\( \text{e}1 \text{d}1 \) a6 14.\( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 15.\( \text{x} \text{g}7 \) \( \text{x} \text{g}7 \) 16.f4\text{e} Cebalo – van der Vorm, Biel 1992.

11...\( \text{d}7 \) – Black continues with his plan to provoke simplifications. 12.f4 \( \text{c}5 \) 13.\( \text{x} \text{g}7 \) \( \text{x} \text{g}7 \) 14.\( \text{x} \text{d}4+ \) f6 15.\( \text{f}3 \) a5 16.\( \text{e}1 \text{d}1 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 17.\( \text{f}1 \text{c}6 \) 18.\( \text{d}5 \) and he has problems to organize some counterplay, his kingside is vulnerable and he lacks space, Mikhailovski – Wirschell, Amsterdam 1995.

11...a6 12.\( \text{d}2 \) c5 – This move weakens not only the d6-pawn, but the important d5-square too (About 12...c6 13.\( \text{e}1 \text{d}1 \) – see 11...c6 12.\( \text{d}2 \) a6 13.\( \text{e}1 \text{d}1 \) 13.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 14.\( \text{f}1 \text{d}1 \) \( \text{b}6 \), Mayer – Stoffers, Email 1999, 15.\( \text{e}1 \text{d}8 \) 16.\( \text{h}6 \)±.

After 11...b6 12.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{b}7 \) 13.\( \text{e}1 \text{d}1 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 14.\( \text{x} \text{g}7 \) \( \text{x} \text{g}7 \) 15.\( \text{d}5 \) a5 16.\( \text{b}3 \), White has a space advantage and excellent prospects for actions on both sides of the board. 16...\( \text{x} \text{d}5 \)?! – White’s knight was very powerful indeed, but now the light-squares complex becomes quite vulnerable. 17.\( \text{x} \text{d}5 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 18.a3 \( \text{f}6 \) 19.\( \text{c}2 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 20.\( \text{b}5 \) Socko – Bednarcska, Krynica 1997.

11...\( \text{e}6 \) 12.\( \text{d}2 \) and now:

12...\( \text{e}7 \) 12.0–0 \( \text{f}6 \) 13.\( \text{e}1 \text{c}6 \), Juhasz – Rausz, Hungary 1995, White can develop his kingside initiative with: 14.f4 \( \text{e}1 \text{d}8 \) (It is possibly better for Black to try the seemingly strange line: 14...\( \text{h}6 \) 15.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 16.\( \text{d}1 \)±) 15.\( \text{f}5 \)±;

12...\( \text{d}7 \) 13.\( \text{e}1 \text{d}1 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 14.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{d}8 \), Sonntag – Guillaumont, Chanac 1989, 14.\( \text{d}5 \) – Now, Black is forced to exchange his vitally important bishop. 14...\( \text{x} \text{d}5 \) 15.\( \text{x} \text{d}5 \)±;

Black would not change much with: 12...a5 13.f4 \( \text{d}7 \) 14.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 15.\( \text{e}1 \text{d}7 \) 16.\( \text{x} \text{g}7 \) \( \text{x} \text{g}7 \) 17.\( \text{b}3 \)± D.Cramling – C.Hoi, Copenhagen 1982;

In answer to 12...\( \text{h}5 \), Stimpel – Csuilts, Bad Segeberg 2002, it is good for White to follow with: 13.f4 \( \text{x} \text{d}4+ \) (or 13...\( \text{f}6 \) 14.\( \text{e}1 \text{c}1 \)±) 14.\( \text{x} \text{d}4 \)±;

12...\( \text{d}7 \) 13.\( \text{x} \text{g}7 \) (Here, it deserves attention for White to avoid the trade of the dark-
squared bishops: 13.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\textbf{\texttt{f2}}}}? \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e5}}} 14.b3\textpm 13...\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{dxc7}}} 14.f4 \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{f6}}} 15.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{d1}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e7}}} 16.b3 a5 17.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{e3}}} \textcolor{green}{\textsf{\texttt{c5}}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{fe1}}} – and White maintains a slight edge thanks to his control over the centre, Lukacs – Karatorosian, Budapest 1997;

12...a6 13.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{ad1}}} \textcolor{green}{\textsf{\texttt{c8}}} (About 13...c6 14.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{e3}}} – see 11...c6 12.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{d2}}} \textcolor{green}{\textsf{\texttt{e6}}} 13.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{ad1}}} a6 14.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e3}}}; 13...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e7}}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{h1}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{ad8}}}, Hohler – Brestian, Triesen 2005, 15.f4\textpm 14.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{h1}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{d7}}} 15.b3 \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e6}}} 16.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{wxb2}}} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{h5}}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{xg7}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{xg7}}} 18.b4\textpm and White is dominant over the whole board, Shipov – De Souza, Internet 2004.

12.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{d2}}} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{e6}}}

12...a6 13.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{ad1}}} b5 (about 13...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e6}}} 14.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e3}}} – see 12...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e6}}} 14.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e3}}} \textcolor{green}{\textsf{\texttt{f8}}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{h1}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e6}}} 16.b3 – see 12...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e6}}} 13.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{ad1}}} a6.

12...d5 13.cxd5 cxd5 14.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{b5}}} dxe4 15.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{xe8}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{xe8}}} 16.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{ad1}}} Suto – Peierl, Eger 1996.

12...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e7}}} 13.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{ad1}}} \textcolor{green}{\textsf{\texttt{d8}}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{fe1}}} b6 15.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{f1}}} L.Rodriguez – V.Roca, Candas 1997.

12...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{c7}}} 13.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{fd1}}} (White can also play here: 13.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{ad1}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e6}}} 14.f4 – see 12...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e6}}} 13.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{ad1}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{c7}}} 14.f4.) 13...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e6}}} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{ac1}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{ad8}}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{d5}}} (Black is now forced to trade his bishop and he can hardly create any counterplay after that.) 15...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{xexd5}}} 16.cxd5 c5 17.b4 b6 18.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{b5}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{d7}}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{xg7}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{xg7}}} M.Kozak – Blatny, Czech Republic 2004 and here after: 20.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{e1}}} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{g8}}} 21.f4\textpm White’s mobile centre is quite powerful and his bishop is superior to his opponent’s knight.

12...\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{a5}}} 13.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{ad1}}} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{h8}}}?! Alvarez Ibarra – Auzmendi, Ermua 1990 (about 13...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e6}}} – see 12...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e6}}}). Now, White can exploit his opponent’s rather strange last move and he can organize a powerful kingside initiative with: 14.g4\textpm h6 (The other possibilities for Black are not any better either: 14...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{d8}}} 15.g5 \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e8}}} 16.f4\textpm; 14...\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{g8}}} 15.g5 \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{h5}}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{xg7}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{xg7}}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{f4}}} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{d8}}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{f2}}} and he can hardly parry White’s threat – 19.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{d5}}}!, or the development of his initiative.) 15.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e3}}} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{h7}}} 16.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{xd6}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e6}}} 17.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{wxc5}}} – and Black has some compensation for the pawn indeed, but it is insufficient.

13.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{ad1}}} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{a5}}}

13...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{c7}}}, Bangiev – Kleinschmidt, Kassel 1992, 14.f4\textuparrow.

13...a6 14.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e3}}} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{f8}}} 15.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{h1}}} b5 16.b3 \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{xc4}}} 17.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{xc4}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{c7}}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{f4}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{exd8}}} 19.c5 \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{e8}}} 20.\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{a4}}} Skarke – Berner, corr. 1994.

14.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{h1}}} \textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{h5}}}?! E.Bukic – Mestrovic, Banja Luka 1974 (Black should better try here 14...\textcolor{blue}{\textsf{\texttt{b4}}} 15.b3\textpm) and now Black loses a pawn without any compensation after: 15.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{\texttt{f4}}}.
Conclusion

In this chapter we have analyzed some lines in which White maintains his control over the centre and later he can develop his initiative on the kingside with f3-f4, as well as on the queenside with the help of the pawn-advance – b2-b4. It is quite advantageous for him to deploy his knight on d5 in many lines and it is active from there on both sides of the board. In case Black exchanges it, White’s space advantage increases, the c-file is opened and Black must worry about the protection of his weak backward c7-pawn.
Chapter 4

1.\(\text{\textit{f3}}\) 2.\(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 2.\(c4\) 3.\(g6\) 4.\(c3\) 5.\(g7\) 6.\(e4\) 7.\(d6\) 8.\(d4\) 9.\(d4\) 10.\(e8\) 11.\(f3\) 12.\(c6\) 13.\(e3\) 14.\(h5\)

11.\(\text{\textit{d2}}\)?

White is trying to support maximally the position of his knight on d4, for the sake of prophylactics and he frees the d1-square for his rook.

We will analyze now: a) 11...\(\text{\textit{xd4}}\), b) 11...\(\text{\textit{f5}}\) and c) 11...\(\text{\textit{f4}}\).

Black has also tried here:

11...\(\text{\textit{b8}}\)?! – That is a dubious pawn-sacrifice, Schermer – Meyerhold, Pinneberg 2002, 12.\(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) \(\text{\textit{bxc6}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{xa7}}\) \(\text{\textit{f4}}\)? (After 13...\(\text{\textit{a8}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{e3}}\), Black has no compensation for the pawn.) 14.\(\text{\textit{xf4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xb2}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{xc1}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc3}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{xc3}}\) \(\text{\textit{exe2}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{xd3}}\) \(\text{\textit{eb2}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{d4}}\) \(\text{\textit{db8}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{c3}}\) and White has a considerable advantage, because of the vulnerable dark squares on Black's kingside; 11...\(\text{\textit{wh4}}\)?! 12.\(\text{\textit{db5}}\) \(\text{\textit{e5}}\) (Black lost rather quickly after: 12...\(\text{\textit{we7}}\)? 13.\(\text{\textit{d5}}\) \(\text{\textit{e5}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{bxc7}}\) \(\text{\textit{d7}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{xa8}}\) \(\text{\textit{xa8}}\) 16.\(f4\) 1–0 M.Savinov – Johnsen, Tromsoe 2000.) 13.\(\text{\textit{f4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc3}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{xc3}}\) \(\text{\textit{f6}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{g3}}\) \(\text{\textit{wh3}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{f3}}\) \(\text{\textit{g4}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{g2}}\) \(\text{\textit{wh5}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{d5}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{cxd5}}\)± A.Shneider – Gadjily, Linaires 1998;

11...\(\text{\textit{a6}}\) – This is just a loss of time. 12.\(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) \(\text{\textit{bxc6}}\) , Vukusic – Armanda, Split 1999, 13.\(\text{\textit{ad1}}\) \(\text{\textit{ab8}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{c5}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{fe1}}\) \(\text{\textit{e5}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{f4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc3}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{xc3}}\) \(\text{\textit{exe4}}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{hxh5}}\) \(\text{\textit{gxh5}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{d4}}\)+ and Black can hardly defend his compromised kingside without his dark-squared bishop.

a) 11...\(\text{\textit{xd4}}\)

Black is trying to simplify the position in his fight for equality.
12.\textit{\text{\textbf{x}d4}} \text{\textit{\text{\textbf{f}4}}}

About 12...\textit{\textbf{x}d4} 13.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}d4}} \text{\textit{\text{\textbf{f}4}}}
14.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{\textbf{f}d}1}} – see 12...\textit{\textbf{f}4}.

13.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{f}d}1}

White must play accurately. In case of 13.\textit{\textbf{x}g7}, Black has the intermediate move 13...\textit{\textbf{g}5!} and after: 14.\textit{\textbf{f}2} \textit{\textbf{\textbf{g}x}g7} 15.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}d}4+} (It is too bad for White to play 15.g3?, because of: 15...\textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}c}5+} 16.\textit{\textbf{e}1} \textit{\textbf{g}2+} 17.\textit{\textbf{d}1} \textit{\textbf{e}3} – +) 15...\textit{\textbf{g}8} 16.g3 \textit{\textbf{\textbf{d}x}e}2 17.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{d}x}e}2 \textit{\textbf{w}e}5 18.\textit{\textbf{w}x}e5 dxe5 19.\textit{\textbf{d}c}3 c6= White has no advantage whatsoever, Trettin – Kassebaum, Germany 1995.

We will analyze now: \textbf{a1}) 13...\textit{\textbf{\textbf{d}x}e}2 and \textbf{a2}) 13...\textit{\textbf{x}d4}.

After 13...\textit{\textbf{g}5} 14.f1, Black should better transpose to variation \textbf{a2} with 14...\textit{\textbf{x}d4} – see 13...\textit{\textbf{x}d4}. White obtains easily the advantage in all other lines:

14...\textit{\textbf{e}6??} Petschar – Rogetzer, Austria 2003, Black loses a piece with that naturally looking move after 15.\textit{\textbf{e}3+-}.

14...\textit{\textbf{e}5?!} Shipov – Gelashvili, Internet 2002, enables White to isolate Black’s knight, 15.\textit{\textbf{e}3} \textit{\textbf{w}h}4 16.g3 \textit{\textbf{h}3+} 17.\textit{\textbf{h}1} \textit{\textbf{f}6} (or

17...\textit{\textbf{w}e}7 18.\textit{\textbf{g}2±} 18.\textit{\textbf{g}2±} – and Black’s knight is quite miserable at the edge of the board and he cannot bring it back into the actions without considerable positional concessions;

14...\textit{\textbf{h}3+} 15.\textit{\textbf{h}1} \textit{\textbf{w}x}d2 16.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}d2} \textit{\textbf{f}4} 17.\textit{\textbf{d}5} \textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}d5} 18.\textit{\textbf{c}x}d5= – and White has a clear-cut plan to attack his opponent’s backward c7-pawn, while Black has nothing to counter that with. 18...\textit{\textbf{h}6} (It is evidently better for Black to play here: 18...f5 19.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}g}7 \textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}g7} 20.\textit{\textbf{c}1} fxe4 21.\textit{\textbf{c}x}e7+ \textit{\textbf{h}6} 22.\textit{\textbf{e}2±}, but while White still wins a pawn, Werle – Jianu, Heraklio 2002.) 19.\textit{\textbf{c}2} f5 20.\textit{\textbf{c}x}e7 fxe4 21.\textit{\textbf{b}5} \textit{\textbf{f}8} 22.\textit{\textbf{f}xe}4+- Grigore – Nannelli, Montecatini Terme 2000;

14...\textit{\textbf{h}6}, Hesse – Hoepfl, Germany 2004, 15.\textit{\textbf{d}5}! \textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}d5} (Black loses material after: 15...\textit{\textbf{h}3+} 16.\textit{\textbf{h}1} \textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}d}2 17.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}d}2 \textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}d}2 18.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{c}x}7±} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}g}5 \textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}g}5 17.\textit{\textbf{c}x}d5± and the pawn-structure is quite favourable for White.

\textbf{a1}) 13...\textit{\textbf{e}x}e2 + 14.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}e}2 \textit{\textbf{e}6}

About 14...\textit{\textbf{x}d}4 15.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}d}4 – see variation \textbf{a2}.

The other possibilities for Black are worse for him:

14...b6 15.\textit{\textbf{c}3} \textit{\textbf{b}7} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}g}7 \textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}g}7 17.\textit{\textbf{a}c}1 a5, Dornauer – Enoeckl, Austria 1999, 18.\textit{\textbf{d}5±;

14...\textit{f}6 15.\textit{\textbf{a}c}1± Teloeken – Kassebaum, Germany 1997;

14...f5 15.\textit{\textbf{c}3} \textit{\textbf{e}6} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}g}7 \textit{\textbf{\textbf{w}x}g}7, L.Rasin – Braunlich, Boston 2001, 17.\textit{\textbf{a}c}1±;
14...\textit{\texttt{h}4} 15.\textit{\texttt{x}g}7  \textit{\texttt{x}g}7 16.\textit{\texttt{a}c}1 \textit{\texttt{e}6}, Malakhatko – Kernazhitsky, Ukraine 2000, 17.\textit{\texttt{f}4} – see 14...\textit{\texttt{e}6};

14...\textit{\texttt{e}7} 15.\textit{\texttt{c}3} \textit{\texttt{e}6} (Black loses immediately after the “pseudo-active” move – 15...\textit{f}5? 16.\textit{\texttt{d}5} \textit{\texttt{f}7} 17.\textit{\texttt{x}g}7  \textit{\texttt{x}g}7 18.\textit{\texttt{c}3}+  \textit{\texttt{h}6} 19.\textit{\texttt{e}x}f5  \textit{\texttt{x}f}5 20.\textit{g}4 \textit{\texttt{c}6} 21.\textit{g}5+ – Peek – De Saegher, Amsterdam 2002.) 16.\textit{\texttt{x}g}7 \textit{\texttt{x}g}7 17.\textit{\texttt{d}5} \textit{\texttt{x}d}5 18.\textit{cxd}5\texttt{±} and White’s superior pawn-structure enables him to combine his queenside pressure with an active play in the centre: 18...\textit{\texttt{e}5}?! 19.\textit{\texttt{a}c}1\texttt{±} \textit{\texttt{e}7} 20.\textit{\texttt{b}4} \textit{\texttt{c}8} 21.\textit{\texttt{d}c}1  \textit{\texttt{g}8} 22.\textit{\texttt{b}4} \textit{\texttt{f}5} 23.\textit{\texttt{f}4}! \textit{\texttt{f}6} 24.\textit{\texttt{e}5} \textit{\texttt{dxe}5} 25.\textit{\texttt{d}6}+– S.Savchenko – Taeger, Bad Wiessee 2002.

15.\textit{\texttt{a}c}1 \textit{\texttt{h}4}

The character of the actions is not changed too much with: 15...\textit{\texttt{a}5} 16.\textit{b}3\texttt{±} Loseries – Kistella, Germany 1995.

16.\textit{\texttt{x}g}7 \textit{\texttt{x}g}7 17.\textit{\texttt{f}4} \textit{\texttt{f}6} 18.\textit{\texttt{c}3} \textit{\texttt{e}5} 19.\textit{\texttt{d}4} \textit{\texttt{x}d}4+ 20.\textit{\texttt{x}d}4 \textit{\texttt{e}7} 21.\textit{\texttt{f}2}\texttt{±} White’s position is much more pleasant, Arlandi – Gaido, Montecatini Terme 1999.

\textbf{a2) 13...\textit{\texttt{x}d}4+ 14.\textit{\texttt{xd}4}}

\textbf{14...\textit{\texttt{g}5}}

After 14...\textit{\texttt{f}5} 15.\textit{\texttt{f}1} \textit{\texttt{g}5} 16.\textit{\texttt{h}1} \textit{\texttt{e}6}, Benkovic – Kosanovic, Backa Palanka 2001, it is very good for White to follow with: 17.\textit{\texttt{e}5} \textit{\texttt{dxe}5} 18.\textit{\texttt{x}e}5\texttt{±} and he maintains a great advantage thanks to his centralization and the compromised position of the black king.

Black’s attempts to deviate from the main line are unsatisfactory:

14...\textit{\texttt{b}6} 15.\textit{\texttt{f}1} \textit{\texttt{e}6} 16.\textit{\texttt{d}2} \textit{\texttt{a}5} 17.\textit{\texttt{d}5} \textit{\texttt{b}7} 18.\textit{\texttt{c}3} \textit{\texttt{xd}5} 19.\textit{\texttt{cxd}5}\texttt{±} Verduyn – De Wit, Belgium 2003;

14...\textit{\texttt{d}7} 15.\textit{\texttt{f}1} \textit{\texttt{e}6} 16.\textit{\texttt{d}2} \textit{\texttt{c}6} 17.\textit{\texttt{b}4} \textit{\texttt{b}6} 18.\textit{\texttt{d}5}\texttt{±} Jankovic – Ljubicic, Pula 2005.

His most interesting try to equalize is the line: 14...\textit{\texttt{xe}2}+ 15.\textit{\texttt{xe}2} \textit{\texttt{b}6} – this move has been played regularly in practice by the young Russian master I.Khairullin (Or 15...\textit{\texttt{e}6} 16.\textit{\texttt{a}c}1 \textit{\texttt{g}5} 17.\textit{\texttt{b}3}\texttt{±} \textit{\texttt{c}5} 18.\textit{\texttt{x}c}5 \textit{\texttt{dxc}5} 19.\textit{\texttt{d}2}\texttt{±} S.Ionov – De Jong, Wijk aan Zee 1998; if 15...\textit{\texttt{g}5} 16.\textit{\texttt{a}c}1 \textit{\texttt{e}5}, then after: 17.\textit{\texttt{c}5}! \textit{\texttt{x}d}4+ 18.\textit{\texttt{a}d}4 \textit{\texttt{dxc}5} 19.\textit{\texttt{b}5}\texttt{±} Black’s position
becomes quite difficult, Gustafsson – Seibold, Fuertth 1998.)

16.\texttt{c3 b7 17.d5 \texttt{xd5 18.cxd5 g5 19.eac1 e7 20.d2 h4,}

Vitiugov – I.Khairullin, Cheboksary 2006 (or 20...\texttt{h5, Strayer – Becerra Rivero, Dos Hermanas 2004, 21.g4!?±) and here, since Black has no other reasonable plan to create any counterplay in sight except the preparation of the pawn-advance f7-f5, it deserves attention for White to occupy some space on the kingside with: 21.g3!? \texttt{h5 (or 21...\texttt{f6 22.c3±) 22.g4 h4 (or 22...\texttt{e5 23.h1±)

\texttt{h1±. Here, White can exploit his space advantage by creating threats along the open c-file and on the kingside. The possible exchange of queens is also favourable for him, because his rooks are more mobile.}

15.\texttt{f1}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess-board.png}
\end{center}

15...\texttt{e6!?

It is premature for Black to play: 15...f5 16.e1 d7 17.c5± – because here the vulnerable placement of his king provides White with clearly better chances, Le Quang – Nguyen Van Huy, Malaysia 2004.

It is worse for Black to play 15...\texttt{c5, Nill – Lauterbach, England 2001, because the arising endgame is very unpleasant for him: 16.e5 dxc5 17.d5 \texttt{xd5 18.cxd5 f5 19.eac1 b6 (19...\texttt{xe4}

20.e5 exf3 21.e7± 20.e5 e5 21.b4±.}

15...b6?! – This move enables White to force his opponent to capture on d5. 16.d5 \texttt{xd5 17.cxd5 f5 18.eac1± Black is now so far behind in development that he fails to create any counterplay. 18.e7 19.e5!? dxe5 20.e4 g7 (Black’s defence is very difficult after: 20...\texttt{b8 21.d6+ e6}

22.dxe7 c8 23.ea4±) 21.e6 b8 22.d6 cxd6 23.e6\texttt{a8 24. e7-- Galyas – Pachow, Budapest 2002.}

The move 15...h5 looks strange too and now White obtains easily a great advantage: 16.d5 \texttt{xd5 17.cxd5 f5 18.eac1 e7 19.exf5}

\texttt{xf5 20.e1± (White occupies the open file.) 20...\texttt{f7?, Landscheidt – Hamburg, Ruhrgebiet 1999, (It is also a disaster for Black to try: 20...ae8 21.e7!±–) 21.b4++.}

15...\texttt{d7 16.d5 \texttt{xd5 17.cxd5 f5 (Black loses a pawn after: 17...}

c5 18.dxc6 \texttt{xc6 19.e6± Tratar – Rezan, Rijeka 2001.) 18.exf5}

\texttt{xf5 19.eac1 e7 20.\texttt{c3± Niedermieser – Rogetzer, Austria 2005.}

15...\texttt{e6 16.eac1 e6 17.e7±}

Huhndorf – Weber, corr. 1995.}

The active try – 15...h3, can be parried by White with the help
of 16.\texttt{d}d2!±, with the idea to follow with \texttt{d}d5. Now, after 16...\texttt{E}e6, Pelletier – Reichenbacher, Germany 2000, Black has lost an important tempo in comparison to the main line and that permits White to accomplish a favourable exchange – 17.\texttt{d}d5 \texttt{x}d5 18.cxd5 \texttt{f}f6 (18...\texttt{h}h4 19.\texttt{f}f1 \texttt{e}e7 20.g3 \texttt{h}h3+ 21.\texttt{g}g2 \texttt{h}h5 22.\texttt{e}e2±) 19.\texttt{f}f1 \texttt{e}e7 20.\texttt{f}c2±.

В случае 15...\texttt{e}e6 16.\texttt{f}f2 (After: 16.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{x}d2 17.\texttt{x}d2 \texttt{b}6 18.\texttt{c}c1 \texttt{a}5 19.\texttt{f}f2 \texttt{b}7 20.\texttt{e}e2 \texttt{c}c5 21.\texttt{c}c1 \texttt{g}g7 22.\texttt{c}c2 \texttt{g}5 23.\texttt{h}h3 \texttt{h}h5=. Black succeeded in creating a reliable defensive fortress on both sides of the board in the game S.Pedersen – Borbjerggaard, Denmark 1999.) 16...\texttt{c}c5. Black trades the queens with the idea to secure his king to the end of the game, but then the influence of White’s space advantage increases considerably. (White controls totally the centre after the line: 16...b6?! 17.\texttt{d}d5 \texttt{b}7 18.f4 \texttt{f}8 19.e5 \texttt{x}d5 20.cxd5 \texttt{c}c5 21.\texttt{b}5±. Farago – Arribas, Balaguer 2005; in case of: 16...\texttt{f}5 17.\texttt{x}f5 \texttt{xf}5 18.\texttt{d}d5±, Black can repel White’s knight away from the centre only at the price of additional weakening of his position, Jaulneau – Ivanovic, corr. 2002.) 17.\texttt{d}d5 (White’s aim is to provoke new pawn-weaknesses in Black’s position in order to create targets for attack for his heavy pieces. Meanwhile, he should refrain from additional exchanges of light pieces and that can be proved by the following game: 17.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{b}6 18.\texttt{d}d5 \texttt{g}7 19.\texttt{e}e1 \texttt{x}f2+ 20.\texttt{x}f2 \texttt{b}7 21.g3 a5 22.b3 \texttt{x}d5 23.cxd5 \texttt{c}5=. Black’s knight has occupied a dominating position on the c5-outpost, Hoerstmann – Pa- chow, Germany 1999.) 17...\texttt{x}f2+ 18.\texttt{x}f2 \texttt{d}d8 (Black would not change much with: 18...\texttt{g}7 19.\texttt{g}3 \texttt{f}8, Cifuentes Parada – Borbjerg- gaard, Malaga 2003, after: 20.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{d}7 21.f4±, White maintains a slight, but stable advantage.) 19.\texttt{d}d2 \texttt{h}5 (The weakening move – 19...\texttt{c}5, was not left unpunished in the game M.Rytshagov – Hait, Russia 1997, 20.\texttt{ad}1 \texttt{f}8 21.\texttt{c}c3 \texttt{d}d4 22.\texttt{e}e2±) 20.\texttt{ad}1 \texttt{f}8 21.g3 \texttt{c}6 22.\texttt{e}e3 \texttt{e}7 23.f4± – and White preserves a stable pressure over Black’s position.

16.g3!

That is an obligatory move for White in his fight for the advantage.

If 16.\texttt{f}f1, then after the simple tactical strike: 16...\texttt{x}c4! 17.h4 \texttt{g}3 18.\texttt{x}c4, Black managed to draw in the game Summerscale – Littlewood, Telford 1997, in
view of the line: 18...h3+ 19.h1 f2+ with a perpetual check.

The immediate move 16.d5, allowed Black with the help of the variation: 16...xd5 17.cxd5 f5! 18.eac1 e7, to solve all his problems in the game Lindner – Schmaltz, St Ingbert 1995, because in answer to 19.exf5, he had the powerful argument: 19...e2! 20.h1 (But not 20.g3?, in view of: 20...wh6 21.h4 g2++) 20...xg2 21.fxg6 xh2+ 22.hxh2 wh4+ 23.g1 w3= and Black had a perpetual check.

16...h5
16...e7?! – This is a dubious move after which White creates pawn-weaknesses in his opponent's camp. 17.c5! d7 (Black loses after: 17...dxc5? 18.wd2 h3+ 19.xh3 xd2 20.xd2 xh3 21.d5 e5 22.f4++, because he must give up the exchange.) 18.wf2 h5 (In case of: 18...dxc5? 19.xd7 xd7 20.h4++, Black loses a knight, while he ends up in a very difficult position too after: 18...h3+ 19.xh3 xh3 20.cxd6 xd6 21.exd6 cxd6 22.d4±) 19.cxd6 xd6 20.exd6 cxd6 21.d1± and Black has great problems defending his queenside, Smalcl – Lexa, corr. 1999.

The move – 16...a6 would not change much in this position after 17.eac1± Muschalek – Duebon, corr. 1998.

17.g2
White is preparing the pawn-advance – f3-f4.

17...we5 18.f4 xd4+ 19. xd4 f6 20.b3 e7
Black has the idea to build the following defensive set-up: f8, b7-b6 and a7-a5.

21.d2
White plans to break through in the centre with e4-e5.

21...b8 22.f1
Now, he switches to the preparation of f4-f5 at an opportune moment.

22...f7
It is a mistake for Black to play here 22...g7?!, because of: 23.f5! gxf5 24.exf5 f7 (But not 24...xf5?, due to: 25.d5 f7 26.f4++, or: 24...xf5, in view of: 25.d5 f7 26.g4++ and Black is incapable of avoiding material losses.) 25.g4± – and White has managed to increase the sphere of action of his light-squared bishop and to destroy Black's pawnchain on the kingside, Gavrikov – Dvoretzky, Bad Wiessee 1997.

23.c1± – White has preserved a powerful positional pressure. It was hardly worth for him to have played 23.f5, because of Black’s response – 23...g5.
b) 11...f5

12...\&xc6

Now, after Black has opened his position a bit on the kingside, this exchange is quite reasonable, moreover that the move – 12...\&f6d1 is not sufficient for White to obtain the advantage: 12...fxe4 13.\&xe4 \&f6 14.\&c3 \&e7 15.\&f2 \&xd4 16.\&xd4 \&e6 17.\&f1, van Wely – Glek, Wijk aan Zee 1997 and here the simplest road for Black to equality is – 17...\&ad8=.

12...\&xc6 13.c5!? d5

The other possibilities for Black are:

13...fxe4 14.fxe4 \&e5 (or 14...\&e6 15.\&ad1±) 15.\&g5 \&f6 16.\&e1 \&e7 17.\&h4 \&xc3 18.bxc3 \&xe4 19.\&c4+d5 20.\&xf6 \&xf6 21.\&xf6 dxc4 22.\&xc6± and he is in for great troubles, despite the presence of opposite-coloured bishops on the board. In the game Gleizerov – Blehm, Cappelle la Grande 1998, Black played later quite logically; nevertheless he lost rather quickly: 22...\&f5 23.\&xc7 \&ec8 24.\&e7 \&xc5 25.\&f6 h5 26.\&ae1 \&c6 27.\&d4 \&d8 28.\&g7+ \&f8 29.\&ee7 1–0;

13...f4 14.\&f2 \&e6 (After: 14...\&b8 15.\&fd1 d5 16.\&ab1 \&e6 17.exd5 \&xd5 18.\&xd5 cxd5 19.b4±, Black failed to offer any tenacious resistance, because of the unfortunate placement of his knight on the h5-square in the game Krivoshey – Lefranc, Sautron 2001; he can defend his d6-pawn with the help of the move 14...\&e5 only temporarily: 15.\&c4+ \&g7 16.\&fd1 \&g5 17.cxd6 cxd6, because of 18.\&d4 and after: 18...\&e6 19.\&xe5+ \&xe5 20.\&xe6 \&xe6 21.\&ac1 \&c5+ 22.\&d4+ \&xd4 23.\&xd4 \&f7 24.\&ec4 c5 25.\&d5±, Black must defend a very difficult endgame, Belichev – Banikas, Tallinn 1997, if 14...\&g5 15.\&fd1 dxc5 16.\&a4 \&h3, then after: 17.\&f1 \&ad8 18.\&c2 \&d4 19.\&xc5± Black's threats have been parried and his weaknesses are still present.) 15.cxd6 cxd6 16.\&fd1 \&e5 17.\&ac1 (It is also good for White to follow with the standard move – 17.\&d4 and after: 17...\&wa5 18.\&f1 \&ab8 19.\&f2 \&b7 20.\&xe5 dxe5 21.\&ac1 g5 22.\&b3 \&g7 23.\&ed6=, Black’s position was very bad in the game Iskusnyh – Riazantsev, St Petersburg 1997.) 17...c5 (It is not any better for Black to try 17...\&f6, Bender sky – Minakov, corr. 1998, because White can occupy the vital d5-outpost with the help of the standard advance of his b-pawn: 18.b4! \&g5 – it is even worse for Black to try to stop that pawn with 18...a6?, because after 19.\&a4± White wins a pawn. 19.b5 cxb5
20.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}5!\pm$} 18.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{b}5$} 19.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{c}4$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{b}6$} 20.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{b}3\pm$} and Black's position is extremely difficult, Yermolinsky – Ashley, Philadelphia 1997;

13...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{b}8$} 14.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{cxd}6$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{x}d6$} (After 14...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{cxd}6$}, White has the powerful argument: 15.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{c}4+$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{h}8$} 16.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{xa}7\pm$} 15.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{ad}1$} and here Black's best choice is to enter an inferior endgame after: 15...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{e}5$} (In the game Atalik – Blehm, Cappelle la Grande 1999, Black tried 15...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{b}4$}, but after: 16.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{xa}7$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{b}7$} 17.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{a}3$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{xb}2$} 18.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{c}4+$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{h}8$}, he came under a crushing attack: 19.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}8!!$} 20.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{e}5$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{xa}3$} 21.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{exf}6{+-}$}) 16.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{f}4$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{xd}2$} 17.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{xd}2$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{xc}3$} 18.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{bxc}3$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{xe}4$} 19.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{xa}7$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{e}8$} 20.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{hxh}5$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{gxh}5$} 21.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}8+$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{xf}7$} 22.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{c}5\pm$};

The move 13...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{f}6$}, Rau – Schlichtaar, Winterberg 2002, looks logical in view of the possible preparation of the pawn-break – \textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}6$}–\textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}5$}; nevertheless Black is doomed after it to a long and very unpleasant defence: 14.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{ad}1$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}5$} (The preliminary exchange is not better for Black: 14...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{fxe}4$} 15.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{fxe}4$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}5$} 16.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{exd}5$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{cxd}5$} 17.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}4$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{c}6$} 18.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{b}4\pm$}, or 15...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{exe}4$} 16.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{exe}4$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{exe}4$} 17.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{f}3\pm$}) 15.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{exd}5$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{xd}5$} (In case of: 15...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{cxd}5$} 16.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}4$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{c}6$} 17.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{b}4\pm$}, White has a clear-cut plan for a queenside offensive.) 16.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{g}5$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}7$} 17.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{c}4\pm$} and the main defect of Black's position is his passive light-squared bishop;

13...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{e}7$} 14.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{cxd}6$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{cxd}6$} 15.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}4$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{f}6$} (In answer to 15...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{e}5$}, Ionov – Shliakhin, Smolensk 2000, White maintains a slight edge due to his superior pawn-structure after: 16.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{c}4+$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{e}6$} 17.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{exe}6+$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{exe}6$} 18.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{ad}1\pm$}; 15...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{fxe}4$} 16.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{fxe}4$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{f}6$} 17.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{ad}1$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{e}6$} 18.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{g}5$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{f}8$} 19.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{e}5$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{dxe}5$} 20.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{exe}5$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}5$} 21.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}5$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{cxd}5$} 22.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{c}3$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{xf}1{+}$} 23.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{xf}1$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{xd}4$} 24.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{xd}4\pm$} – and White has a minimal advantage in the arising endgame, Nadanian – Matikozian, Yerevan 1999.) 16.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{c}4+$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{e}6$} 17.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{exe}6+$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{exe}6$} 18.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{exf}5$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{xf}5$} 19.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{ae}1$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}5$}, Krivoshey – Pihlajasalo, Polanica Zdroj 1999, 20.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{exe}8+$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{xe}8$} (or 20...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{exe}8$} 21.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{xa}7\pm$}) 21.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{e}1\pm$}.

14.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{g}5!$}

It is not good for White to play 14.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{exd}5$}?; because of: 14...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{xc}3$}! 15.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{bxc}3$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{e}7$} 16.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{f}6$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{h}4+$} 17.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{g}1$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{e}7=$} and he cannot avoid the repetition of moves.

14...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{f}6$}

After 14...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{d}7$}, P.Nielsen – Volokitin, Esbjerg 2002, it is quite good enough for White to follow with 15.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{ad}1\pm$}.

15.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{xf}6$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{xf}6$} 16.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{exd}5$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{cxd}5$}

It is even worse for Black to continue with: 16...\textcolor{blue}{$\text{xd}5$} 17.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{c}4$} \textcolor{blue}{$\text{e}6$} 18.\textcolor{blue}{$\text{fe}1\pm$, because his position is very difficult, due to his inferior pawn-structure, his vul-

17.\textit{b5}. The evaluation of that position is favourable for White and that was confirmed in some practical games: 17...\textit{d7} (It is much worse for Black to defend with: 17...\textit{e6} 18.\textit{e2} c6 19.a4 \textit{e7} 20.\textit{d4} \textit{xc5} 21.b4 \textit{b6} 22.\textit{xc6}, because his d5-pawn is weak and his pieces are disordinated, I.Farago – Heck, Bad Zwesten 2002.) 18.\textit{c6} \textit{e6} 19.\textit{e2} \textit{d6} 20.\textit{d4} and the main drawback of Black’s position is due to his rather passive light pieces, Weetik – Khruschiov, St Petersburg 2001.

c) 11...\textit{f4} 12.\textit{fd1}  

Black has many possibilities here, but we are going to analyze in details two of them: \textbf{c1) 12...\textit{e6} and c2) 12...\textit{xe2}.}

The lines: 12...\textit{xd4} 13.\textit{xd4} and 12...\textit{xd4} 13.\textit{xd4} \textit{g5} 14.\textit{f1} \textit{xd4} 15.\textit{xd4}, transpose to variation \textit{a}.

He has also tried in practice:
12...\textit{e5} 13.\textit{xc6} \textit{xe2}+ 14. \textit{xe2} \textit{bxc6} 15.\textit{d4} \textit{f6} 16.c5 \textit{xe5} 17.\textit{xe5} \textit{xe5}, Mokos – Salai, Slovakia 2003, White should better preserve the queens in order to be able to create some threats on the kingside, besides attacking Black’s vulnerable pawns on the c-file. 18.\textit{c3} \textit{b8} 19.\textit{f2};

12...\textit{f5} 13.\textit{f1} \textit{e6} (After: 13...\textit{xd4} 14.\textit{xd4} \textit{xd4}+ 15.\textit{xd4}, it is quite dubious for Black to continue with: 15...\textit{fxe4}?! 16.\textit{xe4} \textit{f8} 17.\textit{e1} \textit{d7} 18.\textit{ad1} a5 19.c5, because White’s domination in the centre becomes overwhelming, Jacobs – Utesch, corr. 2000, it is more precise here for Black to play: 15...\textit{g5} 16.\textit{e1} – see variation \textit{a2}, 15...\textit{f5}) 14.\textit{xe6} \textit{xex6} 15.\textit{xf5} \textit{xf5} 16.d5 \textit{wd7} 17.\textit{h6} \textit{xex6} (It is worse for Black to defend with: 17...\textit{e5} 18.\textit{xb7} \textit{xb7} 19.\textit{wc3} g5 20.c5 \textit{ac8}, Akimov – Rybenko, Novokuznetsk 2001, because after 21.cxd6 cxd6 22.\textit{we3}, White wins a pawn.) 18.\textit{xb7} \textit{xb7} 19.\textit{ac1} \textit{g5} \textit{h} – H.Hoffmann, Germany 1997;
12...\textit{e6} 13.\textit{f1} \textit{xd4} 14.\textit{xd4} \textit{xe5}, Kreiman – Maurer, Bad Wiessee 1997, after 15.\textit{e3}?! \textit{h5}
(Black cannot play here 15...\texttt{f6}, because of: 16.\texttt{b5} \texttt{e7} 17.g3++) 16.\texttt{ac1+}, White maintains his advantage.

\textbf{c1) 12...\texttt{e6} 13.\texttt{xe6}  \texttt{xe6} 14.\texttt{d5 a5}}

In case of 14...f5, White follows with: 15.exf5 \texttt{xf5} 16.\texttt{d3±} and his prospects are preferable.

15.\texttt{g5}

After 15.\texttt{ac1} a4 16.\texttt{g5} f6 17.\texttt{h4 b6=}, Black’s position is quite acceptable, Vera – Becerra, Cuba 1996.

15...\texttt{d4+}

The natural move – 15...f6 is weaker here, because of: 16.\texttt{h4 g5} (In case of: 16...b6 17.\texttt{f4} \texttt{f8} 18.\texttt{ef1!} \texttt{h8} 19.\texttt{ae1 d7} 20.\texttt{d1±}, White deploys his pieces quite comfortably, Pelletier – Becerra, Lucerne 1997.) 17.\texttt{f2} f5 18.exf5 \texttt{xf5} 19.c5 dxc5 20.xc5± and White’s chances are clearly better.

16.\texttt{xd4} (After 16.\texttt{h1} f6 17.\texttt{h4 g5} 18.\texttt{g3}, Black can play 18...f5∞ and he obtains some counterplay.) 16...\texttt{xd4} (Black loses immediately after 16...\texttt{xd4}?) 17.\texttt{xg5?, because of 17.\texttt{f6!++--) 17.\texttt{xd8}  \texttt{xe2+} 18.\texttt{f2} \texttt{exd8} 19.\texttt{xe2±} – White has much better prospects in that endgame.

\textbf{c2) 12...\texttt{xe2+} 13.\texttt{cxe2}}

Black has obtained the two bishop-advantage indeed, but White’s space advantage has become threatening.

![Chess Diagram]

13...\texttt{e5}

About 13...\texttt{xd4} 14.\texttt{xd4} – see variation a.

13...\texttt{e6} – This move is played only very seldom, because now Black must consider the possibility of White capturing that bishop at any moment. 14.b3 \texttt{d7} 15.\texttt{f4} a6 16.\texttt{ac1} \texttt{ad8} 17.\texttt{xc6} bxc6 18.\texttt{d4} \texttt{xd4+} 19.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{e7} 20.c5± Atalik – Kilicaslan, Istanbul 2006.

13...\texttt{d7} – That move is rarely of a separate importance. 14.\texttt{ac1} b6, S.Nikolov – Ciglic, Ljubljana 2000 (About 14...\texttt{e5} 15.b3 – see 13...\texttt{e5}; as for 14...a6 15.b3 \texttt{e5} 16.\texttt{c3} – see 13...\texttt{e5}.), 15.\texttt{xc6} \texttt{xc6} 16.\texttt{d4±.}

13...f5 14.exf5 \texttt{xf5}, Nosenko – Korobkov, Mariupol 2003 and...
here after: 15.\textit{Q}xf5 gxf5 16.\textit{Q}f4±, Black has no compensation for his compromised kingside.

13...\textit{W}e7 14.\textit{D}c3 \textit{e}6 (It is premature for Black to play: 14...f5? 15.\textit{D}d5 \textit{W}f7, Y.Malinin – Dashko, Krasnodar 2002, in view of the simple line – 16.\textit{D}b5± and White wins his opponent’s c7-pawn.) 15.b3 a6 16.\textit{A}ac1 \textit{A}ac8 17.\textit{A}e1 \textit{Q}xd4 18.\textit{Q}xd4 \textit{Q}xd4+ (It is not better for Black to try: 18...\textit{Q}e5 19.f4 \textit{Q}xd4+ 20.\textit{Q}xd4 \textit{g}h4 21.\textit{g}f1±) 19.\textit{Q}xd4 \textit{g}5 20.\textit{g}f2 \textit{b}6 21.f4 \textit{Q}c5 22.\textit{e}e3± and Black has no counterplay and his defence on the kingside is quite problematic, Maksimenko – Kilicaslan, Chalkidi 2002.

14.\textit{A}ac1

White has often played here 14.b3, besides the move in the text, but that transposition of moves is practically immaterial. After: 14...a6 15.\textit{A}c3 \textit{d}7 16.\textit{A}ac1, the game enters the main line. Following the dubious move – 14...c6?! White after: 15.\textit{A}ac1 \textit{c}7 16.\textit{A}c3 b6 17.\textit{A}de2 \textit{f}8 18.\textit{g}5 \textit{d}7 (or 18...\textit{g}7 19.f4 \textit{d}7 20.e5+-) 19.\textit{h}6 \textit{xh}6, deprives his opponent of the two-bishop-advantage. (It is not good for Black to play here 19...\textit{e}7, in view of 20.\textit{d}d4 \textit{f}6 21.\textit{g}5±) 20.\textit{A}xh6 \textit{b}7 21.\textit{d}d2 \textit{e}6 22.\textit{d}d4 \textit{e}8 23.\textit{d}e2 \textit{e}6 24.\textit{f}4 \textit{f}6 and White’s positional pressure has paralyzed Black’s pieces. So it is not surprising that White has a tactical solution of the problems: 25.e5! \textit{e}5 26.\textit{e}4 \textit{f}5 27.\textit{e}e3±, with the idea to follow with g2-g4, Ivanchuk – Shirov, Yerevan 1996.

14...\textit{a}6

About 14...\textit{d}d7 15.b3 a6 16.\textit{A}c3 – see 14...\textit{a}6.

It is premature for Black to play: 14...f5 15.\textit{exf}5 gxf5, Kober – M.Hoffmann, Germany 2003, because after 16.\textit{A}g3 \textit{f}8 17.\textit{A}h5 \textit{h}8 18.\textit{h}6 \textit{f}7 19.\textit{f}2±, Black’s bishop pair does not compensate his compromised kingside, moreover that White has a space advantage.

After 14...\textit{W}e7, Giemsa – Juhnhke, Germany 1997, Black is threatening to push f7-f5, therefore it is logical for White to take care of his bishop: 15.\textit{h}6 \textit{f}6 (or 15...\textit{h}8 16.b3 c6 17.\textit{A}g3 \textit{d}8 18.\textit{g}5 \textit{f}6 19.\textit{e}3±) 16.b3 c6 17.\textit{A}c3± White maintains his advantage, thanks to his control over the centre, moreover that Black has no counterplay at all.

15.b3 \textit{d}7 16.\textit{A}c3

In case of: 16.\textit{h}6 \textit{h}8 17.\textit{g}5 \textit{f}6 18.\textit{h}4 \textit{g}7 19.\textit{c}3±, White’s position remains more pleasant, Goldin – Khalifman, Elista 1997.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chessboard.png}
\end{center}

16...\textit{A}b8
After 16...c8 17.\(d\)e2 b5 18. c5! dxc5, R. Janssen – V. Golod, Dieren 1998, the most aggressive line for White is: 19.f4!? g4 20.\(x\)xc5 b4 (It is too bad for Black to play: 20...\(x\)e6 21.\(w\)e1 \(d\)d7 22.e5±, because it is not clear how he can save his bishop on d7 after White doubles his rooks on the d-file.) 21.d5 \(x\)e4 22.\(g\)3 \(w\)h4!? (In case of 22...\(e\)e6 23.h3±, Black can hardly neutralize White's pressure along the d-file without material losses.) 23.\(x\)xe4 \(w\)xh2+ 24.\(f\)1 \(b\)5+ 25.\(c\)c4 \(w\)h1+ 26.\(g\)1 \(e\)e8 27.\(g\)3± – and Black's compensation for the sacrificed material is evidently insufficient.

17.\(d\)e2 \(e\)e6

White can counter the move 17...b5 with – 18.c5±.

After: 17...\(c\)c6 18.\(h\)h6 \(w\)e7 19.\(x\)g7 \(x\)g7, Shipov – Noritsyn, Guelph 2005, White maintains a stable advantage after the simple line: 20.d5 \(x\)xd5 (It is worse for Black to play: 20...\(w\)d8 21.\(w\)c3 \(g\)8 22.c5±, because White either creates a weakness for his opponent on the d6-square, or he opens the d-file.) 21.cxd5± and Black can hardly get rid of his backward c7-pawn without complying with additional weaknesses; meanwhile he has to worry about the possible advance of White’s central pawns.

18.d5 c5

Here, again the move – 18...b5 is not so good for Black, because it leads to the appearance of additional weaknesses on the queenside after: 19.cxb5 \(x\)xd5 20.\(w\)xd5 axb5 21.d4 \(w\)d7 22.\(c\)c6±.

18...f7 19.\(d\)e4 b6? (It is better for Black to continue with: 19...d7 20.\(a\)a7 \(e\)a8 21.d4±, although he has no possible counterplay in sight.) 20.\(x\)xe6 \(x\)xe6 21.b4 \(c\)c6 22.\(f\)f4 \(e\)e8, B. Lalic – Valdes, Seville 2003 and here White's most energetic reaction seems to be the temporary pawn-sacrifice – 23.b5!±. He occupies the d5-square, creating weaknesses on his opponent's queenside.

19.\(g\)5 (It is also good for White to follow with: 19.\(d\)f4!? \(c\)c6 20.\(x\)xe6 \(x\)xe6 21.\(f\)f4 \(e\)e8 22.d5±, because his knight occupies a dominating position in the centre.) 19...f6 20.\(h\)h6 \(x\)h6 21.\(x\)h6 \(x\)d5 22.\(x\)d5 b5 23.\(d\)d2 \(f\)7 24.\(g\)3±. White maintains some pressure against his opponent's d6-pawn and his prospects are clearly better, Psakhis – Manion, Chicago 1997.
Conclusion

We have analyzed in this chapter the most popular and logical methods of playing in the variation with the move 7...exd4. On his move 11, Black has three approximately equally strong possibilities:

In variation a Black tries to equalize by simplifying the position. Still, White has a stable space advantage and that enables him to preserve a powerful pressure against Black's position in the endgame. Meanwhile, Black's chances to obtain some active counterplay are just minimal.

In variation b Black is trying to organize immediately some counterplay in the centre, but that compromises his king's shelter. White has the better development and his pieces are perfectly deployed in the centre, so he manages to create weaknesses in his opponent's camp with the help of quite logical moves, avoiding Black's counterplay.

In variation c Black obtains the two bishop-advantage and he tries to avoid exchanges in order to prepare f7-f5 under more favourable circumstances, or to push b7-b5, with the idea to organize some counterplay on the queenside. Tournament practice shows however, that he fails to create any meaningful counterplay on the kingside and the pawn-advance b7-b5 only creates additional weaknesses.

The main advantage of White's position, which is typical for all the lines in this chapter, is that he enjoys permanently extra space and his pieces are well centralized. That helps him maintain a powerful pressure against his opponents position, no matter if Black chooses to compete in a middle game with many pieces on the board, or he prefers to fight for equality by simplifying.
Part 2

1.\(\text{\textit{d}f3}\) \(\text{\textit{\textit{d}f6}}\) 2.\(\text{\textit{c}4}\) \(\text{\textit{g}6}\) 3.\(\text{\textit{c}c3}\) \(\text{\textit{\textit{g}7}}\) 4.\(\text{\textit{e}4}\) \(\text{\textit{d}6}\) 5.\(\text{\textit{d}4}\) 0–0 6.\(\text{\textit{\textit{e}e2}}\) \(\text{\textit{e}5}\) 7.0–0 \(\text{\textit{\textit{a}a6}}\)

That move is relatively new. Let us try to understand Black’s idea by looking at the position from his point of view.

The positional battle in the King’s Indian Defence is focused on White’s centre. The most favourable developments for Black usually arise after White exchanges on e5, because that weakens the complex of dark squares in his camp. Still, it is tremendously difficult for Black to force his opponent to do that. In case White closes the centre with d4-d5, then the opponents usually attack on different sides of the board (for example after: 7...\(\text{\textit{c}c6}\) 8.\(\text{\textit{d}5}\) \(\text{\textit{\textit{c}c7}}\) and then each tempo becomes tremendously important, meanwhile Black has already lost some time and his knight is miserably placed on the e7-square. Black can also exchange pawns in the centre with 7...exd4, in order to ensure the c5-square for his knight. On the other hand, White’s knight then occupies the d4-outpost and if he solidifies his centre – his position remains clearly better. The move 7...\(\text{\textit{\textit{b}bd7}}\) is just classical, but Black is then practically forced to exchange on d4 at some moment, otherwise the diagonal for the bishop on c8 would remain closed.

Accordingly, Black is playing 7...\(\text{\textit{\textit{a}a6}}\), so that White will need to clarify the situation in the centre sooner or later and then Black’s knight on a6 will strive for entering the actions...

8.\(\text{\textit{\textit{c}c3}}\)

This is White’s most logical and possibly best move, solidifying the centre.

His other possibilities are less promising (for example): The move 8.\(\text{\textit{\textit{e}e1}}\) is considered to be one of the main lines for White, just like 8.\(\text{\textit{\textit{e}e3}}\). 8...\(\text{\textit{c}6}\) 9.\(\text{\textit{f}f1}\) (White has
also tried here 9...\(\texttt{b1}\). He intends to exploit favourably for him the fact that Black cannot play a7-a5, analogously to the variation with a knight on the d7-square, 9...\(\texttt{exd4} 10.\texttt{cxd4} \texttt{e8} 11.\texttt{f1} \texttt{g4} 12.\texttt{h3} \texttt{b6} 13.\texttt{hxe4} \texttt{xd4}^=\) and Black's counterplay is sufficient to maintain the balance. After 11.f3 \(\texttt{h5!} 12.\texttt{e3} \texttt{f5} 13.\texttt{f1} \texttt{f4} 14.\texttt{f2} \texttt{e5} 15.\texttt{b4} \texttt{f6}^!\), Black gradually seizes the initiative, Utemov – Glek, Moscow 1989, while in case of 11.\(\texttt{f3}\), it is annoying for White if Black continues with 11...\(\texttt{h6}\), followed by \(\texttt{h7-g5}\). 9...\(\texttt{exd4}\) (It is also possible for Black to play the not so active move 9...\(\texttt{g4}\), with which he is trying to take immediate advantage of the placement of his knight on a6 and not on the d7-square. 10.d5 c5 11.h3 \(\texttt{d7}\) 12.a3 12...\(\texttt{h8}\) 13.b4 \(\texttt{g8}\) 14.\(\texttt{b1}\) \(\texttt{h6}\) 15.\(\texttt{xh6}\) \(\texttt{xh6}\) 16.\(\texttt{d2}\) \(\texttt{g7}^=\),

Black's position is quite solid, Piket – Topalov, Tilburg 1998. Black must counter the maneuver 12.\(\texttt{g5}\), with the help of: 12...\(\texttt{h8}\) 13.a3 \(\texttt{b8}\) 14.\(\texttt{b1}\) \(\texttt{g8}\) 15.\(\texttt{b4}\) \(\texttt{f6}\) 16.\(\texttt{d2}\) \(\texttt{d8}\) 17.\(\texttt{d3}\) \(\texttt{h6}^=\) and his position was reliable enough in the game Anuszkiewicz – Szlag, Suwalki 1999.\) 10.\(\texttt{xd4} \texttt{g4} 11.\texttt{h3} \texttt{b6} 12.\texttt{hxg4} \texttt{xd4} 13.\(\texttt{f4}\) (White has tried some other moves here too: 13.\(\texttt{g5}\) \(\texttt{xd1} 14.\texttt{xd1}\) \(\texttt{e5}^=\), or 13.\(\texttt{f3}\) \(\texttt{e5} 14.\texttt{g5}\) \(\texttt{e7}^=\) and the position remains approximately equal in both cases.) 13...\(\texttt{xd1}\) 14.\(\texttt{axd1}\) \(\texttt{e5}\) 15.\(\texttt{h6}\) \(\texttt{e8}\) 16.\(\texttt{f3}\) \(\texttt{c5}\) 17.\(\texttt{f2}\) a6 18.\(\texttt{c1}\) \(\texttt{e6}\) 19.\(\texttt{e3}\) \(\texttt{b5}^=\) and Black has equalized, van Der Sterren – Gelfand, Wijk aan Zee 1998.

After 8.\(\texttt{e3}\), Black has numerous possibilities and we will analyze these variations in Chapters 5-9.
Chapter 5

1.\( \text{d}f3 \) \( \text{d}f6 \) 2.\( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 3.\( \text{c}c3 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 4.\( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 5.\( \text{d}4 \) 0–0 6.\( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 7.0–0 \( \text{a}6 \) 8.\( \text{e}3 \)

Black’s main defensive lines are: 8...\( \text{c}6 \), 8...\( \text{w}e8 \), 8...\( \text{g}4 \) and we are going to deal with them in our next chapters. Now, we will analyze: a) 8...\( \text{h}6 \) and b) 8...\( \text{w}e7 \).

He has tried sometimes in practice:

8...\( \text{w}e8 \) and that move enables White to close the centre favourably. Black’s rook is evidently misplaced on the e8-square. After 9.\( \text{d}5!? \) \( \text{c}5 \) 10.\( \text{d}d2 \), the game usually transposes to a well-known theoretical position and following: 10...\( \text{a}5 \) 11.\( \text{a}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) 12.\( \text{b}4 \) axb4 13.axb4 \( \text{e}x\text{a}1 \) 14.\( \text{w}x\text{a}1 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 15.\( \text{w}a3 \), White obtains a considerable advantage. For example: 15...\( \text{g}4 \) (It is worse for Black to opt for: 15...\( \text{e}7 \) 16.\( \text{c}5 \) dxc5 17.bxc5 \( \text{g}4 \) 18.\( \text{x}g4 \) \( \text{x}g4 \) 19.\( \text{b}1\pm \) Anand – Morgenstern, Frankfurt 1994.) 16.\( \text{x}g4 \) \( \text{x}g4 \) 17.\( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 18.\( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 19.\( \text{e}a5\pm \) Lopez Martinez – Svetushkin, Yerevan 1999;

White can counter 8...\( \text{h}5 \), with 9.\( \text{w}d2 \) and if 9...\( f5 \), then 10.\( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{w}e8 \), W.Schulz – Xia Yanchong, Winnipeg 1999 and now after: 11.\( \text{dxe}5 \) dxe5 12.exf5 gxf5 13.\( \text{d}d5 \), White’s initiative is very powerful;

8...\( \text{d}7 \) – This move is evidently not connected with any special idea and it is played by Black much rather with the intention to confuse some not so experienced opponent and to avoid his home-preparation. White can react calmly here – 9.\( \text{w}d2!? \) exd4 10.\( \text{d}xd4 \) \( \text{c}5 \)c5 11.f3 and he maintains a long-term advantage thanks to his control over the centre;

Black fails to equalize if he seeks some simplification in the centre with: 8...exd4 9.\( \text{d}xd4 \) \( \text{w}e8 \) (About 9...\( \text{c}5 \) 10.f3 – see line a, Chapter 17, Book 1a; Or 9...\( \text{c}6 \) 10.\( \text{w}d2 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 11.f3 \( \text{w}e7 \) – this is an attempt by Black to avoid playing \( \text{w}e8 \), 12.\( \text{a}d1 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 13.\( \text{f}e1 \) \( \text{e}6 \) 14.
f4 \( \text{\&c5} \) 15.\( \text{\&f3} \) \( \text{\&f6} \) 16.b4 \( \text{\&a6} \) 17.b5± Koniushkov – N.Aleksandrov, Novorossijsk 1996.) 10.f3 c6 11.\( \text{\&d2} \) d5. Black is trying to solve all his opening problems in a radical fashion. (Or 11.\( \text{\&e7} \) 12.\( \text{\&c2} \) \( \text{\&e6} \) 13.\( \text{\&ad1} \) \( \text{\&d8} \) 14.\( \text{\&f4} \) – White maintains a powerful pressure against Black’s d6-pawn.) 12.cxd5 cxd5 13.\( \text{\&b5} \) (Here, there is a quite interesting idea for White and it was tested in the game Burmakin – Candela, Linares 2005, 13.e5!? \( \text{\&d7} \) – 13...\( \text{\&xe5} ?? \) 14.\( \text{\&xa6} \) bxa6 15.\( \text{\&c6} \)++ – 14.f4 \( \text{\&b6} \) 15.\( \text{\&db5} \) \( \text{\&f8} \) 16.\( \text{\&ad1} \) \( \text{\&e6} \) 17.\( \text{\&e1} \) \( \text{\&b4} \) 18.\( \text{\&f2} \) \( \text{\&c2} \) 19.\( \text{\&c5} \) \( \text{\&xc5} \) 20.\( \text{\&xc5} \) and White remained with a great advantage, because the dark squares were very vulnerable in Black’s camp.) 13...\( \text{\&d7} \) 14.\( \text{\&xa6} \) bxa6 15.exd5 \( \text{\&c8} \) 16.\( \text{\&e1} \) and Black’s compensation for the pawn is evidently insufficient;

In case of 8...\( \text{\&g4} \), White can maintain his edge in a very interesting fashion: 9.dxe5 (He plays much more often in practice – 9.d5.) 9...dxe5 10.\( \text{\&b3} \) and Black has suddenly great problems to protect his b7-pawn, for example: 10...\( \text{\&c8} \) 11.\( \text{\&d5} \) \( \text{\&h8} \) (The move 11...c6?? is a terrible blunder and Black loses his queen after 12.\( \text{\&e7} \).) 12.h3 (or 12.\( \text{\&xf6} \) \( \text{\&xf6} \) 13.\( \text{\&h3} \) \( \text{\&xf3} \) 14.\( \text{\&xf3} \) Sarmiento – De La Cruz, Tenerife 2001) 12...\( \text{\&xf3} \) (The other moves for Black are even worse: 12...\( \text{\&e6} \) 13.\( \text{\&g5} \)±; 12...\( \text{\&d7} \) 13.\( \text{\&xf6} \) \( \text{\&xf6} \) 14.\( \text{\&c3} \) \( \text{\&e8} \) 15.\( \text{\&f4} \)±; 14...\( \text{\&c6} \) 15.\( \text{\&d2} \) and in connection with the threat b2-b4-b5, Black is forced to retreat: 15...b6 16.b4 \( \text{\&b7} \) 17.c5±) 13.\( \text{\&xf3} \) c6 (Or 13...\( \text{\&d7} \) 14.\( \text{\&e7} \) \( \text{\&d8} \) 15.\( \text{\&a3} \) – \( \text{\&c6} \) 15...\( \text{\&b6} \) 16.b3 \( \text{\&e8} \) 17.\( \text{\&c6} \) \( \text{\&c8} \) 18.c5! and if Black captures the knight – 18...\( \text{\&xc6} \), White follows with 19.\( \text{\&e2} \) 14.\( \text{\&xf6} \) \( \text{\&xf6} \) 15.\( \text{\&fd1} \). White is better due to his powerful couple of bishops and his dominance on the d-file, meanwhile Black’s knight on a6 might even fail to be centralized altogether.

\( a \) 8...h6

This move has recently become the trademark of some Ukrainian players.

9.dxe5

Black’s idea works perfectly after 9.h3, because White weakens the g3-square and it can be exploited by Black’s pieces in the forthcoming battle. 9...\( \text{\&xd4} \) 10.\( \text{\&xd4} \) \( \text{\&e8} \) 11.f3 (White can also try to protect his e4-pawn with his bishop, but then Black can utilize
the fine points of the placement of his pawn on the h6-square: 11.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}f3 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}c5 12.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}c2 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h7!. Black’s knight is headed for the g5-square! 13.b4 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e6 14.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}ad1 a5 15.a3 axb4 16.axb4 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}hg5 and he has a quite acceptable position.) 11...\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h5 12.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d2 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h4. Black has an active play on the weakened dark squares. It is too dangerous for White to play 13.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xh6, because of 13...\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}g3!. The idea of GM Denis Yevseev deserves due attention: 9.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e1?! – White takes the g4-square under control. Black should have tried here the move 9...\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}g4?! (Instead, he played in the game – 9...exd4?! – exchanging in the centre, without obtaining anything from White in return: 10.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xd4 c6 11.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}c2 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e8 12.f3 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}c7 13.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d2= Yevseev – Loginov, Kazan 2005; it is not advisable for Black to continue with 9...\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e8?!), since after 10.d5!, his pieces are deployed rather unfavourably for the standard kingside attack. Meanwhile, White’s knight is going to its perfect d3-square and it will support his queenside offensive from there...) 10.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xg4 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xg4 11.f3 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d7 12.dxe5 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xe5 (or 12...dxe5 13.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}f2 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e6 14.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d2 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}c8 15.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e2\texttildetilde) 13.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d3 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}g7 14.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d2 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h7 15.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d5\texttildetilde. White’s subsequent plans include \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}f2 and \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d4 and thus he will liquidate Black’s main trump in this position – his couple of bishops.

9...\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}g4

If 9...dxe5, C.Williams – Stepak, Port Erin 2004, then 10.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}c1 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}g4 11.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d2 and Black has White’s threat – h2-h3 to worry about. 11...g5 12.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d1 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e7 (It is too bad for Black to try 12...\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}f6?!, due to 13.h3.) 13.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d5 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e6 14.c5 c6 15.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e3 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e7 16.h3 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xe3 17.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xe3 – and White is slightly better, because of the weaknesses created in Black’s camp by the move – g6-g5.

10.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d2 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xe5 11.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d4

White achieves nothing much with: 11.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xe5 dxe5 12.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}c1 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h7 13.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d1 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h4 14.g3 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h3 15.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e3 c6 16.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d6 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e8 17.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d1. Now, Black can hardly avoid the repetition of moves and after: 17...\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}f8 18.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}f1 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}g4 19.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e2 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h3 20.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}f1, the opponents agreed to a draw in the game Zhao Xue – Efimenko, Dubai 2005.

11...\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e8

11...\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h4?! – This move has not been tested in practice yet. 12.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e3 (After 12.f4 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}g4 13.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}f3 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h5, the position becomes quite double-edged, for example: 14.e5 dxe5 15.h3 exf4 16.hxg4 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}c5+ 17.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h1 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xg4 18.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xf4 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e8.) 12...\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}g4 13.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xg4 (or 13.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}f4? \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}f6\textsuperscript{+}) 13...\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xg4 14.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d2 (Black’s idea was based on the possibility of a perpetual: 14.f3 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e5! 15.g3 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xg3 16.hxg3 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}xg3+ 17.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h1 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h3+ and a draw.) 14...\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d7 15.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}db5?\texttildetilde.

12.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}e3 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}c5 13.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}d2 \textit{\textipa{\textacute}}h7

(digram)

14.f3 a5, V.Ivanov – Uman-sky, Moscow 1989 and here White could have played 15.\textit{\textipa{\textacute}}db5\texttildetilde. Now, Black’s c7 and d6-pawns are
under attack by his opponent’s knight and White can improve his position in the centre at leisure, maintaining the advantage.

b) 8...\( \text{We7} \)

Black is trying to exert some pressure against White’s e4-pawn.

9.\( \text{g5} \)

In case White protects his pawn with the move – 9.\( \text{wc2} \), then Black can counter that with: 9...
\( \text{b4} \) 10.\( \text{wbd1} \) (but not 10.\( \text{wh3} \), because of 10...\( \text{exd4} \) 11.\( \text{dxd4} \) \( \text{exe4} \) 10...\( \text{exd4} \) 11.\( \text{dxd4} \) \( \text{g4} \) 12.\( \text{pxg4} \) \( \text{exg4} \) 13.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{d5} \) 14.\( \text{cx} \) \( \text{f6} \) \( \text{ch6} \) 15.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{d7=}, with the idea to follow with \( \text{c7-c6} \).

9...\( \text{we8} \)

This is a very tricky move for Black.

He fails to cover the d5-square in the primitive fashion with the move 9...\( \text{c6} \), because of 10.\( \text{c5!±} \). He cannot equalize either after the extravagant line: 9...
\( \text{b4} \) 10.\( \text{a3} \) \( \text{exd4} \) 11.\( \text{dxd4} \) \( \text{h6} \) 12.\( \text{dxd4} \) \( \text{exe4} \) 14.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{exe4} \) 15.\( \text{b5±} \), since White’s prospects are clearly superior, despite Black’s two-bishop advantage.

9...\( \text{exd4} \) 10.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{f8} \) 11.\( \text{dxd4} \) \( \text{c6} \) (or 11...\( \text{c5} \) 12.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{g6} \) 13.\( \text{e3±} \)) 12.\( \text{xf6} \) + \( \text{xf6} \) 13.\( \text{xf6} \) \( \text{f6} \) 14.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{c5} \) 15.\( \text{f3} \) a5 16.\( \text{ad1} \) (It is possibly better for White to have placed there the other rook, in order to vacate the f1-square immediately for the retreat of the bishop – 16.\( \text{fd1} \) !?. White’s further plan includes to tie Black’s pieces to the defence of the vulnerable d6-pawn and then to improve the position with the maneuver \( \text{f1-g2} \). Later, White follows that with f4 and he will be perfectly prepared to take some decisive actions.) 16...\( \text{d8} \) 17.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{d7} \) (Black fails to equalize with the pawn-break 17...\( \text{d5} \), because of: 18.\( \text{cx} \) \( \text{d5} \) \( \text{xd5} \) 19.\( \text{b5!} \) \( \text{b6} \) 20.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{e6} \) 21.\( \text{e5} \) d4 – otherwise White follows with \( \text{d2} \) and \( \text{d4} \) and he will be clearly better – 22.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{xa2} \) 23.\( \text{fx} \) \( \text{d8} \) 24.\( \text{c1} \) \( \text{d7} \) 25.\( \text{b6} \) \( \text{xb6} \) 26.\( \text{d6±} \) 18.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{e7} \) 19.\( \text{d2!?} \) \( \text{c8} \) 20.\( \text{c3} \) f6 21.\( \text{b7} \) \( \text{f7} \) 22.\( \text{ed2} \) \( \text{d7} \) 23.\( \text{ed1±} \) Gelfand – Damljanovic, Istanbul 2000. Black’s position is quite defensible, but still it remains too passive.

10.\( \text{e1} \) !?
White is not in a hurry to clarify the situation in the centre and he makes a useful move instead. His rook is deployed on e1, protecting the e4-pawn and it eyes Black’s queen on the e8-square in the process.

10...h6

In case of 10...c6, it is interesting for White to try the move 11.dxe5, which has not been tested yet. (It is also possible for him to follow with: 11.d5 c5 12.\(\text{c}d\)2 h6, H.Schneider - Hanguerreyr, Austria 2002, 13.\(\text{c}e\)3\(\text{f}\) and his chances are slightly better in that quite complex position.) 11...dxe5 12.\(\text{c}\)d6 \(\text{c}\)d7 (or 12...\(\text{c}\)h5? 13.\(\text{c}\)e7\(\text{f}\)) 13.\(\text{c}\)a3 and strangely enough, White’s queen is very well placed on a3. It controls from there the key-squares d6 and e7 and it does not stand in the way of the rooks to occupy the d-file. 13.\(\text{c}\)c7 14.\(\text{c}\)ad1 b6 (or 14...\(\text{c}\)e6 15.c5\(\text{f}\)). Now, after Black has compromised his queenside, White’s queen can go back to d6 with a great effect – 15.\(\text{c}\)d6\(\text{f}\).

Black can opt for the attractive line: 10...\(\text{c}\)xd4 11.\(\text{c}\)xd4 (or 11.\(\text{c}\)xd4 \(\text{h}\)6?! =) 11...\(\text{c}\)g4 (In case he tries 11...\(\text{c}\)e6?!, White can still fight for the advantage with the help of the line: 12.\(\text{c}\)e3 \(\text{c}\)g4 13.\(\text{c}\)c1\(\text{f}\) 12.\(\text{c}\)d2 \(\text{c}\)c5 (After 12...\(\text{c}\)f6 13.\(\text{c}\)f4 \(\text{c}\)e5 14.\(\text{c}\)d4 \(\text{c}\)c5 15.b3 \(\text{c}\)f7 16.\(\text{c}\)ad1\(\text{f}\), White had a comfortable position in the game Herrera - Hidalgo – De La Riva, Burgos 2003.) 13.\(\text{c}\)f1 \(\text{c}\)xc3?! – Black begins some tactical actions, ignoring the danger of exchanging his valuable dark-squared bishop. (or 13...\(\text{c}\)f6 14.\(\text{c}\)f4\(\text{f}\) 14.\(\text{c}\)xc3 \(\text{c}\)xe4, V.Milov – Arizmendi, Biel 2002. It looks like White’s best move in that sharp position is 15.\(\text{c}\)d4\(\text{f}\), for example: 15...\(\text{c}\)f5 (Or 15...\(\text{c}\)gxf2 16.\(\text{c}\)h6 f6 17.\(\text{c}\)g5\(\text{f}\) +; 15...\(\text{c}\)f5 16.\(\text{c}\)d3 c5 17.\(\text{c}\)d5 \(\text{c}\)gxf2 18.\(\text{c}\)xe4 \(\text{c}\)xe4 19.\(\text{c}\)g4\(\text{f}\); 18...\(\text{c}\)xe4 19.\(\text{c}\)xd6\(\text{f}\)) 16.\(\text{c}\)d3 \(\text{c}\)gxf2 (Or 16...c5 17.\(\text{c}\)d5 \(\text{c}\)e6? 18.\(\text{c}\)xe4 \(\text{c}\)xd5 19.\(\text{c}\)xd5 \(\text{c}\)g7 20.\(\text{c}\)xe8\(\text{f}\) 17...\(\text{c}\)f7 18.\(\text{c}\)xe4 \(\text{c}\)xe4 19.\(\text{c}\)xf8 \(\text{c}\)xf8 20.\(\text{c}\)d2\(\text{f}\).

10...\(\text{c}\)g4 – The trade of the bishop on c8 for White’s knight simplifies the position, but it does not equalize completely. 11.h3 \(\text{c}\)xf3 (Or 11...h6 12.\(\text{c}\)e3 \(\text{c}\)d7 – in case of 12...\(\text{c}\)xd4, it is very unpleasant for Black if White follows with: 13.\(\text{c}\)xd4 \(\text{c}\)e6 14.\(\text{c}\)wb3\(\text{f}\) – 13.dxe5 dxe5 14.c5 \(\text{c}\)c6 15.\(\text{c}\)b1! \(\text{c}\)d7, Komarov – Grigore, Bucharest 1994 and here White could have won the exchange with: 16.\(\text{c}\)xa6 bxa6 17.c6 \(\text{c}\)xc6 18.\(\text{c}\)c5\(\text{f}\)) 12.\(\text{c}\)xf3 \(\text{c}\)xd4 (Or 12...\(\text{c}\)d7 13.\(\text{c}\)e3 \(\text{c}\)xd4 14.\(\text{c}\)xd4 \(\text{c}\)xd4 15.\(\text{c}\)xd4 \(\text{c}\)e5 16.\(\text{c}\)d2 \(\text{c}\)f6 17.\(\text{c}\)ad1 \(\text{c}\)ad8 18.g3 c6 19.\(\text{c}\)g2\(\text{f}\) Veingold – Moradiabadi, Calvia 2004; 13...c6 14.\(\text{c}\)b1 \(\text{c}\)c7 15.d5! c5 16.b4 \(\text{c}\)a6, Epishin – Movsesian, Groningen 1998. The opponents agreed to a draw in that position, but White could and should have continued to play a bit more: 17.\(\text{c}\)b5 \(\text{c}\)e7
18.a3 f5 19.exf5 gxf5 20.\textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}2±.}) 13.\textit{\textipa{\textl{xd}}4 \textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}7} 14.\textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}2 \textit{\textipa{\textl{e}}5} 15.\textit{\textipa{\textl{e}}2 \textit{\textipa{\textl{c}}5} 16.\textit{\textipa{\textl{f}}1!}. This is White's most precise move. (After 16.\textit{\textipa{\textl{e}}3 \textit{\textipa{\textl{ed}}7}, Black can plan attacking White's e4-pawn.) 16...\textit{\textipa{\textl{e}}6} 17.\textit{\textipa{\textl{e}}3 c5?!. This move was played for the first time in the game A.Karpov – V.Milov, Biel 1996. Black was evidently intending to follow a concrete plan including the occupation of the d4-square and that was the right moment for the move c7-c5. His knight would then follow the route to e5-c6 and d4. (In case Black waits for a while, then White gradually repels Black's knights away from the centre and he maintains his advantage as it happened in the game Huzman – V.Milov, Tel Aviv 1994: 17...\textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}8 18.f4 \textit{\textipa{\textl{c}}6} 19.\textit{\textipa{\textl{ad}}1 \textit{\textipa{\textl{h}}4} 20.\textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}5±). It is evident that the right way for White to improve his position is connected with the advance f2-f4-f5, threatening f6. Anatolij Evgenievich decided to support his pawn, by redeploying his bishop to the b4-square, We can suggest an alternative plan to that one of A.Karpov by helping the advance of the f-pawn with the rook from the f1-square. 18.f4!? (The move 18.\textit{\textipa{\textl{ad}}1}, was tried in the first game, played in that variation: 18...\textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}8 19.\textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}5 \textit{\textipa{\textl{c}}6} 20.f4 \textit{\textipa{\textl{ed}}4} 21.\textit{\textipa{\textl{f}}2 \textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}7} 22.\textit{\textipa{\textl{h}}4} f6 23.b4 b6 24.b5 \textit{\textipa{\textl{c}}7} 25.\textit{\textipa{\textl{xe}}6+ \textit{\textipa{\textl{e}}6} 26.f5 (26.\textit{\textipa{\textl{f}}2 \textit{\textipa{\textl{e}}6} 27.f5!?±) 26...gx\textit{\textipa{\textl{f}}5} and Black had some counter chances and he managed to make subsequently a draw.) 18...\textit{\textipa{\textl{c}}6 19.f5 \textit{\textipa{\textl{ed}}4} 20.\textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}5 \textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}8} (It is too dangerous for Black to play 20...\textit{\textipa{\textl{xe}}4? due to 21.f6 and Black's bishop will be forced to retreat to h8, creating additional worries for the Black's king.) 21.\textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}3 \textit{\textipa{\textl{e}}5} (Now, it is essential that Black cannot exchange White's proud knight on the d5-outpost: 21...\textit{\textipa{\textl{e}}7?? 22.f6 and White wins.) 22.\textit{\textipa{\textl{f}}1} and White practically forces Black to advance f7-f6, after which the light squares in his camp are so vulnerable that White maintains a great positional advantage.

\textit{\textipa{\textl{xf}}6 \textit{\textipa{\textl{xf}}6} 12.c5!}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chess_diagram.png}
\end{center}

Now, we will deal in details with: \textbf{b1)} 12...\textit{\textipa{\textl{exd}}4} and \textbf{b2)} 12...\textit{\textipa{\textl{b}}4}.

Black has also tested in practice:

12...\textit{\textipa{\textl{g}}7?! 13.\textit{\textipa{\textl{x}}6 bxa6 14. \textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}5 \textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}8} 15.\textit{\textipa{\textl{xe}}5 dxe5} 16.\textit{\textipa{\textl{a}}4± Bilobrk – Bosiocic, Zadar 2003; It is too dubious for him to follow with 12...\textit{\textipa{\textl{g}}7, Lukacs – Schaefer, Budapest 1993, 13.\textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}5! \textit{\textipa{\textl{d}}8 14.\textit{\textipa{\textl{xe}}5 dxe5} 15.\textit{\textipa{\textl{xa}}6 bxa6} 16.\textit{\textipa{\textl{a}}4±;}}\end{center}
12...\nobla b8? 13.\nobla d5 \nobla d8 – Now, all Black’s pieces are stranded on the last rank and that is definitely not an example to follow... 14.cxd6 cxd6 15.dxe5 dxe5 16.\nop w c1± and here, Black loses his h6-pawn and he comes under a dangerous attack, Epishin – Piven, Seefeld 1996;

12...dxc5 13.\nobla x a6 bxa6 (It is too bad for Black to defend with: 13...cxd4? 14.\nobla d5 \nobla d8, Hillarp Persson – Arizmendi, Reykjavik 2000, 15.\nobla d3! a5 (otherwise White’s knight finds a safe haven via the b4-square) 16.\nop w c1! c6 17.\nop w x h6 and here Black’s king comes surprisingly under attack, for example: 17...cxd5 18.exd5 \nop w f6 19.\nop w x e5!±) 14.\nobla d5 \nobla d8 15.dxe5 \nop w g4 16.\nop w f6 \nop w x f6 17.exf6± Giemsa – Panzer, Hamburg 1993;

12...\nop w g4 – This move is too optimistic. 13.\nobla d5 \nobla d8 14.\nop w b3! and Black’s bishop is forced to retreat in ignominy. 14...\nop w c8 (or 14...\nop w f3 15.gxf3 c6 (15...\nop w c6 16.\nop w b5++; 15...\nop w b8 16.\nobla x a6++) 16.\nop w x b7 \nop w b8 17.\nop w x a6 cxd5 18.\nop w x d6!? \nop w x b2 19. c6 \nop w b6 20.exd5±) 15.cxd6 cxd6, Murugan – Joshi, India 1994, 16.dxe5 dxe5 17.\nop w a1!±;

After 12...\nobla d8, Hillarp Persson – Mir Markovic, Stockholm 1999, White can try some tactics: 13.cxd6 cxd6 14.\nop w b5 \nop w e6 (or 14...\nobla d7 15.\nop w x d7 \nop w x d7 16.dxe5±) 15.\nobla d5 and here Black would not succeed in exchanging White’s knight on d5: 15...\nop w c7?! 16.\nop w x c7 \nop w x c7 17.\nop w c1 \nop w b6 18.\nop w x h6±.

b1) 12...exd4 13.\nobla d5 \nobla d8
Black is trying to preserve his two-bishop advantage. His dark-squared bishop cannot remain on the long diagonal anymore. He loses after: 13...\nop w g7??, because of: 14.\nobla x a6 bxa6 15.\nop w x c7.

White is clearly better after: 13...\nop w d8 14.cxd6, for example: 14...cxd6 15.\nop w x f6+ \nop w x f6 16.\nop w x d4 \nop w x d4 17.\nop w x d4±; or 14...\nop w x d6 15.\nobla x a6 bxa6 16.\nop w x f6+ \nop w x f6 17.\nop w x d4 \nop w x d4 18.\nop w x d4 c5 19.\nop w c6±.

14.\nobla x a6 bxa6
The piece-sacrifice is insufficient for Black: 14...dxc5 15.\nobla d3 c6 16.\nop w f4 \nop w a5 17.\nobla d2!? (White obtained a good position in the first game available in this line: 17.\nop w f1 b5 18.b3 \nop w c3 19.\nop w c1 \nop w a6 20.\nop w e2± Veingold – Nelson, San Sebastian 2000.) 17...\nop w e7 18.\nop w c1± and Black’s pawns are immobile.

15.cxd6 cxd6 16.\nop w d2

\n
16...\nop w b7?
This is the wrong move for Black. Instead, he had better continue with: 16...\nop w h7 17.\nop w a1 \nop w b7 18.\nop w x d4±, or 17...\nop w b8 18.\nop w x d4

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\[ e6 \] 19.b3± and White’s position would be superior thanks to his powerful knight on the d5-outpost and Black’s numerous pawn-weaknesses.

17.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xh6}}} \]
Now, White’s queen has sneaked in the closest vicinity to Black’s king.

17...\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xd5}}} \] 18.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{exd5}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{b5}}} \] 19.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xd4}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xb2}}} \]
If 19...\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xd5}}} \], then White plays 20.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{e6!}}} \] fxe6 21.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xb6+}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{h8}}} \] 22.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{wh6+}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{g8}}} \] 23.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xe6}}} \] and he wins.

20.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{ad1}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{f6}}} \] 21.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{e2}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{c3?}}} \]
Black should have avoided placing his queen on the third rank. He had to continue with:

21...\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{b6}}} \] 22.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{c6+}}} \], because now White can finish his opponent off in a spectacular fashion:

22.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{ec3}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{b2}}} \] 23.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{eb3!}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xa2}}} \]
24.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{eh3}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{f6}}} \]

25.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{f5!}}} \] 1-0 Riediger – Doerres, Wildflecken 1993, 25...\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xd5}}} \] 26.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{wh7+}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{f8}}} \] 27.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{wh8+}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xe8}}} \] 28.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{exh8#}}} \]; 25...\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{b2}}} \] 26.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{wh7+}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{f8}}} \] 27.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{eh6}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{de7}}} \] 28.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{ea3+}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{d7}}} \] (or 28...\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{e5}}} \] 29.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xf7}}} \] 29.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xf7+}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{c7}}} \] 30.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{g8}}} \] and White wins.

b2) 12...\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{b4}}} \]

13.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{cxd6!}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{cxd6}}} \] 14.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{b5}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{e7}}} \]
15.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{d2}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{c6}}} \]
It is too bad for Black to defend with: 15...\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{a6}}} \] 16.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xb6}}} \].

16.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{d5}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{d4}}} \] 17.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{fxd4}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{exd4}}} \]
18.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{fl!}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{d7}}} \] 19.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{xd4}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{ac8}}} \]

It looks like Black has some compensation for the sacrificed pawn, but in fact White is clearly better, because his centre might advance after f2-f4 and e4-e5. Black’s bishop on d7 is completely useless in that position and this complicates his defence even more.

20.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{ad1}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{fe8}}} \] 21.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{h3}}} \]
White plans already advancing his pawn – f2-f4.

21...\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{g5}}} \] 22.\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{b4!}}} \] \[ \text{\textit{\textbf{c7}}} \]
The move 22...\[ \text{\textit{\textbf{b6?}}} \], compro-
mises disastrously the c6-square: 23.\(\text{Qc6} \text{Qxc6} 24.\text{dxc6} \text{Qxc6?} 25.\text{Qb5} \) and White remains in a winning position.

23.\(\text{Qf3}\)

White was prevented from opening the position with the help of the breakthrough with the f-pawn, so he could try to destroy Black’s defensive fortress with e4-e5, with the support of his knight on f3.

23...\(\text{Qc2} 24.\text{Qd2}\)

Here, it deserved attention for White to continue with 24.e5, for example: 24...\(\text{dxe5} 25.\text{d6} \text{Qd8}\) (25...\(\text{Qe6} 26.\text{Qd4}\) 26...\(\text{Qd3}\); 24...\(\text{Qxe5} 25.\text{Qxe5} \text{dxe5} 26.\text{d6} \text{Qf6}\) 27.\(\text{Be2} \text{Qc6} 28.\text{Qed2} \text{Qb6} 29.\text{Qa3} \text{e4} 30.\text{Qc4}\).

24...\(\text{Qxd2} 25.\text{Qxd2} \text{Qc8} 26.\text{Qd3} \text{Qg7?!} 27.\text{Qb4} \text{Qe8}\)

That position was reached in the game Shchekachev – Degraeve, Bethune 2003.

White is close to winning, following: 28.\(\text{e5!} \text{dxe5}\) 29.\(\text{d6} \text{Qd8}\) (Or 29...\(\text{Qe6} 30.\text{Qd4}\) \(\text{Qd5}\) 31.\(\text{Qf5+} \text{Qh8} 32.\text{Qe4}\)) 30.\(\text{Qxe5}\).

**Conclusion**

In the position arising after 8.\(\text{Qe3}\), it is not favourable for Black to “give up” the centre immediately, by exchanging on d4. Instead, he has at his disposal plenty of other lines, which lead to complex situations. White can treat the problem with his pawn on d4 in three different ways, depending on the deployment of Black’s pieces:

a) He can hold the centre, while Black does not exert any pressure against his opponent’s d4-pawn;

b) He can push d4-d5, when Black’s pieces are not well prepared for a kingside attack in a position with a closed centre, or when his counterplay connected with c7-c6 would not be effective;

c) White can exchange on e5, with the idea to occupy additional space on the queenside and to isolate Black’s knight away from the actions.

White maintains a slight advantage in all the variations, which we have just analyzed.
Chapter 6

1. \( \text{d}f3 \text{d}f6 2. \text{c}4 \text{g}6 3. \text{c}c3 \text{g}7 4. \text{e}4 \text{d}6 \\
5. \text{d}4 0–0 6. \text{e}2 \text{e}5 7. 0–0 \text{a}6 8. \text{e}3 \text{e}8 \)

Black is trying to create threats against White’s e4-pawn. He uses that order of moves with the idea to avoid White’s additional possibility – 11. \( \text{d}d2 \) (for example, in the variation: 8...\( \text{g}4 \) 9. \( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 10.\( \text{d}xe5 \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 11.\( \text{d}d2 \)), meanwhile he should not be so much afraid of that line, because he can counter that possibility quite successfully and equalize.

9.\( \text{dxe5} \)

White has tried in practice to preserve the tension in the centre, besides that exchange, but he has not been particularly successful, for example:

9.\( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{g}4 \) 10.\( \text{c}1 \) (Or 10.\( \text{g}5 \) \( \text{exd}4 \) 11.\( \text{xd}4 \) \( \text{e}5 \)! 12.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 13.\( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 14.\( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{xf}3 \) 15.\( \text{xf}3 \) \( \text{b}4 \) 16.\( \text{c}2 \) \( \text{e}6 \) and Black exerts a powerful pressure against White’s queenside pawns, Keesen – Safin, Vlissingen 1998.) 10...\( f5 \) 11.\( \text{xf}5 \) \( \text{gxf}5 \) 12.\( \text{dxe5} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 13.\( h3 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 14.\( c5 \) \( e4 \) 15.\( \text{xa6} \) \( \text{bxa6} \) 16.\( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{e}5 \) and there arose a very complicated position in the game van Wely – Gelfand, Arnhem 1988;

9.\( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{d}7 \) (It is possible – that might be Black’s best choice and it is aimed at the preparation of the pawn-advance – f7-f5.) 10.\( \text{e}1 \) f5 11.\( \text{xf}5 \) \( \text{gxf}5 \) 12.\( \text{dxe5} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 13.\( c5 \) \( c6 \) 14.\( \text{xa6} \) \( \text{bxa6} \) 15.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{c}7 \) 16.\( \text{w}b3 \) + (It is worth testing here 16.\( \text{b}4 \) \( \text{b}8 \), or 16...a5.) 16...\( \text{h}8 \) 17.\( \text{w}c4 \) \( \text{g}8 \) 18.\( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 19.\( \text{h}2 \) e4 20.\( \text{d}6 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 21.\( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{e}5 \) = and Black had a very good game on the kingside, Fishbein – Ma.Tseitlin, Israel 1991.

9...\( \text{dxe5} \)

After 9...\( \text{g}4 \), accepting the sacrifice 10.\( \text{exd}6 \), leads to positions in which Black has a good compensation for the sacrificed material. 10...\( \text{xe3} \) 11.\( \text{fxe3} \) \( \text{cxd6} \) (Here, it deserves serious attention for Black to exchange immediately his “pride” in the King’s Indian Defence – the bishop on g7 for White’s knight on c3: 11...\( \text{xc3} \) 12.\( \text{bxc3} \) \( \text{cxd6} \) 13.\( \text{w}d4 \) \( \text{e}7 \)∞; the
piece-sacrifice would not work for Black:

12...\textit{\textbf{Wxe4?}} 13.d7 \textit{\textbf{Wxe3}} 14.\textit{\textbf{Qf2}}
\textit{\textbf{Qxd7}} 15.\textit{\textbf{Qxd7}} \textit{\textbf{Qad8}} 16.\textit{\textbf{Qh3}} \textit{\textbf{Qc5}}
17.\textit{\textbf{Qd4+}} 12.\textit{\textbf{Qd4}} (Or 12.\textit{\textbf{Qxd6}}
\textit{\textbf{Qxc3}} 13.\textit{\textbf{Qxc3}} \textit{\textbf{Wxe4}} 14.\textit{\textbf{Wd4}} \textit{\textbf{Qe8}?=}
and White has too many weak pawns to worry about.) 12...\textit{\textbf{Qc5}}
13.\textit{\textbf{Qc2}} \textit{\textbf{Qe5}} 14.\textit{\textbf{Rd1}}, Garcia Pal-
ermo – Yermolinsky, Forli 1989 and here Black could have played
more energetically – 14...\textit{\textbf{f5}}!? (It is weaker for him to try: 14...
\textit{\textbf{a5}} 15.\textit{\textbf{Qdb5}}?; as well as: 14...
\textit{\textbf{Rxe8}} 15.\textit{\textbf{Qdb5}} \textit{\textbf{Qxe4}} 16.\textit{\textbf{Rd5}} \textit{\textbf{Qe7}}
17.\textit{\textbf{Qxe4}} \textit{\textbf{Wxe4}} 18.\textit{\textbf{Qxe4}} \textit{\textbf{Qxe4}} 19.
\textit{\textbf{Qxd6}} \textit{\textbf{Qe6}} 20.\textit{\textbf{Qc7}} \textit{\textbf{Qxe3}} 21.\textit{\textbf{Qxa8}}
\textit{\textbf{Qxe2}} 22.\textit{\textbf{Rd8}} \textit{\textbf{Qf8}} 23.\textit{\textbf{Qc7?}} 15.\textit{\textbf{Qh1}}
\textit{\textbf{Qxe4}} 16.\textit{\textbf{Qxe4}} \textit{\textbf{fxe4}} 17.\textit{\textbf{Qxf8}} \textit{\textbf{Qxf8}}
18.\textit{\textbf{Qb5}} \textit{\textbf{Qd7}=} with an approximately equal position.

Therefore, it is much better for White to continue with 10.\textit{\textbf{Qc1}}
(He plays more often here 10.\textit{\textbf{Qg5}},
but after: 10...\textit{\textbf{dxe5}} 11.\textit{\textbf{h3}} \textit{\textbf{h6}}, there
arise positions, which are not the subject of our book...) 10...
\textit{\textbf{dxe5}} (Or 10...\textit{\textbf{dxe5}} 11.\textit{\textbf{Qd4?!}} \textit{\textbf{Qe6}}
12.\textit{\textbf{Qxe6}} \textit{\textbf{fxe6}} 13.\textit{\textbf{Qe3?}} and White had a slight edge in the game
Buturin – Wieczorek, Katowice 1993.) 11.\textit{\textbf{h3}} \textit{\textbf{Qf6}} 12.\textit{\textbf{Qe3}}, trans-
posing to the main lines – see 9...
\textit{\textbf{dxe5}} 10.\textit{\textbf{h3}}.

\textit{\textbf{10.h3}}

White thus ensures reliably the placement of his bishop on
the \textit{\textbf{e3}}-square.

He can also do that with the help of the move 10.\textit{\textbf{Qd2}}, but
Black can obtain a good game in

that case with: 10...\textit{\textbf{Qd7}}! (It is also
quite reliable for him to play 10...
\textit{\textbf{b6}}.) After: 11.a3 \textit{\textbf{Qac5}} 12.b4 \textit{\textbf{Qe6}}
13.c5 \textit{\textbf{Qd4}} 14.\textit{\textbf{Qc4}} \textit{\textbf{Qf6}} 15.\textit{\textbf{Qb3}},
Black continued with: 15...\textit{\textbf{Qe6}}!
16.\textit{\textbf{Qd5}} \textit{\textbf{Qxd5}} 17.\textit{\textbf{exd5}} \textit{\textbf{Qd8}} 18.
\textit{\textbf{Qxd4}} \textit{\textbf{Qxd5}} 19.\textit{\textbf{Qg5}} \textit{\textbf{Qe7+}} and he
even seized the initiative in the game Lputian – Nalbandian, Ye-
revan 1999.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Diagram 7.0-0}
\end{center}

Now, we will analyze in details
\textbf{a) 10...\textit{\textbf{c6}}, b) 10...\textit{\textbf{Qd7}}, c) 10...
\textit{\textbf{Qh5}} and d) 10...\textit{\textbf{b6}}.

Black has also tried in practice some second-rate moves like: 10...
\textit{\textbf{Qe7}}, 10...\textit{\textbf{Qd7}}, 10...\textit{\textbf{h6}}:

10...\textit{\textbf{Qd7}?!} 11.\textit{\textbf{Qc2}} \textit{\textbf{Qh5}} 12.\textit{\textbf{c5}}!
\textit{\textbf{Qb4}} (or 12...\textit{\textbf{Qf4}?} 13.\textit{\textbf{Qxa6}} \textit{\textbf{bxa6}}
14.\textit{\textbf{c6}} \textit{\textbf{Qxc6}} 15.\textit{\textbf{Qc5?}}) 13.\textit{\textbf{Qb3}} a5 14.
\textit{\textbf{a3}} \textit{\textbf{Qc6}} 15.\textit{\textbf{Qd5}} a4 16.\textit{\textbf{Qc2?}} Norri
– Kanko, Helsinki 1990;

10...\textit{\textbf{h6}}, transposes to the variation: 8...\textit{\textbf{Qg4}} 9.\textit{\textbf{Qg5}} \textit{\textbf{Qe8}} 10.\textit{\textbf{de}}
\textit{\textbf{de}} 11.\textit{\textbf{h3}} \textit{\textbf{h6}} 12.\textit{\textbf{Qd2}} \textit{\textbf{Qf6}}, except that
White has an extra tempo. He can use that for the useful move
– 11.a3?!±;

It is bad for Black to play 10...
\textit{\textbf{Qe7}}, because after: 11.\textit{\textbf{Qd5}} \textit{\textbf{Qd8}}
(or 11...\textit{\textbf{Qxd5}} 12.\textit{\textbf{cx}}\textit{\textbf{d5}} \textit{\textbf{f}}\textit{\textbf{5}} 13.\textit{\textbf{Qxa6}}
\textit{\textbf{bxa6}} 14.\textit{\textbf{Rc1}} \textit{\textbf{Qe8}} 15.\textit{\textbf{Qa4?}} Bud-
nikov – Areshchenko, Kharkov 2000) there arises a position similar to the variation: 7...\(a\)a6 8.\(\text{c}3\) \(e7\), but White's pawn is already on h3 and that is definitely in his favour. 12.\(c2\) and now:

12...\(c6\) 13.\(\text{xf6}\) \(\text{xf6}\), Ftacnik – Kovalev, Hamburg 1995, 14.\(c5\)!

(In the game White wasted some time for the preparation of c4-c5: 14.a3 \(e7\) 15.b4 and after 15...\(c5\), there arose a complicated fight in which White had no advantage at all.) 14...\(\text{c7}\) 15.\(\text{d2}\) \(e6\) 16.\(\text{c4}\) \(d4\) 17.\(\text{xd4}\) \(\text{xd4}\) (Or 17...\(\text{xd4}\) 18.e5 \(g7\) 19.\(f4\) – and White will gradually manage to collect Black's d4-pawn.) 18.b4 – White's powerful knight comes to d6 and then he can organize an attack on either side of the board thanks to it. In case Black exchanges on d6, White will obtain a powerful passed pawn on d6 and Black will have great problems to cope with it;

Or 12...\(c7\)?! 13.a3 \(c6\) 14.\(\text{c3}\) \(\text{ac5}\), Zhang Zhong – Kempinski, Linares 2001, 15.\(\text{fd1}\)?:, White should preserve the f1-square for his bishop (In the game he played: 15.\(\text{ad1}\) \(e6\) 16.b4 \(f4\) 17.\(\text{fe1}\) \(e8\) – 17...\(\text{xe2}\)?! – 18.\(c5\) \(\text{xe2}\) 19.\(\text{xe2}\) \(e7\) 20.\(\text{d2}\) \(f6\) 21.\(\text{c4}\) \(e6\) 22.\(\text{d6}\) and he obtained some minimal edge too, but with a considerably reduced number of pieces and that was advantageous for the defending side.) 15.\(\text{e6}\) 16.b4 \(e7\) (Or 16...\(f4\) 17.\(\text{f1}\) – avoiding exchanging pieces – 17...

\(f6\) 18.g3 \(e6\) 19.\(g2\) - 17.\(c5\) \(f4\) 18.\(\text{c4}\).

a) 10...\(c6\)

Black can now bring his knight on a6 into action, but he thus weakens the d6-square.

11.\(c5\) \(c7\)

About 11...\(h5\) 12.\(\text{xa6}\) bxa6 13.\(e1\) – see 10...\(h5\).

Black has also tried in practice: 11...\(e7\) 12.\(\text{xa6}\) bxa6 13.\(a4\) (It is also good for White to play 13.\(d6\)!!, attacking his opponent's pawns and trying to exchange queens, obtaining a powerful passed pawn on d6.) 13...\(c7\) 14.\(d2\) and White had a clear advantage in the game Estremera – P.Garcia, Zaragoza 1992.

It seems a bit strange for Black to come back with his queen to its initial position 11...\(d8\)??, but it is quite sensible – he wishes to protect the d6-square from the penetration of his opponent's queen. Still, after: 12.\(\text{xa6}\) bxa6, White can simply grab a pawn: 13.\(\text{xe5}\) 13...\(\text{xe4}\) 14.\(\text{xc6}\) \(\text{xd1}\) 15.\(\text{e7}\) \(h8\) 16.\(\text{axd1}\) \(\text{xc3}\) 17.\(\text{xc3}\) \(e6\) 18.\(d5\) and Black has no compensation for it at all.

12.\(d6\)

There are no visible drawbacks of that "immodest" move, but it is also possible for White to continue with: 12.\(d2\) \(e6\) 13.\(c4\) \(f4\) 14.\(f3\) \(e6\) 15.\(d6\) \(e7\) 16.\(e2\) and he maintains a slight edge.

12...\(b5\)

Or 12...\(e6\) 13.\(\text{xe5}\).
Or 12...\textit{d}d8 13.\textit{f}fd1 \textit{e}e6, King-Loek – Stingray, Internet 1994, 14.\textit{w}e5 \textit{f}fd5 15.\textit{w}g3 \textit{xc}3 16.bxc3 \textit{w}c8 17.\textit{d}d4\textpm.

13.\textit{xb}5 \textit{xb}5

The defender of the d5-square has been relocated to b5 and White begins the fight for the centre:
14.\textit{g}5! \textit{e}6 (14...\textit{w}e6 15.\textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}6 16.\textit{xb}5\textpm) 15.\textit{fe}1! \textit{bd}8 (15...b4? 16.\textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}6 17.\textit{d}d5\textpm) 16.\textit{xe}5 \textit{d}7 17.\textit{g}3\textpm.

\textbf{b) 10...\textit{d}d7}

Black is trying to bring his knight from a6 to the e6-square with the help of his king’s knight.

11.a3 \textit{ac}5

Or 11...c6 12.b4 \textit{w}e7 13.c5 \textit{dc}7 14.\textit{yb}3 \textit{h}8 15.\textit{ad}1\textpm Heissler – Schaefer, Germany 1993.

The line: 11...\textit{dc}5 12.b4 \textit{e}6 13.c5 c6 14.\textit{c}4 \textit{h}8 15.\textit{wd}2\textpm, led to a stable advantage for White in the game Kolev – Kr.Georgiev, Plovdiv 2003.

11...f5 12.b4 f4, Piscopo – Agdestein, Canberra 1997 (In this position, Black’s standard march of his pawn to the f4-square is not so good and it only creates additional weaknesses.) 13.\textit{c}1!? (Now, White’s bishop will be quite useful on the b2-square.) 13...c6 14.c5 \textit{h}8 (or 14...\textit{c}7 15.\textit{wd}6\textpm) 15.\textit{wd}6 (White prevents Black’s knight from coming to c7.) 15...\textit{f}6 16.\textit{d}2 (Now, Black’s rook is rather misplaced.) 16...\textit{c}7 17.\textit{b}2\textpm.

\textbf{12.b4}

It is also possible for White to play tactically – 12.\textit{b}5!??, for example: 12...\textit{wd}8 (or 12...\textit{e}6 13.\textit{g}5 \textit{xb}5 14.\textit{xd}5\textpm) 13.\textit{xc}5 \textit{d}5 14.\textit{xd}8 \textit{xd}8 15.\textit{xc}5 \textit{h}8 – White won a pawn, but he had to exchange his dark-squared bishop for Black’s knight. As it often happens in the King’s Indian Defence, Black has some compensation for that. Still, in that position, White exploits the powerful d5-outpost for his pieces and he maintains the advantage. 16.\textit{d}d1 \textit{d}7 17.\textit{d}d5 \textit{e}6 18.\textit{f}d1! (or 18.\textit{d}2 \textit{h}6\textpm) 18...\textit{a}4 (or 18...\textit{d}4 19.\textit{d}d4 exd4 20.\textit{b}5 \textit{c}6 21.\textit{xa}7? \textit{xd}5 22.exd5 \textit{d}3 23.\textit{xd}3 \textit{xb}2 24.\textit{d}6\textpm) 19.\textit{xe}6 (or 19.\textit{xd}8 \textit{xd}8 20.\textit{d}d2\textpm) 19...\textit{xd}1 20.\textit{xd}8 \textit{xe}2 21.\textit{b}d7 \textit{xc}4.
22.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)\textsubscript{xb7}\(\pm\) and White preserves his extra pawn and good winning chances.

**12...\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)\textsubscript{e6} 13.e5 c6**

Black thus weakens the d6-square.

It is possibly better for him to play: 13...\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)h8 14.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)c4 f6 15.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)d5 d8 16.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)h6 g8 17.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)c1 c6 18.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)e3 c7 19.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)b2 e7 20.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)b3 e8 21.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)f1+ and he maintains a slight, but stable edge, Chuchelov – Kersten, Hamburg 1995.

Or 13...\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)f4 14.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)c4 a5 15.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)c2 c6 16.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)fd1 f6 17.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)f1 h6 18.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)a4+ Woodward – Nalbandian, Capelle la Grande 2003.

14.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)d6 \(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)f4

After: 14...\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)f6 15.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)h6 g7 16.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)fd1 e7 17.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)c4 e8 18.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)a2 a5 19.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xe7 xe7 20.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)ad2\(\pm\), White had an overwhelming advantage in the game Hertneck – Metaxas, Katerini 1993.

\[\text{Diagram} 15.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)c4! (Now, it is not so easy to see how Black can untie his pieces without losing material. White's queen on d6 is extremely powerful and it paralyzes his opponent's communications.) After 15...\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)f6, Kotanjian – Nalbandian, Yerevan 2005, Black repels White's queen from d6, but he loses the coordination of his pieces (Or 15...\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)f6?! 16.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xf4 exf4 17.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xf4 h5 18.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)e3 \(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xc3 19.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xc3 \(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xe4 20.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xe1 \(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)f5 21.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)e7\(\pm\)). 16.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)fd1 \(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)e7 (Or 16...\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)e7? 17.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xe7 \(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xe7 18.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xd7 \(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xd7 19.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xe5\(\pm\) 17.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)d2\(\pm\) and later, White can begin his queenside offensive, or he can improve his control over the position by exchanging the knight on f4 and doubling his rooks along the d-file.

\[\text{Diagram} c) 10...\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)h5

That move seems illogical, because in comparison to the variation: 7...\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)a6 8.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)e3 \(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)g4 9.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)g5 \(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)e8 10.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xe5 dxe5 11.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)h3 h6 12.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)d2 \(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)f6 13.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)e3 \(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)h5, Black cannot support his knight on f4 (after the maneuver \(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)h5-f4) with the move – g6-g5.

11.c5!

That is probably the best decision for White, although it is also possible for him to try 11.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)e1.

11...\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)f4

The game was very quickly over after: 11...c6 12.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)xa6 bxa6 13.\(\text{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{}}}}\)e1 f5 (It is likely that after:
13...\(\text{\textcorner}f4 \) 14.\(\text{\textframed e}f4 \text{exf4} \) 15.\(\text{\textframed d}6\pm\), Black would have resisted a bit longer...) 14.exf5 \(\text{\textframed g}f5 \) 15.\(\text{\textframed c}x\text{xe}5 \text{\textframed w}x\text{e}5\) (but not 15...\(\text{\textframed d}xe5\), in view of 16.\(\text{\textframed d}d4+-\)) 16.\(\text{\textframed x}x\text{h}5 \text{\textframed g}b8\) 17.\(\text{\textframed g}5 \text{\textframed w}x\text{c}5 \) 18.\(\text{\textframed e}e7 \text{\textframed c}4 \) 19.\(\text{\textframed f}x\text{f}8\) and Black resigned, Pogorelov – K.Movsziszian, Spain 1997.

12.\(\text{\textframed b}5\)

After 12.\(\text{\textframed x}x\text{a}6 \text{bx}a6\) 13.\(\text{\textframed e}e1\), Black should better continue with: 13...\(\text{\textframed b}8\), (In case of 13...\(\text{\textframed e}6\), White follows with: 14.\(\text{\textframed c}c2\) \(\text{\textframed d}8\) 15.\(\text{\textframed x}x\text{f}4 \text{exf}4\) 16.\(\text{\textframed d}5\) \(\text{\textframed x}x\text{d}5\) 17.\(\text{\textframed e}x\text{d}5 \text{\textframed b}5\) 18.\(\text{\textframed a}d1 \text{\textframed x}x\text{b}2\) 19.\(\text{\textframed x}x\text{b}2\) \(\text{\textframed e}7\) 20.\(\text{\textframed c}e6\) 21.\(\text{\textframed d}6\) \(\text{\textframed a}3\) and in the game Cebalo – Fercec, Cannes 1996, White could have played: 22.\(\text{\textframed e}5!\) \(\text{\textframed c}x\text{c}5\) 23.\(\text{\textframed d}7\) \(\text{\textframed b}6\) 24.\(\text{\textframed f}1\)+, creating insurmountable problems for his opponent. It is not better for Black to defend with: 13...\(\text{\textframed e}6\), because of 14.\(\text{\textframed d}2\), in order to counter 14...\(\text{\textframed f}5\), with 15.\(\text{\textframed h}6\pm\) and later it is possible to follow with 14.\(\text{\textframed d}2\) (After 14.\(\text{\textframed c}2\) \(\text{\textframed w}e6\)! Black’s queen becomes quite active.) 14...\(\text{\textframed e}6\) 15.\(\text{\textframed x}x\text{f}4 \text{exf}4\) 16.\(\text{\textframed a}d1\) (or 16.\(\text{\textframed x}x\text{f}4 \text{\textframed c}6=\)) 16...\(\text{\textframed e}7\) and Black is not worse at all.

12...\(\text{\textframed e}6\)

Now, Black’s queen is forced to occupy a not so comfortable square in the middle of the board, because the move – 12...\(\text{\textframed c}6\) in unacceptable for Black in view of 13.\(\text{\textframed x}x\text{a}6 \text{bx}a6\) and the vulnerability of the \(d6\)-square will be quite troubling for him. 14.\(\text{\textframed d}6!\) \(\text{\textframed h}5\). Black preserves the material balance. (After 14...\(\text{\textframed e}6\) 15.\(\text{\textframed x}x\text{f}4 \text{exf}4\)

16.\(\text{\textframed x}f4\), Black’s \(c6\)-pawn has occupied a very important square for his queen and he can hardly obtain a sufficient compensation for the pawn. 16...\(\text{\textframed w}b8\) 17.\(\text{\textframed e}5!?\) \(\text{\textframed x}b2\) 18.\(\text{\textframed d}4\pm\); 16...\(\text{\textframed e}7\) 17.\(\text{\textframed c}e3\) \(\text{\textframed a}8\) 18.\(\text{\textframed b}3\pm\), White has consolidated his extra pawn and he is clearly better.) 15.\(\text{\textframed a}d1\) \(f5\), Kozak – Karlik, Czech Republic 2004 (Black has no other counterplay in sight.), 16.exf5 \(\text{\textframed x}f5\) (After: 16...\(\text{\textframed g}f5\) 17.\(\text{\textframed f}e1\) \(\text{\textframed e}7\) 18.\(\text{\textframed h}6!\), Black’s central pawns are weak and not strong at all. For example: 18...\(\text{\textframed e}4\) 19.\(\text{\textframed g}5\) \(\text{\textframed e}7\) 20.\(\text{\textframed x}g7\) \(\text{\textframed x}g7\) 21.\(\text{\textframed d}2\pm\) 17.\(\text{\textframed g}5\) \(\text{\textframed h}6\) 18.\(\text{\textframed g}e4\pm\), White maintains a clear advantage.

13.\(\text{\textframed e}1\)

13...\(\text{\textframed x}g2?\)

That sacrifice would not work, but what is Black supposed to do here?

After 13...\(\text{\textframed h}6\), there arises a familiar position from the popular variation: 8...\(\text{\textframed g}4\) 9.\(\text{\textframed g}5\) \(\text{\textframed w}e8\) 10.\(\text{\textframed x}x\text{e}5\) (We analyze in this book another move – 10.\(\text{\textframed c}5\) – see Chapter 9) 10...\(\text{\textframed x}x\text{e}5\) 11.\(\text{\textframed h}3\) \(\text{\textframed h}6\) 12.\(\text{\textframed c}1\) \(\text{\textframed f}6\) 13.\(\text{\textframed e}3\) \(\text{\textframed h}5\) 14.\(\text{\textframed c}5\) \(\text{\textframed f}4\) 15.\(\text{\textframed b}5\) \(\text{\textframed w}e6\) 16.\(\text{\textframed e}1\), but the difference is
that it is White to move and not Black. 14...c1 ♜h8 (Black plays analogously to the variation in which he has an extra tempo.) 15.♗xf4 exf4 16.e5 g5 17.♕d4 ♙e7 18.c6 and White manages to break in the centre. It is not good for Black to follow with 18...♘d8, because of: 19.♗f3! ♘b8 20.♖d5±.

14.♗xg2 ♙xh3+ 15.♗g1 ♘g4

Now, White has an important resource in the absence of the h6-pawn.

16.♗g5! ♙h4 17.f3 ♗g3+ 18.♗h1 ♘e8 (Black would not change much with the line: 18...♗h5 19.♗g1 ♙h4+ 20.♗g2++) 19.♗g1 ♙h4+ 20.♗g2 h6 21.♗h1++. Here, White’s king is safe from the chase of his opponent’s queen, while Black’s king is in trouble, because of White’s rook.

d) 10...b6

(diagram)

11.a3!

White has tried various moves in his fight for the advantage. See some of them:

The pawn-sacrifice is insufficient to obtain an edge: 11.c5 ♖xc5 12.♘xc5 ♘xc5 13.♕d5 (Or 13.♗c2 ♘b7 14.♗d2 ♙e7 15.♗b3 ♘ab8, with the idea to counter 16.♕a5 with 16...♗a8; 15.♕a4 ♙f5= and Black has a very good position and after the appearance of White’s rook on the c1-square, Black’s bishop will come to h6.) 13...♗xd5 14.♗xd5 ♘b8 15.b3 ♘b7 16.♗c4 ♙c6 17.♕d3, Niemela – Alava, Helsinki 1995, 17...♗fd8 18.♕f1 ♘d7 and Black’s chances are at least equal;

11.♗d2 ♘d7! (That is a standard solution of Black’s problems.) 12.♗b1 ♘ac5 13.b4 ♘e6 14.♘e1 ♘b7 15.♗d5 c6 16.♘c3 ♘f5= and Black has an excellent counterplay, Barus – Tkachiev, Jakarta 1996;

11.♗b1 ♘h5!? (Black has also tried in practice: 11...♗c5 12.b4 ♘e6 13.♗d1 ♘d7 14.c5!=, with some compensation, Shipov – Shchekachev, Paris 1995.) 12.♘d1 ♘c6= and the position was approximately equal in the game Lalic – Mrdja, Castellanea 1997.

11...♘b7

11...c6 12.b4 ♙e7 13.c5 ♘d8 14.♗a4!= Jelen – Leskiewicz, Bled 1999.
11...\texttt{h}5, Gralka – Kempinski, Poland 1993, 12.b4!? \texttt{f}4 13.c5 \texttt{b}8 (about 13...\texttt{b}7 14.\texttt{wc}2 – see 11...\texttt{h}5 12.\texttt{wc}2 \texttt{h}5; 13...\texttt{xc}5? 14.b5 \texttt{b}8 15.\texttt{xc}5\texttt{+} 14.\texttt{c}4\texttt{+} White has extra space, while Black’s knight on a6 is isolated.

Black has also tried here: 11...\texttt{c}5 12.\texttt{xc}5! (It is insufficient for White to obtain the advantage with: 12.\texttt{wc}2 \texttt{d}7 13.\texttt{ad}1 \texttt{e}6 14.\texttt{d}2 \texttt{dc}5 15.\texttt{wc}2, Marzolo – Kazhgaleyev, Paris 2004, 15...\texttt{d}7=) 12...\texttt{xc}5 13.b4 and White has a slight edge (After 13.\texttt{d}2 \texttt{b}8\texttt{!}, Black can hamper White’s thematic pawn-advance b2-b4, in comparison to the variation with 11...\texttt{h}7. In the game Cramling – Tkachiev, Ampuriabrava 1997, Black obtained a very comfortable game after: 14.\texttt{wc}2 c6 15.\texttt{a}4 \texttt{e}7=) 13...\texttt{e}7!? (Or 13...\texttt{xb}4 14.axb4 \texttt{h}5 15.\texttt{a}5 \texttt{f}4 16.\texttt{wc}2 c6 17.\texttt{fa}1 \texttt{e}7 18.\texttt{b}5 \texttt{xc}5 19.\texttt{xb}5\texttt{=} Relange – Kazhgaleyev, Paris 1999. It also deserves attention for White to consider: 16.\texttt{d}5\texttt{!?} \texttt{e}6 17.\texttt{c}5\texttt{=} 16...\texttt{xd}5 17.\texttt{xd}5 \texttt{xc}5 (It is premature for Black to play: 15...\texttt{f}5 16.bxc5 \texttt{xe}4 17.d6 \texttt{xd}6 18.\texttt{xd}6 \texttt{f}6 19.\texttt{g}5! \texttt{f}5 20.\texttt{d}5 \texttt{h}8 21.h4\texttt{=} 16.axb4 \texttt{xb}4 (or 16...\texttt{f}5 17.\texttt{b}3\texttt{=} 17.\texttt{c}2 \texttt{f}5 18.\texttt{xc}7 \texttt{f}7 (It is too risky for Black to capture the pawn after: 18...\texttt{xe}4? 19.\texttt{c}4 \texttt{h}8 20.\texttt{g}5\texttt{=} as well as after: 18...\texttt{fx}e4 19.\texttt{fb}1\texttt{+}, since his queen gets surprisingly trapped.)

19.\texttt{wc}4 \texttt{d}6 (or 19...\texttt{xc}4 20.\texttt{xc}4 \texttt{fx}e4 21.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{c}7 22.\texttt{a}2\texttt{=} 20.\texttt{fc}1 \texttt{f}6 21.\texttt{d}3\texttt{=} – White maintains a slight advantage thanks to his powerful passed d5-pawn.

12.\texttt{wc}2

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

12...\texttt{dc}5

Black is consistent in the planned regrouping of his forces.

It is not good for him to opt for: 12...\texttt{d}8 13.b4 c6 14.c5\texttt{!}

Black has tried in this situation the flank maneuver – 12...\texttt{h}5, after 13.b4 c5 (Or 13...\texttt{f}4 14.c5 \texttt{xe}2 15.\texttt{xe}2 \texttt{f}5 16.\texttt{fc}1 and here it is bad for Black to play: 16...\texttt{xc}5?! 17.\texttt{b}5 \texttt{b}8 18.\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{f}7 19.\texttt{g}5 \texttt{d}7 20.\texttt{d}1 \texttt{h}6 21.\texttt{c}4\texttt{=} Bacrot – Kempinski, Khanty Mansyisk 2005, but even after the best for him: 16...\texttt{f}4 17.\texttt{d}2, White preserves the advantage, for example: 17...\texttt{c}6 18.\texttt{a}4 \texttt{b}5 19.\texttt{b}2 \texttt{b}8 20.\texttt{c}3 \texttt{d}7 21.a4 a6 22.\texttt{d}1 \texttt{e}7 23.\texttt{d}6\texttt{=} 14...\texttt{e}6 15.\texttt{ac}1 \texttt{xc}5 16.b5 \texttt{b}8, Cebalo – Ma.Tseitlin, Ljubljana 1995 and besides the simple move for White – 17.\texttt{c}5, he has the interesting pawn-sacrifice at his disposal: 17.\texttt{d}5?! \texttt{xd}5 18.exd5 \texttt{xd}5 19.\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{d}8
Chapter 6

20.\(\texttt{c}4\); 17...\(\texttt{xd}5\) 18.\(\texttt{exd}5 \texttt{exd}5\) 19.\(\texttt{g}5\) \(\texttt{Wf}6\) 20.\(\texttt{Wxc}5\) \(\texttt{c}6\) 21.\(\texttt{Wfd}1\); 18...\(\texttt{Wxd}5\) 19.\(\texttt{Wxc}5\) \(\texttt{Ec}8\) 20.\(\texttt{Wfd}1\) \(\texttt{We}6\) 21.\(\texttt{Dg}5\) - The activity of White's pieces will cost Black potentially much more than a mere pawn.) 14.\(\texttt{Aab}1\) \(\texttt{f}5\) 15.\(\texttt{Aa}5\) \(\texttt{Ec}8\) (Black fails to equalize after: 15...\(\texttt{cxb}4\) 16.\(\texttt{axb}4\) \(\texttt{f}xe4\), because of: 17.\(\texttt{Dg}5\) \(\texttt{Df}4\) 18.\(\texttt{Wfd}1\) \(\texttt{Dd}8\) 19.\(\texttt{Dxe}4\), with an edge for White.) 16.\(\texttt{exf}5\)? (In case of: 16.\(\texttt{Wfd}1\) \(\texttt{Wh}8\) 17.\(\texttt{exf}5\) \(\texttt{gx}f5\) 18.\(\texttt{Dg}5\) \(\texttt{h}6\) 19.\(\texttt{De}6\) \(\texttt{Wxe}6\) 20.\(\texttt{Axb}5\) \(\texttt{cxb}4\) 21.\(\texttt{axb}4\) \(\texttt{b}5\), the position became very sharp in the game Tukmakov – Ferencz, Porto- roz 1996.) 16...\(\texttt{gx}f5\) (If 16...\(\texttt{cxb}4\), then White has the intermediate move: 17.\(\texttt{f}6!\) \(\texttt{Dxf}6\) 18.\(\texttt{Dxf}6+\) \(\texttt{Dxf}6\) 19.\(\texttt{axb}4\pm\) with an advantage for him.) 16...\(\texttt{gx}f5\) 17.\(\texttt{Dg}5\). Now, White is threatening: 18.\(\texttt{Axb}5\) \(\texttt{Wh}5\) and 19.\(\texttt{De}7\), while if: 17...\(\texttt{Wh}8\), then Black must consider the line: 18.\(\texttt{bxc}5\) \(\texttt{Axc}5\) 19.\(\texttt{Axc}5\) \(\texttt{Bxc}5\) 20.\(\texttt{Axb}5\) \(\texttt{Wh}5\) 21.\(\texttt{De}6\) \(\texttt{Cc}8\) 22.\(\texttt{Wxb}2\pm\) with a superior position for White.

12...\(\texttt{c}6\) 13.\(\texttt{b}4\) \(\texttt{We}7\) (Or 13...\(\texttt{Dd}7\), Lehmarn – Antoniewski, Slofok 1996, 14.\(\texttt{Dfd}1\) \(\texttt{We}7\) 15.\(\texttt{Aa}2\)! \(\texttt{Wfd}8\) 16.\(\texttt{Aad}1\) \(\texttt{Df}8\) 17.\(\texttt{c}5\)\(+\); It is not advisable for Black to try 13...\(\texttt{Dc}7\), due to: 14.\(\texttt{c}5\) \(\texttt{b}5\) 15.\(\texttt{a}4\) \(\texttt{a}6\) 16.\(\texttt{axb}5\) \(\texttt{axb}5\) 17.\(\texttt{Axa}8\) \(\texttt{Axa}8\) 18.\(\texttt{Aa}1\) – Vera – Del Rey, Aceimart 1995.) 14.\(\texttt{Dfd}1?!\) (In the game Driam – Khismatullin, Samara 2002, there followed: 14.\(\texttt{c}5\) \(\texttt{Dd}7\) 15.\(\texttt{a}4\) \(\texttt{b}5\) 16.\(\texttt{Dc}3\) \(\texttt{Dc}7\) 17.\(\texttt{Dfd}1\) \(\texttt{a}5\) 18.\(\texttt{bxa}5\) \(\texttt{De}6\) and Black's counterplay was quite sufficient.) 14...\(\texttt{Dfd}8\) and only now: 15.\(\texttt{c}5\) \(\texttt{Dd}7\) 16.\(\texttt{Dd}6\), for example: 16...\(\texttt{bxc}5\) 17.\(\texttt{Axa}6\) \(\texttt{Axa}6\) 18.\(\texttt{Dxc}6\) \(\texttt{Cc}4\) 19.\(\texttt{Dd}1\).

12...\(\texttt{Dd}7\) 13.\(\texttt{b}4\) \(\texttt{f}5\) 14.\(\texttt{c}5\) \(\texttt{bxc}5\) 15.\(\texttt{b}5\) \(\texttt{Dab}8\), Horstmann – Hoeksema, Groningen 1989 and here it would have been very strong for White to follow with 16.\(\texttt{Aa}4\)! (Instead of the move – 16.\(\texttt{Dg}5\), which was played in the game. It would not work for White to continue with: 16.\(\texttt{exf}5\) \(\texttt{gx}f5\) 17.\(\texttt{Aa}4\) \(\texttt{Dh}8\) 18.\(\texttt{Dd}5\), because of 18...\(\texttt{e}4?!\) 16...\(\texttt{Dh}8\) 17.\(\texttt{Dd}5\) \(\texttt{Cc}8\) 18.\(\texttt{exf}5\) \(\texttt{Db}6\) (or 18...\(\texttt{gx}f5\) 19.\(\texttt{Dg}5\)\(\pm\); 18...\(\texttt{Dxf}5?\) 19.\(\texttt{Ad}7\)) 19.\(\texttt{f}6\)\(1\). It is important for White to exchange his opponent’s Dking’s Indian bishop, because it protects Black’s king: 19...\(\texttt{Dxf}6\) 20.\(\texttt{Dxf}6\) \(\texttt{Dxf}3\) 21.\(\texttt{Dg}4\).

13.\(\texttt{Dxc}5\) \(\texttt{bxc}5\) 14.\(\texttt{Dd}5\)

It is also very interesting for White to try here 14.\(\texttt{b}4\), since he postpones placing his knight on the d5-square. Black can put up with it there for a while and then he can repel it from that square with the move – c7-c6. Instead, White waits for a more opportune moment to play \(\texttt{Dd}5\). Black has several lines at his disposal, but he cannot reach complete equality after anyone of them:

14...\(\texttt{h}5\) 15.\(\texttt{Dd}5\) \(\texttt{Dc}8\) 16.\(\texttt{Dd}2!\) \(\texttt{c}6\) (It is too bad for Black to play: 16...\(\texttt{Df}4?!\) 17.\(\texttt{Db}3!\) \(\texttt{Dxd}5\) 18.\(\texttt{cx}d5\) \(\texttt{cxb}4\) 19.\(\texttt{axb}4\) \(\texttt{Df}7\) 20.\(\texttt{Dg}4\) \(\texttt{Db}8\) 21.\(\texttt{Dxa}5\) \(\texttt{Wxb}4\) 22.\(\texttt{Dc}6\) \(\texttt{Dxb}2\) 23.\(\texttt{Dxb}2\) \(\texttt{Dxb}2\) 24.\(\texttt{Axa}4\) 19.\(\texttt{Df}3!\) \(\texttt{Db}8\) 20.\(\texttt{f}1\) \(\texttt{ex}b4\) 21.\(\texttt{axb}4\).}
15.b4!

That is the only way for White to fight for the advantage. He is trying to force his opponent to open files on the queenside in order to increase the scope of action of his heavy pieces. It is weaker for him to play the indifferent move – 15...\(<15...\text{d}d1, because of 15...a5 (It is also quite possible for Black here to follow with: 15...c6 16.\(<x6+ \text{xf6} 17.\text{d}d2 \text{d}d8 18.\text{a}ad1 \text{c}c7=, with an approximately equal position.) 16.a4 \text{e}8= and Black maintained the balance in the game Ftcnik – Nataf, Cappelle la Grande 1997.

15...\text{cxb4}

Black would not equalize if he ignores his knight on d5 demonstratively with: 15...\text{d}d7 16.b5!? (or 16.\text{xf}d1 \text{e}8 17.\text{ab}1 c6 18.\text{c}c3 \text{c}c7 19.b5 \text{xf}8=) 16...\text{e}8 17.a4 \text{f}8 18.a5 \text{e}6 19.a6 \text{xd}5 20.\text{xd}5 \text{d}d4 21.\text{c}c4!?± – since he will be faced with a difficult defence without any good prospects.

16.\text{xb}4 \text{e}8

After: 16...\text{xd}5 17.\text{cxd}5 \text{xb}4 18.\text{a}a4! \text{d}6 19.\text{a}a6 \text{b}4 20.\text{d}3±, Black has an extra pawn only temporarily, while White's piece-
pressure is even stronger, because of the presence of opposite-coloured bishops on the board.

17.²a5 ²h5 18.²g5 ²f4

In case of 18...c6, after: 19.²xh5 cxd5 20.exd5 ²d8 (Black would not save the day with: 20...h6 21.²xf7 gxh5 22.²g6+−, or 20...f6 21.²xh7 gxh5 22.²g6 ²d8 23.²a3! h4 24.²f3+-, with a winning position for White, while after: 20...²h6 21.²e4 gxh5 22.²f6+ ²g7 23.²xh5+ ²h8 24.²f6 ²g7 25.²xh7+ ²xf6 26.²xh6+ ²e7 27.²h4+ ²f8 28.²e1→ White’s attack is overwhelming.) 23.h4 f6 24.²e6 ²xe6 25.dxe6 gxh5 26.²d1±, Black is in for a big trouble.

Possibly, the best solution for him here is: 18...h6 19.²xh5 hxg5 20.²g4± and White has only a slight advantage.

19.²xf4 exf4 20.c5!± It was quite difficult for Black to neutralize White’s pressure in the game Vera – Gallagher, Luzern 1997.

Conclusion

By playing the move – 8...²e8, Black forces his opponent to clarify the situation in the centre. It is the best for White in that case to open the d-file with the move – 9.dxe5. Later, Black can choose between several plans, but his main problem is – what to do with his c-pawn:

1) He can place that pawn on the c6-square and he can bring his knight on a6 into the centre without weakening his queenside. That plan had a certain drawback, though. Black ceases to control the d6-square and White’s pieces can penetrate there. The plan including: c4-c5, ²f3-d2-c4-d6 is then quite unpleasant for Black. In some lines even White’s queen can occupy the d6-square paralyzing his opponent’s pieces.

2) It is also possible for Black to try the idea of a quick development with b7-b6, ²a6-c5 etc., but then White can exchange his bishop on e3 for Black’s knight on c5, doubling his opponent’s pawns and Black fails in that case to exploit effectively the absence of his opponent’s dark-squared bishop. White occupies additional space on the queenside, seizing the initiative, and after ²d5!, he maintains the advantage.
Chapter 7  

1.\(\text{d}f3\) 2.\(\text{f}6\) 3.\(\text{c}3\) 4.g7 4.e4 d6 5.d4 0-0 6.\(\text{e}2\) e5 7.0-0 a6 8.e3 c6

Black plans to open the centre at an appropriate moment and accordingly that forces White to clarify his intentions concerning his d4-pawn.

9.d5

White has tried to obtain the advantage in some other ways too (9.dxe5, 9.\(\text{Ze}1\)), but practice has proved that Black then solves his defensive problems easier.

Now, we will analyze the following possibilities for Black: a) 9...\(\text{c}xd5\), b) 9...c5 and c) 9...\(\text{g}4\).

His other options are:

About 9...\(\text{d}7\) 10.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{e}7\) 11.\(\text{a}3\) – see 9...\(\text{e}7\);

9...\(\text{e}8?!\) – Black is planning to begin flank operations without clarifying the situation in the centre and that is too dangerous for him. 10.\(\text{xc}6\) \(\text{bxc}6\) 11.c5! f5 12.\(\text{c}xd6\) f4, Sandstrom – Berg, Copenhagen 1991 and here it seemed quite convincing for White to opt for: 13.d7 \(\text{xd}7\) 14.\(\text{xd}7\) \(\text{xd}7\) 15.\(\text{xa}6\) fxe3 16.fxe3±;

9...\(\text{e}7\) 10.\(\text{d}2\) c5?! (It is worse for Black to play: 10...\(\text{d}7\) 11.a3 h5?! 12.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{h}7\) 13.b4± Ikonnikov – Kieffer, Le Touquet 2004.) 11.a3 \(\text{e}8\) 12.\(\text{h}1\) f5 13.exf5 gxf5 14.f4± – White maintains some advantage, Radocaj – Muhvic, Pula 1999;

9...\(\text{h}5\) 10.\(\text{xc}6\)! \(\text{bxc}6\) 11.\(\text{d}2\) f5. Otherwise Black’s move \(\text{h}5\) would not be justified. (In case of 11...\(\text{f}4\) Efstatniou – Karayanni, Athens 2001, White should not capture the pawn on f4, opening the scope of action for Black’s bishop on g7, but he should play instead 12.\(\text{fd}1\)± and Black has difficulties protecting his d6-pawn.) 12.exf5 gxf5 13.\(\text{g}5\)! \(\text{f}6\) (All the other moves are very bad for Black: 13...\(\text{e}8\) 14.\(\text{xd}6\); 13...\(\text{c}7\) 14.\(\text{xe}5\) ) 14.\(\text{ad}1\) e4 15.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{e}8\) 16.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 17.\(\text{b}3\) – and Black’s weak pawns are indefensible.
a) 9...cxd5 10.cxd5

10...\textit{\texttt{g4}}

Or 10...\textit{\texttt{h5}} 11.d2 f4, Teiss-serenc – Gaillard, Paris 1993, 12.b5!?; White clarifies immediately the pawn-structure on the queenside. 12...b6 (or 12...\textit{\texttt{d7}}?!) 13.d6 \textit{\texttt{a4}} 14.b3 \textit{\texttt{xb3}} 15.axb3 \textit{\texttt{xe2}} 16.\textit{\texttt{xe2}} \textit{\texttt{xd6}} 17.e4 \textit{\texttt{d7}} 18.f4±. 10...e8 11.d2 f5 12.f3 \textit{\texttt{f6}}?!, Roetteler – Werner, Germany 2002, Black wishes to either exchange his dark-squared bishop, or to activate it to the g5-square (12...f4 13.f2 \textit{\texttt{d7}} 14.f1±). White could have prevented the accomplishment of that idea with the preemptory exchange on f5 – 13.exf5! gxf5 14.f1± and here after 14...\textit{\texttt{g5}} White has the resource – 15.f4!, maintaining his advantage.

11.e4

It also deserves attention for White to follow with the immediate move 11.d2?!±.

11...f6 12.d2

Whenever the c-file has been opened, White should better re-
treat from g5 to the d2-square, in order to prevent the appearance of Black's bishop on h6.

12...\textit{\texttt{h6}}

Black should deprive his opponent of the g5-square, prior to advancing f6-f5.

It is bad for Black to play 12...f5 immediately: 13.g5! f6 14.e6 \textit{\texttt{xe6}} 15.dxe6 \textit{\texttt{xe4}} (15...c7 16.b3±; 15...\textit{\texttt{xe4}} 16.e5±) 16.d5! e8 17.c1 d5 (or 17...e6 18.xa6 bxa6 19.e7 e8 20.a5±) 18.e7 \textit{\texttt{d7}} (After 18...e6 19.e7 \textit{\texttt{xe7}} 20.e3± – Black’s compensation for the exchange is insufficient.) 19.e3 b6 20.a4! b7 21.b5 f6 22.xf6 xf6 23.xd6 xe7 24.xc5 bxc5 25.e5 g7 26.e8+–, White won the exchange and he pressed his material advantage home in the game Greenfeld – Avrukh, Israel 1998.

13.e1 e7

Or 13...f5 14.g5!±.

14.e1 f5 15.d3 fxe4

b) 9...c5

Now, White can deploy his pieces quite comfortably with the help of a standard maneuver.

10.\(\text{\textipa{d}e1}\) \(\text{\textipa{d}d7}\)

Black has some other possibilities too:

The move 10...\(\text{\textipa{c}c7}\), does not seem to be logical at all – Black’s knight is not better placed on c7 than on a6. He simply loses time. 11.a3 \(\text{\textipa{f}e8}\) 12.b4 b6 13.\(\text{\textipa{d}d3}\)± Schuurman – Bergen, Graz 2002;

10...\(\text{\textipa{e}8}\). That retreat of the knight has some drawbacks in comparison to \(\text{\textipa{d}d7}\) – it does not support the e5-pawn from that square and White can react in a typical fashion for the King’s Indian Defence. After f7-f5, he can take of f5 and then in case of gxf5, he can follow with f2-f4, attacking his opponent’s e5-pawn and forcing Black to clarify the situation in the centre. For example: 11.\(\text{\textipa{d}d3}\) f5 12.exf5 gxf5 13.f4 e4 14.\(\text{\textipa{f}f2}\) \(\text{\textipa{f}f6}\) (Black can also try the resource – 14...\(\text{\textipa{x}c3}\) and that is one more standard idea in the \(\text{\textipa{d}ing}\)’s Indian defence. The exchange on c3 enables him to build a passive, but quite solid position. 15.bxc3 \(\text{\textipa{f}f6}\) – White’s bishop on e3 does not have any good prospects now and he will hardly manage to push g2-g4. That is the beginning of a tough positional battle with slightly better chances for White.) 15.h3 h5 16.\(\text{\textipa{x}h5}\) \(\text{\textipa{x}h5}\) 17.\(\text{\textipa{w}xh5}\) \(\text{\textipa{f}f6}\) 18.g3 \(\text{\textipa{d}d7}\) 19.\(\text{\textipa{w}e2}\) \(\text{\textipa{g}6}\) 20.\(\text{\textipa{h}h2}\) \(\text{\textipa{e}7}\) 21.\(\text{\textipa{g}1}\)± White has regrouped his forces advantageously and he has preserved his extra pawn, Berezin – Podat, Kiev 2002; or 13...b6 (instead of 13...\(\text{\textipa{e}4}\)) 14.\(\text{\textipa{w}d2}\) (The line: 14.\(\text{\textipa{f}x5}\) dxe5 15.\(\text{\textipa{w}d2}\) also deserves a serious attention for White.) 14...\(\text{\textipa{e}4}\) (It is too dubious for Black to wait with the move 14...\(\text{\textipa{d}d7}\), for example: 15.\(\text{\textipa{f}x5}\) dxe5 16.\(\text{\textipa{g}5}\) \(\text{\textipa{c}c7}\) 17.\(\text{\textipa{h}h6}\) \(\text{\textipa{d}d6}\) 18.\(\text{\textipa{x}g7}\) \(\text{\textipa{x}g7}\) 19.\(\text{\textipa{e}ae1}\) \(\text{\textipa{a}ae8}\) 20.\(\text{\textipa{d}d1}\). White wishes to redeploy his bishop to the c2-square and it will exert pressure against Black’s pawns from there. The e5 and f5-pawns are much rather a liability than strength and their every move will present White’s knights with comfortable squares, moreover that Black’s knight on a6 is completely idle. 20...\(\text{\textipa{b}b4}\) 21.\(\text{\textipa{f}f2}!\)±. White avoids exchanging Black’s useless knight and he preserves his advantage, Kistella – Odendahl, Germany 2002.) 15.\(\text{\textipa{f}f2}\) \(\text{\textipa{f}f6}\) 16.h3±. Now, White can organize an all-out offensive, preparing gradually the pawn-break g2-g4 and then he can play on the queenside with: \(\text{\textipa{b}b1}\), a2-a3, b2-b4, exerting pressure against
Black’s position all over the board, Parmentier – Moracchinì, Paris 1998.

11.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{d3} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{e7}

In case Black plays 11...\(f5\) immediately, then after: 12.exf5 gxf5 13.f4 e4 14.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{f2} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textit{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{xc3} 15.bxc3 \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{f6} 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{b1±, he has no effective counterplay and he can only wait whether White will manage to break through somewhere, or not.}

12.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{d2} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{c7} 13.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{ab1} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{f5} 14.\text{exf5} \text{gxf5} 15.f4 e4 16.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{f2}

\[\text{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}\text{c5}!\text{? Black begins active actions on the queenside in advance of his opponent, preventing his play connected with b2-b4. 17.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{xb5} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{xb5} 18.\text{cxb5} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{b6 (After Black accepts the sacrifice, his} d5-pawn becomes vulnerable.) 19.b3 (It seems attractive, but things are far from clear if White continues with: 19.b4 cxb4 20.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{xb4} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{b7} 21.\text{ecl} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{c8} 22.\text{c6} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{f7=; 21.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{d1} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{h8} 22.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{xb6} \text{axb6} 23.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{c3} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{ac8} 24.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{c1} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{c5\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{f7 20.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{fd1} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{b7} 21.a4 \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{xd5! (Capturing with the knight – 21... \(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{xd5??, loses because of the pin 22.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{c4; while after 21...\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{h8?, as it was played in the following game, White preserves his extra pawn with the help of the move 22.a5 and he obtains a winning position, Nickoloff – Alarcon, Elista 1998.) 22.a5 \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{xb3} 23.\text{axb6} \text{axb6! (It is too bad for Black to follow with 23...\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{xd1} 24.b7±) 24.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{d6} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{xd1} 25.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{xd1± and White maintains somewhat better prospects in the forthcoming complex fight.}}

c) 9...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{g4}

10.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{g5} \text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{f6}

If Black plays 10...\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{c7, that will be a try to avoid the move f7-f6 and to advance f7-f5 at once. White can react in the following fashion – 11.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{e1} \text{h6 (After 11...f5 12.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{c4!?) 12.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{d2±, he can patiently improve his position on the queenside, while Black has no real counterplay on the kingside; 11...\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{f6} 12.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{d3} 12.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{e2} 13.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{d2±) 13.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{d2 f5 (or 12...\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{f6} 13.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{d3±) 13.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{xg4!?) fxg4 14.\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{c1± and White has better prospects.}}

11.\(\text{\textit{\textbf{\textdaggerlittle}}}}\text{h4!}

This is White’s strongest move. He prevents the advance f6-f5 for Black.
In positions with a black pawn on c7 (see 7...\texttt{Qd7}), this retreat has not been very appropriate. After the opening of the c-file, as a result of White’s pawn-offensive on the queenside, Black takes the key c1-square under control, which is essential for the mobilization of White’s heavy pieces.

Now, (with Black’s pawn already on c6) the centre will be blocked (pawns on c5, d6 and e5 against White pawns on c4, d5 and e4, since it is unfavourable for Black to capture c6xd5, because of White’s response \texttt{Qxd5}) and as a result the b-file will be probably opened and Black’s control over the c1-square will be almost immaterial.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess-board.png}
\end{center}

Now, we will deal in details with: \textbf{c1) 11...\texttt{Qh6}, c2) 11...\texttt{h5} and c3) 11...\texttt{c5}.}

11...\texttt{Qb6}?! 12.dxc6! \texttt{Qxc6} (Or 12...\texttt{Qxb2} 13.exb2 \texttt{Qxb7} 14.\texttt{Qb1 Qxc3} 15.\texttt{Qxb7 Qc5} 16.\texttt{Qc7}±; it is not good for Black to try: 12...bxc6, in view of 13.\texttt{Qxd6}, for example: 13...\texttt{Qc5} 14.\texttt{Qd2}± and Black’s compensation for the pawn is nowhere in sight; or 13...\texttt{Qxb2} 14.\texttt{Qxc6 Qxc3} 15.\texttt{Qxa8 Qb2} 16.\texttt{Qd5}+-; 14...\texttt{Qb8} 15.\texttt{c5 Qxc3} 16.\texttt{Qxa6 Qxa6} 17.\texttt{Qxa6}± and Black cannot capture the c5-pawn, because of \texttt{Qe6}.) 13.\texttt{Qd5}. Now, White has gained access to the wonderful d5-outpost. 13.\texttt{Qh8} 14.b4 \texttt{Qc7} 15.\texttt{Qe1 f5} 16.\texttt{Qe7 Qe8} 17.\texttt{Qxc7 Qxc7} 18.\texttt{Qxd6}± van den Bos – Michaud, IECC 2001.

11...g5 12.\texttt{Qg3} f5 (After 12...\texttt{Qh6}, we can recommend to White the waiting move – 13.\texttt{h3}?!± 13.exf5 \texttt{Qxf5} 14.dxc6 bxc6 15.\texttt{Qa4 Qc7} 16.\texttt{Qad1 Qb8} 17.\texttt{Qe4} (or 17...\texttt{Qh6} 18.\texttt{Qxe5}±) 18.bxg4 exf3 19.\texttt{Qxf3} and White had a winning position in the game Pira – Moingt, Montpellier 1991.

\textbf{c1) 11...\texttt{Qh6}?!}

This is the worst for Black from the three abovementioned possibilities. Now, White has a tactical solution.

12.\texttt{c5}!

He makes use of the circumstance that the centre has not been completely closed and he opens the game quite favourably.

It is not advisable for him to play 12.\texttt{Qd2}, because in that pawn-structure with a closed centre, White’s knight on d2 cannot support actively his queenside offensive. 12...\texttt{c5} (It is weaker for Black to start his kingside counterplay immediately, because then White’s passive knight on d2 can occupy the excellent blocking e4-square. After 12...g5 13.\texttt{Qg3} f5.

12.a3 – When the centre is closed, if Black controls the c5-square with only one knight, White should better avoid playing the preparatory move – a2-a3. 12...c5 13.∆e1 ∆d7 (It is better for Black not to lose time and to play immediately 13...²e8!, followed by f6-f5.) 14.∆d3 ∆h8 15.b4!? g5 16.∆g3 f5 17.f3 f4 18.∆e1 b6 (Black cannot play: 18...cxb4 19.axb4 ∆xb4 20.∆xb4 ²b6, because of: 21.∆f2 ²xb4 22.∆d2!±) 19.∆b1 ∆g8 (or 19...²f7 20.g4, followed by ∆g2 and ∆h1) 20.g4! – with the standard resource 20...fxg3 21.hxg3± van Wely – Zude, Munich 1991.

12...∆xc5

We will have a look at two other possibilities for Black:

12...dxc5 13.∆xa6 bxa6 14.∆xe5!. This is the right move for White. (After 14.dxc6 ²e6 15.²a4 g5 16.∆g3 ∆c8± the position became somewhat complicated, Ivan- nisevic – Ilincic, Belgrade 1998.) 14...cxd5 15.∆c6± and White had a great advantage;

12...g5 13.dxc6 bxc6 (Or 13...gxh4? 14.²d5 ²f7 15.cxb7 ∆xb7 16.²xb7 ∆xe5 17.²d5± and the dark squares in Black’s camp are completely defenseless.) 14.cxd6 gxd6!?. This move has not been tested in practice yet. (or 14...²f7 15.d7 ²b7 16.∆g3± Budnikov – Ko- stjuk, Kharkov 2000) 15.d7 ∆xd7 (but not 15...∆b7?? 16.∆b3+-) 16.∆xa6 h3 17.g3 (Things are far from clear if White plays: 17.∆c4 ²h8! 18.∆d3 ²g4 19.²fd1 ²b6 20.²a4 ²b4 21.²b3 ²xb3 22.axb3 f5) 17...²g4 18.∆c2 ²b8 19.∆c2! and White’s prospects are better in this sharp position, since Black’s bishop on g7 is “bad” and his pawn-structure is in ruins.

13.b4 ∆d7 14.dxc6 bxc6

This is an interesting pawn sacrifice.

After 14...²b6 15.a4, in the game Lautier – Le Quang Kim, Antwerp 1998, everything ended almost in a flash: 15...a5 16.bxa5 ∆xa5 17.²b3+ ²h8 18.²b1 and Black resigned.

15.²xd6 ²b6 16.²xc6

It would not work for White to continue with: 16.²xd8 ²xd8 17.∆xe5 (17.²fd1 ²f7 18.∆e1 ²e6 19.f3 ²xd1 20.²xd1 a5=) 17...g5 18.∆xc6 ²e8 19.∆g3 ∆d7 20.b5 ²f7

16...²d7 17.²d6 ²f7
18. \textit{wd3!}

White’s queen has many possible retreats on the d-file, but only that one poses some problems to Black.

The game with which the entire variation originated – Hoeksema – Pel, Groningen 2001, continued with 18. \textit{wd2} and the opponents agreed to a draw and decided to settle the argument in their home-analysis. For example: 18... \textit{wc7} 19. \textit{d5} (or 19. \textit{ac1} \textit{h6} 20. \textit{d5 xc1} 21. \textit{x}x6 \textit{g7} 22. \textit{xc1 xc1} 23. \textit{xd7 xd7} 24. \textit{xe1 ac8=}) 19... \textit{xd5} 20. \textit{xd5 c6} 21. \textit{xc4 ac8} 22. \textit{d3 fd8} 23. \textit{fc1} and Black has some compensation for the pawn indeed, but will it be sufficient to equalize remains quite unclear. For example: 23... \textit{b7} (or 23... \textit{d7} 24. \textit{dxe5?} fxe5 25. \textit{xd8 xd8} 26. \textit{a6 h6} 27. \textit{xc6 xc6} 28. \textit{xc6 xd3} 29. \textit{xa8 f8} 30. \textit{xa7±} 24. \textit{b5 d5} 25. \textit{d4 xc1} 26. \textit{xc1 xa2} – Black has regained temporarily his pawn, but now White can inflict a tactical strike: 27. \textit{xe5!} g5! (27...f5?? 28. \textit{xd8+}; 27... \textit{d5?} 28. \textit{xa2 dh8} 29. \textit{c2±}) 28. \textit{xa2 fxe5} 29. \textit{b6!}. This move opens the way for White’s bishop to the a6-square. 29... \textit{axb6} (29... \textit{gxh4??} 30. \textit{c7+}; 29... \textit{xb6} 30. \textit{c4 gh4} 31. \textit{xf7 dh8} 32. \textit{d5±}) 30. \textit{a6 a7} 31. \textit{g5} \textit{a8} 32. \textit{a1 xa6} 33. \textit{xa6 xa6} 34. \textit{xa6 gxg5} 35. \textit{f3±}. Black’s passed b-pawn will hardly be promoted, while his opponent’s rook is on b7, while White can create a couple of passed pawns on the kingside.

18. \textit{wc7}


19. \textit{ac1 ac8} 20. \textit{a4!}

This is one of the basic ideas in that position for White – to repel the enemy knight away from the b6-square and to occupy the d5-outpost.

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

20... \textit{xa4!} After that move White is compelled to enter a long forced variation. (20... \textit{xa4?} 21. \textit{xa4 xc1} 22. \textit{xd7+}; 20... \textit{e6} 21. \textit{d7} 22. \textit{a6!+} and White preserves his extra pawn.)

21. \textit{xa4 xc1} 22. \textit{xb6 axb6} 23. \textit{xc1 xc1} 24. \textit{f1 d8} 25. \textit{b5}! \textit{dd1} 26. \textit{g4 xf1} 27. \textit{g2!} and White’s queen is much stronger in this position than Black’s two rooks stranded on White’s first rank. There might follow later: 27... \textit{g5} 28. \textit{g3 h5!?} (28... \textit{f1} 29. \textit{xb6 c4} 30. \textit{b7±}) 29. \textit{e8} (29. \textit{gxh5?} g4++) 29... \textit{f8} 30. \textit{e6 h4} (30...h4?? 31. \textit{xe5+-}) 31. \textit{h4} \textit{xb4} 32. \textit{h4±} and White maintains a dangerous initiative.
c2) 11...h5

12.h3

White is trying to exploit immediately the fact that the centre of the board has not been closed completely yet.

We have already mentioned in our previous notes that the move 12...c3 is not promising much for White, because of 12...c5 (Black's attempts to organize some immediate active actions on the kingside are not going to end optimistically for him: 12...h6 13.h3 g5 14.g3 g4 15.hxg4 hxg4 16.xb1 xf7 17.b4 cxd5 18.cxd5 c7 19.c4 f8, van Wely – Nijboer, Eindhoven 1991 and here White could have consolidated his advantage in the game with the help of the line 20.b5!, with the idea to follow with b2-b4.) 12.c5 a3 h6 14.f3 h6 15.h1 h6 16.gel g5= and Black's position was quite solid in the game Schneider – Smirin, Bastia 1997.

It is also worth mentioning the move 12...e1!? and after 12...h6 (The move 12...c5, transposes to variation c3b; 12...b6 13.a4 d4 14.h3 h6 15.dxc6 bxc6 16.f3 xd1 17.fxd1 f7 18.c5!±; 15.ex4 16.f3 xh4 17.cxh b8 18.bxc8 bxc8, Huzman – Nalbandian, Warsaw 2005, 19.d5! – this move is played with the idea to bring the knight into the actions, first from e1 and then from the a4-square. 19...h7 20.f3 f4 21.e6 d8 22.c3 c7?? 23.g3+-; 22...f5 23.d5 h6 24.xf5 gxf5 25.b3±; 22...g8 23.d5 h6 24.h4!± and White organizes a powerful attack on the kingside. It is also interesting for him to continue with the smart move 15.b1, setting the trap 15.cxd5?? – Black should better play here: 15...c5 16.c3 a6, enabling his queen to retreat to the b6-square. 17.e2 b6 18.d3 ± – 16.f3 xe4 17.d3 f4 18.g3+-) 13.f3 and here it seems quite attractive for Black to capture the pawn – 13...b6! (It is too passive for him to play: 13...f7 14.d3 c5, Tunik – Doroshkevich, Krasnodar 1991, because White can start his standard attacking plan on the queenside with 15.b1, followed by b2-b4.) 14.f2 xb2 15.a4 a3 (or 15...b4 16.c5 xc5 17.xc5 dxc5 18.d3±) 16.dxc6 (Or 16.c5?!, not allowing the move 17...xd8 in the main line.) 16.bxc6 17.c5 xc5, Shulman – Dydyshko, Minsk 1993 (Or 17...dxc5? 18.a6 a6 19.xc5+; 17...d8?! 18.cxd6 xd6 19.c4 f7 20.d3 c7 21.ac5 b5∞; 18...xd6 19.c2 xd1 20.a3 a1 21.a1 f7
22.\(\text{c4}\) and White's compensation for the pawn is more than sufficient. He will soon regain his pawn on the queenside in a few moves and he will preserve better prospects.) 18.\(\text{xc5}\) dxc5 19.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{h7}\) 20.\(\text{d3}\) \(\text{d8}\) 21.\(\text{xc5}\) \(\text{a5}\) 22.\(\text{c2}\) – and only the additional practical test will show how substantial White's compensation for the sacrificed material is.

12...\(\text{h6}\) 13.c5!?

In fact, White now opts for that pawn-break a move earlier. But contrary to variation c1, here it is far from simple for him to prove his advantage.

13...g5
This move is just forced.
Black loses in case of 13...dxc5?, due to: 14.\(\text{xa6}\) bxa6 15.\(\text{xe5}\)+.
It is also bad for him to defend with: 13...\(\text{f7}\)?, because of: 14.\(\text{xa6}\) bxa6 15.dxc6 dxc5 16.\(\text{a4}\) g5 17.\(\text{g3}\) h4 18.\(\text{h2}\)+
Antic – Zakic, Herceg Novi 2000 and White's passed c6-pawn and his proud knight on d5 provide him with a great advantage.

It is dubious for Black to try: 13...\(\text{xc5}\)?!, because of: 14.b4 \(\text{d7}\) 15.dxc6 \(\text{b6}\) (White's advantage is overwhelming in case of: 15...bxc6 16.\(\text{xd6}\) and we reach a position, which we have analyzed in the variation 11...\(\text{h6}\) 12.c5, except with the inclusion of the moves – h3 and h5. It often happens that similar small details affect considerably the general evaluation of the position and
here, for example the move 16...\(\text{b6}\), loses now for Black, because White’s bishop has gained an access to the g3-square in many lines. 17.\(\text{d8}\) \(\text{d8}\) 18.\(\text{e5}\)+–; 16...g5 17.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{b6}\) 18.\(\text{c6}\) \(\text{d7}\) 19.\(\text{d6}\) \(\text{f7}\) 20.\(\text{d3}\) \(\text{c7}\) 21.\(\text{ac1}\) \(\text{ac8}\) 22.\(\text{b1}\)– Black has compromised the light squares on his kingside considerably with the move g6-g5.) 16.a4! bxc6 (The move 16...a5, loses outright, because of the line: 17.bxa5 \(\text{xa5}\) 18.\(\text{b3}\) \(\text{f7}\) 19.\(\text{fb1}\) \(\text{xa4}\) 20.\(\text{xb7}\) \(\text{xb7}\) 21.\(\text{xa4}\) 1–0 Y.Shulman – Markowski, Swidnica 1996; it is also bad for Black to play the intermediate move 16...g5?! 17.a5! \(\text{xh4}\) 18.\(\text{xb6}\) \(\text{xb6}\) 19.\(\text{d5}\) \(\text{d8}\) 20.c7 \(\text{e8}\) 21.\(\text{h4}\)+–; 18...\(\text{xc6}\) 19.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{f7}\) 20.\(\text{xa7}\) \(\text{e8}\) 21.\(\text{wb3}\) \(\text{b7}\) 22.\(\text{hxh4}\)–) 17.a5 \(\text{d7}\) 18.\(\text{xd6}\)+ and White maintains an overwhelming advantage.

14.\(\text{xa6}\) bxa6 15.dxc6 dxc5
It is a disaster for Black to play 15...\(\text{xh4}\), in view of: 16.\(\text{d5}\)+ \(\text{f7}\) 17.c7 \(\text{xc7}\) 18.\(\text{xa8}\) \(\text{h3}\) 19.\(\text{d5}\)+–.

16.\(\text{g3}\) \(\text{e6}\) 17.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{c8}\)
About 17...\(\text{h4}\) 18.\(\text{h2}\) \(\text{c8}\) 19.\(\text{fd1}\) \(\text{e8}\) 20.\(\text{xa6}\) \(\text{f7}\) 21.\(\text{d6}\)! – see 17...\(\text{c8}\).
It is not advisable for Black to try: 17...\(\text{b6}\), because of: 18.\(\text{xd5}\) \(\text{xd5}\) 19.exd5 \(\text{fd8}\) 20.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{b5}\) 21.b3 \(\text{f5}\) 22.\(\text{ac1}\)+ and White has a great advantage.

18.\(\text{fd1}\) \(\text{e8}\) 19.\(\text{xa6}\) \(\text{h4}\)
White can counter the natural move for Black 19...\(\text{f7}\) with
the powerful argument 20.h4! g4 (Black loses after 20...hxg4?, because of: 21.hxg5 hxg5 22.g6++)
21.hxg5! (White brings his bishop into the actions in that fashion.) 21...fxg5 22.hxg5 Chuchelov – Polzin, Hamburg 1997 and White’s edge is considerable.

20...h2 6f7

21.Ed6! ef8
It is bad for Black to continue with: 21...Ec7 22.Ed5+.

22.Edad1!
White sacrifices the exchange on d6 in order to preserve his passed pawn on the c6-square.

22...Exd6 23.Exd6 Ed8
See some exemplary variations, which confirm the correctness of White’s sacrifice after Black’s other defensive possibilities:


24.c7 Exd6 25.Exd6 Ed7 26.Exe5! Now, White’s seemingly dead bishop on h2 inflicts a mortal blow. 26...fxe5 (After 26...Exd6 27.Exd6++, Black is helpless against White’s c7-pawn.)

27.Exe5. It is surprising, but Black is incapable of defending his position having a whole extra rook.


(c3) 11...c5 12.Ed1

Now, Black can choose between: (c3a) 12...Ed6, or (c3b) 12...h5.

(c3a) 12...Ed6 13.Ed3 Ef8
The aggressive move 13...g5, leads after: 14.Qg3 f5 15.exf5 Qxf5 16.f3 Qg6, Peng – Fishbein, Philadelphia 2002, 17.Qe4\# to a position, in which White maintains somewhat better chances.

13...Qd7 – In general, that move is not consequential in Black’s basic plan, connected with the pawn-advance f6-f5. After 14.a3, White can transpose to the game van Wely – Zude – see our notes to the variation: 11...Qh6 12.a3.

13...Qf7 – In order to play f6-f5, Black will have to remove sooner or later his queen away from the h4-d8 diagonal, so White can counter that with: 14.Qb1!? Qe8 15.f3, transposing to the main line.

14.f3 Qf7

In case of 14...f5, White would continue with 15.Qb1! (The risky move 15.g4?! would enable Black after: 15...Qf7 16.gxf5 gxf5 17.Qh1 Qh8\# to obtain an excellent counterplay.). Now, contrary to the analogous situations in the variations with the move 7...Qbd7, Black cannot bring his knight on a6 quickly into the actions against White’s king and that circumstance permits White to create swiftly dangerous threats on the queenside.

15.Qb1!

This is a very strong move, if you have in mind that Black cannot put his second knight quickly to the c5-square. Now, White can now push b2-b4 immediately without having to prepare it with a2-a3 beforehand. Later, he might need the key b3-square as well.

15.f5 16.b4 b6 17.bxc5

The plan with opening the maximum number of files on the queenside promises less for White: 17.a4 Qh6 18.Qf2 Qd7 19.a5 Qe7 20.axb6 axb6 21.bxc5 bxc5 and here it would not work for him to continue with 22.Qa4, because of: 22...Qxa4! 23.Qxa4 fx4 24.fx4 Qg5\# and Black has some counterplay against his opponent’s e4-pawn.

17...bxc5

After the other capture – 17...dxc5 18.Qb5 Qd7 19.a4\#, White has good prospects on the queenside, while Black has problems to deploy his knight on the good blocking d6-square.

18.Qa4

White should not worry anymore about Black’s possible checkmating attack after he trades the queens.

18...Qxa4 19.Qxa4 Qd7 20.Qc3 Qfb8

21.Qb5! (The straightforward
move 21.\textit{b}3, would have enabled Black to organize some counterplay with: 21...\textit{x}b3 22.axb3 \textit{xb}8 23.\textit{a}1 \textit{xb}3 24.\textit{xa}6 \textit{xc}3 25.\textit{xa}7 \textit{e}8=) 21...\textit{h}6 22.\textit{f}2 (After 22.\textit{b}3, Black’s dark-squared bishop enters the action: 22...
\textit{xb}5 23.\textit{xb}5 \textit{c}7 24.\textit{b}3 \textit{xb}3 25.\textit{ax}b3 \textit{e}3= Kiriakov – Isupov, Orel 1997.) 22...
\textit{xf}8 23.\textit{b}3 \textit{xb}5 (This exchange is practically forced, since it would not work for Black to continue with: 23...
\textit{b}7 24.\textit{fb}1 \textit{ab}8, because of 25.\textit{xa}7±) 24.\textit{xb}5 \textit{c}7 25.\textit{b}3
\textit{xb}3 26.\textit{ax}b3± and White preserved a slight, but stable advantage in the game Gelfand – Sutovsky, Tilburg 1996.

c3b) 12...\textit{h}5

13.\textit{h}3 \textit{h}6 14.a3 \textit{f}7
Black’s other possibilities are:
About 14...\textit{b}6 15.\textit{d}3 \textit{c}7 16.\textit{b}4 – see 14...\textit{c}7; as for 14...\textit{e}8 15.\textit{d}3 \textit{f}7 16.b4 – see 14...\textit{f}7.
14...\textit{g}5 15.\textit{g}3 \textit{h}4?! That is a bad move and it weakens the light squares. (or 15...\textit{g}4 16.\textit{hx}g4 \textit{hx}g4 17.\textit{h}4±) 16.\textit{h}2±;
14...\textit{e}7 15.\textit{d}3 \textit{g}5 (or 15...
7.0-0 \( \text{d}a6 \) 8.\( \text{e}3 \) c6 9.d5
\( \text{\&xg4} \) \( \text{\&xg4} \) 28.\( \text{\&f5}\pm \) 23...hxg4 24. \( \text{\&f2} \) \( \text{\&h6} \) 25.\( \text{\&d3} \) \( \text{\&h5} \) 26.g3\( \pm \) 24. \( \text{\&xg4} \) \( \text{\&xg4} \) 25.\( \text{\&d2} \) \( \text{\&f6} \) 26.b4 \( \text{\&h6} \) 27.\( \text{\&d3}\pm \) – and Black’s compensation for the pawn is nowhere in sight;

14...\( \text{\&d7} \) 15.a3 and now:

about 15...\( \text{\&f7} \) – see 14...\( \text{\&f7} \);
or 15...\( \text{\&c8} \) 16.\( \text{\&g3} \) \( \text{\&f7} \) 17.f4 exf4 18.\( \text{\&xf4}\pm \) Maksimenko – Kozakov, Werther 1999;

15...g5 – Black starts immediately opening files on the kingside. Meanwhile, now you can see the drawbacks of the placement of Black’s queen-knight on the a6-square. It cannot join in the actions on the other side of the board. 16.\( \text{\&g3} \) g4 17.hxg4 \( \text{\&xg4}(\text{Or 17...hxg4}?! 18.\( \text{\&h4} \) \( \text{\&e8} \) 19.f4! exf4 20.\( \text{\&xf4} \) f5 21.\( \text{\&xf5} \) \( \text{\&xf5} \) 22.\( \text{\&e4}\pm \); 19...\( \text{\&xf3} \) 20.\( \text{\&xf3} \) f5 21.\( \text{\&g3}\pm \) 18. \( \text{\&h4} \) \( \text{\&e7} \) 19.\( \text{\&g4} \) hxg4 20.f4 \( \text{\&xf3} \) 21.\( \text{\&xf3} \) \( \text{\&e8} \) 22.\( \text{\&b5}\)! and White is ready to sacrifice a pawn in the fight for the f5-square. 22...\( \text{\&xb5} \) 23.\( \text{\&xb5} \) \( \text{\&xb5} \) 24.\( \text{\&f2} \). White’s knight is going to f5 and he has a dangerous initiative. 24...\( \text{\&e8} \) 25.\( \text{\&g4} \) \( \text{\&g6} \) 26.\( \text{\&e3} \) \( \text{\&ad8} \) 27.\( \text{\&f5} \) \( \text{\&d7} \) 28.\( \text{\&h3}\pm \) Antic – Arsovic, Jagodina 1998;

15...\( \text{\&c8} \) – Black’s queen is well deployed here. It eyes the h3 and c4-squares (in case White plays b2-b4) and it supports the pawn-advance g6-g5-g4. 16.\( \text{\&g3}\! \) f5 17. f4!. White is thus exploiting the only drawback of the placement of his opponent’s queen on c8, it is quite essential though...instead

of on the typical for that system – e8-square. He can push f4 and he opens the position quite favourably. Had Black’s queen been on e8, then he would have countered f2-f4 with the line – fxe4 \( \text{\&xe4} \) exf4 with an advantage for him. 17...\( \text{\&e8} \) 18.\( \text{\&f3} \) fxe4 19.\( \text{\&xe4} \) \( \text{\&f5} \) 20.\( \text{\&e1} \) – and White had a clear advantage in the game Musat – Grigore, Bucharest 2002.

15.\( \text{\&d3} \)

Now, we have reached the basic position of the entire line with the move – 12...h5.

Black has tried in practice here: c3b1) 15...\( \text{\&d7} \) and c3b2) 15...\( \text{\&h6} \).

About 15...\( \text{\&e8} \) 16.b4 \( \text{\&d7} \) – see 15...\( \text{\&d7} \).

\textbf{c3b1) 15...\( \text{\&d7} \) 16.b4 \( \text{\&e8} \)}

16...b6, van Wely – Piket, Groningen 1997, 17.b5!. This same idea was tried later in another game – van Wely – Sasikiran, New Delphi 2000, 17...\( \text{\&c7} \) 18.a4\( \pm \).

17.\( \text{\&e1} \)?

White is preparing to counter Black’s planned pawn-advance f6-f5 and he leaves his rook on
a1, where it might be more useful in this variation, than on the b1-square.

17...b6
It is too dangerous for Black to play immediately 17...f5, in view of: 18.bxc5 Qxc5 19.Qxc5 dxc5 20.exf5 Qxf5 21.d6 e4 22.Qc1 Qc6 23.Qe7+.

18.b5! Qc7 19.a4
Now, White's rook is on the right square at the right time – that was the idea behind the move 17.Qe1.

19...Qe7
Or 19...f5 20.exf5 Qxf5 21.Qf3 Qh6 22.Qe4.

20.a5 Qh6 21.Qa3!
White plans not only to double his rooks on the a-file, but he can also activate his rook along the third rank.

21...Qg5

22.Qh1! This is another important prophylactic move, so that Black's eventual sacrifices on h3 should not worry White in the nearest future. 22...Qg7 23.Qf1 Qh7 24.Qg3 Qf6 25.f4± van Wely – Sasikiran, New Delhi 2000. White has prevented f6-f5, he has played f2-f4 himself and he has obtained a considerable advantage.

23b2) 15...Qh6 16.b4 Qg7
16...b6 – Black is trying to fortify his queenside with that move. 17.Qb1 Qf4 18.Qg3 Qxg3 19.fxg3 f5 20.exf5 Qxf5 21.g4! (That is a typical resource for White.) 21...hxg4 22.hxg4 Qd7 (or 22...Qxd3 23.Qxd3 Qg5 24.Qe4 Qh6 25.Qg3+; 23...Qg7 24.Qe4 Qe7 25.Qd2±) 23.Qe4 Qg7 24.Qd2 Qh8, S.Pedersen – Bekker, Denmark 2006, 25.Qf6! Qe7 26.Qbf1 Qaf8 27.g5±.

It is purposeful for Black to play immediately 16...Qf4, after which it is interesting to see White's try: 17.bxc5 (Or 17.Qb3?!, keeping Black's bishop on c8 and preparing Qg3; but it would have been a blunder to continue with the immediate: 17.Qg3? Qxg3 18.fxg3 cxb4 19.axb4 Qxb4 20.Qxb4 Qb6 21.Qf2 Qxb4+ 17...Qxc5 18.Qxc5 dxc5 19.Qg3 Qd6 (19...Qxg3 20.fxg3 Qd6 21.Qc1! Qa5 22.Qb5! Qxb5 23.cxb5±; 21...Qd7 22.Qh6 Qe8 23.a4± and White has positional pressure on both sides of the board; 19...Qe7 20.Qd3±) 20.Qxf4 exf4 21.Qc1 g5 22.Qh5± and there arose a position, in which Black's compensation for the pawn was evidently insufficient, Volke – Thiede, Germany 2003.

17.Qc2 Qe7
Black is playing that position
quite inventively. He avoids the standard move – b7-b6 and he finds a way to improve his position on the kingside in the process.

18...\textit{b2}  
Or 18...\textit{g3}!?+-, not letting Black's bishop to the f4-square.

18...\textit{f4}  
Now, it would not work for Black to continue with: 18...\textit{d7} 19.bxc5 \textit{dxc5} 20...\textit{xc5} dxc5 21.\textit{xb7} \textit{d6} 22.\textit{wb2}, because White remains with an extra pawn.

19...\textit{g3} \textit{xg3} 20.\textit{fxg3} \textit{b8}  
21.bxc5 \textit{xc5} 22...\textit{xc5} dxc5  
(diagram)

23.a4!? White does not permit closing of the queenside (After 23...\textit{d3} b6 24.a4 a5! 25.\textit{a3}  
\textit{d8} 26.\textit{b3} \textit{d6} 27.\textit{wb1} \textit{a6} 28. \textit{af2} \textit{wd8} 29.\textit{fb2} \textit{f8}=-, Black managed to hold the position in the game Topalov – Ki.Georgiev, New Delhi 2000.) 23...\textit{d6} (It is too bad for Black to follow with: 23...f5 24.exf5 \textit{xf5} 25.g4 hgx4 26.hxg4 \textit{d7} 27.\textit{e4}+-) 24.\textit{a5} \textit{d7} 25.\textit{wd2}+- and White brings his queen to e3, attacking on c5 and he maintains a long-lasting positional advantage.

Conclusion

The fight is quite complicated in the lines after: 8...c6 9.d5. Still, we have to summarize some basic ideas for you.

Black can close the centre immediately with the move c6-c5 and the focus of the battle will then be on the flanks. In general, White should not be afraid in that case to come under a checkmating attack, because after f5 he can capture on f5 and if Black takes there with a piece White can occupy the e4-square with his knight. In case Black captures on f5 with a pawn, then White plays f4 with some advantage. Whenever Black is not in hurry to push f5, White can continue his queenside play with a2-a3, b2-b4, which is not so quick indeed, but it is still effective. We advise you to play through the game van Wely – Sasikirian very attentively, because it is a true masterpiece of White's play in this variation.

Black's second possibility is not to close the centre outright. White has at his disposal then the powerful resource – c4-c5. This move literally breaks the centre apart and there arises a complicated tactical battle. White usually maintains the advantage in the variations that we have analyzed.
Chapter 8

1. \( \text{\textit{\( \texttt{\texttt{f}3 \texttt{f}6 \texttt{c}4 \texttt{g}6 \texttt{c}3 \texttt{g}7 \texttt{e}4 \texttt{d}6 \texttt{d}4 \texttt{e}2 \texttt{e}5 \texttt{a}6 \texttt{e}3 \texttt{g}4 \texttt{g}5 \)}} \)} \)

Now, Black must choose between 9...f6 and 9...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}8}} \) (Chapter 9).

9...f6

It is absolutely unacceptable for Black to play 9...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}6}} \)?! because of: 10.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{xf}6}} \) \( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{xf}6}} \) (or 10...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{xf}6}} \) 11.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{dxe}5}} \) 12.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5+}} \) 11.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}3 \texttt{h}6}} \) 12.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{g}7}} \) (or 12...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}8}} \) 13.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{dxe}5}} \) 14.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{g}7}} \) 15.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5; \texttt{dxe}6}} \) 13.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{g}5 \texttt{f}6}} \) and 14.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}6+}} \) 15.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{dxe}5}} \) 14.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{c}7+ \texttt{h}8}} \) 15.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}8 \texttt{dxe}8}} \) 16.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{c}6}} \) 17.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{dxe}5}} \) 18.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{dxe}8}} \) 19.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}4 \texttt{dxe}4}} \) 20.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}4+}} \) and White remains with a solid extra pawn.

10.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{cl!}}} \)

White achieves much less after the other retreats of his bishop. Now, Black has several possibilities: a) 10...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}5}} \), b) 10...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{exd}4}} \), c) 10...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}8}} \), d) 10...c6, e) 10...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}6}} \) and f) 10...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}8}} \).

a) 10...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}5}} \)\)

That immediate pawn-break is not good for Black.

11.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{xf}5 \texttt{exd}4}} \)

It would not help him to try 11...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{gxf}5}} \), due to 12.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}3 \texttt{exd}4}} \), Leroy – Borocz, Budapest 1994 (Or 12...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{xf}6}} \) 13.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{dxe}5}} \) 14.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{e}4}} \) 15.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}4 \texttt{exe}1}} \) 16.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}1 \texttt{c}3}} \) 17.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{bxc}3 \texttt{e}8}} \) 18.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}1 \texttt{xe}5}} \) 19.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}5+}} \); 12...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}6}} \) 13.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{dxe}5}} \) 14.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}5+}} \) 13.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{g}5 \texttt{e}8}} \) 14.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}4+}} \) – and White maintains the advantage, because Black’s pawn-structure is in ruins.

12.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{g}5}} \!\)\)

But not 12.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{xd}4}} \!\), because of: 12...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{h}2}} \!\) 13.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}1 \texttt{h}4}} \) 14.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}3 \texttt{xf}5+}} \) and Black was better in the game Soppe – Sorin, Argentina 1996.

12...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{e}8}} \)

After 12...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}7}} \) 13.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}5 \texttt{gxf}5}} \), Wylie – Heller, Email 2000, White could have solidified his edge with 14.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{dxe}4}} \!\). After 12...\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{f}6}} \), it is good for White to follow with: 13.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{e}6}} \) 14.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{xd}4}} \!\).

13.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{d}5}} \)

It is insufficient for White to continue with 13.\( \texttt{\textit{\texttt{xd}4}} \!\), because
of: 13...\textit{\textit{x}}h2 14.\textit{\textit{x}}h2 \textit{\textit{f}}5+ 15. \textit{\textit{g}}1 \textit{\textit{x}}d4 16.\textit{\textit{f}}g6 \textit{\textit{h}}g6= with an approximately equal position.

\textbf{13...\textit{\textit{x}}f5 14.\textit{\textit{e}}7}

White would not achieve much with: 14.\textit{\textit{x}}d4, because of: 14...\textit{\textit{f}}5 15.\textit{\textit{x}}g4 \textit{\textit{x}}g4 16.\textit{\textit{w}}xg4 \textit{\textit{x}}d4 17.\textit{\textit{f}}e6 \textit{\textit{h}}h8=.

\textbf{14...\textit{\textit{h}}8 15.\textit{\textit{x}}d4 \textit{\textit{e}}5 16. \textit{\textit{f}}4! White repels his opponent’s bishop from the e5-square and he clears the e-file for the rook. 16...\textit{\textit{c}}6 17.\textit{\textit{x}}d5 \textit{\textit{g}}x5 18.\textit{\textit{f}}3 \textit{\textit{x}}e7 19.\textit{\textit{e}}e1 \textit{\textit{f}}7, Hort – Nicevski, Stip 1977, 20.\textit{\textit{x}}e7! \textit{\textit{x}}c4 (Black loses immediately after the careless line: 20...\textit{\textit{x}}b2? 21.\textit{\textit{x}}f3 \textit{\textit{x}}xa1 22.\textit{\textit{w}}xa1+-) 21.\textit{\textit{x}}b7 \textit{\textit{c}}5 22.\textit{\textit{w}}f3 \textit{\textit{a}}ab 23. \textit{\textit{a}}xf8 \textit{\textit{b}}xb2 24.\textit{\textit{a}}ab1± and White has an overwhelming advantage.

\textbf{b) 10...\textit{\textit{d}}4 11.\textit{\textit{x}}d4 \textit{\textit{f}}5 12. \textit{\textit{h}}3 \textit{\textit{f}}6}

Black is worse after: 12...\textit{\textit{h}}6 13.\textit{\textit{x}}h6 \textit{\textit{x}}h6 14.\textit{\textit{x}}f5 \textit{\textit{x}}f5 15.\textit{\textit{f}}3 \textit{\textit{c}}6 16.\textit{\textit{b}}1 \textit{\textit{g}}7 17.\textit{\textit{b}}4 \textit{\textit{b}}xb4 18.\textit{\textit{b}}xb4 \textit{\textit{c}}5 19.\textit{\textit{x}}xb7 \textit{\textit{x}}xb7 20.\textit{\textit{e}}e6± Pogorelov – Rogers, Las Palmas 1994.

\textbf{13.\textit{\textit{d}}db5!?}

That move has not been tried in practice yet.

White used to play before: 13.\textit{\textit{x}}f5 \textit{\textit{x}}f5! (After 13...\textit{\textit{g}}xf5 14. \textit{\textit{h}}xg4 \textit{\textit{x}}g4 15.\textit{\textit{x}}g4±, Black has no compensation for the pawn.) 14.\textit{\textit{g}}f2 \textit{\textit{g}}xf5 15.\textit{\textit{e}}5 (or 15.\textit{\textit{g}}4 \textit{\textit{f}}4 16.\textit{\textit{g}}f4 \textit{\textit{e}}6 17.\textit{\textit{d}}d2 \textit{\textit{c}}5 18.\textit{\textit{a}}f1 \textit{\textit{d}}d4=) 15...\textit{\textit{x}}f5 (The other possibilities are even worse for Black: 15...\textit{\textit{d}}d4?! 16.\textit{\textit{g}}4 \textit{\textit{d}}x1 17. \textit{\textit{d}}x1 \textit{\textit{f}}8 18.\textit{\textit{f}}1±, or 15...\textit{\textit{h}}4 16.\textit{\textit{f}}4±) 16.\textit{\textit{d}}5 and here Black had to play 16...\textit{\textit{h}}8 (In the game Soulas – Barredo, Internet 2003, Black just blundered a piece with 16...\textit{\textit{e}}6?? 17.\textit{\textit{x}}f5+-) and in case of 17.\textit{\textit{g}}4 (It is too risky for White to follow with: 17.\textit{\textit{g}}4 \textit{\textit{b}}4 18. \textit{\textit{b}}xb7 \textit{\textit{d}}d4=) 17...\textit{\textit{h}}4 18.\textit{\textit{g}}xf5 \textit{\textit{d}}4 19.\textit{\textit{d}}e4 \textit{\textit{g}}8 20.\textit{\textit{g}}4 \textit{\textit{c}}5!, Black would have organized a powerful attack, for example: 21.\textit{\textit{f}}1?! \textit{\textit{a}}e8 22.\textit{\textit{g}}2 \textit{\textit{b}}4 23.\textit{\textit{d}}xd6 \textit{\textit{x}}g4--.

\textbf{13...\textit{\textit{e}}5 14.\textit{\textit{x}}f5}

Now, Black can capture on f5 in three different ways, but he has no equality in any of the lines.

\textbf{14...\textit{\textit{x}}f5}

That is his most tenacious defence. Black sacrifices material, relying on the activity of his pieces: 14...\textit{\textit{g}}xf5 15.\textit{\textit{f}}4 \textit{\textit{g}}6 16.\textit{\textit{e}}3 \textit{\textit{e}}8 17.\textit{\textit{d}}d2±; 14...\textit{\textit{x}}f5 15.\textit{\textit{e}}3 \textit{\textit{e}}6 16. \textit{\textit{d}}5 \textit{\textit{f}}7 17.\textit{\textit{d}}d2± and White is slightly better.

\textbf{15.\textit{\textit{d}}d5 \textit{\textit{e}}6}

After: 15...\textit{\textit{h}}8 16.\textit{\textit{b}}xb7 \textit{\textit{c}}5 17.\textit{\textit{xc}}7±, White simply gobbles pawns and Black has no real threats in sight.

\textbf{16.\textit{\textit{b}}xb7 \textit{\textit{c}}5 17.\textit{\textit{a}}c7 \textit{\textit{e}}4}

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18.\texttt{xe}4 \texttt{xe}6 19.\texttt{xc}4 \texttt{xc}4 20.\texttt{xd}6 \texttt{xd}6 21.\texttt{xd}6\pm – White has some extra material and he has nothing serious to worry about.

c) 10.\texttt{we}8

Black is preparing f6-f5, but he is in for a surprise.

11.\texttt{c}5!

That is a standard, but quite effective way for White to fight for the advantage. After: 11.\texttt{h}3 \texttt{h}6 12.\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{dxe}5 13.\texttt{b}3 \texttt{e}6 14.\texttt{a}3 \texttt{f}7 15.\texttt{c}2 \texttt{f}8= White had nothing in the game Cebalo – I.Sokolov, Yugoslavia 1989.

11.\texttt{dxc}5

It is weaker for Black to play: 11...\texttt{exd}4 12.\texttt{xd}4 \texttt{dxc}5, because of: 13.\texttt{b}3 \texttt{e}6 14.\texttt{d}5!? \texttt{c}6 (Black loses the exchange after: 14...\texttt{f}7 15.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{d}7 16.\texttt{c}4= Karr – Grigore, Paris, 1998.) 15.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{d}7 16.\texttt{xa}6 (It is also good for White to follow with: 16. \texttt{xd}7 \texttt{xd}7 17.\texttt{c}4 \texttt{h}8 18.\texttt{xa}6 \texttt{bxa}6 19.\texttt{xc}5\pm) 16...\texttt{xa}6 17.\texttt{xd}7 \texttt{xd}7 18.\texttt{xc}5\pm and White had a considerable advantage in the game Barkhagen – Winsnes, Sweden 1991.

12.\texttt{xa}6 \texttt{bx}a6 13.\texttt{d}5!?

That is an interesting idea for White to preserve his centre and to capture his opponent's c5-pawn with a piece.

Instead, it is weaker for him to play: 13.\texttt{dxe}5 \texttt{xe}5 14.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{xe}5 15.\texttt{f}4, due to: 15...\texttt{xf}4 16.\texttt{d}5+ \texttt{e}6 17.\texttt{xe}6+ \texttt{h}8 18.\texttt{ad}1 \texttt{f}5= and Black is not worse at all, Baron – Comas, Torrevieja 1997.

White has tried 13.\texttt{dxc}5, but Black can counter that with 13... \texttt{e}6 (In the first game in that variation, he played 13...\texttt{c}6?! and that move took the c6-square for the queen and weakened the d6-square too. 14.\texttt{we}2 \texttt{f}5 15.\texttt{h}3 \texttt{f}6 16.\texttt{xf}5 \texttt{e}4 (It is even worse for Black to follow with: 16...\texttt{xf}5 17.\texttt{xa}6 \texttt{d}5 18.\texttt{c}4 \texttt{d}8 19.\texttt{g}5\pm, because White remains with an extra pawn.) 17.\texttt{d}4 \texttt{xf}5 18.\texttt{f}4 \texttt{h}5 19.\texttt{d}6\pm and White had a slight advantage in the game Zontakh – Benderac, Herceg Novi 2001.) 14.\texttt{h}3 \texttt{h}6 15. \texttt{d}3 \texttt{c}6\pm and Black has an excellent counterplay, because his queenside pawn-weaknesses are immaterial.

13...\texttt{f}5 14.\texttt{e}1 \texttt{f}4?!

Black should not close the centre, but even after: 14...\texttt{fxe}4 15.\texttt{xe}4 \texttt{f}5 16.\texttt{xc}5?! (or 16. \texttt{h}3 \texttt{f}6 17.\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{e}4\infty) 16...\texttt{b}5 17. \texttt{e}6\pm, White maintains a slight advantage.

15.\texttt{b}3 \texttt{h}6 16.\texttt{a}3 \texttt{g}5 17.\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{f}7 18.\texttt{b}4 \texttt{f}6 19.\texttt{a}4 \texttt{d}7

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20.\textit{axa6} g4 21.\textit{h4} \textit{h7}, Pogorelov – Larino, Calvia 2005. Here, White had better start immediate active actions in the centre with: 22.\textit{d6! cxd6} (It is not good for Black to play: 22...c6 23.\textit{g6 g5} 24.\textit{c7=} 23.\textit{xd6=} – White has much better prospects.

\textbf{d) 10...c6}

11.h3

White prepares to break through in the centre with his last move.

It is weaker for him to do that immediately with: 11.c5?! exd4 12.\textit{axa6} dxc3 13.\textit{c4=} \textit{h8} 14.\textit{xd6 x6d6} 15.\textit{cxd6 f5} 16.\textit{bxc3 xc3} 17.\textit{d2 xd2} (The position is rather unclear after: 17...\textit{xa1} 18.\textit{axa1 fxe4} 19.\textit{c3=} \textit{f6=})

18.\textit{xd2}, Greenfeld – Matros, Mariehamn 1997 and here, Black could have played 18...\textit{xd8=}, because he would counter 19.h3, with 19...\textit{xd6=} with an overwhelming advantage for him.

11...\textit{h6} 12.\textit{c5!}

White breaks through in the centre. He makes use of the fact that Black's knight is misplaced on a6 and he has the intermediate check along the a2-g8 at some moment.

After 12.\textit{e3 f7} 13.\textit{dxe5} dxe5 14.\textit{e5} \textit{c7} 15.\textit{c4 e6} 16.\textit{d2 e7} 17.\textit{b3 f8} 18.\textit{xe6 xe6} 19.\textit{c4 h6} 20.\textit{xe6 c6} = and White had nothing to brag about in the game Sosonko – Vaganian, Ter Apel 1992.

12...\textit{exd4}

Black equalizes neither with: 12...\textit{d7} 13.\textit{xd6 b5} (or 13...\textit{xd6} 14.\textit{e3=}) 14.\textit{dxe5} fxe5 15.a4 b4 16.d7 \textit{b7} 17.\textit{b1 c5} 18.a5 a6 19.\textit{e3 xd7} 20.\textit{c4 h8} 21.\textit{e6=} – because Black was totally outplayed strategically in the game Arsovic – M. Markovic, Nis 1995; nor with: 12...\textit{xc5} 13.\textit{dxe5 xd1} 14.\textit{xd1 c7} (It is amazing how White can exchange both his bishops for Black's decentralized knights after: 14...\textit{f5} 15.\textit{h6} and White wins the e5-pawn: 15.\textit{h6} 16.\textit{c4 g7} 17.\textit{xa6}, destroying completely Black's pawn-structure on the queenside – 17...\textit{bxa6} 18.\textit{e5=}) 15.\textit{xf6 xf6} 16.\textit{g5 f8} 17.\textit{e3 b6} 18.\textit{d6 h5} (or 18...\textit{e5} 19.\textit{xc6 d7} 20.\textit{f3}}
\[ \text{In case White had retreated to the d2-square with his bishop on move 10, then he would not have had that possibility now.} \]

16...\textcolor{red}{\textsf{h}8}

White’s advantage is indisputable after: 16...\textcolor{red}{\textsf{xd}5} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{xd}5+} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{h}8} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{b}xc3}±.

17.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{b}xc3} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{a}6}

(\text{in case of: 18...\textcolor{red}{\textsf{d}8}?!}) 19.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{b}5} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{xd}5} 20.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{xc}7} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{xc}5} 21.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{x}a8} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{xc}4} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{e}3} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{b}6}, White can play 23.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{f}d1}+, because Black cannot answer with 23...\textcolor{red}{\textsf{b}7}, due to: 24.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{hxh}} 25.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{d}8}+ \textcolor{red}{\textsf{g}7} 26.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{d}7}.) 19.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{e}1}± with a great advantage for White, M.Gurevich - C.Hansen, Groningen 1992.

\[
18.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{d}4} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{a}6}
\]

\[
19.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{b}5} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{xd}5} 20.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{xc}7} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{xc}5} 21.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{x}a8} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{xc}4} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{e}3} \textcolor{red}{\textsf{b}6}, White can play 23.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{f}d1}+, because Black cannot answer with 23...\textcolor{red}{\textsf{b}7}, due to: 24.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{hxh}} 25.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{d}8}+ \textcolor{red}{\textsf{g}7} 26.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{d}7}.) 19.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{e}1}± with a great advantage for White, M.Gurevich - C.Hansen, Groningen 1992.

\[
10.\ldots\textcolor{red}{\textsf{h}6}
\]

11.\textcolor{red}{\textsf{b}1}!
White intends to push his b-pawn.

11...\textit{\textbf{f7}}

In case of 11...f5, Black must consider: 12.dxe5 dxe5 13.\textit{\textbf{xe5}}+.

He has also tried in practice: 11...exd4 12.\textit{\textbf{xd4}} \textit{\textbf{c5}} (or 12...f5 13.\textit{\textbf{xe6}} \textit{\textbf{xe6}} 14.\textit{\textbf{exf5}}+ Polateli - Popstein, Email 2003) 13.\textit{\textbf{xe3}} \textit{\textbf{e8}} 14.\textit{\textbf{b3}} \textit{\textbf{e6}} (or 14...\textit{\textbf{xe4}}? 15.\textit{\textbf{d5}}!+-; 14...\textit{\textbf{xb3}} 15.\textit{\textbf{xb3}} \textit{\textbf{h8}} 16.c5±) 15.\textit{\textbf{d2}} \textit{\textbf{f7}} 16.\textit{\textbf{bd1}}+ - and White maintained his advantage in the game Gausel – Sanden, Stockholm 1997.

After 11...c6, White can continue with his standard plan: 12.b4 \textit{\textbf{c7}} (If Black tries to play tactically: 12...exd4 13.\textit{\textbf{xd4}} \textit{\textbf{xb4}}, then after: 14.\textit{\textbf{xb4}} c5 15.\textit{\textbf{b3}} cxd4 16.\textit{\textbf{xd4}} f5 17.\textit{\textbf{d5}}+! \textit{\textbf{f7}} 18.\textit{\textbf{exf5}}+, White’s advantage increases; 12...\textit{\textbf{f7}} 13.b5 \textit{\textbf{c7}} 14.\textit{\textbf{bxc6}} bxc6 15.d5 c5 16.\textit{\textbf{d2}} f5 17.\textit{\textbf{b3}} \textit{\textbf{a6}} 18.\textit{\textbf{d2}} \textit{\textbf{d7}} 19.\textit{\textbf{exf5}} gxf5 20.f3 \textit{\textbf{d8}} 21.\textit{\textbf{a5}}+. The weakness of the c6-square is typical for that pawn-structure and it provides White with along-lasting advantage, Berebora – Gal, Hungary 1992.) 13.d5 (White can also try 13.b5, with the idea after 13...\textit{\textbf{f7}}, to follow with 14.de - see the main line, but in that case he should consider 13...c5 and he will be forced to either close the position with d4-d5, presenting Black with free hands for kingside actions, or after the exchange on c5 to let his opponent’s knight to the d4-square with rather unclear consequences.) 13...\textit{\textbf{f7}}, Baigorri – Llanes, Zaragoza 1992 and here White had to continue with: 14.c5 f5 (14...\textit{\textbf{cxd5}} 15.\textit{\textbf{xd5}} \textit{\textbf{e6}} 16.\textit{\textbf{c4}}±) 15.\textit{\textbf{dxc6}} bxc6 16.\textit{\textbf{xh6}} \textit{\textbf{h6}} 17.\textit{\textbf{g5}}+ with an edge for White.

In answer to 11...c6, White can try 12.c5, for example: 12...exd4 13.\textit{\textbf{xa6}} bxa6 (The piece-sacrifice is insufficient for Black: 13...\textit{\textbf{dxc5}} 14.\textit{\textbf{c4}} \textit{\textbf{h8}}, Shariyazdanov – Zivkovic, Pula 2000, because White could have countered it with: 15.\textit{\textbf{a4}}! \textit{\textbf{g5}} 16.\textit{\textbf{xc5}} bxc4 17.\textit{\textbf{xd4}} \textit{\textbf{xd4}} 18.\textit{\textbf{xd4}}± – and his active knights would have guaranteed his advantage; it is weaker for Black to defend with 15.\textit{\textbf{wxe7}}, due to 16.b4, for example: 16...b5 17.\textit{\textbf{xc5}} bxc4 18.\textit{\textbf{xd4}} \textit{\textbf{g4}} 19.\textit{\textbf{f4}}+, or 16...\textit{\textbf{xb4}} 17.\textit{\textbf{d2}}! c5 18.\textit{\textbf{d5}} \textit{\textbf{b8}}?! 19.\textit{\textbf{c1}}+ and Black can hardly protect his pawns.) 14.\textit{\textbf{xd4}} (It is also possible for White to play: 14.\textit{\textbf{xd4}}!? \textit{\textbf{f7}} 15.\textit{\textbf{d1}} \textit{\textbf{xc5}} 16.\textit{\textbf{xc5}} \textit{\textbf{b6}} 17.\textit{\textbf{e3}}) 14...\textit{\textbf{h8}}? (Here, after the correct defence for Black: 14...\textit{\textbf{dxc5}} 15.\textit{\textbf{c6}} \textit{\textbf{d7}} 16.\textit{\textbf{a4}} \textit{\textbf{b7}} 17.\textit{\textbf{c4}}+, White would have only a slight edge.) 15.\textit{\textbf{xc6}} \textit{\textbf{e8}} 16.\textit{\textbf{xe6}} \textit{\textbf{xh6}} 17.\textit{\textbf{xd6}} \textit{\textbf{d7}} 18.\textit{\textbf{a5}}+ and White had a material advantage in the game Komarow – Marchini, Montecatini Terme 1999.

12.\textit{\textbf{dxe5}}

It is premature for White to continue with 12.b4, due to: 12...exd4 13.\textit{\textbf{xd4}} \textit{\textbf{xb4}}! 14.\textit{\textbf{xb4}} c5 15.\textit{\textbf{b3}} cxd4 16.\textit{\textbf{xd4}} f5 17.\textit{\textbf{d5}} \textit{\textbf{e8}}= and Black equalizes.
White should not close the centre with 12.d5, because after: 12...c5 13.a3 f5 14.b4 b6 15...e1 c7 16.bxc5 bxc5 17...d2 e8 18...d3 f6± – Black redeployed his knight on a6 to the kingside and he obtained a quite acceptable position in the game Pogorelov – Foisor, Spain 1997.

12...dxe5 13.b4 c6

13...wxd1 – Black is trying to avoid the main lines (13...c6 14.b5 w1 and here 15...d1), in which White captures sometimes with his bishop on d1 and Black forces his opponent to capture on d1 with the rook. 14...d1 (or 14...d1 e6=) 14...e8 (Or 14...c6 15...e3 h8 16.a3±, White can also play 15.b5 – see 13...c6.), but now White can turn his attention to the plan with c4-c5: 15...e3 c6 16.c5! f8 17...d2 e6 18...c4 e8d8 19...xd8 cxd8 20.a3± – and White had a slight advantage in the game Lechtynsky – Hrbolka, Plzen 1999.

14.b5 wxd1

That is the best move for Black.

It is weaker for him to follow with: 14...c7 15...a3 e8 16.bxc6 bxc6 17...a4 d7 18...d1 c8, Benjamin – Kindermann, Novi Sad 1990, because here White could play: 19...d2 d8 (or 19...h6 20...d3±) 20...bd1± with a great advantage.

15...xd1

The following line is not so successful for White in the tournament practice: 15...d1 cxb5 (or 15...c7 16.bxc6 bxc6 17...a4±) 16...b5 c7 17...b3 e6 18...e3 (± evaluation of GM Benjamin). It looks like White preserves some pressure, but after: 18...f8, Black’s position is quite defensible, for example: 19...xe6 xe6 20...d1 d6=; or: 19.b6 axb6 20...xb6 xb3 21...xb3 d7 22...e3 e6 23...b1 d6=; or: 19...f1 xb3 20...xb3 e6=.

White does not achieve much, with the exchange operation, which happened in the game Topalov – Herraiz, Albacete 2000: 18.b6 axb6 19...xe6 xe6 20...xb6 c5 21...b5 a4 22...xa4=.

15...c7 16...e3 d8

17...a4!?± White pushes his a-pawn to the a5-square and he occupies additional space on the queenside with a better position.

f) 10...h8

(diagram)

That is a useful prophylactic move, with the idea to prevent the pawn-break c4-c5.

11.h3

The move – 11.c5 is not so ef-
squares; therefore White's light-squared bishop is going after it. 18...h5 (Even after the trade of the dark-squared bishops: 18...\textit{g}5 19.\textit{xe}6 \textit{xe}3 20.\textit{xe}3 \textit{xe}6 21. c5\pm, White preserves his pressure against Black's position. The immediate moves with Black's knight do not bring him complete equality, for example: 18...\textit{d}4 19.\textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8?! 20.\textit{xd}4 exd4 21. \textit{b}5\pm; 19...\textit{xc}8 20.\textit{b}5\pm and White has a slight edge, or: 18...\textit{f}4 and here after: 19.\textit{d}5 \textit{xc}4 20.hx\textit{g}4 \textit{g}5, Black has some counterplay, but the line: 19.\textit{xc}8 \textit{xc}8 20.\textit{d}5 \textit{g}5 21.\textit{ad}1\pm provides White with a slight advantage.) 18...h5 19.\textit{xe}6 \textit{xe}6 20.\textit{d}5 \textit{h}4 (It is too bad for Black to play 20...c6, because of: 21.\textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}6 22.b3\pm with a difficult position for him; in case of: 20...\textit{xd}5 21.\textit{xd}5 \textit{wd}7 22.\textit{ac}1\pm, or: 20...\textit{g}7 21.\textit{g}5 \textit{wd}7 22.\textit{ad}1\pm and White maintains his positional pressure.) 21.\textit{ac}1\pm. White's position remains more pleasant, thanks to the possibility of the pawn-breaks c4-c5 and f2-f4, despite Black's two bishop-advantage, Karpov - Kasparov, New York (m/7) 1990.

13.\textit{xd}8

White needs to trade queens right now; otherwise after: 13. \textit{e}3 \textit{f}7 14.\textit{xd}8 \textit{xd}8, Black's knight goes to the e6-square with tempo.

13...\textit{xd}8 14.\textit{e}3 \textit{e}6

Black fails to solve all his problems with: 14...c6 15.\textit{fd}1 \textit{e}8 (or
15...\text{\textit{e6}} 16.\text{\textit{exd8 e6}} 17.\text{\textit{xa7+}}
16.\text{\textit{d2 f8}} 17.\text{\textit{a3 f5}} 18.\text{\textit{f3 c5}}
19.\text{\textit{b4 e6}} 20.\text{\textit{b3 f4}} 21.\text{\textit{f1 xe4}}
22.\text{\textit{xe4 f5}} 23.\text{\textit{f2 e6}} 24.\text{\textit{a2 g7}}
25.\text{\textit{d6 xd6}} 26.\text{\textit{xd6+}} – and White had the advantage in
the endgame, Johannessen – Simu-
towe, Istanbul 2000. There fol-
lowed: 26...e4?! 27.fxe4 \text{\textit{g5}} 28.
\text{\textit{e2+}} and it turned out that Black
could not capture on e4 – 28...
\text{\textit{xe4??}} 29.\text{\textit{xe4 xe4}} 30.\text{\textit{d8+}}. 

15.a3!

After 15.\text{\textit{fd1 f7}} 16.a3, Black
 can play 16...\text{\textit{h6=}} with equality.

15...\text{\textit{f7}} 16.\text{\textit{b4 c6}}

In case of 16...\text{\textit{h6}}, Black must
consider 17.\text{\textit{d5!}} (It is less precise
for White to play 17.c5, due to:
17...\text{\textit{exe3}} 18.fxe3 c6. He cannot
continue with 17.b5 either, in view
of: 17...\text{\textit{exe3}} 18.bxa6 \text{\textit{b6}} 19.axb7
\text{\textit{ab8}} 20.\text{\textit{bab1 d6.}}) 17...\text{\textit{exe3}}
18.fxe3 \text{\textit{g7}} 19.c5 and here af-
after: 19...\text{\textit{xd5}} (or 19...c6 20.\text{\textit{xa6}}
bxa6 21.\text{\textit{xf6 xf6}} 22.\text{\textit{d4+ e7}}
23.\text{\textit{xc6+ d7}} 24.\text{\textit{xd8+}}) 20.
exd5 \text{\textit{xd5}} 21.\text{\textit{c4 d8}}, it is very
strong for White to play 22.c6!±.

17.\text{\textit{fd1 xd1+ 18.exd1 c7}}

19.\text{\textit{d2 f8}}
Black’s position is lost after:
19...\text{\textit{h6}}, because of: 20.\text{\textit{hxh6}}
\text{\textit{hxh6}} 21.\text{\textit{b3 b6}} 22.\text{\textit{d6+}}.

20.\text{\textit{b1}}! (After the immediate
move 20.\text{\textit{b3}}, Black has the
resource – 20...\text{\textit{b6.}}) 20...
\text{\textit{b6}} (In case of: 20...f5 21.exf5
\text{\textit{xf5}}, Black must consider: 22.f4
\text{\textit{h6}} – White can counter 22...e4,
with 23.g4± – 23.g3+, with slightly better pros-
spects for White. Black could have
plays here 20...\text{\textit{h6}}, but White
could respond with: 21.\text{\textit{hxh6}}
\text{\textit{hxh6}} 22.\text{\textit{b3±}}, or 22.c5±) 21.c5!
\text{\textit{b5}} 22.\text{\textit{a4±}} Kramnik – Topalov,
Novgorod 1997. White preserved
a slight advantage and Black had
to fight long and hard for the
draw.

Conclusion

The variation – 8...\text{\textit{g4}} 9.\text{\textit{g5 f6}}, can be evaluated as favourable
for White. He maintains the advantage in all the lines. He can go back
to c1 with his bishop and await Black’s further actions:

If Black pushes f6-f5 (either after the exchange on d4, or immedi-
ately), then White captures on f5 and he occupies the centre with his
pieces;

If Black plays c7-c6, awaiting developments, then White can march
forward with his b-pawn – after \text{\textit{b1}}, b2-b4-b5, occupying additional
space on the queenside.

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Chapter 9

1.\textit{\&}f3 \textit{\&}f6 2.c4 g6 3.\textit{\&}c3 \textit{\&}g7 4.e4 d6 5.d4 0–0 6.\textit{\&}e2 e5 7.0–0 \textit{\&}a6 8.\textit{\&}e3 \textit{\&}g4 9.\textit{\&}g5 \textit{\&}e8

\textbf{10.c5!?}

This move has become quite popular lately. White opts for an immediate sharp tactical fight instead of a long positional battle for a minimal advantage.

Black usually defends with: \textbf{a) 10...dxc5}, \textbf{b) 10...exd4} and \textbf{c) 10...h6}.

After 10...f6 11.\textit{\&}h4 (White can also try 11.\textit{\&}c1 – see Chapter 8, variation c.) 11...exd4 12.\textit{\&}xd4 dxc5 13.\textit{\&}b3\pm it is not so clear what Black is after, by choosing the move 10...f6, instead of the usual – 10...h6.

\textbf{a) 10...dxc5 11.\textit{\&}xa6 bxa6 12.\textit{\&}d5 \textit{\&}b8}

After 12...exd4, White can transpose to the game Cheparinov – Matamoros, Dos Hermanas 2005, see 10...exd4 11.\textit{\&}d5 dxc5.

Black can hardly equalize with: 12...f6, A.Dimitrov – D.Antic, Kavala 2005, 13.\textit{\&}xc7 (13.\textit{\&}h4!?)

\textbf{13...\textit{\&}c6 14.\textit{\&}xa8 cxd4} (or 14...fxg5 15.dxc5 \textit{\&}xa8 16.\textit{\&}b3 \textit{\&}h8 17.\textit{\&}xg5 \textit{\&}f6 18.\textit{\&}f7 \textit{\&}g7 19.\textit{\&}d6\pm)

15.\textit{\&}b3! \textit{\&}h8 (or 15...\textit{\&}e6 16.\textit{\&}ac1 \textit{\&}d7 17.\textit{\&}c7\pm 16.h3 fxg5 17.bxg5 \textit{\&}e6 18.\textit{\&}b4 \textit{\&}xa8 19.\textit{\&}xg5 \textit{\&}xg4 20.f3 \textit{\&}d7 21.\textit{\&}d6\pm.

\textbf{13.\textit{\&}e7}

White has tried before: 13. dxe5 \textit{\&}xe5 14.\textit{\&}f6 \textit{\&}xf6 15.\textit{\&}xf6.

Now, instead of 15...\textit{\&}d7, Avrukh – Bojkov, Greece 2005, it is obviously stronger for him to play: 15...\textit{\&}g4! 16.\textit{\&}d2 \textit{\&}d7 17.\textit{\&}c3 \textit{\&}xf3 18.gxf3 \textit{\&}e5\infty – and White’s king shelter has been compromised and Black has sufficient counter chances.

\textbf{13...\textit{\&}h8 14.\textit{\&}xc8 exd4 15. \textit{\&}e7 \textit{\&}xc8}

It is not enough for equality for Black to continue with: 15...\textit{\&}g8 16.\textit{\&}xa7 \textit{\&}xe7 17.\textit{\&}c6 \textit{\&}d6 18. \textit{\&}xb8 \textit{\&}xb8 19.b3\pm.

16.\textit{\&}xf8 \textit{\&}xf8 17.b3\pm and White’s prospects are better in the upcoming battle.
b) 10...exd4 11.\(\text{\&d5}\)

Now, it deserves attention to analyze the following possibilities: b1) 11...\(\text{\&xe4}\), b2) 11...dxc5, b3) 11...\(\text{\&xc5}\).

It is too bad for Black to continue with 11...\(\text{\&d7}\)?, in view of: 12.\(\text{\&xa6}\) \(\text{bxax6}\) 13.c6\(\pm\) and he loses material.

The move 11...c6? cannot be recommended either: 12.\(\text{\&e7}\) \(\text{\&h8}\) 13.cxd6 c5 (or 13...\(\text{\&c5}\) 14.\(\text{\&xd4}\)\(\pm\); 14.h3!? \(\text{d3}\) 15.\(\text{\&xd3}\) \(\text{\&e5}\) 16.\(\text{\&c2}\)\(\pm\); 14...\(\text{\&e5}\) 15.\(\text{\&xe5}\) \(\text{\&xe5}\) 16.f4 \(\text{\&g7}\) 17.\(\text{\&h6}\)!\(\pm\)) 14.\(\text{\&c1}\) f6 15.\(\text{\&f4}\) \(\text{\&e5}\) 16.\(\text{\&xa6}\) \(\text{bxax6}\) 17.\(\text{\&xc5}\)\(\pm\) Ibrahimov – Lahno, Moscow 2005.

Black has never tried in practice – 11...h6?! – but it deserves a serious attention. His idea is to transpose to the variation: 10...\(\text{h6}\) 11.\(\text{\&h4}\) \(\text{exd4}\) 12.\(\text{\&d5}\), preventing 12.\(\text{\&xd4}\)!. It is interesting for White to try in this position 12.\(\text{\&e7}\) (Things are far from clear after: 12.\(\text{\&xa6}\) hgx5 13.\(\text{\&xc7}\) \(\text{\&c6}\) 14.cxd6 \(\text{bxa6}\) 15.\(\text{\&c1}\) \(\text{\&xe4}\) 16.\(\text{\&e1}\) \(\text{\&b7}\) 17.\(\text{\&xa8}\) \(\text{\&xa8}\) 18.\(\text{\&xd4}\) \(\text{\&e5}\)\(\infty\)) 12.c6 13.\(\text{\&xf8}\) \(\text{\&xf8}\) (or 13...\(\text{\&xf8}\) 14.\(\text{\&f4}\) \(\text{\&xc5}\) 15.\(\text{\&xd4}\)\(\pm\)) 14.\(\text{\&xa6}\) \(\text{cxd5}\) 15.\(\text{\&e2}\) \(\text{dxe4}\) (or 15...\(\text{dxc5}\) 16.\(\text{exd5}\) \(\text{\&f6}\) 17.\(\text{\&c4}\) b5 18.\(\text{\&e1}\) \(\text{\&d7}\) 19.\(\text{\&e5}\) \(\text{\&b7}\) 20.\(\text{\&f1}\)?) 16.\(\text{\&xd4}\) \(\text{\&xh2}\) 17.\(\text{\&xh2}\) \(\text{\&e5}\) 18.\(\text{\&g1}\) \(\text{\&xd4}\) 19.\(\text{\&xd4}\) \(\text{\&xd4}\) 20.\(\text{\&xd6}\) \(\text{\&e6}\) 21.\(\text{\&fd1}\)\(\pm\).

b1) 11...\(\text{\&xe4}\) 12.\(\text{\&e7}\) \(\text{\&h8}\)


13.\(\text{\&xd6}\) \(\text{\&c5}\)

Black is slightly worse after: 13...\(\text{\&xd6}\)?! 14.\(\text{\&xc8}\) \(\text{\&xc8}\) 15.\(\text{\&d2}\) \(\text{\&e5}\) 16.\(\text{\&xg4}\) \(\text{\&xg5}\) 17.\(\text{\&xc8}\) \(\text{\&xc8}\) 18.\(\text{\&c1}\)\(\pm\) Mikhailevsky.

14.\(\text{\&c4}\) d3 15.\(\text{\&c1}\) \(\text{\&e5}\) 16.\(\text{\&e1}\)

16...\(\text{\&xf3}\)

It is equally bad for Black to opt for: 16...\(\text{\&g4}\) 17.\(\text{\&xe5}\) \(\text{\&xe5}\) 18.h3! \(\text{\&h5}\) 19.\(\text{\&xc8}\) f6 (or 19...\(\text{\&xc8}\) 20.g4 \(\text{\&xh3}\) 21.\(\text{\&xe5}+\)?) 20.d7! \(\text{\&xd7}\) 21.\(\text{\&xd3}\)\(\pm\).

17.\(\text{\&xf3}\) \(\text{\&d4}\) 18.\(\text{\&xc7}\) \(\text{\&xb2}\)

19.\(\text{\&xd3}\) \(\text{\&xd3}\) 20.\(\text{\&xd3}\) \(\text{\&xa2}\)

21.\(\text{\&xc8}\) \(\text{\&xc8}\) 22.\(\text{\&d8}\) h6 23.\(\text{\&d7}\)\(\pm\).

b2) 11...dxc5 12.\(\text{\&xa6}\) \(\text{bxax6}\) (diagram)

13.\(\text{\&c1}\)!

This move was played first by GM Cheparinov. Until that game

Chapter 9

\[ \text{b3) 11...} \text{x}c5 \]

12.\text{x}c7 \text{w}xe4 13.\text{e}1

Or 13.\text{x}c7 d3.

13...\text{b}8

It is worse for Black to play: 13...\text{e}6 14.\text{c}xa8 \text{x}xa8 15.b4! d3 16.\text{bxc}5 dxe2 17.\text{exe}2 \text{c}6 (or 17...\text{w}f5 18.\text{cxd}6 \text{xa}1 19.\text{w}xa1 \text{d}5 20.\text{w}d4) 18.\text{cxd}6 \text{xa}1 19.\text{w}xa1 \text{xd}6 20.\text{h}3 h6 21.\text{c}1.

14.\text{e}4 \text{w}f5

Black’s position is dangerous after: 14...\text{w}c6 15.\text{d}5 \text{a}4!? (or 15...\text{w}d7 16.a4! – White is trying to trap the enemy queen. 16...\text{e}5 17.\text{exe}5 dxe5 18.\text{f}6 \text{xf}6 19.\text{xf}6 e4 20.\text{e}5 \text{a}8 21.\text{xd}4) 16.\text{b}3 \text{a}3 17.\text{cl} \text{a}5 18.\text{d}2 \text{d}8 19.\text{g}5 \text{f}6 (19...\text{a}5 – White has managed to force his opponent’s queen to occupy an uncomfortable position by some ingenious maneuvering with his bishop. 20.a4! \text{a}6 21.\text{e}7) 20.\text{xd}4 – and Black has come under a dangerous pin.

15.\text{e}7 \text{d}7

15...\text{e}5 16.\text{xd}4 \text{w}d7 17.\text{xf}8 \text{xf}8 18.\text{d}5; 15...d3 16.\text{xd}6 b5 17.\text{xf}8 \text{xf}8 18.\text{xb}5 \text{b}7 19.\text{bd}4 The position is complicated indeed, but White is clearly better.

16.\text{h}3 \text{f}6

White preserves better chances after: 16...\text{xf}2 17.\text{xf}2 \text{f}c8 (or 17...b5 18.\text{xf}8 \text{xc}4 19.\text{gx}7 \text{d}3 20.\text{g}1 \text{g}7 21.\text{e}2 \text{c}8 22.\text{a}6 \text{a}5 23.\text{e}7) 18.\text{xd}6 \text{e}4 19.\text{exe}4 \text{xe}4 20.\text{xf}7 \text{h}8 21.\text{d}5 \text{e}3 22.\text{g}3; as well as following: 16...\text{e}5 17.\text{xd}4 \text{f}4 18.\text{d}5 \text{xd}4 19.\text{xd}4 \text{f}3 20.\text{gx}f3 \text{xd}4 21.\text{ad}1 \text{xb}2 22.\text{xd}6.

17.\text{xd}6 \text{c}4 18.\text{xf}8 and White had the advantage in the game Navara – McShane, Gothenburg 2005.

c) 10...\text{h}6

(diaotgram)

That is some prophylactic, before the start of the active operations in the centre.

11.\text{h}4 \text{exd}4

The other lines for Black seem to be worse.
on a straightforward idea – Black captures the e4-pawn. Still, the exchange of his dark-squared bishop cannot be justified in that position. 14...bxc3 15...xe4 15.f3 16...h1 c4 17.fgx4!? exb3 18.axb3 h5 19.b4. As a result, White has preserved his bishop pair and Black’s king is vulnerable, while his extra pawn is practically immaterial. For example: 19...h3 20.h4 (or 20.xa2 xc3 21.b3 h5 22.xb3 xd1 23.xd1 h6 24.d2 xb3 25.xb3 g5) 20...d2 21.e1 f4 22.e2±.

14.d5

The endgame is approximately equal after: 14...xa6 xa6! 15. d5 16.g3 17.d5 f4 18.5e5 19.e4 17.f4 18.5c5 19.e4 20.5d5 21.5c3 22.5c4 23.5a5±. The other capture is worse for Black – 14...bxa6. He opens the h1-a8 diagonal for his pieces indeed, but White obtains a great advantage after that move: 15.5d5! c4 (or 15...b8 16.xc1 xb2 17.xc5 18.xc3 19.e4; 17.e5 18.xc3 17.xc7 18.xc7 19.e5 20.e4; 17.f6 18.e6 19.e8 20.b7 21.axb3; 17.xa8 18.xc5 19.xc8 20.xc8 21.xc8 22.xc8 23.xd8 24.xc7 25.xe8±.

14...g5

But not 14...c6?, due to: 15. e7 h7 16.xc8± and White wins a piece.

15.g3 c6

Black loses after: 15...d8?? 16.xg4 xg4 17.e7+, or 15...xb2?? 16.b1 g7 17.xa6 xa6 18.xc7 xa2 19.xa8+.
16.h3
The position is quite rich with tactical possibilities. For example, the following line is interesting:
16...\texttt{dxc5!}?  17.\texttt{xc4} 18...\texttt{dxe4} 19.\texttt{xc7} 20.\texttt{xb2} 21.\texttt{xg4} 22.\texttt{d6} 23.\texttt{a6} 24.\texttt{h5} 25.\texttt{d2} and it still needs some practical testing.

He has much more problems after: 16...\texttt{e5} 17.f4!? (The simple move – 17.\texttt{e3} also deserves attention.) 17...\texttt{gx}f4 (or 17...\texttt{xd}5 18.\texttt{f6} 19.\texttt{xe5} 20.\texttt{xe6} 21.\texttt{bxa6} 22.\texttt{d2} and White’s pieces are very active; 17...\texttt{g6} 18.f5 19.\texttt{xc3} 20.\texttt{fxg6} 21.\texttt{b1} 22.\texttt{f6} 23.\texttt{xf6} 24.\texttt{d6} 25.\texttt{g7} 22.\texttt{b} 26.\texttt{c5} 27.\texttt{c6}+) 18.\texttt{xf4} 19.\texttt{h5} 20.\texttt{e} 21.\texttt{f6} (It is worse for Black to try: 21...\texttt{c7}!? 22.\texttt{f6} 23.\texttt{xf6} 24.\texttt{cxb3} 25.\texttt{c4} 26.\texttt{xf6} 27.\texttt{c5} – and White has a slight edge, because Black has too many weaknesses.

17.\texttt{d4}
White obtains no advantage after: 17...\texttt{xe} 18.\texttt{c5} 19.\texttt{e} 20.\texttt{b7} 21.\texttt{dxe} 22.\texttt{d4} 23.\texttt{b4} – and White wins the exchange;

16...\texttt{d8}!? The other possibilities for Black are:
16...\texttt{cxd} 17.\texttt{e} 18.\texttt{dxe} 19.\texttt{xf7} 20.\texttt{c} 21.\texttt{f7} 22.\texttt{h7} – and White has a powerful kingside attack: 22.\texttt{ae1} 23.\texttt{e7} 24.\texttt{xb3} 25.\texttt{c} 26.\texttt{xf6} 27.\texttt{e} 28.\texttt{h6} 29.\texttt{d4} 30.\texttt{c5} 31.\texttt{b4} – and White wins the exchange.

White obtains the advantage after: 16...\texttt{dxe} 17.\texttt{f} 18.\texttt{c5} 19.\texttt{a6} 20.\texttt{xd} 21.\texttt{h4} 22.\texttt{xe} 23.\texttt{b} 24.\texttt{b} 25.\texttt{c} 26.\texttt{e} 27.\texttt{f} and Black’s position is at least equal.

18.\texttt{c3!}
After: 18.\texttt{f3} 19.\texttt{e} 19.\texttt{f6} = Black wins the exchange;

18...\texttt{d1} 19.\texttt{e} 20.\texttt{f5}
Now, it looks like Black has outplayed his opponent in the complications.

21.\textcircled{\textbf{a}}d1!
White manages to activate his rook with that move.
21...fxg4 22.\textcircled{\textbf{a}}d8  \textcircled{\textbf{g}}f7 23. \textcircled{\textbf{d}}d6  \textcircled{\textbf{e}}e7 24.\textcircled{\textbf{x}}xc8  \textcircled{\textbf{x}}xc8 25. \textcircled{\textbf{x}}xc8  \textcircled{\textbf{d}}d7 26.\textcircled{\textbf{x}}xa7

After: 26.\textcircled{\textbf{d}}d6 b5 27.\textcircled{\textbf{e}}e4 c4 28.\textcircled{\textbf{b}}bc5  \textcircled{\textbf{x}}xc5 29.\textcircled{\textbf{x}}xc5  \textcircled{\textbf{e}}e7\textsuperscript{2}
Black has some dangerous passed pawns on the queenside and White will probably need to give up a piece in order to cope with Black’s c-pawn.

26...\textcircled{\textbf{a}}xb2
White preserves good winning chances after: 26...c4 27.\textcircled{\textbf{a}}a5 gxf3 (or 27...d4 28.\textcircled{\textbf{d}}xc6 bxc6 29.hxg4 c3 30.bxc3  \textcircled{\textbf{x}}xc3 31.\textcircled{\textbf{c}}c4  \textcircled{\textbf{e}}e6 32.\textcircled{\textbf{f}}f1  \textcircled{\textbf{d}}d5 33.\textcircled{\textbf{e}}e3\textsuperscript{2}) 28. \textcircled{\textbf{x}}xc4  \textcircled{\textbf{d}}d4 29.\textcircled{\textbf{e}}e5  \textcircled{\textbf{e}}e6 30.\textcircled{\textbf{a}}xc6 bxc6 31.\textcircled{\textbf{x}}xc6  \textcircled{\textbf{x}}xb2 32.gxh3\textsuperscript{2}.

27.\textcircled{\textbf{a}}a5 gxf3

28.\textcircled{\textbf{c}}c4!  \textcircled{\textbf{d}}d4 29.gxh3\textsuperscript{2}.White has excellent chances to win that position and it all depends on what he will manage to get in return for his roaming knight on a7. Draw is the best that Black can hope for in this position.

\textbf{Conclusion}

\textit{In the variation – 8.\textcircled{\textbf{g}}g5 9.\textcircled{\textbf{g}}g5  \textcircled{\textbf{e}}e8, White should try the resource – 10.c5!?}. That move leads to a direct tactical clash in the centre. There arise sharp, non-standard positions in which every move (particularly for Black) is tremendously important. White obtains the advantage in every variation, which we have analyzed, after a sharp tactical fight. That often happens even deeply into the endgame... It is of course useful to memorize all these variations and it is even better to replay them before the game, but it might be even the best if you keep your head fresh in order to calculate the variations correctly. The opening advantage then will surely belong to you!
Part 3

1.\(\text{d}f3\) \(\text{f}6\) 2.\(c4\) \(g6\) 3.\(\text{c}c3\) \(g7\) 4.\(e4\) \(d6\) 5.\(d4\) 0–0
6.\(\text{e}e2\) \(e5\) 7.0–0 \(\text{c}e6\)

Black develops his knight to the c6-square and he forces White to clarify the pawn-situation in the centre. Nowadays, that is Black’s most popular reaction against the classical system of development chosen by White in response to the King’s Indian Defence.

8.\(d5\)

White is forced to close the centre. His traditional method of keeping the tension in answer to the lines with 7...\(\text{bd}7\) and 7...\(\text{a}6\), i.e. the move – 8.\(\text{e}3\), does not yield him anything after 8...\(\text{e}8\)! (It is also good for Black to play: 8...\(\text{g}4\) 9.\(\text{g}5\) \(f6\).) 9.d5 \(\text{d}4\) 10.\(\text{xd}4\) exd4 11.\(\text{xd}4\) \(\text{xe}4\). 8...\(\text{e}7\)

Black’s knight is headed for the kingside. He is planning to organize an offensive there, by preparing the pawn-advance \(f7\)-\(f5\).

The risky move – 8...\(\text{d}4\)?! is not well justified here. Black risks losing a pawn without any compensation: 9.\(\text{xd}4\) exd4 10.\(\text{f}d4\) \(\text{d}7\) (After the rather prosaic line: 10...\(\text{e}8\) 11.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 12.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}5\) 13.\(\text{d}2\)– Vacek – Hruska, Prague 1994, White remains with a solid extra pawn; in case of: 10...\(\text{g}4\) 11.\(\text{d}1\), it is too bad for Black to play 11...\(h5\)?, because of: 12.\(h3\) \(\text{h}6\) 13.\(f4\) \(\text{h}4\) 14.\(d2\) \(\text{h}7\) 15.\(g5\) and in the game Vereecken – van Ryssen, Antwerp 2003, he had to resign, while the active move 11...\(\text{h}4\), E.Muller – De Carvalho, corr. 1996, can be countered by White in the simplest fashion with 12.\(h3\) 11.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{e}8\) (Or 11...\(\text{c}5\) 12.\(f3\) \(f5\) 13.\(\text{xf}5\) \(\text{xf}5\) 14.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 15.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{d}3\) 16.\(xg7\) \(\text{e}3\)+ 17.\(h1\) \(\text{e}7\) 18.\(\text{xd}3\) \(\text{xd}3\) 19.\(g4\) \(\text{xd}1\) 20.\(\text{axd}1\)– V.Popov – Pravdiuk, Krasnodar 1997.) 12.\(c2\) \(\text{c}5\) and here, in the game Paredes – Rob-
les, Peru 1999, White had to use the right moment to give back his extra pawn, but to occupy decisively additional space in the centre of the board with the variation: 13.\textit{\texttt{c}}e3?! \textit{\texttt{x}}c3 14.\textit{\texttt{x}}xc5 \textit{\texttt{x}}xb2 15.\textit{\texttt{w}}xb2 dxc5 16.e5∞.

The line 8...\textit{\texttt{b}}b8 9.\textit{\texttt{g}}4, has already been analyzed before – see 6...\textit{\texttt{c}}c6 7.d5 \textit{\texttt{b}}b8 8.0–0 e5 9.\textit{\texttt{g}}5 (Chapter 11, Book 1a).

In case of 8...\textit{\texttt{b}}b4, White can act in an analogous fashion – 9.a3 \textit{\texttt{a}}a6 10.\textit{\texttt{g}}5!? (Following: 10.b4 \textit{\texttt{h}}5, White decided to sacrifice a pawn in order to continue with his queenside initiative: 11.c5 dxc5 12.\textit{\texttt{e}}e3 cxb4 13.axb4 Evelev – I.Zaitsev, Moscow 2000; while after: 9.\textit{\texttt{e}}e1 \textit{\texttt{c}}c5 10.f3 a5 11.\textit{\texttt{e}}e3 \textit{\texttt{d}}d7 12.b4 axb4 13.axb4 \textit{\texttt{x}}a1 14.\textit{\texttt{w}}xa1, Novak–Petran, Loucovice 1979, White should consider the possibility for Black – 14...\textit{\texttt{b}}b3 15.\textit{\texttt{d}}d1 \textit{\texttt{d}}d4 16.\textit{\texttt{x}}xd4 exd4∞.) and in comparison to the line with the retreat of Black’s knight to b8 – he has nothing to brag about. For example, there might follow: 10...h6 11.\textit{\texttt{h}}4 g5 12.\textit{\texttt{g}}3 (If Black does not bother his opponent’s dark-squared bishop: 12...\textit{\texttt{c}}c5 13.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2†, then White can prepare his queenside pawn-onslaught at leisure.) 12...\textit{\texttt{h}}5 13.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2 (If 13...\textit{\texttt{x}}xg3, then 14.fxg3†, with the idea after 15.\textit{\texttt{g}}4 to exert some positional pressure along the light squares.) 13...\textit{\texttt{f}}f4 14.\textit{\texttt{g}}4= and the light squares in Black’s camp are quite vulnerable.

9.\textit{\texttt{e}}4

This is an important moment. White starts an immediate queenside offensive. The boost in the development of the entire variation with the move b2-b4 is connected with the name of Vladimír Kramnik during the second half of the 90ies of the last century. Gradually, it focused the attention of the theoreticians and the tournament players too.

White used to play before mostly the lines 9.\textit{\texttt{e}}e1 and 9.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2 in his fight to obtain an opening advantage. Still, both these moves have some drawbacks as well. For example, in case of 9.\textit{\texttt{d}}d2, White is planning b2-b4 and c4-c5, followed by \textit{\texttt{d}}d2-c4, but after 9...a5! (Concerning the positions after 9...\textit{\texttt{h}}8 10.b4, 9...\textit{\texttt{d}}d7 10.b4, or 9...\textit{\texttt{e}}e8 10.b4 f5 11.c5, we will discuss them later.) 10.a3 \textit{\texttt{d}}d7 (with the idea to follow with a5-a4) 11.b3 c6, it becomes clear that White’s knight will hardly ever manage to occupy the c4-square and it hampers the coordination of the rest of his pieces considerably, while residing on d2.

The move 9.\textit{\texttt{e}}e1 has some de-
fects too. After 9...\(\text{d}d7 \text{10.e}e3\) (In case of: 10.\(\text{d}d3 \text{f}5 \text{11.d}d2 \text{f}6,\) White’s knight on \(\text{d}3\) helps the preparation of the pawn-advance \(c4-c5\) indeed, but that is not enough for White to maintain the advantage just by pushing forward his c-pawn without the support of his pieces.) 10...\text{f}5 \text{11.f}3 \text{f}4 \text{12.f}2 \text{g}5, White’s bishops are ready to exert pressure against Black’s kingside, but he slows down the preparation of the move \(c4-c5\), while his king becomes a juicy target for the majority of Black’s pieces on the kingside. These developments are usually rather unpleasant for the White players...

(diagram)

The position on this diagram is our base for the analysis of the possibilities for both sides.

Black’s main defensive lines – 9...a5 and 9...\(\text{h}5\) will be dealt with in Chapters 15-22.

The moves: 9...\(\text{h}8, \text{9.e}d7\) and 9...\(\text{e}8,\) have the common feature that after them White should better transpose to the line, which we have already mentioned – with the move \(\text{f}3-d2\) (that is – 7.0-0 \(\text{c}6 \text{8.d}5 \text{e}7 \text{9.d}2\)). We will analyze these variations in our Chapters 11-14.

All the other possibilities for Black have not gained any popularity at all, but we will deal with them extensively in Chapter 10.
Chapter 10

1.\( \text{\texttt{f3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{f6}} \) 2.\( c4 \) \( g6 \) 3.\( \text{\texttt{c3}} \) \( g7 \) 4.\( e4 \) \( d6 \) 5.\( d4 \) 0–0 6.\( \text{\texttt{e2}} \) e5 7.0–0 \( \text{\texttt{c6}} \) 8.\( d5 \) \( \text{\texttt{e7}} \) 9.\( b4 \)

Accordingly, it becomes quite obvious that the move 9...h5?! is weak. White does not need to worry anymore about the possible maneuver of the Black’s knight to h5 and he can start immediately the preparation of his queenside offensive – 10.c5?! \( \text{\texttt{h7}} \) 11.a4 \( f5 \) 12.\( g5 \) f4 (12...\( \text{\texttt{xg5}} \) 13.\( \text{\texttt{xg5}} \) \( \text{\texttt{f6}} \) 14.\( \text{\texttt{xf6}} \) \( \text{\texttt{xf6}} \) 15.f4 \( \text{\texttt{g7}} \) 16.fxe5 \( \text{\texttt{dxe5}} \) 17.\( \text{\texttt{d2}} \pm \) Hoorweg – Stavast, corr. 1996) 13.\( \text{\texttt{xh7}} \) \( \text{\texttt{hxh7}} \) 14.\( \text{\texttt{a3}} \) \( g8 \) 15.b5 \( \text{\texttt{f7}} \) 16.a5 \( \text{\texttt{f8}} \) 17.b6 dxc5 18.bxc7 \( \text{\texttt{xc7}} \) 19.\( \text{\texttt{b5}} \) \( \text{\texttt{d8}} \) 20.d6 \( \text{\texttt{g5}} \) 21.\( \text{\texttt{b3}} \) \( \text{\texttt{h6}} \) 22.\( \text{\texttt{ad1}} \pm \) S.Savchenko – Schlamp, Frankfurt 2004.

The move – 9...a6?! is more or less similar to the previous one. That is not prophylactic at all; it is much rather a deliberate compromising of his own position. White will manage to push c4-c5 in the nearest future and after the exchange of pawns on the d6-square; he will use the vulnerable b6-square as an outpost for his pieces. See some possible eventual developments: 10.c5 (10.\( \text{\texttt{xd2?!}} \) 10...\( \text{\texttt{d7}} \) (After: 10...\( \text{\texttt{e8}} \) 11.\( \text{\texttt{d2}} \) f5 12.f3 \( f4 \) 13.\( \text{\texttt{c4}} \) and in case of: 13...\( \text{\texttt{xf7}} \) – 14.a4

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g5 15...a3 16.cxd6 cxd6 17.a5 18.h8 18.b6 19.a1 20.b5= Sosa – Escobar Forero, Buenos Aires 1992, as well as following: 13...g5 14.a4 15.a3 16.b5 b5 17.bxa6 bxa6 18.a5 dxc5 19.a4 h5 20.dxc5= Maugg – R.Winter, Langenwang 1993, White is clearly ahead of his opponent in the development of his onslaught. If Black reacts with: 10...h5 11.e1 f5 12.d2!? 13.f3 14.h6 15.c4+, he fails to organize anything effective on the kingside, while the weakening of his position on the queenside, as a result of the move a7-a6, will have long-term consequences.) 11.a3 f5 12.a d2 f4 13.f3 g5 14.cxd6 cxd6 15.b5 16.bxa6 bxa6 17.d4= Wortmann – Wassilian, Willingen 2001.

Black inflicts irreparable damage to his queenside with the move – 9...b6?! as well. White’s method to obtain the advantage is already quite familiar: 10.d2? 10.e8 (In case of: 10...d7 11.b3 f5 12.f3 f4, the most logical plan for White is to break Black’s queenside defence with the help of the march of his a-pawn – 13.a4! g5, Kostanjecv – Beletic, Kranj 1996 and here it looked quite attractive for White to continue with: 14.a5 b8 15.axb6 axb6 16.ea7+, with a clear advantage for him.) 11.c5 f5 12.c4! (It is worth mentioning here that White should not be in a hurry to exchange pawns on d6, so that Black should not be able to build a solid defensive fortress like the one, which he did after: 12.cxd6 dxd6 13.f3 f4 14.d4 g5 15.a4 a6 16.b5 a5 17.a3 18.d4, in the game Gerk – Gerg, Germany 1984.) 12...f7 13.a4 14...a6 15.b5 16.f4= fx4 (16...fxe4 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.e5 dxe5 19.d6+--; 17.fxex5 bxc5 18.f7 exf7 19.e6=). White had an overwhelming advantage.

Our collection of harmful moves for Black would not be quite complete without the move – 9...c5?! After 10.bxc5! (In case of 10.dxc6, White can transpose to the line 9...c6, but that would have been the least of evils for Black...) 10...dxc5 11.e1 e8 12.a4 a5 13.b1 d6 (After 13...f5 14.d3 b6 15.b3 a6, White can open the game with: 16.f4! exf4 17.dxe5 d6 18.b5 g5 19.c6 dxe6 20.dxc6= Ahlander – Mudelsee, Berlin 1994 and that would be obviously in his favour.) 14.b3 a6 15.d3 b6. Now, Black’s queenside defence seems to be quite solid, but his pieces are rather passive and White can inflict a strike on the other side of the board with: 16.f4! f6 17.h1 d7 18.e3= Sestjakov – Forgacs, Kecskemet 1991.

It seems too passive for Black to play here – 9...d7. Now, when White attacks his opponent’s d6-pawn, Black’s bishop will be a
bit misplaced on the d7-square. Therefore, White's mist logical continuation would be: 10.c5  $\mathcal{Q}h5$
(After 10... $\mathcal{W}e8$ 11.$\mathcal{Q}d2$ a5 12.$\mathcal{Q}a3$
$\text{axb4}$ 13.$\mathcal{Q}xb4$ $\text{dxc5}$ 14.$\mathcal{Q}xc5$ $\text{b6}$
15.$\mathcal{Q}b4$ $\text{h6}$ 16.a4 $\mathcal{Q}h8$ 17.$\mathcal{Q}c4\pm$
Gajic – Aydemir, Mangalia 1992, Black's position is already ter-
nible. His queenside is in ruins
and he has no counterplay on the kingside whatsoever.) 11.$\mathcal{F}e1$
$\text{f5}$ 12.$\mathcal{Q}d2$. After every possible
retreat of Black's knight – 12...
$\mathcal{Q}f6$ (12... $\mathcal{Q}f4$ 13.$\mathcal{Q}f1$?) 13.$\text{f3}$ a5
(13... $\text{h6}$ 14.$\mathcal{Q}c4\dagger$) 14.$\mathcal{Q}a3$ $\mathcal{Q}h6$
15.$\mathcal{Q}c4\dagger$, White maintains his
initiative.

In case of 9... $\mathcal{Q}g4$, the g4-
square becomes inaccessible to
Black's knight. White can exploit
that circumstance with the move
10.$\mathcal{E}e3$!? (Following: 10.c5 $\mathcal{Q}h5$
11.$\mathcal{E}e1$ $\mathcal{D}f4$ 12.$\mathcal{D}xf4$ $\text{exf4}$ 13.$\mathcal{E}c1$
$\text{fxg3}$ 14.$\mathcal{D}xf3$ $\text{g5}$ 15.$\mathcal{Q}b5$ $\mathcal{Q}g6$ 16.$
\mathcal{D}d4$ $\mathcal{D}xd4$ 17.$\mathcal{W}xd4$ $\mathcal{D}e5$ 18.$\mathcal{D}d1$
$\mathcal{W}f6\infty$ Sanz Arilla – Llanes Luno,
Aragon 1998, Black has a very
good game thanks to his domi-
nance over the dark squares, while
in case of the immediate exchange
of the light-squared bishops with:
10.$\mathcal{Q}d2$ $\mathcal{Q}xe2$ 11.$\mathcal{W}xe2$, after: 11...
c6 12.a4 a5?! Eisengraeber Pabst
– Angus, corr. 1996, Black can
easily organize some counterplay
on the queenside.) 10...c6 (After
10... $\mathcal{D}h5$ 11.g3?!?, the unfavour-
able placement of Black's bishop
on g4, forces him to abandon the
idea – 11...f5?! in view of 12.$\mathcal{Q}g5\pm$;
while in case of: 10...h6, Gouder
– Al Jassani, Skopje 1972, White
can follow with: 11.c5 $\mathcal{Q}h5$ 12.$\mathcal{Q}d2$
$\mathcal{W}xe2$ 13.$\mathcal{W}xe2$ f5 14.f3$\dagger$ 11.$\text{h3}$ $\mathcal{Q}d7$,
Shariyazdanov – I.Zaitsev, Moscow
2002 and here after 12.$\text{dxc6}$
$\mathcal{Q}xc6$ 13.$\mathcal{W}d3\dagger$, White preserves
some edge.

Black plays the move 9...h6
here quite often. Contrary to his
previous possibilities, this move
does not weaken his position.
Its main drawback is that it is in
fact a waste of time. The subse-
dquent developments are essen-
tially quite standard: 10.$\mathcal{Q}d2$!? (The other possibility for White:
10.c5 $\mathcal{Q}h5$ 11.$\mathcal{E}e1$ f5 12.$\mathcal{Q}d2$ $\mathcal{D}f6$, is analyzed later in Chapter 18,
where we deal with the variation:
9... $\mathcal{D}h5$ 10.$\mathcal{E}e1$ h6 11.c5, but White
does not need to transpose to it,
because after the move-order: 9...
$\mathcal{D}h5$ 10.$\mathcal{E}e1$ h6, it is much stronger
for him to continue with 11.$\mathcal{D}d2$!.)
10...$\mathcal{D}d7$ (If Black does not pre-
vent the pawn-advance c4–c5,
then White's queenside initiative
devolves quite effortlessly: 10...
g5 11.c5 $\mathcal{Q}g6$ 12.$\mathcal{Q}c4$ $\mathcal{D}f4$ 13.$\text{cxd6}$
cxd6 14.$\mathcal{B}b5$ $\mathcal{D}e8$ 15.$\mathcal{E}e1$ $\mathcal{D}f6$ 16.a4
$\mathcal{D}g7$ 17.$\mathcal{E}e3$ $\mathcal{H}h8$ 18.$\mathcal{G}g4\dagger$ Loehr
– Wallhof, Dresden 2005; 10...
$\mathcal{D}h7$ 11.c5 f5 12.$\mathcal{F}f4$ f4 13.$\mathcal{E}c4$ g5
14.$\mathcal{B}b5$ dx5 15.$\text{bxc5}$ a6 16.$\mathcal{D}c3$
$\mathcal{D}f6$ 17.$\mathcal{E}b1$– Coleman – Day,
corr. 1993; after the passive line
for Black – 10...$\mathcal{D}e8$ 11.c5, there
arises a position from Chapter 14,
variation a.) 11.a4 (It is also pos-
sible for White to play 11.c5, Chu-
prov – Temirbaev, Kurgan 1993,
but he must carefully consider the consequences of the line: 11... dxc5 12.bxc5 Qxc5 13...a3 b6∞.) 11...f5 12...a3 f6 (12...b6 13.a5 fxe4 14.Qdxe4 f5 15.c5± Epishin – Probst, Baunatal 2001) 13.c5 (White still has not tested in practice the logical move 13.f3 and here after the natural line: 14... f4 15.c5, the game transposes to a situation, which is favourable for White and it has been analyzed in Chapter 14, variation a, see the notes to Black’s move 12.) 13...fxe4 (After 13...g5 14.b5 Qe8 15.a5 b6 16.cxd6 cxd6 17...b4 Qb8 18.Qc4 f6 19.Wb3 Wh8 20.axb6 axb6 21.f3 f4, White can break in the standard fashion on the queenside with the help of the typical combination: 22.Qa4 Qd7 23.Qxc6b6! Qxb6 24. Qa5 Qc8 25.Wc3 g4 26.Qxb6 Qxb6 27.Qa5+- Skalik – Szajna, Lubniewice 1998.) 14.Qdxe4 (The other possible capture for White here is: 14.Qcxe4, Stern – Triscic, Germany 1996 and after: 14... dxc5 15.Qxf6+ Qxf6 16.bxc5 Qxd5 17.c6 Qf7∞, it might lead to quite unnecessary complications.) 14... Qxe4 15.Qxe4 f4 16.Qf3!? Qf7 (It is too bad for Black to play 16... Qf5?! , in view of 17.Qc1±; or 16... Qf8?! , because of: 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.b5 Qf5 19.Qg4±; while in case of: 16...dxc5 17.bxc5 Qxd5 18.Qc3 c6 19.Qxd5 cxd5 20.Qxd5+ Wh7 21.Wb3↑, White’s pieces are much more active than their counterparts.) 17.Qc1 Qf5 18.Qg4± - and

White’s knight has occupied the powerful e4-outpost.

10.Qdxc6!

White’s most urgent task here is to ensure the safety of his queenside. For example, in case of 10.a4, Black has the powerful argument – 10...a5!, while following: 10.Qa3, in the game Greenfeld – Murrey, Israel 1998, Black countered with 10...a6, with the idea to prepare the pawn-advance b7-b5, at an opportune moment and White’s bishop on the a3-square would be completely isolated from the actions in that case.

White plays here often: 10.Qd2 a5 11.bxa5 Wxa5. As a result of that, there arises a transposition to the line: 9.Qd2 c6 10.b4 a5 11.bxa5 Wxa5. In order to understand what is going on, you must have in mind that the pawn-structure, which appears on the board after 12.Qc2 c5, is quite favourable for Black, since White cannot accomplish a break on the queenside only with piece-pressure. He needs plenty of time to prepare to break Black’s defensive fortress
there with the help of a sacrifice of knight, or a bishop on the c5-square and Black manages to re-group his forces in the process. There might follow: 13.\textit{\=Q}b3 \textit{\=Q}d8 14.a4 \textit{\=Q}d7 15.a5 (After: 15.\textit{\=Q}d2 f5 16.f3, White must consider the possibility of a pawn-onslaught of his opponent on the kingside: 16...f4 17.a5 h5 18.\textit{\=Q}a4 \textit{\=Q}a6 19.\textit{\=Q}f1 g5\textsuperscript{=} and Black had an excellent counterplay in the game Ftacnik – Neurohr, Germany 1990.) 15...\textit{\=Q}a6 16.f3 f5 17.\textit{\=Q}d2 \textit{\=Q}h8 18.\textit{\=Q}a4 \textit{\=Q}g8 19.exf5 gxf5 20.\textit{\=Q}d3 \textit{\=Q}f6\textsuperscript{∞} and the adversaries agreed to a draw in the game Kramnik – Poluljahov, Kuibyshev 1990.

It looks like White can diminish the effect of Black’s move a7-a5 with the help of 10.\textit{\=Q}b1, but things are far from simple. In that case, troubles might befall White on the other side of the board – 10...cxd5!? 11.cxd5 \textit{\=Q}h5! (Now, if you compare that position with those arising in the variation with the move 9...\textit{\=Q}h5, you will easily notice that the move c7-c6 turns out to be much more useful than \textit{\=Q}a1-b1.) 12.\textit{\=Q}e1 f5. Here, White has nothing better than 13.\textit{\=Q}d2 (You can see now some fragments of games like: 13.\textit{\=Q}f1 \textit{\=Q}f6 14.\textit{\=Q}g5 h6 15.\textit{\=Q}e6 \textit{\=Q}xe6 16.dxe6 fxe4 17.\textit{\=Q}xe4 \textit{\=Q}xe4 18.\textit{\=Q}xe4 d5 19.\textit{\=Q}e1 \textit{\=Q}b6 20.\textit{\=Q}e3 \textit{\=Q}xe6+\textsuperscript{=} Royer – Bremond, Clichy 2002 as well as: 13.\textit{\=Q}g5 \textit{\=Q}f6 14.\textit{\=Q}f3 h6 15.\textit{\=Q}e6 \textit{\=Q}xe6 16.dxe6 fxe4 17.\textit{\=Q}xe4 \textit{\=Q}xe4 18.\textit{\=Q}xe4 d5 19.\textit{\=Q}c2, Soppe – Schche-

kachev, Internet 2001, 19...\textit{\=Q}b6\textsuperscript{=} and they show quite clearly that White should not try to play analogously to the main line in which we analyze the move 9...\textit{\=Q}h5.) 13...\textit{\=Q}f6 14.b5 \textit{\=Q}c7\textsuperscript{∞} Spielmann – Bremond, Clichy 2002.

10...\textit{\=Q}xc6

That move is quite obvious, since Black wishes to preserve his control over the important d5-square.

After 10...\textit{\=Q}xc6, the d5-outpost becomes a gaping wound in Black’s position. 11.\textit{\=Q}b1!? White thus solves the problem with the defence of his b4-pawn and he removes his rook away from the X-ray of Black’s bishop on g7. (In case of: 11.b5 \textit{\=Q}d4\textsuperscript{∞}, or 11.a3 a5 12.b5 \textit{\=Q}d4\textsuperscript{∞}, it is much more difficult to prove White’s advantage.) 11...a5 12.b5 \textit{\=Q}d4. This is a forced move for Black. (After: 12...\textit{\=Q}e7? 13.\textit{\=Q}a3 \textit{\=Q}e8 14.c5+-, Black position crumbles altogether.) 13.\textit{\=Q}xd4 exd4 14.\textit{\=Q}xd4 \textit{\=Q}xe4 15.\textit{\=Q}xe4 \textit{\=Q}xc3, Petran – Erdelyi, Budapest 2001 and here White could have continued with 16.\textit{\=Q}f3 \textit{\=Q}e5 (Black loses after: 16...\textit{\=Q}f5??, because of: 17.\textit{\=Q}xc3 \textit{\=Q}xb1 18.\textit{\=Q}h6++) 17.\textit{\=Q}b2\textsuperscript{=} and he would have maintained the advantage, thanks to his superior pawn-structure.

(digram)

11.\textit{\=Q}g5!

That is the point. It will soon become evident that Black will unavoidably have great problems
with the defence of his d6-pawn.

**11...h6**

Black’s position is hardly any better after his other possibilities either. Following: 11...e6 12.d2 w7 13.e1 d8 14.xf6 xf6, his pieces are terribly misplaced: 15.d5! xd5 16.cxd5 w7 17.c6 x6 18.d5 a5 19.d5—Truskavetsky – Loskutov, Alushta 2005.

It is a bit more difficult for White to refute the move 11...h5. After: 12.c5 f6, it becomes obvious that he must enter the complications: 13.c4+! (In case of: 13.c6 fxg5 14.xe7 wxe7∞ Jerome – Jobe, corr. 1998, the position is rather unclear.) 13...d5 14.exd5 fxg5 15.c6+ (It would not work for White to play: 15. d6+ h8 16.xg5 d5 17.xd5, because of: 17...cxd5! 18.wxd5 xg5 19.xa8 f4— and Black’s attack is very dangerous.) 15...h8 16.wxd8 xxd8 17.xg5 e4. White has already three pawns for the piece and he preserves a powerful initiative. 18.f7+ g8 19.d6+ f8 20.c5 d2 21. c7 b8 22.ad1 (White can also

play here: 22.xc8 xc8 23.e6+ f7 24.g5+ e8 25.b5+) 22... xd1 23.xd1 xc6 24.xc8 xc8 25.d7+.

**12.xf6 xf6 13.wd2**

**13...g7**

Now, Black has problems to avoid losing a pawn. See some examples: 13...g4 14.wxh6 w6 15.g5 xg5 16.wxg5 xe2 17. xxe2 f6 18.wd2+—Archangelsky – Ljuboschitz, Dresden 2006; 13...g7 14.ad1 d5 15.cxd5 cxd5 16.exd5 f5 17.e1+– Polak – Schill, Paks 2004; 13...d5 14.wxh6 dxe4 15.ad1 f5 16.xd8 xhx6 17.xf8+ xf8 18.xe4 g7 19.b5 d7 20.a4+– Babula – Vokac, Opava 2000.

Things are a bit more complex after: 13..b8 14.ab1 g5 15.fd1 g4 16.e1 g6, Babula – Hausner, Czech Republic 2005, but even then after 17.a3!? (White is threatening 18.wxh6.) 17...e7 18.c5 dx5 19.wxh6 g5 20.wx5 f4 21.xd8 xhx5 22.xc8! fxc8 23.xg4 cxb4 24.axb4+, White wins material by force.

**14.f6 d5**

Black is trying to neutralize
White's positional pressure at the price of a pawn.

In case of: 14...a5 15.b5 cxb5 16.cxb5 a6 17.acl a7 18.e3 b7 19.d2+ Matjushin – Dolzhikova, Kiev 1998, he loses his control over the d5-square and White manages to create a passed pawn on the queenside.

15.cxd5 cxd5 16.xd5 xd5 17.xd5 xd5 18.xd5 b7 (diagram)

19.a5 xe4 20.xe5 b8 21.f4+ – Black's bishop-pair does not compensate fully his sacrificed pawn, since White's pieces are evidently more active, Wallner – Gruber, St Veit 2004.

**Conclusion**

*We have analyzed in this chapter some lines, which are not so popular nowadays. There are certain reasons for that. As a rule, these moves either compromise Black's position, or they lose valuable time for him. In the majority of cases, the White player must simply make a choice between the immediate pawn-advance c4-c5, or he can transpose to the variation with 9.d2. He should pay a special attention though, only to the move 9...c6, since it requires precise and concrete actions in the centre with the idea to exploit the lead in development.*
Chapter 11 1.d3 f3 2.c4 g6 3.e3 c3 g7 4.e4 d6 5.d4 0-0 6.e2 e5 7.0-0 c6 8.d5 e7 9.b4 h8

This prophylactic move with the king gained popularity mostly thanks to GM Mark Hebden. Black often has problems, in the system with the move 7...c6, with the future of his knight on e7. In this particular case, he wishes to solve that problem in the following fashion: his knight on f6 goes to the e8-square in order to improve the required protection of the c7 and d6-pawns, while his knight on e7 heads for the g8-square and then after the preliminary pawn-advance f7-f5, it goes, depending on circumstances, either to f6, or to h6.

10.d2!?

It is more frequently met in practice here the other move-order in which White plays 10.c5 immediately in the diagrammed position. Still, he must consider then the possibility 10...h5!? (After 10...e8 11.a4 g8 12.a3 f5 13.d2, or 10...e8 11.d2 e8 12.a4 f5 13.a3, the game transposes to positions, which we analyze after the move – 10.d2.) and it leads to a rather sharp and forced play. There might follow: 11.e1 (In case of: 11.cxd6 cxd6
12.g5 f4 13.xf4 exf4 14.c1 h6 15.f3 g5 16.b5 g6∞ Comp “Fritz 5.32” – J.Polgar, Budapest 1999, Black’s dark-squared bishop becomes tremendously powerful.) 11.f5 (It is already ineffective for Black to play here: 11...f4 12.g1 g8 13.a4 f5 14.xf4 exf4, in view of: 15.e5! g5 16.c1 g4 17.exd6 cxd6 18.d4± Cebalo – Jakic, Zadar 1997.) 12.d2 (The position becomes even sharper after: 12.g5 f4 13.xf4 exf4 14.c1 dxc5 15.bxc5 h6∞ Korobkov – Tseshkovsky, Krasnodar 2004, but it is still too difficult to prove White’s advantage...) 12...f4 (After: 12...f6 13.f3 f4 14.c4 g5 15.a3 e8 16.b5 b6 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.b4 f6 19.a4 d7 20.a5 b8 21.axb6 axb6 Sosonko – Nijboer, Netherlands...
1992, White has the typical counterstrike on the kingside: 22.g4!? fxg3 23.hxg3±, preserving better chances.) 13...c4 (In the variation: 13...f1 fxe4 14.dxe4 dxc5∞ Evchin – Lysak, Kiev 2002, you can see the usefulness of the prophylactic move – g8-h8; White can prevent the crumbling of his pawn-centre only with the unnatural line 13.c4 g8, but after 14.f1 f6∞ Veingold – Paunovic, Burgas 2001, or 14.h1 h6∞ Kononenko – Matamoros Franco, Sevilla 2006, it becomes clear that White’s bishop is misplaced and it only occupies the excellent c4-square for his knight.) 13.c4 dxc5 (After: 13...fxe4?! 14.cxd6 cxd6 15.exd4 exd5 16.exd6 exf4+ 17.exf4 fxe4 18.hxg4 fxg4 19.ebd1 e7 20.eb3 Astrom – M.Ivanov, Hafnarfjordur 1997, there arose a quite unusual position, in which White’s couple of knights was considerably stronger than Black bishop pair.) 14.bxc5 fxe4 15.g6 (That is the only way for White to avoid losing his d-pawn.) 15...f5 16.exf4∞ and the arising position is not easy to be evaluated at all.

10...e8

The move 10...f8?! definitely contradicts the ideas for Black, which we have mentioned in the notes to Black’s move nine. It is not surprising that after: 11.c5 f5 (or 11...d7 12.c4 c8 13.a4 f5 14.f3 d6, Heinoth – Urban, Germany 1992, 15.e3?) 12.f3 h6 13.c4 g5 14.b5 f6 15.b2 g6, White can inflict a preventive counter strike on the kingside with – g4!± Henley – Goldman, Kenilworth 1990 and he obtained an overwhelming advantage.

Following 10...d7, White can continue his queenside offensive quite comfortably with – 11.a4!?, (He has also tried in practice the line: 11.a3 a5! 12.bxa5 bxa5 13.b4 a8 14.b3, Gleizerov – Hoeckendorf, Balatonbereny 1994, but in that case White’s bishop on b4 turns out to be misplaced and after: 14...b6?! 15.a4 c5 16.b3 17.wb3 c5! 18.dxc6 dxc6 19.axb6 axa1 20.axa1 wb6∞ White has nothing to brag about.) bringing his a-pawn into the actions. There might follow: 11...f5 12.f3 a5 (If 12...f6 13.c5, then the game transposes to variation a – see 10...e8 11.c5 f5 12.a4 d6 13.f3.) 13.bxa5 bxa5 14.c3 b3 a8 15.e3!?, as a result of which, the game transposes to the variation, which we analyze in our Chapter 12 (see – 9...d7 10.d2 a5 11.bxa5 bxa5 12.b3 a8 13.a4 f5 14.f3 g8 15.e3).

Black’s attempt to create some counterplay on the queenside with the move 10...c6, after 11.a4 cxd5 12.cxd5 e8 13.c4 f5 14.b5 g8 15.exf5 xf5 16.b6 axb6 17.b3 e8 18.e3, slowed down White’s queenside onslaught indeed, but it did not solve all his problems in the game Gormally – Hebden, Hastings 2005.

The same conclusion applies

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more or less to the move – 10...a5. After 11.bxa5! (White must play very precisely here, because after: 11.a3 axb4 12.axb4, Black manages to equalize the game, thanks to the unfavourable placement of White’s knight on the d2-square, with the line: 12...c5! 13.dxc6 bxc6=) 11...a3x5 12.a3b3
b3 13.c5 b3e8 14.a3 f3 f5 15.f3
g8 (In case of: 15...dxc5 16.bxc5
d6 17.c2 d7 18.a4± Dzeglav-

The other popular move-order for Black here is: 10...eg8 11.c5
eg8 12.a4 f5 13.a3 and it leads to the same position as 10...eg8.

**11.c5 f5 12.a4**

Until now, both sides were playing according to a more or less prepared program. Now, Black has the option to choose between: a) 12...f6, b) 12...a5 and c) 12...g8.

His attempt to counter White’s queenside actions with: 12...c6 13.g4 fxe4 (or 13...cxd5 14.exd5 d7 15.b2 e4 16.d2
g8, Powell – Garner, Telford 2004, 17.a5+) 14.g5 f6 (or 14...

It is too risky for Black to play 12...h6, Petkov – Krstic, Zadar 2005, because after: 13.c4 xc1 14.xc1, he must consider the possibility of the pawn-advance f2-f4. He can defend by playing 14...f4 himself, but then White is considerably ahead of his opponent in the development of his initiative. There might follow, for example: 15.b5 g5 (Black is in a hurry to bring his knight to the g6-square, in order to reduce the effect of the move – b5-b6, because the lines: 15...b6 16.cxd6 cxd6 17.a5±; as well as: 15...f6 16.b6† are both very bad for him.) 16.a5 g6 17.h5 f6 (or 17...e7 18.b6 axb6 19.axb6 dxc5 20.bxc7
d6 21.dxd6 bxc6 22.b5 b6 23.b1±) 18.c6 bxc6 (It is a disaster for Black to follow with 18...
b6, in view of: 19.a1 b8 20.axb6 axb6 21.a4+, threatening 22. a7, 19.dxc6± and Black’s queenside ends up in ruins.

The exchange: 12...fxe4 13.
xe4 f5, presents White with the powerful e4-outpost for
his knight. In case of 14...g4!? (Now, after the trade of the light-squared bishops, the removal of Black's knight away from the f5-square weakens the light squares in his camp considerably.) 14...h6 15.ea3 f7 16.a5 f8 17.e1 Matamoros Franco – Blasco Blasco, Alcobendas 1993, White maintains the initiative. If he manages to push f2-f4, Black's situation might soon become critical.

a) 12...f6

In principle, any other possible set-up of Black's knights on the kingside, which is different from what we have already indicated in our notes to Black's move nine, will be much less dangerous for White (Black has already lost time for the move ™h8). Still, that thesis requires some clarification. That is the reason we include Black's last move in the scheme of our main lines.

![Diagram]

13.f3

Now, White has protected the e4-square quite reliably and Black's knight on e7 is doing nothing there. Additionally, it only hampers Black's defence, while White attacks the d6-pawn.

13...f4

That is Black's most principled decision. It leads to a double-edged position in which both sides attack on the opposite wings and the outcome of the game usually hinges on the principle – whoever comes first...

Still, I would like to inform the readers who do not wish to memorize long non-forced variations that White is faster as a rule and by far at that...

In case of: 13...g5?! 14.c4 g4 15.fxg4 dx5 16.bxc5 fxe4 17.d6 cxd6 18.g5 ™e8 19.cxd6 ™g6 20. ™xe4+ – Petran – Werner, Budapest 2004, Black loses the fight all over the board.

It seems better for Black, from the point of view of strategy, to play the move 13... ™h6?! , but unfortunately for him, he does not have the time to afford that. 14.c4 ™xc1 15. ™xc1? f4 16.a5 g5 17.b5! (It is essential that White has managed to play that move before Black has protected his e5-pawn with his knight.) 17... ™g6 (After 17...dxc5 18. ™xe5+ – Black's position crumbles.) 18.b6 dx5 19. ™b5 ™e8 20. ™xa7 ™d7 21. ™b2 cxb6 22.axb6 ™f6 23. ™b5+ – Schussler – Ivarsson, Stockholm 1980.

Black has also tried in practice: 13... ™eg8 14.c4 ™h6 (It would be fruitless for Black to try: 14... ™h6 15.a3 ™h5, in view of: 16.b5 ™f6 17.g3 ™e7 18.cxd6 cxd6
19.f4!+– Gleizerov – Rimawi, Damascus 2003; after: 14...\textit{f7} 15.a5 h6 16.b5 \textit{h5} 17.e3 \textit{f8} 18.b6 \textit{d4} 19.bxc7 \textit{g5} 20.g3 \textit{h3}+ 21.h1 \textit{f6} 22.cxd6+– S.Nikolov – Malnar, Kranj 2004, Black has lost his key-defensive pawns and he has not created any serious threats against White’s king.) 15.a5 \textit{f7} 16.e3 \textit{d7} 17.b5 dxe5 18.xc5 \textit{e8} 19.b6 axb6 20.axb6 \textit{xal} 21.\textit{xa1} c6 and here in the game R.Hernandez – Ojanen, Siegen 1970, White could have maintained his advantage with the move 22.e3, so that after: 22...f4 23.dxc6 \textit{xxc6} 24.e5\textit{d6}±, he could have deployed his knight in the very centre of the board.

White can simply ignore the threat of the appearance of the black knight on the f4-square after 13...\textit{h5}, Browne – Booth, Los Angeles 1991. Following: 14.c4 \textit{f4} 15.\textit{xd6} cxd6 16.e3\textit{e8}±, in connection with the threat 17.b5, Black cannot avoid the creation of additional weaknesses on the queenside.

\textbf{14.e4}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=1in]{image.png}
\end{center}

14...h5

This move is quite typical for many variations of the King’s Indian Defence. Black attacks first with his h-pawn in order to prevent his opponent’s counterstrike on the kingside – g2-g4. Meanwhile, White’s game is so easy in that line that such nuances are practically immaterial under the circumstances.

In case of: 14...\textit{g8} 15.a3 \textit{f8} (After: 15...g5 16.b5 \textit{e8} 17.b6 cxb6 18.d6 \textit{dx6} 19.cxd6 \textit{g6} 20.b5 \textit{d7} 21.c7 \textit{e8} 22.b3 h5 23.e6 \textit{e8} 24.b5 g4 25.\textit{ac1}+– Olesen – Thorhallsson, Gausdal 1991, White accomplishes the standard penetration of his pieces into Black’s camp via the queenside.) 16.b5 \textit{e8}, Lasala – Aranzabal, Madrid 1997 and here you can witness – why the placement of Black’s knight on the e7-square is so unfavourable for him: 17.b6! axb6 18.cxd6 \textit{dx6} 19.c6 cxd6 20.b5++– Black is simply incapable of protecting his d6-pawn.

It is hardly any better for Black to play: 14...g5 15.a3 \textit{e8} (After: 15...\textit{g8} 16.b5 \textit{e8} 17.a5 \textit{gf6} 18.b6+– C.Gomez – Llorens, Spain 1993, Black’s queenside ends up in ruins; about 15...h5 – see 14...h5.) 16.b5 \textit{f6} (In case of: 16...b6 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.a5 \textit{b8} 19.b4 h5, White settles the issue with the help of the standard combination: 20.axb6 axb6 21.a4! \textit{f6} 22.a5b6++– De Sousa – Gallegos, Los Angeles 1991.) 17.a5 (White
must play precisely while accomplishing his plan of the queenside offensive, because after: 17.b6?! axb6 18.cxb6 c5 19.dxc6 Qxc6 20.Qd5 Bh6 21.Qc7, Chuchelov – Thiteca, Brussels 1995, Black could have exploited the wonderful opportunity to sharpen the game with: 21...Qxc7 22.bxc7 Bxc7 23.Qxd6 Bf7±) 17...Bg6 (After 17...Bg6, time is ripe for White to break Black’s defence with: 18.b6! Bf8 19.bxc7 Bxc7 20.Qxd6 Qxd6 21.cxd6 Qe8 22.Qb4 Qxd6 23.Qb5± Bonin – Zardus, Long Island 1995.) 18.b6! axb6 19.axb6 dxc5, Gonzalez Garcia – Balogh, Budapest 1995 and here with the help of the line: 20.bxc7? Bxc7 21.Qb5 Bd7 22.Qxc5 Bxa1 23.Bxa1 Bxb5 24.Qxe7±, White is evidently ahead of his opponent in the development of his onslaught.

15.Qa3 Qe8

About 15...g5 16.b5 Qe8 17.a5 – see 15...Qe8 16.b5 g5 17.a5.

16.b5 Qg8

Black’s attempt to decrease the pressure against his d6-pawn with: 16...dxc5 17.Qxc5 Qd6 18.a5 Qxc4 19.Qxc4 Bf6 20.Qb3 g5 21.Qb4 Qg8 22.Bfd1±, does not solve any of his defensive problems, Guthrie – Larrea, Medellin 1996.

After 16...g5 17.a5 dxc5 (If Black persists in defending his d6-pawn, as a result of: 17...Bf6?! 18.b6! Qg6 19.bxc7 Bxc7 20.Qb5 Bd7 21.Qbxd6+- S.Nikolov – Mamak, Ljubljana 2005, he loses material.) 18.Qxc5 Qd6 19.b6 Qxc4 20.Qxc4 axb6 21.axb6 Bxa1 22.Qxa1 cxb6 23.Qb4 g4 24.Qa3 Qf6, D.Gomez – M.Fernandez, Buenos Aires 2004, the best reaction for White is 25.Qb5± and Black’s position is tremendously difficult.

17.b6!

That is a typical pawn-break and Black’s pawn-structure on the queenside crumbles after it.

17...axb6 18.cxb6 cxb6 19.Qb1! Qf6 20.Qxb6 Bb8 21.a5 Qf8 22.Qc4 Qh6

23.Qxc8. That is a quite interesting moment to pay attention to. Black’s counterplay on the kingside is practically ineffective without his light-squared bishop. Even if we assume the highly unlikely development of the appearance of a black pawn on the g3-square, then White will have the blocking move – h2-h3 and Black has no piece to sacrifice on the h3-square. Therefore, White annihilates his opponent’s most important attacking piece and then he can continue with his queenside offensive at leisure.

23...Qxc8 24.Qb6 Qc7 25.Qc1
b) 12...a5

This is a prophylactic counter-strike. Black thus disrupts his opponent's pawn-structure on the queenside in order to slow down White's onslaught a bit.

13.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash h}a3}

White wishes to replace his b-pawn with his bishop, so that he can exert some pressure against Black's d6-pawn.

13...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a\textbackslash b}4}

Black sacrificed his a-pawn with: 13...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}8}? 14.bxa5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}f6} 15.exf5 gxf5 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}4} e4 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}5} in the game Appleberry – Caminade, Paris 1992, but it proved to be insufficient.

It is more logical for him to try: 13...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}6} 14.bxa5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}a}5 15.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}4} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}8} 16.a5 dxc5 (In case of: 16...fxe4, Hjartarson – Einarsson, Iceland 1999, it is the simplest line for White to maintain his initiative with: 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}xe4} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}5} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}6} fxe6 20.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}4} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}7} and here after the move 21.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}1}†, Black's counterplay, connected with b7-b6, has been prevented.) 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}c5} b6 (Black got crushed rather quickly after: 17...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}e}4 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}xe4} fxe4 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}e}4 b6 20.axb6 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}a}1 21.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}a}1 cxb6 22.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}6} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}5} 23.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}e}5+- Prudnikova – Jovic, Pale 1993.) 18.axb6 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}a}1 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}a}1 cxb6 20.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}4} fxe4 21.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}xe4} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}e}4 22.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}e}4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}7} 23.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}1}† L.Rasin – Pang, Boston 2001, but even then White preserves the initiative thanks to his powerful d5-pawn, which is supported actively by his pieces.

14.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}b}4 fxe4

Black has already no time to continue with the plan with the move f5-f4. In that case White's hands will be completely free for actions on the queenside and he will encounter practically no resistance at all.

About 14...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}6} 15.a5 – see 13...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}6} 14.bxa5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}a}5 15.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}4} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}8} 16.a5.

After 14...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}8} 15.a5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}f6} 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e}1} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash g}8} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}1} f4 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}4} g5 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}e}6 cxd6 20.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}5} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash f}8} 21.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}3} g4 22.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}3} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}6}, White can exploit the fact that Black's pieces are overburdened with the defence of his d6-pawn, by playing the move 23.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}e}5!+- Husari – Schoepf, Budapest 2003.

In case of: 14...dxc5 15.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}c}5 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}6} (Or 15...b6 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash a}3} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}7} 17.f3 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash d}6} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}5} fxe4 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}d}6 cxd6 20.fxe4 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}f}1† 21.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash x}f}1 \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash c}8} 22.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash b}5}± Craig – Houston, corr.)
1999.) 16.f3 g5 17.\(\text{c}4\) f4 18.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{xc}4\) 19.\(\text{xc}4\)± Karttunen – Fieandt, Heinola 1999, the fight is concentrated only on the queenside and that is evidently disadvantageous for Black.

The diagrammed position was reached in the game Bern – Sousa, Cappelle la Grande 1995. Here, it looked quite attractive for White to continue with: 15.\(\text{dxe}4\)± in order to force his opponent to defend his d6-pawn with his knight on e8.

c) 12...\(\text{g}8\)

This is the most straightforward plan for Black. He follows the scheme, which we have described in our notes to his move 9...\(\text{h}8\).

13.\(\text{a}3\)!?

White’s knight on d2 might still be needed for the protection of the e4-pawn, while his bishop has nothing better to do in this position.

13...\(\text{h}6\)

It is obviously premature for Black to play 13...f4, because of: 14.\(\text{g}4\)!? \(\text{x}g4\) 15.\(\text{w}xg4\) \(\text{g}6\) 16.\(\text{w}e2\) g5 17.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{g}8\) 18.a5 \(\text{f}8\) 19.\(\text{g}4\) fxg3 20.\(\text{hxg}3\) \(\text{h}5\) 21.\(\text{h}2\) \(\text{w}e7\) 22.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{e}6\) 23.\(\text{e}3\)± and White seizes the control over the light squares, E.Panos – Horrillo, Seville 2002.

Following: 13...fxe4 14.\(\text{dxe}4\) \(\text{g}6\), the most precise reaction for White is 15.\(\text{g}3\)!?, since now Black’s knight remains idle on the e8-square – 15...\(\text{h}6\) 16.a5 \(\text{f}5\) 17.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{x}c1\) 18.\(\text{x}c1\) \(\text{d}7\) 19.f4 \(\text{w}e7\) 20.fxe5 \(\text{w}e5\) 21.\(\text{w}d2\)± Tratar – Starcic, Kranj 1999.

Black cannot solve his opening problems with the move 13...\(\text{f}7\), Khudaverdijeva – Szczepkowska, Chalkidiki 2001, in view of 14.a5!? . Now, Black’s attempt to prevent his opponent’s pawn-advance b4-b5 with 14...\(\text{f}8\) (After 14...\(\text{f}7\), J.Watson – Barata, corr. 1998, 15.b5 \(\text{f}8\) 16.c6 f4 17.cxb7 \(\text{x}b7\) 18.\(\text{a}2\) g5 19.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{g}7\) 20.\(\text{b}2\) h5 21.c1 g4 22.f3 \(\text{g}x\text{f}3\) 23.\(\text{x}f3\)±, Black’s kingside attack was evidently too slow.) 15.c4 \(\text{g}6\), enables White to break through on the other side of the board – 16.f4! \(\text{ex}f4\) 17.\(\text{xf}4\)±.

After 13...\(\text{g}6\), it also deserves
attention for White to follow with 14.a5!? (It is possible for him to play 14.b5 too, but then, in case of: 14...dxc5 15.\text{\textit{\&}}xc5 \text{\textit{\&}}d6\text{±} Jhtarson – Shaked, Bermuda 1997, Black’s defence becomes much easier.) 14...\text{\textit{\&}}xe4 (About 14...\text{\textit{\&}}f7 – see 13...\text{\textit{\&}}f7; Black’s most principled reaction here is: 14...\text{\textit{\&}}h6 15.b5, but after: 15...\text{\textit{\&}}f7 16.\text{\textit{\&}}c4 \text{\textit{\&}}xe4 17.\text{\textit{\&}}xe4 fxe4 18.b6\text{±} Janssen – Cukier, Golden Sands 2000, as well as following: 15...\text{\textit{\&}}xd2 16.\text{\textit{\&}}xd2 \text{\textit{\&}}xe4 17.\text{\textit{\&}}xe4 fxe4 18.b6 axb6 19.axb6\text{±} Lputian – Donguines, Moscow 1994, White can sacrifice temporarily a pawn and his initiative develops faster than his opponent’s possible counterplay. If Black pushes immediately his kingside pawns with the line: 14...f4 15.\text{\textit{\&}}c4 g5, White has up his sleeve the standard preventive counter strike: 16.g4!? fxg3 17.fxg3 \text{\textit{\&}}e7 18.\text{\textit{\&}}d2 \text{\textit{\&}}g8 19.\text{\textit{\&}}e3 \text{\textit{\&}}f7 20.g4 \text{\textit{\&}}f8 21.\text{\textit{\&}}f5\text{±} Babula – Vokac, Czech Republic 2002.) 15.\text{\textit{\&}}dxe4 \text{\textit{\&}}xe4 16.\text{\textit{\&}}xe4\text{±} and White maintains a slight but stable advantage thanks to his powerful knight on the e4-outpost.

14.b5

\begin{center}
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14...\text{\textit{\&}}xe4

It is again unfavourable for Black, just like on the previous move, to play now 14...f4?! After: 15.\text{\textit{\&}}c4 g5 (In case of: 15...b6 16.cxd6 cxd6 17.\text{\textit{\&}}b4 \text{\textit{\&}}b8 18.a5 g5 19.axb6 axb6, White has the resource 20.\text{\textit{\&}}h5+- and Black is incapable of protecting his d6-pawn, A.Greenfeld – Birnboim, Israel 1992; after 15...\text{\textit{\&}}f6 16.a5 \text{\textit{\&}}f7 17.b6 axb6 18.axb6 dxc5 19.bxc7 \text{\textit{\&}}xc7 20.\text{\textit{\&}}xc5 \text{\textit{\&}}xa1 21.\text{\textit{\&}}xa1\text{±}, White breaks through on the queenside much earlier than Black can create any real threats on the kingside, Hahn – Jezierska, Chandler 1997.) it seems quite effective for White to inflict again the standard preventive strike – 16.g4! (White can simply continue with his pawn-offensive on the queenside with: 16.f3 \text{\textit{\&}}f6 17.a5, but after: 17...dxc5 18.\text{\textit{\&}}xc5 \text{\textit{\&}}g6 19.h3 \text{\textit{\&}}f7 20.b6 cxb6 21.axb6 a6 22.\text{\textit{\&}}b3 h5 23.\text{\textit{\&}}b4 \text{\textit{\&}}ed6\text{∞} Mrkvicka – Stiefel, corr. 2000, Black can fortify his defence by bringing his knight to the d6-square and there remains some tension on the kingside.) 16...\text{\textit{\&}}f6 (In case of: 16...fxg3 17.fxg3 \text{\textit{\&}}h3 18.\text{\textit{\&}}xf8+ \text{\textit{\&}}xf8 19.c6 b6 20.\text{\textit{\&}}d2 \text{\textit{\&}}g7 21.a5 \text{\textit{\&}}b8, Kalod – Gross, Kunzak 2001, Black’s position seems to be quite dubious. White only needs to get rid of the potentially dangerous black pieces on the kingside with: 22.\text{\textit{\&}}c1 \text{\textit{\&}}f7 23.\text{\textit{\&}}d1\text{±}, followed by 24.\text{\textit{\&}}f2.) 17.c6 bxc6 18.bxc6\text{±} D.Komarov – Hebden, Algarve 1999. Black’s
kingside attack has been completely neutralized, while White's queenside offensive has caused serious damage in Black's defensive set-up.

It is more acceptable for Black to play: 14...dxc5 15.axc5 0-0d6, in order to provide the d6-square for his knight. There might follow: 16.a5 0-hf7 (In case of: 16...fxe4 17.0-dxe4 0-hf5, as was recommended by GM V.Golod, White can play 18.0-d3+ and he maintains his advantage, because of his extra space, meanwhile, Black's bishops are considerably restricted, because of that.) 17.0-c4 (It is still too early for White to continue with 17.b6, because of: 17...axb6 18.axb6 0-xa1 19.0-xa1 cxb6 20.0-b4 0-e8∞ V.Golod). 17...f4!? (or 17...fxe4 18.b6↑) 18.0-b3 (Now, White is threatening the move 19.b6, while the immediate 18.b6?, would have been a mistake, because of 18...f3↑) 18...e8 19.b6 0xc4 20.bxc7 0xc7 (20...0g5? 21.0xc4! 0h3 22.g3! 0xf1 23.0xf1!+-) 21.0xc4 0d7 (but not 21...f3?? 22.0b5!+-) 22.0b5 0xb5 (In case of: 22...0b8?! 23. 0fc1±, Black's queen is evidently misplaced.) 23.0xb5 0f8 24.0xf8 (It is pointless for White to capture a pawn here with 24. 0xa7?, because following: 24...0d6 25. 0wb6 0g7∞, Black is threatening 26...0c8, as well as 26...0xe4.) 24...0f8 25.0fc1 0e7 26.0g4!± V.Golod – Hebden, Algarve 1999. White’s bishop controls the c8-square and that guarantees his domination over the open c-file.

15.0xc4 0f5 16.0c1

The complications after: 16. 0c4 dxc5 17.0xc5 0d4!? 18.0e6 0xe6 19.0xf8 0xd5 20.0xg7? 0xg7± (P.Eljanov), lead to a position, in which Black has a good compensation for his minimal material deficit, thanks to his powerful knight on the d4-outpost.

16...0f7

In case of: 16...dxc5 17.0xc5 0ed6 (After 17...0d4, it is very good for White to continue with: 18.0e6!, because he can counter 18...0xe6, with: 19.dxe6 0d6 20.0c2±, while the exchange sacrifice – 18...0xe6 19.0xf8 0xd5 20.0xg7+ 0xg7 21.0f3± is not so effective for Black as before...) 18.0g4± (P.Eljanov) and White maintains again his edge.

17.cxd6 0exd6

This move is much stronger than: 17...cxd6 18.0g4±, since then Black’s knight would be misplaced on the e8-square.

18.0g4 0xe4

After 18...a6 19.0xd6 cxd6, it is very strong for White to continue with: 20.b6!? 0xb6 21.0c4↑ (P.Eljanov) and he regains his sacrificed pawn, maintaining the initiative.

19.0xe4 0d4

Black’s problems are even greater after 19...0d7, because of the line: 20.d6!? cxd6 21.0xf5 gxf5 22.0xd6±.
20...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}c8 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}c8 21.d6
White opens the game and then the vulnerability of the light squares in Black's camp becomes even more damaging.

\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}f4 22.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{d}}}}d3 cxd6 23.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{a}}}}xd6 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}c1 24.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{a}}}}xc1\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{+}}} P.Eljanov, but still White's prospects are better, because of his more active pieces. The exchange – 22.dxc7?! after: 22...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}c7 23.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}c7 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{f}}}c7 24.f3 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{c}}}c4\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{+}}}}}}, provides Black with a dangerous counterplay.) 22.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{b}}}}b2! cxd6, Eljanov – Mariano, Dubai 2004 (After 22...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}d6 23.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{a}}}}xd4 exd4 24.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{w}}}xd4+ \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{g}}}g8 25.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{d}}}fd1\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{+}}}}, Black loses a pawn as well.) and here following: 23.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}c8!? \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}c8 24.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{f}}}xd4 exd4 25.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{d}}}x}d6! \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}d6 26.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{w}}}xd4+ \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{g}}}g8 27.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\texttt{w}}}xd6\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{+}}} (P.Eljanov) White could have won a pawn.}

\texttt{Conclusion}

Black loses time in order to improve the placement of his knight on e7 in the variation with 9...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{h}8}. The protection of the key-point of his defence – the d6-square is as a rule much easier if his knight is absent from e7. Still, he pays a dear price for that. The tempi he wastes for that maneuver preclude him from organizing an effective kingside attack. In fact, the pawn-advance – f7-f5-f4 is not dangerous for White when his pawn is not on f3. Black can force his opponent to play f2-f3 in variation a (see 12.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{g}}f6), but then he will have to repeat the maneuver with his knight – \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{f}}}6-e8 twice. It is quite easy to understand – then White's b-pawn goes quickly to b6 and Black's defence on the queenside crumbles. It seems logical for Black to try after f7-f5, to leave one of his knights on e8 and to maneuver the other knight to the f6-square via e7 and g8. We are analyzing that principled possibility for Black in variation c (see 12...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{g}}}g8 13.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a}}}a3 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{g6}}}. In that case, White can sacrifice temporarily his e4-pawn and he can emphasize the drawbacks of that time-consuming idea for Black. Evidently, Black’s best decision is to refrain from being too ambitious in his intentions to attack speedily on the kingside. In variation b (see 12...a5), as well as in variation c (see 12...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{g}}}g8 13.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{a}}}a3 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\texttt{h}}}6), Black should better reduce the tension in the centre with the move f5xe4 and he should settle for defending a solid, but still slightly passive position.
Chapter 12

1. \( \text{f3} \text{f6} \) 2. \( \text{c4} \text{g6} \) 3. \( \text{c3} \text{g7} \) 4. \( \text{e4} \text{d6} \) 5. \( \text{d4} 0-0 \) 6. \( \text{e2} \text{e5} \) 7. \( 0-0 \text{c6} \) 8. \( \text{d5} \text{e7} \) 9. \( \text{b4} \text{d7} \)

Black opens the way forward of his f-pawn and he is trying meanwhile to prevent White’s pawn-advance c4-c5.

10. \( \text{d2}! \)

White has several interesting possibilities here. His choice is mostly depending on style. Black’s move nine seems to be more passive in comparison to his main lines – (9...a5 and 9...\( \text{h5} \)). Therefore it looks like White’s optimal decision is to transpose to the lines with the move 9.\( \text{d2} \) (see our notes to White’s move nine in Part 5). It would be useful to know that the variation with 9.\( \text{d2} \) was an essential part of the opening repertoire of Vladimir Kramnik during the 90ies of the 20\text{th} century.

Meanwhile chess is developing. If we go a bit further in our book and we have a look at the variation with the move 9...\( \text{h5} \), then we might come to the point of asking: “Is it not possible for White to exploit the placement of his knight on f3 in order to counter Black’s move f7-f5 with \( \text{f3-g5} \)?"

Naturally, that is an alternative for White and he experiments a lot in practice. It is still too early to make any conclusions, though...It is quite possible that in the future, besides the line in our main text, we might see the variation: 10.a4!? f5 (After 10...a5 11.\( \text{a3} \text{axb4} \) 12.\( \text{xb4} \), there arises a transposition to the main line with the move – 9...a5 – see Chapter 17.) 11.\( \text{g5} \) (In case of: 11.\( \text{c5} \text{f6} \) 12.\( \text{g5} \text{xe4} \) 13.\( \text{xe4} \text{fxe4} \) 14.\( \text{d2} \text{h6} \) 15.\( \text{xe7} \text{xe7} \) 16.\( \text{xe4} \text{f5} \) 17.\( \text{cx}d6 \text{cd6} \) 18.\( \text{d3} \text{ac8=} \), Black’s position is quite acceptable, Skembris – Siamidis, Athens 1996.) 11...\( \text{f6} \). Now, just like in our main variation with the move – 9...\( \text{h5} \) (see 9...\( \text{h5} \) 10.\( \text{e1} \text{f5} \) 11.\( \text{g5} \text{f6} \)), White must make up his mind about how to protect
his e4-pawn – with the bishop, or with his pawn:

12. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) f3 fxe4 (Or 12...c6 13. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) b3!? h6 14. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) e6 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe6 15.dxe6 fxe4 16. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe4 17. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) c8 18. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) d1 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) d8 19.b5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe6 20. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) a3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) Paragua – Nguyen Van Huy, Vietnam 2003.) 13. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) cxe4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) f5 (Or 13...
\( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe4 14. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) f5 15. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) a3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) d4 16. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) g4 Hoftricher – Bomsdorf, Freiburg 2001.) 14. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) b2 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe4 15. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) d4 (Or 15...a5 16.bxa5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xa5 17. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) c3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) a8 18.a5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) d4 19. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xd4 exd4 20. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) g4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) h4 21. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xc8 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xc8∞ Mikanovic – Laurin, Montreal 2003.) 16. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xd4 exd4 17.c5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) f5 18.cxd6 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe4 19. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xd6 20. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) d2 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) ae8 21. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) ae1 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) c7, draw, I.Thomas – Groene, Duisburg 2005. Generally speaking, we can say that the advantages of the move a2-a4, in comparison to the line with \( \text{\textcopyright} \) f1-e1, in the variation with 9...\( \text{\textcopyright} \) h5 10.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) e1 f5 11.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) g5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) f6, are not so evident for Black;

12.f3!? c6 (After 12...h6 13. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) e6 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe6 14.dxe6, Black has tried here: 14.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) c8 15.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) d5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) e8 16.c5 dxc5 17.bxc5 fxe4 18.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) x6+ \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xf6 19.fxe4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe6 20.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) xh6 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) h7 21.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) c1 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) g8 22.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) c4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) e7 23.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) e3+– Khegai – Vidawati, Jakarta 2005; 14...
\( \text{\textcopyright} \) c6 15.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) e3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) e8 16.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) b3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) c7 17.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) ad1 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) h7 18.c5 d5 19.exd5 cxd5 20. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xd5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) exd5 21.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) c4 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe6 22. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xd5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) d4 23.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) xd4 exd4 24.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) xb7 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) b8 25.c6± D.Shapiro – Moore, Philadelphia 1992; 14...\( \text{\textcopyright} \) e8 15.c5 c6 16.cxd6 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xd6 17.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) e3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) c7 18.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) b3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) ad8 19.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) ad1± Scalcione – Camerini, Italy 2001; 14...\( \text{\textcopyright} \) h7

15.b5 f4 16.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) a3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) e8 17.c5 g5 18.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) c4± Alba – Arrue, Gijon 2002; he cannot equalize either with: 14...\( \text{\textcopyright} \) c6 15.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) d5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xd5 16. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xd5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xb4, due to: 17. \( \text{\textcopyright} \) b3 a5 18.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) a3\( \text{\textcopyright} \) It is also good for White to play – 13.a5!?; taking away the b6-square for Black’s queen.) 13...\( \text{\textcopyright} \) b6+ 14.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) h1 cxd5 15.cxd5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) d4 16.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) b2 h6 17.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) e6 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xe6 18.dxe6 fxe4 19. fxe4\( \text{\textcopyright} \) Hamilton – Simpson, Gosford 1988. White can rely on obtaining the advantage in that fashion too.

10...a5

The other popular line for Black – 10...f5 – is analyzed in Chapter 13.

His other possibilities are clearly weaker. For example after: 10...b6 11.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) b3, or 10...h6 11.a4, there arise positions, which we have already analyzed (see the moves 9...b6 and 9...h6 accordingly).

The drawbacks of the move 10...a6?! have already been mentioned (see 9...a6). Now, the situation is a bit different, but the basic arguments against the move a7-a6 remain more or less the same. After 11.a4 f5 (or 11...c6, Litchfield – Igboemeka, Canada 1995, 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) b3\( \text{\textcopyright} \) 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) a3 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) f6 13.c5 f4, Le Van Hoa – Hoang Minh, Vung Tau 2004, White only needed to continue with 14.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) c4± and he would gain an easy access to Black’s queenside weaknesses.

In case of: 10...c5?! 11.bxc5 \( \text{\textcopyright} \) xc5 12.\( \text{\textcopyright} \) b3, Black fails to pre-
serve the control with his pieces over the key c5-square. Here, you can see the negative consequences of the placement of his knight on the e7-square. After: 12...b6 (Or 12...dxb3 13.axb3† Kaabi – Ouechtati, Cannes 1990 and it becomes tremendously difficult for Black to defend his queenside in that position.) 13.dxc5 bxc5 (After 13...dxc5 14.e3 b7 15.a4 d8 16.a5 d6 17.b3 f5 18.f3 a6 19.axb6 axb6 20.fxe4 21.fxe4 c8 22.a2± Onat – Suer, Tehran 1972, Black's knight will be soon forced to surrender the strategically important key d6-outpost.) 14.g5 f6 15.d2 f5 16.e1 f4 17.g4 g5 (or 17...h5 18.e8 xc8 19.f3± Islam – Hasan Md, Dhaka 2005) 18.e3 f6 19.e8 xc8 xc8 20.f3 g6 21.e2 h5 22.f1 g4 23.e1± Henley – McCormell, Kenilworth 1990 and Black's kingside attack turned out to be totally ineffective without his light-squared bishop. Meanwhile, White's achievements on the opposite side of the board were quite obvious. He had the control over the only open b-file.

After 10...c6, the natural move for White is 11.db3!?↑ (The knight on d2 hampers the development of his queenside initiative considerably. 11.e1 cxd5 12.db5 db6 13.cxd5 a6 14.fc3 d7 15.a4 c8 16.cbd3 c7 17.db2 h6! 18.f1 xd2 19.0xd2 c4 20.c2 db2 21.bxb2 wb6= Amorim – Rocha, corr. 1990. The move 11.a4 has an only drawback and that is the change of the pawn-structure on the queenside is detrimental to White: 11...a5 12.bxa5 xa5 13.fc2 c5. Well, he can develop his initiative there even then, for example: 14.db5 a6 15.db3 wb8 16.db3 f5 17.f3 f4 18.fc2 h5 19.fb1 g5 20.a5! Pelts – R.Byrne, Chicago 1994, threatening 21.db6.), but for some strange reason it is regularly overlooked as a resource from the White players.

Black has also tested 10...h6. White can counter that with the aggressive move – 11.c5! (He has tried in practice too the calmer line: 11.db3 xc1 12.xc1 f5 and here after the trade of the dark-squared bishops he can inflict the typical counter strike in the centre: 13.f4! exf4 14.xf4 xf4 15.xf4 ef6 16.f4↑ D.Yanofsky – Krstic, Siegen 1970.) 11...f5 (After: 11...dxc5 12.bxc5 dbxc5 13.db3 dbd7 14.db4, White has a promising initiative for the pawn, Sinkovics – Willumsen, Copenhagen 1988.) 12.db5! db6 (or 12...dxc5 13.db3 dbxc5 14.db3 with a compensation for White) 13.db7! dbd2 (or 13...wxc7 14.cxd6 wxe6 15.db4±) 14.cxd6! wxe6 (or 14...db4 15.db7 wxe7 16.db8+-) 15.db5 db8 (or 15...db4 16.db3 wb2 17.db7±) 18.dbd2 dbxe4 (As a result of: 16...a6 17.db3 fx4 18.db5!, in case of: 18.db7 19.db dbg8 20.dbxe4+– Epishin – Uhlmann, Frankfurt 1990, as well as following: 18...f5 19.db7 db2 20.dbxe4+–.
d6 \( \Box c6 \) 21.\( \Box x e 4 + - \), Black’s position becomes immediately hopeless.) 17.\( \Box h 6 \pm \) and Black must give up the exchange, because White’s threat – 18.d6 is extremely unpleasant for him.

11.bxa5!

We will have to deal numerous times with the problem for White – how to treat in analogous positions (see 9...a5 and 9...\( \Box h 5 \) 10.\( \Box e 1 \) a5) his queenside pawns? Should he exchange on a5, or he should better protect his b4-pawn with his bishop? There is not an absolute automatic answer to that question. White’s decision depends as a rule on the details of every particular position. Now, it is better to capture on a5. This enables White to remove his knight from the d2-square with a tempo, because it is not so well placed there. The other possibility for him – 11.\( \Box a 3 \) axb4 12.\( \Box x b 4 \) f5 13.a4 \( \Box h 6 \pm \), presents Black with some counterplay.

11...\( \Box x a 5 \)

White is now threatening to protect his a5-pawn with the move \( \Box b 3 \) and Black’s decision to restore the material balance seems to be practically obligatory. Still, he has tried to play in another fashion in some games.

The attempt to block White’s play on the dark squares by trading the dark-squared bishops with: 11...\( \Box h 6 \) 12.\( \Box b 3 \) \( \Box c 1 \) 13.\( \Box x c 1 \) f5 is evidently insufficient, mostly because of 14.c5!? (The less ambitious line for White: 14.\( \Box d 2 \) \( \Box g 7 \) 15.\( \Box e 5 \) \( \Box x f 5 \) 16.\( \Box e 4 \) \( \Box f 6 \) 17.\( \Box x f 6 \) \( \Box x f 6 \) 18.c5\( \pm \), also led to an advantage for him in the game Kirusha – Yezersky, St Petersburg 2000.) 14...\( \Box x c 5 \) (After 14...\( \Box x c 5 \) 15.\( \Box x c 5 \) \( \Box x c 5 \) 16.\( \Box c 4 \) \( \Box h 8 \), it is very strong for White to break in the centre with the standard resource: 17.f4! \( \Box x f 4 \) 18.e5 \( \Box x a 5 \) 19.\( \Box x f 4 \pm \) 15.d6 \( \Box x d 6 \) \( \pm \) and Black’s blockade crumbles, while his pieces are deployed tremendously passively.

Black’s position is quite dubious too after: 11...\( \Box c 5 \) 12.\( \Box b 3 \) \( \Box a 6 \) (or 12...c6?? 13.\( \Box x c 5 \) \( \Box x c 5 \) 14.d6++ Elmasi – Rosin, Trave-muende 2004) 13.\( \Box e 3 \)\( \pm \). He can hardly prevent White’s pawn-advance – c4-c5.

If Black really wishes to block the queenside, then he can try another interesting version of that idea: 11...f5 12.\( \Box b 3 \) \( \Box f 6 \) (Black’s position is just terrible after: 12...f4 13.a4 \( \Box f 6 \) 14.\( \Box a 3 \) g5 15.c5 \( \Box g 6 \) 16.\( \Box x d 6 \) \( \Box x d 6 \) 17.\( \Box b 5 \)++ Foucaud – Huisman, Sautron 1999; while in case of: 12...\( \Box h 8 \) 13.f3 \( \Box g 8 \) 14.\( \Box c 2 \), after: 14...\( \Box h 6 \) 15.\( \Box x h 6 \) \( \Box x h 6 \) 16.f4!? \( \Box x f 4 \) 17.\( \Box x f 4 \) g5 18.

12.Kb3

This is the most precise move for White. He improves the placement of his pieces prior to advancing his a-pawn forward. Instead, it is less precise for him to play 12.a4, because besides: 12...f5 13.Kb3 Kd8 14.f3, which transposes to variation b, Black has the additional possibility to try – 12...Kc5?!∞.

12...Ka8 13.a4

The further White advances his a-pawn, the harder Black's task to organize his defence on the queenside becomes. We would not like to draw your attention to the other popular possibility for White here – 13.Ke3, at least because after 13...b6 (It is worth mentioning that Black's other alternative: 13...f5 14.f3 Kf6?!, is objectively not so advantageous for him at all, because of the line: 15.c5! f4 16.Kf2 g5 17.a4 h5 18.a5±, but it leads to a very sharp play, in which the target of the black pieces will be – White's king...) 14.a4 f5 15.f3 Ke5 16.a5 and it all ends in a transposition to the variation b3.

Now, we will deal in details with two possibilities for Black: a) 13...b6 and b) 13...f5. Black can try to parry White's queenside offensive with the help of the move 13...Kc5?! too, but that is
clearly unfavourable for him due to: 14.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{x}c5 \text{dxc}5 15.a5= and his c5-pawn becomes quite vulnerable.

a) 13...b6
Black is trying to prevent the advance of White’s pawns to the a5 and c5-squares.

\[\text{Diagram}\]

14.a5
Black’s blockade turns out to be unreliable. White overcomes easily Black’s queenside defensive fortress.

14...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}6\)
The position is already quite difficult for Black. His problems are even greater, because of the fact that after: 14...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}5\) 15.axb6 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{x}a\)1, White has the important intermediate move: 16.bxc7! \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xc}7\) 17.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xa}1\).\+

The same tactical nuance works too after: 14...f5 15.axb6 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{x}a\)1 (The capture: 15...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb}6\) 16.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xa}8\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{x}a\)8 17.f3 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d}7\), enables Black to avoid material losses, but his queenside ends up in ruins anyway after: 18.c5! dxc5 19.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{x}c5\)= Voelgel – Doskocil, Austria 1995.) 16.bxc7! \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xc}7\) 17.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xa}1\).

Black hopes to preserve the control over the c5-square, but that task seems to be rather difficult to accomplish successfully. 17...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}5\) (In case of: 17...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}6\) 18.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}3\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}5\) 19.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{b}3\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{b}7\) 20.c5 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xe}2\), Wichmann – Breitfeld, Leipzig 1998, it is quite strong for White to continue with: 21.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xe}2\) dxc5 22.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{x}c5\)! dxc5 23.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}4\)=! \(+\)– 18.f3 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xe}4\) 19.fxe4 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}7\)+ 20.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{h}1\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xa}1\).

The material balance has been restored, but White has seized the initiative completely. 21.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{b}5\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}6\) 22.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}3\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d}8\), Juettner – Schmiedbauer, Bayern 1998 and here it is very good for White to follow with: 23.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}1\) h6 24.c5 fxe4 25.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}4\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}8\) 26.c6=\+.

The exchange of pawns after 14...bxa5 15.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xa}5\) only enhances the activity of White’s pieces. 15...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{b}8\) (Black has no time to play 15...f5, in view of the line: 16.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}6\)! \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xa}1\) 17.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xd}8\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d}8\) 18.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}2\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}5\) 19.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{g}5\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xf}1\)+ 20.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xf}1\)= Ledger – Scopes, London 1995; he can try to parry that threat with: 15...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{e}8\), but that attempt fails after: 16.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{b}5\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{b}8\) 17.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xc}7\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d}8\) 18.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{b}5\)= L.Mueller – Habibi, Lenk 1990; after 15...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}6\) 16.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{e}3\) f5 17.f3 f4 18.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f}2\) g5, it is again very strong for White to continue with: 19.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c}6!\?\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xc}6\) 20.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xc}6\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f}6\) 21.c5 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xe}2\) 22.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xe}2\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}1\) 23.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}1\)= Soffer – Barash, Kfar Sava 1993.) 16.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{e}3\) f5 17.f3 h5 (or 17...f4 18.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}7\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}8\) 19.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f}2\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f}6\) 20.c5 g5 21.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d}2\)= Fochtler – Matzdorf, Wuerttemberg 1995) 18.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d}2\) f4 19.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}7\) \(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a}8\).
Now, White can proceed with his total queenside space expansion with the line: 20.\textit{\&e6?!} \textit{\&xc6} 21. \textit{\textit{\&xc6} \textit{\&f6}, Soffer – Romm, Haifa 1993, followed by 22.c5±. It is too passive for Black to try: 14...\textit{\&b8} 15.axb6 \textit{\textit{\&xb6} 16.\textit{\&b5\textit{\textit{\&c5}, because he cannot solve any of his problems in that fashion. White opens files on the queenside with: 17.\textit{\&xc5!} \textit{\textit{\&xc5} 18.\textit{\&d2 f5 19.f3 h5 20.\textit{\textit{\&a7 \textit{\textit{\&b7} 21.\textit{\textit{\&a4± Eberhard – Mittermayr, Werfen 1996 and that provides him with an overwhelming advantage. It is worth mentioning that in similar positions one of the main reasons for Black’s mishaps is the unfavourable placement of his knight on the e7-square. The game develops in more or less the same way after: 14...\textit{\&b7 15.\textit{\textit{\&e3\textit{\textit{\&c5 (After 15...f5 16.f3 \textit{\textit{\&c5 17.\textit{\textit{\&c2 \textit{\textit{\&d7} 18.\textit{\textit{\&fb1 \textit{\textit{\&fb8, common sense indicates that the exchange of the knights – 19.\textit{\textit{\&xc5!, should not be good for White, because of 19...\textit{\textit{\&xc5, but that is an exceptional case. In fact, White’s a-pawn is just triumphant in its way forward to promotion: 20.a6! \textit{\textit{\&c8 21.\textit{\textit{\&xb8 \textit{\textit{\&xb8} 22.a7 \textit{\textit{\&a8} 23. \textit{\textit{\&b3 c6 24.\textit{\textit{\&b8+– Goletiani – Chow, Chicago 2005.) 16.\textit{\textit{\&e2 f5 17.axb6 \textit{\textit{\&xb6} 18.\textit{\textit{\&xa8 \textit{\textit{\&xa8} 19.f3 fxe4 20.fxe4 \textit{\textit{\&xf1} 21.\textit{\textit{\&xf1 \textit{\textit{\&b7} 22.\textit{\textit{\&xc5 \textit{\textit{\&xc5, Black suffers again, due to his miserable knight on the e7-square – 23.\textit{\textit{\&a4 \textit{\textit{\&f6 (23...\textit{\textit{\&f7 24.\textit{\textit{\&a7 \textit{\textit{\&d7} 25.\textit{\textit{\&b5 \textit{\textit{\&c8} 26.\textit{\textit{\&b8± W.Schmidt – Atanasov, Leipzig 1973.) 24.\textit{\textit{\&a7 \textit{\textit{\&a8} 25.\textit{\textit{\&b6 \textit{\textit{\&c8} 26.\textit{\textit{\&c7 \textit{\textit{\&a6} 27.\textit{\textit{\&b5± W.Schmidt – Drozd, Zielona Gora 1974. 15.\textit{\textit{\&e3} White has achieved a lot on the queenside indeed, but he must still play rather accurately. For example, he should not remove his bishop away from the c1-h6 diagonal in order to increase his queenside pressure. That might present Black with a chance to organize some counterplay: 15.\textit{\textit{\&a3?! \textit{\textit{\&c5} 16.\textit{\textit{\&b4 f5 17.\textit{\textit{\&d2 \textit{\textit{\&h6± Duong – Phung Nguyen, Brunei 2003. 15...f5 If 15...\textit{\textit{\&c5, then it is good for White to follow with: 16.axb6 \textit{\textit{\&xb6} 17.\textit{\textit{\&c2±. 16.f3 f4 Black’s position is quite difficult too after: 16...\textit{\textit{\&f7 17.\textit{\textit{\&c2 \textit{\textit{\&c5 18.\textit{\textit{\&fb1 \textit{\textit{\&c8} 19.a2 fxe4 20.\textit{\textit{\&xe4 \textit{\textit{\&xe4} 21.fxe4± L.Szabo – Penrose, Leipzig 1960. He has no counterplay on the kingside at all, while White’s initiative is just overwhelming on the queenside. 17.\textit{\textit{\&f2 g5 18.a3 \textit{\textit{\&c5} 19. \textit{\textit{\&c2 \textit{\textit{\&c8 White’s game seems to be quite easy and simple, but still he must calculate the lines precisely to the end. It would not work for Black to play: 19...\textit{\textit{\&xb3 20.\textit{\textit{\&xb3} bxa5 21.\textit{\textit{\&xa5 \textit{\textit{\&xc4} (or 21...c5 22.\textit{\textit{\&b4 \textit{\textit{\&b7} 23.\textit{\textit{\&xa8 \textit{\textit{\&xa8} 24.\textit{\textit{\&a7±), in view of: 22.\textit{\textit{\&xa8 \textit{\textit{\&xb3} 23.\textit{\textit{\&xd8 \textit{\textit{\&xd8} 24.\textit{\textit{\&b1 \textit{\textit{\&b8} 25.\textit{\textit{\&d1+ and}
his light-squared bishop gets trapped.

\[ 9.b4 \text{ d7 10. d2} \]

\[ 20. \text{ f6a1 } \text{ xb3 21. } \text{ xxb3 } \text{ xxa5 22. } \text{ xxa5 } \text{ bxa5 23. c5 } \text{ h8 24. } \text{ b8 } \text{ g8 25. } \text{ xxa5} \text{± B. Arkhangeisky – Chehlov, Rowy 2000. White has accomplished everything he has dreamed about out of the opening. He has opened files on the queenside and he has penetrated his opponent’s camp along them.} \]

\[ \text{ b) 13...f5} \]

Black has not made up his mind yet – how to defend his queenside, but he wishes to set forth his kingside aggression first.

\[ 14.f3 \]

That is the most natural line for White. He tries sometimes in practice the line 14.a5 too. Indeed, the advance of his a-pawn usually facilitates his queenside achievements. Still, here you must have in mind some tactical nuance. After: 14...f6 15.f3, Black has the possibility to follow with: 15...c5!? The pawn-structure, which arises after 16.\text{xc2} (In case of: 16.dxc6 bxc6 17.\text{a3} c5\text{∞}, Black has some promising counterplay connected with the maneuver – \text{c6-d4.} ) 16...\text{a6} (The exchange of the pawns after: 16...\text{xe4}?! 17.\text{xe4} \text{d7} 18.\text{b5} \text{a6} 19.\text{e3}?, deprived Black of any chances to attack his opponent’s kingside; meanwhile White had the possibility to break through on the queenside with the help of the standard piece-sacrifice – 20.\text{xd6} in the game Grigore – Vajda, Bucharest 1998.) makes it really hard for White to break Black’s queenside defence.

Now, it is worth analyzing in details the lines: \[ \text{ b1) 14...h8, b2) 14...f4 and b3) 14...b6.} \]

The other possibilities for Black are either evidently weaker, or they have been played only very seldom. For example, after: 14...\text{xe4} 15.\text{xe4} \text{xf1+} 16.\text{xf1} \text{g6 17.c5 g4 18.\text{c2}} \text{h5 19.g3} \text{f6 20.e3} \text{h5 21.h3} \text{d7 22.cxd6} \text{cxd6 23.d2 c8 24.h2} \text{h7 25.b3}, Black was doomed to a very laborious defence without any counterplay on the kingside at all, Gustafsson – Klemm, Germany 1992.
Chapter 12

Black fails to block the game on the queenside with the move 14...c5. Following: 15.dxc6 bxc6 (After: 15...dx6, Kucheyda – Kleinegger, Ruhrgebiet 2004, 16. \xe3\pm – Black’s d6-pawn is extremely vulnerable.) 16.a3 fxe4 17.fxe4 \xf1+ 18.\xf1 \xb6+ 19.c5 dxc5 20.\xe4+ \xc6 21.a5 \xc7 22.\xd3 Okumara – Guimaraes, Brazil 1999, the position is opened to White’s complete satisfaction.

In case Black wishes to block the position, it deserves attention for him to try 14...\xc5, but even here after: 15.dxc5 dx5 16.e3 b6 17.a5 \xc7 (or 17...\xa6? 18.axb6 cxb6 19.d6! \xc6 20.\xd5+ \xf7 21.\xc6 \xb7 22.\xa8 -- O’Kelly – Jimenez Zerquera, Leipzig 1960) 18.\xb3 \xc8 19.axb6 \xa1 20.\xa1 cxb6 21.\xb1 White maintains an obvious advantage, Sjogren – Schultz, Ronneby 1998. Black’s b6-pawn is so weak that his knight cannot occupy the wonderful blocking d6-square because of that.

The other possible route for Black’s knight – 14...\xf6, enables White to play – 15.c5. Black brings an additional battle unit to the kingside indeed, but that weakens his queenside defence at the same time. There might follow: 15...f4 (In case of: 15...h6 16.cxd6 cxd6 17.e3 g5 18.d2 \g6 19.e4 fxe4 20.e4 e4 21.e4 f4 22.e3 \xf6 23.\xb6 \xb8 24.e8 \xc8 25.g3 \g6 26.\xb3 Nill – Konik, Griesheim 1998; or 15...

\d7 16.a5 \xc8 17.\xc2 \xf7 18.cxd6 cxd6 19.\b5 \xb5 20.\xb5 \xc7 21.\xe2 \h5 22.\xe3 \f4 23.\d2+ Dokhoian – Heyme, Germany 1992, Black loses completely his control over the light squares; 15...\h8 16.a5 \e8 17.\c3 \g8 18.\e2 \gf6 19.\b5 \f7 20.\d2 f4 21.\f2 d7 22.\b1+ Nemet – Schlenker, Velp 1978 and White has the rather unpleasant threat – 23.\c4; while after: 15...\h5 16.cxd6 cxd6 17.a5 \h8 18.\c3 \g8, Bouton – Gik, Lausanne 1998, it seems very good for him to continue with: 19.\xb5 \f4 20.\xc1, threatening to penetrate to the c7-square.) 16.a5 h5 17.e3 g5 18.cxd6 cxd6 19.e4 (White can occupy the b6-square in another fashion too: 19.\e5 \e8 20.\b4 \h8 21.d2 \g8 22.\c4 Gezaljan – L.Gapenko, Leningrad 1990.) 19...g4 20.\b6 \a7 21.h1 g3 22.h3 \h7 23.e8 \xc8 24.\c3 \g5 25.\fc1 \f6 26.\ec2\pm Grigore – Jarmolinskaya, \ucharest 1995. White should not worry anymore about his defence on the kingside after the trade of the light-squared bishops.

b1) 14...\h8

Black’s knight on e7 is again hampering the rest of his pieces considerably. Now, he can try to redeploy it to the g8-square and later he can attempt to trade the dark-squared bishops. 15.\e3!

It seemed attractive for White
to follow with 15.a5, but then after 15...\textit{g}g8, he should have considered the possible exchange of the dark-squared bishops. He can try to prevent that with 16.\textit{e}e3 \textit{h}6 (It is obviously unfavourable for Black to follow with: 16...f4 17.\textit{f}2 g5 18.c5 \textit{xc}5 19.\textit{xc}5 dxc5 20.\textit{xc}5 \textit{f}6 21.\textit{b}3= Peckham – Blair, corr. 1996; after 16...\textit{gf}6 17.c5 \textit{h}5 18.cxd6 cxd6 19.\textit{b}5 \textit{df}6 20.\textit{b}6 \textit{e}7 21.\textit{c}7 \textit{b}8, White has a little combination at his disposal: 22.\textit{a}7!? \textit{xc}7 23.\textit{e}1! \textit{e}7 24.\textit{xb}8= and it led to the win of an exchange in the game Testor – Gottamm, Austria 2000.) 17.\textit{f}2, but then he must evaluate carefully the consequences of the variation: 17...fxe4!? 18.fxe4 \textit{xf}2! 19.\textit{xf}2 \textit{h}4+ 20.\textit{g}1 \textit{e}3+ 21.\textit{h}1, Schlapp – Bachmann, Germany 1995. Now, in case of: 21...\textit{f}4! 22.\textit{xf}4 \textit{xf}4 23.\textit{b}5 \textit{gf}6 24.\textit{xc}7 \textit{xe}4\textit{a}, the outcome of the battle would be extremely unclear...

15...\textit{g}8

That is the most straightforward line for Black. His attempt to assault directly his opponent’s kingside is bound to fail. White is obviously ahead of Black in the development of his queenside initiative. After: 15...f4 16.\textit{f}2 g5 17.c5 \textit{f}6 18.cxd6 cxd6 19.\textit{b}5 \textit{h}6 (In case of: 19...\textit{b}6 20.\textit{d}2 \textit{f}8 21.\textit{c}4 \textit{g}6 22.\textit{e}1 \textit{a}6 23.\textit{b}1 \textit{c}8 24.a5= Leitao – Cukier, Guarapuava 1992, Black fails to fortify his queenside in time...)

White can easily cope with Black’s threats along the h-file with the help of the line: 20.a5 (It is quite instructive what might happen after: 20.\textit{c}2?! \textit{e}8 21.\textit{fc}1 \textit{h}5 22.\textit{h}3 \textit{f}8 23.\textit{g}1 g4! 24.\textit{xf}4 \textit{x}g4= and Black organized a powerful kingside attack just like out of nowhere, Henrichsen – Carlsson, Copenhagen 1996.) 20...\textit{e}8 21.\textit{h}1! \textit{h}5 22.\textit{g}1=.

It is useless for Black to try 15...\textit{f}7. White simply continues with his plan in that case: 16.c5 dxc5 17.\textit{xc}5 \textit{xc}5 18.\textit{xc}5 \textit{d}7 19.\textit{b}3 \textit{c}8 20.\textit{fd}1 Kaabi – Jiravorasuk, Manila 1992.

About 15...\textit{b}6 16.a5 see variation b3.

16.\textit{d}2

White prevents the move 16...\textit{h}6, by postponing for a move the pawn-advance – c4-c5.

17...\textit{df}6 17.c5 fxe4

Black’s defence is not becoming much easier after the trade of some pieces.

18.fxe4 \textit{g}4 19.\textit{xd}4 \textit{xd}4 20.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8

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21.a5 \[d7\], Kopjonkin – Petkevich, Voronezh 1997. After: 22. cxd6 cxd6 (or \[xd6\] 23.\[c5\]) 23.\[a4\] and White’s knight is headed for the b6-square.

b2) 14...f4

This idea can also be tried by Black. He wishes to prevent the appearance of White’s bishop on the a7-g1 diagonal, since it supports quite effectively from there his pawn-expansion with c4-c5 on the queenside.

15.a5

There arises only a transposition after: 15.\[a3\] b6 16.a5 (In case of: 16.\[b4\] \[c5\] 17.a5\], White can also rely on obtaining some edge, but still the placement of his bishop on the b4-square is less comfortable.).

15...b6

If Black allows his opponent to push c4-c5, then his position can become quite difficult rather quickly. See some examples: 15...g5 16.\[a3\] \[f6\] (or 16... \[g6\] 17.c5 dxc5 18.\[xc5\] \[xc5\] 19.\[xc5\] \[e8\] 20.\[b5\] \[d7\] 21.\[b3\]± Vilela – Lopez Perez, Albacete 2002) 17.c5 dxc5 (After: 17...\[h6\] 18.\[b5\] \[f8\] 19.\[f2\] dxc5 20.\[xc5\] \[h8\], the simple tactical strike – 21.\[xc7\]+++—, ended up essentially the fight in the game Beelby – D.Lee, Pasadena 1992.) 18.\[xc5\] \[xc5\] 19.\[xc5\] \[f8\] 20.\[b3\] \[h8\] 21.\[db5\] \[d7\] 22. \[bc1\] b6 23.axb6 cxb6 24.\[xa8\] \[xa8\] 25.\[c7\] \[d8\] 26.\[f2\]± Kasparov – V.Akopian, Moscow (simultan) 1986.

After: 15...\[f6\] 16.\[a3\] b6 17. axb6 cxb6 18.\[b4\] \[xa1\] 19.\[xa1\] \[c5\] 20.\[xc5\] dxc5 (or 20...\[xc5\] 21.\[a5\]|) 21.\[a3\] g5 22.\[b5\] \[f7\] 23.\[b2\] \[g6\] 24.\[a8\]±, White managed to penetrate with his pieces his opponent’s camp via the queenside in the game Fedorowicz – Przewoziak, Naleczow 1979.

16.\[a3\]

It looks like Black cannot reach complete equality either in case of: 16.axb6 \[xa1\] 17.\[xa1\] (Here, the intermediate move 17.bxc7??, analogously to what we had mentioned in variation a, would not work, because of: 17...\[xc7\] 18.\[xa1\] \[a7\]|, since following: 17...c6 (or 17...\[c6\] 18.\[b3\]) 18.dxc6 \[xb6\] 19.\[h1\] \[xc6\] 20.
\( \text{b5 ef6 21.} b3 \pm - \) Black's d6-pawn would need some additional protection.

16...\text{bxa5.} This move enables White to accomplish the thematic pawn-break \(- c4-c5. \) (It is more resilient for Black to defend with: 16...\text{c5} 17.axb6 cxb6 18.\text{wc2} \pm , but even then White's prospects are somewhat better mostly to his superior pawn-structure.) 17.\text{c5 a4, C} \text{.Rodriguez - B} \text{.Solera, Spain 1993 and here by playing: 18.} \text{b4} \dagger, \) White could have regained his pawn and he would have maintained his powerful positional pressure on the queenside.

\textbf{b3) 14...b6}

That idea is quite familiar to us from variation \textbf{a}. Still, the inclusion of the moves f7-f5 and f2-f3, introduces here some additional tactical nuances in that position.

15.\text{e3!}

In case White had played the move 15.a5 (analogously to variation \textbf{a}), then after: 15...\text{bxa5 16.} xxa5 (White would not achieve much with the line: 16.\text{xa5 } xxa5 17.xa5, due to: 17...c6! 18.xc6 xxc6 19.dxc6 \text{b6}+ 20.h1 xxc6 21.b5 fxe4 22.xd6 c5 23.e3 e6 24.xe4 and the opponents agreed to a draw in the game K.Tikkanen - Neuvonen, corr. 1986.), Black could have countered that with the resource: 16.c6! 17.dxc6, Ehrenfeucht - Stempin, Bydgoszcz 1980 (Here, in answer to 17.xc6?, Black has the possibility to check - 17...\text{b6}+ and White loses the exchange.) 17...\text{f6} 18.b3 xxa1 19.xa1 \text{b6}+ 20.h1 xxc6\text{c} and Black's counterplay is quite sufficient to maintain the balance in that position.

Now, Black must make up his mind where to deploy his knight - to the kingside with \textbf{b3a) 15...\text{c6}, or to the queenside with: \textbf{b3b) 15...\text{c5.} }

All his other possibilities are either clearly worse or they only lead to a transposition of moves.

For example, the move 15...h6\text{?}, seems to be just a loss of time. Now, after: 16.a5 bxa5 17.c5 g5 18.xa5, White easily breaks his opponent's defence on the
queenside. We will illustrate that thesis with some examples: 18...
\(\text{g6} \) (Following: 18...
\(\text{x}5 19.\ x5 \text{ dc5 } 20.\text{b}3 \text{ d6}, \) White settles the issue with the variation: 21.\text{b}5! \text{ c4 22.\text{xc}4 \text{ b}6+ 23.\text{h}1 \text{a}5 24.\text{d}6+ \text{h}8 25.\text{axe}7 \text{e}8 26.\text{xc}7 \text{exe}7 27.\text{a}8!+- 19.\text{c}2 \text{f}6 20.\text{ex}5 \text{f}4 21.\text{e}4 \text{exe}5 22.\text{c}6 \text{exe}2+ 23.\text{exe}2 \text{a}1 24.\text{c}e7+ \text{h}8 25.\text{xf}5+- \text{Chuchelov} – \text{Roblet}, \text{France 1998.}

The move 15...\text{h}8, would not help Black either. The redeployment of his pieces seems to be too slow, while his queenside is the juicy target of White’s onslaught. After: 16.a5 \text{g}8 (Or 16...f4 17.\text{f}2 \text{c}5 18.\text{b}5 \text{g}5 19.\text{c}e2 \text{h}5 20.axb6 \text{xa}1 21.\text{xa}1 \text{xb}6 22.\text{a}8 \text{d}7 23.\text{a}7 \text{dd}8 24.\text{xc}5 \text{xc}5 25.\text{e}1 \text{g}6 26.\text{a}5 \text{f}6 27.\text{c}7+- \text{Kjeldsen – F.Hansen, \text{Tonder 1993; 16...b}8 17.axb6 \text{xb}6 18.\text{b}5 \text{f}6 19.\text{a}1 20.\text{xa}1 \text{eb}6 17.\text{axb}6 \text{xa}1 18.\text{xa}1 \text{eb}6 19.\text{a}7! \) (It would be quite sufficient for White to just hesitate a bit and Black’s pieces might spring into action: 20.\text{d}3 \text{h}6 20.\text{f}2 \text{c}5 21.\text{xc}5 \text{xc}5 22.\text{b}1 \text{d}2 23.\text{b}5 \text{exe}4 24.\text{exe}4 \text{f}6 25.\text{d}3 \text{h}5\text{Montousse – Viejo, Spain 1999.}) 19.\text{h}6 20.\text{f}2 \text{g}6 21.\text{b}5 \text{exe}4 22.\text{xd}6 \text{exe}3 23.\text{xf}3 \text{e}4, \text{Danschczyk – Rother, \text{Germany 1991,} the move 24.\text{c}2!+, would have guaranteed an overwhelming advantage for White.

The line 15...f4, after: 16.\text{f}2 \text{f}6 (In case of: 16...\text{e}8 17.a5 \text{bxa}5 18.\text{xa}5 \text{xa}5 19.\text{b}5 \text{a}6 20.c5 \text{xc}5 21.\text{xc}5 \text{exe}2 22.\text{exe}2 \text{dc}5 23.\text{c}4 \text{f}7 24.\text{xc}5\text{I.Kiss} – \text{Ferencz, corr. 1999, White is clearly better; while about: 16...\text{h}8 17.a5, see 15...\text{h}8 16.a5 \text{f}4 17.\text{f}2; if 16...\text{c}5, then 17.a5 – see 15...\text{c}5, variation \text{b}3\text{b}; after 16...g5, or 16...h5, White obtains an excellent game with the help of the line: 17.a5 \text{bxa}5 18.\text{c}5\text{I.17.a5 bxa}5 18.\text{c}5! and all that leads by a transposition of moves to variation \text{b}3\text{a} (see 15...\text{f}6). I would also like to mention that instead of White’s last move, it is weaker for him to play: 18.\text{xa}5?! \text{xa}5 19.\text{d}5, because of 19...c5! and Black manages to get rid of his passive knight on the c7-square – 20.\text{c}6 \text{d}7 21.\text{c}5 \text{e}8 22.\text{exe}7+ \text{exe}7 23.\text{a}4 \text{h}5 24.\text{a}7 \text{xa}7 25.\text{xa}7 \text{d}7 26.\text{b}1 \text{g}5 27.\text{b}7 \text{f}7 28.\text{e}1 \text{a}4 29.\text{xf}7 \text{xf}7\text{Frohbach – Borgdorf, \text{Muethen 1999.}}

In case of: 15...\text{f}xe4 16.\text{f}xe4 \text{c}5 17.a5 \text{xb}3 18.\text{xb}3, the best that Black can do is to play: 18...\text{xf}1+ 19.\text{xf}1 and to transpose to variation \text{b}3\text{b}. The careless move – 18...\text{bxa}5?! after 19.c5 \text{d}7, in the game Bonin – Boudreaux, \text{Parsippany 2003, could have led to much greater difficulties for Black after: 20.\text{xf}8+ \text{xe}8 21.c6 \text{c}8 22.\text{a}3 \text{h}8 (or 22...\text{d}8 23.\text{b}5 \text{a}4 24.\text{wb}4; 22...\text{h}6 23.\text{ex}6 \text{xe}6 24.\text{b}5\text{b}5 23.\text{b}5 \text{d}8 24.\text{c}3 \text{a}4 25.\text{b}4...}
b3a) 15...\(\text{f6}\)

Black is trying to organize a swift attack against White's king-side and he ignores completely the future of his queenside with his last move.

16.a5

That is a thematic pawn-advance for White. It leads unavoidably to opening of new files on the queenside and that is quite favourable for him.

16...\(\text{bxa5}\) 17.c5!

In case White captures the pawn with: 17.\(\text{bxa5}\)  \(\text{bxa5}\) 18.\(\text{dxa5}\) \(\text{fxe4}\) 19.\(\text{fxe4}\), he should be ready to cope with the powerful resource for Black – 19...c5!. The main drawback of the line: 20.\(\text{c6}\) \(\text{d7}\) 21.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{b7}\) 22.\(\text{exe7+}\) \(\text{exe7=}\) is that it enables Black to get rid of his passive knight on e7, Jobe – De Melo, corr. 1999.

The other possible capture for White – 17.\(\text{cxa5}\) is better. After: 17...c5!? 18.\(\text{c6}\) \(\text{xa1}\) (Black's defence is much more difficult with more pieces present on the board: 19...\(\text{xe8}\)! 20.\(\text{a7}\)! \(\text{f4}\) 21.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{g5}\) 22.\(\text{c5}\) \(\text{d7}\) 23.\(\text{xc8}\) \(\text{xc8}\) 24.\(\text{a6}\)\(=\) S.Kishnev – Jorgensen, Copenhagen 1991.) 19.\(\text{xa1}\) \(\text{c7}\) 20.\(\text{a7}\) \(\text{xa7}\) 21.\(\text{xa7}\) \(\text{d7}\) 22.\(\text{ab5}\) \(\text{c8}\) 23.\(\text{a1}\)\(=\) and White maintained some edge in the game Antunac – Martinovic, Dravograd 1963.

17...f4

Black’s position would not become any easier to defend if he refrains from the advance of his f-pawn. He has so many weaknesses on the queenside that White penetrates his camp easily and that process is quite difficult to contain: 17...\(\text{f7}\) 18.\(\text{a5}\) \(\text{f8}\) 19.\(\text{c6}\) \(\text{xa1}\) 20.\(\text{xd8}\) \(\text{xd1}\) 21.\(\text{xd1}\) \(\text{g7}\) 22.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{d7}\) (or 22...\(\text{e8}\) 23.\(\text{a4-}\) 23.\(\text{c6}\) \(\text{c5}\) 24.\(\text{f6-}\) Ilundain – Nualart, Spain 1991.

Black’s position remains quite dubious too after: 17...\(\text{a4}\) 18.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{h5}\) 19.\(\text{xa4}\) \(\text{xa4}\) 20.\(\text{xa5}\) \(\text{f4}\) 21.\(\text{a6}\) \(\text{exe4}\) 22.\(\text{exe4}\) \(\text{h6}\) 23.\(\text{h1}\)\(=\) Skalkotas – Escondillas, Skopje 1972.

In case of: 17...\(\text{h8}\) 18.\(\text{xa5}\) \(\text{xa5}\) 19.\(\text{xa5}\) \(\text{e8}\) 20.\(\text{c6}\) \(\text{d7}\), Nocke – Lehmann, Germany 1993, it deserves attention for White to prevent the appearance of Black’s bishop on the h6-square with the line: 21.\(\text{c1}\)\(=\)? \(\text{exe4}\) 22.\(\text{exe4}\) \(\text{g4}\) 23.\(\text{xf8}\) \(\text{xf8}\) 24.\(\text{g5}\)\(=\).

18.\(\text{f2}\) \(\text{a6}\)

Capturing 18...\(\text{dxc5}\), only worsens Black's situation on the queenside: 19.\(\text{xa5}\) \(\text{d7}\) 20.\(\text{xc5}\) \(\text{e8}\) 21.\(\text{b3}\) \(\text{h8}\) 22.\(\text{b7}\) \(\text{b8}\) 23.\(\text{a7-}\) Plachkinova – Carretero, Salou 2000.
Chapter 12

After: 18...a4 19.\(\text{Q}\)d2 g5 20.\(\text{Q}\)xa4 \(\text{Q}\)xa4 21.\(\text{Q}\)xa4 h5 22.\(\text{Q}\)c4 g4 23.cxd6 cxd6 24.\(\text{Q}\)b6 \(\text{Q}\)e8, Hrubant – Klein, Mlada Boleslav 1995, it is very strong for White to follow with 25.\(\text{Q}\)b4+- and the base of Black’s pawn-chain (the d6-pawn) is destroyed.

The line: 18...g5 19.\(\text{Q}\)xa5 \(\text{Q}\)xa5 20.\(\text{Q}\)xa5 h5 21.\(\text{Q}\)b3! is quite instructive. White’s position is superior; nevertheless he must play attentively. (After: 21.c6 g4 22.\(\text{Q}\)b7 \(\text{Q}\)e8, the natural move for White – 23.\(\text{Q}\)b5?, turned out to be a mistake, because of 23...gxf3! and here, following: 24.gxf3 \(\text{Q}\)h3\#, he lost the exchange in the game Schaufelberger – Isler, Biel 2000, while in case of: 24.\(\text{Q}\)xf3 \(\text{Q}\)xb7 25.cxb7 \(\text{Q}\)xb5 26.\(\text{Q}\)b1 c6\#, the placement of Black’s knight on b5 turns out to be very bad for him.) 21...\(\text{Q}\)f7 22.\(\text{Q}\)b7 \(\text{Q}\)xb7 23.\(\text{Q}\)xb7 \(\text{Q}\)g6 24.\(\text{Q}\)a1 \(\text{Q}\)f8 25.\(\text{Q}\)a8 \(\text{Q}\)e7 26.\(\text{Q}\)b5 dxc5 27.\(\text{Q}\)c4 \(\text{Q}\)h7 28.\(\text{Q}\)c8 \(\text{Q}\)e8 29.\(\text{Q}\)b8+- Charushin – Molnar, corr. 1989.

19.c6

White could have concentrated on the attack of his opponent’s d6-pawn: 19.\(\text{Q}\)xa5 \(\text{Q}\)xe2 20.\(\text{Q}\)xe2 g5 21.cxd6 cxd6 22.\(\text{Q}\)c4 \(\text{Q}\)xa1 23.\(\text{Q}\)xa1\# Bakalarczyk – Reese, Naumburg 2002.

19...\(\text{Q}\)b8

(diagram)

20.\(\text{Q}\)xa6 \(\text{Q}\)xa6 21.\(\text{Q}\)c2 \(\text{Q}\)b4 22.\(\text{Q}\)a4 \(\text{Q}\)b8 23.\(\text{Q}\)fa1\# Trnota – Zacek, Czech Republic 1996. Black’s extra a5-pawn is about to be annihilated in a couple of moves. Then his c7-pawn will be doomed too. Black will have great problems to protect it if he plans some active kingside operations at the same time...

b3b) 15...\(\text{Q}\)c5

Black is trying first to fortify his queenside with his last move.

16.a5

It is typically premature for White to opt here for 16.\(\text{Q}\)xc5?! After 16...bxc5!, Black will not let his opponent’s passed a-pawn further than the a5-square and he will preserve his possibility to organize some active counterplay on the kingside: 17.\(\text{Q}\)b5 f4 18.\(\text{Q}\)d2 g5 19.\(\text{Q}\)e1 \(\text{Q}\)f7 20.\(\text{Q}\)a5 \(\text{Q}\)g6 21.\(\text{Q}\)d2 h5 22.h3 \(\text{Q}\)f8 23.\(\text{Q}\)b1 \(\text{Q}\)h7 24.\(\text{Q}\)a2 g4\# Chestnova – Cheremnova,

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Dagomys 2004.

16...fxe4

Black is trying to gradually equalize by simplifying the position.

In case of: 16...f4 17...f2 g5 18...c2 h5 19.axb6 axa1 20.exa1 cxb6 21...a8 wd7 22...b5 b7 23...a7 c8 24...a3±, his pieces will be occupied with the defence of the weaknesses on the queenside, Panno – Granda Zuniga, Buenos Aires 1993. He would simply have no time to regroup his forces to the kingside.

After 16...h8 17.axb6 axa1 18...xa1 cxb6 19...b3 (White can try to deploy his knight to the c6-square, but then the game becomes much more forced: 19...c2 d7 20...a1 c8 21...b4 f6 22...c6 bxc6 23.dxc6 e7∞ A.Rychagov – Becerra Rivero, Internet 2003.) 19...g8 20...xc5 bxc5, I.Akimov – Giri, St Petersburg 2005 and here White had to play the move – 21...d2!± in order to prevent the appearance of Black’s knight on the h6-square.

Now, just like in the previous line, after: 16...d7 17.axb6 axa1 18...xa1 cxb6 19...c2 c8 20...b3 wh4 21...xc5 bxc5, Emberger – Kotz, Austria 1996, White had to continue with 22...d2±, precluding Black’s bishop from coming to h6.

White maintains his initiative too, in case of: 16...xb3 17...xb3 bxa5 (The exchange of the rooks after: 17...xa5 18...xa5 bxa5 19.c5 fxe4 20.fxe4 xf1+ 21.xf1 f8, J.Johansson – Saastamoinen, Jyvaskyla 1996, enables White to penetrate with his queen into Black’s camp: 22...b8 h6 23...f2 wd8 24...b5±) with 18.c5! (A.Beliavsky).

17.fxe4 xf1+ 18...xf1

18...xb3

It can hardly be good for Black to follow here with 18...f8?!; Husari – Naiditsch, Paks 1998, because after 19...b5!?, it becomes clear that he has problems protecting his c7-pawn and the natural move – 19...d8, can be countered by White with: 20.axb6 axa1 21.bxc7!+–.

In case of 18...d7, White can continue with: 19...xc5! bxc5 20. a6! and his a-pawn manages to advance further than the critical a6-square.

19...xb3 bxa5

About 19...xa5 20...xa5 bxa5 21.c5 – see 16...xb3 17...xb3 ...xa5 18...xa5 bxa5 19.c5 fxe4 20.fxe4 xf1+ 21...xf1.

Black has also tried in practice the line: 19...h8 20...b5 g8 21...c3 f6 (or 21...bxa5 22...xa5
\( \text{\texttt{\textbackslash x}a5} \) 23.\texttt{\textbackslash x}a5 \texttt{\textbackslash f}6 24.\texttt{\textbackslash w}a8! \texttt{\textbackslash g}4 25.\texttt{\textbackslash d}d2 \texttt{\textbackslash w}f8 26.\texttt{\textbackslash a}e2= \text{A.Huzman}) 22.axb6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}a1 (or 22...\texttt{\textbackslash o}xe4? 23.\texttt{\textbackslash x}a8 \texttt{\textbackslash o}xc3 24.b7+...) 23.\texttt{\textbackslash w}xa1 \texttt{\textbackslash c}xb6 (If 23...\texttt{\textbackslash o}g4, then 24.\texttt{\textbackslash w}a3! and here Black loses after: 24...\texttt{\textbackslash o}xe3 25.bxc7 \texttt{\textbackslash w}g5 26.\texttt{\textbackslash w}a8 \texttt{\textbackslash g}4 27.\texttt{\textbackslash o}xd6+; as well as following: 24...\texttt{\textbackslash w}h4 25.h3 \texttt{\textbackslash o}xe3 26.\texttt{\textbackslash w}xe3 \texttt{\textbackslash o}h6 27.\texttt{\textbackslash w}f2+; or: 24...\texttt{\textbackslash c}xb6 25.\texttt{\textbackslash o}xd6 \texttt{\textbackslash g}8 26.\texttt{\textbackslash o}xc8+-) 24.\texttt{\textbackslash w}a8= Beliavsky – Xie Jun, Belgrade 2000 and Black’s situation is tremendously difficult because of the vulnerability of his pawns on d6 and b6.

20.\texttt{\textbackslash c}5 \texttt{\textbackslash o}h8 21.cxd6 cxd6

Black fails to free himself from the positional bind with the line: 21...\texttt{\textbackslash w}xd6 22.\texttt{\textbackslash h}a4 c6. Following: 23.\texttt{\textbackslash h}c5 \texttt{\textbackslash w}d8 24.d6=, White ends up with a dangerous passed pawn.

22.\texttt{\textbackslash a}b6 \texttt{\textbackslash d}7, Kettner – Brunsch, Hockenheim 1994. Now, White restores the material balance with: 23.\texttt{\textbackslash x}a5 \texttt{\textbackslash b}8 24.\texttt{\textbackslash a}4= and he obtains a superior position thanks to his more actively placed pieces.

Conclusion

We have analyzed in this chapter a variation in which Black disrupts his opponent’s harmonious pawn-chain on the queenside with the move a7-a5. We are going to encounter again a similar situation in our next chapters numerous times. The essential specific of this chapter is that White’s knight manages to go quickly to the b3-square via d2. It is important to understand that in the absence of White’s b-pawn and his opponent’s a-pawn, Black wishes to improve his pawn-structure on the queenside with the help of the move c7-c5. White’s knight, deployed on d2, in fact often facilitates the accomplishment of that idea for Black. In case he fails to push c7-c5, White’s plan is quite simple – he should prepare c4-c5. Meanwhile, the absence of Black’s pawn on a7 only makes that idea even more effective, because after the exchange of pawns on d6, the b6-square becomes available to White’s pieces. Should Black try to counter that idea with the move b7-b6, White can then push a2-a4-a5 and he can open additional files on the queenside. It then becomes extremely difficult for Black to parry the thrust of White’s kingside pawns and to organize at the same time some effective counterplay on the kingside.
Chapter 13  
1.\( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qf6} \) 2.\( \text{c4} \) g6 3.\( \text{Qc3} \) \( \text{Qg7} \) 4.\( \text{e4} \) d6 5.\( \text{d4} \) 0–0 6.\( \text{Qe2} \) e5 7.0–0 \( \text{Qc6} \) 8.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{Qe7} \) 9.\( \text{b4} \) \( \text{Qd7} \) 10.\( \text{Qd2} \) f5

\[ 
\text{Diagram: }
\]

11.\( \text{c5!} \)

White is trying hard to break through on the queenside ignoring the possible loss of a pawn.

Black has in principle two different approaches to the problems: to accept the pawn-sacrifice \textbf{a) 11...dxc5}, or to decline it \textbf{b) 11...Qf6}. It is understandable that he can refuse to accept the gift in various ways, but they all are weaker than variation \textbf{b} and as a result of that, they are only rarely played in practice.

We will discuss these seldom played lines, starting as usual with the moves, which compromise Black's position. The easiest way for Black to harm his queenside defence is by playing – 11...b6?!. White's reaction can be like that: 12.\( \text{cxd6} \) cxd6 13.\( \text{Qc4} \) \( \text{Qf6} \) 14.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{Qh8} \) 15.\( \text{Qa3} \) \( \text{Qeg8} \) 16.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{Qe8} \) 17.\( \text{b4} \) (He plans to enlarge the front of his queenside offensive and to accomplish the pawn-break a4-a5.) 17...a5 18.\( \text{Qa3} \) (White's advantage is overwhelming after: 18.\( \text{bxa6} \) \( \text{Qxa6} \) 19.\( \text{a4\pm} \) 18...\( \text{Qh6} \) 19.\( \text{Qe1} \) \( \text{Qb8} \) 20.\( \text{Qd3} \) f4 21.\( \text{Qa4} \) \( \text{Qf7} \). Now, White follows with the typical combination for these positions: 22.\( \text{Qaxb6} \) \( \text{Qxb6} \) 23.\( \text{Qxa5!} \) \( \text{Qf7} \) 24.\( \text{Qxb6} \) \( \text{Qxb6} \) 25.\( \text{Qxb6} \) \( \text{Qxb6} \) 26.\( \text{Qb4\pm} \) – Grzeskowski – Berta, corr. 1976.

I will mention here another very harmful move for Black – 11...a5?!. After White has managed to push c4-c5, Black’s attempt to undermine his opponent’s pawn-chain on the queenside in that fashion is like to try to extinguish fire with gasoline...After: 12.\( \text{cxd6} \) cxd6 13.\( \text{bxa5} \) \( \text{Qxa5} \) 14.\( \text{Qb5\uparrow} \) Fassl – Deutsch, Austria 1996, White’s knights are headed to attack the d6-pawn and the b6-square and Black’s is forced to a passive defence of his weaknesses, without any active prospects.

Black should better not push
Chapter 13

forward his f-pawn until White plays f2-f3. The answer – why? – to that question can be best seen in some fragments of the following two games: 11...f4?! 12...e4 (White has here another solution and it is even more brutal: 12.g4 f5 13.exc8 ecx8 14.f3 g5 15.c4 a6 16.a4 h5 17.a3 g4 18.b5 axb5 19.xb5 gxf3 20.gxf3± Villela – Villamor, Collado Villalba 2002.) 12..f6 13.a4 g4 (In case Black shows indifference – White creates pressure against the d6-pawn and he forces his opponent to remove his knight away from the f6-square, from where it supports the advance of Black's kingside pawns: 13..f7 14.a3 f8 15.b5 e8 16.a5 g5 17.b6 axb6 18.axb6 g6 19.bxc7 xc7 20.b5 wd8 21.b6 wb8 22.xc8 xc8 23.g4+– Spraggett – A.Jimenez, Seville 2000.) 14.b5 dxc5 (Black's knight on f6 cannot retreat now to e8, because of the loss of the g4-pawn.) 15.xc5 f3 (In case of: 15...h5 16.d6–, White breaks through in the centre with a decisive effect.) 16.gxf3 gxf3 17.xf3 h3 18.g2 xg2 19.xg2±. Black has no compensation for the pawn whatsoever.

We have already discussed what is in store for Black after: 11..h6 12.b5, when we were analyzing the move – 10..h6.

In case of 11..f7, White can make a good use of Black's order of moves in his favour after: 12.a3!? f6 13.f4 (In answer to: 13..e8 14.c4 f4, Maly – Siemes, Germany 1997, White plays 15.b5† and he prepares easily the swift march forward of his b-pawn all the way to the b6-square.) 14.c4 g5 15.b5 e8 16.b6 and White is clearly ahead of his opponent in the development of his initiative. White's breakthrough on the queenside is even more effective, because Black's knight remains rather misplaced on the e7-square. There might follow: 16..xb6 (Or 16..xb6 17.xd6 xd6 18.cxd6 g6 19.b5 d7 20.d7 and here after: 20..b8 21.b3 h5 22.e6 f6 23.ac1 f8 24.xc7 xe6 25.dxe6 xe6 26.ac4 xc4 27.xc4 f8 28.d5+– Niemela – Pakkanen, Helsinki 1993, the pin along the a2-g8 diagonal becomes decisive, while in case of: 20..c8 21.b3 f6 22.b5 f8 23.ac1 g4 24.xd7 xd7 25.e6– Karr – Maier, France 1999, White's pieces penetrate his opponent's camp with a disastrous effect.) 17.cxb6 cxb6 (or 17..c6 18.dxc6 xc6, Lohr – Siewert, Germany 2002, 19.xd6±) 18.b3 g6 (After 18..a6 19.ab1±, White's knight reaches the b6-square.) 19.ab1 (But not 19.cxb6?? xa3!–+) 19..h5 (Or 19..f8 20.cxb6 b8, Itturioz – Lorente, corr. 1991, 21.ac4±; in case of: 19..f8 20.cxb6 b8 21.c4 h5 22.ac1 f6 23.xc8 xc8 24.xc8 xc8 25.b6 d8 26.ac1± Duong – Bui Tuan, Vietnam 2004, Black's light squares...
are quite vulnerable.) 20.\( \textit{\text{\dd{b}6}} \) \( \textit{\text{\dd{b}8}} \) 21.\( \textit{\text{\dd{c}a4}} \) \( \textit{\text{\dd{f}8}} \) 22.\( \textit{\text{\dd{c}x\dd{c}8 \dd{w}c8}} \) 23.\( \textit{\text{\dd{f}c1 \dd{e}c7}} \) 24.\( \textit{\text{\dd{b}6 \dd{c}x\dd{c}1+}} \) 25.\( \textit{\text{\dd{c}x\dd{c}1 \dd{d}8}} \), Kostelný – Kubala, Slovakia 1998 and here the move \( 26.\textit{\text{\dd{b}5\dd{+}}} \) would have provided a stable advantage for White. It is worth mentioning here that it is essential for White to capture his opponent’s light-squared bishop in similar positions. That reduces considerably the effect of his pawn-offensive on the kingside. White solved that task successfully in the examples that we had quoted.

There are not many people left willing to try here – 11...\( \textit{\text{\dd{f}xe4}} \). The reason is that White establishes his knight on that outpost and it is extremely powerful there. After: 12.\( \textit{\text{\dd{d}xe4 \dd{f}6}} \) 13.\( \textit{\text{\dd{x}fx6+ \dd{x}fx6}} \) 14.\( \textit{\text{\dd{h}h6 \dd{g}7}} \) 15.\( \textit{\text{\dd{x}xg7 \dd{x}xg7}} \), Umansky – Zhelnin, USSR 1972, it seems quite attractive for White to play actively on the kingside, if you have in mind the exchange of the dark-squared bishops, which had taken place. 16.\( \textit{\text{\dd{f}4!}} \) \( \textit{\text{\dd{e}x\dd{f}4}} \) (It is even worse for Black to play: 16...\( \textit{\text{\dd{f}5}} \) 17.\( \textit{\text{\dd{d}2 a5}} \) 18.\( \textit{\text{\dd{b}5 \dd{x}f4}} \) 19.\( \textit{\text{\dd{f}x\dd{f}4 \dd{x}c5}} \) 20.\( \textit{\text{\dd{a}f1 \dd{e}e8}} \) 21.\( \textit{\text{\dd{e}4 \dd{b}6}} \) 22.\( \textit{\text{\dd{g}4}} \) 17.\( \textit{\text{\dd{d}4+ \dd{g}8}} \) 18.\( \textit{\text{\dd{x}f4 \dd{f}f5}} \) 19.\( \textit{\text{\dd{c}c4 a5}} \) 20.\( \textit{\text{\dd{b}5\dd{+}}} \).

\textbf{a) 11...\( \textit{\text{\dd{d}xc5}} \) 12.\( \textit{\text{\dd{b}xc5}} \)}

White succeeds in completing his queenside development rather quickly at the price of only a pawn.

12...\( \textit{\text{\dd{x}c5}} \) 13.\( \textit{\text{\dd{a}3}} \)

Now, Black is again faced with a choice \textbf{a1) 13...\( \textit{\text{\dd{x}xe4}} \), or \textbf{a2) 12...\( \textit{\text{\dd{b}6}} \).}

It is evidently weak for him to continue with 13...\( \textit{\text{\dd{d}d7?!}} \), because of 14.\( \textit{\text{\dd{b}5\dd{+}}} \) and White is already threatening – 15.\( \textit{\text{\dd{x}xc7}} \).

After: 13...\( \textit{\text{\dd{a}6?!}} \) 14.\( \textit{\text{\dd{c}c4 \dd{h}8}} \) (In case of: 14...\( \textit{\text{\dd{c}5}} \) 15.\( \textit{\text{\dd{x}c6 \dd{c}c6}} \), Tjanov – Z.Popova, USSR 1989, 16.\( \textit{\text{\dd{xf8\dd{+}}}} \); or 14...\( \textit{\text{\dd{x}e4}} \) 15.\( \textit{\text{\dd{d}6 \dd{c}6}} \) 16.\( \textit{\text{\dd{x}c7 \dd{x}d1}} \) 17.\( \textit{\text{\dd{a}xd1 \dd{d}d4}} \) 18.\( \textit{\text{\dd{xf8 \dd{x}f8}} \) 19.\( \textit{\text{\dd{f}4\dd{+}}}, \) Black has no compensation for the exchange.) 15.\( \textit{\text{\dd{b}3\dd{+}}} \), Black can hardly prevent the advance of White’s pawn to the d6-square.

\textbf{a1) 13...\( \textit{\text{\dd{x}xe4}} \)}

Black hopes to simplify the position, preserving his extra pawn. Tournament statistic shows that Black’s results in this line are just disastrous; nevertheless it is far from easy to prove White’s advantage.

14.\( \textit{\text{\dd{d}xe4 \dd{f}xe4}} \) 15.\( \textit{\text{\dd{c}4!}} \)

That is the right approach for White. He wishes to deploy his pieces maximally actively.

White often plays here 15.\( \textit{\text{\dd{x}xe4}} \), but that move is weaker,
because of: 15...\text{h}f4!? 16.d6 \text{\textit{c}}c6! 17.dxc7 (In case of: 17.\textit{d}d5+ \textit{g}h8 18.g3, Black has – 18...\textit{c}c6!\textit{f} Boyd – Backlund, corr. 1982; after: 17.g3 \textit{xe}4 18.\textit{d}d5+ \textit{\textit{e}}6 19.\textit{x}e4 cxd6 20.\textit{g}g4 \textit{d}d7 21.\textit{xe}6+ \textit{xe}6 22.\textit{f}fd1 \textit{fd}8 23.\textit{d}d5 \textit{f}f7\textit{f} Lund – Lilja, Olstykke 1994, Black obtains two pawns for the exchange.) 17...\textit{xc}7 18.g3 \textit{xe}4 19.\textit{d}d5+ \textit{f}f7 20.\textit{xe}4 \textit{d}d4=\textit{e} Wajnberg – Ralaison, corr. 1999. White has won the exchange for a pawn, but Black’s pieces have been activated dangerously.

\textbf{15...\textit{h}h8 16.\textit{xe}4 \textit{f}f4}

The exchange-sacrifice here is not advisable for Black: 16...\textit{f}f5?!
17.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 (or 17...\textit{xf}8 18.\textit{e}e1=\textit{f} Kipper – Zschiedrich, Schoeneck 1996) 18.\textit{b}1=\textit{d} Pardo – Barahona, Maringa 1991.

After: 16...h6 17.d6 \textit{cxd}6 18.\textit{xc}d6 \textit{d}c7 19.\textit{xe}1\textit{\textdagger}, the position is opened and the activity of White’s pieces becomes threatening, Zelba – Kaeck, Winterberg 2002.

In case of 16...\textit{f}f5, White can penetrate into Black’s camp with the help of the line: 17.\textit{g}g5! (In answer to 17.d6, van der Sterren – O’Neill, Novi Sad 1990, Black has the cold-blooded argument 17...\textit{c}c6!\textit{f}; if 17.\textit{xe}1, then he can play: 17...\textit{xe}4 18.\textit{xe}4 \textit{f}f4\textit{f} and White can hardly improve his position.) 17...h6 18.\textit{xe}6 \textit{xe}6 19.\textit{dxe}6 \textit{f}f4 20.\textit{b}3 \textit{c}c6 21.\textit{ad}1 \textit{e}e8 22.\textit{b}5\textit{\textdagger} and White’s far-advanced e6-pawn is quite dangerous for Black.

\textbf{17.\textit{e}e1!}

White wishes to repel his opponent’s rook from its active position on f4. He has many attractive possibilities here indeed, but still the road to the advantage for him is much narrower than it might seem at first sight. For example, the spectacular move – 17.\textit{g}g5?, after: 17...\textit{g}g8 18.h4, Zernitsky – Vladimirov, Leningrad 1970, can be refuted by Black with 18...\textit{f}f6+. 17...\textit{g}g8

In case Black plays more actively – 17...\textit{f}f5, then White can follow with: 18.\textit{g}g5 \textit{f}f8 (After: 18...\textit{d}d7 19.\textit{f}f7+ \textit{g}g8 20.\textit{xe}5 \textit{xe}5 21.\textit{xe}5 \textit{xc}4 22.\textit{xe}7 \textit{a}4 23.\textit{f}f3\textarrow, White has a powerful attack on the dark squares in this position with opposite coloured bishops.) 19.\textit{b}3 \textit{f}f6 (After: 19...h6 20.\textit{xe}6 \textit{xe}6 21.\textit{dxe}6 \textit{d}d8 22.g3 \textit{fd}4 23.\textit{c}c5\textit{\textdagger}, White’s e6-pawn is quite powerful.) 20.\textit{e}6! \textit{xe}6 21.\textit{dxe}6 b6 22.g3 \textit{d}d4 23.\textit{b}2\textit{\textdagger} and White has a superior position.

\textbf{18.g3}

In case of 18.f3, Galliamova – Amura, Azov 1990, White must
consider the possibility – 18...
\[ \text{Qf6}\infty. \]

White can also repel Black’s rook from the f4-square with the help of the line: 18.\[ \text{Qc1} \text{Qf5} 19.\text{Qb1}\#. \]

18...\[ \text{Qg4} \]

After 18...\[ \text{Qf5}, \] White has good compensation for the pawn following: 19.d6!? c6 20.h4\#.

19.\[ \text{Qc1}! \]

White has only tried in practice until now: 19.\[ \text{Qb1} \text{Qf3} 20.\text{Qb2} \text{Qf5} 21.\text{Qc5}. \] Here after: 21...\[ \text{Qxf2}?! \] (or 21...\[ \text{Qh5}, \] Feletar – D.Marjanovic, Osijek 2003, 22.\[ \text{Qc3}! \text{Qb8} 23.\text{Qd3}\#) \] White continues with: 22.\[ \text{Qd3}! \text{Qf8} 23.\text{Qxe5} \text{Qb8} 24.\text{Qb2}\# and he preserves a sufficient compensation for the pawn (analysis of D.Feletar).

19...\[ \text{Qf5} \]

After the other possible retreat – 19...\[ \text{Qf3}, \] Black’s rook comes under the attack of White’s pieces: 20.\[ \text{Qb1} \text{b6} 21.\text{Qg5} \text{Qh6} 22.\text{h4} \text{Qf5} 23.\text{Qb2}\#. \] Black is incapable of exploiting the pin of White’s knight, because of the vulnerability of his e5-pawn.

20.\[ \text{d6!} \]

White finally breaks through!

20...\[ \text{Qh6} \]

Black only enhances his opponent’s piece-activity with the line: 20...\[ \text{Qxd6} 21.\text{Qxd6}\#; \] or 20...\[ \text{c6} 21.\text{Qb1} \text{Qb8} 22.\text{Qc5}\#. \] In case of 20...\[ \text{Qd7}, \] it is very good for White to follow with 21.\[ \text{Qb1}\#, \] emphasizing that Black’s queen is not such a reliable blocker after all.

21.\[ \text{Qb1} \text{Qf3} \]

Black can sacrifice the exchange here with the idea to organize some counterplay on the light squares: 21...\[ \text{b6} 22.\text{Qd5} \text{c5} 23.\text{Qxa8} \text{Qxa8} 24.\text{Qc4}\#], but that does not solve his problems. White’s passed d-pawn remains quite dangerous.

22.\[ \text{Qxb7} \text{Qxd6} \]

23.\[ \text{Qxg7}?! \] (This move is more to the point than: 23.\[ \text{Qe6} \text{Qh5} 24.\text{Qe3}\#) 23...\[ \text{Qxg7} 24.\text{Qxd6} \text{Qh5} 25.\text{Qc3} \text{Qf6} 26.\text{Qe3} \text{Qf8} \]

(The other possibilities for Black are worse. He loses after: 26...\[ \text{Qe4}?, \] because of: 27.\[ \text{Qb4}! \text{Qd8} 28.\text{Qb2} \text{Qe5} 29.\text{Qb7}+ \text{Qh8} 30.\text{Qxe4} \text{Qd1+} 31.\text{Qf1}++. \] It would not work for him to try: 26...\[ \text{Qc6}?! 27.\text{Qc2} \text{Qxh2}, \] due to: 28.\[ \text{Qf3}! \text{Qd5} 29.\text{Qd3}\#) 27.\[ \text{Qe4} \text{Qxe4} 28.\text{Qxf8}+ \text{Qxf8} 29.\text{Qxe4}\#. \] White has regained all his sacrificed material and he maintains the advantage thanks to the vulnerability of Black’s e5-pawn and the exposed position of his king.

a2) 13...\[ \text{b6} \]

Black is not going after a ma-
terial advantage in this line. His main idea is to neutralize the activity of White’s pieces.

14. \textbf{\textit{Exc5}}

That exchange compromises Black’s pawn-structure on the queenside at the price of the two bishop-advantage.

14...\textbf{\textit{Bxc5}} 15. \textbf{\textit{Bb3?!}}

This idea is relatively new. White’s queen joins in the hunt for his opponent’s c5-pawn. Earlier, his knight was accomplishing that task.


In case of 15. \textbf{\textit{Bb3}}, it is possible for Black to follow with: 15... \textbf{\textit{h8}} (Or 15...\textbf{\textit{Wd6}} 16. \textbf{\textit{Bb5}} \textbf{\textit{b6}} 17. \textbf{\textit{Ec1}} a6 18. \textbf{\textit{Wxc7}} \textbf{\textit{Wxc7}} 19. \textbf{\textit{d6}} \textbf{\textit{Wxa7}}, Solonar – Haensel, Germany 2003, 20. \textbf{\textit{Wxc5?!}} \textbf{\textit{Ed8}} 21. \textbf{\textit{Dxe7}} \textbf{\textit{Wxe7}} 22. \textbf{\textit{Bb3+}} \textbf{\textit{h8}} 23. \textbf{\textit{Ffd1±.}})


15... \textbf{\textit{Wh8}} 16. \textbf{\textit{Wc4}}

It is not good for White here to continue with 16. \textbf{\textit{Wa4?!}}, because of 16...\textbf{\textit{c6±}}. After 16. \textbf{\textit{Wxd1}}, Dani – Mathe, Hungary 2003, Black obtains a very comfortable game with 16...\textbf{\textit{c6}}∞.

16...\textbf{\textit{Wc6}}

Black wishes to get rid of his c7-pawn. Otherwise, after the loss of the c5-pawn, it might become the next target of White’s pieces.

GM A.Beliavsky’s recommendation here is wrong: 16...\textbf{\textit{Wh6?!}} 17. \textbf{\textit{Wfd1}} \textbf{\textit{xd2}} 18. \textbf{\textit{Wxd2}} \textbf{\textit{Wd6}}, because of: 19. \textbf{\textit{Bb5!}} \textbf{\textit{b6}} 20. \textbf{\textit{Wc3+–.}}

17. \textbf{\textit{Wxc5}} \textbf{\textit{exd5}} 18. \textbf{\textit{exd5!}}

White must play now carefully. He should preserve the knights, since his opponent’s knight on e7 hampers the coordination of Black’s pieces.

After the careless move: 18. \textbf{\textit{Wxd5?!}} \textbf{\textit{Wxd5}} 19. \textbf{\textit{exd5}} \textbf{\textit{Wb7}} 20. \textbf{\textit{Wc4}}, Eljanov – Beliavsky, Warsaw 2005, Black could have played 20...\textbf{\textit{Wf7+}}, followed by \textbf{\textit{Wd7}} and \textbf{\textit{Ec8}} and he could have even obtained the advantage. White’s d-pawn is in fact a weakness in that position.

18...\textbf{\textit{Wb7}} 19. \textbf{\textit{d6}} \textbf{\textit{Wc6}} 20. \textbf{\textit{Wab1}}

Now, we can witness the op-
posite situation. White’s d-pawn is not a liability – it is very powerful.

20...\texttt{\textbackslash d7} 21.\texttt{\textbackslash b5} \texttt{\textbackslash f8}

That move has been recommended by GM V.Mikhalevski. In case of: 21...\texttt{\textbackslash f6} 22.\texttt{\textbackslash c4} e4, Coutton – Deschamps, France 2004, after: 23.\texttt{\textbackslash a5!} \texttt{\textbackslash ac8} 24.\texttt{\textbackslash a4\textbackslashpm}, Black has great problems to avoid immediate material losses.

22.\texttt{\textbackslash d5!?} (White can also consider here the move – 22.\texttt{\textbackslash c4!}\texttt{\textbackslashuparrow})

22...\texttt{\textbackslash d8} (If 22...\texttt{\textbackslash d8}, then 23.\texttt{\textbackslash c4\textbackslashdownarrow})

23.\texttt{\textbackslash c4} e4 24.\texttt{\textbackslash a4}\texttt{\textbackslashuparrow}

White’s initiative increases and Black’s position becomes quite suspicious.

b) 11...\texttt{\textbackslash f6}

This move clarifies already the intentions of both sides. Black will attack on the kingside and White will organize a queenside offensive.

12.f3

White fortifies his e4-pawn and he prepares \texttt{\textbackslash c4}.

12...f4

That is the most logical move for Black. He intends to begin a pawn-offensive against White’s king. The position is closed indeed, but right now there starts a fight in which each tempo has its worth in gold.

Black’s attempt “to correct” something on the queenside might end up very badly for him: 12...c6? 13.exd6 \texttt{\textbackslash xd6} 14.\texttt{\textbackslash c4} \texttt{\textbackslash xb4} 15.\texttt{\textbackslash d2} (White is threatening – 16.\texttt{\textbackslash a4}, winning his opponent’s queen.) 15...\texttt{\textbackslash c5+} 16.\texttt{\textbackslash e3} \texttt{\textbackslash b4} 17.\texttt{\textbackslash c1} (Black’s queen is trapped now, since White is threatening – 18.a3.) 17...\texttt{\textbackslash edx5} (Or 17...\texttt{\textbackslash edx5} 18.exd5 b5 19.a3 \texttt{\textbackslash xc4} 20.\texttt{\textbackslash xc4} bxc4 21.\texttt{\textbackslash c5+–} Herkstroeter – Cotillard, corr. 1995.) 18.exd5 \texttt{\textbackslash d8} 19.d6 \texttt{\textbackslash e6} 20.a3+– Kamaluddin – Mendieta Alcantara, corr. 1999.

There is another way for Black to compromise totally his queenside and that is connected with a move of his a-pawn. The further it is pushed, the worse it becomes for Black...After: 12...a5?! 13.bxa5 dxe5 (Or 13...\texttt{\textbackslash xa5} 14.exd6 cxd6 15.\texttt{\textbackslash c4} \texttt{\textbackslash a8} 16.\texttt{\textbackslash b1} b5 17.\texttt{\textbackslash xb5} \texttt{\textbackslash a6} 18.\texttt{\textbackslash b4} \texttt{\textbackslash c7} 19.\texttt{\textbackslash e3} \texttt{\textbackslash fb8} 20.\texttt{\textbackslash a4\textbackslashpm} Jacob – Hoogendoorn, Dieren 1991.) Black’s queenside
is in ruins in only two moves. It is not surprising that he failed to offer any serious resistance in anyone of the games that we are quoting here: 14.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{d}7\) (Or 14...\(\text{c}d7\) 15.\(\text{b}b1\) \(\text{c}8\) 16.\(\text{e}e3\) fxe4 17.fxe4 \(\text{d}6\) 18.\(\text{d}d3\) \(\text{e}7\) 19.\(\text{c}xc5\) – E. Geller – I. Zaitsev, Moscow 1969.) 15.\(\text{b}b1\) \(\text{h}8\) (15...fxe4 16.fxe4 \(\text{h}8\) 17.\(\text{e}f8\)+ \(\text{f}8\) 18.\(\text{b}b5\) \(\text{g}8\) 19.\(\text{b}b2\) \(\text{g}7\) 20.\(\text{d}6\) c6 21.\(\text{c}c7\) \(\text{a}7\) 22.\(\text{e}e6\) \(\text{e}e8\) 23.\(\text{d}xg7\) \(\text{a}xg7\) 24.\(\text{d}c2\) – Vitous – Hlavinca, corr. 1999.) 16.\(\text{g}5\) h6 17.\(\text{e}e3\) \(\text{g}8\) 18.\(\text{d}d2\) f4 19.\(\text{d}f2\) \(\text{f}6\) 20.\(\text{d}cxd6\) 21.\(\text{d}xd6\) \(\text{a}xa5\) 22.\(\text{f}d1\) \(\text{b}b8\) 23.\(\text{d}d5\) \(\text{d}7\) 24.\(\text{d}xa5\) \(\text{x}a5\) 25.\(\text{d}c4\) \(\text{g}7\) 26.\(\text{d}xc8\) \(\text{xc}8\) 27.\(\text{d}xb7\) \(\text{d}6f6\) 28.\(\text{d}b6++\) D’Arruda – Roche Peris, corr. 1997.

The more modest move – 12...\(\text{a}6?!\), is not satisfactory for Black either, since he thus compromis-es his b6-square and White can penetrate there with some of his pieces, for example after: 13.\(\text{d}4\) f4 14.\(\text{d}c4\) g5 \(\text{h}5\) (14...\(\text{e}7\) 15.\(\text{a}a3\) \(\text{x}f8\) 16.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{e}e8\) 17.\(\text{b}6++\) Chudinovskih – R. Rau, Germany 1993; 14...\(\text{d}7\) 15.\(\text{a}a3\) \(\text{c}8\) 16.\(\text{b}5\) c6 17.\(\text{d}xc6\) bxc6 18.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{b}8\) 19.\(\text{d}xd6++\) Nikolov – Piber, Nova Gorica 1998; in case of: 14...\(\text{h}5\), it is the simplest for White to retreat immediately with his rook – 15.\(\text{e}1\) \(\pm\), because after: 15.\(\text{a}a3\) \(\text{g}3?!\), Niemela – Hy-tonen, Helsinki 1993, he will have to do that anyway, since he cannot accept the sacrifice of the knight: 16.\(\text{h}xg3?? \text{fxg3} 17.\(\text{e}e1\) \(\text{f}5!\) 18.\(\text{exf5}\) \(\text{d}h4++\) 15.\(\text{a}a3\) \(\text{e}8\) (15...\(\text{g}6\) 16.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{e}8\) 17.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{cxb6}\) 18.\(\text{cxd6}\) \(\text{f}7\) 19.\(\text{b}b1\) \(\text{f}8\) 20.\(\text{xb6}\) \(\text{g}7\) 21.\(\text{a}5++\) A. Rodriguez – Diaz Suarez, Buenos Aires 1995; 17...\(\text{e}f6\) 18.\(\text{bxc7}\) \(\text{xc7}\) 19.\(\text{cxd6}\) \(\text{d}6\) 20.\(\text{d}xh6\) \(\text{xd6}\) 21.\(\text{d}xe6\) \(\text{xd6}\) 22.\(\text{d}h1\) \(\text{f}8\) 23.\(\text{f}3\) 24.\(\text{f}a1++\) Borgschulze – Wagner, Ruhrgebiet 1998.) 16.\(\text{f}6\) 17.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{h}8\) 18.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{d}5\) 19.\(\text{d}xc5\) \(\text{g}6\) 20.\(\text{bxc7}\) \(\text{xc7}\) 21.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{f}7\) 22.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{f}8\) 23.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{b}8\) 24.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{O}l\text{ivier} – Rasmussen, Lugano 1989.

The move – 12...\(\text{d}7?!\), not only loses an important tempo, but it impedes the natural protection of Black’s d6-pawn. After: 13.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{b}5\) (Or 13...\(\text{e}8\) 14.\(\text{a}4\) a6 15.\(\text{e}e3\) \(\text{c}8\) 16.\(\text{a}a5\) \(\text{b}8\) 17.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{f}4\) 18.\(\text{d}f2\) \(\text{f}6\) 19.\(\text{c}6++\) Shirov – Zulu, Tunja 1989; in case of: 13...\(\text{f}4\), White still cannot win the d6-pawn, because of the possible check for Black with his queen from the b6-square, but he can increase his pressure against it with: 14.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{e}8\) 15.\(\text{a}a3\) g5 16.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{c}8\) 17.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{h}8\) 18.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{a}xb6\) 19.\(\text{a}xb6\) \(\text{d}xc5\) 20.\(\text{bxc7}\) \(\text{xc7}\) 21.\(\text{d}6++\) Coyne – Owens, corr. 2003.) 14.\(\text{a}a5\) (It would be a typical mistake for White to exchange: 14.\(\text{x}b6? \text{axb6}\) \(\text{b}6\) Dutu – H. Hansen, corr. 2000, because that would only facilitate Black’s defence on the queenside.) 15...\(\text{d}xc5\) 16.\(\text{b}7\) (In case of: 16.\(\text{b}xc5\) \(\text{b}+\) – Black repels the defender of White’s e4-pawn.) 16...\(\text{e}8\) 17.\(\text{c}5\) \(\pm\) and White already has squares for penetration on the queenside.
We know now what Black should not do on the queenside, so we have to explain to you the correct methods of playing on the kingside. The worst possible thing to do with Black would be to trade pawns in the centre – 12... fxe4? 13.fxe4. It does not give anything to Black and it is a great achievement for White. He opens the d1-h5 diagonal for his bishop and that deprives Black of active play on the kingside. The possible exchange of the dark-squared bishops with 13...\=h6, would not solve any problems for Black under these circumstances. White’s initiative develops effortlessly: 14.\=c4 \=xc1 15.\=xc1 b6 16.\=wb3 bxc5 17.bxc5 \=e8 18.\=xe5 dxe5 19.d6+ \=g7 20.\=xf8 \=xf8 21. dxe7+ \=xe7 22. \=d5 \=e6 23.\=f1+ \=g7 24.\=f3 \=g8 25.\=e7+ T.Martinez – Donoso, La Bordeta 1999.

In case White plays even with minimal accuracy, Black’s chances to attack successfully on the kingside are practically non-existent after: 12...\=h5?! 13.\=c4 f4 (If Black refrains from advancing his f-pawn, White’s dark-squared bishop exerts pressure over his opponent’s queenside from the other side of the board – 13... \=f4 14.cxd6 cxd6 15.\=e3 b6 16.a4 \=b7 17.a5\= Franke – Holzschuh, Boeblingen 1985; while in case of: 13...a6 14.a4 \=f4, Hammes – Lachmann, Berlin 1997, it is also possible for White to play: 15.\=e3\= , with the idea to follow with: 16.cxd6 cxd6 17.\=b6.) 14.\=e1\= (It is weaker for White to play the habitual line: 14.\=a3, due to 14...\=g3, Heinsohn – Wieland, corr. 1989 and he will have to lose a tempo for a rook-move anyway, since the move 15.hxg3? is too risky due to: 15...fxg3 16.f4 \=c6! 17.\=d2 exf4\= ).

It is too dubious for Black to play 12...h5?! , because of: 13.\=c4 f4 (After: 13...a6?! 14.a4 f4 15.\=a3 \=e8 16.b5 \=f6 17.b6 dxe5 18.\=xc5 cxb6, Krzesaj – Jaroch, Warsaw 2005, White’s simplest line would have been: 19.\=f2! g5 20.\=b3+-) 14.a4, but we will discuss that in details later in variation b1 (see 12...f4 13.\=c4 h5?!). I would like to warn you that the main drawback of the move with the h-pawn is that White manages to exert pressure against his opponent’s d6-pawn in that line. Black has no time to protect it with his bishop from f8, since his knight on e7 and the rook on f8 stand in its way.

The move 12...\=f7 has more or less the same drawback. Still, here after: 13.\=c4 f4 (or 13... \=e8, Hoelzl – Kostic, Austria 1989, 14.\=e3?!\= ) White needs to act more energetically 14.\=a3?! (If he loses a tempo for the move – 14.a4, then after: 14...g5 15.\=a3 \=g6 16.b5 \=f8, the game transposes to the main line – see 12... f4.). We have analyzed that position in details in our notes to the move – 11...\=f7.

After 12...\=h8 13.a4, there
arises a transposition to Chapter 11, variation a.

Black has also tried in practice the trade of the dark-squared bishops. After: 12...\texttt{h6} 13.\texttt{e4} \texttt{xc1} 14.\texttt{xc1} \texttt{f4} (Just like before, it is a serious weakening of Black’s queenside if he plays: 14...\texttt{a6}?! 15.a4 and his position is very bad in case of: 15...\texttt{b8} 16.a5 \texttt{h5} 17.b5 dxc5 18.\texttt{xe5} \texttt{d6} 19.\texttt{c4} \texttt{d8} 20.b6+ H.Olafsson – McCambridge, Lone Pine 1977, as well as after: 15.\texttt{h5} 16.a5 \texttt{f4} 17.g3 \texttt{h3}+ 18.\texttt{g2} \texttt{g5} 19.\texttt{d2} \texttt{f4} 20.g4 \texttt{f7}, R.Hernandez – Villarroel, Havana 1970, 21.cxd6 cxd6 22.b5±; Black has tried too: 14...\texttt{g7} 15.\texttt{d2}, Plachetka – Lament, Stary Smokovec 1983, 15...\texttt{f4} 16.\texttt{b5} \texttt{e8} 17.\texttt{b2} \texttt{f6} 18.\texttt{xc7}! \texttt{xc7} 19.cxd6 \texttt{xd6} 20.\texttt{exe5} \texttt{b6}+ 21.\texttt{h1}–) White’s most dangerous line would be here probably: 15.\texttt{b5}! (The early exchange of pawns: 15.cxd6 cxd6 16.\texttt{b5} \texttt{e8} 17.\texttt{b3}, Siepmann – Kabisch, Dresden 2005, enables Black to repel his opponent’s knight with the move – 17... \texttt{d7}!, since it would not work for White to play: 18.\texttt{bxd6}?? \texttt{xd6} 19.\texttt{xd6}, because of 19...\texttt{b6}–+) 15...\texttt{e8} 16.\texttt{b3} \texttt{g5} (Or 16...\texttt{h8}?! 17.\texttt{b2} \texttt{g8}, Truta – Sinanovic, Mravinci 1993, 18.\texttt{xc7}! \texttt{xc7} 19.cxd6 \texttt{xd6} 20.\texttt{xe5}–) 17.cxd6 cxd6. Now, White has the powerful resource 18.\texttt{xe5}! and that enables him to open the game after: 18...\texttt{dxe5} 19.d6+ \texttt{h8} 20.dxe7 \texttt{xe7}

21.\texttt{fd1} a6 22.\texttt{c3} \texttt{e6} 23.\texttt{b2} \texttt{f6} 24.\texttt{a4} \texttt{g8}, Speelman – Mestel, London 1987. White can continue with: 25.\texttt{c5}! \texttt{ae8} 26.b5† and he maintains his initiative thanks to the vulnerability of Black’s e5-pawn.

In case of: 12...\texttt{g5} 13.\texttt{c4} \texttt{f4} (Or 13...\texttt{g4}?! , Jackson – Tabarin, Novi Sad 1990, 14.cxd6!? cxd6 15.\texttt{fxg4} \texttt{xe4} 16.\texttt{xe4} \texttt{fxe4} 17.\texttt{xf8}+ \texttt{xf8} 18.\texttt{e3}±) 14.a4 – see variation \texttt{b2}.

13.\texttt{c4}

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It is worth now to deal in details with two possibilities for Black: \texttt{b1}) 13...\texttt{h5} and \texttt{b2}) 13...\texttt{g5}.

Black has tried in practice some other moves too. Still, they have no separate importance. We have already seen most of what we need in these cases. We only have to add some more lines that might be necessary:

About 13...\texttt{a6}?! 14.a4, see – 12...\texttt{a6}; 13...\texttt{d7}?! 14.a4, see – 12...\texttt{d7}; 13...\texttt{h5}? 14.\texttt{e1}, see – 12...\texttt{h5}; 13...\texttt{f7} 14.\texttt{a3}?, see – 11...\texttt{f7}; 13...\texttt{h8} 14.a4 – see Chapter 11, variation \texttt{a} (i.e. 9...\texttt{h8}

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10. \( \text{d}2 \text{e}8 \) 11.a4 f5 12.c5 \( \text{d}f6 \) 13.f3 f4 14.\( \text{d}c4 \).

After 13...\( \text{d}e8 \) 14.a4, Black should better transpose to variation b2 (14...g5). In case of: 14...\( \text{d}h8?! \) 15.\( \text{a}3 \text{g}8 \) 16.b5 h5 (After: 16.\( \text{f}7 \) 17.a5 \( \text{f}8 \) 18.b6 \( \text{w}f6 \) 19.bxc7 dxc6, Svane – Vangsgaard, Aarhus 1992, the simplest road for White to victory is – 20.\( \text{b}2 \text{!}++ \), attacking Black’s e5-pawn.) 17.b6! and we have a transposition to the unfavourable for Black variation a1 from Chapter 11.

b1) 13...h5?!

All this seems to be quite logical – Black begins his kingside pawn-offensive. Meanwhile, he prevents radically White’s possible counterstrike on the kingside – g2-g4. Still, his last move is essentially a loss of time.

14.a4

White’s plan is to bring his pawn to the b6-square in order to disrupt his opponent’s pawn chain on the queenside. His a-pawn might also be useful in that case.

14...g5

Black has also tried in practice: 14...h4?! 15.h3 \( \text{h}5 \) 16.\( \text{a}3 \)→ Koch – Reiss, Austria 2001, but that is not so serious. In fact, White is really attacking on the queenside, while Black is only pretending to be doing something on the kingside. He cannot create any real threats against White’s king with-out advancing his g-pawn.

15.\( \text{a}3 \)

White’s bishop is eyeing Black’s d6-pawn.

15...\( \text{e}8 \)

Now, White has already achieved something and we have to pay attention to it. Black must protect his d6-pawn with his knight from f6. In the ideal situation for him, he would have to do that with his bishop from g7, but he has failed to accomplish that task. The e7 and f8-squares are occupied. Now, Black has problems to prepare g5-g4 in the absence of his knight on f6. Moreover, the fact that Black’s bishop is not on f8 makes is quite hard for him to oppose White’s queenside offensive. There is no pressure at all against White’s c5-pawn.

Naturally, Black could have postponed the retreat of his knight to e8 with another move – 15...\( \text{g}6 \), but that would not have changed anything. After: 16.b5 \( \text{e}8 \) (In case of: 16...dxc5 17.\( \text{a} \)xc5 \( \text{f}7 \) 18.\( \text{w}b3 \) h4 19.h3 \( \text{h}5 \), Black cannot create any real threats, while White’s queenside onslaught develops effortlessly: 20.\( \text{a}5 \) \( \text{g}3 \) 21.\( \text{gd}1 \) \( \text{d}d7 \) 22.\( \text{b}6+ \) – Cuno – Harabor, corr. 1995.) 17.a5 \( \text{f}7 \) (17...b6 18.axb6 axb6 19.cxb6 cxb6 20.\( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{b}8 \) 21.\( \text{b}4 \) – see 15...\( \text{e}8 \); 17...dxc5 18.\( \text{xc}5 \) \( \text{d}d6 \) 19.b6 \( \text{xc}4 \) 20.\( \text{xc}4 \) cxb6 21.axb6 a6, R.Hernandez – Mitra, Calcutta 1988, 22.\( \text{wb}3 \)++) and here White breaks through decisively
on the queenside with: 18.b6! 

\[ \text{axb6 (18...\textit{\textbullet}f8 19.bxc7 \textit{\textbullet}xc7 20.} \textit{\textbullet}xd6 \textit{\textbullet}xd6 21.cxd6 \textit{\textbullet}e8 22.\textit{\textbullet}b5 g4 23.fxg4 hxg4 24.\textit{\textbullet}xg4+- Cavallieri – Franca, Brazil 2002; 19...\textit{\textbullet}xc7 20.cxd6 \textit{\textbullet}xd6 21.\textit{\textbullet}xd6 \textit{\textbullet}xd6 22.\textit{\textbullet}xd6 \textit{\textbullet}xd6 23.\textit{\textbullet}b5 \textit{\textbullet}c5+ 24.\textit{\textbullet}h1 \textit{\textbullet}g7 25.\textit{\textbullet}d6 \textit{\textbullet}d7 26.\textit{\textbullet}e1 \textit{\textbullet}b4 27.a6 \textit{\textbullet}xa6 28.\textit{\textbullet}d5+ \textit{\textbullet}h7 29.\textit{\textbullet}xa8+- Lesiege – Luksza, Montreal 2000.) 19.axb6 \textit{\textbullet}xc5 (About 19...\textit{\textbullet}f8 20.bxc7 – see 15...\textit{\textbullet}f7; after 19...g4 20.fxg4 \textit{\textbullet}g5 21.\textit{\textbullet}bxc7 hxg4 22.\textit{\textbullet}b6 f3 23.\textit{\textbullet}b5 \textit{\textbullet}e3+ 24.\textit{\textbullet}f2 – McGowan – Boyle, corr. 1992, White is not only threatening to win a piece with the move – 25.\textit{\textbullet}xe8, but he can also trade the queens with – 25.\textit{\textbullet}d2.) 20.\textit{\textbullet}xc5 \textit{\textbullet}xa1 21.\textit{\textbullet}xa1 g4 22.\textit{\textbullet}a8 g3 23.h3 \textit{\textbullet}h4 24.\textit{\textbullet}a1 \textit{\textbullet}d7 25.\textit{\textbullet}f1 \textit{\textbullet}h8 26.\textit{\textbullet}b8+- B.Rodriguez – Andrade, Merida 2001. In fact, White has managed to accomplish his plan in that example, so to say, in its purest form. His pieces have penetrated Black’s position via the queenside.

Black can choose here 15...\textit{\textbullet}f7, but after 16.b5, he will have to retreat with his knight anyway – 16...\textit{\textbullet}e8. In fact, that marks the end of his active actions on the kingside.

17.a5 \textit{\textbullet}f8 (The move – 17...b6, prevents White’s pawn-break, but it creates weaknesses and White’s plan is quite standard: 18.cxd6 cxd6 19.\textit{\textbullet}b4 \textit{\textbullet}b8 20.axb6 axb6 21.\textit{\textbullet}a7 \textit{\textbullet}g6 22.\textit{\textbullet}xf7 \textit{\textbullet}xf7 23.\textit{\textbullet}a4 \textit{\textbullet}f8 24.\textit{\textbullet}wc2 \textit{\textbullet}e7 25.\textit{\textbullet}axb6+- Petran – Podvrsknik, Austria 1993.)

18.b6! \textit{\textbullet}xb6 (or 18...\textit{\textbullet}xb6 19.axb6 \textit{\textbullet}a6 20.\textit{\textbullet}b1 \textit{\textbullet}g6 21.c6+– Murugan – Abdulghafour, Moscow 1994) 19.axb6 \textit{\textbullet}g6 20.bxc7 \textit{\textbullet}xc7 (or 20...\textit{\textbullet}xc7 21.\textit{\textbullet}xd6 \textit{\textbullet}xd6 22.\textit{\textbullet}xd6 \textit{\textbullet}xa1 23.\textit{\textbullet}xc7 \textit{\textbullet}xc7 24.\textit{\textbullet}xa1+– R.Szmetan – Cao, Mar del Plata 1972) 21.\textit{\textbullet}b5 \textit{\textbullet}d8, R.Hernandez – Morales, Granma 1999 and here White’s simplest reaction is: 22.\textit{\textbullet}b2!? \textit{\textbullet}d7 23.\textit{\textbullet}bxd6 \textit{\textbullet}xd6 24.cxd6+–.

If we try to justify Black’s move 13, then we have to check – 15...g4. Still, after 16.b5, he is faced with a dilemma: how to protect his d6-pawn, if its only defender – the knight on f6 will be occupied with the support of the g4-pawn. He has tried to solve that problem in different ways, but his position is bad throughout: 16...\textit{\textbullet}xc5 (Or 16...\textit{\textbullet}xf3, Sekano – Mestrom, Haarlem 1992, 17.\textit{\textbullet}xf3+-; 16...g3 17.cxd6 \textit{\textbullet}d6, Vanderhallen – Smits, Hengelo 2002, 18.\textit{\textbullet}xd6+-) 17.\textit{\textbullet}xc5 \textit{\textbullet}g6 and here it is essential for White not to be tempted by winning material, but to open the position with 18.d6±. It is risky for him to win the exchange with: 18.\textit{\textbullet}xf8?! \textit{\textbullet}xf8, because the position is closed and his extra material is not so important, while after: 19.d6 g3 20.h3, Black followed with: 20...\textit{\textbullet}xh3! 21.gxh3 \textit{\textbullet}d7→ and he had a very powerful kingside attack in the game Pekarek – McDonald, Tbilisi 1986.

16.b5 b6
Black is building a barrier in
front of White’s b-pawn. We have already seen what might happen after: 16...\textit{f}7 17.a5 – see 15...\textit{f}7 16.b5.

It is not better for Black to try 16...\textit{f}6 either. After 17.a5 b6 (It is already too late for Black to try to consolidate his defence with 17...\textit{g}8, because of: 18.b6 cxb6, Kipper – Karst, Bad Ems 1996, 19.axb6++; the risky pawn-break – 17...g4, backfires, because White defends too easily: 18.fxg4 hxg4 19.\textit{x}g4 \textit{x}g4 20.\textit{w}xg4 \textit{g}6 21.\textit{w}e2+– Grigore – Gilbert, Bucharest 1993; Black has no time to prepare it with 17...\textit{g}6, in view of: 18.b6 dxc5 19.bxc7 \textit{w}xc7 20.\textit{d}b5 \textit{d}d8 21.\textit{x}c5 g4 22.\textit{x}xa7 gxf3 23.\textit{x}xf3+– A.Peter – Dembo, Hungary 2003.) 18.cxd6 cxd6 19.\textit{b}4 \textit{b}8 20.axb6 axb6 21.\textit{d}a4 \textit{d}7 and Black needs only one tempo in order to fortify his position with the move – \textit{e}7-c8. It is White’s move however and that settles the issue: 22.\textit{c}xb6! \textit{xb}6 23.\textit{a}5 \textit{c}8 24.\textit{w}e1! (That is the most precise line for White, since his queen goes to the f2-square.) 24...g4 25.\textit{x}xb6 \textit{x}xb6 26.\textit{w}f2 \textit{g}6 27.\textit{w}xb6 \textit{h}4 28.\textit{d}d8+– Gonzalez Garcia – Pecorelli Garcia, Matanzas 1994.

Black’s attempt to consolidate his defence in the centre with: 16...\textit{h}8 17.a5 dxc5 18.\textit{xc}5 \textit{d}6, does not lose immediately indeed, but that in fact only postpones his inevitable demise: 19.b6! \textit{xc}4 20.\textit{xc}4 axb6 21.axb6 \textit{xa}1 22.\textit{xa}1 cxb6 23.\textit{b}4 g4 24.\textit{a}3 \textit{f}6, Gomez – M. Fernandez, Buenos Aires 2004. Now, it looks very good for White to follow with 25.\textit{b}5!?±, with the idea to continue with \textit{d}6, in order to control the movements of Black’s light-squared bishop.

17.cxd6!

It is important for White to know that he should not capture – 17.cxb6?! After: 17...\textit{xb}6 18.\textit{b}4 \textit{d}7 19.a5 \textit{c}8 20.axb6 \textit{xb}6 21.\textit{a}5 \textit{f}6 = I.Alekseevov – Korelov, Leningrad 1990, it becomes too difficult for him to break Black’s queenside defence.

17...\textit{c}xd6 18.\textit{b}4 \textit{g}6

After: 18...\textit{f}6 19.a5 \textit{b}8 20.axb6 axb6 21.\textit{a}4, we have already noticed (see 16...\textit{f}6), that Black lacks only a single tempo in order to fortify his queenside defence. And if that cannot help him in that position, nothing will. For example: 18...\textit{h}8 19.a5 \textit{b}8 20.axb6 axb6 21.\textit{a}4! \textit{f}6 22.\textit{axb}6+– De Sousa – Gallegos, Los Angeles 1991.

19.a5 \textit{b}8

Black’s attempt to break
through on the kingside at the most fortified point with the move – 19...g4, is after: 20.fxg4 hxg4
21.\(\Box\)xg4 \(\Box\)g5 22.\(\Box\)f3 bxa5 23.\(\Box\)xa5 \(\Box\)f6 24.\(\Box\)b6 \(\Box\)h3 25.\(\Box\)h1+ -- Di Caro – Massironi, Bratto 2003, doomed to fail.

\[20.\text{axb6} \text{axb6} 21.\(\Box\)a4 \(\Box\)f7\]

After 21...\(\Box\)h4, White is quite effective with his standard mechanism: 22.\(\Box\)axb6! \(\Box\)xb6 23. \(\Box\)a5 g4 24.\(\Box\)xb6+– Chuchelov – M.Ivanov, Le Touquet 1996.

\[22.\(\Box\)xb6! \text{(That is perfectly O\(\Box\), but White can do that in another way too): 22.\(\Box\)axb6! \(\Box\)xb6 23.\(\Box\)a5 \(\Box\)f7 24.\(\Box\)d2 \(\Box\)f6 25.\(\Box\)xb6 \(\Box\)xb6 26.\(\Box\)a5 \(\Box\)d7 27.\(\Box\)f1--; 22...g4 23.\(\Box\)xc8 \(\Box\)xc8 24.\(\Box\)a6+– Behm – Wiegmann, Kassel 2003.) 22...\(\Box\)xb6 23.\(\Box\)a5 \(\Box\)f7 24.\(\Box\)c1 \(\Box\)d7 25.\(\Box\)c6! \(\Box\)xc6 26.\(\Box\)xc6 \(\Box\)b8 (or 26...\(\Box\)b8 27.\(\Box\)d5 \(\Box\)h7 28.\(\Box\)f7+–) 27.\(\Box\)xb7 \(\Box\)xb7 28.b6 \(\Box\)f6 (Black would not change anything much with the line: 28...\(\Box\)f6 29.\(\Box\)a6 \(\Box\)d7 30.\(\Box\)b3+ \(\Box\)h7 31.\(\Box\)c1+– Bonin – Penkalski, USA 1993.) 29.\(\Box\)a6 \(\Box\)g7 30.\(\Box\)b3+ \(\Box\)h7 31.\(\Box\)c1+–. In the game Ftacnik – Gazik, Slovakia 1996. Black soon resigned.\]

b2) 13...g5

Black is trying to remove his knight from the e7-square as soon as possible in order to manage to protect his d6-pawn with his dark-squared bishop.

\[14.a4\]

Now, just like in variation b1, Black is preparing a kingside offensive, while White will attack on the queenside. The game develops under the motto – whoever comes first...

White's counterstrike on the kingside – 14.g4, would not solve all his problems. After 14...h5 (it is weaker for Black to play: 14...fxg3?! 15.hxg3 \(\Box\)h5 16.\(\Box\)g2 \(\Box\)g6 17.\(\Box\)h1+ because he is practically forced to give up some material, R.Sherbakov – Motylev, Ekaterinburg 1997.) 15.h3 \(\Box\)g6 16.a4 \(\Box\)f7 17.\(\Box\)a3 \(\Box\)h8+ and Black has some dangerous counterplay, Jelen – Guig, Nova Gorica 1998.

In case White tries to save some time, avoiding playing with his a-pawn – 14.\(\Box\)a3 \(\Box\)g6 15.b5 \(\Box\)e8 16.b6 cxb6!? 17.cxb6 (or 17.\(\Box\)xd6 bxc5 18.\(\Box\)xe8 \(\Box\)xe8∞ Vaganian – Shirov, Manila 1990) 17...a6,
then he will have to consider the
fact that under the existing pawn-
structure, he cannot break Black's
defence so easily at all. 18...b3 (White is planning the maneuver — a5-c6.) 18...f7 19.axb5 b8!? 20.d3 g4! (Black makes use of
the circumstance that White's pieces are away from the king-
side at the moment.) 21.fxg4 g5
22.c4 f8 23.d2 h4± and
Black had a good compensation
for the pawn in the game Birukov
— V. Kozak, St Petersburg 1994.

14...g6

All other possibilities for Black
lead to already familiar positions,
which we have analyzed before:

About 14...a6?! 15.a3 — see
12...a6; 14...h5?! 15.a3 — see 13...
h5;

The move — 14...f7, does not
have any separate importance
either. After: 15.a3 e8 (About
15...g6 16.b5 — see 14...g6; in
case of: 15...b6?! 16.cxd6 cxd6
17.b5 e8, Grabner — Nolimal,
corr. 1997, it seems good for White to
play: 18.b4!±, with the idea
to follow with 19.a5.) 16.b5 g6
17.b6! and the game transposes to
variation b2a.

14...e8 15.a3 f6 (About
15...g6 — see 14...g6; 15...h5?! 16.b5, see variation b1; 15...a6!?,
then 16.b5, see — 12...a6.) 16.b5
b6 (In case of: 16...g6, Black's
knight on e7 cannot retreat to
the g6-square anymore and that
means White can break through
immediately: 17.b6!? dxc5 18.
bxc7 dxc7 19.d5 d8 20.xc5 a6 21.c3 Toikka — Maki, Tam-
pere 1996, without the prepara-
tory move — a4-a5; if 16...h6, Al
Kuwar — Novacek, Decin 1997,
then it is already worth for White
to lose a tempo for 17.a5±, in
order to ensure 100% the prepara-
tion of the pawn-break — b5-b6.
The reduction of the pawn-tension
is in favour of White, because
it facilitates his queenside attack:
16...dxc5 17.xc5 g6 18.a5 d7
19.b3 c8, this line is refuted
with the standard breakthrough
in the centre: 20.d6! e6 21.dxc7
xc7 22.b4 f7, Pekarek — Kwie-
cien, Myslowice 1985 and here
White could have parried the
activity of his opponent's pieces
25.f1±) 17.cxd6 cxd6. It is now
interesting for White to try the maneu-
ver — 18.a2! (In case White
plays analogously to variation b1:
18.b4 d7 19.a5 b8 20.axb6
axb6±, then Black just manages
to fortify his queenside in time,
Sorokin — Semara, Buenos Ai-
res 1994.) with the idea to rede-
ploy the knight to the c6-square.
If Black prevents that idea with
18...a5 (After: 18...h5 19.b4 g6
20.xe6 c7 21.b4 g4 22.a5+—, Black's kingside attack is non-ex-
estent and his queenside is indef-
sensible.) 19.bxa6 axa6 20.b1±,
then his b6-pawn becomes terri-
ibly weak.

15.a3

I would like to emphasize once
again that White should better refrain from exchanging pawns along the c-file. It becomes quite difficult for him to break Black’s defence in that pawn-structure. As long as Black’s a and b-pawns remain at their initial squares, White’s pieces do not have squares for penetration. After: 15.cxd6 cxd6 16.\text{c3}b5 \text{c8}e8 17.\text{d2} \text{f7} 18. \text{c1} \text{d7} 19.\text{a}a5 (In case of 19. \text{f2}, M.Gurevich – Shirov, Wijk aan Zee 1993, Black can again preserve the tension with the move - 19...\text{b}b8!\infty) 19...\text{b}b8! 20.\text{f2} \text{f6} 21.\text{b}b3 \text{d}d8\infty Pelletier – Maiwald, Germany 2000 and Black’s queenside pawns withstood the pressure of his opponent’s pieces.

15...\text{f7}

Black is trying to remove his pieces as quickly as possible from the a3-f8 diagonal.

15...\text{e}e8 16.b5 dxc5 (About 16...\text{f7} – see 15...\text{f7}; in case of 16...b6?! 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.\text{b}b4 and: 18...h5 19.a5 \text{b}b8 20.axb6 axb6 21.\text{a}a4 – see 13...h5, variation b1, as well as after: 19.a5 \text{b}b8 20.axb6 axb6 21.\text{a}a4, Black is helpless against the tactical strike - 22.\text{cxb6}!+-) 17.\text{xc}c5 \text{d}d6 18.\text{a}5 \text{f6} 19.\text{b}b3 \text{f8} 20.\text{f2} \text{xc}c4, Vitiugov – Lo Curto, Chalkidiki 2001 and here White could have obtained an overwhelming advantage with 21.\text{b}b3! (White’s bishop might be useful on the e2-square in order to hamper Black’s pawn-advance – g5-g4.) 21...\text{h}h8 22.\text{a}a4 h5 23.\text{f1} \text{d6} 24.b6\text{+}.

16.b5

Now, we will analyze: b2a) 16...\text{e}e8, b2b) 16...dxc5 and b2c) 16...\text{f}f8.

b2a) 16...\text{e}e8 17.b6!

It seemed attractive for White to play 17.a5, in order to prepare b5-b6 comfortably, but he has no time for that. After 17...\text{f8}, Black’s bishop exerts pressure against the c5-pawn. White’s attempt to play solidly with: 18.\text{a}a4 (In case of 18.b6, besides: 18...axb6 19.axb6 dxc5 20.bxc7 \text{d}dxc7 21.\text{b}b6 \text{b}b8\infty Giacomazzi – Maces, Le Havre 1977, White must consider 18...dxc5?! \infty too.) might backfire with a disastrous effect after: 18...h5 19.b6, due to: 19...g4! 20.fxg4 \text{g}g5 21.gxh5 (Following: 21.bxc7 \text{h}xg4 22.\text{d}d6 \text{d}xd6 23.cxd6 \text{h}h7 24.\text{b}b5 \text{w}h4 25.h3 \text{g}xh3 26.\text{a}a2 \text{f}f6→, Black’s attack is very powerful.) 21...\text{h}h4 22.\text{f3} axb6 23.cxb6 \text{g}g7 24.\text{a}a2 \text{xf}x3+ 25.\text{w}xf3 \text{g}g4\text{=} Petran – B.Lengyel, Budapest 2006 and Black has an excellent compensation for his minimal material deficit.

17...\text{cxb6}
Capturing with the other pawn – 17...axb6 would not trouble White at all. After: 18.cxb6 cxb6 19.\(\text{W}b3\) \(\text{f}8\) 20.\(\text{Q}xb6\) \(\text{E}b8\) 21.a5 \(\text{d}7\) 22.\(\text{Q}xd7\) \(\text{E}xd7\) 23.\(\text{W}b6\) \(\text{g}7\) 24.\(\text{R}ab1\pm\) Dautov – Siwik, Porz 1991, White has captured his opponent’s light-squared bishop and that has basically solved the problem with the security of his kingside.

18.\(\text{Q}xd6\)?

After: 18.cxd6 \(\text{f}8\) 19.\(\text{Q}b5\) \(\text{d}7\) 20.\(\text{W}b3\), the game transposes to variation b2c.

18...\(\text{Q}xd6\) 19.cxd6 \(\text{Q}d7\)

In case of: 20...\(\text{f}8\) 21.\(\text{Q}b5\), White’s knight penetrates Black’s position via the c7-square.

20.\(\text{W}b3\) \(\text{f}8\) 21.\(\text{f}c1\) \(\text{h}4\)

Black has no attack on the kingside at all after: 21...g4 22.\(\text{f}xg4\) \(\text{h}4\) 23.\(\text{d}1\pm\).

22.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{f}6\) 23.\(\text{E}c7\) \(\text{E}b8\)

White does need to worry about the line: 23...g4 24.\(\text{f}xg4\) f3 25.\(\text{g}xf3\pm\).

24.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{xb}5\), K.Berg – Kielhorn, Dortmund 1986 and after: 25.\(\text{a}xb5\)\(\pm\), there will be an exchange of the pawns on d6 and a7 and that will be evidently in favour of White.

b2b) 16...\(\text{d}xc5\)

Black does not wish to waste time for the fortification of the d6-square. He reduces the tension in the centre and he plans to concentrate his efforts on a kingside attack.

This is in fact one of the sharpest variations among all that we are analyzing in this book.

17.\(\text{R}xc5\)

White must accomplish one of the two possible pawn-breaks – d6, or b6 (after the preliminary a4-a5) and then Black will be in a real trouble.

17...h5

Black is going forward without any respite under the motto"All or nothing!" I would not like to criticize Black’s last move, but I believe that in the future the Black players will have to turn their attention to the move – 17...\(\text{f}8\). Now, White must decide whether he would like to trade the dark-squared bishops or not. Generally speaking, he should better avoid
that exchange, but the element of time is also quite important here. Therefore we must first examine
the consequences of the move – 18...\$xf8?! (After: 18...\$f2 h5 19.a5
g4 20.b6, White's bishop on f2 will
come unavoidably under attack. Black has tried in practice here:
20...g3 21.hxg3 fxg3 22...\$xg3 \$c5+ 23...\$f2 axb6\$\$∞ Manolache – Bar-
bu, Romania 1994, but possibly it is
even stronger for him to follow with:
20...\$xf8 19.a5 (White would not
achieve much with: 19...\$b3 g4
20.fxg4 \$xg4 21.d6 cxd6 22...\$a6
\$e6 23...\$xg4 \$xg4 24...\$xd6 \$xd1
25...\$xd1 \$d8 26...\$xf7 \$d1+ 27.
\$xd1 \$c5+ 28...\$h1 \$xf7= Arlan-
di – Manca, Cremona 2005.)
19...g4 (In case of: 19...h5 20.b6
g4, Farago – Kr.Georgiev, Baile
Herculane 1982, White can con-
tinue with the prophylactic move –
21...\$h1!!, preparing the active
maneuver with his knight to the
b5-square: 21...g3 22...\$b5 \$h7
23...\$e11\$ (20.fxg4 \$xg4 21...\$xg4
\$c5+ 22...\$h1 \$xc4 23...\$c1 \$xg4
24...\$xg4+. White maintains a
slight edge, mostly thanks to his
superior pawn-structure. After
the trade of the queens, Black's
c7-pawn might turn out to be vul-
nerable. In case of the prophylac-
tic move for Black – 17...b6, White
preserves his initiative with the
help of the line: 18...\$f2 h5 19.a5
\$b8 20.axb6 axb6 21.d6!\$.
18.a5
I will mention here that White
fails to break through in the
centre. After 18.d6?! , it would
be quite unpleasant for him if
Black plays: 18...\$f8! 19...\$a3
\$e6\$∞ L.Mueller – Lurje, Swit-
zerland 1993, while if: 18...\$h1 g4
19.d6, then he must consider the
possibility 19...\$e6\$ Guseinov –
Zulfugarli, Baku 1998.

18...g4 19.b6
White must go only forward.
He cannot prevent the appear-
ance of Black's g-pawn around
his king: 19...\$f2 g3! 20.hxg3 fxg3
21...\$xg3 h4\$∞ Riska – Havlík, Ta-
bor 2005.

19...g3

20...\$h1!
White should play precisely
here. It would not work for him
to continue with: 20.bxc7? \$xc7
21...\$a3, because of: 21...\$h7!
22.d6 \$h4 23...d5+ \$f7 24.h3
\$xh3= and Black wins.
He loses too in case of:
20...\$b5?, due to: 20...\$d7! 21.
\$xc7 \$h4 22.h3 \$xc5 23...\$a8
\$xh3 24.gxh3 \$xh3 25...\$f2 gxh2+
26...\$xf2 \$g3+ 27...\$f1 \$f6 28...\$a2
\$h4 29...\$d3 \$h3= S.Nikolov
– Bonev, Sunny Beach 2005.
White is still not well prepared for the pawn-break in the centre – 20.d6. After: 20...cxb6 21.axb6 \(\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}}}\) e6 22.\(\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{h}}}\) h1 \(\texttt{\texttt{d}}\) d7 23.\(\texttt{\texttt{g}}\) g1 \(\texttt{\texttt{h}}\) h4 24.\(\texttt{\texttt{d}}\) d5 \(\texttt{\texttt{h}}\) h3=∞, there were great complications in the game E. Melnikov – Barletta, corr. 2004.

20...\(\texttt{\texttt{h}}\) 7

Black frees the way forward of his queen. In some lines that knight can go to the g5-square, taking part in the offensive against White’s king.

It is not advisable for Black to open files on the queenside. After: 20...ab? 21.axb6 \(\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}}})a1 22.\(\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{w}}})a1 \(\texttt{\texttt{g}}\) g4 23.fxg4 \(\texttt{\texttt{w}})h4 24.\(\texttt{\texttt{w}})g1 hxg4 25.\(\texttt{\texttt{w}})a8=∞ Tratar – Roselli Mailhe, Bled 2002, his position was immediately hopeless.

The other retreat of the black knight – 20...\(\texttt{\texttt{d}}\) e8, seems to be more solid, but it does not prevent White’s break in the centre – 21.d6! (It is considerably weaker for White to try: 21.\(\texttt{\texttt{b}}\) b5?! in view of: 21...\(\texttt{\texttt{f}}\) f8 22.\(\texttt{\texttt{g}}\) g1 \(\texttt{\texttt{w}})g5† with a powerful initiative for Black, Siegel – Maiwald, Germany 1998; White’s task is quite difficult too in case of: 21.bxc7 \(\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{b}}})c7 22.\(\texttt{\texttt{g}}\) g1 \(\texttt{\texttt{f}}\) f8 23.d6 \(\texttt{\texttt{g}}\) g7=∞ Babula – Polzin, Austria 2004.) After: 21...cxb6 (The idea of White’s last move becomes clear in the variation: 21...axb6 22.dxc7 \(\texttt{\texttt{w}})xd1 23.\(\texttt{\texttt{a}})xa1 bxc5 24.\(\texttt{\texttt{b}}\) b6 \(\texttt{\texttt{x}})c7 25.\(\texttt{\texttt{a}})xa8 \(\texttt{\texttt{a}})xa8 26.\(\texttt{\texttt{c}}\) c4 \(\texttt{\texttt{f}}\) f6 27.\(\texttt{\texttt{b}}) b5 \(\texttt{\texttt{h}}) h8 28.\(\texttt{\texttt{a}}) a7!!; following: 21...\(\texttt{\texttt{d}}\) xd6 22.\(\texttt{\texttt{d}}\) xd6 \(\texttt{\texttt{a}})xd6 23.\(\texttt{\texttt{w}})xd6 \(\texttt{\texttt{w}})xd6 24.\(\texttt{\texttt{d}}\) d6 axb6 25.axb6 \(\texttt{\texttt{a}})xa1 26.\(\texttt{\texttt{a}})xa1, opening of files on the queenside turns out to be in favour of White as usual...) 22.axb6 \(\texttt{\texttt{w}})h4 23.\(\texttt{\texttt{g}}\) g1 a6 (If 23...\(\texttt{\texttt{h}}\) h3, then it is possible for White to continue with: 24.\(\texttt{\texttt{a}}) a3=±, with the idea to follow with 25.\(\texttt{\texttt{c}}) c4.) 24.\(\texttt{\texttt{d}}\) d5 \(\texttt{\texttt{h}}) h3 25.\(\texttt{\texttt{d}}) d2=± and Black’s attack reaches its dead end. It is quite difficult for him to increase his pressure, since his knight on e8 is occupied with purely defensive functions.

21.d6!

After Black retreats with his knight away from the centre, White counters with a pawn-break.

It is bad for White to play 21.\(\texttt{\texttt{b}}\) b5?! because of: 21...\(\texttt{\texttt{w}}) h4 22.\(\texttt{\texttt{g}}\) g1 \(\texttt{\texttt{g}}) g5→ and Black has a powerful attack. After: 21.\(\texttt{\texttt{e}}\) e1 \(\texttt{\texttt{w}}) h4 22.\(\texttt{\texttt{g}}\) g1, Watanabe – Mailhe, Istanbul 2000, it is good for Black to continue with 22...\(\texttt{\texttt{f}}\) f8=∞, threatening 23...\(\texttt{\texttt{c}}) c5.

21...\(\texttt{\texttt{w}}) h4 22.\(\texttt{\texttt{g}}\) g1 \(\texttt{\texttt{h}}) h3?!

Now, the game becomes tactical.

Black has tried to sacrifice his bishop in another fashion: 22... cxb6 23.axb6 a6 24.\(\texttt{\texttt{a}}\) a5 \(\texttt{\texttt{h}}) h3 25.gxh3 \(\texttt{\texttt{w}})h3 (Or 25...\(\texttt{\texttt{g}}\) g5 26.\(\texttt{\texttt{c}}\) c4 \(\texttt{\texttt{w}}) h3 27.\(\texttt{\texttt{a}}) a2 \(\texttt{\texttt{h}}) h4 28.\(\texttt{\texttt{f}}\) ff2 gxf2 29.\(\texttt{\texttt{c}}) c2 \(\texttt{\texttt{d}}) d7 30.\(\texttt{\texttt{a}}) a4 \(\texttt{\texttt{e}}) e8 31.\(\texttt{\texttt{d}}) d5 \(\texttt{\texttt{h}}) xf3 32.\(\texttt{\texttt{d}}) d5 b7 \(\texttt{\texttt{g}}) xg1 33.\(\texttt{\texttt{a}}) a4 \(\texttt{\texttt{d}}) d5 34.\(\texttt{\texttt{b}}) b2 \(\texttt{\texttt{a}}) xe4 35.\(\texttt{\texttt{e}}) e4=± Serradimigni – Troncoso, corr. 2003.) 26.\(\texttt{\texttt{f}}) f2 gxf2 27.\(\texttt{\texttt{a}}) a2 \(\texttt{\texttt{g}}) g5. Black’s attack might become quite dangerous, so White must
try to exchange queens, despite his material deficit – 28.\textit{\&}f1! (After: 28.\textit{\&}xb7 \textit{\&}xb7 29.\textit{\&}d5+ \textit{\&}h7 30.\textit{\&}xb7 \textit{\&}xf3 31.\textit{\&}xf3 \textit{\&}xf3+ 32. \textit{\&}g1 \textit{\&}xc3–, White even loses; in case of: 28.\textit{\&}a4?! \textit{\&}d8! 29. \textit{\&}c5 \textit{\&}xd6 30.\textit{\&}xd6 \textit{\&}xf3 31.\textit{\&}xf3 \textit{\&}xf3+ 32.\textit{\&}g1 \textit{\&}g4+ 33.\textit{\&}f1 \textit{\&}f3 34. \textit{\&}e1 \textit{\&}f8 35.\textit{\&}d8 \textit{\&}g2–, he comes under a very dangerous attack as well.) 28...\textit{\&}xf3+ (Or 28...\textit{\&}c8 29.\textit{\&}a4± and after the removal of Black’s queen away from the h3-square, White has his hands free for actions on the queenside.) 29.\textit{\&}xf3 \textit{\&}xf3 30.\textit{\&}c4 \textit{\&}b8 (If 30... \textit{\&}f8, then 31.\textit{\&}xb7±) 31.\textit{\&}a4±. White will soon win the exchange, because of the pin and later his powerful passed d-pawn and the vulnerability of Black’s queenside pawns will be the decisive factors in the evaluation of that position in favour of White.

23.gxh3!

That is the only way for White to obtain the advantage. After the too late prophylactic – 23.\textit{\&}e1?, Black wins with a standard; nevertheless quite spectacular combination: 23...\textit{\&}xg2+! 24.\textit{\&}xg2 \textit{\&}h3+!! 25.\textit{\&}xh3 \textit{\&}g5+ 26.\textit{\&}g2 \textit{\&}h4+ 27.\textit{\&}f1 g2+ 28.\textit{\&}f2 \textit{\&}h3#. This type of final solution was in store for the white king in the game Ftacnik – Cvi\v{n}ek, Germany 1997 and there after: 23.bxc7? \textit{\&}xg2+! 24.\textit{\&}xg2 \textit{\&}h3+!! 25.\textit{\&}xh3 \textit{\&}g5+ 26.\textit{\&}g2 \textit{\&}h4+, White resigned in anticipation of being checkmated.

23...\textit{\&}xh3 24.\textit{\&}f2

That is White’s only defence against the checkmate.

24...gx f2 25.\textit{\&}xf2 axb6

The other capture – 25...cxb6, after 26.axb6 a6, enables White to play: 27.\textit{\&}f1! \textit{\&}c8 28.\textit{\&}a4± and to obtain an excellent game as a compensation for the sacrificed exchange. Black is simply helpless against the transfer of White’s knights to the a5 and c5-squares.

26.\textit{\&}d5!

That is the best move for White and it has been recommended by GM L.Ftcnik.

It is not so convincing for him to opt for: 26.dxc7 \textit{\&}xc7 27.\textit{\&}xb6, since after: 27...\textit{\&}xc3!? 28.\textit{\&}xa8 \textit{\&}g f8! Black is threatening to redeploy his knights to the g5 and d4-squares and that would provide him with a good counterplay.

26...b5

If 26...cxd6, then after: 27. \textit{\&}xd6 \textit{\&}h4 (Or 27...\textit{\&}xa5 28.\textit{\&}xa5 bxa5 29.\textit{\&}xf7 \textit{\&}xf7 30.\textit{\&}c4+–; 27...\textit{\&}ff8 28.\textit{\&}f1! \textit{\&}e6 29.\textit{\&}xb6+-) 28.\textit{\&}xh4 \textit{\&}xh4 29.\textit{\&}xf7 \textit{\&}xf7 30. \textit{\&}b3 \textit{\&}f8 31.\textit{\&}xb6–, Black’s po-
sition is lost.
In case of 26...c6, White can follow with: 27.\(\text{xf}1\) \(\text{xf}5\) 28.\(\text{xc}7\) \(\text{xc}7\) 29.\(\text{dxc}7\) and his far-advanced pawn should be decisive for the outcome of the game.
After 26...\(\text{bxa}5\), it is very strong for White to continue with 27.\(\text{dxc}7\), with an overwhelming advantage for him.
\[27.\text{xc}7 \text{d}8 28.\text{xb}5\]

Now, despite Black's extra exchange, White's centralized pieces and his passed d-pawn provide him with a clear advantage. After, for example: 28...\(\text{g}5\) 29.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{h}8\) 30.\(\text{b}6\), White has a clear-cut plan to improve his position: he can repel his opponent's queen from \(h3\) with the move \(\text{f}1\) and his rook can penetrate Black's camp via the route - \(\text{c}3\)-c7.

\[\text{b2c)} 16...\text{f}8\]
(diagram)
Black is threatening the c5-pawn and that forces White to clarify his queenside pawn-structure.
\[17.\text{b}6!\]
This standard pawn-break is connected here with a pawn-sacrifice and it is practically forced. You must know by now that it is unfavourable for White to enter positions of the type: 17.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{xd}6\) 18.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{a}6\) - Jones – Franklin, Glasgow 1970. He can hardly improve his situation on the queenside and Black has the initiative on the other side of the board.
White has tried numerous times in practice 17.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{dxc}5\) and in that case his initiative compensates the sacrificed pawn, but not more...
\[17...\text{xb}6\]
Black can accept the pawn-sacrifice in two different ways:
\[1) 17...\text{dxc}5 18.\text{bxc}7 \text{xc}7\] (Or 18...\(\text{xc}7\) 19.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{b}8\) 20.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{e}8\) 21.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{a}6\) 22.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{Ftcnik}\); after: 19...\(\text{d}8\), Sakaev – Shchekachev, Sochi 1990, White should better force his opponent to protect his e5-pawn, before he pushes his d-pawn forward: 20.\(\text{b}2\)?, with the following eventual developments: 20...\(\text{d}7\) 21.\(\text{d}6\); 20...\(\text{a}6\) 21.\(\text{ba}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 22.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{b}8\) 23.\(\text{c}2\);)
\[19.\text{b}5 \text{g}7\] (19...\(\text{d}7\) 20.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{Knaak}\) 20.\(\text{b}2\) \(\text{a}6\) 21.\(\text{ba}3\) (After: 21.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{h}5\) 22.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{g}4\) 23.\(\text{b}6\)

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Chapter 13

\( \text{\textcopyright XB6 24.\textcopyright XB6 \textabarw 8 25.a5 \textabarw h4} \infty \) Beaumont – Jackson, Torquay 1998, Black manages to organize some counterplay on the kingside.) 21...\textabarw d7 22.d6 \textabarw f6 23.a5?! (Following: 23.\textabarw b3 \textabarw h8 24.\textabarw a1, I.Nemet – Fricker, Mendrisio 1987, Black could have consolidated his queenside with the move 24...b6!??) 23...h5 24.\textbar d5+ \textbar f7 (24...\textabarw h8 25.\textbar c3+) 25.\textbar d1 \textbar d5 26.\textbar x d5\pm and White has an excellent compensation for his minimal material deficit. Black’s c5 and e5-pawns are weak and his queenside is paralyzed, because of the unfavourable placement of his knight on d7, which is forced to protect the e5-pawn.

2) 17...\textbar x b6 18.\textbar x b6 and now: 18...c5? 19.dxc6 bxc6 20.\textbar x d6 \textbar d7 21.\textbar b3+- Ftacnik;

Black’s attack is developing too slowly after: 18...h5?! 19.\textbar b5 g4 20.bxc7 \textbar x c7 21.\textbar x d6 \textbar x d6 22.\textbar x d6 g3 23.\textbar x c8 gxh2+ 24.\textbar h1 \textbar x c8 25.d6 \textbar g7 26.\textbar c4+ \textbar h8 27.\textbar e6 \textbar a8 28.\textbar e1 \textbar h4 29.\textbar h3+- Molander – Guid, Patras 1999;

In case of the more aggressive line: 18...g4?! 19.fxg4 h5 20.gxh5 \textbar h4, Easton – Taylor, Birmingham 2001, the simplest way for White to neutralize his opponent’s attack is by playing: 21.\textbar e1! \textbar g4 22.\textbar h1 \textbar g5 23.g3+-;

After: 18...\textbar d7 19.bxc7 \textbar x c7 20.\textbar b3 h5 21.\textbar b6 \textbar d8 22.a5 g4 23.\textbar b5 \textbar x b5 24.\textbar x b5 \textbar g7 25.\textbar h1 \textbar h4 26.\textbar g1 \textbar f7 27.\textbar b4 \textbar h8 28.\textbar e1 \textbar g6 29.\textbar e2 \textbar e7 30.\textbar e1, Black was forced to start defending after he had lost his light-squared bishop in the game Prudnikova – Kucymera, Germany 1997.

In answer to: 18...\textbar e8 19.bxc7 \textbar x c7, as it was played in the games Canadell – Gayobot, corr. 1988 and Maly – Dobrinac, Germany 1997, White could have prepared the transfer of his knight to the b6-square without removing his queen from d1 with: 20.a5!?+, followed by: 20...g4 21.fxg4 \textbar x g4 22.\textbar x g4 \textbar x c4 23.\textbar e6+ \textbar h8 24.\textbar b3+, or 20...h5 21.\textbar b4 \textbar d7 22.\textbar b6 \textbar b8 23.\textbar b1 \textbar f6 24.\textbar b5 \textbar x b5 25.\textbar x b5;

18...\textbar x b6 – Black’s e5-pawn has been reliably protected now, but if White’s knight penetrates to the b6-square, before Black begins his kingside attack, White will definitely win the opening battle. He can accomplish that by choosing a precise order of moves: 19.\textbar b3! (After: 19.\textbar b1 \textbar a6 20.\textbar b3, Black succeeds in organizing a kingside attack with: 20...g4! 21.\textbar x b6 \textbar x f3 22.\textbar x f3 \textbar h3 23.\textbar x a6 bxa6 24.\textbar h1 \textbar x f1 25.\textbar x f1 \textbar h5 26.\textbar e2 \textbar h4+ I.Cosma – Sahovic, Belgrade 1995.) 19...\textbar a6 (About 19...\textbar e8 20.\textbar x b6 – see variation b2a 17...\textbar x b6; 19...h5 20.\textbar x b6 \textbar d7, R.Kaufman – Barrera Lopez, Havana 1999, 21.\textbar x d8 \textbar x d8 22.a5 g4 23.\textbar b5\pm; Black has no time to play 19...g4, because of: 20.\textbar x b6 \textbar c7 21.\textbar b5 \textbar x d5 22.\textbar x d5 g3 23.\textbar h1 \textbar h4 24.\textbar g1+- Tratar – Rie-
gler, Slovenia 1994.) 20.b5! (It is essential for White to repel Black’s knight from its active position on f6.) 20...e8 21.fcl!? (After: 21...f6 22.c3 h5 23.fcl d7 24.b2 f7 25.c4 f6=, in the game Soppe – Fiorito, San Luis 1990, the opponents repeated moves and they agreed to a draw.) 21...f6. This move is forced. (The attempt – 21...h5?, loses in view of: 22.cxd6 xd6 23.xd6 g4 24.xf8 xf8 25.c3 a8 26.xe5 wh4 27.g3+– Tratar – Grilc, Slovenia 1994.) 22.ab1 (White prepares the retreat of his knight to the c3-square.) 22...h5 (In case of 22...h4, after White’s knight retreats to c3, Black can try attacking with his g-pawn, but White refutes that idea with the move – 23.g3!±) 23.c3 g4 24.xb6±.

18.cxd6!

That is the correct reaction for White. Now, his pawn on d6, which has penetrated his opponent’s position, would be weak indeed, but Black will lose time in order to capture it and that would deflect him from the attacking plan on the kingside, including the preparation of the pawn-advance g5-g4. Black will have then three main problems: his e5-pawn, White’s threat to penetrate with his pieces to the c7-square and the necessity to watch for the pawn-break – a4-a5.

It is not good for White to capture 18.xb6, because of the possibility – 18...a6, as we have already told you about that (see our notes to White’s move 17).

In case of: 18.xd6 g7! 19.cb5, Schlecht – Souleidis, Germany 2000 (19.xc8 xc8 20.d6 bxc5 21.b5 c6 22.c7 xd6 23.c4+ h8 24.e6 d7+ Epishin – Akopian, Minsk 1990), after 19...a6 20.c3 bxc5 21.xc8 xc8 8xc8∞, it becomes quite difficult for White to prove that his initiative compensates the sacrificed pawn.

18...e8

Black’s knight is sent to fight against his opponent’s d6-pawn. That means that he postpones the pawn-break g5-g4 for the time being.

He has tried numerous times in practice the move – 18...d7. In that case after: 19.b5! (Or 19.b3 g4! 20.fxg4 xg4 21.b5 h4 22.xg4 xg4 23.f2, Mai – Bos Swieck, Halle 1987, 23...f3†; 20.b5 g3 21.h3 xh3 22.c7 xh5!→ Tuschinske – Loehn, Germany 1995; 21.c7 gxh2+ 22. xh2 xh5 23.xa8 g3→ Pitkaenen – Kollmann, corr. 1999.) 19...
\( \text{Chapter 13} \)

\( \text{\&e8 (If White's queen is on d1, then it is a mistake for Black to play: 19...g4?, because of: 20.fxg4 } \text{x}4 21.\text{d3 } \text{x}b5 22.axb5 \text{xd6 23.\text{gx}6 hxg6 24.\text{xe}5+-) 20.}\text{\&b3, White can transpose to the line that we analyze a bit later, after the move – 18...\text{\&e8}.} \)

In answer to: 18...\text{\&g7} 19.\text{\&b5 \&e8}, Gleizerov – Burovic, Ljubljana 1992, it deserves attention for White to play: 20.\text{\&b3?! h5 (20...\text{\&h8? 21.d7 \&xd7 22.\text{xf}8 \text{xf}8 23.\text{\&e}5+-) 21.\text{\&b2 \&f6.} After Black’s pieces are occupied with the defence of the e5-pawn, White can start his decisive actions on the queenside: 22.a5!? bxa5 23.\text{\&xa}5 \text{xd}6 24.\text{\&b}6 \text{xd}6 25.\text{\&c1 (White is threatening 26.\text{\&b}6.) 25...\text{\&c}7 26.\text{\&d}6 \text{xc}1+ 27.\text{\&xc}1 \text{xd}6 28.\text{\&a}3 \text{d}8 29.\text{\&c}5\text{\&c5. White's position is better, despite Black's extra pawn, since he is dominant on the dark squares.} \)

In case of 18...h5, it is again very good for White to follow with 19.\text{\&b5. Later, there might follow: 19...\text{\&e8, Krzywicki – Borkowski, Polanica Zdroj 1995 (It is obviously weaker for Black to play 19...g4?!, because then he can cover the c7-square against the penetration of White's pieces only by giving up the exchange: 20.\text{\&c7 }\text{xc}7 21.\text{dc}7 \text{xc}7 22.\text{xf}8 \text{xf}8 23.\text{\&c1 g3 24.\&e1! gxh2+ 25.\text{\&x}h2 \text{g}4+ 26.\text{fx}g4 hxg4 27.\text{g}3+- Dizdar – Groselj, Ljubljana 1997.)} 20.\text{\&b}2 \text{f}6. Now, just like in the previous line, White has tied up his opponent's pieces with the protection of his e5-pawn and he can try to break through his queenside defence with the help of the line: 21.a5!? bxa5 22.\text{\&a}5 \text{xd}6 23.\text{\&b}6 \text{xd}6 24.\text{\&a}1 \text{c}7 24...g4 25.\text{\&d}6 \text{xd}6 26.\text{\&a}7\text{\&c}7 25.\text{\&e}5 g4 26.\text{\&c}5\text{\&c}5 and White is threatening 27.d6 and his compensation for the pawn is quite sufficient.} \)

19.\text{\&b5 \&d7}

The move 19...a6?!, is chronically weakening the b6-pawn – 20.\text{\&c7 }\text{xc}7 21.\text{dc}7 \text{xc}7 22.\text{d}6 \text{d}8 23.\text{\&b}1 b5 24.axb5\text{\&c}6 Civin – Jirovsky, Prague 1995.

20.\text{\&b}3?!

That is the latest discovery in this variation.

White fails to penetrate his opponent's position, when Black's knight is on e8, with the line: 20.\text{\&c}7 \text{xc}7 21.\text{dc}7 \text{xc}7 22.\text{d}6 (It is worse for White to try: 22.\text{\&c}1?! \text{d}8 23.\text{\&b}3 \text{c}8 24.\text{\&c}3 \text{c}5+ 25.\text{\&xc}5 \text{xc}5\text{f Reischl – Lipok, Bayern 1997.) 22...\text{\&c}6 23.\text{\&b}2 \text{c}8 24.\text{\&c}1, Heinsohn – P.Schmidt, Germany 1997. The simplest way for Black to parry White's threats is: 24...\text{\&c}5+ 25.\text{\&h}1 \text{b}4\text{\&c}6.)

After: 20.\text{\&b}2 \text{f}6 (Or 20...\text{\&b}5 21.axb5 \text{xd}6 22.\text{\&a}2?! \text{\&b}8 23.\text{\&a}1\text{f Ftcnik; Black should not weaken his b6-pawn: 20...a6?! 21.\text{\&b}3 \text{xd}6 22.\text{\&h}1\text{f Sakaev – Stotika, Leningrad 1990.)} 21.\text{\&a}2 \text{xd}6 22.\text{\&b}6 \text{xd}6 23.\text{\&d}6)
9.b4 \(\mathcal{D}d7\) 10.\(\mathcal{D}d2\) f5 11.c5

\(\mathcal{W}xd6\) 24.\(\mathcal{A}a3\) \(\mathcal{W}f6\)∞ Ftacnik – Akopian, Groningen 1991 and the final position is not easy to evaluate at all.

20...\(\mathcal{A}xb5\)

Black gets rid of White's knight on b5 immediately. The following lines illustrate – why he should do that: 20...\(\mathcal{W}f6\) 21.\(\mathcal{A}c7\) \(\mathcal{C}c8\) 22.a5 bxa5 (If 22...\(\mathcal{A}xd6\), then after: 23.axb6 axb6 24.\(\mathcal{A}xd6\) \(\mathcal{A}xd6\) 25.\(\mathcal{D}e6\) \(\mathcal{A}c5+\) 26.\(\mathcal{A}xc5\) \(\mathcal{J}xc5\) 27.\(\mathcal{A}xb6\) \(\mathcal{K}b5\) 28.\(\mathcal{A}xd7\) \(\mathcal{A}xb3\) 29. \(\mathcal{A}xf6+\) \(\mathcal{A}xf6\) 30.d6!', Black is faced with the rather unpleasant threat – 31.\(\mathcal{A}c4\).) 23.\(\mathcal{A}xe8\) \(\mathcal{A}xe8\) 24.\(\mathcal{A}xa5\) b6 25.\(\mathcal{A}c6\)± and White would not lose his d6-pawn, but he is going to exchange it for his opponent's a7-pawn.

After 20...h5 21.\(\mathcal{B}b2\), Black would have to capture White's knight anyway: 21...\(\mathcal{A}xb5\) (If 21...a6, then: 22.\(\mathcal{Q}c7\) \(\mathcal{Q}xc7\) 23.\(\mathcal{D}xc7\) \(\mathcal{W}xc7\) 24.\(\mathcal{Q}h1\)±; in case of: 21...\(\mathcal{Q}g7\) 22.a5!? bxa5 23.\(\mathcal{A}xa5\) a6 24.\(\mathcal{Q}c7\) \(\mathcal{Q}xc7\) 25.\(\mathcal{D}xc7\) \(\mathcal{W}xc7\) 26.\(\mathcal{Q}b6\) \(\mathcal{E}d8\) 27.\(\mathcal{Q}c1\) \(\mathcal{W}d6\) 28.\(\mathcal{A}a3\) \(\mathcal{W}f6\) 29.\(\mathcal{A}xd7\) \(\mathcal{A}xd7\) 30.d6±, White's knight on b5 has fulfilled a very important task once again.) 22.axb5 \(\mathcal{A}xb6\) 23.\(\mathcal{A}xd6\) \(\mathcal{A}xd6\) 24.\(\mathcal{A}a3\)±.

21.axb5

Now, Black will have to protect his a7-pawn.

It is weaker for White to follow with 21.\(\mathcal{W}xb5\)!, because of: 21...\(\mathcal{A}xd6\) 22.\(\mathcal{A}xd6\) \(\mathcal{A}xd6\) 23.a5 bxa5 24.\(\mathcal{A}xd6\) \(\mathcal{W}xd6\) 25.\(\mathcal{A}xa5\) (Ftacnik).

21...\(\mathcal{A}xd6\)

In case of: 21...\(\mathcal{A}xd6\) 22.\(\mathcal{A}xd6\) \(\mathcal{A}xd6\) 23.\(\mathcal{A}a2\) \(\mathcal{E}d7\) 24.\(\mathcal{A}xa1\) \(\mathcal{W}b8\) 25.\(\mathcal{A}b2\)± (Ftacnik) Black's a7 and e5-pawns are so vulnerable that he must switch to only defending.

22.\(\mathcal{W}f1\) h5

If 22...\(\mathcal{A}xc4\), then after: 23. \(\mathcal{A}xc4\) \(\mathcal{A}xa3\) 24.\(\mathcal{A}xa3\) \(\mathcal{E}d7\) 25.\(\mathcal{A}ca1\), Black will be soon forced to give up his a7-pawn.

23.\(\mathcal{A}c2\) \(\mathcal{H}h7\) 24.\(\mathcal{A}ca2\) \(\mathcal{G}g7\)

After: 24...\(\mathcal{A}c8\) 25.d6 \(\mathcal{E}d7\) 26. \(\mathcal{D}d2\), Black's position is rather cramped. GM Ftacnik considers as the best line for Black here: 24...\(\mathcal{A}xc4\) 25.\(\mathcal{A}xc4\) \(\mathcal{A}xa3\) 26. \(\mathcal{A}xa3\) \(\mathcal{W}b8\), but after the move – 27.\(\mathcal{A}a2\)±, he will have to give back his extra pawn.

25.\(\mathcal{A}xd6\) \(\mathcal{A}xd6\) 26.\(\mathcal{A}xa7\) \(\mathcal{A}xa7\) 27.\(\mathcal{A}xa7\)± – and White's prospects are clearly better thanks to his superior pawn-structure, Ftacnik – D.Gross, Czech Republic 1998.

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Conclusion

The variation with the retreat of Black’s knight to the d7-square, followed by f7-f5, is in fact one of the most important treatments for him in the classical system with 9.b4, which we are analyzing.

The plans for both sides are quite clear-cut: White attacks on the queenside and Black organizes a kingside offensive. White is not reluctant to even sacrifice a pawn – 11.c5!, in order to accomplish his ideas. Black accepts that sacrifice quite rarely. The reason for that is more than obvious – White maintains a long-lasting initiative in all the variations under index a. It is much more difficult for him to fight against the move – 11...\$f6. Black often manages in that line to occupy additional space on the kingside and that might turn into a dangerous attack against his opponent’s king. White tries to counter that plan by destroying Black’s pawn-structure on the queenside by advancing his b-pawn all the way up to the b6-square. The target of that operation is his opponent’s light-squared bishop. Black’s kingside attack lacks effectiveness without it, as a rule. It is worth mentioning that it is usually unfavourable for Black to counter the advance of White’s b-pawn, like in variation b1, with the move – b7-b6. White has at his disposal a standard combination with a temporary knight-sacrifice, similar to the one, which was mentioned at the end of variation b1, and it is quite frequently used by White in the lines of the entire chapter.

The variations under the index b2 are the most interesting from the theoretical point of view. The position after White’s move 16 seems to be the critical one here. Black must solve the problem – how to protect his d6-square. The retreat of his knight to e8 (variation b2a) reduces the effectiveness of his kingside attack. White can play energetically then – 17.b6! and he creates great problems for Black in that case.

The reduction of the pawn-tension with the move – 16...\$xc5 (variation b2b) leads to an extremely sharp game and each tempo becomes tremendously important. Black’s compromising in the centre practically means that he risks everything on a toss of a coin. In that case, White must neutralize his opponent’s attack and maintain his advantage.

Variation b2c, with the move – 16...\$g8, can be regarded as an improved modification for Black of variation b2a. The pawn-break – 17.b6, does not promise White too great an advantage, but still that is exactly – how he should play! His powerful d6-pawn creates great problems for Black and he can get rid of it only at the price of his light-squared bishop. As a result of that, White can feel secure about the defence of his king.
1.\textit{d}f3 \textit{d}f6 2.c4 g6 3.\textit{d}c3 \textit{g}g7 4.e4 d6
5.d4 0–0 6.\textit{d}e2 e5 7.0–0 \textit{c}6 8.d5
\textit{d}e7 9.b4 \textit{d}e8

This move seems to be more passive than 9...\textit{d}d7, but still the knight on e8 will have a very important mission – to deny access of White’s pieces to the c7-square.

\textbf{10.c5}

Black does not prevent that pawn advance, so White should not postpone it.

Now, the most popular possibilities for Black are: \textbf{a) 10...h6}, and \textbf{b) 10...f5}.

His other moves are only very seldom played. As usual, we will start with some of the worst. The exchange in the centre is no doubt – terrible for Black – 10...dxc5?
11.bxc5 f5 12.\textit{w}b3 \textit{g}h8 13.\textit{d}d1 h6
14.\textit{g}b2→ S.Koch – Ciemnyjewski, Ratzeburg 1997.

Why Black’s position is so seriously compromised after: 10...a6?! 11.\textit{d}d2, we have already mentioned in our notes to the move 9...a6 (see Chapter 10).

Following 10...c6, White should fight for the advantage with 11.dxc6!? (If 11.\textit{c}4, Lovrnicov – Herbst, Germany 2006, then White must consider the possibility 11...a5?!; after 11.\textit{g}e3, Borbjerget – Pirisi, Budapest 1996, Black had the opportunity to equalize with the help of: 11...cxd5 12.\textit{d}xd5 \textit{d}xd5 13.\textit{w}xd5 \textit{f}6
14.\textit{w}c4 \textit{e}6 15.\textit{w}c2 d5=) 11...\textit{d}xc6
(In case of: 11...bxc6 12.\textit{x}d6 \textit{d}xe6 13.\textit{e}3+; White’s pawn-structure is better.) 12.\textit{g}5 \textit{d}7 (It would not work for Black to play: 12...\textit{f}6?!, because of 13.\textit{h}6 and he will have to give up the exchange, because after: 13...\textit{g}7 14.\textit{x}g7 \textit{e}7 15.b5 \textit{e}7 16.\textit{x}e5+-, things might become even worse...) 13.\textit{b}1!? (Here, it seems attractive for White to play: 13.b5
\textit{d}4 14.\textit{x}d4 \textit{x}d4 15.c6 bxc6
16.bxc6 \textit{xc}6 17.\textit{d}5 \textit{h}8 18.\textit{e}7
\textit{g}8 19.\textit{b}1\textit{g}8, but despite the rather unfavourable placement of his pieces, Black can still hold.) 13...
dxc5 14.\(\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}\text{x}d7 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}x\text{d}7 15.bxc5 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}b8 16.\(\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}f\text{d}1 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}e6 17.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}d5\uparrow \) and White maintains the initiative, thanks to the powerful placement of his knight on the d5-outpost.

The position, arising after: 10...\(\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}a5 11.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}a3 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{b}4 \) (In case of: 11...\(\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}h6 12.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}d2 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{b}4 13.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{b}4 f5 14.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}c4 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}f6 15.a4 dxc5 16.\(\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{c}5 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}d6 17.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{e}5 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{e}5 18.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}g4 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{g}4 19.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{g}4 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}e\text{f}5, \text{Pacheco – Reta-mozo, Lima 2002, after 20.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}e2\pm, Black will have to lose his e4-pawn; if 11...f5, then it is possible for White to continue with: 12.b5 \(\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}h6 13.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}d2 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{e}4 14.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{d}xe4 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}f5 15.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}d2 dxc5 16.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{c}5 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}c\text{d}6 17.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}\text{f}e1 b6 18.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}a3 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}f7 19.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}\text{c}e\text{c}\uparrow \) and he has the initiative, \text{Muttoni – Peto, corr. 2002.) 12.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{b}4, seems to be more typical for the variation: 9...\(\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}a5 10.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}a3 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{b}4 11.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{b}4 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}e\text{e}8 12.c5 and it will be analyzed in Chapter 16.

In case of 10...\(\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}h8 11.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}d2, the game transposes to Chapter 11.

**a) 10...\(\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}h6**

Black prevents his opponent's knight from coming to the g5-square, but we will see later (see variation \textbf{b} 10...f5) that this is hardly necessary.

**11.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}d2**

We have already mentioned in Chapter 10 (see the notes to the move 9...h6) that the main drawback of Black's last move with the h-pawn is that it is essentially a loss of time.

**11...f5**

In this position, the move 11...a5, recommended by N. Rashkovsky, has not been tested yet, but it is not so difficult to predict – what might happen next. After 12.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}a3 and Black's logical reaction: 12...\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{b}4 13.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{b}4, we are back on the habitual theoretical path to a position in which Black will have so few chances to organize any counterplay. 13...f5 (Or 13...dxc5 14.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{c}5 b6 15.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}b4 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}d\text{d}6 16.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}c4 f5 17.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{d}6 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{d}6 18.\(\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}e\text{f}3 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}b7 19.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}b5 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}f6 20.a4\pm Allen – Ilie, Gold Coast 1999; 14...\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}d6 15.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}b3 f5, Hole – Gilbert, Gausdal 2005, 16.\textit{f3}\uparrow) 14.f3 f4 (Or 14...b6 15.cxd6 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}c\text{d}6 16.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}b5 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}d7 17.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}c4 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{b}5 18.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{b}5 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}c8 19.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}b3\uparrow K.Thomas – Netzer, France 2002; in case of: 14...\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}d7 15.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}c4 h5 16.a4 \text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}h6 17.a5\pm, White managed to squeeze maximally Black's queenside, by advancing his a-pawn in the game \text{Jaeger – Robertsen, Tromsoe 2002.}) 15.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}c4 g5 16.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}b5 dxc5 17.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}x\text{c}5 b6 18.\text{\textit{\textasciitilde}}}f3\pm and White maintains a powerful positional pressure, \text{Veingold – Paasikangas, Naantali 1996. His plans for the nearest future include – breaking through Black's queenside with the advance of the a-pawn. 12.a4?!}

White is reluctant to push 12.f3 and quite understandably so. Black will then have an extra tempo in comparison to the positions, which we have analyzed in Chapter 13 (see variation \textbf{b2}), because Black's knight came imme-
diately to the e8-square. See some eventual developments: 12...f4 13.\texttt{\textbackslash \textemdash}c4 g5 14.a4 \texttt{\textemdash}g6 15.\texttt{\textemdash}a3 \texttt{\textemdash}f7 16.b5 \texttt{\textemdash}f8 17.b6 cxb6 18.cxd6 \texttt{\textemdash}xd6 19.\texttt{\textemdash}xd6 \texttt{\textemdash}xd6 20.\texttt{\textemdash}xd6 \texttt{\textemdash}xd6 21.\texttt{\textemdash}b5 \texttt{\textemdash}d8 22.d6, Simo- nenko – Aliyev, Ashkhabad 1996 and here after: 22...\texttt{\textemdash}e6?! 23.\texttt{\textemdash}c7 \texttt{\textemdash}xc7 24.dxc7 \texttt{\textemdash}xc7\textsubscript{$\infty$}, Black ends up with a couple of pawns for the exchange.

13.\texttt{\textemdash}a3?! g5 (After: 13...h5 14.\texttt{\textemdash}c4 \texttt{\textemdash}h7 15.a5 \texttt{\textemdash}g8 16.b5 b6 17.axb6 axb6 18.cxb6 cxb6 19.\texttt{\textemdash}a4 \texttt{\textemdash}b8 20.\texttt{\textemdash}b4 \texttt{\textemdash}gf6 21.f3 \texttt{\textemdash}f7 22.\texttt{\textemdash}e1 \texttt{\textemdash}f8, White wins with the standard combination: 23.\texttt{\textemdash}axb6! \texttt{\textemdash}xb6 24.\texttt{\textemdash}a5 \texttt{\textemdash}fb7 25.\texttt{\textemdash}xb6 \texttt{\textemdash}xb6 26.\texttt{\textemdash}a5 \texttt{\textemdash}d7 27.\texttt{\textemdash}fc1 \texttt{\textemdash}e7 28.\texttt{\textemdash}xb6 \texttt{\textemdash}xb6+ 29.\texttt{\textemdash}xb6 \texttt{\textemdash}xb6 30.\texttt{\textemdash}xc8 1-0 Marcelin – L.Roos, Besancon 1999.) 14.a5 \texttt{\textemdash}g6 15.b5 \texttt{\textemdash}f7 16.\texttt{\textemdash}c4 \texttt{\textemdash}f8 17.b6 \texttt{\textemdash}d7, Paredes – Salazar, Peru 2000 (or 17...dxc5 18.\texttt{\textemdash}h5! \texttt{\textemdash}g7 19.\texttt{\textemdash}xg6 \texttt{\textemdash}xg6 20.\texttt{\textemdash}xe5+; 17...cxb6 18.\texttt{\textemdash}h5! \texttt{\textemdash}g7 19.axb6+–) and here White had a decisive move – 18.a6+–.

The line 12...\texttt{\textemdash}f6?! is in fact an admission by Black that the move h7-h6 was wrong. After: 13.f3 f4 (In case of: 13...\texttt{\textemdash}f7 14.\texttt{\textemdash}c4 fxe4 15.fxe4 g5, Kubicek – Beil, Olo- muc 1973, it is worth playing for White 16.\texttt{\textemdash}e3±; as a result of: 13...\texttt{\textemdash}h8 14.\texttt{\textemdash}c4 a6 15.\texttt{\textemdash}e3 f4, Eppinga – De Bas, Hengelo 1993, the simple move – 16.\texttt{\textemdash}f2±, emphasizes best of all that Black’s queenside has been compromised; after 13...\texttt{\textemdash}h5 14.\texttt{\textemdash}e1 \texttt{\textemdash}f4 15.\texttt{\textemdash}f1 a5 16.\texttt{\textemdash}a3, Black cannot create any real threats on the kingside.) 14.\texttt{\textemdash}a3 and there arises a position, which has been played in practice numerous times. Still, it is quite enough to have a look at variation b, from Chapter 13 and you will easily be convinced – Black is in a serious trouble. He has played the unnecessary move h7-h6 in a very sharp position, in which each
tempo is worth a lot. We would like to illustrate that thesis with some examples: 14...g5 (Or 14...h5 15.\Dc4 g5 16.b5 \De8 17.a5 b6 18.cxb6 axb6 19.axb6 cxb6 20.\Da4 \Eb8 21.\Dc4 \Ef6 22.\Daxb6! \Db7 23.\Da4 \Ec8 24.\Da5+- Pacheco – Etcheverz, Guaymullen 2001; 14...\De8 15.\Dc4 \Ef6 16.b5 b6 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.\Da2 g5 19.\Dd4 \Dg6 20.\Dc6 \Wd7 21.\Db4 h5 22.a5 bxa5 23.\Dxa5+- Kaufman – Feuerstein, New York 1972; 15...\Ef7 16.b5 b6 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.a5 g5 19.\Dd4 \Eh8 20.axb6 axb6 21.\Da4 \Dg6 22.\We1 h5 23.\Dxg6 g4 24.\Dxc8 \Wxc8 25.\Wd1 g3 26.h3+- Atalik – Tomic, Neum 2001.) 15.\Dc4 \Dg6 (If 15...\De8 16.b5 b6, Frade Marques – Desbois, France 2005, then the fastest road to success for White is the standard – 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.a5!?+-) 16.b5 \De8 17.a5 b6 (In case of: 17...\Ef7 18.b6 axb6 19.axb6 cxb6 20.\Dxb6 \Eb8, Smyslov – Ciocaltea, Sochi 1963, White’s simplest line is: 21.\Dca4?! \Ef8 22.\Wb3 \Dh8 23.\Dac1+- and after doubling of the rooks along the c-file, Black’s position crumbles.) 18.cxd6 cxd6 19.\Db4 \Eh8 20.axb6 axb6, M.Rios – Caamaño, corr. 1985 and here the move – 21.\Da4! +- followed by capturing on b6, settles the issue immediately. It looks like White’s position is quite safe, but things are far from simple. He played a bit slow in the game – 21.\Dc7?! (instead of 21.\Da4!) 21...h5 22.\Da4 and after: 22...g4 23.\Daxb6 \Exb6 24.\Da5 g3 25.\Dxb6 \Wd4 26.\Dh3 \Dxh3! 27.gxh3 \Dxh3–, Black had a powerful kingside attack.

13.\Ddxe4 \Df5

Now, we have to admit that Black’s move h7-h6 turned out to be a bit useful after all. White’s light pieces do not have an access to the g5-square.

14.\Da3 \Ef7

In case of: 14...\Dd4, Mikanovic – Robichaud, Trois Rivieres 2001, White’s best move is 15.\Dd3+. Black’s position is evidently inferior. He must worry about the protection of his pawns on d6 and g6.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{c}
15.\Df8 16.a5 b6 17.cxb6 cxb6 18.\Db4 \Eh8 19.axb6 axb6 20.\Dd2 \Dg7 21.\Dc4
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

That position was reached in the game Seel – Kinsic, Balatonlelle 2001. White maintained the initiative thanks to his pressure against Black’s vulnerable b6 and d6-pawns.

b) 10...f5 11.\Dd2

(diagram)

White has tried numerous times to break Black’s defence
with the help of the move 11.\( \mathcal{Q} \)g5. Still, after: 11...h6 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \)e6 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xe6 13.dxe6 fxe6 14.cxd6 \( \mathcal{Q} \)d6\( \mathcal{Q} \)∞, Black has managed to obtain positions, which are solid enough.

Now, we will deal in details with: \textit{b1)} 11...fxe4, \textit{b2)} 11...a5 and \textit{b3)} 11...\( \mathcal{Q} \)h6.

Naturally, White has tried some other possibilities too. We have encountered plenty of them in some other variations from other chapters:

About 11...h6 12.a4 – see 10...h6, variation \textit{a}; 11...a6?! 12.f3 – see 9...a6, Chapter 10; 11...\( \mathcal{Q} \)h8 12.a4 – see 9...\( \mathcal{Q} \)h8, Chapter 11; 11...\( \mathcal{Q} \)f6 12.f3 – see 9...\( \mathcal{Q} \)d7, Chapter 13.

Black’s attempt to undermine his opponent’s centre with 11...c6?! can be countered by White in the most effective fashion with: 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \)c4 cxd5 13.exd5! (or 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \)xd5 \( \mathcal{Q} \)c6 14.cxd6 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xd6= Stuart – Gollogly, Dunedin 1983) 13...e4 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \)b2\( \mathcal{Q} \). White maintains his pawn centre and his space advantage.

The move – 11...\( \mathcal{Q} \)d7?! is not only a loss of time, but it also creates problems for Black to protect his \( \mathcal{Q} \)d6-pawn. After: 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \)c4 f4 13.a4 a6 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \)a3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)c8 15.\( \mathcal{Q} \)a5 b6 16.cxb6 cxb6 17.\( \mathcal{Q} \)c6 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g5 18.f3 h5 19.\( \mathcal{Q} \)d3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)h6 20.\( \mathcal{Q} \)e2 \( \mathcal{Q} \)c7, van den Berg – Rauch, Wijk aan Zee 1971, the simplest way for White to exploit the weaknesses on Black’s queenside is to follow with: 21. \( \mathcal{Q} \)ac1!? g5 22.\( \mathcal{Q} \)b1\( \mathcal{Q} \), with the unpleasant threat – 23.\( \mathcal{Q} \)xe5.

It is not so popular for Black to play 11...g5. That is mostly due to the fact that White can seize complete domination over the light squares with: 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \)c4 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g6 13.exf5 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xf5 14.\( \mathcal{Q} \)g4 \( \mathcal{Q} \)d7, Carlsammar – Justnes, Gausdal 1988 and here it seemed quite attractive for White to continue with: 15.\( \mathcal{Q} \)xf5 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xf5 16.\( \mathcal{Q} \)f3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)f4 17.\( \mathcal{Q} \)e4\( \mathcal{Q} \).

The move – 11...f4, compromises the light squares too. That line seems to be a bit anti-positional at first sight, but its refutation is far from simple. It looks like the most unpleasant move for Black should be – 12.a4! (The seemingly attractive and “principle” decision for White: 12.\( \mathcal{Q} \)g4 h5?! 13.\( \mathcal{Q} \)xc8 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xc8 leads to a situation, in which Black can easily coordinate his forces and White must play extremely accurately. He needs one imprecise move and he might be quickly into trouble – 14.f3?! g5 15.\( \mathcal{Q} \)c4 \( \mathcal{Q} \)f6 16.a4 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g6 17.\( \mathcal{Q} \)a3 g4 18.\( \mathcal{Q} \)h1 \( \mathcal{Q} \)f6! 19.\( \mathcal{Q} \)e1 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g7 20.\( \mathcal{Q} \)c1 \( \mathcal{Q} \)g6 21.\( \mathcal{Q} \)e2 \( \mathcal{Q} \)h8 22.b5 \( \mathcal{Q} \)h4!\( \mathcal{Q} \), threatening 23...\( \mathcal{Q} \)g3, Lukac – Deak, Hungary 1992.) with the idea to postpone for a while
the exchange of the light-squared bishops. White’s queenside offensive is quite easy to prepare, while Black must be constantly on the alert on the kingside about the possibility $\mathbb{c}e2-g4$. There might follow: 12...g5 (Black should avoid pushing pawns on the queenside: 12...a5 13.$\mathbb{c}a3$ b6 14.$\mathbb{c}xb6$ cxb6 15.$\mathbb{b}xa5$ bxa5 16.$\mathbb{c}b1$+ Bonin – Hasbun, New York 1991; 12...b6 13.$\mathbb{c}xd6$ $\mathbb{c}xd6$ 14.b5 a6 15.$\mathbb{a}a3$ axb5 16.$\mathbb{c}xb5$ Montalvan – Vaquero, Malaga 2000; after 12...h5 13.$\mathbb{a}a3$, Black manages to prevent his opponent’s maneuver $\mathbb{e}2-g4$ indeed, but it remains far from clear – how he should proceed with his kingside actions, since after: 13...g5?! 14.$\mathbb{c}xh5$ $\mathbb{f}6$ 15.$\mathbb{e}2$ g4 16.$\mathbb{c}c4$ $\mathbb{g}6$ 17.$\mathbb{c}xd6$ cxd6 18.$\mathbb{b}5$ f3 19.$\mathbb{g}xf3$ gxf3 20.$\mathbb{a}xf3$ $\mathbb{h}3$ 21.$\mathbb{c}xd6$+– Hausrath – Kunte, Halle 1995, or 13...$\mathbb{c}f7$ 14.$\mathbb{c}c4$ $\mathbb{h}6$ 15.a5 $\mathbb{g}7$ 16.b5 b6 17.$\mathbb{c}xd6$ cxd6 18.$\mathbb{b}4$ $\mathbb{b}8$ 19.axb6 axb6 20.$\mathbb{w}b3$± Costescu – Motoc, Eforie Nord 1998, Black’s position is very bad.) 13.$\mathbb{a}a3$! (That is the right way for White to continue with his queenside offensive, because his knight might be useful on the d2-square, so that in case White trades the light-squared bishops on g4, Black would not be able to provoke any compromising of White’s pawn-structure on the kingside with the help of the move – $f4-f3$.) 13...$\mathbb{g}6$ (In case of 13...$\mathbb{c}f7$, Hanko – Csolto, Slovakia 1997, White has the possibility: 14.$\mathbb{g}4$?! $\mathbb{f}6$ 15.$\mathbb{a}e6$+; while after: 13...$\mathbb{c}f6$ 14.b5?, there arises a position from Chapter 13, variation b – see 9...$\mathbb{d}d7$ 10.$\mathbb{d}d2$ f5 11.c5 f4.) 14.$\mathbb{g}4$ $\mathbb{c}xg4$ 15.$\mathbb{w}xg4$ $\mathbb{f}7$ 16.$\mathbb{a}a5$ $\mathbb{f}8$ 17.$\mathbb{a}6$ b6 18.$\mathbb{c}b5$ $\mathbb{e}7$ (or 18...$\mathbb{g}7$ 19.$\mathbb{f}fc1$ h5 20.$\mathbb{w}xe2$ g4 21.f3+) 19.$\mathbb{f}fc1$ $\mathbb{f}6$ (After: 19...$\mathbb{g}7$ 20.$\mathbb{c}xb6$ $\mathbb{c}xb6$ 21.$\mathbb{c}c7+$, White’s knight penetrates into Black’s camp.) 20.$\mathbb{w}e2$ g4 21.$\mathbb{c}xb6$ cxb6, Bromberger – Duschek, Germany 1999 and here the move 22.f3+, prevents radically Black’s possible advance $f4-f3$.

Following: 11...$\mathbb{c}f7$ 12.a4 $\mathbb{f}6$ (In case of: 12...g5 13.$\mathbb{c}xf5$ $\mathbb{c}xf5$ 14.$\mathbb{d}de4$ h6 15.$\mathbb{c}h5$ $\mathbb{g}6$ 16.$\mathbb{c}e3$ $\mathbb{f}8$ 17.$\mathbb{c}xg6$ $\mathbb{d}xg6$ 18.$\mathbb{w}g4$+ Tatar – Burovic, Ljubljana 1993, Black loses the fight for the light squares; after: 12...$\mathbb{c}f8$ 13.$\mathbb{a}a3$ f4 14.$\mathbb{g}4$ h5, M.Kozak – Stluka, Klatovy 2001, it is not necessary for White to exchange on c8. Instead, he can trade the light-squared bishops later under much more favourable circumstances: 15.$\mathbb{a}e6$?! $\mathbb{xe}6$ 16.$\mathbb{d}xe6$ $\mathbb{f}6$ 17.$\mathbb{b}3$ $\mathbb{g}7$ 18.$\mathbb{d}f3$ $\mathbb{xe}6$ 19.$\mathbb{c}xd6$ cxd6 20.$\mathbb{b}f1$ $\mathbb{d}6$ 21.$\mathbb{a}5$ 22.$\mathbb{a}2$ $\mathbb{c}8$ 23.$\mathbb{cc}1$+; in case of 12...f4, it is good for White to continue with: 13.$\mathbb{c}c4$ 13...$\mathbb{f}6$ 14.$\mathbb{c}a3$ $\mathbb{g}7$ 15.b5 g5 16.$\mathbb{g}4$± Gleizerov – Shapovalenko, St Petersburg 2004, as well as with the immediate: 13.$\mathbb{g}4$ h5, Ortmann – A.Fischer, Stuttgart 2001, having in mind the line: 14.$\mathbb{e}6$?! $\mathbb{xe}6$ 15.$\mathbb{d}xe6$ $\mathbb{f}6$ 16.$\mathbb{w}b3$ c6 17.$\mathbb{d}d1+$ (It is also possi-
ble to play 13...a3, in order to be content after: 13...fxe4 14...dxe4 dxe4 15...dxe4 f5 16...cd6 cd6 17...b5 f8 18...g4!? d4 19...xc8 ecx8 20.c1 ecx1 21.xc1 f8 22.c3 f7 23.e3 f8 24.a5 f5 25.f3 with only a minimal advantage for White, Pekarek – Behnk, Germany 1993.) 13...f4 14.a3 g5 15.c4 and the game transposes to variation b2, from Chapter 13.

b1) 11...fxe4

Black hopes to equalize by exchanging pieces. He solves the eternal problems here with his knight on e7 rather simply – the knight is headed for the f5-square.

12...dxe4

Now, White’s knight will be deployed quite dominantly – on the e4-outpost.

12...f5

About 12...h6 13.a4 – see variation a; as for 12...f6 – see the line: 11...f5xe4, from Chapter 13.

If 12...a5, then White can play 13.b5!?, as well as the move 13...a3, which leads to variation b2.

Black has also tried in practice:
12...f5 13...b3 h8 14...f3 f6 (It is too dangerous for Black to part with his light-squared bishop, because of: 14...fxe4!? 15.fxe4 xf1+ 16.xf1 f8 17.f3 e3 h4 18.g1 e6 19.f1+ Cornelisse – Colijn, Vlissingen 2005.) 15.c1 b6 16.e3 and here after the careless move: 16...f7?? 17.xf6 xf6 18.g4++, Black lost a piece in the game Skalkotas – Midjord, Siegen 1970.

13...g5!?

White exploits the fact that contrary to variation a, now Black has not played the move h7-h6.

Meanwhile, White has an interesting alternative here: 14. g4!? f7, Stohl – Malisauskas, Lubniewice 1994 (Or 14...d4 15.xc8 xc8 16.a4 a6 17.ae1 f7, Farago – F.Portisch, Austria 1998, 18.f4!? 15.xf6+! fxf6 16.xf6 xf6 17.e4 h8 18.f2 f7 19.f4+ and he seizes the initiative.

13...f6

Black goes with his knight deliberately under the pin with the idea to simplify the position.

The ugly move – 13...f7, after 14.c1 h6 (The exchange of the dark-squared bishops: 14...f7 15.e3 h6 16.xh6 xh6 17.d2 f5, enables White to begin some decisive kingside operations with: 18.f4! f7 19.c4 xf4 20.xf4± Atakisi – Izrhanov, corr. 2000.) 15.d2 f7 16.a4 d4 17.xd3 xf5 18.a5 a6 19.e3± Cichy –
Konikowski, Germany 1985, leads to a position, in which White maintains a slight edge thanks to his extra space.

14.\textit{\textbf{Ec1 h6}}

In case Black remains under the pin – 14...\textit{\textbf{f7}}, Ionescu – F.Portisch, Zalakaros 1998, then it seems attractive for White to continue with the thematic move – 15.\textit{\textbf{g4}}!??. Black has also tried in practice: 14...a6 15.\textit{\textbf{g4}}!? \textit{\textbf{d4}} 16.\textit{\textbf{x)c8 xc8}} 17.\textit{\textbf{xf6 xf6}} 18.\textit{\textbf{g4 e7}} 19.f4 \textit{\textbf{xf4}} 20.\textit{\textbf{xf4 exf4}}, Matera – Khientens, Teeside 1974 and here after: 21.\textit{\textbf{d1}}?! \textit{\textbf{f5}} 22.\textit{\textbf{xf4}}!, White maintains some initiative.

15.\textit{\textbf{xf6}}

White is going after some forced play.

15...\textit{\textbf{xf6}} 16.\textit{\textbf{cxd6}}

Now, Black has some problems, because his pieces are cramped and he does not object to exchanges. In case of: 16.\textit{\textbf{xf6+ xf6}} 17.\textit{\textbf{d2 g7}} 18.\textit{\textbf{e4 b6}} 19.\textit{\textbf{c3 b7}} 20.\textit{\textbf{e4}}! Lubben – Starace, corr. 2001, White maintains the initiative, but Black’s position remains quite solid, because he has no evident weaknesses.

16.\textit{\textbf{cxd6}}

Black continues with his previous manner of playing aimed at simplifications. After: 16...\textit{\textbf{cxd6}} 17.\textit{\textbf{b5}}! (It is weaker for White to play here: 17.\textit{\textbf{xf6+ xf6}}, because in that position after: 18.\textit{\textbf{e4 f7}} 19.\textit{\textbf{g4 d7}} 20.\textit{\textbf{c3 b5}} 21.\textit{\textbf{e2 h4}} 22.\textit{\textbf{f3 xe2}} 23.\textit{\textbf{xe2 d8}} 24.\textit{\textbf{a3 a5= C.Gimenez – Riasco, Mislata 2005, Black equalized.}) 17...a6 18.\textit{\textbf{c7 b8}} 19.\textit{\textbf{g4 e7}} 20.b5\textit{\textbf{+}}

Dorfman – Iuldachev, Elista 1998 and White managed to penetrate his opponent’s camp with his knight.

17.\textit{\textbf{xd6 cxd6}} 18.\textit{\textbf{d3 g5}}

19.\textit{\textbf{c2 g7}} 20.\textit{\textbf{e4 f5}} 21.\textit{\textbf{g5 hxg5}} 22.\textit{\textbf{d2+}}. That position was reached in the game Meessen – Kuerten, Karlsruhe 2003. White preserved some advantage, mostly because of his superior pawn-structure.

b2) 11...a5

Black is following the same idea as in variation b1, except that under different circumstances. He hopes to equalize the game, by
simplifications.

12. \textbf{\textit{a}3}

The position is much less clear after: 12.bxa5 dxc5∞, or: 12.cxd6 \textit{\textbf{x}d6} 13.bxa5, Aijala – Manninen, Lahti 2002 and since White has not played f2-f3 yet, then Black can play – 13...\textbf{f}xe4!?∞.

12...\textbf{\textit{x}b}4

The move 12...\textbf{\textit{d}7}?! is evidently bad for Black. He completes the development of his queenside, indeed, but that development lacks harmony. He will have problems to protect his d6-pawn with a bishop placed on the d7-square. It is not surprising that after: 13.f3 \textit{\textbf{f}6} 14.\textit{\textbf{c}4} axb4 15.\textbf{\textit{x}b}4 b6 16.cxb6 cxb6 17.a4±, White obtained quickly an overwhelming advantage in the game Russi – De Marco, Imperia 2003.

It is also bad for Black to try 12...b6?!, in view of: 13.cxb6 cxb6 14.bxa5 bxa5 15.\textit{\textbf{b}1} \textit{\textbf{a}6} 16.\textit{\textbf{x}a}6 \textit{\textbf{x}a}6 17.\textit{\textbf{c}e}2 \textit{\textbf{b}6} 18.\textit{\textbf{x}b}6 \textit{\textbf{x}b}6 19.\textit{\textbf{c}4} \textit{\textbf{d}8} 20.\textit{\textbf{b}5} \textit{\textbf{c}8} 21.f3 \textbf{\textit{f}xe}4 22.\textbf{\textit{f}xe}4 \textit{\textbf{x}f}1+ 23.\textit{\textbf{x}f}1 \textit{\textbf{f}8} 24.\textit{\textbf{g}4}± Tratar – Bilbija, Portoroz 2005 and Black lost completely his control over the light squares.

In case Black postpones the exchange on b4 – 12...\textbf{\textit{h}8}, then White can follow with 13.bxa5!? (The other possibility for White – 13.b5 dxc5 14.\textbf{\textit{x}c}5, Budra – Maloberti, corr. 2001, enables Black to fortify his queenside with: 14...b6?! 15.\textbf{\textit{a}3} \textit{\textbf{d}6±.) 13...\textit{\textbf{e}5} 14.\textbf{\textit{b}4} \textit{\textbf{a}8} 15.f3!± and the arising position is basically quite similar to the one in which Black exchanges himself on b4 (see the line: 12...\textit{\textbf{x}b}4 13.\textbf{\textit{x}b}4 \textit{\textbf{h}8}).

12...\textbf{\textit{f}xe}4 13.\textit{\textbf{d}xe}4 \textit{\textbf{f}5} (about 13...\textit{\textbf{x}b}4 14.\textit{\textbf{x}b}4 – see 12...\textit{\textbf{x}b}4) 14.bxa5?! \textbf{\textit{x}a}5 15.\textbf{\textit{h}4} \textbf{\textit{e}8} 16.a4 – see 12...\textit{\textbf{x}b}4 13.\textbf{\textit{x}b}4 fxe4.

13.\textbf{\textit{x}b}4 dxc5


The exchange of pawns after: 13...\textbf{\textit{f}xe}4 14.\textbf{\textit{d}xe}4, is a part of White’s plans. He can thus solve the problem with his knight on e7, but still after: 14...\textbf{\textit{f}5} (The knight on e7 can hardly be useful after the other possibilities for Black: 14...\textbf{\textit{f}5} 15.\textbf{\textit{b}5} dxc5 16.\textbf{\textit{x}c}5 \textit{\textbf{d}6} 17.\textbf{\textit{b}3} \textit{\textbf{h}8} 18.f3 \textbf{\textit{b}8} 19.\textbf{\textit{a}d}1 \textit{\textbf{c}e}8 20.a4± Farago – Predovic, Bizovac 2002.) 15.a4 \textit{\textbf{d}4} 16.\textbf{\textit{c}4} (The position is calm enough, but still White must watch carefully about Black’s possible kingside counterplay: 16.a5 \textbf{\textit{f}4} 17.f3 \textbf{\textit{h}6} 18.\textbf{\textit{d}3} \textbf{\textit{h}4} 19.\textbf{\textit{e}1} \textbf{\textit{f}4}± Villeneuve – Chevrier, St Chely d’Aubrac 2001; White’s attempt to win some material with the help of the line: 16.\textbf{\textit{x}d}6 \textbf{\textit{x}d}6 17.\textbf{\textit{b}5} \textbf{\textit{d}7} 18.\textbf{\textit{x}d}6 \textbf{\textit{x}d}6 19.\textbf{\textit{x}d}6, enabled Black after: 19...\textbf{\textit{h}3} 20.\textbf{\textit{x}f}8 \textbf{\textit{g}5} 21.g3 \textbf{\textit{x}f}8 22.\textbf{\textit{e}4} \textbf{\textit{f}5}→ to organize a powerful attack against...}
White’s king, Behm – Kabisch, Illertissen 2005.) 16...\textbf{\textit{f5}} 17.\textbf{\textit{xe1}} \textbf{\textit{e7}} 18.\textbf{\textit{exd6}} \textbf{\textit{xd6}} 19.\textbf{\textit{xd6}} \textbf{\textit{cxd6}} 20.\textbf{\textit{db5}} \textbf{\textit{xb5}} 21.\textbf{\textit{xb5}} \textbf{\textit{d7}} 22.\textbf{\textit{we2}} \textbf{\textit{xb5}} 23.\textbf{\textit{axb5}} \textbf{\textit{xc8}} 24.\textbf{\textit{bac1}} \textbf{\textit{xc1}} 25.\textbf{\textit{xc1}} \textbf{\textit{h6}} 26.\textbf{\textit{ac2±}} and White preserves a slight edge, thanks to his more active pieces and his space advantage, Weber – Koehler, corr. 1997.

\textbf{\textit{14.xxc5 b6}}

In case Black slows down a bit with 14...\textbf{\textit{d6}}, White fortifies his e4-pawn – 15.f3!? g5 (After: 15...\textbf{\textit{e7}} 16.\textbf{\textit{ac4}} \textbf{\textit{e8}} L.Kaufman – B.Gurevich, Mashantucket 1999, Black must consider the consequences of the complications after: 17.f4!? exf4 18.e5\uparrow) 16.a4 \textbf{\textit{g6}}, Haritakis – Papastavropoulos, Kavala 1996 and here after 17.g3±, Black is deprived of any counterplay on the kingside.

\textbf{\textit{15.db4 d6}}

If 15...\textbf{\textit{h8}}, then 16.f3!? \textbf{\textit{a6}}, W.\textbf{\textit{ocho}} – Piber, Fefferantz 2004 and here White could have obtained an overwhelming advantage with the line: 17.\textbf{\textit{xa6}} \textbf{\textit{xa6}} 18.\textbf{\textit{we2}} \textbf{\textit{a8}} 19.\textbf{\textit{c4±}}. After: 15...\textbf{\textit{b7}} 16.\textbf{\textit{wb3}} \textbf{\textit{h8}} 17.f3!? \textbf{\textit{d6}}, Rakitskaja – Bronnikova, Samara 2005, White could have improved patiently his position, for example with the move 18.\textbf{\textit{ac4±}.

In case of 15...\textbf{\textit{ef7}}, M. Ginsburg – Aldrich, Las Vegas 2003, White can parry Black’s threat to advance – c7-c5, with the simplest move – 16.\textbf{\textit{wb3±}.

\textbf{\textit{16.cc4}}

The tactical nuance of that position is that in case of: 16.f3, Black can equalize the game with the help of the move 16...c5!. White would then have to comply with the exchange of his d5-pawn, because his bishop has no squares to retreat to – 17.dxc6 \textbf{\textit{xc6=}}.

\textbf{\textit{16...fxe4}} 17.\textbf{\textit{xd6}} \textbf{\textit{cxd6}} 18.\textbf{\textit{xe4}} \textbf{\textit{f5}}

After: 18...\textbf{\textit{ef4?!}} 19.f3 \textbf{\textit{f5}} 20.\textbf{\textit{d2}} \textbf{\textit{d7}} 21.g3 \textbf{\textit{a4}} 22.\textbf{\textit{we1}} \textbf{\textit{xe4}} 23.\textbf{\textit{xe4}} \textbf{\textit{d4}} 24.\textbf{\textit{ac1±}} Arcija – Manhardt, Medellin 1996, Black had to give up the exchange without obtaining a sufficient compensation for it all.

\textbf{\textit{19.cc4±}}

We have seen that resource before. White plans to trade favourably the light-squared bishops. It is less purposeful for him to play: 19.\textbf{\textit{e1}} \textbf{\textit{wh4}} 20.\textbf{\textit{ff1±}}, but he still maintained some slight edge in the game Taimanov – Portisch, Zalaegerszeg 1969.

\textbf{\textit{19...we4}}

It is a mistake for Black to play 19...\textbf{\textit{h4?!}}, because as a result of the line: 20.\textbf{\textit{xd6}} \textbf{\textit{f4}} 21.\textbf{\textit{e6+}} \textbf{\textit{xe6}} 22.\textbf{\textit{dxe6}} \textbf{\textit{xe4}} 23.\textbf{\textit{c7}} \textbf{\textit{d7}}
24.\text{\texttt{w}}d5+ \text{\texttt{g}}h8 25.\text{\texttt{w}}xa8+-, in the game Wajnberg – Wittman, corr. 1999, Black had a lost position.

20.\text{\texttt{f}}xe1

White preserves some advantage. His light pieces exert pressure against his opponent’s d6-pawn and that forces Black on the defensive side.

b3) 11...\text{\texttt{h}}h6

Black wishes to get rid of his passive dark-squared bishop.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

12.\text{\texttt{f}}c4

White has no advantage after: 12.\text{\texttt{e}}xf5 \text{\texttt{g}}xf5 13.\text{\texttt{c}}c4 \text{\texttt{x}}xc1 14.\text{\texttt{e}}xc1 \text{\texttt{g}}6∞ Gligoric – Vukic, Sarajevo 1969.

12...\text{\texttt{e}}xc1

The retreat of the bishop – 12...\text{\texttt{g}}7?, loses two tempi for Black after: 13.a4 \text{\texttt{h}}8 14.\text{\texttt{a}}a3 \text{\texttt{g}}8 15.a5 \text{\texttt{g}}f6 16.f3 f4 17.b5 b6 18.axb6 axb6 19.cxb6 cxb6 20.\text{\texttt{a}}a4 \text{\texttt{b}}8 21.\text{\texttt{b}}b4 g5, Alon – G.Horvath, Budapest 1998 and White can punish his opponent with the help of the standard combination: 22.\text{\texttt{x}}xb6! \text{\texttt{x}}xb6 23.\text{\texttt{a}}a5 \text{\texttt{d}}d7 24.\text{\texttt{e}}c1+-.

13.\text{\texttt{e}}xc1 f4

That is a forced move. After Black has traded his dark-squared bishop, his kingside might come under attack after White pushes f2-f4.

Black loses after 13...\text{\texttt{h}}h7?, because of: 14.f4! \text{\texttt{f}}xe4 15.\text{\texttt{f}}xe5 \text{\texttt{x}}xf1+ 16.\text{\texttt{x}}xf1 \text{\texttt{d}}xe5 17.d6 cxd6 18.cxd6 \text{\texttt{f}}5 19.\text{\texttt{f}}d5+ \text{\texttt{g}}7 20.\text{\texttt{e}}xe4 \text{\texttt{d}}7 21.\text{\texttt{e}}xe5 \text{\texttt{e}}xd6 22.\text{\texttt{e}}xd6 \text{\texttt{b}}6+ 23.\text{\texttt{c}}c5+- Pein – Stewart, Plymouth 1989.

After: 13...\text{\texttt{h}}h8?! 14.cxd6 cxd6, it is again very good for White to play: 15.f4! exf4 (Or 15...\text{\texttt{f}}xe4 16.\text{\texttt{e}}xe5 \text{\texttt{x}}xf1 17.\text{\texttt{e}}xf1 \text{\texttt{f}}5 18.g4 b5, Goeke – Kleinschmidt, Germany 2004, 19.\text{\texttt{e}}xb5+--; following: 15...\text{\texttt{f}}6 16.\text{\texttt{e}}xe5 \text{\texttt{d}}xe5 17.\text{\texttt{e}}xe5 \text{\texttt{f}}xe4 18.\text{\texttt{e}}xe4 \text{\texttt{e}}xd5 19.\text{\texttt{e}}xf6 \text{\texttt{e}}xf6 20.\text{\texttt{e}}xf6 \text{\texttt{b}}6+ 21.\text{\texttt{e}}c5 \text{\texttt{e}}xf6 22.\text{\texttt{e}}d4+) 16.\text{\texttt{d}}d4+ \text{\texttt{g}}8 17.\text{\texttt{e}}xf4± and he maintains a clear advantage.

Black has great problems after: 13...\text{\texttt{e}}xe4?! 14.\text{\texttt{e}}xe4 \text{\texttt{f}}5 (His defence is not any easier after: 14...\text{\texttt{d}}xc5, Farago – Suba, Bucharest 1974, in view of: 15.\text{\texttt{d}}xc5 \text{\texttt{e}}xd5 16.\text{\texttt{f}}3 \text{\texttt{e}}xd1 17.\text{\texttt{e}}fxd1 c6 18.\text{\texttt{e}}xe5+ 15.f4! b5 (After: 15...\text{\texttt{f}}xe4 16.\text{\texttt{e}}xf4, Black comes under a powerful positional pressure on the kingside in case of: 16...\text{\texttt{e}}e7 17.\text{\texttt{d}}3 \text{\texttt{e}}h6 18.\text{\texttt{d}}2 \text{\texttt{e}}xf4 19.\text{\texttt{e}}xf4 \text{\texttt{f}}5 20.\text{\texttt{g}}3 \text{\texttt{g}}7 21.\text{\texttt{e}}c3± Tukmakov – Cebalo, Biel 2003, as well as after: 16...\text{\texttt{f}}6 17.\text{\texttt{f}}xf6+ \text{\texttt{e}}xf6 18.\text{\texttt{d}}2 h5 19.\text{\texttt{d}}3 \text{\texttt{d}}7 20.c6 bxc6 21.\text{\texttt{d}}xc6 \text{\texttt{e}}6, R.Garcia – Moreno Carnero, Buenos Aires 1996, 22.\text{\texttt{e}}e3± 16.cxb6 axb6, because
of: 17.g4!? (It is less precise for White to play: 17.fxe5 dxe5 18.d6, Otterstetter – Schlamp, Boeblingen 1999, because of: 18...e6! 19.dxc7 $Qxc7\# 17...b5 (All other moves lose by force for Black: 17...$Qd4 18.fxe5 dxe5 19.$Qxe5 $Qxe2+ 20.$Qxe2 $Qxf1+ 21.$Qxf1 $Qxd5 22.$Qf3+-; 17...$Qe7 18.fxe5 $Qxf1+ 19.$Qxf1 dxe5 20.e5 $Qb7 21.$Qc4+-; 17...$Qh6 18.fxe5 $Qxf1+ 19.$Qxf1 $Qxg4 20.$Qxg4 $Qxg4 21.e6 $Qe6 22.$Qe3!+–) 18.gxf5 gxf5 19.$Qg3 bxc4 20.$Qxc4\#.

!4...$Qg4!? 15.$Qxc8 $Qxc8

White should better trade the light-squared bishops immediately in this position. After: 14.g4 $Qh8 15.$Qb5 $Qg8 16.a4 $Qgf6 17.f3 h5 18.h3 $Qf7\#, he will have problems to activate his light-squared bishop, Kapengoni – Biserekho, Elista 1998.

The standard queenside attack – 14.a4 h5 15.b5, can be countered by Black with 15...b6!? The absence of the dark-squared bishops makes it harder for White to attack effectively on that side of the board: 16.cxd6 cxd6 17.a5 $Qf7 18.$Qa1 $Qb8 19.axb6 axb6\# Lo-
too slow to organize any effective counterplay on the kingside.

16.f3 g5 17...b3
White is threatening 18...xe5.
17...f7 18.b5 g6
After: 18...b6 19.cxd6 cxd6 20.
a4 g4 21..a2↑, White's knight heads for the c6-square.

19.b6 axb6 20.cxb6 cxb6
21...xb6+ 22...xb6 c5
(diagram)
23...ca4. Now, Black must play very precisely, despite the numerous exchanges. 23...
cc7. (Black had surprisingly great problems to protect his d6-pawn after the trade of the rooks:
23...xc1? 24.xc1 c7 25.xc7

Conclusion

The variation with the retreat of Black's knight to the e8-square is not as popular as the line with 9...d7, but generally speaking it is more purposeful. He can transpose to the main lines, which have been analyzed in Chapter 13, under index b, and he has some additional possibilities too. We have devoted our Chapter 14 to them. Variation a, does not have any special importance for Black although the move – h7-h6 is played quite frequently, despite the fact that it is hardly necessary. In variations b1 and b2, Black tries to equalize by simplifications. It happens quite often in these lines, that White's knight occupies the powerful e4-outpost; Black must make some additional positional concessions if he wishes to get rid of his opponent's powerful knight. Variation b3 is much trickier for Black. He exchanges the dark-squared bishops with the move – 11...h6. This maneuver is quite reasonable for him from the point of view of strategy, but in order to avoid being crushed in the centre and on he kingside with f2-f4, Black must play f5-f4 himself. That enables White to make a good use of the absence of his pawn on the f3-square and to trade the light-squared bishops. In the arising position, without bishops, space advantage and superior development become tremendously important. White is clearly better in both these aspects and that guarantees his advantage and initiative.
Chapter 15

1.\textit{f}f3 \textit{f}f6 2.\textit{c}c4 \textit{g}6 3.\textit{c}c3 \textit{g}7 4.e4 \textit{d}6 5.d4 0–0 6.\textit{e}e2 \textit{e}5 7.0–0 \textit{c}c6 8.d5 \textit{e}e7 9.b4 a5

12.\textit{d}d2 f5 13.f3 – see Chapter 14, variation \textit{b}2;

After 10...\textit{e}e8 11.c5 axb4 (Or 11...h6 12.\textit{d}d2 axb4 13.\textit{x}xb4 – see variation \textit{a}, Chapter 14; 11...f5 12.\textit{d}d2 – see variation \textit{b}2, Chapter 14; 11...\textit{h}h8 12.\textit{d}d2 axb4 13.\textit{x}xb4 f5, Kvisvik – Hitzgerova, Gausdal 2001, the best for White is to fortify his e4-pawn with the move – 14.f3!?\pm) 11...12.\textit{x}xb4 – see 10...axb4 11.\textit{x}xb4 \textit{e}e8 12.c5 (Chapter 16);

In case of: 10...\textit{h}6, Karkuth – Kindsvogel, corr. 1998, it looks attractive for White to continue with 11.c5\uparrow;

The move – 10...c6 requires special attention. Now, just like in Chapter 10 (see 9...c6) White must treat the problems in the centre quite delicately. 11.dxc6!? bxc6 (It is a mistake for Black to play: 11...\textit{xc}6?! 12.b5 \textit{d}d4 13.\textit{ex}d4 \textit{ex}d4 14.\textit{wx}d4 \textit{xe}4 15.\textit{xe}4 \textit{xc}3, because as a result of the forced play, there arises a very difficult position for him. The game Silva – Aguettaz, Grenoble 2004, followed with: 16.\textit{ad}1 17.\textit{b}2 \textit{c}5 18.\textit{f}3 \textit{e}6 19.\textit{f}4 g5

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20.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}1} 21.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}e1} 22.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}e5} h6 23.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{a}}3} d7 24.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{e}}2} c5 25.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{d}}5} h7 26.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{w}}c2} and Black resigned.)
12.b5 c5 (Opening of the game after: 12...\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}xb5}?! 13.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}xb5} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{b}}7} 14.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}d6} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}d6} 15.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}d6} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}e8} 16. \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{g}}e5}-- ends up in a disaster for Black, Christian – Suarez Real, Internet 2004.) 13.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{d}}3} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}7} (After: 13...\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{b}}6} 14.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}ad1} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{e}}8} 15.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{e}}1} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{e}}6} 16.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}2} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{h}}6} 17.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}3} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{e}}3} 18.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}e3} f6, White opens a second front of actions, while Black has failed to bring his knight on e8 to the e6-square: 19.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}4}! exf4 20.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}xf4} g5 21.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{w}}f3} g4 22.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{g}}3} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{g}}6} 23.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{b}}2} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{e}}5} 24.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{d}}5}-- Babula – Bielek, Olomouc 1997.) 14.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}d1} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{e}}8} 15.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{a}}ab1} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{b}}7} (In case of: 15... \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{b}}8} 16.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{d}}2} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{e}}6} 17.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}1} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{h}}6} 18. \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{e}}3} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}e3} 19.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}e3} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}8}, White can remind his opponent that his dark squares around his king are terribly compromised: 20.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}4}! f6 21.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{b}}1} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{b}}6} 22.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}xe5} fxe5 23.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}xf8}+ \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}xf8} 24.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}1}+ \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{g}}8} 25.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{d}}5} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}d5} 26.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}d5} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}8} 27.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}2} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{e}}7} 28.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}1}+ C.Pedersen – Petri, Aarhus 2005.) 16.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{d}}2} f5 17.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}3} f4 18.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{g}}4} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}6} 19. \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{b}}6} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}d8} 20.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{d}}5} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}d5} 21.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}xd5}± Black had complied with his opponent's powerful knight on d5 long enough, but as a result of its exchange White becomes totally dominant over the light squares, Antoniewski – Kislov, Krynica 1997.

\textbf{a) 10...\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{d}}h5} 11.c5}

As you are going to see later – that is White’s only chance to fight for the advantage. The prophylactic move 11.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{e}}1} is ineffective due to: 11...\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}4} 12.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}1} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{g}}4}!, but we are going to deal with that in details in Chapter 18.

\textbf{11...\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}4} }

Black’s knight penetrates into enemy territory. He could have done that after the preliminary exchange of pawns 11...\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{a}}xb4} (Chapter 16, variation a).

Black has also tested in practice 11...\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}5}. In that case, White obtains a powerful initiative with – 12.b5! b6 (If 12...\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{d}}xc5}, then 13.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}xc5}+, with the idea to follow with d5–d6; 12...\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}4} 13.b6! \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}xe4} 14.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{b}}xc7} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{w}}xc7} 15.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{g}}5}+) 13.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}xd6} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}d6} 14.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{d}}2} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}6} (About 14...\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}4} 15.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}4} see – 11...\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}4} 12.b5 b6 13.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}xd6} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}d6} 14.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{d}}2} f5 15.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}4}.) 15. \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{c}}4} \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{e}}8} and here White could have increased his pressure with: 16.\textit{\textbf{\lowercase{f}}4}! \textit{\textbf{\lowercase{x}}f4} 17.e5!

\begin{center}
\textbf{12.b5!}
\end{center}

That is the best for White. His attempt to transpose to variation \textbf{a} from Chapter 16 with the move 12.bxa5, is not reasonable. At first, the move 12.b5 promises him more and secondly he cannot
transpose so easily, because Black is not forced to capture the pawn immediately: 12...f5!? 13.cxd6 cxd6∞ Lamprecht – Istratescu, Biel 1994.

12...\textit{\texttt{g4}}

Black can hardly solve his defensive problems on the queenside with the move 12...b6. After: 13.cxd6 cxd6 14.\textit{\texttt{d2}}!? (In case of 14.\textit{\texttt{E1}}, Topalov – J.Polgar, Frankfurt 1999, 14...f5 15.\textit{\texttt{Ee1}} \textit{\texttt{b7}} 16.\textit{\texttt{d2}}± White’s advantage is not so great.) 14...f5 (After: 14...\textit{\texttt{b7}} 15.\textit{\texttt{Ec4}} \textit{\texttt{c8}} 16.\textit{\texttt{Ec1}} f5 17.\textit{\texttt{f3}} \textit{\texttt{a7}} 18.\textit{\texttt{Ec2}} \textit{\texttt{a8}} 19.\textit{\texttt{Ec1}} \textit{\texttt{a7}} 20.\textit{\texttt{f3}} h5 21.\textit{\texttt{a4}}± Czakon – Kislov, Polandica Zdroj 2005, White’s pressure against the b6-pawn is very powerful.) 15.\textit{\texttt{Ec4}} \textit{\texttt{f6}} (White’s light-squared bishop only impedes the coordination of the rest of his pieces. It was not surprising that after: 15...\textit{\texttt{exe2}}+ 16.\textit{\texttt{exe2}} \textit{\texttt{f6}} 17.\textit{\texttt{f3}} \textit{\texttt{b8}} 18.\textit{\texttt{Ed1}} \textit{\texttt{h8}}, White had the line: 19.f4! \textit{\texttt{exe4}} 20.\textit{\texttt{exe4}}–– Lesiege – Quan Zhe, Montreal 2003, leading to a decisive advantage for him; in case of: 15...\textit{\texttt{exe4}} 16.\textit{\texttt{xd6}} \textit{\texttt{f5}} 17.\textit{\texttt{exe4}} \textit{\texttt{exe2}}+ 18.\textit{\texttt{exe2}} \textit{\texttt{d4}} 19.\textit{\texttt{Ed3}} \textit{\texttt{f4}} 20.\textit{\texttt{Ec1}} \textit{\texttt{f7}} 21.\textit{\texttt{g5}}–– Veingold – Meskanen, Espoo 1998, White’s extra pawn should be sufficient to win the game.) 16.\textit{\texttt{Ec1}} \textit{\texttt{exe2}}+ 17.\textit{\texttt{exe2}} \textit{\texttt{b7}} (if 17...f4, then 18.\textit{\texttt{exe5}}! and after: 18...\textit{\texttt{exe5}} 19.d6 \textit{\texttt{ef5}} 20.\textit{\texttt{exe5}} \textit{\texttt{xex5}} 21.\textit{\texttt{exe5}} \textit{\texttt{f8}} 22.\textit{\texttt{Be7}} \textit{\texttt{xc3}} 23.\textit{\texttt{wb3}}+–, as well as following: 18...\textit{\texttt{f8}} 19.\textit{\texttt{Ec6}} \textit{\texttt{xc6}} 20.\textit{\texttt{dxc6}}–– S.Savchenko – Rechel, Darmstadt 2001, White obtains a decisive advantage.) 17...\textit{\texttt{b7}} 18.\textit{\texttt{a4}} \textit{\texttt{c8}} 19.\textit{\texttt{Ec1}} h6 20.f3± and White’s bishop will occupy the a7-g1 diagonal. Black has a difficult position without any counterplay whatsoever.

Black can trade two couples of light pieces with: 12...\textit{\texttt{exe2}}+ 13.\textit{\texttt{exe2}} \textit{\texttt{g4}} (After: 13...\textit{\texttt{b6}} 14.\textit{\texttt{cxd6}} \textit{\texttt{cxd6}} 15.\textit{\texttt{d2}} \textit{\texttt{b7}} 16.\textit{\texttt{Ec4}} \textit{\texttt{c8}} 17.\textit{\texttt{a4}} \textit{\texttt{b8}} 18.\textit{\texttt{ac1}} \textit{\texttt{a8}} 19.\textit{\texttt{Ec3}} \textit{\texttt{e8}} 20.\textit{\texttt{f1c1}} \textit{\texttt{h6}} 21.\textit{\texttt{ic2}} \textit{\texttt{c7}}, Malakhatko – Shianovsky, Kiev 2003, it seems very good for White to transfer his bishop to the a7-g1 diagonal: 22.\textit{\texttt{g4}}! \textit{\texttt{d7}} 23.\textit{\texttt{h3}} \textit{\texttt{f8}} 24.\textit{\texttt{c1+!}} 1h3 \textit{\texttt{xf3}} 15.\textit{\texttt{xf3}} f5 16.\textit{\texttt{ad1}} b6 (or 16...f4? 17.b6! \textit{\texttt{c8}} 18.\textit{\texttt{b5}} \textit{\texttt{xb6}} 19.\textit{\texttt{cxd6}} –– Melia – J.Butterworth, corr. 2001) 17.\textit{\texttt{cxd6}} \textit{\texttt{xd6}} 18.\textit{\texttt{d3}}± and Black can reduce the tension on the queenside, but that does not solve all his opening problems. His dark-squared bishop is without any bright prospects and he has to protect his c6-square from the penetration of White’s pieces on the queenside.

13.\textit{\texttt{d2}}!?  

It is premature for White to try to break Black’s queenside with the move 13.\textit{\texttt{b6}}, due to: 13...\textit{\texttt{exe2}}+ (or 13...\textit{\texttt{xb6}}? 14.\textit{\texttt{cxd6}} \textit{\texttt{c8}} 15.\textit{\texttt{exe5}} \textit{\texttt{xex5}} \textit{\texttt{f8}} 16.\textit{\texttt{f5}} \textit{\texttt{c8}} 17.\textit{\texttt{exe5}} \textit{\texttt{exe5}} 18.\textit{\texttt{exe5}}+– Lalic – Mogranzini, Cannes 2005) 14.\textit{\texttt{exe2}} 14...\textit{\texttt{cxd5}} 15.\textit{\texttt{bxc7}} \textit{\texttt{xc7}} 16.\textit{\texttt{ad1}} \textit{\texttt{d7}} 17.\textit{\texttt{exe5}} \textit{\texttt{ac8}} 18.\textit{\texttt{f3}} \textit{\texttt{xf3}} 19.\textit{\texttt{gxf3}}, Farago – Joksic, Basel 2000 and here after: 19...\textit{\texttt{h6}}?
20. \( \text{B}xh6 \text{B}xc5 \) \( \text{B}xh6 \) Black would not be worse at all.

13...\( \text{Q}xe2+ \)

After the trade of the light-squared bishops: 13...\( \text{Q}xe2 \) 14. \( \text{Q}xe2 \) f5, White can follow in a strictly positional style: 15.f3! fxe4 16.fxe4 \( \text{B}d7 \) 17.c6 \( \text{B}xc6 \) 18. \( \text{B}xc6 \) \( \text{B}c8 \) 19.\( \text{R}c4 \)± Steingrimsson – Mogranzini, Scanno 2005.

14.\( \text{Q}xe2 \) dxc5

In case of 14...\( \text{B}e8 \), White can increase his pressure with: 15.f3 \( \text{B}d7 \) 16.\( \text{B}b1 \)±.

15.\( \text{B}xc5 \) b6 16.\( \text{B}a3 \) \( \text{B}e8 \) 17. \( \text{B}c4 \) \( \text{B}c8 \)

If Black allows his opponent to push d5-d6, his position would crumble very quickly.

18.\( \text{B}c1! \)

After 18.\( \text{B}d3 \) \( \text{B}h6 \) 19.\( \text{B}c3 \) \( \text{B}d6 \)± Black managed to block reliably his opponent's d-pawn in the game Piket – Nunn, Amsterdam 1995.

18...\( \text{B}d7 \)

The principled line: 18...\( \text{B}d6 \) 19.\( \text{B}xd6 \) cxd6 20.\( \text{B}c6 \) \( \text{B}d7 \) 21.\( \text{B}xd6 \) \( \text{B}xc6 \) 22.\( \text{B}xc6 \) \( \text{B}e6 \) 23.\( \text{B}a3 \)± leads to a position in which Black's defence is rather difficult, despite his extra exchange. It is sufficient for White to bring his knight to the d5-outpost and the fight would be virtually over.

Black would not solve his problems with 18...\( \text{B}a7 \), due to 19.\( \text{B}b1 \)±.

The line: 18...\( \text{B}h6 \) 19.\( \text{B}c2 \) \( \text{B}a7 \) 20.\( \text{B}b1 \)± is just another illustration of the same subject.

19.\( \text{B}c3 \) \( \text{B}h4 \) 20.\( \text{B}d3 \) \( \text{B}d8 \) 21.\( \text{B}c2 \) \( \text{B}a7 \)

22.\( \text{B}c1 \). White is forced to retreat temporarily in order to let his pawn to the a4-square. That would enable him to remove his knight from c3 and to attack Black's backward c7-pawn.

22...f5 23.a4 \( \text{B}d6 \) 24.f3 \( \text{B}b7 \) 25.\( \text{B}a3 \)± Straka – Hlavac, corr. 2002. White maintains his initiative and Black can hardly coordinate his pieces, because of his backward c7-pawn, which needs permanent protection.

b) 10...\( \text{B}b6 \)

11.bxa5

White cannot push c4-c5, so he needs to exchange on a5 in order to remove his bishop from a3
and to let his a-pawn be pushed forward.

11...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)h5

After 11...\(\text{\texttt{Ka}}\)xa5 12.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{b}}}\)b4 \(\text{\texttt{Ka}}\)a8 (In case of 12...\(\text{\texttt{Ka}}\)a6, Black’s rook comes unavoidably under attack from White’s bishop – 13.a4 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{h}}}\)5 14.a5 bxa5 15.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{a}}}\)xa5 \(\text{\texttt{Qf}}\)4 16.c5\(\uparrow\) Dobrov – Voitsekhovsky, St Petersburg 2000; after 12...\(\text{\texttt{Ka}}\)a7 13.a4 White continues with his plan to advance his a-pawn, while Black’s attempt to free his position with the help of the move – 13...c5? fails due to: 14.dxc6 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xc}}}\)6 15.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xd}}}\)x6 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xb}}}\)4 16.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xb}}}\)4+- Baekgaard – K.Pedersen, Denmark 2002.) 13.a4 the game transposes to positions from variation b Chapter 16 – see 10...\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xb}}}\)4 11.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xb}}}\)4 b6 12.a4.

In case of Black’s other lines, White can force his opponent to capture on a5 with a pawn. That is quite favourable for White, because he will push c4-c5 much easier in the absence of a black pawn on b6. See a typical example: 11...\(\text{\texttt{Qd}}\)7 12.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{b}}}\)a4!? bxa5 13.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{a}}}\)3 f5 (After 13...\(\text{\texttt{Qc}}\)5, Ordonez – Harper, San Felipe 1999, White could have compromised his opponent’s queen’s pawn-structure with: 14.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xc}}}\)x5 dxc5 15.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{d}}}\)d6 16.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{ab}}}\)1 and Black cannot repair it with 16...c6, because of 17.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{b}}\texttt{b}}\)6\(\texttt{\pm}\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{Qd}}\)d2 f4 (Once again Black is reluctant to play 14...\(\text{\texttt{Qc}}\)5, since after 15.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xc}}}\)x5 dxc5 16.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{b}}}\)3 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{d}}}\)6 17.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{a}}}\)4\(\pm\) he loses a pawn; in case of the relatively best defence for Black – 14...\(\text{\texttt{Qf}}\)6, White follows with the thematic move – 15.c5\(\uparrow\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{g}}}\)4 \(\text{\texttt{Kf}}\)6 16.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xc}}}\)x8 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xc}}}\)8 17.c5\(\pm\) D.Shapiro – Gregory, Monticello 2005.)

In answer to 11...\(\text{\texttt{Qe}}\)8, White can play again 12.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{b}}\texttt{4}}\)!\(\uparrow\). The counter strike 12...c5 (After 12...bxa5 13.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{a}}}\)3 f5, White prepares the pawn-break c4-c5 and that is quite dangerous for Black as you can see in the following example – 14.\(\text{\texttt{Qd}}\)d2 \(\text{\texttt{Kf}}\)6 15.c5 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{d}}}\)6 16.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{c}}}\)4 \(\text{\texttt{Kh}}\)8 17.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xd}}}\)6 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xd}}}\)6 18.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xe}}}\)5 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{d}}}\)5 19.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{d}}}\)6 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xd}}}\)6 20.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xd}}}\)6 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xd}}}\)6 21.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xd}}}\)6 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{a}}}\)7 22.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{c}}}\)4+ \(\text{\texttt{Kh}}\)8 23.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{d}}}\)5+– S.Behm – Weichhold, Germany 2003.) after 13.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xc}}}\)6 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xc}}}\)6 14.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{a}}}\)3 (White can win a pawn neither with: 14.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xb}}\texttt{b}}\)6 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xb}}}\)4 15.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{b}}}\)1 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xb}}}\)6 16.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{b}}}\)8=; nor with: 14.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{d}}}\)5 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{b}}}\)7 15.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{ab}}\texttt{1}}\) \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xa}}}\)5 16.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{d}}}\)2 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{c}}}\)6 17.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{a}}}\)3 \(\text{\texttt{Kf}}\)5\(\uparrow\) 14...\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{xa}}}\)5 (The other capture 14...bxa5, Dziadyk – P.Borisov, Ukraine 2003 is even worse for Black due to 15.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{b}}\texttt{1}}\)\(\uparrow\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{b}}}\)5 \(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{e}}}\)6 16.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{d}}}\)3\(\uparrow\) might lead to a position, in which Black will have problems protecting his d6-pawn.

In answer to 11...\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{h}}}\)6, Teschner – Clarke, Wageningen 1957, White should better continue with 12.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{b}}\texttt{4}}\)!\(\uparrow\), playing analogously to what we have just mentioned.

12.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{c}}}\)e1!

That is a prophylactic move. It is essential for White to avoid his light-squared bishop being exchanged.

The move 12.\(\text{\texttt{K\texttt{b}}\texttt{4}}\) is not so
good here due to: 12...bxa5 13. \( \text{\textit{a}3} \) \( \text{\textit{f}4} \) 14.c5 \( \text{\textit{x}e}2 + \) 15.\( \text{\textit{d}xe}2 \) f5 16.\( \text{\textit{c}3} \) fxe4 17.\( \text{\textit{d}xe}4 \) \( \text{\textit{f}4} \)∞ Lang-geveld – Strautins, corr. 2002. Black has some counterplay thanks to the absence of his oppo-
nent’s light-squared bishop.

Now, Black must choose be-
{}tween: b1) 12...\( \text{\textit{f}5} \) and b2) 12...
{}\( \text{\textit{d}f}4 \). His most natural move 12...
{}\( \text{\textit{x}xa}5 \), leads after 13.\( \text{\textit{b}4} \) \( \text{\textit{a}8} \) 14.
{}a4 to positions from variation b3
{}Chapter 16 – see 10...\( \text{\textit{a}xb}4 \) 11.\( \text{\textit{d}xb}4 \)
{}b6 12.a4 \( \text{\textit{h}5} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{e}e}1 \).

b1) 12...\( \text{\textit{f}5} \)
{}Black starts his kingside ac-
tions ignoring temporarily his oppo-
nent’s a5-pawn.
{}13.\( \text{\textit{b}4} \)!

Now, after White has ensured
{}the f1-square for the retreat of
{}his bishop, he is quite willing to
{}spend some time in order to force
{}his opponent to capture on a5
{}with a pawn. The same idea af-
{}ter: 13.\( \text{\textit{d}2} \) \( \text{\textit{f}6} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{b}4} \) does not
{}seem to be so convincing. Black
can change the pawn-structure
{}on the queenside thanks to the
{}placement of White’s knight on
{}d2: 14...c5!? 15.dxc6 \( \text{\textit{d}xc}6 \) 16.\( \text{\textit{a}3} \)
{}\( \text{\textit{x}a}5 \) (or 16...bxa5?! 17.\( \text{\textit{b}5} \) \( \text{\textit{b}4} \)
{}18.\( \text{\textit{b}3} \) \( \text{\textit{a}6} \), Bareev – Smirin,
{}Moscow 2002, 19.c5+) 17.\( \text{\textit{b}5} \)
{}\( \text{\textit{b}7} \)∞.

13...\( \text{\textit{b}xa}5 \) 14.\( \text{\textit{a}3} \)
{}White has lost some tempi
{}for moves with his dark-squared
{}bishop, but that was quite pur-
{}poseful. Now, in the absence of
{}Black’s pawn on b6, he can easily
{}prepare c4-c5.
{}14...\( \text{\textit{d}f}4 \)
{}Black fails to equalize after:
{}14...\( \text{\textit{f}6} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{d}3} \) fxe4 16.\( \text{\textit{d}xe}4 \) \( \text{\textit{g}g}4 \)
{}17.\( \text{\textit{xf}6} \) 18.\( \text{\textit{e}4} \) \( \text{\textit{f}5} \) 19.
{}

15.\( \text{\textit{f}1} \)
{}That bishop should better be
{}preserved.
{}15...\( \text{\textit{f}xe}4 \)
{}After 15...\( \text{\textit{h}8} \) 16.c5 \( \text{\textit{g}g}8 \), Chan
{}– Lim Chuing, Kuala Lumpur
{}2001, White could have increased
{}the pressure against Black’s d6-
pawn with the move 17.\( \text{\textit{d}2} \)!!
{}followed by 18.\( \text{\textit{c}4} \).

16.\( \text{\textit{d}2} \)!!
{}After 16.\( \text{\textit{xe}4} \) \( \text{\textit{g}4} \)∞ Danailov
{}– Nijboer, Wijk aan Zee 2000,
{}the pin of the knight is rather un-
{}pleasant for White.

16...\( \text{\textit{d}3} \)
{}Black continues the chase of his
{}opponent’s light-squared bishop.
{}His fierce attacking attempt on
{}the kingside: 16...\( \text{\textit{f}5} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{d}xe}4 \)
\(d4 \, 18.\, b5 \, h4\), backfires after White’s cold-blooded response 19.f3!. If Black complies with the trade of the knights on b5, then he will have to worry about his weak c7-pawn. His idea to solve his problems tactically with: 19...
\(\, h3+\, 20.\, h1\, \text{exe}4\, 21.\, \text{exe}4\, \text{f2+}\, 22.\, g1\, \text{xd1}\, 23.\, \text{xd1}\, \text{c2}\) (23...
\(\, \text{xb5}\, 24.\, \text{exb5}\, \pm\)) 24.\, b2\, \text{f7}\, 25.\, \text{e2}\, \text{b4}\, 26.\, \text{c3}\, \pm\) failed too in the game van Oosterom – Timmerman, corr. 1999. Black’s a5 and c7-pawns need protection and his knight is unstable on the b4-square.

17.\, \text{xd3}\, \text{exd3} 18.\, \text{de4}\, \text{f5}

If 18...\, a6 19.\, \text{xd3}\, \text{f5}, White can play 20.\, \text{b5}.\)

19.\, \text{xd3}\, \text{h6}

Or 19...\, g5 20.\, \text{b5}\, g4 21.\, \text{c1}±


20.\, \text{c1}\, \text{xc1}

21.\, \text{axc1}\, a4, Delchev – Smi-
rin, Pula 2001. Now, the precise move 22.\, \text{d2}!, would have consolidated White’s advantage.

In case of 22...\, \text{d7} (22...\, a6?! 23.\, \text{xa4}±; 22...\, \text{d4}?! 23.\, \text{b5}±) he would have continued with 23.\, c5±.

b2) 12...\, \text{f4}

13.\, \text{f1}

White should again preserve his light-squared bishop.

13...\, \text{f5}

About 13...\, \text{h8} 14.\, \text{b4}?! \text{bxa5} 15.\, \text{a3}\, f5 16.\, c5 — see 12...\, \text{f5} 13.\, \text{b4}\, \text{bxa5} 14.\, \text{a3}\, \text{f4} 15.\, \text{f1}\, \text{h8} 16.\, \text{c5}.

Black would not change much

with 13...\, \text{h6}. White can con-

continue in the standard fashion — 14.\, \text{b4}!? \text{bxa5} 15.\, \text{a3}\, f5 16.\, c5\, ±


The move 13...\, \text{g4} would not

create any problems for White. It is unfavourable for Black to trade the light-squared bishops. After: 14.\, \text{h3}\, \text{d7} (In case of: 14...\, \text{x}f3

15.\, \text{x}f3\, f5 16.\, \text{d1}± Black cannot create any real threats on the kingside without his light-squared bishop.) White can repeat the fa-
miliar maneuver: 15.\, \text{b4}!? \text{bxa5} 16.\, \text{a3}\, f5 17.\, c5\, ±.

Black only transposes moves with the line: 13...\, \text{xa5} 14.\, \text{b4}\n
\text{a8} (It is weaker for him to play 14...\, \text{a7}?!), because his rook comes under attack by White’s knight:

15.\, a4\, \text{d7} 16.\, \text{b5}\, \text{b7} 17.\, a5\, \text{bxa5}
18.\xa5 \xb5 19.\xb5 \xd7, B. Walsh – R. Davies, Hamilton 1998 and now, the most precise line for White would have been: 20.\xd2? \xf5 21.\xf4 \xf4 22.e5\(±\) 15.\b5 \f5 16.\d2 – see 13...\f5.

14.\d2 \xa5

White’s game is quite easy after: 14...g5?! 15.\b3 \xa5 16.e5 \xf6 17.g3 \f6 18.\d2 \f4 19.\e2 \xd7 20.\c4± Shomoev – Arakelov, Kolontaevo 1998 and Black must already consider the unpleasant threat: 21.cxd6 cxd6 22.\b6.

After 14...\f4, it is possible for White to follow with 15.\dxe4?! (The other capture is weaker: 15.\cxe4 \xa5 16.\b4 \a8 17.a4, because of: 17...\f5 18.a5 \xa5 19.\xa5 \xd7, followed by 20...c6=) 15...\f5 16.g3 \h5 (Black’s attack after: 16...\d4?! 17.\xf4 \xf4 is easily repelled by White with: 18.\g2 \g4 19.\wd3\(±\), recommended by GM V. Golod.) and here the piece-sacrifice is quite promising for White: 17.axb6! (Following: 17.b5 \xa5 18.\b4 \a8 19.a4\(±\) White managed to obtain a slight edge, due to his powerful knight on e4 and the possibility to break on the queenside with a4-a5 in the game Golod – Bitansky, Israel 1999.)

15.\b4 \a8 16.\b5?! Here, White can play 16.a4, transposing to variation b3 Chapter 16, but the move with the knight is even better, because it deprives Black of the possible counterplay connected with c7-c5.

16...\d7

Or 16...\f4 17.\dxe4 \f5 18.\g3 \h5 19.a4 \d4, Bjeluroseps – Seel, Bad Zwesten 1998, 20.\xd4 \xd4 21.a5±.

If 16...\f6, in order to prepare a move with the c-pawn, then White has a powerful argument – 17.g3 \h5 18.\xf5!. It becomes clear now that 18...\f5 will lose a piece for Black after 19.g4±.

17.a4 \xb5 18.\xb5 \f4 19.\xe4 \h8

It is too risky for Black to play 19...\f5, due to: 20.g3?! \h5 21.g4 \d4 22.gxh5 \f3+ 23.\g2 \h4 and the queen-sacrifice: 24.\xf3! \xf3 25.\xf3\(±\) neutralizes Black’s attacking potential.

20.\c4 \f5
21.\(\text{h}1\)!?! (After 21.g3, S. Savchenko – Reyhan, Istanbul 2003, Black could have maintained the tension with: 21...\(\text{h}3+ 22.\text{g}2\) \(\text{g}5\infty\) 21...\(\text{d}4\) 22.\(\text{c}3\) – Black’s knights are rather unstable. White’s imminent plans include the pawn-moves g3 and f4.

c) 10...\(\text{d}7\)

11.\(\text{bxa}5\)

Now, just like in variation b, White cannot push c4-c5 immediately, so he reduces the pawn-tension on the queenside.

11...\(\text{xa}5\)

The other moves for Black are illogical, for example: 11...b6 is not good for him due to 12.\(\text{b}4\) see variation b – 10...b6 11.\(\text{bxa}5\) \(\text{d}7\).

He loses a pawn after the rest of his moves: 11...f5?! 12.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{f}6\) 13.\(\text{d}2\) f4 14.c5 g5 15.\(\text{cxd}6\) cxd6 16.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{g}6\) 17.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{e}8\) 18.\(\text{b}6\)++ Gokhale – Tan Koh Boon, Singapore 2003; 11...\(\text{h}6\)?! Buhmann – Kloepfer, Boeblingen 2001, 12.\(\text{b}4\)?! f5 13.\(\text{d}2\)++; 11...\(\text{h}8\)??, Radjabov – Visser, Wijk aan Zee 2001, 12.\(\text{b}4\)??.

If 11...\(\text{c}5\)??, then White preserves his extra pawn with:
12.\(\text{xc}5\) dxc5 13.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{xa}5\) (13... \(\text{d}7\) 14.\(\text{b}3\) b6 15.d6 \(\text{c}8\) 16.\(\text{dxc}7\) \(\text{xc}7\) 17.\(\text{d}5\)+– S. Savchenko – Mrva, Yerevan 1996; 13...f5 14.\(\text{b}3\) fxe4 15.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 16.\(\text{bxc}5\) \(\text{xa}5\) 17.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{a}3\) 18.\(\text{w}c1\) \(\text{a}8\) 19.c5+ Qvortrup – Bergstad, Norway 1994) 14.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{a}8\) 15.\(\text{xc}5\) b6 16.\(\text{b}3\) f5 17.a4 fxe4 18.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 19.a5± O’Cinneide – Klinova, Saint Vincent 2004.

12.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{a}6\)

With that move Black is trying to avoid the line: 12...\(\text{a}8\) 13.a4 – see 10...\(\text{xb}4\) 11.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{d}7\) 12.a4 (Chapter 17).

It is evident that if White manages to push c4-c5, then Black’s rook will be misplaced on a6, because it would be attacked by White’s bishop.

13.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{h}6\)

In case of 13...\(\text{c}5\) 14.a5, Black should better play: 14...\(\text{h}8\) (or 14...f5 15.\(\text{xc}5\) dxc5 16.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{h}6\)? 17.\(\text{b}3\) b6 18.axb6 cxb6 19.d6 \(\text{xa}1\) 20.\(\text{xa}1\)+– Kramnik – “IC-Clover”, Internet 1999; 16...\(\text{d}7\)?? 17.\(\text{b}3\) b6 18.\(\text{a}2\) \(\text{f}6\) 19.axb6 \(\text{xa}2\) 20.\(\text{xc}7\) \(\text{xc}7\) 21.\(\text{xa}2\)+ Bagautov – Symeonidis, Athens 1997) in order to ensure a square for the retreat of his knight. There might follow: 15.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{g}8\) 16.\(\text{xc}5\) dxc5 17.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{e}7\) 18.\(\text{a}4\) b6 19.\(\text{c}3\) f5 20.axb6 cxb6. Black plans the maneuver – \(\text{h}6\)-f7-d6. (or 20...\(\text{xb}6\)?? 21.\(\text{a}5\)± Baumbach – Berliner, corr. 2001) 21.\(\text{xa}6\)
\( \text{\#xa6 22.\#a1=} \) and Black’s position remains solid, but somewhat passive.

After 13...f5 (with a rook on a6) Black should not be afraid of White’s move \( \text{\#g5} \). Still, the placement of that rook on a6 has some negative sides too. He has problems to bring his knight on d7 into the attack against his opponent’s e4-pawn. On the other hand, if the knight is removed from d7 – the effect of c4-c5 is even greater because the rook on a6 comes under attack. Now, the line: 14.a5!? (or 14.c5?! dxc5 15.\#a3 \#a5 16.\#d2 \#a8 17.\#c4 \#h8=° Rashkovsky – Becerra, Ubeda 1999) 14...\#h6 (Black will have to play that move anyway, since after: 14...\#f6 15.c5 fxe4 16.\#g5=° he has problems, because of the X-ray \#e2-\#a6 along the diagonal.) 15.\#d2 leads to a transposition of moves – see 13...\#h6.

14.a5 f5 15.\#d2 \#h8

It is always useful for Black to have in mind the possibility 15...c5=° in similar positions. Here, it is bad in view of: 16.dxc6 \#xc6 17.\#f3 \#a6 18.\#b3 \#f6 19.exf5 gxf5 20.\#b5 e4 21.\#e2 \#f4 22.\#c3 \#g6 23.c5= Grebionkin – S.Kim, Samara 2002.

After: 15...\#c5=° 16.\#xc5 \#xd2 17.\#xd2 dxc5, it looks like Black has blocked reliably the position on the dark squares, but that is an illusion: 18.f4! exf4 19.\#xf4 fxe4 20.\#xf8+ \#xf8 21.\#xf8+ \#xf8 22.\#xe4 b6 23.\#f1+ \#g7 24.axb6 cxb6 25.\#d6=° Bjerke – M.Ivanov, Gausdal 1997.

16.\#a4=°?

White prepares c4-c5. It is worse for him to play with the same idea: 16.\#b3 \#f6 17.c5, because of: 17...fxe4 18.\#xa6 bxa6 19.cxd6 cxd6 20.\#e1 \&g4=° Spielmann – Calistrì, Paris 2005 and he will have to worry about the protection of his d5-pawn.

16...\#f6 17.c5 fxe4

Here, Black will need to sacrifice the exchange; otherwise the retreat of the rook on a6 on move 12 would be an admitted mistake. It is too late to retreat now: 17...\#a7=° 18.cxd6 cxd6 19.\#c4 fxe4 20.\#xd6 \#fxd5 21.\#xe5=\#g8 22.\#d4=; 17...\#a8 18.\#cxd6 cxd6 19.\#b6=+ (analysis of I.Tsesarsky).

18.\#xa6 \#exd5

The line: 18...bxa6 19.cxd6 cxd6 20.\#c4 \#f5 21.\#ab6= is unacceptable for Black.

19.\#xe4

White must make up his mind about what bishop he will part with. If he preserves the dark-squared one with 19.\#a3, then he must consider the possibility: 19...bxa6 20.cxd6 cxd6 21.\#xe4 \#g4=∞.

19...\#xb4

Or19...bxa620.\#d2 \#g4 21.\#c2 \#f4 22.\#g3=+ (I.Tsesarsky).

(diagram)

20.\#xf6 \#xf6 21.\#c4= van
Conclusion

In Chapters 15-17 we analyze one of the basic replies for Black against the system with b2-b4. He wishes to disrupt White’s queenside pawn-structure with the counter strike a7-a5. White protects his b4-pawn with his bishop (It is essential that the move – 10.bxa5 allows 10...c5!) and he plans to prepare c4-c5. In Chapter 14 we analyze only the lines in which Black refrains from the exchange of pawns on the b4-square.

In variation a (10...�h5) Black ignores completely his queenside. White then manages to advance c4-c5 relatively easily and he creates some pressure against Black’s d6-pawn.

On the contrary, in variation b (10...b6) Black is trying to impede immediately the pawn-advance c4-c5. White must exchange pawns with b4xa5 in order to continue with his pawn-offensive on the queenside. That is quite justified, because Black’s counter-play connected with c7-c5 is already impossible. The idea to push c4-c5 is so attractive for White that in numerous lines (for example in variation b1) he is prepared to even lose several tempi in the process (�a3-b4-a3). The idea of that maneuver is to force Black to capture – b6xa5. White removes in that fashion an important obstacle – Black’s b6-pawn.

In case Black’s pawn remains on b6 (variation b2) White continues with his queenside offensive by a march forward of his a-pawn. It is worth emphasizing the maneuver 16.b5!? with the help of which he prevents Black’s counter strike c7-c5.

Variation c (10...d7) is an attempt by Black to improve on variations d2 and e1 from Chapter 17. The deployment of his rook on a6 might be useful for him in case of White’s maneuver f3-g5-e6 (after f7-f5). Still, the drawbacks of that idea are quite evident too. If White manages to push c4-c5, Black’s rook comes under attack by White’s light-squared bishop.
Black has played most often in that position: a) \(11...\text{\#h5}\), b) \(11...\text{\#d7}\) (Chapter 17).

About \(11...\text{\#h6}\) 12.c5 \(\text{\#e8}\) 13. cxd6 – see 11...\(\text{\#e8}\) 12.c5 \(\text{\#h6}\) 13.cxd6.

All other possibilities for Black enable White to push c4-c5 effortlessly.

The move \(11...\text{\#d7}\)! is unsatisfactory, because White implements easily his standard plan on the queenside: 12.c5 \(\text{\#c8}\) 13. \(\text{\#d2}\) \(\text{\#e8}\) 14.\(\text{\#c4}\) dxc5 15.\(\text{\#xc5}\) \(\text{\#ed6}\) 16.\(\text{\#b3}\) b6 17.\(\text{\#xd6}\) \(\text{\#xd6}\) 18.\(\text{\#xd6}\) cxd6 19.\(\text{\#b4}\) \(\text{\#e8}\) 20.\(\text{\#f1}\) \(\text{\#b8}\) 21.a4± Dias – Santos, Lisbon 2001.

White’s game is quite simple after \(11...\text{\#e8}\). Following: 12.c5 dxc5 13.\(\text{\#xc5}\) \(\text{\#d7}\) 14.\(\text{\#e3}\) b6 15. \(\text{\#b5}\) \(\text{\#b7}\) 16.a4 \(\text{\#c8}\), D.Collas – Relange, Clichy 2004, he restricts maximally Black’s counterplay with: 17.\(\text{\#d2}\)! \(\text{\#d6}\) 18.\(\text{\#e2}\) f5 19.f3!.

In answer to \(11...\text{\#e8}\), White can play 12.c5. After 12...\(\text{\#h6}\) (about 12...h6 – see 9...\(\text{\#c8}\) 10. c5 h6 11.\(\text{\#d2}\) a5 12.\(\text{\#a3}\) axb4 13. \(\text{\#xa3}\), variation a, Chapter 14; 12...dxc5 13.\(\text{\#xc5}\) \(\text{\#d6}\) 14.\(\text{\#d2}\) b6 15.\(\text{\#e3}\) \(\text{\#a6}\) 16.a4 \(\text{\#d7}\) 17.\(\text{\#c1}\) f5 18.f3± Neidhardt – Krug, Germany 2003; 15...f5 16.f3 f4 17.\(\text{\#f2}\) g5 18.\(\text{\#c4}\) g4 19.\(\text{fxf4}\) \(\text{\#xg4}\) 20.\(\text{\#xd6}\) \(\text{\#xe2}\) 21.\(\text{\#xe2}\) \(\text{\#xd6}\) 22.\(\text{\#b5}\) f3 23.\(\text{\#xf3}\) \(\text{\#d7}\) 24.\(\text{\#ac1}\)± Jovanovic – A.Popovic, Belgrade 2004.)

13.cxd6!? cxd6 (or 13...\(\text{\#xd6}\) 14. \(\text{\#xe5}\) 14.\(\text{\#d2}\) f5 15.\(\text{\#c4}\) \(\text{\#h8}\) (or 15...\(\text{\#f6}\) 16.a4±; 15...\(\text{xfxe4}\) 16.\(\text{\#xe4}\) \(\text{\#f5}\) 17.a4 \(\text{\#h4}\) 18.\(\text{\#xd6}\) \(\text{\#xd6}\) 19.\(\text{\#xd6}\)± Ostrowski – S.Farago, Budapest 1998) 16.a4 \(\text{\#g8}\) 17.\(\text{\#b3}\) \(\text{\#gf6}\) 18.\(\text{\#a3}\)! (White is threatening 19.\(\text{\#xd6}\), as well as 19.\(\text{\#xe5}\).) 18...\(\text{\#xe4}\) 19.\(\text{\#xe4}\) fxe4, Panelo – Madeira, Barbera del Valles 2005 and here White obtains a great advantage with: 20.\(\text{\#xd6}\) \(\text{\#xd6}\) 21.\(\text{\#xd6}\)±.
a) 11...\(\text{\#h5}\) 12.c5

Black’s last move does not prevent the advance of White’s c-pawn and he should make a good use of that.

12...\(\text{\#f4}\)

The move 12...\(\text{\#g4}\)! is not in the spirit of the position and after: 13.cxd6 cxd6 14.h3 \(\text{\#xf3}\) 15.\(\text{\#xf3}\) \(\text{\#f4}\) 16.\(\text{\#b5}\) \(\text{\#c8}\) 17.a4 f5 18.\(\text{\#h2}\) \(\text{\#f7}\) 19.g3 \(\text{\#xe4}\) 20.\(\text{\#xe4}\) \(\text{\#h5}\) 21.\(\text{\#c1}\) \(\text{\#f8}\) 22.\(\text{\#g2}\) White is clearly better thanks to his dominance on the light squares, Veingold – Pasi- sikangas, Espoo 1998.

The game is much sharper after: 12...\(\text{\#xc5}\) 13.\(\text{\#xc5}\) \(\text{\#f4}\) 14.\(\text{\#c4}\) \(\text{\#g4}\) 15.h3 \(\text{\#h5}\) (15...\(\text{\#xf3}\)?! 16.\(\text{\#xf3}\) J.Nill – Gilbert, Kusadası 2006). In case of 16.\(\text{\#b5}\) \(\text{\#h8}\) (Black is planning f7-f5; 16...\(\text{\#g5}\)? 17.\(\text{\#b3}\) \(\text{\#a6}\) 18.\(\text{\#fd1}\) \(\text{\#f6}\) 19.\(\text{\#xe5}\) \(\text{\#xd1}\) 20.\(\text{\#xd1}\) \(\text{\#d6}\) 21.\(\text{\#xd6}\) cxd6 22.\(\text{\#b6}\) \(\text{\#c8}\) 23.\(\text{\#g4}\) f5 24.\(\text{\#xf5}\) \(\text{\#xf5}\) 25.\(\text{\#f1}\) h5 26.\(\text{\#e3}\) – Babula – Hillarp Persson, Gothenburg 2005.) 17.\(\text{\#b3}\) f5 18.d6 cxd6 19.\(\text{\#xd6}\) White maintains the initiative.

About: 12...f5 13.cxd6 cxd6 14.\(\text{\#d2}\) \(\text{\#f4}\) (In case of: 14...\(\text{\#f6}\) 15.\(\text{\#c4}\) \(\text{\#a6}\), White has enough time to play 16.f3?) 15.\(\text{\#b5}\) see – 12...\(\text{\#f4}\).

13.cxd6

The exchange of pawns on b4 would eliminate the possibility for White to attack with his b-pawn, but it would enable his dark-squared bishop to join in the attack of the d6-pawn.

It is best for White to exchange pawns immediately on d6. In case of 13.\(\text{\#b5}\) c6! there might arise great complications in which White might have problems to prove his advantage.

13...\(\text{\#xd6}\)

The trade of his active knight for White’s passive bishop: 13...\(\text{\#xe2}\) + 14.\(\text{\#xe2}\), would not equalize for Black. After 14...\(\text{\#xd6}\), M.Espanol – Brayman, corr. 2002, 15.\(\text{\#d2}\)! f5 16.\(\text{\#c4}\) \(\text{\#a6}\) 17.\(\text{\#f3}\) White succeeds in protecting his e4-pawn and he ties his opponent’s pieces with the defence of the d6-pawn.

14.\(\text{\#d2}\)!

The line: 14.\(\text{\#b5}\) \(\text{\#a6}\) 15.\(\text{\#c4}\), leads to a very complicated game, because of the pin of White’s knight: 15...\(\text{\#g4}\)! 16.h3, Werle – van Veen, Vlijssingen 2002, 16...\(\text{\#h5}\) 17.\(\text{\#b3}\) f5∞.

14...f5

About 14...\(\text{\#xe2}\) + 15.\(\text{\#xe2}\) f5 16.\(\text{\#c4}\) – see 13...\(\text{\#xe2}\) +.

15.\(\text{\#b5}\)!

Now, after the pinning of White’s knight is impossible, he should better preserve his light-squared bishop.

15...\(\text{\#xe4}\) 16.\(\text{\#dxe4}\) \(\text{\#f5}\) 17.\(\text{\#e1}\)

White should not weaken his position: 17.g3 \(\text{\#h3}\) + 18.\(\text{\#h1}\) \(\text{\#d4}\) 19.\(\text{\#e2}\) h5 20.\(\text{\#g2}\) \(\text{\#f5}\)∞ Orso – Capucci, Argentina 1997.

White should fortify his g2-square by retreating with the bishop to f1.
17...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash ighet{h}4}} \)

That try is harmless, but even after: 17...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash ighet{f}f7}} \) 18.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash ighet{a}4\pm}} \) White preserves his advantage thanks to his powerful knight on the e4-outpost.

\[ 
\begin{array}{c}
\text{\texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash image}}}
\end{array}
\]

18.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash ighet{f}f1\uparrow}} \) – and Black has great problems to defend his d6-pawn, Babula – Hagarova, Slovakia 2002.

b) 11...b6

Black has prevented temporarily c4-c5, but now White has a target – the b6-pawn, in order to open new files on the queenside.

12.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash ighet{a}4}} \)

\[ 
\begin{array}{c}
\text{\texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash image}}}
\end{array}
\]

White wishes to break Black's queenside by advancing his a-pawn.

Now, we need to analyze thor-

oughly the moves: b1) 12...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash ighet{d}7}} \), b2) 12...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash ighet{e}8}} \), b3) 12...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash ighet{h}5}} \) and b4) 12...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash ighet{e}8}} \).

After Black's other lines, White fulfills his plan effortlessly. For example in case of: 12...h6, Kuczaj – Zambo, North Bay 1999, or 12...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash ighet{h}6}} \), J.Nill – M.Sergeeva, Yerevan 1999, White should consolidate his advantage with the line: 13.a5 bxa5 14.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash ighet{x}a5\uparrow}} \).

After 12...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash ighet{a}6}} \), it is again good for White to play 13.a5. There might follow: 13...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash b}xa5} \) (After: 13...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash ighet{h}5}} \), L'Huillier – Huertas, Clichy 2003, 14.axb6 cxb6 15.g3\pm or 13...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash w}d7} \), A.Andersson – Runstrom, corr. 1967, 14.axb6 cxb6 15.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash a}a3} \) \( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash f}c8} \) 16.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash b}b3\pm} \) White maintains the edge thanks to his superior pawn-structure.) 14.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash x}xa5} \) (14.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash x}a5?!} \) c5! 15.dxc6 \( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash xc}6\infty} \) Belouadah – Merad, Algiers 2000) 14...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash d}d7} \) 15.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash c}c2} \) \( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash c}5} \), Leimand – Stovring, Aarhus 2001 and here the line: 16.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash b}b5?!} \) \( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash x}xb5} \) 17.cx\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash x}b5\uparrow} \) preserves White’s initiative, because Black’s pieces are tied up with the protection of the c7-pawn.

Black fails to equalize after: 12...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash d}d7} \) 13.a5 \( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash c}c8} \) (After White has completed successfully the break with his a-pawn: 13...\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash b}xa5} \) 14.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash x}xa5} \) \( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash e}8} \), now he can continue with the preparation of c4-c5 – 15.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash d}d2?!} \) f5 16.c5 dxc5 17.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash h}b3} \) c4 18.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash d}d2} \) \( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash d}6} \) 19.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash x}c4} \) \( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash e}c8} \) 20.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash b}b3} \) \( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash a}7} \) 21.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash b}4\uparrow} \) Aberbach – Mazzeo, corr. 2001,) 14.axb6 \( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash x}xa1} \) 15.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash x}a1} \) cxb6 16.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash a}3} \) \( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash e}7} \) 17.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash d}d2} \) \( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash h}6} \) 18.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash d}d1} \) \( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash e}8} \) 19.\( \texttt{\texttt{\textbackslash b}5} \)
f5 20.f3 \( \text{g}6 21.\text{\textit{\textbf{d}}}3 \text{\textit{\textbf{g}}}7 22.\text{\textit{\textbf{a}}}1 \pm \) – Black's active possibilities are considerably restricted, because of the vulnerability of his b6 and d6-pawns, Duijvema - Sobyannik, Serpuhov 2004.

After: 12...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{g}}}4 \) 13.a5 bxa5 14.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{x}}} \)xa5 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}}7 \) (In case of: 14... \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}}8 \) 15.c5 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{x}}} \)xf3 16.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{x}}} \)xf3 dxc5, Baekgaard – Malvild, Copenhagen 2000, White can increase his pressure with: 17.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}} \)a4!? \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)d7 18.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{f}}b1} \pm \) 15.h3 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{x}}} \)xf3 16.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{x}}} \)xf3 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)a6 17.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)b5 c6 18.dxc6 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)xc6 19.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)d3 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{f}}} \)a8 20.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)c3\( \pm \) – White maintains the pressure against the d6-pawn, while Black can hardly create any threats against the e4-pawn without his light-squared bishop, Albert – Humor, corr. 2001.

b1) 12...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)d7

Black's knight is placed here worse than on the e8-square, because it does not protect the key future weakness – the d6-pawn.

13.a5

White has no obstacles to proceed with his plan.

13...bxa5

Black exchanges to avoid the formation of weak b6 and d6-pawns in his camp.

See what might happen if Black complies with weakening his pawn-chain on the queenside:

13...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}} \)b8 14.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)b5 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)c5 15.axb6 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)xb6 16.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)d2 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}} \)b7 17.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)c2 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)d7 18.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)b3 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}} \)a8 19.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)xc5! bxc5 (Black got crushed in an exemplary fashion in the game I.Ivanov – Meyer, Kissimmee 1997: 19...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)xc5 20.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)c3 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)xa1 21.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)xa1 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}} \)a8 22.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)xa8+ \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)xa8 23.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}} \)a4 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}} \)b7 24.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}} \)a7 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)c8 25.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}} \)b8 f6 26.h3 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)a6 27.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)c7 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}} \)a4 28.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)xd6 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)xa6 29.d6+–) 20.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)c3\( \pm \). After the exchange of the black knight on c5, White often penetrates the enemy camp with his heavy pieces;

13...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)c5 14.axb6 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)xa1 15.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)xa1 cxb6 16.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}} \)b1 f5 (In case of: 16... \( \text{\textit{\textbf{h}}} \)h6 17.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}} \)a7, White maintains a powerful pressure too: 17...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)d7 18.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)xc5! bxc5 19.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)d1 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)c8 20.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}} \)a6 f5 21.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}} \)a4 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)xa4 22.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}} \)xa4 fxe4 23.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)xe4 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{f}}} \)f4 24.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{g}}} \)g3 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{f}}} \)f8 25.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}} \)b7\( \pm \) Corti – Fuzishawa, corr. 2000, or 17...f5 18.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)xc5! bxc5, Ulko – Dobrov, Moscow 2000, 19.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}} \)b6\( \pm \)). He can change the pawn-structure again here in order to penetrate with his pieces into Black's position: 17.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)xc5! bxc5 18.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}} \)b8 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)c7 (After: 18...fxe4 19.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)xe4 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{c}}} \)c7 20.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{a}}} \)a8 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{f}}} \)f5 21.h3 h6 22.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)fd2 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)d4 23.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)d3 \( \text{\textit{\textbf{f}}} \)f5, Prudnikova – N.Kiseleva, Niksic 1997, it is very strong for White to follow with 24.\( \text{\textit{\textbf{b}}} \)b1! on the way to the b5-square with the knight and Black's defence – 24...\( \text{\textit{\textbf{d}}} \)d7 would not help
due to: 25.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\textbackslash f6}+! \texttt{\textbackslash f7} 26.\textcolor{red}{\texttt{\textbackslash x}d7 }\texttt{\textbackslash x}d7 27.\texttt{\textbackslash b}7 \texttt{\textbackslash x}a8 28.\texttt{\textbackslash x}d7+ \texttt{\textbackslash f}8 29.\texttt{\textbackslash g}4\pm) 19.\texttt{\textbackslash w}a8 \texttt{\textbackslash d}7 20.\texttt{\textbackslash b}7 \texttt{\textbackslash x}a8 21.\texttt{\textbackslash x}c7 \texttt{\textbackslash d}8 22.\texttt{\textbackslash g}5 \texttt{\textbackslash f}6 23.\texttt{\textbackslash e}6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e6 24.\texttt{\textbackslash d}xe6+ – and his position is quite difficult, despite the presence of opposite-coloured bishops on the board, Veingold – Vakeva, Karhula 1994.

If Black captures with his knight on b6, then White pushes c4-c5 even easier. Should Black play inaccurately, the game might end in a flash: 13...\texttt{\textbackslash b}7 14.\texttt{\textbackslash a}xb6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}xb6 15.\texttt{\textbackslash c}5 \texttt{\textbackslash x}a1 16.\texttt{\textbackslash x}a1 \texttt{\textbackslash d}xc5 17.\texttt{\textbackslash x}c5 \texttt{\textbackslash w}d7 18.\texttt{\textbackslash b}5 \texttt{\textbackslash w}d8 19.\texttt{\textbackslash w}a7 \texttt{\textbackslash c}8 20.\texttt{\textbackslash d}6+– Saitua – A.Smith, Internet 2004;

It is hardly any better for Black to try: 13...\texttt{\textbackslash a}6 14.\texttt{\textbackslash a}xb6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}xb6 15.\texttt{\textbackslash c}5 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e2 16.\texttt{\textbackslash w}xe2 \texttt{\textbackslash x}a1 17.\texttt{\textbackslash x}a1 \texttt{\textbackslash d}xc5 (or 17...\texttt{\textbackslash b}c8 18.\texttt{\textbackslash a}8 \texttt{\textbackslash w}d7 19.\texttt{\textbackslash e}6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e6 20.\texttt{\textbackslash w}b5!+– T.Overbeck – S.Overbeck, Marburg 2000) 18.\texttt{\textbackslash x}c5 \texttt{\textbackslash e}8 19.\texttt{\textbackslash b}5 \texttt{\textbackslash c}e8 20.\texttt{\textbackslash w}c2 \texttt{\textbackslash d}6 21.\texttt{\textbackslash a}x\texttt{\textbackslash d}6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}d6 22.\texttt{\textbackslash w}c6 \texttt{\textbackslash f}8 23.\texttt{\textbackslash b}6 \texttt{\textbackslash d}7 24.\texttt{\textbackslash x}d6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}d6 25.\texttt{\textbackslash w}xd6+– Vrbica – M.Lukac, corr. 2000.

In case of 13...h6, R.Hansen – L.Hansen, Denmark 1999, White must proceed in the similar fashion as in the previous examples: 14.\texttt{\textbackslash a}xb6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}a1 15.\texttt{\textbackslash x}a1 \texttt{\textbackslash x}b6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash c}5\pm.

Black’s counterplay on the kingside – 13...f5, would not solve his problems: 14.\texttt{\textbackslash a}xb6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}a1 15.\texttt{\textbackslash x}a1 \texttt{\textbackslash x}b6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash w}a2!? (But not 16.\texttt{\textbackslash w}a7, because after: 16...\texttt{\textbackslash f}xe4 17.\texttt{\textbackslash d}xe4 \texttt{\textbackslash f}5\infty White might fail to keep his control over the strategically important e4-square, S.Andersen – Far- kas, Budapest 2005.) 16...\texttt{\textbackslash f}xe4 17.\texttt{\textbackslash d}xe4 \texttt{\textbackslash f}5 18.\texttt{\textbackslash d}3 \texttt{\textbackslash w}d7 19.\texttt{\textbackslash c}2 \texttt{\textbackslash x}a8 20.\texttt{\textbackslash b}1 \texttt{\textbackslash w}d8 21.\texttt{\textbackslash e}g5\uparrow Maugg – Reinke, Baden 2001. The trade of the light-squared bishops will expose the light squares in Black’s camp.

14.\texttt{\textbackslash x}a5 \texttt{\textbackslash x}a5

If 14...\texttt{\textbackslash b}8, then White is not obliged at all to retreat with his bishop. He can play instead: 15.\texttt{\textbackslash b}5?! \texttt{\textbackslash x}b5 16.\texttt{\textbackslash x}b5 \texttt{\textbackslash f}5 17.\texttt{\textbackslash g}5 \texttt{\textbackslash f}6 18.\texttt{\textbackslash a}5 \texttt{\textbackslash e}8. Now, Black’s pieces are tied up with the protection of the c7-pawn and White commences his decisive actions: 19.\texttt{\textbackslash c}5! \texttt{\textbackslash f}6 20.\texttt{\textbackslash c}xd6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}g5 21.\texttt{\textbackslash x}e7 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e7 22.\texttt{\textbackslash w}b3 \texttt{\textbackslash h}8 23.\texttt{\textbackslash e}c1 \texttt{\textbackslash a}6 24.\texttt{\textbackslash d}6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}d6 25.\texttt{\textbackslash x}c7 \texttt{\textbackslash w}d7 26.\texttt{\textbackslash x}d6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}d6 27.\texttt{\textbackslash w}d5 \texttt{\textbackslash c}8 28.\texttt{\textbackslash x}a6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}c7 29.\texttt{\textbackslash d}1+– Blanco Fernandez – Arribas, Havana 1993. Black will have to pay with his bishop for the pin along the d-file.

15.\texttt{\textbackslash a}x\texttt{\textbackslash a}5 \texttt{\textbackslash c}5

After: 15...\texttt{\textbackslash a}6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash a}4 \texttt{\textbackslash c}8 17.\texttt{\textbackslash c}5! \texttt{\textbackslash x}e2 18.\texttt{\textbackslash x}e2 \texttt{\textbackslash x}c5 19.\texttt{\textbackslash x}c5 \texttt{\textbackslash d}xc5 20.\texttt{\textbackslash e}c1 \texttt{\textbackslash d}6 21.\texttt{\textbackslash w}b5\pm both black c-pawns are doomed, Tukmakov – Jaeggi, Basel 1999.

In case of: 15...\texttt{\textbackslash b}6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash b}5 \texttt{\textbackslash f}5, A.Gerasimov – Kononov, Kazan 2004, it seems strong for White to follow with 17.\texttt{\textbackslash w}b3! (threatening 18.\texttt{\textbackslash x}c7) 17...\texttt{\textbackslash f}xe4 18.\texttt{\textbackslash d}2 \texttt{\textbackslash f}5 19.\texttt{\textbackslash c}5 \texttt{\textbackslash d}xc5 20.\texttt{\textbackslash d}6+ \texttt{\textbackslash h}8 21.\texttt{\textbackslash x}c7 \texttt{\textbackslash w}d7 22.\texttt{\textbackslash x}e4\pm.

16.\texttt{\textbackslash d}2
16...f5, Quiroz – Ruiz, Lima 1999, Black’s position is hopeless without some kingside counterplay. (After: 16...a6 17.b4 f5 18.xc5 dxc5 19.wa4 xf6 20.b3 w6 21.wa5 wb6 22.xb6 cxb6 23.a1 c8 24.a8 h8, Veingold – Jiretorn, Mislata 2001, White could have settled the issue with 25.b8++. He could have continued with his queenside offensive with: 17.b5! a6 18.c5 dxc5 19.b3 h8 20.f3=)

b2) 12...e8

13.d3!?

The idea behind Black’s last move can be best seen in the variation: 13.a5 c5! 14.xc6 bxc6. Here, in case of: 15.xd6, Black can play: 15...xa5!? 16.xa5 xa5 17.xe5 xd1 18.xd1 xe4= equalizing.

Black is not threatening to counterstrike with c7-c5, while White’s pawn is on a4. The strange queen-move is basically of a prophylactic nature. In case Black plays c7-c5, White wishes to concentrate on attacking the d6-pawn. He might also play c3-b5, so the e4-pawn would need additional protection and White’s queen will provide it.

13.d7

Black wishes to place his knight on c5 in order to neutralize White’s queenside pressure. He has tried some other moves here too. The most original one – 13...df5?! can be refuted by White trivially with 14.a5! (He should not capture the knight 14.exf5!?, because of 14...e4) 14...bxa5, Kotanjan – D.Petrosian, Iran 2005 and here after 15.bxa5= Black must defend against the annoying threat – 16.xc7.

Following: 13.b7 14.fd1 d7 15.d2 ed8, Farago – Kotz, Austria 2004, White should better prevent c7-c5 with the move 16.b5=.

If 13...f8, with the idea to prepare c7-c6, then White can prevent that with 14.b5=, planning a4-a5 and preparing a square for the retreat of his dark-squared bishop on the a5-e1 diagonal in case his opponent pushes c7-c5. Black has tried in that position: 14...b7 15.a5 c5 16.c3, but here his kingside
activity: 16...\textit{\textcopyright}h5 17.g3 bxa5 18.\textit{\textcopyright}a4 f5 19.\textit{\textcopyright}d2 \textit{\textcopyright}f6 20.f3 h5 21.f4! only enabled White to attack on that same part of the board in the game Shabalov – Sharavdorj, Qingdao 2002. 

White’s queen is a tempting target for Black on the d3-square. He can play here 13...\textit{\textcopyright}h5, but still it is far from easy for him to attack White’s most valuable piece. After: 14.g3 f5 15.\textit{\textcopyright}d2 (White is still not quite ready for his thematic move – 15.a5, because of: 15...bxa5 16.\textit{\textcopyright}xa5 fxe4 17.\textit{\textcopyright}xe4 \textit{\textcopyright}f5 18.\textit{\textcopyright}fd2 \textit{\textcopyright}d7 19.\textit{\textcopyright}c3 \textit{\textcopyright}f6 20.\textit{\textcopyright}xf6+ \textit{\textcopyright}xf6 21.\textit{\textcopyright}e4 \textit{\textcopyright}g7 22.\textit{\textcopyright}fb1 \textit{\textcopyright}h8 23.\textit{\textcopyright}c2 c6! 24.dxc6 \textit{\textcopyright}xc6 25.\textit{\textcopyright}xa8 \textit{\textcopyright}xa8 = Rogozenko – Djukic, Bucharest 2002.) 15...\textit{\textcopyright}f6 16.\textit{\textcopyright}b5 (The move 16.a5 is again premature, Veingold – Rodriguez Gonzalez, Erandio 2003, this time due to: 16...c5! 17.dxc6 \textit{\textcopyright}xc6 18.\textit{\textcopyright}xd6 \textit{\textcopyright}d4=) 16...\textit{\textcopyright}b7 17.a5?! fxe4 18.\textit{\textcopyright}xe4 \textit{\textcopyright}xe4 19.\textit{\textcopyright}xe4 c5 20.\textit{\textcopyright}c3 bxa5 21.\textit{\textcopyright}g4 \textit{\textcopyright}c8 22.\textit{\textcopyright}xc8 \textit{\textcopyright}xc8 23.\textit{\textcopyright}a4± (with the idea 24.\textit{\textcopyright}fa1) and White exerted a powerful pressure on the queenside.

14.\textit{\textcopyright}b1!

That move is quite original and very strong at that. The queen retreats in anticipation of the attack by Black’s knight on c5. The same maneuver would not have been good a move earlier, because of the counterstroke c7-c5. Now, when Black’s knight has severed the connection between the queen on d8 and the pawn on d6, that non-standard maneuver is just perfect.

I will mention that the straightforward attempt to continue with White’s plan – 14.a5, would have been ineffective, because of: 14...c5! 15.dxc6 \textit{\textcopyright}xc6 16.\textit{\textcopyright}xd6 \textit{\textcopyright}xa5 17.\textit{\textcopyright}xa5 \textit{\textcopyright}xa5 18.\textit{\textcopyright}d5 (18.\textit{\textcopyright}b5 \textit{\textcopyright}b7∞ Bromberger – Golubev, Bad Wiessee 1999.) 18...\textit{\textcopyright}c5 19.\textit{\textcopyright}xc5 bxc5 20.\textit{\textcopyright}a3 \textit{\textcopyright}f8 21.\textit{\textcopyright}b1 \textit{\textcopyright}e6 22.\textit{\textcopyright}b8 \textit{\textcopyright}a6 23.\textit{\textcopyright}wb2 \textit{\textcopyright}c6∞ Dub – Bromberger, Pardubice 2001.

14...\textit{\textcopyright}h6

After 14...\textit{\textcopyright}c5, White plays again 15.a5. Following 15...f5 (about 15...\textit{\textcopyright}h6 16.axb6 – see 14...\textit{\textcopyright}h6; 15...bxa5 16.\textit{\textcopyright}xc5 dxc5 17.\textit{\textcopyright}a4 \textit{\textcopyright}wd6 18.\textit{\textcopyright}b5 \textit{\textcopyright}d7 19.\textit{\textcopyright}xc5 \textit{\textcopyright}xa4 20.\textit{\textcopyright}xd6 cxd6 21.\textit{\textcopyright}xa4 \textit{\textcopyright}ec8 22.\textit{\textcopyright}fa1 \textit{\textcopyright}ec5 23.\textit{\textcopyright}d2± 16.axb6 \textit{\textcopyright}xa1 17.\textit{\textcopyright}xa1 cxb6, White’s pieces penetrate Black’s queenside: 18.\textit{\textcopyright}xc5! bxc5 19.\textit{\textcopyright}b1 (19.\textit{\textcopyright}a7 \textit{\textcopyright}f8 20.\textit{\textcopyright}d3 \textit{\textcopyright}h6 21.\textit{\textcopyright}b1 \textit{\textcopyright}d7 22.\textit{\textcopyright}wb6 \textit{\textcopyright}xb6 23.\textit{\textcopyright}xb6 \textit{\textcopyright}c8 24.\textit{\textcopyright}a6± Farago – Roeder, Le Touquet 2003.) 19...\textit{\textcopyright}f8 20.\textit{\textcopyright}a7 \textit{\textcopyright}d7 21.\textit{\textcopyright}b7 \textit{\textcopyright}c8 22.\textit{\textit{\textcopyright}a6 \textit{\textcopyright}f7 23.\textit{\textit{\textcopyright}d3 \textit{\textcopyright}f6 24.\textit{\textit{\textcopyright}h3 \textit{\textcopyright}g7 25.\textit{\textit{\textcopyright}c2 \textit{\textcopyright}f8 26.h4! J.Anderson – Klauner, corr. 2002.)

Black can prevent a4-a5 with 14...\textit{\textcopyright}f8, but only temporarily. White plays then 15.\textit{\textit{\textcopyright}d1± resuming his threat.

15.a5 \textit{\textit{\textcopyright}c5

After: 15...c5 16.dxc6 \textit{\textit{\textcopyright}xc6 17.\textit{\textit{\textcopyright}xd6 \textit{\textit{\textcopyright}xa5 18.\textit{\textit{\textcopyright}d5 \textit{\textit{\textcopyright}xa1 (Ivanchuk) White’s pieces are much more active than their counterparts.}
16.axb6 axa1 17.\&xa1 cxb6 18.\&b1

The type of game here is quite similar to what we have seen before in variation b1 – see 12...\&d7 13.a5 \&c5 14.axb6 \&xa1 15.\&xa1 cxb6 16.\&b1.

18...f5

The move 18...\&c7?! 19.\&b5 \&d8 (or 19...\&b8 20.\&xc5! bxc5 21.\&a5= Ivanchuk) 20.\&xc5! bxc5 21.\&a7\+ enabled White to gain additional tempi for his queenside offensive in the game Ivanchuk – Ye Jiangchuan, Moscow (m/1) 2001.

19.\&a7= White has managed to push a4-a5 and he has seized the initiative on the queenside.

b3) 12...\&h5

Now, that move is more to the point than in variation a, because White cannot push c4-c5 anymore.

13.\&e1

White avoids the trade of his light-squared bishop with that prophylactic move.

13...\&f4

After 13...f5 14.\&d2 (If 14.a5, then White must consider: 14...bxa5 15.\&xa5 \&f4 – see 13...\&f4 14.a5 bxa5 15.\&xa5 f5.) 14...\&f6, Solar – Ignacio, Calpe 2004 (about 14...\&f4 15.\&f1 – see 13...\&f4 14.\&f1 f5 15.\&d2) 15.\&d3!? c5 (Otherwise White plays 16.\&b5, preventing Black’s counterplay with c7-c5.) 16.dxc6 \&xc6 17.\&a3\+ and White is slightly better due to the vulnerability of Black’s b6 and d6-pawns.

14.\&f1

It would not work for White to play: 14.a5 bxa5 15.\&xa5 f5 16.c5, in view of: 16...dxc5! 17.\&b3 (or 17.\&c4 \&h8 18.\&b5? \&xa5! 19.\&xa5 fxe4 20.\&xe4 c6=+) 18.d6 \&xd6 19.\&xc7 \&xd1 20.\&axd1 fxe4 21.\&xe5 \&c6=) 17...fxe4 18.d6+ \&e6 19.\&c4 \&xd6 20.\&g5 \&xc4 21.\&xc4+ \&fd5 22.\&xc7 \&xa1 23.\&xa1 \&xc7 24.\&xd5 \&xd5 25.\&xd5+ \&h8 26.\&a8 h6= with equality.

14...f5

Otherwise White would push a4-a5, after 14...\&h6 15.a5 bxa5, Nill – Mammadova, Dresden 2004, he should better capture the a5-pawn with his bishop 16.\&xa5\+,
in order to create some pressure against the c7-pawn later. That is how White played in the game Hamzabegovic – Stauch, Bern 2000: 14...\textit{d}7 15.a5 bxa5 16.\textit{xa}5 \textit{wb}8 17.\textit{b}5 \textit{xb}5 18.\textit{cxb}5±.

After: 14...h6 15.a5 bxa5 16.\textit{xa}5 \textit{g}4 17.h3 \textit{xf}3 18.\textit{xf}3 f5 19.g3 \textit{h}5 20.c5 \textit{fxe}4 21.\textit{xe}4 \textit{f}6 22.\textit{c}4± White has a powerful positional pressure in the absence of Black’s light-squared bishop, Rocha – Blalock, Lisbon 2000.

It is a bit smarter for Black to follow with 14...\textit{e}8 and White should postpone the advance of his a-pawn in order after 15.\textit{b}5!?± (In case of: 15.a5 c5 16.dxc6 \textit{xc}6, Hodjamykuliev – Rohit, Denizli 2003, White would have to exchange his a5-pawn for Black’s d6-pawn.) to impede Black’s counter strike c7-c5.

Black can prepare the move with his c-pawn with the help of 14...\textit{g}4 as well. Still, White can again obtain the advantage with the line: 15.\textit{e}3! \textit{h}6 (Or 15...f5 16.h3 \textit{fxe}4 17.hxg4 \textit{exf}3 18.\textit{xf}3±; it would not work for Black to play 15...\textit{xf}3, in view of: 16.\textit{xf}3 c5 17.dxc6 \textit{xc}6 18.\textit{xd}6 \textit{d}4 19.\textit{g}3 \textit{xd}6 20.\textit{xd}6±; while in case of 15...\textit{e}8, with the idea to push c7-c5, White can continue with 16.\textit{b}5!?; since after 16...c5 17.\textit{d}2± Black is helpless against the march of White’s a-pawn.) 16.h3 \textit{hxh}3+(After: 16...\textit{d}7 17.a5 bxa5 18.\textit{xa}5 f5 19.c5± White implements his basic plan successfully.) 17.gxh3 \textit{xe}3 18.\textit{xe}3 \textit{h}5 19.\textit{xe}2± Nikolaidis – Mitigas, Poroš 1998.

15.\textit{d}2

White should again refrain from the move 15.a5, this time because of: 15...bxa5 16.\textit{xa}5 \textit{fxe}4 17.\textit{xe}4 \textit{g}4 18.\textit{e}3 \textit{d}7 19.h3, Canizares – L.Nemeth, corr. 2003, because here Black would have obtained a very good game with 19...\textit{f}5!∞, followed by c7-c6.

15...c5

That is probably not the best move for Black, but it is the most popular and principled too. White should always consider that possibility while his knight is on the d2-square. In case of: 15...g5 16.g3?! \textit{fg}6 17.a5 bxa5 18.\textit{xa}5 White maintains his initiative. The careless move – 18...\textit{d}7?, led to an immediate disaster for Black: 19.c5! dxc5 20.d6++ Khegai – Ungure, Elista 1998.

After: 15...\textit{h}8 16.\textit{b}5 \textit{d}7 17.\textit{g}3 \textit{h}5 18.a5 bxa5, White maintains his pressure with: 19.\textit{xa}5± (It is weaker for him to play 19.\textit{xa}5, Petran – Erdelyi, Buda-
pest 2001, due to 19...\text{\textit{Eb8}}!\textit{\&}). It is important that while Black's bishop is on d7, the following combination: 19...\textit{Exa5}? 20.\textit{Exa5} c6, would not work because of; 21.dxc6 \textit{Wxa5} 22.cxd7\textit{\&}.

White's plans are not changed after the move – 15...\textit{Ah}6, since following: 16.\textit{Ab}5 \textit{Ad}7, Kruglyakov – Solomaha, Kiev 2006, he can again continue with: 17.a5 \textit{Bxa5} 18.\textit{Axa5}\textit{\&}.

About 15...c6 17.dxc6 \textit{Bxc6} 18.\textit{Aa}3 – see 15...c5; or 15...fxe4 16.\textit{Dxe}4 \textit{Df}5 17.g3 \textit{Ah}5 18.\textit{Ab}5 – see variation \textit{b2}, Chapter 15.

16.dxc6 \textit{Dxc6} 17.\textit{Aa}3

Black has managed to counter-strike with c7-c5, but now he has problems defending his d6-pawn.

17...\textit{Dd}4

After: 17...\textit{De}6 18.\textit{Db}3 \textit{Dc}5 19.\textit{Wd}5+ \textit{De}6 20.\textit{Wxc}6 \textit{Dxb}3 21.\textit{Ab}1\textit{\&} Black lost material in the game V.Mikhalevski – Golod, San Salvador 2003.

In case of: 17...\textit{Wg}5 18.g3 \textit{Dd}4, Black's attack is dead in its tracks: 19.\textit{Ea}2 (or 19.\textit{Ah}1?! \textit{Df}6 20.\textit{Dd}5 \textit{Ob}7 21.\textit{Dxd}6 \textit{Ef}7 22.\textit{Ag}2\textit{\&} Holman – Decroix, Paris 1999) 19...\textit{Dh}5 20.\textit{Db}5 \textit{f}4 21.\textit{Dxd}4 \textit{fxg}3 22.\textit{Dd}f3 \textit{gfx}2+ 23.\textit{Dxf}2\textit{\&} Orso – Alfred, Budapest 2000.

18.\textit{Db}5 \textit{Ef}7

The trade of the knights after: 18...\textit{Dxb}5 19.\textit{cx}b5\textit{\&} would be right into White's hands.

Black's position crumbled quickly after: 18...\textit{Wg}5?! 19.\textit{Dh}1 \textit{Db}5 20.\textit{cx}b5 \textit{Dd}8 21.g3 \textit{De}6 22.\textit{Dd}4+ Liarokapis – V.Petrovic, corr. 2001.

19.\textit{Dxd}4!

In case of: 19.\textit{Dxd}6 \textit{Dd}7 20.\textit{Dxc}8 \textit{Exc}8 21.\textit{Ea}2 \textit{Ef}8\textit{\&} Black has a good compensation for the pawn thanks to his active pieces. 19...\textit{exd}4 20.g3 \textit{De}6 21.\textit{exf}5 \textit{Exf}5 22.\textit{Ag}2\textit{\&}. Black has too many weaknesses to worry about.

\textit{b4) 12...De}8

Black provides additional protection for his d6-pawn, in order to prepare \textit{f}7-\textit{f}5 and eventually even c7-c5.

13.\textit{Wb}3?!

But not 13.a5?, because of: 13...c5! 14.dxc6 \textit{Dxc}6 15.\textit{ax}b6 \textit{Exa}1 16.\textit{Wxa}1 \textit{Dxb}4 17.\textit{E}1 \textit{Ca}6 18.\textit{b}7 \textit{Dxb}7 19.\textit{Dxb}7 \textit{Dc}5 20.\textit{Dd}7

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\(\text{f}6\) 21.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{h}6\) and White loses a pawn, Mohr – Freitag, Graz 1998.

The preparatory move 13.\(\text{b}5\) is not so effective, because of: 13...\(\text{f}5\) 14.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{h}6\) and White achieves nothing with 15.\(\text{a}5\), due to: 15...\(\text{c}6!\) 16.\(\text{dxc}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 17.\(\text{xc}3\) \(\text{xc}5\) Lopepe – Spitz, corr. 1999.

It is not better for him to try 13.\(\text{d}2\), in view of: 13...\(\text{f}5\) 14.\(\text{b}3\) (about 14.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{h}6\) – see 13.\(\text{b}5\)) 14...\(\text{h}8\) 15.\(\text{fd}1\) \(\text{xe}4\) 16.\(\text{dxe}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 17.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 18.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{bxa}5\) 19.\(\text{xa}5\), Louiseiro – Bouwman, Sao Paulo 2001, 19...\(\text{c}6!\) 20.\(\text{xa}8\) \(\text{ba}8\) 21.\(\text{bxd}6\) \(\text{exd}6\) 22.\(\text{dxd}6\) \(\text{d}4\) 23.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{cxd}5\) 24.\(\text{cxd}5\) \(\text{bb}8\) 25.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) =.

13...\(\text{b}8\)

Black prevents the move a4-a5.

It seems a bit strange for him to go back with the knight – 13...\(\text{f}6\). In that case, White should proceed patiently with his basic plan: 14.\(\text{fd}1\) \(\text{d}7\) 15.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{c}5\) 16.\(\text{b}2!\) (It is imprecise for White to play 16.\(\text{c}2\), Iskusnyh – I.Zaitsev, Moscow 1996, because the line: 16...\(\text{a}6!?\) 17.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{bxa}5\) 18.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{xc}5\) 19.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{xc}5\) 20.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 21.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{c}6\) enables Black to simplify the position advantageously.) and Black will have to comply with the formation of numerous pawn-weaknesses in his camp.

The exchange of the light-squared bishop is not logical – 13...\(\text{g}4\). After: 14.\(\text{fd}1\) \(\text{h}6\) 15.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{xf}3\) 16.\(\text{xf}3\) \(\text{x}5\) 17.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{bxa}5\) 18.\(\text{xa}5\) \(\text{fxe}4\), Spreeuw – R. Thomas, Birmingham 2001, White can emphasize the vulnerability of the light squares in Black’s camp with: 19.\(\text{xe}4!?\) \(\text{f}5\) 20.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{d}4\) 21.\(\text{d}3\).

Black does not need to play 13...\(\text{h}6\). That move is simply a loss of time. After: 14.\(\text{fd}1\) \(\text{f}5\) 15.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{bxa}5\) 16.\(\text{xa}5\) \(\text{h}7\) 17.\(\text{d}2\) (It is a typical mistake for White to follow with 17.\(\text{b}5?\), because of the standard tactical strike: 17...\(\text{xa}5!\) 18.\(\text{xa}5\) \(\text{c}6\) Connelly – Burden, Internet 2004.) White is better.

Black has also tried here 13...\(\text{h}6\), but White can counter that with 14.\(\text{fd}1\) (The immediate move 14.\(\text{a}5\), is met traditionally by Black with: 14...\(\text{c}5!\) 15.\(\text{dxc}6\) \(\text{bxa}5\) 16.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{xc}6\) 14...\(\text{f}5\) (or 14...\(\text{b}8\) 15.\(\text{a}3\) threatening 16.\(\text{xe}5\) and 16.\(\text{a}5\)) 15.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{bxa}5\) (In case of: 15...\(\text{f}6\) 16.\(\text{axb}6\) \(\text{xa}1\) 17.\(\text{xa}1\) \(\text{xb}6\) 18.\(\text{a}3\), after 18...\(\text{fxe}4?!\), White obtains a decisive advantage by force with: 19.\(\text{xe}5!\) \(\text{c}3\) 20.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{d}8\) 21.\(\text{d}6\) \(\text{xc}6\) 22.\(\text{dxc}6\) \(\text{f}4\) 23.\(\text{g}3\) \(\text{e}5\) 24.\(\text{d}1\) Stohl – Atalik, Beijing 1996, it is not any better for Black to try the other capture – 18...\(\text{xe}4\) 19.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{fxe}4\) 20.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{d}8\) (or 16...\(\text{f}6?\) 17.\(\text{xc}7\) – 16...\(\text{fxe}4?!\) 17.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 18.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{e}7\) 19.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{e}2\) 17.\(\text{c}2\)! preparing \(\text{c}4\)-\(\text{c}5\) (It is not so good for White to play 17.\(\text{c}5\) immediately, because of: 17...\(\text{dxc}5\) 18.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{f}7\) 19.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{c}4\) 20.\(\text{xc}4\) \(\text{a}6\) 21.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{fxe}4\)).
Black's move 13...\textit{\textbf{h}8}, requires from White some preparation to accomplish the plan with a4-a5. After 14.\textit{\textbf{b}5} (in case of: 14.a5 c5! 15.dxc6 bxa5 16.c7 \textit{\textbf{c}7} 17.\textit{\textbf{b}5} \textit{\textbf{b}7}∞ Husari – Dembo, Budapest 2003, Black's position is at least equal; about 14.\textit{\textbf{f}d}1 f5 15.\textit{\textbf{d}d}2 fxe4 – see 13.\textit{\textbf{d}d}2 f5 14.\textit{\textbf{b}3} \textit{\textbf{h}8} 15.\textit{\textbf{f}d}1 fxe4.) 14...f5 15.\textit{\textbf{d}d}2 \textit{\textbf{g}8} (Black cannot stop White's a-pawn after his other possibilities either: 15...\textit{\textbf{h}6}, D.Stern – Chytilek, corr. 1995, 16.\textit{\textbf{f}d}1 fxe4 17.\textit{\textbf{c}e}4 \textit{\textbf{f}5} 18.a5; after: 15...fxe4 16.\textit{\textbf{c}e}4 \textit{\textbf{f}5} 17.\textit{\textbf{d}d}3 \textit{\textbf{f}6} 18.\textit{\textbf{f}3} \textit{\textbf{d}7} Mrkvicka – Enev, corr. 1998, White breaks through with: 19.\textit{\textbf{d}d}7!? \textit{\textbf{xf}6} 20.a5; in case of: 15...\textit{\textbf{d}d}7 16.a5 \textit{\textbf{xb}5} 17.\textit{\textbf{xb}5} bxa5 18.\textit{\textbf{xa}5} \textit{\textbf{h}6}, Sakai – Hartung, corr. 2000, White has the simple resource – 19.\textit{\textbf{f}d}1t! 16.a5 bxa5 17.\textit{\textbf{xa}5} \textit{\textbf{xa}5} 18.\textit{\textbf{xa}5} \textit{\textbf{g}6} (The move 18...\textit{\textbf{h}6}, enables White to break through on the queenside in another fashion too: 19.c5! dxc5, Sander – Buese, corr. 2001 and here the best for White is: 20.\textit{\textbf{c}3}?? fxe4 21.\textit{\textbf{xc}5}t 19.exf5 \textit{\textbf{xf}5} 19...gxf5 20.f4t) 20.\textit{\textbf{xe}3} \textit{\textbf{d}7} 21.h3± and Black's position was solid, but very passive in the game Astrom – Nevedichy, Yerevan 1996.

After 13...f5, White can accomplish the thematic breakthrough with his a-pawn without any preparation: 14.a5! c5 (14...bxa5 15.\textit{\textbf{xa}5} \textit{\textbf{xa}5} 16.\textit{\textbf{xa}5} \textit{\textbf{d}7}? 17.\textit{\textbf{g}5} c5 18.\textit{\textbf{e}6} \textit{\textbf{f}7} 19.\textit{\textbf{b}6} h6 20.\textit{\textbf{d}1}+– T.Vasilevich – R.Gonzalez, Gibraltar 2004; 16.h6 17.\textit{\textbf{b}8}∞ Gousseinov – Voracek, Tallinn 1997; 14...fxe4 15.\textit{\textbf{xe}4} \textit{\textbf{f}4} 16.\textit{\textbf{f}d}2 bxa5 17.\textit{\textbf{xa}5} \textit{\textbf{f}5} 18.\textit{\textbf{c}3} \textit{\textbf{xa}1} 19.\textit{\textbf{xa}1}∞ Astashov – V.Danielian, St Petersburg 1999; Black has too many weaknesses after: 14...\textit{\textbf{b}8}? 15.axb6 cxb6 16.\textit{\textbf{a}3} h6 17.\textit{\textbf{b}5} \textit{\textbf{f}6} 18.\textit{\textbf{d}d}2 g5 19.\textit{\textbf{h}5} \textit{\textbf{g}6} 20.\textit{\textbf{fx}5} \textit{\textbf{xf}5} 21.g4+– Bilsel – Bassi, corr. 1998.) 15.dxc6 bxa5 (15...\textit{\textbf{xc}6}? 16.c5+ \textit{\textbf{h}8} 17.\textit{\textbf{cxb}6}± Stauch – G.Brunner, Bad Wiessee 2001) 16.c5+ \textit{\textbf{h}8}, Kosteniuk – M.Socko, Warsaw 2004, 17.cxd6!? \textit{\textbf{xc}6} 18.\textit{\textbf{c}5}t. White's far-advanced passed d6-pawn squeezes Black's pieces considerably.

\begin{center}
\textbf{14.\textit{\textbf{b}5}}
\end{center}

White prepares the pawn-break a4-a5.

The immediate move 14.a5?? would not work, because of: 14...bxa5 15.\textit{\textbf{xa}5} c5!–+.

\begin{center}
\textbf{14...f5 15.\textit{\textbf{d}d}2 fxe4}
\end{center}

Black's position is solid, but very passive after: 15...\textit{\textbf{h}8} 16.\textit{\textbf{d}3} \textit{\textbf{a}8} 17.\textit{\textbf{a}3} \textit{\textbf{g}8} 18.a5 bxa5 19.\textit{\textbf{xa}5} \textit{\textbf{xa}5} 20.\textit{\textbf{xa}5} \textit{\textbf{g}6} 21.
9.b4 a5 10...\xa3 ab 11...\xb4

\xe2 fxe4 22...\xe4 \xe4 23...xe4 \xa6 24...\xb1 \xf7 25.c5± Beckhuis – Kuhlins, Germany 1997.

He should not be happy as a rule with similar developments and he should strive for some counterplay. It is usually connected with White’s e4-pawn.

Black can increase his pressure against the e4-pawn with the help of the move – 15...\xf6. White can play then 16.a5 (He can try also something less forced – 15.f3 \xd5 16.g3±, but that has not been tested in practice yet.) 16...fxe4 (or 16...bxa5 17...xa5 \xe4 18...xe4 fxe4 19...c2 \xb7 20.c5 dxc5 21.d6 \xc6 22...xc7± Vodep – J.Nielsen, corr. 1998; 16...\xe4 17...xe4 fxe4 18.axb6 \xb6 19.c5±) 17.axb6 \xb6 18.c5± and White has the initiative.

Black can attack his opponent’s central pawn with 15...\xf6. In that case White can fight for the advantage with 16.a5!? (It is also a good alternative for White to play: 16.f3!? \xf6 17...d3 \xh5 18.g3 \xa8 19.a5 bxa5 20...xa5± K.Szabo – M.Mueller, Budapest 2002.) 16...bxa5 17...xa5 \xd2 18...xd2 fxe4 19...g5! \xf6 20...c2 \xf5 21...d2± – and White has the initiative thanks to the vulnerability of the dark squares around Black’s king, Berry – A.Hunt, Birmingham 2002.

16.a5

White can also transpose moves with: 16...\xe4 \xf5 17.a5 bxa5 18...xa5 – see 16.a5.

16...bxa5 17...xa5 \xf5 18...xe4 \xd4

Black is trying to play actively.

He can penetrate to the d4-square with his knight in another fashion too – 18...\xd7 19...d1 \xb5 20...b5 \xd4 21...\xb1 \xf6, I.Sokolov – Kindermann, Nussloch 1996. Still after: 22...fxe6+ \xf6 23...c3 \xe2+ 24...xe2 \xf6 25...a1± White maintains a slight edge. Black’s dark-squared bishop is completely idle.

18...\xf6 19...d3 \xf7 20...c3 \xf6 21...fxe6+ \xf6 22...a7+ Cassella – Clawitter, Los Angeles 2003.

18...\xh4 19...d3 \xb7 20...ab1 \xd7 21...e1 c5 22...xc6 \xc6 23...f3± J.Nilsson – T.Schmidt, Birkerod 1999.

19...d1 \xe2+

After: 19...\xb5 20...b5 \xf6, Dub – M.Mueller, Budapest 2002, 21...c2!? \xd7 22...fb1± White maintains some pressure against Black’s backward c7-pawn.

20...\xe2 \xd7 21...fd1 \xe7

22...d2 \xb7 23...a8 \xf6 24...g5 \xf5 25...da1 \xe4 26...xf6
\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{x}f6} 27.\texttt{\texttt{x}f8+} \texttt{\texttt{x}f8} 28.\texttt{\texttt{x}e4+}}

-- Black must protect his vulnerable light squares, which are very weak after the exchange of his light-squared bishop, Atakisi -- Soberano, corr. 2000.

**Conclusion**

In Chapters 16 and 17 we analyze Black's most popular lines in the variation 9.\texttt{b4} \texttt{a5}, in which he exchanges pawns immediately on the \texttt{b4}-square. In that case White plans to develop his initiative on the queenside with \texttt{c4-c5}. If he manages to do that, like for example in variation a, then his offensive is running smoothly.

In the variations under index b (11...\texttt{b6}) Black prevents White's \texttt{c}-pawn from advancing forward.

White then breaks through on the queenside just gradually. He usually uses his a-pawn (a2-a4-a5) for that purpose. That idea however requires certain precision. White must watch constantly about Black's possible counterstrike \texttt{c7-c5}, which is particularly effective with a white pawn on \texttt{a5}, or a knight on \texttt{d2}. Still, contemporary tournament practice shows that White copes with his problems quite successfully. It is worth mentioning here -- the game Ivanchuk -- Ye Jiangchuan, Moscow (m/1) 2001, (variation b2) in which White accomplished an unusual maneuver with his queen in order to prevent Black's counterplay on the queenside.
Chapter 17

1.\(\text{\&}f3\) \(\text{\&}f6\) 2.\(c4\) \(g6\) 3.\(\text{\&}c3\) \(\text{\&}g7\) 4.\(e4\) \(d6\) 5.\(d4\) 0–0 6.\(\text{\&}e2\) \(e5\) 7.0–0 \(\text{\&}c6\) 8.\(d5\) \(\text{\&}e7\) 9.\(b4\) \(a5\) 10.\(\text{\&}a3\) \(\text{axb4}\) 11.\(\text{\&}xb4\) \(\text{\&}d7\)

Black maintains the elasticity of his pawn-chain on the queenside. His set-up however, is not so harmonious. The knight on \(d7\) has covered the diagonal for the light-squared bishop and it will have to remain there for a while. In case Black removes it from \(d7\), White will immediately push \(c4\)-c5.

12.\(a4\)

Now, we will analyze thoroughly: a) 12...\(\text{\&}c5\), b) 12...\(\text{\&}h8\), c) 12...\(h6\), d) 12...\(\text{f}5\) and e) 12...\(\text{g}6\).

About 12...\(b6\) 13.\(a5\) – see 11...\(b6\) Chapter 16, variation b1

Black has also played:
12...\(\text{\&}b8\)?! (That move is too slow.) 13.c5! \(\text{\&}a6\) 14.\(\text{\&}xa6\) \(\text{\&}xa6\) 15.cxd6 \(\text{cx}d6\) 16.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(f5\) 17.\(\text{\&}b5\) \(\text{fxe}4\) 18.\(\text{\&}xe4\) \(\text{\&}f4\) 19.f3\(\pm\) and White's pieces are much more active, exerting pressure against Black's d6-pawn, Prudnikova – Kachiani, Germany 1996;

After 12...\(\text{\&}e8\) 13.\(a5\), it is insufficient for Black to equalize with: 13...\(\text{\&}c5\) 14.\(\text{\&}xc6\) \(\text{\&}xc6\) 15.\(\text{\&}xd6\) \(\text{\&}xa5\), Golod – Raptis, McMinnville 2004, because White can increase his pressure with: 16. \(\text{\&}xa5\)!? \(\text{\&}xa5\) 17.\(\text{\&}b5\)\(\uparrow\).

a) 12...\(\text{\&}c5\)

This attempt to block the queenside is bound to fail.

13.\(\text{\&}xc5\)!

That is the most precise line for White. In case of 13.\(a5\), he will need to consider: 13...\(\text{\&}a6\)!? 14.\(\text{\&}a3\) \(f5\)\(\infty\).

13...\(\text{\&}xc5\) 14.\(a5\)

That move is an integral part of White's plan. Now, Black's c5-pawn might become vulnerable.

14...\(\text{\&}d7\)

The other possibilities for Black are even worse.

He can defend his pawn with his queen – 14...\(\text{\&}d6\), but that is not the best occupation for his strongest piece, moreover it can come under attack there by White's knight. After: 15.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}h8\) 16.\(\text{\&}b5\) \(\text{\&}d8\) 17.\(\text{\&}b3\) \(f5\) 18.\(\text{\&}xc5\) \(c6\)
Chapter 17


Black should protect his c5-pawn somehow; otherwise White will attack it with his knights: 14... Wh8 15.Qd2 Qg8 16.Qb3 We7 17. Qa4 f5 18.Qxc5 Qf6 19.Qc2 Wh6 20.Qd3 Qh5 21.Qe1 Qf4 22.Qf1= Izoria – Jamagidze, Tbilisi 2001.

The move 14...b6 is seemingly reliable, but after opening of the a-file, White’s queen will penetrate Black’s camp along it: 15.axb6 Qxa1 16.Wxa1 cxb6 17. Qb1 Qd7 18.Wa6 Qc8 19.Qb7 f5 20.Qd3 Ze8. After: 21.Qg5!? h6 (In case of 21...f4, it is good for White to play 22.Qf3, with the idea to follow with Qd2 and Qc2-a4 and Black can hardly counter that plan: 22...Qf8 23.Qd2 g5 24.Qc2 Ze7 25.Qb8= Gausel – Rogozenko, Yerevan 1996.) 22. Qe6 Qxe6 23.dxe6 Ze7 (or 23... Wxd3 24.Qf7+ Wh7 25.Qxe8++; 23...Qxe6 24.exf5 Ze7 25.Qd5+ Wxd5 26.Qxd5++) 24.Qd5 Wxd5 25.Qxd5= (Gausel) and Black will soon lose material.

It is not good for Black to play actively on the other side of the board either – 14...f5. White plays 15.Qd2! (This knight goes after the c5-pawn, while the other idea – 15.Qg5 can be countered by Black with 15...Wh6? and White will have to retreat the knight, because the line: 16.Qe6?! Qxe6 17.dxe6 Qd2!= is not good for him at all.) 15...fxe4 (Or 15...c6 16.Qb3 fxe4 17.Qxe4 cxd5 18.cxd5 Qf5 19. d6 b6 20.Qd5+– Tisdall – Carlson, Stockholm 1997; 16.Qd6 17.Qd2 f4, A.Rychagov – Ar.Smynov, Kolontaevo 1997, 18.Qa4++; after 15...Qd7 16.Qb3 b6, Black saves his c5-pawn, but White follows with: 17.d6! cxd6 18.Wxd6 Qf6 19.Qd2 Qc6 20.Qd5 Qd6 21.axb6 Qxa1 22.Qxa1= and Black’s position crumbles, O.Pavlov – Yarkovich, Novosibirsk 2001; Black has tried to save his c5-pawn in another way too: 15...Wf6 16.Qb3 Qf6 17.Qf3 Wh8 18.Qa4 Qxa5 19.Qxa5 Qxa5 20.Qc3 Qxa1 21.Qxa1=, but at the price of an exchange, Schlecht – Steinmueller, Boeblingen 2000.) 16.Qdxe4 Qf5 17.Qxc5 Qd4, Pelletier – Jenni, Neuchatel 1997, 18.Qg4= and Black is not only a pawn down, but his light squares are quite vulnerable.

15.Wb3

White is not letting his opponent off the hook even for a second. If he slows down, Black will deploy his knight on d6, as he did in the following example: 15.Qd2 Qc8 16.Qb3 b6 17.a6 Qd6 18.Qc2 f5± Dobrev – Novik, Internet 2003 and he would have a good counterplay.

The recommendation of GM D.Rogozenko – 15.d6, was tested in the game Mascarenhas – Blanco Gramajo, corr. 1999. After: 15...cxd6 16.Wxd6 Qc6 17.Qd5
9.b4 a5 10.\textit{a}3 ab 11.\textit{xb}4 \textit{d}7 12.a4

\textit{g}4 18.\textit{xc}5 \textit{xa}5= Black would have preserved an approximately equal position.

15...\textit{a}7

In case of 15...b6, White should not be in a hurry to clarify the pawn-structure on the queenside. The most unpleasant line then for Black would be 16.\textit{a}2!± with the idea 17.\textit{fa}1.

If Black protects his b7-pawn from the back with 15...\textit{b}8, then after: 16.\textit{fd}1 \textit{c}8 17.a6 \textit{b}6 18.\textit{b}5 \textit{xb}5 19.\textit{xb}5 \textit{d}6 20.\textit{d}2 f5 21.\textit{c}4 \textit{a}8 22.\textit{a}4± the same type of position would be reached as after the move 15...\textit{a}7, S.Ivanov – Laveryd, Sweden 1999.

16.a6 \textit{b}6

After: 16...\textit{bx}a6?! 17.\textit{a}3 White regains his pawn and he destroys his opponent’s queenside.

Black frees the g8-square for his knight with that prophylactic move.

13.a5

Now, it is more difficult for Black to oppose the pawn-break c4-c5, while White’s pawn is on a5.

13...\textit{g}8

About 13...\textit{h}6 14.\textit{d}3 f5 15.\textit{e}1 – see 12...\textit{h}6.

White must counter the move 13...f5, with 14.\textit{g}5! (The typical maneuver of the knight to the queenside – 14.\textit{d}2 \textit{h}6 15.\textit{b}3 \textit{f}6± enables Black to obtain a dangerous counterplay, for example: 16.f3?! \textit{e}3+ 17.\textit{h}1 \textit{h}5 18.\textit{d}3 \textit{g}3+!! 19.\textit{hx}g3 f4 20.\textit{gf}4 \textit{g}5–+ Jelen – B. Socko, Groningen 1998.) 14...\textit{c}5 15.\textit{xc}5 \textit{xc}5 16.\textit{b}3 \textit{xe}4, O’Connell – McCarthy, Leinster 1993 and here White could have maintained his initiative with: 17.\textit{exe}4 \textit{f}5 18.\textit{g}4±.

14.\textit{d}2

White is in a hurry to redeploy

17.\textit{b}5 \textit{xb}5 18.\textit{xb}5 \textit{c}8 19.\textit{d}2 \textit{d}6 20.\textit{d}3 \textit{e}7 21.\textit{c}4 \textit{h}8 22.\textit{fe}1± Lautier – M. Novik, Dubai 2002. White does not risk losing in that position. Black must delegate one of his pieces to take care of White’s protected passed pawn and that
his knight to the queenside, in order to support the pawn-break c4-c5, while Black has no threats at all.

14...f5 15...b3!?

That is the most consistent way for White to complete the maneuver with the knight. After: 15...d3 h6 16.a4 f6 17.c5 xex4 18.f7 19.a3 e8 20.c3 f8 21.cxd6 xdx6∞ White pushed c4-c5 indeed, but Black turned out to be quite well prepared for it in the game San Segundo – Smirin, Las Palmas 1997.

15...fxe4

Now, the d6-square needs additional protection by a knight. In case of: 15...g6 16.c5 dxc5 (After: 16...e8 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.d2 df6, White manages to defend his e4-pawn with 19.f3! and he can follow that with his standard positional bind: 19...h6 20.c4 f7 21.d3 f4 22.b5 f8 23.b6 b8 24.f1 h5 25.a3 g7 26. c4 d7 27.xe5+ Adamov – Shtanko, Kiev 1999.) 17.xc5 xxc5 18.xc5 e8, Villavicencio – Colon, Maspalomas 2000 and now, White can increase his pressure with: 19.b5!? d7 20.f3.

The move 15...df6, Bekker – Ferris, Melbourne 2003, enables White to break through immediately: 16.c5!? xex4 17.xe4 fxe4 18.cxd6 cxd6 19.d2 f6 20.c4 e8 21.b6 b8 22.c1 f5 23.e3∞. His knight has penetrated to the b6-square and it paralyzes Black’s queenside.

16.xe4 df6 17.c3 h6 18.c5 fg4

After: 18...g7 19.cxd6 xdx6, Black must consider the possibility 20.c5∞.

19.g3 f6

Now, Black should retreat to avoid the worst. He must not try to create new threats on the kingside, because the move 19...g5?, I. Sokolov – Wortel, Antwerp 1998, could have been easily refuted by White with: 20.cxd6 cxd6 21.e4 h5 22.h4++. 

20.cxd6 cxd6 21.d2 h3 22.e1 f7 23.c4+ – and Black has managed to protect his d6-pawn indeed, but his position remains quite passive.

c) 12...h6
That is prophylactic once again. Black takes the g5-square under control before he pushes f7-f5. The main drawback of that move is that now Black's dark-squared bishop is deprived of the h6-square, from where it could have entered the actions along the c1-h6 diagonal.

13.a5

This is a thematic move for White in similar pawn-structures. He should play it now, because the play is non-forced presently.

13...f5 14...e2 d6

It is not good for Black to reduce the tension in the centre with the move 14...f4?! White can easily trade the light-squared bishops and he pushes c4-c5 effortlessly. After: 15.g4 f6 16.exc8 exc8 17.c5 17.f3 d8 18.cxd6 exc6 20.b3 d8 21.c4 xc4 22.xc4 xc4 23.xb4 d8 24.f1 d6 25.h5 xb5 26.xb5± White is clearly better, Braschi – Reino, Lima 2000.

The move 14...d6?! is not good for Black either, because it deprives the knight of the f6-square, therefore he cannot increase the pressure against the e4-pawn. After: 15.a3 f4 (or 15...f8 16.c5 dxc5 17.xc5 18.xc5 b6 19.axb6 xa1 20.xa1 cxb6 21. a3± Kotanjan – Umbrigaliev, Samara 2002) 16.c5 dxc5 17.xxxc5 18.xc5 b6 19.axb6 xa1 20.xa1 cxb6 21. a3± Taylor – Rios, Philadelphia 1992) 18.c5 d6 19.c5 b5 d8 20.d2 a6 21.c4 d8 22.xb6 xb8 23.g4± Black's position was very difficult in the game Abbasov – Kaabi, Abu Dhabi 1999.

The other rook-move – 14...f7 is more justified. Still, in that case after: 15.b3 f6 16.f3 h5 17.c5 h6 White can push e4-c5 too, Plachkinova – Moreno, Tarragona 2003. He can prevent the activation of his opponent's dark-squared bishop with the move 18.d3!.

In case of 14...h8, White can support his e4-pawn with 15.f3!, since Black cannot use the c1-h6 diagonal with his bishop after the prophylactic move h7-h6. After: 15.h5 (Following: 15.g8 16.b3 g6 17.c5 e8 18.b5 f6 19.cxd6 cxd6, G.Andersson – Svenn, Sweden 2001, White should prevent b7-b6 and he should better do it in the following fashion – 20.c2! b6 21.c6 a6 22.axb6 a6 23.b6 d8 24.d2±) 16.b3 h6 17.d3 g8 (17...h7 18.c5 dxc5 19. xc5 xc5 20.xc5± Taylor – Rios, Philadelphia 1992) 18.c5 d6 19.b5 d8 20.cxd6 cxd6 21.d2 xd2 22.xd2 f4 23.f1 g5 24.c3± and all Black's pieces are stuck to the eighth rank, Raeker – Sinkovic, Biel 1995.

After 14...h7, Lukacs – Groszper, Solymar 1996, the simplest for White is 15.f3?!±.

It is interesting for Black to try 14...h5, but White manages again to prepare c4-c5, preventing Black's queenside counterplay: 15.a3 (Black's idea can be best seen in the following line:
15.exf5?! gxf5! 16.\(\text{\textdiagram}xh5\) e4, threatening c7-c5 and after: 17.\(\text{\textdiagram}b1\) e5 18.\(\text{\textdiagram}e2\) \(\text{\textdiagram}g7\) 19.f4 exf3 20.\(\text{\textdiagram}xf3\) \(\text{\textdiagram}d3\) 21.\(\text{\textdiagram}e2\) \(\text{\textdiagram}g5!\)\() he had an excellent compensation for the pawn in the game Antic – Panchev, Negorski Bani 1997.) 15...\(\text{\textdiagram}f6\) 16.\(\text{\textdiagram}f3\) \(\text{\textdiagram}h6\) 17.\(\text{\textdiagram}d3\). Black does not have the h5-square for his knight and it is safe for White’s queen to occupy the d3-square.

15.c5!

White should better exploit immediately the absence of Black’s knight from the d7-square.

15...fxe4

About 15...\(\text{\textdiagram}xe4\) 16.\(\text{\textdiagram}dxe4\) fxe4 17.\(\text{\textdiagram}xg6\) cxd6 18.\(\text{\textdiagram}xe4\) – see 15...fxe4.

It is not in the spirit of the position for Black to play 15...f4?! because after: 16.\(\text{\textdiagram}xg6\) cxd6 17.\(\text{\textdiagram}c4\) \(\text{\textdiagram}e8\) 18.\(\text{\textdiagram}b6\) \(\text{\textdiagram}f6\) 19.\(\text{\textdiagram}b5\) \(\text{\textdiagram}f6\) 20.\(\text{\textdiagram}g4\) h5 21.\(\text{\textdiagram}xe8\) \(\text{\textdiagram}xe8\) 22.\(\text{\textdiagram}e6+\) \(\text{\textdiagram}h7\) 23.\(\text{\textdiagram}a3\) \(\text{\textdiagram}f8\) 24.\(\text{\textdiagram}c3\) \(\text{\textdiagram}g7\) 25.\(\text{\textdiagram}f3\) \(\text{\textdiagram}e7\) 26.\(\text{\textdiagram}xc1\) \(\text{\textdiagram}xe6\) 27.\(\text{\textdiagram}xe6+\) – he was completely outplayed in the game Gajic – Mihelic, Nova Gorica 1992.

The move 15...\(\text{\textdiagram}e8\)?! is too passive. White can increase methodically his pressure on that side of the board with: 16.\(\text{\textdiagram}f3\) \(\text{\textdiagram}f7\) 17.\(\text{\textdiagram}b3\) \(\text{\textdiagram}f8\) 18.\(\text{\textdiagram}c4\) \(\text{\textdiagram}h7\) 19.\(\text{\textdiagram}b5\) \(\text{\textdiagram}g8\) 20.cxd6 cxd6 21.\(\text{\textdiagram}a3!\) \(\text{\textdiagram}f6\) 22.\(\text{\textdiagram}xe5\) \(\text{\textdiagram}xe4\) 23.\(\text{\textdiagram}xe4\) \(\text{\textdiagram}f7\) 24.\(\text{\textdiagram}c4\) \(\text{\textdiagram}xe4\) 25.\(\text{\textdiagram}d3\) – Buss – Jaechle, Germany 2000.

Black can open the game with: 15...dxe5 16.\(\text{\textdiagram}xc5\) fxe4 17.\(\text{\textdiagram}dxe4\) \(\text{\textdiagram}xe4\) 18.\(\text{\textdiagram}xe4\) \(\text{\textdiagram}f4\) 19.d6 \(\text{\textdiagram}c6\), Stokke – Wallin, Oslo 2003, but White still has a tactical solution – 20.\(\text{\textdiagram}e3\) and Black cannot play 20...\(\text{\textdiagram}xe4\) in view of 21.\(\text{\textdiagram}d5\).

16.cxd6

GM J.Hjartarson suggests here: 16.\(\text{\textdiagram}dxe4\) \(\text{\textdiagram}f5\) 17.\(\text{\textdiagram}a3\), but White must exploit the fact that his opponent cannot capture with his knight on d6 right now.

16...\(\text{\textdiagram}xd6\) 17.\(\text{\textdiagram}dxe4\) \(\text{\textdiagram}xe4\)

Black wishes to simplify the position quite understandably, because he lacks space. After: 17...\(\text{\textdiagram}e8\) 18.\(\text{\textdiagram}b5\) \(\text{\textdiagram}f4\) 19.\(\text{\textdiagram}f3\) b6 20.\(\text{\textdiagram}g3\) \(\text{\textdiagram}f5\) 21.\(\text{\textdiagram}exd6\) \(\text{\textdiagram}xd6\), Dehne – Kuhnen, Dortmund 2001, White could have won with 22.\(\text{\textdiagram}xd6\).

18.\(\text{\textdiagram}xe4\) \(\text{\textdiagram}f5\)

The move 18...\(\text{\textdiagram}f4\)! looks dubious, Candela – Almagro, Collado Villalba 2000, since after 19.\(\text{\textdiagram}f3\) Black has problems defending his d6-pawn, because of the placement of his rook on the f4-square.

19.\(\text{\textdiagram}d3\)

Black’s d6-pawn is weak now. His position would become quite difficult if White manages to bring his rook to b6.
d) 12...f5

That is the principled answer for Black. He does not wish to waste time on prophylactic.

13.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{g}5}}!

It is logical for White to play that move if Black is not preventing it. He has no time for the standard move 13.a5, because after: 13...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{f}6}} 14.c5 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}e}4} 15.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}e}4} fxe4 16.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{g}5}}, with the help of: 16...e3! 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.fxe3 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{h}6}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}f}8+} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{xf}8}} \Rightarrow \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{Kasparov}}} – ICC, London (simul) 1997, Black could have obtained an excellent counterplay on the kingside.

Now, White is threatening to deploy his knight to the e6-square and Black can try to counter that with \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{d1}}} 13...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{f}6}}, or \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{d2}}} 13...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}5}}.

\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{d1}}} 13...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{f}6}} 14.c5!

White can break through on the queenside after the removal of Black’s knight from the d7-square.

14...fxe4

About 14...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}e}4} 15.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}xe}4} fxe4 16.cxd6 cxd6 17.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}e}4} – see 14...fxe4.

14...h6 15.cxd6!? cxd6 16.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{e}6}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}e}6} 17.dxe6 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}8}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}d}6} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{d}6}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}d}6} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{f}e}8} 20.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{b}5}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}6}} 21.exf5 gxf5 22.e7 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{d}2}} 23.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{e}2}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{e}4}} 24.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{a}3}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{g}5}} 25.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}4+}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{g}7}} 26.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{e}6+}} Tratar – Rigatti, Nova Gorica 2002.

In case of: 14...dxc5 15.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}c}5} b6, R.Bilek – Hodovsky, Brno 2001, after: 16.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{a}3}}! \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{h}6}} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{b}3}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{g}7}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{e}6+}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}e}6} 19.dxe6 c5 20.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{f}d}1} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{b}8}} 21.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{d}5}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{fx}d}5} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{ex}d}5+} -- Black can hardly stop White's passed pawns without considerable material losses.

The move 14...h6, only helps White’s knight on its route to the e6-square – 15.cxd6 cxd6 16.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}6}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}e}6} 17.dxe6 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{e}8}} (or 17...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}8}} 18.exf5 gxf5 19.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{b}5}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{e}8}} 20.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{h}5}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{g}5}} 21.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}e}8} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{e}8}} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}7+}} Gill – M.Koch, corr. 1997; in case of: 17...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}6}} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{xd}6}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{e}8}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{b}5}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{h}8}} 20.e7 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{d}7}} 21.f3 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}8}} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}1}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{e}6}} 23.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}c}6} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{xc}6}} 24.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{b}4}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{e}8}} 25.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{d}5+}} Black will lose material while coping with his opponent’s c7-pawn, Finegold – Mellen, Flint 1993) 18.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{b}5}} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}6}} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{d}5±}} and White’s advantage was overwhelming in the game Grebionkin – Yamaletdinov, Ufa 1999.

\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}xd}6}!?

White must capture like that, while Black is forced to take with his pawn. In case of: 15.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{g}xe}4} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{f}5}}= Gulkov – S.Timofeev, Tula 2000, in answer to 16.cxd6, he must consider the possibility 16...\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{x}d}6}. Following: 15.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}xe}4} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{xe}4}} 16.\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{c}xe}4} \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{f}5}} 17.cxd6 \textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{xd}6}}
18.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}5=\) Niessen – Martjukhin, corr. 2001, Black’s position is quite solid.

\textbf{15...cxd6 16.\(\text{g}xe4\)}

If White captures with the other knight 16.\(\text{c}xe4\), Black can counter that with: 16...\(\text{h}6\) 17.\(\text{xf}6+\) \(\text{xf}6\) 18.\(\text{e}6\) \(\text{xe}6\) 19.\(\text{dxe}6\) \(\text{xe}6!\) 20.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{d}5\) 21.\(\text{xe}7\) \(\text{xe}7\) 22.\(\text{xd}5+\) \(\text{h}7\) – and White’s minimal edge, connected with his superior pawn-structure, would be too difficult to materialize, due to the presence of opposite-coloured bishops on the board.

\textbf{16...\(\text{d}xe4\)}

After 16...\(\text{f}5\), White can follow with 17.\(\text{a}5\) improving his position on the queenside.

\textbf{17.\(\text{d}xe4\) \(\text{f}4\)}

If 17...\(\text{f}5\), Brittner – Enjuto Velasco, Istanbul 2000, then it is good for White to continue with 18.\(\text{a}5\) followed by 19.\(\text{g}4\).

18.\(\text{f}3\)! Now, the pawn-structure is very favourable for White. Black needs to protect his d6-pawn. (White only must neutralize accurately Black’s active pieces and it would be a mistake for him to try with that idea the move 18.\(\text{f}3?\), Hamel – Reyes, Internet 2003, because of: 18...\(\text{xe}4!\) 19.\(\text{f}xe4\) \(\text{b}6\). After 18.\(\text{d}3?!\) White should consider: 18...\(\text{f}5\) 19.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{b}6\) 20.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{xe}4\) 21.\(\text{xf}4\) \(\text{xd}3\) 22.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{c}4\). You have already seen in these lines that Black’s counterplay is based mostly on the attack against the f2-square. Therefore, it is the best for White to protect his knight on e4 with the bishop on f3.) 18...\(\text{f}5\). That is an attempt at justifying the placement of the rook on the f4-square. 19.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{xe}4\) (19...\(\text{b}6\) 20.\(\text{b}1\); 19...\(\text{d}7\) 20.\(\text{d}2\) – and White is better. Now, Black must give up his light-squared bishop for White’s knight; otherwise he will have to lose the exchange.) 20.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{xe}4\) 21.\(\text{xe}4\) \(\text{b}6\) 22.\(\text{xb}1\) \(\text{f}5\) (22...\(\text{a}6\) is worse for after 23.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{f}8\) 24.\(\text{f}1!\) Monnard – Libens, France 1991 Black’s weak pawns are difficult to defend.) 23.\(\text{a}5\) \(\text{c}7\), N.Danilov – Kanep, Parnu 2002, when 24.\(\text{d}2\) intending to send the rook to b6 keeps up the pressure on the enemy’s position.

d2) 13...\(\text{c}5\)
Now, contrary to variation d1, Black does not allow c4-c5, so he is forced to comply with the weakening of his pawn-structure.

14.\textit{hx}c5 dxc5 15.\textit{gf}3?!

That move is necessary, because White must prepare the move \textit{ge}6. The immediate 15. \textit{ge}6, enables Black to fortify his queenside: 15...\textit{exe}6 16.dxe6 b6 (After: 16...\textit{dc}6 17.\textit{fd}3 \textit{wd}4 18. \textit{dd}5, Zavgorodniy – Ajrapetjan, Simferopol 2001, 18...\textit{exe}4∞ the game is quite unclear.) 17.\textit{ea}2 c6 18.\textit{ed}2 \textit{we}8 19.\textit{ef}3 \textit{ef}6 20.\textit{wb}3 \textit{bb}8∞ Bilsel – Burlant, corr. 1998. White’s e6-pawn was encircled by Black’s pieces.

In case of: 15.\textit{wb}3 \textit{gf}6 16.\textit{ge}6 \textit{exe}6 17.dxe6, Black succeeded after: 17...\textit{wc}8 18.\textit{dd}5 (or 18.\textit{wb}5 \textit{dc}6 19.\textit{xc}5 \textit{wd}6= Van Scheltinga – Euwe, Beverwijk 1958) 18...\textit{eb}8 19.\textit{ad}1 \textit{we}6 20.\textit{xc}7, Veingold – Safin, Elista 1998, 20...\textit{wc}6∞ to survive after the complications, capturing White’s e6-pawn in the process.

The standard move 15.a5 is useful for White. That is not however, the right moment for it. Black can counter it with 15...\textit{gh}6!?. White is forced to retreat with his knight to f3, because the line: 16.\textit{ge}6 \textit{exe}6 17.dxe6 \textit{dd}2! 18. \textit{wb}3 \textit{xc}3 19.\textit{xc}3 \textit{dc}6∞ will not yield anything promising for him.

15...\textit{Fa}6

If 15...\textit{gf}6, then White should at first fix Black’s b7-pawn with 16.a5!. Then, Black’s wish to clarify immediately the situation in the centre with 16...\textit{ce}6, as a result of: 17.dxc6 \textit{wd}1 18.\textit{fd}1 bxc6 19.\textit{da}4 \textit{xa}5 20.\textit{db}6 \textit{xa}1 21.\textit{xa}1 \textit{h}6 22.h4 \textit{dg}5 23.hxg5 \textit{fg}8 24.\textit{ea}7 \textit{f}xe4 25.\textit{xe}4± led him to a difficult endgame, A.Rotstein – Tomba, Saint Vincent 2003.

16.a5!

White cannot avoid playing that move. After: 16.\textit{bh}1 \textit{gh}6 17. \textit{ge}6 \textit{exe}6 18.dxe6 \textit{dd}6 19.\textit{we}2, Black, with the help of the line: 19...\textit{b}6!? 20.\textit{fd}1 \textit{gc}6∞ can improve his defensive set-up on the queenside, Zebre – M.Stein, corr. 2001.

16...\textit{Ff}6

In case of: 16...\textit{gh}8 17.\textit{ge}6 \textit{exe}6 18.dxe6 f4, it becomes clear that Black will have problems to cope with his opponent’s far-advanced e6-pawn. After: 19.\textit{wd}8 \textit{xd}8 20.\textit{fb}1 \textit{bh}8 21.\textit{dd}5 \textit{xd}5 22.cxd5 \textit{f}8 23.\textit{ee}2 \textit{ca}7 24.\textit{ae}6 \textit{dd}6 25.h4 \textit{dg}7 26.$$c$$4 b6 27.\textit{bb}5 \textit{h}6 28.\textit{f}f1± Black’s position is difficult, Kramnik – Kasparov, Moscow (blitz, m/6) 1998. Opening of files on the kingside is just deadly for Black.
Following: 16...h6 17.\&e6 \&xe6 18.dxe6 \&c8 19.\&d7 \&c6 20.\&d5 \&xd7 21.exd7 \&d8 22.\&xc7 \&xa5 23.\&xa5 \&xa5 24.\&d1 \&f7 25.exf5 gxf5 26.\&d5+ \&f6 27.\&e8+ \&g6 28.\&e6 \&f8 29.\&d3+ the arising endgame is again too problematic for Black to defend, Ortmann — Blank, Wuertemberg 2001. White’s passed d7-pawn squeezes Black’s forces.

17.\&e6 \&xe6 18.dxe6 c6

The advantages of the placement of White’s pawn on a5 can be best seen in the variation: 18...
\&d6? 19.\&b3+–.

19.\&b3

After: 19.\&d7 \&a8 20.\&ab1 \&a7= Black is threatening to create a drawing-machine: 21...\&d8 22.\&c7 \&c8.

19...\&xa5

If 19...\&c7 20.\&fd1 \&xa5 21.\&ab1 \&a7 22.\&d7 \&a5, then White can open calmly a leeway for his king – 23.h3\&g5. It is essential that his e6-pawn is not under threat.

20.\&xb7 \&a8 21.\&b2 \&xa1 22.\&xa1 \&c8 23.\&b6 \&xe6 24.\&xc5 \&d8 25.\&b6+ Veingold – Auzmendi, Erandio 2004. Black has succeeded in getting rid of his opponent’s e6-pawn, but his position remains worse. His light squares are vulnerable. Additionally, he might have problems with the protection of his king in the future, because of the absence of his f7-pawn.

e) 12...\&h6

That is the most popular move for Black. He controls in advance the g5-square in order to push f7-f5 comfortably.

13.a5

White needs to play that move and we know about that already...

It is weaker for him to redeploy his king’s knight to the queenside. After: 13.\&d2 f5 14.\&b3, Black can follow with 14...b6!? (recommended by Kramnik, so that Black ensures the c5-outpost for his knight) 15.a5 \&c5 16.\&a3 (or 16.exf5 gxf5 17.\&b5 \&g6= I.Sokolov – Gelfand, Groningen 1996; 16.\&xb6 \&xa1 17.\&xa1 cxb6 18.f3 \&h8 19.\&c2 \&g8 20.exf5 gxf5 21.\&b5 \&f6\&g2 Ovod – Bronnikova, Sochi 2004) 16...\&d7 17.axb6 (After: 17.\&xc5 bxc5 18.a6
fxe4 19.\textit{\v{c}}xe4 \textit{\v{d}}f5 20.a7 \textit{\v{c}}e7 21.g3 c6 22.\textit{\v{c}}f3 \textit{\v{d}}d4=\textit{\v{c}} Black’s pieces are quite active, Lalic – Shaked, Pula 1997.) 17...\textit{\v{c}}xb6! 18.\textit{\v{c}}xc5 (or 18.f3 \textit{\v{c}}e3\textit{\v{d}}=) 18...\textit{\v{c}}xc5\textit{\v{d}}= and White has not achieved anything to brag about, Matthiesen – K.Larsen, Nyborg 2001.

13...\textit{\v{f}}f5

About 13...\textit{\v{g}}h8 14.\textit{\v{d}}d3 f5 15.\textit{\v{e}}e1 – see 13...\textit{\v{f}}5.

After: 13...\textit{\v{c}}c5?! 14.\textit{\v{c}}xe5! \textit{\v{a}}a6 15.\textit{\v{d}}d3 \textit{\v{c}}xb4 16.\textit{\v{c}}xb4 f5 17.\textit{\v{w}}d3= Black lost a pawn without a sufficient compensation for it in the game Sakic – Jobe, corr. 2003.

14.\textit{\v{d}}d3!

That is an important moment. It was quite popular for White to play here – 14.\textit{\v{d}}d2. Still, after 14...\textit{\v{f}}f6?! 15.c5 \textit{\v{c}}xd2 16.\textit{\v{w}}xd2, the game becomes forced. Tournament practice has shown that White’s advantage is too difficult to prove after 16...\textit{\v{f}}xe4! (Kramnik succeeded in establishing that after: 16...\textit{\v{c}}xe4?! 17.\textit{\v{c}}xe4 \textit{\v{f}}xe4, it is very good for White to follow with 18.\textit{\v{c}}c3! with the idea to redeploy White’s rook along the fourth rank in order to re-

gain the sacrificed pawn: 18...\textit{\v{f}}f5 19.\textit{\v{a}}a4 \textit{\v{d}}h4 20.\textit{\v{c}}xe4= Kramnik – van Wely, Monaco 1997.) 17.\textit{\v{c}}xd6 \textit{\v{c}}xd6 18.\textit{\v{d}}b5 (18.\textit{\v{a}}a4, A.Evdokimov – Kurnosov, Vladivostok 2002, 18...\textit{\v{a}}g4! 19.\textit{\v{c}}c4 \textit{\v{c}}c8=; 19.\textit{\v{c}}xe4 \textit{\v{c}}xe4 20.\textit{\v{c}}b6 \textit{\v{c}}a6=) 18...\textit{\v{d}}f5 (or 19.\textit{\v{c}}c1 \textit{\v{f}}f7 20.\textit{\v{g}}4?! \textit{\v{d}}d4 21.\textit{\v{c}}xe4 \textit{\v{c}}xd4 22.\textit{\v{c}}xd4 \textit{\v{c}}xd4 23.\textit{\v{c}}c4 \textit{\v{c}}xe4 24.\textit{\v{w}}xe4 \textit{\v{c}}xf2=+ Koblai – Ulko, Moscow 2002; 20.\textit{\v{c}}c4 \textit{\v{d}}d7 21.\textit{\v{c}}c7 \textit{\v{c}}c8 22.\textit{\v{c}}e6 \textit{\v{a}}xe6 23.\textit{\v{c}}xe6 \textit{\v{c}}xc7 24.\textit{\v{c}}c4 \textit{\v{f}}f7 25.\textit{\v{c}}e4 \textit{\v{d}}d8 26.\textit{\v{c}}c7 \textit{\v{c}}a7 27.\textit{\v{w}}d7 \textit{\v{c}}xd7= Beckhuis – T.Paecht, Gelsenkirchen 1997) 21...\textit{\v{c}}xa3 22.\textit{\v{c}}xa3 \textit{\v{c}}a6! (22...\textit{\v{b}}b7 23.\textit{\v{w}}xe4 \textit{\v{c}}xb6 24.\textit{\v{c}}c4=) 23.\textit{\v{b}}b7 \textit{\v{c}}xb7 24.\textit{\v{c}}xe4 \textit{\v{c}}a6 25.\textit{\v{b}}b1= Sergel – van de Wynkel, corr. 2000.

Black’s main arguments against the move 14.\textit{\v{d}}d3 are: e1) 14...\textit{\v{c}}h8 and e2) 14...\textit{\v{c}}f6.

His other tries are less principled. The move 14...\textit{\v{f}}4?! is obviously wrong. If Black reduces the tension in the centre, that only helps White not to worry about his e4-pawn: 15.\textit{\v{c}}e2 g5 16.\textit{\v{h}}3 \textit{\v{c}}g6 17.\textit{\v{h}}h2 \textit{\v{c}}f6 18.\textit{\v{c}}f5 \textit{\v{c}}f7 19.\textit{\v{c}}xd6 \textit{\v{c}}xd6 20.\textit{\v{g}}4 \textit{\v{c}}f8 21.\textit{\v{a}}a3= Farago – Karatorossian, Budapest 2004.

In case of 14...\textit{\v{c}}f6, (with the idea to push later c7-c5) it is possible for White to continue with: 15.\textit{\v{b}}b5 \textit{\v{c}}a6, S.Savchenko – De-
graeve, Metz 1999 and here he can start immediate active actions with: 16.c5! dxc5 17.dxc5 fxe4 18.\textsf{\textbf{dxe4}} \textsf{\textbf{fxe4}} 19.\textsf{\textbf{Wc2}} \textsf{\textbf{f6}} 20.\textsf{\textbf{axe5}} \textsf{\textbf{exe4}} 21.\textsf{\textbf{axe6}} \textsf{\textbf{fxe6}} 22.\textsf{\textbf{a3}} b2 \textsf{\textbf{Bxd5}} 23.\textsf{\textbf{Bd1\textasciitilde}} – Black’s king is exposed, his knight on d5 is pinned and White has threats along the a1–h8 diagonal.

If 14.\textsf{\textbf{Be7}}, van Wely – Piket, Monaco (m/4) 1997, then White is under no threats at all and he can improve patiently his position with: 15.\textsf{\textbf{Be1\textasciitilde}}.

\textbf{e1}) 14...\textsf{\textbf{Bh8}} 15.\textsf{\textbf{Be1\textasciitilde}}

White fortifies his e4-pawn with that prophylactic maneuver.

His alternative is – 15.\textsf{\textbf{Bd2}}. See what happened in the opening stage of the game between Kramnik and Topalov: 15...\textsf{\textbf{Bf6}} – Black is preparing the counter-strike c7-c5. (or 15...\textsf{\textbf{Bf6}} 16.c5?! fxe4 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.\textsf{\textbf{Bdxe4}} \textsf{\textbf{f5}} 19.\textsf{\textbf{Wb3\textasciitilde}} van Wely; 15...\textsf{\textbf{Bxd2\textasciitilde}}! 16.\textsf{\textbf{Wxd2}} f4 17.f3 g5 18.\textsf{\textbf{Bc4}} \textsf{\textbf{f6}} 19.c5 g4 20.cxd6 cxd6 21.\textsf{\textbf{Bb6\textasciitilde}} Z.Almasi – B.Socko, Batumi 1999; 15...\textsf{\textbf{Bb8\textasciitilde}}! 16.c5 \textsf{\textbf{d6}} 17.\textsf{\textbf{Bxa6}} \textsf{\textbf{Bxa6}} 18.\textsf{\textbf{Bc4}} dxc5 19.\textsf{\textbf{Bxc5}} \textsf{\textbf{Bg7}} 20.f3 \textsf{\textbf{Be8}} 21.d6\textasciitilde Bacrot – J.Polgar, Bastia 1999; 15...\textsf{\textbf{Bg8}} 16.\textsf{\textbf{Wc2}} \textsf{\textbf{f7}} 17.\textsf{\textbf{Bxd1\textasciitilde}} van Wely – Morozevich, Monaco 2006) 16.\textsf{\textbf{Bc4}} \textsf{\textbf{B7}} (The rook frees that square for Black’s knight. It is worse for Black to play: 16...b6?! 17.axb6 cxb6 18.\textsf{\textbf{Wc2\textasciitilde}}; 16...c5?! 17.\textsf{\textbf{Bc3\textasciitilde}} Kramnik.) 17.c5 (or 17.\textsf{\textbf{Be1}} \textsf{\textbf{f6\textasciitilde}} 18.c5? fxe4 19.cxd6 \textsf{\textbf{Bxd5\textasciitilde}})

17...dxc5 (or 17...fxc4 18.\textsf{\textbf{Bxe4}} dxc5 19.\textsf{\textbf{Bc3}} – see 17...dxc5) 18.\textsf{\textbf{Bc3}} (or 18.\textsf{\textbf{Wxe5}} dxc5 19.\textsf{\textbf{Bc5}} fxe4 20.\textsf{\textbf{Wxe4}} \textsf{\textbf{Bf5\textasciitilde}} Kramnik) 18...\textsf{\textbf{f4}} 19.\textsf{\textbf{Bxe4}} \textsf{\textbf{f5}} 20.\textsf{\textbf{Bc4}} \textsf{\textbf{d6\textasciitilde}}! (or 20...\textsf{\textbf{Bd4\textasciitilde}} 21.\textsf{\textbf{Bxc5}} dxc5 22.\textsf{\textbf{Bxe5\textasciitilde}} – it is less precise for Black to continue with 20...\textsf{\textbf{Bg7}} Kramnik – Topalov, Las Palmas 1996, in view of: 21.d6\textasciitilde? \textsf{\textbf{Bd4}} 22.dxc7 \textsf{\textbf{Wxc7}} 23.\textsf{\textbf{Ba6\textasciitilde}} Kramnik) 21.\textsf{\textbf{Bxe5}} dxe5 22.\textsf{\textbf{Bxe5\textasciitilde}} \textsf{\textbf{Bg7}} 23.\textsf{\textbf{Bxe7\textasciitilde}} \textsf{\textbf{Bxe7}} 24.\textsf{\textbf{Bc5\textasciitilde}}! (or 24. \textsf{\textbf{Bc3}} \textsf{\textbf{f6\textasciitilde}}) 24...\textsf{\textbf{Bb6}} 25.\textsf{\textbf{Be6}} (or 25.axb6 \textsf{\textbf{Bxa6}} 26.\textsf{\textbf{Bxa1}} cxb6 27. \textsf{\textbf{Bxe6}} \textsf{\textbf{dxe6}} 28.\textsf{\textbf{dxe4}} \textsf{\textbf{Bxe4}} 29.\textsf{\textbf{c7}} \textsf{\textbf{Bxe7}} 30.\textsf{\textbf{Be1}} b5 31.\textsf{\textbf{Bd4=}}) 25... \textsf{\textbf{dxe6}} 26.dxe6 \textsf{\textbf{dxe4}} 27.axb6 cxb6 (27...\textsf{\textbf{Bb8}} 28.\textsf{\textbf{Bxd8}} \textsf{\textbf{Bxd8}} 29.\textsf{\textbf{Be1}} \textsf{\textbf{d6}} 30.\textsf{\textbf{Bxd1}} cxb6 31.\textsf{\textbf{Be7}} \textsf{\textbf{Bxe7}} 32. \textsf{\textbf{Bxe7}} \textsf{\textbf{Bxe7}} 34. \textsf{\textbf{Bf1}} \textsf{\textbf{b7}} 35.\textsf{\textbf{Be2}} b5 36.\textsf{\textbf{Bd3}} \textsf{\textbf{Bb7}} 37.\textsf{\textbf{Bc3\textasciitilde}} = Surender – Raffaele, corr. 1999) 28.\textsf{\textbf{Be1}} \textsf{\textbf{Bc3}} (28...\textsf{\textbf{Bf6}} 29.\textsf{\textbf{Be7}} \textsf{\textbf{Bxe8}} 30.\textsf{\textbf{Bxa8}} \textsf{\textbf{Bxa8}} 31.\textsf{\textbf{Bd8\textasciitilde}} \textsf{\textbf{Bxe8}} 32.\textsf{\textbf{Bd4}} \textsf{\textbf{Bc6=}) 29.\textsf{\textbf{e7}} \textsf{\textbf{Bxd1}} 30.\textsf{\textbf{Bxd8\textasciitilde}} \textsf{\textbf{Bxd8}} 31.\textsf{\textbf{Bxd1}} \textsf{\textbf{Bxd1\textasciitilde}} 32.\textsf{\textbf{Bxd1}} \textsf{\textbf{Bb7}} 33.\textsf{\textbf{Bf1}} b5 34.\textsf{\textbf{Bb1}} \textsf{\textbf{Bb7}} 35.\textsf{\textbf{Be2}} \textsf{\textbf{f6}} 36.\textsf{\textbf{Bd3=}} Kramnik – Topalov, Dortmund 1997.

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15...\textsf{\textbf{Bg8}}
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That is a standard maneuver for Black. His knight is redeployed to f6, while his other knight protects the c5-square.

White can counter 15...\(\text{d}f6\) with: 16.c5 fx\(e\)4 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.\(\text{d}\)xe4 \(\text{d}\)xe4 19.\(\text{d}\)xe4 \(\text{d}\)f5 (After 19...\(\text{d}\)f5, White accomplished a wonderful maneuver with his rook: 20.\(\text{b}\)b1! \(\text{w}\)f6 21.\(\text{c}\)c3 \(\text{g}\)g7 22.\(\text{b}\)b6± Zielinska – Blimke, Brzeg Dolny 2000.) 20.\(\text{w}\)d3 \(\text{w}\)d7 21.\(\text{w}\)a3 \(\text{d}\)xe4 22.\(\text{d}\)xe4 \(\text{d}\)f5. The complications after 23.g4! \(\text{d}\)e3 24.\(\text{d}\)xe5 dxe5 25.\(\text{w}\)xf8 \(\text{w}\)xf8 26.\(\text{d}\)xe3 \(\text{w}\)xg4+ 27.\(\text{g}\)g3 \(\text{w}\)d4, Malakhatko – Grivas, Nikea 2003, as a result of 28.\(\text{w}\)a2± should have enabled White to neutralize the attack and to preserve his material advantage.

16.\(\text{w}\)c2!?

White attacks Black's f5-pawn and he prevents the transfer of his knight to f6.

White has also tried here 16...\(\text{d}\)d2. After 16...\(\text{b}\)f7 (Just like before, it is not advantageous for Black to reduce the tension in the centre with 16...f4?!), since then White has no more problems with his e4-pawn: 17.\(\text{a}\)a4 \(\text{b}\)f7 18.c5 dxc5 19.\(\text{d}\)xc5 \(\text{d}\)xc5 20.\(\text{d}\)xe5 \(\text{w}\)f8 21.\(\text{w}\)c2 \(\text{d}\)d6 22.\(\text{b}\)ec1 \(\text{d}\)f6 23.\(\text{d}\)xd6 cxd6 24.\(\text{d}\)c4± Jelen – Enjuto, Bled 2002.) White will have to play 17.\(\text{w}\)c2 anyway. There might follow: 17...\(\text{d}\)d6 (or 17...\(\text{d}\)a6 18.\(\text{b}\)b3± preparing c4-c5) 18.c5 fx\(e\)4 19.\(\text{d}\)xe4 \(\text{d}\)xe4 20.\(\text{d}\)xe4 \(\text{d}\)f6 21.\(\text{d}\)xf6?! (or 21.cxd6 \(\text{d}\)xe4 22.\(\text{d}\)xe4 cxd6 23.\(\text{w}\)d3 b6! 24.\(\text{w}\)a3 \(\text{d}\)f8 25.\(\text{c}\)c3 \(\text{w}\)a7 26.a\(x\)b6 \(\text{w}\)xb6 27.\(\text{a}\)xa7 \(\text{w}\)xa7= Polateli – Erdogdu, Kusadasi 2004) 21...\(\text{w}\)xf6 22.\(\text{c}\)c3± with some advantage for White.

16...\(\text{d}\)f6

The immediate exchange: 16...fxe4 17.\(\text{d}\)xe4 \(\text{d}\)g6 (or 17...\(\text{w}\)xf3 18.gxf3 \(\text{d}\)g6 19.\(\text{d}\)g3±) 18.\(\text{d}\)eg5 \(\text{d}\)b8 19.\(\text{d}\)d2± enables White to avoid the trade of a couple of knights,

17.\(\text{d}\)d2 (After: 17.\(\text{w}\)xf5 gxf5 18.\(\text{d}\)xe5 dxe5 19.\(\text{d}\)xf8 \(\text{w}\)xf8 20.\(\text{w}\)xe5 \(\text{d}\)g4∞ Black's pieces become quite active.) 17...fxe4 18.\(\text{d}\)xe4 \(\text{d}\)xe4 19.\(\text{d}\)xe4 \(\text{d}\)f6 20.\(\text{d}\)xf6 \(\text{w}\)xf6 21.c5 \(\text{e}\)f7 22.\(\text{c}\)c3 \(\text{d}\)g8 23.\(\text{w}\)ab1 \(\text{d}\)f8 24.\(\text{b}\)b5 \(\text{a}\)a7 25.\(\text{w}\)e2± Kordts – Miller, corr. 2000. White maintains some positional pressure.

\(\text{e2}\) 14...\(\text{d}\)f6 (diagram)

15.\(\text{c}\)5!?

White makes use of the fact that Black's knight has abandoned the d7-square.

15...fxe4

In case of 15...\(\text{h}\)h8, White can

16.f4

White should better not be in a hurry with the exchange of pawns in the centre, so that Black does not have some counterplay along the c-file. After: 16.cxd6 cxd6 17. dxe4 dxe4 18.e4, White must consider the line: 18...f5? 19. e1 fxe4 20.e4 df5 21.b1 ec8 22.e1 ef7 23.d3 dc7 24.h3 dc5= Bunzmann – Kindermann, Germany 2000.

16.f5

After: 16...f5?! 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.d6 e4 (18...e3 19.wd3 dxd5 20.wb3+–) 19.xb7 wd7 20.c4 xeb7 21.xd7 exf3 22.xf3 wc8 23.ea4+ (Lautier) the complications end up in favour of White.

In case of: 16...fxd5?! 17.c4 dxc5 18.xc5 c6 19.xe5 ef5 (19...g7? 20.b6++) 20.d4 f4+ (Lautier) and the pin of the knight on d5 is quite annoying for Black.

17.f4 f5

If 17...f4, then White can play: 18.cxd6 cxd6. Tournament practice has tested the lines: 19.wd3 wd7 (or 19...f6, Bromberger – Gaso, Bayern 1997, 20.d2++) 20.d2 f6 21.dc4 ef8 (After: 21...ea6 22.f3 f5 23.ab1 White can fortify his e4-square.) 22.a6 bxa6 23.exc6 dc8 24.exd6 xd6 25.xe5 ef7 (or 25...wc7 26.xg4 xe4 27.xh6+ ef7 28.ta7+ xh6 29.wc3+ wg5 30. xh7– S.Savchenko – Miroshnichenko, Alushta 1999) 26.xg4 xe4 27.xf6+ xf6 28.d6 and White has a rook and two pawns for two light pieces. That provides him with a great advantage in connection with his powerful passed d-pawn.

Black has also tried here 17...f4. If White wishes to place his queen on d3, then he must exchange pawns at first with: 18.cxd6? (It is not good for White to play immediately: 18.wd3? ef5 19.d2, because of 19...dxc5+) 18.cxd6 19.wd3. Black’s kingside activity has ebbed away and his queenside weaknesses are still present – 19...f5 (or 19...g4 20.d2 ef6 21.xc4) 20.d2 dh4 (After: 20...xe4 21.dxe4 xc8 22.df1++; or 20...xc8 21.f3 and according to the analysis of Chytilek, Black pieces are stuck
to the protection of the d6-pawn.) 21.f3 \( \text{Ec8} \) (or 21...\( \text{Ed7} \) 22.\( \text{Ec4} \) \( \text{Ec8} \) 23.\( \text{Ee1!} \) \( \text{Ef4} \) 24.\( \text{Eg3} \) \( \text{Exe4} \) 25.\( \text{Exe4} \) \( \text{Exf1+} \) 26.\( \text{Exf1=} \); 21...\( \text{Aa6} \) 22.g3 \( \text{Eb3} \) 23.\( \text{Ec4=} \) Chytilek) 22.g3 \( \text{Eh5} \) (22...\( \text{Exd2} \) 23.\( \text{Exd2} \) \( \text{Eh3} \) 24.\( \text{Eg2} \) \( \text{Exe4} \) 25.\( \text{Exe4} = \) R-Chytilek) 23.\( \text{Ec4=!?} \) Chytilek – Hostinsky, corr. 1999.

18.\( \text{Ee1} \) \( \text{Exe4} \)

Black’s best chance is to simplify the position. If he plays tentatively, White will exploit his weaknesses on the queenside. For example after: 18...\( \text{Ef7} \) 19.\( \text{Exd6} \) \( \text{Exd6} \) 20.\( \text{Ed3} \) \( \text{Exe4} \) 21.\( \text{Exe4} \) \( \text{Ee5} \) 22.\( \text{Dd2} \) \( \text{Ef4} \) 23.\( \text{Ee4} \) \( \text{Aa6} \) 24.\( \text{Eae1} \) \( \text{Cc7} \) 25.\( \text{Eb6} \) \( \text{Ed4} \) (Black’s knight should help in the defence of the queenside; otherwise his position would be just terrible: 25...\( \text{Ef8} \) 26.\( \text{Ec4} \) \( \text{Ed8} \) 27.\( \text{Gg3} \) \( \text{Bh6} \) 28.\( \text{Ec8} \) \( \text{Gg5} \) 29.\( \text{Ec3} \) \( \text{Ee7} \) 30.f4 e4 31.\( \text{Ec4} \) \( \text{Ee3} \) 32.\( \text{Cc7=} \) Mackie – Hessenius, corr. 2002.) 26.\( \text{Ac3} \) \( \text{Eb3} \) 27.\( \text{Cc4} \) \( \text{Cc5} \) 28.\( \text{Cc2=} \) and Black’s position is very difficult.

If 18...\( \text{Ed7} \), then it becomes important for White not to let Black’s queen free – 19.\( \text{Eb1=} \). There might follow: 19...\( \text{Eh8} \) (In case of: 19...\( \text{Exe4} \) 20.\( \text{Exe4} \) \( \text{Ef5} \) 21.\( \text{Ed3} \), GM Lautier indicates that it is bad for Black to play: 21...\( \text{Ad8=} \)! 22.\( \text{Ea3=} \) \( \text{Dxc5} \) 23.\( \text{Exc5} \) \( \text{Exd5} \) 24.\( \text{Ee4} \) \( \text{Ef7} \) 25.\( \text{Ebe1} \) \( \text{Cc6} \) 26.\( \text{Exe5=} \), as well as: 21...\( \text{Ec6=} \)! 22.\( \text{Exd6} \) \( \text{Exd5} \) 23.\( \text{Ee1=} \), while after: 21...\( \text{Eh6} \) 22.\( \text{Exd6=} \) \( \text{Cxd6} \) 23.\( \text{Exe5} \) \( \text{Exf2+} \) 24.\( \text{Eh1} \) \( \text{Eaf8} \) 25.\( \text{Ef3} \) \( \text{Ef5} \) 26.\( \text{Ee2} \) \( \text{Aa7} \) 27.\( \text{Ec3} \) \( \text{Ef7} \) 28.\( \text{Eb6=} \) White maintains a dangerous initiative.) 20.\( \text{Ac3} \) \( \text{Ea7} \) 21.\( \text{Ed3} \) \( \text{Gg8} \) 22.\( \text{Exf5} \) (or 22.\( \text{Exd6=} \) \( \text{Ecd6} \) 23.\( \text{Ebe6} \) \( \text{Ef6} \) 24.\( \text{Exf5} \) \( \text{Gxf5} \) 25.\( \text{Eh4=} \)!) 22...\( \text{Exf5} \) (22...\( \text{Gxf5} \) 23.\( \text{Exe5} \) \( \text{Dxe5} \) 24.\( \text{Exe5} \) \( \text{Eg7} \) 25.\( \text{Ed7} \) \( \text{Ef6} \) 26.\( \text{Cc6=} \); 22...\( \text{Exf5} \) 23.\( \text{Ad4=} \) \( \text{Ef7} \) 24.\( \text{Eb5} \) \( \text{Aa6} \) 25.\( \text{Cc6} \) \( \text{Bxc6} \) 26.\( \text{Ecd6=} \); 23...\( \text{Exd4} \) 24.\( \text{Cc6} \) \( \text{Bxc6} \) 25.\( \text{Efd7} \) \( \text{Eg7} \) 27.\( \text{Exa7} \) \( \text{Exa5} \) 28.\( \text{Ad4=} \) Lautier) 23.\( \text{Efxf5} \) \( \text{Efx5} \) (or 23...\( \text{Gxf5} \) 24.\( \text{Exd6} \) \( \text{Ebd6} \) 25.\( \text{Eh8} \) \( \text{Ed8} \) 26.\( \text{Ef4} \) \( \text{Ff4} \) 27.\( \text{Ef5} \) \( \text{Ef8} \) 28.\( \text{Efe5=} \) ) 24.\( \text{Exd6} \) \( \text{Ebd6=} \) – White has regrouped his forces successfully in order to attack Black’s weaknesses on the queenside – the pawns on b7 and d6, Lautier – M.Roeder, Germany 2001.

19.\( \text{Exe4} \) \( \text{Ef4} \)

After 19...\( \text{Ed7} \), the most precise move for White is 20.\( \text{Eb1=} \). If 20.\( \text{Ef3} \), R.Stern – Bakhtadze, Rotterdam 1998, then Black’s queen is set free 20...\( \text{Ef5=} \), while the sharp variation: 21.\( \text{Exe5} \) \( \text{Gg7} \) 22.\( \text{Gg4} \) \( \text{Ef5} \) 23.\( \text{Ec1} \) \( \text{Exa5} \) 24.\( \text{Exd6} \) \( \text{Ecd6} \) 25.\( \text{Ef1} \) \( \text{Ea1=} \) does not provide White with more than equality.

In case of 19...\( \text{Ef5} \), White should again choose 20.\( \text{Eb1=} \). Following 20.\( \text{Ef3} \), White must consider the possibility: 20...\( \text{Eb6=} \) 21.\( \text{Cxd6} \) \( \text{Cxb6} \) 22.\( \text{Aa6} \) \( \text{Bb5} \) 23.\( \text{Efe2} \) (or 23.\( \text{Ea1} \) \( \text{Ef6} \) 24.\( \text{Ec4} \) \( \text{Exa6} \) 25.\( \text{Cc6} \) \( \text{Exa1} \) 26.\( \text{Exb6} \) e4\text{oo}) 23...\( \text{Ef6} \) 24.\( \text{Cxc6} \) \( \text{Exc6} \) 25.\( \text{Ecd6} \) \( \text{Gg7} \) 26.\( \text{Ea5} \) \( \text{Ef6} \) 27.\( \text{Dg4} \) d5 28.\( \text{Ee1} \) e4 29.\( \text{Gxf5} \) \( \text{Exf3=} \) K.Mueller – Monacell, corr. 2001.
20...cxd6

It seems attractive for White to try: 20.afx4 axf4 21.wb3 af5 22.ac3, but after: 22...e4! 23.ad4 wh4 24.g3 axg3! 25.fxg3 axg3 26.wb2 ef8 27.wg2 axh2+ 28.wxh2 wg5+ 29.ah1 we3 30. cxd6 cxd6 31.ab2 ef2 32.wh4 ef4 33.wh2 ef2= it looks like White should comply with the repetition of moves, Sakic - Balabaev, corr. 2003.

20...cxd6

It is too risky for Black to play 20...exe4?! , in view of: 21.dxe7 wd7 22.wb3 wb5 (22...xb4 23. wxb4 xd5 24.2e1=) 23. wb1=. White's c7-pawn is quite dangerous and Black's king is rather unsafe.

21.ad2 ec8 22.wa4 ef7 23. ac4 df5 24. wa3 af8 25. ab1?

White plans to bring his rook to the b6-square. Instead, he lost the logical thread of the game after: 25.ad1 wf6 26.wd3 ah6 27.ab1 fc7 28.ef1 ed8 29.g3 ef8∞ Fuzishawa – Balabaev, corr. 2001.

25...wf6 26.wd3 ah6

But not 26...dd4?, because of 27.f4+-.

Conclusion

We have analyzed in this chapter the most popular plan for Black nowadays, with the move – 11...ad7. He shows with that move that he has active ideas as well. He prevents White's pawn-break c4-c5 and he prepares his counterplay with f7-f5 on the opposite side of the board. Black has a multiple choice on his move 12. The passive line 12...dc5 (variation a) does not suit the spirit of the position. The draw is the maximum Black can dream about. Meanwhile, the active move – 12...f5 (variation d) enables White to start fighting for the light squares in the middle of the board with the maneuver ad5-e6. Therefore, Black usually tries to accomplish the pawn-advance f7-f5 after the preliminary prophylactic: 12...ah8, 12...h6, or 12...ah6. Variation e (12...ah6) is presently the most fashionable. The fight focuses around the e4-outpost. The outcome of White's queenside offensive depends largely on whether his control over that square is reliable enough.
Chapter 18

1.\( \text{d}f3 \) \( \text{d}f6 \) 2.\( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 3.\( \text{c}c3 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 4.\( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 5.\( \text{d}4 \) 0–0 6.\( \text{\&}e2 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 7.0–0 \( \text{\&}c6 \) 8.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{\&}e7 \) 9.\( \text{b}4 \) \( \text{h}5 \)

That is the most aggressive move for Black.

10.\( \text{\&}e1 \)

Tournament practice has proved – that prophylactic move is quite necessary for White; otherwise Black’s task is much simpler.

We will analyze in this position: a) 10...\( \text{c}6 \), b) 10...\( \text{h}6 \) and c) 10...\( \text{\&}f4 \), as well as 10...\( \text{a}5 \) (Chapters 19-20) and 10...\( \text{f}5 \) (Chapters 21-22).

Black plays only very seldom:

10...\( \text{\&}g4 \), Sanz – Llanes, Aragon 1998 11.\( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{\&}x\text{f}3 \)?! (about 11...\( \text{\&}d7 \) 12.\( \text{c}5 \) \( \text{\&}f4 \) 13.\( \text{\&}f1 \) – see variation c1) 12.\( \text{\&}x\text{f}3 \) \( \text{\&}f4 \) and here the move 13.\( \text{g}3 \)!\( \pm \) wins material for White;

10...\( \text{\&}h8 \) 11.\( \text{\&}d2 \) \( \text{\&}f4 \) 12.\( \text{\&}f1 \) \( \text{f}5 \) (or 12...\( \text{a}5 \) 13.\( \text{b}xa5 \) \( \text{\&}xa5 \) 14.\( \text{a}4 \)

14.\( \text{c}5 \) – see chapter 20; 12.\( \text{\&}g8 \)

13.\( \text{c}5 \) – see variation c3) 13.\( \text{g}3 \) \( \text{\&}h5 \) 14.\( \text{\&}x\text{f}5 \) \( \text{\&}x\text{f}5 \) 15.\( \text{\&}d4 \) 16.\( \text{\&}g2 \) \( \text{f}6 \) 17.\( \text{\&}g5 \) \( \text{\&}f5 \) 18.\( \text{\&}b5 \)!

(White can repel now the knight on \( \text{d}4 \) away from the centre, because Black’s pawn is on \( \text{c}7 \) and not on \( \text{c}5 \).) 18...\( \text{\&}x\text{b}5 \) 19.\( \text{\&}x\text{b}5 \) \( \text{\&}d7 \) 20.\( \text{\&}x\text{f}6 \) \( \text{\&}x\text{f}6 \) 21.\( \text{w}e2 \) \( \text{\&}e4 \)

22.\( \text{\&}x\text{e}4 \) \( \text{a}6 \) 23.\( \text{b}xa6 \) \( \text{\&}xa6 \) 24.\( \text{a}3 \)

(The position has been simplified considerably, but White’s bishop is much stronger than its counterpart and he can organize an attack on the kingside.) 24...\( \text{\&}g5 \) 25.\( \text{h}4 \) \( \text{\&}h6 \) 26.\( \text{\&}g2 \) \( \text{\&}g7 \) 27.\( \text{h}5 \) \( \text{\&}f7 \)

28.\( \text{h}x\text{g}6 \) \( \text{hxg}6 \) 29.\( \text{\&}h1 \)\( \pm \) Eljanov – Paunovic, Andorra 2003.

a) 10...\( \text{c}6 \) 11.\( \text{\&}a3 \)! \( \text{cxd}5 \)

After 11...\( \text{\&}f4 \) 12.\( \text{\&}f1 \) \( \text{\&}g4 \) – Black can play analogously to the variation with 11...\( \text{cxd}5 \), except without the exchange of the central pawns. (In case of 12...\( \text{f}5 \), Sou- cha – Hala, corr. 2003, White can try to fight for the advantage with the line: 13.\( \text{g}3 \)!\( \pm \) \( \text{fxe}4 \) 14.\( \text{\&}x\text{e}4 \)

\( \text{cxd}5 \) 15.\( \text{cxd}5 \) \( \text{\&}h3 \) 16.\( \text{\&}x\text{h}3 \) \( \text{\&}x\text{h}3 \)

17.\( \text{\&}g5 \) \( \text{\&}f5 \) 18.\( \text{b}5 \) \( \text{\&}e4 \) 19.\( \text{\&}x\text{e}4 \)

\( \text{\&}f5 \) 20.\( \text{\&}d3 \)\( \pm \) 13.\( \text{h}3 \) \( \text{\&}x\text{f}3 \) 14.\( \text{\&}x\text{f}3 \)

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f5 and here White can follow with: 15.\&d1!? exploiting the tension in the centre in his favour. (15.b5?! – Black has preserved the c-pawns on the board and now he can play 15...c5!, safeguarding his d6-pawn from the attacks of White’s pieces; it is interesting for White to sacrifice the exchange with: 15.dxc6 \&xc6 16.exf5 gxf5 17.\&d1 \&d4 18. \&xd4!? exd4 19.\&b5 a6 20. \&xd4 \&xd4 21.\&xf4 \&f6 22.\&d1 \&e5 23.\&f3\&e8 and he has an excellent compensation for the sacrificed material.) 15...cxd5 16.exd5! \&c8 17.c5\&e6 – White opens the game and his couple of bishops becomes very powerful.

12.cxd5 \&f4
12...\&g4 13.h3 \&d7 14.b5 \&c8 15.\&d2 \&f4 16.\&f1 \&g5 17.\&h2 \&e8 18.\&c4 \&f8 19.\&f3\&e6 Shariyazdanov – Mamedov, Dubai 2001.

13.\&f1 \&g4

White can counter the straightforward move 13...f5, with: 14.b5 fxe4 15.\&xe4 \&g4 16.\&xd6 \&h3 17.gxh3 \&xf3 18.\&d2 \&xe4 (or 18...\&d5? 19.\&xf7 \&g8 20.\&d6\&e5 19.\&xe7 \&xe7 20.\&xe4 \&d6 21.\&c1 \&f5 22.\&b4\&e5 – and White preserved his extra passed d5-pawn and he had a better game.

14.h3 \&xf3 15.\&xf3 f5 16.b5 \&c8 17.\&b4 \&h8 18.\&d1!

(diagram)

The opponents agreed to a draw here in the game Lalic – Martinez, Moratalaz 2001, but White’s position was preferable: 18...\&b6 (18...fxe4 19.\&xe4 \&fxd5 20.\&xd6\&e5 20.\&d5 \&xc1 21.\&xc1 \&d8 22.\&c3\&e4)

b) 10...h6

11.\&d2

The move 11.c5 – seems to be a good alternative for White, for example: 11...f5 (about 11...\&f4 12.\&f1 – see variation c2) 12.\&d2 \&f6 – this retreat of Black’s knight is the most principled. (about 12...\&f4 11.\&f1 – see 11.\&d2 \&f4 12.\&f1 f5 13.c5) 13.a4!? \&h8 14.\&a3 \&f7 15.cxd6 cxd6 16.b5 \&deg8 17.\&c4 \&e8 (or 17...\&f8, Jakic – Levacic, Zadar 1996 and here it looks quite purposeful for White to sacrifice a pawn with: 18.f4!? exf4 19.e5 dxe5 20.\&xe5 \&g7 21.\&xf8 \&xf8 22.\&d4\&e4 and his pieces are totally dominant in the centre.) 18.\&c1
About 12...g5 13.c5 – see variation c2; as for 12...\( \text{h8} \) 13.c5 f5 – see 12...f5 13.c5 \( \text{h8} \).

12...\( \text{h7} \) 13.c5 \( \text{g8} \) 14.\( \text{c4} \) \( \text{f6} \) 15.a4± – Black has wasted plenty of time in order to redeploy his knight, but he has not obtained any real counterplay, Kordts – Schmahl, Germany 2002.

If 12...c6, then White can play: 13.a4 a5 (or 13...\( \text{h8} \) 14.a5 cxd5 15.cxd5 f5 16.\( \text{c4} \) g5 17.b5 \( \text{f6} \) 18.b6 a6 19.\( \text{wb3} \) \( \text{g6} \) 20.\( \text{a3} \)± Piket – Xie Jun, Monaco 1996; 13...\( \text{d7} \), Finocchiaro – Kilgour, corr. 1996, 14.\( \text{a3} \) \( \text{c8} \) 15.\( \text{c1} \)±; 14...a6 15.\( \text{wb3} \)± – White should play on the flank, where his is stronger.) 14.bxa5 \( \text{xa5} \) (or 14...c5?! Khan – Belakovskia, Chandler 1997, 15.\( \text{xa3} \) \( \text{xa5} \) 16.\( \text{b5} \)± and Black has lost a tempo in comparison to the main lines, because he has played c7-c6-c5.) 15.\( \text{b2} \) c5 16.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{d8} \) 17.\( \text{a3} \)± Stern – Enders, Heringsdorf 2000.

b1) 12...f5 13.c5

![Diagram](image_url)

About 13...g5 14.g3 – see variation c2.
Black's other possibilities are:
He loses after 13...c6?, due to:
14.cxd6 \textit{W}xd6 15.c4 \textit{W}xb4 16.
\textit{W}d2+ -- with the idea to follow
with a3, Veingold – Maki, Vantaa 1996.

13...dxc5?! 14.a4 (That is a
standard intermediate move.)
14...\textit{h}h7 (14...\textit{cx}b4 15.d6 \textit{h}h7
16. \textit{d}xe7\pm) 15.bxc5 b6 16.a3
c6, Dumitrache – Krstic, Zagreb
1997, 17.d6! \textit{g}8 18.\textit{f}3 (White
does not let the enemy queen to
the g5-square.) 18.a6 19.a6\textit{e}6
\textit{e}xe6 20.exf5 \textit{xf}5 21.\textit{e}e4\pm – and
White has a great advantage
thanks to his far-advanced passed
pawn;

13...a5 14.bxa5 fxe4 15.\textit{d}xe4
\textit{e}xa5 16.cxd6 cxd6 17.b5! (White
succeeds in attacking the d6-
pawn.) 17...f5 18.a4\pm;

13...\textit{h}h7 14.g3 \textit{h}h5 15.g2
\textit{f}6, Gonzalez – Diaz, El Sau-
zal 2003, 16.c4! fxe4 17.\textit{e}xe4
\textit{e}xe4 18.\textit{e}xe4 \textit{f}5 19.g2!\pm with a
better position for White;

13...\textit{d}7, Berebora – Armanda,
Split 1996, 14.g3 \textit{h}h5 15.c4\pm
– and it is not clear how Black can
protect his d6-pawn;

13...\textit{h}h8 14.g3 \textit{h}h5 15.g2 \textit{f}6
16.c4 fxe4 17.\textit{e}xe4 \textit{g}4 18.\textit{b}3
\textit{e}xe4 19.\textit{e}xe4 \textit{d}7 20.\textit{b}2 \textit{f}7
21. f3 \textit{f}5 22.\textit{f}1\pm – White has a
long-lasting advantage, Schlosser –
Nijboer, Germany 1997.

14.\textit{d}xe4 \textit{f}5

14...\textit{h}8 15.cxd6 cxd6 16.b5
\textit{f}5 17.g3 \textit{h}h5 18.a4 \textit{f}6 19.\textit{xf}6
\textit{xf}6 20.\textit{e}e4 h5 21.a3\pm White
has extra space and he exerts a
powerful pressure against the
d6-pawn, Beaumont – Williams,

14...f5 15.a4 \textit{h}7 16.a4 (or
16.\textit{b}1!? a6 17.a4 \textit{d}7 18.b5\pm and
White's pawn goes to b6, destroy-
Black's pawn-chain.) 16...
\textit{e}4, S.Anderson – Simms, Dal-
as 1996, 17.\textit{e}4 dxc5 18.bxc5
\textit{xf}5 18.\textit{e}xd5 (18.\textit{e}xd5 19.g3+-) 19.
\textit{b}3\pm – and White has a good
compensation for the pawn.

14...a6, Verhoeven – Bellmann,
corr. 1996, 15.\textit{b}1!? \textit{f}5 16.a4
\textit{d}16...dxc5 17.bxc5 \textit{e}5 18.a4
\textit{e}6 19.eb7\pm.

15.g3 \textit{h}5

The piece-sacrifice is insuf-
ficient: 15...d4 16.gxf4 \textit{h}4,
Dambacher – Smits, Arnhem
2003, 17.e3! exf4 18.\textit{d}3 f3 19.
\textit{xd}6 \textit{e}5 20.\textit{e}3 \textit{e}5 21.\textit{d}3 \textit{f}5
22.\textit{xf}3\pm.

16.\textit{g}2 \textit{d}4

After: 16...\textit{f}6 17.\textit{xf}6+ \textit{xf}6
18.\textit{e}4 \textit{e}7 19.\textit{b}2 a5 20.a3
\textit{ax}b4 21.\textit{ax}b4 \textit{d}7 22.\textit{d}3\pm White
maintains the advantage thanks
to his control over the import-
tant e4-outpost, Brgelez – Ipavec,
Radenci 1998.
17...e3 f6 18...xf6+ xf6
19.f4± and White’s prospects are clearly better, Epishin – Trisic, Bad Zwesten 1997.

b2) 12...a5

13.bxa5 xa5

Or 13...c5 14.a4 wa5 15.b5 wd8 16.a3 g5 17.g3 h3?! (or 17...fg6 18.h2±) 18.xh3 xh3 19.g4± Relange – Guadalpi, France 1999.

14.h3

After 14.a4 c5, the game transposes to chapter 20, but White has some other possibilities too.

14...ea8 15.c5 f5 16.cxd6

cxd6 17.d2!
White’s knight is redeployed to the c4-square.

17...g5

Black has also tried in practice: 17...h8 18.a4 h5 19.a3 f6 20.c4 a6 21.b5 xe4 22.f3 c5 23.ac1± - and despite his extra pawn, Black can hardly parry White’s threats, Garcia Palermo – J.Moreno, Buenos Aires 1997.

White is better after: 17...d7, Jong – Sandehn, IECG 1998, 18.e1 c7 19.b3! c8 20.a3±.

18.e1 h5 19.b3

This is with the idea to follow with 20.ab6.

19...fxe4

After: 19...f6 20.a3 g6 21. d4± White increases his pressure and Black has no checkmating threats on the kingside.

20.dxe4 h8?! A.Karpov – Kamsky, Elista (m/7) 1996 (or 20...h5 21.wb6 wb6 22.xb6±; 20...f5?! 21.wf6 w7 22.a4 h5 23.a3 d8 24.a5±)

21.a4!? a3±.

c) 10...f4

This move seems to be quite natural, but contemporary tournament practice has shown that Black’s knight is vulnerable on the f4-square.
Chapter 18

11. \( \text{xf1} \)

Now, we will deal with the lines: c1) 11...\( \text{g4} \), c2) 11...\( \text{h6} \), c3) 11...\( \text{h8} \) and c4) 11...\( \text{f5} \).

I will also mention some other possibilities for Black:

About 11...\( \text{c6} \) 12.\( \text{a3} \) – see variation a;

11...\( \text{g5?!} \) – This move is too extravagant. 12.\( \text{xg5} \) \( \text{eg6} \) 13.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{h6} \) 14.\( \text{e5} \) f5 15.\( \text{d2} \) fxe4 (or 15...\( \text{w5} \) 16.\( \text{g3}\pm \)) 16.\( \text{dxe4}\pm \) and Black remained a pawn down in an inferior position in the game Tisdall – Gullaksen, Namsos 1995;

11...\( \text{d7} \) – Black abandons his attacking plan on the kingside and he starts defending on the queenside. 12.\( \text{c5} \) a5 13.\( \text{a3} \) axb4 14.\( \text{xb4} \) dxc5 15.\( \text{xc5} \) \( \text{e8} \) 16.\( \text{b3} \) b6 17.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{c8} \) 18.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{d6} \) 19.\( \text{xd7} \) \( \text{xd7} \) 20.\( \text{xf4} \) exf4 21.\( \text{e5}\uparrow \) and White seized the initiative in the game Naumann – W.Uhlmann, Dresden 2001;

After 11...a5 12.bxa5 (\( \text{ut not 12.\( \text{a3} \), due to: 12...\( \text{g4} \) 13.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{xf3} \) 14.\( \text{xf3} \) axb4 15.\( \text{xb4} \) c5!=}) the game usually transposes to the lines in chapters 19-20, for example: 12...\( \text{bxa5} \) 13.\( \text{d2} \) – see 10...a5 11.bxa5 \( \text{bxa5} \) 12.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{f4} \) 13.\( \text{f1} \); about other moves 12 (besides 12...\( \text{bxa5} \)) – see 10...a5 11.bxa5 \( \text{f4} \) 12.\( \text{f1} \). Meanwhile, White can restrict Black’s choice after: 11...a5 12.bxa5 \( \text{xa5} \), with the help of: 13.a4! c5 (If 13...f5, only then 14.\( \text{d2} \)) 14.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{a6} \) 15.\( \text{a3} \) and due to the presence of the knight on \( f3 \), Black cannot transpose to the game Kramnik – Kasparov, Novgorod 1997 (Chapter 20) and he cannot play 15...\( \text{d7} \) either, because of: 16.\( \text{xf4} \) exf4 17.\( \text{c1} \) \( \text{h6} \) 18.\( \text{e5}\pm \).

\( \text{c1) 11...\( \text{g4} \) 12.\( \text{h3} \) \)

12...\( \text{xf3} \)

Black weakens the light squares in his camp after the exchange of that bishop.

12...\( \text{d7} \) – he has provoked h2-h3 indeed, but the inclusion of that move is in favour of White. 13.\( \text{c5} \) f5 (After: 13...\( \text{h6} \) 14.\( \text{xf4} \) exf4 15.\( \text{e5} \) dxe5 – Black could have played \( \text{g4} \) with a good game, with a white pawn on \( h2 \). Now, he does not have that possibility. 16.\( \text{xe5} \) a5 17.\( \text{b5}\pm \); 16...\( \text{f5} \) 17.\( \text{c1} \) g5 18.\( \text{c4} \) a6 19.\( \text{d6} \) cxd6 20.\( \text{xd6} \) \( \text{c6} \) 21.\( \text{xc6} \) bxc6 22.\( \text{a4}\pm \) L.Sokolov – Wilsieff, Oppvisning 1996.) 14.\( \text{xf4} \) exf4 (or 14...\( \text{fxe4} \) 15.\( \text{xe5} \) exf3 16.\( \text{gxg7} \) \( \text{gxg7} \) 17.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{g8} \), Stirling – Dekker, London 2001, 18.\( \text{g4}\pm \)) 15.e5 a5 (or 15...\( \text{dxe5} \) 16.\( \text{xe5} \) \( \text{h8} \) 17.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{xe5} \) 18.\( \text{exe5} \) g5 19.\( \text{ee1} \) \( \text{g6} \) 20.\( \text{d6}\pm \) Bunzmann – Krumwiede, Oldenburg 2000) 16.\( \text{b3} \) h6 17.\( \text{b5} \) \( \text{h7} \).
18...b6!± Santa – Ahmad, Elista 1998.

13...\textbackslash wxf3 f5

The inclusion of the moves 13...a5 14.bxa5 is unfavourable for Black, for example: 14...f5 (or 14...c5 15.g3 \textbackslash d5, Pakhteev – Markosian, Tula 2000, 16.b1 \textbackslash c7 17.d2 f5 18.d1±; 16...\textbackslash d7 17.f5± – preventing Black from recapturing the a-pawn, with the intention to double the rooks just in case.) 15.b1 fxe4 16.he4 e8 17.c5 e5 18.cxd6 cxd6 19.b4 b6 20.xf4 xf4 21.xd6 xc3 (Black’s position is bad too after: 21...xf7 22.b4 f8 23.d6+ Lauber – Zimmerman, Gyula 1998.) 22.xe7 d4, Jovanic – Armanda, Opatija 2001, 23.e6! h8 24.xb6± and White remains with a solid extra pawn.

14.d1 fxe4

Black’s position is clearly inferior after: 14...e8 15.fxe5 gxf5 16.xf4 exf4 17.f3±.

14...h8 – Black’s king is running away from the dangerous diagonal. 15.g3 h5 16.exf5 e4 (16...xf5!? 17.g4?! e4; 17.e4 d4 18.g2± 17.b2 e3 (17...xf5 18.xe4 hgx3 19.fxg3 hxg3 20.e1? xf1 21.f1 g5 22.h1 e3; 20.d2! xe4 21.xe4±) 18.xe3 xf5 19.e3 f6 20.g2± Mikanovic – Proulx, Montreal 2000.

14...d7, Alvarez – Martinez, Spain 1997, 15.c5!? fxe4 16.xe4 f7 17.b5±.

14...a5 – Black is trying to de-stroy White’s pawn-structure on the queenside. 15.bxa5 e5 16.a4 b6 17.d2 a8 18.a3 h6 19.b5 fxe4 20.xe4 g5 21.g3 f6 22.a5 bxa5 23.ea5 c6 24.xa8 xa8, Farago – Klundt, Bad Wiessee 2001, 25.dxc6 xc6 26.d3± – The light squares are quite vulnerable in Black’s camp.

15.xe4 h6

The line: 15...d7 16.b1 (16. c5?...) 16...h6 17.g4± transposes to the game Tukmakov – Cvitan.

16.b1! d7 17.g4± – and you can witness that the trade of the light-squared bishop has been very bad for Black, Tukmakov – Cvitan, Zurich 1995.

c2) 11...h6

This move seems to be too
slow.

12.c5!?  
About 12.\xbcd2 – see variation b.  
12...g5  
Black’s other possibilities are:  
After 12...\xcg4 13.h3, the game develops analogously to the variation with 11...\xcg4;  
12...a5 13.\xcad3 axb4 14.\xcxb4\xbpm;  
12...f5 13.\xcxf4 exf4 14.e5 g5 (or 14...\xdxe5 15.\xcxe5 \xdh7 16.\xc4  
\xd7 17.b5 \xc8, Lomineishvili – Bielcki, Germany 2000, 18.\xcff3  
g5 19.h4!\pm; 14...a5 15.b5!? – with  
the idea to follow with b5-b6 –  
15...b6 16.\xcxb6 cxb6 17.\xcac1\pm; 15.  
\xcbb3 \xdh7 16.\xcad1 \xd7 17.b5 dxe5  
18.\xcxe5\pm Aleksandrov – Antonov,  
Velingrad 2004) 15.exd6 cxd6  
16.\xd4 dxc5 (or 16...\xc5 17.cxd6  
\xcxd6 18.\xcbb3 a6 19.\xcfe6\pm; 17...  
\xcxd6 18.\xcdb5 \xcff6 19.d6 \xc6 20.  
\xcac1\pm; 17...\xc6 18.\xc6 \xcxe6, Delchev – Babula,  
Batumi 1999, 19.\xcxe5?! \xcxe5 20.  
dx6++; 19...  
\xd7 20.\xcfe6?!\pm) 17.bxc5 \xdh8 18.  
d6 \xc6 (18...\xcg6? 19.\xcdd5 \xd7 20.\xcac1  
\xc8 21.\xcce7 \xc8 22.  
\xcfx5+ – Bouton – Gik, Lausanne  
1988) 19.\xcbb5 \xcxd4 20.\xcxd4  
\xcff6 21.\xcbb3 \xd7 22.\xcbb1\pm.  
13.\xcdd2 f5  
Black has no chances to equalize  
without trying to undermine  
White’s centre:  
It is not good for Black to opt for: 13...\xc6 14.cxd6 \xcxd6 15.\xc4  
\xcdd7 (or 15...\xcxb4 16.\xcg2!\pm) 16.d6  
\xcg6 17.\xcg3 (or 17.a4?! \xcg6  
18.\xcg3 \xc8 19.\xcg2\pm and White’s  
passed d6-pawn seems to be quite  
safe.) 17...\xcg8 18.\xcg5 \xcg8 (18...  
\xcg4 19.\xcxb4 g4 20.\xcfx4 exf4 21.e5\pm) 19.g3 \xcg6 20.\xcg3 Does-  
erich – Muders, Wiesbaden 1996;  
13...\xcg4 14.\xcg4 h5 (or 14...  
dxc5 15.bxc5 f5 16.g3 fxe4 17.gxf4  
exf4 18.\xcbb2 e3. Zhaurov –  
Alexander Sokolov, Kstovo 1998,  
19.d6! cxd6 20.\xcdd5 \xcg7 21.cxd6  
exf2 22.\xcfx2 g4 23.\xcdb3 \xcg4  
24.  
\xcg2. White has no problems to  
play with his king left and right,  
because he dominates in the  
centre. 24...f3 25.\xcdd1 f2 26.\xcff1\pm  
Now, White’s king is completely  
safe, while its black counterpart  
will come under attack for sure.  
Black’s counterattack backfires  
after: 14...\xcg4 15.cxd6 cxd6 16.\xcg7  
17.\xcg3 \xcg8 18.\xcxd6 \xcg4 19.  
\xcg1!, since he has no targets on  
the kingside. 19...\xcg5 20.\xcg2 \xcdd7  
21.\xcbb3\pm – White’s strongest piece  
has joined in the defence along the  
third rank, Astrom – Johansson,  
Linkoping 1996.) 15.a4 dxc5 (The  
direct attack against White’s king  
is again fruitless: 15...\xcg4 16.cxd6  
cxd6 17.\xcdb5 \xcg4 18.f3 \xcg3. Black  
sacrifices material, but White  
defends rather easily. 19.gxh3 \xcfx5  
20.\xcg2 \xcxe4 21.\xcxb6 \xcg2 22.  
\xcg3– Akhmetov – Shchukin, St  
Petersburg 2003.) 16.bxc5 \xcg4  
17.\xcbb3 \xcg8 18.\xcbb2\pm.  
14.g3!  
That is the ideal moment to at-  
tack Black’s knight, because it has  
no access to the h3-square.  
14...\xcfg6  
Black cannot sacrifice a piece
here: 14...\(\mathfrak{D}e6?!\) 15.gxf4 exf4
16.\(\mathfrak{D}b2\) g4 17.\(\mathfrak{D}a4\) \(\mathfrak{D}xb2\) (or 17...
\(\mathfrak{f}3\) 18.\(\mathfrak{D}xg7\) \(\mathfrak{xg7}\) 19.exf5 \(\mathfrak{xf5}\)
20.\(\mathfrak{D}e4\) \(\mathfrak{xxe4}\) 21.\(\mathfrak{D}d4++\) - Vilela –
Komljenovic, Madrid 2002)
18.\(\mathfrak{D}xb2\) \(\mathfrak{W}h4\) 19.\(\mathfrak{D}d3\) \(\mathfrak{fxe4}\) (or
19...\(\mathfrak{g}3\) 20.\(\mathfrak{D}f3\) \(\mathfrak{gxh2}\) 21.\(\mathfrak{D}h1\) \(\mathfrak{W}d8\)
22.e5++) 20.\(\mathfrak{D}xe4\) \(\mathfrak{f}5\) 21.\(\mathfrak{D}xd6\)
\(\mathfrak{E}ae8\), Arias – Ashe, Internet
2003, 22.\(\mathfrak{D}dc5\) \(\mathfrak{cxd6}\) 23.\(\mathfrak{D}e6\) \(\mathfrak{xe6}\)
24.\(\mathfrak{D}xe6\) \(\mathfrak{g}5\) 25.\(\mathfrak{D}g2++\).

14...\(\mathfrak{g}4?!\) Matthiesen – Skou-
sen, Denmark 2001, that is an-
other incorrect sacrifice. 15.gxf4
\(\mathfrak{fxe4}\) (about 15...\(\mathfrak{exf4}\) 16.\(\mathfrak{D}b2\) \(\mathfrak{g}6\)
17.\(\mathfrak{D}a4\) – see 14...\(\mathfrak{eg6}\) 16.\(\mathfrak{D}dxe4\)
\(\mathfrak{exf4}\) 17.\(\mathfrak{D}d2\) \(\mathfrak{g}6\) 18.\(\mathfrak{cxd6}\) \(\mathfrak{cxd6}\)
19.\(\mathfrak{Ec1}\) \(\mathfrak{xe5}\) 20.\(\mathfrak{Db5}\) \(\mathfrak{Wh4}\) 21.\(\mathfrak{D}e2!\)
\(\mathfrak{f}3\) 22.\(\mathfrak{D}f1\) – White has lost some
line, but he has acquired the g3-
square for his knight and his king
is safe now: 22...\(\mathfrak{G}g2\) 23.\(\mathfrak{D}xg2\)
\(\mathfrak{W}h4\) 24.\(\mathfrak{D}g3++\).

15.\(\mathfrak{a}4\) \(\mathfrak{f}f6\)
Black can try here some other
lines too:

About 15...\(\mathfrak{g}4\) 16.\(\mathfrak{c}c4\) \(\mathfrak{f}4\) – see
15...\(\mathfrak{f}4\);

After: 15...\(\mathfrak{fxe4}\) 16.\(\mathfrak{D}dxe4\) \(\mathfrak{f}5\)
17.\(\mathfrak{g}2++\) White has the powerful
blocking e4-outpost and he has
better prospects in that pawn-
structure;

In case Black reduces the ten-
sion in the centre with the move
15...\(\mathfrak{f}4?\) and he tries to attack
his opponent's king, then after:
16.\(\mathfrak{c}c4\) \(\mathfrak{g}4\) 17.\(\mathfrak{b}5\) \(\mathfrak{f}6\) 18.\(\mathfrak{a}3\)
\(\mathfrak{h}5\) 19.\(\mathfrak{x}c7!\) the issue might be
settled rather quickly: 21...\(\mathfrak{W}xg7\)
20.\(\mathfrak{cxd6}\) \(\mathfrak{B}xd6\) 21.\(\mathfrak{D}xd6\) \(\mathfrak{W}xd6\) 22.

\(\mathfrak{b}5++\) – Anand – Almasi, Groningen
(m/2) 1997;

If 15...\(\mathfrak{Wh7}\), White reacts sim-
ply with 16.\(\mathfrak{c}c4\) and Black's
move \(\mathfrak{Wh7}\) turns out to be a loss
of time, Ortmann – Doerflinger,
Germany 2003.

16.\(\mathfrak{a}3\) \(\mathfrak{Wh8}?!\) – It is of course
interesting for Black to play in the
style of M.Chigorin here (his
knight goes to the g5-square), but
still that is too slow. 17.\(\mathfrak{xc6}\)
\(\mathfrak{cxd6}\) 18.\(\mathfrak{Ec1}\) \(\mathfrak{f}7\) 19.\(\mathfrak{Ec2}\) \(\mathfrak{g}4\) 20.
\(\mathfrak{Db5}\) \(\mathfrak{D}g5\) 21.\(\mathfrak{W}c7\) – Black has
failed to organize anything real on
the kingside, Croad – Guthrie,
Wanganui 2003.

c3) 11...\(\mathfrak{Wh8}\)

Black wishes to do something
useful with his knight on e7 and
to take control over the important g5-square.

12.\(c_5\) \(\text{\&}g8\)

White can counter 12...f5, with the standard reaction: 13.\(\text{\&}x4!\) fxe4 (or 13...exf4 14.e5+) 14.\(\text{\&}xe5\) exf3 15.\(\text{\&}xg7\) \(\text{\&}xg7\) 16.g3 \(\text{\&}g8\) 17.\(\text{\&}e3\) a5 18.cxd6 \(\text{\&}xd6\) 19.\(\text{\&}e4\) \(\text{\&}xb4\) 20.d6\(\pm\) – White's initiative was quite dangerous in the game Granda Zuniga – Clerides, Yerevan 1996.

13.\(\text{\&}d2\)

It is also interesting for White to try the unusual move – 13.h3!? – he weakens his kingside a bit, but he thus fortifies his knight on f3, for example: 13...a5 14.bxa5 \(\text{\&}xa5\) (or 14...dxc5 15.a6 b6 16.\(\text{\&}a4\)) 15.cxd6 cxd6 16.\(\text{\&}b3\); or 13...g5 14.g3 \(\text{\&}xh3\) 15.\(\text{\&}xh3\) \(\text{\&}xh3\) 16.\(\text{\&}xg5\) \(\text{\&}d7\) 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.\(\text{\&}h5\) \(\text{\&}h6\) 19.\(\text{\&}d2\); or 13...f5 14.\(\text{\&}xf4\) exf4 15.\(\text{\&}c1\) a5 16.cxd6 cxd6 17.b5 \(\text{\&}e8\) 18.\(\text{\&}d3\) \(\text{\&}h6\) 19.\(\text{\&}d2\)

13...\(\text{\&}g5\)

Or 13...\(\text{\&}f6\) 14.\(\text{\&}c4\) \(\text{\&}e8\) and in that position, White continues with the standard maneuver: 15.a4 h5 16.a5 h4 17.\(\text{\&}a3\)! – his rook has joined in the actions along the third rank, protecting the knight on c3 and running away from the a1-h8 diagonal. 17...\(\text{\&}d7\) 18.\(\text{\&}xf4\) exf4 19.e5\(\pm\) Sorokin – Murga, Buenos Aires 1996.

13...f5 14.\(\text{\&}c4\) \(\text{\&}f6\) 15.g3 fxe4 (or 15...\(\text{\&}h5\) 16.exf5 gxf5 17.\(\text{\&}g5\) h6 18.\(\text{\&}h4?!\(\pm\)) 16.gxf4 \(\text{\&}g4\) 17.\(\text{\&}xe4\) exf4, Dumitrache – Teodorescu, Romania 1996, 18.\(\text{\&}b2\); Black's compensation is insufficient after: 17...\(\text{\&}h4\) 18.h3 \(\text{\&}xf2\) 19.\(\text{\&}xf2\) exf4 20.\(\text{\&}b2\) \(\text{\&}xb2\) 21.\(\text{\&}xb2\) \(\text{\&}g3\) 22.\(\text{\&}h1\) \(\text{\&}xf2\) 23.\(\text{\&}b3\)

14.\(\text{\&}h1\) \(\text{\&}f6\)

Now, Black is trying to organize a piece-attack against White's king.

15.\(\text{\&}f3\) \(\text{\&}6h5\)

16.\(\text{\&}c4\) \(\text{\&}h4\), S.Savchenko – C.Santos, Panormo 2001 and here there are no real threats against White's king after: 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.\(\text{\&}xd6\) \(\text{\&}g3\) (18...\(\text{\&}d7\) 19.\(\text{\&}xh7\)) 19.\(\text{\&}g1\) \(\text{\&}xf1\) 20.\(\text{\&}xf1\) \(\text{\&}e7\) (20...\(\text{\&}g5\) 21.\(\text{\&}c2\)) 21.\(\text{\&}xc8\) \(\text{\&}xc8\) 22.\(\text{\&}e2\) \(\text{\&}xb4\) (22...\(\text{\&}xe2\) 23.\(\text{\&}xe2\) \(\text{\&}xb4\) 24.\(\text{\&}e3\)) 23.\(\text{\&}xf4\) exf4 24.\(\text{\&}b1\)

c4) 11...f5
That is the traditional method for Black to undermine White's centre in the King's Indian Defence. It is not good for him here, but we will analyze it thoroughly, because that is exactly what can be expected from players who do not know these variations in details.

12.\textit{\textbf{xf4}} exf4

The move 12...fxe4 – leads to a very difficult position for Black. 13.\textit{\textbf{xe5}} exf3 (After 13...dxex5, Black has no good prospects: 14.\textit{\textbf{xe4}} $\textit{\textbf{f5}}$ 15.c5 $\textit{\textbf{d4}}$ 16.$\textit{\textbf{xd4}}$ exd4 17.\textit{\textbf{b3}} $\textit{\textbf{h8}}$ – and White is clearly better after 18.d6± 14.$\textit{\textbf{gxg7}}$ $\textit{\textbf{xg7}}$ (or 14...fxg2? 15.$\textit{\textbf{xf8}}$ gxf1$\textit{\textbf{w}}$, Orso – Farago, Budapest 2000, 16.$\textit{\textbf{xf1}}$! White should better leave his rook on the open file. 16..\textit{\textbf{xf8}} 17.$\textit{\textbf{d3}}$ $\textit{\textbf{d7}}$ 18.\textit{\textbf{e4}}± – Black has no attack now and the position is of a purely technical nature.) 15.g3 $\textit{\textbf{f5}}$ (It is also bad for Black to play: 15...g5 16.$\textit{\textbf{xe3}}$ $\textit{\textbf{g6}}$ 17.\textit{\textbf{d4}} $\textit{\textbf{f6}}$ 18.$\textit{\textbf{xf6}}$ $\textit{\textbf{xf6}}$ 19.\textit{\textbf{c5}}±; 17...\textit{\textbf{g8}} 18.c5 $\textit{\textbf{f5}}$ 19.$\textit{\textbf{ae1}}$ $\textit{\textbf{e5}}$ 20.$\textit{\textbf{b5}}$±, because White is dominant in the centre and he has a great advantage, Istratescu – Vajda, Bucharest 1997.) 16.$\textit{\textbf{e4}}$ $\textit{\textbf{g8}}$ (or 16...\textit{\textbf{d7}}? 17.$\textit{\textbf{xf3}}$ c5? 18.\textit{\textbf{bxc5}} $\textit{\textbf{xc8}}$ 19.$\textit{\textbf{wxc3}}$+– Szaberenyi – Pesztericz, Budapest 2000; 16...\textit{\textbf{h6}} 17.$\textit{\textbf{e3}}$ $\textit{\textbf{g4}}$ 18.h3 $\textit{\textbf{f5}}$ 19.\textit{\textbf{d4}} $\textit{\textbf{g8}}$ 20.$\textit{\textbf{d2}}$!? – White prevents the exchange of the bishops. 20...\textit{\textbf{d7}} 21.g4!± Now, Black cannot protect his f3-pawn; 20.$\textit{\textbf{xf3}}$ $\textit{\textbf{xe4}}$ 21.$\textit{\textbf{exe4}}$ $\textit{\textbf{xf3}}$ 22.$\textit{\textbf{xf3}}$±

with an extra pawn for White, Ernst – Blom, San Agustin 1998.) 17.$\textit{\textbf{c1}}$ a5 18.$\textit{\textbf{b5}}$ $\textit{\textbf{f7}}$ (18...b6 19.$\textit{\textbf{xc3}}$ $\textit{\textbf{h6}}$ 20.$\textit{\textbf{xf3}}$+– Shariyazdanov – Jorquera, Medellin 1996) 19.$\textit{\textbf{c3}}$ $\textit{\textbf{g7}}$ 20.h3 $\textit{\textbf{f5}}$ 21.$\textit{\textbf{xf3}}$ $\textit{\textbf{xe4}}$ 22.$\textit{\textbf{xf7}}$ $\textit{\textbf{xf7}}$ 23.$\textit{\textbf{xe4}}$ $\textit{\textbf{wd7}}$ 24.$\textit{\textbf{e2}}$! White has an extra pawn, but now it is essential for him to activate his bishop. 24...\textit{\textbf{e8}} 25.$\textit{\textbf{g4}}$ $\textit{\textbf{d8}}$ 26.$\textit{\textbf{f3}}$ $\textit{\textbf{g8}}$ 27.$\textit{\textbf{e6}}$± and White's position was close to winning in the game Fokin – Sazonova, Orsk 2001.

13.\textit{\textbf{e5}}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

13...\textit{\textbf{dxe5}}

Black has also tried here many second-rate moves, but they all lead to an advantage for White:

13...\textit{\textbf{e8}}? – That strange move weakens the light squares around Black's king even more. 14.c5 $\textit{\textbf{d7}}$ 15.$\textit{\textbf{c1}}$ dxe5 16.$\textit{\textbf{c4}}$ $\textit{\textbf{c8}}$, Moreira – Delgado, Quito 1998 and here it is good for White to win a piece with: 17.c6! $\textit{\textbf{d6}}$ 18.cxd7 $\textit{\textbf{xd7}}$ 19.\textit{\textbf{b3}}±;

After 13...b6, Kanep – Dubrovin, Tallinn 2000, it deserved attention for White to continue with the calm move 14.$\textit{\textbf{d2}}$!? at-
tacking Black’s f4-pawn. 14...dxe5 15.\(\text{c}x\text{e}5\) g5 16.c5±;

13...g5 14.\(\text{c}x\text{g}5\) dxe5 15.c5 \(\text{c}g6\) (or 15...\(\text{f}6\) 16.\(\text{w}h5\) \(\text{x}g5\) 17.\(\text{w}xg5\) \(\text{c}g6\) 18.\(\text{w}xd8\) \(\text{c}xd8\) 19.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 20.\(\text{c}c4\) \(\text{g}7\) 21.\(\text{d}6\)±; 19...c6 20.\(\text{c}c7\) \(\text{b}8\) 21.\(\text{e}ad1\) cxd5 22.\(\text{c}c4\)! \(\text{xf}8\) 23.\(\text{xd}5\)± and White is better in the endgame; 15...\(\text{h}6\) 16.\(\text{c}c4\)!
\(\text{h}8\) 17.d6 e4, Malek – Nichols, Frankfurt 2002, 18.\(\text{b}5\)?! \(\text{c}xd6\) 19.\(\text{c}xd6\)++; 18...\(\text{e}6\) 19.\(\text{f}7\) \(\text{xf}7\) 20.\(\text{xf}7\) \(\text{c}xd6\) 21.\(\text{d}6\)±; the move 16...\(\text{hx}g5\)? loses immediately after: 17.d6 \(\text{b}7\) 18.\(\text{w}h5\) \(\text{e}8\) 19.\(\text{dxe}7\)++; 17...\(\text{h}7\) 18.\(\text{dxe}7\) \(\text{c}xd1\) 19.\(\text{e}fxf8\) \(\text{d}8\) 20.\(\text{b}xd1\)++; 18...\(\text{e}xe7\) 19.\(\text{e}d5\) \(\text{f}7\) 20.\(\text{b}6\) \(\text{e}6\) 21.\(\text{c}x\text{e}6\) \(\text{c}xe6\) 22.\(\text{c}c8\) \(\text{c}xa8\) 23.\(\text{w}h5\)++; 19...\(\text{d}8\) 20.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{h}6\) 21.\(\text{e}6\) \(\text{c}xe6\) 18.\(\text{dxe}6\) \(\text{w}g5\) (18...\(\text{h}7\)? 19.\(\text{e}ad1\) \(\text{w}g5\) 20.\(\text{w}xg5\) \(\text{hx}g5\) 21.\(\text{d}7\)±;

In case of: 13...\(\text{h}6\) 14.\(\text{w}d2\) \(\text{g}5\) 15.\(\text{c}xd6\)!! \(\text{c}xd6\) 16.\(\text{d}d4\) \(\text{w}g6\) 17.\(\text{e}ad1\) White centralizes his pieces maximally, before starting active actions. 17...\(\text{e}e5\) 18.\(\text{c}5\)! \(\text{a}5\) 19.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{axb}4\) 20.\(\text{axb}4\) \(\text{f}6\) 21.\(\text{d}c\text{b}5\) \(\text{d}c\text{5}\) 22.\(\text{b}c\text{5}\) \(\text{d}d\text{7}\) 23.\(\text{c}c\text{7}\) \(\text{b}c\text{8}\) 24.\(\text{d}d\text{6}\)± Bellaiche – Nakamura, Cannes 1997;

Or 13...c6 14.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{cxd}5\) 15.\(\text{c}xd5\) \(\text{d}7\) 16.\(\text{e}ad1\) and White is obviously dominant in the centre, Baljiev – Kun, Gyor 1997.

14.\(\text{c}x\text{e}5\) a5

The other moves would not equalize for Black either:

14...\(\text{g}5\) 15.c5 \(\text{d}g6\) 16.\(\text{c}xg6\) \(\text{hxg6}\) 17.\(\text{c}c1\) \(\text{d}7\) 18.d6 c6 (or 18...\(\text{c}xd6\) 19.\(\text{w}xd6\) \(\text{e}8\) 20.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{h}8\) 21.\(\text{b}5\)±) 19.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{h}8\) 20.\(\text{e}7\) \(\text{e}8\) 21.\(\text{f}e1\)± Pacheco – Etcheverz, Botucatu 2003;

14...\(\text{e}8\)?! 15.c5 \(\text{d}x\text{d}5\) – that move loses by force. (Black is not out of the woods after: 15...\(\text{e}6\) 16.\(\text{c}x\text{c}6\) \(\text{bxc}6\) 17.\(\text{d}x\text{c}6\) \(\text{e}6\) 18.\(\text{c}xe6\) \(\text{e}xe6\) 19.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{c}x\text{c}3\) 20.\(\text{w}xe6\) \(\text{h}8\)
21...\text{b}1\#) 16.\text{w}xd5 \text{w}xd5 17.\text{c}xd5 \text{e}xe5 18.\text{e}xe5 \text{e}xe5 19.\text{e}e1 \text{d}d4 20.\text{c}xc7 \text{e}b8 21.\text{c}c4 \text{f}8 22.\text{e}e8 \text{g}7 23.\text{e}e6 \text{e}e5 24.\text{c}xc8+- Jegorovas – Ibarra, 2000;

14...\text{h}8 15.\text{c}c1 (15.\text{c}5!? ) 15...\text{g}5 16.\text{c}5 \text{e}xe5 17.\text{e}xe5 \text{d}g6 18.\text{e}e1 \text{d}d7 19.d6± Kitte – Duchhardt, Norway 1996;

14...\text{b}6 15.\text{c}c1 \text{b}7, Matjushin – Lukyanov, Kiev 1999, 16.\text{c}5\text{h}8 (or 16...\text{a}5 17.\text{c}c4 \text{h}8 18.\text{cxb6} \text{cxb6} 19.d6±) 17.\text{c}c4±.

15.\text{c}5 \text{axb}4 16.\text{b}3!

Black can counter 16.\text{c}c4 with: 16...\text{e}6! 17.dxe6, Lputian – Nalbandian, Yerevan 1996 and here he could have exchanged the knight – 17...\text{xe}5!∞ with rather unclear consequences.

16...\text{h}8 17.\text{w}xb4 \text{xd}5

The move 17...\text{f}3!? destroys the pawn-shelter of White’s king, but he is dominant in the centre, so he should not be afraid of that, since Black cannot organize an attack. 18.\text{e}ad1 \text{fxg}2 19.\text{e}xg2 \text{f}4 – with the idea for Black to activate his pieces somehow, Liehr – Ritter, Meisterschaft 2004, 20.d6 \text{c}6 (20...\text{g}5?? 21.d7+-)

21.\text{c}6 \text{bxc}6 22.\text{a}xc6 \text{e}a6 (or 22...\text{f}3 23.\text{h}4! \text{e}b8 24.\text{w}xb8 \text{w}xh4 25.\text{xf}3 \text{g}5 26.\text{e}g2 \text{h}3 27.\text{b}7 \text{xe}3 28.\text{e}e3+-) 23.\text{f}3 \text{cxd}6 24.\text{cxd}6±

18.\text{c}xd5 \text{w}xd5, Psakhis – Weeramantry, Waikiki 1997 and here, White could have obtained an overwhelming advantage by force with the help of the line: 19.\text{c}c4 \text{w}d8 (The immediate queen-sacrifice would not save Black: 19...\text{w}xe5 20.\text{e}xe5 \text{e}e5 21.c6 \text{g}7 22.\text{c}d1 \text{bxc}6 23.\text{e}e7±) 20.\text{d}f7+ \text{e}f7 21.\text{a}xf7 \text{a}xa1 22.\text{e}e8+ \text{w}xe8 23.\text{a}xe8 \text{e}e6 (23...\text{e}xa2 24.c6 \text{g}7 25.h3±) 24.\text{c}6 \text{bxc}6 (or 24...\text{e}xe8 25.cxb7 \text{e}b8 26.\text{e}a5!–) 25.\text{a}xc6 \text{d}8 26.\text{f}3± Black’s compensation for the queen is insufficient.
1.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f3} \text{\textit{Q}}\text{f6} 2.\text{c4} \text{g6} 3.\text{\textit{Q}}\text{c3} \text{\textit{Q}}\text{g7} 4.\text{e4} \text{d6} 5.\text{d4} 0-0 6.\text{\textit{Q}}\text{e2} \text{e5} 7.0-0 \text{\textit{Q}}\text{c6} 8.\text{d5} \text{\textit{Q}}\text{e7} 9.\text{b4} \text{\textit{Q}}\text{h5} 10.\text{\textit{Q}}\text{e1} \text{a5}

This move should be considered as an improvement of variation c (Chapter 18). The black knight is on h5 and not on f4 and it can choose another route just in case.

11.bxa5!

It is weaker for White to play 11.\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{a3}, because of: 11...\(\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f4} 12.\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f1} \text{\textit{Q}}\text{g4} 13.h3 (After 13.c5, or 13.\text{\textit{Q}}\text{e3, White should consider 13...\text{\textit{Q}}\text{f5}). 13...\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xh3} 14.\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xh3} \text{axb4} 15.\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb4} \text{c5} 16.\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xc6} \text{\textit{Q}}\text{xc6} 17.a3 \text{\textit{Q}}\text{e6} 18.\text{\textit{Q}}\text{b5} \text{\textit{Q}}\text{ed4} 19.\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d3} (or 19.\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xd4} \text{exd4} 20.\text{\textit{Q}}\text{d2} \text{d3=} 19...\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb4} 20.\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xh4} \text{\textit{Q}}\text{xb6} 21.\\text{\textit{Q}}\text{xd4} \text{exd4=} \text{Kramnik} – \text{Gelfand, Dortmund 1996.}

In case of 11.bxa5, both sides usually play according to well-familiar plans. Black captures on a5, he places his knight on f4 and follows that with c7-c5. White at first retreats his bishop to f1 (after \textit{Qh5-f4}) and then he plays a4 and \textit{a3}. Naturally, there are some attempts to play originally too...

We will analyze now a) 11...\textit{Qf4}, b) 11...\textit{f5} and c) 11...\textit{axa5}.

After 11...\textit{c5}, White should better transpose to Chapter 20 with: 12.\textit{Qd2 \textit{Qf4} 13.\textit{Qf1 \textit{axa5} 14. a4. Meanwhile, Black has also tried, although unsuccessfully, capturing: 13...\textit{axa5} 14.\textit{Qb5 \textit{Qd8} 15.a4 \textit{a6} 16.\textit{Qa3}, but as a result, in comparison to the usual variations, when he takes on a5 with his rook and he follows that with \textit{a6}, he simply remained a tempo down in the game Eljanov – Taboas, Internet 2004.

a) 11...\textit{Qf4}

That is not the most precise move-order for Black, because if he wishes to continue with his usual plan – White has an additional possibility and that is to leave his knight on the f3-square.

12.\textit{Qf1 \textit{Qg4}

This move seems to be the only sensible alternative for Black.
About 12...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}8 13.a4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xa}}5 14. \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}d2 c5 – see Chapter 20.}}

If 12...c5, then as I have mentioned before, White can try to avoid the move 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}d2, which after: 13...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xa}}5 14.a4, transposes to chapter 20, and he can play immediately – 13.a4.}

White is clearly better after:
12...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f5}} 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf}}}x4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{ex}}f4 14.e5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{dxe}}5 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xe}}}x5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xa}}5} 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}d2} g5 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}ad1 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}d6 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}f3} g4 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}d4± Suhl – Rosenthal, Germany 2002.}

13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}3

13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}8}, Pelletier – Langheinrich, Germany 2002 (about 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf}}}x3 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf}}}x3 see variation \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c1}}, Chapter 18}). Now, it deserves attention for White to sacrifice a pawn: 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}5!? \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{dxc}}5 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}}6! \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}6 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}}a4 (White's passed a-pawn is not so powerful yet, but Black still cannot capture it. Meanwhile, White is threatening \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf}}}x4.) 16...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}d7 (or 16...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}5 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf}}}x4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{exf}}4 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}5±) 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}}a3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}h5. Black prevents White's idea – \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf}}}x4 and e5. (or 17...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}8 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf}}}x4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{exf}}4 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}5±) 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}b1 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}8 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}}}g4!? \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}f4 20. \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xf}}}x4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{exf}}4 21.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}}}5 22.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{gxh}}}5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{gxh}}}5 23.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{bd}}}1±.

b) 11...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}5

12.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}d2!

White should immediately clarify the intentions of Black's knight on h5.

If he delays that, then after: 12.a4 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xa}}5 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{a}}}a3, Black's knight might choose another route: 13...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}f6! 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}1 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}4± with a good counterplay for him, I.Sokolov – Smirin, Dresden 1998.

12...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}f6

After: 12...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}f4 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}f1 (White can preserve his extra pawn with 13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}3, but then the game becomes too sharp: 13...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xe}}}x2+ 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xe}}}x2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}4 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}c2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}3!? 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{gxf}}}x3 h6 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}5 g5 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}}}b5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}g6∞ Mikhailievski – Kanstler, Israel 1999.) 13...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{fxe}}}4 (about 13...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xa}}}x5 14.a4 – see variation \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}2})} 14.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}b3. Now, White protects his important a5-pawn and he can capture on e4 a bit later. 14...\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}d3 15.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd}}}x3 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{exd}}}3 16.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{e}}}e4 c5 17.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xd}}}x3 h6 18.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}}}d2 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}}}5 19.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{ab}}}1 g5 20.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}c1± White's bishop takes care of the protection of the e4-pawn and the knight can be redeployed to the kingside, Nakamura – Moreno, Bermuda 2003.

13.\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}}}5 \textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xa}}}5
Capturing 13...dxc5 can hardly be recommended to Black. He compromises his pawn-chain and his pawns become vulnerable. 14.f3 (That is an interesting idea. White fortifies his centre with the intention to take on e4 with a pawn, restricting the mobility of the knight on e7.) 14...c6 (But not 14...exa5, due to: 15.\(\text{c}b3\) \(\text{exa}8\) 16.\(\text{c}c4\) \(\text{eh}8\) 17.\(\text{dx}c5\) 15.d6! Black's position is very difficult now. 15...\(\text{we}6\) 16.\(\text{cc}4\) \(\text{wc}7\) (It is even worse for Black to play: 16...\(\text{wd}4\) 17.\(\text{ee}3\) \(\text{xc}3\) 18.\(\text{ec}1\) \(\text{wb}4\) 19.\(\text{eb}1\) \(\text{wc}3\) 20.\(\text{eb}3\)++; 19...\(\text{fxe}4\) 20.\(\text{ex}b4\) \(\text{cx}b4\) 21.\(\text{ec}5\)++; as well as: 16...\(\text{wx}d1\) 17.\(\text{ex}d1\) \(\text{we}6\) 18.\(\text{eb}1\) \(\text{wb}8\) 19.\(\text{e}e3\) \(\text{d}d7\) 20.\(\text{ex}d4\) \(\text{ex}d7\) 21.\(\text{eb}6\) \(\text{ec}8\) 22.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{ef}6\) 23.\(\text{cc}a4!\) \(\text{exa}5\) 24.\(\text{dd}6\);) 17.\(\text{ee}3\) \(\text{ed}8\) 18.\(\text{wc}2\) \(\text{dd}4\) (or 18...\(\text{ee}6\) 19.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{cc}8\) 20.\(\text{ed}1\);) 19.\(\text{ca}4!\) \(\text{fxe}4\) 20.\(\text{ex}d4\) \(\text{ex}d4\) (After 20...\(\text{cx}d4\) 21.\(\text{fxe}4\) Black's compensation is insufficient.) 21.\(\text{fxe}4\) \(\text{wb}4\) Van Wely – Visser, Netherlands 2004.

14.\(\text{cxd}6\) \(\text{cxd}6\) 15.\(\text{a}4\)

15...\(\text{gh}6\)
The move 15...\(\text{fxe}4\) would not equalize for Black either:

16.\(\text{dx}e4\) \(\text{dx}e4\) 17.\(\text{dx}e4\) \(\text{ff}5\) 18.\(\text{d}b5\) \(\text{dx}e4\) 19.\(\text{dx}e4\) \(\text{df}5\) 20.\(\text{b}2\) \(\text{a}8\) 21.\(\text{ec}1\) \(\text{f}7\) 22.\(\text{ec}4\) \(\text{gh}6\) (It is possibly better for Black to defend with: 22...\(\text{dd}4\)?! 23.\(\text{ex}d4\) \(\text{ex}d4\) 24.\(\text{wd}4\)?) 23.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{bc}6\) 24.\(\text{wb}1\) \(\text{fa}8\) 25.\(\text{he}4\)! (Black has no clear plan and White can prepare \(\text{ff}4\), but he must play accurately: 25.g3? \(\text{eg}3\)!) 25...\(\text{gg}5\) 26.g3 \(\text{wa}7\) Wells – Nijboer, Calvia 2004 and here White could have played 27.\(\text{gh}1\) and after 27...\(\text{ed}8\), to follow with 28.\(\text{ff}4\), consolidating his advantage.

16.\(\text{aa}3\) \(\text{xd}2\) 17.\(\text{xd}2\) \(\text{fxe}4\)

It is worse for Black to capture with a piece: 17...\(\text{dx}e4\) 18.\(\text{dx}e4\) \(\text{fxe}4\) 19.\(\text{b}4\) \(\text{a}8\) (or 19...\(\text{ex}d5\) 20.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{xe}6\) 21.\(\text{ex}d5\) \(\text{ex}d5\) 22.a5! \(\text{wd}7\) 23.a6;?) 20.\(\text{d}1\) (White maintains the control over the g4-square.) 20...\(\text{ff}5\) 21.g4! \(\text{ec}8\) 22.\(\text{xe}4\) b5 (The move 22...b6 enables White to open the game advantageously. 23.\(\text{ff}4!\) \(\text{ex}f4\) 24.\(\text{ex}f4\) exf4 25.\(\text{wd}4\) with a crushing attack.) 23.a5 (White creates a dangerous passed pawn.) 23...\(\text{bb}7\) 24.\(\text{bb}3\) \(\text{ff}3\) 25.\(\text{ee}3\) \(\text{ff}4\) 26.\(\text{hh}3\).

18.\(\text{bb}5\)

Or 18.\(\text{bb}4\)?? \(\text{a}8\) 19.\(\text{dd}1\) \(\text{ff}5\) 20.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{h}5\) 21.\(\text{bb}5\) \(\text{ec}8\) (or 21...\(\text{ff}d5\)?) 22.\(\text{bb}3\) \(\text{ae}6\) 23.\(\text{dd}6\);)

22.\(\text{ec}1\) \(\text{f}7\) 23.\(\text{ee}3\)?? \(\text{dd}7\) 24.\(\text{ec}3\).
from giving back the pawn with the move e4–e3 activating his pieces, and he opens the way of his queen to the h4-square. 21...\e8 22.\e3 \e8 23.\b4 \e8 24.\xe8 \xe8 25.\xd6 \xd6 26.\xd6± S.Savchenko – Nikolov, Bulgaria 2005.

20.g4 \c8, Kramnik – Smirin, Moscow 2002, White should not be in a hurry to capture his opponent’s e4-pawn. 21.\eac1!? – White maintains his advantage in the sharp lines arising after that move. 21...h5 (With the move 21...e3 – Black can maim a white piece to the unfavourable e3-square: 22.\xe3 h5 23.g5 \e8 24.\xe8 \xe8 25.\e4±; 23...\h7 24.\e4 \f5 25.\ec3) 22.g5 \h7 23.\xe4 \f4 24.\e4 \xh3 25.\xd6 \xe4 26.\c4 \xe4 27.\xe5 \f5 28.\e6±.

c) 11.\e5 12.\d2
It is less precise for White to play 12.a4, because he should consider 12...f5, followed by \f6.

12...\f4
12...\f6?! – That is a strange decision, since the knight closes the way forward of the f-pawn. 13.a4 \d7 14.\b3 \a8 15.\e3 f5 16.f3 f4 17.\f2 \f7 18.c5 \f6 19.cxd6 cxd6, Bourel – Hochart, Fouesnant 1998, 20.\b5! (White is much ahead of his opponent on the queenside thanks to the tempo lost by Black for his move 12.) 20...g5 21.a5±

13.\f1

Now, we will deal with: c1) 13...\a8, c2) 13...f5, c3) 13...b6 and 13...c5 (Chapter 20).

He has tried other moves too: 13...g5 14.g3 (White can also decline the sacrifice: 14.a4 \eg6 15.\b3 \a8 16.c5 \e7 17.\e3 – and it is not quite clear how Black can continue with his attack.) 14.\eg6 15.gxf4 exf4 16.\b2 g4 17.\c2 \e8, Dobrev – Pachow, Oberland 2003, 18.\b5? \e5 19.\a4 \h4 20.\xc7 g3 21.fxg3 fxg3 22.\e2± White defends successfully and he preserves his extra material;

13...d7 – That move is unnecessary, because the bishop on c8 was not placed worse than on d7. 14.\b3 \a8 15.c5 \c8 16.\e3 h5
c1) 13...\textit{Ex}a8 14.a4

The idea 14.c5 is interesting, but it is still not well analyzed. Contrary to the similar sacrifice after: 14.a4 f5 15.g3 \textit{h}5 16.c5, White sacrifices a pawn, before Black has pushed \textit{f}7-\textit{f}5. 14...\textit{dxc}5 15.\textit{xc}4. White's idea is that the move a2-a4 is not necessary for the sacrifice c4-c5, but Black has not obtained any active counterplay against White's centre, having refrained from f7-f5. 15...\textit{d}7 (or 15...b6 16.\textit{xb}1 \textit{a}6 17.g3 \textit{h}3 18.\textit{g}21±; 15...f5 16.g3 \textit{h}5 17.d6!?) 16.\textit{b}1 b6 17.a4 \textit{c}8 18.a5 \textit{b}xa5 19.\textit{xe}3 \textit{d}6 20.\textit{xc}5 \textit{xc}4 (After: 20...\textit{f}6 21.\textit{xd}6 cxd6 22.\textit{b}6 \textit{a}7 23.\textit{xd}7 \textit{xd}7 24.g3 \textit{h}5 25.\textit{b}6± White should regain his pawn preserving a slight advantage.) 21.\textit{xc}4 \textit{e}8 (or 21...\textit{g}5 22.g3 \textit{h}3 23.\textit{g}2 \textit{fb}8 24.\textit{gb}5±) 22.g3 \textit{h}5?! (It was worse for Black to play: 22...\textit{h}3?! Ponomariov – Bologan, Foros 2006, because the knight was misplaced on the h3-square just like in many other variations. 23.\textit{g}2 h5 24.\textit{gb}5± and Black's position was difficult.) 23.\textit{b}5 \textit{f}6 24.\textit{wa}4 \textit{f}8∞ – and Black has good chances to equalize by exchanging pieces.

14...\textit{f}5

About 14...c5 – see 13...c5 14.a4 \textit{xa}8.

Black has tried in practice some other moves too:

14...\textit{h}8, Abel – Baulig, Hamburg 1998, 15.c5!? dxc5 16.\textit{b}3 (16.\textit{c}4!!) 16...b6 17.a5±;

14...b6 15.\textit{b}3 h5 16.a5 bxa5 (Black's activity for the sacrificed material is only temporary after: 16...h4?! 17.\textit{xb}6 \textit{xa}1 18.\textit{xc}7! \textit{xc}7 19.\textit{xa}1 \textit{a}5 – 19...\textit{a}6 20.\textit{b}5± – 20.\textit{d}2 \textit{g}5 21.\textit{b}5 \textit{b}6 22.\textit{e}3 \textit{d}8 23.\textit{b}3± and White remained with an extra pawn in the game Piket – J.Polgar, Wijk aan Zee 1998.) 17.\textit{xc}5 \textit{d}7 18.\textit{e}3 h4 19.c5 h3 20.g3 \textit{g}2 21.\textit{yg}2 hxc2 22.\textit{b}7 \textit{xa}1 23.\textit{xc}1 \textit{c}8 24.\textit{b}1± van Egmond – Beken, Haarlem 1999;

14...g5, Markus – Peter, Balatonelle 2001, 15.c5 – That is obviously the best for White (After 15.\textit{b}3, as it was played in the game, White's knight supports c4-c5, but it is not well placed; 15.g3 \textit{h}3 16.\textit{xb}3 \textit{xb}3 17.\textit{wh}5 \textit{g}4 18.\textit{f} f6 19.\textit{h}4 \textit{e}8 20.\textit{xe}8 \textit{fxe}8 21.\textit{e}3±; 17...\textit{wd}7 18.\textit{yg}5 \textit{f}51±) 15...\textit{dxc}5 (15...\textit{g}4 16.\textit{cxd}6 \textit{xd}6 17.\textit{c}4 \textit{g}6 18.\textit{b}5±; 16...\textit{cxd}6 17.\textit{c}4 f5 18.\textit{a}3±) 16.\textit{b}3 b6 (or 16...\textit{d}6 17.\textit{b}5 \textit{d}8 18.\textit{xc}5 \textit{c}6 19.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 20.\textit{a}3±) 17.a5 \textit{eg}6 18.a6 \textit{a}7 19.\textit{e}3± – and despite the one pawn deficit, White has achieved a lot on the queenside, since his passed a6-pawn is quite dangerous. Black's kingside counterplay is too slow.
15.\textit{\textit{\textbullet}a3}

The pawn-sacrifice 15.g3 needs additional testing (White exploits the opportunity to repel the enemy knight from the f4-square.) 15...\textit{\textbullet}h5 16.c5!? for example: 16...dxc5 17.\textit{\textbullet}c4 and White's pieces are very active. 17...fxe4 (or 17...\textit{\textbullet}f6!? 18.d6 cxd6 19.\textit{\textbullet}xd6 \textit{\textbullet}e6 20.\textit{\textbullet}b1=; 18...\textit{\textbullet}c6 19.dxc7 \textit{\textbullet}xc7 20.\textit{\textbullet}b5= – White obtains a powerful initiative for the pawn.) 18.d6 cxd6 19.\textit{\textbullet}xd6 \textit{\textbullet}c6 20.\textit{\textbullet}d5 (or 20.\textit{\textbullet}c4 \textit{\textbullet}h8 21.\textit{\textbullet}f7 \textit{\textbullet}xf7 22.\textit{\textbullet}xf7 \textit{\textbullet}d4 23.\textit{\textbullet}xe4 \textit{\textbullet}f5 24.\textit{\textbullet}c4 \textit{\textbullet}d7=) 20...\textit{\textbullet}h8 21.\textit{\textbullet}cxe4 \textit{\textbullet}f6 22.\textit{\textbullet}f7 \textit{\textbullet}xf7 23.\textit{\textbullet}xf7 \textit{\textbullet}xe4 24.\textit{\textbullet}xe4 \textit{\textbullet}f5 25.\textit{\textbullet}e1 \textit{\textbullet}d4=. Dorfman – Bologan, France 2005.

15...\textit{\textbullet}xe4

After 15...\textit{\textbullet}h8 16.g3 \textit{\textbullet}h5, Boller – Folk, Klatovy 1997, 17.\textit{\textbullet}g2 f4 18.a5, it is not so easy for Black to regroup his forces for an attack against White's king, if 18...\textit{\textbullet}g8, then 19.\textit{\textbullet}f3=.

16.\textit{\textbullet}dxe4 \textit{\textbullet}b6

Black impedes the pawn-advance c4-c5.

He used to play before: 16...\textit{\textbullet}f5 17.\textit{\textbullet}b5! \textit{\textbullet}d4!? 18.\textit{\textbullet}xd4 exd4 19.\textit{\textbullet}b2 \textit{\textbullet}d7, Shchekachev – Los-

kutov, St Petersburg 1999, but in that position it would be very strong for White to play 20.g3! repelling Black’s knight from its powerful outpost: 20...\textit{\textbullet}h5 21.a5=. 17.\textit{\textbullet}b5

White's knight has occupied an important position, attacking the a7-pawn and opening the third rank for the rook. His next task is to prepare a4-a5.

17...\textit{\textbullet}h8

The maneuver \textit{\textbullet}f5-d4, exchanging the knight, is not so good for Black; therefore he removes his king from the dangerous a2-g8 diagonal and he frees the g6-square for his knight.

18.g3 \textit{\textbullet}h5 19.\textit{\textbullet}g2!?

White is not in a hurry to play a4-a5 and he improves the placement of his pieces.

In the game van Wely – Bacrot, Dortmund 2005, there followed the immediate: 19.a5 bxa5 (or 19...\textit{\textbullet}xa5 20.\textit{\textbullet}xa5 bxa5 21.\textit{\textbullet}d2 \textit{\textbullet}d7 22.\textit{\textbullet}xa5 \textit{\textbullet}xb5 23.\textit{\textbullet}xb5=) 20.\textit{\textbullet}d2 \textit{\textbullet}f5 21.\textit{\textbullet}xa5 (or 21.\textit{\textbullet}xa5? \textit{\textbullet}xa5! 22.\textit{\textbullet}xa5 c6=) 21...\textit{\textbullet}d7 22.\textit{\textbullet}a4 \textit{\textbullet}xa5 23.\textit{\textbullet}xa5 \textit{\textbullet}xe4!? (Black gets rid of his weak c7-pawn, but at the cost of presenting White with a couple of bishops.) 24.\textit{\textbullet}xe4 c6 25.dxc6 \textit{\textbullet}xc6 26.\textit{\textbullet}a1 d5 (It is better for Black to bring his knight back into action: 26...\textit{\textbullet}f6! 27.\textit{\textbullet}e2 d5 28.\textit{\textbullet}xd5 28.\textit{\textbullet}xd5=) 27.\textit{\textbullet}xd5 \textit{\textbullet}xd5 28.\textit{\textbullet}e1= – and White has a slight edge. 19...\textit{\textbullet}h6
Black's position is very bad after: 19...\texttt{d7} 20.\texttt{g5}±.

\begin{center}
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\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

20.a5. Now, that pawn-break is with a great effect: 20...\texttt{bxa5} 21.\texttt{d2} \texttt{d7} 22. \texttt{xa5}.

c2) 13...\texttt{f5} 14.a4

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\end{center}

14...\texttt{fxe4}

About 14...\texttt{a8}, see variation c1; 14...\texttt{b6} 15.\texttt{g3} – see 13...\texttt{b6}; 14...\texttt{c5} 15.\texttt{b5} – see Chapter 20.

Black tries seldom some other moves too:

14...\texttt{h8} 15.\texttt{g3} \texttt{h5} 16.\texttt{b3} \texttt{a8} 17.a5 \texttt{f4} (or 17...\texttt{f6} 18.\texttt{g2}±; 17...\texttt{fxe4} 18.\texttt{xe4} \texttt{f5} 19.\texttt{g2} \texttt{f6} 20.c5 \texttt{xe4} 21.\texttt{xe4}±) 18.\texttt{ea2}! (White’s rook is very useful for the defence along the second rank.) 18...\texttt{g8} 19.c5 \texttt{gf6} 20.cxd6 cxd6 21.\texttt{a4} \texttt{fg3} 22.\texttt{fxg3} \texttt{gg4} 23.\texttt{d3} \texttt{g8} 24.\texttt{b6} \texttt{b8} 25.\texttt{g2}± Lobron – Ahn, Eupen 1996;

14...\texttt{d7} 15.\texttt{g3} \texttt{h5} 16.\texttt{b3} \texttt{a8} 17.a5± – and later White can continue analogously to the game of GM Lobron;

14...\texttt{d7} 15.\texttt{g3} \texttt{h5} 16.\texttt{b3} \texttt{a8} 17.c5 \texttt{fxe4} 18.\texttt{xe4} \texttt{f6} 19.cxd6 cxd6 20.\texttt{bd2}± White deploys his knight to the \texttt{c4}-square with a slight advantage;

14...\texttt{h6} 15.\texttt{a3} \texttt{b6} (White is clearly better after: 15...\texttt{fxe4} 16.\texttt{dxe4} \texttt{f5} 17.\texttt{b4} \texttt{a8} 18.g3 \texttt{h5} 19.c5. He is undermining the base of Black’s pawn-chain. 19...\texttt{dxc5} 20.\texttt{dxc5} \texttt{d4} 21.\texttt{g2} \texttt{f6} 22.\texttt{d6}!± Papenin – Mutschnik, Kiev 2000.) 16.\texttt{b4} \texttt{a8} 17.\texttt{b5} \texttt{d7} (After: 17...g5?! 18.a5 \texttt{bxa5} 19.\texttt{xa5} – White must be careful, because in case of 19.\texttt{xa5}? Black has the resource: 19...\texttt{xaxa5} 20.\texttt{xaxa5} c6± – 19...\texttt{a6} 20.g3 \texttt{fg6} 21.\texttt{wh5}!; 21.\texttt{d2} c5, Dour reassou – Hamel, Hyeres 2002, 22.\texttt{ea1}! \texttt{f7} 23.\texttt{xa8} \texttt{xaxa8} 24.\texttt{a5} \texttt{d7} 25.\texttt{c7}±; 22...\texttt{xa6} 23.\texttt{xaxa6} \texttt{xaxa6} 24.\texttt{xaxa6} \texttt{xc8} 25.\texttt{c5}±; 24...\texttt{f6} 25.c5 and White breaks easily in the centre: 25...\texttt{d5} 26.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{xf6} 27.\texttt{xf5}±) 18.a5 \texttt{bxa5} 19.\texttt{xa5} \texttt{xb5} 20.\texttt{b5}± Papenin – Kurnoj, Kiev 2000;

After: 14...g5 15.g3 \texttt{fg6}, Black has no compensation for the pawn. (The piece-sacrifice is also fruitless for him following: 15...\texttt{g4} 16.\texttt{b3} \texttt{a8} 17.gxf4 \texttt{exf4} 18.\texttt{d4} \texttt{g6} 19.\texttt{a3} \texttt{h4} 20.\texttt{cb5}! \texttt{f3} 21.\texttt{xf5} \texttt{xf5} 22.\texttt{xc7} \texttt{e5} 23.
of problems even after his best move – 16...\textbf{e}7 (or 16...b6? 17.g3 \textbf{h}5 18.g4 \textbf{h}4 19.\textbf{g}5+--; 16...\textbf{d}4? 17.\textbf{x}d4 exd4 18.\textbf{x}f4 \textbf{x}f4 19.\textbf{d}2+– Xu Jun – Sutovsky, Bad Homburg 1997) 17.c5! \textbf{dxc}5 18.\textbf{d}6 exd6 19.\textbf{b}xd6+ – and White’s compensation for the pawn is more than sufficient.

\textbf{c3) 13...b6}
Black is trying to prevent mechanically White’s pawn-break on the queenside.

14.a4

\begin{center}
\textbf{14...d7?!}
\end{center}
About 14...\textbf{a}8 – see 13...\textbf{a}8 14.a4.

I will also mention Black’s other possibilities:
About 14...h5 15.\textbf{b}3 \textbf{a}8 – see variation \textbf{c}1 (14...b6);
14...h6?! 15.\textbf{b}3 \textbf{a}8 16.a5 bxa5, Jueettner – Droessler, Germany 2003, 17.\textbf{x}a5! \textbf{e}8 (or 17...\textbf{d}7 18.c5 dxc5 19.\textbf{b}7+ 18.\textbf{c}3+;
14...g5?! 15.\textbf{b}3 \textbf{a}8 16.a5 g4 17.axb6 \textbf{x}a1 18.bxc7 \textbf{xc}7 19.\textbf{x}a1 f5 20.\textbf{b}3 fxe4 21.\textbf{x}e4 \textbf{f}5 22.c5± Lesiege – Rousseau, Mon-

\textbf{16.\textbf{b}5}

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Now, Black is faced with a lot
treal 2003;
Black fails to equalize after 14...f5. Now, the move 15.g3!
leads almost by force to a clear
advantage for White (or 15.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{a}3
fxe4 16.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{x}e4 \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}5\infty\) Genova –
Balabaev, Athens 1999) 15...\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}5
16.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}3\) (Black has a dangerous
attack after: 16.exf5 \(\text{\textit{x}}\text{f}5 17.g4\!\!
\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4! 18.gxh5 \text{\textit{g}}\text{g}5 19.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}1 \text{\textit{g}}\text{g}4
20.f3 \(\text{\textit{x}}\text{f}3 21.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{f}3 \text{\textit{x}}\text{h}5\!\!\!\!\) 16...
\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}8 17.a5 bxa5 18.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{a}5 \text{\textit{a}}\text{a}6\) (or
18...fxe4 19.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}6 \text{\textit{x}}\text{c}6 20.\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}8
\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}4 21.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}3 \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}3 22.\(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}1\infty\) Babula
– Klisurica, Saint Vincent 2005; Black’s compensation for
the sacrificed material is insufficient after: 19...\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}1 20.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}8 \text{\textit{x}}\text{d}8
21.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}2!\? \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}6 22.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}5\pm\) 19.exf5
\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{f}5 20.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}6 \text{\textit{d}}\text{d}7 21.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}4\) (Now,
White’s second knight is going to the e6-square.) 21...\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}7 22.\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}8
\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}8 23.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}2 \text{\textit{f}}\text{f}6 24.\(\text{\textit{g}}\text{g}5 \text{\textit{x}}\text{c}6 25.
\text{\textit{d}}\text{xc}6 \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}8 26.c5\!\!\!\!\) and White had
a couple of bishops and a great
advantage in the game Eljanov
15.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}3 \text{\textit{a}}\text{a}8 16.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}2

Black’s idea can be seen in the
variation: 16.a5? bxa5 17.\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}5 \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}5
18.\(\text{\textit{d}}\text{d}3\) (or 18.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{c}6? \text{\textit{a}}\text{a}5 19.\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}5
\text{\textit{x}}\text{a}5 20.\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}d7 \text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3\!\!\!\!\) 18...\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}1
19.\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}1 \text{\textit{b}}\text{b}6=.

16...f5
In case Black delays, or refrains
from the pawn-advance f7-f5, for
example: 16...\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}8!?, then White
can continue calmly with his plan
with the help of: 17.\(\text{\textit{b}}\text{b}5 \text{\textit{d}}\text{d}8 (It
is worse for Black to defend with:
17...c6 18.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{c}6 \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}6 19.\(\text{\textit{e}}\text{e}3 \text{\textit{d}}\text{d}8
20.\text{\textit{d}}\text{c}d6\!\!\!\!\) 18.a5 c6 19.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{c}6 \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}6
20.\(\text{\textit{c}}\text{c}3 \text{\textit{c}}\text{c}8 21.\(\text{\textit{f}}\text{f}3\!\!\!

17.g3 \(\text{\textit{h}}\text{h}5, Markus – G.Hor-
vath, Balaton 2001, 18.a5!? bxa5
19.\(\text{\textit{a}}\text{a}5 \text{\textit{f}}\text{xe}4 20.\(\text{\textit{x}}\text{xe}4\!\!\!\!


Chapter 20  1.\( \texttt{\textdollar}f3 \texttt{\textdollar}f6 2.\texttt{c4} \texttt{g6 3.\texttt{c3} \texttt{g7 4.e4 d6 5.d4 0-0 6.\texttt{e2} e5 7.0-0 \texttt{c6 8.d5 e7 9.b4 h5 10.e1a5 11.bxa5 \texttt{xa5 12.d2 f4 13.f1 c5 14.a4}}}

We will analyze thoroughly a) 14...\( \texttt{h5} \), b) 14...\( \texttt{h8} \) and c) 14...\( \texttt{a6} \).

Black has tried here some other lines, but the game often transposes to the abovementioned variations.

14...\( \texttt{a8} \) – The rook is placed worse on a8 than on a6, since it protects the d6-pawn from there. White can continue just like in the main line: 15.\( \texttt{a3} \) 

14...\( \texttt{h5} \), V.Salov – J.Polgar, Wijk aan Zee 1998, 15.\( \texttt{f3} \)! White prevents the further advance of Black’s pawns and the play develops analogously to variation c3, (The moves 14...\( \texttt{a6} \) 15.\( \texttt{a3} \) are included there.). 15...\( \texttt{f6} \) 16.\( \texttt{h4} \) \( \texttt{g4} \) 17.\( \texttt{a3} \). Now, Black is forced to retreat with his rook from the a5-square, transposing to variation

\( \texttt{c3} \), because after the immediate: 17...f5 18.\( \texttt{xf4} \), White exchanges his bishop on \( \texttt{c1} \) in one move: 18...\( \texttt{exf4} \) 19.\( \texttt{d3} \) 

14...\( \texttt{g5} \) 15.\( \texttt{g3} \) \( \texttt{h3} \) 16.\( \texttt{hxh} \) \( \texttt{h3} \) 17.\( \texttt{b3} \) \( \texttt{a6} \) 18.\( \texttt{xg5} \) \( \texttt{f6} \), Kuemin – Pitkaaho, Oulu 2003 and here White can continue tactically: 19.\( \texttt{h6} \) \( \texttt{hxh} \) 20.\( \texttt{wh5} \) \( \texttt{d7} \) 21.\( \texttt{hxh6} \). That is another standard idea in that variation – White’s queen impedes Black’s ideal attacking set-up on the kingside. 21...f5 22.\( \texttt{d2} \)!(White’s idle knight on \( \texttt{b3} \) should be redeployed to the kingside.) 22...\( \texttt{f4} \) 23.\( \texttt{eb1} \) \( \texttt{c8} \) 24.\( \texttt{df3} \) \( \texttt{e8} \) (24...\( \texttt{fxg} \) 25.\( \texttt{dg5} \) \( \texttt{g6} \) 26.\( \texttt{xg6} \) \( \texttt{hxg6} \) 27.\( \texttt{a5} \) 

14...\( \texttt{d7} \) 15.\( \texttt{b5} \) \( \texttt{a6} \) 16.\( \texttt{a3} \) \( \texttt{h6} \) 17.\( \texttt{g3} \) \( \texttt{h5} \) 18.\( \texttt{g2} \) \( \texttt{c8} \) 19.\( \texttt{b2} \) – White’s forces are quite well placed and he has a slight advantage, Agomeri – Southwell, ICCF 2002;

14...f5 15.\( \texttt{g3} \) \( \texttt{h5} \) 16.\( \texttt{exf5} \) \( \texttt{xf5} \) 17.\( \texttt{de4} \) – That is a calm positional move. (There arise wild complications after: 17.\( \texttt{g4} \)?? \( \texttt{d4} \) 18.\( \texttt{gxh5} \) \( \texttt{g5} \) 19.\( \texttt{h1} \) \( \texttt{g4} \) 20.\( \texttt{f3} \) \( \texttt{xf3} \) 21.\( \texttt{xf3} \) \( \texttt{wh5} \) 22.\( \texttt{g2} \) e4 23.\( \texttt{xe4} 

255
\( \text{x}a1 \text{4.d}2 \text{a}e5 \text{5.e}xe5 \text{a}x\text{d}1 \\
\text{26.d}7 \text{w}f5 \text{27.x}f8 \text{x}a4 \text{28.} \\
\text{d}x\text{d}6 \text{w}f6 \text{29.e}6 \text{w}f3 \text{t}; \text{23.e}x\text{e}4 \\
\text{a}x\text{c}3 \text{24.x}xg4 \text{w}xg4 \text{25.b}1 \text{w}x\text{c}4 \\
\text{26.b}6 \text{t}; \text{22...x}f3 \text{23.e}4 \text{b}f1 \\
\text{24.x}x\text{f}1 \text{a}x\text{d}1 \text{25.d}2 \text{a}x\text{a}4, \text{Grebi} \\
\text{onkin} \text{– Manakov, St} \text{Petersburg} \\
\text{2000, 26.a}x\text{d}1 \text{b}x\text{c}4 \text{27.b}1! \text{h}6 \\
\text{28.e}3 \text{t} – \text{this position is in fa} \\
\text{vour of White, because his pieces are} \\
\text{well coordinated and Black’s} \\
d6-pawn is weak.) 17...h6 (about} \\
\text{17...e}d4 \text{18.g}2 \text{h}6 \text{19.b}1 \text{ – see} \\
\text{17...h}6) \text{18.g}2 \text{d}4 \text{19.b}1 \text{f}7 \\
\text{(or 19...a}6, \text{Porat – Kahn, Bud} \\
pest 2004, 20.d2?! f6 21.b2 \\
\text{a}x\text{e}4 \text{22.x}x\text{e}4 \text{t} 20.b5 \text{a}6, \text{La} \\
\text{bib – Rahman, Cairo 1999 and} \\
\text{here it would be interesting to try} \\
\text{21.x}x\text{d}4?! \text{ex}d4 \text{(21...c}x\text{d}4 \\
\text{22.e}5 \text{f}5 \text{23.a}b5 \text{t}) 22.a2 \text{f}6 \\
\text{(or 22...f}5 \text{23.g}4 \text{t}) 23.x\text{f}6 \\
\text{w}x\text{f}6 \text{24.e}8 \text{f}8 \text{25.x}f8 \text{w}x\text{f}8 \text{26.} \\
a5 \text{t} – \text{and White’s prospects are} \\
superior; \\
14...h6 \text{15.b}5 \text{g}5 \text{g5 about 15...} \\
\text{a}6 \text{16.a}3 \text{ – see 14...a}6; \text{15...} \\
\text{h}8 \text{16.a}3 \text{ – see 14...h}8; \text{15...} \\
\text{a}a8 \text{16.a}3 \text{g}5 \text{17.g}3 \text{h}3? \text{Black} \\
falls into a trap, since now he loses \\
his bishop on h3. 18.xh3 \text{x}h3 \\
19.g4 \text{Relange – Guadalpi,} \\
France 1999; 17...f\text{g}6 \text{18.b}2 \text{t} \\
16.a3 \text{f}5 – \text{That move is consist} \\
ent, but still not sufficient for \\
equality – \text{Black compromises} \\
considerably the light squares on \\
his kingside. (About 16...a}6 – see \\
14...a}6; 16...\text{g}4 \text{17.g}3 \text{h}3 \text{18.} \\
\text{x}h3 \text{g}x\text{h}3, \text{Glicenstein – Bellai} \\
che, France 2002, 19.h5! \text{h}7. \\
White was threatening \text{b}3. 20. \\
g4. He prevents f7-f5. 20...\text{g}6 \\
21.f3! \text{It is not necessary to send} \\
that knight to the queenside, be} \\
because it is in fact more useful on \\
the kingside. 21...a6 22.\text{h}1 \text{h}8 \\
23.g5 t – \text{Black has come under} \\
attack; 21...f4 22...x\text{f}4 \text{ex}f4 \text{23.e}5 \\
d\text{e}5 \text{24.x}x\text{e}5 \text{e}8 \text{f5} 25.x\text{f}7 \text{t} \\
24...a6 25.d6 \text{x}e5 26.x\text{e}5 \text{t} \\
17.x\text{f}5 \text{d}5 \text{18.e}4 \text{a}6 \text{19.g}3 \\
\text{g}6 20.\text{h}5 \text{g}7 \text{f5 (or 20...e}8 \text{?} \\
21.c7 t \text{Korchagin – Kangur,} \\
Estonia 2002) 21.h4 \text{g4 (or 21...x}x\text{h}4 \\
22.g4 \text{d}4 \text{23.x}x\text{d}4 \text{x}d4 \text{24.} \\
\text{x}h6 t 22.x\text{g}4 \text{c}3 \text{23.e}2 \text{c}x\text{f}1 \\
24.xf1 f5 25.x\text{d}1 \text{c}7 \text{26.}d2 \text{t} \\
– \text{Black failed to prove his com} \\
pensation for the pawn in the} \\
game S.Savchenko – Ribshtein,} \\
Antwerp 1999. \\
a) 14...\text{h}5 \\
That maneuver is a bit strange \\
– \text{Black goes to ...e}8 with his} \\
\text{knights.} \\
15.a3 \text{f6} \\
After: 15...\text{h}8 16.b5 \text{a}6 \\
17.g3 \text{g}8 18.e2! the game \\
transposes to variation c – see \\
15...\text{h}8. \\
16.b5 \\

\begin{center}
\text{Diagram}
\end{center}
16...\textit{De}8
Black has lost plenty of time to bring his knight to e8, but it is hardly well placed there.

16...\textit{Ec}6 17.\textit{Dc}2 \textit{Dd}7 18.g3 f5 19.f4 exf4 (Or 19...g5?! — that is not a good idea, after: 20.fxg5 f4 21.\textit{Dh}3 \textit{Db}6 22.\textit{Dxc}8! \textit{Dxc}8 23.a5 \textit{Dd}7 24.\textit{Wg}4± White has a great advantage, Xu Jun – Magai, Istanbul 2000.) 20.\textit{Dxg}7 \textit{Dxg}7 21.\textit{gxf}4 fxe4 22.\textit{Dxe}4 \textit{Df}6 23.\textit{Wa}1 \textit{Df}5 24.\textit{Dh}3! and the position is double-edged, but White is still better due to his more active pieces, for example: 24...\textit{De}8 25.\textit{Df}2 (\textit{Dxf}6) 25...\textit{Dd}7?? 26.\textit{Dxf}5 \textit{gxf}5 27.\textit{Dc}3+–; 25...\textit{Dd}4 26.\textit{Dxd}4 \textit{Dxe}4 27.\textit{Dxe}4 \textit{Dxe}4?? 28.\textit{Dc}6+–; 26...\textit{Dxe}4 27.\textit{Dc}6 \textit{Dxe}6 28.\textit{Dxe}4 \textit{Dxh}3 29.\textit{Dxh}3 \textit{Dxa}4 30.\textit{Dxa}4 \textit{Dxe}4 31.\textit{Dg}2!±.

17.\textit{Db}2 f5 18.\textit{f}4! exf4 19.e5
Possibly, it is more precise for White to play 19.\textit{Dxg}7!, because now Black’s king must either remain on the dangerous a1-h8 diagonal, or his knight has to abandon the blocking d6-square: 19...\textit{Dxg}7 20.e5 dxe5 21.\textit{Dxe}5 \textit{Da}6 22.\textit{Dc}e 2 \textit{Df}7 23.\textit{Df}2± — and White regains his pawn, preserving his positional advantage; or: 19...\textit{Dxg}7 20.e5 dxe5 21.\textit{Dxe}5 b6 22.\textit{Dc}e 2± — and White has a powerful initiative for the pawn.

19...\textit{Dxe}5 20.\textit{Dxe}5 \textit{Dxe}5 21.\textit{Dxe}5 g5
Black fails to block the enemy pawn after: 21...\textit{Dd}6 22.\textit{Db}3 \textit{Da}8 23.\textit{Dxc}5 \textit{Dxb}5 24.\textit{Dxb}5 \textit{Dd}6 25.\textit{Dd}4! b6 26.\textit{Dxe}7! \textit{Dxe}7 27.\textit{Dd}6 \textit{Dg}7 (or 27...\textit{Dxc}5 28.\textit{Dc}4+–) 28.\textit{Dd}5 \textit{Dh}8 29.\textit{Dxa}8 \textit{Dd}4 30.\textit{Dh}1 \textit{Dxc}5 (30...\textit{Dxd}6 31.\textit{Dc}6 \textit{Dxc}6 32.\textit{Dxc}6 \textit{Dxc}5 33.\textit{a}5+–) 31.\textit{Dd}3 \textit{Dc}1 32.\textit{Df}3 \textit{Da}7 33.\textit{Df}2±.

22.\textit{Df}3 \textit{Da}6 23.\textit{Dxc}5 \textit{Dh}6

24.\textit{Dd}6! \textit{Dxd}6 (or 24...\textit{Dc}6 25.\textit{Dd}5 \textit{Dh}8 26.\textit{Df}6 27.\textit{Dxc}8\textit{Dxc}8 28.\textit{De}6 \textit{Dxe}5 29.\textit{Dxe}5 \textit{Df}8 30.\textit{Dd}4±) 25.\textit{Dd}3 \textit{De}6 26.a5 \textit{g}4, van Wely – A.Fedorov, Leon 2001 and here White had a very powerful resource: 27.\textit{Dd}2! \textit{Dhg}6 (27...\textit{Dg}7 28.\textit{Dd}1 \textit{Dc}6 29.\textit{Dd}1+–; 27...\textit{Df}3 28.\textit{Dxd}6 \textit{Dxd}6 and 29.\textit{Dxh}6++) 28.\textit{Dxf}4± regaining his pawn and maintaining an overwhelming advantage.

b) 14...\textit{Dh}8
Chapter 20

If Black will play that move, he should better do it now, while he can redeploy his knight from e7.

15...\(\text{a6}\)

About 15...\(\text{a6}\) 16.\(\text{b5}\) – see 14...\(\text{a6}\) 15...\(\text{a3}\) \(\text{gh}8\) 16.\(\text{g}5\).

Or 15...\(\text{h6}\), Daunt – Hoellriegl, Seefeld 1997, 16.\(\text{b5}\)!? \(\text{a}6\) (or 16...\(g5\) 17.g3 \(\text{fg}6\) 18.\(\text{g}2\)) 17.g3 – see variation \(\text{c}5\).

15...\(\text{g}8\) 16.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{h}6\)

Black has redeployed his knight from the unfavourable e7-square and he has prevented White’s idea with g3.

About 16...\(\text{a}6\) 17.g3 – see 14...\(\text{a}6\) 15...\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{gh}8\) 16.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{g}8\) 17.g3.

17.\(\text{f}3\)

After: 17.g3 \(\text{h}3\) 18.\(\text{hxh}\) \(\text{h}3\), White cannot play the move g3–g4, trapping Black’s bishop on h3.

17...\(\text{a}6\)

17...\(f5\) 18.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{xf5}\) (or 18...\(\text{xf5}\) 19.g3+) 19.\(\text{xf4}\) \(\text{xf4}\) 20.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{a}6\) 21.\(\text{xf4}\)

17...\(f6\) 18.\(\text{xf4}\) \(\text{xf4}\) 19.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f7}\) (or 19...\(g5\) 20.\(\text{e}6\)) 20.\(\text{xf4}\) \(\text{f5}\), Sargissian – A. Fedorov, Moscow 2002, 21.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{xf5}\) 22.\(\text{g}3\) – and White preserves his extra pawn, for example: 22...\(\text{a6}\) 23.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{e}5\) 24.f4 \(\text{g}4\) 25.\(\text{d}3\).

18.\(\text{xf4}\)

It is interesting to test the waiting move: 18.\(\text{d}2\)!? \(f6\) (or 18...\(f5\) 19.\(\text{xf4}\) f\(e4\) f\(e4\) 20.e5+) 19.\(\text{c}1\) \(g5\) 20.\(g3\).

18...\(\text{xf4}\) 19.e5 \(\text{f}5\)

Or 19...\(\text{exe}\) 20.\(\text{exe}\) \(\text{e}8\) 21.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{exe}\) 22.\(\text{e}1\).

20.\(\text{dxe}\) \(\text{dxe}\) 21.\(\text{d}2\)

That is the key-position of the variation with 14...\(\text{gh}8\).

21...\(\text{a}5\)

It is insufficient for Black to play: 21...\(\text{xb}\) 22.\(\text{xb}\) \(\text{d}6\) 23.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{f}5\) 24.a5+ – because White’s passed-pawn is tremendously dangerous.

21...\(\text{f5}\) 22.\(\text{f}3\)! \(\text{xb}\) (or 22...\(g5\) 23.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{a}5\) 24.\(\text{dxe}\) \(\text{xd}\) 25.\(\text{d}1\) \(\text{b}4\) 26.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{xd}\) 27.\(\text{d}3\); 22...\(\text{a}5\) 23.\(\text{xf4}\) \(\text{xb}\) 24.\(\text{cxb}\) \(\text{f}6\) 25.e3+) 23.\(\text{cxb}\) \(\text{d}6\) 24.\(\text{c}4\).

21...\(g5\) 22.\(\text{dxe}\) \(\text{dxe}\) 23.h3!? (White is not in a hurry to determine the placement of his knight.) 23...\(\text{h6}\) 24.\(\text{f}3\) (Now, Black’s dark-squared bishop has no active possibilities and it remains idle.) 24...\(\text{d}6\) (or 24...\(g4\) 25.\(\text{hxg}\) \(\text{xg}\) 26.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{xf}3\) 27.\(\text{xf3}\) \(\text{h}4\) 28.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{f}6\) 29.e\(\text{xh}\) \(\text{h}\) 30.\(\text{d}3\) 25.a5 \(g4\) 26.\(\text{hxg}\) \(\text{xg}\) 27.\(\text{b}1\) (It is essential for White to exchange queens.) 27...\(\text{h}\) 28.\(\text{b}6\)! – Black has failed to build up the deadly battery on
the h-file and that means that he is worse.

22.\textit{\texttt{Be4 \texttt{Be8}}}

It is inferior for Black to play:
22...\texttt{Bxb5} 23.\texttt{cxb5} \texttt{Ba7} 24.\texttt{Bd6} \texttt{Wb4} 25.\texttt{Ba2+}

Two games between strong players have come to that position: Golod \texttt{-} Avrukh, Israel 2004 and Eljanov \texttt{-} A.Fedorov, Dubai 2004 and in both of them White played 23.\texttt{Bc4}.

23.\texttt{Bbxd6} \texttt{Bxd6} 24.\texttt{Be2}!
\texttt{Bd8} (or 24...\texttt{Bd7}?! 25.\texttt{Bf3}! \texttt{Wc7} 26.\texttt{Wd2} f5 (26...\texttt{Bc5} 27.\texttt{Bf6\pm}) 27.\texttt{Bg5} \texttt{Bxe2} 28.\texttt{Bxe2\pm}) 25.\texttt{Bd6}!
\texttt{Bxe2} 26.\texttt{Bxe2} \texttt{Wc7} (or 26...\texttt{Bg8} 27.\texttt{Bc7} \texttt{Bf8} 28.\texttt{Bxe8} \texttt{Bxe8} 29.\texttt{Wxb7} \texttt{Be8} 30.d6\pm) 27.\texttt{Be8} \texttt{We5}
28.\texttt{Bxg7} \texttt{Bxe2} 29.\texttt{Bxe2} \texttt{Bxg7}
30.\texttt{Bb3\pm} - White has a protected passed pawn on d5 and he maintains the advantage in that endgame.

\textbf{c) 14...\texttt{Ba6} 15.\texttt{Ba3}}
(diagram)

We will analyze now \textbf{c1) 15...\texttt{Bd7}, c2) 15...\texttt{Wd7}, c3) 15...h5, c4) 15...g5 and c5) 15...h6.}

Black might lose a piece after:

15...f5?, due to: 16.g3! \texttt{Bh5} 17.exf5 \texttt{Bxf5} 18.g4+–.

He has also tried:
15...\texttt{Bh5} 16.\texttt{Bb5} - see 14...\texttt{Bh5};
15...\texttt{Bh8} - It would have been better for Black to have started the redeployment of his knight on the previous move. 16.\texttt{Bb5} \texttt{Bg8} (After 16...\texttt{Wd7}, Stern \texttt{-} Chekhovatenko, Rotterdam 1998, Black defends against g3, just like in variation \textbf{c2}, but in connection with his future plans, including g6-g5-g4 and h7-h5-h4, the move \texttt{Bh8} might prove to be unnecessary. White might continue with 17.\texttt{Bh1} and then play analogously to the abovementioned variation.) 17.g3 \texttt{Bh5} (17...\texttt{Bh3}? 18.\texttt{Bxh3} \texttt{Bxh3} 19.g4 \texttt{Wh4} 20.\texttt{Bg3\pm}) 18.\texttt{Be2} \texttt{Bg6}, Iskusnyh \texttt{-} Ershova, Perm 1998 (In case of 18...\texttt{Bhf6}, Iskusnyh \texttt{-} V.Zaitsev, Russia 1998, we can recommend 19.\texttt{Bb2}! \texttt{Bf2-f4.}) and now it is not easy for White to push f2-f4 indeed, but Black’s knight on h5 will be under attack for a long time. White should better react in the following fashion: 19.\texttt{Bf1}! \texttt{Bh3} 20.\texttt{Bf3} \texttt{Bd7} 21.\texttt{Bd3\pm}. 

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c1) 15...\textit{\texttt{d}7} 16.\textit{\texttt{b}5} \textit{\texttt{c}8}? Black ensures the f4-square for his knight.
   About 16...h6 – see 15...h6.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chessboard.png}
\caption{A chessboard with move notations}
\end{figure}

17.\textit{\texttt{h}1}!

After 17.\textit{\texttt{b}2}?! White will not succeed in pushing f2-f4 anytime soon, because Black will maintain his knight on f4, defending that square from White’s future pawn-break. 17...g5 18.\textit{\texttt{h}1} \textit{\texttt{g}6}. Here, White admitted his mistake and he returned his bishop: 19.\textit{\texttt{c}1}
\textit{\texttt{g}4} → Zagorskis – Safin, Elista 1998.

White has another non-standard idea in his fight for the advantage: 17.\textit{\texttt{f}3}?! – the knight comes back, creating the threat \textit{\texttt{f}4} and \textit{\texttt{e}4}–\textit{e}5. 17...f6 18.\textit{\texttt{h}1} g5 19.\textit{\texttt{g}1}!!? (White’s pieces retreated to the first rank in order to repel the annoying black knight from the f4-square.) 19...h6 20.g3 \textit{\texttt{f}6} 21.\textit{\texttt{d}3} f5 22.exf5 \textit{\texttt{xf}5}, Gligoric – Pavlovic, Ulcinj 1998, 23.\textit{\texttt{e}2}
\textit{\texttt{g}e}7 24.\textit{\texttt{g}1}±.

17...g5 18.g3! \textit{\texttt{h}3} 19.\textit{\texttt{e}2}

Black’s knight is hanging on h3, so he cannot push f7–f5.

19...\textit{\texttt{g}6} 20.\textit{\texttt{g}2} g4 21.\textit{\texttt{f}1}

White solidifies his f2-square, preparing the advance of his f-pawn in the process.
   Or 21.\textit{\texttt{f}1} f5 22.exf5 \textit{\texttt{xf}5}±.
   21...h6 22.\textit{\texttt{b}1} \textit{\texttt{g}5}

23.\textit{\texttt{x}g}5! (That is a good decision, since Black’s knight is stronger than his opponent’s bishop and now White starts playing in a positional fashion.) 23...\textit{\texttt{h}xg}5
24.\textit{\texttt{c}3} \textit{\texttt{f}6} 25.\textit{\texttt{d}1} (White’s knight goes to the f5-square and Black’s position is rather unpleasant.) 25...\textit{\texttt{g}7} 26.\textit{\texttt{e}3} \textit{\texttt{f}4} (It is too bad for Black to try: 26...\textit{\texttt{e}7}
27.f3 \textit{\texttt{xf}3} 28.\textit{\texttt{xf}3}±) 27.\textit{\texttt{xf}4}
\textit{\texttt{exf}4} 28.\textit{\texttt{f}5} \textit{\texttt{xf}5} 29.\textit{\texttt{exf}5} \textit{\texttt{f}3}
(29...\textit{\texttt{xf}5} 30.\textit{\texttt{e}4} \textit{\texttt{e}5} 31.f3 \textit{\texttt{g}3}
32.\textit{\texttt{g}2}±) 30.\textit{\texttt{xf}3} \textit{\texttt{xf}3} 31.\textit{\texttt{xf}3}
\textit{\texttt{h}8} 32.\textit{\texttt{g}1} \textit{\texttt{h}6} 33.\textit{\texttt{h}3}
\textit{\texttt{h}8} 34.\textit{\texttt{g}4} \textit{\texttt{xa}4}? (Black regains his pawn indeed, but he exchanges the vital defender of his d6-pawn.) 35.\textit{\texttt{g}2} \textit{\texttt{xa}3} 36.\textit{\texttt{x}a}3
\textit{\texttt{d}8} 37.\textit{\texttt{g}3} \textit{\texttt{e}7} 38.h4± Xu Jun – Sasikiran, Udaipur 2000.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chessboard2.png}
\caption{A chessboard with move notations}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chessboard3.png}
\caption{A chessboard with move notations}
\end{figure}

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\textbf{c2) 15...\textit{\texttt{d}7}}

The idea behind that move is the same as with 15...\textit{\texttt{d}7} – to ensure the f4-square for the knight.
9.b4 \(\Box h5\) 10.\(\Box e1\) a5 11.ba \(\Box xa5\) 12.\(\Box d2\) \(\Box f4\) 13.\(\Box f1\) c5 14.a4

\[\]

16.\(\Box b5\) g5
With 16...h6, Dumitrache – Claverie, Queven 1999, Black simply loses a tempo for the preparation of g5; he should better not do that at all – 17.\(\Box h1\).+

17.\(\Box h1\)?
That is the best for White. He follows the same plan as in variation c1, because it is quite unpleasant for Black in that set-up as well.

17.\(\Box b2\) – This move is hardly so necessary in that position. 17...h5 18.\(\Box h1\) g4 (Things are far from clear in the line with 18...h4?!<sup>∞</sup>) 19.g3 \(\Box fg6\) 20.f3! \(\Box h6\) 21.\(\Box e2\) f5 22.exf5 \(\Box xf5\) 23.fxg4 \(\Box e3\) 24.\(\Box b1\) \(\Box e7\) 25.\(\Box e4\) hxg4 26.\(\Box c1\) \(\Box f5\) 27.\(\Box d2\) (Black’s pieces have penetrated White’s position, but they will not get out without losses.) 27...\(\Box h7\), Sprenger – Rajlich, Paks 2001, 28.\(\Box xe3!\) \(\Box xe3\) (or 28...\(\Box xe3\) 29.\(\Box bxd6\)±) 29.\(\Box xg4\) \(\Box h6\) 30.\(\Box f1\).+

17...g4 18.g3 \(\Box h3\) 19.\(\Box e2\)±

\[\]

c3) 15...h5!?
Black’s idea is to fortify the knight on f4 by advancing his h-pawn up to the h4-square.

\[\]

16.\(\Box f3\)
The line: 16.\(\Box b5\) h4 17.\(\Box f3\) \(\Box g4\), V.Salov – J.Polgar, Wijk aan Zee 1998, 18.h3 \(\Box h5\) 19.g4!? hxg3 20.fxg3∞ leads to a complicated double-edged game.

16...f6 17.\(\Box h4\)!
That is an original idea – White prevents the move g6-g5.

It is also interesting for him to try: 17.\(\Box h1\) g5 18.\(\Box g1\) g4, Ionescu – Nevednichy, Bucharest 1998 and here the opponents agreed to a draw, but there was plenty of fight left in that position.

17...\(\Box g4\) 18.\(\Box e3\) f5 19.\(\Box xf4\) \(\Box xf4\) 20.\(\Box d3\) \(\Box xe4\) 21.\(\Box xe4\) \(\Box f5\) 22.\(\Box xf5\) \(\Box xf5\)

\[\]

23.\(\Box e6\) \(\Box h7\) (Or 23...\(\Box f6\) 24.\(\Box e1!\) \(\Box xe6\) 25.dxe6 \(\Box e7\) 26.\(\Box g5\) \(\Box xc3\) 27.\(\Box xc3\)±; 25...\(\Box xc3\) 26.e7 \(\Box e8\) 27.\(\Box xc3\) \(\Box xa4\) 28.\(\Box d3\)

\[\]

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b6 29.g5±; 24...xe6 25.dxe6 w7 26.g5±; 25...w8 26.e7±
24.e4 xf3 25.xf3 xh4?? (25...e5 26.wb1±) 26.xh3 d8

c4) 15...g5

17.g3 h3+
Black cannot be satisfied with
the line: 17...f6 18.h3 h5 (After:
18...gxh3 19.h5 w7 20.h2 w4 21.xg4 22.xh3± –
Black’s pawn-weaknesses should
be a telling factor for the future.)
19.hxg4 xg4 (or 19...xg4 20.e2 f5
21.exf5 xf5 22.wxe2 e5 23.ee4±; 20...d7 21.f3 f6 22.
h2 xe2 23.xe2 h4 24.g4 g7
25.gxh4± – Now, White’s rook
is very effective along the third
rank; after: 20...xe2 21.xe2 h4
22.h5 f5 23.f3± – White’s at-
tack becomes decisive.) 20.e2
d7 21.f1 f5, Golod – Zaltz,
Modiin 2002 and here it would have
been very strong for White to fol-
low with: 22.h2! f7 (or 22...fxe4
23.xg4 f5 24.xe4±) 23.d2± –
White protects his f2-square
and he can capture the pawn on
g4 whenever he pleases.

18.xh3 gxh3

19.f4!
It is less precise for White to
play 19.h5, in view of: 19...f5
20.f3 fxe4 21.g5 f5 22.xe4
d7 23.h6 g6± and Black has
some counterplay, Naumann –
Heissler, Germany 1998.

19...exf4 20.gxf4 f5 21.Qg3 Qg6 22.Qf3! Qf6
But not 22...fxe4 23.Qg5± Awh5.
23.e5!
It is also good for White to play 23.Qg5?±.
23...dxe5 24.fxe5 dxe5
That move was what Black relied on.

25.Qg5! (The line: 25.Qxe5 f4 26.Qf3 Qg5 27.Qg3 Qf6, leads to a draw, while after: 25.Qxe5 f4+ Black is better.) 25...Qxf3 26.Wxf3 Qb2 (Black loses after:
26...f4 27.Qxf6 fxg3 28.d6++) 27.d6 (White's attack is very
dangerous now.) 27...f4 (It is too bad for Black to play the pro-
phylactic move: 27...Qh8 after:
28.Qc1! Qf6 29.Qe7 Qg8 30.Qe3 Qxa4 31.Qexg7+--; 30...f4 31.Qxf4
Now, there arises a long forced
variation, in which White's attack
is victorious. (It is also terrible
for Black to play: 28...Qf6 29.Qf1
Qxa4? 30.Qe5!+--) 29.Qc3! Qa1
30.Qxg7! Qxg7 31.Qe5 Qg6 32.
Qg3 Qh5 33.Qd1! Qd2 34.Qxa1
Qg8 35.Qe5 Qh6 36.Qxg8 Qxd1
37.Qf2 Qd2, Malakhatko – Mo-
tylev, Swidnica 1998, 38.Qf1 Qf4
(38...Qd1 39.Qe1 Qf3 40.Qg1+–)
39.Qe1! and White avoids the
perpetual check and he wins: 39...
Qc1 40.Qe2 Qc2 41.Qf1+–.

c5) 15...h6 16.Qb5

16...g5
About 16...Qd7 – see 15...Qd7.
The move 16...Qh8 – seems
to be too slow. 17.g3 Qh5 18.Qb2
Qd7 19.Qe2 Qf6 20.f4! Qe8 21.Qf1
Qa8, V.Milov – Gofshtein, Israel

16...Qd7 17.g3 Qh5 (It is bad
for Black to play 17...Qh3+ in view
of: 18.Qxh3 Qxh3 19.g4+– – that
little combination is typical for
this variation.) 18.Qb2 Qe8!? –
Black frees the d7-square for his
knight (or 18...Qe8 Qe8 19.Qb2±).
Now, the move 19.Qg2! is also
very good, because Black's knight
has no better square than f6. (In
the game Topalov – Nijboer, Wijk
aan Zee 1998, White played dif-
frently: 19.Qe2 Qf6 20.f4 Qd7
21.Qa1 f5 and here after: 22.fxe5
Qxe5 23.Qf3 Qxf3 24.Qxf3 Qxb2
25.Qxb2 fxe4 26.Qxe4± White

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could have obtained a slight edge.) 19...©f6 20.f4 ©d7 21.©a1 f5 – and in comparison to the game of Topalov, White has some additional possibilities, for example: 22.©h3!?± exerting a powerful pressure.

17.g3 ©fg6 18.©e2! f5

After 18...©d7 19.©h5 ©h7 (or 19...f5 20.exf5 ©xf5 21.f3! ©h3 22.©g4 ©xg4 23.fxg4 e4 – otherwise White follows with ©e4 with a great advantage – 24.©xe4 ©e5. Black’s pieces are quite mobile now, but not more... 25.©c7! ©b6 26.©e6+!) 20.f3 f5 (Black plays too cold-bloodedly, having lost two tempi going back with his queen to the d8-square. 20...©d8 – Meanwhile, in open positions a similar waste of time often leads to disaster, while in closed pawn-structures it is more difficult to punish the opponent for that. 21.©g4 f5 22.exf5 ©xf5 23.©e4± Pacheco – Gutierrez, Lima 2002.)

21.exf5 ©xf5 22.©c2 ©f7 23.©e4 ©e7?? (23...©d4 24.©xd4 cxd4 25.©xg5+) 24.©xg6 ©xg6 25.g4 1–0 Veingold – A.Sanchez, Burgos 2001.

19.exf5 ©xf5

Black has seldom played: 19...©xf5 20.©g4 ©d7 21.©xf5 ©xf5 22.©h5 ©f7 23.©f3 e4 24.©xe4 ©e5 25.©xf7 ©xf7 26.©a3 g4 27.©g2 ©h7 28.h3 h5, Spassov – A.Sanchez, Poio 2001, 29.hxg4 hxg4 30.f4 gxh3 31.©xf3 ©xf3 32.©xf3± – but he achieves nothing with his checks and White re-mains with an extra pawn.

20.©h5 ©ge7 21.©e4 ©d4

It is not correct for Black to follow with: 21...e4? 22.©xe4 ©g6, because of; 23.©f3!± Krasenkow – A.Fedorov, Vilnius 1997.

White is slightly better too after: 21...©h8 22.©e4 ©g8 23.©f3 ©d7 24.©b2 ©ge7 25.©xd6 ©xd6 26.©xf8 ©xf8 27.©xd7 ©xc4 28.©c3± Jelenko – Zelenika, Kastav 1999, as well as after: 21...©d7 22.©e4 ©h8 23.©b2 ©e8 24.©h5 ©g6 25.©b1± S.Savchenko – Arakhamia-Grant, Luzern 1997.

22.©xd4

White has a good alternative here – 22.©xc8 ©xc8?! (It is stronger for Black to capture with his queen: 22...©xc8 23.©e4±) 23.©e4 ©d7 24.©xd4 exd4 25.©f3 g4 26.©xf8 ©xf8 27.f3! ©xa4 (or 27...©xa4 28.©d3 ©b4 29.©f1) 28.fxg4± Miciak – Egger Jorge, corr. 2003.

Conclusion about Chapters 18-20

Black is trying, by playing the move $\text{f4}$, to either start an attack on the kingside, or to prevent the advance of White's queenside pawns. Tournament practice has shown that Black usually fails to block his opponent's pawn-offensive on the queenside, or even if he manages to do that, he loses plenty of time and creates weaknesses in his position. Then, White can counter with the powerful plan with $\text{f2-f4}$, after which his pieces become tremendously active in the centre and on the kingside. In fact, the maneuver – $\text{h5-f4}$, turns out to be in favour of White. At first, he has the possibility to play $\text{xf4}$ and e5. Secondly, Black's attempt at attacking with the move $\text{h3}$, after $\text{g2-g3}$, is only seldom purposeful. Therefore, he usually goes back with his knight to h5 and White obtains the edge. Despite all that, the position remains with mutual chances and the White players need to have vast experience to be able to press their slight advantage home.
Chapter 21  1.♘f3 ♘f6 2.c4 g6 3.♗c3 ♘g7 4.e4 d6
5.d4 0–0 6.♖e2 e5 7.0–0 ♗c6 8.d5 ♘e7 9.b4 ♗h5 10.♗e1 f5

That is the most principled move for Black. Now, his knight can go back to f6, increasing the pressure against White’s centre, or it can go to f4. On the other hand, White has a clear-cut plan to develop his initiative, connected with the penetration of his knight to e6.

11.♗g5

White exploits the possibility to trade Black’s light-squared bishop; meanwhile his d5-pawn goes to e6 and the basic fight in that variation is focused on whether White will manage to protect that pawn, or he will have to exchange it, or even sacrifice it advantageously, or not.

11...♗f4

Black’s strongest move – 11...♗f6 is analyzed in Chapter 22.

12.♕xf4 exf4 13.♗c1

Now, we will deal in details with: a) 13...♕xe4, b) 13...h6, c) 13...c6 and d) 13...♗f6.

The inclusion of the moves 13...a5 14.b5 does not have any separate importance, because after that the game usually transposes to the other variations, which we analyze. Meanwhile, that is in an even better situation for White, because his pressure along the h1-a8 diagonal is even stronger. For example: 14...♗e5 (about 14...♗f6 – see 17...a5 in variation d) 15.♗f3 ♙xe4 16.♗xe4 ♗f5 17.♗e6± Prokopchuk – Lykov, Russia 1998. The other possibilities for Black are:

13...♗e5 14.♗f3 ♙xe4 15.♗xe4 ♗f5, Teske – Kupreichik, Graz 2002 and here it would be interesting for White to test: 16.♗f3!? a5 (After 16...♗f6, White must play energetically: 17.♗xe5 dxe5 18.c5 ♗d4 – 18...a5 19.d6!± – 19. d6 ♗xd6 20.♗d5 ♗f6 21.♗e4±; 16...♗e8 17.♗xe5 dxe5 18.c5± and he should always manage to repel Black’s knight from the d4-square with the help of the move ♗d2, moreover that he is threatening to
push d5-d6 at any moment.) 17.b5 \( \mathcal{A}g7 \) 18.\( \mathcal{A}e2 \) g5 19.\( \mathcal{A}e4 \) g4 20.\( \mathcal{A}xf5 \ \mathcal{A}xf5 \) 21.\( \mathcal{A}xf5 \) \( \mathcal{A}xf5 \) 22.\( \mathcal{A}d4 \) White maintains a slight edge, thanks to his domination over the e-file;

13...h5. Evidently, that slightly strange move is aimed at depriving White’s bishop of the g4-square. 14.\( \mathcal{A}f3 \) (In the game E.Ragozin – Dyachkov, Russia 1996, there followed: 14.\( \mathcal{A}e6 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe6 \) 15.dxe6 \( \mathcal{A}xc3 \) 16.\( \mathcal{A}xc3 \) fxe4. Here, with a black pawn on h6, instead of on h5, it would have been the best for White to follow with \( \mathcal{A}g4 \) – but now he does not have that possibility. 17.\( \mathcal{A}f1 \) e3 18.fxe3 f3 19.gxf3 \( \mathcal{A}xf5 \) 20...\( \mathcal{A}e5 \) and here: 15.\( \mathcal{A}e6 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe6 \) 16.dxe6 – it is not good for Black to exchange on c3 here, because he loses a tempo in the process;

13...\( \mathcal{A}h8 \) 14.\( \mathcal{A}f3 \) \( \mathcal{A}e5 \) (or 14...h6; 14...fxe4 15.\( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) \( \mathcal{A}f5 \) 16.\( \mathcal{A}e6 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe6 \) 17.dxe6 \( \mathcal{A}e5 \) 18.\( \mathcal{A}d5 \) g5 19.\( \mathcal{W}e1 \) \( \mathcal{A}g8 \) 20.\( \mathcal{A}xe5 \) Zavadsky – Pearson, Berkeley 2005; 14...\( \mathcal{A}xd5 \) 15.\( \mathcal{A}xd5 \) \( \mathcal{W}xg5 \) 16.\( \mathcal{A}xc7 \) \( \mathcal{W}b8 \) 17.\( \mathcal{W}xd6 \) \( \mathcal{W}d8 \) 18.\( \mathcal{A}e6 \) 19.a5 15.b5 \( \mathcal{A}g8 \) 16.\( \mathcal{A}e6 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe6 \) 17.dxe6 \( \mathcal{A}xc3 \) 18.\( \mathcal{A}xc3 \) \( \mathcal{W}f6 \) 19.\( \mathcal{A}ec1 \) \( \mathcal{W}xe6 \) 20.\( \mathcal{W}xf5 \) \( \mathcal{A}xf5 \) 21.\( \mathcal{A}d4 \) \( \mathcal{W}f6 \) 22.\( \mathcal{W}xf6 \) \( \mathcal{A}xf6 \) 23.\( \mathcal{A}xb7 \) \( \mathcal{W}b8 \) 24.\( \mathcal{A}d5 \) Fedorowicz – Belakovskaya, Philadelphia 1998) 15.\( \mathcal{A}e6 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe6 \) 16.dxe6 c6 17.b5 \( \mathcal{W}e6 \) (or 17...\( \mathcal{A}ce7 \); 17...\( \mathcal{A}c8 \), Truskavetsky – Nechaev, Ukraine 2005, 18.\( \mathcal{A}xf5 \) \( \mathcal{A}xf5 \) 19.c5 \( \mathcal{W}xe6 \) 20.bxc6 \( \mathcal{W}xc6 \) 21.\( \mathcal{A}xc6 \) \( \mathcal{E}ac8 \) 22.\( \mathcal{A}d5 \) \( \mathcal{W}e7 \) 23.\( \mathcal{A}c6 \) 18.\( \mathcal{E}xf5 \) \( \mathcal{G}xf5 \) (or 18...\( \mathcal{A}xf5 \) 19.bxc6 \( \mathcal{B}xc6 \) 20.\( \mathcal{E}c5 \) \( \mathcal{A}xc3 \) 21.\( \mathcal{A}xc3 \) d5 22.\( \mathcal{W}d4 \) \( \mathcal{G}g8 \) 23.\( \mathcal{A}b3 \) Rychagov – Pettersson, Internet 2003) 19.bxc6 \( \mathcal{B}xc6 \) 20.\( \mathcal{A}e2 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe6 \) 21.\( \mathcal{A}xf4 \) \( \mathcal{H}h6 \) 22.\( \mathcal{W}d2 \) Stohl – Kupreichik, Germany 1998;

13...\( \mathcal{A}h6 \) 14.\( \mathcal{A}f3 \) (White can also try the aggressive line: 14.\( \mathcal{A}e6 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe6 \) 15.dxe6 \( \mathcal{A}f3 \) 16.\( \mathcal{A}xf3 \) \( \mathcal{A}xc1 \) 17.\( \mathcal{W}xc1 \) and his compensation for the exchange is sufficient, Schaffer – Haensel, Essen 2002.) 14...\( \mathcal{A}g7 \) (or 14...\( \mathcal{A}g5 \) 15.\( \mathcal{A}c2 \) a5 16.b5 \( \mathcal{A}h8 \) 17.\( \mathcal{A}d4 \) White’s knight is again headed for the e6-square. 17...\( \mathcal{A}g7 \) 18.\( \mathcal{A}e6 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe6 \) 19.dxe6 c6 20.\( \mathcal{A}d3 \) fxe4 21.\( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) \( \mathcal{A}d7 \) Rau – Haensel, Greifswald 2002; 14...\( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) 15.\( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) \( \mathcal{A}f5 \) 16.c5 a5 17.b5 \( \mathcal{A}h8 \) 18.\( \mathcal{E}c2 \) \( \mathcal{A}d7 \), Fiedler – Adamek, Czech Republic 1997, 19.\( \mathcal{A}e6 \) 16.\( \mathcal{A}d7 \) 17.\( \mathcal{A}c2 \) \( \mathcal{A}e8 \) 18.c6 \( \mathcal{B}xc6 \) 19.\( \mathcal{A}xc6 \) \( \mathcal{A}e6 \) 20.\( \mathcal{A}c4 \) Skalik – Heymann, Polanica Zdroj 1998) 15.\( \mathcal{A}f1 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) (or 15...a5, Jiretorn – Kovatsou, Bled 2002, 16.b5! \( \mathcal{A}c3 \) 16.\( \mathcal{A}xc3 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) 17.\( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) \( \mathcal{G}g4 \) 18.\( \mathcal{A}f3 \) \( \mathcal{A}xf3 \) 19.\( \mathcal{A}xf3 \) Now, White is dominant on the e-file and he is clearly better, Lecuyer – Blachier, France 1998.) 16.\( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) h6 (or 16...\( \mathcal{A}f5 \) 17.c5 h6 18.\( \mathcal{A}xd6 \) \( \mathcal{A}xc5 \) a5 20.b5 g5 21.\( \mathcal{A}e6 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe6 \) 22.\( \mathcal{A}xe6 \) \( \mathcal{A}d5 \) Pustilnik – Benitez, Asuncion 1998) 17.\( \mathcal{A}d2 \) \( \mathcal{A}d4 \) 18.\( \mathcal{A}xd4 \) \( \mathcal{A}g6 \) 20.\( \mathcal{A}c5 \) Soldan – Janos, Slovakia 2003.

a) 13...\( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) 14.\( \mathcal{A}xe4 \) \( \mathcal{A}f5 \)

14...h6 15.\( \mathcal{A}e6 \) \( \mathcal{A}xe6 \) 16.dxe6 \( \mathcal{A}c6 \) (About 16...\( \mathcal{A}f5 \) 17.\( \mathcal{A}g4 \) – see
14...\textit{Qf5}; 16...\textit{We8} 17.\textit{Df3} \textit{Ef5} 18.c5
d5 19.\textit{Dd6} cxd6 20.cxd6 \textit{Dd8} 21.dxe7 \textit{Dxe7} 22.\textit{Gg4}+– Karp-
tunen – Louhivaara, Helsinki
1997; 17...\textit{Qe5} 18.c5 dxc5 19.\textit{Exe5}
\textit{cxb4} 20.\textit{Dd7} \textit{Dxd7} 21.\textit{exd7} \textit{Qf5} 22.\textit{Dxb7} \textit{Ed8} 23.\textit{Dd1} \textit{Qd6} 24.
\textit{Dc6}++; 21...\textit{Dc6} 22.\textit{Dxc6} bxc6, Blasko – Bakos, Miskolc
1999, after 23.\textit{Qc1}! White has a winning
\textit{Df6} 28.g4! He is weaving a check-
mating net. 28...\textit{fxg3} 29.\textit{hxg3} b3
30.axb3 \textit{Eab8} 31.g4 \textit{Exb3} 32.\textit{Dg2}
\textit{Dd3} 33.f4++; and Black is defense-
less against the checkmate.) 17.e5
(or 17.d5!? \textit{Df7} 18.e5++) 17...d5
18.\textit{Dc3} \textit{Ee7} (or 18...\textit{Dxc3} 19.\textit{Dxc3}
\textit{Df6} 20.\textit{Dh3} \textit{Dxe6} (or 20...\textit{Dfe8}
21.\textit{Dh5}++) 21.\textit{Df3} \textit{Df6} 22.b5 \textit{Dd4}
23.\textit{Dxd5} \textit{Dg7} 24.\textit{Dxb7}++) 19.\textit{Df3} c6
20.a4 \textit{Df5} and here White found a
powerful piece-sacrifice: 21.\textit{Dxd5}!
\textit{cx5} 22.\textit{Dxd5} \textit{Dxd5} 23.\textit{Dxd5} \textit{Df6}
(or 23...\textit{Dae8} 24.e7 \textit{Df7} 25.\textit{Dcd1}
\textit{Dc3} 26.\textit{De4}++) 24.\textit{Dxb7} \textit{Dab8} 25.
\textit{Dc6} \textit{Ee7} 26.\textit{Dd7}–– Heller – Sta-
race, Email 2000.

14...a5 15.b5 \textit{Df5} 16.\textit{Dg4}–
– White is playing analogously to the
line with 14...\textit{Df5} and the in-
clusion of the moves 14...a5 15.b5
is in his favour.

15.\textit{Dg4}! \textit{h6}
15...\textit{Db2} 16.\textit{Ee2} \textit{Dc5} 17.c5 \textit{h6}
18.\textit{Dxe6} \textit{Dxe6} 19.dxe6 \textit{Dh4}, Veingold
– Keskinen, Vantaa 1999 and here
obviously, it would have been
better for White to play: 20.\textit{Dxf5}!
\textit{Exf5} (In case of: 20...\textit{Dxf5}, White
continues with the standard sac-
ifice for that line: 21.\textit{Dxd6}! cxd6
22.cxd6 \textit{Df6} 23.e7++) 21.cxd6
\textit{cxd6} (The other moves are even
worse for Black: 21...f3 22.\textit{Dg3}
fxg2 23.dxc5+–; 22...\textit{Dxd6} 23.\textit{Dxf3}
\textit{Dh5} 24.\textit{Dxh5} \textit{Dxb2} 25.\textit{Df1} \textit{Dh3}
26.\textit{Dc2} \textit{Dxe6} 27.\textit{Dxd3}++; 21...
\textit{Dh5} 22.\textit{Dxc7} \textit{Dxb2} 23.\textit{Df1} \textit{Dxc7}
24.\textit{Dxc7} \textit{f3} 25.\textit{Df6}– and White
checkmates first.) 22.\textit{Dc1}! \textit{f3} (or
22...\textit{Dd5} 23.\textit{Dxb7} \textit{dxe4} 24.\textit{Dd7}––)
23.\textit{Dg3} fxg2 24.\textit{Df4} \textit{Dh3} 25.\textit{Dxe5}
\textit{Dxe5} 26.f4 \textit{Dxe6} 27.\textit{Dxa1}––;

15...\textit{Dd4} 16.\textit{Dd6}?! \textit{Dxe6} 17.
\textit{Dxe6} \textit{Dxe6} 18.\textit{Dxe6} \textit{Df5}? (or 18...
\textit{Df3} 19.c5; 18...\textit{Df5} 19.\textit{Dd7} 20.
\textit{Dd5}–) 19.c5 d5 20.\textit{Dd6}! That is
a surprising, but powerful re-
source for White. 20...\textit{Dxd6} 21.\textit{Dd7}
(21...\textit{Dxe6} 22.\textit{Dxd6} \textit{Dxe6} 23.\textit{Dxe6} \textit{Df6}
(Or 22...\textit{Df8} 23.\textit{Dd4}++; 22...f3 23.\textit{Dc7}
\textit{Dxd6} 24.\textit{Dd8} \textit{Dxe8} 25.\textit{Dxe8} \textit{Df8}
26.\textit{Dxb7}–– Pelletier – Gormally, Hastings
1996.) 23.\textit{Dc7} \textit{Dxd6} 24.\textit{Dc4} \textit{Dxc7}
(Or 24...\textit{Dd7} 25.\textit{Dxe8}! \textit{Dxe8} 26.\textit{Dd8}+)
25.\textit{Dxe8} \textit{Df8} 26.\textit{Dd8}–– Pelletier

16.\textit{Dd6} \textit{Dxe6} 17.\textit{Dxe6} \textit{Df7}
Following: 17...\textit{Dd4} 18.\textit{Dc3}
\textit{Df5}? Jesus – Jorge, Spain
1998, White could have won with
the simple line: 19.\textit{Df7} \textit{Dxe7}
20.\textit{Dxe4}++; 18...\textit{Dc6} 19.\textit{Dd5}++

18.c5! \textit{Dd4}
After: 18...\textit{Dad8} 19.\textit{Dxc6} \textit{cxd6}
(or 19...\textit{Dxd6} 20.\textit{Dc2} \textit{h5} 21.\textit{Dxd6}
\textit{cxd6} 22.\textit{Df3}+ Tratar – Starcic,
Bled 2002) 20.\textit{Dd5} \textit{Dh8} 21.\textit{Dc3}
\textit{Dxc3} 22.\textit{Dxc3} \textit{Df6}, R. Smith – Las-
sen, corr. 1999, 23...c4 e8 24. cxe4± White obtains a clear advantage, having protected reliably his e6-pawn.

19.cxd6 cxd6, Malakhatko – Miroshnichenko, Polanica Zdroj 1998, 20.e3! f3 21.g3 h5 (In case of: 21...e5, White obtains the edge with the interesting maneuver: 22.e4 dxe6 23.e3! Now, Black's knight cannot return to the d4-square. 23...g5 24.d5 g7 25.c7 h5 26.e6 h8 27.h4±) 22.h3 g5. Black does not let White's knight to the d5-outpost. (After: 22...e5 23.d5 g5 24.e7 e8 25.c4 White repels his opponent's knight from d4 and his advantage becomes decisive. 25... d5 26.c7+–) 23.d3 e8 24.e4± – White's queen joins in the fight and he has the edge.

b) 13.h6 14.d6 dxe6 15. dxe6

(diagram)

15...xc3

The other possibilities for Black are:

About 15...fxe4 16.xe4 – see variation a; as for 15...c6 16.f3

– see variation c;

15.a5 16.b5 (The inclusion of that move is in favour of White too.) 16...xc3 17.xc3 fxe4, Nava – Rego, Email 2000, 18.g4± transposing to the main lines with the inclusion of the moves a5 and b5;

15.h8 16.f3 e5 17.d2 c6 18.b5 c8 19.exf5 gxf5 (or 19... xf5 20.bxc6 bxc6 21.e2 g5 22.g4 e6 23.d4 f6 24.xc6 e7 25.xe7 e7 26.c5±) 20.c5 xe6 21.cxd6 xd6 22.xd6 23.e6 a3 24.b1 ac8 25.bxc6 xc6 26.xb7+ Lang – Wichmann, Germany 1999;

After: 15.h7 16.f3 xc3 17.xc3 b8 18.c5 dxc5 19.d3 c8 20.bxc5+– White's advantage was decisive in the game H.Schneider – Erlacher, Aschach 2003;

15.e5 16.d3! (In case of: 16.c5?! xc3 17.xc3 fxe4∞ Black "loses" a tempo, but after c5, he can protect his e4-pawn with the move d5, Cifka – Zeleny, Czech Republic 2006.) 16...c6 17.d3± and White has excellent attacking prospects.

16.xc3 fxe4

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Or 16...\(\text{c6}\) 17.exf5 \(\text{xf5}\) 18. \(\text{xf3}\) \(\text{f6}\) 19.\(\text{xc1}\) \(\text{e8}\) 20.c5 \(\text{dxc5}\), Skrzypczak – Budrewicz, Leba 2004, 21.\(\text{xc5}\) \(\text{xc5}\) 22.bxc5±.

17.\(\text{g4}\) \(\text{c6}\)

About 17...\(\text{h5}\) – see 13...\(\text{f6}\).

Black’s position is very bad after: 17...\(\text{d5}\) 18.cxd5 \(\text{h5}!\) (or 18...\(\text{xd5}\) 19.\(\text{xc7}\) \(\text{g5}\) 20.\(\text{xe4}\)\(±\) Chasovnikova – Kucypera, Munich 1998; 18...\(\text{xd5}\) 19.e7 \(\text{xe7}\) 20.\(\text{b3}\) \(\text{h8}\) 21.\(\text{d1}\) \(\text{e8}\) 22.\(\text{xc7}\) \(\text{d8}\) 23.\(\text{xe8}\) \(\text{xd8}\) 24.\(\text{e7}\) \(\text{e8}\) 25.\(\text{c3}\) \(\text{g8}\) 26.\(\text{e6}\)\(+-\)) 19.\(\text{e2}\)! \(\text{xd5}\) 20.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{c6}\) 21.\(\text{xe4}\)\(±\).

18.\(\text{xe4}\)

Now, the game develops analogously to the variation with 13...\(\text{f6}\) (p.272), except that Black’s pawn is on \(\text{h6}\) and not on \(\text{h7}\).

18...\(\text{g5}\) (That seems to be the only difference, because now Black’s queen is protected on the g5-square.) 19.\(\text{d5}\) \(\text{e7}\) 20.\(\text{xe5}\) \(\text{hxg5}\), Estremera – Dvirnyy, Verona 2006, 21.\(\text{xe1}\) \(\text{g7}\) 22.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{ab8}\) 23.b5\(±\) and White preserves a minimal edge in that endgame.

c) 13...\(\text{c6}\)

That move is not so much with the idea to undermine White’s centre, but to protect in advance the d5-square. In case White plays \(\text{e6}\), then Black can quickly complete his development with \(\text{c7}\) and \(\text{ad8}\).

14.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{h6}\)

Black is clearly worse after: 14...\(\text{xe4}\) 15.\(\text{cxe4}\) \(\text{h6}\) 16.\(\text{xe6}\) \(\text{xe6}\) 17.dxe6 \(\text{xf5}\) (or 17...\(\text{d5}\) 18.\(\text{cxd5}\) \(\text{cxd5}\) 19.\(\text{c5}\)\(±\) 18.b5 \(\text{e7}\), Guichard – Choisy, France 2003, 19.\(\text{c5}\)!? \(\text{d5}\) 20.\(\text{d6}\) \(\text{ad8}\) (or 20...\(\text{xd6}\)? 21.cxd6 \(\text{xd6}\) 22.bxc6 \(\text{xc6}\) 23.\(\text{d7}\) \(\text{f6}\) 24.\(\text{xc6}\)\(+-\)) 21.\(\text{e4}\) \(\text{xd6}\) 22.cxd6 \(\text{xd6}\) 23.bxc6 \(\text{xc6}\) 24.\(\text{xc6}\)\(±\), as well as following: 14...\(\text{e5}\) 15.\(\text{xf5}\) \(\text{xf5}\) (or 15...\(\text{xf5}\) 16.\(\text{c5}\)\(±\) 16.\(\text{h4}\) \(\text{h6}\) 17.\(\text{e4}\) a5 18.dxc6 \(\text{axb4}\) 19.\(\text{d5}\) \(\text{bx6}\) 20.\(\text{d6}\) \(\text{xb4}\) 21.c5 \(\text{xf5}\) 22.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{d5}\), Raff – Holzinger, Oeffingen 2002, 23.\(\text{g5}\)!\(±\).

15.\(\text{e6}\) \(\text{xe6}\) 16.\(\text{dxe6}\) \(\text{c7}\)

Black has tested in practice some other moves too:

It is a disaster for him to play 16...\(\text{f6}\)? – he fails to capture on e6 and he covers the diagonal of his bishop on g7. 17.cfx5 \(\text{xf5}\) 18.b5 \(\text{c7}\) 19.bxc6 \(\text{bxc6}\) 20.\(\text{b5}\) \(\text{b6}\) (or
20...\text{\textit{\textswirl}}e7 21.\textit{\textswirl}xc6=\pm 21.\textit{\textswirl}xd6 \textit{\textswirl}d8 22.c5=\pm Prudnikova – Bielicki, Germany 1998;

16...g5? 17.exf5! (It is also good for White to play 17.\textit{\textswirl}h5!?=\pm penetrating with his bishop into Black's camp.) 17...\textit{\textswirl}xf5 18.b5 \textit{\textswirl}c7 19.bxc6 bxc6 Kretz – Wieweg, Sweden 1999 and here White could have won immediately with the simple, but spectacular tactical strike: 20.\textit{\textswirl}b5! cxb5 21.\textit{\textswirl}xa8 \textit{\textswirl}xa8 22.\textit{\textswirl}d5=\pm;

16...\textit{\textswirl}e5 17.\textit{\textswirl}b3 \textit{\textswirl}c7 18.c5! \textit{\textswirl}xc3 (or 18...dxc5 19.bxc5 \textit{\textswirl}g7 20.\textit{\textswirl}d5!= cxd5 21.exd5 \textit{\textswirl}ae8 22.\textit{\textswirl}a3 \textit{\textswirl}fd8 23.d6 \textit{\textswirl}xd6 24.cxd6 \textit{\textswirl}xd6 25.dxe6 \textit{\textswirl}xe6 26.\textit{\textswirl}xc8 \textit{\textswirl}xc8 27.e7=\pm; 21...\textit{\textswirl}fd8 22.d6 \textit{\textswirl}xd6 23.cxd6 \textit{\textswirl}xd6 24.\textit{\textswirl}xb7=\pm) 19.\textit{\textswirl}xc3 fxe4 20.cxd6 \textit{\textswirl}xd6 21.\textit{\textswirl}xe4 \textit{\textswirl}ad8, Hornung – Heika, Germany 1999, 22.\textit{\textswirl}b3=\pm White protects his e6-pawn and he prepares b5, so his advantage is indisputable.

17.c5 \textit{\textswirl}ad8

If 17...dxc5, then 18.bxc5 \textit{\textswirl}ad8 19.\textit{\textswirl}b3 \textit{\textswirl}d3 20.exf5 \textit{\textswirl}xc3 21.\textit{\textswirl}xc3 \textit{\textswirl}a5 22.\textit{\textswirl}ec1 \textit{\textswirl}xc3 23.\textit{\textswirl}xc3 \textit{\textswirl}xf5 24.g3=\pm and White maintains a great advantage.

18.cxd6

After 18.\textit{\textswirl}b3! the game is likely to transpose to the line with 17...dxc5.

18...\textit{\textswirl}xd6 19.\textit{\textswirl}b3 \textit{\textswirl}h7 20.\textit{\textswirl}b5 cxb5 21.\textit{\textswirl}xb5 \textit{\textswirl}b6 22.\textit{\textswirl}c7 \textit{\textswirl}d2, Cebalo – Cucancic, Pula 1996, 23.\textit{\textswirl}f1 \textit{\textswirl}e8 24.e5 \textit{\textswirl}c6 25.\textit{\textswirl}d7 \textit{\textswirl}xd7 26.exd7 \textit{\textswirl}xe5 27.\textit{\textswirl}xa7=\pm

\textbf{d) 13...\textit{\textswirl}f6 14.\textit{\textswirl}e6 \textit{\textswirl}xe6 15.dxe6}

15...\textit{\textswirl}xc3

About 15...a5 16.b5 \textit{\textswirl}xc3 17.\textit{\textswirl}xc3 fxe4, Pinus – Ruff, Email 2000, 18.\textit{\textswirl}g4=\pm see 15...\textit{\textswirl}xc3, 17...a5.

15...c6 16.c5 (or 16.\textit{\textswirl}f3! and later White can continue analogously to variation \textbf{c}) 16...dxc5 17.bxc5 \textit{\textswirl}a5 18.\textit{\textswirl}b3 \textit{\textswirl}ad8 19.exf5 gxf5 20.\textit{\textswirl}f1 \textit{\textswirl}d2 21.\textit{\textswirl}e2 \textit{\textswirl}xa2 22.\textit{\textswirl}xf4=\pm – and he obtained an edge in the game G.Fish – Hoerstmann, Germany 2001.

16.\textit{\textswirl}xc3 fxe4 17.\textit{\textswirl}g4 \textit{\textswirl}c6

The alternatives for Black are:

17...e3 18.fxe3 c6 (Or 18...fxe3 19.\textit{\textswirl}exe3! and later White can play like in the game Vein-
gold – Cheutshenko – see 17...a5 18.b5 e3.) 19...\hbox{\texttt{e3!}} (Now, without the inclusion of the moves a5 and b5, it would not work for White to follow with: 19...\texttt{exf4} 20...\texttt{xf1} 21.c5 \texttt{xf1} 22.\texttt{xf1}, due to 22...\texttt{xb4}! = and evidently he has nothing more than a perpetual check.) 19...\texttt{b6} 20.a3 (Now, White can fortify his b4-pawn.) 20...d5 21.c5 \texttt{c7} 22.e4 \texttt{f8} 23.\texttt{xf3} b6 24.exd5 cxd5 25.\texttt{xf3} \texttt{ac8} 26.c6 b5 27.\texttt{f3} = Raffaele – Hansen, Email 2000;

17...d5? That move practically loses the game for Black. 18.cxd5 f3 (or 18...\texttt{exd5} 19.e7 \texttt{exe7} 20.b3 Kamaluddin – Thompson, Email 1999, 20...\texttt{wh8} 21.\texttt{d1}! 19...\texttt{xf3} \texttt{exf3} 20.\texttt{xf3} \texttt{xf3} 21.\texttt{xf3} = Corbat – Hoeser, IECC 2001;

17...a5 18.b5 e3 (or 18...\texttt{g5}?! 19.\texttt{exe4} \texttt{xf6} 20.\texttt{ec1} \texttt{e7} 21.b6 h5 22.\texttt{xf3} \texttt{cxb6} 23.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{c6} 24.\texttt{exe1} = Tukmakov – Rupp, Portorož 1996) 19...\texttt{f3} and Black cannot equalize completely with the line: 19...\texttt{c6}, Zhu Chen – Xie, Beijing 1998, (White is better after: 19...\texttt{exe3} 20.\texttt{exe3}! c6 21.\texttt{d4} cxb5 22.\texttt{cxb5} \texttt{e8} 23.\texttt{h4} \texttt{exe3} 24.\texttt{exe3} \texttt{f5} 25.\texttt{xf5} \texttt{xf5} 26.b6! \texttt{e5}! 27.\texttt{ec7} \texttt{f6} 28.\texttt{h2}! \texttt{xe6} 29.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{xf6} 30.\texttt{xb7} d5 31.\texttt{g3} a4, Veningol – Cheutshenko, Estonia 1998 and here White could win with: 32.\texttt{bb8}! \texttt{g7} 33.\texttt{b7} \texttt{b6} 34.\texttt{f4} a3 35.\texttt{e5} \texttt{b5} 36.\texttt{d6} –.; 34...\texttt{b4} 35.\texttt{e5} d4 36.a3 \texttt{b3} 37.\texttt{xd4} = Veingold.) 20.\texttt{exe4}! (or 20.\texttt{d4} h5! 21.\texttt{f3} \texttt{f5} 22.\texttt{xf4} \texttt{g4} 23.\texttt{wxg3} \texttt{xf3} 24.\texttt{gxf3} \texttt{f6} =) 20...\texttt{b6} (or 20...\texttt{xf4} 21.\texttt{xf1} \texttt{xf1} – 21...\texttt{f6} 22.c5+- – 22...\texttt{xf1} \texttt{xe8} 23.\texttt{xf3} \texttt{g7} 24.\texttt{d1} \texttt{e5} 25.\texttt{f7} \texttt{e8} 26.\texttt{h4}! =) 21.\texttt{h1} \texttt{xf4} 22.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{g4} 23.\texttt{xe7} \texttt{f2} 24.\texttt{g1} \texttt{f8} 25.\texttt{xc1} \texttt{h4} 26.\texttt{e7} =;

17...\texttt{h5} 18.\texttt{h3} (White’s victory is problematic after: 18.\texttt{xf5}! \texttt{gxf5} 19.\texttt{xf6} \texttt{xf6} 20.\texttt{h3} \texttt{a6} 21.\texttt{h7} \texttt{f8} 22.\texttt{dxe4} \texttt{d7} 23.\texttt{xe7} \texttt{e7} 24.\texttt{h7} \texttt{f8} 25.\texttt{e7} \texttt{e8} =) 18...\texttt{e3} (or 18...\texttt{e8} 19.\texttt{xe4} \texttt{g5} 20.\texttt{g3} \texttt{g6} 21.\texttt{ae1} \texttt{f6} 22.\texttt{g2} = Jelen – Kopczynski, Ljubljana 2005; 21...\texttt{g4} 22.\texttt{g2} \texttt{f3} 23.\texttt{f1} \texttt{f6} 24.\texttt{dxe3}; 18...\texttt{c6} 19.\texttt{xe4} \texttt{d5} 20.\texttt{cxd5} \texttt{xd5} 21.\texttt{d4} \texttt{xd4} 22.\texttt{xd4} \texttt{xd8} 23.\texttt{d7} \texttt{d7} 24.\texttt{exe7} \texttt{d8} 25.b5 \texttt{f7} 26.\texttt{a3} =; 24...\texttt{f7}, Babula – Lanka, Germany 1997, 25.\texttt{c4} \texttt{g5} 26.\texttt{f3} \texttt{d8} 27.\texttt{ec5} \texttt{f6} 28.b5 \texttt{cx5} 29.\texttt{xb5} \texttt{b6} 30.\texttt{g2}; 27...\texttt{g4} 28.\texttt{fxg4} \texttt{xd7} 29.\texttt{gxh5} \texttt{d1} 30.\texttt{g2} \texttt{d2} 31.\texttt{f3} =) 19.\texttt{xf3} \texttt{c6}, V.Aleksandrov – Djachkov, Samara 2003 (or 19...\texttt{exe3} 20.\texttt{exe3} \texttt{a6} 21...\texttt{d4} 20.\texttt{exe4} \texttt{xf4} 21.\texttt{g3} \texttt{b6} 22.\texttt{h1} \texttt{d4} 23.\texttt{ed3} \texttt{xd3} 24.\texttt{xd3} \texttt{d5} (or 24...\texttt{exe4} 25.\texttt{b1} =) 25.a3. 18.\texttt{exe4}
18...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{De}5}  
18...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Df}6} 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Ff}3}! White provokes the weakening of Black's position. 19...g5 (After 19...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dg}5} 20.e\textcolor{red}{\textbf{C}7} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxe}7} 21.h4 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxg}4} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxe}7} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Rf}7} 23.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxf}7} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxf}7} 24.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dd}5} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dg}7} 25.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxb}7}\pm; 21...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Df}6} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dd}2}\pm - White restores the material balance and he remains in a superior position; 19...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Db}8} Harestad – Mendez, Email 2002, 20.g3!? \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dc}5} 21.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxf}4}\pm; 20...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Df}2} 21.gxf4 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxa}2} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Db}5} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{De}7} 23.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dc}1} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Da}5} 24.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dd}2}\pm) 20.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Da}3}! (White would not achieve much with the calm line: 20.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dc}1} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{De}5} 21.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Db}3} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{De}8} 22.h3 h5 23.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxh}5} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dx}e}6 24.a4 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dg}7} = Waterschoot – Donsanti, Email 2002.) 20...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{De}5} 21.h3 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{De}8} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Db}5}\pm; 21...h5 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxh}5} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxe}6} 23.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Cc}5} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dfd}8} 24.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dd}4} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dg}7} 25.c\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dx}d}6 exd6 26.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Cc}3}\pm.

18...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dc}7} 19.c\textcolor{red}{\textbf{D}5} dxc\textcolor{red}{\textbf{D}5} 20.bxc\textcolor{red}{\textbf{D}5} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dac}8} (Or 20...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dad}8} 21.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dbd}1} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dd}2} (or 21...h5 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dc}2} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dd}2} 23.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dd}3} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxd}3} 24.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxd}3} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxc}5} 25.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Df}1}\pm) 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}3}\pm) 21.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dc}1} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dcd}8} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxf}4} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxf}4} 23.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxf}4} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dd}4} 24.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dg}3}, Janosi – Lynn, Email 2003, 24...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dc}4} 25.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}3}\pm.

19.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Cc}5} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dc}7}  
19...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Df}6} 20.c\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}d}6 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dx}g}4, Bengtsson – M.Garcia, Framingham 2001, 21.e7! \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxc}3} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dd}7}\pm. Black will have to give his rooks for White’s passed-pawns.

20.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Cxd}6} c\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}d}6 21.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dh}3} g\textcolor{red}{\textbf{5}} 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dc}2}! g\textcolor{red}{\textbf{4}} 23.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxe}5}! d\textcolor{red}{\textbf{x}e}5 (or 23...gxh3 24.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dh}5}\pm) 24.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxg}4} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dh}4} (or 24...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dxb}4} 25.a3 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dc}5} 26.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}4} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dfe}8} 27.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dc}7} e4 28.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dc}5}\pm) 25.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dc}7} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dae}8} 26.g\textcolor{red}{\textbf{3}} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dx}g}3 27.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{hx}g}3 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dh}6} 28.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Df}5} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Df}6} 29.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dx}h}7 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dg}8} 30.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Dg}8} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{Df}7}+ – van der Stricht – Roger, Bethune 2004.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Black manages in this variation to accomplish one of the main ideas of the King’s Indian Defence indeed and that is to open the h8-a1 diagonal; nevertheless White’s achievements turn out to be even greater. The e6-pawn becomes his most important battle unit. White’s basic strategy is strikingly simple. He exploits his dangerous passed pawn, his space advantage and more active pieces in order to develop a powerful initiative in the centre and on the queenside. Tournament practice proves that White either manages to preserve his outpost on e6 and his initiative, or he obtains other positional and material advantages in case Black succeeds in neutralizing the perilous passed-pawn. It is usually quite difficult for Black to organize any real counterplay and contrary to the variation with 11...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{Df}6}, he does not have a mobile pawn-mass in the centre and his bishop on g7 is “attacking practically nothing...
Chapter 22

1.\(\text{d}f3\) \(\text{d}f6\) 2.\(c4\) \(g6\) 3.\(\text{c}c3\) \(\text{g}7\) 4.\(e4\) \(d6\) 5.\(d4\) 0–0 6.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{e}5\) 7.0–0 \(\text{c}6\) 8.\(d5\) \(\text{e}7\) 9.\(b4\) \(\text{h}5\) 10.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{f}5\) 11.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{f}6\) 12.\(\text{f}3\)

We will now analyze thoroughly: a) 12...\(\text{h}8\), b) 12...\(\text{h}5\), c) 12...\(\text{h}6\) and d) 12...\(\text{c}6\).

Black plays sometimes:

12...\(\text{d}e8??\) 13.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{h}6\) 14.\(\text{d}e6\) \(\text{x}e6\) 15.\(\text{d}xe6\) see variation c;

12...\(\text{d}e8?!\) 13.\(\text{h}1\) \(\text{h}6\) 14.\(\text{d}e6\) \(\text{x}e6\) 15.\(\text{d}xe6\) \(\text{w}c8\) 16.\(\text{d}d5\) \(\text{w}d8\).

Black simply loses time. (or 16...\(\text{w}x\text{e}6\) 17.\(\text{d}xe7\) \(\text{x}e7\) 18.\(\text{d}d5\) \(\text{h}7\) 19.\(\text{x}b7\) 17.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{c}6\) 18.\(\text{d}xe7\) \(\text{w}e7\) 19.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{d}8\) 20.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{f}xe4\) 21.\(\text{f}xe4\) \(\text{c}7\) 22.\(\text{c}d6\) \(\text{x}d6\) 23.\(\text{a}4!\) White's couple of bishops provides him with some edge, Schranz – Alves, IECG 2000; 12...\(\text{a}5\) 13.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{c}6\) (or 13...\(\text{h}6\) 14.\(\text{d}e6\) \(\text{x}e6\) 15.\(\text{d}xe6\) 14.\(\text{b}x\text{e}6\) \(\text{bxc6}\) 15.\(\text{f}b1\) \(\text{cxd5}\) 16.\(\text{cxd5}\) \(\text{h}6\) 17.\(\text{d}e6\) \(\text{x}e6\) 18.\(\text{x}e6\) \(\text{w}c8\) 19.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{d}5\) 20.\(\text{a}3\) Eingorn – Golubev, Ukraine 2001.

a) 12...\(\text{h}8\) 13.\(\text{d}e6!\) 14.\(\text{d}xe6\) \(\text{f}xe6\) 15.\(\text{f}xe6\) \(\text{c}6\) 16.\(\text{d}5\)

16...\(\text{d}xe4\)

Black is worse after: 16...\(\text{g}8\) 17.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{d}4\) 18.\(\text{e}7\) \(\text{c}7\) 19.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{d}x\text{d}5\) (or 19...\(\text{e}8\) 20.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{h}6\) 21.\(\text{e}7\) \(\text{f}xe7\) 22.\(\text{e}7\) \(\text{f}xe7\) 23.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{d}8\) 24.\(\text{c}3\) \(\text{d}3\) \(\text{c}xe2\) 22.\(\text{c}xe2\) \(\text{c}xe2\) 23.\(\text{f}xe2\) \(\text{d}8\) 24.\(\text{e}3\) van Wely.

17.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{d}f6\)

Or 17...\(\text{g}5\) 18.\(\text{x}g5\) \(\text{w}xg5\) 19.\(\text{e}7\) \(\text{f}xe7\) 20.\(\text{c}xe7\) \(\text{e}4\) 21.\(\text{f}x\text{e}4\) \(\text{f}xf3\) 22.\(\text{x}a8\) ±.

18.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{d}x\text{d}5\)

Or 18...\(\text{e}7\) 19.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 20.\(\text{x}b7\) \(\text{b}8\) 21.\(\text{d}5\) van Wely.

19.\(\text{bxc}6\) \(\text{b}6\)

It is unacceptable for Black to play: 19...\(\text{e}4\) 20.\(\text{cxb}7\) \(\text{b}8\) 21.
cxd5 exf3 22.gxf3 Λxa1 (or 22... Λe5 23.Λb1  만들어 24.Λxe5 dxe5
25.Λe3+—) 23.e7 �e8 24.exf8�
�xf8 25.�a4+--; as well as: 19...
Λc3 20.cxb7 �b8 21.�c2 e4 22.
Λxe4± van Wely.
20.cxb7 �b8 21.c5

21...e4 (Black is lost after: 21...
dxc5? 22.�xd8 �fxd8 23.e7 �e8
24.Λg5 h6 25.Λc6+-) 22.�xe4
dxc5 23.�xd8 �fxd8 24.Λg5
�e8 25.Λd1± van Wely – Rada-
bov, Khanty Mansyisk 2005.

b) 12...Λh5

13.c5 Λf4
About 13...Λh8 14.Λc4 Λf4
– see 13...Λf4.
14.Λc4 Λh8
In case of 14...a5, it is very
good for White to follow with

15.b5! (The line: 15.bxa5 Λxa5
16.cxd6 �xd6 17.�b3± provided
White with only a minimal advan-
tage in the game Goloshchapov –
Golubev, Ordzhonikidze 2001.)
15...h6 16.Λe6 Λxe6 (or 16...
Λxe6 17.dxe6 dxc5 18.�b3 Λh7
19.Λb2±) 17.dxe6 dxc5 18.�b3±.
14...fxe4!? Rezasade – Doehn,
Germany 2003, that is a rarely
played move, because Black usu-
ally tries to maintain the tension
in the centre. His idea becomes
evident in the following varia-
tion: 15.fxe4 Λh8 and there arises
a transposition to the main line,
except that Black has already ex-
changed on e4 and that is favour-
able for him if White has captured
with a pawn. For example: 16.Λe6
(Now, it is not good for White to
continue analogously to the game
of Bareev – 16.Λb1, because of:
16...Λexd5! 17.Λxd5 �xg5 18.
Λxf4? exf4 19.Λxc7 f3++; 18.
Λxf4 exf4 19.cxd6 Λg4 20.�d5
�xd5 21.Λxd5 cxd6 22.Λxb7 �ab8
23.Λd5 Λd4 24.Λfl, Zhu Chen –
Ye, Chine 2003, 24...Λc8= and
Black seizes the initiative; 16.g3
h6 17.Λe6 Λxe6 18.dxe6 Λc6
19.cxd6 cxd6 20.Λc3 Λd4 21.Λd4
exd4 22.Λe2 �g5∞) 16...Λxe6 17.
dxe6 and we have reached a fa-
vourable position for Black from
the variation: 14...Λh8 15.Λe6.

Therefore, in answer to 14...f6,
White should play 15.Λgx4 and
there might follow: 15...Λf5 16.g3
Λh5!? Black is provoking his op-
ponent, because his knight can go
back to f6, while the h3-square will be available to his pieces. (After: 16...\&h3 17.\&g2 \&d4 – the line 17...a5 18.b5! is in favour of White – 18.\&f1 a5 19.b5 b6 20.cxb6 exb6 21.\&a3 White is attacking Black’s key d6-pawn and he has a slight advantage.) Here, it is more reasonable for White to decline the pawn-sacrifice 17.\&e2 (The game is completely unclear after: 17.g4 \&f4!? 18.gxf5 gxf5 19.\&g3 \&h3 20.\&g2 \&h4\&\&a0; 17...\&d4 18.gxh5 \&xf3 19.\&h1 \&h4 20.\&e2 \&g4\&\&a0; 17.\&g5 \&d7!) 17...\&f6 18.\&g5 h6 19.\&xf6 \&xf6 20.\&d3 White is dominant over the e4-outpost and he can continue with his queenside offensive.

15.\&b1!

That strong move was first played by GM Bareev at the tournament in Wijk aan Zee in the year 2003. White’s previous attempts at obtaining the advantage were not so successful, for example: 15.\&e6 \&xe6 16.dxe6 fxe4 17.fxe4 \&e6 18.\&e3 \&d4 (Black’s position is not worse at all.) 19.g3 \&fxe6 20.\&xe6 \&xe6 21.cxd6 cxd6 22.\&b5 a6 23.\&xd6 \&d4 24.\&xd4 exd4 25.\&xb7 \&b6 26.\&c5 d3\&\&b Nakamura – Al Modiahki, Bermuda 2003

15...a6

15...\&xd5? That is a futile try to solve Black’s problems in a tactical fashion: 16.\&xd5 \&xg5 17.\&xf4! exf4 18.\&xc7 fx4 (or 18...\&b8 19.cxd6 fx4, van Wely – Mutschnik, Kuppenheim 2005, 20.\&xe4 \&f5 21.\&e6 –) 19.\&xa8 \&h3 20.\&e2 \&xa8 21.cxd6 – White repels the enemy attack remaining with extra material.

15...fxe4 16.\&xe4 (About 16. fx4 17.\&xd5! – see 14...fxe4 15. fx4.) 16...\&f5 17.g3 \&h3 18.\&g2 \&d4 19.\&f1 g5?! (It is better for Black, but still not enough for equality to follow with: 19...a5 20.\&e2 axb4 21.\&xd4 exd4 22. cxd6 cxd6 23.\&xb4 20.\&xe2 \&xe2 (or 20...\&f5 21.\&d3! \&d7 22.cxd6 cxd6 23.g4 \&xg4 24.\&xd4 \&f4 25.\&xf4 \&h3 26.\&h1 \&xf1 27. \&xf1; 23...\&xe4 24.\&xe4 \&xe2 25.\&xe2) 21.\&xe2 \&g8 22.c6! b6 23.\&a6 Gyimesi – Brustman, Cappelle la Grande 2004.

15...\&xc5 – Black should capture like that in order to attack his opponent’s d5-pawn. 16.bxc5 \&xc5 17.\&xd5 (It deserves a serious attention for White to continue here with 17.h4?! and Black can choose between different possibilities in that variation, but White’s pieces seem to be dominant in all the lines: 17...\&e7 18.\&xd5 \&xc5 19.\&e3 h6 20.\&f7 \&h7 21.exf5; 17...h6 18.\&xd5 hgx5 19.exf5
\( \text{16.} \text{h1} \text{ h6 17.} \text{e6} \text{ dxe6} \)

Or 17...\text{xe6} 18.dxe6 fxe4 19.fxe4 \text{c6}, Liang – Ye, Xiapu 2005, 20.g3!? (White should do his best to preserve his e6-pawn.) 20...\text{h3} 21.\text{e3} \text{f2} (or 21...\text{d4} 22.\text{g4} \text{f2} 23.\text{xf2} \text{xf2} 24.\text{d5} \text{f3} 25.\text{e2}+; 24...\text{e6} 25.\text{e7} \text{e8} 26.\text{c7} \text{xe7} 27.\text{xa8}+; 24...\text{dxc5} 25.bxc5 \text{c8} 26.\text{e7} \text{e8} 27.\text{xe6} \text{h7} 28.\text{h4} \text{h5} 29.\text{h3}+! 20.f2 \text{xf2} 22.\text{xf2} 23.\text{d5} a5 24.\text{g1} \text{xf8} 25.\text{d5} \text{e7} (or 25...\text{d4} 26.e7) 26.\text{b6} \text{xd5} 27.\text{xd5}+.

**18.dxe6 c6**

After: 18...\text{e6} 19.\text{b3}! \text{c6}, it is not clear how Black can counter the developing move – 20.\text{e3}!? (White obtains only a slight edge after: 20.\text{d4} \text{f8} 21.\text{c3} \text{fxe4} 22.\text{fxe4} \text{c6} 23.\text{xc7} \text{e4} 24.\text{xa8} \text{xa2} 25.\text{b2} \text{Bareev.}) White improves his position and Black cannot cope with his opponent’s e6-pawn without material losses: 20...\text{f4} 21.\text{g1} \text{g5} (21...\text{d4} 22.\text{xd4} \text{exd4} 23.\text{d5}+! 22.\text{bc1} \text{g6} 23.\text{xd6} \text{cxd6} 24.\text{d5} \text{xe6} 25.\text{xf4}+.

**19.b5**

GM Bareev recommends in his comments the line: 19.\text{exf5} \text{gxf5} 20.b5 \text{d4} 21.bxa6 \text{bxa6} 22.\text{e7} \text{xe7} 23.\text{xd4} \text{xd4} 24.\text{xe7} \text{dxc3} 25.\text{d5} \text{f6} 26.\text{e2} (26.\text{xc7} \text{e8} 27.\text{hxh6} \text{b8} 28.\text{c1} \text{dxc5} 29.\text{e7} 27.\text{hxh6} \text{d8} 28.\text{c6}+! evaluating the position in favour of White, but after: 28...\text{h7} 29.\text{f4} (or 29.\text{e3} \text{e8} ) 29...\text{a5} the position is quite unclear, because
Black’s pawn on c3 is very powerful.

19...\textit{d}d4

Or 19...axb5 20.\textit{d}xb5 dxc5 21. \textit{w}xd8 \textit{w}xd8 22.\textit{a}xc7 \textit{e}a7 23.\textit{d}c3±.

20.bxa6 bxa6 21.\textit{a}a3 \textit{e}e8

Black is worse after his other defensive lines: 21...\textit{f}xe4 22.cxd6 cxd6 23.\textit{d}xe4±; 21...\textit{d}xe6 22.\textit{d}xe6 \textit{d}xe6 23.cxd6±; 21...\textit{d}xc5 22.\textit{d}xc5 \textit{e}e8 23.e7±.

22.\textit{d}d5 c6

22...\textit{d}xe6 23.\textit{d}xa8 \textit{w}xa8 24. cxd6 cxd6 25.\textit{d}xd6 \textit{w}c6 26.\textit{b}b4±.

Black’s position is inferior after the recommended line: 22...\textit{e}a7 23.\textit{d}b8 \textit{d}xe6 24.\textit{d}xe6! \textit{d}xe6 25.\textit{w}b3 \textit{e}e8 (or 25...\textit{w}e8? 26.cxd6 cxd6 27.\textit{w}c4±) and here White can follow simply with: 26.cxd6! (or 26.\textit{d}f7 \textit{d}h7 27.exf5 gxf5 28.cxd6 \textit{d}d7= Bareev) 26...\textit{d}xd6 27.\textit{d}d5! It is a bit strange to award an exclamation mark to such a natural move, but White’s powerful centralized knight on d5 provides him with a great advantage. 27...\textit{w}h4 (Black does not have much to hope for after: 27...\textit{f}xe4 28.\textit{e}c1 \textit{f}f7 29.\textit{d}xc8 \textit{w}xc8 30.\textit{d}xc8 \textit{d}xc8 31.h4+--) 28.\textit{e}c1 \textit{h}7 (28...\textit{d}d7 29.\textit{d}xe8 \textit{d}xe8 30.\textit{w}b8+-) 29.exf5 gxf5 30.\textit{w}e3+- and Black loses material.

23.cxd6 \textit{d}xe6

Black’s position is too bad after: 23...cxd5 24.e7 \textit{w}a5 (or 24...\textit{w}d7 25.\textit{d}xd5 \textit{f}xe4 26.\textit{f}xe4 \textit{w}a7 27.\textit{e}c1 \textit{d}e6 28.\textit{d}c7+) 25.\textit{d}b4 \textit{w}b6 26.\textit{d}xd5 \textit{w}c6 27.\textit{e}c1±.

24.\textit{d}xe6 \textit{d}xe6 25.\textit{d}c5 \textit{b}b5

26.\textit{w}b3 \textit{w}e8

Or 26...\textit{w}d7 27.\textit{d}a4 \textit{f}f7 28. \textit{d}b6 \textit{d}d8 29.\textit{d}c4±.

27.\textit{w}e1± Bareev – Radjabov, Wijk aan Zee 2003.

c) 12...\textit{h}6

Black is just forcing White’s knight to occupy the e6-square.

13.\textit{d}e6 \textit{d}xe6 14.\textit{d}xe6

14...\textit{c}6

Black cannot capture the e6-pawn with the move 14...\textit{w}c8, because of: 15.\textit{d}d5 \textit{d}fxd5 16.\textit{c}xd5. He has tried some other moves too, but not so successfully:

14...\textit{d}c6, Cmilyte – Thi An, Paris 1995, 15.exf5?? gxf5 16.\textit{d}d5 \textit{w}e8 17.e7 \textit{d}xe7 18.\textit{d}xf6 \textit{w}xf6 19.\textit{d}xh6±;

14...\textit{f}4 15.c5 d5 (or 15...\textit{d}xc5

14...e8 15.b5 fxe4 (Things are not changed in principle if Black leaves the pawns on the board: 15...h7, Ruememele – Bross, ICCF 2001, 16.b3 c8 17.c5! and later White can play like in the game of Notkin.) 16.fxe4 h7, Notkin – Nevednichy, Bucharest 1997, 17.b3!? c8 18.c5! dxc5 19.e3 b6 20. b1 b7 21.f2 g5 (or 21...ed8 22.g3 h5 23.xh5 gxh5 24.ed7 g6 25.f1+ 22.d5 edx5 23.exd5 e4 24.h3+;

14...h8 15.e3 c8 (or 15... eg8 16.b3 d8 17.c5 f6 18.ad1 g5 19.f2 h4 20.g3+ Kopasov – Skrjabin, St Petersburg 2003) 16.d5 eg8, Gokhale – Myo, Kuala Lumpur 1993, 17.c5! dxc5 18.bxc5 fxe4 19.fxe4 c6 20.bxf6 xf6 21.w3+.

15.e3! c7

Black plans to capture the e6-pawn, having protected his d6-pawn with his rook.

Instead of c7, he had plenty of other possibilities too, for example:

15...f4 16.f2 g5 17.b3 (or

17.c1! e8 18.e2 c8 19.c5+) 17...w8 18.c5 d5 19.exd5 cxd5 20.b5 c8 21.ad1 a6 22.d6 wxe6 23.cxb7+ Ra7 – Oertel, Cologne 2004;

15...e8 – That is a futile try to capture the e6-pawn. 16.wb3 c7 (About 16...h7 17.ad1 c7 18.c5 – see 16...c7; 16...h8 17.ad1 c7 18.c5 d5 19.exd5 cxd5 20.bxd5 c5 21.ac4 c7 22.ad5 c5 23.cxh5 24.h6 f6 25.g5! bxc6 26.c6 c6 27.ad7 ef6 28.ac1 c8 29.xh6+ Flurbort – Nikolic, Heraklio 2002; 17...f6 18.c5 c8 19.exd6 cxd6 20.f4 Kopasov – Serov, St Petersburg 2003.) 17.ad1 h7 18.c5 d5 19.exd5 c5 20.bxd5 cxd5 21.c4 c7 22.ad5 c5 23.b7+ Veingold – Candela, Burgos 2001;

15...h8 16.wd2 f4 (Black should not open the position, since after: 16...fxe4 17.fxe4 d5 18.exd5 cxd5 19.cxd5 cxd5 20.a4 21.wxd5 cxd5 22.c5 f6 23.c4+ White’s bishop-pair is tremendously powerful.) 17.f2 18.b5 g5 19.ed1 ed8 20.ac1 eg8 21.bxc6 bxc6 22.c2 ef7 23.a4 edc8 24.c5+ Veingold – Skrjabin, Helsinki 2003;

15...h7 (Black protects his h6-pawn just in case.) 16.ac1 e8 17.wb3 ef6 (or 17...c7 18.c5 d5 19.exd5 cxd5, Chessy – Hertel, Internet 2001, 20.ed1 ed7 21.ad5 cxd5 22.c4 wxd6 23.c5 cxd5 24.xd5 25.h5+; 22... ed3 23.xe3 ed8 24.a4 f6 279
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d5 19.exd5 cxd5 20.\(\text{c}d1\) d4 (or 20...\(\text{c}7\) 21.\(\text{c}d5\) \(\text{c}xd5\) 22.\(\text{c}c4\) \(\text{xe}6\) 23.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 24.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{e}8\) 25.\(\text{d}ed\) 21.f4! (White thus destroys Black’s centre.) 21...\(\text{e}c8\) 22.\(\text{fxe}5\) \(\text{xe}6\) 23.\(\text{c}xd4\) \(\text{c}6\) 24.\(\text{f}f2\) \(\text{xe}5\) 25.\(\text{d}5\pm\) and White has the two bishop-advantage and powerful centralized pieces, Bosboom – Pedzich, Loewenstein 1997; 15...d5? Black fails to break through in the centre with that move as well: 16.\(\text{ex}d5\) \(\text{c}xd5\) 17.\(\text{c}d5\) \(\text{f}x\) 15...\(\text{d}e5\)? 18.\(\text{f}b3\) \(\text{e}7\) 18...\(\text{f}h7\) 19.\(\text{ad}1\) \(\text{b}8\) 20.\(\text{c}5\) \(\text{e}8\) 21.\(\text{b}5\) -- and White had a winning position in the game Picasso – Blanco, Malaga 2003.) 18.\(\text{c}xd5\) \(\text{xd}5\) (18...\(\text{d}x\) 19.\(\text{b}3\) --) 19.\(\text{c}c1\) \(\text{fd}8\) 20.\(\text{c}4\).

16.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{fd}8\)

17.b5 \(\text{c}8\) 18.\(\text{b}x\) 19.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{h}7\)

Black removes his king in advance from the dangerous diagonal.

20.\(\text{d}1\)

It deserves attention for White to play 20.\(\text{ex}f5\), in order to activate his light-squared bishop. 20...\(\text{g}x\) (or 20...\(\text{xf}5\) 21.\(\text{f}2\)

25.\(\text{xd}5!\)

There were quite interesting developments in the game Komljenovic – A.Kuzmin, Benasque 1999: 25.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{ec}7\) 26.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) (It is stronger for Black to play here: 26...\(\text{x}a6!\) 27.\(\text{f}6\) \(\text{xf}6\) 28.\(\text{xd}7\) and it only seems that he is worse; nevertheless White’s beautiful idea has a refutation: 28...f4! 29.\(\text{f}2\) \(\text{b}8\) 30.\(\text{x}g7\) \(\text{x}g7\) 31.\(\text{x}g7\) \(\text{x}g7\) 32.\(\text{xa}6\) \(\text{b}1\) 33.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{a}4\) 27.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 28.\(\text{xd}5\) \(\text{xd}5\) 29.\(\text{f}g7\) \(\text{x}g7\) 30.\(\text{b}7\) \(\text{f}6\) 31.\(\text{xa}8\))

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\[9.b4 \, d5 \, 10.e1 \, f5 \, 11.g5 \, f6 \, 12.f3\]

\[\mathcal{W}d1 \, 32.\mathcal{W}f2 \, c2\] and here White could not believe that he could run away from the checks and the game ended in a draw. 33.\mathcal{W}e1 – that is the right attempt to play for a win: 33...\mathcal{W}b1 34.\mathcal{W}e2 \, x\mathcal{W}a2 (or 34...\mathcal{W}b5 35.\mathcal{W}d2 \, \mathcal{W}b2 36.\mathcal{W}d1 \, \mathcal{W}b1 37.\mathcal{W}c1 \, d3 38.\mathcal{W}e1 \, c3 39.\mathcal{W}d2\pm) 35.\mathcal{W}d2 \, c4 36.\mathcal{W}e1 \, \mathcal{W}xc5 37.\mathcal{W}d8\pm and White maintains winning chances.

25...\mathcal{E}xd5 26.\mathcal{E}xd5 \, \mathcal{E}xd5 27.\mathcal{E}c4 \, d1 28.\mathcal{E}f1 \, d5. Otherwise Black loses his c6-pawn. 29.\mathcal{E}e7\pm White paralyzes Black's knight on e7 and he preserves a slight advantage.

\[d) \, 12...c6\]

13.\mathcal{W}e3

The alternative for White here is - 13.\mathcal{W}h1.

13...\mathcal{W}h6!

About 13...h6 14.\mathcal{W}e6 \, x\mathcal{W}e6 15.dxe6 – see variation c.

The other moves for Black are not any better:

13...cxd5 14.cxd5 fxe4 15.fxe4 \, h8, Khegai – Tamin, Jababeka 2005, 16.f1!? (\, \mathcal{W}e1-h4) 16...h6 17.\mathcal{W}e6 \, x\mathcal{W}e6 18.dxe6\pm;

13...\mathcal{W}e8? That move takes the knight to an unfavourable passive square and White exploits that immediately. 14.c5! \, cxd5 (14...h6 15.cxd6 \, x\mathcal{W}d6 16.\mathcal{W}e6 \, x\mathcal{W}e6 17.\, dxe6\pm; 14...f4 15.\mathcal{W}f2 \, cxd5 16.\, cxd5 \, x\mathcal{W}g5 17.cxc6 \, bxc6 18.\mathcal{W}e4 \, d8 19.cxd6\pm; 15...cxd5 16.exd5 \, f5 17.\mathcal{W}e6\pm; 14...dxc5 15.dxc6! \, \mathcal{E}xd1 16.\mathcal{E}axd1 \, cxb4 17.\mathcal{E}c4\pm) 15.\, exd5! \, c4 16.cxd6! \, x\mathcal{W}d6 (16...\mathcal{W}xd6 17.\, \mathcal{W}b5 \, \mathcal{W}xd5 18.\mathcal{W}xd5 \, \mathcal{E}xd5 19.\mathcal{E}c4 \, \mathcal{W}e6 20.fxe4 \, fxe4 21.\, \mathcal{W}ad1+--; 16...\, \mathcal{E}xc3 17.cxc7 \, \mathcal{W}xe7 18.d6 \, g7 19.\mathcal{W}c1 \, \mathcal{E}xe1 (19...\, \mathcal{W}e5 20.\, \mathcal{W}xc8 \, bxc8 21.\, \mathcal{W}d5 \, \mathcal{W}h8 22.\, \mathcal{W}e6+-) 20.\, \mathcal{W}d4 \, \mathcal{W}f6 21.\, \mathcal{W}xe1 \, h6 22.\mathcal{W}c7 \, \mathcal{W}d7 23.\mathcal{W}c4 \, \mathcal{W}h8 24.\, \mathcal{W}e6+-) 17.\, \mathcal{W}d4 \, h6 18.\, \mathcal{W}xg7 \, \mathcal{W}xg7 19.\, \mathcal{W}d4 \, \mathcal{W}g8 20.\, \mathcal{W}e6 \, \mathcal{W}xe6 21.\, dxe6\pm G.Timoshenko – Motylev, Ohrid 2001;

About 13...f4 14.\mathcal{W}f2 \, \mathcal{W}e8 15.c5 – see 13...\mathcal{W}e8 14.c5 f4 15.\mathcal{W}f2.

14.h4

After: 14.c5 f4 (or 14...cxd5 15.cxd6 \, \mathcal{W}xd6 16.\mathcal{W}b3 fxe4 17.\mathcal{W}c5 \, d8 18.\mathcal{W}xe4 \, \mathcal{W}e6 19.\, \mathcal{W}ad1 \, \mathcal{W}xe4 20.fxe4 \, \, b6 21.\, \mathcal{W}xe7 \, \mathcal{W}xe7 22.exd5 \, \mathcal{W}f7 23.\mathcal{W}f4\pm White has an interesting possibility at his disposal
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- 15...\textit{\textit{f}b3}!?, but it is hardly sufficient to obtain the advantage. (In the game Bareev – Balcerak, Germany 2001, White tried the line: 15...cxd6 fxe3 16.dxc6 \textit{\textit{e}e7} 17.d6 \textit{\textit{d}d8} 18...\textit{c}c4 \textit{\textit{f}g7} 19...\textit{e}e6 \textit{\textit{e}e6} 20...\textit{e}e6 \textit{\textit{w}b6} 21...\textit{d}d2 \textit{\textit{a}d8} 22...\textit{w}d3 \textit{\textit{w}xb4} 23...\textit{c}c6d1 \textit{\textit{c}c6} 24.d7 \textit{\textit{d}f6} 25...\textit{d}d1b1 \textit{\textit{c}c7} 26...\textit{c}c4 \textit{\textit{d}b8\textit{=}} and it led to a rather unclear position.) 15...\textit{\textit{h}h8}! That is the most precise reaction for Black. (After: 15...cxd5?! 16.exd5 \textit{\textit{b}5g5} 17.dxc6 d5 18.cxb7 \textit{\textit{b}xb7} 19...\textit{f}f2 \textit{\textit{g}g7} 20...\textit{f}f1=, or: 15...\textit{d}d5?! 16.cxd6 \textit{\textit{x}e}eg5 17...\textit{c}c5 White’s prospects are better, but it is quite possible for Black to follow with: 15...\textit{f}e6!? 16.dxc6 and here – 16...\textit{d}d5!, for example: 17.c7 \textit{\textit{w}e}8 18...h4 \textit{\textit{w}h8\textit{=}}, or: 17.cxb7 \textit{\textit{b}xb7} 18...\textit{e}e6 \textit{\textit{w}d7}! 19...\textit{xf}8 \textit{\textit{xf}8} 20.exd5 \textit{\textit{x}d}d5 21.cxd5 \textit{\textit{e}e}xd5 22...\textit{d}d1 \textit{\textit{d}d8} 23...\textit{c}c4 \textit{\textit{w}e}6! 24.b5 e4=) 16.cxd6 fxe3 17.dxe7 \textit{\textit{w}xe7} 18.d6 \textit{\textit{w}d}7 19...h4 \textit{\textit{e}e8\textit{=}}. Meanwhile, that variation needs an extensive practical testing in order to be evaluated correctly.

14...cxd5

It is worse for Black to play: 14...\textit{f}f4 15...\textit{f}f2 \textit{\textit{b}5g5} 16.hxg5 \textit{\textit{b}5h5} 17...\textit{c}c5\textit{=}+, because White opens the game quite favourably, Polak – Rajlich, Paks 2001.

14...fxe4 15.fxe4 cxd5 (After 15...a5 16.b5 c5 – Black closes the queenside, but White is much stronger on the kingside. 17...\textit{d}d1 \textit{\textit{d}d7}18...\textit{w}d3 b6 19...\textit{d}d2 \textit{\textit{g}g7} 20...\textit{c}c6 \textit{\textit{e}e6} 21.dxe6\textit{=} Sobirey – Coclet, IECG 2002; 15...cxd5 16.exd5 \textit{\textit{x}g5} 17.dxc6 d5 18.cxb7 \textit{\textit{b}xb7} 19...\textit{f}f2 \textit{\textit{g}g7} 20...\textit{f}f1=) 16.d5 \textit{\textit{b}5g5} 17...\textit{f}f1 \textit{\textit{c}c8} 18...\textit{w}d3 (or 18...\textit{c}c1? a5 19.a3) 18...a5 19.a3 \textit{\textit{b}5g5} 20.hxg5 \textit{\textit{c}c3} 21...\textit{w}xc3 \textit{\textit{c}c4} 22...\textit{w}xf8 \textit{\textit{c}c4} 23...\textit{d}d4 Black has sacrificed some material, but his compensation is insufficient, Perez – Marcinkiewicz, ICCF 2001.

15.cxd5

The move 15.exd5!? has been tested only very seldom, but still White should better not play like that. 15...\textit{f}4 (The line: 15...\textit{h}5 16.c5 f4 17...\textit{f}f2 \textit{\textit{x}g5} 18.hxg5 transposes to the game.) 16...\textit{f}f2 \textit{\textit{b}5g5} (In case of: 16...a5 17...\textit{w}b3 \textit{\textit{b}5f5} 18.c5 axb4 19...\textit{w}xb4 \textit{\textit{b}5a5} 20...\textit{w}xa5 \textit{\textit{c}c5} 21.cxd6 \textit{\textit{c}c6} 22...\textit{b}6=; 16...\textit{f}f1?! – Black might refrain from exchanging his bishop on h6 for White’s knight, so that he can attack the h4-pawn later. 17...\textit{d}e6 \textit{\textit{c}c5} 18.dxe6 \textit{\textit{d}d3} 19...\textit{w}b3 \textit{\textit{c}c7} 20...\textit{d}d5 \textit{\textit{f}xd5} 21.cxd5 \textit{\textit{f}f5=}; 17.c5 \textit{\textit{h}h5?!} 18...\textit{d}d6? 19...\textit{f}e6 19...\textit{d}xe6 \textit{\textit{h}g3=} 18...\textit{d}e4 18...\textit{d}f3 17...\textit{d}h5 18.c5 \textit{\textit{f}f5} 19...\textit{f}e4 \textit{\textit{d}g3}, Bosboom – Nijboer, Hoogeveen 1997 (or 19...\textit{d}h3 20...\textit{c}g3 \textit{\textit{f}xg3} 21...\textit{w}d2 a5 22...\textit{d}e1 axb4 23...\textit{d}xb4\textit{=}) and here White should not play 20...\textit{d}xg3!+, because of 20...\textit{f}xg3! and Black has dangerous checkmatk threats with his pawn on g3 (White has good chances to obtain the advantage in the line: 20...\textit{\textit{d}d}d3? 21...\textit{c}c6 \textit{\textit{c}c5} 22...\textit{c}c4\textit{=}) 21...\textit{d}d3 (or 21...c4 \textit{\textit{d}f4} 22...\textit{d}a4 \textit{\textit{f}f5;...
21.\textbf{xf1} \textbf{xf5} 22.\textit{cxd6} \textit{xe4} 23.\textit{xe4} \textit{wxg5+}; 21.\textit{xc1} \textit{xf4} 22.\textbf{xf1} \textbf{xf5} 23.\textit{dxc3} \textit{wxg5} 24.\textit{fxf5} \textit{fxf5} 25.\textit{c6} \textit{bxc6} 26.\textit{dxc6} \textit{wg3} 27.\textit{wxd6} \textit{wh5+}; 22.\textit{cxd6} \textbf{xf5} 23.\textit{dxc3} \textit{wxg5} 24.\textbf{xf2} \textit{e4+}) 21...\textit{xf4} 22.\textbf{xb5} \textbf{xf5} – and Black has a powerful initiative.

\textbf{15...\textit{d7} 16.\textit{xc1} a6}

Black has tried to equalize with: 16...a5 17.\textit{b5} \textit{h5} 18.\textit{d4} \textit{fxe4} 19.\textit{fxe4} \textit{g3}, Rupsys – Diaz, ICCF 2002, 20.\textbf{b6}!?, but his compensation is insufficient after: 20...\textbf{e4} (20...\textbf{b8} 21.\textit{d3} \textit{e2} 22.\textit{exe2} \textit{e5} 23.\textit{hxg5} \textit{dc8} 24.\textbf{fxd7} \textit{fxd7} 25.\textit{b6}+) 21.\textbf{xa8} \textit{xa8} 22.\textbf{f3} \textbf{g3} 23.\textbf{f2} \textit{e5f} 24.\textbf{g4} \textit{d8} 25.\textit{a4}.

\textbf{17.\textit{b5} \textbf{xb5}!}

Following: 17...\textit{f4} 18.\textit{f2} \textit{e5} 19.\textit{hxg5} \textit{h5} 20.\textit{b3}! a5 (or 20...\textit{c8}?) 21.\textit{bxa6} \textit{bxa6} 22.\textit{b7}+ 21.\textit{b6} \textit{c8} 22.\textit{b5} White had an overwhelming advantage in the game S.Ivanov – Rudolf, Panorama 2001.

Black's position is inferior after the total exchanges: 17...\textit{f4} 18.\textit{f4} \textit{axb5} 19.\textit{b3} \textit{e5} (or 19...\textit{c8} 20.\textit{b4}!?) \textit{g4} 21.\textit{e4} \textit{e4} 22.\textit{xb5}+ 20.\textit{hxg5} \textit{g4} 21.\textit{hxg4} \textit{e4} 22.\textit{xb5}+. It is worse for Black to defend with: 19...\textbf{c8} 20.\textit{f1} \textit{a7} (or 20...\textit{a5} 21.\textit{xb5}! \textit{e5} 22.\textit{hxg5} \textit{xb5} 23.\textit{fxe6}+; 21...\textit{axb5} 22.\textit{xb5} \textit{xa2} 23.\textit{xa2} \textit{fxe6} 24.\textit{fxe6} 25.\textit{bxc8} \textit{e8} 26.\textit{c3}+) 21.\textit{a4} \textit{a5} 22.\textit{axb5} \textit{d8} 23.\textit{wh2} \textit{e7} 24.\textit{a1} \textit{d8} 25.\textit{xa8} \textit{xa8} 26.\textit{b6} \textit{c8} 27.\textit{c1}+ Mooij


\textbf{18.\textit{xb5}!}

That is the only move for White to fight for the advantage: 18.\textit{xb5} axb5 19.\textit{xb5} (or 19.\textit{b3} \textit{f4} 20.\textit{e4} \textit{e5} 21.\textit{hxg5} \textit{e4}+; 19.\textit{d3} \textit{xa2} 20.\textit{e6} \textit{e3} 21.\textit{xe3} \textit{a5} 22.\textit{fxe8} \textit{gxf8} 22.\textit{b3} \textit{e5} 24.\textit{e1} \textit{d4} 25.\textit{b4} \textit{f5} (25...\textit{xe3}?!)) 26.\textit{b3}+.

\textbf{18...\textit{axb5} 19.\textit{xb5}}

White is not better after: 19.\textit{xb3} \textit{f4} 20.\textit{e4} \textit{g4} 21.\textit{b5} \textit{d3} 22.\textit{bxe3} \textit{d1} 23.\textit{g3} \textit{e5} 24.\textit{hxg5} \textit{f7}+.

\textbf{19...\textit{f4} 20.\textit{f4} \textit{e5} 21.\textit{hxg5} \textit{e4} 22.\textit{d7} \textit{f5}}

White maintains a slight edge after Black's other possibilities too:

22.\textit{xc8} 23.\textit{f6} \textit{xc1} 24.\textit{xc1} \textit{xb6} 25.\textit{e3} \textit{e4} 26.\textit{g8} \textit{xf8} 27.\textit{e2} \textit{e8} 28.\textit{f1} \textit{d5} 29.\textit{g8} \textit{d7} 30.\textit{h2}+;

22.\textit{xa8} 23.\textit{b3} \textit{a1} 24.\textit{f6} \textit{xc1} 25.\textit{xe1} \textit{a5} 26.\textit{g8} \textit{f8} 27.\textit{axb7} \textit{d5} 28.\textit{f1} \textit{e8} 29.\textit{b8} \textit{d7} 30.\textit{b2} \textit{d3} (Black is lost
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after: 30...\(\text{Qf5?} \quad 31.\text{xa1} \quad \text{xe3} \quad 32.\text{xa7+}\) 31.\text{f3} \quad \text{e6} \quad 32.\text{f8±.}

23.\text{xa8} \quad 24.\text{xd3} \quad 25.\text{eg3} 
26.\text{xe3} \quad 27.\text{b6} \quad 28.\text{xf2} \quad 29.\text{xf2} \quad 30.\text{g1} \quad 31.\text{e2} \quad (or 30...\text{xd5} \quad 31.\text{d8} \quad 32.\text{f6} \quad 33.\text{a1+}) 31.\text{h2} \quad 32.\text{d8} \quad 33.\text{d7} \quad 34.\text{c8} \quad 35.\text{xb7} \quad 36.\text{f8} \quad 37.\text{g4± Black's king is rather unsafe, so White's prospects are slightly better.}

Conclusion

The variation, we have analyzed in this chapter, is the most principled argument for Black against the system with 9.b4. He has practically a quite rich counterplay in all the variations and White often has to sacrifice material in his fight to obtain the advantage. The arising positions are very complicated and they must often be evaluated just intuitively. You must rely on your own experience and on the exact calculation of variations.
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