Opening for White According to Kramnik

Alexander Khalifman
Opening for White According to
Kramnik 1.\textit{f}3

Book I a

Old Indian Defence
Anti-Gruenfeld Variation
King's Indian Defence

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Concept of the Series

You are holding in your hands book one of the series “Opening for White According to Kramnik – 1.Ðf3”.

It is not exactly a book about openings, at least not in the generally accepted fashion. It is not about the move 1.Ðf3 and not about the Reti opening at all. This book is about how to solve your problems in the opening once and for all with the help of Vladimir Kramnik (who is a friend of mine and a co-author behind the scene...) under my supervision.

The idea to write that book came to my mind a long time ago. Chess players have always had the problem of a choice of openings and that is even more important in contemporary competitive chess. It is not a secret anymore that presently plenty of games are won thanks to the superior preparation of one of the players and mostly due to the correct choice of an opening. How to do that? How should one choose, what is appropriate for him, amidst an ocean of opening schemes, plans and variations?

One of the ways of solving that problem is to choose one of the leading contemporary grandmasters, whose style of playing suits you and whose successes you admire as the ideal model and to build up your opening repertoire based on his preference. There are some difficulties here, though... At first, it is who to choose as a pattern to imitate and secondly how to start playing the opening like your model? Naturally, you can select his games from the database and you can try to study them. Still, that is far from simple too. Your future opponent might be completely ignorant about the newest theoretical discoveries, played at the top level, and he might try at any moment some mediocre move, avoiding theory. Then, you will have to find yourself what to do next, what plan to follow and how to obtain the advantage.

Grandmasters do not just play certain openings. Their opening repertoire is the product of an entire concept. To put it in another way, every grandmaster uses a certain number of schemes that he knows well and he likes to play and he strives to follow them reaching his well familiar positions. (For example, whoever likes to play
with Black the Queen’s Gambit usually attempts to reach the typical lines of that opening after 1.c4 as well as after 1.Qf3.). Finally, every grandmaster has spent hundreds of hours on building his opening repertoire and he is ready to counter all possible surprises.

I suggest that you saved plenty of time and effort and I am ready to solve your opening problems for you when you play White. We will learn how to play openings “according to Kramnik”. There is a catch here though... Kramnik’s opponents are usually grandmasters and it would not come to their minds to make a very bad move, while your adversaries might easily do that and you will have then to react correctly yourselves. You will find the right solution of that problem in this book! In fact, this is a book about players who would like to play the opening like Kramnik, but whose opponents are expected to be slightly weaker than Anand and Topalov...

Whenever Kramnik begins his games with the move 1.Qf3, he does not intend to play the Reti opening at all. He simply wishes to obtain pleasant positions in case his adversary plans to choose the Queen’s Indian Defence, the Gruenfeld Defence or the Benoni Defence.

The player who wishes to study (or to improve) the right way of playing the move 1.Qf3 with White, should not necessarily be a specialist of the Queen’s Indian Defence and even less of the Gruenfeld Defence. After you have studied that book, you should always manage to enter well familiar positions (that is quite enjoyable...!) and you will feel comfortable if you know the standard strategical and tactical motives and ideas typical for that opening. You will also master how to obtain the advantage not only after Black’s theoretically correct play, but also whenever he plays inferior moves.

Meanwhile, it happens only very seldom that people who are below the level of a master play closed openings. They usually consider the positions arising after 1.d4, or 1.c4 as very dull... They prefer starting with 1.e4 and after 1...e5, they like to analyze some exciting openings like the King’s Gambit, the Evans Gambit etc...

Play 1.Qf3! and your inexperienced opponent might make a mistake right in the first several moves and then attack forcefully! Following my recommendations, even if your adversary plays the opening correctly, you will obtain positions with initiative and then it all depends on you. It is all in your head.
Dear readers,

We will analyze in the first part of our book the variations after: 1.\(\text{\&}f3\) \(\text{\&}f6\) 2.\(c4\) d6 3.d4 (The adherents to the first move with the queen's pawn should notice that we are back to the classics!). Strangely enough, in the Russian chess literature there is still not an officially accepted name of that not so fresh opening system yet. It might be named "not quite King's Indian Defence", or "almost King's Indian Defence". The Western school recognizes it as the Old Indian.

The point is that in this part of the book we deal with variations, in which Black delays the development of his bishop to \(g7\), or he prepares it for another deployment altogether, for example after \(e7\)-\(e5\) and \(\text{\&}f8\)-\(e7\). In fact, these opening set-ups have long had the reputation of being solid, but with not so good prospects for Black. That is correct indeed, but White's task is far from simple, since he must choose between several promising lines. I hope that our book will help you solve that problem.

The second part of this book is in fact critical from the point of view of contemporary theory. It is devoted to a system, which has been named, not quite officially indeed, but still popularly – the "Anti-Gruenfeld". It is just one of the few "anti-systems", which we analyze in our series of books, so I would like to mention here again something about the general concept behind out multi-volume work "Opening for White According to Kramnik – 1.\(\text{\&}f3\)".

I recommend that you began your games with this knight-move, but that does not imply that you have to abandon the fight for the centre, or for the advantage in the opening. Actually, in the majority of cases, the game will soon transpose to lines that are quite typical for the players who usually start their games with the moves 1.d4 or 1.c4. However, there are some opening set-ups that we manage to avoid when we begin with the tricky development of the knight on move one. One of them is the Gruenfeld Defence and its present revival is mostly connected with the successes of Garry Kasparov.
Accordingly, after: 1.♘f3 ♘f6 2.c4 g6 3.♗c3, Black follows with
3...d5, emphasizing that he does not intend to play the King’s In-
dian Defence and he invites his opponent to enter the main lines
of the Gruenfeld Defence. There follows however, an unusual move
– 4.♕a4+!? and the Gruenfeld Defence is out of question and Black
is faced with difficult problems. The theory of that system is rela-
tively new and players should be ready to start playing on their own
as early as moves 7-8. I hope that I have managed to systematize in
this book the accumulated practical material and to indicate the best
prospects for White of obtaining the opening advantage. I believe
that his chances to end up in a better position in the “Anti-Gruen-
feld” are not worse at all than these in the main lines of that opening,
while there is a greater opportunity of showing creative endeavour
and imagination.

In the third part of this book, we begin to analyze the King’s In-
dian Defence. Its main and most fashionable variations are so com-
plex and strategically independent that we have decided to devote a
special volume to it (Book 1b). Still, some of the lines, which we deal
with in this volume, deserve serious attention too. The majority of
them are only seldom played in contemporary tournament practice,
but the effect of surprise often justifies their use. I hope that similar
surprises will more often bring you joy after you have studied our
book thoroughly.

August 2006
A.Khalifman, 14th World Chess Champion
Part 1

1.\textit{d}f3 \textit{d}f6 2.\textit{c}4 d6 3.\textit{d}4

This part of our book is devoted to the so-called "Indian" schemes. If we delve a bit in history, we will notice that similar schemes of development were tried from time to time even when the classical approach to the problems of the centre was clearly dominant. They became really popular at the beginning of the 20th century and their main exponents were the representatives of the "new wave" – hyper-modernists like: Nimzowitsch, Reti and Tartakower. It can be said that only then the variations, which we are here analyzing, became an integral part of the contemporary opening theory.

Academically speaking, these schemes are far from being perfect from the point of view of strategy and they are hardly appropriate to become anybody's main opening weapon; nevertheless the example of Vladimir Malanjuk indicates otherwise. He used to play the system classified as "A55", for a long time quite successfully. We will not try to enumerate all the players who have played these variations (and still play them...), but we will mention the names of – Capablanca, Em.Lasker, Bronstein, Larsen, T.Petrosian, Spassky, Tseshkovsky etc. The author of this book is not an exception either...

The popularity of these schemes is easy to explain – they all lead to a complicated, often non-standard positional fight abundant with numerous fine points. They are all quite attractive to the really creative players and also they seem to be a bit away from the focus of the intensively analyzed opening lines and therefore they are not so well studied yet. We hope that in the following four chapters we will manage to
deal with them thoroughly and we will succeed in eliminating the so-called "blank spots" in the opening theory.

In Chapter 1 we will analyze the system with $3...\text{\texttt{f}}\text{f}5$ – since after that move it suddenly becomes clear that White cannot push e2-e4 so easily. The move $3...\text{\texttt{g}}\text{g}4$ is an attempt by Black to solve the problem with the development of his light-squared bishop at a very early stage of the game and it will be dealt with in Chapter 2. Later, we will turn our attention to the system: $3...\text{\texttt{bd}}\text{d}7 \text{\texttt{4.c}}\text{c}3 \text{\texttt{c}}\text{c}6 \text{\texttt{5.e}}\text{e}4 \text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}5 \text{\texttt{6.e}}\text{e}2 \text{\texttt{e}}\text{e}7 \text{\texttt{7.0–0}}$.

In Chapter 3 we will study Black's numerous possibilities in that line.

And finally, as a "dessert" – we will see the contemporary treatment of the variation, which we analyze in Chapter 3 – $7...0–0 \text{\texttt{8.e}}\text{e}3 \text{\texttt{a}}\text{a}6$ (Chapter 4).
This is White's most straightforward line. Now, Black has to choose between three main possibilities: 3...\textit{f5} (This chapter deals with that particular move...), 3...\textit{g4} (Chapter 2) and 3...\textit{bd7} (Chapters 3-4).

Now, something in short about Black's other variations:

After 3...g6, 4.d\textit{c3} \textit{g7} 5.e4, the game transposes to lines of the King's Indian Defence;

The move 3...c6 is an essential part of practically all possible set-ups for Black, therefore after 4.d\textit{c3}; there arise transpositions to variations, which we will analyze later;

In case of 3...\textit{d7} 4.d\textit{c3}, Black has hardly anything better than to enter some not so favourable lines of the King's Indian Defence with: 4...g6 5.e4;

Or 3...\textit{a6} 4.d\textit{c3} c5, Meyer - Jacobsen, Denmark 1994 (about 4...\textit{f5} – see 3...\textit{f5}) 5.e4 \textit{g4} 6.\textit{e2}±;

3...b6 4.d\textit{c3} \textit{b7} 5.\textit{c2} \textit{bd7} 6.e4 e5 7.d5 a5 8.\textit{e2} \textit{e7} 9.0-0 0-0 10.\textit{b1±} Banikas - Aftsgou, Kavala 2001;

3...h6 4.d\textit{c3} a6 (About 4...\textit{f5} – see 3...\textit{f5}) 4...c6 5.e4 e6, Westergaard - Eriksson, Oerebro 1992, 6.\textit{d3}± 5.e4 \textit{g4}, Janic - D.Popovic, Belgrade 2003, 6.\textit{e2}±;

3...\textit{c6} 4.d\textit{c3} e5 5.d5 \textit{e7} 6.e4 \textit{g6} 7.g3 \textit{e7} 8.\textit{e2} h5. Black thus solves somehow the problems with his development, but now his king will not find a safe haven on the kingside. 9.h4 \textit{g4} 10.\textit{h2} \textit{xe2} 11.\textit{xe2} \textit{f8} 12.\textit{e3} \textit{d8} 13.0-0 0-c5 14.f3 a6 15.\textit{f2} \textit{a5} 16.\textit{e1±} C.Hansen - Oswald, Germany 1997;

3...c5 4.d\textit{c3} \textit{bd7} (The line: 4...\textit{xd4} 5.\textit{xd4} g6 6.g3, leads to positions, which will be analyzed in Book 2.) 5.e4 \textit{c7} 6.\textit{e2} e5, Guzman - Romano, Villa Battlester 2003, 7.dxe5 dxe5 8.0-0±.

3...\textit{f5}

Black is trying to impede in
that fashion the pawn-advance e2-e4.

4.\(\text{\textdagger}c3\)

Now, Black has two main alternatives: a) 4...\textbf{h6} and b) 4...\textbf{g6}.

His other possibilities are:

4...\textbf{c8} 5.g3, transposes to variations a or b;

4...\textbf{e4}. It is hardly advisable for Black to make a second move with the same piece at such an early stage of the game – White is evidently better prepared for the arising complications. 5.\textbf{wb3} (This is slightly simpler than 5.\textbf{wc2}, An.Kharitonov – Moehring, Sochi 1979.) 5...\textbf{c8} (or 5...\textbf{dx}c3 6.\textbf{xb}7 \textbf{e}4 7.d5\(\text{=}\)) 6.\textbf{h}4 \textbf{dx}c3 7.\textbf{xf}5 \textbf{e}4 8.\textbf{f}3\(\text{=}\); 4...\textbf{c}5 5.\textbf{dx}c5 \textbf{dx}c5 (In case of 5...\textbf{c}6, Holin – Ruff, France 2003, 6.\textbf{xd}x6, Black's compensation for the sacrificed material is obviously insufficient.) 6.\textbf{xd}x8+ \textbf{xd}x8 7.\textbf{e}5 \textbf{e}6 8.\textbf{f}4\(\text{=}\); 4...\textbf{a}6 5.\textbf{b}3 \textbf{b}8, Schulz – Netz, Dortmund 2001, 6.\textbf{g}5 \textbf{e}4 7.\textbf{xe}x \textbf{xe}x4 8.\textbf{d}x\textbf{g}6 9.e4 c5 10.d5 \textbf{a}5 11.\textbf{d}3 \textbf{b}4 12.\textbf{b}1\(\text{=}\); 4...\textbf{c}6 (After that move, it is again quite probable that there will be a transposition to lines that we will analyze later, for example to 3...\textbf{bd}7 and 3...\textbf{g}4.) 5.\textbf{h}4 \textbf{c}8 (Black can retreat with his bishop to some other squares too: 5...\textbf{d}7 6.e4 e5 7.\textbf{f}3 \textbf{c}7 8.\textbf{e}2 9.0-0 0-0 1.\textbf{g}3 \textbf{e}8 11.d5 \textbf{g}4 12.\textbf{e}1\(\text{=}\) Khenkin – Lenz, Baden-Baden 1990; or 5...\textbf{g}6 6.\textbf{g}x\textbf{g}6 hx\textbf{g}6 7.e4 e5 8.\textbf{e}2 9.\textbf{e}3 \textbf{bd}7 10.0-0 0-0 11.\textbf{h}1 \textbf{h}7 12.f4 \textbf{ex}d4 13.\textbf{xd}x4 g5 14.g3 \textbf{e}8 15.\textbf{bd}7 \textbf{xf}4 16.\textbf{xf}4 \textbf{h}8 17.\textbf{f}3\(\text{=}\) Sosonko – van der Wiel, Netherlands 1993; about 5...\textbf{g}4 6.h3 \textbf{h}5 7.g4 \textbf{g}6 8.g2 \textbf{bd}7 9.f4 – see 4...\textbf{bd}7.) 6.e4 e5 7.\textbf{f}3 \textbf{ex}d4 (After 7...\textbf{bd}7, or for example: 7...\textbf{g}4 8.\textbf{e}2 \textbf{c}7 9.\textbf{e}3 \textbf{e}7 10.0-0 0-0 11.d5 \textbf{bd}7, the game transposes to the variations with 3...\textbf{bd}7, or 3...\textbf{g}4 and we deal with them in our next chapters. Following: 7...\textbf{a}5 8.d2 \textbf{g}4, as it was played in the game Vranesic – D.Bronstein, Amsterdam 1964, White had better continue with 9.d5\(\text{=}\) 8.\textbf{xd}x4 \textbf{e}7 9.\textbf{e}2 0-0 10.0-0 \textbf{a}6, Veron – Gravier, Paris 2001, 11.f4 \textbf{c}5 12.\textbf{c}2 – and we will analyze similar positions in Chapter 3; 4...\textbf{e}6 5.\textbf{b}3 (It is also good enough here for White to play 5.g3\(\text{=}\) 5...b6 6.g3 \textbf{e}7 (Or 6...\textbf{bd}7 7.\textbf{g}2 \textbf{b}8 8.0-0 \textbf{e}7 9.\textbf{h}4 \textbf{g}4 10.h3 \textbf{h}5, Vekshenkov – Nesterenko, Tomsk 1998 11.\textbf{b}5 a6 12.\textbf{a}7\(\text{=}\) 7.\textbf{g}2 \textbf{bd}7 8.\textbf{h}4 \textbf{b}8 9.\textbf{xf}5 \textbf{xf}5, McIntosh – Rowell, Dunedin 1998, 10.\textbf{b}5+; 4...\textbf{c}6 5.d5 \textbf{e}5 (Black loses too many tempi in case of: 5...\textbf{b}8 6.d4 \textbf{g}6 7.g3 c5 8.d\textbf{xc}6 \textbf{xc}6 9.\textbf{g}2 \textbf{c}8 10.0-0 \textbf{wd}7, Mathonia – Xhelandini, Baden 2002 11.\textbf{b}3\(\text{=}\) 6.d\textbf{d}4 g6 7.\textbf{xf}5 \textbf{xf}5 8.\textbf{c}2 \textbf{d}7 9.e3 \textbf{g}7 10.f4 \textbf{g}6 11.
4...d3± Rashkovsky – D. Maric, Belgrade 1988;
5...d4 6.h3 d5 7.g4 d6 8.g2 c6 9.f4 e6 10.g5 d5 11.e4 dxe5 12.f5 d6 13.g1 d5 14.f3 exd5 15.b1 dxe4 16.d2 dxe4 17.xh5 d5 18.f1 and his compensation for the sacrificed piece was insufficient in the game Van der Sterren – Ligterink, Budel 1987; 5...e6 6.fxe5 dxex5 7.g3 g6 8.g2 b8 9.0–0 g7 10.e2 0–0 11.e1 e8 12.b4 Arlandi – Mantovani, Reggio Emilia 1991; 5...e4 6.f3 g6 7.e4 e5, Shchekachev – Kozlowski, L’Etang 2001, 8.xg6 hxg6 9...e3+ 6.g3 (White can also play 6.xg6 hxg6 7.g3.) 6...e5 (The line: 6...c6 7.g2 e5 only leads to transpositions of moves.) 7.g2 c6 (The other possibilities for Black are clearly worse: 7...exd4 8.xd4 c6 9.0–0 b6 10.d2 e7 11.b3 0–0, Michaelson – Moehring, Bad Wildbad 1993, 12.b2 followed by xg6 – and White maintains a stable advantage thanks to his powerful bishop pair; 7...b8 8.0–0 Lukov – Mladenov, Bankia 1992.) 8.0–0 e7 9.d5! (That is White’s most resolute reaction. Meanwhile, after: 9.xg6 hxg6 10.e3 0–0 11.b3 e8 12.b2 exd4 13.xd4 c5 14.fd1, his position is clearly better too, Johannesson – Thorvaldson, Reykjavik 1970.) 9...cxd5

(It is evidently more resilient for Black to defend here with 9...c5, but even then his position remains rather passive: 10.e4 d5, Prudnikova – M. Petrovic, Belgrade 1997, 11.f5 xf5 12.exf5 hxf5 13.h3 0–0 14.e3± 10.xg6 hxg6 11.xd5 xdx5 12.xd5 c7 13.e3± Schuh – Buchal, Germany 1988.)

a) 4...h6

Black avoids the exchange of his bishop with that move and he preserves the control over the b1–h7 diagonal.

5.g3

It is also interesting for White to try here 5.d5 (He is planning to continue with f3–d4 and that more or less forces Black to act actively in the centre.) 5...e5 6.dxe6 xex6 7.d4 d7 8.g3 c6 9.g2 g6, Gligoric – Ivkov, Palma de Mallorca 1970 and now it deserves attention for White to play 10.c5!? dxc5 (In case of 10...d5, he can follow with: 11.xd5 xxc5 12.db3.) 11.xc6 xxc6 12.xc6+ bxc6 13.wa4± Gligoric. Black’s queenside pawns are an excel-
lent target for White's pieces to attack.

5...c6

Black only creates additional weaknesses with the pseudo-active line: 5...g5 6.g2 c6 7.0-0 g7 8.e1 e5 9.d5 cxd5, Malich – Hausman, Tel Aviv 1964, 10.xd5.

The other possibilities for Black usually lead to a transposition, because he can hardly avoid playing the move c7-c6, for example: 5...bd7 6.g2 e5 7.h4 h7, Jauernig – Seebauer, Germany 1996, 8.xb7, or 7...e6 8.xb7 b8 9.g2 xc4 10.d5 – and White maintains the advantage in both cases.

6.g2 bd7

It is not good for Black to play 6...d5, Mutl – Svetlik, Svetla nad Sazavou 1999, in view of: 7.cxd5 cxd5 8.b3. It is not such a good idea for him to try: 6...c8 – because he loses too many tempi for the exchange of the light-squared bishops: 7.0-0 h3 8.e4 xg2 9.xg2 e6 10.e5 dxe5 11.dxe5 fd7 12.e4, Davidson – Kolle, Scheveningen 1923.

7.0-0 e5

After 7...c7, as it was played in the game Becker – Gruber, Vienna 1923, White's simplest line was 8.d5=. He obtains the advantage in an analogous fashion in case of: 7...e6 8.d5! cxd5 9.cxd5 e5 10.d2 b6 11.a4 a5 12.e4 d7 13.b3 e7 14.a3 0-0 15.e2 e8 16.b5= Hulak – Day, Toronto 1989.

8.h4

It is not so convincing for White if he opts for: 8.e1 e7 9.e4 h7 (It is worse for Black to defend with: 9...g4 10.h3 xf3 11.xf3 b6 12.d5=) 10.b3 0-0 11.b2 e8 12.d2 f8 13.h3 c7 14.ad1 a6 15.c1 xe6 16.f2 b5, with a rather complicated game, Zamansky – Pieterse, Groningen 1990.

8...h7 9.e4 e7

It is rather dubious for Black to try: 9...b6 10.d5 a6 11.b3 c5 12.e1= Andersson – Westernin, Stockholm 1970.

In case of: 9...exd4, then after: 10.xd4 e7 11.f5 xf5 12.exf5, there arises a position, which is analogous to the one that we analyze in the main line. Later, in the game Ulibin – Bielczyk, Berlin 1994, there followed: 12...0-0 13.f4 a5 14.a1 e8 15.b4 xf5 (After 14...xb4, White has the resource: 15.exf7 xf7 16. xd6=) 16.b5. White's bishops exert now a powerful pressure over Black's position. 16...e5 17.xe5 dxe5 18.e5 xd7. Black relies on the drawish tendencies, which are typical for the endgames with opposite coloured bishops, but White has a surprise up his sleeve: 19.xd7 xd7 20.xe7! xe7 21.bxc6 bxc6? (It is more resilient for Black here to defend with 21...e5, but White maintains his initiative even then: 22.cxb7 b8 23.d5=+. This move prevents Black's maneuver e6-
b6 and now he cannot capture his opponent’s b7-pawn, because of the pin.) 22.\textit{x}c6 \textit{d}d8 23.\textit{d}d1 \textit{f}f8 24.\textit{d}a4 \textit{g}g8 25.c5++. Black is now completely defenseless against the threat – \textit{b}5, followed by c5-c6.

\textbf{10.\textit{e}e3 0–0 11.\textit{d}f5 \textit{xf}5}

It is worse for Black to play 11...
\textit{e}e8, Ugarteburu – Ronda, Spain 1999, 12.\textit{d}xe7+ \textit{exe}7 13.d5\textpm.

\textbf{12.\textit{xf}5 \textit{ex}d4}

After 12...\textit{e}e8 13.h3 \textit{h}7, White had a stable advantage: 14.d5 c5
15.h4 \textit{d}6f6 16.\textit{f}3 e4 17.\textit{g}2 \textit{d}7
18.g4\textpm in the game Espig – Vorotnikov, Germany 1997.

\textbf{13.\textit{xd}4 \textit{a}5 14.\textit{c}2 \textit{f}e8}

Black loses a pawn in case of:
14...d5 15.cxd5 \textit{xd}5 16.\textit{d}xd5 cxd5 17.\textit{b}3 \textit{f}6
18.\textit{ad}1 \textit{xd}4 19.\textit{xd}4\textpm C.Ionescu – Nisipeanu, Bucharest 1994.

\textbf{15.\textit{ab}1 \textit{ad}8 16.\textit{b}4\textpm}


\textbf{b) 4...g6}

(diagram)

This system of development is popular enough and it is a part of the opening repertoire of Vitalij Tseshkovsky and Igor Glek. Black has temporarily prevented White from occupying additional space with e2-e4 and he transposes to King’s Indian set-ups. The drawback of that idea is that the b1-h7 diagonal has been shortened considerably (in comparison to the variation with 4...h6) and White manages to put under question the purposefulness of the development of Black’s bishop to the f5-square.

\textbf{5.\textit{b}3 \textit{c}8}

The inclusion of that couple of moves is definitely in favour of White. His queen is now on a more active position and its counterpart is forced to protect the b7-pawn. Meanwhile, the move – 5.\textit{b}3 contributes to White’s development much more than Black’s move 5...\textit{c}8 – since White can already castle long in some lines.

I will also mention that the variation: 5..b6 6.\textit{g}5 h6 7.e4
\textit{g}4 8.\textit{f}3 \textit{xf}3 9.\textit{xf}3 \textit{g}7, Komarov – Shirazi, France 1996,
10.f4 e5 (or 10...0–0 11.e5 \textit{h}5
12.\textit{e}3\textpm) 11.fxe5 dx e 5 12.d5 \textit{bd}7
13.\textit{e}2 \textit{c}5 14.\textit{c}2 – gives White
a superior position too. He has a pair of powerful bishops and his pawn-mass on the queenside will march forward sooner or later.

6...a6 7.a5 c5 (It is much weaker for Black to play here: 7...e5 8.e4 exd4 9.d5! exd5 10.cxd5 a7 11...f3+—, or 7...a7 8.e4 a7 9.a3 a5 10.dxe5 a8 11.g6 h6 12.d3 f3++. In case of: 7...h6 8.e4 d7 9.a3 a7 10.e2 0-0 11.0-0±, Black will probably have to play c7-c5 anyway — see 7...c5.) 8.d5 h6 9.e4 a7 10.d3 a7 11.e2 0-0 12.0-0 c7 13.a4 and White’s plan for actions is quite easy — he should prepare the pawn-break in the centre — e4-e5;

6...c5 7.d5 (White’s position is superior after: 7.dxc5 dxc5 8. g4 d7 9.a4 a7 10.e5 a6 11.a2 d4 12.xb7 xb7 13. xb7 b8 14.xd7 xd7 15.xf6+ xf6 16. 0-0-0 b4 17.e3 e6 18...h6±; Possibly, Black should better defend with: 11...0-0 12. a3 d7 a7 13.0-0 b6 14.a5 d5 a5 15.cxd5 a4 16.d4 a1±) 7... a7 8.a5 h6 9.e4 a7 10.d3 0-0 11.e2±.

7.g4 a7 8.e4 0-0

It is still too early for Black to try 8...c5, in view of: 9.e5 dxe5 10.dxe5 a8 11.a4±.

9.e5 e8

This move is played with the idea to attack White’s centre with c7-c5 and that looks more principled than the immediate: 9...dxe5 10.dxe5 e8 11.a2 (It is worse for White to play: 11.a5 f6 12.a4, Olah – Nadassy, Budapest 2003, 12...fxe5±) 12.a3 e6 13...b5? (White prevents 13...a5; mean-
while his subsequent maneuver with the queen is quite attractive, since it disorganizes Black's defence.) 13...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd7 (Or 13...a6 14.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}c5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d7 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d1 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d6 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd6 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd6 17.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}xa3 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xc4 18.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}d2 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d3 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d5; 13...f6 14.0-0-0 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xe5 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}g5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d6 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd6+-) 14.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}c5! b6 15.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}d5! \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}a5 16.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}d3\pm.

10.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}g2

White must be very careful now. Black's pieces are like a coiled spring and they can be suddenly activated as it often happens in the King's Indian Defence. In case of: 10.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}f4 c5 11.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c6 12.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd6, White must consider: 12...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd6 13.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xe7+ \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xe7 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd6 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}e8 15.0-0-0 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd4 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd4 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c6\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}f6

10...\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}c5

It is hardly advisable for Black to try: 10...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c6 11.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}f4 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}dxe5 (He would not achieve much with the line: 11...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}a5 12.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}c2 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xc4? 13.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d5+-, or 12...c6 13.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}e2\pm) 12.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xe5 (The game is quite unclear after: 12.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}dxe5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}f6, but it is possible for White to opt for: 12.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}xe5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}dxe5 13.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}dxe5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c6 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d5\pm) 12...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd4 (or 12...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xe5 13.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xe5\pm) 13.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xb7 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xb7 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xb7 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d8 15.0-0-0 and he maintains a clear advantage after 15...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c5 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}h1\pm, as well as following: 15...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}e6 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}h1 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d6 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd4 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xb7 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}e8 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d1\pm.

11.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}dxe5?!

In case of: 11.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c6 12.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd6 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd6 13.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}dxe5 e6 14.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}e7+ \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xe7 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xd6 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c6 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c5\pm, Black has some serious counter chances.

11...\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}dxe5

His other possibilities are:

11...\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}dxe5 12.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d3 b6 (or 12...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c6 13.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}xe5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}a5 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d2 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c7 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}e3\pm) 15.0-0-0 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c6 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d2 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c7 (It is evidently more reliable for Black to defend with: 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}a5 15.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}c2 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c6 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}b7 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}g5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}f6 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}a1 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}e8 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}f4 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}b5 20.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}d1 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}f8 21.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}e2 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d2\pm) 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}h1 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d8 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}g5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}a5 (It is a disaster for Black to play 16...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}dxe5 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}f4+-) 17.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}c2 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}b8 (The move 17...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}dxc4, does not work at all in view of: 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xe3 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xe7+ \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}f8 20.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}d3 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xc3 21.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xe3 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c7 22.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}f3\pm) 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}f4 and Black has great problems to worry about, because in case of 18...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}dxc4, White has the powerful argument: 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d5! \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}x5 20.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}dxc4+-;

11...\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}dxc5 12.0-0 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c6 (Black is in trouble after his other defensive lines as well: 12...\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}c8 13.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c6 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}g5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}f6 15.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}xf6 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xf6 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}e1\pm; 12...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}dxe5 13.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}e3 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c8 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}dxe5\pm) 13.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}e3 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}a5 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d8 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d1 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d7 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}e2 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}c7 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d4 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}a4 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}b4\pm.

12.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}dxe5 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}xc5

It is bad for Black to try here: 12...\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}dxe5 13.\textcolor{blue}{\textbackslash}xb7 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d8 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}d8 \textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}a8 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbackslash}g2+-.
Chapter 1

13. ∆xd7
White heads for a better endgame. His alternative to the move in the text is the following variation: 13. ∆d3  ♢d6 14. ∆xb7 (Black can counter 14. f4, with the line: 14... e5! 15. f3  ♣c6 16. ∆d5  ♣a6 17.0-0  ♣c7 and his position would be quite acceptable.) 14...  ♢xd3 15. ∆xa8  ♣c6 16. ∆e3  ♣d6 17. ∆xc6 (It looks like Black would be out of the woods after the variation: 17. ♢d1  ♣xc3+ 18. ♣xc3  ♣e4 19.0-0  ♣xa8 20. ♣h6  ♣e5 21. ♣xe5  ♣xe5 22.c5  ♣e4 23.f4  ♣xg4 24.hxg4  ♣xg4 25.fxe1  ♣xc5 26.g5 f6 27. ♣h4  ♣f7.) 17... ∆xc6 18. ∆d5  ♣e4 19.0-0  ♣e8 20. ∆ac1 e6 21.f3  ♣e5, or even: 19... ∆xc4 20. ∆xe7+  ♣xe7 21. ♣xc4  ♣b7!!! and doubtlessly Black remains with some compensation for the sacrificed material. 13... ∆xd7 14. f3  ♣d4 15. ♣xd4  ♣xb4 16. ♣d1  ♣e5+ 17. ♣e2  ♣d6

18. ♣d1  ♣ac8 (Or 18... ♣c5 19.0-0±) 19. ♣xe5  ♣xe5 20.b3 g5 21. ∆d5  ♣fe8 22.f4  ♣xf4 23. ♣xf4 a6 24. ∆d5  ♣d7. Black plays that move with the idea to follow with 25...b5, but naturally White should prevent that. 25. ∆d3±.

Conclusion

The move – 3... ♦f5, which we have analyzed in this chapter, is quite logical – Black wishes to prevent his opponent from occupying additional space and White must solve the problem with the control over the centre. In fact the fight is around the e4-square; otherwise White cannot obtain anything real out of the opening. His fianchettoing of the light-squared bishop (variation a) helps him solve that task and he thus avoids unnecessary simplification. The position becomes rather non-standard if Black transposes to King’s Indian schemes (variation b), but even then he cannot obtain easily acceptable game at all. The combination of the moves 3... ♦f5 and 4...g6 entices White to try to exploit the temporary disharmony of the deployment of Black’s pieces and it looks like the maneuver 5. ♣b3, followed by h2-h3 and g2-g4 enables White to accomplish that. Meanwhile, thus White creates some weaknesses in his own camp too and he must cope effectively with Black’s possible counterplay. The variations, which we have analyzed in this chapter show that White not only obtains a real advantage, but what is maybe even more important – he maintains the initiative.
Chapter 2

1.\textit{\textit{\textit{d}f}3 \textit{\textit{d}f}6 2.c4 d6 3.d4 \textit{\textit{g}g}4

4.\textit{\textit{d}c}3

If White would not mind the possibility of his pawns being doubled – that is no doubt his simplest decision. We have to mention now, that some positions, which we will analyze later, can be reached after other order of moves, for example: 1.\textit{\textit{d}f}3 d6 2.d4 \textit{\textit{g}g}4 3.c4 \textit{\textit{d}d}7 (with the idea to counter 4.\textit{\textit{w}h}3 with 4...\textit{\textit{b}b}8); we will deal with that system in our book three. Therefore, White has an alternative to the move in the text and that is – 4.\textit{\textit{w}h}3, preserving his pawn-structure flexible. Then, there might arise the following developments: 4...\textit{\textit{w}c}8 (Black should not just ignore his pawns, after 4...\textit{\textit{b}b}d7? 5.\textit{\textit{x}b}7 \textit{\textit{c}c}5, in the game Ftacnik – Mrva, Czechoslovakia 1992, White could have played: 6.e3! \textit{\textit{b}b}8 7.\textit{\textit{w}c}6 \textit{\textit{b}b}6 8.\textit{\textit{w}a}4 \textit{\textit{xf}3} 9.gxf3 cxd4 10.exd4 \textit{\textit{d}d}5 11.c5 \textit{\textit{e}e}6+ 12.\textit{\textit{e}e}3\textit{\textit{+}}, maintaining his material advantage and the safety of his king, while in case of: 4...\textit{\textit{c}c}6 5.\textit{\textit{b}b}d2 a5 6.d5 \textit{\textit{b}b}4 7.h3 \textit{\textit{d}d}7 8.e4 e5, White continued with: 9.c5! \textit{\textit{d}x}c5 10.a3 a4 11.\textit{\textit{w}c}3 \textit{\textit{a}a}6 12.\textit{\textit{b}b}e5 \textit{\textit{d}d}6 13.\textit{\textit{e}e}3 0–0 14.\textit{\textit{d}d}c4 \textit{\textit{e}e}8 15.0–0\textit{\textit{+}} and he was dominating in the centre in the game Browne – Balinas, Reno 1994.) 5.h3 \textit{\textit{h}h}5 (In case of the immediate: 5...\textit{\textit{b}b}x\textit{f}3, White obtains a stable advantage with quite natural moves: 6.\textit{\textit{w}f}3 g6 7.\textit{\textit{d}c}3 \textit{\textit{g}g}7 8.g3 \textit{\textit{c}c}6 9.e3 0–0 10.\textit{\textit{w}g}2 \textit{\textit{e}e}8 11.\textit{\textit{d}d}1 e6 12.0–0 d5 13.b3 \textit{\textit{w}d}7 14.\textit{\textit{b}b}2 \textit{\textit{ad}8} 15.\textit{\textit{a}a}4\textit{\textit{+}} Portisch – Larsen, Tilburg 1979.) 6.g3 \textit{\textit{b}b}d7 7.\textit{\textit{g}g}2 c6 8.\textit{\textit{d}d}3 e5 9.0–0 \textit{\textit{e}e}7 10.\textit{\textit{e}e}3 0–0 11.\textit{\textit{d}d}4\textit{\textit{+}} P.Schmidt – Ploehn, Bayern 2000.

Now, going back to 4.\textit{\textit{c}c}3, Black enjoys a great number of possible set-ups: a) 4...\textit{\textit{g}g}6, b) 4...\textit{\textit{e}e}6, c) 4...\textit{\textit{b}b}x\textit{f}3 and d) 4...\textit{\textit{b}b}d7.

His other defensive lines are:

4...\textit{\textit{d}f}d7. Black plays often like that in the King’s Indian Defence,
but here it is hardly worth for him to clarify his intentions at such an early stage of the game. 5.g3! (Following 5.e4, White must consider the possibility of total exchanges after: 5...e5 6...e2 xf3 7.xf3 c6 8.d5 d4 9.e3 xf3+ 10.xf3 e7 11.0–0 0–0 12.b4 g5 13.c5 xe3 14.xe3 f5 and Black’s position is quite acceptable.) 5...e5 (It is not advisable for Black to fianchetto his bishop here: 5...g6 6.g2 g7 7.g5!± – because both his b7-pawn and the bishop on g4 are endangered. White’s game is rather comfortable too in case of: 6...c6 7.h3±, or 6...c6 7.d5±) 6.g2 c6 (It is hardly any better for Black to try: 6...c6 7.d5, for example: 7...e7 8.0–0 g6 9.d2 b6 10.dxe4 g7 11.c5! dxc5 12.d6 c6 13.dxc7 xc7 14.b5 xc7 15.h3 e6 16.b6+ f8 17.xc5±, or 7...xf3 8.xf3 d4 9.0–0 e7 10.f4 0–0 11.fxe5 dxe5 12.f4±) 7.h3! (Castling is often a loss of time in a position in which each tempo counts in the development of the initiative... This is the case here too – after the routine move – 7.0–0, the fight becomes quite tense: 7...e7 8.e3 0–0 9..b3 c8 10.fd1 a6, Frias Pablaza – Karklins, New York 1985.) 7...h5 8.h4! and now Black must give up one of his bishops in order to complete his development – 8...g6 9.d5, followed by xg6±, or 8...e7 9.f5±;

4...c6 5.e4 and here in the majority of the lines the game transposes to other variations:

about 5...e6 6.e2 – see variation b;

about 5...e5 6.d5 bd7 7.e2 e7 8.0–0 0–0 9.e3 – see variation d;

as for 5...c7 6.e2 e5 7.e3 (or 7.d5) 7...e7 8.0–0 0–0 9.d5 – see variation d as well;

5...bd7 6.e2 and now, depending on Black’s choice, the game might transpose into variations b, or d, or to the King’s Indian Defence;

5...g6 6.e2 bd7 (We will quote here one quite recent game: 6...xf3 7.xf3 g7 8.0–0 0–0 9.e3 bd7 10.e2 a6 11.c2 c8 12.ad1± Cramling – Efimenko, Gibraltar 2006.) 7.e3 (It is also good for White to continue now with: 7.g1 xe2 8.xxe2 g7 9.f3 0–0 10.e3±) 7...g7 and the game transposes to the variations of the King’s Indian Defence;

5...xf3 6.xf3 bd7 (or 6...e5 7.d5 e7 8.g3 bd7 9.h3 0–0 10.0–0 a5 11.e2 b6 12.d2±) 7.e2 e5 8.d5 e7 9.g3 0–0 10.h3±; the arising position
is essentially quite similar to the one in variation d;

There are some original variations only after 5...\textit{\$a5}, but White then has an excellent game too: 6.h3 (It is also possible for him to try the immediate: 6.\textit{\$b3} b5?! 7.\textit{\$d3}±) 6...\textit{\$h5} 7.\textit{\$b3} \textit{\$b6} 8.\textit{\$e3} \textit{\$a6} 9.\textit{\$d2} \textit{\$xb3} 10.\textit{\$xb3} \textit{\$g6} 11.f3 e5 12.dxe5 dxe5 13.c5± Tkachiev – Galego, Ohrid 2001.

4...\textit{\$c6} (After that move, the game will transpose eventually to positions that we will analyze later, except that Black will have lost a couple of tempi.) 5.d5 \textit{\$b8} The other possibilities for Black are hardly any better. It is very bad for him to try: 5...\textit{\$a5} 6.e4± O'Neill – Poupas, Elancourt 2003; while in case of: 5...\textit{\$e5} 6.\textit{\$xe5} dxe5 7.\textit{\$b3} \textit{\$c8} 8.e4, White's advantage is again quite obvious, for example: 8...g6 9.c5± Kozul – Podvrsnik, Ptuj 1989, or 8...d7 9.f4 e6 10.\textit{\$e2} exd5 11.\textit{\$xe5} \textit{\$xe4} 12. cxd5 \textit{\$xc3} 13.\textit{\$xc3}± Izoria – Sokolin, Minneapolis 2005; the line 5...\textit{\$xf3} 6.exf3, leads to positions from variation c, with several extra tempi for White.) 6.h3 \textit{\$h5} (or 6...\textit{\$xf3} 7.\textit{\$xf3}±) 7.e4±.

\textbf{a) 4...g6}

This move is relatively seldom played.

(diagram)

\textbf{5.e4}

White should not avoid the main lines – after 5.e3 \textit{\$g7} 6.\textit{\$e2} 0–0 7.h3 (or 7.0–0 \textit{\$c5}) 7...\textit{\$f5} (It is worse for Black to defend with: 7...\textit{\$xf3} 8.\textit{\$xf3} c6 9.0–0 \textit{\$bd7} 10.\textit{\$b4} e5 11.\textit{\$b5} \textit{\$c7} 12.\textit{\$b1} \textit{\$fe8} 13.\textit{\$xc6} bxc6 14.\textit{\$a4} e4 15.\textit{\$e2}± Tukmakov – Onischuk, Koszalin 1999.) 8.\textit{\$d2} \textit{\$a6} 9.e4 \textit{\$d7} 10.0–0 e5, Relange – Tkachiev, France 1999, because at the end it comes again to King's Indian set-ups, except that the arising positions are not so favourable for White.

\textbf{5...\textit{\$xf3}}

After Black's other possible moves, it is quite probable that the game will again transpose to the King's Indian Defence, therefore we will analyze only the variations, which are leading to original positions:

5...\textit{\$c6} 6.\textit{\$e2} e5 (or 6...\textit{\$g7} 7.\textit{\$e3} with a transposition to the King's Indian Defence) 7.d5 \textit{\$xf3} (in case of 7...\textit{\$e7}, White seizes the initiative on the queenside rather quickly: 8.0–0 \textit{\$g7} 9.\textit{\$b4} 0–0 10. c5 \textit{\$e8} 11.\textit{\$e3} \textit{\$xf3} 12.\textit{\$xf3} f5 13. \textit{\$c1} \textit{\$h8} 14.a4 \textit{\$g8} 15.\textit{\$a5} \textit{\$h6} 16. a6 bxa6 17.\textit{\$xh6} \textit{\$xh6} 18.\textit{\$a1}± Suba – Ciocaltea, Bucharest 1979; while after 14...a5, White maintains his initiative easily too – 15.\textit{\$b3} axb4 16.\textit{\$xb4}±) 8.\textit{\$xf3}
Chapter 2

\( \text{\&d4 9.\text{\&e3} \text{\&xf3}+ (Black's other possibilities are clearly worse - 9.\text{\&g7} 10.\text{\&xd4} \text{exd4} 11.\text{\&xd4} 0-0 12.0-0\pm Ekeberg - Areklett, Asker 2003, or 9...c5 10.dxc6 \text{\&xc6} 11.\text{\&d2}\pm G.Schmidt - Vasic, Seefeld 1997.) 10.\text{\&xf3} \text{\&g7}, San Segundo - Parragan, Malaga 1991, 11.0-0 0-0 12.c5 \text{\&d7} 13.\text{\&ac1}\pm and White has in mind simply to double his rooks along the c-file;}

5...\text{\&g7} 6.\text{\&e2} \text{\&fd7} (or 6...0-0 7.\text{\&e3} and the game again transposes to the King's Indian Defence) 7.\text{\&e3} c5 8.d5 \text{\&a6} 9.0-0 0-0 10.\text{\&g5}?! \text{\&xe2} 11.\text{\&xe2} \text{\&c7} (After 11...\text{\&xc3} 12.bxc3 \text{\&a5} 13.\text{\&ac1} \text{\&a4} 14.f4 \text{\&c7} 15.\text{\&f3} h6 16.\text{\&h3} \text{\&g7} 17.\text{\&g3} \text{\&h8} 18.e5, White's initiative was quite dangerous in the game Shulman - D'Amore, Moscow 1994; 11...h6 12.\text{\&h3} \text{\&c7} 13.f4. Black has also tried here: 13...f5, Miroshnichenko - Efimenko, Germany 2004, 14.\text{\&f2} \text{\&a1}\pm; 13...e6 14.dxe6 \text{\&xe6} 15.f5 \text{\&d4}, Golod - Kurnosov, Bad Wiessee 2004, but White should better continue with: 16.\text{\&d2} g5 17.\text{\&d5} \text{\&f6} 18.\text{\&xf6}+ \text{\&xf6} 19.\text{\&f2} \text{\&e7} 20.\text{\&ae1} \text{\&fe8} 21.h3 \text{\&ac8} 22.\text{\&g4}\pm, or 19...\text{\&e5} 20.\text{\&ae1} \text{\&ae8} 21.\text{\&xg5!} \text{hxg5} 22.\text{\&g4}\pm) 12.a4 (White must avoid the unnecessary complications possible after: 12.f4 b5 13.cxb5 a6, Avrukh - G.Guseinov, Mallorca 2004.) 12...a6 13.f4 \text{\&b8} 14.e5 dxe5 15.f5 b5 16.axb5 a6 17.\text{\&g4} \text{\&b6} (Black loses after: 17...\text{\&xc4} 18.\text{\&xf6} fxg6 19.d6 exd6 20.\text{\&xc4}+ d5 21.\text{\&xd5}+-; it is better for him to play at first: 17...\text{\&f6} 18.\text{\&h3} and only then 18...\text{\&xc4}, but White still maintains a powerful initiative, for example: 19.\text{\&xf6} \text{\&xf6} 20.\text{\&xf6} \text{\&xf6} 21.\text{\&h7}+ \text{\&f8} 22.\text{\&xc5} \text{\&xb2} 23.\text{\&ce4}! \text{\&xd5}. This move loses a piece for Black, but he has nothing else in sight. 24.\text{\&xe7}+ \text{\&xe7} 25.\text{\&xg7}+ \text{\&f7} 26.\text{\&xf7}+ \text{\&xf7} 27.\text{\&xf7} \text{\&xf7} 28.\text{\&e7}\pm) 18.\text{\&h3}!

(The game becomes quite unclear after: 18.b4 \text{\&xf5} 19.\text{\&xf5} \text{\&g6} 20.bxc5 bxc4 21.d6 exd6 22.cxd6 \text{\&e6}, Khalifman - B.Larsen, London 1991, 23.\text{\&d5} \text{\&xg5} 24.\text{\&e7}+ \text{\&h8} 25.\text{\&xg5} \text{\&b6}+ 26.\text{\&h1} \text{\&xd6}; nevertheless it deserves a serious attention for White to try the line: 19.\text{\&xf5} \text{\&g6} 20.bxc5\dagger) 18...h6 19.\text{\&xf6} \text{\&xg6} 20.\text{\&f3}. White's knight is headed for the f5-square and that spells disaster for Black: 20...e6 21.dxe6 \text{\&xe6} (or 21...\text{\&xe6} 22.\text{\&h4}\pm) 22.\text{\&h4} \text{\&g5} 23.\text{\&xg5} \text{\&xg5} 24.\text{\&f5} (It is also good for White to continue with: 24.\text{\&f3} \text{\&a4}+ 25.\text{\&f6} \text{\&ad1}+-) 24...\text{\&f6} 25.\text{\&ad1}+-.)

6.\text{\&xf3}

The other possible capture does not look so natural - 6.\text{\&xf3}?! After 6...c6 7.\text{\&e3} \text{\&bd7} 8.b4 e6 9.\text{\&b1} \text{\&h5} 10.\text{\&e2} \text{\&wh4} 11.h3 \text{\&g7} 12.\text{\&c1} 0-0 13.c5 d5 14.e5 f6, Black's prospects were even better in the game Vil.Kovacevic - Petrosonian, Zagreb 1970.)

6...\text{\&c6}
It is too dangerous for Black to try: 6...\(\text{Qf}6\) 7.\(\text{g}5 \text{g}7\), Grimm – Knippel, Germany 1991, 8.0–0–0 h6 (After the immediate 8...c5, White follows with: 9.e5 cxd4 10.\(\text{Qb}5\)†) 9.\(\text{h}4\) c5 10.e5 cxd4 11.\(\text{Qb}5\) \(\text{Qb}6\) 12.exd6 exd6 13.\(\text{Qe}1+\) \(\text{Qe}5\) 14.\(\text{Qx}b7\)±.

7.d5

In case of: 7.\(\text{Qd}1\) \(\text{g}7\) 8.\(\text{Qe}3\) 0–0 9.\(\text{Qe}2\) e5 10.d5, White must consider the possible pawn-sacrifice by Black – 10...\(\text{Qd}4\) 11.\(\text{Qxd}4\) exd4 12.\(\text{Qxd}4\) \(\text{Qe}8\) 13.\(\text{Qd}3\) \(\text{Qd}7\) 14.f3 f5 15.0–0 \(\text{c}5\) 16.\(\text{Qc}2\) fxe4 17.fxe4 \(\text{Qg}5\) and the position was approximately equal in the game Atalik – Soltis, San Francisco 1998.

7...\(\text{Qd}4\) 8.\(\text{Qd}1\) \text{c}5 9.\(\text{Qxc}6\) \(\text{Qxc}6\), Ehnlvest – Murshed, Dhaka 1999, 10.\(\text{Qe}2\) \(\text{Qg}7\) 11.\(\text{Qe}3\) 0–0 12.0–0±. White’s plans for the nearest future are rather typical for similar set-ups: f3, \(\text{Qd}2\), \(\text{Qfd}1\), \(\text{Qac}1\) and later depending on circumstances...

b) 4...e6

Now, after Black’s light-squared bishop has become quite active, he should strive for arranging his central pawns in the spirit of the “classics” – c6-d5-e6.

5.e4

It is also possible for White to try here 5.g3. I believe that in case of: 5...\(\text{Qxf}3\) 6.exf3, he can play analogously to variation c and he can obtain the advantage. White must play d4-d5 as quickly as possible in order to prevent Black from building the pawn-triangle in the centre – c6-d5-e6. It seems more reliable for Black to defend with 5...c6 6.\(\text{Qg}2\) e6 7.0–0 \(\text{Qbd}7\) 8.\(\text{Qc}3\) d5, but White can obtain the advantage even then. In fact, in comparison to the similar positions in the Slav Defence – White has an extra tempo.

5...c6

Black’s other possibilities are:
5...d5 6.cxd5 exd5 7.e5 \(\text{Qe}4\) 8.\(\text{Qb}3±\) Labollita – Pedro, Villa Martelli 2001;
5...\(\text{Qc}6\) 6.d5 \(\text{Qe}5\) 7.\(\text{Qa}4+\) (It is also very good for White to follow simply with: 7.\(\text{Qe}2\) \(\text{Qxf}3\) 8.\(\text{Qxf}3\) \(\text{Qe}7\) 9.\(\text{Qe}2±\) 7...\(\text{Qed}7\) 8.\(\text{Qe}2\) e5 9.\(\text{Qe}3±\) Kandiba – Varavin, Smolensk 1991;
5...bd7 6.e2 c6 (Black will have to resort to that plan sooner or later, just because he has nothing else to do.) – see 6...bd7;

5...c5 6.e2 (In case of 6.dxc5, White must consider 6...c6. This idea looks quite attractive, because it is aimed at a quick development and it reminds us of the fundamental principles of chess. 7.cxd6 xd6 8.e2. In the game Benjamin – Shirazi, New York 1986, there followed: 8...c7 9.b5 b4+ 10.d2 and White repelled his opponent’s attack and he preserved the extra material. Still, after: 8.b4 9.xd8+xd8 10.d2 0–0, or 9.c2 xf3 10.xf3 d4 11.a4+ d7, he would have much more difficult problems to worry about.)

6.cxd4 (It is worse for Black to defend with: 6...c6 7.d5 xf3 8.xf3 d4 9.dxe6 fxe6 10.e5.) Now, for example after: 7.xd4 xe2 8.xe2 bd7 9.0–0 e7 10.b3 0–0 11.b2 a6 12.ad1±, there arises a position, which is typical for the Sicilian Defence (1.e4 c5 2.f3 d6 3.b5+ d7 4.xd7 bxd7 5.c4 gf6 6.c3 e6 7.0–0 e7 8.b3 0–0 9.b2 a6 10.e2 c8 11.d4 xd4 12.ad4), except that White has a couple of extra tempi (This is due to the fact that White did not contribute to his opponent’s development with 3.b5+, 4.xd7+, but it was the other way around – 3...g4, 7...xe2...).

After 5...e7 6.e2 0–0 7.0–0 c6 (It is too bad for Black to play 7..d5?!, because of: 8.exd5 exd5 9.b3 xf3 10.xf3 c6, Vanheste – Blees, Hilversum 1989 and here White’s simplest line would have been: 11.xb7 xd4 12.xd5 c6 13.d1±, preserving his material advantage.) the game transposes to a variation that we are going to analyze a bit later.

6.e2

6.e7

It is too early for Black to play 6...d5, because after 7.exd5 (I believe that it is less precise for White to try the other possible capture – 7.cxd5 cxd5 8.b3 dxe4 9.xb7 d7 10.xe4 xe4 11.xe4 b4+, or 8.a4+ c6 9.b5 xf3 10.xc6+ bxc6 11.xc6+ d7 12.gxf3 b4, because Black has some serious compensation for the sacrificed pawn.) 7...exd5 8.b3, or 7...exd5 8.c5 d5 9.b3 – and White has the initiative.

Having in mind the notes to White’s previous move, it seems logical for Black to follow with 6...bd7, but then after 7.0–0, he will have to lose some tempi,
by playing 7...\(\text{\textcopyright}b6\) (The move 7...d5, can be countered by White with the unpleasant – 8.e5.) 8.b3 \(\text{\textcopyright}e7\) (Here again, after 8...d5, Black must worry about 9.e5 \(\text{\textcopyright}fd7\) 10.c5\(\pm\), or 9...\(\text{\textcopyright}e4\) 10.\(\text{\textcopyright}xe4\) dxe4 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}g5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xe2\) 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}xe2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xd4\) 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}b2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}d3\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}h5\) g6 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}g4\) 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}b2\) 0–0 10.e5 dxe5 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}xe5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xe2\) 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}xe2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}c7\) (It is a disaster for Black to continue with: 12...\(\text{\textcopyright}xd4??\), in view of: 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}d5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}c5\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}d3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}d6\) 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}xf6\) + \(\text{\textcopyright}xf6\) 16.\(\text{\textcopyright}xf6\) gxf6 17.c5+-) 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}ad1\) \(\text{\textcopyright}ad8\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}d3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}bd7\), Sommerbauer – Roth, Austria 1996 and now, White’s simplest decision is the move 15.f4\(\pm\).

7.0–0

It is quite difficult for White to break through in the position arising after: 7.d5 cxd5 8.exd5 exd5 9.exd5 \(\text{\textcopyright}xf3\) (It is also acceptable for Black to play: 9...0–0 10.\(\text{\textcopyright}d4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xe2\) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}we2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e8\), followed by \(\text{\textcopyright}bd7\), a6, \(\text{\textcopyright}f8\).) 10.\(\text{\textcopyright}xf3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}bd7\) 11.0–0 0–0 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}e3\) a6, Jelen – Tratar, Bled 2000.

7...0–0

About 7...\(\text{\textcopyright}c7\) 8.\(\text{\textcopyright}f4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xf3\) 9.\(\text{\textcopyright}xf3\) e5 10.\(\text{\textcopyright}e3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}bd7\) 11.d5 (White can also follow with the simple line: 11.g3 0–0 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}g2\)\(\pm\) Nyback – Tan, Internet 2004) – see variation d.

8.\(\text{\textcopyright}h3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}h5\) 9.d5 cxd5

Black has tried in practice as well: 9.e5 10.\(\text{\textcopyright}e3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}g6\) 11.\(\text{\textcopyright}d2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}a6\) 12.g3 (White is planning to trap his opponent’s bishop at an opportune moment with the help of f4–f5.) 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}d7\) 13.a3. Here, Black had better try to seize the initiative on the kingside with: 13...f5 (In case of: 13...\(\text{\textcopyright}g5\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}xg5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xg5\) 15.h4 \(\text{\textcopyright}h6\) 16.h5, Black loses a piece, Goldin – Popchev, Moscow 1989.), although that move had some serious drawbacks as well – the e4-square would have become an excellent outpost for White’s pieces. There might have followed, for example: 14.exf5 \(\text{\textcopyright}xf5\) 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}h2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}c8\) 16.\(\text{\textcopyright}de4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}f6\) 17.\(\text{\textcopyright}xf6+\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xf6\) 18.\(\text{\textcopyright}g4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}d7\) 19.\(\text{\textcopyright}e4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}g6\) 20.f3\(\pm\).

10.cxd5 exd5

11.\(\text{\textcopyright}xd5\)!


11...\(\text{\textcopyright}g6\)

In case of: 11...\(\text{\textcopyright}xe4\), White regains his pawn rather quickly and his advantage is quite convincing: 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}f4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xf3\) 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}xh5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xh5\) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}d5\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xf6\) 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}xb7\); the move 11...\(\text{\textcopyright}c6\) does not create any special problems for White – 12.\(\text{\textcopyright}f4\) \(\text{\textcopyright}xf3\) 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}xf3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}e5\) (or 13...\(\text{\textcopyright}b6\) 14.g3 \(\text{\textcopyright}e5\) 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}g2\)\(\pm\)) 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}d2\) \(\text{\textcopyright}b6\) 15.\(\text{\textcopyright}c3\) \(\text{\textcopyright}ac8\) 16.\(\text{\textcopyright}e1\) \(\text{\textcopyright}c4\) 17.g3 \(\text{\textcopyright}xf3+\) 18.\(\text{\textcopyright}xf3\)\(\pm\).
12. \( \textit{\text{\text{xf4}} \text{xe4}} \)

After 12...\( \textit{\text{\text{c6}}} \) 13.\( \textit{\text{\text{xe7+ \text{xe7}}} \) 14.\( \textit{\text{\text{x}} \text{d6 \text{xe4}}} \) 15.\( \textit{\text{\text{a3 \text{e8}}} \) 16.\( \textit{\text{\text{x}} \text{xd8}}, \) the activity of White's pieces guarantees his edge in the arising endgame. Meanwhile, the fact that he has a leeway for his king is also in his favour: 16...\( \textit{\text{\text{x}} \text{axd8}} \) 17.\( \textit{\text{\text{b5 \text{c6}}} \) 18.\( \textit{\text{\text{ac1 \text{c8}}} \) 19.\( \textit{\text{\text{fd1}}} \).

If 12...\( \textit{\text{\text{xd5}}} \) 13.\( \textit{\text{\text{xd5 \text{c6}}} \) (with the idea to follow with 14...\( \textit{\text{\text{b4}}} \) 15.\( \textit{\text{\text{d2 \text{d5}}} \) ), then White plays – 14.\( \textit{\text{\text{c4}}} \).

13.\( \textit{\text{\text{d3 \text{c6}}} \) 14.\( \textit{\text{\text{e1 \text{f5}}} \) 15.\( \textit{\text{\text{b3}}} \) \( \textit{\text{\text{f7}}} \)

Black is protecting indirectly his b7-pawn.

16.\( \textit{\text{\text{xe4 \text{fxc4}}} \) 17.\( \textit{\text{\text{xe4 \text{wd7}}} \)  
Or 17...\( \textit{\text{\text{g6}}} \) 18.\( \textit{\text{\text{d1 \text{d7}}} \) 19.\( \textit{\text{\text{e3}}} \).

18.\( \textit{\text{\text{h6! \text{fxc8}}} \) 19.\( \textit{\text{\text{g4 \text{f8}}} \) 20.\( \textit{\text{\text{g5}}} \) (White achieves nothing much with: 20.\( \textit{\text{\text{f6+ \text{h8}}} \) 21.\( \textit{\text{\text{xd7 \text{xb3}}} \) 22.\( \textit{\text{\text{axb3 \text{gxd6}}} \) 23.\( \textit{\text{\text{xf8 \text{xf8}}} \) )

20...\( \textit{\text{\text{a5}}} \) 21.\( \textit{\text{\text{a3}}} \) (It is hardly worth for White to win a pawn with: 21.\( \textit{\text{\text{g3 \text{g6}}} \) 22.\( \textit{\text{\text{h7 \text{h7}}} \) 23.\( \textit{\text{\text{d2 \text{f7}}} \) 24.\( \textit{\text{\text{f4 \text{f5}}} \) 25.\( \textit{\text{\text{h4+ \text{g8}}} \) 26.\( \textit{\text{\text{xa5 \text{e7}}} \) – because he evidently loses the harmonious coordination of his pieces.) 21...\( \textit{\text{\text{h5}}} \) 22.\( \textit{\text{\text{e4 \text{h8}}} \) 23.\( \textit{\text{\text{g6 \text{f7}}} \) 24.\( \textit{\text{\text{h5 \text{h5}}} \) 25.\( \textit{\text{\text{xg5 \text{e5}}} \) 26.\( \textit{\text{b4 \text{d5}}} \) 27.\( \textit{\text{e3}}} \) White maintains a stable advantage, mostly because of his superior pawn-structure.

c) 4...\( \textit{\text{xf3 \text{e5}}} \) 5.\( \textit{\text{xf3}} \)

I think that after 5.gxf3, White is again better, but it is more important for him in that situation to open the e-file – this is an additional chance to enlarge the front of the attack.

Naturally, it is too early for a definite evaluation of the position, because the fight has just started, but the general scheme of the upcoming events is already obvious. White plans to utilize the entire force of his pieces (including the bishop pair, of course...) in order to increase his space advantage. In this situation, Black’s only chance to prevent that is to change somehow the pawn-structure in his favour – that is to manage to push d6-d5. It is understandable that White will try to prevent that, but it would be even worse for Black.
to remain idle. Therefore, it is easy to predict his next move...

5...c6

Now, something about Black’s other possibilities:

About 5...c6 6.d5 – see 4...c6; analogously the move 5...bd7 has no separate importance, White can even start with 6.d5 – to make the situation clearer.

In case of 5...g6, the game transposes to the main line; meanwhile White can force his opponent to play c8; later Black will have to lose a tempo in order to bring his queen to a more favourable placement. See an example about the eventual possible developments in that case: 6.e2 (It is more precise for White to follow immediately with: 6.b3! c8 7.e3 c6, Ikonnikov – Petit, Metz 1994, 8.d5.) 6...g7 (After 6...c6, Black can ensure a more comfortable square for his queen – c7.) 7.b3! c8 8.e3 0–0 9.0–0 bd7 10.fd1 c6 11.d5 c7 (If Black follows with 11...c5, it would be high time that White turned his attention to the e-file and the kingside as well – 12.f4± Kohlweyer – Artamonova, Metz 2003.) 12.ac1 fe8 13.f4 a6 14.f3± and White had a better position in the game Salov – Adams, New York 1996;

5...e5 6.dxe5 (White maintains his advantage even after the not so logical move 6.d5, for example: 6...e7 7.f4 bd7 8.e2 0–0 9.0–0 a5 10.b1 c5 11.fxe5 dxe5 12.c2 bd7 13.b3 Moller – Doll, Germany 1994, followed by a3, b4±) 6...dxe5 7.xd8+ xd8 8.f4 e4 9.e3 bd7 10.0–0 0–0 c8 11.g3±;

5...e6 6.d5. This is the simplest decision for White. Now, in case of: 6...exd5 7.cxd5 e7 (After 7...bd7 8.e3 c5 9.dxc6 bxc6 10.a6 c7 11.c1 b8 12.0–0 a5 13.e2 e7 14.fe1 0–0 15 xa7, White remained with an extra pawn in the game Komarov – Karasev, Novosibirsk 1989.) 8.b3 c8 9.e2 bd7 10.0–0 0–0 11.e3 c5 12.c2 a5 13.a3 e8 14.b4± and White is still slightly better, van Der Sterren – De Heer, Netherlands 1997. After 6...e5, it is quite sufficient for White to continue with 7.f4± (Look over the notes to the move 5...e5, to make a comparison...). White plans to rely on his powerful bishop-pair and his space advantage in order to increase his positional pressure. We will now supply you with an example – a game in which White played f3-f4 a bit later, even losing a tempo in the process – 7.e2 bd7 8.e3 e7 9.f4 xf4 10.xf4 e5 11.e3 0–0 12.f4 g6, Lerner – Mikhailetz, Ordzhonikidze 2000 and here he had to continue with 13.0–0±, planning the following scheme of deployment of his forces – g3, f3, f2, d3, f1. It would be extremely difficult for Black to organize any counterplay in that case.
6...d5

It is much simpler for White to hamper Black's plans altogether, than after 6.f4, to try to refute the move 6...d5 (in case of 6...e6, White plays: 7.d5 exd5 8.cxd5 ½e7 9.½e2 0–0 10.0–0 ½bd7 11.½e3 ½b6 12.½f3 ½c8 13.½b3 c5, Ein-gorn – Marangunic, Bern 1993, 14.a4±; while after: 13...½fxd5 14.½xd5 ½xd5 15.½xd5 cxd5 16.½xb7 ½f6 17.½ad1, he preserves his edge again). Following: 7.f5 g6 8.fxg6 hxg6 9.½e3 ½h6 10.½f3 ½a5 11.cxd5 ½e6 12.½b5+ ½f8, the situation remained rather unclear in the game Mikhailchishin – Jacimovic, Skopje 1991.

6...g6

Black’s choice here is not so great after all.

The variation: 6...½bd7 7.½e2 g6 8.½e3 ½g7 9.0–0, transposes to the main line.

The move 6...c5 seems to be quite suspicious, since it presents White with a free hand for actions on the kingside. 7.½d3 g6 8.0–0 ½g7 9.f4 ½d7 10.½e1 0–0 11.½c2 ½c8 12.f5 gxf5 13.½f3+ Doettling – Schmidt, Boeblingen 2000;

6...cxd5 7.cxd5 a6 8.f4 ½bd7 9.g4!? White enjoys a huge space advantage and a couple of bishops and he can act without any restraint, since Black has practically no counterplay. 9...½a5 10.½g2 g6 11.0–0 ½g7 12.½e1 h6 13.½d2 ½d8 14.½e2 ½c8 15.½ad1 ½b6 16.½c1 ½c7 17.½d3 0–0 18.½f5! ½g5 (or 18...gxf5 19.g5! hxg5 20.½xg5 ½e8 21.½g3+– Atalik) 19.h4 ½h7 20.hxg5 hxg5 (or 20...½xg5 21.f4 ½h7 22.g5– Atalik) 21.½e4 ½f6 22.½e3 ½c4 (or 22...½c8 23.½xf6+ exf6 24.½xb6 ½xc1 25.½e3– Atalik) 23.½h3 ½e5 24.½g3 and White’s threats were tremendously dangerous in the game Atalik – Runic, Bled 2002.

7.½e3

The plan for White, connected with the fianchetto of his lightsquared bishop also seems very attractive. Its only drawback is the weakening of the c4-square. Meanwhile, it has several pluses too and most of all the possibility to bring the bishop to the c3-c8 diagonal, which is very important in the fight for the c-file. There can follow: 7.g3 ½g7 8.½g2 0–0 9.0–0 ½bd7 10.f4 ½b6 11.½e2 ½c8 12.½e3 cxd5 13.cxd5 ½fd7, Schoene – Maiwald, Germany 1997, 14.½ac1±.

7...½g7 8.½e2

Or 8.½b3 ½c7 and the game transposes to the main line.

8...0–0 9.0–0 ½bd7
9...cxd5 (The variation: 9...a6 10.\w_7b3 \w_7c7 11.\w_7a1 \w_7d7 again leads to the main line.) 10.cxd5 \w_7bd7 11.\w_7e1 \w_7a5 12.\w_7b3 a6 13.a4 \w_7fc8 (or 13...\w_7d5 14.\w_7a3± Ribli) 14.\w_7f1 \w_7f8 15.\w_7ad1 \w_7g8?! (Or 15...\w_7c7 16.\w_7a3 \w_7ac8 17.b4 \w_7xc3 18.\w_7xc3 \w_7xc3 19.bxa5; 15...\w_7ab8 16.\w_7d4 \w_7c5 17.\w_7a3±; so, it becomes obvious that the least of evils for Black is to stop being ambitious and to resort to patient defending – 15...\w_7d8 16.\w_7b4 \w_7c7 17.a5±) 16.\w_7xb7 \w_7c5 17.\w_7xc5 \w_7xc5 18.\w_7e4 \w_7a5 19.b3± Shipov – Odesskij, Moscow 1994.

10.\w_7b3

10...\w_7c7

After 10...cxd5 11.cxd5 \w_7a5 (In case of: 11...\w_7b8 12.\w_7fc1 \w_7c8 13.f4 a6 14.a4 b6 15.\w_7f3 \w_7c5 16.\w_7d1 \w_7a7 17.b4 \w_7cd7 18.\w_7e2± White’s knight is headed for the c6-square, Stohl – J.Pribyl, Germany 1993.) 12.a3 a6 13.\w_7ac1 \w_7ab8 (Following: 13...\w_7ac8?! 14.\w_7xb7 \w_7b8 15.\w_7xa6 \w_7xa6 16.\w_7xa6 \w_7xb2 17.a4± Black’s compensation for the pawn was insufficient in the game Bacrot – Markotic, Nice 1994.) 14.\w_7fd1 and White’s prospects are slightly better.

It is also possible for Black to play: 10...\w_7b8 11.\w_7fd1 (In case of 11.f4, he must consider: 11...\w_7c5 12.\w_7c2 cxd5 13.\w_7fd5 \w_7c8 14.\w_7e4.) 11.\w_7c8 12.\w_7ac1 a6 13.\w_7d2 cxd5 (If 13...\w_7c5, then White regroups his forces quite comfortably with: 14.\w_7d1 \w_7xd5 15.\w_7xd5 \w_7xd5 16.\w_7c4 \w_7dc2±. It is sharp, but not quite correct for Black to try: 13...b5 14.dxc6 bxc4 15.\w_7xb8 \w_7xb8 16.\w_7a4 \w_7xc6 17.\w_7xc4 d5 18.\w_7b6 \w_7xb6 19.\w_7xd5 \w_7xd5 20.\w_7c8+ \w_7f8 21.\w_7xd5 and here his position becomes hopeless after: 21...\w_7c6 22.\w_7e8+ –, as well as following: 21...\w_7xb2 22.\w_7xf8+ \w_7xf8 23.\w_7d8+ \w_7g7 24.\w_7d4+-, instead it is more reliable for him to defend with: 17...\w_7f8 18.\w_7b6 \w_7e7 19.\w_7d5 \w_7b7 20.\w_7dc2± Gelfand.) 14.\w_7xd5 \w_7xd5 15.\w_7xd5 \w_7c6 (Or 15...\w_7c5 16.\w_7c2 a5 17.b3±. If 15...b5, then 16.cx b5 \w_7xc1+ 17.\w_7xc1 e6 18.\w_7d1 \w_7c5 19.\w_7b4 axb5 20.a3±, while in case of 17...\w_7c5, it is quite interesting for White to try: 18.\w_7xc5?? dxc5 19.bxa6± Gelfand; there might follow, for example: 19...\w_7xb3 20.axb3 \w_7d4 21.\w_7d2 \w_7xb2 22.\w_7a5 and then \w_7b6, a6-a7 etc.) 16.\w_7f4 \w_7c7 17.\w_7dd1 a5 18.\w_7f3 \w_7c5 19.\w_7c2 \w_7b6 20.\w_7b1± Gelfand – Ivanchuk, Belgrade 1997.

11.\w_7fd1 a6

After 11...\w_7fb8 12.\w_7ac1 \w_7a5 13.a3 \w_7d8 14.f4 a6 15.h3 cxd5 16.\w_7xd5 \w_7xd5 17.\w_7xd5 b6 18.f5 \w_7a7 19.fgx6 hxg6 20.\w_7c2?!, White preserves his advantage (The
game Kharitonov – Gurgenidze, Sverdlovsk 1984, followed with: 20.\(\text{E}c1\) a5! 21.\(\text{W}c2\) a4, but White’s pawn-structure on the queenside was practically immobile).

\textbf{12.\(\text{E}ac1\) \(\text{F}fc8\)}

If 12...\(\text{E}ab8\), Shipov – Hasangatin, Internet 2004, then White can continue with: 13.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{F}fc8\) 14.\(\text{f}3\) and the game transposes to the main line.

\textbf{13.\(\text{f}4\) e6 14.dxe6}

In case of: 14.\(\text{f}3\) exd5 15.cxd5 c5, White’s pieces are not so well deployed in the situation arising in that pawn-structure. There might follow: 16.a4 \(\text{E}e8\) 17.\(\text{E}e1\) \(\text{E}e7\) and the game remains unclear.

\textbf{14...fxe6 15.\(\text{f}3\) \(\text{ab}8\) 16.g3 \(\text{E}e8\)}

In general, White’s position is better and it is essential for him not to allow his opponent to balance the prospects with some tactical tricks. Black has no visible active piece-play at the moment, therefore White must be careful about the possible changes of the pawn-structure. Having this in mind, if we analyze the situation, we will see that Black has the option to try e6-e5, followed by e5xf4 and his knights might become quite active – going to e5, g4 etc. White’s position is quite solid indeed, but it would always be useful for him to restrict his opponent’s active possibilities. Accordingly, it deserves attention for him to continue with: 17.h3!? (The game Kharitonov – Agrest, Pinsk 1993, followed with: 17.\(\text{d}e2\) \(\text{bd}8\) 18.\(\text{W}a3\) \(\text{f}8\) 19.b4 e5 20.\(\text{W}b3\) \(\text{h}8\) 21.\(\text{c}c3\) \(\text{g}7\) 22.\(\text{W}c2\), but here Black could have activated his pieces with the help of the line: 22...\(\text{xf}4\)! 23.\(\text{xf}4\) \(\text{e}5\) 24.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{E}e6\).) and now in case of: 17...\(\text{bd}8\) 18.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{Ed}2\), as well as after: 17...c5 18.\(\text{W}c2\) \(\text{ab}6\) 19.b3, White maintains a slight advantage.

\textbf{d) 4...\(\text{bd}7\)}

That is the most popular plan for Black – he prepares the pawn-advance e7-e5.

\textbf{5.e4 e5 6.\(\text{f}e2\) c6}

This is the most flexible line for Black.

His other possibilities are: 6...g6 7.\(\text{f}e3\) \(\text{g}7\) 8.0–0 and the
game transposes to the King’s Indian Defence;

The move 6...a5, which was tested in the game Reinke – Hildebrand, Bad Breisig 2000, does not have any separate importance either: 7...e3 and Black will have to make a choice anyhow – 7...c6, or 7...d7 and again there will be a transposition to the lines that we are going to analyze later;

6...exd4 7.exd4 dxe2 8...xe2 g6 9.0–0 d7 10.f4!? (White is presently preventing in that fashion the pawn-advance c7-c6.)

10...e5 11.b6, Andersson – Spassky, Bugojno 1982, 12.f3 e8 13.b2 h7 14.b3;

After 6...xf3 7.xf3 exd4 8...xd4, White’s bishop-pair provides him with a slight advantage: 8.g6 (Or 8...e7 9.0–0 0–0, Engel – Hermann, Germany 1998, 10.f4 d5 11.e2±; 8...e5 9.e2 g6, Streikus – Slapikas, Platelia 1999, 10.f4±) 9.0–0 d7 10.g5 0–0 (Or 10...h6 11.e3 0–0 12.d2 h7 13.f3 d8 14.e4± M.Grabarczyk – Jansa, Germany 1994.) 11.d2 e8 12.e1 e5 13.e2 c6 14.e7±

Komarov – Okhotnik, France 1996;

6...e7 (This move often leads only to a transposition of moves too.) 7.0–0 0–0 (about 7...c6 – see the main line) 8.e3

(diagram)

and now:

8.c6 9.d5 – see the main line;

about 8...xf3 9.xf3 c6 – see later;

8...e8, Makinen – Porrasmaa, Finland 1997, 9.d5 c6 10.d2 xe2 fxe2 d8 d4 b4±;

8...a5 9.d5 h6 10.d2 xe2 11.xe2 h7 12.a3 g5 13.b4±

Lomineishvili – Borsuk, Gothenburg 2005;

8...e8, Antic – Czerwonski, Internet 2003, 9.b3 xf3 (or 9...b6 10.ad1±; 9...exd4 10.ad4±) 10.xf3 exd4 11.ad4±;

8...exd4 9.xd4 xe2 10...xe2 c5 11.d3 f7 12.f5 d6 13.d5 d6 14.ad1± Mazzilli – Ferro, Laveno 1999;

8...h6, R.Hernandez – Espig, Thessaloniki 1988 (Black plans in case of 9.d5, to exchange on f3 and to follow that with h7 and g5.) 9.d2 (analogously to the variation with 8...h5 – see later) 9...xe2 10.e2±;

8...e8 9.d5 a5 (or 9...h5, Gonda – Suto, Hungary 2002, 10.g3±) 10.b3 h6 11.a3 h7 12.d2 xe2 13.xe2 g5 14.b4 xe3 15.xe3 d5 16.xg5 hxg5 17.b3± Shipov – Hartoch, Groningen 1992;

8...h5 9.d2 (In case of 9.d5,
as it was played in the game Korchnoi – Speelman, Monte Carlo 1992, White had to consider 9...
\(\text{\texttt{\textdollar}e8}) 9...exd4 (After 9...\(\text{\texttt{\textdollar}g6}), White maintains his advantage with: 10.f3 c6 11.d5 – see the main line, the variation with 9...
\(\text{\texttt{\textdollar}h5}) 10.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xd4} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}xe2} 11.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xe2} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}e8} 12.f4 \text{\texttt{\textdollar}f8} 13.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}ad1} a6?! (Black could have tried to continue without that move – 13...c6. The game might have continued with: 14.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}f3} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}a5} 15.a3 \text{\texttt{\textdollar}e6} 16.b4. Now, it is not good for Black to follow with 16...\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xa3}?, because of: 17.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}a1} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}b2} 18.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}a2} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}xb4} 19.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}b1} and his queen gets trapped, while in case of 16...\text{\texttt{\textdollar}h5} 17.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xh5} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}xh5} 18.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}b3} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}h6} 19.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}fe1}, White preserves his advantage again.) 14.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}f3} c6 15.g4 \text{\texttt{\textdollar}c5} 16.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xc5} dxc5 17.e5 \text{\texttt{\textdollar}d7} 18.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}de4}± T.Petrosian – Larsen, Copenhagen 1960.

\(7.0-0\,\text{\texttt{\textdollar}e7}

After 7...\text{\texttt{\textdollar}b6}, Araz – Ali, Dubai 1998, it is good enough for White to continue with 8.d5±. After Black’s other tries – the game transposes to variations, which we are analyzing later, for example: 7...h6 8.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}e3} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}c7} 9.d5; 7...\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xf3} 8.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xf3}; 7...\text{\texttt{\textdollar}c7} 8.d5 (or 8.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}e3}).

\(8.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}e3} 0-0\)

This move is also a “must” for Black.

Now, something in short about his other alternatives:

about 8...\text{\texttt{\textdollar}h5} 9.d5 0-0 – see 8...0-0 9.d5 \text{\texttt{\textdollar}h5}; 8...\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xf3} 9.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xf3} 0-0 10.d5 – see 9.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xf3}; 8...\text{\texttt{\textdollar}c7} 9.d5 0-0 (Black can hardly con-

\(9...\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xd5}\)

That is Black’s most fashionable defence here, but he has plenty of other possibilities as well:

9...\text{\texttt{\textdollar}c5}? 10.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xc5} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}xf3} 11.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xd6} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}xe4} 12.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}xe5} cxd5 13.cxd5± Gasthofer – Nazarenus, Pardubice 2005;

9...\text{\texttt{\textdollar}e8} 10.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}d2} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}xe2} 11.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}e2} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}a5}, Wright – Tartakower, Southsea 1949 (Black’s defence is rather complex after the rest of the lines too: 11...cxd5 12.cxd5± Jankovec – Baumgartner, Havirov 1968; 11...a5 12.b3± Miralles – Letre-guilly, Montpellier 1991; 11...c5, Hobusch – Eismont, Duesseldorf 2005, 12.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}fb1}±; 11...g6 12.b4 cxd5 13.cxd5 \text{\texttt{\textdollar}b6} 14.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}fc1} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}d7} 15.a4±; 11...\text{\texttt{\textdollar}b8} 12.b4 cxd5 13.cxd5 \text{\texttt{\textdollar}xc8} 14.\text{\texttt{\textdollar}fc1} \text{\texttt{\textdollar}d8}, Pachman – Mokry,
Czechia 1994, 15...b5 e6c1+ 16.£xc1 Δ16...a5 17.a7+- 12. £ab1!? Δ12...cxd5 13.b4 £c7 14. £b5 £b8 15.cxd5 a6 16.£c3±;

9...£a5 (This is a very good idea for Black – to redeploy his queen to the a6-square.) 10.a3! (For example, in case of 10.£d2, Black can play: 10...£xe2 11.£xe2 £fc8 12.£fc1 £a6 13.f3 cxd5 and White will be forced to capture with his e-pawn – 14.exd5, Piven – Kruppa, Seefeld 1996, because in case of 14.cxd5?, Black has the powerful argument – 14...£xc3! and White loses a piece.) 10...£fc8 11.b4 £d8, S.Ivanov – Cicak, Stockholm 2005 and here it deserves attention for White to follow with 12.£c1 (protecting the knight on c3 against the possibility – 12...cxd5) 12...a5 13.dxc6! bxc6 14.b5 and White maintains the advantage thanks to his powerful passed pawn;


9...a5 (Black thus restricts White’s possibilities on the queenside.) 10.£d2 £xe2 11.£xe2 £e8 (Or 11...a4 12.b4 axb3 13.axb3 c5 14.£b5 £e8 15.£xa8 £xa8 16.£b1 £d8, Wegner – Hausner, Hamburg 1990, 17.£a1 £c7 18.£xc7 £xc7 19.£b1?) 12.£fd1!? This move is based on Black’s eventual next reply, but still it cannot be defined as a trap! After Black has pushed a7-a5, it would be unfavourable for him to change the pawn-structure in any possible fashion – he would be reluctant to play c6-c5, or c6xd5, because of the vulnerability of the b5-square. This is what White exploits by making the “mysterious” rook-move – his indirect pressure against his opponent’s d6-pawn becomes already a telling factor. 12...£g5 13.dxc6 bxc6 14.c5! £xe3 15.£xe3 £xc5 16.£c4 £e7 17.£xd6 £e6 18.£f5± Murshed – Koshy, Dhaka 1993;

9...a6 10.£d2 £xe2 11.£xe2 £b8 (White’s general strategical plan, connected with active actions on the queenside, remains the same after Black’s other possibilities as well: 11...h6, Montagard – Caposciutti, France 2002, 12.b4±; 11...c5, Eriksson – Malmstig, Umea 2003, 12.£ab1±; 11...£e8 12.b4± Wegner – Hickl, Bad Neuenahr 1989; 11...g6, Lingnau – Kogan, Senden 2000, 12.£h6 £e8 13.b4±; 11...cxd5 – see later.) 12.b4 £c8 13.£fc1 cxd5 14.£xd5! £xd5 15.cxd5 £d8 16.£b3 £b6 17.£xb6 £xb6 18.£a5. The position has been simplified indeed, but Black fails to neutralize White’s initiative. 18...£a4 19.£e3! £c7 20.£xc7 £c7 21.£c1 £e7 (It is a mistake for Black to follow with: 21...£d7? 22.£h3! £xh3 23.gxh3+- M.Pavlovic – Blagojevic, Bar 2006.) 22.£c2±;

9...£xf3. This move is usually connected with the idea to trade
the dark-squared bishops, but White should prevent that by all means. 10...\texttt{exf3} c5 (About 10...cxd5 – see later; 10...a6, M.Socko – Mira, Plovdiv 2003, 11.b4±; 10...\texttt{Qe8} 11.\texttt{Wb3} \texttt{Cc7} 12.g3 h6 13.h4± Appel – Rahlis, Leipzig 2006; 10...\texttt{Cc7} 11.\texttt{Qd2} a6, Ryba – Hagenauer, Regensburg 1996, 12.\texttt{Qfc1}±) 11.g3! a6 (White’s advantage is considerable too after: 11...\texttt{Qe8} 12.\texttt{Qg4} g6 13.\texttt{Qh6} \texttt{Qg7} 14.\texttt{Qd3} \texttt{Qh8} 15.\texttt{Qh3} \texttt{Qf6} 16.\texttt{Qae1} \texttt{Qg8} 17.\texttt{Qd2} f5 18.f4± Zeller – Heidenfeld, Germany 1998, or 12...a6 13.\texttt{Qb1} \texttt{Qef6} 14.\texttt{Qh3} b5 15.\texttt{Qxb5} axb5 16.b4± Ruck – Runic, Bled 2002.) 12.\texttt{Qg2} \texttt{Qa5} 13.\texttt{Qe2} \texttt{Qab8} 14.\texttt{Qd2} b5 15.\texttt{Qxb5} (I would have preferred the more academical line: 15.\texttt{Qd1} \texttt{Cc7} 16.\texttt{Qe3}± and Black’s possibilities as quite restricted just like before.) 15...a5b5 16.a3 c4 17.\texttt{Qa2}± Razuvaev – I.Dmitriev, Novgorod 1995; 9...\texttt{Qh5} 10.\texttt{Qd2} \texttt{Qg6} 11.f3 \texttt{Qe8} (or 11...\texttt{Qh5} 12.g3 f5 13.\texttt{Qxf5} \texttt{Qxf5} 14.\texttt{Qde4}±) 12.b4 \texttt{Qg5} 13.\texttt{Qf2} c5 14.\texttt{Qxc5} \texttt{Qxc5} 15.\texttt{Qb3} b6 16.\texttt{Qxc5} \texttt{Qxc5} 17.\texttt{Qb1} \texttt{Qc8} 18.\texttt{Qd3} \texttt{Cc7} 19.\texttt{Qc2} \texttt{Qa6} 20.\texttt{Qb2}± Portisch – Larsen, Moscow 1959; 9...\texttt{Qe8} 10.\texttt{Qd2} \texttt{Qxe2} 11.\texttt{Qxe2} \texttt{Qg5}, I.Vukovic – Graul, Bad Wiessee 1999, 12.b4 \texttt{Qxe3} 13.\texttt{Qxe3} \texttt{Qdb3}±; 9...\texttt{Qc7} (I believe that is not the best square for Black’s queen in this situation.) 10.\texttt{Qd2} \texttt{Qxe2} 11.\texttt{Qxe2} a5 (Black has tried here some other moves too, but they can hardly change the essence of the game: 11...\texttt{Qfc8} 12.\texttt{Qfc1} a6 13.a3± Kiss – Dede, Aggtelek 2000; 11.cxd5 12.cxd5 a6 13.\texttt{Qfc1} \texttt{Qfc8}, Sosonko – Schaller, Bled 1997, 14.a3 \texttt{Qb4}, \texttt{Qb3}±; 11...g6 12.b4 \texttt{Qh5} 13.g3 f5 14.\texttt{Qxf5} \texttt{Qxf5} 15.\texttt{Qd4} \texttt{Qg7}, Herndl – Stichelberger, Werfen 1998, 16.dxc6 bxc6 17.b5±; 11...\texttt{Qe8} 12.b4 g6, Beil – Krajnak, Olomouc 1998, 13.\texttt{Qb3} f5 14.f3±; 11...\texttt{Qfe8} 12.\texttt{Qfc1} c5 13.\texttt{Qab1} g6 14.\texttt{Qxb4} cxb5 15.\texttt{Qxb4} \texttt{Qc5} 16.\texttt{Qcb1} \texttt{Qfd7} 17.\texttt{Qb3} \texttt{Qxb3} 18.\texttt{Qb5} \texttt{Qd8} 19.\texttt{Qxb3} b6 20.a4± K.Georgiev – Herb, Bad Woerishofen 2002; 11...a6 12.\texttt{Qfc1} c5, Alexandria – Kostic, Pula 1990, 13.\texttt{Qab1}±; 11...h6 12.\texttt{Qfc1} \texttt{Qh7} 13.\texttt{Qb4} \texttt{Qg5} 14.c5 \texttt{Qxe3} 15.\texttt{Qxe3}± Burdik – Kaderabek, Klatovy 2004.) 12.b3 cxd5 13.\texttt{Qb5}! (That is a standard maneuver – White wishes to capture on d5 with his c-pawn.) 13...\texttt{Qd8} 14.cxd5± Ghinda – Bogdan, Eforie Nord 1998; 9...c5. Black is thus closing the centre and he restricts his opponent’s possibilities on the queenside. He also envisages the possible trade of the dark-squared bishops at an opportune moment. 10.a3 (It is good for White to play 10.\texttt{Qe1}, as well as 10.\texttt{Qd2}, but still the move in the text seems to me to be the most flexible.) 10...\texttt{Qxf3} (Or 10...\texttt{Qc8} 11.\texttt{Qd2} \texttt{Qxe2} 12.\texttt{Qxe2} \texttt{Qe8} 13.b4 \texttt{Qg5} 14.\texttt{Qab1} \texttt{Qxe3} 15.\texttt{Qxe3}± Adianto – Sitanggang, Beijing 1992; 10...\texttt{Qe8} 11.\texttt{Qd2} b6 12.\texttt{Qab1} h6 13.\texttt{Qfc1} \texttt{Qdf6} 14.\texttt{Qwd1} \texttt{Qh8}
15.b4± J.Pinter – Heidenfeld, Germany 1997.) 11...\textbf{xf3} a6 (Or 11...\textbf{e}e8 12.\textbf{wd}2 g6 13.\textbf{e}2 f5 14. \textbf{exf}5 \textbf{gxf}5 15.f4 \textbf{g}7 16.\textbf{fxe}5 dx\textbf{e}5, Naumkin – Pozzi, Cesenatico 1998, 17.d6 \textbf{f}6 18.\textbf{wd}5+ \textbf{f}7 19. \textbf{ad}1±) 12.g3 \textbf{c}c8, Peptan – Sanduleac, Bucharest 2006, 13.\textbf{g}2±.

10.\textbf{xd}5

10...\textbf{xf}3

This is the main line for Black. He must consider now White’s possible maneuver \textbf{f3}-d2 – after the exchange of the light-squared bishops there will remain an identical compact of pieces for both sides and White’s advantage will be enhanced not only by his extra space, but also by the obvious difference in strength between the bishops on e3 and e7. After the move in the text, the piece-balance changes. The relatively useless in this pawn-structure white light-squared bishop remains on the board, while Black dreams about the trade of his “bad” dark-squared bishop on e7 via the g5, or b6-squares.

Now, something about his other possible plans:

10...\textbf{c}c8 11.\textbf{d}d2 \textbf{xe}2 12.\textbf{w}xe2 a6 13.\textbf{fc}1 \textbf{e}8 14.b4 \textbf{g}5 15.\textbf{d}d1± Leveille – Frialde, Canada 1991;

10.\textbf{wa}5 11.\textbf{d}d2 \textbf{xe}2 12.\textbf{w}xe2 \textbf{fc}8 13.\textbf{fc}1 \textbf{e}8 (or 13...\textbf{c}c5, Lopes Carlos – Lebredo, Cuba 1992, 14.f3±) 14.a4! This is a quite typical resource to establish a positional bind on Black’s queenside for this pawn-structure. 14...\textbf{d}8 15.a5 a6 16.\textbf{c}c4 \textbf{g}5 17.\textbf{a}a4 \textbf{xe}3 18.\textbf{xe}3± and White occupies the c-file, Piket – Urdag, Novi Sad 1990. Black’s defence was not visibly facilitated even after the exchange of his “bad” dark-squared bishop;

10...\textbf{b}b8 11.\textbf{d}d2 \textbf{xe}2 12.\textbf{w}xe2 \textbf{d}8 13.\textbf{fc}1 a6 14.b4 \textbf{b}6 15.\textbf{xb}6 \textbf{xb}6. Black has achieved what he wanted, but his pieces are quite misplaced. 16.\textbf{e}3 \textbf{fd}7 17.a4 \textbf{e}8 (with the idea to counter 18.a5, with 18...\textbf{c}c4) 18.\textbf{w}2! a5 (Otherwise White would play a4-a5 himself and his knight would penetrate to the b6-square.). It deserved attention for White to try here 19.\textbf{b}5 (It is a bit less precise for him to follow with: 19.bxa5 \textbf{xa}5 20.\textbf{b}3 \textbf{a}6 21.a5 \textbf{c}5± Peng Zhaqin – Blagojevic, Pozarevac 1995.) 19...\textbf{x}b4 20.\textbf{w}xb4±. Black must worry now about White’s unpleasant pressure along the b-file, but his vulnerable d6-pawn is an even greater problem;

10...a6 11.\textbf{d}d2 \textbf{xe}2 12.\textbf{w}xe2 \textbf{e}8. This move is with the idea to exchange the dark-squared bishops. Now, White must play very
precisely in order to maintain his positional advantage. 13.b4 g6 (or 13...\textit{\&}g5 14.\textit{\&}c4 \textit{\&}c8 15.\textit{\&}ac1 f5 16.exf5±) 14.\textit{\&}c4 \textit{\&}g5 15.\textit{\&}ac1 \textit{\&}c8 16.\textit{\&}a5 \textit{\&}c7 17.\textit{\&}a4 \textit{\&}xe3 18.\textit{\&}xe3 f5 19.\textit{\&}xc7 \textit{\&}xc7 20.exf5! (Things are not so clear if White continues with: 20.\textit{\&}xb7 \textit{\&}b8.) 20...\textit{\&}xf5 21.\textit{\&}c3±;

10...\textit{\&}e8 11.\textit{\&}b3 (It is also possible for White to follow with: 11.\textit{\&}d2 \textit{\&}xe2 12.\textit{\&}xe2 \textit{\&}g5 13.\textit{\&}ac1 a6 – see 10...a6.) 11...\textit{\&}b8 12.\textit{\&}fc1 \textit{\&}c5 13.\textit{\&}c2 f5 14.\textit{\&}xc5 dxc5 15.\textit{\&}xf5 \textit{\&}xf5 16.\textit{\&}d3± M.Marin – Al.Hasin, Dresden 1988.

11.\textit{\&}xf3 \textit{\&}b8

That is the most flexible line for Black.

He has also tried in practice:

11...a5?! 12.\textit{\&}e2± Bulava – Helis, Karolina 2001;

11...\textit{\&}b6 12.b3 \textit{\&}fd7 13.\textit{\&}d2 h6 14.\textit{\&}ac1 \textit{\&}g5 15.\textit{\&}xg5 hgx5 16.\textit{\&}b5 \textit{\&}c5, Kluger – Pirc, Gyula 1965 17.\textit{\&}e3±;

11...\textit{\&}e8, Ivkov – Supanicić, Cetinje 1990, 12.\textit{\&}g4± (White starts the fight for the c-file and he is presently preventing 12...\textit{\&}g5);

About 11...a6 12.a4 \textit{\&}b8 13.\textit{\&}e2 \textit{\&}c8 14.\textit{\&}fc1 \textit{\&}d8 15.a5 – see the main line.

12.a4 \textit{\&}c8

Black brings his rook into action. It is less precise for him to play: 12...\textit{\&}d8 13.a5± Schlemermeyer – Hausner, Stockholm 1988.

13.a5 \textit{\&}d8

It is clearly worse for Black to follow with: 13...b5 14.\textit{\&}a2 \textit{\&}c5 15.\textit{\&}b4 \textit{\&}cxe4 16.\textit{\&}c6 \textit{\&}b7 17.\textit{\&}c1 b4 (Black prevents 18.b4 and later \textit{\&}d3, but now the trouble comes from the other side of the board.) 18.a6! \textit{\&}c7 19.\textit{\&}xe4 \textit{\&}xe4 20.\textit{\&}xe7+ \textit{\&}xe7 21.\textit{\&}xc8+ \textit{\&}xc8 22.\textit{\&}g4 \textit{\&}c4 23.b3 h5 24.\textit{\&}f3+– Lukacs – Priehoda, Hungary 1999.

14.\textit{\&}e2!??

It is also possible for White to continue with: 14.\textit{\&}e2 b5 15.f3 a6, Gelfand – Campora, Izmir 2004. We have to mention indeed, that White’s straightforward attempt to establish his knight on the c6-square was not successful, moreover Black managed to accomplish the quite advantageous in strategical aspect exchange of the dark-squared bishops too: 16.\textit{\&}f2 \textit{\&}b7 17.\textit{\&}f1 h6 18.g3 \textit{\&}c7 19.\textit{\&}g2 \textit{\&}b8 20.\textit{\&}a2 \textit{\&}a7 21.\textit{\&}xa7 \textit{\&}xa7 22.\textit{\&}b4 \textit{\&}b8. Still, the basic liabilities of Black’s position remained – the vulnerability of the a6-pawn and the chronic lack of space. At the end, White traded all heavy pieces and he won the
arising endgame. Possibly, Black did not defend in the best fashion, but I would still like to quote the entire game here as an instructive illustration that White had good prospects even when it seemed that Black had solved most of his defensive problems. 23.\textit{\textbf{R}}c1 \textit{\textbf{R}}d7 24.\textit{\textbf{R}}fc2 \textit{\textbf{R}}ac7 25.\textit{\textbf{R}}d3 \textit{\textbf{R}}f8 26.\textit{\textbf{R}}xc7 \textit{\textbf{R}}xc7 27.\textit{\textbf{R}}xc7 \textit{\textbf{R}}xc7 28.\textit{\textbf{R}}c1 \textit{\textbf{R}}xc1 29.\textit{\textbf{R}}xc1 \textit{\textbf{R}}fd7 30.\textit{\textbf{R}}f2 \textit{\textbf{R}}c5 31.\textit{\textbf{R}}e3 \textit{\textbf{R}}e7 32.b4 \textit{\textbf{R}}cd7 33.\textit{\textbf{R}}h3 \textit{\textbf{R}}f6 34.\textit{\textbf{R}}d3 \textit{\textbf{R}}e8 35.f4 \textit{\textbf{R}}f6 36.\textit{\textbf{R}}c8 \textit{\textbf{R}}c7 37.\textit{\textbf{R}}f3 \textit{\textbf{R}}d8 38.\textit{\textbf{R}}f5 \textit{\textbf{R}}d7 39.h4 \textit{\textbf{R}}f8 40.h5 \textit{\textbf{R}}e8 41.\textit{\textbf{R}}f2 \textit{\textbf{R}}c7 42.\textit{\textbf{R}}d1 \textit{\textbf{R}}e8 43.\textit{\textbf{R}}e3 \textit{\textbf{R}}c7 44.\textit{\textbf{R}}h3 \textit{\textbf{R}}e8 45.\textit{\textbf{R}}f5 \textit{\textbf{R}}c7 46.\textit{\textbf{R}}g6 \textit{\textbf{R}}xg6 47.hxg6 \textit{\textbf{R}}e8 48.\textit{\textbf{R}}f5 with the unavoidable threat – \textit{\textbf{R}}xg7, 1-0.

14...a6
If 14...\textit{\textbf{R}}c5, then 15.\textit{\textbf{R}}a3!±.

15.\textit{\textbf{R}}fc1 b5
In case of 15...b6, White will play again: 16.b4 bxa5 17.bxa5±. He must preserve the a-pawns, because Black's a6-pawn is a worrisome weakness.

16.b4 \textit{\textbf{R}}b7 17.\textit{\textbf{R}}e1
White plans to transfer his bishop to the h3-c8 diagonal.

17...\textit{\textbf{R}}f8

Black can trade the dark-squared bishops indeed, but White occupies the c-file in that case too – 17.\textit{\textbf{R}}c7 18.\textit{\textbf{R}}b1 \textit{\textbf{R}}b8 19.\textit{\textbf{R}}xc8+ \textit{\textbf{R}}xc8 20.\textit{\textbf{R}}d2 \textit{\textbf{R}}a7 21.\textit{\textbf{R}}c1 \textit{\textbf{R}}d8 22.\textit{\textbf{R}}f1±.

18.\textit{\textbf{R}}e2 \textit{\textbf{R}}c7 19.f3 \textit{\textbf{R}}g6 20.\textit{\textbf{R}}d7 21.\textit{\textbf{R}}a2 \textit{\textbf{R}}ac8 22.\textit{\textbf{R}}ac2 h6 23.\textit{\textbf{R}}d2 \textit{\textbf{R}}gf8 24.\textit{\textbf{R}}f1 \textit{\textbf{R}}h7 25.\textit{\textbf{R}}h4 \textit{\textbf{R}}hf6

26.\textit{\textbf{R}}h3. It is all over now! White only needs to exchange the rooks and Black's defence will be extremely difficult with queens present on the borad, or even without them. 26...\textit{\textbf{R}}c4 27.\textit{\textbf{R}}b1 \textit{\textbf{R}}xc2 28.\textit{\textbf{R}}xc2 \textit{\textbf{R}}h5 (or 28...\textit{\textbf{R}}c7 29.\textit{\textbf{R}}xc7 \textit{\textbf{R}}xc7 30.\textit{\textbf{R}}c3 \textit{\textbf{R}}xc3 31.\textit{\textbf{R}}xc3±) 29.\textit{\textbf{R}}h2 \textit{\textbf{R}}xc2 30.\textit{\textbf{R}}xc2 \textit{\textbf{R}}hf6 31.\textit{\textbf{R}}d2 \textit{\textbf{R}}h7 32.\textit{\textbf{R}}b3±.

Conclusion
The variations that we have dealt with in this chapter are essentially different; nevertheless they have a lot in common too. It happens quite often in the closed openings (we mean the classical openings as well as the King's Indian Defence) that the development of the bishop on c8 is a serious problem for Black. Here, that problem has been solved in a radical fashion. Still, as it usually happens, he inherits other problems to solve as "a compensation" for that. White should try to exploit these drawbacks of Black's opening set-up.

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Chapter 2

Now, we have to summarize the variations, which we have just analyzed and to emphasize the important key – points:

a) 4...g6. This is a very seldom played system of development and as a result the game gradually enters the lines of the King’s Indian Defence. The only original lines arise after an early capture ♦xf3, but even the simple evaluation of that line from the point of view of chess common sense reminds us that Black should not be able to equalize easily;

b) 4...e6. That is the most solid decision from the point of view of positional play and it involves a logical plan for Black too. He intends to prepare additionally c7-c6 and d6-d5 even if that would mean the loss of some tempi. His light-squared bishop would be placed quite reasonably on g6 in that case. It is far from easy for White to prove the defects of that set-up; therefore he should play d4-d5 as quickly as possible. It looks like that is the only way for him to maintain his advantage;

c) 4...♦xf3. I believe that following that exchange White’s pawn-structure becomes even more attractive – the e-file has been opened and after f3-f4, the e5-square is already unavailable for Black’s pieces. Meanwhile, later White can exchange his doubled f-pawn if necessary with the eventual advance f4-f5. We would like to emphasize again that White needs to place his pawn on d5, analogously to variation b; otherwise Black would do that quite happily.

d) 4...♦bd7. That is a natural way of developing pieces for Black, but it does not pose any serious problems to White. The fine point here is that after the centre is blocked (d4-d5), the trade of the light-squared bishops with ♦f3-d2, ♦g4xe2, ♦d1xe2 will be quite advantageous for White from the point of view of strategy. It should not be a great problem for him to prevent the maneuver ♦g4xf3, followed by the trade of the dark-squared bishops with ♦e7-g5. Meanwhile, White’s light-squared bishop would not be weak at all in that case, since it can be quite useful along the h3-c8 diagonal. Finally, the idea for Black to place his light-squared bishop on the g6-square seems to be dubious indeed.

In conclusion, all these remarks and the detailed analysis has convinced us that White’s prospects are better in all these variations.
Chapter 3  

1.\( \text{d}f3 \text{d}f6 \) 2.\( \text{c}4 \text{d}6 \) 3.\( \text{d}4 \text{b}d7 \)

Black is planning to advance his central pawn – e7-e5.

4.\( \text{c}3 \text{c}6 \)

This order of moves is considered to be the most precise for Black. The point is that after the natural move 4...e5, it is quite promising for White to follow with 5.\( \text{g}g5 \). In case of, for example: 5...\( \text{e}e7 \) (if 5...h6 6.\( \text{h}h4 \) g5, then 7.\( \text{dxe5!} \) dxe5 8.\( \text{gg}3\#) 6.e3 c6 7.\( \text{wc}2 \) 0-0 8.0-0-0 h6 (White maintains his initiative too after: 8...\( \text{wa}5 \) 9.\( \text{d}d3 \) e8 10.g4 exd4 11.exd4 \( \text{d}f8 \) 12.h3, Vaiisser – Larsen, Mesa 1992.) 9.\( \text{h}h4 \) \( \text{wa}5 \) (The exchange of the dark-squared bishops with: 9...\( \text{h}h5 \) 10.\( \text{x}e7 \) \( \text{xe7} \), would not be sufficient to equalize for Black due to: 11.g4 \( \text{h}h6 \) 12.g5 hxg5 13.\( \text{xg5} \) e8 14.h4 \( \text{f}8 \) 15.e2 e4 16.\( \text{d}d1 \) \( \text{f}5 \), Miles – Krasenkow, Las Vegas 1999, 17.h5! 10.\( \text{b}b1 \) e8 11.\( \text{d}d3 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 12.h3 (It is also interesting for White to try here 12.c5.) 12...\( \text{e}6 \) (It is evidently premature for Black to continue with: 12...e4?, in view of: 13.\( \text{x}e4 \) \( \text{x}e4 \) 14.\( \text{x}e4 \) \( \text{h}4 \) 15.\( \text{x}h4 \) g5 16.\( \text{f}f5 \) \( \text{xe4} \) 17.\( \text{h}xh6+ \) =) 13.g4 e4 (It is a mistake for Black to play: 13...b5?!, because of: 14.dxe5 bxc4 15.exf6 cxd3 16.\( \text{x}d3 \) gxf6 17.\( \text{d}d4\#) 14.\( \text{x}e4 \)! (White should refrain from the line: 14.\( \text{x}e4 \) \( \text{x}e4 \) 15.\( \text{x}e4 \) \( \text{h}4 \) 16.\( \text{x}h4 \), due to 16...\( \text{xc}4 \)! =) 14...\( \text{xc}4 \) 15.\( \text{xf}6 \) \( \text{xf}6 \) 16.h4 and White preserves the initiative, Ionov – Kochyev, USSR 1984.

Of course, we must also analyze 5.e4 (after 4...e5), because that plan will be out “spearhead” in the middle game. Tournament practice shows that plenty of other variations will unavoidably transpose, because Black can hardly continue the game without playing c7-c6 at some moment. 5...\( \text{exd}4 \) – This is the only line for Black in which there might arise some original variations. 6.\( \text{d}x\text{d}4 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 7.f3 a5 (After 7...g6, the game
transposes to the King’s Indian Defence – see Part 1, Book 1b) 8.\textit{xe}3 \textit{xe}7 9.\textit{xe}2 0–0 10.0–0 \textit{xe}8 11.\textit{fd}2 c6, Konopka – Kandic, Germany 2002, 12.\textit{fd}1 \textit{ab}1, b2-b3, a2-a3 and b3-b4±.

5.e4

5...e5

In case of 5...\textit{c}7 6.\textit{xe}2 e5, we have again a transposition to variations that we are going to analyze later, or after 6...g6, to the King’s Indian Defence. Now, I would like to change the subject of purely chess-comments and to delve in the past for a while and to try to look at that system from the point of view of Black. The position after 5...e5 has been played for the first time in the game Rubinstein – Capablanca, New York 1913, so that it is relatively “new”, so to speak. If we ignore the fine points, connected with the move-order, as an inventor of the system should be considered Siegbert Tarrasch – one of the outstanding chess players at the time. He tried that line back in the year 1903 at the tournament in Monte Carlo, against the not less eminent player at that moment – Karl Schlechter. The “premiere” ended in a disaster... Schlechter was White and he won convincingly, but the beginning was set. Later, Nimzowitsch and Tartakower tried that variation too. It is amazing that Capablanca was the first one who played c7-c6 before \textit{f}8-e7. That might seem to you to be a trifle, but we must acknowledge the exquisite feeling of harmony of one of the greatest players of all times.

We would not say – that system had become popular immediately; nevertheless during the second half of the last century it had been a part of the opening repertoire of then future World Champion Boris Spassky and the multiple challenger for the world title Bent Larsen. Sometime later, the interest towards the variation increased gradually and it became a weapon in the opening armour of numerous famous grandmasters. The reason was that the arising positions were not so well studied and there remained plenty of room for creative endeavour. Secondly, Black has his objective counter chances. His pawn-structure in the centre and on the queenside is quite flexible (e5, d6, c6, b5, a6) – that is exactly the contemporary treatment of that variation too and it is rather dynamic, so White must control quite precisely the pawn-tension – b5-c4 and e5-d4 (For example, Black after 0–0, \textit{b}7, \textit{e}8, \textit{f}8
can endanger White’s e4-pawn in connection with the possibilities – e5xd4 and c7-c5.). Each side is trying to exploit the pawn-tension in his favour and things are far from clear. As a rule, the straightforward play does not yield any immediate success; so all possible plans must take into account the eventual changes of the pawn-structure. This requires profound positional mastership, a sense of “total chess” and it is quite obvious that the difference in strength between the opponents will be much more important under these circumstances in comparison to the traditional openings in which the plans are so well familiar.

The next outbreak of popularity of that system was at the beginning of the 80ies of the last century, when the Ukrainian grandmaster Vladimir Malaniuk turned into an avid adherent to that variation for Black. It became a formidable weapon in his opening repertoire and White had to begin to treat it quite seriously. Gradually, White managed to cope with the problems in that system and we can also recommend the fianchetto variation with 5.g3, besides the system, which we analyze in our book. Naturally, White must then be prepared to enter lines belonging to the King’s Indian Defence, but that is an entirely different story...

6...e2 e7

Here, just like before, the move 6...g6, followed by g7, transposes to the King’s Indian Defence.

7.0–0

The attempt – 7.e3 is clearly premature in view of: 7...g4 8.d2 exd4 9.cxd4 and now 9...b6! 10.xg4 xd4 11.e2 c5= Dlugy – Gulko, USA 1988.

![Chess Diagram]

Now, Black has several possibilities at his disposal: a) 7...c7, b) 7...a6 and c) 7...0–0. Something in short about his other lines:

About 7...a5 8.h3 0–0 9.e3 – see 7...0–0;

About 7...h6 8.e3 0–0 – see 7...0–0; as for 8...c7 – see 7...c7;

7...exd4. It is not in the right spirit of this variation for Black to give up the centre so early, because his dark-squared bishop is not so active here, in comparison to the King’s Indian Defence, moreover it closes the e-file and he cannot organize easily any counterplay against White’s e4-pawn. 8.xd4 c5 (The other lines for Black are evidently worse: 8...g6?! 9.h6± Vark – Vargas, Medellin 1996; 8...0–0, Panza-
lović – Kamberovic, Internet 2003, 9.dı5 ęc5 10.đxe7+ ęxe7 11.f3± Ribli.) 9.ęc2 a5 10.dı4 ęc7 11.ęad1 0-0 12.ęd2 ęe6 (or 12...
ęe6 13.đxe6 fxe6 14.c5 e5 15.cxd6 ęxd6 16.ęe3± Ribli) 13.ęfd1 ęad8 14.ęg3 ęfe8 15.đxe6 fxe6 (Black is trying to change the pawn-
structure in order to create some counter chances – for example after e6-e5, he has some wishful-
thinking idea to penetrate with his knight to the d4-outpost at some moment in the bleak fu-
ture...White maintains a solid positional bind otherwise – 15...
đxe6 16.a3±) 16.f4! e5 17.f5! White thus prevents Black’s maneuver đc5-e6-d4. 17...g6 18.đf2 ęh8
19.a3 ęg8 20.ęh1 ęa8 21.g4 ęfd7 (It would have been bad for Black to have continued with: 21...gxf5
22.exf5 đxg4 23.đxg4 ęxg4 24.đxc5 đxc5 25.đd7+–. Meanwhile, White is already threatening to
advance further his kingside pawns – 22.g5.) 22.b4. This is the beginning of the decisive on-
đxd6 and Black was in a great trouble in the game M.Sorokin –
Peregrudov, Perm 1997.

a) 7...ęc7

This move frees the knight from the protection of the e5-
pawn and Black opts for the maneuver đf8-g6. Meanwhile, he has not castled yet, so he would
not need to waste a tempo for the

move đf8-e8. The drawback of that idea is that Black’s lag is de-
velopment becomes worrisome.

8.ęe3

Naturally, White can try to prevent that idea with the move –
8.ęe1. In this case however, Black might change up his mind and
transpose to the main lines of that system with 8...đf8?!, he might end up in a
very difficult position after: 9.c5!
đxc5 10.dxe5 đg4 and here after:
11.đd5!! đxd5 12.exd5 ęb6 13.e6
đxe6 (In case of: 13...c4 14.đd4
đf6 15.ęa4+ ęd8 16.ęxg4 ęxd4,
Black might get completely wiped
out from the board as a result of the
line: 17.e7+! ęxe7 18.ęxe7! ęxe7
19.ęg5+ f6 20.ęe1+ ęd8 21.ęe8+ ęc7 22.d6+ ęxd6 23.ęd8+ ęd7
24.ęx7+ ęx7 25.ęx7+–, after
13...fxe6 14.ęa4+ ęd7 15.ęxg4
đf6 16.ęxg7 ęg8 17.ęh6 ęg6 18.
ęf4 ęxd5 19.ęc4± Black’s position
was again quite hard to de-
 fend in the game Grigore – Dodu,
Honorod 1992.) 14.ęa4 and
White’s attack was tremendously

8...\(\text{Qf8}\)

In case of 8...0–0, there arises a position from variation c.

Black’s other possibilities are:

8...a5. This move ensures the a5-square for the knight, in case White adheres to a plan including the advance d4-d5. Still, pawns do not go back and Black loses terminally the possibility to try the most flexible pawn-set-up connected with a7-a6 and b7-b5, so White is not obliged to close the centre at all. 9.\(\text{Wc2}\) h6 10.\(\text{Qh4}\) \(\text{Qf8}\) 11.\(\text{Qf5}\) \(\text{xf5}\) 12.\(\text{exf5}\) \(\text{Qd8}\) 13.f4 \(\text{exd4}\) 14.\(\text{Qxd4}\) with the idea to follow with \(\text{Qf3}, \text{a6}, \text{Schiffer} – \text{van Dongen}, \text{Groningen 2003};\)

8...a6 9.d5 c5 (About 9...0–0 – see variation c4, the notes to Black’s move nine.) 10.\(\text{De1}\) \(\text{Qf8}\), Bakic – Pikula, Kladovo 1991, 11.\(\text{Qd3}\) \(\text{Qg6}\) 12.b4 \(\text{cxb4}\) 13.\(\text{Wxa4}\) \(\text{Qxd7}\) 14.\(\text{Qxb4}\) \(\text{Qc8}\) 15.\(\text{Qe1}\) 0–0 16.\(\text{Bab1}\) \(\text{Qxc4}\) 17.\(\text{Qxb7}\);

8...h6. This move is with the idea to organize some actions on the kingside, leaving the king in the centre for a while. 9.d5 c5 (Or 9...\(\text{Qf8}\) 10.b4 g5 11.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qg6}\) 12.c5 0–0 13.\(\text{Qc4}\) \(\text{Qd8}\) 14.\(\text{Qc1}\)± I.Farago – Kjaergaard, Kiel 2004; 9...\(\text{Qg4}\) 10.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qf8}\) 11.b4 f5, van den Doel – Armis, Wijk aan Zee 1995, 12.\(\text{exf5}\) \(\text{xf5}\) 13.\(\text{Qh4}\) \(\text{Qxh4}\) 14.\(\text{Qxg4}\)±, or 10...g5 11.b4 \(\text{Qf8}\) 12.\(\text{De1}\) \(\text{Qgf6}\) 13.\(\text{Qc2}\) Qg6 14.\(\text{Qe3}\) \(\text{Qf4}\) 15.\(\text{Qxc6}\) \(\text{Bxc6}\) 16.b5± Jukic – Bacic, Tucepi 1996.) 10.\(\text{De1}\) g5 11.g3 \(\text{Qf8}\)

12.\(\text{Qh1}\) \(\text{Qg6}\) 13.\(\text{Qc2}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) 14.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qh3}\) 15.\(\text{Qg1}\) h5 (White would counter 15...\(\text{Qg4}\), with 16.\(\text{Qg2}\).) 16.f3 \(\text{Qg8}\) 17.\(\text{Qe3}\) \(\text{Wd7}\) 18.a3 \(\text{Qh6}\) 19.b4 b6 20.\(\text{Qd3}\) h4 21.\(\text{Qf4}\) 22.\(\text{Qc2}\)± Kruppa – Gerasimenyk, St Petersburg 2003;

8...\(\text{Qg4}\) 9.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qf8}\) (Or 9...d5, F.Bilobrk – Jurkovic, Zadar 1995. This is an interesting idea connected with the attempt to create some threats along the h2-b8 diagonal and it requires certain precision from White. 10.\(\text{Qxd5}\) \(\text{exd4}\) 11.\(\text{Qxc6}\) \(\text{Bxc6}\) 12.\(\text{Qa4}\) 0–0 13.\(\text{h3}\) \(\text{Qgf6}\) 14.\(\text{Qc2}\) \(\text{Qd6}\) 15.\(\text{Qac1}\) \(\text{Qe5}\) 16.\(\text{Qxe5}\) \(\text{Qxe5}\) 17.\(\text{Qd3}\) \(\text{Qb8}\) 18.\(\text{Qf4}\) \(\text{Qh5}\) 19.\(\text{Qf3}\)±) 10.d5 \(\text{Qg6}\) 11.\(\text{Qe1}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) 12.\(\text{Qd3}\) 0–0, Stone – Hamilton, Canada 1986, 13.\(\text{Qf6}\) 14.\(\text{Qe3}\)±.

9.d5 c5

Black has also tried in practice: 9...\(\text{Qg6}\) 10.\(\text{Qe1}\) h5 (In case of 10...c5, White can follow with: 11.b4 \(\text{cxb4}\) 12.\(\text{Qa4}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) 13.\(\text{Qxb4}\) 0–0 14.\(\text{Qb1}\) b6 15.\(\text{Qb5}\) \(\text{Qb8}\) 16.\(\text{Qf3}\)±) 11.\(\text{Qd3}\) \(\text{Qg4}\) 12.\(\text{Qd2}\) f5 13.c5!? (White should try to open the game in the centre, otherwise for example after: 13.\(\text{Qf6}\) 14.b4 \(\text{Qxd5}\) 15.\(\text{Qxd5}\) \(\text{f4}\) 16.\(\text{Qf2}\), Black would organize a powerful attack against White’s king with: 16...0–0 17.\(\text{Qc1}\) \(\text{Qd8}\) 18.\(\text{Qb3}\) \(\text{Qe8}\) 19.\(\text{Qc2}\) \(\text{Qh4}\) 20.\(\text{Qb1}\) \(\text{Qg3}\) – Cvitan – Jurkovic, Zadar 1995.) 13...0–0 (It is not good for Black to defend with: 13...\(\text{Qxc5}\) 14.\(\text{Qxc6}\) \(\text{Qxc6}\)?) 15.\(\text{Qxe5}\)±, as well as with: 14... \(\text{Bxc6}\) 15.\(\text{Qa4}\) c4 16.\(\text{Qd5}\)±) 14.
dxc6 bxc6 15.h3 \( \text{\&} \text{f}6 \) 16.cxd6 \( \text{\&} \text{d}6 \) 17.\( \text{\&} \text{e}3 \) \( \text{\&} \text{xe}4 \) 18.\( \text{\&} \text{xe}4 \) fxe4 19.\( \text{\&} \text{c}5 \pm \) – since he would remain with too many pawn-weaknesses to worry about.

10.\( \text{\&} \text{b}1 \)

White’s position is good enough, so he does not need to complicate the game so much. Naturally, it seems attractive for him to try 10.b4, but after 10...cxb4 11.\( \text{\&} \text{a}4+ \) \( \text{\&} \text{d}7 \) 12.\( \text{\&} \text{b}5 \) (In case of 12.\( \text{\&} \text{xb}4 \), Black manages to fortify his knight on the c5-square – 12...0-0 13.\( \text{\&} \text{e}1 \) \( \text{\&} \text{c}5 \) 14.f3 \( \text{\&} \text{fd}7 \) 15.\( \text{\&} \text{d}3 \) \( \text{\&} \text{d}8 \).) 12...\( \text{\&} \text{d}8 \) 13.a3 (The defenselessness of the e4-pawn becomes a great liability of White’s position. He is setting a trap with his last move – after 13...b3, he inflicts a strike with the move 14.c5! –) 13...\( \text{\&} \text{xe}4 \) 14.axb4 a6 15.\( \text{\&} \text{d}3 \) \( \text{\&} \text{e}6 \), the situation on the board remains quite unclear.

10...\( \text{\&} \text{g}6 \) 11.b4 \( \text{\&} \text{b}6 \)

It is probably better for Black to play 11...cxb4, but White achieves a slight edge even then without to many problems – 12.\( \text{\&} \text{a}4+ \) \( \text{\&} \text{d}7 \) 13.\( \text{\&} \text{xb}4 \) 0-0 14.c5 dxc5 15.\( \text{\&} \text{xc}5 \) \( \text{\&} \text{xc}5 \) 16.\( \text{\&} \text{xc}5 \) \( \text{\&} \text{e}8 \) 17.\( \text{\&} \text{fc}1 \) \( \text{\&} \text{d}6 \) 18.\( \text{\&} \text{d}3 \), with the idea to trade the blocking d6-knight with the move 19.\( \text{\&} \text{b}5 \).

12.bxc5 bxc5 13.\( \text{\&} \text{a}4+ \) \( \text{\&} \text{d}7 \) 14.\( \text{\&} \text{a}6 \) 0-0

In case of: 14...\( \text{\&} \text{c}8 \) 15.\( \text{\&} \text{b}5 \) \( \text{\&} \text{d}7 \) 16.\( \text{\&} \text{c}6 \), Black ends up with great problems.

15.\( \text{\&} \text{b}7 \) \( \text{\&} \text{d}8 \) 16.\( \text{\&} \text{xc}7 \) \( \text{\&} \text{xc}7 \) 17.\( \text{\&} \text{xc}7 \) \( \text{\&} \text{g}4 \) 18.\( \text{\&} \text{d}2 \) \( \text{\&} \text{f}5 \) 19.\( \text{\&} \text{b}1 \pm \).

b) 7...\( \text{\&} \text{a}6 \)

Sometimes Black delays his castling short with the idea to push b7-b5 as quickly as possible – at least that is how it seems at first sight. In fact the idea is much subtler – he wishes to avoid the unpleasant scheme, which arises for example after: 7...0-0 8.\( \text{\&} \text{e}3 \) a6 9.d5 cxd5 10.cxd5 b5 11.\( \text{\&} \text{d}2 \)
and we are going to deal with that line in our next chapter.

8. \( \texttt{h4!} \)

White is now threatening 9. \( \texttt{f5} \) and he thus forces his opponent to change his plans.

It is much harder for White to obtain any advantage if he tries some other ways. In case of 8.a4 a5, there arises a chronic weakness of the dark squares on the queenside (We are talking about the b4-square and the possible vulnerability of the c5-square if White pushes the thematic move d4-d5, or after Black exchanges in the centre e5xd4.) and that precludes him from active operations in the centre. For example: 9. \( \texttt{c2} \) 0–0 10. \( \texttt{d1} \) \( \texttt{c7} \) 11.d5 cxd5 12.cxd5 \( \texttt{c5} \) 13. \( \texttt{d2} \) \( \texttt{e8} \) 14. \( \texttt{c4} \) \( \texttt{d7} \) 15. \( \texttt{e3} \) f5 16.f3 \( \texttt{c8=} \) Alster – Ambarchumjan, Prague 1989.

After the immediate 8.d5 cxd5 (It is less appropriate for Black to try here: 8... \( \texttt{c5} \), in view of: 9. \( \texttt{d2} \) and he will have to lose additional time for another move with his rook pawn – 9...a5 10.b3 0–0 11.a3 \( \texttt{d}7 \) 12. \( \texttt{b1} \) cxd5 13.cxd5 b5 14.b4 axb4 15. \( \texttt{xb4} \) Polugaevsky – Larsen, Bugojno 1982 and White’s position seems to be preferable, because of the weakness of Black’s b5-pawn.) 9.cxd5 b5 10.b4 \( \texttt{b6} \) 11. \( \texttt{e3} \) \( \texttt{d7} \) 12. \( \texttt{d2} \) 0–0 13. \( \texttt{c1} \) \( \texttt{b8} \) and Black succeeded in reaching the optimal set-up of his pieces in the game Ivanchuk – Serper, Bagio 1987. This scheme of development for Black in this pawn-structure – with a knight on b6 and the light-squared bishop on the d7-square is standard for this variation and White should do his best to prevent it.

White would not change anything much with the line: 8. \( \texttt{e3} \) \( \texttt{g4} \) 9. \( \texttt{d2} \) \( \texttt{g6}! \) 10.d5 cxd5 11. cxd5 b5 12.b4 \( \texttt{b6} \) 13. \( \texttt{e3} \) \( \texttt{d7} \), because Black manages to reach again the abovementioned deployment of forces, Yevseev – Belikov, Alushta 2002.

8...exd4

There are some other possible tries for Black too.

In case he ignores the threat \( \texttt{f5} \), for example: 8...0–0 9. \( \texttt{f5} \) \( \texttt{e8} \) (or 9...b5 10. \( \texttt{g5} \) h6 11. \( \texttt{h4} \) \( \texttt{e8} \) 12. \( \texttt{xb5} \) \( \texttt{xb5} \) 13. \( \texttt{dxe5} \) dxe5 14. \( \texttt{d5} \) \( \texttt{f8} \) 15. \( \texttt{c1=} \) R.Sherbakov – A.Borisenko, Novgorod 1995), then White should better choose 10. \( \texttt{e3}! ? \) (In fact, he has spent too much time on maneuvers with this knight, so he should be reluctant to part with it so easily. After 10. \( \texttt{xe7+} \) \( \texttt{xe7} \) 11.f3 \( \texttt{f8} \) 12. \( \texttt{e3} \) \( \texttt{e6} \) 13. \( \texttt{wd2} \) c5 14. \( \texttt{dxe5} \) dxe5 15. \( \texttt{d5} \) \( \texttt{xd5} \) 16.cxd5 \( \texttt{d4} \) 17. \( \texttt{xd4} \) exd4, Black equalized completely in the game Gleizerov – Goncharov, Orel 1997.) 10... \( \texttt{f8} \) 11.d5 \( \texttt{c5} \) 12. \( \texttt{g3} \) a5 13.a3 and White maintains better chances. It is too bad for Black to play for example: 13... \( \texttt{b6} \) 14.b4! axb4 15.axb4 \( \texttt{xb4} \) (Following: 15... \( \texttt{xa1} \) 16. \( \texttt{xa1} \) \( \texttt{xb4} \) 17. \( \texttt{b1} \) \( \texttt{b3} \) 18. \( \texttt{b2} \), Black loses a piece.) 16. \( \texttt{xa8} \) \( \texttt{xc3} \) 17. \( \texttt{b1} \) –.
In case of: 8...@f8, R. Sherbakov – Dmitriev, Smolensk 2000, the simplest line for White is: 9.@e3 @e6 (or 9...@g6 10.@f5 @xf5 11.exf5 @h4 12.dxe5 dxe5 13.@c2 @d7 14.@d3 0–0–0 15.@ad1± 10.@f5 exd4 11.@xd4 0–0 12.@f5 @c5 13.@xe7+ @xe7 14.f3±.

Black’s most natural attempt to prevent the appearance of White’s knight on the f5-square is the move 8...g6, but then he must worry about the possibility: 9.@h6 @f8 10.@xf8 @xf8 11.@d2 (It also deserves attention for White to continue with the not so obvious set-up: 11.@f3 @g7 12.@e1 @e7 13.@f1 @d8 14.@d2 @f8 15.h3 a5 16.@ad1 @e6 17.@e3 @c7 18.dxe5 dxe5 19.@xd8 @xd8 20.@c5 @d7 21.@e7 @e6 22.@d1 a4 23.@d6 @dc5 24.@xc7 @xc7 25.@xe5++ Golod – P. Nielsen, Panormo 2002.) 11...@g7 12.dxe5 (After the move 12.f4, which was tested in the game Dreev – Serper, Tunja 1989, White had to consider 12...@e8, with the idea in case of 13.@ad1, for Black to play: 13...exd4 14.@xd4 @b6, increasing the pressure against the e4-pawn.) 12...dxe5 13.@g5 @e8 14.@f5+ @g8 15.@d6 @e6 16.@ad1 @b6 (After 16...@c7 17.@f5± Black’s position is very difficult.) 17.@d2 @c5 18. @e3± – Black cannot avoid material losses, Tesic – Vratornic, Kladovo 1991.

It is interesting for Black to opt for: 9...@b6 10.@f3 (After 10.dxe5 @xe5!? 11.@g7 @g8 12.@xf6 @xf6 13.@xd6 @d8 14.@xd8+ @xd8 15. @f3 @xf3+ 16.@xf3 @e6, it would be quite difficult for White to materialize his extra pawn.) 10...@xb2 (Black must have something to suffer for, otherwise White would have much less problems to worry about after: 10...@g4 11.@c1 0–0 12.h3 @gf6 13.c5 dxc5 14.dxe5 @e8 15.@h6 @g7 16.@c1 @c7 17.@f4 @e6 18.@g3 @ad8 19. @ad1±, or 13...@c7 14.cxd6 @xd6 15.@e3± Miles – Larsen, London 1980.) 11.@a4 @a3 (The line – 11...@b4 12.@b1 @a5 13.c5, leads more or less to the same thing.) 12.c5 exd4 13.@c1 @b4 14.a3 @a5 15.cxd6 @xd6 16.@xd4 @c7 (Black can take some care for the safety of his king – 16...0–0, but he will have problems without his dark-squared bishop. The game might continue with the following attractive variation: 17.@xd6 @xa4 18.e5 @e4 19.@e7 @c3 20.@d1 @xd1 21.e6++ 17.@h6 @g8 (In case of 17...c5 18.@d1 b5, it is possible for White to continue with: 19.@xc5 @xc5 20.@g7± 18.@d2 @h5 19.e5 @g4 (but not 19...@xe5 20.@f4) 20.@f4 and White has an excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

White must play rather precisely in answer to: 9...exd4 10. @xd4 @c5, as it happened in the game Vasquez – Godoy, Santiago 1997. Black was threatening 11. @e6, followed by 12...@g8 and White’s pieces would have been endangered. He had to consoli-
date urgently. 11.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)f3 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e6 12.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)d1 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)g4 13.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)d2 0–0 14.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e1. That retreat was temporary and White’s forces would soon spring back into action. 14...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e5 (or 14...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)f6 15.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e3\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\) 15.f4 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)b6+ 16.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)h1 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)d7 17.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)d3\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\). 9.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xd4

9...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)c5

The endgame, arising after 9...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)b6 10.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xb6 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xb6, is difficult for Black. See some examples on that subject, confirming this evaluation: 11.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e3 c5 (after 11...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)bd7, the move 12.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)f5 is quite annoying for Black) 12.h3 (White thus restricts maximally his opponent’s light-squared bishop. Meanwhile, it is also quite good for him to follow with: 12.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)f3 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)g4 13.b3 h6 14.h3 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xf3 15.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xf3\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\) Kiseleva – Erenskaja-Radzewska, Warsaw 1996.) 12...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e6 13.b3 0–0 0–0 (Black would not save the day with 13...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)g4, in view of: 14.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xg4 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xg4 15.hxg4 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xh4 16.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)ad1 0–0 0–0 17.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)f4 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e7, V.Ivanov – Shchukin, St Petersburg 1999 and here White’s simplest line would have been: 18.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)d5! \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xd5 19.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xd5, with a great positional advantage.) 14.

f4 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)d7 15.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)f3 f5 16.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)g5 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xg5 17.fxg5 g6 (Black’s situation is quite difficult too after: 17...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)hf8 18.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)ad1 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e5, because of: 19.exf5 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xf5 20.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e4\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\) 18.exf5 gxf5 (Following: 18...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xf5 19.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)ad1 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e5 20.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)g4 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e6 21.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e4 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)c7 22.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)f4, Black is faced with unavoidable material losses.) 19.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)d3 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)hf8 20.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)c2\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\) Val.Popov – Shchukin, St Petersburg 1998.

10.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)f5 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xf5 11.exf5 a5 12.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)g4!

White begins a pawn-offensive with the idea to cramp his opponent’s position even more.

12...0–0 13.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)g5 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)fd7 14.h4 f6 15.f4 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)c7

After 15...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xg5 16.fxg5 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e5, it is possible for White to follow with 17.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e3 (He has also the resource: 17.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e4 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xe4 18.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xe4\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\), maintaining his two-bishop advantage.) 17...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)d7 18.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)f4 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e3\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\) (or 18...\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)ae8 19.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)ad1\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\) 19.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xd3 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xd3 20.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e4 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e5 21.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)ad1 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)c7 and now white’s knight heads for the e6-square – 22.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e2. \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)

16.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)h1 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)ad8 17.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)d2 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xg5, S.Savchenko – Suetin, Groningen 1993, 18.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)xg5 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)e5 19.\(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)f2 \(\text{\texttt{Q}}\)cd7
20. \( \text{dxe}_5 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 21. \( \text{xf}1 \) \( \text{xe}_4 \) 22. \( \text{xe}_4 \pm. \)

c) 7...0–0

This is the most natural, as well as the most popular line for Black.

8. \( \text{xe}_3 \)

This structure is rather similar to the King’s Indian Defence; therefore the basic strategical ideas are more or less the same. The plans for both sides, the positional and tactical resources coincide, but naturally there are some nuances and fine points too. The most significant difference is that Black's dark-squared bishop is placed on e7 instead of being fianchettoed. That has some advantages and of course some drawbacks too and it influences the possible plans for both sides. The basic minus for Black is that the effect of his counterplay against White's centre after e5xd4 is diminished considerably. His bishop will be quite passively placed in that case, instead of being on the long dark diagonal and also it covers the e-file, precluding the possibility to organize a swift pressure against the e-pawn. There are some positive sides to its placement on e7 too. Black can activate that bishop, or even exchange it with the help of the maneuver \( \text{xe}_7-g5 \), moreover it defends the vulnerable d6-pawn and in case of White's exchange d4xe5, it can become a very good piece indeed.

Therefore, White’s main plans are: 1) to maintain the tension in the centre; 2) to push d4-d5 at some moment and so to consolidate his space advantage and to follow that with active actions on the queenside. Meanwhile, White should try to prevent Black’s setup, which we have indicated in our notes to White’s move eight in variation b of this chapter, as well the fortification of Black’s knight on the c5-outpost. In that case the general evaluation of the position is of paramount importance. If Black fails to create some effective counterplay, then White can easily repel that knight with the standard operation b2-b3, a2-a3, followed by b3-b4.

For instance, the immediate move 8.d5 enables Black to play 8...\( \text{c}_5 \) and to consolidate his fortifications on the queenside. 9.\( \text{xc}_2 \) (In case of: 9.\( \text{d}_2 \) a5 10.b3 \( \text{d}_7 \) 11.a3, with the idea to oust the knight later from the c5-square, Black can continue with: 11...\( \text{cxd}5 \) 12.cxd5 b5!? 13.\( \text{xb}_5 \) \( \text{fxe}4 \) 14.\( \text{dxexe}4 \) \( \text{exe}4 \) 15.\( \text{xd}7 \) \( \text{xc}3 \) 16.
\textit{\(\text{\#g4 and here after: 16...\text{\#b8!}\,? 17.\text{\#f5 \\#f6 18.\text{\#d2 \\#b5 19.\text{\#e3 g6 20.\text{\#c2 \#g7, followed by 21.\text{\#d4, Black obtained a quite acceptable position in the game Danner – Zagrebely, Budapest 1993.}}\) 9.\text{\#c2 cxd5 (It would be imprecise for Black to try: 9...a5, in view of 10.\text{\#e3\#\pm\) 10.cxd5 \text{\#c7 11.\text{\#d2 (White achieves nothing special with 11.\text{\#b5, because of 11...\text{\#d8 and after 12.\text{\#c3 \text{\#c7, there will be a repetition of moves, while in case of 11.\#b1, Black plays simply 11...\#d7\#\infty\) 11.\#d7 12.a4 \text{\#ac8 13.\#a3 \#e8 14.\#d1 \#g5 15.b4 \#a6 16.\#b3 f5!\,? and Black’s counterplay was quite sufficient in the game Kasparov – Larsen, Bugojno 1982.}}\) 9.\#d2 \#gf6 10.\#c2 cxd4;}\) 9.h3 cxd4 10.\#xd4 \#c5 11.\#c2 \#e8 12.\#ad1 and the game transposes to a position, which we will analyze later, in variation c1 – see 8...\#g4 9.\#d2 \#gf6 10.\#c2 cxd4;}}\) 9.\text{\#d2 \#gf6 10.\#c2 cxd4;}}\) 9.h3 cxd4 10.\#xd4 \#c5 (It is very bad for him to play: 9...d5?! 10.cxd5 cxd5, due to: 11.cxd5! \#b6 12.\#db5 \#fxd5 13.\#xd5 \#xd5 14.\#xa7 \#e6 15.a4 \#a5 16. \#d4 \#fd8 17.\#g4\#\pm and White remained with an extra pawn in the game Savchenko – Manouck, Cappelle la Grande 1995.) 10.\#c2 (It is also good for White to continue with 10.f3?!\) 10...a5 (or 10... \#g4 11.\#xg4 \#xg4 12.h3 \#e6 13. \#xe6 fx6 14.\#ad1 \#d7, Ksieski – Eis, Germany 1994, 15.f4 e5 16. f5\# 11.\#ad1 \#c7 12.h3 \#e8 13.b3 \#f8 14.\#f3 \#fd7, Okrajek – Roverer, Werther 2001, 15.g3 \#e5 16.\#g2\#.}

Black has plenty of various possibilities here. The main line \textbf{– 8...a6} will be the subject of our next chapter, while now we will analyze: \textbf{c1) 8...\#g4, c2) 8...\#e8 and c3) 8...\#c7. Here, something in short about several rarely played lines for Black.}

8...a5. (Now, in case of 9.d5, Black has a wonderful square for his knight on c5. Still, he does not have anymore the possibility to organize some counterplay with the help of the pawn-structure – a6-b5-c6-d6-e5 and that is in fact his most principled plan in this system. White can maintain the tension in the centre, because the pawn-structure is quite favourable for him. He only needs to watch about the possibility e5xd4, but that is hardly a problem in that situation.) 9.h3 cxd4 10.\#xd4 \#c5 11.\#c2 \#e8 12.\#ad1 and the game transposes to a position, which we will analyze later, in variation c1 – see 8...\#g4 9.\#d2 \#gf6 10.\#c2 cxd4;

Black’s attempt at opening the centre is not sufficient for equality either: 8...exd4 9.\#xd4 \#c5 (It is very bad for him to play: 9...d5?! 10.cxd5 cxd5, due to: 11.cxd5! \#b6 12.\#db5 \#fxd5 13.\#xd5 \#xd5 14.\#xa7 \#e6 15.a4 \#a5 16. \#d4 \#fd8 17.\#g4\#\pm and White remained with an extra pawn in the game Savchenko – Manouck, Cappelle la Grande 1995.) 10.\#c2 (It is also good for White to continue with 10.f3?!\) 10...a5 (or 10... \#g4 11.\#xg4 \#xg4 12.h3 \#e6 13. \#xe6 fx6 14.\#ad1 \#d7, Ksieski – Eis, Germany 1994, 15.f4 e5 16. f5\# 11.\#ad1 \#c7 12.h3 \#e8 13.b3 \#f8 14.\#f3 \#fd7, Okrajek – Roverer, Werther 2001, 15.g3 \#e5 16.\#g2\#.)

The other possibilities for Black are less principled and they do not create any real problems for White:}
Chapter 3

8...b6 (This is a dubious move, which does not improve Black’s position at all and it weakens unnecessarily the c6-square.) 9.d5 \( \text{\textit{g}} \text{b7} \) 10.b4 \( \text{\textit{e}} \text{c8} \) 11.dxc6 \( \text{\textit{c}} \text{xc6} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{b1} \) a6 13.h3+ Sielecki – Blecken, Ruhrgebiet 1998;

8...\( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e8} \) 9.b4. Black’s most sensible plan here is – g7-g6, \( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e8-g7} \) and f7-f5, so he should not close the position. Instead he should opt for active actions in the centre. 9...g6 10.\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{b3} \) d7 11.\( \text{\textit{e}} \text{ad1} \) \( \text{\textit{w}} \text{c7} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d2} \) f6 13.h3 \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{f5} \) 14.d5! \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{f6} \) (or 14...\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{f4} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{e}} \text{xf4} \) exf4 16.e5! dxe5 17.c5+ Atalik) 15.c5 \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d7} \) (It is slightly more resilient for Black to defend with: 15...dxc5 16.bxc5 \( \text{\textit{x}} \text{xd5} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{xd5} \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{xd5} \) 18.\( \text{\textit{x}} \text{xc5} \) 19.\( \text{\textit{e}} \text{c1} \) b6 20.d6+– Atalik.) 16.cxd6 \( \text{\textit{x}} \text{xd6} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{f}} \text{fd1} \) cxd5 18.\( \text{\textit{b}} \text{b5} \) 1-0 Atalik – Cordero, Del Plata 2003;

8...\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{e8} \) – That is an original maneuver, but Black loses several tempi in the process. 9.d5 a6 10.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d2} \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d8} \) 11.b4 \( \text{\textit{w}} \text{e7} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{b}} \text{b3} \) cxd5. The effectiveness of the change of places of Black’s queen and bishop is rather questionable, so he is trying to do something active on the kingside. 13.cxd5 \( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e8} \) 14.a4 g6 15.a5 \( \text{\textit{g}} \text{g7} \) 16.\( \text{\textit{a}} \text{a4} \). Black’s main problem has become evident. He has defended the c7-square from the penetration of White’s pieces, but he has problems to protect his bishop on c8. 16.\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{h4} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d2} \) f5 18.f3 \( \text{\textit{h}} \text{h5} \) 19.\( \text{\textit{c}} \text{c4} \) \( \text{\textit{w}} \text{e7} \) 20.\( \text{\textit{e}} \text{c1} \) f4 21.\( \text{\textit{f}} \text{f2} \) g5 22.\( \text{\textit{e}} \text{c3} \) \( \text{\textit{h}} \text{h6} \) 23.\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{c2} \) h5 24.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d2} \) +– Psakhis – Hickl, Lugano 1988;

8...h6 9.\( \text{\textit{w}} \text{c2} \). Black’s previous move did not clarify his intentions about what he had in mind to do later, so it was reasonable for White to keep the decision about his own plan flexible. He can close the centre at any moment at leisure. 9...\( \text{\textit{h}} \text{h7} \) (Or 9...\( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e8} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{e}} \text{ad1} \) \( \text{\textit{w}} \text{c7} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{f}} \text{fe1} \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{h7} \) 12.b4 \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{g5} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{xg5} \) \( \text{\textit{x}} \text{g5} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{x}} \text{xg5} \) hxg5 15.dxe5 dxe5 16.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d2} \) ± Iskusnyh – Zarezenko, Novosibirsk 1998.) 10.\( \text{\textit{e}} \text{ad1} \) \( \text{\textit{f}} \text{f6} \) 11.d5 c5 12.a3 \( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e7} \) 13.b4 b6 14.\( \text{\textit{b}} \text{b1} \) \( \text{\textit{d}} \text{f6} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d2} \) \( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e8} \) 16.bxc5 bxc5 17.\( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e1} \) \( \text{\textit{g}} \text{g5} \) 18.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d3} \) \( \text{\textit{x}} \text{xd2} \) 19.\( \text{\textit{x}} \text{xd2} \) \( \text{\textit{e}} \text{e7} \) 20.f4. White has seized the initiative on the kingside, meanwhile he has the b-file in reserve... 20...exf4 21.\( \text{\textit{x}} \text{xf4} \) f6 22.\( \text{\textit{g}} \text{g4} \) ± Khalifman – Casper, Germany 1997.

c1) 8...\( \text{\textit{g}} \text{g4} \) 9.\( \text{\textit{d}} \text{d2} \)

9...\( \text{\textit{g}} \text{f6} \)

That move is quite sensible. Black’s knight on g4 is unstable and he keeps the harmony of his piece-development with his last move. White must prove now that the placement of his bishop on d2
is not compromising his position to say the least.

Black’s other possibilities are:
About 9...a6 10.d5 – see the following chapter; as for 9...\&e8 10.d5 – see 8...\&e8; 9...\&c7 – see 8...\&c7; 9...a5 10.h3 \&gf6 11.\&e3 – see 8...a5;
9...\&f6?! 10.d5 \&e7, Schenk – Pape, Viernheim 1999, 11.\&e1±;
9...\&e8 10.d5 \&d8 11.b4 a6 (or 11...exd5, which in fact leads to a transposition of moves – 12.cxd5 a6 13.\&e1 \&gf6, Val.Popov – Akhmetov, Togliatti 2001, 14.\&e3) 12.\&e1 \&gf6 13.\&e3 cxd5 14.cxd5 \&b6 15.\&c2 \&xe3 16.\&xe3± Doroshkievich – Akhmetov, St Petersburg 2002. The opponents agreed to a draw here, but it was obvious that there was plenty of fighting possibilities left to play for. White had a distinct space advantage.

9...\&b6, Z.Polgar – Oll, Debrecen 1990, 10.a3!? (The game continued with: 10.\&a4 \&c7 11.h3 \&gf6 12.\&c2 \&e8 13.\&f6 \&b8 14.\&f1 exd4 15.\&xd4 g6 16.\&ad1 a6 17.\&c3 b5 18.b4 \&b7 19.\&f3 \&b6 20.\&b3 bxc4 21.\&xc4 d5 22.\&d3 c5 and the position remained practically equal. Black holds as well in case of: 10.h3 \&gf6 11.c5 \&c7 12.cxd6 \&xd6 13.\&g5 exd4 14.\&xd4 \&e8 15.\&ad1 \&c5.) 10... exd4 (Naturally, it is wrong for Black to capture 10...\&xb2, because he loses his queen after 11.\&a4.) 11.\&a4 \&c7 12.\&xd4 \&d6 (It is a mistake for Black to follow with: 12...\&f6 13.\&f5±; while after 12...\&g6, White reacts again with: 13.\&f5 \&b6 14.\&xe7+ \&xe7 15.\&xb6 axb6 16.f3±) 13.h3 (This set-up seems to me to be more reasonable than: 13.f3 \&e5 14.\&c1 \&e8 15.\&e3 \&d7 16.\&d2 \&ad8 17.b4 \&g6 18.\&fd1 \&b8 and Black’s position resembles a bit the “hedgehog” system. White must constantly be on the alert about the possibility d6-d5, followed by \&d6 – he does not need this pain in the neck...) 13...\&e5 14.\&c2 \&e8 15.\&e3 \&d7 16.f4 \&g6 17.\&c3 \&ad8 18.\&d3 \&c8 19.\&f2 \&d7 20.b4. White is gradually cramping his opponent. 20...\&d6 21.\&ac1 \&df8 22.\&f5±;
9...\&b6 10.\&c1 (The following line does not create too many problems for Black: 10.d5 cxd5 11.cxd5 f5 12.exf5 \&xf5±.) 10... exd4 11.\&xd4 \&e5 (or 11...\&f6 12.\&f4 \&e5 13.b3 \&e7 14.\&e3±) 12.b3 \&e8 (The break through in the centre 12...d5, would not equalize for Black in view of the line: 13.cxd5 cxd5 14.exd5 \&xd5 15.\&xd5 \&xd5 16.\&c3±) 13.\&e3 c5?! (This change of the pawn-structure is advantageous for White, but even after: 13...\&f8 14.\&d2++, he maintains his edge.) 14.\&c2 \&d7 15.\&d2 \&c6 16.\&cd1 a6 17.\&f3 \&bd7 18.\&d5± Gavrikov – Gulko, USSR 1985.

10.\&c2 exd4

Now, the following developments can be expected:

10...a5. Here, as I have already
mentioned, White does not need to close the centre. 11...a6 12.b3 e8 13.e3 f8 14.h3 d7 (It is hardly any better for Black to try: 14...e6 15.e3 h5 16.a4 ef4 17.dxe5 dxe5 18.b6±) 15.e3 e8 16.dxe5 dxe5 17.c5 e6 18.a4 d6d7 19.d2 b8 20.c4± Stohl – Brigljevic, Medulin 1997;

10.e8 11.d5 c5, I. Farago – Goldstern, Seefeld 2003, 12.a3. White begins implementing his standard plan connected with actions along the b-file. 12...d8 13.b4 b6 14.bxc5 bxc5 15.a1 d7 16.b7 b8 17.xb8 xb8 18.b1 a8 19.b2 g6 20.b7±;

10...c7 11.ac1. White wishes his queen to be protected in case of the possible b7-b5 and the opening of the c-file. 11...a6 12.b4 b5 13.cxb5 cxb5, Korotylev – Zablotsky, St Petersburg 2001, 14.a4 bx4a 15.xa4 b7 (or 15...b8 16.f1d1±) 16.c2±.

11.xd4 e8 12.e3 e5
12...f8 13.a1 c7, Stohl – Godena, Manila 1992, and here it deserved attention for White to continue with 14.g5, in order to restrict the mobility of Black’s knight on d7. There could have followed, for example: 14...a5 15.h4 a6 16.f5 dxe4 17.xg7+, or 14...g6 15.f3± – this position resembles the King’s Indian Defence. White’s plan is to increase the pressure along the d-file and eventually to develop his queenside initiative.

13.h3 c7

14.f4. This plan is not always good in the King’s Indian Defence, but here it is quite appropriate, because of the passive deployment of Black’s pieces. 14...g6 15.a1 f8 16.d3 d7 17.f2±. Here Black must permanently watch about White’s possible maneuver d4-f5.

c2) 8...e8

9.d5

That move is thematic; moreover that in this case it is even more up to the point, because Black’s rook has abandoned the f8-square not only to free it for the knight on its route to g6, but also to exert pressure on White’s centre (after the possible exchange
e5xd4). Now, the centre has been blocked, sooner or later Black must prepare the pawn-advance f7-f5 and then his rook would be needed on f8.

9...c5

Naturally, Black has numerous other possibilities (I will mention here immediately that the line 9...a6 10.b4 – will be analyzed in the next chapter after the following move order: 8...e3 a6 9.d5 e8 10.b4.). White's general strategy remains the same. His task is to develop his initiative on the queenside and to prevent Black's counterplay on the kingside. The practical implementation of that strategy however, requires from White to take into account the peculiarities of the different set-ups chosen by his opponent in each separate case. So:

9...g6 10.d2 f8 11.b4. Now, in comparison to the King's Indian Defence, White has at least an extra tempo. 11...a6 12.b3 cxd5 13.cxd5 g7 14.a5± Komarov – Zimina, Reggio Emilia 2004;

9...f8, Cvitan – Weiler, Berlin 1988. If we apply here some abstract reasoning (see our notes to the move 9.d5), this move can be played, of course, but Black can hardly afford to give a couple of tempi to White unpunished. 10.d2 e8 11.b4 g5 12.xg5 xg5 13.b3±;

9...h6 10.b4 h7, Malykin – Schugal, Greifswald 2002, 11. b1±. Black's d6-pawn is so weak that his exchange operations like g5, or g5 are difficult to accomplish;

9...cxd5 10.cxd5 a6 (Or 10...a5 11.d2± Umanskaya – Bielmeier, Weilburg 1995; 10...g4 11.d2 f8 12.de1 g6 13.e3 e8 14.d2 g6 15.d3 a6 16.h1 f6 17.a4± C.Horvath – Vukovic, Pula 2001.) 11.d2 (There arises a similar position after: 8...a6 9.d5 cxd5 10.cxd5 b5 11.d2 – see the next chapter. The difference being that Black has already lost a tempo for the move f8-e8, which is not the most useful under the circumstances.) 11...b5 (or 11...f8 12.a4± Flumort – Stjazhkin, Budapest 1998) 12.b4 b6 13.a4 bxa4 14.xa4 xaxa4 (or 14...d7 15.xb6 xb6 16.b5 a5 17.xb6 xb6 18.c4 d8 19.d2 a4 20.b4± Alexandria – Isoselian, Moscow 1987) 15.xa4 b8 (It is worse for Black to play 15...b7, because then he has great problems with the protection of his a6-pawn – 16.a1 b8 17. b1+– Spassov – Garcia Fernandez, Cullera 2003.) 16.b3 g4 17.xg4 xg4 18.c4 c8 (or 18...c8 19.b6 b7 20.f3±) 19.a5 d7 20.c6±;

9...a5 10.d2 c5 (White's task is slightly easier after: 10...c7?! 11.a3 c5 12.b4 a6, Molina – Anez, Santa Cruz 2005, 13.b3t; in case of 11...f8 12.a4, there arises the position from variation c3 – see 9...a5.) 11.a3 cxd5 12.cxd5 d7 13.b4
Ka6, Tratar – Kodric, Bled 1996
(Black’s situation is not any easier following: 13.axb4 14.axb4 \(\text{a}1\) 15.\(\text{xa}1\) 14.\(\text{c}4\) axb4 15.axb4 \(\text{xb}4\) 16.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{a}6\) 17.\(\text{xb}7\) and Black has too many problems to worry about;

9...\(\text{f}8\) 10.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{g}6\) (or 10...
\(\text{d}7\), Korchnoi – Drimer, Havana 1966, 11.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}3\), b4) 11.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{d}7\) (About 11...c5 – see the main line; 11...\(\text{cxd}5\) 12.\(\text{cxd}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 13.\(\text{c}1\) \text{h}8, Czebe – Rezsek, Zalakaros 2003, 14.\(\text{b}3\) \text{b}8 15.a4 \(\text{g}4\) 16.\(\text{xg}4\) \(\text{xg}4\) 17.f3 \(\text{d}7\) 18.\(\text{b}5\); 11...\text{h}8, Ballo – Schrake, Baunatal 1999, 12.b4; 11...\(\text{d}7\) 12.\(\text{d}2\) a6, Degterevel – Simachev, Novosibirsk 2003, 13.\(\text{fc}1\); 11...\(\text{f}8\).

This move is played with the idea to simplify the position a bit, after Black’s knight reaches the f4-square. 12.f3 h5 13.\(\text{d}2\) h4 14.b4+ Krivosheev – Krob, Metz 2001, it is obviously more reliable for Black to defend with: 12...\(\text{h}5\) 13.\(\text{g}3\) 12.\(\text{d}4\) \(\text{cxd}5\) 13.\(\text{cxd}5\) b5 14.a4 \(\text{b}4\), J.Horvath – Markus, Hungary 2001, 15.\(\text{d}2\) (White is planning to continue with b4-b5 and he has in reserve the move \(\text{e}2-d1\)\(\text{xa}4\).) 15...\(\text{c}8\) 16.f3;

9...\(\text{f}8\) 10.b4 g6 (about 10...c5 11.a3 \(\text{g}4\) – see 9...\(\text{g}4\) 11.\(\text{d}2\) c5 12.a3 \(\text{b}6\) 13.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{g}7\) 14.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}8\) 15.bxc5 \(\text{bxc}5\) 16.\(\text{ab}1\) \(\text{h}5\) 17.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 18.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{xb}5\) 19.\(\text{xb}5\)\(\text{b}\) Elbilia – Laclau, France 1993.

9...\(\text{c}7\) 10.h3 (After d4-d5, White usually tries to avoid playing that move. He plans to rede-
ploy his knight on f3 to another square, so it looks like he should not waste a tempo for that pawn-
move. It turns out however, that Black’s set-up has its advantages too, since he intends to bring his knight on d7 to the kingside as quickly as possible. For example: 10.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f}8\) and here after: 11.b4 \(\text{g}6\) 12.\(\text{g}3\), Sharavdorj – Mongonhui, Ulaanbaatar 2002, 12...
a5 13.a3 \(\text{h}3\) 14.\(\text{e}1\) axb4 15.axb4 \(\text{a}1\) 16.\(\text{xa}1\) \(\text{g}4\) 17.\(\text{xg}4\) \(\text{xg}4\), as well as following: 11.\(\text{c}1\) \(\text{g}6\) 12.b4, Lunev – Komliakov, Orel 1998, 12...a5 13.a3 axb4 14.axb4 \(\text{f}4\) 15.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{xe}2\)+ 16.\(\text{xe}2\) \(\text{g}4\), Black’s position is quite acceptable. White can possibly follow with 10.\(\text{e}1\), without being too principled, but we have already mentioned that he should try to prevent Black’s defensive set-up with a knight on c5 and a pawn on a5. Now, in case of: 10...\(\text{f}8\), Hanes – Stancele, Romania 1992, 11.f3, White’s position is superior. It is more logical for Black to play: 10...\(\text{c}5\) 11.f3 a5 12.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{xd}3\) 13.\(\text{xd}3\) \(\text{h}5\) 14.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 15.\(\text{d}2\) a4 and his position is satisfac-
tory.) 10...\(\text{f}8\) (The other possible tries for Black are: 10...\(\text{c}5\), Sanchez – Oliva, San Francisco 2000, 11.\(\text{cxd}5\) \(\text{c}5\) 12.\(\text{d}1\) a5 13.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{d}7\) 14.a4 \(\text{ac}8\) 15.\(\text{d}2\) 10...g6, Mozharov – Nozdrin, Satka 2005, 11.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{b}4\); 10...\(\text{d}6\), Jugow – G.Fischer, Frankfurt 2002, 11.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}1\) b4, \(\text{b}3\); 10...a5 11.a3 \(\text{cxd}5\) 12.\(\text{cxd}5\) a4, Datta – Rios,
Kansas 2002, 13...b5\+, or 11...c5
12.d3 b8 13.h2 f8 14.d2 g6 15.g3 b6 16.c2 Arbakov
– Siepelt, Wuerzburg 1991; 10...
c5 11.d2 a5, Scholz – Weiner,
Berlin 1999, 12.a3 a6 13.b4 d7
14.b3 axb4 15.axb4 c5 16.bxc5
xc5 17.b4; 10...c5, Franco
Ocampos – Remon, Cienfuegos
1991, 11.b1!? f8 12.b4 b6 13.a4
g6 14.a5 d7 15.d1 f4 16.f1
 eb8 17.axb6 axb6 18.b2 g6
9.cb1\+) 11.d2 g6 12.fd1\?.
That move not only frees the f1-
square for the bishop, but it also
creates a hidden threat in some
possible variations. 12...c5 (Here,
it turns out that after the natural
line for Black: 12...h5 13.f1
hf4 14.h2, he should consider
not only the possibility 15.g3, but
also the sudden tactical strike –
15.xe5.) 13.ca1 d7 14.b4 cb4
15.xb4 b6 16.a4\+. White’s task
now is to prepare gradually the
pawn-advance a4-a5.

I am going to mention here
that the line 9...g4 10.d2 re-
quires special attention.

There might follow:
About 10...c5 11.e1 gf6,

Dragomirescu – Smokina, Bucha-
rest 2003, 12.e3 – see the main
line;

10...f8. This move is too pas-
sive. 11.b4 c5 12.a3\+, with the idea
to follow with e1-d3, Ruzele
– Horstmann, Hamburg 1997;

10...f8 11.e1 h6?! That maneu-
ver can only be sensible
if Black manages to preserve the
light-squared bishops and to push
f7-f5. 12.xh6 gxh6 13.g4 Glad-
dyszev – Ianov, Kosice 1997;

10...gf6\?. This position is far
from simple and White must play
precisely in the process of accom-
plishing his plans. 11.c2 (This is
with the idea to counter 11...c5,
with 12.b4; the fight becomes
rather complicated after: 11.b4
c5! 12.a3 a5! 13.bxa5 xa5 14.e1
f8 15.c2 e8 16.e3 g6 17.g4
g7. I was studying that line us-

ing the “tree” of the computer
database. The program was omit-
ting the rating of the players and
I had to operate with the mouse
for a while to learn the rating of
every individual player. I must
admit that I was a bit lazy to do
all that. Still, I had a strange feel-
ing at some moment – it looked
like White was doing everything
correctly in one of the games;
nevertheless Black neutralized
accurately White’s initiative on
the queenside and then he de-
veloped a powerful counterplay
on the kingside and he won in an
instructive fashion. It turned out
– that game was played in the
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USSR Championship, back in the year 1961! 18...c2 a6 19.a4 g5 20.h3 f5, Furman – Spassky, Moscow 1961.) 11...c5 12.a3 f8 13.b4 b6 14.eb1 g6 15.a4 cxb4 16...xb4, followed by a4-a5±.

10...b1

In case of the natural move 10.e1, the Serbian grandmaster Milan Vukic plays an interesting move – 10...b6 (He is preventing 11.d3 in the process.) and after 11.a3 – 11.d7 and now, following 12.b4 cxb4 13.axb4 c7 and if necessary e8-c8 and White has problems protecting his c4-pawn. We can try to find the drawbacks of that idea, but it is much easier for White to change a bit the move-order.

10...f8

Now, the idea 10...b6 is useless – White can defend his c4-pawn with f3-d2 and the waiting move 10...h6 will be countered with 11.a3±.

11.e1 g6

It is pointless for Black to try: 11...d6d7, Lukacs – T.Paeth, Trnava 1986, 12.a3 g5 13.xg5 w.xg5 14.db5±.

12.d3 h6

The other lines for Black are less logical:

12.d7 13.b4 b6 (or 13...cxb4 14.eb4 g5 15.w.d2±) 14.a3 a6 15.g4 f6 16.xc8 wc8 17.bxc5 bxc5 18.f3± Z. Arsovic – Aftosoglou, Kavala 1997;

12...a6 13.b4 cxb4 14.eb4 d7 15.g4 c5 16.xc8 wc8 17.xc5 dxc5 18.b2± Rees – Trevelyan, Swansea 2003;

12...b6 13.b4 a6, Wirthensohn – Schrepp, Germany 1997, 14.a4, with the idea to follow with 15.a5±.

13.a3 h7 14.b4 b6 15.g4± Nevednichy – Goric, Djakovo 2005.

C3) 8...c7

9.d5 c5

This is the most logical possibility for Black, but he has tried many other moves in this position. I will begin with the relatively rarely played (I am going to mention here that 9...a6 leads to positions, which we analyze in our next chapter.):

9.e8 – see 8...e8;
9...b6 10.d2 fd7?! 11.b4
f5 12.exf5 cxd5 13.exd5 exd5 14.cxd5 and White had a clear advantage in the game Elness – Ludvigsen, Norway 2000;
9...g6, Kahlert – Bergstraesser, Germany 2004, 10.Qd2 Qe8 (There remains nothing else for Black in sight. He cannot establish his knight on the c5-outpost and after 10...a5, White would continue with 11.a3 and b2-b4± 11.b4 f5 12.f3. Black evidently fails to create any real threats on the kingside – it would take too much time for him to do that. Meanwhile, White is well prepared to open the centre with Qd2-b3 and c4-c5. If for example: 12...f4 13.Qf2 a5, then 14.a3 Qef6 15.Qb3 axb4 (or 15...a4 16.Qa5±) 16.axb4 Qxa1 17.Qxa1 g5 18.dxc6 bxc6 19.Qa5±;
9...cxd5 10.cxd5 Oe5, Matju- shin – Dzupin, Alushta 2004, 11.Qd2 Qd7 12.Qc1 a5 13.a4=. White’s plan here is with Qe2-b5 (either immediately, or following with the preparatory move f2-f3) to exchange Black’s “good” bishop on d7 and that would even increase White’s advantage, because the vulnerability of the b5-square is considerable;
9...h6 10.Qd2 Qh7 (After 10...Qh7, which was played in the game Marques – Melendez Tira- do, Isla Margarita 1998, it seems reasonable for White to continue with: 11.b4 a5 12.a3 and his queenside operations are quite clear.) 11.b4 Qg5 12.Qxg5 Qxg5 13.Qb3±. White is obviously ahead of his opponent in the development of his initiative and one of his possible plans is to deploy his heavy pieces along the d and c-files and even if Black manages to solve the problem of the defence of his d6-pawn – his position would remain quite difficult;
9...Qe8, Malakhatko – V.Kiselev, Kiev 2004, 10.b4 a5 11.a3 g6 12.Qb3=;
9...Qd8 10.Qd2 (It is possibly quite sufficient for White to continue with his standard scheme: 10.b4 Qf8 11.Qe1 Qg6 12.Qd3=. His plan in this game not only looks highly aesthetic, but it is necessary to study it thoroughly in order to enlarge your strategical arsenal. I seem to remember a phrase, which is present in almost every chess textbook for beginners – the object of the chess game is to checkmate the enemy king!) 10...Qf8 11.Qh1. The idea of that move will become clearer later. 11...Qg6 12.g3 Qd7 (Now, it becomes evident that in case of 12...Qh3, White follows with 13.Qg1 and the direct threat – 14.g4.) 13.Qc1 Qac8 14.f4 exf4 15.gxf4 Qe8 16.Qg1 Qh8 17.Qg3 Qf8 18.Qg1 Wb5 19.Qd4 Qd8 20.Qf1 Qe7 21.Qd3 a6 (It would not work for Black to continue with: 21...Qh5 22.Qg5 Qhx4 23.Qxh4.) 22.Qg5 c5 23.Qe3 b5 24.b3 b4 25.Qd1 a5 26.Qf2 a4 27.Qf3 Qxe4 28.Qxe4 f5 29.Qxg6 fxe4 30.Qg5 Qf5 31.Qe6 Qxe6 32. dxe6 1-0 Naumkin – M.Pribyl, Prague 1989;
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9...a5 10.\(\Box\)d2 \(\Box\)e8 (about 10...
\(\Box\)c5 – see 9...\(\Box\)c5) 11.a3 \(\Box\)f8, Wojtkiewicz – Ritter, Nassau 1999, 12.\(\Box\)a4 (White exploits the vulnerability of the b6-square.) 12...c5 (or 12...\(\Box\)g6 13.\(\Box\)b6 \(\Box\)b8 14.b4 axb4 15.axb4 \(\Box\)f4 16.\(\Box\)f3\(\pm\)) 13.b4! axb4 14.axb4 cxb4 15.\(\Box\)b3 \(\Box\)g6 16.\(\Box\)b6! \(\Box\)b8 17.\(\Box\)xb4 \(\Box\)f4 18.\(\Box\)fe1\(\pm\).

It is more popular for Black to play in practice – 9...c5 10.\(\Box\)e1

\(\Box\)fb1 (with the idea a2-a4-a5) 15...cxb4 16.\(\Box\)b5 \(\Box\)b8 17.\(\Box\)xb4\(\pm\);

10...\(\Box\)e8 11.\(\Box\)d3 \(\Box\)d8 (11...
\(\Box\)g6. This line is pricipled, but Black is absolutely unprepared for opening of the game. 12.\(\Box\)d2 \(\Box\)g7 13.f4 exf4 14.\(\Box\)xf4 f5 15.\(\Box\)b5 \(\Box\)b8 16.exf5 \(\Box\)xf5 17.g4 \(\Box\)g7 18.\(\Box\)e3 \(\Box\)e8 19.\(\Box\)g3\(\pm\) Johannessen – Glenne, Bergen 2001; 11...f5 12.exf5 \(\Box\)b6 13.b3 \(\Box\)xf5 14.\(\Box\)g4 g6 15.f4 exf4 16.\(\Box\)xf4 \(\Box\)g7, An.Nikutin – Voinov, Tomsk 2003, 17.\(\Box\)e6 \(\Box\)xe6 18.dxe6 \(\Box\)c8 19.\(\Box\)h6 \(\Box\)xe6 20.\(\Box\)e1 \(\Box\)d7 21.\(\Box\)xf8 \(\Box\)xg4 22.\(\Box\)xe7 \(\Box\)xh1 23.\(\Box\)xd7 \(\Box\)xd7 24.\(\Box\)xd6 \(\Box\)g4 25.\(\Box\)e1 h5 26.h3 \(\Box\)f5 27.\(\Box\)d5\(\pm\); 11...

a6, Miniboeck – Kamaryt, Vienna 1998, 12.a4 b6 13.b4 cxb4 14.\(\Box\)xb4 \(\Box\)c5 15.a5 bxa5 16.\(\Box\)c6\(\pm\)) 12.\(\Box\)d2 g6 (or 12...a6 13.a3 g6 14.\(\Box\)h6 \(\Box\)g7 15.f4 \(\Box\)f6 16.f5\(\pm\) I.Farago – Praznik, Feffernitz 2001) 13.b4 b6 14.a4 f5 15.\(\Box\)h6 \(\Box\)g7 16.a5 \(\Box\)b8 17.exf5 gxf5 18.\(\Box\)b5+- van Wely – Saltaev, Manila 1992.

And finally 9...\(\Box\)g4 (White must consider the consequences of this move in practically every variation of that system.) 10.\(\Box\)d2

and later:
10...\textit{\$h8 11.\textit{\$e1 f5?! 12.\textit{\$xg4 fxg4 13.\textit{\$xg4 d6 14.\textit{\$e2, Dreev \textit{\& Kandic, Mainz 2003. Black's compensation for the sacrificed pawn is hardly sufficient;}}}}}

10...a5, I.Farago \textit{\&} M.Hansen, Hastings 1989, \textit{\$e1} (This is to prevent Black's knight from occupying the c5-square.) 11...\textit{\$g6 12.\textit{\$d3\pm;}}

10...c5 11.a3 (White can also start with: 11.\textit{\$e1 \textit{\$g6 12.\textit{\$d3\pm;}}}) 11...a6 12.b4 b6 13.\textit{\$e1 \textit{\$g6 14.\textit{\$d3 \textit{\$h8 15.\textit{\$b1\pm Vitiugov \textit{\& Gankin, Dagomys 2005;}}}}}}

10...\textit{\$g6 11.b4 cxd5 12.cxd5 \textit{\$e8 13.\textit{\$c1\pm C.Horvath \textit{\& Kewes, Bern 2000. There might arise the following eventual developments:}}}}

13...\textit{\$b8 (Black continued with 13...\textit{\$f8 in the game, but he lost the exchange after: 14.\textit{\$b5 \textit{\$d8 15.\textit{\$c7\pm)} 14.\textit{\$c2 \textit{\$f8 15.a4 \textit{\$g6 16.a5 \textit{\$d7 (or 16...\textit{\$f4 17.\textit{\$xf4 exf4 18.\textit{\$d2\pm) 17.\textit{\$b5 and White maintained a slight, but stable advantage;}}}}}}}}}}

10...\textit{\$b6, Behrman\textit{\& A.Pinter, Bled 2001, 11.\textit{\$e1 \textit{\$f6 12.b3 (It is also interesting for White to try 12.\textit{\$c2, with the idea 13.\textit{\$e3 \textit{\& because his knight will be eyeing both sides of the board from that square.) 12...\textit{\$d7 13.\textit{\$d3\pm. Generally speaking, White's plan is the following \textit{\& complete the mobilization of forces with \textit{\$d1-b3, \textit{\$a1-c1, \textit{\$f1-d1 and after c4-c5, to operate on the c and d-files. There might arise the following spectacular variation: 15...a5 16.a3 \textit{\$b6?!}}}}}}}}}}

17.\textit{\$b3 f4 18.\textit{\$f2 cxd5 19.c5! dxc5 20.bxc5 and White wins. Black should better adhere to a strategy of simplification. Although even then, for example after: 16...\textit{\$xe4 17.\textit{\$xe4 \textit{\$xf1+ 18.\textit{\$xf1 axb4 19.axb4 \textit{\$xa1 20.\textit{\$a1 \textit{\$f6 21.\textit{\$f2, White's prospects are clearly superior.) 14...\textit{\$xf4 15.\textit{\$xf4 \textit{\$f6 16.\textit{\$d2 \textit{\$e8, Pajeken \textit{\& Dreyer, Germany 1996, 17.\textit{\$ad1\pm. Black's main defensive idea is \textit{\& deploy a piece to the e5-outpost and it has been neutralized, because in case of 17...\textit{\$e5, White follows with: 18.\textit{\$xe5 \textit{\$xe5 19.\textit{\$xe5 \textit{\$xe5 20.dxc6 bxc6 21.\textit{\$xd6, while there is no other reasonable plan for Black in sight.}}}}}}}}}}}}}

10.\textit{\$d2 a5 11.a3 \textit{\$d7 11...cxd5 12.cxd5 \textit{\$d7, Mohota \textit{\& Pina, Yerevan 2000, 13.f3 \textit{\$h5 14.\textit{\$b5. White thus forces the quite favourable exchange from the positional point of view of the light-squared bishops. 14...\textit{\$xb5 (Or 14...\textit{\$f4 15.\textit{\$xd7 \textit{\$xd7 16.\textit{\$b5 \textit{\$c8 17.a4\pm \& but White should not fall into the trap \textit{\& \textit{\$xc1 18.\textit{\$xc1 \textit{\$e2+.) 15.\textit{\$b5 \textit{\$b6 16.a4\pm.}}}}}}}}}}}}}

\textit{\$d1-b3, \textit{\$a1-c1, \textit{\$f1-d1 and after c4-c5, to operate on the c and d-files. There might arise the following spectacular variation: 15...a5 16.a3 \textit{\$b6?!}
12.b4 axb4 13.axb4 ález

14.Wb3

14...Dc5 15.bxc5
It is weaker for Black to play 15.b5, because of 15...Db4, with an approximate equality, Psakhis – A.Shneider, Tilburg 1994.

15...Dxc5 16.Wb4

16...b6 17.Bfb1 Exa1

18.Exa1 Eb8 19.h3=
White’s space advantage and his compact pawn-structure guarantee his long-term superiority in that position.

Conclusion
We have analyzed in this chapter some relatively rarely played defensive systems for Black. These are dealt with in variations a and b, in which Black delays his castling and tries to do something useful saving that tempo. It seems to me that White should not have any problems to cope with these lines. In variation c, Black avoids playing the move a7-a6, or he postpones it for the later stages of the game.

Our readers might have already noticed that that the analysis of the different sidelines requires more time and efforts (they comprise even more space in our book too...) than the main lines. Still, the analytical work that we have done makes us reach some general conclu-
ions concerning the strategy as well as the concrete details of the variations, which we are analyzing.

1) White’s main plan is connected with d4-d5, which consolidates his space advantage. We will discuss all that extensively in the conclusions to the next chapter (although there we will deal with positions, in which the moves 8...a6 9.d5 have been included, but that does not change anything much, concerning the essence of the position...), but now I would like to talk about the reasons for that pawn-advance as well as about the possible exceptions.

The idea of closing the centre is 80% connected with the so-called “human factor”, that is the desire of the contemporary Homo sapiens to facilitate his life – see the notes to Black’s move five. I would like to clarify my point – I do not think at all that if White maintains the tension in the centre, he loses his chances to preserve his advantage. There are some objective problems indeed; moreover that White cannot break Black’s defence so easily. Additionally, it is much easier for White to settle on long-term planning in a position with a closed centre.

Still, in some cases it is advisable for White not to clarify the situation in the centre, for example if Black has already played a7-a5. Following that move, Black cannot proceed with the plan to form a flexible pawn-formation on the queenside with a6-b5-c6-d6 and his light-squared bishop will have to remain on the c8-h3 diagonal, so he cannot create any serious threats against White’s e4-pawn. Accordingly, White can easily cope with the consequences of the possible exchange in the centre e5xd4.

2) White must consider carefully the possible active move Qf6-g4 for Black, because it causes some disharmony in White’s position, since the placement of his bishop on d2 has certain drawbacks too.

3) It is desirable for White to avoid the trade of the dark-squared bishops, unless he obtains some other positional advantages like, for example organizing certain pressure against the vulnerable d6-pawn, or gaining several tempi for the development of his initiative.

4) I have already mentioned that White’s general strategical concept is quite clear. Still, the concrete tactical fine-points are sometimes different and that can be best illustrated in some sidelines. For example, after d4-d5, White plays sometimes Qf3-d2 and in other lines – Qf3-e1 and then b2-b4, while in some variations White even plays h2-h3 altogether (see variation c2, the notes to the move 9...c7). That is not just a whim, as a rule it is required by the peculiarities of every different position. It is not easy to make a general evaluation here, but
we can pinpoint some special cases. For example, the knight should go to d3 if White wishes to cover the f4-square, in case Black goes for g7-g6 and f7-f5 and White intends to counter that with e4xf5 g6xf5, f2-f4 e5-e4, Qd3-f2 and sometimes with g2-g4 just in case. The knight must go to the d2-square if the e4-pawn needs some additional protection and that knight might later head for the a5-square. White plays b2-b4 whenever he needs to play something useful and he has not made up his mind yet about the eventual redeployment of his king’s knight etc.

5) In the variations in which Black bring his knight from d7 to g6, White must watch carefully about the possible penetration of Black’s knight to the g4 and f4-squares. That might be annoying for White in some lines, because his bishops could be exchanged. You must have in mind that White’s dark-squared bishop is tremendously important, while the light-squared one can sometimes be traded without any real compromising of the position.

At the end, I should mention that the general evaluation of all these variations is quite favourable for White and that is confirmed by the tournament practice nowadays.
Black is planning to push b7-b5.

9.d5

It is counterproductive for White to prevent Black's plans with 9.a4, because of 9...a5 – squares and outposts are much more important in that case than tempi.

9...cxd5

I will mention that playing the move 9...d5 is not so reasonable for Black, due to 10.d2 and later the game might continue analogously to variation c3 from the previous chapter, the difference being that Black will have to lose another tempo for a move with his a-pawn. In most of the other cases, White should act according to the already familiar schemes and we have already seen them in action in the previous chapter. The essence of White's strategy is the activity on the queenside; meanwhile after d4-d5, it is not favourable for Black to maintain the tension in the centre, because then White can open not one, but two files on the queenside – b and c. His forces are perfectly mobilized and he has a great space advantage, so such developments will end up badly for Black. White adheres to a strategy of containment on the kingside, as a rule. He must be on the alert about the possible exchange (We have to emphasize here, that it is quite advantageous for Black, from the positional point of view...) of the dark-squared bishops. White must strive to get something in return in that case – I do not have in mind only material, but some tempi would be quite sufficient too. Advantages in chess often transform and a couple of tempi would mean initiative etc.

Besides 9...cxd5, Black has tried in practice some other lines and I will start with the relatively rarely played:
9...g6 10.h6!. This move prevents h6-e8-g7 for Black. 10...e8 11.d2 Maksimenko – Topalov, Vrnjacka Banja 1991;

9...h6 10.d2 c5 11.a3 h7 12.g3. That move does not contradict the general idea. White simply assumes the responsibility to control the situation on both sides of the board. This approach guarantees that the middle game fight will be with abundant possibilities on both sides of the board. (After 12.b4 g5 13.xg5 xg5 14.b3 b6, it all hinges on whether White will manage to transform his advantage on the queenside into something real.) 12.g5 13.f4 exf4 14.gxf4 f6 15.d3 e8 16.f3 b8 17.h1 b5, S.Ivanov – V.Loginov, St Petersburg 2005 and here it would be reasonable for White to consolidate the situation on the queenside, so that later he can concentrate his forces on the kingside – 18.c1 b4 19.axb4 xb4 20.b3;

9...e8 10.b4 (It is also good for White to play 10.d2, but generally speaking, if he plans to develop his initiative on the queenside, he will have to push b2-b4 sooner or later.) 10...f8 (In the game A.Nikitin – Chernov, Novosibirsk 1999, Black tried to exploit the absence of the move f3-d2 with: 10...a5 11.a3 g4, but he did not achieve anything much: 12.d2 axb4 13.axb4 xa1 14.xa1 c5 15.b5 f8 16.a7 h6 17.a1 f5 18.e1 gf6?! 19.exf5++) 11.d2 g6, I.Ionescu – Klinova, Chisinau 2005, 12.a4 (It also deserves attention for White to continue with: 12.b3 f4 13.xf4 exf4 14.d2.) 12.f4 13.b6 b8 14.a4 – with the intention to fortify the knight on b6 with the help of a4-a5. White would not mind the exchange of his bishop on e2 for Black’s knight on f4, since he can counter that if necessary with the same – exchanging his knight on b6 for Black’s bishop on c8;

9...c7 10.d2

and now:

After 10.cxd5 11.cxd5 b5 12. xc1, as it was played in the game
Lukacs – Zagrebeln, Budapest 1991, there arises the position from variation b4;

It looks like a loss of time for Black to play 10...Bb8, Stjazhkina – Zvereva, St Petersburg 1999, 11.b4 cxd5 12.Qxd5 Qxd5 13.cxd5 Bb8 14.Qc4±;

After 10...c5 11.Bb1 h6, there arises a position, which is similar to the one that we will analyze a bit later, see 9...h6. There might follow 12.g3 (White is taking care in advance against the maneuver f6-h7 and e7-g5.) 12...h7, Tratar – Brurar, Slovenia 1994, 13.a3±;

10...e8 – This move is not so useful in this situation. 11.b4 c5 12.a3 b6 13.Bb1± Shishkin – Docenko, Kiev 2003;

10...h6 11.b4 c5 (It is weaker for Black to follow with: 11...h7 12.b3 c5 13.bxc5 dxc5 14.a4± Kragelj – I.Saric, Rijeka 2001.) 12.a3 b6 13.Bb1 h7 14.bxc5 (It is often reasonable for White not to be in a hurry with that capture...) 14...bxc5 (The move 14...xc5, does not solve Black’s problems either – 15.Qa4 Bb8 16.Qxc5 bxc5 17.Qxb8 Qxb8 18.Qa4 Qg5 19.Qb1 Qc7 20.Qxg5 Qxg5 21.h4 Qh7 22.Qc6±) 15.Qa4 Qa7 16.Qb2 Qg5 17.Qxg5 Qxg5 18.Qg4 Qf6 19.Qxc8 Qxc8 20.Qb1± Djuric – Lobron, New York 1987.

We must pay a close attention to the possibility – 9...Qd4. The point is that after 10.Qd2, it becomes clear that both sides have lost partially the coordination of their pieces. Black’s knight on g4 is rather unstable, while White’s bishop on d2 occupies an important square for the knight and Black can exploit that by attacking the e4-pawn, for example with his knight from the c5-square.

There might follow:

10...c5 (White has nothing now to be afraid of.) 11.a3 g6 12.b4 b6 13.Qa4 Qg6 14.Qc2 e8 (Black goes back to his standard plan, having lost plenty of time, while White has done everything perfectly in the process.) 15.Qh6 Qg7 16.Qd3! (White prevents f7-f5) 16...Qf6 17.bxc5 bxc5 18.Qab1 Qa7 19.Qb8 Qc7 20.Qb1 Qg4 21.Qd2 f5 22.Qe8b6 Qf6?! 23.Qc6 Qd8 24.Qb8+– Lagunow – Chuchelov, Novosibirsk 1989;

10...h6 (That is hardly the best way to justify the maneuver f6-g4.) 11.Qe1 Qg6 12.Qd3 c5 13.Qe3 b5 14.cxb5 axb5 15.b4 Qa6 16.a3 Qc7 17.Qd2 Qb6 18.Qb2 Qd7 19.Qh3 Qb8 20.Qf1 cxb4 21.axb4 Qd8 22.Qa3 Qe8 23.Qa6+– Slavina – Kirillova, Dагomys 2005;

10...a5 (That is a very purpose-
ful move now, despite the loss of a tempo – he had played 8...a6 a couple of moves earlier.) 11.\(\mathcal{D}\)e1 \(\mathcal{D}\)g6 12.\(\mathcal{D}\)d3 \(\mathcal{A}\)e8 13.\(\mathcal{D}\)e3 \(\mathcal{A}\)f8 14.\(\mathcal{A}\)f3?! (It seems to me that White can try to emphasize the drawback’s of Black’s set-up without entering a direct contact with the enemy. Things are rather unclear in the line: 14.a3 \(\mathcal{D}\)g6 15.b4 cxd5 16.exd5 \(\mathcal{G}\)h4 and Black had some real counter chances in the game Khenkin – Dominguez, Santo Domingo 2003; in case of 16.cxd5, the position is simplified considerably – 16...axb4 17.axb4 \(\mathcal{A}\)xa1 18.\(\mathcal{A}\)xa1 \(\mathcal{D}\)g4 19.\(\mathcal{D}\)xg4 \(\mathcal{A}\)xg4.) 14...\(\mathcal{D}\)g6 15.\(\mathcal{A}\)d2±. White is prepared to play g2–g3 too, if necessary and then he can turn his undivided attention to the queenside;

10...\(\mathcal{G}\)f6 (with the idea to follow with \(\mathcal{D}\)d7-c5 and a7-a5) 11.b4 a5 (White maintains his advantage after the other lines for Black as well: 11...\(\mathcal{A}\)e8, Pushkov – Bezgodov, Orel 1992, 12.\(\mathcal{A}\)b1 \(\mathcal{G}\)f8 13.\(\mathcal{A}\)e1 \(\mathcal{G}\)g6 14.\(\mathcal{A}\)d3±; 11...\(\mathcal{A}\)c7, Pribyl – Freislter, Prague 2000, 12.\(\mathcal{A}\)b3 c5 13.a3±) 12.a3 axb4 13.\(\mathcal{A}\)xb4 \(\mathcal{X}\)xa1 14.\(\mathcal{X}\)xa1 c5 15.\(\mathcal{A}\)b1 cxb4 16.\(\mathcal{A}\)xb4 \(\mathcal{A}\)c5 17.\(\mathcal{A}\)b1 \(\mathcal{G}\)g4 18.\(\mathcal{A}\)e3 \(\mathcal{A}\)fd7 19.\(\mathcal{A}\)a4 \(\mathcal{A}\)xa4 20.\(\mathcal{A}\)xa4 \(\mathcal{A}\)c7 21.\(\mathcal{A}\)b4 b6 22.h3 \(\mathcal{A}\)xf3 23.\(\mathcal{A}\)xf3 \(\mathcal{A}\)b8 24.g3 h6 25.h4 \(\mathcal{A}\)d8 26.\(\mathcal{A}\)a4 \(\mathcal{A}\)c5 27.\(\mathcal{A}\)a3± Shipov – V.Goncharov, Orel 1997.

Black has another monumental line at his disposal – 9...c5, but as people like to say – it is solid, but passive. After 10.\(\mathcal{A}\)e1 \(\mathcal{A}\)e8 (Or 10...\(\mathcal{B}\)b8, Shishkin – Vinitsky, Kiev 2002, 11.\(\mathcal{A}\)d3 \(\mathcal{A}\)h4 12.cxb5 axb5 13.\(\mathcal{A}\)d4±; 10...\(\mathcal{A}\)e8, Gordin – Smokina, Eforie Nord 1998, 11.\(\mathcal{A}\)b1±; 10...h6 11.\(\mathcal{A}\)d3 and there arises a position, which we will analyze later – see 9...\(\mathcal{A}\)g4 10.\(\mathcal{A}\)d2 h6.) 11.\(\mathcal{A}\)d2 (preventing 11...\(\mathcal{A}\)g5) 11...g6 (Black has also tried: 11...h6 12.g3 and now 12...\(\mathcal{A}\)c7 13.a4 \(\mathcal{B}\)f5 14.\(\mathcal{A}\)xf5 \(\mathcal{A}\)xf5 15.\(\mathcal{A}\)d3 \(\mathcal{A}\)f8, Ribli – Casper, Germany 1994, 16.\(\mathcal{A}\)f4 \(\mathcal{A}\)xf4 17.\(\mathcal{A}\)xf4 \(\mathcal{A}\)d6 18.a5±, or 12...\(\mathcal{A}\)d6 13.\(\mathcal{A}\)h3 14.\(\mathcal{A}\)f2 \(\mathcal{A}\)d7, Kindermann – Lendwai, Vienna 2003, 15.\(\mathcal{A}\)b1 a5 16.\(\mathcal{A}\)d1 a4 17.\(\mathcal{A}\)c2 a3 18.b4±; 11...\(\mathcal{A}\)h8 12.a3 g6 13.\(\mathcal{A}\)d3 f5 14.\(\mathcal{A}\)xf5 \(\mathcal{A}\)xf5 15.f4 – that is White’s standard method of fighting in similar pawn-structures – 15...e4 16.\(\mathcal{A}\)f2 \(\mathcal{A}\)g8 17.g4!. White thus destroys Black’s centre and his knight is headed for the e6-square. 17...\(\mathcal{A}\)xg4 18.\(\mathcal{A}\)xc4 \(\mathcal{A}\)d6 19.\(\mathcal{A}\)g5 \(\mathcal{A}\)g7 20.\(\mathcal{A}\)h1 h6 21.\(\mathcal{A}\)e6 \(\mathcal{A}\)xe6 22.\(\mathcal{A}\)xe6± Schenk – Huber, Ueberlingen 2000.) 12.\(\mathcal{A}\)d3 \(\mathcal{A}\)g7 (or 12...f5, M.Grabarczyk – Sokolowski, Koszalin 1997, 13.\(\mathcal{A}\)xf5 \(\mathcal{A}\)xf5 14.f4 e4 15.\(\mathcal{A}\)f2 \(\mathcal{A}\)f6 16.g4±) 13.\(\mathcal{A}\)h6 (This is of course the most academic way for White, but I believe that our readers would like to have a look at another way of playing chess as well – 13.f4?! \(\mathcal{A}\)f6 14.f5 \(\mathcal{A}\)xf5 15.\(\mathcal{A}\)xf5 \(\mathcal{A}\)b6 16.\(\mathcal{X}\)xc5!? dxc5 17.g4 e4?!. Black is attempting to liven up his pieces in that fashion, but unfortunately for him – that counter sacrifice does not achieve

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anything much, he had better play passively under the circumstances: 17...\e7 18.\e4 \e8 19.\h6 f6 and Black’s position would have been quite acceptable. 18.\xe4 \e8 19.\xf6+ \xf6 20.\xc5 \a4 21.\a3 \d7 22.\f3 h5 23.\h4 \g2 24.\g2 \xf5 25.\xf5 \xf5 26.\f2 \e3+ 27.\h2 \f4+ 28.\h1 \xf1 29.\xf1 \f5 30.\g3+ \h7 31.\g2 \g6 32.\f3 \g8 33.\b3 \b6 34. \g1 \e5 35.\h4 \f7 36.\h3 1-0 Huzman – Protosovich, Beersheba 1994.) 13...\h8 (In case of 13... \b8, White can follow with 14.a4 and the emphasis on the fight will be transferred entirely to the kingside. White has more than sufficient resources to improve his position if Black keeps on playing passively – 14...b6 15.\ae1 \b7 16.\h1 f6 17.g3 \b7 18.f4 \e8 19.f5\pm Spassov – Stoinov, Sofia 2004. After the more active line: 14...f5 15.f4 \b7, which was tested in the game Miniboecck – Lanc, St Poelten 2002, White could suddenly sharpen the game with 16.g4!? and his initiative would have become quite dangerous, for example: 16...\f4 17.\xb5 \b6 18.\xe5 \f1+ 19.\f1 \xb5 20.\f5 \xf5 21.\xf5 \xf5 22.\f3\pm, or 18...\c4 19.\f2 \f1+ 20.\f1 \xb5 21.\xb5 \xe5 22.\xe5 \xe5 23.\xb5 \xb5 \xb5 24.\f4 \f7+ \h8 25.\f1! c4 27.\e2+–) 14.\h1 \f6 15.\f4 \c7 16.\e5 dxe5 17.\g5 \g8 18.\ad1\pm Rowson – Summerscale, Torquay 1998.

10.cxd5

Now, Black is faced with a choice between a) 10...\g4 and b) 10...\b5.

Something in short about his other possibilities:

10...h6 11.a4 (Presently, White refrains from his standard maneuver \f3-d2, in connection with the following circumstances: Black is planning to follow soon with \f6-h7 and \e7-g5; so White will capture in that case with his knight. If Black plays instead of \e7-g5 – \h7-g5, White answers that with \f3-d2 and if Black insists on exchanging his dark-squared bishop, he would have to lose another tempo for the retreat of his knight on g5. White will thus gain a couple of extra tempi as a result and that would be just wonderful for him.) 11...\g4 12.\d2 a5 13.h3 \gf6 14.\e3 \h7 15.\xc1 \g5 16.\d2\pm Barsov – Blodstein, Tashkent 1992;

10...g6 11.\h6!. This move disrupts the coordination of Black’s pieces and he will have great problems to bring his knight to the g7-square. 11...\e8 12.\d2 \f8 13.\e3\pm – and in comparison to similar positions arising in the
King’s Indian Defence, White had an excellent position in the game van der Werf – van der Fliert, Netherlands 1993;

10...\(\text{bxc6}\) 11.a4 g6. This move is logical, to say the least. Black should not change his plan just like that. (If, for example: 11...a5, then 12.\(\text{xd7}\) b6. Otherwise Black would not manage to play \(\text{xd7-c5}\), since he would lose his e5-pawn after the exchange on c5.

13.\(\text{dxc6}\) f5 16.exf5  \(\text{xf5}\) 17.\(\text{g5}\) and White has the better game: 17...\(\text{f6}\) 18.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{Ribli}\); 17...\(\text{c7}\) 18. \(\text{xb6}\) h6 19.\(\text{xc6}\) dxc6 20.\(\text{a3}\) e4 21.\(\text{xe5}\) \(\text{f6}\) 22.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{+}\); 17...\(\text{f6}\) 18. \(\text{g5}\) \(\text{f6}\) 19.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{d7}\) 20.\(\text{xe8}\) \(\text{xe8}\) 21.d6= Lugovoi – Genba, Moscow 1995.) 12.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{g5}\) (Black has tried in practice some other lines too: 12...\(\text{f5}\) 13.exf5 gxf5 14.\(\text{f4}\) \(\text{f6}\) 15.\(\text{c4}\) e4 16.\(\text{h1}\) \(\text{c5}\) 17.\(\text{a3}\) a5 18.\(\text{b5}\) b6 19.\(\text{h5}\) \(\text{e7}\) 20.\(\text{xe8}\) \(\text{xe8}\) 21.d4, but it all ended in a checkmate in the game Naumann – Heissler, Germany 2002; 12...b6 13.\(\text{c4}\) a5 14.\(\text{b1}\). White aims at his opponent’s d6-pawn. 14...\(\text{g5}\) 15.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{g5}\), Biebinger – Genba, Groningen 1994, 16.b4 axb4 17.\(\text{xb4}\) \(\text{d8}\) 18.\(\text{b3}\) (13.\(\text{g5}\) \(\text{g5}\) 14.\(\text{c4}\) \(\text{b8}\) (or 14...\(\text{e7}\) 15.a5= Malaniuk – Genba, St Petersburg 1994)) 15.a5 \(\text{df6}\) (or 15...b5 16.axb6 \(\text{xb6}\) 17.\(\text{a5}\); 15...f5 16.exf5 gxf5 17.f4 \(\text{f4}\) 18.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{Ribli}\)) 16.\(\text{c1}\) \(\text{h4}\) (or 16...\(\text{xc1}\) 17.\(\text{xc1}\) (or 17...\(\text{g4}\) 18.\(\text{g4}\) \(\text{g4}\) 19.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{d7}\) 20.f4= Ribli)) 18.f4 \(\text{f4}\) 19.\(\text{xf4}\)

11...\(\text{b5}\)

Black has tested in practice some other moves too:

11...a5 – this pawn-advance seems a bit strange to say the least. 12.\(\text{h3}\) \(\text{g6}\) 13.\(\text{a3}\) \(\text{e7}\) Nevendenichy – Giffard, Aosta 2004;

11...\(\text{c7}\), Schmidt – Grosse-Kloenne, Germany 2003, 12.\(\text{c1}\). There might follow, for example: 12...\(\text{b8}\) 13.\(\text{e1}\) \(\text{g6}\) 14.\(\text{c2}\) \(\text{d8}\) (or 14...\(\text{c5}\) 15.\(\text{f3}\) \(\text{h5}\) 16.\(\text{b4}\) \(\text{d7}\) 17.g3 and White maintains a huge space advantage) 15.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{a5}\) 16. \(\text{b4}\) \(\text{b6}\) 17.\(\text{d2}\);

11...\(\text{b6}\) – this experiment can hardly be successful, since that square is not so appropriate for the knight. 12.\(\text{h3}\) \(\text{g6}\) 13.\(\text{a3}\) \(\text{e8}\) 14.\(\text{a4}\) \(\text{d7}\) 15.a5= Z.Polgar – Larsen, Monte Carlo 1994;

11...\(\text{e8}\). Black plans to bring his bishop to the b6-square. 12.a4!? \(\text{d8}\) 13.\(\text{a5}\) b6 14.\(\text{h3}\) \(\text{g6}\) 15.\(\text{e3}\) \(\text{bxa6}\) 16.\(\text{b2}\) \(\text{b6}\) 17.\(\text{xb6}\) \(\text{xb6}\) 18.\(\text{xa5}\) \(\text{e7}\), van der Werf
5.e4 e5 6.\textsuperscript{c}e2 \textsuperscript{c}e7 7.0-0 0-0 8.\textsuperscript{c}e3 a6 9.d5

– Lobron, Leeuwarden 1997, 19.\textsuperscript{w}b3!? White prevents the appearance of Black’s knight on c7. 19...\textsuperscript{c}fd7 20.\textsuperscript{f}fa1±.

I would also like to mention the move 11...\textsuperscript{c}gf6. It is quite purposeful, since the c6-square has not been weakened and White’s maneuver \textsuperscript{d}f3-e1-c2-b4 – see the main line – will not be so effective yet. Meanwhile, Black’s knight on g4 is not doing anything useful for the time being and it will have to be retreated anyway, so why not do that immediately?! 12.b4.

![Diagram](image)

Now, Black has numerous possibilities at his disposal, but it is quite difficult for him to obtain an acceptable game:

12...b5 13.a4! bxa4 14.\textsuperscript{c}xa4 \textsuperscript{d}b7 15.\textsuperscript{w}b3± Huzman – Porubszki, Biel 2000;

12...\textsuperscript{c}e8 – this set-up is too passive and White has no problems after that whatsoever. 13.\textsuperscript{w}c2 \textsuperscript{d}f8 14.a4 \textsuperscript{c}g6 15.a5 \textsuperscript{d}d7 16.\textsuperscript{c}e3 and White maintained a clear advantage in the game Brunner – Heissler, Germany 1994;

12...\textsuperscript{d}b6, Schmittiel – P.Nielsen, Gausdal 1994, 13.a4!? \textsuperscript{g}g4. That was evidently the idea behind Black’s last move. 14.a5 \textsuperscript{c}xf3 15.\textsuperscript{c}xf3 \textsuperscript{d}c4 16.\textsuperscript{e}e1!! The placement of Black’s knight on c4 is extremely unstable. 16...\textsuperscript{c}e8 17.\textsuperscript{c}e2 \textsuperscript{d}d7 18.\textsuperscript{w}b3 \textsuperscript{w}c7 19.\textsuperscript{c}a2 \textsuperscript{c}g5 20.\textsuperscript{a}a4 and Black has plenty of problems to worry about;

12...\textsuperscript{e}e8 13.a4 g6 (It is also possible for Black to play the immediate: 13...f5 14.exf5 a5 15.bxa5 \textsuperscript{c}c5 16.\textsuperscript{c}e3 \textsuperscript{w}xa5 17.\textsuperscript{d}b5, but here after: 17...\textsuperscript{c}xf5 18.\textsuperscript{c}xc5 dxc5 19.d6, as well as following: 17...\textsuperscript{c}e4 18.\textsuperscript{d}d2 \textsuperscript{c}xf5 19.\textsuperscript{c}c4 \textsuperscript{w}d8 20.\textsuperscript{d}d3, White obtains a considerable advantage.) 14.\textsuperscript{h}h6 \textsuperscript{g}g7 15. a5?! (I believe – 15.\textsuperscript{w}d2 is good enough, but it seems attractive for White to cramp his opponent completely on the queenside.) 15...f5 16.\textsuperscript{w}d2 and White has excellent prospects, for example: 16...\textsuperscript{f}f6 17.\textsuperscript{c}g5 \textsuperscript{e}e8?! 18.f4±; 16...f4 17.\textsuperscript{f}fc1 g5 18.h3±; 16...\textsuperscript{f}xe4 (This seems to be the most reliable plan for Black.) 17.\textsuperscript{c}e4 \textsuperscript{f}f6 18.\textsuperscript{f}fg5 \textsuperscript{e}e4 19.\textsuperscript{c}xe4 \textsuperscript{f}f5 20.f3± and for example in case Black’s bishop goes later to d7, then White can squeeze Black’s knight with g2-g4.

12.\textsuperscript{e}e1!

V.Kramnik was the inventor of that move! White plans to transfer his knight along the route \textsuperscript{d}c2-b4-c6, meanwhile he is doing that with tempo, exploiting the unstable placement of Black’s knight on g4.

White used to play before
12.b4 \( \Box b6 \) 13.a4 and that plan did not lose its popularity altogether. Naturally, you must have in mind that the fight is rather original in that variation. Black often ignores the threats to his a6-pawn and he opts for a lively piece-play. White must play very precisely in order to neutralize Black activity and to preserve his material advantage. See several examples: 13...bxa4
14.\( \Box c4 \) f5 15.exf5 \( \Box x f 5 \) 16.\( \Box c3 \) \( \Box h 8 \) 17.\( \Box a 5 \) \( \Box c 8 \) 18.\( \Box b 3 \) \( \Box d 8 \) 19.\( \Box a 2 \) e4 20.\( \Box d 4 \) \( \Box f 6 \) 21.\( \Box x f 5 \) (or 21.\( \Box e 6 \) \( \Box x c 3 \)) 21...\( \Box x f 5 \) 22.\( \Box x g 4 \), draw, J.Pinter – Hickl, Austria 2000 (After 22.\( \Box c 2 \) \( \Box e 8 \) 23.h3, Black has the resource – 23...\( \Box x f 2 \) 24.\( \Box e 3 \) \( \Box x h 3 + \) 25.\( \Box x h 1 ? \) \( \Box g 6 \) 26.\( \Box b 6 \) \( \Box f 4 + \)). Or 17.\( \Box b 3 \) \( \Box f 6 \) 18.h3, Mchedlishvili – Hickl, Kalithea 2003, 18...e4 19.hxg4 exf3 20.\( \Box x f 3 \) \( \Box d 3 \) and Black has an excellent game. I still think that White’s resources in that variation have not been exhausted at all. There must be found an improvement if there is a wish...

**Diagram**

12...\( \Box g f 6 \) **13.\( \Box c 2 \)**

It is less precise for White to play 13.\( \Box d 3 \), in view of: 13...\( \Box c 5 ! \)
14.\( \Box x c 5 \) dxc5 15.\( \Box c 2 \) c4 16.a4 \( \Box d 7 \) and the position becomes quite unclear, Ulibin – M.Hansen, Cappelle la Grande 1994.

**Diagram**

13...\( \Box b 6 \)

Now, the move 13...\( \Box c 5 \) is not so effective anymore, because of White’s simplest reaction: 14.f3 \( \Box d 7 \) (Black’s choice is not so great after all. His tactical operation, connected with 14...b4?, would not work, because of the line: 15.\( \Box x b 4 \) \( \Box b 6 \) 16.\( \Box c 6 \) \( \Box c x e 4 + \) 17.\( \Box h 1 \) and two of Black’s pieces are hanging. If 14...\( \Box h 5 \), then 15.\( \Box b 4 \) \( \Box g 5 \) 16.\( \Box c 6 \) \( \Box b 6 \) 17.\( \Box h 1 \) \( \Box x d 2 \) 18.\( \Box x d 2 \) and here Black has tried: 18...\( \Box d 7 \) 19.b4 \( \Box a 4 \) 20.\( \Box x a 4 \) bxa4 21.\( \Box a c 1 \) \( \Box f 4 \) 22.\( \Box c 4 + \) Latzke – Chudinovskih, Wuerttemberg 2000, as well as the more logical line: 18...b4 19.\( \Box d 1 \) \( \Box f 4 \) 20.\( \Box e 3 \) \( \Box d 7 \) 21.\( \Box c 4 \) a5 22.\( \Box a c 1 \) \( \Box h 8 \) 23.g3 \( \Box h 5 \) 24.\( \Box f d 1 \) g6 25.\( \Box e 2 \). White’s advantage increases gradually. 25...\( \Box c 7 \) 26.\( \Box c 4 \). Black’s position is about to crumble at any moment. 26...f5 27.\( \Box x f 5 \) gxf5 28.\( \Box h 6 \) \( \Box f 6 \) 29.\( \Box x e 5 \) dxe5 30.\( \Box x c 5 \) \( \Box d 6 \) 31.\( \Box x a 5 \), Gelfand – M.Gurevich, Khanty-Mansyisk 2005.) 15.b4 \( \Box a 4 \) 16.\( \Box x a 4 \) bxa4 17.\( \Box a 3 ! \). White’s knight controls the important c4 and b5-squares from here. 17...\( \Box b 8 \) (It is also possible for Black to continue with: 17...\( \Box h 5 \) 18.\( \Box c 4 \) \( \Box f 4 \) 19.\( \Box x f 4 \) exf4 20.\( \Box c 1 \) \( \Box f 6 \) 21.\( \Box h 1 \) \( \Box e 5 \) 22.\( \Box d 2 \), preserving the possibility to exchange on b5 at an appropriate moment, or 21...\( \Box b 8 \) 22.a3 \( \Box b 5 \) 23.\( \Box a 5 \) \( \Box b 2 \)

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24. Kb1 f6 25. a5 xf5 26. d3 e5 27. c6 and White's advantage is quite stable thanks to his control over the c-file.) 18. h1 c8 19. b1 e8, Chekhov – Hickl, Germany 1992, but here it deserved attention for White to follow with: 20. d3 d2 e2, c4-a5±.

Black has also tried 13... b7 14. b4 (White has good reasons to change his plan – because Black's bishop cannot go back to the d7-square in order to prevent the undermining move a2-a4; meanwhile after 14... b4, White must consider 14... c5.) 14... b6 15. e3 g6, V. Umanisky – Bojcuk, Legnica 1996, 16. d3 h5 17. g3 g7 18. a4 bxa4 19. x a4 f5 20. x b6 x b6 21. c4±.

14. b4

I must admit that White's road to obtaining the advantage would be long and it would take a lot of efforts for him to prove it, so I would suggest another line, which has never been tested in practice yet – 14. b3!? without taking the final decision about the route of White's knight. It can also be redirected to the f5-square via c3. Why not after all; the position resembles a bit the classical variation of the Ruy Lopez!? There might follow:

14... d7 15. a4 bxa4 16. bxa4 a5 17. e3±;

14... f7 15. b4 b7 16. a4 bxa4 17. bxa4 a5 18. c6 x c6 19. dxc6 b4 20. d5 d2 21. xc6 bxc6 17. x a4 bxa4 18. x a4 x e 4 19. x a6 x a6 20. x a6 d7 21. c6 x a8 22. a8 x a8 23. x f3 f6 24. b4 and the b-pawn can become quite dangerous, for example: 24... a3 25. b5 f8 26. b6 e4 27. d1 b7 28. b1±.

15. b3!? This move has not been played in practice yet and I believe – that move order is more precise than 15. c1. The point is that after 15...
Chapter 4

16...\textit{d6} \textit{xc6} 17...\textit{dxc6} b4 18...\textit{b5}

18...\textit{d5}

It is also possible for Black to accept the pawn-sacrifice – 18...\textit{dxe4} 19...\textit{xe3} \textit{c5} (In case of: 19...\textit{wb8} 20...\textit{bc1}, White's compensation for the pawn is more than sufficient. His pieces are much more active and he has a far-advanced passed pawn, so that will be a telling factor for the future. Black's only chance is to coordinate his pieces and to try to advance his pawn-mass in the centre, while White's task is to prevent that. There might arise the following developments: 20...\textit{bc3}. Black gives back his extra pawn with the idea to provoke some simplification. 21...\textit{xc3} bxc3 22...\textit{xc3} \textit{wc7} 23...\textit{xb6} \textit{xb6} 24...\textit{cf8} 25...\textit{d5!} \textit{a7} 26...\textit{c4} \textit{xc7} 27...\textit{xf7+} \textit{h8} 28...\textit{h3+}; 20...\textit{a4} 21...\textit{f3} d5 22...\textit{c7} \textit{wb7} 23...\textit{xb6} \textit{xb6} 24...\textit{xd5+}; 20...\textit{xc8} 21...\textit{f4!} \textit{xf6} 22...\textit{exe5} \textit{dxe5} 23...\textit{f5!} e4 24...\textit{d4+} 20...\textit{c7} \textit{wc8} (It is weaker for Black to defend with: 20...\textit{we8} 21...\textit{xd6} \textit{wc6} 22...\textit{f3} \textit{xd6} 23...\textit{xd6} \textit{xd6} 24...\textit{xa8} \textit{xa8} 25...\textit{ad1} \textit{xc8} 26...\textit{xd6} \textit{dxc6}

\textit{c8} 16...b3 (White does not achieve much with: 16...\textit{xa6} \textit{dc4} 17...\textit{xc4} \textit{xc4} 18...b3 \textit{dd4} – since his knight on a6 is endangered and he will have to give up his e4-pawn.) 16...\textit{a5} 17...\textit{c6} \textit{xc6} 18...\textit{dxc6} b4 19...\textit{b5} \textit{xe4} 20...\textit{e3} \textit{c5} 21...\textit{c7} (The situation becomes rather unclear after: 21...\textit{f3} f5 22...\textit{xd6} \textit{xd6} 23...\textit{xc5} \textit{xc5} 24...\textit{xc5} \textit{wc7}, or 21...\textit{xc5} dxc5 22...\textit{xd8} \textit{xc8} 23...\textit{f6d1} \textit{xd1} 24...\textit{xd1} \textit{c8} 25...\textit{c7} f5.) 21...\textit{xc7} 22...\textit{xc7} \textit{wc7} and Black already has two pawns for the exchange and not too many problems to worry about, Radjabov – Hickl, Halkidiki 2002.

15...\textit{a5}

The move 15...\textit{c8}, does not have any separate importance, because it usually leads to a transposition of moves, but White must still play precisely: 16...\textit{c2}! (That is the fine point – White thus avoids the transposition to the abovementioned game Radjabov – Hickl, because his e4-pawn is protected. I will also mention that the position is rather unclear in the following line: 16...\textit{xa6} \textit{xc3}! 17...\textit{xc3} \textit{wc8} 18...\textit{d3} \textit{xa6} 19...\textit{a4} \textit{e8}! 20...\textit{f4} \textit{exf4} 21...\textit{xf4} f5? 22...\textit{a5} \textit{xa8} 23...\textit{exf5} \textit{xf6} 24...\textit{b4} \textit{ac7} and Black’s pieces will soon spring into action.) 16...\textit{a5} 17...\textit{c6} \textit{xc6} 18...\textit{dxc6} b4 (Following: 18...\textit{xc6} 19...\textit{xb5}, White’s advantage is obvious.) 19...\textit{b5} d5 20...\textit{exe5} \textit{bxd5} 21...\textit{ac1} \textit{b6} and the game transpose to the main line of the variation.
27.\text{\textxf}5 \text{\textxc}b5 28.\text{\textxc}b6+-) 21.\text{\textxc}g4 \text{\textxc}b7 (or 21...f5 22.\text{\textxc}d6+-; 21...
\text{\textxc}e8 22.\text{\textxf}x6 \text{\textxc}c6 23.\text{\textxc}f5 \text{\textxc}c7 24.\text{\textxc}c1+-) 22.\text{\textxc}c5 \text{\textxc}d5 23.\text{\textxc}e2 \text{\textxc}a6 24.\text{\textxc}e5 \text{\textxc}b5 25.\text{\textxc}e7 \text{\textxe}8 26.\text{\textxc}d6±

\textbf{19.\text{\textxc}d5 \text{\textxc}xd5 20.\text{\textxc}c2 \text{\textxc}b6 21.\text{\textxc}a1 \text{\textxc}a8 22.\text{\textxc}c4}

GM S.Shipov evaluates this position as ± in Chess Informant 65. Naturally, that is quite close to the truth, but there is still a lot of fight left...

\textbf{22...h6}

Black has numerous possible useful moves, so to speak – h7-h6, \text{\textxc}f8-d8 and e5-e4 and the character of the fight depends most of all on what combination of ideas and what move-order he is going to use.

22...\text{\textxc}fd8 23.\text{\textxc}fd1 e4 24.\text{\textxc}g5 (In case of: 24.\text{\textxc}c7 \text{\textxc}d7 25.\text{\textxc}g5, White must consider he possible exchange-sacrifice – 25...
\text{\textxc}xc7 26.\text{\textxc}xc7 \text{\textxc}xc7 27.\text{\textxc}a6 \text{\textxc}xa6 28.\text{\textxc}xa6 \text{\textxc}c3 29.\text{\textxc}d2 \text{\textxc}d6 30.\text{\textxc}f4 \text{\textxc}c5 31.\text{\textxc}c4 \text{\textxc}g4 32.\text{\textxc}d7 \text{\textxc}d5 33.
\text{\textxc}xg5 \text{\textxc}xg5 34.\text{\textxc}e2 \text{\textxc}e5.) 24...
e3 25.f3 \text{\textxc}c7 26.\text{\textxc}xc7 \text{\textxc}xd1+ 27.\text{\textxc}xd1 \text{\textxc}xc7 28.\text{\textxc}c1– and White’s passed pawn becomes extremely powerful.

\textbf{23.\text{\textxc}fd1 e4}

23...\text{\textxc}fd8 24.\text{\textxc}c7 \text{\textxc}d7 25.\text{\textxc}e1 \text{\textxc}xc7. Now, that sacrifice is not so effective anymore. 26.\text{\textxc}xc7 \text{\textxc}xc7 27.\text{\textxc}b5 \text{\textxc}xb5 28.\text{\textxc}xb5 \text{\textxc}c5 29.\text{\textxc}c4±.

\textbf{24.\text{\textxc}e1 \text{\textxc}fd8}

Black’s defence is not any easier after: 24...\text{\textxc}f4 25.\text{\textxc}c7 \text{\textxc}xe2+ 26.\text{\textxc}xe2 \text{\textxc}e8 27.\text{\textxc}d7 \text{\textxc}g5 28.\text{\textxc}d2! \text{\textxc}xd2 29.\text{\textxc}xd2 \text{\textxc}xc7 30.\text{\textxc}c2 \text{\textxc}xb5 31.\text{\textxc}xc8 \text{\textxc}c3 32.\text{\textxc}xf8+ \text{\textxc}xf8 33.\text{\textxc}d2 \text{\textxc}e7 34.a3 \text{\textxc}c6 35.\text{\textxc}h1 \text{\textxc}e6 36.\text{\textxc}b4 \text{\textxc}b4 37.\text{\textxc}a1, because White should manage to realize his extra exchange.

\textbf{25.\text{\textxc}c7 \text{\textxc}xc7 26.\text{\textxc}xd8+ \text{\textxc}xd8 27.\text{\textxc}d2 \text{\textxc}a6 28.\text{\textxc}f4 \text{\textxc}fd5}

\textbf{29.\text{\textxc}d6}

White has succeeded in transforming his positional edge into a material advantage. (In case of the attractive line: 29.\text{\textxc}xc7 \text{\textxc}xc7 30.\text{\textxc}xd5, Black has the powerful argument: 30...\text{\textxc}xh2+ 31.\text{\textxc}xh2 \text{\textxc}xc1 32.\text{\textxc}d2 \text{\textxc}c6 33.\text{\textxc}c4 \text{\textxc}xc4 34.\text{\textxc}xe4 \text{\textxc}xc4 35.\text{\textxc}d8+ \text{\textxc}h7 36.\text{\textxc}xa5 e3 37.\text{\textxc}xe3 \text{\textxc}h4+ and it all ends in a perpetual.)

29...\text{\textxc}xc4 30.\text{\textxc}xc4 \text{\textxc}a8 31.\text{\textxc}g3 \text{\textxc}g5 32.\text{\textxc}e2 e3 33.\text{\textxc}xf7! \text{\textxc}xf2+ 34.\text{\textxc}xf2 \text{\textxc}xf7 35.\text{\textxc}xc7 \text{\textxc}e6 36.\text{\textxc}f3 \text{\textxc}d7 37.\text{\textxc}xd5 \text{\textxc}c8 38.\text{\textxc}e6+ \text{\textxc}xe6 39.\text{\textxc}e2+ \text{\textxc}d7 40.\text{\textxc}xa5 \text{\textxc}e7 41.\text{\textxc}b6±. Naturally, White must overcome some technical difficulties, but Black’s fight for the draw will be far from easy too.
b) 10...b5 11.\(\text{d}d2\)

This is a multi-purpose move. White protects his e4-pawn and he covers the g4-square; meanwhile in case of his active operations on the queenside – the knight can be redeployed along the route \(\text{d}d2-b3-a5-c6\).

\[\text{Diagram} 1\]

Black's main defensive lines in this position are: b1) 11...\(\text{d}e8\), b2) 11...\(\text{x}xe4\), b3) 11...\(\text{b}b7\), b4) 11...\(\text{c}c7\) and b5) 11...\(\text{b}b6\).

He also tries sometimes in practice:

11...b4 12.\(\text{a}a4\) \(\text{x}x\)e4 (It is worse for Black to continue with: 12...\(\text{b}b8\) 13.\(\text{e}c1\) \text{d}e8 14.\(\text{c}c4\) f5 15.\(\text{e}xf5\) \text{d}xf6 16.\(\text{d}a7\) \text{b}b7 17.\(\text{b}b6\) \text{d}d7 18.\(\text{x}a5\), since White had an overwhelming advantage in the game Olarasu – I.ionescu, Bucharest 1997.) 13.\(\text{x}xe4\) f5, Meissner – Huber, Boeblingen 1998, 14.\(\text{x}b3\) \(\text{f}xe4\) 15.\(\text{x}xb4\) \(\text{d}f6\) 16.\(\text{b}b6\) \(\text{b}b8\) 17.\(\text{e}ac1\); 11...\(\text{b}b8\) 12.\(\text{b}b4\) \(\text{d}b6\), Kamaradze – Chibukhchian, Batumi 2002, 13.\(\text{b}b3\) \text{c}7 (or 13...\(\text{c}c4\) 14.\(\text{d}xc4\) \text{bxc4} 15.\(\text{a}a5\) \text{c}7 16.a\(\pm\)) 14.\(\text{c}c1\) \(\text{c}4\) 15.\(\text{d}xc4\) \text{bxc4} 16.\(\text{a}a5\) \(\text{xb}4\) 17.\(\text{c}c6\) \(\text{b}b7\) (White's position is superior too after: 17...a5 18.\(\text{d}xb4\) \(\text{a}x\)b4 19.\(\text{b}b5\), or 17...\(\text{b}b2\) 18.\(\text{d}a4\) \(\text{xa}2\) 19.\(\text{x}c4\)\(\pm\)) 18.f3\(\pm\).

b1) 11...\(\text{e}e8\) 12.\(\text{b}4!\)

White cannot prevent the trade of the dark-squared bishops, but instead he develops a powerful initiative on the queenside.

12...\(\text{g}g5\) 13.\(\text{x}x\)g5 \(\text{x}xg5\) 14.\(\text{a}a4\) \(\text{b}x\)a4 15.\(\text{c}c4!\)

It is less precise for White to follow with: 15.\(\text{xa}4\) \(\text{b}b8\) 16.\(\text{b}b1\), in view of: 16...f5 17.\(\text{exf5}\) \(\text{d}d6\) and Black obtained an excellent position in the game Cvitan – Djurhuus, Biel 1989.

15...\(\text{b}b8\)

The immediate move 15...f5 is too risky for Black, because of: 16.\(\text{x}xa4\) \(\text{b}b8\) 17.\(\text{a}a5\) \(\text{b}b6\) 18.\(\text{c}c2\) and White is clearly better.

16.\(\text{xa}4\) \(\text{b}b6\) 17.\(\text{xb}6\) \(\text{xb}6\) 18.\(\text{c}fc1\) f5 19.\(\text{d}d1\) \(\text{b}b8\)

After 19...\(\text{f}6\), the game might develop much sharper: 20.\(\text{a}a5\) \(\text{b}b8\) (If 20...\(\text{x}b7\), then 21.\(\text{b}5!\) \(\text{a}x\)b5 22.\(\text{e}a8\)\(\pm\)) 21.\(\text{d}c7\) \(\text{b}b7\) 22.\(\text{xd}6\) \(\text{d}d2\) 23.\(\text{f}1\) \(\text{f}e8\) (In case of 23...\(\text{c}c4\), it is good for White to continue with: 24.\(\text{c}e5\) \(\text{c}e8\) 25.\(\text{b}2\)\(\pm\) – and Black's a6-pawn will be rather vulnerable in the subsequent fight.) 24.\(\text{c}c7\). This move is played with the idea to bring the other rook to the g3-square. 24...\(\text{e}1\) (White can counter 24...\(\text{d}4\) with the powerful argument 25.\(\text{d}c3\) \(\text{b}d8\) 26.\(\text{c}5\)\(\pm\)) 25.\(\text{a}3\) \(\text{b}d8\) (After 25...\(\text{h}8\), White can follow
with: 26.\textit{\texttt{exg7!}} \xg7 27.\textit{\texttt{gg3+}} and here there are two possibilities for Black: 27...\textit{\texttt{xf7}} 28.\textit{\texttt{wc7+ xe7}}
29.\textit{\texttt{wb8}} f4 30.\textit{\texttt{gg5!}} h6 31.\textit{\texttt{exe5 xe5}} 32.\textit{\texttt{exe5+}}, or 27...\textit{\texttt{dg4}}
28.\textit{\texttt{exf5 xd1}} h3 h5. Black gets checkmated, or he loses plenty of material if he tries something else.
30.\textit{\texttt{gg6+}} \xf8 31. \textit{\texttt{f6+}}) 26.\textit{\texttt{cc5 xe4}} (In case of 26...\textit{\texttt{cc8}}, Black fails to create any counterplay –
27.\textit{\texttt{xc8 xc8}} 28.\textit{\texttt{wb6 xd1}} 29. \textit{\texttt{wb7 cc1}} 30.\textit{\texttt{xa6+}}) 27.\textit{\texttt{a7}}
\textit{\texttt{xb8}} 28.\textit{\texttt{xb7 xb7}} 29.\textit{\texttt{xb7 xd1}} 30.\textit{\texttt{d7 f8}} 31.\textit{\texttt{xe6+}} \xh8 32.\textit{\texttt{exe5}}
\textit{\texttt{d2}} 33.\textit{\texttt{f3+}}--.

\textbf{20.\textit{\texttt{exf5}} \textit{\texttt{xf5}} 21.\textit{\texttt{de3}} \textit{\texttt{gg6}}
22.\textit{\texttt{ec4}} \textit{\texttt{ef4}} 23.\textit{\texttt{ac1}} \textit{\texttt{dd4}}}

After 23...\textit{\texttt{ff6}}, White can play 24.\textit{\texttt{gg4}} and here it would not work for Black to continue with
24...\textit{\texttt{xf2+}}, because of: 25.\textit{\texttt{ee6+}} \xh8 26.\textit{\texttt{gg4+}}-- and White wins.

\textbf{24.\textit{\texttt{xa6!}}} This move is even stronger than 24.\textit{\texttt{gg4}}.
\textbf{24...\textit{\texttt{xb4}}}
\textbf{25.\textit{\texttt{ec8}} \textit{\texttt{ee7}} 26.\textit{\texttt{bb5}} \textit{\texttt{f4}}, Stohl –
Jones, Moscow 1994. Here, White could have finished his opponent off immediately with: 27.\textit{\texttt{exe8}}
\textit{\texttt{exe8}} 28.\textit{\texttt{exe8+}} \textit{\texttt{exe8}} 29.\textit{\texttt{ec8}}
\textit{\texttt{b1+}} 30.\textit{\texttt{ff1+}}--.

\textbf{b2) 11...\textit{\texttt{exe4}}}
Black is trying to solve his problems in a tactical fashion.
\textbf{12.\textit{\texttt{cxe4}} \textit{\texttt{f5}}}

\textbf{13.a4}
The situation in the centre is rather complicated, but the final evaluation of the position depends mostly on the unstable black pawns on the queenside.

\textbf{13...\textit{\texttt{bxa4}}}
Following: 13...\textit{\texttt{b4}} 14.a5 \textit{\texttt{exe4}}
15.\textit{\texttt{exe4}} \textit{\texttt{f6}} 16.\textit{\texttt{xf6+}} \textit{\texttt{xf6}}, the
knights have disappeared from the board and much rather thanks to that, White can easily attack
Black’s queenside weaknesses with: 17.\textit{\texttt{bb6}} \textit{\texttt{e7}} 18.\textit{\texttt{a4}} e4 19. \textit{\texttt{xb4}} \textit{\texttt{e5}} 20.\textit{\texttt{g3}} \textit{\texttt{f5}} 21.\textit{\texttt{e3}}. White
had an extra pawn and a huge positional advantage in the game Psakhis – Zapata, Manila 1992.

\textbf{14.\textit{\texttt{xa4}} \textit{\texttt{exe4}} 15.\textit{\texttt{exe4}} \textit{\texttt{f6}}
16.\textit{\texttt{xf6+}} \textit{\texttt{xf6}}}
The other possible capture –
16.\textit{\texttt{xf6}}, leads after: 17.\textit{\texttt{fc1}} \textit{\texttt{f8}}
18.\textit{\texttt{gg4}} \textit{\texttt{f5}} 19.\textit{\texttt{xf5}} \textit{\texttt{xf5}} 20.\textit{\texttt{cc6+}} to a great advantage for White as well, Khenkin – B.Stein, Dortmund 1993.

\textbf{17.\textit{\texttt{w6}} \textit{\texttt{b8}} 18.\textit{\texttt{xa6}} \textit{\texttt{e7}}
Following: 18...\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}xb2} 19.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xc8 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xc8 20.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xd6 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}d8 21.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c6\pm, or 18...\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xa6 19.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xa6 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xb2 20.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xd6 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xd6 21.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xd6 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}a8 22.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}d1\pm White remains with a solid extra pawn in both cases.

19.b4 e4 20.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}ab1\pm — and Black has no compensation for the pawn, I. Farago – B. Stein, Dortmund 1986.

b3) 11...\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b7

12.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b4
That is a standard resource for White in similar pawn-structures. He restricts maximally Black’s possibilities in order to avoid unnecessary complications. White has also tried in practice the immediate: 12.a4 b4 13.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}a2 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c5 (It is too passive for Black to play:

13...a5 14.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b5 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b8 15.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c1 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}d8 16.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c4 and White maintains a powerful pressure on the queenside, Dragomarezki – Freisler, Prague 1990.) 14.f3 a5 15.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xc5 (In case of: 15.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b5 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c8 16.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c1 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}d7 17.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}cb3 f5 18.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c1 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xb3 19.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xc1 20.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xc1 fxe4 21.fxe4 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}f6, the position is gradually simplified.) 15...dxc5 (Black hopes “to sneak” to the d4-square with his bishop.) 16.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c1 (After 16.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b5 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}e8 17.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xe8?! \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xe8 18.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c4 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}a6 19.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b3 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}g5 20.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}fe1 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}f4, Black has some threats on the kingside.) 16...\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}d7 17.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b5 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b6 18.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}d3 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}d6 19.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c4 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xc4 20.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xc4 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}g5 21.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}e1 and White still maintains a slight advantage. Black fails to penetrate to d4 with his bishop anyway, or to unblock the position, for example: 21...\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}a6 22.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xa6 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xa6 23.b3 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c8 24.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b2\pm.

12...\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c8
The other lines for Black are not promising anything better either:

12...\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}e8 13.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b3 f5, Johnsen – Malin, Vadsø 1990, 14.exf5 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c8 15.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}a5 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xc3 (or 15...\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}a8 16.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c6+-) 16.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xb7 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c8 17.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}a5 and White has a great advantage – his light-squared strategy is bound to prevail;

12...\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b8 13.a4 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c8 14.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b3 bxa4 15.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xa4 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c7 16.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}a3 (It deserves attention for White to try 16.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}c1, with the idea after 16...a5 to follow with: 17.bxa5 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}xa5 18.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b6, winning the exchange.) 16...a5 17.\textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}b5 \textit{\textipa{\v{c}}}d8?! (It is more resil-
ient for Black to defend with 17... \( \mathcal{Q}c2 \), but even then after: 18.bxa5 \( \mathcal{Q}xe4 \) 19.\( \mathcal{Q}xe4 \mathcal{Q}xe4 \) 20.\( \mathcal{Q}c3 \mathcal{Q}xc3 \) 21.\( \mathcal{Q}xc3 \mathcal{Q}xd5 \) 22.f3, White should win that position.) 18.\( \mathcal{Q}a7 \) (In case of 18.\( \mathcal{Q}xa5 \), as it was played in the game Val.Popov – Bryzgalin, Samara 2002, Black could have continued with: 18...\( \mathcal{Q}c5 \)?? 19.bxc5 \( \mathcal{Q}xa5 \) 20.\( \mathcal{Q}c4 \mathcal{Q}a2 \) 21.\( \mathcal{Q}xa2 \mathcal{Q}xa2 \) 22.\( \mathcal{Q}cd6 \mathcal{Q}xd6 \) 23.\( \mathcal{Q}xd6 \mathcal{Q}xe2 \) 24. \( \mathcal{Q}xb7 \mathcal{Q}xe4 \) 25.c6 \( \mathcal{Q}c2 \) and there would be no direct win for White in sight.) 18.axb4 19.\( \mathcal{Q}xc8 \mathcal{Q}xa3 \) 20.\( \mathcal{Q}xb4 \mathcal{Q}xe3 \) 21.\( \mathcal{Q}xe7+ \mathcal{Q}xe7 \) 22. \( \mathcal{Q}xe3 \mathcal{Q}c5 \) 23.\( \mathcal{Q}a1 \) and White only needs to overcome some technical difficulties;

12...\( \mathcal{Q}xe4 \) (Black plays analogously to variation b2.) 13. \( \mathcal{Q}dx e4 \) f5 14.a4 bxa4 15.\( \mathcal{Q}xa4 \mathcal{Q}x e4 \) 16.\( \mathcal{Q}xe4 \mathcal{Q}f6 \) 17.\( \mathcal{Q}xf6+ \mathcal{Q}xf6 \) 18.\( \mathcal{Q}d3 \mathcal{Q}e8 \) 19.\( \mathcal{Q}e4 \mathcal{Q}b5 \) 20.\( \mathcal{Q}b3 \). White’s bishops are dominating the board.

13.\( \mathcal{Q}b3 \) \( \mathcal{Q}b6 \)

It is hardly any better for Black to defend with: 13...\( \mathcal{Q}c7 \) 14.a4 bxa4 15.\( \mathcal{Q}xa4 \mathcal{Q}c8 \) 16.\( \mathcal{Q}a3 \) h6 17.\( \mathcal{Q}c4 \) Poluljahov – Bazart, Cap d’Agde 2002.

14.a4 \( \mathcal{Q}c4 \)

It is very bad for Black to play: 14...\( \mathcal{Q}xa4 \) 15.\( \mathcal{Q}xa4 \) bxa4 16.\( \mathcal{Q}xa4 \mathcal{Q}c7 \) 17.\( \mathcal{Q}xa6+- \) Bewersdorff – Herges, Griesheim 2003.

(diagram)

15.\( \mathcal{Q}xc4 \) bxc4, Cs.Horvath – Szirmai, Balatonbereny 1992, 16.\( \mathcal{Q}c2 \). White’s space advantage is quite obvious and he has excel-
lent prospects on the queenside. He can create a powerful passed pawn, or he can try to win Black’s c4-pawn.

b4) 11...\( \mathcal{Q}c7 \)

Black deploys his queen on its habitual place in this variation. Meanwhile, White cannot attack Black’s queenside immediately with 12.a4, because of 12...b4; it is also impossible for him to play 12.b4, due to the defenselessness of his knight on c3.

12.\( \mathcal{Q}c1 \) \( \mathcal{Q}b8 \)

It is not so good for Black to try 12...\( \mathcal{Q}b7 \), van der Sterren – Hickl, San Bernardino 1992. 13.b4 \( \mathcal{Q}d8 \). Otherwise Black’s queen will be attacked with tempo after White’s possible maneuver \( \mathcal{Q}d2-b3-a5 \).

14. \( \mathcal{Q}b3 \) \( \mathcal{Q}b6 \) 15.\( \mathcal{Q}d3 \) \( \mathcal{Q}xe3 \)
16.\textit{\texttt{\&xe3}} and White’s advantage is considerable – Black can hardly neutralize White’s pressure along the c-file.

13.\textit{\texttt{b4}}

White must fix Black’s b-pawn. In case of: 13.a4 b4 14.\textit{\texttt{\&cb1 \&d8}}, Black’s position remains relatively acceptable.

13...\textit{\texttt{\&b6}}

The other possible plan for Black, connected with the trade of the dark-squared bishops does not seem so attractive – 13...\textit{\texttt{\&d8}}. There might follow, for example: 14.\textit{\texttt{\&b3 \&b6}} 15.\textit{\texttt{\&d3 \&xe3}} 16.\textit{\texttt{\&xe3 \&b6}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\&a5 \&d7}} 18.\textit{\texttt{f4}}. White exploits the fact that Black’s knights have presently no access to the important e5-outpost. 18...\textit{\texttt{exf4}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\&xf4}}± and Black has the positional exchange-sacrifice on f6 to worry about.

14.\textit{\texttt{\&b3}}

After 14.a4 \textit{\texttt{\&xa4}} 15.\textit{\texttt{\&xa4 bxa4}} 16.\textit{\texttt{\&xa4 \&d7}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\&b3 a5}} 18.\textit{\texttt{bxa5 \&xa5}}, the position is simplified considerably.

14...\textit{\texttt{\&d7}} 15.\textit{\texttt{\&a5 \&c8}} 16.\textit{\texttt{\&d2 \&a7}}

It also deserves attention for Black to try: 16...\textit{\texttt{\&d8}} 17.\textit{\texttt{f3}}! (White must react accurately. In case of the attractive move 17.\textit{\texttt{f4}}, Black can follow with the spectacular fairy-tale line: 17...\textit{\texttt{\&xc3!}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\&xc3 \&bx5}}! 19.\textit{\texttt{exd5 \&xd5}} and 20...\textit{\texttt{\&xe3}}.) 17...\textit{\texttt{h6}}. (Black can also play: 17...\textit{\texttt{\&c4}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\&xc4 bxc4}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\&b1 \&b6}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\&f2}}±. It is more precise for him to defend with 18...\textit{\texttt{\&xa5}}, but White maintains a slight advantage even then: 19.\textit{\texttt{bxa5 \&xc4}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\&e2 \&xc1}} 21.\textit{\texttt{\&xc1 \&d8}} 22.\textit{\texttt{\&b6 \&f8}} 23.\textit{\texttt{\&c7 \&c8}} 24.\textit{\texttt{\&c2}}± – Black’s position is rather cramped and his pawns on a6 and d6 are quite vulnerable.) 18.\textit{\texttt{\&b1}}! White begins his fight for the c6-square. 18...\textit{\texttt{\&a7}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\&xc8 \&xc8}}, Antic – Aronian, Yerevan 2000 and here the move 20.\textit{\texttt{\&c6}}! would have been extremely unpleasant for Black, because after 20...\textit{\texttt{\&xc6}}, White has: 21.\textit{\texttt{\&c1 \&c4}} 22.\textit{\texttt{\&xc4 bxc4}} 23.\textit{\texttt{\&a7}}±.

17.\textit{\texttt{\&c2}}

It is interesting for White to try: 17.\textit{\texttt{f4}} \textit{\texttt{exf4}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\&d4}}!? (in order to capture on f4 with the queen) 18...\textit{\texttt{\&ac7}} (White can counter 18...\textit{\texttt{g5}}, with 19.\textit{\texttt{g3}} and his initiative would be very powerful.) 19.\textit{\texttt{\&f4 \&a4}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\&xa4 \&xc1}} 21.\textit{\texttt{\&xc1 \&xc1}} 22.\textit{\texttt{\&xc1 bxa4}} 23.\textit{\texttt{\&c6}}, or 17...\textit{\texttt{\&ac7}} 18.\textit{\texttt{fxe5 dxe5}} 19.\textit{\texttt{d6 \&xc3}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\&xc3 \&xe4}} 21.\textit{\texttt{\&xc8+ \&xc8}} 22.\textit{\texttt{\&xc2 \&xd6}} 23.\textit{\texttt{\&c6 \&xc6}} 24.\textit{\texttt{\&xc2 \&bd7}} 25.\textit{\texttt{\&c1 \&xc6}} 26.\textit{\texttt{\&xe6 f5}} 27.\textit{\texttt{\&xa6 \&c3}} 28.\textit{\texttt{\&d3 \&f7}} 29.\textit{\texttt{\&c2}} and White’s chances to press his material advantage home are
considerable. Black should rather prefer a waiting tactics – 17..\textit{e8} and White must find a way to improve his position. Meanwhile, he should not forget that the structure of the position has been changed and Black has certain counter chances – for example, after the exchange on f4, he can deploy his knight on the key-outpost e5.

\textbf{17...\textit{_ac7 18.\textit{f6c1 h6}}}


\textbf{19.f3 \textit{h7}}

In case of: 19...\textit{d8 20.f1}, White increases his pressure even more by bringing his queen to the \textit{f2}-square, for example: 20...\textit{h7} 21.\textit{f2 g5 22.xb6 \textit{xc3 23.xc3 xc1 24.c6±}}

\textbf{20.c6! \textit{xc6 21.dxc6 \textit{g5}}}

It is a mistake for Black to play 21...\textit{xc6}. After the forced line: 22.d5 \textit{xc2 23.xe7+ f8 24.xc2 \textit{xc2 25.xc2 xe7 26. wc6}, there arises an endgame, which is very difficult for Black. 26.c4 27.f2 a5 28.a4! (White thus creates a dangerous passed pawn.) 28.axb4 29.axb5 a5 30.a6 b7 31.a4±

\textbf{22.d5} (White has an alternative here – 22.a4 \textit{xc6 23.axb5 xxb5 24.xg5 \textit{c5 25.xb5 c4 26.f2 xc7+ 27.xc4 xc4 28.d5 xc2 29.xc2 xc2 30.xc2 a7+ 31.f1} and he preserves a slight edge in the endgame. 22...\textit{xd5 23.exd5 xe3+ 24.xe3 f6 25.dd2±}) White’s passed c6-pawn is very powerful and Black has difficulties to cope with it. He will hardly manage to build a fortress. Meanwhile, White has more than enough resources to improve his position; his first task is to prepare the pawn-advance a2-a4. He must not forget however, that his d5-pawn must always be well protected.

\textbf{b5) 11...\textit{b6}}

\textbf{\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}

\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}}

This move is with the idea to follow with 12.d7 and White should be prepared for a tough positional battle after that.

\textbf{12.a4!}

White inflicts an immediate strike against Black’s queenside, exploiting the tactical nuances of the position.

\textbf{12...bxa4}
The concrete justification of White’s last move can be best illustrated in the variation – 12...b4? After 13.a5 ßbd7 (It is a disaster for Black to play 13...bxc3, in view of: 14.ßxb6 ßd7 15.bxc3+ – Lindinger – Belorusset, Hamburg, 1997.) 14.ßa4 ßc5 15.ßxc5 dxc5 16.ßc2, Griego – Bennett, Manchester 1993 and White’s position is strategically winning.

13.ßxa4 ßxa4 14.ßxa4 ßd7

The move 14...a5? is not convincing at all. After 15.b4 ßd7 16.b5 ßb8 (or 16...ße8 17.ßb3 ßg4 18.ßxg4 ßxg4 19.ßfa1+- Ru-kavina – Vi.Kovacevic, Subotica 1984) 17.ßa1 ßd8 18.ßb1 ßb6 19.ßa3 ßxe3 20.ßxe3, Black’s position was hopeless in the game Shishkin – Kuzmicz, Chojnice 2005. It is equally bad for Black to try: 14...ßd7 15.ßc4 f5 16.exf5 ßxf5 17.b4 ßf8?! 18.ßb6+- Vugus – Mahesh, Witley 2000.

15.ßa3!?

If White accepts the pawn-sacrifice, Black’s compensation is quite adequate, because of his powerful couple of bishops: 15.ßxa6 ßxa6 16.ßxa6 ßg4 17.ßc4 ßxe3 18.ßxe3 ßb6=ß Chow – Odendahl, Chicago 1993. Instead, White can continue with: 15.ßa2 ßb8 16.f3 ßd8 (or 16...ßb5 17.ßxb5 ßxb5 18.ßa4± Dlugy – Kogan, Estes 1987) 17.ßb3 ßxb3 18.ßxb3 a5 19.ßfa1 ßb8 20.ßxa5 ßxa5 21.ßxa5 ßxb2 22.ßf1+ Ata-lík – Nikcevic, Vrnjacka Banja 1998. Naturally, White’s position is better, but it would not be so easy for him at all to exploit the vulnerability of Black’s d6-pawn. In fact, the game soon ended in a draw.

Black has now three basic defensive lines: b5a) 15...a5, b5b) 15...ßb8 and b5c) 15...ßb5. It is not advisable for him to play: 15...ßb8 16.b3 ßb5 17.ßxb5 axb5 18.ße2, because White had a clear advantage in the game Panczyk – Sokolowski, Wysowa 2003.

b5a) 15...a5 16.ßc2

Now, White’s knight is free from the task of protecting the e4-pawn. It is worse for him to play 16.f3 – since after 16...ßh5, Black’s pieces are dangerously activated, Stohl – Hickl, Munich 1992, or 16.h3 ßb8 17.ßc2 a4 18.ßfa1 ßb4 19.ßc4 ßb8 20.ßd2 ßb7 21.ßc3?! (White had defended reliably his b2-pawn, but he has lost control over the g1-a7 diagonal.) 21...ßd8 and Black managed to coordinate his pieces successfully in the game Cvitan – Christiansen, New York 1987. After 16.ßb1 ßg4 17.ßxg4 ßxg4 18.ßc1 ßd7 19.ßc4,
S. Arkhipov – Hickl, Lippstadt 1992, 19...f5 20...b6 ²e8 21...c7 ³a6, the position remains rather unclear.

16...a4

In case of: 16...g4 17...xg4 ²xg4 18...c4 ³c8 19.b3, Black has problems protecting his a5-pawn. 17...c4 ²b8 18...c1 ³b5

19...c3 and White maintains a powerful positional pressure.

b5b) 15...²b8 16...b3

It is understandable that White should not exchange the queenside pawns.

16...²c8

It is quite suspicious for Black to play: 16...²b5 17...xb5 axb5, because of: 18...b4! ²b7 19...b1 ³a5 20...a3±, while in case of: 16...²e8 17...b6 (After 17...²b1, White must consider 17...g4.) 17...²b8 18...xa6! (Following the almost forced line: 18.f3 ²xb6 19...xb6 ²b8 20...c4 ²b5 21...f2 ²xc4 22...xc4 ²xb2 23...a1 ²xa1 24...xa1 ³c8 25...d3 ³a8 26...xa6 ²xa6 27...xa6, S. Ivanov – Shchukin, St Petersburg 1998, Black’s position should be quite defendable in case of an accurate play, for example: 27...²d7! 28...f1 ³c5 29...b5 ²d8 30...e2 ²a5, not allowing White’s king to go to the queenside.) 18...xb2 19...c4 ³b4 20.f3 ²b8 21...d2 and despite the total annihilation of the queenside pawns, White preserves better chances. His pieces control the greater part of the board and they prevent the activation of Black’s forces. Meanwhile, the d6-pawn is a serious liability in Black’s camp. It would not work for him to play 21...³c8?, because of 22...²b6.

17...²d8

Things might become a bit unclear after 17...²b1, S. Ivanov – Dmitriev, Maikop 1998, 17...g4!, for example: 18...c1 ²e8 19...xg4 ²xg4 20...b7 ³c8 21...c7 f5.

17...²b7 18...²c2 ³fb8 19.b3 ²d8

20...c4 ³b4, P. Lukacs – Anic, Budapest 1990, 21...²d2±. White has the idea to continue with 22...g3 and he can play on both sides of the board after that, additionally he has the possibility to accomplish the maneuver ²d2-c1-a3.
b5c) 15...\textit{b5} 16.f3

Now, White's e4-pawn is reliably defended and his knight is ready to begin its journey along the route – \textit{d2-b3-a5-c6}.

\textbf{16...\textit{d}h5}

In case of: 16...\textit{d}d7 17.\textit{xb}5 \textit{xb}5 18.\textit{b}3\pm, Black has his b5-pawn to worry about.

\textbf{17.\textit{g}3}

White would like to have avoided that weakening, but after: 17.\textit{xb}5 \textit{xb}5 18.\textit{xa}8 \textit{xa}8 19.\textit{b}3 \textit{a}5 (It is too passive for Black to play: 19...\textit{b}8 20.\textit{c}1 \textit{f}4 21.\textit{f}1 \textit{h}5 22.g3 \textit{g}6 23.\textit{a}3. Now, in this endgame after: 23...\textit{xa}3 24.\textit{b}xa3 \textit{a}8 25.\textit{b}1, Black's b5 and d6-pawns are vulnerable and White also controls the only open file, so his advantage is considerable. For example in case of 25...\textit{b}8, he fixes at first Black's weaknesses with 26.\textit{d}2!, with the idea to follow with \textit{d}2-b4, \textit{c}1-c6 and \textit{b}1-c3. If 23...\textit{f}8, then 24.\textit{a}7 \textit{xa}7 25.\textit{xa}7 \textit{b}7 26.\textit{f}2\pm Yakovich – Kremenetsky, Moscow 1996. Black's rook now also has an open file available, but he can hardly create any efficient counterplay. For example, White can place his pawn on b3 and bring his king to the d3-square. Meanwhile, Black's b5-pawn is very weak.) 20.\textit{c}1 \textit{f}1 21.\textit{f}1, Shchekachev – Djuric, Rome 2004, 21...\textit{g}5 22.g3 \textit{h}3 23.\textit{x}g5 (Black can counter 23.\textit{g}2 with the powerful argument – 23...\textit{f}4+!.) 23...\textit{x}g5 24.\textit{c}3 b4 25.\textit{e}3 \textit{f}6 and White has not accomplished anything to brag about.

\textbf{17.\textit{d}7}

It would not work for Black to play 17...\textit{g}5, due to 18.f4++. The move 17...\textit{f}5 is also quite risky – 18.exf5 \textit{d}d7 19.\textit{xb}5 axb5 20.\textit{xa}8 \textit{xa}8 21.\textit{b}3 \textit{f}6 22.g4 \textit{a}4 23.\textit{b}1\pm.

\textbf{18.\textit{c}4 \textit{ab}8 19.\textit{a}5}

White's knight is headed for the c6-square in order to force Black to exchange his most active light piece. White intends to parry in that fashion the effectiveness of Black's possible kingside counterplay.

\textbf{19...\textit{f}5 20.\textit{ex}f5 \textit{f}6}

20...\textit{xf}5 21.\textit{c}6 \textit{b}7 (or 21...\textit{xc}6 22.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xb}2? 23.g4 \textit{g}6 24.\textit{d}3+–) 22.\textit{xb}5 axb5 23.\textit{d}3 \textit{wh}3 24.\textit{f}2\pm.

21.\textit{c}6! \textit{xc}6 22.\textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 23.\textit{xa}6 \textit{d}7 24.\textit{f}4 \textit{e}4 (Or 24...\textit{xf}5 25.\textit{xe}5 \textit{xe}5 26.\textit{d}4\pm) 25.\textit{a}7 \textit{b}7 26.\textit{xb}7 \textit{xb}7 27.\textit{d}2 \textit{b}8 28.\textit{d}4 and White maintains the initiative.
Conclusion

First of all, I would like to congratulate every reader who has reached this part of the book, including myself...As the proverb says – the end crowns the endeavour. I hope that the lines, which we have analyzed, will give you a clear understanding of the character of the fight in that system. You might have the impression that Black has numerous choices on practically every move. Still, it is not so difficult to find your way in this multitude of lines, because White has some standard plans and strategical concepts and they have withstood the test of time...We were talking about that at the beginning of this chapter and now it is high time we drew some conclusions. I would try to avoid repeating myself as far as that is possible...

The general line of actions for White in the system that we are studying is as follows – he closes the centre in the majority of cases with the move d4-d5 and that is quite logical. White thus consolidates his space advantage and he aims at focusing his efforts on the queenside. Contrary to the King’s Indian Defence, Black’s counterplay on the kingside is not so dangerous and that enables White to continue playing without any psychological stress and that becomes tremendously important from the purely practical point of view. Black can react to that approach in several ways.

1) It would be unwise for him to remain indifferent, because then White will have his hands free for action and he will be able to find the right way of improving his position at leisure. Naturally, Black can lose a tempo and try a6-a5 and d7-c5, but he will hardly be able to parry his opponent’s onslaught on the queenside by playing like that. White continues with his standard plan in that case – b2-b3, a1-b1, a2-a3 and b3-b4, so he gradually repels Black’s pieces.

2) It looks like Black’s simpler solution of the problem is the move c6-c5 and that narrows the front of his opponent’s queenside attack only to operations along the b-file. Still, things are far from being so elementary here either – White continues with the following plan: a1-b1, a2-a3, b2-b4 (He can try some other move-order too...), then he forces Black to play b7-b6 and he thus begins the fight for the b-file. White’s space advantage remains huge throughout and his d5-pawn is the essential factor in his territorial dominance. Black has no access to such important squares as c6, d6 and e6; therefore he can only maneuver on the seventh and eight ranks. Contrary to Black, White can operate on the b-file and the outcome of the further queenside
Chapter 4

operations depends entirely on his actions. He has the choice when and under what circumstances to exchange b4xc5, or to wait a bit and it becomes clear that Black has a lot of problems to worry about, although his position is quite defendable in principle.

3) In case Black exchanges on d5 and he follows that with b7-b5, he obtains additionally the b6-square for his pieces. That does not seem to be a great achievement, but the chess board is not so large after all and just one square matters a lot sometimes...He has other problems in that case though, White can attack immediately his opponent's vulnerable pawn-structure on the queenside and he can penetrate to the c6-square with his knight. That is quite annoying for Black as a rule.

At the end, one of the essential ways for Black to change the character of the fight is to exchange pawns in the centre (e5xd4), but he is to far from equality following that as well. In general, if we have all these notes in mind, we have to evaluate White's prospects in this variation as quite optimistic.
Part 2

1.\(\triangle f3\) \(\triangle f6\) 2.\(c4\) \(g6\) 3.\(\triangle c3\) \(d5\)

We will provide you here with some historical background. After the moves 1.d4 \(\triangle f6\) 2.c4 \(g6\) 3.\(\triangle c3\) \(d5\), there arises one of the most popular openings named after the Austrian player Ernst Gruenfeld— he introduced it into the tournament practice during the 20ies of the last century. We have to mention that the conditions for the appearance of similar opening concepts were quite ripe then. The hyper-modernists were just appearing then and it was not surprising that Alexander Alekhine and Richard Reti joined in the club immediately. Later, Mikhail Botvinnik, Vasily Smyslov, Robert Fischer and Garry Kasparov became avid adherents to the Gruenfeld Defence... Why was that opening set-up so attractive? That was in fact an entirely different opening strategy and it was focused on quick development of the pieces and ensuring the safety of the king, despite the fact that Black had to pay for that by losing temporarily the fight for the centre. Sometimes White was risking to be crushed right in the opening and that with the supersolid first move 1.d2-d4!

Times were running, evaluations were changing and theory was developing rapidly. There came times when opening novelties around move 30 were not a surprise at all. Still, White has never succeeded in sinking Black's ship yet, so the theoreticians have turned again their attention to the move order without d2-d4. We must admit that even earlier many players preferred to avoid theoretical discussions and they entered instead the English Opening shunning the immediate pawn-contact in the centre in order to postpone the conflict into
the middle game. As it usually happens, Black gradually coped with that tactics as well, since the strategical ideas in those schemes had already become well familiar by then. White’s position continued to be quite flexible, but that proved to be insufficient and he lacked fresh creative ideas.

During the year 1937, at the tournament in Kemeri, the game Alekhine — Rellstap was played and it was probably the first one in the system that we will deal with in our book. Contemporary players call that variation “Anti-Gruenfeld”. After the moves 1.\( \mathcal{Q} \)f3 \( \mathcal{Q} \)f6 2.c4 g6 3.\( \mathcal{Q} \)c3 d5, there followed: 4.cxd5 \( \mathcal{Q} \)xd5 5.\( \mathcal{W} \)a4+ c6 (Presently, it is considered that the move 5...\( \mathcal{Q} \)d7 provides Black with a quite satisfactory game.) 6.\( \mathcal{W} \)d4 \( \mathcal{Q} \)f6 7.\( \mathcal{W} \)xd8+ and White obtained a great advantage, although Alekhine failed to win that game. It was possibly due to the result of the game that his contemporaries did not evaluate deservedly the profundness of that idea outright. Anyway, more than a quarter century later the same position arose in the game Stein – Keres, Piarmu 1971. There, Black prolonged the fight for barely 30 moves... Naturally, Black later found an antidote – 6...f6, but that set the beginning of the process and the variation started developing rapidly. Some time later White found an idea that remained quite fashionable even today –

4.\( \mathcal{W} \)a4+!

It was first tried in the game T.Petrosian – Smekal, Milan 1975. If you collect some information about that variation in the database, you will notice that the average rating of the White players is in the vicinity of 2450. That is a rather impressive proof that the system is quite reliable. The idea of the move is simple enough in a tactical aspect – in case of 4...c6, or 4...\( \mathcal{Q} \)c6 (Chapter 5) White follows with 5.cxd5 – and he should be quite happy with positions of that type. If 4...\( \mathcal{Q} \)d7, then 5.\( \mathcal{W} \)b3! dxc4 6.\( \mathcal{W} \)xc4. In our Chapter 6 we will deal with the lines 6...\( \mathcal{Q} \)c6 and 6...\( \mathcal{Q} \)g7, while the final Chapter 7 of this part will be devoted to the move 6...a6. White builds his strategy in that line on the fact that the placement of his opponent’s bishop is not ideal in some positions, mostly because it occupies a key-square for the knight, for example in the variation 6...\( \mathcal{Q} \)g7 7.e4 0–0 8.e5!

There are some opening nuances and they are connected with concrete variations, but I would
like to emphasize the fact that the opening system has a solid strategical base and that is probably the most important thing. White can solve the problems in the centre in numerous ways. These include the standard move d4, as well as e4 and even the early e4-e5 with a pawn on d2, as well as the pawn-construction e4-d3 (in case of 6... \( \text{\texttt{\textbackslash g}7 \text{e\texttt{\textbackslash e}4 \text{\texttt{\textbackslash c}6}}} \)) – not to speak about the eventual fianchettoing of White’s light-squared bishop. In general, contrary to the classical variations of the Gruenfeld Defence, Black has no clear-cut strategy against White’s pawn-centre and that rather unclear situation makes Black’s task quite difficult.
Black chooses a method of development, which is typical for the Gruenfeld Defence. Still, White has the possibility to avoid (thanks to the fact that he has not played the move d2-d4 yet) the main lines of that “unfavourable” opening...

4.\textit{\textbf{a4}+!}?

This is the most fashionable and also the most promising way of fighting for the opening advantage. White is trying to disrupt the harmonious development of Black’s pieces.

Now, the following possibilities for Black deserve analyzing:
\textbf{a}) 4...\textit{c6}, \textbf{b}) 4...\textit{\textbf{c6}} and 4...\textit{\textbf{d7}} (Chapters 6-7).

\textbf{a}) 4...\textit{c6} 5.\textit{cxd5} \textit{\textbf{axd5}}

It looks like Black has blun-dered a pawn with: 5...\textit{g7}? 6.\textit{dxc6} \textit{\textbf{xc6}} 7.d4± in the game Schiffer – Muschik, Germany 2003.

6.\textit{\textbf{xd5}?!}

The move 4...\textit{c6}, was considered to be unsatisfactory by the opening theory, because of White’s response 6.\textit{\textbf{d4}}. Still, after 6...f6 (White maintains a stable advantage in the endgame after: 6...\textit{\textbf{g6}} 7.\textit{\textbf{xd8+} \textbf{xd8}} 8.e4 \textit{\textbf{g7}} 9.d4 \textit{\textbf{f8}} 10.h3 \textit{b6} 11.g4± Stein – Keres, Piarnu 1971, as well as in the middle game following: 6...\textit{\textbf{g8}} 7.e4 \textit{\textbf{g7}} 8.\textit{\textbf{a4} \textbf{b6}} 9.\textit{\textbf{c2}} \textit{\textbf{g4}} 10.\textit{\textbf{g5}} \textit{h6} 11.\textit{h3} \textit{\textbf{c8}} 12.\textit{\textbf{d3}} \textit{\textbf{e6}} 13.\textit{d3} \textit{\textbf{d6}} 14.\textit{\textbf{e3} \textbf{a6}} 15.a3 \textit{\textbf{e8}} 16.\textit{\textbf{e2}± David Alberto – Z.Csapo, Zalakaros 1988.)} 7.e4, Black has a very powerful argument at his disposal – 7...\textit{e5}! (In case of: 7...\textit{\textbf{b6}}, then White plays: 8.\textit{\textbf{xd8+} \textbf{xd8}} 9.d4 \textit{\textbf{g4}} 10.\textit{\textbf{e3} \textbf{d8d7}} 11.0-0-0 e5 12.\textit{\textbf{e2} \textbf{c7}} 13.\textit{\textbf{b1} \textbf{e8}} 14.\textit{\textbf{g5}± and Black had to defend a very difficult endgame in the game V.Milov – Zolbrecht, Biel 1998, if: 7...\textit{\textbf{xc3} 8.\textit{\textbf{xc3} \textbf{h6}} 9.\textit{d4 \textbf{f8}} 10.0-0 \textit{\textbf{g4}}, then after: 11.d4! \textit{\textbf{xc1}} 12.\textit{\textbf{axc1} \textbf{xf3}} 13.\textit{\textbf{xf3} \textit{\textbf{xd4}} 14.\textit{\textbf{h3} \textbf{g7}} 15.\textit{\textbf{e6}± Black}}

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risks coming under a very dangerous attack, Wirthensohn – Rukavina, Skopje 1972.) 8...\textit{xc5} 9...\textit{xc3} \textit{xd8}+ 10...\textit{xe8} 11...\textit{xe4} \textit{c3} 12...\textit{c5} 13.h4 \textit{g7} 14.h5 g5∞ White does not obtain sufficient material equivalent for his knight.) 9...\textit{d7} (Following: \textit{c4} \textit{xe4}+ 11...\textit{e3} \textit{b4} 12...\textit{xc4} \textit{xc4} 13...\textit{xc4} \textit{d7} 14. 0–0 \textit{e5} 15...\textit{e2} \textit{e6}∞, Black is not worse at all in that endgame, Wirthensohn – Kozul, Germany 1991.) 10...\textit{f3} \textit{xe4}+ 11...\textit{e2} \textit{d7} 12.0–0 \textit{b4} 13.d3 (After 13...\textit{b3} \textit{c5} 14...\textit{d1} \textit{d3} 15...\textit{xd3} \textit{xd3} 16...e1+ \textit{f7} Black is even better with his powerful couple of bishops, Ubilava – A.Fernandes, Elgoibar 1999.) 13...\textit{e7} 14...\textit{c2} \textit{b6} 15...\textit{h6} \textit{e6} 16...\textit{d4} 0–0 0–0 17...\textit{xe6} \textit{xe6}∞ and Black can even hope to seize the initiative sometimes soon, Kohlweyer – Kozul, Frankfurt 1990.

\textbf{6...\textit{xd5} 7.e4}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\textbf{7...\textit{d8}}

After 7...\textit{e6}, it is very unpleasant for Black if White plays: 8...\textit{g5} \textit{f6} 9.d4±.

Black has also tried in practice: 7...\textit{d6} 8.d4 \textit{g7} 9...\textit{e3} \textit{e4}, Enano – Wright, Melbourne 2002 (In answer to 9...\textit{d7}, Vigorito – Leung, Merrimack 2003, White preserves a slight, but stable edge with the simple line: 10...\textit{e2}, with the following eventual developments: 10...\textit{e5} 11...\textit{d1} 0–0 12.0–0 \textit{exd4} 13...\textit{xd4}±; 10...0–0 11.0–0 \textit{b6} 12...\textit{c2} \textit{g4} 13...\textit{fd1}±; 11...\textit{e5} 12...\textit{fd1} \textit{exd4} 13...\textit{xd4} \textit{d4} 14...\textit{xd4} \textit{e7} 15...\textit{ad1}±) and here White can emphasize that the development of Black’s lightsquared bishop is premature with: 10...\textit{e5}?! \textit{e6} (It is bad for Black to try: 10...\textit{xe5} 11...\textit{xe5} \textit{c7} 12...\textit{h3} \textit{e6} 13.f4±) 11...\textit{c4} \textit{d8} (or 11...\textit{xc4} 12...\textit{xc4} \textit{d7} 13.0–0–0±) 12...\textit{b4}! b6 (It is not advisable for Black to continue with: 12...\textit{b5} 13...\textit{a5} \textit{a6} 14...\textit{d2}±) 13...\textit{d1}±.

\textbf{8.d4 \textit{g7} 9...\textit{e3} 0–0}

After 9...\textit{d7}, Fernandez Diaz – Alvarez Vega, Norena 2001, it seems logical for White to follow with 10...\textit{e2}, keeping the d-file open and in case of 10...\textit{e5} (About 10...0–0 11...\textit{d1} – see 9...0–0 10...\textit{e2} \textit{d7} 11...\textit{d1}.) 11...\textit{d1} \textit{exd4} 12...\textit{xd4}±.

The position after: 9...\textit{g4} 10...\textit{e2} has been tested four times and A.Fernandes played two of these games. He had serious problems to equalize in both of them: 10...\textit{d7} 11...\textit{d1} 0–0 12.0–0 \textit{c7} (It is hardly an improvement for Black to try: 12...\textit{b8} 13...\textit{h3} \textit{xf3} 14. \textit{xf3} e5 15...\textit{xe5} \textit{b6}, Hauchard – A.Fernandes, Barreiro 2001
and here White's most aggressive line seems to be: 16.\ue b4! \ue x e5 17.b3\pm; 16...\ue x e5 17.g4\pm and he has two powerful bishops and a mobile centre; moreover that the vulnerability of Black's queenside pawns provide White with a long-lasting positional pressure.) 13.\ue c2 \ue a c8 14.h3 \ue x f3 15.\ue x f3 e5 16.dxe5 \ue x e5 17.e2 c5 18.f4 \ue c6 19.e5 b6 20.\ue e4\pm Ibragimov – A. Fernandes, Lisbon 2000, it is not better for Black to defend with: 10...\ue b6 11.\ue b1 \ue x f3 12.\ue x f3 \ue a 6 13.\ue a 3! e5 14.d5 \ue x a 5 15.bxa 3 b6 16.0–0\pm and White has a clear-cut plan for the development of his queenside initiative, Rubinetti – L. Bronstein, Argentine 1983. 

10.\ue e 2

The move 10.h3, enables Black to equalize with 10...c5 (In case of: 10...\ue d7 11.\ue d1 \ue b 6 12.\ue c 2 and here 12...e6?! 13.\ue e 2 \ue d 7, Black might come under a crushing attack, following: 14.h4 h6 15.\ue c 1 \ue h 7 16.h5 g5 17.e5 \ue d 5 18.\ue x g 5!+- Karpov – Orsoni, Bastia (simultaneo) 1998.) 11.\ue d 1 \ue b 6 12.\ue d 2 c x d 4 13.\ue x d 4 \ue d 7 14.\ue a 3 \ue c 8 15.\ue e 2 \ue c 1 + 16.\ue d 1 \ue a 6 = Engqvist – Upmark, Stockholm 1997. 

10...\ue d 7

In answer to 10...\ue g 4, White should better clarify immediately the intentions of his opponent's light-squared bishop with 11.h3, since after: 11.0–0 \ue d 7 12.\ue f d 1 \ue b 6 13.\ue b 3 (It is not better for White to play 13.\ue b 4, due to: 13...
after which Black has the powerful d5-outpost indeed, but that does not compensate his “bad” bishops. One of them is restricted by his own pawns, while the other one is cramped by the opponent’s pawns.

White obtains the advantage easily after: 11...c7 12.0-0 e5 13. d5 cxd5 14.exd5 e4 15.e4 dxb2 16.h4+ Nyback – Jerez Perez, Dos Hermanas 2004, Black fails to equalize too with the line: 14...d6 15.d2! xdx5 16.b3 e6 17.c5± and White wins at least the exchange. It looks strange for Black to continue with 11...e5?!., Borik – Weber, Bern 1979, he regains his pawn, but he has great problems with his development: 12.dxe5 c7 13.e6 fxe6 14.0-0; 12...e7 13.g5 e8 14.b4±; 13...c5 14.e6 fxe6 15.e3 e7 16.c2±.

12.c2 g4

12...g4?! – This is a very dubious idea and Black only loses several tempi with it. 13.f4 a5+ 14.d2 b6 15.h3 h6?, Roeder – Kojovic, Belgrade 2005, even after the best for Black: 15..f6 16.0-0, White’s advantage is evident, because he has a powerful centre and he wins a piece after the obvious move 16.c1+–.

It is hardly advantageous for Black to “activate” his queen with: 12...a5+ 13.d2 b6 (or 13...xa2?? 14.c4+-) 14.0-0 g4 15.e3 f4 (in case of 15...a5, it is unpleasant for Black if White follows with: 16.b4± Tsesarsky – Vydeslaver, Israel 1999.) 16.h3 xf3 17.xf3± and White maintains a slight advantage.

13.0-0±

White’s edge is minimal in the diagrammed position, but it is quite stable, because Black has practically no active play. The game Roeder – Ilic, Belgrade 2005, followed later with: 13...xf3 14.xf3 b8, but here instead of: 15.e5 d5 16.xd5 cxd5 17.b3 e6 and Black equalized gradually, it seemed logical for White to continue with: 15...e1±. Black’s only chance to obtain some counterplay is connected with the pawn-advance e7-e5, but White is perfectly prepared for it.

b) 4...c6
5...cxd5

This is White’s best move, because after 5...d4 (if 5...e5, then after 5...d7 6.cxd7 cxd5 7.cxd5 exd5 8.exd5 wxd5=, White falls behind considerably in development.) 5...d7 6.cxd5 exd5 (It is bad for Black to play here: 6...fxd4, due to: 7...xd4 g7 8...c4 0–0 9.g3 e8 10...g2 d6 11...f4± and White had a big advantage in the game Adamski – Siekaczynski, Warsaw 1992.) 7...xc6 (Black equalizes after: 7...xd5 wxd5 8...xc6 wxc6 9...xc6+ bxc6 10.e3, with 10...e6 11.b3 g7 12.d4 c5 13...b2 cxd4=, or 10.g3 e6! 11...g2 xd5 and he has an excellent game, but not: 10...g7?! 11...g2 eb8 12...xc6+ d7 13...xd7+ xxd7 14...b1± Ovetchkin – Matveeva, Samara 2002.) 7...wxc6! (It will not work for Black to play: 7...xc3 8.dxc3 wxc3 9...xc6+ bxc6, because of: 10.g3 eb8 11...g2 c5 12...f4 f6 13.0–0–0± and White had somewhat better chances in the game Smiejkal – Ilincic, Prague 1989.) 8...d4 xc3 9.dxc3 (but not 9...xh8? xxa2!−+) 9...f6= and the position is equal.

5...xd5 6.e5

Black’s knight has come under a pin deliberately and now White has an additional motive for his active actions.

6...db4

6...b6? – This blunder of a pawn is in fact met quite often in practice. 7...xc6 xxa4 (Black could have played even worse...− 7...xd6?? 8...d4 1–0 Pogorelov – Tamayo Flores, Benasque 1999; he has no compensation for the pawn after: 7...bxc6 8...xc6+ d7 9...c5 g7 10.g3 0–0 11...g2 eb8 12.0–0 e6 13.d3± J.Rubinetti – Paz, Mar del Plata 1994, or 11...e5? Guner – Harstad, Izmir 2003, 12...xa8 xb8 13.f3+.) 8...xd8 xc3 9...xf7 xf7 10.dxc3± Once again Black has lost a pawn for nothing, but amazingly enough many strong players have fallen into that trap, for example all this happened in the game Krasenkow – Azmaiparashvili, Groningen 1997.

6...d7? – Black again loses at least a pawn: 7...xf7 cb4 (It is just terrible for Black to try: 7...e5? 8...xd8 xa4 9...e6 xc3 10.dxc3+− Doric – B.Richter, Pula 1996; 7...xc3? Barbero – Haas, Bern 1992, 8...c4+−; his compensation for the pawn is hardly sufficient in case of: 7...xf7 8...xd5 e5 9...c3 d4 10...d1 f5 11.d3 b4, Soln – Kosmac, Bled 1998, 12.e3 eb8 13...d2 c6 14.a3±) 8...b3 xf7 9...xd5 xd5 10...xd5± White wins now a second pawn and Black’s initiative is not enough to compensate that, Smiejkal – Boll, Val Thorens 1978.

He plays only very seldom: 6...d6 7...xc6 bxc6 (In answer to 7...xc6, Truta – Kos, Slovenia 1994, White’s simplest line is: 8...xc6+ bxc6 9.g3± and the end-
game is quite difficult for Black.)
8...e\(4\) d7 (Or 8...e6 9.d4 f6 10.e3 g7 11.e\(4\) e5 12.xe5 fxe5 13.x\(c5\) crafty – nanis, Internet 1998), Gyorkos – Neussner, Werfen 1989 and it seems logical for White to attack Black’s weak pawns on the c-file with: 9.g3 g7 10.g2±.

Following: 6...\(x\)xc3, White maintains a long lasting advantage with 7.dxc3 (It is also possible for White to play: 7.bxc3 d7 8.xd7 e7 9.b1 b6 10.g3 a5 11.xd7+ xd7 12.g2, but in that case after: 12...d8 13.d7 b6 14.d2 c6 15.e4 d7 16.0-0 e7 17.e1 e8±, it is quite difficult for him to advance his pawnmass in the centre, Lindenmaier – Pomm, Germany 1993.) 7...d7 (It is no doubt much worse for Black, among the other moves that he has tried in that position, to opt for: 7...g7?! 8.xc6 d7 9.g3 xc6 10.xc6+ bxc6 11.g2 d7 12.e3 b8 13.0-0 e5 14.d2± Felecan – Davtian, Herculean 1994; 8...bxc6 9.xc6+ d7 10.c5± D.Johansen – N.Kagan, Warwick 2002, or 7...d5, U.Rohde – Claassen, Porz 1991, 8.f4 g7 9.e4 c5 10.b5 b6 11.xb6 cxb6 12.b5±) 8.xd7 xd7 9.e4 c5 (White obtained a great advantage by playing quite natural moves after: 9...a6 10.e3 d8 11.e2 e6 12.0-0 g7 13.c4 c8 14.d5± Perera Gonzalez – Pinedo Prieto, Tenerife 2003.) 10.xd7+ xd7 11.e3 e5 (It is not good for Black to continue with: 11...a6?! 12.d1 g7 13.c4 d8 14.e2 0-0 15.b3† Gosset – Manet, France 2002; after 11...g7 12.0-0 d8 13.b5 a6 14.a4 b5 15.b3 0-0 16.xc2 c5 17.d5 b4 18.d2±, White’s two-bishop advantage will be a telling factor for the future, Pogorelov – R.Sanchez, Las Palmas 1995, but turned out to be even worse for Black to try: 12...a6?! 13.xc4 e5 14.e2 0-0 15.f4 c6 16.d7 c8 17.e5† Makarichev – Prada Rubin, Oviedo 1992; he cannot save the day by simplifying either after: 12...b6 13.e2 d8 14.xd8+ xd8 15.xc2±, because Black has no counterplay and White’s couple of bishops should gradually be sufficient to win the game, Acebal Muniz – F.Martin, Mesa 1992.) 12.d1 h5 (Black would not change much with: 12...d6 13.c4± L.Spassov – Simic, Pernik 1981.) 13.f3 h6. Naturally, White avoids the exchange of bishops with 14.f2 and after: 14...a6 15.c4 h7 16.e2 0-0 0-0 17.a4 f6 18.e6 e7 19.h3±, he maintains a powerful positional pressure, mostly thanks to his light-squared bishop, which has no opponent, Gavrikov – Ledger, London 1988.

7.a3 g7

Black should refrain from 7...f6?! because of 8.axb4±.

It is also not good for him to follow with: 7..c2+ 8.xc2 xe5, due to 9.d4! (White achieves
much less with 9.e3, since after: 9... g7 10.d4 d7 11.e2 0–0 12.0–0 c6 13.d1 f6=, Black’s position is quite solid, Panno – Mellado, Palma de Majorca 1989.) 9...d7 (It is bad for Black to opt for 9... xd4?, because of 10.b5+; if 9...c6, then after: 10.d5 b8 11.f4 g7 12.b5 a6, Moe RNG – Lindam, Cologne 1989, White could have created great problems for his opponent with 13.e4!±; in case of 9...g4, Black also failed to equalize with: 10.h3 f6 11.e4 c6 12.e3 g7 13.e2 0–0 14.0–0 e6 15.f3 d1, in the game Rosiak – Mirschinka, Karl-Marx-Stadt 1990.) 10.f4 c6 11. d1 g7 12.e4 e5 (In answer to: 12...0–0, Montalta – Silva, corr. 1999, it seems good for White to continue with 13.c4?!, with the following eventual developments: 13...b6 14.a2 xd4?! 15.e2±; 13...a5 14.e3 b6 15.b3 e5 16.dxe5 xe5 17.f4±; 14.e5 15. d5 b6 16.e2 cxd5 17.exd5 f5 18.c1 c8 19.d6±) 13.dxe5 e7 14.e6 xe6 15.d6 e5 16.xe5 xe5 17.e2 0–0 18.0–0 f6 19.d2± and White has a slight, but stable advantage, Cifuentes Parada – C.Amura, Buenos Aires 1991.

8.axb4
This is White’s only way to fight for the advantage.

After 8.d4 xe5 9.dxe5 d5 10.d2 b6 11.xf4, Black has the wonderful resource 11...xe5! and White cannot play 12.xe5?, because of 12...xd2+.

It would not work for White to try 8.xf7?!; since after the intermediate move 8...d3+ 9.exd3 xg7, Black obtains an excellent compensation for the pawn, because White’s bishops remain completely idle.

8...xe5 9.b5

9...b8
The more active move – 9... d4 – is worse for Black. 10.e3 e6 (Black does not obtain any compensation for the pawn after: 10...f5 11.b6+ c6 12.xa7?+, or 11...d7 12.a5 d6 13.bxa7 0–0 14.d4 b6 15.a6± Andrade – Costa, Olival Basto 2000.) 11.d4 g7 (In case of 11...d6?!), Fuchs – B.Schneider, Eppingen 2004, 12.e4 f6 13.h6±, Black’s pieces are too misplaced.) 12.c4 0–0 13.0–0± and White enjoys a great space advantage, while Black has no active possibilities, M.Rohde – Mirabile, Philadelphia 2003.

10.e3
White has also tried to develop his light-squared bishop on the long h1–a8 diagonal with: 10.g3 0–0 11.g2 g7 12.0–0 c6
13.d3 a6, but after: 14.bxc6 ∆xc6 15.∆xc6 bxc6 16.∆xc6 (White’s position becomes even worse in case of: 16...∆h4 ∆b8 17.∆a4 h5+ Timman – Tseshkovsky, Yugoslavia 1979.) 16...∆b8 17.∆d1 ∆b7 and Black had a quite sufficient compensation for the pawn, due to the chronical vulnerability of the light squares on White’s kingside, Pogorelov – P.Perera, Las Palmas 1999.

10...∆g7

About 10...0–0 11.d4 ∆g7 12.∆e2 – see 10...∆g7 11.d4 0–0 12.∆e2.

11.d4 0–0

Or 11...b6 12.∆e2 ∆b7 13.0–0 0–0 14.∆d1 a6 15.∆c2 axb5 16.∆xa8 ∆xa8 17.∆xb5+ Mozetic – Vukanovic, Belgrade 2003.

12.∆e2 c6

White’s b5-pawn cramps Black’s queenside and he will have to get rid of it sooner or later.

About 12...a6 13.0–0 c6 14. bxc6 – see 12...c6 13.0–0 a6 14. bxc6; as for 12...∆d7 13.0–0 c6 14. ∆d1! – see 12...c6 13.0–0 ∆d7 14. ∆d1!.

After 12...∆d7 13.0–0 ∆b6 (It is worse for Black to play: 13... e5?! 14.dxe5 ∆b6 15.∆e4± Buhr – Karius, Berlin 1996 and he has no compensation for the pawn, but it is hardly any better if he tries: 14...∆xe5 15.∆d1 ∆d7 16.∆d5±, or 14...∆xe5 15.∆d1 ∆e8 16.b6!? exb6 17.∆b5 ∆e7 18.∆h4 ∆f8 19.e4± and Black’s extra pawn does not compensate his totally misplaced pieces.) 14.∆c2 e5 (In case Black plays calmly, he might come under a terrible positional bind. See a typical example: 14...∆d7 15.∆f3 ∆f5 16.e4 ∆d7 17.∆d1 c6 18.bxc6 ∆xc6 19.d5 ∆d7 20.∆f4 ∆c4 21. ∆e2 b5 22.∆xc4! bxc4 23.∆a6± and White had an overwhelming advantage in the game Arkhipov – M.Muse, Kecskemet 1990.) 15. dxe5 ∆xe5 16.∆d1±. White’s prospects are better.

Black would not facilitate his defence with the line: 12...e5 13.dxe5 ∆xe5 14.0–0 ∆e6, Rosen – M.Bakalarz, Germany 1993, because after: 15.∆e4 ∆d7 16.∆d1 ∆f6 17.∆xb7 ∆c5 18.∆f3±, White remains with a solid extra pawn.

13.0–0

White can also fight for the advantage with the help of: 13.bxc6 ∆xc6 14.0–0. After 14...∆d7 (In case of 14...a6, there arises a position, which we will analyze later in the main line.) the following lines have been tested:

15.∆a3 e6 16.∆d2 (After 16.∆d1 ∆e7 17.∆xe7 ∆xe7 18.e4 ∆fc8 19. ∆e3 a6 20.∆f3 ∆c4=, Black managed to equalize in the game Nikicic – Dragojlovic, Tivat 1995.) 16...∆e7 17.∆e4 and here it deserved attention for Black to play: 17...∆fc8 (Following: 17... ∆fd8 18.∆f3 ∆e8 19.∆fc1 ∆xa3 20.∆xa3±, White maintained some edge in the endgame, Ionov – Turov, St Petersburg 1994.), with the idea in case of: 18.∆xc5 ∆e8 19.∆fc1 ∆c7 20.b4 ∆ac8 21.b5,
to follow with 21...\texttt{\textasciitilde}xd4!?, with complications;
15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3 b6 (It is not better for Black to opt for: 15...\texttt{\textasciitilde}a5 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}a3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}c6 17.d5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e5 18.e4 a6 19.\texttt{\textasciitilde}g5\pm, because White’s advantage is considerable, Muse – B.Jukic, Medulin 2002.) 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1 (If 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2, then Black should better clarify immediately the position of White’s queen with 16...\texttt{\textasciitilde}e6\textasciitilde, because after 16...\texttt{\textasciitilde}a5 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}c2, in the game Tal – Semeniuk, Kiev 1984, Black did not venture to try the move – 17...\texttt{\textasciitilde}e6, in view of the line: 18.d5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xc3 19.\texttt{\textasciitilde}exc3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xd5 20.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xa5 bxa5 21.\texttt{\textasciitilde}fd1\pm (M.Tal) and the pin was quite unpleasant for Black.) and if 16...\texttt{\textasciitilde}a5, then White can follow with 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}a3\textasciitilde.

\textbf{13...a6}

It is worth mentioning that Black cannot transpose into the lines, which we have analyzed in our previous notes with the help of the move – 13...\texttt{\textasciitilde}d7, because of 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1! and after 14...a6 15.bxc6 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xc6 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b4 e6 17.e4 b5 18.d5\pm he will have great problems to worry about, L.Sandstrom – A.Nylen, Sweden 1997.

If 13...e5, then after 14.dxe5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xe5 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}c7, in the game I.Alvarez – Aranda Marin, Alcobendas 1993, White could have continued simply with 16.h3\textasciitilde, maintaining his advantage, since Black’s queenside is completely paralyzed.

In case of: 13...cxb5 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xb5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}c6 (Or 14...a6 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3 b6 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}a7 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}b7 18.e4\textasciitilde Hakulinen – J.Kekki, Helsinki 1991; it is just terrible for Black to play: 14...\texttt{\textasciitilde}d7, in view of: 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d5! \texttt{\textasciitilde}d8 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b6 a6 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3\pm and White’s pieces are raging on Black’s kingside, Marosi – Vareille, Cannes 1989; if 14...\texttt{\textasciitilde}d7, then after 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}b6 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}c7 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2 e6 18.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e2 a6 19.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e4\pm, White preserves his advantage, Radziewicz – Aginian, Mureck 1998.) it is possible for White to follow with 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f3 (He has maintained some advantage after Black’s other possibilities too, for example: 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1 a6 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d6 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d7 18.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2 \texttt{\textasciitilde}ab8 19.\texttt{\textasciitilde}e4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}c7 20.\texttt{\textasciitilde}ac1\pm Z.Franco – S.Martinez, Sevilla 1992, or 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2 \texttt{\textasciitilde}b8 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}fd1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d7 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3 b6 18.\texttt{\textasciitilde}a6 \texttt{\textasciitilde}a5 19.\texttt{\textasciitilde}a2 \texttt{\textasciitilde}g4 20.f3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}c8 21.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f1\pm Yakovich – Notkin, Elista 1997.) 15...a6 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}d7 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1 (It looks very attractive for White to try 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2, with the idea \texttt{\textasciitilde}f1-c1, since it would not work for Black to play 17...\texttt{\textasciitilde}e5?, because of: 18.dxe5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xd2 19.\texttt{\textasciitilde}fd1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e6 20.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d5\pm and White’s position is completely winning.) 17...\texttt{\textasciitilde}b8 (It is not good for Black to continue with: 17...b5 18.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xb5 \texttt{\textasciitilde}b8, because of: 19.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d5\pm and White remains with an extra pawn.) 17...\texttt{\textasciitilde}b8 18.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2\pm. Black had to withstand a powerful positional pressure in the game Timman – Sax, Rio de Janeiro 1979.

\textbf{14.bxc6 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xc6 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d1!?}

After 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3, White must consider the move 15...b5!?\textasciitilde, because
Black obtains some counterplay.

If White plays too aggressively: 15.d5  Gib5 16.gd1  gd7 17.gwb3  b5 18.f4, then after: 18...gc4 19.xc4  bxc4 20.wxc4  wb6 21.ab3  ac8 22.ge2  a5=, Black’s compensation for the pawn is sufficient to maintain the balance, Gavrikov – Zjukin, Estonia 1998.

White has only seldom tried 15.ad2. After: 15..ge6 16.gef3  ad7 17.wa3  gb8 18.edf1  be8 19.eac1  gf8 20.wb3  a7, Ionov – Gubanov, St Petersburg 1997, White could have played the move 21.e4!?± and Black would have some serious problems to worry about.

15..gd7


16.wa3

Following 16.wb3  b5 17.d5, it becomes clear that White’s queen is not well placed, because of: 17..da5 18.wa3  db7 19.e4  dd6 20.e3  a5† and Black had good counter chances on the queenside in the game Manujlov – Gubanov, St Petersburg 1997.

16..b5

17.ge4. White is trying to transfer his knight immediately to the c5-outpost, which Black has just weakened. 17..e6 18.ge5  wc7 19.ad2± Z.Franco – S.Kudrin, Marchena 1990. White maintains clearly better prospects in the future battle, because of his space advantage, his powerful knight on c5 and the vulnerability of Black’s queenside.

Conclusion

We have analyzed some very seldom played moves for Black in this chapter. Their main drawback is that White obtains easily a great space advantage and a superior development. It is essential that White’s b2-pawn, contrary to the Gruenfeld Defence, remains at its initial place and accordingly he can exploit the c-file. Therefore, despite the fact that Black’s position seems to be solid enough, he will have to comply with the fact that White seizes the initiative and he has a slight, but stable advantage in all the variations.
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1.dıf3 dıf6 2.c4 g6 3.dıc3 d5 4.dıa4+ dıd7

This is the most logical move for Black and accordingly it is also the most popular.

5.dıb3 dıxc4

If 5...dıc6, then after 6.e3 (It is also possible for White to continue with: 6.cxd5 dıxd5 (It is even worse for Black to play: 6...dıxd5? 7.e4 dıb6 8.d4± Simeonidis – Poulos, Kirykos 2005, or 7...dıxc3 8.dıc4! e6 9.dıxc3 dıg8 10.d3±) 7.dıxd5 dıxd5 8.dıxd5 dıxd5 9.g3 dıb4 10.dıd1 dıg7 11.dıg2 c6 12.d4 dıd7 13.dıd2 dıd5 14.e3 e6 15.dıe2± Andonov – Lin Weiguo, Frunze 1989.) 6...dıg7 (In case of: 6...e6?! 7.dıe5 dıc8 8.dıxc6 bxc6 9.d4±, White dominates in the centre, he has a couple of bishops and he has an easy game against Black's weaknesses, Laihonen – Salokangas, Finland 2005.) 7.dıe5 0–0 8.d4 dıbd7 9.cxd5 dıxd5 10.dıxd5 dıxe5 11.dıb4± and White had a clear advantage in the game M.Sorokin – P.Ricardi, Villa Martelli 1997.

6.dıxc4

In this position, Black has usually played: a) 6...dıc6, b) 6...dıg7 and 6...dıa6 (Chapter 7).

The move 6...dıc6?! Hoeksema – Wemmers, Netherlands 1998, is not played so often, because after 7.dıe5 (about 7.e4 dıg7 8.d3 – see 6...dıg7 7.e4 dıc6 8.d3) 7...e6 (It is terrible for Black to try: 7...dıd5? 8.e4+–, while in the variation: 7...dıd5 8.dıxd5 dıxd5 9.dıxd5 dıxd5 10.a3±, White has a stable advantage in that endgame, thanks to his couple of powerful bishops.) 8.d4 dıg7 9.dıg5 h6 10.dıh4 0–0 11.e3±, White is better, due to his dominance in the centre and also because he can capture Black's light-squared bishop at an appropriate moment.

Black tried the interesting move – 6...c5!? in the game B.Kantsler – Smirin, Israel 2004 and White reacted quite logically – 7.dıe5 (After 7.dıxc5 dıc6=, Black
has an excellent compensation for the pawn due to his huge lead in development.) 7...e6 8.g3 □c6 9.□xd7 □xd7 10.□g2 □d4 (GM Kantzler pointed out in his comments to the game that Black's best line was: 10...□e7! 11.0-0 0-0=, but still after: 12.□a4 □ac8 13.d3 □fd8 14.□d1±, White would preserve a slight advantage, because of his bishop pair.) 11.0-0 □c8 12.a4 □g4?! (Naturally, here it is better for Black to continue with 12...□g7!. Still, even then after: 13.e3 □c2 14.□b1 0-0 15.□a2! □b4 16.□xb4 □xa4 17.□xb7±, White maintains some edge thanks to his couple of bishops, for example: 17...□c7 18.□a6! □xb4 19.□xb4 cxb4 20.d4±, or 17...□b8 18.b3! □xb4 19.□xb4 cxb4 20.□g2 □fd8 21.d4 □d5 22.□a1±, while in answer to 20...□d5, it is strong for White to continue with 21.□b2!, exchanging Black's powerful bishop and remaining with a good bishop against a knight, moreover that White has good chances to organize some positional pressure on the queenside. It is hardly any better for Black to follow with: 13...□f5 14.e4!? □d4 15.e5 □g4 16.f4 f6 17.h3 □h6 18.exf6 □xf6 19.□e4+) 13.a5! □e5 14.□a4 □b8 15.d3 □xa4 16.□xa4±. He lags considerably in development and his queenside is vulnerable.

a) 6...□c6

The game often transposes to one of the variations of the Grunfeld Defence after that move.

7.d4

7...□g7

About 7...a6 8.e4 — see Chapter 7.

It would not work for Black to play 7...□e6, because of 8.□a4±, it is also bad for him to try, for example: 8...□g4, Delaunay – Le Ruyet, Sautron 2005, in view of: 9.d5 □xf3 10.exf3 □xd5 11.□a6! □xc3 12.bxc3 □g7 13.0-0 bxa6 14.□xc6+ □f8 15.□g5++, while after: 8...□d7 9.e4 □b6 10.□c2 □b4 (Black loses immediately in case of: 10...□xd4? 11.□xd4 □xd4 12.□b5+) 11.□d1 □g7 12.a3 □a6, Koerholz – Wagener, Germany 2002, it also seems attractive for White to continue with: 13.□xa6, with the following eventual line: 13...bxa6 14.0-0 0-0 15.□c2 □g4 16.□e5+.

8.e4 0–0

If 8...□g4, then White preserves his advantage after: 9.d5 □xf3 10.gxf3! □e5 11.□e2 c6 12.□f4 □ed7 13.□g2 □xd5 14.e5 □e4 15.□xd5 f5 (It is not better for Black to opt for: 15...□a5+ 16.b4

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\[ \text{\#xd5 17.\#xe4 \#e6, Reis - G.Sabbatini, Email 2001, after 18.\#xb7 \#b8 19.\#e4 \#b6 20.\&c6 \#xb4+}

\[ 21.\#xb4 \#xb4 22.\#e3\#, White has an overwhelming advantage, because of his powerful bishop pair in this open position.), Bar-

\[ \text{reev - Krasenkow, Polanica Zdroj 1997 and here after: 16.exf6 \#xf6}

\[ 17.0-0\#, Black has serious problems with the safety of his king.} \]

9.\#f4!?

It is weaker for White to play 9.\#e2, because of 9...\#g4\#.\#

He has no advantage after: 9.

\[ \text{e5 \#e6 10.exf6 \#xc4 11.fxg7 \#xg7}

\[ 12.\#xc4 \#xd4 13.\#xd4 \#xd4 14.\#e2 \#b4!}, Aronian - Sutovsky, Reykjavik 2004.

9...\#g4

Black failed to equalize in case of: 9...\#c8 10.\#d1! \#g4 11.d5 \#a5

\[ 12.\#a4 \#b6 13.\#a6\# Ungureanu - N.Kirov, Timisoara 1972.

10.d5 \#h5

It is premature for Black to follow with 10...\#xf3\#!, McCam-

\[ \text{bridge - Jonsson, Grindavik 1984, because White maintains}

\[ \text{a great advantage after the simple line: 11.gxf3! e5 12.dxc6 exf4}

\[ 13.exb7 \#b8 14.\#c6\#, or 11...\#h5}

\[ 12.\#e5 \#a5 13.\#e2\#.

Black’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient following: 10...\#a5

\[ 11.\#xc7 \#c8 12.\#xd8 \#fxd8 13.\#d2\# Coello Perez - Pe-

\[ \text{rrera Gonzalez, Santa Cruz de Tenerife 2002.}

11.\#e3 \#a5

It is evidently the best for Black to continue with: 11...\#e5 12.\#xe5

\[ \#xe5, S.Pedersen - Schandorff, Aalborg 2000, although even}

\[ \text{then White’s prospects are supe-

\[ \text{rior thanks to his extra space af-

\[ \text{ter: 13.\#d4 \#xd4 14.\#xd4 c6 15.}

\[ \#h3 \#e6 16.\#e5\#.}

12.\#b4 \#c6 13.\#d1 \#xf3 14.

\[ \text{gxf3 \#c7 15.\#f4 \#f6 16.\#g2\# White has the two-bishop advan-

\[ \text{tage and a powerful pawn-centre,}

\[ \text{so Black’s defence is highly ques-

\[ \text{tionable, Jankovic - D.Howell,}

\[ \text{Oberwart 2004.}

b) 6...\#g7 7.e4

Black’s bishop on d7 is forced to defend the a4-e8 diagonal and accordingly, White’s last move, with the idea to follow with e4-e5 is very unpleasant for Black.

White’s other possibilities promise him much less. For example: 7.g3 0-0 8.\#g2 \#c6 9.0-0 (Black has no problems after: 9.d3

\[ \#bd7 10.0-0 \#xf3 11.\#xf3 \#e5}

\[ 12.\#f4 \#xf3+ 13.\#xf3 c6 14.\#d2}

\[ \#d5= Lerner - Stohl, Polanica

\[ \text{Zdroj 1985.) 9...\#d5 (In case of:}

\[ 9...\#bd7 10.d4 \#b6 11.\#d3 \#bd5,}

\[ \text{Black must consider 12.\#e5} \]

White would not achieve much if he goes after Black’s light-squared bishop with: 7.oe5 0–0 8.exd7 fxd7 9.g3. After 9...c6 10.eg2 ed4 11.wa4 REDENTIAL5 12.wd1 a5 13.0–0 e5 14.b3 redient6 15.aa3 ed6 16.cc1 c6=, Black managed to equalize in the game M.Sorokin – Semeniuk, Kuibyshev 1990.


Now, it is much worse for Black, than on the previous move, to continue with 7...a6?!., due to: 8.e5 b5 9.wc5 eg4 10.h3 he6 11.d4 0–0 12.e2 e8 13.0–0 cc6 14.a4± and White had an overwhelming advantage in the game Kruppa – Rogovoi, St Petersburg 1999.

It is too dubious for Black to try: 7...eg4?! 8.e5 redient5 9.exf6 ecx4 10.gx7 eg8 11.xc4 eg7 12.d4±, because White’s three light pieces are superior than Black’s queen and a pawn, Grebionkin – S.Vukanovic, Dos Hermanas 2003.

7...c6?! – This move is too passive. 8.d4 0–0 9.eg2 ed6 (Black has problems to create some counterplay after: 9...e6 10.wa4 ed7 11.0–0 eg4 12.ed3 wb8 13.h3 ef3 14.df3 e5 15.d5± A.Rychagov – Grebionkin, Moscow 2000.) 10.0–0 c5 11.e5 eg4? (It is better for Black here to follow with: 11...e6 12.eb5 ed5 13.xc5±, although he does not have a sufficient compensation for the pawn in that case either.) 12.h3 cxd4 13.xd4 and now Black loses a piece by force: 13...
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14...hxh6 15...xa6 bxa6 16...fd1 ...c6 17...h4+– Razuvaev – Sarno, Saint Vincent 2000.

Black has tried here only very seldom the move – 7...a6, after 8.e5! (It is weaker for White to continue with: 8.d4 c5 9...xc5 ...c8 10.e5 ...g4 11...d4 ...b8∞, or 8...g5 e6 9.b4 b5∞ Smirin – Mikhailovski, Israel 1998 and the position remains quite unclear in both cases.) 8...g4 9.d4 (It is also possible for White to play 9.e6!? and after: 9...xe6 10...b5+ ...d7 11...xb7 ...c5 12...b4 ...e6 13...xg4 ...d4 14...xd4 ...xd4 15...xd4∞ he is slightly better.) 9...c5 10.h3 ...h6 (Black cannot continue now with 10...xd4?, because of: 11...xd4 ...h6 12...xh6 ...xh6 13.e6+–, while following: 10...b4 11...e4 ...f5 12...xc5±, White remains with a solid extra pawn.) 11.dxc5± and White’s prospects are better.

b1) 7...c6

Black does not permit with that move his opponent to put his d-pawn on the d4-square, but he blocks the way forward of his own c-pawn and deprives his knight of the good c6-square, moreover that his bishop is quite passive on c6. All this enables White’s queenside initiative to run smoothly.

8.d3 0–0

Or 8...a6 9...e2 b5 10...b3 ...bd7 11.0–0 0–0, Hoeksema – Wemmers, Netherlands 1998, about 12.e5 – see 8...0–0 9...e2 a6 10.0–0 b5 11...b3 ...bd7 12.e5.

In answer to: 8...fd7?! Z. Peng – Krupkova, Elista 1998, it seems reasonable for White to occupy the centre with: 9.d4!? ...b6 10...b3 0–0 (It is too dangerous for Black to try here: 10...xd4?! 11...h6∞, because White has excellent chances to organize a dangerous attack against the black king stranded in the middle of the board.) 11...e3±.

9...e2

It is also interesting for White to follow here with 9...f4!? a6 (If 9...bd7, then 10...d4±) 10...e2 b5 11...c5 ...bd7 12...e3 b4 13...d1± and White had a slight advantage in the game Piket – Wesselink, Netherlands 1998.

9...bd7

Black has tried in practice some other moves too, but they all enable White to occupy the centre and to obtain an overwhelming advantage:

9...a6?! 10.0–0 b5 11...b3 ...bd7 12.e5 ...d5 13...xd5 ...c5 14...xe7+ ...xe7, Bu Xiangzhi – Nevedorov, Moscow 2004, and here White could have achieved a considerable edge with: 15...a3! ...e5
(or 15...b4 16.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xb4} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}ab8} 17.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}c4} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xf3} 18.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xf3} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xe5} 19.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}e3\pm}) 16.d4 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xf3} 17.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xf3} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xd4} 18.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xa8} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xa8} 19.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d2\pm} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}f6} 20.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}c3};

9...b6?! – This move is too slow. 10.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}f4} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}h5} 11.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}e3} e5, Tratar – Krupkova, Montecatini Terme 1997, 12.d4 exd4 13.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xd4} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}f4} 14.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xf4} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xd4} 15.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xd4} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xd4} 16.f3\pm;

9...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}fd7}?! – Now, White can occupy the centre at leisure, Pelletier – Moor, Lugano 1999, 10.d4 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b6} (It is hardly any better for Black to continue with: 10...e5?! 11.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}g5} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b6} 12.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b3\pm}) 11.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b3} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xd4}?! 12.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xd4} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xd4} 13.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}e3} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}f6} 14.0–0 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d7} 15.f4\pm and White has a more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn, because of his dominance in the centre, his better development and the vulnerability of the dark squares on Black’s kingside;

9...a5 10.0–0 a4 11.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d1} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}fd7}, Dziuba – Zezulkin, Swidnica 2000, 12.d4 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b6} (or 12...a3 13.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d3} axb2 14.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xb2} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b6} 15.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d2\pm}) 13.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d3} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d6} (or 13...a3 14.bxa3\pm) 14.a3\pm;

9...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}e8} 10.0–0 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}bd7}, Tratar – Vujakovic, Rabac 2003, 11.d4 e5 (Black loses in case of: 11...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xe4}? 12.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xe4} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xe4} 13.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}g5+-}) 12.d5 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b6} 13.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b3} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d7} 14.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}e3\pm}.

10.0–0

The d7-square is occupied now and White can follow with: 10.e5?! \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}e8} (The move 10...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b6}, leads after: 11.exf6 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xc4} 12.fxe7 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xe7} 13.dxc4\pm to a very favourable material ratio for White, while after 10...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}h5} 11.d4 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b6}, it is very strong for White to play 12.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}c5\pm}, with the idea g2–g4, Boersma – Peelen, Amsterdam 1986.) 11.d4 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b6} 12.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}c5} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d5} 13.h4 h5 14.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}g1\uparrow}, followed by g2–g4.

It is also good for White to continue with: 10.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}f4} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}h5} 11.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}e3} e5 12.g3. He prevents radically the possibility of the appearance of a black knight to the f4-square. (After 12.d4 exd4 13.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xd4} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b6} 14.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}c5} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}f4} 15.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}f1} – but not 15.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xc6}?, in view of 15...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}xg2\uparrow} – 15...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}e8} 16.0–0–0\pm; 15...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d7} 16.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}a3\pm}, White maintains some advantage.) 12...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}hf6} 13.0–0 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}e8} (or 13...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b6} 14.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b3} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}e7} 15.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}ad1} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}ad8} 16.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}f6e1} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}fe8} 17.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}f1\uparrow}) 14.b4! (Now, White starts his queenside offensive.) 14...a6 (In case of 14...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d6}, it is possible for White to continue with: 15.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b3} b6 16.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}ac1} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b7} 17.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}f6d1\pm}) 15.a4 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b6} (Following: 15...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d6} 16.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b3} b5 17.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}fc1\pm}) 16.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b3} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d7} 17.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}f6d1\pm}, White preserves a slight, but stable advantage, Piket – Bacrot, Andorra 1998.

10...e5

The move 10...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}e8}?! – permit White to establish a total control over the centre. 11.d4 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d6} 12.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d3} b6 13.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}f4\pm} Lukov – Zigura, Iłłkirch 2002.

In answer to: 10...\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b6} 11.\textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}b3} \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d7} (After 11...a5 12.a4 \textit{\textipa{\textasciitilde}d7}, Sulypa – Gerard, Elancourt 2005, 13.d4\pm, the weakening of the b4-square is not so important
as White’s complete dominance over the centre.), M.Hoffmann – Kolbus, Biel 2002, White has an evident edge after he occupies the centre with 12.d4±, while after 10...a5 11.e5 ♘b6, besides the very attractive line: 12.exf6 ♗xf6 13.fxg7 ♗xg7 14.dxc4± Krasenkow – McShane, Esbjerg 2003, White has also the resource: 12.♔h4!? ♗fd5 13.♕e4↑ and he has excellent attacking chances.

**11.b4 a6 12.a4 ♘b6**

The move 12...♘h5 – enables White to occupy some additional space with: 13.♗g5 ♙c8 14.b5 ♘xb5 15.axb5 ♕xa1 16.♕xa1 ♘b6, Chekhov – Baikov, Moscow 2000 and here after: 17.♗b4 ♗d7 18.d4 exd4 19.♕xd4±, White maintains an obvious advantage in the centre of the board.

**13.♗b3 ♕e8**

**b2) 7...0–0**

8.e5

This is the right move for White now, while the d7-square is occupied.

In case of 8.d4, the game transposes to one of the main lines of the Gruenfeld Defence. Black has a powerful argument by playing: 8...b5! 9.♘xb5 (After 9.♕b3 c5 10.e5 ♘g4 11.♘xb5 cxd4 12.♗xd4 ♘xb5 13.♗xb5 a6 14.♕a3 ♙d4 15.♕c2 ♙c6↑, White was even worse in the game Huebner – Kasparov, Brussels 1986.) 9...♗xe4 10.♕xc7 (Following: 10.♕xc7 ♙c6 11.♘xa8, Black has a very powerful attack after: 11...♕a5+ 12.♕d2 ♘xd2 13.♗xd2 ♘xd4→) 10...♘c6 11.♘d3 ♘b4 12.♗xe4 ♘xb5 13.♕xd8 ♙axd8 14.♖d2 ♘d3+ 15.♗xd3 ♘xd3 16.♕c3 ♙e4 17.♗d1 ♙xf3 18.gxf3 ♙d5 19.♗e2 ♙fd8= and despite White’s extra pawn, the position is completely equal, G.Giorgadze – Stohl, Senek 1998.

Now, Black is once again faced with a choice – where to retreat his knight to: **b2a) 8...♕g4,** or **b2b) 8...♕e8.**

It is bad for Black to play 8...
\( \text{e6?} \), due to 9.exf6 (It is also very good for White to play: 9.\text{h4!} \text{d5} 10.\text{g5 h6} 11.\text{xex6 fxe6} 12.\text{e4 xxc3} \) – Black failed to create a sufficient counterplay after: 12...\text{c6} 13.d4 \text{db4} 14.\text{e3 xd4} 15.0-0-0 c5 16.\text{xg6 xc7} 17.a3+-, in the game Chubukov – S.Dvoiry, USSR 1979 – 13.dxc3 \text{d5} 14.\text{xg6 xe5+ 15.xe3+} and White has an excellent position Adamski – Vujić, Valjevo 1984, while after 9...\text{g4} 10.d4 \text{c6?} 11.h3+-, White won quickly, R.Janssen – Pruijssers, Dieren 2004. Naturally, Black was not obliged to blunder his knight, but even after: 10...h5 11.h3 \text{h6} 12.g4+, White’s advantage is more than obvious.) 9...\text{xc4} 10.fxe7 \text{xg7} 11.\text{xc4+}.

b2a) 8...\text{g4} 9.d4

9...\text{e6}

That is Black’s most popular answer in this position.

9...b6?! – This move is too passive and it does not contribute to Black’s development. 10.h3 \text{h6} 11.\text{f4 c5}, Chytilek – Koster, Veszprem 2000, 12.\text{d1+}.

9...\text{a6?!} – That is simply a loss of time: 10.h3 \text{b6}, Bauer – Dunsbach, Hamburg 1999 and here White’s most energetic reaction seems to be 11.\text{g5?}, with the following exemplary variation: 11...b5 12.\text{c5 e8} 13.d5+.

In case of: 9...c6 10.h3 \text{h6} 11.\text{f4 e6} (or 11...b5 12.\text{e2 c5} 13.dxc5 b4 14.\text{d5+} J.Gustafsson – R.Moor, Dresden 2002) 12.\text{e2 d5} (It is insufficient for Black to play: 12...c5 13.\text{d1 cxd4} 14.\text{xd4 b6}, Werle – Brendel, Germany 2003, because he lags considerably in development and after: 15.\text{e3! wa5} 16.\text{b5 wc7} 17.\text{xe6 fxe6} 18.\text{c4+}, his position looks already beyond salvation; it is also too passive for him to defend with: 12...\text{h8} 13.\text{d1 e8} 14.\text{e2 f6} 15.\text{e3} Horvath – Brnas, Pula 2001.) and here White develops an extremely powerful initiative with: 13.0-0-0 \text{a6} 14.h4 \text{c7} 15.h5 \text{e6} 16.\text{f5} 17.g4+ and in the game Jo.Horvath – Sarno, Montecatini Terme 1999, Black failed to counter White’s overwhelming attack...

9...\text{a6?!} – This move is interesting for Black, but it is still insufficient to equalize. 10.h3 \text{h6} 11.\text{e2 c6} (The risky move – 11...c5?! leads to a very difficult situation for Black after: 12.\text{hxh6} \text{hxh6} 13.dxc5 \text{a5} 14.\text{h4 g7} 15.0-0 \text{xc5} 16.\text{e4+}, because his defence is tremendously questionable in this cramped position and in the game Eingorn – Gavrikov,
Chapter 6

Klaipeda 1983, he was quickly lost following: 16...♗b6 17.♕xe7 ♖c6 18.♕xf6+ ♖xf6 19.♕xf6 ♕xb2 20.♕xa6 ♕xf3 21.♕c4 ♖c6 22.♕b3 ♗ae8 23.♕e1 a5 24.♕ab1 ♘d4 25.♕bd1 ♘b2 26.h4+–) 12.0–0 ♚c7 (After 12...♕h8 13.♕b3 ♘b8 14.♕a3± G.Giorgadze – S.Garcia, Benasque 1999, Black has great problems to maintain the material balance.) 13.♕b3 b6 14.♕d1 ♘h8, Chuchelov – Gormally, Cappelle la Grande 2001 and here White can obtain a clear advantage after 15.a4!, with the following eventual developments: 15...♗e6 (otherwise the move 16.♕c4 is very unpleasant for Black) 16.♕c4 ♕xc4 17.♕xc4 ♕d7 18.d5 ♕xd5 19.♕xd5 ♕xd5 20.♕xd5 ♕e6 21.♕xh6! ♘xh6 22.♕d4 ♘c8 23.♕c6± and White’s powerful knight paralyzes his opponent’s heavy pieces.

9...♕c6 10.♕f4 ♘a5 11.♕e2 c5 (White wins material decisively after: 11...♕e6 12.h3 ♘c4 13.♕d2 ♖xf1 14.♕xf1 ♘c4 15.♕e2 1-0 Namgilo – Palos, Polanica Zdroj 1998; 12...♕h6 13.♕d2 ♖f5 14.d5 ♖d7 15.g4+–, as well as in case of: 11...♕h8 12.h3 ♘h6 13.♘xh6 ♘xh6 14.e6 ♘c6 15.♗e5+ ♕f6 16.♗xa5 ♕b6 17.♗a6 ♕xf3 18.gxf3 ♕xd4 19.♘d1 ♗e5+ 20.♗e2+– Vaulin – Vokarev, Novgorod 1999.) 12.h3 ♕xd5 13.♘xd4 ♘h6 (It would not work for Black to try: 13...♗b6, due to: 14.♕f3 ♘h6 15.♗d2+– and he loses his knight.) 14.♗d1 ♘b6 (It is a disaster for Black to continue with: 14...♗e8, in view of: 15.♗d2 ♖f5 16.b4 ♕c6 17.♗xc6 ♖xc6 18.b5+–) 15.♗d2 ♖f5 16.♕xf5 (The move 16.♕d5, enables Black to play: 16...♗xd4 17.♗xe7+ ♘h8 18.♗xd4 ♘xd4 19.♗xd4 &e6+ and he obtains a serious counterplay.) 16...♗xf5 17.♕d5 ♕d8 18.♗b4± and White had an overwhelming advantage in the game Ivanchuk – Shirov, Polanica Zdroj 1998.

10.♕d5 ♖f5


11.♕f4 ♖d7 12.♗e2 ♕f6

Black tried to seize the initiative in a quite original fashion in the game Lobron – Jansa, Fuerth 2001: 12...♖g5!? 13.♗g3 e6 14.0–0–0 ♕e7 15.h3 ♘h6 16.♗e3 ♖g6 17.♗xe6 ♘xe6 18.♗xg5 ♘e8 19.♗xe7 ♕xe7 20.♗h4 ♕f7, nevertheless after 21.♖g5±, his compensation for the pawn would have been insufficient.

13.♖e5 ♕xe5

Black loses after: 13...♘c5 14.♗c4 b6 (It is equally bad for him to try: 14...♗g5? 15.♗g3 ♘a6 16.♗h4+– Volzhin – Valdes, Saint Vincent 2001.), because of: 15.♗d4 ♘e5 16.♗xe5 ♘xe5 17.♘c6 ♘e8 18.b4 ♘b7 19.♖b5+– Drogon – E.Vorobiov, Moscow 1998.

14.♗d1 ♕d6

The move – 14...c6, ends up in a loss for Black too, in view of: 15.♗d4 ♘d3 16.♗xd3 ♕xd3+ 17.♘xd3 ♕xd5 18.♗e2 ♘e5 19.♗b5
g5 20...<br>

Black's position is extremely difficult after: 14...<br>

(Or 15...g5 16.<br>

17. <br>

18.<br>

Jepson – Moberg, Malmo 2004 and in case of: 19.<br>

20.<br>

21.0–0 <br>

22.<br>

Black has no compensation for the pawn.)<br>

16.<br>

Mellegers – L’Ami, Dieren 2002. Here naturally, White must preserve his powerful bishop with: 18.<br>

(18...<br>

19.<br>

20.<br>

21.<br>

22.0–0± ) 19.<br>

c6 20.0–0±.

15.<br>

White is parrying the threat –<br>

d3+.

15...<br>

After 15...c6 16.dxc6 <br>

d4±, White maintains a great advantage.

Black ends up in a very difficult position after the too aggressive line: 15...<br>

16.<br>

17.<br>

18.<br>

19.<br>

20.<br>

g5, Kaganskiy – Khmelniker, Tel Aviv 2003, because here White could have maintained a considerable edge with the accurate move – 21.<±, for example: 21...<br>

22.<br>

23.<br>

24.<br>

25.<

16.<br>

17.<br>

18.<br>

19.<br>

20.<br>

c7 <br>

(diagram)

21.<br>

(This move creates the threat – 22.<br>

21...<br>

22.<br>

23.<br>

24.<br>

25.<br>

26.<br>

b2b) 8...<br>

9.<br>

White preserves the fourth rank open with the idea to deploy his queen to the h4-square, where it will be most active.

9...<br>

If 9...<br>

White creates the dangerous threat <br>

g5. Later, the game Biriukov – Otkidach, St Petersburg 2005, followed with: 10...<br>

11.<br>

<± and White’s
advantage was beyond any doubt, while in case of: 9...c6 10.d4 a5 11.0-0 b4 12.d5 b5, as it was played in the game Boersma – Lont, Groningen 1988, it would have been again very strong for White to continue with 13.h4+, followed by c1-h6.

10.0-0 c7 11.d1

Black can counter 11.h4 with: 11...c5 12.e4 e6∞, while after: 11.b3, he has the powerful argument: 11...c5! 12.xb7 c6 13.b3 d7=, with an equal position.

11...f5

If 11...e6, it is again very good for White to follow with 12.h4, with the idea f3-g5.

12.h4 e6

After 12...c5, White plays 13.d4=.


13.d4 xh4 14.xh4+ and White’s prospects are clearly superior in that endgame.

Conclusion

We have analyzed in this chapter the move 6..g7, which is the most popular for Black, but it is hardly the best for him. Its main drawback is that White can occupy immediately additional space with the energetic response – 7.e2-e4! and Black is faced with a difficult choice after that. His attempt at preventing the further advance of White’s e-pawn with the help of the move 7..c6, leads to a situation, in which Black’s bishop will be isolated from the actions for a long time. Meanwhile, White’s queenside initiative develops effortlessly. Black’s other possibilities are not any better either – White obtains a huge space advantage and excellent prospects in the centre and on the kingside. Black gains access to the good d5-outpost in the majority of the variations, but that is not enough to compensate White’s dominance in the centre, which provides him with a long-lasting initiative. He achieves a considerable edge in the variation with – 6..c6 too, just by occupying the centre with quite natural moves.
Chapter 7

1.\( \textsf{\textit{d}}f3 \textsf{\textit{d}}f6 2.\textsf{\textit{c}}c4 \textsf{\textit{g}}6 3.\textsf{\textit{c}}c3 \textsf{\textit{d}}5 4.\textsf{\textit{w}}a4+ \textsf{\textit{d}}d7 5.\textsf{\textit{w}}b3 \textsf{\textit{d}}xc4 6.\textsf{\textit{w}}xc4 \textsf{\textit{a}}6 \)

This move is played with the idea to follow with b7-b5 and c7-c5, after which Black will already have a slight space advantage.

7.\( \textsf{\textit{d}}4 \)

That is White’s most radical resource to restrict Black’s possibilities; otherwise he might easily lose his advantage.

7...\( \textsf{\textit{b}}5 \)

In case of 7...\( \textsf{\textit{c}}c6 \), White can continue with: 8.e4 b5 (or 8...\( \textsf{\textit{g}}g7 \) 9.e5! \( \textsf{\textit{e}}e6 \) 10.exf6! This queen-sacrifice is standard for these lines. 10...\( \textsf{\textit{x}}xc4 \) 11.fxg7 \( \textsf{\textit{g}}g8 \) 12.\( \textsf{\textit{x}}xc4 \) \( \textsf{\textit{x}}xd4 \) 13.\( \textsf{\textit{x}}xd4 \) \( \textsf{\textit{w}}xd4 \). Now, White’s task is to coordinate quickly his pieces and to try to seize the initiative. It is essential to prevent Black from building a solid and reliable pawn-chain. 14.\( \textsf{\textit{d}}d5 \textsf{\textit{c}}6 \) 15.\( \textsf{\textit{b}}b3 \) \( \textsf{\textit{w}}xg7 \) 16.0-0 0-0-0 17.\( \textsf{\textit{g}}g5 \) \( \textsf{\textit{w}}e5 \) 18.h4↑ – Black has problems protecting his pawns.) 9.\( \textsf{\textit{w}}b3 \) and the game transposes to the main line of variation a, but it is possible for White to try also: 9.\( \textsf{\textit{w}}d3 \) \( \textsf{\textit{g}}g7 \) 10.\( \textsf{\textit{e}}e2 \) 0-0 11.0-0±, avoiding plenty of side variations, Rahman – Ricardo, Bled 2002.

If 7...\( \textsf{\textit{e}}e6 \), then after 8.\( \textsf{\textit{w}}a4 \) b5 9.\( \textsf{\textit{w}}c2 \), there arises a transposition to the main line of variation b.

8.\( \textsf{\textit{w}}b3 \)

Here, Black has two basic possibilities: to opt for a lively piece-play, without clarifying the structure of the position with – a) 8...\( \textsf{\textit{c}}c6 \), or to attack immediately White’s centre with – b) 8...\( \textsf{\textit{c}}c5 \).

His other lines are:

About 8...\( \textsf{\textit{e}}e6 \) 9.\( \textsf{\textit{w}}c2 \) \( \textsf{\textit{c}}5 \) (It is too bad for Black to play: 9...\( \textsf{\textit{c}}c6 \) 10.e4 \( \textsf{\textit{x}}xd4 \), because of: 11.\( \textsf{\textit{x}}xd4 \) \( \textsf{\textit{w}}xd4 \) 12.\( \textsf{\textit{x}}xb5+\) ) 10.\( \textsf{\textit{d}}xc5 \) – see variation b;

8...\( \textsf{\textit{c}}c8 \), Werle – van de Mortel, Leeuwarden 2001, 9.e4±;

8...\( \textsf{\textit{g}}g7 \) 9.e4 0-0 (or 9...\( \textsf{\textit{c}}c6 \), with a transposition to the main line of variation a) 10.e5 \( \textsf{\textit{g}}g4 \) (about 10...\( \textsf{\textit{e}}e6 \) 11.exf6 \( \textsf{\textit{x}}xb3 \) 12.}
fxg7 \hxg7 13.axb3 \c6 14.e3 – see 11...\e6 in variation a) 11.h3 \h6, Zakhartsov – Stambulian, Krasnodar 2001, 12.e2 c5 13. dxc5 \e6 14.\wb4 \c6 15.\we4±.

a) 8...\c6

9.e4!

This is the most principled line for Black.

In case of 9.\xf4, Black can accomplish numerous exchanges with – 9...\e6 10.\wd1 \d5 11. \g3 \xc3 12.bxc3 \g7 13.e4 \a5 14.e2 c5 15.0–0 \c4= Yakovich – Yandemirov, Voronezh 2006.

9...\g7

That is the most natural line and strangely enough, this position has been tried only very seldom in practice. It is not good now for Black to play 9...b4, Lautier – Svidler, Cannes 2001, due to 10.d5!±.

In case Black plays like in the Smyslov variation of the Grunfeld Defence – 9...\g4, then it seems very good for White to continue with: 10.e5!? \xe5 11.dxe5 and his powerful pawn-centre guarantees his advantage. There might follow 11...\d7 (It is clearly worse for Black to try: 11... \e6 12.\wc2 \g4 13.\f4+) 12.\f4 \g7 13.\wc2! 0–0 14.\e2±.

10.\e3!

White completes the development of his queenside and he fortifies the strategically important d4-square. He can hardly avoid playing that move; otherwise Black obtains a comfortable position. For example, after 10.\f4, it is good for Black to play 10...\g4! and he has an excellent game thanks to his superior development: 11.\e5 \xe5 12. \xe5 c5 13.dxc5 \xe4 14.\xb5+ axb5 15.\xb5+ \f8 16.\xg7+ \xg7 17.\xe4 \d4; 11.\xb5 0–0 12.\xc7 \xf3\+=; 11.d5 \xf3 12.\xc6 \xe4 13.\d1 \wc8 14.\xe4 \xe4 15.\d7 0–0\f.

It is premature for White to try 10.e5 \e6 11.exf6?! – because the queen-sacrifice is not quite correct under the circumstances – 11...\xb3 12.\fg7 \g8 13.axb3 \b4+. Therefore, he must continue with: 10.e2 0–0 11.e5 \e6 and the game transposes to the main lines of the Grunfeld Defence. The position after: 12.exf6 \xb3 13.\fg7 \xg7 14.axb3 \xd4 15.\xd4 \xd4 16.0–0 \b4 17.\f3 \xb3! has been tested several times in practice. See one of the recent examples – the game Bologan – Svidler, France 2006.

10...0–0

In case of 10...\g4, (with the idea to follow with 11...e5) it is
essential for White to restrict maximally Black’s possibilities – 11.e5! AMESPACE 12.fxe3 0–0 13.e2, with a transposition to the main line.

11.e5

It is quite possible that Black should better consider the more reliable move 11...g4 and I will inform you about the possible developments in that case. 12.e2 AMESPACE (Having in mind the spirit of that system, Black should try to play concretely; otherwise after some natural moves White would obtain a clear advantage: 12.b4 13.e4 14.f2+) 13.fxe3 a5 (After 13...f5, White plays the prophylactic move 14.d1! and Black will have great problems to create any counterplay.) 14.a3 c5 (It is too passive for Black to play: 14...c6 15.e4 h6 16.c5 c8 17.0–0=, while after: 14...c6, White follows with 15.c5+) 15.xc5 c8 16.a3 h6 17.0–0! (The initiative here is much more important than a pawn, because White’s king is unsafe and it might cause problems for him, for example: 17.f2 g4, with the idea: 18.xf3 19.xf3 c4, or 17.d5 c6 18.d1 h3=) 17.xe3+ 18.h1 h6 (The bishop retreats from that dangerous square. In case of: 18...b4 19.xb4 c6 20.a3, White is clearly better: 20.d4 21.d5 c2 22.xe7+ g7 23.d6=, or 20.xd4 21. ad1 xe5 22.xe5 xe5 23.d5 e8 24.e3 f6 25.xa6=) 19.d5! b8 (That is an attempt by Black to deflect White from his central strategy.) 20.b4 c4 21.xc4 bxc4 22.ad1=. White has the possibility to improve his position even more. He can create a powerful d-passed pawn and also he can try the maneuver c3-e4-c5. It would also be advisable for him to bring his queen to active actions – that is possible for example in the variation: 22.b6 23.b5 axb5 24.xe7=.

12.exf6 xb3 13.fxg7 xg7 14.axb3

As a rule, that position arises after the usual move-order in the Gruenfeld Defence. In case the pawn-structure does not change in the nearest future, Black’s de-
fence would be very difficult. Therefore, his task is not to create additional weaknesses unnecessarily and to try to attack his opponent’s b3-pawn. White’s plan is to defend accurately against the direct threats, to complete his development and then to begin exploiting Black's weaknesses. It would also be useful for him to manage to trade the knights, after which his opponent would be left only with long-range pieces.

**14...b4**

It is obviously weaker for Black to follow with: 14...d6 15...e2. He has tried in that position the lines:

15...b4, Dinu – D.Ionescu, Bucharest 1996, 16.d5! (This is evidently White's most effective resource.) 16...a5 17.0–0 c5 (In case of 17...xb3, White plays 18.a3! with the idea to continue with 19.a2+-) 18.a3! b7 19.e5+-;

15...f5 16.g3 h6 (or 16...f4 17.gxf4!) 17.d5 b4 18.d1+ Hoe
nig – Neven, corr. 1999;

15...e6 16.0–0 Bfd8?! 17.g5 d8 18.f1± Levin – Kinez, Pula 1998.

**15.e1 d7**

The other possibilities for Black are not in harmony with his general plan (see the notes to 14.axb3) and they only help White to accomplish his plans:

15...f5?! 16.f4 d5 (Black’s attempt to get at his opponent’s only weakness on b3 is not effective at all: 16.d7 17.e2 e6 18.d5! xd5 19.g5 g8 20.xd5 xd5 21.c3! e5 22.d3+-) 17.e5+ g8 18.e2± Bastida – Urrutia, Monzon 1987;

15...f6?! 16.e2 e5 (or 16...c5 17.0–0 cxd4 18.xd4± Lehto – Oim, Finland 2003) 17.xe5 d3+ 18.xd3 xd3 19.d4+– C.Horvath – Duemmke, Velden 1994;

15...c6 16.e2 a5 17.0–0 a4 18.bxa4 bxa4 19.e5 f6 20.c4± J.Murray – Sogaard, corr. 1973;

15...d5 16.xd5 xd5 17.c3 f5 18.e2 f4 19.e1 e4 20.0–0 Akhmovskaya – Ioselian, Tbil
isi 1987. I will also mention here that in case of 20...b4, White can play not only the intermediate move 21.d3, but also: 21.xc7 xe2 22.e1 d3 23.exe7+ f6 24.xf4+-.

**16.e2 d8**

It is too passive for Black to continue with: 16...c6 17.e4 f5 18.f2 d5 19.0–0 c8 20.c5 c7 21.f3± D.Bronstein – Pou	tiainen, Tallinn 1977. It is also not advisable for him to try the immediate line: 16...e6 17.d5! xd5 (or 17...d7, Haggren – Valonen corr. 1980, 18.d4 e8 19.0–0 xd5 20.xd5 xd5 21.f3+) 18.xd4 d6 19.xd5 xd5 20.f3 d6 21.xa8 xa8 22.0–0 Pash
khis – Khmelniker, Cappelle la Grande 2006.

**17.0–0 e6 18.d1!?**

White’s knight on f3 and his bishop on e3 are both at their
optimal position at the moment, preventing Black’s eventual provocations in the centre. His pawnstructure is relatively stable and White begins a patient regrouping of his forces. It is worth mentioning here, for the sake of objectivity, that although Black obtained an excellent game after: 18.\textcolor{red}{$\text{d}2}$ $f5$ 19.$g3$ $f4$ (19...$h6$!??) 20.$\text{xf}4$ $\text{xf}4$! 21.$\text{gxf}4$ $\text{xd}4$, Riemer – Megier, corr. 1988, it would have been much stronger for White to follow here with 20.$\text{gxf}4$!, with the idea to penetrate his opponent’s position by exploiting the g-file, for example with: 20...$c6$ 21.$\text{h}1$ $\text{h}8$ 22.$\text{g}1$ $a5$ 23.$\text{g}5$$\pm$.

b) 8...$c5$ 9.$\text{dxc}5$

There arises a similar position in the Gruenfeld Defence, the only difference being that here Black’s light-squared bishop is on d7 and not on c8. That is the nuance that White wishes to exploit in his fight for the opening advantage.

9...$\text{e}6$

It is hardly good for Black to play 9...$\text{e}7$ immediately, Stepanov – Sohier, Bischwiller 1999, 10.$\text{g}5$ $e6$ 11.$\text{c}4$$\pm$.

Still, it deserves attention for him to try another move-order: 9...$\text{g}7$ 10.$e4$ 0–0 (In case Black continues to keep his king in the centre, he might be in for a lot of trouble – 10...$\text{c}6$ 11.$\text{e}2$ $\text{e}6$ 12. $\text{c}2$ $\text{b}4$ 13.$\text{b}1$ $\text{d}7$ 14.$\text{e}3$ $\text{c}8$ 15.0–0 $\text{c}4$ 16.$a3$ $\text{xc}3$ 17.$\text{xc}4$ $\text{bxc}4$ 18.$\text{c}1$$\pm$ – Vorobiov – Yandemirov, Dagomys 2004.) 11.$\text{e}2$ $\text{c}6$ (Black is trying to transpose to the main lines of the Gruenfeld Defence – see the notes to White’s next move. Meanwhile, the difference between the placement of Black’s bishop on c8 and d7 is quite evident here – Black does

20.$\text{e}2$ $\text{d}7$ 21.$\text{e}4$$\pm$ – White’s knight is already headed for the c5-outpost. Black has nothing to counter White’s improvement of the position with.
not have the move 11...\( \text{Q} \text{bd7.} \) 12.e5!? (In case of: 12.0-0 \( \text{Qxe4} \) 13.\( \text{Qxe4} \) \( \text{Qxe4} \), there arises a quite critical position and the statistics of the recent games indicates that it is very favourable for White. See one of the latest examples on that theme: 14.\( \text{Qf4} \) \( \text{d5} \) 15.\( \text{Qe3} \) \( \text{Qxb2} \) 16.\( \text{Rad1} \) e6 17.\( \text{Qd6} \) \( \text{Qc6} \)? 18.\( \text{Qxf8} \) \text{Qxf8} Vorobiov – Grebionkin, Kazan 2005.) 12...\( \text{Qf7} \) 13.\( \text{Qe3} \) \( \text{Qxe5} \) (In general, Black’s light-squared bishop is usually on b7 in that position and White must consider the maneuver \( \text{Qb8-c6.} \)) 14.\( \text{Qxe5} \) \( \text{Qxe5} \) 15.0-0 e6 16.\( \text{Rad1} \) \( \text{Cc7} \) 17.f4 \( \text{Qg7} \) 18.a4! bxa4 19.\( \text{Qxa4} \) \( \text{Qd7} \) 20.\( \text{Qb6} \) \( \text{Qxb6} \) (It is too dangerous for Black to play here: 20...\( \text{Qb7} \) 21.\( \text{Qd6} \) \( \text{Qxb6} \) 22.\( \text{Qxb6} \) \( \text{Qxg2} \) – because after: 23.\( \text{Qxb7} \) \( \text{Qxb7} \) 24.\( \text{Cc6} \) \( \text{Cc8} \) 25.\( \text{Qc7} \pm \) White’s powerful passed pawn should suffice to settle the issue.) 21.\( \text{Qxb6} \) \( \text{Qxb6} \) 22.\( \text{Qxh6} \) a5 23.\( \text{Qb3} \pm \).

10.\( \text{Qc2} \) \( \text{Qg7} \)

Now, once again Black’s attempt to regain the c5-pawn would lead to an advantage for White: 10...\( \text{Qc6} \) 11.e4 \( \text{Qc7} \) (or 11...\( \text{b4} \) 12.\( \text{Qa4} \) \( \text{Qa5} \) 13.\( \text{Qb3} \) \( \text{Qg7} \) 14.\( \text{Qb2} \pm \); 11...\( \text{Qg4} \) 12.\( \text{Qe3} \) \( \text{Qxf3} \) 13.\( \text{Qxf3} \) \( \text{Qd4} \) 14.\( \text{Qd1} \pm \) Huzman) 12.\( \text{Qe2} \) \( \text{Qb4} \) 13.\( \text{Qb1} \) \( \text{Qxc5} \) 14.0-0 \( \text{Qg7} \) 15.\( \text{Qe3} \) \( \text{Qc7} \) 16.\( \text{Qc1} \) \( \text{Qb7} \) 17.\( \text{Qd4} \) \( \text{Qg4} \) 18.\( \text{Qf3} \) \( \text{Qd7} \) 19.\( \text{Qb3} \) 0-0 20.\( \text{Qc5} \pm \) Huzman – Ma.Tseitin, Israel 2000.

11.e4 0-0 12.\( \text{Qe2} \)

This position is usually reached after another move-order in the tournament practice: 1.d4 \( \text{Qf6} \) 2.

12...\( \text{Qc6} \)

The other possibilities are weaker for Black:

About 12...\( \text{Qc8} \) 13.\( \text{Qg5} \) \( \text{Qxc5} \) 14.\( \text{Qxe6} \) – see. 12...\( \text{Qc7} \) 13.\( \text{Qd4} \) \( \text{Qxc5} \) 14.\( \text{Qxe6} \);

12...\( \text{Qa5} \) 13.0-0 \( \text{Qbd7} \) 14.\( \text{Qc5} \), Santos – Costa, Lisbon 2000, 15.\( \text{Qe3} \) b4 16.\( \text{Qd5} \) \( \text{Qxe4} \) 17.\( \text{Qxe7+} \) \( \text{Kh8} \) 18.\( \text{Qd3} \); 12...\( \text{b4} \) 13.\( \text{Qa4} \) \( \text{Qa5} \) 14.0-0 \( \text{Qbd7} \) 15.\( \text{Qg5} \) \( \text{Qac8} \) 16.\( \text{Qxe6} \) \( \text{fxe6} \) 17.\( \text{Qe3} \) \( \text{Qxe4} \) 18.\( \text{Qxe4} \) \( \text{Qxa4} \) 19.\( \text{Qxe6+} \) \( \text{Kh8} \), Korovesi – Bartolini, Lucca 2000, 20.\( \text{Qac1} \); ...

12.\( \text{Qbd7} \) 13.\( \text{c6} \) \( \text{Qb6} \) 14.\( \text{Qf4} \) \( \text{Qh5} \), Daroczy – Bernath, Heves 2000, 15.\( \text{Qe3} \pm \).

In fact, Black’s most serious alternative seems to be the move 12...\( \text{Qc7} \). Now, after: 13.\( \text{Qd4} \) \( \text{Qc4} \) (It is worse for Black to follow with: 13...\( \text{Qxc5} \) 14.\( \text{Qxe6} \) \( \text{fxe6} \) 15.\( \text{Qd3} \) \( \text{Qc6} \) 16.\( \text{Qc1} \) \( \text{Qbd7} \) 17.0-0 \( \text{b4} \), Conquest – Huenerkopf, Germany 1987, 18.\( \text{Qd5} \) \( \text{Qxc2} \) 19.\( \text{Qxf6+} \) \( \text{Qxf6} \) 20.\( \text{Qxc2} \) \( \text{Qxe4} \) 21.\( \text{Qf3} \pm \) 14.\( \text{Qe3} \), there can arise the
following variations:

14...\(\text{\textit{d}d}8,\text{Praszak-Ma.\textit{T}setlin, Gdynia 1989, 15.0-0 \textit{c}xe2 16.} \textit{c}xe2 \textit{g}4 17.\textit{a}f4 e5 18.\textit{g}3\text{\textpm};

14...e5 15.\textit{a}b3 \textit{c}6 16.0-0 \textit{ad}8 17.\textit{a}xc4 bxc4 18.\textit{d}d2 \textit{d}d4 19.\textit{w}a4 \textit{xc}5 20.\textit{w}xc5 \pm 20.0.\textit{xc}5 18.\textit{d}d4 \pm 19.\textit{w}xa1 19.\textit{f}f3 \pm 20.\textit{d}d5 \pm 21.\textit{xd}5 \pm (\text{Korchnot}).

\textbf{18.} \textit{d}d4 \textit{c}4

After 18...\textit{d}d7, White's knight is headed along the route \textit{d}b3-c5 - either immediately, or after the preparatory move 19.\textit{f}f3 \pm (\text{Piket}).

\textbf{19.} \textit{a}3 \textit{c}6

Or 19...\textit{dxe}2 20.\textit{d}xe2 \textit{e}5 21.\textit{d}d3 \textit{c}6 22.\textit{w}c2 \pm Ftcnik; 19...e5 20.\textit{a}xc4 exd4 21.\textit{d}xd4 bxc4 22.\textit{a}xb4 \textit{xb}4 23.e5 \textit{d}d7 24.\textit{d}d5 \textit{d}d4 \pm 25.\textit{e}e4 \pm (Korchnot).

\textbf{20.} \textit{xc}6 \textit{xc}6 21.\textit{f}f3! \textit{d}d6

White was threatening b2-b3 and he would have played that even after 21...\textit{e}e6 - 22.b3! \textit{d}xb3 23.e5 \textit{h}b5 24.\textit{g}g4 \textit{c}4 25.\textit{e}e4 \textit{d}d5 26.\textit{e}e5 \pm (Piket).

\textbf{22.} \textit{d}d1 \textit{e}5

It is maybe more tenacious for Black to play with 22...\textit{e}e6, although after: 23.e5 \textit{xe}5 24.\textit{d}d4 \textit{e}6 25.\textit{xa}8 \textit{e}a8 26.\textit{c}c1 \textit{b}3 27.\textit{e}e1 \textit{c}4 28.\textit{e}e3 \textit{d}d8 29.\textit{e}e5\text{\textpm} his compensation for the exchange is insufficient.

\textbf{23.} \textit{a}d4 \textit{e}6 24.e5 \textit{d}d5

25.\textit{e}e4\text{\textpm} Piket - Abruik, Biel 1999. It becomes clear now that
Chapter 7

Black has serious problems with his bishop on the c4-square, in connection with White’s threats 26.b3 and 26.\( \mathcal{D} \)c5.

Conclusion

White counters Black’s attempt to organize some counterplay on the queenside with an asymmetrical central strategy and that is the most unpleasant approach for Black. The game usually develops analogously to the popular variation in the Gruenfeld Defence – 1.d4 \( \mathcal{D} \)f6 2.c4 g6 3.\( \mathcal{D} \)c3 d5 4.\( \mathcal{D} \)f3 \( \mathcal{D} \)g7 5.\( \mathcal{D} \)b3 dxc4 6.\( \mathcal{D} \)xc4 0–0 7.e4 a6 8.\( \mathcal{D} \)e2 b5 9.\( \mathcal{D} \)b3 c5 – and our readers can study more profoundly the difference between these variations if they so wish. In general, we have to mention that White’s main achievement is that by maiming Black’s bishop to the d7-square he restricts Black’s possibilities considerably. White’s strategical idea is to exploit the c5-outpost and of course he must watch carefully about the numerous tactical nuances that the Gruenfeld Defence is abundant with. In case he manages to accomplish that task, his chances to succeed are quite considerable.
Part 3

1.²f3 ²f6 2.c4 g6 3.²c3 ²g7 4.e4

The King’s Indian Defence is one of the sharpest openings, leading to a fight without any compromises and it is one of the most frequent answers to the closed opening systems. Black presents his opponent deliberately with a space advantage and that is a bit risky from a strategical point of view; nevertheless it is far from easy for White to exploit that. The arising positions are so dynamic and rich concerning ideas and fine points that without any exaggeration it can be said that the fantastic popularity of that opening is not surprising at all. It is of course impossible to mention here all the world famous adherents to that opening, but I believe that some names would still suffice: D.Bronstein, Gligoric, E.Geller, Fischer, Kasparov...

This part of the book is devoted to some seldom played schemes of the classical variation and it arises most often after the following order of moves: 1.d4 ²f6 2.c4 g6 3.²c3 ²g7 4.e4 d6 5.²f3 0-0 6.²e2. Generally speaking, White has plenty of systems of development at his disposal, but they all have advantages and drawbacks. It is not sufficient however to choose a variation for White according to style and preference. We are building an entire concept for opening strategy for White and we have to take into account the possibility of Black transferring into the Gruenfeld Defence. That explains the move order that we have chosen.

I am dealing with problems that are just ahead; in fact White’s pawn is not on d4 yet and Black can prevent d2-d4 with the moves 4...e5 or 4...c5 and they will be analyzed in Chapter 8. The next Chapter 9 is devoted to the scheme: 4...0-0 5.d4 c6!? 6.²e2 d5, which is a peculiar hybrid between the King’s Indian Defence and the Gruenfeld Defence. That is obviously Black’s
only possibility to exploit the order of moves including 4...0-0, so that he can reach something original, therefore we will deal with the usual lines 4...d6 5.e4 later. In Chapter 10 we analyze the possibilities 5...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash}bd7, 5...c6 and 5...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash}g4, although the idea for Black to avoid castling short on move 5 is not so popular.

We have come now to our approach to the critical position – 5...0-0 6.e4.

In Chapter 11 we deal with the seldom played alternatives for Black: 6...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash}bd7, 6...a5, 6...c6, 6...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash}c6. The positions arising after 6...c5 7.0-0 are analyzed after 6...c5 7.0-0 are analyzed in Chapter 12 and we put the emphasis on different lines, with the exception of 7...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash}xd4, which leads to the Maroczy system – see Book 3. The fine points of the variation 6...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash}g4 7.\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash}e3, in which Black tries to organize some counterplay against his opponent's d4-pawn at an early stage of the game, are dealt with in Chapters 13 and 14.

Finally, our Chapter 15 is an introduction to the classics: 6...e5 7.0-0. We will analyze there some seldom played variations for Black (with the exception of the most popular lines 7...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash}bd7 – see Part 4 of this book, and 7...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash}c6, 7...\texttt{\textbackslash \textbackslash}a6, 7...exd4 – see Book 1b).
Chapter 8  1.⪄f3 ⪄f6 2.c4 g6 3.⪄c3 ⪄g7 4.e4

White intends to occupy the centre with his pawns c4, e4 and d4; meanwhile forcing his opponent to develop his pieces to not so comfortable squares.

We will deal in this chapter with some lines, in which Black is trying to prevent radically White’s pawn-move – d2-d4: a) 4...e5 and b) 4...c5.

a) 4...e5

Black wishes to counter White’s plan to occupy the centre completely with his pawns. Now, White must play concretely, capturing his opponent’s e5-pawn, in order to fight for the advantage.

5.⪄xe5 ⪄xe4

The other reasonable move for Black here is – 5...⪄e7. There might follow: 6.d4 d6 7.⪄f3 ⪄xe4 8.⪄d5 ⪄d8 (The move 8...⪄d7 is a bit strange, because it covers the way of his own bishop. 9.⪄d3 0-0 10.⪄xe4 ⪄e8 11.0-0 ⪄xe4 12.⪄h6 c6 13.⪄c3 ⪄g4?? – it is correct for Black to play: 13...⪄e8 14.⪄xg7 ⪄xg7 15.d5± – 14.⪄xg7 ⪄xg2+ 15.⪄xg2 ⪄h3+ 16.⪄h1 ⪄g4 17.⪄g1 1-0 Horacio – Rabovszky, Email 1998; 14...⪄xg7 15.g3!, followed by h3 and Black’s rook on g4 gets trapped.) 9.⪄d3 (White can counter the immediate 9...⪄f6 with: 10.⪄e2+ ⪄e6? 11.⪄xf6+ ⪄xf6 12. d5 and he wins a piece; 10...⪄xf8 11.⪄xf8 ⪄xf8 12.⪄g5 ⪄e6 13.⪄e3±) 9...0-0 10.0-0 (The move 10.⪄xe4 leads to rather unclear consequences: 10...⪄e8 11.⪄c3 f5 12.⪄g5 ⪄d7 13.0-0 fxe4 14.⪄d2 ⪄f5∞ Gelfand – De La Villa, Pamplona 2000.) 10...⪄f6 11.⪄g5 c6 (After 11...h6? Black fails to get rid of the pin: 12.⪄xf6+ ⪄xf6 13.⪄xh6+–) 12.⪄xf6+ ⪄xf6 13.⪄d2! It is essential for White to trade the dark-squared bishops and to weaken the shelter of the black king. 13...⪄xg5 14.⪄xg5
\[ \text{Page 6} \]

15.\( \text{eae1} \) \( \text{f5} \) (The careless move 15...\( \text{xd4} \), loses after: 16. \( \text{xh7} \) \( \text{d8} \) 17.\( \text{g5!} \); 16...\( \text{xh7} \) 17.\( \text{xg6+} \) 16.\( \text{xf5} \) \( \text{gxf5} \) 17.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{d7} \) 18.\( \text{e3} \) \( \text{fe8} \) 19.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{h8} \) 20. \( \text{xd6!} \) 1-0 Djuric – Schaefer, Arco 2000.

6.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xe5} \) 7.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{g7} \) 8. \( \text{g5} \)

It is important for White to provoke the weakening move f7-f6.

8...\( \text{f6} \) 9.\( \text{e3} \) 0-0

After 9...d5 10.\( \text{c3} \) dxc4 11. \( \text{xc4} \), Black cannot castle, because of the move f7-f6.

Now, White has plenty of attractive moves. The simplest for him is:

10.\( \text{c3} \)

10...\( \text{f5}! \)

The other possibilities for Black are clearly worse:

10...\( \text{c6} \) 11.d5 \( \text{e7} \) (After the centralizing move – 11...\( \text{e5} \), White can follow with 12.d6! isolating Black’s bishop and gaining access to the d5-outpost.) 12.\( \text{d3} \) d6 13.0-0 \( \text{f5} \) 14.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{h6} \) 15.\( \text{c1} \) f5 16.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{f7} \). Black has finally managed to redeploy his knight from e7, where it had no useful moves at all, to a more respectable place – the f7-square. Still, White finds a way to create problems for it there too. 17.\( \text{e3!} \) \( \text{d7} \) 18.\( \text{f4} \) (depriving the enemy knight of the e5-square) 18...\( \text{e8} \) 19.\( \text{f2} \) a6 20.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{f6} \) 21.b3 b6 22.\( \text{d4} \) – and White has a stable positional advantage thanks to his dominance in the centre. For example: 22...\( \text{h6} \) 23.\( \text{b1} \) \( \text{f8} \) 24.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{h8} \) 25.h3 \( \text{e6} \) 26.\( \text{d4} \) \( \text{d8} \) 27.\( \text{c3} \)\( \text{+} \) Timman – Aronian, Las Vegas 1999;

10...d6 11.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{e8} \) – That move has not been tested in practice yet. (After 11...\( \text{d7} \) 12.\( \text{g2} \) \( \text{c8} \), Black plans to trade the light-squared bishops and to follow that with f6-f5. 13.\( \text{d5} \)!. That move forces Black’s queen to protect the c7-pawn. 13...\( \text{c6} \) 14.0-0 \( \text{f7} \) 15.\( \text{c1} \) \( \text{e7} \) 16.\( \text{xe7}+ \) \( \text{xe7} \) 17.\( \text{wb3} \) c6 18. \( \text{f4} \) \( \text{h3} \) 19.\( \text{xd6} \) and White captures his opponent’s d6-pawn and wins, Keene – Miles, Hastings 1974; 11...\( \text{c6} \) 12.\( \text{g2} \) f5 13.\( \text{e2}+ \) and White had an overwhelming advantage in the game Prusikin – Grabarska, Bad Wiessee 2001.) 12.\( \text{g2} \) \( \text{h6} \) 13.0-0! Naturally, White should not be afraid to sacrifice pawns like that. 13...\( \text{xe3} \) 14.\( \text{fx3} \) \( \text{xe3} \) 15.\( \text{wd2} \) \( \text{e8} \) 16.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{d7} \) (or 16...f5 17.\( \text{eae1} \) 17.\( \text{ae1} \) – and White’s lead in development is decisive. For example: 17...\( \text{xe1} \) 18.\( \text{xe1} \) \( \text{f7} \) 19.\( \text{xc7} \) \( \text{xc7} \) 20.\( \text{d5}+ \) \( \text{f8} \) 21.\( \text{e6} \) \( \text{g7} \) 22.\( \text{e7}+ \) \( \text{h6} \) 23.\( \text{f4} \) g5 24.\( \text{xf6}+ \) and White’s attack is crushing.)
11.\(\text{Wd2 Cc6}\)

White maintains a great advantage after: 11...d6 12.\(\text{Ke2 Cc6}\) 13.d5 \(\text{Ke5}\) 14.\(\text{h3 Wc7}\) 15.0-0 a5 16.\(\text{Aae1 Wh7}\) 17.f4± Buss – Widmer, Zug 2003.

12.\(\text{Dd5}\)

That new move has not been tested in practice yet.

It is of course possible for him to try the simple line: 12.d5 \(\text{Ke5}\) 13.\(\text{Ke2}\) d6 14.\(\text{h3}\), transposing to the variation with 11...d6. The position is quite unclear after: 12.g3 d6 13.\(\text{Kg2 f4!}\)++ I.Ibragimov – Odeev, Dubai 2000.

12...d6

Now, White has an interesting active line at his disposal: 13.\(\text{h4!}\)

Generally speaking, White’s idea is the following: he wishes to open the h-file for his rook and to checkmate on h7, or on h8. There might follow: 13...\(\text{Ke6}\) 14.\(\text{h5 Wd7}\) 15.\(\text{hxg6 hxg6}\) 16.\(\text{Af4 f7}\) 17.d5 \(\text{Ke5}\) 18.0-0-0. White is dominant in the centre and he has the open h-file, so in case of: 18...\(\text{c5}\) (Black is trying not to let his opponent’s bishop to the d4-square.) White can continue with:

19.\(\text{dxc6 Wxc6}\) 20.\(\text{Wxd6 Efc8}\)

(or 20...\(\text{Wd4}\) 21.\(\text{Wd5}\)±) 21.\(\text{Wxc6}\) \(\text{Exc6}\) 22.\(\text{b3 Ag4}\) (or 22...b5 23.\(\text{c5}\)±) 23.\(\text{Ke2 Axe3}\) 24.\(\text{fxe3 Re8}\) 25.\(\text{Af3 Aa6}\) 26.\(\text{Ab1 g5}\) 27.\(\text{Ah5}\)±.

b) 4...\(\text{c5}\)

5.\(\text{d4 Wa5}\)

About 5...\(\text{cxd4}\) 6.\(\text{Dxd4}\) – the Maroczy system (see Book 3).

About 5...d6 6.\(\text{dxc5}\) – see 4...d6 5.\(\text{d4}\) c5 6.\(\text{dxc5}\); as for 5...\(\text{Dxa6}\) 6.\(\text{Ke2}\) c5 – see 4...d6 5.\(\text{d4}\) \(\text{Dxa6}\) 6.\(\text{Ke2}\) c5.

The line 5...0-0 6.\(\text{Ke2}\), does not lead to original positions, because if Black plays later d7-d6, then the game transposes to a scheme that we have analyzed in Chapter 12 (4...d6 5.\(\text{d4}\) 0-0 6.\(\text{Ke2}\) c5), while if he exchanges soon on d4 (\(\text{cxd4}\)), then there arises the Maroczy system (see Book 3).

6.\(\text{Dd2 cxd4}\)

6...d6 7.\(\text{d5!}\)? White closes the position. Now, Black will have to retreat his queen from a5 to d8 (or to c7) and White will practically have an extra tempo in the major-
ity of the positions. For example: 7...g4 8.e2 0–0 9.0–0 a6 10.a4 c7 11.h3 xf3 12.xf3+ Larsson – Welin, Sweden 2004.

After 6...c6?! we can recommend: 7.e5! g8 (It is too bad for Black to play: 7...g4 8.h3 h6 9.dxc5 0–0 10.d5 d8 11.\(e2=\); 9...xc5?? 10.a4+– and his queen is trapped.) 8.d5 d8 9.dxc5 e5 (The move 9...e6 – regains the pawn for Black, but it compromises the dark-squares. 10.c3 g7 11.e4 0–0 12.c3=; 10.xe5 11.e4 e7 12.c3= 10.c6 d6 (or 10...xf3 11.xf3 f6 12.xf6 exf6 13.e3=) 11.cxd6 xd6 (or 11...exd6 12.c5 ex5 dxe5 13.e2=) 12.c5! b8 (or 12...xf3 13.xf3 xc3 14.xc3 xd5 15.xh8 f8 16.d1 e4 17.e2 e6 18.c3 f6 19.f3=) 13.b5 f8 14.0–0= and White had an overwhelming advantage in the game Zaiichik – Va.Kozlov, Lviv 1975.

7.xd4

7...0–0

About 7...c6 8.c2 0–0 – see 7...0–0.

Black plays only very seldom the line: 7...e5 8.f3 c7 9.e2 d6 10.0–0 f4 11.b5 d7 12.e5 e4 13.exd6 xd6 14.cxd6 xd6, Lav. Smith – Hart, Gold Coast 1996, because White can obtain the edge with: 15.c5 c7 16.a4 d7 17.a3 c6 18.c3=.

After: 7...b6 8.b3 c6 9.e3 d8, White can play 10.d4, transposing to the Maroczy system (see Book 3), as well as 10.e2 0–0 11.0–0 d6 12.f3= preserving the possibility to go back with his knight to d4, depending on circumstances.

8.e2 c6

Naturally, it is not good for Black to play: 8...xe4 9.xe4 e5, due to 10.b5.

9.c2 d6


10.0–0 d8

Black has tried some other moves in practice too: 10.e6 11.d5 d8 12.f3, Ovchinnikova – Lialin, Perm 1998, 12.c8 13.b3 d7 14.c1=; 10.d7 11.b4 d8 12.h1! (White plans to push his f-pawn, so he removes his king to safety against possible checks.) 12.c8 13.f4 a6 14.b1 e8 15.d3 d4 16.cxd4 xd4 17.a4 b6 18.d5 c6 19.f5= and White has occupied additional space and he might organize an attack against Black's king in the future, Peralta – Eingorn, France 2001; 10...a6,
Charpentier – Jimenez, Antiguo 1999, Black cannot push b7-b5, while his queen is on a5, so White can patiently prepare the advance of his f-pawn. 11...h1?±.

11...e3 a5

After: 11...d7 12.d2 c5 13.f3 a5, Timoscenko – Mikac, Nova Gorica 2000, it would have been the best for White to play 14.b3, without clarifying which rook he intends to deploy on d1 and that would make Black's plan with f7-f5 less effective. 14...e6 15.ad1±.


Conclusion

Black's attempt to avoid the classical variations of the King's Indian Defence, by playing the move 4...e5, leads to positions with a space advantage for White. In some lines he can even evacuate his king to the queenside and he can start an attack on the kingside by exchanging the h-pawns.

After 4...c5, White can keep his centre, inviting his opponent to transpose to the Maroczy system and he parries Black's attempts to enter the Benoni Defence under favourable circumstances. It is then essential for White to know when to close the centre with the help of d4-d5. He obtains a comfortable advantage in all variations, which we have analyzed.
White has succeeded in occupying the centre. He controls the d5-square with two pawns and a knight. Black however, has a system, which allows him to avoid the standard schemes of the King’s Indian Defence and to strike at White’s most fortified square – the d5-outpost.

5...c6!?  
That move is also a sheer provocation – since it entices White to make the natural move e4-e5. I would like to elaborate on that a bit. The King’s Indian players with Black often try to avoid the main theoretical lines in order to take their opponents into terra incognita. This strange line, for example, you can often see in the games of GM Lev Gutman. He usually plays the Grunfeld Defence with Black, but it turns out that you can obtain similar positions even in the classical variation of the King’s Indian Defence!

6...e2  
We will analyze neither the move 6...d3, because of d7-d6 and White’s bishop is not on the “classical” e2-square, nor the “aggressive” move 6.e5, because after 6...dxe5, Black destroys White’s centre with d7-d6 and you can trust us – nobody has ever proved White’s edge in that position.

6...d5  
The move 6...d6 transposes to the usual King’s Indian positions (see Chapter 11).

7.e5 dxe5  
I will also mention that it is very bad for Black to play: 7...d6? 8.cxd5 cxd5 9.exd5, because he simply remains a pawn down – Wunder, Bad Wiessee 2002, as well as: 7...dxe5 8.h3 d6 9.f4 f6 10.exf6 exf6 11.cxd5 cxd5 12.b3± Neidhardt – Bletz, Bad Neustadt 1988.

The retreat 7...dxe5 seems a bit strange after the brave sequence
c6 and d5; nevertheless it has been played quite often. Black's knight goes to e6 in a bit round-about way and if he manages to trade his light-squared bishop he will have chances to solve his opening problems. 8.cxd5 (White can also try the calmer line: 8.0-0 dxc4 9.âxc4 âc7 10.âb3 with the idea to counter 10...âd7 with: 11.âg5 e6. Here, in the game Koerholz – Golubovic, Budapest 1995, the opponents agreed to a draw, but it deserved attention for White to try 12.âe3!±) 8...cxd5 9.h4 âc7 (The move 9...h5 prevents White's direct kingside attack, but now Black has great problems to prepare the thematic break f7-f6, because of the weakness on g6. 10.âe3 âc6, Szerebenyi – Nanu, Szeged 1998 and here: 11.0-0 âc7 12.âc1± White is better thanks to his space-advantage.) 10.h5 âc6 11.âe3 f6 12.hxg6 hxg6 13.âd3 fxe5 14.âxg6 âf5 15.âxf5 âxf5 16.âxe5 âxe5 17.dxe5 âxe5 18.âd3 âe6 19.0-0-0± – Black's king is rather exposed and White has a clear advantage, Werner – Appel, Germany 1990.

8...âxc3

In case of 8...f6, Black tries to undermine White's centre immediately, but he weakens the a2-g8 diagonal. 9.âb3 âh8 10.âe3 âxc3 11.bxc3 dxc4 12.âxc4 âd7 and here he should better try 13.d5!± – that is an interesting positional decision, because White wishes to create targets for attack in Black's position in order to exploit his lead in development. (Now, instead of the line, which was played in the game: 13.âad1 âb6 14.âe2 âd5 15.c4 âxe3 16.âxe3 âb6∞ with a lively piece play, Seredenko – Douven, Almatalat 1989, it deserved attention for White to follow with: 13.âe6 âb6 14.âxc8 âxc8 15.c4±) 13...âb6 (or 13...âxe5 14.âxe5 âxe5 15.dxc6 bxc6 16.âad1 âe8 17.âe6±; 13...xd5 14.âxd5 âxe5 15.âxe5 âxe5 16.âfd1 âc7 17.âab1±) 14.dxc6 âxc6 15.âxc6 bxc6 16.âxc6± and White remained with a solid extra pawn.

8...âf5 Black intends to fortify his knight on e4 with that move and he also develops his light-squared bishop. 9.âf4!± – White has not tested that move in practice yet. (After the habitual line:. 9.âb3 âb6 10.cxd5 âxb3 11.axb3 âxc3 12.bxc3 cxd5± there arises an endgame with certain counter-chances for Black.) 9...âxc3 (9...âb6?! That is a typical move – White's bishop has abandoned the c1-square, so Black should attack the b2-pawn! Sill, the thor-
ough analysis proves that move to be not so good for Black. 10.cxd5 and here for example: 10...\(\text{\textit{exb2}}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{a4}}\) \(\text{\textit{b4}}\) – 11...\(\text{\textit{a3}}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{b3}}\) see 11...\(\text{\textit{b4}}\) – 12.\(\text{\textit{b3}}\)! \(\text{\textit{exb3}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{axb3}}\) \(\text{\textit{cxd5}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{b6}}\) and Black loses the exchange; 12...a5 13.\(\text{\textit{fxb1}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{c5}}\) \(\text{\textit{exb3}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{axb3}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc5}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{xc5}}\) \(\text{\textit{cxd5}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{b5}}\); 15...\(\text{\textit{e8}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{dxc6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc6}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{e3}}\); or 10...\(\text{\textit{xc3}}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{bxc3}}\) \(\text{\textit{cxd5}}\) 12.c4 \(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) and White is clearly better in that position, because Black fails to attack White’s centre. After 13...\(\text{\textit{c6}}\) 14.d5 \(\text{\textit{a5}}\), White plays 15.\(\text{\textit{d3!}}\) 10.\(\text{\textit{bxc3}}\) \(\text{\textit{d7}}\) (or 10...c5 11.\(\text{\textit{b3}}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{axd3}}\) and White is dominant in the centre and he has the semi-open b-file for his rooks.

8...\(\text{\textit{g4}}\) – The exchange of that bishop on f3 does not solve Black’s problems at all. 9.h3 \(\text{\textit{xf3}}\) 10.\(\text{\textit{xf3}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc3}}\) 11.\(\text{\textit{bxc3}}\) \(\text{\textit{dxc4}}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{e2}}\). Here, in the game: Zajogin – Poley, Minsk 1994, the opponents agreed to a draw, but White had a clear advantage, thanks to his bishop pair and dominance in the centre: 12...\(\text{\textit{d7}}\) (Or 12...b5 – 13.a4!±) 13.\(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) and White would regain his pawn maintaining a considerable advantage.

8...\(\text{\textit{a6}}\) Black wishes to redeploy his knight to c7. 9.\(\text{\textit{e3}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc3}}\) 10.bxc3 \(\text{\textit{c7}}\) and now White could have obtained a slight edge with: 11.\(\text{\textit{b3}}\) b6 12.cxd5 \(\text{\textit{cxd5}}\) 13.a4±.

9.\(\text{\textit{bxc3}}\) \(\text{\textit{dxc4}}\) 10.\(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) c5

Black frees the c6-square for his knight.

11.\(\text{\textit{xf4}}\)

White has also tried here 11.h3 in order to prevent \(\text{\textit{g4}}\). Still, the latest games in that line prove that Black has no problems at all. His light-squared bishop manages to occupy the d5-outpost. 11...\(\text{\textit{c6}}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{xe1}}\) \(\text{\textit{cxd4}}\) 13.\(\text{\textit{cxd4}}\) \(\text{\textit{a5}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\) \(\text{\textit{e6}}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{d4}}\) \(\text{\textit{d5}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{e2}}\) \(\text{\textit{c8}}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{b1}}\) b6 18.\(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{b5}}\) \(\text{\textit{c4}}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xc4}}\) 21.d5 \(\text{\textit{f8}}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{g5}}\) a6 23.\(\text{\textit{bb1}}\) \(\text{\textit{xd5}}\) 24.\(\text{\textit{xe7}}\) \(\text{\textit{xe5}}\) (Black can even try to play for a win with the line: 24...\(\text{\textit{xa5}}\) 25.\(\text{\textit{e2}}\) \(\text{\textit{e8}}\) 26.\(\text{\textit{h4}}\) \(\text{\textit{xe5}}\) 27.\(\text{\textit{xe5}}\) \(\text{\textit{xe5}}\) 28.\(\text{\textit{d2}}\) \(\text{\textit{e6}}\) 29.\(\text{\textit{d8}}\) \(\text{\textit{c3\#}}\)) 25.\(\text{\textit{xb6}}\) \(\text{\textit{xf3+}}\) 26.\(\text{\textit{gxf3}}\) a5= Ibraiev – Mamedyarov, Khanty-Mansyisk 2005.

11...\(\text{\textit{xd4}}\) 12.\(\text{\textit{cxd4}}\) \(\text{\textit{g4}}\)

Or 12...\(\text{\textit{c6}}\) 13.d5 \(\text{\textit{a5}}\) 14.\(\text{\textit{e2}}\)±

13.d5!?

That move is interesting and logical too. Until GM Dreev’s game, in which the move d5 was tried, White players did not believe in the possibility to hold the centre after e5 and d5 and they kept their d4-pawn on its place. They paid for that with giving up the d5-outpost to Black. See some examples how White treated
that position prior to that game:
13...e2 d6 14.b1 b6 15.h3 e6 16.a4 d5 17.b1 d7 18.b5 f8 19.a6 d8 20.b5, Eriks-
son – Lind, Helsingborg 1991 and here to say the least Black could have offered a draw with
the move 20...d8!=; while after: 13.h3 xf3 14.xf3, he could have captured bravely the pawn:
14...xd4! 15.d5 d7 16.e6 fxe6 17.ad1 e5! (That was the move Black's position was holding on...)

\[ 13...d7 14.e1 c8 \]

15.c1!? 
That is a new move. The situation is quite complex. Black has plenty of possibilities to attack
White's central pawns.

Alexey Dreev played in that game 15.b3 and there followed 15...f6?! – Black was trying to im-
mEDIATELY destroy White's centre. That move proved to be bad, however...: 16.exf6 xf6 17.h6 xf3
(Or 17...e8 18.d6+ h8 19.f7=; 18...e6 19.c1 and Black's position is hopeless; winning the exchange
on a1 is not good for him, because he pays too dear a price for that:
17...xa1 18.a1 f6 19.d6+ e6 20.h3 f5 and White wins here
with a simple, but quite attractive tactical strike – 21.xe6.)
18.xf3 a1 19.d6+ e6 (After: 19...h8 20.xf8 edx6 21.xd6 White has a great advantage in
a technical position.) 20.xe6+ h8 21.xf8 xf8 22.xf8+ xf8 23.f1 c5 24.g4 d8, Dreev –
Charbonneau, Khanty-Mansi-
isk 2005 and here White's best
move is 25.d1!, for example:
25...e4 (After: 25...g7 26.f3
f6 27.f2 e5 28.e3+ Black
cannot capture the pawn, because
of f3-f4+.) 26.d7 g7 (or 26...h5
27.c1 d6 28.c8+) 27.c1 f7
28.c7 h5 29.f3 g5 (Or 29...d6
30.h3 and later White central-
izes his king and he evidently wins.)
30.h4=.

After 15.b3, Black obtains a
quite sufficient counterplay with
the move 15...c5!, there might follow: 16.h3 f5! 17.c4 e6!.
That attempt at equalizing leads
to a slightly worse, but still quite
defensible endgame. (The other possibilities for Black are not so
forced and they all end up with
an edge for White. For example:
17...a5 18.d4 e4 19.b3 b4
20.c1 xb3 21.axb3 f5 22.d6+
and he remains with a danger-
ous passed-pawn; 20...b5 21.
xc5 xc5 22.a3 a5 23.b3 xc1
24.xc1; 22...xa3 23.ex4 bxc4
24.ex4 f8 25.xc5 xc5 26.
b1=; or 17...a6 18.d4 e4 19.
\(\text{Db3 } \text{Ef5} 20.\text{Wd4} - \text{White holds his centre firmly and he is better; } \text{18...Wd7 } 19.\text{Ec1 Wf8} - \text{or } 19...\text{b5} - 20.\text{e2! } - 20.\text{Wf3! White is threatening e5-e6. } 20...\text{b5} 21.\text{e6 Wf8?? } 22.\text{xf5 gxf5} 23.\text{exf7+ Wxf7} 24.\text{Wxh7+; } 21...\text{fxe6} 22.\text{xf5} \text{gxf5} 23.\text{dxe6 Wd4} 24.\text{Wd1 e4} 25.\text{Wxd8+ Wxd8} 26.\text{xb5+}; 23... \text{Wc6} 24.\text{Wxc6 Wxc6} 25.\text{Wb3 Wc8} 26.\text{Wc2 and the endgame is quite favourable for White, because of his} \text{his couple of bishops.) } 18.\text{dxe6 Wxc4} 19.\text{exf7 Wxf7} 20.\text{Wb3 Wd3} 21...\text{e3! Wxb3} 22.\text{axb3 Wb4} 23.\text{axb7 Wxb2} 24.\text{d4 Wb5} 25.\text{e6 Wg8} 26.\text{xf5 gxf5} 27.\text{Wd1 Wf3} 28.\text{Wg5! That is a smart move, creating concrete problems for Black. (After } 28.\text{Wc5, Black holds: } 28...\text{e8} 29.\text{Wf5 } \text{Wc7!} 28...\text{b5 (All other possibilities are clearly worse for him; } 28...\text{f4} 29.\text{Wxe5 Wxe3} 30.\text{Wxe3 Wxf2} 31.\text{Wd7 Wf1} 32.\text{Wg2 Wf8} 33.\text{Wb7+ White maintains good winning chances with four rooks present on the board; } 28...\text{c7} 29.\text{Wad5 h5} 30.\text{c5 Wb6} 31.\text{Wxe7 Wf8} 32.\text{Wc7}; 28...\text{d6} 29.g4 b5 30.gxf5+; 29...\text{Wb4} 30.\text{Wb6} 31.\text{Wc7} 32.\text{gxf5 Wf4} 33.\text{Wc8} 34.\text{Wc5 Wxb2} 35.\text{Wd4+; } 29...\text{h5} 30.\text{xf5 Wxf5} 31.\text{gxf5+} 29.\text{Wc5 Wf8} 30.\text{Wc8} 31.\text{Wc7 Wf6} 31.\text{Wff7 Wf6} 32.\text{Wf2 b4} 33.\text{Wxe7 Wf5} 34.g3 b3 35.\text{Wd6 Wf6} 36.Wf7 b2 (36...\text{Wd4?}) 37.\text{Wf6 Wb8} 38.\text{Wb1 Wf1} 39.\text{Wb1 Wc8} 40.\text{Wc4} 41.\text{Wd1 Wc8} 42.\text{Wc1 Wb8+}. \text{We believe - the readers who played over that last variation to the end de-}
\text{serve a special prize for their patience. Still, in contemporary} \text{chess, the choice between the different lines often depends on the evaluation of the arising end-}
\text{games. You should not try to memorize such long variations; nevertheless it is quite useful to} \text{know how to treat similar complex positions.}
\text{15.}\text{Wa5}

\text{White is better after Black's other possibilities:}
\text{15...Wxf3?} 16.\text{gxf3 Ec5 17.}\text{Ab3+;}
\text{15...Wb6?! That is not the best square for Black's knight. } 16.\text{Ab3} \text{Wd7 (or } 16...\text{Ec1 17.}\text{Ec1 Ad7} 18.\text{Ab2 (18.}\text{Af4!?) 18...\text{Ac5 19.}\text{d4 Wc8 20.}\text{g5+} 17.\text{d4+;}
\text{15...a6?! 16.}\text{Wd2 White would not let his opponent's queen come to a5. } 16.\text{Wxf3 17.gxf3} 18.\text{Ab3 Ec5 19.d6 and his passed-}
\text{pawn is very dangerous. } 19.\text{Wxb3 20.axb3 Wd7 21.Wg2 h5 (or } 21...\text{Wd6 22.exd6 Ec1 23.Ec1 Ec6 24.Ec7 Wf5 25.d7 (25.}\text{Ec3} \text{Ec5 26.Wb7+} 25...\text{Wd8 26.Wb7+} 22.\text{g5 e6 23.f4 Wf8 24.Ed1+;}
\text{16.h3}

\text{White can try to avoid complications with the move } 16.\text{Wd2}!, \text{with the idea to reach a slightly better endgame after: } 16.\text{Wxd2 (It would not work for Black to play: } 16...\text{Ec5!} 17.\text{Exa5 Exa5, due to: } 18.\text{d2! Ec5 19.}\text{b4 Ec8 (or } 19...\text{Ec4 20.Ec4Ef3 21.gxf3 Ec5 22.Wc3+--) 20.}\text{Wxe7 Wf8 21.d6 Wxf3 22.e6+--) 17.}\text{Wxd2}
White’s position is superior too after: 18...\textit{\texttt{a}a3} 19.\textit{\texttt{e}e3} \textit{\texttt{c}c5} 20.\textit{\texttt{d}d6} exd6 (or 20...\textit{\texttt{x}xe5} 21.dxe7 \textit{\texttt{x}xe7} 22.f4 \textit{\texttt{h}h4} 23.\textit{\texttt{b}b5} \textit{\texttt{x}xf4} 24.\textit{\texttt{x}xd7} \textit{\texttt{h}h2+} 25.\textit{\texttt{f}f1} \textit{\texttt{c}cd8} 26.\textit{\texttt{b}b4±}) 21.\textit{\texttt{x}xf7±}.

19.\textit{\texttt{f}f4} f6 20.e6 \textit{\texttt{b}b6} 21.\textit{\texttt{b}b3} f5

Black must play actively; otherwise after 21...\textit{\texttt{d}d6}, White closes his opponent’s bishop with: 22.f5! \textit{\texttt{d}d5} 23.\textit{\texttt{x}xc8} \textit{\texttt{xc8}} 24.\textit{\texttt{e}e1} \textit{\texttt{d}d8} 25.\textit{\texttt{x}xg6} hxg6 26.\textit{\texttt{g}g4} \textit{\texttt{c}c3} 27.\textit{\texttt{x}xg6} \textit{\texttt{d}d3} 28.\textit{\texttt{x}xd3} \textit{\texttt{c}c3} 29.\textit{\texttt{e}e3} \textit{\texttt{xe}e3} 30.\textit{\texttt{x}xe3} b6 31.h4±.

17...\textit{\texttt{h}h8}

Black fails to equalize after his other possibilities either:

17...\textit{\texttt{f}f8} 18.e6!? fxe6 19.d6 \textit{\texttt{e}e8} 20.\textit{\texttt{e}e2} \textit{\texttt{x}xc4} 21.\textit{\texttt{x}xc4} exd6 22.\textit{\texttt{c}c7} \textit{\texttt{x}xc7} 23.\textit{\texttt{x}xc7}±;

17.\textit{\texttt{b}b6} 18.\textit{\texttt{d}d2} \textit{\texttt{a}a3} 19.\textit{\texttt{b}b3} \textit{\texttt{c}c5} 20.f4 \textit{\texttt{x}xd5} 21.\textit{\texttt{f}f3} \textit{\texttt{x}xc1} 22.\textit{\texttt{x}xc1} e6 23.\textit{\texttt{x}xd5} \textit{\texttt{b}b2} 24.\textit{\texttt{e}e3} exd5 25.\textit{\texttt{x}xd5} b6 26.\textit{\texttt{c}c7} a5 27.\textit{\texttt{g}g2}±;

17...b5 18.\textit{\texttt{b}b3} \textit{\texttt{x}xc1} (or 18...\textit{\texttt{c}c5} 19.d6 exd6 20.exd6 \textit{\texttt{d}d8} 21.\textit{\texttt{d}d5} \textit{\texttt{e}e6} 22.\textit{\texttt{e}e8} \textit{\texttt{x}xc8} 23.\textit{\texttt{d}d7} \textit{\texttt{d}d8} 24.\textit{\texttt{d}d6} \textit{\texttt{x}xd7} 25.\textit{\texttt{x}xf8} \textit{\texttt{xd}d} 26.\textit{\texttt{x}xd5} \textit{\texttt{x}xf8} 27.\textit{\texttt{e}e7}±) 19.\textit{\texttt{c}c1} \textit{\texttt{c}c5} 20.\textit{\texttt{e}e1} \textit{\texttt{b}b4} 21.d6 exd6 22.\textit{\texttt{d}d4} (or 22...\textit{\texttt{c}c7} 23.\textit{\texttt{g}g2}±; 22...\textit{\texttt{x}xb3} 23.axb3 \textit{\texttt{d}d8} 24.\textit{\texttt{d}d4} \textit{\texttt{d}d4} 25.\textit{\texttt{e}e1} \textit{\texttt{x}xf2+} 26.\textit{\texttt{x}xf2} \textit{\texttt{d}d4+} 27.\textit{\texttt{x}xe3} \textit{\texttt{x}xd7} 28.\textit{\texttt{e}e7}--+) 23.\textit{\texttt{g}g2} \textit{\texttt{x}xb3} 24.axb3 \textit{\texttt{d}d8} 25.\textit{\texttt{d}d7}±.

18.\textit{\texttt{d}d2} \textit{\texttt{d}d8}

22.\textit{\texttt{b}b4}! \textit{\texttt{x}xc1} 23.\textit{\texttt{x}xc1} \textit{\texttt{xd}d5} 24.\textit{\texttt{d}d5} \textit{\texttt{xd}d5} 25.\textit{\texttt{c}c7}. White has lost his d5-pawn indeed, but he still has a great advantage. Black cannot protect reliably his e7-square and White’s e6-pawn is tremendously dangerous, because it might soon be promoted! There might follow: 25...\textit{\texttt{b}b2} 26.\textit{\texttt{e}e7} \textit{\texttt{b}b3} 27.\textit{\texttt{c}c3} \textit{\texttt{d}d1}+ 28.\textit{\texttt{c}c1}± - and White’s edge is overwhelming, because Black would hardly manage to cope with his opponent’s passed e6-pawn.
Chapter 9

Conclusion

The system with c6 and d5 for Black is a quite rare guest in tournament practice; still it requires thorough knowledge from White. The arising fight in the centre resembles a bit the Gruenfeld Defence. White manages to obtain a far-advanced passed d-pawn in some lines, or he opens the shelter of his opponent's king with the move e5-e6. Black succeeds in maintaining the equality in plenty of variations by organizing an active counterplay. Still, if in the Gutman variation White holds his centre, he usually keeps his advantage. The majority of the variations, which we have analyzed, have not been even played yet, so they require practical testing.
Chapter 10  

1.\textit{f}3 \textit{f}6 2.\textit{c}4 \textit{g}6 3.\textit{c}3 \textit{g}7 4.\textit{e}4 \textit{d}6 5.\textit{d}4

Black's main line here is of course 5...0-0, but we will also analyze the moves: a) 5...\textit{bd}7, b) 5...\textit{c}6 and c) 5...\textit{g}4.

Naturally, Black can try some other lines as well, but they are either transposing to other variations, or they are just too dubious:

5...\textit{c}6 6.\textit{d}5 \textit{b}8 (About 6...\textit{e}5 7.\textit{x}e5 \textit{d}xe5 8.\textit{e}2 0-0 – see 5...0-0 6.\textit{e}2 \textit{c}6.) 7.\textit{e}2 and Black will have to play sooner or later 0-0, so there will arise the line: 5...0-0 6.\textit{e}2 \textit{c}6 7.\textit{d}5;

5...\textit{a}6 6.\textit{e}2 \textit{c}5 (About 6...0-0 7.0-0 – see 5...0-0.) 7.0-0 0-0 (Black's other possibility here – 7...\textit{xd}4, leads to the Maroczy system. 8.\textit{xd}4 – see Book 3.) 8.\textit{e}1 – see 6...0-0 7.\textit{e}2 \textit{a}6 8.\textit{e}1;

5...\textit{f}d7?! – this idea is highly questionable, because Black lags immediately in development. 6.\textit{e}2 \textit{e}5, T.Minasjan – Lotz, Bad Wiessee 1999 (About the line – 6...0-0 7.0-0 – see 5...0-0.), and here the most energetic reaction for White seems to be – 7.\textit{g}5! \textit{f}6 (Black's pieces look completely disordinated in the variation: 7...\textit{f}6 8.\textit{e}3 0-0 9.\textit{h}4±) 8.\textit{e}3 0-0 9.\textit{wd}2± Blacks position is solid indeed, but he can hardly complete his development;

5...\textit{e}5?! – this move is too dubious. Black not only loses a pawn, but his king remains in the centre and it will hamper the development and the coordination of his pieces. 6.\textit{d}xe5 \textit{d}xe5 (Or 6...\textit{g}4 7.\textit{g}5 \textit{wd}7 8.\textit{xd}6 0-0, Baulés – Herrera, Panama 1999 and here White's most direct road to victory is to simplify the position with: 9.\textit{h}3 \textit{e}5 10.\textit{xe}5 \textit{xe}5 11.\textit{d}5+-; 7...\textit{f}6 8.\textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}6 9.\textit{xf}6 \textit{xf}6 10.\textit{e}2+- T.Schmidt – Wiesinger, corr. 1995.) 7.\textit{xd}8+ \textit{xd}8 8.\textit{d}xe5 \textit{d}xe4 (It is also bad for Black to follow with: 8...\textit{e}7 9.\textit{g}5 \textit{h}6? 10.\textit{d}5+ 1-0 Deidun –
Liew, corr. 2002; it is only a little better for Black to defend with: 9...c6 10.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e8 11.0-0-0 \(\mathcal{Q}\)f8 12.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)bd7 13.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f4+ - Kobylin - Blot, Slovakia 1992; he has no compensation for the pawn after: 8...\(\mathcal{A}\)e6 9.\(\mathcal{A}\)e2 \(\mathcal{A}\)xe4 10.\(\mathcal{A}\)xf7+ \(\mathcal{A}\)xf7 11.\(\mathcal{A}\)xe4+- Cohen - Loop, Concord 1995.) 9.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xe5 10.\(\mathcal{Q}\)g5+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)e8 11.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f6+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)f8 12.\(\mathcal{Q}\)h6+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)e7 13.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e8, Spraggett - Vives, Malgrat del Mar 1991 (Black loses immediately after: 13...\(\mathcal{Q}\)d8 14.\(\mathcal{Q}\)g5+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)e8 15.f4 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xb2 16.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d1 f6 17.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xc7+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)f7 18.\(\mathcal{Q}\)h4+- Cordts - Pruess, Germany 1991.) and here White's most convincing line seems to be: 14.f4 c6 (14...\(\mathcal{Q}\)xb2 15.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b1+-) 15.fxe5 cxd5 16. cxd5+-;

The move 5...c5, before castling, looks also quite suspicious, because of: 6.dxc5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)a5 (The endgame is very difficult for Black in case of: 6...dxc5 7.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd8+ \(\mathcal{Q}\)xd8 8.\(\mathcal{Q}\)g5!, for example: 8...\(\mathcal{Q}\)e8 9.f4 h6 10.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f3 a6?! 11.e5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)fd7 12.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3+ A.Rodionov - Voropai, Kiev 2002; or 8...\(\mathcal{Q}\)f8, Thalmann - Reschke, Ruhrgebiet 1999, 9.f4 h6 10.\(\mathcal{Q}\)f3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)g4 11.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e6 12.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3+-; 10...\(\mathcal{Q}\)c6 11.e5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)d7 12.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3+; 11...\(\mathcal{Q}\)h5 12.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3 b6 13.0-0-0± and White enjoys a huge space advantage and better piece coordination is all the variations.) 7.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d2 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xc5 (In answer to 7...dxc5, C.Gonzales - Malmstroem, Internet 2002, it seems logical for White to continue with 8.e5! and there might arise the following eventual developments: 8...\(\mathcal{Q}\)g4 9.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)b4 10.f4±; 8...\(\mathcal{Q}\)fd7 9.f4 0-0 10.h4+ h5?! 11.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b3, with the idea for White to start attacking with g4! either immediately or after \(\mathcal{Q}\)d5 beforehand.) 8.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e2 0-0 9.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)c7 10.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e6 11.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c1 a6 (In case of: 11...\(\mathcal{Q}\)xc4 12.\(\mathcal{Q}\)b5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xe2 13.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xc7 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xd1 14.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xd1 \(\mathcal{Q}\)c6 15.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xa8 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xa8 16.f3± Black's compensation for the exchange is evidently insufficient.) 12.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xd5 13. cxd5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)d8 14.f3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)bd7 15.0-0±. Here, White's position is clearly preferable due to his powerful bishop pair, Pytel - G.Gonzalez, Yurimala 1983; 5...b6 6.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e2 \(\mathcal{Q}\)b7 (About 6...0-0 7.0-0 - see 5...0-0.) 7.d5 c6 (As for 7...0-0 - see 5...0-0; 7...\(\mathcal{Q}\)fd7 8.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c2 \(\mathcal{Q}\)e5 9.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xe5 dxe5 10.c5± Skalkotas - Lepine, Thessaloniki 1984; 7...\(\mathcal{Q}\)bd7 8.\(\mathcal{Q}\)d4 0-0 9.f3 a6 10.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e3 \(\mathcal{Q}\)c8 11.\(\mathcal{Q}\)c1± c5?! 12.dxc6 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xc6 13.\(\mathcal{Q}\)xc6 \(\mathcal{Q}\)xc6 14.0-0± Trois - De Oliveira, Sao Paulo 2003.) 8.0-0 0-0 9.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e1 cxd5, Wiesbeck - Obernortner, Feffernitz 1998 and here after: 10.exd5 \(\mathcal{Q}\)bd7 11.\(\mathcal{Q}\)g5± White maintains a powerful pressure in the centre, while Black has no counterplay at all.

a) 5...\(\mathcal{Q}\)bd7 6.\(\mathcal{Q}\)e2

![Diagram](image-url)
6...e5
Black chooses sometimes other moves too, but they either lead to dubious positions, or they transpose to the main lines:
About 6...0-0 – see 5...0-0; as for 6...c6 – see 5...c6;
After 6...d6?! 7.h3 0-0 8.0-0 d7, Ackermann – Weber, Germany 1997, 9.e3+ Black’s pieces on the queenside are totally discoordinated and he can hardly create any counterplay whatsoever;
In case of 6...b6?! 7.e5 g8, Ludveid Masana – Hartnack, Email 1992, White’s most energetic line seems to be: 8.e6 fx6 9.g5 f8 (or 9...d6 10.f3 b8 11.c6+ f8 12.e2±) 10.f3 b8 11.b5± and he regains his sacrificed pawn with a clearly superior position;
6...e6?! Benesch – Rasztik, Zalakaros 1997, 7.e5 dxe5 (It is too bad for Black to try: 7...g4 8.h3 h6 9.e4 dxe5 10.dxe5±) 8.dxe5 g4 9.g5 f6 10.exf6 gxf6 11.xd2± and White has better development and excellent prospects in the centre as well as on both sides of the board;
6...h6?! 7.e5 dxe5 8.dxe5 g4 9.e6 xc3+ 10.bxc3 de5, Bandza – Kratzer, Wiesbaden 1992, 11. xd8+ xd8 12.f4 f6 13.d4+–;
6...c5 7.e5 dxe5 (In answer to 7...g4, Allen – Trotman, corr. 1998, White obtains a stable advantage thanks to Black’s backward weak pawn after: 8.exd6 exd6 9.h3 gf6 10.0-0 0-0 11.e3±) 8.dxe5 g4 (Black lags in development just terribly in the line: 8...g8 9.f4 a6 10.0-0± Harasta – Janik, Rimavská Sobota 1975.) 9.e6 fx6 10.g5 xf2?! (This piece sacrifice is forced, but it is hardly sufficient.) 11.xf2 0-0+ 12.f3 d4+, Faber – M.Polovina, Germany 1996, 13.f1 e5 (It is not any better for Black to try: 13.f6 14.b5 e5 15.xd4 cxd4 16.xg1 f5 17.g4±) 14.xb5 xc4 15.xd4 cxd4 16.e1±. Black’s three pawns for the piece are not enough to compensate it, since they are practically immobile.
7.0-0 exd4
About 7...0-0 – see 5...0-0;
7...a5, T.Petrosian – Ljubojevic, Manila 1974, 8.e3 g4 (8...0-0 – see 5...0-0) 9.g5 f6 10.d2 0-0 – see 5...0-0 6.e2 e5 7.0-0 bd7 8.e3 g4 9.g5 f6 10.d2 a5.
7...h5?! 8.e3 f4, Mihaljevic – Reyes, Toronto 1995, now White wins a pawn after: 9.xf4! exf4 10.d5 0-0 (It is just terrible for Black to play: 10... g5? 11.xg5 xg5 12.xc7+ d8 13.xa8+; is position is also very bad in case of: 10...h6 11.xd2 g5 12.a5! b6 13.a4 b7 14.e5±) 11.xf4 xg8 12.c2±.
7...b6 8.g5 0-0 9.xd2 c6 10.ad1 b7, Kaidanov – Neil, Dallas 1999, 11.d5±.
7...c6 8.d5 c5 9.c2 cxd5 10.cxd5 0-0 11.b4 a6, Melcer – Lacassagne, Paris 2002, 12.b1 c7 13.d2±.
7...h6 8.♗e1 0–0 9.♕f1 ♙e8, A.Vogt – K.Larsen, Amsterdam 2001, 10.d5±.

8.♗xd4 ♙c5

It is a disaster for Black to follow with: 8...c5? 9.♕db5 ♙f8 10.♕xd6+ – Thanh – Huong, Vietnam 2000.

Or 8...♕e5 9.f4♕ ♙d7 10.♕f3 0–0, Sulzbach – Gaisbauer, Klinge 1993, 11.♕e3 c6 12.♕c2±.

9.f3 a5

About 9...0–0 10.♕e3 – see Chapter 17.

10.♕e3 0–0 11.♕db5

and there has arisen a position, which we analyze in our Chapter 17 (5...0–0 6.♕e2 e5 7.0–0 ♙bd7 8.♕e3 exd4 9.♕xd4 ♙c5 10.f3 a5 11.♕d2).

b) 5...c6

6.♕e2 a6?!

This is a very dubious attempt by Black to seize the initiative on the queenside ignoring his piece development.

About 6...0–0 7.0–0 – see 5...0–0; as for 6...♕g4 7.♕e3 – see 5...♕g4 6.♕e2 c6 7.♕e3. The move 6...♕c7, does not lead to any original positions, because in the nearest future Black will have to castle short anyway and the game will transpose to the line 5...0–0 6.♕e2 c6 7.0–0 ♙c7.

6...♕a5?! – White usually develops his initiative on the queenside in the King’s Indian Defence and accordingly that move seems to be a waste of tempi. 7.0–0 e5 (Or 7...♕g4 8.h3♕ ♙xf3 9.♕xf3 ♙bd7 10.♕b1! 0–0 11.♕e3 ♙b4 12.♕e2± Milea – Anghel, Eforie Nord 2000; 7...♕bd7, Soukup – Kastner, Slovakia, 8.♕b1! 0–0 9.b4♕ ♙c7 10.♕b3 e5 11.d5±; 7...0–0 8.♕b1 e5 9.b4♕ ♙c7, Ubiparip – Okilj, Pancevo 2005.) 8. d5 0–0 (Or 8...♕cxd5 9.cxd5 0–0 10.♕d2 ♙e8 11.♕c4 ♙d8 12.♕e3± Doettling – Wafte, Oropesa del Mar 1998.) 9.♕b1 ♙g4 10.b4 ♙c7 11.♕b3 ♙bd7 12.♕e3± Heinig – Thal, Germany 1997. Black’s queen came under attack in all the lines and it had to retreat ignominiously.

6...♕bd7??! – This is a dubious move and it enables White to develop a long-lasting initiative. 7.e5! dxе5 (Or 7...♕g8 8.exd6 exd6 9.♕f4 ♙d6 10.d5 ♙h5 11.♕g5 f6 12.♕e3± J.Kristinsson –
Gudmundsson, Reykjavik 1969; 11...h6, Beitar – Lee, La Valetta 1980, 12...d2±) 8.dxe5 g4 (The other possible retreat is hardly any better for Black: 8...g8 9.e6 fxe6 10.g5 e5 11.xd8+ xd8 12.f4 e8, Gralka – Jedryczka, Polanica Zdroj 2001, 13.0–0–0 h6 14.gxe4 f7 15.h4±; 12...h6 13.0–0–0+ e8, Pehlgrim – Uhmeier, Bargteheide 1989, 14.c5 h7 15.ge4±) 9.e6 fxe6 (Or 9...de5? 10.xd8+ xdx8 11.xe5 xe5 12.f4 xe6 13.fxe5 xex5 14.e3± Hillarp Persson – Hesse, Berlin 1997.) 10.g5 xex3+ 11.bxc3 ge5 (Or 11...gf6 12.xe6 a5 13.0–0 e5 14.d4± Frendzas – Bolis, Iraklion 1998.) 12.xe6 a5, Canabrava – Del Pozo, Sao Paulo 1960, 13.f4 f7 14.g7+ f8 15.e6+ g8 16. wd4 f6 17.c5±.

7.0–0 b5
About 7...0–0 8.e1 – see 5...0–0.
7...fd7 8.e3 b5 9.0–0 10.h6 bxc4 11.xg7 xg7 12.xc4± Yukhtman – Berezhnoi, Kiev 1964.
7...c7 8.f4 h5 9.e3 e5?!, Martin Ojeda – C.Santos, Tenerife 2001 and now, White can obtain an overwhelming advantage with the typical pawn-break in the centre – 10.c5! dxc5 11. dxe5±.
7...g4 8.e3 bd7, Scho – Rooms, corr. 1999, 9.h3 xf3 10.xf3 0–0 (10...b5? 11.e5! dxe5 12.xc6++) 11.b4±.

8.e5!? dxe5 9.dxe5 xd1 10.xd1 g4 11.f4 d7 12. e6 fxe6, Gamundi Salamanca – Frontinan, Spain 1992, 13.g3± and his lead in development and Black's numerous pawn-weaknesses are more than sufficient compensation for White's sacrificed pawn.

c) 5.g4 6.e2

6.fd7
Black should have better entered the main lines here, by playing: 6...0–0 7.0–0 – see 5...0–0.
He has tried some other possibilities too, but he has failed to equalize, no matter what:
Black loses in case of 6.e5?, Voglova – Hlavsova, Frymburk 2000, 7.dxe5 xf3 8.exf6 xe2 9.fxg7+–, or 7...dxe5 8.xd8+
\( \mathcal{d}xd8 9.\mathcal{d}xe5+- \) and White remains with a solid extra pawn;

Black’s defence is very difficult after: 6...c5 7.dxc5 dxc5 8.\( \mathcal{d}xd8+ \) \( \mathcal{d}xd8 \) 9.\( \mathcal{a}e3 \) \( \mathcal{b}b7 \) 10.e5 \( \mathcal{e}e8? \) 11. \( \mathcal{g}g5+- \) Noronha – Bianchi, corr. 2000. White maintains his advantage easily after Black’s other lines too: 7...\( \mathcal{a}a5 \) 8.0-0 dxc5, Macho – S.Rodriguez, Uruguay 1988, 9.\( \mathcal{b}b3 \) \( \mathcal{b}b4 \) 10.e5 \( \mathcal{d}fd7 \) 11. \( \mathcal{d}d5? \); 8...\( \mathcal{a}xc5 \) 9.\( \mathcal{a}e3 \) \( \mathcal{c}c8 \), Rosic – Biljanic, Yugoslavia 1994, 10.\( \mathcal{a}c1 \) 0-0 11.\( \mathcal{d}d5? \); 9...\( \mathcal{a}a5 \) 10.\( \mathcal{b}b3 \) \( \mathcal{b}b7 \) 11.\( \mathcal{a}xb7 \) \( \mathcal{b}b8 \) 12.\( \mathcal{a}xa7 \) D.Williams – Kattimani, Email 2002;

6...\( \mathcal{c}c6 \) 7.d5 \( \mathcal{xf}3 \) (About 7... \( \mathcal{d}b8 \) 8.0-0 0-0 – see 5...0-0; Black loses at least a pawn after: 7...\( \mathcal{d}e5? \) 8.\( \mathcal{a}xe5 \) \( \mathcal{xe}2 \), Husain – Said, Brunei 2001, 9.\( \mathcal{xf}7! \) \( \mathcal{xd}1 \) 10.\( \mathcal{a}xd8 \) \( \mathcal{xd}8 \) 11.\( \mathcal{a}xd1 \) \( \mathcal{g}4 \) 12.\( \mathcal{a}e2 \) \( \mathcal{e}5 \) 13.\( \mathcal{d}b5 \) c6? 14.\( \mathcal{c}c7+ \) \( \mathcal{f}f7 \) 15.\( \mathcal{c}e6+\); 13...\( \mathcal{d}d7 \) 14.\( \mathcal{a}a3\)?) 8.\( \mathcal{xf}3 \) \( \mathcal{e}5 \) (or 8...\( \mathcal{a}a5 \) 9.\( \mathcal{e}2 \) c5 10.0-0 0-0 – see 5...0-0) 9.\( \mathcal{e}2 \) c5 (About 9...c6 10.\( \mathcal{e}3 \) 0-0 11.0-0 – see 5...0-0; as for 9...0-0 10.0-0 – see 5...0-0.) 10.0-0? Black’s position is extremely cramped and he has great problems to push e6, or b5, Letelier Martner – Flores Alvarez, Vina del Mar 1945;

6...c6 7.\( \mathcal{a}e3 \) \( \mathcal{c}c7 \) (About 7... 0-0 8.0-0 – see 5...0-0 6.\( \mathcal{g}4 \) 7.\( \mathcal{e}3 \) c6 8.0-0; 7...a6, Kalinitschew – Menk, Kiel 2002, 8.\( \mathcal{a}xf3 \) 9.\( \mathcal{xf}3 \) e5 10.0-0?; 9...b5 10.e5 dxe5 11.dxe5 \( \mathcal{b}b1 \) 12.\( \mathcal{a}x\)d1! \( \mathcal{g}g8 \) 13.\( \mathcal{f}4? \); 9...\( \mathcal{b}d7 \) 10.0-0 0-0 11.\( \mathcal{b}4\) 12...\( \mathcal{xf}3 \) 8.\( \mathcal{xf}3 \) \( \mathcal{b}d7 \) 9.0-0 0-0 10.\( \mathcal{a}e1 \) a6 11.\( \mathcal{a}d2 \) e5 12.d5= Guitar – C.Muniz, Ste-Ceria 1997, in answer to 8...0-0, Sitter – Pottinger, Winnipeg 2000, it is interesting for White to try 9.g4!?→; 7...\( \mathcal{a}a5 \) 8.0-0 \( \mathcal{c}c7 \) 9.\( \mathcal{d}d2 \) 0-0 10.\( \mathcal{a}fd1 \) \( \mathcal{a}a6 \) 11.a3= Krivoshey – Mansour, Tanta 2002, 8...\( \mathcal{xf}3 \) 9.\( \mathcal{xf}3 \) \( \mathcal{b}b4 \) 10.\( \mathcal{e}2 \) 0-0, Reinhardt – Ehrhardt, Passau 1997, 11.\( \mathcal{a}c1\); 7...\( \mathcal{b}d7 \) 8.0-0 e5 9.d5 \( \mathcal{c}c7 \) 10.dxc6!? – this is another standard maneuver – White is fighting for the d5-outpost, 10...bxc6 11.b4= Bonin – Italie, Saratoga Springs 2000.) 8.0-0 \( \mathcal{b}b7 \) 9.\( \mathcal{d}d2 \) \( \mathcal{xf}3 \) 10.\( \mathcal{xf}3 \) e5 11.d5 c5 12.\( \mathcal{b}5 \) \( \mathcal{b}6 \) 13.a4! a5 14.b4! \( \mathcal{e}7 \), Stoeckl – Kolnhofer, Vienna 1934 (White has a clear advantage following: 14...\( \mathcal{a}xb4 \) 15.\( \mathcal{a}fb1 \) 0-0 16.\( \mathcal{xb}4\)±) and here the most logical line for White seems to be: 15.\( \mathcal{b}xa5 \) \( \mathcal{a}xa5 \) 16.\( \mathcal{a}fb1 \) \( \mathcal{a}h8 \) 17.g4±, because he exploits his huge lead in development and he can operate successfully on both sides of the board;

6...\( \mathcal{xf}3 \) 7.\( \mathcal{xf}3 \) \( \mathcal{fd}7 \) (About 7... e5 8.d5 0-0 9.\( \mathcal{e}3 \) – see 5...0-0; Black loses immediately after 7... e6?, Mutwig – Port Sauer, Bad Laasphe 1994, 8.\( \mathcal{e}5 \)++; it is almost with the same result if he tries: 7...0-0? 8.e5 dxe5, Balaram – Hulse, corr. 2001, 9.dxe5 \( \mathcal{xd}1+ \) 10.\( \mathcal{xd}1\)++; Black will most probably come under a dangerous attack in the line: 7...c6 8.\( \mathcal{e}3 \) 0-0
9.g4 e8 10.h4 h6 11.g5± Freundlieb – Harbaum, Porz 1990; or 9...

\[ \text{c7} 10.h4 \text{d}f7 11.\text{d}d2 e5 12.d5 \text{b}6 13.b3 c5, Smith – Rubel, East Lansing 1991, 14.h5±; Black loses too many tempi in the variation: 7...

\[ \text{c6} 8.d5 \text{e}5 9.e2 0–0 10.0–0 \text{c}8 11.e3 a6, Wagner – Christ, Schoeneck 1996, 12.c5±; or 9...d7 10.0–0 0–0 11.e3 e5 12.b4± Short – Picha, Prague 1990. It is too passive for Black, nevertheless it is solid enough if he tries: 7...bd7 8.e3 a6 9.d2 0–0, Mueller – Port Sauer, Bor-

\[ \text{kum 1996, 10.0–0} \text{c}6 (Black takes too many chances with the line: 8...c5 9.d5 \text{xc}3+!? 10.bxc3 \text{a}5 11.b3 \text{b}6 12.a4 \text{d}d7 13.e2±, because White has good prospects to prepare opening of files in the centre and his bishop will become tremendously powerful then. Black’s attempt at playing something led him to a very difficult position following: 13...f5?! 14.exf5 gxf5 15.0–0 \text{e}5 16.h6 \text{g}8 17.f1 0–0–0 18.c2! \text{xc}4 19.xf5+ \text{b}8, in the game K.Berg – Westerinen, Hamburg 1985, 20.h3±) 9.e2 e5 (It is hardly any better for Black to continue with: 9...0–0 10.h4 e5 11.d5 \text{e}7 12.h5 f5, Eingorn – Basag, Velden 1994, because after: 13.hxg6 hxg6 14.\text{xc}3± White had excellent attacking prospects.) 10.d5 \text{e}7 11.g4 h5 12.g5 f5 13.g2 fxe4 14.\text{g}3± Eingorn – Basag, Oberwart 1994;

6...bd7 7.e3 c6 (Black’s defence is very difficult after his other possibilities too: 7...

\[ \text{b}6 8.b3 c5, Smekal – Mokry, Olomouc 1998, 9.c1±; 7...0–0 8.h3 \text{xf}3 9.xf3 e5 10.0–0 exd4 11.xd4 e5 12.e2± A.Abdula – Al Azmi, Dubai 2003; Black enters an unfavourable line of the Benoni Defence in case of: 7...

\[ c5 8.d5 \text{b}8 9.0–0 \text{h}5 10.d2 0–0 11.h3± Noceto – Gallareto, corr. 2001, it is more or less the same after: 8...a6, Casafus – Burgo, La Hora 1985, 9.0–0±; Black might come under the gun in the variation: 7...e5 8.d5 0–0 9.d2 \text{xe}2 10.xe2 h8 11.g4 c6, Teo Kok – Westerinen, Thessaloniki 1988, 12.0–0–0, while after: 8...

\[ e7 9.d2 \text{xe}2 10.xe2 c6, Orel – Vodopivec, Skofja Loka 2002, 11.0–0± White maintains wonderful chances for a queenside offensive; 7...a6 8.h3 \text{xf}3 9.xf3 e5 10.d5 b6, Farkas – Lorincz, Miskolc 2001, 11.b4±; 7...xf3 8.xf3 e5 9.d5 b6 10.b4 0–0 11.0–0± Pogorelov – Ruciero Miguez, Seville 2004; 9...0–0 10.d2 b6 11.0–0± Ollivier – Fassier, Guingamp 2002.) 8.d2 \text{xe}2 9.xe2 e5 (Black must cope with a huge space deficit after his other possibilities: 9...0–0 10.0–0 h5, Galanza – Chafer, Spain 1997, 11.h3±; 9...a5 10.0–0 0–0, Grigoriou – Khatzikonstandinou, Athens 1972, 11.f4± 10.d5 0–0 11.g4 \text{e}8 12.0–0–0 \text{f}6 13.h4!– Black can hardly find a successful defence against White’s crushing at-

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tack and in the game Krasenkow – Baldersson, Yucatan 1999, the issue was settled almost in a flash: 13...\textit{\&}xh4 14.\textit{\&}f1 \textit{\&}g5 15.\textit{\&}h3 h6 16.\textit{\&}f3 \textit{\&}xe3+ 17.fxe3 \textit{\&}f6 18.g5 1–0.

7.\textit{\&}e3

\begin{center}
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\end{center}

7...c5

White’s two-bishop advantage provided him with a stable edge after: 7...\textit{\&}xf3 (About 7...e5 8.d5 0–0, see 5...0–0; or 7...0–0 8.\textit{\&}c1, see 5...0–0.) 8.\textit{\&}xf3 \textit{\&}c6 9.\textit{\&}e2 e5 10.d5 \textit{\&}e7 11.g4 a5 12.\textit{\&}g3 \textit{\&}c5 13.h4 \textit{\&}d7 14.g5 h5 15.\textit{\&}g2± E.Vladimirov – Mukhin, Simferopol 1975, but even after: 9...\textit{\&}a5 10.\textit{\&}a4 c5 11.dxc5 dxc5 12.\textit{\&}g4 \textit{\&}c6, Loetscher – Georges, Switzerland 2001, the simple line: 13.0–0–0 e6 14.f4± guarantees White superior prospects thanks to his domination in the centre.

In answer to 7...\textit{\&}c6, Malich – Moehring, Gera 1962, it is logical for White to follow with 8.\textit{\&}c1 and here about 8...0–0 – see 5...0–0, while after: 8...e5 9.d5, Black loses with: 9...\textit{\&}xf3? 10.dxc6++, therefore he is forced to play: 9...\textit{\&}e7 10.\textit{\&}d2 \textit{\&}xe2 11.\textit{\&}xe2 f5 12.f3± and he remains with two very “bad” pieces – the bishop on g7 and the knight on e7. Accordingly, Black is faced with a long and laborious fight for equality.

8.d5 \textit{\&}a6

In answer to 8...0–0 9.0–0 a6, Siebrecht – Hoelzl, Budapest 1994, White’s initiative is very powerful following: 10.\textit{\&}g5! \textit{\&}xe2 11.\textit{\&}xe2 \textit{\&}b6 12.f4↑.

8...\textit{\&}xc3+!? – this move is quite risky. Black is trying to obtain the advantage, but White remains with a bishop pair, a powerful centre and excellent prospects to open files rather effectively. All this compensates his pawn weaknesses with interest. 9.bxc3 \textit{\&}a5 10.\textit{\&}b3 \textit{\&}b6 11.a4 \textit{\&}d7 (11...\textit{\&}a6?! – This is a bad move and it enables White to isolate Black’s queen completely away from the actions. 12.a5 \textit{\&}xf3 13.gxf3 \textit{\&}d6 14.\textit{\&}d2±. Now, White penetrates on the open b-file unavoidably. 14...b6 15.axb6 \textit{\&}xb6 16.\textit{\&}hb1 \textit{\&}xb3 17.\textit{\&}xb3 \textit{\&}d8 18.\textit{\&}b7 a6 19.f4 \textit{\&}c8 20.\textit{\&}ab1 a5 21.e5 \textit{\&}a6 22.e6+- Schlosser – Westerinen, Cattolica 1993.) 12.h3 \textit{\&}xf3 13.gxf3!? f5 14.exf5 gxf5 15.f4 0–0–0 16.\textit{\&}d3± (White’s prospects are clearly superior.) 16...\textit{\&}df8 17.\textit{\&}e2 \textit{\&}f6 18.\textit{\&}hb1 \textit{\&}e4 19.\textit{\&}a3 \textit{\&}hg8 20.\textit{\&}c2. White has numerous weaknesses in his camp; nevertheless he has increased his advantage and he wins irrevocably a pawn, creating a dangerous kingside attack as well: 20...
1.d3 f6 2.c4 g6 3.d3 g7 4.e4 d6 5.d4

@d7 21.èxe4 fxe4 22.èxe4 èg7 23.èb5 èd8 24.èb1 èe8 25.èxb7 èh5+ 26.èd2 èb6 27.èxb6 axb6 28.a5+- M.Gurevich – Schebler, Belgium 2002.

9.0–0 0–0

In answer to 9...èc7, Schroeder – Foguelman, Santiago 1965, it also deserves attention for White to follow with 10.èg5!? èxe2 11.èxe2+ and the arising positions are similar to the main line.

Now, contrary to the variation: 6...èg4 7.èe3 ëfd7, White has saved a tempo for the move 8.èc1, so he can afford to continue much more energetically.

14.dxe6 ëxe6

10.èg5! èxe2 11.èxe2 h6

11...èxc3?! – That is a questionable decision, because Black will have great problems to ensure the safety of his king without the dark-squared bishop. 12.bxc3 èa5 13.èac1 èa4 14.f4 èc7 15.èf3 èh6 16.èh3 èg7 17.èg3 èh8 18.e5→ Y.Shulman – D’Amore, Moscow 1994.

After: 11...èc7 12.a4 a6 13.f4 èb8 14.e5 dxe5 15.f5= White’s compensation for the pawn was more than sufficient in the game,


12.èh3 èc7 13.f4 e6

It is also too risky for Black to try: 13...f5, Miroshnichenko – Efimenko, Allemagne 2004, because of: 14.exf5 gxf5 (It is even worse for Black to opt for: 14...èxf5 15.èf2=, since White’s knight comes to the e4-outpost and it is magnificently deployed there.) 15.èd2=. White’s plan here includes the trade of the dark-squared bishops at some moment, because that would facilitate the organization of an effective kingside attack.

15.f5 èd4, Golod – Kurnosov, Bad Wiessee 2004, 16.èd2 g5 17.èf2=. Black’s pieces seem to be beautifully placed; nevertheless his defence will be rather difficult, because his kingside is weakened. White will manage to establish his knight on the d5-outpost in many variations and it will exert tremendous pressure from there on both sides of the board, for example: 17...èe5 18.èxd4 èxc4 19.èe2 cxd4 20.èd5 èe5

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21.\texttt{a}ac1++, or 17...\texttt{e}e8 18.\texttt{g}g4 \texttt{f}f6 19.\texttt{xf}xf6+ \texttt{xf}f6 20.\texttt{ae}e1+, fol-
lowed by a transfer of the bishop to the g3-square.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The lines, which we have analyzed in this chapter, are very sel-
dom played. Black is trying to avoid the main theoretical variations
by playing like that and he intends to avoid his opponent's theoretical
preparation and to force him to solve immediate problems right from
the start of the game. The basic drawback of that approach is that
in case White plays logically, he obtains a considerable advantage
even without too much of an effort, as the variations in this chapter
prove convincingly. Therefore, Black is usually forced to transpose to
already familiar lines and schemes, but he usually does that under
unfavourable circumstances.
Chapter 11  
1.\(\text{d}f3\) \(\text{d}f6\) 2.\(c4\) \(g6\) 3.\(\text{c}c3\) \(\text{g}g7\) 4.\(e4\) \(d6\) 5.\(d4\) 0–0 6.\(\text{e}e2\)

Now, we have come to the main position of the Classical system of the King’s Indian Defence. The development and the character of the fight here depend largely on Black’s choice of a move.

In this chapter we will deal with some seldom played moves like: a) 6...\(\text{b}d7\), b) 6...\(a5\), c) 6...\(c6\), d) 6...\(\text{c}c6\).

The moves 6...\(\text{w}e8\) and 6...\(\text{d}a6\) transpose to lines which are considered in other chapters:

6...\(\text{w}e8\) 7.0–0 \(e5\) (about 7...\(\text{d}a6\) – see 6...\(\text{d}a6\)) 8.dxe5 – see 6...\(e5\) 7.0–0 \(\text{w}e8\) 8.dxe5;

6...\(\text{d}a6\) 7.0–0 \(\text{w}e8\) (It is much better for Black to continue here with 7...\(e5\) – see Part 2, Book 1b. About 7...\(c5\) – see 6...\(c5\) 7.0–0 \(\text{d}a6\); as for 7...\(c6\) 8.\(\text{f}f4\) – see 6...\(c6\); as for 7...\(\text{g}g4\) 8.\(\text{e}e3\) – see 6... \(\text{g}g4\) 7.\(\text{e}e3\) \(\text{d}a6\).) Now White’s simplest reaction is 8.\(\text{e}e3\) and the game transposes to one of the following schemes: 8...\(\text{g}g4\) (About 8...\(e5\) 9.dxe5 dxe5 10.h3 – see Chapter 6, Book 1b) 9.\(\text{g}g5\) \(h6\) (About 9...\(e5\) 10.\(c5\) – see Chapter 9, Book 1b) 10.\(\text{c}c1\) \(e5\) 11.dxe5 dxe5 (11...\(\text{d}xe5\), Aubel – De Gleria, Hengelo 1995, 12.\(\text{d}d4\) – see Chapter 6, Book 1b) 12.h3 \(\text{f}f6\) 13.\(\text{e}e3\) – see Chapter 6, Book 1b.

The other possibilities for him are very rarely seen in the tournament practice:

6...\(\text{f}d7\) 7.\(\text{g}g5\) \(c5\) (Or 7...\(f6\) 8.\(\text{e}e3\) \(e5\) 9.\(\text{d}d2\) \(\pm\) and Black has great problems to complete his development, for example: 9...\(f5\) 10.\(\text{e}xf5\) \(\text{g}xf5\) 11.\(\text{g}g5\) \(\text{e}e8\) 12.\(\text{d}d5\)\(\pm\) 8.d5 \(h6\) 9.\(\text{d}d3\) \(\text{f}f6\) (He can hardly create any effective counterplay in case of: 9...\(a6\) 10.\(\text{d}d2\) \(\text{h}7\) 11.0–0 \(\text{d}f6\) 12.h3 \(\text{b}d7\) 13.\(\text{b}3\) 14.\(\text{h}7\) 15.\(\text{d}d2\) \(\text{g}8\) 12.0–0 \(\text{d}d7\) 13.\(\text{h}2\) \(f5\) 14.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{g}xf5\) 15.\(\text{d}f3\) \(b6\) 16.\(\text{d}h4\) \(\pm\) Black’s kingside has been compromised and he has no counterplay at all, so his defence was an ordeal in the game T.Petrosian – Mukhitdinov, Tashkent 1951;
Chapter 11

6...a6 7.0–0  \( \text{Q} \)bd7 (About 7...c6 8.\( \text{B} \)e1 – see 6...c6; as for 7...c5 8.\( \text{B} \)e1 – see 6...c5; 7...\( \text{B} \)g4 8.\( \text{B} \)e3 – see 6...\( \text{B} \)g4; 7...e5 8.d5  \( \text{Q} \)bd7 9.\( \text{B} \)e3 – see 6...e5; 7...\( \text{Q} \)c6?! 8.d5  \( \text{A} \)a7 9.h3  \( \text{A} \)d7 10.\( \text{Q} \)e3 b5, Armas Gago – Fernandez Carrion, Asturias 1998, 11.a3=; or 8...\( \text{Q} \)e5 9.\( \text{B} \)xe5 dxe5 10.c5 e6 11.\( \text{Q} \)g5 h6 12.\( \text{Q} \)e3 exd5 13.exd5 \( \text{Q} \)e8 14.\( \text{Q} \)d2 \( \text{Q} \)h7, Grabuzova – Fichtner, Germany 1996, 15.f4=; 7...b6?! 8.e5 \( \text{Q} \)e8 9.\( \text{Q} \)f4 f6 10.exd6 \( \text{Q} \)xd6 11.c5 \( \text{Q} \)f7 12.cxb6 cxb6, Baburin – Moussa, Istanbul 2000, 13.d5=) 8.e5 \( \text{Q} \)e8 (Black must defend a very difficult endgame after: 8...dxe5 9.dxe5 \( \text{Q} \)g4 10.e6 \( \text{Q} \)de5 11.\( \text{Q} \)xf7+ \( \text{Q} \)xf7 12.\( \text{Q} \)xd8 \( \text{Q} \)xd8 13.\( \text{Q} \)d5 \( \text{Q} \)d7 14.\( \text{Q} \)g5! \( \text{Q} \)f6 15.\( \text{Q} \)e6 \( \text{Q} \)xd5 16.\( \text{Q} \)xd5= Surender – Wyna, Email 1999, but it is a real disaster for him to continue with: 10...\( \text{Q} \)xe6?? 11.\( \text{Q} \)g5=, because White won a piece in the game Mikita – Mikulas, Slovakia 1995.) 9.\( \text{Q} \)e1 b6 (The best for Black here is: 9...c6 10.exd6 \( \text{Q} \)xd6 11.\( \text{Q} \)f4=) 10.e6 \( \text{Q} \)df6 11.\( \text{Q} \)xf7+ \( \text{Q} \)xf7 12.\( \text{Q} \)g5 \( \text{Q} \)f8 13.\( \text{Q} \)f3 \( \text{R} \)a7 14.\( \text{Q} \)c6=– and despite the material equality, Black's position is hopeless, because he is practically stalemated, Hrubenja – Varga, corr. 1977;

6...\( \text{Q} \)e8 7.0–0  \( \text{Q} \)bd7?! – This move is very dubious as usual... (Or 7...\( \text{Q} \)fd7?! 8.\( \text{Q} \)g5=; 7...\( \text{Q} \)g4?! 8.h3 \( \text{Q} \)h6? 9.\( \text{Q} \)f4 \( \text{Q} \)d7? 10.\( \text{Q} \)d2=– Kuhnert – A.Schmidt, Germany 1999; 7...b6?! 8.e5 dxe5 9.\( \text{Q} \)xe5 \( \text{Q} \)b7 10.\( \text{Q} \)f3! \( \text{Q} \)xf3 11.\( \text{Q} \)xf3 \( \text{Q} \)a6 12.\( \text{Q} \)c6= White's powerful knight here practically paralyzes Black's game, Bieker – Siewerdt, Email 1995; 7...\( \text{Q} \)h8?! – This is simply a loss of time, Turner – Williams, Detroit 1990, 8.e5 dxe5 9.\( \text{Q} \)xe5 \( \text{Q} \)g8 10.\( \text{Q} \)f3=; 7...\( \text{Q} \)d7?! 8.h3 e5 9.d5 c6 10.\( \text{Q} \)e3 cxd5 11.cxd5 a6 12.a4= A.Mueller – Langer, Germany 1994) 8.e5 dxe5 9.dxe5 \( \text{Q} \)g4 10.e6. Now, Black has three possibilities, but his position remains suspicious all over: 10...\( \text{Q} \)xe6? 11.\( \text{Q} \)g5=; 10...\( \text{Q} \)df6 11.\( \text{Q} \)xf7+ \( \text{Q} \)xf7 12.\( \text{Q} \)b3= J.Watson – Gilliam, corr. 1994, 10...\( \text{Q} \)de5 11.\( \text{Q} \)xf7+ \( \text{Q} \)xf7 12.\( \text{Q} \)xd8 \( \text{Q} \)xd8 13.\( \text{Q} \)d5 \( \text{Q} \)d7 14.\( \text{Q} \)g5 \( \text{Q} \)f6 15.\( \text{Q} \)e6= Chuchelov – F.Meyer, Berlin 1998;

6...b6 7.0–0 \( \text{Q} \)b7 (About 7...\( \text{Q} \)d7?! 8.e5 – see 6...\( \text{Q} \)bd7 7.0–0 b6 8.e5; Black has problems to create any counterplay after: 7...a6 8.d5 c5, Astashov – Gassij, St Petersburg 1998, 9.\( \text{Q} \)f4=; 7...\( \text{Q} \)c6?! 8.d5 \( \text{Q} \)a5, Peigney – Hamel, Noisy 1996, now the simplest way for White to exploit the awkward placement of Black's knight at the edge of the board is to create some pressure in the centre: 9.\( \text{Q} \)d4 \( \text{Q} \)d7 10.f4 c5 11.\( \text{Q} \)f3=; 7...\( \text{Q} \)g4 – this try has no connection with Black's previous move. 8.\( \text{Q} \)g5 \( \text{Q} \)bd7 9.h3 \( \text{Q} \)xf3 10.\( \text{Q} \)xf3 \( \text{Q} \)b8 11.\( \text{Q} \)d2 c5 12.d5 \( \text{Q} \)e5 13.\( \text{Q} \)e2= Hoezl – B.Miller, Istanbul 2000) 8.d5 \( \text{Q} \)bd7 (Or 8...a5 9.\( \text{Q} \)d4=; 8...\( \text{Q} \)e8 9.\( \text{Q} \)e1 \( \text{Q} \)bd7 10.\( \text{Q} \)d4=; 8...c6 9.\( \text{Q} \)g5 e5 10.\( \text{Q} \)d2 \( \text{Q} \)e8 11.\( \text{Q} \)ad1= Jacobs – Verelst, Brasschaat 2002; the move 8...
c5, Svitseva – Rezova, Dagomys 2004, leads to a very dubious variation of the Benoni Defence for Black in which his light-squared bishop is misplaced: 9.\textit{f}4 \textit{d}7 10.h3=, or 9...\textit{h}5 10.\textit{g}5 h6 11.\textit{e}3 \textit{d}7 12.\textit{d}2 \textit{h}7 13.h3=; 8...e5 9.\textit{e}3 \textit{a}6 10.\textit{d}2 \textit{c}5 11.b4 \textit{a}6 12.a3= Vaassen – Whitman, Email 2001.) 9.\textit{d}4 \textit{c}5 (Black has tried here some other moves too, but White obtains a clear advantage in all variations with a logical play: 9...\textit{c}8 10.\textit{e}3 \textit{c}5, J.Kristiansen – Nilsson, Tarnby 1983, 11.\textit{c}2 a5 12.f4=, 11...e5 12.\textit{f}3 a5 13.a3=; 9...\textit{e}8 10.\textit{e}3 \textit{c}5 11.\textit{c}2 e6, Madeira – Parreira, Monte Estoril 2003, 12.b4 \textit{d}7 13.\textit{b}d1= 10.f3 a5 11.\textit{c}3 e5 (or 11...\textit{e}8 12.\textit{b}1 e6 13.\textit{d}b5 \textit{f}d7 14.\textit{d}2 \textit{f}8, Hashim – Kamal, Doha 1992, 15.b3=) 12.\textit{d}b5 \textit{f}d7 13.b3 f5 14.\textit{c}2 f4 15.\textit{f}2 g5 16.a3 \textit{a}6 17.\textit{b}2 \textit{f}6 18.b4= White’s actions on the queenside are much more effective than Black’s attempts to organize a kingside attack, Salokangas – Aalto, Finland 1999;

6...e6 7.\textit{g}5 h6 (The move 7...e5?, loses material for Black: 8.dxe5 dxe5, Svindahl – Steilberg, Dos Hermanas 2004, 9.\textit{xd}8 \textit{xd}8 10.\textit{d}5=; 7...c6=, weakens the dark squares in the centre, Breuer – Mummerz, corr. 1989, 8.c5=; 7...c5=, loses time and accordingly – Black lags in development. 8.dxc5 \textit{a}5 9.0–0 \textit{xc}5 10.\textit{e}3= Mungyereza – Dill, Lut-}

cerne 1982; 7...\textit{d}7=, this move seems to be quite unnatural. 8.\textit{d}2 b6, Monge – Bolivar Baron, Norena 2001, 9.0–0= 8.\textit{e}3 \textit{c}6 9.h3 e5 10.d5 \textit{e}7 11.\textit{d}2 \textit{h}7, Farid – Sompisha, Novi Sad 1990 and here after 12.g4= White has excellent chances to organize a powerful kingside attack.

a) 6...\textit{bd}7

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.3\textwidth]{chess_diagram.png}
\caption{Chess Diagram}
\end{figure}

Black plans to advance e7-e5, avoiding the possible exchanges after: 6...e5 7.dxe5 dxe5, see the beginning of Chapter 15.

7.0–0

In case of the aggressive try 7.e5, after 7...\textit{e}8, White has problems to hold his position in the centre, for example: 8.\textit{f}4 c6 9.\textit{d}2 dxe5 10.dxe5 \textit{c}7 11.\textit{d}1 \textit{e}6 12.\textit{g}3 \textit{c}7 13.\textit{e}3 \textit{b}6 14.\textit{c}1 a5 15.0–0 a4 16.\textit{f}e1 \textit{b}4 17.\textit{f}1 \textit{dc}5= and Black had an active piece play in the game Doroshenko – Badea, Bucharest 1993.

7...\textit{c}6

Here, the best reaction for White is to play 7...e5, after which the game transposes to Chapters 16-21.
Black's every other move leads practically to a very bad position for him:

7...c5 – see 6...c5 7.0‐0 Qbd7; 7...e8 8.e5 – see 6...e8 7.0‐0 Qbd7 8.e5; 7...a6 8.e5 – see 6...a6 7.0‐0 Qbd7 8.e5;

7...Qb6 8.e3 Qg4, Roehl – Meiler, Guben 1996, 9.Qb3±;

7...Qh5?! Kos – Von Boeselager, Germany 1993, 8.Qg5 h6 9.Qe3±;

7...Qe8?! Darbinian – Rakic, Oropesa del Mar 1999, this move occupies the e8‐square for the retreat of the knight and that enables White to begin active actions in the centre: 8.e5 Qg4 (or 8...dxe5 9.dxe5 Qg4 10.Qb5 Qd8 11.e6+) 9.h3 Qh6 10.Qf4±;

7...Qe8?! 8.Qg5 h6 9.Qe3 Qh7 10.Qc2 e5 11.Qa1 exd4 12.Qxd4± Lehner – Breneis, Oberwart 2004;

7...e6?! 8.Qe1 Qe8 (or 8...b6, Labin – Linardatos, Ermelo 1970, 9.e5 Qe8 10.Qf4±; or 9...dxe5 10.dxe5 Qg4 11.Qg5±) 9.e5 dxe5 10.dxe5 Qg4 11.Qg5± Zika – Muzikar, Klatovy 2002;

7...h6?! – that move compromizes Black’s kingside. 8.e5 dxe5 (Or 8...Qe8 9.Qf4 c5 10.exd6 Qxd6 11.d5 f5 12.h4 a6 13.Qc2 Qf7 14.Qe3± Flohr – Boros, Bad Liebenwerda 1934.) 9.dxe5 Qg4 10.e6 Qde5 11.Qxf7+ Qxf7 (It is even worse for Black to follow with: 11...Qxf7 12.Qxd8 Qxd8 13. Qd5 Qd7 14.Qh4 Qge5 15.f4±) 12. Qb3± Woolley – Cordes, Werther 2001;

7...b6?! 8. e5 8...Qe8 (The move 8...dxe5? – loses immediately after: 9.dxe5 Qe8 10.e6 Qxe6 11.Qg5 Qf6 12.Qg4+– Naala – Happonen, corr. 1997, or 9. Qg4 10.e6 Qdf6 11.Qxf7+ Qxf7, M.White – S.Pereira, Email 1997, 12.Qxd8 Qxd8 13.h3 Qh6 14.Qe5+ Qg8 15.Qf3+-) 9.Qg5! (This is White’s most energetic move with the idea to exploit the vulnerability of the h1‐a8 diagonal.) 9...dxe5 10.dxe5 Qxe5 11.Qf3 Qb8 12.Qb5 a6 (It is not any better for Black to try here: 12...Qd6 13.Qc1 a6 14.Qa7 Qb7 15.Qxb7 Qxb7 16. Qc6±) 13.Qa7 Qd6 14.Qc6± Doncea – Petroae, Bucharest 2002;

7...a5?! 8.e5 Qe8 (It is also too bad for Black to continue with: 8...dxe5 9.dxe5 Qg4 10.e6 Qxe6? 11. Qg5+–; 10...Qe5 11.Qxf7+ Qxf7 12.Qxd8 Qxd8 13.Qd5±; 8...Qg4 9.Qg5 Qh6 10.Qe6±) 9.Qf4 c6 9...b6 10.Qe1± Hanel – Lederwasch, Austria 2003) 10.Qd2 Qb6 11.h3 dxe5 12.Qxe5± R.Hernandez – Dalinger, Villa Ballester 1994.

8.Qe3 Qc7

About 8...e5 9.d5 – see Chapter 21.

8...Qg4 9.Qg5 f6 (9...h6 10.Qh4 c5 – leads to a favourable position for White of the Benoni Defence: 11.d5 Qgf6 12.Qd2±) 10.Qh4 e5, V.Chekhov – K.Chekhova, Dresden 1996, 11.d5 – see Chapter 20.


8...b6 9.Qd2 c5 10.d5 Qg4
11.\( \text{g5} \) f6 12.\( \text{h4} \) \( \text{e}5 \) 13.\( \text{e}1 \) g5 14.\( \text{g3} \)± Schaeffner – Gutzeit, Bayern 2002.

8...h6 9.\( \text{d}2 \) c5 10.d5 \( \text{e}5 \) 11.h3 g5 12.e1 \( \text{g}6 \) 13.\( \text{f}1 \) d7 14.d2± Pelletier – Hadjadj, Aubervilliers 2003.

8...c5 9.h3 b6 – this transposes once again to the Benoni Defence, quite advantageously for White, though...10.d5 \( \text{e}8 \), Buffe – Vuilleremoz, Cannes 2000, 11.\( \text{d}2 \)±; 9...\( \text{cxd4} \) – this move leads to a favourable line for White of the Maroczy system. 10.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{c}5 \) 11.\( \text{c}2 \) d7 12.b4 \( \text{e}6 \), Gruber – E.Onoprienko, Vienna 1995, 13.\( \text{b}3 \)±.

9.\( \text{d}2 \) e5
9...\( \text{e}8 \) 10.f4±

10.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \)

Or 10...a6 11.b4±; 10...a5 11.a3 \( \text{e}8 \) 12.b4 f5 13.f3 c5 14.\( \text{b}5 \) \( \text{d}8 \) 15.bxc5 \( \text{xc}5 \) 16.\( \text{b}3 \)± Veselovsky – Holecko, Presov 2001.

11.b4 f5 12.f3 c5 13.a3 f4

The move 13...b6, Bosiocic – Bajramovic, Pula 2005, does not neutralize the development of White’s initiative at all: 14.\( \text{b}1 \)±.

White is much ahead of Black in the process of creating threats. 15...a6?! 16.\( \text{bxc5} \) \( \text{xc5} \) 17.\( \text{a}4 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 18.a5 h5 19.\( \text{a}4 \)± – Pohl – Nill, Crailsheim 1995.

b) 6...a5

This try is relatively new.

7.0–0 \( \text{a}6 \)

About 7...\( \text{g}4 \) – see 6...\( \text{g}4 \) 7.\( \text{e}3 \) a5; About 7...e5 8.dxe5 – see 6...e5 7.0–0 e5 8.dxe5.

7...c6?! – That move does not contribute to Black’s piece development. 8.\( \text{f}4 \) \( \text{h}5 \), Fuentetalba – Schmidlin, Vina del Mar 1998, 9.\( \text{g}5 \)! h6 10.\( \text{e}3 \) e5 11.\( \text{d}2 \) \( \text{h}7 \) 12.\( \text{ad}1 \)± and White is perfectly prepared for opening of files in the centre, while Black might be already beyond salvation, for example: 12...\( \text{e}7 \) 13.c5 exd4 14.\( \text{cxd6} \) \( \text{xd6} \) 15.\( \text{d}4 \) and he can hardly neutralize White’s oncoming onslaught in the centre and on the kingside.

7...\( \text{c}6 \) 8.d5 \( \text{b}4 \) (about 8...\( \text{b}8 \) – see 6...\( \text{c}6 \)) 9.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{g}4 \) (It is slightly better for Black to play here 9...\( \text{d}7 \), Jobe – Hutton, Email 2001, but after 10.\( \text{d}4 \)± he
has no counterplay at all.) 10.\textbf{b}1 \textbf{xf}3 11.\textbf{xf}3 \textbf{d}7 12.a3 \textbf{a}6 13.\textbf{wc}2 e5 14.\textbf{g}4± Franke – Kosa, Berlin 1988.

8.\textbf{f}4 \textbf{we}8

8...\textbf{h}5?! 9.\textbf{g}5 h6 10.\textbf{e}3 \textbf{f}6 (Black can hardly equalize after: 10...e5, Wirthensohn – Forster, Switzerland 2000, 11.\textbf{wd}2 \textbf{h}7 12.\textbf{ad}1 f5 13.\textbf{xf}5 gxf5?! 14.\textbf{d}xe5! f4 15.\textbf{d}d4 c5 16.\textbf{e}4 cxd4 17.\textbf{xd}4±, because White’s compensation for the piece is more than sufficient. He has a total control over the centre, three pawns for the bishop; meanwhile Black’s knight is isolated from the actions on the h5-square. It is therefore better for Black to try: 13...\textbf{xf}5 14.\textbf{d}xe5 dxe5 15.\textbf{d}5±) 11.h3 \textbf{d}7 12.\textbf{wd}2 \textbf{h}7 13.\textbf{fd}1± Now, White controls the centre and he has a straightforward plan to develop his queenside initiative, Kiriakov – Bates, Coventry 2005.

8...c5?! White can transpose to the Benoni Defence after the useless move for Black – a5?, since he cannot organize any counterplay on the queenside because of it. 9.d5 \textbf{h}5 10.\textbf{g}5 h6, Moreno Romero – Lazkano, San Sebastian 2004, 11.\textbf{e}3 \textbf{d}7 12.\textbf{e}1 \textbf{f}6 13.f4 \textbf{w}c7 14.a3±.

8...\textbf{d}7 9.\textbf{wd}2 e5 10.\textbf{g}5 \textbf{we}8 11.\textbf{fe}1 exd4 12.\textbf{xd}4± Harestad – S.Johnsen, Trondheim 2004.

8...\textbf{g}4 9.e5 dxe5 10.\textbf{xe}5 c6 11.h3 \textbf{f}5, Rau – Podzielny, Germany 2003, 12.\textbf{wd}2±.

9.e5 \textbf{d}7 10.\textbf{wd}2 \textbf{dxe}5

GM D.King commented this game and he recommended for Black: 10...c5!? 11.\textbf{xd}4 cxd4 12.\textbf{b}5 e5 13.\textbf{h}6 b6 14.\textbf{fe}1†, but he failed to notice that White could have simply won a pawn with the line: 12.\textbf{xd}6 \textbf{w}d6 13.\textbf{xd}4±.

11.\textbf{dxe}5 \textbf{dc}5 12.\textbf{h}6 b6

Black has great problems too after: 12...\textbf{g}4, because of: 13.\textbf{xe}7 \textbf{xe}7 14.\textbf{d}4! \textbf{xe}2 15.\textbf{xe}2± and White maintains an overwhelming advantage.

13.\textbf{xe}7 \textbf{xe}7 14.\textbf{d}4 \textbf{b}7 15.\textbf{e}3 \textbf{d}8 16.\textbf{ad}1 f5

It would have been very bad for Black to try: 16...\textbf{e}6†!, due to: 17.\textbf{xe}6+ \textbf{fxe}6 18.\textbf{b}5±, with the idea for White to follow with \textbf{d}4 and \textbf{g}4.

Here, in the game Ftacnik – Istratescu, Krnica 1998, White could have consolidated his advantage with the help of the line: 17.\textbf{d}5 \textbf{e}6 (It is just terrible for Black to continue with: 17...\textbf{xd}5 18.\textbf{cd}5 \textbf{f}7 18.\textbf{fe}6†+–, or 17...\textbf{b}4 19.\textbf{c}4 \textbf{f}4 20.\textbf{f}3+– and White’s position is crushing.) 18.\textbf{f}6 \textbf{f}7 19.\textbf{f}3±. All white
pieces are perfectly deployed in this variation.

c) 6...c6 7.0–0

![Diagram]

Now we will analyze thoroughly: c1) 7...\(\text{Ke8}\), c2) 7...a6 and c3) 7...\(\text{Qa6}\).

About 7...\(\text{Qg4}\) 8.\(\text{Qe3}\) – see 6...\(\text{Qg4}\); as for 7...a5 – see 6...a5; 7...\(\text{Qbd7}\) 8.\(\text{Qe3}\) – see 6...\(\text{Qbd7}\) 7.0–0 c6 8.\(\text{Qe3}\); 7...e5 8.d5 – see 6...e5 7.0–0 c6 8.d5.

Black has tried in practice some other moves too:

7...d5 8.e5 \(\text{Qe4}\) (Or 8...\(\text{Qe8}\) 9.\(\text{Qb3}\) \(\text{Qc7}\), Krum – Neumark, Bad Neustadt 1992, 10.\(\text{Qe3}\)\{\}) 9.\(\text{Qb3}\) \(\text{Qxc3}\) 10.\(\text{Qxc3}\) b6 11.a4\# Landenberge – Samovolska, Tapolca 1989;

7...\(\text{Qfd7}\) 8.\(\text{Qg5}\) h6 (Or 8...\(\text{Qe8}\) 9.\(\text{Qd2}\) a5 10.\(\text{Qfe1}\) a4, Abakarov – Shishov, Tbilisi 1957, 11.\(\text{Qad1}\)\{; 8...\(\text{Qe8}\) 9.\(\text{Qd2}\) e5 10.\(\text{Qh6}\) exd4? – even after the best for Black: 10...\(\text{Qf6}\) 11.\(\text{Qxg7}\) \(\text{Qxg7}\) 12.\(\text{Qad1}\)\# White has a superior development and a space advantage – 11.\(\text{Qxg7}\) \(\text{Qxg7}\) 12.\(\text{Qxd4}\) – R.Andersen – Berger, Kiel 1992; White obtains the edge easily here, by simply centralizing his pieces with: 8...f6 9.\(\text{Qe3}\) e5 10.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qa6}\), Sande – Arregui, corr. 1975, 11.\(\text{Qad1}\)\{, as well as in case of: 10...\(\text{Qe7}\), Bilinskas – Bukojemski, Augustow 1997, White’s advantage is evident after his central strategy – 11.\(\text{Qad1}\), for example: 11...f5 12.\(\text{Qg5}\) \(\text{Qf6}\) 13.\(\text{Qc5}\)\{, or 12...\(\text{Qf6}\) 13.\(\text{Qxf6}\) \(\text{Qxf6}\) 14.\(\text{Qc5}\)\{, 13...\(\text{Qxf6}\) 14.\(\text{Qxe5}\) dxe5 15.b4 a5 16.a3 \(\text{Qa6}\) 17.\(\text{Qb2}\)\{) 9.\(\text{Qe3}\) e5 (In answer to: 9...\(\text{Qe8}\) 10.\(\text{Qd2}\) g5 11.\(\text{Qe1}\) e5, Storkebaum – Wendel, Bad Woerishofen 2002, White occupies the f5-square and he plans a favourable trade of the light-squared bishops with: 12.d5 c5 13.\(\text{Qg4}\)\{; 9...\(\text{Qa6}\) 10.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qh7}\) 11.\(\text{Qad1}\) \(\text{Qf6}\) 12.h3\# Bailey – Zacks, East Lansing 1995.) 10.\(\text{Qc2}\) a5 11.\(\text{Qfd1}\)\# M.Ivanov – Zyla, Bad Woerishofen 2000;

7...\(\text{Qc7}\) 8.\(\text{Qf4}\) \(\text{Qh5}\) (Black’s other possibilities are even worse: 8...b6 9.\(\text{Qc1}\) \(\text{Qb7}\) 10.c5 \(\text{Qh5}\) 11.\(\text{Qxd6}\) exd6 12.\(\text{Qg5}\) \(\text{Qe8}\) 13.\(\text{Qd3}\)\# Forestier – Magnin, Lyon 2000; 8...\(\text{Qbd7}\) 9.c5 \(\text{Qh5}\) 10.\(\text{Qxd6}\) exd6 11.\(\text{Qg5}\) h6 12.\(\text{Qe3}\) \(\text{Qhf6}\) 13.\(\text{Qwd2}\) \(\text{Qh7}\) 14.\(\text{Qac1}\) \(\text{Qe8}\) 15.\(\text{Qd3}\)\# Comp Milano Pro – Brooks, USA 1996) 9.\(\text{Qe3}\) e5 (Black’s other tries enable White to establish complete domination in the centre: 9...\(\text{Qd7}\) 10.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qhf6}\), Pavlovic – Alcaide, Terrassa 1994, 11.f4\{; 9...\(\text{Qe8}\), J.Schmid – Gaebler, Germany 1982, 10.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qf6}\) 11.\(\text{Qf4}\)\{) 10.\(\text{Qd2}\) f5 (Or 10...\(\text{Qe8}\), Werner – Schiffer, Mainz 1987, 11.d5 c5 12.b4\{; 10...\(\text{Qd7}\) 11.b4 b6 12.b5\# Herndl
– Steiner, Austria 1993; 10...exd4 11.\(\text{\textasciicircum}\text{x}d4 \text{\textasciicircum}f6\), Pedersen – Andreassen, Vadso 1993, 12.\(\text{\textasciicircum}a11 \text{\textasciicircum}e8\) 13.\(f3\)\(±\); 10...\(\text{\textasciicircum}g4\) 11.h3 \(\text{\textasciicircum}xf3\) 12.\(\text{\textasciicircum}xf3\) exd4 13.\(\text{\textasciicircum}xd4 \text{\textasciicircum}xd4\) 14.\(\text{\textasciicircum}xd4 \text{\textasciicircum}g7\) 15.\(\text{\textasciicircum}ad1\)\(±\) Trifunovic – Palda, Dubrovnik 1950.) 11.dxe5 dxe5 (After: 11...\(\text{\textasciicircum}f4\) 12.exd6 fxe3 13.dxc7 exd2 14.cxb8\(\text{\textasciicircum}x\)xb8 15.c5\(±\) Black has a couple of bishops indeed, but that does not compensate his pawn-deficit, Martinez – Olivera, Uruguay 1997.) 12.\(\text{\textasciicircum}ad1\) f4 13.\(\text{\textasciicircum}c5\) \(\text{\textasciicircum}e8\) 14.\(\text{\textasciicircum}d6\)\(±\) Dubinskas – Liebus, Klaipeda 2001.

\[c1\] 7...\(\text{\textasciicircum}e8\) 8.h3

8...\(\text{\textasciicircum}c7\)

The move 8...e6?! permits White to occupy additional space and it also weakens the d6-square, Teichmann – Kastner, Passau 1998, 9.e5 dxe5 10.dxe5 \(\text{\textasciicircum}fd7\) 11.\(\text{\textasciicircum}f4\)\(±\).

8...\(\text{\textasciicircum}fd7\) 9.\(\text{\textasciicircum}g5\) h6 10.\(\text{\textasciicircum}e3\) c5 11.\(\text{\textasciicircum}d2\) \(\text{\textasciicircum}h7\), Broberg – Simon, Gladchenbach 1999, 12.d5\(±\).

8...h6 9.\(\text{\textasciicircum}f4\) g5 10.\(\text{\textasciicircum}h2\) \(\text{\textasciicircum}bd7\) 11.e5\(±\) Efimov – Everet, Italy 1999.

In answer to 8...a6, Dehghes – Weber, France 1994, it seems logical for White to follow with: 9.\(\text{\textasciicircum}e1\) b5 10.e5 \(\text{\textasciicircum}fd7\) 11.exd6 exd6 12.\(\text{\textasciicircum}f4\) \(\text{\textasciicircum}b6\) 13.c5\(±\).

Black lags in development considerably after the tentative line: 8...\(\text{\textasciicircum}a6\) 9.\(\text{\textasciicircum}e3\) \(\text{\textasciicircum}c7\), Mitsopoulos – Barbayiannis, Athens 1997, 10.\(\text{\textasciicircum}d2\)! \(\text{\textasciicircum}e6\) (or 10...e5 11.d5\(±\)) 11.f4 c5 12.dxc5 dxc5 (or 12...\(\text{\textasciicircum}xc5\) 13.b4 \(\text{\textasciicircum}e6\) 14.\(\text{\textasciicircum}c1\)\(±\) 13.e5 \(\text{\textasciicircum}d7\) 14.\(\text{\textasciicircum}de4\)\(±\).

9.\(\text{\textasciicircum}e3\) \(\text{\textasciicircum}bd7\)

Or 9...e5 10.d5 c5, Rusiniak – Gozdziejewski, Malbork 1999, 11.a3\(±\).

10.\(\text{\textasciicircum}c1\) e5

Following: 10...a6 11.b4 e5 12.d5 c5 13.a3 b6 14.\(\text{\textasciicircum}d2\) \(\text{\textasciicircum}f8\), Senchukov – Vlasenko, St Petersburg 1998, 15.\(\text{\textasciicircum}b1\)\(±\), or 14...h6, Berube – Auger, Charny 1984, 15.\(\text{\textasciicircum}b1\)\(±\) White maintains a dangerous queenside initiative and a huge space advantage in both cases; meanwhile Black has no counterplay whatsoever.

In answer to 10...b6, Bovio – Gradin, Norena 2001, it is logical for White to continue with 11.b4\(±\) and he preserves a great space advantage and excellent prospects for a queenside initiative.

11.d5 \(\text{\textasciicircum}c5\)

White maintains his standard edge thanks to his queenside pressure after Black’s other possibilities too: 11...\(\text{\textasciicircum}h5\) 12.\(\text{\textasciicircum}d2\) a6 13.b4 c5 14.a3 b6, Kiviaho – Kauko, Finland 2001, 15.\(\text{\textasciicircum}d3\)\(±\); 11...c5 12.\(\text{\textasciicircum}d2\) \(\text{\textasciicircum}f8\) 13.a3 a6 14.b4 \(\text{\textasciicircum}e8\),
Armbuster – Nill, Hessen 1995, 15...b3 f5 16.exf5 gxf5 17.f4±; 11...a6 12.b4 c5 13.a3 b6 14...d2 h8 15.e1 g8 16.g4± Medina Fontes – Flores, Mexico 2001.


c2) 7...a6

Black is preparing the pawn-advance – b7-b5.

8.e1!

After 8.a4 a5=, Black will obtain some good outposts for his knights on the queenside – the b4-square and in perspective c5.

The move 8.e5 is evidently premature at this moment, because of: 8...dxe5 9.dxe5 g4 10...xd8 exd8 11.e4 d7 12.ad1 e8 and Black has some counter-play against White’s e5-pawn. If 9.ex5, then after: 9...fd7 10...f4 ex5 11.xe5 xe5 12.dxe5 e6 13...xd8 xdx8 14...fd1 d7 15.f4 g5 16.g3 xf4 f6 18.exf6 xf6=, the position was equal in the game Velikov – Tseshkovsky, Vrnjacka Banja 1982.

8...b5

In answer to 8...c7!?, Iliwitzki – L.Belov, USSR 1963, it is logical for White to continue analogously to the variation 7...c7), except that he will have an extra tempo – 9...f4 h5 (9...g4 10.c5±) 10...e3 e5 (10...f6 11.h3±) 11.c5!± and White is dominant in the centre.

8...fd7 9.e3 b5 (It is worse for Black to try: 9...c5 10.d5 e5, Komarishkina – S.Novikova, Ptvinco 2001, because he remains in a very cramped position and he cannot develop his queenside, therefore White’s most natural line is: 11.d2± with the idea to occupy the centre.) 10...d2 bxc4 (In case of 10...b6, E.Vladimirov – Kr.Georgiev, Yerevan 1982, 11.b3, Black’s active actions on the queenside only create additional weaknesses for him: 11...b4 12.d1 c5 13.a3±, or 11...xc4 12.xc4 d7 13...ab1±) 11.xc4 b6 12.b3 a5 13.a4 g4 14. g5 xa4 15.xa4 d7, Ftcnik – L.Karlsson, Gjovik, 1983, (It is not any better for Black to play here: 15...h6 16.f3 xf3 17.gxf3 h7 18.f4±, since he has no coun-
terplay and his pieces are quite passive. White’s minute kingside weaknesses are irrelevant in this position.) and here after 16...\textit{eac1+}, Black has problems to find any reasonable plan.

8...\textit{b7} 9...\textit{h3} b5 10...\textit{e5} \textit{e8} 11. \textit{f4} \textit{b7}, B.Malich – Hort, Halle 1978, 12...\textit{xd6} exd6 (or 12...\textit{xd6} 13...\textit{c5} \textit{f5} 14.\textit{f1±}) 13...\textit{b3+} and Black’s light-squared bishop is very "bad" and his pieces are rather passive, so he can hardly organize any effective counterplay.

After 8...\textit{g4} 9...\textit{h3} \textit{xf3} 10. \textit{xf3} \textit{xd7} 11...\textit{e3} b5 12...\textit{xb5} axb5 13...\textit{a3} \textit{b6}, L.Schmid – Trikaliotis, Athen 1976, 14...\textit{b3+} Black’s knights have no good squares to be deployed to and White’s couple of bishops provides him with a slight, but stable advantage.

9...\textit{e5} \textit{e8}

Now, in case of: 9...\textit{dxe5} 10...\textit{dx5} \textit{g4} (It is not better for Black to continue with: 10...\textit{xd1} 11...\textit{xd1} \textit{e8} 12...\textit{g5±} L.Johannessen – Hvenekilde, Copenhagen 2003.) 11...\textit{xd8} \textit{xd8} 12...\textit{f4} \textit{d7} 13...\textit{ad1} \textit{e8}, White can easily protect his e5-pawn with the help of the resource 14...\textit{f1±}.

10. \textit{f4} \textit{bxc4}

The move 10...\textit{f6}, enables White to maintain a stable edge with the line: 11...\textit{xd6} exd6 12...\textit{xb5} axb5 13...\textit{b3+} \textit{h8} 14...\textit{d5±} Jelen – Zheliandinov, Ptuj 1993, while in case of 10...\textit{g4}, E.Torre – Diez del Corral, Lucerne 1982, White’s simplest line is: 11...\textit{xb5} axb5 12. a3± and he is clearly better. 10...\textit{d7} 11...\textit{c1} \textit{b7} 12...\textit{xd6} exd6 13. \textit{e4} \textit{f6} 14...\textit{g3} \textit{wd7} 15...\textit{b3} \textit{xb8} 16...\textit{a3±} Veingold – Paasikangas, Myyrmanni 1999.

11. \textit{xc4} d5 12. \textit{b3} \textit{g4}

Black failed to obtain any compensation for his queenside weaknesses after: 12...\textit{c7} 13...\textit{c1} \textit{e6} 14...\textit{e3} a5 15...\textit{a4±} Rajna – Roth, Reggio Emilia 1988.

13...\textit{h3} \textit{xf3} 14...\textit{xf3} \textit{c7} 15. \textit{ac1} \textit{e6} 16...\textit{e3} \textit{d7} 17...\textit{d1} \textit{h8} 18...\textit{f4} \textit{h6} 19...\textit{d2} \textit{e8} 20...\textit{a4±} and White had obviously superior prospects in the game, Akesson – Smyslov, London 1988.

c3) 7...\textit{a6}

This method of development
has been tried very often recently.

8...\hfill \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f4}}}

White is trying to hamper maximally Black's central pawn-advance -- e7-e5.

8...\hfill \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{d}h5}}}}

Or 8...\hfill \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}c7}} 9.d5 a6 10.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}c}c1} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d7}}, Joentausta -- Pajukari, corr 1988, 11.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e}e}e2} ±.

The move 8...c5 -- transposes to the Benoni Defence, except that Black has already lost an important tempo. 9.d5 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{a}a6}} 10.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f4}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}c7}} (He has even greater problems to create counterplay after: 10...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{b}b}b6} 11.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}d2} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d7}}, Leung -- De Weert, Email 2002, 12.h3±) 11.h3 a6 (or 11...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d7}} 12.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}d2} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e}e}e8} 13.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{a}a}d1} a6 14.a4 b6 15.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f1}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{b}b7}} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f1}} ± Morrison -- Menachem, Haifa 1989) 12.a4 b6 (It is worse for Black to follow with: 12...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{b}b}8} 13.e5 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f8}} 14.a5± W.Unzicker -- Kupper, Munich 1958.) 13.e5 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f8}} 14.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}d2} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{b}b8}} 15.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f1}} ± R.Ibrahimov -- Amer, Abu Dhabi 2005.

8...\hfill \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d7}?!} -- Black's knight is not so active on that square as on h5, but on the other hand it will not be hanging in case he pushes f7-f5. 9.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{g}g5}} h6 (or 9...f6 10.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{h}h}h4} e5 11.d5 c5 12.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e}e1}}) 10.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e}e3}} e5 11.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d2}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{h}h7}} 12.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{a}a}d1} (White is preparing to open the game in the centre and he places his rooks accordingly...) 12...f5 (This move is quite risky, but Black's other tries are hardly any better: 12...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}c}c7} 13.b4 a5 14.b5±; 12...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e}e}e7} 13.c5 dxc5 14.dxe5 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}c7}} 15.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}d6} ±; 14...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}xe}e5} 15.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}xe}e5} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}xe}e5} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{a}a}a6} bxa6 17.f4 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{g}g7}} 18.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f}f2}±; 17...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}c}c3} 18.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}c}c3} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}e}e4} 19.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f1}}±; 12...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e}e8}} 13.d5 c5 14.g3 f5 15.exf5 gxf5 16.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{h}h}h4} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f6}} 17.f3± with the idea to follow with 18.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}d3}.) 13.dxe5 dxe5 14.exf5 gxf5 15.g3! (This is an excellent positional move, because White thus ensures the h4-square for his knight. It will support from there the pressure along the b1-h7 diagonal and it will create plenty of tactical threats.) 15...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f6}} (After 15...f4 16.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}c}c2}+ \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{g}g}8} 17.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}c}c1}, the vulnerability of the b1--h7 diagonal will create many problems for Black.) 16.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{h}h}h4} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}c5}! (It is premature once again for Black to try: 16...f4 17.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}c}c2}+ \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{g}g}8} 18.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}3} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{b}b}4} 19.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{h}h}h7}+ \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f}f7} 20.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e}e}e2}--; or 19...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{h}h}8} 20.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{b}b}1}!→ because White's attack is extremely dangerous and possibly winning.) 17.b4 e4 (17...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}d6}?? 18.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}f}f5} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}f}f5} 19.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}3}+) 18.bxc5 \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}c}c3}, Chuchelov -- Glek, Bad Zwesten 2000 and here White's most energetic line seems to be: 19.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}d6} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f6}} (Or 19...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}f}f6} 20.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f4}} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f8}} 21.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}d6}± with the idea for him to follow with 22.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}h}h6}.) 20.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}d5± and he creates the unpleasant threat -- 21.f3.

\hfill \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{g}g}5} h6}}}

Or 9...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{c}c}c7} 10.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}d2} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e}e8}}, Alcock -- Carlino, Email 2000 and here after the move 11.d5±, Black's knights are completely deprived of any reliable squares.

10.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{e}e3}} e5 11.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{d}d}d2} \textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{h}h7}}

11...\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{f}f}f4}?! -- this pawn-sacrifice is not well justified. 12.\textit{\textbf{\textcolor{red}{x}f}f4}
13.\(\text{B}f6\) b6 14.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{B}b7\) 15.\(d5\) (Black intends to follow with 15...exd4, so White closes the centre.)
15...\(\text{B}f6\) 16.\(\text{B}d3\) c5, Shchekachev – Glek, Russia 1998. Here, it was possible for White to continue with 17.\(\text{B}c2\), with the idea in case of 17...\(\text{B}e7\) 18.\(\text{B}a4\) \(\text{B}g8\) to emphasize the vulnerability of the light squares in Black’s camp with the help of the line: 19.\(\text{B}c6\) f5 20.\(\text{B}xf5\) gxf5 21.\(\text{B}b5\)±.

d) 6...\(\text{B}c6\)

It is not a good idea for Black to start attacking the d4-square in that fashion.

7.d5

After that move, Black has a problem to find a comfortable place for his knight to go back to.

7...\(\text{B}b8\)

The other possible retreats are not any better either.

7...\(\text{b}5\) 8.\(\text{B}d2\) (After 8.\(\text{B}b4\) \(\text{B}xc4\) 9.\(\text{B}xc4\) \(\text{B}xe4\) 10.\(\text{B}xe4\) \(\text{B}xa1\)∞, White’s two knights should be stronger than Black’s rook and two pawns, but White cannot prove that so easily, because Black preserves good chances to build a powerful pawn-centre, Huss – Dekan, Brocco 1991) 8...c5 (In case of: 8...b6?! 9.\(\text{B}b4\) 10.\(\text{B}c1\)± White has a stable edge, due to the weakness of the c6-square and Black’s “bad” knight on b7.) 9.0–0 – see 6...c5 7.0–0 \(\text{B}c6\) 8.d5 \(\text{B}a5\) 9.\(\text{B}d2\).

It is insufficient for Black to try: 7...\(\text{B}b4\) 8.0–0. White is much ahead of his opponent in the development of his initiative. 8...a5 (About 8...\(\text{B}a6\) – see 7...\(\text{B}b8\); as for 8...c5 9.\(\text{B}f4\) – see 6...c5 7.0–0 \(\text{B}c6\) 8.d5 \(\text{B}b4\) 9.\(\text{B}f4\); in answer to 8...e5 9.a3 \(\text{B}a6\), Evelev – I.Zaitsev, Moscow 2000, it seems quite reasonable for White to transpose in a standard fashion
into the Petrosian system with: 10.\(\text{Qg5}!\) h6 11.\(\text{Qh4}\pm\), he has two extra tempi and despite the fact that the move – a3 does not seem to be very useful, but still White has the advantage; 8...c6 9.\(\text{Qe3}\) \(\text{Qe8}\), Tan Chun – Schnellenpfeil, Singapore 1995, 10.\(\text{Qd2}\pm\); 8...d7 9.\(\text{Qg5}\) \(\text{Qc5}\) 10.\(\text{Qd2}\) f5 11.\(\text{Qxf5}\) \(\text{Qxf5}\) 12.\(\text{Qd4}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) 13.\(\text{Qad1}\pm\) J.Adamski – T.Kempinski, Krynica 1998; in case of 8...\(\text{Qg4}\), it deserves attention for White to follow with 9.\(\text{Qg5}!\).) 9.\(\text{Qe3}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) (Or 9...e6 10.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qe8}\), Doroshkievich – Odeev, USSR 1989, 11.a3 \(\text{Qa6}\) 12.f4\pm; 9...e5 10.a3 \(\text{Qa6}\) 11.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qd7}\), Shikerov – N.Dimitrov, Sofia 1992 and here after 12.\(\text{Qb1}\) \(\text{Qe7}\) 13.b4\pm Black has nothing to oppose White’s increasing queenside initiative with. Once again in answer to 9...\(\text{Qg4}\), Franke – Kos- sa, Berlin 1988, White preserves a long-lasting initiative with the move – 10.\(\text{Qg5}!\); 9...\(\text{Qg4}\), F.Levin – H.Schmidt, Germany 2003, 10.\(\text{Qd4}\) e5 11.dxe6 \(\text{fxe6}\) 12.\(\text{Qxg7}\) \(\text{Qxg7}\) 13.h3\±; 10.\(\text{Qd4}\) c5 11.\(\text{Qdb5}\) \(\text{Qa6}\) 12.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qc7}\) 13.a4 \(\text{Qxb5}\) 14.axb5 b6 15.\(\text{Qh6}\) (White exchanges the dark-squared bishops and he thus emphasizes the effect of the oncoming pawn-break in the centre – e4-e5.) 15...\(\text{Qg4}\) 16.\(\text{Qxg7}\) \(\text{Qxg7}\) 17.f4 f6 18.e5 dxe5 19.\(\text{Qxg4}\) \(\text{Qxg4}\) 20.\(\text{fxe5}\). In the game Hertneck – Hackbarth, Aschah 1997, Black failed to protect his king.

7...\(\text{Qe5}\) 8.\(\text{Qxe5}\) dxe5 9.0–0 e6 (The other moves for Black here do not influence the correct evaluation of the position: 9...\(\text{Qe8}\) 10.\(\text{Qe3}\) b6?! 11.b4\pm – see 9...b6; 10...f5 11.f3 e6 12.c5 \(\text{exd5}\) 13.\(\text{Qxd5}\)\pm \(\text{Qxd5}\) 14.\(\text{Qxd5}\) c6 15.\(\text{Qc4}\pm\) Kovalevsky – Miroshnichenko, Moscow 1995; 11...f4 12.\(\text{Qf2}\) g5 13.c5 \(\text{Qf6}\) 14.\(\text{Qb3}\) \(\text{Qh8}\) 15.\(\text{Qfd1}\) h5 16.\(\text{Qd3}\) \(\text{Qg8}\) 17.\(\text{Qad1}\) \(\text{Qe8}\) 18.\(\text{Qd6}\pm\) Acceleb Muniz – Muniz Giron, Spain 1989; 13...\(\text{Qh8}\) 14.\(\text{Qb3}\) \(\text{Qf6}\) 15.\(\text{Qb5}\) \(\text{Qg6}\) 16.g4 a6 17.\(\text{Qa3}\pm\) Csala – Pirklova, Prague 2003; 9...\(\text{h6}\)? – this is a typical loss of time; nevertheless it had been tested in several games so far 10.\(\text{Qe3}\pm\); 9...b6?! 10.0–0 \(\text{Qe8}\) 11.a4 \(\text{Qd6}\) 12.a5\± \(\text{Qa6}\)? 13.axb6 axb6 14.\(\text{Qxa6}\)++ Nikcevic – Austin, Sitges 1997; 10...\(\text{Qb7}\) 11.\(\text{b4}\) a5 12.a3 \(\text{Qd7}\) 13.\(\text{Qb3}\pm\) Guilman – Lemieux, Quebec 2001; 10...e6 11.\(\text{Qc1}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) 12.\(\text{Qf3}\) \(\text{Qd8}\), Raffar – Golsorkhi, Teheran 2002, 13.\(\text{dx6}\) \(\text{fxe6}\) 14.\(\text{Qc5}\pm\); 9...c6 10.\(\text{Qg5}!\) h6 11.\(\text{Qe3}\) \(\text{Qc7}\) 12.\(\text{Qd2}\) \(\text{Qh7}\) 13.\(\text{Qf3}\) \(\text{Qe8}\) 14.\(\text{Qad1}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) 15.\(\text{b4}\pm\) Kluger – Sax, Hungary 1972; 10...\(\text{Qd6}\) 11.a3 e6 12.\(\text{Qxc6}\) \(\text{Qxc6}\) 13.\(\text{Qd3}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) 14.\(\text{Qfd1}\pm\) Chabot – Zafirov, Montreal 2004.) 10.\(\text{Qe3}\) \(\text{Qxd5}\) (Black is in a serious trouble after his other possibilities too: 10...\(\text{Qa6}\) 11.\(\text{Qc2}\) \(\text{Qe7}\) 12.\(\text{Qac1}\) \(\text{Qe8}\) 13.\(\text{Qfd1}\) f5 14.\(\text{Qxe6}\) \(\text{Qxe6}\) 15.\(\text{Qd5}\) \(\text{Qf7}\) 16.\(\text{Qxf5}\) gxf5 17.\(\text{Qc5}\pm\) Shirov – Desjardins, North Bay 1994; 10...\(\text{Qe8}\) 11.\(\text{Qc1}\) b6 12.\(\text{Qb7}\) 13.\(\text{Qb3}\) c6 14.\(\text{Qfd1}\) \(\text{Qxd5}\) 15.\(\text{Qxd5}\) \(\text{Qxd5}\) 16.\(\text{Qxd5}\) \(\text{Qxd5}\) 17.\(\text{Qxd5}\) \(\text{Qd6}\) 18.\(\text{Qb5}\) \(\text{Qed8}\)
Black has tried numerous moves in that position, but he has failed to equalize throughout.

We will deal in details with: d1) 8...\(\mathcal{B}d7\), d2) 8...e5 and d3) 8...c6.

He has also tested the lines:

8...e8 9.e3 e6 (about 9...\(\mathcal{B}d7\) – see 8...\(\mathcal{B}d7\) 10.dxe6 \(\mathcal{Q}xe6\) 11.\(\mathcal{Q}d4\) \(\mathcal{Q}d7\) 12.f3 \(\mathcal{Q}c6\) 13.\(\mathcal{Q}d2\) a6?!), Black has reached a standard position of the King's Indian Defence, in the variation with the exchange on d4, except that he has lost several tempi and therefore he is forced to choose a quite dubious plan. 14.\(\mathcal{Q}d1\) \(\mathcal{B}b8\) 15.\(\mathcal{Q}ac1\) b5 16.\(\mathcal{Q}d5\) V.Hort – Westerinen, Wijk aan Zee 1970;

8...e6 9.\(\mathcal{C}c2\), White frees the d1-square for his rook. 9...c6 10.dxe6 \(\mathcal{Q}xe6\) 11.\(\mathcal{Q}d1\) \(\mathcal{W}e7\) 12.\(\mathcal{Q}f4\) \(\mathcal{E}d8\) 13.\(\mathcal{Q}d2\). Now, Black must protect his d6-pawn, so his pieces are squeezed and White's pressure gradually increases. 13... \(\mathcal{Q}a6\) 14.\(\mathcal{Q}ad1\) \(\mathcal{Q}e8\) 15.a3 \(\mathcal{H}e6\) 16.\(\mathcal{Q}d4\) \(\mathcal{Q}d7\) 17.b4 \(\mathcal{Q}ac7\) 18.\(\mathcal{Q}b3\) \(\mathcal{Q}e6\) 19.\(\mathcal{Q}g3\) \(\mathcal{Q}ac8\) 20.f3 \(\mathcal{Q}a8\) 21.\(\mathcal{Q}f2\) \(\mathcal{Q}b6\) 22.\(\mathcal{Q}a5\). Black had great problems to get free from White's positional bind in the centre and on the queenside in the game L.Schmid – Westerinen, Havana 1967;

8...a5 – This move only weakens the b5-square, because Black cannot establish his knight on c5 anyway. 9.e3 \(\mathcal{Q}bd7\) (After: 9... \(\mathcal{Q}a6\) 10.\(\mathcal{Q}d2\) e5 11.a3 \(\mathcal{H}e6\) 12.\(\mathcal{H}b4\), White managed to prepare the
thematic pawn-advance on the queenside – b2-b4, while Black failed to do anything constructive on the opposite side of the board, Kecskes – Mate, Budapest 1995.) 10.♗c2 ♗c5 10...♕e8?! 11.♕ad1±) 11.♕ad1 b6 12.a3 ♗g4 13.♗d4 ♗f6 14.b4± Linestrom – Rotariu, corr. 1995, White has a huge space advantage and a clear-cut plan for actions in the centre and on the queenside, so he maintains a stable edge;

8...♗g4 – Black presents his opponent with a couple of bishops with that move and he does not obtain anything in return. 9.h3 ♗xf3 10.♗xf3 ♗bd7 11.♗e3 c6 (After 11...e5 12.b4 ♗e8 13.c5 f5 14.c6± Likavsky – Felcir, Tatranske Zruby 2001 – White has dangerous threats in the centre and on the queenside and Black can hardly create any counterplay. Following 11...c5 12.♗d2±, there arises the pawn-structure of the Benoni Defence and White seizes the initiative on both sides of the board, while Black has nothing to counter that with, Pham Minh – Phung Nguyen, Hanoi 2002. After: 11...a5 12.♗c1 b6 13.a3 h6 14.♗c2 ♗h7 15.b4±, White’s queenside offensive is quite clear-cut, while Black is almost helpless against it, Huss – Mikavica, Zurich 1989.) 12.♗b3 ♗c7 13.♗ac1 ♗fe8 14.a3 e6 15.dxe6 ♗xe6 16.♗fd1 ♗eb8 17.♗c2 a5 18.♗a4 ♗e8 19.♗b1 ♗b7 20.g3 ♗ab8 21.b3± Jansa – Nikolic, Vrnjacka Banja 1978. Black has no active possibilities. White’s plan is to double the rooks on the d-file and then to prepare patiently his attack on the kingside.

8...♗a6 9.♗e3 ♗d7 (Now, it is so very obvious that White is much ahead in the standard actions on the opposite sides of the board: 9...e5 10.♗d2 ♗e8 11.♗b1 f5 12.f3 f4 13.♗f2 g5 14.b4 h5 15.c5 ♗b8 16.♗c4± Brumen – Sereinig, Finkenstein 1993. It is also too dubious for Black to transpose here into the Benoni Defence – 9...c5 10.♗d2 b6 11.f4 ♗d7, Kamenskaja – O.Sergeeva, Russia 2002, 12.♗f3±. White obtains a huge space advantage after: 9...♗g4 10.♗d4 e5 11.dxe6 ♗xe6 12.♗xg7 ♗xg7 13.♗d4± Molina – K.Vera, La Paz 2002. It is hardly better for Black to try: 9...♗c5 10.♗c2 a5 11.♗ad1 ♗g4 12.♗d4 f6 13.h3 ♗e5 14.♗xe5 fxe5 15.♗e3± Gritsak – G.Kuzmin, Swidnica 1999, because White has a clear standard plan to develop his initiative on the queenside, connected with the pawn-advance b4, while Black has problems to create any counterplay; or 10...♗g4 11.♗d4 e5 12.dxe6 ♗xe6 13.♗xg7 ♗xg7 14.♗ad1± and White preserves a slight but stable edge thanks to his extra space and his possibilities for active actions in the centre as well as on both sides of the board, Baumgartner – Tibbert, corr. 1989. White obtained a great lead in development and dominance in the centre after: 9...c6
10.h3 \(\text{c5} \ 11.\text{c2 a5 12.\text{fd1 cxd5 13.cxd5 \text{fd7 14.f4c1± V.Popov – N.Nikolaev, Peterhof 2005.)}}
10.\text{ec1 \text{e8 11.a3 e6 12.dxe6 (It seemed more logical for White to play: 12.b4! \text{exd5 13.exd5± and he would have achieved an overwhelming advantage thanks to Black’s miserable knight on the a6-square.) 12...\text{exe6 13.d\text{d4 \text{e8 14.f3, but even here Black has the difficulties that are typical for the variations of the King’s Indian Defence in which he exchanges on d4, Kiriakov – Nisipeanu, Santo Domingo 2003;})}}}

8...c5 – Now, White has several extra tempi and he can quickly and easily occupy the centre in this position of the Benoni Defence. 9.h3 – This is a useful prophylactic move. Black has reacted differently against it in practice, but White obtains an obvious advantage in all the variations:

9...\text{a6 10.f4 \text{c7 11.e5± White occupied the centre in the game Strikovic – Del Rey, Mandariz 1995;}}

9...\text{bd7 10.f4 \text{b6 (Or 10...\text{e8 11.d2 a6 12.a4 \text{b8 13.f4 \text{b6 14.dad1± Kraai – Diaz, Minneapolis 2005.) 11.a5, Siebrecht – Dubois, Lenk 1994, 12.f4d2± Black has problems creating counterplay;}}}

9...h6 10.f4 \text{bd7 11.f1c2 \text{h7 12.ea1 \text{e5, Bewersdorff – Kaban, Hessen 1990, 13.dxe5 14.e3 b6 15.a3±;}}}

9...e5 10.dxe6 fxe6 (After: 10...\text{exe6 11.f4 \text{b6 12.b3 \text{c6, Frumson – Ilkin, Tula 2004, the simple move – 13.f4f4 poses great difficulties to Black, because his queenside is not developed yet and his d6-pawn is weak.) 11.d3 \text{e7, Petkov – Bunis, Bankia 1991, Black’s pawns are so weak now that White should logically attack them immediately with: 12.d2 c6 13.ad1 \text{d8 14.f4±;}}}

9...a6 10.f4 \text{bd7 11.a1 e8, Titz – Pilz, Austria 1994, 12.d2±;}}

9...e8 10.d3 a6 11.a4 b6 12.f4 \text{bd7 13.d2± Kopjonkin – Gorda, Gyongyos 1995;}}

After: 9...e6 10.a1 b6 11.dxe6 fxe6 12.e5 \text{dxe5 13.ad8 \text{d8 14.e5 b7 15.f3±, there arose a very pleasant endgame for White in which he had an easy plan to attack Black’s vulnerable e6-pawn in the game Esirkepova – T.Vasilevich, Medellin 1996;}}

9...b5?! This transposition into the Volga Gambit without two tempi seems to be more than dubious: 10.xb5 a6 11.a4 axb5 12.xb5± Saric – Topalovic, Kastav 2001.

\[d1\] 8...\text{bd7 9.e3 \text{g4}

Black has tried plenty of different moves in this position, but his loss of two tempi cannot be compensated at all.

About 9...c6 – see 8...c6; as for 9...d5 – see 8...a6.

Concerning 9...d5 10.\text{c2 – see 8...a6 9.e3 \text{c5 10.c2.}}
After 9...e6 10.\textit{\v{c}}c2 a6 11.a\textit{\v{d}}d1 \textit{\v{w}}e8 12.b4 \textit{\v{q}}g4 13.\textit{\v{c}}c1 e5, Zimmer – Puster, Germany 1996, the simplest method for White to develop his initiative on the queenside is to sacrifice temporarily a pawn with: 14.c5!? dxc5 15.bxc5 \textit{\v{d}}xc5 16.\textit{\v{a}}a3±.

In case of: 9...\textit{\v{g}}e8 10.\textit{\v{c}}c2 c5 11.\textit{\v{d}}d2 a6 12.a\textit{\v{d}}d1 \textit{\v{w}}c7 13.h3 e6 14.dxe6 fxe6 15.\textit{\v{f}}f3± White has a huge lead in development and an easy game against Black's vulnerable central pawns, Tisdall – Ng, Jakarta 1997.

9...c5 10.\textit{\v{d}}d2 \textit{\v{e}}e5 11.h3 a6 12.a4 b6 13.f4± White has a complete control over the centre and that guarantees him a stable advantage, Lysyj – Turdialiev, Denizli 2003.

9...a5 10.\textit{\v{c}}c2 \textit{\v{g}}g4, Newman – Kinkelin, corr. 2004, 11.\textit{\v{d}}d4 e5 12.dxe6 fxe6 13.\textit{\v{d}}xg7 \textit{\v{w}}xg7 14.\textit{\v{d}}d4±.

The move 9...e5 leads to the habitual pawn-structure of the King's Indian Defence, but it does not promise Black anything optimistic under the circumstances: 10.\textit{\v{d}}d2 \textit{\v{e}}e8 (Or 10...\textit{\v{h}}h8 11.b4 \textit{\v{d}}e8 12.c5 f5 13.f3± Kleeschtaetzky – H.Urban, Germany 1995) 11.b4 f5 (Black's eventual activity on the queenside only facilitates the development of White's initiative there: 11...a5, Brond – Stella, Mar del Plata 1967, 12.a3 f5 13.f3 f4 14.\textit{\v{f}}f2± 12.f3 f4 13.\textit{\v{f}}f2 g5 14.c5 \textit{\v{d}}f6, J.Kaplan – Craske, Stockholm 1969 and after the natural reaction – 15.\textit{\v{c}}4±, White is obviously ahead in the process of creating effective threats.

10.\textit{\v{d}}d4 \textit{\v{d}}g6

It is even worse for Black to continue here with: 10...\textit{\v{g}}e5 11.\textit{\v{d}}x e5 \textit{\v{d}}xe5 12.c5± \textit{\v{d}}d7?? 13.f4 1–0 Azevedo – Batista, corr. 1998, 11...dxe5 12.\textit{\v{e}}e3 f5 13.f3 \textit{\v{d}}f6 14.c5± and White's initiative on the queenside and in the centre is much faster than Black's possible kingside counterplay, Belli Pino – Carvajal, La Paz 2000.

\begin{center}
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\end{center}

11.h3 c5 12.\textit{\v{e}}e3 a6 13.\textit{\v{w}}d2± and White had a great advantage in the centre in the game Salata – Cierny, Rimavska Sobota 1975.

d2) 8...e5

Black goes back to positions with the standard King's Indian pawn-structure, but he has lost a couple of tempi and he cannot hope to remain unpunished.

9.\textit{\v{g}}5!

This is a quite typical resource for White in similar pawn-constructions. There arose a position from the Petrovian system with two extra tempi for White.
His main idea is to either hamper Black’s thematic pawn-advance — f7-f5, or to provoke a weakening of the light squares after Black pushes h7-h6 and g7-g5. The vulnerability of the f5-square and the h3-c8 diagonal will become a very important factor in that case. Meanwhile, White develops a powerful initiative on the queenside — his knight from f3 goes usually to d2 and from there it can be deployed to the queenside, or even (in case Black weakens his f5-square) back to the kingside.

9...h6

Or 9...a5 10.dıd2 dıa6 11.dı d7, Panno – Diez del Corral, Siegen 1970, 12.ıb1±.

9...dıbd7 10.0–0 a6 (about 10...h6 11.dıh4 – see 9...h6) 11.b4 c5?! – This move only facilitates the development of White’s queenside initiative, because it weakens considerably Black’s d6-pawn – 12.dxc6 bxc6 13.dıb3 h6 14.dıe3 ıc7 15.dıd2 dıh7 16.ıfd1± Gonzalez Zamora – Soto, Merida 1998.

10.dıh4 g5

About 10...a6 11.dıd2 ıe8 12.b4 ıbd7 – 13.dıb3 – see 10...dıbd7; about 10...ıe8 11.dıd2 a6 12.b4 ıbd7 13.dıb3 – see 10...dıbd7.

10...a5 11.dıd2 ıa6 (Or 11...dıd7 12.b3 ıa6 13.a3 ıe8, Agrifoglio – Venturelli, Luginiana 1998, 14.ıb1±) 12.a3 ıd7 13.ıb1 c5 14.dıb5 ıb6, Gonzalez Garcia – S.Farago, Budapest 1997, Black has no counterplay whatsoever and it seems reasonable for White to prepare a breakthrough in the centre: 15.ıg3 g5 (It is worse for Black to opt for: 15...ıc7 16.ıf4±) 16.ıc2 ıc7 17.ıc3 a4 18.ıe1±. White’s knight will be redeployed to the e3-square and later he will try to open files on the queenside with the help of the move b2-b3 at an opportune moment.

10...dıbd7 11.dıd2 a6 (About 11...g5 12.ıg3 ıh7 13.ıg4! – see 10.g5 11.ıg3 ıbd7 12.dıd2 ıh7 13.ıg4!); 11...ıe8 12.b4 ıf8 13.f3 g5 14.ıf2± Galayas – B.Nagy, Budapest 2003; 11...c5 12.a3 ıe8 13.b4 a6 14.ıb3 b6 15.ıb1 ıc7 16.ıd2 ıh7 17.f3± Olsen – Abdullah, Thessaloniki 1988.) 12.b4 ıe8 13.ıb3 ıh7 14.c5 ıg5 15.f3 fı 16.ıf2 ıf6 17.ıd2 ıh5 18.ıe1 ıf4 19.ıf1±. White’s kingside is reliably protected, while he will have sooner or later the quite comfortable b6-square for the penetration of his pieces, Huss – Hamed, Thessaloniki 1984.

11.ıg3 ıh5

11...ıh7?! Handke – Ortmeyer, Germany 1997, this is not Black’s best square for his knight, because it will not appear on g5 anyway: 12.dıd2 f5 13.exf5 ıxf5 14.ıg4±.

It is even worse for Black to play here: 11...dıbd7 12.dıd2 ıh7 13.ıg4! ıc5 14.ıxc8 ıxc8 15.ıe2 ıe8 16.b4± Malich – Calero, Zinnowitz 1967.

12.dıd2 ıf4

Or 12...ıxg3 13.fxg3! ıd7 14.
\(4.e4 \, d6 \, 5.d4 \, 0-0 \, 6.e2\)

\(g4 \, f6 \, 15.xc8 \, xxc8, \text{El Chamie} - \text{Shurgulaia, Spain 1998, 16.} \text{e2}\)
\(c6 \, 17.\text{xf5}\)

\(13.\text{g4} \, \text{d7}\)

Black's light squares are so vulnerable that White maintains a stable advantage in the variation:
\(13...\text{xg4} \, 14.\text{xg4} \, \text{d7} \, 15.h4 \, \text{f6} \, 16.\text{xf5} \, \text{c8} \, 17.\text{hxg5} \, \text{xf5} \, 18.\text{exf5} \, \text{hxg5}, \text{Beitar} - \text{Trisa Ard, La Valetta 1980, 19.} \text{f6e1} \, \text{d3} \, 20.\text{d3} \, \text{c5} \, 21.f3\)

\(14.f3 \, a6\)

Black cannot change much with the line: \(14...\text{e8} \, 15.\text{xf2} \, \text{f8} \, 16.\text{xe3}\). O’Kelly – Porreca, Bari 1972; or \(14...\text{f6} \, 15.\text{xc8} \, \text{xc8} \, 16.\text{xe1} \, c6 \, 17.\text{d3}! - \) and White’s knight goes to the queenside. \(17...\text{c5} \, 18.\text{d2}! \). Now, the situation has changed entirely and Black has no queenside counterplay at all and the knight will be redeployed on the kingside - to the f5-outpost! \(18...\text{6h5} \, 19.\text{f1} \, a6 \, 20.\text{d3}\) Strauss – Labrador, Los Angeles 1991.

\(15.b4 \, \text{f6} \, 16.\text{xc8}\) and White gradually made a proper use of the vulnerability of the light squares in Black's camp in the game O’Kelly – G.Garcia, Havana 1969.

\(d3\)

\(8...\text{e6} \, 9.\text{d3}\)

\(9...\text{e6} \, 10.\text{dxe6} \, \text{xe6} \, 11.\text{c2} \, \text{e6} \, 12.\text{xexe6} \, \text{hxe6} \) (It is disaster for Black to play \(12...\text{fxe6}?, \) because of \(13.\text{e5}\)). \(13.\text{d2} \, \text{d6} \, 14.\text{e1}\)

\(15.b3 \, \text{a5} \, 16.\text{f3} \, \text{d7} \, 17.\text{a4} \, \text{d2} \, 18.\text{xd2} \, \text{fbd8} \, 19.\text{a3}\). White has neutralized his opponent’s threat to break through on the queenside, while the weakness of Black’s d6-pawn will remain a telling factor in the future, Dautov – Gabdakhmanov, Podolsk 1993.

In case of: \(9...\text{e6} \, 10.\text{dxe6} \, \text{xe6}, \) White's simplest reaction is \(11.\text{d4}\) with a slight but stable edge. It is weaker for him to try \(11.\text{d2}, \) because after: \(11...\text{g4} \, 12.\text{h4} \, \text{e5} \, 13.\text{b3} \, \text{xf3}+ \, 14.\text{xf3} \, \text{xe5} \, 15.\text{ac1} \, \text{d7} \, 16.\text{e3} \, \text{a5=}, \) Black’s position is quite reliable, Kosanski – Klinger, Werfen 1992.

\(9...\text{g4} \, 10.\text{h3} \, \text{xf3} \, 11.\text{xf3} \, \text{f7} \) (or \(11...\text{a5} \, 12.\text{ec1} \, \text{fd7} \, 13.\text{e1}\) Delchev – Foisor, Mangalia 1992) \(12.\text{d2} \, a5 \, 13.\text{ab1} \, \text{a6} \, 14.\text{fc1} \, \text{ac5} \, 15.b3 \, \text{b6} \, 16.a3.\) White’s queenside initiative is running completely unopposed, Tukmakov – Foisor, Zaragoza, 1993.

\(10.h3 \, \text{c5}\)

About \(10...\text{cxd4} \, 11.\text{cxd4} \, \text{c5} \, 12.\text{c2} – \) see \(10...\text{c5} \, 11.\text{c2} \, \text{cxd5} \, 12.\text{cxd5}.

After \(10...\text{e8} \, 11.\text{c1} \, a6 \, 12.\text{dxe6!} \, \text{bxc6} \, 13.c5 \, \text{dxc5} \, 14.\text{xc5}\)
\( \text{c7, A.Yegiazarian – Kalantarjan, Yerevan 1995, Black’s paws are in}
ruins and his pieces are discoordinated. White can emphasize his
advantage with the simple and calm move – 15.\text{e}3\pm. \\
Following: 10...\text{wc7 11.}\text{e}1 \text{dc5 12.e5 ffe4 13.}\text{xe4 dxe4 14.}\text{d3}
\text{dc5 15.}\text{f1 cxd5 16.cxd5 a5 17.}\text{c1± White has occupied some}
additional space, he dominates in the centre and he can develop
his initiative on both sides of the board, Arutiunov – Bannik, Yere-
vanc 1981. \\
In case of 10...\text{wa5 11.}\text{e}1 \text{c5 - Black again transposes to the}
Benoni Defence. 12.a3 a6 13.\text{d2 b5 14.b4! cxb4 (His compensation}
for the queen is evidently insufficient after: 14...\text{xa3 15.e5 dxe5}
16.\text{a1 xb4 17.fb1 e4 18.}\text{g5 bc4 19.}\text{a4! ±) 15.axb4 \text{xb4 16.}
}\text{b1±. Now, all the files on the}
quenside are opened and that is
definitely in favour of White, be-
cause of his superior development
and extra space, Fajardo – Majul,
Barranquilla 1999. \\
After 10...a6 11.a4 cxd5 12.cxd5
\text{wa5 13.}\text{d2 c5, Basin – Thom-
as, Detroit 1991, Black has cre-
ated plenty of weaknesses on his}
quenside and White’s most logi-
cal line here seems to be: 14.\text{c4}
\text{c7 15.}\text{c2±. He has good chan-
ces to occupy the only open file and}
his prospects in the centre and on
the kingside are just excellent.}

11.\text{c2 cxd5}
About 11...a5 12.\text{fd1 – see 8...}
\text{a6 9.}\text{e3 c6 10.h3 d5 11.}\text{c2 a5}
12.\text{fd1.}

12.\text{cxd5 d7, H.Kramer –}
L.Szabo, Zaanstreek 1946 (Or 12...
a5 13.\text{fd1 d7 14.}\text{xc5 dxc5 15.e5±}
Lelchuk – Zatulovskaya, Alma-
Ata 1980). Now, White can seize
the initiative on the queenside
with: 13.\text{b4 a6 14.}\text{b3±.}

Conclusion

All the lines, which we have analyzed in this chapter, can be noted
for the common feature that Black develops his pieces according to a
certain plan. He however, practically ignores White’s actions and the
fight for the centre and that can be seldom justifiable. Therefore, in
general, we can conclude that White obtains a clear advantage with
a logical play in the centre, without being afraid to enter some other
opening schemes like the Maroczy system, or the Benoni Defence.
All these transpositions usually lead to unfavourable situations for
Black.
Chapter 12  
1.dıf3 dıf6 2.c4 g6 3.dıc3 dıg7 4.e4 d6 5.d4 0–0 6.dıe2 c5

7.0–0

After 7.d5, White should be prepared to enter the basic schemes of the Benoni Defence.

We will analyze now a) 7...dıbd7, b) 7...asıa6, c) 7...gıg4 and d) 7...asıc6, although it is quite possible that Black's best decision here, might have been to transpose to the Maroczy system with: 7...cxd4 8.dıxd4 (see Book 3).

Black has also tested:

7...asıfd7?! 8.asıe3 asıc6 9.d5 asıce5 10.dıd2!, White is not obliged to trade knight. 10...f5 11.f4 asıg4 12.asıxg4 fxg4 13.asıxg4 asıe5 14.asıe2 asıg4, Nedobora – Galarza, Oviedo 1991 (It is worse for Black to play:

14... gıg4 15.asıe1 asıd3 16.asıb1 asıxc3 17.asıxd3 gıg7 18.asıab1±, 15.e5! and White has the initiative;


7...b6 – Black intends to exchange on d4 and to develop his bishop on b7. 8.d5??. That solid move is preferable to the risky 8.e5, moreover that now Black's move b7-b6, turns out to be obsolete. 8...a6 9.asıf4 ąh5 10.asıg5 h6 11.asıe3± Keitlinghaus – Gabriel, Baden-Baden 1999;

7...asıe8 8.asıe1 cxd4 ( or 8... gıg4 9.ıxc5 ıxc5 10.e5 ıfd7 11.lıh3 ıf5 12.ıf4 ıc6 13.ıf1 ıb4 14.g4 ıe6 15.ıe2 ıa5 16.a3 ıc6 17.ıd5 ıac8 18.b4 ıd8 19.ıad1±

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Spraggett – Martinovic, Lugano 1985; It is hardly better for Black to continue with: 14...\texttt{\&}c2 15.\texttt{\&}d2 \texttt{\&}f8 16.\texttt{\&}d5\pm 9.\texttt{\&}xd4 – Now, the game transposes to the Maroczy system with a not so useful move for Black – \texttt{\&}e8. 9...\texttt{\&}c6 (After: 9...a6 10.\texttt{\&}e3 b6 11.f3 \texttt{\&}b7 12.\texttt{\&}d2 \texttt{\&}bd7, S.Furman – U.Andersson, Bad Lauterberg 1977, it deserves attention for White to continue with his queenside initiative: 13.a4!? \texttt{\&}c8 14.a5\upr) 10.\texttt{\&}d2 \texttt{\&}d7 (It is premature for Black to try: 10...\texttt{\&}xd4 11.\texttt{\&}xd4 \texttt{\&}d7 12.b4\pm; in answer to 10...a6, White should better follow with 11.\texttt{\&}b3\pm, avoiding exchanges and planning after the deployment of his rooks on d1 and c1, to push c4-c5. He managed to obtain the advantage, thanks to the vulnerability of his opponent’s d6-pawn, too after: 11.\texttt{\&}d2 \texttt{\&}g4 12.\texttt{\&}xg4 \texttt{\&}xg4 13.\texttt{\&}xc6 bxc6 14.\texttt{\&}d4 e5 15.\texttt{\&}e3 \texttt{\&}e6 16.b3 f5 17.\texttt{\&}h6 \texttt{\&}xh6 18.\texttt{\&}xh6 f4 19.\texttt{\&}ad1 \texttt{\&}e7 20.\texttt{\&}d3 \texttt{\&}ad8 21.\texttt{\&}ed1 \texttt{\&}f8 22.h4\pm M.Sorokin – Minzer, Buenos Aires 1997.) 11.\texttt{\&}d2 \texttt{\&}xd4 (It is dubious for Black to try: 11...a5?!., Wegener – Heinitz, Dresden 1992, in view of: 12.\texttt{\&}db5! \texttt{\&}c8 13.f3\pm and Black’s position is so cramped that he cannot organize any counterplay, or: 12...a4 13.f3 \texttt{\&}a5 14.\texttt{\&}f1 \texttt{\&}ac8 15.\texttt{\&}f2\pm and White wins material after attacking Black’s c4-pawn: 15...\texttt{\&}e5 16.\texttt{\&}b6 \texttt{\&}b4 17.\texttt{\&}c7\pm; 11...\texttt{\&}c8 – Black has problems creating counter chances after that move, Macchia – Mesquita, Email 2002, 12.f3 \texttt{\&}e5 13.b3 \texttt{\&}a5 14.\texttt{\&}ac1\pm 12.\texttt{\&}xd4 \texttt{\&}c6 13.\texttt{\&}d3 a5 14.\texttt{\&}ad1 a4 15.\texttt{\&}d5 \texttt{\&}d7 (After: 15...\texttt{\&}xd5 16.cxd5 \texttt{\&}g4 17.\texttt{\&}xg7 \texttt{\&}xg7 18.\texttt{\&}b5 \texttt{\&}f8 19.\texttt{\&}d4+ \texttt{\&}g8 20.\texttt{\&}xa4\pm. Black loses his a4-pawn, Strelnikov – Zavgorodniy, Kharkov 2002.) 16.\texttt{\&}xg7 \texttt{\&}xg7 17.\texttt{\&}e3 \texttt{\&}a5 (In answer to 17...e5!?., Fulgoni – Pavlovic, Biel 2003, it seems good for White to continue with: 18.\texttt{\&}b4 \texttt{\&}c5 19.\texttt{\&}c2\pm and Black can hardly defend his weak a4 and d6-pawns.) 18.\texttt{\&}c1 \texttt{\&}xd5 (or 18...\texttt{\&}e5 19.\texttt{\&}e2 f6, Gufeld – H.Wu, Kissimmee 1997, 20.\texttt{\&}h3\pm) 19.\texttt{\&}h3 \texttt{\&}f6 (19...h5 20.exd5\pm) 20.\texttt{\&}h6+ \texttt{\&}g8 21.exd5 \texttt{\&}b6 22.g4 \texttt{\&}d4 23.\texttt{\&}h4\pm (White has managed to create very dangerous threats on the kingside.) 23...\texttt{\&}xb2 (Black loses spectacularly after: 23...\texttt{\&}h5 24.\texttt{\&}xh5! gxh5 25.\texttt{\&}xh7+ \texttt{\&}xh7 26.\texttt{\&}xd4 ++) 24.g5 \texttt{\&}d7 25.\texttt{\&}g6 \texttt{\&}g7 26.\texttt{\&}xh7++ and White materialized soon his advantage in the game M.Sorokin – P.Nielsen, Cheliabinsk 1991.

\textbf{a)} 7...\texttt{\&}bd7 8.\texttt{\&}e1 a6

It is better for Black to play here: 8...\texttt{\&}xd4 9.\texttt{\&}xd4 a6 (About 9...\texttt{\&}c5 10.f3 – see 7...\texttt{\&}a6 8.\texttt{\&}e1 cxd4 9.\texttt{\&}xd4 \texttt{\&}c5 10.f3; 9...\texttt{\&}e8 10.\texttt{\&}f1 a6 11.\texttt{\&}g5 e6 12.\texttt{\&}d2 b6 13.\texttt{\&}c2 \texttt{\&}f8 14.\texttt{\&}ad1\pm Orinstein – L.Karlsson Malmo 1979.) 10.\texttt{\&}f1 e6 (In answer to 10...\texttt{\&}b8, Mishuchkov – V.Kozlov, Tbilisi 1974, White’s simplest reaction
is: 11...e3 \=e5 12.h3 \=d7 13.\=e1±, with a standard edge, thanks to his control over the centre, for example: 13...\=c6 14.\=d2 \=xd4 15.\=xd4 \=c6 16.b4±, or 15...b5 16.cxb5 axb5 17.e5 dxe5 18.\=xe5 \=e8 19.a3±) 11.\=g5 h6 12.\=e3 \=c7 13.f3 \=e5, Szittar – T.Horvath, Zalakaros 1994 and here White maintains a stable advantage with 14.\=c1 b6 (Black loses after: 14...
\=xc4? 15.\=xc4 \=xc4 16.\=d5 \=xa2 17.\=b6 \=b8 18.\=d2++) 15.\=d2 \=h7 (It is again too dangerous for Black to grab the pawn after: 15...
\=xc4 16.\=xc4 \=xc4 17.\=d5++) 16.b4 \=d8 17.\=b3±.

8...a5?! Shishkin – Belolipetsky, Tula 2001, 9.d5±.

8...\=e8?! – this move enables White to break in the centre, because Black's knight is deprived of the important e8-square to retreat to: 9.e5 dxe5 10.dxe5 \=g4 11.e6 fxe6 12.\=g5 \=gf6 13.\=xe6± Gosset – Lerat, La Fere 2002.

8...\=g4?! – that move is either a waste of time, or it leads to quite a dubious position for Black: 9.h3 (It is also good for White to follow with 9.d5, transposing to favourable variations of the Benoni Defence.) 9...cxd4 10.\=xd4 \=b6 11.\=xg4 \=xd4, Roy – Ruiz, Spain 1997, 12.\=d5 \=xf2+ 13.\=f1 \=c5 14.b4 \=d4 15.\=e7+ \=h8 16.\=h6±.

8...b6 9.d5 \=b7 (9...b5?! – Now, the transposition to the Volga Gambit without a tempo is a not well justified attempt by Black to seize the initiative: 10.cxb5 a6 11.a4 \=e8 12.\=d2 \=c7 13.\=c2 \=b7 14.a5± Michalczak – Ennis, Czech Republic 1997) 10.h3 a6 11.\=f4 h6 12.\=d2 \=h7 13.\=ad1± Harwell – Lindqvist, corr. 1996.

9.\=f1 \=c7?!

This move enables White to break in the centre.

It is also bad for Black to try: 9...e5 10.dxc5 dxc5 11.b3 \=e7 12.\=b2 \=e8 13.\=c2 \=f8 14.\=d5± Dzhakaev – Chapliev, Krasnodar 2001.

His best here line is to play: 9...cxd4 10.\=xd4 – see 8...cxd4 9.\=xd4 a6 10.\=f1.

10.e5 dxe5 11.dxe5 \=g4

12.\=d5 \=d8, Gereben – Vollmer, Zurich 1979 and now White's most energetic continuation seems to be: 13.\=g5! \=e8 (It is too bad for Black to play: 13...f6? 14.\=xe7++) 14.h3! \=h6 (He loses too after: 14...\=gx5? 15.\=xe5 \=xe5 16.\=xe5 \=xe5 17.\=xe7++) 15.e6 \=f6 (or 15...fxe6 16.\=xe6±) 16.exf7+ \=xf7 17.\=xe7± and White remains with a solid extra pawn.
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b) 7...\(\text{d6} 8.\text{e1}

8...\(cxd4\)

This is a transposition to the Maroczy system, but we have to mention that it is not under favourable circumstances for Black. In the classical case, Black usually manages to exchange a couple of knights (\(c6xd4\)) and that facilitates his defence considerably, if you have in mind his chronical lack of space.

Black has tried in practice some other moves too:

After 8...\(c7\), Amador – Privman, Philadelphia 2000, 9.dxc5 dxc5 10.\(\text{f4} 1\text{e6} 11.\text{e5} \pm\) White obtains a stable advantage by centralizing his pieces;

In answer to 8...\(b8\), Gralka – Ermenkov, Sofia 1979, White could have obtained a great advantage by occupying some more space with: 9.e5 \(g4 10.\text{exd6} \text{xd6} 11.\text{b5} \text{b6} 12.\text{f4} \pm\), or 9...dxe5 10.dxe5 \(d7 11.\text{f4} \text{c7} 12.\text{d2} \text{e6} 13.\text{ad1} \pm\); 8...\(e6\) – this move is too passive. 9.\(\text{f1} \text{c7} 10.\text{dxc5} dxc5,\) Segers – van der Brink, Netherlands 1989 and Black has great problems to avoid the immediate material losses, moreover that after 11.\(f4\) White has a superior development and he controls the centre;

8...\(b6\) – this move enables White to continue in aggressive fashion, Adamski – Filipowicz, Bydgoszcz 1990, 9.e5 dxe5 (It is even worse for Black to opt for: 9...\(g4 10.h3 \text{cxd4} 11.\text{xd4} \text{xe5} 12.\text{f4} \text{d7} 13.\text{c6} \text{e8} 14.\text{f3} \pm\), 11...dxe5 12.\(\text{c6} \text{e8} 13.\text{d5} \text{h8} 14.\text{cxe7} \pm); 10...\(d6 11.\text{exd6} \text{xd6} 12.\text{dxc5} \pm\) 10.dxe5 \(g4\) (Following: 10...\(\text{xd1} 11.\text{xd1} \text{e8} 12.\text{d5} \pm\) White's pieces are tremendously active and he dominates in the centre.) 11.\(\text{xd8} \text{xd8} 12.\text{d5} \pm;\)

8...\(\text{d7} 9.\text{d5}\) (Black will have great problems to prepare \(e7-e6\) after that move and thus White transposes to the Benoni Defence under very favourable circumstances.) 9...\(c7\) (Or 9...\(b8,\) Zika – Horejsi, Klatovy 2002, 10.h3 \(c7 11.a4 a6 12.a5 \pm\) 10.h3 a6 (It is hardly better for Black to try: 10...\(\text{fe8} 11.\text{f4} a6 12.a4 b6 13.\text{d3} \text{e5} 14.\text{dxe6} \text{fxe6} 15.\text{g5} \text{b8} 16.e5 \pm\) El Kher – Damgaard, Copenhagen 1997.) 11.a4 \(b6 12.\text{f4} \text{b8} 13.\text{e5} \text{fe8} 14.\text{e4} \pm\) and the superiority of White’s centralized pieces over Black’s forces, cornered at the edge of the board, is just striking, Beckert – Schmidbauer, Bayern 1995;

After 8...\(g4 9.h3 \text{cxd4} 10.\text{xd4} \text{e5} 11.\text{e3} \text{d7} 12.\text{d2} \text{c8} 13.b3 \text{c5} 14.\text{ad1} \pm\) Black is de-
prived of any active counterplay and his knights have no reliable outposts, moreover that he lacks space too, R.Bauer – Leeflang, Lowell 2002;

In case of: 8...£e8 9.h3 cxd4 10.£xd4 £c5 11.£f1 a6 12.b4 £e6 13.£e3± White’s space advantage allows him to operate successfully on both sides of the board and Black’s counterplay is now here in sight, Radziewicz – Krivec, Patras 1999;

8...£g4 9.d5 £c7 (Or 9...£e8 10.h3 £xf3 11.£xf3 £d7 12.£e3 £a5 13.£c2 £b4 14.£d2± Schaffer – Lieder, Bad Zwischen 2004; after: 9...e5 10.dxe6 £xe6 11.£f4 £b6 12.£d2 £ad8, Smejkal – Vokac, Austria 1992, White obtains a great advantage after: 13.£ab1!? £b4 14.a3 £c6 15.£d5±) 10.h3 £xf3 (It is worse for Black to play 10...£d7, Rubinetti – A.Needleman, Argentina 1989, 11.£f4±) 11.£xf3 £b8 (It is hardly any better for Black to follow with: 11...£d7 12.£e2 e6 13.£e3 exd5 14.exd5 £e8 15.£d2 £f6 16.£g5 £d7, Peralta – G.Needleman, Buenos Aires 2006, 17.£f4 £e5 18.£xf6 £xf5 19.£g3 £xf6 20.£e4, and White wins the exchange; or: 12...£b8 13.£f4 a6 14.a4 h6 15.£d2 £h7 16.£a3 £e5 17.a5 b5 18.axb6 £xb6 19.£a4 £b4 20.£c2± Warisch – Pleyer, Bayern 2001) 12.£e2 a6 (12...e6 13.£g5! h6 14.£e3 exd5 15.exd5 a6 16.a4 £e8, Rogozenko – Ionescu, Romania 1998, 17.£d2. White defends against the eventual exchange-sacrifice on e3 just in case. 17...£h7 18.£ab1 £d7 19.£f4! White deflects his opponent’s knight away from the c5-outpost. 19...£e5 20.b4±) 13.a4 b6 (About 13...e6 14.£g5 h6, Dombai – I.Almasi, Hungary 2003, 15.£e3 exd5 16.exd5 – see 12...e6.) 13.a4 b6 14.£f4 £d7 15.£d2 £e8 16.£ad1 £c8, Kiselev – Gorbatow, Orel 1994, White’s pieces are perfectly deployed and his opponent has no counterplay. He only needs to improve his position. 17.£e3 £b7 18.f4±. White is clearly better and Black is forced to wait for the advance of his opponent’s pawns on the kingside, hoping only for some tactical counter chances.

9.£xd4 £c5

White faces no real problems after: 9...£g4 10.£db5 £e5 11.£e3 £e6 12.£d5 £c5 13.f3 £c6 14.£d2 a6 15.£bc3± D.Gurevich – Tate, Chicago 1994.

10.f3 £d7

That is the most acceptable plan for Black in this situation – to complete his development. The other lines for him look much less natural:

10...a5 11.b3 £e8 12.£e3 b6 13.£d2± Chekhov – Gorbatow, Leningrad 1991;

10...a6 11.£e3 £c7 12.£c1 £e6, Hakki – Sichilina, Novi Sad 1990, 13.b4 £cd7 14.£d5 £xd5 (14...£d8 15.£f4+-) 15.exd5 £d8 16.£b3±;
10...\( \text{Qh5} \) 11.\( \text{Le3} \) \( \text{Ce5} \) (That maneuver enables Black to obtain some counterplay in the classical King's Indian Defence, but here things are slightly different. The d8-h4 diagonal has been closed and Black's queen cannot join in the attack.) 12.\( \text{Cxd2} \) e6 13.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{Cxf4} \) 14.\( \text{Cxf4} \) \( \text{Cxf4} \) 15.\( \text{Cxf4} \) e5 16.\( \text{Cxd2} \) \( \text{exd4} \) 17.\( \text{Cxd4} \) ± Flumbert – Schoepf, Austria 2005;

10...\( \text{Bb6} \) – That is not the best square for Black's queen, L. Johannessen – Kormaksson, Reykjavik 2000 and here after 11.\( \text{Ce3} \), it is too risky for him to capture the pawn: 11...\( \text{Cxb2} \) 12.\( \text{Cdb5} \) \( \text{Cbd4} \) 13.\( \text{e5} \) dxe5 (or 13...
\( \text{Cd7} \) 14.\( \text{Cxd5} \) \( \text{Ca5} \) 15.\( \text{Cxe7} \) + \( \text{Cg8} \) 16.\( \text{exd6} \) +) 14.a3 \( \text{Ca5} \) 15.\( \text{Cxc5} \) a6 16.\( \text{Cfb4} \) \( \text{Cbd6} \) + 17.\( \text{Cc5} \) \( \text{Cfc6} \) 18.f4 axb5 (Black has no compensation for the piece after: 18...\( \text{e4} \) 19.\( \text{Cdc4} \) \( \text{Cc7} \) 20.\( \text{Cbd2} \) \( \text{Cdb8} \) 21.\( \text{Cc4} \) +) 19.\( \text{fxe5} \) \( \text{Ce4} \) 20.\( \text{Cf5} \) ± and Black can hardly avoid the material losses.

\begin{center}
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11.\( \text{Ce3} \) \( \text{Cce8} \) 12.\( \text{Cf1} \) a6 13.\( \text{Cc1} \) \( \text{Bb8} \) 14.\( \text{Bd2} \) and Black has problems coordinating his pieces due to his lack of space, Eingorn – Mahdi, Oberwart 2001.

c) 7...\( \text{Bc4} \) 8.\( \text{d5} \)

Now, the following possibilities deserve a thorough analysis for Black: c1) 8...\( \text{e6} \) and c2) 8...
\( \text{Cbd7} \).

About 8...\( \text{e5} \) – see 8...\( \text{e6} \).

His other lines are:

8...\( \text{Ba6} \) 9.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{Cxf3} \) 10.\( \text{Cxf3} \) \( \text{Cc7} \) 11.\( \text{Ce1} \) \( \text{Bb8} \) 12.\( \text{Ce2} \) – see 7...\( \text{Ba6} \);

8.\( \text{Be1} \) \( \text{Bc4} \) 9.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{Cc7} \) 10.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{Cxf3} \) 11.\( \text{Cxf3} \);

8...\( \text{Cxf3} \) 9.\( \text{Cxf3} \) – That exchange is not forced and Black usually transposes to variations in which he has already lost a tempo;

8...\( \text{Bb8} \) 9.\( \text{Bg5} \) \( \text{Bxe2} \) 10.\( \text{Cxe2} \) h6 11.\( \text{h3} \) e6, Milosevic – Djuric, Golubac 2003, 12.\( \text{dxe6} \) \( \text{Bxe6} \) (or 12...
\( \text{Bxe6} \) 13.\( \text{e5} \) dxe5 14.\( \text{Cxe5} \) \( \text{Cc7} \) 15.\( \text{Bg3} \) ±) 13.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{Cfc6} \) 14.\( \text{Ce3} \) \( \text{Cd7} \) 15.\( \text{Bf4} \) ±;

Or 8...\( \text{ Cd7} \) 9.\( \text{Gg5} \) \( \text{Ba6} \) 10.\( \text{Cd2} \) \( \text{Bxe2} \) 11.\( \text{Cxe2} \) \( \text{Cc7} \) 12.\( \text{f4} \) \( \text{Bb8} \) 13.\( \text{Ba1} \) a6 14.\( \text{Cd3} \) b5 15.b3 e5 16.f5 ± T.Petrosian – Taimanov, Leningrad 1959;

8...a6 9.\( \text{h3} \) \( \text{Cxf3} \) (It is worse for Black to continue with 9...
\( \text{Cd7} ? \), Udovec – Smalbeogovic, Skopje 1962, because after 10.\( \text{a4} \) ±, Black
has problems developing his queenside.) 10.\textit{xf3} \textit{c7}, Amura – Mesias, Buenos Aires 2005, (about 10...\textit{bd7} – see 8...\textit{bd7}) 11.\textit{e2} \textit{bd7} 12.f4±.

c1) 8...\textit{e6} 9.dxe6

We will analyze now c1a) 9...\textit{xex6} and c1b) 9...fxe6.

c1a) 9...\textit{xe6} 10.\textit{f4}

10...\textit{xb6}!

It is bad for Black to continue with: 10...\textit{e8}? 11.e5 \textit{c6} 12.exd6 \textit{d4} 13.\textit{xd4} cxd4 (or 13...\textit{xd4} 14.\textit{b5} \textit{xb2} 15.\textit{b1} \textit{f6} 16.\textit{c7}±) 14.\textit{b5} \textit{b6} 15.\textit{c1±} J.Graf – Vatter, Baden 1981; as well as: 10...\textit{e8}?, Reicher – Ghitescu, Wijk aan Zee 1973, 11.\textit{xd6}! \textit{c6} 12.\textit{xc5} \textit{a5} 13.\textit{e3±} – and Black has some initiative indeed, but it is evidently insufficient to compensate his two pawn-deficit.

11.\textit{g5}!

That is a new move for White. He can win a pawn with: 11.\textit{b3} \textit{d8}! 12.\textit{fd1} \textit{c6} 13.\textit{xb6} axb6 14.\textit{xd6} (White achieves nothing special with: 14.\textit{xd6} \textit{d4} 15.\textit{xd4} cxd4 16.\textit{b5} \textit{xe4} 17.\textit{c7}

\textit{xc8} 18.\textit{xb6} \textit{xc4} 19.\textit{xc4} \textit{xc4} 20.\textit{xd4}, Feick – Hochgraefe, Germany 1991, 20...\textit{ec2}! =) 14...\textit{xd6} 15.\textit{xd6} \textit{d4} 16.\textit{f1} \textit{xf3} 17.\textit{gxf3}, but after 17...\textit{d7}±, Black's compensation is quite sufficient.

11...\textit{ed8}

White is better after: 11...\textit{xb2}?! 12.\textit{a4} \textit{a3} (or 12...\textit{b4}? 13.\textit{b1} \textit{a5} 14.\textit{xd6}±) 13.\textit{xd6} \textit{d8} 14.e5 \textit{c6} 15.\textit{exe6} \textit{fxe6} 16.\textit{xc5}±; and following: 11...\textit{e8} 12.\textit{d5} \textit{xd5} 13.exd5 \textit{wb2} (In case of: 13...\textit{d7} 14.\textit{c2}±, White has a slight, but stable advantage.) 14.\textit{b1} \textit{f6} (White has some edge too after: 14...\textit{xa2} 15.\textit{xb7} \textit{a6} 16.\textit{e4}±) 15.g3 (White can try to organize an attack after: 15.\textit{d2} b6 16.\textit{b3}!? \textit{eh3}.) 15...b6 16.\textit{f3} and White is a pawn down indeed, but Black's pieces are misplaced and he has problems protecting his d6-pawn. For example: 16...\textit{d7} 17.\textit{e6}! \textit{fxe6} 18.dxe6 \textit{d8} 19.\textit{d5} \textit{h8} 20.exd7 \textit{xd7} 21.\textit{e1}±.

12.\textit{xe6} \textit{fxe6} 13.\textit{g4} \textit{f7}

It is a bit uncomfortable for Black to defend his e-pawn, so he has to do that with his king.

14.\textit{b1} \textit{c6}
Chapter 12

15.$g5!
White’s bishop frees the way for the f-pawn, since it is essential for him to occupy the d5-outpost with his knight.

15...$d4 16.f4 $g8 17.f5±.

c1b) 9...fxe6

10.$g5 $xe2 11.$xe2 $d7
It is not so good for Black to play 11...$e7, due to: 12.$f4 e5 13.$d5 and his queen comes under attack. 13...$d7 14.$xf6 $xf6, Teplitzky – Gravel, Toronto 1996 and here it would have been stronger for White to play: 15.$d5! $h8 16.$e3 h6 17.$h3! (It is interesting to test in practice the pawn-sacrifice: 17.$f3 $c7 18.b4!? $xb4 19.a3 $c6 20.$fb1 $xa3 21.$xa3↑) 17...$c7 18.$f3 $c6 19.$f2 $f7 20.$d2 $h7 21.$d1 $d4 22.$c3± – White’s knight has reached at last the coveted d5-outpost and he has obtained some advantage.

12.e5! $xe5
It is too dubious for Black to follow with: 12...$e8?! 13.$f4 $f5 14.$fxe6 $xe5 15.$xg7 $xg7 16.f4 $f5 17.b3 $c6 18.g4 $ff8 19.$b2 $ae8 20.f5± Vaganian – Bellon, Rome 1977.

13.$xd7 $bxd7
Now, Black’s knight cannot reach the d4-square so quickly. Still, if he tries to place it there immediately, his position becomes very difficult: 13...$fxd7 14.$xe6 $c8 (that is forced...) 15.$d1! $f6. (It is even worse for Black to play: 15...$f6 16.$c3±, or 15...$c6 16.$xg7 $xg7 17.b3!±) 16.b3! $b6 17.$xg7 $xg7 18.$b2 $c6 19.f4! $e8 (That is Black’s only move, otherwise White remains with a solid extra pawn: 19...$d4 20.$xe5 $xe2+ 21.$f2+-) 20.$d6! $d4 21.$xe5! $xe2+ 22.$f1 $g4 (Black cannot save the day in case of: 22...$g3+ 23.$hxg3 $g4 24.e6+ $g8 25.$e1++; or 23...$e4 24.$d7+ $g8 25.$e1! $g5 26.$e2++; 25...$xg3+ 26.$f2 $f5 27.e6 h5 28.$f3++) 23.$xe2 $g8 24.e6+- Filippov – Bu, Koszalin 1999.

14.$xe6 $f7, Vera – Vega, Merida 2001 (It is worse for Black to play here: 14...$fc8 15.$c3 $c6 16.$xg7 $xg7 17.$d1 $f8 18.$g5! b6 19.$d3 h6 20.$xf6 $xf6
21...\(\text{c}\text{1}\text{=}\text{c}\), because the endgame is very difficult for him, Shariyazdanov – Filippov, Moscow 1995.) 15.\(\text{c}\text{c}3?!\) White is not in a hurry to exchange on g7. 15...\(\text{xe}8\) 16.\(\text{d}\text{xg}7\) \(\text{hxg}7\) (Black’s defence is not any easier after capturing with the rook either: 16...\(\text{e}\text{g}7\) 17.\(\text{h}\text{h}6\) \(\text{ge}7\) 18.\(\text{d}\text{ad}1\) \(\text{f}\text{f}8\), Marosi – Nemeth, Hungary 1986, 19.\(\text{g}\text{g}5\text{=}\text{+}\). Now, White can already capture the pawn: 17.\(\text{b}\text{b}5?!\) (It is also possible for White to follow with 17.\(\text{e}\text{e}1\text{=}\text{+}\)) 17...\(\text{e}\text{e}6\) 18.\(\text{d}\text{xa}7\) \(\text{e}4\) 19.\(\text{b}\text{b}5\) \(\text{e}\text{e}5\) 20.\(\text{b}\text{b}3\text{=}\text{+}\).

c2) 8...\(\text{bd}\text{d}7\)

![](image)

9.\(\text{h}\text{h}3\) \(\text{xf}3\) 10. \(\text{xf}3\) \(\text{a}\text{a}6\)

10...\(\text{b}\text{b}6\) 11.\(\text{c}\text{c}2\) \(\text{de}5\) (or 11...\(\text{a}\text{a}6\), G.Andersson – Frowall, corr. 1992, 12.\(\text{e}\text{e}2\text{=}\text{+}\)) 12.\(\text{e}\text{e}2\) \(\text{e}6\) 13.\(\text{f}\text{f}\text{d}7\) 14.\(\text{e}\text{e}3\text{=}\text{+}\) Adelman – Ilandzis, New York 1990.

10...\(\text{c}\text{c}7\) 11.\(\text{e}\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}\text{e}8\) 12.\(\text{b}\text{b}1\) \(\text{a}\text{a}6\)

13.\(\text{e}\text{e}2\) \(\text{e}6\) 14.\(\text{d}\text{xe}6\) \(\text{fxe}6\) 15.\(\text{f}\text{f}4\text{=}\text{+}\) Miraglia – Bendig, Email 2002.

10...\(\text{e}\text{e}8\) 11.\(\text{e}\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}\text{c}7\) 12.\(\text{g}\text{g}5\) \(\text{a}\text{a}6\)

13.\(\text{a}\text{a}4\) \(\text{b}\text{b}8\) 14.\(\text{d}\text{d}2\) \(\text{e}\text{e}8\) 15.\(\text{f}\text{f}4\) \(\text{b}\text{6}\)

16.\(\text{b}\text{a}1\) \(\text{h}\text{h}8\) 17.\(\text{h}\text{h}1\text{=}\text{+}\) W.Schmidt – Ermenkov, Smederevska Palanka 1981.

10...\(\text{e}\text{e}5?!\) – This strange move is quite popular, but it leads to the loss of several tempi and it enables White to develop a powerful initiative on the kingside.

11.\(\text{e}\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}\text{c}7\) (The move 11...\(\text{e}\text{e}6\) – is a blunder. 12.\(\text{f}\text{f}4\) \(\text{e}\text{d}7\) 13.\(\text{d}\text{xe}6\) \(\text{fxe}6\) 14.\(\text{w}\text{xd}6\text{=}\text{+}\) Faisal – Saeed, Abu Dhabi 2001; 11... \(\text{b}\text{b}6\) 12.\(\text{f}\text{f}4\) \(\text{e}\text{d}7\), Zilberman – Krylov, Nikolaev 2001, 13.\(\text{w}\text{d}3\text{=}\text{+}\); 11...\(\text{a}\text{a}6\) 12.\(\text{f}\text{f}4\) \(\text{e}\text{d}7\), Klewe – Biester, corr. 1987, 13.\(\text{w}\text{d}3\) \(\text{e}\text{e}8\) 14.\(\text{e}\text{e}3\text{=}\text{+}\)) 12.\(\text{f}\text{f}4\) \(\text{e}\text{d}7\) 13.\(\text{h}\text{h}1\) \(\text{a}\text{a}6\) 14.\(\text{w}\text{d}3\) \(\text{w}\text{d}8\) 15.\(\text{g}\text{g}4\text{+}\) White’s space advantage allows him to organize a powerful initiative on the kingside, Rybak – Zajkowska, Poznan 1998.

10...\(\text{b}\text{b}6?!\) – That is not the best square for Black’s knight.

11.\(\text{e}\text{e}2\) \(\text{f}\text{f}7\) (He cannot create any effective counterplay after his other possibilities either: 11...\(\text{e}\text{e}5\) 12.\(\text{d}\text{xe}6\) – see 11...\(\text{e}\text{e}6\); 11...\(\text{e}\text{e}6\) 12.\(\text{d}\text{xe}6\) \(\text{fxe}6\), Boss – Beier, Borkum 2004, 13.\(\text{w}\text{d}3\) \(\text{e}\text{e}7\) 14.\(\text{f}\text{f}4\) \(\text{ad}8\) 15.\(\text{e}\text{e}3\text{=}\text{+}\)) 12.\(\text{e}\text{e}3\) \(\text{a}\text{a}6\) 13.\(\text{a}\text{a}4\text{=}\text{+}\) Lino – Lopes, Bobadela 2001, 11...\(\text{e}\text{e}6\) 12.\(\text{d}\text{xe}6\) \(\text{fxe}6\) 13.\(\text{g}\text{g}5\) \(\text{h}\text{6}\) 14.\(\text{e}\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}\text{e}7\), Boss – Beier, Borkum 2004, 15.\(\text{e}\text{e}5\) \(\text{d}\text{xe}6\) 16.\(\text{w}\text{c}2\text{=}\text{+}\).

11.\(\text{e}\text{e}2\) \(\text{b}\text{b}8\)

The other lines for Black are hardly any better: 11...\(\text{e}\text{e}8\), Mertins – Kolnsberg, Bad Wildbad 1993, 12.\(\text{f}\text{f}4\text{=}\text{+}; 11...\(\text{c}\text{c}7\) 12.\(\text{f}\text{f}4\text{=}\text{+}\) Ayad – Ekrof, Doha 2003; 11...\(\text{e}\text{e}8\), Smejkal – Bilek, Budapest 1975, 12.\(\text{e}\text{e}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 13.\(\text{w}\text{d}2\text{=}\text{+}\) and Black’s counterplay is highly questionable.
12.a4  \( \text{\textit{De}}\text{8} \)

After 12...\( \text{\textit{c}}\text{7} \) 13.f4 e6 14.dxe6 fxe6, Lois – Rimanoli, Buenos Aires 1982, White dominates in the centre and he can afford to play aggressively: 15.\( \text{\textit{ae}}\text{3} \) \( \text{\textit{bd}}\text{8} \) 16.g4±.

13.\( \text{\textit{ae}}\text{3} \) \( \text{\textit{dc}}\text{7} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{wd}}\text{2} \) \( \text{\textit{ye}}\text{8} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{f}}\text{4} \) \( \text{\textit{e}}\text{6} \) 16.dxe6 \( \text{\textit{xe}}\text{6} \) 17.\( \text{\textit{af}}\text{3}± \) Dobrev – Maupoint, La Ferre 2004.

d) 7...\( \text{\textit{ac}}\text{6} \)

Black is trying to increase his pressure in the centre.

8.d5

White attacks the enemy knight with tempo.

8...\( \text{\textit{da}}\text{5} \)

Now, in comparison to the Yugoslav variation of the King’s Indian Defence, where White’s bishop is fianchetted, the placement of Black’s knight at the edge of the board seems to be senseless, because White’s c4-pawn is reliably protected. Therefore, this piece has no good prospects. In fact, that is the “bad” knight, doctor Tarrasch had in mind...

Black’s other possibilities are not better at all:

About 8...\( \text{\textit{db}}\text{8} \) – see 6...\( \text{\textit{dc}}\text{6} \), variation d, Chapter 11.

8...\( \text{\textit{db}}\text{4} \) 9.\( \text{\textit{df}}\text{4} \) (White plays more often here 9.a3, but why should he repel Black’s knight from its bad placement?) 9...\( \text{\textit{da}}\text{6} \) (White’s advantage is quite obvious after: 9...\( \text{\textit{dh}}\text{5} \) 10.\( \text{\textit{ae}}\text{3} \) f5 11.exf5 \( \text{\textit{xf}}\text{5} \), Monier – Hernandez Guerrero, Buenos Aires 1983, 12.\( \text{\textit{dh}}\text{4} \) \( \text{\textit{d}}\text{7} \) 13.a3 \( \text{\textit{da}}\text{6} \) 14.\( \text{\textit{axh}}\text{5}± \), or 12...\( \text{\textit{df}}\text{6} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{xf}}\text{5} \) \( \text{\textit{gx}}\text{f5} \) 14.a3±)

10.\( \text{\textit{wd}}\text{2} \) \( \text{\textit{dc}}\text{7} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{h}}\text{3} \) \( \text{\textit{dd}}\text{7} \) 12.\( \text{\textit{ae}}\text{1}± \) Vilela – Rytov, Tallinn 1979.

8...\( \text{\textit{de}}\text{5} \) 9.\( \text{\textit{dx}}\text{e}5 \) \( \text{\textit{dx}}\text{e}5 \) 10.\( \text{\textit{ae}}\text{3} \) \( \text{\textit{b}}\text{6} \) (10...\( \text{\textit{dd}}\text{7} \) 11.\( \text{\textit{wd}}\text{2} \) e6? 12.dxe6 fxe6 13.\( \text{\textit{ad}}\text{1} \) \( \text{\textit{df}}\text{6} \)? 14.\( \text{\textit{xd}}\text{8} \) \( \text{\textit{xd}}\text{8} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{xd}}\text{8}+ \) 1-0 Yaz – Verren, Internet 1999.) 11.a3 e6 (After 11...\( \text{\textit{dd}}\text{7} \) 12.b4 f5 13.f3± Black has practically no counterplay, Hoeksema – Buechi, Groningen 1979; it is slightly better for him to follow with: 11...\( \text{\textit{dd}}\text{7} \) 12.b4 \( \text{\textit{cc}}\text{8} \) 13.\( \text{\textit{bb}}\text{1} \) \( \text{\textit{wc}}\text{7} \) 14.f3±, but his “bad” dark-squared bishop on g7 will make his defence quite problematic in the future battle, Pshenova – Borisova, Dagomys 2004.) 12.b4 exd5 13.cxd5 cxb4 14.axb4 \( \text{\textit{dd}}\text{7} \) (Black cannot change much with: 14...\( \text{\textit{de}}\text{8} \) 15.\( \text{\textit{bb}}\text{5} \) \( \text{\textit{dd}}\text{6} \) 16.\( \text{\textit{cc}}\text{6}± \) Taima-
nov – V.Bykov, Leningrad 1957.) 15.\texttt{b}5 \texttt{b}7 16.\texttt{c}6\texttt{c} van Wely – Kandic, Kuppenheim 2004.

\textbf{9.\texttt{d}2}

That is an important move, because White will attack his opponent's knight on a5, so he defends his knight on c3, in case he will need to support his c4-pawn with the move b2-b3.

\textbf{9...e5}

In case of 9...e6, White's simplest reaction is 10.h3, in order after 10...exd5 to continue with 11.exd5± and he obtained a slight but stable advantage, thanks to Black's "bad" knight on a5, after: 10...a6 11.\texttt{d}3 \texttt{b}8 (11...exd5 12.exd5 \texttt{d}7 13.\texttt{c}2 b5 14.b3± Headlong – Ludbrook, West Bromwich 2004) 12.\texttt{c}2 b5 13.b3 exd5 14.exd5 \texttt{d}7 15.\texttt{ab}1 \texttt{e}8 16.\texttt{g}5! White plans to occupy even more space and to start an attack with the help of f2-f4-f5. 16...\texttt{b}7 (Black's position becomes very bad after: 16...\texttt{c}7 17.\texttt{ce}4 \texttt{xe}4 18.\texttt{xe}4, because White has plenty of threats – to win simply a pawn, or to exchange the dark-squared bishops. Black's defence is difficult: 18...b4 19.\texttt{g}5! \texttt{f}5 20.\texttt{f}6 \texttt{xf}6 21.\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{xd}3 22.\texttt{d}2! 1–0 Goldstern – Cebalo, Baden 1999.) 17.f4 b4 18.\texttt{e}2 \texttt{f}5 19.\texttt{xf}5 \texttt{xe}2 20.\texttt{d}3 \texttt{e}8 21.f5 \texttt{h}5 22.g4± Andersson – B.Ivanovic, Bar 1997.

9...b6 – This is a useful move, because the knight on a5 can enter the actions only via the b7-square, A.Kovacs – Monacell, Email 1999, 10.b3 \texttt{g}4 (About 10...e5 11.\texttt{e}1 – see 9...e5.) 11.h3 – see 9...\texttt{g}4.

9...a6 10.\texttt{c}2 \texttt{g}4 11.b3 \texttt{d}7, Kavalek – Middendorf, Germany 1976, 12.\texttt{ae}1 \texttt{c}7 (or 12...h6 13.\texttt{wc}1 \texttt{xf}3 (13...\texttt{h}7 14.\texttt{g}5±) 14.\texttt{xf}3 \texttt{h}7 15.\texttt{e}2±) 13.\texttt{g}5±.

9...\texttt{g}4 10.b3 a6 (Or 10...b6 11.h3 \texttt{d}7 12.\texttt{c}2\pm Gagarin – Batarello, Zadar 1996; 10...e5 11.\texttt{e}1 \texttt{d}7 12.\texttt{d}3 \texttt{e}8 13.\texttt{w}e1 a6 14.\texttt{d}1 b6 15.\texttt{c}3± Jacimovic – Cheparinov, Leon 2001.) 11.\texttt{c}1 \texttt{b}8 12.\texttt{w}e1! Black's situation seems to be quite precarious in view of the extremely unfavourable placement of the knight on the a5-square and White's threat – e4-e5. 12...\texttt{xf}3 (After 12...b6 13.e5!± Black had a very difficult position in the game Eingorn – Balashov, Uzhgorod 1988. If 12...b5, then after: 13.e5 dxe5 14.\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{xe}2 15.\texttt{xe}2± Black's situation is highly questionable.) 13.\texttt{xf}3 b6 (In case of 13...b5, Black must seriously consider White's possibility: 14.e5 dxe5 15.cxb5 axb5 16.\texttt{e}4 \texttt{b}7 17.\texttt{xc}5±) 14.e5± – White maintains his advantage.

\textbf{10.\texttt{b}3 \texttt{b}6}

About 10...\texttt{d}7 11.\texttt{e}1 b6 12.\texttt{c}2 – see 10...b6 11.\texttt{e}1 \texttt{d}7 12.\texttt{c}2.

\textbf{11.\texttt{e}1 \texttt{d}7}

11...h5?! – That move only compromises Black's position on the kingside, since he cannot seize the initiative there. 12.\texttt{c}1 a6 13.f4 \texttt{xf}4 14.\texttt{xf}4 \texttt{g}4 15.\texttt{xg}4 173
\[ \textit{\&xg4 16.\&d2 \&b8 17.h3 \&c8, Gre-bionkin – Stark, Internet 2003, 18.\&f3\pm.} \]

11...\&d7 12.\&c1 \&e7 13.g3 f5
14.exf5 gxf5 15.f4 e4 16.\&g2 \&f6
17.h3\pm G.Timoshenko – Jovanic, Nova Gorica 1999.

11...\&b7 12.g3 \&e8 13.\&c2 \&h3
14.\&g2 f5 15.exf5 gxf5 16.f3\pm \&f6
17.\&ae1 \&d8 18.\&d1 \&d7 19.\&c1 h5
20.\&f2\pm S.Savchenko – Jovanic, Zadar 2000.

12.\&c2 \&b7

It will be more or less the same after: 12...\&e7 13.\&d3 \&b7 14.\&ae1 \&ae8, Antic – Damljanovic, Kopaonik 2005, 15.\&d1 a6 16.f4\pm.

13.\&d3 \&c7 14.f4\pm

Conclusion

We have analyzed in this chapter Black’s attempts to organize some pressure against his opponent’s centre with the move c7-c5. After White’s natural move 7.0–0, Black chooses different lines:

In variations a and b, the best that Black can hope for is to enter positions from the Maroczy system, except that his queen’s knight is usually misplaced – it usually ends up on the c5-square and there it impedes his pieces to use the c-file. Additionally, Black lacks space and he should strive to exchange pieces, so his knight-maneuvers lose time.

In variation c there arise positions from the Benoni Defence, which are disadvantageous for Black, because of the premature development of his light-squared bishop to the g4-square. That enables White to either obtain the two bishop-advantage, or to organize a powerful pressure in the centre.

Black’s attempt to increase the pressure against White’s centre with the move 7...\&c6 is analyzed in variation d and it leads to a position, in which his knight ends up at the edge of the board. That enables White to begin active actions favourably on the other side of the board.
Chapter 13

1.\( \text{d}f3 \) \( \text{d}f6 \) 2.\( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 3.\( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 4.\( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 5.\( \text{d}4 \) 0–0 6.\( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{g}4 \)

Black’s typical maneuver:

10...\( \text{a}5! \)

After 10...\( \text{e}5 \) 11.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{e}7 \) 12.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{f}5 \) 13.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{d}f6 \) 14.\( \text{c}3 \) \( \text{f}4 \) 15.\( \text{f}2 \) \( \text{h}5 \) 16.\( \text{c}5 \), the light squares in Black’s camp seem to be rather vulnerable. The game Johansen – Mohr, Yerevan 1996, developed in a very instructive fashion: 16...\( \text{g}5 \) 17.\( \text{h}1 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 18.\( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{f}7 \) 19.\( \text{b}3! \). That is an important move, which provokes a weakening of Black’s queenside. The game might develop in the following fashion:

19...\( \text{b}6 \) 20.\( \text{cxd}6 \) \( \text{cxd}6 \) 21.\( \text{c}2 \) \( \text{g}4 \) 22.\( \text{f}c1 \) \( \text{g}3 \) 23.\( \text{e}1 \) \( \text{gxh}2 \) 24.\( \text{b}5 \) \( \text{e}8 \) 25.\( \text{b}4 \) \( \text{f}8 \) 26.\( \text{a}6 \) \( \text{g}7 \) 27.\( \text{ac}7 \) \( \text{c}8 \) 28.\( \text{e}6 \) and White’s strategy obviously triumphs.

11.\( \text{c}1 \) \( \text{c}5 \) 12.\( \text{d}3 \) \( \text{cxd}4 \) 13.\( \text{x}d4 \) \( \text{d}f6 \) 14.\( \text{f}3 \) \( \text{c}6 \) 15.\( \text{e}3 \) \( \text{e}6= \). Black maintained the balance in the game Stone – I.Ivanov, Canada 1986.

1b) 9.\( \text{d}5 \) \( \text{x}f3 \) 10.\( \text{xf}3 \) \( \text{a}5 \) 11.\( \text{e}2 \) \( \text{xc}3! \)

That is another typical resource for Black in this line. White has the bishop pair indeed and Black’s king shelter has been
compromised; nevertheless the position remains approximately equal, because of the weaknesses of the pawn-structure on White’s queenside. Meanwhile, it is not good for Black to continue with the tentative line: 11...\(\text{\&}b6\), because of: 12.\(\text{\&}xb6!\) \(\text{cxb6}\) 13.\(\text{\&}c1\) \(\text{\&}c8\) 14.b3\(\text{\&}\) and his knight on a5 is quite misplaced, Toth – Hug, Rome 1979.

12.bxc3 e5 13.dxe6

White possesses a couple of powerful bishops, so he should attempt to open the position, therefore it is worse for him to follow with: 13.g3 \(\text{\&}e8\) 14.\(\text{\&}a4\) b6 15.\(\text{\&}ae1\) \(\text{\&}c5\) 16.\(\text{\&}c2\) \(\text{\&}d7\) 17.\(\text{\&}g5\) \(\text{\&}a4\) and Black managed to attack effectively White’s vulnerable pawns in the game Mack – Kochyev, Manila 1974.

13...\(\text{\&}xe6\) 14.f4

White would not obtain any advantage with the move 14.\(\text{\&}h6\), due to: 14...\(\text{\&}f7\) 15.f4 \(\text{\&}e7\) 16.f5 \(\text{\&}e5\) Chow – Southam, Nort Bay 1994.

14...\(\text{\&}e7\) 15.\(\text{\&}c2\)

It is insufficient for White to continue with 15.f5, because of: 15...\(\text{\&}xf5\) 16.\(\text{\&}d5+\) \(\text{\&}f7\) 17.\(\text{\&}xa5\) \(\text{\&}xe4\) 18.\(\text{\&}f3\) f4 19.\(\text{\&}e1\) \(\text{\&}xe3\) 20.\(\text{\&}xf7\) \(\text{\&}xf7\) 21.\(\text{\&}xf3\) \(\text{\&}e7\) 22.\(\text{\&}xb7\) \(\text{\&}e8\) 23.\(\text{\&}c6\) \(\text{\&}f6\) Astrom – Zueger, Zurich 1984, while after: 15.\(\text{\&}a4\) b6 16.\(\text{\&}ae1\) \(\text{\&}b7\) 17.\(\text{\&}f3\) \(\text{\&}bc5\) 18.\(\text{\&}c2\) \(\text{\&}ae8\) 19.\(\text{\&}g3\) \(\text{\&}f7\) 20.\(\text{\&}g2\) \(\text{\&}ef8\) 21.\(\text{\&}e2\) e5\(\text{\&}\) Black seized the initiative in the game Cuellar – Tal, Leningrad 1973.

15...b6 16.\(\text{\&}f3\) \(\text{\&}b7\) 17.\(\text{\&}af1\) \(\text{\&}bc5\) 18.\(\text{\&}g3\) \(\text{\&}f7\) 19.f5 \(\text{\&}e5\) 20.\(\text{\&}f4\) \(\text{\&}af8\) 21.\(\text{\&}xe5\) dxe5 22.\(\text{\&}xf6\) \(\text{\&}xf1+\) 23.\(\text{\&}xf1\) h6

Black’s compensation for the pawn is quite sufficient, Doroshenko – Moldovan, Bucharest 1994, for example: 24.\(\text{\&}e2\) \(\text{\&}f4\) 25.\(\text{\&}e3\) \(\text{\&}g7\) 26.\(\text{\&}h5\) \(\text{\&}g5\) 27.\(\text{\&}d1\) \(\text{\&}g4\).

2) 7.h3

White wishes to force his opponent to clarify his intentions concerning his light-squared bishop, so that in case of its exchange, White can use his h-pawn in order to attack Black’s kingside. Still, White loses a tempo, while playing that move and that proves to be a dear price to pay.

7...\(\text{\&}xf3\) 8.\(\text{\&}xf3\) \(\text{\&}fd7\) 9.\(\text{\&}e3\)

In case White tries to prevent the appearance of Black’s knight on the c6-square with the move 9.d5, then it can enter the actions via another route: 9...\(\text{\&}a6!\) 10.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}ac5\) 11.0–0 a5 12.\(\text{\&}c1\) e5 13.dxe6 (Should White have refrained from capturing en passant and he had played, for example
13.g3, then Black could have possibly followed with: 13...h5 14.h4 \$h7=, with the idea to exchange the dark-squared bishops with the move \$h6.) 13...fxe6 14.\$e2 \$h4 15.g3 \$e7 16.\$g2 \$e5\# and Black’s position was quite active in the game Sher – Kochyev, Leningrad 1976.

9...\$c6 10.\$e2

After 10.0–0, Black plays: 10...e5 11.d5 \$d4 and he realizes his plan, obtaining a very comfortable position in the process: 12.\$b5 \$xf3+ 13.\$xf3 f5 14.\$c3 f4 15.\$d2 \$f6\# De Greif – Tal, Havana 1963.

In case of: 10.d5 \$a5 11.\$e2 \$xc3+ 12.bxc3 e5 13.dxe6 fxe6 14.0–0 \$e7\#, there arises a position from variation 1, except that White has lost a tempo for the unnecessary move – h2–h3.

10...\$a5!

This is an important moment for Black. After 10...e5 11.d5 \$e7 12.h4 f5 13.h5\# he comes under an overwhelming kingside attack, due to the absence of his light-squared bishop. For example: 13...f4 14.\$d2 \$f6 15.hxg6 hxg6 16.g3! g5 17.gxf4 gxf4 18.\$c3 \$d7 19.\$g2 c6 20.\$h3 \$c7 21.\$e6++ and White won easily in the game Keene – Fuller, Sydney 1979. This attacking scheme is quite instructive and typical for this variation.

11.\$c1 c5 12.0–0 \$c6 13.\$d2

Black can counter 13.g3 with 13...\$b6=.

13...\$xd4 14.\$xd4 \$xd4 15.\$xd4 \$xd4 16.\$xd4 \$a5 17.\$c3 \$c5= and the position was completely equal in the game Tisdall – Wittmann, Debrecen 1992.

So, we have come to the conclusion that White must protect the d4-square –

7.\$e3

Black’s main line – 7...\$fd7, will be the subject of the next chapter. Now, we will analyze Black’s other possibilities: a) 7...e5, b) 7...\$xf3, c) 7...\$bd7 and d) 7...\$c6.

He has also tried in practice:

7...\$a6 – This move is too timid and it does not combine well together with Black’s previous
move and White obtains the two-bishop advantage and dominates in the centre. 8.h3 ♜xf3 9.♗xf3 c5? 10.e5+- ♙c7 11.exf6 1–0 Zaremba – Bianchi, Email 2000;

7...c5?! – That pawn-sacrifice is highly questionable. 8.dxc5 ♙a5 (Or 8...♕xf3? 9.♗xf3 ♙a5 10.e5+- Bullerkotte – Krahle, Email 2001; 8...dxc5 9.♗xd8 ♙xd8 10.♘xc5 ♙c6 11.0–0± Kuba – Paiva, Dos Hermanas 2004.) 9.♗d2 ♙xe2 10.♕xe2 dxc5 (Or 10...♗b4, Werner – Casadevall, Budapest 2005, 11.♗b1 dxc5 12.e5 ♙fd7 13.♗d5 ♙a5 14.♕xe7+ ♙h8 15.f4±) 11.♗b3 ♙c7 12.♘xc5 b6 13.♗b3 ♙c8 14.♗d5± and White remains with a solid extra pawn, Summerscale – Barrett, Birmingham 2002;

7...a5 8.h3 ♜xf3 9.♗xf3 ♙c6 (Black is very likely to come under a dangerous attack after: 9...♗fd7 10.h4 e5, Salinas – Castillo, Santa Clara 1968, 11.d5 f5 12.h5 f4 13.♗d2 g5 14.h6 ♙f6 15.♗a4± White has failed to organize an attack indeed, but Black’s light squares are quite vulnerable and he has no active play at all.) 10.0–0 ♙d7 11.d5 ♙b4 12.♗d2±. White has a clear-cut plan for the development of his queenside initiative and he dominates in the centre, V.Hort – W.Hug, Zurich 1999;

7...a6 – This waiting move might turn out to be useful after all. 8.♗c1 ♙bd7 (About 8...♗fd7 – see 7...♗fd7; as for 8...♗xf3 9.♗xf3 ♙fd7 – see 7...♗fd7.) 9.0–0 ♙c8, Geilen – Kressmann, corr. 1998, 10.♗d2 ♙xe2 11.♗xe2 c5 12.dxc5 ♙xc5 (or 12...dxc5 13.f4±) 13.b4 ♙e6 14.f4±;

Following: 7...c6 8.♗c1 ♙bd7 9.0–0 e5 10.d5 c5, there arises a standard position and the way GM Psakhis has treated it is quite exemplary indeed. 11.♗e1 ♙xe2 12.♗xe2 ♙e8 13.♗d3 f5 14.f3 ♙e6 15.a3±. (White has excellent prospects on the queenside, while Black can hardly organize any effective attack on the kingside with his light-squared bishop absent from the board.) 15...f4 16.♗f2 g5 17.b4 b6 18.♗b1 ♙7 19.a4 h5 20.a5 g4 21.♗h4! ♙f8 22.g3! ♙g7 23.♗h1± (Black has played too "actively" and now White can prepare his kingside attack at leisure.) 23...gxf3 24.♗xf3 ♙g4 25.♗g1 cxb4 26.♗xb4+– Psakhis – Idelstein, Kfar Sava 1993;

7...♗e8, J.Adamski – Roth, Passau 1997, that is not the best place for Black’s rook in case he intends to adhere to the standard plan connected with the pawn-advance e7–e5 and in case White closes the centre, to follow with f7–f5. Here, it seems quite reasonable for White to obtain the two-bishop advantage: 8.h3 ♙xf3 (After 8...♗c8 9.0–0± Black has already lost two tempi in comparison to the main lines.) 9.♗xf3 ♙fd7 (or 9...♗c6 10.d5 ♙a5 11.♗e2 e6 12.0–0±) 10.♗d2 c5 11.♗d5±. There has arisen the standard pawn-structure of the Benoni
Defence in which Black has problems with the development of his queenside.

a) 7...e5
That move is quite illogical too, because now the placement of Black’s bishop on g4 seems rather senseless.

8.d5

8...c5
After the centre has been closed, White has his hands free for operations on both sides of the board, moreover he has not castled yet and that is clearly in his favour.

About 8...\textit{xf3} 9.\textit{xf3} – see 7...\textit{xf3}; 8...\textit{bd7} – see 7...\textit{bd7}; 8...\textit{fd7} – see 7...\textit{fd7}.

8...c6 9.0–0 cxd5 (In answer to 9...h6, Bolduc – Leavell, Email 1998, White has the powerful argument – 10.\textit{wd2} and Black loses a pawn after the natural move: 10...\textit{h7} 11.dxc6 \textit{xc6} 12.\textit{fd1}+ and that means that he will have to open the c-file anyway: 10...\textit{cd5} 11.cxd5 \textit{h7} 12.\textit{fc1}+ 10.cxd5 \textit{bd7} (It is hardly any better for Black to try: 10...a6

11.a4 \textit{xf3} 12.\textit{xf3} \textit{e8} 13.\textit{b3}+ Wissemann – Norheimer, Worms 1995.) 11.\textit{d2} \textit{xe2} 12.\textit{xe2} \textit{dc5} 13.b4 \textit{a6} 14.\textit{b1}+ and White had a dangerous initiative on the queenside, while Black had no counterplay at all in the game Pira – Le Bras, Fouesnant 1999.

In case of: 8...a5 9.c5 \textit{a6} 10.cxd6 cxd6, Loos – Gerer, Regensburg 1996, the best way for White to exploit Black’s queenside weaknesses is by playing: 11.\textit{d2} \textit{xe2} 12.\textit{xe2} \textit{c5} 13.0–0+.

In answer to: 8...\textit{a6}, Fang – Treger, Woburn 1998, it is again logical for White to continue with 9.h3 and there might follow: 9...\textit{xf3} 10.\textit{xf3} \textit{d7} 11.h4 \textit{f5} 12.h5 \textit{f4} 13.\textit{c1} \textit{g5} 14.h6 \textit{f6} 15.\textit{g4}+, or 9...\textit{d7} 10.\textit{d2} \textit{e8} 11.\textit{g4} \textit{f6} 12.\textit{f3} \textit{g7} 13.\textit{g1}+ and White has excellent prospects on the kingside.

After the immediate try for Black – 8...\textit{h5}, Henley – Toulbut, Mexico 1980, White can neutralize Black’s activity on the kingside with the help of: 9.g3 a5 10.h3 \textit{d7} 11.\textit{d2} \textit{f6} and then he can start active actions on the opposite side of the board with: 12.c5! dxc5 (In case of: 12...\textit{a6} 13.cxd6 cxd6 14.\textit{c4}+ Black’s queenside will be soon in ruins.) 13.\textit{xc5} \textit{e8} 14.\textit{xe3} (It is less precise for White to play here 14.\textit{f1}, because of 14...\textit{h6}, with the idea to follow with \textit{a6.}) and if 14...\textit{c8}, trying to force White to protect his h3-pawn, then the simple
line: 15.\textit{c}c1 \textit{a}a6 16.\textit{a}a4±.

9.h3 d7

In fact, Black would not change much with 9...c8 10.g4. Later, in the game Spraggett – Hebert, Montreal 1981, after 10...e8, White made a good use of the fact that Black's knight had abandoned the f6-square, so that in case of g4-g5, he would not be able to retreat to h5 and White played 11.g5. The game continued with: 11...d7 12.h4 f5 13.h5 (This was with the threat to isolate Black's bishop completely from the actions with the move h5-h6.) 13...f4 14.d2 f7, but here White had better follow with 15.b3± with the idea to continue with 0–0–0 and h4.

It is not satisfactory for Black to give up his bishop with: 9...xf3 10.xf3 e8, Antoshin – Krementeisky, Moscow 1981, 11.h4! – After the centre has been blocked, White is not obliged to castle, he can start his kingside attack immediately. 11...f5 (Black's other possibilities are not any better at all: 11...d7 12.h5±; 11...h5 12.g4 hxg4 13.xg4 f5 14.h3±) 12.h5 f4 13.d2 g5 14.h6 f6 15.g4+. White's light-squared bishop is so powerful that Black has no counterplay on the kingside and he lacks space too. White only needs to prepare opening of the position with g3.

10.g4 h8

In case Black ignores White's actions and he responds with 10...a6, then there might arise the following eventual developments: 11.d2 c7 12.a3 b6 13.f1 b8 14.b4 c8 15.g3 b8 16.d2 h8 17.g5 g8 18.h4 e7 19.h5± and Black is on the defensive on both sides of the board, Lputian – Konfidis, Panormo 1998.

Black can hardly change anything with: 10...e8 11.g1 a6 12.h4± van Rijn – Velema, Dieren 1998.

11.d2 g8 12.h4 f5 13.gxf5 gxf5 14.exf5

14.e4 (After the natural move – 14...xf5, White blocks Black's e5-pawn and his bishop on g7 as well with the move 15.de4±) 15.dxe4 xf5 16.d2±. The position has been opened a bit, nevertheless Black's compensation for the pawn seems to be insufficient, Mellano – Schwober, Buenos Aires 1993.

b) 7.xf3 8.xf3 e5

About 8...bd7 – see 7...bd7; 8...fd7 – see 7...fd7; 8...c6 – see 7...c6; 8...c6 9.h4 e5 10.d5 – see 8...e5 9.d5 c6 10.h4.

9.d5
Now, White is completely dominant in this position.

9...c6

This is a logical attempt by Black to create some counterplay in the centre; otherwise he can hardly defend against White’s oncoming direct kingside attack:

9...a6, Iordache – Smokina, Eforie Nord 1999, 10.h4±;
9...c5? 10.h4 h5 11.g5.bd7 12.g4 hxg4 13.xg4 wb6 14.xd7! xd7 15.exf6 f6 16.d2+- Djuric – Ljubisavljevic, Geneva 2004;
9...bd7 10.g4! a6 11.h4 b8 12.h5 e8 13.g5±. White’s space advantage is so great that Black has problems to organize any counterplay. In the game Panno – Castelli, Santos Lugares 1977, there followed 13.c5, after which White could have finished his opponent off quickly by transferring his queen to the h-file with 14.g4 c7 15.h3+–;
9...f6 10.g4! wh4 (In answer to the standard maneuver 10...f6, White can sacrifice a pawn and he practically isolates Black’s bishop from the actions with 11.h4 xh4 12.d2±) 11.wd2 h6 12.0–0–0 wh7 13.g5→ Sieglen

– Kuhn, Germany 1980;
9...a5 10.g4 a6 11.h4 d7, Barria – Balada Moreno, Mislata 2004 and here after 12.ed2±, White completes his development and he begins his kingside offensive.

In case of 9...e8, White’s simplest reaction is 10.h4 (The move 10.g4? would be a typical mistake, because of: 10...f6 11.wd2 h4 12.0–0–0 f6=, followed by g5, Mellado – Gonzales, Berga 1995.)
10...f6 11.g3± and Black has no counterplay whatsoever.

10.h4

White’s pawn-centre is quite solid now and he can start his kingside attack. Black has great problems to organize any counterplay on the c-file.

10...w7

Black’s defence is difficult after his other possibilities as well:
10...h5 11.g4 hxg4 12.xg4 bd7 13.h3±, followed by the unavoidable h5; or 10...a5 11.h5 cxd5 12.cxd5 a6 13.a3± and White is dominant in the centre as well as on both flanks of the board.

11.h5 bd7 12.g4 cxd5 13. cxd5 wb6
14.g5 \(\text{Qd7}\) 15.hxg6 \(\text{hxg6}\), Upton – Okike, West Bromwich 2004 and here White’s most active line seems to be: 16.\(\text{Ag4}\) \(\text{Cc4}\) 17.\(\text{Ac1}\)\(\text{±}\), followed by the redeployment of his queen to the h-file and repelling later Black’s active pieces on the queenside.

c) 7...\(\text{Qbd7}\)

Now, White’s simplest decision is to obtain the two-bishop advantage and that provides him with a stable edge in that position.

8.\(\text{h3}\) \(\text{xf3}\) 9.\(\text{xf3}\) c6

Black has played some other moves too, but only very seldom, despite the fact that they do not seem to be worse at all:

9...\(\text{Qe8}\) 10.0–0 a6 11.\(\text{Qb3}\) \(\text{Qb8}\), Johannes – Bianchi, corr. 2001, 12.\(\text{Qfd1}\) e5 13.d5 \(\text{Qe7}\) 14.\(\text{Qc2}\)\(\text{±}\);

9...c5 10.0–0 a6 11.dxc5 \(\text{Qxc5}\)?? (Even after the best line for Black: 11...dxc5 12.\(\text{Qc2}\) \(\text{Qe8}\) 13.\(\text{Qad1}\) \(\text{Qd6}\) 14.\(\text{Qe2}\)\(\text{±}\), White controls the centre and he maintains a stable advantage.) 12.e5 \(\text{Qe8}\) 13.exd6 exd6 14.\(\text{Qd2}\)\(\text{±}\) J.Perez – P.Tomaszewski, Email 2000;

9...a6 10.0–0 \(\text{Qe8}\), Burchardt – Kessler, Worms 1996 (About 10...c5 11.dxc5 – see 9...c5 10.0–0 a6 11.dxc5.) and here, after the standard pawn-break on the queenside, White increases his grip on the centre: 11.c5! dxc5 (Black is in a serious trouble after his less principled lines too: 11...\(\text{Qd8}\) 12.cxd6 exd6 13.\(\text{Qb3}\)\(\text{±}\); 11...e5 12.cxd6 cxd6 13.d5\(\text{±}\)) 12.e5 \(\text{Qh5}\) 13.\(\text{Qxb7}\) \(\text{Qb8}\) 14.\(\text{Qc6}\)\(\text{±}\);

9...e5 – This is Black’s most popular reaction, but it is evidently not the best. The absence of his light-squared bishop diminishes considerably the effect of the pawn-advance f7–f5, moreover that he has not castled yet and that is in favour of his opponent. White can easily organize a powerful pressure on the kingside, while Black has problems to create any counterplay. 10.d5 \(\text{Qb6}\) 11.\(\text{Qd3}\) \(\text{Qfd7}\), Kuenitz – Auer, Mehlingen 1997. Black has somehow hampered the development of his opponent’s queenside initiative, but White can begin his standard actions on the kingside: 12.h4 \(\text{Qc5}\) (or 12...\(\text{Qf6}\) 13.g3\(\text{±}\)) 13.\(\text{Qe2}\) a5 14.h5\(\text{±}\). The other possibilities for Black (after 9...e5 10.d5) enable White to exploit the fact that Black has not castled yet and he can start a dangerous kingside onslaught:

10...a5 11.g4 \(\text{Qc5}\) 12.g5 \(\text{Qfd7}\) 13.h4 f5 – Black is trying to obtain some counterplay on the f-file. 14.gxf6 \(\text{Qxf6}\) 15.\(\text{Qe2}\)! – White prevents the possible trade of
the dark-squared bishops. 15...a4 16...d2 e6 17.0–0–0 e8a8 18.h5+– and White had a crushing attack and the game ended rather quickly after: 18...d8 19.hxg6 f6 20.gxh7+ h8 21.h6 xh6 22.xh6 1–0 Nemet – Joncic, Baden 1998;

10...e8, Mathisen – Jernberg, Norway 1997, 11.h4 b6 12.b3 d7 13.h5 g5 14.h6 f6 15.g4±;

10...a6, Cramling – Fuerstman, New York 1985, 11.h4 h5 (or 11...b6 12.b3 d7 13.h5±) 12.g4→;

10...b6 11.g4 e8 12.h4 f6 13.h5 g5 14.b4± White had squeezed his opponent on the kingside and he developed a powerful queenside initiative in the game Sulava – Bankovic, Pula 1997;

10...e8, Loos – David, Regensburg 1998, 11.h4 f5 (Black’s defensive problems are even greater after: 11...h5 12.g4 hxg4 13.xg4 f5 14.h3! xh4 15.e2 f6 16.0–0–0) 12.h5 f4 13.d2 g5 14.h6 f6 15.g4±;

10...h8 11.h4 g8 12.h5 g5 13.g4 b6 14.b3 h6 15.c1± Black’s dark-squared bishop is “bad” and he cannot obtain sufficient counterplay. His attempt at activating his pieces led him to a quick demise after: 15...f5 16.exf5 xf5 17.xf5 xf5 18.h6 f8, in the game Zubak – Kozjak, Pula 2000, 19.g4+–, because White was winning at least the g5-pawn;

10...h6 11.d2 h7, Blazkova – Cdra, Karvina 2003, White’s attack is no less dangerous against that defensive set-up as well: 12.g4 b6 13.e2 d7 14.h4±.

10.0–0

10...e5

10...b8?! Strasser – Klee, Seefeld 1998, this move is played obviously with the intention to prepare b7-b5, but White can prevent Black’s counterplay with the simple reaction: 11.e2! c5 (or 11...b5 12.cxb5 cxb5 13.b4±) 12.dxc5 dxc5 13.f4±.

In answer to 10...a6, Kasparov – Dlugy, Saint John 1988, it is logical for White to begin immediate queenside actions with: 11.b4 c7 (Black has great difficulties after his other possibilities too: 11...c5!? 12.bxc5 dxc5 13.e5±; 11...e5 12.d5 e7 13.b1±; 11...a5 12.a3 axb4 13.axb4 xal 14.xal±) 12.b3 e5 13.d5 f8 14.f1± White’s standard queenside initiative is running unopposed, because Black’s counterplay is nowhere in sight.

10...c7 11.d2 e8 12.f1 a6 13.c1 a8, I.Ivanov – Bakhoun, Las Vegas 1992, 14.b4
Chapter 13

- this is White's most energetic line, since his powerful initiative on the queenside is developing with quite natural moves: 14...e5 15.d5 c5 16.\(\mathcal{O}\)a4\(\pm\), or 14...a5 15.a3 \(\mathcal{O}\)a8 16.c5\(\pm\).

11.d5 c5

Black's other replies are hardly better:

11...a6?! 12.dxc6 bxc6 13.\(\mathcal{O}\)xd6\(\pm\) and he had no compensation for the sacrificed pawn in the game Lensh – A.Maier, Bexbach 1995;

11...\(\mathcal{O}\)c7 12.\(\mathcal{O}\)c1 \(\mathcal{O}\)fb8 13.b4 a5 14.dxc6 bxc6 15.b5\(\pm\), White occupies the key d5-outpost, Lize – Nedess, corr. 1990;

11...cxd5 12.cxd5 a6 13.\(\mathcal{O}\)b3 b5 14.a4\(\pm\), Black's activity on the queenside only created additional weaknesses for him, Doorgachurn – Sobucki, Maisons Alfort 2001.

12.a3 \(\mathcal{O}\)e8

White has a powerful initiative on the queenside and he has plenty of extra space, so he maintains a clear advantage after Black's other defensive lines as well: 12...\(\mathcal{O}\)e7 13.b4 b6 14.\(\mathcal{O}\)d2 \(\mathcal{O}\)fb8 15.\(\mathcal{O}\)fb1 \(\mathcal{O}\)e8 16.\(\mathcal{O}\)d1\(\pm\) Vacek – Sustr, Czech Republic 1998; 12...a6 13.b4 b6, Vakles – Varhomoki, Sarospatak 1998, 14.\(\mathcal{O}\)a4 \(\mathcal{O}\)c7 15.\(\mathcal{O}\)fc1\(\pm\); 12...\(\mathcal{O}\)b6 13.\(\mathcal{O}\)e2 \(\mathcal{O}\)fd7 14.b4 f5 15.f3 a6, Morris – Pinto, corr. 1995, 16.\(\mathcal{O}\)b1\(\pm\).

13.b4 b6

Black's counterplay is quite harmless after: 13...f5, Iotti – Bonaccio, Cesenatico 1999, 14.\(\mathcal{O}\)b1 \(\mathcal{O}\)e7 15.\(\mathcal{O}\)d3\(\pm\).

14.\(\mathcal{O}\)b1 f5 15.\(\mathcal{O}\)e2 f4 16.\(\mathcal{O}\)d2\(\pm\)

Black's space advantage on the kingside cannot be transformed into an attack against his opponent's king, because his pieces are rather cramped and his important light-squared bishop is absent, Rivas Pastor – B.Rodriguez, Spain 1992.

d) 7...\(\mathcal{O}\)c6

Black begins attacking White's centre ignoring the fact that his knight is not reliably placed in the centre. Similar decision can hardly go unpunished.

8.d5 \(\mathcal{O}\)xf3

8...\(\mathcal{O}\)b8 – This is a dubious move, because Black has forced his opponent to occupy additional

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space and he has lost two tempi in the process. 9.0–0 $\text{b}d7$ (Black has played other moves only very seldom: about 9...$\text{a}fd7$ 10.$\text{b}c1$ – see 7...$\text{a}fd7$; 9...$\text{e}5$?! – that move weakens the light squares and it does not contribute to Black’s development, Schulte – M.Pfleger, Germany 1993, 10.$\text{h}3$ $\text{xf}3$ 11. $\text{xf}3\pm$, 10...$\text{e}c8$ 11.$\text{d}4\pm$; 9...$\text{e}5$?! – Now, White has his hands free for the queenside offensive. 10.$\text{c}5$ $\text{h}5$ 11.$\text{wb}3$ $\text{c}8$ 12.$\text{fc}1\pm$ Kaufman – Adu, Washington 1999; 9...a5 10.$\text{d}4$ $\text{xe}2$ 11.$\text{xe}2$ $\text{a}6$ 12.$\text{f}4\pm$ Bjerre – Jacobsen, Hjorring 1971; 9...c5 10.$\text{d}2$ $\text{bd}7$ 11.$\text{h}3$ $\text{xf}3$ 12.$\text{xf}3\pm$ Pham Minh – Phung Nguyen, Hanoi 2002; 9...c6 10.$\text{h}3$ $\text{xf}3$ 11.$\text{xf}3$ $\text{fd}7$ 12.$\text{wd}2$ a5 13.$\text{ab}1$ $\text{a}6$ 14.$\text{fc}1$ $\text{ac}5$ 15.$\text{b}3$ $\text{b}6$ 16.a3±. White has a solid centre, the two-bishop advantage and a clear-cut plan for queenside actions, Tukmakov – C.Foisor, Zaragoza 1993; about 9...$\text{xf}3$ 10.$\text{xf}3$ $\text{fd}7$ 11.$\text{c}1$ – see 7...$\text{fd}7$, 10...$\text{bd}7$ 11.$\text{e}2$ c5 12. $\text{f}4\pm$ and White was completely dominant in the centre in the game Hill – Stewart, corr. 1994; 10...c6 11.$\text{b}3$ $\text{c}7$ 12.$\text{fc}1$ $\text{fd}7$ 13.$\text{d}1$ a5 14.$\text{ab}1\pm$. Now, in comparison with 9...c6, White has an extra tempo, V.Ikonnikov – O.Foisor, St Afrique 1995.) 10.$\text{h}3$ $\text{xf}3$ 11.$\text{xf}3$ c6 (The move 11...$\text{e}5$?! – transposes to the standard King’s Indian pawn-structure, except that Black has lost a couple of tempi. 12.$\text{b}4$ $\text{e}8$ 13. $\text{c}5$ f5 14.$\text{c}6\pm$ Likavyš – Felcir, Slovakia 2001; 11...a5 12.$\text{c}1$ b6 13.$\text{a}3$ h6 14.$\text{c}2$ $\text{h}7$ 15.$\text{b}4\pm$ and White has a powerful queenside initiative, while Black has no counterplay at all, Huss – Mikavica, Zurich 1989; 11...b6 12.$\text{wd}2\pm$ Monin – Janda, Decin 1996; 11...a6 12.$\text{c}1$ $\text{b}8$ 13.$\text{b}4$ $\text{e}5$ 14.$\text{e}2\pm$ Kostelny – Torotto, Slovakia 2000; 11...e6, Claret – Tiboas, La Coruna 1995, 12.$\text{b}3$ b6 13.$\text{c}2$ $\text{e}8$ 14.$\text{fd}1\pm$; 12...exd5 13.$\text{xd}5$ $\text{c}8$ 14.$\text{ac}1\pm$; 12...$\text{c}8$ 13.$\text{dx}6$ $\text{fx}6$ 14.$\text{e}5\pm$; 12...$\text{b}8$ 13.$\text{dx}6$ $\text{fx}6$ 14. $\text{c}5\pm$) 12.$\text{b}3$ $\text{c}7$ 13.$\text{ac}1$ $\text{f}8$ 14.$\text{a}3$. White’s plan for actions is quite straightforward in the centre and on the queenside. 14...e6 15.$\text{dx}6$ $\text{bx}6$ 16.$\text{fd}1$ $\text{eb}8$ 17.$\text{c}2$ a5 18.$\text{a}4$ $\text{e}8$ 19.$\text{b}1$ $\text{b}7$ 20.$\text{g}3$ $\text{ab}8$ 21.$\text{b}3\pm$ and White’s couple of bishops and his control over the centre provided him with an overwhelming advantage in the game Jansa – S.Nikolic, Vrnjacka Banja 1978.

9.$\text{xf}3$ $\text{e}5$

About 9...$\text{b}8$ 10.0–0 – see 8...$\text{b}8$ 9.0–0 $\text{xf}3$ 10.$\text{xf}3$.

9...$\text{a}5$ 10.$\text{e}2$ c5 (Or 10...$\text{d}7$ 11.$\text{c}1$ c5 12.0–0 $\text{b}6$ 13.$\text{b}3$ e5 14.$\text{dx}6$ $\text{fx}6$ 15.$\text{b}5\pm$ and Black’s knights were so misplaced and his pawns were so weak that he lost rather quickly after: 15...$\text{c}8$ 16.$\text{g}4$ $\text{e}7$ 17.$\text{d}2$ $\text{c}6$ 18.$\text{cd}1$ $\text{d}8$ 19.$\text{g}5\pm$– Quinteros – Root, Lone Pine 1979; 12...$\text{b}6$ 13.$\text{d}2$ $\text{b}7$, B.Zueger – Hon Kah, Thessaloniki 1988, 14.$\text{f}4\pm$; 10...c6
Chapter 13

— this move is connected with the idea for Black to obtain some counterplay on the c-file, but his knight is so miserably placed at the edge of the board that he cannot organize any effective counterplay. 11...c1 cxd5 12.exd5 c8 13.b3 d7 14.0–0 a6 15.e4 b6, Golz – Shagalovich, Minsk 1968, it would have been a disaster for Black to defend with: 15...c5 16.g3 f5 17.f4+- and he would be defenseless against 18.b4, but even now after: 16.b4 b7 17.d2 a5 18.a3 axb4 19.axb4 a8 20.h6 f4, White exchanges his opponent’s only active piece and he maintains an advantage, which is close to winning.) 11.0–0 d7 (11...a6 — That is a logical move, played with the intention to create some counterplay on the queenside. 12.c2 b8 13.f4 d7, Malykin – Haub, Germany 2001, but now Black’s straightforward actions aimed at the preparation of the pawn-advance b7-b5, enable White to break through in the centre: 14.e5 dxe5 15.fxe5 g4 16.xg4 xg4 17.h3 h5 18.xc5 xc5 19.e4+. It is hardly better for Black to try: 14.g4 15.d2 h6 16.e4+, or 15...dxe5 16.h3 h6 17.e4 b6 18.fxe5 f5 19.f4+ and White has a great advantage in the centre. 12...c7 13.b1 e6 14.b3 f8, Paschall – Burnett, New York 1995, 15.d2 d7 16.f4; 13...b6 14.f4 e6 15.dxe6 fxe6 16.f5+ Simagin – V.Soloviev, Moscow 1964; 11...e8 12.c2 d7 13.ad1 a6 14.b3± Donchev – F.Portisch, Bratislava 1983.) 12.d2 a6 (Black must worry about the same problems in case of: 12.e8 13.b1 a6 14.b3± Bogdanovski – Ilíc, Kladovo 1990, or 13...b6 14.b3 b7 15.f4± Sanchez – Agudelo, Barranquilla 1972.) 13.b1 b8 (13...b6 — This move is too slow and thus Black enables his opponent to organize an assault in the centre and on the kingside. 14.h6 c7 15.xg7 xg7 16.f4 b7 17.g4 d8 18.e5± Simic – Tosic, Vrnjačka Banja 1984; 13...c7 14.f4 b8, Andruet – Giffard, Epinal 1989, 15.b3+) 14.b3+ – Black cannot push b7-b5 and accordingly his knight remains idle on the a5-square.

10.e2

10...c6

About 10...d7 11.0–0 c6 — see 10...c6 11.0–0 d7.

But not 10...fd7?? 11.f4+– Prieto – Rodriguez Antuna, Gijon 1999.

10...ed7 11.0–0 a6, S.Trofimov – Tataev, Kemerovo 1995 (about 11...c6 — see 10...c6), 12.d2±.
10...e6, Morales – Velez, Havana 1982, 11.0–0 %e7 12.%e1 \text{\textcopyright}ed7 13.%d2±.

10...c5 – This move leads to a favourable position for White in the Benoni Defence. 11.0–0 a6 (Black would not change much if he plays some other moves: 11...%e8, Halasz – V.Kostic, Austria 1997, 12.f4 \text{\textcopyright}d7 13.%d2±; 11...\text{\textcopyright}ed7 12.%d2 %e8, Siegmund – Neulinger, Feffernitz 1999, 13.f4±) 12.a4 %a5, Pajkovic – Ristic, Budva 2002 (Black has problems too creating counterplay in case of 12...%e8, Bluebaum – Bilo, Lemgo 1985, 13.a5±) and here after: 13.f4 \text{\textcopyright}ed7 14.%d2 %b6 15.a5±, Black’s position is cramped in the centre as well as on the flanks.

After 10...%e8, it is possible for White to follow with: 11.g4! e6 (11...h6?! – This move allows White to open quickly the h-file: 12.h4 e6 13.g5 hxg5 14.hxg5± and Black has great problems to protect his king. It is hardly surprising that the game ended very quickly: 14...\text{\textcopyright}h7 15.dxe6 %xe6 16.%d2 a6 17.f4 \text{\textcopyright}d7 18.%d4 f6 19.c5 c6 20.0–0–0 d5 21.exd5 cxd5 22.%f3 1–0 Sam-buev – Yanvarjov, Korolev 1999.) 12.g5 %h5 13.dxe6 %xe6 14.%d2 a6 15.f4 (It is weaker for White to play 15.0–0–0, because Black obtains some counterplay after: 15...b5 16.c5 %c4 17.%xc4 bxc4 18.%d5, or 16.cxb5 axb5 17.%xb5 %f3.) 15...%c6 16.%f3 %a5 (Black would not solve all his problems with the line: 16...%xc3 17.%xc3 %e7 18.0–0 %xe4 19.%xe4 %xe4 20.%ae1 %f5 17.b3 b5 18.cxb5 axb5 19.%c1 c6, Epishin – Rogers, Brno 1991. Here, White could have consolidated his advantage with the help of the variation: 20.f5 %e8 21.f6±. 11...%e8 12.%e1 %c7 13.f4 \text{\textcopyright}d7 14.%f3± Primel – Des Bouillons, Avoine 2003.

11...%e8 12.f4 %e7, Maynard – A.Saenz, Merida 1997 and here it would be logical for White to continue in a similar fashion to the main line: 13.%c1 %a5 14.a3±.

11...%c7 12.f4 %d7 13.%c1 e6, M.Petursson – Angantysson, Reykjavik 1980, Black is trying to create some counterplay in the centre, but he has problems to open files, therefore White can develop his kingside initiative with: 14.%f3 %f8 (or 14...e5 15.f5±) 15.g4±.

In case of: 11...%b8 12.f4 %d7 13.%c1 %c8, Gordin – Osman, Bucharest 2002, Black prevented his opponent from occupying additional space on the queenside, but his pieces remained too passive and he had no counterplay at all, 14.%f3±.

Black has tried in some blitz-games the line: 11...%c8 12.%c1 a6, Dopey – Gariços, Internet 1999, but here White could have obtained a great advantage with: 13.f4 %d7 14.b4 c5 (It is just terrible for Black to follow with: 14...cxd5 15.exd5 %b6 16.%b3 e6 17.dxe6 fxe6 18.%fd1±) 15.a3±.
11...\textit{Q}ed7 12.\textit{Q}c1 a5, Schirm – Liebau, Hamburg 1993 (In answer to 12...\textit{W}a5, Techmer – F. Bachmann, corr. 1991, it is essential for White not to let his opponent's knight to the c5-square and to gradually prepare the advance of his pawns on the queenside: 13.a3! \textit{E}ac8 14.\textit{W}d2±) and now after the simple reaction: 13.f4 a4 14.\textit{Q}f3±, White occupies space and he is threatening to break through in the centre.

11...\textit{W}d7 12.f4 \textit{Q}eg4 13.\textit{Q}d4 cxd5? (Black's endgame is very difficult to even after his more resilient defence: 13...c5! 14.\textit{Q}xg4 \textit{Q}xg4 15.\textit{Q}xg4 \textit{Q}xg4 16.\textit{Q}xg7 \textit{Q}xg7 17.\textit{Q}ae1±, while the line: 14.\textit{Q}xg4 15.\textit{Q}xg7 \textit{Q}xg7 16.\textit{W}f3 \textit{E}ae8 17.\textit{Q}ae1± leads to an even more unpleasant position for him – White is threatening to break in the centre as well as a kingside offensive.) 14.e5+ – Keilhack – Redzepovic, Nuremberg 1990.

After 11...\textit{E}e8 12.f4 (It is weaker for White to play 12.\textit{Q}c1, due to 12...e6 and if 13.f4, then he must consider the line: 13...\textit{Q}xc4 14.\textit{Q}xc4 exd5± and Black's compensation is quite acceptable.) 12...\textit{Q}ed7 13.\textit{Q}h1 a6 (In case of: 13...\textit{W}c7 14.\textit{W}d2 e6 15.dxe6 \textit{W}xe6 16.\textit{W}f3 \textit{E}ae8 17.\textit{E}ad1± White remains with a space advantage and a couple of powerful bishops, H. Schussler – Steinbacher, Germany 1983.) 14.\textit{W}f3 \textit{E}c8 and in game Lobron – van der Sterren, Wijk aan Zee 1993, White seized the initiative with: 15.dxc6 bxc6 16.c5 \textit{Q}xc5 17.\textit{Q}xc5 dxc5 18.e5 \textit{Q}d7 19.\textit{W}e2 \textit{W}a5 20.e6 \textit{W}f6 21.\textit{Q}xf7+ \textit{Q}xf7 22.f5 \textit{G}xf5 23.\textit{Q}h5+ \textit{Q}xh5 24.\textit{Q}xh5+ \textit{Q}g8 25.\textit{Q}xf5 \textit{Q}f8 26.\textit{Q}af1 \textit{W}b4 27.\textit{W}e2+. Following: 11...cxd5 12.exd5 \textit{W}c8 (about 12...\textit{W}a5 13.f4 \textit{Q}ed7 14.a3! – see 11...\textit{W}a5) 13.b3 \textit{Q}fg4 (White occupies the centre rather quickly after: 13...a6 14.\textit{Q}d4 \textit{Q}ed7 15.\textit{Q}c1 \textit{Q}c5 16.b4± Sauermann – Gotsch, corr. 1977; it is also too bad for Black to play 13...\textit{Q}fd7, B. Ionov – Rakhmanov, St Petersburg 2002, because after 14.\textit{B}c1± he has to waste a lot of time in his efforts to save his centralized knight. The simplification of the position is in favour of White in case of: 13...\textit{Q}eg4 14.\textit{Q}d2 \textit{Q}h6 15.h3 \textit{Q}xd2 16.\textit{W}xd2 \textit{Q}e5 17.\textit{Q}f1 \textit{W}c5 18.\textit{Q}a4 \textit{W}a3 19.\textit{Q}f1 \textit{Q}f6 20.\textit{Q}e3±, because Black's e7-pawn is weak and he has no counterplay, Unzicker – Hug, Bath 1973.) 14.\textit{Q}d2 \textit{Q}h6 15.\textit{Q}c1 \textit{Q}f5 16.\textit{Q}h1± and White gradually repels Black's knights away from the centre by marching forward with his f and g-pawns, Yrrjola – Barlov, Sochi 1984.
12.f4!
That is White’s most energetic reaction – now he occupies maximum space in the centre and on both sides of the board.

12...\textit{\textdelta}d7 13.a3! cxd5

The move 13...\textit{\textdelta}fc8 – does not prevent White from following his plan: 14.b4 \textit{\textdelta}d8 15.\textit{\textdelta}c1 cxd5 16.exd5 a5 17.\textit{\textdelta}b3 \textit{\textdelta}f8 18.\textit{\textdelta}f3. He has occupied plenty of space all over the board and Black’s attempts to organize some counterplay only weaken his position additionally: 18...axb4 19.axb4 \textit{\textdelta}d7 20.\textit{\textdelta}fd1 \textit{\textdelta}a6 21.\textit{\textdelta}b5 b6 22.\textit{\textdelta}d4± Berkes – Cekro, Plovdiv 2003.

14.exd5 \textit{\textdelta}fc8

It is more or less with the same result for Black if he plays: 14...a6

15.b4 \textit{\textdelta}c7 16.\textit{\textdelta}c1 \textit{\textdelta}fc8 17.\textit{\textdelta}h1 \textit{\textdelta}d8 18.\textit{\textdelta}b3± Zielinska – Stumberger, Menorca 1996.

15.b4 \textit{\textdelta}d8 16.\textit{\textdelta}b3 a6 17.\textit{\textdelta}ac1 \textit{\textdelta}e8 18.g4 e6 19.\textit{\textdelta}f3±.

White’s pieces were evidently better prepared for the forthcoming opening of the position in the game Eingorn – Mironenko, Alicante 1992.

\textit{Conclusion}

We have analyzed in this chapter the variations in which Black is not in a hurry to realize the main idea behind the move 6...\textit{\textdelta}g4 – to fight for the d4-square. In connection with that, White usually obtains the two-bishop advantage and he maintains a solid pawn-centre. It is quite typical for variations a, b and c that White makes a very good use of the circumstance that he has not castled yet – so he develops a powerful initiative on the kingside. This is usually transformed into a dangerous attack, or sometimes Black’s kingside gets blocked and White is left with free hands for actions on the queenside. In variation d, White occupies additional space not only in the centre, but also on both sides of the board, therefore Black can hardly organize any counterplay whatsoever.
Chapter 14
1.\(\text{\texttt{d}}f3\) \(\text{\texttt{d}}f6\) 2.\(\text{\texttt{c}}4\) \(\text{\texttt{g}}6\) 3.\(\text{\texttt{c}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{g}}7\) 4.\(\text{\texttt{e}}4\) \(\text{\texttt{d}}6\) 5.\(\text{\texttt{d}}4\) 0–0 6.\(\text{\texttt{e}}2\) \(\text{\texttt{g}}4\) 7.\(\text{\texttt{e}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{f}}d7\)

8.\(\text{\texttt{g}}c1\)

The idea of that move is to prevent the possibility for Black after 8.0–0, to follow with the line: 8...\(\text{\texttt{d}}c6\) 9.\(\text{\texttt{d}}5\) \(\text{\texttt{xf}}3\) 10.\(\text{\texttt{xf}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{a}}5\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{e}}2\) \(\text{\texttt{xc}}3\)! 12.\(\text{\texttt{b}}xc3\) e5\(\infty\).

Now, Black has three main defensive options: a) 8...\(\text{\texttt{c}}5\), b) 8...\(\text{\texttt{a}}6\) and c) 8...\(\text{\texttt{e}}5\).

About 8...\(\text{\texttt{a}}6\) 9.0–0 \(\text{\texttt{c}}5\) – see 8...\(\text{\texttt{c}}5\) 9.0–0 \(\text{\texttt{a}}6\); 8...\(\text{\texttt{xf}}3\) 9.\(\text{\texttt{xf}}3\) e5 10.d5 – see 8...\(\text{\texttt{e}}5\); 9...\(\text{\texttt{d}}c6\) 10.d5 – see 8...\(\text{\texttt{d}}c6\).

He has also tried in practice:

8...\(\text{\texttt{b}}6?!\) – This piece is usually misplaced on that square. After White's simple reply – 9.b3\(\pm\), Black's knight on b6 is without any good prospects.

8...\(\text{\texttt{a}}5\) – That move is useful for Black only in case he includes in his plan the pawn-advance e7-e5, therefore White's best reaction against it is: 9.a3 \(\text{\texttt{d}}a6\) (Following: 9...\(\text{\texttt{c}}5?!\) 10.d5\(\pm\), Black cannot push b7-b5 anymore.) 10.\(\text{\texttt{b}}1\) \(\text{\texttt{e}}5\) (It is too bad for Black to continue with: 10...\(\text{\texttt{f}}5\)? 11.\(\text{\texttt{g}}5\)\(\pm\) 11.d5 – see 8...\(\text{\texttt{e}}5\);

After 8...\(\text{\texttt{e}}6\) 9.0–0 \(\text{\texttt{c}}5\) 10.\(\text{\texttt{b}}5\) \(\text{\texttt{xf}}3\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{xf}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{cxd}}4\) 12.\(\text{\texttt{xd}}4\) \(\text{\texttt{e}}5\), San Segundo – Romero Holmes, Ayamonte 2002, White does not need to go after Black's d6-pawn, since after the simple line: 13.\(\text{\texttt{e}}2\) \(\text{\texttt{a}}6\) 14.\(\text{\texttt{c}}3\) \(\text{\texttt{b}}c6\) 15.\(\text{\texttt{e}}3\)\(\pm\), he maintains a stable advantage thanks to his control over the centre and his couple of bishops;

8...\(\text{\texttt{c}}6\) 9.0–0 \(\text{\texttt{a}}6\), Dougherty – Velasquez, Toronto 1992 (In answer to 9...\(\text{\texttt{a}}5\), Panama – Chokbengboun, France 2003, it seems reasonable for White to follow with 10.d5!?\(\pm\) and Black has problems to prepare e7-e5, while it is not advantageous for him to try to push c6-c5, because of the vulnerability of the b5-square.) and here White can obtain the two-bishop advantage with: 10.h3 \(\text{\texttt{xf}}3\) 11.\(\text{\texttt{xf}}3\) and Black cannot organize any active play, for example: 11...\(\text{\texttt{e}}5\) 12.d5 c5
13.a3 f5 14.\(\text{c}6\) b5 \(\text{e}7\) 15.b4!?± and his chances to finish his attack off successfully are just minimal without the light-squared bishop; meanwhile White's queenside initiative is very powerful;

8...\(\text{c}6\) – This obvious loss of time is in fact quite popular. 9.d5 \(\text{xf}3\) (White is dominant in the centre after: 9...\(\text{cb}8\) 10.0–0 a5, Grabiauskas – Zavarsky, Martin 1996, 11.d4 \(\text{xe}2\) 12.\(\text{xe}2\) a6 13.f4±; or 10...\(\text{c}5\) 11.d4 \(\text{xe}2\), Kerek – A.Nagy, Hungary 1995, 12.\(\text{xe}2\) a5 13.f4±) 10.\(\text{xf}3\) \(\text{a}5\) (It is too passive for Black to opt for: 10...\(\text{cb}8\) 11.\(\text{e}2\) c5 12.0–0 \(\text{a}6\), Kretchetov – Boysan, Dos Hermanas 2003, 13.f4±; he cannot create an effective counterplay with the line: 10...\(\text{ce}5\) 11.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{f}6\) 12.f4 \(\text{ed}7\) 13.0–0 e5 14.f5± Graelken – Lachmuth, Germany 2004; it is hardly better for Black to try: 11...\(\text{b}6\) 12.b3 c5 13.f4 \(\text{ed}7\) 14.0–0± Schell – Degering, Bayern 1999; after 12...\(\text{e}8\) 13.0–0 e6 14.f4 \(\text{ed}7\) 15.dxe6 \(\text{xe}6\) 16.\(\text{f}3\)±, White had a stable advantage in the centre and he turned it quickly into a full point: 16...\(\text{e}8\) 17.\(\text{wd}2\) \(\text{c}8\)?! 18.e5 \(\text{f}8\) 19.\(\text{e}4\) 1–0 Chuchelov – Koehn, Germany 1997.) 11.\(\text{e}2\) c5 (It is not advisable for Black to compromise his light squares with: 11...b6 12.0–0 \(\text{b}7\), I.Farago – Krause, Wattens 1999, while in case of 13.b4±, Black's knight on b7 will remain passive for a long time.)

12.0–0 a6 (Or 12...\(\text{b}6\), Rohrbach – Schatz, Germany 1996, 13.b3±) 13.f4 \(\text{b}8\), Gmeiner – Hoffmann, Germany 2001, 14.b3±. Black is without any counterplay and his knight on a5 will remain isolated from the actions for a long time to come.

\begin{itemize}
  \item a) 8...\(\text{c}5\)
  \begin{itemize}
    \item White is quite well prepared for that move.
  \end{itemize}
  \begin{itemize}
    \item 9.d5
  \end{itemize}
\end{itemize}

9...\(\text{a}6\)

About 9...a6 10.a4 – see 8...a6 9.d5 c5 10.a4.

9...\(\text{b}6\) – This indifferent move does not contribute to Black's counterplay. 10.b3 \(\text{a}6\) (It answer to: 10...a6 11.0–0 \(\text{c}7\), Taimanov – Alatortsev, Yalta 1962, it seems good for White to follow with the standard plan: 12.\(\text{g}5\)!! \(\text{xe}2\) 13.\(\text{exe}2\) h6 14.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{d}7\) 15.f4±; in case of: 10...e6 11.0–0 exd5, Arlandi – Berend, Leibnitz 1990, White can hamper Black's active possibilities with: 12.exd5 \(\text{e}8\) 13.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 14.h3± 11.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{xf}3\) 12.\(\text{xf}3\) \(\text{c}7\) 13.\(\text{ed}2\) e5 14.g4 \(\text{c}8\) 15.h4 a6 16.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{d}7\) 17.h5± and Black's position is cramped on

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9...b5 – This transposition into the Volga Gambit is not good for Black at all: 10.cxb5 a6 11.a4 axb5 12.axb5 – see 8...a6 9.d5 c5 10.a4 b5 11.cxb5 axb5 12.axb5.

9...\text{xf3} 10.\text{xf3} \text{a6} 11.0–0 \text{c7} 12.\text{e2} b5 13.cxb5 a6 14.a4± and once again Black had no compensation for the pawn in the game Tratar – Gozzoli, Pula 2003.

10.0–0 \text{c7}

10...\text{b6} – Black only provokes the fortification of White’s centre with that move, Langeweg – L.Szabo, Beverwijk 1966, 11.b3±.

After 10...\text{a5} 11.\text{d2} \text{fb8} 12.h3 \text{xf3} 13.\text{xf3} \text{d8} 14.\text{e2} \text{c7} 15.a4 b6 16.f4 a6 17.\text{d3} \text{e7} 18.\text{e2}± White will soon organize a breakthrough in the centre and Black can hardly find any counterplay, W.Schmidt – Blackstock, Budapest 1977.

11.h3

That is the simplest method for White to obtain a slight, but stable advantage.

In this position after 11.\text{g5}, Black manages to create some counterplay on the queenside: 11...\text{xe2} 12.\text{xe2} a6 13.a4 b5 14.axb5 axb5 15.cxb5 \text{b8} =, with the idea to follow with \text{c8–b7}.

11...\text{xf3} 12.\text{xf3} a6

12...\text{b8} 13.\text{e2} \text{e8} (About 13...a6 14.a4 – see 12...a6; after 13...e5 14.dxe6 \text{dxe6} 15.\text{c2} a6 16.\text{d2} \text{d4} 17.\text{xd4} \text{cxd4} 18.\text{xd4}!, White has a powerful centralized knight and a pawn for the exchange and that is a more than sufficient compensation for it. 18...\text{xd4} 19.\text{xd4} \text{a7} – It is not any better for Black to try: 19...\text{e5} 20.\text{d5} \text{d8} 21.f4 \text{c6} 22.\text{c3} =, because his static rooks cannot do anything active – 20.\text{xd6} \text{ad8} 21.\text{d5} \text{g7} 22.\text{d1} \text{c5} 23.\text{g3}±. White has a couple of pawns for the exchange and he preserves the possibility for a pawn-offensive, so he has superior prospects, U.Andersson – Vaganian, Skelleftea 1989.) 14.\text{e1} a6 15.a4 b6 16.\text{d2} e6 17.b3±. Black failed to organize any counterplay in the game Filip – Westerinen, Wijk aan Zee 1970.

In case of: 12...e6 13.\text{e2} \text{exd5} 14.\text{exd5} f5 15.\text{d2}±, Black cannot do anything active, L.Wu – Efimenko, Hastings 2004.

13.a4 \text{e8}

Black’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient after: 13...e6 14.\text{dxe6} \text{dxe6} 15.\text{xd6}± Prusikin – Gruenenwald, Bodensee 1998.

The position is more or less similar to the main line in case of: 13...\text{e5} 14.\text{e2} e6 15.\text{d2} \text{exd5} 16.\text{exd5} f5, Sofrrevski – Veli-mirovic, Skopje 1971, 17.a5±.

Following: 13...\text{b8} 14.\text{e2} e5 (about 14...e6 15.dxe6 – see 14...e5) 15.\text{dxe6} \text{dxe6} 16.f4 \text{d4} 17.\text{d3}±, Black has a powerful centralized knight indeed, but it is not good enough to compensate
his lack of active possibilities and the weakness of the d5-square, Malich – Barczay, Halle 1976.

14.\(\text{\textit{\$d}}}2 \text{\textit{\$b}}8\)

There arise similar positions after: 14...e6 15.a5 exd5, Sriram – Deepan, Bikaner 2004, 16.exd5\(\pm\).

15.\(\text{\textit{\$e}}}2 \text{\textit{\$e}}}6\)

15...\(\text{\textit{\$a}}}8 – This is definitely not the best square for Black’s knight.

16.\(\text{\textit{\$a}}}1 \text{\textit{\$a}}}5 17.\text{\textit{\$e}}}c2 \text{\textit{\$e}}}c8 18.\text{\textit{\$a}}}3 \text{\textit{\$d}}}8 19.a5\(\pm\) Hertneck – Resende, Spain 1999.

8...a6, the pawn-advances on the queenside – c7-c5 and then b7-b5, for example after: 9.0-0 c5 10.d5 b5 (It is also possible for him to follow with the more restrained line: 10...\(\text{\textit{\$e}}}xf3 11.\text{\textit{\$e}}}xf3 b5 12.\text{\textit{\$e}}}e2 bxc4 13.\text{\textit{\$e}}}xc4 \text{\textit{\$b}}}6 14.\text{\textit{\$e}}}e2 \text{\textit{\$d}}}8d7 15.b3 \text{\textit{\$b}}}8\infty Nikolac – Cebalo, Medulin 1997.) 11.cxb5 axb5 12.\(\text{\textit{\$e}}}xb5 \text{\textit{\$e}}}e5 13.\text{\textit{\$e}}}e2 \text{\textit{\$e}}}xf3 14.\text{\textit{\$e}}}xf3 \text{\textit{\$e}}}xf3 15.\text{\textit{\$e}}}xf3 \text{\textit{\$d}}}7\infty Schneider – Hertneck, Aschach 1997 and there arises a position, which is typical for the Volga Gambit in which Black’s compensation for the pawn is quite sufficient.

9.d5

This is White's most principled reaction against Black’s last move.

9...\(\text{\textit{\$e}}}xf3\)

In answer to 9...\(\text{\textit{\$e}}}c5, White maintains a stable advantage after: 10.h3 \(\text{\textit{\$e}}}xf3 11.\text{\textit{\$e}}}xf3 a5 (or 11...c6 12.b4 \(\text{\textit{\$c}}}d7 13.0-0\(\pm\)) 12.h4 \(\text{\textit{\$c}}}bd7 13.h5\(\pm\).

The other possibilities for Black are:

9...a5 10.0-0 \(\text{\textit{\$a}}}6, Babula – Zesch, Hamburg 2005, 11.\(\text{\textit{\$d}}}d4 \text{\textit{\$e}}}xe2 12.\text{\textit{\$e}}}xe2 \text{\textit{\$a}}}c5 13.\text{\textit{\$f}}}4\(\pm\);

9...b5 10.cxb5 axb5 11.\(\text{\textit{\$e}}}xb5 \text{\textit{\$e}}}e5 12.\text{\textit{\$e}}}e2 \text{\textit{\$e}}}xf3 13.\text{\textit{\$e}}}xf3 c5, van Heirzeele – van Mechelen, Gent 2000, 14.0-0\(\pm\);

9...c6 10.0-0 \(\text{\textit{\$a}}}5 11.a3 \text{\textit{\$e}}}c8 12.h3 \text{\textit{\$e}}}xf3 13.\text{\textit{\$e}}}xf3 \text{\textit{\$e}}}e5 14.\text{\textit{\$f}}}2\pm Shtyrenkov – F.Beren, Pardubice 1997;

9...c5 10.a4 – White prevents radically his opponent’s most im-

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important counterplay – the preparation of the move b7-b5. Black has tried numerous moves here, but he has problems to obtain effective counter chances:


10...Ax f3 11.Axf3 Ab6 (about 11...b5 12.axb5 axb5 13.cxb5 – see 10...b5) 12.b3 e5 13.h4 f5 14.h5± Lakdawala – Krechetov, San Francisco 2001;


10...Aa5 11.Ac4 Ac7 (After 11...Ad8, Damljanovic – Pikula, Belgrade 2000, White’s simplest counter measure is – 12.0-0±) 12.0-0 e5, Franic – Cebalo, Zadar 1997, 13.dxe6 Axc6 (or 13...fxe6 14.Ag5±) 14.Af4±;

10...b5!? – That is Black’s most principled move, but it is obviously not the best for him. 11.cxb5 axb5 12.axb5 Axf3 (In answer to 12...Ab6, S.Atalik – Cebalo, Bled 2001, it seems reasonable for White to continue with: 13.Ac2


10.Ac4

10...b5

Here, Black is simply forced to sacrifice a pawn in order to justify his opening strategy.

After 10...c5 11.Ac2± Shields – Farkas, corr. 1999, it would be even worse for him to sacrifice a pawn, because White’s lightsquared bishop would become very active. Should Black refrain from pushing b7-b5, then his maneuver with the knight to d7 will turn out to be just a loss of a couple of tempi.

The calm move – 10...a5, presents White with free hands for kingside actions: 11.h4 Aa6 (If
11...h5, then it is advantageous for White to follow with: 12.g4 hgx4 13.\textit{x}g4 \textit{c}c5 14.h5→.) 12.h5 \textit{ac}c5 13.hxg6 hxg6 (After 13...fxg6, White can react simply with 14.0–0± Berry – Ghasi, Scarborough 2001.) 14.\textit{bd}2?! , with the idea to follow with the maneuver \textit{wg}1-h2, for example: 14...c6 (It is useless for Black to try: 14...\textit{e}5, due to 15.\textit{e}e2 \textit{ed}7 16.\textit{wg}1 \textit{xc}3+ 17.\textit{xc}3 \textit{xe}4+ 18.\textit{c}c2±) 15.\textit{g}1 and Black will hardly manage to save his king – 15...\textit{e}e8 (or 15...\textit{b}6 16.b3 \textit{cxd}5 17.\textit{exd}5 \textit{wc}8 18.\textit{h}2→) 16.\textit{wh}2 \textit{f}8 17.\textit{h}6→.

11.cxb5 axb5 12.\textit{wb}3 c5 13.\textit{xb}5 \textit{a}5

It is favourable for Black to trade queens in this typical Volga Gambit position, because his rooks remain quite active and White needs to play very precisely.

Black’s attempt to preserve the queens led after: 13...\textit{a}5 14.\textit{b}3 \textit{a}6, Loncar – Grobelsek, Zadar 2003, to a position in which White had to react accurately: 15.a3! – this was a very strong move, because it restricted the possibilities of Black’s knight on a6. 15...\textit{c}7 16.\textit{e}2±.

14.\textit{xa}5 \textit{xa}5 15.a3 \textit{b}6

In answer to 15...\textit{a}6, it is again good for White to play 16.\textit{c}2 \textit{b}8, Tukmakov – Cebalo, Solin 1999 and here he should only complete his development after which his extra pawn and the couple of bishops will provide him with a stable edge: 17.\textit{c}1! \textit{c}7 18.\textit{e}2 f5 – Black is trying to weaken White’s central pawns. White has prevented the appearance of his opponent’s knight to the b5-square and Black has no other counterplay. 19.f3 fxe4 20.fxe4 \textit{d}4 21.\textit{f}1±.

16.\textit{c}2!

White provides additional protection of his b2-pawn and prepares the ideal placement of his dark-squared bishop on the c1-square.

After 16.b4?! \textit{xa}3 17.\textit{b}5, it is good for Black to play: 17...\textit{xe}3+! 18.\textit{xe}3 \textit{xb}4 , while in case of 16.\textit{e}2, Black reacted with: 16...\textit{d}7 17.\textit{d}2 \textit{b}8 18.\textit{c}2 \textit{a}4 and he had a quite acceptable compensation for the pawn in the game Kramnik – Piket, Amsterdam 1996.

16...\textit{d}7 17.\textit{g}5

That is a standard move with the help of which White discoordinates temporarily his opponent’s pieces.

17...\textit{b}8

Black is ready to give up a second pawn with the idea to try to
trap White's bishop. 

After his relatively best defence: 17...\textit{Be}8 18.0–0 h6 19.\textit{Ac}1\textit{±}, White's pieces are quite reliably placed.

\textbf{18.\textit{Axe}}7 \textit{Ae}5

It would not work for Black to continue with: 18...\textit{Dc}8 19.\textit{Ag}5 \textit{Ab}2 20.\textit{Exb}2 \textit{Ac}3\textit{+}, due to 21.\textit{Ad}2\textit{±}.

\textbf{19.0–0}

Now, the immediate retreat of the bishop to c1 is already too late: 19.\textit{Ag}5 \textit{Dc}4 20.\textit{Ac}1 \textit{Ab}2!\textit{?}.

\textbf{19...f}6

After 19...\textit{Da}4 20.\textit{Dd}1 \textit{f}6 21.\textit{Ag}4 \textit{Db}6 22.\textit{De}6\textit{+} \textit{Dg}7 23.f4 \textit{Ad}4\textit{+} 24.\textit{Ah}1\textit{±}, White not only succeeds in consolidating his queenside, but he preserves his dark-squared bishop as well.

\textbf{20.b}4 \textit{Ab}8

It is insufficient for Black to follow with: 20...\textit{Ax}a3, because of the line: 21.bxc5 \textit{Exc}3 22.\textit{Exc}3 \textit{Exc}3 23.\textit{Ad}6\textit{±}.

\textbf{21.\textit{Ab}5 \textit{Ac}8}

\textbf{22.\textit{Ae}2! \textit{Axe}7} (After 22...\textit{g}5 23.\textit{Ad}8\textit{±}, White's bishop is completely safe. \textbf{23.f}4 \textit{Exb}5 (Black fails to win a piece with the help of the move 23...\textit{Dd}4\textit{+}, because of: 24.\textit{Dxd}4 cxd4 25.\textit{Cc}7 d3 26.\textit{Dxd}3 \textit{Exa}3 27.\textit{Ef}3 \textit{Ed}8 28.\textit{Ab}5\textit{±}) \textbf{24.fxe}5 \textit{c}4 \textbf{25.exf}6 \textit{Ac}8 26.\textit{Exc}4\textit{±} and White had a more than sufficient compensation for the piece in the game Georgadze – Ardeleanu, Ubeda 1997.

\textbf{c) 8...e}5 \textbf{9.d}5

In case of: 9.\textit{Dg}1 exd4 10.\textit{Dxd}4 \textit{Axe}2 11.\textit{Dgxe}2, Gostisa – Zheliandinov, Ljubljana 1995, it deserves attention for Black to try: 11...\textit{Ah}6?! 12.f4 \textit{Dc}6 13.\textit{Af}2 \textit{Ag}7\textit{±}, with the idea to organize some counterplay against White's e4-pawn.

![Diagram]

Now, Black can choose between two possibilities, which are more or less similar: \textbf{c1) 9...f}5, or \textbf{c2) 9...a}5.

He has also tried in practice: 9...c5?! – Black sacrifices a pawn, but he obtains no compensation for it at all. 10.\textit{Dxc}6 \textit{Dxc}6 11.\textit{Dxd}6\textit{±} Shipov – Korotkov, Pavlodar 1991;

9...\textit{Da}6 10.0–0 \textit{f}5 11.\textit{h}3 \textit{Dxf}3 12.\textit{Dxf}3 \textit{f}4 13.\textit{Dd}2 c5?! 14.\textit{Dxc}6!.
The opening of the game in the centre here is definitely in favour of White, because of his superior development and his couple of bishops. 14...bxc6 15.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{b}8\) 16.a3 \(\text{ac}5\) 17.b4 \(\text{e}6\) 18.c5± Rashkovsky – Ghitescu, Palma de Mallorca 1989; 9...\(\text{xf}3\) 10.\(\text{xf}3\) a5 (In case of 10...f5, there arise positions, which we have analyzed in variation c1, except that White has saved a tempo for the move – h3. 11.b4 \(\text{f}6?!\) 12.c5 \(\text{f}7\) 13.0–0 f4 14.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f}8\) 15.\(\text{a}4\) \(\text{bd}7\) 16.c6± and White had a powerful pressure on the queenside in the game Taimanov – Bielicki, Havana 1964. It is hardly stronger for Black to try: 11...\(\text{f}6\), Bjelobrk – Berezina, Melbourne 2001, because White obtains a powerful queenside initiative with the help of a temporary pawn-sacrifice: 12.c5?! f4 13.\(\text{d}2\) dxc5 14.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{a}6\) – it is worse for Black to continue with: 14...\(\text{f}7?!\) 15.\(\text{a}4\) cxb4 16.\(\text{x}b4\) \(\text{b}6\) 17.\(\text{c}5\)±, because White has a more than sufficient compensation. He leads in development and his pieces are very active, moreover that Black’s e6-square is extremely vulnerable – 15.b5 c4 16.\(\text{x}c4\) \(\text{b}6\) 17.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{c}5\) 18.0–0±. It is better for Black to defend with: 11...a5 12.a3 \(\text{f}6\) 13.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{h}8\), Nikolic – Arapovic, Bjelovar 1979 and after 14.\(\text{e}2\) \(\text{a}6\) 15.\(\text{b}1\)±, there arise standard positions, in which White can organize his queenside initiative much faster than Black can do something dangerous on the kingside. The lines: 12...\(\text{xb}4\) 13.\(\text{xb}4\) \(\text{a}6\) 14.\(\text{b}1\), or 12...\(\text{a}6\) 13.\(\text{b}1\), transpose to variation c2b.) 11.h4 f5 12.h5 \(\text{a}6\) (It is too bad for Black to follow with: 12...\(\text{f}6?!\) 13.\(\text{hx}g6\) \(\text{hx}g6\), Vilela – W.Garcia, Camaguey 1974, since he has great defensive problems to protect his king after: 14.\(\text{ex}f5\) \(\text{g}6\) 15.\(\text{h}5\) \(\text{g}7\) 16.\(\text{g}6\)→; it is also bad for him to try: 12...f4 13.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{gx}h5\) 14.\(\text{x}h5\) \(\text{f}6\) 15.\(\text{g}4\) \(\text{xg}4\) 16.\(\text{w}xg4\)± van der Stricht – de Wit, Gent 1999.) 13.\(\text{hx}g6\) \(\text{hx}g6\) 14.\(\text{e}2\) f4 15.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{f}6\) 16.\(\text{g}3\)±. Now, White attacks dangerously Black’s bare king, while his own king is completely safe in the centre of the board. 16...g5 17.\(\text{g}4\) 18.\(\text{g}2\) \(\text{ex}f4\) 19.\(\text{xf}4\) \(\text{xe}4\) 20.\(\text{e}3\) \(\text{xc}3\)± 21.\(\text{b}x\)c3 \(\text{c}5\) 22.\(\text{w}c\)2± L.Stein – J.Rubinetti, Mar del Plata 1966.

c1) 9...f5 10.h3!

Here, the move, which used to be considered as the best, would not provide White with any advantage after: 10.\(\text{g}5\) \(\text{xe}2\)! (In case of 10...f4 11.\(\text{hx}g4\) \(\text{hx}g5\) 12.h4 \(\text{e}7\) 13.\(\text{d}2\)±, White’s light-squared bishop becomes very powerful.) 11.\(\text{xe}2\) \(\text{c}5\) 12.\(\text{ex}f5\) \(\text{gx}f5\) 13.\(\text{h}5\) (After 13.b4, Black obtains a dangerous counterplay with the line: 13...f4 14.\(\text{h}5\) h6 15.\(\text{b}x\)c5 \(\text{wx}g5\) 16.\(\text{x}g5\) \(\text{hx}g5\) 17.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{a}6\)! 18.\(\text{c}d\)6 19.\(\text{e}4\) \(\text{c}5\) 20.\(\text{xc}5\) \(\text{d}x\)c5 21.f3 e4±) 13...h6 14.\(\text{c}x\)c5 \(\text{wx}g5\)
15.\texttt{\textit{W}}xg5 hxg5 16.\texttt{\textit{B}}e3 g4 17.h3 gxh3 18.\texttt{\textit{B}}xh3 \texttt{\textit{D}}d7 19.\texttt{\textit{B}}b5 \texttt{\textit{B}}fc8= and the position remained equal in the game Ftacnik – Reich, Munich 1991, because in case White had captured the pawn – 20.\texttt{\textit{B}}xa7, Black could answer with: 20...\texttt{\textit{B}}f8 21.\texttt{\textit{B}}b5 f4 22.\texttt{\textit{B}}d2 \texttt{\textit{B}}xa2 23.\texttt{\textit{B}}xc7 \texttt{\textit{B}}xb2\texttt{\textit{B}} and he would have some counterplay.

\textbf{10...\texttt{\textit{B}}xf3}

10...f4?! – This move is connected with a pawn-sacrifice and White can and should accept it. 11.hxg4 fxe3 12.fxe3 g5, N.Newman – Koolsbergen, Email 1999 (otherwise White plays 13.g5) and here he can bring his king to safety to the b1-square after 13.\texttt{\textit{B}}d2\texttt{\textit{B}} and following the transfer of his knight to f5, he will maintain a great advantage.

\textbf{11.\texttt{\textit{B}}xf3 a5}

We have already mentioned that it is not favourable for Black to reduce the tension in the centre after the trade of his light-squared bishop for White’s knight: 11...f4 12.\texttt{\textit{B}}d2 \texttt{\textit{D}}c5 13.0–0 a5 14.b3 \texttt{\textit{B}}bd7 15.\texttt{\textit{B}}b1 b6 16.a3 a4 17.\texttt{\textit{B}}xa4 \texttt{\textit{B}}xa4 18.bxa4 \texttt{\textit{D}}c5 19.a5 bxa5 20.\texttt{\textit{B}}b5 a4 21.\texttt{\textit{B}}b4 \texttt{\textit{B}}b3 22.c5\texttt{\textit{B}} and White had an overwhelming advantage in the game Notkin – Kovalevskaya, St Petersburg 1994.

Black cannot solve all his problems with the line: 11...\texttt{\textit{D}}a6 12.a3 \texttt{\textit{B}}ac5 (White’s position is again superior after: 12...\texttt{\textit{B}}f6 13.b4 \texttt{\textit{B}}g5 14.\texttt{\textit{B}}xg5 \texttt{\textit{W}}xg5 15.g3\texttt{\textit{B}}, or 12...f4 13.\texttt{\textit{B}}d2 \texttt{\textit{B}}ac5, Ftacnik – Xu Yang, Beijing 1996 and here he could have consolidated his edge with: 14.0–0 a5 15.b4 axb4 16.axb4 \texttt{\textit{D}}a6 17.\texttt{\textit{B}}b3\texttt{\textit{B}) 13.b4 fxe4. It is now essential for White to preserve his knight on the blocking e4-square, therefore he should follow with: 14.\texttt{\textit{B}}xe4! \texttt{\textit{B}}xe4 15.\texttt{\textit{B}}xe4\texttt{\textit{B}} with a better position.

\textbf{12.a3}

In case of: 12.\texttt{\textit{B}}b1, Black equalizes with the traditional transfer of his bishop to the g5-square: 12...\texttt{\textit{B}}f6 13.a3 \texttt{\textit{B}}g5 14.\texttt{\textit{B}}xg5 \texttt{\textit{W}}xg5 15.b4 axb4 16.axb4 \texttt{\textit{D}}a6 17.0–0 \texttt{\textit{B}}f7 18.\texttt{\textit{B}}c2 \texttt{\textit{B}}af8 19.\texttt{\textit{B}}e2 h5 20.\texttt{\textit{B}}d3 f4= Pogorelov – David, France 1992.

\textbf{12...\texttt{\textit{B}}a6}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\textbf{13.\texttt{\textit{B}}c2!}

That is an important resource for White. Now, Black cannot accomplish the maneuver \texttt{\textit{B}}f6-g5, because of the defenselessness of his f5-pawn.

\textbf{13...\texttt{\textit{B}}h8}

Or 13...\texttt{\textit{B}}f7 14.\texttt{\textit{B}}b1 \texttt{\textit{W}}f8, Hausner – Hoi, Prague 1980 (about 14...\texttt{\textit{B}}h8 – see 13...\texttt{\textit{B}}h8) and Black’s idea is to exchange the dark-squared bishops and to fol-
low that with a further advance of his kingside pawns. Meanwhile White can disrupt the coordination of the pieces of his opponent with: 15.exf5!? gxf5 16.\textit{h}5 \textit{e}7 17.\textit{g}5 \textit{f}6 (Black’s compensation for the pawn is hardly sufficient after: 17...\textit{f}6 18.\textit{xf}5 \textit{x}5 19.\textit{x}5+ \textit{g}7 20.\textit{h}4 \textit{f}6 21.0–0±) 18.\textit{e}2 \textit{h}6 19.\textit{xh}6 \textit{xh}6 20.\textit{xf}5 \textit{f}8 21.\textit{c}2 \textit{g}5 22.0–0± and Black’s position only looks active, while he cannot create any real threats and he remains a pawn down.

13...\textit{ac}5 14.b4 \textit{axb}4 15.\textit{axb}4 \textit{fxe}4 16.\textit{axe}4! (This is an important moment and we will encounter it again numerous times. White must preserve his knight, so that it can occupy a dominant position on the e4-outpost.) 16...\textit{xe}4 17.\textit{xe}4 \textit{a}3 18.\textit{g}5 \textit{a}8 19.0–0 \textit{a}4 (It seems that Black has achieved some relative success on the queenside, but it will soon become clear – that is an illusion.) 20.c5! \textit{xb}4 21.\textit{xd}6 \textit{xd}6 22.\textit{e}7± and Black could not avoid considerable material losses in the game Steingrimsson – Reich, Kechment 1991.

14.\textit{b}1 \textit{e}7

Following: 14...\textit{f}7, Shchekachev – Douriet, Paris 2004, White can begin his queenside offensive, since Black cannot create any dangerous counterplay without his light-squared bishop. For example after: 15.b4 \textit{axb}4 16.\textit{axb}4 \textit{f}6 17.\textit{c}1 \textit{f}4 18.\textit{d}2±, there arises a standard position in which it is much easier for White to prepare c4–c5, than it is for Black to organize some effective actions on the kingside.

15.b4 \textit{axb}4 16.\textit{axb}4 \textit{f}6

17.\textit{c}1 \textit{h}4, Schandorff – Hoi, Copenhagen 2002, 18.0–0 (It is precarious for White to leave his king in the centre, because Black can open files after the undermining move – c7–c6.) 18...\textit{f}4 (That is Black’s most logical attempt to organize a kingside attack.) 19.\textit{d}2 \textit{h}5 20.\textit{e}2! (This is a multipurpose move, with which White prevents the further advance of his opponent’s pawns and he creates the threat – g2–g3. He will thus seize the initiative on the kingside, meanwhile he frees the c3-square for his bishop.) 20...\textit{c}5 (It is too bad for Black to try: 20...\textit{f}6 21.g3 \textit{g}5 22.\textit{gxf}4 \textit{exf}4 23.\textit{c}3 \textit{h}7 24.\textit{d}4±, because White’s knight will occupy the c6-square, while after: 20...\textit{f}6 21.\textit{a}1±, White is clearly ahead of Black in his queenside operations.) 21.\textit{dx}6 \textit{bx}6 22.\textit{c}3±. The centre had been opened and
Black’s d6-pawn is vulnerable. His pieces are not well coordinated, so he has failed to seize the initiative on the kingside.

c2) 9...a5

10.a3!?

After 10.0–0, Black manages to redeploy his queen’s knight to the wonderful c5-outpost and thus he increases the pressure against White’s e4-pawn, for example: 10...Qa6 11.a3 f5 12.Bb1 Qac5 13.b4 axb4 14.axb4 Qxe4 15.Qxe4 Qxf3 16.Qxf3 fxe4 17.Qg4 (Following: 17.Qxe4 Qh4 18.f3 Qh6=, Black succeeds in simplifying the position quite advantageously.) 17...b6 18.Qe6+ Qh8 19.Qc2 Qf6 20.Qfd1 Qg8 21.Qxe4 Qh6 22.Qa1 Qxe3 23.fxe3 Qf6= and in the game Petrovian – Bednarski, Tel Aviv 1964, White failed to materialize his minimal advantage.

White’s attempt to open files on the kingside with: 10.h3 Qxf3 11.Qxf3 Qa6 12.h4 (In case of 12.a3, Black has a powerful argument – 12...Qf6! and if 13.Qd2, then 13...Qac5, while in case of: 12.g4 Qf6 13.Qd2 Qh4=, Black blocks White’s kingside pawns.) seems to be quite logical. Still, Black has more than enough counter chances after: 12...f5 13.h5 Qb4! 14.hxg6 hxg6 15.Bb1 (After 15.a3, Black can play: 15...f4 16.Qg4 Qf6 17.Qe6+ Qf8∞) 15...Qc5 16.a3 Qbd3+ 17.Qf1 a4 18.Qe2 f4 19.Qd2 f3! 20.Qxf3 Qf6 21.Qh6 Qf7 22.Qd2 Qh4 23.Qe3 Qf6 24.Qg1 Qaf8 25.Qf1 g5 26.Qd1 Qg6→ and his initiative seemed to be really threatening in the game Kavalek – Westerinen, Nethanya 1969.

The exchange of the bishops: 10.Qd2 Qxe2 11.Qxe2, does not provide White with any advantage either, due to: 11...f5 12.f3 Qh6 13.Qf2 Qg5= Garcia Ilundain – Herrera Lopez, Terrassa 1994.

10...Qa6


In answer to: 10...f5 11.b4 axb4 (Or 11...Qf6 12.0–0 Qa6 13.Bb1 Qxf3 14.Qxf3 Qh8 15.Qc1 – see 10...Qa6; Black has also tried here 11...h6?!, but it seems to be just a loss of time. 12.h3 Qh5? Hobuss – Vucenovic, Zurich 1999 and Black had better exchange his bishop, because now White could have maintained a great advantage after: 13.g4! axb4 14.axb4 fxg4 15.Qg5! g3 16.Qe6+ 12.axb4 Qa3, Hybl – Ditt, corr. 1961, Black’s ac-
tivity on the “wrong” side of the board could have allowed White to win material with the line: 13.\e5 g5! f4 (It is now hardly any better for Black to defend with: 13...\e6xe2 14.\e6xe2 f4 15.\e6f6\p) 14.\e6xg4 fxe3 (In the variation: 14...\f7xg5 15.\d2 f6 16.\e6+ \h8 17.g3\p, Black preserves the material balance, but he remains without any active play.) 15.\e6 exf2+ 16.\f1f1\pm.

11.\f4 f5
In case of 11...\f6, White can follow with 12.\e7\f1\pm.

About 11...\e7 12.h3 \e3 f5 14.b4 axb4 15.axb4 \h4, W.Schmidt – IIlic, Dortmund 1989 – see 11...f5, variation c2b.

11...h6?! 12.\d2 \f3 13.\xf7 f5 14.\e6h7 14.\e2 \h8?!. Black has lost so many tempi that White should play energetically. 15.h4 f5 16.h5 f4 17.\d2 g5 18.\g4 \f6 19.\f5 \e8 20.g4! \d7 21.b4\pm. Now, the kingside has been completely blocked and White’s plan includes concentrating his pieces on the queenside, followed by the pawn-break – c4-c5, G.Timoscenko – Klemanic, Slovakia 2001.

11...\xf3 12.\xf3 f5 13.b4 \h4 (About the variation: 13...axb4 14.axb4 \e7, Spassov – Hoi, Buenos Aires, 1978 – see 11...f5, variation c2b; 14...\f6 15.0-0 \g5, E.Bukic – Lakic, Banja Luka 1976 – see 11...f5, variation c2a; in answer to: 14...\f6 15.0-0 – see 11...f5, variation c2b; 13...f4 14.\d2 axb4 15.axb4 \h8 16.0-0 \f6, Gaidot – Guyot, corr. 1994, 17.\e2 g5 18.f3\pm; after 13...\f7 14.0-0 \f8, K.Berg – P.Peev, Pernik 1984, White can prevent the trade of the dark-squared bishops with the move 15.\f1\pm) 14.0-0 f4 15.\d2 axb4 16.axb4 \f6 17.\e2\!. White is building an impenetrable fortress on the kingside and then he will just crush easily Black’s queenside.

17...g5 18.f3 \h5 19.\e1 \g3 20.\d3! \f6 21.\f4! \h6 22.h3 \f8, Polugaevsky – A.Zakharov, Leningrad 1963, 23.\e2\! – White deprives his opponent of any tactical chances with that move. 23...\x2e+ (It is too bad for Black to continue with: 23...g4 24.fxg4 \g5 25.\f3\+, because he cannot break White’s kingside defence.) 24.\xe2 \h5 25.\f2\+. Now, Black’s threats have been parried and White can begin his queenside offensive.

12.b4

Black has tried most often in this position the moves c2a) 12...\f6 and c2b) 12...axb4.

12...\e7 13.h3 \f3 14.\xf7 f5 axb4 (In case of: 14...\f6 15.0-0...
axb4 16.axb4 \&g5 17.\&xg5 \&xg5 18.c5!, White has accomplished his thematic pawn-break on the queenside, while Black has not done anything on the opposite wing. The game ended rather quickly after: 18...\&f6 19.c6 b6 20.\&e2 h5 21.\&b2 f4 22.\&a1 \&h4 23.\&h2, because Black was losing a piece, 1-0 Bonanni – De Palma, corr. 1987.) 15.axb4 a6 16.\&e2 f4 17.\&c1 \&h8, I.Farago – C.Hoi, Tastrup 1990 and here White can obtain an overwhelming advantage with the natural move 18.0-0\+ , followed by the preparation of the pawn-advance – c4-c5. Black has great problems to create any counterplay.

12...f4 – This move leads to original variations only if Black preserves his light-squared bishop. Kaabi – Eid, Dubai 1995, 13.\&d2 \&f6 (otherwise White would be able to play 14.h3) 14.\&c2 \&e7 15.0-0\+. Black has kept his important light-squared bishop indeed, but he cannot develop easily his kingside initiative, while White would be much faster in his preparation of the breakthrough c4-c5 on the queenside.

c2a) 12...\&f6
Now, White must play:
13.0-0!
This is an important move and it seems that Black can equalize by exchanging his dark-squared bishop via the g5-square, but that is an illusion.

13...\&xf3
Black can try to hold his queenside against the pawn-break c4-c5, but he must pay a too dear price: 13...axb4 14.axb4 b6 15.\&b3 \&xf3 16.\&xf3 \&g5 17.\&xg5 \&xg5 18.\&a1 \&f6 19.\&a4\+ and he will have great problems with his knight on a6.

The other possibility for Black here is – 13...\&h8, Knudsen – Stephan, corr. 1999, but its main drawback is that White can prevent the trade of the dark-squared bishops – 14.\&c1!, with the following eventual developments: 14...f4 (Or 14...ab 15.ab \&xf3 16.\&xf3 \&e7 17.\&b5 \&ac8 18.\&d1 f4 – and Black’s attempt to organize a kingside attack by advancing his pawns there is obviously too slow. 19.\&d2 h5 20.\&e2 \&h7 21.\&b3 \&g7 22.c5! dxc5 23.\&a7 \&a8 24.\&xa6 \&xa7 – it is not better for him to try: 24...\&xa6 25.\&c6 g5 26.bxc5 \&xe4 27.\&a5 \&ac8 28.\&b4 \&h7 29.\&b7 f3 30.\&e3 \&xg2 31.\&xc7\+, or 27...f3 28.\&b4 \&f5 29.\&xc7 a5 30.\&a4 \&xg2 31.\&d2\+, 30...e4 31.\&e7 \&g4 32.\&g3 h4 33.h3 \&h5 34.\&d6\+. The coordination of Black’s piec-
es is so bad that his chances for a successful attack are just negligent – 25.\textcapcircled{b}5 \textcapcircled{f}6 26.f3\textpm, Black loses his extra pawn and his kingside pieces remain passive, Stone – Mazuchowski, Dearborn 1992.)

15.\textcapcircled{d}2 axb4 (It is bad for Black to continue with: 15...g5?! 16.\textcapcircled{g}xg5 \textcapcircled{ex}2 17.\textcapcircled{e}e6 \textcapcircled{e}e7 18.\textcapcircled{xe}2 \textcapcircled{g}8 19.\textcapcircled{c}3\textpm, because he cannot organize any attack on the open g-file, while he remains a pawn down. The move 15...\textcapcircled{e}e7 – does not contribute to Black's counterplay. 16.c5 axb4 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.axb4 g5 19.h3 \textcapcircled{h}5 20.\textcapcircled{h}4! \textcapcircled{xe}2 21.\textcapcircled{f}5 \textcapcircled{f}7 22.\textcapcircled{xe}2 \textcapcircled{e}7 23.\textcapcircled{c}4\textpm, 18...\textcapcircled{b}6 19.\textcapcircled{d}1 \textcapcircled{f}c8 20.\textcapcircled{b}3 g5 21.h3 \textcapcircled{d}d7 22.\textcapcircled{h}2\textpm. He has preserved his light-squared bishop, so he has greater chances to create some counterplay; nevertheless his straightforward play leads only to the appearance of additional weaknesses – 22...\textcapcircled{e}e8 23.\textcapcircled{f}c1 \textcapcircled{g}6 24.\textcapcircled{d}1 \textcapcircled{c}4 25.\textcapcircled{e}1 b5 26.\textcapcircled{a}1\textpm) 16.axb4 \textcapcircled{e}e7 17.\textcapcircled{c}2 g5 18.h3 \textcapcircled{h}5 (Black's counterplay is absolutely ineffective without his light-squared bishop.) 19.\textcapcircled{h}4 \textcapcircled{f}7 20.\textcapcircled{f}5 \textcapcircled{g}6 (It is even worse for Black to continue with: 20...\textcapcircled{xe}2 21.\textcapcircled{xe}2 f3 22.\textcapcircled{e}g3 fxg2 23.\textcapcircled{ex}g2\textpm, because White seizes the initiative on the kingside.) 21.g4! \textcapcircled{g}7 (Black's prospects to fight successfully for the h-file are not so promising: 21...h5 22.\textcapcircled{g}2 \textcapcircled{h}7 23.\textcapcircled{h}1\textpm; in case he plays passively, he will have problems on the queenside: 21...\textcapcircled{d}d8 22.\textcapcircled{a}4 h5 23.c5 \textcapcircled{f}6 24.c6 b5 25.\textcapcircled{c}3\textpm) 22.\textcapcircled{g}2 \textcapcircled{f}6 23.\textcapcircled{h}1\textpm and White has excellent chances in the future battle on both sides of the board.

14.\textcapcircled{xf}3 \textcapcircled{g}5

About 14...\textcapcircled{h}8 15.\textcapcircled{c}1 f4 16.\textcapcircled{d}2 axb4 17.axb4 \textcapcircled{b}6 18.\textcapcircled{e}2 c5, Lukacs – Zueger, Budapest 1994, White could have consolidated his advantage with: 19.dxc6 bxc6 20.\textcapcircled{d}1 \textcapcircled{e}7 21.b5\textpm.

15.\textcapcircled{g}xg5 \textcapcircled{g}xg5 16.\textcapcircled{c}5 axb4

It is hardly any better for Black to follow with: 16...\textcapcircled{f}6 17.c6 axb4 18.axb4 \textcapcircled{f}8b8 19.\textcapcircled{a}1 bxc6 20.\textcapcircled{d}c6 \textcapcircled{e}xb4 21.\textcapcircled{e}2 \textcapcircled{b}6 22.\textcapcircled{e}a6 \textcapcircled{a}a6 23.\textcapcircled{a}a6 \textcapcircled{e}a6 24.\textcapcircled{b}3+ \textcapcircled{f}8 25.\textcapcircled{b}7 \textcapcircled{d}2 26.\textcapcircled{a}a6 \textcapcircled{xc}3 27.\textcapcircled{f}5+– and White was soon victorious in the game Adamski – Ghitescu, Makarczyk 1978; it is equally bad for Black to opt for 16...\textcapcircled{d}c5, due to 17.b5 \textcapcircled{a}b8 18.d6\textpm.

17.\textcapcircled{a}xb4 \textcapcircled{d}c5

17...\textcapcircled{c}7? – This is a waste of time and Black's position becomes extremely difficult after that. 18.c6 bxc6 19.\textcapcircled{d}c6 \textcapcircled{b}6, Suchov – Kopp, corr. 1990 and here White's most energetic way to materialize his advantage is to exchange in the centre, for example: 20.\textcapcircled{f}5! gxf5 (The other capture loses even faster for Black: 20...\textcapcircled{xf}5 21.\textcapcircled{d}5 \textcapcircled{xd}5 22.\textcapcircled{xd}5+ \textcapcircled{g}7 23.\textcapcircled{a}1 \textcapcircled{e}8 24.\textcapcircled{a}4 \textcapcircled{f}4 25.\textcapcircled{a}1 \textcapcircled{c}8 26.\textcapcircled{a}3 h5 27.\textcapcircled{a}5 \textcapcircled{d}4 28.\textcapcircled{f}3+–; 24...\textcapcircled{b}8 25.\textcapcircled{a}1 \textcapcircled{b}5 26.\textcapcircled{f}3! d5 27.\textcapcircled{b}1–,
26...\text{xf}3 27.\text{gxf}3 \text{xc}6 28.\text{a}3+–, the greatest liability of Black’s position is his miserable knight at the edge of the board and he loses it in all the variations.) 21.\text{d}5 \text{xd}5 22.\text{xd}5+ \text{h}8 23.\text{d}3 \text{f}4 24.\text{c}4 \text{g}5 (White obtains a winning position rather quickly after Black’s other possibilities as well: 24...\text{b}8 25.b5 \text{g}7 26.\text{a}1 \text{xa}1 27.\text{xa}1 \text{e}4 28.\text{e}1+–; 24...\text{f}3 25.\text{xf}3 \text{f}4 26.\text{e}4+–) 25.\text{a}1 \text{f}3 26.g3 \text{h}5 and here White’s simplest line is: 27.h4 \text{f}4 28.\text{xa}6+–.

In answer to 17...\text{f}6, Ryvova – Stephan, Email 2001, White’s fastest and most direct road to an overwhelming advantage is: 18.\text{c}6! \text{fb}8 (Or 18...\text{bxc}6 19.\text{dxc}6±; Black’s terrible knight will cause a lot of troubles for him after: 18...\text{b}6 19.\text{wd}3 \text{h}4 20.\text{wc}4 \text{b}8 21.\text{a}1+–) 19.\text{c}2! \text{bxc}6 (or 19...\text{fxe}4 20.\text{b}5±; 19...\text{xe}4 20.\text{xe}4 \text{fxe}4 21.\text{b}5 \text{bxc}6 22.\text{xc}6 \text{a}7 23.\text{e}1+–) 20.\text{dxc}6 \text{g}7 (or 20...\text{h}8) 21.\text{b}5!± and Black’s bad knight on a6 is again the main drawback of his position.

18.\text{b}5 \text{b}4

Black has also tried the more passive line: 18...\text{ab}8 19.d6 \text{cxd}6, E.Bukic – Lakic, Banja Luka 1976, but here White can activate his bishop after some exchanges: 20.\text{exf}5 \text{gxf}5 21.\text{xb}7 \text{a}3 22.f4!? \text{g}7 (or 22...\text{g}6 23.\text{f}3 \text{h}8 24.b6±) 23.\text{f}3 \text{exf}4 24.\text{c}1 \text{a}7 25.\text{d}5+ \text{h}8 26.\text{xf}4± and White is a pawn down indeed, but Black’s centre is vulnerable and White’s passed b-pawn is quite dangerous.

19.\text{d}6 \text{c}6

White’s advantage is overwhelming following: 19...\text{cxd}6 20.\text{xd}6 \text{ad}8 21.\text{exf}5± Adamski – Hug, Stary Smokovec 1974.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\caption{Chess board showing the position after 21.\text{exf}5.}
\end{figure}

20.\text{bxc}6 \text{bxc}6 21.\text{exf}5 \text{gxf}5

22.\text{xc}6 \text{ad}8. White’s central passed pawn provides him with superior chances after: 22...\text{xc}6 23.\text{d}5+ \text{h}8 24.\text{xc}6±, but still that line would have been stronger for Black than what he played in the game. 23.\text{xd}7 \text{xd}7 24.\text{a}4. White’s dangerous passed pawn is now extra and small wonder that the game ended very quickly. 24...\text{g}7 25.\text{g}3 \text{f}4 26.\text{xc}5 \text{fxg}3 27.\text{b}3+ \text{h}8 28.\text{fxg}3 1–0 I.Farago – Roth, Vienna 1986.

\text{c2b}) 12...\text{axb}4 13.\text{axb}4 \text{xf}3

About 13...\text{f}6 14.0–0 \text{xf}3 15.\text{xf}3 – see 13...\text{xf}3.

After 13...\text{f}4 14.\text{c}1 \text{h}5 15.\text{h}3 \text{xf}3 16.\text{xf}3 \text{f}7, Zikharev – V.Zaitsev, corr. 1978, instead of: 17.g4? \text{fxg}3 18.\text{fxg}3 \text{b}6 19.\text{e}2
\( \text{f7} 21.\text{a3=}, \text{the light squares are vulnerable in Black's camp, therefore White's queenside initiative is more than sufficient to compensate the sacrificed pawn.} \)
18.\text{b3} \text{h4} 19.\text{a1} \text{f6} 20.\text{a4 g4, Spassov - Hoi, Buenos Aires 1978 and here White was winning simply with:} 21.\text{h3} \text{g5} \text{(or} 21...\text{f6} 22.\text{fa1} \text{g5} 23.\text{xa6 xa6} 24.\text{xa6} \text{g4} 25.\text{b5+-}) 22.\text{b5 h8} 23.\text{hxg4 hgx4} 24.\text{xc4} \text{gx4} 25.\text{h3+-}.

\text{15.0-0} 

\text{If 15.g5, then the natural reaction for Black would be 15...d7= Maksimenko - Krasenkow, Katowice 1993.} 

\text{15.f4} 

\text{15.fx e4 16.e4!}. \text{It is essential for White to preserve his knight on the board. After} 16.\text{xe4}, \text{Black equalizes easily with:} 16.\text{xe4 xe4} 17.\text{xe4 wh4} 18.f3 \text{h6=, while now White maintains his advantage thanks to his powerful knight on the e4-outpost:} 16...\text{xe4} 17.\text{xe4=}. 

\text{16.c1 h5 17.e2 e7 18. b3 h7} 

\text{Black would not achieve anything much by advancing his kingside pawns:} 18...\text{g5} 19.\text{a3} \text{g4 20.f3 b8 (or 20...g3} 21.\text{h3 d7 22.c5=} \text{21.c5=}. 

\text{19.a3 g4} 

\text{In case of:} 19...\text{d7} 20.a4=, \text{Black cannot prevent White's pawn-break c4-c5 for long.} 

\text{20.h3 wh4} 

\text{Black organizes an effective
Chapter 14

attack neither with the help of an exchange sacrifice: 20...f3 21.xf3 xf3 22.gxf3 d6 23.e2++, nor by a massive pawn-offensive: 20...d6 21.c1 g5 22.b5 b8 (White is much ahead of Black after: 22...c5 23.xc5 dxc5 24.b6! g4 25.bxc7 f3 26.xb7 ac8 27.gxf3±) 23.b6 cxb6 24.b5 d8 25.d1 (Black’s pawn-assault on the kingside weakened his light squares there considerably.) 25...h6 26.b3 e4 27.xh5 c5 28.xc5 bxc5 29.c7! a7 (It is just terrible for Black to play: 29...xc7 30.d3 xh5 31.h7+-) 30.e6±.

21.d1 b8 22.f3 h6

23.f2 d7 24.c5 g8 25.f1 f8

26.c6± Darga – R.Garcia, Skopje 1972. It is now quite evident that the development of White’s queenside initiative is much ahead of Black’s counterplay on the kingside.

Conclusion

We have analyzed in this chapter Black’s main line – 7...d7, in the system with 6...g4. After White’s precise move 8.c1!, Black fails to organize a sufficient counterplay in the centre. He has two main possibilities:

1) Entering the pawn-structure of the Benoni Defence, but then his king’s knight on the d7-square is misplaced, since it hampers the development of his queenside. Therefore, it seems logical for him to enter a scheme of the Volga Gambit with the help of the pawn-sacrifice b7-b5. Still, Black has to present his opponent with the two-bishop advantage in most of the lines and that improves White’s chances considerably;

2) The transposition to the basic King’s Indian pawn-structure. The placement of the knight on d7 is justified in that case, because Black needs to push f7-f5. The main drawback of that variation for Black then is the premature development of his bishop to the g4-square, because he has to trade it for White’s knight on f3 in most of the lines. Black can hardly create any dangerous counterplay on the kingside after that exchange. It is also important that Black must develop his queen’s knight to the a6-square in numerous variations and then it has no real chances to enter the actions from there, meanwhile it does not prevent effectively White’s pawn-break c4-c5 at all.
Chapter 15  
1.\(\text{d}f3\) 2.\(\text{f}f6\) 3.\(\text{c}c3\) 2.g7 4.e4 d6 5.d4 0–0 6.\(\text{a}e2\) e5

This is the main line for Black against the Classical system. He attacks White's centre immediately having some tactical possibilities up his sleeve.

7.0–0

That move is White’s most popular answer to his opponent’s last move. The lines, arising after that move, lead to very complex positions and they are tested permanently in the tournament practice.

The variation: 7.dxe5 dxe5 8.\(\text{w}x8\) 2.xd8, simplifies the position considerably and it is often used by White in order to play for a quick draw. Meanwhile, he should better continue with 9.\(\text{d}d5\) immediately in that case (Black’s pieces become quite active after 9.\(\text{x}e5\) 2.xe5, while following:

9.\(\text{g}g5\) c6!? White will be too far from a quick draw, because in order to avoid the chronic weakness of the d4-square he has to enter the complications after: 10.\(\text{a}xe5\) 2.e8 11.0–0–0 \(\text{a}a6++\) and Black has an excellent compensation for the pawn with his lively piece play.) 9...\(\text{d}xd5\) (This is the simplest defence for Black. The complications after: 9...\(\text{d}d7\) 10.\(\text{a}xe5\) 2.xd5 11.\(\text{a}xd7\) 2.b4 12.\(\text{x}b8\) 2.c2+ 13.\(\text{d}d1\) 2.xa1 14.\(\text{f}f4\) 2.xb2 15.\(\text{xc}7\) are in favour of White.) 10.cxd5 c6 11.\(\text{c}c4\) cxd5 12.\(\text{a}xd5\) 2.a6 (It is also quite reliable for Black to play: 12...\(\text{d}d7\) 13.\(\text{a}g5\) 2.e8 14.0–0–0 \(\text{d}f8\) 15.\(\text{d}d2\) 2.e6 16.\(\text{f}f4=\) 13.\(\text{a}g5\) 2.e8 14.0–0–0 \(\text{c}7\) 15.\(\text{b}3\) 2.e6= and the draw is practically unavoidable after an accurate play of both sides.

The move - 7.d5 has the same drawback as White’s previous possibility and that is – it reduces the tension in the centre. That enables Black to develop his queen’s knight to a stable blocking position. After 7...a5 8.\(\text{g}g5\) h6 9.\(\text{h}4\) 2.a6 10.0–0 2.e8, Black’s position is quite reliable.
The resource 7.\(\textit{\&}e3\) for White, just like the main line in the text, is aimed at maintaining the tension in the centre and it is quite popular too. The lines after 7...\(\textit{\&}g4\) (The position is rather complex too in case of: 7...\textit{exd4} 8.\textit{\&}xd4 \textit{\&}e8 9.f3 c6\(\infty\)) 8.\textit{\&}g5 f6 9.\textit{\&}c1 (The other fashionable variation here is – 9.\textit{\&}h4 \textit{\&}c6\(\infty\)) 9...\textit{\&}c6, or 9...f5 10.\textit{\&}g5, lead to positions in which the correct evaluation is defined more accurately daily by tournament practice, while the methods of playing are in fact quite similar to the main line – 7.0–0.

After 7.0–0, Black has four main lines: 7...\textit{\&}bd7 (see Part 4), 7...\textit{exd4}, 7...\textit{\&}a6 and 7...\textit{\&}c6 (Book 1b) and we will analyze them later in the book.

He plays sometimes the following moves too: a) 7...\textit{\&}e8, b) 7...\textit{\&}fd7, c) 7...\textit{h6}, d) 7...\textit{a6}, e) 7...\textit{\&}e7, f) 7...\textit{a5}, g) 7...\textit{\&}g4, h) 7...\textit{\&}h5, i) 7...\textit{\&}e8 and j) 7...\textit{c6}.

Black has tried in practice some clearly inferior moves as well:

7...\textit{\&}e8? – This is a blunder of his central pawn and after 8.dxe5\(\pm\), he has no compensation whatsoever;

About 7...\textit{b6} 8.d5 \textit{\&}b7 9.\textit{\&}e3 – see 6...\textit{b6} 7.0–0 \textit{\&}b7 8.d5 e5 9.\textit{\&}e3, Chapter 11.

a) 7...\textit{\&}e8?!
That is a rather primitive attempt at exerting some indirect pressure against White’s e4-pawn. It is not popular and quite deservedly so.

8.d5!
Now, White closes the centre, exploiting the absence of Black’s rook from the f-file, since the move f7-f5 will not be so effective anymore.

On the contrary, the endgame after: 8.dxe5 dxe5 9.\textit{\&}xd8 \textit{\&}xd8= is quite acceptable for Black.

8...\textit{\&}h5
This is an attempt by Black to organize some immediate active actions on the kingside. He can also try:

8...\textit{\&}c6 – opening of files is in favour of White here. 9.\textit{\&}g5 \textit{cxd5} 10.\textit{cxd5} \textit{\&}bd7, Maggiolo – Vaca, Brazil 1997 and now after 11.\textit{\&}d2\(\pm\), White has a powerful queenside initiative and Black has no counterplay at all.

8...\textit{a5} 9.\textit{\&}g5 (That is once again a standard method of restricting Black’s activity on the kingside.) 9...\textit{h6} (In response to: 9...\textit{\&}a6 10.\textit{\&}d2 \textit{\&}c5, Pichl – Brodersen, Kassel 1998, White must continue with his plan to prepare b4, with
11.b3±, analogously to the variation: 9...h6 10.h4, meanwhile White’s bishop is very well placed on the g5-square here, because in answer to 11...h6, he can redeploy it immediately to the quite important g1-a7 diagonal with 12.e3±) 10.h4 a6 11.d2 d7 12.b3 c5 13.a3 g5 14.g3 fxe4 15.dxe4 dxe4 16.dxe4 f5 17.d2 (It is also possible for White to follow with: 17.f3 fxe4 18.fxe4± – and he might reach a very favourable endgame, with a “bad” bishop for Black, after the trade of the light-squared bishops.) 17...f4 18.h5 e7 19. c4. The opponents agreed to a draw here in the game Zamora – Blehm, Guarapuava 1995, but after 19...fxg3 20.fxg3±, White could have continued the fight, because his dominance over the important blocking e4-outpost would have provided him with clearly better prospects.

8...bd7 9.g5 h6. That is probably the best for Black. (The move 9...c6?! – blunders a pawn – 10.dxc6± Kiselev – Moreilj, Rybinsk 1997; 9...b6?! – that is not the best square for Black’s knight, Tell – Grothkopp, Pinneberg 1999, 10.d2±. In answer to 9...a5, Baswedan – Salinas, Leipzig 1960, White has the standard plan: 10.d2! c5 11.b3± and Black has no active play on the kingside, while White’s queenside initiative is very powerful. 9...c5 10.b4 cd7 11.d2 h6, Hebert – Kast, Yerevan 1996, 12.e3± – This is White’s most energetic reply. Black has problems organizing his kingside counterplay, while White’s queenside offensive is just about to start.) 10.h4 a5 (Or 10...g5 11.g3 c5 12.d2 a5, Hack – A.Munoz, Mexico 1995 and after 13.b3±, it will be much easier for White to develop his queenside initiative than it would be for Black to do something effective on the kingside.) 11.d2 c5 12.b3 c6 13.a3 b6 14.b1± Sirletti – Oney, Istanbul 2000.

9.g3!
That is White’s standard reaction!

9...d7
Or 9...f5 10.exf5 gxf5 11.xe5 xg3 12.fxg3 dxe5 13.c5± and White has a powerful pressure in the centre.

10.e3

10...f8
Black has his best practical results with that move.

While his initiative develops much faster after Black’s other possible defensive lines:

10...f8, F.Nielsen – Borg, Gro-
ningen 1979, 11.\(\text{c}e1\) \(\text{c}f6\) 12.\(f3\)±;
10...\(\text{f}6\), van Dongen – Nevednichy, Avoine 2000, 11.\(\text{b}4\)±;
10...\(\text{h}6\), Pantelias – Damarakis, Athens 1996, 11.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{h}7\)
12.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{h}f6\) 13.\(f3\)±;
10...\(\text{d}6\) 11.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{h}3\) 12.\(\text{e}1\)
\(\text{d}7\) 13.\(f3\)± and White’s queenside plan is crystal clear, while
Black has no counterplay in sight, Ogaard – L.Santos, Arosa 1972;
10...\(a5\) 11.\(a3\) \(\text{h}f6\) 12.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{c}5\)
13.\(b4\)± Wu Shaobin – Ananberdiev, Doha 2003.

11.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{g}7\) 12.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{f}5\) 13.\(f3\)
\(\text{e}7\)

In case of: 13...\(a5\) 14.\(a3\) \(\text{c}5\)
15.\(\text{c}2\) \(\text{h}5\), Krush – Bologan, Edmonton 2005, White could
have obtained a great advantage by giving up surprisingly the
two-bishop advantage to his opponent with the line: 16.\(\text{xc}5\)!
\(\text{dxc}5\) 17.\(f4\) exf4 18.\(\text{hxh}5\) g\(\text{h}5\) 19.
\(\text{xf}4\)±.

14.\(b4\) \(\text{f}8\) 15.\(c5\) \(\text{f}6\) 16.\(\text{b}c1\)
\(\text{h}5\) 17.\(f2\) \(\text{h}4\) 18.\(g4\) \(\text{f}4\) 19.\(\text{d}2\)
\(\text{dxc}5\) 20.\(\text{d}3\) cxb4 21.\(\text{b}5\)±
– White developed a powerful queenside initiative thanks to
the vulnerability of Black’s cen-

tral pawns. He lost his knight on
b5, but he won the game anyway
– Al.Onischuk – Florean, San Di-
ego 2006.

b) 7...\(\text{f}d7\)?!
Or 10...g5 11.dxe5 \( \text{dxe5} \) 12. \( \text{dxe5} \) \( \text{dxe5} \) 13.f4 \( \text{dxf7} \) 14.\( \text{Ead1} \)±. Golombek – Fazekas, Hastings 1953. After 10...a5 11.\( \text{Ead1} \) b6?? – Black had problems developing his pieces indeed, but he did not need to blunder in one move 12.dxe5+ – Gilman – Clyde, Montreal 2003.

Black’s attempt at organizing some counterplay with the help of the move 10...f5, leads after: 11.exf5 gxf5 12.dxe5 (or immediately 12.g5 \( \text{We8} \) 13.\( \text{Dd5} \)±) 12...dxe5 13.g5± to and even greater activity of the centralized white pieces.

11.\( \text{Ead1} \)

11...f5, Roedl – Rellstab, Luneburg 1947, it is not easy to recommend anything better to Black, but now White establishes practically a total control over the centre: 12.g5!? \( \text{b6} \) (or 12...exd4 13.\( \text{xd4} \) \( \text{dxf6} \) 14.c5±) 13.dxe5 \( \text{dxe5} \) 14.f4±.

c) 7...h6

(diagram)

Black prevents with that move the appearance of White’s bishop on g5, but he loses time in the process and he compromises a bit his kingside pawn-structure.

8.d5 \( \text{We8} \)

About 8...c6 9.\( \text{Ee1} \) – see 7...c6 8.d5 h6 9.\( \text{Ee1} \).

Black has tried some other moves too:

8...\( \text{h7} \) 9.\( \text{Ee1} \) \( \text{g8} \) 10.\( \text{Ee3} \) f5 11.exf5 gxf5 12.f4± Schulz – Kue- rten, Hockenheim 1994;

8...\( \text{bd7} \) 9.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{h8} \) 10.\( \text{wc2} \) \( \text{g8} \) 11.b4 a5 12.bxa5 \( \text{xa5} \) 13.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{a8} \) 14.a4 b6 15.a5± Naumkin – Yeuillaz, Saint Vincent 2001;

8...c5 9.\( \text{Ee1} \) \( \text{Ee8} \) 10.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{d7} \), Newman – Copping, Paignton 1956 and here, besides the standard plan for actions on the queenside, it deserves attention for White to try some kingside activities with: 11.f4!? exf4 12.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{wE7} \) 13.\( \text{wd2} \)±;

8...\( \text{h7} \) – Black is preparing f7-f5, meanwhile his knight is ready to join in the actions on the kingside via the g5-square, Radev – Liangov, Bulgaria 1966, but White is much ahead of his opponent in creation of threats: 9.c5!? f5 (After 9...dxc5 10.\( \text{Ee3} \) \( \text{d7} \) 11.\( \text{wc1} \) h5 12.\( \text{d1} \), White has
an excellent compensation for the sacrificed pawn thanks to his lead in development.) 10.cxd6 cxd6 11.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e3} f4 12.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}d2}±;

8...a5 9.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e1} \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}a6} 10.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}d3} b6 11.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e3} c5 12.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}xc5} bxc5 13.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}d2} h7, Restif – Marcussi, Acasuso 1991, 14.f4!? exf4 (or 14...\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}d7} 15.f5 \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}f6} 16.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}f2}±) 15.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}xf4} \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e7} 16.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}af1} \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}d7} 17.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}b5} \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e5} 18.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e1}± and the excellent placement of Black’s knight on the e5-outpost does not compensate the passivity of the rest of his pieces;

After 8...\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}a6} 9.a3 \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}c5} 10.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}c2} a5 11.b3 \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}d7} 12.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e3} b6, M.Mueller – Dargel, Ruhrgebiet 1998, Black’s attempt at blocking the queenside with his knight leads to the fact that White can repel it now with tempo – 13.b4 \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}a6} 14.bxa5 bxa5 15.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}d2}±;

8...\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}h5}, Bello – Pastor Pons, San Sebastian 1995, 9.g3±;

8...\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e7}, Bruned – Pastor Pons, San Sebastian 2000, 9.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e1} \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}a6} 10.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e3} \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}c5} 11.f3 \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}h5} 12.b4±.

9.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e1} f5

If 9...\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}d7} 10.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e3} f5, Bodrogi – G.Toth, Nyiregyhaza 1994, White continues with: 11.exf5 gxf5 12.f4 – see 9...f5.

10.exf5 gxf5 11.f4 \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}d7} 12.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e3} c5

It is even worse for Black to play: 12...e4 13.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}c1} a5, Sorm – Hager, Vienna 1984, because after 14.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}c2}±, White’s light pieces are deployed on e3 and d4 and he can develop his initiative on both sides of the board.

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13.dxc6 bxc6 14.c5 \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}b8} 15.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}d6} \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}xb2} 16.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}d3}±. White’s light pieces are so active that he maintains a stable advantage, Jussupow – Gunawan, Indonesia 1983.

d) 7...a6 8.d5

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8...\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}bd7}

8...\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}d7}?! – Black is trying to organize some actions on the queenside, but White obviously dominates there. 9.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e1} b5, Neese – Funk, Dresden 2001 and here after the simple move 10.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}b3}±, Black is forced to give up a pawn.

The move 8...\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e8}, Baillot – Hohner, Paris 1994, is too passive and after the standard line: 9.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}g5} f6 10.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}d2} f5 11.\textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}g5} \textcolor{red}{\underline{\text{\&}}e7} 12.exf5 gxf5 13.f4±, Black can hardly organize any counterplay whatsoever.
After 8...c6 9.\texttt{\textasciitilde}g5 h6 10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}h4 g5 11.\texttt{\textasciitilde}g3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}h5 12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2±, Black's light squares on the kingside are so vulnerable that White preserves a lasting positional pressure, Bobadilla – Barrios, Barranquilla 1999.

9.\texttt{\textasciitilde}g5!

Now, there arises a quite difficult line of the Petrov system for Black and White obtains a great advantage as M.Tal demonstrated in his game against R.Fischer at the Candidates tournament back in the year 1959.

9...h6

In answer to 9...\texttt{\textasciitilde}e8, G.Diaz – Pirozzi, Guaymallen 2001, it seems very good for White to continue with the typical idea – 10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2 a5 11.a3± and his queenside initiative is very powerful.

10.\texttt{\textasciitilde}h4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e8

10...\texttt{\textasciitilde}c5?! – that is simply a loss of a couple of tempi. 11.b4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}cd7, R.Pettersson – Asadpour, Orebro 1992, 12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2±.

10...g5 – Black compromises his light squares on the kingside with that move. 11.\texttt{\textasciitilde}g3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}h5 12.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2 \texttt{\textasciitilde}f4 13.\texttt{\textasciitilde}g4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}f6 (Black can hardly change anything much with 13...\texttt{\textasciitilde}b6, Gil – Blasco Cusido, Tarragona 2000, 14.f3±) 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xc8 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xc8 (It is not better for Black to opt for: 14...\texttt{\textasciitilde}xc8 15.b4 h5, Kumar – R.Irzhavanov, Bratislava 1993, because after: 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}g6 17.f3±, Black cannot create any real threats, while White's initiative on the queenside is running smoothly unopposed.) 15.f3 h5 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}h1 \texttt{\textasciitilde}g6 17.b4 h4 18.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f2 \texttt{\textasciitilde}f4 19.c5± Franco Ocampos – Blasco Blasco, Malaga 1991.

11.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2 \texttt{\textasciitilde}h7

11...\texttt{\textasciitilde}c5?! – That is again a loss of two tempi, just like on the previous move. 12.b4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}cd7, Le Hoang – Thai Nguyen, Hanoi 2002, 13.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3±.

11...h5 12.b4 \texttt{\textasciitilde}h6, Huss – Darbellay, Zurich 1989, 13.\texttt{\textasciitilde}b3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}h7 (After the dubious move 13...g5?! 14.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2 \texttt{\textasciitilde}h7 15.f3±, Black's dark-squared bishop remains extremely passive.) 14.f3 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e3+ 15.\texttt{\textasciitilde}f2 \texttt{\textasciitilde}xf2+ 16.\texttt{\textasciitilde}xf2 \texttt{\textasciitilde}e7 17.\texttt{\textasciitilde}d2±. Black has lost so much time in order to exchange his "bad" dark squared bishop that he cannot organize any active actions now, for example the move 17...f5, can be countered by White with the typical argument: 18.exf5 gxf5 19.f4± and it becomes clear that now Black’s light-squared bishop is deprived of good prospects as well.

12.b4

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\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

12...\texttt{\textasciitilde}f6

That is Black's thematic idea – to trade his passive bishop.
Chapter 15

His other possibilities are hardly any better:

The move 12...g5 – compromises the light squares on Black’s kingside and it has not become popular at all. 13...g3 f5 14.exf5 gxf5 15.d3 f8 16.c2± T.Schmidt – Dobsa, corr. 1991;

12...h5 – That move is played with the idea to activate or to exchange the passive dark-squared bishop. 13.f3 f5 (The move 13...g5?! – is even worse here than on the previous move, because White’s bishop goes to a more active placement. 14.f2 f5 15.exf5 d6 16.d3± Black will regain his pawn indeed, but his light squares on the kingside are very weak and White’s queenside initiative develops effortlessly, Camarena – R.Crespo, Spain 1995; 13...h6 14.b3 e3+ 15.h1 g5?! 16.f2 xf2 17.xf2 f5 18. exf5 xf5 19.d3 f4 20.c2 df8 21.e4± Lugovoi – Khatov, Novgorod 1995.) 14.f2 e7 15.a4 h6 16.a2 f4 17.a5 df6 18.c5+ and White’s standard queenside offensive provides him with superior prospects, Gunnarsson – Hickl, Reykjavik 1997;

12...f5 13.exf5 g5 14.g3 xf5 (or 14...d6, Camarena Gimenez – Grau Dominguez, Aragon 1996, 15.d3 h5 16.c5±) 15.d3 f8 16.c2± T.Schmidt – Dobsa, corr. 1988;

12...b6 13.a4 b7?! Gasperowicz – Motyka, corr. 2000, 14.a5 g5 15.c2 f5 16.f3±;

12...g5 13.f3 e7 (Black cannot create a dangerous attack with limited forces after: 13...f5 14.f2 f6 15.c5 h5, Syperek – Rosalski, Hamburg 1997, because White’s queenside initiative is visibly ahead in its development: 16.cxd6 cxd6 17.c4 e7 18.b6 b8 19.e3 f4 20.e1±. It is possibly better for Black to follow with: 15.d7 16.c2 h5 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.c4† although even then White is clearly ahead in the development of his initiative, Clemens – Tan, Groningen 2000. The other possibilities for Black would not change the evaluation of the position as quite favourable for White: 14...f4 15.c5 h7, Roelli – Choukourova, Mureck 1998, 16.e4±; or 14...e7 15.c1 f6 16.c5± Tal – Fischer, Yugoslavia 1959.) 14.h1 f5 15.c1 d6 16.c5 h5 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.a4± F.Olafsson – Gligoric, Yugoslavia 1959;

12...h8 – This move is simply a loss of time. 13.b3 f6, Jakob – Klossner, Bern 1994 (It looks rather strange for Black to play: 13...g8?! 14.c1 f5, Kloss – Seywald, Eisenberg 1993 and after 15.f3± it is quite difficult to understand what Black has achieved by transferring his rook to the g-file.), 14.xf6 xf6 15.d2 g7 16.c5±.

13.xf6 xf6

White’s queenside initiative is running smoothly after: 13...d6 14.c5 d8 (or 14...e7 15.c1±)
15.a4± Huss – Palacios, Luzern 1982.

14.\texttt{B}b3 \texttt{Be}7 15.\texttt{B}d2 \texttt{B}h7

After: 15...\texttt{B}g7 16.\texttt{Be}3± Black's king is unsafe in comparison to Fischer's move, Naumkin – Scerbo, Cutro 2006.

16.\texttt{Be}3± Tal – Fischer, Yugoslavia 1959. White's plan for active actions on the queenside is crystal clear, while Black's counterplay, based on the pawn-advance f7-f5 is too slow; moreover that White can react against it by exchanging on f5, followed by f2-f4.

e) 7...\texttt{Be}7

8.\texttt{B}g5!

That is the most effective way for White to emphasize the drawbacks of Black's last move.

His other attempts to obtain the advantage are less convincing. For example: 8.dxe5 dxe5 9.\texttt{B}d5 \texttt{B}d8 (It is a concession to White for Black to continue with: 9...\texttt{B}xd5 10.cxd5\texttt{B}d8 10.\texttt{B}g5 \texttt{B}bd7 11.\texttt{B}xe5 (White is trying to obtain an edge in a tactical fashion.) 11...\texttt{B}xe5 12.f4 \texttt{B}ed7 13.e5 h6 14.exf6 \texttt{B}xf6 15.\texttt{B}xf6+ \texttt{B}xf6 16.\texttt{B}xd8 \texttt{B}xd8 17.\texttt{B}xh6 \texttt{B}e8 18.\texttt{B}d3 \texttt{B}f6 19.\texttt{B}ae1 \texttt{B}f5\texttt{B}a and despite the fact that White managed to win a pawn, Black's activity proved to be enough to maintain the equality in the game van der Sterren – Damljanovic, Wijk aan Zee 1990.

In case White closes the centre immediately with 8.d5, Black can follow with 8...\texttt{B}h5 (White can counter 8...a5 with the powerful argument – 9.\texttt{B}g5± and Black's queen is not better placed on e7 than on d8 and that means Black has lost a tempo in comparison to the variation: 7.d5 a5 8.\texttt{B}g5 \texttt{B}a6 9.0–0.) 9.g3 f5 10.exf5 gxf5 and here after the standard line: 11.\texttt{B}xe5 \texttt{B}xg3 12.fxg3 dxe5\texttt{B}a, the game remains rather unclear, since White cannot play c4-c5 and his attempt to prepare it with the move 13.\texttt{B}e3 can be countered by Black with 13...f4!.

8...\texttt{B}bd7

That is relatively the best decision for Black.

In case he tries to control the d5-square with the help of the move 8...c6?!, White can refute that with the standard reaction
to continue with 17.\texttt{\textdaggerdbl}d3!, for example: 17..f6 18.\texttt{\textdagger}b1 g5 19.\texttt{\textdaggerdbl}e6! fxe6 20.fxe6 \texttt{\textdagger}e7 (20..\texttt{\textdagger}h6 21.\texttt{\textdagger}xd6\texttt{\textdagger}} 21.\texttt{\textdagger}f7 \texttt{\textdagger}xf7 22.exf7+ \texttt{\textdagger}xf7 23.\texttt{\textdagger}xg5+ \texttt{\textdagger}g7 24.\texttt{\textdagger}xh7+! \texttt{\textdagger}h8 25.\texttt{\textdagger}e8+ \texttt{\textdagger}f8 26.\texttt{\textdagger}h4 \texttt{\textdagger}h3 27.\texttt{\textdagger}e4+ \texttt{\textdagger}g8 28.\texttt{\textdagger}xa8 \texttt{\textdagger}d4+ 29.\texttt{\textdagger}f2+-.

\section*{9.d5}

White thus transposes to a standard position, in which Black will have great problems to get rid of the extremely unpleasant pin along the h4-d8 diagonal.

It is less precise for White to follow with 9.\texttt{\textdagger}c2, because of: 9..h6 10.\texttt{\textdagger}h4 c6 and Black manages to cover successfully the d5-square. After 11.\texttt{\textdagger}d1 g5 12.\texttt{\textdagger}g3 \texttt{\textdagger}h5 13.b4 \texttt{\textdagger}xg3 14.hxg3 \texttt{\textdagger}f6 15.dxe5 dxe5 16.c5 a5 17.a3 axb4 18.axb4, Rhode – Djuric, New York 1989, Black could have equalized with the help of the move 18..\texttt{\textdagger}e8, for example: 19.\texttt{\textdagger}d2 \texttt{\textdagger}e6 20.\texttt{\textdagger}c4 \texttt{\textdagger}xc4 21.\texttt{\textdagger}xc4 b6=.

\section*{9...h6 10.\texttt{\textdagger}h4}

\begin{tikzpicture}[scale=0.8]
  % Chessboard setup
  % ...}

\section*{10.g5}

The other possibilities for Black are not better at all:

10..\texttt{\textdagger}d8 11.\texttt{\textdagger}d2 g5 12.\texttt{\textdagger}g3 \texttt{\textdagger}f8 13.b4 \texttt{\textdagger}g6 14.\texttt{\textdagger}b3 \texttt{\textdagger}f4 15.\texttt{\textdagger}c1 c6,
Mikhailis – V.Zhelnin, Briansk 1995 and here after the simple line 16.\=Nd2, it looks like Black has nothing better than: 16...\=Qxe2+ 17.\=Qxe2 h5 18.f3 h4 19.\=Ng2+ and he has problems to create any effective threats on the kingside, while White has a clear-cut plan for actions on the queenside and in the centre; 10...c5 11.\=Qe1 a6 12.a3 b6 13.\=Qb1 \=Qe8 14.b4 \=Bb8 15.\=Nd3\pm and once again White’s queenside initiative is more dangerous than Black’s counterplay, Čvek – Movsesian, Zlin 1997.

11.\=Qg3 c6

It is possibly better for Black to try: 11...\=Qxe4 12.\=Qxe4 f5 13.\=Qfd2 fxe4 14.\=Qxe4 \=Qf6 15.\=Nd3 \=Qf5, Franco Ocampo – Palacios de la Prida, Seville 1992, although after 16.\=Qe2+, White has a slight, but quite stable advantage thanks to his dominance over the important e4-outpost.

12.\=Qd2 cxd5 13.cxd5 a6

14.\=Qc4\pm – and Black’s position is very difficult, because of the vulnerability of the light squares in his camp, Hoppe – Guennewig, Bochum 1989.

That is a smart move, because after White’s standard answer – 8.\=Qe1, Black can play 8...\=Qc6 9.d5 \=Qe7\=Q∞ and the position is rather complex, Komarov – Bellotti, Montecatini Terme 1999, while the other standard move for White -8.\=Qe3, can be countered by Black with 8...\=Qa6! and as we are going to see later in the variation with 7...\=Qa6, Black’s pawn on a5 is placed quite usefully. For example: 9.dxe5 dxe5 10.\=Qd2 \=Qe6 11.a3 \=Qe8! 12.\=Qc1 \#f8\=Q Mejster – Glek, Germany 1990/91, or 9.h3 exd4 10.\=Qxd4 \=Qe8 11.\=Qd2 c6 12.\=Qe1 \=Qc5 13.\=Qf1 \=Qd7 14.g3 \=Qe6 15.\=Qe3 c5 16.\=Qf3 \=Qc6 17.\=Qd2 \=Qd7= and Black’s light pieces are deployed quite reasonably, Miles – Glek, Biel 1996.

Still, White can enter a favourable endgame with the line:

8.dxe5 dxe5 9.\=Qxd8 \=Qxd8 10.\=Qg5 \=Qe8

After 10...\=Qbd7 11.\=Qf1 \=Qf8 12.\=Qd5 c6 13.\=Qe7+ \=Qh8, White has the powerful move 14.\=Qe3! and Black is faced with a rather unpleasant choice: 14...b6 15.\=Qxc6
\( \text{x}e4 16.\text{x}e7\# \) and his b6-pawn was quite vulnerable in the game Shariyazdanov – Shchekachev, Elista 1996, or 14.\text{x}e8 15.\text{x}xc8 \text{x}xc8 16.c5\# and White had the two-bishop advantage and good prospects in the centre and on the queenside.

11.\text{x}d5 \text{x}d5 12.cxd5 c6

That position was reached in the game Syre – Thiede, Germany 1996.

Black's other defensive lines are not better for him at all:

12...h6 13.\text{x}e3 f5 14.\text{xa}c1 c6, P.Larsen – H.Schmidt, Copenhagen 1998, 15.\text{a}d2\#;

12...f5 13.\text{xa}c1 fxe4 14.\text{d}d2 h6
15.\text{x}e3 \text{a}a6 16.\text{xa}6 \text{xa}6 17.\text{xc}7 \text{d}d6, Barrios – Mejia, Cartagés 2001, 18.\text{xc}e4 \text{xd}5 19.\text{xf}x6\#;

12...\text{xd}7 13.\text{d}d2 \text{a}a6 14.\text{xa}c1 b5 15.\text{b}3\# Radziewicz – Calota, Menorca 1996.

13.\text{d}d2

White maintains a powerful pressure on the queenside after that standard transfer of his knight there.

13...\text{d}d7

It is worse for Black to defend with: 13...h6 14.\text{xe}3 \text{d}d7 (Or 14...
\text{cxd}5 15.\text{xd}5 \text{a}a6 16.\text{c}4 \text{b}4
17.\text{b}6 \text{b}8 18.\text{c}5 \text{f}f8 19.\text{xc}1\#,
18...\text{f}5 19.\text{ad}1 \text{a}a6 20.\text{xe}3 \text{b}4
21.\text{d}2\#; 19...\text{xa}2 20.\text{d}6 \text{bd}8
21.\text{c}7\#) 15.\text{fd}1 \text{f}6 (Or 15...
\text{cxd}5 16.\text{xd}5 \text{f}6 17.\text{c}4\#; 16...
\text{e}4 17.\text{b}5\! \text{xb}2 18.\text{ab}1 \text{g}7 19.\text{bc}1\#; 16...f5 17.\text{c}4\# and White has a great advantage, because

Black plays now analogously to the variation with 6...\text{g}4, but that is not so good for him anymore, because his e-pawn has closed the scope of action of the bishop on g7.

8.d5

That is the right way for White to obtain maximal profit in that situation.

We will now deal in details with the lines: g1) 8...c5, g2)
8...\textbf{\textit{\textbf{\textit{xf3, g3}}}} 8...\textbf{\textit{\textit{bd7 and g4}}})
8...\textbf{\textit{\textit{a5.}}}

In case of 8...c6 9.\textbf{\textit{\textit{xe3}}} – see Chapter 13 (6...\textbf{\textit{\textit{g4}} 7.\textbf{\textit{xe3 e5}} 8.d5 c6 9.0–0).

Black will unavoidably encounter great problems after his other possibilities. See some examples:

8...\textbf{\textit{\textit{a6?!}} – This move only weakens his queenside and it enhances White’s initiative, Rempel – Wrona, Krakow 1998, 9.\textbf{\textit{\textit{xe3}}}±;}

8...\textbf{\textit{\textit{h6?!}} – Black compromises deliberately his kingside, J.Neumann – A.Richter, Germany 1991 and here the simplest reaction for White is to prepare a queenside offensive with 9.\textbf{\textit{\textit{xe3}}}±. For example, if Black tries to prevent the move b2-b4, by playing 9...\textbf{\textit{\textit{a5}}, there arises the position from the line \textbf{\textit{\textit{g4}}, except that White has an extra tempo;}}

8...\textbf{\textit{\textit{xe8}} 9.\textbf{\textit{\textit{xe3 c5}} 10.a3 \textbf{\textit{\textit{a5}}}} 11.\textbf{\textit{\textit{b1 \textit{\textit{d6}}}} 12.\textbf{\textit{\textit{e1 \textit{\textit{c8}}}} 13.\textbf{\textit{\textit{d3}}}}± – and White is perfectly prepared for opening of the game in the centre and he has excellent prospects on the queenside as well, Gipslis – Katalymov, USSR 1967;

8...\textbf{\textit{\textit{h5}} 9.g3 \textbf{\textit{\textit{d7}}}} (After 9...\textbf{\textit{\textit{we8}} 10.\textbf{\textit{\textit{e1 \textit{\textit{xe2}}}}}} 11.\textbf{\textit{\textit{xe2 \textit{\textit{f5}}}} 12.\textbf{\textit{\textit{f3 \textit{\textit{a6}}}} 13.\textbf{\textit{\textit{d3 c5}}}} 14.\textbf{\textit{\textit{d2 \textit{\textit{d7}}}} 15.\textbf{\textit{a3}}±, White has a slight edge, because of his extra space and the unfavourable placement of Black’s knight on the a6-square, Berczes – M.Carlsen, Budapest 2003; 9...\textbf{\textit{\textit{a5}} 10.a3 \textbf{\textit{\textit{d7}}}} 11.\textbf{\textit{\textit{d2 \textit{\textit{a6}}}}? – Black overlooks a standard combina-

\textbf{\textit{tion, Radev – Bobotsov, Sofia 1959, 12.\textbf{\textit{\textit{xe5 \textit{\textit{xe2}}}}}} 13.\textbf{\textit{\textit{xd7 \textit{\textit{xd1}}}}}} 14.\textbf{\textit{\textit{xd1 \textit{\textit{f6}}}} 15.g4±. Naturally, it would have been better for him to continue with: 11...\textbf{\textit{\textit{\textit{h3}}}} 12.\textbf{\textit{\textit{e1}}}} \textbf{\textit{\textit{f4}} 13.\textbf{\textit{\textit{xf4}}}} \textbf{\textit{\textit{exf4}} 14.\textbf{\textit{\textit{g5}}}}± and White would have only a minimal advantage.) 10.\textbf{\textit{\textit{xe3}} \textit{h6}} (Black has problems to maintain the material balance after: 10...\textbf{\textit{\textit{f5}} 11.exf5 \textbf{\textit{\textit{xf5}}}} 12.\textbf{\textit{\textit{e4 \textit{\textit{e7}}}}}} Sandor – Barczay, Budapest 1958, 13.\textbf{\textit{\textit{h4}}}$±, it is hardly any better for him to try: 11...\textbf{\textit{\textit{xf5}} 12.\textbf{\textit{g5}} f4 13.\textbf{\textit{\textit{xe4 \textit{\textit{xe4}}}}}} 14.\textbf{\textit{\textit{xf4}}}$±, because he has no compensation for the sacrificed pawn at all.) 11.\textbf{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{d2 \textit{\textit{h3}}}}}}}} 12.\textbf{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{fe1}}}}}± – and White’s prospects were preferable in the game Ftacnik – W.Schmidt, Arhus 1982;

8...\textbf{\textit{\textit{d7}} 9.\textbf{\textit{b1}} (Of course not 9.b4?, since after 9...\textbf{\textit{\textit{a5}}, White’s pawn chain is incapable of maintaining the control over the important blocking c5-square.) 9...\textbf{\textit{\textit{a5}} 10.a3 \textbf{\textit{\textit{a6}}}} 11.b4± and White has an easy game, because he has an extra tempo in comparison to the variation with 6.\textbf{\textit{\textit{g4}}, Quinteros – Ocampo, Buenos Aires 1968.

\textbf{\textit{g1)}} 8...\textbf{\textit{c5}}

\textbf{\textit{\textbf{\textit{\begin{tikzpicture}
\draw [line width=1pt] (0,0) -- (1,0);
\draw [line width=1pt] (0,0) -- (0,1);
\draw [line width=1pt] (1,0) -- (1,1);
\draw [fill=lightgray] (0.5,0.5) circle (0.1);
\end{tikzpicture}}}}\textbf{\textit{}}}
9.\(\text{d}e1\)

White’s initiative is not running so smoothly after 9.\(\text{xe}1\), due to: 9...\(\text{xf}3\) 10.\(\text{xf}3\) \(\text{bd}7\) 11.\(\text{g}5\) a6 12.\(\text{f}e2\) \(\text{c}7\) 13.a3 \(\text{a}c8\) 14.h4!.. Having in mind the arising pawn-structure and the ratio of the light pieces left on the board, White cannot break Black’s defence by playing only on the queenside, therefore he is threatening h4-h5 and thus he forces his opponent to compromise his defence on the kingside as well. 14...h5 15.g3 h7 16.d1 h6 17.e3\(\pm\). Black has problems now to organize any active counterplay and White maintains his advantage, Krasenkow – Janvarev, Moscow 1991.

9...\(\text{xe}2\)

Or 9...\(\text{c}8\) 10.d3 \(\text{bd}7\) 11.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{e}8\) 12.b4 b6 13.a4 f5 14.e2 \(\text{df}6\) 15.f3 f4 16.a5 \(\text{a}7\) 17.a1\(\pm\) Rahman – Storey, Scarborough 1999.

9...d7?! – That is not the best square for Black’s bishop and now White obtains the advantage in the centre: 10.f4! \(\text{xf}4\) 11.\(\text{xf}4\) \(\text{e}7\) 12.f3 \(\text{a}6\) 13.d3 \(\text{b}4\), Vallejo Pons – Morozevich, Monaco 2005. His pieces are deployed quite favourably and he can begin his central offensive: 14.e5! dxe5 (The other possibilities are even worse for Black: 14...\(\text{e}8\) 15.exd6 \(\text{xd}6\) 16.c5 \(\text{f}5\) 17.h1\(\pm\); 14...d3 15.exd6 \(\text{d}8\) 16.d3\(\pm\) and White remains with a solid extra pawn in both cases.) 15.\(\text{xe}5\) \(\text{f}5\) 16.d6 \(\text{e}6\) 17.xb7 \(\text{ab}8\) 18.d5\(\pm\) and White has an overwhelming advantage, because of his extra passed pawn in the centre.

10.\(\text{exe}2\) \(\text{bd}7\)

Black can hardly change anything much with his other replies: 10...a6 11.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{bd}7\), Gladyszew – Le Kouaghet, La Fere 2003, 12.d3 \(\text{e}7\) 13.b4\(\pm\);

10...h5 11.d3 d7 12.d2 a6 13.a3\(\pm\). White enjoys a stable space advantage and he is ready to build up his queenside initiative. After Black’s mistake on the next move, White obtained active prospects on the kingside too: 13...\(\text{b}6\)?! 14.g4 \(\text{f}6\) 15.b3 \(\text{d}7\) 16.h3 \(\text{e}8\) 17.a1f5 18.gxf5 gxf5 19.f4\(\pm\) Ezat – Tahoun, Tanta 2002.

11.\(\text{b}1\) \(\text{e}8\) 12.\(\text{e}3\) f5 13.f3 \(\text{f}6\) 14.h1 \(\text{g}5\) 15.g1 a5 16.\(\text{b}3\) \(\text{e}6\) 17.\(\text{b}5\) \(\text{b}6\)

18.\(\text{d}3\)\(\pm\) – Black has practically no active counterplay. Meanwhile, White can prepare b3-b4, but he also has the possibility to sacrifice on d6 and that was what happened in the game: 18...\(\text{f}4\) 19.\(\text{f}4\) \(\text{f}7\) 20.\(\text{d}6!\) \(\text{d}6\) 21.c5 \(\text{bd}7\) 22.e6--; Berry – Davis, Glenrothes 2000.
g2) 8...\texttt{\texttt{-xf3}} 9.\texttt{\texttt{-xf3}}

9...\texttt{\texttt{-bd7}}

In case of 9...c5, White continues 10.\texttt{\texttt{g5}}, analogously to the game Krasenkow – Janvarev, Velingrad 2004, 10.\texttt{\texttt{b1±}}

9...\texttt{\texttt{-d7?!}} 10.\texttt{\texttt{e3}} \texttt{\texttt{a6}} 11.\texttt{\texttt{b1±}} Baljiev – Hever, Gyor 1997.

9...\texttt{\texttt{e8}}, Dresen – Bletz, Karlsruhe 1988, 10.\texttt{\texttt{b1}} a5 (or 10...f5 11.b4±) 11.a3 \texttt{\texttt{d7}} 12.b4± and White's queenside initiative is obviously much faster than Black's counterplay.

After 9...a5 10.\texttt{\texttt{e3}} \texttt{\texttt{a6}}, Wilfling – Steiner, Austria 1998, White's most natural move is – 11.a3±. He is thus preparing to occupy additional space on the queenside.

9...\texttt{\texttt{-f7}} – this move does not contribute to Black's development. 10.\texttt{\texttt{b1}} f5 11.b4 \texttt{\texttt{f6}} 12.c5 dxc5, Knott – Horner, Edinburgh 1985 and here it deserves attention for White to try 13.d6!?\textsuperscript{+}, with a powerful initiative in the centre and on the queenside.

9...c6 – that opening of files on the queenside should be favourable for White. 10.0–0 \texttt{\texttt{e8}} (The other possibilities for Black are hardly any better: 10...\texttt{\texttt{c7}} 11.\texttt{\texttt{c1}} \texttt{\texttt{bd7}} 12.b4 a5 13.a3 axb4 14.axb4 \texttt{\texttt{b6}} 15.c5± Vospernik – Zugaj, Ljubljana 1995; 10...c5 11.a3 \texttt{\texttt{e8}} 12.b4± Wulf – Hein, Bad Segeberg 1995; 10...a6 11.b4± Brecht – Schreiber, Germany 2004.) 11.b4± and White has a quite clear plan for active actions on the queenside, while Black has no counterplay at all. Pallos – Zerenyi, Fuzesabony 1994.

10.\texttt{\texttt{e3}} \texttt{\texttt{e8}}

In case Black delays the organization of his counterplay on the kingside, White's powerful queenside offensive will run smoothly and unopposed:

10...c6? – This is a blunder of a pawn. 11.dxc6 bxc6 12.\texttt{\texttt{xd6±}} Verrat – Tenor, France 2003;

10...h6?! – That move does not contribute to Black's counterplay. 11.\texttt{\texttt{d2}} \texttt{\texttt{h7}}, Buesdorf – Ruppelt, Bad Breisig 2001, 12.b4±;

10...a6?! 11.b4 b6 (or 11...\texttt{\texttt{e8}?!}) Vannay – Mravik, Budapest 1998, 12.c5±) 12.\texttt{\texttt{a4}} \texttt{\texttt{e7}} 13.\texttt{\texttt{c2±}} Martini – Makrai, Budapest 2002;

10...\texttt{\texttt{b6}?!} – Black cannot counter White's queenside offensive by playing in that fashion. 11.\texttt{\texttt{e2}} \texttt{\texttt{fd7}} (It is not better for Black to play: 11...c5 12.dxc6 bxc6, Lukov – Chuprys, corr. 2004, because here White could have obtained a stable advantage.
with the line: 13.c5 dxc5 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xc5± and Black’s queenside would have been totally in ruins.) 12.b4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}c8, S.Gonchar – E.Tkachenko, Kharkov 2003, 13.c5±;

10...\textit{\textbf{Q}}e7 11.b4 c5 12.dxc6 bxc6 13.\textit{\textbf{Q}}d2 \textit{\textbf{Q}}fd8 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}}ad1 \textit{\textbf{Q}}f8 15.b5± Zaric – Balic, Yugoslavia 1994;

10...\textit{\textbf{Q}}h8 11.b4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}e8, Ogaard – J.C.Hansen, Oslo 1983, 12.\textit{\textbf{Q}}e2 f5 13.f3 f4 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}}f2±;

10...b6 11.b4 a5 (About 11...a6 12.\textit{\textbf{Q}}a4 – see 10...a6 11.b4 b6; 11...\textit{\textbf{Q}}c8 12.\textit{\textbf{Q}}a4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}a8 13.\textit{\textbf{Q}}c6 h6, Pogorelov – Ruciero Miguez, Seville 2004, 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}}fc1±) 12.a3 \textit{\textbf{Q}}e8 13.\textit{\textbf{Q}}e2 f5 14.f3 f4 15.\textit{\textbf{Q}}f2 g5, Dom- bai – Salamon, Budapest 1998, 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}}a4±;

10...a5 11.a3 \textit{\textbf{Q}}e8 12.\textit{\textbf{Q}}e2 f5 (After 12...\textit{\textbf{Q}}f6, Steinmacher – C.Maier, Lauda 1986, White should not mind the trade of the bishops, because he seizes the initiative on the queenside with: 13.b4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}g5 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}}d2 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xe3 15.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xe3±) 13.f3 f4 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}}f2 c5 15.dxc6 bxc6 16.b4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}f6 17.b5± and White occupies the important d5-square and that provides him with a stable advantage, Csonkics – Kinsigo, Tallinn 1986.

11.\textit{\textbf{Q}}e2 f5

11...a5 12.a3 \textit{\textbf{Q}}f6 (Black is trying to trade the dark-squared bishops.) 13.\textit{\textbf{Q}}d2 \textit{\textbf{Q}}c5 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}}ab1 \textit{\textbf{Q}}b3 (That seemingly active move with the knight only creates additional problems for Black.) 15.\textit{\textbf{Q}}d1 \textit{\textbf{Q}}d4 (But not 15...a4, because of 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xa4+-, while after

15...\textit{\textbf{Q}}c5, White’s initiative develops easily without any problems with: 16.b4 axb4 17.axb4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}d7 18.\textit{\textbf{Q}}d2±) 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xd4 exd4 17.\textit{\textbf{Q}}b5± Farago – Maier, Badenweiler 1985 and Black loses a pawn, because it would not work for him to continue with: 17...c5 18.dxc6 bxc6 19.\textit{\textbf{Q}}xd4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}b6 20.\textit{\textbf{Q}}f3 \textit{\textbf{Q}}xb2, due to: 21.\textit{\textbf{Q}}c2 \textit{\textbf{Q}}b8 22.\textit{\textbf{Q}}fd1 and White’s threat \textit{\textbf{Q}}d2, winning a piece, is impossible for Black to parry.

12.f3 f4

12...\textit{\textbf{Q}}f6 – This is a purposeful move for Black, with the idea to trade the “bad” dark-squared bishop. 13.b4 \textit{\textbf{Q}}g5 14.\textit{\textbf{Q}}f2 \textit{\textbf{Q}}h4 15.g3 \textit{\textbf{Q}}e7 16.\textit{\textbf{Q}}b3±. The bishop has been preserved and the slight weakening of White’s kingside is immaterial, Ronco – Needleman, Buenos Aires 2005.

13.\textit{\textbf{Q}}f2

White’s initiative on the queenside develops much faster than his opponent’s counterplay after Black’s other answers too: 13...\textit{\textbf{Q}}df6 14.c5± Kotrba – Postup- pa, Czech Republic 1999, or 13...
h5 14.b4 g5 15.c5± I. Perez – Fuentes, Cuba 2000.

14.b4 a5 15.a3 b6 16.\(\text{c1}\) \(\text{e7}\)

After 16...axb4 17.axb4 h5, Hernandez – Cabrera, Fuerte-ventura 1992, the fastest way for White to continue with his queenside initiative is the move 18.\(\text{b5}\)±, followed by the occupation of the a-file.

\(\text{h5}\); as for 9...\(\text{xf3}\) 10.\(\text{xf3}\) \(\text{e8}\) – see 8...\(\text{xf3}\).

Black has tried in practice some other moves as well:

9...\(\text{b6}\)! – This is a loss of a couple of tempi. 10.c5 \(\text{bd7}\) 11.b4 a5 12.a3± Schander – Glarner, Vaxjo 1991;

9...\(\text{b6}\) – Black only enhances White's queenside initiative with that move, Roestenburg – van Tonder, Email 2000, 10.h3 \(\text{xf3}\) 11.\(\text{xf3}\) a5 12.a3±;

9...a6?! – That deliberate weakening of Black's queenside is hardly necessary. 10.b4 \(\text{e8}\) 11.c5 f5 12.\(\text{d5}\) \(\text{xe2}\) 13.\(\text{we2}\) \(\text{e7}\) 14.\(\text{d6}\)± C.Pedersen – Dinic, Budva 2003;

9...\(\text{h6}\)! – This is again a loss of a tempo to say the least. 10.h3 \(\text{xf3}\) 11.\(\text{xf3}\) \(\text{h7}\) 12.b4 b6 13.\(\text{a4}\)± Saeheng – Bao, Vietnam 2003;

9...a5, Kruskic – Berger, Darmstadt 1995, 10.h3 \(\text{xf3}\) 11.\(\text{xf3}\) \(\text{c5}\) 12.a3±;

9...\(\text{h5}\) 10.b4 \(\text{h7}\) 11.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{xe2}\) 12.\(\text{we2}\) f5 13.f3 f4 14.\(\text{ff2}\) g5 15.c5± Husemann – Zink, corr. 2000;

9...\(\text{c5}\) 10.h3 \(\text{xf3}\) 11.\(\text{xf3}\) a5 12.a3 \(\text{e8}\), Sjoberg – Cruz, Stockholm 1992 and here White could have obtained a great advantage by continuing with his queenside offensive with: 13.b4 \(\text{a6}\) 14.\(\text{wa4}\) f5 15.\(\text{wb5}\)±;

After 9...\(\text{h8}\) 10.\(\text{d2}\) \(\text{xe2}\) 11.\(\text{we2}\) \(\text{h5}\) 12.g3±, White’s initiative on the queenside is much more effective than Black’s king-

\(\text{g3}\) 8...\(\text{bd7}\) 9.\(\text{e3}\)

\(\text{e8}\)

About 9...\(\text{h5}\) 10.g3 – see 7...

10.b4 \xf3 11.\xf3 f5 12.\xc1 f4 13.\xd2 h5

14.\xa4± Dankert – D.Lange, Hamburg 1992. It is quite difficult for Black to organize an attack on the kingside without his light-squared bishop, while White’s queenside offensive is very dangerous and rather simple to develop.

g4) 8...a5 9.\xg5!

White provokes a seemingly minimal, but in fact quite relevant weakening of Black’s pawn-structure on the kingside.

9...h6

In answer to 9...\xbd7, Shabani – Haddouche, Szeged 1994, White could have exchanged the light-squared bishops, followed by the preparation of b4 and c5, with eventual developments like: 10.\xd2 \xe2 11.\xe2 c6 12.b3 \xc7 13.\xc1 \xc5 14.\xb1 and Black has great problems to create any effective counterplay.

10.\xe3 \xa6 11.\xb1

It is also possible for White to play: 11.\xd2 \xe2 12.\xe2, but in that case Black can temporarily contain the development of White’s queenside initiative with the move 12...c6±.

11...\xd7

That position was reached in the game A.V.Karpov – Avdeev, corr. 1996.

After 11...\xh5, Gavrikov – Sygulski, Naleczow 1984, the simplest line for White to maintain a considerable advantage would have been: 12.\xd2! \xh7 13.\xg5 hxg5 14.\xg4±. You can see in that last variation how White could have profited advantageously from the weakening move h7-h6.

The other standard resource for White to exploit the compromising move h7-h6 is – 12.g3, with the idea to counter 12...\xf5 with 13.\xh4!±.
5.d4 0-0 6.ae2 e5 7.0-0

Here, in the diagrammed position, the most natural way for White to continue the game is to proceed with his queenside offensive with: 12.ad2 ac5 13.b3=. White prepares gradually b4, while Black has problems to organize any effective counterplay.

**h) 7...dh5**

8.g3

White must prevent the appearance of Black's knight on the f4-outpost, otherwise he might have serious problems, for example: 8.exd1 df4 9.f1 g4 10.d5 hf6 11.g3 xf3 12.xf3 xd5+ Mikhalevski – Remmel, Dieren 1999.

White does not achieve much either with: 8.dxe5 dxe5 9.xd8 xd8 10.cd5, because of 10...da6=.

Now, we will analyze: **h1) 8...dg4 and h2) 8...dh3.**

About 8...exd4 9.cd4 dh3 10.e1 – see 8...dh3.

Black has tried in practice some other lines too, but only very seldom:

8...dc6 9.g5 wd7 10.e3 f5?!

– This line is too aggressive for Black, since his queen is placed so badly that his activity cannot end successfully. 11.exf5 gxf5 12.d5 e7 13.xe5= and White remained with a solid extra pawn in the game Komljenovic – Baldwin, Albacete 1992;

In answer to 8...c5, Nikcevic – Vukovic, Cetinje 1996, White leads in development and he dominates on the open d-file and he obtains a lasting initiative after the simple line: 9.dxc5 dxc5 10.e3 xd1 (The other replies for Black look much worse: 10...b6 11.d5 xd5 12.cxd5= and White has a powerful passed pawn in the centre and an easy game on the queenside; after 10...e7 11.d5 d6 12.g5 f6 13.e3=, Black’s knight on h5 is so bad that he has no chances to fight for equality at all; about 10...b6 11.d5 d6 – see 10...e7; in case of: 10...a6 11.b3 f5!? 12.exf5 gxf5 13.xe5 f4 14.xh5 fxe3 15.f4=, Black’s two-bishop advantage does not compensate his sacrificed pawn, because White leads in development and he has powerful outposts for his knights in the centre.) 11.fxd1 b6 12.d6.

**h1) 8...dg4**

Black is trying to create some pressure against White’s d4-pawn.

9.g5!

It is also good for White to play 9.d5 – see the line: 7...g4 8.d5
\(\text{dh5 9.g3.} \)

**9...f6**

It is hardly better for Black to defend with: 9...\(\text{wd7} \) 10.\(\text{ae3 da6?} \)
Jaeger – Gullaksen, Langesund 2001, his last move was a blunder (After the best defence for Black: 10...\(\text{exd4} \) 11.\(\text{xd4 xe2} \) 12.\(\text{xe2} \) 13.\(\text{xd1 fd8} \) 14.g4\(\text{±} \).

**10.\(\text{ae3 cc6} \)**

In answer to 10...\(\text{dd7} \), Olsen – Gullaksen, Torshavn 2003, White can also start active actions on the queenside and in the centre: 11.c5 \(\text{xc5} \) 12.\(\text{b3} \) \(\text{h8} \) 13.dxe5! \(\text{xe5} \) 14.\(\text{g5 xe2} \) 15.\(\text{xe2 de7} \) 16.\(\text{e6} \).

That position was reached in the game Ekeberg – M.Carlsen, Oslo 2003. **11.c5?!** This is White’s most energetic reaction. **11...dxc5** (Following: 11...\(\text{xf3} \) 12.\(\text{xf3 exd4} \) 13.\(\text{xd4 xd4} \) 14.\(\text{xd4} \) 15.\(\text{g5} \) \(\text{e2} \) 16.\(\text{e7} \) 17.\(\text{e6} \).

**dxe3 15.xh5± and he remains with a “bad” bishop, or 12...\(\text{de7} \) 13.\(\text{xc5} \) 14.\(\text{e2} \). White is obviously ahead in the development of his initiative.) 13.\(\text{xc6 xe2} \) 14.\(\text{xe2} \). White’s advantage in the centre and the unfavourable placement of his opponent’s light pieces, provide him with more than sufficient compensation for the sacrificed pawn.

**h2) 8...h3**

**9.e1 exd4 10.xd4 f6 11.g5**

This bishop-maneuver is quite familiar to us in this pawn-structure. As a rule, it is always advantageous unless there are some tactical reasons against it.

The less precise move – 11.\(\text{e3} \), enabled Black after: 11...\(\text{bd7} \) 12.f3 e5 13.\(\text{c1 a6} \) 14.b4 c6 15.b3 e8 16.f2 h5\(\text{±} \), to obtain some counterplay in the game Gligoric – Ilincic, Niksic 1997.

**11...h6**

It is evidently worse for Black to follow with: 11...\(\text{e8} \) 12.\(\text{d2} \) \(\text{d7} \) 13.f3 a6 14.h6 e6, Andriulaitis – De Groot, corr. 1999
(After 14...\h8 15.g4!?\textup{↑}, Black has great problems to save his only active piece – his bishop on h3, which is under the threat of entrapment.) and here after the quite obvious exchange – 15.\\texttt{\textasciitilde}{\texttt{xg7}} \\texttt{xg7} 16.\\texttt{\textasciitilde}{\texttt{d5}±, Black has nothing to counter White’s mounting pressure in the centre with.

The move 11...\\texttt{c6}, has been tested by Black as well. After: 12.\\texttt{\textasciitilde}{\texttt{x6b}} bxc6 13.\\texttt{\textasciitilde}{\texttt{d2}} e8 14.\\texttt{\textasciitilde}{\texttt{f4}} e7, it is probably worth for White to try in practice: 15.g4!? (Instead, the move 15.c5, after: 15...\\texttt{e5} 16.cxd6 cxd6 17.\\texttt{xex5} \\texttt{xex5} 18.\\texttt{xf4} \\texttt{e8} 19.\\texttt{f3} \\texttt{e8} 20.\\texttt{ad1} d5 21.exd5 \\texttt{xex5} 22.\\texttt{xex5}+ \\texttt{xex5} 23.\\texttt{xex5}, led to a completely equal position and the opponents agreed to a draw in the game Jelen – Mohr, Maribor 1998.) 15...\\texttt{h5} (In case of: 15...\\texttt{e5} 16.\\texttt{e3} \\texttt{xg4} 17.\\texttt{xh3} \\texttt{xh3} 18.\\texttt{xf2} \\texttt{xf2} 19.\\texttt{xf2} \\texttt{g5} 19.\\texttt{e3}!\textup{±, it remains rather unclear whether Black’s initiative will be sufficient to compensate White’s extra piece.) 16.gxh5 gxh5 17.\\texttt{h4}± and the pin along the d8-h4 diagonal is quite unpleasant for Black.

12.\\texttt{e3} e8

It is not so good for Black to opt for: 12...\\texttt{d7}?! 13.\\texttt{d2} h7 14.f3 c6, Zielinska – Babaev, Barlinek 2001, 15.\\texttt{xc6} \\texttt{xc6} (White is dominant in the centre, so it is even worse for Black to defend with: 15...bxc6 16.c5±) 16.b4±, since White ends up with an advantage in the centre and on the queenside.

12...\\texttt{d7} 13.\\texttt{d2} h7 14.f3 e5 (About 14...\\texttt{e8} 15.\\texttt{d1} – see 12...\\texttt{e8}; in response to: 14...\texttt{a6}, S.Pedersen – Shaked, London 1997, it is logical for White to adhere to a scheme, which is quite typical for this variation with: 15.\\texttt{d1} e5 16.\\texttt{f2} d7 17.\\texttt{ad1}±) 15.\\texttt{d1} d7 16.\\texttt{f2} a6 17.\\texttt{ad1}± – and Black can hardly organize any effective counterplay, because of White’s considerable advantage in the centre, while after: 17...\texttt{b6} 18.\texttt{b3} e8 19.\texttt{c2} \\texttt{e6} 20.\texttt{g2} b5 21.cxb5 axb5 22.\\texttt{d4} b4 23.\\texttt{xex6} \\texttt{xex6} 24.\texttt{h3} a3 25.f4±, White acquired the two-bishop advantage in addition to his central positional bind, Piket – Ilincic, Leon 2001.

13.\\texttt{d2}

White is reaping now some dividends out of his bishop-manoeuvre to g5.

13...\\texttt{h7} 14.f3 \\texttt{bd7} 15.\\texttt{d1}?

White starts this operation with the idea to repel his opponent’s light-squared bishop away from its active position on the h3-square.
Chapter 15

He has also tried in practice the natural line: 15...\textit{c6} (In case of: 15...\textit{d4} 16...\textit{c2} \textit{e7} 17...\textit{f2} \textit{h5}, Black has some counterplay, although White’s prospects are slightly better, Beaumont – Buckley, Torquay 1998.) 16...\textit{c2} \textit{f8} 17...\textit{g5} \textit{a5} 18...\textit{e3} \textit{h5} 19...\textit{g2} \textit{xg2} 20...\textit{g2} \textit{a4} 21...\textit{c2} and despite the fact that White had some edge, Black had counterplay in connection with the possibility to occupy the dark squares on the queenside in the game I.Sokolov – van Den Doel, Rotterdam 1997.

\begin{center}
\includegraphics{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

15...\textit{d5} 16...\textit{f2} \textit{d7} 17...\textit{ad1} \textit{a6} 18...\textit{c2}± I.Sokolov – Seeman, Stockholm 1998.

\textbf{i) 7...\textit{e8}}

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\includegraphics{chess_board2.png}
\end{center}

Black exerts indirect pressure against White’s e4-pawn, just like in the variation \textbf{a) 7...\textit{e8}}, but now his king’s rook remains on the f-file and that might be useful for him in his subsequent operations.

\textbf{8...dxe5 dxe5 9.b4!}

That is White’s best line, since Black cannot exploit the vulnerability of the d4-square.

\textbf{9...\textit{e7}}

After 9...\textit{c6}?! – Black fails to consolidate on the d4-outpost. 10.b5 \textit{d4} 11.a3 \textit{c6}, Aseev – Nalbandian, Cappelle la Grande 2003. Now, White’s simplest decision is to win the exchange and Black’s compensation is insufficient: 12...\textit{d4} \textit{exd4} 13...\textit{xf8} \textit{xf8} (Or 13...\textit{xc3} 14...\textit{g7} \textit{g7} 15.bxc6 bxc6 16...\textit{d6}± and Black’s passed c3-pawn is not supported by the rest of his pieces, so he is going to lose it soon.) 14...\textit{xd4} \textit{xe4} 15...\textit{xe4} \textit{xc3} 16...\textit{ad1}± and Black’s dark-squared bishop is very powerful indeed, but it should still be weaker than White’s rook in this position with an equal number of pawns.

It is not better for Black to play: 9...\textit{g4} 10.b5! \textit{xf3} (It is even worse for him to try: 10...c5 11...\textit{d2} \textit{xe2} 12...\textit{xe2} \textit{bd7} 13.a4 \textit{h5} 14.g3 \textit{e6} 15...\textit{d5}± and White maintains a stable advantage with his centralized knight. 15...\textit{ac8} 16.a5 \textit{h6} 17.a6 \textit{b6} 18...\textit{a3} \textit{g7} 19...\textit{b2} \textit{e8} 20.f4. White’s kingside initiative is quite dangerous, while Black has no counterplay.)
at all. It is not surprising that the game ended rather quickly after: 20...f6 21.\textit{e}af3 exf4 22.gxf4 \textit{d}e6 23.\textit{g}g2 \textit{d}d4 24.\textit{g}g3 f5 25.e5 \textit{d}e6 26.h4 \textit{g}g7 27.h5 \textit{d}xh5 28.\textit{h}h3 \textit{g}g7 29.\textit{x}hx5 gxh5 30.e6 1–0 Epishin – Issermann, Nice 2004.) 11.\textit{x}xf3 \textit{w}e6 12.\textit{d}d5 \textit{c}c8, Hrubant – Gregor, Czech Republic 2001 and here White could have consolidated his edge with the natural move 13.\textit{e}e3, with the following eventual developments: 13...\textit{b}d7 14.\textit{b}b1 c6 15.bxc6 bxc6 16.\textit{d}xf6+ \textit{x}xf6 17.\textit{w}a4± and Black would be practically helpless against White’s mounting pressure on the queenside.

10.b5

10...c6

Black fails to equalize after: 10...\textit{d}d8 11.\textit{d}d5 \textit{d}x5 12.cxd5 c6 13.\textit{c}c4 cxd5 14.\textit{xd}5\textit{d} ± – White leads in development and he exerts a powerful pressure on the queenside. Black’s attempt at simplifying the position only increased White’s advantage after: 14...\textit{e}e6 15.\textit{g}g5 \textit{f}f6 16.\textit{x}xf6 \textit{xf}6 17.\textit{xb}7! \textit{xd}1 18.\textit{xf}xd1, Shariyazdanov – Tratar, Roque Saenz Pena 1997. White’s two rooks are evidently superior to Black’s queen.

10...\textit{b}d7 – That is a logical try for Black to occupy the c5-outpost. 11.a4 \textit{c}c5 12.\textit{a}a3 \textit{f}fd7, S.Ivanov – Kempinski, Stockholm 2000, but Black can hardly organize any active actions, so it seems logical for White to occupy some additional files with: 13.\textit{w}d2 \textit{e}e8 14.\textit{f}fd1 \textit{f}f8 (It is even worse for Black to play: 14...c6?! 15.\textit{w}e3 \textit{f}f8 16.bxc6 bxc6 17.\textit{xd}7! \textit{xd}7 18.\textit{xe}1\textit{±}) 15.\textit{w}e3 \textit{f}6 16.\textit{d}d5 \textit{d}d8 17.a5 c6 18.\textit{b}b4 cxb5 19.\textit{d}d5\textit{±}. White’s lead in development is so huge that his compensation is more than sufficient, for example: 19...bxc4 20.\textit{xc}4 \textit{e}e6 21.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8 22.\textit{c}c3± and Black will soon have to give up his extra pawn, while after: 22...\textit{f}4 23.\textit{b}b5! a6 24.\textit{xf}4 axb5 25.\textit{d}d5!++, he will lose plenty of material.

11.\textit{w}b3 \textit{d}d8

It might be even stronger for Black to follow with the seldom played in practice line: 11...\textit{e}e8!? 12.\textit{a}a3 \textit{w}c7 13.\textit{f}fd1 \textit{f}8 14.\textit{xf}8 \textit{xf}8, Aupov – Zakharevich, Togliatti 2001, although even then after: 15.c5 \textit{g}g4 16.bxc6 bxc6 (In case of: 16...\textit{xc}6 17.\textit{d}d5 \textit{xd}5 18.\textit{exd}5 \textit{xf}3 19.d6! \textit{d}d7 20.\textit{xf}3\textit{±} White maintains a great advantage thanks to his powerful central pawns.) 17.\textit{d}6 \textit{bd}7 18.\textit{ad}1\textit{±}, White’s extra space provides him with a long-lasting positional pressure.
12.\texttt{a3} \texttt{c7}

White maintains a huge lead in development and extra space following: 12...\texttt{e8} 13.\texttt{fdd1} \texttt{xd1+} 14.\texttt{xd1} \texttt{d7} 15.\texttt{bxc6} \texttt{bxc6} 16.\texttt{d6} \texttt{h5} 17.\texttt{c5} \texttt{f4} 18.\texttt{c4±} Eljanov – Kempinski, Calvia 2004.

13.\texttt{ad1} \texttt{xd1} 14.\texttt{xd1} \texttt{e8}

The move 15...\texttt{g4}?, Farago – Wittmann, Budapest 2004, loses by force. In connection with the vulnerability of the f7-square, Black fails to preserve the material balance after White's energetic reaction: 16.b6! \texttt{e7} (or 16...\texttt{xb6} 17.\texttt{cxb6} \texttt{e8} 18.\texttt{g5+-}) 17.\texttt{d5}! \texttt{f8} 18.\texttt{c7+-}.

16.\texttt{d5!} \texttt{xd5} 17.\texttt{exd5} \texttt{f5}

18.\texttt{c4}

White's central pawns are very powerful and he enjoys a huge lead in development, so all that more than compensates his sacrificed knight.

18...\texttt{g4} 19.\texttt{h3} \texttt{xf3}

20.\texttt{xf3±} and Black failed to find anything better in that position than to give back his extra material with: 20...\texttt{d6} 21.\texttt{cxd6} \texttt{c8} (or 21...\texttt{xc4} 22.\texttt{c1+-}) 22.\texttt{f1} \texttt{d7} 23.\texttt{c1} \texttt{e8} 24.\texttt{c7+-} and Black failed to save that position despite his tenacious resistance in the game Kobalija – Zakharevich, Samara 2000.

\textbf{j)} 7...\texttt{c6} 8.\texttt{d5}

Now, White must close the centre.

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We will deal in details with the moves: \textbf{j1)} 8...\texttt{cxd5}, \textbf{j2)} 8...\texttt{c5} and \textbf{j3)} 8...\texttt{a5}.

About 8...\texttt{a6} 9.\texttt{e3} – see 7...

\texttt{a6} 8.\texttt{e3} \texttt{c6} 9.\texttt{d5}; 8...\texttt{g4} 9.\texttt{e3} – see 7...\texttt{g4} 8.\texttt{d5} \texttt{c6} 9.\texttt{e3}; 8...\texttt{a6} 9.\texttt{g5} – see 7...\texttt{a6} 8.\texttt{d5} \texttt{c6} 9.\texttt{g5}.

Black has also tried in practice:

8...\texttt{b5}? – This is an attempt to seize the initiative on the queenside, but it is bound to backfire, because White is obviously stronger there: 9.\texttt{dxc6} \texttt{bxc6} 10.\texttt{a4} \texttt{e8} 11.\texttt{d5±} van Wely – Belkhodja, Hyeres 1992;

8...\texttt{h5} 9.\texttt{g3} \texttt{cxd5} (In answer to 9...\texttt{h6} Teplitzky – Ricardi, Yerevan 1996, White's simplest reaction is: 10.\texttt{e1} \texttt{f6} 11.\texttt{e3±}) 10.\texttt{cxd5} \texttt{h3} 11.\texttt{e1} \texttt{d7??} (That
is a terrible blunder, but even after: 11...h6 12.\( \text{\&d}2 \text{\&f}6 \text{13.\&c}4 \pm, White has a huge lead in development and excellent prospects on the queenside.) 12.\( \text{\&g}5+ - \) Iwanziw – Bokemaer, Oberbernhards 2004;

8...\( \text{\&h}8 \) 9.\( \text{\&g}5 \) c5 10.\( \text{\&e}1 \text{\&d}7?! - Black pushed c5 in two moves and he followed that with the too original placement of his queen in the game N.Spiridonov – J.Bednarski, Varna 1968 and White could have exploited that successfully by opening the centre with: 11.\( \text{\&d}2 \text{\&g}8 \text{12.\&d}3 \text{f}5 \text{13.f}4 \pm;

8...h6 9.\( \text{\&e}1 \text{\&h}7 \) (or 9...cxd5 10.cxd5 \( \text{\&e}8 \)?! 11.\( \text{\&e}3 \pm \) Hicker – Loeffler, Hallein 1988) 10.\( \text{\&e}3 \) \( \text{\&g}8 \) 11.\text{c}5 \pm and White’s lead in development enables him to exert a powerful pressure in the centre, Sebestyen – Engelbrecht, Budapest 2004;

8...\( \text{\&e}8 \), Sulava – Danieli, Lido Estensi 2003, 9.dxc6 bxc6 (or 9...\( \text{\&xc}6 \text{10.\&g}5 \pm ) 10.c5 \( \text{\&e}7 \) 11.cxd6 \( \text{\&xd}6 \text{12.\&e}3 \pm;

8...\( \text{\&c}7 \) 9.\( \text{\&e}1 \) cxd5 (The other possibilities are not any better for Black either: 9...\( \text{\&e}8 \) 10.\( \text{\&e}3 \) \( \text{\&d}7 \), Alonso – Maller, Villa Ballaster 1993, 11.\( \text{\&d}2 \) f5 12.exf5 \( \text{\&x}f5 \) 13.f4 \pm; 9...\( \text{\&bd}7 \) 10.\( \text{\&d}3 \) \( \text{\&e}8 \)?! 11.\( \text{\&e}3 \) c5 12.f3 a6 13.\( \text{\&d}2 \) \pm Bischoff – Szenatra, Boeblingen 1997.) 10.cxd5 a6 11.\( \text{\&e}3 \) \( \text{\&bd}7 \) (It is worse for Black to try: 11...b5?! 12.\( \text{\&c}1 \text{\&d}8 \) 13.\( \text{\&d}3 \)+, because his queenside is considerably com-

promised, Corry – Tilenbaeva, Moscow 1994.) 12.\( \text{\&c}1 \text{\&d}8 \text{13.a}4 \text{\&e}8 \), S.Zimmermann – J.Schlein, Hessen 1997 and here it deserved attention for White to redeploy his knight to the c4-square with: 14.\( \text{\&f}3 \)?! f5 – that is the only reasonable counterplay for Black.

15.\( \text{\&g}5 \) \( \text{\&c}5 \) 16.exf5 \( \text{\&xf}5 \) 17.f4 \pm.

**j1) 8...cxd5 9.cxd5**

This exchange of the c-pawns is in principle in favour of White, since it presents him with the c4-square for his king’s knight and it also enlarges the scope of action of his light-squared bishop on e2.

**9...\( \text{\&e}8 \)**

About 9...\( \text{\&a}6 \) 10.\( \text{\&e}3 \) – see 7...\( \text{\&a}6 \) 8.\( \text{\&e}3 \) c6 9.d5 cxd5 10.cxd5; as for 9...\( \text{\&bd}7 \) 10.\( \text{\&e}3 \) – see 7.0-0 \( \text{\&bd}7 \) 8.\( \text{\&e}3 \) c6 9.d5 cxd5 10.cxd5.

Black can try to organize some counterplay on the queenside with the help of the line: 9...a6 10.\( \text{\&e}1 \) b5 (In case of: 10...\( \text{\&e}8 \), Malich – Minev, Germany 1958, after White’s natural reaction: 11.\( \text{\&e}3 \) f5 12.exf5 \( \text{\&xf}5 \) 13.f4 \( \text{\&f}6 \) 14.\( \text{\&h}1 \) \( \text{\&g}4 \) 15.\( \text{\&g}1 \pm \), Black can
hardly do anything active.), but after: 11.\textit{\texttt{Qc2 \texttt{b7} 12.a4!}}, he only ends up with additional weaknesses on that side of the board: 12...\texttt{bxa4} 13.\texttt{\texttt{Bxa4}} \texttt{\texttt{Qbd7}} 14.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{Qe3}} \texttt{\texttt{b6}}} 15.\texttt{\texttt{Qa2+}} Azmaiparashvili – McDonald, Tbilisi 1986.

\textbf{10.a4 h6}

It is premature for Black to try: 10...f5 11.\texttt{Qg5} \texttt{c7} 12.\texttt{exf5} \texttt{gxf5} 13.f4± I.Farago – R.Rodriguez, Amsterdam 1975.

It is not advisable for him to continue with 10...\texttt{g4} 11.\texttt{\texttt{Qe3}} f5, Ihlenfeld – Suedel, corr. 1988, because after: 12.\texttt{g5} \texttt{xe2} 13.\texttt{\texttt{Qxe2}} \texttt{c7} 14.\texttt{exf5} \texttt{gxf5} 15.f4± White is much better prepared for opening of the game in the centre.

\textbf{11.a5 f5}

![Diagram](image)

Now, after: 12.\texttt{exf5} \texttt{gxf5} 13.\texttt{g3} \texttt{\texttt{a6}} 14.\texttt{\texttt{h4}} \texttt{f4} 15.\texttt{\texttt{\texttt{a3}} \texttt{\texttt{h3}}} 16.\texttt{\texttt{Qg4+}} Black’s attack was over and he had to think about defending in the game Korchnoi – Suetin, USSR 1966.

\textbf{j2) 8...c5}

(diagram)

\textbf{9.\texttt{Qg5}}

White’s task becomes much easier after he restricts Black’s eventual counterplay on the kingside.

After 9.\texttt{\texttt{Qe1}} \texttt{\texttt{e8}} 10.\texttt{\texttt{d3}} (but not 10.g4?!), because of 10...\texttt{\texttt{f6+}})

10...f5 11.f4 \texttt{\texttt{Qd7}} 12.\texttt{\texttt{Qe3}}, with the help of 12...b6, Black can transpose to one of the sharp variations of Chapter 21 (7.0–0 \texttt{\texttt{Qbd7}} 8.\texttt{\texttt{Qe3}} c6 9.d5 c5 10.\texttt{\texttt{Qe1}} \texttt{\texttt{e8}} 11.\texttt{\texttt{Qd3}} f5).

I will also add that it is weaker for Black to follow with 12...\texttt{Qe7}, due to: 13.\texttt{exf5} \texttt{gxf5} 14.\texttt{fxe5} \texttt{\texttt{Qxe5}} 15.\texttt{\texttt{Qxe5}} \texttt{\texttt{Qxe5}} 16.\texttt{\texttt{Qd2+}}, as it was played in the game Scheltinga – Toran, Beverwijk 1957.

\textbf{9...h6}

Black must weaken now his kingside; otherwise he cannot organize any counterplay, because White’s bishop is placed so well on g5 that it restricts Black’s actions considerably.

9...\texttt{\texttt{Qd7}} – This is not the best square for Black’s queen. 10.\texttt{\texttt{Wc1}} \texttt{\texttt{h8}} 11.h3 \texttt{\texttt{e8}} 12.\texttt{\texttt{Qh2}} f5 13.f4 \texttt{\texttt{Qa6}} 14.\texttt{\texttt{f3}} \texttt{\texttt{Qac7}} 15.\texttt{\texttt{h6±}} F.Petek – Mar, Kranj 1999.

9...\texttt{a6} 10.\texttt{\texttt{Qd2}} \texttt{\texttt{Qbd7}}, Renaud – Boisvert, corr. 1974 (or 10...\texttt{g4}, Buesdorf – Nietsch, Bad Breisig 2001, 11.h3 \texttt{\texttt{Qxf3}} 12.\texttt{\texttt{Qxf3}} \texttt{\texttt{Qbd7}}
13.\(\text{\&}e2\pm\) and here after 11.\(\text{\&}e1\pm\), White can prepare opening of the game on both sides of the board.

9...\(\text{\&}b6\) 10.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}e8\) 11.\(\text{\&}ab1\) \(\text{\&}bd7\), Uceda – Hernandez del Can, Madrid 2002, 12.\(\text{\&}e1\pm\).

About 9...\(\text{\&}g4\) 10.\(\text{\&}d2\) a6 11.h3 – see 9...a6 10.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}g4\) 11.h3.

10.\(\text{\&}h4\)

10...\(\text{\&}b6\)

10...a6?! – This move compromises Black’s queenside and that is no doubt in favour of White. 11.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}e8\) 12.\(\text{\&}b1\) \(\text{\&}h7\) 13.b4\(\text{\&}f\) and White has a powerful initiative on the queenside. Black’s attempt to create some counterplay only leads to the appearance of additional weaknesses on the kingside as well: 13...\(\text{\&}xb4\) 14.\(\text{\&}xb4\) f5 15.\(\text{\&}xf5\) gxf5 16.\(\text{\&}h5\) \(\text{\&}d7\) 17.\(\text{\&}a4\) \(\text{\&}c7\) 18.\(\text{\&}b6\pm\) Boersma – Kerkhoff, Netherlands 1994.

10...g5 – This move makes the light-squares on Black’s kingside extremely vulnerable. 11.\(\text{\&}g3\) \(\text{\&}h5\) 12.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}f4\) (It is even worse for Black to play here: 12...\(\text{\&}xg3\) 13.\(\text{\&}xg3\) f5 14.\(\text{\&}xf5\) \(\text{\&}xf5\) 15.\(\text{\&}de4\) \(\text{\&}a6\), Starke – Zadlo, Leipzig 1995, 16.\(\text{\&}g4\pm\), because his defensive becomes tremendously difficult. His dark-squared bishop is “bad” and his light-squares on the kingside are very weak.) 13.\(\text{\&}g4\) a6 (or 13...\(\text{\&}a6\) 14.\(\text{\&}xc8\) \(\text{\&}xc8\) 15.\(\text{\&}a3\) \(\text{\&}c7\) 16.b4\(\pm\) Resano – Frotta, corr. 1996) 14.\(\text{\&}xc8\) \(\text{\&}xc8\) 15.\(\text{\&}e1\) \(\text{\&}d7\) 16.\(\text{\&}f1\) \(\text{\&}f6\) 17.\(\text{\&}e3\pm\) S. Marek – Kopacz, Presov 2002.

10...a5 – Black weakens the b5-square with that move. It restricts White’s play on the queenside indeed, but also helps him concentrate his forces for actions on the kingside, without being afraid of Black’s eventual counterplay connected with b7-b5. 11.\(\text{\&}e1\) \(\text{\&}a6\) 12.h3 \(\text{\&}c7\) 13.\(\text{\&}c2\) \(\text{\&}d7\) 14.\(\text{\&}g3\pm\) Cserna – B. Balogh, Kecskemet 1985.

10...\(\text{\&}c7\) 11.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}h7\) 12.a3 \(\text{\&}f6\) – The trade of the dark-squared bishops does not facilitate Black’s play much, since he has problems creating counterplay anyway. 13.\(\text{\&}xf6\) \(\text{\&}xf6\) 14.b4 \(\text{\&}bd7\) 15.\(\text{\&}b3\) a6 16.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}g7\) 17.\(\text{\&}e3\pm\) I. Farago – Garcia Martinez, Polanica Zdroj 1974.

Black has also tried in practice: 10...\(\text{\&}bd7\) 11.\(\text{\&}e1\) a6 (He cannot prevent the development of White’s queenside initiative with: 11...\(\text{\&}b6\) 12.\(\text{\&}d3\) \(\text{\&}h7\), Cristiani – Tomba, Venice 1997, 13.\(\text{\&}b1\pm\).

Black weakens the f5-square and it is quite dubious for him to try the risky line: 11...g5 12.\(\text{\&}g3\), because he has great problems to organize any counterplay, for example: 12...\(\text{\&}e8\) 13.\(\text{\&}c2\) \(\text{\&}f8\) 14.
\(\text{\textsection e3}^\pm\text{ Rachela - Mikrut, Presov 2001; or 12...\textsection h7, O'Donnell - Lewis, Detroit 1994, 13.\textsection c2; or 12...\textsection h8 13.\textsection c2 \textsection g8 14.\textsection e3 \textsection f8 15.a3 \textsection g6 16.b4± Podzielny - Krass, Dortmund 1992.) 12.\textsection b1 \textsection c7 (Or 12...\textsection b8 13.a3 \textsection c7 14.\textsection c2 \textsection h7, Tielemann - Schultz, Germany 1984, 15.\textsection d2 f5 16.exf5 gxf5 17.f4±) 13.\textsection d3 \textsection b8 (or 13...\textsection h7 14.b4 b6 15.bxc5 bxc5 16.\textsection a4± Iulachev - Baudys, Hlinsko 1993) 14.\textsection d2 b5 15.cxb5 axb5 16.b4 c4 17.\textsection b2 g5 18.\textsection g3± and White had an overwhelming advantage in connection with the unavoidable pawn-advance a2-a4, in the game Smiejkal - Zysk, Germany 1988.

11.\textsection b1

This move is with the idea for White to follow with \(\text{\textsection e1-d3}.\)

It is weaker for him to try 11.\textsection d2, because after that Black manages to organize a powerful defensive fortress in a very instructive fashion: 11...\textsection d7 12.\textsection b1 a5 13.a3 \textsection a6 14.\textsection c2 \textsection f8 15.\textsection b3 \textsection d8 16.\textsection b5 \textsection f8 17.\textsection c3 \textsection e8 18.f3 f5= Gligoric - Donner, Madrid 1960.

11...\textsection h5

\[12.\textsection e1 \textsection f4, Soltau - Burger, corr. 1975. It is worth for White to preserve his bishop in that position. 13.\textsection f3 \textsection a6 14.\textsection g3 f5 (or 14...g5 15.\textsection g4±) 15.exf5 \textsection xf5 (or 15...gx5? 16.\textsection xf4 exf4 17.\textsection d3±) 16.\textsection e4± and White has a slight, but stable advantage thanks to his dominance over the e4-outpost.

\]

\[j3) 8...a5\]

9.\textsection g5 h6

It is weaker for Black to follow with 9...\textsection a6, since after 10.\textsection d2!, White’s bishop has an access to the comfortable e3-square. 10...\textsection c5 (Or 10...\textsection d7 11.a3 h6 12.\textsection e3 cxd5 13.cxd5 \textsection e8, A.Szymanski - J.Zawadzka, Polanica Zdroj 2005, 14.\textsection c4±) 11.b3 \textsection c7, Convertito - Scacco, Vitinia 1996, 12.a3 and White's queenside initiative is becoming so powerful that Black has nothing to counter it with: 12...\textsection d7 13.b4±.

10.\textsection h4

White has no advantage whatsoever after: 10.\textsection xf6 \textsection xf6 11.dxc6 \textsection xh6 12.\textsection b5 \textsection d4 13.\textsection fxh4 exd4 14.\textsection d3 \textsection d7 15.\textsection a1 \textsection xb5 16.cxb5 \textsection e6 17.\textsection b1 \textsection f8 18.\textsection d3 d5= Ve-
5.d4 0-0 6.e2 e5 7.0-0

10...a6 11.d2

Now, Black has two possibilities, which lead to entirely different positions: j3a) 11...d7 and j3b) 11...c5.

His other tries are less reliable:

After: 11...cxd5 12.cxd5 d7 13.c4 e8 14.a4±, he has problems organizing any counterplay, Mory – Chagnaud, Auxerre 1996;
11...c7 12.a3 d7 13.c1 h7 14.h1 f5 15.f3 c5?! (It would have been better for Black to trade his "bad" bishop with 15...f6, although White maintains a slight advantage in that case too with: 16.xf6 xf6 17.exf6 gxf5 18.f4±, or 17...xf5 18.f4 exf4 19.xf4 a8 20.b3 c5 21.d4±) 16.b5 xb5 17.cxb5 b8 18.b6!± Indjic – Dena, St Ingbert 1989;
11...b6 12.b1 h7 13.h1 h5 (Black fails to exchange his dark-squared bishop under favourable circumstances after: 13...f6 14.g3 g5 15.a3 f5 16.exf5 xf5 17.de4± – because White dominates over the important e4-outpost, while Black’s knight on a6 is a sorry sight, so White enjoys a stable advantage, Bui Vinh – Nguyen, Vietnam 2001.) 14.e7 e8 15.xd6 cxd5 16.c5 xc5 17.xc5 xc5 18.xd5 d8 19.c1± and Black has a couple of bishops indeed, but it does not compensate his compromised queenside and the active white pieces, Ribli – Planinc, Ljubljana 1975;

If 11...c5, Winants – W.Watson, Wijk aan Zee 1987, then White should improve his position by transferring his knight on d2 to the d3-square with: 12.b3 d7 13.c1±.

j3a) 11...d7

Black leaves his knight on a6 for a while in order to avoid it being attacked with tempo. Still, now it is much easier for White to obtain a considerable advantage, because Black’s pieces remain quite passive.

12.b1 e8

12...b8?! 13.a3 c5 (It is hardly any better for Black to play: 13...g5?! 14.g3 c7 15.c2 fc8 16.dxc6 bxc6 17.a4±) 14.b5 b6 15.h1 b8 16.c2 h7 17.f3 c7 18.b4± S.Ershova – Kozlovskaya, Elista 1996.

12...b8 13.a3 cxd5, Dmitrovic – Janevska, Skopje 1998 and here White obtains a slight, but stable edge with the line: 14.xf6!? xf6 15.xd5 d8 (After 15...d8 16.b4±, Black’s pieces on the
queenside are deployed just miserably.) 16.b4±.

13.a3 â6c8 14.b4 axb4 15. axb4 g5

It is possibly better for Black to fortify his knight on the c5-square with: 15...c5 16.bxc5 âxc5, but that line weakens his queenside and White can exploit that by playing 17.âd6!+ and it would be rather risky for Black to try to win the exchange, since after: 17...âwd8!!? 18.âxd6! g5 19.âg3 âe8 20.âxd7 âxd7 21.âg4â5, White has an excellent compensation for it. He is totally dominant on the light squares and he has potentially tremendously dangerous passed pawns in the centre.

16.dxc6 bxc6 17.âg3 âc7 18.âb3± Lakić – Planinec, Ba-
nja Luka 1976. White has an overwhelming advantage on the queenside.

j3b) 11...âc5
(diagram)

That is probably Black’s most active method of countering White’s queenside initiative.
12.b3 cxd5

This is the most principled decision for Black, because he wishes to prove in this fashion that his chances on the queenside are not worse.

12...âc7?! – That is hardly the best position for his queen. 13.a3 âh7, Dmitrovic – Dierich, Caorle 1982 and here White’s standard plan for queenside actions provides him with better chances: 14.b4 âd7 (or 14...axb4 15.axb4 âxa1 16.âxa1 âa6 17.b5±) 15.dxc6 bxc6 16.b5±.

12...âe7?! – Black’s queen does not prevent the development of White’s initiative on the queenside on that square and it does not support Black’s counterplay either. 13.a3 g5 14.âg3 cxd5 15.cxd5 âd8 16.b4± Kratochvíl – V. Svoboda, Czech Republic 1996.

12...âe8?! – This move is not connected with any reasonable plan at all, Csizmadia – Murin, Hungary 1995, 13.a3 âb6 14.âb1±.

12...g5 13.âg3 cxd5 14.cxd5 âfxe4?! (Here, the best line for Black is: 14...âd7 15.a3 – see 12... cxd5. It is too passive for him to follow with: 14...âe8?! 15.f3 âd7 16.âf2 âc8 17.âc1± Loheac

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Amoun – Midjord, Skopje 1972.)
15...\text{dxe4} \text{xex4} 16...\text{dxe4} \text{f5} 17...\text{f3}
\text{fxe4} 18...\text{fxe4}\text{±}. Black has plenty of
weaknesses and his bishops are too passive, Lower – Cornwall,

12...\text{d7} – This is a very pur-
poseful move – Black is not in a
hurry to open the c-file and he
postpones that possibility for a
more appropriate moment. 13.a3
g5 (The other possible defensive
moves for Black are not any bet-
ner: 13...\text{b6} 14...\text{b1} \text{cxd5} 15...\text{cxd5}
\text{xc8} 16...\text{h1} \text{c7} 17...\text{e8} \text{b5}\text{±} Lyrberg –
Izhanov, Medelin 1996, or 14...\text{xc8}
15.b4 \text{axb4} 16.axb4 \text{a6}, Danner – Wittmann,
Moesern 1997, 17.c5!? ±; 13...\text{c8}
14.b4 \text{a6} 15.dxc6 bxc6, Ivanov –
Zlotnikov, New York 1994 and
here White could have destroyed
his opponent’s queenside com-
pletely with the line: 16...\text{b3}!
axb4 17.axb4 \text{xb4} 18...\text{xd6} \text{c2}
19...\text{a2}±; after 13...\text{a6} 14...\text{b1}
c5, Grinev – Semenov, Kiev
2004, the most energetic line for
White seems to be: 15...\text{b5}!? \text{b6}
16...\text{g3}†, with the idea to open
files in the centre, exploiting the
unfavourable placement of Black’s
pieces, which are stranded on
the queenside, for example: 16...
\text{e8} 17.f4 \text{exf4} 18...\text{xf4} \text{f5} 19...\text{xf5}
\text{g4}?! \text{xb1} 21...\text{xb1} g5
22...\text{g5}!± and White has good at-
tacking chances.) 14...\text{g3} \text{b6} (It
is worse for Black to play the risky
line: 14...b5?! 15.b4 axb4 16.axb4
\text{a4} 17...\text{xa4} bxa4 18.dxc6 \text{xc6}
19...\text{d3}±, because he will probably
lose soon his vulnerable a4-pawn,
Sbarra – Molinari, Genova 2001.)
15...\text{h1} \text{cxd5} 16...\text{d5} \text{fc8} (In
answer to: 16...\text{fxe4} 17...\text{exe4}
\text{xe4} 18...\text{f5}, Tonon – Bab-
ula, Imperia 1996, White obtains
a great advantage after: 19...\text{d2}!
f4 20...\text{c4} \text{c7} 21...\text{c1}±, or 20...
\text{a7} 21...\text{xd6} \text{fgx3} 22...\text{fgx3} \text{xf1+}
23...\text{xf1}±) 17...\text{c1} \text{e8} 18...\text{f3} \text{f8}
19...\text{f2} \text{d8} 20.a4 \text{g7} 21...\text{b5}±
and Black’s defence was extreme-
dly difficult, due to the vulnerabili-
ty of the light squares in his camp,
in the game Antoshin – Vasiukov,
Leningrad 1962.

13...\text{d5} \text{d7} 14.a3

14...\text{g5}

In answer to 14...\text{b8}, Danner –
Hermanek, Dortmund 1992, it
seems quite logical for White to
occupy additional space on the
queenside by repelling the active
black knight to the edge of the
board with: 15.b4 axb4 16.axb4
\text{a6} 17...\text{b3}±. Black cannot pre-
vent the development of his oppo-
nent’s queenside initiative with
the line: 14...\text{c8} 15...\text{c1} \text{b6}
16...\text{h1} g5 17...\text{g3} h5 18...\text{f3} \text{e8}
19.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}2}}} \textbf{\textit{\textcolor{blue}{h}6}} 20.b4 axb4 21.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{c}4}} \textbf{\textit{\textcolor{magenta}{d}8}} 22.axb4\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{\pm}}}, because his pieces have no coordination and his queenside is practically in ruins, Kaunas – Giterman, Riga 1968.

\textbf{15.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textit{g}3}}} \textbf{\textit{\textcolor{blue}{b}5}}} 16.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{b}4}} axb4 17.\textbf{\textit{axb4 \textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{a}4}}} 18.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{\textit{x}a}4}} bxa4}

It is evidently stronger for Black to continue with: 18...\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{xa}4}}!? 19.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{xa}4}} bxa4, Wikstrom – Westin, Stockholm 1994, although in that case after: 20.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{magenta}{c}2}} \textbf{\textit{\textcolor{magenta}{b}6}} 21.b5\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{\pm}}}, his defence is quite difficult, because even if he manages to exchange White’s passed pawns there, the weakness of the f5-square and the d6-pawn would not let him equalize.

\textbf{19.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{magenta}{b}1}}} \textbf{\textit{\textcolor{magenta}{b}6}}

Or 19...h5 20.f3 \textbf{\textit{\textcolor{blue}{h}6}} 21.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{c}4}} \textbf{\textit{\textcolor{blue}{b}5}} 22.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{a}2}} Soppe – Kizov, Istanbul 2000.

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\textbf{20.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{c}4}}} \textbf{\textit{\textcolor{magenta}{a}6}} 21.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{c}1}} \textbf{\textit{\textcolor{blue}{b}5}} 22.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{a}3}} \textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{f}c}8} 23.\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{a}c}3}\textbf{\textit{\textcolor{brown}{\pm}}}. White is clearly better in this position, because of the vulnerability of the light squares in Black’s camp, his “bad” dark-squared bishop and the weak d6-pawn, P.Horvath – Pesztericz, Balatonlelle 2004.

\textbf{Conclusion}

We have analyzed in this chapter Black’s attempts to avoid the main lines. Their basic drawback is the fact that White can easily obtain a clear advantage without doing anything extraordinary. He must just play logically in the centre and on the queenside and he is bound to reach a superior position in all variations. It is practically always useful for White to play the move \textbf{\textit{\textcolor{red}{\textit{g}5}}}, in order to provoke a weakening of the kingside of his opponent. He also prevents Black’s counterplay there in that fashion.
Part 4

1.\(\text{\&f3} \text{\&f6} 2.\text{c4 g6 3.\text{\&c3 \&g7} 4.e4 d6 5.d4 0-0} \text{6.g2 e5 7.0-0 \&bd7}\)

Black plays a useful developing move. Well, it has a certain drawback and it is that he covers the \(c8-h3\) diagonal for his lightsquared bishop on \(c8\). That can be very important in numerous variations.

8.\(\text{\&e3}!\)

This is a key prophylactic move as a part of White's plans. The point is that after Black increases his pressure in the centre (for example, along the e-file with the move – 8...\(\text{\&e8}\)), White can simply play \(d4-d5\) and in answer to the move \(\text{\&d7-c5}\), he will have the wonderful response – \(\text{\&f3-d2}\). There are two essential circumstances here: 1) White’s knight will not cover the \(c1-h6\) diagonal for the bishop; 2) after the move – \(\text{\&f3-d2}\), White’s queen and his bishop on \(e2\) will protect reliably the bishop on \(e3\), from the eventual attack of the black knight – \(\text{\&f6-g4}\).

There is also another possibility for White – he can exchange the d-pawns in the centre at some moment with \(d4xe5\), (for example, in case Black pushes his a-pawn one or two squares forward) in order to exploit the weakened dark squares for the penetration of his pieces on the queenseide. The bishop on \(e3\) will be very useful in that case too.

It is worth mentioning that White cannot provide a stable deployment of the bishop on \(e3\) with the move \(h2-h3\) (prior to the exchange of the d-pawns), because Black will trade then his e-pawn for his opponent’s d-pawn with \(e5xd4\). He will follow that with some pressure against the e4-pawn and that might lead to a serious compromising of the shelter of White’s king.

There are some other good moves deserving attention for White besides 8.\(\text{\&e3}\) (for example 8.\(\text{\&c2}\), or 8.\(\text{\&e1}\)), but I think that the bishop-move is the most purposeful of all.
Chapter 16  
1.\( \mathcal{D}f3 \) \( \mathcal{D}f6 \) 2.\( \mathcal{C}c4 \) \( \mathcal{G}g6 \) 3.\( \mathcal{C}c3 \) \( \mathcal{G}g7 \) 4.\( e4 \) \( d6 \) 5.\( \mathsf{d}4 \) 0-0 6.\( \mathsf{e}2 \) \( \mathsf{e}5 \) 7.0-0 \( \mathsf{bd}7 \) 8.\( \mathsf{e}3 \)

Now, Black has a great choice and the moves: 8...\( \mathsf{exd}4 \), 8...\( \mathsf{e}e8 \), 8...\( \mathsf{e}e7 \), 8...\( \mathsf{g}g4 \) and 8...\( \mathsf{c}6 \), will be analyzed in the next chapters. Here, we will deal with some seldom played alternatives and mostly with: a) 8...\( \mathsf{a}5 \) and b) 8...\( \mathsf{h}6 \).

He has also tried in practice:
8...\( \mathsf{h}8?! \) Pavlova – Manina, Vladimir 2004, that move is a loss of time and White can continue with the logical move – 9.\( \mathsf{w}c2 \pm \), after which Black can transpose to any other line, except that with a loss of a tempo.

8...\( \mathsf{h}5?! \) 9.\( \mathsf{wd}2 \) \( \mathsf{df}6 \), Laloi – Hagopian, Meudon 1992 and here White can emphasize the senselessness of Black’s set-up on the kingside with the move – 10.\( \mathsf{g}g5 \pm \).

After: 8...\( \mathsf{c}5?! \) 9.\( \mathsf{dxe}5 \) \( \mathsf{dxe}5 \), Karabakhtsian – Kosov, Serpukhov 2001, White is dominant on the open file and he leads in development. 10.\( \mathsf{wc}2 \) \( \mathsf{g}4 \) (There is no other reasonable plan for Black in sight.) 11.\( \mathsf{g}g5 \) \( f6 \) 12.\( \mathsf{d}d2 \) \( \mathsf{b}6 \) (12...\( \mathsf{f}5 \) 13.\( \mathsf{h}3 \) \( \mathsf{h}6 \) 14.\( \mathsf{g}g5 \) \( \mathsf{f}6 \) 15.\( \mathsf{fd}1 \) \( \mathsf{b}6 \) 16.\( \mathsf{d}d5 \) \( \mathsf{xd}5 \) 17.\( \mathsf{cx}d5 \pm \)) 13.\( \mathsf{h}3 \) \( \mathsf{h}6 \) 14.\( \mathsf{e}3 \) \( \mathsf{e}7 \) 15.\( \mathsf{a}4 \) \( a5 \) 16.\( \mathsf{wb}3 \pm \) – and that symmetrical pawn-structure does not provide Black with enough chances to equalize;

8...\( \mathsf{e}8?! \) – that move is too passive. 9.\( \mathsf{wd}2 \) \( f6 \) (It is even worse for Black to play: 9...\( \mathsf{f}5?! \) 10.\( \mathsf{exf}5 \) \( \mathsf{gxf}5 \) 11.\( \mathsf{dxe}5 \) \( \mathsf{dxe}5 \) 12.\( \mathsf{g}g5 \pm \) – because he is totally unprepared for opening of the game, Huber – Eu, Bayern 1995; it is not logical for Black to exchange pawns in the centre, because his previous move does not contribute to his active play: 9...\( \mathsf{exd}4?! \) 10.\( \mathsf{xd}4 \) \( \mathsf{df}6 \) 11.\( \mathsf{ad}1 \) \( \mathsf{g}4 \) 12.\( \mathsf{f}4 \pm \) Crouch – Lee, Coventry 2004; Black has problems creating counterplay after: 9...\( \mathsf{b}6 \) 10.\( \mathsf{ad}1 \) \( \mathsf{b}7 \) 11.\( \mathsf{fe}1 \) \( a5 \) 12.\( \mathsf{f}1 \) \( \mathsf{exd}4 \) 13.\( \mathsf{xd}4 \) \( \mathsf{ef}6 \) 14.\( \mathsf{g}5 \pm \) W.Schmidt – Pesko, Kosza-
lin 1997.) 10.c5 exd4 11...xd4 0e5, Filip – Kubicek, Luhacovice 1968, 12.0ad1 0e6 13.0e3±;

In answer to 8...0e8, Naumkin – Arbakov, Moscow 1988, White can transpose to the schemes that we analyze later: 9.0b5? 0d8 (Or 9...exd4 10.0fxd4 0d8 11.0c3 – see 8...exd4 9.0xd4.) 10.dxe5 0xe5 (It is not good for Black to play: 10...0xe4 11.exd6 cxd6 12.0d4±) 11.0d2 b6 (About 11...a6 12.0c3 – see 8...a6 9.dxe5 0xe5 10.0d2.) 12.0c2±;

8...a6 9.dxe5. Black has compromised a bit his queenside with his last move. White exploits immediately that circumstance. (It is premature for him to play 9.b4, because of: 9...exd4 10.0xd4 0xe8 11.f3 and here Black has: 11...c5 12.bxc5 0xc5±, with some counterplay.) 9...dxe5 10.b4 (Now, it seems quite reasonable for White to implement the plan starting with the move 10.0d2, which was tested in the game Shirov – Djeruus, Gausdal 1991 – see variation 8...a5. For example: 10...c6 11.c5 0e7, Korchagin – Kuusk, Tallinn 2003 and now White should continue with: 12.0a4 0d8 13.0c2±, after which the position of Black’s a-pawn becomes immaterial. 10...0g4 (Black cannot parry the development of White’s queenside initiative with: 10...b6 11.0c2 0b7 12.0fd1 0e7 13.0ab1 a5 14.a3 axb4 15.axb4 c6 16.0d2 0e8, G.Nikolic – Todorcevic, Tivat 1995, since White could have won his opponent’s b6-pawn with:: 17.0a4! 0a6 18.b5 cxb5 19.cxb5 0a8 20.0c4+-; Black cannot equalize with: 10...a5 11.a3 0c6, because of: 12.0d2 b6 13.c5 b5 14.0b3 a4 15.0a5± and White’s knight on a5 is causing a lot of trouble for Black, Todorcevic – Garcia Ilundain, Las Palmas 1993.) 11.0g5 f6 12.0d2 0h6 13.c5 c6 14.0b3+ 0h8 15.0ad1 0e7 16.0xh6 (White annihilates the potential defender of the d-pawn and he ensures the possibility to penetrate along the d-file.) 16...0xh6 17.0d6 a5 18.a3 axb4 19. axb4 0e8 20.0fd1 0f8. In the game Janjgava – Todorcevic, Genf 1991, White played the move – 21.b5± and he enlarged the scope of action of his pieces on the queenside even more.

8...b6 9.b4. White occupies additional space on the queenside. 9...exd4 (White maintains the advantage after his other possibilities too, for example: 9...a5 10.a3 axb4 11.axb4 0xa1 12.0xa1 exd4 13.0xd4 0b7 14.f3 c5 15.bxc5 dxc5 16.0db5 0e7 17.0a7± and his pieces are quite active. Black’s queenside is considerably compromised and he fails to seize the initiative on the kingside with the line: 10...0e8 11.d5 0g4 12.0d2 f5, Ringoir – Baekelandt, Bad Zwesten 2006, because of: 13.0b5 0d8 14.0g5 0df6 15.f3±. In case of 9...0b7, White can close the centre with 10.d5, because Black’s bishop is misplaced on the b7-square.)
The game might continue with: 10...\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}g4 \) 11.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}g5 \) f6 12.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}h4 \) 12.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}h6 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}d2 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}f7 \) 14.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}b3 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}h6 \) 15.a4\( \pm \), followed by a4-a5, while if 13...a5, then White plays: 14.a3 \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}f7 \) 15.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}b3 \)\( \pm \) with an advantage, or 13...g5 14.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}g3 \) f5 15.exf5 \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}xf5 \) 16.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}de4 \)\( \pm \) and White is dominant over the important e4-outpost.)

10.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}xd4 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}b7 \) 11.f3 a6 12.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}d2 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}e8 \) (White will counter 12...c5, with 13.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}c2 \), preserving his edge.) 13.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}fd1 \) c6, van Wely – Bosboom, Sonnevaneck 1992, White could have played here 14.b5!, because in case of 14...c5, he could have followed with: 15.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}c6 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}c8 \) 16.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}xd6 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}f8 \) 17.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}g3 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}xg6 \) 18.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}xc6 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}xc6 \) 19.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}d5 \)\( \pm \) with an obvious advantage for White.

**a) 8...a5**

Black prevents the possible advance of White’s queenside pawns and he prepares the c5-square for his knight on d7 after he exchanges his e-pawn for White’s d-pawn.

**9.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}dxe5!**

That is the only way for White to emphasize the drawbacks of his opponent’s move eight.

For example, in case of 9.d5, Black obtains a good game with: 9...\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}g4 \) 10.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}g5 \) f6 11.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}h4 \) h5, Gligoric – Geller, Moscow 1967. After: 9.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}c2 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}g4 \) 10.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}g5 \) f6 11.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}d2 \), he has the resource: 11...\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}exd4! \)

12.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}xd4 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}c5= \) Gelfand – McNab, Novi Sad 1990.  

**9...\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}xe5**

After 9...\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}xe5 \), Zack – Fehrn, corr. 1986, White plays simply 10.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}d4\).  

**10.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}d2**

White prevents the possibilities for Black \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}h5 \), or \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}g4 \) and he prepares the move 11.c5, followed by \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}c4 \).

**10...b6**

10...\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}e8 \) – That move is logical, but it is too slow and it is connected with the idea to transfer the knight to the e6-square. 11.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}c2 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}f8 \), Plachetka – J.Fernandez, Trnava 1980, after 12.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}ad1 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}e6 \) (Or 12...\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}g4 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}b3 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}h4 \) 14.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}xg4 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}xg4 \) 15.f3 \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}e6 \) 16.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}d5 \)\( \pm \) and White maintains a powerful positional pressure on the queenside and in the centre.) 13.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}f3 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}d7 \) 14.c5 c6 (It is a disaster for Black to play: 14...\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}f8? \) 15.c6 bxc6 16.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}xe5+\) 15.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}a4\)\( \pm \) and Black fails to exploit the weakness of the d4-square.

Following 10...c6, White continues with his standard plan to occupy the dark squares on the queenside: 11.c5! \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}e7 \) (About 11...\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}e8 \) 12.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}c4 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}e7 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}a4 \) – see 11...\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}e7 \) 12.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}a4 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}e8 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}c4\) ) 12.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}a4 \) \( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}d8 \) (After 12...\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}e8 \) 13.\( \text{\textit{\textsterling}}}c4 \), Black
has two essentially different possibilities – the active line – 13...
 f5 14.exf5 gxf5, Da Silva Filho – Rain, Email 2001, leads to a diffi-
cult position for him after: 15.f4
e4 16...d2\pm, or 15...c7 16...d2 e4
17...d6 \h8 18...c4\pm, it is some-
what better for him to try: 16...
\d5 17.fxe5 \xe3 18...xe3 \xe5
19...ab6\pm, but he loses his f5-
pawn; and the passive line – 13...
\c7 14...d6 \xd6 15.cxd6 \b5
16...cb6\pm, after which White's
powerful passed d6-pawn pro-
vides him with a stable advantage,
Roca – Podkrajsek, corr. 1995.)
13...c2 \e8 (or 13...f8 14...c4
\g4 15...ab6! \xe3 16...xe3\pm Shi-
rov) 14...c7, Cmiele – Burkard,
corr. 1989, and here White should
better complete his development
with: 15...d1 \e6 16...ab6 \xb6
(It is hardly any better for Black
to play: 16...b8 17...xc8 \bxc8
18...xa5 \xdxc5 19.b4\pm) 17...xb6
\xb8 (17...\xd1 18...xd1 \b8 19.
...d6 \xd6 20...cxd6\pm) 18...g4\pm
and the difference between the
activity of the pieces is quite visi-
table even to the naked eye...

Black's position remains worse
if he tries the plan with the trade
of the dark-squared bishops too:
10...e8 11...c5 \f6 12...d5 \g5
13...xg5 \xg5 14...f3 \d8 15...c1
\g7 16...c6 \xc6 17...xc6 \b7 18...c2
\e6 19...d2\pm – Black will have to
defend his pawn-weaknesses on
the queenside, Robatsch – Sigur-
jonsson, Munich 1979.

11...a4!

White must play energeti-
cally; otherwise Black will man-
age to consolidate his position,
for example: 11.a3 \b7 12.b4 \xb4
13...xb4 \e8 14...b3 and here the
move – 14...f8? should remind
White about the vulnerability of
his d4-square.

11...\b7 12...d1 \e7

Black cannot preserve the
existing pawn-structure with-
out compromising his position,
for example: 12...c6 13...c5! b5 14.
...xb5! cxb5 15...xb5 \a6 16...c6!
...b8 17...c5\pm, or 12...e8 13...b3
\e7 14...d5\pm (Shirov).

13...d5 \xd5 14...xd5 f5 15...f3!

The complications of the type:
15...ac1? f4 16...xc7 \xe3 17...xd7
\h4\infty (Shirov) are undesirable
for White.

15...\h8

Opening of the f-file is defi-
nitely in favour of White: 15...xe4
16...xe4 \f6 17...f1 \f7 18...f2 \af8
19...af1 \e8 20...b5 \e7 21...h3\pm

White's advantage is over-
whelming after: 15...c5 16...a3
\f7 17...ac1 \f8 18...xc5 \xc5
19...c4\pm (Shirov), but that was
possibly Black's best decision.
Chapter 16

16.\texttt{\textbar ac1}  \texttt{\textbar ac8}, Shirov – Djurhuus, Gausdal 1991. Here, it was quite strong for White to continue with the move – 17.\texttt{\textbar b4}! – recommended by Shirov, because the line: 17...\texttt{axb4} 18.\texttt{\textbar a7 a8} 19.\texttt{\textbar a6}+–, would force Black to lose material.

b) 8...\texttt{h6}

That is an insidious move – Black prepares \texttt{g4}, followed by \texttt{f7-f5}. Meanwhile, that attempt has some drawbacks too – at first it does not contribute to the development of Black’s pieces and secondly White can win a tempo in many lines by attacking the h6-pawn.

9.\texttt{dxe5}

Tournament practice has proved that the exchange here presents White with the best chances to obtain the advantage. Among his other tries, we have to mention only: 9.d5 \texttt{g4} 10.\texttt{d2 f5} 11.g3!, which was played for the first time in the game M.Pavlovic – I.Zaitsev, Protvino 1988.

9...\texttt{dxe5}

In case of the other possible capture – 9...\texttt{xex5}, White manages after: 10.\texttt{xex5 dxe5}, to change the pawn-structure in his favour with: 11.\texttt{c1 h7} 12.\texttt{d1 e7} 13.\texttt{d5 xd5} 14.cxd5 \texttt{d8} 15.\texttt{c4}+ Norri – Lehti, Finland 1991.

If Black plays 9...\texttt{g4}, with the idea to impede White’s planned set-up, then 10.\texttt{exd6}! (In case of 10.\texttt{d2}, Black gradually equalizes with: 10...\texttt{dxe5} 11.\texttt{xe5 dxe5} 12.h3 \texttt{f6} 13.\texttt{c1 h7} 14.\texttt{e3 e6} 15.\texttt{d1 d7} 16.\texttt{e5 e8} =; it is also good for him to follow with: 11...\texttt{xe5} 12.\texttt{xe3} \texttt{e6} =) 10...\texttt{xe3}, Khalifman – Yurtaev, Novosibirsk 1989 and White can capture another pawn – 11.\texttt{dxc7} and here after: 11...\texttt{xc7} 12.\texttt{xe3 xc3} (or 12...\texttt{c6} 13.\texttt{d5 xd5} 14.cxd5 \texttt{b6} 15.\texttt{d4}+) 13.\texttt{xc3 b6} (Or 13...\texttt{c5} 14.e5 \texttt{d8} 15.\texttt{e1} =; it seems purposeful for Black to try here: 13...\texttt{d5}, but he fails to complete his development in that case – 14.\texttt{xe5 xe5} 15.\texttt{d4 e8} 16.\texttt{ad1}! \texttt{e7} 18.\texttt{f3 e6} 19.e5 and White’s bishop goes to the d5-square; 16...\texttt{xe4} 17.\texttt{xe4 xe4} 18.\texttt{d8}+ \texttt{g7} 19.\texttt{f2}! and Black has no defence against \texttt{fd1}, followed by doubling of White’s rooks along the eighth rank.) 14.\texttt{d4 d8} 15.\texttt{f6}+, as well as after: 11...\texttt{g5}!? 12.\texttt{xe3 xe3}+ 13.\texttt{h1 xc3} 14.bxc3 \texttt{e8} 15.\texttt{d2 xe4} (or 15...\texttt{xd2}?! 16.\texttt{xd2 e5} 17.\texttt{fd1 e6}!? 18.\texttt{ab1 b6} 19.c5 \texttt{ec8} 20.\texttt{xb6}+! 16.\texttt{ae1} White maintains an overwhelming advantage.)
10. \textit{\underline{\text{c1}}}!

White disrupts in that fashion the coordination of Black's pieces and he prevents the maneuver - \(\triangle f6\)-h7-g5-e6.

White used to play before the move 10.\textit{\underline{\text{d2}}}, but on the contrary - it does not impede that maneuver of the black knight and after: \(10...\triangle h7\) 11.c5 \(\triangle g5\) 12. b4 \(\triangle e6\) 13.\textit{\underline{\text{b3}}} \(\triangle f4\), Black obtains a satisfactory game, Wells - Strauss, London 1984.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Diagram}
\end{array}
\]

Now, Black has two basic possibilities - \textit{\underline{\text{b1}}} 10...\textit{\underline{\text{g4}}} and \textit{\underline{\text{b2}}} 10...\textit{\underline{\text{h7}}}.

He plays sometimes the move 10...h5, but it does not have a separate importance, because after 11.h3, there arises a position from the variation: 10...\textit{\underline{\text{g4}}} 11.\textit{\underline{\text{d2}}} h5 12.h3 \(\triangle f6\) 13.\textit{\underline{\text{e3}}}, but two moves earlier.

\textit{\underline{\text{b1}}} 10...\textit{\underline{\text{g4}}} 11.\textit{\underline{\text{d2}}} h5

The move 11...\textit{\underline{\text{h7}}}, enables White to obtain an edge, by exploiting the vulnerable placement of Black's king: 12.\textit{\underline{\text{d1}}} (It is also possible for White to play immediately 12.\textit{\underline{\text{g5}}}+.) 12...c6 (I do not think that the line: 12...\textit{\underline{\text{g6}}} 13.c5!? \(\triangle e7\) is any better for Black - it is just terrible for him to follow with: 13...\textit{\underline{\text{xc5}}} 14.\textit{\underline{\text{hxh6}}} \(\triangle e7\) 15.\textit{\underline{\text{gxg7}}} \(\triangle xg7\) 16.\textit{\underline{\text{d5}}}! - 14. \(\triangle e3\) and here Black cannot play: 14...\textit{\underline{\text{xc5}}} 15.\textit{\underline{\text{d5}}} \(\triangle xd5\) 16.\textit{\underline{\text{xc5}}} \(\triangle f4\) 17.\textit{\underline{\text{b5}}}, because he has no compensation for the exchange at all.) 13.\textit{\underline{\text{g5}}}+! hxg5 14.\textit{\underline{\text{hxg4}}} \textit{\underline{\text{f6}}} (After 14...f6 15.\textit{\underline{\text{e3}}} \textit{\underline{\text{f7}}}, in the game Bohak - Monostori, corr. 1997, White could have continued with 16.\textit{\underline{\text{c2}}}±, followed by doubling of his rooks and his position would have been superior.) 15.\textit{\underline{\text{a4}}} \(\triangle e7\) 16.a3 \(\triangle d8\) 17.\textit{\underline{\text{b4}}} \(\textit{\underline{\text{e8}}}\) (If 17...c5, then White establishes his knight on the d5-outpost after: 18.\textit{\underline{\text{d2}}} \textit{\underline{\text{f8}}} 19.\textit{\underline{\text{xc8}}} \textit{\underline{\text{axc8}}} 20. \textit{\underline{\text{c3}}}±) 18. \textit{\underline{\text{e3}}} \textit{\underline{\text{e7}}} 19.\textit{\underline{\text{xe7}}} \(\textit{\underline{\text{xc7}}}\) 20.\textit{\underline{\text{d3}}}! and here White settles the issue with the pin: 20...\textit{\underline{\text{g7}}} 21.\textit{\underline{\text{d6}}} \textit{\underline{\text{f8}}} 22.\textit{\underline{\text{d2}}} \textit{\underline{\text{xd6}}} 23. \textit{\underline{\text{xd6}}} \textit{\underline{\text{e7}}} 24.\textit{\underline{\text{ad1}}}+- and his position was winning in the game Berebora - Brigljevic, Medulin 1997.

12.\textit{\underline{\text{h3}}}

That move is more precise than 12.\textit{\underline{\text{ad1}}}, since Black can counter that with: 12...c6 13.h3 \(\textit{\underline{\text{g6}}}\) 14.b4 a5 15.a3 and here in the game Magerramov - Foigel, corr. 1988, Black had to defend with: 15...\textit{\underline{\text{e7}}} 16.c5 \textit{\underline{\text{d8}}} 17.\textit{\underline{\text{e3}}} \textit{\underline{\text{f8}}} 18.\textit{\underline{\text{d2}}} \textit{\underline{\text{e6}}}±, reminding White about the weakness of his d4-square.

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12...\textit{Ag}f6 13.\textit{Ac}3 c6 14.c5 \textit{We}7

It is hardly better for Black to try 14...\textit{De}8, Jelen – Mazi, Bled 2001, because the simplest line for White is to continue with: 15.\textit{Ed}1 \textit{Cc}7 16.\textit{Cc}4! (He should not let Black’s knight occupy the e6-square.) 16...\textit{We}7 17.\textit{Ed}6 \textit{Df}6 (White was threatening 18.\textit{Exg}6.) 18.\textit{Wd}2± and Black has problems to complete his development.

15.b4 \textit{Wh}7

16.\textit{Cc}4 (White prevents the pawn-advance f7-f5.) 16...\textit{Wh}8 17.\textit{Dg}5! White impedes again Black’s counterplay. (It is weaker for White to play 17.\textit{Ed}1, because of: 17...f5 18.\textit{Ch}6 f4 19.\textit{Dxg}7+ \textit{Hxg}7\infty) 17...\textit{Dxg}5 18.\textit{Dxg}5 f6 19.\textit{De}3 \textit{Ed}8 (It is too risky for Black to opt for 19...f5, due to: 20.\textit{Dg}5 \textit{Df}6 21.\textit{Dxf}6+ \textit{Dxf}6 22.\textit{Wg}5± and White has a great advantage.) 20.\textit{Ed}1 \textit{Df}8 21.\textit{Dxd}8 \textit{Wxd}8 22.\textit{Wh}1± and White’s prospects were clearly superior in the game Belov – Stricovic, Pula 1989.

b2) 10...\textit{Wh}7 11.\textit{Ed}1

11...\textit{Dg}8

Black cannot equalize after his other possibilities either:

11...\textit{We}7 12.\textit{Dd}5 (It is also good for White to play 12.c5!??, since Black has hardly anything better than: 12...c6 13.\textit{Dd}4 \textit{Dg}8, transposing to the variation 11...\textit{Dg}8.) 13.\textit{Dxd}5 cxd5 and White maintains a stable edge thanks to the vulnerability of his opponent’s backward c7-pawn.

11...\textit{Dg}8, M. Andersson – Holving, Sweden 1996 – Black prepares with this move, just like in the case with 11...\textit{Dg}8, the pawn-advance f7-f5, but that can only be dangerous for him, because of his considerable lag in development. The move is not so purposeful either, from the point of view of positional play, because the knight cannot be redeployed to the d4-square in the long run. White can continue playing in the standard fashion – 12.c5 \textit{Dg}7 13.\textit{Wc}2 c6 (It is tremendously risky for Black to try: 13...f5 14.\textit{exf}5 \textit{gxf}5 15.\textit{Cc}4±) 14.\textit{Dd}2 f5 15.f3 (The situation is rather unclear after: 15.\textit{exf}5 \textit{Dxf}5?) 15...f4 16.\textit{Df}2± – and White’s knight goes to the
d6-square via c4, while Black’s actions on the kingside are harmless for White;

11...\textit{d}e8 12.\textit{d}d2 c6 (It is premature for Black to play: 12...f5 13.exf5 – White enjoys a much better development, therefore opening of the game would be favourable for him, for example: 13...gxf5 14.\textit{w}c2 e4 15. f3! exf3 16.\textit{d}xf3 \textit{w}f6 17.\textit{d}d4 ±, or 14...\textit{h}h8 15.\textit{f}f3 e4 16.\textit{d}d4 \textit{w}h4 17.\textit{d}d5± and Black’s hanging pawn-centre has been blocked and it is a liability in his position.) 13.c5 \textit{w}e7 14.b4 \textit{c}c7 – Black is trying to transfer his knight to the d4-square. (It is weaker for him to play: 14...\textit{d}d6 15.f3 \textit{h}h5 16.\textit{c}c4 \textit{f}f4 17.\textit{f}f1 h5 18.\textit{e}e2 \textit{xe}2 19.\textit{x}e2 \textit{c}c7 20. \textit{g}g5! f6 21.\textit{e}e3 – White’s pressure along the d-file is very powerful and Black has nothing to counter it with, because of the weakness of the d6-square, Komarov – Golubovic, Jesolo 1999.) 15.\textit{c}c4 \textit{e}e6 16.\textit{d}d6 a5! Garcia Vasquez – J.Garcia, Huacho 2004. White preserves some edge, by playing: 17.a3 \textit{d}d4 18.\textit{w}b2 \textit{xe}2+ (Otherwise, White’s bishop will go to c4 and Black cannot do much with only one knight in the centre.) 19.\textit{xe}2 \textit{f}6 (It is unfavourable for Black to open the a-file now, or on the previous moves as well, because only White can exploit it effectively.) 20.\textit{a}a4!±.

12.b4

White can try to save a tempo and continue playing without the move – 12.b4: 12.c5! \textit{w}e7 (It is too passive for Black to resist indifferently with: 12...c6 13.\textit{d}d2 \textit{w}e7 14.\textit{c}c4±) 13.\textit{b}b5!? (It is worse for White to follow with: 13.\textit{d}d5 \textit{xd}5 14.\textit{c}xd5 f5 15.c6 \textit{b}b6 16.\textit{c}c5 \textit{w}f7, since Black has a good counterplay on the kingside, Seel – Khismatullin, Oropesa del Mar, 2001; it is dubious for White to continue with: 13.\textit{d}d2?! \textit{xc}5 14.\textit{d}d5? (The position is equal after 14.\textit{b}b5.) 14...\textit{xd}5 15.\textit{ex}d5 (but not 15.\textit{c}c5 \textit{f}4!) and White’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient, Nyback – Polivanov, Chalkidiki 2003.) 13...\textit{f}8 14.c6 b6 15.\textit{w}c2. Here, I believe that White’s position is preferable, but that line is hardly better than the standard – 12.b4.

12...c6

Black would not solve his problems with the line: 12...a5 13.b5 b6 14.c5 bxc5 15.\textit{xc}5 \textit{b}b7 16.\textit{c}c2± and White has the edge.

13.c5 \textit{w}e7 14.\textit{d}d2 \textit{f}8

In case of 14...a5, White plays: 15.a3 axb4 16.axb4 \textit{xa}1 17.\textit{x}a1 \textit{f}8 18.f3 \textit{e}6 19.\textit{b}3± and he will be dominant on the a-file, having covered the d4-square.
15.f3!

It is weaker for White to play 15.\( \text{Cc4} \), because of: 15...\( \text{g4} \) 16.\( \text{d2} \) (or 16.\( \text{xg4} \) \( \text{g4} \) 17.f3 \( \text{e6} \) 18.\( \text{d6} \) \( \text{ed8} \) 19.b5 \( \text{cxb5} \) 20.\( \text{cxb5} \) \( \text{d7=\#} \) 16...\( \text{h4} \) 17.h3? Gruenberg – Wirius, Austria 1999, 17...\( \text{xf2} \) (After: 17...\( \text{xf2} \) 18.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{xh3} \)+ 19.\( \text{gxh3} \) \( \text{h3} \) 20.\( \text{d3} \) \( \text{e6} \) 21.\( \text{d6} \), White's extra piece is clearly stronger than Black's three pawns.) 18.\( \text{h1} \) \( \text{f6} \). It looks like White has a good compensation for the sacrificed pawn, but he cannot achieve anything real, for example: 19.\( \text{d6} \) \( \text{e7} \) 20.\( \text{e1} \) \( \text{g5} \) 21.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{h4}= \).

15...\( \text{e6} \) 16.\( \text{b3} \) \( \text{h5} \) 17.\( \text{c2} \)

\( \text{h4} \) 18.\( \text{f1} \) \( \text{g5} \)

\( \text{b5} \). White increases the scope of action of his pieces in that fashion. 19...\( \text{h5} \) 20.\( \text{bxc6} \) \( \text{bxc6} \) 21.\( \text{a5} \) \( \text{c7} \) 22.\( \text{a4} \) and White had the advantage in the game Chuchelov – Kristensen, Eupen 1997.

Conclusion

The basic drawback of the move 8...a5 is that Black weakens the dark squares on the queenside. White can exploit that with an energetic play in the centre and on the queenside.

In the variation with an early move h7-h6, White should better reduce the tension in the centre (dxe5) and then win a tempo by attacking his opponent's h6-pawn with the move \( \text{c1} \). Later, he can combine his queenside actions with some pressure along the d-file and that provides him with a comfortable advantage. It is quite effective for him to bring his knight on f3 to the queenside in numerous lines. It is worth mentioning here that Black's counterplay on the kingside, connected with the pawn-advance f7-f5, is not so dangerous for White, because he has a considerably better development and he is quite well prepared for opening of the game in the centre.
Chapter 17

1. \( \text{df}3 \) \( \text{df}6 \) 2. \( \text{c}4 \) \( \text{g}6 \) 3. \( \text{dc}3 \) \( \text{dg}7 \) 4. \( \text{e}4 \) \( \text{d}6 \) 5. \( \text{d}4 \) 0–0 6. \( \text{de}2 \) \( \text{e}5 \) 7. 0–0 \( \text{dbd}7 \) 8. \( \text{de}3 \) exd4

We will analyze similar positions, in which Black exchanges his e-pawn for White’s d-pawn in Chapters 1–4 (Book 1b). The inclusion of the moves 7...\( \text{dbd}7 \) and 8.\( \text{de}3 \), however, introduces some new elements in the situation.

9. \( \text{dx}d4 \)

Now, the main lines for Black are: a) 9...\( \text{dc}5 \) and b) 9...\( \text{e}8 \).

We have to mention that Black has plenty of acceptable alternatives in the arising positions. Some of them lead to transpositions and quite original situations arise after some other of them. In principle, Black has two basic plans: 1) He can exert pressure against White’s e4-pawn trying to break his opponent’s centre with d6-d5; 2) He can wait – that is he develops his pieces without trying to do anything active. From the point of view of the fight for equality – the second method provides less promising prospects, since White has a considerable space advantage, which guarantees him a comfortable edge in calm positions. Black can hardly create any serious threats on either side of the board.

It is a mistake for Black to play: 9...c5 10.\( \text{db}5 \), since he cannot protect his d6-pawn, as well as: 9...b6 10.\( \text{c}6! \) \( \text{we}8 \) 11.\( \text{b}5 \) \( \text{e}5 \) (or 11...\( \text{c}5 \) 12.\( \text{cxa}7 \) \( \text{we}5 \) 13. \( \text{d}4 \) \( \text{we}7 \) 14.\( \text{xc}8 \) \( \text{axc}8 \) 15.f3) 12. \( \text{cxa}7 \) \( \text{we}7 \) 13.\( \text{xc}8 \) \( \text{fxc}8 \) 14.f3 and White remains with a solid extra pawn.

The move 9...a6, Pieterse – Bosboom, Rotterdam 1990 is not necessary in that system, because Black cannot play on the queenside. White continues in a standard fashion – 10.\( \text{wd}2 \), followed by \( \text{ad}1 \) and \( \text{fe}1 \), while Black must somehow develop his pieces, transposing to one of the systems, which we will analyze later, except that he will be a tempo down.

The move 9...c6 after 10.\( \text{wd}2 \)
will most probably lead to a transposition (for example: 10...\textit{c}c5 11.f3 – see variation a, 10...\textit{e}e8 11.f3 – see variation b), but Black has tried in practice two lines, which have separate importance:

10...d5, Lu Yang – Bereza, Internet 2004, it is difficult to believe that Black can equalize like that. The simple line: 11.exd5 \textit{cxd5} 12.\textit{cxd5} \textit{b}b6 13.\textit{e}f3 \textit{fxd5} 14.\textit{xd5} \textit{xd5} 15.\textit{g}g5 \textit{wb}6 16.\textit{ad}1 \textit{c}7 17.\textit{f}e1± leads to a serious pressure for White against his opponent’s position. The fact that it is symmetrical is not so important, because Black lags considerably in development;

10...\textit{we}7 11.f3 \textit{d}8 (The immediate move d6-d5 would not work here: 11...\textit{db}6 12.\textit{ad}1 d5 13.\textit{cxd5} \textit{cxd5} 14.\textit{b}b3 \textit{e}8, De Matos – Pagliilla, Buenos Aires 1995, 15.\textit{xb}6! \textit{axb}6 16.\textit{b}5 \textit{d}8 17.exd5 \textit{wd}6 18.\textit{f}e1± – and Black has no compensation for the pawn.) 12.\textit{ad}1 \textit{f}8 (Black again cannot play 12...\textit{b}6 in view of: 13.c5! \textit{bd}7 14.\textit{xd6} \textit{xd6} 15.f4 \textit{w}7 16.e5 \textit{e}8 17.\textit{f}3 \textit{c}7 18.\textit{x}c6 bxc6 19.\textit{x}c6 \textit{f}8 20.\textit{xd}8 \textit{xd}8 21.\textit{e}4±) 13.\textit{f}e1 \textit{e}6 (Black would not equalize with: 13...d5 14.exd5 \textit{cxd5} 15.c5±. Meanwhile White can prevent the move d6-d5, by playing 13.\textit{c}2.) 14.c2± As you are going to see later – Black’s position is rather unpleasant.

a) 9...\textit{c}c5

This looks like a very dubious move. Black exerts some pressure against White’s e4-pawn indeed, but his possibilities are considerably reduced now, in comparison to 9...\textit{e}8.

10.f3

Black will hardly manage to break in the centre, because the placement of his knight on c5 is not so helpful for the advance – d6-d5, after the preliminary c7-c6.

Here, Black usually chooses \textbf{a1}) 10...c6 or \textbf{a2}) 10...a5.

His other possibilities are:

10...\textit{d}7 11.\textit{wd}2 \textit{e}8, Schrader – Ohnmaacht, Email 2002, 12.\textit{ad}1 \textit{e}6 14.\textit{c}2±;

10...b6 11.\textit{wd}2 \textit{b}7 12.\textit{ad}1 \textit{e}8, Hilton – Mishnaevsky, Email 2000, 13.\textit{f}e1 \textit{e}6 14.\textit{c}2±;

10...h6 11.\textit{wd}2 \textit{h}7 12.\textit{ad}1 a5, Estremera – Gutierrez, Seville 2004 and now, White could have played 13.\textit{db}5, transposing to the variation 10...a5 11.\textit{db}5 in an even more favourable situation;

10...\textit{e}6 11.\textit{wd}2 \textit{e}8 12.\textit{ad}1 \textit{d}7 13.\textit{h}1 (13.\textit{c}2±) 13...a6 14.\textit{f}e1 \textit{h}5 15.\textit{xe}6 \textit{xe}6 16.\textit{d}5 \textit{f}6 17.\textit{f}4 \textit{d}7 18.\textit{xe}6 fxe6 19.

The move 10...a6 was tried in the game Maleychik – Kvatkovsky, Dnepropetrovsk 2001. White obtained an overwhelming advantage by playing: 11.b4 ∆e6 12. WIDTH=15.8⌋c1 c6 13. WIDTH=21.8⌋d2 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋e7 14. WIDTH=15.8⌋fd1 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋d8 15. ∆b3 b5 16. WIDTH=21.8⌋c2 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋b7 17. WIDTH=15.8⌋c5 dxc5 18. ∆xc5 ∆xc5 19. ∆xc5. Still, I am not sure that the line chosen by White is better than the standard set-up connected with: 11. WIDTH=21.8⌋d2 and 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋ad1, because the move 10...a6 is not improving Black’s position at all.

About 10...e8 11.b4 – see 9...e8 10.f3 ∆c5 11.b4.

a1) 10...c6

That is a risky move, because White exerts an immediate pressure against the d6-pawn.

11. WIDTH=21.8⌋d2 a5

About 11...e8 – see 9...e8.

Black is not out of the woods after: 11...e7 12.20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋ad1 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋e8 13.20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋fe1± – and White has a clear positional advantage, Koniuashkov – Aleksandrov, Novorossijsk 1996.

11...∆e6 12. ∆c2 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋e7 13. ∆ad1 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋d8, Pilipenko – Y. Savchenko, Mariupol 2003, 14. 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋fe1 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋h5 15. 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋f1 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋e5 16.g3± Black has already played all available active moves, but it remains rather unclear what he should do next. White can easily improve his position and he has active possibilities all over the whole board.

11...∆h5, Prado – Saralegui, Uruguay 2002, 12. 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋ad1 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋h4 (Otherwise Black’s move 11...∆h5 will turn out to be useless.) 13. 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋f2± Black’s activity has evaporated, since now it is bad for him to play: 13...e5 14.g4! and White is much better prepared for the future fight.

12. ∆ad1

That is the most natural move for White and it is also the best – he exerts pressure against Black’s d6-pawn and he believes that his rooks belong to the d1 and e1 squares.

12...∆fd7

That is practically forced for Black. White is already threatening 13. ∆xc6+– and retreating of the queen is not better at all, for example: 12...e7 13. ∆b3! 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋xb3 14. ∆xd6 ∆xd6 15. ∆xd6 a4 16.axb3 axb3 17. ∆d1 and Black has no compensation for the pawn.

13. ∆b3 ∆e5

14. ∆xc5 dxc5 (or 14... ∆xc5 15. ∆xc5 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋h4 16.f4 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋xc3 17. 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋xd6 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋g7, Strauss – Rogers, USA 1992, 18. 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋f2! 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋h6 19. 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋d4+-) 15.f4 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋c7 (or 15... 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋g7 16. ∆xc5+-) 16. 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋g4 f5 (or 16...f6 17. 20.HEIGHT=15.8⌋xd8 ∆xd8 18.
\[ \text{\textit{Chapter 17}} \]

\[ \text{\textit{\$xd8+ \$xd8 19.\$xc8 \$xc8 20. e5+-)) 17.exf5 gxf5 18.\$h3 \$f6 19.\$fe1+ and White's advantage is beyond any doubt.}} \]

\[ a2) 10...a5 \]

11.\$db5!

Now, White does not allow his opponent to play c7-c6.

It is worth mentioning that the objective evaluation of the position is on the level of \( \pm \), but the tendency is quite clearly in favour of increasing White's advantage, because Black is cramped and his defensive task is tremendously difficult.

11...b6

The other lines for Black would not change the character of the position:

11...\$e7 12.\$d2 b6 (or 12...\$e6, Gozzoli – Sanchez, Creon 2002, 13.\$fe1 with the idea to follow with \( \$d5\pm \)) 13.\$g5 \$b7 14.\$d5 \$xd5 15.cxd5 \$fc8 16.\$ac1\pm and White had a great positional advantage in the game Donaldson – Cartagena, San Fransisco 1996;

11...\$a6 12.\$d2 \$e8 13.\$ad1 \$e6 14.\$fe1\pm Black has no space and no active counterplay whatsoever. White will play \$d5 sooner or later and he will force Black to exchange on d5. After that he will have problems defending his queenside;

Following: 11...\$fd7 12.\$d2 \$e8 13.\$ad1 b6 14.\$fe1 \$a6 15.\$f1 \$e5 16.\$g5 f6 17.\$h4 \$b7 18.b3 \$d7 19.\$d5 c6 20.\$xb6 \$d8 21. \$xa8 cxb5 22.\$xd6 \$xd6 23. \$xd6, White had a winning position in the game Werle – Aliev, Baku 2002.

After 11...\$e6, White should not force the issue immediately: 12.e5 \$e8 13.exd6 cxd6 14.\$xd6?! (14.\$d2\pm) \$xd6 15.\$xd6 \$xd6 16.\$xc5 \$fd8, because Black obtains an excellent compensation for the pawn, Sosa – Carnevali, Piripolis 1987. The standard reaction: 12.\$d2 \$e8 13.\$ad1 \$fd7 14.b3, provides him with a comfortable edge.

12.\$d2 \$b7

Black cannot change much with 12...\$a6, because it is not good for him to capture on b5 anyway.

13.\$fe1 \$e8 14.\$d5 \$c8 15. \$ad1 \$e6
Here, White obtained a decisive advantage with: 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{d}xc7!}} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{e}c7}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{x}b6}} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{w}b8}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{x}c7}} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{x}c7}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{x}d6}} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{e}8}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{c}5+}}--Tratar – Ciglic, Ljubljana 1996.

b) 9...\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{e}8}} 10.\textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{f}3}}

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

10...\textbf{\texttt{\textup{c}6}}

That is the main line for Black, since he prepares the freeing move – 10...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{d}6-\textup{d}5}}.

The other defensive lines for him are:

It is not good for him to try: 10...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{e}5}} 11.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{w}d2}} and here 11...\textit{\texttt{\textup{c}6}}. Of course, White can simply transpose to variation \textbf{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{b}2}}, but he is not obliged to remove his knight, because Black is not threatening \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{d}6-\textup{d}5}} right now. For example the game Khmelnitski – Belenov, Bor 2000, continued with: 12.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{e}ad1}} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{w}e7}} 13.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{f}e1}} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{w}f8}} 14.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{f}1}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{e}6}} 15.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{x}e6}} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{x}e6}} 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{h}1}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{b}6}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{d}8}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{c}2}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textup{h}6}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textup{f}4+}};

10...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{h}6}} – That move is rather questionable. White is playing in the centre, while Black is doing what... It did not look like a serious plan for him what he played in the game A.David – Schunk, corr. 1993, 11.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{w}d2}} 12.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{h}7}} 12.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{e}d1}} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{g}8?!}}; The simplest way for White to counter 10...\textit{\texttt{\textup{a}5}} is to play: 11.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{d}b5+}} Adasmi – Maciejewski, Poland 1973, analogously to the variation 9...\textit{\texttt{\textup{c}5}} 10.\textit{\texttt{\textup{f}3}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{a}5}}, maintaining a considerable advantage;

The line: 10...\textit{\texttt{\textup{f}8}} 11.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{w}d2}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{e}6}}, was tested in the game Saglam – Walter, Neuwied 1993. After: 12.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{c}2?!}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{b}6}} 13.\textit{\texttt{\textup{b}4}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{a}5}} 14.\textit{\texttt{a3}} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{b}7}} 15.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{a}b1}} \textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{e}7}} 16.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{f}d1}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{e}d8}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash \textup{d}5}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{d}5}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textup{x}d5}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textup{f}8}} 19.\textit{\texttt{\textup{d}4}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{a}xb4}} 20.\textit{\texttt{\textup{a}xb4}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{e}8}} 21.\textit{\texttt{\textup{b}5}} White’s advantage is doubtless;

10...\textit{\texttt{\textup{a}6}} – The purpose of that move is far from clear, because Black is not playing on the queenside, is he? In fact, that move often turns out to be just a loss of time, for example: 11.\textit{\texttt{\textup{w}d2}} 12.\textit{\texttt{\textup{c}5}} 12.\textit{\texttt{\textup{e}d1}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{e}6}} 13.\textit{\texttt{\textup{c}2}} and in the game Rees – Fejzullahu, Saint Vincent 2005, there arose a position, analogous to the variation 10...\textit{\texttt{\textup{f}8}}, but with an extra tempo for White;

10...\textit{\texttt{\textup{c}5}} 11.\textit{\texttt{\textup{w}d2}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{a}5}} (about 11...\textit{\texttt{\textup{e}6}} – see 10...\textit{\texttt{\textup{f}8}}) 12.\textit{\texttt{\textup{d}b5}}! That is the simplest reaction for him, since he plays analogously to well-familiar examples (see variation \textbf{\texttt{\textup{a}2}}). Black’s position is simply cramped. 12...\textit{\texttt{\textup{b}6}} 13.\textit{\texttt{\textup{f}d1}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{w}7}} 14.\textit{\texttt{\textup{a}b1}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{b}7}} 15.\textit{\texttt{\textup{g}5}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{e}c8}} 16.\textit{\texttt{\textup{d}5}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{x}d5}} 17.\textit{\texttt{\textup{c}xd5}} \textit{\texttt{\textup{f}8}} 18.\textit{\texttt{\textup{c}3+}} Sass – Mischke, Voelklingen 2001;

10...\textit{\texttt{\textup{b}6}} – Black’s knight is not well-placed on the b6-square, but the only justification of that move is the preparation of the pawn-ad-
vance d6-d5. After the standard line: 11.\texttt{\textbackslash w}d2 c6 (In the game Lassila – Viinamaki, Tampere, 1992, Black refrained from the preparation of d6-d5 and after: 11...\texttt{\textbackslash d}h5 12.\texttt{\textbackslash f}fd1 \texttt{\textbackslash w}e7 13.\texttt{\textbackslash f}f2 \texttt{\textbackslash e}5 14.g3 \texttt{\textbackslash g}7 15.\texttt{\textbackslash d}b5 \texttt{\textbackslash e}6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash d}d5 \texttt{\textbackslash x}d5 17.\texttt{\textbackslash c}xd5 a6 18.\texttt{\textbackslash d}d4 \texttt{\textbackslash w}d7 19.\texttt{\textbackslash a}c1\pm his position remained clearly inferior.) 12.\texttt{\textbackslash e}ad1 (It is also possible for White to play 12.\texttt{\textbackslash c}c2 – see 10...c6 11.\texttt{\textbackslash c}c2 \texttt{\textbackslash b}6 12.\texttt{\textbackslash w}d2.) 12...d5 13.\texttt{\textbackslash c}xd5 (White can play in a calmer fashion: 13.\texttt{\textbackslash b}3!? \texttt{\textbackslash e}6 14.\texttt{\textbackslash c}xd5 cxd5 15.\texttt{\textbackslash b}5 \texttt{\textbackslash c}4 16.\texttt{\textbackslash c}xc4 dxc4, Pirc – Tot, Zagreb 1946, 17.\texttt{\textbackslash c}c5 \texttt{\textbackslash w}e7 18.\texttt{\textbackslash d}d6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}d6 19.\texttt{\textbackslash x}d6 \texttt{\textbackslash f}f8 20.\texttt{\textbackslash e}d2 b6 21.\texttt{\textbackslash x}xe6 \texttt{\textbackslash b}x\texttt{\textbackslash x}e6 22.\texttt{\textbackslash f}fd1 a6 23.g4! – and White has good chances to win that endgame, because of his active pieces and the control over the only open file.) 13...\texttt{\textbackslash c}xd5 14.\texttt{\textbackslash g}5! \texttt{\textbackslash w}d6 (The alternative – 14...\texttt{\textbackslash d}xe4 is not any good either: 15.fxe4 \texttt{\textbackslash w}d6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash c}b5 \texttt{\textbackslash b}7 17.\texttt{\textbackslash f}f2 \texttt{\textbackslash g}4 18.\texttt{\textbackslash w}xf7+ \texttt{\textbackslash h}8 19.\texttt{\textbackslash w}x\texttt{\textbackslash g}7+ \texttt{\textbackslash x}g7 20.\texttt{\textbackslash b}5+ \texttt{\textbackslash x}f5 21.\texttt{\textbackslash x}d6 \texttt{\textbackslash b}x\texttt{\textbackslash x}b5 22.\texttt{\textbackslash c}xb5 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e4 23.\texttt{\textbackslash h}3 \texttt{\textbackslash e}3 24.\texttt{\textbackslash c}xe3 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e3 25.\texttt{\textbackslash d}d4 and White should convert his extra pawn into a full point; It is also possible for Black to play: 17...\texttt{\textbackslash x}e4 18.\texttt{\textbackslash x}e4 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e4 19.\texttt{\textbackslash w}xf7+ \texttt{\textbackslash h}8 20.\texttt{\textbackslash f}f5 \texttt{\textbackslash c}5+ 21.\texttt{\textbackslash x}e3 \texttt{\textbackslash f}8 22.\texttt{\textbackslash x}f8+ \texttt{\textbackslash x}f8 23.\texttt{\textbackslash x}d7 \texttt{\textbackslash g}5f5 24.\texttt{\textbackslash c}5 \texttt{\textbackslash a}8 25.\texttt{\textbackslash x}f5 \texttt{\textbackslash e}2 26.\texttt{\textbackslash f}2 \texttt{\textbackslash x}b2 27.\texttt{\textbackslash x}e4! but his position remains very difficult.) 15.\texttt{\textbackslash d}b5 \texttt{\textbackslash c}5+ 16.\texttt{\textbackslash w}e3 \texttt{\textbackslash c}6 (The endgame after: 16...\texttt{\textbackslash x}e3+ 17.\texttt{\textbackslash x}e3 dxe4 18.\texttt{\textbackslash c}c7 \texttt{\textbackslash x}f3 19.\texttt{\textbackslash x}f3 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e3 20.\texttt{\textbackslash d}8+ \texttt{\textbackslash f}8 21.\texttt{\textbackslash x}a8 \texttt{\textbackslash e}8 22.\texttt{\textbackslash x}e8 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e8 23.\texttt{\textbackslash x}b6 \texttt{\textbackslash c}5+ 24.\texttt{\textbackslash h}1 \texttt{\textbackslash x}b6 is hopeless for Black.) 17.\texttt{\textbackslash w}f2! (That is an important moment. White should not be in a hurry to win material: 17.\texttt{\textbackslash x}a7?! \texttt{\textbackslash x}a7 18.\texttt{\textbackslash b}5 \texttt{\textbackslash e}6 19.\texttt{\textbackslash x}e8 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e8 20.\texttt{\textbackslash x}d5 \texttt{\textbackslash x}e3+ 21.\texttt{\textbackslash x}e3 \texttt{\textbackslash e}6 22.\texttt{\textbackslash f}e1 \texttt{\textbackslash x}c3 23.\texttt{\textbackslash b}xc3 \texttt{\textbackslash d}c4 and his advantage has decreased.) 17...a6 (17...\texttt{\textbackslash d}7 18.\texttt{\textbackslash x}f6 \texttt{\textbackslash x}f6 19.\texttt{\textbackslash c}7 d4 20.\texttt{\textbackslash b}5+-) 18.\texttt{\textbackslash e}3! \texttt{\textbackslash b}d7 19.\texttt{\textbackslash x}d5 \texttt{\textbackslash x}d5 20.\texttt{\textbackslash x}d5 \texttt{\textbackslash x}b5 21.\texttt{\textbackslash x}b5++. 11.\texttt{\textbackslash w}d2

That is a natural, but very important move – White would not mind the immediate opening of the centre after d6-d5, believing that his better development and his dominance in the centre should provide him with superior chances.

![Diagram](image_url)

We will now analyze in details: b1) 11...\texttt{\textbackslash e}7 and b2) 11...d5.

After 11...\texttt{\textbackslash e}5 12.\texttt{\textbackslash a}d1, there arises variation b from Chapter 3, Book 1b (i.e. 7...\texttt{\textbackslash d}d4 8.\texttt{\textbackslash d}x\texttt{\textbackslash d}4 \texttt{\textbackslash e}8 9.f3 \texttt{\textbackslash d}c6 10.\texttt{\textbackslash c}3 \texttt{\textbackslash e}5 11.\texttt{\textbackslash d}2 c6 12.\texttt{\textbackslash a}d1)

Black has also tried here:
About 11...\texttt{\textbackslash e}5 12.\texttt{\textbackslash a}d1 – see
7...exd4 8.\(\text{Q}\)xd4 \(\text{Q}e8\) 9.f3 \(\text{Q}c6\) 10.\(\text{Q}e3\) \(\text{Q}e5\) 11.\(\text{B}\)d2 \(\text{c6}\) 12.\(\text{B}\)ad1;

11...\(\text{Q}c5!\) 12.b4 \(\text{Q}e6\) 13.\(\text{Q}b3\) \(\text{Q}c7\) 14.\(\text{Q}ac1\)± Black’s possibilities for counterplay have diminished after the transfer of the knight to the e6-square, Caruana – Konate, Thessaloniki 1988;

11...a6?! – This move seems to be a loss of a tempo. 12.\(\text{B}\)ad1 \(\text{Q}e5\) 13.b4 \(\text{Q}e7\) 14.\(\text{Q}c2\) \(\text{Q}e6\) 15.c5± Gal-\(\text{Q}rardo\) Garcia – Vallespir Salort, Cala Mendia 2001;

11...\(\text{Q}f8\) 12.\(\text{Q}c2\) \(\text{Q}c7\) 13.\(\text{B}\)ad1± Now, Black has problems finding a reasonable plan, so he decides to try to break through in the centre. 13...d5?! 14.\(\text{Q}xd5\) \(\text{Q}xd5\) 15.\(\text{Q}xd5\) \(\text{Q}f5\), Weisbrod – Poetzh, Heim-\(\text{B}\)bach Weis 1997 and here the simplest line for White is: 16.d6 \(\text{Q}e5\) 17.\(\text{Q}f2\)± and his position is close to winning;

11...a5 12.\(\text{B}\)ad1 a4 (After 12...\(\text{Q}f8\), Ippoliti – Garcia, Buenos Aires 1989, 13.\(\text{Q}c2\), Black has hardly anything better than: 13...a4 14.b4 – see 12...a4.) 13.\(\text{Q}c2\) \(\text{Q}f8\) (In answer to 13...\(\text{Q}e6\), Kozul – Todorovev, Ljubljana/Portoroz 1989, White can start his queenside offensive with: 14.b4 axb3 15.axb3 \(\text{Q}c7\) 16.b4± and Black can hardly obtain any counterplay.), Kozul – Todorovev, Yugoslavia 1989 and now White would have an overwhelming advantage after the standard reaction: 14.b4 axb3 15.axb3±;

11...\(\text{Q}c7\) 12.\(\text{Q}c2\) a5 (or 12...\(\text{Q}f8\) 13.\(\text{B}\)ad1) 13.\(\text{B}\)ad1 \(\text{Q}f8\) 14.b3 \(\text{Q}c5\) (In the game Zavgorodniy – Alexikov, Nikolaev 2001, Black played unconvincingly: 14...h5 15.\(\text{Q}h1\) \(\text{Q}h7\) 16.\(\text{Q}g5\) \(\text{Q}g8\) 17.\(\text{B}\)fe1±) 15.\(\text{Q}h1\) \(\text{Q}h5\) 16.g4± and White was better, Suares – Palermo, Buenos Aires 1959;

11...\(\text{Q}f8\) 12.\(\text{Q}c2\) a6 13.\(\text{B}\)b3 \(\text{Q}c5\) 14.\(\text{B}\)ad1 \(\text{Q}d7\) 15.\(\text{B}\)h1 \(\text{Q}f6\) 16.\(\text{B}\)fe1 \(\text{Q}e6\) 17.f4 \(\text{Q}ec5\) 18.\(\text{B}\)f3 \(\text{Q}g7\) 19.\(\text{B}\)d4 \(\text{Q}h6\) 20.g3 \(\text{Q}e7\) 21.\(\text{B}\)e3 \(\text{Q}f8\) 22.\(\text{B}\)g4± with a superior position for White, van Wely – Todorovev, Las Palmas 1993. It looks like the idea for Black to protect his d6-pawn with \(\text{Q}f8\) cannot equalize for him;

After 11...\(\text{Q}b6\) 12.\(\text{Q}c2\) \(\text{Q}e6\) 13.\(\text{B}\)b3, there arises a very interesting situation – on one hand Black has prepared d6-d5 (Otherwise it is not clear what his knight is doing on b6...), while on the other hand the change in the pawn-structure is favourable for White, for example: 13...d5 (It is not reasonable for Black to refrain from d6-d5 – 13...\(\text{Q}c7\) 14.\(\text{Q}ac1\) \(\text{Q}ad8\) 15.\(\text{B}\)fd1 \(\text{Q}c8\) 16.\(\text{B}\)g5 \(\text{Q}b6\)± 17.\(\text{B}\)h1 \(\text{Q}e7\) 18.\(\text{B}\)d4 \(\text{Q}h8\) 19.\(\text{B}\)e3 \(\text{Q}c7\) 20.\(\text{B}\)d5! \(\text{Q}b8\) 21.\(\text{Q}xe6\) \(\text{Q}xe6\) 22.\(\text{Q}xe7\) \(\text{Q}xe7\) 23.e5+- Crispino – Pavoni, corr. 1985. Naturally, Black’s play is not to be imitated; nevertheless he is bound to remain without counterplay without d6-d5; about 13...\(\text{Q}e7\) – see 11...\(\text{Q}e7\) 14.exd5 \(\text{Q}xd5\) 15.c5 \(\text{Q}bd7\) 16.\(\text{B}\)ad1 (After: 16.\(\text{B}\)b5 d4!? Arteaga – Gulbrand- sen, Siegen 1970, White obviously has nothing better than: 17.\(\text{Q}xd4\)
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\( \text{\#xc5 18.\text{\#ac1 \#d5 19.\text{\#f2 \#f8 20.\text{\#fd1 a6 21.\text{\#c3 \#f6 22.\text{\#xe6 \#xc3 23.\text{\#xc3 \#xc3 24.\text{\#xc3 \#xe6 24.\text{\#f1+ with some chances to materialize his two bishop-advantage.}) 16...\#e7 17.b4 a5 18.a3.}}}}}} \)

b1) 11...\#e7

That move is obviously weaker than 11...\#e5.

12.\#c2

Now, Black has problems with the defence of his d6-pawn.

12...\#b6

We have already mentioned that Black's knight is not well placed on the b6-square.

It is not easy to tell what Black's best choice is in that position (maybe 12...\#e5 13.\#ad1 – see variation b, from Chapter 3, Book 1b.). White is better in all the lines:

12...a5 – This move is difficult to understand. After: 13.\#ad1 \#f8 14.\#fe1+ White has a comfortable advantage without any counterplay for Black, Muse – Hannebauer, Berlin 1993;

In case of 12...\#h5, Borbjerjgaard – Ka.Hansen, Denmark 1994, the simplest reaction for White is: 13.g4 \#hf6 14.\#ad1 \#f8 15.\#fe1 and Black is again without counter chances.

13.\#ad1 \#e6 14.b3 \#ad8

After 14...\#fd7 15.\#fe1+ Black has difficulties organizing counterplay. In the game Albrecht – Sauermann, corr. 1998, after: 15.\#ac8 16.\#d4 \#f8 17.a4! \#cd8 18.a5 \#c8 19.\#d5!± White's advantage was considerable.

15.\#fe1 d5

Black must push d6-d5 in this position.

16.exd5 cxd5 17.c5 \#bd7

18.\#b5! That is an interesting maneuver. The fight is focused on the dark squares in the centre; therefore White's light-squared bishop is weaker than his opponent's knight. 19.\#f8 19.\#xd7 \#xd7 20.\#d4 \#c8 21.b4+ – Black's position is very difficult indeed, still he was not supposed to lose it in just several moves: 21...\#h5 22.g4! \#f6 23.\#h6 \#e8 24.\#xg7 \#xg7 25.\#xe6 1-0 Kolev – H.Gonzalez, Aviles 1991.

b2) 11...d5

\[
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\]
That is the most principled move for Black, but it is not the best. White leads in development and he is perfectly prepared for opening of the game in the centre.

12.exd5 cxd5

12...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}6}?! – This is an interesting idea, Bjühr – Berglund, corr. 1970 and here it is not good for White to follow with: 13.dxc6? \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{xe}}}3 14.\textcolor{green}{{\textit{xe}}}3 \textcolor{red}{\textbf{g}4}+, because Black ends up with two pieces for a rook; however the cold-blooded response – 13.b3! creates great problems for Black: 13...cxd5 14.c5 \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{e}}7} 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}2} \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{bd}}7} (After: 15...\textcolor{blue}{{\textit{xc}}}5 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}5} \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{f}}8} 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xg}}7 \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{xg}}7} 18.\textcolor{green}{{\textit{d}4}±} White’s powerful dark-squared bishop more than compensates the sacrificed pawn.) 16.\textcolor{blue}{{\textit{ae}}}1 a6 (Now, it is again too risky for Black to go after winning material: 16...\textcolor{blue}{{\textit{xc}}}5 17.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}5} \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{b}}4} 18.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xg}}7 \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{xg}}7} 19.\textcolor{green}{{\textit{d}4}±} 17.b4± Black has lost a couple of tempi for the maneuver with his knight and White has a great space advantage and a superior development.

13.\textcolor{green}{{\textit{db}}5}!

The move 13...\textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}6}?! – loses two tempi. 14.c5 \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{bd}}7} 15.\textcolor{blue}{{\textit{ad}}1} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}8} 16.b4± Rzepecki – Wojnar, corr. 1996.

13.\textcolor{blue}{{\textit{f}}8} 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{f}4} \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{h}5} (After: 14...dxc4 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}7} \textcolor{blue}{\textit{c}5}+ 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}1} \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{e}}3} 17.\textcolor{blue}{{\textit{xe}}}3 \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{xc}}7} 18.\textcolor{green}{{\textit{d}4}±} White has a full compensation for the pawn, thanks to his dark-squared bishop and his plan includes opening of the game after \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{ac}}1}, followed by b3.) 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}7} (In answer to the greedy move – 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{c}7}, Tatai – De Barnot, Las Palmas 1977, Black has the powerful argument 15...g5!\textcolor{red}{{\textit{e}2}}) 15...c5+ 16.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{h}1} \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{h}4} 17.g4! – Black’s temporary activity on the kingside has reached its dead end, due to his lag in development and White obtains the advantage with an energetic play. 17...a6 (It is worse for Black to try: 17...\textcolor{blue}{{\textit{ae}}}3 18.\textcolor{blue}{{\textit{xe}}}1 \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{xe}}}1 19.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{axe}}1±) 18.gxh5 axb5 19.hxg6 hxg6 20.cxd5± Black’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient.

13...a6 – This move is of course possible, but still it seems a bit illogical. Black loses a tempo, having presented White with the two bishop-advantage and a pawn, which Black must still regain. 14.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{d}6} \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{e}6} 15.\textcolor{red}{\textbf{xc}}8 \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{xc}}8} 16.cxd5 \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{e}}8}, Bernholdsson – Lindfeldt, Stockholm 1994 and here after: 17.\textcolor{blue}{{\textit{fe}}1} \textcolor{red}{\textbf{b}6} 18.d6 \textcolor{blue}{{\textit{c}}6} 19.\textcolor{blue}{{\textit{ad}}1±} Black has good chances to regain his pawn, but White’s couple of bishops provides him with a stable advantage.
14.\textit{\textbf{d6}} f8

After: 14...\textit{\textbf{xe3}} 15.\textit{\textbf{xe3}} b6 16.\textit{\textbf{ad1}}± Black fails to obtain a sufficient compensation for the exchange. His position is rather unpleasant too after: 14...\textit{\textbf{e7}} 15.\textit{\textbf{xc4}} b6 16.\textit{\textbf{d6}}±.

15.\textit{\textbf{xc4}} e7, Drazic – Lazic, Skopje 1998 and now White should complete his development, while Black has great problems in doing the same: 16.\textit{\textbf{ad1}} e5 (Or 16...\textit{\textbf{e8}} 17.\textit{\textbf{fe1}} f8 18.\textit{\textbf{f1}} e6 19.\textit{\textbf{h6}}± and White is clearly better, because of his dominance over the central files.) 17.\textit{\textbf{d6}} e8 18.\textit{\textbf{xe7}} \textit{\textbf{xe7}} 19.\textit{\textbf{c5}} e6 20.\textit{\textbf{f4}} ed7 21.\textit{\textbf{b4}} e4 22.\textit{\textbf{f3}} and White’s superior development provides him with a long-lasting initiative, for example: 22...\textit{\textbf{xc3}} 23.bxc3 f8 24.\textit{\textbf{d6}}±, or 22...\textit{\textbf{f8}} 23.a3 \textit{\textbf{xb4}} 24.axb4 \textit{\textbf{ef6}} 25.\textit{\textbf{b5}}±.

Conclusion

We have analyzed in this chapter the variation with the exchange on d4. Still, the inclusion of the moves \textit{\textbf{e3}} and \textit{\textbf{bd7}}, in comparison to the variation with 7...\textit{\textbf{exd4}}, does not bring any dividends to Black.

For example, after 9...\textit{\textbf{c5}}, White maintains the advantage without any problems deploying his pieces according to well-familiar schemes: \textit{\textbf{d2}}, \textit{\textbf{ad1}} and \textit{\textbf{fe1}}.

Black’s most principled approach is to organize maximally quickly d6-d5, but even then he can hardly equalize, because White’s pieces are excellently prepared for actions in the centre.

The only way Black can have some chances for equality is to prepare the pawn-break in the centre (d6-d5), meanwhile White still maintains some advantage by following with exd5 and c5.
Chapter 18

1.\( \text{\&f3} \) 2.\( \text{\&f6} \) 2.\( \text{c4} \) g6 3.\( \text{\&c3} \) \( \text{\&g7} \) 4.\( \text{e4} \) d6
5.\( \text{d4} \) 0–0 6.\( \text{\&e2} \) e5 7.0–0 \( \text{\&bd7} \)
8.\( \text{\&e3} \) \( \text{\&e8} \)

Black is trying to increase the pressure against his opponent’s e4-pawn.

9.\( \text{d5} \)

White closes the centre, having in mind that Black’s rook has abandoned the f-file and it cannot support actively the undermining move – f7-f5.

We will analyze now a) 9...\( \text{\&c5} \), b) 9...\( \text{\&h5} \) and c) 9...\( \text{\&g4} \).

Black has also tried in practice:

9...\( \text{\&f8}?! \) 10.\( \text{\&d2} \) \( \text{\&e8} \) (White’s queenside initiative develops rather quickly after: 10...\( \text{\&h8} \) 11.\( \text{b4} \) \( \text{\&e8} \) 12.\( \text{c5\pm} \) Kleeschaetzky – H.Urban, Germany 1995.) 11.\( \text{b4} \) f5 (It is not better for Black to defend with 11...a5, Brond – Stella, Mar del Plata 1967, 12.a3 f5 13.f3

f4 14.\( \text{\&f2\pm} \) 12.f3 f4 (Black would hardly change anything with: 12...\( \text{\&e7} \) 13.\( \text{\&c1} \) f4 14.\( \text{\&f2\pm} \) – White is obviously ahead of his opponent in his queenside actions. 14...\( \text{\&ef6?! \) 15.\( \text{\&b5} \) \( \text{\&b6} \) 16.\( \text{c5\pm} \) – Sheldon – Jilemnicka, Paris 1994.) 13.\( \text{\&f2} \) g5 14.\( \text{c5} \) \( \text{\&d6} \) 15.\( \text{\&c4\pm} \) Nguyen Thai Binh – Nguyen Sy Hung, Tan Binh 2000;

9...\( \text{\&b6?! \) – This move is a loss of two tempi, Oud – Haug, Dresden 2006, 10.\( \text{\&d2} \) a5 (or 10...\( \text{c5} \) 11.a3 a5 12.f4\( \pm \); 10...\( \text{\&d7} \) 11.\( \text{b4\pm} \)) 11.a3\( \pm \) and White will follow unavoidably with b2-b4 and later c4-c5;

9...\( \text{\&f8?! \) – That move impedes Black’s subsequent counterplay. 10.\( \text{\&d2} \) \( \text{\&d7?! \) 11.\( \text{c5} \) a6 12.\( \text{cxd6} \) cxd6, Etemadi – Asgari, Fajr 1993, 13.\( \text{\&c4\pm} \);

9...a6?! – Black compromises his queenside with that move. 10.\( \text{\&d2} \) h6 (The other possibilities for Black are even worse: 10...\( \text{\&f8} \) 11.\( \text{b4} \) a5 12.a3 h6 13.\( \text{c5} \) axb4 14.axb4 \( \text{\&xa1} \) 15.\( \text{\&xa1\pm} \) Veskov – Calapso, Bari 1971; 10...\( \text{\&b8} \) 11.\( \text{b4} \) b6 12.\( \text{\&c2} \) \( \text{\&b7} \) 13.\( \text{\&b3\pm} \) Llanos – Koblinc, Mar del Plata 1992.)

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11.b4 c5 12.dxc6 bxc6 13.\(\text{\&}b3 \text{\&}f8\) 14.a3± Malek – Lauer, Germany 2002 and Black’s central pawns are very weak and he has no counterplay;

9...b6?! 10.\(\text{\&}d2 \text{\&}b7\) (about 10...a5 11.a3 – see 9...a5) 11.b4 c6 12.dxc6 \(\text{\&}xc6\) 13.f3 \(\text{\&}b7\) 14.\(\text{\&}b3\)±. Black has no active play at all and his d6-pawn is vulnerable, Kodentsov – Wu Sai Wah, Soest 1999;

9...h6?! 10.\(\text{\&}d2\) a5 (In case of 10...g5?! – Black fails to organize anything active on the kingside, because his f5-square is very weak. 11.b4 \(\text{\&}f8\) 12.c5 \(\text{\&}e7\) 13.\(\text{\&}c4 \text{\&}e8\) 14.\(\text{\&}g4\)± Rezan – Vujcic, Croatia 2001; 10...\(\text{\&}h7\) 11.b4 \(\text{\&}f8\) 12.c5 dxc5 13.bxc5 \(\text{\&}e8\) 14.\(\text{\&}c4\)± Seiler – Luft, Greifswald 2003; White’s queenside initiative is so powerful that he maintains considerably better chances after Black’s other possibilities too: 10...\(\text{\&}h7\) 11.b4 f5 12.f3 \(\text{\&}f8\) 13.\(\text{\&}b3 \text{\&}df6\) 14.c5± van den Berg – Masic, Wijk aan Zee 1971; 10...c6 11.b4 a5 12.a3 \(\text{\&}c7\) 13.\(\text{\&}b3\) c5 14.\(\text{\&}b5\)± Cornea – Hein, Timisoara 1995.) 11.a3 \(\text{\&}h7\) 12.\(\text{\&}c2 \text{\&}f8\) 13.b4 f5 14.f3 f4 15.\(\text{\&}f2\) g5 (15...\(\text{\&}df6\) 16.c5± J.Horvath – Sevo, Rabac 2003) 16.c5±. Black has occupied some space on the kingside indeed, but he has no time to organize an attack, because he has to parry White’s queenside threats, I.Farago – Gerer, Aschach 1994;

9...a5?! – This move impedes temporarily White’s queenside expansion, but it weakens the b6 and b5-squares and that is in favour of White. 10.\(\text{\&}d2\) b6 (About 10...h6 11.a3 – see 9...h6; 10...\(\text{\&}c5\) 11.a3 – see 9...\(\text{\&}c5\); Black has no counterplay after: 10...h5 11.a3 \(\text{\&}f8\) 12.f3 \(\text{\&}h7\), Singer – Ebner, Austria 1995, 13.b4 h4 14.c5±; White is evidently ahead of his opponent after: 10...\(\text{\&}f8\) 11.a3 \(\text{\&}e8\) 12.\(\text{\&}a4\) f5 13.f3 f4 14.\(\text{\&}f2\) g5 15.c5± Bets – Lomakina, Serpukhov 2003.) 11.a3 \(\text{\&}f8\) (about 11...\(\text{\&}c5\) 12.b4 – see 9...\(\text{\&}c5\)) 12.b4 \(\text{\&}e8\) 13.\(\text{\&}b3\)±. The development of White’s queenside initiative has been facilitated by the advance of Black’s pawns there, Sinkovics – Klemancic, Sarospatak 1995.

\textbf{a) 9...\(\text{\&}c5\)?!}

This rather dubious line is quite popular. Still, Black fails to fortify his knight on that good square and that means that he loses two tempi in the process.

10.\(\text{\&}d2\)

White has placed his pieces in the ideal fashion.

10...a5 11.a3 \(\text{\&}d7\)
Black's other possibilities would not equalize for him either:


11...b6 12.b4 Qb7 (Or 12...Qc7 13.Qa4 Qe7 14.c5 bxc5 15.bxc5 dxc5 16.Qc2 Qf8 17.Qc1± Tiilikainen – Blessing, corr. 1997.) 13.Qb3 Qe7 (13...h5 14.f3 Nh7 15.c5 bxc5 16.bxc5 Qxc5 17.Qxc5 dxc5 18.Qxc5± Kleeschaetzky – Rossman, Germany 1995.) 14.Qc2 h6 15.Qb5 Qxe4 16.Qxe4 Qf5 17.Qf3 e4 18.Qg3± and in connection with the unfortunate placement of Black’s knight on b7, White's light pieces are obviously stronger than his opponent’s rook, Lopez Garcia – Guetas Sanchez, Zaragoza 2003;

11...a6 12.Qb1 c5 13.f4 Qd7 (After 13...exf4 14.Qxf4 Qe7 15.Qb5 Qd8 16.Qe1 Qe8 17.Qg3± Black’s pieces are terribly mis-placed, therefore he can hardly exploit the e5-square.) 14.f5 Qf6 15.fgx6 hxg6 16.Qf3 Qg7, C.Lopes – Correia, Bobadela 2002 and here after: 17.Qxe1 Nh8 18.Qg3+ White doubles his rooks unavoidably on the f-file and his kingside attack is very powerful;

11...a4!? – This pawn-sacrifice is interesting, but it is still insufficient. 12.Qxc5 dxc5 13.Qxa4 b6 14.Qc3 Nh6 (It is not any better for Black to play 14...Qf8 15.b4± – he has no compensation for the pawn and his subsequent exchange-sacrifice led to a hopeless position for him after: 15.Qxa3! 16.Qxa3 cxb4 17.Qb3 bxc3 18.Qxc3 Qh6 19.Qf3+– Azmaiparashvili – Vallina, Oviedo 1992.) 15.Qe1 Qf8, Jansson – Olsson, Nassjo 1970 and here the simplest line for White to achieve an overwhelming advantage is: 16.Qc2 Qe8 17. b4 Qe7 18.bxc5 Qxc5 19.Qb3 Qe7 20.a4± – he has an extra pawn and a powerful initiative on the queenside.

12.b4 axb4 13.axb4 Nxa1

In answer to 13...Qa6, Prudnikova – Richtrova, Igalo 1994, it is strong for White to continue simply with: 14.c5 Qxb4 (or 14...dxc5 15.bxc5 Qc8 16.Qb5±) 15.Qxa8 Qxa8 16.cxd6 cxd6 17. Qc4 Qb8 18.Qb3 Qa6 19.Qb6 Qf8 20.Qb1±, since he regains his pawn, preserving his advantage thanks to the great activity of his pieces.

14.Qxa1 Qa6
15.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{e}a5} \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{g}4}, Laiho – Mustonen, corr. 1986, 16.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}xg4} \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}xg4} 17.\texttt{c}c5 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{c}8} (After 17...\texttt{dxc}5 18.\texttt{bxc}5±, White’s edge is obvious.) 18.\texttt{c}c6 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{b}6} 19.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}b}5 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}5} (Black’s attempt to create some counterplay is already too late.) 20.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{a}a1}! \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}4} 21.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}xb6!} \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{c}xb6} 22.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}xa6} \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}xa6} 23.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}xa6}+ – and Black can hardly cope with his opponent’s c6-pawn without losing material.

b) 9...\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{h}h5}

10.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{g}3}

It is also interesting for White to try 10.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{e}e1}, for example: 10...\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}8}. The main idea of that move is to free the g7-square for the knight and it will support from there the pawn-advance f7-f5, as well as to place the bishop on e7 in order to activate it, or even ex-

change it with \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{e}7-g5}. (Black fails to create any serious threats on the kingside with: 10...\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}f}4 11.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}f}1 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}f6} 12.\texttt{h}3 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{h}h5} 13.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{h}h}2 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{d}d}7 14.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{g}g}1 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}f6} 15.\texttt{c}5 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{e}e}8 16.\texttt{cxd}6 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{c}xd}6 17.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{c}c}1 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{e}e}8 18.\texttt{g}3 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{h}h}5, Rubel – Koester, Frankfurt 2004, because here White can consolidate his advantage by playing: 19.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{b}b}5 a6 20.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{a}a7±, depriving his opponent of his vital light-squared bishop.) 11.\texttt{b}4 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{g}7} 12.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{d}d}2 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}5} (Or 12...\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{e}e}7 13.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{b}b}3 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{g}5} 14.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}xg}5 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}g}5 15.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{c}c}1 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{e}e}7 16.\texttt{c}5 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}f}6, Kirusha – Iskus

nyh, St Petersburg 2001, 17.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{b}b}5? \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}xe}4 18.\texttt{cxd}6 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{c}xd}6 19.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{c}c}7 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}f}5 20.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{c}xa8} \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}xa8} 21.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{d}f}3±; 17...\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{d}c}5 18.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{b}xc}5 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}xe}4 19.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}f}3 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}f}6 20.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{d}d}6 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{c}xd}6 21.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{c}c}d6 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}f}8 22.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{c}c}7±; 17...\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{d}d}8 18.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{h}e}3 a6 19.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{\textcolor{blue}{a}a}3} \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{h}h}5 20.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{c}c}4±) 13.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}3} \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{e}7} 14.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{b}b}3 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{g}5}, Thorfinnson – Nevednichy, Calvia 2004 (White is much ahead of his opponent after: 14...\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{h}h}4 15.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}f}1 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}4} 16.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}f}2 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{xf}2}+ 17.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}xf}2 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{e}e}7 18.\texttt{c}5±, although he should not underestimate Black’s counterplay on the kingside, Caravan – Zhadko, Eforsie Nord 1998.) 15.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}g}5 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}g}5 16.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{d}d}2± – Black has traded his dark-squared bishop indeed, but the rest of his pieces are rather passive. 16...\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}xd}2 (After 16...\texttt{f}4 17.\texttt{c}5±, or 16...\texttt{h}4 17.\texttt{c}5†, White’s pieces are perfectly prepared for queenside actions, while Black has not even completed his development yet.) 17.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{x}xd}2 a6 18.\texttt{\textcolor{blue}{d}d}3 \texttt{\textcolor{blue}{f}f}6 19.\texttt{c}5± – and White develops his queenside initiative at leisure, without any risk of being check-
mated in that endgame.

10...\f8

We have already seen the idea behind that maneuver (see the notes to White's move 10).

The following line leads only to a transposition of moves: 10...\f6 11...\e1 \g7 12...\d2 \e7 13...\d3.

10...b6?! 11...\e1 \d6f6 12...\d3 \h3 13...\e1±.

10...h6 11.b4 \f5, Pantelis – Darmarakis, Athens 1996, 12.exf5 a5 (or 12...gx5 13...\h4 \f4 14...\xf5±) 13.bxa5 \xf5 14...\h4±.

10...\d6f6?! 11...\e1 \e7 (It is slightly better, but still insufficient for Black to equalize by playing: 11...\h3 12...\g2 \e7 13.f3 \d7 14...\b5 \d8 15...\xa7 \xa7 16...\xa7 b6 17.c5! dxc5 18...b5 \f8 19...\c6±, or 17...\xc5 18...\b5 \f8 19.b4±; after 15...f5 16...\b5 \f4 17...\f2 \f8 18.a4±, Black's compensation for the pawn is insufficient. White neutralizes his opponent's activity and after: 13...\f8 14...\b3 c5 15...\d1 \e8 16...\f2± – Black must either comply with f2-f4, or he has to give up his important bishop.) 12...\e1 \f8 (Here, Black had better play: 12...\h3 13...\g2 \f8 14.f3±, with only a slight edge for White.) 13...\d3! \h3 14...\e1 \d7 15.c5± Kotanjian – Gogochuri, Batumi 2001.

10...a5 – White is clearly superior on the queenside, so that move only enhances his initiative there. 11.a3 \h6f6 12...\d2 \c5 13.b4 axb4 14.axb4 \xa1 15...\xa1 \a6 16...\b1 \g4 17...\xg4 \xg4 18.c5 – Black has obtained the two bishop-advantage indeed, but White's queenside initiative is too powerful for him to cope with. 18...f5 19.f3 \f4 20...\f2 fxg3 21.hxg3 \c8 (or 21...\h6 22.fxg4 \xd2 23.c6 \c8 24...b2±) 22...\e3 \f8 23.c6 \f6 24...\d1 \f7 (or 24...bxc6 25...d6 \g5 26...\c3 \xe3 27...\xe3 \e6 28...\c3±) 25...\xb7 \xb7 26...\f2 h5 (The simplifications are in favour of White after: 26...\g5 27...\c3 \c8 28.b5 \xe3 29...\xe3 \c5 30...\c4±) 27...\g2 \c8 28...\c3 \e8 29.b5±, Black has failed to organize anything substantial on the kingside, while his queenside is completely in ruins, Wu Shaobin – Annaberdiev, Doha 2003.

10...\f8 – Black has difficulties to create any counterplay after that move, Fries Nielsen – Borg, Groningen 1979, 11...\e1 \h3 (or 11...\f6 12.f3 \h3 13...\f2±) 12...\g2 \f6 13.f3 \d6d7 14.b4 \f5 15...\d2±.

11...\e1 \g7 12...\d3 \e7

12...f5 13.f3 a5 (About 13...\e7 14...d2 – see 12...\e7.) 14.a3 \c5 15...\h5, Krush – Bologan, Edmonton 2005 and here White obtains an overwhelming advantage after: 16...\xc5! dxc5 17.f4 \f4 (Following: 17...\xe4 18...\xe5 \f6 19...\xe4±, White remains with a solid extra pawn.) 18...\xh5 \xh5 (Black loses after: 18...\xe4 19...\f4 \xh5 20...\h5+-) 19...\f4 \g5 20...\e6 \xe6 21...\xe6 \xe6 22...\f5±.
Chapter 18

13.f3 f5 14.Wd2

14...Ef8

It is not better for Black to defend with: 14...Wf6 15.c5 fxe4 (About the stronger line for Black: 15...Ef8 16.Eacl – see 14...Ef8.) 16.xe4 Dg4 17.xg4 xg4, Krush – McNab, York 1999 and here White is clearly better after he restricts the mobility of Black’s light-squared bishop with: 18.c6! b6 (In case of 18...bxc6 19.dxc6 De6 20.Dd5±, White’s powerful centralized knight prevents Black’s counterplay.) 19.Dg2 Ef8 (After: 19...Ec8 20.Df2 Ef8 21. Dxg4 Wxg4 22.h3±, White annihilates Black’s potentially dangerous bishop and the rest of his pieces are quite active.) 20.h3 Ec8 21.b4±.

In case of 14...a5, Magerramov – Bologan, Nimes 1991, it is possible for White to follow with 15.a3 and if 15...Ec5, then 16.xxc5 dxc5 17.Dd3 a4 18.Ec2 Dd7 19.Eae1, with the idea 20.Wd1 and 20.f4±.

15.Eacl Df6

15...h5 – That move compromises Black’s kingside and it enables White to operate in the cen-

tre. 16.f4 Df6, Shishkin – Komlia-

15...a5 16.a3 h5, Avrukh – Saltaev, Elista 1998, Black’s attempt to break his opponent’s defence by advancing his h-pawn is even worse here, because he has weakened important squares on the queenside with his move 15. 17.f4! exf4 (Or 17...Ef6 18.c5±; 17...h4 18.Df3 fxe4 19.Dxe4 Df5 20.Df2±; 17...a4 18.c5±) 18.gxf4 fxe4 19.Dxe4 Df6 (After: 19...Df5 20.Df2 Df6 21.Df3±, there is no active possibility for Black in sight.) 20.Df3 Dg4 21.Dh1 Dxe3 22.Dxe3 Df5 23.Dg3± and White is dominant on the only open file, while Black’s king is quite unsafe and he has no reliable outposts in the centre.

16.c5 fxe4

In case of 16...h5, White can continue with: 17.cxd6 cxd6 18. exf5 Dxf5 19.Df2 Dg7 20.f4± and he maintains better prospects, Kacheivhili – Iordachescu, Mede-

17.xe4 Dg4 18.Exf8+ Wxf8

5.d4 0-0 6.â³e2 e5 7.0-0 â³bd7 8.â³e3 â³e8 9.d5

19.â³g5 â³f6, Kasimdzhanov – Saltaev, Tehran 1998 (It is insufficient for Black to try here: 19...â³e7 20.â³xe7 â³xe7, because of 21.â³b5! and if 21...a6, then 22.cxd6 cxd6 23.â³xc8+– with a victory for White.) 20.b4!? â³e7 21.â³h6 â³g4 22.â³xg4 â³xg4 23.â³f1 â³d7 24.b5±.

c) 9...â³g4

10.â³g5 f6

The move 10...â³f6? – transposes to the Petrosian system, except that Black has lost a tempo for the weak move – â³e8, Stock – Fink, Willingen 2001, 11.â³d2±.


11.â³h4

Black usually chooses in this position: c1) 11...â³h6, c2) 11...h5 and c3) 11...â³f8.

About 11...g5 12.â³g3 â³h6 13.â³d2 – see 11...â³h6 12.â³d2 g5 13.â³g3; as for 11...a5 12.a3 h5 13.â³d2 â³h6 14.f3 – see 11...h5 12.â³d2 â³h6 13.f3 a5 14.a3.

11...â³h6

White manages to regroup his forces quite comfortably after that move.

12.â³d2 â³f7

About 12...â³f8 13.f3 – see 11...â³f8 12.â³d2 â³h6 13.f3.

12...â³h8?! 13.b4 â³g8?! – This move is too extravagant, Touzane – Sellos, Cannes 1994, after: 14.â³c2 â³f8 15.â³b3±, it is much easier for White to develop his queenside initiative, than it is for Black to do something active on the kingside.

12...â³f8 – That transfer of Black’s bishop to a more active position is too slow. 13.f3 â³e7 14.b4 f5 15.â³f2 f4, Notkin – Lymar, Moscow 1998. He intends to place the bishop on h4, with the idea to exchange it, or to provoke a weakening of his opponent’s king shelter... White should not be afraid of the trade of the dark-squared bishops, because Black loses too much time in order to do that. 16.â³c2 â³h4 17.â³xh4 â³xh4

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18...a6 (Black loses after: 18...\textit{gf7} 19.\textit{gb5}+-- , as well as following: 18...\textit{g5} 19.\textit{gb5}+-; White maintains his advantage, thanks to his powerful knight in his opponent’s camp after: 18...\textit{dxc5} 19.\textit{gb5} \textit{wd8} 20.d6 cxd6 21.\textit{dxd6 ef8} 22.bxc5±) 19.cxd6 cxd6 20.\textit{dc4} \textit{gf7} 21.a4 g5 22.\textit{d1±}.

12...a5 – That move prevents \textit{b2-b4} only temporarily, Pajeken – Luminet, Antwerp 2000, 13.a3±.

If 12...\textit{g5} 13.\textit{g3} \textit{f8}, then after: 14.b4 \textit{g6}, De La Vega – Vidal, Mar del Plata 1969 (Or 14...\textit{f5} 15.exf5 \textit{xf5} 16.\textit{de4} \textit{g6} 17.c5± Riediger – Netolitzky, Austria 1998.) White should have preferred: 15.\textit{ae1} \textit{f4} 16.\textit{f1}, avoiding the exchange of his light-squared bishop for Black’s knight, while in answer to the extravagant move 16...\textit{h5}!? , he could have continued with his queenside offensive 17.c5± (Instead, it is too bad for White to play 17.\textit{xf5}?, because of 17...\textit{g4}++ and his queen gets trapped.)

13.\textit{f3} \textit{h6}

After: 13...c5 14.a3 \textit{h6} 15.\textit{f2} \textit{b6} 16.b4 \textit{f8} 17.\textit{b3}± – White’s queenside initiative is running smoothly, while Black has problems organizing an effective counterplay on the kingside. 17...\textit{d7} 18.bxc5 bxc5 19.\textit{b1} \textit{c8} 20.\textit{c2} \textit{g5} 21.\textit{b2} \textit{g6} 22.\textit{fb1} \textit{f8} 23.\textit{d2} \textit{h5} 24.\textit{f1±}. Black has no chances to equalize, because of the vulnerability of his light squares, Zpevak – Stratil, Czech Republic 2000.

14.\textit{f2}

White manages just in time to prevent the penetration of Black’s bishop in his camp.

14...\textit{c6}

After 14...\textit{f5}, White can continue with his offensive with 15.b4, followed by \textit{c4-c5} and his light pieces are perfectly placed in that case.

If Black tries to impede his opponent’s queenside onslaught with the move 14...a5, then it is possible for White to proceed with: 15.\textit{a4}!? b6 16.\textit{b1} \textit{c5} 17.\textit{bc3}±, followed by a2-a3 and \textit{b2-b4}.

15.\textit{dxc6}

After that exchange, Black cannot exploit the vulnerability of the d4-square and White’s activity on the queenside is even stronger.

15...\textit{bxc6} 16.\textit{b4} \textit{f8} 17.\textit{b3} \textit{e6} 18.\textit{c2} \textit{c7} 19.\textit{fd1} \textit{ab8} 20.a3 \textit{ed8}

21.\textit{c5}! White increases the scope of action of his pieces. In the game Nikoloff – I.Ivanov, Canada 1986, after: 21...\textit{d5} 22.\textit{exd5} \textit{cxd5} 23.\textit{b5} \textit{e7} 24.\textit{c6}±, Black suffered material losses.
c2) 11...h5

12.\(\text{\textit{d}d2}\) \(\text{\textit{h}6}\)

In case of 12...\(\text{\textit{f}8}\), the game transposes to the variation c3.

13.f3 \(\text{\textit{f}7}\)

It is in favour of White if Black plays: 13...a5 14.a3 \(\text{\textit{f}7}\) (Black fails to create a sufficient counterplay after: 14...g5 15.\(\text{\textit{f}2}\) f5 16.b4 f4 17.c5 \(\text{\textit{f}6}\) 18.cxd6 cxd6 19.\(\text{\textit{c}4}\) axb4 20.\(\text{\textit{b}5}\)!\(\pm\)). Now, it is quite difficult for him to find any satisfactory defence against White’s queenside threats. 20...\(\text{\textit{f}8}\)?! 21.\(\text{\textit{b}6}\) \(\text{\textit{d}7}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{c}7}\)\(\pm\) – Mourin – Molina, corr. 1991, it would have been better for Black to resist with: 20...\(\text{\textit{a}6}\) 21.axb4 \(\text{\textit{a}1}\) 22.\(\text{\textit{w}xa1}\) \(\text{\textit{f}7}\) 23.\(\text{\textit{b}6}\)\(\pm\) and his position would have remained difficult, but with equal material...\) 15.\(\text{\textit{c}2}\) \(\text{\textit{h}6}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{f}2}\) f5 (It is interesting, but probably insufficient for Black to sacrifice a pawn with: 16...a4?! 17.\(\text{\textit{fd1}}\) \(\text{\textit{c}5}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{xc5}}\) dxc5 19.\(\text{\textit{xa4}}\) \(\text{\textit{e}3}\) + 20.\(\text{\textit{h1}}\) \(\text{\textit{d7}}\) 21.\(\text{\textit{c3}}\) \(\text{\textit{d6}}\) 22.b4\(\pm\); Meanwhile, White can decline the sacrifice with: 17.b4?! axb3 18.\(\text{\textit{xb3}}\) b6 19.a4\(\pm\) 17.b4 b6 18.\(\text{\textit{fd1}}\) f4 19.\(\text{\textit{a4}}\) axb4 20.axb4 g5 21.c5\(\pm\) – and Black failed to organize any counterplay in the game Shalimov – Voitsekhovsky, Alushta 2000.

If 13.c5, then it is possible for White to play 14.g4!? (It would not work for White to continue here with: 14.dxc6 bxc6 15.b4, because of 15...\(\text{\textit{b6}}\)\(\pm\)) 14...h5xg4 14.fxg4 \(\text{\textit{f7}}\) 16.\(\text{\textit{d3}}\) \(\text{\textit{h}6}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{e}2}\) a6 18.\(\text{\textit{f}2}\) \(\text{\textit{h7}}\) 19.\(\text{\textit{a}1}\) \(\text{\textit{f}4}\) 20.\(\text{\textit{g}3}\)\(\pm\) and Black’s only active piece does not compensate the passivity of the rest of his forces, Vaassen – Oestergaard, Email 2001.

14.\(\text{\textit{b}4}\) \(\text{\textit{h}6}\) 15.\(\text{\textit{f}2}\) f5 16.\(\text{\textit{c}5}\)\(\pm\) – White’s threats along the c-file are running much faster than Black’s kingside initiative, Adamski – Sigurjonsson, Raach 1969.

\[\text{c3) 11...\(\text{\textit{f}8}\)}\]

12.\(\text{\textit{d}2}\) \(\text{\textit{h}5}\)

It is weaker for Black to opt for 12...\(\text{\textit{h}6}\), in view of 13.f3 \(\text{\textit{f}7}\) (Black cannot contain White’s queenside initiative with: 13...b6 14.b4 a5 15.a3 \(\text{\textit{e}7}\), Wikman – Neubert, corr. 1990, after: 16.\(\text{\textit{f}2}\) \(\text{\textit{d}7}\) 17.\(\text{\textit{b}5}\) \(\text{\textit{d}8}\) 18.\(\text{\textit{c}2}\)\(\pm\), White will unavoidably prepare the pawn-advance c4-c5.) 14.b4 \(\text{\textit{h}6}\), Gligoric – Geller, Monte Carlo
1967 and here the line: 15.\textit{f}f2! f5 16.c5 \textit{d}d7 17.c6± (Gligoric) could have led to an overwhelming advantage for White.

\textbf{13.b4 a5}

Black has also tried here 13...\textit{h}7, but White can counter that with: 14.\textit{e}e1 \textit{f}8 15.f3 \textit{h}6 (It is too bad for Black to play: 15...\textit{e}3, because of 16.\textit{c}c1, followed by \textit{f}2 and \textit{d}3, capturing his opponent’s knight.) 16.a4 \textit{e}7 17.a5 \textit{g}7 18.\textit{h}h1 \textit{e}7 19.\textit{f}2 f5 20.c5 f4 and Black’s attack is evidently too slow, moreover that after: 21.cxd6 cxd6 22.\textit{b}5, he had to lose his a7-pawn in the game Buckley – McNab, Hampstead 1998, because following: 22...\textit{a}6 23.\textit{b}6 \textit{d}d7 24.\textit{c}c7 \textit{b}8 25.\textit{a}7 \textit{xc}7 26.\textit{c}1!+-, he would have had to lose even more material.

The Scottish grandmaster tried to improve on his play during the following year: 13...\textit{e}7 14.c5 \textit{h}6 15.cxd6 cxd6 16.f3 \textit{d}d7 17.\textit{c}1 \textit{ec}8 18.\textit{c}4 \textit{f}7, Buckley – McNab, London 1999, 19.a4 \textit{h}6 20.\textit{c}2±.

\textbf{14.bxa5 \textit{xa}5 15.\textit{b}3 \textit{a}8 16.c5 \textit{h}6 17.cxd6 cxd6 18.f3 g5 19.\textit{f}2 \textit{g}6 20.a4} (That is the most principled line for White – he will have to advance his a-pawn anyway, although he can postpone that for a while: 20.\textit{d}2 \textit{f}4 21.\textit{c}4 \textit{a}6 22.\textit{e}3± Radjabov – Xie Jun, Buenos Aires 2001.) 20...\textit{f}4 21.\textit{a}5 \textit{h}3? (Even after the best line for Black: 21...f5 22.\textit{b}6 \textit{e}7 23.\textit{b}5±, he will have problems to maintain the material balance.) 22.\textit{gxh}3 \textit{c}8, Li Wenliang – Yurtau, Calcutta 2001 and here after the simple move – 23.\textit{e}1+– Black would have remained a piece down without any compensation for it.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The main drawback of the move – 8...\textit{e}8 is that it is too slow. After White closes the centre with 9.d5, both sides attack on opposite flanks and Black must push f7-f5, so his rook belongs to the f-file. White’s plan includes opening of files on the queenside and he will do that in the standard fashion with c4-c5. White manages to accomplish that pawn-advance quite easily practically in all variations, which we have analyzed in this chapter.
Chapter 19

1.\(\text{\#f3} \text{\#f6} \) 2.\(\text{c4} \text{g6} \) 3.\(\text{\#c3} \text{\#g7} \) 4.\(\text{e4} \text{d6} \)

5.\(\text{d4} \text{0-0} \) 6.\(\text{\#e2} \text{e5} \) 7.\(\text{0-0} \text{\#bd7} \)

8.\(\text{\#e3} \text{\#e7} \)

Black is trying to exert pressure against White's e4-pawn, just like in the variation with 8...

\(\text{\#e8} \).

9.\(\text{\#c2} \)

White should better preserve the tension in the centre.

The other possibilities are weaker for him, for example:

9.\(\text{dxe5} \text{dxe5} \) 10.\(\text{\#d5} \text{\#d8} \) 11.\(\text{\#d2} \text{c6} \)

12.\(\text{\#c3} \text{\#e7} \) 13.\(\text{\#a4} \text{h5} \) 14.\(\text{f3} \text{h4} \)

15.\(\text{\#fd1} \)\(\text{\#h5=} \) and Black has a good counterplay, Grooten – Golumbev, Belgium 1998, or 9.\(\text{d5} \)\(\text{\#g4} \)

10.\(\text{\#g5} \text{f6} \) 11.\(\text{\#h4} \) (Black's counterplay is quite sufficient too after:

11.\(\text{\#d2} \text{f5} \) 12.\(\text{\#g5} \text{\#d6} \) 13.\(\text{exf5} \text{gxf5} \)

14.\(\text{h3} \text{\#h6} \) 15.\(\text{f4} \text{\#f7=} \) Belov – Balashov, Germany 1994.)

11.\(\text{\#h6} \) 12.\(\text{\#d2} \)\(\text{\#f7} \) (Black’s attempt to get rid immediately of the pin along the h4-d8 diagonal enables White after: 12...

\(\text{g5} \) 13.\(\text{\#g3} \text{f5} \) 14.\(\text{exf5} \)\(\text{\#f6} \) 15.\(\text{\#d3} \text{\#xf5} \) 16.\(\text{\#de4} \text{\#xe4} \)

17.\(\text{\#xe4} \text{\#d7} \) 18.\(\text{\#d3=} \), to obtain a long-lasting initiative thanks to his dominance over the powerful e4-outpost, V.Popov – Gelman, Krasnodar 1998.) 13.\(\text{\#b4} \)

\(\text{\#h6} \) 14.\(\text{\#c1} \text{a6} \) 15.\(\text{\#c2} \text{\#g5} \) 16.\(\text{\#xg5} \text{\#xg5=} \) and Black’s position is quite reliable, Pritchett – McNab, Oban 1996.

After 9.\(\text{\#c2} \), Black usually chooses one of the following possibilities: a) \(9...\text{\#e8} \), b) \(9...\text{\#g4} \), c) \(9...\text{exd4} \) and d) \(9...\text{c6} \).

About 9...\(\text{h6} \) 10.\(\text{\#ad1} \text{c6} \) – see 9...

\(\text{c6} \) 10.\(\text{\#ad1} \text{h6} \).

He has also tried:

9...\(\text{a5} \) 10.\(\text{\#ad1} \text{exd4} \) 11.\(\text{\#xd4} \)

\(\text{\#c5} \) 12.\(\text{f3} \text{c6} \) 13.\(\text{\#d2} \) – see 9...

\(\text{exd4} \) 10.\(\text{\#xd4} \text{\#c5} \) 11.\(\text{f3} \text{a5} \) 12.\(\text{\#ad1} \text{c6} \)

13.\(\text{\#d2;} \)

9...\(\text{\#e8} \) – this move is too passive. 10.\(\text{\#d5} \)\(\text{\#e6??} \) (Black should better play: 10...

\(\text{\#d8} \) 11.\(\text{\#ad1} \text{c6} \) 12.\(\text{\#c3=} \), but even then his knight on e8 is idle.) 11.\(\text{\#g5} \) 1–0

a) 9...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e8?}}!
Black increases the pressure against the e4-pawn. Still, that move does not combine well with his previous move (8...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash w7}}).

10.d5
That is White's standard reaction against Black's last move. After the rook has abandoned the f-file, White should close the centre and Black will have to lose time for the preparation of f7-f5. If we compare that position with the one after White's move 9 in the variation with 8...\textit{\texttt{\textbackslash e8}}, it becomes clear that the placement of White's queen on c2 is very purposeful, since it prevents f7-f5.

10...\texttt{\textbackslash h5}
In case of 10...\texttt{\textbackslash g4}, White plays: 11.\texttt{\textbackslash g5} \texttt{\textbackslash f6} (If 11...\texttt{\textbackslash f6}, then it is possible for White to continue with 12.\texttt{\textbackslash h4}, for example: 12...h5 13.\texttt{\textbackslash d2} \texttt{\textbackslash h6} 14.\texttt{\textbackslash f3} \texttt{\textbackslash f7} 15.b4 a6 16.\texttt{\textbackslash f2} f5 17.c5± and his queenside initiative seems unstoppable, Krause – M.Hoffmann, Hamburg 2004.) 12.\texttt{\textbackslash d2} \texttt{\textbackslash g7} 13.b4† – and White's queenside offensive is much more effective than Black's kingside counterplay.

11.\texttt{\textbackslash b5} \texttt{\textbackslash c5} 12.b4 \texttt{\textbackslash a6} 13.\texttt{\textbackslash ab1} \texttt{\textbackslash f4}
The tentative move – 13...b6, is not better for Black due to: 14.\texttt{\textbackslash f1} f5 15.\texttt{\textbackslash f1} f5 16.\texttt{\textbackslash c3} fxe4 17.\texttt{\textbackslash x4} \texttt{\textbackslash h8} 18.\texttt{\textbackslash d1} \texttt{\textbackslash b8} 19.\texttt{\textbackslash a4} \texttt{\textbackslash f8} 20.c5 \texttt{\textbackslash f5} 21.\texttt{\textbackslash f2} and he fails to save his knight on a6, Groszpeter – Bilek, Budapest 1987.

14.\texttt{\textbackslash fc1}!? It is also possible for White to play 14.\texttt{\textbackslash x7}, in order after: 14...\texttt{\textbackslash x7} 15.\texttt{\textbackslash x7} b6, to follow with 16.a3 and after 16...\texttt{\textbackslash b7}, to save his bishop on a7 with: 17.c5! dxc5 18.b5±.

14...\texttt{\textbackslash x2}+
After 14...\texttt{\textbackslash g4}, in the game Chekhov – Vogt, Halle 1987, White obtained a great advantage with: 15.h3! \texttt{\textbackslash h5} 16.\texttt{\textbackslash d1} \texttt{\textbackslash f6} 17.\texttt{\textbackslash h2} (That is a standard method of repelling Black's knight from the f4-square.) 17...g5 18.\texttt{\textbackslash g1} \texttt{\textbackslash xd1} 19.\texttt{\textbackslash xd1} \texttt{\textbackslash ed8} 20.g3 \texttt{\textbackslash g6} 21.\texttt{\textbackslash f3}±.

15.\texttt{\textbackslash xe2} f5

16.c5 – and White's queenside initiative seems to be much more effective than Black's counterplay. See an exemplary varia-
tion recommended by V.Chekhov: 16...f4 17.cxd6 cxd6 18...xa7 d7 19.b6±.

b) 9...g4
Black clarifies the intentions of White’s dark-squared bishop.
10.g5 f6 11.d2 c6

12.d5!
That is an excellent move.
12...f5
12...h5 – This move is not so useful and it compromises Black’s kingside. 13.b4 h7 14.h3 h6 15. ab1± Hess - Beckemeier, Germany 1982.
12...h6 13.b4 f7 – Black postpones his counterplay for a while, D.Gurevich - Popovych, Chicago 1995, 14.fd1 c5 (In answer to the logical line: 14...h6 15.xh6 xh6, it is interesting for White to sacrifice a pawn: 16.c5! dxc5 17.b5! cxd5 18.xd5 w d8 19.a4∞ – White controls the centre and he prevents the development of Black’s queenside; it is not better for Black to play: 17...xb5 18.d6 f7 19.xb5 b6 20.c7 b8 21.a4±) 15.a3±, White’s initiative on the queenside is more dangerous than Black’s counterplay, for example: 15...h6 16.xh6 xh6 17.b5 b6 18.bxc5 dxc5 19.d6±.

If 12...c5, then 13.b5 b8 (It is very bad for Black to try 13...b6, due to 14.b4 a6 15.bxc5) 14.b4 a6 15.e1 cxb4 (If 15...xb4, then 16.xb4 cxb4 17.c5 dxc5 18.d6↑, with a powerful initiative for White.) 16.d3 d7 (After 16...f5, Black must consider: 17.f3 f6 18.c5 exe4 19.cxd6 w e8 20.xb4 exf3 21.xf3↑, with initiative for White.) 17.xb4 c5 18.f3 h6 19.d3 d3 20.xd3 f7 21.a4± and White is better, Lesiege - Zapata, Matanzas 1993.

Black gives up the idea to play f6-f5 immediately in favour of the prophylactic move 12...h8, but that enables White to maintain a long-lasting initiative: 13.g3 f5 14.h4 h6 15.xh6 xh6 16.exf5 g5 17.f3 gxf5 18.xg5 w xg5 19. f4 w h6 20.dxc6 bxc6 21.ad1± – with an edge for White, Sakaev – McNab, Cappelle la Grande 1994.

13.g5 df6
After 13...c5 14.b4 a6 (It is bad for Black to play: 14...xe4, in view of: 15.gxe4 fxe4 16.dxc6 bxc6 17.wxe4± and White wins material.) 15.a3 h6 16.f3±, White maintains his advantage.

If 13...b6, Peddie – Kaczorowski, Email 1999, then it is rather unpleasant for Black if White plays: 14.a4!? f4 (Black should refrain from 14...a5, because of 15.wb3, if 14...h6, then
15.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xc1}}} and Black cannot play 15...a5 again due to: 16.h3 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xf6}}} 17.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{exh7}}}, or 14...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{f6}}}, because of: 15.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xe6}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xe6}}} 16.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{dxex6}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xe6}}} 17.f3 and White wins a piece.) 15.h4\uparrow with the idea to counter 15...h6 with 16.a5.

14.f3

White has tried: 14.exf5 gxf5 15.f3 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{dh6}}} 16.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{d3}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{d7}}} (If 16...c5, then 17.eae1, with the idea 18.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{f4}}} e4 19.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{cxe4}}}→) 17.eae1 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{dh8}}} 18.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{h1}}} Korchnoi – Mestel, Beer-Sheva 1984.

14...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{dh6}}} 15.c5!

White prevents closing the centre.

15...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{cxd5}}}

It is not better for Black to defend with: 15...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{dh8}}} 16.dxc6 bxc6 17.cxd6 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xd6}}} 18.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{e3}}} and his pieces are misplaced and his c6-pawn is weak, Sosulin – V.Zhelnin, Tula 2000.

After: 15...dxc5 16.dxc6 b6 (or 16...bxc6 17.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{qa4}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{d7}}} 18.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{e6}}} 17.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{d5}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{d6}}} (If 17...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xd5}}}, then 18.exd5\uparrow, followed by b2-b4.) 18.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{fad1}}} and White is much better.

16.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xd5}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xd5}}} 17.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{c4}}} f4 18.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xd5}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xd5}}} 17.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{c4}}} f4 18.

\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{ xd5}}}+ \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{h8}}} 19.h4 dxc5 20.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{ac1}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{g8}}} 21.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xc5}}} and Black failed to defend his position in the game Korchnoi – Svidler, St Petersburg 1997.

c) 9...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{exd4}}}

Black gives up the centre with the idea to attack later White’s e4-pawn and to try to prepare d6-d5.

10.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xd4}}} c6

About 10...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{e8}}} 11.f3 c6 12.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{ad1}}} – see 10...c6 11.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{ad1}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{e8}}} 12.f3.

10...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{c5}}} 11.f3 a5 12.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{ad1}}} c6 13.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{wd2}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{d8}}}? (That is a blunder, he should better play: 13...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{fd7}}} 14.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{efe1}}} – see 10...c6 11.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{ad1}}} a5 12.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{efe1}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{c5}}} 13.f3 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{fd7}}} 14.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{wd2}}}; it is too passive for Black to try: 13...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{e8}}} 14.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{efe1}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{d7}}} 15.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{eb3}}} \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{e6}}}?! – that move loses a pawn. It was better for Black to continue with: 15...\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xb3}}} 16.axb3 \texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{e6}}} 17.f4\uparrow, although White is clearly better even then, because of his dominance in the centre and the greater activity of his pieces. 16.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xc5}}} dxc5 17.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{a4}}}+– Lutz – Wolter, Biel 1990.) 14.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xc6}}} bxc6 15.\texttt{\textcolor{red}{\textit{xc5}}}+– G.Orlov – McGearry, Seattle 1990.
11.\textit{\textbf{B}}e1 \textit{\textbf{f}}e8

11...\textit{\textbf{a}}5 12.\textit{\textbf{f}}f1 \textit{\textbf{c}}5 (about 12...
\textit{\textbf{e}}8 13.\textit{\textbf{f}}3 – see 11...\textit{\textbf{e}}8 12.\textit{\textbf{f}}3 \textit{\textbf{a}}5)
13.\textit{\textbf{f}}3 \textit{\textbf{d}}d7 (It is worse for Black to play: 13...\textit{\textbf{e}}8 14.\textit{\textbf{h}}f1 \textit{\textbf{e}}6 15.\textit{\textbf{x}}e6
\textit{\textbf{x}}e6 16.c5 dxc5 17.\textit{\textbf{a}}a4 \textit{\textbf{d}}d4 18.
\textit{\textbf{d}}x5\textit{\textbf{c}}5 and White has a stable advantage thanks to his dominance on the only open file and in the centre, M.Sorokin – Bernard, Buenos Aires 1995.) 14.\textit{\textbf{w}}d2 \textit{\textbf{e}}8
15.\textit{\textbf{f}}f1 \textit{\textbf{e}}5 16.\textit{\textbf{c}}c2 \textit{\textbf{f}}f8, Terrie – Stolerman, Needham 2000 and here White has a slight, but stable advantage after: 17.h3 \textit{\textbf{e}}6 (or
17...\textit{\textbf{d}}ed7 18.f4 a4 19.g3\textit{\textbf{d}}) 18.b3
\textit{\textbf{d}}ed7 (After 18...a4 19.\textit{\textbf{d}}d4\textit{\textbf{d}}, besides capturing on e6, Black must worry about b3-b4 and f3-f4.)
19.\textit{\textbf{d}}d5\textit{\textbf{d}} – and White remains with a couple of bishops.

11...\textit{\textbf{a}}6!? – Black wishes to push d6-d5. 12.\textit{\textbf{g}}g5! \textit{\textbf{e}}8 13.f4 h6
14.\textit{\textbf{h}}h4 \textit{\textbf{c}}5 15.\textit{\textbf{f}}f3 \textit{\textbf{c}}7 16.h3 a5
17.b3\textit{\textbf{d}} – He has failed to organize the pawn-break in the centre and now he is doomed to a long difficult defence, V.Golod – Szekely, Saint Vincent 2003.

In case of: 11...\textit{\textbf{c}}c5 12.f3, Black can try to break in the centre – 12...d5 (About 12...\textit{\textbf{e}}8 13.\textit{\textbf{f}}f1 –
see 11...\textit{\textbf{e}}8 12.f3 \textit{\textbf{c}}5 13.\textit{\textbf{f}}f1; 12...a5 13.\textit{\textbf{f}}f1 – see 10...\textit{\textbf{c}}5 11.f3
a5 12.\textit{\textbf{d}}d1 c6 13.\textit{\textbf{d}}d2; after: 12...
\textit{\textbf{h}}5 13.\textit{\textbf{d}}d2 \textit{\textbf{e}}8, Schandorff – Mortensen, Copenhagen 2002, it deserves attention for White to occupy additional space with: 14.b4 \textit{\textbf{e}}6 15.f4 \textit{\textbf{f}}6 16.\textit{\textbf{f}}f3\textit{\textbf{d}}. It is not better for Black to play:
15...\textit{\textbf{h}}xf4 16.\textit{\textbf{x}}f4 \textit{\textbf{x}}f4 17.\textit{\textbf{x}}f4
\textit{\textbf{e}}5 18.\textit{\textbf{f}}f4\textit{\textbf{d}), but then his pieces in the centre become unstable:
13.cxd5 cxd5 14.\textit{\textbf{g}}g5! (That is a
popular tactical resource.) 14...\textit{\textbf{e}}6 (or 14...\textit{\textbf{d}}xe4? 15.\textit{\textbf{d}}d5\textit{\textbf{+}}) 15.
\textit{\textbf{d}}x6 (Here, it deserves attention for White to try: 15.\textit{\textbf{x}}d5!? \textit{\textbf{d}}x5 16.\textit{\textbf{d}}xe6 \textit{\textbf{x}}e6
17.\textit{\textbf{x}}d5 \textit{\textbf{b}}6+ 18.\textit{\textbf{h}}h1 \textit{\textbf{f}}f5 19.\textit{\textbf{d}}d3 \textit{\textbf{f}}f8
20.\textit{\textbf{b}}b1 \textit{\textbf{x}}d3 21.\textit{\textbf{x}}d3\textit{\textbf{d}}, with a considerable edge.) 15...\textit{\textbf{e}}6 (or
15...\textit{\textbf{x}}e6 16.\textit{\textbf{d}}d2\textit{\textbf{d}}) 16.\textit{\textbf{x}}d5 \textit{\textbf{d}}x5
17.\textit{\textbf{x}}d5 h6 18.\textit{\textbf{x}}xf6 \textit{\textbf{x}}f6 19.b3
\textit{\textbf{e}}ad8 20.\textit{\textbf{c}}4\textit{\textbf{d}} – White has an extra pawn and excellent winning chances, despite the opposite-coloured bishops, Alterman – Oratoovsky, Israel 1994.

12.\textit{\textbf{f}}3

That is the most natural move.

White's other possibility is 12.\textit{\textbf{g}}g5. Its main drawback however is that the same position might arise in another variation of the King's Indian Defence, but with White to move... (8.\textit{\textbf{c}}c2 \textit{\textbf{d}}4
9.\textit{\textbf{x}}d4 c6 10.\textit{\textbf{g}}g5 \textit{\textbf{e}}8 11.\textit{\textbf{d}}d1 \textit{\textbf{c}}7). After 12...\textit{\textbf{c}}5 (It is possibly better for Black to include 12...
\textit{\textbf{h}}6!? 13.\textit{\textbf{h}}h4 and then follow with 13...\textit{\textbf{c}}5 and a7-a5 next.) 13.\textit{\textbf{f}}f1
a5 (It is too risky for Black to grab a pawn with: 13...h6 14.\textit{\textbf{h}}h4
\textit{\textbf{g}}5 15.\textit{\textbf{c}}c3 \textit{\textbf{f}}xe4, due to 16.\textit{\textbf{f}}f3\textit{\textbf{d}})
14.\textit{\textbf{f}}f1 (In case of 14.f3 a4, there arises a position from the game Grunberg – Kochyev, Dresden 1985 in which White cannot play the standard consolidating move
15.\textit{\textbf{d}}d2, because of the typical tac-
critical strike 15...\(\textit{\&}f\text{xe}4\!+\!\textit{\&}\!\text{f}7\!, Byrne – Castro, Lugano 1968 and after 15.\(\text{\&}d2\!\text{!}\!\pm\!, White could have obtained a slight, but stable advantage.

We will analyze now c1) 12...\(\textit{\&}h5\,\text{c2}) 12...a5, c3) 12...a6 and c4) 12...d5.

Black has also tried in practice:

12...\(\text{\&}f8\) – This move prepares d6-d5, but Black’s knight has occupied a very passive position and he has problems organizing counterplay, Gleizerov – Lukianov, Smolensk 1991, 13.\(\textit{\&}b3\!\text{!}\!\pm\!;

12...\(\text{\&}c5\) 13.\(\textit{\&}e\text{fe}1\!\textit{\&}h5\) (About 13...a5 14.\(\textit{\&}f1\) – see 12...a5; 13...d5? – that move is very bad in this situation. 14.\(\textit{\&}d\text{xd5}\!\textit{\&}d5\), Heinicke – Heemsoth, Oldenburg 1949, 15.\(\textit{\&}g5\!\textit{\&}f8\) 16.\(\textit{\&}e\text{xf6}\!\textit{\&}f6\) 17.\(\textit{\&}d\text{xd5}\!\pm\!\textit{\&}\!\text{f6}\!\textit{\&}d5\!\pm\!, White has an extra central pawn and powerful pieces. Meanwhile, Black’s other moves lose: 15...dxe4? 16.\(\textit{\&}d5\!\textit{\&}e5\) 17.\(\textit{\&}f6\!\textit{\&}e6\) 18.\(\textit{\&}f6\!\textit{\&}e6\) 19.\(\textit{\&}c5\!\pm\!; 15...\(\textit{\&}d6\) 16.\(\textit{\&}f6\!\textit{\&}f6\) 17.\(\textit{\&}x\text{d5}\!\textit{\&}d8\) 18.\(\textit{\&}b5\!\pm\!) and he gives up material in both cases.) 14.\(\textit{\&}f1\!\textit{\&}e5\) 15.g3 \(\textit{\&}g7\) 16.\(\textit{\&}g2\!\textit{\&}e6\) 17.\(\textit{\&}d2\!\textit{\&}c7\) 18.\(\textit{\&}d2\!\pm\!, Hynes – Blaeser, Haifa 1989;

After: 12...\(\textit{\&}e5\) 13.\(\textit{\&}d2\!\textit{\&}d7\!, Mena – Roche, corr. 1991, the pin is quite unpleasant for Black after: 14.\(\textit{\&}g5\!\textit{\&}f8\) (or 14...\(\textit{\&}e6\) 15.\(\textit{\&}b3\!\pm\!\textit{\&}\!\text{c2}\!\textit{\&}e6\) 16.\(\textit{\&}d6\!\pm\! – and White ends up with a solid extra pawn;

12...\(\textit{\&}b6\) – That is not a good placement of the knight and it can only be justified by the eventual preparation of d6-d5, Pankratov – Krasnov, Moscow 1994, but here White can prevent his opponent’s main idea with: 13.\(\textit{\&}f2\!\textit{\&}d5\) (or 13...\(\textit{\&}d7\!\textit{\&}f7\) 14.\(\textit{\&}d2\!\textit{\&}e5\) 15.\(\textit{\&}b3\!\pm\!\textit{\&}\!\text{c2}\!\textit{\&}e6\) 16.\(\textit{\&}e4\) 17.\(\textit{\&}f5\) 18.\(\textit{\&}b5\!\pm\!) 17.\(\textit{\&}b5\!\textit{\&}f5\) (or 17...\(\textit{\&}xf3\) 18.\(\textit{\&}xf3\!\textit{\&}e5\) 19.\(\textit{\&}f2\!\textit{\&}g4\) 20.\(\textit{\&}d6\!\pm\!) 18.\(\textit{\&}xe4\!\textit{\&}xe4\) 19.\(\textit{\&}xe4\!\textit{\&}xe4\) 20.\(\textit{\&}f3\!\textit{\&}e5\) 21.\(\textit{\&}d4\!\textit{\&}g5\) 22.\(\textit{\&}d6\!\pm\!\textit{\&}\!\text{e1}\!\pm\!, and the activity of White’s pieces more than compensates the sacrificed pawn.

\textbf{c1)} 12...\(\textit{\&}h5\) 13.\(\textit{\&}d2\!\textit{\&}e5\)

13...a5 14.\(\textit{\&}c2\!\textit{\&}e5\) 15.\(\textit{\&}g5\!\textit{\&}xc3\!?! (It is better for Black to play: 15...\(\textit{\&}f6\) 16.\(\textit{\&}d4\!\textit{\&}c5\!\textit{\&}e6\) 18.\(\textit{\&}xe6\!\textit{\&}xe6\) 19.\(\textit{\&}d2\!\pm\!) 16.\(\textit{\&}xc3\!\textit{\&}e5\) 17.\(\textit{\&}e3\!\pm\!) – White can exploit the vulnerability of Black’s dark squares on the kingside much easier than Black can make use of his opponent’s pawn-weaknesses, Eliseit – Potts, corr. 1989.

After 13...f5, it is good for White to play 14.\(\textit{\&}c2\) and Black’s counterplay is insufficient after
the pawn-sacrifice: 14...f4 15.\texttt{xf4} \texttt{xf4} 16.\texttt{xf4} e5 17.\texttt{e3} \texttt{c5} 18.\texttt{b4} \texttt{f6}? (Black should better defend with: 18...\texttt{e6} 19.f4) 19.f4 \texttt{xc3} 20.bxc5+– Borbely – Devai, corr. 1998.

14.b3 \texttt{d7} 15.\texttt{c2} \texttt{c5} 16.\texttt{g4}?

It is also possible for White to try: 16.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{xd6} 17.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{xb3} (It is interesting for Black to opt for: 17...\texttt{xc3}! 18.\texttt{xc5} \texttt{f4} 19.\texttt{f2} \texttt{f5}+, with some compensation for the pawn.) 18.axb3 \texttt{xc3} 19.\texttt{d3} \texttt{g7} 20.g4 \texttt{f6} 21.\texttt{fd1}±.

16...\texttt{e5} 17.\texttt{f2}

It is too risky for White to try: 17.gxh5 \texttt{gxh2}+ 18.\texttt{h1} \texttt{h4} 19.\texttt{f2} \texttt{g3}+ 20.\texttt{g1} \texttt{h3} and Black’s attack is very dangerous.

17...\texttt{f6} 18.b4 \texttt{e6} 19.\texttt{f1} \texttt{d7}

20.\texttt{e2} \texttt{b6}, Cebalo – Voisika, Graz 1987, 21.\texttt{g3}! Black lacks space, so that move is much stronger than 21.\texttt{ed4}, which was played in the game, because it prevents simplifications. Black has problems defending against White’s threats in the centre and on the kingside.

c2) 12...a5

13.\texttt{fe1}

It is less precise for White to play 13.\texttt{h1}, because after: 13...\texttt{h5} 14.g4 \texttt{hf6} 15.\texttt{wd2} a4, in the game Roder – Akopian, El Vendrell 1996, the position was quite complex. In case of 16.\texttt{c2}, White had to consider: 16...h5 17.g5 \texttt{h7} and he could not play: 18.\texttt{xd6} \texttt{xd6} 19.\texttt{xd6}, because of 19...a3.

13...\texttt{c5}

Black fails to solve his opening problems with: 13...\texttt{h5} 14.\texttt{f1} \texttt{c5} 15.\texttt{wd2} a4 16.\texttt{de2} \texttt{f8} 17.\texttt{g5} \texttt{c7} 18.\texttt{f4} \texttt{xf4} 19.\texttt{xf4}±, since his d6-pawn is weak and he can hardly organize any counterplay, Diu – Akopian, Ekaterinburg 2002.

14.\texttt{f1} \texttt{fd7}

After 14...a4 15.\texttt{wd2}±, in the game Hernandes – Fernandes, La Coruna 1989, White reached a standard position with a slight advantage, while following 15...a3 (Black was evidently afraid of the maneuver – \texttt{d4-c2}.) 16.b4 \texttt{a4} 17.\texttt{xa4} \texttt{xa4} 18.b5, his position improved even more.
15.b3
15...đe5 16.đd2
White wishes to tie his opponent’s pieces with the protection of the d6-pawn.

13.đb3
White achieves less after his other lines, for example: if 13.đh1, then 13...đd5 14.cxd5 đxd5! 15.đf2 đxc3 16.bxc3 đe5 17.đc4 đd7= with an approximately equal position, Gofshtein – Castaneda, Winnipeg 1997; if 13. đf2, then 13...đe5 14.đh1 c5 15.đb3 đe6 16.đd2 đc6= and Black has a good position, Lalic – Todorcevic, Zaragoza 1995; if 13.đf4 đh5 14.đc1 đb6 15.g4 đf6 16.đf4, Greenfeld – Todorcevic, Ljubljana 1989, then Black can follow with 16...đfd7∞ with an acceptable game; if 13.đg5, then after 13...h6 14.đh4, it is possible for Black to continue with 14...a5, followed by đc5 and White would not have ćc2-d2, because of the tactical strike – đf6xe4.
13...đe5
After 13...a5 14.đd2 a4 15.đc1 đf8 16.đg5±, White maintains his pressure.
Or 13...b5 14.đa5 đe5 15.đd2 đc7 16.b4 đf8 17.cxb5 axb5, G.Gonzalez – J.Reyes, Las Palmas 1994 and here White had to play 18.ćc1± with better chances.
14.c5 d5 15.đg5 đed7

Black has tried many different lines in this position, but White is better throughout, thanks to his extra space: 16...đf8 17.đg5 f6 18.đh4 đf7 19.đc2 đh6 20.a3 đe5 21.đh1 đd7 22.đg3 đf8, D.Paulsen – Fischdick, Germany 1988, 23.f4±; 16...a4, Motl – Wockenfuss, Bad Wiessee 2000, 17.b4 đe6 18.a3±; 16...f6, Teschner – Kestler, Germany 1981, 17.h3 đf7 18.f4 đc7 19.đf2±; 16... đe6, Prokopisin – Goryi, Nyiregyhaza 2003, 17.đxe6 fxe6 18.f4 đed7 (or 18...đg4 19.đxc5 dxc5 20.e5 đad8 21.đd3±) 19.đf2 đad8 20.g3±.

c3) 12...a6
Black wishes to prepare d6-d5 under most favourable circumstances.
Or 15...dxe4 16...xe4 f5 17.
ed6±, with an advantage for
White.

16.exd5 c5 17.c4

17...xb3 (or 17...f5 18.f2
xb3 19.fxb3±) 18.xb3 w4 19.wf2 h6?! M.Nelson – Peddie, Email 2001 (It is better for Black to play: 19...f5 20.d6±) and here
White would have a very power-
ful attack after: 20.xf6! xf6
21.e4 g7 (In case of: 21...e5
22.dxc6 bxc6 23.f4 g7 24.d6
e7 25.f5±, Black has problems
defending his light squares as well
as neutralizing White’s threats
along the f-file.) 22.dxc6 bxc6
23.xf7+! xf7 24.d6+ f8 25.xe8 xe8 26.c2 b6+
27.h1 f5 (It is even worse for
Black to play: 27...f7 28.c4+
f8 29.f7+–) 28.c4 f8 29.
g4± – and White’s pieces are per-
fectly coordinated, while Black’s
king has been stranded in the
centre.

c4) 12...d5

Black is trying to solve imme-
diately all his problems with that
move.

13.cxd5 cxd5

It is bad for Black to play: 13...
xd5 14.xd5 cxd5, because of:
15.b5 dxe4 16.f4!± and he loses
material, for example: 16...b6 (In answer to: 16...f6 17.c5
e6, Tisdall – Rantanen, Gausdal
1982, White wins with: 18.d6!
e7 19.d2! and he can cap-
ture the rook, because his queen
is protected: 19...e6 20.c7
c6 21.xa8 b6 22.xb6 axb6
23.e3--; Black loses even faster
with: 18...f5 19.d4++, or 18...
xa2 19.c4 a5 20.b4++, since
his queen gets trapped in both
cases.) 17.c5 h4 18.c7 f5
19.b3± and Black’s powerful
e4-pawn is still not sufficient to
compensate the exchange, Sirota – Kissinger, corr. 1999.

14.db5 dxe4 15.fxe4

But not 15.c7, in view of:
15...fxe3 16.xf3 e5 17.xf6
xc7+ Elbilia – Calvo, Torcy

15.e5

15...c5?? – That is a terrible
blunder and the game was quick-
ly over after it. 16.xf6 xf6 (or
16...fxe6 17.d5--; 17.xc5 e6
18.c7 ec8 19.d6 1–0 Barsov

It is bad for Black to play: 15...\textit{\texttt{f8}}, because of: 16.\textit{\texttt{d6 \texttt{d8}}} 17.\textit{\texttt{c5 \texttt{e5}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{d5 \texttt{d7}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{d4 \texttt{xd6}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{xf6 \texttt{c6}}} 21.\textit{\texttt{c4 \texttt{h6}}} 22.\textit{\texttt{c3 \texttt{g5}}} 23.\textit{\texttt{xf2 \texttt{xc4}}} 24.\textit{\texttt{f6+}} -- and he should better resign, Shirov – Akopian, Borzhami 1988.

16.\textit{\texttt{h1!}}

That is White’s best move.

After 16.\textit{\texttt{d6 \texttt{d8}}} 17.\textit{\texttt{c5 \texttt{e6}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{a3 \texttt{c7}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{e2 \texttt{b6+}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{h1 \texttt{fg4}}} 21.\textit{\texttt{d1 \texttt{f8+}}}, Black seized the initiative in the game Holst – Siegl, DDR 1990.

It is insufficient for White to play 16.\textit{\texttt{xa7}}, because of: 16...\textit{\texttt{e6}} 17.\textit{\texttt{ab5 \texttt{fg4}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{d4 \texttt{ad8}}} with a good compensation for Black for the sacrificed pawn, Flear – Todorcevic, Szirak 1987.

If 16.\textit{\texttt{xf6 \texttt{xf6}}} 17.\textit{\texttt{c7}}, then 17...\textit{\texttt{g4!}} 18.\textit{\texttt{xe8 \texttt{exe8}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{xa7 \texttt{xe2}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{xe2 \texttt{c6}}} 21.\textit{\texttt{c5 \texttt{e6}}} 22.\textit{\texttt{wb5 \texttt{xc3}}} 23.\textit{\texttt{bxc3}}, Stempin – Lanc, Poznan 1983 and here Black could have equalized with the line: 23...\textit{\texttt{xa2}} 24.\textit{\texttt{xb7 \texttt{c2}}} 25.\textit{\texttt{xf1 \texttt{d8}}} 26.\textit{\texttt{d7 \texttt{xe4}}} =.

16...\textit{\texttt{fg4}}

After: 16...\textit{\texttt{g4}} 17.\textit{\texttt{g5 \texttt{xe2}}} 18.\textit{\texttt{exe2 \texttt{eg4}}} 19.\textit{\texttt{h3 \texttt{h6}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{h4 \texttt{g5}}} 21.\textit{\texttt{g3 \texttt{e5}}} 22.\textit{\texttt{d6 \texttt{ed8}}} 23.\textit{\texttt{f5 \texttt{e6}}} 24.\textit{\texttt{d5\pm}}, the issue was settled rather quickly in the game M.Gurevich – Termeulen, Ostend 1991.

17.\textit{\texttt{d5 \texttt{wh4}}}

18.\textit{\texttt{f4!}} (That is an important tactical nuance.) 18...\textit{\texttt{e6}} (But not 18...\textit{\texttt{f2+}}, because Black loses his queen after: 19.\textit{\texttt{xf2! \texttt{xf2}}} 20.\textit{\texttt{g3+-}) 19.\textit{\texttt{g3 \texttt{wh6}}}, Fedoro-

wicz – Bosboom, Wijk aan Zee 1989 and here Black would have great problems after the move: 20.\textit{\texttt{c7!}} ±.

\textbf{d) 9...\texttt{c6}}

10.\textit{\texttt{ad1}}

It seems good for White to play immediately 10.d5, but the centralization of his rook forces Black to find a useful move right now.

10...\textit{\texttt{g4}}

About 10...\textit{\texttt{exd4}} 11.\textit{\texttt{xd4}} – see 9...\textit{\texttt{exd4}}.

10...\textit{\texttt{d8}} – This move is as il-
logical as 10...ex8, Thorsteins – Bjarnason, Borgarnes 1985, 11. d5±.


10...a6 – That move only creates weaknesses, because Black has no active possibilities on the queenside, Ovchinnikova – Kozlovskaya, Sochi 1988, 11.d5 c5 (or 11...cxd5 12.exd5 13.dg4 14.dg5 f6 14.d2=±) 12.de1=±.


In case of 10...hx5, it is possible for White to continue with: 11.b4 a5 12.a3 axb4 13.axb4 d4 14.xxf4 exf4 15.c5 dxc5 16.bxc5 h5 17.e5 b6 18.xc4 a6 19.xa6 axa6 20.cx6 b6 21.de4=± and his advantage is indisputable, Inkov – Toshkov, Saint John 1988.

The move 10...a5, Cichoki – Szymczak, Slupsk 1989, compromises Black’s queenside and White has 11.d5!?±, after which it is bad for Black to reduce the tension in the centre, because of the weakness of the b5-square. It is also interesting for White to play: 11.dxe5!? dxe5 (After: 11...dxe5 12.dxe5 dxe5 13.d4 d7 14.c5=±, Black’s b6 and d6-squares are quite vulnerable.) 12.d4 g4 (or 12...hx5 13.c5 d4 14.d4c4=±) 13.dg5 f6 14.d2 c5 (It is not advisable for Black to try: 14...f5 15.g5 f6 16.c1 g7 17.c5=±, because his queenside remains paralyzed.) 15.b6 ax6 16.xc8 xc8 17.de1 h6 18.e3=±.

The move 10...h6, only worsens Black’s position. After: 11.d5 c5 (It would not work for Black to play: 11...d4 12.c1 f5, due to: 13.h3 g6 14.h4=±; or 11...cxd5 12.exd5 d4 13.c1 f5 14.h3 d6 15.h4=±) 12.g3 h7 (After: 12...h7 13.h4 g5, Gelfand – Smirin, Saint Vincent 2005, White can force a favourable trade of the light-squared bishops: 14.xg4 d6 15.xc8 xc8 16.f3=±; Black fails to push f7-f5, because of the vulnerability of the g6-square after: 12...d4 13.c1 f5 14.h4.) 13.h4 g8 14.b1=± and just like before it is difficult for Black to advance f7-f5, while White’s play on the queenside is quite real.

It is illogical for Black to follow with 10...ex8, because of White’s standard reaction: 11.d5 c5 (Or 11...d4 12.c1 c5 13.a3 ex8 14.b4 b6 15.de1 h6 16.e3 f5 17.f3 d6 18.bxc5 bxc5 19.d3 f4 20.f2 g5 21.a4=± Ullbin – Buckley, Mamaia 1991.) 12.de1 h5 (The other possibilities for Black are not better: 12...b6 – his knight is too passive on that square and it can be attacked by White. 13.a3 d7 14.b4 cxb4 15.axb4 g4, Melson – Bensiek, corr. 1991, 16.xg4 xg4 17.de2 xc8 18.c5=±; 12...a6, Jelen – Sigurjonsson, Ljubljana 1977, that move compromises
unnecessarily Black's queenside and White opens the b-file with a decisive effect - 13...\texttt{b}1±; 12...
\texttt{f}8 13...\texttt{d}3 h5 14.f3 \texttt{h}7 15.b4± - White is clearly ahead of his opponent in the development of his initiative, Yevseev – A.Utkin, St Petersburg 2005; 12...\texttt{f}8 - Black admits that his move 10 was a mistake.. 13...\texttt{d}3 \texttt{e}8 14.f4 \texttt{xf}4 15...\texttt{xf}4 \texttt{e}5 16...\texttt{x}e5 \texttt{xe}5 17...\texttt{x}e5 \texttt{x}e5 - it is even worse for him to play: 17...\texttt{xe}5 18.d6 \texttt{e}6 19...\texttt{d}2 \texttt{d}7 20...\texttt{d}5± and White’s pawn on d6 is quite strong, supported by the rest of his pieces. 18...\texttt{d}2 \texttt{d}7 19...\texttt{h}6 \texttt{g}7 20...\texttt{h}4 a6, Pek – Voropaev, Mehlingen 2000 and here White emphasizes his advantage with: 21...\texttt{g}4 \texttt{xe}4 22...\texttt{xe}4±. Black’s knight is stranded on e8 and it cannot come to the e5-outpost.) 13...\texttt{b}1!, That is a smart move. After the retreat of Black's knight, White wishes to push b2-b4, without playing a2-a3 beforehand. 13...\texttt{g}4 14...\texttt{d}2 \texttt{f}8 15...\texttt{h}6 \texttt{c}1 \texttt{h}7 17...\texttt{b}4 \texttt{b}6 18...\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{xc}5 19...\texttt{d}1! (The bishop is going to the c6-square.) 19...\texttt{a}6 20...\texttt{b}5 \texttt{g}8 21...\texttt{a}3!±, White's advantage is overwhelming, due to his excellent move 13, Sherbakov – Benoit, Cappelle la Grande 1995.

11...\texttt{g}5 \texttt{f}6

In answer to 11...\texttt{f}6, Stempin – Casper, Leipzig 1986, it is good for White to play: 12...\texttt{c}1 \texttt{xe}5 (After: 12...\texttt{exe}5 13...\texttt{exe}5 14...\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{xf}6 15...\texttt{fd}1±, White has a powerful pressure along the d-file.) 13...\texttt{x}g5 \texttt{x}g5 (It is worse for Black to play: 13...\texttt{gf}6 14.c5! \texttt{exe}4 15...\texttt{xd}6 \texttt{exe}4 16...\texttt{d}4± 14...\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{gf}6 15.f4 \texttt{h}6 16...\texttt{h}3± and White has a space advantage and a superior piece-coordination.

12...\texttt{c}1

It deserves attention for White to play: 12...\texttt{h}4!? \texttt{h}5 (Black would not change much with: 12...\texttt{g}5 13...\texttt{g}3 \texttt{h}5 14...\texttt{h}4 \texttt{h}6 15.c5± W.Schmidt – Kiedrowicz, Poland 1983; he has also tried here: 12...\texttt{h}6 13.c5!? \texttt{d}xc5 14...\texttt{exe}5 \texttt{d}xe5 15...\texttt{xe}5 \texttt{exe}5 16...\texttt{g}3 \texttt{e}7 17...\texttt{b}3+ \texttt{h}8 18...\texttt{d}6 \texttt{e}7 19...\texttt{c}4 \texttt{d}7 20...\texttt{xc}5 b5 21...\texttt{e}2 \texttt{xd}1 22...\texttt{xd}1 \texttt{xe}6 23...\texttt{c}2± – with a better position for White, Kristiansen – Hoi, Esbjerg 1978; it is not any better for Black to defend with: 14...\texttt{f}7 15...\texttt{b}3 \texttt{b}6 16...\texttt{exe}6 \texttt{xe}6 17...\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{xf}6, Aliev – Saltaev, Tehran 1998, because now White advances his pawn-centre after: 18...\texttt{d}2 \texttt{e}6 19...\texttt{a}3 \texttt{e}7 20.f4±, or 19...\texttt{d}7 20...\texttt{b}3 \texttt{b}6 21.f4±) 13...\texttt{h}3 (Or 13...\texttt{g}3 \texttt{d}8 14...\texttt{b}4 \texttt{h}6 15.c5 \texttt{d}xc5 16...\texttt{xc}5 \texttt{f}7 17...\texttt{c}4 \texttt{exe}4 18...\texttt{d}6 \texttt{e}8 19.e5! 20...\texttt{exe}5 20...\texttt{exe}5 \texttt{fxe}5 21...\texttt{xe}6++ and Black is incapable of saving his king, Wedberg – Rivello, Lugano 1987.) 13...\texttt{h}6 14.c5 \texttt{d}xc5 15...\texttt{exe}5 \texttt{f}xe5 16...\texttt{exe}5 \texttt{exe}5 17...\texttt{c}4+ \texttt{h}8 18...\texttt{g}3 \texttt{f}4 19...\texttt{h}4 \texttt{g}4 20...\texttt{e}2!++ and Black’s queen gets trapped, Balinas – Werner, Germany 1987.

12...\texttt{h}6

The reduction of the tension in the centre is in favour of White
– 12...exd4 13.\(\text{\textcopyright}d4 \text{c5}\) (or 13...
\(\text{\textcopyright}b6 14.h3 \text{e5} 15.f4! \text{exf4} 16.b3
\text{\textcopyright} a5 17.f5\(=\); 13...\(\text{\textcopyright}g5 14.f4 \text{gf7}
15.\(\text{\textcopyright}f3\)=) 14.b4 \(\text{\textcopyright}a6 15.\text{\textcopyright}b3 \text{\textcopyright}h8
16.h3 \(\text{\textcopyright}h6 17.\text{\textcopyright}e1\).

After: 12...f5 13.exf5 gxf5 14.h3
\(\text{\textcopyright}h6 15.dxe5 dxe5 16.\text{\textcopyright}fe1\), Black’s
pawns come under terrible pressure from White’s pieces.

13.b4

After the immediate move 13.d5, White must consider the
line: 13...f5 14.\(\text{\textcopyright}g5 \text{c5} 15.b4
\text{\textcopyright}xe4 16.\text{\textcopyright}gxe4 fxe4 17.dxc6 bxc6
18.\(\text{\textcopyright}xe4 \text{\textcopyright}b7\)=.

13...\(\text{\textcopyright}f7\)
(diagram)

Now, in the game Jansson – Olsson, Sweden 1972, White had
to follow with: 14.b5\(=\), opening
files on the queenside. If we com-
pare that position with the one after move 15 in the game Ata-
lik – Saltaev, Cappelle la Grande
1998 (see variation b, Chapter 20), then we will see that the dif-
ference is only in the placement of
Black’s king (It is on g8 and not
on h8...) and that is in principle
favourable for White.

Conclusion

We have analyzed the move 8...\(\text{\textcopyright}e7\) in this chapter and Black
attacks with it his opponent’s e4-pawn and he forces White to play
9.\(\text{\textcopyright}c2\). After that Black has four basic defensive possibilities:

In variation a he loses important tempi with 9...\(\text{\textcopyright}e8\). White closes
the centre and his queenside offensive is much more dangerous than
Black’s counterplay on the kingside.

In variation b Black forces his opponent to clarify immediately the
situation with his dark-squared bishop. He wishes to prepare quickly
f7-f5, in order to start active kingside operations. The basic drawback
of that approach is that he weakens the g5-square and White’s knight
appears there with a great effect. Later, White opens files in the centre
and on the queenside and his advantage increases.

In variation c Black reduces the tension in the centre by exchang-
ing on d4 and he tries to attack his opponent’s e4-pawn. He intends
to push d6-d5 at some moment, but the centralized white pieces are
perfectly prepared for opening of the game.

In variation d Black has problems equalizing too. White’s pieces
are quite powerful in the centre, moreover he has a clear-cut plan for
queenside actions, connected with the advance of his b-pawn.
Chapter 20

1.\(\text{d}f3\) 2.\(\text{f}f6\) 2.c4 g6 3.\(\text{c}c3\) 4.g7 4.e4 d6 5.d4 0–0 6.\(\text{e}e2\) e5 7.0–0 \(\text{bd}7\)
8.\(\text{e}e3\) \(\text{g}4\)

That is the most principled answer for Black. He wishes to clarify the intentions of White’s dark-squared bishop.

9.\(\text{g}5\) \(f6\)

Black loses immediately after: 9...\(\text{e}8??\) 10.\(\text{d}5\) \(f6\) 11.\(\text{xc}7+–\) – Bause – Hoffmann, Goerlitz 1998.

9...\(\text{g}6?!\) – This move transposes to the Petrosian system with an extra tempo for White, moreover that it is considered that Black’s knight is not so well placed on the d7-square. 10.d5 \(h6\) 11.\(\text{h}4±\).

In case of 9...\(\text{f}6\), White should simply retreat 10.\(\text{c}1\) (After the trade of the bishops, White cannot achieve much: 10.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{gx}f6\) 11.\(\text{c}2\) c6 12.\(\text{fd}1\) \(\text{e}7\) 13.\(\text{dxe}5\) \(\text{dxc}5\) = Velikov – Kr.Georgiev, Sofia 1984.) 10...\(\text{g}7\) 11.\(\text{b}1?!\) (It is still too early for White to clarify the pawn-situation in the centre with the move: 11.d5, because of: 11...a5 12.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{h}6\) 13.\(\text{e}3\) f5 14.f3 \(\text{f}6±\) and Black obtains counterplay.) 11.c6 (In case of 11.c5, it is possible for White to play: 12.\(\text{xc}5!\) \(\text{dxc}5\) 13.\(\text{h}3\) \(\text{gf}6\) 14.\(\text{e}3\) \(b6\) 15.\(\text{d}3\) \(\text{b}7\) 16.\(\text{fd}1±\) and he maintains a powerful positional pressure, because Black has problems to bring his knight to \(c6\), or to \(e6\). If 11...\(f5\), then 12.\(\text{exf}5\) \(\text{gxf}5\) 13.\(\text{dxe}5\) \(\text{dxe}5\) 14.\(\text{g}5!\) \(\text{f}6\) 15.\(\text{xf}6\) \(\text{dxf}6\) 16.\(\text{c}1\), with an advantage for White; after 11...a5, White follows with 12.b3, while in case of: 11...\(\text{exd}4\) 12.\(\text{xd}4\), you can see the main drawback of the placement of Black’s knight on \(g4\). He cannot attack effectively his opponent’s e4-pawn after opening of the game.) 12.d5 \(c5\) (After 12... \(\text{e}7\) 13.\(\text{b}4\), opening of the c-file is usually in favour of White: 12... \(\text{exd}5?\) 13.\(\text{cxd}5\) \(h6\) 14.\(\text{d}2\) \(\text{gf}6\) 15.\(\text{c}4\) \(\text{e}8\) 16.\(\text{e}3±\) – White’s huge lead in development is more than obvious, Salo – Kanko, Helsinki 1992.) 13.\(\text{e}1\) \(\text{h}6\) 14.g4?!
(Black has counterplay after: 14...\textit{\texttt{Q}}d3 \textit{\texttt{Q}}b6 15.b3 f5, or: 14.b4 cxb4 15...\textit{\texttt{Q}}xb4 f5 16...\textit{\texttt{Q}}d3 b6 17.a4 \textit{\texttt{Q}}a6.) 14...f6 (or 14...f5 15.exf5 gxf5 16.g5 \textit{\texttt{Q}}f7 17.h4±) 15...\textit{\texttt{Q}}h1 \textit{\texttt{Q}}f7 16...\textit{\texttt{Q}}g2 \textit{\texttt{Q}}h6 17.f4 \textit{\texttt{Q}}e7 (in case of 17...exf4, White has the powerful argument – 18...\textit{\texttt{Q}}xf4†) 18.f5 \textit{\texttt{Q}}xc1 19.fxg6 hxg6 20...\textit{\texttt{Q}}xc1± – and Black has problems to bring his knight to the f4-square.

\textbf{10...\textit{\texttt{Q}}d2}

Now, Black has two main lines: \textbf{a) 10...c6} and \textbf{b) 10...\textit{\texttt{Q}}h6}.

He has also tried in practice:

\textit{10...g5?! Baigorri – Loscos, La Salle 1995, 11...\textit{\texttt{Q}}c2 \textit{\texttt{Q}}h6 12.dxe5 \textit{\texttt{Q}}xe5 13...\textit{\texttt{Q}}ad1?;}

\textit{10...exd4?! 11...\textit{\texttt{Q}}xd4 \textit{\texttt{Q}}xf2? (After the only good line for Black: 11...\textit{\texttt{Q}}b6 12...\textit{\texttt{Q}}xg4 f5 13.exf5 gxf5 14...\textit{\texttt{Q}}f3 \textit{\texttt{Q}}xd4 15...\textit{\texttt{Q}}h6±, White still maintains the advantage thanks to his better piece placement and the compromised position of Black’s king.) 12...\textit{\texttt{Q}}xf2+– Dahl – J.Jensen, Denmark 1993;}

\textit{10...\textit{\texttt{Q}}e8 11...\textit{\texttt{Q}}c2 exd4 (It is not better for Black to try: 11...c6 12...\textit{\texttt{Q}}ad1 a5, W.Schmidt – Shulman, Moscow 1994, because he has compromised his queenside and it is quite logical for White to exploit that with 13.d5±, in answer to 12...\textit{\texttt{Q}}e7, Kragelj – Farkas, Kecskemet 2005, it is also good for White to follow with: 13.d5 c5 14...\textit{\texttt{Q}}b5 \textit{\texttt{Q}}b8 15.b4±; after 11...\textit{\texttt{Q}}f8 12.h3 exd4 13.d4 \textit{\texttt{Q}}h6 14...\textit{\texttt{Q}}ad1 \textit{\texttt{Q}}f7 15...\textit{\texttt{Q}}e3 \textit{\texttt{Q}}e6 16...\textit{\texttt{Q}}b3 \textit{\texttt{Q}}d7, Zelinska – Sergeeva, Zagan 1997, it seems attractive for White to play in the centre: 17.c5 f5 18.exf5 gxf5 19.cxd6 \textit{\texttt{Q}}xd6 20...\textit{\texttt{Q}}f3±) 12...\textit{\texttt{Q}}xd4 \textit{\texttt{Q}}b6 (It is insufficient for Black to continue with: 12...f5, Prakash – Saravana, Guntur 2000, 13...\textit{\texttt{Q}}xd4 14...\textit{\texttt{Q}}xg4 \textit{\texttt{Q}}h4 15...\textit{\texttt{Q}}e2 gxf5 16...\textit{\texttt{Q}}e1 c6 17...\textit{\texttt{Q}}xf5 \textit{\texttt{Q}}c5 18...\textit{\texttt{Q}}f4 \textit{\texttt{Q}}xf4 19...\textit{\texttt{Q}}xf4±; Black loses after 16...\textit{\texttt{Q}}f6, because of: 17...\textit{\texttt{Q}}b5 \textit{\texttt{Q}}g4 18...\textit{\texttt{Q}}xg4+– and he suffers huge material losses.) 13.h3 \textit{\texttt{Q}}e5 14...\textit{\texttt{Q}}ad1 \textit{\texttt{Q}}d7, Gill – Nyvlt, corr. 1999 and Black can hardly create any counterplay after his opponent’s natural move – 15.b3±;}

10...a5 11...\textit{\texttt{Q}}c1 \textit{\texttt{Q}}h6, Byrne – Wozney, USA 1969 and here the best way for White to exploit Black’s compromised queenside is by exchanging: 12.dxe5 \textit{\texttt{Q}}xe5 (The other possibilities are worse for Black: 12...fxe5 13...\textit{\texttt{Q}}g5 \textit{\texttt{Q}}f6 14.c5±; 12...dxe5 13...\textit{\texttt{Q}}c2 \textit{\texttt{Q}}c5 14...\textit{\texttt{Q}}fd1 \textit{\texttt{Q}}e8 15...\textit{\texttt{Q}}d5 \textit{\texttt{Q}}e6 16.c5±) 13...\textit{\texttt{Q}}xe5 dxe5 (or 13...fxe5 14.c5±) 14...\textit{\texttt{Q}}e3 \textit{\texttt{Q}}xd1 15...\textit{\texttt{Q}}fxd1 \textit{\texttt{Q}}e6 16...\textit{\texttt{Q}}d5 \textit{\texttt{Q}}f7 17.c5± – and Black’s queenside is weak and his pieces are rather misplaced on the kingside;}

10...\textit{\texttt{Q}}h8 – That waiting move
is played only seldom. 11...c2 c6 12.ead1 (The move – 12.d5+ leads to more standard positions.) 12...
\[f\] 13 gé1 f5 14.exf5 gxf5 15.d5 \[\text{d}6] 16.dg5 \[\text{f}6] 17.f4± and Black is doomed to a long and laborious
defence due to his vulnerable central pawns, Hulak – Ye Jiangchuan, Lucerne 1982;

10...f5?! – That typical King's Indian move is rather premature at this moment. 11.g5 \[f6] (Black's central pawns are obviously weak in the line: 11...gf6
12.exf5 gxf5 13.dxe5 dxe5 14.wc2 e4 15.d4 d8 16.ed1 w8 too, Oud – Landau, Bad Woerishofen
2000, because now White can open files in the centre with: 17.f3 exf3 18.xf3 xf3+ 19.xf3 c6
20.f4+, it is not any better for Black to defend with: 16...w7 17.f3 c5 18.db5 xf3 19.xf3
xf3+ 20.xf3± Fuertes – Que-
sada, Malaga 1999, while after:
17...exf3 18.xf3 xf3+ 19.xf3
c6 20.d3±, Black has problems to
protect his f5-pawn.) 12.xf6
\[\text{g}6] 12...xf6 (The move 12...xf6?! – loses a pawn after: 13.h3 dh6
14.dxe5 dxe5 15.dxe5 \[\text{d}6], Sand – Holzinger, Stuttgart 2004 and here the safest method for White to preserve his extra material is the line: 16.wc1 \[\text{d}5] 17.wxh6±; it looks more aggressive for Black to play 12...dxf6, but after 13.exf5, he has again problems to maintain the material balance, for example:
13...gxh6 14.h3 e4 15.h4 dh6
16.wd2 w7 17.wf7 \[\text{d}6] 18.g4±

Loeffler – Heidrich, corr. 1975, or
13...e4, R.Garcia – Zucotti, Buen-
as Aires 1981 and here it is very
strong for White to play 14.wh4!,
since after: 14...w8 15.g3 gxf5
16.xf5±, he wins a pawn. Black can hardly protect his weaknesses in the variation: 14...gxf5 15.h3
w8 16.xf5 xf2 17.xf2 \[\text{xf}5
18 wb3 w7 19.xaf1+) 13.exf5
xf5 14.dxe5 dxe5 (14...xex5
– That is an attempt by Black to facilitate his defence by exchanging pieces. 15.c5! xf3+ 16.xf3
dxc5 17.wb3+ w8 18.xad1 \[\text{d}7],
Schoen – Schorr, New York 1987,
19.db5! – This move consolidates
White’s advantage and after: 19...
a6 20.wc3+, Black loses in case of:
20...xf6 21.xc7 xc7 22.xd7
xd7 23.xf6+ wg7 24.d8+ wg8
25.d6++ – because of the lack of development of his queenside and the unreliable shelter of his king, while following: 20...xf6 21.xc7
xc7 22.bxc3 w8 23.wf1 the difference of the activity of the pieces is quite evident.) 15.wd2
w8 (or 15...e4 16.wg5+ w8 17.
\[\text{h}4 – see 15...w8 16.wg5) 16.
w5 e4 17.w4 \[\text{e}5 18.xad1 w7

a) 10...c6 11.d5

It is considerably weaker for
White to play 11.b4 (with the idea
d4-d5), because of: 11...f5 12.d5
f4 13.xc1 c5 14.xb5 db6 15.xg5

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a6 16.\(\text{Oe}6\) \(\text{Oxe}6\) 17.dxe6 axb5 18.\(\text{Oxg}4\) bxc4\(\text{f}\) and Black has already the advantage, Uhlmann - Knaak, Leipzig 1977, or 11.\(\text{Cc}2\) f5 12.exf5 (In case of 12.\(\text{Og}5\), it is good for Black to follow with: 12...\(\text{Ca}5\) 13.dxe5 \(\text{Cdx}e5\) 14.\(\text{Odx}e5\) \(\text{Oxe}5\), while after 12.dxe5 - he has 12...\(\text{Odx}e5\) 13.\(\text{Oxe}5\) \(\text{Oxe}5\), because Black can counter 14.h3, with: 14...\(\text{Oh}2!\) 15.\(\text{Cfe}1\) f4 16.f3 \(\text{Oxh}3!\)→) 12...exd4 13.\(\text{Og}5\) \(\text{Ca}5!\) 14.\(\text{Oxd}4\) \(\text{Oxd}4\) 15.\(\text{Oxg}4\) \(\text{Oe}5\)\(\text{f}\) and Black had a lively piece play in the game Gavrilov – Kalegin, Moscow 1991.

11...\(\text{Oh}6\), This move loses a pawn for Black after: 12.dxc6 bxc6 (The move – 12...\(\text{Oc}5\), would not help Black either in view of: 13.b4! \(\text{Oe}6\) 14.cxb7 \(\text{Oxb}7\) 15.c5 dxc5 16.\(\text{Cb}3\) \(\text{Cc}8\) 17.\(\text{Cc}4\) \(\text{Ce}8\) 18.\(\text{Oh}xh6\) \(\text{Oxh}6\) 19.\(\text{Oxb}5\) \(\text{Of}8\) 20.\(\text{Oxe}6+\) \(\text{Oxe}6\) 21.\(\text{Oxe}6+\) \(\text{Oxe}6\) 22.\(\text{Oc}7+-\) and as a result of that forced line he remains an exchange down, Browne – Ginsburg, New York 1989.) 13.\(\text{Oxh}6\) \(\text{Oxh}6\) 14.\(\text{Oxd}6\) \(\text{Ob}6\) 15.\(\text{Oab}1\) \(\text{Ec}8\) (It is even worse for Black to continue with: 15...\(\text{Od}8\), because of: 16.\(\text{Oc}4\) \(\text{Sa}5\) 17.\(\text{Oxc}6\) \(\text{Ob}7\) 18.\(\text{Oe}6+\) \(\text{Oh}8\) 19.\(\text{Oc}3+-\) and White had a couple of extra pawns in the game Shipov – Belkhodja, Paris 1995.) 16.b4 \(\text{Of}8\) 17.\(\text{Ob}3\) a5 18.\(\text{Cc}5\) \(\text{Cc}7\) 19.a3 – Black’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient, while after: 19...\(\text{Oe}7\) 20.\(\text{Od}5+\)–, in the game Chekhov – Strikovic, Pula 1990, the fight was practically over...;

11...c5 12.\(\text{Ob}5\) \(\text{Ob}8\) (It is a disaster for Black to try: 12...\(\text{Ob}6\),

13.dxc6 bxc6 (Black has no compensation for the pawn after: 13...\(\text{Oc}5\) 14.\(\text{Cc}1\) \(\text{Of}7\) 15.cxb7 \(\text{Oxb}7\) 16.\(\text{Oc}2\)\(\text{f}\) 17.\(\text{Oxh}6\) \(\text{Oxh}6\) 18.\(\text{Oxd}6\) \(\text{Ob}6\) 16.\(\text{Oa}4\) \(\text{Ob}7\) (In answer to: 16...\(\text{Oa}6\), R.Janssen – Varavin, Moscow 2002, White has the powerful argument: 17.a3! \(\text{Eh}7\) 18.\(\text{b4}\)\(\text{±}\) and he ends up with an extra pawn and a strong queenside initiative.) 17.\(\text{Cc}5\) \(\text{Ec}8\) 18.\(\text{Od}1\) \(\text{Ob}4\) 19.\(\text{Oc}2\)\(\text{f}\) and later White prepares b2-b4, increasing his advantage, Tratar – Hanko, Bled 1999;

11...\(\text{Oh}6\), This move loses a pawn for Black after: 12.dxc6 bxc6 (The move – 12...\(\text{Oc}5\), would not help Black either in view of: 13.b4! \(\text{Oe}6\) 14.cxb7 \(\text{Oxb}7\) 15.c5 dxc5 16.\(\text{Cb}3\) \(\text{Cc}8\) 17.\(\text{Cc}4\) \(\text{Ce}8\) 18.\(\text{Oh}xh6\) \(\text{Oxh}6\) 19.\(\text{Oxb}5\) \(\text{Of}8\) 20.\(\text{Oxe}6+\) \(\text{Oxe}6\) 21.\(\text{Oxe}6+\) \(\text{Oxe}6\) 22.\(\text{Oc}7+-\) and as a result of that forced line he remains an exchange down, Browne – Ginsburg, New York 1989.) 13.\(\text{Oxh}6\) \(\text{Oxh}6\) 14.\(\text{Oxd}6\) \(\text{Ob}6\) 15.\(\text{Ab}1\) \(\text{Ec}8\) (It is even worse for Black to continue with: 15...\(\text{Ed}8\), because of: 16.\(\text{Ab}4\) \(\text{Sa}5\) 17.\(\text{Oxc}6\) \(\text{Ab}7\) 18.\(\text{Oe}6+\) \(\text{Oh}8\) 19.\(\text{Oc}3+-\) and White had a couple of extra pawns in the game Shipov – Belkhodja, Paris 1995.) 16.b4 \(\text{Oe}8\) 17.\(\text{Ed}3\) a5 18.\(\text{Cc}5\) \(\text{Cc}7\) 19.a3 – Black’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient, while after: 19...\(\text{Oe}7\) 20.\(\text{Od}5+\)–, in the game Chekhov – Strikovic, Pula 1990, the fight was practically over...;
due to: 13.b4! a6, Correia – Merg
Vaz, Internet 2003, 14.bxc5 axb5
15.cxb6± 13.b4 a6 14.a3 h6
15.eb1 f7 16.ee1 f5 17.ee3± and
White was slightly better in the
game Wojtkiewicz – Zapata, Bue-
nos Aires 1998;
11...cxd5 – Opening of the c-
file is as a rule in favour of White.
12.cxd5 h6 (If 12...a5, Yermolinsky
– Vetema, Parnu 1982, with the
idea for Black de-d7-c5 and
f6-f5, it is good for White to play
13.ea4!±; or 12...c5 13.b4 ea6
14.db3 h6 15.eac1± J.Nielsen –
Anton, corr. 1982; 12...f5 13.e5
c5, Ihlenfeld – Poellen, corr.
1989 and here White’s most natu-
ral reaction is: 14.b4 ea6 – Black
would not fare any better after:
14...h6 15.bxc5 xg5 16.xg5
dxg5 17.xg4 fxg4 18.cxd6± –
15.ee6 xe6 16.dxe6± and the
light squares are very weak in
Black’s position, as well as his d6-
pawn; meanwhile he has prob-
lms to activate his dark-squared
bishop.) 13.e2 (It is also possible
for White to follow with 13.e1,
but as you are going to see later,
his queen’s rook might be useful
on the a1-square, while he can
place on c1 his king’s rook.) 13...
a6 (Black only weakens his queens-
side with: 13...a5 14.a3±, while
after the careless move 14...f5?!,
in the game Poluljahov – Frolov,
Krasnodar 1998, there were im-
mediately some almost forced
developments after: 15.f5 xg5
c5 17.b4 axb4 18.axb4
xa1 19.xa1 e4 20.cxe4 fxe4
21.a8 f6 22.ee4 f5 and
here the move – 23...xe6! settled
the issue – 23...xe6 24.g4 d7
25.f6+ and Black resigned. Af-
fter the immediate move 13...f5,
White can also play: 14.exf5 xf5
15.db5 f6 16.c7 b8 17.eac1
d7 18.f3±) 14.a4 h8 (If 14...
f5 15.e5 c5 16.a5 f4, Kottnauer
– Donner, Bad Aibling 1968, it
is interesting for White to follow
with: 17.b4!? db3 18.xb3 xg5
19.a4±; 17...xg5 18.bxc5 h3
19.f3 eac8 20.a4±. After the
tentative move – 14...f7 15.a5
h6, White obtains easily a con-
siderable advantage with: 16.e5
e5 17.aa4 xf3+ 18.e5xf3 xd2
19.xd2 f5 20.db4 foz – Bel-
lia, Vinkovci 1989; 16...b6 17.axb6
eb6 18.a4 xd2 19.xd2 e4 20.
xa4 f5 21.ea1 fxe4 22.xe4±
Lindemann – Heinig, Germany
2003.) 15.a5 f5 16.e5 c5 17.f3
(Now, in case of 17...xe4, White
can counter that with 18.xe4, pre-
venting the activation of Black’s
forces after ef5-d4.) 17...f7
18.b4 e5 19.bxc5 d7 20.db3
c8 21.b6 h6 22.h1 (That
prophylactic was necessary, be-
cause Black was threatening 22...
ef3+.) 22...c5 23.xd8 xd8 24.xa1
Krivoshiey – Casper,
Hofheim 2005. Black’s position
is difficult, his b7 and c5-pawns
are vulnerable and he can hardly
defend against White’s doubling
of the rooks along the b-file, fol-
lowed by (if necessary) xa6.
12.\textit{\textbf{Qg5}} \textit{\textbf{Qd6}} 13.\textit{\textbf{b4}}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.4\textwidth]{chess_board.png}
\end{center}

13...\textit{\textbf{exd5}}

If 13...a5, then: 14.bxa5 \textit{\textbf{Qxa5}} 15.\textit{\textbf{Wb3}} c5 16.f3 \textit{\textbf{Qh6}} 17.\textit{\textbf{Qe6}} \textit{\textbf{Qxe6}} 18.\textit{\textbf{dxe6}} \textit{\textbf{Qa7}} 19.\textit{\textbf{Qd5}} \textit{\textbf{Wb8}} 20.\textit{\textbf{Wb5}} \textit{\textbf{Qe8}} 21.e7 \textit{\textbf{Qf7}} 22.\textit{\textbf{a5}} and White’s advantage is overwhelming, Gelfand – M.Marin, Tallinn 1989.

In answer to 13...fe, B.Lalic – Zapata, Linares 1997, it is very strong for White to continue with: 14.\textit{\textbf{Qe6}}! \textit{\textbf{Qxe6}} 15.\textit{\textbf{dxe6}} \textit{\textbf{Qh6}} 16.\textit{\textbf{g4}} d5 (It is not any better for Black to defend with: 16...\textit{\textbf{Qe8}} 17.\textit{\textbf{Qxe4}} \textit{\textbf{Qe7}} 18.\textit{\textbf{Qc1}}+) 17.\textit{\textbf{Qg5}}! \textit{\textbf{Qd6}} (or 17...\textit{\textbf{Ec8}} 18.\textit{\textbf{cxd5}} cxd5 19.e7 – see 13...\textit{\textbf{cxd5}}) 18.\textit{\textbf{cxd5}} \textit{\textbf{Qxb4}} (Black can hardly cope with White’s powerful passed e6-pawn after: 18...\textit{\textbf{cxd5}} 19.\textit{\textbf{Qxf6}} \textit{\textbf{Qxf6}} 20.\textit{\textbf{Qxd5}}\pm; or 18...\textit{\textbf{Qxd5}} 19.\textit{\textbf{Qxd5}} cxd5 20.\textit{\textbf{Qc4}}!+) 19.\textit{\textbf{Qe1}}! \textit{\textbf{Qhxg4}} (or 19...\textit{\textbf{cxd5}} 20.\textit{\textbf{Qxf6}} \textit{\textbf{Qxf6}} 21.\textit{\textbf{Qxd5}} \textit{\textbf{Qxe1}} 22.\textit{\textbf{Qxe1}}!+) 20.\textit{\textbf{Qb1}} \textit{\textbf{Qc5}} 21.e7 \textit{\textbf{Qfe8}} 22.\textit{\textbf{dxc6}} bxc6 23.\textit{\textbf{Qxg4}} \textit{\textbf{Qxg4}} 24.\textit{\textbf{Qxe4}}+ and soon White’s passed e7-pawn will yield him additional material gains.

13...\textit{\textbf{Qe7}} 14.\textit{\textbf{h3}} \textit{\textbf{Qh6}} 15.c5! \textit{\textbf{Qh8}} (It is worse for Black to play: 15...

\textit{\textbf{dxc5}} 16.\textit{\textbf{Wb3}} \textit{\textbf{Qh8}} 17.\textit{\textbf{bxc5}} and here he loses, for example after: 17...\textit{\textbf{Qxc5}}?! 18.\textit{\textbf{Qa4}} \textit{\textbf{Qe7}} 19.\textit{\textbf{Qb4}}+) 16.\textit{\textbf{Wb3}} \textit{\textbf{Qe8}} 17.\textit{\textbf{b5}} and Black fails to create any counterplay, Gruenberg – Knaak, Glauchau 1987.

13...\textit{\textbf{Qh8}} 14.\textit{\textbf{Qc1}} \textit{\textbf{Qe7}}, Krush – Buckley, London 1999, now White can start active actions on the queenside with: 15.f3 \textit{\textbf{Qh6}} 16.\textit{\textbf{dxc6}} bxc6 17.\textit{\textbf{Qd5}} \textit{\textbf{Qd7}} (or 17...\textit{\textbf{c5}} 18.\textit{\textbf{Qe1}} \textit{\textbf{Qf7}} 19.\textit{\textbf{Qh4}}+) 18.\textit{\textbf{Qxe6}} \textit{\textbf{Qxe6}} 19.\textit{\textbf{Qd5}} \textit{\textbf{Qd7}} 20.\textit{\textbf{Qc2}}+ – and White’s powerful knight on the d5-outpost provides him with a slight, but stable advantage.

14.\textit{\textbf{cxd5}} \textit{\textbf{fxe4}}

According to GM V.Ivanchuk, that move leads to a very difficult position for Black. It would have been stronger for him to follow with 14...\textit{\textbf{Qe7}}, but even then his defence would not have been easy at all: 15.\textit{\textbf{Wb3}}! \textit{\textbf{Qxe4}} 16.\textit{\textbf{Qxe4}} \textit{\textbf{fxe4}} 17.\textit{\textbf{Qxe4}} \textit{\textbf{Qf6}} (or 17...\textit{\textbf{Qxh2}}? 18.\textit{\textbf{Qg5}}+) 18.\textit{\textbf{Qg5}}! \textit{\textbf{Qf5}} 19.f3 \textit{\textbf{Qd7}} 20.\textit{\textbf{Qg3}}+.

Black is still too far from equality after: 14...\textit{\textbf{Qh8}} 15.\textit{\textbf{Qe6}} \textit{\textbf{Qxe6}} 16.\textit{\textbf{dxe6}} \textit{\textbf{Qc8}} (or 16...\textit{\textbf{Qe7}} 17.f3 \textit{\textbf{Qh6}} 18.\textit{\textbf{Qc4}}+) 17.\textit{\textbf{Qc1}} \textit{\textbf{Qe8}} 18.\textit{\textbf{Qxg4}} \textit{\textbf{Qxg4}} (In case of: 18...\textit{\textbf{fxg4}} 19.\textit{\textbf{Qg5}}, White has a powerful knight on d5 against a passive black bishop on g7.) 19.exf5 gxf5 20.\textit{\textbf{Qf3}} \textit{\textbf{Qe7}} (or 20...\textit{\textbf{Qxe6}} 21.\textit{\textbf{Qxf5}} \textit{\textbf{Qg6}} 22.\textit{\textbf{Qd5}}+) 21.\textit{\textbf{Qxf5}} \textit{\textbf{Qf6}} 22.\textit{\textbf{Qe4}}!+

15.\textit{\textbf{Qe6}}!

It is weaker for White to continue here with: 15.h3 \textit{\textbf{Qh6}} 16.\textit{\textbf{g4}},

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because of: 16...\texttt{h}8 17.\texttt{g}xe4 \texttt{xe}4 18.\texttt{xe}4 \texttt{f}7 19.\texttt{g}2 \texttt{h}6= and Black equalizes, L.Hansen – Vogt, Taastrup 1990.

15...\texttt{xe}6 16.\texttt{dx}e6 \texttt{h}6
It is not better for Black to opt for: 16...\texttt{h}5 17.\texttt{g}5+.

17.g4!
That is a strong move and it is aimed at the restriction of the mobility of Black’s knight on \texttt{h}6.

17...d5 18.\texttt{g}5!
After: 18.g5 \texttt{f}5 19.\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{xf}6\texttt{=} , Black has compensation for the sacrificed piece.

18...\texttt{Ec}8
It is too bad for Black to try 18...d4 19.\texttt{dx}e4$^\pm$; but it would have been much more resilient for him to continue with: 18...\texttt{Ee}8 19.\texttt{xf}6, but here not: 19...\texttt{xf}6 20.\texttt{xd}5 \texttt{wh}4 21.\texttt{b}3$, but instead: 19...\texttt{xf}6!, although he would have to fight in a rather difficult endgame even then: 20.\texttt{xd}5! (This move seems to be stronger than GM Ivanchuk’s recommendation – 20.\texttt{dx}d5, in view of: 20...\texttt{h}8! 21.\texttt{wb}3 \texttt{Ec}8 and White’s \texttt{e}6-pawn is lost...) 20...\texttt{xd}5 21.\texttt{xd}5 \texttt{d}8 22.\texttt{ac}1$^\pm$.

19.e7! (That move settles the issue outright.) 19...\texttt{xe}7 20.\texttt{xd}5 \texttt{we}6 21.\texttt{xf}6+ \texttt{xf}6 22.\texttt{xf}6 \texttt{xf}6 23.\texttt{d}5+– and White had a winning position in the game Ivanchuk – Piket, Wijk aan Zee 1996.

b) 10...\texttt{h}6

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

11.\texttt{wc}2
White has no advantage after: 11.dxe5 dxe5 12.b4 c6 13.c5 \texttt{we}7 14.\texttt{wb}3+ \texttt{f}7 15.\texttt{ad}1. Black has at his disposal a typical plan, which leads to balanced chances: 15...\texttt{e}8 16.\texttt{e}3 \texttt{f}8 17.\texttt{d}2 \texttt{e}6 18.\texttt{c}4 \texttt{ad}8 19.\texttt{a}3 \texttt{xd}1 20.\texttt{xd}1 a6 21.\texttt{a}5 \texttt{dd}8= with equality, Banikas – Damljanovic, Panormo 1998.

White’s immediate activity on the queenside after: 11.b4 \texttt{f}7 12.\texttt{wb}3, enables Black to inflict a counter strike in the centre with: 12...f5! 13.dxe5 (In case of 13. \texttt{ex}f5, it is quite sufficient for Black to follow with: 13...\texttt{gxf}5 14.dxe5 \texttt{dx}e5$^\odot$) 13...\texttt{dx}e5 (After 13...dxe5, Black must consider the possibility – 14.\texttt{ad}1$^\pm$) 14.\texttt{xf}5 \texttt{xf}5 15.\texttt{d}4 \texttt{d}7 16.\texttt{ad}1 \texttt{h}4= 288
with an approximately equal position, W.Schmidt – Mikrut, Poland 1998.

11...c6

About 11...a5 12.aad1 f7 13.e3 – see 11...f7 12.aad1 a5 13.e3; 11...e8 12.aad1 c6 13.b4 f7 14.e3 – see 11...c6 12.aad1 f7 13.b4 e8 14.e3.

11...h8, A.Bachmann – Rossmann, Germany 2001, 12.aad1 c6 13.b4±.

11...f5?! – This move is premature. 12.g5 f6 13.dxe5 dxe5, Carlsson – Aijala, Sundsvall 1979 and here White obtains a clear advantage after the standard reaction: 14.c5 f7 15.c4 e8 (It is even worse for Black to play: 15...h8 16.xf7 xf7 17.xe5+-) 16.xf1±.

White’s advantage is more than obvious after: 11...exd4 12.xd4 e5 (Following: 12...c5 13.aad1, Black equalizes neither with the aggressive line: 13...f5?! 14.xh6 xh6 15.xf5 xf5 16.xf5 xf5 17.b4 d7 18.c5± De Boer – Bakalarz, Myslowice 1985, nor with the help of the accurate: 13...f7 14.e3 e6 15.xe6 xe6 16.c5± Soucha – J.Novak, corr. 1999, since White ends up with a clear edge in both cases.) 13.aad1 f5 14.xc1 h7 15.xf5 xf5 16.c2± L.Spaso – Sahovic, Vrnjacka Banja 1976.

11...f7 12.aad1 a5 (About 12...c6 – see 11...c6; 12...h8, Jansson – Westerinen, Siegen 1970 and here White’s simplest way to make use of Black’s waiting move is the line: 13.e3 e7 14.b4±, or 13...c6 14.b4±; after 12...e8 13.e3 c6, Fomichenko – Kondenko, Krasnodar 2001, it seems quite logical for White to play the typical line: 14.d5 c5 15.b1±, while the exchange of the dark-squared bishops after: 13.h6 14.xh6 xh6, Kraidman – Morovic, Ramat Hasharon 1980, would not equalize for Black in view of: 15.b4 f7 16.c5±) 13.e3 c6 (In answer to: 13...h6 14.xh6 xh6, Kahlert – Groeppel, Hamburg 2002, White obtains the advantage by opening the centre: 15.c5! exd4 16.a4 xc5 17.xc5 dxc5 18.xc5±. It is just terrible for Black to play: 15...dxc5 16.dxe5+-, because he loses material.) 14.c5! dxc5 (If 14...exd4, rat – Weeber, corr. 1971, then: 15.xd4 e7 16.a4 e8 17.c4± and Black is completely squeezed to the last two ranks, while his attempt to win a pawn as a compensation for that ends up in an immediate loss of the game for him after: 17...xe4? 18.b3 d5 19.f1+-) 15.dxe5 e7, Topalov – Sorin, Zaragoza 1992 and here after: 16.a4 fxe5 17.xc5 f6 18.a4± Black’s queenside is vulnerable and his e5-pawn only hampers his own pieces to develop some activity.

12.aad1

In case of 12.b4, White must consider – 12...f5.
12...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{e7}}}

In principle, Black would not change anything with: 12...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{c7}}}
13.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{b4\pm}}} Heroiu – Ammermann, Germany 1995.

12...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{a5}}} – This move compromises the dark squares on Black’s queenside, Ostrowski – Jurkiewicz, Gdynia 1986, 13.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{dxe5 dxe5}}}
(or 13...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{dxe5 14.dxe5 fxe5 15.c5\pm}}})
14.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{e5 e7}}}
15.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{a4\pm}}} and White will soon redeploy his knight on f3 to the c4-square and that would increase his advantage considerably.

After: 12...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{f7}}} 13.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{b4 f5}}} (About
13...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{e7}}} 14.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{c1}}} – see 12...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{c7}}};
13...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{exd4 14.dxd4 e8}}} 15.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{b3\pm}}};
13...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{c7}}}, Sebrnic – Praznik, Slovenia 2003, 14.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{c1\pm}}}; after
13...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{e8}}} 14.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{e3}}} Black fails to trade favourably his” bad” dark-
squared bishop with: 14...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{h6}}}
15.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{c5 dxc5}}} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{dxe5}}}
\textit{\textbf{\textsc{exe3}}}
17.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{c4!}}}
\textit{\textbf{\textsc{h6}}} 18.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{e6\pm}}}, because he loses material, S.Volkov – Badea, Sovata 2001. It is slightly better for him to defend with the passive line:
14...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{c7}}} 15.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{d5 c5}}} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{b5 b6}}}
17.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{a4 d8}}}, M.Sorokin – Dolezal, Villa Martelli 1995, but White can easily develop his queenside ini-
tiative with: 18.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{a3 h6}}} 19.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{bxc5}}}
\textit{\textbf{\textsc{dxc5}}}
20.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{exh6}}}
\textit{\textbf{\textsc{dxe6}}}
21.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{b1\pm}}}; White obtains a slight, but stable edge with: 13...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{b6}}} 14.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{c1 b7}}}
15.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{c5 dxc5}}} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{bxc5 e7}}} 17.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{xb6}}}
\textit{\textbf{\textsc{exd4}}}
18.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{d4 axb6}}} 19.a4\pm Werle – Khismatullin, Oropesa del Mar 2001.) 14.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{exf5 gxf5}}} (White’s advantage is indisputable after: 14...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{exd4}}}
15.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{fxg6 hxg6}}} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{e4\pm}}})
15.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{dxe5 dxe5}}} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{dxe5 dxe5}}} and
in the game Sherbakov – Pospelov, Kurgan 1995, White could have continued with: 17.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{h6 e7}}}
(He maintains the positional pressure too with the line: 17...
\textit{\textbf{\textsc{f6}}} 18.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{dxd4 exd4}}} 19.fxe1\pm Sher-
bakov.) 18.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{dxd4 exd4}}} 19.c5 a5
20.a3 axb4 21.axb4 \textit{\textbf{\textsc{e6}}} 22.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{h5\pm}}}
(Sherbakov) and White would have somewhat better chances.

13.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{b4}}}

13...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{f7}}}

Black fails to equalize with the line: 13...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{exd4 14.dxd4 e5}}}
15.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{c1 ef7}}} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{b5\pm}}} van der Ster-

After: 13...\textit{\textbf{\textsc{f5}}} 14.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{g5 e8}}} 15.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{d5}}}
\textit{\textbf{\textsc{f7}}} 16.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{d1 f6}}} 17.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{dxc6 bxc6}}} 18.
\textit{\textbf{\textsc{g5 f4}}} 19.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{xf7 xf7}}} 20.\textit{\textbf{\textsc{c5 dxc5}}}

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21.bxc5  
with a clear advantage.

Following: 14...h8 15.b5 d8 16.bxc6 bxc6 17.c5 dxc5, Atalik – Saltaev, Cappelle la Grande 1998, White could have chosen the move – 18.a3?!, with a slight edge, for example: 18...exd4 19.exd4 b7 20.a4 g5 21.f3 f8 22.b3 e6 23.c4=.

15.xh6 xh6 16.c5 dxc5 17.dxc5 e8

In the game Cramling – Zapata, Biel 1988, Black tried 17...f5, but White could have obtained the advantage with the line: 18.c4+ h8 19.exf5 gxf5 20.d6.

18.d2 f8 19.c4 e6


20.d6

In case of 14...e8, Hakki – Hassan, Cairo 1999, White could have followed with 15.b5=.

After 14...g5, Pelletier – Rakow, Hamburg 1998, it seems very good for White to continue with: 15.xg5 fxg5 16.d5 c5 17.b5=.

20...ed8, Bajec – Tringov, Ljubljana 1969 and here White could have exploited the vulnerability of Black’s kingside with: 21.d2. Black’s defence is quite difficult now, for example: 21...g5 22.e3 g6 23.g3 f7 24.f5 f8 25.g4 c4 26.f1 h6 27.
Chapter 20

\( \text{\textit{Conclusion}} \)

We have analyzed in this chapter Black’s most principled line – 8... \( \texttt{Cg4} \) and its aim is to prevent the optimal deployment of his opponent’s pieces. White counters that with the bishop-maneuver – \( \texttt{e}3-\texttt{g}5-\texttt{d}2 \) and he provokes weakening of the complex of light squares along \( \texttt{a}2-\texttt{g}8 \) diagonal, with the idea to create outposts on the \( \texttt{e}6 \) and \( \texttt{d}5 \)-squares. The advantages of White’s position can be best seen in variation \( a \), in which Black tries to organize active actions in the centre and on the kingside with the help of the moves – \( \texttt{c}7-\texttt{c}6 \) and \( \texttt{f}6-\texttt{f}5 \). It is more reliable for Black, but also more passive to continue with 10...\( \texttt{Ch6} \) and we have dealt with that move in variation \( b \). White then exploits his opponent’s tentative play by deploying his pieces in the centre and he prepares opening of the game and further occupation of the \( \texttt{d} \)-file.

Practically in all the lines of that variation, White tries to disrupt Black’s pawn-chain – \( \texttt{d}6-\texttt{e}5 \) with the move – \( \texttt{c}4-\texttt{c}5 \) and he establishes a powerful outpost on the \( \texttt{d}6 \)-square. The position of White’s \( \texttt{d} \)-pawn is an important nuance in that position. He pushes \( \texttt{d}4-\texttt{d}5 \), in case Black plays \( \texttt{c}7-\texttt{c}6 \) prematurely. In the majority of the lines, it is advantageous for White to maintain the tension in the centre, having the options to play – \( \texttt{d}4xe5 \), \( \texttt{d}4-\texttt{d}5 \), or \( \texttt{c}4-\texttt{c}5 \).
Chapter 21

1.\(\text{\&}f3\) 2.\(\text{\&}f6\) 3.\(\text{\&}c4\) 4.\(\text{\&}g7\) 5.\(\text{\&}e4\) 6.\(\text{\&}e2\) 7.\(0-0\) 8.\(\text{\&}d7\) 9.\(\text{\&}e3\) c6

That is the main line for Black.

9.\(\text{\&}d5\)

White is threatening to win a pawn, for example: 9...\(\text{\&}h6\) 10.\(\text{\&}xc6\) bxc6 11.\(\text{\&}xd6\) Hafner – Pitzel, Austria 1998. If 9...\(\text{\&}g4\), then after: 10.\(\text{\&}g5\) f6 (It is too bad for Black to play 10...\(\text{\&}f6\), due to: 11.\(\text{\&}xc6\) bxc6 12.\(\text{\&}xf6\) \(\text{\&}xf6\) 13.\(\text{\&}d2\). The threat is 14.\(\text{\&}h3\), capturing Black’s knight. 13...\(\text{\&}g7\) 14.\(\text{\&}ad1\) – and Black loses unavoidably his d6-pawn. He would not change anything with: 12...\(\text{\&}dx6\) 13.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}g7\) 13.\(\text{\&}ad1\) – and Black loses material.) 11.\(\text{\&}d2\), there is a transposition to variation a from Chapter 20.

9...c5

That move reduces maximally White’s active possibilities on the queenside. In case Black plays something else, White has additional resources, connected for example with the capturing – d5xc6:

9...\(\text{\&}e8\) 10.\(\text{\&}xc6\) bxc6 11.c5. This move destroys Black’s pawn-structure. 11...\(\text{\&}xc5\) (Or 11...\(\text{\&}c7\) 12.\(\text{\&}xd6\) \(\text{\&}xd6\) 13.\(\text{\&}xd6\) \(\text{\&}xd6\) 14.\(\text{\&}d1\) Meza – Bednıkova, Spain 1999.) 12.\(\text{\&}xc5\) \(\text{\&}c7\) 13.\(\text{\&}xf8\) \(\text{\&}xf8\) 14.\(\text{\&}a4\) \(\text{\&}b7\) 15.\(\text{\&}a5\) \(\text{\&}e6\) 16.\(\text{\&}c4\) – D.Gurevich – Klinova, Groningen 1996;

9...\(\text{\&}c7\). That is not the best square for Black’s queen if you have in mind that White is planning to play actively on the queenside. 10.\(\text{\&}d2\) \(\text{\&}e8\) (Or 10...a5 11.a3 \(\text{\&}e8\) 12.b4 cxd5 13.\(\text{\&}b5\)! \(\text{\&}b8\) 14.cxd5 axb4 15.axb4 \(\text{\&}xa1\) 16.\(\text{\&}xa1\) Lima – Arias, Cali 2001.) 11.b4 f5 12.f3 \(\text{\&}df6\) 13.\(\text{\&}c1\) f4 14.\(\text{\&}f2\) g5 15.c5 – Z.Mamedjarova, Batumi 2000;

9...\(\text{\&}c5\). Black fails to fortify his knight on that square even temporarily, so White obtains a stable advantage in all variations.

9...\texttt{\textit{\textbf{e7}}} 10.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{d2 d8}}} (The other possibilities for Black are: 10...\texttt{\textit{\textbf{cxd5}}} - see 9...\texttt{\textit{\textbf{cxd5}}} 10...\texttt{\textit{\textbf{a5}}} 11.a3 \texttt{\textit{\textbf{e8}}} 12.b4 c5 13.bxc5 dxc5, Nevedichy - Ungureanu, Curtea de Arges 2002, 14.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{d3}}} \texttt{\textit{\textbf{d6}}} 15.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{c2}}} f5 16.f3 b6 17.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{a4}}} 10...\texttt{\textit{\textbf{d5}}} 11.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{h1 d8}}} 12.g4. White plays analogously to the main line. 12...\texttt{\textit{\textbf{xc7}}} 13.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{g1 b8}}} 14.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{b5}}} \texttt{\textit{\textbf{xb5}}} 15.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{xb5}}} \texttt{\textit{\textbf{b6}}} 16.a4 \texttt{\textit{\textbf{d7}}} 17.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{b4 cxb4}}} 18.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{b3}}} Sulava - Loganlo, Cortina d'Ampezzo 2004; 10...\texttt{\textit{\textbf{h5}}} 11.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{g5}}} a5 12.a3 c5 13.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{b1 h7}}} Greenfeld - Bacrot, Bugojno 1999, 14.b4!? and here after: 14...\texttt{\textit{\textbf{xb4}}} 15.axb4 cxb4 16.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{xb4 c5}}} 17.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{b3}}} 18.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{h6}}} \texttt{\textit{\textbf{h6}}} 16.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{a4}}} axb4 17.axb4 b6 18.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{b3}}} g5 19.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{a1 h7}}} 20.bxc5 bxc5 21.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{c3}}} \texttt{\textit{\textbf{xa1}}} 22.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{xa1}}} h4 23.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{d1}}} ±, White obtains a clear advantage.) 11.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{d6}}} bxc6 12.b4 (White is slightly better after: 12.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{b3 a5}}} 13.c5 a4 14.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{d6}}} \texttt{\textit{\textbf{xd6}}} 15.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{c5}}} a3 16.b4 14.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{a4}}} ± Crabling - Kr. Georgiev, Innsbruck 1977.) 12...\texttt{\textit{\textbf{f5}}} 13.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{f3 d6}}} 14.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{b5 f4}}} 15.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{f2}} c5 16.a4 \texttt{\textit{\textbf{c7}}} 17.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{d5 d5}}} 18.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{cx5 d5}}} g5 19.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{c4 h5}}} 20.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{h1 e7}}} (In case of 20...\texttt{\textit{\textbf{g4}}}, White counters with 21.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{h4}}} and he stops Black's offensive.) 21.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{a5}}} \texttt{\textit{\textbf{f8}}} 22.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{c6 e8}}} 23.a5 \texttt{\textit{\textbf{b7}}} 24.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{c4 h8}}} 25.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{b3 e7}}} 26.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{b6}}} axb6 27.a6! That is the point. White's pieces penetrate along the open b-file into his opponent's camp. 27...\texttt{\textit{\textbf{e7}}} 28.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{xb6+}}} Kruppa - Kirillova, St Petersburg 2004.

9...\texttt{\textit{\textbf{cxd5}}} 10.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{cxd5}}}. After opening of the b-file, White has a clear plan for the development of his initiative on the queenside, so it is worth for Black to try to find quickly some counterplay.

![Chess Diagram]

His most logical move seems to be 10...\texttt{\textit{\textbf{g4}}} and after 11.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{g5}}} f6 12.\texttt{\textit{\textbf{d2}}}, it leads to positions, which we analyze in Chapter 17, variation \textbf{a}. After Black's other moves, White maneuvers his knight along the standard route for this pawn-
structure – f3-d2-c4, meanwhile he prevents .cb6-g4:

About 10...cb5 11.d2 a5 12.a3 – see 9...cb5;

10...ce8?! That move is not good in this position. 11.d2 ce7
12.cb5 cf8 13.cb1++ Kargoll – Buttenmueller, Klinge 1993;

10...cb5 11.ce1 cf4 12.cf1 cb6 13.cb3 cg4?! (Black only forces White’s knight to follow the planned route, meanwhile after the possible f7-f5, Black’s bishop will not be so well placed on the g4-square. It is more logical for him to play immediately 13...f5, although White’s position is excellent after that too – 14.d2 fx4 15.dxe4 gf5 16.a4± 14.d2 cc8 (Now, it becomes clear that in case of 14...f5, White plays: 15.f3 cb5 16.g3 fx4 17.fxe4 and Black loses his knight on f4.) 15.cb4 ce7 16.cb5+– Katanic-Vujic – Stankovic, Kladovo 1991;

10...a5. Black’s queenside is totally compromised after that move. 11.d2 b6 12.a3 ce8 13.cb5 f5 14.f3 f4 15.cf2 h5 16.cb4 cb8 17.ca4 g5 18.cc1 g4 19.ch1 g3 20.hxg3 fxg3 21.xg3 sh6 22.cc3 cb5 23.xc5 bxc5 24.xe8 xe8 25.f4++ Ghaem Maghami – Ravi, Kish 2003;

10...ce7 11.d2 ce8 (or 11...a5?! 12.cc4 cc5 13.f3 sd7 14.

g5 15.cc1 h5 16.cb5 a6 17.ca7± Bui Ngoc – Tran Quoc Dung, Ho Chi Minh 2001;

10...h6 11.dd2 ce8 (or 11...a6 12.a4 b6 13.cc4± Alonso Garcia – Chain, Dos Hermanas 2004)
gx5 15.f4 e4 16.a5±;

10...ce8 11.d2 (White has achieved best practical result here with the move 11.cb1, with the idea to counter 11...f5, with 12.cc5, but the line: 12...cc6 13.cc5 cc8 15.cc5 a3, Johansen – Levi, Melbourne 1991, 14...

a6! 15.ca4 cb8, enables Black to neutralize White’s direct threats. For example after: 16.cc5? axb5
17.ca7, Black has: 17...f4 18.h4 cc4 19.cxb8 sh3=) 11...f5 (The exchange of the dark-squared bishops with: 11...ce8 12.cc4 cc5, seems good for Black in principle, but here it does not bring him anything promising. The point is that White’s space advantage is the most important factor in that position. There might follow: 13.cc2, Chekhova – Zietek, Bydgoszcz 1990, 13...cc3 14.cc3
g5 15.exf5 gxf5 16.f4 e4 17.cc1 b6 18.cc2 cb7 19.cc1 cc6 20.cc2

cc8 21.cc3± 12.cc3 f4 (or 12...cc4

13.cc1 cc3 14.cc1 f14 15.cc2± Wissemann – Jamin, Avoine 1996) 13.cc2 f5 (about 13...a6 – see 10...a6) 14.cc5 h5 (as for 14...a6 – see 10...a6) 15.cc5 b6 16.cc4
dc6 17.a5 cc6 18.cc3 cc8 19.

dd2 cc2 20.cc2± M.Nielsen – Jensen, Copenhagen 2004;

10...a6 11.cc2 ce8 (After 11...b5, White’s task is much
Chapter 21

easier – 12.b4 \( \square b6 \) 13.a4 bxa4 14.\( \square x a 4 \) \( \square x a 4 \) 15.\( \square x a 4 \) \( \square e 8 \) 16.b5 a5 17.\( \square c 4 \) f5 18.\( \square d 2 \pm \) Shishkin – Myzyk, Chojnice 2005.) 12.a4 f5 (It is too passive for Black to play: 12...\( \square d f 6 \) 13.\( \square c 1 \) \( \square d 7 \) 14.f3 \( \square c 8 \), Lazcano Arguelles – Ortiz Fernandez, Spain 1995, 15.\( \square b 3 \pm \) 13.f3 f4 (or 13...a5?!) 14.\( \square c 4 \) \( \square c 5 \) 15.\( \square d 6 \pm \) Sielecki – Visser, Germany 1997) 14.\( \square f 2 \) b6, Titz – Klocker, Dornbirm 1988 (The other lines for Black do not pose any problems to White and his initiative is running unopposed: 14...a5 15.\( \square b 5 \) g5 16.\( \square c 2 \) \( \square d f 6 \) 17.\( \square c 4 \) g4 18.\( \square b 6 \pm \) Ivan Ivanov – Pashev, Sofia 2004; 14...g5 15.a5 h5 16.\( \square c 4 \) \( \square f 6 \) 17.\( \square a 4 \) \( \square g 6 \) 18.\( \square c 1 \) g4 19.\( \square x g 4 \) \( \square d f 6 \) 20.gxh5++ – Shipov – Chuprov, Internet 2004; 14...\( \square d f 6 \) 15.\( \square c 4 \) h5, Colangeli – Luzi, Rome 1997, 16.\( \square b 3 \) \( \square g 5 \) 17.\( \square f c 1 \pm \) 15.\( \square c 2 \) g5 16.\( \square a 2 \). The c6-square is the only weakness in Black's camp and White's knight is going there. 16...a5 (or 16...\( \square b 7 \) 17.\( \square b 4 \) \( \square c 8 \) 18.\( \square c 6 \pm \) 17.\( \square f c 1 \) \( \square b 7 \) 18.\( \square b 5 \) \( \square c 8 \) 20.\( \square d 1 \pm \). Black's queenside is weak and his counterplay on the kingside is only symbolic.

10.\( \square e 1 \)

That is the best route for the knight on f3 in that pawn-structure. It will not have so good prospects on the d2-square: 10.\( \square d 2 \) \( \square e 8 \) 11.a3 (In case of 11.g4, Black can play 11...\( \square f 6 \), forcing 12.\( \square f 3 \) and then 12...\( \square e 7 \), followed by \( \square g 7 \) and f7-f5.) 11...f5 12.f3 \( \square f 6 \) 13.b4 \( \square g 5 \) 14.\( \square f 2 \) b6 15.\( \square a 2 \) \( \square d f 6 \) 16.bxc5 bxc5 17.\( \square a 4 \) \( \square h 5 \) 18.\( \square b 1 \) \( \square f 4 \) and Black had a good counterplay in the game Mohr – Khalifman, Bled/Rogashka Slatina 1991.

10...\( \square e 8 \)

That is the most natural move for Black, but he has numerous other possibilities as well:

About 10...h6 11.\( \square h 1 \) \( \square e 8 \) – see 10...\( \square e 8 \);

10...b6. That is not his most useful move, particularly if Black follows with his standard plan for kingside actions. 11.g4 \( \square e 8 \) 12.\( \square h 1 \) \( \square f 6 \) 13.\( \square d 2 \) \( \square g 7 \) 14.\( \square d 3 \) \( \square c 7 \) 15.\( \square g 1 \) \( \square e 8 \) 16.\( \square g 3 \) \( \square h 4 \) 17.\( \square h 3 \) \( \square c 7 \) 18.\( \square g 1 \) h5 19.\( \square h 6 \) \( \square f 6 \) 20.f3 \( \square h 7 \) 21.f4± Sulava – Valenta, Bled 1995;

10...h5 11.\( \square g 5 \) a6 12.\( \square d 2 \) \( \square e 8 \) 13.\( \square h 6 \) \( \square e 7 \) (After 13...\( \square h 7 \), the game might develop in the following fashion: 14.a4 f5 15.\( \square x g 7 \) \( \square x g 7 \) 16.exf5 gxf5 17.f4 e4 18.\( \square c 2 \) \( \square g 6 \) 19.\( \square e 1 \pm \). Later, White's plan includes – \( \square e 3 \), \( \square h 4 \), a4-a5 and possibly \( \square a 3 \)-b3, cramping his opponent's position even more.) 14.a4 \( \square g 4 \) 15.\( \square x g 4 \) hxg4 16.f3
‡xh6 17.‡xh6 ³f6 18.a5± Ortega – Bitansky, Aviles 2000;
10...³b6 11.a4 a5. Now, thanks to the weakening of the b5-square, White has a slight, but stable advantage after any possible change in the pawn-structure. 12.³d2 ³g4 13.f3 ³d7 14.³b5 ³e8 15.³g5 f6 16.³h4 ³b8 17.³c2 f5 18.³xf5 ³xf5 19.b3± Martinez Uceda – Del Carril, Email 2000;
10...³e8 11.a3 ³e7 12.b4 b6 13.³h1 ³e8 14.g4 f5 15.gxf5 gxf5 16.³xf5 e4 17.³g1± Halkias – Hadzidakis, Ermioni Argolidas 2005;
10...³e7 11.³d3 ³e8 (about 11...a6 12.a4 ³e8 – see 10...a6) 12.³d2 f5 (Or 12...³b6 13.b3 f5 14.³xf5 e4 15.³xf4 ³f5, Akesson – Komliakov, Elista 1998, 16.f3 ³f6 17.³ae1±; 12...b6, Solak – Managadze, Ermioni Argolidas 2005, 13.a4!? a6 14.a5±) 13.³exf5 (It is also possible for White to play: 13.³g5 ³ef6, Csomos – Soos, Hungary 1997, 14.³xf5 ³xf5 15.f4 e4 16.³e1 h6 17.³h4 ³f7 18.³c2 ³g6 19.³e3±) 13...³xf5 14.f4 e4 (or 14...³e7 15.³xe5 ³xe5 16.³xe5 ³xe5, Gleizerov – Ozhgibtsev, Roslavl 1989, 17.³f4±) 15.³f2 ³ef6 16.³b1 ³e8 17.³b5! ³b8 18.b4 b6 19.bxc5 bxc5 20.³b3± Groszpeter – Ginting, Novi Sad 1990;
10...³h8 11.³d3 ³g8 (The relatively best move for Black – 11...³b6, does not solve all problems for him after: 12.b3 ³g8 13.³d2 f5 – it is worse for him to try: 13...³d7 14.³ae1 ³e7 15.f4 ³xf4 16.³xf4 ³c8 17.³f3 ³d4+ 18.³h1± Kole-

snikov – P. Czarnota, Urgup 2004 – 14.³exf5 ³xf5 15.f4 e4 16.³f2 ³h6 17.a3± Groszpeter – Romanishin, Sochi 1984.) 12.³d2 f5 (Or 12...³e7 13.f4 f6 14.³xe5 ³xe5 15.³xf8+ ³xf8 16.³g5 ³d7 17.h3 a6 18.a4 ³g8 19.a5± Janjgava – Chiburdanidze, Tbilisi 1991; 12...³e7 13.³ae1 f5 14.³g5 ³df6 15.f4 h6 16.³h4 ³xe4 17.³xe7 ³xd2 18.³xd6 ³xf1 19.³xf1± Duncan – Thipsay, Scarborough 1999.) 13. f4 g5 (In case of: 13...³e7 14.³xe5 ³xe5 15.³xe5 ³xe5 16.³f4 ³d4+ 17.³h1 a6 18.³ae1±, Black’s d6-pawn is quite vulnerable.) 14.³xf5 f4 15.³f2 ³xg5 16.³b5! White’s knight goes to the e6-square and Black has nothing to counter that with. 16...³g6 17.³f3 b6 18.³e2 a6 19.³c7 ³a7 20.³e6± Petkov – Kozul, Zadar 2005;
10...a6 11.³d3 ³e8 (After 11...b5, White reacts in the standard fashion: 12.cxb5 axb5 13.b4±)
12.a4 f5 (If 12...³e7, then: 13.a5 ³c7 14.³d2 f5 15.f3 f4 16.³f2 ³f6 17.b4 cxb4 18.³a4± Polugavevsky – Nunn, Toluca 1982, while in case of 12...a5, White gains access to the b5-square and it deserves attention for him to continue with 13.f4?!), although the following calmer line is also quite attractive: 13.³d2 ³b6 14.b3 f5 15.³xf5 ³xf5 16.f3 ³c8 17.³ae1 b6 18.³f2 ³e7 19.g4 ³c8 20.³f4 ³h8 21.³d3± J. Donaldson – Shsamkovich, Bermuda 1999.) 13.f4 g5 (The tentative move 13...³e7, also enables White to seize the initiative:
14.exf5 gxf5, C.Byrn – Sinkbaek, Copenhagen 1999, 15.fxe5 \(\text{Qxe5}\)
16.\(\text{Qxe5}\) dxe5 17.a5 f4 18.d6\(\pm\),
or 15...dxe5 16.\(\text{Qxc5}\) \(\text{Qxc5}\) 17.d6
\(\text{Wxd6}\) 18.\(\text{Wxd6}\) \(\text{Qxd6}\) 19.\(\text{Qxc5}\) \(\text{Qd8}\)
20.\(\text{Qad1}\) \(\text{Qf7}\) 21.\(\text{Qd5}\)\(\pm\) 14.fxe5 f4
(In case of 14...\(\text{Qxe5}\), White should play analogously to the game Tal – Nunn, London 1984, where they had reached the same position, without the inclusion of the moves a7-a6 and a2-a4 – 15.\(\text{Qxe5}\)
\(\text{Qxe5}\) 16.exf5 \(\text{Qxf5}\) 17.g4 \(\text{Qg6}\) 18.\(\text{Qxf8}\) + \(\text{Qxf8}\) 19.\(\text{Qd2}\) h6 20.h4
ggx4 21.\(\text{Qxh6}\) + \(\text{Qh8}\) 22.\(\text{Qf1}\) 15.\(\text{e6}\)!
fxe3 16.exd7 \(\text{Qxf1}\) + 17.\(\text{Qxf1}\) \(\text{Qxd7}\) (Black only needs to play
18...\(\text{Qe7}\), or 18...\(\text{Qd4}\), but he fails to do that.) 18.e5!\(\pm\).

11.\(\text{Qg4}\)!?

That is an unusual decision, but it is quite justified in that position. In case of: 11.\(\text{Qd3}\) f5 12.f3
f4 13.\(\text{Qf2}\) h5!, we reach the well-familiar situation with a “race” of attacks on both sides of the board. Meanwhile, you must take into account the important psychological moment that whoever attacks the king has the advantage. Another thing, you should not forget that with a black pawn on c5 it is much slower for White to attack on the queenside and not so dangerous for Black either, than the penetration along the c-file. Also, in case of: 12.f4 exf4 13.\(\text{Qf4}\) \(\text{Qe5}\)
14.exf5 \(\text{Qxf5}\), it is far from easy for White to prove his advantage, Al-

11...\(\text{Qf5}\)

The other possibilities for Black are:

11...f6? That idea is too dubious. 12.\(\text{Qg2}\) g5 13.\(\text{h4}\) \(\text{Qf7}\) 14.\(\text{Wd2}\)
h6 15.a3 a6 16.b4 b6 17.\(\text{Qfb1}\) \(\text{Qf8}\)
18.\(\text{h5}\)\(\pm\) Timoschenko – Felcim, Slovak-ia 1995;

11...a6, Janjgava – Sichinava, Tbilisi 1996, 12.a4\(\pm\);

11...h6 12.\(\text{Qh1}\) \(\text{Qh7}\) 13.\(\text{Qd2}\) a6
14.a3 \(\text{Qf6}\) 15.\(\text{Eg1}\) \(\text{Qg8}\) 16.\(\text{Eg3}\) g5
17.\(\text{Eb1}\) \(\text{Qe7}\) 18.b4 b6 19.\(\text{Qd1}\) \(\text{Qg6}\)
20.\(\text{Qa4}\)\(\pm\) Sundararajan – Shivku-
mar, Chennai 2004;

11...\(\text{Qb6}\), Sielecki – Movs-
seian, Groningen 1997, 12.a4?! (In case of: 12.\(\text{Qh1}\) f5 13.\(\text{gx5}\) \(\text{Qg5}\)
14.exf5 \(\text{Qxf5}\), White fails to deploy his knight on g5 under favourable
circumstances: 15.\(\text{Qf3}\) e4 16.\(\text{Qg5}\)
\(\text{Qxc3}\) – see the notes to White’s move 14 in the main line.) 12...
\(\text{a5}\) (After: 12...f5 13.a5 f4 14.axb6
\(\text{Qxe3}\) 15.\(\text{bxa7}\) \(\text{Qxf2}\) 16.\(\text{Qxf2}\) \(\text{Qxf2}\)
17.\(\text{Qxf2}\), White’s a7-pawn ties up his opponent’s pieces, for example:
17...\(\text{Qb6}\) 18.\(\text{Qa4}\)\(\pm\), or 17...\(\text{Qh6}\)
18.\(\text{Qd3}\) \(\text{Qd7}\) 19.\(\text{Qg2}\) \(\text{Qb6}\) 20.g5!
\(\text{Qxg5}\) 21.\(\text{Qg4}\) \(\text{Qd8}\) 22.\(\text{Qe6}\)\(\pm\) 13.\(\text{Qh1}\) f5 14.\(\text{gx5}\) \(\text{Qg5}\) 15.\(\text{exf5}\) \(\text{Qxf5}\)
16.\(\text{Qf3}\) e4 17.\(\text{Qg5}\) \(\text{Qxc3}\) (That idea
is not so effective in this situation.) 18.bxc3 and White has the advantage. Black’s knight is unstable on the b6-square and White can exploit that by combining his kingside actions with some play along the b-file.

11...f56 – Black’s idea is to deploy his knight on g7, his bishop on e7 and to push f7-f5. It is far from simple to do that, though...12.d2 g7 13.h1 e7 14.g1.

There have been several games played on that theme, but tournament practice has shown that Black’s position is without any good prospects whatsoever:

14.f6 15.a3 f7 16.d3 f8 17.f4 d7 (The line: 17...exf4 18.xf4, leaves Black with only some minimal chances to change the structure of the position.) 18.f5 g5 19.h4 h6 20.g2+ – Maksimenko – Klinova, Wijk aan Zee 2001;

14..f6 15.a3 (White obtained an overwhelming advantage surprisingly easily in the following game: 15.f3 d7 16.d3 c8 17.a3 b6 18.b4 b8 19.ab1 f8 20.f4 f6 21.f5 g5 22.g2 d8 23.h4

Pigott – Areshchenko, Cappelle la Grande 2003. I will also mention that it is not advisable for Black to continue with: 15...f8 16.d3 f5?! 17.gxf5 gxf5 18.f4; 15.h5 16.h3 h4 17.hxg4 h5 (It is more logical for Black to play here 17...h7, but White can counter that with 18.g5+, planning to bring later his rook on a1 to the kingside, for example with e1-d3, g1-g3, h1-g2 and a1-h1.) 18.f3 h8 19.g2 g8 20.d3 h7 21.h1 f5, Huzman – Sakaev, Panormo 2002, 22.f4!? exf4 23.xf4 e8 24.gxf5 gxf5 25.e11;

14.h8 15.d3 f6 (We will also consider some other moves for Black. It is not reasonable to recommend: 15..f5 16.gxf5 gxf5 17.h6 f6 18.exf5 f7 19.e4 b6 20.f4+. It is not so aesthetic for Black to try: 15..a5, Farago – Karatorossian, Budapest 2004, because White can react to that with 16.b5+, or 16.h6+, planning to push f2-f4 later, for example after b6 and d7, that is when Black’s knights will be away from the important e5-outpost. It is more reliable for Black to defend with: 15..b6 16.b3 g5. He thus ensures the f4-square for his knight, but that seems to be insufficient for him to obtain an acceptable game under the circumstances. 17.f3 g8 18.e2 a5 19.c3 d7 20.a3 f8 21.g3 g6 22.f5 f4 23.h6! White avoids the exchange on f5 and he squeezes Black’s pieces even more.
23...\text{f}8 24.\text{b}4\text{±} Lesiege – Rogers, Philadelphia 2003.) 16.a3!? (White has tested in practice the immediate: 16.f4 exf4 17.\text{xf}4 \text{d}7, Llanos – Sorin, Buenos Aires 1995 and after 18.g5, followed by 19.\text{af}1, he again obtains the advantage.) 16...\text{g}8 17.f4\text{±};

11...\text{h}4 12.\text{h}1 \text{h}8 (Black transposes to the main line, except with an extra tempo for White, as a result of Black’s maneuver \text{d}8-h4-e7, with: 12...f5 13.gxf5 gxf5 14.\text{f}3 \text{e}7 15.exf5 \text{b}6, Vybiral – Luch, Brno 2004, 16.\text{g}1. If: 12...\text{b}6 13.\text{g}1 \text{e}7, then White can play: 14.\text{d}2 f5 15.gxf5 gxf5 16.exf5 \text{xf}5 17.\text{f}3 etc. as well as: 14.a3 f5 15.gxf5 gxf5 16.\text{g}5 \text{f}6, Gyimesi – Solomonovic, Germany 2004, 17.\text{d}3 \text{h}6 18.\text{xf}6 \text{xf}6 19.b4!? , before starting with his active actions on the kingside, White wishes to reap some positional dividends on the queenside too. 19...\text{d}7 20.bxc5 \text{xc}5 21.\text{f}3 \text{xe}4 22.\text{xe}4 \text{f}4 23.\text{fd}2! – White’s doubling of rooks on the g-file is rather unpleasant for Black.) 13.\text{g}1 \text{e}7 14.a3 (It is also possible for White to play here 14.\text{d}2 and for example after: 14...\text{b}6 15.\text{g}3 f5 16.gxf5 gxf5 17.exf5 \text{xf}5 18.\text{f}3 , there arise positions similar to the main lines, but with an extra tempo for White.) 14...\text{df}6 15.b4 \text{b}6 16.\text{d}3 \text{g}8. Here, it deserved attention for White “to pack” his opponent’s pieces with: 17.\text{f}3!? f5 18.g5, depriving them of the possibility to enter the actions, before attacking on the queenside. (That idea was tried in the game Gelfand – Ivanchuk, Kramatorsk 1989: 17.a4 f5 18.g5 \text{xf}7 19.a5 \text{b}8 20.f3 h6 21.axb6 axb6 22.h4 f4 23.\text{xf}2 hxg5 24.hxg5 \text{f}6 25.\text{g}2\text{±}, but Black could have exploited that order of moves, with the idea to facilitate his defence a bit with 18...\text{fxe}4, ensuring the f5-outpost for his pieces.);

11...\text{e}7 12.\text{h}1 f5 (If 12...\text{h}8 13.\text{g}1 f5, van Duijenbode – van der Marel, Leiden 2002, then 14.gxf5 gxf5 15.exf5 \text{xb}6 16.\text{d}2 \text{xf}5 17.\text{f}3 \text{f}6 18.\text{g}5, transposing to the main line.) 13.gxf5 gxf5 14.exf5 \text{df}6 (About 14...\text{e}4, Krush – Ojeda, Buenos Aires 2003, 15.\text{c}2 \text{df}6 – see 14...\text{df}6.) 15.\text{c}2 e4 16.\text{g}1 \text{xf}5 17.\text{g}5 \text{g}6 18.\text{g}2 \text{d}7 19.\text{h}4\text{±} Zakharov – Priborsky, Prague 2005;

11...\text{h}8 12.\text{h}1 and here Black has several possibilities at his disposal:

About 12...\text{e}7 – see 11...\text{e}7;

12...\text{b}6, Krush – Kovalev, Presov 2000, 13.a4!? f5 (or 13...\text{a}5 – see 11...\text{b}6) 14.exf5! gxf5 15.a5 f4 (or 15...\text{d}7 16.gxf5) 16.axb6 \text{xe}3 17.bxa7 \text{xf}2 (or 17...\text{xf}2 18.\text{g}2\text{±}) 18.\text{d}3 and if 18...\text{b}5, then 19.\text{f}2! \text{xc}4 20.\text{fe}4! \text{xf}1+ 21.\text{xf}1;
posing to the main line, while in case of 16...h6, there might arise the following developments: 17. \( \text{\text{Ge}4 \text{\text{F}}f6 18.\text{\text{G}}g3!} \) \( \text{\text{h}h3 19.\text{\text{G}}g1 \text{\text{Wd}7} 20.\text{\text{Wd}3} \text{\text{Ef7} 21.\text{\text{Cc}e}4 \text{\text{Gg}8} 22. \text{\text{Xf}6} \text{\text{Xf}6 23.\text{\text{D}e}4 \text{\text{Ff8} 24.\text{\text{Gg}3} \text{\text{Ff}5} 25.\text{\text{Baq}1}++} \) 15.\text{\text{D}d3} \text{e4 16.\text{\text{Xe}4} \text{\text{Xe}4} 17.\text{\text{D}xe}4 \text{\text{Xf}5} 18.\text{\text{Xf}5} \text{\text{Xf}5} 19.\text{\text{Wg}4}++ \) Kelly – Sutovsky, Nottingham 2005; 12...\( \text{\text{D}f6} 13.\text{\text{Gg}1} \text{\text{Gg}8} 14.\text{\text{Wd}2} \text{f5} \) (If Black plays passively, White simply begins his queenside actions.) 15.gxf5 gxf5 16.exf5 \text{\text{Xf}5} 17.\text{\text{D}f}3 \text{\text{Gf}6} 18.\text{\text{Gg}5} \text{\text{Wd}7} 19.\text{\text{Gg}3} \text{\text{C}c}7 20.\text{\text{Ag}1} \text{\text{Gg}8} 21.\text{\text{Xc}5}++ \) Michaelsen – Hausrath, Germany 1997. 12.exf5 gxf5 13.gxf5 \( \text{\text{D}b}6 \)

In case Black’s knight goes to the kingside – 13...\( \text{\text{D}f6} \), he will have to work hard to regain his f5-pawn – 14.\( \text{\text{D}d3} \) (14.\( \text{\text{Wc}2}++ \) \( \text{\text{Wd}7} 15.\text{\text{D}h}1 – \) see 11...\( \text{\text{Wd}7} \) 14...\( \text{\text{e}4}++ \) (After: 14...\( \text{\text{Wd}7} 15.\text{\text{D}f}3 \text{\text{Wf}7} 16.\text{\text{D}h}1 \text{\text{Dh}5} 17.\text{\text{Gg}1} \text{\text{Xf}5} 18.\text{\text{Xf}5} \) \( \text{\text{Wxf}5} 19.\text{\text{Wxf}5} \text{\text{Xf}5} 20.\text{\text{D}e}4 \text{\text{Dh}8} 21.\text{\text{D}d}3 \text{\text{Dd}8} 22.\text{\text{Gg}5}++ \) White maintains some pressure, C.Hansen – Djurhuus, Reykjavik 1996.) 15.\( \text{\text{Xe}4} \text{\text{Xe}4} 16.\text{\text{Xe}4} \text{\text{Xf}5} \) (Or 16...\( \text{\text{Wd}4} 17.\text{\text{Dd}d} \text{\text{Xb}2} 18.\text{\text{Gg}2} \text{\text{Wd}6} 19.\text{\text{Bab}1}++ \) Mchedlishvili – Himdan, Dubai 2003; the move 16...\( \text{\text{Xb}2} \) has some drawbacks too, after: 17.\( \text{\text{Bb}1} \text{\text{Gg}7} 18.\text{\text{Dh}1} \text{\text{Wd}4} 19. \text{\text{C}c}2 \text{\text{Wh}3} 20.\text{\text{Gg}2} \text{\text{Dc}5} 21.\text{\text{f}4} \text{\text{Dc}7} 22.\text{\text{D}f}3++ \) Black’s queen is placed rather uncomfortably, Michaelsen – Lane, Wijk aan Zee 1995.) 17.\( \text{\text{Wd}3} \text{\text{Wd}7} 18.\text{\text{Xf}5} \text{\text{Xf}5} 19.\text{\text{D}h}1 \text{\text{Df}6} 20.\text{\text{Gg}1}++ – \) and Black’s compensation for the pawn is insufficient, Wunnik – van der Veen, Hoogeveen 1998.

14.\( \text{\text{D}f}3 \)

The move 14.\( \text{\text{D}h}1 \) is considered to be the main line, but White has serious problems after: 14...\( \text{\text{Xf}5} \) 15.\( \text{\text{Gg}1} \) (If 15.\( \text{\text{D}f}3 \), Black plays 15...\( \text{\text{e}4} \), followed by 16...\( \text{\text{Xc}3} \) and that transposes to some lines, which we analyze later.) 15...\( \text{\text{D}h}8 \) (That is the best for Black. In case of 15...\( \text{\text{e}4} \), his dark-squares become vulnerable and White can quickly activate his pieces – 16.\( \text{\text{Wd}2} \) \( \text{\text{Dd}7} 17.\text{\text{Gg}2} \text{\text{Dh}8} 18.\text{\text{Gg}5} \text{\text{Wc}8} 19.\text{\text{Dh}4}++ \) Prudnikova – Kovalevskaya, Estonia 1995. If 15...\( \text{\text{D}f6} \), then after: 16.\( \text{\text{D}f3} \) \( \text{\text{Gg}4} 17.\text{\text{Gg}5} \), Black has great problems to safeguard his king, as one of the first games played in that variation showed. It followed with: 17...\( \text{\text{Xe}3} \) 18.\( \text{fxe}3 \text{\text{e}4} \) 19.\( \text{\text{D}e}6 \) \( \text{\text{Xe}6} 20.\text{\text{Dxe}6} \text{\text{Wd}7} 21.\text{\text{D}xe}4 \text{\text{Xe}6} 22.\text{\text{D}d}3 \text{\text{Dh}8} 23.\text{\text{Gg}3}++ \) Gelfand – Romero Holmes, Wijk aan Zee 1992.) 16.\( \text{\text{D}f}3 \) \( \text{\text{e}4} ! 17.\text{\text{Gg}5} \text{\text{Xc}3} ! 18.\text{\text{bxc}3} \text{\text{Wc}7} \) and tournament practice has confirmed that Black has sufficient
counter chances. See one of the latest examples on that subject: 19.\( \text{Ng3} \) \( \text{Nf6} \) 20.\( \text{Nd2} \) \( \text{b7} \) 21.\( \text{Bag1} \) \( \text{Ng8} \) 22.\( \text{xf4} \) \( \text{e5} \) 23.\( \text{xe5} \) dxe5 24.\( \text{Wc3} \) \( \text{af8} \) 25.a4 b6 26.\( \text{d1} \) \( \text{e8} \) 27.\( \text{a5} \) \( \text{G6} \) 28.axb6 axb6 29.\( \text{c2} \) \( \text{h5} \) 30.\( \text{E3g2} \) \( \text{f4} \) 31.\( \text{G3} \) \( \text{h5=} \) Ionov – A.Kuzmin, St Petersburg 2004.

Instead of 16.\( \text{xf3} \), it is interesting for White to try 16.\( \text{d2} \), avoiding the change of the pawn-structure. White’s position is no doubt preferable, but there is nothing decisive for him in sight. There might follow: 16...\( \text{xf6} \) (It is worse for Black to play 16...\( e4 \) 17.\( \text{Gg2} \), or 16...\( \text{wh4} \) 17.b3 \( \text{f6} \) 18.\( \text{c1} \pm \) 17.\( \text{bg3} \) \( \text{e7} \) 18.\( \text{Gg2} \) \( \text{e4} \) 19.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 20.\( \text{bg1} \) \( \text{f7} \) 21.\( \text{f3} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 22.b3
(If 22.\( \text{h6} \), Black counters with: 22...\( \text{hxh6} \) 23.\( \text{whxh6} \) \( \text{f6} \).) 22...\( \text{af8} \), followed by \( \text{b6-d7} \).

14...\( \text{xf5} \) 15.\( \text{Gg5} \)

15...\( \text{we7} \)

After 15...\( \text{w7} \) (The line: 15...\( \text{xf6} \) 16.\( \text{wh1} \) \( \text{w7} \) 17.\( \text{Gg1} \), transposes to the main variation.) the general picture remains the same: 16.\( \text{wh1} \) \( \text{h8} \) 17.\( \text{Gg1} \) \( \text{f6} \) 18.\( \text{w4} \) \( \text{ae8} \) (But not 18...\( \text{g4} \), in view of: 19.\( \text{e6} \) \( \text{xe6} \) 20.dxe6

\( \text{wc6+} \) 21.\( \text{d5} \) \( \text{xf2+} \) 22.\( \text{xf2} \) \( \text{xf2} \) 23.\( \text{eg7} \) \( \text{eg7} \) 24.\( \text{g1+} \) \( \text{h8} \) 25.\( \text{g5=} \), or 21...\( \text{dxe3} \) 22.fxe3 \( \text{ae8} \) 23.\( \text{h5} \) \( \text{xe6} \) 24.\( \text{wg2} \) \( \text{h6} \) 25.\( \text{af1=} \) 19.\( \text{eg3} \) \( \text{e7} \) (In case of: 19...\( \text{d4} \) 20.\( \text{xa4} \) \( \text{xa4} \) 21.\( \text{ag1} \), White’s initiative is very powerful, for example: 21...\( \text{h6} \) 22.\( \text{d6} \) \( \text{e4} \) 23.\( \text{hxh6=} \); 21...\( \text{h6} \) 22.\( \text{xe6} \) \( \text{xe3} \) 23.\( \text{exe3} \); 21...\( \text{e7} \) 22.\( \text{d3} \) e4 23.b3 \( \text{e8} \) 24.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{h5} \) 25.\( \text{g2} \) \( \text{e5} \) 26.\( \text{g4} \); 21...\( \text{xa2} \) 22.\( \text{d3} \) e4 23.\( \text{e2} \) \( \text{e7} \) 24.\( \text{d6} \) \( \text{xe6} \) 25.\( \text{dxe6} \) 20.\( \text{ag1=} \) Sand – Stimpel, Bad Wiessee 2000.

16.\( \text{h1} \) \( \text{f6} \)

After 16...\( e4 \) (It is worse for Black to play: 16...\( \text{h6} \) 17.\( \text{ge4} \) \( \text{w4} \) 18.f3=, while: 16...\( \text{wh8} \) 17.\( \text{g1} \) e4 18.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{f6} \), transposes to the main line.) it is good for White to continue with 17.\( \text{wc2} != \) (In case of: 17.\( \text{g1} \) \( \text{xc3} \) 18.\( \text{bxc3} \) \( \text{h8} \) 19.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{f6} \) 20.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{bd7} \), we are back to positions, which we will analyze later – see 14.\( \text{h1} \) \( \text{xf5} \) 15.\( \text{f3} \) e4.) 17...\( \text{h6} \) 18.\( \text{e6} \) \( \text{xe6} \) 19.\( \text{dxe6} \) \( \text{xe6} \) 20.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xe4} \) 21.\( \text{xe4} \) \( \text{xb2} \) 22.\( \text{ad1=} \) and White regains his sacrificed pawn, maintaining the initiative.

17.\( \text{g1} \) \( \text{h8} \)

This move is more reliable than 17...\( e4 \) (In case of 17...\( \text{h6} \), White has the resource: 18.\( \text{e6} \) \( \text{xe6} \) 19.\( \text{hxh6=} \) 18.\( \text{d2} \) \( \text{h8} \) 19.\( \text{g3} \) \( \text{d7} \) (Following: 19...\( \text{g8} \) 20.\( \text{ag1} \) \( \text{ae8} \), White inflicts a surprising strike on the queenside with – 21.b4! and Black’s position crumbles: 21...\( \text{xb4} \) 22.\( \text{b5=} \), or...
21...\textit{\dd{d}7} 22.bxc5 dxc5 23.d6 \textit{\dd{f}6} 24.\textit{\dd{h}5}+- Cassidy - Manduch, corr. 1998.) 20.\textit{\dd{a}g1} \textit{\dd{g}8} 21.\textit{\dd{b}3} \textit{\dd{f}6} 22.\textit{\dd{g}4}! \textit{\dd{x}g5} 23.\textit{\dd{x}g5} \textit{\dd{x}g5} 24.\textit{\dd{e}2} \textit{\dd{x}g4} 25.\textit{\dd{x}g4} h6 26.\textit{\dd{h}3} \textit{\dd{g}7} 27.\textit{\dd{x}e4}+- Karavade - Areshchenko, Dubai 2005.

\textbf{18.\textit{\dd{d}2} \textit{\dd{g}6}}

White maintains his initiative after Black's other lines too: 18...\textit{\dd{g}8} 19.\textit{\dd{g}3} a6 20.\textit{\dd{a}g1} \textit{\dd{b}d7}, Nikolaidis - Managadze, Halkida 1997, 21.\textit{\dd{f}3} \textit{\dd{g}6} 22.\textit{\dd{e}6} \textit{\dd{e}4} 23.\textit{\dd{e}1} \textit{\dd{x}c3} 24.\textit{\dd{x}g6} \textit{\dd{x}e2} 25.\textit{\dd{x}e2} \textit{\dd{f}6} 26.\textit{\dd{h}6}±; 18...a6 19.\textit{\dd{g}3} \textit{\dd{h}6} 20.\textit{\dd{a}g1} \textit{\dd{g}8} 21.\textit{\dd{b}3} \textit{\dd{b}d7} 22.\textit{\dd{f}3} \textit{\dd{g}6} 23.\textit{\dd{h}3} \textit{\dd{x}g5} 24.\textit{\dd{x}g5} \textit{\dd{e}8} 25.\textit{\dd{e}3}± Simeonidis - Koukoufikis, Korinthis 2002.

White can play even more aggressively in that last variation; 21. \textit{\dd{d}3} e4 22.\textit{\dd{e}2} \textit{\dd{g}7} 23.\textit{\dd{f}4} \textit{\dd{d}ad8} 24.\textit{\dd{e}3} (threatening 25.b4) and Black cannot play 24...\textit{\dd{b}d7}?, due to 25.\textit{\dd{x}d6}+-.

\textit{\textbf{19.\textit{\dd{a}f1} \textit{\dd{h}5} 20.\textit{\dd{e}6} \textit{\dd{f}7}}} 21.\textit{\dd{b}3}± Kramnik - Knaak, Dortmund 1992.

\textbf{Conclusion}

\textit{Having analyzed all these variations, we can assume that the evaluation of the system (8...c6), as favourable for White has not changed. Still, I would like to clarify that the basic idea of the variation – to push pawns in front of White's king needs precise treatment. The move 11.g4 is connected with the idea of a positional bind – besides 11...f5, Black has no other options to obtain any counterplay; therefore he is obliged to force the issue. After the total exchanges on the f5-square, there arises a situation in which White's plan is quite simple. He must concentrate his forces on the kingside and he should double his rooks along the g-file. Black has a great problem with his bishop on g7 then, since it has practically no good square to go to. He lacks space too and he must worry about the possibility of White's knight penetrating to the e6-square, so in general, the situation is quite difficult for Black. It becomes clear that he should try to obtain somehow a more acceptable position – see the notes to White's move 14. Accordingly, we need to understand what to strive for and what to avoid with White, particularly if we have in mind that there are numerous possible transpositions in that system from one variation into another.}
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